Datasets:

haritzpuerto

/

the_pile_00_PhilPapers

like 0

Cuadernos Salmantinos de Filosofía Vol. 44, 2017, 71-94, ISSN: 0210-4857 71 SUÁREZ Y LA PREMOCIÓN FÍSICA SUÁREZ AND THE PHYSICAL PREMOTION DaviD torrijos castrillejo Recibido: 2/07/2017 Profesor Asociado Aceptado: 29/09/2017 Facultad de Filosofía Universidad Eclesiástica San Dámaso Madrid/España [email protected] Resumen: Este artículo se propone examinar la difícil cuestión del estatuto ontológico de la "premoción física", es decir, la moción divina del libre albedrío creado. Es una noción ideada por el dominico Báñez que recibió una fuerte crítica por parte del jesuita Suárez. Examinando algunos textos de Suárez en que describe esta premoción se advierte cómo el jesuita ha ido condicionando el debate, haciendo ver la premoción como una entidad distinta del creador y del agente libre. Se revisan también varios textos de Báñez en diálogo con un estudio reciente de Matava y se llega a la conclusión de que Báñez sigue la estela de Aristóteles y santo Tomás en lo sustancial; en consecuencia, no cree que la moción divina tenga ningún otro efecto en el mundo distinto de la acción libre del agente creado. Palabras clave: causalidad, concurso divino, determinismo, gracia, libre albedrío, teología natural. Abstract: This article intends to examine the problematic question of the ontological status of "physical premotion," that is, the divine motion of created free will. This idea was developed by the Dominican Báñez and was strongly criticised by the Jesuit Suárez. Suárez's description of physical premotion shows that he gradually conditioned the debate in a way which compelled to see the premotion as an entity different from the creator and the free agent. Several texts of Suárez are also reviewed in discussion with a recent study of Matava. Finally, the article concludes that Báñez follows the main lines of the thought of Aristotle and Aquinas; consequently, he does not believe that the divine motion has any other effect in the world than that of the free action of the created agent. Keywords: causality, divine concurrence, determinism, free will, grace, philosophy of religion. CSF 44-2007 maqueta.indd 71 21/11/17 20:30 Universidad Pontificia de Salamanca 72 DAVID TORRIJOS CASTRILLEJO Cuadernos Salmantinos de Filosofía Vol. 44, 2017, 71-94, ISSN: 0210-4857 Es bien conocido que Suárez fue uno de los principales actores en la controversia teológica conocida con el nombre de auxiliis1. Aun siendo un destacado apologeta de la postura molinista, la suavizó con un sistema más matizado que se suele denominar "congruismo". Su amplia y significativa contribución al debate merece un estudio más detallado del que ha recibido por la crítica 1 Acerca de la participación histórica de Suárez en la disputa de auxiliis y sobre esta temática en su pensamiento existe bastante literatura. Sólo citaré obras del s. XX y XXI (con excepción del libro de Schneemann, por haber sido traducido hace poco a nuestra lengua). En cuanto a la narración de los acontecimientos, conviene compensar los trabajos compuestos por los jesuitas con los documentos y su respectiva introducción aportados por el dominico Beltrán de Heredia; éste sitúa precisamente a Suárez como protagonista de la controversia y no lo deja, por cierto, en un lugar demasiado bueno. Además, mencionamos otras publicaciones de carácter más especulativo que histórico: SCHNEEMANN, Gerhard, Origen y desarrollo de la controversia entre el tomismo y el molinismo. Oviedo: Fundación Gustavo Bueno, 2015; DE SCORRAILLE, Raoul, François Suárez de la Compagnie de Jésus, tome 1. Paris: Lethielleux, 1912, 349-478; RIBÓ, A. M., "Cómo concilió Suárez la gracia eficaz con nuestro libre consentimiento". En Conmemoración del tercer centenario del eximio doctor español Francisco Suárez en la ciudad de Barcelona, 1617-1917. Barcelona: Subirana, 1923, 79-91; STEGMÜLLER, Friedrich, Zur Gnadenlehre des jungen Suarez. Freiburg im Brisgau: Herder, 1933; DUMONT, Paul, Liberté humaine et concours divin d'après Suarez. Paris: Beauchesne, 1936; ID., "Suarez, François. Dogmatique". En VACANT, Jean M.A. et al. (eds.), Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique. Vol. 14.2. Paris: Letouzey et Ané, 1941, col. 2672-2680; GARCÍA-VILLOSLADA, Ricardo, Manual de historia de la Compañía de Jesús. Madrid: Compañía Bibliográfica Española, 1940, 265-275; DALMAU, José María, "Suárez y las grandes controversias sobre la gracia". Revista Nacional de Educación, 3, 1943, 97-116; ELORDUY, Eleuterio, "Suárez en las controversias sobre la gracia". Archivo teológico granadino, 11, 1948, 117-192; SAGÜÉS, José, "Suárez ante la ciencia media". Estudios Eclesiásticos, 22, 1948, 265-310; MULLANEY, Thomas U., Suarez on Human Freedom. Baltimore: The Carroll Press, 1950; BELTRÁN DE HEREDIA, Vicente, Domingo Báñez y las controversias sobre la gracia: Textos y documentos. Madrid: CSIC, 1968, 11-99; CRAIG, William L., The Problem of Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingents from Aristotle to Suarez. Leiden: Brill, 1988, 207-233; FERNÁNDEZ BURILLO, Santiago, "Francisco Suárez: teólogo y filósofo del humanismo renacentista. II. El punto de partida: naturaleza y gracia en la polémica de auxiliis". Espíritu, 44, 1995, 33-42, 169-181; GARCÍA DE LA SIENRA, Adolfo, "El libre albedrío y la gracia: Molina, Suárez y la Reforma". En Francisco Suárez (1548-1617), Tradição e Modernidade. Lisboa: Edições Colibri, 1999, 265-278; LÓPEZ MOLINA, Antonio M., "Causalidad y libertad en Suárez y en la polémica De auxiliis". Logos, 34, 2001, 67-100; FREDDOSO, Alfred J., "Suarez on God's Causal Involvement in Sinful Acts". En KREMER, Elmar J., LATZER, Michael J. (eds.), The Problem of Evil in Early Modern Philosophy. Toronto: University of Toronto, 2001, 10-34; GARCÍA DE LA SIENRA, Adolfo, "Causalidad divina y libertad humana en Suárez". Tópicos, 27, 2004, 9-23; BAC, J. Martin, Perfect Will Theology. Divine Agency in Reformed Scholasticism as Against Suárez, Episcopius, Descartes, and Spinoza. Leiden: Brill, 2010, 71-99; GARCÍA CUADRADO, José Ángel, "Determinismo y libertad: sobre la existencia del libre arbitrio en F. Suárez y D. Báñez". Recherches philosophiques, 6, 2010, 161-183; PENNER, Sydney, "Free and Rational: Suárez on the Will". Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 95, 2013, 1-35; ID., "Free Will". En LAGERLUND, Henrik, HILL, Benjamin (eds.), Routledge Companion to Sixteenth Century Philosophy. New York/London: Routledge, 2017, 509-514. CSF 44-2007 maqueta.indd 72 21/11/17 20:30 Universidad Pontificia de Salamanca SUÁREZ Y LA PREMOCIÓN FÍSICA 73 Cuadernos Salmantinos de Filosofía Vol. 44, 2017, 71-94, ISSN: 0210-4857 contemporánea, la cual se ha ocupado preferentemente de Molina2. Descuidar este aspecto del pensamiento de Suárez no puede tener buenas consecuencias para su correcta comprensión si es verdadera la audaz afirmación de Fernández Burillo, quien no duda en describir el conjunto del suarismo como "la filosofía del molinismo"3. Las Disputaciones metafísicas van siendo cada vez mejor conocidas y una de ellas (la vigesimosegunda) se ocupa, en buena medida, de estas cuestiones; pero sus principales aportaciones se encuentran en otros trabajos. En este artículo tendré especialmente presente un estudio reciente compuesto por Matava, que ha tratado cuidadosamente la controversia desde el punto de vista del dominico Báñez –el líder de la facción contraria a los jesuitas–. Este libro ha dedicado también algunas páginas a Suárez, pero se ha centrado en las Disputaciones4. Sin duda, fueron compuestas en pleno apogeo de la polémica; no obstante, podría ser de interés completar el panorama con otros tratados posteriores, donde retoma el mismo problema atendiendo a nuevas argumentaciones de sus oponentes. Por este motivo, en las páginas que siguen me interesaré también por obras como los Opúsculos teológicos a los que Báñez mismo parece tener como principal oponente en su estudio más maduro al respecto de la "premoción física"5. Los 2 Cfr. CRAIG, The Problem of Divine Foreknowledge, 169-206; FREDDOSO, Alfred J., "Introduction". En MOLINA, Luis de, On Divine Foreknowledge (Part IV of the Concordia). Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 1988, 1-81; FLINT, Thomas, Divine Providence. The Molinist Account. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1998; DEKKER, Eef, Middle Knowledge. Leuven: Peeters, 2000; PERSZYK, Ken (ed.), Molinism: The Contemporary Debate. New York: Oxford UP, 2011; KAUFMANN, Matthias, AICHELE, Alexander (eds.), A Companion to Luis de Molina. Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2014. 3 FERNÁNDEZ BURILLO, "Francisco Suárez. II", 38; cf. 174. Pese a esto, dos recientes publicaciones en lengua inglesa sobre Suárez, aparecidas en editoriales de reconocido prestigio, así como la voz de la influyente enciclopedia online de Stanford, omiten atender los problemas teóricos implicados en la aportación de Suárez a la controversia de auxiliis: HILL, Benjamin & LAGERLUND, Henrik (eds.), The Philosophy of Francisco Suárez. Oxford/New York: Oxford UP, 2012; SALAS, Victor M. & FASTIGGI, Robert L. (eds.), A Companion to Francisco Suárez. Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2014; SHIELDS, Christopher & SCHWARTZ, Daniel, "Francisco Suárez". En: ZALTA, Edward N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. [en línea]. Stanford: Stanford University, 1999 (actualización 21 dic. 2016).<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/suarez/>. [Consulta: 30 jun. 2017]. ISSN: 1095-5054. 4 Cfr. MATAVA, Robert J., Divine Causality and Human Free Choice. Domingo Báñez, Physical Premotion and the Controversy De Auxiliis revisited. Boston: Brill, 2016, 306-321. 5 Me refiero a BÁÑEZ, Domingo, "Tractatus de vera et legitima concordia liberi arbitrii creati cum auxiliis gratiae Dei efficaciter moventis humanam voluntatem". En: ID., Comentarios inéditos a la Prima secundae de santo Tomás. BELTRÁN DE HEREDIA, Vicente (ed.). Vol. 3. Madrid: CSIC, 1948, 351-420. Matava hace amplio uso de esta obra. CSF 44-2007 maqueta.indd 73 21/11/17 20:30 Universidad Pontificia de Salamanca 74 DAVID TORRIJOS CASTRILLEJO Cuadernos Salmantinos de Filosofía Vol. 44, 2017, 71-94, ISSN: 0210-4857 Opúsculos fueron publicados en 1599 y supusieron su aportación más cumplida a esta problemática6. Sin embargo, mi objetivo aquí no es exponer el pensamiento de Suárez sobre la polémica de auxiliis –que difícilmente se podría condensar en un grueso volumen–, ni siquiera aclarar todo lo que piensa respecto de la premoción física. Querría más bien hacer un recorrido a través de Suárez con el propósito de comprender un poco mejor el estatuto ontológico de la premoción física tal como lo sostuvo Báñez, a quien suele atribuirse esa presunta innovación teológica. 1. MOLINISMO Y BAÑECIANISMO Comencemos por recordar las líneas principales del debate. La dificultad que se pretende explicar reside en la armonización de la omnipotencia divina con la libre voluntad del hombre. Sin embargo, este problema no es sólo teológico, es decir, no hace referencia tan sólo a la influencia de la gracia sobre la voluntad humana, porque también se plantea el mismo dilema en el nivel de la naturaleza: de acuerdo con la doctrina católica común a todos los participantes en la controversia, la gracia habitual significa la presencia de cierta perfección creada por Dios en el ser humano con el objeto de sanar su pecado y elevar su naturaleza, mientras que la gracia actual influye concretamente sobre la actuación del hombre; no obstante, en todo caso, Dios es el creador del hombre mismo y, por consiguiente, su causa primera también en el orden natural. Se trata de un Dios omnipotente de quien dependen todas las cosas y esto incluye hasta el último de los pensamientos y actos humanos. Además, es omnisciente y conoce el resultado de todas sus deliberaciones. La dificultad surge precisamente ante la acción humana libre, cuya libertad parecería verse vulnerada ante este omnímodo poder divino. Para salvar este escollo, Molina se aparta de la doctrina tradicional escolástica introduciendo un nuevo tipo de ciencia en la mente de Dios,diverso de la ciencia de visión y de la ciencia de simple inteligencia. Esta distinción trataba de distinguir entre lo que Dios sabía de la creación porque ha sucedido, está sucediendo o sucederá (ciencia de visión) y aquello que conocía sencillamente porque es inteligible, aunque nunca vaya a suceder (ciencia de simple inteligencia). A caballo entre ambas, introduce Molina la "ciencia media", que pretende explicar el conocimiento que Dios tendría de los futuros contingentes. Gracias a la ciencia media, Dios conocería todas las posibilidades con que podría obrar el libre arbitrio creado en los 6 Cfr. PRIETO LÓPEZ, Leopoldo, Suárez y el destino de la metafísica: De Avicena a Heidegger. Madrid: BAC, 2013, 66. CSF 44-2007 maqueta.indd 74 21/11/17 20:30 Universidad Pontificia de Salamanca SUÁREZ Y LA PREMOCIÓN FÍSICA 75 Cuadernos Salmantinos de Filosofía Vol. 44, 2017, 71-94, ISSN: 0210-4857 infinitos estados de cosas y variadas situaciones que pudieran presentarse. Estos futuros son denominados "futuros condicionados". Ahora bien, Dios no sólo sabe qué va a suceder, sino que es además el autor último de todas las cosas. ¿Cómo puede ser creador de todos los acontecimientos por ínfimos que sean y, a la vez, que éstos sucedan libremente cuando se deban a un libre arbitrio creado? Según Molina, esto es posible porque Dios concurre en la acción con la causa creada. Aunque el ser de la criatura libre dependa de Dios, a la hora de actuar, Dios interviene en el acto voluntario creado mediante un "concurso general" que no produce todo el resultado de la acción, puesto que también el hombre es responsable parcial de cada acto deliberado, además de Dios –el cual, es también concausa parcial de ese mismo acto–. El punto de vista de Suárez es más moderado que el de Molina. Según Suárez, la tesis de la "ciencia media" es probable y, como ha sintetizado perfectamente Fernández Burillo, su planteamiento presupone "un concepto filosófico de naturaleza, como sujeto apto de suyo para obrar, sin ser movido por otro, sino con sólo ciertos requisitos previos dados"7. Por ese motivo, cree que el concurso divino es el modo más acertado de comprender la influencia de Dios en los actos deliberados, pero –a diferencia de Molina– se niega a considerar a Dios causa meramente parcial de los actos humanos; por el contrario, cree que, al concurrir en cada uno de los actos voluntarios, se convierte en causa total de ellos, igual que el agente creado, el cual estaría, a su vez, subordinado a Dios. Este sistema, que defendieron Suárez y Belarmino, recibe el nombre de "congruismo" porque, de acuerdo con la teoría de la "ciencia media", Dios prevé cómo el hombre actuará en cada caso, de modo que le concede la gracia adaptada a la complexión de cada sujeto, en el momento oportuno en que, de acuerdo con la previsión divina, hará buen uso de ella. Ahora bien, apartándose nuevamente de Molina, el congruismo no sostiene que la predestinación divina respecto de cada individuo incluya la previsión de los méritos futuros; por el contrario, para salvaguardar, con la Escritura y la Tradición, la total libertad de Dios al predestinar a cada uno, afirma que la predestinación es anterior a los méritos. La acción humana meritoria se realiza porque Dios da la gracia "congrua" en el instante propicio a aquella persona que ha predestinado y sabe que hará buen uso de la gracia en ese momento, aunque ésta no determine al ser humano a actuar de tal o cual manera. Por el contrario, el dominico Domingo Báñez fue la gran figura opuesta al molinismo y, por ello, también a Suárez y Belarmino. Báñez no pretendía sostener ninguna doctrina nueva, sino tan sólo defender las tesis de santo Tomás de Aquino, que habrían sido contradichas por el molinismo. El molinismo, en cambio, 7 FERNÁNDEZ BURILLO, "Francisco Suárez. II", 37. CSF 44-2007 maqueta.indd 75 21/11/17 20:30 Universidad Pontificia de Salamanca 76 DAVID TORRIJOS CASTRILLEJO Cuadernos Salmantinos de Filosofía Vol. 44, 2017, 71-94, ISSN: 0210-4857 sería a sus ojos sospechoso de "semipelagianismo". Para Báñez, la ciencia media es un imposible, pues las acciones humanas efectivas caen bajo la ciencia de visión y, además, forman parte de los entes previstos por la providencia. Por tanto, el plan divino ordena que ciertos actos sucedan y lo hagan de modo libre. Para eso, ha dispuesto el libre albedrío en la criatura racional. Ahora bien, la voluntad, en cuanto criatura, no sólo es creada y conservada por Dios, sino también es movida por Él, pues es el primer motor de todo cambio. Eso significa que, además de la especial moción divina en el hombre que se produce por la gracia, Dios mueve siempre la voluntad para que ésta actúe. Esta moción, así como la moción especial de la gracia, reciben el nombre de "premoción física". Este nombre subraya la anterioridad causal –no temporal– de Dios sobre la causa libre. Por lo demás, Báñez insiste en la diferencia esencial entre la gracia eficaz y la gracia suficiente, pues sería impensable que, queriendo Dios que un hombre realizase una obra meritoria determinada en un momento y una circunstancia precisa, y para ello le diese la gracia, ésta no fuese eficaz y no moviese a ese hombre a actuar. La gracia no podría quedarse en "suficiente" sólo porque el libre albedrío decidiese no hacer uso de ella, puesto que incluso tal decisión es fruto de la gracia. La última tesis que Báñez defiende es la total libertad divina al predestinar al hombre, que es, por supuesto, anterior a la previsión de los méritos. En consecuencia, podemos advertir fácilmente que ambas posturas teológicas intentan resolver el presunto conflicto entre el poder de Dios y el poder del hombre en la acción deliberada: mientras que los jesuitas daban más preponderancia a la libertad humana, los dominicos preferían insistir en el poder divino irresistible; mientras que el molinismo era sospechoso de semipelagianismo a los ojos de sus oponentes, los dominicos eran acusados de luteranos y calvinistas por los jesuitas, que veían en su doctrina la supresión del libre albedrío creado, doctrina definida poco antes en Trento (DH 1554). A continuación, me voy a centrar en la crítica de Suárez a la noción de "premoción física", pues sospecho que el debate que el jesuita suscitó entonces ha orientado la interpretación posterior de la tesis de Báñez. El problema principal de esta premoción es su estatuto ontológico, como ha reconocido Matava8. Ciertamente, son escasos los pasajes donde Báñez proporciona una aclaración, de modo que su afirmación de la existencia de la premoción como algo realmente distinto de la creación y la conservación divina, ha llevado a Matava a describir la premoción física como una entidad intermedia entre Dios y la criatura que predeterminaría a ésta para sus acciones. Sin embargo, Matava no logra ofrecer ningún texto de Báñez donde la premoción sea descrita como una entidad de algún tipo 8 Cfr. MATAVA, Divine Causality and Human Free Choice, 60. CSF 44-2007 maqueta.indd 76 21/11/17 20:30 Universidad Pontificia de Salamanca SUÁREZ Y LA PREMOCIÓN FÍSICA 77 Cuadernos Salmantinos de Filosofía Vol. 44, 2017, 71-94, ISSN: 0210-4857 (cualidad, hábito, acto...) distinta de Dios y de la criatura que actúa. Por eso ha de remitirse a la recepción de la premoción física entre otros tomistas9. Sin embargo, cuando nos fijemos en la crítica de Suárez a la tesis "bañeciana", veremos enseguida que es él quien tiende a convertir la premoción física en una "cualidad", pese a la negativa de Báñez a conceder este punto. Pero, comencemos por consultar uno de los primeros escritos de Suárez sobre la controversia de auxiliis, una carta de 1594 en la que ya admitía que no todos sus oponentes hacían de la "premoción física" un tertium quid distinto de la acción de Dios y la acción de la criatura: Los P.P. Dominicos enseñan que Dios determina físicamente la voluntad nuestra con la suya eficaz, y de tal manera preveniente, que ultra de los auxilios excitantes, inspiraciones, aprehensiones, etc., pone en nuestra voluntad una determinación física ad unum, con la cual no puede querer sino aquello a que la determinan, y sin la cual no puede querer nada. Y esta determinación dicen unos dellos que es una cualidad distincta del acto, que llaman moción de suyo eficaz physice: otros dicen que es el mismo acto de nuestra voluntad, ut est prior in nobis a solo Deo eiusque voluntate efficaci, quam sit a nobis10. Aunque no sea fácil determinar a quiénes se refiere con esta distinción, sí es claro que no podía identificar sin más a todos sus oponentes con esa concepción de la premoción física que Matava atribuye también a Báñez. Ahora bien, si la premoción física pudiese ser entendida como "el mismo acto de nuestra voluntad" en cuanto efecto de la acción divina que posee prioridad respecto de la acción humana, entonces estaríamos plenamente dentro de la concepción de santo Tomás de Aquino, sin que Báñez hubiera añadido nada a éste. En efecto, Tomás explica con amplitud que Dios es causante de todos los acontecimientos, no sólo como conservador de las criaturas, sino como primer moviente inmóvil y gobernante del mundo. Ahora bien, gobierna cada cosa de acuerdo con su forma de ser, de modo que unos acontecimientos sucedan de modo necesario, otros de modo contingente y algunos de modo libre. En último término, porque la voluntad benevolente de Dios quiere que haya tal variedad en el mundo y que cada cosa se comporte de acuerdo con su naturaleza11. Aunque ha puesto causas próximas 9 Cfr. ibid., 71-72. Aunque cite, entre otros, a Álvarez, no deja de advertir que éste niega expresamente que la premoción sea una "cualidad": cfr. ibid., 51, nota 41. 10 Cit. por DE SCORRAILLE, François Suárez de la Compagnie de Jésus, 385; trad. española: El P. Francisco Suárez, de la Compañía de Jesús, vol. 1. Barcelona: Subirana, 1917, 364. La carta se conserva en el Fondo Antiguo de la Biblioteca de la Universidad de Granada: cfr. ID., François Suárez de la Compagnie de Jésus, 388, nota 1. 11 Me he ocupado de la concepción de santo Tomás sobre el destino y la providencia en TORRIJOS-CASTRILLEJO, David, "La providence chez Saint-Thomas d'Aquin comme CSF 44-2007 maqueta.indd 77 21/11/17 20:30 Universidad Pontificia de Salamanca 78 DAVID TORRIJOS CASTRILLEJO Cuadernos Salmantinos de Filosofía Vol. 44, 2017, 71-94, ISSN: 0210-4857 para cada uno de estos efectos, él permanece como primer moviente de sus acciones. Pero después volveremos sobre santo Tomás de Aquino. 2. LA PREMOCIÓN ENTENDIDA POR SUÁREZ COMO CUALIDAD El estudio de la crítica de Suárez a la noción de premoción física merecería una atención pormenorizada que no podemos dedicarle aquí. Nuestro propósito en estas páginas es tan sólo hacer un primer acercamiento que muestre cómo Suárez prefiere primero dar una interpretación de la premoción menos matizada y más unilateral que la ofrecida en el fragmento de su correspondencia que acabamos de considerar; posteriormente, ofrecerá una visión más completa, aunque acabe cayendo en un reduccionismo semejante. En efecto, la línea general de su presentación en las Disputaciones metafísicas identifica la moción divina con una cualidad, pues cree que sólo en ese predicamento podría caer ese tipo de intervención divina en la criatura libre. En cambio, en los Opuscula expondrá de un modo más exacto la postura de sus oponentes, pero al final la simplificará en su propio beneficio. En primer lugar, veamos cómo alude a la premoción en las Disputaciones metafísicas (1597), donde identifica ya la premoción con una cualidad, alegando que no es posible entender ésta de otro modo: Así, pues, esta alteración previa suele llamarse excitación de la virtud en sentido metafórico; pero, en realidad, es, o bien un complemento de la virtud mediante una cualidad añadida, o bien una aplicación o disposición del agente para que pueda emitir por sí mismo algún vapor o exhalación mediante la cual obra (como cuando la cosa olorosa se enrarece por calentamiento, puede exhalar más fácilmente el olor, y así en otros casos). Mas la excitación de la causa primera no puede ser semejante a esta excitación natural por alteración previa, ya que ni siempre es necesario el complemento de la virtud en la causa segunda, como se ha demostrado, ni tampoco una disposición material12. compréhension de la totalité". En: BRUNIER-COULIN, Claude (ed.), Institutions et destitutions de la Totalité. Explorations de l'oeuvre de Christian Godin.Paris: Orizons, 2016, 293-318. 12 "Haec ergo alteratio praevia solet dici excitatio virtutis per metaphoram; re tamen vera est aut complementum virtutis per qualitatem additam aut applicatio vel dispositio agentis ut ex se emittere possit vaporem vel exhalationem aliquam qua mediante agit, ut dum res odorifera per calefactionem rarefit, facilius potest exhalare odorem, et sic de aliis. Excitatio autem causae primae non potest esse similis huic naturali per alterationem praeviam, quia nec complementum virtutis est semper necessarium in causa secunda, ut ostensum est, neque etiam dispositio aliqua materialis"(Disputationes Metaphysicae, XXII, 2, n. 27; trad. española y texto latino: SUÁREZ, Francisco, Disputaciones metafísicas. Vol. 3. Madrid: Gredos, 1961, 632; modifico la puntuación y el subrayado es mío). CSF 44-2007 maqueta.indd 78 21/11/17 20:30 Universidad Pontificia de Salamanca SUÁREZ Y LA PREMOCIÓN FÍSICA 79 Cuadernos Salmantinos de Filosofía Vol. 44, 2017, 71-94, ISSN: 0210-4857 Igualmente, así se expresa en un pasaje en que está suponiendo que no es preciso admitir otra influencia de Dios sobre el libre albedrío sino la conservación creadora: [...] ¿qué otra aplicación [de la causa primera a las causas segundas] puede darse? Porque si es eficiencia real, será movimiento o mutación real de la causa segunda. Entonces, ¿qué término tiene? No local, ni de otro género fuera de la cualidad, como parece evidente. Tampoco puede ser una cualidad; pues, si esa cualidad se da como virtud activa, ya no es sólo una condición, sino un principio esencial de acción, y se repiten las razones aducidas anteriormente. Y si se da para que no obre nada, es improcedente para obrar y no es posible dar razón de por qué se le llama condición necesaria13. Nótese que Suárez ya ha dirimido la dualidad de posturas entre los tomistas reduciéndolas a una sola y, así, vemos aquí cómo llega a ignorar deliberadamente que estos teólogos hubieran sostenido que el efecto de la moción divina se identificase con el acto mismo de la voluntad creada –como empero había dicho en aquella misiva–. Excluye esta posibilidad, no en sus objeciones personales a la postura "bañeciana", sino en la exposición misma de ésta: [...] mas esta moción no puede consistir en la acción misma de la causa segunda, [1] no sólo porque la moción se encuentra en la cosa que es movida, mientras que la acción transeúnte no se encuentra en el agente por el que es realizada, [2] sino también porque esta moción antecede a la acción, al menos en causalidad, ya que los agentes segundos son movidos precisamente para obrar, porque no pueden obrar si no son movidos14. La primera razón resulta improcedente porque la acción de la que se trata es inmanente –la intelección, la volición, etc.– y, por tanto, no puede sino encontrarse en el agente creado. Luego la moción debería consistir en la acción misma de la causa segunda que, al ser inmanente en este caso, reside en la causa segunda. La 13 "At vero praeter has, quaenam alia esse posset applicatio? Nam si est realis efficientia, erit realis motus vel mutatio causae secundae. Quem ergo terminum habet? Non localem, nec alterius generis extra qualitatem, ut per se notum videtur. Neque etiam esse potest qualitas aliqua; nam, si illa qualitas datur ut virtus agendi, iam non est conditio tantum, sed principium per se actionis, et redeunt rationes superius factae. Si vero datur ut nihil agat, impertinens est ad agendum, nec reddi potest ratio cur dicatur conditio necessaria" (Disputationes Metaphysicae, XXII, 2, n. 23; trad. española, 630; el subrayado es mío). 14 "[...] haec autem motio non potest consistere in ipsa actione causae secundae, tum quia motio est in re quae movetur, actio vero transiens non est in agente a quo fit, tum etiam quia haec motio antecedit actionem saltem causalitate, quia ad hoc moventur agentia secunda ut agant, eo quod non possunt agere nisi mota" (Disputationes Metaphysicae, XXII, 2, n. 7; trad. española, 620). CSF 44-2007 maqueta.indd 79 21/11/17 20:30 Universidad Pontificia de Salamanca 80 DAVID TORRIJOS CASTRILLEJO Cuadernos Salmantinos de Filosofía Vol. 44, 2017, 71-94, ISSN: 0210-4857 segunda razón parece desconocer lo que se quiere decir: la moción es antecedente en el agente pero coincide con el efecto en lo movido. Veamos ahora cómo describe la premoción en los Opuscula (1599). Allí se nos explica que la tesis de la premoción física suele ser presentada como si fuera una sola, cuando en realidad existen dos versiones diferentes de ella: Primero, [la causa primera mueve o determina la segunda] mediante una auténtica acción sobre ella, imprimiendo en ella algo por lo cual quede determinada formalmente para realizar tal acción, como la piedra es determinada por el ímpetu impreso en ella para moverse hacia arriba. Segundo, tan sólo mediante una moción extrínseca cuasi efectiva, es decir, no por la impresión de cierta cosa anterior, sino únicamente por un acto antecedente y eficaz de la voluntad divina, por el cual quiere que la causa segunda o la voluntad humana actúe, de modo que, cuando se da esta volición de Dios, enseguida se sigue la acción de la causa segunda y ello no por cierta cosa previa impresa en ella, sino por una subordinación natural y cierta simpatía entre estas causas15. Mientras que la primera posición supondría una "moción" intrínseca, es decir, cierta "entidad" o "cualidad"16, la segunda sería una "moción extrínseca". Esta segunda postura es ejemplificada con una serie de causas creadas: el brazo es movido por la voluntad, aunque es el brazo quien posee en sí el poder de moverse a sí mismo, pues la potencia locomotriz en cuanto tal está sita en el brazo, no en la voluntad. Ni tampoco la voluntad ha de comunicar ninguna perfección al brazo para que mueva, sino que el poder que requiere para ello le pertenece de suyo. Eso sí, hay una subordinación de un agente a otro agente: así, debe haber una sujeción mucho mayor de las causas segundas a la causa absolutamente primera. Ahora bien, según las palabras de Suárez, sus oponentes presentarían la premoción física tan sólo de acuerdo con la primera interpretación: Algunos doctores que afirman que es preciso que haya una premoción de la causa primera sobre la segunda y sus potencias para que la causa segunda actúe, aunque no distinguen ambos modos suficientemente, se han referido a esta moción y predeterminación de acuerdo con el primero de éstos. No excluyen el segundo modo, 15 "Primo, per veram actionem in ipsam, imprimendo ei aliquid quo formaliter determinetur ad talem actionem; sicut lapis per impressum impetum ad motum sursum determinatur. Secundo, per solam extrinsecam motionem quasi effectivam, id est, non per impressionem alicujus rei praeviae, sed solum per antecedentem actum efficacem voluntatis divinae, quo vult causam secundam aut voluntatem humanam agere, ad quam Dei volitionem statim sequitur actio causae secundae, non propter rem aliquam praeviam ei impressam, sed propter naturalem subordinationem, et quasi sympathiam harum causarum" (Opuscula, I, 1, cap. 5, n. 3, ed. Vivès, 22). 16 "Illa namque qualitas, vel motio aut entitas, aut quovis alio nomine appelletur" (Opuscula, I, 1, cap. 5, n. 4, ed. Vivès, 23); "[...] illa qualitas seu entitas" (Opuscula, I, 1, cap. 7, n. 5, ed. Vivès, 34; cfr. nn. 6.7). CSF 44-2007 maqueta.indd 80 21/11/17 20:30 Universidad Pontificia de Salamanca SUÁREZ Y LA PREMOCIÓN FÍSICA 81 Cuadernos Salmantinos de Filosofía Vol. 44, 2017, 71-94, ISSN: 0210-4857 sino que, además de él, exigen que haya en la causa segunda cierta cosa impresa inherente en ella17. Estas palabras publicadas en imprenta, que contradicen de modo flagrante su carta manuscrita de unos años antes, no dejan de entrañar un contrasentido: en efecto, si esos doctores presentan la doctrina de la premoción exigiendo siempre que haya algún tipo de perfección real distinta de la criatura y del creador que inhiera en ella, entonces sí estarían excluyendo implícitamente la segunda interpretación, pues ésta se caracterizaría –según Suárez mismo– porque basta sólo con la moción divina extrínseca sin que haya nada añadido a la criatura para obrar. En todo caso, la presentación de Suárez acusa a sus oponentes de subrayar la preponderancia de la causa primera sobre la segunda, de manera que acabarían negando la suficiencia de la causa segunda para obrar cuando falta la acción de la causa primera, como si esta acción fuese cierta perfección real añadida, al modo de una causa meramente instrumental. La conclusión de este razonamiento es que el acto de la causa segunda estaría determinado necesariamente con una "necesidad hipotética", es decir, bajo el supuesto de que ha sido premovida por Dios para realizar cierto acto, la voluntad lo realizará necesariamente. Aquí Suárez parece soslayar, como suele ser corriente entre los oponentes de la premoción, que tal necesidad es meramente "lógica", pero no "ontológica", es decir: es necesario que la criatura actúe como Dios ha dispuesto pero eso no quiere decir que lo haga de modo necesario –desde el punto de vista ontológico–, sino ora contingente ora libremente18. Ahora bien, si la premoción física fuese una determinación previa del agente libre, es decir, algún tipo de entidad o perfección –como una cualidad–, entonces la criatura sí estaría intrínsecamente determinada por Dios. Por eso es tan importante para el propósito de Suárez presentar de ese modo la tesis "bañeciana". Así puede afirmar a continuación que únicamente Dios 17 "Doctores ergo nonnulli, qui affirmant ad actionem causae secundae necessariam esse praemotionem causae primae in secundam, et in virtutem ejus, licet non satis hos modos distinguant, priori tamen modo de hac motione et praedeterminatione locuti sunt. Non quod posteriorem excludant, sed quod, ultra illum, etiam rem aliquam impressam ipsi causae secundae, eique inhaerentem requirant" (Opuscula, I, 1, cap. 5, n. 4, ed. Vivès, 23). 18 Cfr. TORRIJOS-CASTRILLEJO, "La providence chez Saint-Thomas d'Aquin", 305. Véase una clara exposición de esta doctrina de raíz aristotélica –ampliamente conocida en el Medioevo– en BÁÑEZ, Domingo, "Réplica del padre Báñez al memorial difundido por el padre Suárez 'En defensa de la Compañía cerca del libre albedrío'", n. 10. En BELTRÁN DE HEREDIA, Domingo Báñez y las controversias sobre la gracia, 448. Ahí Báñez lamenta que haya "llegado a tanto la ignorancia de la verdadera definición del libre albedrío, que algunos padres de la Compañía se ríen de nosotros cuando hacemos esta distinción, tan antigua en la escuela de teulogía, de sensu composito y sensu diviso". CSF 44-2007 maqueta.indd 81 21/11/17 20:30 Universidad Pontificia de Salamanca 82 DAVID TORRIJOS CASTRILLEJO Cuadernos Salmantinos de Filosofía Vol. 44, 2017, 71-94, ISSN: 0210-4857 decidiría si el agente creado actúa o no y cómo lo hace19. En resumen, Dios usaría las facultades de la criatura anulando su libertad en la práctica. Por fin, encontramos una exposición semejante en otro escrito, su última contribución a esta polémica: el Tratado sobre la verdadera comprensión del auxilio eficaz y de su concordia, el cual fue compuesto en los primeros años del siglo XVII20. Allí, como en los Opuscula, distingue de nuevo dos maneras de comprender la premoción física: primero, como cierta perfección "a modo de acto primero", es decir, algún tipo de "hábito, cualidad o alguna entidad transeúnte"; segundo, como algún tipo de "acto segundo", es decir, un acto vital, una operación actual21. Según el teólogo jesuita, si fuera algo añadido de acuerdo con el primer modo, no sería posible que el libre albedrío quedase determinado del todo. En cambio, si consistiera en una operación vital como tal, no sería una verdadera obra de la criatura, porque sería producida exclusivamente por Dios. De modo similar se expresa también, en disputa con los seguidores de Báñez, en su amplio tratado Sobre la gracia de Dios22, publicado entre 1619 y 165123. 3. EL RECHAZO DE BÁÑEZ DE LA INTERPRETACIÓN SUARISTA DE LA PREMOCIÓN La descripción de Suárez de la premoción física parece corroborar la interpretación que haría de ella un tertium quid distinto del creador y de la criatura. Tiene en su favor que, con el paso del tiempo, acabó siendo generalmente comprendida de esa manera incluso entre sus defensores24. Sin embargo, es también significativo que no encontremos una declaración expresa de esta 19 "Quo etiam fit ut, licet actus voluntatis sit effective a voluntate, tamen determinatio ejus non sit active ab illa, sed a Deo tantum; in voluntate autem fiat passive, quia in hac praevia actione solus Deus est agens, ut plane supponitur" (Opuscula, I, 1, cap. 5, n. 4, ed. Vivès, 23). 20 Para la datación: cfr. PRIETO LÓPEZ, Suárez y el destino de la metafísica, 68. 21 "Quod breviter declaro, quia illa determinatio vel est aliquid in voluntate nostra per modum actus primi, non vitalis, sive sit habitus, sive qualitas aut entitas transiens, vel est aliquid per modum actus secundi et vitalis" (Tractatus de vera intelligentia auxilii efficacis, ejusque concordia, cap. 3, ed. Vivès, 319). 22 Cfr. v. gr. De gratia, III, cap. 32, ed. Vivès, 140-143. 23 Para la datación: cfr. DALMAU, "Suárez y las grandes controversias sobre la gracia", 97. 24 Invocando autoridades como Juan de santo Tomás o Zigliara, afirma Garrigou Lagrange: "Cette motion [...] est réellement distincte et de l'action incréé de Dieu dont elle dépend, et de l'acte [...] auquel elle est ordonnée [...]. Il ne faut donc pas confondre la motion divine passivement reçue dans la cause seconde, ni avec la motion active qui est Dieu même, ni avec l'opération produite par la cause seconde" (GARRIGOU LAGRANGE, Réginald, "Prémotion". En VACANT, Jean M. A. et al. [Eds.], Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique. Vol. 13. Paris: Letouzey et Ané, 1936, col. 39-40). CSF 44-2007 maqueta.indd 82 21/11/17 20:30 Universidad Pontificia de Salamanca SUÁREZ Y LA PREMOCIÓN FÍSICA 83 Cuadernos Salmantinos de Filosofía Vol. 44, 2017, 71-94, ISSN: 0210-4857 doctrina en las obras principales que los dominicos aportaron inicialmente a la controversia. No la he podido hallar en la Apología que presentaron en 1592 en defensa de las tesis con las que habían impugnado la Concordia de Molina25. De hecho, ni tan siquiera aparece ahí el término qualitas y tampoco se usa demasiado la expresión praemotio ni el verbo praemovere, los cuales se reservan sobre todo para los efectos de la gracia. La formulación praemotio physica en cuanto tal está del todo ausente. Igual sucede en otras obras de Báñez. Es más, incluso Báñez nos refiere, con cierta exasperación, que el apelativo physica lo introdujeron los jesuitas para presentarse ellos mismos como defensores de una premoción meramente "moral"26. En el escrito de Báñez más maduro sobre esta temática, el Tractatus (1600)27, se habla de praemotio y de praemovere con más soltura, empleando esta terminología indistintamente para hablar acerca de la influencia de Dios sobre el libre albedrío tanto en el orden de la naturaleza como en el orden de la gracia. Sin embargo, en esta obra se nos ofrece una protesta de Báñez contra la interpretación de Suárez sobre la premoción, a quien consideraba el principal defensor del molinismo28. En otros pasajes del Tractatus, Báñez cita 25 Cfr. "Apologia fratrum praedicatorum adversus quasdam assertiones cuiusdam doctoris Ludovici Molinae nuncupati". En BELTRÁN DE HEREDIA, Domingo Báñez y las controversias sobre la gracia, 115-380. Contamos con una traducción española realizada por Juan Antonio Hevia Echevarría: Apología de los hermanos dominicos contra la Concordia de Luis de Molina. Oviedo: Pentalfa, 2002. Se trata de una obra conjunta aunque parece que Báñez debió de ser el redactor principal (cfr. BELTRÁN DE HEREDIA, ibid., 93; MATAVA, Divine Causality and Human Free Choice, 117). En efecto, guarda similitudes notables con otras obras de su autoría, como el Tractatus. 26 Cfr. BÁÑEZ, Domingo, "De efficacia praevenientis auxilii gratiae, an sit intrinsece et a se, vel a libero hominis arbitrio. Disputatio inter patres Societatis Jesu et magistrum Bañes", nn. 11.16. En BELTRÁN DE HEREDIA, Domingo Báñez y las controversias sobre la gracia, 620.627. 27 Para la datación: cfr. MATAVA, ibid., 39. 28 En efecto, ya en la Apologia, Báñez se expresaba de esta manera: "Unum scimus quod notissimum est, quosdam esse in eadem Societate asertores et defensores illius novae doctrinae, inter quos praecipuus est Franciscus Suarez qui etiam vulgari sermone scriptum quoddam in defensionem doctrinae Societatis, ut ille ait, circa liberum arbitrium invulgaverit" (Apologia, Prol., n. 3. En BELTRÁN DE HEREDIA, Domingo Báñez y las controversias sobre la gracia, 116). El escrito al cual se refiere Báñez ha sido editado también, con la oportuna respuesta de Báñez –también en lengua romance– además de otros documentos pertinentes, en BELTRÁN DE HEREDIA, Domingo Báñez y las controversias sobre la gracia, 411-471 (cfr. ibid., 86). Báñez compone su réplica sin conocer al autor (cfr. v. gr. "Réplica del padre Báñez", n. 10, 446), declarando además saber de Suárez sólo de oídas: "[...] me dicen ser el padre Suárez en su Tercera parte y en sus lecturas [uno de los difusores de la tesis molinista], que yo cierto no he querido me cansar en leer sus escriptos" (ibid., n. 4, 432). Debe suponerse que sólo después de tener terminado su escrito averigua que fue compuesto por Suárez gracias a llegarle la noticia mediante el dominico Pedro de Herrera: cfr. BELTRÁN DE HEREDIA, ibid., 417. A raíz de este incidente, Báñez toma conciencia de la significatividad que posee Suárez y dirigirá sus ataques ante todo contra él. CSF 44-2007 maqueta.indd 83 21/11/17 20:30 Universidad Pontificia de Salamanca 84 DAVID TORRIJOS CASTRILLEJO Cuadernos Salmantinos de Filosofía Vol. 44, 2017, 71-94, ISSN: 0210-4857 en distintas ocasiones los Opuscula y por eso es probable que tenga en mente los textos de Suárez que hemos leído antes cuando afirma: Suponiendo estas cosas, respondo lo mismo a aquella molesta pregunta en la que se interroga cuál sea esa moción pasiva por la cual la voluntad es movida por el autor de la naturaleza cuando pasa de no querer a querer lo bueno en general: ¿se trata de cierta cualidad inserida en la voluntad a modo de principio para originar de manera elícita la acción vital que atañe a su objeto propio? Respondo diciendo que no hay ninguna cualidad añadida a modo de principio, puesto que la voluntad misma en cuanto tal es principio suficiente para originar de manera elícita la acción vital que atañe a su objeto propio propuesto por el entendimiento. Ahora bien, que esto sea propuesto en cierto momento por el entendimiento y que la voluntad tienda de manera actual en ese momento hacia ello son actos ambos que no se producen sin la premoción divina. Tal premoción no es la mera conservación de las potencias, pues, si lo fuese, el entendimiento y la voluntad estarían en acto, puesto que siempre serían conservados por Dios. Declaro que no entiendo qué otra cosa podrá ser la premoción divina –considerada pasivamente– sino la facultad del entendimiento misma puesta en acto completo por el autor de la naturaleza, el cual obra en todas las cosas de acuerdo con el designio de su providencia. En cambio, si la premoción es considerada activamente, es decir, en cuanto está en Dios, no entiendo que sea otra cosa sino la voluntad divina que está presente en todas las cosas íntimamente, produciendo en ellas todas las cosas que hacen, en cuanto poseen la razón de ser y de bondad. La razón de por qué la voluntad divina, que es la causa primera de todas las cosas que se producen, ahora mueve aunque antes no movía, no puede explicarse sino apelando al designio de la providencia divina, que tal lo dispuso de acuerdo con el designio de su voluntad29. 29 "Hoc autem supposito, idem dico ad quaestionem illam molestam in qua quaeritur, quid sit illa motio passiva qua voluntas movetur ab auctore naturae dumtaxat quando transit de non volente in volentem bonum in communi: an sit aliqua qualitas indita voluntati per modum principii ad eliciendum vitalem actionem circa proprium objectum. Et respondeo non esse aliquam qualitatem superadditam per modum principii, quia ipsamet voluntas secundum se est principium sufficiens ad eliciendum vitalem actionem circa proprium objectum propositum ab intellectu. Verum, quod ab intellectu proponatur nunc, et quod nunc voluntas actualiter tendat in illud, neutrum fit sine divina praemotione. Quae promotio [sic] non est sola conservatio potentiarum; alias semper intellectus et voluntas essent in actu, quia semper conservantur a Deo. Sed fateor me non intellegere quid aliud sit illa divina praemotio, si passive consideretur, quam ipsamet facultas intellectus posita in actu completo ab auctore naturae, qui operatur in omnibus secundum rationem suae providentiae. | Si autem praemotio active consideretur, prout est in Deo, nihil aliud esse intelligo quam divinam voluntatem, quae in omnibus rebus intime adest, efficiens in illis omnia quae fiunt, prout habent rationem essendi et bonitatis. Quare autem nunc moveat et antea non moveat ipsa divina voluntas, quae est prima causa rerum omnium quae fiunt, non potest ratio reduci nisi ad rationem divinae providentiae, quae ita disposuit secundum consilium voluntatis suae" (Tractatus, II, cap. 2, n. 2. En BÁÑEZ, Comentarios inéditos a la Prima Secundae de santo Tomás, vol. 3, 384-385; la traducción es mía, pero los subrayados aparecen así en la edición de Beltrán de Heredia). CSF 44-2007 maqueta.indd 84 21/11/17 20:30 Universidad Pontificia de Salamanca SUÁREZ Y LA PREMOCIÓN FÍSICA 85 Cuadernos Salmantinos de Filosofía Vol. 44, 2017, 71-94, ISSN: 0210-4857 Se nos disculpará haber copiado tan ampliamente este texto, debido a la gran importancia que entraña. Según Matava, este pasaje es el único en que Báñez parecería "desdecirse" de su teoría de la premoción física como algo añadido a la criatura30. Por ese motivo le dedica varias páginas, para acabar concluyendo que, en realidad, Báñez no habría podido cambiar su postura respecto de la premoción física, porque incluso en otras partes del Tractatus seguiría sosteniendo las mismas líneas generales de dicha postura31. Él, por su parte, cree que lo más lógico sería entender que este texto tan sólo hace referencia a un tipo particular de auxilio, a saber, el auxilium omnino praeveniens, es decir, el que es antecedente a los actos deliberados actuales, incluso desde el punto de vista temporal32. En consecuencia, "cuando Báñez identifica la premoción física con los actos vitales del entendimiento y de la voluntad, no está identificando la premoción divina con la libre elección de la criatura. Más bien, está mostrando que la identificación de la premoción física y de la operación de la criatura está limitada a los actos del entendimiento y de la voluntad que sean anteriores a la voluntad libre y estén presupuestos por ella"33. Es cierto que Báñez se refiere en esa página a la moción de la voluntad para que quede inclinada a "lo bueno en general" y a la suministración de la inclinación de la facultad hacia su "objeto propio". No obstante, el primer párrafo continúa la argumentación hablando de la moción requerida para "que esto sea propuesto en cierto momento por el entendimiento y que la voluntad tienda de manera actual en ese momento hacia ello", es decir, se está refiriendo a actos intelectivos y volitivos actuales –no, por así decir, habituales, como serían los actos producidos de un modo enteramente preveniente–. Ahora bien, no es preciso ver en el texto ni siquiera un "cambio de postura" de Báñez sino más bien una queja por la que declara el malentendido de su postura difundido por Suárez y por todo aquel que sospeche que la premoción física sea una "cualidad", una "entidad" o cualquier cosa diferente de "la facultad del entendimiento misma puesta en acto completo por el autor de la naturaleza". Al decir "acto completo" se está indicando justamente que la criatura no sólo recibe de Dios el ser y el poder obrar (conservación), sino también la activación de dicho poder (por efecto de la moción), la cual es realmente distinta de la mera posesión 30 Cfr. MATAVA, Divine Causality and Human Free Choice, 61-73. 31 Cfr. ibid., 64. 32 Cfr. ibid., 66-73. 33 "When Báñez identifies physical promotion with vital acts of the intellect and will, he is not identifying divine promotion with creaturely free choice. Rather, he is showing that the identification of physical promotion and creaturely operation is limited to acts of the intellect and will that are prior to free choice and presupposed by it" (ibid., 71). CSF 44-2007 maqueta.indd 85 21/11/17 20:30 Universidad Pontificia de Salamanca 86 DAVID TORRIJOS CASTRILLEJO Cuadernos Salmantinos de Filosofía Vol. 44, 2017, 71-94, ISSN: 0210-4857 del poder activo. Esta activación es requerida cuando se trata de una potencia que puede estar bien en potencia bien en acto; pero puede ser realmente distinta sin que constituya una entidad distinta. El texto en cuestión expone, pues, la teoría de la premoción física distinguiendo su dimensión "pasiva" de su dimensión "activa". Desde el punto de vista de la criatura, la moción es "pasiva", puesto que es la receptora de la moción: aunque la voluntad y el entendimiento sean capaces de realizar sus propios actos, ello no obsta para que sean movidos por Dios, como ya había afirmado santo Tomás de Aquino (De malo, q. 6, co.; STh., I, q. 105, aa. 3-4, etc.). Esto no significa que sea introducido algún tipo de entidad creada –un tertium quid– en la criatura que intervenga en la acción "a modo de principio". Tal cosa sería una verdadera y propia determinación intrínseca. Ahora bien, la moción es una intervención divina real, en el sentido en que activar la potencia para que se ponga en acto por sus propias fuerzas supone una acción de Dios distinta de la mera conservación (con la cual Suárez pretende explicarlo todo). Dios no es sólo el creador y conservador del mundo, sino también su gobernante, pues de Él no sólo depende el ser sino también el obrar34. En ello, Báñez tiene a santo Tomás de nuevo en su favor y, así, lo invoca –contra Suárez35– en el mismo Tractatus (II, cap. 1, nn. 4.6). Dice el Aquinate: "Todo aquello que unas veces es agente en acto y otras veces lo es en potencia, requiere ser movido por algún agente. Es evidente que la voluntad comienza a querer algo aunque antes no lo quería. Es, pues, necesario que sea movida a querer en virtud de algo"36. La dependencia de la criatura del creador 34 Explica santo Tomás: "Unde ad divinam bonitatem pertinet ut, sicut produxit rex in esse, ita etiam eas ad finem perducat. Quod est gubernare" (STh., I, q. 103, a. 1, co.). No obstante, para santo Tomás, la conservación también forma parte del gobierno divino (STh., I, q. 104). 35 Cfr. Disputationes Metaphysicae, XXII, 2, n. 47. 36 "Omne enim quod quandoque est agens in actu et quandoque in potentia, indiget moveri ab aliquo movente. Manifestum est autem quod voluntas incipit velle aliquid, cum hoc prius non vellet. Necesse est ergo quod ab aliquo moveatur ad volendum" (STh., I-II, q. 9, a. 4; en n. 4, Báñez cita también STh., I, 105, a. 4; I-II, q. 6, a. 1, ad 3; q. 10, a. 4; además, véase BÁÑEZ, In STh., I, q. 82, a. 1. En Scholastica Commentaria in Primam Partem Angelici Doctoris D. Thomae Aquinatis a Quaestione LXV. usque ad CXIX, & ultimam. Vol. 2. Venetiis: M. Sessa, 1591, col. 1268 [A]: ahí cita STh., I, q. 83, a. 1, ad 3; I-II, q. 6, a. 4, ad 1). El razonamiento de Tomás, aquí como en otros textos paralelos, concluye que Dios es el primer moviente de los actos de la voluntad, pero podría referirse al primer impulso dado a la voluntad por la cual resulta inclinada habitualmente a querer el bien en cuanto tal, mientras que ella sola se movería a sí misma para los actos particulares (esto parecería estar corroborado por STh., I-II, q. 9, a. 4, ad 3). Sin embargo, por ejemplo en STh., I, q. 116, a. 1, co., se presupone que la moción divina provoca también el movimiento de la voluntad, no sólo hacia el bien en cuanto tal, sino incluso hacia bienes finitos, apetecidos en actos particulares; además, creo que está expresamente afirmado en STh., I-II, q. 10, a. 4, ad 3. Mucho más claramente todavía cuando se habla de la gracia actual: cfr. ibid., q. 110, a. 2, co.; q. 111, a. 2, co. CSF 44-2007 maqueta.indd 86 21/11/17 20:30 Universidad Pontificia de Salamanca SUÁREZ Y LA PREMOCIÓN FÍSICA 87 Cuadernos Salmantinos de Filosofía Vol. 44, 2017, 71-94, ISSN: 0210-4857 no se limita, pues, tan sólo a la conservación de su sustancia, sino también a la influencia como primer moviente de toda actividad que pueda emanar de ella. En segundo lugar, desde el punto de vista "activo", la premoción física es la voluntad divina misma, agente de la moción por la cual las potencias creadas se ponen en acto. De este modo, se excluye que haya nada entre Dios y la criatura; no hay ningún tertium quid sino que la acción humana tan sólo tiene un agente, además del libre albedrío: Dios mismo. No hay ninguna entidad misteriosa inserta en el hombre de la que Dios se serviría instrumentalmente para determinar al hombre. El efecto de la voluntad divina es el acto mismo de la facultad, el cual es libre, igual que el acto de una potencia natural contingente es contingente y el de una potencia necesaria es necesario. Si estamos en lo cierto, la postura de Báñez no podría ser descrita en modo alguno de acuerdo con la primera de las dos posturas a las que Suárez se enfrentaba, ya que no es posible hallar ningún texto en que se refiera a la premoción como una "entidad" distinta del creador y la criatura; mucho menos la identifica con una "cualidad", sino que incluso rehúsa dicha interpretación. Si acaso, la teoría de Báñez podría ser encuadrada en la segunda de las posturas enumeradas por Suárez, es decir, la de quienes "dicen que [la premoción] es el mismo acto de nuestra voluntad, ut est prior in nobis a solo Deo eiusque voluntate efficaci, quam sit a nobis"37. En efecto, en esa sentencia de la carta que copiamos en el primer apartado, aparecía la dimensión "pasiva" de la moción al decir: "es el mismo acto de nuestra voluntad". También se refería a la dimensión "activa", es decir, a la intervención de la eficaz voluntad divina, que sería el único antecedente del acto voluntario mismo: en esas palabras, la prioridad característica de la premoción reside "únicamente" en Dios (a solo Deo) y no hay ninguna otra entidad interpuesta. De ahí que el efecto de la moción sea el acto mismo de la facultad. 4. EL TRASFONDO ARISTOTÉLICO-TOMISTA DE LA PREMOCIÓN El texto de Báñez que hemos citado in extenso en el apartado anterior evoca implícitamente un par de pasajes de la Summa Theologiae de santo Tomás que son bastante significativos. El primero aparece en la cuestión dedicada a la 37 La composición misma llama la atención porque Suárez espontáneamente da un salto del español al latín, como si citara alguna sentencia escolástica que no he logrado localizar. Años después de haber sido escrita esta carta, el jerónimo Pedro de Cabrera se pronunció por escrito en favor de la identificación de la premoción con los actos del agente creado, pero podría estar siguiendo al dominico –que escribió antes el Tractatus– y no al revés. CSF 44-2007 maqueta.indd 87 21/11/17 20:30 Universidad Pontificia de Salamanca 88 DAVID TORRIJOS CASTRILLEJO Cuadernos Salmantinos de Filosofía Vol. 44, 2017, 71-94, ISSN: 0210-4857 predestinación, donde afirma que "la ejecución de la providencia [divina] que se denomina gobierno, está pasivamente en los gobernados y activamente en el gobernante"38. Después, aclara que "la predestinación no pone nada en el predestinado, pero su ejecución, que afecta a cosas exteriores, pone en ellas algún efecto"39. Como es lógico, estas "cosas" –digamos: "realidades"– son principalmente los predestinados mismos,los cuales reciben la oportuna influencia de Dios para que, merced a la gracia y sus méritos (tal sería el "efecto"), puedan alcanzar el destino previsto por Dios. La página de la Summa que acabamos de citar posee la distinción entre la dimensión activa y pasiva del gobierno divino, una doctrina a la que se apelaba en el texto de Báñez. Sin embargo, faltaría por explicar si el "efecto" de dicho gobierno –que sí "pone algo" en la criatura– supone necesariamente una entidad distinta de la criatura y sus actos, o bien se puede identificar, al menos en algunos casos, con tales actos. Esta doctrina también está expuesta expresamente por santo Tomás en un artículo muy pertinente para comprender esta materia y que, no obstante, Suárez se cuida bien de no comentar en sus Opuscula. Se trata nada menos del artículo donde explica que la gracia santificante posee la índole de una cualidad; pero, de paso, también se distingue esta gracia habitual de la gracia actual que precisamente posee la índole de una moción y, por tanto, no constituye ninguna cualidad ni entidad alguna fuera del acto mismo de la criatura: Cuando decimos que alguien posee la gracia de Dios significamos que posee cierto efecto de la graciosa voluntad de Dios. Ahora bien, antes40 se ha dicho que el hombre es ayudado por la voluntad gratuita de Dios de dos maneras: Del primer modo, en cuanto el alma del hombre es movida por Dios para conocer o querer o hacer algo. De este modo, el efecto gratuito en el hombre no es una cualidad, sino cierto movimiento del alma, pues "el movimiento es un acto del moviente que está en lo movido", como se dice en el tercer libro de la Física41. Del segundo modo, el hombre es ayudado por la graciosa voluntad de Dios en cuanto es infundido por Dios cierto don habitual [...] y, de esta manera, el don de la gracia es cierta cualidad42. 38 "Sed executio providentiae, quae gubernatio dicitur, passive quidem est in gubernatis; active autem est in gubernante" (STh., I, q. 23, a. 2). 39 "Unde praedestinatio non ponit aliquid in praedestinato. Sed executio eius, quae transit in exteriores res, ponit in eis aliquem effectum" (ibid., ad 1). 40 Cfr. STh., I-II, q. 109, aa. 1.2.5. 41 Cfr. ARISTÓTELES, Phys., III, 3, 202 a 13-14. Véase SANTO TOMÁS, In Phys., III, lect. 4-5. 42 "Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, in eo qui dicitur gratiam Dei habere, significatur esse quidam effectus gratuitae Dei voluntatis. Dictum est autem supra quod dupliciter ex gratuita Dei voluntate homo adiuvatur. Uno modo, inquantum anima hominis movetur a Deo ad aliquid cognoscendum vel volendum vel agendum. Et hoc modo ipse gratuitus effectus in homine non est qualitas, sed motus quidam animae, actus enim moventis in moto est motus, ut dicitur in III Physic. CSF 44-2007 maqueta.indd 88 21/11/17 20:30 Universidad Pontificia de Salamanca SUÁREZ Y LA PREMOCIÓN FÍSICA 89 Cuadernos Salmantinos de Filosofía Vol. 44, 2017, 71-94, ISSN: 0210-4857 Aunque aquí no se esté hablando de la moción divina natural que Báñez también admite, sí se explica la gracia actual como la moción de Dios que provoca actos deliberados concretos en el hombre. Se niega expresamente que constituya cierta "cualidad", es decir, que posea una constitución ontológica propia y distinta de la criatura y sus operaciones. Así, apoyándose en una importante doctrina de Aristóteles, la "moción" de Dios no consiste en otra cosa sino en el acto segundo –la operación– de la criatura. Este texto es crucial para comprender el punto de vista de Báñez. No sólo hemos de suponer que Báñez lo conocía bien, sino que tampoco podía desconocer la enseñanza aristotélica que hacía superfluo concebir una entidad intermedia entre el moviente y lo movido, pues el acto del moviente coincide realmente con el acto mismo de lo movido. No podía ignorarla quien había comentado el tratado De generatione et corruptione, donde, entre otras cosas, se estudia la acción y la pasión, de un modo que guarda una importante vinculación con todo el capítulo tercero del tercer libro de la Física, del cual está sacada esa idea de Aristóteles43. De acuerdo con esto, leemos en sus Institutiones dialecticae: En efecto, una es la relación del movimiento con el agente y otra con el paciente, aunque, de acuerdo con la significación del término "movimiento", sea indiferente que se pueda aplicar a la acción o a la pasión, porque no significa determinadamente "acción" ni significa determinadamente "pasión"44. Esta consideración sobre la acción y la pasión es la que funda la distinción entre la moción vista desde el punto de vista activo y desde el punto de vista pasivo a la que apelaba en el Tractatus para mostrar que el efecto de la moción divina, que es un movimiento, no puede estar en Dios, sino en la criatura movida. Luego este movimiento se puede ver como acción de Dios o como pasión de la criatura, pero el resultado de la eficacia divina y de la eficacia humana es uno y el mismo: la acción humana. Así, el libre albedrío no es puramente activo en su eficacia sino que se trata de un motor movido. En definitiva, la causalidad de la acción deliberada Alio modo adiuvatur homo ex gratuita Dei voluntate, secundum quod aliquod habituale donum a Deo animae infunditur. [...] Et sic donum gratiae qualitas quaedam est" (TOMÁS DE AQUINO, STh., I-II, q. 110, a. 2, co.). 43 Cfr. esp. BÁÑEZ, Dominicus,Commentaria et quaestiones in duos librosAristotelis Stagyritae De Generatione et Corruptione, I, cap. 7, conclusiones 6-8, Venetiis: Apud Iuntas, 1587, 261C-262e. Ahí se habla de la subordinación de unos movientes a otros y cómo los movientes subordinados mueven al ser movidos. Si el primer motor inmóvil puede ser tal es porque el único efecto de su acción no está en él sino en lo movido. 44 "Nam alia est relatio motus ad agentem, alia ad patientem, quanuis secundum significationem huius termini motus, indifferens sit ut possit verificari de actione vel passione, etiam si non significet determinate actionem neque determinate passionem" (BAÑES, Dominicus, Institutiones minoris dialecticae quas summulas vocant, Salmanticae: A. Renaut, 1599, 277). CSF 44-2007 maqueta.indd 89 21/11/17 20:30 Universidad Pontificia de Salamanca 90 DAVID TORRIJOS CASTRILLEJO Cuadernos Salmantinos de Filosofía Vol. 44, 2017, 71-94, ISSN: 0210-4857 creada posee una causa primera, la voluntad de Dios, la cual es verdaderamente motriz de la acción de igual modo como lo es la voluntad humana. Frente a Suárez, esta "moción" no puede ser comprendida como una mera "conservación" sino que es a la acción (acto segundo) lo mismo que la conservación es al acto de ser (acto primero)45. Por consiguiente, es preciso un acto de gobierno divino peculiar y distinto de la mera conservación. Teniendo esto en cuenta, podemos comprender mejor lo que Báñez quiere decir en otro momento de su comentario en el que arremete de nuevo contra Suárez46 por identificar el auxilio de Dios con el concurso y éste con la acción del libre albedrío47. Este texto es citado por Matava para corroborar su tesis48. El pasaje comienza por distinguir el auxilio divino en cuanto "principio formal operativo" de la "moción", la cual –se entiende– no será por tanto ningún principio formal operativo en el agente creado49. Después, rechaza la identificación con estas palabras: Dios concurre con nosotros para producir la acción; luego el concurso divino no es nuestro mismo acto. De otra manera, diríamos que el concurso divino concurre al concurso. Además, cuando decimos que el hombre, para actuar –por ejemplo, para creer–, requiere del auxilio de Dios que mueve o del concurso de Dios, nadie entiende con ello que el hombre requiere de una acción para actuar. Ésta es, pues, la denominación formal de aquel que es actualmente agente, el cual se denomina por su acción. Por el contrario, entendemos la moción divina por parte de Dios como causa eficiente para que pasemos de inoperantes a agentes actualmente operantes, de no creyentes a creyentes. El hombre, por más que sea perfecto en sus ínsitas fuerzas y en los auxilios prevenientes, necesita esta moción real antes de consentir y pasar de no obrar rectamente a obrar rectamente50. 45 Cfr. Tractatus, II, cap. 1, n. 5. En BÁÑEZ, Comentarios inéditos a la Prima Secundae de santo Tomás, vol. 3, 378ss. 46 Creo que se refiere a Opuscula, I, 3, cap. 20, n. 3, ed. Vivès, 276-277 (Báñez indica en cambio n. 4). 47 Cfr. In STh., I-II, q. 109, a. 4, n. 2. En BÁÑEZ, Comentarios inéditos a la Prima Secundae de santo Tomás, vol. 3, 87. 48 Cfr. MATAVA, Divine Causality and Human Free Choice, 70. 49 "[...] nota [...] quomodo nomine auxilii Dei non solum intellegat divus Thomas collationem alicujus principii formalis operativi, sed etiam auxilium Dei est ipsa divina motio ad actum implendi mandata" (BÁÑEZ, ibid.). 50 "Deus enim concurrit nobiscum ad actionem producendam: ergo concursus divinus non est ipse actus noster. Alias diceremus quod divinus concursus concurrit ad concursum. Item quando dicimus quod homo indiget auxilio Dei moventis sive concursu Dei ad agendum, v. g., ad credendum, nemo intelligit quod indiget homo actione ad agendum. Haec enim est formalis denominatio agentis actualiter quod ab actione denominatur. Sed plane intellegimus divinam motionem ex parte Dei ut causae efficientis de non operantibus actualiter operantes, de non credentibus credentes. Hac enim CSF 44-2007 maqueta.indd 90 21/11/17 20:30 Universidad Pontificia de Salamanca SUÁREZ Y LA PREMOCIÓN FÍSICA 91 Cuadernos Salmantinos de Filosofía Vol. 44, 2017, 71-94, ISSN: 0210-4857 El concurso no es nuestro mismo acto porque al decir "concurso" nos referimos a Dios como agente, mientras que al decir "nuestro acto" nos referimos a nosotros como agentes, pues el agente "se denomina por la acción". Esto no obsta para que el efecto de la acción divina sea nuestro acto, del cual –por ser inmanente– somos nosotros mismos agentes y pacientes. Así, sin que sea necesario suponer ninguna entidad distinta de Dios,el agente creado y sus potencias con sus actos respectivos, aquí se reclama que el acto del creador por el cual "conserva" la sustancia y la potencia activa es realmente distinto del acto por el cual "mueve" la potencia y "la pone en acto completo", es decir, "la ayuda" para que pase de la potencia al acto. Es realmente distinto porque esta moción produce un efecto nuevo, a saber, la activación final de la potencia para que produzca el acto libre. Pero esta "activación" no pone en la realidad ninguna entidad accidental ni sustancial distinta del acto mismo de la potencia. El principio aristotélico del cual se servía antes santo Tomás hace innecesaria "una acción para actuar" porque el único efecto que posee la intervención divina es la acción de la voluntad creada. Esta "acción para actuar" sería una especie de "principio formal operativo" en la criatura como el que Báñez quiere excluir. Es decir, está excluyendo justo lo que Suárez y la mayoría de los intérpretes atribuyen a Báñez: una especie de prolongación creada de la voluntad divina en la criatura, pasiva respecto de Dios y activa respecto de la criatura. En definitiva, negar que el auxilio actual sea idéntico con los actos de la criatura agente no supone que sea preciso añadir alguna entidad nueva, sino tan sólo muestra que hace falta admitir que Dios es el primer moviente de la causalidad eficiente ejercida por la criatura. No obstante, el efecto de esta causalidad divina es numéricamente uno con el efecto de la causalidad de la criatura. De ahí que los ejemplos de tales efectos de la acción divina aducidos por Báñez (obrar o creer) sean actos concretos de la criatura, no entidades previas a esos actos; eso sí, son actos producidos merced a la moción divina. Ni siquiera podemos vernos turbados por otro texto en que Matava podría haberse amparado para justificar la comprensión de la premoción física como una realidad distinta del creador y de la criatura. Según creo, se trata del pasaje que a primera vista podría oponerse más frontalmente a la interpretación que estamos defendiendo aquí, puesto que se llega a designar no sólo la gracia habitual –cuyo estatuto ontológico es de cualidad, como reconoció Tomás mismo– sino incluso la gracia actual como una "entidad": motione reali indiget homo, quantumlibet perfectus sit viribus inditis et auxiliis praevenientibus, antequam consentiat et transeat de non recte operante ad recte operantem" (ibid.). CSF 44-2007 maqueta.indd 91 21/11/17 20:30 Universidad Pontificia de Salamanca 92 DAVID TORRIJOS CASTRILLEJO Cuadernos Salmantinos de Filosofía Vol. 44, 2017, 71-94, ISSN: 0210-4857 Aquella fuerza actual de la moción de la gracia eficaz es una entidad verdaderamente real y física51. Aquí se está empleando el término entitas de modo lato, pues no se está presuponiendo que la gracia actual constituya una entidad numéricamente distinta de las operaciones de la criatura, sino tan sólo se está indicando que Dios interviene "realmente" en el efecto (la acción humana) y no sólo "moralmente" como piensan los congruistas. Es más, es en esta misma disputa donde Báñez escribe estas contundentes palabras: Nosotros nunca hemos afirmado que haya cierta entidad creada que, considerada por sí sola de acuerdo con su naturaleza metafísica, determine nuestro libre albedrío o lo predetermine al acto de la conversión hacia Dios, sino que consideramos el auxilio de Dios en cuanto procede actualmente de Dios y de su voluntad absoluta y eficacísima por la cual hace todo lo que quiere real y físicamente y no sólo moralmente52. En definitiva, no podemos identificar a Báñez entre aquéllos que ponían algún tipo de "entidad creada" distinta de la voluntad divina y del libre arbitrio creado, sino que ha rechazado expresamente esa descripción de la premoción física. Por el contrario, su postura, que aquí pronuncia con las palabras "auxilium Dei prout est actualiter a Deo et ab efficacissima ejus absoluta voluntate", se aproxima bastante al pensamiento que Suárez dejó consignado en la carta de la cual partimos: "ut est prior in nobis a solo Deo eiusque voluntate efficaci". CONCLUSIONES A lo largo de estas páginas hemos tratado de revisar el estatuto ontológico de la premoción física según Báñez, manteniendo un diálogo sobre todo con el magnífico libro que nos ha brindado recientemente Matava. Pese a los logros de 51 "Ubi hoc unum a vobis saltem accipio, vim illam actualis motionis gratiae efficacis esse vere realem et physicam entitatem" (BÁÑEZ, "De efficacia praevenientis auxilii gratiae, an sit intrinsece et a se, vel a libero hominis arbitrio. Disputatio inter patres Societatis Jesu et magistrum Bañes", n. 10. En BELTRÁN DE HEREDIA, Domingo Báñez y las controversias sobre la gracia, 614). 52 "Nos enim nunquam asserimus aliquam entitatem creatam quae secundum suam metaphysicam naturam praecise considerata determinet liberum arbitrium nostrum vel praedeterminet ad actum conversionis in Deum, sed consideramus auxilium Dei prout est actualiter a Deo et ab efficacissima ejus absoluta voluntate, qua omnia quaecumque vult facit realiter et physice, et non solum moraliter" (ibid., n. 11. En BELTRÁN DE HEREDIA, Domingo Báñez y las controversias sobre la gracia, 619). CSF 44-2007 maqueta.indd 92 21/11/17 20:30 Universidad Pontificia de Salamanca SUÁREZ Y LA PREMOCIÓN FÍSICA 93 Cuadernos Salmantinos de Filosofía Vol. 44, 2017, 71-94, ISSN: 0210-4857 esta obra, el contraste con Suárez nos ha permitido plantear serias dudas respecto de algunas de sus conclusiones. Tras leer los textos con benevolencia y sin dar por supuesta la continuidad con los defensores posteriores de la tesis "bañeciana", hay buenas razones para creer que Báñez en persona nunca pensó la premoción como un tertium quid distinto de Dios y la criatura (tal era el argumento principal que Matava aducía para considerar insatisfactoria la tesis de Báñez). Por consiguiente, no habría ninguna determinación intrínseca en el ser humano por la cual Dios hubiera prefijado sus acciones. Báñez no parece compartir, pues, con Suárez una visión de la causalidad presuntamente común a ambos como "un tipo de energía o influjo que media entre la causa y el efecto y que, en cuanto tal, es físicamente anterior al efecto"53. Báñez se ceñiría a la ontología aristotélico-tomista sin añadir ningún principio causal intermedio. Ahora bien, el núcleo del dilema sigue en pie: el determinismo de Báñez permanece aunque lo haga en una esfera extrínseca, puesto que Dios determinaría en sus decretos eternos cómo obrará la criatura. Con todo, en el agente creado se dan todos los requisitos intrínsecos para tomar decisiones libres. En descargo de Báñez, se ha de reconocer que no ha rebajado a Dios hasta ponerlo en competencia con la criatura, sino que advierte que la antecedencia de su moción respecto de la acción creatural constituye una de las atribuciones de su peculiar condición de creador54: la moción divina de las criaturas no debe confundirse con la conservación, pero en todo caso se trata de una moción que sólo el creador, el autor de todo ser, puede realizar. Se podría formular como hipótesis provisional que Suárez logró que la disputa se planteara de modo que sus oponentes tendiesen a hipostasiar la premoción haciendo de ella una entidad intermedia entre Dios y la criatura. También se debería examinar a este propósito la recepción de la noción de impetus que Filópono introdujo en el aristotelismo. En realidad, es la aceptación o no de la metafísica aristotélica el asunto que se está ventilando de fondo. Creo que Fernández Burillo ha advertido esto lúcidamente al notar que, en último término, la férrea oposición a la premoción 53 "I would submit that in this case, the point of origin [to diagnose the fault in this doctrines] lies outside the parameters of the Controversy de Auxiliis as it was originally framed, and lies instead in an assumption shared by both sides of that controversy, though it played out very differently on the two sides. The assumption in question is that causality, (in this case, divine causality) is a kind of energy or influx that mediates between cause and effect and which, as such, is physically prior to the effect" (MATAVA, Divine Causality and Human Free Choice, 320-321). 54 "[...] sicut esse Dei est causa perpetuo influens esse in creaturis, ita necesse est ut quando creatura transit de non operante in operantem, vel quomodolibet alias movet aut movetur, ita influxus divinae motionis sit prior ordine causalitatis" (Tractatus, II, cap. 1, n. 5. En BÁÑEZ, Comentarios inéditos a la Prima Secundae de santo Tomás, vol. 3, 378). CSF 44-2007 maqueta.indd 93 21/11/17 20:30 Universidad Pontificia de Salamanca 94 DAVID TORRIJOS CASTRILLEJO Cuadernos Salmantinos de Filosofía Vol. 44, 2017, 71-94, ISSN: 0210-4857 por parte de Suárez se debe a su concepción metafísica del ente finito y a sus dificultades para aceptar las nociones de acto y potencia tomistas55. El ente finito de Suárez posee actualidad de suyo e igualmente es independiente para obrar. Se cansa en vano Báñez reprochando a su oponente que, con sus planteamientos, queda arruinada la primera vía tomista, es decir, la vía aristotélica para conocer a Dios como primer moviente56. No en vano, ya Suárez había declarado tranquilamente en las Disputaciones que esa vía no era probativa y que el omne quod movetur ab alio movetur debía ser sustituido por el omne quod fit ab alio fit57. Es claro, pues, que esta disputa tenía un trasfondo más profundo del que se advertía a primera vista y que se estaba fraguando una nueva ontología58. 55 Cfr. FERNÁNDEZ BURILLO, "Francisco Suárez. II", 38-40. 56 Cfr. BÁÑEZ, Tractatus, II, cap. 1, n. 6. En BÁÑEZ, Comentarios inéditos a la Prima Secundae de santo Tomás, vol. 3, 379. 57 Cfr. DOYLE, John P., "The Suarezian Proof for God's Existence". En SALAS, Victor M. (ed.), Collected Studies on Francisco Suárez, S.J. (1548-1617). Leuven: Leuven UP, 2010, 112. 58 Sobre este tema, véase GARCÍA CUADRADO, José Ángel. "Las controversias sobre la gracia y la génesis del humanismo ateo". Espíritu, 65, 2016, 407-432. CSF 44-2007 maqueta.indd 94 21/11/17 20:30 Universidad Pontificia de Salamanca

DATA, PRIVACY AND THE INDIVIDUAL MARCH 2020 VIEWS ON PRIVACY. A SURVEY Siân Brooke Carissa Véliz Background The purpose of this survey was to gather individual's attitudes and feelings towards privacy and the selling of data. A total (N) of 1,107 people responded to the survey. We conducted an online survey through a distribution platform (Amazon's Mechanical Turk) which has been developed through Qualtrics software. The survey covers: (1) Experiences of online data and privacy breaches (2) Concerns regarding privacy (3) The use of personal data by companies (4) The use of personal data by institutions (5) Trust in companies and institutions (6) Acceptability of monetising privacy (7) Bulk data collection by governments Author contributions: Carissa Véliz initiated the project, wrote the first draft of the survey, and co-edited the survey report. Siân Brooke co-designed the survey instrument, distributed the survey, carried out the analysis of the data, and wrote up the results, including a comparison with previous work. 3DATA, PRIVACY AND THE INDIVIDUAL Contents 02 Background 04 Survey Design 04 DEMOGRAPHICS 04 EXPERIENCES 04 CONCERN ABOUT PRIVACY 05 RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 05 PERSONAL DATA AND SENSITIVE INFORMATION 06 TRUST IN COMPANIES AND INSTITUTIONS 07 GOVERNMENT DATA COLLECTION 07 PRICE OF PRIVACY 08 Ethical Procedure 09 Sampling Frame 09 NOTES ON MECHANICAL TURK 10 NOTES ON COUNTRIES 11 Variables 12 Demographics 14 Experiences 16 Importance of Privacy 18 Concerns about Privacy 19 CONCERNS ABOUT PRIVACY BY AGE 21 Violations to the Right to Privacy 22 Is Privacy a Right? 23 The Use of Personal Data by Companies 26 Trust in Companies 28 Trust in Institutions 39 Government Collection of Data 39 BULK COLLECTION OF PERSONAL DATA 39 CIRCUMSTANCES 30 Price of Privacy 30 PAY FOR ACCESS 31 PAY FOR DELETION 32 Comparison with Previous Work 34 Bibliography 4 DATA, PRIVACY AND THE INDIVIDUAL This section of the document will serve to outline the design of the survey and questions asked at each stage. Please note that later in the analysis multiple questions are used to formulate a singular measure, as is the norm with Likert scales. All questions had a "Prefer not to say" option, which allowed us to count purposefully unanswered questions, rather than just incomplete surveys. This option also meant that respondents could decline to answer any specific question, whilst still completing the majority of the survey. The survey was piloted before full release to ensure credible survey design. The pilot took place in two batches of 20 responses, a week apart, in early November 2019. The full survey was rolled out on the 12th of November 2019 and the final batch was completed on the 23rd of December 2019. DEMOGRAPHICS As is standard with a survey-based methodology, the first data that was collected was demographics. Responses to these questions were singular choice and participants selected the appropriate category that best described them. Note that non-binary and self-description options are available for gender identification, as is good practise when conducting surveys. The demographic information collected was; (1) gender identification (2) age (3) nationality (4) highest level of education achieved to date (5) employment (6) income. EXPERIENCES In a similar manner to previous research, we first wished to ascertain frequency of privacy-related experiences among our respondents. This question was multiple choice, meaning that respondents were encouraged to select all experiences that applied to them. A free text option was also available, which is detailed in the results section. (1) Unauthorised access to my online account. (2) Credit card number stolen / bank fraud / unauthorised purchases from your account (3) Being charged more for a product or service than other people (4) Someone using spyware on me (5) Someone impersonating me (6) Private emails or messages posted online without my consent (7) Public shaming online (people targeting me and shaming me for something I did or wrote, or for who I am) (8) Private images or videos posted online without my consent (9) Doxxing (private information posted online, such as my address) (10) Other (Free Text) CONCERN ABOUT PRIVACY In the next section, respondents were presented with a series of 5-point Likert scales and were asked to what extent they agreed with each of the statements provided. The Likert scale points were labelled: Strongly Agree, Agree, Undecided/Neutral, Disagree, and Strongly Disagree. Survey Design 5DATA, PRIVACY AND THE INDIVIDUAL 7-Point scales were considered, but research has shown that the additional two options rarely add depth to findings (Dawes, 2008). (1) My personal data could be used by others to steal money from me. (2) My personal data could be used by others to impersonate me, which could affect my credit rating. (3) My personal data could be used to badly affect my reputation. (4) My personal data could be used by others to hurt me. (5) My personal data could be used to unfairly discriminate against me. (6) My personal data could be misused by governments. (7) Not having privacy will lead me to change what I say online. (8) Not having privacy will lead me to change my behaviour in negative ways. (9) Not having privacy will lead other people to change their behaviour in negative ways. (10) Privacy is a good in itself, above and beyond the consequences it may have. RIGHTS VIOLATIONS Respondents were asked to what extent they agreed with the statement "Violations to the right to privacy are one of the most important dangers that citizens face in the digital age". Responses were recorded as a 5-point Likert scale and were labelled: Strongly Agree, Agree, Undecided/ Neutral, Disagree, and Strongly Disagree. Respondents were also asked "Do you think that privacy is a right?", which was a simple Yes or No answer. PERSONAL DATA AND SENSITIVE INFORMATION Prior to answering questions on personal data, respondents were presented with a definition of personal and sensitive data. This was included to address the ambiguity of the definition, and to account for different understandings between respondents. The text that was shown is below. Take into consideration what personal data is and the sensitive information that can be inferred from it when you answer the following questions. There are many things that count as personal data. Examples include: • Your name • An identification number, such as your national insurance or passport number • Your location data, such as your home address or mobile phone GPS data • An online identifier, such as your IP or email address. Personal data can be used to infer sensitive information, including: • Racial or ethnic origin • Political opinions • Religious or philosophical beliefs • Trade union membership • Sex life or sexual orientation. 6 DATA, PRIVACY AND THE INDIVIDUAL Following this information, respondents were presented with a series of 5-point Likert scales and were asked to what extent they agreed with each of the statements provided on companies uses of personal data. The Likert scale points were labelled: Strongly Agree, Agree, Undecided/Neutral, Disagree, and Strongly Disagree. (1) Sell that data to third parties (insurance companies, governments, etc.) as part of their way of making money. (2) Personalise ads to make them more relevant to individuals. (3) Engage in price discrimination (charge different prices to different people for the same products and services). (4) Research to develop new products. (5) Investigate prospective employees (people who they want to hire). (6) Investigate their current employees. (7) Predict people's behaviour (e.g., where you are going to go, what you are going to buy, etc.). (8) Try to influence what people will buy (try to get people to buy something they wouldn't otherwise buy). (9) Try to influence how people will vote. TRUST IN COMPANIES AND INSTITUTIONS Respondents were shown a series of Variable Attribute Scales (VAS, 0-10) and asked to rate how much they trusted a selection of companies and institutions to protect privacy. The scales were rated from 0 – I don't trust them at all, to 10 – I trust them completely. The respondents moved sliders, and were not shown the number attributed to each company or institution. The companies that respondents were asked to provide a rating of trust on were: (1) Facebook (2) Twitter (3) Instagram (4) Snapchat (5) Google (6) Amazon (7) Apple The institutions that respondents were asked to provide a rating of trust on were: (1) My internet and telephone provider (2) My bank (3) My local neighbourhood shops (4) My employer (5) My government Companies and institutions were grouped into two separate questions to avoid confusion. 7DATA, PRIVACY AND THE INDIVIDUAL GOVERNMENT DATA COLLECTION Respondents were asked two questions on bulk collection of personal data by governments. The first question was: "Do you think it's okay for governments to bulk collect everyone's personal data?". The responses available were (1) Yes, there are some uses of this data that is necessary and acceptable, (2) No, Governments should not be about to collect everyone's data for any purpose, they should only be able to collect the data of criminal suspects, and (3) Prefer not to say. The second question in this section asked respondents "Under what circumstances would you consider it acceptable for governments to collect everyone's data?". The answer was given in the form of multiple choice selection. The options available were: (1) Predict whether people will protest (2) Predict how people will vote (3) Try to influence how people will vote (4) Make sure that people are paying their taxes (5) Prevent petty (minor) crimes (6) Prevent serious crimes (7) Catch criminals of petty (minor) crimes (8) Catch criminals of serious crimes PRICE OF PRIVACY The survey also examined respondents on the two most common payment models in regards to privacy online. The first model is pay for access. The question stated "It is known that most online platforms (e.g. Facebook, Google, and others) collect user personal data. For what amount (in USD) per month would you be willing to be paid to allow access to your personal data?". The responses available were: (1) The should pay me $ [Free text], (2) Nothing, I'm not worried about online platforms having access to my personal data, and (3) Nothing, privacy is a right and I don't think we need to pay for it. The second question looked at the pay for deletion model. The questions stated: "It is known that most online platforms (e.g. Facebook, Google, and others) collect user personal data. What would you be willing to pay per month (in USD) to continuously delete all of your personal data from the parties that hold it?". The responses available were: (1) I would pay $ [Free text], (2) Nothing. I'm not worried about online platforms holding my personal data, and (3) Nothing. Privacy is a right and I don't think we should need to pay for it. Respondents were limited to one response for each question. A comparison of the results of this measure and existing work by Winegar and Sunstein (2019) can be found in the last section 8 DATA, PRIVACY AND THE INDIVIDUAL Ethical approval for the study was granted by the University of Oxford in November 2019 (Ref: SSH_OII_ CIA_19_065). Participants were provided with an information sheet and required to give written consent in the beginning of the survey in order to participate. They were also informed that they may withdraw at any time, and that questions were not mandatory, with "prefer not to say" options provided. The confidentiality and anonymity of the subjects was guaranteed, and no personally identifiable data was collected. The remuneration offered to participants was 2.00 €. Such remuneration was calculated from the EU minimum living hourly wage, which is 10.03 €. This wage is also slightly above the average payment expected for such tasks on platforms such as Mechanical Turk, but is not high enough that it risks incentive affects and the validity of our data. Ethical Procedure 9DATA, PRIVACY AND THE INDIVIDUAL As previously outlined, respondents were collected through Mechanical Turk. We aimed to collect respondents from a range of nationalities, and split our sample between the United States and European countries to facilitate a regional comparison. The full demographics of the sample can be found in the results section. NOTES ON MECHANICAL TURK The survey was distributed through Amazon's crowdsourcing Internet marketplace, Mechanical Turk (MTurk). MTurk is an increasingly prominent forum for digital social research, largely forming the basis of credibility in many online studies. Buhrmester, Kwang & Gosling (2011) evaluated the stability and quality of web-based data collection from samples drawn from Amazon's Mechanical Turk (MTurk). Sampling Frame REGION N COUNTRIES EUROPE 630 Britain Germany Spain France Netherlands Italy Belgium Portugal Russia Czech Republic Ukraine Croatia 303 129 84 55 23 15 7 5 5 2 1 1 NORTH AMERICA 427 United States of America 427 SOUTH AMERICA 32 Mexico Colombia Brazil Venezuela Argentina 16 8 5 2 1 ASIA 18 Japan India Hong Kong Morocco China Singapore 10 3 2 1 1 1 Table 1: Breakdown of countries in sample 10 DATA, PRIVACY AND THE INDIVIDUAL The integrated compensation system, large sampling pool, ease of participant recruitment results in MTurk being an appealing platform for data collection in the social sciences (Casler, Bickel, & Hackett, 2013). However, concerns have been raised as to how MTurk compares with other samples, and the effects of task length and compensation/incentive amount. Buhrmester, Kwang & Gosling (2011) administered around 500 personality tests to participants recruited through MTurk and a second large internet sample. The two tests were ad-ministered in two waves, three weeks apart (Buhrmester et al., 2011). By using the test-retest method, Buhrmester, Kwang & Gosling (2011) were able to conclude that stability of data collected through MTurk was very high, comparing favourably with correlations of traditional methods, resulting in a high level of reliability. A crucial factor in the reliability of a study is its stability over time, which is held to be high on MTurk. Prior to using platforms such as MTurk, the predominant and most popular population from which research acquired samples was undergraduate students, of which the external validity as an unrepresentative sampling pool has been debated extensively (Buhrmester et al., 2011). Berinsky, Huber, & Lenz (2012) conducted an examination into the external and internal validity of MTurk as a promising source of subject recruitment. In terms of internal validity with research conducted primarily on MTurk, the authors raise two concerns: (1) "Do MTurk workers violate assignment by participating in experiments multiple times?" and (2) "MTurk respondents may generally pay greater attention to experimental instruments and survey questions than do other subjects" (Berinsky et al., 2012, pp. 365-366). Their study found that repeat survey taking was of minimal importance. Furthermore, sampling conducted through MTurk can be considered high quality due to demographic representativeness and high levels of diversity, largely negating concerns of external validity (Berinsky et al., 2012). In short, MTurk is a suitable platform to gather respondents. NOTES ON COUNTRIES Countries where asking questions on government data collection practises was considered sensitive information were shown an altered version of the survey, in order to comply with high ethical standards. Location was determined to be where the user identified their location at the start of the survey. China (n=1), Hong Kong (3), Russia (2) were deemed to be places in which questions about government data collection were too sensitive to ask. QUESTION ALTERATION Please rate the degree to which you agree or disagree with each of the statements below. I am concerned about my privacy because. Respondents were not shown Measure 6: My personal data could be misused by governments. From 1 to 10, how much do you trust different institutions to protect your privacy? Respondents were not shown Institution 6: My government. Do you think it is okay for government agencies to bulk collect everyone's data? Question not displayed Under what circumstances would you consider it acceptable for governments to collect everyone's data? Question not displayed Table 2: Sensitive countries flow control measures. 11DATA, PRIVACY AND THE INDIVIDUAL VARIABLE DESCRIPTION Region Geographic Region in which respondent is based. One of: Europe, South America, North America, Asia. Age Age brackets: 17 or younger, 18-20 years, 21-29 years, 30-39 years, 40-49 years, 50-59 years, 60 or older, Prefer not to say Gender Participant self-identified gender: Male, Female, Non Binary, Prefer to self-describe (free text) Education Highest level of education achieved: Less than high school degree, High school degree or equivalent (e.g., GED), Some college but no degree, Associate degree, Bachelor degree, Graduate degree (Masters/PhD), Prefer not to answer Employment Employment status: Full-time employed, Part-time employed, Not employed for pay (Unemployed), Caregiver (e.g., children, elderly) Homemaker, Full-time student, Part-time student, Other, Prefer not to say Income Income in USD: $0, $1 to $9 999, $10 000 to $24 999, $25 000 to 49 999, $50 000 to 74 999, $75 000 to 99 999, $100 000 to 149 999, $150 000 and greater Experience Privacy related experience, multiple choice. Privacy Important Likert scale (5-point) on the importance of privacy. Pay for Access How much should companies pay to access your personal data? Pay to Delete What would you be willing to pay to have your personal data deleted? Privacy Measure 5-Point Likert scale. Strength of concerns regarding privacy. i.e. "My personal data could be used by others to steal money from me". Violations 5-point Likert scale. "Violations to the right to privacy are one of the most important dangers that citizens face in digital age" Right Single choice: Is privacy a right? Companies Data Uses 5-Point Likert scale. Purposes for which companies can use personal data "Sell that data to third parties (insurance companies etc.) as part of their way of making money?" Companies Protect 0-10 Variable Attribute Scale. To what extent are certain companies trusted to protect data Institutions Protect 0-10 Variable Attribute Scale. To what extent are certain institutions trusted to protect data Government Data: Collect Select the statement that closest matches respondent's own views. "Do you think it is okay for government agencies to bulk collect everyone's personal data?" Government Data: Circumstance Under what circumstances is it okay for governments to collect everyone's personal data. Multiple Choice. i.e." To make sure people are paying their taxes" Table 3: Summary of variables As shown below, Table 3 provides a concise summary of each of the variables used in our analysis, as detailed in the survey design section. Variables 12 DATA, PRIVACY AND THE INDIVIDUAL In the following section, the complete demographics of the sample are broken down into their respective categories and by region. The countries included in each region are detailed in the sampling frame section. Demographics Figure 1: Gender of respondents SOUTH AMERICA ASIA 452 Male 173 Female 2 Non-Binary 3 Withheld 265 Male 159 Female 23 Non-Binary 20 Male 11 Female 1 Non-Binary TOTAL 749 Male 349 Female 6 Non-Binary 3 Withheld 12 Male 6 Female NORTH AMERICA EUROPE 13DATA, PRIVACY AND THE INDIVIDUAL Table 4.1: Age of respondents REGION 18-20 YEARS 21-29 YEARS 30-39 YEARS 40-49 YEARS 50-59 YEARS 60 YEARS OR OLDER Europe 54 235 210 95 29 7 North America 2 131 180 57 35 22 South America 0 17 13 2 0 0 Asia 1 5 9 2 1 0 Total 57 388 412 156 65 29 Table 4.2: Highest education level achieved REGION LESS THAN HIGH SCHOOL HIGH SCHOOL SOME COLLEGE ASSOCIATE DEGREE BACHELOR'S DEGREE GRADUATE DEGREE WITHHELD Europe 8 81 89 35 248 166 3 North America 2 51 64 38 222 50 0 South America 0 1 4 3 16 7 1 Asia 0 1 2 2 9 4 0 Total 10 134 159 78 495 227 4 Table 4.3: Current employment status REGION FT EMPLOYED PT EMPLOYED FT/PT STUDENT HOMEMAKER/ CAREGIVER UNEMPLOYED OTHER WITHHELD Europe 357 120 87 18 24 21 3 North America 343 34 4 10 15 18 3 South America 16 9 3 3 1 0 0 Asia 9 1 4 0 1 3 0 Total 725 164 98 31 41 42 6 Table 4.4: Income level (USD) REGION 0 19,999 10,00024,999 25,00049,000 50,00074,999 75,00099,999 100,000149,999 150,000+ WITHHELD Europe 27 129 147 179 66 40 7 1 34 North America 1 31 86 142 109 32 16 5 5 South America 0 5 11 10 3 1 0 0 2 Asia 2 3 5 6 2 0 0 0 0 Total 30 168 249 337 180 73 23 6 41 14 DATA, PRIVACY AND THE INDIVIDUAL Experiences This section breaks down the frequency of different negative experiences regarding privacy by region. There are two points to note here. Firstly, this is a self-reported measure, without a particular time limit, so depends on each respondent's ability to recall the event. The second is that the question was multiple choice, so the number of total recorded experiences will be larger than that of the total sample size. In total only 8% (n = 85) of respondents had no experience of their privacy being breached. Across all regions, the average respondent had 1.86 bad experiences concerning privacy. The most common privacy breach was unauthorised access to an online account (n = 481), closely followed by the theft of credit card numbers, bank fraud, or unauthorised purchases from an account (450). In Other (Free Text), additional experiences listed included: • Phishing/scam emails (Frequency: 3) • Data Breach (4) • Device Hack (6) • Malware (1) • False accusations (1) Several respondents (3) referred specifically to being targeted using information that was leaked during the "Equifax Breach". In September 2017, Equifax (one of the three largest consumer credit reporting agencies) announced a cyber-security breach, which it claims to have occurred between mid-May and July 2017. The perpetrators accessed approximately 145.5 million U.S. Equifax consumer records, including their full names, Social Security numbers, birth dates, addresses, and driver license numbers. Equifax also confirmed at least 209,000 consumers' credit card credentials were stolen in the attack. On March 1, 2018, Equifax announced that 2.4 million additional U.S. customers were affected by the breach. Europe followed the pattern of all regions collectively with the average European having 1.85 experiences of privacy breaches. For North American respondents, the most common experience was the theft of credit card number, bank fraud, or purchases made from an online account (n = 217), followed by unauthorised access to an online account (169). The average North American had 1.90 experiences of privacy breaches. We used an independent two-sample t-test (Welch) to assess if there was a significant difference between regions. We found that there is not a significant difference and the null hypothesis was accepted (t = 1.08 and p = 0.29. As α = 0.05). The results are broken down by gender in Table 5.1. We expected to see a significant difference in experiences of privacy breaches between men and women, as there is some literature claiming that women are more likely to be doxxed than men, or to have private images shared online without their consent (Mantilla, 2015; Phillips, 2015). 15DATA, PRIVACY AND THE INDIVIDUAL EXPERIENCE ALL REGIONS EUROPE NORTH AMERICA FREQUENCY % FREQUENCY % FREQUENCY % Unauthorised access to my online account 481 23% 290 25% 169 21% Credit card number stolen / bank fraud / unauthorised purchases from your account 450 22% 210 18% 217 27% Being charged more for a product or service than other people 210 10% 154 13% 48 6% Someone using spyware on me 199 10% 114 10% 72 9% Someone impersonating me 173 8% 93 8% 71 9% Private emails or messages posted online without my consent 141 7% 77 7% 63 8% Public shaming online (people targeting me and shaming me for something I did or wrote, or for who I am) 132 6% 68 6% 55 7% Private images or videos posted online without my consent 129 6% 77 7% 60 7% Doxxing (private information posted online, such as my address) 91 4% 46 4% 41 5% Other (Free Text) 46 2% 27 17 2% Total 2052 1156 813 EXPERIENCE MALE FEMALE FREQUENCY % FREQUENCY % Unauthorised access to my online account 342 24% 136 22% Credit card number stolen / bank fraud / unauthorised purchases from your account 285 20% 163 26% Being charged more for a product or service than other people 156 11% 52 8% Someone using spyware on me 151 11% 47 8% Someone impersonating me 121 9% 52 8% Private emails or messages posted online without my consent 103 7% 36 6% Public shaming online (people targeting me and shaming me for something I did or wrote, or for who I am) 88 6% 43 7% Private images or videos posted online without my consent 82 6% 46 7% Doxxing (private information posted online, such as my address) 62 4% 29 5% Other (Free Text) 31 2% 15 2% Total 1421 619 In the same manner as region, we ran a t-test between self-identified men and women looking for statistically significant differences in bad privacy experiences. Whilst we did collect data for non-binary and selfdescribing individuals, not enough data was collected in order to form a comparison. We found that t = 2.49 and p = 0.02. As p was below α, we reject the null hypothesis and concluded that there is a statistically significant difference between men and women's distribution of experiences across measures. We find that 97% of women have had one of the experiences listed, with an average of 1.02 experiences. For men, these figures are 96% and 1.02 experiences respectively. There was no statistically significant difference found for education, age, income, or employment. Table 5: Experiences regarding privacy: All Regions, Europe and North America Table 5.1 Experiences regarding privacy: All Regions, By Gender 16 DATA, PRIVACY AND THE INDIVIDUAL Importance of Privacy The following tables reflect a breakdown of responses to the question "How important is privacy?". Results are broken down by region, gender, and education, as these are the characteristics thought to be most likely to have significant variations, according to the established literature. In assessing if there are regional differences in concerns regarding privacy, the results of the t-test were t = 1.08 and p = 0.04. As p was below α, the null hypothesis was rejected, and we find that there are statistically significant differences between Europeans and North Americans in how they value privacy. By examining Figure 2.2, we can see that on average North Americans seem to place a higher value on privacy than Europeans. Figure 2.1 Importance of Privacy (All respondents) Figure 2.2 Importance of Privacy: By region 43% Very 14% Moderately 39% Extremely 1% Not at all HOW IMPORTANT IS PRIVACY? 3% Slightly Extremely Very Moderately Slightly Not at all 37% 43% 15% 4% 40% 45% 12 % 2% 0 % 1% Europe (630 total) North America (427 total) 17DATA, PRIVACY AND THE INDIVIDUAL Table 6 Importance of Privacy: Education We found no significant difference between men and women (p = 0.39) regarding how important they deem privacy. Both men and women, on average, think that privacy is very important. Similarly, a survey of the literature led us to examine if there is a significant relationship between highest level of education and the importance given to privacy. A test of association (Spearman) resulted in p = 0.46, meaning that we accepted the null hypothesis that there is no statistically significant relationship between education level and belief in the importance of privacy. Further testing revealed that there is no statistically significant association between belief that privacy is important and any of the demographic factors collected, including age of respondents. Figure 2.3 Importance of Privacy: Gender 41% Extremely 44% Very 11% Moderately 3% Slightly 1% Not at all WOMEN (349 Total) 39% Extremely 43% Very 15% Moderately 3% Slightly MEN (749 Total) EDUCATION HOW IMPORTANT IS PRIVACY? EXTREMELY VERY MODERATELY SLIGHTLY NOT AT ALL Less than High School 4 3 2 0 1 High School 56 48 27 1 1 Some College 59 62 29 7 2 Associate Degree 34 32 8 4 0 Bachelor's Degree 192 224 61 16 1 Graduate Degree 87 107 27 5 1 Withheld 3 0 0 0 0 18 DATA, PRIVACY AND THE INDIVIDUAL across nearly all measures. However, change of behaviour in self averages at 3 – Undecided/Neutral; this result may be due to the statement being a bit unclear. Following Welch's t-test, we conclude that there is no statistically significant difference between regions and reasons for concern about privacy. When we conduct the test with gender, however, we find that men and women differ significantly on every measure for concern about privacy. Concerns about Privacy Concerns about privacy consisted of ten 5-point Likert scales. The full text of each of the scales is available in the Survey Design. Each statement here is an abbreviated version of the full statement displayed to participants. Whilst there is some evidence of central tendency bias (an instance of social desirability1 bias) here, overall the median and mode selection for every scale shows that in general respondents are very concerned with privacy Table 7.1 Privacy concern: All respondents and Regions REASON FOR CONCERN ABOUT PRIVACY ALL RESPONDENTS EUROPE NORTH AMERICA MO (MODE) MD (MEDIAN) MO (MODE) MD (MEDIAN) MO (MODE) MD (MEDIAN) Theft of Money 5 (Strongly Agree) 4 (Agree) 5 (Strongly Agree) 4 (Agree) 4 (Agree) 4 (Agree) Affect Credit Rating 4 (Agree) 4 (Agree) 4 (Agree) 4 (Agree) 4 (Agree) 4 (Agree) Badly Affect Reputation 4 (Agree) 4 (Agree) 4 (Agree) 4 (Agree) 4 (Agree) 4 (Agree) Used for Harm 4 (Agree) 4 (Agree) 4 (Agree) 4 (Agree) 4 (Agree) 4 (Agree) Discrimination 4 (Agree) 4 (Agree) 4 (Agree) 4 (Agree) 4 (Agree) 4 (Agree) Misused by Governments 4 (Agree) 4 (Agree) 4 (Agree) 4 (Agree) 4 (Agree) 4 (Agree) Free Speech 4 (Agree) 4 (Agree) 4 (Agree) 4 (Agree) 4 (Agree) 4 (Agree) Change Behaviour (Self) 3 (Undecided) 3 (Undecided) 3 (Undecided) 4 (Agree) 3 (Undecided) 3 (Undecided) Change Behaviour (Others) 4 (Agree) 3 (Undecided) 4 (Agree) 3 (Undecided) 3 (Undecided) 3 (Undecided) Good in Itself 4 (Agree) 4 (Agree) 4 (Agree) 4 (Agree) 4 (Agree) 4 (Agree) 1 The tendency of survey respondents to answer questions in a manner that will be viewed favourably by others. It can take the form of over emphasising or reporting 'good' behaviour, and underreporting undesirable (or 'bad') behaviour. 19DATA, PRIVACY AND THE INDIVIDUAL Table 7.2 Privacy concern: Gender Significance: p = >0.05 *, p = > 0.01 **, p = >0.001 *** Looking at the mode values displayed on table 7.2, we can see that men are more often concerned with privacy as a protector against theft of money. We focus on mode here due to its ease of interpretation as the most common rating. Moreover, the results in table 7.2 also show that, compared to men, women disagree with the idea that a loss of privacy would lead them to change their own behaviour online in negative ways. This gendered difference could be explained by women largely seen as more social and communicative online, thus feeling that this behaviour is more constant and less likely to change (Papacharissi, 2010). No significant association was found with age, education, or income. CONCERNS ABOUT PRIVACY BY AGE Analysing concerns about privacy by age, we first averaged the Privacy Concerns Likert scores into a singular Privacy Measure. We then used ANOVA (Analysis of Variance) to determine if privacy concerns vary significantly by age group. Overall, we found no significant variation between age groups. REASON FOR CONCERN ABOUT PRIVACY MEN WOMEN t-stat ß MO (MODE) MD (MEDIAN) MO (MODE) MD (MEDIAN) Theft of Money 5 (Strongly Agree) 4 (Agree) 4 (Agree) 4 (Agree) -0.50*** -0.01 Affect Credit Rating 4 (Agree) 4 (Agree) 4 (Agree) 4 (Agree) -1.76*** -0.06 Badly Affect Reputation 4 (Agree) 4 (Agree) 4 (Agree) 4 (Agree) 0.64*** 0.2 Used for Harm 4 (Agree) 4 (Agree) 4 (Agree) 4 (Agree) 1.04*** 0.05 Discrimination 4 (Agree) 4 (Agree) 4 (Agree) 4 (Agree) 0.40*** 0.01 Misused by Governments 4 (Agree) 4 (Agree) 4 (Agree) 4 (Agree) 2.45*** 0.07* Free Speech 4 (Agree) 4 (Agree) 4 (Agree) 4 (Agree) 0.39*** 0.01 Change Behaviour (Self) 3 (Undecided) 3 (Undecided) 2 (Disagree) 3 (Undecided) 4.60*** 0.14*** Change Behaviour (Others) 4 (Agree) 4 (Agree) 3 (Undecided) 3 (Undecided) 2.44*** 0.08** Good in Itself 4 (Agree) 4 (Agree) 4 (Agree) 4 (Agree) 0.77*** 0.02 20 DATA, PRIVACY AND THE INDIVIDUAL 15%25%31%22%6% 23%29%24%19%5% 17%35%30%13% 20%37%22%16% 28%36%21%12% 29%40%18%10% 28%42%17%9% 36%40%12%9% 35%43%13%6% 42%41%8%7% 11%19%29%31%11% 16%28%32%19%6% 21%32%21%19%6% 22%33%20%21% 23%34%23%16%5% 26%41%18%12% 26%42%16%13% 33%41%18%6% 37%45%11%5% 42%43%7%7% Theft of Money Credit Rating Good in Itself Reputation Cause Harm Misused Government Discrimination Online Speech Negative Behaviour Change (Others) Negative Behaviour Change (Self) Theft of Money Credit Rating Good in Itself Reputation Cause Harm Misused Government Discrimination Online Speech Negative Behaviour Change (Others) Negative Behaviour Change (Self) 50% 50% 0% 0% 50% 50% 100% 100% P ri v a c y C o n ce rn s: M a le R e sp o n d e n ts P ri v a c y C o n ce rn s: F e m a le R e sp o n d e n ts 42%42%8%7% 35%42%15%6% 36%42%12%8% 27%42%18%10% 28%41%17%11% 26%35%22%13% 21%36%22%17% 17%33%31%15%5% 23%30%23%19%5% 14%23%30%25%7% Theft of Money Credit Rating Good in Itself Reputation Cause Harm Misused Government Discrimination Online Speech Negative Behaviour Change (Others) Negative Behaviour Change (Self)P ri v a c y C o n ce rn s: A ll R e sp o n d e n ts 4% 4% 3% 3% 2% 2% 2% Strongly Disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree Undecided 2% 2% 3% 3% 3% 4% 4% 4% 4% 1% 2% 2% 3% 3% Figure 3 Privacy concerns 5-Point Likert 21DATA, PRIVACY AND THE INDIVIDUAL Violations to the Right to Privacy This measure is a 5-point Likert scale, which states "violations to the right to privacy are one of the most important dangers that citizens face in the digital age". We found no statistically significant association between this measure and gender, region, age, income, education, or employment. Figure 4 Violations to the right to privacy are one of the most important dangers that citizens face in the digital age 34,93% Strongly Agree 0,45% Strongly Disagree 53,76% Agree 6,70% Undecided 4,16% Disagree 22 DATA, PRIVACY AND THE INDIVIDUAL Is Privacy a Right? This question simply asked respondents if they believe privacy was a right or not. As expected, a vast majority (97%) believed that privacy is a right. This pattern held across demographics. Figure 5.1 Is privacy a right? All respondents Figure 5.2 Is privacy a right? By gender Figure 5.3 Is privacy a right? By region 97% YES 1% Prefer not to say 2% NO TOTAL 1107 RESPONDENTS Europe (630 total) North America (427 total) 96%97% 3% 1%2% 1% YES NO Prefer not to say MEN (749 Total) WOMEN (349 Total) 1% Prefer Not to Say 97% YES 2% NO 2% NO 23DATA, PRIVACY AND THE INDIVIDUAL The Use of Personal Data By Companies Table 10.1 shows the average choices for all respondents on a collection of 5-point Likert scales regarding companies' use of personal data. The exact wording of these questions can be found in the survey design section. The measures show some interesting dichotomies. For example, whilst it is generally agreed that it is acceptable to use personal data to personalise advertisements (43%), people tend to think it is unacceptable to use this data to influence purchases (57%). There are other interesting tensions, such as a 12% increase in dis-agreement with using personal data to investigate current employees (55% disagree and strongly disagree), compared to investigating prospective employees (43% disagree and strongly disagree). Table 8.1 Companies' use of personal data: All respondents USE OF PERSONAL DATA MO (MODE) MD (MEDIAN) Sell to Third Parties 1 (Strongly Disagree) 2 (Disagree) Personalise Ads 4 (Agree) 3 (Neutral/Undecided) Price Discrimination 1 (Strongly Disagree) 1 (Strongly Disagree) Develop New Products 4 (Agree) 4 (Agree) Investigate Prospective Employees 4 (Agree) 3 (Neutral/Undecided) Investigate Current Employees 1 (Strongly Disagree) 2 (Disagree) Predict Behaviour 2 (Disagree) 2 (Disagree) Influence Purchases 2 (Disagree) 2 (Disagree) Influence Voting 1 (Strongly Disagree) 1 (Strongly Disagree) 24 DATA, PRIVACY AND THE INDIVIDUAL Table 8.2 Companies' use of personal data: By region An independent t-test of Europe and North America (Table 8.2) shows that the continents differ significantly on each measure of companies' use of personal data. Below are divergent stacked bar chart of each of the measures, separated by region. USE OF PERSONAL DATA EUROPE NORTH AMERICA t-stat ß MO (MODE) MD (MEDIAN) MO (MODE) MD (MEDIAN) Sell to Third Parties 1 (Strongly Disagree) 2 (Disagree) 1 (Strongly Disagree) 2 (Disagree) -3.08*** 0.10** Personalise Ads 4 (Agree) 3 (Undecided) 4 (Agree) 3 (Undecided) 0.43*** -0.01 Price Discrimination 1 (Strongly Disagree) 1 (Strongly Disagree) 1 (Strongly Disagree) 1 (Strongly Disagree) -2.04*** 0.08* Develop New Products 4 (Agree) 4 (Agree) 4 (Agree) 3 (Undecided) 4.02*** -0.13*** Investigate Prospective Employees 4 (Agree) 3 (Undecided) 2 (Disagree) 3 (Undecided) 1.82*** -0.05 Investigate Current Employees 1 (Strongly Disagree) 2 (Disagree) 2 (Disagree) 2 (Disagree) -2.36*** 0.07* Predict Behaviour 2 (Disagree) 3 (Undecided) 1 (Strongly Disagree) 2 (Disagree) 0.70*** -0.20 Influence Purchases 2 (Disagree) 2 (Disagree) 2 (Disagree) 2 (Disagree) 0.10*** -0.01 Influence Voting 1 (Strongly Disagree) 1 (Strongly Disagree) 1 (Strongly Disagree) 1 (Strongly Disagree) -2.73*** 0.09** Significance: p = >0.05 *, p = > 0.01 **, p = >0.001 *** 25DATA, PRIVACY AND THE INDIVIDUAL 100% 50% 0% 50% P e rs o n a l d a ta u se s: E u ro p e P e rs o n a l d a ta u se s: N o rt h A m e ri c a P e rs o n a l d a ta u se s: A ll r e sp o n d e n ts Strongly Disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree Undecided 50%0%50%100% Figure 6 Personal data uses 5-Point Likert 13%44%24%13%6% 6%37%25%20%12% 7%28%22%24%19% 7%19%24%26%24% 7%18%20%27%28% 6%16%21%32%25% 6%10%9%30%46% 11%9%16%59% 5%9%11%22%54% 13%36%27%17%8% 8%32%27%19%14% 8%23%20%27%22% 9%18%21%26%27% 10%17%19%28%26% 7%15%20%32%26% 7%12%8%30%42% 6%12%9%16%56% 7%9%9%22%52% 4% 4% 14%48%23%10%5% 5%38%24%21%12% 6%31%23%22%19% 6%21%24%27%22% 5%17%21%31%25% 18%19%27%31% 9%11%22%55% 9%10%16%62% 9%9%29%49% 4% 3% 3% Develop New Products Personalise Ads Investigate Prospective Employees Predict Behaviour Investigate Current Employees Influence Purchases Sell to Third Parties Influence Voting Price Discrimination Develop New Products Personalise Ads Investigate Prospective Employees Predict Behaviour Investigate Current Employees Influence Purchases Sell to Third Parties Influence Voting Price Discrimination Develop New Products Personalise Ads Investigate Prospective Employees Predict Behaviour Investigate Current Employees Influence Purchases Sell to Third Parties Influence Voting Price Discrimination 26 DATA, PRIVACY AND THE INDIVIDUAL Trust in Companies Figure 7.1 lists the statistically significant positive associations (Pearson's) between trust in different companies. The strongest association (0.78) is between Facebook and Instagram, which is likely due to the fact that Facebook is Instagram's parent company. All of the correlations are positive and relatively strong. The exact wording of these questions can be found in the survey design section. These questions consisted of Variable Attributed Scales (VAS) that were labeled from 0 – I don't trust them at all to 10 – I trust them completely. Respondents were asked to rate each company. Std refers to the Standard Deviation, or a how much the members (95%) of a group differ from the mean value for the group. In table 9.1 we can see that the least trusted platform is Facebook, followed by Snapchat (which also had the most consensus), Instagram and Twitter. Google sits in about the middle of the group, with Amazon and Apple as the most trusted. The respondents surveyed rated Amazon almost twice as trustworthy, on average, than Facebook. Figure 7.1 Heat Map of Trust in Companies: All Regions Table 9.1 Trust in Companies: All Respondents COMPANY RESPONSES MEAN std Facebook 1101 2.75 3.01 Twitter 1101 3.84 2.81 Instagram 1102 3.39 2.92 Snapchat 1099 3.23 2.70 Google 1102 4.47 3.18 Amazon 1102 5.15 3.05 Apple 1099 5.03 3.11 1.0 0.5 0.75 0.25 0.69 0.78 0.74 0.67 0.7 0.72 0.66 0.68 0.65 0.58 0.6 0.65 0.64 0.57 0.77 0.51 0.6 0.52 0.54 0.62 0.68 Facebook Instagram Snapchat Google Amazon Apple Twitter F a ce b o o k In st a g ra m S n a p c h a t G o o g le A m a zo n A p p le Tw it te r 27DATA, PRIVACY AND THE INDIVIDUAL 1.0 0.5 0.75 0.25 Figure 7.3 Heat Map of Trust in Companies: North America Figure 7.2 Heat Map of Trust in Companies: Europe Table 9.3 Trust in Companies: North America Table 9.2 Trust in Companies: Europe It is worth highlighting that even the companies with the highest rating for trust, still only reach the halfway mark of our scale for all respondents and regions. This finding is an indicative of low trust in companies. We also found statistically significant differences between Europe and North America, The HeatMaps and significant correlation coefficients are displayed in Figures 7.2 and 7.3. Table 9.2 shows that Europeans trust Facebook the least, and trust in Amazon and Apple is twice as high. In North America, each company receives a lower average trust rating than in Europe, again with Facebook and Apple at opposite ends of the scale. For North America, not a single company passes over midpoint of the scale, which indicates low trust. COMPANY RESPONSES MEAN std Facebook 424 3.15 3.36 Twitter 424 3.84 3.05 Instagram 424 3.55 3.10 Snapchat 424 3.29 2.94 Google 424 4.68 3.36 Amazon 424 4.93 3.15 Apple 423 4.73 3.25 COMPANY RESPONSES MEAN std Facebook 627 2.46 2.71 Twitter 627 3.84 2.64 Instagram 628 3.25 2.77 Snapchat 625 3.15 2.53 Google 628 4.36 3.06 Amazon 628 5.27 3.00 Apple 626 5.15 3.02 0.63 0.74 0.68 0.63 0.62 0.67 0.58 0.64 0.6 0.53 0.53 0.6 0.58 0.54 0.75 0.45 0.56 0.47 0.5 0.6 0.67 Facebook Instagram Snapchat Google Amazon Apple Twitter 1.0 0.5 0.75 0.25 0.77 0.82 0.82 0.72 0.79 0.79 0.73 0.74 0.71 0.65 0.7 0.72 0.71 0.61 0.82 0.6 0.66 0.6 0.61 0.69 0.69 Facebook Instagram Snapchat Google Amazon Apple Twitter F a ce b o o k In st a g ra m S n a p c h a t G o o g le A m a zo n A p p le Tw it te r F a ce b o o k In st a g ra m S n a p c h a t G o o g le A m a zo n A p p le Tw it te r 28 DATA, PRIVACY AND THE INDIVIDUAL Trust in Institutions In the same manner as our question regarding companies, this question consisted of Variable Attributed Scales (VAS) that were labeled from 0 – I don't trust them at all to 10 – I trust them completely. The least trusted institution is the government, followed by Internet Service Providers (ISPs). Local shops are more trusted, relatively, followed by employers and banks, with healthcare providers as the most trusted. On average, institutions rated as more trustworthy than companies. In comparing the two scales, we can see that in general Amazon and Apple are trusted more than the government. There was no significant difference (t-test) between men and women, or by region. Figure 8 Heat Map of Trust in Institutions: All Regions Table 10 Trust in Institutions: All Regions INSTITUTION COUNT MEAN std ISP 1104 4.74 2.80 Banks 1103 6.69 2.57 Healthcare Provider 1103 6.71 2.47 Local Shops 1102 5.66 2.58 Employer 1102 6.36 2.49 Government 1098 4.50 2.95 0.56 0.45 0.62 0.33 0.23 0.3 0.41 0.45 0.51 0.43 0.55 0.43 0.39 0.26 0.45 ISP Healthcare Provider Local Shops Employer Government Banks IS P H e a lt h c a re P ro v id e r Lo c a l S h o p s E m p lo ye r G o ve rn m e n t B a n k s 1.0 0.5 0.75 0.25 29DATA, PRIVACY AND THE INDIVIDUAL Government Collection of Data BULK COLLECTION OF PERSONAL DATA In table 11.1, we can see that the majority of respondents believe that governments should not be allowed to collect everyone's personal data. Europeans are more likely than North Americans to find some uses of personal data collection acceptable. CIRCUMSTANCES This measure is a multiple choice question asking under what circumstances it is considered acceptable for the government to bulk collect everyone's personal data. The catching of criminals and prevention of serious crimes are generally considered to be the most acceptable use of personal data by governments. However, no use of personal data receives even 50% support from respondents. This is likely due to the low trust in governments that was outlined in Table 10. Table 11.1 Bulk Collection of Personal Data: By Region Table 11.2 Governments' use of personal data: Region ALL REGIONS Europe North America No, governments should not be allowed to collect everyone's data for any purpose, they should only be allowed to collect the data of criminal suspects. 603 55% 333 53% 247 58% Yes, there are some uses of these data that are necessary and acceptable 450 41% 270 43% 162 38% Prefer not to say 47 4% 24 4% 17 4% TOTAL 1100 627 426 ALL REGIONS Europe North America Catch criminals of serious crimes 748 29% 471 28% 240 32% Prevent serious crimes 625 24% 415 25% 175 23% Make sure that people are paying their taxes 415 16% 279 17% 119 16% Catch criminals of petty (minor) crimes 273 11% 193 12% 62 8% Prevent petty (minor) crimes 226 9% 163 10% 45 6% Predict how people will vote 123 5% 65 4% 53 7% Predict whether people will protest 82 3% 44 3% 35 5% Try to influence how people will vote 61 2% 28 2% 32 4% TOTAL 2553 1658 761 30 DATA, PRIVACY AND THE INDIVIDUAL Price of Privacy PAY FOR ACCESS Participants were asked whether they would be willing to give companies access to their personal data in exchange for money. Table 12.1 shows that, on average, respondents are not willing to surrender their privacy for a fee2. Europeans are less likely than North Americans to surrender their personal data. Table 12.2 shows the figure (USD) that respondents state they would have to be paid per month in order for companies to have access to their private data. In general, we can see that the figures here are very high. One way to interpret the very high values is to think that participants who entered very high values think privacy is so precious that they are not willing to consider it within a monetary framework. Even when we trim the mean, the amounts are reasonably high, in the hundreds, nearly a thousand, dollars. Table 12.1 Pay for access to personal data: Region Table 12.2 Pay for access: Amount by region3 ALL REGIONS Europe North America I would surrender my personal data for a fee 473 43% 260 41% 192 45% I would not surrender my personal data for a fee 631 58% 368 59% 234 55% TOTAL 1104 628 427 COUNT Mean Median MIN 25% 50% 75% max Trimmed mean (0.1) Europe 258 9649 300 1 100 300 1000 500,000 958 America 189 4406 500 1 50 500 1000 100,000 768.07 TOTAL 468 7936 450 1 87.5 450 1000 500,000 954.40 2 Pay for Access is recoded into a binary variable for the sake of simplicity. The original form of the answer offered several justifications behind not considering payment for surrendering privacy or a fee for securing privacy. 3 Since the results of this table and the next are a fat-tailed distribution, standard deviation is not a meaningful way to calculate variance, which is the reason why we have omitted it in this table and the next (14.3, 14.4). 31DATA, PRIVACY AND THE INDIVIDUAL PAY FOR DELETION This measure referred to respondents paying a monthly rate (USD) to have their personal data protected and deleted. The clear majority of participants would not pay to secure their personal data. Overall, North Americans were more likely to pay to secure their privacy than Europeans. Unsurprisingly, the amounts that respondents gave for the figure they would be willing to pay to have their personal data is lower than the average figures for third parties to pay for access. Perhaps the most interesting figure here is that Americans are will to pay nearly twice as much (USD) as Europeans to have their personal data deleted. It is worth noting that the n for the t-test is relatively small, however, an a-priori analysis dictated that it was more than sufficient. Table 12.3 Pay to delete personal data: Region Table 12.4 Pay to delete personal data: Amount by region ALL REGIONS Europe North America Nothing. Privacy is a right and I don't think we should need to pay for it 803 73% 477 76% 288 68% I would pay a specified amount. 205 19% 109 17% 90 21% Nothing. I'm not worried about online platforms holding my personal data 96 9% 42 7% 48 11% TOTAL 1104 628 426 COUNT Mean Median MIN 25% 50% 75% max Trimmed mean (0.1) Europe 108 278 10 0 5 10 46 15,000 20.25 America 88 1579 25 0 10 25 77.50 100,000 54.95 TOTAL 202 1579 14 0 5 14 50 15,000 29.54 32 DATA, PRIVACY AND THE INDIVIDUAL Comparison with Previous Work These measures were built from previous work by Winegar and Sunstein (2019) on the value placed on privacy among Americans. In their study the authors examine how much consumers value privacy by using metrics of willingness to pay (WTP) or willingness to accept (WTA) third party access. They find that the median participant is willing to pay $5 a month to maintain data privacy (to delete their data from all parties that have it), but demands a significant amount more ($80) to allow access to their personal data.4 Winegar and Sunstein (2019) argue that this disparity is indicative of a super-endowment effect, according to which individuals are much more likely to try and hold on to what they do have, rather than attempting to acquire it from other parties. In other words, individuals want to hold onto the privacy they do have (as a right), but are unwilling to make financial concessions to achieve more privacy. Like Winegar and Sunstein (2019), our survey found that the figures submitted as an indicator of pay for access (WTA) were unlikely to be practical amounts that respondents were willing and able to pay. The entering of a value here is expressive, that is, a protest answer against the stipulation of the worth of privacy in the question. Our data also supported their finding that WTA is much higher than WTP for mean and median. Whilst Winegar and Sunstein (2019) found that 14% of respondents were not willing to pay anything for data privacy, our data shows that the vast majority of respondents were not willing, with only 19% prepared to pay for protecting their personal data. Winegar and Sunstein's (2019) result could be explained somewhat by the fact that their sample was completely American. Our data shows that when a comparison is drawn between Europe and North America, Europeans are more likely to consider their privacy a right and not be willing to pay for it. This difference is also noticeable in the average amount that North Americans and Europeans provide for WTA. Americans ask for 150% of what Europeans request for access to personal data. 4 While we also found that people ask more money to allow access to their personal data than what they are willing to pay to delete their data, the figures in our analysis are much higher than those of Winegar and Sunstein. The reason for this discrepancy is likely to be in how we handled outliers (i.e., people who responded with extremely high values). Winegar and Sunstein did the following to standardise responses: 'To determine a threshold at which to cut off responses, we took the 99th percentile of income in 2017, which IPUMS reported as roughly $300,000 per individual (IPUMS-USA). This equates to roughly $25,000 per month, and since it seems unlikely that participants would actually be willing and able to pay this amount (only 40 respondents of the 2,416 reported household income over $200,000 per year), we converted any amount of willingness to pay greater than $25,000 to $25,000.' They did the same with willingness to accept, for symmetry. Given that MTurk workers have an income lower than the national average, we had doubts about the meaningfulness of using IPUMS data. Instead, we trimmed the mean. It is likely that people who entered high numbers (even those much lower than $25,000) are not willing to pay that amount for privacy, and they might not realistically expect to receive that amount for giving up their privacy. Even then, however, the values entered are still a reflection of the value people place on privacy, albeit it might be a reflection that goes beyond their monetary framework. 33DATA, PRIVACY AND THE INDIVIDUAL Regarding paying to delete personal data (WTP), we found higher median amounts for all regions. Winegar and Sunstein (2019) found that the average (median) that respondents were willing to pay was $5 per month. However, our data shows that Europeans are willing to pay $10 and Americans are willing to pay $25. What is particularly interesting here is that Americans are willing to pay 250% the amount than Europeans to have their personal data deleted. The overall finding here is that in general Americans are more likely to consider their personal data privacy for sale than Europeans. This results in a higher value placed on payment for access to their personal data, but also a higher value they are willing to pay in order to protect it. Our findings support Winegar and Sunstein's (2019) doubts that users are making trade-offs when exchanging personal data for free platform use, and that consumers lack clear information on what happens with their personal data on platforms. As speculated in their study, we find significant evidence of regional variation. In particular, Europeans are more likely than Americans to see privacy as a right. EUROPEANS ARE MORE LIKELY THAN AMERICANS TO SEE PRIVACY AS A RIGHT. 34 DATA, PRIVACY AND THE INDIVIDUAL Berinsky, A. J., Huber, G. A., & Lenz, G. S. (2012). Evaluating online labor markets for experimental research: Amazon.com's mechanical turk. Political Analysis, 20(3), 351–368. https://doi.org/10.1093/pan/mpr057 Buhrmester, M., Kwang, T., & Gosling, S. D. (2011). Amazon's Mechanical Turk: A New Source of Inexpensive, Yet High-Quality, Data? Perspectives on Psychological Science: A Journal of the Association for Psychological Science, 6(1), 3–5. https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691610393980 Casler, K., Bickel, L., & Hackett, E. (2013). Separate but equal? A comparison of participants and data gathered via Amazon's MTurk, social media, and face-to-face behavioral testing. Computers in Human Behavior, 29(6), 2156–2160. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chb.2013.05.009 Dawes, J. (2008). Do data characteristics change according to the number of scale points used? An experiment using 5-point, 7-point and 10-point scales. In International Journal of Market Research (Vol. 50). Mantilla, K. (2015). Gendertrolling: How Misogyny Went Viral. Santa Barbara: ABC CLIO. Papacharissi, Z. (2010). A Networked Self. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203876527 Phillips, W. (2015). This is why we can't have nice things: mapping the relationship between online trolling and mainstream culture (Vol. 0777). https://doi.org/10.1080/14680777.2016.1213581 Winegar, A. G., & Sunstein, C. R. (2019). How Much Is Data Privacy Worth? A Preliminary Investigation. Journal of Consumer Policy, 42(3), 425–440. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10603-019-09419-y BIBLIOGRAPHY Carissa Véliz, University of Oxford Siân Brooke, University of Oxford RECOMMENDED CITATION: Brooke, Sian and Véliz, Carissa, Data, Privacy & The Individual. Madrid: Center for the Governance of Change, IE University, 2020 The opinions expressed in this document are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of Telefónica. © 2020 CGC Madrid, Spain AUTHORS: This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercialShareAlike 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-SA 4.0) License. To view a copy of the license, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0 36 www.cgc.ie.edu

So Goes the Nation? R E V I E W B Y M I K E D O A N The Fifty Year Rebellion by Scott Kurashige; University of California Press, 2017 The Fifty-Year Rebellion invites us to consider Detroit's recent history as both epitomizing and shaping national trends. But it's not the kind of invitation we've all grown used to. We've heard the warnings: Detroit is America's "canary in the coal mine," signaling to the rest of the country how toxic the air is growing. And since the birthplace of the American Dream is now the poster-child of post-industrial decline, we've all heard how, "as goes Detroit, so goes the nation." These clichés are usually wielded as counsels of despair. Not only do they cast Detroit as a place consumed by doom and gloom, they also strip us all of our agency, conjuring images of an unavoidable spiral into unemployment, neighborhoods ravaged by school closings, water shutoffs, shuttered houses, broken promises and shattered dreams. Far less common are reminders that Detroit is the home of incalculable collective power- a place brimming with the brilliance of visionary organizers, the seedbed of so many other ways to keep on going on, quietly sowing and growing together. As Grace Lee Boggs once put it, Detroiters have long been "very conscious of our city as a movement city." In The Fifty-Year Rebellion, Scott Kurashige skillfully reinvigorates this consciousness, teaching us to think about the overlapping crises of our city, country, and planet from below. From this vantage point, systematic disinvestment, emergency management, and bankruptcy are all part of a decades-long effort to stamp out the liberatory energies that erupted in '67, and are still pulsing through the city today. These Mike Doan is a community-based activist in Detroit where he has lived for five years. He works with Detroiters REsisting Emergency Management, the Detroit Independent Freedom Schools Movement and the Boggs Center To Nurture Community Leadership. He is also a Professor of Philosophy. are reactions born of white fear and feelings of growing irrelevancy on the part of the capitalist class: fear of black political power, of the collective strength of workers, and of the swagger of Detroiters demonstrating more humane ways of surviving and thriving together while capitalism writhes and dies in the background. Long before the election of Donald Trump- who rode a groundswell of right-wing populism, racism, and xenophobia, promising to "make America great again"-Detroiters were plenty familiar with forced "revitalization" in the name of former greatness. As Kurashige points out, many key elements that marked the rise of Trump had already facilitated the state takeover, the bankruptcy of Detroit, and the corporate restructuring of the city: voter disenfranchisement, the gutting of workers' rights, the pillaging of public goods and institutions, and authoritarian rule by superwealthy "outsiders" (Snyder as Michigan's Trump). Kurashige develops three key arguments: first, the "counter-revolution" we are confronting is a reaction to a 50-year rebellion; second, the overlapping political and economic crises confronting us today are a product of the neoliberal turn; and third, despite the immense hardships its peoples have endured, Detroit remains most significant as a city of hope. There is much to be rejected in the age of emergency managers and gameshow presidents. Nevertheless, Kurashige emphasizes that Detroit's visionary organizers "have moved from the 'rejections' defining the stage of rebellion to the 'projections' necessary to revolutionize the way we live, work, and sustain community." Growing food in vacant lots and producing life's necessities with community-based technologies "can offer the proletariat a new method to own the means of production"-if only the city's devalued lands can be protected and preserved while Detroiters continue "building the social consciousness and relationships necessary to unleash the greatest potential of the post-industrial epoch." Ultimately, the decades-long battle to redefine and reshape Detroit "provides a window into the epochal conflict between two alternative futures": one characterized by authoritarian rule by the superwealthy, the other by the steady spread of participatory democracy. Insofar as Detroit's most creative organizers are helping to tip the scales towards the more promising of the two futures, it is because they embody "an intercommunal form of localism that seeks to connect with place-based struggles around the globe that refuse to be absorbed into a dehumanizing and unsustainable system." This is a book to be shared with everyone hoping to keep tipping the scales. It helpfully heals historical amnesia, centers everyday people as creators of change, and moves us next to each other, where we keep turning to turn things around. A BOU T T H E BACK COV ER A RT IST Ash Arder is a Detroit-based, interdisciplinary artist and designer who creates objects and experiences that investigate and re-imagine the relationship between people and natural environments. This work relies on the cultivation and research of live plants throughout each stage of their lifecycle, including the process and potential of plants to create fiber and other industrial materials. Ash combines personal memories with fictional narratives to create future worlds and scenarios that challenge the way objects are consumed and used. "Each work depicts stinging nettle in some way. I forage for the plants in Detroit and then hand process them into fiber. Some of these works explore alternative ways of growing the nettle, and others make use of the fiber and/or the byproduct of the fiber-making process." Cabinet, 2016, Materials: mixed media Pulp studies, 2016 Materials: stinging nettle pulp r i v e r w i s e m a g a z i n e s u m m e r 2 0 1

Husserl's Phenomenological Theory of Intuition chad kidd 1. evidence, intuition, and knowledge The central theme of Husserl's phenomenology is the phenomenal intentionality of consciousness or the fact that our experiences seem, from the inside, to be directed beyond themselves in a way that makes the external world manifest.1 In Husserl's view, this experiential fact is the most fundamental phenomenological fact there is. As such, intentionality serves as a starting point in phenomenological description of all our experience.2 And it is for this reason that the descriptive elucidation of intentionality from the first-person perspective in experience is the centerpiece of Husserl's theory of the nature and possibility of knowledge. Husserl's conception of knowledge stands squarely in the Kantian tradition, which understands knowledge as the product of intuition and concept. The correlate of this duality in Husserl's phenomenological philosophy is the descriptive phenomenological difference between an act of "empty" intentional meaning (Meinung) and "fulfilling" intuition (Anschauung). The epistemological feature that fulfilling intuition lends to the act of meaning in the unity of an act of knowing is what Husserl calls "evidence" (Evidenz). This term is often translated into English as "self-evidence." The reason for this is that "evidence" is a feature of consciousness that lends justification to cognitive states without having justification previously conferred upon it; states of consciousness with "evidence" are intrinsically justified in an immediate, non-inferential way without also being infallible or absolutely indefeasible.3 Evidence is to be understood as a feature that is conferred upon acts of pure meaning by being brought into union with a sensuously intuitive act in an act of "fulfillment" (Erfüllung). And an act of fulfillment is an act that brings an act of pure meaning into a non-inferential union with a sensuously intuitive act in a way that confers the evidence of the intuitive act on the act of meaning. Thus, 131 evidence must be distinguished from "justification," where this term is understood to be a feature derived from (inferential) relations with beliefs.4 Suppose I believe the honeysuckle inmy yard is blooming. All I have here is the performance of an act of meaning: a warranted thought that intends the relevant state of affairs. Now suppose I go into my yard and see the bushes covered in newly blossoming honeysuckle. "Where this happens," Husserl says, "we experience a descriptively peculiar consciousness of fulfillment: the act of puremeaning, like a goal-seeking intention, finds its fulfillment in the act which renders the matter intuitive" (LI VI §8, p. 694). What the intuitional component in an act of knowing delivers is an awareness of the "thing itself" that satisfies the intentional content of the act of meaning: an awareness of the object "in the flesh" (leibhaft), "with intuitive fullness," actually now here before me, just as it is meant or intended in the act (cf., LI VI §16, pp. 719– 720, TS §§4–5). Throughout Husserl's writings, there is a consistent observation of the essential distinction between the act, the act's intentional content, and its object (given that it has one). In LI, it is clear that what Husserl calls the "matter" of an act is an element in the subject's psychological activity by virtue of which it is intentionally directed to its object (LI V §20). Drawing on the mereological theory of dependence outlined in LI III, we might say that thematter is a dependent part of the psychological event that represents the relevant object (in this case, the honeysuckle itself), in other words, a part of the psychological act that cannot exist without the act of which it is a part.5 Thus, the matter is distinct from the object itself, which is represented in the act; it is distinct from the ideal "meaning content" itself, of which the matter is an instance. The ideal meaning can be expressed as what is believed, seen, imagined, remembered, desired, and so on, from the firstperson perspective in the experience. And in the following I will sometimes express the meaning of the act in this way. However, it should be observed that this is different from mentioning the object of the experience itself.6 Later, in Ideas, Husserl modified this view, drawing a further distinction between the ideal essence of the intrinsic features of an act of consciousness (the noesis) and the ideal essence of the meaning of the act (the noema). I will discuss this modification further in section 3. Until then, for simplicity, I will follow the usage of LI, referring to the intrinsic intentional feature of the act as the "matter," the ideal meaning of the act as the "meaning," and the object the act is directed upon as the "object." Acts with the structure of fulfillment constitute knowledge. Every part of the expansive body of human knowledge, in Husserl's view, finds its origins in some act of fulfillment, be it in my own personal psychological 132 Chad Kidd history or in that of some other individual or group of individuals that has been handed down in scientific practice and culture. And so, every part of human knowledge is, in some way, "founded" on the sensuous components of acts of fulfillment. But, as I will discuss in greater detail later, there are a variety of different ways in which acts of knowledge can be founded on (or dependent on) sensuous, straightforward perceptual intuition of individual objects. Some forms of foundation are epistemic in character, where the evidence associated with the bit of knowledge derives directly from the sensuous perceptual act, for example, in the unity of an act of fulfillment. Other forms of foundation are non-epistemological or merely ontological, where the evidence of the belief does not derive from the sensuous perceptual experience, but could not be without the existence of the perceptual experience: for example, I couldn't have an intuitive awareness of the essential truth that red is a color if it weren't for my sensuous awareness of red objects, even though the evidence associated with my belief in this essential truth does not depend on the evidence associated with my beliefs about individual red objects. Husserl distinguishes at least three different kinds of fulfillment, each of which is founded on sensuous perceptual experience in different ways: an act of "straightforward" perceptual intuition, which is a direct and de re awareness of individual objects and their dependent parts (or "moments"); a "synthetic" categorial intuition of states of affairs (or of individual objects and properties bound together by ideal categorial forms); and an "essential intuition" (Wesenschau) or "ideation" that is a direct awareness of ideal essences and categorial forms themselves. Husserl also distinguishes at least three grades of evidence to be found among these three different kinds of intuitive fulfillment (CM §6). Some acts of fulfillment yield absolutely certain or "apodictic" evidence. This constitutes the ideal of self-evident knowledge: (i) it is completely "adequate," in other words, the intuitive givenness of an item just as it is meant, for every aspect which is meant; and (ii) the evidence is indefeasible, that is, the object cannot conceivably be otherwise than as it is meant and intuited in the act. The next level down is what Husserl calls "adequate" fulfillment.7 It involves an element (i) of the apodictic grade of fulfillment, but it lacks feature (ii). Rather, it is only conditionally or defeasibly certain: its object could be other than it is meant and intuited in the act; and it has a kind of evidence that can be overturned by the course of further experience. The lowest grade of fulfillment is like adequate fulfillment in that it too is defeasible, but it also lacks the achievement of adequacy. Instead, it yields an intuitive presentation that fulfills only part of the total intentional matter of the act. Husserl's Phenomenological Theory of Intuition 133 By combining these distinctions, Husserl reinscribes the Aristotelian conception of the regionality of evidence within his phenomenological epistemology. For it is a view that takes seriously the idea that "it is the mark of an educated man to look for precision in each class of things just so far as the nature of the subject admits" (Nichomachean Ethics, 1094b24–5; cf., Ideas §§13, 73–5). It does not try to press all forms of knowledge and evidence into one mold. Instead, it understands each grade of evidence as constitutive of a different grade of intuitive fulfillment and a different variety of knowledge, which is founded on sensuous experience in a way that is appropriate to its epistemic essence. So, even though Husserl's view of the origins of evidence contains resounding "echoes of British empiricism," as Emmanuel Levinas (1995, p. 71) put it – the strongest of which is Husserl's belief that all evidence comes on a foundation of sensuous experience – and even though Husserl is fond of drawing out parallels between his approach to epistemological issues and the method of skeptical doubt taken by Descartes, we should be careful to distinguish Husserl's views from the foundationalist views of these two traditions. For, unlike the Cartesian approach, Husserl does not attempt to found all knowledge on an apodictically certain foundation. And, unlike the empiricist approach, he does not try to reduce all evidence to that kind that derives from sense experience. 2. "coincidence" and fulfillment In this section, I attempt to bring the structure of fulfillment into sharper focus before outlining the distinguishing phenomenological characteristics of the three different kinds of intuitive fulfillment found in straightforward perceptual experience (section 3), synthetic categorial intuition (section 4), and essential intuition (section 5). Husserl understands acts of fulfillment to be acts that bring two phenomenologically distinct kinds of act – an act of pure meaning and an intuitive act – into a "unity of identity" (LI VI §8, p. 696). This unity of identity is constituted in a higher-order act of recognition of the "congruence" or "coincidence" (Deckung) of the meanings in the act of pure meaning and the intuitive act. In other words, it is a recognition that "the semantic essence of the signitive (or expressive) act reappears identically in corresponding intuitive acts, despite phenomenological differences on either side" (LI VI §28, p. 744). Or, in cases of inadequate forms of intuitive fulfillment, coincidence consists in the partial identity of the semantic essences of the intuitive and meaning acts. An act of fulfillment is essentially 134 Chad Kidd a "founded" act, in other words, a kind of act that ontologically depends on another act (cf., LI III, chapter 1). Now, as previously mentioned, Husserl's epistemology is Kantian in the sense that knowledge is to be understood as the function of an act of meaning and an act of intuition. So one way to bring the structure of fulfillment into sharper focus is to bring out the phenomenological differences between the two founding acts. Consider again my belief that the honeysuckle is blooming and the intuitive presentation of the blooming honeysuckle in perception. Husserl suggests that there are two key phenomenological differences between these founding acts, as they are experienced independently of synthesis in fulfillment: (1) A qualitative experiential difference: in intuition, the relevant object is presented with "bodily presence" (Leibhaftigkeit), the quality of an object's being actually now, here, before me.8 In thinking that the honeysuckle is in bloom, in contrast, I am not necessarily presented with any particular kind of sensuous quality or imagery. (2) A non-qualitative experiential difference: in thinking of an object, it is phenomenologically evident that I am engaged in an intentional activity of "bringing the object to thought" or of directing my mind toward some object. However, in perceiving an object, I do not necessarily have an intention to bring some particular to mind. Rather, the object is simply present to me in perceptual consciousness, without a prior intention aimed at it in the course of my perceptual activity. Husserl calls the feature of intuitive acts that is responsible for the qualitative difference from acts of mere meaning the "representative" (Repräsentant) content or (in later work) the "hyletic data" of an intuitive act (LI VI §55, p. 807; Ideas §85). This sensuous content is different from the intentional content of an act. Its presence in experience does not make a direct contribution to what is sensuously intended in the act. It is not an intrinsically intentional feature of experience. Rather, the representative content makes a contribution to meaning only "in and with the interpretation put upon" it in the act (LI VI §22, pp. 730–731). This combination of sensuous data and interpretative content constitutes a sensuously constrained meaning intrinsic to the intuitive act. Husserl calls this the "intuitive substance" or "intuitive content" (Gehalt) of an act of intuition (LIVI §22).9 It is the "coincidence" of the intuitive content and thematter of the act of meaning that is recognized by the founded higher-order act in an act of fulfillment. Husserl's Phenomenological Theory of Intuition 135 This touches on the second, non-qualitative difference between acts of meaning and intuitive acts. Intuitive acts have an intentional matter (and an intentional essence) that are constitutive of their intuitive content. But this intentional matter shares an "essential, internal" relation with the representative content in the unity that these constitute in the intuitive content of the intuitive act (LIVI §26, pp. 740–741). In LI, Husserl characterizes this as a relation of resemblance (ibid). However, this is not true of an act of pure meaning. It is true that we always find these acts "clinging to some intuitive basis" (LI VI §25, p. 739). Unlike an intuitive act, however, there is no essential correlation between the sensuous intuitive data and what I intend in the act of meaning. For "what goes beyond this content . . . can be varied at will without disturbing the sign's signitive function" (ibid). The same thought may pass through my mind while I am watching television, watching the clouds pass, or conversing with someone about honeysuckle. The only time an "essential, internal" relation is established between an act of pure meaning and its intuitive basis is in the unity of an act of fulfillment, where the intuitive substance of the intuitive act is recognized, in a further higher-order act, as having the same intentional essence as that realized in the intentional matter of the act of meaning. Characterizing the relation between representative content and intentional matter in the intuitive act in terms of resemblance faces a problem. In what sense can an intentional and a non-intentional entity resemble one another otherwise than by having some properties in common? And what could these properties be aside from either having the same (or similar) meaning contents – an option that transgresses the claim that representative content is not intentional – or by having the same sensuous features – an option that transgresses the claim that intentional matter does not have sensuous filling (cf. Hopp, 2008, esp. section III)? One answer to this puzzle is to hold that the notion of resemblance in terms of sharing properties is not apt for this relation.10 Rather, one should see the relation between sensuous data and interpretative meaning in the unity of the intuitive act as a one-sided dependence of types of meaning on types of complexes of sensuous data, in other words, a relation in which, necessarily, a certain kind of intentional matter can be instantiated in an act only if a certain kind of organization of sensuous data is also present (cf., Mulligan, 1995, section 5). Thus, when an intuitive meaning is instanced in the unity of the sensuous content of an act, it is in an ineluctably stable (pre-reflective) equilibrium with the sensuous data. In such a unity, "the original dialectic of sense and presence" (to use a phrase from Paul Ricoeur [1967, p. 6]) comes to a stable position of agreement.11 In Husserl's view, this 136 Chad Kidd equilibrium is not achieved by accident, but it is a possibility grounded in the very essence of the representative content and interpretative activity. The important point here is that the notion of "resemblance" does not require a set of matching properties between the two acts, but rather only a mutually reinforcing conformity of representative content and intentional matter that, due to the unity they form in this equilibrium, makes it reasonable to describe each using the same terms. Outside of the unity of the intuitive content of the intuitive act, we could not describe a sensation of red as being "red." For red is a color property of material objects, not a property of sensations. However, in and with the interpretation of it as "the sensuous appearance of a red surface," it seems appropriate to apply this intentional description to it. For we seem to have no other way to refer to it, and this equivocal application of the term "red" (cf., TCL §1, p. 6) is anodyne, given the highly stable nature of the equilibrium of interpretation and sensuous feedback in an intuitive act, so long as we recognize that the application is equivocal. 3. "straightforward" perceptual intuition As previously mentioned, the incomplete overlapping or "coincidence" of the content of intuition and meaning in an act of fulfillment is the key to understanding how the evidence of perceptual experience can still qualify as knowledge, even though it is, in most cases, defeasible and inadequate. Nevertheless, Husserl holds to the empiricist thesis that perceptual intuition is the "originary source" of all knowledge – the place where "natural cognition" begins and ends, including theoretical cognition, such as in physics and applied mathematics (Ideas §1, p. 5). In this section, I want to highlight how perceptual consciousness realizes the general structure of fulfillment and unpack the reasons why Husserl thought of perceptual knowledge as a foundational form of evidence. For this will provide the necessary context for a proper understanding of how Husserl held to the empiricist thesis. Husserl's primary reason for thinking of perceptual evidence as essentially inadequate and defeasible are phenomenological, based on firstpersonal descriptive observations about perceptual consciousness. Suppose I see a die. In this experience, I see this as an object with six sides, even though, because of the spatial character of visual consciousness, I can only actually see three sides from where I am. These "unperceived" sides are intended in this experience as sides that can be seen if I twist the die or move around it (cf., Ideas §44). In LI, Husserl claims that, to Husserl's Phenomenological Theory of Intuition 137 each perceptual experience as of an individual object, there "corresponds phenomenologically a continuous flux of fulfillment or identification, in the steady serialization of the percepts 'pertaining to the same object.' Each individual percept is a mixture of fulfilled and unfulfilled intentions" (LI VI §14b, p. 714). In my perceptual consciousness of the die, then, part of the total intentional matter of my perceptual experience is the fulfilled intention directed at the facing side of the die. The rest is a set of unfulfilled intentions directed to the sides facing away, the object's innards, history, uses, and so on. But these unfulfilled intentions can be brought to fulfillment by further perceptual exploration of the object, by "retaining" the currently fulfilled intentions in memory (or, in the language of TCL, "retentions") and following up certain unfulfilled intentions or anticipations (or, in the language of TCL, "protentions") in the total content of my perceptual consciousness. To perceive, then, is essentially to undergo a temporally extended process of intention and fulfillment with the goal of bringing the object of perceptual consciousness – this particular object – to adequate givenness; nevertheless, given the perspectival and spatial character of visual consciousness, this goal is unachievable. Instead, it functions as a Kantian regulative ideal for perceptual cognition (Ideas §143). In addition, because of this essential inadequacy, any perceptual evidence achieved in the partial fulfillment of the intentional matter at any stage of perceptual experience is, in principle, open to revision in light of future experience. For example, suppose I see the die on the table, then after turning it around, I discover that it is not covered by three square faces. In this case, an "explosion" (as Husserl characterizes it at Ideas §138, p. 332) of the initial meaning has occurred. I become aware that an anticipation of a backside of the die was part of how I was structuring the experience of what was immediately given in perception. And now I am forced to restructure my anticipations, taking what I see now to be only three flat square pieces, put together to form a corner that looks like a complete die from certain perspectives. Essentially correlated with this change in the interpretative activity is a change in the ideal meaning structure (the total ideal meaning content) essentially correlated with my act, and a change in the epistemic status of the previous stage of intuitive fulfillment. The evidence of latter intuition displaces the evidence of the former. Restructuring the anticipations in perceptual experience is not reducible to a mere change in belief. I do not have beliefs that correspond to every aspect of what is merely anticipated in perceptual experience. Some of these anticipatory activities are "habitual," grounded in accretions of bodily 138 Chad Kidd perceptual skills, and culturally inherited background beliefs, values, and practices. Many of these are aspects of our anticipatory activity that many of us have never thought about and would probably have great difficulty expressing in words, if we were to become aware of them.12 Despite this essential inadequacy and defeasibility of perceptual evidence, Husserl maintains that perceptual consciousness is still to be phenomenologically described as delivering awareness of the object itself, "in the flesh" (leibhaft), and not just an image or mere appearance of the object. Together with the actual sensuous appearance, the anticipatory activity of perceptual experience brings the object as whole into the field of perceptual consciousness. In the language of the Ideas, each actual appearance is experienced as an "adumbration" or "shading-off" (Abschattung) of a side or aspect of the same object. This intuition of the identity of the object through the series of actual perceptual appearances is the correlate of an irreducibly demonstrative aspect of perceptual content, "the pure X in abstraction from all predicates" (Ideas §131, p. 313). It is an aspect of the intentional matter of each partial intention belonging to the total intentional content of the perceptual experience that is coincident with the matter of every other partial intention in the act. This is a part of the meaning activity that informs the sensuous, representative content in every phase of the perceptual consciousness of an individual object. Given that it is what it is in abstraction from all predicates, it is not to be understood a matter directed to a stock of common properties. It is, rather, better understood as a form of essentially demonstrative de re content, a form of content that directly refers to a particular object, by relying on non-qualitative aspects of the object in relation to the perceiving subject.13 Another way to characterize the "bodily presence" (Leibhaftigkeit) of the object in perceptual consciousness is to note its relation to Husserl's notion of the "natural attitude" in the Ideas (cf., §§27, 31, & 47). As previously mentioned, perceptual experience is pervaded by a sort of ambiguity or duality of content wherein I see the presence of a die (a material object) in14 my perspectival experience of a side (a mere appearance). But, when the appearance is in conformity with the structuring anticipatory activity and vice versa, in other words, when these two achieve a stable equilibrium, then this allows us, in an equivocal fashion, to apply the descriptors appropriate to appearing objects to the perspectival appearances. One problematic aspect of this, of course, is that one might not recognize that this is an equivocal application of the descriptor. And this is a real danger because the Husserl's Phenomenological Theory of Intuition 139 ambiguity of perceptual content doesn't usually show up in the course of perceptual consciousness. (This may also be a reason that it also doesn't clearly "show up," as it were, in a distinction in ordinary language.) The normal course of perceptual experience achieves a highly stable pre-reflective equilibrium between our structuring anticipatory activities and what becomes actually presented that permits us to keep going with the standard set of anticipations without significant interruption from what is actually presented. And this highly stable equilibrium involves intentions that posit a natural world of inanimate and animate material objects, ordered by certain natural physical, biological, psychological, and sociological laws. In other words, it posits the natural world, which becomes confirmed (as "actually there, in the flesh" (leibhaft)) in sensuous intuition. Husserl calls this the "natural attitude." He argues that the key to advancement in phenomenological research is to somehow set aside this natural mode of comportment, in order to descriptively clarify the sensuous intuitive data and interpretative activities that constitute this normally highly stable equilibrium. In Ideas, Husserl develops the concepts of "noema" and "noesis" to help provide a more perspicuous account of this complex structure of consciousness. The noema is an abstract meaning structure (much like Frege's notion of Sinn) that is a function of the actual presentations and anticipations concerning the object in an act of consciousness (cf., Ideas §§88, 90–95). The aspects of the noema corresponding to the actually perceived elements Husserl calls the "noematic core" of the act (Ideas §132); the totality of the anticipatorymeanings in the act Husserl calls the "horizon" of the act; and the noematic core plus the horizon constitutes what he calls the total noematic content of the act (Ideas §130). In addition, it is the total noema of a perceptual act that enables the direct awareness of the physical object of perceptual consciousness. The noesis, on the other hand, is the experiential (i.e., "Reel" or temporally occurring) counterpart to the noema. The noesis is the set of structuring experiences, the actual activities of consciousness, that are essentially correlated with the abstract noematic contents of the act (Ideas §§98 & 100) and that attempt to structure anticipations in a way that is in conformity with the hyletic data –which is roughly equivalent to what Husserl calls representative content in LI – (Ideas §86). The noesis, in other words, is the activity of consciousness that gives meaning to the act, the hyletic data are what is interpreted in the noetic activity – as Husserl put it, they are "possible wefts in the intentional weave, possible stuffs for intentional forming" (Ideas §86, p. 189, translation modified) – and the noema is the ideal meaning that is given in the act. 140 Chad Kidd 4. synthetic categorial intuition Husserl maintains that the range of objects of intuition is wider than that of straightforward or simple de re perceptual intuition. There are also intuitive experiences that present particular objects bound together by pure categorial forms such as "relation," "unity," "plurality," "identity," and "part and whole." The objects of these acts are concrete states of affairs (Sachverhalt), in other words, individual material objects bound together by categorial forms. One way to approach Husserl's concept of synthetic categorial intuition is to make out how he answers a long-standing puzzle about this form of intuition. This is, in short, that even though the intentions in synthetic categorial acts find fulfillment in sensuous content of straightforward perception, the "surplus of meaning" directed to the categorial forms in the experience, "finds nothing in the appearance itself to confirm it" (LI VI §40, p. 775). For example, all I am aware of in straightforwardly seeing, say, a white piece of paper on the desk is "this white paper," a particular without any logical form in itself. As Husserl puts it (voicing agreement with the Kantian thesis that being is not a predicate), I can see colour, but not being-coloured. I can feel smoothness, but not being-smooth. I can hear a sound, but not that something is sounding. Being is nothing in the object, no part of it, no moment tenanting it, no quality or intensity of it, no figure of it or no internal form whatsoever, no constitutive feature of it however conceived. (LI VI §43, p. 780) Husserl seems to be in paradox. On the one hand, he asserts that the intentional objects of straightforward perception lacks categorial form. Yet, on the other, he asserts that the straightforwardly presented object of perception can fulfill a categorial intention, which implies that the intuitive content of straightforward perception involves a representation of categorial form. Husserl attempts to dissolve the paradox by showing how the same representative content sustain distinct "interpretations" (or could become coincident with different total noematic contents) in the unity of multiple different intuitive acts. The key to this approach is the fact that there are different ways in which sensuous content can found a meaning intention in the unity of fulfillment. As noted, in straightforward intuition, the intuitive substance of the act founds the intentional meaning of the act by having an intentional content that is partially identical to that of the meaning activity. In a synthetic categorial act, however, Husserl's Phenomenological Theory of Intuition 141 The "content" which represents α, will be functioning as the same content in a twofold fashion and, in so far as it does this, it will effect a coincidence, a peculiar unity of the two representative functions; we shall, in other words, have two coincident interpretations, both sustained by the representative content in question. (LI VI §48, pp. 793–794) Thus, categorial intuition is a founded act with a more complex structure than straightforward intuition, consisting of both (i) an act of straightforward perceptual fulfillment and (ii) a categorial meaning intention that coincides with a certain part of the content of the straightforward perceptual act. In synthetic categorial intuition, there is also a higher-order meaning intention that "bring[s] to maturity a new awareness of objects which essentially presupposes the old" (LI VI, §46, p. 787). So, the structure of "foundation" (Fundierung) in a synthetic categorial intuition is different from that in straightforward intuition. Synthetic categorial intuition is an act that presupposes a prior act of fulfillment, a prior cognitive awareness of the world, which provides the "point d'appui" of the categorial act (LI VI §47, p. 791). Developing this suggestion further, Husserl observes that one key descriptive phenomenological difference between straightforward and categorial intuition is that the higher-order act in categorial intuition is typically15 experienced as a deliberate intentional activity ofmaking explicit some part of the total content of straightforward perceptual intuition that was only implicit in the straightforward perceptual act (LI VI §47, p. 792). The key is that it is a kind of "active synthesis" of contents, which is phenomenologically distinct from the "passive synthesis" of horizonal meaning and actually given appearance in straightforward perception (cf. CM §38). For example, in straightforwardly seeing the die, the whole die is given to consciousness "in one blow," "without the help of further, super-ordinate acts" (LI VI §40, p. 775). Given this experience, I (the subject) am put in a position to make the categorial forms also intended in the horizon of this act into thematic objects of awareness. This process can begin with a reflective recognition of the perspectival and spatial character of my experience: for example, the fact that the backside of this die is not actually given and that, as such, is an emptily intended part of the object (LIVI §48, p. 793). I can then take this intention, directed to the unseen part of the die, and thematize it as a horizonal element of my present experience, that is, as "the ideal possibility of bringing the part, and the fact that it is a part, to perception in correspondingly articulated and founded acts" (LI VI §48, p. 794).16 With this, I bring to completion an act with a "surplus of meaning" that is not fulfilled in the straightforward perceptual intuition by itself (LI VI 142 Chad Kidd §40, p. 775), but which finds fulfillment and confirmation in the appearance after I engage in "a novel act which, taking charge of such presentations, shapes and combines them suitably" (LI VI §48, p. 794). The kind of foundation straightforward perceptual intuition provides is not one that directly confers evidence on a categorial intuition. Just seeing the die (in the natural attitude) does not also provide awareness of this actually appearing side of the die as such. Rather, this latter form of awareness also requires a further cognitive process of abstraction, wherein I consider the actual visual experience in light of a new meaning that emphasizes the implicit presence of this part-whole structure in the (horizonal) content of the straightforward perceptual act. 5. essential intuition In this section I consider the form of categorial intuition that Husserl calls "ideation," "eidetic intuition," or "essential intuition" (Wesenserschauung) (cf., Ideas §18).17 This kind of intuition takes formal relations and structures, sets, numbers, functions, and other mathematical entities as its objects. This is, by far, the most controversial part of Husserl's phenomenological theory of intuitive knowledge. For it is hard to see how our awareness of them could qualify as intuitive. However, like his approach to the puzzle of synthetic categorial intuition, Husserl intends to justify the claim to this kind of intuition by way of highlighting the analogies and disanalogies with the archetype of intuitive knowledge – straightforward perception.18 And, here too, the key to understanding the analogies is to see the different ways in which straightforward perceptual intuition can serve as a foundation for acts of fulfillment. To get a feel for the phenomenon of essential intuition, consider the structure of the Socratic search for the essence or "Form" of some entity in the early Platonic dialogues. The discussion may begin by taking as its topic a concrete instance of, say, piety or justice. But this serves as a launching point (a model) for a discussion about Piety or Justice itself: a discussion that attempts to cleave all factual information away from these concepts, leaving only their essential make-up, the set of predicates and laws that necessarily govern entities of that class or species. Essential intuition is an act that brings this ideal entity itself to intuitive awareness and so confers fullness and evidence on the categorial meaning act. To bring out the phenomenological difference between essential intuition and merely intending an ideal entity, compare merely thinking about the Pythagorean theorem (perhaps by way of symbols: a2 + b2 = c2) with Husserl's Phenomenological Theory of Intuition 143 constructing a proof this theorem. In elementary courses on geometry, it is commonplace to be asked to imagine variations of geometric figures. You might be asked to rotate, translate, or make the reflection of a triangle. Or you might be asked to shrink or extend the sides of the triangle. Eventually, if you arbitrarily vary this shape in imagination, you will come to realize that there are a set of properties of the triangle that remain constant under a certain class of variations (for instance, the class of so-called "rigid motions"). These constants Husserl calls essences ("eide" or singular, "eidos"). And Husserl believes that, at some point in this process of varying the image of the shape, we gain intuitive access to the essence. Husserl calls this method of achieving an intuitive grasp of an ideal truth, which he developed first in Ideas (§§69–70), the method of imaginative variation. He envisions that it can be applied in intuition of all essential formations, not just geometric. And, as in geometric variation, since the concern is with the essential structure of the class of entities in question, that is to say, with possibility and not actuality, an imaginative series of variations will serve just as well as a series of actual perceptual experiences or the experiences of some other factive attitude. What makes this an intuitive grasp is that this consciousness of the essence serves to constrain the activity of variation, analogous to how the sensuous hyle constrain the activity of (implicit) anticipation and interpretation in perception. As Richard Tieszen puts it, "in the midst of all of our free variations we will come up against certain constraints, as though we have a swirling sea of changes around some islands of permanence" (Tieszen, 2005, p. 72). Ultimately,Husserl hoped that thismethodof free variation could be applied to all domains of knowledge – to both exact (e.g., pure geometry, mathematics, logic) and non-exact (applied geometry, sciences of nature, phenomenology) fields of knowledge. However, since some essences are inexact and vague, "morphological" essences, the standards of systematicity and intuitive clarity have to be modified to accommodate the structure of the essences in question (cf. Ideas §§71–5). The conviction of the universal applicability of essential intuition in all science (Wissenschaft) is expressed in one of the most famous passages from Husserl's corpus, the so-called "principle of all principles": No conceivable theory can make us err with respect to the principle of all principles: that every originary presentive intuition is a legitimizing source of cognition, that everything originarily (so to speak, in its "personal" actuality) offered to us in "intuition" is to be accepted simply as what it is presented as being, but also only within the limits in which it is presented there. (Ideas §24, p. 44, emphasis in original) 144 Chad Kidd Husserl envisioned a special role for imaginative variation in transcendental phenomenology: that, when applied alongside the other reductions, it would eventually unearth the logical structure of experience – "a universal apodictically experienceable structure" of experience that governs the reality of all phenomena that can appear to the subject (CM §12, p. 28) – bringing to completion the project of transcendental philosophy envisioned by Kant.19 This also helps reveal the reasons behind Husserl's claim that not all ideal possibilities are real possibilities. For only possibilities that belong to "the total realm of possible fulfillment" are knowable. "The realm of meaning is," Husserl maintains, "much wider than that of intuition" (LI VI §63, p. 824). Consider, for instance, the concept of a round square or an "analytic contradiction" such as "an A which is not an A" or "All A's are 5's and some A's are not 5's" (ibid.). These concepts and statements are not meaningless or "non-sense" in the strict sense of a syntactically formless "heap of words" (e.g., "King but or like and.") (LI IV §14, p. 522). They are not the kinds of meanings, however, that can be brought to intuitive fulfillment and so are not, by themselves, expressions of possible knowledge.20 Now, at this point, there are two interrelated problems that Husserl must address. First, it is hard to know what the sensuous representative content of essential intuition could be.21 Second, it is hard to see how straightforward perception can provide any evidential foundation for essential intuition, since the objects of straightforward perception are concrete and contingent existences, but essences are ideal and necessary. First, concerning the representative content of essential intuition, we can see that the answer lies in the dual role that straightforward content can play in categorial intuition. Like synthetic categorial intuition, ideation is a process of active synthesis that requires the subject to take up an intention to make explicit something only implicitly meant in the horizon of straightforward intuition. However, unlike synthetic intuition, more is required than to make explicit the formal features that are implicit in a single straightforward experience. We must also take up the intention to grasp the structural features of this object that are common with every object of a certain class. So, like synthetic intuition, one must start with an example or "model" given in straightforward intuition; but, then, one must also actively produce an arbitrary and (ideally) complete multiplicity of variations that exhibit "coincidences" of invariant features. Another way to understand this is that the phenomenologically evident constitutive activity of synthetic categorial intuition is (normally) involved in the constitutive activity of ideation. But essential intuition involves Husserl's Phenomenological Theory of Intuition 145 more. Since its object is to grasp the essential structure of a given phenomenon, it cannot rest with the awareness of a categorial form in one instance. Rather it must construct a series of categorial presentations that vary in a perfectly arbitrary way and exhibits all possible transformations of the phenomenon that are consistent with its essence. Concerning the second problem – about how sensuous intuition can provide a foundation for essential intuition despite the modal differences – we see that essential intuition is not an immediate "seeing" of the essence in one shot, as it were, but is instead more like what cognitive scientists today call "pattern recognition" (cf., Smith, 2007, p. 352). So, the contingency of the data in a single sensuous intuition does not sully the necessity of the eidetic claim confirmed in essential intuition. What matters is the invariant structural features of a class of intuitions (oftentimes each is sensuous, but not necessarily). In addition, it is important to notice that the results of essential intuition too are fallible and subject to modification in light of further experience. For example, if we discover that the class of variations explored previously were not complete, or if we discover that there are other classes of variations to be included (as occurred, e.g., in the development of alternative geometries (cf., Tieszen, 2005)), then earlier results might need to be modified. The ideal is that of apodictic evidence, which is achieved by a complete articulation of possible variations compatible with a thing of a certain type. But, Husserl holds, even though it is not clear that any area of scientific inquiry has reached this pinnacle, it is a possibility adumbrated for us in the conscious activity of coming to know the essential structure of the world. references Centrone, Stefania. 2010. Logic and Philosophy of Mathematics in the Early Husserl. Dordrecht: Springer. Drummond, John J. 1979. "On Seeing a Material Thing in Space: The Role of Kinaesthesis in Visual Perception." Philisophy and Phenomenological Research, 40 (1): 19–32. Foster, John A. 2000. The Nature of Perception. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Føllesdal, Dagfinn. 1985. "Husserl on Evidence and Justification." In Edmund Husserl and the Phenomenological Tradition, ed. Robert Sokolowski. Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press. Føllesdal, Dagfinn. 2006. "Husserl's Reductions and the Role They Play in His Phenomenology." In A Companion to Phenomenology and Existentialism, ed. Herbert L. Dreyfus and Mark A. Wrathall. Malden, MA: WileyBlackwell. 146 Chad Kidd Gödel, Kurt. 1983. "What Is Cantor's Continuum Problem?" In Philosophy of Mathematics: Selected Readings, ed. Paul Benacerraf and Hilary Putnam. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hopp, Walter. 2008. "Husserl on Sensation, Perception, and Interpretation." Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 38 (2): 1–28. Husserl, Edmund. 1936. The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. Husserl, Edmund. 1960. Cartesian Meditations. Trans. Dorion Cairnes. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Husserl, Edmund. 1970. Logical Investigations. Trans. John N. Findlay. New York: Humanities Press. Husserl, Edmund. 1973. Experience and Judgment. Trans. James S Churchill and Karl Ameriks. London: Routledge. Husserl, Edmund. 1983. Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. Book I. Trans. Fred Kersten. The Hague: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Husserl, Edmund. 1989. Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy: Book II. Trans. Richard Rojcewicz and André Shuwer. The Hague: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Husserl, Edmund. 1991. On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893–1917). Vol. 4. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Husserl, Edmund. 1997. Thing and Space. Trans. Richard Rojcewicz. Dordrecht: Springer. Hyder, David, and Hans-Görg Rheinbeger, eds. 2010. Science and the Life-World. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Kriegel, Uriah. Forthcoming. "The Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program." In Phenomenal Intentionality: New Essays, ed. Uriah Kriegel. New York: Oxford University Press. Levinas, Emmanuel. 1995. The Theory of Intuition in Husserl's Phenomenology. 2nd ed. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. Livingston, Paul M. 2004. Philosophical History and the Problem of Consciousness. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. 2002. Phenomenology of Perception. Trans. Colin Smith. London: Routledge. Miller, Izchak. 1984.Husserl, Perception, and Temporal Awareness. Bradford Books. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Mulligan, Kevin. 1995. "Perception." In The Cambridge Companion to Husserl, ed. Barry Smith and David Woodruff Smith. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Noë, Alva. 2004. Action in Perception. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Parsons, Charles. 1979. "Mathematical Intuition." Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 80: 1–13. Pryor, James. 2000. "The Skeptic and the Dogmatist." Noûs, 34 (4) (December 1): 517–549. Quine, Willard V.O. 1951. "Main Trends in Recent Philosophy: Two Dogmas of Empiricism." Philosophical Review, 60 (1): 1–26. Husserl's Phenomenological Theory of Intuition 147 Rawls, John. 1951. "Outline of a Decision Procedure for Ethics." Philosophical Review, 60 (2): 1–22. Rawls, John. 1999. A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press (Originally published 1971). Ricoeur, Paul. 1967. Husserl: An Analysis of His Phenomenology, Trans. Edward G Ballard and Lester E. Embree. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. Sellars, Wilfrid. 1968. Science and Metaphysics: Variations on Kantian Themes. London: Routledge. Simons, Peter. 1982. "Three Essays in Formal Ontology: Essay I. the Formalization of Husserl's Theory of Parts andWholes." In Parts andMoments: Studies in Logic and Formal Ontology, ed. Barry Smith. München: Philosophia Verlag. Smith, David Woodruff. 1989. The Circle of Acquaintance: Perception, Consciousness, and Empathy. Dordrecht: Kluwer. Smith, David Woodruff. 2007. Husserl. London: Routledge. Smith, David Woodruff, and Ronald McIntyre. 1982. Husserl and Intentionality: a Study of Mind, Meaning, and Language. Dordrecht: Reidel. Tieszen, Richard. 2005. "Free Variation and the Intuition of Geometric Essences: Some Reflections on Phenomenology and Modern Geometry." In Phenomenology, Logic, and the Philosophy of Mathematics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Tieszen, Richard L. 1989. Mathematical Intuition. Dordrecht: Kluwer. Wollheim, Richard. 1998. "On Pictorial Representation." The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 56 (3): 217–226. notes 1. I cite Husserl's works using the following titles: (Husserl, 1970) = LI, (Husserl, 1997) = TS, (Husserl, 1991) = TCL, (Husserl, 1983) = Ideas, (Husserl, 1989) = Ideas II, (Husserl, 1960) = CM, (Husserl, 1973)=EJ, (Husserl, 1936) = Crisis. I include both the chapter number and page number of the English translation when citing a passage from one of these works. When citing LI, I will also cite the investigation number before the paragraph and page number. 2. This is not equivalent to the claim that all the phenomenologically salient features of experience are intentional. Husserl acknowledges the existence of non-intentional experiential data, which he calls sensuous "hyle" (Ideas, §85). However, unlike many in the Empiricist tradition, who acknowledge sense data as material for incorrigible knowledge, Husserl denies that hyle have any cognitive value by themselves. To have a cognitive value, they must also be combined with an intentional or "interpretative" act. 3. Husserl thus anticipates the "dogmatist" position in epistemology, inspired by the philosophy of G. E.Moore in analytic epistemology. It has been championed recently by James Pryor (2000). 4. Thus, unlike the view of the sensuous "given" articulated in the Kantian tradition by Wilfrid Sellars, sensuous contents do not guide conceptual acts of knowledge merely by causal influence (Sellars, 1968, p. 16), but by being constitutive of knowledge itself. 148 Chad Kidd 5. For more on Husserl's modal mereology see Simons (1982). 6. Husserl's view is also an early version of what has come to be known as a phenomenal intentional theory of consciousness: a view that understands the intentional content of experience to be determined by what is subjectively available, that is, by how things appear to the subject fromwithin the experience. Thus, intentional content, on the phenomenal intentionality view, cannot be determined by causal, historical, or teleofunctional relations. See Kriegel (forthcoming) for a discussion of the differences between phenomenal and nonphenomenal theories of intentional content. 7. As Husserl uses this, it is close in meaning to the Latin adequatio, which means, roughly, "correspondent to." 8. Cf., TS §§4–6 and Smith (1989, chapter 5). John Foster (2000, pp. 49ff) calls this phenomenology the "presentational feel" of perceptual experience. 9. It's worth emphasizing that Husserl also clearly distinguishes hyletic contents as elements of the stream of consciousness from the qualities of objects that are intended or attained by perceptual intentionality. Cf., TS §14 and Ideas §§85–6. 10. At TS §§16–7, Husserl admits that the notion of similarity he employs in this relation "is not quite natural." 11. Dagfinn Føllesdal (1985) likens Husserl's conception of the ground of evidence to the holistic conceptions of justification developed in the pragmatist tradition. He pointed out that Husserl's conception of justification could also be understood as employing Rawls's (1999) concept of reflective equilibrium. Except that Husserl (like Rawls, 1951) would explicitly understand the presence of equilibrium in the unity of an intuitive act or in the unity of fulfillment as signaling more than the presence of agreement, but as also securing evidence or justification for the meanings that conform to the representative content. Husserl employs the notion of reflective equilibrium within the four major bodies of knowledge – empirical science, mathematics, logic, and ethics – individually, and he did not attempt to combine them in a way that would, e.g., allow one to bring intuitions or principles in ethics to bear on theorems or intuitions in mathematics (as is suggested by the famous image that closes Quine's "Two Dogmas" (Quine, 1951), in which our knowledge is an interwoven web of beliefs on which experience has greatest effect at the periphery, but which can, in principle, cause readjustments even at the tightly woven core). Here I go beyond Føllesdal's application of the Rawlsian notion by also locating the presence of such equilibria in the "pre-reflective" spheres of consciousness with evidence, such as in the passive syntheses of basic perceptual consciousness. Rawls said of reflective equilibrium: "It is an equilibrium because at last our principles and judgments coincide; and it is reflective since we know to what principles our judgments conform and the premises of their derivation" (Rawls, 1999, p. 18). The equilibria achieved in basic perceptual consciousness, in contrast, are pre-reflective since we do not necessarily know to what ideal meanings our sensuous contents conform or what the logical implications of this content are. 12. The earliest phenomenological descriptions of these implicit cultural and "bodily" anticipations in the content of perceptual experience are to be found in TS and Ideas II. These aspects of the total intentional content of perception Husserl's Phenomenological Theory of Intuition 149 became key elements in Husserl's conception of the innerand outer-horizon of an object in EJ and the all-encompassing "Lifeworld" (Lebenswelt) in the Crisis. These latter analyses were also great influences on Merleau-Ponty's (2002) analyses of the living, perceptual body. 13. For more on Husserl's conception of de re perceptual content, see Drummond (1979), Miller (1984, esp. chapter 3), and Smith (1989). 14. This notion of "seeing-in" is derived from Wollheim's (1998) work on the consciousness of objects in images. Cf., Noë (2004, chapter 3) for an application to seeing ordinary objects. 15. It is important to note that not all cases of categorial intuition are the result of a deliberate cognitive activity on the part of the subject. Sometimes the awareness of such things seems to just "dawn on us." Even here, Husserl would maintain that there is a further act carried out, perhaps compulsively out of habit or some other motive, it depends on a prior perceptual experience. See EJ §83. 16. Husserl describes intentional meanings in the "horizon" of an act as involving an "indeterminateness" that "necessarily signifies a determinableness which has a rigorously prescribed style. It points ahead to possible perceptual multiplicities which, merging continuously into one another, join together to make up the unity of one perception in which the continuously enduring physical thing is always showing some new "sides" (or else an old 'side' as returning) in a new series of adumbrations" (Ideas §44, p. 94). 17. Husserl's most detailed and mature study of essential intuition is to be found in EJ §§80–98. In this section, however, I will focus on the basics of the view presented earlier in LI and Ideas. 18. Kurt Gödel seems to have the same idea when he writes, "But, despite their remoteness from sense-experience, we do have something like a perception of the objects of set theory, as is seen from the fact that the axioms force themselves upon us as being true. I don't see any reason why we should have less confidence in this kind of perception, i.e. in mathematical intuition, than in senseperception" (Gödel, 1983, pp. 483–484). 19. See Føllesdal (2006) for further discussion. 20. See Livingston (2004, chapter 3) for a discussion of the controversy between Husserl and Moritz Schlick concerning his conception of nonsense and its application in discovering the a priori logical structure of experience. 21. Charles Parsons (1979, note 8) avers that Husserl's treatment of this problem at LI VI §56 "lapses into obscurity." 150 Chad Kidd

Reliable credence and the foundations of statistics Jesse Clifton Department of Statistics, North Carolina State University Abstract If the goal of statistical analysis is to form justified credences based on data, then an account of the foundations of statistics should explain what makes credences justified. I present a new account called statistical reliabilism (SR), on which credences resulting from a statistical analysis are justified (relative to alternatives) when they are in a sense closest, on average, to the corresponding objective probabilities. This places (SR) in the same vein as recent work on the reliabilist justification of credences generally [Dunn, 2015, Tang, 2016, Pettigrew, 2018], but it has the advantage of being action-guiding in that knowledge of objective probabilities is not required to identify the best-justified available credences. The price is that justification is relativized to a specific class of candidate objective probabilities, and to a particular choice of reliability measure. On the other hand, I show that (SR) has welcome implications for frequentist-Bayesian reconciliation, including a clarification of the use of priors; complementarity between probabilist and fallibilist [Gelman and Shalizi, 2013, Mayo, 2018] approaches towards statistical foundations; and the justification of credences outside of formal statistical settings. Regarding the latter, I demonstrate how the insights of statistics may be used to amend other reliabilist accounts so as to render them action-guiding. I close by discussing new possible research directions for epistemologists and statisticians (and other applied users of probability) raised by the (SR) framework. 1 Introduction Despite a century of debate over the foundations of statistics, only the various Bayesian approaches to statistical inference have made sustained contact with epistemology - in particular, with the program of Bayesian epistemology. Philosopher of science Mayo [2018] has offered a frequentist account of statistical testing in the fallibilist tradition (she calls it "severe testing") which accords with much of statistical practice, but being an account of hypothesis testing in particular it falls short of a full-blooded statistical philosophy (as statistics is concerned with more than hypothesis testing). Aside from Mayo's work there is little in the way of philosophical foundations for frequentist statistical practice. This situation is troubling. Applied statisticians have a broadly frequentist outlook on the justification of statistical inferences (though they may help themselves to Bayesian computational machinery, as do Efron [2005] and Gelman and Shalizi [2013], for instance). What's more, the Bayesianism of classical Bayesian epistemology - which says that degrees of belief need only follow the probability calculus, be updated by Bayes rule, and (for so-called objective Bayesians) respect additional side constraints such as using "uninformative priors" [Yang and Berger, 1996] - faces serious limitations as applied to statistical practice. Among these limitations is the fact that, due to the computational cost of Bayesian methods and the difficulty of eliciting informative priors in complex settings, Bayesian statisticians routinely use "default priors" for reasons of mathematical and computational convenience, rather than out of a sincere effort to encode their beliefs [Mayo, 2013]. Meanwhile, in recent decades there has been significant progress regarding the justification of credences in the formal epistemology literature. Early work in this area sought to place Bayesian epistemology on firmer epistemic ground than the classical pragmatic (Dutch book) arguments by showing that credences which follow the probability calculus and are updated by Bayesian conditionalization are, in some sense, closer to the truth than ones which do not obey these rules [Joyce, 1998, Greaves and Wallace, 2006, Leitgeb and Pettigrew, 2010a,b]. More recently, Dunn [2015] and Tang [2016] have discussed reliabilist accounts of the justification of particular credences (rather than just the Bayesian norms), and Pettigrew [2018] has argued that each of these accounts is extensionally equivalent to (i.e. each deems the same credences justified as) his own favored 1 epistemic utility account of justified credence. This account, as well as others discussed by Tang [2016], critically depends on probabilities which are objective in a frequentist sense; each says (very roughly) that a credence in a proposition is justified when it is close to the objective probability of that proposition. I aim to bridge this gap between the foundations of statistics and recent developments in formal epistemology. I start with the view that the goal of a statistical analysis is to provide justified credences (among a set of alternatives) about observable quantities. Concretely, statisticians study problems like this: Running Example: Given the working class of models Xi i.i.d∼ N(θ0, 1) : θ0 ∈ R, read "observables Xi are independently and identically distributed (i.i.d) as normal with variance 1 and unknown mean θ", and data x1, . . . , xn, what is our best guess at the distribution of Xi? Note that I will follow the convention of denoting generic random variables with capital letters, and realizations of those random variables - i.e. observations from the process encoded by those random variables - with the corresponding lower-case letters. A typical answer to the question in (Running Example) is N(xn, 1), where xn is the sample mean of x1, . . . , xn. In mainstream statistics, arguments for the claim that xn is the best estimator of θ0 (and therefore, implicitly, N(xn, 1) is the best estimator of the distribution ofXi) are typically in terms of the "frequentist properties" of the estimator Xn. For instance, assuming the data are truly distributed as i.i.d normal, then Xn is the uniformly minimum variance unbiased estimator of θ0. "Unbiased" means that, in repeated samples X1, . . . , Xn, the corresponding estimates Xn are on average equal to θ0. "Uniformly minimum variance" means that, under the i.i.d normal assumption and across all unbiased estimators, Xn has the lowest variance regardless of the value of θ0. Because expected squared error loss decomposes into bias and variance 1 this in turn means that Xn has uniformly lowest expected squared error loss in the class of unbiased estimators of θ0; qualitatively, it is closest to θ0 on average, among unbiased estimators (again, under the i.i.d normal assumption). This approach is to be contrasted with (orthodox) Bayesian statistics, wherein the analyst places a prior distribution over the class of candidate models, and updates this prior given data to obtain a posterior over candidate models. This posterior, according to the usual Bayesian story, encodes the analyst's rational degrees of belief about the underlying model. It is also used to obtain the "posterior predictive distribution" over the observable in question, which is supposedly the analyst's rational beliefs about future observables from the same process. Returning to (Running Example), the analyst may place a prior θ0 ∼ N(θπ, σ2π) over the possible values of the unknown θ0. The resulting posterior and posterior predictive distributions turn out to be (θ0 | x1, . . . , xn) ∼ N ( 1 1 σ2π + n [ 1 σ2π θπ + nxn ] , 1 1 σ2π + n ) (1) (Xn+1 | x1, . . . , xn) ∼ N ( 1 1 σ2π + n [ 1 σ2π θπ + nxn ] , 1 1 σ2π + n + 1 ) . (We will see Equation 1 again in the discussion of prior reliability in Section 2.2.) On the account I develop, arguments from frequentist properties are used to justify the choice of estimator of the objective probability distribution. On the other hand, the estimator of the objective probability distribution is given an epistemic interpretation, just as Bayesians give the posterior predictive distribution an epistemic interpretation. (Indeed, the posterior predictive distribution can be seen as a "Bayes estimator" (defined below) of the objective probability distribution for certain choices of scoring rule.) So my account focuses, like posterior predictive Bayesian analysis, on the quantification of (epistemic) uncertainty over observables, while tying the justification 1 I.e. For an estimator θ, E θ|θ0 (θ−θ0)2 = E2 θ|θ0 (θ−θ0)+Varianceθ|θ0 (θ) = Bias 2 θ|θ0 (θ)+Variance θ|θ0 (θ), where subscript (θ | θ0) means an expectation taken with respect to the distribution of estimator θ when θ0 is the true value of the parameter of interest. 2 of these epistemic probabilities to their reliability with respect to the objective probabilities, much in the spirit of frequentism. In Section 2, I develop this reliabilist account of the justification of credences, called statistical reliabilism. While we will see that statistical reliabilism in a way refers to a familiar family of statistical principles, I will argue that taking its implications seriously leads to novel insights about strict versus permissive views on the justification of statistical methodology; the appropriate use of priors; and the separation of statistical activity into justification conditional on a set of models on one hand, and into exploration, model criticism, and model revision on the other. In Section 3 I explore the connections between my account and other accounts of reliabilist justification of credence discussed in Tang [2016] and Pettigrew [2018]. I will show that, once amended to make these accounts action-guiding (in the sense of making definite statements about which credences are justified) in the absence of knowledge of the relevant objective probabilities, they can be seen as applications of the (SR) framework. As a final remark on the scope of the article: I do not recapitulate the extensive arguments over reliabilism. However, in Section 3 I do show how my account, similarly to other accounts of reliabilist credal justification, may be defended from several important objections facing reliabilism. Nor do I take up the problem of analyzing objective probability. I will only say that a concept of objective probability is useful and perhaps indispensable in statistical practice, as well as in the explication of reliabilism, which I consider to be the most promising direction for the justification of belief. 2 Statistical reliabilism Suppose we wish to form justified credences about observable quantity X, with (unknown) objective probability distribution P0. In this section I give a process-reliabilist account of justification. In statistical language, "estimation" of the true distribution P0 is an example of a process producing an epistemic probability distribution over X. So the best-justified credence, in the case of statistical estimation, is that produced by the estimator which is closest (in a sense) to the objective probabilities on average. In statistics, an estimator is just a function from data to an estimate of a quantity of interest. In the introduction, we saw an estimator of the mean of a normal distribution, T : (X1, . . . , Xn) 7→ Xn. Estimators may instead map data to entire candidate objective distributions, for instance T ′ : (X1, . . . , Xn) 7→ N(Xn, 1) from the same example. For simplicity, I will discuss estimation in terms of the estimation of model parameters. However, keep in mind that the distribution corresponding to the optimal estimator in the space of parameters need not be the distribution which is optimal with respect to a scoring rule that directly measures the distance to the true distribution. (See (Squared error) and (KL divergence) below as an example of this distinction.) Indeed, Lawless and Fredette [2005] show that "plugin" estimators like N(Xn, 1) are suboptimal (in a certain sense) with respect to KL-divergence, which is arguably a more appropriate measure of how close the estimated distribution is to the true objective distribution. Here is a first pass at formulating the account: Statistical reliabilism for estimators, first pass (SRE-α): An epistemic probability distribution p over X is justified with respect to a class of estimators T and scoring rule L2 iff, given data D and objective probability distribution P0 for X, p is a realization of P = T (D) and T ∈ argmin T ′∈T ED|P0L(T ′(D), P0). Examples of scoring rules include: • Squared error: Let P0 belong to a class of models parameterized by a Euclidean vector θ - for instance, {N(θ, 1) : θ ∈ R} in (Running Example) - such that θ(P ) returns the parameter corresponding to distribution P . Then, Lsquared error : (P, P0) 7→ ‖θ(P )− θ(P0)‖2, where ‖*‖ is the Euclidean norm. 2In the statistical and machine learning literatures, scoring rules are usually called loss functions. 3 • Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence: LKL divergence : (P, P0) 7→ ∫ P (x) log P (x) P0(x) dx. KL divergence directly measures the inaccuracy of distribution P with respect to distribution P0, rather than measuring the distance between the corresponding parameters. But credence-forming processes need not depend only on data and estimator; we will see this in the discussion of priors in Section 2.2. So we have the more general formulation: Statistical reliabilism, first pass (SR-α): An epistemic probability distribution p over X is justified with respect to a class of credence-forming processes P and scoring rule L iff, given objective probability distribution P0 for X, p is a realization of P ∈ argmin P ′∈P EP |P0L(P ′, P0). Introducing the risk function of statistical decision theory R(*, P0) : T 7→ ED|P0L ( T (D), P0 ) , we see that (SRE-α) is exactly the requirement that the estimator minimize risk in the class T. The problem, of course, is that R depends on the unknown distribution P0. Luckily, statistics provides methods of measuring the risk of an estimator across a class of models P (e.g. P = {N(θ, 1) : θ ∈ R} from (Running Example)) rather than just at single distribution. I will call such measures reliability measures. There are two classical reliability measures in statistical decision theory. The first is worst-case risk over P, and the corresponding best estimators in this sense (when they exist) are called minimax estimators. The second is average risk with respect to a weighting function π over P, and the corresponding estimators are called Bayes estimators [Berger, 2013]. We can write these as follows: Rminimax(T,P) = sup P0∈P R(T, P0) Rπ-Bayes(T,P) = ∫ P R(T, P0)dπ(P0). Letting Tn be a sequence of estimators defined on a growing dataset Dn, with T ∈ {Tn}n∈N, we can also consider asymptotic measures as n grows. This often simplifies theoretical arguments. For instance, there is the asymptotic maximum risk over small neighborhoods of P0, Rl.a.-minimax(T,P) = lim δ↓0 lim inf n→∞ sup {P∈P:‖θ(P )−θ(P0)‖<δ} R(Tn, P0), whose minimizers are called "local asymptotic minimax" estimators (and can in some cases be obtained without knowing P0) [Van der Vaart, 2000]. Finally, there are reliability measures which do not depend on a class P. Examples include resampling measures such as the bootstrap and cross-validation [Efron and Gong, 1983] and (penalized) empirical risk [Vapnik, 1992]. For instance, consider datasets D = {Xi}ni=1 and scoring rule L defined on pairs (P ,X). Then we have: Rpenalized empirical risk(T,P) = 1 n ∑ i=1 L(T (D), Xi) + Penalty(T (D)) = Rempirical risk(T,P) + Penalty(T (D)). where Penalty is a penalty function which measures the complexity of the estimate T (D). (We write these reliability measures as if they depend on P in order to keep the notation consistent.) The penalty is introduced to prevent minimizers of Rpenalized empirical risk from over-fitting the data and therefore generalizing poorly to new samples. Thus we have the amended formulation for estimators: Statistical reliabilism for estimators (SRE): An epistemic probability distribution p is justified with respect to a class of estimators T, class of models P, and reliability measure R iff, given total evidence D, p is a realization of P = T (D) and T ∈ argmin T ′∈T R(T ′,P). 4 We may also define reliability measures on generic credence-forming processes to obtain the general formulation: Statistical reliabilism (SR): An epistemic probability distribution p is justified with respect to a class of credence-forming process P, class of models P, and reliability measure R iff p is a realization of P ∈ argmin P ′∈P R(P ′,P). 2.1 Choosing a reliability measure How do we decide on a reliability measure R? Classical statistical decision theory is divided over minimax and Bayesian choices. Each faces salient objections. Setting aside the fact that minimiax estimators do not always exist, their conservatism seems ill-motivated. On the other hand, the problem of the choice of prior π for the Bayesian choice is vexing if it is to be given an epistemic interpretation, as this requires the further justification of π; in 2.2 I give an alternative account of priors within the (SR) framework which avoids this difficulty. If π is treated simply as a weighting function introduced to allow for the measurement of reliability independent of P0, and spreads weight evenly (in some sense) over P, then it seems to be an attractive choice, as it avoids the pessimism of minimax while guaranteeing admissibility (i.e. that the estimator is not dominated in risk over P by another element of T) under certain conditions (by the celebrated complete class theorems [Berger, 2013]). Of course, identifying functions which "spread weight evenly" over P is fraught, as the history of the principle of indifference attests [Shackel, 2007]. But if the deflationary and heuristical view of the choice of R mentioned below is appropriate, then these worries too may be deflated. At least as concerning, and more neglected, questions of justification arise for asymptotic measures like Rl.a.-minimax. Geyer et al. [2013] make the obvious but overlooked point that We know that asymptotics often works well in practical problems because we can check the asymptotics by computer simulation (perhaps what Le Cam meant by "checked on the case at hand"), but conventional theory doesn't tell us why asymptotics works when it does. It only tells us that asymptotics works for sufficiently large n, perhaps astronomically larger than the actual n of the actual data. So that leaves a theoretical puzzle. • Asymptotics often works. • But it doesn't work for the reasons given in proofs. • It works for reasons too complicated for theory to handle. The lack of a logical relationship between asymptotic results and the finite-sample reliability of estimators seems to leave, in the absence of finite-sample results which explain the connection (but also render the asymptotics superfluous), only induction from the observed success of asymptotically sound methods as a justification for their use. As for "model-free" measures like Rpenalized empirical risk, these are typically regarded as estimators of an underlying reliability measure (and their use justified by the kind of asymptotic arguments which have just been called into question). However, for the purposes of this presentation I leave open the possibility that the model-free reliability measures may in some cases stand on their own. Indeed, we will see examples in Section 3 where there is no obvious way of specifying a class of models and therefore a model-free measure may be called for. This leads me to consider a more general perspective on how the choice of reliability measure might be defended. We may treat the selection of R as a meta-decision problem, based on the modeler's experience with the outcomes of similar choices. Let C be a set of candidate reliability measures and, for each R ∈ C, let U(R) be the observed utility of using R in similar past situations, or in relevant simulation experiments; U(R) includes things like the predictive accuracy of the estimator derived from R on newly observed data, and relative computational cost. Then they may choose T by minimizing R∗ = argmaxR∈C U(R). Of course, this meta-decision problem is inevitably informal given the ill-definedness of the terms involved. And such an account raises questions about how and when the empirical performance of statistical methodology in one setting should be expected to hold in another - questions which would likely benefit from philosophical input. But this is at least a plausible account of how experienced modelers do, in fact, choose among 5 statistical approaches, and lends some justification to the widespread ecumenism and "pragmatism" among statisticians. Another, perhaps indirect, reason for a deflationary view of disputes over the choice of R is that justification on (SR) is tentative in the first place. As I discuss at greater length in Section 2.3, the justification of credence relative to a set of models and estimators is only a small part of statistical activity. Much more work goes into exploring the data in order to generate new modeling strategies, and searching for flaws in the assumptions which lead to the credences / estimates. It is difficult, given this point of view, to expend much energy trying to identify a unique solution concept, and is perhaps enough to regard R as a heuristic for the quality of statistically-grounded credences, underdetermined but still justified by qualitative considerations of reliability. 2.2 Priors Rather than considering only epistemic probability distributions arising from deterministic estimators T (D), we may consider estimators which contain an additional source of randomness: the inclusion of prior information. Priors - at least, informative priors (those not constructed using principle of indifference-like arguments [Yang and Berger, 1996]) - are appropriately regarded as random variables in this framework because they result from a chancy credence-forming process: the elicitation of a prior from an expert. Crucially, Bayes estimators, which are constructed by updating this elicited prior given the data-at-hand, will be more reliable than estimators which use only the data-at-hand only if the prior elicitation process meets a certain threshold of reliability. To continue with (Running Example): given a certain class of priors, the Bayes estimator of θ0 in (Running Example) is given by θBayes = αn(σ2π) *Xn + (1− αn(σ2π)) * θπ, where (θπ, σ2π) are the prior mean and variance and αn(σ2π) is a weight in (0, 1) that depends on the sample size and prior variance (Equation 1). On my account, (θπ, σ2π) is treated as a random variable, and in particular as the output of a chancy process which may be more or less reliable with respect to the true distribution N(θ0, 1) on some appropriate reference class. Then the expected squared-error loss with respect to the true mean θ0 is: R(θBayes, θ0) =EθBayes|θ0(θBayes − θ0) 2 =E(X1,...,Xn,σ2π)|θ0α 2 n(σ 2 π)(Xn − θ0)2 + E(θπ,σ2π)|θ0(1− αn(σ 2 π)) 2(θπ − θ0)2+ 2E(X1,...,Xn,θπ,σ2π)|θ0αn(σ 2 π)(1− αn(σ2π))(θπ − θ0)(Xn − θ0). So, the risk with respect to the squared error loss decomposes into the risk of the sample mean, the risk of the prior, and the covariance between the error of the sample mean and that of the prior. Thus, if we have reason to believe - either due to evidence from a formal elicitation process, or qualitative domain-specific considerations - that the unreliability of (θπ, σ2π), E(θπ,σ2π)|θ0αn(σ 2 π) 2(θπ − θ0)2, is high, then we might prefer the no-prior estimator Xn. This simultaneously vindicates the Bayesian insistence that prior information be considered - insofar as the inclusion of prior information improves reliability - and makes sense of efforts to elicit reliable priors, which are difficult to justify in the classical Bayesian framework which places minimal constraints on credences. (The entire subfield of prior elicitation is dedicated to developing methods for improving the reliability of prior elicitation methods, for instance by developing exercises which improve the calibration of domain experts whose priors are to be elicited [O'Hagan et al., 2006].) The reliabilist understanding of priors can also explain the hesitancy of statisticians to use informative priors in cases where it is unclear how to "correctly" represent prior knowledge, even if a formal prior elicitation process is not feasible for the analysis in question. On the other hand, (SR) leaves open the possibility of incorporating prior information in ways other than via Bayesian conditionalization. For instance, Boos and Monahan [1986] use priors in combination with the bootstrap to obtain posterior-like uncertainty quantification, and Schweder and Hjort [1999] describe methods for combining likeilhoods with "prior confidence distributions" as a frequentist analog to the Bayesian procedure for incorporating prior beliefs. 2.3 Contingency, exploration, and criticism (SR) is an account of justification with respect to a class of models P. While a limitation, I also take it to be a virtue of (SR) that it respects the open-endedness of statistical practice. Indeed, 6 forming credences based on a fixed set of models is only a small part of the working statistician's job. Exploring the data and critiquing the choice of P is often the bulk of the work. For instance, a statistician analyzing data from (Running Example) might examine diagnostic plots of x1, . . . , xn, or conduct formal statistical tests which measure how unlikely the data are under the model assumptions, to determine whether {Xi i.i.d∼ N(θ, 1) : θ ∈ R} is an appropriate class of models. Evidence of (say) heavy tails might lead them consider a wider class of candidate distributions, while evidence of (say) correlation between consecutive observations might lead them to re-evaluate the assumption of independence. So (SR) is complementary to approaches which emphasize open-ended model-building, criticism, and revision such as Gelman and Shalizi [2013] and Mayo [2018] (though a rigorous account of how P should itself be chosen and revised is beyond the scope of the current work). And, while the dependence of data-based beliefs on model assumptions and the importance of data exploration and iterative model-checking may be truisms among mainstream statisticians, similar insights are perhaps neglected in the formal epistemology literature. In Section 3 I will place (SR) in the context of existing reliabilist theories of justified credence, and show how the this and other lessons of the statistical point of view may shed light on issues of the justification of belief beyond statistics. 3 Statistical reliabilism beyond statistics Returning to the formal epistemology literature, I explore connections between (SR) and two other reliabilist accounts of justified credence. In Section 3.1, I develop amendments to accounts presented in Tang [2016] and Pettigrew [2018] which render them action-guiding by allowing them to make statements about justified credences without knowledge of objective probabilities. I then show that the amended accounts coincide with applications of (SR). In Section 3.2, I show how (SR) may be defended from salient objections to reliabilism in a similar fashion as previous accounts, but in a way that follows directly from the (SR) framework without needing to posit additional epistemic principles. 3.1 (SR) as an action-guiding version of other reliabilist accounts On the first account considered here - (Brier) as discussed by Tang [2016] - credences are justified if they are produced by a process which yields credences that are close to the truth in expected squared error loss. Here is a comparative version, which I denote (Brier-α) to parallel SR-α; and where Tang only writes that credences should have "a low average Brier score", I write out the expectation to make its relation to the present account explicit: Brier-α: For any set P of credenceforming processes, a credence of p in q is justified relative to P iff p is a realization of P and P ∈ argmin P ′∈P E(P − X) 2, where X = 1(Q) are indicators of propositions Q3 on an appropriate reference class for q, and the expectation is taken with respect to the joint distribution of (P ,X) on some relevant reference class of propositions. (Brier-α) is inadequate because it is not action-guiding without knowledge of the relevant (objective) expectation for each P ; without knowing the true Brier scores (expected squared errors) we do not know which credence to accept. However, (Brier-α) is actually a special case of (SR-α) and may therefore be amended to render an (action-guiding) version of (SR), which we can call (SR-Brier). Let {qi}ni=1 be propositions in a relevant reference class and define xi = 1(qi). For each P ∈ P let {pi}ni=1 be n realizations of P . Then, one reliability measure is Rempirical risk(P ,P) = ∑n i=1(pi − xi)2 n , which is exactly the (empirical) Brier score used to evaluate real-world forecasters and forecasting systems [Brier and Allen, 1951, Gneiting and Raftery, 2007]. Tang rejects (Brier-α). He objects that on (Brier-α), processes which form intermediate credences will never be perfectly justified, as their Brier score will never be 0. He raises the further 3That is, 1(q′) = { 0 when q′ is false; 1 when q′ is true. 7 worry that if "perfect justification" is relativized to a reasonable class of credence-forming processes, then it may be too easy to have perfectly justified credences; for instance, if an agent has access to only one, highly unreliable credence-forming process, (Brier-α) allows their credence to be perfectly justified. Tang says this is the wrong conclusion. I reply that it is beside the point whether a credence is "perfectly justified" if it is the only game in town. However, the unreliability of all available processes may prompt a rational agent to search for better credence-forming processes. This point is a generalization of the points made in Section 2.3 about the complementarity between justification contingent on a set of models, and processes which generate new and improved sets of models (or estimators). If we take the view that forming credences is part of an iterative process of fixing and expanding the set of available credence-forming processes, Tang's worry about the "easiness" of credal justification under (Brier-α) is defused. The second account is Pettigrew [2018]'s epstemic value reliabilism: Epistemic value reliabilism for justified credence (ERC): credence of p in proposition q by an agent S is justified iff (ERC1) S has ground g; (ERC2) The credence p in q by S is based on ground g; (ERC3) If S has ground g′ ⊆ g, then the objective probability of q given that the agent has ground g′ approximates or equals p - that is P0(q | S has g′) ≈ p. Pettigrew's account also fails to be action-guiding when the objective conditional probability in (ERC3) is unknown. However, we may reconcile (ERC) with (SR) by the following procedure. Suppose we have data {(xi, pji , gi}ni=1 for each credence-forming process P j . Then, given grounds g we can adopt the credence from credence-forming process corresponding to j∗ = argmin j 1 #{gi=g} ∑ gi=g (pji − xi)2, i.e. the optimal empirical Brier score for cases where the credences are based on grounds g. This is just an application of (SR-Brier) to the subset of relevant (credence, proposition) pairs where the credence was formed based on g. Notice that this conditional Brier score is a measure of the average of squared errors (P0(q | S has g)− P j)2; thus we preserve the spirit of (ERC3) while having a procedure which allows us (at least in an idealized setting) to actually identify a (relatively) justified credence. This leads to a generalization of (SR) in which epistemic probability distributions depend on the available grounds for belief: Statistical reliabilism with grounds (SRG): An epistemic probability distribution p, given the most inclusive available grounds for belief g, is justified with respect to a class of credence-forming processes P (which are random maps from grounds to probability distributions), class of models P, and reliability measure R if p is a realization of P (g) and P (*) ∈ argmin P ′(*)∈P R(P (*)′,P), where reliability measures here act (in general) on collections of random variables indexed by grounds, i.e. random maps g 7→ P (g). (SRG) is a generalization of (SR) because, in the simplest case, we may regard the credenceforming process P as a black box (i.e. we do not have access to the grounds on which the credences are based), and therefore the grounds may be modeled as the constant g = {}. In this case, we can drop the dependence of P (*) on g and recover (SR). To make (SRG) more concrete, take an adapted version of Pettigrew's story about the reliability of flower identification. Suppose a friend and I spend morning and evening looking at flowers in a field. For the ith flower we encounter, we each write down our beliefs p1i , p2i in the proposition qi = [Flower i is a corncockle], look up the answer xi = 1(qi) in our guidebook, and mark it down. Upon seeing flower n + 1, we each form credences p1n+1, p2n+1. Now I wish to adopt a justified credence from the two available credences. I write down the (overly simplistic) class of models P1: (Xi, P 1 i ) i.i.d∼ P 10 (Xi, P 2 i ) i.i.d∼ P 20 8 where P 10 and P 20 are unknown, objective joint probability distributions. P1 treats our respective credence-forming processes as black boxes. But suppose at each flower i we are additionally tracking the lighting level `i. We each know that our confidence is modulated by `i (we are less confident in low light), and therefore the grounds on which we each base our credences about the ith flower are gi = {`i}. I may then build a more complex (though still overly simplistic) class of models P2: ((Xi, P 1 i ) | `) i.i.d∼ P 10 (`) ((Xi, P 2 i ) | `) i.i.d∼ P 20 (`), (where P 1 and P 2 are now maps from grounds to conditional probability distributions), and invoke (SRG) to obtain (relatively) justified credences about Xn+1 given grounds {`n+1}. For concreteness, suppose `i ∈ {Dim,Bright}, and that an equal number of flowers have been seen under Dim and Bright conditions. Then, suppose `n+1 = Dim. Taking Rempirical risk as a reliability measure, I have two ways to choose my (relatively) justified credence from {p1n+1, p2n+1} given grounds {`n+1 = Dim}: pP1n+1({`n+1}) = p j∗ n+1, where j ∗ = argmin j∈{1,2} 1 n n∑ i=1 (pji − xi) 2 pP2n+1({`n+1}) = p j∗ n+1, where j ∗ = argmin j∈{1,2} 1 2n ∑ `i=Dim (pji − xi) 2. At first blush, pP2n+1 seems clearly preferable to p P1 n+1, because it is based on more inclusive grounds. However, it is based on half as much data. This means that the random variable PP2n+1 will have greater variance than PP1n+1, and variance reduces reliability (see Footnote 1, for example). So it is not automatically the case that the credence based on more inclusive grounds is preferable from the perspective of (SRG). This point goes beyond the comparison of P1 and P2. We may consider still more realistic models; it is sensible, for example, to model P ji ({`i}) as a dependent process whose accuracy is improving over time. Refer to some formalization of this set of candidate processes as P3. P3 is presumably a more faithful representation of the credence-forming processes, it is again highervariance than P1 and P2 due to its greater complexity. In a formal setting, we might consider the (hierarchical) model class P4 = {P1,P2,P3} and use model selection techniques (which are constructed to select the model class which optimally trades off complexity and fit to the data, in a reliabilist sense) 4 to arrive at a justified credence via (SRG). Now, I do not envision people actually assessing their credences in this way. But the account exhibits several properties which should figure into reliabilist accounts of belief generally. First, judgements about the reliability of credences over observables depend on assumptions about the structure of the underlying process. Second, those assumptions may be critiqued and revised, both by reasoning about the plausible mechanisms underlying the reliability of the credence-forming process (as we did when we formulated model class P3), and by comparing (if only intuitively) how well the candidate models trade off simplicity and fit to the data (as would be formalized in the process of selection among the models in P4). 3.2 The Generality and Graining problems The requirement in (ERC) that credences be based on the most inclusive available grounds is motivated (following Comesaña [2006] and Tang [2016]) by two problems for reliabilism: the Generality Problem [Conee and Feldman, 1998], and what Pettigrew calls the Graining Problem. The Generality Problem is that there seems to be no non-arbitrary way of saying what count as instances of a "process", and that some ways of defining the process by which a credence is produced will render that process reliable, while others will render it unreliable. The most-inclusive-grounds requirement aims to solve this problem by introducing a non-arbitrary constraint on the definition of the process-type: the process should be one of forming credences based on the most inclusive 4See Forster and Sober [1994] for a philosophical discussion of a popular model selection technique. 9 available grounds. This simultaneously addresses the Graining Problem, which is the problem that credences may be based on different subsets of the available evidence. If (ERC) is indeed safe from Generality and Graining, then (SRG) is, too, by also requiring that credences be based on the most inclusive grounds g (and, in the case of statistical estimation, the full data set D). But the role grounds and data play in the (SR) framework is somewhat subtle, and helps to explain the intuition motivating the Comesaña/Tang/Pettigrew most-inclusive-grounds requirement. This is because (SRG) does not require that the entire dataset or grounds is "active" in the same way that (ERC) requires credences to depend on the most inclusive grounds; on (SR), we are allowed to consider estimators which discard any amount of the information at hand. To take an extreme case, we may even include in T estimators of the form T : D 7→ c for some constant c. For rich-enough T, however, such estimators will be automatically discarded as a consequence of our formulation, because estimators which throw away information in this way are known to be unreliable. As an example, consider the squared error loss of estimators T1 : D 7→ c and T2 : D 7→ Xn of the true mean of Xi ∼ N(θ0, 1). For any θ0, the risks of each with respect to the squared error loss turn out to be (given n "draws" from N(θ0, 1)): R(T1(D), θ0) = ED|θ0(T1(D)− θ0) 2 = (c− θ0)2 R(T2(D), θ0) = ED|θ0(T2(D)− θ0) 2 = 1 n . Thus any of the reliability measures we have seen (with the exception of Bayes estimators which use a weighting function concentrated on c) would prefer N(Xn, 1) to N(c, 1) as an epistemic probability distribution for Xn+1. Or, consider Pettigrew [2018]'s example of a person forming a credence about the color of a ball drawn from an urn. Half of the balls are black and half are white and each is marked with a unique number. The person has drawn a ball which they see as White and marked with the number 73. What credence should they form on the basis of their visual experience g = {Color=White,Number=73}? Pettigrew points out that it is irrational to base our beliefs only on the grounds {Number=73} (and therefore form a credence of 12 that the ball is White), which is the sort of observation that motivates the "most-inclusive grounds" stipulation. However, from the point of view of (SR) there is no need to invoke an additional principle. Consider two credence forming-processes, one based only on {Number} and the other based on the full data {Color,Number}: P1 : {Color,Number} 7→ P (Color = White | Number) = 1 2 P2 : {Color,Number} 7→ 1(Color = White), Then (assuming the person's vision is intact) P2 is perfectly reliable, but P1 is not; its expected squared error loss, for instance, is 0.25. On the other hand, as discussed in Section 2.2, "throwing away" data may sometimes improve reliability, if that data enters via an unreliable process - for instance, via systematically bad prior elicitation in the case of Bayesian estimation. Similarly, because more complicated models have higher variance (and therefore, all else equal, lower reliability), we may sometimes prefer credences which do not "activate" the most inclusive grounds. The upshot is that the statistical-reliabilist point of view explains why we should generally base our beliefs on all of the available evidence: evidence provides information, and more information leads to more reliable beliefs (in a way that can be quantified in formal statistical settings). At the same time (SR) explains why we may sometimes rightfully reluctant to include certain sources of information when forming beliefs. 4 Conclusion There are several issues I have not had space to discuss here. One is how the choice of scoring rule L figures into the justification of the corresponding reliability measure. There has been substantial discussion of the epistemic significance of scoring rules in both statistics and formal epistemology [Gneiting and Raftery, 2007, Leitgeb and Pettigrew, 2010a, Levinstein, 2017], and there is surely more to be said about how various putative epistemic requirements for scoring rules (such as "propriety") interact with other considerations (such as computational efficiency) in the (SR) framework. Another area I have neglected is the confidence distribution approach to statistical 10 foundations. While little-discussed in the philosophy literature, the confidence distribution approach purports to unify frequentist and Bayesian approaches to statistics by giving an account of epistemic probability ("confidence") which is grounded in frequentist properties [Schweder, 2018]. In particular, confidence distributions are distributions on the space of parameters for a class of models which make calibrated statements of confidence, in the sense that (say) 95% confidence intervals derived from such a distribution will (under the model assumptions) contain the true parameter value in 95% of samples [Xie and Singh, 2013]. This makes the confidence approach a rival to (SR) as a reliabilist foundation for statistics. However, confidence distributions need not be optimal in the (SR) sense (though they turn out to be in some cases; see Lawless and Fredette [2005]), and therefore do not exhibit what I regard as the appropriate sense of reliability. Indeed, this is an instance of the often-noted inadequacy of calibration relative to accuracy as a notion of reliability for probability statements; see the discussion of (Calibration) versus (Brier) in Tang [2016], for example. The (SR) account also points to promising opportunities for collaborations between formal epistemologists and statisticians. First, as touched on briefly in 2.1, the nature of the justification of a statistical procedure via asymptotic arguments and simulation experiments would likely benefit from philosophical clarification. Second, the adoption of reliabilism for credences raises questions about what a reliabilist decision theory might look like; for instance, should agents calculate expected utilities by averaging utilities against an (SR)-justified epistemic probability distribution? Or should expected utility be estimated directly, just as epistemic probabilities are obtained by estimating objective probabilities in (SR)? This question parallels questions in the literature on optimal sequential decision-making over "model-based" versus "model-free" approaches [Sutton and Barto, 2018], as well as "direct" versus "indirect" methods of optimizing expected utility [Zhao and Laber, 2014]. References James O Berger. Statistical decision theory and Bayesian analysis. Springer Science & Business Media, 2013. Dennis D Boos and John F Monahan. Bootstrap methods using prior information. Biometrika, 73 (1):77–83, 1986. GlennW Brier and Roger A Allen. Verification of weather forecasts. In Compendium of meteorology, pages 841–848. Springer, 1951. Juan Comesaña. A well-founded solution to the generality problem. Philosophical Studies, 129(1): 27–47, 2006. Earl Conee and Richard Feldman. The generality problem for reliabilism. Philosophical Studies, 89(1):1–29, 1998. Jeff Dunn. Reliability for degrees of belief. Philosophical Studies, 172(7):1929–1952, 2015. Bradley Efron. Modern science and the Bayesian-frequentist controversy. Division of Biostatistics, Stanford University, 2005. Bradley Efron and Gail Gong. A leisurely look at the bootstrap, the jackknife, and cross-validation. The American Statistician, 37(1):36–48, 1983. Malcolm Forster and Elliott Sober. How to tell when simpler, more unified, or less ad hoc theories will provide more accurate predictions. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 45 (1):1–35, 1994. Andrew Gelman and Cosma Rohilla Shalizi. Philosophy and the practice of bayesian statistics. British Journal of Mathematical and Statistical Psychology, 66(1):8–38, 2013. Charles J Geyer et al. Asymptotics of maximum likelihood without the lln or clt or sample size going to infinity. In Advances in Modern Statistical Theory and Applications: A Festschrift in honor of Morris L. Eaton, pages 1–24. Institute of Mathematical Statistics, 2013. 11 Tilmann Gneiting and Adrian E Raftery. Strictly proper scoring rules, prediction, and estimation. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 102(477):359–378, 2007. Hilary Greaves and David Wallace. Justifying conditionalization: Conditionalization maximizes expected epistemic utility. Mind, 115(459):607–632, 2006. James M Joyce. A nonpragmatic vindication of probabilism. Philosophy of science, 65(4):575–603, 1998. JF Lawless and Marc Fredette. Frequentist prediction intervals and predictive distributions. Biometrika, 92(3):529–542, 2005. Hannes Leitgeb and Richard Pettigrew. An objective justification of bayesianism i: Measuring inaccuracy. Philosophy of Science, 77(2):201–235, 2010a. Hannes Leitgeb and Richard Pettigrew. An objective justification of bayesianism ii: The consequences of minimizing inaccuracy. Philosophy of Science, 77(2):236–272, 2010b. Benjamin Anders Levinstein. A pragmatist's guide to epistemic utility. Philosophy of Science, 84 (4):613–638, 2017. Deborah G Mayo. Discussion: Bayesian methods: Applied? yes. philosophical defense? in flux. The American Statistician, 67(1):11–15, 2013. Deborah G Mayo. Statistical inference as severe testing: How to get beyond the statistics wars. Cambridge University Press, 2018. Anthony O'Hagan, Caitlin E Buck, Alireza Daneshkhah, J Richard Eiser, Paul H Garthwaite, David J Jenkinson, Jeremy E Oakley, and Tim Rakow. Uncertain judgements: eliciting experts' probabilities. John Wiley & Sons, 2006. Richard Pettigrew. What is justified credence? Episteme, 2018. doi:0.1017/epi.2018.50. Tore Schweder. Confidence is epistemic probability for empirical science. Journal of Statistical Planning and Inference, 195:116–125, 2018. Tore Schweder and Nils Lid Hjort. Frequentist analogues of priors and posteriors. Preprint series. Statistical Research Report http://urn. nb. no/URN: NBN: no-23420, 1999. Nicholas Shackel. Bertrand's paradox and the principle of indifference. Philosophy of Science, 74 (2):150–175, 2007. Richard S Sutton and Andrew G Barto. Reinforcement learning: An introduction. MIT press, 2018. Weng Hong Tang. Reliability theories of justified credence. Mind, 125(497):63–94, 2016. Aad W Van der Vaart. Asymptotic statistics, volume 3. Cambridge university press, 2000. Vladimir Vapnik. Principles of risk minimization for learning theory. In Advances in neural information processing systems, pages 831–838, 1992. Min-ge Xie and Kesar Singh. Confidence distribution, the frequentist distribution estimator of a parameter: A review. International Statistical Review, 81(1):3–39, 2013. Ruoyong Yang and James O Berger. A catalog of noninformative priors. Institute of Statistics and Decision Sciences, Duke University, 1996. Ying-Qi Zhao and Eric B Laber. Estimation of optimal dynamic treatment regimes. Clinical Trials, 11(4):400–407, 2014.

casistica, studio dei "casi di coscienza", cioè di situazioni in cui in prima istanza i principi morali accettati sembrano essere più di uno o nessuno. Fra il 1200 e il 1650 fu una pratica fiorente che diede origine a un'ampia letteratura comprendente lo Enchiridion di M. Navarro (1556) e le Resolutiones morales di A. Diana (1629-1659). A partire dal Seicento divenne oggetto di discredito principalmente per via della dottrina collegata, affermatasi largamente fra i gesuiti del tempo, del probabilismo; questa affermava che se una opinione pratica è probabilmente vera è lecito seguirla anche se l'opinione opposta è più probabilmente vera; è ovvio come una dottrina siffatta potesse essere usata da una coscienza poco scrupolosa per giustificare a posteriori qualsiasi linea di condotta; il termine, tuttora sussistente nel linguaggio ordinario, di "gesuitismo" rispecchia le vive reazioni di rifiuto per questa dottrina. La casistica fu fatta oggetto di critica da parte dei protestanti e dei giansenisti. B. Pascal in particolare nelle Lettere provinciali (1656-57) espose ferocemente al ridicolo questa pratica. È scomparsa nella filosofia morale posteriore sopravvivendo in qualche misura nella teologia morale insegnata nei seminari e nella facoltà teologiche cattoliche. G.E. Moore usò (impropriamente) il termine c. per designare l'etica normativa. Negli ultimi due decenni il fiorire dell'etica applicata ha riportato in vita se non il nome, almeno la pratica della casistica, esplicitamente difesa di recente da S. Toulmin. [Sergio Cremaschi]

PIETRO PIOVANI LA FILOSOFIA DELL'ASSENZA Ha profetizzato il destino del Novecento Friedrich Nietzsche in quel tragico autunno 1888 quando, vagando per le vie di Torino, gridava «Guarda in fuori! non guardare indietro! Si va a fondo quando si giunge sempre ai fondamenti» 1 . Il secolo che Nietzsche non avrebbe visto non si è più lasciato illudere dalle grandi sicurezze razionali, dalla ricerca delle certezze, dalle «anestesie razionalistiche del reale», per dirla con le parole di Carlo Michelstaedter. La ragione aveva costruito grandi cattedrali, che abbiamo continuato e continuiamo a visitare con rispetto e reverenza, ma le nostre case sono uscite dalle nostre menti e, fuori, vi abbiamo trovato un eterno precipitare nell' infinito nulla. Come ci consoleremo? Se la philo-sophia nasce come amante di quella sapienza di cui è manchevole e alla quale rivolge lo sguardo come sommo bene, dopo aver vanamente tentato di farsi puro sapere, sophia, scienza, deve ritornare al suo stato di amante. Ma il suo sguardo sarà rivolto non più alla sapienza, bensì alla mancanza stessa. Non all'essenza bensì all'assenza. Rivelativo, dell'uomo e del pensiero, è il richiamo piovaniano a una delle Considerazioni inattuali in cui Nietzsche nota che «l'esistenza dell'uomo è un imperfetto che non si compie mai». Siamo nell'ultimo capitolo dell'opera del 1972, Principi di una filosofia della morale, che si apre con la ferma acquisizione che lo stare dell'uomo sia instabile anche nei suoi assetti più stabili. Il titolo del capitolo è Assenza e valorazione e prelude al capolavoro, uscito postumo nel 1981, Oggettivazione etica e assenzialismo . Il concetto di assenza, e ciò che da esso ne deriva, rappresenta, a nostro modo di vedere, l' acmé del pensiero del filosofo napoletano, figura silenziosa, tra le più acute e originali della filosofia italiana del secondo Novecento 2 Pietro Piovani muore a Napoli, sua città natale, il 13 agosto del 1980. Aveva cinquantotto anni. E' stato uno studioso « appartato, riservato, discreto, severo», come lo descrive Fulvio Tessitore, uno dei suoi più pregevoli allievi. Un «solitario non insocievole», secondo la definizione di Gennaro Sasso all'indomani della morte. Non è un caso che Piovani avesse scelto come motto della "Collana di filosofia" da lui fondata e diretta, l'affermazione di Seneca «quid enim turpius philosophia captante clamores?» . E se la filosofia è per lui, costituzionalmente, un «pensare in grande»3, « l'operosa severità del grande [...] germina e cresce in silenzio», al contrario delle «piccinerie del caduco» impantanate nella «rumorosità del piccolo»4. Nata nel tempo della crisi dei valori, la filosofia di Piovani si carica, 1 FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, Ditirambi di Dioniso e Poesie postume (1882-1888), a cura di Giorgio Colli e Mazzino Montinari, Milano, Adelphi, 1977, volume VI, tomo IV, pag 183. 2 Per il nostro lavoro abbiamo analizzato principalmente le opere di Pietro Piovani degli ultimi vent'anni e in modo particolare Principi di una filosofia della morale e Oggettivazione etica e assenzialismo , contenuti in P. PIOVANI, Per una filosofia della morale, a cura di Fulvio Tessitore, Milano, Bompiani, 2010. Il volume raccoglie le quattro principali monografie teoretiche di Piovani, che configurano la sua filosofia della morale. Per una informazione sulle opere di e su Piovani si possono consultare la Bibliografia degli scritti di Pietro Piovani (1946-1981), a cura di F. Tessitore e G. Acocella, Napoli, Società Nazionale di Scienze Lettere ed Arti, 1982 e la più recente Bibliografia degli scritti su Pietro Piovani (19482000), a cura di P. Amodio, Napoli, Liguori Editore, 2000, il cui aggiornamento, fino al 2007, si legge, curato dallo stesso Amodio, in «Archivio di storia della cultura », XXI, 2008, pp.361-372. 3 Il corsivo è nell'originale 4 PIETRO PIOVANI, Principi di una filosofia della morale ( 1972), in Per una filosofia della morale..., cit, p. 818. come nota Tessitore 5 , « di una attualissima inattualità», che fa di lui un classico del nostro secondo Novecento, il cui esistenzialismo è fondamentalmente antiesistenzialistico, il cui storicismo è risolutamente opposto allo storicismo idealistico, il cui interesse al tema del negativo è profondamente contrario all'uso fattone dalle filosofie della crisi. La nuona sintesi tra soggetto e oggetto, particolare e universale, esistenzialismo e storicismo trova espressione nella dinamica dell'individuale. Ma l'esistente uscito dall'orbita di ogni universalismo, abbandonato a se stesso e fondamentalmente preoccupato anzitutto di universalizzare senza essere universalizzato, di ordinare senza essere ordinato, dunque disposto a non abbandonare a nessun prezzo la sua effettiva qualità esistenziale, sa ormai [...] di non essere dell'essere, di non essere dall'essere; rimane, vuole rimanere, ancorato alla storicità come situazionalità, in una storia che non si cosmologizzi in storia universale, ma rimanga un interrelazionale tessuto di bisogni, speranze, aspirazioni, godimenti, dolori, fatiche successi, scacchi, delusioni 6 . E' l'individuale il soggetto di questo divenire storico, che non può essere depurato da una qualsivoglia ragione , ma solo moltiplicato, e dove la storia non è tanto ciò che è stato, ma ciò che ancora ha da essere. Assenza. Pietro Piovani è cresciuto sotto la guida «incomparabile e amorosa » 7 di Giuseppe Capograssi, al quale lo univano la comune passione per la storia, il diritto e per il mondo morale, dal quale lo distingueva quella forte vocazione per la razionalità, che non si accordava con la diffidenza del maestro nei confronti della ragione , che proveniva dai presupposti religiosi del suo pensiero, assenti invece nel discepolo. I primi scritti di Piovani furono sul Critone platonico e su Rosmini, ma il fulcro tematico di partenza e di progressivo approfondimento del suo pensiero è costituito dalla concezione del diritto come attività. L'attrazione per gli aspetti filosofici lo ha però portato ad abbandonare gli interessi specifici per i problemi giuridici e a riesaminare i temi della filosofia del diritto dal punto di vista della filosofia e in particolare dell'etica. Ne sono emersi dei volumi fondamentali : Normatività e società (Napoli, 1949), Linee di una filosofia del diritto (Padova, 1958), Giusnaturalismo ed etica moderna ( Bari, 1961) e La filosofia del diritto come scienza filosofica (Milano, 1963) nella quale Piovani delinea il suo modo di intendere la Filosofia del diritto, sulla base delle opere precedenti e con riferimenti importanti a Vico, Hegel e Rosmini. L'ultima fase del pensiero di Piovani, la più originale e compiuta, è all'insegna dei problemi generali dell'etica: Filosofia e storia delle idee (Bari, 1965) e Conoscenza storica e coscienza morale (Napoli, 1966). Sono le ultime due opere però, Principi di una filosofia della morale del 1972 e Oggettivazione etica e assenzialismo, pubblicata postuma nel 1981 a cura di Fulvio Tessitore, a costituire la vera punta di diamante del pensiero di Piovani. Non per il compimento e il completamento di un percorso teoretico, ma per le prospettive che lasciano in eredità. Non per ciò che chiudono, ma per ciò che aprono. «L'essenza di ogni realtà fenomenica è l'assenza »8 sostiene Piovani nel capitolo della sua ultima opera, dal titolo Desum ergo sum . A rigore quindi l'essenza della vita ( l'essere ) è assenza ( il nonessere ): l'essenza è assenza, l'essere è assenza. L'essenza nonè e l'assenza è. Dunque l'essere è il nonessere. Qui Piovani recupera un tema aurorale della storia del pensiero, ma lo porta ad una estrema, originale radicalità. L'opposizione al principio parmenideo per cui «l'essere è e il non essere non è» e che Aristotele ha reso paradigma della logica occidentale il principio di non contraddizione -, ha avuto da sempre i suoi sostenitori, sia sui versanti più strettamente ontologici, sia nella sua declinazione più propriamente esistenziale ( l'opposizione-relazione tra vita-morte ). Il contrasto di Eraclito, il Platone parricida (Sofista, 241b,242 d), la mistica negativa della filosofia medievale, 5 FULVIO TESSITORE, Dialettica delle forme morali e anti-ontologismo in Pietro Piovani, in PIETRO PIOVANI , Per una filosofia della morale....., cit, pp. 918-919. 6 PIETRO PIOVANI, Principi di una filosofia della morale ..., cit, p. 834. 7 ENRICO OPOCHER, Ricordo di Pietro Piovani, in Quaderni fiorentini, per la storia del pensiero giuridico moderno, n.10 (1981), Milano, Giuffrè editore, p. 523 e sgg. 8 PIETRO PIOVANI, Oggettivazione etica e assenzialismo, in Per una filosofia della morale..., cit, p. 1039. l'immane potenza del negativo di Hegel, la noluntas di Schopenhauer, l'angoscia di Kierkegaard, la persuasione e la retorica di Michelstaedter, e poi l'inesauribile "essere per il nulla" del Novecento esistenzialistico. Pietro Piovani, da acuto e rigoroso storico della filosofia quale era, non ha mancato di analizzare le vie già percorse. E a criticarle 9 . In particolare l'esistenzialismo e la sua entificazione del nulla: Niente è meno esistenzialistico del cosiddetto esistenzialismo: nei suoi più significativi rappresentanti ( che infatti non vogliono essere definiti esistenzialisti) il problema filosofico fondamentale diventa la ricerca di un altro essere, di un più vero e sostanziale essere, perché nella tradizione filosofica dell'Occidente, è ormai chiarito che l'Essere e il Nulla si equivalgono. Per questo, l'esistenzialismo si converte in neo-essenzialismo 10 . Il fondamento della critica di Piovani è lo s-fondamento radicale di ogni ontologismo essenzialistico. Il tema compare già in Normatività etica e società (1949) e si sviluppa in Linee di una filosofia del diritto (1958) : Per quanto io tenti di conoscermi nella nudità del mio sentire e pensare, per quanto io tenti risalire al mio primo atto di consapevolezza, per quanto io riesca a ricostruire, in ipotesi, una per una, la storia delle mie volizioni, devo arrestarmi di fronte a una constatazione, che mi presenta un dato, che mi presenta me stesso come dato: io che voglio non mi sono voluto[...]. Qualunque cosa io voglia oggi o abbia voluto ieri, io, alla mia origine, non mi sono voluto: altri [...] ha voluto per me. 11 Il volere dell'individuo trova il suo invalicabile confine all'inizio del suo essere, oltre il quale non può andare. Al suo principio, la soggettività dell'individuo coglie l'oggettività , il limite, la sofferenza del limite, e si esperisce in balìa di una volontà altra , che lo attraversa alla radice e che contraddice ogni possibile pretesa di soggettività assoluta, al punto per cui «perfino io sono altro da me » 12. L'individuo porta in sé stesso il mistero del suo essere stato individuato, del suo essere stato voluto. Da chi? Gli sviluppi di queste considerazioni sono rimandate all'opera del 1972, dove Piovani afferma che, dato il carattere finito dell'individuo, in quanto volente che non si è voluto, dato il carattere assenziale della sua essenza, l'esistente non ha più bisogno di nessun fondamento. L'esistente non ha fondamento perché si fonda. L'instaurazione personalitaria non procede nel senso di una fisiologia o nel senso di una ontologia. L'eliminazione di ogni natura che sostanzialisticamente fornisca una base all'evoluzione dell'esistente respinge e soluzione oggettivistica e soluzione soggettivistica [...]. Se si vuole esistere aderendo quanto più direttamente è possibile al reale, alla sua concretezza, si deve mantenere, angosciosamente, il contatto con i contrasti del concreto, non allontanarsene, non trascurarli, non livellarli con artifici mistificanti, non prescinderne 13 . In modo particolare l'individuo contemporaneo è più che mai infondato, dovendo continuamente fondarsi e dovendo relazionarsi con una realtà che è in continua trasformazione, dovendo « accettare di esistere in uno stato di perenne, nobilissima, consapevole precarietà, in cui non c'è stabilità conquistata che non appartenga all'equilibrio instabile della condizione umana»14 . In Oggettivazione etica e assenzialismo Piovani tocca i vertici della sua critica del fondamento affermando che « nulla è stabile per l'uomo. Il quale stabilisce proprio perché è non-stabile e non-stabilito. Nemmeno la ragione è il suo fondamento: nell'esistenza è soltanto il suo precario fondarsi »15. Costretto a rendere stabile la propria instabilità, l'uomo si riconosce senza essere e fonda la sua esistenza su una assenza. Qui Piovani, attraverso la formulazione del "volente non volutosi", sradica i presupposti del pensiero moderno, costruito sull' ipertrofizzazione dell'io, e coglie nell'esperienza del limite, della finitezza e dell'alterità il cominciamento dell'esistente. Il volente si coglie non volutosi: esiste pur potendo certamente non esistere. In particolare è la concezione idealistica della storia a farne le spese come Piovani già 9 PIETRO PIOVANI, Oggettivazione etica e assenzialismo,...., cit, pp. 999 e segg. 10 PIETRO PIOVANI, Oggettivazione etica ..., cit, p. 1037. 11 PIETRO PIOVANI, Linee di una filosofia del diritto, in Per una filosofia della morale..., cit, p. 505 12 PIETRO PIOVANI, Linee di una filosofia del diritto, in Per una filosofia della morale..., cit, p. 506. 13 PIETRO PIOVANI, Principi di una filosofia della morale ..., cit, p. 835. 14 PIETRO PIOVANI, Etica, in Posizioni e trasposizioni etiche, a cura di G. LISSA, Napoli, 1958, p. 154. 15 PIETRO PIOVANI, Oggettivazione etica ..., cit, p. 1032. tematizza con chiarezza nella sua opera del 1966una storia totalizzata in una nuova assolutezza, in cui lo Spirito onnisolutore e onnigiustificatore è retorico travestimento della metafisica classica e assoluzione plenaria delle coscienze, ovvero congedo assoluto delle coscienze. L'ambivalenza piovaniana dell'esistente come volente non volutosi trasforma invece il volente in valente, la cui esistenza si compie nella valorazione : «[...]le esaminate strutture dell'esistenza provano che le volontà esistenziali sono ben altro che immediate volizioni. Il compimento dell'esistenza non avviene nella semplicità della volizione, ma nella complessità della valorazione» 16 . Ne segue un'etica estremamente rigorosa che, incontrando e superando l'agonismo etico kantiano, « pretenda , in maniera caratteristica, la tensione di ognuno, impegnato ad affermare e difendere la sua qualità di uomo in un mondo tutto umano »17. Siffatta etica è tanto severa da risultare spietata, severa fino alla crudeltà, conclude Piovani. Nella consapevolezza di questa inattingibilità « la coscienza del naufrago, nella navigazione esistenziale verso l'infinità, si converte in un rinvigorimento etico del soggetto»18 . L'esistente, che non è fondato nell'ontologia, si fonda nella deontologia, che non è però la dottrina dei doveri, ma, seguendo l'etimologia greca δεῖ ,che indica mancare, è designazione di una insoddisfazione che chiede di essere soddisfatta, di una assenza. «L'esistente [...] può, senza equivoci, neppure terminologici, riconoscersi realizzantesi in un farsi dominato dall'assenza: non esiste che per diventare ciò che non è, per farsi quale non è ancora»19. Niente a che fare con un " banale" – e questo per Piovani è supremo dispregio – nichilismo, che altro non è che una ontologia raffinata, nessun favor vacui di una negatività neo-ontologica, bensì una nuova riflessione sulla positività dell'inadeguato. L'assenza è massima forza energetica del vivere e, seguendo Nietzsche, l'esistente non si realizza nel niente, ma in un più. Per diventare se stesso deve essere più di se stesso, deve farsi più di quel che già sia. Il suo già-essere non è stasi, ma transizione.[...]. L'esistenza umana nel suo tratto dominante, è una futurologia.[...]. L'essenziale non è ciò che non è, bensì ciò che ancora-non-esiste. Veramente essenziale all'uomo è l'assenziale 20 . L'oggettivazione etica è dunque, contro la mentalità statico-monistica, la capacità del soggetto di oggettivarsi nel divenire, realizzando così nell'esperienza esistenziale la sua soggettività, il vero essere del soggetto. La filosofia contemporanea ha dinanzi ha sé il compito rivoluzionario, sostiene Piovani, di esplorare questa visione dinamica, divenieristica e assenzialistica della razionalità. Sistema di scelte, l'oggettivazione etica partecipa della razionalità quale processo: non applica i dettami della ragione, ma li collauda provandoli e riprovandoli, verificando il loro intimo essere razionale. E' la costruzione etica, nel suo oggettivarsi, a mettere in gioco l'umanità intera del soggetto. Nella razionalità come effettivo fieri, l'esistente può fare i conti col primato del negativo e ritenere, alla fine: quod deest me constituit. Rinuncia a trovare un fondamento perché sa di esistere solamente se, dinamicamente, non è stabile ma si fa stabile. Il suo fondamento non è perché è mancanza. Imparare a guardarsi in negativo per l'uomo non è facile perché l'abitudinario pensiero tradizionale, privo di dimestichezza con l'assenzialismo, lo dissuade dalla novità dello sforzo; eppure traendo le somme della massima consapevolezza del pensiero moderno, la filosofia ha un avvenire ( un seducente avvenire) soltanto come filosofia negativa 21 . L'approdo della filosofia alla negatività è un percorso lento e difficile perché implica una inversione di tendenza rispetto alle stratificazioni del pensiero, che tende alla conservazione, alla ripetizione, tutto preso dall'« assillo dello stare, del rimanere »: l'esistenza chiama l'esistenza, ci dice Piovani. La crisi dell'oggettività dei valori della filosofia morale del ventesimo secolo, altro non è che la crisi della deduzione dei valori dal sistema in cui erano inseriti. Ma questa crisi del processo deduttivistico tradizionale non costituisce una diminutio per la filosofia morale, che al contrario, trovandosi costretta a dar conto di sé, si pone al centro del discorso teoretico. Nella nuova prospettiva dello storicismo esistenziale e assenzialistico, un valore vive già nella mera tensione, «perché il suo aspirare, perseguire, 16 PIETRO PIOVANI, Principi di una filosofia della morale ..., cit, p. 836. 17 PIETRO PIOVANI, Etica.....cit. p.158 18 PIETRO PIOVANI, Principi di una filosofia della morale ..., cit, p. 845. 19 PIETRO PIOVANI, Principi di una filosofia della morale ..., cit, p. 836. 20 PIETRO PIOVANI, Principi di una filosofia della morale ..., cit, p. 837. 21 PIETRO PIOVANI, Oggettivazione etica ..., cit, p. 1042. perseverare è un esistere che lascia tracce e crea rapporti con risonanze imprevedibili e invisibili (anche l'invisibile esiste)» 22. Non più dedurre e applicare, bensì capire che, nella prassi, pensiero e azione non sono disgiunti. Il vero non è, ma si fa. Contro ogni sostanzialismo Piovani è convinto che la verità sia un verificare. Conoscere la realtà significa penetrarne le strutture mobili, perché definire il fermo non ha significato e in ogni campo « l'esistente o è mobile o non è »23 . Motivo per cui la verità di ogni cosa non può essere possesso, ma ricerca. Per possedere una realtà sua, il soggetto non deve averla, ma acquistarla attraverso la lotta per la morte, polemos perenne, attraverso una azione espansiva di sé, che è fatta di imprevedibili improvvisazioni, attraverso un processo che è in continuo divenire 24 . L'essere pensante stesso è divenire, il pensare implica il divenire. L'allontanamento tra pensiero ed essere deriva dal dubbio che il soggetto del cogito ha di essere il punto di partenza del pensiero. L'identità di cogito e sum è incrinata e la razionalità stessa spinge il soggetto alla dimestichezza con l'insicurezza e la precarietà, che richiede una coraggiosa attitudine al rischio. « Il sistema della moralità non è un regno di sicurezze da preservare, ma un complesso di rischi da correre [...]. Non è solido assetto, ma precario acquisto »25. Abbiamo dunque visto che il volente non volutosi, che non è in grado di rispondere al proprio radicale perché, di fronte all'inspiegabilità del suo essere originario deve fare i conti con la propria oggettività come mera datità. E per quanto desideri che il suo essere vero coincida con la sua razionalità, si trova invece « ad essere esistente in una originarietà impenetrabile e ambigua nelle sue radici [...] fin dall'inizio l'esistenza è un invischiamento »26. Ma lo stesso non volutosi « una volta accettata l'esistenza, si vuole. Vuole la stessa oggettività primaria, quindi la trasforma. La decisione esistenziale è soggettificazione dell'oggettivo. Come esistente mi accetto quale dato che si dà: divento un oggetto soggettificato». Il soggetto potrà quindi trovare la sua realtà solo nella realizzazione : « la realtà del dato, che ha incontrato come oscura inconoscibilità, l'ha superata volontarizzandosi nella decisione esistenziale » 27. E', questo, il luogo dell'ethos , il terreno in cui si realizzano quelle oggettivazioni, che confermano e protraggono la decisione esistenziale. E' il terreno delle scelte, e ogni scelta limita, ma forma. Se le scelte non limitassero di volta in volta, il soggetto non sarebbe formato. E' la dialettica dell'individuale: il soggetto sa bene quanto sia penoso, quanto sia costoso continuare ad esistere. Ed è proprio perché l'esistente, con tutte le lacerazione e limitazioni dell'esistere, è dominato dall'assillo del rimanere e dal timore della precarietà che cerca relazioni : Privo di un essere da possedere, l'esistente umano è costretto a cercare di essere più di quel che sia perché, inizialmente, è sempre meno di quel che vorrebbe. Se non fosse originariamente meno di quel che vorrebbe, non vorrebbe. Il suo volere è mosso dalla sua insufficienza 28 . Proprio perché l'esistente sa di non essere dell'essere, di non essere nell'essere, non ha un essere semplicemente da conservare, ma deve formarselo con uno sforzo, fatto di continui oltrepassamenti 29 . 22 PIETRO PIOVANI, Oggettivazione etica ..., cit, p. 1031. 23 PIETRO PIOVANI, Oggettivazione etica ..., cit, p. 1033. 24 E' interessante la presenza di Kierkegaard in Piovani: « ha detto giustamente Kierkegaard: "Un io, in ogni momento della sua esistenza, è in divenire"» ( Oggettivazione etica...cit. p.960). I riferimenti, espliciti o impliciti, al filosofo danese sono molteplici nel pensiero di Piovani. Importanti e profonde assonanze, concettuali e terminologiche, anche su temi quali: singolarità, rischio, libertà, vanità e gratuità, essere testimoni, scelta, salto, ma soprattutto sul ruolo edificante – utilizzando questa volta una espressione squisitamente kierkegaardiana – dell'angoscia, cui faremo cenno poco innanzi. 25 PIETRO PIOVANI, Oggettivazione etica ..., cit, p. 962. 26 PIETRO PIOVANI, Oggettivazione etica ..., cit, pp. 956 e seg. 27 PIETRO PIOVANI, Oggettivazione etica ..., cit, pp. 959. 28 PIETRO PIOVANI, Oggettivazione etica ..., cit, p. 968. 29 Contro ogni essenzialismo, specie idealistico, l'etica di Piovani si riconosce più facilmente nell'agonismo etico kantiano, nel primato della ragione pratica e dell'intenzionalità. Così, rintracciamo l'ombra di Kant quando Piovani sostiene che il volere e il valore si misurano nella capacità di oggettivarsi, che l'azione chiusa nel suo singolarismo e isolamento si autodistrugge e non vale nemmeno per il soggetto stesso, che l'eccezionalità dell'azione eroica ha invece la caratteristica di valere per tutti. Il debito verso Kant riguarda la sua filosofia della finitezza, che è carattere costitutivo del soggetto storico Ma Sull'opera di Piovani campeggia il quesito capitale: « Perché l'esistenza invece dell'inesistenza?» 30. Come osserva Giuseppe Maria Pizzuti nel suo, come sempre, acuto saggio del 1990 : « vorremmo dire che la riflessione etica di Piovani, in ultima analisi, si riduce a un girare attorno a quella domanda, e si dispiega precisamente in ragione dell'impossibilità di dare una risposta a quella domanda: l'esistenza si atteggia in guisa di un grande divertissement rispetto a quel punto interrogativo, un periplo che tuttavia è contenuto nello spazio degli estremi di esso, e che in esso naufraga quando, con la morte, il soggetto è costretto ad ammettere che "perché sia gli è ignoto oggi più di ieri: meglio di ieri"»31. L'uomo è l'indigente per antonomasia, ci dice Piovani. In mezzo a esistenze finite e definite ( e pensa soprattutto al mondo animale, le cui funzioni sono sempre più o meno adeguate e idonee nella lotta per la sopravvivenza), l'uomo brilla per la sua sprovveduta debolezza e deficienza. Non per niente, osserva Piovani, Freud vede la nascita della civiltà come forma di difesa dell'uomo contro la natura : « si potrebbe dire che l'uomo per darsi una natura, per farsi accettare dalla natura, deve negarla storicizzandola con la civiltà »32. E seguendo ancora la pista freudiana, Piovani afferra alla radice questa dialettica uomo-natura: Nelle selve primigenie la terrificante lotta per l'esistenza è dominata dal terrore. Meno fornito di specifici mezzi di difesa, l'uomo si caratterizza come il più impaurito dei viventi. Atterrito più d'ogni altro, conosce il terrore: si forma e resiste con quest'atto di conoscenza. Nella confusione informe di viventi e morenti, capisce di essere il più esposto all'insidia dell'inesistenza incombente: la scoperta della morte è il primo atto di vita del soggetto umano, morente consapevole tra morenti inconsapevoli 33 . La scoperta della morte non è un freddo atto dell'intelletto, ma la prima vera attivazione della libertà, finalizzata alla durata della resistenza, al permanere nel tempo. Ma di fronte alla dissimiglianza della natura, dominato dal terrore, il più imperfetto, inetto, costituzionalmente malato e instabile dei viventi, si stabilisce. La paura si ipostatizza , si trascende 34 . E se l'inesistenza è al principio dell'esistere umano, l'agguato dell'inesistenza domina la vita : l'esistenza umana nasce proprio come antidoto dell'inesistenza. La spinta a vivere viene dall'opposizione alla morte, sostiene Piovani e l'esistere si qualifica come permanente opposizione all'inesistenza: « l'esistenza è una resistenza [...] la vita umana è una inventio mortis .E' la morte a renderla umanamente vita » 35. Se l'esistere è un resistere, il non esistere inerisce all'esistenza: «Grazie all'attrito con l'inesistenza, all'assillo della inesistenza, l'esistere esiste»36. lo storicismo esistenziale di Piovani oltrepassa l'etica kantiana proprio in virtù del suo assenzialismo, come si evince in particolare nella originale concezione piovaniana della libertà, piuttosto che dell'intenzionalità o del teleologismo negativo. Si veda, ad esempio, Oggettivazione etica... cit. p. 1027 30 Qui il tema tocca invece un aspetto del pensiero dell'altro grande faro piovaniano, ovvero Nietzsche. Il tema è quello della genealogia della morale, che diventa centrale nel problema conoscitivo. «La genetica esistenziale riporta al nascimento dei problemi rivelandoli a loro stessi con novità d'impostazione che in più casi privilegia il loro apparente negativo». PIETRO PIOVANI, Oggettivazione etica ..., cit, p. 985. Il titolo del capitolo è – emblematicamente Existentia infecta, esistenza non conclusa . 31 GIUSEPPE MARIA PIZZUTI, La verità è forse la morte? La prospettiva della filosofia morale di Pietro Piovani, in Occasioni filosofiche 1990,n. 1, Potenza, Ermes, p. 163. 32 PIETRO PIOVANI, Oggettivazione etica ..., cit, p. 986. Frequenti e importanti sono i riferimenti a Freud nelle opere di Piovani, qui in particolare si tratta di rintracciare i legami tra gnoseologia e assiologia e tra scienza e co-scienza. 33 PIETRO PIOVANI, Oggettivazione etica ..., cit, p. 987. L'inscindibilità del legame vita-morte è dichiarato in SIGMUND FREUD, Al di là del principio del piacere (1920), Torino, Bollati Boringhieri, 1977. Per Freud, in quest'opera pubblicata a conclusione di un sofferto itinerario segnato dall'esperienza della guerra, vita e morte abitano l'una nell'altra. La dualità vita – morte è solo apparente perché la vita è in qualche modo anche morte. Non dualismo tra due principi antagonisti, bensì duplicità all'interno di un unico principio per cui vita e morte si rivelano aspetti tra loro indissolubili. Questo è evidenziato dal famoso aneddoto del gioco del rocchetto, analizzato in questa luce da JACQUES DERRIDA, Speculare su «Freud» (1980), ed. it. a cura di Graziella Berto, Milano, Cortina, 2000. 34 E' una declinazione, se pure su fronti opposti, della famosa rilettura severiniana del passo aristotelico sulla nascita della filosofia dal thàuma, in cui Severino sostiene che la filosofia sia nata dal terrore di fronte all'imprevedibile divenire della vita. EMANUELE SEVERINO, La filosofia dai Greci al nostro tempo, vol 3, cap. 1, Milano, Rizzoli, 2004 35 PIETRO PIOVANI, Oggettivazione etica ..., cit, p. 989. 36 PIETRO PIOVANI, Oggettivazione etica ..., cit, p. 1047. L'esistere non è che un individuarsi per non essere cancellati; la stabilità non è che trasformazione dell'instabile: equilibrio nella mutevolezza, creazione di assetti resi intimamente durevoli dalla loro intima razionalità, che l'etica manifesta e comprova 37 . Ma la nuova teorizzata consapevolezza dell'instabilità continua Piovani è produttrice di paradossi. La fine dell'uni-verso armonico lascia spazio al multi-verso instabile. La fine dell'idea pagana di armonia, continuata dalla scolastica cattolica , coincide con il tempo dell'Anticristo. L'uomo « nevrotizzato », che ha perduto ogni armonia, vive all'insegna dell'angoscia, sotto il segno dell'Anticristo. Però, ecco il paradosso: grazie all'angoscia, si risveglia nell'orto di Gethsemani, vicino come non mai all'estrema solitudine addolorata del Cristo. Morto il Dio di tutte le cosmogonie teologizzanti rinasce, nella comunanza sacrificale dell'agonia, il figlio dell'Uomo condannato all'infamia della Croce, indelebilmente segnato da essa, contrassegno di tutte le contraddizioni. Sulla traccia dell'indicazione di Pascal, l'angoisse sottintende una radicale transizione dal Dio al Cristo: mutamento che è troppo carico di futuro per essere compreso e sviluppato dalle grosse e distratte confessioni religiose tradizionali . Ci avviciniamo, con un finale dalla portata drammaturgica, alle ultime possenti pagine dell'opera postuma, che nulla hanno però della finzione estetica. Il razionale ma non razionalista Piovani riconosce alla luce spietata dell'angoscia il compito tragico di sfidare ogni miraggio conoscitivo: Per la prima volta, l'angoscia esenta il pensiero dal compito di conciliare e lo sfida a penetrare, con dialettica effettiva, l'inconciliabilità del reale, l'inesauribilità degli opposti, l'irriscattabilità del dolore del mondo. L'autentica dialettica è il rifiuto di ogni forma di teodicea, di ogni emulsionante dilatazione nella storia universale. Pensare non è suturare le fratture o coprirle, ma comprenderle nella loro irresolubilità. La contraddizione certamente superabile non è contraddizione: intenderla nelle ragioni della sua contraddittorietà è capire l'esistenza nelle sue lacerazioni insanabili [...] L'esistenza non si lascia sottrarre al divenire: è perché, in sé, non si arresta. [...] Se gli esistenti sono in quanto si fanno, se il loro farsi è un produrre effettività, essi non possono essere in quanto sono, ma in quanto divengono e il loro divenire è un continuo difendersi dall'inesistenza, una continua assunzione di coscienza della precarietà combattuta. L'esistere è un corpo a corpo contro l'instabilità perciò non può essere che divenendo 38 . E' la tematizzazione kierkegaardiana dell'angoscia che consente qui a Piovani di guardare in faccia definitivamente la finitezza, e quindi la negatività del preteso tutto. L'angoscia, lontana dall'essere uno stato della psiche, è l'esperienza originaria del limite e quindi del rischio dell'inesistenza, è quell'apertura inquietante che si rivela nelle pieghe più intime, profonde e sofferte dell'interiorità umana 39 . La ragione che si instaura sull'angoscia non ha più bisogno di conciliare ,superare, mediare. L'angoscia instaura una reale e non culturale comunione dell'uomo con il Figlio dell'Uomo, producendo uno spazio di vicinanza al cristianesimo lontano e incompreso, al paradosso del Dio della Croce e 40 . La scelta del Cristo contro il Dio delle cosmogonie teologiche decreta anche la fine di tutte le metafisiche ontologizzanti « Ogni metafisica positiva è un errore». La rivelazione radicale della menzogna metafisica è la verità metafisica. Così sappiamo che « abbiamo bisogno della menzogna per vivere » 41. E' la " sconcertante" lezione di Nietzsche dei Frammenti Postumi, che pone di fronte a un bivio: la metafisica positiva come "compassionevole menzogna" o l'accettazione, tragica, della morte. Ha ragione Celine in Viaggio al termine della notte: « La verità di questo mondo è la morte. Bisogna scegliere: morire o mentire». E proprio l'atteggiamento nei confronti dell'inesistenza qualifica la filosofia: Conoscere la morte è la conoscenza più alta. Solo il vivente che viva fino in fondo la sua esperienza esistenziale conosce la morte.[...]. Il conoscere è stato rivelato, in tutta la sua esistenzialità, come processo di consapevolizzazione che viene da 37 PIETRO PIOVANI, Oggettivazione etica ..., cit, p. 1034 38 PIETRO PIOVANI, Oggettivazione etica ..., cit, p. 1035. 39 Si veda, anche su questo tema, il saggio di GIOVANNI MARIA PIZZUTI, La verità è forse..., cit.pp. 172 e sgg. 40 Sulla dimensione religiosa di Piovani indichiamo di FULVIO TESSITORE, Piovani, la religione e la storia, in Archivio di storia della cultura, XXII, (2009), pp. 23-46, e soprattutto GIOVANNI MORETTO, Sulla traccia del religioso, Napoli, Guida, 1987, in particolare il cap. 7, Pietro Piovani e l'etica della Croce. 41 PIETRO PIOVANI, Oggettivazione etica ..., cit, p. 1037. lontano, viene dal remoto, viene da dove conscio e inconscio forse si toccano, quasi accompagnando dal buio al buio, nell'attraversare la fioca luce disponibile 42 . Ma ancora: perché l'esistere invece del non esistere? E cos'è l'inesistenza? L'inesistenza ormai è chiaro- non è solo la morte. Se l'esistere è un resistere, il non esistere inerisce all'esistenza, è la possibilità di non essere mai stato, è l'assillo grazie al quale l'esistere esiste e, quindi, non si trova solamente alla fine dell'esistere, ma anche prima 43 . Infatti solo il deficitario esistente, e non l'essere, ha a che fare con l'inesistenza. Si tratta anche in questo caso di un radicale ripensamento del concetto di perfezione. « La perfezione è in quanto non esiste » 44 . Seguendo la lezione dell'antiontologismo critico di Kant, Piovani è convinto che la razionale pensabilità del perfetto sia possibile solo se il perfetto non possa esistere. Se l'idea della piena perfezione includesse l'esistere, l'idea sarebbe impura. Il perfectum non può , per Piovani, rivendicare più alcun primato rispetto all'imperfectum. Lo stesso rapporto con Dio ne è coinvolto: « Se un Dio umiliato e imperfetto si è offerto come modello dell'umanità da redimere, l'imperfezione può essere logicamente guardata come il prius logico non essenziale, ma deessenziale .L'eccelso è il miraggio che, prima di fornire un fondamento ontologico alla entificazione del pensiero, vale come impulso esigenziale fondamentale»45. E' la prospettiva teoretica del deesse, la grande svolta come Piovani stesso la presenta nella prefazione della sua ultima opera della lunga storia della filosofia. L'esse lascia il posto al deesse. L'uomo non si rapporta a una perfezione perduta, ma a una defectio, a una inquietudine originaria e congenita, che è il suo destino. E la sua nobiltà: la continua opera della vita dell'uomo è costruire la morte. La morte, culmine del conoscere, è legata a questa realtà deessenziale, in quanto è connessa alla capacità di partecipare al recupero dell'inesistenza . La morte è un processo . Per questo il desiderio conclusivo di conoscere la morte non è soddisfatto dalla morte volontaria, che sottrae il morire all'assolutezza dell'inesistenza 46 . Momento radicale di quella oggettivazione etica, punto di arrivo di tutte le mancanze, di tutte le carenze, di tutte le insufficienze che mettono in moto la vita grazie alle loro insoddisfazioni [...] la morte si guadagna vivendo. Non può essere rapinata col semplice sfratto di un gesto istantaneo; deve essere meritata con accoglimenti, adesioni, ricezioni, capaci di realizzare l'approccio all'inesistenza 47 . Solo a queste condizioni la morte diventa atto culminante di conoscenza, unico spazio conoscitivo in cui « l'esistere e l'inesistere si incontrano», massima aspirazione, suprema ambizione, suprema negatività liberatrice L'abbandono consapevole all'attinta beatitudine dell'inesistenza riscatta dalle fatiche dell'esistere, vissute come necessità trasfigurata in dovere; consente, infine, di toccare la compiutezza in cui tutte le assenze si verificano vanificandosi [...] chiudendo coerentemente il ciclo dall'incognito all'incognito, dentro il quale il raggiunto silenzio non ha motivo di rinnovare o di rinnegare la speranza perché, in gurgite tacito, già la include . Sono le parole conclusive dell'ultima opera di Pietro Piovani. 42 PIETRO PIOVANI, Oggettivazione etica ..., cit, p. 1049. 43 Piovani non si esime dal criticare contestualmente la banalità della familiarizzazione del Novecento con la morte e la marginalità storica del rapporto con l'inesistenza. Si veda, tra l'altro, Oggettivazione etica....cit., p. 1048. 44 PIETRO PIOVANI, Posizioni e trasposizioni etiche, a cura di G. LISSA, Napoli, 1958, p. 210. 45 PIETRO PIOVANI, Posizioni e trasposizioni...,cit., p. 223. 46 Piovani critica la seduzione di abbandonarsi alla morte. Il suicidio per il nostro filosofo è una specie di morte artificiosa, più un gesto che una azione, e come tale si addice all'uomo estetico. Si veda Oggettivazione etica...., cit., pp. 1050 e sgg. 47 PIETRO PIOVANI, Oggettivazione etica ..., cit, p. 1053.

The Motivational Structure of Appreciation Servaas van der Berg (This is the penultimate draft. Please cite the published version-published in Philosophical Quarterly and available here: https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqz004) Abstract On a widely held view in aesthetics, appreciation requires disinterested attention. George Dickie famously criticized a version of this view championed by the aesthetic attitude theorists. I revisit his criticisms and extract an overlooked challenge for accounts that seek to characterize appreciative engagement in terms of distinctive motivation: at minimum, the motivational profile such accounts propose must make a difference to how appreciative episodes unfold over time. I then develop a proposal to meet this challenge by drawing an analogy between how attention is guided in appreciation and how practical action is guided in 'striving play'-a mode of game play recently foregrounded in the philosophy of games. On the resulting account appreciation involves an 'inverted' motivational structure: the appreciating agent's attention is guided by cognitive goals taken up instrumentally, for the sake of the cognitive activity that results from attending under the guidance of those goals. Keywords: aesthetic attitude, disinterest, attention, goal-directed thought, game play I. INTRODUCTION According to a contemporary version of the disinterest thesis in aesthetics, appreciation requires disinterested or non-instrumentally motivated attention. That is, to engage with an item appreciatively, one must attend to it 'without ulterior purpose', 'for its own sake', or 'for the sake of the very experience of attending to it' (see for example Stolnitz 1960; Iseminger 2005; Stecker 2006; Levinson 2016). The thought that disinterest qualifies a way of attending instead of, as Kant (1790/2000) had it, a type of pleasure or judgment, originated with the aesthetic attitude theorists. Schopenhauer (1819/2010: 231) provides an early articulation when he locates the value of 1 the aesthetic attitude in how it 'lifts us out of the endless stream of willing, tearing cognition from its slavery to the will', such that 'attention is no longer directed to the motives of willing.' The later aesthetic attitude theorists took up this thread. For Bullough (1912: 89), for example, aesthetic appreciation involves 'putting the phenomenon, so to speak, out of gear with our practical, actual self' and 'allowing it to stand outside the context of our personal needs and ends'. For Stolnitz (1960: 32–36), the aesthetic attitude requires both disinterest, which he understood to mean a lack of any motive other than just to attend, and what he called 'sympathy', which entails not imposing one's own preconceptions on the object of attention. Aesthetic attitude theory's heyday around the mid-twentieth century was short lived, however, and many now credit George Dickie's (1964) paper, 'The Myth of the Aesthetic Attitude', with sounding its death knell. But despite Dickie's role in curtailing the attitude theorists' influence, his attack on the very existence of a disinterested mode of attention has failed to engender consensus. A chorus of dissenting voices, several of them recent (Lind 1980; Zangwill 1992; Kemp 1999; Shelley 2017; Levinson 2016: 28–31; Nanay 2016: 20– 21; Matthen 2017, 2018), has helped the notion of an appreciative mode of attention, marked by its own peculiar motivational profile, to outlive its theoretical beginnings. Dickie's critics are right to point out that his attack on the existence of a disinterested mode of attention was inconclusive. But pointing this out falls short of meeting the challenge his arguments pose. In particular, there is still no informative positive analysis in the literature of what 'attending for its own sake' amounts to, capable of bearing the explanatory weight routinely thrust upon the notion. The current paper takes up this challenge. It does so by revisiting Dickie's arguments and extracting from them an overlooked desideratum for accounts that seek to understand appreciation in terms of a distinctive motivational profile. 2 Once this desideratum is clearly articulated (in section II), the aim will be to develop a model of appreciative motivation that meets it (sections III–V). Two caveats are in order at the outset. What follows should not be construed as an attempt at a complete theory of appreciation, and even less so a theory of aesthetic appreciation. For a start, even if we were to grant the attitude theorists that a non-instrumental mode of attention is necessary for engaging in appreciation, this does not yet imply that it would be sufficient. Hence, the account will provide a model only of the appreciative mode of attention as put forward by the aesthetic attitude theorists. There will at most be some hints and suggestions about how the mental kind picked out by the account should feature in a complete picture of the grab bag of phenomena that sometimes go under the label of appreciation. Implicit in the background is the assumption that this mental kind is indeed central to such a picture, but the task of providing the full picture is beyond this paper's remit.1 Second, even if we find, contra Dickie, that something in the vicinity of a noninstrumental mode of attention is a real and commonplace mental phenomenon, why think that its occurrence would track the aesthetic domain? Attending to an item noninstrumentally, whatever we take that to entail, plausibly (or even likely) comes apart from ascribing aesthetic value to the item, and from attending to all or any of its aesthetic features. In other words, Dickie was right that we should not assume, as the aesthetic attitude theorists arguably did, that an account of the appreciative mode of attention could furnish an easy answer to the question of how the domain of the aesthetic is to be demarcated from other domains. For this reason the account developed below intentionally leaves open-indeed, it invites the conclusion-that there is a double dissociation between the appreciative mode of There is of course also a rich history of positive accounts of appreciation that do not invoke a 1 distinctive non-instrumental mode of attention at all. These are not targets of this paper's arguments. 3 attention on the one hand, and aesthetic cognition on the other. We can engage appreciatively with non-aesthetic features of the world, and we can experientially register aesthetic values and properties without thereby realizing the motivational profile underlying the appreciative mode of attention. Despite these caveats, and notwithstanding appearances to the contrary, this paper's aims retain a deep continuity with the aesthetic attitude theorists' views. Broadly speaking, they believed that there is a distinctive mode or manner of attending that is pivotal to our aesthetic lives, that this mode supervenes on how our attention is motivated, and that it is possible to give a general account of the motivation that grounds it. What follows agrees with these commitments (at least thus formulated). But where the attitude theorists construed appreciative attention in terms of a subject's ascription of final (that is, non-instrumental) value to the object of their attention, or to their own attentional engagement with it, the proposal below will be that no such final valuing is required. Instead, the sense in which appreciative attention is non-instrumentally motivated resides in how the appreciating subject selects cognitive goals not merely for the sake of the broader ends those goals' attainment serves, but rather for the sake of ends served by the process of being engaged in the cognitive activity that results from those goals' pursuit. Unlike in everyday cognition, the motivational relationship of means to ends is inverted in the appreciating subject's cognitive engagement with the world. This proposal will be thoroughly unpacked below, but the argument starts with Dickie's challenge to the attitude theorists. 4 II. DICKIE'S CHALLENGE Crucial to the aesthetic attitude theorists' project is the feasibility of distinguishing in a principled way between disinterested (or non-instrumental) and interested (or instrumental) modes of attention. The gist of Dickie's complaint is that they conflate this distinction, between different species of attention, with a distinction between different kinds of motives for which one may attend. Take one of Dickie's examples: Smith and Jones both listen to a piece of music, Jones with the aim of remembering its details for an exam the next day, and Smith with no such ulterior purpose. The thought is that, on the aesthetic attitude theorists' criterion, Jones's practical interest in the exam would get in the way of his simply savouring the music. Smith, on the other hand, can listen unencumbered and, provided he attends closely, his attention can rise to the level of aesthetic appreciation. Of this example Dickie (1964: 58) writes that 'what initially appears to be a perceptual distinction-listening in a certain way (interestedly or disinterestedly)-turns out to be a motivational or intentional distinction-listening for or with a certain purpose.' Disparate motives for attending, he argues, are not sufficient for disparate modes of attention: 'There is only one way to listen to (to attend to) music, although the listening may be more or less attentive and there may be a variety of motives, intentions, and reasons for doing so' (ibid.). Dickie's argument for this conclusion consists of a series of intuition pumps, each involving a subject whose attention would, like that of Jones, putatively count as interested on the attitude theorists' criterion. In each case, Dickie proclaims, there is either no difference between the subject's attention and that of a disinterested subject at all, or, if there is a difference, it is in what they are attending to rather than the manner of their attention. The impresario at the theatre taking pleasure in the size of the audience, for example, is not 5 attending to the play interestedly, but is attending to the till instead (ibid.: 58–9). The reader approaching a poem solely for diagnostic evidence of the author's neuroses, is at worst a case of attention to the author instead of the poem, and at best, a case of partial attention to the poem (ibid.: 60). Thus, the argument goes, the distinction the attitude theorists are tracking, in so far as they are tracking any distinction at all, is not one between disinterested and interested modes of attention, but rather one between attention and distraction. Whether we buy this line of argument depends on whether we share Dickie's intuitions in the pertinent cases, about who is attending to what, and how. The problem is that questions about who is attending to what are not always straightforward. In work on the nature of attention, Mole (2011) makes this point by emphasizing that questions about an agent's attention are connected to questions about which perceptual, cognitive, and practical tasks they are engaged in. In laboratory conditions, honing in on which task a group of experimental subjects is engaged in is a matter of experimental design. But the same precision is not available in thought experiments involving agents in ordinary circumstances: Outside of the lab an agent's tasks will tend to be more numerous, complex, nested, and overlapping. As a result the question 'What task is this agent performing?', when asked outside the lab, may admit of many answers, some of which are only vaguely true. [...] [A]nswers to the question 'To what is this agent attending?' will inherit some of this vagueness. (Mole 2011: 52) In as much as Dickie's arguments depend, then, on clear verdicts about what the subjects in his cases are attending to, there is room for disagreement. And if vagueness besets our intuitions concerning what an agent in ordinary circumstances is attending to, we at least 6 need an argument for thinking that our intuitions about whether two agents are attending in the same way are any more probative. Dickie's critics have not been remiss in pointing this out. About the Smith and Jones example, Shelley (2017) writes: The contention that Jones and Smith are attending in the same way appears to be question-begging, as it evidently depends on a principle of individuation that the attitude theorist rejects: if Jones's attention is governed by some ulterior purpose and Smith's is not, and we individuate attention according to the purpose that governs it, their attention is not the same. To accept Dickie's argument, in other words, we must first accept his contention that the mode of attention exemplified in an attentional episode is not determined by the purpose that motivates the attending in that episode. But this is precisely what is under contention in his dispute with the attitude theorists. Besides his discussion of the sample of cases, Dickie offers no argument for his restrictive standard for differentiating between attentional episodes. What arguments could he offer? To answer this question, we need an account of the relation between an attentional episode, and the purpose that motivates it. We can understand this relation in one of two ways, each corresponding to a major conception of how purposeful behaviours in general relate to their goals. Davidson (1963) famously holds that what distinguishes purposeful behaviours (actions) from mere bodily movements is that they are caused in the right way by their agents' beliefs and desires. Frankfurt (1978) criticizes Davidson's belief-desire account of action. On the alternative he proposes, calling a behaviour purposeful entails nothing about how it is initiated or caused, but rather that it is guided or kept on track by its purpose as it unfolds. 7 Much has been written on this dispute in action theory and, in retrospect, it seems clear that one could make a Davidsonian account of action compatible with Frankfurt's by incorporating a more sophisticated notion of causation than the one Frankfurt's criticisms assume (see Setiya 2003: 348, n.11). But the point here is not to take sides or resolve the dispute; it is to highlight the difference in emphasis between the two views-one on causation, the other on guidance. We can use the contrast between the two views to articulate two different ways an attentional episode could relate to its goal or purpose. On a Davidsonian picture, to attend for a particular purpose would be for one's attending to have been caused by the appropriate beliefs and desires regarding that purpose. On a Frankfurtian picture, it would be for one's attention to be guided by that purpose as it unfolds.2 Return now to Dickie's standard for individuating modes of attention. His insistence that they are not differentiated by the purposes that motivate an attentional episode makes perfect sense on the Davidsonian picture. If motivation concerns just how an attentional episode is initiated or caused (in the sense of a triggering cause), then one episode can be intrinsically identical-that is, identical in contents to which the subject attends-to another episode with very different motivation (read: causal antecedents). For two differently motivated episodes to differ in mode, we need to understand their motivation on the Frankfurtian picture instead, in terms of what guides the course of an episode as it unfolds. If motivation is a matter of guidance, then a difference in type of motivation can yield a difference in the mode of attention an episode instantiates. Just as an instance of purposeful physical behaviour may be identical in all its intrinsic properties to a set of mere bodily movements not guided by the agent, so two attentional episodes may in principle be identical in all of their contents while only one has the contents The idea of applying a Frankfurtian notion of guidance to episodes of attention to capture 2 common sense distinctions between mental kinds is due to Irving (2016: 563–4), who uses it in an account of the nature of mind-wandering. 8 it does because of the right kind of guidance. As in the former case, of purposeful behaviour versus mere bodily movement, we surely want to maintain the distinction between types of attentional episodes that are differently guided. Thus the notion of a distinctive way of attending, corresponding to a distinctive motivation-or, more specifically, a distinctive kind of attentional guidance-remains a live possibility despite Dickie's insistence to the contrary. None of this is to say that Dickie's arguments are inconsequential. In fact, once understood in this way, they pose a challenge to any feasible analysis of the appreciative motivational profile. They show that such an analysis will have to specify the distinctive motivation of appreciative episodes in the Frankfurtian guidance sense. It will not do to specify a characteristic type of reason for which appreciators attend to the object of appreciation. Rather, what is required is a characteristic type of purpose by which, or manner in which, attention to an object is guided as appreciative episodes unfold over time. Appreciative motivation, if there is such a thing, should help explain why appreciative episodes proceed as they do, rather than merely why they are engaged in at all. Until now Dickie's critics have failed to recognizes this challenge, let alone attempted to meet it.3 One reason the challenge has some real traction is that while the standard characterizations of appreciative motivation-using locutions like attending 'disinterestedly', 'non-instrumentally', or 'without ulterior purpose'-admit of quite natural Davidsonian readings, they do not admit of equally obvious Frankfurtian readings. This is in part because they are contrastive rather than positive, prohibiting certain kinds of motivations or purposes A possible exception is Matthen (2017, 2018), whose account of appreciative (or aesthetic) 3 motivation does imply a link between an attentional episode's motivation and how it unfolds. There is much to like about Matthen's account, but the account developed in this paper differs from his in several respects: it gives a non-hedonic reading of appreciative motivation; it shifts the focus to guidance implemented by deliberate attentional constraints (see section V); and, unlike Matthen's view, it does not tie appreciative motivation to fluent cognitive processing (Matthen 2018: 24). 9 (interested, instrumental, and ulterior ones). But a Frankfurtian account of the motivational 4 profile these locutions pick out should specify how attention is guided, and settling on which goals or purposes it may not be guided by, does not yet much constrain how attention must be guided to count as appreciative. The challenge, then, is to give a positive account of appreciative motivation which could help explain why cognition unfolds as it does in appreciation. The rest of this paper develops such an account via an analogy with a practical activity we often do engage in 'for its own sake': playing games. The next section introduces the notion of 'striving play', a special form of game play that has been the focus of recent work in the philosophy of games (section III). Looking further ahead, the plan will be to show that striving play amounts to a genuinely distinctive practical mode of engaging in games (section IV) and then to argue that striving play's practical motivational structure is isomorphic to the cognitive motivational structure by which attention is guided in episodes of appreciative engagement (section V). III. STRIVING PLAY In what is by now a classic work in the philosophy of games, Bernard Suits (1978: 55) defines game play as 'the voluntary attempt to overcome unnecessary obstacles'. The point of our efforts in playing a game is not just to achieve the goal the game prescribes, but to achieve it under prescribed limitations. Suits expresses the thought in terms of a distinction between a game's lusory and prelusory goals (ibid.: 36–7). The in-game (lusory) goal of a bicycle race is not just to reach the finishing line first (the prelusory goal), but to reach it using only the permitted means (in this case, cycling along a prescribed route). Note that the Note that the formulation 'attending for its own sake' is also naturally read contrastively: as 4 ruling out cases of attending for something else's sake. That is, to attend for its own sake is to attend because one attributes final (rather than instrumental) value to doing so. 10 prelusory goal can be specified independently of the game's existence, but the lusory goal owes its existence to the game as constituted by the combination of the prelusory goal and the pertinent restrictions on means. On Suits's definition, all games have this structure, of pursuit of a lusory goal that is constituted by the combination of a prelusory goal and rules restricting efficient means. One may doubt the definition's extensional adequacy, but the model of game play Suits develops in the process of defending it generates illuminating descriptions of many gamerelated phenomena. In recent work inspired by Suits, Nguyen (forthcoming: ch. 1) takes advantage of this fact by suggesting that the set of games that satisfy Suits's definition-call them 'Suitsian games'-can be approached as an independently interesting topic of inquiry, whether or not it coincides with the set that ordinary usage categorizes under 'games'. For Nguyen (ibid.), the 'most interesting possibility raised by the Suitsian analysis' is the form of engagement in Suitsian games he calls striving play. III.1. Two distinctions in game play To distinguish striving play from other forms of play, consider the diversity of reasons for which one might engage in a Suitsian game. Sometimes we play sudoku just for the sake of distracting ourselves on the morning commute. Wagering games and professional sports show that often money and social prestige figure into players' reasons for playing a game. We might play a sport for the sake of our physical health. Or perhaps the feeling of winning is all the reward we need. In fact, we can be maximally pluralist about potential reasons for engaging in games. Taking up a game's prelusory goal (the game-independent state to be achieved) and constitutive rules (the restrictions on means) is done for the same proximal 11 reason across all cases: to make possible the activity of playing the game. But, as constituted, a game's (in-game) lusory goal can be pursued for any number of reasons. Nguyen (ibid.: ch. 3) argues that these reasons vary along two dimensions. Firstly he distinguishes between extrinsic and intrinsic play, a distinction pertaining to whether a player ultimately engages in the game for goods internal or external to it. Secondly, both intrinsic and extrinsic players may differ with regard to the locus within game play to which the values they pursue, adhere. Nguyen dubs this the distinction between achievement and striving play: a player may care either for goods associated with the achieving of the game's lusory goal (winning) or for goods associated with the activity or process of attempting to achieve it. The two distinctions crosscut, yielding four types of play. Intrinsic achievement players care non-instrumentally for winning; they are pure competitors. Extrinsic achievement players care for the instrumental benefits of winning, like money or social prestige. Extrinsic striving players care for game-independent benefits that result from being engaged in the in-game activity, such as the fitness or health that result from playing sport, cognitive skills acquired by playing chess, or the distraction to be had by working at the crossword. Finally, intrinsic striving players care non-instrumentally for engagement in the in-game activity.5 Now consider how Nguyen's two motivational distinctions may be used to give two different readings of what it means to play a game for its own sake. On one reading, to play a game for its own sake is to engage in intrinsic play: to play for the sake of goods internal to the game. The distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic play presupposes a working conception of what it means to participate in a game for non-instrumental reasons. Elsewhere in value theory this kind of non-instrumental motivation is couched in the terminology of Nguyen (ibid.) rightly notes that these categories are not exclusive. In real world cases our 5 reasons for engaging in games are typically mixed. 12 final value (Korsgaard 1983; Kagan 1998). Intrinsic players ascribe final value to the game, whereas extrinsic players value it instrumentally. As final value is typically equated with value something has 'for its own sake', this makes it natural to understand intrinsic play as the paradigm case of game play for its own sake. But notice that whether we are intrinsic or extrinsic players of a game-whether or not we attribute final value to it-is a matter of our motives for playing the game at all. The distinction pertains to why we take up the prelusory goal and rules of the game voluntarily, to whether we do so in pursuit of goods internal or external to the game we thereby constitute. Thus, the explanatory purchase that the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic play gives us is limited to our actions with respect to the game, as opposed to our actions within the game. It answers questions such as why we play this game rather than that one, or why we spend as much time on a certain game as we do, but not questions about why our in-game pursuit of the lusory goal proceeds as it does. What the discussion of Dickie's challenge in the last section showed is that an account of appreciative motivation should provide explanatory purchase not just on why appreciative episodes are initiated (how they are caused), but on why they unfold as they do. We want an account of appreciative motivation in the Frankfurtian sense. But an analogy with intrinsic play would be ill suited to delivering such explanation. The notion of intrinsic play gives us only a causal, Davidsonian account of play for its own sake-it explains why we play rather than why our playing goes as it does. This paper's central hypothesis is that the sense in which appreciative attention is non-instrumentally motivated is better captured by an analogy with striving play than intrinsic play. Ascribing final value to an episode of cognitive engagement (in the way the intrinsic player ascribes final value to the game) turns out to be neither necessary nor sufficient for realizing the appreciative motivational profile. 13 III.2. Striving play as play for its own sake Part of what makes striving play interesting is that it demands a kind of reversal of our ordinary means-ends engagement in practical life. Nguyen (forthcoming) calls this a 'motivational inversion', but the motivational structure underlying striving play is perhaps equally well understood as a feedback loop. Suitsian game play in general (including both striving and achievement play) already involves a kind of inversion of means and ends. To constitute a game, one must take up the prelusory goal as an instrument. In a bicycle race, being at the finishing line is worth pursuing only in as much as pursuing it helps to bring about the game. If being at the finishing line (the prelusory goal) were too highly valued independently of the race (the restricted pursuit of the prelusory goal), then we would take the shortcut by taxi instead of cycling the long way around. The prelusory goal is thus, paradoxically, an 'end' that a Suitsian game player takes up as a means to constituting the game. But not all participation in Suitsian games is striving play. The achievement player's reasons for taking up the prelusory goal (and thereby constituting the game) involve the potential benefits of winning, whereas the striving player's reasons involve benefits that accrue from being engaged in the in-game activity, independently of success within the game. This does not mean that she can be entirely indifferent to winning, because the activity she cares to be engaged in just is the sincere pursuit of the game's lusory goal. Like the achievement player, she must be submerged in the game to the extent that the lusory goal takes on motivational salience prompting real attempts to achieve it (more on this 'submersion requirement' in the next section). But her overall motivational relation to the lusory goal differs from the achievement player's. Whereas the achievement player's pursuit of the lusory goal is nested in a broader, game-independent interest in maximizing 14 achievement, the striving player's pursuit of the lusory goal is nested in a broader, gameindependent interest in activities like the one constituted by the very attempt to achieve the game's lusory goal. This, then, is the sense in which the striving player engages in a game noninstrumentally: it is not that she ascribes final value to either the in-game activity or in-game achievement (like the intrinsic player), but rather that her interest in achievement within the game is motivationally grounded in a more fundamental interest in being engaged in the ingame activity constituted by the pursuit of that achievement. The pursuit of achievement thus has a role both as a means and as an end in the striving player's global motivational set. This yields a motivational feedback loop. The in-game activity can still be characterized in perfectly vanilla means-ends instrumental terms, as activity in service of winning, but the attempt to win, to achieve the lusory goal, can in turn be understood as a means to the further, game-independent end of being engaged in the in-game activity of its pursuit. In a sense then, the striving player's in-game activity, while proximally aimed at winning, is ultimately activity enacted in its own pursuit (or, if you will, for its own sake!). Crucially, this feedback loop conception of the non-instrumental motivation that marks striving play (if 'non-instrumental' is indeed an apt term for it) differs from the noninstrumental motivation of intrinsic play. Intrinsic play requires that the in-game goods for which a player plays are final goods. No further rational grounds may be invoked to explain why an intrinsic player pursues either the in-game activity or the in-game achievement. But striving players can be intrinsic or extrinsic players. Their reasons for pursuing a particular game's in-game activity may involve valuing that activity intrinsically, but it may also be thoroughly integrated with the rest of their practical projects outside the game. As long as their interest in winning is motivationally less fundamental than their interest in the in-game activity that is the pursuit of winning, nothing prevents that latter interest from being further 15 grounded in some other, more fundamental global goals (like getting fit, escaping boredom, gaining skills, etc.). Nguyen's account of striving play thus illuminates an interesting sense of engaging in an activity 'for its own sake'-one which allows but does not require ascribing final value to the activity. Moreover, nothing in his account is inimical to the possibility of the same kind of motivational inversion or feedback loop involved in striving play occurring outside of the artificial practical context of Suitsian game play (for instance, in everyday cognitive activities picked out at a more basic level). The question that concerns us now is whether the motivational model provided by striving play could be better suited to the current aim of meeting Dickie's challenge than the model provided by intrinsic play. Plausibly, unlike intrinsic play, striving play is not just a matter of what explains our actions with respect to the game, but also of how our in-game pursuit of the lusory goal is guided, and hence, it could serve as a model for how attention is guided in appreciation. But there is a complication: the 'submersion requirement' on Suitsian game play puts pressure on the idea that the striving player's interest in striving makes a difference to how her in-game actions are guided. IV. THE SUBMERSION REQUIREMENT To be engaged in a game-to have accepted its prelusory goal and constitutive rules-is what Suits (1971: 38–41, 142–146) refers to as being in the lusory attitude. Sustaining the lusory attitude is required of achievement and striving players alike. Nguyen (forthcoming: ch. 1) offers a strong reading of what this entails: "To play a game is to behave, during the game, as if the pre-lusory goal were a final end. To be gripped by the game, to be absorbed by it, we must be able to enter the phenomenal state of holding the pre-lusory goal as a final end." 16 It is not that the prelusory goal should actually figure as a final end in the player's global motivational set, but that she must temporarily induce in herself a state in which she is practically motivated by it as if it were, so that the activity that constitutes the game can emerge. Let us stick with the terminology Nguyen introduces for entering this phenomenal state-being 'submerged' in the practical perspective the game prescribes-and call this the submersion requirement on Suitsian game play. The submersion requirement arguably imposes a greater demand on the striving player than the achievement player. When an achievement player enters a game, the prelusory goal presumably takes on and retains motivational salience for them directly and automatically, as means to the achievement goods they are after. Parsed in Nguyen's terminology: the prelusory goal automatically takes on the guise of a final end with respect to an achievement player's in-game actions. By contrast, the goods that the striving player is after attend the lusory goal's pursuit regardless of whether that pursuit succeeds. The problem is that a complete lack of interest in goods attending the lusory goal's successful achievement threatens to undermine the normative traction of the prelusory goal on the player's actions. Nguyen (ibid.) illustrates the problem with an anecdote of a child playing Monopoly with his father and enjoying each time he wins game money so much that, whenever he approaches victory, he hands his father some of his own game money in order to extend the game. Although a parent might humour their child in this situation, there is an important sense in which they have then given up playing Monopoly. This is an instance of a more general predicament-call it the Monopoly trap-in which a player's interest in striving undermines their wholehearted pursuit of the prelusory goal. The Monopoly trap is Nguyen's reason for construing the lusory attitude as a comprehensive submersion in the practical perspective the game prescribes. On his strong construal, submersion, for the striving player, requires completely disengaging from the 17 motivational pull of her broader interest in striving, even while her ultimate reason for doing so just is to find herself engaged in striving. Notice, however, that this rules out any principled difference between how the achievement and striving players' in-game actions are guided. What differentiates them-their respective interests in achievement and striving goods-is relegated by a strong submersion requirement to figuring only in their reasons for entering and exiting the lusory attitude, and hence, to explaining their actions with respect to rather than within the game. But this would make striving play, like intrinsic play, an unsuitable model for building a Frankfurtian account of the appreciative motivational profile in terms of how attention is guided in appreciative episodes. The crucial question, then, is whether the Monopoly trap really necessitates such a strong construal of submersion. There is reason to think that it does not. To see why, first consider achievement play. The achievement player faces no Monopoly trap, no tension between their pursuit of achievement goods and their experience of the game's prelusory goal as motivationally akin to a final end. The hazard for the achievement player is in fact the converse of the Monopoly trap; it is that their interest in achievement might undermine the normative traction not of the prelusory goal, but of the game's restrictions on permitted means. In this vicinity lies the temptation to cheat: to pursue the game's prelusory goal by flouting the game's constitutive rules. The hazard of cheating does not, however, give us reason to construe the submersion requirement strongly, at least not as a constitutive condition on achievement play. As a matter of course, we do not expect achievement players to disengage completely from the guiding influence of their game-independent interest in achievement goods. On the contrary, the particulars of expected achievement goods typically do (and should!) make a difference to how achievement players play. When the stakes are high, skilled achievement players play to the percentages; when the stakes are low, they might opt for more risky but showy play. 18 Game play does not break down until the interest in achievement puts sufficient pressure on a player's capacity to support the lusory attitude. Only such complete breakdowns of the game -when guidance by the aim to achieve renders a player's in-game actions incompatible with simultaneous guidance by the lusory goal-should be ruled out by the submersion requirement. Much the same goes for the striving player. The Monopoly trap should not lead us to require a complete disengagement from the broader interest in striving. Striving play only breaks down when guidance by that interest defeats the motivational traction of the prelusory goal and thereby renders the player's in-game actions incompatible with simultaneous guidance by the game's lusory goal. A strong submersion requirement rules out too much. Game-independent interests in achievement or striving may make a difference to how a player's in-game pursuit of that goal unfolds, as long as this does not interfere excessively with the motivational traction that the constitutive rules and prelusory goal have on their actions. This more moderate reading of the submersion requirement leaves us with a picture of the difference between achievement and striving play as not merely a matter of what motivates a player to take up the lusory attitude, but also of how their in-game pursuit of the lusory goal unfolds. The moderate reading thus clears the way to use striving play as analogy for building a Frankfurtian account of appreciative motivation. V. FROM STRIVING PLAY TO APPRECIATION The last two sections showed that striving play amounts to an interesting sense of game play 'for its own sake' and that, unlike intrinsic play, it finds expression in how episodes of game 19 play unfold. What remains is to generalizes the motivational structure underlying striving play to how attention is guided in cognitive activities centred on objects of appreciation. Attentional guidance can best be thought of in terms of the constraints on how cognition unfolds over time. Such constraints come in broadly two kinds (Christoff et al. 2016): automatic constraints, for instance habitual cues and mechanisms of perceptual and affective salience, that influence where our attention is directed without our executive control; and deliberate constraints, implemented by our executive functions in service of our goals. It is the presence of deliberate attentional constraints in appreciation-its involving goal-directed thought-that makes it amenable to the analogy with striving play. We can start by spelling out striving play's side of the analogy. The crux of striving play lies in the player's complex motivational relation to the game's lusory goal. Striving players differ from achievement players with regard to the focus of the broader goals that rationalize their having and being guided by the intention to achieve the lusory goal. It is a difference, in other words, between the hierarchical goal structures within which their respective commitments to achieving the lusory goal is nested. Goal-guided endeavours of almost any level of complexity involves some hierarchical nesting of tasks. If I am rational, the intention to have friends for dinner would typically lead to further intentions to complete tasks that I consider ways of accomplishing the goal of dinner with friends. I have to invite them, check my refrigerator, decide what to serve, go to the grocery store, etc. Commitment to each subtask counts as a move guided by the broader intention, and the subtasks figure in ways of accomplishing that intention-they are motivationally nested in the intention. Subtasks can be further divided as ways of completing them correspond to more nested intentions formed lower down the hierarchy (to invite my friends, I have to first get up off the couch to go get my phone, etc.). The initial overarching intention can also be formed under guidance of yet broader personal goals (seeing my friends 20 more often, introducing two of them to each other, etc.). Goals higher up in the hierarchy serve to guide, and, in good cases, rationally justify, the tasks of achieving nested goals lower down. This gives us a general way to characterize achievement and striving play as modes of Suitsian game play. Both kinds of players share a commitment to achieving the game's lusory goal, which in Suitsian game play is represented by a personal level mental state (an intention). Both probably have multiple broader goals higher up their motivational hierarchies served by engaging in the game, some of which perhaps guided their initial decision to play the game. The discussion of the submersion requirement in the last section showed that, in order for there to be a difference in their mode of play, they cannot differ just with respect to which goals higher up the hierarchy secure their commitment to the lusory goal; there must also be a difference in which goals higher up influence how they go about pursuing the lusory goal. Thus the striving player's in-game moves and decisions must, for some part of their pursuit of the lusory goal, be under active guidance not just of commitment to the lusory goal, but also of a goal higher up their motivational hierarchy that stands to be promoted by some in-game behaviours irrespective of their contribution to successful attainment of the game's lusory goal. Kumiko and Siviwe are playing a friendly set of tennis after school. Both are trying to win, so they are occupied in the same Suitsian game. Siviwe is due to play in a tournament 6 in a month or two, so for him the match is an opportunity to hone his craft. Unbeknownst to him, Kumiko has accepted a wager with a mutual friend, that she can win against Siviwe. In her hierarchy of goals, higher up than winning the match is the aim of winning the bet, to which the match win serves as a means. As a result, she plays in achievement mode, choosing To see that tennis satisfies the Suitsian analysis, start with the prelusory goal of making a 6 tennis ball bounce twice without interruption and add materials and restrictions stepwise until you have the constitutive rules for a tennis point. 21 only strategies she thinks likely to produce the win, which pushes her play towards efficiency and risk avoidance. Siviwe also cares about the win. But his reasons for caring include the aim of improving his slice backhand before the tournament. His play is guided by that aim, and he looks for every opportunity to use his slice to good effect. This makes for riskier, less efficient play, as his topspin backhand is more secure. He loses the set, to Kumiko's delight, but Siviwe does not leave empty handed. Towards the end of the set his slice backhand starts clicking into place, and the satisfaction of hitting a few with growing confidence compensates for the disappointment of losing the match. Siviwe plays in striving mode because his ingame activity in pursuit of winning is actively guided by a goal higher up his motivational hierarchy that is satisfied by his pursuing the win in a certain way. How he plays is sensitive to features of the in-game activity he values independently of whether they are successconducive in the particular match. At this point all the necessary materials are in hand for spelling out this paper's proposal. Here is a first gloss: appreciative engagement is the striving mode of goal-directed cognition. In fleshing out the analogy, it should be kept in mind that the cognitive activities involved in goal-directed thought are of a different order than the practical activities of game play. Game play features explicit goals and rules, intentionally taken up by the players. In goal-directed cognition, however, cognitive goals need not always be represented by personal level mental states (see Bargh 1990) and, even when they are, they need not be within reach of consciousness to continue guiding an agent's cognition (Bos et al. 2008). We can abstract away from such differences by thinking of what Suitsian game play and goal-directed cognition have in common: both have a task-like structure, proceeding under constraints set by the agent's goals. To capture this common feature, it will be useful to have a minimal 22 model of what guidance by a goal consists in. We can borrow such a model from work by Imogen Dickie (2015: 95–98). Minimally, on her model, a system realizes guidance when it includes the following components: (A) a state of the system that represents a goal; (B) a feedback mechanism generating reports on current status; and (C) moves made by the system that are jointly determined by the goal at (A) and the feedback about current status at (B). Guidance is apt when it leads to goal-fulfilment, which happens when (D) the function described at (C) tends towards outputs that minimize the difference between the goal represented in (A) and the current status represented at (B). Dickie's model is fully general. It captures the basic features of guidance as it is realized across all levels of system complexity, and across both living and inanimate systems. Just as it applies to an automated heating system, so also to an agent's goal-directed actions in Suitsian game play.7 In a Suitsian game, at a broad level of description, the in-game activity consists of behaviours put out at (C)-for instance: turn shoulders!, adjust grip on racquet!, etc.-in response to intentional commitment to the game's lusory goal and its nested goals at (A)-for Dickie's guidance system is similar to what Miller, Galanter & Pribram (1960) call a 'test-7 operate-test-exit (TOTE) unit'. The strategy to be implemented here, of using nested iterations of such guidance systems to capture complex goal-guided behaviours, owes a debt to their seminal work in cybernetics. 23 instance: I will keep the ball in play, I will foil my opponent's attempts to approach the net by placing my shots deep into the court, etc.-and perceptual feedback about the state of the game at (B)-my opponent is off balance, the ball is headed for the left sideline, etc. Behaviours at (C) are proximally determined by (A) and (B) but need not be fully determined by them. In the striving player, another higher-order system realizes guidance relative to a goal higher up in the player's motivational hierarchy. Call the goal represented in this second system (A*)-for instance: I will practice my slice backhand. It has contents satisfied by some (A)-guided behaviours rather than others. Thus the feedback mechanism in the higher-8 order system, (B*), will makes the overall system sensitive to features of how the (A)subsystem realizes guidance, by reporting on which behaviours are output at (C)-for instance: are there relatively many slice backhands compared to topspin ones?, how successful are they?, how does their success correlate with features of their execution?, etc. A new, complex guidance system arises in which subsequent behaviours output at (C) are jointly determined by (A), (B), (A*) and (B*). Crucially, in striving play, whether outputs at (C) render the guidance realized by the (A*)-subsystem apt is independent of whether those same outputs at (C) render the (A)-subsystem's guidance apt. The last paragraph uses the Suitsian game of tennis to illustrate the model of noninstrumental guidance that striving play instantiates. But with the model in hand, it should be clear that it need not be specific to practical activities dependent on the lusory attitude. Generalizing to the case of goal-directed cognition is straightforward: to attend in the appreciative mode is to be engaged in perdurant cognitive activity during which attention is Note that (A*)'s satisfaction conditions will be constrained by whether the outputs of the 8 overall complex system are compatible with guidance by (A), otherwise guidance by (A*) would make the lower-order, (A)-guided system break down. This builds the modest submersion requirement endorsed at the end of the last section into the overall system. 24 guided by commitment to a goal, and the activity constituted by that guidance is modified by second-order guidance towards manifestations we find worthwhile for reasons independent of their efficiency in attaining our first-order goal. Thus a cognitive agent engaged in appreciation has their cognition under guidance realized by a complex motivational structure including: (A) a mental state of either personal or sub-personal level representing a cognitive goal; (B) a feedback mechanism generating reports on progress towards the goal in (A); (A*) a mental state representing a second-order goal that favours some (A)-guided cognitive behaviours of the agent over none, and some particular (A)-guided cognitive behaviours over others irrespective of whether they are the best available minimizers of the difference between (A) and (B); (B*) a feedback mechanism reporting on (A*)-relevant features of ongoing (A)guided cognitive behaviours; (C) cognitive behaviours implemented by the subject's executive functions, jointly determined by (A), (B), (A*) and (B*). This application of the model to goal-directed cognition provides a picture of the appreciative motivational profile as involving attention guided by proximal cognitive goals that are taken up by the appreciating agent instrumentally, for the sake of cognitive activities that result from attending under the guidance of those goals. In appreciation our motivation is, in a manner of speaking, inverted: the first-order cognitive goals guiding our attention become means to the very attention they guide. We carry out cognitive tasks not primarily for the knowledge or information contingent on their completion, but to be engaged in the cognitive 25 activities that constitute our attempts to complete those tasks. Crucially, this biases our strategies for completing the pertinent tasks towards attempts consisting of cognitive activities that we care (either intrinsically or instrumentally) to be engaged in. Consider again George Dickie's Smith and Jones example from section II, in which Jones listens to remember a piece of music's details for an exam, and Smith listens with no such purpose. Dickie's claim was that they differ in their motives for attending and perhaps the degree of their attentiveness, but not with respect to the mode their attention to the music exemplifies. What does the motivational inversion model just outlined allow us to say about this case? Recall first that intuitions about such cases are complicated by the fact that agents in ordinary circumstances are engaged in 'numerous, complex, nested, and overlapping' tasks (Mole 2012: 52), and hence, over the course of their attention to the piece, Smith and Jones may each well instantiate a mixture of appreciative and non-appreciative motivation (compare footnote 5). We can simplify by focussing only on pertinent differences between them. In as much as Jones is guided by the overarching goal of doing well on the exam, his attempts to latch onto, classify, memorize, compare, and assess features of the music will tend to emerge from and unfold in service of that overarching goal. This does not mean that his exam-focussed listening is a case of inattention or distraction from the music; on the contrary, the cognitive tasks Jones engages in will pertain directly to features of the piece and, if he cares about the exam, we should expect his listening to be attentive to a high degree. But nor does it mean that he is attending to the music in just the same way as Smith. Jones's aim of doing well in the exam makes the payoff of his cognitive efforts contingent on the efficient selection and attainment of his proximal cognitive goals. He gets what he wants when he gleans information he deems exam-relevant, irrespective of how he gleans it, and he will likely avoid expending cognitive resources on features of the music that fall outside 26 exam-relevant range, or on inefficient ways of gleaning exam-relevant information. Jones attends like Kumiko plays in the tennis example: in achievement mode. Smith's attention, on the other hand, is meant to qualify as appreciative on the aesthetic attitude theorists' criterion because, unlike Jones, he has 'no ulterior motive' for listening. We have seen, however, that this kind of contrastive gloss on appreciative motivation provides little actual purchase on what the mode of Smith's attention to the music consists in. Here the motivational inversion account steps into the gap. If Smith really is engaging with the piece in the appreciative mode, the account suggests that it must be in virtue of some ongoing, goal-directed cognitive activities pertaining to the piece, guided by an overarching secondorder interest of a different sort than that of Jones. Let us for a moment imagine that the piece was a favourite of Smith's late grandmother and, as he hears it now, it activates in him the tacitly held goal to commemorate her. Inadvertently he finds himself actively trying to latch onto, classify, memorize, compare and assess subtle features of the piece. Many of the cognitive tasks that Smith takes up overlap with those of Jones: determining how the composer achieves certain effects, picking out the number of time signature changes in one part, anticipating the recurrence of a musical theme, and so on. But unlike for Jones, the payoff of Smith's cognitive efforts does not lie in his success at memorizing, predicting, or finding things out about the piece. Instead, Smith gets what he wants when his attempts to do so transpire in the right ways: when his listening proceeds as though through his grandmother's ears; when his anticipation of a motif foregrounds it as representative of her taste; when the manner of his focus on the rhythm in a certain passage helps call to mind the memory of her voice humming along. Alternatively we might envision Smith's listening as guided by a less personal goal- one that is in principle available to anyone who listens. Imagine, for instance, that the piece is a composition in counterpoint and Smith wishes simply to be taken in by its complexities and 27 melodic interactions. As he listens, he tries, perhaps deliberately, or perhaps he simply finds himself trying, to track the individual melodic lines. Again his cognitive efforts overlap substantially with those of Jones, who might also be tracking the individual lines, say, to find out (for exam purposes) how a recurring motif is adapted in each voice. But again, the payoff of Smith's efforts do not lie in successfully keeping track of the different voices or rightly identifying variations in a recurring motif. In fact, it is sometimes the manner of Smith's failures to keep track of all the melodies simultaneously-his temporarily losing the thread of one voice as he tracks another, only for the former to reemerge delightfully a few bars later- that gets him the payoff he is after. Smith attends, unlike Jones, in striving mode. These examples show that it is not the specific contents of Smith's higher-order goal that matter, but rather that, whatever they are, those contents are satisfied by certain firstorder cognitive efforts irrespective of their relative efficiency or actual success. The assortment of higher-order goals that could render the mode of Smith's listening appreciative can thus vary immensely. They could be goals narrowly focussed on the particular piece, or ones that connect Smith's current listening, say, to his broader interest in the genre (as in the counterpoint example), or they could be goals not essentially tied to music or listening at all (as in the grandmother example). They could be impersonal goals that derive from formal listening practices (the counterpoint case), or they could be goals grounded in deeply subjective personal commitments (the grandmother case). Additionally, to count as attending in the appreciative mode, Smith need not have anything that amounts to an intention to appreciate the music or, for that matter, to attend to it in the way the motivational inversion account describes. The motivational inversion account picks out a mental capacity we have and exercise independently of reflective awareness of it or ability to activate it at will. Much like our capacity to see things in the clouds or in marked surfaces precedes and provides the foundation for practices of pictorial representation (see 28 Wollheim 1986: 46), so our capacity to attend to things in the appreciative mode precedes and grounds the appreciative endeavours and practices that depend upon it. VI. CONCLUSION If the model developed in the last section is on the right track, then our cognitive efforts in appreciation instantiate the inverted motivation or motivational feedback loop identified in the discussion of striving play (section III). When an appreciator's cognition proceeds in pursuit of proximal cognitive goals (such as to find certain things out about the object of appreciation), those goals are ultimately pursued not for any purpose their attainment would serve, but rather for the sake of aspects of their attentive pursuit. In this narrow sense, then, appreciation does consist in attention 'for its own sake'. The motivational inversion account meets Dickie's challenge to the aesthetic attitude theorists. It is formulated in expressly 'Frankfurtian' terms pertaining to how attention is guided over the course of appreciative episodes. Moreover, it provides a positive rather than privative analysis of the appreciative motivational profile, committing to a determinate nested structure of goals by which attention is motivated, rather than just ruling out certain kinds of motivation. But the account is admittedly unorthodox in several respects. For a start, whereas appreciative motivation is traditionally made criterial for aesthetic mental states (such as pleasures, judgments, an attitude, or responses), it is presented here as qualifying a distinctive kind of process or activity instead. The perdurance of cognitive episodes-their unfolding over time-is not typically given explanatory import in general theorizing about appreciation. At most, it sometimes features in the claim that appreciation or aesthetic experience is 'autotelic' or 'self-sustaining' (for example in Schaeffer 2015, Dokic 2016). But on its own, the invocation of autotelicity is more notional than illuminating. One 29 way to read the current account is as offering a determinate analysis of what the pertinent kind of autotelic motivation amounts to. The account further deviates from tradition by picking out a motivational profile that is 'disinterested' or 'non-instrumental' only in an attenuated sense. It eschews any requirement that a cognitive agent must attribute final value to the activity of attending to an object of appreciation. As in the example involving Smith's grandmother in the last section, the second-order goal rationalizing and guiding an appreciator's attention may be completely integrated in an idiosyncratic set of personal ends. Token episodes of appreciation may be engaged in for entirely instrumental purposes, as long as those purposes are served by being engaged in the cognitive activity comprising the episode rather than just by the attainment of that activity's proximal cognitive goals. Abandonment of a full-fledged, restrictive notion of disinterest is a move with some recent precedent in aesthetics. Some philosophers have, for example, been advocating for the revival of an older, Platonic tradition in which aesthetic value is considered the object proper to loving (and, hence, deeply interested) attitudes (Nehamas 2007; Riggle 2016). Others have taken issue with how the disinterest requirement erroneously casts appreciative engagement as a passive affair (Berleant 2016; Lopes 2018: 159–163). Yet another line of criticism laments that the valorization of disinterest in aesthetics has severed the arts-and our appreciative engagement with them-from the broader human activities from which they arose in the first place, and from which they derive their meaning and significance (Wolterstorff 2015). The motivational inversion account is rooted in sympathy with these concerns, but ultimately offers a strategy for sidestepping the dispute about disinterest. On the one hand it accommodates the critics of disinterest on all fronts. It brooks no prohibition on personal concerns and passions (including loving attitudes) prompting and helping to guide an agent's 30 attention in token appreciative episodes; it conceives appreciation as involving active, tasklike exercises of cognitive agency; and it integrates appreciative motivation with the broader motives underlying our practical projects outside the confines of the gallery and concert hall. Nonetheless, the account also allows the proponents of disinterest to maintain that appreciative episodes are non-instrumentally motivated in the substantive (if non-traditional) sense captured by the motivational inversion model. Live questions thus remain about the extent to which the model is compatible with, or even fitted to, the theories of some proponents of disinterest such as Schopenhauer and Bullough. Finally, as conceived in this paper, the appreciative mode of attention is ubiquitous. The psychological kind picked out by the proposed account can be instantiated in attention to any manner of item or task, ranging from things of great aesthetic significance to the utterly mundane or frivolous. This forestalls the temptation to draw an essential connection, as the aesthetic attitude theorists did, between appreciative motivation and the aesthetic. But this is as it should be. The aim of an account of appreciative attention should be to explain why the values of things-both aesthetic and otherwise-come to fruition in experience when we attend to them appreciatively.9 My thanks for very helpful comments on (in some cases multiple) earlier drafts of this paper 9 to Anthony Cross, Sina Fazelpour, Alex King, Dominic Lopes, Irene Martínez Marín, Chris Mole, Thi Nguyen, Sophia Sideris, and the audience at Camp Aesthetics 2018 at UVU Capitol Reef Field Station. Thanks also for invaluable discussion of some of the main ideas to Aleksey Balotskiy, Jasper Heaton, and audiences at Uppsala University's Higher Seminar in Aesthetics, the 2018 BSA Conference at St Anne's College, Oxford, and UBC Philosophy's graduate colloquium. 31 REFERENCES Bargh, J. A. (1990) 'Goal ≠ Intent: Goal-Directed Thought and Behavior Are Often Unintentional', Psychological Inquiry, 1/3: 248–77. Berleant, A. (2016) Re-thinking Aesthetics. New York: Routledge. Bos, M. W., Dijksterhuis, A and Van Baaren, R. B. (2008) 'On the goal-dependency of unconscious thought', Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 44/4: 1114–20. Bullough, E. 1912. '"Psychical Distance" as a Factor in Art and an Aesthetic Principle', British Journal of Psychology, 5: 87–117. Christoff, K., Irving, Z. C., Fox, K. C. R., Spreng, R. N. and Andrews-Hanna, J. R. (2016) 'Mind-wandering as spontaneous thought: a dynamic framework', Neuroscience, 17: 718–31. Davidson, D. (1963) 'Actions, reasons, and causes', Journal of Philosophy, 60/23: 685–700. Dickie, G. (1964) 'The Myth of the Aesthetic Attitude', American Philosophical Quarterly, 1/1: 56–65. Dickie, I. (2015) Fixing Reference. Oxford: OUP. Dokic, J. (2016) 'Aesthetic Experience as a Metacognitive Feeling? A Dual-Aspect View', Proceedings of the Aristotelean Society, 116/1: 69–88. Frankfurt, H. (1978) 'The problem of action', American Philosophical Quarterly, 15/2: 157– 62. Irving, Z. C. (2016) 'Mind-wandering is unguided attention: accounting for the "purposeful" wanderer', Philosophical Studies, 173: 547–71. Iseminger, G. (2005) 'The Aesthetic State of Mind', in M. Kieran (ed.) Contemporary Debates in Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art, 98–112. Oxford: Blackwell. Kagan, S. (1998) 'Rethinking Intrinsic Value', Journal of Ethics, 2: 277–97. Kant, I. (1790/2000). Critique of the Power of Judgement. Trans. P. Guyer and E. Matthews. New York: Cambridge University Press. Kemp, G. (1999) 'The Aesthetic Attitude', British Journal of Aesthetics, 39/4: 392–99. Korsgaard, C. (1983) 'Two Distinctions in Goodness', Philosophical Review, 92: 169–95. Levinson, J. (2016) 'Toward an Adequate Conception of Aesthetic Experience' in Aesthetic Pursuits: Essays in Philosophy of Art, 28–31. Oxford: OUP. Lind, R. W. (1980) 'Attention and the Aesthetic Object', Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 39/2: 131–42. Lopes, D. M. (2018) Being for Beauty: Aesthetic Agency and Value. Oxford: OUP. Matthen, M. (2017) 'The Pleasures of Art', Australasian Philosophical Review, 1/1: 6–28. Matthen, M. (2018) 'New Prospects for Aesthetic Hedonism', in J. A. McMahon (ed.) Social Aesthetics and Moral Judgment: Pleasure, Reflection and Accountability, 13–33. New York: Routledge. Miller, G. A., Galanter, E. and Pribram, K. H. (1960) Plans and the Structure of Behavior. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. 32 Mole, C. (2011) Attention is Cognitive Unison. An essay in cognitive psychology. Oxford: OUP. Nanay, B. (2016) Aesthetics as Philosophy of Perception. Oxford: OUP. Nehamas, A. (2007). Only a Promise of Happiness: The Place of Beauty in a World of Art. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Nguyen, C. T. (Forthcoming). Games: Agency as Art. OUP. Riggle, N. (2016) 'On the Interest in Beauty and Disinterest', Philosopher's Imprint, 16/9: 1– 14. Schaeffer, J.(2015) 'Aesthetic Relationship, Cognition, and the Pleasures of Art', in P. F. Bundgaard and F. Stjernfelt (eds.) Investigations into the Phenomenology and the Ontology of the Work of Art. New York: Springer. Schopenhauer, Arthur (1819/2010) The World as Will and Representation, Vol. 1. Trans. J. Norman and A. Welchman. New York: Cambridge University Press. Setiya, K. (2003) 'Explaining Action', Philosophical Review, 112/3: 339–393. Shelley, J. (2017) 'The Concept of the Aesthetic', in E. N. Zalta (ed.) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy , Winter 2017 edn. (First version published in Fall 2009 edn.) <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/aesthetic-concept/> Stecker, R. (2006) 'Aesthetic Experience and Aesthetic Value', Philosophy Compass, 1/1: 1– 10. Stolnitz, J. (1960) Aesthetics and Philosophy of Art Criticism. New York: Houghton Mifflin. Suits, B. (1978) The Grasshopper: Games, Life, and Utopia. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Wollheim, R. (1986) 'Imagination and Pictorial Understanding', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes, 60/1: 45-60. Wolterstorff, N. (2015) Art Rethought: the Social Practices of Art. Oxford: OUP. Zangwill, Nick (1992) 'Unkantian notions of disinterest', British Journal of Aesthetics, 32/2: 149–52. University of British Columbia, Canada

Time, Persistence, and Causality Towards a Dynamic View of Temporal Reality Rögnvaldur D. Ingthorsson Umeå 2002 Institutionen för filosofi och lingvistik Umeå universitet 901 87 Umeå Akademisk avhandling som med vederbörligt tillstånd av rektorsämbetet vid Umeå universitet för avläggande av filosofie doktorsexamen offentligen försvaras i hörsal F, humanisthuset lördagen den 31 maj 2002, kl 10.15. ISBN 91-7305-256-6 ISSN 1650-1748 ii ABSTRACT The thesis revolves around the following questions. What is time? Is time tensed or tenseless? Do things endure or perdure, i.e. do things persist by being wholly present at many times, or do they persist by having temporal parts? Do causes bring their effects into existence, or are they only correlated with each other? Within a realist approach to metaphysics, the author claims that the tensed view of time, the endurance view of persistence, and the production view of causality naturally combine into what is called the dynamic view of temporal reality, and that the tenseless view of time, the perdurance view of persistence, and the correlation view of causality naturally combine into what is called the static view of temporal reality. The author argues in favour of a dynamic view. During the discussion a number of metaphysical problems are addressed. First, it is argued that the charges that the dynamic view is contradictory, made by J.M.E. McTaggart and David Lewis, are viciously circular. Secondly, it is argued that the static view cannot account for change, and deprives metaphysics of essential means to provide natural explanations to empirical phenomena. Thirdly, the author presents a novel account of the nature of necessary causal production. He suggests that the traditional conception of causes as essentially being external to the effects should be abandoned, and that causal production instead should be explicated in terms of reciprocal interactions between coexistent substances. Key words: Metaphysics, time, persistence, causality, change, interaction, temporal parity, tensed view, tenseless view, endurance, perdurance, McTaggart, Bunge, Lewis, Mellor, Simons. iii TABLE OF CONTENTS Preface 1 General Introduction 5 1. The appearance of time 5 2. Considerations in relation to the study of time 8 3. Two views of time 21 4. Two views of persistence 26 5. Two views of causality 31 6. Interconnections between the articles 43 I: McTaggart and the Unreality of Time 51 1. Introduction 51 2. The Aand B-views on the notion of succession 52 3. The structure of McTaggart's reasoning in The Nature of Existence 54 4. A short reconstruction of the Argument 54 5. The infinite regress of temporal properties 59 6. McTaggart's ontology: criteria of reality for time as a 'series' 60 7. The Universe is a compound substance, but can it be temporal? 64 8. The sense of positions, series of positions, and moments of time 66 9. Time as a substance 68 10. Conclusion II: Temporal Parity and the Problem of Change 73 1. Introduction 73 2. The contradiction of change 78 3. The circularity of arguments against dynamic change 84 4. Temporal parity and the metaphysics of the static view 87 5. Change, causality, and explanation 89 6. Conclusion 91 III: Causal Production as Interaction 93 1. Introduction 93 2. Causal production: a relation or a process 99 3. Causal production as interaction 101 4. Conclusion 118 Appendix A: Causal Aspects of Persistence 123 1. Persistence as existence at many times 123 2. The causal component of persistence 125 iv Appendix B: Can Things Endure in Tenseless Time? 133 1. The temporal parity thesis of the tenseless view of time 134 2. Mellor's solution 136 3. Simons' theory of invariants 141 4. Substance, process, or trope ontology? 143 5. Conclusion 146 PREFACE This is a Ph.D. thesis in the philosophy of time. Its structure deviates from the usual monograph form of philosophical dissertations in that it consists in three self-contained and previously published articles, whose background and unifying theme is presented in an introduction. The introduction, as well as the appendices, contains complementary material which, for the sake of brevity required by journal articles, did not find its place in the final draft of these articles. Here I can allow myself to include this material, in so far as it facilitates the understanding and appreciation of the articles and the problems they deal with. The three articles are: I: 'McTaggart and the Unreality of Time', Axiomathes 9(3): 287-306, 1998. II: 'Temporal Parity and the Problem of Change', Sats Nordic Journal of Philosophy 2(2): 60-79, 2001. III: 'Causality as Interaction', Metaphysica, 3(1): 87-119, 2002. These articles all address, in one way or another, what has been one of the most fundamental issues in the philosophy of time during the last century or so: whether or not there really is an objective difference between the present, the future, and the past, and whether reality really changes with respect to what is future, present and past (Tooley 1997, p. 13; Craig 2000, p. ix). Philosophers are divided into two camps over this issue, those who think that future, present, and past really are objective features of temporal reality, and those that do not. On the latter view, future, present, and past, are merely features of the subjective perspective we have on a reality that objectively speaking does not contain these features; it claims that all moments of time are equally existent and real. The two views go under a variety of names: the A and B view, the tensed and tenseless view, and the dynamic and static view. The terms A and B view can be considered to be the original designations of the two views. They were inspired by J.M.E. McTaggart's use of the terms A and B series in his famous argument for the unreality of time, an argument which must be considered to be the origins of the contemporary debate between the proponents of the two views. Later, D.H. Mellor coined the terms tensed and tenseless view, which are more 2 descriptive. Other writers, like Michael Tooley, prefer to talk of the dynamic and the static view, because these terms put less focus on the linguistic aspects of tense. In the general introduction I will predominantly use the terms tensed and tenseless views of time, and the terms tensers and detensers for the proponents of the two views, for the sake of convenience, in order not to confuse the reader with too many terms for the same thing. These terms are well known for those who are acquainted with the issue, and descriptive enough to be helpful for those who have no previous knowledge of it. In the articles however, there is a shift from the terms tensed and tenseless to the terms dynamic and static, and this shift occurs when I turn from discussing different views of time, to discussing different unified views of time, persistence and causality. At this early stage, I think it is premature to use the terms dynamic and static, because this dissertation is in itself an account of what I understand to be a dynamic and static view of temporal reality. Although this dissertation addresses the dispute over the question whether a tensed or tenseless view of time is correct, it should not be taken to be an attempt to prove that either of these views is correct. The articles should be seen as complementary parts in an attempt to clarify what I think is really at stake in the choice between the two views, or at least clarify certain central issues relevant to such a choice. This does not mean that I attempt to make an impartial assessment of the issue. I make no secret of the fact that I advocate a tensed view of time, but I do not expect that my reasons for preferring that view will necessarily compel the reader to follow suite. What I hope to achieve is that those who have not made up their mind in favour of either view will appreciate this book as a guide to making an educated choice, and that those who have made up their minds in favour of a tenseless view will find something in my discussion of the issue that will at least persuade them to reconsider their choice. At the very least, I hope detensers will find it worthwhile, and even necessary, to respond to my discussion. In the general introduction, I will begin with a discussion of the features of the phenomenon that is the subject of the debate, namely time, and some of the problems facing a philosophical inquiry into the nature of time. Then I will try to present the overall picture of the philosophical field that the articles contained in this dissertation address. A more comprised account of this philosophical field can be found in the introduction to article II, i.e. 'Temporal Parity and the Problem of Change' (p. 73). It may well be a good idea to begin the reading of this book by skimming through that introduction, before returning here. 3 The general introduction does not contain a summary of the discussion in the articles. This is because the articles are highly comprised, to the point that any informative summary would probably be just as long as the articles themselves, and make this book tediously repetitive. So, the introduction will only serve as a presentation of certain connections between different views on the nature of time, persistence and causality, and of the problems related to those views and their connections, which will then be discussed in the articles. The appendices contain commentaries to the discussion in articles II and III, and, to a lesser degree, some further elaboration of some of the arguments therein. Please note, finally, that there is a list of references at the end of each part of this book, but no complete bibliography for the whole book. This is due to the independent fashion in which each part is written. I have tried to make the references in the different articles as homogenous as possible, but in this respect 'McTaggart and the Unreality of Time' deviates from the norm, only in the way that all references are given in the footnotes, none in the text. 4 5 GENERAL INTRODUCTION 1. The appearance of time Time, or temporality, is a basic feature of our experience of the world, perhaps the most basic feature. Time permeates our experience of the occurrence of every phenomenon, whether material, social, or mental, e.g. of a cup standing on a table, of a radiant smile, and of our reflections on our experiences of these phenomena. All phenomena, including our reflections on various phenomena, appear to have a certain duration, they appear to occur earlier than some occurrences, be simultaneous with others, and later than the rest. The world also appears to be tensed, firstly, in the sense that in our immediate experiences of the world events are constantly beginning and ceasing to occur. This gives us the impression not only that events are beginning and ceasing to occur, but also that new events will continue to occur. It creates in us an expectancy of the occurrence of events that do not yet exist, and we talk and think of those events as occurring in the future. Those events whose occurrence we are immediately experiencing we talk and think of as being present, and the events that have ceased to occur, but which we remember having occurred, or which we otherwise know to have occurred, are said to have occurred in the past. It is not just the existence and occurrence of events that appears to be tensed. So does the existence of things and persons. I exist presently, there will exist (I hope) persons in the future that will be my grandchildren, but Plato existed in the past. Change is also an essential feature of the appearance of time. Reality as a whole appears to change with regards to what is future, present, and past. Things appear to have certain properties at one time, but other contrary properties at other times. And, events appear to be changes in things or constellations of things. The existence in time of things and of events appears to be different in this respect. Things often continue to exist after having changed; they persist through the changes they suffer. Events do not continue to exist through changes, rather they are the changes. And, changes also appear to be tensed. A leaf which has turned yellow, has been green in the past, and it will turn to mould in the future. It may be noted that there are, allegedly, a certain kind of objects that do not appear to be temporal, namely abstract objects, and some philosophers think of 6 them as objects existing outside time and space (Lowe 1998, Ch. 10). But, to say that they do not appear to be temporal, is not to say that as a matter of experiential fact they appear to be located outside time and space. We have no experiences of abstract objects located outside of time and space. Abstract objects do not have an appearance in that sense We only have experiences of the universal features of objects existing in time and space, and each particular instance of such features appears to be in time. Of course, one might argue that we have experiences of abstract objects as objects of thought. To be sure, the number 2, when I think of it, is not an object I think of as being located at any particular time or at any particular place (admitting for the sake of argument that it can be thought of as an object), or as being an object subject to change. But, I do not think of it as an object existing outside time and space either; I think of it as an object located in my thoughts, and those thoughts have a certain duration, they occur earlier than some thoughts, and later than others. I am thinking of it now, I expect to think of it again in the future, and I remember having thought of it in the past. So, the thoughts exist in temporal reality, the question is whether the objects of those thoughts do. There is a significant difference between the manner in which abstract objects appear to us in thought, and the way concretely existing objects appear to us in sensory perception. We can think of an object at will, while concretely existing objects only appear to us when they causally influence our senses. The question is then, whether the objects of our thoughts have a mind-independent existence outside space and time, or whether their non spatio-temporal appearance just reflects the fact that they are objects that only exist when we think of them. If there exist abstract objects outside time and space, and not just in our minds, then our knowledge about their existence, or our assumption of their existence, is at least derived by some other way than from our mere experience of the world. The question whether there are objects existing outside time and space is an interesting one, since it implies that the whole of reality is perhaps not entirely temporal, i.e. that there is a non-temporal reality 'outside' temporal reality, but this is a question that is not discussed in this dissertation. The focus here is on the temporal nature of reality, and then it is of course primarily temporal reality that is of interest. I am however sceptical as to the reality of objects existing outside time and space, and of the division of reality into the temporal and nontemporal. Partly, because it seems to me that by 'abstract objects' one means 'universals', and I fail to see the need to assume that universals exist outside of time. That is, I have sympathy for the view that one should accept the existence 7 of abstract objects if it is found to be unavoidable in order to explain some feature of the world, but I am not yet convinced that it is unavoidable. According to immanent realism, abstract objects are simply universal features of objects existing in time and space, and exist nowhere else than in those temporal objects. On that account, our knowledge of abstract objects is derived by abstraction from our experiences of concrete reality, experiences that are the product of the causal influence of that concretely existing world. Admittedly, mathematical objects are not easily thought of as being universal features of existent reality, at least not as easily as one can think of colours and shapes as universal features of existent reality. Perhaps mathematical considerations would compel me to accept the reality of non-temporal abstract objects, but I doubt that it would compel me to accept that such objects would exist. In my view, to exist is to be capable of participating in causal interactions, or in other ways being grounded by entities that are so capable. If we were to accept that abstract objects exist, then we would be forced to admit two very different forms of existing, so different that I fail to see in what way they could be two different species of the same genus. The idea that it is impossible to think of abstract objects only in terms of universal features of concretely existing reality, is, I think, a stronger argument in favour of the view that existence and reality do not coincide, rather than the view that one part of reality exists outside time and space.1 To sum up. The appearance of time consists in the beginning and ceasing to be of things and events in a certain order, an order we either describe in terms of the events passing from the far future towards the present, and then receding into the distant past, or in terms of being earlier than, simultaneous with, and/or later than each other. These events have a certain duration and they appear to consist in the activity of substantial entities. These substantial entities, mostly what we ordinarily call things, have a less fleeting existence than events. Things often persist through the changes they suffer, while events are the changes which happen to things. 2. Considerations in relation to the study of time I think the crude phenomenological description of the appearance of temporal reality given above is a description that most philosophers would accept as basically correct, at least for the purpose of the issue now under consideration. Strange as it may seem, in the debate on what time is really like there is no great 1 For a recent overview on the topic of the existence of abstract objects see Bob Hale (1998). 8 controversy over the appearance of time, although there is controversy over the question whether the appearance of time itself provides a direct proof in favour either of a tensed or tenseless view.2 It is agreed that time appears to be tensed and constantly changing with respect to future, present, and past, i.e. it is agreed that the tensed view is in better accordance with our experience of time. It is nevertheless a matter of deep philosophical controversy whether time really is the way it appears to be, and it is this controversy that is the subject of this dissertation. Since the phenomenology of time is not an issue in the debate under consideration, I provide no discussion of different analyses of the experience of time in this work, such as can be found in the phenomenological tradition. The crude phenomenological description given above suffices for the purpose of discussing the debate over the real nature of time. This also explains the thoroughly realist approach taken in the discussion. The appearance of time is not the issue here. The issue is: what is time really like? Or, rather, what is the nature of the objective reality that gives rise to the appearance of time? This question only makes sense from a realist perspective, i.e. on the assumption that there exists an objective reality independently of minds and that it is the features of this objective reality that is the object of investigation. There is an implicit assumption in this controversy, namely that there is a distinction to be made between subjective experience and objective reality, and that time, if it exists at all, is really a feature of objective reality. A further implicit assumption is that we may be mistaken about the nature of objective reality. That is, the question 'what is time really like', presupposes the possibility that our experience of time may be mistaken and therefore that the way we talk about time may be false. Otherwise we would be content with a straightforward phenomenological analysis of experience and a semantic analysis of language. One may, however, object to talk about 'the appearance of time' in this context for entirely different reasons. Strictly speaking, time has no distinct or independent appearance (LePoidevin 2000). Not like a table appears to be distinct from the chairs around it. Time permeates our experiences of every phenomenon, but we have no experience of time independent of our experiences of other phenomena. Every phenomenon appears to be in time, but there is no phenomenon 'time' distinct from the phenomena occurring in time. Admittedly, we often talk and think about time in terms of moments, instants, and/or intervals of time, which are items that we may think as being independent of the things and/or events that exist at those moments. That is, as items contingently 2 See for instance, Oaklander & Smith (eds.)(1994, part III). 9 occupied by certain things and events.3 But, these items, i.e. times or moments, have no appearance independently of the things or events existing 'at' those times. The idea of moments of time existing independently of the things and/or events existing at those moments of time, is an abstraction from our experience of the concretely existing temporal reality. We can perhaps think empty time, but we never perceive empty time. The appearance of space differs in this respect from the appearance of time, in that we do perceive empty spaces, and do not just think them. The duration of temporal intervals only appears to us as the duration of events, or of experiences, and in the persistence of things around us and of ourselves. The temporal relations between moments of time, those of simultaneity, earlier than, and later than, only appear as relations holding between occurrences of real phenomena that are simultaneous with, earlier than, or later than each other. The future appears to us in the continuous realisation of events and things we were expecting to happen, and/or to come into existence. The present appears to us in our immediate experience of the world and the events occurring in it, while the past appears to us as the cessation of events and as memories of those no longer existing events. Time appears to us as a feature of all appearances, but has no distinct appearance of its own. Time is therefore one of the most familiar aspects of reality and one of the most elusive. That time is familiar is clear from the ease with which we talk and orient ourselves in time. Time is not a problem in everyday contexts, not even for young children. In philosophy, however, the objective nature of time is an eternal puzzle. One reason why time is so enigmatic, may be that in order to identify time as a distinct object of investigation one must abstract it from our continuous experience of reality as a whole, and yet it must at all times be studied as a feature of reality as a whole, not as distinct from it. That is, time can only be identified as an abstraction, but it cannot be studied only as an abstraction, if only for the simple reason that if the initial abstraction is faulty one will be studying a chimera. There is a problem already in the identification of the object 'time' which is under investigation. Another reason for why time is such a difficult issue may be that because time is a feature of almost everything, temporal considerations enters into almost every philosophical issue in every field of philosophical inquiry. Consequently, 3 The view that time is independent of the things existing in time, is called the substantival view of time. For the purposes of this work, it is not important whether or not time is distinct from the things and events existing in time, since whatever can be said about the tensed or tenseless nature of things and events, also applies to the tensed or tenseless nature of moments of time. 10 the metaphysics of time is potentially relevant for every philosophical inquiry and vice versa. I think this is the most difficult aspect of the philosophical study of time. To give some examples, the question of whether the future and past exists or not, has consequences: (i) for the assignment of truth values, or modality, to propositions about the future and past (which is a problem in logic), (ii) for what we can know, if anything, about the future and past (which is a problem in epistemology), (iii) for the problem of reference to future or past events (a semantic problem), and (iv) for the problem of free will (which is a problem for the philosophy of mind, of agency, and of ethics). The metaphysics of time may have consequences for all these issues. Conversely, anything found to be indubitably true in any area of philosophy may have implications for one's metaphysics of time. For instance, if one is persuaded that the principle of bivalence is in fact true, i.e. the thesis that all propositions are unqualifiedly either true or false, then one should hold that the future exists, at least on the assumption that truth is correspondence to facts. If the future does not exist, propositions about the future cannot correspond to the future and so cannot be true. And, if one holds that the future exists, then one should hold that becoming present does not involve beginning to exist. Conversely, if one holds that things only begin to exist when they become present, then one should hold that the future cannot exist. There is not only a problem in the relation between the metaphysics of time and other fields of philosophical inquiry, e.g. logic, semantics, and ethics, but also with the relations between different notions within the field of metaphysics. It is the problematic relations between metaphysical notions that is the subject of this dissertation. Take existence, for example. The nature of existence is lurking in the background of most of the philosophical puzzles about time. The following example given by Quentin Smith and Nathan Oaklander is typical in this respect: Consider, for example, the birth of my first grandchild. Since that event is in the relatively distant future, it does not yet exist. Nevertheless, it will (I hope) eventually take place-that is, the event in question will come into existence. Subsequently, the event will cease to exist as it recedes into the past. It would thus appear that the passage of time involves events moving from the nonexistent future to the existing present to the nonexistent past. But if the future does not exist, how can it become present? How can what is not become what is? How can something (the present) come from nothing (the future), and what is (the present) become what is not (the past)? Questions like that have led some people to wonder how our experience of time could ever reflect the real nature of time. (1994, p. xi) 11 Consider as well Leibniz' law, i.e. the principle that 'if a and b are identical, then they have all properties in common'. This principle concerns the metaphysics (and also the logic) of the identity of things, and is often found to be self-evidently true (Kripke 1980, p. 3). This principle is central in certain attempts to 'prove' that things cannot change its intrinsic properties from time to time and yet remain the same, or rather, to 'prove' that it involves a contradiction to assume that things persist as strictly identical entities through changes. The argument goes as follows. If an object a persists through a change, then (i) a exists both before and after the change (requirement for persistence), and (ii) a has different properties after the change than it had before (requirement for change). The contents of (i) and (ii) are then assumed to be properly expressed in terms of (iii) a is F at one time t, and not-F at another time t*. From the further assumption that Leibniz' law is true, it follows, it is argued, that if a existing at t is identical to a existing at t*, then a at t and a at t* must have all properties in common. That is, it allegedly follows that a at t must be both F and not-F, and a at t* must be both not-F and F, which is contradictory. Thus, it is argued, a existing at t cannot really be identical to a existing at t*, and therefore there is no strictly identical object a that has two incompatible properties at different times. David Lewis calls this the problem of temporary intrinsics (1986, p. 202-5). The question is, whether this argument is a 'proof' of the impossibility of persistence through changes, or a reductio ad absurdum of the practice of applying Leibniz' law across times, since it leads to the apparently absurd conclusion that things do not really persist through changes. It seems to me that even the possibility of thinking of this proof as a reductio indicates that Leibniz' law may not be as self-evident as it is often thought to be, since it is obviously not self-evident how that law should be applied in metaphysics. I am not denying that Leibniz' law is true, I just do not think that it is self-evidently true to anyone except those who have come to the conclusion that it cannot be doubted after having thought long and hard about it. After all, it requires some understanding of the use of symbolic logic to even understand properly the idea behind the formulation of the principle. Whether or not one takes the argument against the possibility of persistence through change as a reductio of the practice of applying Leibniz' law across times, depends, firstly, on whether one thinks that the identity of a thing resides in its properties or in the substance that has the properties, and secondly, on whether one thinks Leibniz' law is self-evident a priori of, or independently of, what one thinks is the nature of persistence. Is the nature of identity 12 ontologically prior to, or independent of, the nature of persistence and change, so that we can decide whether a certain conception of persistence and change is true on the basis of our beliefs about the nature of identity? Could we really determine the nature of identity without considering what is the nature of persistent and changeable objects, given that it is first and foremost persistent and changeable objects that we think of as having an identity at all? It seems to me that these two issues are mutually dependent on one another and that this kind of mutual dependence between metaphysical notions is a part of the difficulty with coming to grips with the nature of various features of reality, not the least time. Causality is another notion closely related to time and existence. According to a common belief, causes are prior to their effects and bring their effects into existence. The coming into existence of effects is of course assumed to occur in connection with the effect becoming present. But, if the future exists, as some believe it does, then effects do not come into existence by becoming present. Consequently, causality cannot involve production if the future exists. Conversely, it is reasonable to believe that the future does not exist if effects are in fact produced. Ideally, the construction of a theory of time should take every field of philosophy into consideration and incorporate them all into a metaphysical model of reality as a whole, since arguably there are mutual interconnections between the metaphysics of time and every other feature of reality. In historical retrospect, those philosophers that have had the most interesting things to say about time are those that have done so in the light of a metaphysical system aiming to account for reality as a whole, e.g. Aristotle, Leibniz, Spinoza, Kant,4 and J.M.E. McTaggart, just to name a few. Having said this, it is not difficult to understand the exasperation in St. Augustine's famous remark: For what is time? Who can easily and briefly explain it? Who can even comprehend it in thought or put the answer into words? Yet is it not true that in conversation we refer to nothing more familiarly or knowingly than time? And surely we understand it when we speak of it; we understand it also when we hear another speak of it. What, then, is time? If no one asks me, I know what it is. If I wish to explain it to him who asks me, I do not know. (Confessions, Ch. 14) I for one, do not take his exasperation as an indication that the appearance of time is a complete mystery. The difficulty lies in giving an account of the temporal reality that lies behind this appearance. If temporal reality includes all of reality, there are temporal features of every aspect of reality. Consequently, to 4 One might object to the inclusion of Kant here, since his philosophy is not obviously described as a metaphysical system. 13 give an exhaustive account of the objective nature of time is tantamount to giving an account of the temporal features of every feature of reality as a whole. And who can easily and briefly explain that? It is the difficulties with making a certain metaphysical conception of time fit into our overall conception of temporal reality that is an exasperating enterprise, because it requires that our conception of time is compatible with our conceptions of existence, identity, persistence, substances, properties, relations, truth, reference, modality and causality. Time is at the very core of our beliefstructure, and therefore our conception of time has to be compatible with all of it, if that structure is to make up a coherent whole. Because of that, a change in our conception of time may threaten to upset the entire structure. That, I think, is part of the reason why philosophers are not so prone to changing their minds on matters of time. To modify our view of time, is to modify our view of the world. The present dissertation is not an attempt to construct such an all-embracing theory of time, and therein lies of course its greatest weakness. But, it is a weakness it shares with most other contributions to the discussion at hand.5 It is even doubtful whether the construction of an all-embracing theory of time can at all be accomplished by a single person, because it calls for mastery in almost every field of philosophy. It is more likely that such a theory may grow forth in a dialogue between members of the scientific community, each contributing with their special expertise. I hope this dissertation may qualify as a valuable contribution to that sort of dialogue, even though it is the result of only 6 years efforts to try and understand some parts of the philosophical puzzle about time. It is an attempt to give some preliminary answers and perhaps suggest some new aspects to some of the innumerable questions hiding behind the seemingly straightforward question 'what is time?' At the same time as this dissertation should only be seen as addressing some parts of the philosophical puzzle, one of its goals is to point out the need to discuss time in a broader perspective than is often the case, notably the need to discuss the nature of time in relation to the nature of change, persistence, and causality. The thesis that there is a natural link between different views of time and different views of persistence, is well known and much debated. Not so for the thesis that there is a natural link between endurance in tensed time and causal production, and between perdurance in tenseless time and causal correlation, nor between tensed time and causal production, and between tenseless time and causal correlation. Writers that in one breath argue for the 5 William Lane Craig makes an admirable effort to deal with the debate from an holistic approach in two companion volumes (2000a & 2000b). 14 view that things perdure in tenseless time (Lewis 1986, pp. 202ff), argue in the next breath that causes bring their effects into existence (Lewis 1970). Sally Haslanger (1989) is one of the few that has noted the connection between different accounts of persistence and different accounts of causality, but she makes no explicit connection to how different views of persistence and causality are linked to different views of time. Time, change, persistence, and causality are interdependent features of temporal reality and should be studied together; time appears to us as a feature of a reality which is continuously changing, change appears to us as a variation between times in the properties of persistent objects, and most changes are causal. Hugh Mellor (1981 & 1998) is one of the few that discusses under the assumption that time, persistence, change, and causality, are interdependent features, but as I will argue, I think he fails to consider that there are two very different accounts of causality. However, the philosophical problems about the nature of time that I do discuss are fewer than those that I do not discuss. Firstly, I do not discuss the question of whether time is continuous, dense, or discrete, which partly turns on the logic of infinity and on considerations from quantum physics. Secondly, I do not discuss the question of whether intervals of time have the same extension in every inertial system, a question that has to do with relativity theory and the conventions of time measurements. Thirdly, I do not discuss the question whether time has a beginning or end, which is a cosmological question. Fourthly, I omit entirely the whole field of the topology of time, i.e. whether there is just one single time order in the universe, or if the history of the universe branches off in different independent series of temporally ordered events. Also, whether time is linear or circular. However, the question whether there is, or is not, a difference between future, present, and past, and whether things begin and cease to exist, can be intelligibly discussed independently of these issues, although they are all relevant to the question 'what is the nature of time'. There is one issue that one may think that I should have given better attention, and which I wish I could have given attention, and that is the question of the direction of time, i.e. is it really the case that the relationship between earlier and later events is asymmetric and not symmetric? Is it really the case that we cannot change the past but can prevent certain events from happening in the future? Are causes always prior to their effects in time? Is it really impossible to travel backwards in time, and if so, why? I briefly touch upon this issue in the paper 'Causal Production as Interaction', where I state, as opposed to argue, some of the things I think my view of temporal reality entails about the direction of time, e.g. why causes always are temporally prior to their effects. 15 No discussion or background account is given of the problem of the direction of time, nor will I do so here. I do not include any material on the subject of the direction of time despite the fact that that subject has definitively been on the agenda from the beginning of my Ph.D. studies. The reason is that discussions about the direction of time are usually discussions about the possibility of giving causal explanations of the direction of time, and I have found that they usually fail to consider the philosophical relevance of the fact that there are two very different accounts of causality: (i) the view that causes bring their effects into existence, i.e. the production view, and (ii) the view that certain kinds of causes merely correlate to certain kinds of effects, i.e. the correlation view. To give a causal theory of time, is to account for the direction of time in terms of the temporal precedence of causes over their effects, or in terms of certain asymmetrical features of the causal structure of the world as a whole (Reichenbach 1956; Salmon 1984). I came to the conclusion that before one considers how the direction of time can be given a causal account, one must be very clear on the difference between the two views on causality and how they relate to different views on time. I have come no further in this dissertation. The task of clarifying the difference between a production and correlation view of causality, and how the difference affects the discussion on time, turned out to be more extensive than I thought from the beginning. Partly because discussions about the nature of causality are just about as complicated as discussions about the nature of time, and partly because I simply could not find any account of causal production with which I was satisfied. My attempts to clarify the difference between a production view and a correlation view soon turned into an attempt to develop an original account of causal production. In this work I do not discuss the direction of time, but I think my discussion of the nature of causal production and how I contrast that view with the correlation view of causality, sets a new stage for such a discussion. It is for similar reasons that two other questions are also left out of account: the question whether there could exist a time in which nothing happened, i.e. can there be time without change, and the question of what gives unity to time, i.e. why is it that the extinction of the dinosaurs and the building of the Sphinx are parts of the same temporal reality. The first issue has to do with the question whether time presupposes change, or whether change presupposes time, or whether they are interdependent. Since many or most changes are causal, this is an issue that cannot be properly addressed without considering the relationship between time, change, and causality. But, since there are two different accounts 16 of time, of change, and of causality, then I think the question of the interrelations between these different accounts has priority over the question whether there can be time without change. I do not discuss what gives time its unity, because that is an issue that I think has to do with the connection between persistence and time. I think time receives its unity because different times are different states of the very same permanent substance. But, this is a view whose substantiation presupposes an account of how a permanent substance can persist through causally produced changes. In this dissertation I attempt to lay the grounds to such an account, by discussing the relationship between persistence and change on a more local scale, i.e. what happens in causal interactions between parts of the permanent substance.6 I do not only leave out certain issues concerning the nature of time, but also certain approaches to the issues that I do discuss. Most notably, I leave out strictly semantic approaches to the question 'what is time really like?' My reasons for this are metaphilosophical. It seems to me that semantic analysis is an inadequate tool for the attempt to answer the question 'what is time really like?' This question, as pointed out above, only makes sense from a realist perspective, since it presupposes a distinction between subjective experience and objective reality. It does not call for analysis of how we actually talk and think about time, but for a discussion of whether the way we actually talk and think about time corresponds to what time is really like. To approach this question only from a semantic perspective is to assume that we already talk and think about time as it really is (Ludlow 1999), or assumes that no other answer can be found, either because we cannot acquire any knowledge of how the world is really like (Hume 1739; Kant 1781), or because we cannot think and talk in any other way than we actually do.7 It is in any case unintelligible to attempt to give an answer to the question 'what is time really like' by providing a semantic analysis. I do not myself attempt to provide any argument or justification of the assumption that we can acquire knowledge of the world, or that we can change our ways of thinking of the world. It is implicitly assumed in the particular discussion about the nature of time that I address, that the attempt to acquire 6 The questions of whether there can be time without change and what gives time its unity are interrelated. Thus e.g. Lowe, develops an argument to the point that persistence gives time its unity, which is based on the premise that time essentially involves change (1998, p. 121ff). 7 It is often claimed that this is Peter Strawson's view in (1959), but to be fair one has to point out that Strawson acknowledges in that work that our conceptual scheme has undergone significant changes during the history of philosophy. He only argues that a certain kernel of our conceptual scheme has not changed. 17 knowledge of the world and to form new ways to think about the world, is an intelligible and worthwhile task. As already mentioned, the question 'what is time really like' implicitly presupposes the distinction between the objective and the subjective. But it also presupposes that experience might be misleading as a guide to how objective reality really is. Furthermore, it implies that we might have false ideas about the world. These assumptions are incompatible with any attempt to give an answer to what time is really like only by way of semantic analysis. Arguably, the way we ordinarily talk and think about time, mainly reflects time as it appears to us. A semantic analysis of how we talk and think about time, can only give us answers to how we actually talk and think about time and thus only gives us an idea of what time appears to be like. But, then the question remains unanswered of whether time really is the way we talk and think about it. During the last fifty years or so, the debate regarding the nature of time has been focussed on semantic issues. For instance, whether tensed discourse can or cannot be reduced to tenseless discourse, or vice versa, and whether the possibility to reduce one to the other entails that one of them is more basic than the other (Smart 1963). However, this approach, I think, was not motivated by the nature of the subject but by the 'existential crisis' that metaphysics went through during this last century, as a result of the positivist trend and the socalled linguistic turn. But times have changed, hopefully to the point that there is no longer any need to justify the claim that it is possible to go beyond semantic analysis of concepts, i.e. to inquire into the basic features of objective reality, and not just into the contents of the concepts we happen to have at any given time.8 Oaklander and Smith write in the preface to the anthology The New Theory of Time, that there has been a reaction within the philosophy of time to what many philosophers have argued before, namely against the idea "that if we can determine what we mean or intend to express by the use of temporal language, then we will have an accurate picture of what reality must be like if our words and thoughts about time are to be true" (1994, p. xiii). I take it that the reaction is not against the validity of this claim as such. If we are clear on what we mean and intend by our words and thoughts, then surely we know how reality must be if our words and thoughts are true. The reaction is against the idea that by becoming clear on how the world must be like if our words and thoughts are true, we are getting any closer to finding out what the world is really like. We 8 Such justifications have been given by Lowe in (1998), Ch. 1, and Thomas Nagel in (1997). 18 may be very clear on how the world must be in order to make our words and thoughts true, but still be very much in the dark about how the world actually is. I may be very clear on what the world must be like if the proposition 'the Earth is shaped like a cube' is to be true, but that clarity brings me no closer to finding out the correct shape of the Earth. The reaction Oaklander and Smith are talking about, is a reaction against the idea that the correct method to investigate the objective nature of time is to determine what we mean or intend by our words and thoughts. It is a reaction against the idea that semantic analysis can substitute metaphysics, and of course against the idea that metaphysics is an unintelligible enterprise. If we can be mistaken about reality, the way we actually think and speak about reality is not a good clue to how reality in fact is. It may be a starting point to a discussion of the nature of reality, namely as an inventory of existing views about the nature of reality, but a semantic analysis cannot give an answer to which of these views are correct.9 But what, then, is metaphysics? To my mind, metaphysics ought to be characterised as a philosophical discipline admitting no other authority than the clarity of a reasoned argument. But, this is only the most general methodological trait of metaphysics. Something more may be said by considering what it is an attempt to think clearly about. Metaphysics, as I conceive it, has as its aim to find out what the world is really like; to lay down the most fundamental structure of reality. Since reality encompasses nothing less than everything, it would be remarkably foolish to restrict one's study of reality to some particular method, i.e. only to semantic, logical, or phenomenological analysis, and assume that any one of these methodologies gives us privileged access to reality. After all, these methods do not even have as their objective to lay down the features of reality, only of language, of valid inferences, and of experience, respectively In present day philosophy, the idea of metaphysics is heavily influenced by the idea that there is a distinction between the subjective and the objective, and 9 This is e.g. the main weakness of Peter Ludlow's discussion about time in (1999). He argues that natural languages have implicit metaphysical commitments, which I will not deny. But he also argues, or, rather, presupposes that there is some connection between natural languages and objective reality, such that a thorough analysis of those languages will give us an indication as to what is the correct metaphysics of time. On this point I disagree, although I think that such an analysis is valuable as a way to find out which metaphysical views are in some sense 'natural' to us. I for one think that one has to have good reasons to reject our natural view of the world, even though they often are false. The view that the Earth is flat was surely a 'natural' one to our ancestors, but it is flat out false. My understanding of Ludlow's linguistic-philosophical approach owes much to Görel Sandström. See (Sandström & Ingthorsson 2000). 19 that we are fallible in our attempts to form correct conceptions of the world. I take it to be a methodological consequence of this that metaphysics should take into account all methods that can plausibly provide us with clues to what the world is really like, and hope that even though one of these methods is inadequate, they may together prove to be adequate. Metaphysics is the task of finding an order in the chaos of various results of different semantic, logical and phenomenonlogical analyses, of hypotheses about the nature of the multifarious features of reality, and of the host of empirical observations of the world. It is the quest for an order that is compatible with, or explains our thoughts and experiences of the world. Metaphysics must consequently approach the task at hand systematically and with an open mind. Finally, it may be asked, what is it that metaphysics can do that empirical science cannot do better, e.g. physics? Both are trying to find out the truth about objective reality, but physicists do not only produce logically coherent hypotheses about reality, they also perform systematic observations to support their hypotheses. Jan Faye, Uwe Scheffler and Max Urchs have the following to say about that, with special reference to the metaphysical study of time: [...] apparently, science has very little to say about the way we think about time and the nature of time itself. This is because we cannot define time in terms of any other concept; on the contrary, we use it in the specification of other concepts. Time seems to be a fundamental concept which we have to accept as a precondition for our understanding of our own life and the whole universe around us. This does not imply, however, that time itself cannot be an object of inquiry, or that it can only be grasped intuitively. Even if we cannot provide a formal definition of time, something instructive and important about time can always be said concerning how it is related to other fundamental concepts like space, event, thing, causation, free will and human experience (Faye et al. 1997, p. 1). I take them to mean that metaphysics is the study of those features of reality which cannot be directly studied by empirical observations, but which are often presupposed in the empirical study of physical phenomena. It is the study of those features of reality whose nature can only be inferred in terms of what we need to assume in our metaphysical systems in order to explain our experiences of the world. I will not pretend to know the methodology and nature of empirical sciences to the degree that I be competent to compare them to the kind of metaphysical study in which I am engaged. I am however convinced that there is a value in the division of labour between the two modes of finding out about the fundamental features of reality, the philosopher's way, and the physicist's way. This value is in direct relation to the idea that different ways of getting to know about the fundamental features of reality may be singularly fallible, and 20 therefore inadequate, while their combined efforts stand a better chance to be adequate. With these preliminary comments, let me now proceed to present the background to the problems discussed in the three articles. 3. Two views on time There are mainly two kinds of answers to the question 'what is time really like', one being the view that time is more or less as it appears to be, i.e. tensed, and the other being the view that contrary to what appears to be the case time is not tensed but tenseless. This is not to say that the tenseless view entirely rejects the validity of our experience. It does hold that events are earlier than and later than each other, like they appear to be, but it does reject the reality of one of the most catching features of our temporal experience, namely the distinction between future, present, and past. The tensed view of time is the view that the apparent transition of events from future to past through the present, represents an objective feature of reality, but there are significant differences between various tensed accounts of how these features should be explained. For the purposes of this dissertation we may distinguish between three different kinds of tensed accounts. Firstly, there is the view that tenses represent different positions of events existing in time and that change of tense is a matter of events changing positions from the future to the present, and from the present to the past (Heller 1992; Smith 1993). On that view, all moments of time exist, albeit in different 'zones' of time, and pass in a uniform way from the far future towards the present, and then recede into the distant past. For the purposes of this dissertation, this view can be considered to be equivalent to the view that tenses are properties (either monadic or relational) that events possess, because both views deny that becoming present and ceasing to be present has to do with events beginning or ceasing to exist. Secondly, there is the view that the present and past exists, but not the future (Broad 1923; Tooley 1997). On that view, new states of affairs are constantly added to reality by coming into existence in the present, but no state that has once been added to existent reality ever ceases to be existent and real. Thirdly, there is the view that only the present exists, while the future and past does not (Aristotle, Physics, Bk. 4, Ch. 10; Augustine Confessions, Ch.28; Craig 2000).10 On that view, to become present is to begin to exist, and to become past is to cease to exist. 10 To attribute this view to Augustine may be problematic due to his considerations concerning the creation of time by God, but according to Erwin Tegtmeier in (1997, p. 102ff), Augustine should be considered as a presentist. 21 The tenseless view denies that tenses are objective features of reality and claims that the earlier than and later than relations are the fundamental characteristics of time. According to the tenseless view, what is existent and real is not confined to the present; contrary to what appears to be the case, all moments of time are equally existent and real. This claim is called the principle of temporal parity.11 Temporal parity really means that, objectively speaking, those events that we think of as being in the future, and perhaps think of as nonexistent, really do exist, albeit in a different temporal location than the location we exist at when we think of them. That is, to hold temporal parity to be true is to hold that there is no difference in terms of existence and reality between 'future', 'present', and 'past' moments of time. According to temporal parity, the battle of Waterloo has not really ceased to exist, it just exists in a different temporal location than the one we exist in. The tenseless view claims that the experience of now, and of events passing through now, is a mere subjective illusion. It denies that there is anything special with the things and events that we experience as occurring now, at least in terms of existence and reality. That we experience some things as occurring now, some as having occurred in the past, and that we expect other things to occur in the future, is just a product of our limited perspective on a reality which does not really contain these features. That something exists now (whenever you read this text), just means that it exists at a position in time which is simultaneous with your reading of this text. That something is past (whenever you read this text), just means that something exists at a moment of time that is earlier than your reading of this text, and that something is future (whenever you read this text), just means that it exists later than that very reading of this text. For the purposes of this dissertation, I have not been able to discern significant differences between various tenseless accounts of time. Detensers have different views about the ontology of objects existing in time, or, rather, about what the tenseless view of time entails about the ontology of objects existing in time, but not, as far as I can tell, about the ontology of tenseless time itself. The articles contained in this dissertation all concern the question whether a tensed or tenseless view of time is correct, but they contain no explicit discussion of which of the tensed views mentioned above is correct. It is however obvious that I assume that it is the view that only the present exists that is the correct tensed view, i.e. what is often called 'presentism'. There are a number of reasons for this. Firstly, the tenseless view is often formulated in terms of a denial of the claim that only the present exists and is real, i.e. as a 11 For reference, see William R. Carter and H. Scott Hestevold (1994). 22 denial of presentism. Consequently, presentism is the natural rival to the tenseless view. Secondly, like Craig (1998), I think presentism is the only view that can cope with McTaggart's argument (discussed below) that the tensed view is contradictory, which is undeniably the most serious objection to the tensed view. The third reason is that I think the other two tensed alternatives are incompatible with the account of causality that I develop in the third article herein, 'Causal Production as Interaction', and with the view of persistence that my account of causal production requires. Indeed, I think they are incompatible with my views on causality and persistence for the very same reasons that I think the tenseless view is incompatible with it. The tenseless view rejects the central idea of presentism, namely that things and events begin and cease to exist. This is in effect also denied by the first tensed view above, since it also holds that all moments of time exist, and pass from one tensed 'time-zone' to another, i.e. change tense. From my perspective, it does not matter whether one takes into consideration those variants of the first tensed view that claim that by changing tense the events go through some more dramatic ontological metamorphosis than just changing position in time, e.g. that they become 'determined' when they enter the present, or that they briefly acquire the characteristic of being 'actual'. On those views, to become determined or actual has nothing to do with beginning and ceasing to exist. I do not deny that things and events become determined and/or actual, but I think that to become determined is to come into existence, and to be actual is to exist. I also think that ceasing to be actual is to cease to exist. The second tensed view claims that things and events begin to exist, but deny that they cease to exist, and that is enough to make it incompatible with my views on the nature of persistence and causality. The first tensed view excludes both beginning and ceasing to exist, although it admits of beginning and ceasing to be present and/or actual, and the second view denies that things cease to exist once they have begun to exist, although it admits of ceasing to be present. Basically, my objection to the first and second tensed views have to do with my views on causal production, presented in the paper 'Causal Production as Interaction'. According to the first view, there really is no exchange of properties other than tense. According to the latter view, new substance must be constantly added to reality, apparently out of nothing since what is added cannot have come to exist out of those things that cease to exist, because nothing ever ceases to exist. The creation of substance out of nothing violates the old materialist principle that nothing comes into being out of nothing. That principle is one of the fundamental principles of the causal account I present. 23 Consequently, when I speak of the tensed view of time, I identify that view with presentism. What, then, are the important issues about which tensers and detensers argue? I think the dispute really circles around three basic issues: (i) whether the tensed view is inherently contradictory, (ii) whether the tenseless view can account for change, and (iii) whether the tensed view can account for causal production. These are in any case the three basic issues addressed in this dissertation. The contemporary debate between tensers and detensers can be seen as an unresolved dispute about the validity of J.M.E. McTaggart's famous argument for the unreality of time. A first version of the argument was published in 1908 in an article in Mind (1908), but it reappeared in 1927 in a revised form as Chapter 33, 'Time', of McTaggart's classic work The Nature of Existence (1927a & 1927b). There have certainly existed tensed and tenseless accounts of time before McTaggart, but he was the first to distinguish clearly between them and to mount what remains today as the most serious objections to each view, (i) that the tensed view is contradictory, and (ii) that the tenseless view cannot account for change. Admittedly, the debate on whether the tenseless view can or cannot account for change is not discussed in relation to McTaggart's argument anymore (I hope this dissertation will revive the connection), but the importance of his argument should not be underestimated. As Richard Gale says: "If one looks carefully enough into the multitudinous writings on time by analysts, one can detect a common underlying problem, that being that almost all of them were attempting to answer McTaggart's paradox." (1968, p. 6) McTaggart distinguishes between two ontological conceptions of time, crudely corresponding to the tensed and tenseless views of time. He then argues that the tensed view involves a contradiction and that the tenseless view contains no change. On the assumption that change is essential to time, McTaggart draws the conclusion that reality cannot really be temporal at all, since the tenseless view contains no change and the tensed view is contradictory. McTaggart develops a third alternative view of reality, which he calls the C series, according to which reality is neither temporal or material, but spiritual (1927b, sects. 347ff). One could in fact describe the debate on the nature of temporal reality as involving three positions, one tensed, one tenseless, and a third timeless. For the sake of convenience I will however talk as if there are only two positions involved, the tensed and tenseless. The proponents of the tensed and tenseless view alike reject McTaggart's final conclusion that time is unreal, but for completely different reasons. Proponents of the tenseless view tend to accept McTaggart's claim that the 24 tensed view entails a contradiction but reject his claim that the tenseless view does not contain change; there can be change in a tenseless reality and therefore time is real. On the other hand, the proponents of the tensed view agree with McTaggart that the tenseless view cannot account for change, but reject his claim that the tensed view entails a contradiction; reality can be tensed and therefore time is real. Tensers and detensers have diametrically opposed and strangely incommensurable views on the validity and even on the very meaning of McTaggart's argument that tensed time involves a contradiction. Tensers generally fail to understand why detensers find McTaggart's argument to be valid and detensers fail to understand why the tensers fail to understand that McTaggart's argument is valid. Consequently, they just keep repeating the same responses to each others arguments, incapable of understanding why the opponents thinks their arguments have any force and why they do not see the force of the response to those arguments. Smith describes the situation thus: The debate between tensers and detensers about the soundness of McTaggart's paradox has been going on for more than 50 years now, and there is no sign that a resolution is in sight. Indeed, a reader of the literature on McTaggart's paradox might well come away with an impression of futility, a sense that the debate repeatedly ends in the same impasse, with the tensers predictably making a certain move and detensers predictably responding with a certain counter-move. (1994) As I have already said, McTaggart also argued that the tenseless view cannot contain change, but on this point his argument is not given much credit these days. McTaggart's reason for thinking that the tenseless view does not contain change, is that events hold permanent positions to one another in terms of being earlier than and later than each other. It is never the case that an event which is at one time earlier than another, is at another time later than that same event. The standard reply by detensers is that McTaggart completely overlooks the fact that there are other kinds of change than events changing position in time, notably changes in the intrinsic properties of things from one time to another, e.g. like a leaf is green in the summer but yellow in the fall. According to this reply, the tenseless view of time can account for change because it can account for the possession by things of different properties at different times, and this, it is argued, is a kind of change McTaggart's argument does not address at all (Oaklander 1984, p. 42; Smart 1972). However, even devoted detensers have admitted that there are great difficulties with accounting for change in terms of the exchange of intrinsic properties by things in tenseless time (LePoidevin 1991), for reasons generally believed to have nothing to do with McTaggart's argument (I think falsely). The 25 difficulty is, that even though the tenseless account of change can account for one aspect of change, namely the possession of different properties at different times, it cannot account for another aspect of change, namely that the different properties must be possessed by one and the very same entity existing at different times. According to this objection, detensers can account for variation in the properties of a thing, but not for the persistence of the thing whose properties vary. The difficulty of accounting for change in tenseless time turns on the nature of persistence. 4. Two views of persistence A widely accepted characterisation of change is that it involves the possession by one and the very same entity of different properties at different times. Change requires that something has different properties at different times and yet is the same object at both times. In other words, change requires that a strictly identical entity x exists at two different times, which is a requirement for the persistence of x, and that x has different properties at the different times. For the layman, it may appear to be a triviality to point out that change requires both persistence of an object, and difference in properties of the object, but the sense in which an object persists over time is a matter of great philosophical controversy. There are two competing philosophical views on the nature of persistence. There is, firstly, what I take to be the common sense view, that things persist by remaining in the present against what is metaphorically described as the 'flow', or 'passage' of time. While there is a constant passage of times from future to present, and from present to past, persistent things remain in the present from the time they come into being until they cease to exist. According to this view, the whole thing is contained in the present and remains there in the continuous process of new times becoming present. Thus it comes to exist at different times. This is often described in terms of the thing being 'wholly present' at many times in succession. As described above, the view that things persist by being 'wholly present' at many times in succession requires that time is tensed, i.e. that reality changes with respect to which moments of time are future, present, and past. Tense allows the thing to be present at one time now, but present at another time in the future. It is difficult to see how things could be 'wholly present' ('present' is here used in the tenseless sense of existing at a time) at many times in succession if time really is tenseless, because tenseless time does not contain any passage allowing the thing to exist in its entirety at a single time and later exist in its 26 entirety at a different time. On the tenseless view, if a leaf exists at t and at t', it must exist, objectively speaking, at them both, without having 'passed' from one time to another, since the tenseless view holds that all moments of time are equally existent and real. That is, the leaf exists in its entirety both at t and at t'. This view apparently contradicts a widely accepted feature of existence in time, namely that one and the very same thing cannot coexist at two times, and be wholly contained in each time, any more than an object can occupy a certain space and yet be wholly contained in each and every part of that space. Further, if the thing cannot 'pass' from one time to another, neither can it 'pass' from one state to another, i.e. change. If the leaf is green at t, but yellow at t', it must exist both at t and at t', and be both green and yellow, which contradicts the belief that one and the very same thing cannot possess incompatible properties. The problem of how things can have different properties at different times when they do not pass from one time to another, or from one state to another, is what has been called the problem of temporary intrinsics, although it is here presented in a different fashion than is usual. Lewis, e.g., does not present it as a problem that is generated by assuming temporal parity to be true, but, on the contrary by assuming only that the thing exists at different times (1986, p. 202ff).12 As a solution to this problem, Lewis suggests that persistent things do not just have spatial parts, like a person has arms and legs, but also temporal parts located at different times. According to this hypothesis, it is different temporal parts of me that write the different letters 't'-'i'-'m'-'e', of the word 'time', and those different parts of me do not begin or cease to exist at the times they are located, nor do they begin or cease to write the letters they write, they simply exist at those times writing the letters they write. Each temporal part of me also has the corresponding temporal parts of all the spatial parts of me, i.e. a temporal part of me may be described as a state of me at a given time. This view has come to be known as the perdurance view of the nature of persistence. The traditional view that things exist 'wholly', and exclusively, at different times by passing from one time to another, has been given the name endurance view of persistence. Some endurantists, e.g. Lowe, are reluctant to use the term 'endurance' as a term for the traditional conception of persistence, because it presents endurance merely as a negation of the perdurance theory, i.e. only as the view that things do not have temporal parts (1998, p. 106-7). I share this reluctance, partly for the 12 My account may here be somewhat premature, since it draws partly on my discussion in 'Temporal Parity and the Problem of Change'. In that paper I argue that Lewis' argument presupposes temporal parity, which is a denial of tense and of passage in or of time. 27 reason cited above, but also because I think it gives the false impression that 'perdurance' and 'endurance' are two theories about the same thing. Like Haslanger (1989), I think that the view that things perdure is really the view that nothing persists, rather than an alternative theory of the nature of persistence. To sum up, according to the view that things perdure, the existence of a thing at different times consists in the fact that the thing is composed of temporal parts existing at different times. Change in a perduring entity consists in the fact that the various temporal parts of the thing possess different properties; the existence of a leaf as it changes from being green to being yellow, consists in the fact that one temporal part of the leaf is green and exists at t, and another part is yellow and exists at a different time t'. According to the view that things persist by enduring, a thing exists at different times by 'passing' from time to time. That an enduring entity changes, consists in the fact that the thing loses one property and acquires another as it 'passes' from time to time. According to the perdurance view, the changing entity does not properly speaking lose or acquire any properties, it just has different properties in its different aggregate parts. We may misperceive the thing as losing and acquiring properties, when all we are really doing is perceiving different parts of the temporal aggregate one after another. It is widely argued that there is a natural connection between the endurance view of persistence and the tensed view of time, and between the perdurance view of persistence and the tenseless view of time.13 The tensed view allows for passage in time, which is required for the endurance of things in time, while the tenseless view denies passage and therefore must adopt a perdurance view of persistence. The tensed view fits naturally with an endurance view of persistence, in the sense that endurance requires time to be tensed, and the tenseless view fits naturally with a perdurance view of persistence, because the tenseless view is incompatible with the endurance view of persistence. The alleged link between tenseless time and perdurance is acknowledged to be a serious problem even by devoted detensers, because, like most tensers14, they entirely reject the temporal parts account of change. Mellor (1998, p. 70-1) and Peter Simons (2000a & 2000b) claim that perdurance is not an explanation of change, but a reduction of change to a set of changeless facts. That the different temporal parts of a thing have different properties, it is argued, is no more a change than the variation in properties between different spatial parts of a thing. In summertime, an oak has green leaves and brown bark, but this variation in the properties of the different parts of the oak does not amount to a 13 For reference, see Carter & Hestevold (1994) and Lowe (1998, Ch. 4). 14 Mark Heller (1994) is one exception. 28 change. If variation between spatial parts is not change, then why should a variation between temporal parts of an entity be considered a change? If none of the parts of the thing loses a property and acquires another, then neither does the thing to which those parts belong. The illusion that a perduring entity loses a property and acquires another may arise when someone observes the different parts in succession, failing to recognise that he is observing a series of parts and not one and the same entity passing from time to time, and from state to state. How such an illusion may arise in the mind of a perduring subject, i.e. in a subject whose various mental states belong to different temporal parts of their brains (or whatever it is that has the mental states), is another related puzzle, but it is one I will not discuss here.15 Mellor and Simons are among the detensers that deny that the tenseless view of time is committed to a perdurance view of persistence, and to the view that change amounts to no more than variation between parts. They think that the temporal parts account of change is a reduction of change, not an explanation of it, and they argue that things can endure in a tenseless time. Others, e.g. Robin LePoidevin (1991) admit that the tenseless view appears to be committed to a temporal parts view of change, and that this is a serious problem. He thinks however that the tenseless view is nevertheless a better option than the tensed view, because he believes that the tensed view involves a contradiction. Mellor claims that the arguments aiming to prove that the tenseless view is committed to a temporal parts account of persistence and change, are inconclusive. He says that there have been two main objections to the idea that things can endure in tenseless time: (i) that the tenseless view of time reduces change to changeless facts, and (ii) that it has no means to distinguish variation in time from variation in space (1998, p. 84). Mellor responds by arguing that even though facts exist tenselessly, on the tenseless view, and therefore do not change, this does not entail that things cannot change (1998, Ch. 8). As for the latter objection, Mellor argues that variation in the properties of a thing between times is different from variation in the properties of the different spatial parts of a thing in the sense that the former variation is due to causal factors while the latter is not (1998, Ch. 8,9, and 10). 15 How an experience which has the appearance of being continuous, can arise in a perduring subject, is a problem that is remarkably often overlooked in discussions about the relationship between our experience of time and various metaphysical theories of time. Oaklander, e.g. makes no mention of it in his introduction to a selection of papers on the topic 'Time and Experience' in (Oaklander & Smith 1994, pp. 289-92). Maybe this is because detensers still resist the idea that the tenseless view of time commits to a perdurance view of persistence. 29 In short, Mellor argues that things can endure in tenseless time because even if facts do not change, things do, and because the difference between having one property at one time and another contrary property at another time is causal, while having different properties in different spatial parts is not. The problem with Mellor's answer to the first objection is that it does not help him avoid the difficulty of explaining how the thing can be equally existent and real at many times and exist 'wholly' at every one of those times. Of course, a fact, then meaning 'existing state of affairs', does not change. If a leaf is green, we may say that it is in a state of 'greenness', but when the leaf turns yellow it is not the state of 'greenness' that changes into a state of 'yellowness', it is the leaf that changes. But, contrary to the tensed view, the tenseless view does not allow that states of affairs begin and cease to exist as the thing changes. That is, the tenseless view denies that the state of affairs which is the leaf being green, ceases to exist, and it denies that the state of affairs which is the leaf being yellow begins to exist. Nevertheless it is bound to hold that the existence of those states is constituted by the possession of certain properties by the leafs. Consequently, if things are constitutive parts of states of affairs, there cannot exist a state of affairs involving a green leaf unless the leaf exists in that state, and there cannot exist a state of affairs involving a yellow leaf unless the leaf exists in that state. On the tenseless view, if it is a fact that the leaf is green and it is a fact that the leaf is yellow, albeit at different times, then the leaf exists in both states of affairs. But, how can the leaf be equally existent and real in both states of affairs without contradiction unless by being constituted by temporal parts? Mellor's answer to the second objection, as I have said, involves the claim that variation in time is causal, but variation in space is not. On that account, a person's backside changes from being pale to be sunburnt because it is exposed to sunlight, i.e. because of the causal influence his backside is subject to. On the other hand, the difference between a person's backside being sunburnt but his belly being pale, is not causal. The difference between the spatial parts is due to the fact that one of the spatial parts has been exposed to a causal influence which the other has not been exposed to. The spatial parts of a thing can change relatively independently of one another, while a thing cannot have a property at one time independently of which properties it had at earlier times. However, there are two fundamentally different accounts of the nature of causality. There is, firstly, the view that causes bring effects into existence, i.e. that causes produce effects, which is a view that is prima facie incompatible with the central tenet of the tenseless view of time; the claim that all moments of 30 time are equally existent and real. If causal production is incompatible with tenseless time, Mellor cannot appeal to causal production to explain why things need not have temporal parts. Secondly, there is the view that causes do not produce effects but are merely correlated with them, but this is a view that naturally implies a perdurance view of persistence (Haslanger 1989), and therefore does not straightforwardly offers support to Mellor's claim that things endure in tenseless time. Consequently, simply to claim that variation in time is causal, while variation in space is not, does not automatically explain that variation in time is not a variation between parts and therefore not analogous to variation in space. Mellor must either argue that tenseless time is not incompatible with the view that causes bring their effects into existence, in particular that the view that everything coexists is compatible with the view that causes bring their effects into existence, or he must argue that a combination of tenseless time and a correlation view of causality does not entail a perdurance view of persistence. The nature of causality is of utmost interest in this context, not only with respect to the possibility of giving an account of change in tenseless time, but also with respect to the possibility of giving an account of coming into existence in tensed time that is not creatio ex nihilo. That is, an account that explains that the present does not come into being out of the non-existing future. 5. Two views on causality As in the case with time and persistence, we find two basic views of the nature of causality, one being in accordance with the common sense conception that causes bring their effects into existence, i.e. that causes produce their effects, the other involving the rejection of the common sense conception. In philosophy, the reality of causal production is a matter of great controversy, or, at least, whether it is possible to make causality intelligible in terms of production. According to a competing view, causes are merely correlated to their effects and do not produce them. I call these two views the production view and the correlation view of causality, respectively. In turn, there are two different kinds of correlation views, of which only one is relevant to this discussion. There is, firstly, the view that causes are as a matter of fact merely correlated to their effects and do not produce them. Secondly, there is the view that we cannot at all make claims about the objective nature of causality, only about how causation appears to us in experience and that as a matter of experiential fact causation does not appear to us as production by causes of effects, but only as correlation between events (Hume 1740). Only 31 the former of these two views can be described as claims about the objective nature of causality, i.e. as attempts to answer the question 'what is causality really like'. In accordance with the realist approach presupposed in this dissertation, I will restrict my discussion to claims about the objective nature of causality, and therefore only consider the view that as a matter of objective fact causes are only correlated to their effects, but do not produce them. A standard picture of causal production has been around at least since Aristotle (Physics, book 2, Ch. 3). The general idea is that new states of affairs are brought into existence when an already existing substance changes due to an external influence, without which the change would not have occurred and the new state of affairs never exist. Typically, the external influence, or cause, is depicted in terms of an 'extrinsic motive agent', basically some object possessing causal powers, which acts upon another object and produces a change in it. Accordingly, a cause is the action of some object upon another object and an effect is the change produced in the object acted upon. The standard picture depicts the causal production of changes as essentially involving three components: (i) that change requires a substance which can be altered, i.e. an enduring substance, (ii) that the alteration is initiated by some influence external to the altering substance, and (iii) that the character of the alteration is determined by the forms of the given substance and of the efficient cause. These components relate to three basic metaphysical convictions about coming into existence in physical reality. The first of these convictions is the old materialist principle that nothing comes into being out of nothing or passes into nothing, the genetic principle for short, since it says that everything has a natural origin.16 The second is the conviction that a distinguishing mark of causal changes in the natural world is that they occur as a result of some kind of action, basically any kind of influence exerted by one substance upon another, let us call that the principle of action.17 The third is the principle of lawfulness, which says that the world changes in a regular way, i.e. according to general laws.18 These principles form the metaphysical framework on which the standard picture rests. 16 The term 'genetic principle' is from Mario Bunge (1959, p. 24). Craig Dilworth calls it 'the principle of (the perpetuity of) substance', (1996, p. 53). 17 The principle of action is the 'production-version' of what is often called 'the causal principle', or 'the principle of causality'. For reference, see Bunge (1959, p. 26), and Dilworth (1996, p. 57). 18 Again I borrow a term from Bunge (1959, p. 26). Dilworth calls it 'the principle of the uniformity of nature' (1996, p. 55). 32 As should be obvious, causal production is thoroughly wedded to an Aristotelian substance ontology in which a distinction is made between the properties of a thing and the substance which has the properties, and between a substance and the substratum of that substance (Metaphysics, Bk.12, Ch. 2). The distinction between substance and property allows an explication of alterations in ordinary things, i.e. it allows that properties begin and cease to exist while the thing persists, while the distinction between substance and substratum allows an explication of the beginning and ceasing to be of ordinary things while the substratum persists; it may be added that it persists permanently. What is important to note is that Aristotle's account of change is based upon the assumption that there exists a permanent matter substratum which has the capacity to alter and persist through those alterations. And, that the reason for assuming the existence of the substratum, and to assume that it has the capacity to alter and persist through alterations, is that this assumption is necessary in order to explain change. The notion of a permanent matter substratum is basic in Aristotle's metaphysics, and of the standard picture of causal production. Let us now return to Mellor's claim that causality explains why things can have different properties at different times without having temporal parts, and that this explains why changes in the properties of a thing really bears no resemblance to variation between the spatial parts of a thing. Clearly the standard picture of causal production involves the idea that some determinate states of a thing begin and cease to exist when that thing is caused to alter, while the substance of the thing that has those determinate states persists through this creation/annihilation of states. That is, it involves the idea that things change by losing and gaining properties, not by having different properties in different temporal parts. However, the standard picture of causality is not easily reconciled with the tenseless view of time endorsed by Mellor. Aristotle indeed intended the standard picture to explain a certain problem that arises from the view that only the present exists: the problem of becoming; the problem of how something that does not exist (the future) can begin to exist, and how what exists (the present) can turn into something that does not exist (the past). The problem of becoming does not arise on the assumption that temporal parity is true, because on that view nothing comes into being at all. According to temporal parity, everything exists on an equal basis, the future and past just as much as the present. If temporal parity is true it is impossible to think that anything is ever produced or otherwise brought into existence (except perhaps that time as a whole came into existence in one original act of creation). Production, on Aristotle's account, requires that a substance ceases to be in one 33 determinate state, in order that it may alter into a new determinate state. But, the tenseless view denies that determinate states of affairs cease to exist. Tenseless time is incompatible with causal production, in the standard sense, because it denies creation and annihilation of states of affairs. The alternative is to account for the apparent regularity displayed in the world, i.e. the relations between causes and their effects, by assuming that events are somehow correlated in a uniform way. However, the correlation view of causality offers no clear solution to the charge that in tenseless time things can only vary their properties over time by having different temporal parts existing at different times. According to the correlation view, the breaking of a window is merely correlated to the hitting by the brick and does not come into existence as a result of the hitting. This does not mean that the correlation view itself excludes the possibility that states of affairs come into existence in a correlated manner. It is when the correlation view is combined with a tenseless view of time that this is an unavoidable consequence, because the tenseless view rejects becoming. On a tenseless correlation view of causality, the state of 'brokenness' of a window is thus a state of affairs that simply exists at a certain time, just as its state of being whole simply exists at some other moment of time. Again we have the problem of how the window can exist in a state of 'brokenness' and in a state of being whole, without beginning to be in one state and ceasing to be in another. And, in order to avoid the contradiction that the window is both whole and broken, and exists at two mutually exclusive positions in time, the detenser is again forced to assume that it is one part of the window that is whole and another that is broken. I repeat that I think it is possible to conceive of a combination of a correlation view with a tensed view of time, and an endurance view of persistence. We could conceive of enduring things as changing according to a pre-established harmony, in a way that lets changes in one thing be correlated to changes in something else, even though no object really influenced any other. It is however beyond the scope of this dissertation to consider whether any plausible reasons can be given for endorsing such a view. Proponents of the tenseless view of time, e.g. Mellor, cannot avoid the charge that the tenseless view depicts change as a mere variation between the temporal parts of a thing by appealing to causality without distinction. Only the production view offers an explanation of variation in properties of things that do not have temporal parts, but tenseless time, I argue, is incompatible with production. The combination of a tenseless view of time and a correlation view of causality entail a temporal parts account of persistence. Consequently, it 34 seems doubtful that the tenseless view of time can avoid the conclusion that variation in the properties of a thing persisting in a tenseless time must be a variation between its temporal parts. The standard picture of causal production is a possible solution to the paradox of becoming in time, and it is an explanation of the difference between variation in time and variation in space, and yet the reality of causal production has been rejected by a number of eminent thinkers. Causal production has not been thought to be contradictory, although it may obviously be guilty of that by association with the tensed view of time. No, the most important reason to reject the standard picture has been its failure to account for the necessary connection between causes and effects. No doubt, Hume's analysis of causality has been most influential in this respect. Moving from the premise that we can only form concepts out of the material provided by our senses, i.e. out of our impressions, Hume argued that the contents of our minds only allow us to make sense of the idea of the causal relation in terms of contiguity, succession, and a constant conjunction of events associated with an impression of an inner feeling of necessity, a necessity which was not really a part of the relation between the events. Hume argued that since we have no impressions of the central notion of the production view, i.e. of a necessary connection between cause and effect, we could not make sense of the causal relation in those terms.19 Today, the thesis that as a matter of objective fact causes are merely correlated to their effects, but do not produce them, i.e. the correlation view of causality, is not in general made dependent on an empiricist epistemology, at least not explicitly. I will in any case consider the correlation view as a genuine claim about the nature of causality in objective reality in accordance with the realist approach of this discussion, rather than as a claim about how we must think causality given some epistemological constraints. But then of course, to the extent that they take a realist approach to causality, they must reject the reality of substance (or, rather, of a substratum), of forces, and of production. Hume's argument raised a certain suspicion concerning the notions of substance, of force, and of the notion of a necessary production, a suspicion that has inspired many present day thinkers to try to account for causality without employing these notions, even though they do not explicitly endorse a 19 G.E.M. Anscombe (1971) and Galen Strawson (1989) argue that Hume's point was epistemological not metaphysical. Strawson even argues that Hume explicitly held the view that in objective reality there exist causal powers, forces, and necessary connections, even though we could not know their ultimate nature (1989, p. 3). 35 correlation view of causality and/or reject a production view (Mackie 1965; Lewis 1973; Mellor 1995; Persson 1996). I take the production and correlation views of causality to be the two main rival theories of the objective nature of causality. However, because I think the cost of accepting the correlation view is tremendously high, then I can only understand the correlation view to be a kind of 'back-up' theory that amounts to the claim that causality can only be a matter of correlation because the production view must be false. To my mind, if causality is mere correlation then nothing makes anything else come into existence or go out of existence. On the further assumption that time is tenseless then nothing can come into existence or go out of existence at all, things do not endure, and they do not really change. To my mind, to accept the correlation view of causality is a step towards the conclusion that reality is not really temporal. I think we should better reconsider the possibility of providing a production view of causality before we settle for the correlation view and a tenseless view of time. The main difficulty, as I have said, is to account for the necessary connection between cause and effect in terms of production. Within the realist approach to the nature of causal production, we can distinguish between two different accounts of the nature of the necessary connection between cause and effect. Firstly, there is the view that the necessity is a matter of lawful, and hence invariant, production by causes of effects. This view is usually connected with the view causal relations are essentially relations between certain kinds of causes and certain kinds of effects. On that account, causal relations are necessary in the sense that certain kinds of causes always and invariably produce certain kinds of effects, in accordance with a general law of the form 'if C happens, then (and only then) E is always produced by it' (Bunge 1959, p. 47). On this account, the necessity is a general feature of causation, manifest in type-type relations. It appears to be thought that the so called 'singularist view' of causality, i.e. the view that particular causes produce particular effects, independently of other cases of production, cannot give an account of the necessary connection between cause and effect in terms of a lawful connection. The singularist position is in any case often characterised as a rejection of general laws, or, at least, as being compatible with the claim that there are no general laws. In Michael Tooley's words: 36 To adopt a singularist view of causal relations is to hold that it is logically possible for two events to be causally related without that relation being an instance of any law, either basic or derived., This in turn suggests, and would seem to support, a more radical conclusion-namely, that it must be possible for events to be causally related even in a world that contains no laws at all (1997, p. 93) I do not think that the view that particular causes produce particular effects independently of other cases of production, suggests anything of the kind, even though this view may perhaps be endorsed by philosophers calling themselves singularists. The characterisation of the singularist view as involving the rejection of general laws fails to appreciate the difference between the idealist doctrine that general laws exist independently of concrete reality and somehow determine what happens in the world, from outside as it were, and the view that general laws merely express the general nature of happenings in the world. We could describe the difference between the two views of the nature of general causal laws in the following way: according to the former view general laws determine causal relations, while according to the latter view causes determine effects in power of their universal properties, and therefore in a general way even though this kind of cause only occurs once. That is, Tooley's characterisation of the singularist position above fails to appreciate the difference between thinking of a causal relation being determined by general laws, and thinking of causes determining effects in accordance with a general law, or simply lawfully.20 On the latter view, laws do not determine anything, they are merely the way something (an effect) is determined by something else (a cause).21 Provided that the way something determines something else is general in nature, then even singular causal relations may manifest a general law. The universality of singular productions can be illustrated in the following way: if it be assumed that the outcome of an interaction is completely determined by the intrinsic properties of the interacting things, and we assume that properties are universal, then this entails that whenever two things of a certain kind interact in a certain way, the very same kind of effect is always produced. We would then have, in principle, a constant and invariable type-type relation, even though there existed but one instance of it. That is, something universal can be instantiated in one particular case. 20 For reference, see Bunge (1959, p. 22ff). I think my account is in accordance with David Armstrong's characterisation of singular causality in (1997, p. 202ff). 21 For a discussion of other kinds of determination, see Bunge (1959, p. 17ff). 37 To my mind, the difference between the view that causality is essentially a matter of type-type relations and the singularist view, is not that the former allows lawful, and hence necessary production, while the latter does not. The difference is that the former holds that general laws are ontologically prior to particular causal relations, while the latter holds that particular causal relations are ontologically prior to general laws. There is, however, a second kind of necessary connection, a 'genetic' connection. According to this view, a particular effect is necessarily connected to its particular cause because it was that particular cause that in fact brought it into existence. I am not sure that this view is anywhere explicitly held in connection with causality, but the idea of a necessary connection of this kind can be found e.g. in Kripke's discussions in (1980, p. 112ff). According to Kripke, it is not possible to think that a certain person x could have come from some other parents than it actually came from, because the attempt to think of x coming from a different sperm and egg than x actually came from, is a thought of the production of a totally different person y which may more or less resemble x; it is not the thought of x having different parents. According to Kripke the identity of a particular thing x is necessarily connected to x's natural origins, so to try to think that x could have had some other natural origins is to try to think of x as not being identical to itself, which is impossible. In 'Causal Production as Interaction' I argue that singular causes and effects are necessarily connected in a similar way, although I allow for the possibility that their relation may also be an instance of a general law. I think however that the genetic link is logically independent from such general laws. I think that one reason to why the singularist view is associated with the rejection of general laws may be that the singularist position is often supported by the observation that we are able to detect causal relations even though we have no knowledge of general laws. This fact has been taken as supporting the idea that being an instance of a general law is not a part of the concept of causality (Ducasse 1926); that concept of course being what enables us to recognise causal relations. The assumption that being an instance of a general law is not part of our criterion of identity for the recognition of causal relations, does not, however, entail that causal relations exist independently of general laws. There may be other general features of causal relations (besides being instances of general laws) by which we do recognise causal relations, even though they were in fact also essentially instances of general laws. Traditionally, it has been held that a distinguishing mark of causal changes is that they occur as the result of the action of something upon something else, i.e. 38 that effects are produced by efficient causes (Bunge 1959, p. 33). Since Hume, it has been seriously questioned whether we can immediately observe efficient causation in the world. Even realists such as Evan Fales accept Hume's thesis that we do not observe efficient causation in outer experience (at least for the sake of argument). However, Fales argues that knowledge of action and forces is given through our inner experience of the effort exercised by our own body (1990, p. 11-4). However, it can be called into doubt whether our knowledge of the way we ourselves act efficiently in the world, really is applicable to causality in the world of inanimate material bodies. A number of eminent thinkers have argued that the concept of causality is indeed biased by that of agency, e.g. F.P. Ramsey (1929), R.G. Collingwood (1940), D. Gasking (1955), and G.H. von Wright (1974). And, I think they are correct in thinking that the concept of causality is biased by agency to the degree that we (falsely) think of causes in terms of 'extrinsic motive agents'. I do not think that the idea that causality involves production and a necessary connection between cause and effect is influenced by agency. I think the bias from agency only has to do with the idea that production is a matter of 'extrinsic motive agents' acting on passive states of affairs, effectively producing a change in that state of affairs. In other words, I think the distinction of substances into 'active' and 'passive' substances, sometimes called 'agents' and 'patients', is not applicable to the world of inanimate material objects. Perhaps intentional agents are different from inanimate objects in that sense, but I do not think a brick hitting a window is active in a way that the window is not. In fact, I think the distinction between 'agents' and 'patients', and the idea that it is the 'agents' that should be identified as the causes doing the producing, is one important reason for why it has been so difficult to make sense of the necessary connection between cause and effect in accordance to the standard picture. According to the standard picture, the essence of causality is expressed by what is sometimes called the causal principle, i.e. 'if C happens, then (and only then) E is always produced by it'. But, when C is taken to be such things as the hitting by a brick of a window, then it is not difficult to show that it is not the case that whenever a brick hits a window (and only then) the window always breaks. If the window is bullet-proof, it will not break. That is, it has turned out to be difficult to show that the standard picture applies to the multifarious instances of causation in the world. Apart from the difficulties of accounting for the necessity of the causal relation, then it has been pointed out that classical mechanics seriously threaten the assumed distinction between 'active' and 'passive' substances, i.e. of the 39 idea that some substances act on other substances, the latter merely receiving the causal influence of that action (Bunge 1959, p. 170-1). According to classical mechanics the interactions of material things are always reciprocal, in the sense that at the same time as one thing acts upon another, the thing acted upon reacts to that action with a force equal to the force of the action but in the opposite direction. That is, according to classical mechanics, there are no pure actions of one thing upon another, only interactions between things and those interactions are thoroughly reciprocal. The lesson drawn by this in classical mechanics is that 'action' and 'reaction' are not two different kinds of influence, one being the cause to the other, but just two different terms for two different influences of one and the same kind. According to classical mechanics, it is a matter of subjective choice which things we consider to be doing the 'acting' and which the 'reacting' (Maxwell 1877, p. 26-7; Hertz 1956, p. 185). In 'Causal Production as Interaction' I present an account of causal production in terms of interactions and suggest that there is a 'genetic' connection between an interaction and the change produced by that interaction, namely that the new state of affairs is necessarily constituted by the very same substances as were involved in the interaction. It may appear to be a provocative oversimplification to claim that there are only two different accounts of the fundamental nature of causality: the production view and the correlation view. After all, there are counterfactual accounts (Lewis 1973) and accounts of causality in terms of necessary and/or sufficient conditions (Mackie 1965). And, there are process ontological accounts (Salmon 1984, pp. 139ff) and probabilistic accounts.22 However, to my mind, counterfactual accounts and accounts in terms of necessary and/or sufficient conditions cannot be understood as independent metaphysical theories of the objective nature of causality. They are different attempts to analyse the concept of causality, or the meaning of causal statements, in the light of metaphysical conceptions about the objective nature of causality; they are attempts to say something illuminating about causality on the basis of some more basic idea. The attempt to analyse the concept of causality in terms of counterfactuals is based on the idea that causes bring their effects into existence, i.e. on a production view of causality (Lewis 1973).23 The attempt to analyse the concept 22 For a critical discussion of probabilistic accounts of causality, see Salmon (1980). 23 An interesting, and surprising observation, is that Lewis suggests an analysis of the concept of causation that presupposes a production view, when he also endorses a tenseless view of time, and even more surprinsing that he takes the suggestion that causes produce their effects to come from Hume. But, of course, Lewis can argue that the concept of causality 40 of causality in terms of necessary and/or sufficient conditions is likewise based on the idea of production, but coupled to insights about the different importance of various factors in causal circumstances. Typically, the efficient cause is considered to be both a necessary and sufficient condition, and the given state of affairs on which the cause acts is considered only as a necessary condition, since it is considered to be causally inefficient. As far as I can see, neither a counterfactual or conditional analysis account for the production of effects by causes, they presuppose it.24 Probabilistic accounts of causation are most easily understood as being claims about how we can make sense of causality in terms of the idea that independently of what causality really is, causes at least increase the probability of their effects. That is, as attempts to use the tools of probability theory to characterise the causal relation in metaphysically neutral terms, or independently of any particular metaphysics of causation (Hitchcock 1997). In this sense, probabilistic accounts are to be understood as the claim that 'whatever the real nature of causality, causes do at least raise the probability of the occurrence of their effects'. Of course, both on the production view and the correlation view, causes and effects are connected in a way that allows us to assume that we may rightly judge from the occurrence of the cause, that the effect will surely follow. Probabilistic accounts are, like Hume's thesis, epistemological and not metaphysical, even though they need not necessarily presuppose the view that we cannot know anything about the objective reality itself. Rather, they are attempts to say something illuminating, and useful, about what causality consists in, without committing to any particular metaphysics of causality. Admittedly, there are those that speculate in the possibility that the most fundamental level of reality, i.e. the quantum level, is essentially probabilistic and not causal. These speculations arise from the success of quantum mechanics, which is a statistically founded theory. But, since I am not a physicist, nor a philosopher of physics, I am not in a position to discuss that issue. Let me just say that there is in any case an interesting difference between providing (causal) explanations on the quantum level, and on the level of ordinary middle-sized objects, if one assumes that the quantum level is the most should be analysed in terms of production, since this is admittedly the common sense view, although in reality no such production occur. 24 Bunge traces the suggestion that causality should be defined in terms of conditions back to Galileo, and criticises it for being too general to distinguish causal determination from other kinds of determination (1959, p. 33). For an overview of different kinds of determination (e.g. mechanical, statistical, structural, and teleological), see Bunge (1959, p. 17ff). 41 fundamental level of reality. On the level of middle-sized ordinary objects, causal explanations are typically explanations of some phenomena with reference to an underlying (causal) mechanism. The most fundamental level of reality cannot be explained in terms of underlying (causal) mechanisms. The most fundamental level of reality can only be described and not explained, which may then legitimise a purely statistical approach on that level. However, I take it to be a matter of controversy whether quantum theory describes the most fundamental level of reality, and whether the legitimacy of a probabilistic description on the quantum level shows that causality is fundamentally probabilistic also on the level of ordinary middle-sized objects. Process ontological accounts of causality are not, I think, alternative views to the production vs. correlation view of causality. They can however be thought as alternative views of the nature of the causal relata. This is a point that I think is often missed by substance ontologists. In his book Causation and Universals, Fales first distinguishes between four proposals as to what is to count as the relata of causal relations, of which (a), the category of events, is the most commonly held. The others are (b) that they are states of affairs, (c) that one of the relata are particulars, i.e. things, in the ordinary sense, and finally (d) that the relata of causality are properties (1990, p. 52). Later, Fales considers the possibility that processes might be conceived as causes but identifies processes with a relation of events, i.e. he thinks processes reduce to a relation between events (1990, p. 67). However, as far as I can tell, there are two very different kinds of process ontologies only one of which can be reduced to a relation between events. Firstly, there is what is often called process philosophy, e.g. the philosophy of Whitehead, which holds that what we perceive as persisting entities are really a series of very short-lived entities, each moving from potentiality to actuality in that brief moment. On that account, a process is a series of causally related events (Griffin 1998). Secondly, there is the view that the concept of a process is primitive, or at least that it need not be understood in terms of a series of causally related events. On that view, processes are causal in the sense that they possess causal powers and they produce changes in each other when they interact (Salmon 1984, p. 139ff). On Salmon's account, processes are the relata of causal relations, but are not themselves a relation between events. For purpose of the discussion in this dissertation, the important point is that process ontological accounts can be given in terms of correlation or in terms of production, and do not therefore constitute an alternative view of causality in 42 that respect. But, at least some process ontologies are alternative views on what is the nature of the relata of the causal relation. I have now completed the initial presentation of the issues that the papers contained herein address. With respect to different view of time, my focus is on the questions (i) whether the tensed view of time is inherently contradictory, and (ii) whether the tenseless view can account for change. I argue that the latter question turns on the notion of persistence, and with respect to persistence it is the question (iii) whether a tenseless view of time is committed to a perdurance account of persistence or if it is also compatible with an endurance account, that is of most interest. From question (iii) I turn to consider the nature of causality, because some thinkers, e.g. Mellor, claim that a causal account can be given of endurance in tenseless time. I pointed out that Mellor's claim is problematic because there are two very different accounts of causality. There is the view that causes produce their effects, and there is the view that causes are merely correlated to their effects but do not produce them. With respect to the issue of causality the interesting questions are (iv) whether tenseless time is compatible with a production view of causality, (v) whether a causal account of endurance in tenseless time can be given in terms of correlation, (vi) whether it is possible to make causality intelligible in terms of production, and (vii) whether it is possible to make the idea of a necessary connection intelligible in terms of production. I will now give a brief account of how the different papers relate to these issues. 6. Interconnections between the articles As I have already mentioned, the debate over the issue of whether a tensed or tenseless conception of time is correct, can be considered to be an unresolved dispute about the validity and meaning of McTaggart's famous argument. A first important step towards a solution of the debate, is to provide an account of McTaggart's argument that both tensers and detensers can recognise as intelligible. The first article contained herein, 'McTaggart and the Unreality of Time', is an attempt to provide such an account. In that paper I argue that McTaggart's argument has always been mistakenly considered as a self-contained argument, independent of the metaphysical system that he advocated, despite the fact that McTaggart himself explicitly stated otherwise. Consequently, every commentator has felt free to interpret the meaning of the argument in accordance with his/hers own metaphysical conviction. Naturally, this has produced a number of incompatible readings of the argument. By giving the outline of McTaggart's metaphysics, I demonstrate 43 how his conclusion follows from the fundamental principles of his metaphysics. The most interesting observation of that exegesis, from the perspective of the overall picture that I address in this dissertation, is that the metaphysics that McTaggart presupposes is directly incompatible with the view that only the present exists. In fact, McTaggart presupposes that the future and past exist on an equal footing with the present, i.e. he presupposes temporal parity. My conclusion is that McTaggart did not show that the tensed view is inherently contradictory, only that it is incompatible with the assumption that temporal parity is true. In 'Temporal Parity and the Problem of Change' I build upon the results of my investigation of McTaggart's argument, in particular the fact that he presupposes temporal parity. I argue that the principle of temporal parity must be understood to be equivalent with the claim that time is not tensed but tenseless. That is, the principle of temporal parity is the negation of the tensed view, and equivalent to the tenseless view. Understood in this way, McTaggart's argument is merely a demonstration of the fact that the tensed view of time is incompatible with its negation, the tenseless view. On this account, those who claim to prefer the tenseless view of time because they think that McTaggart's argument is valid, must already think that temporal parity is true, and so already hold the view that time is not tensed but tenseless. In other words, it involves a vicious circle to adopt the tenseless view on the grounds that the tensed view has been shown to be contradictory. I also argue in 'Temporal Parity and the Problem of Change', that Lewis' problem of temporary intrinsics is of the same basic form as McTaggart's argument against tensed change. In particular, that it also presupposes the principle of temporal parity. The presupposition that the principle of temporal parity is true, I argue, is the common root to two of the most controversial claims in the philosophy of time and persistence today, (i) McTaggart's claim that the tensed view is contradictory, and (ii) Lewis' claim that the possession by a strictly identical entity x of incompatible properties at different times involves a contradiction. I agree with McTaggart and Lewis, to the point that if temporal parity is true, tensed change is contradictory and things cannot be 'wholly present' at different times, or possess incompatible properties. I just do not accept their assumption that temporal parity is true. In the second half of the paper I further discuss the metaphysical consequences of holding temporal parity to be true, arguing that it is incompatible with a production view of causality, commits the tenseless view of time to a correlation view of causality, and excludes the possibility of giving 44 natural explanations of empirical phenomena. It restricts the intelligibility of metaphysics to the description of the existent and real. This is a discussion that is then continued in Appendix B, where I consider Mellor's and Simons' attempts to show that things can endure in tenseless time. I argue that they do not adequately overcome the restrictions set on their metaphysical endeavour by the principle of temporal parity. In 'Causal Production as Interaction' I turn to the task of providing an account of necessary causal production in terms of interactions between coexistent things. I argue that to think of causality in terms of interaction provides an explanation to how something is produced out of something else so that there is a necessary connection between that which produces and the product, and in a way that involves causal influence between things. I suggest that if we abandon the idea that causes are essentially external to the changing thing, it is possible to construe causal production in terms of reciprocal interaction between coexistent entities. This view takes seriously the lessons thought by classical mechanics that there is always a reaction to every action, and that the action and reaction occur simultaneously with equal force in opposite directions. I suggest, briefly, that a new state of affairs is produced by the interaction of things, out of the very substance those things are made; the state which is produced is made of the same substance as were involved in the interaction. The necessary connection between cause and effect, on this account, consists in the fact that the cause and the effect are made of the very same substance. This does not, however, exclude that the production occurs in accordance with general laws. On the surface, the paper may give the impression that this is all its wants to do, contribute to the philosophy of causality. But, its main purpose is nevertheless to contribute to the philosophy of time, in ways perhaps not explicitly stated in the paper. In addition to further strengthen the thesis that tensed time, endurance, and causal production are interdependent notions, thus excluding the possibility of a combination of endurance and tenseless time, this account of causality offers an explanation of how new states of affairs come into existence out of presently existing states of affairs, not out of the non-existent future. In Appendix A, I point out that there is a neglected causal aspect to persistence, namely that persistence is not just merely a matter of existence during a period of time, but also a matter of resisting influences working to destroy a thing. I suggest, on the basis of the account of causality offered in 45 'Causal Production as Interaction', that the proposed account of causal production in terms of interactions, may perhaps also provide a basis for a causal theory of persistence, and not just of change. With respect to the overall picture of this dissertation, my account of causal production is the final contribution to the debate on whether a dynamic or static view of temporal reality is correct. This contribution consists partly in a clarification of the possibilities open to each view, and partly in the development of a new dynamic view of temporal reality. To repeat: as far as I can tell the three major objections to a dynamic account are (i) that it is inherently contradictory (which I respond to in the first and second paper), and (ii) that it cannot account for the necessary connection between cause and effect (which I respond to in the third paper), and (iii) that it invites paradoxes of becoming ex nihilo (which is argued against in all three papers). In somewhat more detail, the articles contain arguments for the following theses: 1. The principle of temporal parity is in effect the negation of the view that time is tensed, i.e. it is equivalent to the view that time is tenseless. 2. The tensed view of time, the endurance view of persistence, and the production view of causality are interdependent views, which together combine in a dynamic view of temporal reality. 3. The tenseless view of time, the perdurance view of persistence, and the correlation view of causality naturally combine to form a static view of temporal reality. 4. McTaggart's and Lewis' famous arguments professing to prove that the dynamic view contains contradictions presuppose temporal parity, and thereby presuppose what they aim to prove, notably that temporal reality cannot be dynamic, and therefore must be static. 5. The dynamic view is not inherently contradictory. 6. The tenseless view of time is incompatible with the view that things exist exclusively at many times, i.e. endure. 7. The tenseless view of time is incompatible with the view that change involves the possession by a strictly identical entity x of different properties at different times. 8. The tenseless view is incompatible with the idea that causes bring effects into existence. 9. The dynamic view can account for becoming without assuming creatio ex nihilo. 10. The dynamic view can account for the necessary connection between causes and their effects 46 References ANSCOMBE, G.E.M. (1971), 'Causality and Determination'‚ in Sosa, E., & Tooley, M. (eds.), Causation, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993. ARISTOTLE (Metaphysics), in Aristotle, Vol. XVIII, trans. Tredennick. H., Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1935. –(Physics), in Aristotle, Vol. IV, trans. Wickstead, P.H., & Cornford, F.M., Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1957. ARMSTRONG, D.M. (1997), A World of States of Affairs, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. AUGUSTINE (Confessions), Book XI, trans. Albert C. Outler (ed), Library of Christian Classics, Philadelphia: Westminster Press & SCM Press, 1955. BROAD, C.D. (1923), Scientific Thought, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. BUNGE, M. (1959), Causality, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. CARTER, W.R. & HESTEVOLD, H.S. (1994), 'On Passage and Persistence', American Philosophical Quarterly 31:269-83. CRAIG, W.L. (1998), 'McTaggart's Paradox and the Problem of Temporary Intrinsics', Analysis 58: 122-7. –(2000a), The Tensed Theory of Time, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. –(2000b), The Tenseless Theory of Time, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. DILWORTH, C. (1996), The Metaphysics of Science, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Press. DUCASSE, C.J. (1926), 'On the Nature and the Observability of the Causal Relation', Journal of Philosophy 23: 57-68. FALES, E. (1990), Causation and Universals, London: Routledge. FAYE, J., SCHEFFLER, U., & URCHS, M. (1997), 'Introduction', in Perspectives on Time, Faye, Scheffler, & Urchs (eds.), Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp. 1-58. GALE, R. (1968), The Language of Time, International Library of Philosophy and Scientific Method, London: Routledge, Kegan & Paul. GRIFFIN, D.R. (1998), 'Process Philosophy', Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol. 7, Craig, E. (ed.), London: Routledge, pp. 711-6. HALE, B. (1998), 'Abstract Objects', in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol. 1, Craig, E. (ed.), London: Routledge, pp. 32-5 HASLANGER, S. (1989), 'Persistence, Change and Explanation', Philosophical Studies, 56: 1-28. 47 HELLER, M. (1992), 'Things Change', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 52:695-704. HERTZ, H. (1956), The Principles of Mechanics, New York: Dover Publications Inc. HITCHCOCK, C. (1997), 'Probabilistic Causation', Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, available online <http: plato.stanford.edu/entries/causationprobabilistic/> HUME, D. (1740), Treatise of Human Nature, 2nd ed., Selby-Bigge, L.A. & Nidditch, P.H. (eds.), Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978. KANT, I. (1781), Critique of Pure Reason, Smith, N.K (trans.), London: Macmillan, 1929. KRIPKE, S. A. (1980), Naming and Necessity, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. LEPOIDEVIN, R. (1991), Change, Cause, and Contradiction, London: Macmillan. –(2000), 'The Experience and Perception of Time', Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, available online <www:cd1.fisher.su.oz.au/stanford/archives/ fall2000/entries/time-experience/#> LEWIS, D. (1986), On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. –(1973), 'Causation', Journal of Philosophy 70: 556-67. LOWE, E.J. (1998), The Possibility of Metaphysics. Oxford: Clarendon Press. LUDLOW, P. (1999), Semantics, Tense, and Time. Cambridge: The MIT Press. MACKIE, J.L. (1965), 'Causes and Conditions', American Philosophical Quarterly 2(4): 245-64. MAXWELL, J.C. (1877), Matter and Motion, New York: Dover. MCTAGGART, J.M.E. (1908), 'The Unreality of Time', Mind 18: 457-74; rpt. in McTaggart, Philosophical Studies, Keeling, S.V. (ed.), Bristol: Thoemmes Press, pp. 110-131, 1996. –(1927a), The Nature of Existence Vol. 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (rpt. 1988). –(1927b), The Nature of Existence Vol. II. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (rpt. 1988). MELLOR, D.H. (1981), Real Time. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. –(1995), Facts of Causation, London: Routledge. –(1998), Real Time II. London: Routledge. NAGEL, T. (1997), The Last Word, Oxford: Oxford University Press. OAKLANDER, N. (1984), Temporal Relations and Temporal Becoming, Lanham: University Press of America. 48 OAKLANDER, N. & SMITH, Q. (eds.) (1994), The New Theory of Time, New Haven: Yale University Press. PERSSON, J. (1997), Causal Facts, Stockholm: Thales. REICHENBACH, H. (1956), The Direction of Time, Berkeley: University of California Press. SALMON, W. (1984), Scientific Expanation and the Causal Structure of the World, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. –(1980), 'Probabilistic Causality', Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 61: 50– 74. SANDSTRÖM, G. & INGTHORSSON, R.D. (2000), 'Review: Ludlow: Semantics, Tense, and Time' [online]. LINGUIST List: Vol-11-1813, available from World Wide Web: <http://www.linguistlist.org/issues/11/111813.html> SIMONS, P. (1998), 'Metaphysical Systematics: A Lesson From Whitehead', Erkenntnis 48: 477-93. –(2000a), 'How to Exist at a Time When You Have No Temporal Parts'. The Monist, 83: 419-36. –(2000b), 'Continuants and Occurrents', The Aristotelian Society, Supp 74: 59-75. SMART, J.J.C. (1972), 'Time'. In The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, VIII. Ed. Paul Edwards. New York: McMillan Publishing Co. Inc. & The Free Press, pp. 126-34. –(1963), Philosophy and Scientific Realism, New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul. SMITH, Q. (1993), Language and Time, New York: Oxford University Press. –(1994), 'The Logical Structure of the Debate about McTaggart's Paradox' in The New Theory of Time, Oaklander and Smith (eds.).pp. 202-10. STRAWSON, G. (1989), The Secret Connexion, Oxford: Clarendon Press. STRAWSON, P.F. (1959), Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, London: Methuen. TOOLEY, M. (1997), Time, Tense, and Causation, Oxford: Clarendon Press. TEGTMEIER, E. (1997), Zeit und Existenz, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck. I MCTAGGART AND THE UNREALITY OF TIME1 1. Introduction John M.E. McTaggart's (1866-1925) famous argument for the unreality of time really is a peculiar artefact in the history of philosophy. Despite that McTaggart's conclusion has been generally rejected, his views on tense has been widely accepted, e.g. in modern tense-logic.2 His terms for the different ways events appear to be positioned in time, the Aand B-series, have even come to be used to characterise the two dominating views in the philosophy of time today: the Aand B-view of time, or as is often said, the tensed and tenseless view of time. McTaggart distinguished between two ways that events appear to be positioned in time and claimed that they implied quite different ontological conceptions of time. On the one hand events are earlier than and later than each other, and on the other hand events are either future, present or past. McTaggart claimed that events hold permanent positions in terms of being earlier than and later than each other, but were continuously changing their positions in terms of being first future, then present, and finally past. Taken separately, both ways imply a conception of time as being constituted by a series of positions. McTaggart chose to call that series whose positions are determined only as earlier and later than each other the B-series, but the series whose positions are determined as future, present and past the A-series. The so called Aand B-views correspond crudely to McTaggart's Aand Bseries in the way that the B-view denies that the distinction of time into future, present and past are objective features and holds that the relations of earlier than and later than are the fundamental characteristics of time. The B-view claims that the experience of now and the transitory relation of events to now is a mere subjective creation. The A-view, on the other hand, holds that the apparent transition from future to past through the present is the fundamental characteristic of time and an objective feature of reality in some way or another. A second more controversial part of McTaggart's argument is his claim that because the relations of the B-series are permanent it cannot on its own account for change and, assuming change to be an essential characteristic of time, that 1 This paper was earlier published in Axiomathes 9(3): 287-306, 1998. 2 Needham (1975, p. 1). 52 the B-series could therefore not be properly characterised as temporal. According to McTaggart the positions of the B-series were dependent on the reality of the A-series for being in time at all. A third equally controversial part is the claim that the change of positions in A-series fashion involves a contradiction and that time must therefore be unreal. It is the ontological nature of this alleged contradiction that is the subject of this paper. A naive form of the contradiction can initially be stated like this: 1. Future, present and past are incompatible properties, but 2. in time every event appears to possess them all, and 3. these two propositions entail the contradiction that events have incompatible properties. The proponents of the B-view tend to accept McTaggart's claim that the Aseries entails a contradiction but reject that the B-series does not contain change.3 The proponents of the A-view have on the other hand rejected McTaggarts claim that the A-series entails a contradiction and claim that they cannot see that he, or the proponents of the B-view, gives any satisfactory justification for this claim. 2. The Aand B-views on the notion of succession Nathan Oaklander has suggested that the disagreement between the Aand Bview on McTaggart's claim that the A-series entails a contradiction revolves around the ontological status of succession.4 Oaklander, himself a proponent of the B-view, refers to the debate between himself and Quentin Smith, a proponent of the A-view, as being representative for this disagreement. Oaklander argues that Smith cannot account for the successive possession of incompatible temporal properties: "Smith simply claims that an appeal to succession avoids the contradiction that McTaggart finds in temporal attributions, but he does not offer an argument."5 And Smith rebuts: "But Oaklander gives no justification for this assumption. Like McTaggart he simply asserts that whatever possesses the three temporal properties must possess them simultaneously."6 3 Whether or not the B-series does contain change is a controversial issue that cannot be addressed properly here. I will be content with simply stating McTaggart's claims on this issue. 4 Oaklander (1996) 5 Oaklander (1994, p. 195). 6 Smith, (1993, p. 174). 53 Both Smith and Oaklander recognise that the arguments of both sides are in some sense incommensurable to the view of the other on this matter: Indeed, a reader of the literature on McTaggart's paradox might well come away with an impression of futility, a sense that the debate repeatedly ends in the same impasse, with the tensers predictably making a certain move and the detensers predictably responding with a certain countermove.7 The situation can be summarised like this. The B-view demands that the A-view gives a plausible account of the successive possession of temporal properties while the A-view demands that the B-view justifies that there is a problem with this kind of succession at all. This is a curious stalemate situation and I think it might be interesting to consider again the reasons why McTaggart claimed that the A-series entails a contradiction and consequently rejected both views. I will attempt to show that McTaggart's claim that the A-series entails a contradiction is neither wholly unfounded nor obscure, by showing how his idealistic ontology of the general nature of the existent and real guides his reasoning in every step of the argument for the unreality of time. This has to the best of my knowledge never been done. The argument for the unreality of time in The Nature of Existence (NE)8 has always been treated by commentators as a self-contained argument independent of the rest of McTaggart's ontological system.9 I will try to show that this is a mistake, and that it is because of this that McTaggart's reasons for claiming that the A-series entails a contradiction have been considered to be obscure. McTaggart himself clearly intended the argument and its conclusion, which is in vol.2 [of NE], to be treated as dependent on the ontology that he had presented in vol.1. I have no ambitions, nor hope, in proving him right, but I hope that my account may provide some kind of clarification that may be useful in making the debate between the proponents of the Aand B-views regarding the alleged contradiction of the Aseries less incommensurable. But I am afraid it is not going to be an easy reading. McTaggart's argument has been muddling the brains of philosophers for some 90 years now, which indicates that it is indeed no easy matter.10 7 Smith (1994a, p. 202). 8 McTaggart (1988) 9 This is the case even with C.D. Broad in his admirable Examination of McTaggart's Philosophy (1938, vol. 1, p. 9). 10 McTaggart first presented his thoughts on this matter in an article in Mind in 1908 (1934). I will however only discuss the mature version of it contained in (1988). 54 3. The structure of McTaggart's reasoning in The Nature of Existence The argument for the unreality of time is to be found in the beginning of the second volume of NE.11 In the first volume of that work McTaggart 'determines' the nature of the existent in general without, as he claims, taking anything specifically existing into consideration.12 McTaggart himself characterizes his ontology as an idealistic ontology in the spirit of Berkeley, Leibniz and Hegel.13 In the second volume, however, he looks at certain empirical features of existing entities, e.g. that they all appear to be temporal and some of them material. Both features are such, he concludes, that they can impossibly belong to anything really existing, according to the general nature of the existent and real that he determined in the first volume of NE: It will be possible to show that, having regard to the general nature of the existent as previously determined, certain characteristics, that we consider here for the first time, cannot be true of the existent[...]14 This structure of NE is made exquisitely clear by McTaggart but is apparently overlooked by most readers of the argument for the unreality of time. I believe that this is the main reason why the outlook of McTaggart's argument is still a subject of controversy. The purpose of this paper is to provide the reader with a short account of the fundamentals in McTaggart's ontology and to show how it affects the argument for the unreality of time, especially how it relates to the alleged contradiction of the A-series. I hope that this will contribute to a deeper understanding of McTaggart's argument. But first we must get better aquainted with the argument and its baffling conclusion. 4. A short reconstruction of the argument As mentioned earlier McTaggart distinguished between two ways that events are believed to be positioned in time and claimed that they implied two quite different ontological conceptions of time. The way events are perceived to be simultaneous with certain events, earlier than some other events and later than the rest, gives us a conception of a series of positions that runs like beads on a string from earlier to later or conversely, i.e. the B-series. Events are also perceived to be either future, present or past and this gives us a conception of a 11 McTaggart (1988, vol.2, Ch. 33) 12 McTaggart (1988, vol.1, Ch. 3). 13 McTaggart (1988, vol.1, sect. 52). 14 [italics are mine, RI], McTaggart (1988, vol.2, sect. 298). McTaggart makes an almost identical statement in vol.1, sect. 54. 55 series of positions that runs from the far future to the present, and from the present to the distant past, or conversely, i.e. the A-series. It might seem strange to describe the A-series to run from future to past or conversely, and it must therefore be noted that it is not the positions that change positions, but the events. The fundamental difference between the two series are that while events appear to change their positions in respect of A-series positions, from future, to present and to past, then their positions in terms of B-series positions are permanent and do not change; no event is at one time earlier than some other event and at another time later than that same event.15 McTaggart assumed that time is universally believed to involve change, and because he could not detect any change in the B-series he concluded that it could not properly be called temporal.16 The A-series however at least appears to involve change; the transition of events from the future to the present and into the past.17 McTaggart claimed that future, present, and past are clearly relations and not qualities, although, like all relations, they generate relational qualities in the entities they relate.18 But he could not determine as to what entity exactly the events stood in these relations and consequently to what they changed their relations to. McTaggart began to look for this change in the relations that hold between the events in the series but concluded that it is not to be found there. Every event in the A-series is changing its positions uniformly in the same direction, which can be seen by the permanence of their B-series relations; no event is first future, then present and finally past in relation to another event. McTaggart claimed that the same problem arises when saying that it is relations to moments of time or positions of time that change, if these are taken as separate entities, because these are entities that themselves must aquire their temporal properties through a relation.19 McTaggart came to the conclusion that the A-series is dependent on some thing or other outside the series to which the entities in the series, whatever they may be, events or moments of time, change their relation to, but which itself does not change.20 McTaggart did not himself introduce the notion of 'now' as this something outside the series. He rested content in saying that it would not be easy to find such a term, but there must exist one if the A-series is to be real. 15 McTaggart (1988, vol.2, sect. 305-306). 16 McTaggart (1988, vol.2, sect. 309-310). 17 For an account of other possible kinds of changes and how McTaggart rules them out see (McTaggart 1988, vol.2, sect. 309-315). 18 McTaggart (1988, vol.2, sect. 326-328. 19 McTaggart (1988, vol.2, sect. 327). 20 McTaggart (1988, vol.2, sect. 327). 56 But even if the existence of such an entity was granted, and thereby the reality of the relational properties of future, present and past, there remains a contradiction he claimed.21 Future, present and past are then taken as relational properties that events possess by holding a relation to something unknown, whether this is some sort of container-time, a now or whatever, is left unsaid. They are however incompatible temporal positions because nothing can be future, present and past in relation to the same thing all at once. And yet in time as a whole every event has them all, and this, McTaggart claims, involves a contradiction. It is at this point readers usually begin to be baffled and even resentful. Events, it is objected, are never future, present and past simultaneously, but well enough successively, and in that there is no contradiction. This is indeed Broad's main reason for rejecting McTaggart's conclusion: I cannot myself see that there is any contradiction to be avoided. When it is said that pastness, presentness and futurity are incompatible predicates, this is true only in the sense that no one term could have two of them simultaneously or timelessly. Now no term ever appears to have any of them timelessly, and no term ever appears to have any of them simultaneously. What appears to be the case is that certain terms have them successively. Thus there is nothing in the temporal appearances to suggest that there is a contradiction to be avoided.22 Well, it is at least clear from the text in NE that McTaggart was perfectly aware of the fact that events do not appear to be nor are believed to be future, present and past simultaneously but well enough successively: It may seem that this can be easily explained. Indeed, it has been impossible to state the difficulty without almost giving the explanation, since our language has verb-forms for the past, present, and future, but no form that is common to all three. It is never true, the answer will run, that M is present, past, and future. It is present, will be past, and has been future. [...] The characteristics are only incompatible when they are simultaneous, and there is no contradiction to this in the fact that each term has all of them successively.23 It seems then that his reasons stem from some other source than a simple mistake in analysing the experience of time or the proper rules of temporal 21 McTaggart (1988, vol.2, sect. 328). Broad believed that McTaggart considered the necessary existence of an unknown entity to be a convincing but not conclusive reason to accept the other parts of his argument, Broad calls this the Subsidiary Argument (Broad 1938, vol.2, pp. 317-318). Nevertheless, McTaggart proceeds, for the sake of argument, assuming the existence of such an entity in relation to which the members of the series hold the simple relational properties of futurity, presentness and pastness (see also (McTaggart 1988, vol. 2, footnote 1, p. 22). 22 Broad (1938, vol.2, p. 313). 23 McTaggart (1988, vol. 2, sect. 330). 57 predication. He is aware that events never appear to hold the temporal positions simultaneously but well enough successively, he is aware that language does not imply that an event has all three tenses simultaneously, and yet he claims that a proposition about any event e that it 'has been future, is present and will be past,' implies that e has them all and that this involves a contradiction. Why does Broad, Smith and other A-view proponents see succession as a simple solution to the contradiction while McTaggart and B-view proponents like Oaklander do not, even when the appearance of succession is an admitted empirical phenomenon by all? The B-view is in fact committed to accept one sense of successive possession of properties; the possession of different properties at different times. Hugh Mellor even goes so far as saying: "A change, then, is a thing having incompatible real properties at different times."24 But if the proponents of the Bview can admit that a thing can change in the sense of first being red at t and then not red but, lets say blue, at t', thus having in succession, or at different times, properties that are clearly incompatible, why can they not accept that an event can first be future and then present? Well the answer is that the B-view accepts the possession of incompatible properties as long as they are possessed one at a time. The contradiction involved in having A-series temporal properties, according to the B-view, is that events never possess any simple A-series temporal characteristic at any single time t, but always a combination of the three incompatible properties future, present and past, at any time. This could be made clear by McTaggart's views on beliefs that "[...]assert that the presence of one characteristic implies the presence of another".25 On his view anything possessing the characteristic of being a unilateral triangle implies that it has an angle sum of 180°, which entails no contradiction. Now, being blue does never imply the possession of being red, or any other incompatible property, but being either future, present or past always implies the possession of the other two; an event that is future is in a sense determined to possess the property of being present and past. Future events are bound to become present, which in a sense 24 [italics are mine, R.I.] Mellor (1981, p. 110). Mellor's account of change is in line with how Russell once defined change: "Change is the difference, in respect of truth or falsehood, between a proposition concerning an entity and a time T and a proposition concerning the same entity and another time T', provided that the two propositions differ only by the fact that T occurs in the one where T' occurs in the other." (1972, p. 469). Mellor however claims that it:"[...] will not do to define change as variation through time, if time itself can only be defined as the dimension of change." Mellor therefore proposes that change must be explained in terms of causation, but without accepting the reality of tenses (Mellor 1981, p. 78). 25 McTaggart (1988, vol.1, sect. 26-31). 58 implies that presentness inheres in the event at the same time that it is future, and so does pastness.26 Succession is of course no solution to the contradiction of having at every moment different combinations of incompatible characteristics but there is controversy regarding the claim that this kind of implication is equal to actually possessing the implied characteristic. It seems then that the B-view of time is dependent on showing that successive possession of temporal properties is not possible because they, as opposed to other properties, can never be had one at a time. The B-view must show that if anything has one of them it has them all. The disagreement, then, between the A-and B-view is not about succession in general but whether or not temporal properties can be possessed in the usual sense of succession. This provides us with an interesting contrast to McTaggart. To him it is equally contradictory that a substance has incompatible colour properties in succession as having temporal properties in succession. He would claim that the incompatible properties really belonged to numerically distinct substances that were parts of a compound substance, united by some common property, other than colour, and that this compound substance was misperceived as changing although in reality its parts have always possessed these properties and always will possess them. So to me it seems that in relation to McTaggart the B-view will have to provide an account of the possibility of change that allows the possession of incompatible properties other than tenses. Mellor, for one, argues that causation will do the job.27 5. The infinite regress of temporal properties In sect. 332 of NE vol.2, McTaggart claims that if it was objected that temporal properties were not had simultaneously but successively it would unavoidably result in a vicious infinite regress of ever more complex combinations of incompatible tenses. This section, and adjoining sections, is apparently believed to be the key sections of the whole argument. Modern writers like Mellor and Michael Dummett have provided defences of the soundness of McTaggart's infinite regress argument, but I will attempt to explain the contradiction without invoking this line of reasoning.28 I believe that my account is logically independent of it. My explanation only assumes, as I believe McTaggart does, 26 Smith proposes a tensed theory of such inherences, admits that there is an infinite regress of inherence relations, but claims that it is not vicious. A full account of Smith's theory is found in (1993). For a comprised account of his views on the infinite regress see Smith (1994b, 180-194). 27 Mellor (1981, p. 8). 28 Mellor (1981, pp. 92-102) & Dummett (1960). 59 that the notion of successive possession of A-series temporal properties presupposes that at some point t1 in time an event e actually is future, at some point t2 in time e actually is present, and at some point t3 in time e actually is past. I assume that all can accept this to be necessary truth conditions for speaking truly about the successivity of futurity, presentness and pastness; if an event e never 'is future' it can never be 'has been future' either, and if e never 'is present' it can never be 'will be past', and if e never 'is past' it will always be false that e 'will be past'. I will attempt to show how the presupposition of just these three necessary facts entails a contradiction, if McTaggart's ontology is presupposed. The proposed explanation is consequently not open to objections that tenses are possessed successively, or to objections that sentences like 'has been future' only appear to imply simultaneous possession of incompatible tenses (e.g. being future now) when failing to recognise the proper nature of temporal predication. Expressions like 'will be past' do for instance not refer to the present, but to some other time when e possesses a different property than it does at the time the expression is uttered. E.J. Lowe and Evan Fales, among others, have claimed that McTaggart's problem is based on a confusion concerning the indexical nature of predicates like 'present' and 'now'. They claim that the indexical nature of these predicates enables us to pick out successive moments in time.29 But McTaggart is in fact assuming that the reality of time is dependent on the truth of what they are claiming, i.e. that it is necessary that events possess temporal predicates successively, and that language does appear to pick out the times when events possess this and that temporal property. It is the existence of the reality thus described by language that he is rejecting because it is in conflict with the ontology that he has previously determined. My explanation will focus on how the notion of time, as involving the successive possession of temporal properties by events, clash with what McTaggart thinks is the necessary characteristics of anything existing and real. At this point let it suffice to say that McTaggart's ontology requires that time, as well as every other really real entity, must be shown to be an existing whole, a substance, or compound substance constituted by coexisting parts, if it is to be real at all. If every event is then supposed to have at least three incompatible positions in such a coexisting whole, i.e. positions they cannot coexist in, how can the positions be coexistent constituents of time? Well, they cannot! It would require that every event had three coexistent incompatible temporal properties and that involves a contradiction. 29 Lowe (1987) & Fales (1990, p. 265). 60 Usually we need an answer to a problem, but in this case we need to explain what the problem is in order to understand the answer. In order to fully understand this explanation we must first become familiar with the fundamental principles in McTaggarts ontology and use it to clarify the ontological status of the notions of event, position, series of positions, moments of time, and their mutual relations in McTaggart's philosophy. 6. McTaggart's ontology: Criteria of reality for time as a 'series'30 To acquire proper understanding of McTaggart's train of thought it is necessary to become familiar with his ontology of the nature of the existent. There is no room for a thorough exposition of his argumentation on this matter. I will only present relevant conclusions about the nature of such notions as existence, reality, substance, property and relation in the form of postulates and only provide a short clarification when needed. I will also present his views on how our beliefs relate to the real facts they are about. This involves notions like belief, assumption, fact, truth and falsity. When this is done I will try to show how McTaggart's views on these matters determines his conclusion about the nature of time. McTaggart himself believed these notions to be indefinable, i.e. only ideally determinable, and much of what he proposes to adopt about them to be widely accepted.31 Reality admits of no degrees; either something is real or it is not.32 We often say that something can be real for someone without really admitting that this something exists. We might grant someone to have had an experience of seeing a ghost even if we do not believe that ghosts really exists. The ghost is therefore only real for someone in the sense that the experience of seeing a ghost exists as a mental state in a consciousness while the subject of that experience does not correspond to anything objectively real in the world. Existence is coextensive with the real; everything that exists is real, and there can be nothing real that does not exist. Even if this was false, i.e. that something was real that did not exist, it would be of no practical consequence to us.33 There is therefore no sphere of possible existents that have not yet been realised; existence does not admit of degrees either.34 Possibilities, other than those simply informing about our ignorance of what actually does obtain, are always 30 For a critique of McTaggart's ontology see, Broad (1938) & Airaksinen (1975) 31 McTaggart (1988, vol.1, sect. 2, 60, 67 & 78). 32 McTaggart (1988, vol.1, sect. 2, Ch. 1 & 2). 33 McTaggart (1988, vol.1, sect. 6 & Ch. 2). 34 McTaggart (1988, vol.1, sect. 35 & 40). 61 assertions about the implication of one characteristic by another and then correspond to existing facts.35 That which exists must have some other nature than existence, viz. it must have properties.36 The existence of properties presupposes the existence of substances that holds the properties; there can never exist a property without substance and there can not be any substances without properties: Something must exist, then, and have qualities, without being itself either a quality or a relation. And this is Substance[...] This is the traditional definition of substance, and it is the one I propose to adopt.37 Substances can form groups by force of a common property and every such group is a compound substance.38 Every human individual is e.g. a substance, but they also stand in a special relation to all other human individuals through their common property of being human and thus form the compound substance 'humankind'. Events are a class of substances having properties and holding relations.39 All substances stand in relation to every other substance in one way or the other, and only between them, or their properties, can there be relations.40 All substances in the whole Universe thus make up a single compound substance and all determine one another.41 Reality is in this sense the totality of all existing substances, the properties they hold and the relations they stand in. This is the sense in which McTaggart means that all 'changes', however minor, determines the nature of all substances in the Universe.42 The fall of a sand-castle on the English coast determines the nature of the Great Pyramid because their mutual relation is part of their nature. According to McTaggart substances possess negative properties and can determine other substances and be related by them no less than through positive properties.43 One should notice that the formation of compound substances, in McTaggart's sense, is by no means restricted to substances co-present in time 35 McTaggart (1988, vol.1, sect. 35). 36 McTaggart (1988, vol.1, sect. 59). 37 McTaggart (1988, vol.1, sect. 67). 38 McTaggart (1988, vol.1, Ch. 14, 15 & 16). 39 McTaggart (1988, vol.1, sect. 5 & vol. 2, sect. 306). 40 McTaggart (1988, vol.1, sect.78-79). 41 McTaggart (1988, vol.1, sect. 135, 137, 138). 42 Of course meaning apparent changes, (McTaggart 1988, vol. 2, footnote 1, p. 347). 43 McTaggart (1988, vol.1, sect. 61) 62 and space and one should therefore not associate them with 'things' in the usual sense.44 I must also stress the point that even though properties and relations are in a sense universal, in McTaggart's account, they cannot have independent existence, i.e. there cannot exist a real relation 'larger than' per se, if nothing really is larger than something else. We might however be able to have an idea of such a relation even if it did not really exist but then it would be an idea of something unreal. From this follows that there cannot be any real relations to non-existing entities.45 There can e.g. not exist any real relations to mythical creatures like the Phoenix, but we can imagine them and then the idea of the Phoenix, as well as the idea of the relation we imagine it to have to us and other things, exists as a mental state in our consciousness. It might be objected that we seem to be able to have a relation in time to not yet existing or not any more existing things, i.e. to the conference we will attend next week or to deceased relatives. It will however become clear that on McTaggart's account it is a mistake to treat not-present things as not existing: "Now tomorrow's weather is existent, for existence is as much a predicate of the future and past as of the present."46 On McTaggart's view relations presuppose something existing as having a relation and if temporality is a relation then it requires the existence of what it relates. Now we have the foundation of the structure that McTaggart applies to what he calls 'Absolute Reality'.47 It is a world constituted by substances, their properties and the relations that hold between them. The Universe is one single compound substance. The parts of this compound substance are not only the things or matter in the Universe as obtain at each moment of time but every qualitatively distinguishable entities of any kind in the entire history of the Universe, not forgetting the qualitative states of our consciousnesses. Each and all are substantially existing entities joined by relations. This is indeed the view from eternity. But something must be said of the relation between Absolute Reality and our beliefs about it. Beliefs are mental states that assert that something is true of reality, they must therefore always be either true or false.48 Mental states are real qualitative states of a consciousness and consciousnesses are substances.49 Truth is a relation of 44 McTaggart (1988, vol.1, sect. 59 & 130). 45 McTaggart (1988, vol.1, Ch. 8). 46 McTaggart (1988, vol.1, footnote 1, p. 7). 47 McTaggart (1988, vol.2, sect. 296). 48 McTaggart (1988, vol.1, sect. 8). 49 McTaggart (1988, vol.2, sect. 433). 63 correspondence between beliefs about reality and facts.50 Facts are:"[...]either the possession by anything of a property, or the connection of anything with anything by a relation."51 That is to say, facts consist of independently existing substances having properties and which hold real relations to other independently existing substances. It is important to realise that McTaggart here uses fact as a universal term for any existing state of affairs, regardless if they appear to be, or are believed to be, events, things, thoughts or whatever, as long as they consist in independently existing substances having properties and holding relations. This is a use that may be confusing. Especially if one is used to treating facts as true propositions that can be true about states of affairs, and even such as do not obtain or exist.52 In McTaggart's terminology facts are not in any way distinct from the state of affairs that exist and beliefs can never be true about non-existent states of affairs (see above about truth).53 McTaggart's view of facts bears close resemblance to the view of 'states of affairs' held by later Cambridge philosophers, but, contrary to e.g. the early Wittgenstein, McTaggart does not allow for the reality of possible, or nonexistent, states of affairs.54 There exists no negative facts in McTaggart's 50 McTaggart (1988, vol.1, sect. 10). 51 McTaggart (1988, vol.1, sect. 10). 52 McTaggart goes to great length in showing that the truth and falsity of beliefs do not presuppose the reality of true and false propositions, but only a direct relation between belief and existing facts (McTaggart 1988, vol.1, ch.2). 53 At times McTaggart speaks as if facts are something that are 'about' states affairs and thus implying that they are distinct from them, but it should be clear that this is only a manner of speaking that he allows himself to indulge in, for the sake of convenience, when he has already given the meaning of the term. 54 McTaggart's account of facts is very similar to that of the logical atomists: "The most general account given by the atomists of an atomic fact was that it was a fact consisting either in the possession by a particular of a characteristic or in a relation holding between two or more particulars", (Urmson 1960, p. 17). Wittgenstein however, in his Tractatus, saw a fact as always consisting of at least two things forming a state of affairs: "2. What is the case -a factis the existence of states of affairs. / 2.01 A state of affairs (a state of things) is a combination of objects (things)", (Wittgenstein 1961, p. 7). In a translation of Tractatus from 1922 by C.K. Ogden and F.P. Ramsey Wittgenstein's Sachverhalten is translated with 'atomic facts'(Wittgenstein 1922), whereas in the translation cited above of D.F.Pears & B.F. McGuinness in 1961, it is translated with 'states of affairs'. The change of terminology from fact to state of affairs is motivated, I assume, because a Sachverhalt, a state of affairs, is something that can be real without actually existing, while a Tatsache, a fact, is a Sachverhalt or Sachlage that exists in actuality. A state of affairs in Wittgenstein is therefore something that can be real as a possibility without actually existing, while a fact is a state of affairs that exists. This is a distinction not allowed by McTaggart, and I therefore use 'state of affairs' as synonymous with fact. 64 ontology although substances possess negative properties.55 Falsity is instead the absence of a relation of correspondence between a belief and any real fact.56 Truth, in McTaggart's sense, is purely metaphysical, not epistemological, it holds whether or not you know there is a relation of correspondence or not. 7. The Universe is a compound substance, but can it be temporal? McTaggart believed that everything we know empirically appeared to be in time, and he wished to inquire whether the appearance of the changing relations of events in time is compatible with the general nature of relations that he so carefully determined. Can the substances in McTaggart's 'Absolute Reality' form a compound substance that is in time? The question is misleading, but it is usually posed in this form so it might be enlightening to consider it in contrast to a more 'McTaggartian' formulation: can the substances in 'Absolute Reality' form a compound substance characterised by changing relations thereby constituting time? The former question depicts reality as something in time, like a rabbit in a hat, but according to McTaggart s ontology any real entity, even time itself, must be either an existing substance, a property of an existing substance, a relation holding between existing substances or a compound substance constituted by substances who are the parts of reality: Having, as it seems to me, succeeded in proving that there can be no time without an A series, it remains to prove that an A series cannot exist, and that therefore time cannot exist. This would involve that time is not real at all, since it is admitted that the only way in which time can be real is by existing.57 The second question implies just this: reality itself, or that part of it we are familiar with, must be temporal if time is to be real. Let us then not be confused by the choice between time being a compound substance or a relation because relations cannot exist independently of the substances that hold the relation. There can therefore not exist a relation that successively holds between different substances, but perhaps there can exist substances that hold different relations. According to McTaggart then, if there exist a temporal relation it must hold between two coexistent substances and thereby unite the substances it relates into a compound substance, i.e. an existing state of affairs. Given then that existence and reality are coextensive and neither allow of any degrees, how can anything existing have properties successively and hold a relation between the 'times' when it has these different properties without actually existing 55 McTaggart (1988, vol.1, sect. 62). 56 McTaggart (1988, vol.1, sect. 19). 57 [italics are mine, RI] McTaggart (1988, vol. 2, sect. 325). 65 simultaneously in these different states? And how can time exist if the positions in time are positions that are held successively and therefore do not coexist? Broad indeed notices that McTaggart's argument "[...]seems to presuppose that all events 'co-exist', and stand to each other timelessly or sempiternally in determinate relations of temporal precedence".58 Broad gives a very well stated, and to my mind correct, account of McTaggart's thoughts on this matter, but does not relate it to McTaggart's argument on the ontological nature of relations in general. He presents it as a "[...]'muddle'[... ]at the back of McTaggart's mind".59 But as we have seen McTaggart made it quite clear that the argument is entirely dependent on his ontology and there the dependence of relations on the coexistence of related terms is perfectly clear. Well, before we answer that question we need to be clear on the nature of the notions of positions, series of positions and moments of time involved in the 'time-series.' 8. The sense of positions, series of positions, and moments of time In order to understand the notion of 'series of positions' we must first understand the ontological status of position. Positions are determined in terms of relations: being to the left to someone, being east of Eden, being fifth in line, earlier than e, etc. But relations cannot have independent existence in McTaggart's ontology; they presuppose the existence of substances. Positions must therefore consist in the existence of a particular substance in a particular relation to other substances. I propose that for McTaggart a position should always be understood as a state of affairs. We are here considering temporal positions and they involve the position of events in a series of positions. Events are not by themselves temporal states of affairs, or temporal facts, according to McTaggart's characterisation, because he believed that future, present and past are relations, and that events are therefore dependent for their temporality on having a relation to some other substance. It is evident that McTaggart believed that the substantiality of positions is provided by the events themselves and that positions can therefore not be existent apart from the existence of an event holding certain relations: The contents of any position in time form an event. The varied simultaneous contents of a single position are, of course, a plurality of events. But, like any other substance, they form a group, and this group is a compound substance.60 58 Broad (1938, vol.2, p. 307). 59 Broad (1938, vol.2, p. 299). 60 McTaggart (1988, vol.2, sect. 306). 66 Remember now that the relations of future, present and past do not hold mutually between the events but to something unknown. The positions of the Aseries can therefore not consist solely of the simultaneous event-content, but also of an unknown entity outside the series of events and the relation holding between them; together they form a state of affairs. The place of that position in the series of positions must however be determined as the relation holding between the positions, or rather, between the successive states of affairs constituted by the different relations that the event-content holds to the unknown entity. Considering then what I granted as necessary conditions of successive possession of temporal properties, i.e. that the facts e is future, e is present and e is past, must obtain singularly at some time or other. These facts should be considered as different states of affairs constituted by e, an unknown entity and the relation that holds between them; these different states of affairs are the proper constitutive parts of the series of positions. The A-series is then a series of states of affairs, or a series of configurations of existing substances, that consist of the different relations that events hold to an unknown entity outside the series. It must now be clear that it was in a sense misleading to claim that events change positions, implying that they do this in a way analogous to how passengers change seats on the bus, because it is the events themselves that constitute the positions. Rather we should say that change in the A-series consists in the event successively constituting different positions when its relation to the unknown entity changes. The temporal characteristic of the series is provided by the events successively partaking in different states of affairs or configurations, and consequently being constituent parts of the states of affairs it partakes in. Each state of affairs or configuration has in its turn a position in the series of configurations and it is this series of configurations that McTaggart identifies with time. We have now got an entity, time, that divides into parts of parts. First there is time as a totality, whose constituent parts are positions, i.e. states of affairs holding a relation to other states of affairs. The constituent parts of the positions are the events holding a certain relation to an unknown entity. Every event can be further divided into parts but we need not go further for our present purposes. If we now apply McTaggart's ontology it will be clear that the reality of time, as a compound substance constituted by positions, is dependent on the coexistence of the positions; a compound substance is a compound of related substances and as we have seen relations require the coexistence of what is related. The existence and reality of the positions per se depend in their turn on that their constituent parts coexist in the relations required for being that position. This is 67 however incompatible with events possessing temporal properties in succession, which in McTaggart's view is equal to participating in different states of affairs. Being future is holding a certain relation to an unknown entity, being present is holding another relation to that same entity. Holding incompatible temporal relations in succession means that events must be constitutive parts of many, and mutually exclusive positions, or states of affairs; states of affairs they cannot coexist in.61 Going from the bottom up: Events are required to be constitutive parts of many positions, if events cannot coexist in all these positions, then the positions fail to coexist in the required sense for constituting a series of positions, and time falls short of existence. It is thus demanded on the one hand that positions must coexist in time, which means that events must coexist in all the positions they are constituent parts of; but on the other hand it is also demanded that events be in different positions successively, which means that they cannot coexist in all the positions they are constituent parts of because succession excludes coexistence. I myself see no way to satisfy both these demands at the same time and have to conclude that they contradict each other. One of them will have to be rejected. If succession is rejected, we reject change and time, but if the other is rejected the reality of time must be defined in some other terms than coexistence of constituent parts. Regarding the relationship of all this to moments of time, if they be taken as separate entities as they are in theories of 'Absolute Time', where moments of time are considered to be homogeneous entities of time 'containing' the concrete event content. I will let it suffice to say that according to McTaggart's ontology they must be substantial enough to hold the properties of future, present and past, properties they must aquire by holding a relation to something that is outside of time. And, because all substances hold relations to all other substances, they must be parts of the temporal states of affairs that constitute and determine positions in time. So, if we originally had a problem with the coexistence of singular events in three different positions, we are not going to get a smaller problem with the coexistence of different positions involving moments of time and the different relations they hold to events in addition to their relations to the unknown entity outside time. McTaggart grants, for the sake of argument, the possibility of moments of time being real entities distinct 61 I have here characterised the contradiction in McTaggart's sense as involving relations but it makes no difference if we would substitute the relations with properties, because properties are only real when held by an existing substance just as relations are only real when holding between existing substances. 68 from events, but claims that this does not solve any problems because whatever holds regarding the temporality of events, holds regarding the temporality of moments of time.62 So whether the parts of time involve events, moments of time or positions do not really affect the conclusion, but granting the possibility of them all as separate entities and then trying to sort out the relations between them can maybe complicate the problem beyond recognizability. Let me summarize: According to McTaggart's phenomenological analysis, time depends for its nature upon being constituted of successive parts, i.e. parts that do not coexist, but according to McTaggart's ontology, time depends for its existence upon being constituted of coexistent parts. 9. Time as a substance I hope I have made it quite clear that the argument for the unreality of time must be understood as a demonstration that time cannot be a substance, or alternatively, that substance cannot be temporal, given McTaggart's conception of what substances are like and how they relate to each other in 'Absolute Reality'. It is clear that all preconceived ideas about time as a 'dimension' of change, or as some kind of objective relation independent of the events that are or come to be related by it, obscure proper understanding of McTaggart, and it is necessary to rid oneself of such prejudiced ideas of what is being dealt with before delving into the argument. Ideas of time as something apart from the substance in the universe are ruled out already in McTaggart's ontology by the fundamental postulates that: 1. nothing can exist and thereby be real that is not a substance, or for its existence dependent upon substances, 2. every substance is in relation to all other substances, 3. relations can only hold between existing substances. Time must consequently be shown to be an existing whole if it is to be real at all: "By objectively real time, I mean a common time in which all existent things exist, so that they stand in temporal relations to each other."63 The sense of 'temporal' is here quite simply 'changing'. 10. Conclusion In my opinion McTaggart did prove what he intended to prove in the argument for the unreality of time, i.e. that our conception of time is incompatible with a 62 McTaggart (1988, vol.2, sect. 327). 63 McTaggart (1988, vol.2, sect. 343). 69 certain internally consistent systematisation of certain widely accepted notions regarding the nature of the constituents that supposedly are in time. This does not of course amount to proving that time actually is unreal, nor that tensed change is contradictory, although McTaggart himself came to this conclusion believing as he did in the truth of his ontology. I hope therefore that my account of McTaggart's argument has shown that it does not provide a conclusive proof against either the A-view or the B-view, unless it can be shown that the proponents of these views hold the same ontology as McTaggart. I hope this detailed explanation may help the proponents of the Aand B-views to sort out their positions regarding the ontological status of the notions treated by McTaggart. I see no other way out of the presently stalemate situation. I hope also to have succeeded in showing that McTaggart was not confused or mistaken concerning the proper use of temporal expressions, nor concerning the temporal characteristics of our experience. His understanding of these matters was not inadequate or mistaken in any way, but in fact exquisitely clear. He just rejected the belief that reality is as it appears to be. He claimed that there is another more fundamental reality beyond our experience, whose ontology he claimed to have determined. In his view this ontology was a measure of the truth of our beliefs about reality, beliefs that are derived from the merely apparently real. McTaggart did not in any way reject the experience of time, as a matter of fact the justification of the experience of time was absolutely necessary for the completeness of any theory about reality in McTaggart's opinion. McTaggart believed that his account of what he called the C-series, did explain how the experience of time and change could emerge in a timeless, changeless reality and thus establish time as a phenomenon bene fundatum; a well founded phenomenon.64 The terms of the C-series, which he claims to be a non-temporal series, stand in the transitive and asymmetric relations of included in and inclusive of, but this is not the place for an account of the C-series.65 McTaggart's quest for a consistent ontology of the real and existing led him into an idealistic philosophical system that clashed with certain empirically grounded notions. Philosophical systems aiming to include everything often tend to clash with some of our well entrenched everyday notions. In McTaggart's case, it proved to be, among other things, time. 64 McTaggart (1988, vol.1, sect. 53, 613 & 619). 65 McTaggart (1988, vol.2, Ch. 47-50). 70 References AIRAKSINEN, T. (1975), Criteria of Reality, Turku: Akateeminen Kirjak. BROAD, C.D. (1938), Examination of McTaggart's Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. DUMMETT, M. (1960), 'A Defence of McTaggart's Proof for the Unreality of Time', Philosophical Review 50: 602-609. FALES, E. (1990), Causation and Universals, London: Routledge. LOWE, E.J. (1987), 'The Indexical Fallacy in McTaggart's Proof of the Unreality of Time', Mind 96: 62-70. NEEDHAM, P.L. (1975), Temporal perspective. A Logical Analysis of Temporal Reference in English, Philosophical Studies, No. 25, Uppsala: Department of Philosophy, Uppsala University. MCTAGGART, J.M.E. (1934) 'The Unreality of Time', Mind 18: 457-74; rpt. in McTaggart (1996), pp. 110-34. –(1988), The Nature of Existence, Broad, C.D. ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. –(1996), Philosophical Studies, Keeling, S.V. ed., Bristol: Thoemmes Press, pp. 110-131. MELLOR, D.H. (1981), Real Time, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. OAKLANDER, L.N. (1994), 'McTaggart's Paradox and the Infinite Regress of Temporal Attributions: A Reply to Smith', in Oaklander & Smith (eds.)(1994), pp. 195-201. –(1996), 'McTaggart's Paradox and Smith's Tensed Theory of Time', Synthese 107(2): 205-221. OAKLANDER, L.N. & SMITH, Q. (eds.) (1994), The New Theory of Time, New Haven: Yale University Press. RUSSELL, B. (1972), Principles of Mathematics, 2nd edn., London: George Allen & Unwin. SMITH, Q. (1993), Language and Time, New York: Oxford University Press. –(1994a) 'The Logical Structure of the Debate about McTaggart's Paradox', in Oaklander & Smith (1994), pp. 202-210. –(1994b) 'The Infinite Regress of Temporal Attributions', in Oaklander & Smith (1994), pp. 180-194. URMSON, J.O. (1960), Philosophical Analysis, London: Oxford University Press. WITTGENSTEIN, L. (1961), Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Pears, D.F. & McGuinness, B.F. (trans.) London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 71 –(1922) Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Ogden, C.K. & Ramsey, F.P. (trans.), London: Kegan Paul. II TEMPORAL PARITY AND THE PROBLEM OF CHANGE1 Abstract I discuss the general form of arguments that profess to prove that the view that things endure in tensed time through causally produced change (the dynamic view) must be false because it involves contradictions. I argue that these arguments implicitly presuppose what has been called the temporal parity thesis, i.e. that all moments of time are equally existent and real, and that this thesis must be understood as the denial of the dynamic view. When this implicit premise is made explicit, the arguments turn out to be either circular, they presuppose what they profess to prove, or mere demonstrations of the fact that the dynamic view is incompatible with its own negation. Furthermore, I discuss the metaphysical consequences of accepting the temporal parity thesis, arguing that it deprives us of the means to provide natural explanations to empirical phenomena 1. Introduction It seems to be universally admitted that change involves, in some sense, the possession by an entity of different properties at different times, but there is disagreement as to what exactly this difference amounts to. The disagreement is often presented as a dispute about whether change has to be a difference in the properties of a strictly identical entity existing 'wholly' at different times, i.e. of an enduring entity, or if it can be the variation between distinct temporal parts of a compound entity, i.e. of a perduring entity. The problem of change is then presented as turning on the nature of persistence.2 The dispute about the nature of persistence is often presented as a dispute about whether time is tensed or tenseless.3 According to the tensed view, the transition from future to present and from present to past, allows that one and the very same entity can at present be in its entirety at one particular time, but in the future be in its entirety at another time. In other words, tense allows one and 1 This paper was first published in Sats–Nordic Journal of Philosophy 2(2): 60-79, 2001. 2 David Lewis (1986; pp. 202ff); D. H. Mellor (1981; 1998); Sally Haslanger (1989); Trenton Merricks (1994); Mark Heller (1992). 3 William R. Carter & H. Scott Hestevold (1994); E. J. Lowe (1998); Michael Loux (1998). 74 the very same entity to be 'wholly present' at many times in succession, i.e. endure. Consequently, if time is tensed, endurance is possible. According to the tenseless view, on the other hand, there really is no such transition in time; contrary to what appears to be the case, what is existent and real is not confined to the present. This claim is sometimes called the temporal parity thesis, i.e. the claim that all moments of time, even those that appear to be 'in the future' and/or 'in the past' are as equally real and existent as what appears to be 'present'.4 In tenseless time nothing 'passes' from one time to another, and yet some things undeniably exist at many times, i.e. persist. According to temporal parity, persistent entities are equally existent and real at all the times at which they exist, i.e. it is not the case that where they appear to be located 'at present' objectively represents where they uniquely exist. Rather they exist, objectively speaking, at all the times at which they exist. However, it is not possible that a thing is, objectively speaking, equally existent and real at many times, and 'wholly present' at each and every one of those times, at least not if being 'wholly present' means to exist exclusively at the time involved.5 Nothing can exist exclusively at a single time, and yet be equally existent and real at many other times. An object can only be equally existent and real at many times by having different parts of itself existing at various times, i.e. by being composed of temporal parts, or, in other words perdure. It has been argued that one's preferred time-view, should dictate one's preferred persistence-view according to two linkage thesis: 1) if time is tensed, persistent things can endure, and 2) if time is tenseless, persistent things must perdure.6 The tensed view of time goes naturally with an endurance view of persistence, not because tensed time necessarily entails endurance, but because it 4 Carter & Hestevold (1994) 5 What various philosophers mean by the phrase 'wholly present' is not always clear. I, like C.J. Klein (1999) and Haslanger (1989) understand 'wholly present' as implying that the things exists objectively speaking in its entirety at one single time, and 'no-when' else. In this sense to be 'wholly present' is to exist exclusively at a single time. Often the sense of what it involves to be 'wholly present' is not given with direct reference to existence at a time, but in terms of not having temporal parts (Mellor (1981; 1998); Peter Simons (2000a; 2000b); Theodore Sider (1997)). I prefer to understand 'wholly present' as exclusive existence at a time, because it avoids possible confusions with the way universals are 'wholly present' at a variety of places and times, in each and every particular in which the universal is instantiated. The way universals are 'wholly present' at various places and times, may perhaps be used metaphorically to convey the sense in which enduring particulars are 'wholly present' at different times, but, whatever one might want to call a universal instantiated in a set of particulars spread out in time, it is not an enduring entity. 6 For instance, Carter & Hestevold (1994). 75 makes endurance possible. On the other hand, it is argued, the tenseless view of time entails perdurance, because a tenseless view of time is incompatible with endurance.7 The disagreement about the nature of change can however also be formulated with relation to causality. The dispute about the nature of causal change turns on the question whether causality involves necessary production, or if it merely involves a relation of constant conjunction, or correlation between distinct entities.8 On the former view, change involves the objective gain and/or loss of properties by a strictly identical entity, while on the latter view change is a regularity relation, or correlation, between temporally distinct entities. Further, that on the former view, the gain/loss of a property by an entity involves the production/destruction of a state of affairs, i.e. its coming into/going out of existence, while on the latter view there is no such gain or loss of properties, or beginning/ceasing to exist; there is merely a correlation between two distinct events, or states of affairs whose existence is given without explanation as a fact of experience.9 On the latter view, nothing is really brought into existence by the cause; existent entities just happen to occur in ordered pairs according to the thesis: If C occurs, then and only then, an occurrence of E always follows. I will refer to these two views as the production, and correlation views of causality respectively. It has been argued that perdurance goes naturally with a correlation view of causality,10 and there is a straightforward way in which a production view combines with an endurance account of persistence. If everything at all times is equally existent and real, according to the temporal parity thesis, then (i) things must perdure if they exist at many times, and (ii) nothing can give rise to or produce anything else because everything is as equally existent and real as 7 This claim is denied by e.g. Mellor (1981; 1998), and Simons (2000a; 2000b). The sense in which they claim things endure is however very different from the sense in which the adherents of what I call the dynamic view (see below) in general understand endurance. Simons e.g. thinks of enduring entities as something supervening on a base of occurrents (i.e. entities who are composed of temporal parts). 8 See Haslanger (1989). 9 Evan Fales distinguishes between four proposals as to what is to count as the relata of causal relations, of which (a), the category of events, is the most commonly held (1990, p. 52). The others are (b) that they are states of affairs, (c) that one of the relata are particulars, i.e. things, in the ordinary sense, and finally (d) that the relata of causality are properties. All these proposals depict the causal relation to hold between temporally distinct entities holding a one-sided relation, even though they do not explicitly involve events. For the sake of convenience I will allow myself to use these different terms for the causal relata at convenience in what follows. 10 For instance, by Haslanger (1989) 76 anything else from any point of view. Consequently, if temporal parity is true, causality cannot involve production, but only correlations between the equally existent and real entities in the world. However, if causality does involve production, then substantial entities must endure to provide the stuff out of which new states of affairs are produced. A potter cannot produce pots without clay. But then what exists at one time cannot be equally existent to what exists at the next, because in order for a pot to be produced out of a lump of clay, the clay must cease to be a shapeless lump. If the clay does not objectively speaking cease to be a lump, before it begins to be a pot, it must objectively speaking be both a lump and a pot, or different parts of it are a lump and a pot respectively. In either case the existence of the pot did not come by through production. The dispute about the nature of change is then nicely nested within three other disputes: (i) about the nature of persistence, i.e. do things endure or perdure, (ii) about the nature of time, i.e. is time tensed or tenseless, and (iii) about the nature of causality, i.e. does causality involve production or correlation. And, the alternatives within each dispute arguably fits with certain alternatives within the other disputes according to certain linkage theses: (i) that one's view of the nature of time should dictate one's view of the nature of persistence, and/or vice versa, and (ii) that one's view of the nature of causality should dictate one's view of the nature of persistence, and/or vice versa. I have not come upon anyone arguing that one's view of time should directly dictate one's view of causality, but only in relation to the persistence-view to which that time-view is associated. However, most philosophers do indeed prescribe to one of two combinations of the alternatives in the three disputes, according to the two linkage theses. Either they hold (a) a tensed-endurantistic-production-view, or (b) a tenseless-perdurantistic-correlation-view. Mark Heller (1992) is one of the few who have attempted to combine a tensed view of time with a perdurance-view of persistence, and D. H. Mellor (1981; 1998) and Peter Simons (2000a; 2000b) are two of the few that have attempted to combine an endurance-view (of a sort, see footnote 6) of persistence with a tenseless view of time. But, in general, philosophers do fit into one of the two alternatives I mention. By being so divided into two camps on these matters, philosophers appear to be divided not just over the particular issues, i.e. change, persistence, time, causality, but over the nature of reality more or less as a whole. I will hereafter talk of the former view as the dynamic view (of reality), and the latter view as the static view (of reality). 77 It is, I think, generally accepted that the dynamic view is more in accordance with the prima facie appearance of reality.11 There appear to be enduring entities, there appears to be something which is metaphorically described as the 'passing' of time, and there do appear to be changes that involve the causal production of new states of affairs. The static view denies that there are enduring entities, that time 'passes', and that states of affairs are causally produced; it reduces these appearances to mere appearance, i.e. nothing but products of our subjective perspective on a reality which does not in itself contain these features. Nonetheless, the dynamic view is by many rejected as a viable alternative to the static view. The main reason given for rejecting the dynamic view is that it contains contradictions.12 For this purpose, proponents of the static view usually rely on some form or other of J. M. E. McTaggart's famous argument for the unreality of time.13 The main reason given for rejecting the static view, despite that it appears to solve the contradictions claimed to be inherent in the dynamic account, is that it solves the contradictions not by explaining what change, persistence and causality is, but by explaining that there really are no such things as change, persistence, and causality as we intuitively know them; it solves the knot by cutting it off.14 In other words, experience tells in favour of the dynamic view, but since it is allegedly contradictory, that tells in favour of accepting the static view despite its apparent disparity with experience, and our intuitive understanding of what change, time, persistence, and causality is.15 11 For reference, see Loux (1998) 12 The issue of whether causality involves production is different in this respect. It is not in general criticised for involving contradictions, but, in the spirit of Hume, for failing to account for the necessity of the causal relation, and for relying on metaphysically 'suspect' notions like 'force', 'energy', and/or 'substance'. I think the reason why accounts of causal production is not criticised in the same way relates to the point made in this paper, i.e. that the so-called problem of change requires temporal parity. The conception of causality as involving production is more clearly a denial of the temporal parity thesis, than is the tensed view of time. If causality involves objective production/destruction of states of affairs, then there can be no talk of all states of affairs throughout the history of the universe being equally existent and real. Obviously, arguments depending on temporal parity, cannot be applied to doctrines that explicitly deny temporal parity. 13 For instance, Mellor (1981; 1998); Nathan Oaklander (1984). 14 Haslanger (1989) 15 I am here concerned with metaphysical arguments about the nature of change, as opposed to semantical arguments. I therefore entirely leave out the discussion of whether tensed discourse can or cannot be entirely translated into tenseless discourse, or vice versa. I do not think the metaphysical and the semantical issues coincide, although surely they relate to one another. However, it would take us too far afield to elucidate how exactly they do or do not overlap. 78 In section 2, of this paper, I will discuss the general form of arguments that profess to show that the dynamic view involves a contradiction, arguing that they all presuppose and depend upon what has been called the temporal parity thesis, i.e. the view that objectively speaking all moments of time are equally existent and real. In section 3, I will argue that the temporal parity thesis must be understood as the negation of the dynamic view, i.e. as a denial of tense. Taken in this sense, temporal parity is not just an important corollary to the tenseless view, but equivalent to it; it amounts to the claim that time is tenseless. As a consequence, all arguments depending upon temporal parity to show that the dynamic view involves a contradiction, are merely arguments showing that the dynamic view is incompatible with its own negation. They are, by analogy, arguments trying to demonstrate that it is impossible to square the circle, or, that the world cannot be square, given that it in fact is circular. Further, arguments that depend on temporal parity cannot be used show that the tenseless position must be true because it is the only alternative to the allegedly contradictory tensed position. Such arguments turn out to be circular on closer inspection, since they presuppose what they profess to prove, i.e. that time must be tenseless. In other words, I will argue that what appears to be a straightforward deduction of a contradiction from given premises is really a vicious circle. In section 4, I will argue that temporal parity sets such constraints to any metaphysical endeavour to make meaningless all questions about the coming into existence, or origin of, particular entities of any kind, whereby the only questions left to ask, and answer, will be those about the structure of existent reality. Like Sally Haslanger (1989), I think this approach deprives us of the means to provide natural explanations to empirical phenomena. 2. The contradiction of change Arguments to the point that change involves a contradiction, whether it is changes in intrinsic properties, or tense, can all be seen as versions of McTaggart's famous argument for the unreality of time (1927b, Ch. 33).16 The basic form is this: 1. There are incompatible properties F and G 2. There is an entity a, 3. There are distinct times t and t* 16 William Lane Craig has in a similar vein argued that McTaggart's paradox is "a special case of what Lewis has called the Problem of Temporary Intrinsics" (1998). 79 4. At t, a possesses F, and at t*, a possesses G, 5. 1, 2, 3 and 4 entail the contradiction that a possesses incompatible properties. If F and G stand for any two incompatible tenses and the entity a is an event, then we have the usual form of McTaggart's argument. If F and G are other kinds of temporary intrinsics, and a is a thing, we have David Lewis' Problem of Temporary Intrinsics. Of course, the conclusion of the argument, as spelled out above, depends upon implicit assumptions, e.g. Leibniz' law, which says that if a and b are identical then they have all properties in common. That is, if a, existing at t, is identical to a, existing at t*, and if a is F at t, and G at t*, then it must follow that a is F and G. When Leibniz' law is made explicit, we have the exact form of Lewis' Problem of Temporary Intrinsics (1986, p. 202ff). However, I think the argument also presupposes temporal parity. It is only on the assumption that a's possession of F and a's possession of G are equally existent and real states of affairs that a can be considered to possess incompatible properties. I think it is important to realise here that temporal parity makes the relativisation of existence to times a meaningless, or at least a merely subjective, notion. According to temporal parity, if a's possession of F is a state of affairs that exists at t, and a's possession of G is a different state of affairs that exists at t*, then these are in a sense coexistent states of affairs because their temporal location is irrelevant to their existence. According to temporal parity all moments of time coexist, although they have different temporal locations. When this coexistence of everything is kept in mind, one will realise that temporal parity requires that the reality of a's being F at t, and G at t*, depends on the coexistence of a's possession of F and G, at t and t* respectively. The term 'coexistence' is perhaps unfortunate because it is usually associated to existence at a time, which may cause confusion. Nathan Oaklander e.g. denies that the tenseless theory, is committed to accepting that all things coexist: "Like relations among universals, temporal relations between and among events, and the facts that they enter into, are not located at any time or any place. Yet, it does not follow that the terms of temporal relations coexist timelessly in the way universals do." (1998).17 However, Oaklanders denial that in tenseless time all things coexist, is directed against the claim made by C. D. Broad that the tenseless theory entailed that everything coexists timelessly (1938, p. 307). 17 This is a thoroughly puzzling passage. Surely, the token instances of the 'earlier than' relation-type, do exist (tenselessly) in time and space, even if one holds that the type does not. Otherwise all temporal relations are uninstantiated universals. 80 Broad's and Oaklander's views illustrate quite clearly the fundamental difference between the tensed and tenseless views with respect to the connection between time and existence. Broad thought (at least in 1938) that time, and tense, is essentially about concrete existence being confined in some sense to particular times, and therefore believed that to coexist must be to exist together either at one and the same time, or at all times. The alternative, for Broad, is that existence is altogether abstract so that things really exist in no time at all (like universals do). For Broad, then, if everything coexists, this must mean that everything exists (i) at one and the same time, (ii) at all times (everything exists always), or (ii) at no time at all. Oaklander, quite correctly, notes that the tenseless theory is not committed to any of these alternatives because it does not hold that existence is confined to a particular moment of time. According to the tenselesss theory, things can exist at different times, but without their different locations imposing any special ontological status on them, in terms of existence and reality. But then, I argue, everything does coexist. Not in any of the senses Broad intended, but in the sense that there is no room for saying that things located at one time exist, while the things located at some other time do not. On the tenseless theory, existence cannot be relativised to times. To talk only of the terms that hold the same location as being coexistent, can only be a figure of speech, on the tenseless view, since the theory denies that existence is confined to any particular moment of time. Now, I think that Broad's fundamental point can be made even given this fourth sense of coexist, namely that it is difficult to understand just in what sense entities that coexist in this fashion hold temporal relations, but that is not relevant for the present paper. What is relevant here is the fact that the claim that existence and reality is not confined to any particular moment of time is the fundamental thesis of the tenseless theory, and the basis of arguments professing to show that the tensed theory is contradictory Let me continue to sort out some possible confusions. Some may object to the claim that McTaggart's argument and Lewis' Problem of Temporary Intrinsics really are two different cases of the same argument. There is, for instance, a widespread misunderstanding to the effect that it would make a fundamental difference to substitute F and G with intrinsic properties, e.g. like colours, instead of tenses, and conceive of a as a thing, instead of events. Thus Nathan Oaklander argues that: 81 McTaggart argues that events do not change and concludes that there is no change in the B-series, but that follows only if events are the only things that can change. The standard reply to McTaggart is that change can occur in the B-series because it is "substances" or things that can change. Events are changes, they do not themselves undergo change (1984, p. 42).18 But, this reply fails to take proper heed of the ontology on which McTaggart bases his argument, and of how similar it is to the ontology of the static view. On the basis of this ontology, it is obvious that McTaggart's argument can be generalised to encompass any kind of incompatible properties and any kind of entity having the properties. This is indeed what Lewis has done, explicitly, and I think it is to be found implicitly in McTaggart's work.19 First of all, McTaggart treats events as a class of substances (1927b, sect. 306), and, secondly, it is obvious that McTaggart only proceeded to consider the possibility that events change tense, after having come to the conclusion that the other class of substances, i.e. things, do not really change properties because they are perduring entities and only vary between parts: "St Paul's Cathedral in the nineteenth century," and "St Pauls Cathedral in 1801," are both names of substances. But they are the names of different substances, since many assertions are true of St Paul's in the nineteenth century which are not true of St Paul's in 1801, and vice versa. And the second substance will be part of the first. If we take the substances which are named "St Paul's in 1801," "St Paul's in 1802," and so on to "St Paul's in 1900," they will together include all the content which is included in "St Paul's in the nineteenth century" (1927a, sect. 163).20 18 A similar objection is given by J. J. C. Smart (1972, p. 127). 19 For a detailed account of how I think McTaggart's ontological system determines his conclusion in the time argument, see Ingthorsson (1998). 20 McTaggart's manner of spelling out his metaphysics in terms of what makes assertions true, has been the source to many misunderstandings about his views. Thus for instance L. B. Lombard claims that McTaggart advocated a notion of change that did not concern the exchange of properties by an object, but did concern changes in the truth values of propositions about when events occur (1986, p. 81). This is plainly mistaken. McTaggart advocated a theory of truth as a direct relation of correspondence between mental states, i.e. beliefs, and existing states of affairs. He explicitly argued against the reality of abstract propositions (1927a, Ch. 2). According to McTaggart, truth is a relation between token beliefs, and token states of affairs, not between types of propositions and token states of affairs. Differences in truth values of different token beliefs of the same type about the same token state of affairs is thus dependent upon changes in that token state of affairs, i.e. no difference in the truth value of different beliefs of the same type about one and the same thing, unless there occurs a real change in that thing. Beliefs about St. Paul's, (and, mediately, linguistic tokens expressing those beliefs) are true by correspondence between the beliefs and the facts they profess to be about, and facts, according to McTaggart, consist of "either the possession by anything of a property, or the connection of anything with anything by a relation" (1927a, sect. 10), i.e. facts are existing states of affairs. The reality required to make 82 According to McTaggart, St. Paul's cathedral is, in short, a compound substance whose parts exist at different times and possess different and incompatible properties. That McTaggart presupposes a perdurance view of persistence, and thinks that whatever can be said about events applies to the temporal parts of things, is very clear in McTaggart's criticism of Russell in the time argument, when he notes that "Mr Russell looks for change, not in the events in the timeseries, but in the entity to which those events happen"(1927b, sect. 315). McTaggart claims that it does not make any difference whether we look for change in the events which happen to things or in the things to which events happen. The reason is that he believes that when we consider things we consider them as being composed of temporal parts. McTaggart draws the obvious conclusion that since St. Paul's cathedral, his poker, and all other temporally extended objects consist of temporal parts, they do not really change, but simply vary between parts (McTaggart calls the temporal parts facts, but he takes facts to be existent states of affairs, see footnote 19). McTaggart does not simply overlook the obvious, that it is things, or substances, that change. He has come to the conclusion that because temporally extended things consist of temporal parts, they cannot really change. Change's only hope is then that events, or the temporal parts of things, change tense. McTaggart does not address the problem of temporary intrinsics in any detail because it has, on his view, an easy solution, namely to give up change and admit that the incompatible properties are not really possessed by one and the same entity, but by different parts of a compound. For him it is easy, because he does not see change as an essential part of reality, it is the price to pay for order, coherence, and, perhaps, simplicity and elegance. In other words, he realised that change was the logical price to pay. The problem of having incompatible tenses, on the other hand, he could not dispose of so easily, because contrary to other kinds of properties he found it to be in the essential nature of tenses to be possessed in succession by one and the same entity. To be blue does not imply the possession of any other (incompatible) property, so one and the very same thing can be permanently blue without any complications. But, to be future necessarily implies that the thing in question will be present, and past. Nothing can be permanently future, permanently present, or permanently past; indeed nothing can be past without having first been future and present. The solution of providing things with temporal parts that permanently possess the various all the true, but incompatible, beliefs and/or assertions about St. Paul's have corresponding states of affairs, is a multitude of distinct substances having different properties. There cannot be only one substance having all these incompatible states, so there must be a multitude of substances that are parts of a compound, i.e. a perduring entity. 83 incompatible properties that apparently occur in the world, cannot be applied to the problem of the possession of incompatible tenses, because it is impossible to think that tense merely involves that there is one part of something that is future, another part that is present, and a third part that is past. This would cancel the sense in which tenses were temporal. What is really interesting here are the premises by which McTaggart comes to the conclusion that things must be composed of temporal parts, and why tensed change involves a contradiction. I will now presuppose what I have earlier argued (Ingthorsson (1998)), namely that the conclusion of the argument can only be understood in light of McTaggart's ontological system, in particular the fundamental principles (here presented as postulates) that: P1. Nothing can be real that does not exist, i.e. that reality coincides with existence (1927a, sect. 2 & Ch. 2) P2. Existence and reality have no degrees, either something exists and is real, or it does not (1927a, sects. 2, 35 & 40). P3. Everything in existence, and therefore in reality as well, is constituted by substances that possess properties and hold relations (1927a, Ch. 4-6) From this it follows that nothing can be real unless by being an existent substance, or a relation or property dependent for its existence upon being possessed by an existent substance. This means of course that time itself, if real, must be shown to be an existing substance, or, rather, compound substance. McTaggart is quite explicit about this: "[T]he only way in which time can be real is by existing." (1927b, sect. 325) The only way in which time can be real by existing, on McTaggart's account, is by existing as a whole. On the assumption that time is either an ordered relation between events and the temporal parts of things, or consists of the orderly related events and temporal parts themselves, the 'time-series', then all those events must coexist in the ordered relations they hold, because relations are for their reality dependent on the existence of the substances that hold the relation. According to his system, it will not suffice that time, or the events in time, exists piecemeal, as theories of temporal becoming suggests. By analogy, one could say that on McTaggart's account events will never make up a time if an event ceases to exist whenever another event begins to exist, just like jigsawpuzzle pieces will never make up a picture if one piece is removed whenever a piece is fitted. McTaggart's ontology requires, in other words, that every moment of time, every event in time, every temporal part of persistent things, coexists, i.e. that if they are real at all, they are all equally real and existent. This is what is known as the temporal parity thesis. Temporal parity just states what 84 follows from the above mentioned principles, P1, P2, and P3, when they are applied to time itself. It is the application of these principles to time that creates problems for the dynamic view.21 3. The circularity of the arguments against dynamic change According to temporal parity, in order for it to be real that in time as a whole an entity is at one time future, at another time present, and at a third time past, that entity must coexist at three different and incompatible positions in time, which is impossible. Nothing could coexist at three different and incompatible positions in time, and yet the reality of tensed time, according to McTaggart's ontology of the real, requires that everything does. According to temporal parity, in order for it to be real that in time an entity is at one time bent, and at another time straight, that entity must coexist in two different and incompatible shapes, which is impossible. Nothing can coexist as bent and as straight, and yet the reality of something possessing different properties at different times, according to McTaggart's ontology, requires that something does. Temporal parity is often treated as an important corollary to the tenseless view, but I hold the stronger view that it is equivalent to the tenseless view.22 The temporal parity thesis, as it is usually formulated, is a negation of the objective reality of tenses, and the thesis that only the present exists and is real, or that the present holds a privileged status in terms of existence and reality. 21 This is not of course the only problem of a dynamic view of time, but it is the most serious one. Other problems concerns, for instance, the construction of a semantics of a dynamic view (Arthur Prior (1967); Peter Ludlow (1999)), of an account of causal production (Mario Bunge (1959)), of a dynamic account of persistence and identity over time (Lowe (1998)). 22 This view seems to be shared by Loux (1998, p. 207), and Michael Rea (1998). They use the term eternalism for the tenseless view of time, and describe it in very much the same way as I have here characterised the temporal parity thesis, notably that it is a denial of the view that only the present exists. 85 William R. Carter and H. Scott Hestevold describe the temporal parity thesis thus: Temporal Parity: For any times ti and tj, neither ti or tj exemplifies the monadic properties of pastness, presentness, or futureness. It is not true that the state of the world at ti or tj uniquely reflects "the way things really are." Rather, the way things really are includes both the way things are at ti and the way things are at tj (1994). To hold temporal parity to be true not just commits to holding tenseless time as true, but is in fact equivalent to it; it is the thesis that time is not tensed, but tenseless. But, if the arguments showing that change involves a contradiction depend on temporal parity, i.e. the denial of tense, then the argument that tenseless time must be true because tensed time is contradictory is circular. The alleged 'contradictory' nature of tensed time cannot then be used to justify one's preference of the tenseless view, because the 'contradictory' nature of tensed time merely consists in the fact that it is incompatible with the temporal parity thesis, i.e. incompatible with tenseless time. Let us however not be too hasty. There is a way to ground the argument against tensed time in a way that is not so obviously circular, but which I think is unfeasible for other reasons. This involves seeing tensed time as directly incompatible, not with the temporal parity thesis itself, but with the principles P1-3 on which the temporal parity thesis rests. Arguably one could hold P1-3 as true, a priori of temporal considerations, i.e. before one has decided whether to hold the tensed or tenseless view as true. This is in fact the essence of McTaggart's reasoning. In the first volume of The Nature of Existence, McTaggart sets out to build an ontological system by arguments that are entirely a priori of any empirical considerations, except two trivial one's: (i) that something exists, and (ii) the existent is diverse (1927b, sect. 294). Accordingly, he establishes a priori of any other empirical considerations (or at least independently of them), including temporal ones, the principles P1-3, listed above. When this metaphysical base is established, and one looks to empirical matters, such as the appearance of time, it has been determined a priori, that unless time can be shown to exist as a whole, it cannot be real. If time fails to meet those a priori requirements for being a reality, when we do consider its empirical features, then it cannot be real. McTaggart's approach is faulty, I suggest, because it presupposes that fundamental metaphysical principles can be established a priori, or independently of empirical considerations. Especially that it presupposes that the 86 nature of existence can be determined a priori of temporal considerations. Surely, it is not possible to determine what it is to exist, without considering what it is to exist in time, or without experiences of what it is to exist in time, granted that everything existing does in fact appear to exist in time. When this approach to metaphysics is rejected, and it is admitted that empirical considerations are vital to the formulation of the basic principles of any metaphysical system, then the appearance of time must be regarded as important with respect to the soundness of principles like 'existence and reality coincide'. This makes it impossible to have accepted P1-3, without already having come to the conclusion that those principles are in accordance with existence in time, i.e. with what one believes is the correct view of the nature of time. Since P1-3, taken together, appear to be in conflict with the tensed conception of time, then one can only accept P1-3 to be correct if one accepts the view that time really is tenseless. It cannot in any case be argued that the tensed view of time (and of existence) is in itself contradictory, but only incompatible with the tenseless view of time (and of existence). My conclusion is that P1-3 cannot intelligibly be separated from the temporal parity thesis, because they are about existence, and existence appears to us as existence in time. Consequently, even when we think of the arguments against the dynamic view as resting directly on the acceptance of P1-3, then the contradictions that appear only amount to an incompatibility between the dynamic view and its negation. I do not want to argue this in detail here, but I think it is important to ask about the reasons for accepting the thesis that existence and reality coincide; is it self-evident, or does it indeed depend on our theories of what it is to exist in time? Do we really think, prima facie, that the past is real by way of existing, and not despite that it has ceased to exist? Do we really think that the 'ratio' between the circumference of a circle and its diameter is real by way of existing? Do we really think possibilities are real by way of existing? Do we think natural laws are real by way of existing? Are the natural numbers real by way of existing? It does not seem to me that it is self-evident that these questions should all be answered affirmatively, and I submit that any principle that is supposed to serve such a basic function as the principle 'existence and reality coincide' does in McTaggart's philosophy, should either be self-evident, or else explicitly be given the hypothetical status it deserves. Even the idea that fundamental principles of the nature of existence and reality, should be boundary conditions upon time, is arguably in contradiction to a long tradition in 87 the metaphysics of time which has seen time as a boundary condition of existent and real phenomena.23 There are questions about the validity of the principle that existence and reality coincide, that are, or should be, relevant to any metaphysical endeavour to establish that all moments of time are equally existent and real. Such a principle cannot be established a priori of temporal considerations, but only in light of a denial or acceptance of some theory about how the empirical features of time should be accounted for. As the situation is today in the philosophy of time, it can only be established in light of the acceptance of the static view, or denial of the dynamic view. In either case, arguments that presuppose temporal parity to show that the dynamic view contains contradictions, are circular. If the a posteriori approach to metaphysics be admitted to be correct in contrast to McTaggart's a priori approach, the temporal parity thesis must be considered to be a denial of the dynamic view and thus any argument depending on this denial for showing that the dynamic view involves contradictions is circular. At the most it amounts to no more than a demonstration that the dynamic view is incompatible with its own negation (which is something we could know a priori of any such demonstration). 4. Temporal parity and the metaphysics of the static view To hold that all moments of time are equally existent and real sets serious constraints to any metaphysical model of reality. More immediately, it says that everything is equally existent and real from any point of view. From any point of view, what appears as 'the future' is as existent and real as 'the present'. So is 'the past'. In such a model there is no place for causal production.24 There can only be existent items permanently holding ordered relations. Whatever can be said within the framework of such a metaphysical system about the indeterminism of natural laws, about certain causes enhancing probabilities for the occurrence of certain effects, cannot change the fact that the fundamental thesis of the metaphysics says that the relata of both ends of any relation, including causal relations, coexist. Any attempt to establish that on the static view it is in some sense indetermined what is on the other end of any relation, or that there are many possibilities about what is on the other end, would either have to be incompatible with the basic principle of the metaphysics of the static view, or involve the claim that there are no causal relations, i.e. that there are no relations 23 Philip Turetzky (1998, p. 1) 24 Haslanger (1989) 88 of constant conjunction; either anything, can be on the other end of any relation, or there are relations of something a bit less than constant conjunction. Perhaps any given kind of cause only holds a 0.8 correlation to some kind of effect. As a consequence it would follow that we could never know for certain on the basis of earlier events what will later follow. That is, we could not know 'beforehand' what is at the other end of the relation, even though of course there is (tenselessly) something at the other end. All questions about whether or not the history of the world is indetermined, uncertain, or contains many possibilities, will inevitably boil down to epistemological considerations, i.e. what we can know about the later stages of this totality of equally existent and real entities, from what we know about earlier and simultaneous stages of this totality. And, what we can know about the apparent regularity of the order we perceive it to have. That something is possible, on such a view, merely means that we do not yet know for certain whether it exists, either because its existence is 'in some place other than here', 'in the future', or 'in another possible world'. The temporal parity thesis even sets restrictions on what is meaningful to ask within an epistemological context. There is no sense in asking about the origin of anything, the coming to exist of anything, merely the relations between what exists. On this account, the reality of anything must in some way or another be grounded in existence. I have already mentioned the question of the existence of the future and past, but there is also such things as possibilities, which are real but non-existent states of affairs, according to the common-sense view. They are typically conceived of as something that might have existed if things would have turned out otherwise, or ways in which things could have been different than they in fact are. However, if principles P1-3 are true, possibilities can only be real by existing. This is, I think, Lewis' view of the nature of possibilities: The world we live in is a very inclusive thing [...] Anything at any distance at all is to be included. Likewise the world is inclusive in time [...] Maybe, as I myself think, the world is a big physical object [...] But nothing is so alien in kind as not to be part of our world, provided only that it does exist at some distance and direction from here, or at some time before or after or simultaneous with now [...] But things might have been different, in ever so many ways[...] Are there other worlds that are other ways? I say there are [...] The other worlds are of a kind with this world of ours [...] The difference between this and the other worlds is not a categorial difference. Nor does this world differ from the others in its manner of existing. I do not have the slightest idea what a difference in manner of existing is supposed to be. Some things exist here on Earth, other things exist 89 extraterrestrially, perhaps some exist no place in particular; but that is no difference in manner of existing, merely a difference in location or lack of it between things that exist. Likewise some things exist here at our world, others exist at other worlds; again, I take this to be a difference between things that exist, not a difference in their existing (1986, pp. 2-3). I read Lewis' modal realism as an attempt to draw out in full the consequences of the principles that existence and reality coincide, and have no degrees. Given those premises, even possibilities must exist in order to be real, and they cannot even exist as mere potentialities in actual states of affairs, since this threatens to introduce degrees of existence and reality. But, since they apparently do not exist in this world, then, on Lewis' hypotheses, there must exist other 'worlds' in which these possibilities do exist (in that world they do not exist as possibilities of course, since then they would not exist there, and would have to exist in some other possible world, etc. ad infinitum). This is all very well, as far as the logical consistency and elegance of the metaphysical system is concerned, but what is the price to pay? I think, like Sally Haslanger (1989), that it deprives us of the possibilities to provide natural explanations to many, or most, empirical phenomena. 5. Change, causality, and explanation When the reduction of change to variation between temporal parts is rejected, it is usually done on the grounds that it is a flagrant violation of our intuitive understanding of what change is, and what persistent objects are like. It is presupposed that we know intuitively what change is, and how persistent objects are, and therefore have the means to judge whether any proposed theory of how persistent things change is adequate or not. Haslanger provides another reason to why the intuitive (read dynamic) conception of change, and persistence, are metaphysically speaking better than the static conception. She argues that the static view deprives us of the means to provide natural explanations of empirical phenomena (1989).25 She moves from the assumption that natural explanations depend on the idea that the past constrains the present, in some sense. She does not want to give herself any detailed account of what would count as a natural explanation in this sense, but surely, causal explanations are the paradigmatic example of natural explanations. There is a straightforward 25 Note that I am here talking about explanations of the natural origins of things, e.g. the existence of a table, a sparrow, a quilt. Other writers have claimed that the static view has 'explanatory advantages' over the dynamic view (Yuri Balashov (2000)), but then the term 'explanatory' is used in a different sense, notably 'descriptive coherence'. 90 sense in which causal explanations explain how the past constrains the present; by preceding their effects in time. But precedence in time is not enough to establish how the past constrains the present. Precedence merely establishes a succession, and, logically speaking, anything can follow in succession after anything, as Hume pointed out. And, if everything coexists, it is not clear to me how the past constrains the present in any sense. Or, to put it in words that are more in line with the static view, how the earlier constrains the later. In a stronger sense, the sense I prescribe to, causes necessarily precede their effects by being what produces the effects, or what brings the effect into existence.26 On this account, a natural explanation is an explanation of why something exists, of what has brought it into existence. It is an explanation of its natural origins (as opposed to its supernatural origins, e.g. being created out of nothing by a deity, or just 'popping' into existence for no reason at all). A natural explanation of why a certain table exists, would be that it was produced out of certain tree by a certain carpenter. The table came into existence by the tree's ceasing to be, but the persistence of the 'stuff' out of which the tree was made. Thus the table is existentially dependent upon the tree, in the sense that the existence of the table required that the tree ceased to exist in order to provide the 'stuff' out of which the table was produced. This kind of explanation is not possible on the static view, because it presupposes that the existence of the temporal parts of the wood, the table, and of the carpenter, are equally existent and real; the table is made out of completely different 'stuff' than the 'stuff' which constitutes the tree. No temporal part could cease to exist to provide the 'stuff' of any other part, without violating the temporal parity thesis. On the static view, what matters is to explain the structure of existent reality, in a consistent and coherent fashion, but explanations of the coming into existence, and continuing existence of the parts of this reality are unintelligible. According to the static view, the only explanation to be given to the question why the pyramids have lasted (persisted) for so long, is simply that they have so and so many temporal parts. Questions about why any particular exists, or why it changes, or why it persists, is strictly speaking unintelligible, on the static account. It is only possible to say what appears to exists, how it appears to change, and how it appears to persists. Let me say that the essence of this criticism of the static view is that it is entirely descriptive, not explanatory. 26 For reference, see Bunge (1959, p. 46). 91 6. Conclusion It seems to me that what has hitherto been considered to be one of the most serious threats to a dynamic account of reality, the charge that it is selfcontradictory and therefore necessarily false, is invalid. Arguments to the point that the dynamic account contains contradictions, rely implicitly on the temporal parity thesis, which is essentially in itself a denial of central tenets of the dynamic view, namely that only the present exists. When this implicit premise is made explicit, what appeared to be a valid deductive argument moving from self-evident premises to a not so evident conclusion, turn out to be either circular, by presupposing what it professes to prove, namely the falsity of the dynamic view, or mere demonstrations of the fact that the dynamic view is incompatible with its own negation. Since the dynamic view is better in accordance with common-sense, and has not been shown to be selfcontradictory, its opponents must provide other reasons for rejecting it. References BALASHOV, Y. (2000), 'Persistence and Space-Time: Philosophical Lessons of the Pole and Barn', The Monist 83: 321-40. BROAD, C. D. (1938), Examination of McTaggart's Philosophy, Vol. II. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. BUNGE, M. (1959), Causality. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. CARTER, W.R. & HESTEVOLD, H.S. (1994), 'On Passage and Persistence', American Philosophical Quarterly 31:269-83. CRAIG, W.L. (1998), 'McTaggart's Paradox and the Problem of Temporary Intrinsics', Analysis 58: 122-7. FALES, E. (1990), Causation and Universals. London: Routledge. HASLANGER, S. (1989), 'Persistence, Change and Explanation', Philosophical Studies 56: 1-28. HELLER, M. (1992), 'Things Change', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52:695-704. INGTHORSSON, R.D. (1998), 'McTaggart and the Unreality of Time', Axiomathes 9: 287-306. LEWIS, D. (1986), On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. LOMBARD, L.B. (1986), Events. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. LOUX, M.J. (1998), Metaphysics. London: Routledge. LOWE, E.J. (1998), The Possibility of Metaphysics. Oxford: Clarendon Press. LUDLOW, P. (1999), Semantics, Tense, and Time. Cambridge: The MIT Press. 92 MCTAGGART, J.M.E. (1927a), The Nature of Existence Vol. 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, rpt. 1988. –(1927b), The Nature of Existence Vol. II. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, rpt. 1988. MELLOR, D.H. (1981), Real Time. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. –(1998), Real Time II. London: Routledge. MERRICKS, T. (1992), 'Endurance and Indiscernibility'. The Journal of Philosophy 92: 165-84. OAKLANDER, N. (1984), Temporal Relations and Temporal Becoming. Lanham: University Press of America. –(1998) 'Freedom and the New Theory of Time'. In Questions of Time and Tense. Ed. LePoidevin, Robin. Oxford: Clarendon Press. PRIOR, A. (1967), Past, Present, and Future. Oxford: Clarendon Press. REA, M.C. (1998), 'Temporal Parts Unmotivated'. The Philosophical Review 107: 225-60. SIDER, T. (1997), 'Four-Dimensionalism'. The Philosophical Review 106: 197231. SIMONS, P. (2000a), 'How to Exist at a Time When You Have No Temporal Parts'. The Monist 83: 419-36. –(2000b), 'Continuants and Occurrents', The Aristotelian Society, Supp 74: 59-75. SMART, J.J.C. (1972), 'Time'. In The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, VIII. Ed. Paul Edwards. New York: McMillan Publishing Co. Inc. & The Free Press, pp. 126-34. TURETZKY, P. (1998), Time. London: Routledge, III CAUSAL PRODUCTION AS INTERACTION1 1. Introduction The notion of causal production lies at the heart of the common conception of the nature of causality, i.e. the belief that causes bring their effects into existence. But, in philosophy, there is controversy regarding the nature of this alleged production. Not only is there controversy regarding its nature, but also about its reality. However, in this paper, I will confine my discussion to the nature of causal production, on the assumption that it is real. Discussions regarding the nature of causal production, like discussions about causality in general, usually turn on the notion of a necessary connection between cause and effect.2 I will however focus as well on the more fundamental question: what is causal production? That is, the problem of causal production, as I discern it, revolves around two distinct but interrelated questions: (i) what is causal production, and (ii) is there a necessary connection between cause and effect? Of course, any answer given to the latter depends partly on how one answers the first, because the first gives us the answer to what causes and effects are. In this paper I will present what I think is a partly novel answer to these questions. A standard picture of causal production has been around at least since Aristotle.3 The general idea is that new states of affairs are brought into 1 This article was first published in Metaphysica 3(1): 87-119, 2002. 2 For reference, see Anscombe (1971). There are accounts of causation that depict the causal relation as something a bit weaker than a necessary connection, e.g. probabilistic accounts of causation. For an overview on different approaches to causality, see Sosa and Tooley (1993). 3 According to Aristotle, causal production requires four ingredients, (i) a material cause, (ii) a formal cause, (iii) an efficient cause, and (iv) a final cause (Physics, book II, Ch. 3). The first three kinds of causes are included as components in what I call the standard picture (I prefer to use the term 'components' because the term 'cause' has come to be used for the efficient cause only). The material cause is the substance of the given state of affairs on which the efficient cause acts, and which provides the substance out of which the effect is produced. The character of the effect (i.e. its form, as opposed to its substance), is determined by the character of the efficient cause and of the given state of affairs. These three components are needed to characterise production in the world of inanimate material objects while the issue 94 existence when an already existing material substance changes due to an external influence, without which the change would not have occurred and the new state of affairs never exist. The kernel of this view comes out clearly in the well known slogan 'whatever comes to be is necessarily born by the action of a cause'. Typically, the external influence, or cause, is depicted in terms of an 'extrinsic motive agent', basically some object possessing causal powers, which acts upon another object, that object sometimes referred to by the term 'patient'. Accordingly, a cause is the action of some object upon another object, and an effect is the change produced in the object acted upon. The standard picture depicts causal production as essentially involving three components: (i) that it requires a substance which can be altered, (ii) that the alteration is initiated by some influence external to the altering substance, and (iii) that the character of the alteration is determined by the form of the given substance and of the efficient cause. These three components relate to three basic metaphysical convictions about coming into existence in physical reality. The first of these principles is the old materialistic principle that nothing comes into being out of nothing or passes into nothing, the genetic principle for short, since it says that everything has a natural origin.4 The second is the conviction that a distinguishing mark of causal changes in the natural world is that they occur as a result of some kind of action, basically any kind of influence exerted by one substance upon another, let us call that the principle of action.5 The third is the principle of lawfulness, which says that the world changes in a regular way, i.e. according to general laws.6 These principles form the metaphysical framework on which the standard picture rests.7 Note that the principle of action does not state that all changes are causal, only that causal changes occur as the result of some kind of action. The metaphysical framework of the standard picture allows non-causal changes of a certain kind. For instance, if the law of inertia is correct, a thing will continue in its motion in the absence of forces, and then a configuration of uniformly moving objects may change without the configuration, or the objects, having whether the production is done in order to achieve a goal, or a good, is only relevant in cases where there are intentional beings involved, acting with a purpose. 4 The term 'genetic principle' is from Bunge (1959, p. 24). Craig Dilworth calls it 'the principle of (the perpetuity of) substance', (1996, p. 53). 5 The principle of action is the 'production-version' of what is often called 'the causal principle', or 'the principle of causality' (Bunge (1959, p. 26); Dilworth (1996, p. 57)). 6 Again I borrow a term from Bunge (1959, p. 26). Dilworth calls it 'the principle of the uniformity of nature' (1996, p. 55). 7 My account of the 'standard picture' and its metaphysical base owes much to Mario Bunge's discussion of causality in (1959), in particular, Ch. 1. 95 being causally affected. Such change is in accordance with the genetic principle and it is lawful, but it is not causal. The standard picture of causal production should therefore not be identified with causal determinism, or physicalism, which is the view that no other kinds of determination exist than causal determination.8 It is also important to note that logically speaking these metaphysical principles are independent of each other with regard to the idea of coming into existence, i.e. of becoming. Everything may be thought to come into being in accordance with the genetic principle, but not in a lawful way, nor due to any action, and, it may be thought that something comes into being in a lawful way, a way that nevertheless violates the genetic principle and the principle of action. That is, it is possible to think that coming into being is always the coming into being of something out of something else, but nevertheless that every becoming is unique and spontaneous, and, it is possible to think of creation ex nihilo by a deity as falling under a general law, which is lawful becoming but violates the genetic principle and the principle of action. It is even possible to think of substance coming into existence for no reason at all, i.e. not out of anything else, not in accordance with any general law, and not because of any kind of influence, not even divine will; it is possible to think of becoming as violating all three basic principles. Consequently, the idea that nothing comes into being spontaneously out of nothing, but always out of something else in a lawful manner, and usually as a result of some kind of action, does not derive its appeal from any logical connection between the three basic convictions, nor between them and the idea of coming into existence. Its appeal must be derived from being confirmed by experience, and/or from its success in explaining experience. I think it is safe to say that the standard picture and its metaphysical framework is the paradigm view of how reality works among laymen in western societies. It is believed that things just do not 'pop' into existence out of nothing, or alter in a random fashion without having been caused to do so. In physics, this view is thought to have its limits. It is thought to have considerable empirical support within the realm of classical mechanics, i.e. as applied to ordinary middle-sized objects moving at moderate velocities, but its validity is uncertain as applied to quantum phenomena.9 Since I am not a physicist, nor a 8 For a discussion of different kinds of determination, see Bunge (1959, pp. 6 ff). 9 I take it to be commonly accepted within physics that although classical mechanics have been shown to fail when applied to objects moving at extreme velocities and when applied to the realm of micro-particles, then it has been established to hold good for macroscopic objects moving with a speed much less than the speed of light. According to what is called the 96 philosopher of physics, I am not in a position to discuss causal production on the quantum level, nor for very big, or very fast moving objects. Consequently, with respect to physics, my discussion will be restricted to the nature of causal production within the realm of classical mechanics. Or, more precisely, I will discuss whether an account of causal production can be given that is compatible with the metaphysical principles given above, and which makes sense of the conviction that there is a necessary connection between that which produces, and the product, i.e. between cause and effect? I think such an account can be given, with only minor modifications of the standard picture. Traditionally, it is lawfulness that has been taken to be the important feature of the standard picture of causality, and the key to explaining the necessity of the connection between cause and effect. The genetic principle is often taken to be an obvious and trivial aspect of causal production, a mere boundary condition, despite that it is what above all distinguishes natural causation from what might be called supernatural causation, or 'magic', e.g. production ex nihilo. That is, the cause-effect relation has been considered to be necessary in the sense that certain kinds of causes always and invariably produce certain kinds of effects, in accordance to a general law of the form 'if C happens, then (and only then) E is always produced by it'. On this account, the necessity is a general feature of causation, manifest in type-type relations. Surely causation has some general features that can be expressed by general laws, I do not dispute that, but, because I think the standard picture is mistaken, I have serious doubts that those features have to do with a one-way link between certain types of actions by 'extrinsic motive agents', and certain types of changes in 'patients'. However, I will not dwell on the problems of general causation. I think it is possible to give a coherent account of how something produces something else so that the two are necessarily connected, independently of general laws. The account comes in two parts. The first part contains an analysis of causal production in terms of a certain kind of interaction between things. Briefly, I suggest that causal production always involves an interaction between things, correspondence principle, the relativity and quantum theories are more general theories which must yield the same results as classical mechanics when applied to the conditions in which the classical theory is known to hold good. Consequently, whatever these theories predict about very small and very fast moving entities, they ought to predict that ordinary middle-sized objects moving at moderate velocities behave like classical mechanics say they do (Weidner & Sells (1968, pp. 13-4); Albert (1992, pp. 43-4)). If what I will propose is compatible with classical mechanics as applied to the conditions in which they are known to hold good, then, according to the correspondence principle, relativity and quantum theories should yield the same result within those same conditions. 97 and that the causally relevant relationship between the interacting entities is in a specific sense symmetrical. In other words, contrary to what the standard picture tells us, I suggest that causal production does not just involve an action of an 'agent' upon a patient, but a mutual and in a certain sense equal action of two things upon each other. Further, that this mutual action occurs simultaneously in both directions. In other words, I suggest that interactions are thoroughly reciprocal. Consequently, I suggest that the conception of cause should be modified to encompass the actions of both 'agent' and 'patient' together, i.e. that interactions should count as causes, and that the conception of effect be modified to encompass the changes produced in both 'agent' and 'patient', when they interact. The second part suggest that there is a necessary connection between an interaction and the state produced by the interaction, notably a genetic link between token states of affairs, as opposed to a lawful connection between certain types of actions by 'extrinsic motive agents', and certain types of changes in 'patients'. The idea that the relationship between interacting entities is in a certain sense symmetrical, is not new in philosophy, nor in physics. In classical mechanics, it is generally accepted that interactions between material bodies are reciprocal, i.e. simultaneous, mutual, and with respect to forces quantitatively equal, but not so in philosophy. Among philosophers, Mario Bunge and Wesley Salmon, are two of the very few who have taken interaction seriously. Bunge argues that the reciprocity of material interactions shows that the dichotomy of substances into 'agents' and 'patients', on which the standard picture depends, is ontologically inadequate (1959, p. 149). He draws the conclusion that the standard picture of causality is merely a methodologically useful approximation, but still rejects the idea that interaction provides a better account of causality. He rejects interaction because he thinks it displays the relationship between cause and effect as being symmetrical and therefore cannot possibly involve production of the effect by the cause (1959, p. 162). Salmon, in his attempt to formulate a radically different approach to the problem of causality, suggests that an explication of the concepts of production and propagation is the key to coming to understand the nature of causality. He suggests that production should be explicated in terms of interaction (1980; 1984, Ch. 5-8). I think Bunge is wrong to reject interaction as a possible account of causal production, and I think more needs to be said about the way interactions involve production than is provided by Salmon's analysis. I think philosophers have 98 been prevented from accepting an interaction-model of causality, because the term 'cause' has since long been restricted to what Aristotle called the 'efficient cause'. That is, causes have come to be considered as essentially something external to the changing thing, as if by definition, and that has prevented the thing acted upon from being even considered as a part of the cause, or to be more precise, to consider the interaction of 'agent' and 'patient' as being the cause to the effect. I suggest, somewhat in the vein of the agency view proposed by F.P. Ramsey (1929), R.G. Collingwood (1940), D. Gasking (1955), and G.H. von Wright (1974), that the conception of cause in terms of 'extrinsic motive agent' is biased by our conception of agency. The agency view states that we could not know causality, or could not form the concept of causality, unless we knew from ourselves and our actions what it is to act as a cause. The agency view might then be taken to claim that the concept of efficient cause is derived from our knowledge of ourselves as active agents. This is indeed the view of Evan Fales. Fales accepts Hume's thesis that knowledge of necessity and forces are not given in outer experience, but claims against Hume that knowledge of action and force is given in our inner experiences of the effort exercised by our bodies (1990, pp. 11-14). The question is: to what extent does our nature as intentional agents, with all the cognitive capacities we have, memory, prediction, etc., bias our view of the objective workings of causality in the world of inanimate material objects? Is our conception of ourselves as 'efficient causes' really applicable to how changes are produced in inanimate material objects by other inanimate material objects? I think not, but I also think that it is possible to abstract the component of intention from our notion of efficient cause, to derive a more objective notion. Some further comments on my approach to the issue of causality will, I think, be helpful to the reader. Firstly, my intention here is not to defend the thesis that causal production is an objective feature of reality against those who deny its reality.10 I take the reality for granted. I want to present a new analysis of causal production which I think can be given considerable empirical support, and which tries to make sense of the idea of a necessary connection between causes and their effects. I nevertheless hope that my analysis will be interesting not only to those that already agree that there is such a thing as necessary causal production, but also to those that have rejected its reality because they have 10 For critiques of the Humean view of causality, according to which causation is merely a correlation between types of events, see Bunge (1959, Ch. 3), and Armstrong (1983, part 1). 99 found the standard picture of causal production inadequate. I hope they will find reasons to at least reconsider their position. Secondly, I am not trying to work out a concept of causal production that will encompass all logically possible alternatives. That is, I am not arguing that the idea of a deity creating the world out of nothing by an act of will is logically incoherent in itself, just as it is not logically impossible that things just emerge out of thin air, that fortune tellers really see the future, or that telepathy is real. I just do not see that there is any reason to consider such logical possibilities in one's theory of causality. There is no clear empirical evidence to the effect that anything has ever been created by an act of divine will, or emerged out of thin air, and even if empirical evidence was found to support e.g. creatio ex nihilo by a deity, this would only call for a need to distinguish between natural causation and supernatural causation. I argue under the assumption that it is the primary role of a metaphysical theory of causality to explain the de facto nature of causality as it appears in this world, not of every conceivable world, and therefore I restrict the scope of my discussion of causality to production of natural effects by natural causes. Here I find myself to be in perfect agreement with what Sally Haslanger says about the relation between metaphysics and rational explanation in (1989). Thirdly, I take myself to be suggesting a crude picture of a novel alternative within the realm of classical mechanics, rather than presenting a fully developed theory of causality. Therefore, I will not be too much concerned with establishing the universal validity of my account. To repeat, since I am not a physicist, nor a philosopher of physics, I cannot discuss whether my suggestion is compatible with, or refuted by, relativity and quantum theories of physics, which deal respectively with the extremely big and fast moving, and the extremely small entities in the universe. 2. Causal production: a relation or a process ? There is a tension between the standard picture of causal production, as I have presented it above, and what I take to be the received view in philosophy today, namely the view that causation is primarily a relation between temporally distinct events. The standard picture depicts the relation between cause and effect as a product of a more fundamental process, the action of something on something else. Of course, the standard picture does not deny that temporally distinct events are causally related, but it does depict those relations as something that comes into being as a result of a more fundamental process, causal production. The standard picture is an attempt to reconcile the idea that 100 causality involves a relation between two temporally distinct events with the ideas: (i) that the former event brings the latter into existence, i.e. produces it in accordance with the genetic principle, and (ii) that this production involves some sort of action of something on something else. It is impossible to puzzle these ideas together with only a cause, an effect, and a relation between them as components, if only for the simple reason that the cause cannot produce the effect by acting on it. If the effect only comes into existence by being produced by the cause, i.e. by the action of the 'efficient cause', the effect cannot be subject to the very same action that is supposed to produce it. This would require that the effect already existed when it is acted upon, and could therefore not have been produced by that very same action. Some account of what acts upon what is required, in order to introduce action into causality, and the cause and effect, construed as 'the event which produces' and 'the event produced' respectively, cannot be those things. So, if causation involves production through action of something on something else, the relation between cause and effect cannot be the most fundamental aspect of causality. On the standard picture, it is the things involved in the events that act upon each other, and thereby produce a change, i.e. an effect. The standard picture implicitly depicts the relation between cause and effect as being itself a product of causation. The relation only comes into being as a result of the production of the effect. On this account, the so-called 'causal relation' is not causal in the sense that it is a relation that causes anything, but in the sense that it comes into being as a result of causal production. This is important, because it implies that the nature of causal production is not available by analysis of causal relations, considered as accomplished feats. The relations must themselves be considered as 'products' of the process to be investigated, and it is the investigation of the process that will explain the relation, and not vice versa. The question is, what kind of process produces the causal relation by way of producing the relata on the other end of the relation? According to the standard picture it is the 'extrinsic motive agent' that produces the effect by acting on the 'patient', i.e. some given state of affairs. The peculiar kind of asymmetry involved in the causal relation, when causation is assumed to involve production, is not in general recognised by philosophers. Bunge is one notable exception. Asymmetrical relations, e.g. larger than, are determined by the characteristics of both relata, but the relation between cause and effect, in terms of 'producer' and 'product', is one-sided in the sense that only one of the relata, the cause, is assumed to determine the relation between the cause and its effect, by being what brings the other end of 101 the relation into existence; the relation comes into existence with the production of the effect. The relation between cause and effect is thus asymmetrical, or unidirectional, in the sense that the existence of the effect is entirely determined by the cause alone. The effect does not exist until the production is finished, and so cannot have any part in the actual producing. We may then say that the conception of effects as being produced by a cause implies that there is a relation of one-sided existential dependence between cause and effect, i.e. e because of c but not vice versa, but also that production cannot be reduced to a dependence relation of that kind.11 3. Causal production as Interaction On the macro level, paradigmatic examples of causation involve the action of things upon other things, e.g. when a window is broken by being hit by a brick. According to the standard picture, it is the action of the brick upon the window that produces the breaking of the window. What is meant by 'action' requires some comment. Here it is intended to mean 'influence exerted by one object upon another', but this may not conform to all uses of the term. Actions of intentional agents are typically composed of a movement of the limbs, performed with the intention to achieve a certain goal, e.g. when a tennis player swings his racket to return a ball. We may use the terms 'striking the ball' as a description of the whole swing. But, the swing is strictly speaking only in part an action upon the ball. It is only when the racket comes into contact with the ball that it has any influence on it. We may unreflectively think of the whole movement as an action upon the ball, because the swing is initiated and guided by the intention to strike the ball. I suspect, that in an unreflective stance one may be prone to think of the way inanimate objects act on each other in a similar way, e.g. to think of the movement of a brick, prior to its collision with a window, as a part of its 'action' upon the window. But, of course, prior to actually touching the window, the brick exerts no influence upon it. Does the brick even act at all prior to its encounter with the window? After all, to be in movement is not in itself an action, not if one is to take the law of inertia seriously, which says that material bodies continue in their motion in the absence of forces. A moving object, unaffected by anything else, continues in its motion without having to 'do' anything about it. At the very least, that kind of motion is not an action of the moving thing upon any other thing. In a sense, non-accelerating motion is really a state, a state of motion. We may say that the 11 For an attempt to further explicate the concept of existential dependence, see Eugenie Ginsberg's paper (1931), with an introduction by Peter Simons. 102 stone we threw, 'flies through the air', as if it was performing a miraculous stunt, but of course this is just a figure of speech. So, when considering a brick acting on a window, we can only consider as an action the actual influence of the brick upon the window, and that influence only begins when they come into contact with each other. One should also avoid confusing 'action', as used here, with the definition denoted by the term 'action' in classical mechanics. In mechanics, 'action' denotes the time integral of the kinetic energy of a material object, as taken between two times. On this account, an action is the summation of the kinetic energy of an object existing at different times, whether that object influences anything else or not. This may allow talk of pure motion as an 'action', but as Heinrich Hertz observed: the name 'action' for the integral in the text has often been condemned as unsuitable[...] these names suggest conceptions which have nothing to do with the objects they denote [in mechanics, RI]. It is difficult to see how the summation of the energies existing at different times could yield anything else than a quantity for calculation[...] (1956, p. 228) Let us then return to our example, and point out that whenever a brick hits a window, the breaking of the window is not the only change resulting from the interaction. At the same time as the window breaks, the brick loses velocity, momentum and kinetic energy; it drops flat to the ground. It does this because of the resistance offered by the window, and this resistance is called a 'reaction'. In fact, whenever anything acts upon anything else, that thing always suffers a change in itself, because the thing acted upon always reacts to the action. When a brick collides with a window, the window breaks, and the brick loses momentum and velocity. In other words, what is often conceived to be an action of one thing upon another thing, is really an interaction between the things. There are some possible confusions, due to ordinary language use, that must be sorted out here. The first is, that sometimes the term 'interaction' is used about communication, where the communicating entities take turns at affecting each other, e.g. in conversation, or, to use a somewhat construed example of communication, when I slap you in the face and you slap back. This kind of interaction is not being discussed here. What is being discussed here is the collision between hand and face; between brick and window. The second is that sometimes, e.g. in the 'communicative' situations mentioned, 'reaction' is used for the ensuing response to some event, e.g. when someone 'reacts' to a slap in the face by slapping back. In this use, 'reaction' is used more or less as equivalent to 'effect'. But, by 'reaction' I mean the physical resistance immediately offered by a thing when it encounters another thing, e.g. the 103 resistance offered by the face being slapped, or by the window being hit by a brick. That is, the breaking of the window is not a reaction, in this sense, but an effect; it is the resistance offered by the window before it breaks that is a reaction. In the same way, the pain, or humiliation, or anger, of being slapped in the face, is not a reaction, but an effect. It is the immediate resistance offered by the face to the hand that slapped it, that is a reaction, and this is a reaction that can be felt in the hand of the person that did the slapping, and may feel as painful as a slap in the face. In what follows, the most important points of the argumentation will be presented in the form of numbered proposals, for the sake of clarity, at the end of my argumentation for that particular point. The argumentation will then continue assuming the truth of that proposal. The first proposal will be the lesson already described, and taught by classical mechanics, that whenever a material thing acts upon another thing, the thing acted upon reacts to that action: P 1: There are no actions without reactions. The reaction of the thing acted upon, and the change suffered by the thing acting on it, are often neglected in discussions about causality. And yet it has been noted that the fact that there is always a reaction seriously threatens the standard picture of causality: A severe shortcoming of the strict doctrine of causality is that it disregards the fact that all known actions are accompanied or followed by reactions, that is, that the effect always reacts back on the input unless the latter has ceased to exist [...] In other words, the polarization of interaction into cause and effect, and the correlative polarization of interacting objects into agents and patients, is ontologically inadequate[...] (Bunge 1959, pp. 170-1). The existence of a reaction undermines the standard picture because it shows that there are no strictly passive substances, i.e. substances who only receive influence but do not themselves influence other things, nor are there substances who influence other things without being themselves affected in any way. It threatens the supposed unidirectionality of actions. It is clear that the standard picture needs to be modified in order to include the reaction of the 'patient', although it is still unclear whether this changes anything much, since it is still possible to hold that the reaction is only an effect of the action. That is, even if it is admitted that there are no actions without a reaction, then it can be argued that the reaction itself is produced, or provoked, by the action, and therefore counts as part of the effect produced by the action. Let us be very clear on this modified picture. When a brick collides with a window, there is supposed to be an action on behalf of the brick upon the 104 window, a reaction on behalf of the window upon the brick, and there are the two changes in the two things: (i) the breaking of the window, and (ii) the loss of momentum and velocity by the brick. The question is, does the action of the brick, produce the reaction in the window, and so in effect produce both the breaking of the window and the loss of momentum and velocity in the brick itself? The action of the 'agent' has been considered to have causal priority mainly for two different but interrelated reasons: (i) because it has been assumed that there is a distinction to be made between active and passive substances, and (ii) because the action has been thought to be temporally prior to the reaction. Now, the first reason partly depends upon the second, at least when it has been pointed out that there are no genuinely 'passive' substances, i.e. substances that merely receive influence, but do not themselves influence other things. Ultimately the causal priority of actions over reactions depends on showing that the action is in some way temporally prior to the reaction, either because the action begins prior to the actual encounter, or because the reaction is temporally retarded in relation to the encounter. The first possibility requires us to treat the motion of the 'agent', prior to the encounter, as part of its action upon the 'patient', and this, as I argued above, is to see it acting with a purpose, a purpose inanimate objects are incapable of having. Whatever a motion through space is, it is something different than the influence exerted by a thing upon another when they encounter one another. The second possibility requires that the thing acted upon initially 'gives way' to the intrusion of the other, without offering any resistance. Perhaps like a rubber band initially offers little or no resistance when it is stretched, but successively the resistance increases. This way of thinking of the relationship between action and reaction may have some appeal when considering a rigid object in motion colliding with a soft, elastic body at rest, but none when considering a soft elastic body in motion colliding with a rigid body at rest. In the latter case it is obvious that the resting body resists the moving body from the first instant they gain contact with each other. And, on closer inspection, the former example is not as convincing as it may first appear to be. In order for the reaction to be temporally retarded, it is not enough that it is initially very small, but must be entirely absent, because if the reaction is initially very small, so is the action. It requires no large effort to make an impression in a pillow. We may perhaps not acquire decisive answers on this issue, by considering common-sense examples. What, then, does science tells us about the relationship between action and reaction? According to classical mechanics, 105 which is that part of physics that deals with the collisions of middle-sized material things, the reaction is always equal to the action, and occurs simultaneously in the opposite direction. This relationship is expressed in Newton's third law of motion, which says that the force by which object 1 acts on object 2 is equal to the oppositely directed force by which object 2 acts on object 1: F1 2 = F2 1 Classical mechanics depicts the action and reaction as being thoroughly reciprocal. Action and reaction, or force and counterforce, as they are also called, are reciprocal "in the sense that we are free to consider either of them as the force or the counterforce" (Hertz 1956, p. 185). Now, firstly, if classical mechanics would have found that the reaction was temporally retarded in relation to the action, it could not consider them to be reciprocal in this sense. Secondly, classical mechanics does not consider interactions as being composed of ontologically different kinds of influences, an 'action' and a 'reaction', of which one kind is only a response to the other. In mechanics, the terms 'action' and 'reaction' are indeed considered only to reflect the subjective aspect under which the scientist considers the interacting objects, i.e. as depending on which changes the scientist is interested in; the changes in the window, or the changes in the brick. This point comes out clearly in a passage by Maxwell: The mutual action between two portions of matter receives different names according to the aspect under which it is studied, and this aspect depends on the extent of the material system which forms the subject of our attention. If we take into account the whole phenomenon of the action between the two portions of matter, we call it Stress[...]But if[...]we confine our attention to one of the portions of matter, we see, as it were, only one side of the transaction-namely, that which affects the portion of matter under our consideration-and we call this aspect of the phenomenon, with reference to its effect, an External Force acting on that portion of matter. The other aspect of the stress is called the Reaction on the other portion of matter (1877, p. 26-7) In classical mechanics, as paraphrased by Bunge, "physical action and reaction are, then, two aspects of a single phenomenon of reciprocal action."(1959, p. 153). I will now present as the second proposal what classical mechanics takes to be an empirical fact that: P 2: Interactions are thoroughly reciprocal. Bunge is one of the very few philosophers who have acknowledged the ontological significance of the fact that there are no actions without reactions. He takes it to show that the standard picture cannot be anything but an 106 approximation of causality, and yet Bunge rejects the idea that causality could be explained in terms of interaction, "if only for the simple reason that material objects are in a state of flux, so that generally the action has over the reaction the definite 'advantage'-to use an anthropomorphic expression-of priority in time."(1959, p. 162) He adds: The frequent asymmetry of interactions, as well as the fact that processes in which the antecedent disappears altogether cannot be described as interactions (although they involve reactions upon different objects), renders interactionism inadequate as a universal doctrine. Causation cannot be regarded as a particular case of interaction because the latter lacks the essential component of irreversible productivity. (1959, pp. 170-1) To sum up, Bunge has four objections against interaction as a universal doctrine of causality: (i) that when we consider the fact that things are in a state of flux, actions are temporally prior to the reaction, (ii) that interactions are often so asymmetric that the reaction and its effect can be quantitatively neglected, (iii) that some processes, e.g. the spontaneous decay of various kinds of micro-particles, cannot be described as interactions, and (iv) that if the action does not give rise to the reaction then interaction contains no element of productivity, which he, like I, considers an essential component of causality. However, as I hope to show, these objections are really directed against a very different conception of interaction than the one I present here. I will discuss the objections in a different order than they appear above, but begin with the first objection that the action is temporally prior to the action. I am afraid that this objection is based on a mistake, namely of not separating the reaction from the effect. When talking generally about interaction Bunge says that "the effect always reacts back on the input" (1959, p. 170), when discussing gravitational interaction he says that "[e]very change produced by m1 on m2 reacts back on m1" (1959, p. 150), and when discussing the sense in which interactions are reciprocal, he only states that there is a reaction to every action, and that the reaction is equal to the action, but does not say that they occur simultaneously. In fact, he says that every action is accompanied or followed by a reaction (1959, p. 170). Indeed, Bunge's third objection that interaction cannot handle processes where the antecedent ceases to exist, is only intelligible if one assumes that he does identify the reaction with the effect. Bunge uses an example of spontaneous decay of a micro-particle to illustrate his point, notably the conversion of a pion, into a muon with the emission of a neutrino: 107 In this case, the parent particle (π) is unstable; it decays spontaneously (that is, without any known extrinsic cause, though presumably as a result of an inner process)[...]This is an irreversible, typically genetic process, the thing furthest from interaction–despite which meson theories usually treat this process as if it were a mutual action between coexistents. More exactly, the parent-child connection existing between the pion and its descendants is described as an interaction eliciting that very transition–despite the fact that the products are not yet born. (1959, p. 163) If the muon and neutrino are 'products' of the decay of the pion, Bunge argues, then there cannot be talk of interaction between them and the pion. There cannot be an action by the pion on the products since they are 'not yet born', nor a reaction from the products on the 'parent particle' since it no longer exists. Note that Bunge does not object to the possibility of products reacting back on what produced them, but only to the possibility of such reaction in cases where the 'producer' ceases to exist in the process of producing the effect. I agree that the decay cannot be described as an interaction between the pion and its descendants, but for the simple reason that I do not think that interactions occur between the product and the producer. I think that the example is really a worse anomaly for the standard view, than it is for the interaction-view I present. If the decay is spontaneous, in the sense that there is no external cause to it, then it cannot be considered as a case of causation at all on the standard picture, because this picture defines causes as being external to the changing entity. On the standard view, if there is no external cause to the decay, and the possibility that the product of the decay reacts back on its own production is excluded, then we are dealing with a spontaneous event; an uncaused change. In that case the example really falls outside the category of phenomena being discussed, namely causal production. However, if the decay is a result of an inner process, as Bunge suggests, then it can possibly be treated as a product of an interaction between the parts of the unstable pion that become the muon and neutrino respectively. This would however require that the pion be treated as a compound substance, which is an issue best left to physicists to answer. What matters here is, firstly, that Bunge identifies the reaction with the effect and therefore thinks that if the 'agent' ceases to exist in the process of producing the effect, then there is nothing for the effect to react back on. Secondly, he cannot see a process internal to the pion as being the cause to its decay, because he restricts the meaning of the term cause to 'extrinsic motive agent': 108 Efficient causes are, by definition, extrinsic determinants[...] As understood in modern times, causal determinism asserts the universal operation of efficient causation. Now, by definition, of all kinds of cause, the efficient cause is the motive or active one‚ it is, moreover, an agent acting on things ab extrinseco and one that cannot act on itself. The efficient cause is, in short, an external compulsion‚ hence, an essential mark of (efficient) causation is externality (1959, pp. 173-4).12 It would seem as if the possibility of understanding the inner process of a pion as being the cause to its decay, require us to reject entirely the idea that efficient causation involves external compulsion, but I think this would be an exaggeration. Even on the interaction model, efficient causation involves external compulsion, namely the external and reciprocal compulsion that interacting things exert on each other. A brick is of course external to the window, and vice versa, but sometimes, an interaction may take place between the parts of a unity, producing the destruction of the unity. The interaction is then internal to the unity that is destroyed, but nevertheless involves external compulsion, namely the compulsion that the parts of the unity exert on each other. Interaction is not incompatible with the notion of external compulsion, it just does not identify the notion of 'cause' with external compulsion. Interaction requires that the notion of 'cause' as meaning the unique producer of a change, must be separated from the notion of external compulsion, because there cannot be a compulsion without a 'countercompulsion'. Let us now turn to Bunge's second objection, that interactions are often so asymmetrical that the reaction can be neglected. This objection is really an argument in favour of the standard picture, not an objection to interaction, i.e. it is a justification of the application of what Bunge calls the causal approximation. He makes a point of the fact that interacting things always affect each other mutually with equal force, but then points out that when there are large quantitative differences between the things, the larger thing will hardly be affected at all by the interaction. Bunge uses gravitation, which is both considered to be a paradigm of causality and thoroughly reciprocal, to illustrate his point: "Only if one of the masses is much smaller than the other (for example, a stone as compared with the whole Earth), can the greater mass be regarded as the cause of the acceleration of the smaller one, and the reaction of the latter's motion be quantitatively neglected" (1959, p. 150).13 That is, even 12 Bunge notes that external causes are insufficient to determine all kinds of changes, but he does not take it to imply that there is anything wrong with the thesis that causes are essentially external to the changing thing. Rather, he takes it to show that causality is but an approximation. 13 Note again, that Bunge does not distinguish clearly between reaction and effect. 109 though the interaction really is reciprocal, then sometimes the effect produced by the reaction is so small that it can be neglected, and the interaction be treated as being approximately causal in the standard sense. Bunge argues that "[i]n some cases this involves no error at all" (1959, p. 150). It is justified to ask: according to which standards is the reaction negligible? The answer is 'in accordance with the explanatory interests of the observer': "by a suitable choice of the reference system (change from laboratory system to center-of-mass system) [...] an interaction problem is thereby transformed into an ideal causal problem" (1959, p. 151).14 That is, Bunge argues that when the effect on one of the things is for all practical purposes negligible, then we are methodologically justified to do the kind of aspect-shift that Maxwell described so well, i.e. sometimes we are justified to neglect those aspects of reality that we have no explanatory interest in. I will not argue that the application of the standard picture is not methodologically justified in many or most cases in scientific practice. I think Bunge does satisfactorily argue that it is so justified, as a useful approximation. But, the fact that interactions can always be approximated to fit the standard picture, by a suitable choice of which effect is to be neglected, is not an ontologically valid argument against interaction. There is clearly a tension between Bunge's ontological and methodological considerations. He makes a point of the ontological inadequacy of the standard picture, regarding the relation between the action and reaction, but he prefers the standard picture, both for its methodological utility in cases where there is a large quantitative difference between the effects produced in an interaction, and because he thinks interaction does not involve production. I have no methodological considerations. I am looking for an ontologically adequate account of causal production, and I think, contrary to Bunge, that interaction does involve production. Bunge's fourth objection, that interaction does not involve production, is the most serious objection to interaction, but it is clear that it is directed against a 14 Bengt Molander also considers briefly the suggestion that the standard conception of causality should be replaced by a conception based on interaction. He dismisses it with the motivation that explanations of what happens in a given system in terms of interaction does not make causal statements of the form 'E because C' about what happens in that system inappropriate or false (1982, pp. 140-3). That is, it will still be true that the brick breaks the window, although at the same time the window causes the brick to lose momentum. This is a motivation I find to be similar to Bunge's reasoning. I would agree with them to the point that causal statements are not inappropriate or false as explanatory statements, in relation to what we want to explain. But it does make the individuation of causes and effects dependent on a subjective choice of reference. 110 completely different conception of interaction than the one I advocate, namely against the view that the relation between cause and effect, then meaning action and reaction, is symmetrical. In Bunge's words: "Let us agree to call interactionism, or functionalism, the view according to which causes and effects must be treated on the same footing, in a symmetrical way excluding both predominant aspects and definitely genetic, hence irreversible, connections." (1959, p. 162) This view, he claims, may be regarded as a "hasty extrapolation of the mechanical principle of the equality of the action and the reaction" (1959, p. 162). Now, I agree that on my view there is not a relation of one-sided existential dependence between the action and reaction, rather a mutual dependence, but I take that to show that the reaction cannot really be an effect, and that the action alone cannot really be a cause. I do not take it to show that there is a symmetrical relation between cause and effect, rather I take it to show that we must re-examine the standard conception of 'cause'. I suggest that by abandoning the idea that causes are essentially what Aristotle called the efficient cause, i.e. something external acting one-sidedly on the changing entity, then it is possible to conceive of the interaction as a whole as the cause, and the change in the compound whole of interacting things as the effect. According to this view, the relation between action and reaction is symmetrical, but it does not follow from this that the relation between the interaction and the change it produces is symmetrical. Indeed I will argue that it is asymmetrical and that the interaction can therefore be considered to be the cause to the change. Bunge completely overlooks this possibility because he considers causes to be by definition external to the changing entity. It is not impossible to conceive of interactions as involving production, when one considers not the reaction as being the product, but the effects produced in the interacting things themselves by their own interaction. It is in fact difficult to conceive of interactions without thinking of them as the production of changes in the interacting things, when, as here, interaction refers to the mutual influence of two things upon each other. The notion of force has always been understood in terms of production of changes. Newton defined it as "an action exerted upon a body in order to change its state, either of rest or of uniform motion in a straight line" (1686, p. 13), and Hertz defined it as "the independently conceived effect which one of two coupled systems[...]exerts upon the motion of the other" (1956, p. 185). If force, meaning the action of one thing upon another, cannot be separated from the changes it produces, then neither can interaction be separated from the production of changes, since an interaction consists in two reciprocal forces. That the forces are reciprocal means that neither can exist 111 without the other, and that, therefore, neither can produce the other. However, together they can produce a new state of affairs. P 3: Interaction involves production. I have so far argued that inanimate material objects cannot be objectively distinguished into 'agents' and 'patient', and thereby that the distinction between causes and effects in terms of 'actions of an agent' and 'changes in a patients', respectively, is ontologically inadequate. It involves a neglect of the reaction of the 'patient' and change produced in the 'agent'.15 The causal production of a state of affairs involves the interaction of things, and this interaction is reciprocal.16 That is, in explaining the causal relation between events, there is always a story to be told about the interaction between the things involved. I do not deny that we often experience interactions as being asymmetrical, but I suggest that this experience of asymmetry is purely subjective. It does appear to be more 'fatal' for a window to be smashed to smithereens than for a brick to lose momentum. But, surely, the sense in which the breaking, or destruction of objects in general, is 'fatal', is a subjective evaluation. Is it perhaps because a smashed window is inconvenient to a house-owner in a way that the loss of momentum by a brick is not, that we attend to the breaking of the window as an 'important' effect of the interaction, while the loss of momentum 15 Someone may find my talk of causes and effects in terms of the action of 'agents' and changes in 'patients' ill fitted to contemporary discussions about causality, where causes are usually formulated in terms of conditions of various sorts. I chose this terminology to avoid confusion with accounts of causality where production has no place. But, I take it that the basic idea behind the polarisation of interacting entities into 'agents' and 'patients', has affinity with the idea behind distinguishing between conditions that are merely necessary, and conditions that are both necessary and sufficient. The idea is that there is some special part of a given state of affairs, whether that part is an object or event, which has an especially important function in the production (or determination) of a subsequent state of affairs. I argue that this idea is mistaken. It may anyhow be pointed out that in terms of conditions, my account comes closest to being compatible with Mackie's analysis of causes in terms of insufficient but necessary parts of a condition which is unnecessary but uniquely sufficient for the effect (INUS condition) (1965). Except, because I think of effects in terms of tokens, not types, and of the genetic link between cause and effect as grounding the necessity of the connection, then I think the 'action' and 'reaction' are each an insufficient but necessary part of an interaction which is necessary and uniquely sufficient for the effect (let me call that an INNS-condition). 16 I am here using 'state of affairs' as the unity of a substance with properties, whether or not the substance is a compound or a simple, and whether or not the compound is an aggregate or unity of substances. For reference, see I. Johansson (1989, Ch. 3). For a recent discussion of the ontology of states of affairs, see E. Runggaldier & C. Kanzian (1998, pp. 198-218). 112 by the brick is a negligible 'side-effect'? If this is the reason, and I think it is, then the experienced asymmetry of the interaction is purely subjective, i.e. dependent on our explanatory interests. To be sure, different things change in different ways when entering into interactions, and these differences can be quite dramatic, but does not justify giving one of the interacting things, e.g. 'the flying brick', the privilege of being the sole producer of the subsequent change, e.g. that the window breaks and that the brick loses momentum and velocity. The objective character of the subsequent state of affairs as a whole is determined jointly, and reciprocally, by all the things involved. I suggest the difference in how things change in interactions is due to differences in the intrinsic properties of the things themselves, not to an asymmetry between the influences they are subject to. Different things change differently when they interact, because they are different, not because of an asymmetry between their respective actions. If it is correct that causal production always involves interaction between coexisting things, then it follows that interaction is ontologically prior to the cause-effect relation believed to hold between temporally distinct events. I think this is something we can observe in our everyday practices, when we reflect upon it. We know we cannot accomplish anything without acting upon things in some way or another, and we always feel their resistance (reaction) when we do. We always suffer a change ourselves when accomplishing a change in something else, but as long as this change is negligible to our purposes, then it will go by unnoticed. It is indeed because we feel the resistance of the things we interact with, that we can adjust the effort we make to their resistance. Our effort is always proportional to their resistance. We also know we value different consequences of interactions in various ways, indeed, different people value the same consequences differently, and we know that the mechanical forces involved have little or nothing to do with their value. A tiny little push on the edge of a cliff can have dramatic consequences, while a full body tackle in the ice-hockey rink does not matter a jot. We even disagree on what is to be considered as the 'agent', i.e. the efficient cause, e.g. in deciding questions of responsibility. That interactions are thoroughly reciprocal, is maybe not intuitively given at first glance, especially when it comes to intentional acts, but I think it is convincing on second reflection in light of everything that has been said.17 17 Perhaps intentional beings could in some sense be examples of 'extrinsic motive agents', in accordance with the standard picture. That is, I am prepared to leave it open whether individuals with the capacity to a) perceive themselves in relation to other objects, b) 113 P 4: Interaction between coexisting objects is ontologically prior to the onesided existential dependence relation between two temporally distinct events. Now, in what sense can a state of affairs produced by an interaction be necessarily connected to the interaction that produced it? Perhaps it is possible to argue that if the character of the interaction is entirely determined by the properties of the interacting things, then the outcome of that interaction is entirely determined by the interaction. On the assumption that properties are universals, then whenever two objects of a certain kind interact in a certain way, the very same kind of effect is always produced. We would then have, in principle, constant and invariable type-type relations, i.e. a necessary connection. I will however argue that there is another kind of necessary connection to be found, a genetic token-token link. Assuming, as I do, what appears to be an empirical fact, that nothing can be produced ex nihilo, then we must consider out of what a new state of affairs is produced. A potter cannot produce pots without clay, factories need raw material out of which they can produce ready products. Without raw material that can be altered into a new shape, nothing can be produced. What is the raw material out of which a new state of affairs is produced, and where does it come from? I propose that a new state of affairs is produced by the interaction of things, out of the very substance those interacting things are made of, i.e. the state which is produced is made of the same substances as were involved in the interaction. It is the same substance that constitutes a window and then a pile of broken glass. It is the same brick that comes flying through the air and then lies in that very pile of broken glass. Since interaction requires at least two things, then the production of a new state of affairs requires an aggregate of things or substances, and we can speak of that aggregate as a compound substance. If the state of affairs produced by have preferences and desires, c) predict various consequences of various actions before they are performed, d) choose the action that is perceived to lead to a desired effect, e) adjust the effort and direction of the action to the reaction of other objects, may perhaps be capable of initiating actions, and not just interact with the environment in the sense described above. This list of capacities is not complete, nor do the distinctions aim to represent logically, or otherwise, independent capacities, but rather interdependent capacities. I just want to make a sharp distinction between how we calculate, and perhaps initiate, our actions in the world, and how physical objects in general actually interact in the course of real events. To what extent intentional actions differ from interactions is beyond the scope of this paper, but I do think our cognitive abilities biases our understanding of the nature of causal production in the world of inanimate material objects. For a recent overview on the topic of mental causation, see Loewer (1998). 114 the interaction is produced out of the substance of the interacting things, then the state of affairs produced by an interaction consist in the very same compound substance as were engaged in the interaction. On this account, the relationship between two different but in this sense causally related states of affairs is necessary in the sense that they are necessarily constituted by the very same compound substance. Causally produced change is then an alteration in the state of a compound substance, brought about by that very substance itself, through the interaction of its aggregate parts. This brings another feature of change into focus, namely that every production of a state of affairs is always at the same time a destruction of an existent state of affairs. The coming into existence of a state of affairs, that does not come into existence out of a state that is destroyed, must be creation ex nihilo. P 5: Two causally related states of affairs are necessarily constituted by the very same compound substance. It might be objected that I am here assuming without argument an endurance view of the persistence of things, as opposed to a perduring view of persistence, but this would be mistaken. That things persist by enduring, as opposed to perduring, is a conclusion of my argument, from the initial premise that causality does in fact involve production. It seems to me that this premise is only compatible with endurance.18 If it were assumed that things persist by having temporal parts, each part being a distinct and independent substantial entity, i.e. by perduring, then I fail to see what could be produced, by what, and out of what.19 If one temporal part of a thing is broken and an earlier part is whole, without the part being whole having changed into being broken, then out of what was the broken part produced? The broken part must either (i) always have existed, in which case it was not produced, (ii) be produced by being brought into reality from outside reality, (iii) be produced out of the substance of the 'agent', in which case a brick would have to be able to change into a pile of glass and the problem would shift to the production of the brick lying in the pile of glass, or (iv) be produced ex nihilo. Indeed most perdurantist would agree and say that since things perdure, there is no production, everything simply exists, albeit at different times. I want to make as good sense as I can of the idea that causality involves production, but reject the possibility of creation ex nihilo, and 18 I have elsewhere argued in greater detail that the notion of causal production requires endurance (2001). 19 Like Haslanger (1989), I have argued that the perdurantist position commits to a Humean interpretation of causality, i.e. to a correlation view of causality, in which production has no place (2001). 115 will then have to conclude that if causality involves production then substances persist by enduring.20 If one is forced to assume that substances persist by enduring, one is arguably also forced to assume that time is tensed. The idea that substances endure through a succession of incompatible states, requires that substances may exists in just one state at a time, and, objectively speaking, cease to exist in the state they change from, when they change into another state. That is, in order for an entity to cease to be in a state and begin to be in another, objectively speaking, that entity must be 'wholly present' at many times in succession, i.e. be at present in one state but in another state in the future. This is a possibility that is denied by the so-called tenseless view of time, which claims that all moments of time are equally existent and real. On the tenseless view, things just appear to exist at different times in succession, when in fact they are at all times equally existent and real at all the times they exist. This view, it is argued, is only compatible with the view that things perdure, i.e. exist at various times by having different temporal parts located at those various times.21 Two states of affairs that are causally related, in the sense given above, will be different states of the very same compound substance, which has changed from one state to the other due to the interaction of its parts. The production of changes cannot then really be construed as involving an external influence on the changing entity (although the parts of that entity act mutually and externally on each other), but to influences internal to a changing compound, or aggregate of substances. That is, on this account, causally produced change is always a change within a system. P 6: Causally produced change is always internal to a compound substance. If causation is the production of a change in an aggregate by the interaction between the coexistent parts of that aggregate, that interaction being considered as the cause to the change, it follows trivially that causes are existentially prior to their effects. The causal production of a new state of affairs, presupposes the existence of an aggregate whose parts interact. On the further assumption that 20 It is widely argued that change per se, not just causally produced change, necessarily requires endurance of the substances involved. For reference see, Aristotle's Metaphysics (Bk. XII, Ch. 2), Haslanger (1989), and Lowe (1998). 21 In (2001), I argue that endurance, tensed time and causal production are essentially linked to one another in what I call the dynamic view of reality, while perdurance, tenseless time and the correlation view of causality essentially belong together in what I call the static view of reality. In that paper I also argue that what has hitherto been considered the most serious objection to the dynamic view, the charge that tensed change in enduring entities is contradictory, is invalid because circular. 116 time is tensed, it follows trivially that interactions always precede their effects in time. P 7: Interactions always precede their effects in time. I must stress that this is an account of causal change that is completely independent of the particular qualitative character of the states of the compound substance before and after the interaction. Surely, what happens in an interaction is determined by the properties of the substances involved, and the way they interact, but my account does not depend on it being the case that any two interactions are exactly alike; my account is compatible with the possibility that every single interaction in the history of the universe is unique. It is also compatible with the possibility that there are general laws, it just does not give a criterion that can be used to identify types of effects that are always and invariably produced by certain types of interactions; that, I think, is a task for empirical science. I have said that I will not defend the reality of causal production against those who deny its reality, and I will not. But, I will point out what I think is an interesting contrast between Hume's account of causality and mine. According to Hume, the objective components of the causal nexus are three: contiguity, succession, and constant conjunction. I have argued that there is also reciprocity between the contiguous objects. I have no qualms with Hume's view that there is no logical necessity in the conjunction of the motion of a billiard ball A and subsequent motion of a billiard ball B, when A and B collide. We are free to think of the collision of A and B as being succeeded by anything whatsoever. We can conceive of A approaching B, and their contact resulting in a third ball C (or whatever object you like) emerging from B. We can even think of ball A simply passing through ball B, without anything happening to B or to A. What we cannot do, or will not do, I submit, is to think of the passing by A through B as being a case of causation, however many times this type of event recurs. Rather, we would think of it as the absence of causality, because, I suggest, it completely lacks any sign of reciprocity. The appearance of reciprocity is present in every instance of causation in the realm of ordinary middle-sized objects. Whether this appearance of reciprocity is explained in terms of production or not, any adequate account of causation will have to be able to account for it. Now there remains to describe the relation between the state destroyed in an interaction and the state produced by that very same interaction. Strictly speaking it is the interaction between the parts of the compound substance that produces a change in the compound from one state to another, the states 117 themselves are always products. That is, the interaction is the process in which the effect is produced. But, I suggest that the relation between any state from which the compound substance changes and the state to which it changes, due to the interaction, nevertheless be characterised as being one of producer to product. Any given state of a substance, although merely a temporary form of the substance, cannot be separated from the substance itself. The state cannot exist without the substance. If, as I have argued, the state to which the compound substance changes, is necessarily constituted by the very same substance as the state from which it changes, then the state to which the compound changes is for its existence dependent on the state from which the compound changes, because the state to which it changes 'inherits' both the substance, and the character, from the state the compound changes from. The temporally distinct states of any such compound, related as producer to product through the interactions of the parts of the compound, will then hold a relation of one-sided existential dependence; the state to which a compound substance changes is for its existence dependent upon the state from which the compound changes, but the state from which it changes is not for its existence dependent upon the state to which it changes. P 8: The state produced by an interaction stands in a relation of one-sided existential dependence to the state destroyed by that very same interaction. That is, on my account, the so-called causal asymmetry between a cause and an effect, i.e. why it does not follow from 'x caused y', that 'y caused x', can be given in the following terms: if x produced y, y could not have produced x, because that would have required y to produce x prior to its own production, which is impossible.22 22 I think this is a good time to point out a significant difference between my view and the perspectival view advocated by Huw Price (1996), who also argues that the standard picture of causality is biased by agency. I argue that the relation between interacting entities should be considered to be symmetrical, but the relation between the interaction and the state it produces as asymmetrical. Price argues that the relation between earlier and later stages of a process hold a symmetrical relation, i.e. he argues that the state which a system appears to have changed from, and the state which it appears to have changed to, when its parts interact, really hold a symmetrical relation. Price's argument is based on the fact that the mathematical formulations of the laws of nature in physics are time invariant. That is, because it makes no difference to exchange the time variable t, with its contrary -t, in the fundamental laws of physics, any process can be described as going either backwards or forwards in time, without violating those laws. Perhaps accounts of causality that rely only on the aspects of lawful connections between types of events in accordance with the laws of physics, will have to accept Price's conclusion, but then, I think, those accounts are incompatible with the conception of causality as involving production. If the relation between two states of one and the same system is symmetrical, neither could have produced the other. Admittedly, the 118 4. Conclusion When the asymmetric relation between 'agent' and 'patient' is abandoned, and causal production of change is taken to be the result of reciprocal action between parts of an aggregate (or system), a relation of one-sided existential dependence can be found to hold between the state produced in the aggregate by the interaction of its own parts, and the state destroyed by that same interaction. In other words, the interaction between the parts of a compound substances, destroys a state of affairs at the same time as it produces a new state of affairs, the produced state of affairs being for its existence one-sidedly dependent upon the state that was destroyed. Thus conceived, the two states of affairs may be logically independent, in terms of being of a certain type each, but they cannot be thought to be made of distinct and independent substances. If it is assumed that they are distinct compound substances, then the question out of what they are produced is left unanswered, or it is answered that they were not at all produced, or it is answered that this effect was at least not produced by this cause. I suggest that in order to explain production of changes, and the existential dependence relation between the change and what produced the change, it is necessary to assume that things, or the substance they are made of, persist by enduring. Conversely it means that if endurance is abandoned, production must be abandoned too. Also, if endurance requires time to be tensed, and production requires endurance, then production requires tensed time. When cause and effect are seen to be made of the same substance, it is impossible to think that any particular effect could just as well have been produced by some other cause than it in fact was. Any attempt to think of the effect as having been produced by some other cause, will necessarily involve thinking of it as having been produced out of some altogether different substance, and therefore as being a totally different effect. It is of course possible to think that a certain type of effect could have been produced by a number of different types of causes, or by different token causes of the same type, but not that a particular token effect could have been produced by any other token cause than it in fact was. I hope I have made a good case for the claims that interaction, as I have described it (i) can be conceived to involve production, (ii) involves a necessary connection between an interaction and its product, and (iii) should be taken seriously as a possible hypothesis of the factual nature of causality. It is an genetic principle imposes no special direction to certain types of processes, but it excludes that the relation between two token stages of one and the same causal process is symmetric. 119 hypothesis that fits the components of the common notion of causality, i.e. that causality involves production due to causal influence such that the producer and product hold a relation of one-sided existential dependence, although it combines these components in a somewhat different way than is usual. It also fits certain widely accepted metaphysical principles, i.e. the genetic principle and the principle of lawfulness, but requires that the principle of action be substituted for what may be called the principle of reciprocity. This, I believe is however only a minor modification, and which serves to correct the agency bias of the standard picture. My final suggestion is thus: P 9: Interaction and necessary causal production is the same process In short, my suggestion is that causally produced change is properly described in terms of changes in the state of a compound substance, produced by the interaction between the parts of that substance itself, i.e. that causally produced change is always due to influences internal to the changing entity. Causally related states of affairs are thus different states of the very same substance, one coming to exist out of the other, and that is, I suggest, the kernel of truth behind all talk of a necessary connection between causally related events.23 23 I would like to thank Phil Dowe, Jan Faye, Ingvar Johansson, E.J. Lowe, Jeff Malpas, Johannes Persson, and four anonymous referees, for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper, and those parts of it presented at the Copenhagen Colloquium on Backwards Causation and Time, in december 1999. 120 References: ALBERT, D.Z. (1992), Quantum Mechanics and Experience, Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts. ANSCOMBE, G.E.M. (1971), 'Causality and Determination', in Sosa, E. and Tooley, M. (eds.), Causation, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 88-104, 1993. ARISTOTLE, 'Metaphysics', in Aristotle, vol. XVIII, translated by Tredennick. H., Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, 1935. – 'Physics', in Aristotle vol. IV, translated by Wickstead, P.H., & Cornford, F.M., Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, 1957. ARMSTRONG, D.M. (1983), What is a Law of Nature, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. BUNGE, M. (1959), Causality, Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts. COLLINGWOOD, R.G. (1940), An Essay in Metaphysics, Oxford University Press, Oxford. DILWORTH, C. (1996), The Metaphysics of Science, Klüwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht. FALES, E. (1990), Causation and Universals, Routledge, London. GASKING, D. (1955), 'Causation and Recipes', Mind 64, 479-87. GINSBERG, E. (1931), 'On the Concepts of Existential Dependence and Independence', with an introduction by Simons, P., in Smith, B. (ed.), Parts and Moments: Studies in Logic and Formal Ontology, Philosophia Verlag, München, pp. 261-287, 1982. HASLANGER, S. (1989), 'Persistence, Change, and Explanation', Philosophical Studies 56, 1-28. HERTZ, H. (1956), The Principles of Mechanics, Dover Publications, Inc., New York. INGTHORSSON, R. (2001), 'Temporal Parity and the Problem of Change', Sats-Nordic Journal of Philosophy 2(2), 60-79. JOHANSSON, I. (1989), Ontological Investigations, Routledge, London. LOEWER, B. (1998), 'Mental Causation', in Craig, E. (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy Vol. 6, Routledge, London, pp. 307-11. LOWE, E.J. (1998), The Possibility of Metaphysics, Clarendon Press, Oxford. MACKIE, J. (1965), 'Causes and Conditions', in Sosa, E. and Tooley, M. (eds.), Causation, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 33-55, 1993. MAXWELL, J.C. (1877), Matter and Motion, Dover, New York. 121 MOLANDER, B. (1982), The Order there Is, and the Order We Make, Philosophical Studies No. 35, Philosophical Society and the Department of Philosophy, University of Uppsala, Uppsala. NEWTON, I. (1686), 'Definitions and Scholium', in Newton's Philosophy of Nature, Thayer. H.S. (ed.), Hafner Press, New York, 1953. PRICE, H. (1996), Time's Arrow and Archimedes Point, Oxford University Press, Oxford. RAMSEY, F.P. (1929), 'General Propositions and Causality', in Ramsey, F.P., Philosophical Papers, Mellor, D.H. (ed), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 145-6, 1990. RUNGGALDIER, E., & KANZIAN, C. (1998), Grundprobleme der Analytischen Ontologie, Schöningh, Paderborn. SALMON, W. (1980), 'Causality: Production and Propagation', in Sosa, E. and Tooley, M. (eds.), Causation, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1993, pp. 154-71. – (1984), Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World, Princeton University Press, New Jersey. SOSA, E., & TOOLEY, (1993), M, 'Introduction', in Sosa, E. and Tooley, M. (eds.), Causation, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1993. WEIDNER, R.T., & SELLS, R.L. (1968), Elementary Modern Physics 2nd ed., Allyn & Bacon Inc, Boston. VON WRIGHT (1974), G.H., Causality and Determinism, New York: Columbia University Press. 122 Appendix A CAUSAL ASPECTS OF PERSISTENCE In 'Causal Production as Interaction' the focal point is on the causal aspects of change in persistent entities. I think there is an important point to be made about the causal aspects of the persistence of those changing entities as well. It is sometimes acknowledged that persistence does have causal aspects, but these aspects are not often discussed in any detail. Thus for instance, Jonathan Lowe distinguishes between explaining persistence and saying what persistence consists in, taking the first to be giving a causal explanation of the phenomena, and the latter to say in some revealing way what that phenomena is, to state its 'essence', so to speak (1998, p. 108). Lowe says that perhaps a causal explanation of the persistence of ordinary middle-sized objects may be forthcoming (although not, he suspects, of the persistence of the most fundamental entities in the world), but that he will focus on a discussion about the essential features of persistence, i.e. on what persistence consists in. I will however discuss the possibility of giving a causal explanation of the persistence of middle-sized objects, in light of the interaction account of causality presented in 'Causal Production as Interaction'. I think that the idea that causality is basically a matter of interaction between coexistent entities, allows us to give a causal explanation of the persistence of middles-sized objects, in a way that is not offered by standard accounts of causality. 1. Persistence as existence at many times In the debate between the proponents of the endurance and perdurance views of persistence, the characterisation 'to exist at different times', is often presented as a theory-neutral description of persistence, i.e. as a description that everybody can accept as a point of departure for the debate. Thus David Lewis writes: [...]something persists iff, somehow or other, it exists at various times; this is the neutral word. Something perdures iff it persists by having different temporal[...]stages at different times[...]it endures iff it persists by being wholly present at more than one time. (1986, p. 202) But, a point of departure does not just determine where the debate starts from, it also indicates where the debate ends. A theory-neutral description of a phenomena, like the one proposed by Lewis, sets conditions of adequacy for any answer that might be given, i.e. it does not just state the problem, it also indicates what will count as an adequate answer. The conditions set by Lewis' 124 description says that any answer explaining what the existence of things at different times consists in, will be adequate explanations of persistence, unless shown to be contradictory, or otherwise faulty. Now, I take it to be generally accepted that the perdurance view is an intelligible account of how things can be conceived to exist at different times, and of how things can be conceived to have different properties at those different times, namely by being composed of temporal parts that exist at different times and that have different properties. It is nevertheless disputed whether this sense of existing at different times and having different properties at those different times really captures the true nature of persistence and change. The objection is that it lacks the component of strict identity of some entity x, existing at the different times, and of objective gain/loss of properties by that entity. It seems then that perdurance theories satisfies the conditions of adequacy set by the allegedly theory-neutral description of persistence and change, and yet endurantists find reasons to deny that perdurance captures the essence of persistence and change. This indicates that endurantists have other conditions of adequacy, not contained in Lewis' presumed theory-neutral formulation, and consequently an altogether different point of departure for the debate. I think endurantist must deny that persistence is simply a matter of existence at various times. The proponents of endurance and perdurance do not just disagree about the solution to the problem, but also about what the problem is. The perdurance view is a solution to what Lewis calls the problem of temporary intrinsics (1986, pp. 202ff), i.e. what he thinks is a contradiction inherent in the endurance view of persistence, and which then requires a new account of what persistence consists in. That is, he thinks this contradiction requires us to reconsider what the essence of persistence really is. The problem facing endurantists is not to solve the problem of temporary intrinsics by giving a new account of persistence, but to show that the problem of temporary intrinsics is a pseudoproblem. In 'Temporal Parity and the Problem of Change', I discuss why I think the problem of temporary intrinsics is a pseudo-problem. Here I want to suggest a more complex endurance view of persistence. I will suggest that one important aspect is very much neglected in the discussion about the objective nature of persistence, namely that the persistence of compound entities, as opposed to the persistence of simple substances, is a product of causal interactions, in much the same way as changes are the product of interactions. 125 2. The causal component of persistence Is persistence really just a relation between things and the positions they exist 'at' in a temporal dimension, as Lewis' suggestion seems to imply? Is the problem of persistence merely a question of whether things are temporal simples that hold a one-to-many relation to times as endurantists suggest, or whether things are temporal compounds whose parts hold a one-to-one relation to times? I think not. In the following I will present some common sense reasons for the claim that the persistence of ordinary middle-sized objects is thoroughly causal, and discuss how the causal aspects of their persistence can be accounted for in terms of interaction. Let us examine paradigmatic examples of persistent entities, i.e. of material middle-sized things and persons. Some things, and some persons, persist longer than others. The pyramids have persisted for over 5000 years, without maintenance, while an automobile may last for 20 years, with good maintenance. Some persons live to a ripe old age while others die 'before their time'. The difference between 'long-lived' and 'short-lived' entities does not appear to be just a matter of their factual existence for long or short periods of time, or whether their existence during that period consists in a one-to-many relation between the thing and the times it exist at, or a one-to-one relation between the parts of the thing to the times those parts exist at. Their persistence appears to be determined by the causal interactions they participate in and by their ability to survive (persist through) those interactions. The question is, can we make sense of their persistence in causal terms? Bohemian crystal is fragile, but if handled carefully it may last for centuries. A glass of Bohemian crystal may even persist longer than a bronze statue, which is of a much more sturdy nature. The fact that a particular crystal glass happens to 'outlive' a particular bronze statue does not make the crystal 'more persistent' than the statue. A bronze statue normally lasts for centuries, even when handled roughly, while crystal glasses need careful handling to last that long. However, a newly cast bronze statue may be destroyed in any number of ways, e.g. during war times. In fact, neither the existence of pieces of crystal, or of bronze, come to an end unless being causally influenced to do so. The persistence of these things is partly due to their ability to resist causal influences that work towards their destruction, i.e. their ability to persist through changes, and partly in the absence of such causal influence. Normally, a crystal glass will not last as long as a bronze statue because it is fragile and often handled carelessly. But, when handled carefully it may nevertheless last longer than a less fortunate bronze statue. In that case, the particular piece of crystal lasts longer despite its fragile 126 nature because of the absence of causal influence that might have resulted in its breaking. In the case of inanimate material objects, like crystal and bronze statues, their persistence is usually explained by the absence of external causal influence. They last as long as nothing external to them causes their destruction. Biological creatures, on the other hand, naturally cease to exist because of the inevitable failure to maintain their own organic structure due to internal degenerative processes, i.e. what we call dying of sickness or old age. Obviously, biological creatures also cease to exist because of external influence, e.g. when killed by being hit by a foreign object, but we do tend to treat such ends as 'unnatural'. It is considered natural for pyramids to be worn down by wind, water, and earthquakes, i.e. by influences external to the pyramid, while it is natural for animals to die because of old age and/or sickness, i.e. influences internal to the animal. I think both kinds of destruction are causal, and both kinds are really at work in all compound objects. Inanimate objects, like statues of bronze and pieces of crystal, do not cease to exist only due to external influence. They are also subject to internal degenerative processes, i.e. interactions between their component parts. Such intrinsic degenerative processes are just more outspoken in biological creatures than in 'dead' matter, although even here there are large variations between different kinds of material substances. Gold is an extremely stable element while iron is less so, it rusts. Given enough time, even 'dead' matter falls apart almost by itself, in due course, because of the interaction between its component parts. The spontaneous decay of radioactive matter is the clearest example of that. The persistence of a compound object thus depends upon its ability to maintain its structure despite influences, external and internal, working to destroy that structure. On this account, for a compound object to persist is for that object to continue to exist despite influences working to the contrary. I suggest that some such influence is always at work in every compound object. I believe that it is relevant to distinguish here between persistence of unities, of aggregates, and of simples. Of these three, I think it is only the first that can be given a causal explanation in terms of interaction, but then again it is the persistence of unities like chairs, tables, and persons that are the paradigmatic examples of persistent entities. The persistence of aggregates is not due to an interaction between parts, mainly because aggregates amount to no more than what is called the mereological sum of its parts, i.e. aggregates are a collection of parts that exist independently of one another. The existence of the collection is dependent upon the existence of each and every part, but the existence of the 127 part is not dependent upon the collection. Aggregates are often objects merely by fiat and may cease to exist just because one of its parts ceases to be a part of the whole because failing to live up to some subjective identity condition. The aggregate of all the cars now being parked on the parking-lot outside my office, exists as long as all those cars persist and stay in the parking-lot. Those cars form an object only because of my decision to bundle them up with reference to some arbitrarily chosen geographical boundary; the parking-lot. They do not form an object because being united to each other by any kind of bond. When anyone removes a car from the parking-lot, that car leaves those arbitrary boundaries and there is a different aggregate within the boundaries. It is not the same aggregate that has lost one part. We can also imagine a situation where none of the cars is ever removed, in which case the aggregate does not cease to exist until some car rusts apart. In that case the aggregate persists until some of its parts is destroyed. In short, the persistence of aggregates is entirely dependent upon the persistence of the parts, but the persistence of the parts is not dependent upon the persistence of the aggregate. There is, as far as I can tell, no explanation forthcoming to the persistence of aggregates in terms of interaction, other than the explanation of the persistence of the parts of the aggregates, in so far as these parts are compounds. If the parts of an aggregate are simple substances, the persistence of the aggregate cannot at all be explained in terms of interactions, because simples can of course not be explained in terms of the interaction of their parts; they have no parts. The persistence of aggregates and simples cannot then be given a causal explanation. If there are simples, then there are entities that merely have a one-to-many relation to times. As suggested by Lowe (1998, p. 107), such simples may then perhaps be described, by analogy, as persisting because of a kind of 'existential inertia'. I could then add that an aggregate consisting entirely of simple parts could be described in the same way as persisting because of the inertia it lends from the permanent nature of its constituent parts. However, more needs to be said about the way unities persist. Of course, the persistence of a unity partly consists in the fact that its fundamental parts have 'existential inertia', but this 'existential inertia' does not explain why the parts continue to be parts of the unity. It is the survival of unities, like tables and persons, which I think can be given a causal explanation when one conceives of causality in terms of interaction. Ordinary middle-sized objects are compound substances whose structure is upheld through the interaction of their parts. A brick is a unity of parts and it can in turn be a part of an aggregate whose parts interact, e.g. when 128 the brick collides with a window. In this example, the unity of the brick is preserved but the unity of the window is destroyed. In 'Causal Production as Interaction' I maintain that the aggregate whole of brick and window also persist through an interaction, but this is not something it does because of the interaction, rather in spite of the interaction. The aggregate whole persists because of the 'existential inertia' it lends from the simple substances that are its fundamental parts. Whether any unity contained in that aggregate survives as well, is decided by how well the unity succeeds in preserving its structure. It should be noted, to avoid confusion, that I am now discussing under the assumption that to persist is to endure. It is mostly middle-sized objects that we think of as enduring entities, but I think it is fitting to use the term also for the persistence of aggregate wholes, when, as here, the term 'endurance' is used in contrast to the notion of perdurance. The endurance vs. perdurance dispute is not primarily a question about what kind of things endure and what kind of things perdure. It is a dispute about whether persistent objects have to have temporal parts or not. Once that issue is settled, if it ever will, the terms endurance and perdurance could be dropped. But, until the dispute about whether persistence involves endurance or perdurance is settled, one may speak of aggregate wholes as enduring just as one speaks about unities as enduring things. The idea that there are causal aspects to persistence is not new, but discussions about the those causal aspects are rare. I think they may have been neglected because standard accounts of causality do not offer a natural way of thinking of persistence in causal terms. Causes are typically conceived in terms of 'extrinsic motive agents' acting on a given thing. A causal explanation of persistence in those terms would require an external cause to the persistence of things, and normally we find no such external factors. The external factors we do find are not factors contributing to the persistence of the thing, but to the destruction of it. On another popular account, causality is taken to be a relation between two events without explicit mention of an 'extrinsic motive agent'. A causal explanation of persistence in those terms require that we conceive of the persisting thing as consisting in a series of events, each event being the cause to the next. As I will discuss further in Appendix B, this is the view of Peter Simons (2000a). He points out that the persistence of things seems to be dependent on the processes taking place in the thing, but he takes this to show that we should think of enduring things as dependent on a base of events, whose temporal parts have a causal relation. In other words, Simons thinks that persistence is causal, but because he presupposes the view that causation is basically a two place 129 relation between distinct events then he thinks that persistent objects must really be constituted by a series of events. I will not add anything further at this point to why I reject these accounts of causality. A less easily categorised view can be found in the works of Wesley Salmon. Salmon does not himself explicitly discuss persistence, but he suggests that causality really involves two different but interrelated components: (i) the production of changes through the interaction of processes, and (ii) the propagation of causal influence by causal processes in the absence of interactions (1984, Ch. 5). The latter component should, I think, be considered to correspond to what substance ontologists call persistence. Salmon's account is thoroughly embedded in a process ontology, which may invite misunderstanding by those substance ontologists who assume that talk of processes commits to an event ontology, i.e. the view that the world is fundamentally constituted by a series of very briefly existing events related as cause and effect. Salmon makes no serious attempt to define what a process is, fundamentally, but offers some examples and points to some essential characteristics. And, he denies that to think of the world as being constituted by processes commits to an event ontology (1984, p. 140).1 By a causal process, Salmon means whatever conserves its structure in the absence of causal interactions, like baseballs and windows remain the same unless caused to change, i.e. the term 'causal process' refers to what substance ontologists call 'things'. But, it could also be applied to simple substances, provided we think of them as entities that conserve their structure. To say that they conserve their structure may appear to be a contradiction in terms, since they are supposedly simple. However, to say that they are simple does not mean that they have no complexity, it just says that they have no parts. A simple can both have extension and colour, which gives it a complexity in aspect. I for one think that if there exist simples, they must in any case have the capacity to interact with other simples in order to be able to constitute compounds. This is a capacity they can preserve. Processes, on Salmons account, are causal. Not by consisting of a series of events related as cause and effect, but by having causal powers in very much the same way as things have inertial mass and velocity, and in the way simples may be thought to have the capacity to interact. These processes are able to conserve their structure and thereby of course their causal powers, if they do not interact with any other processes. In the same way, things continue to exist and preserve their inertial mass as long as nothing causes their destruction or loss of inertial 1 For a recent overview on the issue of processes, see Griffin (1998) 130 mass. This is the essence of the analogy between 'existential inertia' and 'inertia' mentioned earlier. By being able to conserve their structure, processes propagate causal influence from one interaction to another, like a baseball propagates the causal influence it is subject to when hit by a batsman, to when it breaks the window it encounters. To sum up. I take Salmon to be saying that things persist unchanged between interactions, and that persistence has a causal aspect in that it is by persisting, i.e. conserving their structure, that things transfer causal influence between interactions. Because a baseball can conserve the change in its causal powers produced in it by its interaction with a baseball-bat, the ball can later break a window it encounters. On Salmon's account, even the continuing to exist in the absence of interactions is causal, even though in a somewhat different sense than I am proposing, namely by grounding the causal relation between temporally distinct interactions. As I have said, processes need not be a series of very short-lived entities. Simples can be thought of as processes, and compounds can be thought of as a structure of simples which conserves this structure by some kind of activity. This, I think, is the main difference between what could be called process-talk and traditional substance-talk, namely that 'process' and 'propagation of causal influence' have associations to some kind of activity, while 'substance' and 'possession of different properties at different times' depict persistent things as something passive. I think Salmon is right to think of persistence as a process, but I think his account leaves the question unanswered in what way things are processes. The conception of a process implies some kind of activity. Therefore to think of persistence as a kind of process that preserves a structure, implies that it is by way of some kind of activity that this structure is preserved. But Salmon makes no attempt to clarify further the nature of this activity that conserves its own structure. I think it is possible to give a substance-ontological account of processes, i.e. as consisting in an interaction of substantial parts, and I think Salmon is wrong to think that the distinction between change and persistence is a matter of interaction vs. absence of interactions. Salmon's account describes the lifetime of a process as consisting in a series of interactions divided by periods where interactions are absent. That is, first a ball interacts with a bat, then it 'propagates causal influence' between its interaction with the bat until it interacts with a window. The period in which the ball propagates causal influence is, on Salmon's account, devoid of interactions. But, the lifetime of the ball can only be so divided into distinct phases of 131 interaction vs. absence of interactions by neglecting the interaction between the ball and the air it flies through on its way from bat to window. Even if we would think of the ball as being hit by an astronaut out in empty space, we would have to disregard the gravitational interaction between the ball and surrounding objects in order to divide its lifetime into distinct phases of interaction vs. propagation, i.e. of interactions vs. absence of interactions. And, even if we could construe an example where the thing was, in theory, unaffected by anything external to it, then we could only divide its lifetime into distinct phases of interaction vs. propagation by neglecting the interaction that takes place between the component parts of the ball itself. It is only if we would think of a 'free' simple substance, i.e. a simple that is not a part of any unity, that we would get an entity whose lifetime could be characterised as one in which interactions were absent. I will leave the task of establishing the factual existence of such 'free' simples to the empirical sciences. In any case, both changes in things due to their interaction with other things, and the non-changes in the structure of a thing in the absence of interactions with other things, are essentially causal. It is only when the causal influence internal to a thing is neglected that persistence, or the propagation of causal influence, can be described in terms of the continuing to exist in the absence of causal influence. Unless there actually exist 'free' simple substances, i.e. substances that are not composed of parts and which are themselves not influenced by other substances, there is never an absence of causal influence. The conservation of structure of anything compound is in itself a causal product, due to the interaction between the component parts. The interaction between component parts is of the conserving kind, just as long as it does not result in the destruction of the structure of which the interacting entities are parts. I think, then, that there is something that makes things persist, namely the interaction between their parts. But, I think the persistence of any compound unity, e.g. ordinary middle sized things, depends as well upon the existential inertia of the substances which are its parts. Like Aristotle (Metaphysics, Bk. 12, Ch. 2), I think that in order to provide an explanation of change we must assume that the world fundamentally consists in a permanent matter substratum. References ARISTOTLE (Metaphysics), in Aristotle, Vol. XVIII, trans. Tredennick. H., Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1935. GRIFFIN, D.R. (1998), 'Process Philosophy', in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, E. Craig (ed.), London: Routledge, pp. 711–20. 132 LEWIS, D. (1986), On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. LOWE, E.J. (1998), The Possibility of Metaphysics. Oxford: Clarendon Press. SALMON, W. (1984), Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World, Princeton: Princeton University Press. SIMONS, P. (2000a), 'Continuants and Occurrents', The Aristotelian Society, Supp(74): 59–75. Appendix B CAN THINGS ENDURE IN TENSELESS TIME? In 'Temporal Parity and the Problem of Change', I argue that the tenseless view is committed to a perdurance view of persistence, but I do not discuss in any detail the arguments of those who deny this linkage thesis, and why I think they fail. Most notably, there are Hugh Mellor's and Peter Simons' attempts to combine an endurance view of persistence with a tenseless view of time. In this appendix I will discuss Mellor's and Simons' attempts, in light of what I argue in 'Temporal Parity and the Problem of Change'. Mellor (1998, p. 90) and Simons (2000a & 2000b) both think that change requires strict identity just as much as it requires differences in properties, and they therefore reject the idea that persistent objects have temporal parts, i.e. that things perdure. But, since Mellor and Simons favour the tenseless view of time they face the problem of showing that the linkage theses between tenseless time and perdurance, and/or between endurance and tensed time, are invalid. They need to argue either, (i) negatively, that the linkage theses do not show conclusively that the combination of endurance and tenseless time is impossible (in which case the combination can be given the benefit of the doubt), or (ii) positively, by presenting an account of how things can endure in tenseless time. It seems to me that Mellor argues mainly negatively in the fashion presented in (i), while Simons argues more in the positive fashion presented in (ii). Mellor argues that it is obvious that things do not have temporal parts, that they endure, but claims that they must endure in tenseless time because he thinks McTaggart proved that the tensed view of time is contradictory. In other words, Mellor presents us with three alternatives, (a) endurance in tensed time, (b) perdurance in tenseless time, and (c) endurance in tenseless time, and argues that the first is contradictory, the second does not allow change, and that therefore we must choose the third, i.e. if we want to allow change at all in our philosophy. He thinks we must accept endurance in tenseless time despite its difficulties, because otherwise we will have to give up change, and claims that, anyway, the arguments outlining the difficulties are inconclusive. Mellor emphasises his tenseless theory of time, and does not provide more than the outlines of an account of how things actually can endure in such a time. His argument mainly strives to show that there are no good arguments against the 134 assumption that things endure in tenseless time. Simons, on the other hand, assumes the tenseless theory of time to be true, and proceeds to construe a positive theory of the way things can be conceived to endure in tenseless time. Briefly, according to Simons, an enduring thing is "an abstractum over occurrents under a suitable equivalence relation" (Simons 2000b). I will return later to the exact meaning of this claim, but for the time being point out that Simons presents enduring entities as existentially dependent on a base of events. Mellor's and Simons' idea is that a combination of the tenseless view of time and the endurance view of persistence would be the perfect match, since it would avoid the contradictions of the tensed view of time and the lack of intuitive appeal of the perdurance view of persistence. 1. The temporal parity thesis of the tenseless view of time In 'Temporal Parity and the Problem of Change', I argue that the thesis that all moments of time are equally existent and real, whose essence is expressed by the principle of temporal parity, is not just an important corollary to the tenseless view of time, as is usually suggested, but in fact equivalent to it. It cannot be understood as merely a positive claim about the objective nature of temporal reality, but must also be understood as a denial of the view that temporal reality is the way it appears to be, i.e. tensed. Consequently, the principle of temporal parity is equivalent to the claim that time is not tensed, but tenseless. Admittedly, the claim that all moments of time are equally existent and real, can be given a tensed interpretation: if time consists in the coming into existence of new states of affairs, and all moments of time come into existence in the present, then all moments of time are existent and real in the same (tensed) way. But, this is not what is usually meant by 'temporal parity'. The principle of temporal parity is always formulated as a denial of the objective reality of tense. It states that contrary to the prima facie appearance of time, the future and past exist just as well as the present: Temporal Parity: For any times ti and tj, neither ti or tj exemplifies the monadic properties of pastness, presentness, or futureness. It is not true that the state of the world at ti or tj uniquely reflects "the way things really are." Rather, the way things really are includes both the way things are at ti and the way things are at tj (Carter & Hestevold 1994). Taken in this sense, to hold temporal parity to be true, is to believe that everything in the history of the universe coexists, albeit located at different positions in time. 135 In 'Temporal Parity and the Problem of Change', I further argue that any theory that is supposed to be compatible with the temporal parity thesis, e.g. Mellor's and Simons' theories of endurance and change, is committed to the view that everything coexist in this sense, and that this is the root to the socalled problem of change, both with regards to tensed change of events and changes in the intrinsic properties of things. In this appendix I focus on the difficulties with giving an account of change in terms of variation in the properties of an enduring thing, i.e. of a thing that exists exclusively at many times in succession, when one presupposes that all moments of time are equally existent and real. It should be noted that I identify endurance with the view that things can exist exclusively at each of the many times it exists at in succession, i.e. that at any given time the thing exists objectively speaking only at that time and 'no-when' else. This is the particular sense of being 'wholly present' that I think is relevant to the debate. Often the endurance view is formulated merely as a negation of the view that things have temporal parts, which may seem to make it an open question whether things can be 'wholly present' at many times without existing exclusively at each and every time. However, this would be to blatantly neglect crucial aspects of the metaphysics to which endurance theories are usually wedded, e.g. the belief that only the present exists and that new states of affairs are causally produced. It also invites confusion with other kinds of entities that do not have temporal parts, but do not endure through changes, e.g. universals. In a sense a universal is 'wholly present' in each particular instantiation of it, but this is not what it means for an enduring entity to be 'wholly present'. I assume therefore that to be 'wholly present' does not just involve a rejection of temporal parts, but implies exclusive existence at a time. To my mind, then, the problem of accounting for change in tenseless time, is to show that the view that things can exist exclusively at many times in succession, is compatible with the view that everything coexists in time. 136 2. Mellor's solution Mellor does indeed seem to agree with my understanding of the problem, i.e. that it consists in showing how the coexistence of everything can be made compatible with change in time: If a poker is hot at 2.15 and cold at 3.15, then those always were and always will be its temperatures at those times. These B-facts no more change over time than spatial B-facts change across space. But what stops a poker's being hot at one end and cold at the other being a case of change is precisely that its hot and cold ends coexist in a single world, albeit in different B-places. But then, as we saw in chapter 2, on a B-theory the hot poker and the cold also coexist in a single world, albeit at different B-times. So if, as everyone agrees, coexistence rules out change in the spatial case, how can it be compatible with change in time? (1998, p. 71) Mellor argues that coexistence is compatible with change in time, by arguing that there is no good reason to think they are incompatible. According to him, there are mainly two objections to the tenseless conception of change: "These are that the theory has no way of distinguishing properties varying over time from properties varying across space, and that it reduces changes to changeless facts". (1998, p. 84) His answer to the first objection is that causality distinguishes temporal variation from spatial variation. As an answer to the latter he claims that it really is no objection at all because "why [...] must facts change in order to be changes"(1998, p. 84). As an answer to the first objection, Mellor argues that the analogy between the two kinds of variation disappears when one realises that variation in the properties of a thing over time is due to a causal factor, while variation between the spatial parts of a thing is not. We could take this as a suggestion that what I take to be a standard account of change, namely that change is the possession by a numerically identical entity of different and incompatible properties at different times, should be augmented so as to include a reference to causality, perhaps in the following way: Change is the possession by a numerically identical entity a of different and incompatible properties F and G at different times t and t', provided the difference between a having the property F at t, and lacking F at t' (or vice versa) is due to a causal factor. I do not dispute that the difference in the properties of a thing between times is due to a causal factor, nor that the difference between spatial parts of a thing is not causal. I just do not think that Mellor has explained why variation in the properties of a thing persisting in tenseless time need not be a variation between 137 parts, by showing that variation in time is different from variation in space with respect to causality. To say that two things are in some way analogous, presupposes that the two can be distinguished, but that they resemble one another in some particular respect. The tenseless view of time is charged for being committed to the view that things have temporal parts, because it holds that an object existing at many times must be equally existent and real at all those times, and this, it is argued, excludes the possibility that the thing can exist exclusively at each particular time. A thing cannot be spatially extended and be 'wholly' contained in each and every part of that spatial extension, and, by analogy, it cannot be temporally extended and be 'wholly' contained in every part of that temporal extension. If it cannot exist exclusively at each particular time, but is nevertheless equally existent and real at every one of those times, then it must be different parts of it that exists at each particular time. This depicts the variation in the properties of a thing between times as being a variation between its parts, and therefore analogous to the variation between the spatial parts of the thing. The problem now under consideration is therefore not simply a matter of distinguishing the two kinds of variation in any old way, but in a way that shows that variation in the properties of an object persisting in tenseless time need not be a variation between its parts. To say that variation in time is due to a causal factor, while variation in space is not, does not make the analogy go away, unless this explains how a thing can exist exclusively at many times in succession, but nevertheless be equally existent and real in all of those times. As pointed out in 'Temporal Parity and the Problem of Change', and further elaborated in 'Causal Production as Interaction', there are two very different accounts of causality: (i) the view that causes bring their effects into existence, i.e. the production view, and (ii) the view that causes are only correlated to their effects but do not produce them, i.e. the correlation view. In these papers I further argue that the production view is wedded to a tensed view of time, and to an endurance view of persistence, but the correlation view to a tenseless view of time and a perdurance view of persistence. Mellor does not explicitly discuss the difference between the production view and the correlation view of causality, nor the difficulties associated with fitting each view to the metaphysics implied by his theory of time. Consequently, I have not been able to discern beyond doubt which view of causality he endorses. Either way, he faces serious problems. If he endorses a production view, he must show that a production view is compatible with temporal parity, in which case he has to show how the thesis that causes produce effects, i.e. bring effects into existence, can be made 138 compatible with the claim that everything at all moments of time is equally existent and real. Prima facie, the idea of something being brought into existence which did not exist before is completely contrary to the view that everything coexists. On the other hand, if Mellor endorses a correlation view, he must show that it is compatible with endurance, i.e. he must show how the view that causality is a correlation between temporally distinct but coexistent entities, can be made compatible with the view that things are not coexistent at all the times of their existence. This he does not do. He completely overlooks the different consequences a production view, or correlation view would have for the overall coherence of his theory.1 To my mind, Mellor's appeal to causality does not explain how variation in tenseless time is different from variation in space in respects relevant to change. Distinguishing variation in time from variation in space by appeal to causation does not automatically establish that variation in time amounts to change, it merely establishes that they are different in this respect: a temporal part implies something about another temporal part of the whole they are parts, in a way that a spatial part does not imply something about other spatial parts of the whole they are parts. The appeal to causality merely snares Mellor into a further problem, namely to show that the linkage thesis between the correlation view of causality and perdurance is invalid. By appealing to causality, he has not given an answer to how persistent things can exist exclusively at each of the many times they exist at and need not have temporal parts. Let us now turn to Mellor's answer to the second objection, i.e. that Mellor's theory reduces change to changeless facts. Mellor claims that this objection rests on the absurd view that change requires that facts must change, but I am inclined to think that Mellor misunderstands the objection The objection does not concern the nature of the facts, but the reduction of changes to facts. It is generally agreed that facts, i.e. existing states of affairs, do not change. States of affairs either exist permanently, according to the tenseless view, or they come into and go out of existence, according to the tenseless view, but on neither view 1 In fact I think Mellor does endorse a production view, e.g. in (1995), but I do not see that he really takes on the task of showing that the ontology of that view is compatible with the temporal parity thesis. In fact, if Mellor were to abandon the tenseless view and adopt a tensed view, I would think the overall consistency of his theory about change, persistence, and causality would greatly improve. He does seem to take seriously all the prima facie appearances accepted by the dynamic view, but since he is convinced that McTaggart's argument conclusively shows that the tensed view cannot be true, he is forced to make all these prima facie appearances fit into a tenseless conception of time. 139 do the facts change.2 It is the constituent parts of those states of affairs that change, i.e. things. It is the window that changes from being whole to be broken, when it is hit by a brick, not the state of 'wholeness' that changes into a state of 'brokenness'. The objection that the tenseless theory of change depicts changes as a conjunction of changeless facts, is not an objection to the tenseless characterisation of the nature of facts, but to the reduction of change to such facts. That is, a change is commonly believed to consist in the possession of different properties F and G by one and the very same thing a at the different times t and t', in which case we have two states of affairs which have a as a common constituent. This is possible if a can endure and change from being F to be G. However, if things perdure, it is different parts of a that have the different properties, and then the two states of affairs really do not have a common constituent; since it is different parts of the thing that are constitutive parts of the two states of affairs, there is nothing that changes from one state to the other. On this account, change is variation between two distinct states of affairs. It is entirely besides the point of Mellor to ask "why [...] must facts change in order to be changes?" (1998, p. 84). Mellor's critics do not require him to explain how facts change, but how his tenseless view allows the constituents of those facts to change, because if the constituents do not change, change is merely a conjunction of facts. Mellor misreads the objection as an objection to the tenseless characterisation of facts, i.e. that they are changeless, and points out that as such the objection is absurd because it is not facts that change but the things to which changes happen. Mellor presents the idea that things do not have temporal parts as an answer to the objection that the tenseless view reduces change to changeless facts, when the objection really is directed against the idea that tenseless time can contain things that persist without having temporal parts. Mellor makes certain logical, and semantical, distinctions between facts and the things those facts 'are about', and between events and the things that those events happen to, in order to justify our talking and thinking about them as independent entities, 2 Please note that in this dissertation I only discuss the presentist version of the tensed view. Other tensed views claim that facts do change, by passing from future to present, and from present to past (see discussion in the general introduction, p. 22). It should also be noted that Aristotle held that beginning and ceasing to exist (of facts) was a kind of change. But, Aristotle held that in order to conceive of beginning and ceasing to exist as a kind of change, one had to assume the existence of a permanent matter substratum in which the beginning and ceasing to exist of determinate states of affairs (facts) is a change. That is, creation/destruction of facts is not a change in the facts, but in the determinations of the matter substrate. In this sense, presentism can accept the coming into existence of facts (and going out of existence) as a kind of change, but not that it is a change in the facts. 140 some of which exist permanently at different times, while others are 'wholly present' at different times. But, he does not give any reasons for why things really can exist exclusively at every of the many times they exist at, as we think they do, when it is assumed that everything coexists in time. To my mind, Mellor's definitions and distinctions between things, facts, events, and changes, merely serve to further establish their interdependence. The distinctions between things, changes and facts are of special relevance. Mellor understands changes as consisting in things having different properties at different times. Each having of a property by a thing is of course a fact. But, facts exist permanently at a certain time, according to the tenseless view, and since they have the thing as a constituent part, the thing must exist permanently at that time too, if the fact does. There can be no fact involving a being F at t, unless a exists at t being F. Now, changes in a thing involves at least two facts, and each fact consists in the thing having a certain property. If the facts exist permanently at two different times then the thing must exist permanently at the two different times, given that the thing is a constituent part of those facts, and yet the thing is supposed to exist exclusively at each particular time. This is an equation I find difficult to solve. My conclusion is that Mellor does not adequately answer the objections he mentions. He fails to answer the first because he fails to appreciate the difference between a production and a correlation view of causality, and I think he misunderstands the latter objection, and therefore never comes round to addressing the problem that gave rise to that objection. The original problem was how a thing could constitute two different and incompatible states of affairs at two different times, and exist exclusively in each particular state of affair, if it was assumed that all moments of time are equally existent and real, i.e. if it was assumed that everything in time coexists. If two states of affairs, involving one and the same thing, coexist in time, it is argued, then that thing cannot exist exclusively in each state; it must be different parts of it that exist in each state. Mellor, I think correctly, does not accept the perdurance account of persistence, because he thinks change requires a difference in the properties of one and the very same thing, but he does not reject the thesis that everything coexists in time. He still faces the problem of showing how a thing can coexist without contradiction in incompatible states of affairs, and of explaining in what sense a thing coexisting in that way can at the same time be 'wholly present' in each particular state of affairs. 141 3. Simons' theory of invariants Peter Simons does not himself provide a theory of time, but he prefers the tenseless view, and assumes it to be the correct one. He agrees with Mellor that perdurance is not a possible explanation of change. He thinks that there must be enduring things, or 'continuants' as he calls them, if there is to be any change at all, because change requires identity as well as difference in properties. Simons' suggestion is, in short, that an enduring entity is "an abstractum over occurrents under a suitable equivalence relation" (2000b). By saying that it is an abstractum, Simons does not mean to say that the enduring entity is an abstract object in the traditional sense, i.e. something outside space and time inaccessible to causal influence, but rather in the sense that it consists in the invariant features of an underlying base of concretely existing occurrents located in space and time. By 'occurrents', Simons means events, i.e. entities that do consist of temporal parts. An enduring entity is the invariant features reproduced in a set of temporal parts of a base of occurrents. In fact, Simons suggests to use the term 'invariants' for enduring entities (2000b). Let me point out certain things about Simons' characterisation of enduring things as invariants: (a) Simons' views are different from traditional endurance views in that he thinks the occurrent base is ontologically prior to the enduring thing, and (b) Simons' must hold that the occurrents of the base, and all their temporal parts, must objectively speaking be equally real and existent, in accordance to the tenseless view of time that he presupposes. Like Mellor, Simons also faces the problem of explaining in what sense the invariant exists exclusively in each and every temporal part of the occurrent base existing at different times, without violating temporal parity. I will not venture into the technical details of Simons' theoretical construct of invariants as 'abstracta over occurrents under a suitable equivalence relation', we can assume it to hold good as such, i.e. as an intelligible theoretical construction of how to conceive of the relationship between things and events. But, even so, it does not appear to me that he succeeds to avoid, or solve, the problem now under consideration, notably that of change. The problem of change was to provide an entity that is supposed to be numerically the same across time, but also could have different and incompatible properties at different times. As I see it, the requirement of numerical identity is satisfied by Simons' account, but not in the sense that the identical entity is 'wholly present' at every particular time at which it exists, in the relevant sense of existing exclusively at each time. As for the requirement of change, i.e. the variation in the intrinsic properties of the thing between times, which is not just a variation 142 between temporal parts, then I do not see that it is satisfied at all. How does an invariant change when it is something which essentially does not change? It cannot consist of, or contain, anything variant, because it is in fact an invariant. According to Simons' thesis, it is the occurrents in which the continuant is an invariant feature that provide the variation between times. This is indeed how they are distinguished. The continuant can be distinguished from the occurrent base, by abstraction, because it is what is invariant in the diverse occurrent base. It is the invariant nature of the invariant, that gives it its identity, and it is the diversity of the occurrents that provide the variation. Is there a sense in which this variation in the occurrent base can be said to be a variation in the invariant, as opposed to between the temporal parts of the occurrents? It appears as if not even Simons thinks there is: How would we expect a continuant to have properties? The answer is that with the exception of those properties it has unqualifiedly, they derive in some way from the properties of its underlying occurrents. [...] For example a life-occurrent may swell in spatial extent along its temporal axis. In such a case we say the associated continuant grows. (2000b) I assume that the properties it has unqualifiedly, it has at all times, and then the apparent difference in the properties of an invariant between times really is a matter of the invariant inhering in different temporal parts of the underlying occurrent base, and thereby being associated with the different properties of those temporal parts. Change, on Simons' account, is a difference in association to various properties of different temporal parts existing at different times, not a difference in the properties which a continuant has simpliciter. This, if anything, reduces change to a variation between temporal parts, although not to the temporal parts of the continuant. One can at least say that change, on this account, does not involve change of intrinsic properties, but it may perhaps be said to involve changes in the associations that a continuant has to different properties of different temporal parts, and those associations is surely something the continuant has simpliciter; thus there is genuine change. But, the sense in which this could be construed as a case of change proper is not clear, mostly because Simons has not solved the problem imposed by the tenseless existence of the continuant at many times, notably that it coexists at all those many times. If the thing coexists at all the times it has different associations to different parts, it is not clear how it changes those associations, as opposed to just having them. Let us be quite clear that the sense of being 'wholly present' relevant to this issue is not the sense in which a universal is 'wholly present' at a multitude of places and times, because a universal is something which does not change. An 143 invariant could easily be conceived of as a universal in this sense, and that it is 'wholly present' in the same sense that each instance of 'redness' is of course never lacking in its 'redness'. A universal, when considered as being real only through its instantiations in time and space (as opposed to being an ideal form outside of space and time), is at least in some sense a concretely existing entity. But, a universal is not exclusively present at any single time and place (except perhaps accidentally if it would be possible for a universal to be instantiated only once), even though it may be thought to be 'wholly present' in the sense that its essence as what kind of universal it is, is never lacking (or incomplete) in any instantiation of it. If the invariant is a universal, it is (if not by anything else, then at least by definition) not subject to change, and change was one of the most important motivations to develop the account in the first place. 4. Substance, process, or trope ontology? I think there is a tension between substance, process, and trope ontological considerations in Simons' work, which I suspect relates to his claim that science should connect to, or be connectible with, one's metaphysics. According to Simons, substance ontology has played out its role as an explanatory concept within physics (1998). He claims that when ordinary middle-sized objects, like stones and drum-sticks, come under the scrutiny of science, their solidity dissolves into a myriad of processes. Stones turn out to be made of molecules, that are made of protons, neutrons and electrons, that are made of quarks, and what have you. This leads science to regard things, and their properties, in terms of processes. As I have already discussed in Appendix A, it is possible to think of things as being processes in the sense that they are unities whose structure is preserved by the interactions taking place between the parts of the things. Simons' however, continues his scrutiny of the inner structure of things down to the quantum level, where, he claims, science discovers entities that do not themselves appear as an activity of parts, and which science fails to individuate and distinguish from other entities during any interval of time. According to quantum mechanics, Simons claims, particles on the fundamental level are not identifiable individuals. At that level the substance-attribute duality appears to break down, and we have something that may perhaps best be described as bundles of once and for all occurrent states, or properties, i.e. bundles of tropes (distinguished from events, in that events are compounds of such bundles of once and for all occurrent properties). Simons' account of endurance is not just meant to explain change, but also (or perhaps primarily) an attempt to incorporate a non-reductionist conception of 144 enduring objects within a fundamentally trope-based ontology, an ontology he believes to be best suited to connect metaphysics with what he thinks is "the best theory we have of what makes up everyday substances", i.e. quantum mechanics (1998). That is, because quantum mechanics imply that the world is constituted by very short-lived entities, Simons wants to say that occurrents are more basic than continuants, tropes more fundamental than occurrents, but in a way that does not totally extinguish continuants, nor occurrents, from his trope ontological framework. It is true that I do not share Simons' positive attitude towards quantum mechanics, but that is not why I reject tropes. I reject tropes because I think it is impossible to think of things even as processes given a trope-based ontology. I do agree with Simons that substance ontologists often neglect the fact that ordinary middle-sized objects are always compounds, whose unity is upheld through the interaction of their constituent parts; i.e. that middle-sized objects are processes, although, as unities, they can for most practical purposes be treated as simples. Process ontologists, on the other hand, neglect the fact that on every level, the conception of a process invokes the idea of it as being an activity of parts, and that it is an empirical question whether or not the parts of any process themselves turn out to be processes, i.e. an activity of parts. I think the process ontologist cannot in the end avoid assuming that processes have certain attributes that cannot themselves be explained in terms of an activity of a compound. That is, at rock bottom the parts of the activity must be gifted with properties that they simply have, properties which are not expressions of their nature as processes, but rather as what makes them capable of constituting a process. For instance, things have mass, not because of the processes taking place in them due to the interaction of its constituent parts, but because its constituent parts just have mass. It is in fact due to the fact that the parts have mass that their gravitational force attracts one another, which is an important part of what makes them capable of interaction. However, the idea that the fundamental entities in the world are tropes, is, I think, incompatible with the idea that ordinary middle-sized objects are properly described as processes. Tropes have the wrong kind of existential boundary conditions for being the parts of a process, they do not persist. In order for something to be a part of an activity, it must persist during that activity. A trope based 'process' ontology conceives of processes as a temporally ordered aggregate or unity of very short-lived entities. But, if a process consists of very short-lived entities that are not in any way involved in an activity, or are in themselves an activity, the process they are supposed to be parts of cannot be 145 properly described as an activity either. So, by assuming that the world is fundamentally constituted by tropes, does not just dispose of the reality of enduring things but also the reality of processes, at least if processes are assumed to be a kind of activity. Trope ontology leaves us with nothing but nonenduring simples which are correlated to each other in a law-like manner. Not just change, but persistence and activity as well, turn out to be far from well founded phenomena on the assumption of such an ontology. Whitehead and Bergson apparently thought of processes as a series of very short-lived entities. But, realising that unless each part of the process contained some form of activity, or change, the process itself could not contain change, then they suggested that every part has a very brief duration in which it moves from potentiality to concreteness, an activity Whitehead called 'concrescence'. This view is called 'process philosophy', to distinguish it from other process views (Griffin 1998). It should be noted that even on this view there are enduring entities, although their duration is too brief to ground the endurance of the things they constitute. Those process ontologists that I am more closely familiar with, have no explicit views about the nature of the fundamental entities in the world, they are content to state that physical science has showed us that the nature of the entities with which we are familiar, i.e. like bricks, balls and windows, are properly described as processes, e.g. Wesley Salmon (1984, p. 139ff). I think that this is a very healthy attitude towards the relationship between metaphysics and what science tells us about the nature of things. It is fairly uncontroversial that middle-sized objects are constituted by an activity of parts, but it is controversial whether quantum mechanics provides a metaphysically sound picture of the nature of the fundamental entities in the universe, as opposed to being a highly useful tool for prediction. Indeed, Salmons main concern is to explain the nature of causality, he is not particularly concerned with what reality ultimately consists in. I for one have no quarrel with the idea that things are in some sense processes, but then I think of processes in terms of an activity of enduring parts, and not as a series of very short-lived entities. The problem of endurance goes much deeper than just to the endurance and changeability of middle-sized objects. The conception of things as being a kind of process is also dependent on the conception of enduring entities, i.e. of the parts of the process as enduring through interactions, at least if one wants the compound thing to be an enduring entity. To deny entirely the reality of enduring entities, i.e. substances, because one has found that ordinary middlesized objects must be thought of as being processes, only gives rise to the 146 question whether processes can properly be thought of as being constituted by tropes.3 5. Conclusion It is my conclusion that neither Mellor or Simons provide adequate explanations of how things can endure in tenseless time, at least for the purposes of grounding the reality of change. To my mind, this failure is an unavoidable consequence of the fact that endurance is incompatible with the principle of temporal parity. Nothing can exist exclusively at a single time in the sense required for endurance, and coexist at many times in the way required by temporal parity. I think neither thinker are adequately aware of just how strong the restrictions of the temporal parity thesis are for their metaphysical endeavour. References CARTER, W.R., & HESTEVOLD, H.S. (1994), 'On Passage and Persistence', American Philosophical Quarterly 31(4): 269–83. GRIFFIN, D.R. (1998), 'Process Philosophy', in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, E. Craig (ed.), London: Routledge, pp. 711–6. MELLOR, D.H. (1995), The Facts of Causation, London: Routledge. –(1998), Real Time II, London: Routledge. SALMON, W. (1984), Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World, Princeton: Princeton University Press. SEIBT, J. (1997), 'Existence in Time: From Substance to Process', in Perspectives on Time, Faye, J. et al. (ed.), Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. SIMONS, P. (1998), 'Farewell to Substance: a Differentiated Leave-taking', Ratio N.S. XI: 235–52 –(2000a), 'Continuants and Occurrents', The Aristotelian Society, Supp(74): 59–75. –(2000b), 'How to Exist at a Time When You Have No Temporal Parts', The Monist 83(3): 419–36. 3 For an interesting discussion of the tension between substance and process ontologies, with respect to the endurance-perdurance debate, see (Seibt 1997).

IMPORTANT: When citing this article, please refer to the print-version: Gasser, Georg (ed.): Personal Identity and Resurrection. London: 2010, 67-85. 3.5-Dimensionalism and Survival A Process-Ontological Approach Godehard Brüntrup SJ abide with me; fast falls the eventide; the darkness deepens; lord, with me abide; swift to its close ebbs out life's little day; earth's joys grow dim, its glories pass away; change and decay in all around I see – o thou who changest not, abide with me. I need thy presence every passing hour; Where is death's sting? Where, grave, thy victory? I triumph still, if thou abide with me. (H.F. Lyte 1793–1847) Process Ontology In this paper I will ask whether the religious hope of surviving one's natural death can be expressed and at least partially explicated within the framework of a process ontology. the central idea of process ontology is the critique of the notion of "substance". This notion seems, however, indispensable if it is to be really me, the identical person, which has survived death. It is the very definition of a substance to be that which endures through time. But how can the subject survive death if it is not a substance? The relationship between process ontology and the notion of immortality has mostly been debated within the framework of Whiteheadian process theology. Whitehead's notion of God played a key role in this debate. Because God does – in his "consequent nature" – preserve all contingent events of creation, several options were available to think even of subjective phenomenal experience as forever maintained in God.1 In what follows, however, the relationship of process ontology and the hope for resurrection will be analyzed independently of the problematic Whiteheadian notion of God. No simple "re-enactment" of Whitehead's philosophy is intended, rather a transformation with some "creative novelty". The main focus will be on establishing connections between themes of current analytic metaphysics and traditional Whiteheadian process ontology, ranging from the identity of particulars through time, the mind-body problem, and the metaphysics of time, to the reality of abstract objects. The theory sketched here uses Whiteheadian ideas in some crucial aspects, but places them within the debate of contemporary metaphysics. Most process philosophers are realists about processes and idealists about substances.2 Process ontology assumes processes with a mind-independent unity and identity. Some of these are directly given in experience. 1 For a detailed survey of these theories see Tobias Müller, Gott, Welt, Kreativität. Eine Analyse der Philosophie A.N. Whiteheads (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2009), pp. 269–94. 2 See Nicholas Rescher, Process Metaphysics. An Introduction to Process Philosophy (New York: SUNY Press, 1996), pp. 58f. 1 von 15 IMPORTANT: When citing this article, please refer to the print-version: Gasser, Georg (ed.): Personal Identity and Resurrection. London: 2010, 67-85. Substances, however, are theoretical constructs which are not directly given in experience, but are rather the result of an abstraction. It is this central thought of process philosophy that will be exploited here in order to find middle ground in the metaphysical debate between endurantists and perdurantists. The Problem of Becoming: Metaphysics between Heraclitus and Parmenides In his magnum opus "Process and reality" Whitehead criticizes modern metaphysics for not adequately representing the riches of human experience.3 This charge is often made against analytic philosophy, arguably the liveliest field in contemporary metaphysics. In "utterances of religious aspiration"4 Whitehead saw a particularly fruitful source of human experience that ought to be discussed in metaphysics. Can analytic metaphysics adequately conceptualize these "utterances of religious aspiration"? This is the question that will be pursued here by focusing on an aspiration most central to christianity, the hope for survival. Whitehead presents a surprising interpretation for the biblical verse "abide with me; fast falls the eventide" (Luke 24:29) that has found a "wealth of expression" in the first two lines of a famous hymn.5 Here the first line expresses the permanence, "abide", "me", and the "Being" addressed; and the second line sets these permanences amid the inescapable flux. Here at length we find formulated the complete problem of metaphysics. Those philosophers who start with the first line have given us the metaphysics of "substance"; and those who start with the second line have developed a metaphysics of "flux". But, in truth, the two lines cannot be torn apart in this way. 6 The remark "in truth, the two lines cannot be torn apart in this way" expresses in a nutshell the theoretical framework of this paper. The technical expression "3.5-dimensionalism" refers to the attempt to keep these two lines together. The goal will be to find a middle ground between the extremes of absolute flux and changeless invariance through time. In analytic metaphysics these opposing positions are labeled "perdurantism" (the "4d-view") and "endurantism" (the "3d-view"). According to the 3d-account, concrete enduring particulars like animals have spatial but no temporal parts. They are extended in space but not in time. If, say, you meet a human being you meet this entire person, not a temporal part of her at that specific point in time. This is the view of classic substance metaphysics. a substance that endures through time undergoes only accidental change. It endures as a numerically identical entity through time. In contrast, perdurance is a continuity of temporal parts in which certain structural similarities are preserved. By adding time as the fourth dimension, the perdurantist claims that concrete particulars have temporal parts. One never encounters an object in its entirety; rather one is in contact with one of its time-slices. The concrete particular is thus not an enduring substance but a four-dimensional space-time worm which comprises all temporal stages of this individual (the "worm-view"). Or it is claimed that the concrete particular is not even this thing extended in space and time, but collapses ultimately into a mere sequence of causally connected stages without assuming any genuine unity (the "stage-view"). In both cases the traditional substance view has been abandoned. The idea of substances has been challenged by many contemporary philosophers. The worldview advocated by the sciences, especially relativistic physics, was clearly in favor of a four-dimensional account (the "block universe"). Given these developments, the relevance of the recent debate on resurrection in analytic metaphysics becomes 3 Alfred N. Whitehead, Process and Reality, corr. edn (New York: The Free Press, 1978). 4 Whitehead, Process, p. 208. 5 He refers to the hymn by Henry Lyte. There is some evidence that Lyte wrote it in 1820 after visiting a dying friend, who, on his deathbed, kept murmuring the passage from Luke: "Abide with me; fast falls the eventide". 6 Whitehead, Process, p. 209. 2 von 15 IMPORTANT: When citing this article, please refer to the print-version: Gasser, Georg (ed.): Personal Identity and Resurrection. London: 2010, 67-85. obvious. One important contribution of this debate was the development of models of survival that are compatible with a 4d-view of human persons. This is true in particular for those positions which, due to their physicalist assumptions, have to focus on bodily resurrection.7 The Internal Coherence of a Process It is widely assumed that the human body is a sequence of non-identical physical stages. For something to count as one human body through time, all there has to be is the right kind of relation between those stages: immanent causation. This notion was already in use by the christian process metaphysician Borden Browne. He was influenced by Hermann Lotze and his critique of the notion of a substance was tightly integrated with his concept of immanent causation.8 The general idea is that a stage s1 of a given concrete entity e causes a later stage s2 of e. The question that arises immediately is how e can be construed as a persisting entity without assuming a non-changing 3dsubstance. Without assuming such a 3d-substance there is no numerical identity through time for concrete entities like human persons. The mere repetition of the relevant properties (stable pattern) together with the right kind of causal connection establishes, however, a weaker form of identity which is often called "genidentity".9 On this view, what we commonly regard as a single entity is strictly speaking a temporal series of different entities. Because these entities produce their successor causally while maintaining key properties, they can be considered "identical" in the weaker sense of genidentity. This accords with Whitehead's view. For him a concrete entity, even a person, consists ultimately of a sequence of (psycho-physical) events which produce each other causally while maintaining certain key properties. What we commonly see as an enduring 3d-substance is really a "society" of events ordered serially in time and thus a process. For Whitehead, an entity which endures through time is characterized by two features: a common element of form and a genetic relatedness that orders the events serially.10 There is a causal inheritance of the defining characteristics in the causal series. These enduring patterns, the form, is not sufficient for the individuation of the entity. If this were the case, all events that instantiated the same abstract form would be identical.11 There remains the possibility of special forms whose instantiation generates individuals, a theory along the lines of aristotelian natural kinds.12 The idea of fixed, clearly and non-vaguely delineated natural kinds is according to most process philosophers incompatible with the theory of evolution. Within the context of survival of one's natural death, the question arises whether or not a surviving human 7 I have analyzed this development in Godehard Brüntrup, "Soul, Body and Survival. The Renaissance of Christian Materialism", Revista Portugesa de Filosofia, 65 (2009): suppl., pp. 317–35. 8 Borden Bowne, Metaphysics: A Study in First Principles (New York: Harper, 1882): "A change between things must depend on a change in things. Now when we remember that the only reason for positing things is to provide some ground for activity and change, it is plain that the changeless core is of no use and must be dropped as both useless and unprovable" (p. 51). "Interaction cannot be conceived as a transitive causality playing between things; it is rather an immanent causality in a fundamental unitary being" (ibid., p. 83). For the most recent developments see Zimmerman, "Immanent Causation", Nous 31, Supplement: Philosophical Perspectives 11: Mind, Causation, and World (1997): pp. 433-71. 9 The concept "genidentity" was originally developed in Kurt Levin, Der Begriff der Genese in Physik, Biologie und Entwicklungsgeschichte. Eine Untersuchung zur vergleichenden Wissenschaftslehre (Berlin: Springer, 1922). 10 Whitehead, Process, p. 34. 11 I am not pursuing the interesting idea of individual essences here. It seems hard to square with the basic intuitions of process philosophy, where the individual event is not fully determined by any pre-existing essence. 12 I am thinking of something like Michael Loux, Metaphysics. A Contemporary Introduction, 3rd edn (New York: Routledge, 2006). 3 von 15 IMPORTANT: When citing this article, please refer to the print-version: Gasser, Georg (ed.): Personal Identity and Resurrection. London: 2010, 67-85. being can remain a member of the biological species homo sapiens. The basic entities in (Whiteheadian) process ontology are individuated by their own unique perspective on the world as a whole, not by instantiating a particular form. Can 3D-Objects Emerge from 4D-Structures? It could be argued that an individual as a 3d-object somehow emerges from the repetition of similar events. But even if a stable pattern somehow emerges in this way, it is by no means implied that this pattern is a new 3d-entity without temporal parts. In process metaphysics, objects enduring in time are, to use a term of Rescher's, "stability waves in a sea of process"13, patterns of activity that emerge from a base that is in constant flux. It is much more natural to view these stability patterns as higher-level processes than to construe them as entities without temporal parts. The thesis that genuine 3d-entities could somehow emerge from a 4d-base is not the thesis of 3.5dimensionalism at issue here, but rather the thesis that both the 3dand 4d-views are true on different ontological levels. But does this idea really make sense? If an entity that were truly numerically identical through time (that is, without having temporal parts) could emerge from a constant flux of non-identical entities, we would have a mysterious and unintelligible emergence. We might as well imagine the emergence of a concrete entity like a tree from a configuration of abstract entities like prime numbers. Such a claim is not really intelligible. A true process ontology can introduce enduring 3d-entities only at the price of incoherence. The same argument can be made against the idea that the higher-level 3d-substances are somehow constituted by the underlying series of non-identical events. Constitution theory has recently been made popular by Baker and others.14 It builds on the old Aristotelian notion that a bronze statue coincides with a lump of bronze by being at the same location in space and time, while not being identical to that lump. can process ontology make use of this idea? Could an enduring 3d-entity without temporal parts coincide with individual events in a series without being identical to them? That sounds initially promising. But constitution theory is not substance dualism. The enduring 3d-entity cannot be ontologically independent and then miraculously interact with the underlying events. If that cannot be the case, then we get back to the idea that enduring 3d-entities somehow "emerge" from an underlying process that is just a series of non-identical events. The intelligibility of this idea has already been questioned. The most basic individuals in process metaphysics are then only the momentary events. If each of these events is causally connected to the following event in the sequence, then the talk of a temporally enduring object can be justified, but only in the sense of genidentity, not that of strict numerical identity. In this context Whitehead often uses "vibration" and "rhythm" as metaphor. An enduring object15 gains its inner determinations by the rhythmic process of inheriting properties from its predecessors and by its own creative novelty. This stable rhythmic pattern of its history constitutes the enduring object, which is not a 3d-object but a higher-level process. Whitehead knew that this account was in full accordance with contemporary science. A stable resonance or vibration in a quantum field may constitute what we call a particle. This particle does not exist as a 3dsubstance without temporal parts. It is, however, the appropriate connection, the "thread of persistence",16 and thus the stability of the pattern, and thus the genidentity of the underlying events, 13 Rescher, p. 53. 14 Lynne Rudder Baker, The Metaphysics of Everyday Life: An Essay in Practical Realism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 15 Whitehead, Process, p. 279. 16 Peter Simons, "The Thread of Persistence", Ch. Kanzian (ed.), Persistence (Heusenstamm: ontos, 2008), pp. 165-84. 4 von 15 IMPORTANT: When citing this article, please refer to the print-version: Gasser, Georg (ed.): Personal Identity and Resurrection. London: 2010, 67-85. that justify the talk of a particle enduring in time. In what follows, a process ontology of the kind just outlined will be assumed without much further argument. It is the backdrop for the main argument of this paper. What will be shown, however, is why the account developed here differs from traditional worm or stage 4d-views. The aim of the 3.5d-view is to locate a middle ground between the "abide with me" and the "fast falls the eventide". Before we can get to this, a few more topics need to be covered at least very briefly because they are central to understanding a process ontology in a broadly Whiteheadian tradition: the metaphysics of time, the mind-body problem, and the metaphysics of abstract objects. All of this will be done only insofar as it serves to answer the question whether the idea of surviving one's natural death can be made intelligible within an ontological framework that wants to manage without the notion of enduring 3d-substances. This seems to make survival impossible, not only in the world to come but already in this world. If I am a series of momentary psycho-physical events then I do, in a certain sense at least, die even now at each passing moment. That is a very provocative thought. It makes death lose is unique status. This idea of radical becoming only makes sense in a presentist conception of time. Presentism Presentism is the common-sense and intuitive view of time. Only the present exists; the future does not yet exist, and the past no longer exists. The past seems to exist in a certain way, because statements about the past are commonly regarded as semantically bivalent (either and only true or false). What makes them true or false if the past no longer exists? In the current debate the presentist view has been on the defensive due to a criticism which David Lewis has formulated in an exemplary fashion.17 Lewis denies that the only intrinsic properties of an object are those it has at the present moment. By intrinsic properties I mean those that a thing has independently of its relations to other objects. Assume that Peter is now blind but could still see ten years earlier. The same person cannot be blind and sighted. The natural solution to this problem is to relate those properties to a point in time. A person can be "seeing-at-t1" and "blind-at-t2". But then we are no longer dealing with intrinsic properties, because we have defined them in relation to a point in time. Thus, for Lewis the only sensible solution is to construe persons as 4d-objects. The metaphysics of time that is most consistent with this view is the eternalist picture. In the same way as no spatial point has a special status, no point in time (here, the present) has a special status. the common-sense triad of past, present, and future (the A-series) is replaced by the duality of earlier and later (the Bseries). A central problem of this picture is that it does not leave room for contingent facts. An entity has its properties necessarily, because there is no open future with alternative possibilities. This view is certainly at odds with both our common-sense view and Christian tradition as it is usually understood. Thus, even though the account proposed here is at the most fundamental level a 4dview, it nevertheless supports a presentist conception of time which is usually associated with a 3dview. This requires a version of the stage-view, as opposed to the worm-view, where the stages are very brief. This move, though somewhat surprising in the contemporary debate, is nonetheless characteristic of a process ontology of radical becoming.18 The philosophical motivation for this lies in the attempt to take our temporal existence seriously, to be a "serious tenser". Not only do we 17 David Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), pp. 202f. 18 In the current debate, Galen Strawson has advocated a similar view and claimed that the "Persistence Belief is not experientially natural." see Galen Strawson, Selves: An Essay in Revisionary Metaphysics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 221. 5 von 15 IMPORTANT: When citing this article, please refer to the print-version: Gasser, Georg (ed.): Personal Identity and Resurrection. London: 2010, 67-85. regard the future as non-existent, but we experience the past as something which no longer exists. But what about the critical questions concerning presentism? The first is: what makes sentences about the past true or false? This question can easily lead to erroneous ontological claims. If we claim, say, that there once were people that do not exist today, does this imply that the people of the past still somehow exist? No, it only implies that some people, who do not exist today, were existing in the past. To have existed in the past is not the same as never having existed, but it does not imply actual present existence. A second and more difficult question seems to be the one raised by Lewis. Can the only intrinsic properties of a person be the ones the person has here and now? Lewis answered in the negative, but in what follows I will, in a certain sense, offer a positive answer. But before we can get to this, our sketch of a process metaphysics will have to be fleshed out further by some remarks on the mind-body problem. Pan(-proto-)psychism Process ontology as such is neutral with regard to different positions in the mind-body debate. A dualism of mental and physical processes could be assumed just as easily as a monism of merely physical processes. A broadly Whiteheadian process ontology needs mental properties to secure the connection of events that happen sequentially in time. For Whitehead, causation is a "simple physical feeling".19 Each event is informed by a fundamental act of prehension of its immediate past and is to a certain extent determined by that act. The temporal relations are constituted in this way. Similar to the Monadology of Leibniz, the spatial relations are also constituted by being "prehended" from the point of view of a particular actual entity. In addition, proto-mental properties are needed to explain the receptivity by which simpler events are enabled to bind into a higher-level more complex events. I cannot give an elaborated account of this ontology here.20 One key intuition, however, needs mentioning: a process ontology that works with physicalistically conceived fundamental events collapses ultimately into a kind of atomism of those events. Higher-level events are mere conglomerates of these. This criticism of process ontology was prominently raised in theology by Pannenberg, who saw process ontology as a strictly atomistic philosophy of nature.21 But this account is inadequate. How can the relations that enable the combination and unification of several fundamental events be grounded in the intrinsic nature of these events? Unity in space and time at a level higher than the most basic events becomes possible only if somehow the intrinsic properties of the basic events ground those relations. In Leibniz's metaphysics, all externalrelational properties ("denominations") are grounded in intrinsic properties (or denominations). The best candidates for such absolutely intrinsic properties are those which somehow make possible a mental or proto-mental representation of the environment. Leibniz's account thus results in a kind of pan-experientialism, in which each monad is a "living mirror" which represents the universe from a perspective. This representation is not merely a passive mirroring but is actively involved in the constitution of the universe. It is not surprising that event ontologies, from Whitehead's classic account to Rosenberg's more recent one, emphasize the mental as fundamental rather than as highlevel structure emerging from an entirely non-experiential "Cartesian" matter.22 The Cartesian 19 Whitehead, Process, p. 236. 20 For a more detailed account see ch. 8 of my Das Leib-Seele-Problem (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2008) and in English my "Natural Individuals and Intrinsic Properties", Ludger Honnefelder, Edmund Runggaldier, and Benedikt Schick (eds), Unity and Time as Problem in Metaphysics (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2009), pp. 237–52. 21 Wolfhart Pannenberg, Theologie und Philosophie (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck, 1996), pp. 353. 22 Gregg Rosenberg, A Place for Consciousness. Probing the Deep Structure of the Natural World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). see also William Seager, "Rosenberg, Reducibility, and Consciousness", Psyche, 12 (2006): pp. 1–15. 6 von 15 IMPORTANT: When citing this article, please refer to the print-version: Gasser, Georg (ed.): Personal Identity and Resurrection. London: 2010, 67-85. "bifurcation" of completely mindless matter and a purely mental soul is but a conceptual abstraction. Contemporary debates on the possibility of resurrection are occurring within this Cartesian framework. Classical Christian philosophy, at least in its Aristotelian version, emphasized the unity of different substances, one of which is material and the other non-material. The ontology developed in this paper is in many respects close to this "compound dualism". It denies, however, the Aristotelian/Thomistic thesis that it is only substantial forms, enduring and somehow untouched by change, that secure the identity through time of the material beings that are configured by these forms. This account fails to capture the materiality and the temporality of natural existence. The entire metaphysical "work" of identifying a substance is being done by an Aristotelian "form", something which, in virtue of its abstract nature, is not really a temporal entity.23 We are, as Brian Leftow has put it eloquently, "souls dipped in dust".24 Hylomorphism is thus not really a compound dualism, since the counterpart of forms is mere prime matter. The view advocated here regards us not as souls dipped in dust but as processes made from material with proto-mental properties, "made from mind-dust", in William James's words. The thought that mental or proto-mental properties can be found at a level less complex than the level of animals strikes one initially as strange. It is, however, an idea with a venerable history in philosophy.25 The prima facie strangeness is caused by the intuition that, if this idea is correct, then even very simple entities would have mental states that are relevantly similar to human mentality. But this is a misunderstanding. similarity is not a transitive relation. Between the lowest, least complex and the highest, most complex levels there are many intermediate levels. With regard to its mental or proto-mental properties each level is similar to its neighboring levels but not necessarily similar to levels that are more distant. Because similarity is not transitive, it is possible that ontological levels that are far removed from each other are no longer similar with regard to their mental properties.26 This critique of the Cartesian bifurcation is aimed at the very notion of mere Cartesian matter, and in consequence allows for a metaphysical picture of the human person as a genuine psycho-physical unity. Only as such can a human person survive. Instead of a dualism we have here a bipolarism such that each concrete individual has both physical and mental properties. The notion of a clear-cut duality of the mental and the physical is the product of an abstraction. If one takes that abstraction to be ultimately real, one commits what Whitehead terms a "fallacy of misplaced concreteness". It was Russell, among others, who argued that physics captures only those relational and formal properties of matter which can be expressed mathematically. Everything we know of the intrinsic properties of matter is derived from our experience of mental properties.27 Without delving deeply into this metaphysical issue, a point must be emphasized which is salient in the context of this paper. It does not suffice, according to this metaphysics, for a concrete particular to be a temporally stable configurational pattern in space. A mere aggregate like a cloud formation or a wave is such a stable configuration. A true individual represents the world from a perspective. It has its unity not only by the stability of its spatial configuration but primarily by the uniqueness of its perspective on reality as a whole. This is a highly relevant feature of a theory of survival in a process-ontological context. Survival means primarily the persistence of a certain perspective on the world. The question is, however, whether a broadly Whiteheadian process ontology has the conceptual 23 For a critical evaluation of compound dualism see Brüntrup, "Soul, Body and Survival", pp. 317–35. 24 "Because what there is to the body if it is abstracted from the soul prime matter hasn't the stature to be a partner in any sort of dualism. It cannot even exist on its own." see Brian Leftow, "Souls dipped in dust", in K. Corcoran (ed.), Soul, Body, and Survival, pp. 120–38, 137f. 25 David Skrbina, Panpsychism in the West (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005). 26 See also Brüntrup, "Is psycho–physical emergentism committed to dualism? the Causal Efficacy of Emergent Mental Properties", Erkenntnis, 6 (1998): pp. 1–19. 27 Bertrand Russell, The Analysis of Matter (London: Routledge, 1992), pp. 270, pp. 402. 7 von 15 IMPORTANT: When citing this article, please refer to the print-version: Gasser, Georg (ed.): Personal Identity and Resurrection. London: 2010, 67-85. resources to explicate the possibility of survival as the persistence of a perspective. Survival in Process Ontology What constitutes a human person on this process-ontological account? A person is a being that can relate to itself as itself, which has a reflective self-relation. Human persons are distinguished from other higher-level animals by the fact that they are endowed with a first-person perspective, the ability to distinguish between themselves as seen from the third person perspective and as seen reflectively from their own perspective. Linguistically this capability is displayed by the use of pronouns like "I" which the person uses to refer to herself. Persons are able to attribute thoughts to themselves as their own thoughts and to reflect on them as such. They thus have self-consciousness, not simply phenomenal consciousness. In process-ontological terms the human person is not a 3dsubstance but, diachronically, a series of momentary events featuring both mental and physical properties. Synchronically, this is a hierarchical ordering of higher-level events constituted by lower-level events, where a person's stream of consciousness is located at the highest level. At lower levels are entities ranging from biological cells all the way down to elementary particles. Only present events exist actually; these are partly determined by their immediate past, which leaves, before ceasing to exist, a mark on the next event. The structural similarity (common form) and the causal connection (genetic relatedness) of the events enable us to speak of a process that endures through time. there is, of course, no numerical identity between the events so connected, only genidentity in the sense given above. The classical notion of a 3d-substance has thus been completely abolished. Within the presentist metaphysics of time the 3d-view cannot simply be replaced by a 4d-view on which a four-dimensional wormlike entity is extended through spacetime. Each personal event which grows organically from the past is thus a re-enactment of its predecessor, without being fully determined by it and thus allowing for the possibility of creative novelty. In spite of this close genetic relatedness of the events, the person seems to become something transient that exists for a moment only to cease to exist in the next moment, a process of mere becoming. The concept of a person identical through time, which has dominated Western metaphysics, seems to have been given up entirely. A victory for Heraclitus? In our biblical quote "Abide with me; fast falls the eventide", the second half of radical becoming would be eliminating the first of permanence. In this case nothing would have been gained in comparison to a stage version of the 4d-view. The stages, however, would be momentary and thus very short. In any case, my prior stages would actually be temporal counterparts of me. A true unity of the person could only be conceived by adopting a worm-view instead of the stage-view. But this requires abandoning presentism, since the worm exists in a way that attributes no special ontological status to the present.28 The situation seems hopeless. The abandonment of the classical notion of a substance seems to imply that everything dissolves in a constant flux. Is there middle ground between these alternatives? Abstraction and Permanence Whitehead famously remarked that "to be an abstraction does not mean that an entity is nothing. It merely means that its existence is only a factor of a more concrete element of nature."29 With that in 28 See Theodore Sider, Four-Dimensionalism. An Ontology of Persistence and Time (Oxford: Clarendon, 2003). 29 Alfred N. Whitehead, The Concept of Nature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1920), p. 171. 8 von 15 IMPORTANT: When citing this article, please refer to the print-version: Gasser, Georg (ed.): Personal Identity and Resurrection. London: 2010, 67-85. mind, let us return briefly to Whitehead's idea that it is a common form of serially ordered events that allows for the recognition of an enduring object. Whitehead writes that the form is a complex eternal object.30 Eternal objects in Whitehead's terminology are abstract entities. If eternal objects have structuring "impact" in the world by some kind of formal causation, then we have arrived again at a Hylomorphic aristotelian view. There would be something like a timeless forma substantialis which constitutes an enduring 3d-object. If this substantial form were doing all or most of the metaphysical work in the individuation of a concrete particular, a substance ontology would be re-established. This is, of course, incompatible with process metaphysics. In what follows the ontological status of those abstract objects or forms will thus be "downgraded" to a non-primary or derivative status. The ontological primacy remains with the actual events. For this purpose it is essential to clarify what is meant by "abstract". Typically, abstract entities can be realized at different places and at different times. Concrete particulars, which we might call "continuants" to avoid the loaded notion "substance", can also exist at different points in time but not simultaneously at different points in space. One and the same person can exist in 2005 and 2010 but not simultaneously at two locations in space. Continuants are thus similar to universals with respect to multiple temporal and non-simultaneous spatial realizability.31 Following a tradition that reaches from the neo-Platonists to Leibniz, Whitehead assumes that all basic entities are concrete entities. abstract entities are not self-grounded; their existence depends on the activity of thinking performed by concrete entities. This position that is located between realism and nominalism is often called conceptualism. But if, in the tradition of neoplatonism, it is the divine mind that secures the existence of abstract objects, one might as well speak of a realist position. As noted earlier, continuants are indeed similar to universals in that they are able to be instantiated at different times. If abstract entities are conceived as entia rationis, entities that are dependent on thinking concrete entities, then a middle ground between a pure 4dand a pure 3d-view is indeed possible. At this point one can refer to the abovementioned thesis by Nicholas Rescher: process philosophers are realists with regard to processes and idealists with regard to substances.32 In the following we will build on this basic intuition. In the process-ontological account presented here, we saw that momentary events are related by genidentity if they are connected in the right way. Two conditions must be met: causal dependence and common form. We could speak of "immanent causation". What is relevant here is the common form as a multiply realizable abstract entity. Entities connected by the relation of genidentity share this common form. The abstract entities remain unchanged through the unfolding process. They are invariants of the genidentity relations. Abstract entities are assumed to be ontologically minddependent. The analysis of the process of abstraction will then tell us more about the exact nature of these entities. For the time being it suffices to analyze abstraction in the human mind, thus sidelining the difficult issue of abstract entities dependent on the mind of God. The classic view of abstraction as a filtering of common characteristics in a multitude of similar cases was replaced in more recent philosophy by a conception that can be traced back to Frege. In his "Grundlagen der Arithmetik" Frege noted that many of the singular terms referring to abstract entities derive from functional expressions. We speak of the "number of objects", and the "direction of objects". "number of" and "direction of" are incomplete ("ungesättigte"), functional expressions.33 The genuine discovery by Frege was that, typically for functional expressions that single out abstract 30 Whitehead, Process, p. 34. 31 See Peter Simons and Joseph Melia, "Continuants and Occurents", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes 74 (2000): pp. 59–92. 32 See Rescher, pp. 58f. 33 Gottlob Frege, Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik. Eine logisch mathematische Untersuchung über den Begriff der Zahl (Breslau: Wilhelm Koebner, 1884), here in particular §62ff. 9 von 15 IMPORTANT: When citing this article, please refer to the print-version: Gasser, Georg (ed.): Personal Identity and Resurrection. London: 2010, 67-85. objects, there are equations of the following structure: f(a) = f(b), iff a r b, where r is an equivalence relation. To use Frege's example: the direction of a = the direction of b, iff a is parallel to b. the number of Fs = the number of Gs, iff there are just as many Fs as Gs.34 The meaning of "number" is determined by the equivalence relation "just as many" or "equinumerous". Frege merely hinted at this theory of abstraction, and only recently has it been more fully developed by crispin Wright and Bob Hale.35 Because equivalence relations are reflexive, symmetrical, and transitive, they can be used to introduce continuants that preserve their identity through time. But we are dealing with a theory of abstraction. continuants become abstracta in a very specific sense. Peter Simons makes use of this Fregean intuition when he introduces continuants in his ontology, which is basically a 4d-account that does not recognize 3d-substances.36 It might be useful to clarify the basic idea a little more. Take a number of objects over which an equivalence relation has been defined, say, an equivalence relation with regard to their mass. It may be called "equi-massive". Then reformulate using Frege's analysis. But this time we begin with the equivalence relation: "a is equi-massive to b" can be conceptually transformed into "the mass of a = the mass of b". Thus, the abstract idea of mass has been introduced, and the term "mass" refers to it. Now let's apply this procedure in the context of this paper. Let's call entities that are endowed with a mental or proto-mental perspective on the world "perspectival". We define an equivalence relation over the set of entities that are perspectival: "a is equi-perspectival to b" can be conceptually transformed into: "the perspective of a = the perspective of b". This can be done for first-person perspectives as well: "a is first-person-equi-perspectival to b" can be conceptually transformed into: "the first-person perspective of a = the first-person perspective of b". So far we have been working within the framework of the theory of abstraction developed by Frege, Hale, and Wright. In the context of personal identity through time this account needs to be expanded because a and b exist at different points in time: 34 See the excellent presentation of this topic in: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/abstract-objects/. 35 See, for instance, Bob Hale and Crispin Wright, "The Meta-Ontology of Abstraction", in David Chalmers et al. (eds), Metametaphysics. New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology (Oxford: Clarendon 2009), pp. 178–212. 36 See Simons, "The Thread of Persistence". 10 von 15 IMPORTANT: When citing this article, please refer to the print-version: Gasser, Georg (ed.): Personal Identity and Resurrection. London: 2010, 67-85. "the first-person perspective of a at t1 = the first-person perspective of b at t2 " can be conceptually transformed into: "the first-person perspective of a at t1 = the first-person perspective of b at t2". The first-person perspective is the identity criterion for persons. Two persons are identical if they have identical first person perspectives on the world (such that they are able to use the personal pronoun "I" to refer to themselves). One thus arrives finally at: "the person at t1 = the person at t2". Personal Identity What has been developed above is in a nutshell a theory of personal identity. The most striking feature is that, according to this account, the concept "person" refers to an abstract object that was introduced by an equivalence relation. The question that immediately comes to mind is this: how can two events featuring a perspective considered to be equi-perspectival? Identity of perspective must not be used to ascribe the relation of being equi-perspectival, because that would entail a vicious circle. The abstract notion of a perspective ought to be derived. The equivalence relations must thus be introduced independently of the abstract entities that will be derived by these equivalence relations. This is where process ontology developed above helps fill the gaps. A suitable equivalence relation stands in need of certain stable patterns and the appropriate causal connection. Because these two elements are sufficient for establishing genidentity, they are also sufficient to establish equivalence relations. The "Thread of Persistence" between the events in a temporal sequence is genidentity. Genidentity, as Whitehead points out,37 rests on the appropriate causal connection and a common element of form. The thread of immanent causation thus established allows for a multitude of momentary events to be joined into an enduring, stable process. But the process is not yet a 3d-object; it is a stable and rhythmic repetition of similar events. The 3d-object, according to the key claim, does not exist independently of the mental abstraction that works with equivalence relations. It is an ens rationis. A thinking mind can make use of the equivalence relations that are based on causal relations and common forms, this is a mental process that results via abstraction in a 3d-continuant. Continuants are abstract objects which can be realized at several points in time and non-simultaneously at several spatial locations. They are well-founded in the reality of the appropriately related events. It is thus by our mental activity that we introduce into the world the stability that withstands the eroding power of the Heraclitean flux. This account does indeed imply a sort of Berkeleyan idealism with regard to 3d-substances. Their being is partially a "being conceived" as continuant. To the question that was raised against Berkeley as to what happens with them if nobody is thinking of them, the theists among the process metaphysicians might well answer just like Berkeley: God secures their existence with his omnipresent mind. One could, however, bite the bullet and grant that there are no 3d-substances in the world that exist independently of the human mind. The introduction of substances might then be conceived as the "original sin" of Western metaphysics.38 Taking stock: Rescher's claim that process philosophers tend to be idealists with regard to 37 Whitehead, Process, p. 34. 38 This view has been advanced recently by Lorenz B. Puntel, Structure and Being (University Park, Pa: Penn State University Press, 2008). 11 von 15 IMPORTANT: When citing this article, please refer to the print-version: Gasser, Georg (ed.): Personal Identity and Resurrection. London: 2010, 67-85. substances was spelled out by drawing on a theory of abstraction originally introduced by Frege. The result was an abstractionist view of 3d-continuants. Continuants without temporal parts are thus abstractions that we introduce in order to structure our physical environment and possibly even more so our social environment. Their introduction is not arbitrary but is founded in the causal relations among events that generate stable patterns through uniform repetition. This relatedness is strong enough that we may speak of genidentity and immanent causation. Sentences about 3dsubstances that are thus ontologically committed to the existence of continuants are not strictly speaking false. In the same way, talk about centers of gravity is not false in physics, even though centers of gravity are abstractions that do not exist strictly speaking. The continuant is not, however, simply identical to a sequence of momentary events which constitutes its life. That would amount to a pure 4d-view. It seems that the 3.5d-view suggested here can prove more fruitful than a 4d-view for understanding our social practices. The 4D-view entirely drops the notoriously difficult notion of a substance and settles instead for a sequence of time slices or stages that are connected in the appropriate way. The account suggested here can introduce ontologically well-founded 3dcontinuants over and above the 4d-base introduced by abstraction. They are thus ontologically dependent on minds and as such differ from classically construed 3d-substances. It is this position between the two well-established camps of 3-dimensionalism and 4-dimensionalism that justifies the talk of the 3.5-dimensionalism featuring as the somewhat provocative title of this paper. One advantage of this view is that it does not require dropping, and in fact provides good reason to maintain, our common-sense 3d-metaphysics. It is a practical necessity to introduce time-invariant fixed points in our common-sense world view. The classical notion of a substance serves this purpose. A revisionist metaphysics implying that there are no entire persons as such but only time-slices of persons or person stages is hardly sustainable in a life lived according to customary social standards. On the abstractionist view advocated here, however, the continuants are fully present at each passing moment. They are a special kind of abstract entity and can thus be present at different times and different places (nonsimultaneously). In the case of personal identity this is of the utmost importance. A single firstperson perspective cannot be shared by two events which exist at different spatial locations. The most difficult issue arises, however, when one contemplates the possibility of fission. What happens if two or more spatially separated personal events are connected in the right way to a sequence of earlier personal events? this is a deep puzzle that cannot easily be solved within a metaphysical account that assumes a 4d-view at the most basic level. Seen from point of view of the persons existing after the fission, several continuants overlap in the past. This is admittedly problematic. In this respect the 3.5d-view does better than the traditional 4d-view, because the continuants are entia rationis and thus mind-dependent. From each point of view, there is thus indeed only one person in the past, and there is no deeper mind-independent level of overlap. Surviving Natural Death The question that prompted this paper was whether abandoning the classical notion of a substance would render the religious notion of possibly surviving one's natural death unintelligible. With the metaphysical framework of process ontology now in place, it will now be shown that this religious hope can indeed be explicated without the reference to the notion of 3d-substances. In an ontology of radical becoming, death loses something of its uniqueness. As demonstrated above, dying is happening constantly in the transition from one momentary event to the next. The fact that we are not worried by this fact is grounded in the experience that in natural life each experienced moment 12 von 15 IMPORTANT: When citing this article, please refer to the print-version: Gasser, Georg (ed.): Personal Identity and Resurrection. London: 2010, 67-85. seems to have an immediate successor which is connected to the earlier one in a way appropriate for establishing genidentity. The concept of genidentity is associated with the concept of immanent causation. The general idea is that a stage s1 of a concrete particular e generates or brings about a later stage s2 of e itself. In the case of persons: a human person P which exists at a time t3 is genidentical to a human person which exists at t1 if the temporal stages that lead to t3 are immanently causally connected with the temporal stage of P at t1. This is the case in our daily experience. The events do have the causal power to bring about their immediate successors. The stream of consciousness which makes our first-person perspective a phenomenal experience, is just this sort of chain of serially ordered events. this is a process which, under normal circumstances, self-perpetuates during the span of a human natural life.39 In the moment of death this causal chain ends abruptly. A subsequent moment of phenomenal experience from the first-person perspective cannot be brought about by the earlier events. Natural life comes to an end. In these circumstances, it seems impossible to survive one's natural death. The dying organism lacks the causal powers to generate a subsequent state that would be able to secure the survival of the first-person perspective. From a Christian point of view this metaphysical analysis hardly comes as a surprise, because human beings are not naturally equipped to survive their natural death. A divine action is needed. The earthly human existence, according to the metaphysical account presented here, is a series of momentary psycho-physical events which are complex enough to sustain a first-person perspective. If God wanted to secure my survival, it would suffice that He created a successor event such that it was connected with the last momentary stage of my earthly existence in the appropriate way. In light of what was developed above this means, first, stability of structure, that is, the endurance of a common form. God would have to create an event that was in relevant aspects sufficiently similar to my earthly existence. The successor must be a human person and not some kind of wildly different being. Most importantly then, the successor must be endowed with a first-person perspective. But one can only reasonably assume that this perspective endures if there is an immanent causal connection bridging the gap, that is, if there is such a connection between my final earthly event and the first event of my afterlife. Only when genidentity is established can numerical identity through time be established, and the latter is established by an act of abstraction using the appropriate equivalence relations. But this is precisely what seems to be impossible. My last earthly event lacks the causal power to bring about all by itself the first event in the afterlife. Here divine concurrence is required. But if the causal chain runs "through" God, then we can no longer speak of immanent causation; we would rather have to admit that an external force is doing the work. Genidentity is thus not preserved. At this point the relevance of recent debates on the compatibility of materialism and survival becomes obvious. Dean Zimmerman has pursued the question whether, in the case of a newly created body in the afterlife, immanent causation could be preserved, even though the causal chain is mediated by God.40 This depends, obviously, on the notion of immanent causation that is being applied, especially which kind of determinants are admissible. If God's intervention is causally necessary but not causally sufficient to bring about the person in the afterlife, then immanent causation might be preserved. Assume God wills and realizes by divine decree: Let there be a person whose first-person perspective on the world is exactly like the one of the person who has just died. In this case God would be necessary for bringing about the successor, but He would not be causally sufficient. The reason is that God does not directly determine how the first-person perspective on the world of the deceased person looks; it is instead determined by the life of the person who has died. The "thread of persistence" really runs "through" God in this case. 39 I am neglecting the question whether there are other causal determinants. There might be an external metaphysical force sustaining this process like Whitehead's creativity or a divine concurrence like a creatio continua. 40 Zimmerman, "Falling Elevator", chapter 2 of this volume. 13 von 15 IMPORTANT: When citing this article, please refer to the print-version: Gasser, Georg (ed.): Personal Identity and Resurrection. London: 2010, 67-85. The obvious and pressing question is now: is the newly created person in the afterlife identical to the deceased earthly person? In the line of the argument given above, the answer is affirmative. Owing to the immanent causal connection secured by divine concurrence there is genidentity between the two personal events. And since from the first-person perspective of the surviving person a 3d-continuant can be abstracted with the relevant equivalence relation (equi-perspectival), the surviving person can be conceived as a continuant without temporal parts. In order to do this in the most efficient way, it would be helpful if the surviving person had a mental representation of his/her entire life experience. In a near-death experience people often have a vivid experience of their temporal existence in a kind of simultaneity that defies description. That is probably the closest analogy we can get for the experience to integrate the fullness of one's earthly life into the life to come. Complete and radical psychological discontinuity (of memory and character) is hard to reconcile with the idea of survival. Survival means that the fullness of experience is somehow integrated in and preserved by the life to come. But the continuant is not identical to its life. In that respect the view advocated here is different from a 4d-account. By the very process of abstraction one disassociates oneself from the mere sequence of events which elapse like a movie made from individual frames, and thus integrates them as experiences of one and the same person (a continuant). The unity of the person is again established by a mental act, an act of abstraction. Subjectivity replaces the old notion of substance. Again, the Berkeleyan problem of what then remains of the person independently of the human mind might be resolved by taking into account mental acts of recognition and individuation by God. What happens to bodily resurrection in this process-ontological account? It seems that we end up in a position that is relevantly similar to Lynne Baker's constitution theory, in which the identity of the first-person perspective is what exclusively ensures survival. The body does no metaphysical work.41 In our account, the "thread of persistence" was woven by causal relations and by a common element of form. The analysis of the mind-body problem within the framework of process ontology repudiated the cartesian "bifurcation" of mind and body, defending instead a psycho-physical bipolarism. Does this psycho-physical bipolarity belong to the indispensable characteristics of a human person that must somehow be preserved as a common element of form in order to ensure that the "thread of persistence" is not severed? This seems to be the case. Human persons are endowed with senses and thus experiences that are sensual in character. Could a human being survive as a spirit without any sensual experience at all? Humans have a clear conception of "inside" and "outside", notions that would not make sense to a pure spirit without sense experience or something similar. If humans cannot become angelic spirits in the afterlife without ceasing to be human persons, then some kind of bodily existence needs to be preserved. It is not necessary, however, that the resurrected body be numerically identical with the biological body we now possess. It might well be a body of a radically different kind. Finally, and in closing, a few remarks on time and eternity. On a presentist metaphysics of time, the claim that human persons exist temporally implies that only the present is fully real and given in its fullness. The richness of my past exists only inasmuch it is preserved in my present; as such it is no longer existent. No human being experiences my pain of 20 years ago, I may only re-enact its experience now. My future experiences are not yet real. It is only the abstract idea of an enduring person (without temporal parts) which integrates this process of radical becoming into a true unity. A unity which is not simply the agglomeration of all my experiences, but the integral unity that makes it possible to speak of each of those experiences as mine, the experiences of an enduring subject of experience. As a tribute to our temporal existence, we need the idea of a 3d-substance in order to prevent our life from disintegrating into a series of episodes. It is hard to imagine the life to 41 Lynne Rudder Baker, "Persons and the Metaphysics of Resurrection", Religious Studies, 43 (2007), pp. 333–48. 14 von 15 IMPORTANT: When citing this article, please refer to the print-version: Gasser, Georg (ed.): Personal Identity and Resurrection. London: 2010, 67-85. come is simply an endless repetitive addition of more and more moments in time. This is a thought that many may find hard to bear. Personally, I picture eternal life more like a "filled moment", an eternal "now". That is just a metaphor, of course, for our imagination is incapable of picturing an existence outside of the time known to us. But if this is so, then we will not in the afterlife need the abstract idea of an enduring substance without temporal parts which integrates the temporal flux of our existence. We need it in this life, so as not to be drowned in the flux of ever new events. If in the life to come there is no time that flows in this way, then we can lay the question of substances and 3D-objects to rest. It is a question that makes sense only in the natural world. It has thus been shown that the religious hope of surviving one's natural death is not necessarily tied to the idea of substances as conceived in classical metaphysics. the idea of resurrection can be formulated independently of substance metaphysics. 15 von

e-ISSN: 2582-5208 International Research Journal of Modernization in Engineering Technology and Science Volume:02/Issue:04/April-2020 www.irjmets.com www.irjmets.com @International Research Journal of Modernization in Engineering, Technology and Science [133] COMPARISON OF PID AND MPC CONTROLLERS FOR CONTINUOUS STIRRED TANK REACTOR (CSTR) CONCENTRATION CONTROL Mustefa Jibril *1 , Messay Tadese *2 , Eliyas Alemayehu Tadese *3 *1,2 Msc, School of Electrical & Computer Engineering, Dire Dawa Institute of Technology, Dire Dawa, Ethiopia *3 Msc, Faculty of Electrical & Computer Engineering, Jimma Institute of Technology, Jimma, Ethiopia ABSTRACT Continuous Stirred Tank Reactor (CSTR) is amajorarea in process, chemical and control engineering. In this paper, PID and MPC controllers are designed for CSTR in order to analyze the output concentration of the system by comparing the two proposed systems using Matlab/Simulink. Comparison have been made using two desired concentration input (Random reference and step) signals with and without input side disturbance (Flow rate error). The simulation result shows that the continuous stirred tank reactor with MPC controller have better response in minimizing the overshoot and tracking the desired concentration for the system without input disturbance and with the effect of the disturbance makes the continuous stirred tank reactor with MPC controller output with small fluctuations and still better than the continuous stirred tank reactor with PID controller. Finally the comparative analysis and simulation results prove the effectiveness of the continuous stirred tank reactor with MPC controller. Keywords: Continuous Stirred Tank Reactor (CSTR), PID controller, MPC controller I. INTRODUCTION A Continuous Stirred Tank Reactor (CSTR) a highly nonlinear system and is an essential system in many industrial processes that require continuous addition and removing of reactants and products. In order to maximize the industrial productivity in process plants, these reactors are maintained at very high precision rates. A CSTR sometimes be an opposite of an idealized well-stirred batch reactor. The series of operating points should exhibit a stable steady estate dealing under the demeanor of disturbance as well. Linear controllers designed for such tendency fail to deliver optimal achievement outside the linear operating range. 1. Continuous Stirred Tank Reactor Description Model In this paper, we've adopted a nonlinear model of a CSTR under the idea that contents are properly mixed and for this reason, concentration is equal anywhere inside the reaction vessel. A diagram of the system is shown in Figure 1 below. Figure 1: Continuous stirred tank reactor system e-ISSN: 2582-5208 International Research Journal of Modernization in Engineering Technology and Science Volume:02/Issue:04/April-2020 www.irjmets.com www.irjmets.com @International Research Journal of Modernization in Engineering, Technology and Science [134] The dynamic model of the system is          1 2 0.2 1 dh t w t w t h t dt                           1 2 11 2 2 2 2 1 b b b b b b b dC t w t w t k C t C C t C C t dt h t h t k C t        Where h (t) Liquid level,  bC t Product concentration at the output of the process,  1w t Flow rate of the concentrated feed 1bC , and  2w t Flow rate of the diluted feed 2bC . 2. The Proposed Controllers 2.1 PID Control A proportional–integral–derivative control is a control closed-loop feedback system which is widely used in control systems. A PID controller achieves to maintain the error between a measured variable and a desired set point by adjusting and outputting an exact action that can maintain the process fatly and accurately, to keep the error minimal. The PID controller involves three separate parameters; the proportional, the integral and derivative values. The proportional value determines the response to the contemporary error, the integral value determines the response primarily based at the sum of latest error, and the derivative value determines the response primarily based at the rate at which the error has been changing. Figure 2: Block Diagram of PID Controller A PID controller may be referred to as a PI, PD, P or I controller inside the absence of the respective manage movements. PI controllers are specifically common, considering that derivative action may be very touchy to size noise, and the absence of an integral value can also save you the device from accomplishing its target value because of the manage action. In this paper, we have use automatic tuning of PID controller. Table 1 shows the PID parameter values. Table 1: PID parameters No Parameters Value 1 PK 2.88847879306232 2 IK 0.9787824154907306 3 DK -0.0884151983707181 e-ISSN: 2582-5208 International Research Journal of Modernization in Engineering Technology and Science Volume:02/Issue:04/April-2020 www.irjmets.com www.irjmets.com @International Research Journal of Modernization in Engineering, Technology and Science [135] 2.2 Model Predictive Control The overall objectives of an MPC controller are 1. Prevent violations of input and output constraints. 2. Drive some output variables to their most desirable set points, even as retaining different outputs inside exact tiers 3. Prevent immoderate movement of the input variables. 4. Control as many process variables as feasible when a sensor or actuator isn't always available. Figure 3: Block diagram for model predictive control. A block diagram of a model predictive manipulate system is shown in Figure 3. A system model is used to expect the modern values of the output variables. The residuals, the differences among the actual and anticipated outputs, serve as the feedback sign to a Prediction block. The predictions are used in two forms of MPC calculations that are done at each sampling immediately: set-factor calculations and manage calculations. Inequality constraints on the input and output variables, inclusive of higher and decrease limits, can be protected in both kind of calculation. II. RESULT AND DISCUSSION In this section the simulation of a continuous stirred tank reactor with PID and MPC controller's output concentration using desired output concentration signals (Random reference input and step input) for with and without input disturbance is done. In this paper, the input concentrations are set to Cb1 = 24.9 and Cb2 = 0.1. The constants associated with the rate of consumption are K1 = 1 and K2 = 1. The objective of the controller is to maintain the product concentration by adjusting the flow W1(t). To simplify the Simulink model, we choose to set W2(t)= 0.1. The level of the tank h(t) is not controlled for this paper. Comparison of continuous stirred tank reactor with PID and MPC controller without Input Disturbance The Simulink model for a continuous stirred tank reactor with PID and MPC controllers for a Random reference input and step input signals without input disturbance is shown in Figure 4 and Figure 5 respectively. Figure 4: Simulink model for a continuous stirred tank reactor with PID and MPC controllers for a Random reference input without input disturbance e-ISSN: 2582-5208 International Research Journal of Modernization in Engineering Technology and Science Volume:02/Issue:04/April-2020 www.irjmets.com www.irjmets.com @International Research Journal of Modernization in Engineering, Technology and Science [136] Figure 5: Simulink model for a continuous stirred tank reactor with PID and MPC controllers for a Step input without input disturbance The simulation result of a continuous stirred tank reactor with PID and MPC controllers for a Random reference input and step input signals without input disturbance is shown in Figure 6 and Figure 7 respectively. Figure 6: Random reference response of output concentration without input disturbance e-ISSN: 2582-5208 International Research Journal of Modernization in Engineering Technology and Science Volume:02/Issue:04/April-2020 www.irjmets.com www.irjmets.com @International Research Journal of Modernization in Engineering, Technology and Science [137] Figure 7: Step input response of output concentration without input disturbance As the result shown from Figure 6 and Figure 7, the continuous stirred tank reactor with MPC controller have better response in minimizing the overshoot and tracking the desired concentration better than the continuous stirred tank reactor with PID controller. Comparison of continuous stirred tank reactor with PID and MPC controller with Input Disturbance The Simulink model for a continuous stirred tank reactor with PID and MPC controllers for a Random reference input and step input signals with input disturbance is shown in Figure 8 and Figure 9 respectively. Figure 8: Simulink model for a continuous stirred tank reactor with PID and MPC controllers for a Random reference input with input disturbance e-ISSN: 2582-5208 International Research Journal of Modernization in Engineering Technology and Science Volume:02/Issue:04/April-2020 www.irjmets.com www.irjmets.com @International Research Journal of Modernization in Engineering, Technology and Science [138] Figure 9: Simulink model for a continuous stirred tank reactor with PID and MPC controllers for a Step input with input disturbance The simulation result of a continuous stirred tank reactor with PID and MPC controllers for a Random reference input and step input signals with input disturbance is shown in Figure 10 and Figure 11 respectively. Figure 10: Random reference response of output concentration with input disturbance e-ISSN: 2582-5208 International Research Journal of Modernization in Engineering Technology and Science Volume:02/Issue:04/April-2020 www.irjmets.com www.irjmets.com @International Research Journal of Modernization in Engineering, Technology and Science [139] Figure 11: Step input response of output concentration with input disturbance As the result shown from Figure 10 and Figure 11, the continuous stirred tank reactor with MPC controller have better response in minimizing the overshoot and tracking the desired concentration with the effect of the disturbance makes the output with small fluctuations and it is better than the continuous stirred tank reactor with PID controller. III. CONCLUSION The modeling description and design of continuous stirred tank reactor with the proposed controllers have been done successfully. The performance investigation of the systems including comparisons of the proposed controllers for the output concentration control purpose analysis is done using Matlab/Simulink. The simulation results of continuous stirred tank reactor without input disturbance shows that the continuous stirred tank reactor with MPC controller almost exactly follow the desired concentration efficiently in both the random reference and step input signals. The simulation results of continuous stirred tank reactor with input disturbance shows that the continuous stirred tank reactor with MPC controller shows a small effect of the disturbance vibration and follows the desired concentration in both the random reference and step inputs. Finally the comparative simulation results proved the effectiveness of the continuous stirred tank reactor with MPC controller. IV. REFERENCE [1] KC Cheng et al. "Model of Hyper branched Polymers Prepared via Polymerization of AB2 and Core C3 Monomers in a Continuous Stirred Tank Reactor" Journal of chemical Engineering Research and Design (Elsevier), 2020. [2] Neha K. et al. "Control System Design and Performance Analysis of PID and IMC Controllers for Continuous Stirred Tank Reactor (CSTR)" Journal of Control and Instrumentation, Vol. 10, No. 1, 2019. [3] DD Mohite et al. "Performance Optimization of Anaerobic Continuous Stirred Tank Reactor Operating on Distillery Spent Wash" Journal of Environmental Engineering, 2019. [4] Z Ye et al. "Disturbance Observer Based Adaptive Sliding Mode Control for Continuous Stirred Tank Reactor" Chinese Control Conference (CCC), 2019. [5] GB S. et al. "Fuzzy Based Nonlinear PID Controller and its Application to CSTR" Korean Journal of Chemical Engineering, 2018. e-ISSN: 2582-5208 International Research Journal of Modernization in Engineering Technology and Science Volume:02/Issue:04/April-2020 www.irjmets.com www.irjmets.com @International Research Journal of Modernization in Engineering, Technology and Science [140] [6] A Sinha et al."Control of a Nonlinear Continuous Stirred Tank Reactor via Event Triggered Sliding Modes" Journal of Chemical Engineering Science (Elsevier), 2018. [7] Matusu et al. "Robust Stabilization of a Continuous Stirred Tank Reactor Model" Annals of DAAAM and Proceedings, Vol.27, pp. 147-150, 2016. [8] Lee J. et al." Temperature Control of a CSTR using a Nonlinear PID Controller" Journal of Institute of Control, Robotics and Systems, Vol. 21, Issue. 5, pp. 482-489, 2015.

The Counterpart Principle of Analogical Support by Structural Similarity A.Hill∗ and J.B.Paris School of Mathematics The University of Manchester Manchester M13 9PL [email protected] [email protected] August 21, 2013 Abstract We propose and investigate an Analogy Principle in the context of Unary Inductive Logic based on a notion of support by structural similarity which is often employed to motivate scientific conjectures. Key words: Analogy, Inductive Logic, Probability Logic, Uncertain Reasoning. Introduction Starting with the founding work of Carnap, [1], there have been a number of attempts within Inductive Logic to formally capture the idea of 'analogical support' between evidence and hypotheses, for example [5], [16], [27], [28]. These attempts to date do not seem to us to have provided a comprehensive formal justification to explain the intuitive appeal of 'support by analogy', and indeed our earlier paper ∗Supported by a UK Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC) Research Studentship 1 [10] shows that some of these formalizations have very limited applicability. By contrast in this paper we shall present an analogy principle within the context of Inductive Logic which holds widely, in particular it holds for the continua of inductive methods of Carnap and Nix-Paris. This principle is inspired by an alternative account of analogical support based on structural similarity. The structure of this paper is that after a section introducing the formal context and notation. we shall briefly motivate the notion of analogy, structural similarity, which we intend to formalize and investigate. Such a formalization, the Counterpart Principle as we shall call it, together with an investigation into conditions under which it does/does not hold will then follow. Context and Notation We will be working, as usual, in the first order framework for (unary) Inductive Logic1 where we have a predicate language L with finitely many, say q, (unary) predicate symbols P1, ..., Pq , constant symbols a1, a2, a3, . . ., the intention being that these constants enumerate the universe, and no function symbols nor equality. Let SL denote the set of sentences of L and QFSL the quantifier free sentences of L. We will use θ, φ, ψ etc. for elements of SL and adopt throughout the convention that if we write a sentence as θ(ai1 , ai2 , . . . , ain) then all the constants appearing in θ are amongst these ai1 , ai2 , . . . , ain , though they need not all actually appear. In this context, where the ai are intended to enumerate the universe, we define a Probability Function on L to be a map w : SL → [0, 1] such that for all θ, φ,∃xψ(x) ∈ SL: (P1) If |= θ then w(θ) = 1. 1Our general approach to Inductive Logic, see for example [21], [23], is actually close to what Carnap in [3] termed Pure Inductive Logic, the intention of 'Pure' here being similar to that in 'Pure Mathematics'. That is, our aim is to investigate the logic itself in isolation, devoid of any particular intended real world interpretation. Of course the rational principles with which Pure Inductive Logic is concerned are (and indeed should be if the subject is not to become simple mathematics for its own sake) almost invariably motivated by real world examples. But once such principles are formulated it is then the task of Pure Inductive Logic to investigate their consequences as they stand, without borrowing further from any particular, special, interpretation. It is akin to studying a differential equation which has arisen in modeling, say, a bridge. Its solutions apply to any model for which the equation is appropriate, and it they do not apply to the particular bridge we started of with then that is because the original formulation was somehow lacking, not that the differential equation itself is at fault. 2 (P2) If θ |= ¬φ then w(θ ∨ φ) = w(θ) + w(φ). (P3) w(∃xψ(x)) = limm→∞w( ∨m i=1 ψ(ai)). The following theorem, due to Gaifman, [8], shows that a probability function w is actually already determined by its action on QFSL. Theorem 1. Let w : QFSL → [0, 1] satisfy (P1), (P2) for θ, φ ∈ QFSL. Then w has a unique extension to SL satisfying (P1-3). The aim in Inductive Logic, as we view it, is to pick out probability functions on L which are arguably logical or rational in the sense that they could be the choice of a rational agent. Or to put it another way to discard probability functions which could be judged in some sense to be 'irrational'.2 The usual method of thinning down towards such rational choices is to impose 'rationality principles' which these probability functions should arguably satisfy. Of course there can be considerable disagreement about which principles are rational (to the extent of different candidates being mutually inconsistent, see for example [20]) but one such widely accepted principle is that the inherent symmetry between the constants should be respected by any rational probability function w on L. Precisely w should satisfy: The Constant Exchangeability Principle (Ex) For θ, θ′ ∈ QFSL, if θ′ is obtained from θ by replacing the constant symbols3 ai1 , ai2 , . . . , ain in θ by ak1 , ak2 , . . . , akn , respectively, then w(θ) = w(θ ′). It is worth remarking that Ex in fact implies this same principle even for θ, θ′ ∈ SL. Thus in Theorem 1 if w satisfies Ex then so will its extension to SL. The atoms4 of the language L are the formulae αi(x), i = 1, 2, . . . , 2 q, of the form ±P1(x) ∧±P2(x) ∧ ... ∧±Pq(x) where ±Pj stands for either Pj or ¬Pj. The atoms are disjoint and exhaustive, so if w is a probability function on L then by (P1-2), for any m, w(α1(am)), w(α2(am)), . . . , w(α2q (am)) ≥ 0 and ∑ i w(αi(am)) = 1. 2It is interesting that 'irrationality' seems much easier to spot than 'rationality'. 3In such lists all the terms will be assumed to be distinct unless otherwise stated. 4Corresponding to Carnap's Q-predicates within the present framework. 3 Conversely for any such vector of non-negative numbers xi with sum 1 there is a probability function w on L with w(αi(am)) = xi for i = 1, 2, . . . , 2 q. Namely for ~x ∈ D2q = {〈x1, ...x2q 〉 |xi ≥ 0, 2q ∑ i=1 xi = 1} define w~x on state descriptions, that is sentences of the form ∧n i=1 αhi(aki), by w~x ( n ∧ i=1 αhi(aki) ) = n ∏ i=1 xhi = 2q ∏ j=1 x nj j where nj is the number of times that the atom αj occurs amongst the αhi . Using the Disjunctive Normal Form Theorem it is easy to see that w~x can be extended to QFSL to satisfy (P1-2) and Ex and hence by Theorem 1 to a probability function on L, which continues to satisfy Ex. Clearly also w~x(αi(am)) = xi for i = 1, 2, . . . , 2q (and any am). In what follows we take Ex as a standing assumption. This allows us access to a powerful representation theorem due to de Finetti, see [7].5 De Finetti's Representation Theorem If the probability function w on L satisfies Ex then there is a (countably additive) measure μ on D2q such that for θ ∈ SL, w(θ) = ∫ D2q w~x(θ) dμ(~x). (1) Conversely if w is defined by (1) then w is a probability function on L satisfying Ex. We refer to the measure μ here as the de Finetti prior of w. In [9] Gaifman showed the following consequence of de Finetti's Representation Theorem:6 5As given here the converse direction assumes a result due to Gaifman on restrictions of probability functions, see [8]. 6One may have hoped that such an elementary and comprehendible statement as this theorem would have a correspondingly elementary and comprehendible proof, using only simple applications of (P1-2) say. Unfortunately we know of no such proof and quite commonly it appears that in this subject we cannot avoid diversions into 'higher mathematics'. We will later see an (apparently) similar situation with the use of Theorems 10, 11 to conclude on page 17 that Carnap's cλ, for 0 < λ < ∞, satisfy our forthcoming Counterpart Principle. 4 Theorem 2. If the probability function w on L satisfies Ex then it satisfies: The Principle of Instantial Relevance (PIR) For ψ ∈ QFSL, α an atom of L and ai, aj distinct constant symbols not mentioned in ψ,7 w(α(ai) |α(aj) ∧ ψ) ≥ w(α(ai) |ψ). (2) In short the additional evidence α(aj) enhances (or at least does not decrease) the probability of α(ai) conditional on evidence ψ. Extending the idea of symmetry between symbols of the language, we might also feel it rational to require that the predicates be exchangeable. The Predicate Exchangeability Principle (Px) For θ, θ′ ∈ QFSL, if θ′ is obtained from θ by replacing the (distinct) predicate symbols Pj1 , Pj2 , . . . , Pjm appearing in θ by the (distinct) predicate symbols Ps1 , Ps2 , ...Psm respectively, then w(θ) = w(θ ′). Using Theorem 1 it is easy to show that Px implies that the same property holds even when θ, θ′ are sentences of L rather than just quantifier free sentences, a fact that we shall use without further mention in what follows. The following is a stronger symmetry based principle which is also frequently seen in Inductive Logic; for example, it is satisfied by both Carnap's Continuum of Inductive Methods and the Nix-Paris Continuum, [20]. The Atom Exchangeability Principle (Ax) If σ is a permutation of 1, 2, ..., 2q , then w ( n ∧ i=1 αhi(aji) ) = w ( n ∧ i=1 ασ(hi)(aji) ) Note that Ax (with Ex) implies that the probability of a state description θ = ∧n i=1 αhi(aji) depends only on the multiset 8 {n1, n2, . . . , n2q} where nj is the number of times that the atom αj appears amongst the αhi . We call this multiset the spectrum of θ. It follows then that stated in this form Ax implies Px. 7In order to circumvent any problems when the conditioning sentence has probability zero we take an expression such as w(φ1 |ψ1) ≥ w(φ2 |ψ2) to be short for the inequality formed by multiplying out the denominators, i.e. w(φ1 ∧ψ1) *w(ψ2) ≥ w(φ2 ∧ψ2) *w(ψ1) in this case. So PIR as defined will automatically hold when w(α(aj) ∧ ψ) = 0 since both sides of the inequality will then be zero. 8A multiset is just a set in which we allow the same element to appear more than once. The usual convention here is that nj which are zero are omitted from mention in the spectrum. However in this case it will be convenient to include them. 5 In addition to symmetry there have been numerous attempts to incorporate principles based on analogy into Inductive Logic, initially by Carnap, for example in [4], by Carnap & Stegmüller [5] and later for example by Festa [6], Kuipers [13], Maher [16], [17], Maio [18], Niiniluoto [19], Romeijn [27], Skyrms [28]. Generally these have considered analogy as deriving from the sharing of similar or identical properties by the constants. In other words, a principle has been sought based on a notion of distance between atoms. This approach means that Ax is violated. Although this may not be a failing of such principles it is interesting to note that the alternative conception of analogy presented in this paper is consistent with Ax and is widely satisfied, including by the probability functions of the afore-mentioned continua. Support by Structural Similarity As a toy example9 of what we have in mind by 'support by structural similarity' suppose that I am observing windfall pears and the first three I see are all green. Then that should not decrease my belief that the next three pears observed will all have a maggot, since my first observation of the three green pears suggests that these pears are a pretty uniform bunch, so no less likely to all have a maggot than was the case before I had observed the three green pears. For an everyday example consider the assertion that there is, or at least once has been, life on Mars. Most of us (we imagine) would think this was indeed worth the multi-billion dollars so far spent trying to confirm it. Equally however for most of us this is (we again imagine) largely based on the similarity between the Earth and Mars. They are both planets with fairly similar ages and orbits, and both have atmospheres of sorts. On top of that 'Earth-Life' is abundant almost across the globe so isn't 'Mars-Life' just a missing piece in the jigsaw, in the pattern, something almost to be expected? Interestingly we can give here a third example which directly relates to Theorem 3 of this paper. As we have seen in the presence of Constant Exchangeability, Ex, we have the Principle of Instantial Relevance, PIR, saying that, in the notation of (2), the additional evidence α(aj) provides support for α(ai). In that case we might conjecture that there should be some similar 'Support Principle' when we have Predicate Exchangeability in place of Constant Exchangeability. As we shall see this is exactly the case. This last example is by no means uncommon within our experience of doing mathematics. In fact with most conjectures one makes there is somewhere in the back9Arising out of the discussion with one of the reviewers. 6 ground a structurally similar situation in which the corresponding conjecture has been confirmed. This is not to say that this is invariably the right goal to aim for, quite often one's conjecture based on this form of analogy turns out to be false, but what it does seem to show is that in forming and attempting to confirm such conjectures we are implicitly giving credence to a principle of support by structural similarity. Nor, of course, do our experiences here seem to differ from those of our fellow mathematicians, or even scientists in general – in [25], [26] Polya gives a nice account of just such analogical reasoning. The Counterpart Principle In view of the above discussion we are lead to propose, within the context of PIL, the following as a principle of analogical reasoning: Counterpart Principle (CP)10 For any θ ∈ SL, if θ′ ∈ SL is obtained by replacing the predicate and constant symbols appearing in θ by (distinct) new ones not occurring in θ then w(θ | θ′ ) ≥ w(θ). (3) Our plan now in this section is to show that the Counterpart Principle, CP, is rather widely satisfied. In the section which follows we will make some observations on when we can have strict inequality in (3). 10Superficial this principle might be thought to resemble the Analogieschluss ('inference by induction') of Carnap & Stegmüller dating back to their [5, p226]. The intuition here is that for state descriptions ψ(a1, . . . , an) = n ∧ i=1 αL1hi (ai), φ(a1, . . . , an) = n ∧ i=1 αL2gi (ai) for disjoint languages L1, L2 the probability of the state description ψ(a1, . . . , an) ∧ φ(a1, . . . , an) of L1 ∪ L2 should be greater the more often hi = hj ⇐⇒ gi = gj . The difference here with CP is that here the analogy or link is between the relations of indistinguishability between the same ai engendered by ψ and φ whereas in CP it is between the forms of sentences θ, θ′ involving disjoint ai. (For more on Carnap & Stegmüller's Analogieschluss within the approach to Inductive Logic taken here see [15], [23].) 7 We need the following notion: A probability function w on a language L is said to satisfy Unary Language Invariance, ULi, if there is a family of probability functions wL, one on each unary language L, each satisfying Px, such that wL = w and whenever L ⊂ L′ then wL ′ restricted to SL (notice that SL ⊆ SL′) equals wL. We say that w satisfies ULi with Ax if in addition we can choose these wL to satisfy Ax. Our argument in favour of it being rational for a probability function w on L to satisfy ULi is that it appears reasonable to suppose that were we to enlarge the language then w could be extended to this larger language, after all it would seem unjustified to assume from the start that L was all the language there could ever be (a point made by Kemeny already in [12]). Similarly if we are assuming the position that P is a property our rational choice of probability function w on L should possess then we should equally demand this property of our chosen extension to larger languages. This then provides a rational justification for Language Invariance. In particular we should require that the probability functions in this family satisfy Px (and Ex by standing assumption), thus yielding ULi. Note that ULi equivalently means that w can be extended to a probability function w∞ on the infinite language L∞ = {P1, P2, P3, . . .} satisfying Px. In more detail, given the ULi family {wL} we let Ln be the language with predicate symbols {P1, P2, . . . , Pn} and for θ ∈ SL∞ set w∞(θ) = w Ln(θ) for any n sufficiently large that θ ∈ SLn. Conversely, given such a probability function w∞ and a language L with predicate symbols {R1, R2, . . . , Rn} we can define the required w L(θ) to be w∞(θ ′) where θ′ is the result of replacing each Ri in θ by Pi. (Notice that by Px this is independent of how we list the predicate symbols of L.) Theorem 3. Let w satisfy ULi. Then w satisfies the Counterpart Principle, CP. Proof. Assume that w satisfies ULi and let w∞ be a probability function on the infinite (unary) language L∞ = {P1, P2, P3, . . .} extending w and satisfying Px. Let θ, θ′ be as in the statement of CP, without loss of generality assume that all the constant symbols appearing in θ are amongst a1, a2, . . . , ak, all the relation symbols appearing in θ are amongst P1, P2, . . . , Pj , and for θ ′ they are correspondingly ak+1, ak+2, . . . , a2k, Pj+1, Pj+2, . . . , P2j . So we can write θ = θ(a1, a2, . . . , ak, P1, P2, . . . , Pj), θ′ = θ(ak+1, ak+2, . . . , a2k, Pj+1, Pj+2, . . . , P2j). 8 With this in place let θi+1 = θ(aik+1, aik+2, . . . , a(i+1)k , Pij+1, Pij+2, . . . , P(i+1)j) ∈ SL∞ so θ1 = θ, θ2 = θ ′. Let L be the unary language with a single unary relation symbol P and define τ : QFSL → SL∞ by τ(P (ai)) = θi, τ(¬φ) = ¬τ(φ), τ(φ ∧ ψ) = τ(φ) ∧ τ(ψ), etc. for φ,ψ ∈ QFSL. Now define v : QFSL → [0, 1] by v(φ) = w∞(τ(φ)). Then since w∞ satisfies (P1-2) (on SL∞) so does v (on QFSL). Also since w∞ satisfies Ex + Px, for φ ∈ QFSL, permuting the θi in w(τ(φ)) will leave this value unchanged so permuting the ai in φ will leave v(φ) unchanged. i.e. v satisfies Ex. By Theorem 1 v has an extension to a probability function on SL satisfying Ex and hence satisfying PIR by Theorem 2. In particular then v(P (a1) |P (a2)) ≥ v(P (a1)). But since τ(P (a1)) = θ, τ(P (a2)) = θ ′ this amounts to w∞(θ | θ ′) ≥ w∞(θ) and hence gives the Counterpart Principle for w since w∞ agrees with w on SL. We remark that by a small amendment of the proof this conclusion, CP, can be strengthen to require that only some of the constant and predicate symbols in θ are changed when forming θ′. Furthermore by then using w∞ conditioned on ψ in place of w∞ through this proof we can further strengthen the conclusion to w(θ | θ′ ∧ ψ) ≥ w(θ |ψ) for any ψ ∈ SL mentioning only constant and predicate symbols common to both θ and θ′ The condition ULi required for Theorem 3 holds for the cLλ of Carnap's Continuum of Inductive Methods, [2], and also for the wδL of the Nix-Paris Continuum 11 defined 11See [20] for an explanation of how this continuum, like Carnap's Continuum of Inductive Methods, is singled out by arguably rational principles. 9 by wδL = 2 −q 2q ∑ j=1 w~ej where ~ej = 〈γ, γ, . . . , γ, γ + δ, γ, . . . , γ, γ〉, the δ occurring in the jth coordinate, γ = 2−q(1 − δ) and 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1. Indeed they both satisfy the stronger condition of ULi with Ax, the language invariant families being given by fixing λ, respectively δ, and varying L, see [20], [21], or for a more technical account [14] or [23]. It is worth noting that we cannot do without ULi here, Ex and Px alone do not guarantee that a probability function satisfies CP. As an example here let q = 2 and take w to be the probability function12 w = 4−1(w〈 1 2 , 1 2 ,0,0〉 + w〈 1 2 ,0, 1 2 ,0〉 + w〈0, 1 2 ,0, 1 2 〉 + w〈0,0, 1 2 , 1 2 〉). Then w satisfies Ex and Px. However for θ = (P1(a1) ∧ ¬P1(a2)), θ ′ = (P2(a3) ∧ ¬P2(a4)), a straightforward calculation shows that w(θ | θ′) = 0 < w(θ) = 18 . Hence CP fails for this function. A second argument for restricting attention here to probability functions satisfying ULi (equivalently to probability functions on L∞) is that without it the lack of available predicates from which to form θ′ from θ becomes a significant nuisance factor. Given this, and the fact that the main interest in Inductive Logic is in probability functions satisfying Ax, we shall henceforth limit our attention to probability functions satisfying ULi with Ax. The Strict Counterpart Principle In the previous section we considered the version of the Counterpart Principle, (3), asserting that the evidence θ′ does not decrease the probability of θ. We now make some observations on when we can, and cannot, assert that θ′ strictly increases the probability of θ, what one might call the 'Strict Counterpart Principle'. In fact we can never have this for all θ since for θ a tautology or contradiction θ′ will have the same status and (3) will simply give equality. In this section we 12It is straightforward to see that convex combinations of probability functions also satisfy (P1-3) and hence are themselves probability functions. 10 shall look at some non-tautologous non-contradictory θ for which all probability functions satisfying ULi with Ax fail to give a strict inequality. First however we shall look at the other end of the spectrum, probability functions satisfying ULi with Ax which fail the strict version CP for all θ. A particular class of well understood functions (see for example [11], [22], [24]) satisfying ULi with Ax, and so CP, are those which satisfy: Weak Irrelevance Principle (WIP) If θ, φ ∈ SL have no constant or predicate symbols in common then w(θ |φ) = w(θ). Clearly WIP implies that CP always holds with equality. For probability functions satisfying WIP we have a precise characterization which we now explain, in part because this notation will be required later. Let B be the set of infinite sequences p = 〈p0, p1, p2, p3, ...〉 of reals such that p0 ≥ 0, p1 ≥ p2 ≥ p3 ≥ ... ≥ 0 and ∞ ∑ i=0 pi = 1. For p ∈ B and f : {1, 2, ..., n} → {1, 2, ..., 2q} let Rp,n = 1− ∑n j=1 pj and designate f(p) = 〈 2−qRp,n + ∑ f(j)=1 pj, 2 −qRp,n + ∑ f(j)=2 pj, ..., 2 −qRp,n + ∑ f(j)=2q pj 〉 ∈ D2q . Now let up,Ln be the probability function defined by up,Ln = 2 −nq ∑ f wf(p) where the f range over all functions f : {1, 2, ..., n} → {1, 2, ..., 2q} and for θ ∈ QFSL define up,L(θ) = lim n→∞ up,Ln (θ). This limit exists and by Theorem 1 up,L extends to a probability function on L. The fact that the up,Ln satisfy Ex and Ax carries over to up,L, indeed as we vary L the up,L form a language invariant family so up,L satisfies ULi with Ax. 11 Notice that if pn+1 = 0 in p then u p,L = up,Ln . In particular for 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 and p = 〈1− δ, δ, 0, 0, . . .〉, wδL = u p,L = up,L1 , so these up,L include the Nix-Paris Continuum. A generalization (to polyadic languages) of the following theorem is proved in [22] Theorem 4. The up,L are exactly the probability functions on L satisfying ULi with Ax and WIP. This theorem then provides a family of probability functions which have equality in CP (in the presence of ULi with Ax) for all θ ∈ SL. We would conjecture that conversely these up,L are the only probability functions with this property. We now turn to look at non-tautologous non-contradictory sentences θ which guarantee equality in CP for any probability function satisfying ULi with Ax. To describe these we first need to introduce some more notation. For θ ∈ QFSL, let fθ(ñ) denote the number of state descriptions with spectrum ñ = {n1, n2, ..., n2q} appearing in the Disjunctive Normal Form of θ 13. Note that for any probability function w satisfying Ax and any sentence θ, w(θ) = ∑ ñ fθ(ñ)w(ñ) where w(ñ) is the value of w on some/any state description with spectrum ñ. The following lemma appears in [23] but for completeness we include a proof here. Lemma 5. Let θ ∈ QFSL be such that for any probability function w on L satisfying Ax, w(θ) = c, equivalently ∑ ñ fθ(ñ)w(ñ) = c, (4) for some constant c. Then for each ñ, fθ(ñ) = cf⊤(ñ). Proof. Given reals s1, s2, ...s2q ≥ 0, and not all zero, let v~s be the probability function on L such that v~s(ñ) = (2 q!)−1 ∑ σ sn1 σ(1)s n2 σ(2)...s n2q σ(2q)(s1 + s2 + ...+ s2q ) −m 13For some fixed set of constants which includes all the constants mentioned in θ, though the particular fixed set is not important in what follows. 12 where σ ranges over all permutations of 1, 2, .., 2q . Then v~s satisfies Ax and (4) together with the fact that v~s(⊤) = 1 gives that ∑ ñ fθ(ñ)(2 q !)−1 ∑ σ sn1 σ(1)s n2 σ(2)...s n2q σ(2q ) = cv~s(⊤)(s1 + s2 + ...+ s2q) m = c ∑ ñ f⊤(ñ)(2 q!)−1 ∑ σ sn1 σ(1)s n2 σ(2)...s n2q σ(2q). Since we can take each si to be algebraically independent this is only possible if the coefficients of sn11 s n2 2 ...s n2q 2q on both sides agree, from which the result follows. We shall refer to a θ ∈ QFSL such that w(θ) = c for all probability functions w on L satisfying Ax as being of constant type. Notice that in this case c must be rational with denominator (when in lowest form) which divides all the f⊤(ñ). As Lemma 5 is stated it seems possible that since the definition of a constant type sentence depends on the overlying language θ could be of constant type for L but not for L′ even though θ ∈ SL ∩ SL′. The next lemma shows that this is not the case. Lemma 6. Suppose that θ ∈ SL∩SL′ and w(θ) = c for all probability functions w on L satisfying Ax. Then w′(θ) = c for all probability functions w′ on L′ satisfying Ax. Proof. It is enough to check this in the cases where L ⊂ L′ and where L′ ⊂ L. In the former case the result is immediate since w′↾SL (w′ restricted to SL) still satisfies Ax and w′↾SL(θ) = w′(θ). So assume that L′ ⊂ L. Then by Theorem 33.1 of [23] there is λ ≥ 0 and probability functions w1, w2 on L satisfying Ax such that w = (1 + λ)w1↾SL ′ − λw2↾SL ′. (5) Hence w(θ) = (1 + λ)w1↾SL ′(θ)− λw2↾SL ′(θ) = (1 + λ)w1(θ)− λw2(θ) = (1 + λ)c− λc, since θ is of constant type for L, = c , as required. 13 Theorem 7. For any θ ∈ QFSL of constant type and any φ ∈ QFSL that has no predicate or constant symbols in common with θ, w(θ |φ ) = w(θ) for all w satisfying Ax. Proof. Suppose that θ and φ have no constant or predicate symbols in common, and that w(θ) = m/n for all probability functions w satisfying Ax. Clearly the result holds if m = 0 so assume that m > 0. Let L1 to be the set (i.e. language) of all predicate symbols occurring in θ. By putting θ in Disjunctive Normal Form (DNF) we can express θ as a disjunction of state descriptions from L1. By Lemma 5 fθ(ñ) = (m/n)f⊤(ñ) for all spectra ñ of L1. For each spectrum ñ, let r(ñ) = n −1f⊤(ñ) and partition the set of state descriptions of L1 with spectrum ñ into n sets A1(ñ), A2(ñ), . . . , An(ñ), each containing r(ñ) state descriptions, so that the union of the first m of these sets constitute all the state descriptions in the DNF of θ with spectrum ñ. Notice that for ξ, ψ state descriptions of L1 (for the same constants) with spectrum ñ there is a permutation of atoms of L which sends ξ ∧ η to ψ ∧ η for any state description η of L−L1 (with disjoint constants of course). Hence, by Ax, w(ξ∧η) = w(ψ ∧ η), and in turn w(ξ ∧ φ) = w(ψ ∧ φ) by taking the DNF equivalent of φ in L− L1. So w(φ ∧ θ) = w    φ ∧ ∨ ñ m ∨ j=1 ∨ ψ∈Añ j ψ    = w    ∨ ñ m ∨ j=1 ∨ ψ∈Añ j (ψ ∧ φ)    = ∑ ñ m ∑ j=1 ∑ ψ∈Añ j w(ψ ∧ φ) = ∑ ñ mr(ñ)w(ψñ ∧ φ) 14 for some/any state description ψñ of L1 (for the same constants) with spectrum ñ. Exactly similarly by replacing θ by ⊤, w(φ) = ∑ ñ nr(ñ)w(ψñ ∧ φ) = (n/m)w(φ ∧ θ) so since w(θ) = m/n the required identity follows. It is worth remarking here that this theorem can, with some more effort, be proved even for φ ∈ SL (see [23]) though we will not need that stronger version here. From Theorem 7 we have the following corollary. Corollary 8. For any θ ∈ QFSL of constant type and any θ′ obtained by replacing all constant and predicate symbols in θ by new ones, w(θ | θ′ ) = w(θ) for all w satisfying Ax. The converse to Corollary 8 is easily shown. Proposition 9. Suppose that θ, θ′ ∈ QFSL with θ′ the result of replacing all constant and predicate symbols in θ by new ones and w(θ | θ′ ) = w(θ) for all w satisfying Ax. Then θ is of the constant type. Proof. Let w1, w2 be distinct probability functions satisfying Ax. Then the probability function 2−1(w1 +w2) also satisfies Ax and so by assumption, 2−1(w1 + w2)(θ ∧ θ ′ ) = 2−1(w1 +w2)(θ)2 −1(w1 + w2)(θ ′) = (2−1(w1 + w2)(θ)) 2 since by Ax w(θ) = w(θ′). Multiplying out and re-arranging we get 2w1(θ ∧ θ ′) + 2w2(θ ∧ θ ′) = w1(θ) 2 + 2w1(θ)w2(θ) + w2(θ) 2. Using the assumption this gives that 2w1(θ) 2 + 2w2(θ) 2 = w1(θ) 2 + 2w1(θ)w2(θ) +w2(θ) 2 and by re-arranging (w1(θ)− w2(θ)) 2 = 0. Hence w1(θ) = w2(θ) as required. 15 Having seen a class of sentences for which equality always holds in the statement of CP, we turn to consider a case in which strict inequality holds for all non-constant θ ∈ QFSL. In order to do so we recall the following special case of a theorem (Theorem 1) from [14]. Theorem 10. Any probability function w on L satisfying ULi with Ax can be represented as an integral w = ∫ B up,Ldμ (6) for some measure μ on the Borel subsets of B. Conversely any such function defined in this way satisfies ULi with Ax.14 Theorem 11. For a probability function w = ∫ B up,Ldμ, if every point in B is a support15 point of μ then strict inequality holds in CP whenever θ ∈ QFSL is not of the constant type. Proof. Assume that w can be expressed in this way and let θ, θ′ ∈ QFSL be as in the statement of CP. Then since the up,L satisfy WIP, w(θ ∧ θ′)− w(θ)2 = ∫ B up,L(θ ∧ θ′) dμ(p)− (∫ B uq,L(θ) dμ(q) )2 = ∫ B up,L(θ)2 dμ(p)− (∫ B uq,L(θ) dμ(q) )2 = ∫ B ( up,L(θ)− ∫ B uq,L(θ) dμ(q) )2 dμ(p) ≥ 0. Since the support of μ is all of B the only way we can have w(θ | θ′) = w(θ) is if up,L(θ) = ∫ B uq,L(θ) dμ(q) for all p ∈ B. In other words up,L(θ) must be constant for all p ∈ B. By a result in [23, Chapter 33] any probability function w on L satisfying Ax is of the form w = (λ+ 1) ∫ B up,L dμ1(p) − λ ∫ B up,L dμ2(p) for some 0 ≤ λ and measures μ1, μ2 on B. Hence if all the u p,L(θ) are constant then so too are all w(θ) for w satisfying Ax. In other words θ is of the constant type. 14Notice that the 'building block functions' here, i.e. the up,L, are precisely the probability functions satisfying ULi with Ax and WIP. 15Recall that a point ~e ∈ B is in the support of μ if μ(B) > 0 for all open subsets B of B containing ~e. 16 The conditions given in this theorem which ensure that w satisfies CP with strict inequality for all non constant type quantifier free sentences can be shown to hold for Carnap's Continuum of Inductive Methods cλ when 0 < λ <∞, thus ensuring that these cλ satisfy this strong version of CP (for quantifier free sentences). However showing this appears to be quite involved and in general we currently have little insight into when these conditions hold for particular probability functions (unlike the situation with the de Finetti's Representation). It might have been hoped at this point that any probability function w satisfying ULi with Ax would either satisfy WIP, and so never give strict inequality in CP, or else not satisfy WIP and always give strict inequality in CP whenever θ ∈ QFSL was not of the constant type. Unfortunately as the following example shows the situation is not as simple as that. Let L be the language with just two predicate symbols, i.e. q = 2. Then for a state description θ with spectrum {3, 1, 0, 0} or {2, 2, 0, 0} the mapping δ 7→ wδ(θ) has a maximum point in (0, 1). So there are 0 < ν < τ < 1 such that wν(θ) = wτ (θ) and in consequence the probability function w = (wν + wτ )/2 has the property that w(θ | θ′) = w(θ). However θ is not of the constant type and w does not satisfy WIP. Conclusions This paper argues that the Counterpart Principle of Analogy has intuitive appeal and gives a proof that it holds for all probability functions satisfying Unary Language Invariance, another appealing principle in our opinion. In particular then the Counterpart Principle is satisfied by both Carnap's Continuum of Inductive Methods and the Nix-Paris Continuum. This also means that it is consistent with Atom Exchangeability, which makes it a rather different analogy principle to those considered previously. The paper also investigates when the inequality in the Counterpart Principle is strict. In this case it is shown that there are probability functions satisfying Unary Language Invariance with Atom Exchangeability that never give strict inequality for any sentence (amongst them the wδ of the Nix-Paris Continuum) and there are non-tautologous non-contradictory 'constant' sentences which never give a strict inequality for any probability function satisfying Atom Exchangeability. Whilst the general situation still begs clarification it can be shown that for 0 < λ < ∞ the cλ of Carnap's Continuum of Inductive Methods do give the strict inequality on quantifier free sentences for all except the 'constant' sentences. 17 References [1] Carnap, R., Logical Foundations of Probability, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1950. [2] Carnap, R., The Continuum of Inductive Methods, University of Chicago Press, 1952. [3] Carnap, R., The Aim of Inductive Logic, in Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, Eds. E.Nagel, P.Suppes & A.Tarski, Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 1962, pp303-318. [4] Carnap, R., A Basic System of Inductive Logic, in Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability, Volume II, ed. R. C. Jeffrey, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1980, pp7-155. [5] Carnap, R. & Stegmüller, W., Induktive Logik und Wahrscheinlichkeit, Springer Verlag, Wien, 1959. [6] Festa, R., Analogy and Exchangeability in Predictive Inferences, Erkenntnis, 1996, 45:229-252. [7] de Finetti, B., Theory of Probability, Volume 1, Wiley, New York, 1974. [8] Gaifman, H., Concerning measures on first order calculi, Israel Journal of Mathematics, 1964, 2:1-18. [9] Gaifman, H., Applications of de Finetti's Theorem to Inductive Logic, in Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability, Volume I, eds. R.Carnap & R.C.Jeffrey, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1971, pp235-251. [10] Hill, A.J. & Paris, J.B., Reasoning by Analogy in Inductive Logic, The Logica Yearbook 2011, eds. M.Pelǐs & V.Punčochář, College Publications, London, 2012, pp63-76. [11] Hill, M.J., Paris, J.B. & Wilmers, G.M., Some observations on induction in predicate probabilistic reasoning, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 2002, 31:4375. [12] Kemeny, J.G., Carnap's Theory of Probability and Induction, in The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap, ed. P.A.Schilpp, La Salle, Illinois, Open Court, 1963, pp711-738. [13] Kuipers, T.A.F., Two types of Inductive Analogy by Similarity, Erkenntnis, 1984, 21:63-87. 18 [14] Landes, J., Vencovská, A. & Paris, J.B., A Characterization of the Language Invariant Families satisfying Spectrum Exchangeability in Polyadic Inductive Logic, Annals of Pure and Applied Logic, 2010,161:800-811. [15] Landes, J., Paris, J.B. & Vencovská, A survey of some recent results on Spectrum Exchangeability in Polyadic Inductive Logic, Synthese, 2011, 181(Supplement 1), pp19-47. [16] Maher, P., Probabilities for multiple properties: The models of Hesse, Carnap and Kemeny, Erkenntnis, 2001, 55:183-216. [17] Maher, P., A Conception of Inductive Logic, Philosophy of Science, 2006, 73:513-520. [18] di Maio, M.C., Predictive Probability and Analogy by Similarity, Erkenntnis, 1995, 43(3):369-394. [19] Niiniluoto, I., Analogy and Inductive Logic, Erkenntnis, 1981, 16:1-34. [20] Nix, C.J. & Paris, J.B., A Continuum of Inductive Methods arising from a Generalized Principle of Instantial Relevance, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 2006, 35(1):83-115. [21] Paris, J.B., Pure Inductive Logic, in The Continuum Companion to Philosophical Logic, Eds. L.Horsten & R.Pettigrew, Continuum International Publishing Group, London, 2011, pp428-449. [22] Paris, J.B. & Vencovská, A., A Note on Irrelevance in Inductive Logic, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 2010, 40(3):357-370. [23] Paris, J.B. & Vencovská, A., Pure Inductive Logic. To appear in the Association of Symbolic Logic series Perspectives in Logic, Ed. M.Rathjen, Cambridge University Press, 2013. [24] Paris, J.B. &Waterhouse, P., Atom Exchangeability and Instantial Relevance, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 2009, 38(3):313-332. [25] Polya, G., Induction and Analogy in Mathematics, Volume I of Mathematics and Plausible Reasoning, Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press, 1954. [26] Polya, G., Patterns of Plausible Inference, Volume II of Mathematics and Plausible Reasoning, Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press, 1954. 19 [27] Romeijn, J-W., Analogical Predictions for Explicit Simmilarity, Erkenntnis, 2006, 64(2):253-280. [28] Skyrms, B., Analogy by Similarity in Hyper-Carnapian Inductive Logic, in Philosophical Problems of the Internal and External Worlds, J.Earman. A.I.Janis, G.Massey & N.Rescher, eds., University of Pittsburgh Press, 1993, pp273-282.

ijLijksixzgks thokuke~ ®v glk vkpk;Z mekLokeh fojfpr rÙokFkZlw=k (vaxzsth O;k[;k Ïksr & vkpk;Z iwT;ikn fojfpr lokZFkZflf1⁄4) Ācārya Umāsvāmī's Tattvārthasūtra – With Explanation in English from Ācārya Pūjyapāda's Sarvārthasiddhi VIJAY K. JAIN Divine Blessings: Ācārya 108 Vidyānanda Muni vkpk;Z mekLokeh fojfpr rÙokFkZlw=k (vaxzsth O;k[;k Ïksr & vkpk;Z iwT;ikn fojfpr lokZFkZflf1⁄4) Ācārya Umāsvāmī's Tattvārthasūtra – With Explanation in English from Ācārya Pūjyapāda's Sarvārthasiddhi fodYi Vijay K. Jain Divine Blessings: Ācārya 108 Vidyānanda Muni vkpk;Z mekLokeh fojfpr rÙokFkZlw=k (vaxzsth O;k[;k Ïksr & vkpk;Z iwT;ikn fojfpr lokZFkZflf1⁄4) Ācārya Umāsvāmī's Tattvārthasūtra – With Explanation in English from Ācārya Pūjyapāda's Sarvārthasiddhi Non-Copyright This work may be reproduced, translated and published in any language without any special permission provided that it is true to the original. ISBN: 978-81-932726-2-6 Rs. 750/Published, in the year 2018, by: Vikalp Printers Anekant Palace, 29 Rajpur Road Dehradun-248001 (Uttarakhand) India www.vikalpprinters.com E-mail: [email protected] Tel.: (0135) 2658971 Printed at: Vikalp Printers, Dehradun Vijay K. Jain (iv) Front cover: This popular figure depicts the universe (loka), transmigration of the soul in four states of existence till it attains liberation (mokÈa), and the main tenet – non-injury (ahiÉsā) – of the Jaina Doctrine. The text at the bottom – 'parasparopagraho jīvānām' – is sūtra 5-21 of 'Tattvārthasūtra'. It means that the function of the souls is to help one another. Ācārya Umāsvāmī's Tattvārthasūtra – With Explanation in English from Ācārya Pūjyapāda's Sarvārthasiddhi ijLijksixzgks thokuke~ ®v glk eaxy vk'khokZn & ije iwT; fl1⁄4kUrpØorhZ 'osrfiPNkpk;Z 108 Jh fo|kuUn th eqfujkt (v) vYik{kjelafnX/a lkjoñ xw<fu.kZ;e~ A funksZ"ka garqer~ rF;a lw=kfeR;qP;rs cq/S% AA & ^i×plaxzg*] xkFkk 4@3] ì"B 585 D I VINE B L ES SINGS 1^vT>;.keso >k.ka* (vè;;u gh è;ku gSA) 1 & j;.klkj*] xkFkk 90 vFkZ & x.kèkjksa us lw=k mls dgk gS tks vYik{kj gks] vlafnXèk gks] lkjoñ gks] xw<+fu.kZ; gks] funksZ"k gks] gsrqer~ gks vkSj rF;iw.kZ gksA lw=k dk ;g y{k.k cgqr gh egÙoiw.kZ gS vkSj vkpk;Z mekLokeh iz.khr ^rÙokFkZlw=k* ij iwjh rjg [kjk mrjrk gSA lw=k ds mDr 7 fo'ks"k.kksa dks Hkh gesa xaHkhjrkiwoZd le>uk pkfg;sA Vhdkdkj vkpk;ks± us budk cgwr foLrkjiwOkZd foospu fd;k gSA tSls fd funksZ"k* fo'ks"k.k esa le>k;k gS fd lw=k cÙkhl nks"kksa ls jfgr gksuk pkfg, vkSj fiQj mu cÙkhl nks"kksa dks ìFkd~&ìFkd~ lksnkgj.k Li"V Hkh fd;k gS] ftls ;gk¡ ge foLrkjHk; ls ugha fy[krs gSa] ijUrq gesa mu lcdks HkyhHkk¡fr le>uk pkfg,] rHkh rÙokFkZlw=k* dk eeksZñ?kkVu gksxkA ^rÙokFkZlw=k* dh efgek opu&vxkspj gSA yksx dgrs gSa fd mlesa xkxj esa lkxj* Hkjk gS] ij eSa dgrk g¡w fd mlesa rks ljlksa ds nkus esa lkxj* lek;k gSA ^rÙokFkZlw=k* bruk egku~ vkSj izkekf.kd 'kkL=k gS fd izkphudky esa rks ^'kkL=k* dk vFkZ gh eks{k'kkL=k* yxk;k tkrk FkkA blh ds vkèkkj ij vusdkussd 'kkL=kksa dh jpuk gqbZ gSA ^vT>;.keso >k.ka* dks pfjrkFkZ djrk gqvk] dksbZ Hkh O;fDr ,d blh xzUFk ds vè;;u ls lEiw.kZ JqrKku dks ljyrk ls izkIr dj ldrk gSA ^rÙokFkZlw=k* dh fo"k;oLrq Hkh vñHkqr gS] blesa iz;kstuHkwr rÙoksa dk loZ fo"k; vk x;k gSA ;Fkk & i<epmDds i<ea] iape, tk.k iksXxya rPpa A Nês&ò lÙke vklo] vêeò , caèk .kknOOkks AA .koes laoj&f.kTtj] nges eksD[ka fo;k.kkfg A bg lÙkrPp Hkf.kna] ft.koji.khna nglqÙka AA vFkZ & izFke ds pkj vè;k;ksa esa izFke vFkkZr~ tho&rÙo dk o.kZu gS] ik¡posa vè;k; esa vtho&rÙo dk o.kZu gS] NBs&lkrosa vè;k;ksa esa (vi) Tattvārthasūtra èkekZuqjkxh Jh fot; dqekj th tSu] nsgjknwu] us ^rÙokFkZlw=k* dh vaxzsth O;k[;k izdkf'kr djk dj fo'o Hkj ds yksxksa dk egku~ midkj fd;k gSA mUgsa esjk cgqr&cgqr eaxy vk'khokZn gSA vkpk;Z fo|kuUn eqfuvDVwcj 2018 dqUndqUn Hkkjrh] ubZ fnYyh vkÏo&rÙo dk o.kZu gS] vkBosa vè;k; esa caèk&rÙo dk o.kZu gS] ukSosa vè;k; esa laoj&rÙo rFkk futZjk&rÙo dk o.kZu gS vkSj nlosa vè;k; esa eks{k&rÙo dk o.kZu gSA bl izdkj nl vè;k;ksa esa lw=kksa }kjk ftuoj&iz.khr lkr iz;kstuHkwr rÙo dgs gSaA ] ] ] Divine Blessings CONT ENT S eaxy vk'khokZn & vkpk;ZJh fo|kuUn th eqfujkt ----- (V) FOREWORD – DR. CHAKRAVARTHI NAINAR DEVAKUMAR ----- (X) PREFACE ----- (XIV) ACKNOWLEDGMENT ----- (XXVII) VIJAY K. JAIN – BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE ----- (XXIX) Ācārya Umāsvāmī's Tattvārthasūtra – With Explanation in English from Ācārya Pūjyapāda's Sarvārthasiddhi PAGE ----4 Chapter-1 RIGHT FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE ----58 Chapter-2 CATEGORY OF THE LIVING ----111 Chapter-3 THE LOWER WORLD AND THE MIDDLE WORLD ----146 Chapter-4 THE CELESTIAL BEINGS ----178 Chapter-5 THE NON-LIVING SUBSTANCES ----232 Chapter-6 INFLUX OF KARMAS R (viii) Tattvārthasūtra ----264 Chapter-7 THE FIVE VOWS ----307 Chapter-8 BONDAGE OF KARMAS ----345 Chapter-9 STOPPAGE AND SHEDDING OF KARMAS ----405 Chapter-10 LIBERATION ----421THE 'TATTVĀRTHASŪTRA' READER Appendix ] ] ] ----322 Guide to Transliteration R List of Figures Fig.-2 – Divisions of deluding (mohanīya) karmas ----113Fig.-1 – The universe (loka) and the non-universe (aloka) ] ] ] ----420 Contents (ix) Epilogue ----466 1¬ ueks ohrjkxk; F OREWORD By Dr. Chakravarthi Nainar Devakumar 1- ¬ – 'om' – is a spiritual syllable that is generally chanted before reciting sacred texts or 'mańtra'. In Jainism, it symbolizes the five Supreme Beings – pańca parameÈÇhī. 'Namo vītarāgāya' is making obeisance to the Omniscient Supreme Being who has vanquished all attachment (rāga). Such Supreme Being has the most auspicious body – paramaudārika śarīra – and is characterized by the four infinitudes (anantacatuÈÇaya): infinite perception (darśana), infinite knowledge (jñāna), infinite bliss (sukha) and infinite energy (vīrya). He is referred to variously as the 'Arhat', 'Tīrthańkara', 'Āpta' and 'Jina'. Brevity is the Soul of the Wit. It is evident in 'Tattvārthasūtra' which captures the essence of the Jain dharma in just 357 aphorisms (sūtra) with a total word count of 2314. Its original name was also a single word, viz., 'Tattvārtha'. This sacred book is the first ever work in Sanskrit in the era of Lord Vardhamāna. It is blissfully musical to recite and an excellent reader in Sanskrit poetry of aphorisms. What is 'tattvārtha'? It is to unravel the common and uncommon threads of the intrigues of the functions of the beings in the universe. In this modern era, the use of artificial intelligence will help in better understanding of the interplay of matter and the bio-ware. 'Tattvārthasūtra' helps in understanding the origin of the natural intelligence, its trappings in the maze of the universe and its purification from the karmic matter. That substratum which happens to be You and Me, is the cornerstone of the subject. (x) Tattvārthasūtra Om namo vītarāgāya The first ever commentary of 'Tattvārthasūtra' in Sanskrit was by the venerable Svāmī Samantabhadra, a genius par excellence in philosophy, poetry, language and logic, among many other arts. No wonder his commentary called 'GandhahastimahābhāÈya' was so elaborate that its total length was about 84,000 śloka. It dealt with all aspects related to the topic with nuances of logic in depth. The need for an easy reader was felt for a few centuries. Fortunately, another genius in the human form of venerable Ācārya Pūjyapāda Devanandi appeared within three hundred years! The beautiful English book in your hand captures the Sanskrit commentary of this venerable Ācārya who called his work 'TattvārthavÃtti'. This commentary in comparison to its forerunner is of 4,000 śloka in length. Its free-flowing style is lucid and easy to comprehend. Each of the word in 'Tattvārthasūtra' is defined unequivocally and the grammar employed in each sūtra is elucidated with authoritative references. Wherever required, the commentary cites other sacred texts to substantiate the points and enhances the curiosity of the avid readers. Thus 'TattvārthavÃtti' has gained over the centuries the undisputed authority of Jain philosophy. As evident from its epilogue, the popularity of 'TattvārthavÃtti' grew among the aspirants seeking liberation from the mundane life. They found it to be the handbook of supremely condensed ambrosia of Lord Jinendra's proclamations and so gave it the honorific title of 'Sarvārthasiddhi'. In another context, this title is most apt as it is also the divine name of the highest seat of celestial life as mentioned in 'Tattvārthasūtra', 4-19 & 4-32. In this supreme celestial life, the lord (ahamindra) achieves everything without any effort (see also Ācārya Jinasena's 'Ādipurāõa', 11:114). The divinity of 'Sarvārthasiddhi' can be best understood by the fact that palm-leaf manuscripts of this scared text have been a part of libraries of major temples in Tamil Nadu. Kaluppa Bhramappa Nitve, Kolhapur, Maharashtra, brought out the second edition of 'Sarvārthasiddhi' in 1917. Prior to the Hindi translation by Pandit Phoolchandra Shastri ji for Bharatiya Jnanpith in 1990, word by word Hindi translation of 'Sarvārthasiddhi' was accomplished by Jagrup Foreword (xi) (xii) Tattvārthasūtra Sahay, Former District Magistrate and Sub-divisional Judge, Uttar Pradesh and a compendium of three volumes running over 1600 printed pages was published in 1930. As mentioned by Shri V.K. Jain in his Preface, the first ever English translation of 'Sarvārthasiddhi' by Professor S. Appandai Jain was published by the name of 'Reality' by Vira Sasana Sangha, Calcutta in 1960. This book received rave reviews from the scholars. Professor Jain hailed from a village called Tiruppanamur in my district in Tamil Nadu. The 'samādhi' of venerable BhaÇÇa Akalanka can be seen in this historical village even today. The name Appandai is the Tamil region-specific title of Lord Pārśvanātha. Professor S.A. Jain's younger brother took to digambara renunciation as Gajapati Sagar and was successful in the sallekhanā. Lest we forget, let me record the fact that Professor Jain received translation inputs from the illustrious guru, Shri Subbaiyya Sastri of Shravanabelagola Mutt, the famous historical Jain centre in south India. The English translation is a masterpiece in the annals of Jainism with scholarly erudition. The author Shri V.K. Jain is already famous in the western world thanks to his numerous English translations of sacred texts. He has already published 'Tattvārthasūtra' with a brief explanation of each aphorism. Possibly, a lesser known fact about him is that he is a bhāvalińgī, i.e., a saint in worldly attire. I dare say that I have not seen another author of Jainism in English with such an exalted spirit. The book at hand is another masterpiece for more than one reason. It carries brief Hindi translation of the aphorisms and more references from sacred books. It retains the original Sanskrit words from 'Tattvārthasūtra' in the body text thus giving an ample opportunity to the readers to enjoy the divine aroma of the sacred 'Tattvārthasūtra'. I am sure, this book will also enrich the lexicon of English language with the addition of vocabulary from 'Tattvārthasūtra'. This book will be complementary to 'Reality' by Professor Jain. Both 'Tattvārthasūtra' and 'Sarvārthasiddhi' elucidate seven-fold October 19, 2018, Vijayādaśamī New Delhi – Dr. Chakravarthi Nainar Devakumar ] ] ] Foreword (xiii) path to liberation (mokÈa) and several novel concepts on soul, five-fold knowledge systems, multiverse, biodiversity, syādvāda, co-evolution, etc., and mantra for successful evolution of individual souls. A deeper reading of various aphorisms will provide impetus for modern research in various branches of science, humanities and sociology. As a scientist of over 40 years experience, I believe that Jainism as elucidated in this book is a rich storehouse of seeds of cure for modern ails and contain novel prescriptions for accelerating UN Millennium Development Goals (MDG). I am sure, this edition will be a veritable resource book on the exalted Jain philosophy and for those pursuing research in the illustrative fields mentioned above. P R E FA C E Ācārya Umāsvāmī's 'Tattvārthasūtra' The Scripture is the Word of the Omniscient 'Tīrthańkara' or 'Āpta' or 'Lord Jina'. It is inviolable and not opposed to the two kinds of valid knowledge – direct (pratyakÈa) and indirect (parokÈa). The ancient, learned preceptors – particularly prior to the 5th or 6th century CE, have deliberately abstained from mentioning their names or lineage in the profound Scripture that they had composed. They believed that their task was just to faithfully present, for the benefit of the bhavya souls, the Word of the Omniscient Tīrthańkara. The Scripture is replete with phrases like 'vadanti jināÍ' (in Sanskrit) and 'jiõa bhaõiyam' (in Prākrit) cautioning the reader that what has been said herein is only the Word of the Omniscient Tīrthańkara. Further, they believed that the association of their names with the Scripture in no way adds to its acceptability or sanctity. Taking cue from works by the subsequent ācārya and various inscriptions, it has been established that Ācārya GÃddhpiccha is the author of 'Tattvārthasūtra'. Two other names of Ācārya GÃddhpiccha are common – Ācārya Umāsvāmī and Ācārya Umāsvāti. The digambara tradition believes that Ācārya GÃddhpiccha (Ācārya Umāsvāmī) may have been a direct disciple of Ācārya Kundakunda who graced this earth at the beginning of the Christian era. Thus, the time for Ācārya GÃddhpiccha (Ācārya Umāsvāmī) is set at the 1st century CE. rÙokFkZlw=kdrkZja x`1⁄4fiPNksiyf{kre~ A oUns x.khUaelatkreqekLokfeequh'oje~ AA I make obeisance to the lord of the congregation of ascetics, venerable, and possessor of the whisk made of the vulture-feather, Ācārya Umāsvāmī, the composer of 'Tattvārthasūtra'. rÙokFkZlw=k ds drkZ] x`1⁄4fiPN ls miyf{kr] x.khUae] Js"B] mekLokeh equh'oj dh eSa oUnuk djrk gw¡A (xiv) Tattvārthasūtra Two versions of a story, regarding the origin of 'Tattvārthasūtra', are found in Jaina literature. Once a bhavya soul, keen to tread the path to liberation, wrote on the wall of his home the following sūtra: 'darśanajñānacāritrāõi mokÈamārgaÍ'. Subsequently, he had to go out of his village for a few days for some work. In the meantime, Ācārya GÃddhpiccha (Ācārya Umāsvāmī) happened to visit his home, seeking food. On seeing the sūtra written on the wall, he prefixed it with the word 'samyak'. On his return, the bhavya soul was absolutely amazed to see the correction incorporated in the sūtra. He set about to approach the most learned Ācārya GÃddhpiccha. On finding the Ācārya, he requested him to compose the Scripture that can lead a bhavya soul to the path to liberation. And, the Ācārya composed 'Tattvārthasūtra'. The other version of the story narrates that once a certain bhavya individual, Dvaiyāka, approached Ācārya GÃddhpiccha (Ācārya Umāsvāmī) in his lonely abode and pleaded, "O Supreme Sage, tell me what is rewarding to the soul?" The Ācārya gave the propitious reply, "Liberation (mokÈa)." Dvaiyāka then asked, "What is the nature of liberation and the way to attain it?" The Ācārya explained the true nature of liberation and the way to attain it. It consists in right faith, right knowledge and right conduct, together. However, the misbelievers, without understanding the true nature of liberation, argue in many ways. Some mistake only the knowledge, without conduct, for the path to liberation. Some others mistake only the faith, and some others only the conduct, for the path to liberation. Just as the knowledge, the faith or the intake of the medicine, severally, fail to yield the desired therapeutic result, similarly, the faith, the knowledge or the conduct that together constitute the path to liberation, fail to yield the desired result of attainment of liberation if employed severally. On further questioning by Dvaiyāka, the Ācārya composed the sūtra: 'samyakdarśanajñānacāritrāõi mokÈamārgaÍ'. This sūtra became the basis for the composition of 'Tattvārthasūtra'. 'Tattvārthasūtra' is also known as 'MokÈaśāstra'; mokÈa or liberation, the ultimate good of the soul, being its subject matter. Preface (xv) 'Tattvārthasūtra' is the major Scripture that deals with the Jaina Doctrine. It expounds in form of aphorisms – sūtra – the nature of the reality, as well as the conduct that leads one to the blissful stage of liberation. Although, Prākrit was the preferred language at that time, 'Tattvārthasūtra' has been composed in Sanskrit, probably due to the onset of Sanskrit as the language for literary works. 'Tattvārthasūtra' is the first major work, dealing with the Jaina philosophy, in Sanskrit. Brief and to-the-point, 'Tattvārthasūtra' delineates beautifully the essentials of all objects-of-knowledge (jñeya). All sects of Jainas have adopted it as their main Scripture. It enjoys tremendous popularity among the philosophical as well as the spiritual seekers, worldwide. It occupies among the Jainas the same place-of-pride as 'The Bhagavad-gītā' among the Hindus, 'The Bible' among the Christians, and 'The Qurān' among the Muslims. Many Jaina devotees read it everyday, particularly so during the fasting days, i.e., the eighth and the fourteenth day of the lunar fortnight. During the ten-day festival of 'dasalakÈaõa', discourses – one chapter each day – on 'Tattvārthasūtra' are arranged in Jaina temples and devotees listen to these with great veneration. Now since the masterpiece 'Tattvārthasūtra' has been composed by Ācārya GÃddhpiccha (Ācārya Umāsvāmī) in form of aphorisms – sūtra – only the men of extraordinary brilliance and accomplishment are able to interpret and understand the full import of each sūtra. Most tenets expounded in the treatise are beyond comprehension of the men of ordinary wisdom, accustomed to seeing and believing objects with form, through worldly means that rely primarily on sensory inputs. Objects-of-knoweldge that are subtle (like drayakarma), distant in space (like Mount Meru) and distant in time (like past and future births), which are beyond direct perception of the mundane souls, are discussed extensively in 'Tattvārthasūtra'. For the benefit of future ascetics and laymen, some later learned and advanced preceptors, therefore, took upon themselves the task of elaborating, with precision, the meaning of each sūtra that comprises 'Tattvārthasūtra': (xvi) Tattvārthasūtra Ācārya Samantabhadra (circa 2nd century CE) is believed to have written an extensive commentary called 'GandhahastimahābhāÈya'. Uncertainty prevails about its existence. 'Sarvārthasiddhi' by Ācārya Pūjyapāda (circa 5th century CE) is the first and foremost extant commentary on 'Tattvārthasūtra'. 'Tattvārthavārtika' or 'Tattvārtharājavārtika' or 'Rājavārtika' by BhaÇÇākalańkadeva (circa 7th century CE) is another commentary on 'Tattvārthasūtra', marked by extraordinary philosophical precision and logical analysis. 'Tattvārthaślokavārtika' by Ācārya Vidyānanda (circa 9th century 1VS) – great logician, and composer of 'AÈÇasahsrī'. 'Tattvārthasāra' by Ācārya AmÃtacandra (circa 10th century VS). 'Tattvārthasāra' is not a direct commentary on 'Tattvārthasūtra' but an independent work, based on 'Tattvārthasūtra'. Excerpts from 'Tattvārtharājavārtika' too have been used at places. 'TattvārthavÃtti' by Ācārya Śrutasāgara (circa 16th century VS). 1 – Gregorian Year 2000 CE corresponds to Year 2057 in the Vikrama SaÉvat (VS) calendar. Ācārya Pūjyapāda's 'Sarvārthasiddhi' Ācārya Pūjyapāda's compositions have been enlightening, since last fifteen centuries, learned ascetics, scholars and the laity, on complex issues including the reality of substances and the path to liberation. He wrote in Sanskrit, in prose as well as verse forms. Over time, the language of his compositions may have lost its mass appeal but the subject matter continues to remain utterly relevant. His expositions reflect a divine understanding of the spiritual subjects and of the objects that are beyond sense-perception. Unmatched brilliance and lucidity mark his writings. Three other names of Ācārya Pūjyapāda find mention in Jaina literature: Deva, Devanandi, and Jinendrabuddhi. Ācārya Pūjyapāda was a digambara ascetic of high order, R Preface (xvii) abounding in faith, knowledge, and conduct, the three cornerstones of the path leading to liberation. He was a master grammarian and an authority on secular subjects including linguistics, poetics and Āyurveda. Ācārya Pūjyapāda was born in a Brahmin family of Karnataka. His parents were MādhavabhaÇÇa and Śridevī. Kanakagiri, a Jaina heritage centre situated at a distance of about 50 km from Mysore, Karnataka, was his abode. He lived around 5th century CE. He was a renowned Preceptor of the Nandi SaÉgha, a part of the lineage of Ācārya Kundakunda (circa 1st century BCE to 1st century CE). His writings reveal both the transcendental and the empirical points of view, and are helpful to the ascetics as well as the laity. He has expounded on the writings of Ācārya Kundakunda and Ācārya Umāsvāmī (alias Ācārya GÃddhpiccha, Ācārya Umāsvāti). Deep influence of Ācārya Samantabhadra is conspicuous in his works. That Ācārya Pūjyapāda was held in great esteem by the subsequent Jaina pontiffs is evident from the following two excerpts from the writings of learned Jaina Ācārya(s): Ācārya Jinasena in Ādipurāõa: dohuka rhFkZÑíso% drjka r=k o.;Zrs A fonq"kka okÄ~eyèoafl rhFk± ;L; opkse;e~ AA (1-52) How can one portray Ācārya Devanandi (alias Ācārya Pūjyapāda) who is like a ford-maker (Tīrthańkara, the 'World Teacher') among the poets and whose sacred articulation removes the faults of verbal expression of the scholars? Ācārya Śubhacandra in JðānārõavaÍ: vikdqoZfUr ;}kp% dk;okd~fpÙklEHkoe~ A dyÄefÄuka lks¿;a nsouUnh ueL;rs AA (1-15)ï õ We make obeisance to Ācārya Devanandi (alias Ācārya Pūjyapāda) whose expressions wash away all dirt due to the activities of the body, the speech, and the mind. (xviii) Tattvārthasūtra Preface (xix) It is mentioned in Jaina inscriptions and literature that Ācārya Pūjyapāda had the supernatural power to visit the Videha kÈetra to make obeisance to the Tīrthańkara Lord Sīmandharasvāmī. It is believed that on account of his vast scholarship and deep renunciation, his feet were worshipped by the deva and, therefore, the name Pūjyapāda (pūjya = venerable; pāda = the feet). The sacred water that anointed his feet could transform iron into gold. He used to visit holy places in celestial carriages and during one such occasion he lost his eyesight. He then composed ŚāntyaÈÇaka and regained his sight. But after this incident, he took to samādhi and relinquished his body by courting voluntary, pious and passionless death. Ācārya Pūjyapāda composed the following Jaina texts: 'Jainendra Vyākaraõa' – a comprehensive work on Sanskrit grammar, considered to be an essential reading for the student of Jaina literature. 'Sarvārthasiddhi' – an authoritative commentary on 'Tattvārthasūtra' by Ācārya Umāsvāmī, it is truly a compendium of Jaina epistemology, metaphysics and cosmology. The title 'Sarvārthasiddhi' implies that going through it one accomplishes all that is desirable; or, it is the means of attaining ineffable bliss appertaining to the liberated souls. There is no exaggeration involved in the above statement as 'Sarvārthasiddhi' is an exposition of the reality – the true nature of substances, soul and non-soul – the knowledge of which equips one to tread the path to liberation, as expounded in 'Tattvārthasūtra'. Those who read, listen to, and assimilate this exposition have in their palms the nectar of eternal bliss; in comparison, the happiness of the king-of-kings (cakravartī) and of the lord of the deva (indra) is insignificant. The treatise deals with the objects-of-knowledge that constitute the reality. There is beginningless intermingling of the soul (jīva) and the non-soul (ajīva) karmic matter, the two (xx) Tattvārthasūtra wholly independent substances. Our activities (yoga) are responsible for the influx (āsrava) of the karmic matter into the soul. Actuated by passions (kaÈāya) the soul retains particles of matter fit to turn into karmas. The taking in of the karmic matter by the soul is bondage (bandha). Obstructing fresh inflow of the karmic matter into the soul – saÉvara – and its subsequent separation or falling off from the soul – nirjarā – are two important steps in attaining the infallible, utterly pristine, sense-independent and infinitely blissful state of the soul, called liberation (mokÈa). 'Samādhitaôtram' (also known as 'Samādhiśataka') – a spiritual work consisting of 105 verses outlines the path to liberation for an inspired soul. Living beings have three kinds of soul – the extroverted-soul (bahirātmā), the introverted-soul (antarātmā), and the pure-soul (paramātmā). The one who is utterly pure and rid of all karmic dirt is the pure-soul (paramātmā). 'Samādhitaôtram' expounds the method of realizing the pure-soul (paramātmā), the light of supreme knowledge, and infinite bliss. It answers the vexed question, 'Who am I?' in a forceful and outrightly logical manner, in plain words. 'IÈÇopadeśa' – a concise work of 51 didactic verses leads the reader from the empirical to the transcendental, from the mundane to the sublime, through an experiential process of self-realization, rather than through a metaphysical study of the soul-nature. 'IÈÇopadeśa' unambiguously establishes the glory of the Self. It is an essential reading for the ascetic. The householder too who ventures to study it stands to benefit much as the work establishes the futility of worldly objects and pursuits, and strengthens right faith, the basis for all that is good and virtuous. 'Daśabhakti' – a collection of the adoration of the essentials that help the soul in acquiring merit. The essentials include the Shower of Divine Blessings Ācārya Vidyānanda (vkpk;Z fo|kuUn) A digambara ascetic (nirgrantha muni) since last fifty-five years, Ācārya Vidyānanda (b. 1925) shuns all communication with the P IC . K IS H O R E J A IN , 5 O C T O B E R 2 0 1 8 , N E W D E L H I R Preface (xxi) Supreme Beings, the Scripture, the Perfect Conduct, and the sacred places like the Nandīśvara dvīpa. Some other works, including 'ŚāntyaÈÇaka' (hymn in praise of the sixteenth Tīrthańkara, Lord Śāntinātha), 'SārasaÉgraha', 'Cikitsāśāstra' and 'JainābhiÈeka', are also believed to have been authored by Ācārya Pūjyapāda. Lucid style, precise expression and masterly exposition of the subject accord all his compositions highly revered place in Jaina literature. What Ācārya Pūjyapāda has expounded is the word of the Omniscient Lord; his compositions are the never-setting sun that will continue to illumine the ten directions for eternity. I make obeisance humble at the holy feet of Ācārya Pūjyapāda whose pure soul had mastered the ocean that is the Scripture. external entities; he sleeps in regard to worldly undertakings but awake in regard to soul-realization. Subduing his senses through the fire of concentration, he dwells in the soul within. He meditates on the self, through the medium of the self. He meditates on the pure, effulgent soul through the instrument of his soul imbued with the 'three jewels' (ratnatraya) of the path to liberation. Established firmly in self-identity, he does not speak while speaking, does not walk while walking, and does not see while seeing. He does not deliberate for long on any task inimical to soul-knowledge. If due to any reason he must undertake some activity of speech and body, he performs it with indifference. He experiences discontent in external sense-objects and happiness in contemplation of the soul-nature. He reckons that no substance other than the soul is potent enough to either assist or obstruct the functioning of his soul. By thus renouncing attachment (rāga) and aversion (dveÈa), he has built a shield around his soul to protect it from extraneous influences. He purifies his soul by the knowledge of the soul. He is ever engaged in concentration (ekāgratā), and study of the Scripture. Concentration is attained by establishing the soul in the trio of right faith (samyagdarśana), right knowledge (samyagjñāna) and right conduct (samyakcāritra), the 'three jewels' (ratnatraya) or the three limbs (ańga) of the soul; the soul essentially being the one whole (ańgī). Concentration is the only means to savour the nectar found in own soul. It is said that the study of the Scripture bears the fruit of meditation through subjugation of the senses and the passions (kaÈāya). As a rule, the study of the Scripture destroys the heap of delusion (moha). This explains his utter inclination toward the study of the Scripture. Ācārya Vidyānanda has showered me with his divine blessings whenever I took up any project involving work on the Holy Scripture. His divine blessings have had wondrous effect in making both, the process as well as the end-result, most gratifying. I make obeisance humble, by bowing my head in utter reverence, to Ācārya Vidyānanda. R(xxii) Tattvārthasūtra Grateful Word of Appreciation for My Worthy Predecessor Professor S.A. Jain In 1960, Professor S.A. Jain (1905-1976) had authored and published "Reality – English Translation of Śrī Pūjyapāda's Sarvārthasiddhi", my pride possession since last two decades. It is impossible not to marvel at the enormity of the task that he had taken upon himself; Ācārya Pūjyapāda's 'Sarvārthasiddhi' is an extremely profound Scripture dealing with complex issues, beyond comprehension of the 1ordinary men. It is mentioned in a later edition of the book that Professor Jain undertook, to do justice to the task, special training to study Sanskrit under a renowned scholar. He mustered all his energies for nearly 15 years to complete and publish the book. He sent the manuscript to well-known Jain philosophers of the time, including Prof. A. Chakravarthi, Dr. A.N. Upadhye, Dr. Hiralal Jain and Mr. S.C. Diwaker. Professor Jain avers in his Preface: "Śrī Pūjyapāda's Sarvārthasiddhi has exercised a great fascination on my mind ever since I commenced the study of this great work. Very few works of the world's literature have inspired me to the same extent or have provided equally satisfactory answers to the world's riddles, which have perplexed the greatest thinkers of all ages. No philosophical work that I know of treats of the great issues that confront humanity with the same simplicity, charm, ease and freedom. I have tried to capture the spirit of the original in thought and expression to the extent it is possible in a translation. It is extremely difficult to convey fully the spirit and charm of Sanskrit in the English language. There are turns of expression 1 – See the biographical note in the 1990 edition of the book under reference, published by Jwalamalini Trust (Regd.), 8 Venkatarama Iyer Street, Venkatapuram, Ambattur, Madras-600053. Preface (xxiii) and ways of exposition peculiar to Sanskrit, which, in a literal translation into English, would appear mechanical repetition instead of heightening the charm of the work as they do in Sanskrit. I have endeavoured to make my translation a true and faithful rendering into English of the Sanskrit original, without violating the idiom and genius of the English language..." Having experienced, first-hand, the tediousness of letterpress composing, I cannot but marvel at Professor Jain's perseverance in faultlessly producing the book not only with original Sanskrit sūtra but also with proper diacritical marks. I have unashamedly excerpted from Professor Jain's magnum opus – 'Reality' – while undertaking the present translation. Due to my overwhelming reverence for it, at many places, I had to almost reproduce full sentences from it. I had no choice; pure gold must be retained as it is. Errors committed in improper reproduction are mine; wherever I could improve upon the text, the credit goes to the foundation provided to me by my predecessor. Precious Contribution from an Authority Dr. Chakravarthi Nainar Devakumar As the present volume was nearing completion, I was scouting a scholar with deep knowledge of 'Tattvārthasūtra' and 'Sarvārthasiddhi', proficient in the Sanskrit as well as the English language and, willing to spend time with me going through the voluminous manuscript. A tall order indeed! I had known Dr. Chakravarthi Nainar Devakumar for the past couple of years and was aware of his deep interest in the Holy Scripture. Occasionally, we would exchange ideas, over phone, about a few tenets contained in sacred texts including 'Tattvārthasūtra', 'Svayambhūstotra', 'Pravacanasāra', 'IÈÇopadeśa', 'Ratnakaraõçakaśrāvakacāra' and 'Ātmānuśāsana'. His command over the Sanskrit language was evident. His rendering of 'Tattvārthasūtra', available in R (xxiv) Tattvārthasūtra form of audio clips, is flawless; only a veteran Sanskrit scholar could recite 'Tattvārthasūtra' with such ease and perfection. His distinguished educational and professional attainments leave no scope for doubt about his command over the English language. With hesitation, I asked Dr. Devakumar whether it would be possible for him to visit my home in Dehradun for a few days to help me out with the noble task. He didn't take a second to accede to my request. And, on the day the proofs were ready, he and his trusted friend, Mr. Arinjaya Jain, graced my home with their pious presence. During my English translation, I had relied primarily on the Hindi translation by Pandit Phoolchandra Shastri of the original Sanskrit text by Ācārya Pūjyapāda. Dr. Devakumar, however, checked for the correctness of my translation referring only to the original Sanskrit text by Ācārya Pūjyapāda. Reading meticulously and with deep concentration, he could mark major flaws, including typos and infelicities, attributable to my negligence, ignorance and inadequacy. I would sincerely wish to proclaim and laud Dr. Devakumar's virtues and also thank him for his committed indulgence in helping me bring out this true-to-the-original treatise but being aware that my well-meant words shall not only fail to meet with his approval but cause him unease, I better stop here. RThe Final Touch Dr. Veersagar Jain A distinguished scholar and author of several books on Jainism, Dr. Veersagar Jain, Professor of Jaina Philosophy (Jaina Darśana) at Shri Lal Bahadur Shastri Rashtriya Sanskrit Vidyapeetha (Deemed University), New Delhi, has willingly, joyfully and swiftly proofread the non-English portion of this work. His deep knowledge of the Sanskrit language and of the subject matter, supplemented by his sharp eye, has led to the removal of some still-remaining imperfections and inaccuracies. My humble gratitude for his final touch. R Preface (xxv) October 24, 2018, śarad pūrõimā Dehradun, India – Vijay K. Jain The Scripture (āgama) is the Word of the Omniscient Lord, elaborated upon by learned and extraordinarily accomplished ancient preceptors (pūrvācārya). It has the doctrine of non-absolutism (anekānta) as its hallmark. Each object-of-knowledge (jñeya or dharmī) comprises infinite attributes (dharma). Comprehending one particular attribute is the subject of naya or standpoint. Synthesis of different standpoints is achieved by employing the doctrine of conditional predications (syādvāda – the particle 'syāt' means 'in a way') wherein every standpoint is able to retain its relative importance. The Scripture is inviolable, reveals the true nature of reality, universally helpful to the living beings, and potent enough to destroy all forms of falsehood. It has the power to vanquish all anxieties and inquisitiveness of the knowledge-soul aspiring to tread the path to liberation. I have only tried to assimilate and then translate into English, faithfully and without adding or subtracting anything, what has already been expounded in the Scripture. Both, 'Tattvārthasūtra' and 'Sarvārthasiddhi', contain specific Jaina terms for which there are no English equivalents. One such example is the term 'manaÍparyayajñāna'. The word 'telepathy', which is grossly inadequate to portray the scope and power of manaÍparyayajñāna, has been used in the translation. To partially subvert this shortcoming, at most places, the specific Sanskrit terms are indicated along with the English translation. With a sense of fulfilment, I present this treatise in the hands of the worthy readers. The sense of fulfilment has emanated from the process rather than the product. The process has helped me in washing off, abundantly, the dirt of delusion and misapprehension that had been clinging to my soul from infinite time past. If the product does the same for even a single soul, the mission stands accomplished. ] ] ] (xxvi) Tattvārthasūtra 1fl1⁄4kUrkpk;Z iaIkwQypUae 'kkÐh (2010)] vkpk;Z iwT;ikn fojfpr lokZFkZflf1⁄4] Hkkjrh; KkuihB] 18 bULVhV~;w'kuy ,fj;k] yksnh jksM] ubZ fnYyh&110003] lksygok¡ laLdj.k2izksegsUaedqekj tSu (1982)] HkV~Vkdyadnsofojfpre~ rÙokFkZok£rde~ (jktok£rde~)] Hkkjrh; KkuihB] ch@45&47] dukWV Iysl] ubZ fnYyh&1100013izksegsUaedqekj tSu (1949)] Jh Jqrlkxjlwfjfojfprk rÙokFkZòfÙk%] Hkkjrh; KkuihB dk'kh] nqxkZdq.M jksM] cukjl flVh4Vhdk&lEiknu & izKkJe.k eqfu vferlkxj (2018)] vkpk;Z mekLokeh fojfpr rÙokFkZlw=k] Jh/eZJqr 'kks/ laLFkku] dksVyk jksM] fiQjkstkckn] prqFkZ laLdj.k5Vhdk&lEiknu & eqfu vferlkxj (2012)] Jheñ vèrpUaelwfj fojfpr rÙokFkZlkj] Hkkjrh; KkuihB] 18 bULVhV~;w'kuy ,fj;k] yksnh jksM] ubZ fnYyh&110003] rhljk laLdj.k6fl1⁄4kUrkpk;Z iaIkwQypUae 'kkÐh (1991)] x`1⁄4fiPN vkpk;Z iz.khr rÙokFkZlw=k] Jh x.ks'k o.khZ fnxEcj tSu laLFkku] ufj;k] okjk.klh] f}rh; laLdj.k7O;k[;kdkj & izksohjlkxj tSu (2017)] rÙokFkZlw=k iznhfidk] Hkkjrh; KkuihB] 18 bULVhV~;w'kuy ,fj;k] yksnh jksM] ubZ fnYyh&1100038fgUnh vuqokn & iaijes"Bhnkl (1971)] eks{k'kkL=k vFkkZr~ rÙokFkZlw=k] Jh fnxEcj tSu Lokè;k; efUnj VaLV] lksux<+ (lkSjk"Va)] prqFkZ laLdj.k9Vhdk & vk£;dk Jh fo'kq1⁄4efr ekrkth] lEiknu & cziajrupUn tSu ^eq[rkj* o MkWpsruizdk'k ikVuh (1974)] JheUusfepUae fl1⁄4kUrpØo£r fojfpr f=kyksdlkj] Jh 'kkfUrohj fnxEcj tSu laLFkku] Jhegkohjth (jktLFkku)10Vhdk & vk£;dk Jh fo'kq1⁄4efr ekrkth] lEiknu & MkWpsruizdk'k ikVuh (2008)] Jh;frò"kHkkpk;Z fojfpr fryks;i..kÙkh] Jh 1008 pUaeizHk fnxEcj tSu vfr'k; {ks=k] nsgjk&frtkjk (jktLFkku)] r`rh; laLdj.kACKNOWL ED GMENT All that is contained in this book has been excerpted, adapted, or translated into English from a number of authentic Jaina texts. Due care has been taken to conserve the essence of the Holy Scripture composed by the ancient preceptors (pūrvācārya). Contribution of the following publications in preparation of the present volume is gratefully acknowledged: (xxvii) 16. Chakravarti Nayanar, A. (Prof.) (2009), "Ācārya Kundakunda's Paôcāstikāya-Sāra", Bharatiya Jnanpith, 18 Institutional Area, Lodi Road, New Delhi, Third Edition. 17. Jain, S.A. (1960), "Reality : English Translation of Shri Pūjyapāda's Sarvārthasiddhi", Vira Sasana Sangha, Calcutta-37. 18. Jain, Vijay K. (Ed.) (2013), "Ācārya Nemicandra's DravyasaÉgraha – With Authentic Explanatory Notes", Vikalp Printers, Dehradun. 19. Jain, Vijay K. (Ed.) (2012), "Āchārya Kundkund's Samayasāra – with Hindi and English Translation", Vikalp Printers, Dehradun. 20. Jain, Vijay K. (2016), "Ācārya Samantabhadra's ĀptamīmāÉsā (Devāgamastotra) – Deep Reflection On The Omniscient Lord", Vikalp Printers, Dehradun. 21. Jain, Vijay K. (2018), "Ācārya Kundakunda's Pravacanasāra – Essence of the Doctrine", Vikalp Printers, Dehradun. 11fl1⁄4kUrkpk;Z iadSyk'kpUae 'kkÐh (2013)] ekbYyèkoy&fojfpr .k;pDdks (u;pØ)] Hkkjrh; KkuihB] 18 bULVhV~;w'kuy ,fj;k] yksnh jksM] ubZ fnYyh&110003] ik¡pok¡ laLdj.k12MkWiUukyky tSu lkfgR;kpk;Z (2015)] vkpk;Z ftulsu fojfpr gfjoa'kiqjk.k] Hkkjrh; KkuihB] 18 bULVhV~;w'kuy ,fj;k] yksnh jksM] ubZ fnYyh&110003] iUaegok¡ laLdj.k13MkWiUukyky tSu lkfgR;kpk;Z (2015)] vkpk;Z ftulsu fojfpr vkfniqjk.k] Hkkjrh; KkuihB] 18 bULVhV~;w'kuy ,fj;k] yksnh jksM] ubZ fnYyh&110003] lksygok¡ laLdj.k14MkW- ,- ,umikè;s ,oa fl1⁄4kUrkpk;Z iadSyk'kpUae 'kkÐh (2014)] vkpk;Z usfepUae fl1⁄4kUrpØo£r jfpr xksEeVlkj deZdk.M] Hkkjrh; KkuihB] 18 bULVhV~;w'kuy ,fj;k] yksnh jksM] ubZ fnYyh&110003] NBk laLdj.k15izksHkkxpUae tSu ,oa iafoeydqekj lkSj;k (2006)] vkpk;Z olqufUn fojfpr olqufUn Jkodkpkj] fgUnh xzaFk dk;kZy;] 9 ghjkckx] lh ih VSad] eqacbZ&400004] izFke laLdj.k- (xxviii) Tattvārthasūtra ] ] ] VIJAY K . JAIN – B IOGRA P HI CAL NOT E Having had his schooling from Mhow and Bhopal in Madhya Pradesh, Vijay K. Jain (b. 1951) did his graduation in Electronics Engineering from Institute of Technology, Banaras Hindu University, and Post-Graduation in Management from Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad. An independent researcher, Vijay K. Jain has authored several books, and translated into English a number of profound Jaina texts: Marketing Management for Small Units (1988), Management Publishing Co., Dehradun. tSu /eZ % eaxy ifjp; (1994), Management Publishing Co., Dehradun. From IIM-Ahmedabad to Happiness (2006), Vikalp Printers, Dehradun. Āchārya Umāsvāmi's Tattvārthsūtra – with Hindi and English Translation (2011), Vikalp Printers, Dehradun. Āchārya Kundkund's Samayasāra – with Hindi and English Translation (2012), Vikalp Printers, Dehradun. Shri Amritchandra Suri's PuruÈārthasiddhyupāya – with Hindi and English Translation (2012), Vikalp Printers, Dehradun. Ācārya Nemichandra's DravyasaÉgraha – with Authentic Explanatory Notes (2013), Vikalp Printers, Dehradun. Ācārya Pūjyapāda's IÈÇopadeśa – The Golden Discourse (2014), Vikalp Printers, Dehradun. Ācārya Samantabhadra's Svayambhūstotra – Adoration of the Twentyfour Tīrthańkara (2015), Vikalp Printers, Dehradun. Ācārya Samantabhadra's ĀptamīmāÉsā (Devāgamastotra) – Deep Reflection On The Omniscient Lord (2016), Vikalp Printers, Dehradun. Ācārya Samantabhadra's Ratnakaraõçaka-śrāvakācāra – The Jewelcasket of Householder's Conduct (2016), Vikalp Printers, Dehradun. Ācārya Pūjyapāda's Samādhitaôtram – Supreme Meditation (2017), Vikalp Printers, Dehradun. Ācārya Kundakunda's Pravacanasāra – Essence of the Doctrine (2018), Vikalp Printers, Dehradun. Mr. Jain is the proprietor of Vikalp Printers, a small, high-end printing and publishing firm, based in Dehradun, India. (xxix) ] ] ] O Lord Śītalanātha! The rays of your unblemished words, bathed in the cool water of passionless and ineffable peace, are more soothing to the aspirant after Truth than the paste of sandalwood, the rays of the moon, the water of the Gańgā, and the garland of pearls. Ācārya Samantabhadra's Svayambhūstotra: u 'khryk'pUnupUaej'e;ks u xkÄeEHkks u p gkj;"V;% Aõ ;Fkk euq Ls r¿s u?kokD;j'e;% 'kekEcxq Hkk%Z f'kf'kjk foif'prke ~ AA (10&1&46) lkekU;kFkZ & gs Hkxou~ ! vki Kkuh (Jh 'khryukFk Hkxoku~) dh ohrjkxebZ ty ls Hkjh gqbZ o iki&jfgr funksZ"k opu :ih fdj.ksa Hksn&Kkuh thoksa dks tSlh 'khryrk ;k lq[k&'kkfUr nsus okyh gksrh gSa ml izdkj lalkj&rki gj.k djus okyh u pUnu gS] u pUnzek dh fdj.ksa gSa] u xaxk unh dk ty gS vkSj u gh eksfr;ksa dh ekyk,¡ gSaA (xxx) Tattvārthasūtra vkpk;Z mekLokeh fojfpr rÙokFkZlw=k (vaxzsth O;k[;k Ïksr & vkpk;Z iwT;ikn fojfpr lokZFkZflf1⁄4) Ācārya Umāsvāmī's Tattvārthasūtra – With Explanation in English from Ācārya Pūjyapāda's Sarvārthasiddhi .keks vfjgark.ka .keks fl1⁄4k.ka .keks vkbfj;k.ka .keks moT>k;k.ka .keks yks, lOOk lkgw.ka lE ;X n' kZuk ; ue % lE;d~rils ue% lE ;d ~pk fj= kk; ue % lE;XKkuk; ue% vgZfRl1⁄4kpk;ksZikè;k;loZlk/qH;ks ue% AA Lo;EHkqos ueLrqH;a AA The man who acquires, through the study of the Scripture expounded by the Omniscient Lord, valid knowledge (pramāõa) – direct (pratyakÈa) and other – of the reality of substances destroys, as a rule, the heap of delusion (moha). It is instructed, therefore, to study the Scripture meticulously. Ācārya Kundakunda's Pravacanasāra: lkekU;kFkZ & izR;{k rFkk ijks{k izek.k&Kku ds }kjk ohrjkx loZK iz.khr vkxe ls inkFkks± dks tkuus okys iq#"k ds fu;e ls eksg dk lewg vFkkZr~ foijhrKku o foijhrJ1⁄4ku uk'k dks izkIr gksrk gS blfy;s ftukxe dk vPNh rjg (lE;d~) vè;;u (vH;kl) djuk pkfg;sA ft.klRFkknks vês ò iPpD[kknh g cqT>nks f.k;ek A [kh;fn eksgksoPk;ks rEgk lRFka lef/nOoa AA (1&86) 3 eks{kekxZL; usrkja HksÙkkja deZHkwHk`rke~ A Kkrkja foÜorÙokuka oUns rñxq.kyCèk;s AA INVOCATION I make obeisance to the Omniscient Lord – the promulgator of the path to liberation, the destroyer of the mountains of karmas, and the knower of the whole of reality – so that I may realize these qualities.  eaxykpj.k  eks{kekxZ ds izorZd] deZ:ih ioZrksa ds Hksnd vFkkZr~ u"V djus okys] rFkk fOk'o ds (leLr) rÙoksa ds tkuus okys (vkIr) dks muds xq.kksa dh izkfIr ds gsrq eSa iz.kke djrk gw¡ & oUnuk djrk gw¡A ] ] ] Right faith (samyagdarśana), right knowledge (samyagjñāna), and right conduct (samyakcārita), together, constitute the path to liberation – mokÈamārga. The word 'samyak' means 'right' or 'laudable'. It should be prefixed to each of these three words: faith (darśana), knowledge (jñāna), and conduct (cāritra). These then become right faith or belief (samyagdarśana), right knowledge (samyagjñāna), and right conduct (samyakcārita). With the addition of the adjective 'samyak', faith becomes 'right' or 'laudable'; faith that is knowledge-based is right faith (samyagdarśana). Knowledge of substances, the soul (jīva) and the others, as these are, is right knowledge (samyagjñāna). The use of the adjective 'samyak' with knowledge wards off faults in knowledge due to delusion (vimoha or anadhyavasāya), doubt (saÉśaya) and error (viparyaya). The knowledgeable man who is keen to demolish the causes of worldly existence, i.e., transmigration, sheds activity that engenders karmic influx; this shedding of activity is right conduct (samyakcārita). The adjective 'samyak' with conduct rules out the conduct not based on right knowledge. Etymologically, the word 'darśana' – faith – is 'that which sees', 'that RIGHT FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE C H A P T E R 1 4 lE;Xn'kZuKkupkfj=kkf.k eks{kekxZ% AA1AA 1lE;Xn'kZuKkupkfj=kkf.ko lE;Xn'kZu] lE;XKku vkSj lE;d~pkfj=k] rhuksa feydj 1eks{kekxZ%o eks{k dk ekxZ gS] vFkkZr~ eks{k dh izkfIr dk mik; gSA Tattvārthasūtra by which is seen', or just 'seeing'. The word 'jñāna' – knowledge – is 'that which knows', or 'that by which is known', or just 'knowing'. The word 'cāritra' – conduct – is 'the doer of activity', or 'that by which activity is performed', or just 'activity'. One may argue that the above definitions treat the agent (kartā) and the instrument (karaõa) as one; this is not true. It is a valid argument when, from a certain point of view, distinction is made between the transformer (pariõāmī) and the transformation (pariõāma). From another point of view, however, there is no distinction between the transformer (pariõāmī) and the transformation (pariõāma). For example, the statement, 'the fire burns the fuel by its quality of burning', stands scrutiny only when a distinction is made between the fire and its quality of burning. From another point of view, there is no difference between the fire and its quality of burning. Thus, employing the many-sided point of view – anekāntavāda – it is proper to speak of the substance (dravya) and its quality (guõa) as same, as well as different. Again, one may argue that knowledge (jñāna) must precede faith (darśana) on two counts: a) faith (darśana) is attained after acquisition of knowledge (jñāna), and b) (in Sanskrit) jñāna has less number of letters than darśana. To say that faith (darśana) is attained after acquisition of knowledge (jñāna) is not correct as the two – faith (darśana) and knowledge (jñāna) – are attained by the soul simultaneously. When the clouds disappear the heat and the light of the sun are manifested simultaneously. Similarly, when right faith is attained by the soul owing to the subsidence (upaśama), destruction (kÈaya) or destruction-cum-subsidence (kÈayopaśama) of the faithdeluding (darśanamohanīya) karmas, right sensory-knowledge (matijñāna) and right scriptural-knowledge (śrutajñāna) are attained at the same time due to the removal of wrong sensoryand scripturalknowledge. Further, as a rule, what is venerable is placed before that of fewer letters. How is right faith venerable? It is venerable as only when right faith is there, knowledge acquires the attribute 'right'. Knowledge is mentioned before conduct, for conduct issues from knowledge. 5 vè;k;&1 Release from all karmas – sarvakarmavipramokÈaÍ – is liberation (mokÈa) and the method by which it can be attained is the 'path' (mārga). The sūtra uses singular 'mārgaÍ' to indicate that all three jointly – right faith or belief (samyagdarśana), right knowledge (samyagjñāna), and right conduct (samyakcārita) – constitute the path to liberation. This refutes the view that each of these singly constitutes the path to liberation. Hence it must be understood that all three – right faith or belief (samyagdarśana), right knowledge (samyagjñāna), and right conduct (samyakcārita) – jointly constitute the direct path to liberation. The next sūtra defines right faith. Belief in substances, ascertained as these are, is right faith (samyagdarśana). rÙokFkZJ1⁄4kua lE;Xn'kZue~ AA2AA 1rÙokFkZJ1⁄4kuao vius&vius Lo:i ds vuqlkj inkFkks± dk tks J1⁄4ku gksrk gS og 1lE;Xn'kZue~o lE;Xn'kZu gSA 'Tattva' is the 'nature' (bhāva) of the substance (padārtha); the nature of the substance, as it is, is 'tattva'. 'Artha' means 'ascertainment'. The compound 'tattvārtha' means ascertainment of the substance, as it is. Or, 'tattvārtha' means ascertainment of the nature (bhāva) of the substance as the two, the nature (bhāva) and the substance (padārtha), are not distinct from each other. Belief in what has been ascertained as the nature of the substance is right faith (samyagdarśana). As this treatise is concerned about the path to liberation, the meaning of the word 'darśana' is taken as 'faith' or 'belief' rather than 'seeing'. Faith or 'darśana' – ascertainment of substances – is a characteristic of the soul (ātmā) and when faith becomes right it is called 6 Tattvārthasūtra 'samyagdarśana'. Right faith is the cause for the attainment of liberation (mokÈa). Right faith is the subject only of potential (bhavya) souls. Seeing is the function of the eyes and it is common to living beings; it is not appropriate to consider it helpful in the attainment of liberation (mokÈa). Right faith (samyagdarśana) is of two kinds – with-attachment (sarāga), and without-attachment (vītarāga). Right faith withattachment (sarāga samyagdarśana) is characterized by signs such as tranquility – praśama; incessant fear of worldly existence – saÉvega; compassion for the worldly beings – anukampā; and keen intellect based on the teaching of the Scripture and the preceptor – āstikya. The man with 'āstikya' believes that the substances – souls and non-souls – exist, that the universe is without beginning and end, that no entity is the creator of the universe, and that the substance undergoes transformation due to its own nature although there is the presence of the cause-and-effect (nimitta-naimittika) relationship with other substances. Right faith without-attachment (vītarāga samyagdarśana) is solely the purity of the soul. How does the right faith that concerns substances – souls and nonsouls – arise? That – samyagdarśana – is attained by intuition – svabhāva, or by acquisition of knowledge – adhigama. rfÂlxkZnfèkxek}k AA3AA 1rr~o og lE;Xn'kZu 1fulxkZr~o LoHkko ls 1oko vFkok 1vf/xekr~o nwljs ds mins'kkfn ls mRiUu gksrk gSA The word 'nisarga' means own-nature (svabhāva) and 'adhigama' means cognizance (avabodha). Both are causes. Of what? Of activity. Which activity? Origination. Origination of what? Right faith 7 vè;k;&1 (samyagdarśana). Thus, the sūtra expounds that right faith (samyagdarśana) originates from own-nature – svabhāva, and cognizance of the objects of knowledge – adhigama. Now the question arises whether right faith (samyagdarśana) entails the knowledge of the substances. If yes, then right faith (samyagdarśana) must originate only after the cognizance of the objects of knowledge – adhigama. If not, then how can one have faith without first acquiring the knowledge of the substance? There is no anomaly in this. In both cases of origination of right faith (samyagdarśana), the internal cause is the subsidence (upaśama), destruction (kÈaya), or subsidence-cum-destruction (kÈayopaśama) of faith-deluding (darśanamohanīya) karmas. When this internal cause is present, right faith (samyagdarśana) originates without teaching by others; this is the first type of right faith – originating from ownnature – nisargaja samyagdarśana. And the second type of right faith originates on acquisition of knowledge of substances, souls and nonsouls, on teaching by others; this is adhigamaja samyagdarśana. This is the difference between the two types of right faith (samyagdarśana). Thus, the first type of right faith (samyagdarśana) originates without teaching by others and the second type on teaching by others. It has been expounded that belief in the nature of the substances – 'tattvārtha' – is right faith (samyagdarśana). The next sūtra delves on the reality – the 'tattva'. thokthokÏocUèklaojfutZjkeks{kkLrÙoe~ AA4AA 1thokthokÏo cU/ laoj futZjk eks{kk%o tho] vtho] vkÏo] cU/] laoj] futZjk vkSj eks{k & ;s lkr 1rÙoe~o rÙo gaSA 8 Tattvārthasūtra The soul – jīva, the non-soul – ajīva, influx – āsrava, bondage – bandha, stoppage – saÉvara, gradual dissociation – nirjarā, and liberation – mokÈa, constitute the reality (tattva). The soul (jīva) is characterized by consciousness (cetanā). Consciousness has knowledge (jñāna), etc., as its signs. The non-soul (ajīva) has characteristics opposite to the soul (jīva). The inflow of auspicious (śubha) and inauspicious (aśubha) karmic matter into the soul is influx (āsrava). The intermingling in the same space-points (pradeśa) of the soul and the karmas is bondage (bandha). The blockage of influx (āsrava) of karmic matter into the soul is stoppage (saÉvara). Separation or falling off of a part of karmic matter from the soul is dissociation (nirjarā). The complete annihilation of all karmic matter bound with the soul is liberation (mokÈa). These are described in detail later on. The soul (jīva) is mentioned first in the sūtra as all fruits are experienced by it. The non-soul (ajīva) is mentioned next as it is of service to the soul (jīva). Influx (āsrava) is mentioned next as it concerns both the soul (jīva) and the non-soul (ajīva). Bondage (bandha) comes next as it follows influx (āsrava). As there is no bondage for one who is well shielded, hence stoppage (saÉvara) is the opposite of bondage (bandha); stoppage, therefore, is mentioned next to bondage. Dissociation (nirjarā) takes place after stoppage (saÉvara) and hence it is mentioned next. As liberation (mokÈa) is the final outcome, it is mentioned last. Merit (puõya) and demerit (pāpa) must be included in the sūtra as some learned commentators have spoken of nine categories. No, it is not necessary; these – merit (puõya) and demerit (pāpa) – are implied in influx (āsrava) and bondage (bandha). But then the mention of influx (āsrava), etc., is also unnecessary as these are included in the soul (jīva) and the non-soul (ajīva). No, it is not unnecessary. Liberation (mokÈa) is the main theme of the work so these must be mentioned. Liberation (mokÈa) is preceded by the cycle of births and 9 vè;k;&1 deaths and influx (āsrava) and bondage (bandha) are the main causes of transmigration. Stoppage (saÉvara) and dissociation (nirjarā) are the chief causes of liberation. Hence these are mentioned severally. The next sūtra is intended to avoid deviation from established conventions while referring to terms like right faith and soul, mentioned earlier. These are installed – nyāsa or nikÈepa – (in four ways) by name – nāma, representation – sthāpanā, substance and its potentiality – dravya, and actual state – bhāva. 1uke LFkkiuk aeO; Hkkor%o uke] LFkkiuk] nzO; vkSj Hkko ls 1rr~ U;kl%o mu lkr rÙoksa rFkk lE;Xn'kZukfn dk yksd O;ogkj gksrk gSA Giving a name to an object, irrespective of its qualities, for the sake of social adentity is naming – nāma. Establishing objects in things made of wood, clay, painting, dice, etc. – 'this is that' – is representation – sthāpanā . That, which will be attained by qualities or which will attain qualities, is a substance – dravya. The substance characterized by its present mode (paryāya) is its actual state – bhāva. To explain, the substance of the soul (jīva) is installed in four ways as soul-name (nāma-jīva), soul-representation (sthāpanā-jīva), soul-substance (dravya-jīva) and soul-state (bhāva-jīva). To call something the soul (jīva) irrespective of its qualities is soul-name (nāma-jīva). Representing the soul (jīva) through dice, etc. – as a living being or as a man – is soul-representation (sthāpanā-jīva). Soul-substance (dravyajīva) is of two kinds: āgama dravya-jīva and noāgama dravya-jīva. ukeLFkkiukaeO;HkkorLrUU;kl% AA5AA 10 Tattvārthasūtra The being who is proficient in, but not attending to, the Scripture dealing with the souls or the human-souls is āgama dravya-jīva. Noāgama dravya-jīva is of three kinds: the body of the knower (jñāyaka-śarīra), potential (bhāvī) and distinct from these two. Soulstate (bhāva-jīva) is of two kinds, āgama bhāva-jīva and noāgama bhāva-jīva. The soul well-versed in the Scripture dealing with the souls or the human-souls and attending to these is the āgama bhāvajīva. The soul taking the mode of a living being or the mode of a human being is the noāgama bhāva-jīva. Installation of the other substances, non-soul (ajīva), etc., must be interpreted similarly in the above mentioned four ways. Of what use is this? It is intended to establish what is desirable and refute what is irrelevant or unsuitable. Now, what is the purport of the word 'tad' – 'that'? It is intended to include both, right faith, etc., and the soul, etc., mentioned in earlier sūtra(s). What is the way of attaining knowledge about the soul and right faith, etc., elaborated through the four kinds of installation? The knowledge (of the seven categories) is attained by 1 2means of pramāõa and naya . lE;Xn'kZukfn jRu=k; vkSj thokfn rÙoksa dk 1vf/xe%o Kku] 1izek.ku;S%o izek.k vkSj u;ksa ls gksrk gSA izek.ku;Sjfèkxe% AA6AA 1 – pramāna – comprehensive knowledge 2 – naya – standpoint, particular point of view 11 vè;k;&1 The true nature of substances (soul, etc.) described in detail through the rule of installation (nāma), etc., can be ascertained through pramāõa and multitude of naya. The characteristics and divisions of pramāõa and naya are described now. Pramāõa is of two kinds, namely, for oneself (svārtha) and for others (parātha). All forms of knowledge, except scriptural knowledge, constitute pramāõa for oneself. But scriptural knowledge is of both kinds – for oneself and for others. Valid knowledge or knowledge itself constitutes pramāõa for oneself and knowledge in form of words constitutes pramāõa for others. The naya(s) are divisions of pramāõa. It is contended that naya should be mentioned first as it consists of fewer letters than pramāõa. It is not a fault. Pramāõa is mentioned first as it is of superior excellence. As a rule, excellence is invincibility. How is pramāõa of superior excellence? As pramāõa is responsible for the origin of naya, it is of superior excellence. It has been said in the Scripture that after knowing the substance with the help of pramāõa, ascertaining its one particular state or mode is naya. Secondly, the scope of pramāõa comprises all attributes of the substance. It has been said in the Scripture that pramāõa is sakalādeśa – comprehensive and absolute, and naya is vikalādeśa – partial and relative. For this reason, too, pramāõa is of superior excellence. Naya is of two kinds, dravyārthika naya and paryāyārthika naya. Paryāyārthika naya is concerned with bhāva nikÈepa – the present mode (paryāya) or actual state (bhāva) of the substance. Since bhāva nikÈepa refers to the mode (paryāya) of the substance, it is specific and falls under paryāyārthika naya. Dravyārthika naya is concerned with the other three nikÈepa – nāma, sthāpanā, and dravya – which are general in nature. Dravyārthika naya refers to the general attributes of the substance, and paryāyārthika naya to the constantly changing states or modes (paryāya) of the substance. That which has the substance as its object is the standpoint of substance – dravyārthika naya. That which has the mode (paryāya) as its object is the standpoint of modes – paryāyārthika naya. Both the substance and the modes are ascertained by pramāõa (comprehensive knowledge). 12 Tattvārthasūtra One method of understanding the nature of the soul, etc., by pramāõa and naya has been explained. Another method of ascertaining the soul, etc., is mentioned next. Knowledge of subjects like right faith (samyagdarśana) and soul, etc., is obtained by description – nirdeśa, ownership – svāmitva, cause – sādhana, substratum – adhikaraõa, duration – sthiti, and division – vidhāna. 1funsZ'k LokfeRo lk/u vf/dj.k fLFkfr fo/kur%o funsZ'k] LokfeRo] lk/u] vf/dj.k] fLFkfr vkSj fo/ku ls Hkh lE;Xn'kZukfn rFkk thokfnd rÙoksa dk vf/xe gksrk gSA funsZ'kLokfeRolkèkukfèkdj.kfLFkfrfoèkkur% AA7AA The description of the nature (svarūpa) of a substance is nirdeśa. Svāmitva is ownership or lordship. Sādhana is the cause of origin. Adhikaraõa is substratum. Sthiti is duration of existence of the substance. Vidhāna is division. What is right faith (samyagdarśana)? The expression that it is faith in substances as these really are, is nirdeśa. Also, installation of right faith by name, etc., is nirdeśa. Who is its possessor? Generally speaking, it is the soul. To particularize, one or more of the three types of right faith (samyagdarśana) – subsidential (aupaśamika), destructional (kÈāyika) and destruction-cum-subsidential (kÈāyopaśamika) – may be possessed by the infernal beings (nāraka), the humans (manuÈya), the plants and animals (tiryańca) and the celestial beings (deva). Only the potential (bhavya – capable of attaining liberation) souls can attain the 13 vè;k;&1 three types of right faith (samyagdarśana); the non-potential (abhavya – not capable of attaining liberation) souls do not possess any. The details can be read from 'Sarvārthasiddhi', p. 16-18. The cause of origin – sādhana – is of two kinds, internal and external. The subsidence, destruction, or destruction-cum-subsidence of faithdeluding (darśanamohanīya) karmas is the internal cause. In the first three infernal regions, right faith arises in some by recollection of past lives – jātismaraõa, in others by listening to the Scripture – dharmaśravaõa, and in yet others by endurance of pain. From the fourth up to the seventh, recollection of past lives and endurance of pain promote right faith. In case of animals, right faith arises in some by recollection of past lives, in some others by listening to the Scripture and in yet others by witnessing the idols of Lord Jina. In human beings also the same causes operate. In case of the celestial beings, right faith is promoted in some by the recollection of past lives, in some others by listening to the Scripture, in some others by witnessing the glory of Lord Jina and in yet others by the sight of the splendour and miraculous powers of other celestial beings. This applies to celestial beings below the Ānata kalpa. In case of the deva of Ānata, Prāõata, Āraõa and Acyuta kalpa only three causes, excluding the sight of magnificence of other celestial beings, operate. The deva of navagraiveyaka attain right faith by recollection of past lives or by listening to discourses on religion. The question of origin does not arise in case of higher celestial beings – those in anudiśa and anuttara vimāna – for they are born with right faith. The substratum (adhikaraõa) is of two kinds, internal and external. The soul which is the possessor of right faith is itself the internal substratum of right faith. The external substratum is the mobilechannel of the universe – trasanāçī. How extensive is it? It is one rajju in diameter and fourteen rajju in length. As regard duration (sthiti), the minimum and maximum duration of subsidential right faith is within one muhūrta (48 minutes). In case of mundane living beings, the minimum duration of right faith resulting from destruction is within one muhūrta and the maximum is thirty14 Tattvārthasūtra three sāgaropama and two pūrvakoÇi less eight years and one antarmuhūrta. In case of the emancipated, it has a beginning but no end. The minimum duration of right faith arising from destructioncum-subsidence is within one muhūrta, and the maximum is sixty-six sāgaropama. As regard division (vidhāna), in general, right faith is one. From the point of view of its origin, it is of two kinds, namely, by own-nature (nisargaja) and by acquisition of knowledge (adhigamaja). It is of three kinds from the point of view of its divisions into subsidential, destructional and destruction-cum-subsidential. From the point of view of verbal nomenclature, it is of numerous kinds. It is of innumerable kinds on the basis of the believers. It is of infinite kinds on the basis of objects which have to be believed in. These – description (nirdeśa) etc. – are to be similarly understood in case of knowledge and conduct, and substances like the soul and the non-soul, as per the Scripture. Are there further means of ascertaining the nature of right faith, the soul and the rest? Yes, there are. The seven categories are known also by existence – sat, number – saÉkhyā, place or abode – kÈetra, extent of space – sparśana, time – kāla, interval of time – antara, thought-activity – bhāva, and reciprocal comparison – alpabahutva. 1po vkSj 1lr~ la[;k {ks=k Li'kZu dky vUrj HkkokYicgqRoS%o lr~] la[;k] {ks=k] Li'kZu] dky] vUrj] Hkko vkSj vYicgqRo & bu vkB vuq;ksxksa ds }kjk Hkh inkFkZ dk Kku gksrk gSA lRla[;k{ks=kLi'kZudkykUrjHkkokYicgqRoSÜÓ AA8AA 15 vè;k;&1 'Sat' indicates existence. 'SaÉkhyā' is enumeration of divisions or classes. 'KÈetra' is the present abode. 'Sparśana' is the extent of space or pervasion relating to the three times – the past, the present and the future. 'Kāla' – time – is of two kinds: real and conventional. These are described elsewhere. 'Antara' is interval of time. 'Bhāva' is thoughtactivity like subsidential (aupaśamika). 'Alpabahutva' – reciprocal comparison – is distinction based on comparison – less or more – between one another. By these are known the three jewels of right faith and also the seven realities, like the soul. Now description (nirdeśa) implies existence (sat), division (vidhāna) implies number (saÉkhyā), substratum (adhikaraõa) implies abode (kÈetra) and extent of space (sparśana), duration (sthiti) implies time (kāla), and name (nāma), etc., imply thought-activity (bhāva). Why have these been mentioned again, separately? Of course, it is a valid argument. But the several ways of exposition of reality depend on the nature of the disciples. Some disciples prefer brief expositions, some others elaborate ones and yet others a balance between these two extremes. The effort of the sages is directed towards the good of all living beings. Hence the different ways of attaining knowledge are described here. Otherwise, it would have been enough to say that knowledge is attained by pramāõa and naya, without the need for describing any other means. The rest of the commentary on this sūtra is highly technical in nature; those interested in it can read 'Sarvārthasiddhi', p. 22-67. Two concepts that are employed to describe the substance of soul (jīva) need mention here. One is the concept of 'guõasthāna' and the other of 'margaõāsthāna'. Guõasthāna – fourteen stages of spiritual development: 1. mithyādÃÈÇi – deluded 2. sāsādanasamyagdÃÈÇi – downfall 3. samyagmithyādÃÈÇi – mixed right and wrong believer 4. asaÉyatasamyagdÃÈÇi – vowless right believer 5. saÉyatāsaÉyata – partial vows 16 Tattvārthasūtra 6. pramattasaÉyata – major vows (saÉyama) but with occasional deviation due to fifteen faults of negligence (pramāda). The fifteen faults due to negligence (pramāda) are indulging in four passions (kaÈāya), five senses (indriya), four kinds of narratives (vikathā) – pertaining to monarch, woman, thief and food, sleep (nidrā) and fondness (sneh). 7. apramattasaÉyata – perfect vows (saÉyama) without negligence (pramāda) 8. apūrvakaraõa (upaśamaka and kÈapaka) – unprecedented purity [rises further in step (śreõī) with either subsidence or destruction of mohanīya karmas] 9. anivÃttibādarasāmparāya (upaśamaka and kÈapaka) – checking of gross-passions [rises further in step (śreõī) with either subsidence or destruction of mohanīya karmas] 10. sūkÈmasāmparāya (upaśamaka and kÈapaka) – checking of even minute passions [rises further in step (śreõī) with either subsidence or destruction of mohanīya karmas] 11. upaśāntakaÈāya (vītarāga chadmastha) – subsided delusion 12. kÈīõakaÈāya (vītarāga chadmastha) – destroyed delusion 13. sayogakevalī – Omniscient-with-vibration 14. ayogakevalī – non-vibratory Omniscient Souls released from the cycle of wandering are the emancipated souls – the Siddha. Margaõāsthāna – fourteen methods of inquiry into the nature of the soul (jīva): 1. gati – the state of existence according to the 'gati' namekarma (nāmakarma) 2. indriya – the senses 3. kāya – the material body 4. yoga – the activities of the mind, the speech and the body 5. veda – sex-inclination (male, female, neuter) 6. kaÈāya – passions (anger, pride, deceitfulness, greed) 7. jñāna – the power to know 17 vè;k;&1 8. saÉyama – restraint 9. darśana – general perception of substances 10. leśyā – colouration of the activities of the mind, the speech and the body on rise of passions. There are six leśyā: black (kÃÈõa), blue (nīla), grey (kāpota), yellow (pīta), pink (padma) and white (śukla). 11. bhavya – the soul having potential to acquire right faith that leads to liberation 12. samyaktva – right faith in the nature of substances 13. saÉjñā – endowed with mind 14. āhāraka – the taking in of the matter fit for the three kinds of bodies (śarīra) and six kinds of completion (paryāpti). The three kinds of bodies are gross physical (audārika) body, the transformable (vaikriyika) body, and the projectable (āhāraka) body emanating from a saint. The six kinds of completion are taking in of the molecules of matter (āhāra), development of the body (śarīra), development of the senses (indriya), development of the respiratory organ (śvāsocchvāsa), development of the organ of speech (bhāÈā), and development of the mind (mana). After a detailed description of right faith (samyagdarśana), the next sūtra describes right knowledge (samyagjñāna). Knowledge is of five kinds – sensory-knowledge – matijñāna, scriptural-knowledge – śrutajñāna, 1efr Jqrkofèk eu%i;Z; dsoykfuo efrKku] JqrKku] vof/Kku] eu%i;Z;Kku vkSj dsoyKku & ;s ik¡p 1Kkue~o Kku gSaA efrJqrkofèkeu%i;Z;dsoykfu Kkue~ AA9AA 18 Tattvārthasūtra 1clairvoyance – avadhijñāna, telepathy – manaÍparyayajñāna, and omniscience – kevalajñāna. The term 'knowledge' is to be taken with each kind mentioned in the sūtra – sensory knowledge, scriptural knowledge, clairvoyant knowledge, telepathic knowledge and perfect knowledge (omniscience). That which reflects on the objects-of-knowledge through the senses and the mind, or that through which the objects-ofknowledge are reflected upon, or just reflection, is sensory knowledge. Owing to the destruction-cum-subsidence (kÈayopaśama) of karmas which obscure scriptural-knowledge, that, which hears, or through which the ascertained objects are heard, or just hearing, is scriptural knowledge. These two are mentioned side by side, as these are governed by the relation of cause-and-effect. This is mentioned later, 'Scriptural knowledge is preceded by sensory knowledge' (sūtra 1-20). The next kind of knowledge is called clairvoyance (avadhi) as it ascertains matter in downward range or knows objects within limits. Ascertaining the objects located in another's mind (mana) is telepathy (manaÍparyaya). Now is telepathy not sensory knowledge? No. Mind (mana) is merely relative; mind (mana) is merely spoken of with reference to one's own and another's mind. Telepathy (manaÍparyaya) works on the strength of destruction-cum-subsidence (kÈayopaśama) alone of karmas of that kind. For instance we say, "Look at the moon in the sky". Here the sky is intended merely as the background. That for the sake of which the seekers pursue the path of external and internal austerities (tapa) is pure and perfect knowledge (kevalajñāna). It also means 'without the help of anything else'. Perfect knowledge (kevalajñāna) is mentioned last as it is attained at the end. Telepathy (manaÍparyayajñāna) is mentioned close to it 19 vè;k;&1 1 – The word 'telepathy' is rather inadequate to convey the true import of the phrase 'manaÍparyayajñāna'. Still, it has been used most reluctantly as there is no equivalent word in the English language that can represent the extraordinary power and scope of manaÍparyayajñāna. (see page 42). because of its proximity. How is there proximity? Self-restraint (saÉyama) is the basis of both. Clairvoyance (avadhijñāna) is far-off from telepathy (manaÍparyayajñāna) hence it has been mentioned before telepathy. Indirect (parokÈa) knowledge is mentioned before direct (pratyakÈa) knowledge as it is easily intelligible. Almost all beings are familiar with and experience sensory-knowledge (matijñāna) and scriptural-knowledge (śrutajñāna), hence these are easily intelligible. Thus, these are the five kinds of knowledge. Their subdivisions are mentioned later. It has been said that knowledge (jñāna) is attained by means of pramāõa and naya. Some consider pramāõa to be the knowledge, some others consider pramāõa to be the connection, and yet others consider pramāõa to be the senses. The next sūtra declares that only the five kinds of knowledge mentioned in the sūtra are pramāõa. These (five kinds of knowledge) are the two types of pramāõa (valid knowledge). 1rr~o mijksDr ik¡p izdkj ds Kku gh 1izek.kso (nks izdkj ds) izek.k gaSA rRizek.ks AA10AA What is the purport of 'tad' – 'that'? It is intended to preclude any other pramāõa invented by others. Some consider the connection with objects as pramāõa. Some others consider the senses as pramāõa. The word 'that' is used in order to preclude these. Only the five kinds of knowledge (jñāna) – sensory knowledge, etc. – constitute pramāõa, not any other. 20 Tattvārthasūtra What is wrong if connection or the senses were considered to be pramāõa? If connection were pramāõa then there would be no knowledge of infinitesimal, concealed and remote things. These cannot be contacted by the senses. Hence there would be no omniscience. If the senses were considered pramāõa, it would result in the same fallacy. The range of the senses such as the eyes is small, and the objects are endless. Further, connection does not apply to all the senses, as the eyes and the mind do not come in contact with the objects. This is discussed later. It is argued that if knowledge is pramāõa then there is no fruit. But attainment of knowledge is accepted as the fruit, and nothing else. If knowledge and pramāõa are one and the same, no separate fruit is possible. But pramāõa must have fruit. If the connection or the senses are considered to be pramāõa, knowledge, which is different from these, is fit to he considered the fruit. But such a contention is untenable. If connection were the pramāõa and knowledge of objects the fruit, then, as connection rests in two things – the object and the sense-organ – the fruit, i.e., knowledge, must also reside in two things. Hence knowledge must be in the objects – the pot and the board – too, and the objects would become knowledge. This is not tenable. But the opponent says that the soul is characterized by consciousness, and so knowledge inheres in the soul and not in other objects. No. If the soul is not of the nature of knowledge, everything would become non-conscious (acetana). Now, it has been contended earlier that there is no fruit if knowledge is pramāõa. It does not matter. There is satisfaction in the attainment of knowledge. The soul, whose nature of knowledge is clouded by the foreign matter of karmas, finds satisfaction in determining the nature of substances with the help of the senses. That is spoken of as the fruit. Equanimity (upekÈā) or the disappearance of ignorance (ajñāna) may be considered as the fruit. Equanimity is freedom from attachment (rāga) and aversion (dveÈa). The disappearance of ignorance, which is like darkness, is also called the fruit. It has been said in texts dealing with the science of thought – nyāya – that the fruit of the first kind of 21 vè;k;&1 pramāõa – direct (pratyakÈa) or omniscience (kevalajñāna) – is equanimity (upekÈā). The fruit of the other kinds of pramāõa – indirect (parokÈa) – is discernment, i.e., acceptance (grahaõa) or rejection (tyāga); besides, of course, equanimity (upekÈā), as stated above. Destruction of ignorance (ajñāna) about the self, however, is 1the actual fruit of all methods of knowledge (pramāõa). That which knows rightly, that by which anything is known, or knowledge alone, is pramāõa. What is known by pramāõa? The soul and the other substances. Now, if pramāõa is the means for knowing the soul and the other substances, then there must be another pramāõa for knowing pramāõa. And that will lead to a regression. No, there is no regression. Pramāõa or knowledge is like the lamp. The lamp is the cause of illuminating objects like the pitcher. It is also the cause of illuminating its own nature or form and, therefore, there is no need to seek another illuminating cause. It must be admitted that pramāõa also is like the lamp. If another pramāõa were necessary to ascertain pramāõa then due to the absence of self-knowledge, there would be no memory or remembrance. And then there would be no social relationship. The dual is used for pramāõa in accordance with the divisions mentioned later. The next two sūtra say, 'the first two are indirect', and 'the rest are direct'. The dual is intended to ward off any other enumeration of pramāõa. The five kinds of knowledge are included in the two pramāõa. Still the two pramāõa may be considered in other ways like direct (pratyakÈa) and inference (anumāna). The next sūtra is intended to dispel such a view. 1 – Vijay K. Jain (2015), 'Ācārya Samantabhadra's ĀptamīmāÉsā (Devāgamastotra) – Deep Reflection On The Omniscient Lord', verse 102, p. 158. 22 Tattvārthasūtra The first two kinds of knowledge are indirect (parokÈa) knowledge (jñāna). 1vk|so izkjEHk ds nks vFkkZr~ efrKku vkSj JqrKku 1ijks{ke~o ijks{k izek.k gaSA vk|s ijks{ke~ AA11AA 'Ādi' means the first; 'ādya' means that which arises from the first. How can two be considered first? It is by the real and the figurative points of view. Sensory knowledge (matijñāna) is the first from the real point of view. Being next to it, scriptural knowledge (śrutajñāna) is also considered the first, figuratively. By the use of the dual number, the secondary one is also taken. These two are indirect (parokÈa) pramāõa or knowledge (jñāna). How are these indirect? These are dependent on 'others'. It is mentioned later that sensory knowledge is acquired through the senses and the mind, and that scriptural knowledge is acquired through the mind. 'Others' means the senses, the mind, the light, the teaching, and such other external causes. On the destruction-cumsubsidence (kÈayopaśama) of the concerned karmas, sensory knowledge and scriptural knowledge arise in the soul through the senses, the mind, and other external causes. Hence these two kinds of knowledge are called indirect (parokÈa). Analogy, verbal testimony, etc., are included in these. The marks of indirect knowledge have been mentioned. All the rest constitute direct (pratyakÈa) knowledge. 23 vè;k;&1 The remaining (three) constitute direct (pratyakÈa) knowledge (jñāna). 1vU;r~o 'ks"k rhu vFkkZr~ vof/Kku] eu%i;Z;Kku vkSj dsoyKku 1izR;{ke~o izR;{k izek.k gaSA izR;{keU;r~ AA12AA That which spreads or knows is the soul (akÈa). That which manifests itself only in the soul on the destruction-cum-subsidence (kÈayopaśama) or destruction (kÈaya) of karmas, without the help of the senses (indriya), is direct (pratyakÈa) knowledge. Now clairvoyant perception (avadhidarśana) and omniscient perception (kevaladarśana) also arise only in the soul. So these would also be included. No. Here the discussion is on 'knowledge', therefore, perception is excluded. Still, wrong (vibhańga) clairvoyance (avadhijñāna) arises only in the soul, that would be included. No, that is excluded as this is the section dealing with right knowledge. The term 'right' is supplied and knowledge is distinguished by it. Wrong clairvoyance is excluded since it ascertains objects not as these really are, owing to the rise of wrong faith. It is not right knowledge. Now it is argued that knowledge arising from the operation of the senses is direct and that arising without the functioning of the senses is indirect. These definitions which are not open to disagreement must be accepted. It is improper to say so. If such a view be accepted, the Omniscient (āpta) would cease to have direct (pratykÈa) knowledge. If knowledge arising from the operation of the senses be considered direct, there can be no direct knowledge in case of the Omniscient for he does not attain knowledge through the senses. If the Omniscient is considered to derive knowledge only through the senses, he would not remain 'all-knowing'. If it is contended that he derives direct knowledge through the mind, that knowledge is certainly not 24 Tattvārthasūtra 1 – 'vijñāna' in Buddhist phenomenology refers to consciousness or discernment – one of the five functions of the sentient being. omniscience, as it is derived through the application of the mind. And it cannot be said that omniscience is attained through the knowledge of the Scripture, for the Scripture presupposes the existence of the Omniscient. If you say that there exists transcendental pratyakÈa, the divine direct knowledge of the yogī, then that too is not direct knowledge as it is not derived through the senses. You have already admitted direct knowledge to be derived from the senses. Moreover, from your above definition of direct knowledge two faults emerge. First, there can be no omniscience, and second, the disputant is compelled to give up his own position. Does this knowledge of the yogī cognize objects in succession or simultaneously? If it cognizes in succession, it cannot be omniscience; for the objects are infinite. If it is contended that it cognizes objects simultaneously, your statement 1that 'just as one vijñāna does not know two objects, two vijñāna do not know one object,' stands shattered. Or your proposition that 'all impressions are momentary' goes to pieces as you have admitted that one vijñāna extends to several instants. Hence, knowing several objects is possible only in succession. It cannot be said that vijñāna knows simultaneously. That which is the instant of birth is the instant of its realization alone. Only after its own realization the object begins to operate. It is argued that vijñāna is like the lamp which does both, self-shining and illuminating objects, at one and the same time. But the two activities of self-shining and illuminating are admitted of the lamp only if the objects exist for several instants. Further, if vijñāna is admitted to be bereft of details, it will become void. Pramāõa has been said to be of two kinds, indirect (parokÈa) and direct (pratyakÈa). The first kind is described in the next sūtra. 25 vè;k;&1 Sensory cognition – mati, remembrance – smÃti, recognition – samjñā, induction – cintā, and deduction – abhinibodha, are synonyms of sensory-knowledge (matijñāna). 1efr%o efr] 1Lèfr%o Lèfr] 1laKko laKk] 1fpUrko fpUrk] 1vfHkfucks/o vfHkfucks/] 1bfro bR;kfn 1vuFkkZUrje~o vFkkZUrj ugha gSa] vFkkZr~ os efrKku ds ukekUrj gSaA efr% Lèfr% laKk fpUrk¿fHkfucksèk bR;uFkkZUrje~ AA13AA These are the synonyms of sensory-knowledge (matijñāna), mentioned first. These arise on the destruction-cum-subsidence (kÈayopaśama) of karmas which obscure sensory knowledge. And there is no activity of these in scriptural knowledge (śrutajñāna), etc. The derivatives are mati, smÃti, samjñā, cintā, and abhinibodha. Cognizing is cognition. Remembering is remembrance. Recognizing is recognition. Inductive reasoning is induction. Deductive reasoning is deduction. Other expansions, as appropriate, must be understood. Though the words are derived from different roots, by the force of convention, these are synonyms. For instance, though the words 'indra', 'śakra', and 'purandara' denote different activities, all these are the names of the same person, the deva-husband of Śaci. If different meanings are attached to these from the point of view of their etymological meanings, the same may be done with regard to the synonyms of sensory knowledge (matijñāna). The meaning intended is that these synonyms do not transgress the range of cognition arising from the cause of destruction-cum-subsidence (kÈayopaśama) of karmas obscuring sensory knowledge (matijñāna). The term 'iti' indicates varieties or species. These are the synonyms or names of sensory knowledge. What is the cause of that? 26 Tattvārthasūtra That – sensory-knowledge (matijñāna) – is caused by the senses (indriya) and the mind (mana). 1bfUae;kfufUae;o bfUnz;k¡ vkSj eu 1rr~o ml efrKku ds 1fufeÙke~o fufeÙk gSaaA rfnfUae;kfufUae;fufeÙke~ AA14AA He who is invested with lordship and wealth is 'indra'. Here the word means the soul. The soul is of the nature of knowledge. However, when there is the destruction-cum-subsidence (kÈayopaśama) of knowledgeobscuring karmas, the soul, by itself, is unable to know the objects. And that which acts as the instrument for acquisition of knowledge by the soul is the sense (indriya). Or that which causes the knowledge of hidden objects is the sign (lińga). Accordingly, that which promotes the knowledge of the subtle soul, is the sense (indriya). For instance, smoke is the cause of the knowledge of the fire. Similarly, the senses, such as touch etc., cannot exist without the soul. Hence by means of those senses the existence of the soul is inferred. Or, 'indra' is the word denoting name-karma (nāmakarma). The senses (indriya) are built by that. The senses of touch, etc., are described later. 'Anindriya', 'mana', 'antaÍkaraõa' are synonyms. The word 'anindriya' is the negation of 'indriya' – sense. How then can it be used to denote the mind which is also a sign of the soul? The negative sign 'a' is used in the sense of slight or a little. A quasi-sense is called 'anindriya'. For instance there is the usage 'anudarā kanyā' – the girl 'without' the belly. Here the meaning of 'without' is taken as 'slight' or 'thin'. How is the meaning 'slight' applied to the mind? The sense-organs perceive objects within a limited range, and these last for a long time. But the mind is not like these. Objects that are perceived by the senses as well as those not perceived by the senses are subject to mental cognition. Though the mind is also the sign (lińga) of the soul 27 vè;k;&1 (indra), it neither cognizes objects within a limited range nor remains for long (the mental attitude changes quickly). The mind is described as an internal sense. In investigating good and evil and in remembrance, etc., the mind is not dependent on the senses. Nor is the mind seen outwardly like the eyes, etc. So it is called the internal sense. What for is 'tad' – 'that' – used? 'That' is used for denoting sensory knowledge (matijñāna). Now sensory knowledge has just been mentioned. It is argued that a rule or an exception refers to what has just been described. So this sūtra would refer to sensory knowledge only even without the word 'that'. The answer is, 'that' is intended to refer to this (previous) sūtra as well as the following sūtra. The knowledge that has synonyms like 'mati' is caused by the senses and the mind. And the same has four stages – impression (avagraha), inquisitiveness (īhā), comprehension (avāya) and retention (dhāraõā). If 'that' were not used, the synonyms such as 'mati' would refer to sensory knowledge, and the kind of knowledge caused by the senses and the mind, would refer to scriptural knowledge with the four stages mentioned in the next sūtra. Thus it would lead to a faulty inference. The cause of sensory knowledge has been understood. Its stages are mentioned in the next sūtra. Impression – avagraha, inquisitiveness – īhā, comprehension – avāya, and retention – dhāraõā, are the four stages [of sensory knowledge (matijñāna)]. 1voxzg bZgk vok; /kj.kk%o voxzg] bZgk] vok;] vkSj /kj.kk & ;s pkj (ml efrKku ds) Hksn gaSA voxzgsgkok;èkkj.kk% AA15AA 28 Tattvārthasūtra The first awareness or adoption of an object as it comes in the range of the senses is impression (avagraha), the first stage of sensory knowledge (matijñāna). When there is the meeting of the sense-organ and the object, it is first perceived; that is darśana. The awareness of the object immediately following it is avagraha. For instance, on seeing an object, the impression that it is white in colour is avagraha. The desire to know particulars regarding the object apprehended through avagraha is inquisitiveness (īhā). Thus, the desire to know more – 'Is that white object a crane or a flag?' – is inquisitiveness (īhā). Knowing the object, as it is, after ascertaining its particulars is the next stage – comprehension (avāya). By its movement up and down and by the flapping of the wings, it is ascertained that it is a crane only and not a flag. Retention (dhāraõā) is the cause of not forgetting in the future what was ascertained in the past. For instance, 'This is the same crane which I saw this morning,' is retention. These are mentioned in the sūtra in the order in which they arise. The subdivisions of these are given next. (The subdivisions of each of these are) many – bahu, many kinds – bahuvidha, quick – kÈipra, hidden – aniÍsÃta, unexpressed – anukta, lasting – dhruva, and their opposites. 1cgqo cgqr 1cgqfo/o cgqr izdkj 1f{kizo tYnh 1vfu%l`ro vfu%l`r 1vuqDro vuqDr 1/zqok.kkao /zqo 1lsrjk.kkao rFkk muls mYVs Hksnksa ls ;qDr vFkkZr~ ,d] ,dfo/] vf{kiz] fu%l`r] mDr] vkSj v/zqo] bl izdkj ckjg izdkj ls voxzg&bZgkfn:i efrKku gksrs gSaA cgqcgqfoèkf{kizkfu%l`rkuqDrèkqzok.kka lsrjk.kke~ AA16AA 29 vè;k;&1 Impression (avagraha), together with other activities, is the subject under consideration. The actions with regard to these are mentioned, i.e., those commencing with 'bahu' – many – and their opposites. Many – 'bahu' – must be understood to mean both the number and the bulk, as it is not particularized. The numbers are one, two, many, etc. The bulk is much rice, much soup, etc. 'Vidha' denotes kinds. 'KÈipra' means knowing swiftly. 'AniÍsÃta' denotes that the entire object is not seen; that is, part of it is seen and part of it is hidden. 'Anukta' is what is implied and not expressed. 'Dhruva' is continual cognition of an object as it really is. 'Setara' is intended to include the opposites of all these. Impression (avagraha) is of twelve kinds – impression of more, impression of less, impression of many kinds, impression of one kind, impression of an object quickly, impression of an object slowly, impression of a hidden object, impression of a revealed object, impression of an implied object, impression of an expressed object, impression of a lasting nature and impression of a transient nature. Similarly with regard to inquisitiveness (īhā) and the others. Each of these arises in case of each of the five senses and the mind. The six kinds denoted by many, many kinds, and the rest, of impression (avagraha), etc., arise owing to the high degree of destruction-cumsubsidence (kÈayopaśama) of karmas obscuring sensory-knowledge (matijñāna). But it is not so in case of their opposites. Those denoted in the sūtra are mentioned first because of their worth. What is the difference between many and many kinds? In both 'many' is common. But in the former 'many' applies to the same kind of objects or things. In the latter 'many' refers to different kinds of objects or things. This is the difference. What is the difference between 'expressed' (ukta) and 'revealed' (niÍsÃta)? 'Revealed' (niÍsÃta) means the object is made known and 'expressed' (ukta) also means the same. But there is this difference: 'expressed' (ukta) is knowing through the instruction imparted by others and 'revealed' (niÍsÃta) is knowing by oneself. 30 Tattvārthasūtra What is the distinction between lasting (dhruva) impression (avagraha) and retention (dhāraõā)? Owing to the destruction-cumsubsidence (kÈayopaśama) of karmas attained by pure thoughtactivity, impression (avagraha) is the same in the first, second and other instants. That is, it becomes neither less nor more. This is called lasting avagraha. But, owing to the destruction-cum-subsidence (kÈayopaśama) by mixed (pure and impure) thought-activity, the impression (avagraha) is of higher or lower degree, as sometimes there is impression of many (bahu), sometimes of less (alpa), sometimes of many kinds (bahuvidha), sometimes of one kind (ekavidha). Hence it is called transient (adhruva) impression. But retention (dhāraõā) is the cause of not forgetting in the future what has been perceived. Thus there is great difference between the two. Impression (avagraha), etc., cognize many (bahu), etc.; of what are many (bahu), etc., the attributes? These – impression (avagraha), etc. – are sensoryknowledge (matijñāna) of substances (artha). mijksDr (voxzg vkfn efrKku) 1vFkZL;o inkFkZ (oLrq) ds gksrs gSaA vFkZL; AA17AA These four kinds of sensory knowledge (matijñāna) relate to substances (artha). The object of the senses is a substance. Impression (avagraha), etc., arise in case of objects characterized by the attributes of many (bahu), etc. Why should this be mentioned; it is evident that many (bahu), etc., relate to substances (artha) only? It is of course true. But 'of substances' (arthasya) is mentioned in order to refute the views of other schools of thought. Some say that the senses have 31 vè;k;&1 contact only with qualities such as colour and that these (the senses) cognize only the qualities. But this is not true. The qualities such as colour are non-material and cannot be contacted by the senses. Then why do we say, "I saw the colour," and "I smelt the odour,"? That which attains modes (paryāya) or that which is attained through modes is the substance (artha). Therefore, 'artha' is 'dravya'. Since colour, etc., are qualities that are not separate from the substance (dravya) it is proper to say, "I saw the colour," and "I smelt the odour," when the senses come in contact with the objects. Do impression (avagraha), etc., occur in case of all the senses and the mind? Or is there any difference? There is only impression (avagraha) of indistinct things – vyańjana. 1O;×tuL;o O;×tu (vizxV:i 'kCnkfn inkFkks±) dk 1voxzg%o ek=k voxzg Kku gksrk gS] bZgkfn rhu Kku ugha gksrsA O;×tuL;koxzg% AA18AA Collection of indistinct sounds, etc., is 'vyańjana'. In case of these, there is impression (avagraha) only. What is the purpose of this sūtra? It is for determination that there is impression (avagraha) only of 'vyańjana' and not inquisitiveness (īhā), etc. If so, the word 'only' should have appeared in the sūtra. No, it is not necessary. If once certain activity has been established, its repetition makes it a rule or makes it a certainty. Hence, without the use of the word 'only' in the sūtra, it establishes the rule. Now impression (avagraha) has been mentioned in both cases, 'artha' and 'vyańjana'. Then what is the difference between the two? The 32 Tattvārthasūtra difference is that while arthāvagraha is distinct impression, vyańjanāvagraha is indistinct impression. How? It is akin to the wetting of a new earthenware. The new earthenware does not get wet by two or three drops of water. But when moistened repeatedly, it gets wet. Similarly, the matter in the modes of sound, and so on, does not become distinct in the first two or three instants. But when apprehended repeatedly, it becomes distinct. Therefore, there is indistinct impression prior to distinct impression. Distinct impression is arthāvagraha. And, inquisitiveness (īhā), etc., do not arise from indistinct impression (vyańjanāvagraha). Does indistinct impression (vyańjanāvagraha) occur in case of all the senses? No. Indistinct impression (vyańjanāvagraha) does not arise in case of the eyes (cakÈu) and the mind (anindriya, mana). O;×tukoxzg 1p{kq% vfufUae;kH;ke~o p{kq vkSj eu ls 1uo ugha gksrkA u p{kqjfufUae;kH;ke~ AA19AA Indistinct impression (vyańjanāvagraha) does not occur in case of the eyes and the mind. How? It is because these do not operate on the basis of contact. The eyes apprehend an object that is not touching it but placed in its vicinity in proper perspective and revealed by external light. Similarly, the mind apprehends an object without touching it. Hence, there is no indistinct impression (vyańjanāvagraha) in case of the sense of sight and the mind. How is it ascertained that there is no contact in ease of the eyes? It is 33 vè;k;&1 ascertained from the Scripture and by inference. First, from the Scripture: 'The sense-organ of hearing apprehends sound that comes in contact, the sense-organ of sight apprehends form (colour) that does not come in contact. The sense-organs of smell, taste and touch apprehend smell, taste and touch, respectively, which come in contact.' By inference: the sense-organ of sight operates without contact for it does not apprehend the object that is in contact. This is clear from the fact that it does not perceive the collyrium applied to the eye. Unlike the sense-organ of touch, it does not perceive it. Thus, both the eyes and the mind operate without contact. It is clear, therefore, that indistinct impression (vyańjanāvagraha) is possible in case of all senses except the sense of sight and the mind. Distinct impression (arthāvagraha) obtains in case of all the senses and the mind. Sensory knowledge (matijñāna) has been described with its marks and divisions. Now it is time to define scriptural knowledge (śrutajñāna) with its marks and divisions. Scriptural knowledge (śrutajñāna) is preceded by sensory knowledge (matijñāna). It is of two kinds, many kinds, and twelve kinds. 1Jqre~o JqrKku 1efriwo±o efrKkuiwoZd gksrk gS vFkkZr~ efrKku ds ckn gksrk gSA og JqrKku 1}Ôusd}kn'kHksne~o nks izdkj dk] vusd izdkj dk vkSj ckjg izdkj dk gSA Jqra efriwo± }Ôusd}kn'kHksne~ AA20AA Though the word 'śruta' is derived from 'hearing', by traditional usage, it points to a particular kind of knowledge. For instance, the 34 Tattvārthasūtra word 'kuśala', derived from the 'cutting of grass', by common currency it means hale and hearty. What is that particular kind of knowledge? The answer is given in the sūtra: 'scriptural knowledge (śrutajñāna) is preceded by sensory knowledge (matijñāna)'. This fulfils the validity of scriptural knowledge. The word 'pūrva' in the sūtra also refers to the instrumental cause or just the cause. Sensory knowledge (matijñāna) has already been described. 'Matipūrvam' means having sensory knowledge as its instrumental cause. A doubt is raised that if scriptural knowledge is caused by sensory knowledge, it would become sensory knowledge. For in the world we see that the effect is like the cause. No, this is not invariably so. Though the pitcher is made by the stick and the wheel, it is not of the nature of the stick and the wheel. Moreover, scriptural knowledge may not arise even in the presence of sensory knowledge. Even in the presence of sensory knowledge and availability of the external causes of scriptural knowledge, the one whose powerful karmic veil of scriptural knowledge is in operation, scriptural knowledge does not arise. But when there is destruction-cum-subsidence (kÈayopaśama) of the karmic veil to a high degree, then scriptural knowledge arises. Hence, sensory knowledge is merely an instrumental cause and not the sufficient cause of scriptural knowledge. Now scriptural knowledge (śrutajñāna) is considered beginningless and endless. If it be preceded by sensory knowledge, that proposition falls to the ground. For that which has a beginning has an end. Moreover, it would lose its authority if it is created by man. But such a view is untenable. From the general point of view of substance, etc., it is considered beginningless and endless. It has not been invented by someone at some time in some manner with great effort. But, from the particular point of view, it has a beginning and an end. So it is said to be preceded by sensory knowledge. For instance, the sprout presupposes the seed, but from the point of view of the series it is beginningless and endless. Further, authority does not consist in its not being created by man. For in that case even the teachings on theft, etc., whose author's name is forgotten, would become authoritative. What is wrong if direct 35 vè;k;&1 (pratyakÈa) knowledge, which is not eternal, is considered valid? It is contended that it is not proper to say that scriptural knowledge is preceded by sensory knowledge, as knowledge arises on manifestation of the first, subsidential right belief – prathamopaśama samyaktva. But it is not true, for the knowledge only becomes 'right' as a result of right belief. The realization of the two kinds of knowledge is in succession. Hence, it is established that scriptural knowledge is preceded by sensory knowledge. Again, the statement that 'scriptural knowledge is preceded by sensory knowledge' is erroneous on account of the fault of nonpervasiveness (avyāpti), for it is said that scriptural knowledge is preceded by scriptural knowledge also. It is as follows. Some person perceives, through his ears, sound molecules consisting of letters, words and sentences. This is sensory knowledge. Next he derives the first śruta knowledge of the meaning of the word 'jar' (ghaÇa). Then, if he gets hints of the function of the jar, with the knowledge of the jar, he acquires the second knowledge of the function of the jar such as storing water, etc. Then scriptural knowledge (śrutajñāna) is preceded by scriptural knowledge (śrutajñāna). Again, some person perceives the objects of the senses such as fire, which is sensory knowledge. Then he acquires the first scriptural knowledge of objects such as smoke. If he acquires the knowledge of the concomitant connection of smoke and fire, then he infers fire from smoke. This way also (śrutajñāna) is preceded by scriptural knowledge (śrutajñāna). Therefore, it is not true that scriptural knowledge (śrutajñāna) is invariably preceded by sensory knowledge (matijñāna). There is nothing wrong in it. When scriptural knowledge (śrutajñāna) is preceded by scriptural knowledge (śrutajñāna), figuratively, the first scriptural knowledge (śrutajñāna) is spoken of as sensory knowledge (matijñāna). Scriptural knowledge (śrutajñāna) also is somehow considered sensory knowledge (matijñāna), as it is necessarily preceded by sensory knowledge. The word 'kinds' is added to every number – two kinds, many kinds and twelve kinds. First the two divisions of the Scripture are the works 36 Tattvārthasūtra outside the original canon – ańgabāhya – and those within the original canon – ańgapraviÈÇa. The non-canonical works – ańgabāhya – are of many kinds such as daśavaikālika and uttarādhyayana. The canonical works – ańgapraviÈÇa – are twelve. 1) ācarāńga, 2) sūtrakÃtāńga, 3) sthānāńga, 4) samavāyāńga, 5) vyākhyāprajñyapti ańga, 6) jñātÃdharmakathāńga, 7) upāskadhyananāńga or śrāvakādhyayanāńga, 8) antakÃddaśāńga, 9) anuttaropapādika daśāńga, 10) praśnavyākaraõāńga, 11) vipākasūtrāńga, and 12) dÃÈÇivādāńga. DÃÈÇivādāńga has five divisions – parikarma, sūtra, prathamānuyoga, pūrvagata and cūlikā. Out of these, pūrvagata has fourteen sections – utpādapūrva, agrāyaõīya, vīryānuvāda, astināstipravāda, jñānapravāda, satyapravāda, ātmapravāda, karmapravāda, pratyākhyānanāmadheya, vidyānuvāda, kalyāõanāmadheya, prāõāvāya, kriyāviśāla and lokabindusāra. Thus verbal testimony or scriptural knowledge is of two, many and twelve kinds. What is the basis of these distinctions? The distinctions are based on the kinds of teachers. The teachers are of three kinds, namely, the Omniscient (the Tīrtkańkara and the kevalī), his disciples (the śrutakevalī), and the later preceptors (ācāryas). The Scripture were really taught by the Omniscient Tīrtkańkara, gifted with perfect knowledge of unimaginable power and splendour. The Omniscient Lord is free from all kinds of impurities and is possessed of direct and perfect knowledge. Hence his word is authoritative. The Lord's direct disciples, called the gaõadhara and the śrutakevalī, gifted with vast knowledge and accomplishments, recollect the import of the Lord's teachings and compose the Scripture called the ańga and the pūrva. These too are authoritative, as these are only interpretations of the Word of the Lord. Later on, works such as daśavaikālika are written by the preceptors to benefit their disciples, whose lives are shorter and whose intellect and energy are less potent owing to the nature of the times. These also constitute valid knowledge, as these are in fact the same as the ańga and the pūrva in a condensed form, just as the water of the Milky Ocean taken in a jar. 37 vè;k;&1 Indirect knowledge has been expounded. Direct knowledge must be described now. Direct knowledge is the knowledge perceived directly by the soul in a vivid manner without the intermediary of the senses or the Scripture. This is of two kinds, direct knowledge of a part of reality – deśaprtyakÈa – and direct knowledge embracing the entire reality – sarvaprtyakÈa. Avadhi (clairvoyance) and manaÍparyaya (telepathy) constitute the first variety, and perfect knowledge (kevalajñāna) constitutes the second variety of direct knowledge. The first of these three kinds of direct knowledge, namely, avadhijñāna, is described first. Avadhijñāna is of two kinds according to the nature of its origin. The first is due to birth – bhavapratyaya, and the second owes its origin to destruction-cum-subsidence of the particular karmic veil – kÈayopaśamanimittaka. First, the bhavapratyaya avadhijñāna is described. Clairvoyance based on birth – bhavapratyaya avadhijñāna – is possessed by the celestial and the infernal beings. 1HkoizR;;%o HkoizR;; uked 1vof/%o vof/Kku 1nsoukjdk.kke~o nso vkSj ukjfd;ksa ds gksrk gSA HkoizR;;ks¿ofèknsZoukjdk.kke~ AA21AA What is the state of existence 'bhava'? The mode (paryāya) of the soul is the state of its existence; it is caused by the lifeand name-karmas (āyu, nāmakarma). 'Pratyaya' means cause (kāraõa) or instrumental cause (nimitta). The avadhijñāna that has the state of existence (bhava) for its cause or origin is the bhavapratyaya avadhijñāna. It is possessed by the deva and the infernal beings. In that case, there 38 Tattvārthasūtra would be no destruction-cum-subsidence (kÈayopaśama) of the karmic veil in this type of clairvoyance. No, it is not so. In case of these beings, the karmic veil disappears and subsides due to their state of being (bhava). So the state of being (bhava) is mentioned as the main cause. Birds fly by instinct (inborn tendency) and not because of teaching. So also clairvoyance arises in these beings not because of any special merit such as observance of vows or restraint, but by reason of their state of existence (bhava). The state of existence being common to all, it would mean that all are endowed with the same degree of clairvoyance. But differences in the degree of clairvoyance (avadhijñāna) possessed by these beings are admitted. Though the beings in heaven and hell are mentioned in general, only those endowed with right faith among them are implied. This is clear from the term 'avadhi' used in the sūtra. In case of wrong believers, it is called vibhańga (erroneous) clairvoyance (avadhijñāna) as it is vitiated by their wrong belief. The degree of clairvoyance among them can be ascertained from the Scripture. If clairvoyance (avadhijñāna) based on birth arises in celestial and infernal beings, in whom does clairvoyance arise due to destructioncum-subsidence (kÈayopaśama) of karmas? Clairvoyance (avadhijñāna) due to destruction-cumsubsidence (kÈayopaśama) is of six kinds. It is acquired by the rest, namely, human beings, and animals. 1{k;ksi'kefufeÙk%o {k;ksi'keuSfeÙkd vof/Kku 1"kM~fodYi%o Ng Hksn okyk gS vkSj og 1'ks"kk.kke~o 'ks"k vFkkZr~ euq";ksa rFkk fr;Z±pksa ds gksrk gSA {k;ksi'kefufeÙk% "kM~fodYi% 'ks"kk.kke~ AA22AA 39 vè;k;&1 When there is no rise of totally-obscuring (sarvaghātī) intensityclairvoyance-obscuring karmas, but there is rise of partiallyobscuring (deśaghātī) intensity-clairvoyance-obscuring karmas, that state is called destruction (kÈaya). Where these karmas do not attain to the stage of rise but are merely existent, that state is called subsidence or quiescence (upśama). That which arises owing to these two causes is called clairvoyance of destruction-cum-subsidence (kÈayopśama). This must be understood to occur in case of the rest. Who are the rest? The rest are human beings (manuÈya), and animals (tiryańca). Even among them, it must be understood to arise only in case of those who have the necessary capacity. That capacity is not present in those who are without mind – asaÉjñī – and who have not attained completion – called aparyāptaka. And even among those with mind and completion, it does not arise in all. If so, in whom does it arise? It arises in case of those in whom right faith, etc., are present, and in whom the concerned karmas are quiescent or destroyed. Though clairvoyance arises owing to destruction-cum-subsidence in all cases, the specific mention of 'due to destruction-cum-subsidence' is intended for determination, namely, depending on destruction-cum-subsidence (kÈayopśama) only and not on the state of existence or birth (bhava). This clairvoyance is of six kinds: anugāmī, ananugāmī, vardhamāna, hīyamāna, avasthita, and anavasthita (accompanying, unaccompanying, increasing, decreasing, steady, and unsteady, respectively) according to particular characteristics. Just as light accompanies the sun, the first kind – anugāmī – accompanies the individual possessing it wherever he goes. The second kind – ananugāmī – does not accompany the individual. It passes away then and there, like the reply given to the question of an indifferent person. The third variety – vardhamāna – expands rapidly like the fire in the forest caused by friction, which spreads rapidly by means of dried leaves and fuel. It develops from its original degree up to the extent of knowing innumerable universes, owing to the purity of right faith, etc., of the individual. The fourth variety – hīyamāna – decreases up to a very small fraction of an ańgula (a very small measure) from its original 40 Tattvārthasūtra degree, owing to the decline of right faith and the consequent increase of impure thoughts. The fifth type – avasthita – neither decreases nor increases. It is like the mole. It is steadfast at the same level at which it originates, as right faith, etc., continue in the same condition. It is so till death or till the attainment of omniscience. The sixth type – anavasthita – is unsteady like the waves in the water caused by wind. It develops as well as deteriorates in accordance with the growth or decline of right faith, etc. Three other classifications of clairvoyance (avadhijñāna) due to destruction-cum-subsidence (kÈayopaśama) – kÈayopaśamanimittaka – have been mentioned: deśāvadhi, paramāvadhi and sarvāvadhi. The first kind – deśāvadhi – is obtained by animals and human beings. However, it is possible for the human beings to obtain paramāvadhi and sarvāvadhi clairvoyance (avadhijñāna) in their state of spiritual discipline (saÉyama). In the fourth and the fifth guõasthāna, deśāvadhi clairvoyance is possible. In higher guõasthāna, all three kinds of clairvoyance are possible. Clairvoyance based on the state of existence – bhavapratyaya avadhijñāna – is of the nature of deśāvadhi. Clairvoyant-knowledge (avadhijñāna) has been explained. Now telepathy (manaÍparyayajñāna) should be described. Hence, with the intention of giving out its marks and subdivisions, the next sūtra is composed. The two kinds of telepathy (manaÍparyayajñāna) are Ãjumati and vipulamati. 1eu%i;Z;%o eu%i;Z;Kku 11⁄2tqefr foiqyefr%o 1⁄2tqefr vkSj foiqyefr nks izdkj dk gSA Ítqfoiqyerh eu%i;Z;% AA23AA 41 vè;k;&1 The word 'Ãju' means produced and straight. Whereby is it produced? It is produced by the knowledge of objects of speech, body and mind located in the minds of others. He who has straight telepathy is called Ãjumati. 'Vipula' means not produced and curved or winding. How is it not produced? It is not produced by the knowledge of objects of speech, body and mind in the minds of others. He who has complex telepathy is called vipulamati. Thus, telepathy is of two kinds – Ãjumati and vipulamati. Now that the divisions of telepathy have been mentioned, it must be defined. Telepathy is that knowledge which knows the objects thought of by the minds of others, owing to the destruction-cum-subsidence (kÈayopaśama) of energy-obstructing (viryāntarāya) and telepathyknowlege-obscuring (manaÍparyaya jñānāvaraņa) karmas and depending on the attainment of name-karmas (nāmakarma) of limbs and minor limbs (ańgopāńga). It may be argued that it is sensory knowledge (matijñāna) only since it happens in the mind (mana). This has already been refuted. The mind is merely for reference as the background. The object located in the mind of another is ascertained by this knowledge. So the mind is intended only as a background. Of these two varieties, Ãjumati can extend from two or three births of oneself and of others, up to a maximum of seven or eight past or future births. It can extend in space from one gavyūti (a measure of length = 2 krośa) up to one yojana (a measure of length = 4 krośa) but not beyond it. The latter – vipulamati – can extend from seven or eight births up to innumerable births in the past and in the future. In space it can extend from one yojana up to the entire abode of human beings (i.e., up to the mountain range of Mānuśottara) and not beyond that. Other particulars regarding these two varieties of manaÍparyayajñānā are described next. 42 Tattvārthasūtra The differences between the two are due to purity (viśuddhi) and infallibility (apratipāta). 1fo'kq1⁄4ÔizfrikrkH;kao ifj.kkeksa dh fo'kqf1⁄4 vkSj vizfrikr vFkkZr~ dsoyKku gksus ls iwoZ u NwVuk 1rf}'ks"k%o bu nks ckrksa ls 1⁄2tqefr vkSj foiqyefr Kku esa fo'ks"krk (vUrj) gSA fo'kq1⁄4ÔizfrikrkH;ka rf}'ks"k% AA24AA The state of the soul on destruction-cum-subsidence (kÈayopaśama) of the karmic veil covering telepathy is purity. 'Pratipāta' is fall. Its opposite is infallibility (apratipāta). The ascetic, whose karmic veil has only subsided (upaśāntakaÈāya) but has not been destroyed, sometimes falls from his spiritual height in the presence of powerful conduct-deluding (cāritramohanīya) karmas. But such a fall does not occur in case of the ascetic whose conduct-deluding (cāritramohaniya) karmas have been completely destroyed (kÈīõakaÈāya). And the excellence of telepathy depends upon purity – viśuddhi – and absence of fall – apratipāta. First, with regard to purity. Vipulamati is purer than Ãjumati with regard to the object (dravya), space (kÈetra), time (kāla) and nature or condition (bhāva). How? The infinitesimal part of karmic matter is ascertained by perfect clairvoyance (sarvāvadhijñāna); its infinitesimal part is the province of Ãjumati. And the infinitesimal part of what is known to Ãjumati is within the reach of vipulamati. Thus the latter knows the infinitesimal part of infinitesimal. Its purity with regard to object (dravya), space (kÈetra), time (kāla) has thus been mentioned. Purity in regard to nature or condition (bhāva) must also be understood from the fact that still subtler or minute forms of matter come within the range of vipulamati than Ãjumati as it is accompanied by greater destruction-cum-subsidence (kÈayopaśama) of karmas. Vipulamati is superior to Ãjumati also owing to the absence of downfall or deterioration as it is possessed by 43 vè;k;&1 those with ascending-conduct (pravardhamāna cāritra). Ŗjumati undergoes downfall or deterioration as it is possessed by those with descending-conduct, owing to the rise of passions (kaÈāya). If these are the differences between the two kinds of telepathy, what are the differences between telepathy and clairvoyance? Telepathy (manaÍparyayajñāna) and clairvoyance (avadhijñāna) differ with regard to purity (viśuddhi), space (kÈetra), possessor (svāmī) and subject matter (viÈaya). 1vof/ eu%i;Z;;ks%o vof/Kku vkSj eu%i;Z;Kku esa 1fo'kqf1⁄4 {ks=k Lokfe fo"k;sH;%o fo'kq1⁄4rk] {ks=k] Lokeh vkSj fo"k; dh vis{kk ls fo'ks"krk gksrh gSA fo'kqf1⁄4{ks=kLokfefo"k;sH;ks¿ofèkeu%i;Z;;ks% AA25AA Purity (viśuddhi) means clarity. Space (kÈetra) is the place where the objects known are present. Knower (svāmī) is the possessor. Object (viÈaya) is the object-of-knowledge (jñeya). With regard to purity (viśuddhi), telepathy is better than clairvoyance. How? It is because telepathy is able to know more subtle (sūkÈma) objects. Space (kÈetra) has already been dealt with. Subject matter (viÈaya) is dealt with later. Here possessor (svāmī) is discussed. Telepathy (manaÍparyayajñāna) arises in ascetics with high conduct, in apramattasaÉyata (seventh stage) to kÈīõakaÈāya (twelfth stage). Even among these ascetics, it arises only in those with ascending-conduct (pravardhamāna cāritra) and not in those with descending-conduct. And even among them, it 44 Tattvārthasūtra manifests itself only in those who possess one or more of the seven extraordinary accomplishments (Ãddhi). Still, not all with extraordinary accomplishments (Ãddhi) attain telepathy. Thus the distinction of the possessor (svāmī) or spiritual discipline is mentioned in the sūtra. Clairvoyance, on the other hand, can be possessed by the deva, infernal beings, human beings and animals. Hence these two differ in terms of their possessors. Now it is time to define omniscience (kevalajñāna). But, passing that over, the subject matter (viÈaya) of knowledge is discussed. Why is it? It is because omniscience (kevalajñāna) is defined in sūtra 10-1. If so, let the scope of the first two types of knowledge – matijñāna and śrutajñāna – be mentioned. 45 The range of sensory knowledge – matijñāna – and scriptural knowledge – śrutajñāna – extends to all the six substances (dravya) but not to all their modes (paryāya). 1efrJqr;ks%o efrKku vkSj JqrKku dk 1fucU/%o fo"k;&lEcU/ 1vloZi;kZ;s"kqo dqN (u fd loZ) i;kZ;ksa ls ;qDr 1aeO;s"kqo tho] iqñxykfn loZ aeO;ksa eas gSA efrJqr;ks£ucUèkks aeO;s"oloZi;kZ;s"kq AA26AA 'Nibandha' means connecting or uniting. Connecting what? The 'viÈaya' – subject matter. Then the word 'viÈaya' must be included in the sūtra. No, it is not necessary for it is implied from its mention in the previous sūtra. In this sūtra, 'dravyeÈu' – plural of singular 'dravya' – is used to include all the six substances – the soul (jīva), the matter (pudgala), the medium of motion (dharma), the medium of rest vè;k;&1 (adharma), the space (ākāśa) and the time (kāla). 'AsarvaparyāyeÈu' qualifies 'dravyeÈu'. All these substances form the subject matter of sensory knowledge (matijñāna) and scriptural knowledge (śrutajñāna) only with reference to some of their modes (paryāya) and not all their infinite modes. How can sensory knowledge (matijñāna) cognize non-material substances such as the medium of motion (dharma) and the medium of rest (adharma) which are beyond the senses (atīndriya)? Therefore, it is wrong to say that sensory knowledge (matijñāna) covers all substances. No, there is nothing wrong in this. There is the internal-sense (anindriya). With the help of this and on destruction-cum-subsidence of quasi-sense-covering (noindriyāvaraõa) karmas, arise impression (avagraha), etc. Then, scriptural knowledge (śrutajñāna), preceded by these, engages in substances such as the medium of motion (dharma) and the medium of rest (adharma). The subject matter of clairvoyance (avadhijñāna) is discussed next. The subject matter (viÈaya) of clairvoyance (avadhijñāna) is substances with form (rūpī). 1vo/s%o vof/Kku dk fo"k;&lEcU/ 1:fi"kqo :ih nzO;ksa easa gS vFkkZr~ vof/Kku :ih inkFkks± dks tkurk gSA :fi"ooèks% AA27AA The range or the subject matter (viÈaya) is supplied from the previous sūtra. The term 'rūpī' implies forms of the matter (pudgala) and embodied souls – bonded souls. The sūtra lays down that the scope of clairvoyance (avadhijñāna) is restricted to 'rūpī' substances only and does not extend to non-material substances. Even with regard to 'rūpī' 46 Tattvārthasūtra substances, the range of clairvoyance is limited to certain modes (paryāya) only according to its potency and does not extend to all modes of the matter. In order to determine this 'asarvaparyāyeÈu' should be brought together. What is the scope of telepathy (manaÍparyayajñāna)? The scope of telepathy (manaÍparyayajñāna) is the infinitesimal part of the matter ascertained by clairvoyance (avadhijñāna). 1rr~ vuUrHkkxso lokZof/Kku ds fo"k;Hkwr :ih nzO; ds vuUrosa Hkkx esa 1eu%i;Z;L;o eu%i;Z;Kku dk fo"k;&lEcU/ gSA rnuUrHkkxs eu%i;Z;L; AA28AA Telepathy (manaÍparyayajñāna) makes its subject matter one infinitesimal part of the matter ascertained by the highest form of clairvoyance, i.e., sarvāvadhijñāna. What is the range or the subject matter (viÈaya) of omniscience (kevalajñāna), mentioned last? 1dsoyL;o dsoyKku dk fo"k;&lEcU/ 1loZaeO;&i;kZ;s"kqo loZ nzO; vkSj loZ i;kZ; gaS] vFkkZr~ dsoyKku ,d gh lkFk lHkh inkFkks± dks vkSj mudh lHkh i;kZ;ksa dks tkurk gSA loZaeO;i;kZ;s"kq dsoyL; AA29AA 47 vè;k;&1 Omniscience (kevalajñāna) extends to all substances (dravya) and all their modes (paryāya) simultaneously. The attributive 'sarva' – all – is added to both, 'dravya' – substance, and 'paryāya' – mode. First the soul-substances (jīva dravya) are infinite-times-infinite (anantānanta). The forms of matter (pudgala dravya) are infinitetimes-infinite of these. Atoms (aõu) and molecules (skandha) are the divisions of matter. The medium of motion (dharma dravya), the medium of rest (adharma dravya) and the space (ākāśa dravya) are three. The substance of time (kāla dravya) is innumerable (asaÉkhyāta). Each of these substances has infinite-times-infinite modes (paryāya), extending through the past, the present and the future. There is nothing, either substance or mode, which does not come within the purview of omniscience (kevalajñāna). The fact that omniscience (kevalajñāna) encompasses all substances (dravya) and all modes (paryāya) highlights its boundless virtue. The subject matter of clairvoyance (avadhijñāna), etc., has been described. But it has not been mentioned how many kinds of knowledge arising from their respective instrumental causes can dwell simultaneously in one soul. 1,dfLeu~o ,d tho esa 1;qxir~o ,d lkFk 1,dknhfuo ,d ls ysdj 1vkprqH;Z%o pkj Kku rd 1HkkT;kfuo foHkDr djus ;ksX; gSa] vFkkZr~ gks ldrs gSaA ,dknhfu HkkT;kfu ;qxinsdfLeÂkprqH;Z% AA30AA From one up to four kinds of knowledge can be possessed simultaneously by a single soul. 48 Tattvārthasūtra 'Eka' denotes number. 'Ādi' means beginning. 'Ekādi' means beginning with one. 'Bhājyāni' means 'dwelling in'. Thus, any one soul can possess from one to four kinds of knowledge, simultaneously. If only one kind of knowledge is present that would be omniscience (kevalajñāna). The other kinds of knowledge arising from destructioncum-subsidence (kÈayopaśama) do not subsist simultaneously along with omniscience attained on total destruction (kÈaya) of karmas. Two kinds of knowledge that can subsist simultaneously in the soul are sensory knowledge (matijñāna) and scriptural knowledge (śrutajñāna). Three kinds that can subsist simultaneously in the soul are sensory knowledge, scriptural knowledge, and either clairvoyance (avadhijñāna) or telepathy (manaÍparyayajñāna). Sensory knowledge, scriptural knowledge, clairvoyance, and telepathy are the four that can subsist simultaneously in the soul. All the five kinds of knowledge cannot subsist together as omniscience stands by itself without any assistance. When the soul is absolutely without covering, in its perfection, only one knowledge subsists, i.e., omniscience (kevalajñāna). But in normal worldly states, the soul is with covering. Knowledge arises in it due to destruction-cum-subsidence (kÈayopaśama) of karmas. Such knowledge is divided into various kinds on the basis of instrumental causes. Since destruction-cum-subsidence (kÈayopaśama) can be of different kinds, there can be simultaneous existence of two, three or four kinds of knowledge in the soul. However, manifestation is only of one kind of knowledge at any particular time; the remaining kinds remain dormant, in form of attainment (labdhi). In the soul without covering, only omniscience (kevalajñāna) manifests. In the soul with covering, one kind of knowledge out of the first four – sensory knowledge, scriptural knowledge, clairvoyance, and telepathy – manifests at any particular time. However, there can be simultaneous existence of all four kinds of knowledge when appropriate causes, i.e., destruction-cum-subsidence (kÈayopaśama) of karmas, are present. Do sensory knowledge, etc., always obtain as designated? 49 vè;k;&1 These three kinds of knowledge – sensory (mati), scriptural (śruta), and clairvoyance (avadhi) – are erroneous also. 1efrJqrko/;%o efr] Jqr vkSj vof/ & ;s rhu Kku 1foi;Z;ÜÓo foi;Z; Hkh gksrs gSaA efrJqrkoèk;ks foi;Z;ÜÓ AA31AA 'Viparyaya' means 'erroneous'. How is it so? It is so because this is the section on 'right' knowledge. 'Ca' means 'also', that is, right as well as erroneous. Sensory knowledge, scriptural knowledge and clairvoyance may be right as well as erroneous. Why are these erroneous? These are erroneous because these co-exist in the soul with wrong belief (mithyādarśana). It is similar to the milk kept in a bitter gourd; the taste of the milk becomes bitter on account of the defect of the receptacle. But even with wrong belief (mithyādarśana), there should be no error in the ascertainment of objects by sensory knowledge, etc. For instance, just as the person of right faith perceives form, colour, and so on, so does the person of wrong faith. Just as the person of right faith ascertains form, colour, etc., through scriptural knowledge and represents these accordingly, so does the person of wrong faith. And just as the person of right faith ascertains matter through clairvoyance, so does the person of wrong faith through his clairvoyance. The next sūtra responds to the doubt raised. 1;n`PNksiyC/s%o viuh bPNk ls pkgs tSlk xzg.k djus ds dkj.k 1lr~ vlrks%o fo|eku vkSj vfo|eku inkFkks± dk 1vfo'ks"kkr~o lnlrksjfo'ks"kk|n`PNksiyCèks#UeÙkor~ AA32AA 50 Tattvārthasūtra Hksn:i Kku (;FkkFkZ foosd) u gksus ls 1mUeÙkor~o ikxy ds Kku dh Hkk¡fr feF;kn`f"V dk Kku foijhr vFkkZr~ feF;kKku gh gksrk gSA 'Sat' is that which exists; 'asat' is that which does not exist. Without proper discernment, knowledge becomes erroneous. Sometimes, owing to the operation of wrong belief (mithyādarśana), when colour, form, etc., are present, these are apprehended as not present; when not present, these are apprehended as present. Also, at certain times, what exists is apprehended as existing, and what does not exist is apprehended as non-existing. For instance, the person whose mind is deranged due to disturbed bile indiscriminately considers the mother as the wife and the wife as the mother. At certain times, he may also consider, according to his whims, the mother as the mother and the wife as the wife. Even the latter is not true knowledge as it is only accidental and not based on discrimination. Similarly, error arises in case of sensory knowledge, etc., while ascertaining shape, colour, etc., of objects. It is as follows. Owing to the operation of wrong belief (mithyādarśana) three kinds of error arise: error of cause – kāraõaviparyāsa, error of difference or non-difference – bhedābhedaviparyāsa, and error of nature – svarūpaviparyāsa, while apprehending colour, etc. Error of cause – kāraõaviparyāsa: Some say that the cause of colour, etc., is one, non-material and permanent. Others consider that the atoms which constitute earth, water, fire and air are of different classes, possessing four qualities, three qualities, two qualities and one quality, respectively. The atoms of one class produce things belonging to the same class. Some others say that earth, water, fire and air are four elements, characterized by the qualities of colour, odour, taste and touch. The collection of these constitutes only one type of Owing to lack of discernment between the real (sat – that exists) and the unreal (asat – that does not exist), wrong knowledge is whimsical as that of the lunatic. 51 vè;k;&1 atom called aÈÇaka (one whole, having eight parts). Still others say that different classes of atoms, such as earth, water, fire and air, characterized by qualities of hardness, fluidity, heat and movement, respectively, produce the objects in the world. Error of difference or non-difference – bhedābhedaviparyāsa: This error entails considering the cause (kāraõa) and effect (kārya) as either absolutely different or absolutely identical. Error of nature – svarūpaviparyāsa: In this error, the person believes that colour, etc., are without particulars, or colour, etc., do not exist, or it is vijñāna (see footnote, p. 25) that takes the form of colour, etc., and there is no other object which is the substratum of colour, etc. This way, owing to the rise of wrong belief (mithyādarśana), people give credence to figments of imagination which go against the known sources of knowledge and inference. Therefore, these are wrong sensory knowledge – kumati jñāna, wrong scriptural knowledge – kuśruta jñāna, and erroneous clairvoyance – vibhańga jñāna. But right belief (samyagdarśana) promotes conviction in substances ascertained as these truly are. Therefore, with right belief, these become sensory knowledge – matijñāna, scriptural knowledge – śrutājñāna, and clairvoyance – avadhijñāna. The two kinds of valid knowledge (pramāõa) have been described. The partial views or standpoints or aspects of pramāõa are called naya. These are described next. 1uSxeo uSxe] 1laxzgo laxzg] 1O;ogkjo O;ogkj] 1Ítqlw=ko Ítqlw=k] 1'kCno 'kCn] 1lefHk:<o lefHk:<] 1,oaHkwrko ,oaHkwr & ;s lkr 1u;k%o u; gSaA uSxelaxzgO;ogkjtqZlw=k'kCnlefHk:<SoaHkwrk u;k% AA33AA 52 Tattvārthasūtra The figurative – naigama, the generic – saÉgraha, the systematic – vyavahāra, the straight – Ãjusūtra, the verbal – śabda, the conventional – samabhirūçha, and the specific – evaÉbhūta are the standpoints (naya). The general (sāmānya) and specific (viśeÈa) definitions of these must be given. First, the general definition. Ascertainment, without contradiction, of one particular state or mode of the object, with a view to describe truly the substance having infinite attributes, is called the 'naya'. It is of two kinds, namely, dravyārthika naya, which refers to the general attributes of the substance, and paryārthika naya, which refers to the constantly changing conditions or modes (paryāya) of the substance. 'Dravya' refers to the general (sāmānya), the general rule (utsarga), or conformity (anuvÃtti). That which has these for its object is the general standpoint – dravyārthika naya. 'Paryāya' means particular (viśeÈa), an exception (apavāda), or exclusion (vyāvÃtti). That which has these for its object is the standpoint of modes – paryārthika naya. Their specific marks are given now. The figurative standpoint (naigama naya) takes into account the purpose or intention of something which is not accomplished. For instance, a person with an axe in his hand is asked by someone for what purpose is he going. The person replies that he is going to fetch a wooden measure (prastha). But at that time the wooden measure is not present; the reference to the wooden measure is the mere intention to make it. Similarly, one is engaged in fetching fuel, water, etc. Another person asks, "What are you doing?" The former replies that he is cooking food. But he is not actually cooking food. He is only engaged in an activity which will ultimately result in cooking food. Such instances of general custom where the intention alone of accomplishing a task is referred to as the basis for speech is the figurative standpoint (naigama naya). The generic standpoint (saÉgraha naya) is that which comprehends 53 vè;k;&1 different substances, belonging to the same class, under one common head. For instance, the words existent (sat), substance (dravya), and jar (ghaÇa). The word 'existent' (sat) groups together, without distinction, all substances characterized by existence as per the general rule of perception and discernment. Further, when the word 'substance' (dravya) is mentioned, the soul, the non-soul, etc., and their subdivisions are grouped together, as all these fulfill the definition of substance. When the word 'jar' (ghaÇa) is mentioned, it includes all jars which are inferred from the word jar and its perception and discernment. Other things also are the subject matter of the generic point of view (saÉgraha naya) in the same way. The division of reality or objects comprehended by the generic viewpoint, in accordance with the rule, is the systematic standpoint (vyavahāra naya). What is the rule? The rule is that the analysis or division into subclasses proceeds in the order of succession. It is as follows. That, which is comprehended as existence by the generic view, without reference to the particular objects, is not conducive to the ways of the world. Hence the systematic standpoint is sought. That which 'exists' (sat) is either a substance or an attribute. Social intercourse is not possible even by the word 'substance' (dravya) of the generic standpoint, without its subdivisions like the soul (jīva) and the non-soul (ajīva). Further, the soul (jīva) and the non-soul (ajīva), solely from the generic standpoint, are not conducive to worldly occupations. Hence these are further subdivided into the deva, infernal beings, etc., and jar, etc., by resorting to the systematic standpoint (vyavahāra naya). This standpoint operates up to the point beyond which no further subdivisions are possible. That, which addresses the straightforward (present) condition, is the straight viewpoint (Ãjusūtra naya). This viewpoint leaves out things of the past and the future and comprehends the present mode of things, as no practical purpose can be served by things past and things unborn. It confines itself to the present moment. It is contended that it would violate the ways of the world. No. Only the object of this viewpoint is indicated here. The intercourse of the world is promoted 54 Tattvārthasūtra by the aggregate of all the viewpoints. The verbal viewpoint (śabda naya) is intent on removing the anomalies or irregularities with regard to gender, number, case, etc. Although the original text highlights many irregularities, just two of these are mentioned here. Irregularity of gender (lińgavyabhicāra) – puÈpa, tārakā and nakÈatra – these are of different genders. Yet these are used as substitutes. Irregularity of time (kālavyabhicāra) – 'viśvadÃśvāsya putro janitā' – 'A son who has seen the world will be born to him.' Here, what will take place in the future (i.e., seeing the world) is spoken of as having taken place in the past. Though such usage prevails by convention or custom, yet the verbal viewpoint considers it improper as words with different meanings cannot be clubbed. If this is opposed to what is universally current, let it be so. Here truth is investigated; medical treatment (medicine) does not satisfy the whimsies of the patient! As it consists of forsaking several meanings, it is called the conventional viewpoint (samabhirūçha naya). It gives up the several meanings and becomes current in one important sense. For instance, the word 'gau' has several meanings such as speech but, by convention, it has come to denote the cow. Or, words are employed to convey the knowledge of the objects. That being so, from every word arises knowledge of one particular object. Hence it is useless to employ synonyms. With the change of the word, the meaning too must change. The conventional viewpoint (samabhirūçha naya) abandons several meanings of the word. For instance, 'indra', 'śakra' and 'purandara' are three words that are used to describe the lord of the celestial being. But these must have three meanings. 'Indra' means the one who is endowed with authority and supremacy, 'śakra' means the strong one, and 'purandara' means the one who destroys cities. Same kind of distinction applies to all words. The important sense of the word, ignoring its several meanings, becomes the conventional viewpoint (samabhirūçha naya). For instance, "Where do you reside?" The answer is, "I reside in myself." Why? It is because one substance cannot reside in another. If, on the other hand, one thing can reside in 55 vè;k;&1 another, then there would be knowledge and colour, etc., in the sky. That which determines or ascertains an object as it is in its present state or mode is called the specific viewpoint (evaÉbhūta naya). According to this standpoint, a word should be used to denote an object only when it is in the state which the word connotes. When he issues commands, then only is he lord (Indra). And at that time he is neither consecrator nor worshipper. Only when it goes it is cow, and not when it stands still or lies down. Or that, which determines a soul by its present mode of knowledge, is the actual standpoint. For example, the soul which cognizes Indra is Indra, and that which cognizes fire is fire. The seven standpoints (naya) have been described. These are successively of finer scope or smaller extent, and the succeeding standpoint is dependent on the one preceding it. These points govern the order of their mention in the sūtra. Each preceding naya has greater range and divergence than the succeeding one, and each preceding naya has smaller range and convergence than the succeeding one. Since the substance has infinite characteristics, the standpoints are of numerous subdivisions. All the naya, with either primary or secondary importance, are interdependent, and a harmonious combination of these paves the way to right faith (samyagdarśana). These are like the cotton threads which, when interwoven in the proper form, produce cloth that wards off cold and provides comfort to the body. But if each threads remain independent and separate, the purpose is not served. It is contended that the example of threads is an uneven one. It is seen that threads, etc., even when independent, produce some kind of effect. Indeed, there is some use of the thread. And one bark of a tree can bind things. This contention is not valid. The critic has not understood the meaning intended. What is said here is that the standpoints (naya), when independent, cannot promote even a little of right faith (samyagdarśana). There is no effect of cloth in case of independent threads. And what has been adduced is not the effect of cloth but the effect of individual threads. Getting a step further, the effect of thread too is absent in individual parts that compose it. Hence 56 Tattvārthasūtra our proposition is established. If it be said that the effect of cloth, etc., is present potentially in threads, etc., then this applies to naya also; assisted by necessary means, even the standpoints (naya), independent in thought or word, have the potential to produce right belief (samyagdarśana). Thus, the standpoints (naya) possess that potentiality, and the example is therefore apt. The standpoints (naya) are a part of scriptural knowledge (śrutajñāna). These have been divided into seven kinds on the basis of their substratum. The substrata are three: convention (upacāra), meaning (artha), and word (śabda). The figurative (naigama) relies primarily on convention (upacāra); still, it is also arthanaya. The generic (samgraha), the systematic (vyavahāra), and the straight (Ãjusūtra) are arthanaya. The remaining three – the verbal (śabda), the conventional (samabhirūçha) and the specific (evaÉbhūta) – are śabdanaya. To comprehend the object from one particular standpoint is the scope of naya (the one-sided method of comprehension). Naya comprehends one specific attribute of the object but pramāõa – valid knowledge – comprehends the object in its fullness. Pramāõa does not make a distinction between the substance and its attributes but grasps the object in its entirety. But naya looks at the object from a particular point of view and puts emphasis on a particular aspect of the object. Both pramāõa and naya are forms of knowledge; pramāõa is sakalādeśa – comprehensive and absolute, and naya is vikalādeśa – partial and relative. A naya looks at the object from a particular point of view and presents the picture of it in relation to that view; the awareness of other aspects is in the background and not ignored. A particular standpoint naya, when treated as absolute (independent of other naya), is wrong (mithyā) knowledge. When treated as partial (dependent on other naya) it constitutes right (samyak) knowledge. 57 AA bfr rÙokFkZlw=kkijukeeks{k'kkÐs izFkeks¿è;k;% lekIr% AA ] ] ] vè;k;&1 The distinctive characteristics (svatattva) of the soul (jīva) are the dispositions or thought-activities – bhāva – arising from subsidence – upaśama, destruction – kÈaya, destruction-cum-subsidence – kÈayopaśama – of karmas, the fruition – udaya – of karmas, and its inherent nature or capacity – pariõāma. Just as the mud in the water settles down when clearing nuts are put into it, so also the karmic matter does not manifest its power in the soul due to causes (i.e., the disposition of the soul). This is called subsidence (upaśama). When the same water is poured into another vessel it becomes completely free from mud. In the same way, complete removal of the karmic matter is destruction (kÈaya). The third state is a mixed state of destruction-cum-subsidence (kÈayopaśama), as in CATEGORY OF THE LIVING C H A P T E R 2 vkSi'kfed{kkf;dkS HkkokS feJÜÓ thoL; LorÙoekSnf;dikfj.kkfedkS p AA1AA 1thoL;o tho ds 1vkSi'kfed{kkf;dkSo vkSi'kfed vkSj {kkf;d 1HkkokSo Hkko 1p feJ%o vkSj feJ rFkk 1vkSnf;d ikfj.kkfedkS po vkSnf;d vkSj ikfj.kkfed & ;s ik¡p Hkko 1LorÙoe~o futHkko gSa vFkkZr~ ;s tho ds vfrfjDr nwljs esa ugha gksrsA What is the nature of the soul (jīva), which is the first of the objects of right faith? 58 Tattvārthasūtra case of the water, which, owing to the presence of clearing nuts, becomes clear as well as muddy in different parts. The fruition of karmas in the presence of certain causes is fruition (udaya). The essential nature (svarūpa) of the soul, irrespective of the karmic matter, is its inherent nature or capacity – pariõāma. That disposition (bhāva), which has subsidence as its object or cause, is subsidential (aupaśamika). Similarly with regard to destructional (kÈāyika), destruction-cum-subsidential (kÈāyopaśamika), rising (audāyika) and inherent nature (pāriõāmika). These five dispositions (bhāva) are the distinctive (asādhāraõa) characteristics – svatattva – of the soul. The subject under consideration is right belief (samyagdarśana). And among the three kinds of right belief, subsidential (aupaśamika) disposition (bhāva) is attained first by the soul. So it is mentioned first. The contender of the subsidential (aupaśamika) disposition is the destructional (kÈāyika) disposition and, among the worldly souls, the right believers of this type are innumerable times more in number than those of the first type. So it is mentioned next. The mixed disposition – destruction-cum-subsidential (kÈāyopaśamika) – is mentioned next as it consists of both. Besides, the right believers of this type are innumerable times more in number than the other two types. The dispositions due to the fruition of karmas – audāyika – and the inherent nature of the soul – pāriõāmika – are mentioned in the end as these are infinite times more than all the other types. The subsidential (aupaśamika) and the destructional (kÈāyika) dispositions (bhāva) arise only in case of the potential (bhavya) souls; the potential (bhavya) souls are those having the inherent capacity for liberation. But the third – mixed disposition of destruction-cumsubsidential (kÈāyopaśamika) – arises in case of the non-potential (abhavya) souls too; the non-potential (abhavya) souls are those not having the inherent capacity for liberation. The last two dispositions (bhāva) arise in case of the potential (bhavya) as well as the nonpotential (abhavya) souls. The first four dispositions (bhāva) have been mentioned primarily on the basis of their instrumental causes (nimitta) and the last on the 59 vè;k;&2 basis of the inherent capacity (yogyatā) of the soul. All worldly activities are divided on these two bases – the instrumental cause and the inherent capacity. Sometimes the instrumental cause is predominant and sometimes the inherent capacity. Giving predominance to the instrumental cause, however, does not mean that the cause is the doer (kartā) of the activity. The purpose of such classification is to exhibit clearly the definitive cause of certain activities. Although the activity takes place due to the inherent capacity (yogyatā or upādāna) of the object under consideration, still there is the presence of the hetu or sādhana – in form of logical association (anvaya) and distinction (vyatireka). The presence of such hetu or sādhana is the definitive cause (nimitta) of the activity. The first four dispositions (bhāva) – aupaśamika, kÈāyika, kÈāyopaśamika and audāyika – are, therefore, called 'naimittika bhāva'. Do these dispositions (bhāva) or characteristics of a single soul have subdivisions? Yes, these have subdivisions. mijksDr ik¡p Hkko 1;FkkØee~o Øe'k% 1f} uo v"Vkn'k ,d o'kfr f=kHksnko nks] uo] vêkò jg] bDdhl vkSj rhu Hksn okys gSaaA f}uok"Vkn'kSd o'kfrf=kHksnk ;FkkØee~ AA2AA These are of two, nine, eighteen, twenty-one and three kinds, respectively. The subsidential (aupaśamika) disposition (bhāva) is of two kinds. The destructional (kÈāyika) disposition is of nine kinds. The destruction-cum-subsidential (kÈāyopaśamika) disposition is of eighteen kinds. The disposition (bhāva) due to the fruition of karmas – audāyika – is of twenty-one kinds. And the disposition (bhāva) due to 60 Tattvārthasūtra inherent nature of the soul – pāriõāmika – is of three kinds. What are the two kinds of characteristics arising from subsidence (upaśama)? 1lE;DRoo vkSi'kfed lE;DRo vkSj 1pkfj=kso vkSi'kfed pkfj=k & bl izdkj vkSi'kfedHkko ds nks Hksn gaSA lE;DRopkfj=ks AA3AA The two kinds of subsidential (aupaśamika) disposition (bhāva) are subsidential belief (aupaśamika samyaktva) and subsidential conduct (aupaśamika cāritra). Right belief and right conduct have already been explained. How do these become subsidential (aupaśamika)? Conduct-deluding (cāritramohanīya) karmas are of two kinds, the kaÈāyavedanīya and the nokaÈāyavedanīya. When the following seven, the four kaÈāyavedanīya – anger (krodha), pride (māna), deceitfulness (māyā) and greed (lobha) – of the anantānubandhī type (leading to endless worldly existence), together with the three kinds of faith-deluding (darśanamohanīya) karmas – samyaktva (slightly clouding right belief), mithyātva (wrong belief) and samyagmithyātva (mixed right and wrong belief) – subside, subsidential belief (aupaśamika samyaktva) arises. How can karmas subside in case of the eternal misbeliever who is subject to passions (kaÈāya) arising from karmas? It is on the basis of the attainment of favourable-time (kālalabdhi), etc. The first kālalabdhi is with regard to time. The potential soul (with capacity for liberation) bound by karmas becomes capable of attaining the first stage of right belief (prathama samyaktva) when there is the residue of 61 vè;k;&2 time known as half-time of whirling-round matter (ardhapudgala parivartana). When the residue of time is more than this, that soul is not capable of attaining the first stage of right belief (prathama samyaktva). The second kālalabdhi is with regard to the duration of karmas. The first stage of right belief is not attained when the duration of karmas is either at the maximum or at the minimum. If so, when is it attained? The suitability for the first stage of right belief arises when the karmas of less than koÇākoÇi sāgaropama duration are bound, and when, owing to the purification of the soul, the existing karmas also are of duration of koÇākoÇi sāgaropama less numerable thousand sāgaropama. The third kālalabdhi is with regard to birth (bhava). The worthy soul endowed with the five senses and the mind (saÉjñī), fully developed (paryāptaka) and purified (sarvaviśuddha), attains the first stage of right faith – subsidential belief (aupaśamika samyaktva). Besides, recollection of the previous births is also among the causes. Subsidential conduct (aupaśamika cāritra) arises on the subsidence of all the deluding (mohanīya) karmas. Right belief – samyaktva – is mentioned first as it is the basis of right conduct (cāritra). The nine characteristics of the destructional (kÈāyika) disposition are described next. 1Kku n'kZu nku ykHk Hkksx miHkksx oh;kZf.ko dsoyKku] dsoyn'kZu] {kkf;dnku] {kkf;dykHk] {kkf;dHkksx] {kkf;dmiHkksx] {kkf;doh;Z rFkk 1po p dgus ij] {kkf;dlE;DRo vkSj {kkf;dpkfj=k & bl izdkj {kkf;dHkko ds ukS Hksn gSaA Kkun'kZunkuykHkHkksxksiHkksxoh;kZf.k p AA4AA 62 Tattvārthasūtra The destructional (kÈāyika) disposition is of nine kinds: knowledge (jñāna), perception (darśana), gift (dāna), gain (lābha), enjoyment (bhoga), re-enjoyment (upabhoga), energy (vīrya), and the two – belief (samyaktva) and conduct (cāritra) – from the previous sūtra. The word destructional (kÈāyika) must be added to each. 'Ca' is intended to include belief (samyaktva) and conduct (cāritra). Perfect knowledge (kevalajñāna – kÈāyika jñāna) manifests on the total destruction of knowledge-obscuring karmas. Perfect perception (kevaladarśana – kÈāyika darśana) must be understood in the same manner. On complete destruction of gift-obstructive (dānāntarāya) karmas arises the power of giving security, the gift of fearlessness, to infinite multitudes of living beings. On complete destruction of the gain-obstructive (lābhāntarāya) karmas, the Omniscient has no need for the partake of food; infinite particles of extremely pure and subtle matter, which give strength and which are beyond the reach of ordinary human beings, are assimilated in his body every instant. As the entire karmas which obstruct enjoyment (bhoga) are destroyed, there arises infinite enjoyment of unparalleled nature consequent on the destruction of karmas. Particularly, the marvels (atiśaya) like the celestial shower of fragrant flowers result from this. As the obstructive karmas of re-enjoyment (upabhoga) disappear without remnant, infinite re-enjoyment is manifested. The bejeweled throne, the waving of flywhisks, three-tier canopy, and other splendours result from this. And as the karmas which obstruct energy (vīrya) are completely destroyed, infinite energy of the pure soul is manifested. On complete destruction of the seven subtypes of karmas referred to above, perfect belief (kÈāyika samyaktva) is attained. Perfect conduct (kÈāyika cāritra) must also be understood in the same way. A doubt is raised: if the power of giving security and bestowing fearlessness, etc., are concomitant to destruction of karmas, then these should also apply to the liberated souls (the Siddha). No. These 63 vè;k;&2 arise only in case of the Omniscient Lord (the Arhat) on account of the presence of the physique-making (śarīra) and Tīrthańkara namekarmas (nāmakarma). In the absence of all karmas, these external manifestations of kÈāyika dāna, etc., do not happen in the liberated souls. How then do these exist in the liberated souls? These exist in the liberated souls only in the form of infinite bliss, pure and unalloyed; as infinite-energy (anantavīrya) exists in the form of infinite-knowledge (kevalajñāna). The eighteen characteristics of destruction-cum-subsidential (kÈāyopaśamika) disposition (bhāva) are now described. 1Kku vKkuo efr] Jqr] vof/ vkSj eu%i;Z; & ;s pkj Kku rFkk dqefr] dqJqr vkSj dqvof/ & ;s rhu vKku] 1n'kZuo p{kq] vp{kq vkSj vof/ & ;s rhu n'kZu] 1yC/;%o {kk;ksi'kfed nku] ykHk] Hkksx] miHkksx] oh;Z & ;s ik¡p yfC/;k¡ 1prq% f=k f=k iÛÓ Hksnk%o bl izdkj 4$3$3$53⁄415 Hksn rFkk 1lE;DRoo {kk;ksi'kfed lE;DRo 1pkfj=ko {kk;ksi'kfed pkfj=k 1po vkSj 1la;ekla;ek%o la;ekla;e & bl izdkj {kk;ksi'kfedHkko ds 18 Hksn gaSA KkukKkun'kZuyCèk;ÜÓrqfL=kf=kiÛÓHksnk% lE;DRopkfj=kla;ekla;ekÜÓ AA5AA The destruction-cum-subsidential (kÈāyopaśamika) disposition is of eighteen kinds: four kinds of knowledge (jñāna), three kinds of wrong knowledge (ajñāna), three kinds of perception (darśana), five kinds of attainment (labdhi), right belief (samyaktva), conduct (cāritra), and 64 Tattvārthasūtra restraint-cum-non-restraint (saÉyamāsaÉyama). The word destruction-cum-subsidential (kÈāyopaśamika) must be added to these eighteen kinds of disposition. The destruction-cum-subsidential (kÈāyopaśamika) disposition arises when, for the present, there is destruction-of-rise (udayābhāvī kÈaya) of the karmic-strength that obscures the attributes of the soul completely – sarvaghāti spardhaka – and, for the future, there is subsidence (upaśama) of these and rise (udaya) only of the karmicstrength that obscures partially – deśaghātī spardhaka. Herein the operation of dispositions like knowledge (jñāna) must be understood with reference to their own covering (āvaraõa) and destruction-cum-subsidence (kÈayopaśama) of the obstructive (antarāya) karmas. The word 'samyaktva' in the sūtra refers to the destruction-cumsubsidential type of right belief – 'vedaka samyaktva' or 'kÈāyopaśamika samyaktva'. The 'vedaka samyaktva' is the belief in substances that arises on destruction-of-rise (udayābhāvī kÈaya) as well as subsidence (upaśama) of these six: four passions (kaÈāya) leading to endless mundane existence – anantānubandhi, the faithdeluding karmas of wrong-belief (mithyātva) and mixed-belief (samyagmithyātva). The rise of the faith-deluding karmas of rightbelief (samyaktva prakÃti) which obscure only partially (deśaghātī) is 'vedaka samyaktva' . The destruction-cum-subsidential (kÈāyopaśamika) restraint-cumnon-restraint (saÉyamāsaÉyama) is the state (pariõāma) of the soul that arises on destruction-of-rise (udayābhāvī kÈaya) as well as on subsidence (upaśama) of the twelve passions (kaÈāya), namely, the four that lead to endless existence – anantānubandhī, the four that prevent partial self-control – apratyākhyānāvaraõa, and the four that prevent complete self-control – pratyākhyānāvaraõa, and on the rise of the partially-obscuring (deśaghātī) karmic-strength (spardhaka) of any one of the gleaming – saÉjvalana – passions (kaÈāya), and possible 65 vè;k;&2 rise of the nine quasi-passions (nokaÈāya). There are four partially-obscuring (deśaghātī) types of knowledgeobscuring (jñānāvaraõīya) karmas, therefore, four kinds of knowledge are manifested on their destruction-cum-subsidence (kÈayopaśama). However, since three kinds of wrong-knowledge (ajñāna) manifest in the wrong-believer (mithyādÃÈÇi), and four kinds of knowledge (jñāna) in the right-believer (samyagdÃÈÇi), there are seven kinds of destruction-cum-subsidential (kÈāyopaśamika) knowledge (jñāna). The three kinds of destruction-cum-subsidential (kÈāyopaśamika) perception (darśana) are ocular-perception (cakÈudarśana), nonocular-perception (acakÈudarśana) and clairvoyant-perception (avadhidarśana). The five kinds of destruction-cum-subsidential (kÈāyopaśamika) attainment (labdhi) are gift (dāna), gain (lābha), enjoyment (bhoga), re-enjoyment (upabhoga), and energy (vīrya). The twenty-one kinds of disposition consequent on the fruition (udaya) of karmas are described next. 1xfro fr;±p] ujd] euq"; vkSj nso & ;s pkj xfr;k¡] 1d"kk;o Øks/] eku] ek;k] yksHk & ;s pkj d"kk;sa] 1 yxo L=khosn] iq#"kosn vkSj uiqaldosn & ;s rhu yx] 1feF;kn'kZuo feF;kn'kZu 1vKkuo vKku 1vla;ro vla;e 1vfl1⁄4o vfl1⁄4Ro rFkk 1ys';k%o d".k] uhy] dkiksr] ihr] iÁ vkSj 'kqDy & ;s Ng ys';k;sa] bl izdkj 1prq% prq% f=k ,d ,d ,d ,d "kM~ Hksnk%o 4$4$3$1$1$1$ 1$63⁄421] bl izdkj lc feykdj vkSnf;dHkko ds 21 Hksn gSaA xfrd"kk; yxfeF;kn'kZukKkukla;rkfl1⁄4& ys';kÜÓrqÜÓrqL=;sdSdSdSd"kM~Hksnk% AA6AA 66 Tattvārthasūtra The disposition (bhāva) due to the fruition of karmas – audāyika – is of twenty-one kinds: states of existence – gati, passions – kaÈāya, sex – lińga, wrong-belief – mithyādarśana, wrong-knowledge – ajñāna, nonrestraint – asaÉyama, imperfect-disposition – asiddha, and colouration – leśyā, which are of four, four, three, one, one, one, one and six kinds, respectively. States of existence (gati) are four: infernal existence (narakagati), subhuman existence (tiryańcagati), human existence (manuÈyagati) and celestial existence (devagati). On the fruition of name-karma (nāmakarma) of infernal existence (narakagati), the disposition of infernal being is manifested; hence, infernal existence (narakagati) is due to the fruition of karmas – audāyika. Similarly it should be understood in regard to the other three states of existence (gati). The passions (kaÈāya) are of four kinds: anger (krodha), pride (māna), deceitfulness (māyā) and greed (lobha). The karma which rouses anger (krodha) on its fruition (udaya) is anger-rousing karma. Similarly it should be understood in regard to the other three passions (kaÈāya). The sexes (lińga) are of three kinds: the male-feeling (puruÈaveda), the female-feeling (strīveda) and the neuter-feeling (napuÉsakaveda). The rise of the female-feeling occurs on the fruition of karmas of the female sex. Similarly it should be understood in regard to the other two sexes. Wrong-belief (mithyādarśana) is one. Wrong-belief in reality is the result of the fruition of karmas of wrong belief (mithyādarśana). Wrong-knowledge (ajñāna) means noncognition of objects. The rise of knowledge-obscuring (jñānāvaraõīya) karmas causes non-cognition of objects; it is thus audāyika. The rise of intense karmas – sarvaghāti spardhaka – of conduct-deluding type gives rise to non-restraint (asaÉyama). Hence, non-restraint (asaÉyama) is audāyika. Imperfect-disposition (asiddha) arises on the fruition of karmas in general; it is thus audāyika. Colouration 67 vè;k;&2 (leśyā) is of two kinds, material-colouration (dravyaleśyā) and psychical-colouration (bhāvaleśyā). As this chapter deals with the psychical-factors of the soul, it does not delve into materialcolouration (dravyaleśyā). Psychical-colouration (bhāvaleśyā) is the source or cause of vibratory activity of the soul on rise of the passions (kaÈāya); it is thus audāyika. It is of six kinds: black (kÃÈõa), blue (nīla), grey (kāpota), yellow (pīta), pink (padma) and white (śukla). Now, it is mentioned in the Scripture that there is the presence of white colouration (śuklaleśyā) in case of those with subsided delusion (upaśānta-kaÈāya), with destroyed delusion (kÈīõa-kaÈāya), and the Omniscient-with-vibration (sayogakevalī). It cannot be so since their passions (kaÈāya) are either subsided or destroyed. It is not a contradiction. From the point of view of the previous colouration of disposition due to past passions, conventionally, it is said that the same is present, owing to presence of activity in them. In case of the Omniscient-without-activity (ayogakevalī), there is no colouration as all activity is absent. The three kinds of disposition (bhāva) due to inherent nature of the soul – pāriõāmika – are mentioned next. 1thoHkO;kHkO;Rokfu po thoRo] HkO;Ro vkSj vHkO;Ro & bl izdkj ikfj.kkfed Hkko ds rhu Hksn gaSA thoHkO;kHkO;Rokfu p AA7AA The soul-principle – jīvatva, the capacity for liberation – bhavyatva, and the incapacity for liberation – abhavyatva are the three dispositions (bhāva) due to the inherent nature of the soul – pāriõāmika. 68 Tattvārthasūtra The three characteristics mentioned in the sūtra are inherent in and unique to the soul (jīva), not found in other substances. Why are these considered inherent in the soul? These do not depend on rise (udaya), subsidence (upaśama), destruction (kÈaya) or destruction-cumsubsidence (kÈayopaśama) of karmas. The soul-principle (jīvatva) is soul-consciousness (caitanya). The soul that will attain right faith (samyagdarśana), etc., is called 'bhavya' – endowed with the capacity for liberation. Or, it is endowed with bhavyatva. And the soul that will not attain right faith, and so on, is called 'abhavya' – not endowed with the capacity for liberation. Or, it is endowed with abhavyatva. These three – jīvatva, bhavyatva and abhavyatva – are the inherent qualities of the soul. Should not the other qualities like existence – astitva, permanence – nityatva, and having space-points – pradeśavattva, be mentioned along with these three qualities? No. These have been included by the particle 'ca' in the sūtra. If so, the number three is contradicted. No. The distinctive (asādhāraõa) characteristics which are inherent in the soul are three only. Qualities like existence (astitva) are common (sādhāraõa) characteristics as these apply to the souls (jīva) as well as the non-souls (ajīva). So these are included separately by the particle 'ca'. Since the soul is incorporeal or non-material (amūrta), how do the dispositions of subsidence – aupaśamika – etc., apply to it? These dispositions have reference to the bondage of karmas. How can there be bondage of karmic matter with the incorporeal soul? It is possible because the soul is incorporeal or non-material (amūrta) only from a certain point of view; it is not true that the soul is non-material (amūrta) from all points of view. From the point of view of its modes (paryāya) in bondage, owing to the influence of karmas, it is corporeal (mūrta) in the embodied state. From the point of view of its pure nature, the soul is incorporeal (amūrta). It is further contended that if the soul becomes one with the body because of the influence of karmas then it cannot be considered separate from the body. It is not so. Though the soul is one with the body in the embodied state, it is 69 vè;k;&2 1y{k.ke~o tho dk y{k.k 1mi;ksx%o mi;ksx gSA mi;ksxks y{k.ke~ AA8AA different from the body because of its distinctive mark (lakÈaõa). The Scripture says, "From the point of view of bondage, the soul is one with the body, still it is different from the body because of its distinctive mark (lakÈaõa). Hence the incorporeal nature of the soul is predicated in a non-absolutistic (anekāntātmaka) sense only. From one point of view it is incorporeal and from another point of view it is not incorporeal." If so, let the distinctive mark (lakÈaõa) of the soul be mentioned. Cognition (upayoga) is the mark (lakÈaõa) – distinctive characteristic – of the soul (jīva). That, which arises from both internal and external causes and concomitant with soul-consciousness (caitanya) is cognition (upayoga) – active or attentive consciousness. By this – cognition (upayoga) – the soul is distinguished from the body. Just as gold and silver, even when mixed together, remain distinct by their respective colour, etc., similarly the soul and the body, though one in bondage, maintain distinctness due to their respective marks (lakÈaõa). The divisions of cognition (upayoga) are described next. 1l%o og mi;ksx 1f}fo/%o nks izdkj dk gS & Kkuksi;ksx vkSj n'kZuksi;ksxA os Øe'k% 1v"V prq% Hksn%o vkB vkSj pkj Hksn lfgr gSa] vFkkZr~ Kkuksi;ksx ds vkB rFkk n'kZuksi;ksx ds pkj Hksn gaSA l f}foèkks¿"VprqHksZn% AA9AA 70 Tattvārthasūtra Cognition (upayoga) is of two kinds. And these, in turn, are of eight and four kinds, respectively. Cognition (upayoga) is of two kinds: knowledge-cognition (jñānopayoga) and perception-cognition (darśanopayoga). Knowledge-cognition (jñānopayoga) is of eight kinds: (1) sensory knowledge – matijñāna, (2) scriptural knowledge – śrutajñāna, (3) clairvoyance – avadhijñāna, (4) telepathy – manaÍparyayajñāna, (5) omniscience – kevalajñāna, (6) wrong sensory knowledge – matyajñāna, kumati, (7) wrong scriptural knowledge – śrutājñāna, kuśruta, and (8) wrong clairvoyance – vibhańgajñāna. Perception-cognition (darśanopayoga) is of four kinds: (1) ocular perception – cakÈudarśana, (2) non-ocular perception – acakÈudarśana, (3) clairvoyant perception – avadhidarśana, and (4) omniscient perception – kevaladarśana. How are these, knowledge and perception, different? Knowledgecognition (jñānopayoga) is with details and, therefore, called sākāra or savikalpa. Perception-cognition (darśanopayoga) is without details and, therefore, called nirvikāra or nirvikalpa or sāmānyāvalokana. These occur in succession in ordinary souls (non-omniscient souls), but occur simultaneously in those who have annihilated karmas. Though perception occurs first, knowledge being more worthy is mentioned first in the sūtra. Earlier, five kinds of right knowledge (samyagjñāna) have been mentioned. But here, three kinds of wrong knowledge are also mentioned as this is the section dealing with cognition (upayoga), in general. Cognition (upayoga) is the mark (lakÈaõa) common to all souls. The souls are classified into two. 71 vè;k;&2 tho 1lalkfj.k%o lalkjh 1po vkSj 1eqDrk%o eqDr & ,sls nks izdkj ds gSaA lalkfj.kks eqDrkÜÓ AA10AA Souls are of two kinds: the transmigrating (saÉsārī) and the liberated (mukta). Transmigration (metempsychosis) is saÉsāra, the cycle of wandering. Those, who undergo the cycle of wandering, are the transmigrating souls. This whirling-round has five subdivisions: the cycle of matter (dravyaparivartana), the cycle of place (kÈetraparivartana), the cycle of time (kālaparivartana), the cycle of being (bhavaparivartana), and the cycle of thought-activity (bhāvaparivartana). The cycle of matter is of two kinds, the cycle of quasi-karmic matter (nokarmaparivartana) and the cycle of karmic matter (karmaparivartana). The cycle of quasi-karmic matter is described first. Particles of matter fit for the three kinds of body and the six kinds of completion or development are taken in by a soul (jīva) in one instant. These remain in the same condition in which they were taken in with regard to their greasiness or roughness, colour, smell, etc. – intense, feeble or intermediate – and fall off in the subsequent instant(s). After that, unabsorbed particles are taken in and cast off infinite times. Similarly, mixed particles are taken in and cast off infinite times. The absorbed particles in the middle are taken in and cast off infinite times. After that, the same particles of matter taken in by the soul at the beginning attain the same state of quasi-karmic matter in the same soul. All these taken together constitute one cycle of quasikarmic matter (nokarmaparivartana). Now the cycle of karmic matter (karmaparivartana) is described. Particles of matter transformed into the eight types of karmic matter are taken in by one soul in one instant and are cast off in the subsequent instant(s), after the lapse of one 72 Tattvārthasūtra 1āvalī and one samaya. Similarly, as described in connection with the cycle of quasi-karmic matter, the same particles of matter taken in by the soul at the beginning attain the same state of karmas in the same soul. All these put together make one cycle of karmic matter (karmaparivartana). It is said in the Scripture, "The soul, indeed, has taken in (enjoyed) successively all the molecules of matter in the entire universe and has cast these off. And the soul has been revolving infinite times in the cycle of matter (pudgalaparivartanarūpa)." The cycle of place (kÈetraparivartana) is described next. The subtle, one-sensed, undeveloped being (nigoda jīva), with the utmost minimum extent of body, is born with the central eight points of the universe as the middle of its body. It lives for a very short time and dies. Then the same being with the same extent of body is reborn in the same spot a second time, a third time and a fourth time. In this manner it is reborn in the same spot as many times as there are space-points (pradeśa) in one 'ghanāńgula' (a measure of volume) divided by innumerable. Again, by increase of one space-point at a time, the entire universe is made the birth-place of the same soul. The period taken for completing this is one cycle of place (kÈetraparivartana). It has been said, "There is no space-point in the entire universe, which has not been the seat of birth of the soul. In this way the soul has taken birth many times in the space of the universe." Now the cycle of time (kālaparivartana) is described. A particular being (jīva) is born in the first instant of the ascending cycle of time (utsarpiõī), and dies after completing his lifetime. Again, the same being is reborn in the second instant of the next ascending cycle and dies at the end of his lifetime. Again, the same being is reborn in the third instant of the third ascending cycle. In this manner the ascending cycle of time (utsarpiõī) is completed. Similarly for the descending cycle of time (avasarpiõī). Thus birth must be taken by any one soul in an uninterrupted manner. Similarly, death must be 1 – 1 āvalī = innumerable samaya; the smallest and indivisible period of empirical time is called samaya. 73 vè;k;&2 understood to be without any interval. So much constitutes a cycle of time (kālaparivartana). It has been said, "The soul revolving in the cycle of time has been born as well as dead many times in the instants of the ascending as well as the descending cycles of time." The cycle of being (bhavaparivartana) is described next. In the infernal state, the minimum lifetime is ten thousand years. Some being is born with that lifetime in that region and, after wandering, is reborn there with the same lifetime. In this manner, he is born and died in the same region as many times as there are instants (samaya) in ten thousand years. Again, by increase of one instant (samaya) at a time, the lifetime of thirty-three sāgaropama, of the infernal region, is completed. Then, coming out from the infernal region, he is born in the plants and animal world with the minimum duration of within forty-eight minutes – antarmuhūrta. And in the manner mentioned above, the lifetime of three palyopama, of the plant and animal world, is completed. Similarly, the being completes the lifetime of within forty-eight minutes – antarmuhūrta – to three palyopama with regard to the human state of existence. In the celestial state it is like that of infernal beings. But there is this difference. In the celestial state, it must be taken up to the completion of thirty-one sāgaropama. All these taken together constitute one cycle of being (bhavaparivartana). It has been said, "Owing to association with wrong-belief (mithyātva), the soul has revolved many times, being born with the minimum, etc., lifetime in all the states of existence, from the infernal regions up to the upper graiveyaka heaven. Now the cycle of thought-activity (bhāvaparivartana) is described. One being endowed with the five senses and the mind – saÉjñī paryāptaka – and actuated by wrong belief (mithyādarśana) acquires the minimum duration, as suited to him, of within one koÇākoÇi (1 crore × 1 crore) sāgaropama of knowledge-obscuring (jñānāvaraõīya) karmas. The Scripture contains highly technical discussion of the cycle of thought-activity, beyond the scope of the present work. Suffice it to say here that with the increase of one instant at a time, the maximum duration of thirty koÇākoÇi sāgaropama is reached. In the 74 Tattvārthasūtra same manner, the cycle of thought-activity (bhāvaparivartana) takes place with regard to the main and the subtypes of karmas. It has been said, "Owing to its association with wrong belief (mithyātva), the soul has acquired all the four types of bondage – nature (prakÃti), duration (sthiti), intensity (anubhāga) and space (pradeśa) – and plunged in the cycle of thought-activity (bhāvaparivartana)." Transmigration (metempsychosis) is saÉsāra, the cycle of wandering. Those who undergo the cycle of wandering are the transmigrating souls. Those who are released from these five kinds of transmigration, the cycle of wandering, are the liberated souls. The transmigrating (saÉsārī) souls are mentioned first in the sūtra as the designation 'liberation' (mukta) is attained by the former. The two kinds of transmigrating souls are mentioned in the next sūtra. 75 lalkjh tho 1leuLdk%o eulfgr&lSuh vkSj 1veuLdk%o eujfgr&vlSuh] nks izdkj ds gSaA leuLdk¿euLdk% AA11AA The transmigrating souls are of two kinds, those with the mind – mana – and those without the mind. The mind (mana) is of two kinds, the physical mind (dravyamana) and the psychical mind (bhāvamana). The physical mind is originated by the rise of name-karma (nāmakarma) of limbs and minor limbs – ańgopāńga. The purity of the soul arising on the destruction-cumsubsidence (kÈayopaśama) of energy-obstructive (vīryāntarāya) and quasi-sense-covering (noindriyāvaraõa) karmas is the psychic mind. Those endowed with this mind are 'samanaska', and those not vè;k;&2 endowed with it are 'amanaska'. Thus the living beings are divided into two classes, those with the mind and those without the mind. Those endowed with the mind are mentioned first as they are worthy. How are they worthy? Being endowed with the power of discrimination between the good and the bad, they are worthy. The transmigrating souls are classified in another way. 1lalkfj.k%o lalkjh tho 1=klo =kl vkSj 1LFkkojk%o LFkkoj ds Hksn ls nks izdkj ds gSaaA lalkfj.kÐlLFkkojk% AA12AA The transmigrating souls are of two kinds, the trasa and the sthāvara. The mundane souls are of two kinds, the trasa and the sthāvara. Those who are subject to the 'trasa' name-karma (nāmakarma) are trasa, and those who are governed by the 'sthāvara' name-karma are sthāvara. Is it correct to say that those who move are trasa and those who are stationary are sthāvara? No, such an interpretation contradicts the Scripture. From the two-sensed beings up to the Omniscient-without-activity (ayogakevalī) are designated 'trasa' in the Scripture. The distinction is not based on movability or immovability, but on fruition of 'trasa' and 'sthāvara' name-karma. As the word 'trasa' is of fewer letters than the word 'sthāvara' and as the trasa beings are worthier, 'trasa' is mentioned first. These are worthier as all varieties of cognition (upayoga) are possible in them. There is not much to be said about the one-sensed, sthāvara beings. So these are explained first, violating the order. 76 Tattvārthasūtra 1ìfFkoh vi~ rst% ok;q% ouLir;%o ìfFkohdkf;d] tydkf;d] vfXudkf;d] ok;qdkf;d vkSj ouLifrdkf;d & ;s ik¡p izdkj ds 1LFkkojk%o LFkkoj tho gSaA (bu thoksa ds ek=k ,d Li'kZu bfUnz; gksrh gSA) ìfFkO;Irstksok;qouLir;% LFkkojk% AA13AA Earth-bodied – pÃthivīkāyika, water-bodied – jalakāyika, fire-bodied – agnikāyika, air-bodied – vāyukāyika, and plant-bodied – vanaspatikāyika, are sthāvara beings. The earth-bodied, and so on, are the different divisions of the 'sthāvara' name-karma. The naming of souls (beings) as earth-bodied, etc., is based on fruition of these divisions of the 'sthāvara' namekarma. Four kinds of each of these – earth-bodied, and so on – are mentioned in the Scripture. For instance, earth (pÃthivī), earth-body (pÃthivīkāya), earth-bodied (pÃthivīkāyika), and earth-soul (pÃthivījīva) are mentioned. That which has no consciousness and has the quality of hardness as its own nature is earth (pÃthivī). Though it has no consciousness, even in the absence of the fruition of earth namekarma, it is called earth as it is characterized by spreading, etc. Or, earth is the common name, found in the other three also. The earthbody (pÃthivīkāya) is that which has been abandoned by the soul present in it, similar to the dead body of a man. The earth-bodied (pÃthivīkāyika) is that which has the earth for its body (namely, the soul that lives in an earth-body). The earth-soul (pÃthivījīva) is that which has acquired the name-karma of earth-body, and is in transit with the karmic body, but has not actually entered the earth-body. Similar divisions must be made with regard to water (jala), etc. These five kinds of living beings are sthāvara. How many lifeprinciples or vitalities (prāõa) do these possess? These possess four 77 vè;k;&2 life-principles (prāõa): the sense-organ of touch (sparśana-indriyaprāõa), strength of body or energy (kāyabala-prāõa), respiration (ucchvāsa-niÍśvāsa-prāõa) and life-duration (āyuÍ-prāõa). What are the trasa beings? 1f}bfUae; vkn;%o nks bfUnz; ls ysdj vFkkZr~ nks bfUnz;] rhu bfUnz;] pkj bfUnz; vkSj ik¡p bfUnz; tho 1=klk%o =kl dgykrs gSaA }hfUae;kn;Ðlk% AA14AA The trasa beings are those having two or more senses (indriya). The beings which have two senses are called two-sensed. The word 'ādi' indicates 'first' in the order. Where is the order indicated? In the Scripture. How? It is indicated by the mention of two-sensed, threesensed, four-sensed and five-sensed beings. How many life-principles do these beings have? The two-sensed beings have six, namely, the sense-organ of taste (rasanā-prāõa) and the sense-organ of speech (vacana-prāõa), in addition to the four possessed by the sthāvara beings. The three-sensed beings have seven with the addition of the sense-of-smell (ghrāõa-prāõa). The four-sensed beings have eight with the addition of the sense-of-sight (cakÈu-prāõa). The five-sensed beings, without mind, of the animal world – asaÉjñī tiryańca – have nine life-principles with the addition of the sense-of-hearing (śrotraprāõa). The five-sensed beings, with mind (saÉjñī), have ten lifeprinciples with the addition of the mind (manobala-prāõa). The beings having six, seven, eight, nine and ten life-principles are the two-sensed, three-sensed, four-sensed, five-sensed-without-mind, and five-sensed-with-mind, respectively, who have attained completion – 78 Tattvārthasūtra paryāptaka. The beings who have not attained completion – aparyāptaka – have less number of life-principles. The upper limit of the senses is to be mentioned, for by the word 'ādi' the limit is not known. 1bfUnz;kf.ko bfUnz;k¡ 1iÛÓo ik¡p gSaaA iÛÓsfUae;kf.k AA15AA The senses (indriya) are five. The word 'sense' has already been explained. The word five is intended to determine that there are only five senses and no more. Should not the organs of activity such as the organ of speech be mentioned here? No. This is the section dealing with cognition (upayoga). Those that are the instruments of cognition (upayoga) alone are mentioned here; not those that are the instruments of activity (kriyā). There is no limit to the instruments of activity (kriyā). All the limbs and minor limbs (ańgopāńga) that are formed due to the fruition of name-karma are the instruments of activity. These are not included. The subdivisions of the senses are mentioned next. lc bfUnz;k¡ 1f}fo/kfuo nzO;sfUnz; vkSj HkkosfUnz; ds Hksn ls nks izdkj dh gaSA f}foèkkfu AA16AA 79 vè;k;&2 Each sense (indriya) is of two kinds. The word 'vidha' means kinds. The five senses are of two kinds each. What are the two kinds? The two kinds are: the physical-sense (dravyendriya) and the psychical-sense (bhāvendriya). The next sūtra describes the physical-sense (dravyendriya). 1fuòZfÙk midj.kso fuòZfÙk vkSj midj.k dks 1aeO;sfUae;e~o nzO;sfUnz; dgrs gSaA fuòZÙ;qidj.ks aeO;sfUae;e~ AA17AA The physical-sense (dravendriya) consists of the formation of the organ – nirvÃtti – and the instrument itself – upakaraõa. 'NiÃvrtti' means formation. Who does the formation? The karmas. Formation is of two kinds, external (bāhya) and internal (ābhyantara). The spreading of a miniscule extent (one/innumerable part of 1utsedhāńgula ) of the soul in the shape of the senses such as the eyes is the internal formation. The collection of the physical matter, owing to the fruition of name-karma (nāmakarma), in the particular shape in the space covered by the soul is external formation. That which assists this formation (nirvÃtti) is the instrument (upakaraõa). The instrument (upakaraõa) also is of two kinds, external (bāhya) and internal (ābhyantara). In case of the eye, the eyeball is the internal 1 – utsedhāńgula = lit. small finger in its breadth; eight barley seeds in diameter ('Trilokasāra', gāthā 18, p. 23) 80 Tattvārthasūtra instrument and the eyelids and the eyelashes are the external instruments. Similarly, it should be understood in respect of the other senses. The psychical-sense (bhāvendriya) is described now. 1yfC/ mi;ksxkSo yfC/ vkSj mi;ksx dks 1HkkosfUae;e~o HkkosfUnz; dgrs gaSA yCè;qi;ksxkS HkkosfUae;e~ AA18AA The psychical-sense (bhāvendriya) consists of attainment (labdhi) and cognition (upayoga). 'Labdhi' means attainment. What is attainment? Attainment is the particular destruction-cum-subsidence (kÈayopaśama) of knowledgeobscuring (jñānāvaraõīya) karmas. In presence of this attainment (labdhi) of various kinds of knowledge, the soul makes use of one particular kind of knowledge at any particular time; this attentive disposition of the soul is termed cognition (upayoga) or activeconsciousness. Both, labdhi and upayoga, constitute the psychicalsense (bhāvendriya). Cognition (upayoga) is the effect (kārya, phala) of the sense (indriya); how can it be called a sense? The characteristic of the cause (kāraõa) is seen in the effect (kārya). For instance, knowledge transformed in the shape of the jar is called the jar; similarly, the effect of the indriya is called the indriya. The mark (lińga) of 'indra' is 'indriya'. The meaning of the word 'indriya' is taken primarily in terms of 'upayoga' as is evident from the words, 'cognition (upayoga) is the mark (lakÈaõa) – distinctive characteristic – of the soul (jīva)'. Hence, it is proper to call cognition (upayoga) a sense (indriya). 81 vè;k;&2 The names of the senses (indriya) and their order are mentioned now. 1Li'kZuo Li'kZu] 1jluo jluk] 1?kzk.ko ?kzk.k] 1p{kq%o p{kq vkSj 1Jks=ko Jks=k & ;s ik¡p bfUnz;k¡ gSaA Li'kZujlu?kzk.kp{kq%Jks=kkf.k AA19AA Touch (sparśana), taste (rasanā), smell (ghrāõa), sight (cakÈu) and hearing (śrotra) are the senses – indriya. The senses are spoken of as something subservient to or different from the soul – 'with these eyes I see clearly,' and 'with these ears I hear distinctly.' Hence touch, etc., are the instruments as these are dependent on another, namely, the soul. On the destruction-cumsubsidence (kÈayopaśama) of energy-obstructing (vīryāntarāya) and sensory-knowledge-covering (matijñānāvaraõīya) karmas and attainment of name-karma of limbs and minor limbs (ańgopāńga), that through which touch is experienced by the soul is the sense-organ of touch. Similarly, that through which taste is experienced is the sense-organ of taste. That through which smell is experienced is the sense-organ of smell. That through which objects are seen is the eye. That through which something is heard is the ear. There is another independent aspect also – 'my eyes see clearly,' and 'my ears hear well.' Hence, touch, etc., are the aspects of the agent. That which touches is the sense-organ of touch. That which tastes is the sense-organ of taste. That which smells is the sense-organ of smell. That which sees is the eye. That which hears is the ear. The order in which the senses are mentioned is intended to recall the order of the increase of the senses. What are the objects of these senses? 82 Tattvārthasūtra 1Li'kZ jl xU/ o.kZ 'kCnk%o Li'kZ] jl] xU/] o.kZ (jaxo] 'kCn & ;s ik¡p Øe'k% 1rr~ vFkkZ%o mijksDr ik¡p bfUnz;ksa ds fo"k; gSa vFkkZr~ mijksDr ik¡p bfUnz;k¡ mu&mu fo"k;ksa dks tkurh gSaaA Li'kZjlxUèko.kZ'kCnkLrnFkkZ% AA20AA Touch (sparśa), taste (rasa), smell (gandha), colour or form (varõa) and sound (śabda) are the objects of the senses. The derivation of touch, etc., must be understood from the point of view of substance (dravya) and mode (paryāya). From the point of view of substance (dravya), the action (karma) of the object is indicated. That which is touched is touch. That which is tasted is taste. That which is smelt is smell. That which is seen is colour. That which is heard is sound. Thus, from this point of view, these are substances (dravya). From the point of view of mode (paryāya), the nature (bhāva) of the object is indicated. Touching is touch. Tasting is taste. Smelling is smell. Seeing is colour. Sounding is sound. Their order is according to the order of the senses. Since the mind is variable, it is not admitted to be a sense. Does it assist cognition (upayoga)? Of course, it does assist cognition (upayoga). Without the mind the senses cannot function in their province. Is assisting the senses only use of the mind or is there any other use too? 1vfufUae;L;o eu dk fo"k; 1Jqre~o JqrKkuxkspj inkFkZ gSa vFkok eu dk iz;kstu JqrKku gSA JqrefufUae;L; AA21AA 83 vè;k;&2 Scriptural knowledge (śrutajñāna) is the province of the mind (mana). The object of scriptural knowledge (śrutajñāna) is the 'śruta' – the knowledge in comprehensible form or the Scripture. It is the province of the mind (mana). With the help of the mind (mana), the soul (jīva) with destruction-cum-subsidence (kÈayopaśama) of scripturalknowledge-obscuring (śrutajñānāvaraõīya) karma, engages in attainment of the knowledge contained in the Scripture. Or, scriptural knowledge is the Scripture. It is the object of the mind. The mind is capable of accomplishing it independently, without the help of the senses. The senses are the instrumental cause of scriptural knowledge by convention (paramparā) only. The objects of the senses have been explained. Who possess these senses? The possessor of the sense of touch is ascertained first. 1ouLifr vUrkuke~o ouLifrdk; ftlds vUr esa gS ,sls thoksa ds vFkkZr~ ìfFkohdkf;d] tydkf;d] vfXudkf;d] ok;qdkf;d vkSj ouLifrdkf;d thoksa ds 1,de~o ,d Li'kZu bfUnz; gh gksrh gSA ouLiR;Urkukesde~ AA22AA The souls (jīva) up to the plant-bodied (vanaspatikāyika) possess only the first sense. The word 'eka' in the sūtra means the first. What is it? It is the sense of touch (sparśana). By whom is it possessed? It is possessed by souls from the earth-bodied (pÃthivīkāyika) to the plant-bodied (vanaspatikāyika). The cause of its origin is now mentioned. The one sense of touch arises on the destruction-cum-subsidence (kÈayopaśama) of 84 Tattvārthasūtra energy-obstructive (viryāntarāya) and sense-of-touch-obscuring (sparśana-indriyāvaraõīya) karmas, on the rise of karmas which totally obscure the other senses, on the attainment of physiquemaking (śarira) name-karma, and on the rise of name-karma of the class of one-sensed (sthāvara) beings. Who are the beings that possess the other senses? 1Ñfe fiihfydk Hkzej euq";knhuke~o Ñfe bR;kfn] phaVh bR;kfn] Hkzej bR;kfn rFkk euq"; bR;kfn ds 1,dSd ò1⁄4kfuo Øe ls ,d ,d bfUnz; c<+rh (vf/d&vf/d) gS vFkkZr~ Ñfe bR;kfn ds nks] phaVh bR;kfn ds rhu] HkkSajk bR;kfn ds pkj vkSj euq"; bR;kfn ds ik¡p bfUnz;k¡ gksrh gSaaA dfefiihfydkHkzejeuq";knhukesdSdò1⁄4kfu AA23AA The beings such as the worm (kÃmi), the ant (pipīlikā), the bee (bhramara) and the human (manuÈya), each, have senses one more than the preceding one. The phrase 'eka-eka' in the sūtra indicates successiveness. It indicates that the senses increase by one successively. The base is the sense of touch (sparśana). Creatures like the worm (kÃmi) have the sense of taste (rasanā) in addition to the sense of touch (sparśana). The ant (pipīlikā) and similar creatures possess the sense of smell (ghrāõa) in addition to the senses of touch and taste. The bee (bhramara) and creatures of that class possess the sense of sight (cakÈu) in addition to the senses of touch, taste and smell. Man and the beings similar to him possess the sense of hearing (śrotra) in addition to the former four. Their accomplishment is as in case of the sense of touch (sparśana), explained already. In each case, there is the fruition (udaya) of the 85 vè;k;&2 intense, all-destructive (sarvaghāti) karmic matter of the subsequent sense or senses. Thus, the mundane (saÉsārī) souls are of two kinds – the trasa and the sthāvara. On the basis of the senses, they are of five kinds. Now the two classes of the five-sensed beings are mentioned. 1leuLdk%o eulfgr thoksa dks 1lafKu%o laKh (lSuh) dgrs gSaaA lafKu% leuLdk% AA24AA The five-sensed beings with the mind (mana) are called 'saÉjñī'. The mind (mana) has been described earlier. Those that are endowed with the mind are called 'saÉjñī'. From this it follows that the other transmigrating souls are not endowed with the mind; they are 'asaÉjñī'. It is contended that the adjective 'samanaskaÍ' in the sūtra is unnecessary as the function of the mind is the investigation of the good and the bad and 'saÉjñī' also means the same. But it is not so. The word 'saÉjñā' is used in many senses like the name, the knowledge, and the desire for food. Thus the word 'saÉjñī' would extend to all souls having such attributes. To exclude such an interpretation, 'samanaskaÍ' – those with the mind – is mentioned. By this, even in the absence of the functioning of the mind – discriminating between the good and the bad – in embryonic stage, in unconscious state and in sleep, it is proper to call those endowed with the mind as 'saÉjñī'. The ability to discriminate between the good and the bad is due to the functioning of the mind. The stage when the soul proceeds to acquire the new body after leaving the old body is without the association of the mind. What is the cause of the soul's activity in that stage? 86 Tattvārthasūtra 1foxzgxrkS%o foxzgxfr esa vFkkZr~ u;s 'kjhj ds fy;s xeu esa 1deZ;ksx%o dkeZ.kdk; ;ksx gksrk gSA foxzgxrkS deZ;ksx% AA25AA In transit from one body to another – vigrahagati – there is the vibration of the karmic-body – kārmaõa śarīra. 'Vigraha' means the body. Motion for the sake of the body is 'vigrahagati'. Or, 'vigraha' is hindrance or obstacle. It implies the state of transit from one body to another in which although karmic matter is taken in, quasi-karmic (nokarma) matter is blocked. The motion with such characteristic is 'vigrahagati'. The karmic-body (kārmaõa śarīra) which is the root cause of all other bodies is called 'karma'. Activity (yoga) is the vibration of the space-points (pradeśa) of the soul caused by the molecules of the organ of speech, the mind and the body. Activity (yoga) caused by the karmic-body is karmayoga. This activity of the karmic-body takes place during transit following death. This way, the taking in of new karma and transit to another place are affected. In what way does the transit of the soul and the matter take place from one place to another? Is it according to the order of space-points or without any rule? 1xfr%o xfr 1vuqJsf.ko Js.kh ds vuqlkj gksrh gSA vuqJsf.k xfr% AA26AA The transit in space takes place in straight lines (śreõī). 87 vè;k;&2 Commencing from the centre of the universe, the lines or rows of successive space-points in all directions – vertical, horizontal, and oblique – are called 'śreõī'. The motion of the souls (jīva) and the matter (pudgala) is in rows, as continuous movement. How is that the matter (pudgala), which is not the subject of this section, included? It is because 'motion' – 'gati' – is mentioned in the sūtra. If the motion of the souls alone were intended, the word 'motion' – 'gati' – would be superfluous, since motion is the subject under consideration. Moreover, in the next sūtra, the 'soul' (jīva) is mentioned; that proves by implication that the matter (pudgala) must be included in this sūtra. Now, the revolution of the heavenly deva such as the moon and the circumambulation of Mount Meru by the 'vidyādhara' (the order of human beings gifted with extraordinary powers) are not in rows. How, then, it is said that the movement of the souls (jīva) and the matter (pudgala) is in lines? To answer this, the rules regarding time (kāla) and place (deśa) must be understood. The rule regarding time: the transit of a soul (jīva) at death to attain another birth and the upward movement of liberated souls are in lines only. The law regarding place: the movement from upper to lower regions, or from lower to upper regions, similarly, from horizontal regions to lower or upper regions, is in lines only. The movement of the matter (pudgala) which takes it to the end of the universe is in lines only. There is no definite rule with regard to other movements; these can be in line or with bend. Now, special movements are described. 1thoL;o eqDr tho dh xfr 1vfoxzgko foxzgjfgr & oØrkjfgr] lh/h & gksrh gSA vfoxzgk thoL; AA27AA 88 Tattvārthasūtra The movement of the liberated (mukta) soul is without a bend – avigraha. 'Vigraha' here means hindered, not straight – vyāghāta. The motion (gati) without a bend is 'avigraha'. To whom does it occur? It occurs to the soul. To what kind of the soul? To the liberated soul. How is the liberated soul implied here? It is inferred from the mention of the transmigrating souls in the next sūtra. It is mentioned in the previous sūtra that the transit in space takes place in straight lines (śreõī). Does it not follow that there is no deviation from rows of space? So this sūtra is meaningless. No. This is to indicate that in the instances of the previous sūtra there may be sometimes irregular movement also. But the rule regarding time and space has been mentioned therein. True; but it is established only from this sūtra. The liberated soul is free from ties. Hence it goes up without impediment to the end of the universe. Is there obstruction in case of the embodied soul, or is it as in case of the liberated soul? 1lalkfj.k%o lalkjh tho dh xfr 1foxzgorh po foxzgokyh rFkk foxzgjfgr gksrh gSA 1prqH;Z% izkd~o foxzgokyh xfr pkj le; ls igys vFkkZr~ rhu le; rd gksrh gSA foxzgorh p lalkfj.k% izkd~ prqH;Z% AA28AA The movement of the transmigrating souls is with bend also prior to the fourth instant. Prior to the fourth – prākcaturbhya – is intended to indicate the limit of time. The word 'prāk' – prior – indicates the limit. Movement with a 89 vè;k;&2 1 – NiÈkuÇa kÈetra is located in the topmost corner of the universe outside the mobile channel (trasa nāçī). Living beings endowed with more than one sense are found only within the boundaries of the mobile channel and not outside it. Hence it is called the mobile channel (trasa nāçī). But onesensed creatures are found within as well as outside the mobile channel. The mobile channel is the region that runs through the centre of the universe. It is in the form of a prism having a square base, each side measuring one rajju, extending throughout the universe of fourteen rajju in height. bend occurs up to three instants but not in the fourth. How is it? The being, who is to be born in the special region outside the mobile 1channel (in the niÈkuÇa kÈetra ) from another such region commences motion with three bends as in such case no straight movement is possible. Here, there is no need for the fourth bend, as there is no place of birth which requires further bends. Hence movement with bend is only up to three instants and not in the fourth instant. 'Ca' is intended for indicating both types of motion, i.e., with and without bends. The time limit for movement with the bend has been mentioned. How much time is required for movement without the bend? 1vfoxzgko foxzgjfgr xfr 1,dle;ko ,d le; ek=k gh gksrh gS vFkkZr~ mlesa ,d le; gh yxrk gSA ,dle;k¿foxzgk AA29AA Movement without a bend is for one instant (samaya). That movement that takes one instant is 'ekasamayā'. The movement without a bend is 'avigraha'. The soul and the matter impelled by movement takes only one instant even to reach the end of the 90 Tattvārthasūtra universe, if there be no impediment – vyāghāta. It is said that in the beginningless convention of karmic bondage, the soul, owing to its wrong-faith, etc., takes in karmic matter at all times. Does the soul take in matter during its passage from one birth to another? foxzgxfr esa 1,da }kS ok =khu~o ,d nks vFkok rhu le; rd 1vukgkjd%o tho vukgkjd jgrk gSA ,da }kS =khUok¿ukgkjd% AA30AA For one, two or three instants (samaya) the soul remains non-assimilative – anāhāraka. Instant (samaya) is supplied from the previous sūtra. This particle 'vā' indicates alternative meaning. The alternative is to be taken as intended. For one, two, or three instants the soul does not take in molecules of matter. 'Āhāraka' is taking in of matter fit for the three kinds of bodies and the six kinds of completion. Without taking in of such matter, the soul remains 'anāhāraka' during this time. However, the taking in of karmas is incessant, as there is the associated karmicbody (kārmaõa śarīra). In straight movement towards the seat of birth, the soul takes in matter; it is 'āhāraka'. In the other three instants the soul does not assimilate matter. The kinds of accomplishment of the new body for the soul in transit and the ways of birth are described next. 91 vè;k;&2 1lEewPNZu xHkZ miiknk%o lEewPNZu] xHkZ vkSj miikn rhu izdkj dk 1tUeo tUe gksrk gSA lEewPNZuxHkksZiiknk tUe AA31AA Birth is by spontaneous generation – sammūrcchana, from the uterus – garbha, or in the special bed – upapāda. In the three worlds – the upper, the lower and the middle – there is spontaneous generation – sammūrcchana – of the body in all directions, that is, formation of the limbs by the surrounding matter. The union of a sperm and an ovum forming a fertilized ovum in the mother's womb constitutes conception – 'garbha'. Or, it is called 'garbha' because of the mixing of the food taken in by the mother. The bed where the soul goes to be reborn is 'upapāda'. 'Upapāda' is the particular name of the seat of birth of the celestial and the infernal beings. These are the three ways in which the transmigrating soul may take birth on fruition of the karmas bound to it due to its auspicious and inauspicious dispositions. So far, the births, the basis for the attainment of enjoyment of things of the world, have been dealt with. Now, the kinds of seats-of-birth (yoni) must be described. 1lfpÙk 'khr laòrk%o lfpÙk] 'khr] laòr 1lsrjko mlls myVh rhu & vfpÙk] m".k] foòr 1p ,d'k% feJk%o vkSj Øe ls ,d lfpÙk'khrlaòrk% lsrjk feJkÜÓSd'kLr|ksu;% AA32AA 92 Tattvārthasūtra ,d dh feyh gqbZ rhu vFkkZr~ lfpÙkkfpÙk] 'khrks".k vkSj laòrfoòr 1rr~ ;ksu;%o ;s uo tUe;ksfu;k¡ gSaA With-life (sacitta), cold (śīta), covered (saÉvÃta), their opposites – without-life (acitta), hot (uÈõa), exposed (vivÃta) – and their combination – with-and-without-life (sacittācitta), cold-and-hot (śītoÈõa), covered-and-exposed (saÉvÃta-vivÃta) – are the seats-of-birth (yoni). That which has consciousness is 'sacitta', that is, with-life. A kind of touch (sparśa) is 'śīta' or cold. Like the word 'white', it denotes both the substance (dravya) and the quality (guõa). Hence that which is 'cold' denotes the substance too. That which is covered well is 'saÉvÃta'. That place which cannot be seen is covered or hidden – 'saÉvÃta'. 'Setara' means the opposite. What are these? Matter without life, hot and exposed are the opposite. 'Miśra' is that which partakes of both natures mentioned above. Thus, with-and-withoutlife (sacittācitta), cold-and-hot (śītoÈõa), covered-and-exposed (saÉvÃta-vivÃta) are 'miśra'. The word 'ekaśaÍ' in the sūtra indicates the proper sequence of the seats-of-birth (yoni). It must be understood as follows – with-life, without-life, cold, hot, covered and exposed. The sequence is not with-life, cold, and so on. 'Tat', meaning 'that', is intended to indicate the kinds of birth. These are the seats-of-birth for spontaneous generation – sammūrcchana – etc. There are, thus, nine kinds of seats-of-birth (yoni). Is there distinction between the seats-ofbirth (yoni) and birth (janma)? Yes, there is; like between the container and the contained. These seats-of-birth (yoni), such as withlife, are the containers. The contained are the kinds of birth. In the seats-of-birth, that are with-life (sacitta), etc., the soul assimilates matter fit to be transformed into the body, the food, the sense-organs, etc., through the three kinds of birth. The celestial and infernal beings take their origin in the yoni that is without-life (acitta); the special bed – upapāda – is without-life. Those who take birth from the uterus have 93 vè;k;&2 mixed (miśra) seat-of-birth. In their case, the semen and blood in the mother's womb are lifeless. But, as these are combined with the vitality of the living mother, it is called a mixed yoni. The yoni of the spontaneously generated – sammūrcchana – are of three kinds. Some generate from the yoni with-life (sacitta). Others generate from the yoni without-life (acitta). And yet others generate from mixed (miśra) yoni. Those who have common bodies (sādhāraõa śarīra) generate from the living yoni since they inhabit the common body and are dependent on each other. The yoni of rest of the spontaneously generated – sammūrcchana – beings are of both kinds, without-life (acitta) and mixed (miśra). The celestial and infernal beings take their rise from hot (uÈõa) as well as cold (śīta) yoni as some of these places are hot and some are cold. Those who possess bodies that emit light take their rise from hot (uÈõa) yoni. The rest of the beings have three kinds of seats-of-birth (yoni). Some have cold (śīta), some have hot (uÈõa), and some others have mixed (miśra) yoni. The yoni of the celestial, the infernal and the one-sensed beings are covered. Those with incomplete senses (vikalendriya), i.e., from two to four-sensed beings, have exposed (vivÃta) yoni. Those who are born of uterus have mixed (miśra) yoni. The 84,00,000 kinds of yoni can be ascertained from the Scripture: "The one-sensed souls with common bodies from eternity – nityanigoda, other one-sensed souls with common bodies – itaranigoda, earth-bodied (pÃthivī-kāyika), water-bodied (jalakāyika), fire-bodied (agnikāyika) and air-bodied (vāyukāyika) beings are of (originate from) 7,00,000 yoni, each. The yoni of trees and other vegetation are 10,00,000. The yoni of all the beings with incomplete senses (vikalendriya) are 6,00,000. The seats-of-birth (yoni) of celestial beings, infernal beings, and five-sensed animals are 4,00,000, each. The yoni of human beings are 14,00,000." It would mean that all beings may take the three kinds of birth in the nine kinds of yoni. The next sūtra is intended to elaborate on uterine birth – garbhajanma. 94 Tattvārthasūtra 1tjk;qt v.Mt iksrkukao tjk;qt] v.Mt vkSj iksrt & bu rhu izdkj ds thoksa ds 1xHkZ%o xHkZtUe gksrk gSA tjk;qtk.Mtiksrkuka xHkZ% AA33AA Uterine birth – garbhajanma – is of three kinds, umbilical (jarāyuja – with membranous covering), incubatory (aõçaja – from an egg), and non-umbilical (potaja – without membranous covering). The membranous covering of the young ones, connected with the umbilical cord and composed of flesh and blood, is called jarāyu. Those born with jarāyu are called jarāyuja. That which has a covering in form of a white shell made of sperm and ovum, hard like the nail, and globular or oval in shape, is the egg (aõça). Those born from the egg are called aõçaja. The young ones of certain animals have their limbs developed without any covering, and are able to move about from the moment of their birth. These are called potaja. These are three types of uterine birth – garbhajanma. Children and calves are born with membranous covering. The chickens, etc., are born from egg. The young ones of the deer, the cub, etc., are born without any covering and are able to move about immediately after birth. If these are kinds of uterine birth, who are born in special beds? 1nsoukjdk.kke~o nso vkSj ukjdh thoksa ds 1miikn%o miikn tUe gksrk gSA nsoukjdk.kkeqiikn% AA34AA 95 vè;k;&2 The celestial (deva) and infernal (nāraka) beings are born in special beds – upapādajanma. What is the manner of birth of the rest? 1'ks"kk.kkao xHkZ vkSj miikn tUe okys thoksa ds vfrfjDr 'ks"k thoksa ds 1lEewPNZue~o lEewPNZu tUe gh gksrk gS vFkkZr~ lEewPNZu tUe 'ks"k thoksa ds gh gksrk gSA 'ks"kk.kka lEewPNZue~ AA35AA The birth of the rest is by spontaneous generation – sammūrcchanajanma. The rest are those to whom embryonic birth and birth in special beds do not apply. Spontaneous generation – sammūrcchana – is the mode of their birth. The three sūtra indicate rules which must be taken both ways. Thus, the garbhajanma pertains only to the three kinds of beings, jarāyuja, aõçaja and potaja. Or, the three kinds of beings, jarāyuja, aõçaja and potaja, have only the garbhajanma. The upapādajanma is only for the celestial and the infernal beings. Or, the celestial and the infernal beings have only the upapādajanma. And, the sammūrcchanajanma pertains to only the rest of the beings. Or, the rest of the beings have only the sammūrcchanajanma. The three kinds of birth and nine kinds of muclei (yoni) have been described. How many kinds of bodies, accomplished by auspicious and inauspicious karmas and bases for enjoyment of the fruits of karmas, are there? 96 Tattvārthasūtra 1vkSnkfjd oSfØf;d vkgkjd rStl dkeZ.kkfuo vkSnkfjd] oSfØf;d] vkgkjd] rStl vkSj dkeZ.k 1'kjhjkf.ko ;s ik¡p 'kjhj gaSA vkSnkfjdoSfØf;dkgkjdrStldkeZ.kkfu 'kjhjkf.k AA36AA The gross – audārika, the transformable – vaikriyika, the projectable – āhāraka, the luminous – taijasa and the karmic – kārmaõa, are the five types of bodies (śarīra). The bodies are the effects of the rise of different kinds of name-karma (nāmakarma). Having grossness is 'audārika'; the audārika body is the gross body. The 'vaikriyika' body is endowed with the eight kinds of superhuman powers, including rapid transformation (vikriyā). The projectable – 'āhāraka' – body originates in a saint of the sixth stage, in order to resolve a doubt or to ascertain the nature of a minute object or to dispel non-restraint. That, which is the cause of brilliance or which is caused by brilliance, is the luminous – taijasa – body. The body composed of karmic matter is the karmic – kārmaõa – body. Although karma is the cause of all types of bodies, by specific usage, the last is restricted to the body composed of the karmic matter. The gross – audārika – body is perceived by the senses. Why are the other bodies not perceived by the senses? igys dgs gq, 'kjhjksa dh vis{kk 1ija ijao vkxs&vkxs ds 'kjhj 1lw{ee~o lw{e&lw{e gksrs gSa] vFkkZr~ vkSnkfjd dh vis{kk oSfØf;d] ija ija lw{ee~ AA37AA 97 vè;k;&2 oSfØf;d dh vis{kk vkgkjd] vkgkjd dh vis{kk rStl] vkSj rStl dh vis{kk ls dkeZ.k 'kjhj lw{e gksrk gSA The bodies are more and more subtle (sūkÈma), successively. Though the word 'param' has many meanings, here it means relative position or order. The phrase 'param param' indicates that the bodies, though distinct from one another, have commonality of the attribute 'fineness', but in varying degree. The gross (audārika) body is 'sthūla' – perceivable by the senses. The transformable (vaikriyika) body is finer (sūkÈma) than the gross one. The projectable (āhāraka) body is still finer than the transformable one. The luminous (taijasa) body is still finer than the projectable one. And the karmic (kārmaõa) body is still finer than the luminous one. Are the bodies successively less with regard to space-points (pradeśa) too? No. 1izns'kr%o izns'kksa dh vis{kk ls 1rStlkr~ izkd~o rStl 'kjhj ls igys ds 'kjhj 1vla[;s;xq.kao vla[;kr~xq.ks gSaaA izns'krks¿la[;s;xq.ka izkd~ rStlkr~ AA38AA Prior to the luminous (taijasa) body (śariīa), each body has innumerable-fold – (asaÉkhyeyaguõā) – space-points (pradeśa) of the previous one. The word 'pradeśa' signifies the atom. That which is beyond the numerable is innumerable. That which is innumerable-fold is 98 Tattvārthasūtra 'asaÉkhyeyaguõā'. With regard to what? It is with regard to atoms or space-points (pradeśa) and not with regard to the pervasive space. 'Successively' is supplied from the previous sūtra. This would then extend up to the karmic (kārmaõa) body. In order to preclude such an interpretation, it is mentioned, 'prior to the luminous (taijasa) body'. The transformable (vaikriyika) body has innumerable-fold spacepoints of the gross (audārika) one. The projectable (āhāraka) body has innumerable-fold space-points of the transformable (vaikriyika) one. What is the extent of the multiplying term? It is one/innumerable part of a palya. If so, the bodies must be successively greater in size. No. There is no difference in size owing to the nature of arrangement or structure, as in case of a heap of cotton and a ball of iron. Though the space-points are greater in case of the successive bodies, the size is determined by the compactness of the atoms. Are the space-points (pradeśa) of the last two the same, or is there any difference? 1ijso 'ks"k nks 'kjhj 1vuUrxq.kso vuUrxq.ks ijek.kq (izns'k) okys gSa vFkkZr~ vkgkjd 'kjhj dh vis{kk vuUrxq.ks izns'k rStl 'kjhj esa gksrs gSa vkSj rStl 'kjhj dh vis{kk vuUrxq.ks izns'k dkeZ.k 'kjhj eas gksrs gSaaA vuUrxq.ks ijs AA39AA The last two (bodies) have infinite-fold (anantaguņā) space-points (pradeśa), consecutively. The extent of space-points – pradeśataÍ – is supplied from the previous sūtra. It is taken thus. The luminous (taijasa) body has infinite-fold space-points of the projectable (āhāraka) body. And the karmic 99 vè;k;&2 (kārmaõa) body has infinite-fold space-points of the luminous (taijasa) body. What is the extent of the multiplying term? It is infinitefold of the non-potential souls or one/infinite part of the emancipated souls. It is contended that the transmigrating souls, being bound with matter, cannot go to the desired place, just as a dart or a spear cannot pass through a wall. But it is not so. What is the reason? Both these (the last two bodies) are without obstruction. rStl vkSj dkeZ.k ;s nksuksa 'kjhj 1vizrh?kkrso vizrh?kkr vFkkZr~ ck/k jfgr gSaaA vizrh?kkrs AA40AA The last two (bodies) are without impediment. The obstruction of one substance (having shape, form) by another is impediment – pratighāta. There is no impediment for these two types of bodies, as these are of extremely fine nature. Just as heat enters a piece of iron, the luminous (taijasa) and the karmic (kārmaõa) bodies meet with no impediment in their transit through adamantine sphere, etc. Now, there is no impediment for the transformable (vaikriyika) and the projectable (āhāraka) bodies also. It is true. But there is a difference. In case of the last two bodies – the luminous (taijasa) and the karmic (kārmaõa) – there is no impediment anywhere up to the end of the universe. But it is not so in case of the other two bodies, namely, the transformable (vaikriyika) and the projectable (āhāraka). Is that the only peculiarity, or is there any other speciality? 100 Tattvārthasūtra 1po vkSj ;s nksuksa 'kjhj 1vukfnlEcU/so vkRek ds lkFk vukfndky ls lEcU/ okys gSaaA vukfnlEcUèks p AA41AA And, these (two) have beginningless (anādi) association with the soul. The particle 'ca' – 'and' – indicates alternative meaning. The association is beginningless as well as with a beginning. From the point of view of the series of cause and effect, the association is beginningless. From the particular point of view, it is also with a beginning as in case of the seed (bīja) and the plant (vÃkÈa). The gross (audārika), the transformable (vaikriyika) and the projectable (āhāraka) bodies are associated with the soul at some time or other. But the luminous (taijasa) and the karmic (kārmaõa) bodies are not so. These two are associated with the soul till the attainment of liberation. Are these two (bodies) possessed by some or by all? ;s (rStl vkSj dkeZ.k 'kjhj) 1loZL;o lc lalkjh thoksa ds gksrs gSaaA loZL; AA42AA These (two) are associated with all transmigratory souls. The word 'sarva' does not exclude anyone. These two types of bodies are possessed by all transmigratory souls. 101 vè;k;&2 In general, this would lead to the interpretation that all the bodies are simultaneously associated with the mundane soul. To preclude such a view it is described how many bodies can exist with the soul, simultaneously. 1rnknhfuo mu rStl vkSj dkeZ.k 'kjhjksa ls izkjEHk djds 1;qxir~o ,d lkFk 1,dfLeu~o ,d tho ds 1vkprqH;Z%o pkj 'kjhj rd 1HkkT;kfuo foHkDr djuk pkfg;s vFkkZr~ tkuuk pkfg;sA rnknhfu HkkT;kfu ;qxinsdfLeÂkprqH;Z% AA43AA Commencing with these (two), up to four bodies can be had simultaneously by a single soul. 'Tat' – 'that' – refers to the luminous (taijasa) and the karmic (kārmaõa) bodies, which are under consideration. 'Tadādi' means those which have the luminous and the karmic bodies in the beginning. 'Bhājyāni' means 'can be attained'. Up to what? Up to four bodies can be attained simultaneously by one soul. Some souls have two, namely, the luminous (taijasa) and the karmic (kārmaõa) bodies. Some others have three, namely, the gross (audārika), the luminous and the karmic bodies, or the transformable (vaikriyika), the luminous and the karmic bodies. Yet others have four, namely, the gross, the transformable, the luminous and the karmic bodies. It is mentioned (see sūtra 2-47) that attainment (labdhi) through austerities is also a cause of the origin of the transformable (vaikriyika) body. Can an ascetic with supernatural powers – Ãddhi – have all the five kinds of bodies, including the projectable (āhāraka) and the transformable (vaikriyika)? No. Firstly, both these bodies – the projectable (āhāraka) and the transformable (vaikriyika) – do not 102 Tattvārthasūtra originate simultaneously. Secondly, the transformable (vaikriyika) body originating through austerities is another form of the projectable (āhāraka) body only, not an independent transformable body. The Doctrine proclaims that only the transformable (vaikriyika) body obtained on the rise of the 'vaikriyika śarīra' name-karma (nāmakarma) should be known as the transformable (vaikriyika) body. Thus, a single soul can have only four kinds of bodies simultaneously. Other details pertaining to these are mentioned. 1vUR;e~o vUr dk dkeZ.k 'kjhj 1fu#iHkksxe~o miHkksx jfgr gksrk gSA fu#iHkksxeUR;e~ AA44AA The last (body) is not the means of enjoyment (upabhoga). That which comes at the end is the last. What is it? The karmic (kārmaõa) body. The receiving of sound, etc., through the channel of the senses is enjoyment (upabhoga). Such enjoyment is not present in the karmic (kārmaõa) body; it is thus without-enjoyment (nirupabhoga). During transit (to take a new birth), there is no perception of sound, etc., as there is presence only of the psychicalsense (bhāvendriya) and not the physical-sense (dravyendriya). Now the luminous (taijasa) body also is devoid of enjoyment. Why, then, is the last alone mentioned in the sūtra? The luminous body is not the cause of activity (yoga) too. Hence the question of enjoyment does not arise in this case. 103 vè;k;&2 These bodies originate in the modes of birth described already. Do these bodies originate without distinction? Or is there any distinction according to the mode of birth? 1xHkZo xHkZ 1lEewPNZute~o vkSj lEewPNZu tUe ls mRi gksus okyk 'kjhj 1vk|ao igyk & vkSnkfjd 'kjhj & gSA xHkZlEewPNZutek|e~ AA45AA The first kind of body is attained through the uterine birth – garbhajanma, and spontaneous generation – sammūrcchanajanma. According to the order in the sūtra, the gross (audārika) body is the first kind of body. That which is attained through uterine birth – garbhajanma, and through spontaneous generation – sammūrcchanajanma, is the gross body – audārika śarīra. In what birth does the body mentioned next originate? 1vkSiikfndao miikntUe okys vFkkZr~ nso vkSj ukjfd;ksa ds 'kjhj 1oSfØf;de~~o oSfØf;d gksrs gSaaA vkSiikfnda oSfØf;de~ AA46AA The transformable (vaikriyika) body originates by birth in special beds – upapādajanma. 104 Tattvārthasūtra That which is born in special beds (upapāda) is 'aupapādika'. Thus, the body that takes birth in special bed must be understood to be the transformable (vaikriyika) body. If the transformable (vaikriyika) body originates in special bed, that body which does not arise from special bed cannot have this attribute of transformableness. This doubt is cleared in the next sūtra. oSfØf;d 'kjhj 1yfC/izR;;a po yfC/&uSfefÙkd Hkh gksrk gSA yfCèkizR;;a p AA47AA Attainment (labdhi) is also the cause (of its origin). By 'ca' the transformable body is taken over. 'Labdhi' is attainment of supernatural powers – Ãddhi – by special austerities (tapa). The transformable (vaikriyika) body attained through 'labdhi' is 'labdhipratyaya'. Thus, the transformable (vaikriyika) body is also 'labdhipratyaya' – attained through 'labdhi'. Is that the only kind of body caused by attainment, or is there any other kind also? 1rStle~o rStl 'kjhj 1vfio Hkh yfC/&uSfefÙkd gSA rStlefi AA48AA The luminous (taijasa) body also is caused by attainment (labdhi). 105 vè;k;&2 By the particle 'api', 'labdhipratyaya' is supplied. The luminous (taijasa) body also is caused by the attainment of supernatural powers – Ãddhi. What is the nature of the projectable (āhāraka) body, and in whom does it originate? 1vkgkjdao vkgkjd 'kjhj 1'kqHke~o 'kqHk gS vFkkZr~ og 'kqHk dk;Z djrk gS 1fo'kq1⁄4e~o fo'kq1⁄4 gS vFkkZr og fo'kq1⁄4deZ (ean d"kk; ls ca/us okys deZ) dk dk;Z gS 1p vO;k?kkfro vkSj O;k?kkr&ck/kjfgr gS rFkk 1izeÙkla;rL;Soo izeÙkla;r (NBosa xq.kLFkkuorhZ) eqfu ds gh (og 'kjhj) gksrk gSA 'kqHka fo'kq1⁄4eO;k?kkfr pkgkjda izeÙkla;rL;So AA49AA The projectable (āhāraka) body, which is auspicious, pure, and without impediment, originates only in the saint of the sixth stage – pramattasaÉyata. The projectable (āhāraka) body is auspicious as it is the cause of the karmas that are auspicious – āhāraka kāyayoga. Sometimes the cause is identified with the effect. For instance, food which preserves life is called life. Since it (the projectable body) brings about spotless and pure result, it is called pure. Sometimes the effect is identified with the cause. For instance, the thread which is the effect of cotton is called cotton. There is no impediment both ways. The projectable (āhāraka) body does not cause impediment to anything else. Nor does anything else cause impediment to the projectable (āhāraka) body. The particle 'ca' is used to indicate multiplicity of its (projectable body) uses. Its utility is sometimes to ascertain the possession of extraordinary 106 Tattvārthasūtra powers, sometimes to ascertain the true nature of minute objects and sometimes to safeguard self-control. The word 'āhāraka' is repetition of the projectable body mentioned previously (see sūtra 2-36). The moment the ascetic originates the projectable body, he comes down to the sixth spiritual stage. Hence it is mentioned that it originates only in the saint of the sixth stage. 'Eva' – only – is used to determine what is intended. It originates only in the ascetic of the sixth stage and not in others. This is how it must be understood. And it should not be understood that the ascetic of the sixth stage has the projectable body only and not the gross body, etc. Thus, the mundane beings possess bodies as indicated. Now, do the three genders obtain in all the four conditions of existence, or is there any rule regarding this? Yes, there is. 1ukjd lEew£PNukso ukjdh vkSj lEewPNZu tUe okys 1uiqaldkfuo uiqald gksrs gSaaA ukjdlEew£PNuks uiqaldkfu AA50AA The infernal-beings (nārakī) and the spontaneouslygenerated (sammūrcchina) are neuter-sex (napuÉsaka). The infernal regions are described later. Those who are born in the infernal regions are infernal-beings (nārakī). The beings who are born by spontaneous generation are the spontaneously-generated (sammūrcchina). The conduct-deluding karmas have two subdivisions – passions (kaÈāya) and quasi-passions (nokaÈāya). Owing to the rise of the quasi-passion (nokaÈāya) called the neuter sex sign – napuÉsakaveda, and of the inauspicious (aśubha) name-karma (nāmakarma), these – the nārakī and the sammūrcchina – are born as 107 vè;k;&2 neither men nor women, but as neuter-sex (napuÉsaka). As a rule, the infernal beings and the spontaneously generated beings are neutersex (napuÉsaka) only. These do not enjoy even the slightest pleasure which the men and women derive from sweet sound, smell, colour (form), taste and touch. If it is determined thus, it would imply that the mundane beings other than these are of the three sexes. Those who are not neuter-sex (napuÉsaka) are mentioned next. 1nsok%o nso 1uo uiqald ugha gksrs] vFkkZr~ nsoksa ds iq#"k yx vkSj nsfo;ksa ds L=kh yx gksrk gSA u nsok% AA51AA The celestial beings (deva) are not neuter-sex (napuÉsaka). The celestial beings (deva) enjoy rare pleasures appertaining to the two sexes, male and female, on account of the rise of auspicious (śubha) name-karma (nāmakarma). Hence, there is no neuter-sex (napuÉsaka) among them. How many genders are there among the rest? 1'ks"kk%o 'ks"k ds & xHkZt euq"; vkSj fr;±p & 1f=kosnk%o rhuksa osn okys gksrs gSaA 'ks"kkfÐosnk% AA52AA 108 Tattvārthasūtra The rest of the beings are of the three sexes (signs – veda). Those with the three sexes (signs – veda) are of three signs (veda). What are the three signs (veda)? These are feminine-sign (strīveda), masculine-sign (puruÈaveda) and neuter-sign (napuÉsakaveda). How are these established? That which is felt is 'veda'. It means the sign (lińga). It is of two kinds, physical (dravyalińga) and psychical (bhāvalińga). The physical sign is accomplished by the rise of the name-karmas of the yoni, the genitals, etc. The psychical sign is accomplished by the rise of the quasi-passions (nokaÈāya). The being in whom conception occurs on the rise of female-feeling karmas is a woman (strī). The being who, on the rise of the masculine-sign (puruÈaveda), produces offspring is a man (puruÈa). The being who is devoid of these two capacities is a neuter-sex (napuÉsaka). These are words of traditional usage. In such words the activity is used for the purpose of derivation. For instance, that which goes is a cow. Otherwise, in the absence of activities such as conceiving and producing offspring, the young and the old among animals and human beings, the celestial beings and those in transit with karmic (kārmaõa) bodies cannot be designated male and female. These three signs occur among the rest, that is, those who have uterine-birth (garbhajajanma). The celestial and other beings have been described as of several kinds on the basis of birth (janma), seat-of-birth (yoni), body (śarīra) and sign (lińga). Depending on the merit (puõya) and the demerit (pāpa), they attain bodies for their lifetime in the four states of existence (gati). Do they attain their next body after living their full lifetime or even prior to it? 109 vè;k;&2 1vkSiikfndo miikn tUeokys nso vkSj ukjdh 1pjeksÙke nsgk%o pje&mÙke nsg okys vFkkZr~ mlh Hko esa eks{k tkus okys rFkk 1vla[;s;o"kZ vk;q"k%o vla[;kr o"kZ vk;q okys HkksxHkwfe ds thoksa dh 1vk;q"k% vuio£ro vk;q viorZu jfgr gksrh gSA vkSiikfndpjeksÙkensgkla[;s;o"kkZ;q"kks¿uioR;kZ;q"k% AA53AA The lifetime of beings born in special beds – upapādajanma, those with final, superior bodies – caramottamadeha, and those of innumerable (asaÉkhyāta) years of age (āyuÍ), cannot be cut short. 'Aupapādika' has been explained as celestial (deva) and infernal (nārakī) beings, born in special beds. 'Carama' means ultimate or final; 'uttama' means superior. Those endowed with final and superior bodies are 'caramottama'. They are those beings who have reached the end of the cycle of births and deaths and will attain liberation in the same birth. Innumerable is that which is beyond numerable. Life of innumerable years, indicated by palyopama, etc., pertains to the animals and human beings born in the lands of enjoyment, such as Uttarakuru. 'Apavartya āyuÍ' is shortening of life by external causes such as poison, weapons, etc. Those whose lives can be cut short are having 'apavartya āyuÍ' and those whose lives cannot be cut short are having 'anapavartya āyuÍ'. As a rule, the life of the celestial beings and the others mentioned in the sūtra cannot be cut short by external causes. There is no such rule for other living beings. The word 'uttama' in the sūtra is intended to indicate the superior nature of the final body, and there is no other special meaning. AA bfr rÙokFkZlw=kkijukeeks{k'kkÐs f}rh;ks¿è;k;% lekIr% AA ] ] ] 110 Tattvārthasūtra The lower world consists of seven earths – Ratnaprabhā, Śarkarāprabhā, Vālukāprabhā, Pańkaprabhā, Dhūmaprabhā, TamaÍprabhā and MahātamaÍprabhā – one below the other, and surrounded by the three kinds of air and the space (ākāśa). THE LOWER WORLD AND THE MIDDLE WORLD C H A P T E R 3 jRu'kdZjkokyqdkiadèkwereksegkre%izHkk Hkwe;ks ?kukEcqokrkdk'kizfr"Bk% lIrkèkks¿èk% AA1AA v/ksyksd esa jRuizHkk] 'kdZjkizHkk] okyqdkizHkk] iadizHkk] /weizHkk] re%izHkk vkSj egkre%izHkk & ;s lkr Hkwfe;k¡ gSa vkSj ?kuksnf/okroy;] ?kuokroy;] ruqokroy; rFkk vkdk'k ds lgkjs Øe ls uhps&uhps fLFkr gSaA The infernal beings (nāraka) have been mentioned in certain sūtra, such as 1-21. Who are they? In order to explain this, first their abode, the lower world, is described. The word 'prabhā' is taken with each of these earths. As these earths have the lustre of jewels (ratna), etc., these are called Ratnaprabhā, etc. That which has the lustre of jewels (ratna) is Ratnaprabhā. That which has the lustre of pebbles (śarkarā) is Śarkarāprabhā. That which has the lustre of sand (valukā) is Vālukāprabhā. That which has the lustre of clay or mud (pańka) is Pańkaprabhā. That which has the lustre of smoke (dhūma) is Dhūmaprabhā. That which has the lustre of darkness (tamaÍ) is TamaÍprabhā. That which is like thick 111 darkness (mahātamaÍ) is MahātamaÍprabhā. These names are derived in this manner. The word 'earth' is intended to indicate the particular nature of the substratum which is solid like the earth. The infernal regions are not like the layers of heavens, which rest without any substratum like the earth. But the infernal regions rest on solid earth. The circles of atmosphere are mentioned in order to indicate the support of these earths. All these earths (which comprise the infernal regions) are successively surrounded by the circle of humid atmosphere – ghanodadhivātavalaya. The sheath of humid atmosphere is supported by the circle of dense air – ghanavātavalaya. The circle of dense air rests in thin air – tanuvātavalaya, which rests in space (ākāśa). And space rests in itself, as it is itself the support and the supported. Each of these three supports (zones) has the thickness of twenty thousand yojana. The number 'seven' is intended to exclude any other number; there are only seven earths, neither eight nor nine. The phrase 'adho(a)dhaÍ' indicates that these are one below the other and not transverse, parallel or horizontal. The space (ākāśa) has two parts, the non-universe-space (alokākāśa) and the universe-space (lokākāśa). (see Fig.-1) The universe-space (lokākāśa) is in the centre of the non-universe-space (alokākāśa). It, the universe-space (lokākāśa), is without a creator – akÃtrima, without a beginning and an end – anādinidhana, and comprises six substances (dravya). In the north and the south directions, everywhere, from the bottom to the crest, its extension is seven rajju. In the east and west directions, its extension is seven rajju at the bottom. As we go up to the height of seven rajju, the extension decreases from both sides till it reduces to one rajju. As we go further up to the height of ten rajju, the extension increases from both sides till it reaches five rajju. Then, at the height of fourteen rajju, the extension reduces again from both sides till it reaches one rajju. Viewed from the east to the west, the universe is like the image of a standing man with legs wide-apart, and arms folded with hands resting on the waist. The lower part of the universe is like the cane-stool (āsana), the middle part is like the frill (jhālara), and the top part is like the Indian percussion instrument 112 Tattvārthasūtra called 'mÃdańga'. The universe-space has three parts: the loweruniverse (adholoka), the middle-universe (madhyaloka), and the upper-universe (ūrdhvaloka). Mount Meru is in the centre of the middle-universe (madhyaloka). The height of Mount Meru is one hundred thousand and forty yojana. The part below Mount Meru is the lower-universe (adholoka), the part above is the upper-universe (ūrdhvaloka), and the transverse region is the middle-universe (madhyaloka). Its expanse being transverse, the middle-universe (madhyaloka) is also called the transverse-universe (tiryagloka). The lower-universe (adholoka) is the subject matter of the present sūtra. Where are the abodes of infernal beings on these earths? Are these everywhere or in some places only? Fig.-1 – The universe (loka) and the non-universe (aloka) THE THREE WORLDS COMPRISE THE UNIVERSE THE INFINITE SPACE BEYOND THE UNIVERSE IS CALLED THE NON-UNIVERSE THE UPPER WORLD THE LOWER WORLD THE MIDDLE WORLD alokākāśa lokākāśa (yksd)eè;yksd v/ksyksd alokākāśa lokākāśa (vyksd) ÅèoZyksd 113 vè;k;&3 mu ìfFkoh;ksa esa Øe ls igyh ìfFkoh esa 30 yk[k] nwljh esa 25 yk[k] rhljh esa 15 yk[k] pkSFkh eas 10 yk[k] ik¡poha esa 3 yk[k] NBoha esa ik¡p de ,d yk[k (99]995) vkSj lkroha esa 5 gh ujd fcy gSaA dqy 84 yk[k ujdokl fcy gaSA rklq =k'kRiÛÓ o'kfriÛÓn'kn'kf=kiÛÓksuSdujd& 'krlgÏkf.k iÛÓ pSo ;FkkØee~ AA2AA In these earths there are thirty hundred thousand, twenty-five hundred thousand, fifteen hundred thousand, ten hundred thousand, three hundred thousand, one 1hundred thousand less five, and only five infernal abodes (naraka), respectively. 1 – The infernal abodes (naraka) are cavities or hollow places in the earth. In these earths, namely, Ratnaprabhā, and so on, the numbers of infernal abodes are mentioned, in that order. The number of abodes in Ratnaprabhā is thirty hundred thousand, in Śarkarāprabhā twentyfive hundred thousand, in Vālukāprabhā fifteen hundred thousand, in Pańkaprabhā ten hundred thousand, in Dhūmaprabhā three hundred thousand, in TamaÍprabhā one hundred thousand less five, and in MahātamaÍprabhā just five. In the first earth (Ratnaprabhā) there are thirteen layers. Below that, up to the seventh, the layers are less by two in each earth. Other details must be ascertained from special treatises dealing with the universe (loka). What are the peculiarities of the infernal beings in these earths? 114 Tattvārthasūtra ukjdh tho lnSo gh vR;Ur v'kqHk ys';k] ifj.kke] 'kjhj] osnuk vkSj fofØ;k dks /kj.k djrs gaSA ukjdk fuR;k'kqHkrjys';kifj.kkensgosnukfofØ;k% AA3AA The thought-colouration (leśyā), environment (pariõāma), body (deha), suffering (vedanā) and deeds (vikriyā) of the infernal-beings (nārakī) are incessantly more and more inauspicious (aśubha), successively. Thought-colouration (leśyā), etc., have already been explained. These are of greater impurity in infernal beings than in the animals. And among the classes of infernal beings themselves, the impurity (foulness) is greater as we go down the infernal regions. 'Nitya' means perpetually, incessantly. Thus, the thought-colouration (leśyā), environment (pariõāma), body (deha), suffering (vedanā) and deeds (vikriyā) of the infernal beings are incessantly more and more impure. In the first and the second regions the prevailing complexion of thought is grey (kāpota). In the upper part of the third region it is grey (kāpota) and in the lower part blue (nīla). In the fourth it is blue (nīla). In the upper part of the fifth it is blue (nīla) and in the lower part black (kÃÈõa). In the sixth it is black (kÃÈõa) and in the seventh pitch-black (parama-kÃÈõa). It is said that the physical-colouration (dravyaleśyā) is the same till the end of one's life, but the thought-colouration (bhāvaleśyā) changes within one muhūrta. The word 'pariõāma' in the sūtra refers to the environment or the prevailing nature in terms of touch (sparśa), taste (rasa), smell (gandha), colour (varõa) and sound (śabda). These are successively more inauspicious and disagreeable, and cause great suffering. Because of the rise of inauspicious name-karma (nāmakarma), the bodies (deha) of infernal beings are successively more inauspicious. These are more and more deformed, loathsome and hideous in shape, and disgusting to look at. 115 vè;k;&3 Their height in the first region is seven dhanuÈa, three hātha and six ańgula. It doubles succesively as we go down the seven earths. Owing to the internal rise of inauspicious-feeling (asātāvedanīya) karmas, they incessantly suffer greatly from extreme heat and cold of the external environment. In the first four earths, the abodes cause agony by heat alone. In the fifth earth, two hundred thousand abodes of the upper part have intense heat and one hundred thousand abodes of the lower part intense cold. In the sixth and the seventh earths, suffering is caused by intense cold alone. The infernal beings intend to perform good deeds (vikriyā), but end up committing only the wicked deeds. They desire to do things that can bring about happiness but end up generating misery alone. Lower and lower down, these dispositions become worse and worse. Is distress caused to infernal beings by heat and cold alone? Or are there other sources of suffering and torment? ukjdh tho ijLij ,d&nwljs ds fy;s nq%[k mRi djrs gSa (ijLij yM+rs gaS)A ijLijksnhfjrnq%[kk% AA4AA They (the infernal beings) cause pain and suffering to one another. How do they cause pain and suffering to one another? Due to the fruition of wrong-belief (mithyādarśana), the infernal beings possess, from birth, wrong-clairvoyance – vibhańga avadhijñāna. Due to this, they are able to see the cause of their pain and suffering. Seeing each other, their anger develops into a rage. They recollect their past lives and are actuated by intense animosity. They begin to hit each other 116 Tattvārthasūtra like dogs and jackals. By their power of changing forms, they make weapons such as sword, hatchet, axe, spear, pike, javelin and crowbar and with these and also using their hands, feet and teeth, indulge in cutting, splitting, paring and biting, causing intense pain and suffering to one another. Are there any other causes of pain? vkSj os pkSFkh ìfFkoh ls igys&igys (vFkkZr~ rhljh ìfFkoh i;ZUr) vR;Ur lafDy"V ifj.kke ds /kjd vlqjdqekj nsoksa ds }kjk nq%[k ikrs gSa vFkkZr~ vlqjdqekj nso rhljs ujd rd tkdj ukjdh thoksa dks nq%[k nsrs gaS rFkk muds iwoZ ds oSj dk Lej.k djk&djk ds ijLij yM+krs gaS vkSj nq%[kh ns[k jkth gksrs gSaA lafDy"Vklqjksnhfjrnq%[kkÜÓ izkd~ prqF;kZ% AA5AA Pain is also caused by the incitement of malevolent Asurakumāra, prior to the fourth earth. Among the celestial beings (deva), there are deva with the 'asura' name-karma (nāmakarma) that makes them highly agitated, with tendency to torment others. Hence they are called 'asura' (demons). Owing to the evil thoughts experienced by them in their previous births, they acquire such demerit and are actuated by malevolence continually. It is not that all 'asura' cause pain to others. Only some 'asura', such as 'AmbābarīÈa', cause pain to the infernal (nāraka) beings. 'Prāk caturthyāÍ' – prior to the fourth – indicates the limit; it means that the wicked 'asura' cause pain only in the first three infernal earths. 'Ca' is intended to include the causes of pain mentioned in the previous sūtra(s). The 'asura' cause pain by actions 117 vè;k;&3 such as making the infernal beings drink molten iron, embrace redhot iron pillars, ascend and descend the tree with sharp thorns, strike others with hammers. Also, by cutting them with hatchets and knives, by sprinkling boiling oil on them, by frying them in an iron vessel, by parching them in an oven, by drowning them in river 'Vaitaraõī', and by grinding them in the oil-press. Though their bodies are cut and rent asunder, they do not meet with premature death, for their lifetime cannot be cut short. If so, let their span of life be mentioned. mu ujdksa ds ukjdh thoksa dh mRÑ"V fLFkfr (vk;q) Øe ls igys esa ,d lkxjksie] nwljs esa rhu lkxjksie] rhljs eas lkr lkxjksie] pkSFks eas nl lkxjksie] ik¡posa eas l=kg lkxjksie] Nês ò esa ckbZl lkxjksie vkSj lkrosa esa rsarhl lkxjksie gSA rs"osdf=klIrn'klIrn'k}k o'kfr=k; L=k'kRlkxjksiek lÙokuka ijk fLFkfr% AA6AA In these seven infernal regions the maximum duration of life is one, three, seven, ten, seventeen, twenty-two and thirty-three sāgaropama, respectively. 'Respectively' is supplied. With regard to these regions one, three, etc., sāgaropama are taken respectively. In Ratnaprabhā, the maximum lifetime is one sāgaropama, in Śarkarāprabhā three, in Vālukāprabhā seven, in Pańkaprabhā ten, in Dhūmaprabhā seventeen, in TamaÍprabhā twenty-two, and in MahātamaÍprabhā thirty-three sāgaropama. 'Parā' means maximum, 'sattvānām' – of infernal beings – is 118 Tattvārthasūtra intended to make clear that these lifetimes pertain to the infernal beings and not to the regions (earths). The lower world consisting of the seven earths has been described. Now the transverse world – tiryagloka – is to be described. Why is it called transverse world (tiryagloka)? It is called so as it consists of innumerable concentric island-continents, extending one beyond the other in transverse position up to the ocean of Svayambhūramaõa. What are these? bl eè;yksd eas 'kqHk&'kqHk uke okys tEcw}hi bR;kfn }hi vkSj yo.kksn bR;kfn leqnz gaSA tEcw}hiyo.kksnkn;% 'kqHkukekuks }hileqaek% AA7AA Jambūdvīpa, etc., are the continents and Lavaõoda, etc., are the oceans, having auspicious names. Jambūdvīpa and the others are the continents. Lavaõoda and the others are the oceans. The continents and the oceans bear all the auspicious names current in the world. The first few are as follows: Names of the continents: 1. Jambūdvīpa 2. Dhātakikhaõda 3. PuÈkaravara 4. Vāruõīvara 5. KÈīravara 6. GhÃtavara 7. IkÈuvara 8. Nandiśvaravara 9. Aruõavara Names of the oceans: 1. Lavaõoda 2. Kāloda 3. PuÈkaravara 4. Vāruõīvara 5. KÈīravara 6. GhÃtavara 7. IkÈuvara 8. Nandiśvaravara 9. Aruõavara 119 vè;k;&3 Thus innumerable continents and oceans must be understood up to the Svayambhūramaõa ocean. The extension, arrangement and shape of these are mentioned in the next sūtra. izR;sd }hi&leqnz nwus&nwus foLrkj okys vkSj igys&igys ds }hi&leqnzksa dks ?ksjs gq, pwM+h ds vkdkj okys gSaaA f}£}£o"dEHkk% iwoZiwoZifj{ksfi.kks oy;kÑr;% AA8AA Each continent or ocean is of double the extension of the preceding ocean or continent. These are circular in shape; each encircles the immediately preceding one. Repetition of the word 'dviÍ' – 'dviÍdviÍ' – is intended to indicate successive action; that is, each is double the extension of the previous one. The extension of the first ocean Lavaõoda is double that of the first continent Jambūdvīpa. The extension of the second continent Dhātakikhaõda is double that of the first ocean Lavaõoda, and so on. It is mentioned that one surrounds the other to show that these are not situated as villages and towns. The phrase 'circular in shape' is intended to exclude shapes like the rectangle or the square. Now the position, shape and extension of Jambūdvīpa must be mentioned as the dimensions of the rest follow from this. mu lc }hi&leqnzksa ds chp esa tEcw}hi gS] mldh ukfHk ds leku rUeè;s es#ukfHkòZÙkks ;kstu'krlgÏfo"dEHkks tEcw}hi% AA9AA 120 Tattvārthasūtra lqn'kZu es# gS] rFkk tEcw}hi Fkkyh ds leku xksy gS vkSj ,d yk[k ;kstu mldk foLrkj gSA In the middle of these oceans and continents is Jambūdvīpa, round and one hundred thousand yojana in diameter. Mount Meru (Meru parvata) is at the centre of this continent, like the navel in the body. In the middle of these means in the middle of the concentric oceans and continents mentioned already. Mount Meru is in the centre of Jambūdvīpa, like the navel in the body. In the centre of which is Mount Meru, which is round like the disc of the sun, and which is one hundred thousand yojana in diameter, is Jambūdvīpa. Why is it called Jambūdvīpa? It is called Jambūdvīpa because it has the 'Jambū' tree as its distinguishing mark. In the Uttarakuru region of Jambūdvīpa there is this 'Jambū' tree, beginningless and eternal, made of earth, uncreated, and surrounded by its satellite trees. What are the seven divisions of Jambūdvīpa, separated by the six mountain-chains? bl tEcw}hi esa Hkjro"kZ] gSeoro"kZ] gfjo"kZ] fonsgo"kZ] jE;do"kZ] gSj.;oro"kZ vkSj ,sjkoro"kZ & ;s lkr {ks=k gSaA HkjrgSeorgfjfonsgjE;dgSj.;orSjkoro"kkZ% {ks=kkf.k AA10AA BharatavarÈa, HaimavatavarÈa, HarivarÈa, VidehavarÈa, RamyakavarÈa, HairaõyavatavarÈa and AirāvatavarÈa are the seven regions (kÈetra). 121 vè;k;&3 The names Bharata and the rest are prevalent from eternity and are without cause. Where is BharatavarÈa (BharatakÈetra) situated? It is the country in the south of the mountain chain of Himavān parvata and surrounded by ocean on the other three sides. It is in the shape of a bow. It is divided into six regions by the mountain chain of Vijayārdha parvata and the two rivers, Gańgā and Sindhu. In the north of (small) Himavān parvata and south of Mahāhimavān parvata, and surrounded by ocean in the east and the west, is the HaimavatavarÈa (HaimavatakÈetra). In the south of the mountain chain of NiÈadha parvata and north of the Mahāhimavān parvata, and surrounded by ocean in the east and the west, lies the HarivarÈa (HarikÈetra). In the north of the mountain chain of NiÈadha parvata and south of Nīla parvata, and surrounded by ocean in the east and the west, is the VidehavarÈa (VidehakÈetra). In the north of the mountain chain of Nīla parvata and south of Rukmī parvata, and surrounded by ocean in the east and the west, is the RamyakavarÈa (RamyakakÈetra). In the north of the mountain chain of Rukmī parvata and south of Śikharī parvata, and surrounded by ocean in the east and the west, is the HairaõyavatavarÈa (HairaõyavatakÈetra). In the north of the mountain chain of Śikharī parvata, and surrounded by ocean on the other three sides, is the AirāvatavarÈa (AirāvatakÈetra). It is divided into six regions by the mountain chain of Vijayārdha parvata and the two rivers, Raktā and Raktodā. The mountain chains have been mentioned as six. What are these and how do these run? mu lkr {ks=kksa dk foHkkx djus okys iwoZ ls if'pe rd yEcs fgeoku~] rf}Hkkftu% iwokZijk;rk fgeoUegkfgeofÂ"kèkuhy& #fDef'k[kfj.kks o"kZèkjioZrk% AA11AA 122 Tattvārthasūtra egkefgeoku~] fu"k/] uhy] #Deh vkSj f'k[kjh & ;s Ng o"kZ/j ioZr gSaA (o"kZ3⁄4{ks=k) These mountain chains divide the Jambūdvīpa into seven regions mentioned already. These extend from east to west, touching the Lavaõasamudra (Lavaõoda ocean) on both sides. These names have been current from eternity and are without cause. These are called 'varÈadhara parvata' as these divide the land into regions. Where is Himavān, also called 'small' (kÈudra) Himavān? It is on the borders of Bharata and Haimavata. It is one hundred yojana in height. The maountain chain of Mahāhimavān divides the regions (kÈetra) HaimavatavarÈa and HarivarÈa. The height of Mahāhimavān is two hundred yojana. NiÈadha is in south of VidehavarÈa and north of HarivarÈa. It is four hundred yojana in height. The other three mountain chains divide the remaining regions (kÈetra). Their heights are four hundred, two hundred and one hundred yojana, respectively. The foundation of these mountains is one-fourth of the height. The next sūtra describes their colours. The six mountain chains Himavān, Mahāhimavān, NiÈadha, Nīla, Rukmī, and Śikharī, running from east to west, divide these regions. ;s ioZr Øe ls Lo.kZ] pk¡nh] rik;k gqvk lksuk] oSMw;Z (uhy) ef.k] pk¡nh vkSj Lo.kZ tSls jax ds gSaA gsektqZuriuh;oSMw;Zjtrgsee;k% AA12AA The mountain chains are of these colours: gold (hema), white (arjuna), purified gold (tapanīya), blue-gem 123 vè;k;&3 (vaiçūrya), silvery (rajata) and golden (hemamaya), respectively. The mountains are of these colours. Himavān is golden, like the Chinese silk. Mahāhimavān is white. NiÈadha is like the heated gold; like the rising sun. Nīla is blue like the neck of the peacock. Rukmī is silvery white. Śikharī is golden, like the Chinese silk. Other details of these mountain chains are given in the next sūtra. bu ioZrksa dk ik'oZ fp=k&fofp=k ef.k;kasa dk gS vkSj Åij&uhps rFkk eè; esa ,d leku foLrkj okyk gSA ef.kfofp=kik'okZ mifj ewys p rqY;foLrkjk% AA13AA Studded with various jewels, the sides of these mountains are variegated and the mountains are of equal width at the foot, in the middle and at the top. Being studded with precious stones of different colours and lustre, the sides of these mountains are variegated. The words 'upari', etc., are intended to exclude unwanted shapes. 'Ca' is intended to include the middle. The breadth is the same at the foot, in the middle and at the top. The lakes situated on top of these mountains are mentioned next. iÁegkiÁfrfx×Ndslfjegkiq.Mjhdiq.Mjhdk ßnkLrs"kkeqifj AA14AA 124 Tattvārthasūtra bu ioZrksa ds Åij Øe ls iÁ] egkiÁ] frfx×N] dsljh] egkiq.Mjhd vkSj iq.Mjhd uke ds ßn&ljksoj gSaA Padma, Mahāpadma, Tigińcha, Kesarī, Mahāpuõçarīka, and Puõçarīka, respectively, are the lakes on top of these mountains. These are the names, respectively, of the lakes on top of Himavān and other mountains. The size and shape of the first of these lakes are mentioned. igyk iÁ ljksoj ,d gtkj ;kstu yEck vkSj yEckbZ ls vk/k vFkkZr~ ik¡p lkS ;kstu pkSM+k gSA izFkeks ;kstulgÏk;keLrn1⁄4Zfo"dEHkks ßn% AA15AA The first lake is one thousand yojana in length and half of it in breadth. The length, from east to west, of lake Padma is one thousand yojana. Its breadth, from north to south, is five hundred yojana. The bottom of the lake is made of adamant. Its banks are variegated, studded with gold and jewels. Its depth is indicated in the next sūtra. n'k;kstukoxkg% AA16AA igyk ljksoj nl ;kstu voxkg (xgjkbZ) okyk gSA 125 vè;k;&3 The depth (avagāha) of the first lake is ten yojana. 'Avagāha' is depth. The depth of lake Padma is ten yojana. What is in the middle of it? mlds chp esa ,d ;kstu foLrkj okyk dey gSA rUeè;s ;kstua iq"dje~ AA17AA In the middle of this first lake, there is a lotus of the size of one yojana. 'Yojanam' means of the extent of one yojana. It amounts to this: each petal measures one-fourth of a yojana (one krośa) and the pericarp half a yojana (two krośa). Hence, the lotus is one yojana (= four krośa) long and one yojana broad. The lotus consists of a multitude of petals (1011 in number, see 'Trilokasāra', verse 569) densely packed, and its stalk has the height of one half of a yojana (two krośa), from the surface of the water. What are the dimensions of the other lakes and lotuses? vkxs ds ljksoj rFkk dey igys ds ljksojksa rFkk deyksa ls Øe ls nwus&nwus foLrkj okys gaSA rñf}xq.kf}xq.kk ßnk% iq"djkf.k p AA18AA The lakes as well as the lotuses on further mountains are each double the magnitude of the previous one. 126 Tattvārthasūtra Repetition in 'taddviguõadviguõāÍ' is intended to convey that these are, each, double the previous one. Double in regard to what? It means double in regard to length, breadth and depth, Mahāpadma is double the length, breadth and depth of Padma. Tigińcha's length, breadth and depth is double that of Mahāpadma. The same applies to lotuses also; each lotus is double, in length, etc., of the previous one. It is like this: lotus Padma is one yojana long and one yojana broad, lotus Mahāpadma two yojana, lotus Tigińcha four yojana, lotus Kesarī four yojana, lotus Mahāpuõçarīka two yojana, and lotus Puõçarīka one yojana. (see 'Trilokasāra', verse 570). The names of the nymphs (devī), their lifetime, and their retinue are mentioned next. ,d iY;ksie vk;q okyh vkSj lkekfud rFkk ifj"kñ tkfr ds nsoksa lfgr Jh] ßh] /`fr] dh£r] cqf1⁄4 vkSj y{eh uke dh nsfo;k¡ Øe ls mu ljksojksa ds deyksa ij fuokl djrh gSaaA rfÂokflU;ks nsO;% Jhsshèk`frdh£rcqf1⁄4y{E;% iY;ksiefLFkr;% llkekfudifj"kRdk% AA19AA In these lotuses live the nymphs (devī) called Śrī, HÃī, DhÃti, Kīrti, Buddhi and LakÈmī, respectively, whose lifetime is one palyopama each and who live with sāmānika and pariÈad classes of deva. In the middle of the pericarps of the lotuses, there are snowwhite mansions, lovelier than the full moon of the autumnal season, one krośa long, half a krośa broad and three-fourth of a krośa high. The nymphs (devī) called Śrī, HÃī, DhÃti, Kīrti, Buddhi and LakÈmī reside 127 vè;k;&3 in the six lotuses, Padma and others, respectively. Their duration of life is one palyopama. Sāmānika are called so because they are of equal status. Sāmānika and pariÈad are classes of deva. These deva reside in mansions on peripheral lotuses, surrounding the primary lotuses. What are the rivers dividing the regions? (Hkjr esa) xaxk] flU/q] (gSeor eas) jksfgr] jksfgrkL;k] (gfj{ks=k esa) gfjr~] gfjdkUrk] (fonsg esa) lhrk] lhrksnk] (jE;d~ esa) ukjh] ujdkUrk] (gSj.;or esa) lqo.kZdwyk] :I;dwyk vkSj (,sjkor esa) jDrk] jDrksnk] bl izdkj Åij dgs gq, lkr {ks=kksa esa pkSng ufn;k¡ chp esa cgrh gSaaA xaxkflUèkqjksfgaeksfgrkL;kgfj1⁄4fjdkUrklhrklhrksnk& ukjhujdkUrklqo.kZ:I;dwykjDrkjDrksnk% lfjrLrUeè;xk% AA20AA Gańgā, Sindhu, Rohita, Rohitāsyā, Harit, Harikāntā, Sītā, Sītodā, Nārī, Narakāntā, Suvarõakūlā, Rūpyakūlā, Raktā, and Raktodā are the rivers flowing across these regions (BharatavarÈa and the rest). The mention of 'rivers' is to clarify that these are not lakes. Do these rivers flow in the interior, border or vicinity of the regions? These flow in the middle of the regions. What are the regions and the directions in which these rivers flow? 128 Tattvārthasūtra (;s pkSng ufn;k¡ nks ds lewg eass ysuk pkfg;s) gj nks&nks ds lewg esa ls igyh&igyh unh iwoZ dh vksj cgrh gS (vkSj ml fn'kk ds leqnz esa feyrh gS)A };ks}Z;ks% iwokZ% iwoZxk% AA21AA The first of each pair of rivers flows eastwards. The sūtra specifies that these rivers are in groups of two and each group flows in one region. It precludes the interpretation that all the rivers flow in one region. The directions are also indicated by the phrase 'pūrvāÍ pūrvagāÍ'. The first river in each group falls into the eastern ocean. These are eastern rivers. On what basis is the first to be taken? The sūtra clarifies that the first seven rivers mentioned are not to be taken as the first rivers. First of each pair is to be taken as 'first' and these only are the eastern rivers. What is the direction of the rest? ckdh jgh lkr ufn;k¡ if'pe dh vksj tkrh gSa (vkSj ml rjiQ ds leqnz esa feyrh gSa)A 'ks"kkLRoijxk% AA22AA The rest are the western rivers. Those which have been left out from each pair must be understood as the western rivers. As these flow into the western ocean, these are called the western rivers. River Gańgā rises from lake Padma and flows through its eastern archway. River Sindhu originates from its 129 vè;k;&3 archway in the west. River Rohitāsyā proceeds from its archway in the north. River Rohita rises from lake Mahāpadma and flows through its archway in the south. That which flows from its archway in the north is river Harikāntā. That which rises from lake Tigińcha and flows through its southern outlet is river Harita. That which flows through its northern outlet is river Sītodā. That which rises from lake Kesarī and flows through its southern archway is river Sītā. That which flows through its northern archway is river Narakāntā. That which rises from lake Mahāpuõçarīka and flows through its southern archway is river Nārī. That which flows through its northern archway is river Rūpyakūlā. That which rises from lake Puõçarīka and flows through its southern archway is river Suvarõakūlā. That which flows through its eastern archway is river Raktā. And that which flows through its western archway is river Raktodā. Their tributaries are enumerated in the next sūtra. xaxk&flU/q vkfn ufn;ksa ds ;qxy pkSng&pkSng gtkj lgk;d ufn;ksa ls f?kjs gq, gaSA prqnZ'kunhlgÏifjòrk xaxkflUèokn;ks u|% AA23AA The rivers Gańgā, Sindhu, etc., have 14,000 tributaries. Why should 'Gańgā, Sindhu, etc.,' be mentioned in the sūtra? It is to include these rivers. But are these rivers, the subject of description, not naturally included? It should not be considered so. The sūtra has reference only to the immediately preceding rule or exception. According to this principle this would include only the western rivers. The term 'Gańgā, etc.,' would include only the eastern rivers. Hence 'Gańgā, Sindhu, etc.,' is used to include both. The word 'nadi' – river – is used in the sūtra to associate this number with 'dviguõadviguõāÍ'. 130 Tattvārthasūtra Therefore, river Gańgā and river Sindhu, each, has 14,000 tributaries. The groups of rivers in the other regions have twice the number of tributaries up to the Videha region. Beyond that the tributaries are less by half the number. This means that rivers Rohita and Rohitāsyā, each, has 28,000 tributaries. Rivers Harit and Harikāntā, each, has 56,000 tributaries. Rivers Sītā and Sītodā, each, has 1,12,000 tributaries. Rivers Nārī and Narakāntā, each, has 56,000 tributaries. Rivers Suvarõakūlā and Rūpyakūlā, each, has 28,000 tributaries. And, rivers Raktā and Raktodā, each, has 14,000 tributaries. The expanse of the regions (kÈetra) is mentioned next. Hkjr {ks=k dk foLrkj] ik¡p lkS NCchl ;kstu vkSj ,d ;kstu ds mÂhl Hkkxksa eas ls Ng Hkkx vf/d gSA Hkjr% "kM~ o'kfriÛÓ;kstu'krfoLrkj% "kV~pSdksu o'kfrHkkxk ;kstuL; AA24AA The width (from south to north) of the region Bharata is 6526 / yojana.19 That which is 526 yojana in width (from south to north) is Bharata. Is 6it only so much? No; / yojana is added to it.19 The widths of the other regions are indicated next. fonsg{ks=k rd ds ioZr vkSj {ks=k Hkjr{ks=k ls nwus&nwus foLrkj okys gSaaA rñf}xq.kf}xq.kfoLrkjk o"kZèkjo"kkZ fonsgkUrk% AA25AA 131 vè;k;&3 The mountains and the regions are double and double in width up to Videha. Those whose widths are double and double that of Bharata are meant. Whose widths are double and double? The widths of the mountains and the regions. Are all double in width? No. Up to Videha these are double of the preceding ones. What are the widths of the mountains and the regions in the north of Videha? fonsg {ks=k ls mÙkj ds rhu ioZr vkSj rhu {ks=k] nf{k.k ds ioZr vkSj {ks=kksa ds leku foLrkj okys gSaaA mÙkjk nf{k.krqY;k% AA26AA Those in the north are equal to those in the south. By 'uttarā' the regions and the mountains from Airāvata and Nīla are taken. These are equal to those in the south, namely, Bharata, etc. This rule applies to all that has been described before. Therefore, the lakes, the lotuses, and the rest, are also equal in magnitude, etc. Are the experiences, and so on, of human beings the same or different in these regions? Ng le;ksa dh vis{kk ls mRl£i.kh vkSj vol£i.kh ds }kjk Hkjr vkSj ,sjkor {ks=kksa esa thoksa ds vuqHkokfn dh òf1⁄4&gkfu gksrh jgrh gSA HkjrSjkor;ksòZf1⁄4ssklkS "kV~le;kH;keqRl£i.;ol£i.khH;ke~ AA27AA 132 Tattvārthasūtra In Bharata and Airāvata there is rise (regeneration) and fall (degeneration) during the six periods of the two aeons of regeneration and degeneration. On what basis are there rise and fall? It is on the basis of the six periods of regeneration and degeneration. Of what regions? Of Bharata and Airāvata regions. It must be understood that rise and fall is not of the regions; this is impossible. Rise and fall happen to the human beings in these regions. The rise and fall – increase and decrease – pertain to human beings in Bharata and Airāvata regions. In what respect do human beings increase and decrease? It is with regard to intellect (anubhava), age (āyuÍ), bodily stature (pramāõa), etc. Again, by what are these increase and decrease caused? These are caused by time (kāla). Time (kāla) has two half-cycles, the ascending – utsarpiõī – and the descending – avasarpiõī. Each of these two is of six divisions. These two are significant names. That half-cycle in which the characteristics of intellect, etc., have ascending tendency is utsarpiõī. And that half-cycle in which intellect, etc., have descending tendency is avasarpiõī. The descending half-cycle has six divisions: 1) suÈamasuÈamā, of 4 koÇākoÇi sāgaropama; 2) suÈamā, of 3 koÇākoÇi sāgaropama; 3) suÈamaduÈÈamā, of 2 koÇākoÇi sāgaropama; 4) duÈÈamasuÈamā, of 1 koÇākoÇi sāgaropama minus 42,000 years; 5) duÈÈamā, of 21,000 years; and 6) atiduÈÈamā, of 21,000 years. The ascending (utsarpiõī) half-cycle has the same divisions but in reverse order, from atiduÈÈamā to suÈamasuÈamā. In this half-cycle there is the all-round, progressive increase in age, strength, stature and happiness of living beings. Each half cycle, the ascending (utsarpiõī) and the descending (avasarpiõī), consists of 10  1 crore  1 crore addhā-sāgaropama (10 koÇākoÇi sāgaropama). Thus, one cycle of time (kalpakāla) gets over in 20 koÇākoÇi sāgaropama. 133 vè;k;&3 At the beginning of suÈamasuÈamā, of 4 koÇākoÇi sāgaropama, human beings are of the same nature as those of Uttarakuru. There is gradual decrease during the period, and then comes the second period, suÈamā, of 3 koÇākoÇi sāgaropama. At the commencement of this period, human beings are equal to those of HarivarÈa. And after gradual decrease during this period, comes suÈamaduÈÈamā, of 2 koÇākoÇi sāgaropama. At the commencement of this period, human beings are equal to those of Haimavata. After gradual decrease commences the fourth period, duÈÈamasuÈamā, of 1 koÇākoÇi sāgaropama minus 42,000 years. At the commencement of this period, human beings are equal to those of Videha. Then, after gradual decrease comes the fifth period, duÈÈamā, of 21,000 years. Lastly, after gradual decrease, comes atiduÈÈamā, again of 21,000 years. Similarly, the ascending half-cycle must also be understood but in the reverse order. What is the nature of the other regions? Hkjr vkSj ,sjkor {ks=k dks NksM+dj nwljs {ks=kksa esa ,d gh voLFkk jgrh gS & muesa dky dk ifjorZu ugha gksrkA rkH;keijk Hkwe;ks¿ofLFkrk% AA28AA The regions other than these are stable. The regions other than Bharata and Airāvata have stable states or conditions. In those regions there are no ascending or descending halfcycles of time. Do human beings in those regions have the same duration of life or are there differences? 134 Tattvārthasūtra gSeord] gkfjo"kZd] vkSj nsodq#od (fonsg{ks=k ds vUrxZr ,d fo'ks"k LFkku ds euq";) Øe ls ,d iY;ksie] nks iY;ksie vkSj rhu iY;ksie dh vk;q okys gksrs gSaA ,df}f=kiY;ksiefLFkr;ks gSeordgkfjo"kZdnSodqjodk% AA29AA The lifetimes of human beings in Haimavata, Hari and Devakuru are one, two and three palyopama, respectively. The human beings born in Haimavata are 'haimavataka'. Similarly, with regard to the others – 'hārivarÈaka' and 'daivakuravaka'. 'Haimavataka' and the rest are three. One and the others are three. These are considered, respectively. The lifetime of 'haimavataka' is one palyopama, that of 'hārivarÈaka' is two palyopama, and that of 'daivakuravaka' is three palyopama. In the two-and-a half continents (dvīpa) in which human beings live there are five Haimavata regions. There the period of suÈamaduÈÈamā prevails always; the lifetime of human beings is one palyopama; the height is two thousand bows (dhanuÈa); they take food on alternate days; the colour of their bodies is like the blue lotus. In the five HarivarÈa regions the period of suÈamā prevails always. The lifetime of human beings is two palyopama; the height is four thousand bows (dhanuÈa); they take food after an interval of two days; the colour of their bodies is white like the conch-shell. In the five Devakuru regions the period of suÈamasuÈamā prevails always. There the lifetime of human beings is three palyopama; the height is six thousand bows (dhanuÈa); they take food after an interval of three days; the colour of their bodies is yellow like gold. What is the condition in the regions of the north? 135 vè;k;&3 mÙkj ds {ks=kksa esa jgus okys euq"; gSeordkfnd nf{k.k ds euq";ksa ds leku gksrs gSaA rFkksÙkjk% AA30AA The condition in the north is the same as in the south. The human beings in the regions of north must be understood to be like those in the south, as already explained. The human beings in the region Hairaõyavata are similar in all respects to those in the region Haimavata. The human beings in the region Ramyaka are similar in all respects to those in the region HarivarÈa. And human beings in the region Uttarakuru are similar in all respects to those in the region Devakuru. Now what is the duration of life in the five Videha regions? fonsg {ks=kksa esa euq";ksa dh vk;q la[;kr o"kZ dh gksrh gSA fonsgs"kq l;s;dkyk% AA31AA In the Videha regions the lifetime of human beings is numerable (saÉkhyāta) years. In all the five Videha regions the duration of life of human beings is numerable (saÉkhyāta) years. The time like that of the closing period of suÈamaduÈÈamā prevails throughout. The height of human beings is five hundred bows (dhanuÈa); they take food everyday. The maximum duration of life is one pūrvakoÇi years and the minimum is antarmuhūrta. The following verse is quoted in this connection. "One 136 Tattvārthasūtra pūrva should be known as seventy lakh crore and fifty-six thousand 1crore years." This comes to 70560000000000 years. One pūrvakoÇi = 1 crore  1 pūrva = 70560000000000  10000000 years. The extent of Bharata has already been mentioned. It is stated again in another way. 1 – This is also mentioned in another way: "1 pūrvāńga = 84 lakh years; 1 pūrva = 84 lakh  1 pūrvāńga = 84 lakh  84 lakh years = 70560000000000 years. 1 pūrvakoÇi = 1 crore  1 pūrva. (1 crore = 10 million = 100 lakh = 100,00,000) (see 'Harivańśapurāõa', p. 133, and 'Ādipurāõa', p. 693-694.) 1Hkjr {ks=k dk foLrkj tEcw}hi dk ,d lkS uOosok¡ Hkkx & / & gSA190 HkjrL; fo"dEHkks tEcw}hiL; uofr'krHkkx% AA32AA The width of Bharata region is one hundred and 1ninetieth part – / – that of Jambūdvīpa.190 The width of the Bharata region is one hundred and ninetieth part of 6Jambūdvīpa, which is 1,00,000 yojana. It equals 526 / yojana, as 19 mentioned already (in sūtra 3-24). There is a mound surrounding Jambūdvīpa, which is encircled by the ocean Lavaõasamudra, whose width is 2,00,000 yojana. The ocean Lavaõasamudra is encircled by the island Dhātakīkhaõça, whose width is 4,00,000 yojana. The next sūtra is intended to describe regions in Dhātakīkhaõça. 137 vè;k;&3 /krdh[k.M uke ds nwljs }hi esa {ks=k] dqykpy] es#] unh bR;kfn lc dh jpuk tEcw}hi ls nwuh&nwuh gSA f}/kZrdh[k.Ms AA33AA In Dhātakīkhaõça the regions and the mountains, etc., are double that of Jambūdvīpa. The recurrence of the regions and the rest in Bharata is intended here. The sūtra indicates that there are two Bkarata, etc., with double the width, etc. It is as follows. The ends of Dhātakīkhaõça touch the two oceans Lavaõoda (Lavaõasamudra) and Kāloda. Two mountain ranges 'IÈvākāra' running from south to north divide Dhātakīkhaõça into east Dhātakīkhaõça and west Dhātakīkhaõça. In the middle of these eastern and western parts, there are two mountains called 'Mandara' or 'Mount Meru'. On the two sides of these mountains are situated the regions such as Bharata and the mountains such as Himavān. Thus it must be understood that there are two Bharata, two Himavān and so on in Dhātakīkhaõça. The extent of these mountain ranges is double the extent of those in Jambūdvīpa. These mountain ranges are midway between the regions as spokes in the wheel. As the 'Jambū' tree is situated in Jambūdvīpa, in similar position is the 'Dhātakī' tree with its attendant trees in Dhātakīkhaõça. It is from this tree that the renowned name Dhātakīkhaõça is derived. The ocean encircling Dhātakīkhaõça is Kāloda. Its embankment is as if fashioned by a chisel. Its width is 8,00,000 yojana. That which encircles the ocean Kāloda is PuÈkaradvīpa, whose width is 16,00,000 yojana. Just as the continents and oceans are double in extension, it would mean that the regions, etc., are twice the number in the next continent. The next sūtra is intended to determine the difference in this respect. 138 Tattvārthasūtra iq"djk1⁄4Z }hi esa Hkh lc jpuk tEcw}hi dh jpuk ls nwuh&nwuh gSA iq"djk1⁄4sZ p AA34AA In the (nearest) half of PuÈkaradvīpa the (number of) regions and mountains are the same. 'Dvi' – 'double' – is supplied from the previous sūtra. With regard to what is 'double' to be taken? It is to be taken with regard to the regions, mountains, etc., of Jambūdvīpa. As the dimensions of Himavān, etc., in Dhātakīkhaõça have been mentioned, similarly, the dimensions of Himavān, etc., in the half of PuÈkaradvīpa are double of Himavān, etc., in Dhātakīkhaõça. The names are the same. Similarly, there are two mountain ranges – 'IÈvākāra' – running from south to north as well as two 'Mandara' or 'Mount Meru', as in Dhātakīkhaõça. As Jambūdvīpa has the 'Jambū' tree, PuÈkaradvīpa has the 'PuÈkara' tree with its attendant trees as its distinguishing mark. From this tree originates its name. Now, why is it called PuÈkarārdha? PuÈkaradvīpa has been divided into two halves by the mountain range of MānuÈottara. The part nearing centre is called PuÈkarārdha. Why is it stated that there are two Himavān mountains, etc., only in PuÈkarārdha and not in the entire PuÈkaradvīpa? ekuq"kksÙkj ioZr rd vFkkZr~ v<+kbZ }hi esa gh euq"; gksrs gSa & ekuq"kksÙkj ioZr ls ijs 1⁄2f}/kjh eqfu ;k fo|k/j Hkh ugha tk ldrsA izkÄ~ekuq"kksÙkjkUeuq";k% AA35AA The human beings are only up to the mountain range of MānuÈottara. 139 vè;k;&3 The mountain range of MānuÈottara runs, like a bangle, in the middle of PuÈkaradvīpa dividing it into two parts. Human beings are found only inside this mountain range and not beyond it. Hence PuÈkaradvīpa has no division into regions beyond this mountain range. Neither 'vidyādhara' (those gifted with extraordinary powers) nor ascetics with 'Ãddhi' (special attainment) go beyond this dividing mountain range. There are, however, three exceptions. 1) The human being, who is to be born after death outside the human region (not, of course, as a human being), effects the exit of the spatial units of his soul beyond the human region, just at the time of transit before his death – māraõāntika-samudghāta. 2) The being (not, of course, a human being) living beyond the mountain range of MānuÈottara who is to be reborn as a human being after death – on fruition of the age and name-karma of a human being – stays outside the human region until the time of entry into the human region just before death. 3) Kevalisamudghāta; the Omniscient emanates from his body the spatial units of his soul, without wholly discarding the body, for the purpose of levelling down the duration of the other three non-destructivc karmas to that of the age-karma. The soul fills up the entire universe and contracts back to the size of the body in eight instants, just prior to attaining liberation. Since human beings are found only inside it, the name MānuÈottara is significant. It is now clear that human beings reside only in the two and a half continents commencing from Jambūdvīpa and in the two oceans. Human beings are of two kinds. vk;Z vkSj EysPN ds Hksn ls euq"; nks izdkj ds gSaA vk;kZ EysPNkÜÓ AA36AA Human beings are of two kinds: the civilized (ārya) and the unevolved (mleccha). 140 Tattvārthasūtra Those human beings who are possessed of virtues or are resorted to by the virtuous are called the civilized – 'ārya'. They are of two kinds: those with supernatural attainment – Ãddhi, and those without it. The latter have five divisions: based on region, family, occupation, conduct, and faith. Those with supernatural attainment – Ãddhi – have seven divisions: on the basis of (extraordinary) intellect – buddhi, power to change form – vikriyā, austerity – tapa, might – bala, healing power – auÈadha, occult power to transform simple food into delicious dishes – rasa, and power to make even limited food inexhaustible – akÈīõa. (see 'Tiloyapaõõattī-2', verses 981-1102; also, 'Ādipurāõa', p. 35-37). The unevolved – 'mleccha' – are of two kinds: those born in mid-isles – antardvīpaja mleccha – and those born in regions of labour – karmabhūmija mleccha. The 'antardvīpaja mleccha' are born in midisles which are 'kubhogabhūmi' – regions of perverse enjoyment. In the Lavaõasamudra (Lavaõoda ocean) in the eight directions there are eight antardvīpa and eight others in the midst of these (in the eight directions). Similarly, there are eight antardvīpa at the end of the mountains Himavān and Śikharī, and the two mountains Vijayārdha. The mid-isles in the directions are across the ocean, five hundred yojana away from the shore. Those in the intermediate points of the compass are five hundred and fifty yojana away from the shore. Those at the end of the mountains are six hundred yojana in the interior. The antardvīpa in the directions are one hundred yojana broad. The width of those in the intermediate points is half of it. Those at the end of the mountains are twenty-five yojana broad. The human beings in the east have one thigh each. Those in the west have tails. Those in the north are mute. Those in the south are possessed of horns. Those in the other four directions have ears like those of the hare, like those of the fish, (broad) like the cloak, and long ears, respectively. Those in the eight intermediate points of the compass have faces like those of the horse, the lion, the dog, the buffalo, the pig, the tiger, the crow and the ape, respectively. Those in the middle of the two corners of Śikharī have faces like the cloud and the lightning; those between the two corners of Himavān like the fish and the cuckoo; those between the 141 vè;k;&3 corners of the northern Vijayārdha like the elephant and the mirror, those between the corners of the southern Vijayārdha like the cow and the ram. Those with single thigh reside in caves and live on clay. The rest dwell on trees and live on flowers and fruits. All of them live for one palyopama. All these twenty-four antardvīpa are one yojana high from the water level. Similarly, it should be understood in Kāloda ocean. All these are 'antardvīpaja mleccha'. The unevolved in other parts of the world – of labour – are the savage tribes, the ionians, the mountaineers, the foresters and so on. These are 'karmabhūmija mleccha'. Which are the regions of labour? ik¡p es# lEcU/h ik¡p Hkjr] ik¡p ,sjkor] ik¡p fonsg (nsodq# rFkk mÙkjdq# ;s nksuksa NksM+dj)] bl izdkj v<+kbZ }hi esa dqy iUnzg deZHkwfe;k¡ gaSA HkjrSjkorfonsgk% deZHkwe;ks¿U;=k nsodq:Ùkjdq#H;% AA37AA Bharata, Airāvata, and Videha, excluding Devakuru and Uttarakuru, are the regions of labour – karmabhūmi. Bharata, Airāvata, and Videha are five each. All these are described as the regions of labour – karmabhūmi. The inclusion of Videha would imply the inclusion of Devakuru and Uttarakuru. In order to exclude these, it is mentioned 'excluding Devakuru and Uttarakuru'. Devakuru, Uttarakuru, Haimavata, HarivarÈa, Ramyaka, Hairaõyavata and the mid-isles (antardvīpa) are called the regions of enjoyment – bhogabhūmi. Why are the 'regions of labour' – karmabhūmi – so called? This is because these are the seats of good (śubha) and evil (aśubha) deeds. Although the three worlds constitute the seat of activity, still these regions are the seats of intense karmic activity. For instance, demerit 142 Tattvārthasūtra capable of plunging a being in the seventh infernal region is acquired only in these regions – Bharata, etc. Merit which leads to the highest celestial state such as Sarvārthasiddhi deva is also acquired in these regions only. Also, the six kinds of occupations, such as agriculture, and the opportunity to give gifts to the worthy – pātradāna – are obtained in these regions only. Hence these are called the regions of labour. The others are called the 'regions of enjoyment' – bhogabhūmi – as the objects of enjoyment are provided by the ten kinds of desirefulfilling trees (kalpavÃkÈa). The lifetime of the human beings in these regions is indicated in the next sūtra. euq";ksa dh mRÑ"V fLFkfr rhu iY; vkSj t?kU; fLFkfr vUreqZgwrZ dh gSA ùfLFkrh ijkojs f=kiY;ksiekUreqZgwrsZ AA38AA The maximum lifetime of the human beings is three palyopama and the minimum is antarmuhūrta. The maximum lifetime of the human beings is three palyopama. The minimum is antarmuhūrta. Between these two limits, there are many gradations. Palya is of three kinds – vyavahāra palya, uddhāra palya and addhā palya. These are significant terms. The first is called vyavahāra palya as it is the basis for the other two palya. There is nothing which is measured by this. The second is uddhāra palya. The continents and oceans are counted by the bits of the fibre (roma) of the ram drawn out from the uddhāra palya. The third is addhā palya. Addhā means duration of time. Now the first palya is described. Three pits of the extent of one yojana long, one yojana broad and one yojana deep, based on the measure of pramāõāńgula, are dug out. The first 143 vè;k;&3 pit is filled tightly with the smallest bits of the fibre of the ram, born in uttama bhogabhūmi and from one to seven days old. The bits must be so small that these are incapable of being cut further by the scissors. 1The number of bits of the fibre in the pit is called 'palya' . Now, these small bits of the fibre are to be taken out one by one; one piece in one hundred years. The time taken for emptying the pit in this manner is the time (kāla) of vyavahāra palyopama. Each bit of the fibre is again cut into so many pieces as there are instants in innumerable crores of years. And (imagine that) with such bits the second pit is filled tightly. The number of bits of the fibre is the uddhāra palya. Then these bits are taken out one by one every instant. The time taken for emptying the pit in this manner is called uddhāra palyopama. Ten crore multiplied by one crore uddhāra palya make up one uddhāra sāgaropama. The continents and oceans are as numerous as the bits in two and a half uddhāra sāgaropama. The third pit is filled with bits got from cutting each bit of uddhāra palya into the number of instants in one hundred years. This is addhāpalya. Then these bits are taken out one by one every instant. The time taken to empty the pit in this manner is called addhā palyopama. Ten crore multiplied by one crore addhā palyopama make one addhā sāgaropama. One descending cycle of time consists of ten crore multiplied by one crore addhā sāgaropama. The ascending cycle is of the same extent. The duration of the karmas, the duration of particular forms, the lifetime, and the duration of the bodies of the beings in the four states must be measured by addhā palya. It has been said thus in the Scripture, "Vyavahāra, uddhāra and addhā must be understood as the three palya. Vyavahāra palya is the basis of enumeration. The enumeration of continents and oceans is by the second. The duration of karmas is reckoned by the third, addhā palya." 1 – The number of bits of fibre in the pit, called 'palya', is mentioned as: 413452630308203177749512192000000000000000000. (see 'Trilokasāra', verse 98) 144 Tattvārthasūtra The lifetimes for subhuman beings are mentioned next. fr;±pksa dh vk;q dh mRÑ"V rFkk t?kU; fLFkfr mruh gh (euq";ksa ftruh) gSA fr;ZX;ksfutkuka p AA39AA The lifetimes of subhuman beings – tiryańca – are the same. 'Tiryagyoni' is the seat-of-birth (yoni) of subhuman beings. It means the birth attained on the rise of name-karma (nāmakarma) of the subhuman (tiryańca) state of existence. Those born in the subhuman (tiryańca) yoni are tiryagyonija. The maximum lifetime of tiryagyonija is three palyopama, and minimum is antarmuhūrta. Between these two extremes, there are many grades. ] ] ] 145 vè;k;&3 AA bfr rÙokFkZlw=kkijukeeks{k'kkÐs r`rh;ks¿è;k;% lekIr% AA The celestial beings – deva – are of four classes (nikāya). THE CELESTIAL BEINGS C H A P T E R 4 nsokÜÓrq£.kdk;k% AA1AA nso pkj lewg okys gSa] vFkkZr~ nsoksa ds pkj fudk; gSa & Hkouoklh] O;Urj] T;ksfr"kh vkSj oSekfudA The word 'deva' – celestial beings – has appeared several times earlier, viz., 'Clairvoyance based on birth – bhavapratyaya avadhijñāna – is possessed by the celestial and the infernal beings.' (see sūtra 1-21). Who are celestial beings and of how many kinds? This is explained now. The celestial beings (deva) get this status on the rise of the namekarma (nāmakarma) – devagati – leading to the celestial state; they roam freely and derive pleasure in several parts of the terrestrial world, the mountains and the oceans surrounding them. They are endowed with magnificence, splendour and extraordinary powers. It is contended that the word 'deva' should have been used in the singular rather than in the plural; 'the celestial being is fourfold' should have been used since a collective noun denoting a class implies the plural. But the use of the plural is intended to indicate that there are different ranks within a particular class of 'deva', such as the lord (indra) and the equals (sāmānika). There are other differences also, based on duration of life, and so on. On the common basis of the rise of karmas leading to the celestial state, the celestial beings are grouped in classes (nikāya), in spite of individual differences. Thus there are 146 Tattvārthasūtra four classes of celestial beings. Who are they? They are the residential (bhavanavāsī), the peripatetic (vyantara), the stellar (jyotiÈka) and the heavenly (vaimānika) deva. The next sūtra is intended to determine their thought-colouration. igys ds rhu fudk;ksa esa ihr rd] vFkkZr~ Ñ".k] uhy] dkiksr vkSj ihr & ;s pkj ys';k,¡ gksrh gSaA vkfnrfÐ"kq ihrkUrys';k% AA2AA The thought-colouration (leśyā) of the first three classes (nikāya) is up to yellow (pīta). Six kinds of thought-colouration (leśyā) have been mentioned (see explanation to sūtra 1-8, p. 18). Among these, the first four are taken by the term 'pītānta' – 'up to the end of yellow'. 'Up to the end of yellow' means those who are characterized by the first four thoughtcomplexions. This is the purport. The first three classes of celestial beings (deva) – the residential (bhavanavāsī), the peripatetic (vyantara) and the stellar (jyotiÈka) – have four thought-colourations (leśyā) – black (kÃÈõa), blue (nīla), grey (kāpota) and yellow (pīta). The subclasses of the four classes (nikāya) are mentioned next. dYiksii (lksygosa dYi rd ds nso) i;ZUr bu pkj izdkj ds nsoksa ds Øe ls nl] vkB] ik¡p vkSj ckjg Hksn gSaA n'kk"ViÛÓ}kn'kfodYik% dYiksiiÂi;ZUrk% AA3AA 147 vè;k;&4 The four classes (nikāya) of deva, up to the kalpavāsī deva, are of ten, eight, five and twelve subclasses. Ten, etc., are taken along with the four classes (nikāya), respectively. The residential (bhavanavāsī) deva are of ten subclasses. The peripatetic (vyantara) deva are of eight subclasses. The stellar (jyotiÈka) deva are of five subclasses. The heavenly (vaimānika) deva are of twelve subclasses. This would imply that all heavenly (vaimānika) deva have twelve subclasses. In order to exclude the heavenly (vaimānika) deva in the nine graiveyaka, etc., the sūtra uses the word 'kalpopapannaparyantāÍ' – 'up to the end of the kalpa'. Now what are the 'kalpa'? Those in which the ten grades like the 'indra' prevail are called the 'kalpa'. Thus, the prevalence of 'indra', etc., forms the basis for the designation 'kalpa'. Though 'indra', etc., are prevalent among the residential (bhavanavāsī) deva too, by convention, 'kalpa' is used for heavenly (vaimānika) deva. Those born in the 'kalpa' are 'kalpopapanna' deva. The next sūtra is intended to convey the detailed particulars. Åij dgs gq, pkj izdkj ds nsoksa esa gj ,d ds nl Hksn gSa & bUnz] lkekfud] =kk; Ð'k] ikfj"kn] vkRej{k] yksdiky] vuhd] izdh.kZd] vkfHk;ksX; vkSj fdfYof"kdA bUaelkekfud=kk; L=k'kikfj"knkRej{kyksdikykuhd& izdh.kZdkfHk;ksX;fdfYof"kdkÜÓSd'k% AA4AA There are ten grades in each of these classes of celestial beings, the lord (indra), the equals (sāmānika), the ministers (trāyastriÉśa), the courtiers (pāriÈada), the 148 Tattvārthasūtra bodyguards (ātmarakÈa), the police (lokapāla), the army (anīka), the citizens (prakīrõaka), the servants (ābhiyogya) and the menials (kilviÈika). The indra are those who are powerful, being endowed with extraordinary occult powers, not possessed by the others. Those who are equal to the indra in respect of duration of life, energy, attendants, enjoyment, etc., but not with regard to authority and splendour, are the sāmānika. They are great ones like fathers, teachers or preceptors. The trāyastriÉśa are like advisors or priests. They are thirty-three, and hence called 'trāyastriÉśa'. The pāriÈada are like friends and companions in the court. The ātmarakÈa are like bodyguards. The lokapāla are like the police who protect people and property. The anīka constitute the army of seven divisions, such as infantry. The prakīrõaka are like the citizens, such as townsfolk and peasants. The ābhiyogya are like servants engaged in serving others in several ways. The kilviÈika are of the lowest rank; those who possess demerit. The general rule would imply that these ten grades exist in all classes (nikāya) of celestial beings. The exceptions are given below. Åij tks nl Hksn dgs gSa mueas ls ;s Hksn & =kk; Ð'k vkSj yksdiky & O;Urj vkSj T;ksfr"kh nsokasa esa ugha gksrs vFkkZr~ muesa bu nks Hksnksa dks NksM+dj ckdh ds vkB Hksn gksrs gSaA =kk; L=k'kyksdikyoT;kZ O;UrjT;ksfr"dk% AA5AA The peripatetic (vyantara) and the stellar (jyotiÈka) deva are without the ministers (trāyastriÉśa) and the police (lokapāla). 149 vè;k;&4 Among the peripatetic and the stellar deva, there are only eight grades leaving out the ministers (trāyastriÉśa) and the police (lokapāla). Now in the four classes, is there one lord (indra) in each class or is there any difference? Hkouoklh vkSj O;Urjksa esa izR;sd Hksn esa nks&nks bUnz gksrs gSaA iwoZ;ks}hZUaek% AA6AA In the first two classes, there are two lords (indra). The first two classes mean the residential (bhavanavāsī) and the peripatetic (vyantara) deva. It is as follows. First, with regard to the residential (bhavanavāsī) deva. Camara and Vairocana are the two lords (indra) of Asurakumāra. Dharaõa and Bhūtānanda are the two lords (indra) of Nāgakumara. HarisiÉha and Harikānta are the two lords (indra) of Vidyutkumāra. Veõudeva and Veõudhārī are the two lords (indra) of Suparõakumāra. Agniśikha and Agnimāõava are the two lords (indra) of Agnikumāra. Vailamba and PrabhaÉjana are the two lords (indra) of Vātakumāra. SughoÈa and MahāghoÈa are the two lords (indra) of Stanitakumāra. Jalakānta and Jalaprabha are the two lords (indra) of Udadhikumāra. Pūrõa and ViśiÈÇa are the two lords (indra) of Dvīpakumāra. Amitagati and Amitavāhana are the two lords (indra) of Dikkumāra. Among the peripatetic (vyantara) deva, Kinnara and KimpuruÈa are the two lords (indra) of Kinnara, SatpuruÈa and MahāpuruÈa of KimpuruÈa, Atikāya and Mahākāya of Mahoraga, Gītarati and Gītayaśa of Gandharva, Pūrõabhadra and Maõibhadra of YakÈa, Bhīma and Mahābhīma of RākÈasa, Pratirūpa and Apratirūpa of Bhūta, and Kāla and Mahākāla of Piśāca. What kind of pleasures do the celestial beings enjoy? 150 Tattvārthasūtra ,s'kku rd ds nso (vFkkZr~ Hkouoklh] O;Urj] T;ksfr"kh vkSj igys rFkk nwljs dYi ds nso) 'kjhj ls dke&lsou djrs gSaaA dk;izohpkjk vk ,s'kkukr~ AA7AA Up to Aiśāna kalpa, the celestial beings, indulge in bodily copulation (pravīcāra). 'Pravīcāra' is copulation (sexual union). 'Kāya' means bodily. The residential (bhavanavāsī) deva, and others, up to those in Aiśāna kalpa enjoy bodily sexual pleasure like human beings, as they are actuated by karmas causing affliction and uneasiness. What is the nature of pleasures of the deva beyond the Aiśāna kalpa? 'ks"k nso] nsfo;ksa ds Li'kZ ls] :i ns[kus ls] 'kCn lquus ls vkSj eu ls dke&lsou djrs gSaA 'ks"kk% Li'kZ:i'kCneu%izohpkjk% AA8AA The others indulge in 'pravīcāra' through touch (sparśa), sight (rūpa), sound (śabda) and thought (mana). Who are the others? Kalpavāsī deva. How are these to be taken? Without contradicting the authority of the Scripture. Why is 'pravīcāra' mentioned again? It is in order to convey what is intended. What is it that does not contradict the Scripture? In Sānatkumāra and Māhendra kalpa the deva as well as the devī (wives, celestial women) derive the highest pleasure by mere touch of the body. The deva of Brahma, Brahmottara, Lāntava and KāpiÈÇha kalpa experience the 151 vè;k;&4 highest pleasure by looking at the charming and lovely forms, merriment, and the beautiful and attractive attire of the devī. In Śukra, Mahāśukra, Śatāra and Sahasrāra kalpa, the deva derive the highest enjoyment by listening to the sweet songs, the gentle laughter, the lovely words and the pleasant sounds of the ornaments of their devī. In Ānata, Prāõata, Āraõa and Acyuta kalpa the deva get the utmost pleasure just by thinking of their devī. What is the nature of pleasures of the rest? lksygosa dYi ls vkxs ds nso dke&lsou jfgr gSaA (muds dkesPNk mRi gh ugha gksrh rks fiQj mlds izfrdkj ls D;k iz;kstu\) ijs¿izohpkjk% AA9AA The rest do not indulge in copulation – they are without pravīcāra. The word 'para' means all the remaining deva or celestial beings. The word 'apravīcāra' indicates much higher kind of happiness. Copulation (pravīcāra) is merely a palliative for pain; it only provides temporary relief. In the absence of pain or uneasiness, the remaining deva enjoy much higher kind of happiness incessantly. What are the ten subclasses of deva of the first class (nikāya)? Hkouokfluks¿lqjukxfo|qRlqi.kkZfXuokrLrfurksnfèk& }hifnDdqekjk% AA10AA Hkouoklh nsoksa ds nl Hksn gSa & vlqjdqekj] ukxdqekj] fo|qr~dqekj] 152 Tattvārthasūtra lqi.kZdqekj] vfXudqekj] okrdqekj] Lrfurdqekj] mnf/dqekj] }hidqekj vkSj fnDdqekjA The subclasses of the residential (bhavanavāsī) deva are Asurakumāra, Nāgakumāra, Vidyutkumāra, Suparõakumāra, Agnikumāra, Vātakumāra, Stanitakumāra, Udadhikumāra, Dvīpakumāra and Dikkumāra. Those who live in mansions are the residential (bhavanavāsī) deva. This is the common name for the first class of celestial beings. Asura, etc., are special names acquired by the fruition of the name-karma (nāmakarma). All these deva are of the same appearance (age) and nature as at birth. Still they appear as youth by their dress, ornaments, weapons, conveyance, animals they ride on, sport, etc. Hence they are designated 'kumāra' by common currency. It is added to every one, as Asurakumāra, and so on. Where are their mansions? The mansions of Asurakumāra are in the pańkabahula part of Ratnaprabhā, the first infernal region. The dwelling places of the other nine subclasses are in the upper and lower strata of kharapÃthivībhāga, leaving out 1,000 yojana above and below. The common and special names of the second class of deva are mentioned in the next sūtra. O;Urjk% fdÂjfdEiq#"kegksjxxUèkoZ;{kjk{klHkwr& fi'kkpk% AA11AA O;Urj nsoksa ds vkB Hksn gaS & fdÂj] fdEiq#"k] egksjx] xU/oZ] ;{k] jk{kl] Hkwr vkSj fi'kkpA 153 vè;k;&4 The peripatetic (vyantara) deva comprise Kinnara, KimpuruÈa, Mahoraga, Gandharva, YakÈa, RākÈasa, Bhūta, and Piśāca subclasses. The common, meaningful designation of these eight subclasses of deva is peripatetic (vyantara), that is, those having habitations in various places. Their eight subclasses must be understood to arise from fruition of special name-karma (nāmakarma). Where are their dwellings? The dwellings of the seven subclasses, except RākÈasa, of peripatetic (vyantara) deva are in the upper hard part – kharapÃthivī – beyond the innumerable islands and oceans. The RākÈasa deva reside in the pańkabahula part of Ratnaprabhā. The general and specific names of the third class are mentioned next. T;ksfr"kh nsoksa ds ik¡p Hksn gSa & lw;Z] pUnzek] xzg] u{k=k vkSj izdh.kZd rkjsA T;ksfr"dk% lw;kZpUaeelkS xzgu{k=kizdh.kZdrkjdkÜÓ AA12AA The stellar (jyotiÈka) deva comprise the sun (sūrya), the moon (candramā), the planets (graha), the constellations (nakÈatra) and the scattered stars (tāre). As these are endowed with light, these five are called by the significant general name of luminary deva (jyotiÈī deva). The sun, etc., are particular names derived from name-karmas (nāmakarma). In order to indicate the importance of the sun and the moon the compound 'sūryācandramasau' has been used specifically. On what account are these two important? These are important on account of their 154 Tattvārthasūtra brilliance, etc. Where are their abodes? The stars which are the lowest among the luminous bodies move at a height of seven hundred and 1ninety yojana from level earth (citrā pÃthivī) . The suns move ten yojana higher. The moons move eighty yojana higher still. Four yojana higher up are the constellations. Four yojana above these are the planets called Budha (Mercury). Three yojana above these are Śukra (Venus). Three yojana above these are BÃhaspati (Jupiter). Three yojana above these are Mańgala (Mars). Three yojana still higher up are Śanīcara (Saturn). The space where these luminary deva (jyotiÈī deva) move is one hundred and ten yojana thick and, transversely (horizontally), it extends to innumerable islands and oceans, up to the humid atmosphere (ghanodadhi). The Scripture mentions: "At the height of seven hundred and ninety yojana above the level earth are the stars. Ten yojana higher up is the sun. Eighty yojana still higher up is the moon. Again, four yojana higher up are the constellations, and four yojana further above is Mercury. Further above, at the interval of three yojana each, are the planets Venus, Jupiter, Mars and Saturn." The movement of the luminary deva (jyotiÈī deva) is described next. 1 – The upper strata (kharabhāga) of the Ratnaprabhā earth (pÃthivī) is 16,000 yojana in depth. The uppermost layer, 1,000 yojana in depth, of kharabhāga is called the citrā pÃthivī. (see 'Tiloyapaõõattī-1', verses 2-9 to 2-14). Above the citrā pÃthivī, in between the trasnali, is the manuÈyaloka, round, with the expanse of 45 lakh yojana. (see 'Tiloyapaõõattī-2', verse 4-2) Åij dgs gq, T;ksfr"kh nso es# ioZr dh iznf{k.kk nsrs gq, euq";yksd esa ges'kk xeu djrs gaSA es#iznf{k.kk fuR;xr;ks ùyksds AA13AA 155 vè;k;&4 The luminary deva (jyotiÈī deva) of the human region (manuÈyaloka, nÃloka), move incessantly round Mount Meru, from left to right – merupradakÈiõā. 'MerupradakÈiõā' means motion round Mount Meru. This phrase is intended to indicate the correct direction of the motion, which is from left to right. 'NityagatayaÍ' is intended to convey incessant motion. 'NÃloka' – the human region – specifies that these are in constant motion within the extent of the human region (see sūtra 3-35), and not outside this limit. Now, there is no cause for the motion of the celestialcars (vimāna) of Stellar deva. These should not move. No. The argument is fallacious. The celestial-cars (vimāna) have incessant motion as these are impelled constantly by the Ābhiyogya subclass of the Stellar deva, who take pleasure in motion. If it be asked why they should enjoy constant motion, the reply is that the fruition of karmas is strange. The fruition of their karmas is in form of constant motion. This is the reason why they constantly engage themselves in motion. Though the Stellar deva revolve constantly round Mount Meru, still they are at a distance of 1,121 yojana from it. That conventional time is related to the motion of the luminary deva is mentioned in the next sūtra. ?kM+h] ?kaVk] fnol] jkr bR;kfn O;ogkjdky dk tks foHkkx gS og xfr'khy T;ksfr"kh nsoksa ds }kjk fd;k tkrk gSA rRdr% dkyfoHkkx% AA14AA The divisions of time are caused by those luminary deva (jyotiÈī deva). 156 Tattvārthasūtra The word 'tad' is intended to indicate the luminary deva (jyotiÈī deva), in motion. Time cannot be measured either by mere motion (gati) or by mere brilliance (jyoti), for time will then be non-perceptible and unchangeable. That is why the sūtra refers to luminary deva (jyotiÈī deva), in motion. Time is of two kinds, conventional time (vyavahāra kāla) and real time (mukhya kāla). Conventional time consists of 'samaya', 'āvali', etc., which are divisions of time as established by the Stellar deva in motion. Conventional time is determined by particular activity and the means of ascertaining what has not been ascertained. Real time is different and it is explained later on. The next sūtra is intended to state that the luminary deva (jyotiÈī deva) outside the human region are fixed. euq";yksd (v<+kbZ }hi) ds ckgj ds T;ksfr"kh nso fLFkj gaSA cfgjofLFkrk% AA15AA The luminary deva (jyotiÈī deva) outside the human region (manuÈyaloka, nÃloka) are stationary. 'Outside' is mentioned. Outside what? Outside the human region. How is it conveyed? 'NÃloke' – the human region – is mentioned in the sūtra under reference. Therefore, the interpretation is 'outside the human region'. Now, it has been indicated that the luminary deva (jyotiÈī deva) have incessant motion in the human region. Does it not imply that they are stationary elsewhere? Does this not make this sūtra unnecessary? It is not so. It has not been established that the luminary deva exist beyond the human region and that they are stationary there. In order to establish both these things, the sūtra is necessary. The sūtra is intended to preclude motion in the opposite direction and also intermittent motion. 157 vè;k;&4 The general name of the fourth class of deva is mentioned next. pkSFks fudk; ds nso oSekfud gSaA oSekfudk% AA16AA The fourth class (nikāya) of deva are called the heavenly deva (vaimānika). The word 'vaimānikaÍ' is intended to indicate a new section or topic. It is for conveying the idea that what is mentioned hereafter relates to the heavenly deva. The abodes of those possessing merit are 'vimāna', and the inhabitants of these abodes are 'vaimanika'. The 'vimāna' are many but fall into three kinds – indraka, śreõībaddha and puÈpaprakīrõaka. The indraka vimāna are in the middle like the lord (indra). The śreõībaddha vimāna are situated in the four directions like the rows of spacepoints. Those, which are scattered like flowers in the intermediate points of the compass, are the puÈpaprakīrõaka vimāna. What are the divisions of vaimānika? oSekfud nsoksa ds nks Hksn gSa & dYiksii vkSj dYikrhrA dYiksiiÂk% dYikrhrkÜÓ AA17AA The heavenly deva (vaimānika) have two divisions, 'kalpopapanna' and 'kalpātīta'. The heavenly deva (vaimānika) have two divisions. Those born in the 158 Tattvārthasūtra 'kalpa' – the sixteen heavens – are called 'kalpopapanna'. Those born beyond the 'kalpa' are called 'kalpātīta'. How are they situated? lksyg dYiksa ds vkB ;qxy] uo xzSos;d] uo vuqfn'k vkSj ik¡p vuqÙkj] ;s lc foeku Øe ls Åij&Åij gSaA mi;qZifj AA18AA The 'kalpa' are one above the other. Why is this mentioned? It is in order to preclude transverse position. These do not have transverse positions like those of the stellar (jyotiÈka) deva. Nor are these in an uneven manner like the habitations of the peripatetic (vyantara) deva. It is described 'one above the other'. What are 'one above the other'? These are the 'kalpa'. If so, in how many celestial-cars (kalpavimāna) do these deva reside? lkS/eZ&,s'kku] lkuRdqekj&ekgsUnz] czã&cãksÙkj] ykUro&dkfi] 'kqØ&egk'kqØ] 'krkj&lgÏkj rFkk vkur&izk.kr] vkj.k&vP;qr] uo xzSos;d foekuksa esa] uo vuqfn'k foekuksa esa vkSj fot;] oSt;Ur] lkSèkeSZ'kkulkuRdqekjekgsUaeczãczãksÙkj& ykUrodkfi'kqØegk'kqØ'krkjlgÏkjs"okur& izk.kr;ksjkj.kkP;qr;ksuZolq xzSos;ds"kq fot;oSt;Urt;Urkijkftrs"kq lokZFkZfl1⁄4kS p AA19AA 159 vè;k;&4 t;Ur] vijkftr rFkk lokZFkZflf1⁄4 bu ik¡p vuqÙkj foekuksa esa oSekfud nso jgrs gSaA The heavenly deva (vaimānika) reside in kalpa called Saudharma, Aiśāna, Sānatkumāra, Māhendra, Brahma, Brahmottara, Lāntava, KāpiÈÇha, Śukra, Mahāśukra, Śatāra, Sahasrāra, in Ānata-Prāõata, Āraõa-Acyuta, in nine graiveyaka, and in Vijaya, Vaijayanta, Jayanta, Aparājita and Sarvārthasiddhi also. How are Saudharma and the rest called kalpa? How are these the names of the lords (indra)? Naturally, or by association. How is it? It is as follows. 'Sudharmā' is the name of the courtroom. That which has this courtroom in it is called Saudharma kalpa, and the lord who is associated with this kalpa is called Saudharma. The lord (indra) has this natural name 'Īśāna'. That which is the habitation of Īśāna is Aiśāna. By association with it the lord also is called Aiśāna. Again, 'Sanatkumāra' is the natural name of the lord (indra). The kalpa got the name Sānatkumāra and, by association with it, the lord also is called Sānatkumāra. 'Mahendra' is the natural name of the lord (indra). The kalpa which is his habitation is Māhendra. By association with it the lord also is called Māhendra. Similarly it must be understood with regard to the rest. The arrangement must be understood in accordance with the Scripture. Due to the phrase 'uparyupari' (see sūtra 4-18), the kalpa must be taken in pairs, and 'one above the other'. The first pair consists of Saudharma and Aiśāna kalpa. Higher up are Sānatkumāra and Māhendra, higher still is Brahma and Brahmottara, and then Lāntava and KāpiÈÇha. Further up are Śukra and Mahāśukra. Then come Śatāra and Sahasrāra, Ānata and Prāõata, and, finally, Āraõa and Acyuta. In two rows at the top and at the bottom, each kalpa must be understood to have one lord (indra) each. In the four rows in the middle there is one lord (indra) for 160 Tattvārthasūtra every row of two kalpa. This is the purport. There are four lords (indra) in the four kalpa of Saudharma, Aiśāna, Sānatkumāra and Māhendra. There is one lord (indra) named Brahma for the two kalpa of Brahma and Brahmottara. Lāntava is the lord (indra) of Lāntava and KāpiÈÇha kalpa. Śukra is the lord (indra) of Śukra and Mahāśukra kalpa. Śatāra is the lord (indra) of Śatāra and Sahasrāra kalpa. There are four lords (indra) for the four kalpa of Ānata, Prāõata, Āraõa and Acyuta. Thus there are twelve lords (indra) of the deva residing in the sixteen kalpa. Mount Meru (or Mahāmandara) of Jambūdvīpa is embedded in the earth to a depth of 1,000 yojana and is 99,000 yojana high. Below it is the lower world (adholoka). That which extends transversely within this range (namely, the height of Mount Meru) is the transverse-world (tiryagloka). Above it is the upper world (ūrdhvaloka). The crest of Mount Meru (Sudarśana Meru) is forty yojana high. And the celestialcar, called ãjuvimāna or ãtuvimāna (the vehicle of Saudharma kalpa), is only one hair's distance from the crest of Mount Meru. Other details must be ascertained from the Scripture. Why is the word 'nava' mentioned separately in the phrase 'navasu graiveyakeÈu'? It indicates that there are other nine vimāna called the anudiśa vimāna. By this the anudiśa must be understood to have been included. It is clear now that the sixteen heavens, called 'kalpopapanna', have only twelve lords (indra). Or, the twelve lords (indra) of the heavenly deva live in sixteen kalpa. The next sūtra describes the differences in the characteristics of the vaimānika deva. fLFkfrizHkkolq[k|qfrys';kfo'kq1⁄4hfUae;kofèk& fo"k;rks¿fèkdk% AA20AA 161 vè;k;&4 fLFkfr (vk;q)] izHkko] lq[k] |qfr] ys';k dh fo'kqf1⁄4] bfUnz;ksa dk fo"k; vkSj vof/Kku dk fo"k; & ;s lc Åij&Åij ds oSekfud nsoksa ds vf/d gaSA There is increase in lifetime (sthiti), influence (prabhāva), happiness (sukha), brilliance (dyuti), purity of thoughtcolouration (leśyāviśuddhi), capacity of the senses (indriyaviÈaya), and range of clairvoyance (avadhiviÈaya) in the deva of higher kalpa. Owing to the fruition of the life-karma (āyuÍkarma) acquired, the soul's association with the body in a particular birth is called the lifetime (āyuÍ). Capacity to inflict pain or confer benefits to others is the influence (prabhāva). Enjoyment of sensuous pleasures is happiness (sukha). The splendour of the body, the dress and the ornaments constitute brilliance (dyuti). The thought-colouration (leśyā) has already been explained (see explanation to sūtra 1-8, p. 18). The purity of thought-colouration is leśyāviśuddhi. The capacity and scope of the senses is indriyaviÈaya and the capacity and scope of the clairvoyance is avadhiviÈaya. The vaimānika deva higher and higher up are superior in regard to all these ascpects. Increase with regard to lifetime (āyuÍ), etc., may extend to movement (gati) etc. The next sūtra is intended to preclude such an interpretation. xfr'kjhjifjxzgkfHkekurks ghuk% AA21AA xfr] 'kjhj] ifjxzg vkSj vfHkeku dh vis{kk ls Åij&Åij ds oSekfud nso ghu&ghu gksrs gSaA 162 Tattvārthasūtra There is decrease with regard to motion (gati), stature (śarīra), attachment (parigraha) and pride (abhimāna). Motion (gati) is the cause of movement from one place to another. The stature (śarīra) means the transformable (vaikriyika) body. Attachment (parigraha) is fondness for worldly things owing to the fruition of greed-passion (lobhakaÈāya). Pride (abhimāna) is haughtiness or self-conceit (ahaÉkāra) owing to the fruition of pride-passion (mānakaÈāya). These are less and less in vaimānika deva of higher and higher kalpa. Due to decrease in fondness for seeking pleasure in different places, there is less movement (gati) of celestial beings in higher kalpa. The stature (śarīra) of Saudharma and Aiśāna deva is seven cubit (aratni or hātha), that of Sānatkumāra and Māhendra deva is six cubit, that of Brahma and Brahmottara, and Lāntava and KāpiÈÇha deva is five cubit, that of Śukra and Mahāśukra, and Śatāra and Sahasrāra deva is four cubit, that of Ānata and Prāõata deva is three and a half cubit, and that of Āraõa and Acyuta deva is three cubit. The stature (śarīra) of the ahamindra in lower graiveyaka is two and a half cubit, and in the middle graiveyaka it is two cubit. The stature (śarīra) of the ahamindra in the upper graiveyaka and in the anudiśa vimāna is one and a half cubit. In the five anuttara vimāna the stature of the ahamindra is one cubit. These are the stature (śarīra) of the deva by own-nature (svabhāva); the stature is transformable (vaikriyika). Higher and higher up, the attachment (parigraha) relating to the size of the celestial-car (vimāna), habitation, dress, retinue, and possessions is less and less. The external possessions shrink as there is increase in merit (puõya) and decrease in infatuation (mūrcchā). Similarly, higher and higher up, pride (abhimāna) also reduces as the intensity of passions decreases. The rule concerning the thought-colouration (leśyā) of the first three classes of deva has been mentioned earlier. Now the rule concerning that of the fourth class is mentioned. 163 vè;k;&4 nks ;qxyksa eas ihr] rhu ;qxyksa esa iÁ vkSj ckdh ds lc foekuksa esa 'kqDy&ys';k gksrh gSA ihriÁ'kqDyys';k f}f=k'ks"ks"kq AA22AA In two, three and the rest (pairs of) kalpa the celestial beings are of yellow (pīta), pink (padma) and white (śukla) thought-colouration (leśyā), in succession. Those with yellow, pink and white thought-colouration (leśyā) are the celestial-beings (deva) with such thought-colouration (leśyā). The deva in Saudharma and Aiśāna kalpa have yellow (pīta) thoughtcolouration (leśyā). The deva in Sānatkumāra and Māhendra kalpa have yellow (pīta) and pink (padma) thought-colouration (leśyā). Those in Brahma and Brahmottara, and Lāntava and KāpiÈÇha kalpa are actuated by pink (padma) thought-colouration (leśyā). The deva in Śukra and Mahaśukra, and Śatāra and Sahasrāra kalpa are actuated by pink (padma) and white (śukla) thought-colouration (leśyā). In further kalpa of Ānata, etc., the deva are of white thought-colouration (leśyā). In anudiśa vimāna and the five anuttara vimāna, the deva have pure-white (paramaśukla) thought-colouration (leśyā). Now, the mixing up of two thought-colourations (leśyā) is not mentioned in the sūtra. Why, then, are these taken together? It is because of association according to worldly usage. How is this interpretation indicated in the sūtra? It is taken as follows. In the first two pairs of kalpa, yellow (pīta) thought-colouration (leśyā) occurs. With regard to Sānatkumāra and Māhendra kalpa pink (padma) thought-colouration (leśyā) is not expressly mentioned but is implied. In the three pairs of kalpa, commencing with Brahmaloka, pink (padma) thought-colouration (leśyā) prevails. With regard to Śukra and Mahaśukra white (śukla) thought-colouration (leśyā) is not explicitly stated. In the other kalpa, from Śatāra onwards, the white (śukla) thought-colouration (leśyā) 164 Tattvārthasūtra prevails, as pink (padma) thought-colouration (leśyā) is not expressly mentioned. Thus there is no fault in the interpretation given. 'Kalpopapanna' has been used earlier. Who are these? xzSos;dkasa ls ifgys ds lksyg Loxks± dks dYi dgrs gSaA muls vkxs ds foeku dYikrhr gSaA izkXxzSos;dsH;% dYik% AA23AA Prior to the graiveyaka are the kalpa. It is not known wherefrom the kalpa commence. Hence Saudharma, etc., are taken over (from sūtra 4-19). It means that Saudharma and the rest, up to graiveyaka, are the kalpa. It also follows that the others are beyond the kalpa – kalpātīta. Where are the 'laukāntika' deva and who comprise these? Are they vaimānika? ftudk fuokl LFkku czãyksd (ik¡poka dYi) gS] mUgsa ykSdkfUrd nso dgrs gSaA czãyksdky;k ykSdkfUrdk% AA24AA Brahmaloka is the abode of the 'laukāntika' deva. 'Ālaya' is dwelling or abode. Those who have the Brahmaloka as their abode are the 'laukāntika' deva. If so, it would include all deva residing there. No. The word is taken in its etymological sense. The word 'loka' in the sūtra denotes the Brahmaloka and 'lokānta' means the end or 165 vè;k;&4 border. Those who are born there, and not all, are called 'laukāntika' deva. The abodes of the 'laukāntika' deva are at the borders of the Brahmaloka. Or else, where birth, old age and death prevails is 'loka', that is, saÉsāra. 'Lokānta' means at the end of it. Those who are at the end of saÉsāra (transmigration) are called 'laukāntika'. All 'laukāntika' deva have come to the end of transmigration. After completing their lifetime as the 'laukāntika' deva, they take one birth as a human being and attain liberation (nirvāõa). The 'laukāntika' deva have been mentioned in general. Their divisions are mentioned next. ykSdkfUrd nsoksa ds vkB Hksn gaS & lkjLor] vkfnR;] ofÉ] v#.k] xnZrks;] rqf"kr] vO;kck/ vkSj vfj"V (;s nso czãyksd dh bZ'kku bR;kfn vkB fn'kkvksa esa jgrs gSaa)A lkjLorkfnR;oÉÔ#.kxnZrks;rqf"krkO;kckèkkfj"VkÜÓ AA25AA The 'laukāntika' deva are (the groups of) Sārasvata, Āditya, Vahni, Aruõa, Gardatoya, TuÈita, Avyābādha and AriÈÇa. Where do these dwell? These eight classes of deva reside in the eight directions of north-east, etc., respectively. The abode (vimāna) of Sārasvata group is in the north-east direction, that of Āditya group in the east, that of Vahni group in the east-south, that of Aruõa group in the south, that of Gardatoya group in the south-west, that of TuÈita group in the west, that of Avyābādha group in the north-west, and that of AriÈÇa group in the north. The particle 'ca' is intended to include two groups of deva between each pair of those enumerated. It is as follows. Between Sārasvata and Āditya are Agnyābha and Suryābha. Between Āditya and Vahni are Candrābha and Satyābha. Between Vahni and 166 Tattvārthasūtra Aruõa are Śreyaskara and KÈemańkara. Between Aruõa and Gardatoya are VÃÈabheÈÇa and Kāmacāra. Between Gardatoya and TuÈita are Nirmāõarajas and DigantarakÈita. Between TuÈita and Avyābādha are ĀtmarakÈita and SarvarakÈita. Between Avyābādha and AriÈÇa are Marut and Vasu. Between AriÈÇa and Sārasvata are Aśva and Viśva. All these are independent as there is no inequality among them. Being devoid of longing for sensual pleasures, they are celestial-sages (devaÃÈi). They are worthy of veneration by the other deva. They are well-versed in the Scripture comprising fourteen pūrva. They descend from the heaven for commending the resolve of the Tīrthańkara when he adopts renunciation. It has been said that the 'laukāntika' deva take one birth as a human being and attain liberation (nirvāõa). Is there any such rule relating to the liberation of the other deva? fot;] oSt;Ur] t;Ur] vijkftr vkSj vuqfn'k foekuksa ds vgfeUae f}pjek gksrs gSa vFkkZr~ euq"; ds nks tUe (Hko) /kj.k djds vo'; gh eks{k tkrs gSa (;s lHkh tho lE;Xn`f"V gh gksrs gSa)A fot;kfn"kq f}pjek% AA26AA In Vijaya, and the others, the deva are of two final births. Here 'ādi' means 'of that sort'. By this Vijaya, Vaijayanta, Jayanta, Aparājita and the nine anudiśa are included. What is meant by 'of that sort'? They are supreme lords – ahamindra – and are born with right belief (samyaktva). It is argued that Sarvārthasiddhi also is included here. No. They are of still superior excellence. And from the etymological meaning of the word, they are of one birth, that is, take human birth only once. Those who take two human births are called 'dvicarama'. They come down from Vijaya, etc., and are born as men 167 vè;k;&4 without any fall in their right belief (samyaktva). They practise restraint (saÉyama) as saints and are born again in Vijaya, etc. Finally, they are born as men and attain liberation (nirvāõa). Hence they are described as of two births. It is possible that a particular deva from Vijaya, etc., is born as a man, is reborn as a deva in Saudharma, etc., born again as a man, is reborn as a deva in Vijaya, etc., and born again as a man to attains liberation (nirvāõa). In such a case, though three births as a man are involved, but from Vijaya, etc. the soul takes only two births as a man, before attaining liberation. While describing dispositions (bhāva) consequent on the fruition of karmas, the subhuman existence (tiryańcagati) has been mentioned (sūtra 2-6). Again, while describing the duration of life, the subhuman (tiryańca) state of existence has been mentioned (sūtra 3-39). Who are the subhumans (tiryańca)? miikn tUe okys (nso rFkk ukjdh) vkSj euq";ksa ds vfrfjDr ckdh lc tho fr;Z×p ;ksfu okys gSaaA vkSiikfndeuq";sH;% 'ks"kkfLr;ZX;ksu;% AA27AA Except those born in special beds – aupapādika – and humans, all other beings have subhuman seat-of-birth – tiryańcayoni. It has been said earlier (sūtra 2-31) that celestial beings and infernal beings are born in special-beds; they are 'aupapādika'. Human beings have been described while it was mentioned that human beings are only up to the mountain range of MānuÈottara (sūtra 3-35). All the rest of the transmigrating souls are subhumans (tiryańca). Just as has 168 Tattvārthasūtra been done in case of celestial beings and others, the abode of subhumans (tiryańca) must also be mentioned. These are spread throughout the universe; hence their region need not be mentioned. The lifetimes of the infernal, human, and subhuman beings have been described. Those of the deva have not been described. The lifetimes of the deva, starting with the residential (bhavanavāsī) deva, are described now. Hkouoklh nsoksa esa vlqjdqekj] ukxdqekj] lqi.kZdqekj] }hidqekj vkSj ckdh ds dqekjksa dh vk;q Øe ls ,d lkxjksie] rhu iY;ksie] v<+kbZ iY;ksie] nks iY;ksie vkSj Ms<+ iY;ksie gSA fLFkfrjlqjukxlqi.kZ}hi'ks"kk.kka lkxjksief=kiY;ksiek1⁄4Zghuferk% AA28AA The lifetime of Asurakumāra, Nāgakumāra, Suparõakumāra, Dvīpakumāra and and the rest of the residential (bhavanavāsī) deva, is one sāgaropama, three palyopama, two and a half palyopama, two palyopama, and one and a half palyopama, respectively. Asurakumāra and the others are taken respectively with sāgaropama, and the rest. This is the maximum lifetime. The minimum is mentioned later. The maximum is as follows. The lifetime of Asurakumāra is one sāgaropama, that of Nāgakumāra three palyopama, that of Suparõakumāra two and a half palyopama, that of Dvīpakumāra two palyopama, and that of the other six subclasses of residential (bhavanavāsī) deva one and a half palyopama. The lifetime of the peripatetic (vyantara) and the stellar (jyotiÈka) 169 vè;k;&4 deva should be described next in regular order. But that of the heavenly (vaimānika) deva is described next. Why? So that the lifetime of the peripatetic (vyantara) and the stellar (jyotiÈka) deva can be mentioned briefly, later on. Lifetime in the first two kalpa among the heavenly (vaimānika) deva is now mentioned. lkS/eZ vkSj ,s'kku dYi ds nsoksa dh mRÑ"V vk;q nks lkxjksie ls dqN vf/d gSA lkSèkeSZ'kku;ks% lkxjksies¿fèkds AA29AA In Saudharma and Aiśāna kalpa the maximum lifetime is a little over two sāgaropama. In the sūtra, sāgaropama is dual. Hence the meaning is two sāgaropama. 'Adhike' denotes 'a little over'. Up to what does 'adhike' apply? Up to Sahasrāra kalpa. How is this ascertained? From the particle 'tu', in the later sūtra (4-31). It follows that the lifetime of deva in Saudharma and Aiśāna kalpa is a little over two sāgaropama. The lifetime in the next two kalpa is described now. lkuRdqekj vkSj ekgsUnz dYi ds nsoksa dh mRÑ"V vk;q lkr lkxjksie ls dqN vf/d gSA lkuRdqekjekgsUae;ks% lIr AA30AA In Sānatkumāra and Māhendra kalpa it is a little over seven sāgaropama. 170 Tattvārthasūtra The maximum lifetime of deva in Sānatkumāra and Māhendra kalpa is a little over seven sāgaropama. The lifetimes of deva from Brahmaloka to Acyuta kalpa are indicated next. iwoZ lw=k esa dgs gq, ;qxy dh lkr lkxjksie dh mRÑ"V vk;q ls ØeiwoZd rhu] lkr] ukS] X;kjg] rsjg vkSj iUnzg lkxjksie ls vf/d vk;q mlds ckn ds czã&cãksÙkj vkfn dYiksa esa gSA f=klIruoSdkn'k=k;ksn'kiÛÓn'kfHkjfèkdkfu rq AA31AA From Brahma-Brahmottara to Lāntava-KāpiÈÇha sets of kalpa the maximum lifetime of deva is more by three, seven, nine, eleven, thirteen and fifteen sāgaropama. From the previous sūtra, 'seven' is taken. It is added to three, etc. Three added to seven, seven added to seven, and so on. Similarly, these must be taken with sets of two kalpa. The word 'tu' is intended to indicate particularity. What particularity does it indicate? 'A little over' supplied from the previous sūtra (4-29) is taken only with the first four sets and not the last two. It is as follows. The lifetime of deva in Brahma-Brahmottara is a little over ten sāgaropama, in LāntavaKāpiÈÇha a little over fourteen sāgaropama, in Śukra-Mahaśukra a little over sixteen sagaropama, in Śatāra-Sahasrāra a little over eighteen sāgaropama, in Ānata-Prāõata twenty sāgaropama, and in Āraõa-Acyuta twenty-two sāgaropama. The lifetimes of the rest are mentioned next. 171 vè;k;&4 vkj.k vkSj vP;qr dYiksa ls Åij ds uo xzSos;dksa esa] uo vuqfn'kksa eas] vkSj pkj fot;kfnd esa nsoksa dh mRÑ"V vk;q ,d&,d lkxjksie vf/d gSA rFkk lokZFkZflf1⁄4 eas rSarhl lkxjksie gh fLFkfr gSA vkj.kkP;qrknwèoZesdSdsu uolq xzSos;ds"kq fot;kfn"kq lokZFkZfl1⁄4kS p AA32AA Above Āraõa-Acyuta, in each of the nine graiveyaka, in nine anudiśa, in four Vijaya, etc., the maximum lifetime of deva is more and more by one sāgaropama. In Sarvārthasiddhi, it is thirty-three sāgaropama only. 'More' is supplied. It must be taken thus: 'more by one and one'. Why is nine mentioned? It is in order to indicate that in each graiveyaka the lifetime is more by one sāgaropama. Otherwise, the increase in all nine graiveyaka would be only one. The word 'ādi' with 'Vijaya' denotes kinds. By this the anudiśa are included. Sarvārthasiddhi is mentioned separately as here there is no minimum. This is the purport. In the lower graiveyaka, the maximum lifetime is twentythree sāgaropama in the first, twenty-four sāgaropama in the second, and twenty-five sāgaropama in the third. In the middle graiveyaka, the maximum lifetime is twenty-six sāgaropama in the first, twentyseven sāgaropama in the second and twenty-eight sāgaropama in the third. In the upper graiveyaka, the maximum lifetime is twenty-nine sāgaropama in the first, thirty sāgaropama in the second and thirtyone sāgaropama in the third. In the nine anudiśa vimāna, the maximum lifetime is thirty-two sāgaropama. In Vijaya and the others, the maximum lifetime is thirty-three sāgaropama. In Sarvārthasiddhi it is fixed at thirty-three sāgaropama, with no minimum lifetime. The minimum lifetime is mentioned next. 172 Tattvārthasūtra lkS/eZ vkSj ,s'kku dYi eas t?kU; fLFkfr ,d iY;ksie ls dqN vf/d gSA vijk iY;ksieefèkde~ AA33AA In Saudharma and Aiśāna kalpa, the minimum lifetime is a little over one palyopama. Palyopama has already been explained (see sūtra 3-38). The word 'aparā' means the minimum. Whose minimum lifetime is this? Of the deva in Saudharma and Aiśāna kalpa. How is it implied? It is implied since the next sūtra provides the minimum lifetime of the other deva. The minimum lifetime of the rest is mentioned next. tks iwoZ&iwoZ ds ;qxyksa dh mRÑ"V fLFkfr gS og vuUrj&vuUrj ds ;qxyksa dh t?kU; fLFkfr gksrh gSA ijr% ijr% iwokZiwokZ¿uUrjk% AA34AA The maximum lifetime in the immediately preceding kalpa is the minimum lifetime in the next kalpa. It is like this. The maximum lifetime in Saudharma and Aiśāna kalpa is a little over two sāgaropama. That plus one 'samaya' is the minimum lifetime in Sānatkumāra and Māhendra kalpa. The maximum lifetime in Sānatkumāra and Māhendra kalpa is a little over seven sāgaropama. That plus one 'samaya' is the minimum in Brahma and Brahmottara kalpa. Similarly with regard to the rest. The maximum lifetime of the infernal beings has been described (see 173 vè;k;&4 sūtra 3-6). The minimum has not been mentioned. Though it is out of context here, still it is described in brief. mlh izdkj ls nwljs bR;kfn ujd ds ukjfd;ksa dh iwoZ&iwoZ dh mRÑ"V fLFkfr gh vuUrj&vuUrj ds ukjfd;ksa dh t?kU; fLFkfr gSA ukjdk.kka p f}rh;kfn"kq AA35AA The same applies to infernal beings from the second infernal region onwards. What for is 'ca' used? It is for taking over the rule just mentioned. What is it? The maximum of the immediately preceding is the minimum of the next one. From this the following meaning is inferred. The maximum lifetime of the infernal beings in the first earth Ratnaprabhā is one sāgaropama. That is the minimum in the second earth Śarkarāprabhā. The maximum lifetime of infernal beings in the second earth is three sāgaropama. And that is the minimum in the third, namely, Vālukāprabhā, and so on. Thus the minimum lifetime from the second earth onwards in the infernal region has been mentioned. What is the minimum in the first? igys ujd ds ukjfd;ksa dh t?kU; fLFkfr nl gtkj o"kZ dh gSA n'ko"kZlgÏkf.k izFkek;ke~ AA36AA The minimum lifetime in the first earth is ten thousand years. 'The minimum lifetime' is supplied. The minimum lifetime in the first 174 Tattvārthasūtra earth Ratnaprabhā is ten thousand years. What is the minimum lifetime of the residential (bhavanavāsī) deva? Hkouoklh nsoksa dh t?kU; fLFkfr nl gtkj o"kZ dh gSA Hkous"kq p AA37AA The residential (bhavanavāsī) deva also have the minimum lifetime of ten thousand years. What does 'ca' signify? It is intended to include the present subject. Therefore, it follows that the minimum lifetime of the residential (bhavanavāsī) deva also is ten thousand years. If so, what is the minimum lifetime of the peripatetic (vyantara) deva? O;Urj nsoksa dh Hkh t?kU; fLFkfr nl gtkj o"kZ dh gSA O;Urjk.kka p AA38AA The peripatetic (vyantara) deva too have the minimum lifetime of ten thousand years. The word 'ca' is intended to include the subject under consideration. Therefore, it is understood that the minimum lifetime of the peripatetic (vyantara) deva also is ten thousand years. What is the maximum lifetime of the peripatetic (vyantara) deva? 175 vè;k;&4 O;Urj nsoksa dh mRÑ"V fLFkfr ,d iY;ksie ls dqN vf/d gSA ijk iY;ksieefèkde~ AA39AA The maximum lifetime of the peripatetic (vyantara) deva is a little over one palyopama. The word 'parā' indicates 'maximum'. Thus the maximum lifetime of the peripatetic (vyantara) deva is a little over one palyopama. Now the maximum lifetime of the stellar (jyotiÈka) deva is mentioned. T;ksfr"kh nsoksa dh Hkh mRÑ"V fLFkfr ,d iY;ksie ls dqN vf/d gSA T;ksfr"dk.kka p AA40AA The maximum lifetime of the stellar (jyotiÈka) deva is a little over one palyopama. 'Ca' is intended to supply what has been mentioned above. So it is to be taken in this manner. The maximum lifetime of the stellar (jyotiÈka) deva is a little over one palyopama. What is their minimum lifetime? T;ksfr"kh nsoksa dh t?kU; fLFkfr mRÑ"V fLFkfr dk vkBok¡ Hkkx gSA rn"VHkkxks¿ijk AA41AA The minimum lifetime of the stellar (jyotiÈka) deva is one-eighth of their maximum lifetime. 176 Tattvārthasūtra One-eighth of a palyopama is the minimum lifetime of the stellar (jyotiÈka) deva. Now special mention has been made of the 'laukāntika' deva. But their lifetime has not been particularized. How much is it? leLr ykSdkfUrd nsoksa dh mRÑ"V rFkk t?kU; fLFkfr vkB lkxjksie gSA ykSdkfUrdkuke"VkS lkxjksiekf.k losZ"kke~ AA42AA The lifetime of all 'laukāntika' deva is eight sāgaropama. All 'laukāntika' deva have lifetime of eight sāgaropama, and are of white (śukla) thought-colouration. Their stature is five cubit (hātha). ] ] ] 177 vè;k;&4 AA bfr rÙokFkZlw=kkijukeeks{k'kkÐs prqFkksZ¿è;k;% lekIr% AA The non-soul substances (bodies) – ajīvakāya – are the medium of motion (dharma), the medium of rest (adharma), the space (ākāśa) and the matter (pudgala). THE NON-LIVING SUBSTANCES C H A P T E R 5 vthodk;k èkekZèkekZdk'kiqñxyk% AA1AA 1/ekZ/ekZdk'kiqñxyk%o /eZ nzO;] v/eZ nzO;] vkdk'k vkSj iqñxy ;s pkj 1vthodk;k%o vtho rFkk ^dk;* & cgq izns'kh & gaSA The soul (jīva) and the non-soul (ajīva), etc., have been mentioned as the substances of right faith (samyagdarśana); the soul (jīva) has been explained. Now, we have to investigate the substance of non-soul (ajīva). The names and the categories of the non-soul (ajīva) are now mentioned. The term 'kāya' is derived from 'body'. It is applied to these substances on the basis of analogy. These non-soul substances are called 'bodies' on the analogy of the body of a living being. Analogy is in what respect? Just as the body is a conglomeration of matter, so also there is manifoldness of space-points in the medium of motion, etc. Hence these substances also are termed 'kāya' or 'body'. The word 'non-soul' applies to time (kāla) also which does not have multitude of space-points. Time (kāla) is described later. To indicate that time (kāla) does not have multitude of space-points though it is a non-soul substance, it is not termed a 'kāya' or 'body'. Time (kāla) is of the extent of one atom (the smallest indivisible unit) and it pervades one space-point only. Therefore, it has no second space-point. Hence 178 Tattvārthasūtra the atom and the time (kāla) are said to have no space-points. The above mentioned substances are called by the general name of the non-soul (ajīva), as the characteristic mark (lakÈaõa) of the soul (jīva) is absent in these. The particular names dharma, adharma, ākāśa and pudgala are Jaina terminology. The term 'substances' (dravya) has appeared in some previous sūtra (e.g., sūtra 1-29). What are the substances (dravya)? ;s & /eZ] v/eZ] vkdk'k vkSj iqñxy & 1aeO;kf.ko nzO; gSaaA aeO;kf.k AA2AA These – dharma, adharma, ākāśa and pudgala – are substances (dravya). Those, which are attained by their own modes (paryāya) or which attain modes (paryāya), are substances (dravya). It may be contended that substance (dravya) is that which possesses 'substancenesss' (dravyatva) and that only should define the substance. No. This way both of these – dravya and dravyatva – cannot be established. The association of the stick (daõça) and the man (possessor of the stick – (daõçī) takes place but they exist separately. The substance (dravya) and 'substancenesss' (dravyatva) do not exist separately in that manner. If there can be union of two things which do not exist separately, then there would be union of the non-existent-sky-flower (ākāśapuÈpa) and the sky (ākāśa), and of the normal person and the second head. If separate existence is admitted, then the invention of the 'substanceness' is useless. Some contend that the assemblage (samudāya) of qualities (guõa) is a substance (dravya). Even here, if there be no distinction between the qualities and the assemblage of qualities, the name substance (dravya) is not justified. If distinction be 179 vè;k;&5 admitted, it is open to the same defects as pointed out in reference to substance (dravya) and 'substancenesss' (dravyatva). But do the same defects not apply to the definition given, 'that which attains attributes or is attained by attributes – undergoes modifications – is a substance'? No. For both, distinction (bheda) and non-distinction (abheda), are admitted between the substance (dravya) and the quality (guõa), depending on the point of view. Hence the name 'substance' (dravya) is justified. Neither the substance (dravya) nor the quality (guõa) exists without the other; there is, thus, nondistinction (abheda) between these. But the two have distinction (bheda) from the point of view of name (samjñā), mark (lakÈaõa), purpose (prayojana), etc. The name substance (dravya) will apply only to the four mentioned in the first sūtra. Hence the next sūtra is intended to include the other two. 1thok%o tho 1po Hkh nzO; gSA thokÜÓ AA3AA The souls (jīva) also are substances (dravya). The word 'jīva' – soul – has been explained already. The plural is used to indicate the different classes of souls (souls at different stages of development). The particle 'ca' is intended to supply the word 'dravya' – substances – from the previous sūtra. That is, the souls also are substances. Thus these five, along with the time (kāla), which is mentioned later, constitute the six substances (dravya). Now the definition of substance is given later (see sūtra 5-38) as: 'that which has qualities and modes is a substance'. From this definition it follows that the medium of motion (dharma) and the medium of rest (adharma), etc., are substances. Then what is the need here to 180 Tattvārthasūtra enumerate these as substances (dravya)? The enumeration is for accurate determination. This excludes the earth (pÃthivī), etc., accepted as substances (dravya) in other systems. The earth (pÃthivī), the water (jala), the fire (agni), the air (vāyu) and the mind (mana) are included under the matter (pudgala) since these are characterized by colour (rūpa), taste (rasa), smell (gandha) and touch (sparśa). It may be argued that the air (vāyu) and the mind (mana) are not characterized by colour (rūpa), etc. No. The air (vāyu) is characterized by colour (rūpa), etc., as it possesses touch (sparśa), like the pitcher (ghaÇa). It may now be contended that colour, taste and smell are absent in the air (vāyu) because these are not perceived by the senses like the sight (cakÈu). But this argument would lead to the negation of the atom (paramāõu), etc., as these also are not perceived by the senses. In the same way, the water (jala) is characterized by smell (gandha) as it possesses touch (sparśa), like the earth. The fire (agni) is characterized by taste (sparśa) and smell (gandha), as it possesses colour (rūpa) like the earth. Now the mind (mana) is of two kinds, the physical mind – dravyamana – and the psychical mind – bhāvamana. The psychical mind – bhāvamana – is knowledge, an attribute of the soul. So it comes under the soul. As the physical mind – dravyamana – is characterized by colour (rūpa), etc., it is a mode (paryāya) of the matter (pudgala). The physical mind – dravyamana – is characterized by colour (rūpa), etc., for it is the cause or instrument of knowledge, like the sense of sight (cakÈu). Now, it is contended that sound (śabda) which is non-material is also the cause of knowledge. So the reason advanced for establishing the physical mind – dravyamana – as possessing colour (rūpa), etc., is fallacious. But this is not true. Sound (śabda) is material, for it is of the nature of matter. Again, it is contended that we perceive effects resulting in establishing atoms (paramāõu) as having colour, etc., but the same effects are not perceived in case of the air and the mind. No. Such effects, establishing these as having colour, etc., exist in case of the air and the mind too for all atoms have the capacity to produce effects that manifest in colour, taste, smell, etc. There are no separate classes of atoms of earth, water, 181 vè;k;&5 fire or air. The activity proceeds with the intermixture or blending of classes. In the same way, direction is included in the space. The convention of the east, the west, etc., – 'the sun rises in the east' – is based on the series or rows of points in the space. The special characteristics of substances are described next. Åij dgs x;s nzO;ksa esa ls pkj nzO; 1v:ikf.ko :i jfgr] 1fuR;kofLFkrkfuo fuR; vkSj vofLFkr gSaA fuR;kofLFkrkU;:ikf.k AA4AA The substances (dravya) are eternal (nitya), fixed-innumber (avasthita) and colourless (arūpī). 'Nitya' means eternal. From the point of view of modes (paryāya) – paryāyārthika naya – these substances do not ever lose their special (viśeÈa) marks (lakÈaõa), such as assistance in motion (gatihetutva) for the medium of motion (dharma), and from the point of view of substance (dravya) – dravyārthika naya – these substances do not ever lose their common (sāmānya) marks (lakÈaõa), such as existence (astitva). Hence these substance (dravya) are indestructible and eternal (nitya). This is further highlighted in sūtra 5-31, 'tadbhāvāvyayam nityam' – permanence is indestructibility of the essential nature (quality) of the substance. Since the fixed number is never violated, the substances are fixed-in-number (avasthita). These do not at any time transgress the number six. These are colourless (arūpī) as these do not possess colour (form). By negation of colour, the accompanying attributes of taste, smell and touch also are negatived. Hence these are colourless (arūpī), that is, non-material. As the common marks of eternity (nitya) and fixity in number (avasthita) pertain to all substances, colourlessness or non182 Tattvārthasūtra materiality – arūpī – would also apply to the matter (pudgala). Hence the exception is mentioned. 1iqñxyk%o iqñxy nzO; 1:fi.k%o :ih vFkkZr~ ew£rd gSaaA :fi.k% iqñxyk% AA5AA Things which have form – rūpī – constitute the matter (pudgala). 'Rūpa' means form. What is form? The effect of the aggregation of colour, shape, etc., is form. Things which have form are called 'rūpī'. Or, 'rupa' is a word denoting a specific quality. And things which possess this quality are material – 'rūpī'. It does not however mean that taste, smell, etc., are excluded as colour is inseparably connected with these. The plural 'pudgalaÍ' is used in order to indicate different forms of the matter, such as the atoms and the molecules. These different forms of the matter are described later. If it be contended that the matter is formless and of elemental nature (as in the SāÉkhya philosophy), it would contradict the manifold effects that are seen in the world. Do other substances, like the medium of motion (dharma), have divisions like the matter (pudgala)? 1vk vkdk'kkr~o vkdk'k i;ZUr 1,daeO;kf.ko ,d&,d nzO; gSa vFkkZr~ /eZ nzO;] v/eZ nzO; vkSj vkdk'k nzO; ,d&,d gSaaA vk vkdk'kknsdaeO;kf.k AA6AA 183 vè;k;&5 Up to the space (ākāśa), each substance (dravya) is an indivisible whole (i.e., single continuum). The substances must be taken in the order in which these are mentioned in sūtra 5-1. Hence the medium of motion (dharma), the medium of rest (adharma) and the space (ākāśa) are taken. The word 'eka' denotes number, and it qualifies the word 'dravya'. The word 'dravya' (substance) is included in the sūtra in order to specify that oneness (single continuum) is with regard to substance (dravya) only and not in regard to place (kÈetra), time (kāla), and nature or condition (bhāva). In regard to place (kÈetra), the medium of motion (dharma) and the medium of rest (adharma) are seen to be innumerable-fold (asaÉkhyāta). In regard to place (kÈetra) and nature or condition (bhāva), the space (ākāśa) is seen to be infinite-fold (ananta). Still, the medium of motion (dharma) or the medium of rest (adharma) or the space (ākāśa), each, is one in regard to substance (dravya); not many, as the souls (jīva) and the matter (pudgala) are. The other peculiarity of these substances is now mentioned. 1po vkSj fiQj ;g /eZ nzO;] v/eZ nzO; vkSj vkdk'k nzO; 1fuf"Ø;kf.ko fØ;k jfgr gSa vFkkZr~ ;s ,d LFkku ls nwljs LFkku dks izkIr ugha gksrsA fuf"Ø;kf.k p AA7AA These three [the medium of motion (dharma), the medium of rest (adharma) and the space (ākāśa)] are also without-movement (niÈkriya). 184 Tattvārthasūtra Arising from internal and external causes, the mode (paryāya) of a substance (dravya) which is the cause of its movement from one place to another, is called activity (kriyā). The substances devoid of such activity (kriyā) are called 'niÈkriya'. The medium of motion (dharma), etc., are without such activity (movement). If so, there can be no origination (utpāda) in these as things like the pitcher are seen to originate only as a result of activity. And, without origination (utpāda), there can be no destruction (vyaya). In such a case, the definition that the substance is characterized by origination (utpāda), destruction (vyaya) and permanence (dhrauvya) stands invalidated. No, it is not so. What is the reason? The presence of these can be established otherwise than by activity (movement). Though there is no origination (utpāda), etc., by activity in case of the medium of motion (dharma) and the other two, it can be shown that these take place. It is as under. Origination (utpāda) is of two kinds, by internal cause – svanimittaka utpāda – and by external cause – parapratyaya utpāda. Origination by internal cause is described thus. By the authority of the Scripture, infinite attributes – 'agurulaghuguõa' – which maintain individuality of substances, are admitted. These undergo six different steps of infinitesimal changes of rhythmic rise and fall (increase and decrease), called 'ÈaÇguõahānivÃddhi'. Origination (utpāda) and destruction (vyaya) are established by this internal cause. External cause also produces origination (utpāda) and destruction (vyaya). The medium of motion (dharma), the medium of rest (adharma) and the space (ākāśa) are the causes of motion (gati), rest (sthiti) and accommodation (avagāhana) of horses and others. Since the states of motion (gati), rest (sthiti) and accommodation (avagāhana) change from instant to instant, the causes, i.e., the medium of motion (dharma), the medium of rest (adharma) and the space (ākāśa), must also change. This way, origination (utpāda), etc., by external cause – parapratyaya utpāda – are attributed to these three substances (dravya). It is contended that if the medium of motion and the other two are without activity (movement), these cannot be the cause of motion, rest and accommodation of living 185 vè;k;&5 beings and forms of matter; it is seen that only substances with activity, such as the water, are the cause of the motion and rest of fish and other objects. There is no contradiction. These substances (dravya) simply render help to the living beings and the forms of matter in their motion, rest, etc., just as the eyes. For instance, the eyes help in the sight of colour, but are powerless in case of a person whose mind is utterly distracted; he fails to see colour in spite of having eyes. Similarly, though 'niÈkriya' – without activity – themselves, these substances – the medium of motion (dharma), the medium of rest (adharma) and the space (ākāśa) – are instrumental causes of activity. As inactivity is admitted in case of these substances, it follows that the souls (jīvadravya) and the forms of matter (pudgaladravya) are characterized by activity (movement). Is the substance of time (kāladravya) with activity? No, activity cannot refer to the substance of time (kāladravya); it is not the subject under reference. It is for this reason that the substance of time (kāladravya) is not included here. The term 'kāya' in sūtra 5-1 indicates the existence of space-points (pradeśa) for these substances. But the extent of space-points is not determined. The extent of space-points is described next. 1/ekZ/eZSdthokuke~o /eZ nzO;] v/eZ nzO; vkSj ,d tho nzO; ds 1vla[;s;k%o vla[;kr 1izns'kko izns'k gSaaA vla[;s;k% izns'kk èkekZèkeZSdthokuke~ AA8AA There are innumerable (asaÉkhyāta) space-points (pradeśa) in the medium of motion (dharma), the medium of rest (adharma) and in each individual soul (jīva). 186 Tattvārthasūtra That which is uncountable is innumerable (asaÉkhyāta). Innumerable is of three kinds, the minimum, the maximum, and that which is neither the minimum nor the maximum (i.e., midway between the two). Here the third variety of innumerable is implied. A space-point (pradeśa) is said to be the space occupied by an indivisible elementary particle (paramāõu). The medium of motion (dharma), the medium of rest (adharma) and each individual soul (jīva) have the same innumerable (asaÉkhyāta) space-points (pradeśa). The media of motion and of rest are 'niÈkriya' – without activity – and co-extensive with the universe (loka). Though the soul has the same number of space-points as these two, still it is capable of contraction and expansion. So it occupies either a small body or a big one as determined 1by the karmas. But, when, at the time of kevali-samudghāta , the soul expands, filling up the entire universe, the central eight space-points 2of the soul remain at the centre of the citrā pÃthivī below Mount Meru and the remaining space-points spread filling up the entire universe in all directions. The extent of space-points (pradeśa) of the substance of space (ākāśadravya) is mentioned next. 1 – See explanation to sūtra 3-35, p. 140. Kevali-samudghāta – the Omniscient emanates from his body the spatial units of his soul, without wholly discarding the body, for the purpose of levelling down the duration of the other three non-destructivc karmas to that of the age (ayuÍ) karma. 2 – See explanation to sūtra 4-12, p. 155. 1vkdk'kL;o vkdk'k ds 1vuUrk%o vuUr izns'k gSaaA vkdk'kL;kuUrk% AA9AA The substance of space (ākāśadravya) has infinite (ananta) space-points (pradeśa). 187 vè;k;&5 Space pervades both the universe and the non-universe. Infinite means endless. What is infinite? The space-points (pradeśa) of space (ākāśa) are infinite. The idea of space-points is to be understood as already given: 'a space-point (pradeśa) is said to be the space occupied by an indivisible elementary particle (paramāõu)'. The extent of space-points (pradeśa) of non-material (amūrta) substances has been mentioned. Now the space-points of material (mūrta) substance – the matter – must be ascertained. 1iqñxykuke~o iqñxyksa ds 1la[;s;kla[;s;k% po la[;kr] vla[;kr vkSj vuUr izns'k gSaA la[;s;kla[;s;kÜÓ iqñxykuke~ AA10AA The space-points (pradeśa) of the matter (pudgala) are numerable (saÉkhyāta), innumerable (asaÉkhyāta) and infinite (ananta). The particle 'ca' in the sūtra includes infinite (ananta) also. Some molecules of matter have numerable (saÉkhyāta) space-points (pradeśa), some others innumerable (asaÉkhyāta) and yet others infinite (ananta). It is contended that infinite-times-infinite (anantānanta) should be mentioned in the sūtra. It is not required since 'infinte' is used in a general sense. Infinite is of three kinds, parītānanta, yuktānanta and anantānanta. All these are included in 'infinte' when used in a general sense. A contention arises. It is admitted that the universe is of innumerable (asaÉkhyāta) spacepoints. How, then, can the universe accommodate molecules of infinite (ananta) and infinite-times-infinite (anantānanta) space-points? It seems contradictory; the space-points (pradeśa) of the matter (pudgala) cannot be infinite (ananta). No, there is no inconsistency here. The indivisible particles of matter are capable of taking subtle 188 Tattvārthasūtra forms, and in such subtle forms even infinite particles of matter can find accommodation in one space-point of the space (ākāśa). Moreover, the space (ākāśa) has amazing power of accommodation (avagāhana). In the previous sūtra the forms of matter (pudgala) are mentioned in general. Hence the space-points mentioned will apply also to the indivisible atom (paramāõu). The next sūtra is intended to exclude the indivisible particle of matter. 1v.kks%o iqñxy ijek.kq ds 1uo nks bR;kfn izns'k ugha gSa] vFkkZr~ og ,d izns'kh gSA uk.kks% AA11AA There are no space-points (pradeśa) in the indivisible atom (paramāõu). There are no space-points (pradeśa) for the indivisible unit of matter (paramāõu), as it is of the extent of one space-point. One space-point of space is considered without space-points as its splitting or division is not possible. Similarly, the indivisible unit of matter (paramāõu) has one space-point, and there can be no further division of its spatial unit. Further, there is nothing smaller than the indivisible atom (paramāõu). So there can be no division of its space-point. The next sūtra is intended to indicate the location of the medium of motion and so on. yksdkdk'ks¿oxkg% AA12AA 1voxkg%o mijksDr leLr nzO;ksa dk voxkg (LFkku) 1yksdkdk'kso yksdkdk'k esa gSA 189 vè;k;&5 These substances – the media of motion and of rest, the souls, and the forms of matter – are located in the universe-space (lokākāśa). These substances, the medium of motion (dhrama), etc., are located in the universe-space (lokākāśa), and not outside it. If space (ākāśa) is the support of the medium of motion, and so on, what is the support of the space? The reply is that there is no other support for the space; it is supported by self. Now the following contention arises. If another support is postulated for the medium of motion and the other substances, another support must be postulated for the space also. And, it will lead to infinite regress. But it is not so. There is no substance which is more extensive than the space, wherein it can be said to be located. It is infinitefold of all other categories. Hence, from the empirical point of view, the space is said to be the receptacle (support) of the medium of motion, etc. But, from the intrinsically genuine or exact point of view, all substances are situated in themselves. For instance, if someone asked another, 'Where are you?' He replies, 'I am in myself.' The effect of referring to these as the supporter and the supported (the container and the contained) amounts to only this much. The medium of motion and the other substances do not exist outside the space of the universe. It is contended that the idea or state of the container and the contained applies only to things which come into existence one after the other. For instance the plums are in the basin. The space is not prior to the other substances such as the medium of motion in that manner. Hence, even from the empirical point of view, it is not proper to speak of space and the rest as the supporter and the supported. But this is not tenable. The idea of the supporter and the supported applies even to things which come into existence at the same time. For instance, we speak of colour, etc., in the pitcher, and hands, etc., in the body. Now what is the universe (loka)? That is called the universe (loka), wherein the substances such as the media of motion and of rest are 190 Tattvārthasūtra seen to exist. Space is divided into two parts, the universe-space (lokākāśa) and the non-universe-space (alokākāśa). The universe (loka) has been described. Space in the universe is the universe-space (lokākāśa). And beyond it is the infinite non-universe-space (alokākāśa). The distinction between the universe (loka) and the nonuniverse (aloka) should be known by the presence and absence of the media of motion and of rest. In the universe-space (lokākāśa) there is the presence of the media of motion and of rest. Outside this space is the infinite non-universe-space (alokākāśa). If the medium of motion did not exist in the universe-space, there would be no certain cause of movement. And then there would be no distinction of the universe and the non-universe. If the medium of rest did not exist in the universespace, there would be no certain cause of assisting rest. Things will not be stationary, or there will be no distinction of the universe and the non-universe. Therefore, owing to the existence of both, the media of motion and of rest, the distinction of universe and non-universe is established. The extent of their pervasiveness is mentioned next. èkekZèkeZ;ks% dRLus AA13AA 1/ekZ/eZ;ks%o /eZ vkSj v/eZ nzO; dk voxkg 1ÑRLuso (fry essa rsy dh rjg) lexz yksdkdk'k esa gSA The medium of motion (dharma) and the medium of rest (adharma) pervade the entire universe-space (lokākāśa). The word 'kÃtsna' indicates all-pervasiveness. The media of motion and of rest are not situated in the universe like the pitcher in the house. These two pervade the entire universe (without leaving any inter-space), in the manner of the oil in the sesamum seed. And all 191 vè;k;&5 these interpenetrate without any obstruction, as these are possessed of the capacity of accommodation (avagāha śakti). The material objects having form are different from the non-material substances like the medium of motion. These extend from one unit of space to numerable, innumerable and infinite units of space. What is the nature of their accommodation? ,dizns'kkfn"kq HkkT;% iqñxykuke~ AA14AA 1iqñxykuke~o iqñxy nzO; dk voxkg 1,d izns'kkfn"kqo yksdkdk'k ds ,d izns'k vkfn ls ysdj (,d ls la[;kr vkSj vla[;kr izns'k i;ZUr) 1HkkT;%o foHkkx djus ;ksX; gS & tkuus ;ksX; gSA The forms of matter (pudgala) occupy (inhabit) from one space-point (pradeśa) onwards. One elementary particle (paramāõu) occupies one space-point (pradeśa). Two elementary particles, either combined or separate, occupy either one or two space-points (pradeśa). Three elementary particles, either combined or separate, occupy one, two or three spacepoints (pradeśa). In the same way, molecules of numerable (saÉkhyāta), innumerable (asaÉkhyāta) and infinite (ananta) atoms occupy one, numerable (saÉkhyāta) or innumerable (asaÉkhyāta) space-points (pradeśa) of the universe-space (lokākāśa). Now, it stands to reason that the non-material (amūrta) substances such as the media of motion and of rest can be accommodated in the same place at the same time without obstruction. But how can it be possible in case of material (mūrta) objects? It is possible even in case of material (mūrta) objects too as these have the nature of getting accommodated and of getting transformed into subtle forms. As the lights from many 192 Tattvārthasūtra lamps in a room intermingle without causing obstruction to each other, in the same manner, the material (mūrta) objects can get accommodated in the same space at the same time. It should be understood in this manner from the authority of the Scripture also: "The universe is densely (without inter-space) filled with variety of infinite-times-infinite forms of matter (pudgala) of subtle (sūkÈma) and gross (sthūla) nature in all directions." What is the nature of accommodation (avagāha) of souls (jīva) in the space? vla[;s;Hkkxkfn"kq thokuke~ AA15AA 1thokuke~o thoksa dk voxkg 1vla[;s; Hkkxkfn"kqo yksdkdk'k ds vla[;kros Hkkx vkfn esa gSA The souls (jīva) inhabit one of innumerable (asaÉkhyāta) parts, etc., of the universe-space (lokākāśa). The universe-space (lokākāśa) is taken over from sūtra 5-12. The universe-space is divided into innumerable (asaÉkhyāta) parts. Each part is one of innumerable (asaÉkhyāta) parts. This part is the starting point. The souls occupy from a single such part to innumerable (asaÉkhyāta) parts. For instance, one soul inhabits one unit of space. Similarly, one soul can permeate two, three, four units of space up to the extent of the entire universe. But all the souls taken together permeate the entire universe. Now a contention arises. If one soul occupies one unit of space, how can infinite-times-infinite souls with their several bodies find room in the universe-space, which is only of the extent of innumerable (asaÉkhyāta) units of space? It should be understood that the souls dwell in subtle (sūkÈma) and gross (sthūla) 193 vè;k;&5 forms. The gross ones possess bodies which offer obstruction. But even infinite-times-infinite souls in the subtle state (the lowest category of souls with one sense only) along with their subtle bodies dwell even in the space occupied by a single one-sensed nigoda jīva. There is no obstruction among themselves and between them and the gross ones. So there is no contradiction in the statement that infinite-timesinfinite souls reside in the innumerable space-points (pradeśa) of the universe. It has been said that one soul is of the same units of space as the universe. How, then, can a soul reside in one unit of space (the universespace divided into innumerable parts)? Should not each soul permeate the entire universe? izns'klagkjfolikZH;ka iznhior~ AA16AA 1iznhior~o nhi ds izdk'k dh Hkkafr 1izns'k lagkjfolikZH;kao izns'kksa dk ladksp vkSj foLrkj gksus ds dkj.k tho yksdkdk'k ds vla[;krkfnd Hkkxksa eas jgrk gSA The soul (jīva) occupies, like the light of the lamp, from one to innumerable (asaÉkhyāta) parts of the universespace (lokākāśa) due to the contraction and expansion of its space-points (pradeśa). Though the soul is intrinsically non-material (amūrta), still it assumes material (mūrta) form on account of beginningless bondage with karmas. And it dwells in small or big bodies on account of its karmicbody (kārmaõa śarīra). It, thus, has the nature of contraction and expansion, like the light of the lamp. And, therefore, it can dwell in 194 Tattvārthasūtra one, two, etc., of the innumerable parts of the universe-space (lokākāśa). The analogy is that the light of the lamp lit in an open space extends far and wide, but extends only to the extent of the casing or the room in which it is placed. It is contended that the media of motion (dharma) and of rest (adharma) will become one by their commingling with one another because of reciprocal spatial interpenetration. But it is not so. Though there is reciprocal commingling of the substances, these do not give up their intrinsic nature. It has been said in the Scripture: "The six substances (dravya), occupying the same space, though mutually interpenetrate and give accommodation to one another, yet these always maintain their individual identity, not losing their respective qualities, general and special." (see 'Pańcāstikāya', verse 7). If so, let the distinctive nature of these substances (dravya) be mentioned. xfrfLFkR;qixzgkS èkekZèkeZ;ks#idkj% AA17AA 1xfrfLFkR;qixzgkSo Lo;eso xeu rFkk fLFkfr dks izkIr gq, tho vkSj iqñxyksa ds xeu rFkk Bgjus eas tks lgk;d gS lks 1/ekZ/eZ;ks% midkj%o Øe ls /eZ vkSj v/eZ nzO; dk midkj gSA The functions of the medium of motion (dharma) and the medium of rest (adharma) are to assist motion and rest, respectively. That which takes an object from one place to another is 'gati' – motion. The opposite of this is 'sthiti' – rest. What is 'upakāra' – assistance? The sūtra refers to assistance in motion and in rest. The medium of motion (dharma) and the medium of rest (adharma) render assistance 195 vè;k;&5 in form of facilitating motion and rest, respectively. Just as the water facilitates movement of the fish, similarly the medium of motion (dharma) facilitates movement of the souls (jīva) and the forms of matter (pudgala) tending to move. Just as the earth gives support to objects like the horse, similarly the medium of rest (adharma) is the common medium of rest for the souls (jīva) and the forms of matter (pudgala) tending to rest. It is contended that the word 'upagraha' in the sūtra is unnecessary as the word 'upakāra' should be sufficient. But it is not unnecessary, for it is intended to avoid misinterpretation according to the order of the words. Misinterpretation can be that as the words 'dharma' and 'adharma' combine with words 'motion' and 'rest' consecutively, the soul (jīva) and the matter (pudgala) should also get combined in the same manner. The interpretation would then be: 'the medium of motion (dharma) assists the motion of the souls, and the medium of rest (adharma) assists the rest of the matter.' The word 'upagraha' is used to avoid such a misinterpretation. Should the assistance rendered by the medium of motion (dharma) and the medium of rest (adharma) not attributed to the space (ākāśa) which is all-pervasive (sarvagata)? No, the space (ākāśa) has another function; it gives room to all substances including the medium of motion (dharma) and the medium of rest (adharma). If we attribute these several functions to space, then there can be no distinction of the universe (loka) and the non-universe (aloka). Again, it is contended that the functions – rendering assistance in motion and in rest – performed by the medium of motion (dharma) and the medium of rest (adharma) are also performed by the earth (pÃthivī) and the water (jala). What then is the use of the media of motion and of rest? But it is untenable. The earth and the water are special causes and the media of motion and of rest are general causes. Moreover, several causes do produce a single effect. Another question is raised. Since the medium of motion (dharma) and the medium of rest (adharma) are of equal potency, motion and rest will oppose each other and cancel out each other's force. But it is not so 196 Tattvārthasūtra because the media of motion and of rest are not active forces but only passive media. The disputant argues that as these are not seen, like the non-existent horns of a donkey, these do not exist. No. There is no difference of opinion among the learned of all schools of thought on this point; indeed, all men of wisdom admit the existence of objects, both visible and invisible. Further, the reason advanced by the disputant is fallacious as far as we are concerned. All substances, without exception, reflect in the perfect knowledge of the Omniscient. He knows perfectly and directly the non-material substances too. The saints well-versed in the Scripture know these substances from the teachings of the Omniscient. If the existence of the media of motion and of rest, which are beyond the senses, is established from their functions, from what function is the existence of invisible space inferred? vkdk'kL;koxkg% AA18AA 1voxkg%o leLr nzO;ksa dks vodk'k & LFkku & nsuk] ;g 1vkdk'kL;o vkdk'k aeO; dk midkj gSA The function of the space (ākāśa) is to provide accommodation (avagāha). 'Upakāra' – assistance – is supplied from the previous sūtra. The assistance rendered by the space (ākāśa) is to give room to the other substances (dravya), such as the souls (jīva) and the matter (pudgala). Now, it is proper to say that the space gives room to the souls and forms of matter which are characterized by activity. But the media of motion and of rest are inactive (niÈkriya) and eternally pervasive. How can penetration apply to these substances? The objection is untenable, as 197 vè;k;&5 penetration is established by convention. For instance, the space (ākāśa) is spoken of as pervading everywhere, although there is no movement. This is because the space (ākāśa) exists everywhere. Similarly, though there is no penetration by the media of motion and of rest, it is attributed conventionally as these permeate the entire universe-space. Another question is raised. If the characteristic of the space (ākāśa) is to give room to other objects, then there would be no obstruction of objects such as stones by steel, adamant and so on, and of cows and others by walls, etc. But there is obstruction. Hence it is destitute of the nature of giving room to other substances. But this objection is untenable. The obstruction in the instances given is mutual between gross objects like steel and stones. So this does not affect the capacity of the space (ākāśa) to give room to other objects. In the instances given, obstruction is offered by the objects only and not by the space (ākāśa). Further, steel, wall, etc., are gross objects and these do not give room to each other. This is not the fault of the space (ākāśa). Subtle forms of matter do give room to each other. If it is so, this is not the special characteristic of the space (ākāśa), as this is present in others also. But there is no contradiction in this. The capacity to allow common accommodation to all substances is the special characteristic of the space (ākāśa). It cannot be said that this characteristic is absent in the non-universe space, for no substance gives up its inherent nature. The help rendered by the space (ākāśa) has been described. Then what is the help rendered by the matter (pudgala)? 'kjhjokÄ~eu%izk.kkikuk% iqñxykuke~ AA19AA 1'kjhokÄ~eu% izk.kkikuk%o 'kjhj] opu] eu rFkk izk.kkiku & 'oklksPÑokl & ;s 1iqñxykuke~o iqñxy nzO; ds midkj gSa] vFkkZr~ 'kjhjkfn dh jpuk iqñxy ls gh gksrh gSA 198 Tattvārthasūtra The function of the matter (pudgala) is to form the basis of the body (śarīra), the organs of speech (vacana) and mind (mana), and respiration (prāõāpāna). It is contended that this is improper. What is improper? The question was, 'What is the help rendered by the matter?' and, as the answer, the marks (lakÈaõa), bodies, etc., of the matter (pudgala) are provided. No, it is not improper. The marks (lakÈaõa) of the matter (pudgala) are described later (as that which is characterized by touch, taste, smell and colour). But here the help rendered by the forms of matter to the souls is described. Five kinds of bodies, such as the gross (audarika), etc., have been described already. Some of these are invisible because these are subtle (sūkÈma). Others are visible. The karmic matter which is the cause of these bodies is also included in the term 'bodies' or śarīra. Taking the karma as matter (pudgala), the forms of matter are said to render help to the souls (jīva). But some say that the karmic-body (kārmaõa śarīra) is non-material as, like the space (ākāśa), it has no form. Only gross bodies having form can be considered material. But it is not so. The karmic-body (kārmaõa śarīra) is material for its fruition depends on the contact of material objects. For instance, paddy, etc., ripen on contact with the water and other things which are material. In the same manner the karmic-body (kārmaõa śarīra) also ripens in the presence of molasses, thorns, etc. – external objects of attachment and revulsion. Hence karmic-body (kārmaõa śarīra) must be ascertained to be material. Speech (vacana) is of two kinds, physical (dravyavacana) and psychical (bhāvavacana). The psychical-speech (bhāvavacana) arises on destruction-cum-subsidence (kÈayopaśama) of energy-obstructing (vīryāntarāya), sensory-knowledge-obscuring (matijñānāvaraõa) and scriptural-knowledge-obscuring (śrutajñānāvaraõa) karmas, and on the rise of physique-making karma (nāmakarma) of limbs and minor limbs (ańgopāńga). It is, therefore, material; without the presence of such karmic matter, the psychical-speech (bhāvavacana) is not possible. Prompted by the active soul endowed with the capacity of the 199 vè;k;&5 psychical-speech (bhāvavacana), the physical-speech (dravyavacana) comes into existence. Hence the physical speech (dravyavacana) too is material. Secondly, the physical speech (dravyavacana) is the object of the sense of hearing; this also indicates that it is material. Why the speech (vacana) is not the object of the other senses? Just as the nose smells odour and is incapable of perceiving taste, etc., similarly, the senses other than the ears are incapable of grasping speech sounds. Is the speech (vacana) non-material? No, it is material. For it is perceived through the senses composed of the matter, it is obstructed by material objects like the wall, it is intercepted by adverse wind, and it is overpowered by other material causes. The mind (mana) is of two kinds, physical (dravyamana) and psychical (bhāvamana). The psychical-mind (bhāvamana) has capacity-tocomprehend (labdhi) and cognition (upayoga) as its marks (lakÈaõa). These are dependent on matter; therefore, the psychical-mind (bhāvamana) is material. Similarly, owing to destruction-cumsubsidence (kÈayopaśama) of knowledge-obscuring (jñānāvaraõa) and energy-obstructing (vīryāntarāya) karmas, and on the rise of physique-making karma (nāmakarma) of limbs and minor limbs (ańgopāńga), particles of matter get transformed into the physicalmind (dravyamana) that assists the soul in examining the good and the evil, remembering things, etc. Hence the physical-mind (dravyamana) also is material. It is contended that the mind is a different substance, that it is bereft of colour (form), etc., and that it is of the size of the atom. Hence it is improper to consider it as material. But this contention is untenable. How? Is the mind connected with the senses and the soul or not? If it is not connected, then it cannot be of assistance to the soul, nor can it be of use to the senses. If it is connected, then the 'atomic' mind connected with one point cannot leave that point and be of use to the other parts (of the soul or the other senses). Nor can it be said to rotate like the potter's wheel on account of an invisible force (adÃÈÇa), as there can be no such capacity. If this invisible force (adÃÈÇa) is the attribute of non-material and inactive soul, it too must be inactive. Being inactive itself, it cannot be the 200 Tattvārthasūtra cause of activity elsewhere. For instance, the wind is endowed with activity and touch, and it is naturally the cause of the wafting of plants and trees. But the invisible force (adÃÈÇa) mentioned above is quite different from it, and hence it cannot be the cause of activity. The soul with the destruction-cum-subsidence (kÈayopaśama) of energy-obstructing (vīryāntarāya) and knowledge-obscuring (jñānāvaraõa) karmas, and on the rise of physique-making karma (nāmakarma) of limbs and minor limbs (ańgopāńga), exhales air from the lungs; it is called the breath-of-life (prāõa). The same soul inhales air from the atmosphere; it is called the breath-of-inhalation (apāna). These, the breath-of-life (prāõa) and the breath-of-inhalation (apāna), also are helpful to the soul, as these enable it to live. The three – the mind, the breath-of-life (prāõa) and the breath-of-inhalation (apāna) – must be understood to be material. How? These meet with resistance, etc., by material objects. The mind stops functioning by thunderbolt, etc., which strike terror in the hearts of the living beings. It is also overpowered by intoxicating liquor, etc. Respiration is obstructed by covering the face with the palm or the cloth. It is also subjugated by phlegm. But a non-material substance cannot be obstructed or subjugated by material objects. It is from this that the existence of the soul is proved. Just as the motion of a puppet equipped with mechanical contrivances for moving the limbs signifies the agent who directs the motion, so also the activities, such as inhalation and exhalation, prove the existence of the active soul. Are these alone the help rendered by forms of matter (pudgala)? Or is there anything else? lq[knq%[kthforej.kksixzgkÜÓ AA20AA 1lq[k nq%[k thfor ej.kksixzgk'po lq[k] nq%[k] thfor vkSj ej.k & ;s Hkh iqñxy ds midkj gaSA 201 vè;k;&5 The function of the matter (pudgala) is also to contribute to pleasure (sukha), suffering (duÍkha), living (jīvita), and death (maraõa) of living beings (jīva). Owing to the presence of the internal causes of karmas which produce pleasant-feelings (sātā) and unpleasant-feelings (asātā), and in consequence of association with external causes such as the objects, the dispositions of agreeableness or affliction are pleasure (sukha) and suffering (duÍkha), respectively. The continuance of respiration in a being owing to the presence of the age-determining (āyuÍ) karma is called living (jīvita). The cutting off or destruction of respiration is death (maraõa). The matter (pudgala) renders help to the soul in these respects. How? These arise in the presence of material causes. It is contended that the word 'upagraha' in the sūtra is unnecessary as this section deals with 'upakāra'. But it is not unnecessary. It is intended to indicate the help rendered by the matter (pudgala) to material objects. For instance, bronze is purified by certain ashes, water is purified by clearing nuts called 'kataka' and steel is tempered with the help of water. The word 'ca' – also – is intended to include other kinds of help. Thus, other kinds of help are also rendered by the matter (pudgala). Just as the body (śarīra), etc., are constituted by the matter (pudgala), in the same way, sense-organs such as the eyes also are the help rendered by the matter (pudgala). After indicating the assistance given by the matter (pudgala), the help rendered by the souls (jīva) is described. ijLijksixzgks thokuke~ AA21AA 1thokuke~o thoksa ds 1ijLijksixzg%o ijLij esa fufeÙk gksuk] ;s midkj gSaA 202 Tattvārthasūtra The function of the souls (jīva) is to help one another. The word 'paraspara' means reciprocity of action. 'Parasparopagraha' means rendering help to one another. That is the help rendered by the souls (jīva) to one another. What is it? It is mutual help as between the master and the servant, and the teacher and the taught. The master renders help to the servant by giving him money. And the servant serves the master by doing him good and protecting him from the evil. The preceptor teaches what is good here and in the next world (birth) and makes his disciples follow his teachings. And the disciple benefits his preceptor by following him and by his devoted service. What is the purpose of the repetition of the word 'upagraha'? Taking cue from the previous sūtra, it indicates that living beings are also the cause of pleasure (sukha), suffering (duÍkha), living (jīvita), and death (maraõa) of one another. If every existing thing must be of help, what is the help rendered by the time (kāla) which is also existent? orZukifj.kkefØ;k% ijRokijRos p dkyL; AA22AA 1orZuk ifj.kke fØ;k% ijRokijRos po orZuk] ifj.kke] fØ;k] ijRo vkSj vijRo 1dkyL;o ;s dky nzO; ds midkj gSaaA Assisting substances in their continuity of being through gradual changes (vartanā), in their modification (pariõāma), in their movement (kriyā), in their endurance (paratva) and in their non-endurance (aparatva), are the functions of time (kāla). Although substances, like the medium of motion (dharma), incessantly attain new modes (paryāya) due to own inherent capacity, 203 vè;k;&5 still external instrumental cause – bāhya sahakārī kāraõa – is required for this attainment. The external instrumental cause – bāhya sahakārī kāraõa – which helps the substances attain new modes 1(paryāya) incessantly – termed 'vartana' – is the time (kāla) . Hence, assistance in the continuity of being through gradual changes – 'vartanā' – is the function of the time (kāla). The mode (paryāya) of the substance changes and the time (kāla) is the causal agent in this activity. If it is like this, is the time (kāla) with-activity (kriyāvāna)? For instance we say, 'The disciple studies and the preceptor helps him study'. Here the preceptor too is with-activity (kriyāvāna). But there is nothing wrong in this. Even an auxiliary cause is spoken of as a causal agent. For instance, we say that the dried cowdung-fire is the cause of study (in cold weather). Here the dried cowdung-fire is only an auxiliary cause. Similarly the time (kāla) is a causal agent in the change of mode (paryāya). How is it ascertained as the time (kāla)? There are particular activities, namely, instant, etc., and cooking, etc., which are referred to as an instant of time, cooking time, and so on, by convention. But, in this conventional usage as an instant of time, cooking time, and so on, the term (saÉjñā) 'time' (kāla) is superimposed. And this term 'time' (kāla) signifies the existence of 'real' (mukhya) time (kāla), which is the basis of the conventional or secondary (vyavahāra or gauõa) time. How? This is because the secondary must imply the real. The mode (paryāya), without vibration, of a substance attained on annihilation of a particular quality, and on origination of another quality is its modification (pariõāma). The modifications (pariõāma) of the soul (jīva) are anger (krodha), etc. The modifications (pariõāma) 1 – The incessant origination (utpāda), destruction (vyaya), and permanence (dhrauvya) that all substances (dravya) undergo in their state of being – sattā – is called 'vartanā'. ( see 'Õayacakko', verses 135-136). Thus, 'vartanā' refers to the imperceptible, minute changes that go on incessantly, every instant, in all substances. 204 Tattvārthasūtra of matter (pudgala) are colour, etc. In the same way, modifications (pariõāma) take place in the medium of motion (dharma), the medium of rest (adharma), the space (ākāśa) and the time (kāla). This modification (pariõāma) is due to the rhythmic rise (vÃddhi) and fall (hāni) – ÈaÇguõahānivÃddhi – in their 'avibhāga-praticcheda' as all these substances have intrinsic 'agurulaghuguõa'. The intrinsic 'agurulaghuguõa' is the general (sādhāraõa) quality-mode (guõaparyāya) of these substances. Movement (kriyā) is characterized by vibration. It is of two kinds, causal (prāyogika) and natural (vaisrasika). The motion of the cart, etc., is causal, and that of the clouds, etc., is natural. Endurance (paratva) and non-endurance (aparatva) are of two kinds: with respect to place (kÈetra) and with respect to time (kāla). As this section deals with time, only the latter is considered. The substance that is enduring in respect of time (kāla) is termed 'paratva', and the one which is not so enduring is termed 'aparatva'. The help rendered to substances in their continuity of being (vartanā), etc., proves the existence of time (kāla). It is contended that continuity of being (vartanā) should be sufficient as modification (pariõāma), etc., are secondary, being its subdivisions. But modification, etc., are not unnecessary. The amplification is intended to indicate the two kinds of time (kāla), the real-time (mukhya-kāla or paramārtha-kāla or niÈcaya-kāla) and the conventional-time (vyavahāra-kāla). The real-time has its mark (lakÈaõa) as continuity of being (vartanā), and the conventional-time has its marks (lakÈaõa) as modification (pariõāma), etc. The conventional-time is determined (recognized) by modification in other substances, which are ascertained by others. It is threefold, the past (bhūta), the present (vartamāna) and the future (bhaviÈyat). In the real-time the conception of time is of primary importance, and the idea of the past, the present and the future is secondary. In the conventional-time, the idea of the past, the present and the future is of prime importance, and the idea of real-time is subordinate. This is because the conventional-time depends on the substances endowed with-activity (kriyāvāna), and on the real-time. 205 vè;k;&5 What are the special marks (lakÈaõa) of the matter (pudgala)? Li'kZjlxUèko.kZoUr% iqñxyk% AA23AA 1Li'kZ jl xU/ o.kZoUr%o Li'kZ] jl] xU/ vkSj o.kZ okys 1iqñxyk%o iqñxy gksrs gSaA The forms of matter (pudgala) are characterized by touch (sparśa), taste (rasa), smell (gandha) and colour (varõa). What is touched or touching alone is touch (sparśa). It is of eight kinds, namely, soft (komala), hard (kaÇhora), heavy (bhārī), light (halkā), cold (Çhańçā), hot (garma), smooth (snigdha) and rough (rūkÈa). What is tasted or tasting alone is taste (rasa). It is of five kinds: bitter (tītā), sour (khaÇÇā), acidic (kaçuā), sweet (mīÇhā) and astringent (kasailā). What is smelt or smelling alone is smell (gandha). It is of two kinds: pleasant smell (sugandha) and unpleasant smell (durgandha). Colour is of five kinds: black (kālā), blue (nīlā), yellow (pīlā), white (safeda) and red (lāla). The foregoing are the principal divisions. And the subdivisions of each of these may be numerable (saÉkhyāta), innumerable (asaÉkhyāta) and infinite (ananta). These – touch, taste, smell and colour – are always associated with the matter (pudgala). For instance, we speak of the (Indian) fig tree possessing milky juice. A question is raised. In sūtra 5-5, it has been said, 'Things which have form – rūpī – constitute the matter (pudgala).' And, it has been explained that form (colour) includes taste, smell and touch also. Thus the characteristics of the matter have already been established. This sūtra, therefore, is unnecessary. But this is untenable. Sūtra 5-4 says, 'The substances (dravya) are eternal (nitya), fixed-in-number (avasthita) and colourless (arūpī)'. That would imply that matter also is non-material – arūpī – like the rest. Sūtra 5-5 was intended to 206 Tattvārthasūtra exclude that view. The present sūtra is intended to explain the distinctive characteristics of the forms of matter (pudgala). The particular modes (paryāya) of the matter (pudgala) are mentioned in the next sūtra. 'kCncUèklkS{E;LFkkSY;laLFkkuHksnreÀNk;kriks|ksr& oUrÜÓ AA24AA mDr y{k.kokys iqñxy 1'kCn cU/ lkS{E; LFkkSY; laLFkku Hksn re'Nk;kriks|ksroUr% po 'kCn] cU/] lw{eRo] LFkwyRo] laLFkku (vkdkj)] Hksn] vU/dkj] Nk;k] vkri vkSj m|ksrkfn okys gksrs gSaaa] vFkkZr~ ;s Hkh iqñxy dh i;kZ;sa gSaA Sound (śabda), union (bandha), fineness (sukÈmatva), grossness (sthūlatva), shape (saÉsthāna), division (bheda), darkness (andhakāra), image/shadow (chāyā), warm light (ātapa) and cool light (udyota) also are modes (paryāya) of the matter (pudgala). Sound is of two kinds. One partakes of the nature of languages and the other is different from it. The first again is of two kinds, sounds which are expressed (indicated) by letters – with the script, and sounds which are not expressed by letters – without the script. Languages having the script are rich in literature. The well developed languages serve as means of intercourse among civilized persons, and other languages among primitive peoples. The latter kind of sounds (i.e. sounds not having the script) is the means of ascertainment of the nature of superior knowledge amongst creatures with two or more senses. Both these kinds of sounds are produced by the efforts of the living beings, 207 vè;k;&5 not by nature. Sounds not partaking of the nature of languages are of two kinds, causal and natural. Natural sounds are produced by the clouds, and so on. The causal sound is of four kinds – tata, vitata, ghana, and sauÈira. Sound produced by musical instruments covered with leather, namely, the drum, the kettle-drum, the large kettledrum, etc., is 'tata'. Sound produced by stringed instruments such as the lute, the lyre, the violin, and so on, is 'vitata'. Sound produced by metallic instruments, such as the cymbal, the bell, etc. is 'ghana'. Sound produced by wind-instruments such as the flute, the conch, etc., is 'sauÈira'. Union (bandha) is of two kinds, natural and that produced by the efforts of human beings. The first kind of union (bandha) is caused by the mixing of smooth and rough particles of matter (positive and negative electric charges) in lightning, meteoric showers, rainfall, fire, rainbow, etc. Union produced by the efforts of human beings is twofold, union of the non-living things, and union of the living and the non-living. Instances of union of the non-living things are resin, wood, and so on. The second kind of union consists of bondage of karma and nokarma with the soul (jīva). Fineness (sukÈmatva) is of two kinds, extreme and relative. Extreme fineness is found in the indivisible atoms. Instances of relative fineness are the wood-apple, myrobalan, plum, etc. Grossness (sthūlatva) also is similarly of two kinds, extreme and relative. The instance of extreme grossness is the biggest molecule of matter pervading the entire universe. Instances of relative grossness are the plum, myrobalan, wood-apple, palmyra fruit, etc. Shape (saÉsthāna) is of two kinds, that which can be defined and that which cannot be defined. The regular geometrical shapes such as the circle, the triangle, the rectangle, the square, the globe, etc., are instances of the first variety. The shapes which are haphazard and irregular, e.g., of the clouds, are those which cannot be defined. Division (bheda) or separation is of six kinds. Illustrations of these kinds are: 1) sawing a piece of wood, 2) grinding barley, wheat, etc. into flour, 3) breaking a pitcher, etc., into potsherds and other fragments, 208 Tattvārthasūtra 4) threshing out black gram, green gram, etc., 5) dividing mica into many layers, and 6) emission of sparks of fire on hammering a red-hot iron-ball. Darkness (andhakāra) is the opposite of light; it obstructs vision. An image/shadow (chāyā) results from obstruction of light by an object. It is of two kinds, images as seen in a mirror and uninverted images like the shadow. In the first of these, the left side becomes right and the right side becomes left. Warm light (ātapa) is heat and light combined, emanating from the sun, etc. Cool light (udyota) is the light issuing from the moon, the firefly (glowworm), jewels, etc. Al these, sound (śabda), etc., are modes (paryāya) of the matter. And those in which these modes (paryāya) are produced are forms of the matter. Other modes (paryāya) of the matter, such as the impulse, the blow, etc., as described in the Scripture, are included by the particle 'ca' in the sūtra. The divisions of the matter (pudgala) are mentioned next. v.ko% LdUèkkÜÓ AA25AA iqñxy 1v.ko% LdU/k% po v.kq vkSj LdU/ ds Hksn ls nks izdkj ds gSaA The atoms (aõu) and the molecules (skandha) are the two divisions of the matter (pudgala). That which occupies one space-point (pradeśa) and possesses the capacity to produce the modes of touch, taste, etc., is called the atom (aõu). Since the atom (aõu) occupies just one space-point (pradeśa), it is the smallest unit of the matter (pudgala); hence the name 'aõu'. 209 vè;k;&5 Because of its minuteness, it is the beginning, the middle and the end. It has been said in the Scriptures, "The atom is itself the beginning, the middle and the end. That indivisible substance (dravya) which cannot be perceived by the senses is the atom (aõu, paramāõu)." The collections of atoms which, in their gross state, can be taken by the hand and handled are the molecules (skandha). Conventionally, if action is present in a few instances, by synecdoche it can be extended to other versions too. Hence, the word 'molecule' (skandha) also applies to molecules consisting of two or more atoms, which cannot be so handled. Though the matter (pudgala) has infinite subclasses, still it is divided into two main classes, atoms (aõu) and molecules (skandha). The plural is used in the sūtra to indicate the infinite subclasses of matter that subsist on these two main classes. In this sūtra the two terms 'aõu' and 'skandha' are mentioned separately, without being combined into a compound, to indicate their connection with the two previous sūtra. The atoms are characterized by touch (sparśa), taste (rasa), smell (gandha) and colour (varõa). Molecules, however, are characterized by sound (śabda), union (bandha), fineness (sukÈmatva), grossness (sthūlatva), shape (saÉsthāna), division (bheda), darkness (andhakāra), image/shadow (chāyā), warm light (ātapa) and cool light (udyota), besides, of course, by touch, taste, smell and colour. Are these modes of the matter (pudgala), atoms (aõu) and molecules (skandha), beginningless, or with a beginning? As these originate, these have a beginning. In that case how are these formed? First the origin of molecules (skandha) is described. HksnlkrsH; mRi|Urs AA26AA ijek.kqvksa ds 1Hksn lkrsH;o Hksn] lkr vFkok Hksn vkSj lkr nksuksa ls 1mRi|Urso iqñxy LdU/ksa dh mRifÙk gksrh gSA 210 Tattvārthasūtra Molecules (skandha) are formed by fission (bheda), fusion (sańghāta) and division-cum-union (bheda-sańghāta). The splitting of molecules (aggregates) by internal and external causes is fission (bheda). The collection together of separate things is fusion (sańghāta). It is contended that since fission and fusion are two, the dual, and not the plural, should be used in the sūtra. The plural is used to include the third, namely, the combination of fission and fusion. It is explained thus. By the combination of two separate atoms, a molecule occupying two space-points (pradeśa) is formed. By the combination of a molecule of two space-points with one atom or the combination of three atoms, a molecule of three space-points is formed. A molecule of four space-points is produced by the combination of two molecules of two atoms each, of one molecule of three atoms with one atom or of four atoms. Similarly, by the fusion (combination) of numerable (saÉkhyāta), innumerable (asaÉkhyāta), infinite (ananta) and infinite-times-infinite (anantānanta) atoms, the molecules of respective space-points (pradeśa) are formed. By the splitting (fission) of such molecules, molecules in size up to the smallest, comprising of two atoms, are produced. Similarly, by the process of fission and fusion in the same instant, molecules of two atoms, and so on, are formed. These are produced by fission of some molecules and fusion of others. Thus the formation of molecules is described. Now the origin of the atom (aõu) is described. Hksnkn.kq% AA27AA 1v.kq%o v.kq dh mRifÙk 1Hksnkr~o Hksn ls gksrh gSA The atom (aõu) is produced only by fission (bheda). 211 vè;k;&5 When a rule, well-established, is enunciated, it is for the purpose of imparting it definiteness or certainty. The rule is that the atom (aõu) is produced by fission (bheda) alone; it is not produced by fusion, or by combination of fission and fusion. A question is raised. While origin of molecules has satisfactorily been explained as by fusion (sańghāta), why was it necessary to mention the combination of fusion and fission? The next sūtra provides the answer. HksnlkrkH;ka pk{kq"k% AA28AA 1pk{kq"k%o p{kq bfUnz; ls ns[kus ;ksX; LdU/ 1Hksn lkrkH;ke~o Hksn vkSj lkr nksuksa ds ,d=k :i gksus ls mRiUu gksrk gSA The molecules (skandha) produced by the combined action of fission (bheda) and fusion (sańghāta) can be perceived by the eyes. The molecules (skandha) composed of even infinite number of atoms may or may not be perceivable by the eyes. How do the molecules which are not perceivable by the eyes become perceivable by the eyes? These become perceivable by the combined action of fission (bheda) and fusion (sańghāta), and not by fission alone. What is the reason for this? When a molecule of minute size splits, it does not give up its minuteness. Hence it must remain unperceivable as before. Again, when a minute molecule splits but simultaneously combines with another molecule, it gives up its minuteness and attains grossness. Then it becomes perceivable by the eyes. The special (viśeÈa) characteristics of substances such as the medium of motion (dharma) have been described. But the common (sāmānya) characteristic has not been mentioned. This must be described. 212 Tattvārthasūtra lñaeO;y{k.ke~ AA29AA 1aeO;y{k.ke~o nzO; dk y{k.k 1lño lr~ (vfLrRo) gSA The mark (lakÈana) of a substance (dravya) is existence (being or sat). That which exists, i.e., marked by existence (sat), is a substance. What is existence (sat)? mRiknO;;èkzkSO;;qDra lr~ AA30AA 1mRikn O;; /zkSO; ;qDrao tks mRikn&O;;&/zkSO; lfgr gks 1lr~o lks lr~ gSA Existence (sat) is with (yukta) origination (utpāda), destruction (vyaya) and permanence (dhrauvya). The substance (dravya) is of two kinds: the animate (cetana) and the inanimate (acetana). These two kinds of substances do not ever leave their essential characteristic (of sat); still, due to internal and external causes, each instant, these attain new states of existence. This is origination (utpāda). For instance, the origination (utpāda) takes place of the pitcher from the clay. Similarly, the loss of the former state of existence is destruction (vyaya). The loss of the lump shape of the clay is destruction (vyaya). As there is no destruction (vyaya) or origination (utpāda) of the inherent nature or quality of the substance (dravya), it is also characterized by permanence (dhrauvya). The quality of being permanent is permanence (dhrauvya). For instance, the clay continues to exist in all states – the lump, the pitcher and in the broken parts. Existence (sat) is thus accompanied by origination 213 vè;k;&5 (utpāda), destruction (vyaya) and permanence (dhrauvya). It is contended that 'yukta' – 'with' – applies to objects which are different. For instance, Devadatta is 'with' a stick (daõça). In that case, the existence of the three states as well as the substance which is said to be 'with' the three states is not possible. But this objection is untenable. The word 'with' is applied from the point of view of highlighting distinction even in case of things which are not different. For instance, there is the usage that the pillar is with (characterized by) strength. Thus, as origination (utpāda), destruction (vyaya) and permanence (dhrauvya) have mutual inseparable togetherness – avinābhāva – it is proper to use the word 'with'. Or, the word 'yukta' – 'with' – means collection or combination. The words 'yukta' (with), 'samāhita' (collection) and 'tadātmaka' (of that nature) are synonyms. Thus, 'existence (sat) is with origination (utpāda), destruction (vyaya) and permanence (dhrauvya)' means 'existence (sat) is of the nature of origination (utpāda), destruction (vyaya) and permanence (dhrauvya)'. It comes to this. Origination (utpāda) and the other two are the marks (lakÈaõa) of the substance and the substance is that which is under consideration (lakÈya). From the point of view of modes – paryāyārthika naya – these three are different from one another and also from the substance (dravya). From the point of view of the substance – dravyārthika naya – these three are not different mutually and from the substance. Hence it is appropriate to consider these three as marks (lakÈaõa) of the substance under consideration (lakÈya). In sūtra 5-4 it is mentioned that the substances (dravya) are eternal (nitya). What is 'nitya' or permanence? rkokO;;a fuR;e~ AA31AA 1rkokO;;ao rko ls tks vO;; gS & P;qr ugha gksrk gS & lks 1fuR;e~o fuR; gSA 214 Tattvārthasūtra Permanence (nitya) is indestructibility of own-nature (tadbhāva). Own-nature (tadbhāva) is explained now. That which is the cause of recognition – pratyabhijñāna – is own-nature (tadbhāva). Recognition – pratyabhijñāna – does not occur accidentally; its cause is the continuance of the own-nature (tadbhāva) of the substance. The knowledge that 'this is the same thing that I saw earlier' is recognition (pratyabhijñāna). If it be considered that the old thing has completely disappeared and that an entirely new thing has come into existence, then there can be no recognition (pratyabhijñāna). Without the feature of recognition (pratyabhijñāna) all worldly relations based on it would come to naught. Therefore, the indestructibility of the essential nature – the own-nature (tadbhāva) – of the substance is its permanence (nitya). But this should be taken from one particular point of view. If the substance be permanent from all points of view, then there can be no change at all. And, in that case, transmigration as well as the way to liberation would become meaningless. A contention arises. It is a contradiction to attribute permanence (nitya) as well as impermanence (anitya) to the same substance. If it is permanent, there can be no destruction and origination, and impermanence would be negatived. If it is impermanent, there can be no continuance in its nature, and permanence would be negatived. The next sūtra explains that there is no contradiction in that. v£irku£irfl1⁄4s% AA32AA 1v£irku£ir fl1⁄4s%o iz/kurk vkSj xkS.krk dh vis{kk ls fojks/h izrhr gksus okys /eks± dh flf1⁄4 gksrh gSA 215 vè;k;&5 The seemingly contradictory attributes (dharma) are established from the points of view, whether primary (arpita) or secondary (anarpita). The substance has infinite attributes (dharma). The particular attribute (dharma) under consideration and, therefore, primary (mukhya) as per the need of expression, is called 'arpita' or 'upanīta'. The other attributes (dharma), not under consideration and, therefore, secondary (gauõa) as per the need of expression, are called 'anarpita'. This means that though other attributes are present in the substance but since, at that particular time, are not under consideration, these are secondary attributes. Thus, depending on the point of view, contradictory attributes are established in a single substance. For instance, there is no contradiction in the same person Devadatta being a father, a son, a brother, a nephew, and so on. In each case, the point of view is different. From the point of view of his son he is a father, and from the point of view of his father he is a son. Similarly with regard to his other designations. In the same manner, from the point of view of its general (sāmānya) qualities, the substance (dravya) is permanent (nitya). From the point of its specific (viśeÈa) qualities – the modes – the substance (dravya) is impermanent (anitya). Hence there is no contradiction. These two, the general (sāmānya) and the specific (viśeÈa), are the two points of view that reconcile apparent contradictions and make possible worldly intercourse. A question is raised. That which exists is governed by the doctrine of manifold points of view (relative pluralism). Therefore, it is proper that molecules (skandha) are formed by division (bheda), union (sańghāta) and division-cum-union (bheda-sańghāta). But there is this doubt. Are molecules (skandha) of two atoms (aõu), and so on, formed by mere union, or is there any peculiarity? The reply is this. When there is union of atoms, these are transformed by combination into one object which is a molecule. Again, a question is raised: if it is 216 Tattvārthasūtra so, why is it that certain atoms combine and certain others do not, though all of these are of the nature of the matter (pudgala)? The answer is that though the atoms are not different as far as their nature as the matter (pudgala) is concerned, their infinite (ananta) modes (paryāya) exhibit unique transformations. These transformations establish combinations in the following manner: fLuXèk:{kRokñ cUèk% AA33AA 1fLuX/:{kRokño fLuX/Ro vkSj :{kRo ds dkj.k 1cU/%o nks] rhu bR;kfn ijek.kqvksa dk cU/ gksrk gSA Combination of atoms takes place by virtue of their greasiness (snigdhatva) and roughness (rūkÈatva). The matter (pudgala) is called 'snigdha' when, owing to the internal and external causes, the mode (paryāya) that is 'greasy' is manifested. Similarly, the matter (pudgala) that has the mode (paryāya) which is rough is called 'rūkÈa'. The matter (pudgala) that is smooth has greasiness (snigdhatva) as its attribute (dharma). The matter (pudgala) that is rough has roughness (rūkÈatva) as its attribute (dharma). Greasiness and roughness are the attributes or qualities. Greasiness (snigdhatva) and roughness (rūkÈatva) are the causes of combination of two atoms, etc., of the matter (pudgala). When there is combination – intermingling – between two atoms (aõu) of greasy and rough attributes, a molecule (skandha) of two atoms is produced. In the same manner, the molecules of numerable (saÉkhyāta), innumerable (asaÉkhyāta) and infinite (ananta) space-points (pradeśa) are produced. The attribute of greasiness (snigdhatva) is of one, two, three, four, numerable, innumerable and infinite divisions. The attribute of roughness (rūkÈatva) also is of the same proportions. 217 vè;k;&5 There are atoms (aõu) possessing these two properties. Greasiness (snigdhatva) is present in increasing degrees in water, goat's milk, cow's milk, buffalo's milk, camel's milk, ghee, etc. Roughness is present in increasing degrees in dust, ash, sand, etc. In the same way, the atoms (aõu) have these attributes of greasiness (snigdhatva) and roughness (rūkÈatva) in varying degrees. Combination of atoms takes place by virtue of these attributes of greasiness (snigdhatva) and roughness (rūkÈatva), in general. The following sūtra highlights the exceptions. u t?kU;xq.kkuke~ AA34AA 1u t?kU; xq.kkuke~o t?kU; xq.k okys ijek.kqvksa dk cU/ ugha gksrkA Combination does not take place between atoms of the lowest degrees of the two attributes. Here, 'jaghanya' means the lowest and 'guõa' means degree (of the attribute). Those which possess the lowest degree of the attribute are the lowest degree. There is no combination between atoms which are characterized by the lowest degree of greasiness or roughness. It is as follows. There is no combination of one degree of greasiness with one, two, numerable, innumerable or infinite degrees of greasiness. In the same manner, there is no combination of one degree of greasiness with one, two, numerable, innumerable or infinite degrees of roughness. Similarly, it should be understood with regard to one degree of roughness. If so, it would imply indiscriminate combination among all degrees of greasiness and roughness other than those of the lowest degree. The next sūtra mentions further exceptions. 218 Tattvārthasūtra xq.klkE;s ln`'kkuke~ AA35AA 1xq.klkE;so xq.kksa dh lekurk gks rc 1ln`'kkuke~o leku tkfr okys ijek.kq ds lkFk cU/ ugha gksrkA tSls fd nks xq.k okys fLuX/ ijek.kq dk nwljs nks xq.k okys fLuX/ ijek.kq ds lkFk cU/ ugha gksrk vFkok tSls fLuX/ ijek.kq dk mrus gh xq.k okys :{k ijek.kq ds lkFk cU/ ugha gksrkA ^u* & (cU/ ugha gksrk) & ;g 'kCn bl lw=k esa ugha dgk x;k ijUrq Åij ds lw=k eas dgk x;k ^u* 'kCn bl lw=k esa Hkh ykxw gksrk gSA There is no combination between atoms of the equal degrees of the same attribute. The term 'sadÃśa' means 'of the same kind' or 'of the same class'. The term 'guõasāmya' means 'of the same degree'. This is what is implied. There is no combination between two degrees of greasiness and two degrees of roughness, three degrees of greasiness and three degrees of roughness, two degrees of greasiness and two degrees of greasiness, two degrees of roughness and two degrees of roughness. This should be extrapolated for other degrees of these attributes too. If so, what is the need of the term 'of the same kind'? It is intended to indicate that combination takes place when there is difference in the degrees of greasiness or roughness. From this it follows that there would be combination between atoms of the same kind and the opposite kind, if there be difference in the degrees of greasiness and roughness. The next sūtra indicates the particular condition for combination to take place. 219 vè;k;&5 }Ôfèkdkfnxq.kkuka rq AA36AA 1}Ôf/dkfn xq.kkuka rqo nks vf/d xq.k ('kDR;a'k) gksa rks gh cU/ gksrk gSA There is combination only when the degree of greasiness or roughness is higher by two units. With the exception of the lowest degree (sūtra 5-34), wherever there is difference of two degrees in greasiness and roughness, whether even or odd, there is combination of similar or dissimilar types (greasiness with greasiness, roughness with roughness, and greasiness with roughness). This implies that combination takes place between similar and dissimilar types of atoms, if there is difference in degrees of either property by two units. There is no combination in all other instances. It is as follows. There is no combination of an atom of two degrees of greasiness with one, two or three degrees of greasiness. But there is combination of it (an atom of two degrees of greasiness) with four degrees of greasiness. The same (greasiness of two degrees), however, does not combine with five, six, seven, eight, numerable, innumerable and infinite degrees of greasiness. Similarly, there is combination of three degrees of greasiness with five degrees of greasiness. But there is no combination of this (greasiness of three degrees) with other than five degrees of greasiness. Greasiness of four degrees combines with (either two or) six degrees of greasiness, but not with the rest. Similarly, it must be understood in other instances. In the same manner, roughness of two degrees does not combine with that of one, two or three degrees. But it combines with roughness of four degrees. The same does not combine with five and higher degrees of roughness. Similarly, it should be understood that there is combination of roughness of three degrees, etc., with that of two degrees higher than itself. It should be understood similarly with 220 Tattvārthasūtra regard to dissimilar types (i.e., greasiness and roughness). It is said in the Scripture: "With the exception of the lowest degree, wherever there is difference of two degrees in greasiness and roughness, there is combination between similar or dissimilar types, such as greasiness with greasiness, roughness with roughness, and greasiness with roughness." What is the purpose of declaring that combination takes place with higher degree of greasiness and roughness only? cUèks¿fèkdkS ikfj.kkfedkS p AA37AA 1po vkSj 1cU/so cU/:i voLFkk eas 1vf/dkSo vf/d xq.k ('kDR;a'k) okyk 1ikfj.kkfedkSo de xq.k ('kDR;a'k) okys dk ifj.keu djkus okyk gksrk gSA (;g dFku fufeÙk dk gSA) In the process of combination, the atom with higher degree of the attribute transforms the other. The term 'guõa' which means degree (of the attribute) is under reference (sūtra 5-34). 'Adhikau', therefore, implies higher degree (of the attribute). 'Pāriõāmika' is that which causes transformation. Causing transformation means to impart another nature (mode), like that by treacle. Treacle, full of sweetness, transforms particles of dust, etc., that stick to it, by imparting its sweetness to these. In the same way, the atom with higher degree of the attribute transforms the one with lower degree, that combines with it. So, the atom with greasiness and roughness of four degrees causes transformation in the atom with greasiness and roughness of two degrees, which combines with it. On combination, the previous individual states of the combining atoms disappear and a new third state is manifested. Thus, oneness in the two kinds of atoms is produced after combination. Otherwise the two 221 vè;k;&5 would appear separate in spite of the union, as in case of the cloth woven with black and white yarn. If combination is governed by the rule enunciated, the duration of thirty sāgaropama koÇākoÇi, etc., of knowledge-obscuring karmas, etc., becomes appropriate. Existence (sat) is characterized by origination (utpāda), destruction (vyaya) and permanence (dhrauvya) (see sūtra 5-30). Now substance (dravya) is defined in another way. xq.ki;Z;oñ aeO;e~ AA38AA 1xq.ki;Z;or~o xq.k vkSj i;kZ; okyk 1aeO;e~o nzO; gSA That which has qualities (guõa) and modes (paryāya) is a substance (dravya). The one which has qualities (guõa) and modes (paryāya) is said to be one with qualities and modes. That in which qualities (guõa) and modes (paryāya) exist is a substance (dravya). It has already been explained (sūtra 5-30) that from the point of view of modes – paryāyārthika naya – three is difference between the attributes and the substance (dravya). From the point of view of the substance – dravyārthika naya – three is no difference. Hence it is appropriate to consider these – qualities (guõa) and modes (paryāya) – as marks (lakÈaõa) of the substance (dravya) under consideration (lakÈya). What are qualities (guõa) and what are modes (paryāya)? Those characteristics which exhibit association (anvaya) with the substance are qualities (guõa). Those characteristics which exhibit distinction or exclusion (vyatireka) – logical discontinuity, 'when the pot is not, the clay is,' – are modes (paryāya). The substance (dravya) possesses both. In essence, that which makes distinction between one substance and another is called the quality (guõa), and the modification of the 222 Tattvārthasūtra substance is called its mode (paryāya). The substance (dravya) is inseparable (residing in the same substratum – ayutasiddha) from its qualities (guõa), and permanent (nitya). That which distinguishes one substance from other substances is its distinctive (bhedaka) quality (guõa). The presence of this quality proves its existence. The absence of distinctive qualities would lead to intermixture or confusion between substances. For instance, the substance of soul (jīva) is distinguished from the matter (pudgala) and other substances by the presence of its distinctive qualities, such as knowledge. The matter (pudgala) is distinguished from the souls (jīva) by the presence of its distinctive qualities, such as form (colour), etc. Without such distinguishing characteristics, there can be no distinction between the souls and the matter. Therefore, from the general (sāmānya) point of view, knowledge, etc., are qualities always associated with the soul, and qualities like form, etc., are always associated with the matter. Their modifications, which are known from particular (viśeÈa) point of view, are modes (paryāya). For instance, in the souls (jīva), the modes (paryāya) are knowledge of the pitcher, knowledge of the cloth, anger, pride, etc., and in the matter (pudgala) these are intense or mild odour, colour, etc. The collection or aggregate of qualities (guõa) and modes (paryāya), which somehow is considered different from these, is called the substance (dravya). If the aggregate were completely (from all points of view) the same, it would lead to negation of all – the substance (dravya), the qualities (guõa) and the modes (paryāya). This is explained thus: if the aggregate of mutually different qualities be considered one and the same as qualities, the aggregate itself would become non-existent, as these are mutually different. The form (colour) is different from the taste, etc. If the aggregate is same as the colour, and the colour being different from the taste, etc., the aggregate is bound to be different from the taste, etc. Therefore, the conclusion would be that colour alone is the aggregate. But one colour is not fit to become an aggregate or a collection. Hence it leads to the negation of the aggregate. And, with negation of the aggregate, its constituents too are negated. It would lead to negation of the 223 vè;k;&5 substance (dravya) and the qualities (guõa). Similarly, it must be considered in case of taste, etc. Therefore, the aggregate of qualities must be admitted to be somehow – from particular point of view – same as the qualities. The substances (dravya), whose attributes have been described, are entitled to be called substances. The next sūtra mentions the substance (dravya) not as yet explained. dkyÜÓ AA39AA 1dky%o dky 1po Hkh nzO; gSA The time (kāla) also is a substance (dravya). The sūtra is 'kālaśca' – 'the time (kāla) also'. What is meant by 'also'? The word 'substance' (dravya) is to be inserted. How is the time (kāla) a substance (dravya)? Because it has the characteristic attributes of a substance. Substance has been defined in two ways. 'Existence is with origination (utpāda), destruction (vyaya) and permanence (dhrauvya)'. (sūtra 5-30). And, 'that which has qualities (guõa) and modes (paryāya) is a substance (dravya)'. (sūtra 5-38). Both these definitions apply to the time (kāla). It is explained as follows. The time (kāla) exhibits permanence (dhrauvya) based on its internal cause – svanimittaka – because it persists in own nature (svabhāva). Origination (utpāda) and destruction (vyaya) in the time (kāla) are based on external causes – paranimittaka – and also due to internal causes – svanimittaka – in view of the rhythmic rise and fall, 'agurulaghuguõa'. Further, the time (kāla) also has two kinds of attributes (guõa), general (sāmānya or sādhāraõa) and particular (viśeÈa or asādhāraõa). The particular (viśeÈa or asādhāraõa) attribute (guõa) of the time (kāla) is assisting substances in their 224 Tattvārthasūtra continuity of being through gradual changes – vartanā – and the general attributes include lifelessness (acetanatva), without having a form (amūrtatva), minuteness (sūkÈmatva) and power of maintaining distinction with all other substances (agurulaghutva). The modes (paryāya) of the time (kāla), characterized by origination (utpāda) and destruction (vyaya), must be similarly established. Since both the definitions of the substance (dravya) apply to the time (kāla), it is established as an independent substance, like the space (ākāśa). The marks (lakÈaõa), like vartanā, of the time (kāla) have already been defined in sūtra 5-22. Why is the time (kāla) mentioned separately? This also must have been mentioned along with the medium of motion (dharma), etc., in sūtra 5-1 itself. No. If the time had been included there, plurality of space-points (pradeśa) would apply to it. That is undesirable, as we cannot attribute multitude of space-points (pradeśa) to the time, neither from real (niścaya) nor from figurative or conventional (vyavahāra) points of view. The time (kāla) is not a 'kāya' or 'body'. With regard to the medium of motion, etc., multitude of space-points has been mentioned from the real (niścaya) point of view. For instance, it has been mentioned that there are innumerable (asaÉkhyāta) space-points (pradeśa) in the medium of motion (dharma), the medium of rest (adharma) and in each individual soul (jīva). (sūtra 58). Similarly, multitude of space-points is attributed to the atom with a single space-point, figuratively, from a certain point of view, called pūrvottarabhāva prajñāpana naya. But for the time (kāla) there is no multitude of space-points from either point of view, real and figurative. Therefore, the time (kāla) has no spatiality (kāyatva). Now a question is raised. In sūtra 5-7, it is mentioned that the medium of motion (dharma), the medium of rest (adharma) and the space (ākāśa) are also without-movement (niÈkriya). This would imply that the time (kāla) should be with-movement in the same manner as has been interpreted in case of the souls (jīva) and the forms of matter (pudgala). So, the time (kāla) should have been included in sūtra 5-6 before the space (ākāśa). No, it is not so. The time (kāla) should not 225 vè;k;&5 have been included there. If the time were included there, the substance (dravya) of the time (kāla) would be interpreted as an indivisible whole (i.e., one single continuum). Therefore, the time is mentioned separately here. What is the extent of the time if it is manifold? The static (niÈkriya) time-atoms (kālāõu) exist throughout the universe-space, each space-point (pradeśa) being occupied by one time-atom. It has been said in the Scripture: "The real time – niścaya kāla – is of the extent of the space-points of the universe, pervading the entire universe-space (lokākāśa). Each particle or unit of the real time is distinct and occupies one unit of space; these innumerable particles of real time, thus, exist in the entire universe-space, like heaps of jewels." (see 'DravyasaÉgraha', verse 22). The substances (dravya) that have multiple (many) space-points (pradeśa) exhibit the oblique-collection (tiryakpracaya or pradeśapracaya); tiryakpracaya is the collection of space-points (pradeśa) in all directions. The collection of multiple (many) 'samaya' is termed the upward-collection (ūrdhvapracaya). All substances (dravya) exhibit the ūrdhvapracaya since these undergo transformation in time (kāla) – the past, the present and the future. All substances (dravya), except the substance of time (kāla dravya), exhibit the tiryakpracaya. The substance of space (ākāśa dravya) has inactive (niścala), infinite (ananta) space-points (pradeśa). The substances of medium-of-motion (dharma dravya) and medium-of-rest (adharma dravya) have inactive (niścala), innumerable (asaÉkhyāta) spacepoints (pradeśa). The substance of soul (jīva) too has innumerable (asaÉkhyāta) space-points (pradeśa) but these are active since the soul (jīva) undergoes expansion and contraction. The substance of matter (pudgala dravya) has single space-point (pradeśa) with respect to its substance (dravya), however, due to its modes (paryāya) arising out of union with other atoms, it has two, numerable, innumerable, and infinite space-points (pradeśa). The substance of time (kāla dravya) has single space-point (pradeśa) since the atoms of time (kālāõu) do not unite. The five substances (dravya) – the space (ākāśa dravya), the medium-of-motion (dharma dravya), the medium-of-rest (adharma 226 Tattvārthasūtra dravya), the soul (jīva) and the matter (pudgala dravya) – exhibit the oblique-collection (tiryakpracaya); the substance of time (kāla dravya), being a substance of single space-point (pradeśa), does not exhibit the tiryakpracaya. All substances (dravya) exhibit the upwardcollection (ūrdhvapracaya). The upward-collection (ūrdhvapracaya) that the five substances (dravya) – the space (ākāśa dravya), the medium-of-motion (dharma dravya), the medium-of-rest (adharma dravya), the soul (jīva) and the matter (pudgala dravya) – exhibit is due to the instrumentality of the substance of time (kāla dravya); these undergo transformation due to the substance of time (kāla dravya). The mode 'samaya' of the time (kāla) causes transformation in the five substances. The upward-collection (ūrdhvapracaya) of time (kāla) causes the ūrdhvapracaya of the five substances (dravya). The upward-collection (ūrdhvapracaya) of time (kāla) is by the time (kāla) itself; its transformation is the mode 'samaya'. The time (kāla) itself is the substantive-cause (upādāna kāraõa) as well as the instrumentalcause (nimitta kāraõa) of the ūrdhvapracaya of the time (kāla). For the upward-collection (ūrdhvapracaya) of the other five substances (dravya), the substantive-cause (upādāna kāraõa) is the substance (dravya) itself and the instrumental-cause (nimitta kāraõa) is the ūrdhvapracaya of the substance of time (kāla). (see 'Pravacanasāra', p. 182-184). The existence of a substance is characterized by simultaneousness of origination (utpāda), destruction (vyaya), and permanence (dhrauvya). Without the space-points (pradeśa) of the substance (dravya), its existence cannot be maintained. If not even one spacepoint (pradeśa) is attributed to the substance of time (kāla), the root of its existence will vanish. One may argue, why not accept just the mode of 'samaya' without the existence of the atom of time (kālāõu)? The answer is that the mode of 'samaya' cannot sustain itself without the associated permanence (dhrauvya) of the substance (dravya) that is the atom of time (kālāõu). The support of the mode of 'samaya' is the atom of time (kālāõu) having just one space-point (pradeśa). With this scheme, the origination (utpāda), the destruction (vyaya), and the 227 vè;k;&5 permanence (dhrauvya) in the substance of time (kāla dravya) can occur simultaneously. Someone else may argue, why not consider the substance of time (kāla dravya) as one indivisible whole occupying the whole of the universe-space (lokākāśa), rather than as innumerable atoms of time (kālāõu) filling up the universe-space? The answer is that if the substance of time (kāla dravya) is one indivisible whole, the mode of 'samaya' cannot be established; only when the indivisible atom of matter (pudgala-paramāõu) traverses slowly from one spacepoint (pradeśa) to the other, the mode (paryāya) of the time 'samaya' appears as the time-atoms (kālāõu) are different in the two spacepoints. One may argue next that if the substance of time (kāla dravya) is considered to be an indivisible whole comprising innumerable space-points (pradeśa) filling up the universe-space (lokākāśa), as the indivisible atom of matter (pudgala-paramāõu) traverses slowly from one space-point (pradeśa) to the other, the mode (paryāya) of the time 'samaya' can be established. This argument entails great fault. If the substance of time (kāla dravya) is considered to be an indivisible whole, there can be no difference of mode (paryāya) of the time 'samaya'. As the indivisible atom of matter (pudgala-paramāõu) would traverse from one space-point (pradeśa) to another, it will encounter the same mode of the time 'samaya' in all space-points (pradeśa). There will be no difference of the time, that is, the 'samaya'. The mode of the time 'samaya' can only be established when the timeatoms (kālāõu) are different in different space-points (pradeśa) of the space (ākāśa). The argument has another fault. The substance of time (kāla dravya) does not exhibit the oblique-collection (tiryakpracaya); it exhibits only the upward-collection (ūrdhvapracaya). If the substance of time (kāla dravya) is considered to be an indivisible whole comprising innumerable space-points (pradeśa) filling up the universe (loka), it must exhibit the oblique-collection (tiryakpracaya). And then the oblique-collection (tiryakpracaya) must become the upwardcollection (ūrdhvapracaya). This is not tenable. The mode of the time 'samaya' can only be established when the substance of time (kāla dravya) is considered as comprising the atoms of time (kālāõu), each 228 Tattvārthasūtra occupying one space-point (pradeśa). (see 'Pravacanasāra', p. 187188). The extent of the real (mukhya) time (kāla), characterized by the instrumentality of change (vartanā) in substances, has been described. What is the extent of the conventional (vyavahāra) time, inferred from modifications in substances? lks¿uUrle;% AA40AA 1l%o og dky nzO; 1vuUr le;%o vuUr ^le;* okyk gSA ^le;* dky dh i;kZ; gSA ;|fi orZekudky ,d le;ek=k gh gS rFkkfi Hkwr&Hkfo"; dh vis{kk ls mlds vuUr ^le;* gSaA It (the conventional time) consists of infinite (ananta) instants (samaya). The present consists of one instant. Still the time is said to consist of infinite instants, as the instants of the past and the future are infinite. Otherwise, this sūtra is intended to determine the extent of the real (mukhya or niścaya) time (kāla). Though the point (unit) of the time is one 'samaya', it is spoken of figuratively as infinite (ananta), as it is the cause of the continuity of being – vartanā – underlying infinite modes (paryāya). Further, the 'samaya' is the smallest unit of the time, and multitudes of 'samaya' constitute 'āvalī', etc. The word 'samaya' is used in both senses – dravyārthika and paryāyārthika. The sense used in this sūtra is paryāyārthika. Both, the real-time (mukhya or niścaya kāla) and the conventionalor figurativeor empirical-time (vyavahāra kāla) are established. The 'samaya', the mode (paryāya), is the smallest unit of the empiricaltime (vyavahāra kāla); its multiples are 'āvalī', 'ucchvāsa', etc. Now the mode (paryāya) cannot exist without the possessor-of-the-mode 229 vè;k;&5 (paryāyī). Hence, the real-time (niścaya kāla) is also established. The substance (dravya) has been defined as that which has qualities (guõa) and modes (paryāya). (see sūtra 5-38). What are qualities? aeO;kJ;k fuxqZ.kk xq.kk% AA41AA 1aeO;kJ;ko tks fujUrj nzO; ds vkJ; ls gksa vkSj 1fuxqZ.kko Lo;a nwljs xq.kksa ls jfgr gksa 1xq.kk%o os xq.k gSaA Those which incessantly have substance (dravya) as their substratum and do not have qualities – nirguõā – are qualities (guõa). The term 'dravyāśraya' means the substance (dravya) as the substratum. Those which do not have qualities are 'nirguõā'. Those which are marked by both these attributes are qualities (guõa). The qualification 'without qualities' – nirguõā – excludes molecules of two atoms, etc. These molecules of two atoms, etc., have the substance (dravya) as their substratum and possess qualities. Therefore, these have been excluded by the qualification 'without qualities' – nirguõā. One may argue that modes (paryāya), like the pitcher, have substance as their substratum and are without qualities. So the term qualities (guõa) would apply to these (modes) also. But it is not so. The term 'dravyāśraya' implies that qualities must reside incessantly in the substance (dravya). Because of this qualification, the modes (paryāya), which are occasional, are not considered as the qualities (guõa). The word transformation – pariõāma – has been used several times (e.g., sūtra 5-37). What is the meaning of 'pariõāma'? 230 Tattvārthasūtra rko% ifj.kke% AA42AA 1rko%o tks nzO; dk LoHkko (futHkko] futrÙo) gS 1ifj.kke%o lks ifj.kke gSA The condition (change) of a substance is its transformation – pariõāma. Some say that qualities (guõa) are separate from the substance (dravya). Is that acceptable to you? No, says the commentator. From the point of view of designation (saÉjñā), etc., qualities (guõa) are different from the substance (dravya). Yet, from another point of view, qualities (guõa) are not different from the substance (dravya) as these are not found without the substance and are just its transformation – pariõāma. If it is so, what is transformation – pariõāma? It is explained as follows. The condition or form in which the substance, such as the medium of motion (dharma), exists is its transformation – pariõāma. The transformation – pariõāma – is of two kinds, beginningless (anādi) and with a beginning (sādi). The condition or form, i.e., pariõāma, of facilitating movement of the medium of motion (dharma) is, from the general (sāmānya) point of view, beginningless (anādi). From the specific (viśeÈa) point of view, the same is with a beginning (sādi). ] ] ] 231 vè;k;&5 AA bfr rÙokFkZlw=kkijukeeks{k'kkÐs iÛÓeks¿è;k;% lekIr% AA The activity (kriyā or karma) of the body (śarīra), the speech (vacana), and the mind (mana) is 'yoga'. INFLUX OF KARMAS C H A P T E R 6 dk;okÄ~eu%deZ ;ksx% AA1AA 1dk;okÄ~eu% deZo 'kjhj] opu vkSj eu dh fØ;k (vkRek ds izns'kksa dk ifjLiUn & gyu&pyu) 1;ksx%o ;ksx gSA The souls (jīva) and the non-souls (ajīva) have been expounded. Now the next category, influx (āsrava) of karmas, is expounded. The words body (śarīra), etc., have already been explained. 'Karma' and 'kriyā' are synonyms. The activity of the body (śarīra), the speech (vacana), and the mind (mana) is called 'yoga'. The vibration in the space-points (pradeśa) of the soul (ātmā) is yoga. Depending on the cause, yoga is threefold: bodily-activity (kāyayoga), speech-activity (vacanayoga) and thought-activity (manoyoga). These are elaborated as follows. Bodily-activity (kāyayoga) sets vibration in the spacepoints (pradeśa) of the soul (ātmā) on assimilation of one of the seven 1kinds of karmic-matter-fit-to-turn-into-body (kāyavargaõā) , consequent on destruction-cum-subsidence of the energy-obstructive 1 – Bodily-activity (kāyayoga) is of seven kinds depending on the specific karmic-matter-fit-to-turn-into-body (kāyavargaõā): audārika kāyayoga, audārika-miśra kāyayoga, vaikriyika kāyayoga, vaikriyika-miśra kāyayoga, āhāraka kāyayoga, āhāraka-miśra kāyayoga, and kārmaõa kāyayoga. (see 'Vasunandi Śrāvakācāra', verse 39, p. 47-48). 232 Tattvārthasūtra (vīryāntarāya) karmas. Speech-activity (vacanayoga) sets vibration in the space-points (pradeśa) of the soul (ātmā) by the mode (paryāya) of speech, on attainment of the capacity for speech due to rise of the physique-making name-karma (śarīra nāmakarma) on assimilation of the karmic-matter-fit-to-turn-into-speech (vacanavargaõā), consequent on destruction-cum-subsidence of the energy-obstructive (vīryāntarāya) and sensory-and-words-covering (matyakÈarāvaraõa) karmas. Thought-activity (manoyoga) sets vibration in the spacepoints (pradeśa) of the soul (ātmā) on the availabilty of the internal cause of destruction-cum-subsidence of the energy-obstructive (vīryāntarāya) and quasi-sense-covering (noindriyāvaraõa) karmas and the external cause of assimilation of the karmic-matter-fit-toturn-into-thought (manovargaõā). Know that the vibration in the space-points (pradeśa) of the soul (ātmā) of the Omniscient-withvibration (sayogakevalī) due to the three kinds of the karmic-matterfit-to-turn-into-karmas (vargaõā) also is 'yoga', even though his energy-obstructive (vīryāntarāya) and knowledge-obscuring (jñānāvaraõa) karmas have been destroyed. The threefold nature of activity – yoga – is admitted. But what is the mark (lakÈaõa) of influx (āsrava)? For the worldly souls, 'yoga' is influx (āsrava). l vkÏo% AA2AA 1l%o og ;ksx 1vkÏo%o vkÏo gSA The activity of the body, the speech, and the mind – the 'yoga' – is the influx (āsrava). Just as the gate from which the water flows into the lake is called 'āsrava', similarly the activity or 'yoga', which is the conduit for the flow of karmic matter into the soul, is called the influx (āsrava). 233 vè;k;&6 Karmas are said to be of two kinds, merit (puõya) and demerit (pāpa). Is activity or yoga the cause of inflow of these two kinds of karmas indiscriminately, or is there any distinction? This question is answered in the next sūtra. 'kqHk% iq.;L;k'kqHk% ikiL; AA3AA 1'kqHk%o 'kqHk ;ksx 1iq.;L;o iq.; deZ ds vkÏo esa dkj.k gS vkSj 1v'kqHk%o v'kqHk ;ksx 1ikiL;o iki deZ ds vkÏo esa dkj.k gSA Auspicious activity – śubhayoga – is the cause of merit (puõya) and inauspicious activity – aśubhayoga – is the cause of demerit (pāpa). What is auspicious activity – śubhayoga – and what is inauspicious activity – aśubhayoga? Killing, stealing, copulation, etc., are inauspicious bodily-activities. Falsehood, harsh and uncivil language, etc., are inauspicious speech-activities. Thoughts of violence, envy, calumny, etc., are inauspicious thought-activities. The opposite of these are auspicious bodily-activities, speech-activities and thoughtactivities. How is activity classified into auspicious or inauspicious? That activity (yoga) which is the consequence of virtuous disposition (pariõāma) is auspicious (śubha) activity. That activity (yoga) which is the consequence of wicked disposition (pariõāma) is inauspicious (aśubha) activity. The distinction is not based on whether the activity is the cause of engendering either the auspicious (śubha) or the inauspicious (aśubha) karmas. If it were so, there would be no virtuous activity as bondage of any kind of karmas is undesirable and even virtuous activities are admitted to be the cause of bondage of karmas, like the knowledge-obscuring karmas. Therefore the purity or impurity of the disposition behind the activity, as mentioned above, is 234 Tattvārthasūtra the appropriate mark (lakÈaõa) of the auspicious or inauspicious activity. That which purifies the soul or by which the soul is purified is merit (puõya); merit is the cause of happy-feeling (sātā-vedanīya), etc. That which sullies the soul is demerit (pāpa); demerit is the cause of unhappy-feeling (asātāvedanīya), etc. Is this influx (āsrava) the same with regard to its effect in case of all mundane beings, or is there any distinction? The answer is given in the next sūtra. ld"kk;kd"kk;;ks% lkEijkf;ds;kZiFk;ks% AA4AA 1ld"kk;L; lkEijkf;dL;o d"kk;lfgr tho ds lalkj ds dkj.k:i (lkEijkf;d) deZ dk vkÏo gksrk gS vkSj 1vd"kk;L; bZ;kZiFkL;o d"kk;jfgr tho ds bZ;kZiFk deZ dk vkÏo gksrk gSA Activity (yoga) with-passions (sakaÈāya) and withoutpassions (akaÈāya) causes influx (āsrava) of karmas, those that extend transmigration – sāmparāyika – and those that shorten transmigration – īryāpatha, respectively. Influx (āsrava) is different according to the originator-soul. Originator-souls are of two kinds, with-passions (sakaÈāya) and without-passions (akaÈāya). Passions are called 'kaÈāya' – literally, decoction of red colour – since these stain the soul through influx (āsrava) of the karmic matter. The passions are anger (krodha), pride (māna), deceitfulness (māyā) and greed (lobha). The person actuated by passions is 'sakaÈāya' and the person free from passions is 'akaÈāya'. Transmigration is same as 'samparāya'. The activity (yoga), or karma, that extends transmigration is 'sāmparāyika'. The activity (yoga), or karma, caused by vibrations, but without passions, 235 vè;k;&6 is called 'īryāpatha'. These are taken respectively. Influx of 'sāmparāyika' karmas takes place in case of persons with-passions (sakaÈāya) and who are wrong-believers (mithyādÃÈÇi). Thus, influx of 'sāmparāyika' karmas takes place from the first stage 'mithyādÃÈÇi' up to the tenth stage 'sūkÈmasāmparāya' of spiritual development (guõasthāna). And influx of the 'īryāpatha' karmas takes place in case of saints free from passions, from the eleventh stage 'upaśāntakaÈāya' till the thirteenth stage 'sayogakevalī'. The 'īryāpatha' karmas do not have the power to bind with the soul. Subdivisions of influx (āsrava) of 'sāmparāyika' karmas are given next. bfUae;d"kk;kozrfØ;k% iÛÓprq%iÛÓiÛÓ o'kfrla[;k% iwoZL; Hksnk% AA5AA 1bfUnz;kf.k iÛÓo Li'kZu vkfn ik¡p bfUnz;k¡ 1d"kk;k% prq%o Øks/kfn pkj d"kk; 1vozrkfu iÛÓo glk bR;kfn ik¡p vozr vkSj 1fØ;k% iÛÓ o'kfro lE;DRo vkfn iPphl izdkj dh fØ;k;sa 1la[;k% Hksnk%o bl izdkj dqy 39 Hksn 1iwoZL;o igys (lkEijkf;d) vkÏo ds gSa] vFkkZr~ bu loZ Hksnksa ds }kjk lkEijkf;d vkÏo gksrk gSA The subdivisions of the former – influx (āsrava) of 'sāmparāyika' karmas – are the senses (indriya), the passions (kaÈāya), the vowlessness (avrata) and the activities (kriyā), of five, four, five, and twenty-five kinds, respectively. Here five, etc., are taken respectively with the senses, etc. The senses are five. The passions are four. The vowlessness is of five kinds. The activities are of twenty-five kinds. The five senses (indriya) are touch 236 Tattvārthasūtra (sparśana), taste (rasanā), smell (ghrāõa), sight (cakÈu) and hearing (śrotra). (see sūtra 2-19). The four passions (kaÈāya) are anger (krodha), pride (māna), deceitfulness (māyā) and greed (lobha). The five kinds of vowlessness (avrata) are injury (hiÉsā), falsehood (anÃta), stealing (steya), unchastity (abrahma) and attachment-to-possessions (parigraha) which will be explained later. The twenty-five activities (kriyā) are as follows. 1. Worship, etc., of the (true) deity, the preceptor and the Scripture that strengthens right faith is 'samyaktva kriyā'. 2. Due to the rise of wrong-belief (mithyātva), worship, etc., of the (false) deity and others, which perverts right-faith is 'mithyātva kriyā'. 3. The tendency of bodily and other activities for going and coming is 'prayoga kriyā'. 4. The tendency of the ascetic to transgress his vows is 'samādāna kriyā'. 5. The activity of the ascetic that helps in walking carefully (preventing injury) is 'īryāpatha kriyā'. These are five activities. 6. Acting in anger is 'prādoÈikī kriyā'. 7. Attempt of a wicked person to act in evil ways is 'kāyikī kriyā'. 8. The activity of taking weapons that cause injury is 'ādhikaraõikī kriyā'. 9. Causing pain to self or others is 'pāritāpikī kriyā'. 10. Harming vitalities such as life, sense-organs, energy and respiration is 'prāõātipātikī kriyā'. These make up five activities. 11. The desire originating from infatuation to see beautiful forms is 'darśana kriyā'. 12. The desire to touch, again and again, animate objects is 'sparśana kriyā'. 13. Inventing novel objects that assist sensual pleasures is 'prātyāyikī kriyā'. 14. Leaving excrement in places frequented by men, women and animals is 'samantānupātinī kriyā'. 15. Laying the body etc. on the ground without examining or cleaning it is 'anābhoga kriyā'. These, again, are five activities. 16. Doing by one's own hand what should be done by others is 'svahasta kriyā'. 17. According approval to wicked activities is 'nisarga kriyā'. 18. Publicizing sins committed by others is 'vidāraõa kriyā'. 19. Wilful misinterpretation of the Scripture, on rise of the conduct-deluding karmas, when unable to carry out the injunctions 237 vè;k;&6 contained therein is 'ājñāvyāpādikī kriyā'. 20. The indifference to observe the injunctions laid down in the Scripture owing to dishonesty or laziness is 'anākańkÈākriyā'. These five activities pollute the conduct. 21. Indulgence in activities such as piercing, striking, slaughtering, and so on, or feeling delight when these are committed by others is 'prārambha kriyā'. 22. Persevering in one's attachment to worldly objects is 'pārigrāhikī kriyā'. 23. Deceitful practice in regard to knowledge, faith, etc., is 'māyā kriyā'. 24. Corroborating another's wrong belief by praising actions based on it is 'mithyādarśana kriyā'. 25. Not renouncing what should be renounced, owing to the rise of karmas hindering restraint, is 'apratyākhyāna kriyā'. These five activities provide nourishment to influx (āsrva) of karmas. (see also 'Harivańśapurāõa', p. 667-668). The senses, the passions, the vowlessness and the activities are the causes, and the effect is influx (āsrava) of 'sāmparāyika' karmas which lead to the cycle of births and deaths. The threefold activity (yoga) is common to all living beings, except the liberated souls (mukta jīva). Does it mean that there is no difference in the bondage of karmas and the enjoyment of fruit? No, it is not so. Though the activities are found in all living beings, these are of infinite varieties according to the dispositions behind these. This is explained in the next sūtra. rhozeUnKkrkKkrHkkokfèkdj.koh;Zfo'ks"ksH;Lrf}'ks"k% AA6AA 1rhozeUnKkrkKkrHkkokfèkdj.k&oh;Z&fo'ks"ksH;%o rhozHkko] eUnHkko] KkrHkko] vKkrHkko] vf/dj.kfo'ks"k vkSj oh;Zfo'ks"k ls 1rf}'ks"k%o vkÏo esa fo'ks"krk & ghukf/drk & gksrh gSA Influx (āsrava) is differentiated on the basis of 238 Tattvārthasūtra intenseness (tīvra) or mildness (manda) of disposition (bhāva), intentional (jñāta) or unintentional (ajñāta) nature of disposition (bhāva), the substratum (adhikaraõa), and distinct-potency (vīryaviśeÈa) of disposition (bhāva). Owing to the external and internal causes, the disposition (bhāva) may be intense (tīvra) and at other times it may be mild or feeble (manda). One proceeds with the intention of killing a being. This is intentional (jñātabhāva), for it is done knowingly. Another performs the same action out of intoxication or negligence. This is unintentional (ajñātabhāva), as it is done unknowingly. The substratum (adhikaraõa) is the receptacle of the substance. Its energy is its distinct-potency (vīryaviśeÈa). The word 'bhāva' – disposition – is added to all qualifications mentioned. Owing to differences in these causes, the nature of influx (āsrava) differs as difference in the cause (kāraõa) leads to difference in the effect (kārya). The word 'adhikaraõa' – substratum – has not been explained. The word 'adhikaraõa' and its subdivisions are explained next. vfèkdj.ka thokthok% AA7AA 1vf/dj.kao vf/dj.k 1thokthok%o tho vkSj vtho ,sls nks Hksn:i gS_ bldk vFkZ ;g gS fd vkRek esa tks dekZÏo gksrk gS mlesa nks izdkj dk fufeÙk gksrk gS_ ,d tho fufeÙk vkSj nwljk vtho fufeÙkA The substrata (adhikaraõa) are in form of living (jīva) and the non-living (ajīva). 239 vè;k;&6 The characteristic attributes of the soul (the living) and the non-soul (the non-living) have been explained already. If so, why are these mentioned again? It is to indicate specifically that these constitute the substrata (adhikaraõa), and to indicate their special property as substrata (adhikaraõa). What is it? It is their condition of being the instruments of injury (hiÉsā), and so on. It is contended that the soul (the living) and the non-soul (the non-living) are two, and so the dual, and not the plural, should have been used in the sūtra. But it is not so, for the modes (paryāya) of these constitute the substrata. The substance possessed of specific modes (paryāya) is the substratum, and not mere substance. Hence the plural is used. The soul (the living) and the non-soul (the non-living) are the substrata of what? From the context it means that these are the substrata of influx (āsrava). The living (jīva) substratum (adhikaraõa) is described first. vk|a lajEHklekjEHkkjEHk;ksxdrdkfjrkuqerd"kk;& fo'ks"kSfL=kfL=kfL=kÜÓrqÜÓSd'k% AA8AA 1vk|ao igyk vFkkZr~ tho vf/dj.k&vkÏo 1lajEHklekjEHkkjEHk;ksx Ñrdkfjrkuqerd"kk;fo'ks"kS% po lajEHk&lekjEHk&vkjEHk] eu&opu&dk;:i rhu ;ksx] Ñr&dkfjr&vuqeksnuk rFkk Øksèkkfn pkj d"kk;ksa dh fo'ks"krk ls 1f=k% f=k% f=k% prq% ,d'k%o ijLij feykus ls (3  3 3 4 3⁄4 108) Hksn:i gSA The first, living-substratum (jīvādhikaraõa) of influx (āsrava), is of three kinds in terms of planning (saÉrambha), preparation (samārambha) and 240 Tattvārthasūtra commencement (ārambha); of three kinds in terms of (three kinds of) 'yoga'; of three kinds in terms of doing (kÃta), causing it done (kārita) and approval (anumata); of four kinds in terms of (four kinds of) passions (kaÈāya). All these, with their combinations, are of one hundred and eight kinds. Formulating a plan to commit violence, etc., is planning (saÉrambha). Collecting necessary materials for its execution is preparation (samārambha). Commencement of it is 'ārambha'. The threefold activity (yoga) has already been explained as bodily-activity (kāyayoga), speech-activity (vacanayoga) and thought-activity (manoyoga). To perform an action by oneself is doing (kÃta). To get it performed by another is causing it done (kārita). Endorsement of what has been done by another is approval (anumata). Anger (krodha), pride (māna), deceitfulness (māyā) and greed (lobha) are the four passions (kaÈāya). The word 'viśeÈa' differentiates one thing from another. It is added to every term: planning, preparation, and so on. The substratum of the living comprises combination of all these – the first of three kinds, the second of three kinds, the third of three kinds, and the fourth of four kinds. The living-substratum (jīvādhikaraõa) due to planning (saÉrambha) is of thirty-six kinds as under: bodily-planning (kāya-saÉrambha) is of twelve kinds: anger-doing-bodily-planning (krodha-kÃta-kāyasaÉrambha), pride-doing-bodily-planning (māna-kÃta-kāyasaÉrambha), deceitfulness-doing-bodily-planning (māyā-kÃta-kāyasaÉrambha), greed-doing-bodily-planning (lobha-kÃta-kāyasaÉrambha), anger-others-bodily-planning (krodha-kārita-kāyasaÉrambha), pride-others-bodily-planning (māna-kārita-kāyasaÉrambha), deceitfulness-others-bodily-planning (māyā-kāritakāya-saÉrambha), greed-others-bodily-planning (lobha-kārita-kāyasaÉrambha), anger-approval-bodily-planning (krodha-anumatakāya-saÉrambha), pride-approval-bodily-planning (māna-anumata241 vè;k;&6 kāya-saÉrambha), deceitfulness-approval-bodily-planning (māyāanumata-kāya-saÉrambha), and greed-approval-bodily-planning (lobha-anumata-kāya-saÉrambha). Similarly, the living-substratum (jīvādhikaraõa) due to speech-planning (vacana-saÉrambha) is of twelve kinds, and due to thought-planning (mana-saÉrambha) too is of twelve kinds. These make up thirty-six. In the same manner, there are thirty-six kinds of the livingsubstratum (jīvādhikaraõa) due to preparation (samārambha), and another thirty-six kinds due to commencement (ārambha). All three add up to one hundred and eight. The term 'ca' is intended to include the subtypes of each of the passions (kaÈāya): that which leads to endless worldly existence (anantānubandhī), that which hinders partial self-discipline (apratyākhyāna), that which hinders complete self-discipline (pratyākhyāna), and that which hinders perfect rightconduct (saÉjvalana). The non-living (ajīva) substratum (adhikaraõa) is described next. fuoZrZukfu{ksila;ksxfulxkZ f}prq£}f=kHksnk% ije~ AA9AA 1ije~o nwljk vthokfèkdj.k vkÏo 1fuoZrZuk f}o nks izdkj dh fuoZrZuk 1fu{ksi prq%o pkj izdkj ds fu{ksi 1la;ksx f}o nks izdkj ds la;ksx vkSj 1fulxkZ f=kHksnk%o rhu izdkj ds fulxZ ,sls dqy 11 Hksn:i gSA The non-living (ajīva) substratum (adhikaraõa) comprises production (nirvartanā), placing (nikÈepa), combining (saÉyoga) and activation (nisarga) of two, four, two, and three kinds, respectively. The word 'param' – the rest – indicates that the sūtra refers to nonliving (ajīva) substratum (adhikaraõa) and not to be understood as 242 Tattvārthasūtra subdivisions of the living (jīva) substratum. 'Nirvartanā' means execution or production. 'NikÈepa' means placing. 'SaÉyoga' means combining. 'Nisarga' means activation. The substratum 'nirvartanā' or production is of two kinds, production of the primary attributes (mūlaguõa nirvartanā) and production of the secondary attributes (uttaraguõa nirvartanā). The first is of five kinds, namely, production of the body, speech, mind, inhalation and exhalation. Making objects of wood, clay, etc., or pictures, comprise the second kind. The substratum 'nikÈepa' or placing is of four kinds. Placing things on the floor without examining for insects, etc., is apratyavekÈita nikÈepādhikaraõa. Placing things without properly cleaning the floor is duÈpramuÈÇa nikÈepādhikaraõa. Placing the books, the water-pot, the body, etc., quickly in a hurry is sahasā nikÈepādhikaraõa. Placing things anywhere without care and not in an orderly fashion is anābhoga nikÈepādhikaraõa. The substratum 'saÉyoga' or combining or mixing is of two kinds. Mixing food, drink, etc., inappropriately is bhaktapāna saÉyogādhikaraõa. Handling and assembling together things and implements without proper discrimination is upakaraõa saÉyogādhikaraõa. The substratum 'nisarga' or activation is of three kinds. Activation of the body is kāyanisargādhikaraõa. Activation of the speech is vacananisargādhikaraõa. Activation of the mind is manonisargādhikaraõa. The non-living (ajīva) substratum (adhikaraõa) of influx (āsrava) is thus described. Influx (āsrava) of karmas, in general, has been explained. Now the causes of influx of specific karmas must be described. What causes influx of the first two kinds of karmas – knowledge-obscuring (jñānāvaraõa) and faith-obscuring (darśanāvaraõa)? rRiznks"kfuÉoekRl;kZUrjk;klknuksi?kkrk Kkun'kZukoj.k;ks% AA10AA 243 vè;k;&6 1rRiznks"k fuÉo ekRl;kZUrjk;klknuksi?kkrk%o Kku vkSj n'kZu ds lEcU/ eas djus eas vk;s gq;s iznks"k] fuÉo] ekRl;Z] vUrjk;] vklknu vkSj mi?kkr ;s 1Kkun'kZukoj.k;ks%o Kkukoj.k rFkk n'kZukoj.k dekZÏo ds dkj.k gSaA Spite against knowledge – pradoÈa, concealment of knowledge – nihnava, non-imparting of knowledge out of envy – mātsarya, causing impediment to acquisition of knowledge – antarāya, disregard of knowledge – āsādana, and disparagement of true knowledge – upaghāta, lead to the influx (āsrava) of knowledge-obscuring (jñānāvaraõa) and faith-obscuring (darśanāvaraõa) karmas. When someone is giving an exposition of true knowledge, which is the means to the attainment of liberation, another person is spiteful and malignant in his attitude towards it. This is spite (pradoÈa). A person seeking knowledge approaches a learned man. But the learned man for some reason or other conceals his knowledge saying that he is ignorant. This is concealment (nihnava) of knowledge. A man is learned. And knowledge is a worthy gift to be given. But out of envy he does not teach others. This is envy (mātsarya). Impediment (antarāya) is placing obstacles in the way of a person acquiring knowledge. Disregard (āsādana) is renouncing by word or deed knowledge taught by another. Blaming true knowledge or calling it false is disparagement (upaghāta). What is the difference between disregard (āsādana) and disparagement (upaghāta)? Lack of veneration or nonappreciation of true knowledge is disregard (āsādana). But disparagement (upaghāta) is condemning true knowledge as false with the idea of destroying it. Thus there is difference between the two. The word 'tad' – 'that' – in the sūtra refers to knowledge and perception. But it is contended that these are not the subjects under discussion, nor have these been mentioned. How, then, can these be indicated by 'that'? 244 Tattvārthasūtra The reply is that it can be done from the point of view of the question. 'What causes influx of knowledgeand perception-obscuring karmas?' is the question. So, from the point of view of the question, 'that' refers to knowledge and perception. It means spite, etc., towards the learned possessed of knowledge and perception, and their means, as these are the basis of knowledge and perception. These (spite, etc.) are the causes of knowledgeand perception-obscuring karmas. It is seen that the same cause can produce several effects. In the same manner, spite, etc., can cause the influx of both knowledgeand perception-obscuring karmas. Or spite, etc., relating to knowledge cause the influx of knowledge-obscuring karmas. And those relating to perception cause the influx of karmas which obscure perception. The causes of the influx of knowledgeand perception-obscuring karmas have been described. The causes of the influx of the feelingproducing (vedanīya) karmas are described next. nq%[k'kksdrkikØUnuoèkifjnsoukU;kReijksHk;& LFkkukU;l}s|L; AA11AA 1vkReijksHk;LFkkukfuo vius esa] ij eas vkSj nksuksa ds fo"k; esa fLFkr 1nq%[k'kksdrkikØUnuo/ifjnsoukfuo nq%[k] 'kksd] rki] vkØUnu] o/ vkSj ifjnsou (vfrlaDys'kiwoZd jksuk&ihVuk) & ;s 1vl}s|L;o vlkrkosnuh; deZ ds vkÏo ds dkj.k gaSA Suffering (duÍkha), sorrow (śoka), agony (tāpa), moaning (ākrandana), injury (vadha) and lamentation (parivedana), in oneself, in others, or in both, lead to the influx (āsrava) of karmas that cause unpleasant-feeling (asātā vedanīya). 245 vè;k;&6 Suffering (duÍkha) is the feeling of pain. The feeling of sadness at the loss or separation of desirable or useful things is sorrow (śoka). The feeling of distress owing to disgrace is agony (tāpa). Moaning (ākrandana) is weeping loudly out of anguish. Injury (vadha) is depriving one of life, the senses, strength or vigour, and respiration. Lamentation (parivedana) is the loud outcry (wailing) of an afflicted person by recalling the achievements of the departed and giving expression to these in order to evoke sympathy in others and secure help to oneself and others. Now, since sorrow (śoka), etc., are only subdivisions of suffering (duÍkha), there is no need to include all these. It is of course true. Still it is desirable or useful to mention a few subdivisions or species belonging to the genus or class to facilitate understanding. When the word 'cow' is not understood, then the particulars such as broken horns, black, white, etc., are mentioned in order to make it understood. Influx caused by suffering is possible in innumerable times the spatial units of the universe. Mention of only 'suffering' (duÍkha) would not have highlighted its numerous subdivisions. Therefore, a few of its subdivisions are mentioned in order to bring home the countless varieties of suffering. Owing to the presence of anger, etc., these may arise in oneself, in others and in both. All these lead to the influx (āsrava) of karmas which cause unpleasant-feeling (asātā vedanīya). If it is so, why should the followers of the Arhat practise and preach to others such things as pulling out the hair, fasting, standing in the sun, and so on? These cause suffering to them and to others. It is true but there is nothing wrong in it. The suffering caused by internal passions, such as anger, alone leads to the influx of karmas which cause unpleasant-feeling (asātā vedanīya). A compassionate surgeon who operates a painful boil on the body of an ascetic free from stings does not attract demerit (pāpa) though, in the process, he causes suffering. The presence of mere external cause (without the presence of passions) does not produce influx (āsrava). In the same way, the ascetic who is restive on seeing great misery of the worldly existence and is determined to destroy its cause, practises what is laid down in the 246 Tattvārthasūtra Scripture with perfect equanimity in order to attain liberation. Since there is no evil feeling or wrath or anger even in the presence of suffering, there is no bondage of demerit. It has been proclaimed: "The implements used in curing the disease are not seen as the causes of pain or pleasure; the person undergoing treatment experiences pain or pleasure. Similarly, the ways and means adopted in traversing the path to liberation are not seen as the causes of pain or pleasure; the person treading the path experiences pain or pleasure." The causes that lead to the influx of karmas which bring about unpleasant-feeling (asātā vedanīya) have been described. Now the causes of the influx of karmas that produce pleasant-feeling (sātā vedanīya) are described. HkwrozR;uqdEiknkuljkxla;ekfn;ksx% {kkfUr% 'kkSpfefr l}s|L; AA12AA 1HkwrozR;uqdEiko izkf.k;ksa ds izfr vkSj ozr/kfj;ksa ds izfr vuqdEik&n;k 1nkuljkxla;ekfn;ksx%o nku] ljkxla;e vkfn ds ;ksx 1{kkfUr% 'kkSpfefro {kkfUr vkSj 'kkSp bR;kfn 1l}s|L;o lkrkosnuh; deZ ds vkÏo ds dkj.k gaSA Compassion (anukampā) towards the living-beings (bhūta) in general and the devout (vratī) in particular, charity (dāna), restraint-with-attachment 1(sarāgasaÉyama), etc. , contemplation on the 1 – These are: restraint-with-attachment (sarāgasaÉyama), restraintcum-non-restraint (saÉyamāsaÉyama), involuntary-dissociation (akāmanirjarā) and childish-austerities (bālatapa). 247 vè;k;&6 aforementioned, equanimity (kÈānti), and purity (śauca) – freedom-from-greed – lead to the influx (āsrava) of karmas that cause pleasant-feeling (sātā vedanīya). Living-beings (bhūta) are those who are born in different conditions of existence owing to the rise of karmas. The devout (vratī) are those who observe the five vows such as non-injury (ahiÉsā). They are the householders, called 'saÉyatāsaÉyata', and the ascetics, called 'saÉyata', who renounce the world. Fellow-feeling for or distress at the sufferings of others, as if these were one's own, is compassion (anukampā). Compassion is towards all living beings in general and to those who practise the five vows in particular. Bestowing gifts on others with the object of benefiting them is charity (dāna). The one who makes an effort to put an end to worldly existence, but has not given up his attachment (rāga), is called 'sarāga'. To restrain oneself from undesirable activities towards living-beings and control one's senses is 'saÉyama' – restraint. The 'saÉyama' – restraint – of one who is with attachment (sarāga), or restraint-with-attachment, is 'sarāgasaÉyama'. 'SaÉyamasaÉyama', 'akāmanirjarā', and 'bālatapa' are also included by the word 'ādi'. 'Yoga' is concentration or application of the mind. The application of the mind in these – compassion (anukampā), charity (dāna), and restraint-withattachment (sarāgasaÉyama), etc. – is intended in the sūtra. Equanimity (kÈānti) is the renunciation of the four passions (kaÈāya) like anger (krodha). Freedom-from-greed is purity (śauca). The word 'iti' in the sūtra indicates 'these types'. Thus, the worship of Lord Arhat and rendering help or service – vaiyāvÃattya – to the young and the old ascetics are also included herein. Though the term livingbeings (bhūta) includes those who observe vows, they are mentioned separately in order to indicate that they deserve compassion chiefly or pre-eminently. All these lead to the influx (āsrava) of karmas that cause pleasant-feeling (sātā vedanīya). The causes of the influx (āsrava) of deluding (mohanīya) karmas are to 248 Tattvārthasūtra be described next. Deluding (mohanīya) karmas are of two kinds, faith-deluding (darśanamohanīya), and conduct-deluding (cāritramohanīya). The causes of the influx of the former are mentioned next. dsofyJqrla?kèkeZnsoko.kZoknks n'kZueksgL; AA13AA 1dsofyJqrla?k/eZnsoko.kZokn%o dsoyh] Jqr] la?k] /eZ vkSj nso dk vo.kZokn (vfo|eku nks"kksa dk izpkj) djuk lks 1n'kZueksgL;o n'kZueksguh; deZ ds vkÏo dk dkj.k gSA Attributing faults to the Omniscient (kevalī), the Scripture (śruta), the congregation of ascetics (saÉgha), the true religion (dharma) and the celestial-beings (deva), leads to the influx (āsrava) of faith-deluding (darśanamohanīya) karmas. Those whose knowledge is without obstruction are the Omniscients (kevalī). They possess perfect knowledge. The most worthy disciples, called gaõadhara, having exceptional brilliance and accomplishment, compose sacred texts that expound the Lord's teachings. These holy texts are the Scripture (śruta). The fraternity of ascetics equipped with the trio of right faith, right knowledge, and right conduct – ratnatraya – is the congregation of ascetics – saÉgha. The religion (dharma) consists in non-injury (ahiÉsā), as expounded in the Scripture. The four orders of celestial-beings (deva) have already been described in Chapter 4. Attributing faults to, or slandering, the great ones described above is 'avarõavāda'. This is the cause of influx of faith-deluding (darśanamohanīya) karmas. Examples of attributing faults – avarõavāda – are: The Omniscients eat morsels of food and conduct themselves like ordinary men. The Scripture recommends 249 vè;k;&6 meat-eating and drinking of wine. The ascetics are base-born and lack in cleanliness, etc. The religion taught by Lord Jina (Tīrthańkara) is devoid of merit; those who follow it will be reborn as demons. The celestial-beings eat meat and drink wine. The causes of the influx of the second variety of deluding (mohanīya) karmas, conduct-deluding (cāritramohanīya), are described now. d"kk;ksn;kÙkhozifj.kkeÜÓkfj=keksgL; AA14AA 1d"kk;ksn;kr~o d"kk; ds mn; ls 1rhozifj.kke%o rhoz ifj.kke gksuk lks 1pkfj=keksgL;o pkfj=k eksguh; ds vkÏo dk dkj.k gSA Intense dispositions induced by the rise of the passions (kaÈāya) cause the influx (āsrava) of conduct-deluding (cāritramohanīya) karmas. The passions (kaÈāya) – anger, pride, deceitfulness and greed – have already been described (sūtra 2-6 and 6-4). Rise is ripening. Intense dispositions owing to the rise of passions (kaÈāya) are the cause of the influx (āsrava) of the conduct-deluding (cāritramohanīya) karmas. Actuating passions in self, engendering passions in others, debasing the conduct of the ascetics, embracing the guise of an ascetic and vows with a distressed mind, and so on, lead to the influx of passions-feeling – kaÈāyavedanīya – karmas. Then there are dispositions that lead to the influx of quasi-passions-feeling – akaÈāyavedanīya – karmas. Ridiculing right conduct, laughing at those in distress or misery, chuckling in wicked sport, excessive prattle and laughter, and so on, cause the influx of laughter – hāsya vedanīya – karmas. Desire for strange pleasures, disrelish of vows and minor vows, and so on, cause the influx of pleasure or liking – rati vedanīya – karmas. Promoting dissatisfaction in others, destroying the pleasures of others, association with the wicked, and so on, lead to the influx of disliking – arati vedanīya – karmas. Bewailing oneself, plunging others into 250 Tattvārthasūtra sorrow, rejoicing at others' lamentation, and so on, cause the influx of sorrow – śoka vedanīya – karmas. Engulfing self with fear, causing fear in others, and so on, lead to the influx of fear – bhaya vedanīya – karmas. Disgust at noble deeds and virtuous conduct, taking interest in slandering, and so on, cause the influx of disgust – jugupsā vedanīya – karmas. Speaking what is untrue, playing tricks upon others, prying into others' faults or weaknesses, intense attachment, and so on, cause the influx of the female-sex-inclination – strī vedanīya – karmas. Slight anger, mildness, contentment with one's wife, and so on, cause the influx of the male-sex-inclination – puruÈa vedanīya – karmas. Great or intense passions, causing injury to concealed parts, assaulting other's wife, and so on, lead to the influx of the neuter-sexinclination – napuÉsaka vedanīya – karmas. The causes of the influx of deluding (mohanīya) karmas have been described. The causes of the influx (āsrava) of life-determining (āyuÍ) karmas will now be mentioned. First the causes of the influx of karmas that give rise to life in which the fruits are experienced till the end is mentioned. càkjEHkifjxzgRoa ukjdL;k;q"k% AA15AA 1càkjEHkifjxzgRoao cgqr vkjEHk vkSj cgqr ifjxzg dk Hkko gksuk lks 1ukjdL;k;qq"k%o ujdk;q ds vkÏo dk dkj.k gSA The influx (āsrava) of karmas which lead to life (āyuÍ) in the infernal regions is caused by dispositions of excessive activity that result in infliction of pain – ārambha – and attachment to possessions – parigraha. 'Ārambha' is activity which causes pain and suffering to the livingbeings. 'Parigraha' is attachment to possessions, namely, entertaining the thought that 'this object is mine'. The adjective 251 vè;k;&6 'excessive' applies to both. Thus, excessive infliction of pain and excessive attachment to possessions cause the influx (āsrava) of lifekarma (āyuÍ) which leads to birth in hell (naraka). Perpetual cruel activity such as killing, appropriating others' wealth, excessive attachment to worldly objects and black (kÃÈõa) thought-colouration (leśyā) with cruel-concentration (raudradhyāna) at the time of death – these cause the influx of life-karma (āyuÍ) which leads to birth in the infernal regions. The influx of life-karma leading to birth in the infernal regions has been described. Now the influx of life-karma causing birth in the animal world must be explained. ek;k rS;ZX;ksuL; AA16AA 1ek;ko ek;k 1rS;ZX;ksuL;o fr;±pk;q ds vkÏo dk dkj.k gSA Deceitfulness (māyā) causes the influx (āsrava) of karmas which lead to life (āyuÍ) in the animal and vegetable world – tiryańca. Deceitful disposition of the soul caused by the particular conductdeluding (cāritramohanīya) karma produces the influx of life-karma which leads to birth in the animal and vegetable world – tiryańca. The preaching of religion from a perverted attitude, lack of good conduct and propriety, desire for cheating others, blue (nīla) and grey (kāpota) thought-colouration (leśyā) with sorrowful-concentration (ārtadhyāna) at the time of death are the varieties of deceitful conduct. The cause of the influx of life-karma leading to birth in the animal and vegetable world has been explained. What is the cause of the influx of life-karma leading to birth as a human being? 252 Tattvārthasūtra vYikjEHkifjxzgRoa ekuq"kL; AA17AA 1vYikjEHkifjxzgRoao vYi vkjEHk vkSj vYi ifjxzgius dk Hkko 1ekuq"kL;o euq";k;q ds vkÏo dk dkj.k gSaA The influx (āsrava) of karmas which lead to life as a human-being (manuÈya) is caused by dispositions of slight activity that result in infliction of pain – ārambha – and attachment to possessions – parigraha. The causes of the influx of karmas which lead to birth in the infernal regions have already been described. The opposites of these cause the influx of karmas which lead to birth as a human being. To elaborate, the following are the causes: humility, gentle disposition, simplicity in behaviour, slight passions (kaÈāya), being free from distressful disposition at the time of death, and so on. Is that all which causes the influx of life-karma leading to birth as a human being? LoHkkoeknZoa p AA18AA 1LoHkkoeknZoao LOkHkko ls gh ljy ifj.kke gksuk 1po Hkh euq";k;q ds vkÏo dk dkj.k gSA Natural mildness (mÃdutā) also leads to the influx (āsrava) of life-karma leading to birth as a human being (manuÈya). The nature of being mild or gentle is mildness or gentleness – mÃdutā or mārdava. To be naturally mild is natural mildness. Natural means 253 vè;k;&6 which comes without teaching or instruction. This natural mildness also leads to the influx of life-karma that causes birth as a human being. Why has this attribute been mentioned separately? It has been mentioned separately as it also leads to the influx of life-karma that leads to birth as a celestial-being. Do these alone (as mentioned in sūtra 17 and 18) cause the influx of life-karma that leads to birth as a human being? No. fuÀ'khyozrRoa p losZ"kke~ AA19AA 1fu%'khyozrRoa po 'khy vkSj ozr dk tks vHkko gS og Hkh 1losZ"kke~o lHkh izdkj dh vk;q ds vkÏo dk dkj.k gSA Non-observance of vows (vrata) and supplementary-vows (śīlavrata) causes the influx (āsrava) of life-karma (āyuÍ) leading to birth among all the four states of existence. The word 'ca' – 'and' – is intended to include what have been referred to. Slight activity that results in infliction of pain – ārambha – and slight attachment to possessions – parigraha – are included herein. Thus, slight ārambha, slight parigraha, non-observance of vows (vrata) and supplementary-vows (śīlavrata) cause the influx (āsrava) of life-karma (āyuÍ) leading to birth among all the four states of existence. Vows (vrata) and supplementary-vows (śīlavrata) are explained later on. The dispositions which prompt non-observance of vows (vrata) and supplementary-vows (śīlavrata) cause the influx of all the four kinds of life-karmas. The word 'sarveÈām' means all the four states of existence – as the infernal being (nāraka), the human (manuÈya), the plant and animal (tiryańca) and the celestial-being (deva). Do these lead to birth in heaven also? Yes. Men and women in 254 Tattvārthasūtra the lands of paradise (bhogabhūmi), without observance of vows (vrata) and supplementary-vows (śīlavrata) are born in heaven after death. What is the cause of the influx of life-karma that leads to birth as a celestial being (deva)? ljkxla;ela;ekla;ekdkefutZjkckyrikafl nSoL; AA20AA 1ljkxla;e la;ekla;ekdkefutZjk ckyrikaflo ljkxla;e] la;ekla;e] vdkefutZjk vkSj ckyri 1nSoL;o ;s nsok;q ds vkÏo ds dkj.k gSaA Restraint-with-attachment (sarāgasaÉyama), restraintcum-non-restraint (saÉyamāsaÉyama), involuntarydissociation (akāmanirjarā) and childish-austerities (bālatapa) cause the influx (āsrava) of life-karma (āyuÍ) leading to birth as a celestial-being (deva). The first two have been explained. Persons confined or bound, or imprisoned are forced to endure hunger, thirst, continence, sleeping on the floor, dirt and distress without any inclination on their part. Still, these lead to dissociation of karmas. This is called involuntary dissociation (akāmanirjarā). 'Bālatapa' is the observance, by a person of perverted faith, of austerities involving unscientific affliction of the body and characterized by fraudulent conduct. These cause the influx of karmas leading to birth in all four orders of celestial beings (deva). Are these alone the cause of the influx of life-karma that leads to birth as celestial beings (deva)? No. 255 vè;k;&6 lE;DRoa p AA21AA 1lE;DRoa po lE;DRo Hkh nsok;q ds vkÏo dk dkj.k gSA vFkkZr~ tks ljkx lE;Xn'kZu gS og Hkh nsok;q ds vkÏo dk dkj.k gSA Right belief (samyaktva) also causes the influx (āsrava) of life-karma (āyuÍ) leading to celestial-birth (deva). The influx (āsrava) of life-karma (āyuÍ) leading to celestial-birth (deva) is supplied from the previous sūtra. Though right belief (samyaktva) is mentioned in general as the cause of the influx of lifekarma (āyuÍ) leading to celestial-birth (deva), it means birth in the heavens (kalpa), commencing from the Saudharma kalpa. How? It is because right belief (samyaktva) is mentioned separately. Does the rule enunciated in the previous sūtra apply uniformly for birth in all classes of deva, without distinction? No. Restraint-with-attachment (sarāgasaÉyama) and restraint-cum-non-restraint (saÉyamāsaÉyama) lead to birth in the heavens (kalpa), commencing from the Saudharma kalpa, for, in the absence of right belief (samyaktva), these do not arise. Hence these two are included herein. The purport is that right belief (samyaktva), even without observance of vows, also causes the influx of life-karma leading to birth as a heavenly (vaimānika) 1deva. The causes of the influx of physique-making (nāma) karmas have to be explained next. First, the influx of inauspicious (aśubha) physiquemaking (nāma) karmas is described. 1 – Hence, persons with right belief (samyaktva), except those whose bondage of life-karma has been accomplished prior to their attainment of right belief, will be reborn among the fourth class of deva – heavenly (vaimānika) – and not among the three lower classes, namely, the residential (bhavanavāsī), the peripatetic (vyantara) and the stellar (jyotiÈka) deva. 256 Tattvārthasūtra ;ksxoØrk folaoknua pk'kqHkL; ukEu% AA22AA 1;ksxoØrko ;ksx esa dqfVyrk 1folaoknua po vkSj folaoknu vFkkZr~ vU;Fkk izorZu 1v'kqHkL; ukEu%o v'kqHk ukedeZ ds vkÏo ds dkj.k gSaA Crooked-activity (yogavakratā) and deception (visaÉvādana) cause the influx of inauspicious (aśubha) physique-making (nāma) karmas. Activity (yoga) has been explained as of three kinds. 'Vakratā' is crookedness, and hence crooked-activity (yogavakratā) is crookedness of activity. 'VisaÉvādana' is deceiving others. Now, the two do not appear to be different. Yes, these appear to be the same. But there is this difference. Crooked-activity (yogavakratā) applies to oneself but deception (visaÉvādana) refers to others, i.e., misleading others. For instance, one is engaged in conduct that leads to heavenly pleasures and liberation. He is asked by another to leave it and get engaged in other unwholesome practices. This is deception (visaÉvādana). These two kinds of activities cause the influx of inauspicious (aśubha) physique-making (nāma) karmas. By the term 'ca' in the sūtra, wrong belief, envy, fickleness of mind, use of wrong weights and measures to benefit oneself, censuring others, praising oneself, etc., are included. What are the causes of the influx of auspicious (śubha) physiquemaking (nāma) karmas? rf}ijhra 'kqHkL; AA23AA 1rf}ijhrao mlls vFkkZr~ v'kqHk ukedeZ ds vkÏo ds tks dkj.k dgs muls foijhr Hkko 1'kqHkL;o 'kqHk ukedeZ ds vkÏo ds dkj.k gSaA 257 vè;k;&6 The opposites of these, namely, straightforward activity and honesty or candour, cause the influx of auspicious (śubha) physique-making (nāma) karmas. The opposites are straightforwardness in one's activities of the body, the speech and the mind, and honesty or integrity. The opposites of those included by the term 'ca' in the previous sūtra must also be taken. Thus, admiring others, reverence towards the virtuous and honouring them, adopting marks of honesty, fear of transmigration, avoidance of negligence, and so on, are included. These constitute the causes of the influx of auspicious (śubha) physique-making (nāma) karmas. Are these alone the causes of physique-making (nāme) karmas, or is there any speciality? Yes. There is the influx of the Tīrthańkara namekarma (nāmakarma), which is the cause of infinite, incomparable majesty and inconceivable splendour and which affects the conquest of the three worlds. If so, let the causes of its influx be enumerated. n'kZufo'kqf1⁄4£ou;lEiÂrk 'khyozrs"ourhpkjks& ¿Hkh{.kKkuksi;ksxlaosxkS 'kfDrrLR;kxrilh lkèkqlekfèkoZS;kòÙ;dj.kegZnkpk;ZcgqJqrizopu& HkfDrjko';dkifjgkf.kekZxZizHkkouk izopuoRlyRofefr rhFkZdjRoL; AA24AA 1n'kZufo'kqf1⁄4%o 1& n'kZufo'kqf1⁄4 1fou;lEiÂrko 2& fou;lEiÂrk 1'khyozrs"ourhpkj%o 3& 'khy vkSj ozrksa esa vufrpkj vFkkZr~ vfrpkj dk u gksuk 1vHkh{.kKkuksi;ksx%o 4& fujUrj Kkuksi;ksx 1laosx%o 5& laosx vFkkZr~ lalkj ls Hk;Hkhr gksuk 258 Tattvārthasūtra 1'kfDrrLR;kxrilho 6&7& 'kfDr ds vuqlkj R;kx rFkk ri djuk 1lk/qlekf/%o 8& lk/qlekf/ 1oS;kòÙ;dj.ke~o 9& oS;kòÙ; djuk 1vgZnkpk;ZcgqJqrizopuHkfDr%o 10&13& vgZr~&vkpk;Z& cgqJqr (mikè;k;) vkSj izopu ('kkÐ) ds izfr HkfDr djuk 1vko';dkifjgkf.k%o 14& vko';d esa gkfu u djuk 1ekxZizHkkouko 15& ekxZ izHkkouk vkSj 1izopuoRlyRoe~o 16& izopuoRlyRo 1bfr rhFkZdjRoL;o ;s lksyg Hkkouk rhFk±dj&ukedeZ ds vkÏo dk dkj.k gSaA The influx (āsrava) of the Tīrthańkara name-karma (nāmakarma) is caused by these sixteen: purity of right faith – darśanaviśuddhi, reverence – vinayasampannatā, observance of vows and supplementary vows without transgression – śīlavratānaticāra, ceaseless pursuit of knowledge – abhīkÈõa jñānopayoga, perpetual fear of the cycle of existence – saÉvega, giving gifts (charity) – tyāga, practising austerities according to one's capacity – tapa, removal of obstacles that threaten the equanimity of ascetics – sādhusamādhi, serving the meritorious by warding off evil or suffering – vaiyāvÃttya, devotion to the Omniscient Lord – arhatbhakti, devotion to the chief preceptors – ācāryabhakti, devotion to the preceptors – bahuśrutabhakti, devotion to the Scripture – pravacanabhakti, practice of the six essential daily duties – āvaśyakāparihāõi, propagation of the teachings of the Omniscient Lord – prabhāvanā, and fervent affection for one's brethren following the same path – pravacanavatsalatva. 259 vè;k;&6 1. Darśanaviśuddhi: Faith in the path to liberation characterized by detachment, as preached by Lord Jina, is purity of faith. Right faith has been described already. It is characterized by eight qualities, freedom from doubt (niÍśańkitatva), freedom from worldly desire (niÍkāńkÈitā), freedom from revulsion (nirvicikitsitatva), freedom from superstitions (amūçhadÃÈÇitā), development of one's spiritual capacity (upabÃńhaõa), ensuring steadiness of right faith and conduct (sthitikaraõa), joy and affection towards those following the path (vātsalya), and propagation of the true path (prabhāvanā). 2. Vinayasampannatā: Reverence is homage to the three-jewels (ratnatraya) which lead to liberation and the preceptors and the rest who initiate others to the path to liberation. 3. Śīlavratānaticāra: Faultless observance, without transgressions, of the vows of noninjury, etc., and the supplementary vows such as giving up anger, etc., which safeguard the vows. 4. AbhīkÈõa jñānopayoga: Incessant cultivation of knowledge of the soul and other categories of substances is ceaseless pursuit of knowledge. 5. SaÉvega: It is the perpetual fear of the cycle of existence, or transmigration. 6. Tyāga: Charity is of three kinds, namely, gift of pure food (āhāradāna), gift of dispelling fear (abhayadāna), and gift of right knowledge (jñānadāna). The giving of these to others according to one's capacity is charity. 7. Tapa: Practising austerities according to one's capacity is voluntary affliction of the body in conformity with the Scripture. 8. Sādhusamādhi: When the treasury is on fire, attempts are made to extinguish it, as it benefits all. Similarly, the ascetic is the seat of rare virtues of vows and minor vows. Hence any obstacles that threaten the equanimity of ascetics are removed. 9. VaiyāvÃttya: When suffering is imminent to the virtuous ascetics, it is warded off by proper methods. 10-13. Arhatbhakti, ācāryabhakti, bahuśrutabhakti, pravacanabhakti: Devotion is the worship of the Omniscient Lord, the chief preceptors, the preceptors, and the Scripture. 14. Āvaśyakāparihāõi: It is performance of the six essential duties at proper times. 15. Prabhāvanā: It is propagation of the teachings of Lord Jina by means of knowledge, austerities, gift, and worship. 16. Pravacanavatsalatva: 260 Tattvārthasūtra It is love and affection, similar to the tender love of the cow for her calf, for one's brethren. These sixteen observances, severally as well as together, are causes of the influx (āsrava) of the name-karma (nāmakarma) which leads to incarnation as the Tīrthańkara. After describing the influx of physique-making karmas, influx of status-determining (gotra) karmas has to be explained. Influx of karmas that cause low-status is dealt with first. ijkRefuUnkiz'kals lnlñxq.kksPNknukskous p uhpSxksZ=kL; AA25AA 1ijkRe unkiz'kalso nwljs dh unk vkSj viuh iz'kalk djuk 1lnlñxq.kksPNknukskous po rFkk nwljs ds izxV xq.kksa dks fNikuk vkSj vius vizxV xq.kksa dks izfl1⁄4 djuk lks 1uhpSxksZ=kL;o uhp xks=kdeZ ds vkÏo ds dkj.k gSaA Censuring others, praising oneself, concealing good qualities present in others and proclaiming noble qualities absent in oneself, cause the influx (āsrava) of karmas which lead to low-status (nīcagotra). Censuring others is to proclaim defects in others, whether existing or not. This is 'paranińdā'. Proclaiming virtues in oneself is praise. This is 'ātmapraśaÉsā'. These are taken respectively, that is censure of others and praise of oneself. The non-manifestation of a thing when there is obstruction is concealment. The manifestation of a thing in the absence of obstruction is proclaiming it. These two are taken respectively, that is concealing existent qualities (in others) – 261 vè;k;&6 sadguõocchādana – and proclaiming non-existent qualities (in oneself) – asadguõodbhāvana. These lead to the influx of karmas which lead to low-status (nīcagotra). What is the cause of the influx of karmas that lead to high-status (uccagotra)? rf}i;Z;ks uhpSòZÙ;uqRlsdkS pksÙkjL; AA26AA 1rf}i;Z;%o ml uhp xks=kdeZ ds vkÏo ds dkj.kksa ls foijhr vFkkZr~ ijiz'kalk] vkRe unk bR;kfn 1po rFkk 1ukspSòZÙ;uqRlsdkSo uezòfÙk gksuk rFkk vuqRlsd & en dk vHkko & lks 1mÙkjL;o nwljs xks=kdeZ vFkkZr~ mPPk xks=kdeZ ds vkÏo ds dkj.k gSaA The opposites of those mentioned in the previous sūtra and humility (namravÃtti) and modesty (anutseka) cause the influx (āsrava) of karmas that lead to high-status (uccagotra). The word 'tad' – 'that' – in the sūtra refers to the causes of the influx of karmas that lead to low-status, just mentioned. 'Viparyaya' are the opposites. What are the opposites? The opposites are censuring oneself, praising others, proclaiming existent qualities (in others), and not proclaiming non-existent qualities (in oneself). Bowing before the virtuous with veneration is humility – namravÃtti or nīcaiÍvÃtti. To be free from pride in spite of possessing knowledge, etc., is modesty – anutseka. To be free from pride means the absence of egotism or haughtiness. These cause influx of karmas that lead to high-status (uccagotra). What is the cause of influx of obstructive (antarāya) karmas? 262 Tattvārthasūtra fo?udj.keUrjk;L; AA27AA 1fo?udj.ke~o nku] ykHk] Hkksx] miHkksx rFkk oh;Z eas fo?u djuk lks 1vUrjk;L;o vUrjk; deZ ds vkÏo dk dkj.k gSA Laying obstacles (vighna) (in way of charity, etc.) is the cause of the influx of obstructive (antarāya) karmas. Charity (dāna), etc., have been explained already (see sūtra 2-4). Laying obstacles in way of these causes influx of obstructive (antarāya) karmas. Now an objection is raised. Spite against knowledge – pradoÈa, concealment of knowledge – nihnava, etc., have been described as specific causes for the influx of knowledgeand perception-obscuring karmas (see sūtra 6-10). Are these specific causes for the influx of particular karmas or common causes for the influx of all karmas without any distinction? If these are admitted to be specific causes, then it will contradict the Scripture, for it is said in the Scripture that the seven karmas – with the exception of lifedetermining (ayuÍ) karma – flow into the souI simultaneously every instant. That will be a contradiction. If, on the other hand, these are considered as common causes, then it is not proper to mention these as specific causes. The justification is this. There is no fixed rule that the enumerated activities will cause bondage of all karmas with regard to space-bondage (pradeśa bandha). But the enumerated activities cause the type of bondage that determines fruition – anubhāga bandha – every instant. Therefore, these have been mentioned separately. ] ] ] 263 vè;k;&6 AA bfr rÙokFkZlw=kkijukeeks{k'kkÐs "k"Bks¿è;k;% lekIr% AA Desisting (virati) from injury (hiÉsā), falsehood (anÃta), stealing (steya), unchastity (abrahma) and attachment-topossessions (parigraha) is the (fivefold) vow (vrata). THE FIVE VOWS C H A P T E R 7 glk¿ùrLrs;kczãifjxzgsH;ks fojfroZzre~ AA1AA 1 glk¿ùrLrs;kczãifjxzgsH;ks fojfr%o glk] vlR;] pksjh] eSFkqu vkSj ifjxzg (vFkkZr~ inkFkks± ds izfr eeRo:i ifj.keu) & bu ik¡p ikiksa ls (cqf1⁄4iwoZd) fuòÙk gksuk lks 1ozre~o ozr gSA At the beginning of Chapter-5, while describing influx (āsrava), it was said, in general, that virtuous (śubha) activity is the cause of merit (puõya). Now the virtuous (śubha) activity is explained specifically. It has been described in later sūtra(s) that injury (hiÉsā) is severance of vitalities out of passion, and so on. Abstaining from these is called the vow (vrata). The vow (vrata) is a deliberately declared and selfimposed observance. For instance, it can be a declaration in form of 'this must be done' or 'this must not be done'. A contention is raised. The dispositions of injury (hiÉsā), etc., are not permanently present; 1how can these be the factors-of-action (kāraka) that are dislodged 1 – Factors-of-action (kāraka) are of six kinds: 1) the doer (kartā), 2) the activity (karma), 3) the instrument (karaõa), 4) the bestowal (saÉpradāna), 5) the dislodgement (apādāna), and 6) the substratum (adhikaraõa). Each of these is of two kinds: empirical sixfold factors-ofaction (vyavahāra ÈaÇkāraka) and transcendental sixfold factors-of-action (niścaya ÈaÇkāraka). (see 'Pravacanasāra', p. 21-23). 264 Tattvārthasūtra (apādāna)? The answer is that in desisting from these dispositions deliberately, there is permanence in dislodgement. Hence these become the factors-of-action (kāraka) that are dislodged (apādāna). Let us take the following example. A man desists from virtue. He reflects that virtue is difficult to be practised and its fruit is imaginary, that is, a matter of faith only. In the same manner, another man who is far-sighted reflects as follows. The thoughts of injury, etc., are the causes of sin or demerit. And those who indulge in sinful activities are punished here itself by the king and his authorities, and are also subjected to suffering later (in the next world). Thus, with his discriminating knowledge, he desists from injury, etc. Therefore, when the person desists from such activities using intellect or discrimination, it is appropriate to attribute permanence to dislodgement (apādāna), which is a factor-of-action (kāraka). The word 'desisting' (abstaining) is added to every one of the terms – desisting from injury, desisting from falsehood, desisting from stealing, desisting from unchastity, and desisting from attachment-topossessions. Non-injury is mentioned first as it is the most important of the vows. Just as the surrounding fence protects the corn, similarly, truth, etc., safeguard the vow of non-injury (ahiÉsā). From the point of view of 'sāmāyika cāritra' (see sūtra 9-18) – equanimity or concentration of mind wherein one desists from all harmful activities – the vow is one. And from the standpoint of reinitiation (chedopasthapanā cāritra) the same vow is spoken of as fivefold, as mentioned here. Now, is it not improper to describe non-injury, etc., as the causes of the influx (āsrava), as these are included in the causes of stoppage (saÉvara)? Self-control (gupti) and regulation-of-activities (samiti) are mentioned as the causes of stoppage (saÉvara) of influx (see sūtra 9-2). Also, among the ten moral virtues or discipline – dasa dharma – self-restraint (saÉyama) is included; and self-restraint (saÉyama) must include the vow (vrata). But there is no contradiction. There the reference is to the dissociation (nivÃtti) aspect of the stoppage (saÉvara) of influx (āsrava) which is characterized by abstinence. Here it is the indulgence (pravÃtti) aspect of active life that is 265 vè;k;&7 emphasized. When violence, falsehood, stealing, unchastity and attachment are discontinued, non-violence, truth, non-stealing, chastity and detachment are practised. And it facilitates stoppage (saÉvara) of influx (āsrava) through self-control (gupti), and so on. The ascetic who practises the vows easily stops the influx (āsrava). Hence the vows are mentioned here separately. Now, should not the sixth minor-vow (aõuvrata) of abstaining from eating at night be added here? No. It is included among observances for the vow of noninjury (ahiÉsā). These are enumerated later (see sūtra 7-4). Among these is mentioned the practice of examining the food before eating to see that there are no organisms in it – ālokitapānabhojana. This encompasses abstaining from eating at night. The subdivisions of the fivefold vow (vrata) are now given. ns'kloZrks¿.kqegrh AA2AA ozr ds nks Hksn gaS & 1ns'kr% v.kq%o mijksDr glkfn ikiksa ls ,dns'k fojfr lks v.kqozr vkSj 1loZr% egrho loZns'k fojfr lks egkozr gSA The vow is of two kinds, minor-vow (aõuvrata) and greatvow (mahāvrata), from the abstinence (virati) being partial or complete. The word 'deśa' refers to partial. The word 'sarva' refers to complete. Desisting or abstinence (virati) is supplied from the previous sūtra. These are taken respectively. Partial abstinence is a minor-vow (aõuvrata), and complete abstinence is a great-vow (mahāvrata). Each vow is of these two kinds. The practise of these vows with vigilance dispels suffering, just as an excellent medicine cures disease. For what purpose and in what manner should the vows be practised or observed? 266 Tattvārthasūtra For the sake of strengthening the vows (vrata), there are five observances (bhāvanā) for each of these. rRLFkS;kZFk± Hkkouk% iÛÓ iÛÓ AA3AA 1rRLFkS;kZFk±o mu ozrksa dh fLFkjrk ds fy;s 1Hkkouk% iÛÓ iÛÓo izR;sd ozr dh ik¡p&ik¡p Hkkouk;sa gSaA (Hkkoksa dk ckj&ckj vuq'khyu djuk lks Hkkouk gSA) In order to strengthen the vows, five observances (contemplations) – bhāvanā – for each of the vows (vrata) must be ascertained. If so, what are the observances for the vow of non-injury (ahiÉsā)? Control of speech – vacanagupti, control of thought – manogupti, regulation of movement – īryāsamiti, care in taking and placing things or objects – ādānanikÈepaõasamiti, and examining food and drink – ālokitapānaokÄ~euksxqIrh;kZnkufu{ksi.klfeR;kyksfdrikuHkkstukfu iÛÓ AA4AA 1okÄ~euksxqIrh;kZnkufu{ksi.klfeR;kyksfdrikuHkkstukfuo opuxqfIr& opu dks jksduk] euksxqfIr& eu dh izòfÙk dks jksduk] bZ;kZ lfefr& pkj gkFk tehu ns[kdj pyuk] vknkufu{ksi.k lfefr& thojfgr Hkwfe ns[kdj lko/kuh ls fdlh oLrq dks mBkuk&/juk vkSj vkyksfdrikuHkkstu& ns[kdj&'kks/dj Hkkstu&ikuh xzg.k djuk 1iÛÓo ;s ik¡p v glk ozr dh Hkkouk;sa gSaA 267 vè;k;&7 bhojana, are the five observances (bhāvanā) for the vow of non-injury (ahiÉsā). These are the five observances for the vow of non-injury (ahiÉsā). What are the observances for the second vow of truthfulness (satya)? ØksèkyksHkHkh#RogkL;izR;k[;kukU;uqohfpHkk"k.ka p iÛÓ AA5AA 1Øks/yksHkHkh#RogkL;izR;k[;kukfuo Øks/izR;k[;ku] yksHkizR;k[;ku] Hkh#RoizR;k[;ku] gkL;izR;k[;ku (vFkkZr~ Øks/ dk R;kx djuk] yksHk dk R;kx djuk] Hk; dk R;kx djuk] gkL; dk R;kx djuk) 1vuqohfpHkk"k.ka po vkSj 'kkÐ dh vkKkuqlkj funksZ"k opu cksyuk 1iÛÓo ;s ik¡p lR;ozr dh Hkkouk;sa gSaA Giving-up (pratyākhyāna) these four: anger (krodha), greed (lobha), fearfulness (bhīrutva) and jest (hāsya), and speaking only faultless words – anuvīcibhāÈaõa – are the five observances (bhāvanā) for the vow of truthfulness (satya). These are the five observances (bhāvanā) for the vow of truthfulness (satya). Speaking only faultless words is anuvīcibhāÈaõa. What are the observances for the vow of non-stealing (acaurya)? The next sūtra describes the observances. 268 Tattvārthasūtra 'kwU;kxkjfoeksfprkoklijksijksèkkdj.kHkS{;'kqf1⁄4& lèkekZfolaoknk% iÛÓ AA6AA 1'kwU;kxkjfoeksfprkoklijksijksèkkdj.kHkS{;'kqf1⁄4& lèkekZfolaoknk%o 'kwU;kxkjokl& ioZrksa dh xqiQk] ò{k dh iksy bR;kfn futZu LFkkuksa esa jguk] foeksfprkokl& nwljksa ds }kjk NksM+s x;s LFkku esa fuokl djuk] ijksijksèkkdj.k& fdlh LFkku ij jgrs gq;s nwljksa dks u gVkuk rFkk ;fn dksbZ vius LFkku esa vkos rks mls u jksduk] HkS{;'kqf1⁄4& 'kkÐkuqlkj fHk{kk dh 'kqf1⁄4 j[kuk vkSj lèkekZfolaokn& lk/£e;ksa ds lkFk ^;g esjk gS*] ^;g rsjk gS* ,slk Dys'k u djuk] 1iÛÓo ;s ik¡p vpkS;Zozr dh Hkkouk;sa gSaA Residence in a solitary place – śūnyagārāvāsa, residence in a deserted habitation – vimocitāvāsa, causing no hindrance to others – paroparodhākaraõa, acceptance of clean food – bhaikÈyaśuddhi, and not bickering with the fellow monks – sadharmāvisaÉvāda, are the five observances (bhāvanā) for the vow of non-stealing (acaurya). Living in vacant or unoccupied places such as a cave, a hill, the hollow of a tree, etc., is śūnyagārāvāsa. Living in places, such as a house vacated by others, is vimocitāvāsa. Living in a manner that causes no hindrance to others is paroparodhākaraõa. Living on clean food, free from organisms as laid down in the Scripture, is bhaikÈyaśuddhi. Not bickering with those following the same path with utterances like 'this is mine,' or 'that is yours,' is sadharmāvisaÉvāda. These are the five observances for the vow of non-stealing (acaurya). What are the observances for the fourth vow of continence or chastity (brahmacarya)? 269 vè;k;&7 ÐhjkxdFkkJo.krUeuksgjkaxfujh{k.kiwoZjrkuqLej.k& ò";s"VjlLo'kjhjlaLdkjR;kxk% iÛÓ AA7AA 1ÐhjkxdFkkJo.kR;kx%o fÐ;ksa esa jkx c<+kus okyh dFkk lquus dk R;kx 1rUeuksgjkaxfujh{k.kR;kx%o muds euksgj vaxksa dks fuj[kdj ns[kus dk R;kx 1iwoZjrkuqLej.kR;kx%o vozr voLFkk esa Hkksxs gq, fo"k;ksa ds Lej.k dk R;kx 1ò";s"VjlR;kx%o dkeo/Zd xfj"B jlksa dk R;kx vkSj 1Lo'kjhjlaLdkjR;kx%o vius 'kjhj ds laLdkjksa dk R;kx 1iÛÓo & ;s ik¡p cãp;Z ozr dh Hkkouk;asa gSaA Renunciation (tyāga) of these – listening to stories that incite attachment for women, looking at the beautiful forms of women, recalling former sexual pleasures, delicious food that stimulates amorous desire, and adornment of the body – constitutes the five observances (bhāvanā) for the vow of chastity (brahmacarya). The word 'renunciation' (tyāga) is added to each of these, that is, renunciation of listening to stories inciting attachment for women, renunciation of the sight of beautiful women, and so on. These are the five observances for the vow of chastity (brahmacarya). What are the observances for the fifth vow of non-attachment (aparigraha)? euksKkeuksKsfUae;fo"k;jkx}s"kotZukfu iÛÓ AA8AA 1euksKkeuksKsfUae;fo"k;jkx}s"kotZukfuo Li'kZu vkfn ik¡pksa bfUnz;ksa ds euksK vkSj veuksK fo"k;kasa ds izfr jkx vkSj }s"k dk R;kx djuk 1iÛÓo lks ik¡p vifjxzgozr dh Hkkouk;sa gSaA 270 Tattvārthasūtra Giving up attachment (rāga) and aversion (dveÈa) for agreeable (manojña) and disagreeable (amanojña) objects of the five senses constitutes five observances (bhāvanā) for the vow of non-attachment (aparigraha or ākiÉcanya). Renouncing attachment (rāga) and aversion (dveÈa) in the presence of agreeable and disagreeable objects of the senses – touch (sparśana), etc. – constitute the five observances for the vow of non-attachment (aparigraha or ākiÉcanya). The observances for strengthening the vows have been described. Are there other contemplations also with regard to injury, etc., which lead to steadiness in practising the vows? Yes. Contemplations with regard to the opposites also are to be practised. glkfnf"ogkeq=kkik;ko|n'kZue~ AA9AA 1 glkfn"kqo glk vkfn ik¡p ikiksas ls 1bg veq=ko bl yksd eas rFkk ijyksd esa 1vik;ko|n'kZue~o vik; vkSj vo| dk n'kZu & vFkkZr~ nq%[k] vkifÙk] Hk; rFkk u|xfr dh & izkfIr gksrh gS] ,slk ckjEckj fpUrou djuk pkfg;sA It is worthwhile to contemplate that injury (hiÉsā), etc., lead to calamity (apāya) and reproach (avadya) in this world and in the next. Calamity (apāya) wrecks activities which lead to prosperity and bliss. Reproach (avadya) is censure (nińdā). One must contemplate that injury (hiÉsā), etc., are nothing but calamity (apāya) and reproach 271 vè;k;&7 (avadya). The blemishes of injury (hiÉsā), etc., lead to calamity (apāya) and reproach (avadya) in this life and in the next. This is now explained. Injury (hiÉsā) – He who commits violence or hiÉsā is always agitated and afflicted, and is actuated by a sense of animosity. He is subjected to pain, imprisonment and suffering in this world. And, after death, he takes an inauspicious birth. He is censured by all. It is, therefore, good to give up injury (hiÉsā) or violence. Falsehood (anÃta) – The person who speaks lies becomes untrustworthy. In this world he is meted out punishment such as the cutting off of the tongue. He is also subjected to torture by the vindictive persons who have been afflicted by his lies. After death, he is plunged into a miserable rebirth, and is despised by all. Hence it is good to renounce falsehood (anÃta). Stealing (steya) – The thief, intent on depriving others of their possessions, is condemned by all. In this world he is beaten, given blows, put in bonds, and subjected to mutilation of hand, leg, ear, tongue, upper lip, and so on. His property is confiscated. And after death he takes an inauspicious birth and becomes despicable. Therefore it is good to desist from stealing (steya). Unchastity (abrahma) – The mind of the unchaste person is ever agitated by lustful passion and amorous excitement. As the infatuated wild elephant, tricked by the female elephant, loses control over self and suffers blows, bonds and other torments, the same is the situation of the person agitated by lustful passion. Being infatuated, he is unable to discriminate between the good and the evil. And he is not able to do anything right or proper. Due to his lustful intercourse with other women, in this life itself, he is subjected to hatred and enmity, mutilation of the genital, blows, bonds and confiscation of property. After death, he takes a low birth and becomes despicable. Therefore it is good to desist from incontinence or unchastity (abrahma). Attachment-to-possessions (parigraha) – The man with possessions is assailed by robbers, just as the vulture with a piece of meat in its beak is attacked by other birds. He also contracts many evils in the course of his efforts to earn and safeguard wealth. Like the fire which consumes any quantity of fuel, he does not find contentment with any amount of 272 Tattvārthasūtra wealth. As he is subjugated by greed (lobha), he pays no heed to what ought to be done and what ought not to be done. After death, he takes a mean birth, and is also despised as an avaricious person. Therefore it is good to desist from attachment-to-possessions (parigraha). In this way, the consequences, such as calamity and reproach, of injury (hiÉsā), etc., should be contemplated. The second contemplation relating to injury (hiÉsā), etc., is now mentioned. nq%[keso ok AA10AA 1oko vFkok ;s glkfnd ik¡p iki 1nq%[kesoo nq%[k:i gh gSa & ,slk fopkjukA Or, it should be contemplated that injury (hiÉsā), etc., are nothing but suffering. It should be contemplated that injury, etc., are nothing but suffering. How are these nothing but suffering? These are nothing but suffering being the cause of suffering. For instance, by overlaying the effect (kārya) in the cause (kāraõa), we say that food is life. Similarly we say that wealth is life, as wealth begets food, and food sustains life. So also injury, etc., are the causes of karmas which produce unpleasantfeeling (asātāvedanīya). And unpleasant-feeling (asātāvedanīya) is the cause of suffering. Thus, injury (hiÉsā), etc., are figuratively referred to as suffering. That injury (hiÉsā), etc., are suffering only is adduced by one's own experience as well as of others. Now, how can all these be said to be suffering when sensual-pleasures are seen to be providing happiness? But what sensual-pleasures provide is not happiness; it only relieves pain for the moment, as scratching in the case of a person suffering from itch or scabies. 273 vè;k;&7 The next sūtra describes other observances (bhāvanā) or contemplations. eS=khizeksndk#.;ekè;LF;kfu p lÙoxq.kkfèkd& fDy';ekukfous;s"kq AA11AA 1lÙos"kq eS=kho izk.khek=k ds izfr fuoSZj cqf1⁄4 1xq.kkf/ds"kq izeksnao vf/d xq.kokuksa ds izfr izeksn (g"kZ) 1fDy';ekus"kq dk#.;aao nq%[kh&jksxh thoksa ds izfr d#.kk vkSj 1vfous;s"kq ekè;LF;ao gBkxzgh feF;kn`f"V thoksa ds izfr ekè;LF; Hkkouk & ;s pkj Hkkouk;sa v glkfn ik¡p ozrksa dh fLFkjrk ds fy;s ckjEckj fpUrou djus ;ksX; gSaA Benevolence (maitrī) towards all living-beings (sattva), joy (pramoda) at the sight of the virtuous (guõādhika), compassion and sympathy (kāruõya) for the afflicted (kliśyamāna), and tolerance (mādhyasthya) towards the insolent and ill-behaved (avineya) are the other observances. The desire that others should be free from suffering and pain is benevolence (maitrī). Fervent affection as well as veneration in the presence of the virtuous (guõādhika) is joy (pramoda). The disposition to render assistance to the afflicted is compassion (kāruõya). Tolerance (mādhyasthya) or unconcern is freedom from attachment and revulsion based on desire and aversion. Those who take birth in several kinds of yoni and die, owing to the ripening of inauspicious karmas, are the living beings (sattva or jīva). The virtuous (guõādhika) are those in whom right knowledge, etc., abound. The afflicted (kliśyamāna) are those who suffer from anguish and distress 274 Tattvārthasūtra on rise of the karmas that produce unpleasant-feeling (asātāvedanīya). The ill-behaved (avineya) are those who don't listen to the reality of substances and fail to adopt virtues. Benevolence, etc., must be practised towards living beings and others respectively – that is, benevolence towards all living beings, devotion towards the virtuous, compassion towards the tormented, and unconcern towards the indecorous and insolent persons. He who conducts himself in this manner is able to practise non-injury (ahiÉsā) and other vows (vrata) to perfection. Some other objects of contemplation are described. txRdk;LoHkkokS ok laosxoSjkX;kFkZe~ AA12AA 1laosxoSjkX;kFkZe~o laosx vFkkZr~ lalkj dk Hk; vkSj oSjkX; vFkkZr~ jkx&}s"k dk vHkko djus ds fy;s 1txr~dk;LoHkkokS oko Øe ls lalkj vkSj 'kjhj ds LoHkko dk fpUrou djuk pkfg;sA In order to cultivate fright at the misery of worldly existence – saÉvega – and detachment to worldly objects – vairāgya – the nature of the universe – jagatsvabhāva – and the nature of the body – kāyasvabhāva – should also be contemplated. The nature of the universe – jagatsvabhāva – is contemplated thus: the universe is eternal without beginning and end. It resembles the caneseat, the cymbal and the drum. In this universe the living beings have been roaming about, enduring misery in womb after womb, in the beginningless cycle of births and deaths, from infinite time past. Nothing is permanent here. Life is as uncertain as the bubbles that 275 vè;k;&7 float on the water. And riches which beget sensual-pleasures are evanescent like the clouds and the lightning. By contemplating thus on the nature of the universe, fright at the misery of worldly existence is cultivated. The nature of the body – kāyasvabhāva – is contemplated thus: the body is transitory, the cause of suffering and pain, worthless and unclean. By contemplating thus on the nature of the body, the inclination for sensual-pleasures is destroyed, and the attitude of detachment to worldly objects – vairāgya – is cultivated. Therefore, the nature of the universe and the body must be contemplated. The vow (vrata) has been described as desisting from injury (hiÉsā), etc. But specific activities that constitute injury (hiÉsā), etc., have not been mentioned. Now these are explained one after another. First injury (hiÉsā) is defined. izeÙk;ksxkRizk.kO;ijksi.ka glk AA13AA 1izeÙk;ksxkr~o d"kk;&jkx&}s"k vFkkZr~ v;Rukpkj (vlko/kuh&izekn) ds lEcU/ ls vFkok izeknh tho ds eu&opu&dk; ;ksx ls 1izk.kO;ijksi.kao tho ds Hkko&izk.k dk] nzO;&izk.k dk vFkok bu nksuksa dk fo;ksx djuk lks 1 glko glk gSA The severance of vitalities (prāõa) due to the activity of the soul tinged with passionate disposition – pramattayoga – is injury (hiÉsā). 'Pramāda' connotes the state of the soul with passions (kaÈāya). The disposition of the soul with 'pramāda' is called 'pramatta'. The activity (yoga) of such a soul is 'pramattayoga'. The ten vitalities or life-principles (prāõa) are the five senses, and so on (see sūtra 2-14, 276 Tattvārthasūtra p. 78). Severance of these vitalities (all the ten vitalities are not present in all living beings) is called injury (hiÉsā). It is wicked as it causes pain and suffering to the living beings. The qualifying phrase 'activity of the soul tinged with passionate disposition' – pramattayoga – is intended to indicate that mere severance of the vitalities is not wicked. It has been said, "Even with the severance of life one is not stained with the sin of injury." Again it has been said, "The ascetic who observes diligently the fivefold regulation of activities (samiti) does not cause bondage even if he has caused injury to the living beings." From the spiritual standpoint, just as infatuation (mūrcchā) is called attachment-to-possession (parigraha), the disposition of the soul tinged with attachment (rāga) is the cause of injury (hiÉsā). Now, it has been admitted in the Scripture that mere passionate attitude, even without the severance of vitalities, constitutes injury (hiÉsā) – "A person following right conduct, due to the absence of passions like attachment, does not commit the slightest of injury (hiÉsā) although he may have occasioned severance of vitalities. Infatuated by passions like attachment, when a person acts carelessly, he commits injury (hiÉsā), whether the living being is killed or not." Yes, it is true. But there is no inconsistency in this. In case of the person tinged with passionate disposition – pramattayoga – there is the severance of life-principles, at least in thought. It has been said thus in the Scripture – "He who is tinged with passionate disposition causes injury (hiÉsā) to himself by himself. Whether injury (hiÉsā) is caused to other living beings or not is immaterial." Injury (hiÉsā) has been defined. What is the definition of falsehood (anÃta) mentioned next to injury (hiÉsā)? vlnfHkèkkueùre~ AA14AA (izekn ds ;ksx ls) 1vlnfHk/kuao thoksa dks nq%[knk;d vFkok feF;k:i opu cksyuk lks 1vùre~o vlR; gSA 277 vè;k;&7 Speaking what is not commendable – asat – is falsehood (anÃta). The word 'sat' connotes 'to laud'. What is not laudable is 'asat'. Speaking what is not laudable is falsehood (anÃta). To speak about something that does not exist is falsehood (anÃta). 'ãta' is truth. What is not 'Ãta' is falsehood (anÃta). What is not laudable? That which causes pain and suffering to the living beings is not commendable. It does not matter whether it refers to the actual fact or not. It has already been said that the other vows are intended to safeguard the vow of non-injury (ahiÉsā). Therefore, it must be taken that words that lead to injury constitute falsehood (anÃta). Stealing (steya), which is mentioned next to falsehood (anÃta), is now defined. vnÙkknkua Lrs;e~ AA15AA (izekn ds ;ksx lss) 1vnÙkknkuao fcuk nh gqbZ fdlh Hkh oLrq dks xzg.k djuk lks 1Lrs;e~o pksjh gSA Taking anything that is not given is stealing (steya). 'Ādāna' means 'to take'. Taking anything which is not given is 'adattādana'. This has been called stealing or 'steya'. If so, the letting in or taking in of karmic and quasi-karmic particles would tantamount to stealing, as these are not given by anybody. No, it is not the case. The convention regarding stealing is that it refers only to things in which 'giving' or 'taking' apply. How does it follow? It is implied by the use of the term 'adatta' or 'not given'. Even then, when the ascetic moves about for food, he enters roads and gateways; that should constitute 278 Tattvārthasūtra stealing. No. That does not constitute stealing as these are left free for anyone to pass through. The ascetic does not enter private roads and gateways which are closed and are not left free. Further, 'pramattayogāt' – 'out of passion' – is supplied from the earlier sūtra. It implies that taking of anything 'out of passion' is stealing. And there is no passion in the ascetic who passes through the streets. It follows that activity actuated by impure dispositions is stealing (steya), whether external objects are taken or not. The fourth vow of unchastity (abrahma) is defined now. eSFkqueczã AA16AA 1eSFkqueczão tks eSFkqu gS lks vczã vFkkZr~ dq'khy gSA Copulation (maithuna) is unchastity (abrahma). The desire of the man and the woman to touch and embrace each other owing to the rise of the conduct-deluding (cāritramohanīya) karmas is called 'mithuna' and the resulting activity is called 'maithuna'. Not all activities of the man and the woman together are 'maithuna'; only the activities prompted by sexual desire are 'maithuna'. Reference in the texts to the desire of a mare and a stallion indicate the same thing. Moreover 'out of passion' is supplied. By that only the action of a couple leading to sexual pleasure is included and not all activities. That which leads to enhancement of virtues like non-injury (ahiÉsā) is chastity (brahma). The opposite of this is unchastity (abrahma). What is it? It is copulation. Copulation promotes injury (hiÉsā), etc. He who indulges in copulation causes injury to immobile and mobile beings. He utters falsehood, takes away things not given, and accumulates possessions, both living (cetana) and non-living (acetana). 279 vè;k;&7 The fifth vow, namely, attachment-to-possessions (parigraha), is defined next. ewPNkZ ifjxzg% AA17AA 1ewPNkZ ifjxzg%o tks ewPNkZ gS lks ifjxzg gSA Infatuation (mūrcchā) is attachment-to-possessions (parigraha). What is 'mūrcchā' or infatuation? 'Mūrcchā' is the activity relating to the acquisition and safeguarding of external possessions such as the cow, the buffalo, the jewels and the pearls, and also internal possessions like attachments (rāga) and desires. Now, conventionally the word 'mūrcchā' is used to denote fainting or swooning. Why should it not mean fainting here? Yes, it is true. The verb 'mūrcch' is used in the general sense of insensibility. What is mentioned in general applies to the particular also. The general meaning implies the particular meaning also. This is the section dealing with attachment. And the particular meaning of 'mūrcch', i.e., infatuation or delusion, is applicable here. A contention is raised. Accepting this particular meaning entails that only the internal possessions should be included and not the possession of external things. It is true. Of course, the internal thoughts only are included as being important. Even in the absence of external things, the disposition that 'this is mine' constitutes infatuation (parigraha). Further, a doubt is raised. If only the internal thought – 'this is mine' – constitutes infatuation (parigraha) then knowledge (jñāna), etc., would also fall under infatuation since knowledge is considered as 'this is mine', like the disposition of attachment (rāga). But it is not so. The phrase 'out of passion' is supplied from the earlier sūtra. So the passionless person, possessed of right faith, knowledge and conduct, being free from 280 Tattvārthasūtra delusion (moha) is free from infatuation (mūrcchā). Further, knowledge, etc., being the inherent-nature (svabhāva) of the soul, are not fit to be cast off. So these are not infatuation (mūrcchā). On the other hand, desire, etc., are fit to be cast off as these are the effects of karmas and contrary to the nature of the soul. So attachment to these is infatuation (mūrcchā). Infatuation or attachment is at the root of all evils. Only in the presence of the idea that 'this is mine' does the man proceed to safeguard his possession. In safeguarding it, violence is bound to result. For its sake he utters falsehood. He also commits theft and attempts copulation. And this results in various kinds of pain and suffering in the infernal regions. He, who realizes thus the evils of injury (hiÉsā), etc., and the merits of non-injury (ahiÉsā), etc., is vigilant in observing the vows (vrata). He gets to what stage? fuÀ'kY;ks ozrh AA18AA 1ozrho ozrh tho 1fu%'kY;%o 'kY; jfgr gh gksrk gSA The votary (vratī) is free from stings (śalya). The thing that causes pain is called 'śalya'. A thorn, a sting or similar sharp thing that causes pain to the body, is called a 'śalya'. In this sūtra, the word 'śalya' refers to dispositions that cause bodily and mental agony. Just as the sting causes pain to the body, the karmagenerated harmful dispositions cause bodily and mental pain and, therefore, called 'śalya', figuratively. This is of three kinds, the sting of deceit – māyā, the sting of desire for enjoyment or pleasure – nidāna, and the sting of perverse attitude or wrong belief – mithyādarśana. He who is free from these three kinds of stings is called a votary without stings – niÍśalya vratī. Now it is contended thus. 'A person who is free 281 vè;k;&7 from stings is niÍśalya and one who observes vows is called a votary (vratī). But a person free from stings is not fit to be called a votary. For instance, a man who is carrying a staff cannot be said to carry an umbrella.' The reply is this. The votary (vratī) is one who is characterized by both the attributes, namely, being free from stings, and observing vows. The one who has not renounced the stings (śalya) but observes vows (vrata) cannot be called a votary (vratī). What is meant is that the votary (vratī) is the one who observes vows (vrata) after first renouncing the stings (śalya). For instance, a person is said to be rich in cows when he has plenty of milk and ghee (clarified butter). He cannot be said to be rich in cows in the absence of milk and ghee, even if he has several cows. So also, even if a person observes vows, he cannot be called a votary if he is not free from stings. He who is free from stings and observes vows is a votary (vratī). The subdivisions are given below. vxk;ZuxkjÜÓ AA19AA 1vxkjho vxkjh vFkkZr~ lkxkj (x`gLFk) 1vuxkj% po vkSj vuxkjh vFkkZr~ x`gR;kxh (eqfu) bl izdkj ozrh ds nks Hksn gSaA uksV& egkozrksa dks ikyus okys eqfu vuxkjh dgykrs gSa vkSj ns'kozr dks ikyus okys Jkod lkxkjh dgykrs gSaA The householder – agārī – and the homeless ascetic – anagārī – are the two kinds of votaries (vratī). What is built for shelter is 'agāra'. Thus, 'agāra' is a home. He who has 'agāra' is the householder – agārī. He for whom there is no home is the homeless ascetic – anagāra. Thus, there are two classes of votaries, the householder – agārī – and the homeless ascetic – anagārī. Now there is 282 Tattvārthasūtra a contention. The ascetics, who stay in vacant habitations, temples, etc., would become 'agārī'. And the laymen who leave home and stay in the woods for some reason, without renouncing sensual-pleasures, would become 'anagārī'. But it is not so. What is intended is the psychical home – the 'bhāvāgāra'. Owing to the rise of the conductdeluding (cāritramohanīya) karmas, a person's thoughts are not turned away from home. This is called the psychical home – the 'bhāvāgāra'. He who has it is a householder, even if he lives in a forest. The ascetic is free from such thoughts and so he is a homeless ascetic even if he lives in a home. Again, it is argued that the householder – agārī – cannot be a votary (vratī) as he observes vows only partially. But it is not so. The householder also is a votary from certain points of view. As an illustration, though a man lives in his home or remains in his bed-chamber, he says, "I live in the town." So, even a person who observes partial vows is called a votary from certain points of view (naigama, saÉgraha and vyavahāra naya). Does partial observance of vows by the householder – agārī – mean the observance of one or two of the five vows? No, it is not so. The householder – agārī – observes all the five vows, albeit partially. The householder votary – agārī – is explained further. v.kqozrks¿xkjh AA20AA 1v.kqozr%o v.kqozr] vFkkZr~ ,dns'k ozr] /kjus okyk lE;Xn`f"V tho 1vxkjho vxkjh (lkxkj) gSA The one who observes minor-vows (aõuvrata) is a householder – agārī. The word 'aõu' indicates smallness. He whose vows are of minor nature is called a householder with minor vows – agārī. Why are his 283 vè;k;&7 vows called of minor nature? It is because it is not possible for him to desist from all sins, like injury (hiÉsā), completely. If so, what does he desist from? He desists from injury (hiÉsā) to the beings with two or more senses – trasa jīva – hence, he observes the first of the minor vows – ahiÉsāõuvrata. The householder refrains from speaking lies, attributable to faults like fondness (sneha) and delusion (moha), and potent cause of the destruction of his home or village; this is his second minor vow of speaking the truth – satyāõuvrata. Out of the fear of punishment by the king or thinking that it may hurt someone, the householder certainly refrains from taking things not given to him. Moreover, his attraction for anything not given to him is reduced and thus he is said to observe the third minor vow of non-stealing – acauryāõuvrata. His desire for sexual union with other (not one's own wife) married or unmarried women becomes extinct; this is the fourth minor vow of renouncing other women – parastrītyāga aõuvrata. He limits his possessions, like riches, corn and land, of his own accord; this is the fifth minor vow of limiting possessions – parigrahaparimāõa aõuvrata. Are these the only peculiarities of the householder, or are there others also? fnXns'kkuFkZn.Mfojfrlkekf;dizks"kèkksioklksiHkksx& ifjHkksxifjek.kkfrfFklafoHkkxozrlaiÂÜÓ AA21AA 1po vkSj fiQj og 1fnXns'kkuFkZn.Mfojfrlkekf;dizks"kèkksiok& lksiHkksxifjHkksxifjek.kkfrfFklafoHkkxozrlaiÂ%o fnXozr] ns'kozr rFkk vuFkZn.Mozr (;s rhu xq.kozr)] lkekf;d] izks"k/ksiokl] miHkksx&ifjHkksx ifjek.k rFkk vfrfFklafoHkkxozr (;s pkj f'k{kkozr) lfgr Hkh gksrk gS] vFkkZr~ ozr/kjh Jkod ik¡p v.kqozr] rhu xq.kozr vkSj pkj f'k{kkozr & bu ckjg ozrksa lfgr gksrk gSA 284 Tattvārthasūtra The householder with minor-vows (aõuvrata) is also equipped with these supplementary vows: withdrawing from activity with regard to the direction – digvirati, withdrawing from activity with regard to the country – deśavirati, withdrawing from purposeless sin – anarthadaõçavirati, periodic concentration – sāmāyikavrata, fasting at regular intervals – proÈadhopavāsavrata, limiting consumable and non-consumable things – upabhogaparibhogapaimāõavrata, and partaking of one's food after feeding the ascetic – atithisaÉvibhāgavrata. The word 'virati' – withdrawing from – is added to each of the first three. Thus, it should be read as withdrawing from the direction – digvirati, withdrawing from the country or region – deśavirati, and withdrawing from purposeless sinful activity – anarthadaõçavirati. These three are called 'guõavrata' as the word 'vrata' is added on to every one of these. Further, the vow of concentration – sāmāyikavrata, fasting at regular intervals – proÈadhopavāsavrata, limiting consumable and non-consumable things – upabhogaparibhogapaimāõavrata, and partaking of one's food after feeding the ascetic – atithisaÉvibhāgavrata, are the other supplementary vows which are called 'śikÈāvrata'. The householder who observes all these seven vows, besides, of course, the five minor vows mentioned already, is called 'viratāvirata', i.e., the one who observes abstinence as well as non-abstinence. It is explained as follows. The directions are east, west, and so on (the eight corners of the compass with the upward and the downward make up ten). Taking a resolve not to participate in activities beyond set limits in the directions, fixing the boundaries with well-known mountains, rivers, villages, towns, etc., is the vow of abstinence with regard to direction – digvirati. Since there is no injury (hiÉsā) caused by the householder to oneor more-sensed living beings beyond the fixed boundaries, he is supposed to observe great 285 vè;k;&7 vows – mahāvrata – in the area outside his limited area of activity. Though there may be opportunity for gain outside his limited area, he does not direct his thoughts there. Thus he curbs his desire or greed (lobha). The region determined by villages, and so on, is the country or province. Desisting from activity outside the chosen country is the vow of abstinence with regard to the country – deśavirati. As in the previous instance, the householder practising this vow is supposed to observe great vows – mahāvrata – beyond his country. The activity which leads to sin without any advantage to self or others is purposeless sin – anarthadaõça. Withdrawing from such activity is to be free from purposeless sin – anarthadaõçavirati. Purposeless sin is of five kinds, namely, evil thought – apadhyāna, preaching of sin – pāpopadeśa, negligent activity – pramādācarita, giving of hurtful things – hiÉsāpradāna, and listening to undesirable stories – aśubhaśruti. Wishing how others may suffer from victory and defeat, punishment, bondage, mutilation, confiscation of their possessions, and so on, is evil thought – apadhyāna. Speaking evil words which incite others to cause suffering to animals, to pursue commerce and activities causing injury to the living beings, and so on, is preaching of sin – pāpopadeśa. Cutting trees, digging the earth, sprinkling water, and so on, without any purpose, is negligent activity – pramādācarita. Giving hurtful things, such as poison, thorn, weapon, fire, rope, whip and stick, is the fourth kind of purposeless sin, i.e., giving of hurtful things – hiÉsāpradāna. Listening to or narrating stories which provoke injury, lust, etc., is the fifth kind, i.e., listening to undesirable stories – aśubhaśruti. The preposition 'sam' means 'to become one'. For instance, ghee merges – becomes one – with the thing mixed. To merge or become one is 'samaya'. That, which has oneness as its object, is 'sāmāyika'. Thus, to become one with the self is 'sāmāyika'. For the time and within the place of his concentration, the householder practising 'sāmāyika' observes great vows – mahāvrata – since he is free from minute (sūkÈma) and gross (sthūla) injury (hiÉsā), and other demerits. It is argued that, in that case, the householder should be deemed having 286 Tattvārthasūtra perfect restraint – sakalasaÉyama. But it is untenable as there is the rise of the karmas which destroy complete restraint. In that case he should not be called as observing great vows – mahāvrata. No. He is called as observing great vows – mahāvrata – figuratively. It is like the generality says figuratively that the auspicious month 'caitra' prevails year-round for the royal household. The word 'proÈadha' refers to the holy days in the lunar month. Abstaining from the pleasures of the five senses, and dwelling in the self in deep concentration is fasting (upavāsa). It means giving up the four kinds of food. Fasting during 'proÈadha' is 'proÈadhopavāsa'. That is, fasting on the eighth and the fourteenth days of the lunar cycle. The fasting householder discards bodily upkeep, such as bath, perfume, garlands and ornaments, and spends time in a sacred place like the abode of a saint, a temple, or earmarked lonely apartment. He spends time listening to or making others listen to the holy discourses and contemplating on the contents of the Scripture, while refraining from all worldly activities (ārambha). Consumable things – upabhoga – are foods, drinks, perfumes, garlands of flowers, and so on, which can be enjoyed only once. Bedspreads, garments, ornaments, beds, chairs, houses, carriages, cars, and so on, are non-consumable things – paribhoga – as these can be enjoyed repeatedly. A limit is placed by the householder on possession of these things of upabhoga and paribhoga; this is called upabhogaparibhogapaimāõavrata. The householder who desires to avoid gross injury – trasahiÉsā – must abstain from honey, meat and wine, permanently. He must also renounce things like flowers of 'ketakī' and 'arjuna', ginger, radish, etc., which are seats of infinite organisms and are fit to be called infinite-bodied (anantakāya). Very little advantage is derived from these in spite of considerable injury (hiÉsā) caused. With regard to cars, carriages, ornaments, etc., the householder decides what is desirable and what is not. And thus he renounces the things undesirable for a limited period or for lifetime, according to his capacity. 287 vè;k;&7 He who moves from place to place without transgressing his selfcontrol (saÉyama) is called the guest (atithi). Or, the guest (atithi) is one who comes on any date without prior intimation. Four things are offered to the guest – food, implements, medicine and shelter. Faultless food must be offered by the householder to the genuine ascetic treading the path to liberation and earnest in practising restraint (saÉyama), with a pure heart. Implements, such as the Scripture, which promote right faith, and so on, must be presented to him. Proper medicine must be arranged for. Shelter must also be provided with great devotion. The term 'ca' – 'and' – at the end of the sūtra is intended to include the householder's duty mentioned next. ekj.kkfUrdha lYys[kuka tksf"krk AA22AA rFkk og (ozr/kjh Jkod) 1ekj.kkfUrdhao ekj.kkfUrd 1lYys[kukao lYys[kuk dk 1tksf"krko izhfriwoZd lsou djus okyk gksrk gSA Futher, the householder adopts, with a sense of contentment, the practice of dispassionately abandoning his body – 'sallekhanā' – at the end of his life. The loss of the senses and the vitalities at the end of one's duration of life – āyuÍ – that is the result of one's own modifications (pariõāma), is death (maraõa). The end refers to the particular state of existence. That state which has death as its end is 'maraõānta'. That which has 'maraõānta' as its object is 'māraõantikī'. To emaciate the body and the passions in the proper manner is 'sallekhanā'. This means that the physical body and the internal passions (kaÈāya) are emaciated in the proper manner by abandoning their sources gradually at the approach of death. The householder observes sallekhanā at the end of his life. Shouldn't the word 'sevitā' – adoption – be used instead of 'joÈitā' in 288 Tattvārthasūtra the sūtra? 'JoÈitā' implies that the householder observes sallekhanā with a sense of contentment. Hence 'sevitā', though clear in meaning, is not used. Without willingness, sallekhanā cannot be imposed on anyone. When there is a sense of contentment, the householder adopts sallekhanā by himself. It is argued that sallekhanā is suicide since it involves voluntary severance of vitalities (prāõa). No, it is not suicide. In sallekhanā there are no associated faults due to negligence (pramāda). It has been said earlier that the severance of vitalities (prāõa) due to the activity of the soul tinged with passionate disposition – pramattayoga – is injury (hiÉsā). (see sūtra 7-13). The householder without 'pramāda' is without faults like attachment (rāga). Only the person who kills himself by means of poison, weapon, etc., swayed by attachment (rāga), aversion (dveÈa) or delusion (moha), commits the crime of suicide. But he who embraces holy death observing sallekhanā is free from attachment (rāga), etc. Hence in no way does he commit the crime of suicide. It has been said by Lord Jina: "Certainly, non-manifestation of faults like attachment (rāga) is noninjury (ahiÉsā) and manifestation of such faults is injury (hiÉsā)." Further, nobody welcomes death. As an example, the merchant engaged in sale, purchase and storage of various commodities does not welcome the destruction of his storehouse. If any reason for its destruction arises, he tries his best to safeguard the storehouse. But if its destruction is imminent he tries to save from ruin at least the commodities. Similarly, the householder engaged in acquiring the commodities of vows and supplementary vows does not desire the ruin of the receptacle of these virtues, namely, the body. But when the body faces danger, he tries to avert it in a righteous manner, without violating his vows. In case it is not possible to avert the danger to the body, it makes sense that he tries to safeguard his vows at least. How can such an effort be called suicide? It has been said that the votary (vratī) is free from stings (śalya). Wrong-belief (mithyādarśana) also is a sting (śalya). Therefore, the votary who is a right-believer (samyagdÃÈÇi) ought to be free from 289 vè;k;&7 stings. Is the right-believer (samyagdÃÈÇi) votary free from transgressions? It is clarified that sometimes, owing to delusion (moha), the following transgressions do occur in case of the right-believer (samyagdÃÈÇi). 'kadkdka{kkfofpfdRlk¿U;n`f"Viz'kalklaLrok% lE;Xn`"Vsjfrpkjk% AA23AA 1'kadkdka{kkfofpfdRlk¿U;n`f"Viz'kalklaLrok%o 'kadk] dka{kk] fofpfdRlk] vU;n`f"V dh iz'kalk vkSj vU;n`f"V dk laLro & ;s ik¡p 1lE;Xn`"Vs% vfrpkjk%o lE;Xn`f"V ds vfrpkj gSaA Doubt in the teachings of Lord Jina – śańkā, desire for worldly enjoyment – kāńkÈā, repugnance or disgust at the afflicted – vicikitsā, admiration for the knowledge and conduct of the wrong-believer – anyadÃÈÇipraśaÉsā and praise of the wrong-believer – anyadÃÈÇisaÉstava, are the five transgressions of the right-believer (samyagdÃÈÇi). Qualities like freedom from doubt – niÍśańkitva – etc., have been explained earlier in 'darśanaviśuddhi...' (see sūtra 6-24). Doubt, etc., are the opposites of those qualities. What is the distinction between admiration (praśaÉsā) and praise (saÉstava)? Admiration (praśaÉsā) is attributing knowledge and conduct to the wrong-believer (mithyādÃÈÇi) in one's own thought. Expression of existent or nonexistent qualities in the wrong-believer (mithyādÃÈÇi) is praise (saÉstava). This is the difference between the two. Now, eight qualities have been mentioned for right belief (samyagdarśana). Should not the transgressions be eight? No, it is not necessary. The author lays down five transgressions each for the primary vows and 290 Tattvārthasūtra the supplementary vows. Hence, here also he mentions only five transgressions; the transgressions of admiration (praśaÉsā) and praise (saÉstava) encompass the other transgressions. The transgressions of the right-believer (samyagdÃÈÇi) have been mentioned. Are there any transgressions for the vows and the supplementary vows also? Yes. The number of transgressions for these is indicated in the next sūtra. ozr'khys"kq iÛÓ iÛÓ ;FkkØee~ AA24AA 1ozr'khys"kqo ozr vkSj 'khyksa esa Hkh 1;FkkØeao vuqØe ls izR;sd esa 1iÛÓ iÛÓo ik¡p&ik¡p vfrpkj gSaA There are five transgressions for each of the vows (vrata) and the supplementary-vows (śīlavrata). The compound 'vrataśīleÈu' means with regard to the vows (vrata) and the supplementary-vows (śīlavrata). It is contended that the inclusion of the supplementary-vows (śīlavrata) is unnecessary as these are implied in the vows (vrata). But it is not unnecessary. The idea is to highlight the specifics too which safeguard the primary vows (vrata) of non-injury (ahiÉsā), etc. The word 'śīla' in the sūtra indicates the inclusion of the supplementary-vows (śīlavrata) such as abstaining from the direction – digvirati. Since this section refers to the conduct of the householder, the five transgressions for each of his vows (vrata) and supplementary-vows (śīlavrata) are mentioned. Now the transgressions of the vow of noninjury (ahiÉsā) are described. 291 vè;k;&7 cUèkoèkPNsnkfrHkkjkjksi.kkÂikufujks/k% AA25AA 1cUèkoèkPNsnkfrHkkjkjksi.kkÂikufujks/k%o cU/] o/] Nsn] vf/d Hkkj yknuk vkSj vÂ&iku dk fujks/ djuk & ;s ik¡p v glk.kqozr ds vfrpkj gSaA Binding – bandha, beating – vadha, mutilating limbs – cheda, overloading – atibhārāropaõa, and withholding food and drink – annapānanirodha, are the five transgressions of the first minor vow of non-injury (ahiÉsāõuvrata). Creating obstruction in the movement of the living being, as it wishes to move, is binding – bandha. The word 'vadha' in the sūtra does not mean killing or severance of vitalities as these have already been renounced on adoption of the vow of non-injury (ahiÉsā). What 'vadha' means here is beating with a stick, a whip or a cane. Mutilation – cheda – is cutting off of limbs such as the ear and the nose. Overloading – atibhārāropaõa – is loading an animal or a human being with more weight than what can reasonably be carried. Withholding food and drink – annapānanirodha – is denying these to the animal when it is hungry and thirsty. These five are the transgressions of the minor vow of non-injury – ahiÉsāõuvrata. feF;ksins'kjgksH;k[;kudwVys[kfØ;kU;klkigkj& lkdkjeU=kHksnk% AA26AA 1feF;ksins'kjgksH;k[;kudwVys[kfØ;kU;klkigkjlkdkjeU=k& Hksnk%o feF;ksins'k] jgksH;k[;ku] dwVys[kfØ;k] U;klkigkj vkSj lkdkjea=kHksn & ;s ik¡p lR;k.kqozr ds vfrpkj gaSA 292 Tattvārthasūtra Perverted teaching – mithyopadeśa, divulging what is done in secret – rahobhyākhyāna, writing falsely – kūÇalekhakriyā, misappropriation – nyāsāpahāra, and proclaiming others' thoughts – sākāramańtrabheda – are the five transgressions of the second minor vow of truthfulness (satyāõuvrata). Perverted teaching – mithyopadeśa – is misdirecting another who is on path to self-attainment and salvation, or to deceive him through false teaching. Divulging what is done in secret – rahobhyākhyāna – is revealing what has been done in secret by a couple. Writing falsely – kūÇalekhakriyā – is forgery or preparing false records in order to cheat someone. Prompted by others, one falsely affirms what has not been said or done by another. Misappropriation – nyāsāpahāra – is taking for oneself gold and other things entrusted to one's care by another. When a person deposits certain things with another, and later on, by mistake, asks for less than what he had deposited, the other person confirms it and takes the rest for himself. Proclaiming others' thoughts – sākāramańtrabheda – is guessing others' thoughts by their posture, facial expression, etc., and proclaiming these out of envy. These are the five transgressions of the minor vow of truthfulness (satyāõuvrata). Lrsuiz;ksxrnkârknkufo#1⁄4jkT;kfrØeghukfèkd& ekuksUekuizfr:idO;ogkjk% AA27AA Lrsuiz;ksx & pksjh ds fy;s pksj dks izsj.kk djuk ;k mldk mik; crkuk bR;kfn] rnkârknku & pksj ls pqjkbZ gqbZ oLrq dks xzg.k djuk] fo#1⁄4jkT;kfrØe & jkT; dh vkKk ds fo#1⁄4 pyuk] 293 vè;k;&7 ghukfèkd&ekuksUeku & nsus&ysus ds ck¡V rjktw vkfn de&T;knk j[kuk vkSj izfr:idO;ogkj & dherh oLrq esa de dher dh oLrq feykdj nwljksa dks Bxuk & ;s vpkS;kZ.kqozr ds vfrpkj gaSA Prompting another to steal – stenaprayoga, receiving stolen goods – stena āhÃtādāna, buying against the law – viruddharājyātikrama, using false weights and measures – hīnādhikamānonmāna, and deceiving others with artificial or imitation goods – pratirūpakavyavahāra, are the five transgressions of the third minor vow of nonstealing (acauryāõuvrata). Prompting a person to steal, prompting him to do so through another, or approving of the theft, is the first transgression – stenaprayoga. The second – stena āhÃtādāna – is receiving stolen goods from a person whose action has neither been prompted nor approved by the recipient. This is a transgression as the goods have been taken otherwise than by just means. Buying against the law – viruddharājyātikrama – is to buy and sell contraband goods and not following the law in trade and commerce. Cheating others by use of false weights and measures in order to obtain more and give less is the fourth transgression – hīnādhikamānonmāna. Deceiving others with artificial gold, synthetic diamonds, and so on, is the fifth transgression – pratirūpakavyavahāra. These five are the transgressions of the third minor vow of non-stealing (acauryāõuvrata). ijfookgdj.ksRofjdkifjx`ghrk¿ifjx`ghrk& xeukuÄØhMkdkerhozkfHkfuos'kk% AA28AAõ 294 Tattvārthasūtra ijfookgdj.k & nwljs ds iq=k&iqf=k;ksa dk fookg djuk&djkuk] bRofjdkifjx`ghrkxeu & ifr&lfgr O;fHkpkfj.kh fÐ;ksa ds ikl vkuk&tkuk] ysu&nsu j[kuk] jkxHkko iwoZd ckr&phr djuk] bRofjdk¿ifjx`ghrkxeu & ifr&jfgr O;fHkpkfj.kh Ðh (os';kfn) ds ;gk¡ vkuk&tkuk] ysu&nsu vkfn dk O;ogkj j[kuk] vuÄØhMk & õ vuaxØhM+k vFkkZr~ dkelsou ds fy;s fuf'pr~ vaxksa dks NksM+dj vU; vaxksa ls dkelsou djuk] vkSj dkerhozkfHkfuos'k & dkelsou dh rhoz vfHkyk"kk] ;s ik¡p czãp;kZ.kqozr ds vfrpkj gaSA Bringing about others' marriage – paravivāhakaraõa, intercourse with an unchaste married woman – itvarikā parigÃhītāgamana, cohabitation with a harlot – itvarikā aparigÃhītāgamana, perverted sexual practice – anańgakrīçā, and excessive sexual-desire – kāmatīvrābhiniveśa – are the five transgressions of the fourth minor vow of contentment with one's wife (svadārasańtoÈa aõuvrata). Marriage – 'vivāha' – consists in taking a woman for wife. The marriage of others is 'paravivāha'. Bringing about or causing the marriage of others – paravivāhakaraõa – is the first transgression. The one whose nature is moving around is 'itvarī'. The woman who likes to go to other men is 'itvarikā' – a contemptible adulteress. 'ParigÃhītā' is a married woman. 'AparigÃhītā' is a harlot without a husband. Cohabitation with 'parigÃhītā' is itvarikā parigÃhītāgamana. Cohabitation with 'aparigÃhītā' is itvarikā aparigÃhītāgamana. Sexual intercourse by other than the generative organ is a perverted practice – anańgakrīçā. The last is excessive sexual-desire – kāmatīvrābhiniveśa. These are the five transgressions of the minor vow of contentment with one's wife (svadārasańtoÈa aõuvrata). 295 vè;k;&7 {ks=kokLrqfgj.;lqo.kZèkuèkkU;nklhnkldqI;& izek.kkfrØek% AA29AA 1{ks=kokLrqizek.kkfrØek%o {ks=k vkSj jgus ds LFkku ds ifjek.k dk mYYka?ku djuk 1fgj.;lqo.kZizek.kkfrØek%o pk¡nh vkSj lqo.kZ ds ifjek.k dk mYya?ku djuk 1/u/kU;izek.kkfrØek%o /u (i'kq vkfn) rFkk /kU; ds ifjek.k dk mYYka?ku djuk 1nklhnklizek.kkfrØek%o nklh vkSj nkl ds ifjek.k dk mYYka?ku djuk rFkk 1dqI;izek.kkfrØek%o oÐ] crZu vkfn ds ifjek.k dk mYYka?ku djuk & ;s ik¡p vifjxzg v.kqozr ds vfrpkj gSaA Exceeding the limits set by oneself with regard to cultivable land and houses – kÈetra-vāstu, gold and silver coins and ornaments – hiraõya-suvarõa, cattle and corn – dhana-dhānya, female and male servants – dāsī-dāsa, and clothes and utensils – kupya, are the five transgressions of the fifth minor vow of limiting possessions (parigrahaparimāõa aõuvrata). 'KÈetra' means the land in which corn is grown. 'Vāstu' is habitation or place of residence. 'Hiraõya' means stamped coins of precious metals. 'Suvarõa' means gold ornaments, etc. 'Dhana' is wealth in form of cows, and so on. 'Dhānya' denotes corn such as rice and wheat. 'Dāsīdāsa' means men and women servants. 'Kupya' means silk and cotton cloth, silken garments, sandalwood paste, etc. Utensils are also included. The householder takes a resolve: "With regard to these, my possessions shall be only so much and not above this limit." Exceeding the set limits with regard to these five – kÈetra-vāstu, hiraõya-suvarõa, dhana-dhānya, dāsī-dāsa, and kupya – out of excessive greed 296 Tattvārthasūtra constitute five transgressions of the minor vow of limiting possessions (parigrahaparimāõa aõuvrata). The transgressions of the vows have been described. Now the transgressions of the supplementary vows are described. ÅèokZèkfLr;ZXO;frØe{ks=kòf1⁄4LèR;Urjkèkkukfu AA30AA 1ÅèoZO;frØeo e;kZnk ls vf/d ÅapkbZ okys LFkyksa esa tkuk] 1v/%O;frØeo e;kZnk ls uhps (d¡qvk] [kku vkfn) LFkkuksa esa mrjuk] 1fr;Zd~O;frØeo e;kZnk ds vfrfjÙkQ xqiQk vkfn esa tkuk] 1{ks=kòf1⁄4o dh gqbZ e;kZnk dk ifjek.k c<+k ysuk vkSj 1LèR;Urjk/kuo {ks=k dh e;kZnk dks Hkwy tkuk & ;s ik¡p fnXozr ds vfrpkj gSaA Transgressing (vyatikrama) the limits set in the directions, namely, upward (ūrdhva), downwards (adhaÍ), and transverse (tiryag), enlarging boundaries in the accepted directions – kÈetravÃddhi, and forgetting the boundaries set – smÃtyantarādhāna, are the five transgressions of the supplementary vow of abstaining from activity with regard to the direction – digvirativrata. Exceeding the limit set with regard to the direction, is a transgression. This, in short, is of three kinds – transgression upwards – ūrdhvavyatikrama, transgression downwards – adhovyatikrama, and transgression in transverse direction – tiryagvyatikrama. Examples of these three transgressions are climbing a mountain, descending into a well and entering a cave, respectively. Enlarging the boundaries in the 297 vè;k;&7 accepted directions out of greed is the fourth transgression, called kÈetravÃddhi. This transgression may be due to negligence, infatuation or attachment. Forgetting the limits set is the fifth transgression, called smÃtyantarādhāna. These five are the transgressions of the supplementary vow of abstaining from activity with regard to the direction – digvirativrata. vku;uisz";iz;ksx'kCn:ikuqikriqñxy{ksik% AA31AA 1vku;uo e;kZnk ls ckgj dh pht dks eaxkuk] 1isz";iz;ksxo e;kZnk ls ckgj ukSdj vkfn dks Hkstuk] 1'kCnkuqikro [kk¡lh] 'kCn vkfn ls e;kZnk ds ckgj thoksa dks viuk vfHkizk; le>k nsuk] 1:ikuqikro viuk :i vkfn fn[kkdj e;kZnk ds ckgj ds thoksa dks b'kkjk djuk vkSj 1iqñxy{ksik%o e;kZnk ds ckgj dadj] iRFkj vkfn isaQddj vius dk;Z dk fuokZg dj ysuk & ;s ik¡p ns'kozr ds vfrpkj gSaA Sending for something outside the country of one's resolve – ānayana, commanding someone there to do thus – preÈyaprayoga, indicating one's intentions by sounds – śabdānupāta, by showing oneself – rūpānupāta, and by throwing clod, etc. – pudgalakÈepa, are the five transgressions of the supplementary vow of abstaining from activity with regard to the country – deśavirativrata. Ānayana is ordering someone to bring something from a country outside the mental resolve. Commanding someone, "Do this," outside the limit is preÈyaprayoga. Making known one's intentions to someone outside the mental resolve by signs such as coughing, grunting, etc., is 298 Tattvārthasūtra śabdānupāta. Showing oneself up to someone outside the mental resolve is rūpānupāta. Signalling to someone outside the mental resolve by throwing clod, etc., is pudgalakÈepa. These are the five transgressions of the supplementary vow of abstaining from activity with regard to the country – deśavirativrata. dUniZdkSRdqP;ekS[k;kZleh{;kfèkdj.kksiHkksx& ifjHkksxkuFkZD;kfu AA32AA 1dUniZo jkx ls gkL;lfgr vf'k"V opu cksyuk] 1dkSRdqP;o 'kjhj dh dqpsk djds vf'k opu cksyuk] 1ekS[k;Zo /`rkiwoZd cgqr T;knk cksyuk] 1vleh{;kf/dj.ko fcuk iz;kstu eu] opu] dk; dh izòfÙk djuk vkSj 1miHkksxifjHkksxkuFkZD;o Hkksx rFkk miHkksx ds inkFkks± dk vko';drk ls vf/d laxzg djuk & ;s ik¡p vuFkZn.Mozr ds vfrpkj gSaA Vulgar jokes – kandarpa, vulgar jokes accompanied by gesticulation – kautkucya, garrulity – maukharya, unthinkingly indulging in too much action – asamīkÈyādhikaraõa, and keeping too many consumables and nonconsumables – upabhogaparibhogānarthakya, are the five transgressions of the supplementary vow of withdrawing from purposeless sin – anarthadaõçavirativrata. Employing vulgar language mixed with laughter out of excessive attachment (rāga) is kandarpa. The same accompanied by undesirable gesticulation is kautkucya. Indulging in meaningless and unrestrained talk out of self-importance is maukharya. Indulging in too much action without considering the object is asamīkÈyādhi299 vè;k;&7 karaõa. Accumulation of consumable and non-consumable objects beyond one's needs is upabhogaparibhogānarthakya. These are the five transgressions of the supplementary vow of abstaining from purposeless sin – anarthadaõçavirativrata. ;ksxnq"izf.kèkkukuknjLèR;uqiLFkkukfu AA33AA 1;ksxnq"izf.k/kuo eu lEcU/h ifj.kkekas dh vU;Fkk izòfÙk djuk] opu lEcU/h ifj.kkeksa dh vU;Fkk izòfÙk djuk] dk; lEcU/h ifj.kkeksa dh vU;Fkk izòfÙk djuk] 1vuknjo lkekf;d ds izfr mRlkg jfgr gksuk] 1LèR;uqiLFkkuo ,dkxzrk ds vHkko dks ysdj lkekf;d ds ikB vkfn Hkwy tkuk & ;s ik¡p lkekf;d f'k{kkozr ds vfrpkj gSaA Misdirected threefold activity – yogaduÈpraõidhāna – of the body (kāya), the speech (vacana) and the mind (mana), lack of earnestness – anādara, and fluctuation of thought – smÃtyanupasthāna, are the five transgressions of the supplementary vow of periodic concentration – sāmāyikavrata. Activity (yoga) has already been explained as of three kinds. Transgressions are actions tending to evil; these also are of three kinds, vicious bodily activity – kāyayogaduÈpraõidhāna, vicious speech-activity – vacanayogaduÈpraõidhāna and vicious mentalactivity – manoyogaduÈpraõidhāna. Lack of earnestness during concentration is anādara. Fluctuation of thought during concentration is smÃtyanupasthāna. These are the five transgressions of the supplementary vow of periodic concentration – sāmāyikavrata. 300 Tattvārthasūtra vizR;osf{krkizek£trksRlxkZnkulaLrjksiØe.kkuknj& LèR;uqiLFkkukfu AA34AA 1vizR;osf{krkizek£trksRlxkZnkulaLrjksiØe.kkuknjLèR;uqiLFkkukfuo fcuk ns[kh] fcuk 'kks/h Hkwfe esa ey&ew=kkfn {ksi.k djuk_ fcuk ns[ks] fcuk 'kks/s iwtu ds midj.k xzg.k djuk_ fcuk ns[ks] fcuk 'kks/s tehu ij pVkbZ] oL=k vkfn fcNkuk_ Hkw[k vkfn ls O;kdqy gks vko';d /eZ&dk;Z mRlkg&jfgr gksdj djuk_ vko';d /eZ&dk;ks± dks Hkwy tkuk & ;s ik¡p izks"k/ksiokl f'k{kkozr ds vfrpkj gSaA Performing these three activities, excreting – utsarga, taking of objects – ādāna, and spreading mats and garments – saÉstara, without inspecting and cleaning the place and the materials, lack of earnestness – anādara, and lack of concentration – smÃtyanupasthāna, are the five transgressions of the supplementary vow of fasting at regular intervals – proÈadhopavāsavrata. Inspecting carefully for organisms is pratyavekÈaõa. Cleaning carefully with soft implements is pramārjana. These two attributes are taken with all three activities – utsarga, ādāna, and saÉstara. Excreting waste matter in a place without inspecting and cleaning it is the first. Taking objects such as sandalwood paste, flowers, incense, etc., intended for worship of the Lord (Arhat) and the preceptor, and cloth, etc., for personal use, without inspecting and cleaning these is the second. Spreading mats and garments without inspecting and cleaning the place is the third. Lack of earnestness – anādara – in one's essential duties when tormented by hunger is the fourth. Lack of concentration – smÃtyanupasthāna – described in the previous sūtra, is the fifth. These five are the transgressions of the supplementary 301 vè;k;&7 lfpÙklEcUèklfEeJkfHk"konq%iDokgkjk% AA35AA lfpÙkkgkj & lfpÙk (thookys) inkFkZ] lEcUèkkgkj & lfpÙk inkFkZ ds lkFk lEcU/ okys inkFkZ] lfEeJkgkj & lfpÙk inkFkZ ls feys gq;s inkFkZ] vfHk"kokgkj & xfj"B inkFkZ] vkSj nq"iDokgkj & vk/s ids ;k vf/d ids gq, ;k cqjh rjg ls ids inkFkZ & budk vkgkj djuk & ;s ik¡p miHkksx&ifjHkksx ifjek.k f'k{kkozr ds vfrpkj gSaA Taking victuals (āhāra) containing (one-sensed) organisms – sacitta, placed near organisms – sambandha, mixed with organisms – sammiśra, stimulants – abhiÈava, and ill-cooked – duÈpakva, are the five transgressions of the supplementary vow of limiting consumable and non-consumable things – upabhogaparibhogapaimāõavrata. The first, sacittāhāra, is food containing (one-sensed) organisms. The second, sambandhāhāra, is food placed near such organisms. The third, sammiśrāhāra, is food mixed with such organisms. How is it that a householder partakes of food with organisms? It is because of negligence or infatuation. AbhiÈavāhāra is food that is stimulating. The last, duÈpakvāhāra, is ill-cooked food. Food is qualified by these adjectives. These are the five transgressions of the supplementary vow of limiting consumable and non-consumable things – upabhogaparibhogapaimāõavrata. vow of fasting at regular intervals – proÈadhopavāsavrata. 302 Tattvārthasūtra lfpÙkfu{ksikfièkkuijO;ins'kekRl;ZdkykfrØek% AA36AA lfpÙkfu{ksi & lfpÙk i=k vkfn esa j[kdj Hkkstu nsuk] lfpÙkkfi/ku & lfpÙk i=k vkfn ls <ds gq;s Hkkstu vkfn dks nsuk] ijO;ins'k & nwljs nkrkj dh oLrq dks nsuk] ekRl;Z & vuknjiwoZd nsuk vFkok nwljs nkrkj dh oLrq dks bZ";kZiwoZd nsuk] dkykfrØe & ;ksX; dky dk mYya?ku djds nsuk & ;s ik¡p vfrfFklafoHkkx f'k{kkozr ds vfrpkj gaSA Placing the food on things with organisms such as green leaves – sacittanikÈepa, covering it with such things – sacittāpidhāna, giving the food of another host – paravyapadeśa, envy – mātsarya, and untimely food – kālātikrama, are the five transgressions of the supplementary vow of partaking of one's food after feeding the ascetic – atithisaÉvibhāgavrata. Placing the food on things such as the lotus leaf, which contain organisms, is sacittanikÈepa. Covering it with similar things is sacittāpidhāna. Offering another host's food as if it were one's own is paravyapadeśa. Lack of earnestness, or envy of another host, is mātsarya. Offering food either too early or too late is kālātikrama. These are the five transgressions of the supplementary vow of partaking of one's food after feeding the ascetic – atithisaÉvibhāgavrata. thforej.kk'kalkfe=kkuqjkxlq[kkuqcUèkfunkukfu AA37AA thfork'kalk & (lYys[kuk /kj.k djus ds ckn) thus dh bPNk djuk] ej.kk'kalk & osnuk ls O;kdqy gksdj 'kh?kz ejus dh bPNk 303 vè;k;&7 djuk] fe=kkuqjkx & fe=kksa esa vuqjkx djuk] lq[kkuqcU/ & igys Hkksxs gq;s lq[kksa dk Lej.k djuk] funku & funku&ca/ djuk vFkkZr~ vkxkeh fo"k;&Hkksxksa dh okaNk djuk & ;s ik¡p lYys[kukozr ds vfrpkj gaSA Desire for life – jīvitāśaÉsā, desire for death – maraõāśaÉsā, attachment to friends – mitrānurāga, attachment to pleasures – sukhānubandha, and longing for future enjoyment – nidāna, are the five transgressions of the practice of dispassionately abandoning one's body – sallekhanā. Desire for life – jīvitāśaÉsā – is to long for a longer life. Desire for death – maraõāśaÉsā – is to long for speedy death. Attachment to friends – mitrānurāga – is recollection of past sport, etc., that one had enjoyed with former friends. Attachment to pleasures – sukhānubandha – is recollection of pleasures enjoyed in the past. Longing for future enjoyment – nidāna – is constantly thinking about future enjoyment. These are the transgressions of the practice of dispassionately abandoning one's body – sallekhanā. In describing the causes of influx (āsrava) of the name-karma of the Tīrthańkara, charity (tyāga) and austerities (tapa) according to one's capacity have been mentioned (see sūtra 6-24). Also, there is the mention of atithisaÉvibhāgavrata (see sūtra 7-21). What is the nature of charity – tyāga or dāna? vuqxzgkFk± LoL;kfrlxksZ nkue~ AA38AA 1vuqxzgkFk±o vuqxzg&midkj ds gsrq ls 1LoL;kfrlxZ%o /u vkfn viuh oLrq dk R;kx djuk lks 1nkuao nku gSA 304 Tattvārthasūtra Charity (dāna) is the giving of one's objects to another for mutual benefit – anugraha. 'Anugraha' means beneficial to both, the giver and the recipient. The giver accumulates merit (puõya); this is benefit to the giver. The gift promotes right knowledge, etc., in the recipient; this is benefit to the recipient. The word 'sva' in the sūtra means wealth. Thus, renouncing one's wealth or possessions for mutual benefit is charity (dāna). Charity (dāna) has been described. Are there any distinctions with regard to the effects of the gift? fofèkaeO;nkr`ik=kfo'ks"kkÙkf}'ks"k% AA39AA 1fof/aeO;nkr`ik=kfo'ks"kkr~o fof/] aeO;] nkr` vkSj ik=k dh fo'ks"krk ls 1rf}'ks"k%o nku eas fo'ks"krk gksrh gSA The effect of giving of the gift – dāna – has distinctions based on the specific manner in which it is given – vidhiviśeÈa, the specific thing given – dravyaviśeÈa, the specific nature of the giver – dātÃviśeÈa, and the specific nature of the recipient – pātraviśeÈa. The manner is the way in which a guest is received and attended to. The distinction is excellence or superiority due to particular qualities. It is added on to everything – excellence of the manner, excellence of the thing given, superiority of the giver, and superiority of the recipient. Thus, 'vidhiviśeÈa' is the distinction in the manner the guest is received and attended to – with reverence or without reverence. The excellence of the thing given – dravyaviśeÈa – consists in its quality to promote austerity, study, etc. The superiority of the 305 vè;k;&7 giver – dātÃviśeÈa – lies in his being free from envy and dejection. The presence of qualities which lead to salvation indicates the superiority of the recipient – pātraviśeÈa. As excellence in the quality of the soil, etc., enhances the quality of the seed and produces a rich harvest, similarly, excellence in the manner (vidhi), etc., of the gift enhances the quality of the charity (dāna) and produces great merit (puõya). ] ] ] 306 Tattvārthasūtra AA bfr rÙokFkZlw=kkijukeeks{k'kkÐs lIrekss¿è;k;% lekIr% AA Wrong-belief (mithyādarśana), non-abstinence (avirati), negligence (pramāda), passions (kaÈāya) and activities (yoga) are the causes of bondage (bandha). BONDAGE OF KARMAS C H A P T E R 8 feF;kn'kZukfojfrizeknd"kk;;ksxk cUèkgsro% AA1AA 1feF;kn'kZukfojfrizeknd"kk;;ksxko feF;kn'kZu] vfojfr] izekn] d"kk; vkSj ;ksx & ;s ik¡p 1cU/gsro%o cU/ ds gsrq (dkj.k) gaSA Influx (āsrava) has been explained. Bondage (bandha) which comes immediately after influx (āsrava) is to be described now. First, the causes of bondage are mentioned, as these are antecedent to bondage. Wrong-belief (mithyādarśana) has been explained. Where has it been explained? It has been explained in sūtra 1-2: 'Belief in substances ascertained as these are is right faith (samyagdarśana)'. And, wrongbelief (mithyādarśana) is just the opposite of right faith (samyagdarśana). Also, in context of influx (āsrava), while describing the twenty-five activities, mithyātva or wrong-belief (mithyādarśana) has been described (see sūtra 6-5). Abstinence (virati) has been described. Non-abstinence (avirati) must he understood to be the opposite of abstinence. Negligence (pramāda) involves misinterpretation of the Scripture and the injunctions contained therein, and indifference to observe the injunctions (see sūtra 6-5). It is indifference to laudable activities. The passions (kaÈāya) – anger, pride, deceitfulness and greed – with their subdivisions have been explained (see sūtra 6-5). Activities (yoga) have been explained as three, namely, bodily activity, 307 vè;k;&8 mental activity and speech activity (see sūtra 6-1). Wrong belief (mithyādarśana) is of two kinds, natural – naisargika, and derived from teaching – paropadeśapūrvaka. On the rise of the karma leading to wrong belief (mithyādarśana), the manifestation of wrong belief, without teaching by others, in the true nature of reality is the first variety – naisargika. The second variety is derived from teaching by others – paropadeśapūrvaka. It is of four kinds, namely, kriyāvādi, akriyāvādi, ajñānika and vainayika. Or it is of five kinds – absolutistic (ekānta), contrary (viparyaya), scepticism (saÉśaya), nondiscriminating or superficial (vainayika) and ignorant (ajñānika). The identifi-cation of a thing and its attribute as 'this alone' or 'thus only' is absolutistic (ekānta) mithyādarśana. Examples of absolutistic (ekānta) mithyādarśana are to believe that supreme being alone is everything (the whole universe), or everything is permanent, or everything is momentary. The following are examples of contrary (viparyaya) mithyādarśana: 'an ascetic with material possessions is a passionless saint,' 'the Omniscient Lord takes morsels of food,' and 'women attain liberation'. The indecisive view, 'whether the three gems of right faith, right knowledge and right conduct lead to emancipation or not,' is an example of scepticism (saÉśaya) mithyādarśana. 'All gods are one,' and 'all religions are the same,' are examples of non-discriminating or superficial (vainayika) mithyādarśana. Incapacity to examine what is good and what is not good to oneself is ignorant (ajñānika) mithyādarśana. To quote from the Scripture: "There are one hundred and eighty kinds of kriyāvādī, eighty-four kinds of akriyāvādī, sixty-seven kinds of ajñānika and thirty-two kinds of vainayika." (see 'GommaÇasāra-karmakāõça', verse 876.) Non-abstinence (avirati) is of twelve kinds, relating to the six classes of embodied souls or beings and the six senses, mind included. The six types of living beings are the five kinds of immobile beings, namely, earth, water, fire, air and plants, and the mobile beings. The sixteen passions and the nine quasi-passions, together, make up twenty-five passions (kaÈāya). There is slight difference between the passions 308 Tattvārthasūtra (kaÈāya) and the quasi-passions (nokaÈāya). But the difference is not relevant here, so these are grouped together. Activities (yoga) are of thirteen kinds. Mental activities (manoyoga) are four, namely, true, false, both true and false, and neither true nor false. Speech-activities (vacanayoga) also are four. Bodily activities (kāyayoga) are five. These make up thirteen. Activities (yoga) are also of fifteen kinds as it is possible for the accomplished ascetic in pramattasaÉyata guõasthāna to attain the two activities of the āhārakakāyayoga and the āhārakamiśrakāyayoga. Negligence (pramāda) is of several kinds. It is with regard to the fivefold regulation of activities, threefold selfcontrol, eight kinds of purity, ten kinds of moral virtues, and so on. These – wrong-belief (mithyādarśana), non-abstinence (avirati), etc. – are the five causes of bondage, whether concurrently or severally. In case of the wrong-believer (mithyādÃÈÇi) all the five causes operate. In case of those in the second (sāsādanasamyagdÃÈÇi), the third (samyagmithyādÃÈÇi) and the fourth (asaÉyatasamyagdÃÈÇi) guõasthāna, the four causes commencing from non-abstinence (avirati) operate. In case of those in the fifth (saÉyatāsaÉyata) guõasthāna, combination of non-abstinence (avirati) and abstinence (virati), negligence (pramāda), passions (kaÈāya) and activities (yoga) operate. In case of the ascetic in the sixth (pramattasaÉyata) guõasthāna, the three, negligence (pramāda), passions (kaÈāya) and activities (yoga) operate. In case of the ascetic in the seventh (apramattasaÉyata), the eighth (apūrvakaraõa), the ninth (anivÃttibādarasāmparāya) and the tenth (sūkÈmasāmparāya) guõasthāna, only two, activities (yoga) and passions (kaÈāya), operate. In case of the ascetic in the eleventh (upaśāntakaÈāya), twelfth (kÈīõakaÈāya) and thirteenth (sayogakevalī) guõasthāna, only one, activities (yoga), operate. In the last stage – ayogakevalī – there is no cause for bondage. The causes of bondage (bandha) have been described. The next sūtra explains bondage (bandha). 309 vè;k;&8 The living being – jīva, the soul – actuated by passions (kaÈāya), retains particles of matter (pudgala) fit to turn into karmas. This is bondage (bandha). ld"kk;RokTtho% deZ.kks ;ksX;kUiqñxykuknÙks l cUèk% AA2AA 1tho% ld"kk;Rokr~o tho d"kk;lfgr gksus ls 1deZ.k% ;ksX;kUiqñxyku~o deZ ds ;ksX; iqñxy ijek.kqvksa dks 1vknÙkso xzg.k djrk gS] 1l cU/%o og cU/ gSA The soul actuated by passions (kaÈāya) is 'sakaÈāya'. Just as the digestive fire of the stomach (the gastric fluid or juice) absorbs food suitable to it, so also the soul retains karmas of duration (sthiti) and fruition (anubhāga) corresponding to the virulent, mild or moderate nature of the passions (kaÈāya). How does the soul which is immaterial take in karmic matter? In answer to this question the word 'jīva' has been used in the sūtra. That which lives is jīva; the jīva has vitality (prāõa) and life (āyuÍ). The phrase 'karmaõo yogyān' indicates the jīva which is with karmas. Only the jīva with karmas is actuated by passions (kaÈāya). The jīva without karmas is not actuated by passions (kaÈāya). From this it follows that the association of the jīva with karmas is beginningless. This answers the question how the immaterial soul is bound by the material karmas. If we postulate a beginning for bondage, there can be no bondage at all as in case of the liberated souls – the Siddha – characterized by utter purity. The second part of the sūtra is that the self takes in appropriate particles of matter (pudgala) capable of being transformed into karmas. The mention of 'pudgala' – matter – is intended to declare that karma is matter. By this the view that karma is the unseen potency or invisible, mystical force of the soul is refuted, as the quality of the soul cannot be the cause of transmigration or worldly existence (i.e., bondage). 'Ādatte' is intended to indicate the relation of cause and effect. 310 Tattvārthasūtra Consequently, owing to the potency of wrong-faith, etc., which make the jīva fit to take in matter (pudgala) and, further, due to its activities (yoga), the jīva gets bound with subtle matter capable of turning into karmas and pervading the same space-points as those of the jīva. This is called bondage. Just as the mixing of several juices of barley, flowers and fruits in a vessel produces intoxicating liquor, so also matter present co-extensive with the jīva becomes transformed into karmic matter owing to the presence of activities (yoga) and passions (kaÈāya). The word 'sa' is intended to exclude any other meaning of bondage. This is the only meaning of bondage, and there is no other bondage. By this the union between the substance and its qualities is refuted. Is bondage of one kind or of several kinds? izdfrfLFkR;uqHkoizns'kkLrf}èk;% AA3AA 1rr~o ml cU/ ds 1izÑfrfLFkR;uqHkoizns'kk%o izÑfrcU/] fLFkfrcU/] vuqHkocU/ (vuqHkkxcU/) vkSj izns'kcU/ 1fo/;%o ;s pkj Hksn gSaA Bondage (bandha) is of four kinds: according to the nature or species – prakÃti, duration – sthiti, fruition – anubhava (or anubhāga), and the quantity of spacepoints – pradeśa. 'PrakÃti' means nature. What is the nature of the margosa? Bitterness. What is the nature of molasses? Sweetness. Similarly, what is the nature of knowledge-obscuring (jñānāvaraõa) karma? Noncomprehension of objects. What is the nature of perception-obscuring (darśanāvaraõa) karma? Non-perception of objects. The feelingproducing (vedanīya) karma has the nature of pleasant (sātā) and 311 vè;k;&8 unpleasant (asātā) feeling. The faith-deluding (darśanmoha) karma has the nature of wrong-belief in the reality. The conduct-deluding (cāritramoha) karma has the nature of non-restraint (asaÉyama). The life-determining (āyuÍ) karma has the nature of the span of life in a particular state of existence. The name-karma (nāmakarma) has the nature of names such as the infernal being, the human being, the celestial being and the plant and animal. The status-determining (gotra) karma has the nature of high and low status. The obstructive (antarāya) karma has the nature of causing obstruction in way of giving, gaining, enjoyment, and so on. Thus, that which is the cause of such happenings or experiences is 'prakÃti' or the nature. Not falling off from its nature (prakÃti) is duration (sthiti). For instance, the retention of the sweetness of milk of the goat, the cow, or the buffalo, is its duration. Similarly, not deviating from the nature of noncomprehension is the duration (sthiti) of the knowledge-obscuring (jñānāvaraõa) karma. The duration (sthiti) of other karmas must be understood in the same way. The peculiar taste or experience of each karma is its fruition (anubhava). Just as the milk of the goat or the cow or the buffalo has its own peculiar taste, similarly each karma has its peculiar taste or experience as it gets to fruition (anubhava). Determining the quantity of karmas is space (pradeśa) bondage. Thus, the measure of the space-points of the karmic molecules that have turned into karmas is space (pradeśa) bondage. 'Vidhi' means 'kinds'. These are the four kinds of bondage. The activity (yoga) causes naturebondage (prakÃtibandha) and space-bondage (pradeśabandha), and the passions (kaÈāya) cause duration-bondage (sthitibandha) and fruition-bondage (anubhavabandha). The diversity of bondage is due to the degree or intensity of activity (yoga) and passions (kaÈāya). It has been said, "The soul, due to activity (yoga) causes nature-bondage (prakÃtibandha) and space-bondage (pradeśabandha), and due to passions (kaÈāya) causes duration-bondage (sthitibandha) and fruition-bondage (anubhavabandha). The soul which does not get transformed due to activity (yoga) and passions (kaÈāya) or the soul that is rid of activity (yoga) and passions (kaÈāya) does not undergo 312 Tattvārthasūtra bondage." Since passions (kaÈāya) exist only till the tenth guõasthāna, up to this stage, duration-bondage (sthitibandha) and fruition-bondage (anubhavabandha) are possible; not in the higher stages. Since activity (yoga) exists till the thirteenth guõasthāna, up to this stage, nature-bondage (prakÃtibandha) and space-bondage (pradeśabandha) are possible. In the fourteenth guõasthāna, since activity (yoga) is absent, there is no bondage. Now the kinds of nature-bondage (prakÃtibandha) are described. vk|ks Kkun'kZukoj.kosnuh;eksguh;k;qukZexks=kkUrjk;k% AA4AA 1vk|kso igyk vFkkZr~ izÑfrcU/ 1Kkun'kZukoj.kosnuh;& eksguh;k;qukZexks=kkUrjk;k%o Kkukoj.k] n'kZukoj.k] osnuh;] eksguh;] vk;q] uke] xks=k vkSj vUrjk; & bu vkB izdkj dk gSA The nature-bondage (prakÃtibandha) is of eight kinds: knowledge-obscuring – jñānāvaraõa, perceptionobscuring – darśanāvaraõa, feeling-producing – vedanīya, deluding – mohanīya, life-determining – āyuÍ, namedetermining or physique-making – nāma, statusdetermining – gotra, and obstructive – antarāya. The first, nature-bondage (prakÃtibandha), must be understood to be of eight kinds. 'Covers' or 'is covered by' is covering (āvaraõa). This is added to the first two karmas – knowledge-covering (jñānāvaraõa) and perception-covering (darśanāvaraõa). 'Feels' or 'is felt by' is by the feeling-producing (vedanīya) karma. 'Deludes' or 'is deluded by' is by the deluding (mohanīya) karma. That by which one takes the mode or life as a hell-being, and so on, is life-determining (āyuÍ) karma. 313 vè;k;&8 'Name' is that by which the soul is designated, i.e., name-determining (nāma) karma. That by which one is called high or low is the statusdetermining (gotra) karma. That which comes between the host and the guest, the giving of gift, and so on, is obstructive (antarāya) karma. As the food taken once gets transformed into various things like blood and other fluids, similarly, the karmic-matter taken in by the soul gets transformed into various kinds of karmas, like the knowledgecovering (jñānāvaraõa), due to the modifications of the soul. 314 Tattvārthasūtra Is there any logic behind the particular sequence given to the eight karmas? Yes, there is. The worldly soul sees, acquires knowledge, and develops belief, in that order. Thus, faith (darśana), knowledge (jñāna) and right-belief (samyaktva) are inherent attributes (guõa) of the soul. These three attributes are complemented by energy (vīrya). Four karmas, called the destructive (ghāti) karmas – perceptionobscuring (darśanāvaraõa), knowledge-obscuring (jñānāvaraõa), deluding (mohanīya), and obstructive (antarāya) – are responsible for causing obstruction to these attributes (guõa) of the soul. Although in case of worldly beings – chadmastha, not vītarāga – faith (darśana) occurs before knowledge (jnana), still, knowledge (jñāna) is considered more venerable (pūjya). Therefore, knowledge-obscuring (jñānāvaraõa) karma gets precedence over perception-obscuring (darśanāvaraõa) karma. After these two karmas, deluding (mohanīya) karma and obstructive (antarāya) karma should be mentioned. Although feeling-producing (vedanīya) karma is nondestructive (aghāti), still, on the strength of deluding (mohanīya) karma that causes likes and dislikes through the senses, it acts like a destructive (ghāti) karma and, therefore, placed in midst of destructive (ghāti) karmas, before deluding (mohanīya) karma. On acquisition of the life-span (āyuÍ) in a particular mode (paryāya) of existence, the soul acquires body, etc., and, further, status is determined. Thus, the sequence of karmas is life-determining (āyuÍ), name-determining (nāma), and status-determining (gotra). Obstructive (antarāya) karma, although designated as a destructive iÛÓuo}Ô"Vk o'kfrprq£}pRok j'kñf}iÛÓHksnk ;FkkØee~ AA5AA 1;FkkØee~o mijksDr Kkukoj.kkfn vkB deks± ds vuqØe ls 1iÛÓuo}Ô"Vk o'kfrprq£}pRok j'kñf}iÛÓHksnk%o ik¡p] ukS] nks] vêkò bZl] pkj] C;kyhl] nks vkSj ik¡p Hksn gaSA The subdivisions of eight main divisions of bondage are five, nine, two, twenty-eight, four, forty-two, two and five, respectively. Knowledge-covering (jñānāvaraõa) is of five kinds, perceptioncovering (darśanāvaraõa) is of nine kinds, feeling-producing (vedanīya) is of two kinds, deluding (mohanīya) is of twenty-eight kinds, life-determining (āyuÍ) is of four kinds, name-determining or physique-making (nāma) is of forty-two kinds, status-determining (gotra) is of two kinds, and obstructive (antarāya) is of five kinds. What are the five kinds of knowledge-obscuring (jñānāvaraõa) karma? (ghāti) karma, cannot destroy completely the energy (vīrya) attribute of the soul, but functions only with the support of life-determining (āyuÍ), name-determining (nāma), and status-determining (gotra) karmas. Hence, it is placed last in the sequence. (see 'GommaÇasārakarmakāõça', part-1, p. 9-10, and 'Õayacakko', verse 83, p. 47). The main divisions of bondage have been described. The subdivisions are to be described now. 315 vè;k;&8 efrJqrkofèkeu%i;Z;dsoykuke~ AA6AA 1efrJqrkof/eu%i;Z;dsoykuke~o efrKku] JqrKku] vof/Kku] eu%i;Z;Kku vkSj dsoyKku & budks vkoj.k djus okys deZ Kkukoj.k ds ik¡p Hksn gaSA The five kinds of knowledge-covering (jñānāvaraõa) karma are those which obscure 1) sensory-knowledge (matijñāna), 2) scriptural-knowledge (śrutajñāna), 3) clairvoyance (avadhijñāna), 4) telepathy (manaÍparyayajñāna) and 5) omniscience (kevalajñāna). The kinds of knowledge such as sensory-knowledge (matijñāna) have been explained. Those which cover these are the five subdivisions of knowledge-obscuring (jñānāvaraõa) karmas. A question is raised. Is the soul of an 'abhavya' (one who is incapable of attaining liberation) endowed with the capacity for telepathy (manaÍparyayajñāna) and omniscience (kevalajñāna)? If the answer is in the affirmative, he is not an 'abhavya'. If it is in the negative, it is unnecessary to invent the two karmas, namely, telepathy-obscuring and omniscience-obscuring. The answer is that from the point of view of the substance – dravyārthika naya – the faculties of telepathy and perfect-knowledge are present in the 'abhavya'. From the point of view of the modes – paryāyārthika naya – the faculties of telepathy and perfectknowledge, are not present in the 'abhavya'. If it is so, the distinction between 'bhavya' and 'abhavya' is improper as both have the inherent capacity of telepathy and perfect-knowledge. No. The distinction between 'bhavya' and 'abhavya' is not based on the presence or absence of the capacities. In that case how is the distinction made? The distinction is made on the basis whether there would be manifestation or not of these capacities. That individual is a 'bhavya' in whom there 316 Tattvārthasūtra will be manifestation of right faith, right knowledge and right conduct. He, in whom there will be no such manifestation, is an 'abhavya'. Illustration is given of 'kanakapāÈāõa' and 'andhapāÈāõa'. Both inherently have gold; from the former it is possible to extract gold 1through processing but from the latter it is not possible to do so. The subdivisions of knowledge-covering (jñānāvaraõa) karma have been mentioned. Now the subdivisions of perception-covering (darśanāvaraõa) karma must be described. 1 – Acarya Samantabhadra has provided another illustration: "These, purity (śuddhi) and impurity (aśuddhi), are two kinds of power akin to the cookability (pākya) or the non-cookability (apākya) of a cereal (viz. beans like uçada and mūńga). The manifestation of purity (in a soul) has a beginning while the manifestation of impurity is beginningless. And, being (the soul's) own-nature (svabhāva), it is not open to logical argument (tarka)." (see 'ĀptamīmāÉsā', verse 100.) p{kqjp{kqjofèkdsoykuka fuaekfuaekfuaekizpyk& izpykizpykLR;kux`1⁄4;ÜÓ AA7AA 1p{kqjp{kqjof/dsoykukao p{kqn'kZukoj.k] vp{kqn'kZukoj.k] vof/n'kZukoj.k] dsoyn'kZukoj.k 1fuaekfuaekfuaekizpykizpykizpyk& LR;kux`1⁄4;ÜÓo fuaezk] fuaezkfuaezk] izpyk] izpykizpyk vkSj LR;kux`f1⁄4 & ;s ukS Hksn n'kZukoj.k deZ ds gSaA The four that cover ocular-perception (cakÈudarśana), nonocular-perception (acakÈudarśana), clairvoyantperception (avadhidarśana) and perfect-perception (kevaladarśana), and sleep (nidrā), deep-sleep (nidrā317 vè;k;&8 nidrā), drowsiness (pracalā), heavy-drowsiness (pracalāpracalā), and somnambulism (styānagÃddhi) are the nine subdivisions of perception-covering (darśanāvaraõa) karma. The four – ocular, non-ocular, clairvoyant and perfect – refer to perception-covering (darśanāvaraõa) karmas – ocular-perceptioncovering (cakşudarśanāvaraõa), non-ocular-perception-covering (acakÈudarśanāvaraõa), clairvoyant-perception-covering (avadhidarśanāvaraõa) and perfect-perception-covering (kevaladarśanāvaraõa). Sleep (nidrā) is intended to remove the effect of intoxication, fatigue and languor. More and more (intense) sleep is deep-sleep (nidrānidrā). Caused by distress, weariness from exertion or strain, intoxication, etc., and which induces sudden movement of the head, the eyes and the body even while sitting, is drowsiness (pracalā). Doing it again and again is heavy-drowsiness (pracalā-pracalā). That which causes noctural emission and other wicked activities in sleep, is somnambulism (styānagÃddhi). Perception-covering is taken with each – sleep, etc., – thus, it is sleep-perception-covering, deep-sleepperception-covering, and so on. The subdivisions of the third kind of karma, feeling-producing (vedanīya), are now described. lnl}s|s AA8AA 1lnl}s|so l}s| vkSj vl}s| & ;s nks osnuh; deZ ds Hksn gSaA The two, which cause pleasant-feeling (sadvedya) and unpleasant-feeling (asadvedya), are the subdivisions of feeling-producing (vedanīya) karma. 318 Tattvārthasūtra The sensual and mental pleasures obtained in the celestial and other states of existence are on rise of the karmas that produce pleasantfeeling (sadvedya). Pleasant-feeling (sadvedya) is the rise of auspicious-feeling-producing karma. The unpleasant-feeling (asadvedya) causes sufferings of many kinds. It is the rise of inauspicious-feeling-producing karma. The pleasant (sātā) and the unpleasant (asātā) modifications that the soul experiences are due to the rise of pleasant-feeling (sadvedya) and unpleasant-feeling (asadvedya) karmas, respectively. The external objects spoken of as the cause of such modifications is just an empirical or figurative expression. The subdivisions of the fourth, deluding (mohanīya) karma, are described next. n'kZupkfj=keksguh;kd"kk;d"kk;osnuh;k[;kfL=kf}uo& "kksM'kHksnk% lE;DRofeF;kRornqHk;kU;d"kk;d"kk;kS gkL;jR;jfr'kksdHk;tqxqIlkL=khiqÂiaqldosnk vuUrkuqcUè;izR;k[;kuizR;k[;kulaToyu& fodYikÜÓSd'k% Øksèkekuek;kyksHkk% AA9AA 1n'kZupkfj=keksguh;kd"kk;d"kk;osnuh;k[;k%o n'kZueksguh;] pkfj=keksguh;] vd"kk;osnuh; vkSj d"kk;osnuh; & ;s pkj Hksn:i eksguh; deZ ds gSa vkSj blds vuqØe ls 1f=kf}uo"kksM'kHksnk%o rhu] nks] ukS vkSj lksyg Hksn gSaaA os bl izdkj ls gSa & 1lE;DRofeF;kRornqHk;kfuo lE;DRo eksguh;] feF;kRo eskguh; vkSj lE;XfeF;kRoeksguh; & ;s n'kZu eksguh; ds rhu Hksn gSa_ 1vd"kk;d"kk;kSo vd"kk;osnuh; vkSj d"kk;osnuh; ;s nks Hksn pkfj=k 319 vè;k;&8 eksguh; ds gSa_ 1gkL;jR;jfr'kksdHk;tqxqIlkL=khiqÂiaqldosnk%o gkL;] jfr] vjfr] 'kksd] Hk;] tqxqIlk] Ðhosn] iq#"kosn vkSj uiqaldosn & ;s vd"kk;osnuh; ds ukS Hksn gSa_ vkSj 1vuUrkuqcUè;izR;k[;ku& izR;k[;kulaToyufodYik% po vuUrkuqcU/h] vizR;k[;ku] izR;k[;ku rFkk laToyu ds Hksn ls rFkk 1,d'k% Øks/ekuek;k& yksHkk%o bu izR;sd ds Øks/] eku] ek;k vkSj yksHk ;s pkj izdkj & ;s lksyg Hksn d"kk;osnuh; ds gSaA bl rjg eksguh; deZ ds dqy vêkò bZl Hksn gSaA There are three, two, nine, and sixteen subdivisions of faith-deluding (darśanamohanīya), conduct-deluding (cāritramohanīya), quasi-passions-feeling (akaÈāyavedanīya) and passions-feeling (kaÈāyavedanīya) karmas, respectively. The three subdivisions of faith-deluding (darśanamohanīya) karmas are subsidential-right-belief (samyaktva), wrong-belief (mithyātva), and mixed-rightand-wrong-belief (samyagmithyātva). Quasi-passionsfeeling (akaÈāyavedanīya) and passions-feeling (kaÈāyavedanīya) are the two kinds of conduct-deluding (cāritramohanīya) karmas. Further, quasi-passionsfeeling (akaÈāyavedanīya) are of nine kinds: laughter (hāsya), liking (rati), disliking (arati), sorrow (śoka), fear (bhaya), disgust (jugupsā), female-sex-passion (strīveda), male-sex-passion (puńveda), and neuter-sex-passion (napuÉsakaveda). Passions-feeling (kaÈāyavedanīya) are of sixteen kinds: the four passions (kaÈāya) – anger (krodha), pride (māna), deceitfulness (māyā) and greed (lobha) – are of four kinds each – that which binds 320 Tattvārthasūtra infinitely (anantānubandhī), that which hinders partial abstinence (apratyākhyāna), that which disturbs complete self-restraint (pratyākhyāna) and that which interferes with perfect conduct (saÉjvalana). Thus, deluding (mohanīya) karma is of twenty-eight kinds. The faith-deluding (darśanamohanīya) karmas are of three kinds. The conduct-deluding (cāritramohanīya) karmas are of two kinds. The quasi-passions-feeling (akaÈāyavedanīya) karmas are of nine kinds. And, the passions-feeling (kaÈāyavedanīya) karmas are of sixteen kinds. (see Fig.-2) The deluding (mohanīya) karmas are primarily divided into two classes, namely, the karmas that delude right belief – darśanamohanīya – and the karmas that delude right conduct – cāritramohanīya. The former consists of three kinds, subsidential-right-belief (samyaktva), wrong-belief (mithyātva), and mixed-right-and-wrongbelief (samyagmithyātva). It is one with regard to bondage, but it becomes three according to the species of karma. On the rise of wrongbelief (mithyātva), the individual turns away from the path revealed by the Omniscient, becomes indifferent to faith in the true nature of reality and is incapable of discriminating between what is beneficial to him and what is not. When wrong-belief (mithyātva) is restrained by virtuous thought-activity, due to auspicious disposition, it becomes quiescent and no longer obstructs right faith. It is then called subsidential-right-belief (samyaktva). The person in this state is called a right-believer (samyagdÃÈÇi). The perverse attitude – wrong-belief (mithyātva) – when it attains partial cleansing or purification, appears along with its purified state; this is called mixed-right-and-wrongbelief (samyagmithyātva). On the rise of it the attitude becomes mixed, like that arising from the use of the half-cleansed intoxicating grain called 'kodrava'. The karmas which delude conduct – cāritramohanīya – are of two kinds, the quasi-passions-feeling (akaÈāyavedanīya) and the passions321 vè;k;&8 322 Tattvārthasūtra F ig .2 – D iv is io n s o f d e lu d in g ( m o h a n īy a ) k a rm a s D e lu d in g ( m o h a n īy a ) k a r m a s F a it h -d el u d in g (d a rś a n a m oh a n īy a ) C o n d u ct -d el u d in g (c ā ri tr a m oh a n īy a ) W ro n g -b el ie f (m it h yā tv a ) M ix ed r ig h t a n d w ro n g b el ie f (s a m ya g m it h yā tv a ) S u b si d en ti a l ri g h tb el ie f (s a m ya k tv a ) Q u a si -p a ss io n sfe el in g (a k a Èā ya v ed a n īy a ) G re ed (l ob h a ) A n g er (k ro d h a ) P ri d e (m ā n a ) D ec ei tf u ln es s (m ā yā ) L a u g h te r (h ā sy a ) L ik in g (r a ti ) D is li k in g (a ra ti ) S o rr o w (ś ok a ) F ea r (b h a ya ) D is g u st (j u g u p sā ) M a le -s ex p a ss io n (p u ń v ed a ) F em a le -s ex p a ss io n (s tr īv ed a ) N eu te rse x p a ss io n (n a p u É sa k a v ed a ) P a ss io n sfe el in g (k a Èā ya v ed a n īy a ) a p ra ty ā k h yā n ā v a ra õ a , th a t h in d er p a rt ia l a b st in en ce p ra ty ā k h yā n ā v a ra õ a , th a t p re v en t co m p le te s el fre st ra in t a n a n tā n u b a n d h ī, th a t le a d t o en d le ss w o rl d ly e x is te n ce sa É jv a la n a , g le a m in g ; th a t h in d er p er fe ct c o n d u ct feeling (kaÈāyavedanīya). The word 'quasi' in quasi-passions (akaÈāya or nokaÈāya) is used in the sense of 'little' or 'slight'. The quasipassions (akaÈāya) are nine. The rise of which causes laughter is hāsya. The rise of which causes attraction for certain objects is rati. The rise of which causes repulsion for certain objects is arati. The rise of which causes grief or sorrow is śoka. The rise of which causes fear is bhaya. The rise of which causes covering of the faults in the self and unearthing of the faults in others is jugupsā. The rise of which causes disposition typical of a woman is strīveda. The rise of which causes disposition typical of a man is puńveda. The rise of which causes disposition typical of the neuter gender is napuÉsakaveda. Sixteen kinds of passions-feeling (kaÈāyavedanīya) karmas are as follows. The passions (kaÈāya) are four, viz., anger (krodha), pride (māna), deceitfulness (māyā) and greed (lobha). And each of these passions (kaÈāya) is subdivided into four classes: 1) most malignant, that bind infinitely (anantānubandhī), 2) highly malignant, that hinder partial abstinence (apratyākhyāna), 3) malignant, that disturb complete self-restraint (pratyākhyāna), and 4) mild, that interfere with perfect conduct (saÉjvalana). Being the cause of endless cycle of worldly existence, wrong-belief (mithyādarśana) is called 'ananta', and the passions (kaÈāya) which give rise to such wrong-belief (mithyādarśana) are called anantānubandhī. In presence of apratyākhyāna variety of passions (kaÈāya), the person is able to acquire right faith but is not able to observe even partial-restraint of the householder. In presence of pratyākhyāna variety of passions (kaÈāya), the person is able to observe partial-restraint of the householder but is not able to observe complete-restraint of the ascetic. In presence of saÉjvalana variety of passions (kaÈāya), the person is not able to observe perfect conduct – śukladhyāna – of the advanced ascetic. These, together, make up sixteen kinds of passionsfeeling (kaÈāyavedanīya) karmas. (see also sūtra 6-14, p. 250-251) The subdivisions of the life-determining (āyuÍ) karma are described next. 323 vè;k;&8 The life-determining (āyuÍ) karma has four subdivisions: life as an infernal being – narakāyuÍ, life as plant and animal – tiryańcāyuÍ, life as a human being – manuÈyāyuÍ and life as a celestial being – devāyuÍ. ukjdrS;ZX;ksuekuq"knSokfu AA10AA 1ukjdrS;ZX;ksuekuq"knSokfuo ujdk;q] fr;±pk;q] euq";k;q vkSj nsok;q & ;s pkj Hksn vk;qdeZ ds gSaA In states of existence, like the infernal being, the period of life is indicated by the life-determining (āyuÍ) karma. The life in the infernal regions is narakāyuÍ. The life in the plants and animal world is tiryańcāyuÍ. The life in the human world is manuÈyāyuÍ. And, the life in the celestial regions is devāyuÍ. That by which an individual lives a long span of life in the infernal regions where there is intense heat and cold is the infernal life-karma. Similarly it must be understood with regard to the rest. Out of the ten vitalities (prāõa), the life-duration (āyuÍ-prāõa) holds the most important place. This is the primary cause of life. As long as life-duration (āyuÍ-prāõa) is present, the living-being is alive; when life-duration (āyuÍ-prāõa) is absent, the living-being is dead. Food, etc., are just the helpful causes of maintaining life. The lifedetermining (āyuÍ) karma is the primary cause of attaining the particular state of existence. The four kinds of life-determining (āyuÍ) karma have been explained. The next sūtra is intended to determine the subdivisions of physiquemaking (nāma) karma. 324 Tattvārthasūtra xfrtkfr'kjhjkaxksikaxfuekZ.kcUèkula?kkrlaLFkku& laguuLi'kZjlxaèko.kkZuqiwO;kZxq#y?kwi?kkr& ij?kkrkriks|ksrksPÑoklfogk;ksxr;% izR;sd'kjhj=kllqHkxlqLoj'kqHklw{ei;kZfIr& fLFkjkns;;'k%dh£rlsrjkf.k rhFkZdjRoa p AA11AA 1xfrtkfr'kjhjkaxksikaxfuekZ.kcUèkula?kkrlaLFkkulaguuLi'kZ& jlxaèko.kkZuqiwO;kZxq#y?kwi?kkrij?kkrkriks|ksrksPÑoklfogk;ksxr;%o xfr] tkfr] 'kjhj] vaxksikax] fuekZ.k] cU/u] la?kkr] laLFkku] laguu] Li'kZ] jl] xU/] o.kZ] vkuqiwO;Z] vxq#y?kq] mi?kkr] ij?kkr] vkri] m|ksr] mPÑokl vkSj fogk;ksxfr & ;s bDdhl] rFkk 1izR;sd'kjhj=kllqHkxlqLoj'kqHklw{ei;kZfIrfLFkjkns;;'k%dh£r& lsrjkf.ko izR;sd 'kjhj] =kl] lqHkx] lqLoj] 'kqHk] lw{e] i;kZfIr] fLFkj] vkns; vkSj ;'k%dh£r & ;s nl rFkk buds izfri{kHkwr nl vFkkZr~ lk/kj.k 'kjhj] LFkkoj] nqHkZx] nq%Loj] v'kqHk] cknj (LFkwy)] vi;kZfIr] vfLFkj] vukns; vkSj vi;'k%dh£r & ;s nl 1rhFkZdjRoa po vkSj rhFkZdjRo] bl rjg ukedeZ ds dqy C;kyhl Hksn gSaA The name or physique-making (nāma) karma has these twenty-one subdivisions: the state of existence – gati, the class – jāti, the body – śarīra, the chief and secondary parts – ańgopāńga, formation – nirmāõa, binding – bandhana, molecular interfusion – saÉghāta, structure – saÉsthāna, joints – saÉhanana, touch – sparśa, taste – rasa, odour – gandha, colour – varõa, migratory form after death – ānupūrvya, neither heavy nor light – agurulaghu, self-annihilation – upaghāta, annihilation by 325 vè;k;&8 others – paraghāta, emitting warm light – ātapa, emitting cool light – udyota, respiration – ucchvāsa, gait – vihāyogati. Further, the following ten, with their opposites, constitute twenty additional subdivisions: individual body – pratyeka śarīra – and collective body – sādhāraõa śarīra, mobile-being – trasa – and immobilebeing – sthāvara, good-tempered – subhaga – and badtempered – durbhaga, melodious voice – susvara – and unmelodious voice – duÍsvara, attractiveness of form – śubha – and unattractiveness of form – aśubha, minute body – sūkÈma – and gross body – bādara, completion (of the organs) – paryāpti – and incompletion – aparyāpti, firmness – sthira – and infirmness – asthira, lustrous body – ādeya – and lustreless body – anādeya, glory and renown – yaśaÍkīrti – and obscurity – ayaśaÍkīrti. The forty-second is the name-karma of Lord Jina – Tīrthakaratva. That (karma) on the rise of which a living being attains another birth is the state of existence – gati. It is of four kinds – the infernal state of existence – narakagati, the plant and animal state of existence – tiryańcagati, the human state of existence – manuÈyagati, and the celestial state of existence – devagati. That which causes birth as an infernal being is the name-karma of the infernal state of existence. Similarly, it must be understood with regard to the rest. Within a particular state of existence, such as narakagati, the grouping together of beings which are alike is the class – jāti. The class is attained due to the name-karma of jāti. It is of five kinds: the class – jāti – of beings with one sense – ekendriya, with two senses – dvīndriya, with three senses – trīndriya, with four senses – caturindriya, and with five senses – pańcendriya. 326 Tattvārthasūtra That on rise of which a body is attained by the soul is the name-karma of body – śarīra. It is of five kinds: the name-karmas of gross body – audārika śarīra, the transformable body – vaikriyika śarīra, the projectable body – āhāraka śarīra, the luminous body – taijasa śarīra and the karmic body – kārmaõa śarīra. Their peculiarities have been explained already (see sūtra 2-36). That on rise of which the chief and secondary parts of the body are distinguished is the name-karma of the limbs and minor limbs – ańgopāńga. It is of three kinds: the name-karmas of the limbs and minor limbs of the gross body – audārika śarīra ańgopāńga, of the transformable body – vaikriyika śarīra ańgopāńga, and of the projectable body – āhāraka śarīra ańgopāńga. That which causes the formation of the body with its several parts in their proper places is the name-karma of formation – nirmāõa. It is of two kinds: the name-karmas of fixing the position – sthānanirmāõa and of fixing the size – pramāõanirmāõa. It determines the position and size of the eyes and so on in conformity with the class of being. The close union or binding of the particles of matter (pudgala) acquired on the rise of the body (śarīra) name-karma is the namekarma of binding – bandhana. That on rise of which oneness or compactness of the body (śarīra) such as the gross body, is attained by close interpenetration (i.e., without any inter-space) of the space-points (pradeśa) of the molecules is the name-karma of molecular interfusion – saÉghāta. That on rise of which the structure of the body, such as the physical body, is accomplished is called the name-karma of structure – saÉsthāna. It is of six kinds: the name-karmas of the perfectly symmetrical body – samacaturasra saÉsthāna, the upper part alone symmetrical – nyagrodha parimaõçala saÉsthāna, the lower part alone symmetrical – svāsti saÉsthāna, the hunchbacked body – kubjaka saÉsthāna, the dwarfish body – vāmana saÉsthāna, and the entirely unsymmetrical or deformed body – hunçaka saÉsthāna. That on rise of which the different types of joints of the bones are 327 vè;k;&8 That on rise of which there is no falling down like the iron ball and no going up like the warm cotton is the name-karma of neither heavy nor light – agurulaghu. affected is the name-karma of joint – saÉhanana. It is of six kinds: the name-karmas of perfect joint noted for extraordinary sturdiness and strength – vajraÃÈabhanārāca saÉhanana, the less-than-perfect joint – vajranārāca saÉhanana, the still inferior joint – nārāca saÉhanana, weak joint – ardhanārāca saÉhanana, very weak joint – kīlikā saÉhanana, and extremely weak joint – asamprāptāsÃpāÇikā saÉhanana. That which gives rise to the sense of touch is the name-karma of touch – sparśa. It is of eight kinds: the name-karmas of hard touch – karkaśa sparśa, soft touch – mÃdu sparśa, heavy touch – guru sparśa, light touch – laghu sparśa, smooth touch – snigdha sparśa, rough touch – rūkÈa sparśa, cold touch – śīta sparśa and hot touch – uÈõa sparśa. That which gives rise to the sense of taste is the name-karma of taste – rasa. It is of five kinds: the name-karmas of bitter taste – tikta rasa, pungent taste – kaÇu rasa, astringent taste – kaÈāya rasa, sour taste – āmla rasa and sweet taste – madhura rasa. That which gives rise to the sense of odour is the name-karma of odour – gandha. It is of two kinds: the name-karmas of pleasant odour – surabhi gandha and unpleasant odour – asurabhi gandha. That which causes distinction in the colour of the body is the namekarma of colour – varõa. It is of five kinds: the name-karmas of black colour – kÃÈõa varõa, blue colour – nīla varõa, red colour – rakta varõa, yellow colour – hāridra varõa, and white colour – śukla varõa. That on rise of which the form of the previous body does not disappear is the name-karma of migratory form after death – ānupūrvya. It is of four kinds: the name-karmas relating to the tendency of the soul after death to move towards the infernal state of existence – narakagatiprāyogyānupūrvya, towards the plant and animal state of existence – tiryaggatiprāyogyānupūrvya, towards the human state of existence – manuÈyagatiprāyogyānupūrvya and towards the celestial state of existence – devagatiprāyogyānupūrvya. 328 Tattvārthasūtra That on rise of which there is self-annihilation by hanging, falling from a cliff, etc., is the name-karma of self-destruction – upaghāta. That on rise of which there is destruction of the self by others, through weapons, etc., is the name-karma of destruction by others – paraghāta. That on rise of which the body emits warm light, like the sunshine, is the name-karma of emitting warm light – ātapa. It is found in the sun, etc. That on rise of which the body emits cool brilliance or lustre is the name-karma of emitting cool light – udyota. It is found in the moon, the glowworm, etc. That on rise of which the being is able to breathe is the name-karma of respiration – ucchvāsa. That on rise of which the being is able to move about is the namekarma of movement or gait – vihāyogati. It is of two kinds: the namekarmas of graceful movement – praśastha vihāyogati, and awkward movement – apraśastha vihāyogati. That on rise of which the soul attains an individual body for its use is the name-karma of individual body – pratyeka śarīra. That on rise of which several souls possess one common body for their use is the name-karma of collective body – sādhāraõa śarīra. That on rise of which the being is born with two or more senses is the name-karma of mobile-being – trasa. That on rise of which the being is born with one sense is the namekarma of immobile-being – sthāvara. That on rise of which the being is pleasing to others is the name-karma of good-tempered – subhaga. That on rise of which the being is unpleasant to others is the namekarma of bad-tempered – durbhaga. That on rise of which the being is endowed with a melodious voice is the name-karma of melodious voice – susvara. That on rise of which the being is endowed with a harsh voice is the name-karma of unmelodious voice – duÍsvara. That on rise of which the being is endowed with an attractive form is 329 vè;k;&8 the name-karma of attractiveness of form – śubha. That on rise of which the being is endowed with an unattractive form is the name-karma of unattractiveness of form – aśubha. That on rise of which the being is endowed with a subtle body is the name-karma of minute body – sūkÈma. That on rise of which the being is endowed with a gross body is the name-karma of gross body – bādara. That on rise of which the being is endowed with complete development of the organs and capacities is the name-karma of completion – paryāpti. It is of six kinds – the name-karmas of taking in of the molecules to form the body – āhāraparyāpti, development of the body – śarīraparyāpti, development of the sense-organs – indriyaparyāpti, development of the respiratory organs – prāõāpānaparyāpti, development of the vocal organ – bhāÈāparyāpti, and development of the mind – manaÍparyāpti. That on rise of which the being is not endowed with full development of these six kinds of completion is the name-karma of incompletion – aparyāpti. That on rise of which the being accomplishes firmness (such as a wellknit frame, fine teeth and strong limbs) is the name-karma of firmness – sthira. That on rise of which the being does not accomplish firmness is the name-karma of infirmness – asthira. That on rise of which the being is endowed with lustre of the body is the name-karma of lustrous body – ādeya. That on rise of which the being is not endowed with lustre of the body is the name-karma of lustreless body – anādeya. That on rise of which the merits of the being get admiration and praise from others is the name-karma of glory and renown – yaśaÍkīrti. That on rise of which the merits of the being do not get admiration and praise from others is the name-karma of obscurity – ayaśaÍkīrti. That on rise of which the being is destined to attain the status of the Lord of the three worlds is the name-karma of Lord Jina – Tīrthakaratva. 330 Tattvārthasūtra The subdivisions of name-karma have been described. The subdivisions of status-determining (gotra) karma are described next. The high-status (uccagotra) and the low-status (nīcagotra) are the two subdivisions of statusdetermining (gotra) karma. mPpSuhZpSÜÓ AA12AA 1mPPkSuhZpSÜÓo mPPkxks=k vkSj uhpxks=k & ;s nks Hksn xks=k deZ ds gaSA The status-determining (gotra) karma is of two kinds: the gotra karma of high-status (uccagotra) and the gotra karma of low-status (nīcagotra). Owing to the rise of the former, an individual is born in a high or noble family of great respectability and prestige. Due to the rise of the latter one gets birth in a low-status family, lacking in prestige and respectability. The high-status family has the tradition of noble conduct; the low-status family has the tradition of vicious conduct. The subdivisions of the eighth kind, the obstructive (antarāya) karma, are now mentioned. nkuykHkHkksxksiHkksxoh;kZ.kke~ AA13AA 1nkuykHkHkksxksiHkksxoh;kZ.kke~o nkukUrjk;] ykHkkUrjk;] HkksxkUrjk;] miHkksxkUrjk; vkSj oh;kZUrjk; & ;s ik¡p Hksn vUrjk; deZ ds gSaA izÑfrcU/ ds miHksnksa dk o.kZu ;gk¡ iw.kZ gqvkA 331 vè;k;&8 The obstructive (antarāya) karma has five subdivisions: the antarāya karma of obstructing the making of a gift (charity) – dāna antarāya, the attainment of a gain – lābha antarāya, enjoyment of consumable things – bhoga antarāya, enjoyment of non-consumable things – upabhoga antarāya, and effort (energy) – vīrya antarāya. The subdivisions of the obstructive (antarāya) karma are made with reference to the kind of obstruction. Thus these subdivisions result in obstruction in charity, in gain, and so on. On the rise of the first kind – dāna antarāya – the individual is not able to make a gift even if he wishes to. The second – lābha antarāya – hinders him from attaining any gain even though he sets his heart on it. The third – bhoga antarāya – hinders the enjoyment of consumable things, though he is desirous of enjoyment. The fourth – upabhoga antarāya – prevents the enjoyment of non-consumable things, although he is eager after enjoyment of such things. The fifth – vīrya antarāya – prevents effort or exertion, although he wants to make an effort or exert himself. The divisions of nature-bondage – prakÃtibandha – have been explained. Now the kinds of duration-bondage – sthitibandha – have to be described. Duration (sthiti) is of two kinds, the maximum (utkÃÈÇa) and the minimum (jaghanya). Certain kinds of karmas have the same maximum (utkÃÈÇa) duration. These are mentioned first. vkfnrfLrl`.kkeUrjk;L; p =k'kRlkxjksiedksVhdksVÔ% ijk fLFkfr% AA14AA 1vkfnrfLrl`.kke~o vkfn ls rhu vFkkZr~ Kkukoj.k] n'kZukoj.k] rFkk osnuh; 1vUrjk;L; po vkSj vUrjk; & bu pkj deks± dh 1ijk 332 Tattvārthasūtra fLFkfr%o mRÑ"V fLFkfr 1 =k'kRlkxjksiedksVhdksVÔ%o rhl dksVkdksfV lkxjksie gSA The maximum duration – utkÃÈÇa sthiti – of the first three types of karmas, i.e., knowledge-covering (jñānāvaraõa), perception-covering (darśanāvaraõa) and feelingproducing (vedanīya), and of the obstructive (antarāya) karma is thirty sāgaropama koÇākoÇi. It is mentioned 'from the first' in order to indicate that the three should not be taken from the middle or from the end. 'Obstructive' is mentioned in order to include that which is separated. 'Sāgaropama' is the duration or period of time indicated already. 'KoÇi' multiplied by 'koÇi' is koÇākoÇi. The word 'parā' means the maximum. The purport is this. The maximum duration – utkÃÈÇa sthiti – of knowledge-covering (jñānāvaraõa), perception-covering (darśanāvaraõa), feelingproducing (vedanīya), and obstructive (antarāya) karmas is thirty sāgaropama koÇākoÇi. In whom does it occur? The bondage of karmas with the maximum duration occurs in case of the wrong-believer (mithyādÃÈÇi) who is endowed with the five senses and the mind – saÉjñī pańcendriya – and who has attained completion – paryāptaka. The maximum duration of the deluding (mohanīya) karma is now indicated. lIrfreksZguh;L; AA15AA 1eksguh;L;o eksguh; deZ dh mRÑ"V fLFkfr 1lIrfr%o lÙkj dksVkdksfV lkxjksie gSA Seventy sāgaropama koÇākoÇi is the maximum duration – utkÃÈÇa sthiti – of the deluding (mohanīya) karma. 333 vè;k;&8 In this sūtra, 'sāgaropamakoÇikoÇi' and 'parā sthitiÍ' – utkÃÈÇa sthiti – have been taken from the previous sūtra. This maximum duration of the deluding (mohanīya) karma also occurs in case of the wrongbeliever (mithyādÃÈÇi) who is endowed with the five senses and the mind – saÉjñī pańcendriya – and who has attained completion – paryāptaka. With regard to the rest it must be understood from the Scripture. The maximum duration of the physique-making (nāma) and the status-determining (gotra) karmas is mentioned next. o'kfrukZexks=k;ks% AA16AA 1ukexks=k;ks%o uke vkSj xks=k deZ dh mRÑ"V fLFkfr 1 o'kfr%o chl dksVkdksfV lkxjksie gSA Twenty sāgaropama koÇākoÇi is the maximum duration – utkÃÈÇa sthiti – of the name (nāma) and the statusdetermining (gotra) karmas. Again, 'sāgaropamakoÇikoÇi' and 'parā sthitiÍ' – utkÃÈÇa sthiti – have been taken from the previous sūtra. This maximum duration also occurs in case of the wrong-believer (mithyādÃÈÇi) who is endowed with the five senses and the mind – saÉjñī pańcendriya – and who has attained completion – paryāptaka. With regard to the rest it must be understood from the Scripture. What is the maximum duration of life-determining (āyuÍ) karma? =k; L=k'kRlkxjksiek.;k;q"k% AA17AA 334 Tattvārthasūtra 1vk;q"k%o vk;q deZ dh mRÑ"V fLFkfr 1=k; L=k'kRlkxjksiekf.ko rSarhl lkxjksie gSA Thirty-three sāgaropama is the maximum duration of the life-determining (āyuÍ) karma. The mention of 'sāgaropama' in the sūtra is to exclude 'koÇākoÇi'. The maximum duration is supplied from the sūtra 8-14. This maximum duration also occurs in case of the wrong-believer (mithyādÃÈÇi) who is endowed with the five senses and the mind – saÉjñī pańcendriya – and who has attained completion – paryāptaka. With regard to the rest it must be understood from the Scripture. The maximum duration – utkÃÈÇa sthiti – has been described. Now the minimum duration – jaghanya sthiti – has to be described. Leaving (for the present) the five types of karmas, which have the same minimum duration, the author describes the minimum duration of the other three types of karmas in two sūtra. vijk }kn'k eqgwrkZ osnuh;L; AA18AA 1osnuh;L; vijko osnuh; deZ dh t?kU; fLFkfr 1}kn'keqgwrkZo ckjg eqgwrZ gSA The minimum duration – jaghanya sthiti – of the feelingproducing (vedanīya) karma is twelve muhūrta. The word 'aparā' means the minimum. The minimum duration of the feeling-producing (vedanīya) karma is twelve muhūrta. 335 vè;k;&8 ukexks=k;ksj"VkS AA19AA 1ukexks=k;ks%o uke vkSj xks=k deZ dh (t?kU; fLFkfr) 1v"VkSo vkB eqgwrZ gSA The minimum duration – jaghanya sthiti – of the physique-making (nāma) and the status-determining (gotra) karmas is eight muhūrta. The words 'muhūrta' and 'aparā sthiti' – minimum duration – are supplied from the previous sūtra. The minimum duration of the remaining five types of karmas is now indicated. 'ks"kk.kkeUreZqgwrkZ AA20AA 1'ks"kk.kkao ckdh ds ik¡p & Kkukoj.k] n'kZukoj.k] eksguh;] vUrjk; vkSj vk;q & deks± dh t?kU; fLFkfr 1vUreqZgwrkZo vUreqZgwrZ gSA The minimum duration – jaghanya sthiti – of the remaining five kinds of karmas is up to one muhūrta. The minimum duration – jaghanya sthiti – of the remaining five karmas is up to one muhūrta. The minimum duration of knowledgecovering (jñānāvaraõa), perception-covering (darśanāvaraõa), and obstructive (antarāya) karmas obtains in the case of the ascetic in the tenth stage of development – sūkÈmasāmparāya guõasthāna. The minimum duration of the deluding (mohanīya) karma occurs in the case of the ascetic in the ninth stage – anivÃttibādarasāmparāya guõasthāna. The minimum duration of the life-determining (āyuÍ) 336 Tattvārthasūtra karma occurs in the case of animals and human beings who take birth with the life-span of numerable (saÉkhyāta) years. What is the definition of fruition – anubhava? foikdks¿uqHko% AA21AA 1foikd%o fofo/ izdkj dk foikd vFkkZr~ iQy nsus dh 'kfDr 1vuqHko%o gh vuqHko gSA Fruition – anubhava – is the capacity of the karmas to provide various kinds of fruits. The word 'vipāka' means distinctive or variegated ripening. It is distinguished by influx of intense or mild dispositions, as described already. Or, different kinds of fruition assisted by differences in substance (dravya), place (kÈetra), time (kāla), state-of-being (bhava) and disposition (bhāva) constitute 'vipāka'. This 'vipāka' is what is experienced on fruition – anubhava. From abundance of auspicious modifications or thought-activity of the soul, there is fruition-bondage of abundance of auspicious karmas, and there is fruition-bondage of very little of inauspicious karmas. Similarly, from abundance of inauspicious modifications or thought-activity of the soul, there is fruition-bondage of abundance of inauspicious karmas, and there is fruition-bondage of very little of auspicious karmas. The fruition resulting thus from appropriate causes operates in two ways, that is, by its own nature, and by the nature of another. The fruition of each of the eight main types of karmas is by its own nature alone. That is to say that the knowledge-covering karma will cover knowledge only and will not produce feeling or will not determine life or status. In case of subtypes of the karmas, except the life-karma, faith-deluding and conduct-deluding karmas, fruition is possible by others' nature also. 337 vè;k;&8 For instance, the fruition of life-karma of an animal or a human being is not possible through life in hell. And the fruition of faith-deluding karma is not possible through conduct-deluding karma and vice-versa. The disciple says, "The ripening of karmas accumulated formerly is fruition. We admit this. But we do not know this other thing. Is fruition according to the nature of karmas or otherwise? "Yes," says the author. Fruition is according to the nature of the species of karmas enumerated. This is declared in the next sūtra. l ;Fkkuke AA22AA 1l%o ;g vuqHko (vuqHkkx) 1;Fkkukeo deks± ds uke ds vuqlkj gh gksrk gSA The nature of fruition is according to the names of the karmas. The fruit of knowledge-covering (jñānāvaraõa) karma is absence of knowledge. The effect of perception-covering (darśanāvaraõa) karma is to obscure perception. Thus the effects of all karmas are significant and are true to their meanings. Hence there is agreement between the several types of karmas and their fruition – anubhava. It is understood that ripening is fruition – anubhava. Now do the experienced karmas continue to remain as ornaments, or do they fall off losing their strength and vigour? rrÜÓ futZjk AA23AA 1rr% po (rhoz] eè;e ;k eUn) iQy nsus ds ckn 1futZjko mu 338 Tattvārthasūtra deks± dh futZjk gks tkrh gS] vFkkZr~ mn; esa vkus ds ckn deZ vkRek ls ìFkd~ gks tkrs gSaA After fruition (anubhava), the shedding – nirjarā – of karmas takes place. Just as food and similar things decay in course of time, the karmas fall off after giving pain or pleasure. These cannot stay on after fruition at the end of their duration. The falling off – nirjarā – or dissociation of karmas is of two kinds, namely, ripening in the usual course – vipākajā – and being made to ripen prematurely – avipākajā. In the great ocean of transmigration, the individual soul wanders, whirling round and round among the four states of existence, in various births. And the auspicious and inauspicious karmas bound with the soul reach the stage of fruition according to their duration, and their shedding takes place. This is the first kind of dissociation – vipākajā nirjarā – arising from maturity in the ordinary course of things. As the mango, jack fruit, etc., are made to ripen by special contrivances, the karmas which have not attained their maturity can be made to rise and experienced. This dissociation is without their ripening in the natural course of things. The word 'ca' is intended to include other methods referred to in a later sūtra, namely, sūtra 9-3, 'tapasā nirjarā ca'. Dissociation is effected by penance and also by other ways. Why is dissociation (nirjarā) mentioned here before stoppage (saÉvara) of karmas, as it should have come after stoppage in the natural course of things? It is mentioned here for the sake of brevity. If it were to be mentioned there, it would have been a repetition. The fruition – anubhava – is of two types, for the destructive (ghāti) karmas and for the non-destructive (aghāti) karmas. The four – deluding (mohanīya), knowledge-covering (jñānāvaraõa), perceptioncovering (darśanāvaraõa), and obstructive (antarāya) – karmas are called destructive (ghāti) as these interfere with the essential characteristics of the soul. For these destructive (ghāti) karmas, the 339 vè;k;&8 fruition – anubhava – varies in degrees and is likened to the creeper (latā), the wood (dāru), the bone (asthi), and the rock (śaila). The other four main types of karmas – feeling-producing (vedanīya), lifedetermining (āyuÍ), physique-making (nāma), and statusdetermining (gotra) – are called non-destructive (aghāti) as these do not interfere with the essential characteristics of the soul. These nondestructive (aghāti) karmas have two classes, merit (puõya) and demerit (pāpa). The fruition – anubhava – of the merit (puõya) varies in degrees and is likened to the molasses (guça), the sweetmeat (khāõça), the sugar (śarkarā), and the nectar (amÃta). The fruition – anubhava – of the demerit (pāpa) also varies in degrees and is likened to the margosa (nimba or nīma), the sour gruel (kańjīra), the venom (viÈa), and the deadly poison (halāhala). (see 'Sarvārthasiddhi', p. 314). Fruition-bondage (anubbhavabandha) has been described. Now space-bondage (pradeśabandha) must be described. In describing it these points must be indicated. What are its causes? When does it occur? How does it occur? What is its nature? Where does it occur? What is its transformation? The next sūtra proceeds to give particulars in the order in which the questions are put. ukeizR;;k% loZrks ;ksxfo'ks"kkRlw{eSd{ks=kkoxkgfLFkrk% lokZReizns'ks"ouUrkuUrizns'kk% AA24AA 1ukeizR;;k%o Kkukoj.kkfn deZ izÑfr;ksa ds dkj.kHkwr 1loZr%o loZ Hkkoksa esa izfrle; 1;ksxfo'ks"kkr~o ;ksxfo'ks"k ls 1lw{eSd{ks=koxkgfLFkrk%o lw{e] ,d{ks=kkoxkgh vkSj fLFkr 1vuUrkuUrizns'kk%o vuUrkuUr iqñxy ijek.kq 1lokZReizns'ks"kqo loZ vkReizns'kksa esa (lEcU/ dks izkIr) gksrs gSaA 340 Tattvārthasūtra The subtle (sūkÈma), infinite-times-infinite (anantānanta), stationary (sthitāÍ) atoms – pudgala paramāõu – fit to be transformed into karmas, as indicated by the names of the karmas, pervade the entire space-points (pradeśa) of the individual soul in every birth. And these are absorbed every instant by the soul because of its activity (yoga). The phrase 'nāmapratyayaÍ' means the species of karmas as indicated by the names. It has been said that the nature of karmas is according to their names (sūtra 8-22). So the word 'name' encompasses all species of karmas. 'SarvataÍ' means in all births. In case of every soul infinite births have gone by or have taken place in the past. And in the future there will be numerable, innumerable or infinite-times-infinite births. The phrase 'yogaviśeÈāt' is intended to indicate that owing to activity (yoga), the matter is absorbed in form of karma. The word 'sukÈma' indicates that the matter capable of being absorbed as karmas is subtle and not gross. The phrase 'ekakÈetrāvagāha' means pervading the same extent of space as occupied by the individual soul. The term 'sthitāÍ' means stationary. This term is intended to indicate that the forms of karmic matter are stationary and not moving. 'SarvātmapradeśeÈu' is intended to indicate the substratum. It means that the forms of karmic matter pervade the entire extent of space of the individual soul. This indicates that karmic particles do not pervade only one, two, etc., space-points (pradeśa) of the soul. These particles pervade the entire space-points of the soul, in all directions, upper, lower and horizontal. The extent of these particles of matter is infinite-times-infinite space-points, and the specific mention of it is intended to exclude other quantities and declare that it is not numerable, innumerable or infinite space-points. The molecules of karmic matter are infinitefold of the number of the non-potential souls (abhavya) and one/infinite of the number of the liberated souls (the Siddha) and occupy one/innumerable part of the ghanāńgula. 341 vè;k;&8 These are of varied duration; of one, two, three, four, numerable and innumerable instants. These particles are characterized by five colours, five tastes, two odours, and four kinds of touch and are fit to be turned into the eight species of karmas. Owing to the activity (yoga) of the soul these are bound with the soul. Thus space-bondage (pradeśabandha) must be understood in brief. It was contended earlier (see sūtra 1-4) that merit (puõya) and demerit (pāpa) are implied in influx (āsrava) and bondage (bandha). Hence these – merit (puõya) and demerit (pāpa) – must be explained now. The next sūtra determines the karmas that constitute merit (puõya). l}s|'kqqHkk;qukZexks=kkf.k iq.;e~ AA25AA 1l}s|'kqHkk;qukZexks=kkf.ko lkrk osnuh;] 'kqHk vk;q] 'kqHk uke vkSj 'kqHk xks=k 1iq.;e~o ;s iq.;&izÑfr;k¡ gaSA The auspicious varieties of the feeling-producing – sātāvedanīya, life-determining – śubha āyuÍ, physiquemaking – śubha nāma, and status-determining – śubha gotra, karmas constitute merit (puõya). The word 'śubha' means auspicious or laudable. It is added to the rest severally – auspicious life, auspicious name and auspicious status. The three auspicious life-karmas are: life as plant and animal – tiryańcāyuÍ, life as a human being – manuÈyāyuÍ and life as a celestial being – devāyuÍ. The thirty-seven auspicious name-karmas are: the human state of existence – manuÈyagati, the celestial existence – devagati, the class of beings with five senses – pańcendriyajāti, the five bodies – śarīa, the three chief and secondary parts – ańgopāńga, the perfectly symmetrical body – samacaturasra saÉsthāna, extra342 Tattvārthasūtra ordinary sturdiness and strength – vajraÃÈabhanārāca saÉhanana, pleasant colour – varõa, pleasant taste – rasa, pleasant odour – gandha, pleasant touch – sparśa, movement towards the human state of existence – manuÈyagatiprāyogyānupūrvya, movement towards the celestial state of existence – devagatiprāyogyānupūrvya, neither heavy nor light – agurulaghu, liability of annihilation by others – paraghāta, respiration – ucchvāsa, emitting warm light – ātapa, emitting cool light – udyota, graceful gait – vihāyogati, mobile-being – trasa, gross body – bādara, complete development of the organs and the faculties of the body – paryāpti, possession of an individual body – pratyeka śarīra, firmness of the bodily frame – sthira, beauty of the body – śubha, good-tempered – subhaga, melodious voice – susvara, lustrous body – ādeya, glory and renown – yaśaÍkīrti, the formation of the body – nirmāõa, and the name-karma of the Tīrthańkara. Further, high status (uccagotra) and pleasant-feeling (sātāvedanīya) are auspicious. In all, there are forty-two auspicious varieties of karmas. vrks¿U;Rikie~ AA26AA 1vr%vU;r~o bu iq.;&izÑfr;ksa ls vU; lc 1ikie~o iki&izÑfr;k¡ gSaA The remaining varieties of karmas constitute demerit (pāpa). The karmas which do not constitute merit (puõya), as mentioned in the previous sūtra, are classified under demerit (pāpa). These are eighty-two in number. Five kinds of knowledge-covering (jñānāvaraõa) karmas, nine kinds of perception-covering (darśanāvaraõa) karmas, twenty-six kinds of deluding (mohanīya) karmas, and five 343 vè;k;&8 kinds of obstructive (antarāya) karmas. The infernal state of existence – narakagati, the plant and animal state of existence – tiryańcagati, the four classes (jāti) of beings (with one, two, three and four senses), the five kinds of structure of the body – saÉsthāna, the five kinds of joints – saÉhanana, inauspicious colour – varõa, inauspicious taste – rasa, inauspicious odour – gandha, inauspicious touch – sparśa, two kinds of movement of the soul towards the place of birth – narakagatiprāyogyānupūrvya and tiryaggatiprāyogyānupūrvya, self-annihilation – upaghāta, awkward movement – apraśastha vihāyogati, immobile-being – sthāvara, minute body – sūkÈma, incomplete development of organs and faculties – aparyāpti, collective body – sādhāraõa śarīra, infirmness of limbs – asthira, unattractiveness of form – aśubha, bad-tempered – durbhaga, unmelodious voice – duÍsvara, lustreless body – anādeya, and obscurity – ayaśaÍkīrti, are thirty-four inauspicious types of name-karmas (nāmakarma). Unpleasant feeling-producing – asātāvedanīya, life as an infernal being – narakāyuÍ, and low status – nīcagotra, are the other three. Thus, bondage has been explained in detail. The bondage is perceived directly by clairvoyance (avadhijñāna), telepathy (manaÍparyayajñāna) and omniscience (kevalajñāna), and can be understood from the Scripture promulgated by those possessed of direct knowledge. ] ] ] 344 Tattvārthasūtra AA bfr rÙokFkZlw=kkijukeeks{k'kkÐs v"Veks¿è;k;% lekIr% AA The obstruction (nirodha) of influx (āsrava) is stoppage (saÉvara). STOPPAGE AND SHEDDING OF KARMAS C H A P T E R 9 vkÏofujksèk% laoj% AA1AA 1vkÏofujks/%o vkÏo dk fujks/ (jksduk) lks 1laoj%o laoj gS vFkkZr~ vkRek esa ftu dkj.kksa ls deks± dk vkÏo gksrk gS mu dkj.kksa dks nwj djus ls deks± dk vkuk #d tkrk gS] mls laoj dgrs gSaA Bondage (bandha) has been described. The next thing to be explained is stoppage (saÉvara) of karmas. Influx (āsrava) which is the cause of taking in of new karmic matter has been explained. The obstruction of the inflow of karmic matter is called stoppage (saÉvara). It is of two kinds, psychic-stoppage (bhāva saÉvara) and material-stoppage (dravya saÉvara). The cessation of activities that lead to transmigration is psychic-stoppage (bhāva saÉvara). When these activities are checked, the taking in of karmic matter is cut off or interrupted; this is material-stoppage (dravya saÉvara). Now this is investigated. What karmas are stopped in what stages of spiritual development – guõasthāna (see explanation to sūtra 1-8)? The self that is subjugated by the karma which causes false belief is the misbeliever or 'deluded' – mithyādÃÈÇi. That karma which flows into the soul chiefly on account of wrong-belief (mithyādarśana) is cut off in case of those in higher guõasthāna. Hence stoppage of that karma prevails in the beings from the second stage of spiritual development, 345 vè;k;&9 namely, 'downfall' – sāsādanasamyagdÃÈÇi – onwards. What is that karma? That karma is of sixteen kinds: wrong-belief – mithyātva, neuter-sex – napuÉsakaveda, infernal-lifetime – narakāyuÍ, infernal state of existence – narakagati, birth as a one-sensed being – ekendriya jāti, birth as a two-sensed being – dvīndriya jāti, birth as a threesensed being – trīndriya jāti, birth as a four-sensed being – caturindriya jāti, unsymmetrical body – hunça saÉsthāna, extremely weak joint – asamprāptāsÃpāÇikā saÉhanana, transmigrating force tending to infernal state of existence – narakagatiprāyogyānupūrvī, emitting warm light – ātapa, the body possessing one sense only – sthāvara, the subtle body – sūkÈma, the undeveloped body – aprayāptaka, and the collective body – sādhāraõa śarīra. Non-restraint (asaÉyama) is of three kinds – the rise of passions (kaÈāya) leading to endless mundane existence – anantānubandhī, the rise of passions hindering partial restraint – apratyākhyāna, and the rise of passions hindering complete self-discipline – pratyākhyāna. The influx of karmas caused by these passions is stopped in their absence. There is, thus, stoppage of these twenty-five karmas which are caused due to the rise of anantānubandhī passions (kaÈāya): deepsleep – nidrā-nidrā, heavy-drowsiness – pracalā-pracalā, somnambulism – styānagÃddhi, anantānubandhī anger – krodha, anantānubandhī pride – māna, anantānubandhī deceitfulness – māyā, anantānubandhī greed – lobha, female-sex-passion – strīveda, animal age – tiryańcāyuÍ, animal state of existence – tiryańcagati, the middle four types of structure of the body – saÉsthāna, the middle four types of joints – saÉhanana, the transmigrating force tending to the animal state of existence – tiryaggatiprāyogyānupūrvī, cold light – udyota, awkward motion – apraśastha vihāyogati, bad-tempered – durbhaga, harsh voice – duÍsvara, lustreless body – anādeya, and low family – nīcagotra. These karmas, the influx of which is caused by nonrestraint (asaÉyama) arising from the anantānubandhī passions (kaÈāya), bind one-sensed beings, etc., only up to the end of the second stage of spiritual development – sāsādanasamyagdÃÈÇi. Owing to the absence of this kind of non-restraint in the higher stages of spiritual 346 Tattvārthasūtra development, there is stoppage of these karmas in those stages, that is, from the third stage of mixed right and wrong belief – samyagmithyādÃÈÇi. Ten karmas flow into the soul primarily on account of non-restraint (asaÉyama) caused by the rise of passions hindering partial restraint – apratyākhyānāvaraõa. These are apratyākhyānāvaraõa anger – krodha, apratyākhyānāvaraõa pride – māna, apratyākhyānāvaraõa deceitfulness – māyā, apratyākhyānāvaraõa greed – lobha, human age – manuÈyāyuÍ, human state of existence – manuÈyagati, gross body – audārika śarīra, the chief and secondary parts of the physical body – audārika śarīra ańgopāńga, excellent joining – vajraÃÈabhanārāca saÉhanana, and the transmigrating force tending to human birth – nanuÈyagatiprāyogyānupūrvī. These karmas bind from one-sensed beings up to the end of the fourth stage of spiritual development, namely, 'vowless right belief' – asaÉyatasamyagdÃÈÇi. Owing to the absence of passions hindering partial restraint – apratyākhyānāvaraõa – there is stoppage of these karmas in the higher stages. In the third stage of mixed belief – samyagmithyātva – there is no binding of age-determining (āyuÍ) karma. That is a peculiarity. On account of non-restraint (asaÉyama) caused by the rise of passions that prevent complete self-control – pratyākhyānāvaraõa – these four karmas, pratyākhyānāvaraõa anger – krodha, pratyākhyānāvaraõa pride – māna, pratyākhyānāvaraõa deceitfulness – māyā, and pratyākhyānāvaraõa greed – lobha, bind from one-sensed beings up to the end of the fifth stage of 'partial vows' – saÉyatāsaÉyata. There is stoppage of these karmas in the higher stages. The influx of karmas caused by negligence (pramāda) is stopped in the absence of negligence. From the stage higher up the sixth stage of 'imperfect vows' – pramattasaÉyata – there is stoppage of karmas whose influx is caused by negligence, as there is no negligence in those stages. What are these? These are the six karmas causing the unpleasant-feeling – asātāvedanīya, disliking – arati, sorrow – śoka, infirm frame – asthira, unattractiveness of form – aśubha, and 347 vè;k;&9 obscurity – ayaśaÍkīrti. The commencement of the binding of celestial age – devāyuÍ – is caused generally by negligence (pramāda) and also by the absence of negligence in the next (seventh) stage of 'perfect vows' – apramattasaÉyata. Owing to the absence of negligence (pramāda), there is stoppage of this binding of celestial age in the higher stages, i.e., after the seventh stage of 'perfect vows' – apramattasaÉyata. The passions bereft of negligence (pramāda), etc., are stopped as the passions (kaÈāya) are controlled. Such passions are of three degrees, namely, intense (tīvra), moderate (madhyama) and minute (jaghanya). These three degrees of passions (kaÈāya) remain in the next three stages (8th, 9th and 10th). In one/numerable part of the eighth stage of 'unprecedented purity' – apūrvakaraõa – only the two karmas of sleep (nidrā) and slumber (pracalā) bind. In the next one/numerable part, thirty divisions of karmas bind. These are the celestial state of existence – devagati, birth as a being with five senses – pańcedriya jāti, transformable body – vaikriyika śarīra, projectable body – āhāraka śarīra, luminous body – taijasa śarīra, karmic body – kārmaõa śarīra, symmetrical build – samacaturasra saÉsthāna, the chief and secondary parts of the transformable body – vaikriyika śarīra ańgopāńga, the chief and secondary parts of the projectable body – āhāraka śarīra ańgopāńga, colour – varõa, odour – gandha, taste – rasa, touch – sparśa, transmigrating force tending to celestial state – devagatiprāyogyānupūrvī, neither heavy nor light – agurulaghu, self-annihilation – upaghāta, destruction caused by others – paraghāta, respiration – ucchvāsa, graceful movement – praśastha vihāyogati, movable body – trasa, gross body – bādara, complete development – paryāpta, individual body – pratyeka śarīra, firmness of the body – sthira, attractiveness of form – śubha, good-tempered – subhaga, melodious voice – susvara, lustrous body – ādeya, sturdy formation – nirmāõa, and the status of the Tīrthańkara. In the last instant of this stage, the four karmas causing laughter – hāsya, liking – rati, fear – bhaya, and disgust – jugupsā, bind. The influx (āsrava) of 348 Tattvārthasūtra these karmas is owing to intense passions; as the passions get progressively less in the higher stages, stoppage (saÉvara) takes place. In the next stage of 'checking of gross-passions' – anivÃttibādarasāmparāya, from the first instant up to one/numerable parts of the duration of this stage, male-sex-passion – puńveda, and gleaming (saÉjvalana) anger – krodha – bind. In the remaining numerable parts of this stage, saÉjvalana pride – māna, and saÉjvalana deceitfulness – māyā bind. And in the last instant, saÉjvalana greed – lobha binds. The influx of these karmas is caused by moderate passions (kaÈāya). And owing to the progressive absence of moderate passions, there is stoppage of these karmas in the higher stages. In the next stage of 'checking of even minute passions' – sūkÈmasāmparāya, the following sixteen karmas bind: five kinds of knowledge-covering – jñānāvaraõa, four kinds of perception-covering – darśanāvaraõa, glory and renown – yaśaÍkīrti, high family – uccagotra, and five kinds of obstructivekarmas – antarāya, the influx of which is caused by minute passions. There is stoppage of these karmas in the higher stages owing to the absence of minute passions. In the next three stages of 'subsided delusion' – upaśānta-kaÈāya, 'destroyed delusion' – kÈīõakaÈāya, and 'Omniscient-with-vibration' – sayogakevalī, there is the bondage of karmas causing pleasant-feeling – sātāvedanīya, owing to the presence of mere vibrations or activity (yoga). And in the absence of activity (yoga) in case of the 'Omniscient-without-activity' – ayogakevalī, there is stoppage (saÉvara) of the karmas causing pleasant-feeling – sātāvedanīya. (see also 'Õayacakko', verse 155, p. 89-90). Stoppage (saÉvara) has been described. The means to attain stoppage are mentioned in the next sūtra. l xqfIrlfefrèkekZuqisz{kkijh"kgt;pkfj=kS% AA2AA 1l%o og (laoj) 1xqfIrlfefr/ekZuqisz{kkijh"kgt;pkfj=kS%o xqfIr] lfefr] /eZ] vuqisz{kk] ijh"kgt; vkSj pkfj=k ls gksrk gSA 349 vè;k;&9 Stoppage (saÉvara) is affected by control – gupti, carefulness – samiti, virtue – dharma, contemplation – anuprekÈā, conquest by endurance – parīÈahajaya, and conduct – cāritra. That by which the soul is protected from the causes of transmigration is control – gupti. Careful movement in order to avoid injury to organisms is regulation or carefulness – samiti. That which takes one to the desired goal is virtue – dharma. Meditating on the nature of the body, and so on, is contemplation – anuprekÈā. To bear with the sufferings of hunger, etc., for the sake of dissociation of karmas is endurance. Conquest by patient endurance is parīÈahajaya. Conduct – cāritra – has been explained in the first sūtra. These, gupti, etc., are most helpful in stoppage (saÉvara), therefore, these are mentioned as instrumental causes. This is the section on stoppage (saÉvara). Still the pronoun 'saÍ' – 'it' – is used in order to indicate direct association of stoppage (saÉvara) with gupti, etc. What is its purpose? It is intended for determination. That is, stoppage can be achieved only by gupti, etc., and not by any other means. Thus, activities such as pilgrimage to holy places, bathing in holy waters, initiation in offering the head as an oblation, and the worship of deities in order to win favours, are precluded. The karmas acquired on account of attachment (rāga), aversion (dveÈa) and delusion (moha) cannot be got rid of by any other way. A potent cause of stoppage (saÉvara) and dissociation (nirjarā) is mentioned next. rilk futZjk p AA3AA 1rilko ri ls 1futZjk po futZjk gksrh gS vkSj laoj Hkh gksrk gSA 350 Tattvārthasūtra By austerity (tapa), dissociation (nirjarā) also is achieved. Though religious austerity is included under the moral virtues, it is mentioned separately in order to indicate that it is the cause of both – stoppage (saÉvara) and dissociation (nirjarā) – and that it is the chief cause of stoppage (saÉvara). Now it is true that austerity (tapa) is the means of prosperity, as it is admitted to lead to positions such as the lord of the deva. How can it then be the cause of dissociation (nirjarā)? There is nothing inconsistent in this for the same cause produces many effects; the fire is one but it has many effects such as scorching, ash and charcoal. Similarly, what inconsistency is there in considering penance or austerity (tapa) as the cause of both worldly prosperity – abhyudaya – and destruction of karmas – karmakÈaya? Control (gupti), which is mentioned first among the causes of stoppage (saÉvara), is now defined. lE;X;ksxfuxzgks xqfIr% AA4AA 1lE;d~;ksxfuxzgkso lE;d~ izdkj ls ;ksx dk fuxzg djuk lks 1xqfIr%o xqfIr gSA Curbing activity (yoga) well is control – gupti. Activity (yoga) has been explained already. (sūtra 6-1). Restraining self-willed activity (yoga) is restraint. The attribute 'samyak' – 'well' – is intended to curb activity leading to worldly pleasures. When the threefold activity of the body, the sense-organ of speech and the mind is curbed well, there is no room for evil disposition. So there is no inflow of karma due to activity, and consequently there is stoppage (saÉvara) of influx. Restraint is of three kinds, control of bodily 351 vè;k;&9 activity – kāyagupti, control of vocal activity – vacanagupti, and control of mental activity – manogupti. For the ascetic who is unable to control activity altogether, activity that is free from injury is indicated. bZ;kZHkk"kS"k.kknkufu{ksiksRlxkZ% lfer;% AA5AA 1bZ;kZHkk"kS"k.kknkufu{ksiksRlxkZ%o lE;d~ bZ;kZ] lE;d~ Hkk"kk] lE;d~ ,"k.kk] lE;d~ vknkufu{ksi vkSj lE;d~ mRlxZ & ;s ik¡p 1lfer;%o lfefr gSaA (pkSFks lw=k dk ^lE;d~* 'kCn bl lw=k esa Hkh ykxw gksrk gSA) The fivefold regulation of activities – samiti – pertain to walking – īryā, speaking – bhāÈā, eating – eÈaõā, lifting and laying down – ādānanikÈepa, and depositing waste products – utsarga. The word 'samyak' – carefulness – is supplied. Walking, etc., are qualified by this. That is, carefulness in walking – īryāsamiti, carefulness in speaking – bhāÈāsamiti, carefulness in eating – eÈaõāsamiti, carefulness in lifting and laying down – ādānanikÈepasamiti, and carefulness in depositing waste products – utsargasamiti. These five kinds of regulations are the means by which the ascetic, acquainted with the dwellings of minute organisms, avoids injury to these. The ascetic who conducts himself in this manner attains stoppage (saÉvara) of influx (āsrava) of karmas arising from nonrestraint (asaÉyama). The third means of stoppage (saÉvara) is virtue (dharma). Its subdivisions are mentioned in the next sūtra. 352 Tattvārthasūtra mÙke{kekeknZoktZo'kkSplR;la;eriLR;kxkfdÛÓU;& czãp;kZf.k èkeZ% AA6AA 1mÙke{kekeknZoktZo'kkSplR;la;eriLR;kxkfdÛÓU;czãp;kZf.ko mÙke {kek] mÙke eknZo] mÙke vktZo] mÙke 'kkSp] mÙke lR;] mÙke la;e] mÙke ri] mÙke R;kx] mÙke vk dpU; vkSj mÙke czzãp;Z & ;s nl 1/eZ%o /eZ gSaA Supreme forbearance – uttama kÈamā, supreme modesty – uttama mārdava, supreme straightforwardness – uttama ārjava, supreme purity – uttama śauca, supreme truthfulness – uttama satya, supreme self-restraint – uttama saÉyama, supreme austerity – uttama tapa, supreme renunciation – uttama tyāga, supreme nonattachment – uttama ākińcanya, and supreme celibacy – uttama brahmacarya, constitute ten virtues (dharma). The foremost means of stoppage (saÉvara) is 'control', that is, to curb activity (yoga). In case of those who cannot curb activity (yoga) altogether, the second means is mentioned – the 'regulation' of activity by giving it proper direction. And the object of the tenfold virtue (dharma) is to avoid spiritual inertia or negligence (pramāda), while getting engaged in activities such as movement. Forbearance – kÈamā – is the absence of defilement, in form of anger (krodha), in the ascetic, who, as he goes out for food for preserving the body, meets with insolent words, ridicule or derision, disgrace, bodily torment, and so on, from vicious people. Modesty (humility) – mārdava – is the absence of arrogance or egotism on account of high birth, rank, and so on. 'Mārdava' implies destruction of pride (māna). 353 vè;k;&9 Straightforwardness – ārjava – is freedom from crookedness in activity (yoga). 'Ārjava' implies destruction of deceitfulness (māyā). Purity – śauca – is freedom from greed (lobha). Truthfulness – satya – is utterance of chaste words in the presence of noble persons. Now, is this not included in regulation of speechactivity – bhāÈāsamiti? There is nothing wrong in this. Under the regulation of speech-activity – bhāÈāsamiti, the ascetic who comes in contact with good as well as wicked people speaks as little as possible – parimita – of what is good – hitakārī. Otherwise, it will lead to unnecessary evil originating from attachment (rāga). But, under the virtue of truthfulness – satya, the ascetic coming in contact with good people, saints or those devoted to them, must discourse elaborately on the attributes of knowledge and conduct in order to promote virtue (dharma). Desisting from injury to life-principles and sensual pleasures through careful regulation of all activity – samiti – is self-restraint – saÉyama. Undergoing penance in order to destroy the accumulated karmas is austerity (tapa). Austerity is of twelve kinds as will be explained later. Renunciation – tyāga – is giving of gift (dāna) or bestowing knowledge, etc., appropriate to saints. Non-attachment – ākińcanya – is giving up adornment of the body and the thought that 'this is mine'. He who has nothing is 'akińcana' and his disposition appreciating this is 'ākińcanya'. Supreme celibacy – brahmacarya – consists in not recalling the pleasures enjoyed previously, not listening to (or reading) stories of sexual passion, and maintaining an appropriate distance from women. Or, it is residing in the abode of the teacher in order to abandon selfwilled activity. The word 'perfect' or 'supreme' is added to each of the ten virtues (dharma) in order to indicate the avoidance of mundane objectives. The practise of these virtues (dharma), and the thought of good that these virtues bring about and of the evil that the opposites of these bring about, lead to stoppage (saÉvara) of karmic inflow. 354 Tattvārthasūtra Passions, such as anger, are curbed as the self embraces moral virtues, such as forbearance – kÈamā, and discards the opposites of these. How is the self able to practise these and refrain from the opposites of these? He becomes one with moral virtues, as the heated ball of iron becomes one with the heat, by reflecting constantly as under: vfuR;k'kj.klalkjSdRokU;Rok'kqP;kÏolaojfutZjk& yksdcksfèknqyZHkèkeZLok[;krRokuqfpUrueuqisz{kk% AA7AA 1vfuR;k'kj.klalkjSdRokU;Rok'kqP;kÏolaojfutZjkyksdcksfèknqyZHk& èkeZLok[;krRokuqfpUrue~o vfuR;] v'kj.k] lalkj] ,dRo] vU;Ro] v'kqfp] vkÏo] laoj] futZjk] yksd] cksf/nqyZHk vkSj /eZLok[;krRo & buds Lo:i dk ckjEckj fpUrou djuk lks 1vuqisz{kk%o ckjg vuqisz{kk (Hkkouk) gSaA Deep reflections – anuprekÈā – are meditating again and again on transitoriness – anitya, helplessness – aśaraõa, transmigration – saÉsāra, solitariness – ekatva, distinctness – anyatva, impurity – aśuci, influx – āsrava, stoppage – saÉvara, dissociation – nirjarā, the universe – loka, rarity of enlightenment – bodhidurlabha, and the truth proclaimed by religion – dharmasvākhyātatva. The human body, the objects of senses, and the substances that are consumed and used, are of transient nature – anitya – as that of the bubble. In the endless cycle of worldly existence, these alternate in quick succession as the union of particular objects takes place in births through the womb, etc. However, the self under delusion (moha) considers the persons and objects associated with him as permanent. But there is nothing in the world, except the natural characteristics of 355 vè;k;&9 knowledge-cognition (jñānopayoga) and perception-cognition (darśanopayoga) of the soul, which is permanent. This is contemplation on the transitory nature of things – anityānuprekÈā. The worthy soul who contemplates thus is free from intense attachment to persons and things, and hence does not get distressed on their separation, as there is no sense of distress when the scent or the garland used is cast off. As there is no escape for the young one of a deer pounced upon by a strong, hungry tiger fond of the flesh, similarly, there is no escape for the self caught in the meshes of birth, old age, death, disease and sorrow. Even the stout body is helpful in the presence of food, not in the presence of distress. Wealth acquired by great effort does not accompany the self to the next birth. The friends who have shared the joys and sorrows of an individual cannot save him when death is imminent. His relations, all united together, cannot give him relief when he is afflicted by serious ailment. Only the merit or virtue accumulated over time will help him to cross the ocean of misery. Even the lord of the deva cannot help him at the point of death. Therefore, virtue (dharma) is the only means of succour to the one in midst of misery. Friends, wealth, etc., are also transient. And so there is nothing else, except virtue, which offers succour to the self. To contemplate thus is the reflection on helplessness – aśaraõānuprekÈā. He, who is distressed at the thought of utter helplessness, does not get attached to worldly things and worldly existence. He endeavours to march on the path indicated by the Omniscient Lord. Transmigration is the attainment of another birth by the self owing to the ripening of karmas. The five kinds of whirling-round have been described already. (sūtra 2-10). The self wanders in the endless cycle of births and deaths, undergoing millions of afflictions in innumerable wombs and families. Being propelled by the mechanism of karmas, the soul takes different relationships; from a father it becomes a brother, a son, a grandson, etc., and from a mother it becomes a sister, a wife, a daughter, and so on. The master becomes the servant and the servant becomes the master. It takes different forms just as an actor takes 356 Tattvārthasūtra several roles. To be brief, sometimes one becomes one's own son. There is no end to the transformations undergone by the self owing to the influence of karmas. To reflect on the nature of mundane existence is contemplation on the worldly existence – saÉsārānuprekÈā. He who contemplates thus is alarmed at the miseries of transmigration, becomes disgusted with worldly existence, and endeavours to free himself from it. 'I am alone in suffering severe pain in successive recurrence of birth, old-age and death. There is none who is my friend or foe. I am born alone; I die alone. No one, relation or other, takes away my manifold sufferings in form of disease, old-age and death. Relations and friends do not accompany me beyond the cemetery. Virtue (dharma) alone is my never-failing companion.' This is the contemplation of solitariness – ekatvānuprekÈā. He who contemplates thus is free from attachment towards his relations and aversion towards others; he cultivates detachment and endeavours to attain emancipation. To reflect that the soul is utterly distinct from the body is the contemplation of distinctness – anyatvānuprekÈā. 'Though my soul is one with the body from the point of view of bondage yet it is different from the body as the two possess different characteristics. The body has sense-organs but my soul is beyond the senses. The body is devoid of knowledge but my soul is knowledge. The body is perishable but my soul is imperishable. My body has a beginning and an end, but my soul has neither beginning nor end. In the course of my mundane existence, my hundreds of thousands of bodies have perished. My soul is different from all these bodies. When even the body is utterly different from my soul, then, O dear, there is no surprise that my soul is different from all other external objects.' He who contemplates thus is free from attachment towards his body and other things. This true knowledge leads to supreme detachment which helps the soul attain emancipation. The body is the receptacle of utter impurities. It is developed from impurities such as semen and blood in the womb. As the lavatory, it is the seat of unclean things. The skin-covering is full of tiny pores 357 vè;k;&9 through which exude impurities. Like the fire, the body consumes quickly what comes in contact with it. Bathing, application of perfumes, incense, powder, garlands, etc., cannot remove the impurities of the body. Only right faith, right knowledge and right conduct are able to bring about complete purification of the soul. He who contemplates thus on the impurities of tho body – aśuci anuprekÈā – is disgusted with the body and puts his heart into crossing the ocean of transmigration. Influx (āsrava), stoppage (saÉvara) and dissociation (nirjarā) have been described already. Still these are mentioned here for reflecting on their good and evil. Influx (āsrava) leads to calamity and distress in this life and in the life to come. It is sharp and strong like the current of a river, and appears in form of the senses (indriya), the passions (kaÈāya) and non-abstinence (avrata). The senses (indriya), such as touch, sight, and the rest, plunge the wild elephant, the crow, the serpent, the bird, the deer, and the rest, into the ocean of misery. Similarly the passions (kaÈāya) cause injury, bondage, disgrace, anguish, and so on, in this world and, in the next, lead to different kinds of suffering in the four states of existence. Reflecting thus on the calamity and distress caused by influx (āsrava) is contemplation on influx – āsravānuprekÈā. This enables the self not to swerve from the wholesome attitudes of forbearance (kÈamā), etc. And the soul protected by this contemplation is rid of evils originating from influx (āsrava), as the tortoise is protected by its shell. If the hole in the keel of a vessel sailing on the ocean is not closed, gradually the water enters the vessel and the passengers must perish. But if there is no hole, the passengers must reach their destination. Similarly, if influx (āsrava) is stopped there can be no obstacle to liberation. Reflection on the merit of stoppage (saÉvara) of karmas is contemplation on stoppage – saÉvarānuprekÈā. He who reflects constantly in this manner attains stoppage (saÉvara) of karmas and liberation. Dissociation (nirjarā) takes place after the fruition of karmas. Dissociation (nirjarā) is of two kinds. One is involuntary – abuddhi358 Tattvārthasūtra pūrvā – and the other is by one's effort – kuśalamūlā. The involuntary dissociation on the fruition of karmas, common to the four conditions of existence such as the infernal beings, gives rise to a chain of bondage (bandha) of inauspicious kind. Dissociation by conquest of afflictions is by one's own effort. It gives rise to a chain of bondage (bandha) of auspicious kind or to no bondage. Reflection on the merits and demerits of dissociation (nirjarā) is contemplation of dissociation – nirjarānuprekÈā. This impels one to destroy karmas. The structure of the universe (loka) has been described already. The universe is in the midst of the non-universe-space – alokākāśa – which is endless. The contemplation of the nature of the universe is lokānuprekÈā. Such contemplation increases the purity of knowledge. In one minute-living-body – nigodaśarira – there are organisms (jīva) infinite times the emancipated souls. Thus the entire universe is densely filled with one-sensed beings with no interspace. To become a being with more than one sense is as difficult as finding out a very small piece of diamond buried in the sands of an ocean. Even among these, most are endowed with imperfect (less than five) senses. Hence, birth as a five-sensed being is as rare as the quality of gratitude among the good qualities. And even among the five-sensed beings, most belong to the animal world such as the cow, the deer, the bird, the serpent, etc. Hence the attainment of human birth is as difficult as finding a heap of jewels at the crossing of the roads. On completion of life as a human being, to attain the human birth yet again is as difficult as it is for the burnt parts – leaves and branches – of a tree to regain the mode (paryāya) of the tree. If somehow the human birth is attained again, a good country, a good family, keen senses, health, etc., are more and more difficult of attainment. When all these are attained, if true faith is not acquired, human birth becomes useless, like the face without vision. And even after attaining this rare true faith if anyone is immersed in worldly pleasures, it is like burning sandalwood paste for the sake of ash. If somehow one is able to renounce worldly pleasures, the adoption of austerities, observance of virtues, and auspicious death, are extremely rare. Only on attainment of all these, 359 vè;k;&9 the human birth can be said to bear fruit; contemplation of this kind is bodhidurlabhānuprekÈā. The person who contemplates thus does not become negligent after attaining this rare jewel of human birth. The faith promulgated by Lord Jina has non-injury (ahiÉsā) as its mark, truthfulness (satya) as its base, humility (vinaya) as its root, and forbearance (kÈamā) as its strength. It is safeguarded by celibacy (brahmacarya), dominated by quietism (upaśama), characterized by restraint (niyati), and supported by non-attachment (aparigraha). Without attaining it, living beings have been wandering in the beginningless mundane existence, undergoing sufferings and misery owing to the rise of inauspicious karmas. If true faith is attained, one is bound to achieve, after enjoying several kinds of worldly-prosperity (abhyudaya) and distinction, liberation. This kind of contemplation is dharmasvākhyātatvānuprekÈā. The person who contemplates thus exhibits true devotion to religion, and endeavours to attain it. The presence in a person of contemplations, such as transitoriness – anityānuprekÈā, helps him practise moral virtues, like forbearance (kÈamā); it leads to effective stoppage (saÉvara) of karmas. Contemplation (anuprekÈā) is mentioned in the middle of virtue – dharma – and conquest by endurance – parīÈahajaya – since it is the cause of both. He who does contemplation (anuprekÈā) observes properly the moral virtues and also endures the afflictions. What are the afflictions (parīÈaha) and for what purpose are these endured? ekxkZP;oufutZjkFk± ifj"kks<O;k% ijh"kgk% AA8AA 1ekxkZP;oufutZjkFk±o laoj ds ekxZ ls P;qr u gksus vkSj deks± dh futZjk ds fy;s 1ijh"kgk% ifj"kks<O;k%o ckbZl ijh"kg lgu djus ;ksX; gSaaA (;g laoj dk izdj.k py jgk gS] vr% bl lw=k esa dgs x;s ^ekxZ* 'kCn dk vFkZ ^laoj dk ekxZ* le>ukA) 360 Tattvārthasūtra Those which are endured so as not to swerve from the path and for the sake of dissociation (nirjarā) of karmas are the afflictions (parīÈaha). As stoppage is the subject under consideration, the path is qualified by stoppage – the path of stoppage (saÉvara). The afflictions (parīÈaha) are to be endured so as not to swerve from the path of stoppage (saÉvara) of karmas and for the dissociation (nirjarā) of karmas. Those who endure hunger (kÈudhā), thirst (pipāsā), etc., do not swerve from the path taught by Lord Jina, and block the influx (āsrava) of karmas by practising the path aright. They also experience the fruits of maturing karmas, destroy these progressively and attain liberation. The afflictions (parīÈaha) are described in the next sūtra. {kqfRiiklk'khrks".kna'ke'kdukXU;kjfrÐhp;kZfu"k|k& 'kÕ;kØks'koèk;kpuk¿ykHkjksxr`.kLi'kZeylRdkjiqjLdkj& izKk¿Kkukn'kZukfu AA9AA 1{kqfRiiklk'khrks".kna'ke'kdukXU;kjfrÐhp;kZfu"k|k'kÕ;kØks'k& oèk;kpuk¿ykHkjksxr`.kLi'kZeylRdkjiqjLdkjizKk¿Kkukn'kZukfuo {kq/k] r`"kk] 'khr] m".k] na'ke'kd] ukXU;] vjfr] Ðh] p;kZ] fu"k|k] 'kÕ;k] vkØks'k] o/] ;kpuk] vykHk] jksx] r`.kLi'kZ] ey] lRdkjiqjLdkj] izKk] vKku vkSj vn'kZu & ;s ckbZl ijh"kg gaSA Hunger – kÈudhā, thirst – tÃÈā, cold – śīta, heat – uÈõa, insect-bite – dańśamaśaka, nakedness – nāgnya, absence of pleasures – arati, woman – strī, pain arising from roaming – caryā, discomfort of posture – niÈadyā, 361 vè;k;&9 uncomfortable couch – śayyā, reproach – ākrośa, injury – vadha, solicitation – yācanā, lack of gain – alābha, disease – roga, pain inflicted by blades of grass – tÃõasparśa, dirt – mala, absence of reverence and honour – satkārapuraskāra, (conceit of) learning – prajñā, despair or uneasiness arising from ignorance – ajñāna, and lack of faith – adarśana, are the twenty-two afflications (parīÈaha). Hunger, etc., are the twenty-two kinds of afflictions or hardships. These have to be endured by the ascetic striving after liberation. The saint who fails to obtain pure food or the required quantity of food, and whose torment of hunger is not dispelled, does not seek food in improper places and at improper times. He does not tolerate neglect of his essential duties even to a small extent and is ever enthusiastic in study and meditation. He has practised, on his own as well as due to circumstances, fasting and eating less than his fill on several occasions. He takes only tasteless food. His throat is dry like the redhot vessel on which a few drops of water have been poured. Even when the ascetic is extremely hungry, he feels that not obtaining the gift of food is more beneficial than obtaining it. The ascetic thus conquers the torment of hunger – kÈudhāparīÈahajaya. The ascetic has given up bathing, immersing himself in water and sprinkling his body with water. Like the bird, he has no fixed resting place and abode. He may at times be tormented by parching thirst, owing to various reasons such as unsuitable food (saltish, oily or astringent food), heat of the summer, bilious fever, fasting, and so on. Even then he does not seek remedy, but extinguishes this flame of the fire of thirst by the cool and fragrant water of his meditation kept in the fresh, earthenware pot of fortitude. Such patient endurance of thirst – tÃÈāparīÈahajaya – is to be extolled. Without garments on his body, the ascetic lives, like the bird, in uncertain places such as on rocks and underneath trees. And when he 362 Tattvārthasūtra is beset by extremely cold wind or suffers from frost, he does not think of remedies enjoyed by him formerly, but dwells in the inner apartment of the house of knowledge. His endurance of cold – śītaparīÈahajaya – is praiseworthy. In summer, the forest has no breeze, no water, and the trees become shadowless as their leaves fall off due to scorching heat of the sun. Still, the ascetic enters the woods and suffers from thirst because of internal causes, such as fasting. Owing to forest-conflagration, scorching wind and oppressive heat of the sun, his throat and palate become parched. Still he does not think of remedies experienced by him formerly on several occasions. He is keenly intent on avoiding injury to living beings and safeguarding his conduct. This is described as endurance of heat – uÈõaparīÈahajaya. Here the word 'dańśamaśaka' – mosquito-bite – is a synecdoche. For instance, 'Let the ghee be safeguarded from crows.' Here the word 'crows' implies all those birds which can damage the ghee. Similarly, 'mosquitoes' imply all kinds of insects such as bees, gnats, small bees, bugs, maggots, ants and scorpions. The ascetic endures pain caused by the biting of such insects without thinking of harming them. His only mantle is the determination to attain emancipation. This is called patient endurance of insect-bites – dańśamaśakaparīÈahajaya. The saint embraces nakedness like that of the newborn child. His nakedness is free from stigma. It is extremely difficult to adopt this form. This form frees him from the evils of begging, safeguarding, injury, etc. The saint adopting this form is free from attachment; it is the sole cause of attaining emancipation. The mind of the saint embracing nakedness is free from the excitement of passions and agitation. As he safeguards his celibacy perfectly, his endurance of nakedness – nāgnyaparīÈahajaya – is blameless. The ascetic is indifferent to pleasures of the senses. He stays in vacant houses, temples, tree-hollows, or in mountain-caves – places devoid of singing, dancing, instrumental music, etc. He is immersed in, and derives pleasure from, study and meditation. His heart is closed to the thoughts of worldly pleasures witnessed, heard of, and experienced 363 vè;k;&9 Someone has led long celibate life, residing in the habitation of his master. He has learnt the truth about bondage and liberation. He moves from place to place as a worthy recipient of food for the sake of his body, the seat of self-restraint (saÉyama). As initiated by his master, he practises detachment like the wind. His body has become weak due to frequent fasting, taking less food, limiting the articles of food, giving up stimulating food, etc. He does not roam in directions opposed to his regulations with regard to place and time and which may cause breach of self-restraint. While roaming he wears no shoes and hence his soles are pricked by thorns, sharp stones, etc., causing him pain. Still, he does not think of conveyance, etc., used by him on former occasions. He practises to perfection the daily duties of the ascetic. This must be understood as the endurance of the affliction of roaming – caryāparīÈahajaya. The ascetic chooses an utterly lonely place, untrodden earlier, like a burial ground, a garden, a vacant house, a mountain cave, or an arbour, examines it carefully with the aid of sunlight and his senses, and adopts, for self-discipline, a definite posture, for a definite time. The roaring of wild animals such as the lion or the tiger does not engender fear in him. The troubles caused by others are unable to swerve him from the path to liberation. His body does not change the posture, such as the vīrāsana or the utkuÇikā, which he had adopted. formerly, and stories concerning worldly pleasures. His heart is insulated well against Cupid's arrows. He always evinces compassion for the living. He must be understood to have conquered dissatisfaction arising from the absence of pleasures – aratiparīÈahajaya. In the presence of lovely, intoxicated women in the bloom of youth, the ascetic residing in lonely bowers, houses, etc., is free from agitation or excitement, even upon being disturbed by them. Similarly, he subdues agitation of his senses and his mind, like the tortoise protected by his shell. And the smile, charming talk, amorous glances and laughter, lustful slow movement of women and the arrows of Cupid have no effect on him. This must be understood as the conquest of the disturbance caused by woman – strīparīÈahajaya. 364 Tattvārthasūtra This is ascertained as conquest of the discomfort of posture – niÈadyāparīÈahajaya. When the body of the ascetic gets exhausted by prolonged study or meditation or walking, he goes to sleep on hard, uneven ground, abounding in pebbles and fragments of broken jars, very cold or very hot, for a few minutes. He stretches his body on one side like a stick. For the sake of avoiding injury to the living organisms, he remains still, without changing side, like the fallen tree or the dead body. He contemplates constantly on knowledge and does not move his body even when tormented by evil spirits. Thus he overcomes the discomfort caused by uncomfortable couch – śayyāparīÈahajaya – for an indefinite time. The saint pays no attention to the harsh, uncivil and vulgar words of persons of perverted attitude betokening censure and contempt; words which can easily provoke the flame of anger. Though he is in a position to instantly counter such evil-doers, he remains unperturbed. He thinks that the spoken words are due to fruition of sinful karmas; he remains intent on practising austerities and does not make room for even the slightest passion (kaÈāya). He thus overcomes reproach – ākrośaparīÈahajaya. On being beaten and tormented by wicked men with sharp swords, maces, pestles, etc., the ascetic does not entertain ill-feelings against them. He thinks, 'This is due to my former evil deeds. What can these wretched people do to me? The body is transient like the bubble and is the cause of misery. These people can harm only my transient body, and not my lasting faith, knowledge and conduct.' Reflecting in this manner the ascetic considers the cutting of his body by an adze or the application of sandalwood paste as equal. He thus overcomes the injury done to him – vadhaparīÈahajaya. As the ascetic is absorbed in practising internal and external austerities, his body is emaciated, and he looks a mere skeleton. Like the dried-up tree without strength or shade due to the extreme heat of the sun, the physical frame of the ascetic is a mere assemblage of skin, bones and arteries. Even on the point of death, he does not meanly and 365 vè;k;&9 piteously, by words, facial expression or gesture, beg for food, habitation, medicine, etc. Even at the time set for soliciting food, he is difficult to be seen like the flash of lightning. This is endurance of the affliction of solicitation – yācanāparīÈahajaya. Like the wind the ascetic is not attached to anything. He goes from place to place and takes food only once a day. He observes complete silence or regulation of speech (bhāÈāsamiti). He displays his form only once. He takes food from his hands. The feeling of disgust does not enter his mind even on not getting food for several days and in several homes. He has no interest in testing the merits of host. 'Lack of gain is of greater virtue to me than gain.' The ascetic who is contented in this manner conquers the lack of gain – alābhaparīÈahajaya. The body is the repository of all kinds of impurities, transient and defenceless. The ascetic, therefore, does not entertain the thought or desire for the body, and does not adorn it. As the body is the means for acquiring the jewels of merit, and accumulating and safeguarding these, he accepts several kinds of useful food to keep the body intact, just as lubricating the axle of the wheel or application of ointment to a wound is indispensable. Sometimes, owing to unsuitable food and drink, he is afflicted with hundreds of diseases, such as gout, at the same time. He is not subjugated by these. He may even possess extraordinary powers of cure acquired by his austerities. Still he does not utilize these powers to get himself cured; he has no attachment towards the body. This is the conquest of the affliction of disease – rogaparīÈahajaya. The word 'tÃõa' – a blade of grass – implies anything which causes pain. When dried blades of grass, hard pebbles, thorns, sharp stones, spears, etc., cause pain to the soles of the feet, the ascetic does not give his attention to it. He carefully avoids injury to minute organisms during walking, sitting and sleeping. This is the conquest of the affliction caused by blades of grass, etc. – tÃõasparśādi parīÈahajaya. The ascetic takes the vow of non-bathing until death for the sake of avoiding injury to water-bodied organisms. He perspires profusely in the extreme heat of the sun and particles of dust wafted by the wind 366 Tattvārthasūtra adhere to his wet body. And even when itching prevails owing to scab, eczema or ringworm, he does not scratch or rub his body. He is engaged in cleansing the soul from the mire of karmic impurities which clog the soul with the pure water of right knowledge and conduct. And naturally he overcomes the discomfort or affliction caused by dirt – malaparīÈahajaya. The word 'satkāra' means reverence and commendation. The word 'puraskāra' is giving the place of honour or offering welcome. 'In these respects I am disregarded. I have practised celibacy for long and I am a great ascetic. I have clear knowledge of what it means to get established in own soul – svasamaya – and to wander in externalities – parasamaya. I have won over my disputants on several occasions. But I am not honoured with reverence, offer of a high seat, and so on, by anyone. The misbelievers, on the other hand, are seen to worship and honour persons with very little knowledge; treating them as allknowing, they proclaim their false religion. It is said in the Scripture that deva worship the ascetic who performs great austerities. If this be true, why is it that I am not reverenced?' The monk who avoids such thoughts overcomes the affliction caused by the absence of reverence and honour – satkārapuraskāraparīÈahajaya. 'I am highly learned and well-versed in all branches of scriptural knowledge – ańga, pūrva, and prakīrõaka – and proficient in language, grammar, logic and spiritual science. Other learned men are insignificant in front of me, like the light of the fire-fly in front of the sun.' The ascetic who is free from such pride in his learning overcomes the affliction caused by (conceit of) learning – prajñāparīÈahajaya. 'I have to put up with such contemptuous remarks as, 'he is stupid, dull-witted and ignorant like an animal'. Though I perform severe austerities and am free from negligence, still I have not acquired excellence in knowledge.' The ascetic who avoids such thoughts overcomes the affliction caused by despair or uneasiness arising from ignorance – ajñānaparīÈahajaya. 'My heart is pure with the attitude of supreme detachment. I am wellversed in the true knowledge of all the categories. I worship the great 367 vè;k;&9 ones – the Arhat, the temple, the saint and the religion. Though I have been an ascetic for a pretty long time, I have not been able to attain remarkable knowledge. It is said in the Scripture that long fasting begets great things such as miraculous powers. But it does not appear to be true. So asceticism is useless. It is useless to observe vows.' The ascetic who, out of his pure right belief, does not think in this manner conquers the affliction caused by lack of faith – adarśanaparīÈahajaya. The ascetic, who endures these afflictions (parīÈaha) without evil thoughts, attains great stoppage (saÉvara) of karmas, as influx (āsrava) caused by attachment and aversion is obstructed. Do all these afflictions occur to all saints endeavouring to cross over the dense forest of transmigration, or is there any peculiarity? These afflictions occur differently according to the stages of conduct. But in the two cases, described below, this should be known definitely. lw{elkEijk;NÁLFkohrjkx;ksÜÓrqnZ'k AA10AA 1lw{elkEijk;NÁLFkohrjkx;ks%o lw{elkEijk; (nlosa) rFkk NÁLFk ohrjkx (X;kjgosa&ckjgosa xq.kLFkku) esa 1prqnZ'ko 14 ijh"kg lEHko gaSA Fourteen afflictions (parīÈaha) are possible in case of the saints in the tenth – sūkÈmasāmparāya – and the eleventh/twelfth – chadmastha vītarāga – stages. Hunger – kÈudhā, thirst – tÃÈā, cold – śīta, heat – uÈõa, insect-bite – dańśamaśaka, pain arising from roaming – caryā, uncomfortable couch – śayyā, injury – vadha, lack of gain – alābha, disease – roga, pain inflicted by blades of grass – tÃõasparśa, dirt – mala, (conceit of) 368 Tattvārthasūtra learning – prajñā, and despair or uneasiness arising from ignorance – ajñāna, are the fourteen afflictions (parīÈaha). The mention of 'fourteen' implies that the other afflictions do not occur in these stages. An objection is raised. As there is no deluding karma in the twelfth stage, the eight afflictions originating from it are absent, and hence the rule limiting the afflictions to fourteen in their case is appropriate. But there is the rise of the deluding karma in the tenth stage. Hence the number fourteen is not appropriate to the saint of the tenth stage. The objection is not valid as in that stage there is mere presence of the deluding karma. There is merely the rise of the gleaming (saÉjvalana) passion (kaÈāya) of greed (lobha), and that too is very minute. So virtually the tenth stage is similar to the twelfth stage and the limit fourteen is applicable to it too. It is further argued that the afflictions such as hunger do not arise, as the rise of deluding karma is either absent or very slight. Hence it is not fit to speak of the conquest of such afflictions. But it is not so. What is the reason? The potentiality alone is referred to here, similar to the capacity of the highest kind of deva (Sarvārthasiddhi deva) to reach the seventh infernal region. (But they never go there, as there is no inclination, curiosity or need for them to do so.) If these afflictions occur to the embodied saint, how many afflictions arise in case of the Omniscient Jina, who still experiences the effects of four aghāti karmas? ,dkn'k ftus AA11AA 1ftuso rsjgosa xq.kLFkku esa ftusUaenso ds 1,dkn'ko Åij crk;s x;s pkSng esa ls vykHk] izKk vkSj vKku] bu rhu dks NksM+dj ckdh ds X;kjg ijh"kg (dsoy mipkj ls) lEHko gSaA Eleven afflictions (parīÈaha) figuratively occur to the Omniscient Jina. In reality, he is free from all afflictions. 369 vè;k;&9 Though the four destructive karmas have been destroyed by Lord Jina, eleven afflictions arising from the feeling-producing (vedanīya) karmas are said to occur. It is argued that it is not proper to speak of afflictions in case of the Omniscient Lord Jina, as hunger and other afflictions do not occur in the absence of rise of the deluding (mohanīya) karmas. It is no doubt true. Though there are no afflictions of hunger, etc., owing to mere presence of material-karmas (dravyakarma) these are attributed to Lord Jina figuratively. With the destruction of knowledge-covering (jñānāvaraõa) karmas and the manifestation of omniscience which knows all things simultaneously, still meditation is attributed to Lord Jina, from the point of view of the destruction of karmas, the result of meditation. Otherwise, eleven afflictions 'do not arise' in case of Lord Jina is appropriate. 'Do not arise' must be supplied, as sūtra are supplemented in this way. It is admitted that the incomplete part of a sentence is to be supplied and it is within the rights of the commentator. Without the help of the rise of the deluding karmas, there are no afflictions such as hunger, etc. If some afflictions only occur to the saints in the tenth stage, etc., to whom do all of these occur? cknjlkEijk;s losZ AA12AA 1cknjlkEijk;so cknjlkEijk; vFkkZr~ LFkwyd"kk; okys thoksa ds 1losZo loZ ijh"kg lEHko gSaA All afflictions (parīÈaha) can arise in case of the ascetic with gross passions – bādarasāmparāya. The word 'sāmparāya' means passions (kaÈāya) and 'bādara' means gross. The ascetic with gross passions is called 'bādarasāmparāya'. This is not a specific stage in spiritual development. The term, 'gross 370 Tattvārthasūtra passions', indicates the meaning. This term includes ascetics from the sixth stage up to the ninth stage – pramattasaÉyata, apramattasaÉyata, apūrvakaraõa, and anivrttibādarasāmparāya. As the passions (kaÈāya) have not been destroyed in their case, all the afflictions occur to them. In what types of conduct do all the afflictions occur? All the afflictions occur to those of the first three types of conduct, namely, sāmāyika, chedopasthapanā and parihāraviśuddhi (see sūtra 9-18). The particular stages with regard to the afflictions have been ascertained. But what karmas cause what afflictions? Kkukoj.ks izKk¿Kkus AA13AA 1Kkukoj.kso Kkukoj.k ds mn; esa 1izKk¿Kkuso izKk vkSj vKku & ;s nks ijh"kg gksrs gSaA Extraordinary learning – prajñā, and ignorance – ajñāna, are caused by knowledge-covering (jñānāvaraõa) karmas. This is improper. What is improper? The affliction of ignorance is consistent with the presence of knowledge-covering (jñānāvaraõa) karmas. But extraordinary learning arises in the absence of knowledge-covering (jñānāvaraõa) karmas. The answer is that extraordinary learning, arising from destruction-cum-subsidence – kÈayopaśama – begets pride in the ascetic on the rise of other knowledge-covering (jñānāvaraõa) karmas. The affliction of (conceit of) extraordinary learning – prajñā – does not arise on total destruction (kÈaya) of knowledge-covering (jñānāvaraõa) karmas. So it is appropriate to say that the affliction of (conceit of) extraordinary learning – prajñā – arises in the presence of knowledge-obscuring (jñānāvaraõa) karmas. 371 vè;k;&9 The karmas causing other afflictions are described in the next sūtra. n'kZueksgkUrjk;;ksjn'kZukykHkkS AA14AA 1n'kZueksgkUrjk;;ks%o n'kZueksg vkSj vUrjk; deZ ds mn; esa 1vn'kZukykHkkSo Øe ls vn'kZu vkSj vykHk ijh"kg gksrs gaSA Lack of faith – adarśana, and lack of gain – alābha, are caused by faith-deluding (darśanamoha) and obstructive (antarāya) karmas, respectively. The words are taken respectively. Faith-deluding (darśanamoha) karmas give rise to the affliction of perverted faith – adarśana. And obstructive (antarāya) karmas give rise to the affliction of lack of gain – alābha. Faith-deluding (darśanamoha) here means samyaktvamohanīya – kÈāyopaśamika samyaktva or vedaka samyaktva. Three faults – wavering (cala), taint (mala), and faltering (agāçha) – accompany right-belief (samyaktva) on the rise of faith-deluding (darśanamoha) karmas. The fault of wavering (cala) implies that although the ascetic has faith on the Supreme Teacher – āpta, the Scripture – āgama, and the nature of substances – padārtha, he entertains thoughts of their nature being different from what he believes it to be. For example, he may entertain the thought that Lord Pārśvanātha saves him from calamities. The fault of taint (mala) implies the presence of doubt (śańkā), etc., in what he believes. The fault of faltering (agāçha) implies occasional irresoluteness in the belief. For example, he may entertain the thought that the particular temple belongs to him. If the first kind of deluding (mohanīya) karmas cause one affliction, how many afflictions are caused by the second type? 372 Tattvārthasūtra pkfj=keksgs ukXU;kjfrÐhfu"k|kØks'k;kpuk& lRdkjiqjLdkjk% AA15AA 1pkfj=keksgso pkfj=keksguh; ds mn; esa 1ukXU;kjfrÐh& fu"k|kØks'k;kpuklRdkjiqjLdkjk%o ukXU;] vjfr] Ðh] fu"k|k] vkØks'k] ;kpuk vkSj lRdkjiqjLdkj & ;s lkr ijh"kg gksrs gSaA Afflictions of nakedness – nāgnya, absence of pleasures – arati, woman – strī, posture – niÈadyā, reproach – ākrośa, solicitation – yācanā, and reverence and honour – satkārapuraskāra, are caused by the conduct-deluding (cāritramoha) karmas. Delusion (moha) has been said to cause afflictions like nakedness – nāgnya, mentioned above. But how can the affliction of posture – niÈadyā, be caused by the rise of delusion (moha)? On the rise of delusion (moha), thoughts of violence arise. And avoidance of injury is the object of the posture – niÈadyā. That is why the affliction of the posture – niÈadyā – has been said to fall under the conduct-deluding (cāritramoha) karmas and not under the feeling (vedanīya) karmas. What karmas are the causes of the remaining afflictions? osnuh;s 'ks"kk% AA16AA 1osnuh;so osnuh; deZ ds mn; esa 1'ks"kk%o ckdh ds X;kjg ijh"kg vFkkZr~ {kq/k] r`"kk] 'khr] m".k] na'ke'kd] p;kZ] 'kÕ;k] o/] jksx] r`.kLi'kZ] vkSj ey gksrs gSaA 373 vè;k;&9 Eleven afflictions have already been mentioned. Other than these eleven, the eleven are remaining afflictions. These occur on the rise of feeling (vedanīya) karmas. What are these afflictions? These afflictions are hunger – kÈudhā, thirst – tÃÈā, cold – śīta, heat – uÈõa, insect-bite – dańśamaśaka, pain arising from roaming – caryā, uncomfortable couch – śayyā, injury – vadha, disease – roga, pain inflicted by blades of grass – tÃõasparśa, and dirt – mala. The causes, definitions and divisions of the afflictions have been described. How many of these can occur simultaneously to a single soul? The remaining afflictions are caused by the feeling (vedanīya) karmas. ,dkn;ks HkkT;k ;qxinsdfLeÂSdksu o'krs% AA17AA 1,dfLeu~ ;qxir~o ,d lkFk ,d vkRek esa 1,dkn;kso ,d ls ysdj 1vk ,dksu o'krs%o mÂhl rd ijh"kg 1HkkT;k%o gks ldrs gSaA From one to nineteen afflictions can occur simultaneously in a single soul. Nineteen afflictions can occur simultaneously in a single soul. How is it? Only one of these two – cold – śīta, and heat – uÈõa – can occur at a time. Similalry, only one out of these three – pain arising from roaming – caryā, couch – śayyā, and posture – niÈadyā – can occur at a time. How? These do not occur simultaneously. While lying in bed, one is not seated and one does not walk. Thus, a maximum of only nineteen afflictions can occur simultaneously to one soul. How can extraordinary learning – prajñā, and ignorance – ajñāna, occur to the 374 Tattvārthasūtra same soul simultaneously, as these also are opposed to each other? But there is no inconsistency here. The affliction of extraordinary learning – prajñā – is with regard to the scriptural knowledge while that of ignorance – ajñāna – pertains to non-manifestation of clairvoyance, etc. The five causes of stoppage (saÉvara) – control – gupti, carefulness – samiti, virtue – dharma, contemplation – anuprekÈā, and conquest by endurance – parīÈahajaya – have been described. Now the causes of stoppage (saÉvara) that constitute conduct (cāritra) are mentioned in the next sūtra. lkekf;dPNsnksiLFkkiukifjgkjfo'kqf1⁄4lw{elkEijk;& ;Fkk[;krfefr pkfj=ke~ AA18AA 1lkekf;dPNsnksiLFkkiukifjgkjfo'kqf1⁄4lw{elkEijk;;Fkk[;kre~o lkekf;d] NsnksiLFkkiuk] ifjgkjfo'kqf1⁄4] lw{elkEijk; vkSj ;Fkk[;kr 1bfr pkfj=ke~o bl izdkj pkfj=k ds ik¡p Hksn gSaA Equanimity – sāmāyika, reinitiation – chedopasthāpanā, purity of non-injury – parihāraviśuddhi, slight passion – sukÈmasāmparāya, and perfect-conduct – yathākhyāta, are the five kinds of conduct (cāritra). Now self-restraint (saÉyama) has been mentioned among the ten moral virtues (dharma) or duties. And that itself is conduct (cāritra). Hence it is meaningless to mention conduct (cāritra) again. But this objection is not valid. Though it is included among the ten virtues, conduct (cāritra) is described at the end in order to indicate that it is the direct cause of liberation. Equanimity – sāmāyika – has been described earlier (see sūtra 7-21). It is of two kinds – with and without 375 vè;k;&9 time limit. Study (svādhyāya), etc., are for a limited time. Restraint in roaming (īryāpatha), etc., are without time limit; that is, the ascetic has to observe these throughout his lifetime. Sometimes, owing to carelessness (pramāda), the ascetic deviates from his vows and commits injury, and so on. When he is installed again in his vows, according to the rules, that is called the conduct of reinitiation – chedopasthāpanā. Or chedopasthāpanā connotes the removal of mental impurity. Refraining from injury (hiÉsā) to living beings is 'parihāra'. 'Parihāraviśuddhi' is purity of conduct (cāritra) emanating from refraining from injury (hiÉsā). The conduct (cāritra) in which passions (kaÈāya) are present only in negligible quantity is conduct (cāritra) with slight passion – sukÈmasāmparāya. On the subsidence (quiescence) or destruction (kÈaya) of the entire deluding (mohanīya) karmas, the soul is characterized by its inherent nature – 1ātmasvabhāva. And this is called perfect or ideal conduct (athākhyātacāritra). This has been described by those in the previous stages of conduct, but has not hitherto been experienced by them prior to destruction or subsidence of deluding (mohanīya) karmas. This arises on the destruction or subsidence of the entire deluding karmas, as the meaning of 'atha' is immediate succession. Or, the alternative reading is 'yathākhyāta'. That is, the nature of the soul manifests just as it ought to be. The word 'iti' must be understood in the sense of completion. That is, it indicates that from perfect conduct follows the total destruction of all karmas. The five kinds of conduct in the sūtra are mentioned in order of their superiority. Conduct (cāritra) has been described. The sūtra next to the one describing the causes of stoppage (saÉvara) mentions austerity (tapa). Now austerity (tapa) must be described. It is of two kinds, external (bāhya) and internal (ābhyantara). Each is of six subdivisions. The external (bāhya) austerities are mentioned first. 1 – The state of the soul when it is rid of (moha) and agitation (kÈobha) is its own-nature (ātmasvabhāva) – sāmya. (see 'Pravacanasāra', verse 1-7). 376 Tattvārthasūtra vu'kukoekSn;ZòfÙkifjla[;kujlifjR;kxfofoÙkQ'kÕ;klu& dk;Dys'kk ckáa ri% AA19AA 1vu'kukoekSn;ZòfÙkifjla[;kujlifjR;kxfofoÙkQ'kÕ;klu& dk;Dys'kko lE;d~ vu'ku] lE;d~ voekSn;Z] lE;d~ òfÙkifjla[;ku] lE;d~ jlifjR;kx] lE;d~ fofoÙkQ'kÕ;klu vkSj lE;d~ dk;Dys'k & ;s 1ckáa ri%o Ng izdkj ds cká ri gSaA The six kinds of external (bāhya) austerities (tapa) are fasting – anaśana, reduced diet – avamaudarya, special restrictions for begging food – vÃttiparisaÉkhyāna, giving up stimulating and delicious food – rasaparityāga, lonely habitation – viviktaśayyāsana, and mortification of the body – kāyakleśa. The external austerity (tapa) of fasting – anaśana – is intended to promote self-control (saÉyama) and discipline, destroy attachment (rāga) and karmas, and attain excellent meditation (dhyāna) and scriptural knowledge. It is not done for temporal benefits. Reduced diet – avamaudarya – is intended to develop vigilance in self-control (saÉyama), suppress evils, contentment, and study with ease. Special restrictions for begging food – vÃttiparisaÉkhyāna – consist in limiting the number of houses, etc., for begging food, and these are intended for overcoming desire. The fourth is giving up stimulating and delicious food – rasaparityāga – such as ghee (clarified butter). It is intended to curb excitement caused by the senses, overcome sleep, and facilitate study. The ascetic has to make his abode in lonely places or houses, which are free from insect afflictions, in order to maintain, without disturbance, celibacy, study, meditation, and so on. This is the fifth austerity of lonely habitation – viviktaśayyāsana. Standing in the sun, dwelling under trees, sleeping in an open place without roof, adopting 377 vè;k;&9 various kinds of postures – all these constitute the sixth austerity, namely, mortification of the body – kāyakleśa. What is the object of this? The object of this is to cultivate patient endurance of bodily pain and suffering in order to remove attachment to pleasures and to proclaim the glory of the teachings of Lord Jina. What is the difference between affliction (parīÈaha) and mortification (kāyakleśa)? Affliction is what occurs by chance. Mortification is selfimposed. Why is this called external? This is called an external austerity (tapa) because it depends on external environment and is seen by others. The divisions of internal austerities (tapa) are described next. izk;fÜÓÙkfou;oS;kòÙ;Lokè;k;O;qRlxZè;kukU;qÙkje~ AA20AA 1izk;fÜÓÙkfou;oS;kòÙ;Lokè;k;O;qRlxZè;kukfuo lE;d~ :i ls izk;f'pÙk] fou;] oS;kòÙ;] Lokè;k;] O;qRlxZ vkSj è;ku 1mÙkje~o ;s Ng izdkj ds vkH;Urj ri gSaA Expiation – prāyaścitta, reverence – vinaya, service – vaiyāvÃttya, study – svādhyāya, renunciation – vyutsarga, and meditation – dhyāna, are the internal (ābhyantara) austerities (tapa). How are these internal? These are internal as the mind is restrained or subdued through these. The removal of faults due to negligence (pramāda) is expiation (prāyaścitta). Veneration to the holy personages is reverence (vinaya). Service (vaiyāvÃttya) is the help rendered to the saints in difficulty by bodily activity or with things. Contemplation of knowledge or giving up sloth or idleness is study (svādhyāya). The giving up of the attitude of 'I' and 'mine' is 378 Tattvārthasūtra renunciation (vyutsarga). Checking the ramblings of the mind is meditation (dhyāna). The subdivisions of internal (ābhyantara) austerities (tapa) are mentioned next. uoprqnZ'kiÛÓf}Hksnk ;FkkØea izkXè;kukr~ AA21AA 1izkd~ è;kukr~o è;ku ls igys ds ik¡p riksa ds 1;FkkØeao vuqØe ls 1uoprqnZ'kiÛÓf}Hksnk%o ukS] pkj] nl] ik¡p vkSj nks Hksn gSa] vFkkZr~ izk;f'pr ds ukS] fou; ds pkj] oS;kòÙ; ds nl] Lokè;k; ds ik¡p vkSj O;qRlxZ ds nks Hksn gaSA Prior to meditation (dhyāna), these (internal austerities) are of nine, four, ten, five, and two kinds, respectively. From the use of the term 'respectively' these are taken as follows. Expiation – prāyaścitta – is of nine kinds. Reverence – vinaya – is of four kinds. Service – vaiyāvÃttya – is of ten kinds. Study – svādhyāya – is of five kinds. Renunciation – vyutsarga – is of two kinds. Meditation is excluded here as there is plenty to be said about it. Hence it will be described later. The subdivisions of the first, expiation – prāyaścitta, are described. vkykspuizfrØe.krnqHk;foosdO;qRlxZRkiÀNsn& ifjgkjksiLFkkiuk% AA22AA 1vkykspuizfrØe.krnqHk;foosdO;qRlxZRkiÀNsnifjgkjksiLFkkiuk%o vkykspuk] izfrØe.k] rnqHk;] foosd] O;qRlxZ] ri] Nsn] ifjgkj] miLFkkiuk] ;s izk;f'pÙk ri ds ukS Hksn gaSA 379 vè;k;&9 The nine subdivisions of expiation – prāyaścitta – are confession – ālocanā, repentance – pratikramaõa, combination of the first two – tadubhaya, discrimination – viveka, giving up attachment to the body – vyutsarga, penance – tapa, suspension – cheda, expulsion – parihāra, and reinitiation – upasthāpanā. Relating, without the ten faults, one's transgressions to the master is confession – ālocanā. Expression of penitence by uttering, "My fault be condoned," is repentance – pratikramaõa. As the sin is corrected by the combination of the two, it is twofold expiation, called 'tadubhaya'. The dissociation or separation from food, drink, implements that cause sense-indulgence is discrimination – viveka. 'Vyutsarga' is performance of austerities, such as standing in a place, getting rid of attachment to the body, for a limited time. Penance – tapa – is fasting, taking less than one's fill, etc. Discounting the period of penance by a week, a fortnight, a month, etc., is suspension – cheda. Expelling one from the order for a fortnight, a month, etc., is expulsion – parihāra, another kind of expiation. Reinitiation – upasthāpanā – consists in initiation into the order once again. The subdivisions of reverence – vinaya – are mentioned in the next sūtra. Kkun'kZupkfj=kksipkjk% AA23AA 1Kkun'kZupkfj=kksipkjk%o Kkufou;] n'kZufou;] pkfj=kfou; vkSj mipkjfou; & ;s fou; ri ds pkj Hksn gSaA The four subdivisions of reverence – vinaya – are reverence to knowledge – jñānavinaya, faith – darśanavinaya, conduct – cāritravinaya, and the custom 380 Tattvārthasūtra of homage – upacāravinaya. Reverence (vinaya) is added to the words in the sūtra – reverence to knowledge – jñānavinaya, reverence to faith – darśanavinaya, reverence to conduct – cāritravinaya, and reverence to the custom of homage – upacāravinaya. Acquiring knowledge, practising knowledge, recollecting knowledge, and so on, with great veneration and with the object of attaining liberation, constitute reverence to knowledge. Belief in the nature of reality without doubt, etc., is reverence to faith. Absorption in conduct, with knowledge and faith, by the right-believer (samyagdÃÈÇi) is reverence to conduct. Rising up, offering welcome and making obeisance in the presence of the head of the order of ascetics and other great ones constitute reverential homage. Making obeisance with the body, speech or mind, extolling their merits and recollecting them, even with regard to the great ones who are not present, also constitute reverence to the custom of homage. The subdivisions of respectful service – vaiyāvÃttya – are described next. vkpk;ksZikè;k;rifLo'kS{kXykux.kdqyla?klkèkq& euksKkuke~ AA24AA 1vkpk;ksZikè;k;rifLo'kS{kXykux.kdqyla?klkèkqeuksKkuke~o vkpk;Z] mikè;k;] riLoh] 'kSS{k] Xyku] x.k] dqy] la?k] lk/q vkSj euksK & budh lsok djuk lks oS;kòÙ; ri ds nl Hksn gSaA The ten subdivisions of respectful service – vaiyāvÃttya – are: respectful service to the head – ācārya, the preceptor – upādhyāya, the ascetic – tapasvī, the disciple – śaikÈa, 381 vè;k;&9 the ailing ascetic – glāna, the congregation of aged saints – gaõa, the congregation of disciples of a common teacher – kula, the congregation of the four orders of ascetics – saÉgha, the long-standing ascetic – sādhu, and the saint of high reputation – manojña. Respectful service is of ten kinds, for its objects are of ten kinds – service rendered to the head of the congregation, service rendered to the preceptor, and so on. 'Ācārya' is the head from whom the vows are taken and practised. 'Upādhyāya' is the preceptor under whom the Scripture is studied in order to attain liberation. 'Tapasvī' is the saint who practises long fasts, etc. The disciple saint is called 'śaikÈa'. 'Glāna' is the saint whose body is afflicted on account of illness, etc. 'Gaõa' is the congregation of old ascetics. 'Kula' is the congregation of disciples of the same head. 'SaÉgha' is the fourfold community of 1ascetics consisting of anagāra, yati, ÃÈi, and muni. The ordinary ascetic is the anagāra. The yati has the ability to engage in purecognition (śuddhopayoga); he reaches the advanced stages (śreõī) called upaśama and kÈapaka. The muni is the one endowed with special knowledge (jñāna) that may take the form of avadhijñāna, manaÍparyayajñāna and kevalajñāna. The ÃÈi is the one endowed with special accomplishment (Ãddhi). 'Sādhu' is the saint of longstanding. 'Manojña' is the saint of high reputation. When these are subject to illness, affliction or perverted faith, rendering help to them with bodily activity or other materials is respectful service – vaiyāvÃttya. This is done for attaining equanimity or concentration, for overcoming the feeling of disgust and for proclaiming affection to the members of the order of saints. The subdivisions of study – svādhyāya – are described in the next sūtra. 1 – see Māilladhavala's 'Õayacakko', verse 332. 382 Tattvārthasūtra okpukìPNukuqisz{kk¿Euk;èkeksZins'kk% AA25AA 1okpukìPNukuqisz{kk¿Euk;èkeksZins'kk%o okpuk] ìPNuk] vuqisz{kk] vkEuk; vkSj /eksZins'k & ;s Lokè;k; ds ik¡p Hksn gSaA The five subdivisions of study – svādhyāya – are: teaching – vācanā, questioning – pÃcchanā, reflection – anuprekÈā, recitation – āmnāya, and preaching – dharmopadeśa. Teaching – vācanā – consists in teaching of the Scripture – words or meanings or both – with precision. Putting questions to others with the object of clearing doubts or strengthening one's knowledge is questioning – pÃcchanā. Contemplation on the knowledge acquired is reflection– anuprekÈā. Recitation – āmnāya – is repeating the text again and again with correct pronunciation. Preaching – dharmopadeśa – is narrating moral stories, etc., for the benefit of the suitable recipients. What is the purpose of these five types of study – svādhyāya? The objects are extraordinary knowledge, purity in disposition, wholesome fear of worldly existence, progress of austerities, and freedom from transgression. The subdivisions of renunciation – vyutsarga – are described next. ckákH;Urjksiè;ks% AA26AA 1ckákH;Urjksiè;ks%o cká vkSj vH;Urj mif/ dk O;qRlxZ & ;g nks izdkj dk O;qRlxZ ri gaSA The two subdivisions of renunciation – vyutsarga – are: giving up external (bāhya) and internal (abhyantara) appendages (upadhi). 383 vè;k;&9 'Vyutsarga' means giving up. It is of two kinds, giving up the external appendages (upadhi) and giving up the internal appendages. House, riches, grain, etc., which do not become one with the soul, are external appendages. The passions like anger, which are the dispositions of the soul, are internal appendages. Similarly, renouncing attachment for the body for a particular period or for one's lifetime is also considered as giving up of internal appendage. What is the purpose of this penance? The object is to cultivate detachment and fearlessness, and to dispel yearning for living. Meditation – dhyāna – was set apart for elaborate treatment. It is now time to discuss its divisions. But, passing it over, its agent, nature and duration are described. mÙkelaguuL;SdkxzfpUrkfujksèkks è;kuekUreZqgwrkZr~ AA27AA 1mÙkelaguuL;o mÙke laguu okys dk 1vk vUreqZgwrkZr~o vUreqZgwrZ rd 1,dkxzfpUrkfujks/ks è;kue~o ,dkxzrkiwoZd fpÙkòfÙk dk tks fujks/ gS lks è;ku gSA Concentration of thought on one particular object is meditation – dhyāna. In case of the person with superior (first three kinds of) physical sturdiness and strength – saÉhanana – it extends up to one muhūrta. The first three kinds of physical sturdiness and strength – vajraÃÈabhanārāca saÉhanana, vajranārāca saÉhanana, and nārāca saÉhanana – are included here. Meditation (dhyāna) is possible for the individuals possessing these three physical structures. But salvation is possible only for the ascetic with the first kind of physical structure. He who has the best physical structure is the agent. 384 Tattvārthasūtra 'Ekāgra' means having one point, edge or object. Thought is characterized by throbbing or quivering, as it embraces several objects. Concentration is turning the thought away from several objects and fixing it on one. By this the nature of meditation has been described. 'Muhūrta' is the period of time. Within one muhūrta is 'antarmuhūrta'. The time limit is within one muhūrta. It is not possible to maintain concentration beyond that. A contention is raised: if curbing or restraining the thought is meditation then meditation is non-existent like the horns of a donkey. There is no contradiction. It is said to be non-existent from the point of view of the removal of other thoughts, but existent with regard to the particular thought. Non-existence is the other form of existence and it too is the characteristic of an object, as it is admitted to be a cause. Or 'nirodha' is not an abstract noun. What else is it? It is a verbal noun. That which is confined is confinement. Confinement of thought is the purport. Knowledge which shines without quivering, like the steady flame, is meditation – dhyāna. The types of meditation – dhyāna – are mentioned next. vkrZjkSaeèkE;Z'kqDykfu AA28AA 1vkrZjkSae/E;Z'kqDykfuo vkrZ] jkSnz] /E;Z vkSj 'kqDy & ;s è;ku ds pkj Hksn gaSA The four subdivisions of meditation – dhyāna – are: painful (sorrowful) – ārta, the cruel – raudra, the virtuous (righteous) – dharmya, and the pure – śukla. That which is the cause of pain is 'ārta'. 'Raudra' means cruel temperament. 'Dharmya' has been defined as 'with virtue'. That which arises from purity is 'pure' – śukla. These four kinds of 385 vè;k;&9 meditation are divided into two classes, good and evil, or auspicious and inauspicious. The former two are inauspicious as these lead to influx (āsrava) of inauspicious karmas or demerit (pāpa). The latter two are called auspicious as these are capable of destroying karmas. What are these? ijs eks{kgsrw AA29AA 1ijso tks pkj izdkj ds è;ku dgs muesa ls vUr ds nks vFkkZr~ /E;Zè;ku vkSj 'kqDyè;ku 1eks{kgsrwo eks{k ds dkj.k gSaA The last two subdivisions of meditation – dhyāna – are the causes of liberation (mokÈa). 'Para' is the last one. 'Pare' is the dual number; it means the last two. The last two kinds of meditation – the virtuous (dharmya), and the pure (śukla) – are the causes of liberation. It follows from this that the sorrowful (ārta) and the cruel (raudra) kinds of meditation are the causes of transmigration. How? There is no other third goal. The sorrowful (ārta) meditation is of four kinds. The first kind is described in the next sūtra. vkrZeeuksKL; lEiz;ksxs rf}iz;ksxk; LèfrleUokgkj% AA30AA 1veuksKL; lEiz;ksxso vfu"V inkFkZ dk la;ksx gksus ij 1rf}iz;ksxk;o mldks nwj djus ds fy;s 1LèfrleUokgkj%o ckjEckj fopkj djuk lks 1vkrZe~o ^vfu"V la;ksxt* uke dk vkrZè;ku gSA 386 Tattvārthasūtra On the contact of disagreeable (amanojñya) objects, thinking again and again for their removal, is the first kind of sorrowful (ārta) meditation. Disagreeable objects include poison, prickly thorns, enemies and weapons. As these cause pain, these are called disagreeable. On their contact, the individual thinks again and again wishing for their removal. This is the first type of sorrowful (ārta) meditation. The second type of sorrowful (ārta) meditation is described next. foijhra euksKL; AA31AA 1euksKL;o euksK inkFkZ lEcU/h 1foijhrao mijksDr lw=k eas dgs gq, ls foijhr vFkkZr~ b"V&inkFkZ dk fo;ksx gksus ij mlds la;ksx ds fy;s ckjEckj fopkj djuk lks ^b"V&fo;ksxt* uke dk vkrZè;ku gSA The contrary – thinking again and again for regaining the agreeable (manojñya) objects that have been lost – is the second kind of sorrowful (ārta) meditation. How contrary? Contrary to what has been mentioned. This is the purport. When agreeable objects, such as the son, the wife or the wealth, are lost, thinking again and again for regaining them is the second type of sorrowful (ārta) concentration. The third type of sorrowful (ārta) meditation is described next. osnuk;kÜÓ AA32AA 1osnuk;k% po osnuk gksus ij mls nwj djus ds fy;s ckjEckj fpUrou 387 vè;k;&9 djuk lks ^osnuktU;* vkrZè;ku gSA In case of suffering from pain, thinking again and again for its removal is the third kind of sorrowful (ārta) meditation. The word 'vedanā' is used in the meanings of feeling – pleasure and pain. But here it is used in the sense of pain as we are discussing sorrow. When pain is caused by disease, such as gout and rheumatism, thinking again and again for its removal is the third type of sorrowful concentration. The fourth type of sorrowful (ārta) meditation is described next. funkua p AA33AA 1funkua po Hkfo";dky lEcU/h fo"k;ksa dh izkfIr esa fpÙk dks rYyhu dj nsuk lks ^funkut* vkrZè;ku gSA The wish for enjoyment – nidāna – is the fourth kind of sorrowful (ārta) meditation. Being tormented by the desire for pleasures, thinking again and again wishing for the pleasures not attained is the fourth type of sorrowful (ārta) meditation. Who are affected by these four types of sorrowful (ārta) meditation? rnfojrns'kfojrizeÙkla;rkuke~ AA34AA 1rr~o og vkrZè;ku 1vfojrns'kfojrizeÙkla;rkuke~o vfojr & 388 Tattvārthasūtra igys pkj xq.kLFkku] ns'kfojr & ik¡poka xq.kLFkku] vkSj izeÙkla;r & Nês ò xq.kLFkku eas gksrk gSA These occur in case of laymen without small vows – avirata, laymen with small vows – deśavirata, and nonvigilant ascetics – pramattasaÉyata. Laymen without small vows – 'avirata' – comprise all those up to the spiritual stage of vowless right belief – asaÉyatasamyagdÃÈÇi. Laymen in the stage of partial vows – saÉyatāsaÉyata – are called 'deśavirata'. The ascetics with perfect vows but with occasional deviation due to fifteen faults of negligence (pramāda) are called 'pramattasaÉyata'. In case of laymen of both classes, all the four types of sorrowful (ārta) meditation occur, as they are actuated by non-restraint. But in case of the non-vigilant ascetic, the first three, excluding the last one, occur occasionally owing to negligence or inadvertence. The types of sorrowful (ārta) meditation have been explained with their names, etc. The names, causes and possessors of the second kind – the cruel (raudra) meditation – are described next. glk¿ùrLrs;fo"k;laj{k.ksH;ks jkSaeefojrns'kfojr;ks% AA35AA 1 glk¿ùrLrs;fo"k;laj{k.ksH;%o glk] vlR;] pksjh vkSj fo"k;&laj{k.k ds Hkko ls mRi gqvk è;ku 1jkSaee~o jkSnzè;ku gS_ ;g è;ku 1vfojrns'kfojr;ks%o vfojr vkSj ns'kfojr (igys ds ik¡p) xq.kLFkkuksa esa gksrk gSA Cruel (raudra) meditation relates to injury – hiÉsā, untruth – asatya, stealing – steya, and safeguarding of 389 vè;k;&9 possessions – viÈayasaÉrakÈaõa. It occurs in laymen without small vows – avirata, and laymen with partial vows – deśavirata. Injury (hiÉsā), etc., described already, promote the rise of cruel (raudra) meditation. 'Thinking again and again' is added to each of these; thus, thinking repeatedly of (hiÉsā), etc. This occurs in case of laymen without small vows – avirata, and laymen with partial vows – deśavirata. Let it occur in case of the layman without small vows. But how can it occur in case of the layman who practises partial abstinence? It can arise, occasionally, in his case also as he is influenced or excited by the idea of injury (hiÉsā), etc., in order to safeguard wealth and other possessions. But it does not lead the partial abstainer to the infernal regions on account of the efficacy of his right belief (samyagdarśana). It does not, however, occur in case of the ascetic. If it occurs, he is no longer an ascetic, that is, he falls from the stage of asceticism – 'pramattasaÉyata'. It has been said that the last two types of meditation are the causes of liberation. The types, nature, etc. of the first of these are described in the next sūtra. vkKk¿ik;foikdlaLFkkufop;k; èkE;Ze~ AA36AA 1vkKk¿ik;foikdlaLFkkufop;k;o vkKk] vik;] foikd vkSj laLFkku & budh fopkj.kk (fop;) ds fy;s eu dks ,dkxz djuk lks 1/E;Ze~o /eZè;ku gSA The application of the mind on the reality as revealed by Lord Jina – ājñāvicaya, misfortune or calamity – apāyavicaya, fruition of karmas – vipākavicaya, and the 390 Tattvārthasūtra structure of the universe – saÉsthānavicaya, are four kinds of virtuous (dharmya) meditation. 'Thinking again and again' is added to each of these. It is not always possible to ascertain the objects of reality by logical analysis, owing to lack of preceptors, keen intelligence, rise of karmas, or the intricate nature of objects. Then one believes in such subtle objects of reality on the authority of the Word of Lord Jina, since the Tīrthańkara do not preach untruth. Ascertaining the reality in this manner is called ājñāvicaya dharmyadhyāna. Or, this kind of meditation also means that after ascertaining the reality, the holy person employs logic, including naya and pramāõa, in bringing home the truth to others in order to propagate it. The misbelievers like the born-blind are averse to the teachings of the Omniscient Lord, and drift farther and farther away from the right path owing to ignorance. Thus the absence, loss or disappearance of the true path is deliberated upon. Or, the self deliberates on how the (vast majority of) living beings can escape from the cycle of worldly existence caused by wrong faith, knowledge and conduct. These are instances of deliberation on misfortune or calamity – apāyavicaya dharmyadhyāna. The cognition of the fruits of karmas depending on the substance (dravya), place (kÈetra), time (kāla), state-of-being (bhava), and nature (bhāva), is called vipākavicaya dharmyadhyāna. Deliberating constantly on the shape and nature of the universe (loka) is saÉsthānavicaya dharmyadhyāna. The ten moral virtues have been explained. Virtuous concentration (dharmyadhyāna) does not swerve from the ten moral virtues. It is of four kinds based on the fourfold objects of reality contemplated upon. It occurs in case of laymen without small vows – avirata, laymen with partial vows – deśavirata, ascetics with negligence – pramattasaÉyata, and ascetics without negligence – apramattasaÉyata. The three kinds of meditation – ārta, raudra, and dharmya – have 391 vè;k;&9 been defined. The fourth, pure meditation – śukladhyāna – must be defined now. It is of four kinds as described subsequently. The next sūtra indicates the lord of the first two kinds. 'kqDys pk|s iwoZfon% AA37AA 1'kqDys pk|so igys ds nks izdkj ds 'kqDyè;ku (vFkkZr~ ìFkDRofordZ vkSj ,dRofordZ) 1iwoZfon%o iwoZfoñ (Jqrdsoyh) ds gksrs gSaA The first two types of pure meditation – śukladhyāna – are attained by the saints who know the Scripture – pūrvavid or śrutakevalī. Among the four kinds of pure meditation – śukladhyāna, the first two occur to the saints who know the Scripture – pūrvavid or śrutakevalī. The word 'ca' in the sūtra indicates that the virtuous meditation – dharmyadhyāna – also is included. Virtuous meditation – dharmyadhyāna – occurs before the ascetic ascends the step (śreõī) in the two advanced stages of spiritual development. At the end of each step (śreõī) the first two kinds of pure meditation – śukladhyāna – arise. The first two kinds of pure meditation – śukladhyāna – must occur to the śrutakevalī. In whom do the rest arise? ijs dsofyu% AA38AA 1ijso 'kqDyè;ku ds vfUre nks Hksn (vFkkZr~ lw{efØ;kizfrikfr vkSj O;qijrfØ;kfuo£r) 1dsofyu%o dsoyh ds gksrs gSaA 392 Tattvārthasūtra The last two types of pure meditation – śukladhyāna – arise in the Omniscient (kevalī). The last two types of pure meditation – śukladhyāna – arise in the Omniscient-with-vibration – sayogakevalī – and non-vibratory Omniscient – ayogakevalī. The Omniscient is the one who has destroyed the entire knowledge-obscuring (jñānāvaraõīya) karmas. The four types of pure meditation – śukladhyāna – are mentioned, in order. ìFkDRoSdRofordZlw{efØ;kizfrikfrO;qijr& fØ;kfuorhZfu AA39AA 1ìFkDRoSdRofordZlw{efØ;kizfrikfrO;qijrfØ;kfuorhZfuo ìFkDRofordZ] ,dRofordZ] lw{efØ;kizfrikfr vkSj O;qijrfØ;kfuo£r & ;s 'kqDyè;ku ds pkj Hksn gSaA The four types of pure meditation – śukladhyāna – are known as: pÃthaktvavitarka, ekatvavitarka, sūkÈmakriyāpratipāti, and vyuparatakriyānivarti, in order. These are the four kinds of pure meditation – śukladhyāna. These are significant names on the basis of their definitions, given soon after. The support or the base of the four kinds of pure meditation – śukladhyāna – is mentioned next. =;sd;ksxdk;;ksxk;ksxkuke~ AA40AA 1=;sd;ksxdk;;ksxk;ksxkuke~o Åij dgs x;s pkj izdkj ds 393 vè;k;&9 'kqDyè;ku vuqØe ls rhu ;ksx okys] ,d ;ksx okys] ek=k dk;;ksx okys vkSj v;ksxh ds gksrs gaSA The four types of pure meditation – śukladhyāna – are, in order mentioned already, of three activities (yoga), of one activity, of bodily activity, and of no activity. The term 'yoga' – activity – has been explained already (sūtra 6-1). These must be taken respectively with the four types of pure meditation – śukladhyāna. In the ascetic with threefold activity, the first type of pure meditation – pÃthaktvavitarka – arises. In the ascetic with just one activity out of the three, the second type of pure meditation – ekatvavitarka – arises. In the ascetic with just the bodily activity, the third type of pure meditation – sūkÈmakriyāpratipāti – arises. In the ascetic with no activity (ayogī), the fourth type of pure meditation – vyuparatakriyānivarti – arises. Specific details of the first two types of pure meditation – śukladhyāna – are described next. ,dkJ;s lfordZohpkjs iwosZ AA41AA 1,dkJ;so ,d JqrKku ds vkJ; ls jgus okys 1iwosZo 'kqDyè;ku ds igys nks Hksn 1lfordZohpkjso lfordZ vkSj lohpkj gksrs gSaaA The first two types – pÃthaktvavitarka and ekatvavitarka – of pure meditation – śukladhyāna – are based on one substratum (ekāśraya), and are associated with scriptural knowledge – savitarka, and shifting – savīcāra. The first two types – pÃthaktvavitarka and ekatvavitarka – of pure 394 Tattvārthasūtra meditation – śukladhyāna – have one substratum (ekāśraya). These two arise in the saint who has attained mastery of the Scripture – śrutakevalī. These are associated with scriptural knowledge (vitarka) and shifting (vīcāra). Hence these are called savitarka, and savīcāra. In order to ward off the error of taking these respectively, the exception is mentioned next. vohpkja f}rh;e~ AA42AA 1f}rh;e~o Åij dgs x;s 'kqDyè;kuksa esa ls nwljk 'kqDyè;ku 1vohpkjao ohpkj ls jfgr gS] fdUrq lfordZ gksrk gSA The second type – ekatvavitarka – is free from shifting (vīcāra). The second type – ekatvavitarka – must be understood to be free from shifting or oscillation – avīcāra. This is the purport. The first – pÃthaktvavitarka – is associated with both, scriptural knowledge – vitarka, and shifting – vīcāra. The second – ekatvavitarka – is associated with scriptural knowledge – vitarka, but not with shifting – vīcāra. What is the distinction between scriptural knowledge (vitarka) and shifting (vīcāra)? fordZ% Jqre~ AA43AA 1Jqre~o JqrKku dks 1fordZ%o fordZ dgrs gSaA 'Vitarka' is scriptural knowledge. 395 vè;k;&9 Detailed or special examination and reasoning with respect to scriptural knowledge is 'vitarka'. What is 'vīcāra'? ohpkjks¿FkZO;×tu;ksxlaØkfUr% AA44AA 1vFkZO;×tu;ksxlaØkfUr%o vFkZ] O;×tu vkSj ;ksx dh laØkfUr (cnyuk) lks 1ohpkj%o ohpkj gSA 'Vīcāra' is shifting (saÉkrānti) with regard to object (artha), word (vyańjana) and, activity (yoga). The subject of meditation – dhyeya – is the object (artha). It is either the substance (dravya) or the mode (paryāya). 'Vyańjana' is word (śabda, vacana). 'Yoga' is the activity of the body, the mind or the speech-organ. 'SaÉkrānti' is shifting from one thing to another. Shifting (saÉkrānti) with regard to the object (artha) is passing from the substance (dravya) to the mode (paryāya) or from the mode to the substance. Shifting (saÉkrānti) with regard to the word (vyańjana) is passing from one scriptural term to another and from that to another. Shifting (saÉkrānti) with regard to the activity (yoga) is changing from bodily activity to some other activity and from that activity to bodily activity. This kind of change is called 'vīcāra'. When there is alternation, how can it be called meditation? The reply is that even thought-stream is meditation. The virtuous (dharmya) and the pure (śukla) meditation, each of which is of four kinds, have been described generally and particularly. These are worthy to be meditated upon by the ascetic who has practised several observances such as control (gupti), and so on, to purify the mind and to free himself from transmigration. The ascetic meditates on the material (objective atom) or thought (subjective atom) and with his knowledge of the 396 Tattvārthasūtra Scripture shifts to objects or verbal symbols or to activities of the body or the speech-organ. He shifts his thought severally from one to another. And just as a person of poor strength and enthusiasm, and with an unsteady hand and a dull axe, is able to cut a tree in a long time so also the ascetic tries to suppress or destroy the deluding karmas, and embrace the first types of pure meditation, namely, the pÃthaktvavitarka with shifting (vīcāra). Again the saint intends to root out the deluding karmas. He embraces infinitefold pure activity and obstructs the bondage of karmas which assist knowledge-covering karmas. He lessens their duration and destroys these. He is actuated by the exertion of scriptural knowledge. He is free from shifting of object (artha), word (vyańjana) and activity (yoga). His mind does not waver. He is passionless and is stainless like the pure crystal. He meditates and never falls back. Hence it is called the unique (single) scriptural meditation – ekatvavitarka. Thus the four destructive (ghāti) karmas are burnt by the soul with the fire of the unique, scriptural, pure concentration, and omniscience sparkles like a multitude of rays. The pure soul shines like the sun coming out of the clouds. And the soul – of the Tīrthańkara or other Omniscient (kevalī) – is worthy to be venerated and worshipped by the lords of the world. And he moves from place to place preaching the Truth to the world up to a maximum period of a little less than pūrvakoÇi years. When the duration of his life-determining (āyuÍ) karma is within one muhūrta, and the feeling-producing (vedanīya), the body-making (nāma) and the status-determining (gotra) karmas are of the same duration, he gives up entirely the activities of the speech, the mind and the gross body. Taking help from slight bodily activity, he embraces the third type of pure meditation of subtle activity – sūkÈmakriyāpratipāti. In case the duration of his life-determining (āyuÍ) karma is within one muhūrta, but the duration of the feeling-producing (vedanīya), the body-making (nāma) and the status-determining (gotra) karmas is more, with remarkable exertion, he makes the duration of these three karmas same as the life-determining (āyuÍ) karma. He is endowed with the wonderful capacity by which stupendous stoppage is affected. 397 vè;k;&9 He performs expansion of the soul which is capable of ripening the karmas very quickly and destroying or reducing these; this is called 1kevali-samudghāta . Here he practises comprehensive pervasion in the form of a stick (daõça), a door (kapāÇa), an oblong (pratara), and filling up the universe (lokapūraõa), in four instants and contracting to his former size immediately in another four instants. He thus makes the duration of all the four karmas equal, and through subtle bodily activity embraces the meditation of subtle activity – sūkÈmakriyāpratipāti. And after that he commences the meditation of complete destruction of activity – vyuparatakriyānivarti, also called samucchinnakriyānivarti. This entails complete destruction of activity as there is disappearance of respiration and movement and vibration of the spatial units of the soul, arising from activities (yoga) of the body, the mind and the speech-organ. In this stage of meditation there is complete annihilation of influx (āsrava) of all kinds of bondage (of karmas). And in the Omniscient-without-activity – ayogakevalī, endowed with the capacity of annihilating all karmas, there arise perfect conduct – yathākhyāta cāritra, knowledge (jñāna), and faith (darśana), which are capable of destroying all kinds of cobwebs of worldly suffering, and which constitute the immediate cause of complete emancipation or final liberation. Thus, the saint in the fourteenth stage burns all karmas with the powerful fire of concentration, becomes purified like 24-carat gold, freed from dirt and other alloys, and attains eternal bliss. Thus these two kinds of pure meditation block the influx (āsrava) of new karmas and cause complete stoppage (saÉvara) and also dissociation (nirjarā) of old karmas. Is dissociation (nirjarā) of karmas alike in all right believers (samyagdÃÈÇi) or is there any speciality? 1 – See explanation to sūtra 3-35, p. 140. 398 Tattvārthasūtra lE;Xn`f"VJkodfojrkuUrfo;kstdn'kZueksg& {kidksi'kedksi'kkUreksg{kid{kh.keksgftuk% Øe'kks¿la[;s;xq.kfutZjk% AA45AA 1lE;Xn`f"VJkodfojrkuUrfo;kstdn'kZueksg{kidksi'kedksi'kkUr& eksg{kid{kh.keksgftuk%o (vfojr) lE;Xn`f"V] i×pe xq.kLFkkuorhZ ns'kfojr Jkod] fojr (izeÙk] vizeÙk eqfu)] vuUrkuqcU/h d"kk; dk fola;kstd] n'kZueksg dk {k; dj {kkf;d lE;DRo dks izkIr djus okyk] mi'keJs.kh ekaMusokyk] mi'kkUreksg (X;kjgok¡ xq.kLFkkuorhZ)] {kidJs.kh ekaMusokyk] {kh.keksg (ckjgok¡ xq.kLFkkuorhZ)] vkSj ftu (l;ksxdsoyh vkSj v;ksxdsoyh) & bu lc ds izfr le; 1Øe'k% vla[;s;xq.kfutZjk%o Øe ls vla[;krxq.kh futZjk gksrh gSA The dissociation (nirjarā) of karmas increases innumerable-fold in each of these ten stages: samyagdÃÈÇi, śrāvaka, virata, anantānubandhiviyojaka, darśanmohakÈapaka, upaśamaka, upaśāntamoha, kÈapaka, kÈiõamoha, and Jina (kevalī, the Victor). The efficacy of dissociation of karmas increases innumerable times in each of the ten stages, starting from that of the right-believer (samyagdÃÈÇi). It is as follows. The soul with capacity for attaining emancipation, on attaining birth with the five senses, the mind, and complete development – paryāptaka, gradually becomes pure in thought. Assisted by other factors such as the favourable time – kālalabdhi, it attains the first right-faith (samyaktva). The person whose soul attains the first right-faith (samyaktva) is called a rightbeliever – samyagdÃÈÇi. The right-believer – 'samyagdÃÈÇi' – causes innumerable-fold dissociation of karmas. Then he becomes a 399 vè;k;&9 householder and embraces the stainless attitude arising from destruction-cum-subsidence (kÈayopaśama) of the conduct-deluding (cāritramohanīya) karmas which obstruct even partial abstinence – apratyākhyānāvaraõa – and attains innumerable-fold efficacy of dissociation. He is called the 'śrāvaka'. After that he embraces greater purity of thought-activity arising from the destruction-cumsubsidence (kÈayopaśama) of conduct-deluding karmas which arrest complete abstinence – pratyākhyānāvaraõa. He becomes an ascetic – 'virata' – and attains innumerable-fold efficacy of dissociation. When he becomes free from the passions of anger, pride, deceitfulness and greed, which lead to endless worldly existence – anantānubandhī – he becomes still more purified in thought-activity and attains still innumerable-fold efficacy of dissociation. He is called the 'anantānubandhīviyojaka'. Later, the three subtypes of faith-deluding (darśanamohanīya) karmas are destroyed, and his thought-activity is still further refined. He is then called the destroyer of faith-deluding karmas – 'darśanamohakÈapaka' – and attains still innumerable-fold efficacy of dissociation. He becomes a perfect right believer – kÈāyika samyagdÃÈÇi, turns towards the spiritual step (śreõī), and endeavours to suppress the conduct-deluding (cāritramohanīya) karmas. And he attains greater mental purity with innumerable-fold efficacy of dissociation. He is called the mitigator – 'upaśamaka'. When the conduct-deluding karmas subside completely, he attains quiescence of passions with still innumerable-fold efficacy of dissociation. He is then called the saint of quiescent passions – 'upaśāntamoha'. When he attains greater purity of mind and endeavours to root out the conductdeluding karmas, he is called the destroyer and he attains still innumerable-fold efficacy of dissociation. He then is called a 'kÈapaka'. The same self tends towards the thought-activity capable of destroying the entire conduct-deluding karmas and attains still innumerable-fold efficacy of dissociation. He is then called the saint free from passions – 'kÈīõamoha'. And when he destroys the four main types of destructive karmas with the help of the second type of pure meditation – śukladhyāna – he acquires the name 'Jina' with still 400 Tattvārthasūtra innumerable-fold efficacy of dissociation. It has been said that even in the presence of right faith, all are not equal on account of differences among them with regard to efficacy of dissociation. If so, all ascetics cannot be called saints – nirgrantha. But it is not so. Though they are different from one another on account of different attributes or virtues, yet they are all saints – nirgrantha – from the intentional standpoint. Different categories of saints are mentioned next. iqykdcdq'kdq'khyfuxzZUFkLukrdk fuxzZUFkk% AA46AA 1iqykdcdq'kdq'khyfuxzZUFkLukrdko iqykd] cdq'k] dq'khy] fuxzZUFk vkSj Lukrd & ;s ik¡p izdkj ds 1fuxzZUFkk%o fuxzZUFk eqfu gSaA These five – pulāka, bakuśa, kuśīla, nirgrantha and snātaka – are the saints – nirgrantha. The saint, whose mind is slothful regarding the practice of the secondary vows (tapa and parīÈahajaya), and who sometimes is lapse in perfect observance of even the primary vows, is called 'pulāka', on account of his resemblance to the blighted or shrivelled grain. The saint who is without possessions and observes the vows perfectly but cares for the adornment of the body and the implements, surrounded by attendants, and whose mind is spotted by infatuation is called 'bakuśa', the spotted saint. The word 'bakuśa' means spotted or variegated. The 'kuśīla' saints are of two kinds: 1) pratisevanākuśīla and 2) kaÈāyakuśīla. The saint who is not free from attachments, who observes both primary and secondary vows to perfection but lapses occasionally with regard to the latter is called pratisevanākuśīla. The saint who has controlled all passions except the gleaming 401 vè;k;&9 (saÉjvalana) ones is called kaÈāyakuśīla. The saint in whom the rise of karmas is indistinct like the mark of the line made in the water by a stick and who will attain perfect knowledge and faith in antarmuhūrta (within forty-eight minutes) is called the 'nirgrantha', meaning without any possessions – internal and external. The Omniscient, of the thirteenth and the fourteenth stages, whose destructive karmas have been destroyed, is called the 'snātaka' – the perfect saint. Though they are different from one another on account of the purity of their disposition, yet they are all called 'nirgrantha' – saint – from the figurative (naigama) and the synthetic (saÉgraha) viewpoints. Again, for further elaboration, the differences among these are mentioned in the next sūtra. la;eJqrizfrlsoukrhFkZ yxysÀ;ksiiknLFkkufodYir% lkè;k% AA47AA mijksDr eqfu 1la;eJqrizfrlsoukrhFkZ yxysÀ;ksiiknLFkkufodYir%o la;e] Jqr] izfrlsouk] rhFkZ] yx] ys';k] miikn vkSj LFkku & bu vkB vuq;ksxksa }kjk 1lkè;k%o Hksn:i ls lkè; gSa] vFkkZr~ bu vkB izdkj ls bu iqykdkfn eqfu;ksa esa fo'ks"k Hksn gksrs gSaA They are fit to be described (differentiated) on the basis of differences in self-restraint – saÉyama, scriptural knowledge – śruta, transgression – pratisevanā, the period of the Tīrthańkara – tīrtha, the sign – lińga, the colouration – leśyā, the birth – upapāda, and the state or condition – sthāna. 402 Tattvārthasūtra The five kinds of saints – pulāka, bakuśa, kuśīla, nirgrantha and snātaka – are to be described (differentiated) with reference to selfrestraint (saÉyama), and so on. It is as follows. SaÉyama: The pulāka, bakuśa, pratisevanākuśīla saints dwell in the first two types of conduct – sāmāyika and chedopasthapanā. The kaÈāyakuśīla saint dwells in parihāraviśuddhi and sukÈmasāmparāya, besides the two mentioned above. The nirgrantha and snātaka saints dwell only in yathākhyāta conduct. Śruta: The pulāka, bakuśa, pratisevanākuśīla saints master the Scripture to the maximum limit of the ten pūrva(s). The kaÈāyakuśīla and nirgrantha saints are masters of the fourteen pūrva(s). At the minimum, the scriptural knowledge of the pulāka saint is of the extent of 'ācāra vastu' – the instruction of the preceptor. That of the bakuśa, kuśīla and nirgrantha saints is of the extent of three controls (gupti) and five regulations (samiti), called the eightfold mother of the Scripture. The snātaka is Omniscient, beyond scriptural knowledge. Pratisevanā: The pulāka saint, under another's compulsion, transgresses either the five primary vows or the vow of abstinence from taking food at night. The bakuśa saints are of two kinds, those who desire for several kinds of implements – upakaraõabakuśa, and those who adorn their bodies – śarīrabakuśa. The pratisevanākuśīla saint is liable to transgression with regard to the secondary vows, without transgressing the primary vows. There is no transgression in case of the kaÈāyakuśīla, nirgrantha and snātaka saints. Tīrtha: All these saints belong to the religious school of the Tīrthańkara – the Arhat or the World Teacher. Lińga: The sign (lińga) is of two kinds – physical sign – dravyalińga, and psychical sign – bhāvalińga. From the point of view of psychical sign, all these five kinds of monks are without-possessions (nirgrańtha). On the basis of physical signs – bodily height, complexion, etc. – there are differences among them. Leśyā: In the pulāka saint the first three – black (kÃÈõa), blue (nīla) and grey (kāpota) – thought-colourations (leśyā) arise. In bakuśa and 403 vè;k;&9 pratisevanākuśīla saints, all the six thought-colourations (leśyā) arise. In the kaÈāyakuśīla saint the last four – grey (kāpota), yellow (pīta), pink (padma) and white (śukla) – thought-colourations (leśyā) arise. In the sūkÈmasāmparāya kaÈāyakuśīla, nirgrantha and snātaka saints, only the white (śukla) thought-colourations (leśyā) arises. And the Omniscient-without-activity (ayogakevalī) has no thoughtcolouration (leśyā). Upapāda: The highest birth of the pulāka saint is in the Sahasrāra kalpa, among the deva of maximum lifetime. The bakuśa and pratisevanākuśīla saints are born in the Āraõa and Acyuta kalpa, with the lifetime of twenty-two sāgaropama. The kaÈāyakuśīla and nirgrantha saints are born in the Sarvārthasiddhi with the lifetime of thirty-three sāgaropama. The lowest birth of all these kinds of saints is in the Saudharma kalpa with the lifetime of two sāgaropama. The snātaka saint attains liberation. Sthāna: There are innumerable states of self-restraint (saÉyama) caused by the passions. Among these the minimum states attained are in case of the pulāka and kaÈāyakuśīla saints. These attain innumerable states simultaneously. After this the pulāka saint is cutoff. Later, the kaÈāyakuśīla saint proceeds alone up to innumerable states. Still further, the kaÈāyakuśīla, pratisevanākuśīla, and bakuśa attain innumerable states simultaneously. After that the bakuśa saint is cutoff. Then the pratisevanākuśīla saint is cut off after attaining still innumerable states. Beyond that the passionless (akaÈāya) saint – nirgrantha – attains innumerable passionless states. That stage also is cut off after traversing innumerable states. And traversing one state beyond that, the snātaka saint attains liberation. The attainment of self-restraint – saÉyamalabdhi – in that stage is infinitefold. ] ] ] 404 Tattvārthasūtra AA bfr rÙokFkZlw=kkijukeeks{k'kkÐs uoekss¿è;k;% lekIr% AA Omniscience or perfect knowledge – kevalajñāna – is attained on destruction of delusion (moha), and on destruction of knowledge-covering (jñānāvaraõa), perception-covering (darśanāvaraõa) and obstructive (antarāya) karmas. LIBERATION C H A P T E R 1 0 eksg{k;kTKkun'kZukoj.kkUrjk;{k;kPp dsoye~ AA1AA 1eksg{k;kr~o eksg dk {k; gksus ls (vUreqZgwrZ i;ZUr {kh.kd"kk; uked xq.kLFkku izkIr djus ds ckn) 1Kkun'kZukoj.kkUrjk;{k;kr~ po vkSj Kkukoj.k] n'kZukoj.k rFkk vUrjk; bu rhu deks± dk ,d lkFk {k; gksus ls 1dsoye~o dsoyKku mRi gksrk gSA It is time now to describe the last of the objects of reality (tattva), i.e., liberation – mokÈa. But as liberation is attained only on attainment of omniscience (kevalajñāna), the causes of omniscience are mentioned first. A contention is raised. The sūtra should have used a single compound. Why? It would make it brief. How? There should be no need for the repetition of the word 'kÈaya' – 'on destruction of'. It is true. But successive stages of destruction are indicated by splitting the sūtra. That is, first delusion (moha) is destroyed, and the soul attains, for up to one muhūrta, the twelfth stage called kÈīõakaÈāya. Immediately after that knowledgeand perception-covering karmas and obstructive karmas are simultaneously destroyed, and it attains 405 vè;k;&10 omniscience (kevalajñāna). The destruction of these karmas is the cause of perfect knowledge. How is delusion (moha) destroyed first? The potential soul becomes a right-believer (samyagdÃÈÇi) and, with growing purity of thoughtactivity, destroys the seven categories of deluding (mohanīya) karmas in any one of the four spiritual stages of asaÉyatasamyagdÃÈÇi, saÉyatāsaÉyata, pramattasaÉyata and apramattasaÉyata, becomes a destructional-right-believer – kÈāyika samyagdÃÈÇi. From the apramattasaÉyata stage, it tends to rise further in step (kÈapaka śreõī) to the apūrvakaraõa stage. And therein, owing to the purity of new thought-activity, the duration and fruition of inauspicious karmas are crushed and the fruition of auspicious karmas is increased. And through the attainment of advanced thought-activity, the self ascends the ninth stage of kÈapaka anivÃttibādarasāmparāya. Here it destroys eight passions (kaÈāya) and then the neuter-sex and the female-sex. Further, he destroys the six quasi-passions (nokaÈāya) by attaching these to the male-sex, the male-sex by attaching it to gleaming (saÉjvalana) anger (krodha), gleaming anger by attaching it to gleaming pride (māna), gleaming pride by attaching it to gleaming deceitfulness (māyā), gleaming deceitfulness by attaching it to gleaming greed (lobha), and gradually annihilating these by the method of gigantic karmic emaciation (bādarakÃÈÇi). And the soul mitigates the gleaming greed, experiences the tenth stage of sūkÈmasāmparāya (kÈapaka) – checking of even minute passions. It thus destroys the entire delusion (moha). Having cast off the burden of the deluding karmas, the soul ascends to the twelfth stage of kÈīõakaÈāya – destroyed delusion. In the last but one instant of the twelfth stage, sleep (nidrā) and drowsiness (pracalā) are destroyed, and in the last instant, the five classes of knowledge-covering (jñānāvaraõa), the four classes of perception-covering (darśanāvaraõa) and the five classes of obstructive (antarāya) karmas are destroyed. Immediately the self attains the state of perfect knowledge – kevalajñāna – and perception of unimaginable splendour and magnificence. 406 Tattvārthasūtra How is liberation achieved? And what is the nature of liberation? cUèkgsRoHkkofutZjkH;ka d`RLudeZfoizeks{kks eks{k% AA2AA 1cUèkgsRoHkkofutZjkH;kao cU/ ds dkj.kksa (feF;kRo] vfojfr] izekn] d"kk; vkSj ;ksx) dk vHkko rFkk futZjk ds }kjk 1ÑRLudeZfoizeks{kks eks{k%o leLr deks± dk vR;Ur uk'k gks tkuk] lks eks{k gSA Owing to the absence of the cause of bondage (bandha) and with the functioning of dissociation (nirjarā) of karmas, the annihilation of all karmas is liberation (mokÈa). No new karmas flow in owing to the absence of causes such as perverted-faith (mithyādarśana), and so on. And the already acquired karmas fall off gradually in the presence of causes that lead to dissociation (nirjarā) of karmas. 'Owing to the absence of the cause of bondage and the functioning of dissociation' indicates the case denoting cause. Therefore, liberation is the total destruction of all karmas at the same time, after levelling down the duration of all the remaining three karmas to that of the age-karma. The disappearance of karmas is of two kinds, namely, that affected by one's effort – yatnasādhya, and that accomplished without one's effort – ayatnasādhya. In case of the soul with the last body (i.e., one who is to attain liberation in that birth itself), the life-karmas (āyuÍkarma) leading to life in hell, heaven and the plantand animal-world are non-existent. This non-existence is not the result of any effort, for these are already absent. The disappearance brought about by effort is described now. In someone of the four stages, commencing from that of the vowless right-believer – asaÉyatasamyagdÃÈÇi, seven subtypes of karmas are destroyed in any one stage. Further, in the ninth stage of spiritual 407 vè;k;&10 development, checking of gross-passions – anivÃttibādarasāmparāya – sixteen subtypes of karmas are destroyed simultaneously. The sixteen subtypes are deep-sleep – nidrā-nidrā, heavy-drowsiness – pracalāpracalā, somnambulism – styānagÃddhi, the infernal state of existence – narakagati, the plant and animal state of existence – tiryańcagati, birth as being with one-sense – ekendriyajāti, two-sense – dvīndriyajāti, three-sense – trīndriyajāti, four-sense – caturindriyajāti, migratory form tending to infernal existence – narakagatiprāyogyānupūrvī, migratory form tending to plant and animal existence – tiryańcagatiprāyogyānupūrvī, body emitting a warm splendour – ātapa, body emitting a cold lustre – udyota, body of a one-sensed-being – sthavara, subtle body – sukÈma śarīra, and common body – sādhāraõa śarīra. After that, in the same stage, eight subtypes of passions (kaÈāya) are destroyed. Again, therein, the neuter-sexinclination – napuÉsakaveda, and the female-sex-inclination – strīveda – are destroyed, in that order. At one stroke, six quasipassions (nokaÈāya) are also destroyed therein. Then the male-sexinclination – puruÈaveda, gleaming (saÉjvalana) anger – krodha, pride – māna, and deceitfulness – māyā, are destroyed completely one by one in the same stage. Gleaming (saÉjvalana) greed – lobha – disappears at the end of the tenth stage of sūkÈmasāmparāya – checking of even minute passions. Sleep – nidrā, and drowsiness – pracalā, are destroyed in the last but one instant of the twelfth stage of kÈīõakaÈāya (vītarāga chadmastha) – destroyed delusion. The five subtypes of knowledge-covering (jñānāvaraõa), the four subtypes of perception-covering (darśanāvaraõa) and five subtypes of obstructive (antarāya) karmas are also destroyed in the last instant of this stage. And seventy-two subtypes of non-obscuring karmas are destroyed in the last but one instant of the Omniscient-without-vibration (the fourteenth stage of ayogakevalī). These are the karmas: one of the two feeling-karmas – vedanīya, the celestial state of existence – devagati, the five bodies (the physical – audārika śarira, the transformable – vaikriyika śarira, the projectable – āhāraka śarira, the electric – taijasa śarira, and the karmic – kārmaõa śarira), the five bindings – 408 Tattvārthasūtra bandhana, the five molecular interfusion – saÉghāta, the six structure – saÉsthāna, the chief and secondary parts of the physical body – audārika śarira ańgopāńga, the chief and secondary parts of the transformable body – vaikriyika śarira ańgopāńga, the chief and secondary parts of the projectable body – āhāraka śarira ańgopāńga, the six firmness of the joints – saÉhanana, the five auspicious complexions – praśastha varõa, the five inauspicious complexions – apraśastha varõa, the two odours – gandha, the five auspicious tastes – praśastha rasa, the five inauspicious tastes – apraśastha rasa, the eight touches – sparśa, tendency (transmigrating force) towards the celestial state of existence – devagatiprāyogyānupūrvī, neither heavy nor light – agurulaghu, self-annihilation – upaghāta, annihilation by others – paraghāta, respiration – ucchvāsa, pleasant gait – praśastha vihāyogati, unpleasant gait – apraśastha vihāyogati, incomplete development – aparyāpta, individual body – pratyeka śarīra, firmness of the frame – sthira, infirm frame – asthira, attractiveness of form – śubha, unattractiveness of form – aśubha, bad-tempered – durbhaga, melodious voice – susvara, unmelodious voice – duÍsvara, lustreless body – anādeya, obscurity – ayaśaÍkīrti, formation of the body – nirmāõa, and low family – nīcagotra. The remaining thirteen subtypes of karmas are destroyed in the last instant of the fourteenth stage of ayogakevalī – Omniscient-withoutvibration. These are: one of the two feeling-karmas – vedanīya, human lifetime – manuÈyāyuÍ, the human state of existence – manuÈyagati, birth as a being with five senses – pańcendriyajāti, tendency towards the human state of existence – manuÈyagatiprāyogyānupūrvī, mobilebeing – trasa, gross body – bādara, completion (of the organs) – paryāpta, good-tempered – subhaga, lustrous body – ādeya, renown – yaśaÍkīrti, Lordship – Tīrthakaratva, and high family – uccagotra. There are a total of one hundred and forty-eight subtypes of karmas. In case of the caramaśarīrī, the one who will attain liberation in the same birth, these three, life as an infernal being – narakāyuÍ, life as a plant or animal – tiryańcāyuÍ, and life as a celestial being – devāyuÍ, do not exist. The karmas of these subtypes, the fourfold assimilative – 409 vè;k;&10 āhārakacatuÈka and the Lordship – Tīrthakaratva, exist in some. The remaining subtypes of karmas must exist in all. With the rise in spiritual stages – guõasthāna – the causes of bondage of karmas are annihilated (kÈaya), and the karmas bound previously are dissociated (nirjarā). With utter destruction of all karmas, the soul gets liberated; it attains liberation (mokÈa). Liberation implies complete destruction of the material-karmas (dravyakarma), quasi-karmas (nokarma), and psychic-karmas (bhāvakarma). The worldly soul is with bondage of karmas; it is thus dependent from a certain point of view. The same soul, on utter destruction of all karmas, becomes independent. This explains the liberation (mokÈa) of the soul. Is liberation (mokÈa) attained on destruction of material-karmas (dravyakarma) only or psychic-karmas (bhāvakarma) also? vkSi'kfedkfnHkO;Rokuka p AA3AA 1po vkSj 1vkSi'kfedkfn HkO;Rokukao vkSi'kfedkfn Hkkoksa dk rFkk ikfj.kkfed Hkkoksa esa ls HkO;Ro Hkko dk eqDr tho ds vHkko gksrk gS & gks tkrk gSA And, liberation (mokÈa) is attained on destruction of the dispositions (bhāva) like the subsidential (aupaśamika), and the capacity for liberation – bhavyatva. Liberation (mokÈa) is taken over from the previous sūtra. The capacity for liberation – bhavyatva – is included in the sūtra in order to exclude the other dispositions due to the inherent nature of the soul – pāriõāmika bhāva. Thus, on disappearance of the capacity for liberation – bhavyatva – among the pāriõāmika bhāva, and also other dispositions like the subsidential (aupaśamika), liberation is attained. (see sūtra 2-1). 410 Tattvārthasūtra If liberation is affirmed as disappearance of all dispositions, then the liberated soul should be bereft of all characteristics of the destructional (kÈāyika) type also. It would be so, if no speciality be mentioned about liberation. But there is speciality. Hence the exception is stated in the next sūtra. vU;=k dsoylE;DRoKkun'kZufl1⁄4RosH;% AA4AA 1dsoylE;DRoKkun'kZufl1⁄4RosH;% vU;=ko dsoylE;DRo] dsoyKku] dsoyn'kZu vkSj fl1⁄4Ro] bu Hkkoksa ds vfrfjDr vU; Hkkoksa ds vHkko ls eks{k gksrk gSA However, there is no destruction of infinite-faith – kevalasamyaktva, infinite-knowledge – kevalajñāna, infinite-perception – kevaladarśana, and infiniteperfection – siddhatva. What is indicated by 'anyatra' – 'other than'? It means that the rule of destruction or absence applies to all psychical factors other than those mentioned: infinite-faith – kevalasamyaktva, infinite-knowledge – kevalajñāna, infinite-perception – kevaladarśana, and infiniteperfection – siddhatva. If these four characteristics alone remain with the liberated soul, it would lead to the denial of infinite-energy (anantavīrya), etc. But it is not so. Being the concomitant characteristic – avinābhāvī – of knowledge and perception, infinite-energy (anantavīrya), etc., must also be found in liberated souls. For without infinite-energy (anantavīrya), there can be no infinite-knowledge (anantajñāna), and bliss (sukha) is of the nature of knowledge. It is contended that there are no emancipated souls, as they have no forms. But it is not so. They have the forms of their last bodies. If the soul is of the extent of the body, then in the absence of the body, the soul should 411 vè;k;&10 expand to the extent of the universe, as the soul is as extensive as the universe with regard to space-points (pradeśa). But it is not so, as there is no cause for it. The expansion or contraction of the soul is determined by the body-making (nāma) karmas. And in the absence of the physique-making karmas, there is neither expansion nor contraction. If there is no expansion or contraction in the absence of cause, then there would be no movement upwards without cause, just as there is no movement downwards or sideways. So the emancipated soul should remain at the place of emancipation. This doubt is cleared in the next sūtra. rnuUrjewèo± xPNR;kyksdkUrkr~ AA5AA 1rnuUrje~o rnuUrj 1Åèo± vkyksdkUrkr~ xPNfro ÅèoZxeu djds yksdkdk'k i;ZUr tkrk gSA Immediately after that the liberated soul darts up to the end of the universe – lokānta. Immediately after what? Immediately after attaining release from all karmas. The soul goes up to the end of the universe. No cause has been mentioned for this upward movement. Why does it move upwards? iwoZiz;ksxknlaxRokñ cUèkPNsnkÙkFkkxfrifj.kkekPp AA6AA 1iwoZiz;ksxkr~o iwoZ iz;ksx ls] 1vlaxRokr~o lax jfgr gksus ls] 1cU/PNsnkr~o cU/ dk uk'k gksus ls] 1rFkkxfrifj.kkekr~ po vkSj 412 Tattvārthasūtra rFkkxfr ifj.kke vFkkZr~ ÅèoZxeu LoHkko gksus ls eqDr tho ds ÅèoZxeu gksrk gSA As the soul is previously impelled, as it is free from ties or attachment, as the bondage has been snapped, and as it is of the nature of darting upwards. Though the logical reason is complete, yet it is not effective in establishing the intended idea without illustrations. Hence, the next sūtra. vkfo1⁄4dqykypØoñO;ixrysikykcqonsj.Mcht& onfXuf'k[kkoPp AA7AA eqDr tho 1vkfo1⁄4dqykypØor~o dqEgkj }kjk ?kqek;s gq, pkd dh rjg iwoZ&iz;ksx ls] 1O;ixrysikykcqor~o ysi nwj gks pqdk gS ftldk ,slh rweM+h dh rjg lax jfgr gksus ls] 1,j.Mchtor~o ,j.M ds cht dh rjg cU/u&jfgr gksus ls 1po vkSj 1vfXuf'k[kkor~o vfXu dh f'k[kk (ykS) dh rjg ÅèoZxeu (Åij dks xeu) djrk gSA Like the potter's wheel in motion, the gourd devoid of mud, the shell of the castor-seed, and the flame of the candle. The instances illustrate, respectively, the four logical reasons mentioned in the previous sūtra. It is as follows. The potter's wheel revolves by the operation of the hand of the potter and the stick on the wheel. And even when the hand and the stick cease to operate, the wheel continues to revolve until the impetus is exhausted. Similarly, 413 vè;k;&10 the self in mundane existence makes several efforts for attaining liberation. And even in the absence of these, the liberated soul darts up on account of the former impetus. Moreover, the self is free from attachment. A gourd coated with clay goes down to the bottom of the water because of its heaviness. But when the coating of clay is washed off by the water, the gourd becomes light and comes up to the surface of the water. Similarly, the soul, loaded with the burden of karmas, wanders indefinitely in mundane existence, being affected by it. But, on being freed from this burden of karmas, it shoots up. Just as the castor-seed darts up on breaking loose from confinement inside the fruit, in the same way, the soul darts up as it breaks loose from confinement of karmas of existence (gati) and birth (jāti) which lead it to the human and other states of existence. Further, the soul is of the nature of going upwards. For instance, in the absence of wind blowing sideways, the flame of a candle tends upwards of its own nature. Similarly, the liberated soul, in the absence of karmas which lead it wandering in different states of existence in different directions, darts upwards only as it is of the nature of going up. If upward motion is the nature of the soul, why does it not go beyond the end of the universe? èkekZfLrdk;kHkkokr~ AA8AA 1/ekZfLrdk;kHkkokr~o vkxs (yksdkdk'k ds ckgj) /ekZfLrdk; dk vHkko gS] vr% eqDr tho yksd ds vUr rd gh tkrk gSA The liberated soul does not go beyond the end of the universe as no medium of motion – dharmāstikāya – exists there. 414 Tattvārthasūtra There is no movement in the non-universe (aloka) above, as there is no medium of motion – dharmāstikāya – which aids movement. Otherwise there would be no distinction between the universe and the non-universe. It is held that the liberated souls are without distinction, as there are no differentiating characteristics such as conditions of existence, birth, etc., among these. Still, there is distinction in some respects. {ks=kdkyxfr yxrhFkZpkfj=kizR;sdcq1⁄4cksfèkr& KkukoxkgUkkUrjla[;kYicgqRor% lkè;k% AA9AA 1{ks=kdkyxfr yxrhFkZpkfj=kizR;sdcq1⁄4cksfèkrKkukoxkgUkkUrj& la[;kYicgqRor%o {ks=k] dky] xfr] yx] rhFkZ] pkfj=k] izR;sdcq1⁄4] cksf/rcq1⁄4] Kku] voxkguk] vUrj] la[;k vkSj vYicgqRo & bu rsjg vuq;ksxksa ls 1lkè;k%o eqDr thoksa (fl1⁄4ksa) esa Hksn djus ;ksX; gSA The liberated souls can be differentiated with reference to the region – kÈetra, time – kāla, state – gati, sign – lińga, the Tīrthańkara – tīrtha, conduct – cāritra, selfenlightened – pratyekabuddha, enlightened by others – bodhitabuddha, knowledge – jñāna, stature – avagāhanā, interval – antara, number – saÉkhyā, and numerical comparison – alpabahutva. The liberated souls are (fit to be) differentiated by thirteen types of questioning with reference to the region (kÈetra), and so on. KÈetra: This determines the region of attainment of liberation. The differentiation is on the basis of two standpoints, one is based on the present and the other on the past. It is as follows. From the standpoint 415 vè;k;&10 of the present, liberation is attained in the abode of the liberated, in the region of liberation, one's own spatial points or in space. From the standpoint of the past, liberation is attained on the basis of birth in fifteen continents of labour – karmabhūmi, or, from the point of view of those transported, in the human region. Kāla: With regard to time (kāla), in what period is liberation attained? From the standpoint of the present, the soul attains liberation in one instant. From the standpoint of the past, in general, one who is born in the ascending (utsarpiõī) or descending (avasarpiõī) cycles of time attains liberation. In particular, one who is born in the last part of the third period – suÈamaduÈÈamā – or in the fourth period – duÈÈamasuÈamā – of the descending (avasarpiõī) cycle of time attains liberation. He who is born in the fifth – duÈÈamā – period of the cycle of time, does not attain liberation in the fifth period. One does not attain liberation at other times. Taking the universe together, liberation is attained at all times in the ascending and descending cycles of time. Gati: With regard to the state of existence, in what state is liberation attained? It is attained in the state of liberation or in the human state. Lińga: By what sign is liberation attained? Liberation is attained in the stage without sign (aveda) or from the three signs (veda). This statement is on the basis of the psychical signs and not the physical ones. On the basis of the physical sign, liberation is attained from the male sex only. Or, it is attained from the without-attachment (nirgrantha) sign, or from the with-attachment (sagrantha) sign from the standpoint of the past. Tīrtha: With regard to Lordship (tīrtha), it is of two kinds, namely, by being a Tīrthańkara, and by not being a Tīrthańkara. The latter are of two kinds, those who attain liberation when there is the presence of a Tīrthańkara, and those who attain liberation when there is no Tīrthańkara. Cāritra: By what conduct is liberation attained? It is attained by the conduct with no name or by one, four and five kinds of conduct. Pratyekabuddha and bodhitabuddha: The self-enlightened (i.e., those who get enlightened or become true believers by their own inherent 416 Tattvārthasūtra capacity) and those enlightened by the teachings of others, constitute the two kinds. Jñāna: By what knowledge? Liberation is attained by one, two, three and four kinds of knowledge. Avagāhanā: Stature is the pervasion of the space-points. It is of two kinds, the maximum and the minimum. The maximum is 525 bows – dhanuÈa – and the minimum a little less than three and a half cubits (aratni). In between, there are several degrees. Liberation is attained in any one of these degrees of stature. Antara: What is the interval? When the liberation of souls is continuous without an interval, the minimum of this duration is two instants – samaya – and the maximum is eight instants. The minimum interval (i.e., the time when no one attains liberation) is one instant and the maximum is six months. SaÉkhyā: At the minimum in one instant one soul attains liberation, and at the maximum one hundred and eight souls attain liberation. Alpabahutva: The difference in the numbers of the souls distinguished on the basis of place, and so on, is 'more or less' (alpabahutva). It is as follows. From the standpoint of the present, in the abode of the liberated, there is no 'more or less' in the case of the souls attaining liberation. Now it is considered from the standpoint of the past. The liberated souls on the regional basis are of two kinds, those liberated from their place of birth and those from that to which they have been transported. The souls liberated from the regions to which they are conveyed are less. Those liberated from the regions of their birth are numerable-fold. The regions are divided into the continents of labour, the lands of enjoyment, the oceans, the islets, the upper-world, the lower-world and the middle-world. The souls liberating from the upper world are the least. The souls liberating from the lower world are numerablefold. Those liberating from the middle world are numerablefold. Again, those liberating from the oceans constitute the smallest number. Those liberating from the islets are numerable-fold. This has been described in general. The least of all are those liberating from the Lavaõasamudra. Those liberating from the Kāloda ocean are 417 vè;k;&10 numerablefold. Those liberating from Jambūdvīpa are numerablefold. Those liberating from Dhātakikhaõça are numerablefold. And those liberating from PuÈkaradvīpa are numerablefold. Similarly, the differences with regard to numerical comparison (alpabahutva) relating to time, and so on, must be understood in conformity with the Scripture. 418 Tattvārthasūtra LoxkZioxZlq[kekIrqeuksfHkjk;SZ tSusUae'kkluojkèrlkjHkwrk A lokZFkZflf1⁄4fjfr lf#ikÙkukek rÙokFkZòfÙkjfu'ka eulk izèkk;kZ AA 1 AA  iz'kfLr  rÙokFkZòfÙkeqfnrka fofnrkFkZrÙok% Ük`.ofUr ;s ifjiBfUr p èkeZHkDR;k A gLrs Ñra ijeflf1⁄4lq[kkèra rSeZR;kZejs'ojlq[ks'kq fdefLr okP;e~ AA 2 AA LoxZ vkSj vioxZ (eks{k) ds lq[k dks pkgus okys vk;Z iq#"k ftusUaenso 'kklu :ih vèr esa lkjHkwr bl rÙokFkZòfÙk & tks lokZFkZflf1⁄4 uke ls iz[;kr gS & dks fujUrj eu%iwoZd èkkj.k djsaA This exposition of ultimate reality, the essence of the supreme and immortal teachings of Lord Jina, called Sarvārthasiddhi by the learned, deserves to be contemplated incessantly by the venerable, seeking celestial happiness and eternal bliss of liberation. lc rÙoksa ds tkudkj tks bl rÙokFkZòfÙk dks èkeZHkfDr ls lqurs vkSj i<+rs gSa ekuks mUgksaus ijeflf1⁄4 lq[kkèr dks vius gkFk esa gh dj fy;k gS] fiQj muds fy;s pØorhZ vkSj nsosUae ds lq[k dk rks dguk gh D;k gS! E U L O G Y AA bfr rÙokFkZlw=kkijukeeks{k'kkÐs n'kekss¿è;k;% lekIr% AA ] ] ] ftgksaus vius foey dsoyKku:ih us=k ds }kjk bl fu£ookn ldy rÙokFkZ dk izdk'k fd;k gS] euq";ksa vkSj nsoksa ds }kjk iwftr] vñHkqr~ xq.kksa ls ;qDr] mu ohj Hkxoku~ dks eSa HkfDriwoZd iz.kke djrk gw¡A ;susneizfrgra ldykFkZrÙoeqñ|ksfrra foeydsoyykspusu A HkDR;k reñHkqrxq.ka iz.kekfe ohjekjkUujkejx.k£priknihBe~ AA 3 AA Those who listen to and study with devotion this great commentary describing the true nature of reality have in their palms the final beatitude of supreme attainment. What, then, is there to be said about the happiness of the lords of men and deva! I bow with great devotion to Lord Mahāvīra, who has expounded the entire reality with his infinite knowledge in an indisputable manner, who is endowed with amazing attributes, and who is worshipped by the men and the deva. ] ] ] 419 iz'kfLr O Ascetics Supreme Ācārya Umāsvāmī and Ācārya Pūjyapāda ! You have expounded this Reality of substances with the sole object that the bhavya souls may acquire right faith (samyagdarśana), the basis for treading the excellent path to liberation. With utmost devotion, I apply on my forehead the sacred water that anoints the most worshipful duo of your feet. This concludes Ācārya Umāsvāmī's Tattvārthasūtra, with explanation in English from Ācārya Pūjyapāda's Sarvārthasiddhi, the ultimate exposition of the Reality. 420 Tattvārthasūtra GUI D E T O T RANS L IT ERAT I ON *Devanāgarī IAST v a vk ā b i bZ ī m u mQ ū , e ,s ai vks o vkS au Í Ã va É v% Í d ka [k kha x ga ?k gha Ä ôa p ca N cha t ja > jha ×k ða Devanāgarī IAST V Ça B Çha M ça < çha .k õa r ta Fk tha n da èk dha u na i pa iQ pha c ba Hk bha e ma ; ya j ra Devanāgarī IAST y la o va 'k śa "k Èa l sa *IAST: International Alphabet of Sanskrit Transliteration AE Ò g ha {k kÈa =k tra K jða J śra THE 'TATTVĀRTHASŪTRA' READER A P P E N D I X Chapter-1 lE;Xn'kZuKkupkfj=kkf.k eks{kekxZ% AA1AA samyagdarśanajñānacāritrāõi mokÈamārgaÍ rÙokFkZJ1⁄4kua lE;Xn'kZue~ AA2AA tattvārthaśraddhānaÉ samyagdarśanam rfÂlxkZnfèkxek}k AA3AA tannisargādadhigamādvā izFke vè;k; • 421 rÙokFkZlw=k&ikB rÙokFkZlw=k&ikB thokthokÏocUèklaojfutZjkeks{kkLrÙoe~ AA4AA jīvājīvāsravabandhasaÉvaranirjarāmokÈāstattvam ukeLFkkiukaeO;HkkorLrUU;kl% AA5AA nāmasthāpanādravyabhāvatastannyāsaÍ izek.ku;Sjfèkxe% AA6AA pramāõanayairadhigamaÍ funsZ'kLokfeRolkèkukfèkdj.kfLFkfrfoèkkur% AA7AA nirdeśasvāmitvasādhanādhikaraõasthitividhānataÍ lRla[;k{ks=kLi'kZudkykUrjHkkokYicgqRoSÜÓ AA8AA satsaÉkhyākÈetrasparśanakālāntarabhāvālpabahutvaiśca efrJqrkofèkeu%i;Z;dsoykfu Kkue~ AA9AA matiśrutāvadhimanaÍparyayakevalāni jñānam rRizek.ks AA10AA tatpramāõe vk|s ijks{ke~ AA11AA ādye parokÈam izR;{keU;r~ AA12AA pratyakÈamanyat efr% Lèfr% laKk fpUrk¿fHkfucksèk bR;uFkkZUrje~ AA13AA matiÍ smÃtiÍ saÉjñā cintābhinibodha ityanarthāntaram rfnfUae;kfufUae;fufeÙke~ AA14AA tadindriyānindriyanimittam voxzgsgkok;èkkj.kk% AA15AA avagrahehāvāyadhāraõāÍ cgqcgqfoèkf{kizkfu%l`rkuqDrèkqzok.kka lsrjk.kke~ AA16AA bahubahuvidhakÈiprāniÍsÃtānuktadhruvāõāÉ setarāõām vFkZL; AA17AA arthasya O;×tuL;koxzg% AA18AA vyañjanasyāvagrahaÍ u p{kqjfufUae;kH;ke~ AA19AA na cakÈuranindriyābhyām Jqra efriwo± }Ôusd}kn'kHksne~ AA20AA śrutaÉ matipūrvaÉ dvyanekadvādaśabhedam 422 Tattvārthasūtra HkoizR;;ks¿ofèknsZoukjdk.kke~ AA21AA bhavapratyayo avadhirdevanārakāõām {k;ksi'kefufeÙk% "kM~fodYi% 'ks"kk.kke~ AA22AA kÈayopaśamanimittaÍ ÈaçvikalpaÍ śeÈāõām Ítqfoiqyerh eu%i;Z;% AA23AA Ãjuvipulamatī manaÍparyayaÍ fo'kq1⁄4ÔizfrikrkH;ka rf}'ks"k% AA24AA viśuddhyapratipātābhyaÉ tadviśeÈaÍ fo'kqf1⁄4{ks=kLokfefo"k;sH;ks¿ofèkeu%i;Z;;ks% AA25AA viśuddhikÈetrasvāmiviÈayebhyo avadhimanaÍparyayayoÍ efrJqr;ks£ucUèkks aeO;s"oloZi;kZ;s"kq AA26AA matiśrutyornibandho dravyeÈvasarvaparyāyeÈu :fi"ooèks% AA27AA rūpiÈvavadheÍ rnuUrHkkxs eu%i;Z;L; AA28AA tadanantabhāge manaÍparyayasya loZaeO;i;kZ;s"kq dsoyL; AA29AA sarvadravyaparyāyeÈu kevalasya ,dknhfu HkkT;kfu ;qxinsdfLeÂkprqH;Z% AA30AA ekādīni bhājyāni yugapadekasminnācaturbhyaÍ efrJqrkoèk;ks foi;Z;ÜÓ AA31AA matiśrutāvadhayo viparyayaśca 423 rÙokFkZlw=k&ikB lnlrksjfo'ks"kk|n`PNksiyCèks#UeÙkor~ AA32AA sadasatoraviśeÈādyadÃcchopalabdherunmattavat uSxelaxzgO;ogkjtqZlw=k'kCnlefHk:<SoaHkwrk u;k% AA33AA naigamasaÉgrahavyavahāraÃjusūtraśabdasamabhirūçhaivaÉbhūtā nayāÍ Chapter-2 vkSi'kfed{kkf;dkS HkkokS feJÜÓ thoL; LorÙoekSnf;dikfj.kkfedkS p AA1AA aupaśamikakÈāyikau bhāvau miśraśca jīvasya svatattvamaudayikapāriõāmikau ca nwljk vè;k; • f}uok"Vkn'kSd o'kfrf=kHksnk ;FkkØee~ AA2AA dvinavāÈÇādaśaikaviÉśatitribhedā yathākramam lE;DRopkfj=ks AA3AA samyaktvacāritre Kkun'kZunkuykHkHkksxksiHkksxoh;kZf.k p AA4AA jñānadarśanadānalābhabhogopabhogavīryāõi ca KkukKkun'kZuyCèk;ÜÓrqfL=kf=kiÛÓHksnk% lE;DRopkfj=kla;ekla;ekÜÓ AA5AA jñānājñānadarśanalabdhayaścatustritripańcabhedāÍ samyaktvacāritrasaÉyamāsaÉyamāśca 424 Tattvārthasūtra xfrd"kk; yxfeF;kn'kZukKkukla;rkfl1⁄4ys';kÜÓrqÜÓrqL=;sdSdSdSd"kM~Hksnk% AA6AA gatikaÈāyalińgamithyādarśanājñānāsaÉyatāsiddhaleśyāścatustryekaikaikaikaÈaçbhedaÍ thoHkO;kHkO;Rokfu p AA7AA jīvabhavyābhavyatvāni ca mi;ksxks y{k.ke~ AA8AA upayogo lakÈaõam l f}foèkks¿"VprqHksZn% AA9AA sa dvividho aÈÇacaturbhedaÍ lalkfj.kks eqDrkÜÓ AA10AA saÉsāriõo muktāśca leuLdk¿euLdk% AA11AA samanaskāmanaskāÍ lalkfj.kÐlLFkkojk% AA12AA saÉsāriõastrasasthāvarāÍ ìfFkO;Irstksok;qouLir;% LFkkojk% AA13AA pÃthivyaptejovāyuvanaspatayaÍ sthāvarāÍ }hfUae;kn;Ðlk% AA14AA dvīndriyādayastrasāÍ iÛÓsfUae;kf.k AA15AA pańcendriyāõi f}foèkkfu AA16AA dvividhāni fuòZÙ;qidj.ks aeO;sfUae;e~ AA17AA nirvÃttyupakaraõe dravyendriyam yCè;qi;ksxkS HkkosfUae;e~ AA18AA labdhyupayogau bhāvendriyam 425 rÙokFkZlw=k&ikB Li'kZujlu?kzk.kp{kq%Jks=kkf.k AA19AA sparśanarasanaghrāõacakÈuÍśrotrāõi Li'kZjlxUèko.kZ'kCnkLrnFkkZ% AA20AA sparśarasagandhavarõaśabdāstadarthāÍ JqrefufUae;L; AA21AA śrutamanindriyasya ouLiR;Urkukesde~ AA22AA vanaspatyantānāmekam dfefiihfydkHkzejeuq";knhukesdSdò1⁄4kfu AA23AA kÃmipipīlikābhramaramanuÈyādīnāmekaikavÃddhāni lafKu% leuLdk% AA24AA saÉjñinaÍ samanaskāÍ foxzgxrkS deZ;ksx% AA25AA vigrahagatau karmayogaÍ vuqJsf.k xfr% AA26AA anuśreõi gatiÍ vfoxzgk thoL; AA27AA avigrahā jīvasya foxzgorh p lalkfj.k% izkd~ prqH;Z% AA28AA vigrahavatī ca saÉsāriõaÍ prāk caturbhyaÍ ,dle;k¿foxzgk AA29AA ekasamayā avigrahā 426 Tattvārthasūtra ,da }kS =khUok¿ukgkjd% AA30AA ekaÉ dvau trīnvā anāhārakaÍ lEewPNZuxHkksZiiknk tUe AA31AA sammūrcchanagarbhopapādā janma lfpÙk'khrlaòrk% lsrjk feJkÜÓSd'kLr|ksu;% AA32AA sacittaśītasaÉvÃtāÍ setarā miśrāścaikaśastadyonayaÍ tjk;qtk.Mtiksrkuka xHkZ% AA33AA jarāyujāõçajapotānāÉ garbhaÍ nsoukjdk.kkeqiikn% AA34AA devanārakāõāmupapādaÍ 'ks"kk.kka lEewPNZue~ AA35AA śeÈāõāÉ sammūrcchanam vkSnkfjdoSfØf;dkgkjdrStldkeZ.kkfu 'kjhjkf.k AA36AA audārikavaikriyikāhārakataijasakārmaõāni śarīrāõi ija ija lw{ee~ AA37AA paraÉ paraÉ sūkÈmam izns'krks¿la[;s;xq.ka izkd~ rStlkr~ AA38AA pradeśato asaÉkhyeyaguõaÉ prāk taijasāt vuUrxq.ks ijs AA39AA anantaguõe pare vizrh?kkrs AA40AA apratīghāte 427 rÙokFkZlw=k&ikB vukfnlEcUèks p AA41AA anādisambandhe ca loZL; AA42AA sarvasya rnknhfu HkkT;kfu ;qxinsdfLeÂkprqH;Z% AA43AA tadādīni bhājyāni yugapadekasminnācaturbhyaÍ fu#iHkksxeUR;e~ AA44AA nirupabhogamantyam xHkZlEewPNZutek|e~ AA45AA garbhasammūrcchanajamādyam vkSiikfnda oSfØf;de~ AA46AA aupapādikaÉ vaikriyikam yfCèkizR;;a p AA47AA labdhipratyayaÉ ca rStlefi AA48AA taijasamapi 'kqHka fo'kq1⁄4eO;k?kkfr pkgkjda izeÙkla;rL;So AA49AA śubhaÉ viśuddhamavyāghāti cāhārakaÉ pramattasaÉyatasyaiva ukjdlEew£PNuks uiqaldkfu AA50AA nārakasammūrcchino napuÉsakāni u nsok% AA51AA na devāÍ 428 Tattvārthasūtra 'ks"kkfÐosnk% AA52AA śeÈāstrivedāÍ vkSiikfndpjeksÙkensgkla[;s;o"kkZ;q"kks¿uioR;kZ;q"k% AA53AA aupapādikacaramottamadehāsaÉkhyeyavarÈāyuÈo anapavartyāyuÈaÍ Chapter-3 jRu'kdZjkokyqdkiadèkwereksegkre%izHkk Hkwe;ks ?kukEcqokrkdk'kizfr"Bk% lIrkèkks¿èk% AA1AA ratnaśarkarāvālukāpańkadhūmatamomahātamaÍprabhā bhūmayo ghanambuvātākāśapratiÈÇhāÍ saptādho adhaÍ rhljk vè;k; • rklq =k'kRiÛÓ o'kfriÛÓn'kn'kf=kiÛÓksuSdujd'krlgÏkf.k iÛÓ pSo ;FkkØee~ AA2AA tāsu triÉśatpańcaviÉśatipańcadaśadaśatripańconaikanarakaśatasahasrāõi pańca caiva yathākramam ukjdk fuR;k'kqHkrjys';kifj.kkensgosnukfofØ;k% AA3AA nārakā nityāśubhataraleśyāpariõāmadehavedanāvikriyāÍ ijLijksnhfjrnq%[kk% AA4AA parasparodīritaduÍkhāÍ lafDy"Vklqjksnhfjrnq%[kkÜÓ izkd~ prqF;kZ% AA5AA saÉkliÈÇāsurodīritaduÍkhāśca prāk caturthyāÍ rs"osdf=klIrn'klIrn'k}k o'kfr=k; L=k'kRlkxjksiek lÙokuka ijk fLFkfr% AA6AA teÈvekatrisaptadaśasaptadaśadvāviÉśatitrayastriÉśatsāgaropamā sattvānaÉ parā sthitiÍ 429 rÙokFkZlw=k&ikB tEcw}hiyo.kksnkn;% 'kqHkukekuks }hileqaek% AA7AA jambūdvīpalavaõodādayaÍ śubhanāmāno dvīpasamudrāÍ f}£}£o"dEHkk% iwoZiwoZifj{ksfi.kks oy;kÑr;% AA8AA dvirdvirviÈkambhāÍ pūrvapūrvaparikÈepiõo valayākÃtayaÍ rUeè;s es#ukfHkòZÙkks ;kstu'krlgÏfo"dEHkks tEcw}hi% AA9AA tanmadhye merunābhirvÃtto yojanaśatasahasraviÈkambho jambūdvīpaÍ HkjrgSeorgfjfonsgjE;dgSj.;orSjkoro"kkZ% {ks=kkf.k AA10AA bharatahaimavataharivideharamyakahairaõyavatairāvatavarÈāÍ kÈetrāõi rf}Hkkftu% iwokZijk;rk fgeoUegkfgeofÂ"kèkuhy#fDef'k[kfj.kks o"kZèkjioZrk% AA11AA tadvibhājinaÍ pūrvāparāyatā himavanmahāhimavanniÈadhanīlarukmiśikhariõo varÈadharaparvatāÍ gsektqZuriuh;oSMw;Zjtrgsee;k% AA12AA hemārjunatapanīyavaiçūryarajatahemamayāÍ ef.kfofp=kik'okZ mifj ewys p rqY;foLrkjk% AA13AA maõivicitrapārśvā upari mūle ca tulyavistārāÍ iÁegkiÁfrfx×Ndslfjegkiq.Mjhdiq.Mjhdk ßnkLrs"kkeqifj AA14AA padmamahāpadmatigińchakesarimahāpuõçarīkapuõçarīkā hradāsteÈāmupari izFkeks ;kstulgÏk;keLrn1⁄4Zfo"dEHkks ßn% AA15AA prathamo yojanasahasrāyāmastadarddhaviÈkambho hradaÍ n'k;kstukoxkg% AA16AA daśayojanāvagāhaÍ 430 Tattvārthasūtra rUeè;s ;kstua iq"dje~ AA17AA tanmadhye yojanaÉ puÈkaram rñf}xq.kf}xq.kk ßnk% iq"djkf.k p AA18AA taddviguõadviguõā hradāÍ puÈkarāõi ca rfÂokflU;ks nsO;% Jhsshèk`frdh£rcqf1⁄4y{E;% iY;ksiefLFkr;% llkekfudifj"kRdk% AA19AA tannivāsinyo devyaÍ śrīhrīdhÃtikīrtibuddhilakÈmyaÍ palyopamasthitayaÍ sasāmānikapariÈatkāÍ xaxkflUèkqjksfgaeksfgrkL;kgfj1⁄4fjdkUrklhrklhrksnk& ukjhujdkUrklqo.kZ:I;dwykjDrkjDrksnk% lfjrLrUeè;xk% AA20AA gańgāsindhurohidrohitāsyāhariddharikāntāsītāsītodānārīnarakāntāsuvarõarūpyakūlāraktāraktodāÍ saritastanmadhyagāÍ };ks}Z;ks% iwokZ% iwoZxk% AA21AA dvayordvayoÍ pūrvāÍ pūrvagāÍ 'ks"kkLRoijxk% AA22AA śeÈāstvaparagāÍ prqnZ'kunhlgÏifjòrk xaxkflUèokn;ks u|% AA23AA caturdaśanadīsahasraparivÃtā gańgāsindhvādayo nadyaÍ Hkjr% "kM~ o'kfriÛÓ;kstu'krfoLrkj% "kV~pSdksu o'kfrHkkxk ;kstuL; AA24AA bharataÍ ÈaçviÉśatipańcayojanaśatavistāraÍ ÈaÇcaikonaviÉśatibhāgā yojanasya rñf}xq.kf}xq.kfoLrkjk o"kZèkjo"kkZ fonsgkUrk% AA25AA taddviguõadviguõavistārā varÈadharavarÈā videhāntāÍ 431 rÙokFkZlw=k&ikB mÙkjk nf{k.krqY;k% AA26AA uttarā dakÈiõatulyāÍ HkjrSjkor;ksòZf1⁄4ssklkS "kV~le;kH;keqRl£i.;ol£i.khH;ke~ AA27AA bharatairāvatayorvÃddhihrāsau ÈaÇsamayābhyāmutsarpiõyavasarpiõībhyām rkH;keijk Hkwe;ks¿ofLFkrk% AA28AA tābhyāmaparā bhūmayo avasthitāÍ ,df}f=kiY;ksiefLFkr;ks gSeordgkfjo"kZdnSodqjodk% AA29AA ekadvitripalyopamasthitayo haimavatakahārivarÈakadaivakuravakāÍ rFkksÙkjk% AA30AA tathottarāÍ fonsgs"kq l;s;dkyk% AA31AA videheÈu saÉkhyeyakālāÍ HkjrL; fo"dEHkks tEcw}hiL; uofr'krHkkx% AA32AA bharatasya viÈkambho jambūdvīpasya navatiśatabhāgaÍ f}/kZrdh[k.Ms AA33AA dvirdhātakīkhaõçe iq"djk1⁄4sZ p AA34AA puÈkarārddhe ca izkÄ~ekuq"kksÙkjkUeuq";k% AA35AA prāńmānuÈottarānmanuÈyāÍ vk;kZ EysPNkÜÓ AA36AA āryā mlecchāśca 432 Tattvārthasūtra HkjrSjkorfonsgk% deZHkwe;ks¿U;=k nsodq:Ùkjdq#H;% AA37AA bharatairāvatavidehāÍ karmabhūmayo anyatra devakurūttarakurubhyaÍ ùfLFkrh ijkojs f=kiY;ksiekUreqZgwrsZ AA38AA nÃsthitī parāvare tripalyopamāntarmuhūrte fr;ZX;ksfutkuka p AA39AA tiryagyonijānāÉ ca Chapter-4 nsokÜÓrq£.kdk;k% AA1AA devāścaturõikāyāÍ pkSFkk vè;k; • vkfnrfÐ"kq ihrkUrys';k% AA2AA āditastriÈu pītānantaleśyāÍ n'kk"ViÛÓ}kn'kfodYik% dYiksiiÂi;ZUrk% AA3AA daśāÈÇapańcadvādaśavikalpāÍ kalpopapannaparyantāÍ bUaelkekfud=kk; L=k'kikfj"knkRej{kyksdikykuhdizdh.kZdkfHk;ksX;& fdfYof"kdkÜÓSd'k% AA4AA indrasāmānikatrāyastriÉśapāriÈadātmarakÈalokapālānīkaprakīrõakābhiyogyakilviÈikāścaikaśaÍ =kk; L=k'kyksdikyoT;kZ O;UrjT;ksfr"dk% AA5AA trāyastriÉśalokapālavarjyā vyantarajyotiÈkāÍ iwoZ;ks}hZUaek% AA6AA pūrvayordvīndrāÍ 433 rÙokFkZlw=k&ikB dk;izohpkjk vk ,s'kkukr~ AA7AA kāyapravīcārā ā aiśānāt 'ks"kk% Li'kZ:i'kCneu%izohpkjk% AA8AA śeÈāÍ sparśarūpaśabdamanaÍpravīcārāÍ ijs¿izohpkjk% AA9AA pare apravīcārāÍ Hkouokfluks¿lqjukxfo|qRlqi.kkZfXuokrLrfurksnfèk}hifnDdqekjk% AA10AA bhavanavāsino asuranāgavidyutsuparõāgnivātastanitodadhidvīpadikkumārāÍ O;Urjk% fdÂjfdEiq#"kegksjxxUèkoZ;{kjk{klHkwrfi'kkpk% AA11AA vyantarāÍ kinnarakimpuruÈamahoragagandharvarākÈasabhūtapiśācāÍ T;ksfr"dk% lw;kZpUaeelkS xzgu{k=kizdh.kZdrkjdkÜÓ AA12AA jyotiÈkāÍ sūryācandramasau grahanakÈatraprakīrõakatārakāśca es#iznf{k.kk fuR;xr;ks ùyksds AA13AA merupradakÈiõā nityagatayo nÃloke rRdr% dkyfoHkkx% AA14AA tatkÃtaÍ kālavibhāgaÍ cfgjofLFkrk% AA15AA bahiravasthitāÍ oSekfudk% AA16AA vaimānikāÍ dYiksiiÂk% dYikrhrkÜÓ AA17AA kalpopapannāÍ kalpātītāśca 434 Tattvārthasūtra mi;qZifj AA18AA uparyupari lkSèkeSZ'kkulkuRdqekjekgsUaeczãczãksÙkjykUrodkfi'kqØegk'kqØ& 'krkjlgÏkjs"okurizk.kr;ksjkj.kkP;qr;ksuZolq xzSos;ds"kq fot;oSt;Urt;Urkijkftrs"kq lokZFkZfl1⁄4kS p AA19AA saudharmaiśānasānatkumāramāhendrabrahmabrahmottaralāntavakāpiÈÇhaśukramahāśukraśatārasahasrāreÈvānataprāõatayorāraõācyutayornavasu graiveyakeÈu vijayavaijayantajayantāparājiteÈu sarvārthasiddhau ca fLFkfrizHkkolq[k|qfrys';kfo'kq1⁄4hfUae;kofèkfo"k;rks¿fèkdk% AA20AA sthitiprabhāvasukhadyutileśyāviśuddhīndriyāvadhiviÈayato adhikāÍ xfr'kjhjifjxzgkfHkekurks ghuk% AA21AA gatiśarīraparigrahābhimānato hīnāÍ ihriÁ'kqDyys';k f}f=k'ks"ks"kq AA22AA pītapadmaśuklaleśyā dvitriśeÈeÈu izkXxzSos;dsH;% dYik% AA23AA prāggraiveyakebhyaÍ kalpāÍ czãyksdky;k ykSdkfUrdk% AA24AA brahmalokālayā laukāntikāÍ lkjLorkfnR;oÉÔ#.kxnZrks;rqf"krkO;kckèkkfj"VkÜÓ AA25AA sārasvatādityavahnyaruõagardatoyatuÈitāvyābādhāriÈÇāśca fot;kfn"kq f}pjek% AA26AA vijaysādiÈu dvicaramāÍ 435 rÙokFkZlw=k&ikB vkSiikfndeuq";sH;% 'ks"kkfLr;ZX;ksu;% AA27AA aupapādikamanuÈyebhyaÍ śeÈāstiryagyonayaÍ fLFkfrjlqjukxlqi.kZ}hi'ks"kk.kka lkxjksief=kiY;ksiek1⁄4Zghuferk% AA28AA sthitirasuranāgasuparõadvīpaśeÈāõāÉ sāgaropamatripalyopamārddhahīnamitāÍ lkSèkeSZ'kku;ks% lkxjksies¿fèkds AA29AA saudharmaiśānayoÍ sāgaropame adhike lkuRdqekjekgsUae;ks% lIr AA30AA sānatkumāramāhendrayoÍ sapta f=klIruoSdkn'k=k;ksn'kiÛÓn'kfHkjfèkdkfu rq AA31AA trisaptanavaikādaśatrayodaśapańcadaśabhiradhikāni tu vkj.kkP;qrknwèoZesdSdsu uolq xzSos;ds"kq fot;kfn"kq lokZFkZfl1⁄4kS p AA32AA āraõācyutādūrdhvamekaikena navasu graiveyakeÈu vijayādiÈu sarvārthasiddhau ca vijk iY;ksieefèkde~ AA33AA aparā palyopamamadhikam ijr% ijr% iwokZiwokZ¿uUrjk% AA34AA parataÍ parataÍ pūrvāpūrvā anantarāÍ ukjdk.kka p f}rh;kfn"kq AA35AA nārakāõāÉ ca dvitīyādiÈu n'ko"kZlgÏkf.k izFkek;ke~ AA36AA daśavarÈasahasrāõi prathamāyām Hkous"kq p AA37AA bhavaneÈu ca 436 Tattvārthasūtra O;Urjk.kka p AA38AA vyantarāõāÉ ca ijk iY;ksieefèkde~ AA39AA parā palyopamamadhikam T;ksfr"dk.kka p AA40AA jyotiÈkāõāÉ ca rn"VHkkxks¿ijk AA41AA tadaÈÇabhāgo aparā ykSdkfUrdkuke"VkS lkxjksiekf.k losZ"kke~ AA42AA laukāntikānāmaÈÇau sāgaropamāõi sarveÈām Chapter-5 vthodk;k èkekZèkekZdk'kiqñxyk% AA1AA ajīvakāyā dharmādharmākāśapudgalāÍ ik¡pok¡ vè;k; • aeO;kf.k AA2AA dravyāõi thokÜÓ AA3AA jīvāśca fuR;kofLFkrkU;:ikf.k AA4AA nityāvasthitānyarūpāõi :fi.k% iqñxyk% AA5AA rūpiõaÍ pudgalāÍ 437 rÙokFkZlw=k&ikB vk vkdk'kknsdaeO;kf.k AA6AA ā ākāśādekadravyāõi fuf"Ø;kf.k p AA7AA niÈkriyāõi ca vla[;s;k% izns'kk èkekZèkeZSdthokuke~ AA8AA asaÉkhyeyāÍ pradeśā dharmādharmaikajīvānām vkdk'kL;kuUrk% AA9AA ākāśasyānantāÍ la[;s;kla[;s;kÜÓ iqñxykuke~ AA10AA saÉkhyeyāsaÉkhyeyāśca pudgalānām uk.kks% AA11AA nāõoÍ yksdkdk'ks¿oxkg% AA12AA lokākāśe avagāhaÍ èkekZèkeZ;ks% dRLus AA13AA dharmādharmayoÍ kÃtsne ,dizns'kkfn"kq HkkT;% iqñxykuke~ AA14AA ekapradeśādiÈu bhajyaÍ pudgalānām vla[;s;Hkkxkfn"kq thokuke~ AA15AA asaÉkhyeyabhāgādiÈu jīvānām izns'klagkjfolikZH;ka iznhior~ AA16AA pradeśasaÉhāravisarpābhyāÉ pradīpavat 438 Tattvārthasūtra xfrfLFkR;qixzgkS èkekZèkeZ;ks#idkj% AA17AA gatisthityupagrahau dharmādharmyorupakāraÍ vkdk'kL;koxkg% AA18AA ākāśasyāvagāhaÍ 'kjhjokÄ~eu%izk.kkikuk% iqñxykuke~ AA19AA śarīravāńmanaÍprāõāpānāÍ pudgalānām lq[knq%[kthforej.kksixzgkÜÓ AA20AA sukhaduÍkhajīvitamaraõopagrahāśca ijLijksixzgks thokuke~ AA21AA parasparopagraho jīvānām orZukifj.kkefØ;k% ijRokijRos p dkyL; AA22AA vartanāpariõāmakriyāÍ partvāparatve ca kālasya Li'kZjlxUèko.kZoUr% iqñxyk% AA23AA sparśarasagandhavarõavantaÍ pudgalāÍ 'kCncUèklkS{E;LFkkSY;laLFkkuHksnreÀNk;kriks|ksroUrÜÓ AA24AA śabdabandhasaukÈmyasthaulyasaÉsthānabhedatamaśchāyātapodyotavantaśca v.ko% LdUèkkÜÓ AA25AA aõavaÍ skandhāśca HksnlkrsH; mRi|Urs AA26AA bhedasańghātebhya utpadyante Hksnkn.kq% AA27AA bhedādaõuÍ 439 rÙokFkZlw=k&ikB HksnlkrkH;ka pk{kq"k% AA28AA bhedasańghātābhyāÉ cākÈuÈaÍ lñaeO;y{k.ke~ AA29AA saddravyalakÈaõam mRiknO;;èkzkSO;;qDra lr~ AA30AA utpādavyayadhrauvyayuktaÉ sat rkokO;;a fuR;e~ AA31AA tadbhāvāvyayaÉ nityam v£irku£irfl1⁄4s% AA32AA arpitānarpitasiddheÍ fLuXèk:{kRokñ cUèk% AA33AA snigdharūkÈatvād bandhaÍ u t?kU;xq.kkuke~ AA34AA na jaghanyaguõānām xq.klkE;s ln`'kkuke~ AA35AA guõasāmye sadÃśānām }Ôfèkdkfnxq.kkuka rq AA36AA dvyadhikādiguõānāÉ tu cUèks¿fèkdkS ikfj.kkfedkS p AA37AA bandhe adhikau pāriõāmikau ca xq.ki;Z;oñ aeO;e~ AA38AA guõāparyayavad dravyam 440 Tattvārthasūtra dkyÜÓ AA39AA kālaśca lks¿uUrle;% AA40AA so anantasamayaÍ aeO;kJ;k fuxqZ.kk xq.kk% AA41AA dravyāśrayā nirguõā guõāÍ rko% ifj.kke% AA42AA tadbhāvaÍ pariõāmaÍ Chapter-6 dk;okÄ~eu%deZ ;ksx% AA1AA kāyavāńmanaÍkarma yogaÍ NBk vè;k; • l vkÏo% AA2AA sa āsravaÍ 'kqHk% iq.;L;k'kqHk% ikiL; AA3AA śubhaÍ puõyasyāśubhaÍ pāpasya ld"kk;kd"kk;;ks% lkEijkf;ds;kZiFk;ks% AA4AA sakaÈāyākaÈāyayoÍ sāmparāyikeryāpathayoÍ bfUae;d"kk;kozrfØ;k% iÛÓprq%iÛÓiÛÓ o'kfrla[;k% iwoZL; Hksnk% AA5AA indriyakaÈāyāvratakriyāÍ pańcacatuÍpańcapańcaviÉśatisaÉkhyāÍ pūrvasya bhedāÍ rhozeUnKkrkKkrHkkokfèkdj.koh;Zfo'ks"ksH;Lrf}'ks"k% AA6AA tīvramandajñātājñātabhāvādhikaraõavīryaviśeÈebhyastadviśeÈaÍ 441 rÙokFkZlw=k&ikB vfèkdj.ka thokthok% AA7AA adhikaraõaÉ jīvājīvāÍ vk|a lajEHklekjEHkkjEHk;ksxdrdkfjrkuqerd"kk;& fo'ks"kSfL=kfL=kfL=kÜÓrqÜÓSd'k% AA8AA ādyaÉ saÉrambhasamārambhārambhayogakÃtakāritānumatakaÈāyaviśeÈaistristristriścatuścaikaśaÍ fuoZrZukfu{ksila;ksxfulxkZ f}prq£}f=kHksnk% ije~ AA9AA nirvartanānikÈepasaÉyoganisargā dvicaturdvitribhedāÍ param rRiznks"kfuÉoekRl;kZUrjk;klknuksi?kkrk Kkun'kZukoj.k;ks% AA10AA tatpradoÈanihnavamātsaryāntarāyāsādanopaghātā jñānadarśanāvaraõayoÍ nq%[k'kksdrkikØUnuoèkifjnsoukU;kReijksHk;LFkkukU;l}s|L; AA11AA duÍkhaśokatāpākrandanavadhaparidevanānyātmaparobhayasthānānyasadvedyasya HkwrozR;uqdEiknkuljkxla;ekfn;ksx% {kkfUr% 'kkSpfefr l}s|L; AA12AA bhūtavratyanukampādānasarāgasaÉyamādiyogaÍ kÈāntiÍ śaucamiti sadvedyasya dsofyJqrla?kèkeZnsoko.kZoknks n'kZueksgL; AA13AA kevaliśrutasaÉghadharmadevāvarõavādo darśanamohasya d"kk;ksn;kÙkhozifj.kkeÜÓkfj=keksgL; AA14AA kaÈāyodayāttīvrapariõāmaścāritramohasya càkjEHkifjxzgRoa ukjdL;k;q"k% AA15AA bahvārambhaparigrahatvaÉ nārkasyāyuÈaÍ ek;k rS;ZX;ksuL; AA16AA māyā tairyagyonasya 442 Tattvārthasūtra vYikjEHkifjxzgRoa ekuq"kL; AA17AA alpārambhaparigrahatvaÉ mānuÈasya LoHkkoeknZoa p AA18AA svabhāvamārdavaÉ ca fuÀ'khyozrRoa p losZ"kke~ AA19AA niśśīlavratatvaÉ ca sarveÈām ljkxla;ela;ekla;ekdkefutZjkckyrikafl nSoL; AA20AA sarāgasaÉyamasaÉyamāsaÉyamākāmanirjarābālatapāÉsi daivasya lE;DRoa p AA21AA samyaktvaÉ ca ;ksxoØrk folaoknua pk'kqHkL; ukEu% AA22AA yogavakratā visaÉvādanaÉ cāśubhasya nāmnaÍ rf}ijhra 'kqHkL; AA23AA tadviparītaÉ śubhasya n'kZufo'kqf1⁄4£ou;lEiÂrk 'khyozrs"ourhpkjks¿Hkh{.kKkuksi;ksxlaosxkS 'kfDrrLR;kxrilh lkèkqlekfèkoZS;kòÙ;dj.kegZnkpk;ZcgqJqrizopu& HkfDrjko';dkifjgkf.kekZxZizHkkouk izopuoRlyRofefr rhFkZdjRoL; AA24AA darśanaviśuddhirvinayasampannatā śīlavrateÈvanatīcāro abhīkÈõajñānopayogasaÉvegau śaktitastyāgatapasī sādhusamādhirvaiyāvÃttyakaraõamarhadācāryabahuśrutapravacanabhaktirāvaśyakāparihāõirmārgaprabhāvanā pravacanavatsalatvamiti tīrthakaratvasya ijkRefuUnkiz'kals lnlñxq.kksPNknukskous p uhpSxksZ=kL; AA25AA parātmanindāpraśaÉse sadasadguõocchādanodbhāvane ca nīcairgotrasya 443 rÙokFkZlw=k&ikB rf}i;Z;ks uhpSòZÙ;uqRlsdkS pksÙkjL; AA26AA tadviparyayo nīcairvÃattyanutsekau cottarasya fo?udj.keUrjk;L; AA27AA vighnakaraõamantarāyasya Chapter-7 glk¿ùrLrs;kczãifjxzgsH;ks fojfroZzre~ AA1AA hiÉsā anÃtasteyābrahmaparigrahebhyo viratirvratam lkrok¡ vè;k; • ns'kloZrks¿.kqegrh AA2AA deśasarvato aõumahatī rRLFkS;kZFk± Hkkouk% iÛÓ iÛÓ AA3AA tatsthairyārthaÉ bhāvanāÍ pańca pańca okÄ~euksxqIrh;kZnkufu{ksi.klfeR;kyksfdrikuHkkstukfu iÛÓ AA4AA vāńmanoguptīryādānanikÈepaõasamityālokitapānabhojanāni pańca ØksèkyksHkHkh#RogkL;izR;k[;kukU;uqohfpHkk"k.ka p iÛÓ AA5AA krodhalobhabhīrutvahāsyapratyākhyānānyanuvīcibhaÈaõaÉ ca pańca 'kwU;kxkjfoeksfprkoklijksijksèkkdj.kHkS{;'kqf1⁄4lèkekZfolaoknk% iÛÓ AA6AA śūnyāgāravimocitāvāsaparoparodhākaraõabhaikÈyaśuddhisadharmāvisaÉvādāÍ pańca ÐhjkxdFkkJo.krUeuksgjkaxfujh{k.kiwoZjrkuqLej.kò";s"VjlLo'kjhjlaLdkjR;kxk% iÛÓ AA7AA strīrāgakathāśravaõatanmanoharāńganirīkÈaõapūrvaratānusmaraõavÃÈyeÈÇarasasvaśarīrasaÉskāratyāgāÍ pańca 444 Tattvārthasūtra euksKkeuksKsfUae;fo"k;jkx}s"kotZukfu iÛÓ AA8AA manojñāmanojñendriyaviÈayarāgadveÈavarjanāni pańca glkfnf"ogkeq=kkik;ko|n'kZue~ AA9AA hiÉsādiÈvihāmutrāpāyāvadyadarśanam nq%[keso ok AA10AA duÍkhameva vā eS=khizeksndk#.;ekè;LF;kfu p lÙoxq.kkfèkdfDy';ekukfous;s"kq AA11AA maitrīpramodakāruõyamādhyasthyāni ca sattvaguõādhikakliśyamānāvineyeÈu txRdk;LoHkkokS ok laosxoSjkX;kFkZe~ AA12AA jagatkāyasvabhāvau vā saÉvegavairāgyārtham izeÙk;ksxkRizk.kO;ijksi.ka glk AA13AA pramattayogātprāõavyaparopaõaÉ hiÉsā vlnfHkèkkueùre~ AA14AA asadabhidhānamanÃtam vnÙkknkua Lrs;e~ AA15AA adattādānaÉ steyam eSFkqueczã AA16AA maithunamabrahma ewPNkZ ifjxzg% AA17AA mūrcchā parigrahaÍ fuÀ'kY;ks ozrh AA18AA niśśalyo vratī 445 rÙokFkZlw=k&ikB vxk;ZuxkjÜÓ AA19AA agāryanagāraśca v.kqozrks¿xkjh AA20AA aõuvrato agārī fnXns'kkuFkZn.Mfojfrlkekf;dizks"kèkksioklksiHkksxifjHkksx& ifjek.kkfrfFklafoHkkxozrlaiÂÜÓ AA21AA digdeśānarthadaõçaviratisāmāyikaproÈadhopavāsopabhogaparibhogaparimāõātithisaÉvibhāgavratasaÉpannaśca ekj.kkfUrdha lYys[kuka tksf"krk AA22AA māraõāntikīÉ sallekhanāÉ joÈitā 'kadkdka{kkfofpfdRlk¿U;n`f"Viz'kalklaLrok% lE;Xn`"Vsjfrpkjk% AA23AA śańkākāńkÈāvicikitsā anyadÃÈÇipraśaÉsāsaÉstavāÍ samyagdÃÈÇeraticārāÍ ozr'khys"kq iÛÓ iÛÓ ;FkkØee~ AA24AA vrataśīleÈu pańca pańca yathākramam cUèkoèkPNsnkfrHkkjkjksi.kkÂikufujks/k% AA25AA bandhavadhacchedātibhārāropaõānnapānanirodhāÍ feF;ksins'kjgksH;k[;kudwVys[kfØ;kU;klkigkjlkdkjeU=kHksnk% AA26AA mithyopadeśarahobhyākhyānakūÇalekhakriyānyāsāpahārasākāramantrabhedāÍ Lrsuiz;ksxrnkârknkufo#1⁄4jkT;kfrØeghukfèkdekuksUekuizfr:idO;ogkjk% AA27AA stenaprayogatadāhÃtādānaviruddharājyātikramahīnādhikamānonmānapratirūpakavyavahārāÍ ijfookgdj.ksRofjdkifjx`ghrk¿ifjx`ghrkxeukuÄØhMkdkerhozkfHkfuos'kk% AA28AAõ paravivāhakaraõetvarikāparigÃhītā aprigÃhītāgamanānańgakrīçākāmatīvrābhiniveśāÍ Tattvārthasūtra {ks=kokLrqfgj.;lqo.kZèkuèkkU;nklhnkldqI;izek.kkfrØek% AA29AA kÈetravāstuhiraõyasuvarõadhanadhānyadāsīdāsakupyapramāõātikramāÍ ÅèokZèkfLr;ZXO;frØe{ks=kòf1⁄4LèR;Urjkèkkukfu AA30AA ūrdhvādhastiryagvyatikramakÈetravÃddhismÃtyantarādhānāni vku;uisz";iz;ksx'kCn:ikuqikriqñxy{ksik% AA31AA ānayanapreÈyaprayogaśabdarūpānupātapudgalakÈepāÍ dUniZdkSRdqP;ekS[k;kZleh{;kfèkdj.kksiHkksxifjHkksxkuFkZD;kfu AA32AA kandarpakautkucyamaukharyāsamīkÈyādhikaraõopabhogaparibhogānarthakyāni ;ksxnq"izf.kèkkukuknjLèR;uqiLFkkukfu AA33AA yogaduÈpraõidhānānādarasmÃtyanupasthānāni vizR;osf{krkizek£trksRlxkZnkulaLrjksiØe.kkuknjLèR;uqiLFkkukfu AA34AA apratyavekÈitāpramārjitotsargādānasaÉstaropakramaõānādarasmÃtyanupasthānāni lfpÙklEcUèklfEeJkfHk"konq%iDokgkjk% AA35AA sacittasambandhasammiśrābhiÈavaduÍpakvāhārāÍ lfpÙkfu{ksikfièkkuijO;ins'kekRl;ZdkykfrØek% AA36AA sacittanikÈepāpidhānaparavyapadeśamātsaryakālātikramāÍ thforej.kk'kalkfe=kkuqjkxlq[kkuqcUèkfunkukfu AA37AA jīvitamaraõāśaÉsāmitrānurāgasukhānubandhanidānāni vuqxzgkFk± LoL;kfrlxksZ nkue~ AA38AA anugrahārthaÉ svasyātisargo dānam fofèkaeO;nkr`ik=kfo'ks"kkÙkf}'ks"k% AA39AA vidhidravyadātÃpātraviśeÈāttadviśeÈaÍ 447 rÙokFkZlw=k&ikB Chapter-8 feF;kn'kZukfojfrizeknd"kk;;ksxk cUèkgsro% AA1AA mithyādarśanāviratipramādakaÈāyayogā bandhahetavaÍ vkBok¡ vè;k; • ld"kk;RokTtho% deZ.kks ;ksX;kUiqñxykuknÙks l cUèk% AA2AA sakaÈāyatvājjīvaÍ karmaõo yogyānpudgalānādatte sa bandhaÍ izdfrfLFkR;uqHkoizns'kkLrf}èk;% AA3AA prakÃtisthityanubhavapradeśāstadvidhayaÍ vk|ks Kkun'kZukoj.kosnuh;eksguh;k;qukZexks=kkUrjk;k% AA4AA ādyo jñānadarśanāvaraõavedanīyamohanīyāyuÍnāmagotrāntarāyāÍ iÛÓuo}Ô"Vk o'kfrprq£}pRok j'kñf}iÛÓHksnk;FkkØee~ AA5AA pańcanavadvyaÈÇāviÉśaticaturdvicatvāriÉśaddvipańcabhedāyathākramam efrJqrkofèkeu%i;Z;dsoykuke~ AA6AA matiśrutāvadhimanaÍparyayakevalānām p{kqjp{kqjofèkdsoykuka fuaekfuaekfuaekizpykizpykizpykLR;kux`1⁄4;ÜÓ AA7AA cakÈuracakÈuravadhikevalānāÉ nidrānidrānidrāpracalāpracalāpracalāstyānagÃddhayaśca lnl}s|s AA8AA sadasadvedye n'kZupkfj=keksguh;kd"kk;d"kk;osnuh;k[;kfL=kf}uo"kksM'kHksnk% lE;DRofeF;kRo& rnqHk;kU;d"kk;d"kk;kS gkL;jR;jfr'kksdHk;tqxqIlkL=khiqÂiaqldosnk vuUrkuqcUè;izR;k[;kuizR;k[;kulaToyufodYikÜÓSd'k% Øksèkekuek;kyksHkk% AA9AA darśanacāritramohanīyākaÈāyakaÈāyavedanīyākhyāstridvinavaÈodaśabhedaÍ samyaktvamithyātvatadubhayānyakaÈāyakaÈāyau 448 Tattvārthasūtra hāsyaratyaratiśokabhayajugupsāstrīpunnapuÉsakavedā anantānubandhyapratyākhyānapratyākhyānasaÉjvalanavikalpāścaikaśaÍ krodhamānamāyālobhāÍ ukjdrS;ZX;ksuekuq"knSokfu AA10AA nārakatairyagyonamānuÈadaivāni xfrtkfr'kjhjkaxksikaxfuekZ.kcUèkula?kkrlaLFkkulaguuLi'kZjlxaèk& o.kkZuqiwO;kZxq#y?kwi?kkrij?kkrkriks|ksrksPÑoklfogk;ksxr;% izR;sd'kjhj=kllqHkxlqLoj'kqHklw{ei;kZfIrfLFkjkns;;'k%dh£rlsrjkf.k rhFkZdjRoa p AA11AA gatijātiśarīrāńgopāńganirmāõabandhanasaÉghātasaÉsthānasaÉhananasparśarasagandhavarõānupūrvyāgurulaghūpaghātaparaghātātapodyotocchvāsavihāyogatayaÍ pratyekaśarīratrasasubhagasusvaraśubhasūkÈmaparyāptisthirādeyayaśaÍkīrtisetarāõi tīrthakaratvaÉ ca mPpSuhZpSÜÓ AA12AA uccairnīcaiśca nkuykHkHkksxksiHkksxoh;kZ.kke~ AA13AA dānalābhabhogopabhogavīryāõām vkfnrfLrl`.kkeUrjk;L; p =k'kRlkxjksiedksVhdksVÔ% ijk fLFkfr% AA14AA āditastisÃõāmantarāyasya ca triÉśatsāgaropamakoÇīkoÇyaÍ parā sthitiÍ lIrfreksZguh;L; AA15AA saptatirmohanīyasya o'kfrukZexks=k;ks% AA16AA viÉśatirnāmagotrayoÍ 449 rÙokFkZlw=k&ikB vijk }kn'k eqgwrkZ osnuh;L; AA18AA aparā dvādaśa muhūrtā vedanīyasya ukexks=k;ksj"VkS AA19AA nāmagotrayoraÈÇau 'ks"kk.kkeUreZqgwrkZ AA20AA śeÈāõāmantarmuhūrtā foikdks¿uqHko% AA21AA vipāko anubhavaÍ l ;Fkkuke AA22AA sa yathānāma rrÜÓ futZjk AA23AA tataśca nirjarā ukeizR;;k% loZrks ;ksxfo'ks"kkRlw{eSd{ks=kkoxkgfLFkrk% lokZReizns'ks"ouUrkuUrizns'kk% AA24AA nāmapratyayāÍ sarvato yogaviśeÈātsūkÈmaikakÈetrāvagāhasthitāÍ sarvātmapradeśeÈvanantānantapradeśāÍ l}s|'kqqHkk;qukZexks=kkf.k iq.;e~ AA25AA sadvedyaśubhāyurnāmagotrāõi puõyam vrks¿U;Rikie~ AA26AA ato anyatpāpam =k; L=k'kRlkxjksiek.;k;q"k% AA17AA trayastriÉśatsāgaropamāõyāyuÈaÍ 450 Tattvārthasūtra Chapter-9 vkÏofujksèk% laoj% AA1AA āsravanirodhaÍ saÉvaraÍ ukSok¡ vè;k; • l xqfIrlfefrèkekZuqisz{kkijh"kgt;pkfj=kS% AA2AA sa guptisamitidharmānuprekÈāparīÈahajayacāritraiÍ rilk futZjk p AA3AA tapasā nirjarā ca lE;X;ksxfuxzgks xqfIr% AA4AA samyagyoganigraho guptiÍ bZ;kZHkk"kS"k.kknkufu{ksiksRlxkZ% lfer;% AA5AA īryābhāÈaiÈaõādānanikÈepotsargāÍ samitayaÍ mÙke{kekeknZoktZo'kkSplR;la;eriLR;kxkfdÛÓU;czãp;kZf.k èkeZ% AA6AA uttamakÈamāmārdavārjavaśaucasatyasaÉyamatapastyāgākincanyabrahmacaryāõi dharmaÍ vfuR;k'kj.klalkjSdRokU;Rok'kqP;kÏolaojfutZjk& yksdcksfèknqyZHkèkeZLok[;krRokuqfpUrueuqisz{kk% AA7AA anityāśaraõasaÉsāraikatvānyatvāśucyāsravasaÉvaranirjaralokabodhidurlabhadharmasvākhyātatvānucintanamanuprekÈāÍ ekxkZP;oufutZjkFk± ifj"kks<O;k% ijh"kgk% AA8AA margācyavananirjarārthaÉ pariÈoçhavyāÍ parīÈahāÍ {kqfRiiklk'khrks".kna'ke'kdukXU;kjfrÐhp;kZfu"k|k'kÕ;kØks'koèk;kpuk¿ykHk& jksxr`.kLi'kZeylRdkjiqjLdkjizKk¿Kkukn'kZukfu AA9AA kÈutpipāsāśītoÈõadaÉśamaśakanāgnyāratistrīcaryāniÈadyāśayyākrośavadhayācanā alābharogatÃaõasparśamalasatkārapuraskāraprajñā ajñānādarśanāni 451 rÙokFkZlw=k&ikB lw{elkEijk;NÁLFkohrjkx;ksÜÓrqnZ'k AA10AA sūkÈmasāmparāyachadmasthavītarāgayoścaturdaśa ,dkn'k ftus AA11AA ekādaśa jine cknjlkEijk;s losZ AA12AA bādarasāmparāye sarve Kkukoj.ks izKk¿Kkus AA13AA jñānāvaraõe prajñā ajñāne n'kZueksgkUrjk;;ksjn'kZukykHkkS AA14AA darśanamohāntarāyayoradarśanālabhau pkfj=keksgs ukXU;kjfrÐhfu"k|kØks'k;kpuklRdkjiqjLdkjk% AA15AA cāritramohe nāgnyāratistrīniÈadyākrośayācanāsatkārapuraskārāÍ osnuh;s 'ks"kk% AA16AA vedanīye śeÈāÍ ,dkn;ks HkkT;k ;qxinsdfLeÂSdksu o'krs% AA17AA ekādayo bhājyā yugapadekasminnaikonaviÉśateÍ lkekf;dPNsnksiLFkkiukifjgkjfo'kqf1⁄4lw{elkEijk;;Fkk[;krfefr pkfj=ke~ AA18AA sāmāyikacchedopasthāpanāparihāraviśuddhisūkÈmasāmparāyayathākhyātamiti cāritram vu'kukoekSn;ZòfÙkifjla[;kujlifjR;kxfofoÙkQ'kÕ;kludk;Dys'kk ckáa ri% AA19AA anaśanāvamaudaryavÃttiparisaÉkhyānarasaparityāgaviviktaśayyāsanakāyakleśā bāhyaÉ tapaÍ 452 Tattvārthasūtra izk;fÜÓÙkfou;oS;kòÙ;Lokè;k;O;qRlxZè;kukU;qÙkje~ AA20AA prāyaścittavinayavaiyāvÃttyasvādhyāyavyutsargadhyānānyuttaram uoprqnZ'kiÛÓf}Hksnk ;FkkØea izkXè;kukr~ AA21AA navacaturdaśapańcadvibhedā yathākramaÉ prāgdhyānāt vkykspuizfrØe.krnqHk;foosdO;qRlxZRkiÀNsnifjgkjksiLFkkiuk% AA22AA ālocanapratikramaõatadubhayavivekavyutsargatapaśchedaparihāropasthāpanāÍ Kkun'kZupkfj=kksipkjk% AA23AA jñānadarśanacāritropacārāÍ vkpk;ksZikè;k;rifLo'kS{kXykux.kdqyla?klkèkqeuksKkuke~ AA24AA ācāryopādhyāyatapasviśaikÈaglānagaõakulasaÉghasādhumanojñānām okpukìPNukuqisz{kk¿Euk;èkeksZins'kk% AA25AA vācanāpÃcchanānuprekÈā āmnāyadharmopadeśāÍ ckákH;Urjksiè;ks% AA26AA bāhyābhyantaropadhyoÍ mÙkelaguuL;SdkxzfpUrkfujksèkks è;kuekUreZqgwrkZr~ AA27AA uttamasaÉhananasyaikāgracintānirodho dhyānamāntarmuhūrtāt vkrZjkSaeèkE;Z'kqDykfu AA28AA ārtaraudradharmyaśuklāni ijs eks{kgsrw AA29AA pare mokÈahetū vkrZeeuksKL; lEiz;ksxs rf}iz;ksxk; LèfrleUokgkj% AA30AA ārtamamanojñasya samprayoge tadviprayogāya smÃtisamanvāhāraÍ 453 rÙokFkZlw=k&ikB foijhra euksKL; AA31AA viparītaÉ manojñasya osnuk;kÜÓ AA32AA vedanāyāśca funkua p AA33AA nidānaÉ ca rnfojrns'kfojrizeÙkla;rkuke~ AA34AA tadaviratadeśaviratapramattasaÉyatānām glk¿ùrLrs;fo"k;laj{k.ksH;ks jkSaeefojrns'kfojr;ks% AA35AA hiÉsā anÃtasteyaviÈayasaÉrakÈaõebhyo raudramaviratadeśaviratayoÍ vkKk¿ik;foikdlaLFkkufop;k; èkE;Ze~ AA36AA ājñā apāyavipākasaÉsthānavicayāya dharmyam 'kqDys pk|s iwoZfon% AA37AA śukle cādye pūrvavidaÍ ijs dsofyu% AA38AA pare kevalinaÍ ìFkDRoSdRofordZlw{efØ;kizfrikfrO;qijrfØ;kfuorhZfu AA39AA pÃthaktvaikatvavitarkasūkÈmakriyāpratipātivyuparatakriyānivartīni =;sd;ksxdk;;ksxk;ksxkuke~ AA40AA tryekayogakāyayogāyogānām ,dkJ;s lfordZohpkjs iwosZ AA41AA ekāśraye savitarkavīcāre pūrve 454 Tattvārthasūtra vohpkja f}rh;e~ AA42AA avīcāraÉ dvitīyam fordZ% Jqre~ AA43AA vitarkaÍ śrutam ohpkjks¿FkZO;×tu;ksxlaØkfUr% AA44AA vīcāro arthavyańjanayogasaÉkrāntiÍ lE;Xn`f"VJkodfojrkuUrfo;kstdn'kZueksg{kidksi'kedksi'kkUreksg{kid& {kh.keksgftuk% Øe'kks¿la[;s;xq.kfutZjk% AA45AA samyagdÃÈÇiśrāvakaviratānantaviyojakadarśanamohakÈapakopaśamakopaśāntamohakÈapakakÈiõamohajināÍ kramaśo asaÉkhyeyaguõanirjarāÍ iqykdcdq'kdq'khyfuxzZUFkLukrdk fuxzZUFkk% AA46AA pulākabakuśakuśīlanirgranthasnātakā nirgranthāÍ la;eJqrizfrlsoukrhFkZ yxysÀ;ksiiknLFkkufodYir% lkè;k% AA47AA saÉyamaśrutapratisevanātīrthalińgaleśyopapādasthānavikalpataÍ sādhyāÍ Chapter-10 eksg{k;kTKkun'kZukoj.kkUrjk;{k;kPp dsoye~ AA1AA mohakÈayājjñānadarśanāvaraõāntarāyakÈayācca kevalam nlok¡ vè;k; • cUèkgsRoHkkofutZjkH;ka d`RLudeZfoizeks{kks eks{k% AA2AA bandhahetvabhāvanirjarābhyāÉ kÃtsnakarmavipramokÈo mokÈaÍ vkSi'kfedkfnHkO;Rokuka p AA3AA aupaśamikādibhavyatvānāÉ ca 455 rÙokFkZlw=k&ikB vU;=kdsoylE;DRoKkun'kZufl1⁄4RosH;% AA4AA anyatrakevalasamyaktvajñānadarśanasiddhatvebhyaÍ rnuUrjewèo± xPNR;kyksdkUrkr~ AA5AA tadanantaramūrdhvaÉ gacchatyālokāntāt iwoZiz;ksxknlaxRokñ cUèkPNsnkÙkFkkxfrifj.kkekPp AA6AA pūrvaprayogādasaÉgatvād bandhacchedāttathāgatipariõāmācca vkfo1⁄4dqykypØoñO;ixrysikykcqonsj.MchtonfXuf'k[kkoPp AA7AA āviddhakulālacakravadvyapagatalepālābuvaderaõçabījavadagniśikhāvacca èkekZfLrdk;kHkkokr~ AA8AA dharmāstikāyābhāvāt {ks=kdkyxfr yxrhFkZpkfj=kizR;sdcq1⁄4cksfèkrKkukoxkgUkkUrj& la[;kYicgqRor% lkè;k% AA9AA kÈetrakālagatilińgatīrthacāritrapratyekabuddhabodhitajñānāvagāhanāntarasaÉkhyālpabahutvataÍ sādhyāÍ ] ] ] n'kkè;k;s ifjfPNUus RkÙokFksZ ifBrs lfr A iQya L;knqioklL; Hkkf"kra eqfuiqÄoS% AAõ The excellent muni have proclaimed that the worthy soul who reads, with understanding, the Tattvārthasūtra, comprising ten chapters, earns the fruit of a day's fasting. 456 Tattvārthasūtra nl vè;k; izek.k rÙokFkZlw=k dk HkyhHkk¡fr ikB vkSj vuqxe djus ls ,d miokl dk iQy izkIr gksrk gS & ,slk Js"B eqfujktksa us dgk gSA As Āchārya Vidyanand writes in the Foreword of Samayasāra, it is the ultimate conscious reality. The enlightened soul has infinite glory. It has the innate ability to demolish karmas, both auspicious as well as inauspicious, which constitute the cycle of births and deaths, and are obstacles in the path to liberation. Samayasāra is an essential reading for anyone who wishes to lead a purposeful and contented life. It provides irrefutable and lasting solutions to all our problems, concerning worldly ways as well as spiritual curiosities and misgivings. Āchārya Kundkund's Samayasāra WITH HINDI AND ENGLISH TRANSLATION ISBN 81-903639-3-X Rs. 350/-  Published: 2012  Hard Bound  Printed on Art Paper  Pages: xvi + 208  Size: 16  22.5 cm English Translation, and Edited by: Vijay K. Jain Foreword by: Āchārya 108 Vidyanand Muni Jhenkpk;Z dqUndqUn fojfpr le;lkj • Prakrit • Hindi • English Sacred Jaina Texts from Vikalp Printers www.vikalpprinters.com 457 Shri Amritchandra Suri's PuruÈārthasiddhyupāya is a matchless Jaina text that deals with the conduct required of the householder (śrāvaka). In no other text that deals with the conduct required of the householder we see the same treatment of complex issues such as the transcendental and the empirical points of view, cause and effect relationships, and injury and non-injury, maintaining throughout the spiritual slant. The basic tenet of Jainism – noninjury or ahiÉsā – has been explained in detail in the book. WITH HINDI AND ENGLISH TRANSLATION ISBN 81-903639-4-8 Rs. 350/-  Published: 2012  Hard Bound  Printed on NS Maplitho Paper  Pages: xvi + 191  Size: 16  22.5 cm Foreword by: Āchārya 108 Vidyanand Muni Shri Amritchandra Suri's PuruÈārthasiddhyupāya Realization of the Pure Self Jh vèrpUaelwjh fojfpr iq#"kkFkZfl1⁄4Ôqik; English Translation, and Edited by: Vijay K. Jain • Sanskrit • Hindi • English 458 ISBN 81-903639-5-6 Rs. 450/DravyasaÉgraha is one of the finest classical Jaina texts, composed by His Holiness Ācārya Nemichandra (circa 10th century CE). It deals primarily with the Realities (tattva) that contribute to world process. The conduct required for attaining the ultimate goal of liberation follows from the knowledge of these Realities. Both, the transcendental and the empirical points of view, have been considered while explaining the nature of substances, souls and non-souls. It will be of much use to scholars worldwide interested in pursuing the study of Jaina epistemology.  Published: 2013  Hard Bound  Printed on NS Maplitho Paper  Pages: xvi + 216  Size: 16  22.5 cm Foreword by: Ācārya 108 Vidyanand Muni With Authentic Explanatory Notes Ācārya Nemichandra's DravyasaÉgraha vkpk;Z usfepUae fojfpr aeO;laxzg English Translation, and Edited by: Vijay K. Jain • Prakrit • Hindi • English 459 Rs. 450/-  Published: 2014  Hard Bound  Printed on NS Maplitho Paper  Pages: xvi + 152  Size: 16  22.5 cm Ācārya Pūjyapāda's IÈÇopadeśa – The Golden Discourse vkpk;Z iwT;ikn fojfpr b"Vksins'k Foreword by: Ācārya 108 Vidyanand Muni Vijay K. Jain By: ISBN 81-903639-6-4 His Holiness Ācārya Pūjyapāda, who graced this earth around 5th century CE, had crafted some valuable gems of Jaina doctrine, including Sarvārthasiddhi and IÈÇopadeśa. Concise but deep in import, IÈÇopadeśa unambiguously establishes the glory of the Self. It is an essential reading for the ascetic. The householder too who ventures to study it stands to benefit much as the work establishes the futility of worldly objects and pursuits, and strengthens right faith, the basis for all that is good and virtuous. • Sanskrit • English 460 Rs. 500/-  Published: 2015  Hard Bound  Printed on NS Maplitho Paper  Pages: xxiv + 220  Size: 16  22.5 cm Divine Blessings: Ācārya 108 Vidyanand Muni Vijay K. Jain By: ISBN 81-903639-7-2 Ācārya Samantabhadra's Svayambhūstotra (circa 2nd century CE) is a fine composition in Sanskrit dedicated to the adoration of the Twentyfour Tīrthaôkara, the Most Worshipful Supreme Beings. Through its 143 verses Svayambhūstotra not only enriches reader's devotion, knowledge, and conduct but also frees his mind from blind faith and superstitions. Rid of ignorance and established firmly in right faith, he experiences ineffable tranquility and equanimity. The book has two useful Appendices. Appendix-1 attempts to familiarize the reader with the divisions of empirical time that are used extensively in Jaina cosmology. Appendix-2 provides a glimpse of life stories, adapted from authentic Jaina texts, of the Twenty-four Tīrthaôkara. Ācārya Samantabhadra's Svayambhūstotra – Adoration of The Twenty-four Tīrthaôkara vkpk;Z leUrHkae fojfpr Lo;EHkwLrks=k • Sanskrit • Hindi • English 461 Rs. 500/-  Published: 2016  Hard Bound  Printed on NS Maplitho Paper  Pages: xxiv + 200  Size: 16  22.5 cm Divine Blessings: Ācārya 108 Vidyanand Muni Vijay K. Jain By: ISBN 81-903639-8-0 Ācārya Samantabhadra's ĀptamīmāÚsā (Devāgamastotra) Deep Reflection On The Omniscient Lord vkpk;Z leUrHkae fojfpr vkIrehekalk (nsokxeLrks=k) • Sanskrit • Hindi • English ĀptamīmāÚsā by Ācārya Samantabhadra (circa 2nd century CE) starts with a discussion, in a philosophical-cum-logical manner, on the Jaina concept of omniscience and the attributes of the Omniscient. The Ācārya questions the validity of the attributes that are traditionally associated with a praiseworthy deity and goes on to establish the logic of accepting the Omniscient as the most trustworthy and praiseworthy Supreme Being. Employing the doctrine of conditional predications (syādvāda) – the logical expression of reality in light of the foundational principle of non-absolutism (anekāntavāda) – he faults certain conceptions based on absolutism. He finally elucidates correct perspectives on issues including fate and human-effort, and bondage of meritorious (puõya) or demeritorious (pāpa) karmas. 462 Rs. 500/-  Published: 2016  Hard Bound  Printed on NS Paper  Pages: xxiv + 264  Size: 16  22.5 cm Divine Blessings: Ācārya 108 Vidyanand Muni Vijay K. Jain By: ISBN 81-903639-9-9 Ācārya Samantabhadra's Ratnakaraõçaka-śrāvakācāra – The Jewel-casket of Householder's Conduct vkpk;Z leUrHkae fojfpr jRudj.MdJkodkpkj • Sanskrit • Hindi • English Ācārya Samantabhadra's (circa 2nd century CE) Ratnakaraõçaka-śrāvakācāra, comprising 150 verses, is a celebrated and perhaps the earliest Digambara work dealing with the excellent path of dharma that every householder (śrāvaka) must follow. All his efforts should be directed towards the acquisition and safekeeping of the Three Jewels (ratnatraya), comprising right faith (samyagdarśana), right knowledge (samyagjñāna) and right conduct (samyakcāritra), which lead to releasing him from worldly sufferings and establishing him in the state of supreme happiness. Giving up of the body in a manner that upholds righteousness on the occurrence of a calamity, famine, senescence, or disease, from which there is no escape, is called the vow of sallekhanā. All persons with right faith, the ascetic as well as the householder, look forward to attaining voluntary, passionless death at the appropriate time. The treatise finally describes the eleven stages (pratimā) of the householder's conduct. 463 Rs. 600/-  Published: 2017  Hard Bound  Printed on NS Paper  Pages: xlii + 202  Size: 16  22.5 cm Divine Blessings: Ācārya 108 Vidyanand Muni Vijay K. Jain By: ISBN 978-81-932726-0-2 Ācārya Pūjyapāda's Samādhitańtram – Supreme Meditation vkpk;Z iwT;ikn fojfpr lekf/ra=ke~ • Sanskrit • Hindi • English Ācārya Pūjyapāda's (circa 5th century CE) Samādhitańtram is a spiritual work consisting of 105 verses outlining the path to liberation for the inspired soul. Living beings have three kinds of soul – the extroverted-soul (bahirātmā), the introverted-soul (antarātmā), and the pure-soul (paramātmā). The one who mistakes the body and the like for the soul is the extroverted-soul (bahirātmā). The extrovertedsoul spends his entire life in delusion and suffers throughout. The one who entertains no delusion about psychic dispositions – imperfections like attachment and aversion, and soul-nature – is the introverted-soul (antarātmā). The knowledgeable introverted-soul disconnects the body, including the senses, from the soul. The one who is utterly pure and rid of all karmic dirt is the pure-soul (paramātmā). Samādhitańtram expounds the method of realizing the pure-soul, the light of supreme knowledge, and infinite bliss. Samādhitańtram answers the vexed question, 'Who am I?' in forceful and outrightly logical manner, in plain words. No one, the ascetic or the householder, can afford not to realize the Truth contained in the treatise, comprehend it through and through, and change his conduct accordingly. 464 Rs. 600/-  Published: 2018  Hard Bound  Printed on Art Paper  Pages: lxi + 345  Size: 16  22.5 cm Divine Blessings: Ācārya 108 Vidyanand Muni Vijay K. Jain By: ISBN 978-81-932726-1-9 Ācārya Kundakunda's Pravacanasāra – Essence of the Doctrine vkpk;Z dqUndqUn fojfpr izopulkj • Prakrit • Sanskrit • Hindi • English Ācārya Kundakunda's (circa 1st century BCE) 'Pravacanasāra' is among the most popular Jaina Scriptures that are studied with great reverence by the ascetics as well as the laymen. Consciousness manifests in form of cognition (upayoga) – purecognition (śuddhopayoga), auspicious-cognition (śubhopayoga) and inauspiciouscognition (aśubhopayoga). Pure-cognition represents conduct without-attachment (vītarāga cāritra). Perfect knowledge or omniscience (kevalajñāna) is the fruit of purecognition (śuddhopayoga). The soul engaged in pure-cognition (śuddhopayoga) enjoys supreme happiness engendered by the soul itself; this happiness is beyond the five senses. Omniscience (kevalajñāna) is real happiness; there is no difference between knowledge and happiness. Delusion (moha), the contrary and ignorant view of the soul about substances, is the cause of misery. The soul with attachment (rāga) toward external objects makes bonds with karmas and the soul without attachment toward external objects frees itself from the bonds of karmas. 465 466 Tattvārthasūtra E P I L O G U E kjkjouruoj k kj My family members have expressed their approval (anumodanā) of my intense involvement in this work through a sweet and thoughtful gesture. They have resolved as under: • Mrs. Manju Jain will undertake pilgrimage to two holy places – Sammed Shikharji and Hastinapur – and gift 5 copies of the book at each place. • Mr. Raghav Chhabra and Mrs. Sonal Jain Chhabra will personally gift 20 copies of the book to Jaina temples and/or muni/āryikā. Tanisha (111⁄2 years) will memorize at least 5 sūtra. Kushagra (8 years) will practice reading aloud passages in English. • Mr. Kishore Jain and Mrs. Malika Jain will personally gift 20 copies of the book to Jaina temples and/or muni/āryikā. – VKJ ] ] ] fodYi Vikalp Printers vkpk;Z Jh mekLokeh fojfpr rÙokFkZlw=k tSu n'kZu dh dqath gSA tks lkr rÙoksa esa lE;XJ1⁄4ku djrk gS fu'p; ls ogh lE;Xn`f gS vkSj ogh eks{k&iFk dk vkjksgd gSA ;g 'kkÐ aeO;kuq;ksx dk lkj gSA bl 'kkÐ dk vè;;u eqfu ds fy;s rks vfr vko';d gS gh] Jkodksa ds fy;s Hkh ;g ije mi;ksxh gSA Jh fot; dqekj tSu bl i×pe dky esa Hkh ,sls 'kqHk Kkuksi;ksx esa layXu gSa tSlk fd izk;% eqfu&p;kZ esa gh ns[kus esa vkrk gSA os lEiw.kZ tSu txr dks ,slh vuqie HksaV ns jgs gSa tks cgqr le; rd HkO; thoksa ds fy;s midkjh gksxhA ,sls eks{kekxhZ Jkod dks eSa varjkRek ls cgqr&cgqr eaxy vk'khokZn nsrk gw¡A vkpk;Z 108 Jh fu%'kadHkw"k.k eqfu ;g izLrqfr rÙokFkZlw=k rFkk lokZFkZflf1⁄4 ,sls nks egku~ 'kkÐksa dk leUo; gSA ;s nksuksa gh 'kkÐ tSu n'kZu ds LrEHk gSaA buesa ftusUaenso ds 'kklu:ih vèr dk lkj gS rFkk lHkh dks budk eu%iwoZd vè;;u djuk pkfg;sA vius foy{k.k o vdFkuh; iz;kl ls Jh fot; dqekj tSu us bu 'kkÐksa dk vaxzth vuqokn izLrqr fd;k gSA mudk ;g dk;Z vfr iz'kaluh; gSA vkus okys cgqr le; rd mudh ;g izLrqfr HkO; thoksa dh iFk&izn'kZd jgsxhA iq.;kRek Jh fot; dqekj tSu dks eSa cgqr&cgqr eaxy vk'khokZn nsrh gw¡A xf.kuh vk£;dk 105 fo|kJh ekrkth vkpk;Z 108 Jh fo|kuUn eqfu dh lq;ksX; f'k";k 30 vDVwcj 2018] gfLrukiqj 30 vDVwcj 2018] gfLrukiqj

. Leibniz and His Correspondents. : Cambridge University Press, . p 26 http://site.ebrary.com/id/10130461?ppg=26 Copyright © Cambridge University Press. . All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or applicable copyright law. . Leibniz and His Correspondents. : Cambridge University Press, . p 27 http://site.ebrary.com/id/10130461?ppg=27 Copyright © Cambridge University Press. . All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or applicable copyright law. . Leibniz and His Correspondents. : Cambridge University Press, . p 28 http://site.ebrary.com/id/10130461?ppg=28 Copyright © Cambridge University Press. . All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or applicable copyright law. . Leibniz and His Correspondents. : Cambridge University Press, . p 29 http://site.ebrary.com/id/10130461?ppg=29 Copyright © Cambridge University Press. . All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or applicable copyright law. . Leibniz and His Correspondents. : Cambridge University Press, . p 30 http://site.ebrary.com/id/10130461?ppg=30 Copyright © Cambridge University Press. . All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or applicable copyright law. . Leibniz and His Correspondents. : Cambridge University Press, . p 31 http://site.ebrary.com/id/10130461?ppg=31 Copyright © Cambridge University Press. . All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or applicable copyright law. . Leibniz and His Correspondents. : Cambridge University Press, . p 32 http://site.ebrary.com/id/10130461?ppg=32 Copyright © Cambridge University Press. . All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or applicable copyright law. . Leibniz and His Correspondents. : Cambridge University Press, . p 33 http://site.ebrary.com/id/10130461?ppg=33 Copyright © Cambridge University Press. . All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or applicable copyright law. . Leibniz and His Correspondents. : Cambridge University Press, . p 34 http://site.ebrary.com/id/10130461?ppg=34 Copyright © Cambridge University Press. . All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or applicable copyright law. . Leibniz and His Correspondents. : Cambridge University Press, . p 35 http://site.ebrary.com/id/10130461?ppg=35 Copyright © Cambridge University Press. . All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or applicable copyright law. . Leibniz and His Correspondents. : Cambridge University Press, . p 36 http://site.ebrary.com/id/10130461?ppg=36 Copyright © Cambridge University Press. . All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or applicable copyright law. . Leibniz and His Correspondents. : Cambridge University Press, . p 37 http://site.ebrary.com/id/10130461?ppg=37 Copyright © Cambridge University Press. . All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or applicable copyright law. . Leibniz and His Correspondents. : Cambridge University Press, . p 38 http://site.ebrary.com/id/10130461?ppg=38 Copyright © Cambridge University Press. . All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or applicable copyright law. . Leibniz and His Correspondents. : Cambridge University Press, . p 39 http://site.ebrary.com/id/10130461?ppg=39 Copyright © Cambridge University Press. . All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or applicable copyright law. . Leibniz and His Correspondents. : Cambridge University Press, . p 40 http://site.ebrary.com/id/10130461?ppg=40 Copyright © Cambridge University Press. . All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or applicable copyright law. . Leibniz and His Correspondents. : Cambridge University Press, . p 41 http://site.ebrary.com/id/10130461?ppg=41 Copyright © Cambridge University Press. . All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or applicable copyright law. . Leibniz and His Correspondents. : Cambridge University Press, . p 42 http://site.ebrary.com/id/10130461?ppg=42 Copyright © Cambridge University Press. . All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or applicable copyright law. . Leibniz and His Correspondents. : Cambridge University Press, . p 43 http://site.ebrary.com/id/10130461?ppg=43 Copyright © Cambridge University Press. . All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or applicable copyright law. . Leibniz and His Correspondents. : Cambridge University Press, . p 44 http://site.ebrary.com/id/10130461?ppg=44 Copyright © Cambridge University Press. . All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or applicable copyright law. . Leibniz and His Correspondents. : Cambridge University Press, . p 45 http://site.ebrary.com/id/10130461?ppg=45 Copyright © Cambridge University Press. . All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or applicable copyright law. . Leibniz and His Correspondents. : Cambridge University Press, . p 46 http://site.ebrary.com/id/10130461?ppg=46 Copyright © Cambridge University Press. . All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or applicable copyright law. . Leibniz and His Correspondents. : Cambridge University Press, . p 47 http://site.ebrary.com/id/10130461?ppg=47 Copyright © Cambridge University Press. . All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or applicable copyright law. . Leibniz and His Correspondents. : Cambridge University Press, . p 48 http://site.ebrary.com/id/10130461?ppg=48 Copyright © Cambridge University Press. . All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or applicable copyright law. . Leibniz and His Correspondents. : Cambridge University Press, . p 49 http://site.ebrary.com/id/10130461?ppg=49 Copyright © Cambridge University Press. . All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or applicable copyright law. . Leibniz and His Correspondents. : Cambridge University Press, . p 50 http://site.ebrary.com/id/10130461?ppg=50 Copyright © Cambridge University Press. . All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or applicable copyright law. . Leibniz and His Correspondents. : Cambridge University Press, . p 51 http://site.ebrary.com/id/10130461?ppg=51 Copyright © Cambridge University Press. . All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or applicable copyright law. . Leibniz and His Correspondents. : Cambridge University Press, . p 52 http://site.ebrary.com/id/10130461?ppg=52 Copyright © Cambridge University Press. . All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or applicable copyright law. . Leibniz and His Correspondents. : Cambridge University Press, . p 53 http://site.ebrary.com/id/10130461?ppg=53 Copyright © Cambridge University Press. . All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or applicable copyright law. . Leibniz and His Correspondents. : Cambridge University Press, . p 54 http://site.ebrary.com/id/10130461?ppg=54 Copyright © Cambridge University Press. . All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or applicable copyright law. . Leibniz and His Correspondents. : Cambridge University Press, . p 55 http://site.ebrary.com/id/10130461?ppg=55 Copyright © Cambridge University Press. . All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or applicable copyright law. . Leibniz and His Correspondents. : Cambridge University Press, . p 56 http://site.ebrary.com/id/10130461?ppg=56 Copyright © Cambridge University Press. . All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or applicable copyright law. . Leibniz and His Correspondents. : Cambridge University Press, . p 57 http://site.ebrary.com/id/10130461?ppg=57 Copyright © Cambridge University Press. . All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or applicable copyright law. . Leibniz and His Correspondents. : Cambridge University Press, . p 58 http://site.ebrary.com/id/10130461?ppg=58 Copyright © Cambridge University Press. . All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or applicable copyright law. . Leibniz and His Correspondents. : Cambridge University Press, . p 59 http://site.ebrary.com/id/10130461?ppg=59 Copyright © Cambridge University Press. . All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or applicable copyright law. . Leibniz and His Correspondents. : Cambridge University Press, . p 60 http://site.ebrary.com/id/10130461?ppg=60 Copyright © Cambridge University Press. . All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or applicable copyright law. . Leibniz and His Correspondents. : Cambridge University Press, . p 61 http://site.ebrary.com/id/10130461?ppg=61 Copyright © Cambridge University Press. . All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or applicable copyright law. . Leibniz and His Correspondents. : Cambridge University Press, . p 62 http://site.ebrary.com/id/10130461?ppg=62 Copyright © Cambridge University Press. . All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or applicable copyright law.

REVIEWSРЕЦЕНЗИИ РУССКОЕ НЕОКАНТИАНСТВО: ВЗГЛЯД СО СТОРОНЫ1 В. Н. Белов, Т. В. Сальникова2 Рец. на кн.: Czardybon B. Problem wiedzy w rosyjskim projekcie neokantowskim. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo IFiS PAN, 2017. 356 s. Рецензируемая книга - «Проблема знания в русском неокантианском проекте» - представляет собой несколько измененную версию докторской диссертации, которую Барбара Чардыбон защитила в 2014 г. на фило софском факультете Ягеллонского университета в Кракове. Следует отметить, что польская ис следовательница истории русской философии име ет уже несколько публикаций на русском языке, вышедших в том числе в «Кантовском сборнике» (см.: Чардыбон, 2015; Белов, Чардыбон, 2016). Книга опубликована в серии «Русская философия», которая издается институтом философии университета Зелёна-Гуры. Серия объединяет польских исследователей, занимающихся изучением русской философской мысли XIX и XX вв. Редакторами серии являются известные польские ученые, профессора Лилианна Киейзик и Яцек Углик (Lilianna Kiejzik, Jacek Uglik). В качестве основной цели издатели серии декларируют пропаганду «богатых содержанием идей, рожденных в умах восточных философов». Книга Барбары Чардыбон составила девятый том серии. До этого в ней уже были опубликованы исследования, посвященные о. Сергию Булгакову, Николаю Бердяеву, Алексею Лосеву, о. Павлу Флоренскому, Фёдору Достоевскому и Александру Герцену. Во введении Барбара Чардыбон намечает основные линии своего исследования. Прежде всего она затра гивает определение неокантианства и эта пов его ис торического развития. Б. Чардыбон справедливо ука зывает на большое количество тенденций и направлений, выделяемых историками философии в неокантианстве. Тем не менее большинство исследователей истории неокантианства ведут речь о двух основных этапах этого философского направления: этапе так называемой кантовской филологии, то есть определенной экзегезы кантовских текстов и заключенных в них новаторских идей, и этапе более самостоятельного прочтения кантовской философии, приверженности ее духу, но не букве. Однако данная периодизация 1 Рецензия подготовлена в рамках инициативного проекта РУДН No 100412-0-000 «Наука и миф». 2 Российский университет дружбы народов (РУДН) 117198, Москва, ул. Миклухо-Маклая, д. 6. Поступила в редакцию: 07.04.2018 г. doi: 10.5922/0207-6918-2018-2-6 © Белов В. Н., 2018 © Сальникова T. В., 2018 RUSSIAN NEO-KANTIANISM: AN EXTERNAL PERSPECTIVE1 V. N. Belov,2 T. V. Salnikova3 Review: Barbara Czardybon, Problem wiedzy w rosyjskim projekcie neokantowskim. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo IFiS PAN, 2017, 356 pp. The book under review - The Problem of Knowledge in the Russian Neo-Kantian Project - is a somewhat amended version of the doctoral thesis that Barbara Czardybon wrote and defended at the Faculty of Philosophy of the Jagiellonian University in Kraków in 2015. Some of her earlier works were published in Russian - two of which previously appeared in the Kantovsky Sbornik / Kantian Journal (see: Czardybon, 2015; Belov & Czardybon, 2016). The book is part of the series "Russian Philosophy" published by the Institute of Philosophy of the University of Zielona Góra. Edited by famous Polish scholars Lilianna Kiejzik and Jacek Uglik, the series brings together Polish researchers focusing on the Russian philosophical thought of the 19th and 20th centuries. The books in the series seek to disseminate the "wealth of ideas that originated from the minds of Eastern philosophers." Dr Czardybon's book is the ninth in the series. The earlier instalments were dedicated to Father Sergey Bulgakov, Nikolai Berdyaev, Aleksey Losev, Father Pavel Florensky, Fyodor Dostoevsky, and Aleksandr Herzen. In the introduction, Czardybon delineates the major strands of her research. At first, she gives a definition, and outlines the history, of Neo-Kantianism. In particular, she stresses the vast variety of Neo-Kantian trends and traditions described by historians of philosophy. Most researchers of the history of Neo-Kantianism distinguish between the period of "Kantian philology," marked by the exegesis of Kantian texts and of the novel ideas contained in them, and that of an independent interpretation of Kantian philosophy and commitment to the spirit rather than to the letter of the 1 This article was supported by the RUDN University's Science and Myth project, No 100412-0-000. 2 RUDN University, 6 Miklukho-Maklaya St., Moscow, Russia, 117198. 3 RUDN University, 6 Miklukho-Maklaya St., Moscow, Russia, 117198. Received: 07.04.2018. doi: 10.5922/0207-6918-2018-2-6 © Belov V. N., 2018 © Salnikova T. V., 2018 Кантовский сборник. 2018. Т. 37, No 2. С. 90-95. Kantian Journal, 2018, vol. 37, no. 2, pp. 90-95. V. N. Belov, Т. V. Salnikova 91 неокантианского направления в европейской философии, по мнению автора книги, во-первых, вынуждена заканчивать его историю 20-ми гг. ХХ в. и не способна внятно объяснить современную актуальность неокантианства. Во-вторых, она опирается на узкую трактовку понимания духа кантовской философии, и, наконец, в-третьих, не может непротиворечивым образом истолковать эволюцию многих, в том числе русских, учеников марбургской и баденской школ неокантианства. Гораздо более продуктивной Б. Чардыбон считает периодизацию неокантианства, предложенную известным польским исследователем немецкого неокантианства А. Норасом в монографии «История неокантианства» (Noras, 2012) и предполагающую третий этап в развитии этого направления, а именно - этап постнеокантианства. Причем этот этап связан с радикальной сменой в приоритетах трактовки кантовской философии и так называемым онтологическим поворотом в европейской философии начала ХХ в. Чардыбон вслед за Норасом полагает, что этот онтологический поворот не был чем-то маргинальным для кантовской позиции в ее отношении к метафизике, а наоборот, выражал основную интенцию мысли философа о построении новой метафизики, свободной от предрассудков и догматических ограничений метафизики старой. Вторая основная линия, последовательно проводимая автором книги, касается отношения западных исследователей к русской философии в целом и к русскому неокантианству в частности. Б. Чардыбон убеждена в ошибочности утверждений некоторых, в том числе авторитетных, польских ученых (например, А. Валицкого) о том, что русская философия представляет собой лишь вторичную рефлексию по сравнению с философскими размышлениями, рожденными в Западной Европе. Она стремится указать на недопустимость преувеличения в подчеркивании решающего влияния западноевропейских философов на интеллектуальную культуру России, поскольку это неизбежно ведет к маргинализации последней. Польская исследовательница истории русской философии разделяет точку зрения, согласно которой нельзя ни абсолютизировать, ни игнорировать особенности русской философии. При всех серьезных влияниях и заимствованиях русская философская культура всегда оставалась самостоятельной и самобытной частью мировой философии. Данное утверждение автор книги в полной мере относит и к характеристике русского неокантианства, которое, помимо очевидного влияния марбургского и баденского неокантианства (многие русские философы были учениками известных представителей этих немецких философских школ), имеет и свою глубокую традицию переводов, интерпретации и развития кантовской философии. В первой главе «Проблема знания в немецком нео кантианстве» (Problem wiedzy w neokantyzmie niemieckim) Б. Чардыбон подчеркивает известный факт особого «пристрастия» неокантианских школ great Königsbergian's works. Czardybon criticises this periodisation on several grounds. Firstly, it views NeoKant ianism as non-existent after the 1920s and it cannot account for the current relevance of Neo-Kantianism. Secondly, it uses a narrow interpretation of the spirit of Kantian philosophy. Thirdly, this periodisation cannot produce a consistent interpretation of the evolution of many, including Russian, students of the Marburg and Baden Schools of Neo-Kantianism. Czardybon favours the periodisation proposed by the authoritative Polish researcher of German Neo-Kantianism Andrzej Noras (see: Noras, 2012), who identifies a third stage that he labels "Post-Neo-Kantianism." This stage is associated with a dramatic change in the priorities of Kant studies and with the so-called ontological turn in European philosophy at the beginning of the 20th century. In agreement with Noras, Czardybon writes that the ontological turn was not marginal to the Kantian position with regards to metaphysics, but that, on the contrary, it embodied Kant's vision of a new metaphysics that should be free of the prejudice and the dogmatic limitations of the old metaphysics. The second topic investigated in the book is the way Western researchers perceive Russian philosophy in general and Russian Neo-Kantianism in particular. Czardybon disagrees with some authoritative, including Polish (A. Walicki), scholars that Russian philosophy is a mere secondary reflection as compared to Western European philosophical thought. The monograph under review tries to disprove the marginalising thesis about the decisive influence of Western European philosophers on Russia's intellectual culture. Czardybon cautions against either ignoring or overemphasising the distinctive features of Russian philosophy. Although affected by strong influences and incorporating borrowings, Russian philosophical culture has always been an independent and original part of international philosophy. According to Czardybon, this thesis equally applies to Russian Neo-Kantianism. Alongside the evident influence of the Marburg and Baden Schools (many Russian philosophers studied under their members), Russian Neo-Kantianism is characterised by a rich tradition of translation, interpretation, and development of Kantian philosophy. In the first chapter, titled "The Problem of Knowledge in German Neo-Kantianism" (Problem wiedzy w neokantyzmie niemieckim), Czardybon emphasises that the German schools paid particular attention to the problem of knowledge and cognition. She draws on the findings of the authoritative Polish researcher of Neo-Kantianism T. Kubalica, which were presented in his article "Knowledge in Neo-Kantianism" (Kubalica, 2013). The article offers a vast array of materials В. Н. Белов, Т. В. Сальникова 92 к проблеме знания и познания. При этом она ссылается на оценки и размышления по данному вопросу авторитетного польского исследователя немецкого неокантианства Т. Кубалицы, озвученные им прежде всего в статье «Знание в неокантианстве» (Kubalica, 2013). При всем богатстве и разнообразии материала, представленного в данной статье (а этот материал возник в результате анализа взглядов Германа Гельмгольца, Якоба Ф. Фриза, Алоиса Риля, Вильгельма Виндельбанда, Генриха Риккерта, Бруно Бауха и Пауля Наторпа), автор книги указывает и на то, что он не охватывает все же третий период - период так называемого постнеокантианства, для которого также характерно внимательное отношение к проблеме знания, однако уже на онтологическом, а не эпистемологическом основании. Подобная трактовка постнеокантианского периода в развитии критической философии в европейской традиции позволяет Чардыбон отнести к этому периоду философские позиции Н. Гартмана и М. Хайдеггера. В главе «Рецепция философии Канта в России. Зарождение русского неокантианства» (Recepcja filozofi i Kanta w Rosji. Narodziny rosyjskiego neokantyzmu) автор книги опирается как на российские источники - работы Н. Лосского, Л. Столовича, А. Круглова, В. Ахутина и др., так и на польские исследования рецепции философии Канта в России, подчеркивает сложившуюся богатую традицию русских переводов кантовских работ и его интерпретаций русскими философами, концентрирует свое внимание на противоречивом восприятии Канта русскими религиозными философами. Одним из факторов интереса русской философской общественности к неокантианству Б. Чар ды бон справедливо полагает активизацию изданий переводов на русский язык произведений философов, представлявших различные неокантианские концепции. Среди работ немецких неокантианцев, переведенных на русский язык на рубеже XIX и XX вв., оказались труды Куно Фишера, Фридриха Альберта Ланге, Фридриха Паульсена, Вильгельма Виндельбанда, Генриха Риккерта, Бруно Бауха, Пауля Наторпа, Эрнста Кассирера, Карла Форлендера и Алоиза Риля. В главах, посвященных истории русского неокантианства, автор монографии опирается на идеи и результаты исследований таких авторитетных российских специалистов, как В. Н. Белов, Н. А. Дмитриева, А. А. Ермичев, В. И. Повилайтис, причем наиболее часто и, заметим, вполне обоснованно польская исследовательница прибегает к материалу, изложенному в монографии Н. А. Дмитриевой (2007). Глава «Русское академическое неокантианство» (Rosyjski neokantyzm akademicki) посвящена представлению неокантианского проекта Александра Введенского, родоначальника, по мнению польской исследовательницы, классического периода в истории русского неокантианства. Здесь автор анализирует статус логики в структуре знаний и проблему взаимосвязи между верой и знанием в философских построениях compiled from an analysis of the works of Hermann Helmholtz, Jakob Fries, Alois Riehl, Wilhelm Windelband, Heinrich Rickert, Bruno Bauch, and Paul Natorp. However, Czardybon stresses that Kubalica's inquiry did not include the period of Post-Neo-Kantianism, which treated the problem of knowledge from an ontological rather than an epistemological perspective. Such an interpretation of the role of Post-Neo-Kantianism in the development of critical philosophy in Europe makes it possible to attribute the ideas of Nicolai Hartmann and Martin Heidegger to the period under consideration. In the chapter "Receptions of Kantian Philosophy in Russia. The Emergence of Russian Neo-Kantianism" (Recepcja filozofi i Kanta w Rosji. Narodziny rosyjskiego neokantyzmu), Czardybon employs both Russian (N. Lossky, L. Stolovich, A. Kruglov, V. Akhutin) and Polish studies on the receptions of Kantian philosophy in Russia. She emphasises the rich Russian tradition of the translation and interpretation of Kant's works and addresses the conflicting perceptions of Kant by Russian religious philosophers. According to the author of the monograph, the interest of Russian philosophers in Neo-Kantianism is partly due to the abundance of Russian translations of German Neo-Kantians. At the turn of the 20th century, the works of Kuno Fischer, Friedrich Albert Lange, Friedrich Paulsen, Wilhelm Windelband, Bruno Bauch, Paul Natorp, Ernst Cassirer, Karl Vorländer, and Alois Riehl were translated into Russian. The chapters focusing on the history of Russian Neo-Kantianism employ the ideas and findings of authoritative Russian experts - V. N. Belov, N. A. Dmitrieva, A. A. Ermichev, and V. I. Povilaitis. Most often, the Polish researcher refers to N. A. Dmitrieva's monograph (Dmitrieva 2007), which seems completely justified. The chapter "Russian Academic Neo-Kantianism" (Rosyjski neokantyzm akademicki) presents the Neo-Kant ian project by Aleksandr Vvedensky, whom Czardybon considers to be the forefather of classical Russian Neo-Kantianism. In this chapter, she analyses the place of logic in the structure of knowledge and addresses the correlation between faith and knowledge in the thought of the early Russian Neo-Kantian. Czardybon concludes that Vvedensky's theory of cognition can be reduced to logic and, thus, to epistemology. She emphasises the Russian Neo-Kantians' predisposition towards metaphysics - a characteristic feature of Russian philosophy in general. Czardybon sees this feature not as a weakness but as a strength of Russian thinkers that is in line with the intentions of Kantian idealism with regards to the construction of a V. N. Belov, Т. V. Salnikova 93 русского неокантианца, приходя к выводу о том, что теория познания Введенского сводится к логике и, таким образом, становится эпистемологией. Б. Чарды бон указывается также на метафизические пристрастия русских неокантианцев, что отличает, собственно, всю русскую философию. Однако данное обстоятельство польская исследовательница интерпретирует не как слабость, а, напротив, как сильную сторону русских мыслителей, соответствующую интенциям кантовского идеализма по построению новой метафизики. Причем автор книги замечает и то, что у Введенского в его отношении к метафизике были предшественники и в стане немецких неокантианцев. В частности, Чардыбон указывает на Йоханнеса Фолькельта, который считал, что Кант не только положил конец старой метафизике, но и заложил основу для развития «новой, морально обоснованной метафизики» (s. 139). Следует заметить, что на очевидные параллели позиции русского неокантианца со взглядами его немецких коллег, в частности Германа Когена, указывает один из авторов этой рецензии (Белов, 2013), а также Н. А. Дмитриева, которая подчеркивает влияние на Введенского К. Фишера и Ф. А. Ланге (Дмитриева, 2013; Dmitrieva, 2016). Однако вызывает некоторое недоумение тот факт, что в своем представлении классического периода в истории русского неокантианства польская исследовательница ограничивается анализом философских взглядов Александра Введенского, хотя известно, что она хорошо знакома и с позицией его ближайших последователей И. И. Лапшина и Г. И. Челпанова. Следующая глава, «Русское неакадемическое неокантианство: проект трансцендентального плюрализма Бориса Яковенко» (Rosyjski neokantyzm nieakademicki: projekt pluralizmu transcendentalnego Borysa W. Jakowienki), представляет собой попытку автора книги охарактеризовать философскую систему русского неокантианца, одного из основателей и активных участников журнала «Логос» (1910-1914, 1925), Бориса Валентиновича Яковенко как интересный синтез неокантианства Германа Когена и феноменологии Эдмунда Гуссерля. Действительно, синтетические интенции в системе трансцендентального плюрализма, как сам русский философ обозначает свою философскую позицию, выражены достаточно четко (можно при этом сослаться и на тот факт, что философию Когена, одного из своих любимых авторов, Яковенко интерпретирует как синтез философии Канта и Гегеля). Однако для подтверждения того, что данный синтез является синтезом неокантианства и феноменологии, необходимы, на наш взгляд, более серьезные аргументы и более глубокий анализ работ Яковенко, к сожалению, отсутствующие в рецензируемой книге. Если уж чью философию и рассматривать как попытку непротиворечивого синтеза неокантианства и феноменологии, то это философию В. Э. Сеземана. Анализ его философской позиции и эволюции взглядов произведен в последней, пятой главе книnew metaphysics. The author of the monograph stresses that Vvedensky's treatment of metaphysics stems from the works of some German Neo-Kantians. In particular, she mentions Johannes Volkelt, who believed that Kant had not only put an end to the old metaphysics but had also laid the basis for a new, morally grounded metaphysics (p. 139). The obvious parallels between the positions of the Russian Neo-Kantian and his German colleagues, for instance, Hermann Cohen, have been drawn by one of the authors of this review (Belov, 2013) and by N. A. Dmitrieva, who stresses the influence of K. Fischer and F. A. Lange on Vvedensky (Dmitrieva, 2016; Dmitrieva, 2013). It is quite surprising that, in analysing the classical period of Russian Neo-Kantianism, Czardybon limits herself to a consideration of Vvedensky's views, although she is well acquainted with the positions of his closest followers I. I. Lapshin and G. I. Chelpanov. The next chapter is titled "Russian Non-academic Neo-Kantianism: Boris Yakovenko's Transcen den tal Pluralism Project" (Rosyjski neokantyzm nieakade micki: projekt pluralizmu transcendentalnego Borysa W. Jakowienki). In this chapter, the author attempts to present the philosophical system of a co-founder of, and prolific contributor to, the journal Logos (1910-1914, 1925), Boris Yakovenko, as a peculiar synthesis of Hermann Cohen's Neo-Kantianism and Edmund Husserl's phenomenology. Indeed, the synthetic intentions in the system of transcendental pluralism - as Yakovenko labelled his philosophical position - are rather clear. Moreover, the Russian Neo-Kantian described the thought of one of his favourite authors, Cohen, as a synthesis of Kant's and Hegel's philosophies. However, to prove that this synthesis is indeed a synthesis of Neo-Kantianism and phenomenology one might need stronger arguments and a deeper analysis of Yakovenko's works. Alas, neither is presented in the book under review. An obvious case of a consistent synthesis of NeoKant ianism and phenomenology is V. E. Sesemann's philo sophy. His thought and the evolution of his views are considered in the fifth chapter of the book, titled "The Russian Post-Neo-Kantian Project" (Rosyjski projekt postneokantowski). In this chapter, Czardybon carries out a comparative analysis of three "Russian thinkers" - N. Hartmann, V. Sesemann, and S. Frank. She believes that their ontological and Kantian intentions are similar enough to be classified as Post-Neo-Kantian ones. However, we believe that several points made by Czardybon require additional arguments. These include, firstly, the consideration of Nicolai Hartmann as a Russian rather than a German philosopher, secondly, the supposed similarity between Hartmann's and Frank's ontological views, and, thirdly, the classification of the thought of all the three philosophers as PostNeo-Kantians. В. Н. Белов, Т. В. Сальникова 94 ги - «Проект русского постнеокантианства» (Ro syj ski projekt postneokantowski). Главный акцент в этой главе автор делает на сравнительном анализе взглядов трех «русских мыслителей» - Н. Гартмана, В. Сеземана и С. Франка, полагая их онтологические и кантианские интенции вполне сопоставимыми и достаточными для отнесения к разряду постнеокантианских. Однако опять же для того, чтобы, во-первых, отнести Николая Гартмана к русским, а не к немецким философам, во-вторых, считать вполне сопоставимыми онтологические построения Гартмана и Франка и, наконец, обозначить философские позиции всех троих как постнеокантианские, на наш взгляд, аргументов приведено недостаточно. Обращаясь к анализу философии русских постнеокантианцев, польская исследовательница определяет и конкретное время появления этого философского феномена в пространстве русской и мировой философии. По ее мнению, это 10-20-е гг. ХХ столетия, отмеченные выходом таких работ русских мыслителей, как «Мистика и метафизика» С. И. Гессена (1910), «Рациональное и иррациональное в системе философии» В. Э. Сеземана (1911), «Путь философского познания» Б. В. Яковенко (1914), «Предмет знания. Об основах и пределах отвлеченного знания» С. Л. Франка (1915), «Иррациональность рассуждения» Г. Ланца (1926). «Если взвешенно говорить о существовании феномена "русского постнеокантианства", - заявляет Чардыбон, - именно эти даты озна меновали бы историческое начало этого образова ния. В свою очередь, 20-е и 30-е годы ХХ века будут связаны с полным расцветом творчества русских постнеокантианцев» (S. 208). В заключение хотелось бы отметить, что рецензируемая книга содержит богатый и интересный материал, характеризующий интенсивность и высокий уровень исследований польскими авторами немецкой и русской философии. Список литературы Белов В. Н. А. И. Введенский - родоначальник русского неокантианства // Неокантианство в России: Александр Иванович Введенский, Иван Иванович Лапшин / под ред. В. Н. Брюшинкина, В. С. Поповой. М. : РОССПЭН, 2013. С. 74-93. Белов В. Н., Чардыбон Б. Исследования по истории русского неокантианства в Польше // Кантовский сборник. 2016. No 1 (55). С. 66-86. Дмитриева Н. А. Критицизм или мистицизм? А. И. Введенский и русское неокантианство // Неокантианство в России: Александр Иванович Введенский, Иван Иванович Лапшин / Под ред. В. Н. Брюшинкина, В. С. Поповой. М. : РОССПЭН, 2013. С. 40-73. Дмитриева Н. А. Русское неокантианство: «Марбург» в России. Историко-философские очерки. М. : РОССПЭН, 2007. Чардыбон Б. Философия Василия Сеземана и марбургское неокантианство // Кантовский сборник. 2015. No 3. С. 66-85. In analysing the philosophy of the Russian PostNeo-Kantians, Czardybon dates the emergence of the corresponding phenomenon in Russian and international philosophy to the 1910s-1930s. In Russia, those decades were marked by the appearance of such philosophical works as S. I. Hessen's "Mysticism and Metaphysics" (1910), V. E. Sesemann's "The Rational and the Irrational in the System of Philosophy" (1911), B. V. Yakovenko's "The Path of Philosophical Cognition" (1914), S. L. Frank's The Object of Knowledge: On the Foundations and Limits of Abstract Knowledge (1915), and H. Lanz's "The Irrationality of Reasoning" (1926). "A thorough analysis of the phenomenon of 'Russian Post-Neo-Kantianism'," Czardybon writes, "would show that these very dates are associated with its historical beginnings. The 1920s and the 1930s would be the zenith of Russian Post-Neo-Kantianism" (p. 208). To conclude, we would like to emphasise that the book under review contains a rich and interesting analysis, which attests to the high level and breadth of Polish research on German and Russian philosophy. References Belov, V. N., 2013. A. I. Vvedneksy, the Forefather of Russian Neo-Kantianism. In: V. N. Bryushinkin, V. S. Popova, eds. 2013. Neo-Kantianstvo v Rossii: Aleksandr Ivanovich Vvedensky, Ivan Ivanovich Lapshin [Neo-Kantianism in Russia: Aleksandr I. Vvedensky, Ivan I. Lapshin]. Moscow: ROSSPEN, pp. 74-93. (In Russ.) Belov, V. N., Czardybon, B., 2016. Studies into the History of Russian Neo-Kantianism in Poland. Kantovsky sbornik [Kantian Journal], 1, pp. 66-86. (In Russ.) Czardybon, B., 2015. The Philosophy of Vasily Sesemann and Marburg Neo-Kantianism. Kantovsky sbornik [Kantian Journal], 3, pp. 66-85. (In Russ.) Czardybon, B., 2017. Problem wiedzy w rosyjskim projekcie neokantowskim. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo IFiS PAN. Dmitrieva, N. A., 2007. Russkoe neokantianstvo: "Marburg" v Rossii. Istoriko-filosofskie ocherki [Russian Neo-Kantianism: 'Marburg' in Russia. Historico-Philosophical Essays]. Moscow: ROSSPEN. Dmitrieva, N. A., 2013. Criticism or Mysticism? A. I. Vvedensky and Russian Neo-Kantianism. In: V. N. Bryushinkin, V. S. Popova, eds. 2013. Neo-Kantianstvo v Rossii: Aleksandr Ivanovich Vvedensky, Ivan Ivanovich Lapshin [Neo-Kantianism in Russia: Aleksandr I. Vvedensky, Ivan I. Lapshin]. Moscow: ROSSPEN, pp. 40-73. (In Russ.) Dmitrieva, N. A., 2016. Back to Kant, or Forward to Enlightenment: The Particularities and Issues of Russian NeoKant ianism. Russian Studies in Philosophy, 54(5), pp. 378-394. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10611967.2016.1290414 Kubalica, T., 2013. Wiedza w neokantyzmie. Studia Systematica, 3, pp. 89-107. Noras, A. J. 2012. Historia neokantyzmu. Katowice: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego. V. N. Belov, Т. V. Salnikova Dmitrieva N. A. Back to Kant, or Forward to Enlightenment: The Particularities and Issues of Russian Neo-Kantianism // Russian Studies in Philosophy. 2016. Vol. 54, no. 5: Neokantianism in Russia. P. 378-394. DOI: 10.1080/10611967.2016.1290414 Kubalica T. Wiedza w neokantyzmie // Studia Systematica. 2013. No 3 (53). С. 89-107. Noras A. J. Historia neokantyzmu. Katowice : Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego, 2012. Об авторах Владимир Николаевич Белов, доктор философских наук, профессор, заведующий кафедрой онтологии и теории познания, факультет гуманитарных и социальных наук, Российский университет дружбы народов (РУДН), Москва, Россия. E-mail: [email protected] Татьяна Викторовна Сальникова, старший преподаватель, кафедра онтологии и теории познания, факультет гуманитарных и социальных наук, Российский университет дружбы народов (РУДН), Москва, Россия. E-mail: [email protected] Для цитирования: Белов В. Н., Сальникова Т. В. Русское неокантианство: взгляд со стороны // Кантовский сборник. Т. 37, No 2. С. 90-95. Рец. на кн.: Czardybon B. Problem wiedzy w rosyjskim projekcie neokantowskim. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo IFiS PAN, 2017. 356 s. doi: 10.5922/0207-6918-2018-2-6. The authors Prof. Vladimir N. Belov, Head of the Department of Ontology and Epistemology, Faculty of Social Sciences and the Humanities, RUDN University, Moscow, Russia. E-mail: [email protected] Tatyana V. Salnikova, Senior Lecturer, Department of Ontology and Epistemology, Faculty of Social Sciences and the Humanities, RUDN University, Moscow, Russia. E-mail: [email protected] To cite this article: Belov, V. N., Salnikova, T. V., 2018. Russian Neo-Kantianism: An External Perspective (Rev.: B. Czardybon, Problem wiedzy w rosyjskim projekcie neokantowskim, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo IFiS PAN, 2017, 356 pp.). Kantian Journal, 37(2), pp. 90-95. http://dx.doi.org/10.5922/0207-6918-2018-2-6.

No Need for Excuses: Against Knowledge-First Epistemology and the Knowledge Norm of Assertion* Joshua Schechter Brown University 1. Introduction Since the publication of Timothy Williamson's Knowledge and its Limits, knowledge-first epistemology has become increasingly influential within epistemology.1 This paper discusses the viability of the knowledge-first program. It has two main parts. In the first part, I briefly present knowledge-first epistemology (Section 2) as well as several big picture reasons for concern about this program (Section 3). While these considerations are pressing, I concede that they are not conclusive. To determine the viability of knowledge-first epistemology will require philosophers to carefully evaluate the individual theses endorsed by knowledge-first epistemologists as well as to compare it with alternative packages of views. In the second part of the paper, I contribute to this evaluation by considering a specific thesis endorsed by many knowledge-first epistemologists – the knowledge norm of assertion. According to this norm, roughly speaking, one should assert that p only if one knows that p. I present and motivate this thesis (Section 4). I then turn to a familiar concern with the norm: In many cases, it is intuitively appropriate for someone who has a strongly justified belief that p, but who doesn't know that p, to assert that p. Proponents of the knowledge norm of assertion typically explain away our judgments about such cases by arguing that the relevant assertion is improper but that the subject has an excuse and is therefore not blameworthy for making the assertion (Section 5). I argue that that this response * This is the penultimate draft of a paper in J. Adam Carter, Emma Gordon, and Benjamin Jarvis (eds.) (2017) Knowledge-First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 132–159. 1 Proponents of knowledge-first epistemology include Williamson (2000), Hawthorne and Stanley (2008), and Littlejohn (2013). See McGlynn (2014) for a comprehensive critical discussion. My discussion of knowledge-first epistemology is heavily indebted to Williamson (2000). 2 will not work (Section 6). In many of the problem cases, it is not merely that the subject's assertion is blameless. Rather, the subject positively ought to make the assertion. Appealing to an excuse cannot be used to adequately explain this fact. (Nor can we explain this fact by appealing to some other, quite different, consideration.) Finally, I conclude by briefly considering whether we should replace the knowledge norm of assertion with an alternative norm (Section 7). I argue that the most plausible view is that there is no norm specifically tied to assertion. 2. Knowledge-First Epistemology Knowledge-first epistemology was originally developed as a reaction to the post-Gettier attempts to provide a conceptual analysis of the concept of knowledge. Gettier (1963) famously argued against analyzing knowledge as justified true belief. In doing so, he provided cases in which a subject had a justified true belief that did not count as knowledge.2 Gettier's paper led to a long series of papers proposing new analyses of knowledge – the no false lemmas view, the no undefeated defeater view, casual theories, sensitivity theories, and many others.3 Each of these proposed analyses were subject to further counterexamples. As time went on, proposed analyses grew increasingly baroque and ad hoc. As Williamson (2013, p. 2) writes, the program of providing an analysis of knowledge displayed the "signs of a degenerating research program". The repeated failure of the post-Gettier literature to provide a successful analysis of the concept of knowledge suggested that we should perhaps take the concept of knowledge to be unanalyzable. Indeed, since the force of the counterexamples did not turn on whether the 2 The dialectic in Gettier's paper is more complicated than the typical presentation suggests. Gettier presents an abstract argument to the conclusion that there can be a justified true belief that does not count as knowledge. (One can competently deduce a justified true belief from a justified false belief. Such a belief won't count as knowledge.) The role of Gettier's original cases was to illustrate this general argument. The subsequent literature, however, became explicitly case-based. 3 See Clark (1963), Lehrer and Paxson (1969), Goldman (1967), and Nozick (1981), respectively. See Shope (1983) for an exhaustive presentation of the literature up to the book's publication. 3 proposed accounts were intended to provide conceptual analyses of the concept of knowledge or metaphysical reductions of the state of knowing,4 there was also some impetus in favor of taking the state of knowing to be irreducible (or, at least, to not be reducible along the lines of anything like the "traditional" justified true belief account). Once it is claimed that knowledge is unanalyzable and irreducible (in anything like the traditional way), we have a new primitive to deploy. We can try to put this primitive to work in providing conceptual analyses and metaphysical reductions. For instance, instead of analyzing the concept of knowledge in terms of the concept of belief and the concept of justification, one might try to analyze the concept of belief and the concept of justification in terms of the concept of knowledge. Alternatively, or in addition, one might try to reduce the cognitive state of believing and the epistemic status of being justified to the state of knowing. One might try to go further and relate knowledge to other epistemic notions, such as inquiry and evidence. One might go still further and relate knowledge to non-epistemic notions, such as deliberation, assertion, and action. Knowledge-first epistemology is the result of going down this intellectual path. Proponents of knowledge-first epistemology endorse the claim that knowledge is unanalyzable and irreducible (in anything like the traditional way).5 But they go much further than this. They suggest that epistemology (and perhaps the philosophy of mind) should be reoriented with knowledge at its base. Much of our mental lives – our cognitive states and their epistemic statuses – and our behavior – actions, assertions, and their assessment – should be understood in 4 My use of the term "state" is not meant to commit me to what Williamson (2000) means when he calls knowledge a mental state. Every claim I make about the state of knowing could be rephrased as a claim about the knowledge relation. 5 It is compatible with knowledge-first epistemology to endorse positive claims about the nature of knowledge. For instance, Williamson (2000) endorses a "safety from error" requirement: If one knows that p, one could not have easily been wrong in a similar case. This is not meant as a conceptual analysis or a reduction of knowledge, since according to Williamson, "similar case" should itself ultimately be understood in terms of knowledge. 4 terms of knowledge. How exactly this should go varies from theorist to theorist. But what doesn't vary among knowledge-first epistemologists is the endorsement of the claim that knowledge is of fundamental importance to the understanding of our mental lives – it is an "unexplained explainer".6 Knowledge-first epistemology, then, shouldn't be understood as a single thesis or package of theses. Rather it is what we might call a "program". To be a knowledge-first epistemologist requires endorsing the claims that the concept of knowledge is unanalyzable and that the state of knowing is irreducible (in anything like the traditional way). But it also requires taking a certain stance – treating knowledge as being of first importance, and trying to put the concept of knowledge and the state of knowing to use in doing significant philosophical work.7 There are many specific theses that are endorsed by individual knowledge-first epistemologists. They concern the concept of knowledge and its relation to other concepts; the metaphysics of the state of knowing and its relation to other cognitive states and epistemic statuses; normative connections between knowledge, assertion, and action; the purpose of cognition and communication; and much else besides. Being a knowledge-first epistemologist does not require that one endorse any specific collection of these theses. But knowledge-first epistemologists will typically endorse many such theses. In particular, knowledge-first epistemologists will typically endorse many of the following theses (or variants thereof):8 6 Williamson (2000), p. 10. 7 In principle, these two components of the knowledge-first program are separable. One could claim that the concept of knowledge is unanalyzable and the state of knowing is irreducible without also claiming that the concept of knowledge and the state of knowing can be used to do significant philosophical work, and vice versa. 8 Many of these theses can be found – explicitly or implicitly – in Williamson (2000). See McGlynn (2014) for additional citations. 5 Concepts  The concept of belief (and the concepts of other cognitive states) can be analyzed in terms of the concept of knowledge. For instance, perhaps believing that p can be analyzed as treating p as if one knows it.  The concept of justification (and the concepts of other epistemic statuses) can be analyzed in terms of the concept of knowledge. For instance, perhaps having a justified belief that p can be analyzed as either knowing that p or having a belief that p that would have been knowledge had the world cooperated. Psychology  Normal human subjects acquire the concept of knowledge before they acquire the concept of belief or the concept of justification. Metaphysics  The knowledge relation is a metaphysically privileged relation. In the terminology of Lewis (1983), it is "perfectly natural". Alternatively, the knowledge relation is more natural than any other cognitive relation (such as the belief relation) or epistemic property (such as being justified).  Belief and other cognitive states can be characterized in terms of the state of knowing.  Justification and other epistemic statuses can be characterized in terms of the state of knowing.  The characterization of belief in terms of knowledge is part of the essence of belief. It provides the real definition of belief. (And similarly for other cognitive states.)  The characterization of justification in terms of knowledge is part of the essence of justification. It provides the real definition of justification. (And similarly for other epistemic statuses.)  Seeing that p, remembering that p, and understanding that p each entail knowing that p. More generally, knowing is the most general propositional attitude that is factive and that constitutes a mental state. Behavior  In predications, explanations, and rationalizations of a subject's behavior, one should appeal to the subject's knowledge and not merely to the subject's beliefs. Connections within Epistemology  A subject's total evidence is all and only the propositions that the subject knows.  Knowledge terminates inquiry. Knowing that p (or knowing that it is not the case that p) closes the question of whether p. Normative Connections  Knowledge norm of assertion: One ought to assert that p only if one knows that p.  Knowledge norm of reasoning: One ought to use the proposition that p as a premise in practical or theoretical reasoning only if one knows that p.  Knowledge norm of belief: One ought to believe that p only if one knows that p.  Knowledge norm of action: One ought to act as if p only if one knows that p. 6  The knowledge norm of assertion uniquely characterizes assertion from among the speech acts. (And similarly for the other normative connections.)  The real definition of assertion is that it is the speech act that obeys the knowledge norm. (And similarly for the other normative connections.) Teleology  The central purpose of cognition is to generate knowledge.9  The central purpose of communication is to transmit and pool knowledge.10  Belief aims at knowledge. Meaning and Reference  What one knows (or is in a position to know) in part determines the reference of one's linguistic and mental representations. Philosophical Methodology  Epistemology should primarily focus on issues concerning knowledge rather than justified belief or rational credence.  The philosophy of mind should primarily focus on issues concerning knowledge rather than belief. What motivates these theses (or variants thereof)? Many of these theses can be motivated individually. For instance, since it will be the focus of the second half of this paper, consider the knowledge norm of assertion. According to this thesis, one ought to assert that p only if one knows that p. This thesis has been argued for in the following ways:11 (i) When someone makes an assertion, it can be questioned by asking, "How do you know that?" An assertion can be rejected by saying, "You don't know that." Requests for answers to yes/no questions can be appropriately responded to with "I don't know." And so forth. The best explanation of this body of data is provided by the knowledge norm. (ii) There is something inappropriate about asserting a Moorean paradoxical sentence of the form "p but I don't know that p." The best explanation of this is provided by the knowledge norm. (iii) If one has merely statistical grounds for believing that someone who purchased a ticket in a lottery is highly unlikely to win, it is inappropriate to tell them, "You're not going to win". The best explanation of this is provided by the knowledge norm combined with the claim that subjects cannot know lottery propositions on merely statistical grounds.12 9 There are other important purposes of cognition – e.g., planning and deliberation. 10 There are other important purposes of communication – e.g., coordination with others. 11 See Williamson (2000), which develops considerations originally put forward in Unger (1975) and Slote (1979). 12 There have been several responses to these motivations in the literature. See, for example, Hill and Schechter (2007), Lackey (2007), Kvanvig (2009), and Whiting (2013). 7 Beyond the individual motivations for these theses, there is a more general motivation – the theses "hang together" nicely. Taken as a whole, they provide an attractively tidy theoretical account of mental life, with knowledge at its center. A central purpose of cognition is the generation of knowledge. When all goes well, our beliefs count as knowledge. In our theoretical and practical reasoning, we reason from premises that we know. In communication, we exchange knowledge with others. We act on what we know. And so on. That's what happens when things are going (very) well. Of course, things don't always go so well. Sometimes we have "mere beliefs" – beliefs that don't count as knowledge. Sometimes our mere beliefs are justified, sometimes not. We can explain what mere beliefs are and what justification is in terms of knowledge. We can explain what it is for a course of reasoning or an assertion to be improper in terms of knowledge. And so on. The simplicity and elegance of this picture provides us with reason to endorse it. 3. ...and its Limits As attractive as this picture is, there are reasons for concern. In this section, I present three bigpicture worries for knowledge-first epistemology. While they are not conclusive, they do provide reasons to be uneasy about the program. The first worry stems from the post-Gettier literature. Proponents of knowledge-first epistemology argue that the post-Gettier literature shows that the concept of knowledge is unanalyzable and that the state of knowing is irreducible. I'm sympathetic to this view. But they also argue for the central importance of knowledge in our mental lives. My view is that the postGettier literature illustrates that this is a mistake.13 13 Kaplan (1985) and Kvanvig (2003) also argue that a moral of the post-Gettier literature is that knowledge is not an important epistemic status. 8 Consider some Gettier-style case in which a subject has a justified true belief that is not knowledge. For instance, here is a version of an example originally due to Russell (1912): Suppose that Jones wonders what time it is and briefly glances at his trusty wall clock. Suppose that the clock reads "2:05" and so Jones comes to believe that it is 2:05 pm. Suppose that it really is 2:05 pm. However, suppose that, unbeknownst to Jones, the clock stopped exactly 12 hours ago. In this case, Jones has a true belief that it is 2:05 pm. This belief is justified, since it is based on good evidence that the time is 2:05 pm. But, intuitively, Jones's belief does not count as knowledge. Thinking about this case, it seems clear that Jones is in a very good epistemic position. His belief about the time is true. His belief fits the evidence that's available to him. His belief was formed on the basis of the evidence. If he acts on his belief about the time – rushing off because he has a 2:15 pm appointment, say – he'll be acting in a way that is appropriate given the facts. He'll be acting in a way that makes sense given his evidence. If he's asked what time it is and he asserts that its 2:05 pm, he'll be asserting a truth. He'll be asserting something that is reasonable for him to assert given his evidence. And so on. In every sense that seems important, Jones is doing quite well. To be sure, Jones lacks knowledge. He doesn't know what time it is. Put baldly like that, it can sound like Jones is not in a great epistemic position, after all. But this strikes me as an illusion due to how we talk – when we say things like "S doesn't know what time it is", we're typically trying to communicate that S is unsure, getting it wrong, or otherwise in some highly 9 problematic state with regard to his view of the time.14 Focusing on the fact that Jones's belief is both true and justified, however, it doesn't seem like Jones is missing anything important. What this suggests is that knowledge is actually a rather marginal epistemic status. It is important to have true beliefs so that we correctly represent the world. It is important to respect the evidence and, more generally, to have justified beliefs (and rational credences). But it is difficult for me to see that, in addition, it is important to have knowledge, too. There are features of Jones's belief that might seem problematic. It is lucky that Jones's belief turned out to be true. Jones's belief about the time is bound up with his false belief that the clock is in good working order. Jones's belief was formed via an unreliable process – glancing at a stopped clock.15 Jones's belief is not safe in the sense that Jones could easily have come to have a false belief about the time. And so on. Nevertheless, these features of Jones's belief do not make it any more problematic than some genuine cases of knowledge. There are cases of knowledge that have similar features. For instance, someone can win a History of the Dodo volume in a raffle and by reading it come to believe that the first recorded mention of dodo birds was in 1598. This belief counts as knowledge despite the element of luck involved. Someone can miscount the number of chairs in a room as 11 (rather than 12), and then infer that the number of chairs in the room is less than 30. The inferred belief counts as knowledge despite the fact that it is bound up with a false belief about the exact number of chairs present. There are differences between the kind of luck involved in Jones's belief and the kind of luck involved in winning a raffle – it was lucky that Jones's belief was true whereas it was lucky that the raffle entrant came to have a belief about 14 See Weiner (2009, p. 166) for a related view. Weiner argues that the concept of knowledge is a "Swiss Army" concept in the sense that knowledge is a concept "that is not important in itself, but that provides an economical way of summing up several other concepts that are important in themselves." 15 Jones's belief was also formed via a reliable process – glancing at a clock that one has no reason to think is not working. 10 dodos at all.16 There are also differences between the way in which a false belief is bound up with Jones's belief about the time and the way in which a false belief is bound up with the chair counter's belief about there are fewer than 30 chairs. But it is difficult to see how anything of serious epistemic significance could depend on these subtle differences. The point is not specific to Russell's clock case. The same holds true for other Gettierstyle cases. In all of these cases, when we focus on the details of the case, the fact that the subject doesn't count as knowing is of little intuitive significance. We're used to talking in terms of knowledge and treating knowledge as the most significant epistemic status. But this may be more an accident of human language and psychology than a guide to the epistemological joints of nature. The second worry about knowledge-first epistemology can be raised by asking the following questions: What could the state of knowing be such that it does everything that proponents of knowledge-first epistemology suggest it does? How could there be a single kind of state that plays all (or many) of the roles listed above? Proponents of knowledge-first epistemology argue that the state of knowing is irreducible, and so cannot answer these questions by providing a reductive account of knowing. But that does not mean that the questions are illegitimate. Proponents of knowledge-first epistemology make the striking claim that there is a single kind of state that plays very many different roles in our mental life. In supporting this claim, they owe us some understanding of how this could be so. What is needed, then, is not a reductive account, but some kind of picture that explains what knowledge is such that it can be the unexplained explainer at the heart of our mental lives. 16 Pritchard (2005) distinguishes between five ways in which a belief may be epistemically lucky and argues that three of them are compatible with knowledge and two are not. 11 There are pictures that could explain the centrality of knowledge to our mental lives. If one of these pictures were attractive, that would buttress the case of knowledge-first epistemologists. But if there were no attractive picture, that would seem to cast doubt on the program of knowledge-first epistemology. The trouble, then, is this: Every picture that I can envision that would explain the centrality of knowledge is grossly implausible. Consider a broadly Cartesian picture of knowledge according to which knowledge entails infallibility, indefeasibility, and rational certainty.17 Suppose, too, that we could always tell when we had such knowledge. If it were possible for us to have a wide range of such Cartesian knowledge, one could make sense of the centrality of knowledge in our mental lives.18 It would be extremely important to generate such knowledge, communicate such knowledge, act on such knowledge, and so forth. Of course, this picture of knowledge is highly implausible.19 If knowledge were required to conform to these constraints, we would have precious little, if any, knowledge. Perhaps some of our beliefs in simple logical, mathematical, and conceptual truths are infallible, indefeasible, and rationally certain. I suspect not, given that there can be rational disagreements even over basic logical principles. But even if we could have some knowledge that satisfied the Cartesian constraints, none of our everyday knowledge about ourselves or the world would count. Alternatively, consider a picture of knowledge according to which knowledge entails being in some intimate metaphysical relation with the relevant fact. Such a view could be developed by analogy to a disjunctivist view of perception according to which perception provides subjects with a distinctive kind of contact with objects in the world, at least in the "good 17 Descartes himself did not impose such strong requirements on everyday knowledge. 18 See BonJour (2011). 19 Williamson (2000) agrees. His anti-luminosity argument is targeted in part against such a Cartesian view. 12 case".20 On the analogous picture of knowledge, in the "good case" of believing – that is, knowing – subjects have a distinctive kind of metaphysical contact with the fact that p. Such a picture of knowledge might be able to explain the central importance of knowledge to our mental life, at least if we could explain what "contact" comes to and why having contact of this sort is itself so important. (We'd also need to explain why having a true belief or a justified true belief doesn't entail having contact with the relevant fact.) Yet, this picture is implausible, too. Consider some of the many different ways in which one can gain knowledge. For instance, one can gain knowledge by testimony. If knowledge entails a distinctive kind of contact with the facts, the picture presumably would be that when a hearer gains knowledge by the testimony of someone who knows, the speaker's contact with the relevant fact is somehow transmitted to the hearer along with the belief in the relevant proposition. This seems incredible. Similarly, one can gain knowledge by inductive reasoning. Again, it is difficult to believe that an inductive inference can yield some kind of intimate metaphysical relation to the truth of the conclusion, even given an intimate metaphysical relation to the truth of the premises.21 How could it be that being in contact (whatever that is) with assorted facts about the nearby environment can put us in contact with facts about distant locations? How could it be that being in contact with assorted facts about the present and recent past can put us in contact with facts about the distant future?22 Given that these pictures of knowledge are implausible, it is difficult to see how else to explain the multifarious roles that knowledge plays in our mental lives according to knowledge- 20 See Hinton (1967), Snowdon (1980), McDowell (1982), and Martin (2002). See Pritchard (2012) and the papers in Byrne and Logue (2008) for recent discussions of disjunctivism. 21 The difficulty here is perhaps most acute for an inductive inference to a conclusion about a particular case that does not go via some inductive generalization – for example, an inductive inference to the conclusion that the next marble will be red that does not go via the intermediate conclusion that all marbles are red. 22 There are metaphysical relations that are transmitted via testimony – for instance, standing in a causal relation with the fact that makes the belief true. The point is that there is no good candidate for such a relation that (a) can be transmitted via testimony and inductive inference, (b) is present in all cases of knowledge, and (c) explains the centrality and importance of knowledge. Thanks to Louis deRossett for pressing me on this issue. 13 first epistemology. This is not to say that knowledge-first epistemologists don't have arguments for their claims – they have provided a battery of arguments in support of their individual theses, and there is a nice theoretical unity to the combination of their views. But in the absence of an attractive picture that illuminates how it could be that there is a cognitive state that can simultaneously play all the roles that knowledge is supposed to play, there is reason for concern. The third worry about knowledge-first epistemology stems from the diversity of our cognitive lives. There are many different kinds of cognitive states beyond outright belief.23 For instance, there are conditional beliefs. There are degrees of confidence. There are assumptions, presuppositions, hypotheses, speculations, hunches, guesses, expectations, convictions, and so on. If part of knowledge-first epistemology is to characterize all of these cognitive states in terms of knowledge, that strikes me as a tall order. Similarly, there are positive epistemic statuses beyond justification and knowledge. For instance, there is wisdom. There are various kinds of understanding. 24 There are specific intellectual virtues, such as open-mindedness and creativity. If part of knowledge-first epistemology is to characterize all of these epistemic statuses in terms of knowledge, that also strikes me as a tall order. In a similar vein, in providing an account of our cognitive lives, one should not focus entirely on beliefs and other cognitive states. There are also transitions between cognitive states. These transitions are governed by rules of inference (and belief-forming methods more generally). There are important epistemological questions about such transitions and rules. For instance, one can look at a course of reasoning that yields an unjustified belief and ask where exactly the mistake was made. Was one of the subject's initial beliefs unjustified? Or did the lack 23 I am here distinguishing cognitive states from conative states such as desiring, wishing, planning, intending, and the like. 24 See Grimm (2006), Khalifa (2011), Sliwa (2014), and Kelp (2015) for proposals on how to reduce (propositional) understanding to knowledge. 14 of justification stem from an epistemic mistake in one of the subsequent transitions in thought? It is difficult to see how these questions can be understood as ultimately concerning knowledge. A knowledge-first epistemologist could, I suppose, claim that a transition between beliefs is faulty if it is not the application of a rule of inference that preserves knowledge when the world is cooperating. (This is analogous to the suggestion that a belief is justified if it is knowledge or would have been knowledge had the world cooperated.) But this proposal faces two difficulties. First, we need an account of what it is for the world to cooperate. Second, and more importantly, there is a kind of Euthyphro problem here. It is plausible that a rule of inference preserves knowledge in part because it doesn't involve any mistake. It is less plausible that a rule of inference doesn't involve a mistake because it preserves knowledge. This suggests that there is a more fundamental epistemic status than knowledge – namely, whether a rule of inference involves an epistemic mistake. The diversity of our cognitive lives – involving many different kinds of cognitive states, many different epistemic statuses, and including transitions and rules of inference – suggests that the attractively tidy account provided by knowledge-first epistemologists may be a bit too tidy an account. I should concede that these worries are not conclusive. (Indeed, I suspect that knowledgefirst epistemologists won't be strongly moved by them.) There may be responses to each of them. And, even if there aren't, other considerations in favor of knowledge-first epistemology may outweigh the worries. All I would like to claim here is that these considerations provide reasons for concern about the program of knowledge-first epistemology. To fully determine the viability of the knowledge-first approach will require philosophers to carefully evaluate the specific theses endorsed by knowledge-first epistemologists and to 15 determine their costs and benefits. It will also require philosophers to compare knowledge-first epistemology with alternative packages of views. In this, I agree with Williamson (2013, pp. 6– 7), who writes, "In the long run, knowledge-first epistemology ... should be judged by its fruitfulness as a research program, compared to its competitors." Indeed, I expect that any verdict on knowledge-first epistemology will only emerge over the next few decades. In the remainder of this paper, I would like to contribute to the evaluation of knowledgefirst epistemology by considering a thesis endorsed by many of its proponents (as well as by other philosophers) – the knowledge norm of assertion. According to this thesis, roughly speaking, one should assert that p only if one knows that p. In what follows, I'll be focusing on a relatively fine-grained issue. There is a popular line of objection to the norm: In many cases, it seems appropriate for someone who has a strongly justified belief that p, but who doesn't know that p, to assert that p. Proponents of the knowledge norm of assertion typically explain away our judgments about such cases by arguing that the relevant assertion is improper but that the subject is not blameworthy for making the assertion because the subject possesses an excuse. In what follows, I will argue that this response to the objection doesn't work. My discussion will not, of course, conclusively show that knowledge-first epistemology faces serious trouble. Indeed, it won't even conclusively show that the knowledge norm of assertion is unacceptable. But it puts pressure on the knowledge norm of assertion, and derivatively on the program of knowledge-first epistemology. 16 4. The Knowledge Norm of Assertion Roughly speaking, the knowledge norm of assertion is as follows: One ought not to assert that p unless one knows that p. In other words, there is something improper about asserting what one doesn't know to be true.25 As stated above, there are several different motivations that have been put forward in support of this norm – for instance, it is appropriate to respond to an assertion by asking the speaker "how do you know?", it is inappropriate to assert claims of the form "p and I don't know that p", and it is inappropriate to assert lottery propositions believed on merely statistical grounds. To this we could add another, bigger picture, line of thought: A central purpose of communication is to transmit and pool knowledge. It is therefore important that there be a speech act tied to the transmission of knowledge. This speech act is assertion. This explains why an assertion of something that one does not know counts as improper.26 The statement of the knowledge norm of assertion above is somewhat rough. There are many choice points in developing a specific thesis. Here are a few of them: First, what is the particular normative status that appears in the knowledge norm? Must subjects make assertions only if they have the relevant knowledge? Or, instead, ought subjects to make assertions only if they have the relevant knowledge? Do they have reason not to make an assertion if they lack the relevant knowledge? Are they criticizable for asserting when they lack knowledge? Do they lack the authority to make an assertion when they lack knowledge? Or is 25 Versions of the knowledge norm of assertion have been defended by Unger (1975), Slote (1979), Williamson (2000), DeRose (2002), Reynolds (2002), Adler (2002), Hawthorne (2004), Stanley (2005), Engel (2008), Schaffer (2008), Turri (2010), Benton (2011), and Blaauw (2012). See McGlynn (2014) for detailed discussion. 26 A version of this motivation is put forward in Williamson (2000), p. 267. 17 some other normative status at issue?27 In what follows, to use neutral terminology, I'll ask about whether an assertion is "proper" or "improper". Second, is knowledge meant to be necessary or both necessary and sufficient for the propriety of an assertion? For simplicity, I'll assume that the knowledge norm states a necessary condition.28 So far as I can tell, nothing in what follows will hang on this. Third, does the norm directly target the propriety of the assertion or the propriety of the assertor? That is, does the norm state that there is something wrong with an assertion that is not based on knowledge or that there is something wrong with the person making the assertion? The prevailing view seems to be that the norm directly targets the propriety of the assertion rather than the assertor. (In the literature, the norm is often stated as a claim about assertors, but this seems mainly to be for presentational convenience.) I find this somewhat puzzling – the intuitions that are used to motivate the norm seem to involve judgments about the relevant assertor and not merely the assertion. But so far as I can tell, nothing in what follows will hang on this, either. Fourth, what kind of normativity is at issue in the knowledge norm? Is it epistemic, moral, pragmatic, conventional (perhaps like the rules of etiquette or of spelling), a distinctively representational or communicative kind of normativity, or "plain vanilla" normativity (if there is such a thing)? One might think that the relevant kind of normativity must be epistemic since knowledge is, after all, an epistemic notion. But this is a mistake – one can have an epistemic requirement built into a non-epistemic norm. (Compare: an epistemic requirement can be built into a legal norm or into the rules of a game.) A better thought to have here is that the knowledge norm of assertion flows from the function or purpose of the practice of assertion. The kind of 27 Williamson (2000) moves between "must", "criticizable", and "authority". It is not apparent to me how these statuses are meant to be connected. 28 See Brown (2010) and Lackey (2011) for objections to the sufficiency of knowledge for proper assertion. 18 normativity at issue in the knowledge norm depends on what this function or purpose is. For instance, on one view, the central function of the practice of assertion is to enable the transmission and pooling of knowledge. Since this is an epistemic function, the relevant kind of normativity is epistemic. This is perhaps the most plausible view for a knowledge-first epistemologist to take. However, one could instead motivate a knowledge norm starting with the claim that the central function of assertion is to enable agents to coordinate with one another. This would support a moral or pragmatic kind of normativity. And other options are live possibilities, too. Fifth, does the norm govern assertions by ordinary subjects or does it first-and-foremost govern assertions by idealized subjects? Here's an analogy that may help to make this contrast more salient: Probabilists typically argue that probabilistic coherence is a norm of rational credence. But this norm is usually understood as a constraint that in the first instance governs ideal reasoners. How this norm ends up bearing on ordinary reasoners turns out to be a delicate matter. What should we say about the knowledge norm of assertion? The prevailing view here seems to be that the norm applies to all assertions, whether by ordinary or idealized subjects. Sixth, is the knowledge norm of assertion a fundamental norm? Or is it grounded in some more basic norm or norms (together with some descriptive facts)? For instance, is the knowledge norm of assertion somehow grounded in the knowledge norm of action? Seventh, and finally, what exactly is the connection between the norm and assertion? Does the knowledge norm of assertion uniquely characterize the speech act of assertion out of all of the speech acts? Is it an analytic truth about assertion? Is it an essential feature of assertion? Does it provide the real definition of assertion? Williamson (2000) suggests that the knowledge norm is constitutive of assertion. On this view, the knowledge norm of assertion is analogous to a 19 rule of a game. One counts as playing a game just in case (and by virtue of the fact that) one is subject to the rules of the game. Analogously, one counts as making an assertion just in case (and by virtue of the fact that) one is subject to the knowledge norm.29 Different answers to these questions generate different candidate knowledge norms of assertion. So far as I can tell, the differences between these candidate norms will largely be irrelevant to the discussion that follows. (There are exceptions: It will be important that the knowledge norm applies to ordinary subjects and not merely to idealized subjects. The distinction between the norm targeting the assertion or the assertor will also turn out to be relevant.) What should we think about the knowledge norm of assertion, however it is developed? There is an obvious objection to the norm, one that has loomed large in the literature: In many cases, an assertion that p can be proper if the assertor has a strongly justified belief that p, even if the assertor doesn't know that p.30 Consider a Gettier-style case, such as the case of Jones and the stopped clock. Suppose that Jones glances at the clock and is then immediately asked the time. Suppose that Jones answers that it is 2:05 pm. Intuitively, Jones's assertion is proper despite the fact that he doesn't know that it is 2:05 pm. (Moreover, Jones's assertion seems just as proper as it would have been had he genuinely known that it is 2:05 pm.) And similarly for other Gettier-style cases. Indeed, there are many cases in which an assertion that p seems proper if the assertor has a strongly justified belief that p, even if the belief is false. For instance, suppose that Smith has strong evidence that the fastest way to get to Thayer Street from a certain location is to make a 29 See Maitra (2011) and Johnson (2017) for objections to the analogy between the knowledge norm of assertion and the rules of a game. 30 Versions of this objection appear in Douven (2006), Hill and Schechter (2007), Lackey (2007), Brown (2008), Koethe (2009), Kvanvig (2009), Gerken (2011), and McKinnon (2013). See McGlynn (2014) for discussion. 20 right on Benefit Street and then a left on Waterman Street. (Suppose that Smith lives in the area and knows the streets well.) When asked by someone "What's the fastest way for me to get to Thayer from here right now?", it is intuitively proper for Smith to respond by asserting "The fastest way for you to get to Thayer is to make a right on Benefit and then a left on Waterman." This is so even if, unbeknownst to Smith, Benefit Street is currently closed to traffic due to an unexpected problem with a water main. The fact that Smith's belief is false does not intuitively make his assertion improper.31 One can push this general line of objection still further. In many cases, an assertion that p can be proper if the assertor believes that p, even if the belief is unjustified.32 For example, suppose that Robinson strongly believes that there is life on Europa on the basis of wishful thinking. (In case it matters, we can suppose that Robinson does not believe that his belief that there is life on Europa is at all defective.) Suppose that Robinson is asked "Is there life somewhere other than the Earth?" Suppose that Robinson responds "Yes, there is life on Europa." I maintain that Robinson's assertion is proper. Since Robinson believes that there is life on Europa, it is not improper for Robinson to say so. Indeed, if Robinson has no reason to avoid answering the question or to try to mislead his interlocutor, Robinson positively ought to assert that there is life on Europa. Of course, there is something wrong with Robinson – he has an unjustified belief. But the fact that his belief is unjustified does not entail that his assertion is improper. That's a different matter. One might think that there is a straightforward way to see that my claim about the propriety of Robinson's assertion is false. In particular, one might draw an analogy between 31 For a similar case, see McKinnon (2013), p. 122. 32 This claim is not widely endorsed in the literature. 21 assertion and belief. According to this line of thought, assertion is the outer acceptance of a claim and believing is the inner acceptance of a claim.33 Now consider a case of inference from unjustified beliefs. For instance, suppose that a thinker has unjustified beliefs in p and in if p then q. Suppose that the thinker comes to believe that q by competently performing a Modus Ponens inference. The thinker's belief that q will (typically) be unjustified. By analogy, one might think, if a subject's belief that p is unjustified and hence epistemically improper, and the subject asserts that p based on this belief, the assertion will also be improper. Just as the impropriety of a belief can be inherited from the impropriety of the beliefs that it is inferred from, so too can the impropriety of an assertion be inherited from the impropriety of the belief that it is based on. Or so goes the line of thought. This line of thought, however, is mistaken. Belief is not analogous to assertion. Believing is a state and assertion is an action. The right analogy is not between asserting that p and believing that p. It is between asserting that p and coming to believe that p.34 And, once we see that, the case of a competent inference from unjustified premises actually tells in the other direction. If a thinker comes to believe that q by competently performing a Modus Ponens inference from unjustified premises, the output belief will be unjustified. But the forming of the belief that q – the Modus Ponens inference itself – is not improper. The inference itself does not inherit any impropriety from the impropriety of its inputs. Given that the thinker strongly believes that p and that if p then q, and given that the question of whether q is salient, the thinker positively ought to draw the inference and form the belief that q. True, the thinker is in an 33 See Adler (2002). Also see Williamson (2000), pp. 255–256, who draws the analogy between assertion and occurrent belief. 34 Is there something tied to assertion to which believing is analogous? Perhaps we could say that in making an assertion, an assertor undertakes a kind of commitment. Then we could say that believing is analogous not to assertion but to assertoric commitment. I'm not sure this is correct. But even if it is, my topic concerns the norms governing assertion, not the norms governing assertoric commitment. 22 epistemically problematic state. But the mistake wasn't in the inference to q. The mistake was in believing that p and that if p then q to begin with. The analogous is true for Robinson. Robinson's assertion that there is life on Europa is not improper. Robinson's belief that there is life on Europa is unjustified. But the act of asserting that there is life on Europa does not inherit any impropriety from the belief that it is based on. Given that Robinson strongly believes that there is life on Europa, and given that Robinson has no reason to avoid answering the question or to try to be misleading, Robinson positively ought to make the assertion. The cases of Jones, Smith, and Robinson tell against the knowledge norm of assertion. If an assertion that p can be proper when the subject doesn't know that p but has a justified true belief that p, a justified false belief that p, or even an unjustified belief that p, then the knowledge norm of assertion is false. Indeed, analogous problems face other proposed knowledge norms, such as knowledge norms for reasoning, belief, and action.35 So there is a serious worry here for proponents of knowledge norms. Proponents of the knowledge norm of assertion (and other knowledge norms) are, of course, aware of this issue. There is a standard response. In the next section, I will present this response and examine some arguments for the claim that it cannot be made to work. 5. Excuses, Excuses The intuition that an assertion can be appropriate in many cases where the assertor does not have knowledge – but instead has a justified true belief (e.g., the case of Jones) or a justified false belief (e.g., the case of Smith) – seems to be widely shared. In response to such problem 35 There is no analogue of the case of Robinson that can be used against the knowledge norm of belief, but there are analogues of the cases of Jones and Smith. 23 cases, the standard response is to explain away our intuitions. According to this response, in a problem case, the relevant assertion is not, in fact, proper. Instead, our intuition that the assertion is appropriate tracks a different normative feature. Although the assertion violated the norm governing assertion, the assertor is blameless for this violation. This is because the assertor has an excuse for the violation. Our intuition about the appropriateness of the assertion tracks blamelessness, not propriety. This explains away our intuition about the case.36 It is worth saying just a bit about excuses here.37 Very generally, there are normative constraints on action. When the norms are complied with, the action is proper.38 When the norms are violated, the action is improper. However, it can happen that the relevant norms are not complied with but the agent is not blameworthy for the violation. This is what happens when the agent has a sufficient excuse. For example, suppose that I promised to pick up my friend from the airport today. It is a norm on behavior that one must do what one has promised to do. If my car unexpectedly (and through no fault of my own) breaks down while I am driving to the airport and I'm unable to pick up my friend, I have violated the norm. But I am blameless in violating the norm – through no fault of my own, it was impossible for me to comply with it. That my car broke down excuses my violation.39 36 See Williamson (2000), pp. 256-7, DeRose (2002), and Hawthorne and Stanley (2008). (DeRose uses a somewhat different terminology – instead of talking about excuses, he talks about "secondary propriety". I think this is merely a terminological difference.) See Sutton (2007), p. 80, for an analogous response to challenges to the claim that knowledge closes inquiry. See Littlejohn (forthcoming) and Williamson (forthcoming) for detailed presentations of the excuse response as targeted against the Cohen and Lehrer (1983) and Cohen (1984) new evil demon problem. 37 See Austin (1956). 38 More precisely, when the moral norms are complied with, the action is morally proper. When the prudential norms are complied with, the action is prudentially proper. And so forth. 39 There are two other categories of blameless norm violation that should be distinguished from having an excuse. First, the violation of a norm can be justified if the agent had sufficiently good reason for violating it. For instance, I might have strong moral grounds not to pick up my friend from the airport, such as if there was an emergency that required me to take someone else to the hospital. (This notion of justification should not be identified with the notion(s) of justification used in epistemology.) Second, as Strawson (1962) argues, a subject can be exempt from the requirement to comply with a norm if the subject lacks the relevant rational capacities required to be held responsible for complying with the norm. For instance, young children are exempt from certain norms on behavior. See Littlejohn (forthcoming) for a discussion of the justification/excuse/exemption distinction in epistemology. 24 What could be the excuse for violating the knowledge norm of assertion in the case of Jones or Smith? There are several options. One could point to any (or several) of the following facts as excusing the norm violation: The assertor reasonably believes the asserted proposition. The assertor reasonably believes that she knows the asserted proposition. In asserting the proposition, the assertor was trying to comply with the norm that governs assertion. The assertor is generally disposed to comply with the norm governing assertion, and the assertion was an exercise of the underlying categorical basis of that disposition. It is through no fault of the assertor that the assertion violates the norm. The assertor reasonably believes that it is highly likely that the she is complying with the norm. And so forth. There are several concerns with this general line of response that appear in the literature. For instance, Gerken (2011) argues against versions of the excuse response where the assertor has an excuse because she reasonably believes that she knows the proposition asserted. Gerken points out that it requires significant cognitive sophistication to believe that one knows something. Presumably, someone in a Gettier-style case or a case of a justified false belief could lack the sophistication required to have such a belief. Nevertheless, intuitively, if such a person asserted the proposition she justifiably believed, the assertion would be appropriate. There are two main ways an advocate of the excuse response could try to avoid this concern. First, one could identify the excuse not with the fact that the subject reasonably believes that she knows the relevant proposition, but with something less cognitively sophisticated. For instance, one could say all that is required is that the subject's evidence be sufficiently strong to make a belief that she knows the proposition reasonable, even if the subject is incapable of forming that belief. Similarly, one could identify the excuse with the fact that the subject reasonably believes the proposition or with the fact that her assertion is the exercise of the 25 categorical basis for her disposition to assert only what she knows. Second, one could say that a subject who lacks the cognitive sophistication to believe that she knows the relevant proposition (and is not culpable for this lack) is exempt from the requirement that she have such a belief. Instead, for such a cognitively limited subject, something less is required.40 Either of these approaches strikes me as providing a plausible response to Gerken's challenge.41 A different concern appearing in the literature is that subjects in Gettier-style cases (and cases of justified false belief) intuitively do not owe an apology to their addressees, and so there could not be any violation of a norm.42 This concern can be answered by pointing out that not every norm violation requires an apology. In particular, if a norm violation is excusable, an apology is typically unnecessary.43 A closely related concern is that subjects in Gettier-style cases and cases of justified false belief do not need any kind of excuse for their assertions to be appropriate.44 I agree with this claim, but I don't see that our intuitions about the cases are clear enough that we can simply read this fact off of our intuitions. The claim is one that must be earned by careful argumentation. So I don't think that this concern is dialectically compelling, either. There are additional worries that one might have about the excuse response.45 Here are two more. The first concerns the target of the norm. The prevailing view in the literature seems to be that the knowledge norm of assertion concerns a normative property of the assertion, not of the assertor. But the claim that the assertor is blameless for making the assertion is a claim about the assertor, not the assertion. If our intuitions about assertions in Gettier-style cases (and cases 40 Compare: Young children have fewer epistemic obligations to check up on their reasoning than do competent adults. 41 But see Gerken (2011) for responses to these suggestions. 42 See Brown (2008) and Kvanvig (2011) for versions of this concern. 43 See Littlejohn (2012) and McGlynn (2014). 44 See Douven (2006) and Lackey (2007) for versions of this concern. 45 I'm not aware that the following concerns appear in the literature. 26 of justified false belief) concern the normative status of the assertor rather than the assertion, then these intuitions cannot be used to motivate the prevailing view. If instead they concern the normative status of the assertion rather than the assertor, then the excuse response cannot be used to explain them away. This suggests that there is a problem with combining the excuse response and the prevailing view. I find this worry somewhat compelling. However, it is not dialectically very strong. Proponents of the excuse response can simply respond that our intuitive judgments are not fine-grained enough to clearly distinguish between the normative status of the assertion and the normative status of the assertor. A second additional worry concerns the assertion of a proposition that the assertor unjustifiably believes, such as in the case of Robinson's assertion that there is life on Europa. Suppose that I'm right and, when we carefully consider the case, Robinson's assertion is intuitively appropriate. An advocate of the excuse response will have to find a way to argue that Robinson has a sufficient excuse. The problem is that many of the potential excuses listed above are not ones that apply in the case of Robinson. For instance, Robinson does not reasonably believe the proposition. Robinson does not reasonably believe that he knows the proposition. And so forth. A potential response here, I suppose, is to claim that all that Robinson needs to have in order to count as blameless is a belief in the proposition asserted, or perhaps a belief that he knows the proposition asserted. The problem with this response is that it makes excusably violating the knowledge norm of assertion something that is remarkably easy to do – one need only believe that one is complying with it. That's not typically how excuses work. Merely believing that one is complying with a norm is not sufficient to count as blamelessly violating it. That said, my guess is that proponents of the knowledge norm of assertion will simply reject my 27 intuition about Robinson and say that his norm violation is not blameless after all. This strikes me as a bullet to bite. But perhaps it is not a very big one. These concerns about the excuse response, then, are not dialectically very powerful. In the next section, I present a more powerful objection. The objection is a little bit involved – it has a few moving parts – but it is, I think, rather compelling. 6. No Excuses Necessary Consider the case of an assertion in a Gettier-style case (e.g., the case of Jones) or in the case of a justified false belief (e.g., the case of Smith). For concreteness, I'll focus on the case of Jones, but nothing will hang on this. According to the excuse response, Jones's assertion is improper but Jones is blameless for asserting it, since Jones has an excuse. The trouble is that it is not merely the case that Jones's assertion is blameless. Rather, Jones positively ought to make the assertion.46 When asked, he should say that it is 2:05 pm. If Jones does not say that it is 2:05 pm (and has no reason not to cooperate with his interlocutor), then he is criticizable for not asserting what he believes about the time.47 That Jones has an excuse for making the assertion, and is therefore blameless for so doing, does not explain this fact.48 A proponent of the excuse response might reply by saying that there are two distinct considerations involved. Jones has an excuse. That explains why he is blameless in making his assertion. In addition, there is a second consideration that explains why Jones positively ought to 46 This already casts some doubt on the excuse response. Typically, when one positively ought to do something, no excuse is necessary in order to count as blameless in doing it, at least when there is a single kind of normativity in play. I don't want to rest much weight on this point, however, since it might be claimed that there are two kinds of normativity in play – for instance, perhaps the kind of blamelessness at issue is epistemic and the kind of ought at issue is not. 47 At the very least, asserting that it is 2:05 pm is a good thing for Jones to do. That's all that's really needed for the argument in this section. 48 See Schechter (2013) for a version of this point in a different context. 28 make the assertion. For instance, perhaps there is a norm of politeness that requires Jones to respond to his interlocutor (if he has no reason not to cooperate). There are difficulties facing this specific proposal.49 But there are also more general problems with the suggestion that there are two separate considerations in play. First, whenever possible, it is better to avoid multiplying considerations, especially when the phenomena being explained are, on the face of it, closely related. Second, if there is a separate consideration that can explain why Jones positively ought to make the assertion, there is the danger that this consideration could be also used to explain the intuitive data alleged to support the knowledge norm. So there is the danger that there would be no work left for the knowledge norm to do. More importantly, recall where the knowledge norm of assertion is supposed to come from. On the most plausible versions of knowledge-first epistemology, the practice of assertion has a function or purpose. The knowledge norm of assertion flows from this function or purpose. Assuming that this is right, the reason that Jones positively ought to assert that it is 2:05 pm would also seem to flow from the function or purpose of assertion. For instance, suppose that the central function of assertion is to enable the transmission and pooling of knowledge. Assuming this view, it is plausible to think that Jones ought to respond to his interlocutor because (very roughly) doing so is the kind of thing that tends to contribute to the transmission and pooling of knowledge. Alternatively, suppose that the central function of assertion is to help agents to 49 Here are two difficulties: First, a norm of politeness may be able to explain why Jones ought to respond in some way to his interlocutor – after all, it would be rude for him to remain silent. But such a norm cannot explain why Jones ought to respond by asserting what he believes the time to be. There are many other things that Jones could instead assert that would be equally polite – for instance, "I'm very sorry, I cannot help". Second, a norm of politeness cannot handle all of the relevant cases. Suppose that instead of being asked the time, Jones notices that someone nearby is wondering what time it is – frantically looking around for a clock, stopping people to ask if they have a watch, and so forth. Even if Jones is not asked what the time is, so long as Jones has no reason to avoid engaging with this person, there is still some sense in which Jones positively ought to say that it is 2:05 pm. At the very least, that would be a good thing for him to do. A norm of politeness cannot explain this fact. This suggests that it would be better to appeal to a norm of helpfulness instead of a norm of politeness. In a way, I think this is right. See below. 29 coordinate more effectively. Assuming this view, it is plausible to think that Jones ought to respond to his interlocutor because (very roughly) doing so is the kind of thing that tends to contribute to effective coordination. And so forth. What this suggests is that there are not two separate considerations in play. The reason why Jones is blameless in making the assertion and the reason why Jones positively ought to make the assertion are the very same reason or, at least, are closely connected reasons. The natural view for proponents of the excuse response to take is to agree that the fact that Jones has an excuse does not explain why Jones ought to make the assertion he does. It is not the existential claim that Jones has an excuse that explains why Jones ought to make the assertion. Rather, it is the fact that constitutes his excuse that explains why he positively ought to make the assertion. On this view, one and the same fact is significant in two different ways – it functions both as an explanation of blamelessness and as an explanation of an ought. So far, the proponent of the excuse response has been able to respond to the objection. But things are about to get a bit stickier. Proponents of the excuse response should not claim that the kind of excuse at issue in the problem cases for the knowledge norm of assertion is a special kind of excuse that is specific to the problem cases, or even to assertion more generally. Any account of the kind of excuse at issue should show how such excuses fit in with a general picture of norms and norm compliance. Otherwise, the resulting view will be unwieldy and ad hoc.50 How can the excuses that feature in the problem cases be tied to a more general account of excuses for norm violations? The most sophisticated proposal of which I am aware is due to 50 See Hill and Schechter (2007) for an articulation of the concern that the excuse response commits Williamson to an overly complex view. 30 Williamson.51 On Williamson's account, when there is a norm governing a practice, there is typically also a secondary norm to be the sort of person who complies with the original or primary norm.52 Williamson suggests that this secondary norm further generates a tertiary norm to do in any situation what someone who complies with the secondary norm (that is, what someone who is disposed to comply with the primary norm) would do. For instance, there is a norm to keep one's promises. This generates the secondary norm to be the sort of person who keeps one's promises. This further generates the tertiary norm to do in any situation what someone who is disposed to keep their promises would do. Williamson further claims that while some of the normative force of the original norm "rubs off" on the secondary and tertiary norms, the derivative norms typically do not "inherit the full normative status" of the original norm.53 For instance, in breaking a promise, one is breaking one's word, not living up to a commitment one has undertaken, etc. In not being the sort of person who keeps one's promises – so long as one has not actually broken a promise – one has done no such thing. Finally, Williamson claims it is often a good excuse for violating a primary norm that one is complying with the tertiary norm it generates. (He also claims that if one complies with both the secondary and tertiary norms, this typically strengthens the excuse.) In particular, if an agent breaks a promise in a certain situation, the fact that the agent is doing what someone who keeps their promises would do in that situation will often excuse the norm violation. There is much to say in favor of Williamson's account. It is elegant. It fits with familiar examples of norm-governed behavior. (Williamson focuses on legal norms and the norms 51 See Williamson (forthcoming). Also see Littlejohn (forthcoming) for a related view. 52 "Complies with the norm" should be understood as a generic – to be the sort of person who complies with a norm does not require that one actually complies with the norm in any given situation. 53 Williamson (forthcoming). 31 governing promising. One might also add the cases of spelling, grammar, etiquette, and games.) However, in the current context, there is a problem. Namely, Williamson's account does not sufficiently explain why it is that, in the problem cases for the knowledge norm of assertion, the assertor ought to make the assertion. Applying Williamson's account, the knowledge norm for assertion generates a secondary norm: One should be the sort of person who asserts only what one knows.54 It further generates a tertiary norm: In any given situation, one should assert what the sort of person who asserts only what they know would assert. Let us grant that Jones is the sort of person who asserts only what he knows. Let us also grant that in asserting that it is 2:05 pm, Jones is asserting what someone who is the sort of person who asserts only what they know would assert. So Jones is complying with the secondary and tertiary norms. This could explain, perhaps, why Jones is blameless in making the assertion. But it does not sufficiently explain why Jones positively ought to make the assertion and why Jones would be criticizable if he failed to make the assertion. One might think that there is a simple reason why Jones is criticizable if he doesn't make the assertion: In not making the assertion, he would be violating the tertiary norm. This isn't quite right – the primary norm doesn't mandate any assertions at all, and so neither does the tertiary norm. But this problem is easily fixed. Presumably, there is a general norm of helpfulness that entails that one should respond to reasonable questions about the time. (Perhaps such a norm is tied to Grice's maxim of quantity.)55 In combination with the knowledge norm of assertion, this explains why one should tell someone the time when asked, if one knows it. In combination with the tertiary assertion norm, the line of thought goes, this mandates that one should tell someone what one believes the time to be if doing so is what someone who is helpful 54 See Lasonen Aarnio (2010), which makes use of a secondary norm on belief in order to try to explain away our intuitions that knowledge can be defeated. 55 See Grice (1975). 32 and is the kind of person who asserts only what they know would assert. So the tertiary norm (in combination with a general norm of helpfulness) does mandate that Jones make the assertion, after all. What then is the problem? The problem is that the kind of mandate that tertiary norms provide is too weak to account for the force of Jones's requirement to assert what he takes the time to be. As Williamson admits, secondary and tertiary norms typically do not "inherit the full normative status" of the primary norm. Not doing what someone who is the sort of person who keeps their promises would do is very different from breaking a promise. One ought to keep one's promises. One also ought to do what the sort of person who keeps their promises would do. But the former ought is stronger and more "full-blooded" than the latter ought. Breaking a promise is a much more serious violation than not doing what the sort of person who keeps their promises would do. In the Jones case, however, not asserting that it is 2:05 pm seems every bit as bad – and bad in the very same way – as it would be if Jones knew that it was 2:05 pm. One way to see this is to think about Jones and twin Jones. Jones and twin Jones are in exactly the same situation – they have both just glanced at a clock that reads 2:05 and they have both been asked for the time – except for one difference. Jones glanced at a clock that stopped twelve hours ago and so doesn't know the time. Twin Jones glanced at a working clock and does know the time. I maintain that Jones and Twin Jones face equally strong pressure to assert that it is 2:05 pm. The oughts that apply to them are exactly on a par. A different way to see the point is to consider a diachronic case where the subject moves from knowledge to a merely justified belief and back again.56 It is a bit easier to make use of the 56 See White (2014) for diachronic cases used against Williamson's externalist response to the new evil demon argument. 33 case of Smith rather than the case of Jones, so let's turn to that case. Suppose that on Monday, Smith counts as knowing that the fastest way to get to Thayer Street from a certain location is to make a right on Benefit Street and then a left on Waterman Street. Suppose that Smith is asked by a passerby "What's the fastest way for me to get to Thayer from here right now?" Smith ought to respond by saying that the fastest way to get to Thayer Street is to make a right on Benefit Street and then a left on Waterman Street. Suppose that on Tuesday, unbeknownst to Smith, Benefit Street is closed due to a water main break. Suppose that Smith is asked by another passerby "What's the fastest way for me to get to Thayer from here right now?" Smith again ought to respond by saying that the fastest way to get to Thayer Street is to make a right on Benefit Street and then a left on Waterman Street. Suppose that on Wednesday, everything is back to normal. Suppose that Smith is asked by a yet another passerby "What's the fastest way for me to get to Thayer from here right now?" Yet again, Smith ought to respond by saying that the fastest way to get to Thayer Street is to make a right on Benefit Street and then a left on Waterman Street. Indeed, the strength of the oughts on all three days seems just the same. Not giving the passerby directions would be just as bad on any of the days, and in just the same way. Williamson's account cannot accommodate this point.57 The objection to the excuse response thus involves the interaction of three constraints on an account of the kind of excuse at issue in the problem cases for the knowledge norm of assertion. First, it is a constraint that the account not merely explain why the assertions are blameless, but also explain why the assertors ought to assert what they do. Second, it is a constraint that the account explain the full normative strength of this ought – and in particular, 57 Williamson might claim that Smith doesn't have knowledge of the fastest route on Monday or Wednesday, since Smith's belief is not safe. We can modify the case to avoid this response. For instance, we can change the case so that Smith is asked for directions on days that are months apart. We can also specify that the water main break is not caused by a random fluke (and thus avoid any resemblance to a lottery case). Presumably, there is some variant of the case on which Smith loses and gains knowledge. We can substitute this variant for the case presented in the text. 34 why the ought is as strong in a problem case as it is in a corresponding knowledge case. Third, it is a constraint that the kind of excuse at issue not be some special kind of excuse particular to assertion. Instead, the account must fit with a general account of norm-governed behavior. The trouble is that it is difficult to see how these constraints can be satisfied simultaneously. I've illustrated this by focusing on Williamson's account. But it is difficult to see that an alternative account can do better. It is worth noting that the dialectical situation would seem to be analogous for other proposed knowledge norms – including the knowledge norms of reasoning, belief, and action. It can be appropriate for a subject to use the proposition that p as a premise in reasoning, to believe that p, or to act as if p, despite not knowing that p. In response to problem cases for one of these norms, it might be suggested that in such cases, the subject has violated the norm, but has done so blamelessly since the subject has an appropriate excuse. But, again, this response underdescribes the situation. In many problem cases, the subject positively ought to reason with the proposition, believe the proposition, or act as if the proposition is true. And it seems difficult to provide an account of the kind of excuse at issue in these problem cases that also explains where this positive ought comes from, accommodates the full normative strength of the ought, and does so in a non-ad hoc way.58 7. Conclusion: Assertion without Knowledge Let's take stock. In the first part of this paper, I briefly presented the program of knowledge-first epistemology. I then put forward three big-picture worries for this program: (i) the post-Gettier literature suggests that knowledge is a marginal status; (ii) for knowledge-first epistemology to 58 If anything, the problem for these other norms is worse than for the knowledge norm of assertion. The suggestion that there are two separate considerations in play – one that explains blamelessness and one that explains the positive ought – is even less plausible for the cases of reasoning, belief, and action. 35 be tenable, we need an explanation of what knowledge could be such that it is central to our mental lives; and (iii) the diversity of our mental lives – involving many different kinds of cognitive states and epistemic statuses and involving transitions and rules in addition to cognitive states – casts doubt on the centrality of knowledge. I also conceded that while these objections are pressing, they are not conclusive. Determining the viability of knowledge-first epistemology requires carefully evaluating the individual theses endorsed by proponents. In the second part of the paper, I turned to a specific thesis that is widely endorsed by knowledge-first epistemologists – the knowledge norm of assertion. I presented a common objection to this thesis: In many cases, it is intuitively appropriate for someone who has a strongly justified belief that p, but who doesn't know that p, to assert that p. I then presented the standard response to this objection: In such a case, the assertion is improper but the assertor is blameless because the assertor possesses a sufficiently good excuse. I argued that extant objections to this response are not dialectically very powerful. Instead, I presented a new (and somewhat complicated) objection. In its essentials, the objection is that it is difficult to provide a non-ad hoc account of the assertor's excuse that explains why the assertor ought to make the assertion, where this ought is just as strong as it would be in a case of knowledge. This, I conclude, provides us with reason to reject the knowledge norm of assertion. (Analogous objections provide us with reason to reject the knowledge norms of reasoning, belief, and action.) Derivatively, this provides us with some reason to reject knowledge-first epistemology. Supposing we reject the knowledge norm of assertion, how should we replace it? The discussion above provides some support for moving to a different norm. If we give up on the excuse response, the cases of Jones, Smith, and Robinson suggest that knowledge, truth, and 36 justification are not necessary conditions on proper assertion. That leaves belief, or perhaps belief that one knows.59 Perhaps, then, we should accept one of these two norms. I suspect not. There are assertions that are intuitively appropriate in which the assertor does not believe the proposition asserted. Suppose, for example, that one is tutoring a student in physics and knows that if one puts in all of the required hedges, the student will get lost in the weeds.60 Similarly, suppose that some situation is urgent, and the most straightforward thing one could do to provide the required aid is to say something one knows to be false.61 In each of these cases, it strikes me as appropriate to assert claims that one knows to be false.62 Proponents of various norms – the belief norm, the justified belief norm, the belief that one knows norm, the knowledge norm – will try to handle these cases by saying that the assertions violate the norm of assertion, but that the educational needs of the student or the urgency of the situation makes the violation blameless. This maneuver may work here. It is not subject to same objections that face the excuse response discussed above. But it would certainly be more satisfying if we didn't have to categorize these assertions as norm violations to begin with. It would be theoretically preferable if we could adopt an account on which these assertions are normatively on a par with other intuitively appropriate assertions. The natural account to reach for here is a broadly Gricean account. In particular, one might think that in the case of the physics student or the case of the urgent situation, what makes the assertion appropriate is that it is the most helpful thing to say in context – the assertor takes the proposition to be more relevant to the listener's informational needs than any alternative 59 Bach and Harnish (1979) argue that assertions express beliefs. Bach (2008) further argues that this generates a belief norm on assertion. See Williamson (2000) for discussion of the belief that you know norm. 60 For a related case, see McKinnon (2013), p. 124. 61 For a related case, see Williamson (2000), p. 256. 62 For additional cases, see the examples of "selfless assertions" in Lackey (2007). 37 proposition that could be asserted.63 On this approach, there are no norms specifically tied to assertion.64 Instead, there are general pragmatic principles governing communication, such as a principle that tells us to do what is communicatively most helpful in context. This approach requires that we find some other way, not involving norms, to distinguish assertion from the other speech acts.65 It also requires that we respond to the positive arguments that have been presented for the proposed norms of assertion. That will take a lot of work. But it strikes me as the most promising approach to take.66 References Adler, Jonathan. (2002) Belief's Own Ethics. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Austin, John L. (1956) "A Plea for Excuses," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 57: 1–30. Bach, Kent. (2008) "Applying Pragmatics to Epistemology," Philosophical Issues 18: 68–88. Bach, Kent and Harnish, Robert. (1979) Linguistic Communication and Speech Acts. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Benton, Matthew. (2011) "Two More for the Knowledge Account of Assertion," Analysis 71: 684–687. Blaauw, Martijn. (2012) "Reinforcing the Knowledge Account of Assertion," Analysis 72: 105– 108. BonJour, Laurence. (2011) "The Myth of Knowledge," Philosophical Perspectives 24: 57–83. Brown, Jessica. (2008) "The Knowledge Norm for Assertion," Philosophical Issues 18: 89–103. Brown, Jessica. (2010) "Knowledge and Assertion," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81: 549–566. Byrne, Alex and Logue, Heather. (eds.) (2008) Disjunctivism: Contemporary Readings. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Clark, Michael. (1963) "Knowledge and Grounds: A Comment on Mr. Gettier's Paper," Analysis 24: 46–48. Cohen, Stewart. (1984) "Justification and Truth," Philosophical Studies 46: 279–295. 63 This is related to Grice's maxims of relevance and quantity. See Weiner (2005), Hill and Schechter (2007), and Lackey (2008) for applications of Gricean principles in responding to arguments in favor of the knowledge norm of assertion. 64 See Sosa (2009) and Johnson (2017) for arguments that assertion does not have a constitutive norm. 65 See MacFarlane (2011) for a survey of approaches. 66 Thanks to Stewart Cohen and Timothy Williamson for discussion of these issues. Thanks to David Black, David Christensen, Louis deRossett, Mikkel Gerken, Jeremy Goodman, Christopher Hill, Casey Johnson, and David Plunkett for helpful comments on this paper. Thanks to the students in David Plunkett's undergraduate seminar at Dartmouth for useful questions and remarks. Thanks to the three editors of this volume for numerous suggestions that led to improvements. This paper was written while I was a visiting fellow at the University of Connecticut Humanities Institute. I'm grateful to the University of Connecticut for its hospitality. 38 Cohen, Stewart and Lehrer, Keith. (1983) "Justification, Truth, and Coherence," Synthese 55: 191–207. DeRose, Keith. (2002) "Assertion, Knowledge, and Context," Philosophical Review 111: 167– 203. Douven, Igor. (2006) "Assertion, Knowledge, and Rationality," Philosophical Review 115: 449– 485. Engel, Pascal. (2008) "In What Sense is Knowledge the Norm of Assertion?," Grazer Philosophische Studien 77: 45–59. Gerken, Mikkel. (2011) "Warrant and Action," Synthese 178: 529–547. Gettier, Edmund. (1963) "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?," Analysis 23: 121–123. Goldman, Alvin. (1967) "A Causal Theory of Knowing," Journal of Philosophy 64: 357–372. Grice, H. Paul. (1975) "Logic and Conversation," in Peter Cole and Jerry Morgan (eds.), Syntax and Semantics, Vol. 3. New York: Academic Press, pp. 41–58. Grimm, Stephen. (2006) "Is Understanding a Species of Knowledge?," British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57: 515–535. Hawthorne, John. (2004) Knowledge and Lotteries. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hawthorne , John and Stanley, Jason. (2008) "Knowledge and Action," Journal of Philosophy 105: 571–590. Hill, Christopher and Schechter, Joshua. (2007) "Hawthorne's Lottery Puzzle and the Nature of Belief," Philosophical Issues 17: 102–122. Hinton, John M. (1967) "Visual Experiences," Mind 76: 217–27. Johnson, Casey. (2017) "What Norm of Assertion?" Acta Analytica. Kaplan, Mark. (1985) "It's Not What You Know that Counts," Journal of Philosophy 82: 350– 363. Kelp, Christoph. (2015) "Understanding Phenomena," Synthese 192: 3799–3816 Khalifa, Kareem. (2011) "Understanding, Knowledge, and Scientific Antirealism," Grazer Philosophische Studien 83: 93–112. Koethe, John. (2009) "Knowledge and the Norms of Assertion," Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87: 625–638. Kvanvig, Jonathan. (2003) The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kvanvig, Jonathan. (2009) "Assertion, Knowledge, and Lotteries," in Patrick Greenough and Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Williamson on Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 140–160. Kvanvig, Jonathan. (2011) "Norms of Assertion," in Jessica Brown and Herman Cappelen (eds.), Assertion: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 233–250. Lackey, Jennifer. (2007) "Norms of Assertion," Noûs 41: 594–626. Lackey, Jennifer. (2011) "Assertion and Isolated Second-Hand Knowledge," in Jessica Brown and Herman Cappelen (eds.), Assertion: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 251–275. Lasonen Aarnio, Maria. (2010) "Unreasonable Knowledge," Philosophical Perspectives 24: 1– 21. Lehrer, Keith and Paxson, Thomas. (1969) "Knowledge: Undefeated Justified True Belief," Journal of Philosophy 66: 225–237. Lewis, David. (1983) "New Work for a Theory of Universals," Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61: 343–77. 39 Littlejohn, Clayton. (2012) Justification and the Truth Connection. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Littlejohn, Clayton. (2013) "The Russellian Retreat," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 113: 293–320. Littlejohn, Clayton. (forthcoming) "A Plea for Epistemic Excuses," in Fabian Dorsch and Julien Dutant (eds.), The New Evil Demon Problem. Oxford: Oxford University Press. MacFarlane, John. (2011) "What is Assertion?," in Jessica Brown and Herman Cappelen (eds.), Assertion: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 79–96. Maitra, Ishani. (2011) "Assertion, Norms, and Games," in Jessica Brown and Herman Cappelen (eds.), Assertion: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 277–296. Martin, Michael. (2002) "The Transparency of Experience", Mind and Language 17: 376–425. McDowell, John. (1982) "Criteria, Defeasibility and Knowledge," Proceedings of the British Academy 68: 455–479. McGlynn, Aidan. (2014) Knowledge First?. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. McKinnon, Rachel. (2013) "The Supportive Reasons Norm of Assertion," American Philosophical Quarterly 50: 121–135. Nozick, Robert. (1981) Philosophical Explanations. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Pritchard, Duncan. (2005) Epistemic Luck. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pritchard, Duncan. (2012) Epistemological Disjunctivism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Reynolds, Steven. (2002) "Testimony, Knowledge, and Epistemic Goals," Philosophical Studies 110: 139–161. Russell, Bertrand. (1912) The Problems of Philosophy. London: Williams and Norgate. Schaffer, Jonathan. (2008) "Knowledge in the Image of Assertion." Philosophical Issues 18: 1– 19 Schechter, Joshua. (2013) "Rational Self-Doubt and the Failure of Closure," Philosophical Studies 163: 429–452. Shope, Robert. (1983) The Analysis of Knowing: A Decade of Research. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Sliwa, Paulina. (2014) "Understanding and Knowing," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 115: 57–74. Slote, Michael. (1979) "Assertion and Belief," in Jonathan Dancy (ed.), Papers on Language and Logic. Keele: Keele University Press, pp. 177–90. Snowdon, Paul. (1980) "Perception, Vision and Causation," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 81: 175–92. Sosa, David. (2009) "Dubious Assertions," Philosophical Studies 146: 269–272. Stanley, Jason. (2005) Knowledge and Practical Interests. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Strawson, Peter. (1962) "Freedom and Resentment," Proceedings of the British Academy, 48: 1– 25. Sutton, Jonathan. (2007) Without Justification. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Turri, John. (2010) "Epistemic Invariantism and Speech Act Contextualism," Philosophical Review 119: 77–95. Unger, Peter. (1975) Ignorance: A Case for Skepticism. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Weiner, Matthew. (2005) "Must We Know What We Say?," Philosophical Review 114: 227– 251. 40 Weiner, Matthew. (2009) "Practical Reasoning and the Concept of Knowledge" in Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar, and Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 163–82. White, Roger. (2014) "What is My Evidence that Here is a Hand?," in Dylan Dodd and Elia Zardini (eds.), Scepticism and Perceptual Justification. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 298–322. Whiting, Daniel. (2013) "Stick to the Facts: On the Norms of Assertion," Erkenntnis 78:847– 867. Williamson, Timothy. (2000) Knowledge and its Limits. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Williamson, Timothy. (2013) "Knowledge First," in Matthias Steup, John Turri, and Ernest Sosa (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, second edition. Malden, Mass.: WileyBlackwell, pp. 1–9. Williamson, Timothy. (forthcoming) "Justifications, Excuses, and Sceptical Scenarios," in Fabian Dorsch and Julien Dutant (eds.), The New Evil Demon Problem. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Education Review Welner, Kevin (2008). Neo-vouchers: The Emergence of Tuition Tax Credits for Private Schooling. NY: Rowman and Littlefield. ISBN 978-0742540804 Reviewed by Jonny Anomaly Duke University Nearly six decades ago Milton Friedman proposed that government financed vouchers could help increase parental choice and improve schools by creating competition for the provision of primary and secondary education. (See Chapter 6 in Capitalism and Freedom). Friedman's central idea was that governments could levy taxes in order to finance education without monopolizing its delivery. In Neovouchers: The Emergence of Tuition Tax Credits for Private Schooling, Kevin Welner offers an overview of American voucher programs, and in the process advances two troubling claims: 1) that vouchers have not been especially successful at improving American education, and that 2) vouchers present a serious challenge to the separation of church and state, since they are most often redeemed at religious schools. The term "neovoucher" is a neologism for a specific kind of voucher. In Friedman's original proposal, vouchers worth a specific amount of money would be issued by governments and handed directly to parents to redeem at a school of their choice. According to Welner, supporters of vouchers feared that opponents might successfully challenge the constitutionality of a program that uses public money to enable parents to send their children to parochial schools. The fear was that if religious schools were the primary beneficiaries of vouchers, voucher programs might be deemed inconsistent with the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, which holds that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion." The Clause has famously been interpreted by the Court as codifying Jefferson's idea that there should be a "wall of separation between church and state." So, in order to avoid court battles, the Arizona legislature created neovouchers, which are educational grants issued to individual parents by private, non-profit organizations. For every dollar spent on educational grants, non-profit organizations are reimbursed by the state. In effect, in 1997 Arizona enacted an oblique version of the plan Friedman envisioned-one that proponents hoped would survive Supreme Court scrutiny. As it turned out, in 2002 the Supreme Court narrowly voted to uphold all voucher programs, provided they remained neutral on the question of which religious schools are entitled to receive money from the public purse. Although Welner expresses concern about the Supreme Court ruling, it's safe to say that he's more concerned about the efficacy of vouchers in achieving their stated goals, and about the unintended consequences vouchers have for other social goals that public schools are often thought to advance. One of the most interesting conclusions Welner comes to is that voucher programs seem to make parents happy, but haven't had any noticeable benefits for children (p. 15). This should worry us if the main goal of an education system is to improve children's prospects rather than simply to appease parents. However, the evidence that vouchers have had no real impact on student performance is complicated by a couple of factors. First, the monetary value of a voucher has to be large if it is to be anything more than a tax credit to parents who already use private schools. The fact that the value of vouchers in Arizona is capped at $1,000 per year may explain Welner's observation that "the policy does not appear to prompt many families to switch from public to private school, nor does it appear to assist the most needy families" (p. 46). If the value of a voucher isn't large enough to induce people to switch schools, it's clearly not going to have measurable consequences. Second, before we can draw any conclusions about how well a truly competitive market for education can work, we need longitudinal studies that take careful note of local conditions. On the supply side, for example, it may take years in some places for new private schools to start up in order to compete with existing schools. On the demand side, there are big costs associated with switching schools, including the psychological cost to children of making new friends and having new teachers and the search costs incurred by parents looking for the best school within their budget. So, although Welner seems skeptical of the capacity of vouchers to significantly improve student performance, the little evidence we have from existing voucher schemes does not warrant any obvious conclusion. Perhaps a more alarming and less frequently discussed effect of voucher programs is that they significantly increase racial and cultural stratification. (pp. 21-24) To some extent, in the absence of forced integration, this is bound to happen in schools for the same reason it happens in neighborhoods and high school cafeterias. There are plenty of people who prefer to surround themselves (or their children) with other people who share a common trait: race, culture, religion, sexual preference, political persuasion, and so on. And even if nobody were like this-even if each person just wanted to avoid minority status in their neighborhood or school-we would still see widespread stratification between groups whose members are free to choose where they live or learn or eat lunch (Schelling, 1969). This is a fact about modern life in a pluralistic society. However, it is not clear that governments have the right to force integration either in schools or in neighborhoods, even if the social consequences of relatively diverse schools (or neighborhoods) might be better in the aggregate. Finally, Welner considers what may be the most plausible argument for the state to take an active role in education: the public goods argument. Because public goods (as economists define them) provide non-excludable benefits, they are notoriously difficult to provide without government action. Examples of public goods include pollution reduction, the control of infectious disease, and an educated population. Education is often neglected by those who discuss the public goods argument for government intervention because many see it as a private good consumed exclusively by parents or children. Yet Welner rightly argues that education is best construed as a public good, especially in democratic societies in which all of us bear the cost of bad voters and unproductive workers (p. 109). Still, Welner's contention that education is a public good doesn't directly bear on the question of whether vouchers are a good idea unless public schools can be shown to be inherently better than private schools at producing productive citizens. And as long as parochial schools with a religious identification are required to teach the same core curriculum as secular schools, there's no reason to think they can't supply a well-educated citizenry as well as public schools or secular academies. Ultimately, although Welner remains suspicious of voucher programs, he takes the sensible position that markets in education provide some benefits, at least for parents, and that there are trade-offs between the competing values of liberty, welfare, and efficiency in any conceivable system for delivering education. References Friedman, Milton. (1962). Capitalism and Freedom. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Schelling, Thomas. (1969). Models of segregation. The American Economic Review, 59(2), 488-493.

Fragmentation and Higher-Order Evidence Penultimate Draft, forthcoming in Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays Daniel Greco The concept of higher-order evidence-roughly, evidence about what our evidence supports-promises epistemological riches; it has struck many philosophers as necessary for explaining how to rationally respond to disagreement in particular, and to evidence of our own fallibility more generally. But it also threatens paradox. Once we allow higher-order evidence to do non-trivial work-in particular, once we allow that people can be rationally ignorant of what their evidence supports-we seem to be committed to a host of puzzling or even absurd consequences. My aim in this paper will be to have my cake and eat it too; I'll present an independently motivated framework that, I'll argue, lets us mimic the particular case judgments of those who explain how to accommodate evidence of our fallibility by appeal to higher-order evidence, but without commitment to the absurd consequences. 1 Road Map My strategy will be as follows. I'll start by introducing the idea of higher-order evidence (HOE), along with some of the examples which it is often thought to illuminate. In particular, my focus will be on the claim that, due to limited higher-order evidence, we are sometimes rationally uncertain about what our evidence supports. I'll then review For helpful comments and discussion, thanks to two anonymous referees for this volume. 1 Fragmentation and Higher-Order Evidence some puzzles this claim engenders. I'll divide them in two categories. First, there are the synchronic puzzles. In particular, it seems to entail that epistemic akrasia-believing some claim, while simultaneously believing that you shouldn't believe it-can be rational. But epistemic akrasia seems paradigmatically irrational (Greco, 2014b; Horowitz, 2014; Littlejohn, 2018). Second, there are a host of diachronic puzzles. Having presented an overview of reasons to be skeptical of the idea that we can be rationally uncertain about what our evidence supports, I'll introduce an alternative strategy for making sense of the cases. In a nutshell, it involves the idea that evidence can be available for some purposes or tasks, but not others, and that we often do better to explicitly relativize talk about a subject's evidence to those purposes or tasks which the evidence is available to guide.1 I'll then argue that when this independently motivated framework is applied to the sorts cases typically discussed in the higher-order evidence literature, it lets us offer plausible descriptions of cases that are usually characterized in terms of rational uncertainty of what our evidence supports, without the puzzles that characterization brings in its wake. 2 Higher-Order Evidence As a first pass, we might say that HOE is evidence about evidence.2 But this rough characterization obscures crucial distinctions-some species of HOE, so defined, raise distinctive epistemological problems that others do not. For instance, if I read in a newspaper that paleontologists have discovered powerful evidence that the cretaceous extinction was not, after all, caused by a meteor impact, I've plausibly gotten higherorder evidence in this minimal sense-I've gotten evidence (what I read in the newspaper) about evidence (what the paleontologists have discovered). But, for reasons that should 1This is a special case of the idea that our mental lives are "fragmented". For some defenses of various versions of this view, see Lewis (1982), Stalnaker (1984, 1991, 1999), Egan (2008), Gendler (2008), Rayo (2013, Chapter 4.), Greco (2014a,b), and Elga and Rayo (Manuscript A, B). 2For instance, Richard Feldman (2009) characterizes HOE as "evidence about the existence, merits, or significance of a body of evidence." 2 Fragmentation and Higher-Order Evidence become clear, this sort of case doesn't raise the tricky issues that have typically been the focus of the recent literature on HOE. For that reason, I'll work in this essay with a narrower characterization of HOE. In the target sense, HOE for a subject S is evidence that bears on what S 's evidence supports. To receive higher-order evidence, in the sense I'm interested in, is for her to receive: 1. Evidence about which body of evidence S herself has, or 2. Evidence about evidential support relations-in particular, evidence about which propositions are supported to which degrees by a body of evidence that, for all S knows, is her own. In this narrower sense, when I read about paleontological discoveries, I don't seem to get any higher-order evidence. I get new evidence to be sure, but that doesn't seem helpfully characterized as either (a) evidence about what my evidence is, or (b) evidence about what that evidence supports.3 While this characterization of HOE may look oddly disjunctive, I don't think it is. There are two sorts of reason I might be uncertain about what my evidence supports. First, while I might know what's supported by each possible body of evidence, I might fail to know which body of evidence is mine. Second, while I might know which body of evidence is mine, I might fail to know what that given body of evidence supports.4 The two-clause characterization of HOE mirrors the two potential sources of uncertainty about what one's evidence supports.5 Ultimately-counterintuitively, I think-I'll suggest that epistemologists can and should avoid appeal to HOE, as characterized above. That is, so long as we're careful 3See also Christensen (2010a), who offers a different characterization of HOE, but which would agree with mine in not counting the newspaper case. In particular, he claims that what's distinctive about HOE is that it "rationalizes a change of belief precisely because it indicates that my previous beliefs were rationally sub-par." (p. 185) And that's not going on in the newspaper case-in coming to suspend judgment about whether a meteor strike caused the cretaceous extinction after reading the newspaper story, I needn't believe that my previous confidence on that point was rationally sub-par. 4Of course, I might also be ignorant in both ways. 5So I agree with Dorst (Forthcoming), who frames his discussion in terms of higher-order uncertainty, rather than higher-order evidence. 3 Fragmentation and Higher-Order Evidence not to equivocate on "evidence", we can safely theorize in a framework in which a subject's evidence always settles (a) what her evidence is, and (b) what that evidence supports, and so in which HOE has no non-trivial role to play. But for reasons that should become clear, it's extremely tempting to equivocate on "evidence". Appeals to HOE in the recent literature should typically be understood as involving a kind of subtle equivocation-a subject may lack evidence (in one sense) about what her evidence (in some other sense) is, or supports. But I'm getting ahead of myself-reasons to accept these surprising claims will only emerge later in the paper. For now, having offered a general characterization of HOE, I'll turn to some familiar examples in which it seems natural and fruitful to theorize in terms of it. 2.1 Examples 2.1.1 Disagreement Probably the best-known examples that have been thought to illustrate the importance of HOE concern disagreement. Here's a typical one:6 Juror: You're a juror in a complex civil case in which a great deal of evidence was presented. On the basis of that evidence, you believe that the accused was at fault, so your tentative plan is to find for the plaintiff. And let's stipulate that your reading of the evidence is, in fact, maximally rational; if an ideal intellect-an epistemic angel-were to look at your evidence, she'd come to the same conclusion you did. But when you sit down to deliberate, you find that many of the other jurors think otherwise-they believe that the accused was not at fault. Upon 6Perhaps the most famous example of disagreement is David Christensen (2007b) "Restaurant Case", but I'm avoiding it on purpose. In short, that case raises the problem of logical omniscience, in addition to problems concerning disagreement. While I do think the diagnosis I'll ultimately offer of this case could extend to that one, it would be complicated, and would go via the view defended in Elga and Rayo (Manuscript A, B.) Because I don't have the space here to summarize their treatment of the problem of logical omniscience, nor how I would appeal to it in treating cases of disagreement, I'll stick to cases of disagreement that don't pose that problem. 4 Fragmentation and Higher-Order Evidence further discussion, you realize it's not that anybody is bringing to bear unshared, background evidence-rather, you just disagree about what conclusion the shared body of evidence presented at court points to. Moreover, the other jurors seem like generally sensible people, and they're not committing any obvious blunders or misunderstandings. At this point, what should you think about whether the accused was at fault? How might we analyze this case-in particular, capturing plausible verdicts about what it's rational to believe both before and after hearing about the other jurors' views- in terms of HOE? Let's suppose that you are rational in believing that the accused is at fault prior to hearing about the other jurors' views, and then rational in suspending judgment on that question afterwards-this pattern of judgments is typical of "conciliationism", in the lingo.7 For what it's worth, this will make my task harder-while there are extant views that downplay the significance of HOE, they tend to do so by treating other jurors' views as as irrelevant to what, in fact, your evidence supports concerning the liability of the accused.8 In this case it's natural to say that you and the other jurors know what the evidence is. We can suppose you all have a very good memory, and that if you were asked about whether the body of evidence presented at court included this or that fact, you would always able to respond accurately. And none of that changes when the other jurors express their views. So HOE in the first sense-evidence about which body of evidence is yours-doesn't seem to be at issue. But, prima facie, it's plausible that HOE in the second sense is at issue. While you may know what your evidence is, because you're not an ideal evaluator of evidence-or at least, if you are, you don't know that-it's not transparent to you what the evidence supports concerning fault. As a matter of fact you judged correctly that it supported the belief that the accused was at fault, but you hold 7E.g., Christensen (2007b), Elga (2007), Feldman (2007). 8I have in mind Titelbaum (2015) and Smithies (2015), both of whom hold that any body of evidence maximally supports all a priori truths about evidential support relations. 5 Fragmentation and Higher-Order Evidence that belief about evidential support only defeasibly, and rightly so. When you learn that the other jurors came up with a different answer, your belief is defeated. You obtained misleading higher-order evidence to the effect that your evidence doesn't support the claim that the accused was at fault after all. And if you're rational, you'll respond by suspending judgment, both about fault, and about what your evidence supports concerning fault. The fact that a reliable inquirer with the same evidence as you disagrees with you suggests you may have made a mistake in judging what your evidence supports. But disagreement isn't the only way you can get evidence of such a mistake. The literature abounds with cases in which, due to learning that you've been drugged,9 or are suffering from oxygen deprivation,10 or sleep deprivation,11 or some other malady, you get evidence that is naturally interpreted as suggesting that you made a mistake concerning evidential support relations-you took a body of evidence to support some proposition that, in fact, it does not-even when you have in fact made no such mistake. 2.1.2 Limited Discrimination While I characterized HOE as coming in two species, aimed at rectifying two sorts of ignorance-ignorance about what your evidence is, and ignorance about evidential support relations-the cases discussed in the previous subsection only concerned the latter species. What about the former? They tend to turn on facts about our limited perceptual discriminatory capacities. Here's an example from Salow (2017b), who is adapting a case from Williamson (2011). I use Salow's version because I'll later appeal to his explanation of what's unattractive about the HOE-based interpretation of the case: Imagine that you are faced with an unmarked clock, with a single hand 9Christensen (2007a). 10Elga (Ms.) 11Christensen (2010a). 6 Fragmentation and Higher-Order Evidence that can point in any one of 60 slightly different directions. Your ability to discriminate where it is pointing is good, but not unlimited. If you are to be reliable in your judgements, you need to leave yourself a margin of error. For example, if the hand is in fact pointing at 53 minutes, you can reliably judge that it is pointing somewhere between 52 and 54 (inclusive), but are unreliable about claims stronger than that. The same is true of every other position the hand could be in. It is somewhat natural to identify your evidence with the strongest claim about the hand's position which you can reliably get right...If the hand is in fact pointing at 53, my evidence will be that it is within [52, 54]; and if it is pointing at 52, my evidence will be that it is within [51, 53]. What's crucial about the setup, for present purposes, is that you're not in a position to know what your evidence is.12 Suppose, e.g., the clock is in fact pointing at 53, so your evidence is that it is between 52 and 54 (inclusive). We may assume that you know the general facts about the setup-you know about your impressive but not unlimited discriminatory capacities, know that the hand could be pointing anywhere from 1 to 60, etc. But in that case, if you were to know that your evidence is that the hand is between 52 and 54, then you would be in a position to know that the hand is actually pointing at 53, contradicting the stipulations of the case-by stipulation, that is your evidence only when the clock is pointing precisely at 53. So you must not know that your evidence is that the hand is between 52 and 54. Rather, if the strongest thing you know about where the hand is pointing is that it's between 52 and 54, then instead of knowing exactly what your evidence is, there are three possibilities compatible with your knowledge concerning what your evidence is-either your evidence is that the hand is between 51 and 53, or your evidence is that it's between 52 and 54, or your evidence is 12Like both Salow and Williamson, I'll assume E = K-your evidence is what you know. So failing to know what your evidence is amounts to lacking evidence concerning what your evidence is. 7 Fragmentation and Higher-Order Evidence that it's between 53 and 55. 3 Puzzles Now that we've been introduced to the notion of HOE, and to the sorts of examples it's typically used to illustrate, it's time to turn to the difficulties it brings in its wake. 3.1 Epistemic Akrasia Perhaps the most frequently discussed puzzle in this neighborhood concerns "epistemic akrasia"-believing some claim while also believing that one shouldn't believe it. This is often generalized to involve other sorts of mismatch between one's first-order doxastic attitudes, and one's attitudes concerning which attitudes one should have.13 Epistemic akrasia can seem paradigmatically irrational. But as many writers have pointed out, if we accept the evidentialist claim that an agent should believe whatever her evidence supports, and we also accept the existence of non-trivial higher-order evidence-that is, if we accept that agents can be rationally uncertain either about what their evidence is, or what that evidence supports-then it's hard to avoid holding that agents should sometimes be epistemically akratic.14 The connection has been spelled out at greater length elsewhere, so I'll just give the flavor of the idea here. First, suppose agents can be rationally uncertain about what their evidence is. Say you don't know whether your total evidence is A, B, or C. You rationally think that each is equally likely to be your evidence. A supports the belief that P, but B and C do not. In fact, your evidence is A. If you have all the beliefs that are supported by your evidence, you'll believe that P (after all, that's supported by A, which is your evidence), while also believing that you probably shouldn't believe that P (after all, you think 13Worsnip (2015) and Rinard (Forthcoming) offer similar generalizations of the anti-akrasia constraint, both in terms of having some doxastic attitude while failing to believe that the attitude is supported by one's evidence. 14See Salow (2017a, Appendix B), Dorst (Ms.). 8 Fragmentation and Higher-Order Evidence it's more likely than not that your evidence is either B or C, neither of which support believing that P).15 Things go much the same if agents can be rationally uncertain about what their evidence supports. Suppose you know what your total evidence is. But there are three hypotheses about what that evidence supports-A, B, and C-in which you rationally invest equal credence. On hypothesis A, your evidence supports the belief that P, but on hypotheses B and C, it does not. A is true-your evidence really does support the belief that P. Given those stipulations, if you have all the beliefs supported by your evidence, then you'll find yourself believing that P (since A is true, believing that P is supported by your evidence) while believing that you probably shouldn't believe that P (since you think it more likely than not that hypothesis B or C is true, and according to those hypotheses your evidence does not support belief in P). At this stage there are a wide variety of responses in the literature. Some authors simply bite the bullet, accepting that these sorts of epistemically akratic states are unavoidable-no adequate epistemological theory can avoid commitment to their possibility.16 Others hold that while there's something to be said for the akratic states, there's also something to be said against them-perhaps the sorts of cases just discussed present a kind of dilemma, in which not all epistemic demands can be met.17 And others try to contest the assumptions that led to the problem. Weaker versions of this third response will propose principles constraining just what combinations of first-order and higher-order evidence are possible, in the hopes that they can allow for some non-trivial HOE, but without licensing the sorts of seemingly irrational akratic states I've been discussing.18 A very strong version of this third response will involve claiming that agents 15The limited discrimination example in the previous section could be such a case, which A, B, and C corresponding to [51, 53], [52, 54], and [53, 55], and P being "the hand is not pointing to 54." 16E.g., Aarnio (2014). 17E.g., Christensen (2010a) holds that subjects with misleading higher-order evidence can't help but violate a rational ideal. Worsnip (2015) holds that such subjects cannot both be rational, and believe what their evidence supports. 18Versions of this response include Elga (2013), Horowitz (2014), and Dorst (Ms.). 9 Fragmentation and Higher-Order Evidence can neither be rationally uncertain of what their evidence is, nor of what it supports.19 Before presenting a version of the third response, I'll turn to a different set of puzzles. 3.2 Diachronic Puzzles In addition to supporting incoherent belief states at a given time, non-trivial HOE leads to odd consequences concerning changes of evidence and belief over time. In this section I'll focus on odd diachronic consequences of ignorance concerning what your evidence is, rather than what a given body of evidence supports. But the latter phenomenon has been discussed in the literature too.20 3.2.1 Monty Hall21 One of three doors, A, B, or C, is hiding a prize. The other two hide trash. Monty instructs you to pick a door. Before you can open it, Monty picks one of the remaining doors that he knows not to conceal a prize-there's guaranteed to be at least one-and opens it, revealing trash. He now gives you the choice of sticking with your initial choice, or switching to one of the remaining doors (either the open door with trash, or the closed door that might contain a prize). For familiar reasons, you should switch to the closed door. There are many explanations, but the one I prefer runs as follows. Suppose you initially picked the wrong door-one that does not conceal the prize. Then there are two doors left, one of which contains the prize, and one of which does not. Given Monty's strategy, he'll have to 19Titelbaum (2015) is explicit that subjects cannot be rationally uncertain about evidential support relations, but doesn't discuss uncertainty about what one's evidence is. Salow (2017a,b) comes close- he argues against the possibility of rational uncertainty about evidential support relations, and argues against the possibility of many (but not all!) forms of rational uncertainty about what one's evidence is. 20See, e.g., Horowitz (2014, §4.3). 21This section is inspired by Bronfman (2014), who notes the oddity of combining (1) the view that updating properly proceeds by conditionalization, (2) the view that KK failures are possible, and (3) the standard diagnosis of the Monty Hall problem. His solution is to hold onto 2 and 3, and propose a novel, non-conditionalization based form of updating. My aim in the present section is to make the sorts of KK failures that would be involved in Monty Hall cases seem odd enough that we'd be better off sticking with (1) and (3), and abandoning (2). 10 Fragmentation and Higher-Order Evidence open the door that does not contain the prize, leaving the door that does contain the prize as the only one left. If you switch to the closed door, you'll switch to the door with the prize. Since you'll initially pick the wrong door two thirds of the time, switching will lead to the prize two thirds of the time. Let's recast that explanation in terms of confidence. For each door, you start out with a credence of 13 that the prize is behind that door. Suppose your initial pick is A. Your credences are unchanged-you have a credence of 13 that the prize is behind door A, and 23 that it's behind one of the other doors. Now, Monty reveals that the prize is not behind door C. Given what you know about Monty's strategy, you retain your credence of 23 that it's behind door B or C, but now that you know it's not behind door C, all of that credence goes to B-you end up with a credence of 23 that the prize is behind B, and 13 that it's behind A. So far, so familiar. But what if you could learn that the prize isn't behind door C, without learning that Monty revealed this to you? Would that undermine the argument for switching? Of course, there are some ways this could happen such that it obviously would. The door might be blown open by a gust of wind, not by Monty's design. Or you might have planted a hidden camera in the room, or hired a spy to look behind door C and report back. In cases like these, when you learn via a non-Monty source that the prize isn't behind door C, you have no reason to switch from A to B. But suppose you know for sure that the only way you could find out what's behind door C is by Monty's showing you, and you know how Monty operates (i.e., you know that he'll only open door C if the prize isn't there). In this case, is it still possible to learn that the prize isn't behind door C, without learning that Monty revealed this to you? And if so, would that undermine the argument for switching? It's very hard to imagine how this could be. And yet, if we think that cases of limited discrimination provide illustrations of how one can gain evidence, without its becoming part of one's evidence that one has gained evidence, then it's hard to rule this out. E.g., 11 Fragmentation and Higher-Order Evidence suppose Monty operates as follows. Rather than throwing a door wide open to view, he renders a door ever so slightly transparent. Your perceptual discriminatory capacities are powerful enough, based on looking at the ever so slightly transparent door C, to give you the evidence that the prize isn't behind it-you can just barely discriminate the look of trash through a slightly transparent door from the look of a prize through a slightly transparent door. So when Monty renders the door slightly transparent, it becomes part of your evidence that the prize isn't behind door C. But your powers of discrimination are limited enough that it doesn't become part of your evidence that it's part of your evidence that the prize isn't behind door C. If this is possible, how should you reason in such a case about whether to stick with door A or switch to B? You certainly aren't in a position to justify switching via the argument sketched earlier. That argument went via the premise that Monty revealed that the prize isn't behind door C, i.e., that he allowed you to learn this. But in the imagined case, that's not part of your evidence-you learned that the prize isn't behind door C, but you didn't learn that you learned this. The following reasoning sounds borderline incoherent, but it's hard to see what's wrong with it, given the assumption that limited discriminatory capacities can let you gain evidence without gaining evidence that you gained that evidence: Clearly I shouldn't switch to C, because it doesn't contain the prize, but should I stick with A, or switch to B? If I knew C didn't contain the prize, then switching to B would be the sensible thing to do, because I'd only know that C didn't have the prize if Monty had revealed it to me, and a familiar argument would establish that I'd have a 23 of gaining the prize by switching to B...but I can't tell whether I know that C doesn't contain the prize. For that matter, I can't tell whether I know that B doesn't contain the prize. Well, C doesn't contain the prize, so I guess I'll flip a coin to choose between A and B. 12 Fragmentation and Higher-Order Evidence The next example, due to Bernhard Salow, has a similar flavor-it concerns odd consequences of allowing that one can gain evidence, without gaining evidence that one has gained evidence. 3.2.2 No-Lose Investigations It's a commonsense piece of epistemology that an investigation can only provide support for a hypothesis if, had the results of the investigation been different, it could have undermined that hypothesis. Karl Popper (1963) famously criticized research programs that seemed to be able to accommodate any possible body of data; to use two of his favorite examples, if Freudian theories of psychodynamics or Marxist theories of history cannot be undermined by evidence, they cannot be supported by evidence either. While Popper's particular development of this insight was problematic,22 similar ideas about "no-lose" investigations have been defended in the recent epistemological literature.23 But, as Salow (2017b) explains, once we take on the idea that you can gain evidence without gaining evidence that you gained evidence, we seem to be committed to the possibility of various sorts of no-lose investigation. Here's his explanation of how this works in Williamson's unmarked clock case, described earlier in §2.1.2: My friend knows whether I'm popular; and I would like to have additional evidence that I am, regardless of whether it is true. So I construct an unmarked clock of the kind Williamson describes, and I ask my friend to set the hand in the following way: if people like me, he will set it to 53; if they don't, he will flip a coin to decide whether to set it to 52 or to 54. Having given the instructions, I know that the clock will be set somewhere between 52 and 54... Next, I take a look. If people actually like me, the hand will be set to 53, 22See Salmon (1981). 23See, e.g., Titelbaum (2010), Salow (2017b). 13 Fragmentation and Higher-Order Evidence and so my evidence will only tell me that it is somewhere between 52 and 54, which I knew already. So if people like me, I get no new evidence. But if people do not like me, it will be set either to 52 or to 54. Suppose it is set to 52; then my evidence will allow me to rule out that it's set to 54, since 54 is far enough away from the actual setting. But I knew that there was a fifty-fifty chance that it would be set to 54 if people didn't like me. So seeing that it isn't set to 54 gives me some evidence that I am popular. Moreover, my evidence cannot discriminate between the hand being set to 52 and its being set to 53, so that I get no evidence against my being popular. So, if the hand is set to 52, I will get evidence that I am popular; by similar reasoning, I will also get such evidence if the hand is set to 54. So if people don't like me, I will get evidence that I am popular. Again, I have successfully set up a no-lose investigation into my popularity. (pp. 18-19) If we ask how the subject of Salow's example should reason, or might rationally act on his evidence-imagine that he's deciding whether to book a large venue for his birthday party, which would only be necessary if he's popular-we'll run into the same sorts of perplexities we saw in the case of Monty Hall. I don't pretend to have provided anything like a comprehensive overview of the terrain. I've just tried to point to various sorts of awkwardness that ensue when we allow that subjects can be rationally ignorant of either (a) which body of evidence is theirs, or (b) which beliefs are supported by which bodies of evidence. But the idea that subjects can't be rationally ignorant of these things can sound hard to swallow. So in the next section I'll present a framework that let's us capture the truths that we express when we describe subjects as being rationally ignorant of (a) and (b), but without the awkward consequences.24 24Does it have other awkward consequences? Certainly. 14 Fragmentation and Higher-Order Evidence 4 Fragmented Evidence What does it take to have some proposition as part of your evidence? First, assume the debatable but defensible view that E = K-your evidence is your knowledge.25 Also assume that belief is a necessary condition on knowledge-you only know that P if you believe it. In this section I'll try to show how broadly "fragmentationist" views about belief can lead to similarly fragmentationist views about evidence, and I'll then apply those views to the putative cases of HOE discussed earlier in this essay. What does it take to believe that P? A debatable, but attractive answer is that it involves behaving in ways that make sense if P. E.g., someone who believes that there's beer in the fridge will be disposed, all else equal, to walk to the fridge if she wants a beer, to respond "yes" to the question "is there any beer left?", to offer beer to thirsty guests, to be surprised upon opening the fridge and failing to see beer, etc.-these are behaviors that make sense if there's beer in the fridge.26 But one can act as if P in some situations but not others, or when engaged in certain tasks but not others. E.g., one might talk like a P-believer, but walk like a P-disbeliever.27 We might capture this by saying that, for the purpose of talking, you believe that P, but for the purpose of walking you believe that ∼P-your doxastic life is fragmented. And we can cut more finely. Even within the category of verbal behavior, or non-verbal behavior, some of one's actions might make sense if P, but not others.28 This kind of fragmentationist view about belief leads naturally to a fragmentationist 25Famously defended by Williamson (2000). 26The example is from Schwitzgebel (2002), who defends a view about belief broadly similar, I think, to the one sketched in this paragraph. There he says believing that P involves "fitting the dispositional stereotype" of someone who believes that P. While I'm inclined to think that's right, I'm more optimistic than he is about the prospects for giving a somewhat systematic account of which dispositions get stereotypically associated with which beliefs, along broadly radical interpretationist lines, where we can say something systematic about what sorts of dispositions "make sense" for a subject who believes that P. See Lewis (1974), Stalnaker (1984), and Dennett (1987). Also, unlike the previous authors, Schwitzgebel stresses that he thinks dispositions to have irreducibly phenomenal states are among the dispositions associated with having various beliefs. For my purposes in this essay, I don't think I need to take a stand on that question. 27See, e.g., Schwitzgebel (2001). 28See, e.g., Elga and Rayo (Manuscript A, B). 15 Fragmentation and Higher-Order Evidence view about knowledge and (if E =K) evidence. That is, suppose S has a dispositional profile that amounts to believing that P for some purposes, but not others. And assume that P is true, and that S's (fragmentedly) believing that P has an appropriately nonaccidental connection to the truth of P-the sort of connection necessary for knowledge. Then it's natural to say that S knows that P-and thereby has P as part of her evidence- for some purposes, but not others. Jack Marley-Payne (Ms.) offers a nice example that illustrates the idea: Take the example of the inarticulate tennis player-let's call her Serena. Over the course of a rally she can execute a complex plan which involves hitting repetitive shots to first ground her opponent in one position and then wrong foot him in order to win the point. Moreover, she can calibrate her play in response to the court conditions, the abilities of her opponent, whether she desires to humiliate him etc. However, she is unable to explain what she was doing-indeed she may even say things about her play that turn out to be false. Her non-verbal behaviour suggests a belief that a cross-court shot will wrong foot her opponent while her verbal behaviour does not. Suppose that a cross-court shot will wrong foot her opponent, and it's no accident that her non-verbal behavioral dispositions reflect sensitivity to this fact; rather, it's the product of years of training, which included seeing how opponents reacted to similar situations in the past. In that case, it's natural to say that Serena knows that a crosscourt shot will wrongfoot her opponent. While she's unable to articulate her knowledge, this doesn't relegate it to the realm of mere reflex; after all, her choice of a cross-court shot is sensitively dependant on her background beliefs and desires in a way that mere reflexes aren't. If we think the characteristic functional role of beliefs is to combine with other beliefs to lead you to choose actions that will satisfy your desires-while mere reflexes manifest themselves in rigid ways that aren't so sensitive to the rest of an agent's psychology-then what Serena has is belief, rather than mere reflex. And because 16 Fragmentation and Higher-Order Evidence that belief is non-accidentally true, it's knowledge. It just happens to be knowledge that she can't draw on for verbal reports.29 We finally have enough conceptual machinery on the table to start applying fragmentation to the topic of higher-order evidence. With the fragmentationist view of belief and evidence in hand, we can distinguish two readings of the claim that non-trivial HOE is impossible. Let x and y be purposes relative to which a subject might have evidence. Fixed Purpose: It's never the case that S's evidencex supports the claim that P, while her evidencex supports the claim that her evidencex doesn't support the claim that P. Variable Purpose: It's never the case that S's evidencex supports the claim that P, while her evidencey supports the claim that her evidencex doesn't support the claim that P. In the remainder of the paper, I'll argue that Fixed Purpose is what we need to rule out the rationality of epistemic akrasia, and the bizarre verdicts about Monty Hall and the possibility of no-lose investigations. But we don't need Variable Purpose, and familiar putative examples of non-trivial HOE can be interpreted as counterexamples to it. My hope is that this amounts to having our cake and eating it too. We can agree with a version of the intuitively plausible idea that you're not always in a position to tell 29The idea that what you know depends in some sense on what task you're engaged in is reminiscent of the version of "contextualism"-in contemporary terminology, probably best interpreted as a version of sensitive invariantism-defended by Michael Williams (1977, 1991). He defends a view on which our inability to answer skeptical challenges amounts to lacking knowledge, but only while we are engaged in the epistemological project of answering skeptical challenges. When we turn our attention to other inquiries-history, ornithology, or just what to have for lunch-our knowledge returns. While I'm sympathetic to much of Williams' discussion, a crucial difference between his approach and the present one concerns higher-order knowledge and evidence. He understands his view as crucially connected to the possibility of failures of KK-cases in which a subject knows, but fails to know that she knows. E.g., "Thus stated, contextualism implies a kind of externalism, for though apropriate contextual constraints will have to be met, if a given claim is to express knowledge, they will not always have to be known, or even believed, to be met." Williams (1991, p.119) "Externalism thus drives a wedge between knowing something or other and knowing that one knows it." (p. 96). By contrast, in the remainder of this paper I'll argue that fragmentationist views about knowledge and evidence open up room for reinterpreting cases that seemed to involve straightforward divergences between first-order and higher-order epistemic status. 17 Fragmentation and Higher-Order Evidence what your evidence supports, and we can apply that idea in broadly the ways it's been applied in the literature. But by distinguishing one version of that idea from a closely related one, we can explain why, properly interpreted, it doesn't lead to absurdity. I'll start with the case of the unmarked clock from §2.1.2. On the interpretation I'll suggest, the subject of the example has different information available for different purposes. On my way of fleshing out the case, the subject is guided by one body of information in her assertions and judgments, but a different body of information in her visuomotor behavior. If we add the subscripts aj and vm to "evidence", so that the subject's evidenceaj is the knowledge available for guiding assertions and judgments, and her evidencevm is the knowledge available for guiding visuomotor tasks, then the diagnosis will be as follows: the subject's evidenceaj fails to settle what her evidencevm is. But nothing in the case suggests that her evidenceaj fails to settle what her evidenceaj is, and, as I'll explain, that's enough to avoid awkward consequences concerning Monty Hall, or no-lose investigations. Next, I'll turn to cases of putative ignorance about evidential support relations, such as the Juror case from §2.1.1. I'll argue that a fragmentationist can make sense of the idea that one ought to be agnostic about whether the accused is at fault, but without understanding that verdict as straightforwardly conflicting with the requirement of total evidence, and without the more general threat of rational akrasia posed by limited evidence concerning epistemic support relations. The basic idea will be that, in an important sense, the relevant evidence the subject has available for determining liability is a relatively sparse one, rather than the richer body that includes all of the evidence that was presented at court. The subject has that richer body of evidence in a sense, but only a sense-she has pieces of that body of evidence available for various different purposes, but she doesn't have the whole body of evidence available for the purpose of determining liability. 18 Fragmentation and Higher-Order Evidence 4.1 Limited Discrimination Revisited In Salow's description of the unmarked clock case, which mirrors Williamson's, we're told that when the clock's hand is in fact indicating that it is 53 minutes past the hour, your powers of discrimination enable you to rule out that it indicates 51 minutes or fewer, and also to rule out that it indicates 55 or more, but they don't allow you to discriminate any more finely than that-you cannot rule out 52, 53, or 54. What form does this discrimination take-how do your powers of perceptual discrimination manifest themselves? While this question isn't given much attention by either Williamson or Salow, I'll try to show that it it's in fact of central importance. A natural answer is that they manifest themselves in occurrent judgments, and/or assertions-when the clock is in fact pointing at 53, then you will be disposed to inwardly judge, and/or outwardly assert, claims like the following: "it's not at 51 or lower," "it's not at 55 or higher", "it might be at 52, 53, or 54."30 And likewise, more generally, for other positions-when the clock is in fact pointing towards n, you'll be disposed to judge and/or assert that it's not at n − 2 or below, not at n + 2 or above, but nothing stronger than that. So far, so good. However, this way of thinking about how her powers of discrimination manifest themselves is inconsistent with another crucial feature of the case, as Williamson and others who've written about it understand it.31 Namely, you yourself-the subject of the case-could know the general epistemic features of the case; you can know that when the clock is pointing to n, your powers of discrimination enable you to know that it is pointing between n−1 and n+1, but nothing stronger. Intuitively, this is plausible-you could have reliable information about just how good your vision is, perhaps provided by an optometrist. Why is the idea that your powers of discrimination manifest themselves 30While Williamson mainly describes the case in terms of "discrimination" and "knowledge" without indicating how they might be manifested, Salow explicitly talks about what the subject can "reliably judge." (p. 17) 31See especially (Christensen, 2010b, p.133-4). 19 Fragmentation and Higher-Order Evidence in judgment and assertion inconsistent with the idea that you can know the general epistemic features of the case? For the following reason. Suppose the clock is pointing at 53. Then your powers of perceptual discrimination will manifest themselves in your making the assertions and judgments mentioned in the previous paragraph-explicitly judging and/or asserting that it might be between 52 and 54, but nowhere else. But if you make those judgments or assertions, you can also notice that you've made them. And making those assertions and judgments is only compatible with knowing that it is between 52 and 54-on the assumption that your peceptual knowledge manifests itself in judgment and assertion, then if you had different perceptual knowledge you'd make different assertions and judgments. But then, contra the stipulation of the case, you're in a position to know what your evidence is-namely, that the clock is pointing between 52 and 54. And because you know the general epistemic features of the case, we get the absurd result that you are in a position to know that the clock is pointing to 53-since you know that your evidence is only [52, 54] when it's actually pointing to 53. What went wrong? One quick response is just to deny that it's possible for there to be any version of the case in which both (a) your powers of perceptual discrimination are limited, and (b) your visual evidence is perfectly sensitive to the actual position of the clock. To motivate this response, we might say that the thought that your powers of discrimination are limited-i.e., that you can't tell exactly where the clock is pointing just by looking-is intimately bound up with the idea that, compatible with your having the visual evidence you have, there are various different positions the clock might be pointing. So if we want to hold on to the idea that you have limited powers of discrimination, we should reject the idea that there's a 1-1 function from positions of the clock to bodies of evidence you get when you look at the clock. This is the route taken by Stalnaker (2009) in the course of responding to a similar case in Hawthorne and Magidor (2009). Applying his response to the present case would lead to the result that, rather than being determined by the actual position of the clock, your evidence is determined 20 Fragmentation and Higher-Order Evidence by your best guess as to the position of the clock, which you are in a position to know. Moreover, there's no strict mapping from where the clock is pointing to what your best guess will be. So the question "what is the subject's evidence when the clock is in fact pointing to position n?", will have a range of possible answers, rather than a unique one. While I'm sympathetic to this response, I think we can be a bit more concessive to the intended interpretation of the case. That is, we can allow that there's a sense in which the subject's evidence depends on the actual position of the clock, which the subject is nevertheless not in a position to know, while still resisting the central lesson about higher-order ignorance. We were led into absurdity when we assumed that your powers of perceptual discrimination would manifest themselves in a way that you were in a position to notice, as when you notice what you say or judge. So suppose they don't. Suppose that your powers of perceptual discrimination manifest themselves in your visuomotor behavior-e.g., they manifest themselves in the direction your hand will move if you decide to reach for the pointer, and other tasks that require integrating visual information with motor activity. For example, suppose your hand-eye coordination isn't perfect, and if asked to very quickly reach out and touch the clock's pointer, you won't always hit it (imagine the hand is quite thin, and you're asked to move very quickly). However, when the pointer is in fact pointing at n, you'll never touch a position below n− 2, or above +2. And suppose this isn't just a quirky fact about a particular task- for a wide range of visuomotor tasks, when the clock is pointing at n, your visuomotor behavior will be as if the clock is pointing somewhere in [n− 1, n + 1]. This lets us vindicate part of the description of the case-the part concerning how your evidence about where the clock is depends on where the clock is actually pointing. But what about the description of the case in terms of higher-order evidence? That is, can we make sense of the idea that, when the clock is pointing at 53, your evidence leaves open various possibilities concerning what your evidence is? If we stick to the idea that what evidence you have is manifested in your visuomotor behavior, it's hard 21 Fragmentation and Higher-Order Evidence to see how to do so. That is, while it's not so hard to see how, insofar as we're interested in explaining your visuomotor behavior, we might fruitfully interpret you as having the evidence that the clock is pointing somewhere in [52, 54], it's much harder to see how, insofar as we're interested in explaining your visuomotor behavior, we might fruitfully interpret you as lacking evidence about what your evidence is. That is, it's just not clear how we should expect information or lack thereof concerning what your evidence is to be manifested in visuomotor behavior. So let's return to assertion and judgment. Plausibly, when you are in fact completing visuomotor tasks as if the clock is pointing in [52, 54], you won't be in a position to reliably assert or judge that you are doing so. E.g., suppose the clock is pointing to 53, and you've just been asked to reach out and touch the pointer 10 times in a row. Each time you touch a position somewhere in [52, 54]. Now you're asked: "did you touch a position below 52 any of those times?" Plausibly, you'll respond: "I don't know, maybe. My best guess is that the clock is pointing to 53, but that's just a guess, so it might be pointing to 52. And given that my hand-eye coordination isn't perfect, if it's in fact pointing to 52, I probably hit 51 a few times." And your coherently giving that speech is consistent with your being happy to assert that if the clock is in fact pointing at 53, then you did not touch a position below 52 on any of those occasions. Unlike when we were thinking of the manifestation of one's knowledge solely in terms of assertion or judgment, now we can see how one's knowledge that the clock is pointing in [52, 54] could be reliably manifested, without your being in a position to learn from that reliable manifestation that you know that the clock is in [52, 54]. To keep all this straight, it will be helpful to introduce subscripts. Let your evidenceaj be your knowledge available for guiding assertions and judgments, and your evidencevm be the knowledge available for guiding visuomotor tasks. The diagnosis I've been offering can be stated as follows. When the clock is in fact pointing at n, your evidencevm is that it is pointing somewhere in [n − 1, n + 1]. Moreover, that general fact about 22 Fragmentation and Higher-Order Evidence how your evidencevm sensitively depends on the actual position of the clock is part of your evidenceaj. And when your evidencevm is that the clock is pointing somewhere in [k − 1, k + 1], your evidenceaj doesn't settle that this is your evidencevm-rather, there will be various different possibilities compatible with your evidenceaj concerning what your evidencevm is. Which will those be? Here, we cannot give a unique answer, because while your evidencevm sensitively depends on the actual position of the clock, your evidenceaj does not-that way lies absurdity, as we saw. What does your evidenceaj depend on? Here I'm happy to stick with Stalnaker's model-perhaps it depends on your "best guess" as to the position of the clock.32 The present diagnosis lets us avoid awkward consequences concerning Monty Hall. We can get a version of the Monty Hall case going where one "learns" that the prize isn't behind door C-in the sense that one's visuomotor dispositions now involve being disposed to complete visuomotor tasks as if it's not there, in some way non-accidentally connected to the fact that its' really not there-but where one doesn't gain this information in a form that would make it available for assertion, judgment, and crucially, deliberation. And since the apparent absurdity in the case involved trying to imagine the sort of planning and deliberation that would be appropriate for an agent who had the evidence that the prize wasn't behind door C, but lacked the evidence that she had this evidence, that absurdity vanishes when the only sense in which she "has" the evidence that the prize isn't behind door C is a sense that wouldn't be manifested in her deliberation. The diagnosis of Salow's "no-lose inquiry" case would proceed along much the same lines. Taking a step back, in what sense does my diagnosis do without non-trivial HOE? It's 32As I hope is clear enough, it's not central to my diagnosis that it's visuomotor information that we contrast with information available for guiding assertion and judgment. It's just that there be some such contrast-some type of task that one's evidence (in a sense) can be used to guide, but whose manifestation can't be reliably noticed and remarked upon by the subject who has that evidence. And since assertions and judgments can be noticed and learned from-when you assert or judge that P, you're in a position to know that you've asserted or judged that P-for a diagnosis of my sort to work, we need some way that knowledge can be manifested other than in assertion and judgment. Visuomotor behavior is just one convenient, natural alternative. 23 Fragmentation and Higher-Order Evidence true that there's a sense in which my explanation of the case makes appeal to non-trivial evidence concerning what your evidence is. But the two occurrences of "evidence" in the previous sentence require different readings-that is, I say that in the case of the unmarked clock, you have non-trivial evidenceaj concerning what your evidencevm is. But if we hold fixed the subscript, we don't have non-trivial higher-order evidence: we saw that non-trivial evidenceaj concerning one's evidenceaj led to absurdity, and it's not clear how to interpret talk of evidencevm concerning one's evidencevm. So while my diagnosis lets us say that in the case of the unmarked clock, your evidence doesn't settle what your evidence is, that turns out to be a less than maximally perspicuous description of the situation. And my suspicion is that this will hold quite generally-cases that are tempting to describe as involving a subject's evidence failing to settle what her evidence is will always turn out to be cases where we can distinguish different senses of "evidence", and so distinguished, they will be cases in which one's evidence-in one sense-fails to settle what one's evidence-in some other sense-is. Given the distinction drawn earlier, they will be counterexamples to Variable Purpose, but not Fixed Purpose. While I can't offer a full defense of that claim here, I hope I've at least shown the following: absent some such distinction, we get puzzles and paradoxes, as illustrated in §3.2. And in a general, schematic sort of case meant to illustrate the possibility of rational ignorance concerning one's evidence-the case of the unmarked clock-the diagnosis I've offered is a natural and attractive one that avoids the paradoxes. So it's natural to hope that similar diagnoses should be available in other cases. 4.2 Epistemic Support Relations Revisited What about the cases meant to illustrate higher-order uncertainty not via ignorance about what one's evidence is, but instead about what it supports? Can the strategy of the previous subsection be of any help? I believe it can, though I admit the fit here is a bit less natural. 24 Fragmentation and Higher-Order Evidence There is a constellation of closely related suggestions that a number of writers have defended for how to deal with HOE that prompts uncertainty about epistemic support relations-sometimes it's put in the language of "bracketing" (Elga, 2007; Christensen, 2010a), sometimes "calibration" Sliwa and Horowitz (2015); Schoenfield (2015), sometimes in other terms.33 The suggestion that we should use these methods is typically treated as a kind of sui generis epistemological principle, which may conflict with other more general principles-most notably, the requirement of total evidence (Kelly, 2010). My ultimate goal in this section is as follows. I want to show how the kind of "bracketing" recommended by the authors just mentioned fits naturally with the idea, defended in the previous section, that evidence can be available for guiding some tasks, but not others. Since this idea is plausible and defensible independently of considerations having to do with higher-order evidence, my aim is to make "bracketing" seem more principled, and less ad hoc. I also hope that my discussion will render the prima facie conflict with the total evidence principle more palatable, in part by making it a bit less clear just how the total evidence principle should be interpreted, once we adopt the fragmentationist view of evidence. Return to the case of Juror, described in §.2.1.1. The recommendation of the bracketer is that, after hearing about the disagreement of her peers, the juror should form her opinion as follows. She should set aside the particular details of the evidence presented at trial and why she thinks those details point to the liability of the accused. Instead, she should reason from the sparse body of essentially psychological evidence, which includes only (a) the fact that she formed the judgment she did, (b) the fact that her peers formed the judgments they did, and (c) general facts that bear on her and her peers' reliability in matters like these. And that sparse body of evidence will support, I assume, agnosticism about whether the accused is at fault. This recommendation looks like it straightforwardly conflicts with the requirement 33Roger White (2009) calls it "treating oneself and others as thermometers." In this volume, Sophie Horowitz discusses a similar suggestion couched in terms of "perspective." 25 Fragmentation and Higher-Order Evidence of total evidence.34 There are facts that are part of the juror's total evidence, and which bear on the question of whether the accused is at fault, that the bracketer says should nevertheless be set aside or ignored when reasoning about whether the accused is in fact at fault. In light of the previous section, however, I believe we should be a bit uneasy when we see phrases like "the juror's total evidence". After all, we saw there that it can be helpful to distinguish between the evidence a subject has available for some tasks from the evidence she has available for others. And in such cases, "the subject's total evidence" will be threaten to be ambiguous, or liable to refer to different bodies of evidence depending on which task we are contemplating the subject performing. While in that section we only distinguished between broad sorts of tasks-discursive versus visuomotor-there's no principled reason we can't distinguish more finely. Elga and Rayo (Manuscript A, B,), following up on some suggestions of Stalnaker (1991, 1999), argue that solving the problem of logical omniscience requires distinguishing the information a subject has for verbally answering some questions from information a subject has for verbally answering others.35 How does this possibility bear on the case of Juror? Here's the idea. While the individual items of evidence presented at trial are each available to the juror for various purposes-answering pointed questions about whether, e.g., the accused drove a sedan, or whether the plaintiff was in Tallahassee on March 21-they may not be collectively available for answering the question: "is the accused at fault?" For that latter task, perhaps the only evidence available is the sparse body of broadly psychological evidence that, according to the bracketer, should determine the juror's view. Phenomenologically at least, this strikes me as plausible. When dealing with a simple body of evidence, I feel like I can base my beliefs directly on that evidence-e.g., if I see 34See Williamson (2007) on the dangers of "psychologizing the evidence." 35While not put in quite these terms, Rayo (2011) is in a very similar spirit, and nicely complements my strategy in the text for addressing the Juror case. 26 Fragmentation and Higher-Order Evidence that the streets are wet, I'll straightaway think that it recently rained, and it's clear to me how my evidence supports my belief. But when dealing with a sufficiently complex and multifaceted body of evidence, with different pieces pointing in different directions and in ways that can't be straightforwardly weighed against one another, the process feels quite different. I'll think about it for awhile, and eventually I'll find myself stably inclined to think one thing or another, but not in a way where it's at all transparent to me how the particular pieces of evidence combine to generate my resultant doxastic inclination. Suppose I accede to that inclination-e.g., I'm in the position of Juror before having heard from my peers, I find myself inclined to believe that the accused is probably guilty, and I go on to believe that. I'm tempted to say that in a case like this my ultimate belief is based not directly on my evidence-as it is in the simple cases-but is instead based on an inclination prompted by reflection on that evidence. While the individual items of evidence are available to me in a sense-I can base some beliefs directly on them, taken individually or in small groups-they're not collectively available to me for answering the target question. I didn't mention disagreement in the previous paragraph. But it's not hard to factor in. Just as I can base a belief that the accused was at fault on the fact that I was inclined to so believe that after reflecting on the evidence, I can base agnosticism about whether the accused was at fault on the facts that (a) I was initially inclined to believe that the accused was at fault, (b) my peers were inclined to believe the opposite, and (c) none of have any distinctive advantage when it comes to evaluating evidence of this sort. I admit that this view complicates the total evidence requirement, and threatens to reduce it to triviality-if a subject can always avoid the charge of violating the requirement by saying that the total evidence wasn't really "available" for the task in question, then what does the requirement rule out? But rather than a reason to reject the strategy I've been outlining for how to think about disagreement, I think this is a genuine difficulty with how to interpret the total evidence requirement once we allow for the 27 Fragmentation and Higher-Order Evidence possibility of fragmented belief and evidence, which I think we have independent reason to do. We don't want the total evidence requirement to rule that a subject who lacks the ability to integrate the information available to her for guiding visuomotor tasks with the information available for guiding explicit verbal reasoning to thereby count as irrational; there's nothing irrational about being able to hit a bullseye without being able to explain what you're doing. But once we admit that, it becomes difficult to say just what sorts of failures to integrate bodies of information available for distinct tasks count as failures of rationality, of the sort that the total evidence requirement rules irrational. And absent an answer to that question, it's not clear whether, properly interpreted, the total evidence requirement will rule out the kind of "bracketing" that's been discussed in the literature on disagreement and HOE more generally. How broadly will this strategy work, if it works at all, for vindicating "bracketing" as a response to HOE prompting uncertainty about evidential support relations? My diagnosis of Juror depended on the idea that the subject in question is dealing with a complex body of evidence whose significance for the target question is difficult to discern, but not all putative cases of rational uncertainty about epistemic support relations have that structure. E.g., what about a case where my evidence is that the streets are wet, and I'm inclined to believe that it rained on that basis, but I then find out that I've taken a drug that makes me very bad at evaluating evidence?36 This case, I think, is much harder to fit into the mold of the previous one, since it's not clear in what sense I might fail to be in a position to base a belief that the streets are wet directly on the fact that it rained, even after taking the drug. I mention the case only to set it aside-I myself have a very hard time wrapping my head around such cases, and am inclined to think not much weight should be put on them. It's not clear to me what we should say about what evidence is available to such a subject for what purposes, nor is it clear to me what we should say such a subject should believe in such a case. While I feel 36This case is inspired by Christensen (2007a). 28 Fragmentation and Higher-Order Evidence the force of the bracketer's position in cases like Juror, I think the fragmentationist can nicely handle those cases. I'm not sure what the fragmentationist can or should say about cases like this one, but that uncertainty matches my uncertainty about what the right verdict is. What about the description of disagreement cases in terms of HOE? It seemed natural to say that the juror's evidence supported a particular belief, but failed to support the claim that it supported that belief. How should we revise this claim if we're fragmentationists about evidence, along the lines I've been discussing? The closest thing we can say, I think, is the following. The evidence the juror would have for the purpose of determining whether the accused was at fault, if she had cognitive powers far vaster than ours-vast enough for the inference from that evidence to the accused's fault to be as transparent and direct for her as the inference from wet streets to rain is for us- supports the claim that the accused is at fault. But the evidence the juror in fact has available for the purpose of determining whether the accused was at fault fails to support the claim in the previous sentence-it fails to support he claim that the evidence she would have if she had with more impressive cognitive powers supports the claim that the accused is at fault. So there's no single reading of "evidence" on which the juror's evidence supports P, while also supporting agnosticism concerning whether it supports P-no counterexample to Fixed Purpose. Rather, the sense in which it supports P, and the sense in which it supports agnosticism, are quite different. And that lets us avoid the threat of epistemic akrasia. Once we offer the present diagnosis, we're under no pressure to say that the juror's evidence supports believing some claim, while also believing that she shouldn't believe it. Rather, we can say the evidence she has available for determining whether the accused is at fault unequivocally supports agnosticism on that question, and supports believing that she should be agnostic on that question. Of course, if the subject had more impressive cognitive powers, then she'd have a different body of evidence available for determining whether the accused is 29 Fragmentation and Higher-Order Evidence at fault-one that would support an affirmative answer. But that's different from her already having a body of evidence that would rationalize an affirmative answer, (while failing to rationalize the claim that it would rationalize an affirmative answer) and so we don't need to say that her presently available evidence-for any purpose-supports an akratic state. 5 Conclusions When we say without qualification that a subject's evidence can fail to settle what her evidence supports-either because it fails to settle what her evidence is, or because it fails to settle questions about which bodies of evidence support which propositions-we run into troubles. But to flatly deny that this is possible beggars belief.37 My strategy in this paper has involved following the old dictum: "whenever you meet a contradiction, draw a distinction."38 By allowing counterexamples to Variable Purpose-allowing one version of the idea that there can be non-trivial HOE-we can have a framework for describing a host of cases of epistemological interest. But by ruling out counterexamples to Fixed Purpose-rejecting a different version of the idea that there can be non-trivial HOE-we can avoid the troubles that the more familiar descriptions engender. Bibliography Aarnio, Maria Lasonen. 2014. "HigherOrder Evidence and the Limits of Defeat." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88:314–345. Bronfman, Aaron. 2014. "Conditionalization and Not Knowing That One Knows." Erkenntnis 79:871–892. Christensen, David, 2007a. "Does Murphy's Law Apply in Epistemology? Self-Doubt 37See Dorst (Forthcoming). 38William James attributes it to the Scholastics. 30 Fragmentation and Higher-Order Evidence and Rational Ideals." In Gendler, Tamar Szabó, and John Hawthorne, editors, "Oxford Studies in Epistemology, Volume I," pages 3–31. Oxford University Press. . 2007b. "Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News." Philosophical Review 116:187–217. . 2010a. "Higher-Order Evidence." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81:185–215. . 2010b. "Rational Reflection." Philosophical Perspectives 24:121–140. Dennett, Daniel, 1987. The Intentional Stance. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. Dorst, Kevin, Forthcoming. "Higher-Order Uncertainty." In "Higher-Order Evidence," Oxford University Press. . Unpublished Manuscript. "Evidence: A Guide for the Uncertain." . Egan, Andy. 2008. "Seeing and Believing: Perception, Belief Formation and the Divided Mind." Philosophical Studies 140:47 – 63. Elga, Adam. 2007. "Reflection and Disagreement." Nous 41:478–502. . 2013. "The Puzzle of the Unmarked Clock and the New Rational Reflection Principle." Philosophical Studies 164:127–139. . Unpublished Manuscript. "Lucky to be Rational." . Elga, Adam, and Agustın Rayo. Unpublished Manuscript. "Fragmentation and Information Access." . Elga, Adam, and Agustin Rayo. Unpublished Manuscript B. "Fragmentation and Logical Omniscience." . 31 Fragmentation and Higher-Order Evidence Feldman, Richard, 2007. "Reasonable Religious Disagreements." In Antony, Louise, editor, "Philosophers Without gods," pages 194–214. Oxford University Press. . 2009. "Evidentialism, Higher-Order Evidence, and Disagreement." Episteme . Gendler, Tamar Szabó. 2008. "Alief and Belief." Journal of Philosophy 105:634–663. Greco, Daniel. 2014a. "Iteration and Fragmentation." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88. . 2014b. "A Puzzle About Epistemic Akrasia." Philosophical Studies 167:201–219. Hawthorne, John, and Ofra Magidor. 2009. "Assertion, Context, and Epistemic Accessibility." Mind 118:377–397. Horowitz, Sophie. 2014. "Epistemic Akrasia." Noûs 48:718–744. , Forthcoming. "Predictably Misleading Evidence." In "Higher-Order Evidence," Oxford University Press. Kelly, Thomas, 2010. "Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence." In "Disagreement," Oxford University Press. Lewis, David. 1974. "Radical Interpretation." Synthese 27:331–344. . 1982. "Logic for Equivocators." Noûs 16:431–441. Littlejohn, Clayton. 2018. "Stop Making Sense? A Puzzle about Evidence and Epistemic Rationality." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research . Marley-Payne, Jack. Unpublished Manuscript. "Task-Indexed Belief." . Popper, Karl, 1963. Conjectures and Refutations. Routledge. Rayo, Agustın. 2011. "A Puzzle About Ineffable Propositions." Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89:289–295. 32 Fragmentation and Higher-Order Evidence Rayo, Agustın, 2013. The Construction of Logical Space. Oxford University Press. Rinard, Susanna. Forthcoming. "Reasoning One's Way Out of Skepticism." Brill Studies in Skepticism . Salmon, Wesley. 1981. "Rational Prediction." British Journal for the Philosophy of Science . Salow, Bernhard. 2017a. "Elusive Externalism." Mind . . 2017b. "The Externalist's Guide to Fishing for Compliments." Mind . Schoenfield, Miriam. 2015. "A Dilemma for Calibrationism." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91:425–455. Schwitzgebel, Eric. 2001. "In-Between Believing." Philosophical Quarterly 51:76–82. . 2002. "A Phenomenal, Dispositional Account of Belief." Nous 36:249–275. Sliwa, Paulina, and Sophie Horowitz. 2015. "Respecting All the Evidence." Philosophical Studies 172:2835–2858. Smithies, Declan. 2015. "Ideal Rationality and Logical Omniscience." Synthese 192:2769–2793. Stalnaker, Robert, 1984. Inquiry. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. . 1991. "The Problem of Logical Omniscience, I." Synthese 89. , 1999. "The Problem of Logical Omniscience II." In "Context and Content," Oxford University Press. . 2009. "On Hawthorne and Magidor on Assertion, Context, and Epistemic Accessibility." Mind 118:399–409. 33 Fragmentation and Higher-Order Evidence Titelbaum, Michael, 2015. "Rationality's Fixed Point (Or: In Defense of Right Reason)." In Gendler, Tamar Szabo, and John Hawthorne, editors, "Oxford Studies in Epistemology, Volume 5," Oxford University Press. Titelbaum, Michael G. 2010. "Tell Me You Love Me: Bootstrapping, Externalism, and No-Lose Epistemology." Philosophical Studies 149:119–134. White, Roger. 2009. "On Treating Oneself and Others as Thermometers." Episteme 6:233–250. Williams, Michael, 1991. Unnatural Doubts: Epistemological Realism and the Basis of Scepticism. B. Blackwell. , 1999-First edition published in 1977. Groundless Belief. Princeton University Press. Williamson, Timothy, 2000. Knowledge and its Limits. Oxford University Press. , 2007. The Philosophy of Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell. , 2011. "Improbable Knowing." In "Evidentialism and its Discontents," Oxford University Press. Worsnip, Alex. 2015. "The Conflict of Evidence and Coherence." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91.

Sguardi Antonio Chiocchi CIV ILTÀ ED EMARGINAZIONE PER LA CRITICA DELLA CIVILIZZAZIONE R ASSOCIAZIONE CULTURALE RELAZIONI COPYRIGHT © BY ASSOCIAZIONE CULTURALE RELAZIONI Mercogliano (Av) 1a edizione aprile 1998 Avellino 2a edizione gennaio 2012 www.cooperweb.it/relazioni Questa edizione, leggermente rivista ed ampliata rispetto a quella del 1998, proietta le tematiche della civilizzazione, dell'emarginazione e delle diseguaglianze oltre le barriere della modernità e del Novecento, immergendole nel fuoco rovente del XXI secolo. La critica della civilizzazione si corona col discorso critico sulla globalizzazione, sviluppato nel capitolo quarto aggiunto. Col che si tenta di portare a coerente compimento le premesse da cui muove il libro. A. C., gennaio 2012 INDICE CAP I MATRICI, MODELLI ED EFETTI DELLA CIVILIZZAZIONE 1. Dall'agire comunicativo all'agire emarginativo p. 4 2. Alfabetizzazione dell'ignoranza 10 3. Dialogica della memoria e dell'identità 14 4. Crisi e modalità dell'agire 20 CAP. II EMARGINAZIONE DA CIVILIZZAZIONE 0. Premessa 23 1. Civilizzazione come stratificazione di emarginazione e diseguaglianza 24 2. Emarginazione come differenzialità 32 3. L'emarginazione politica: la cittadinanza negata 35 CAP. III TRA SVILUPPO ED EMARGINAZIONE: IL MEZZOGIORNO D'ITALIA 0. Premessa 40 1. Lo sviluppo come problema 40 2. I dilemmi dello sviluppo 43 3. La marginalità meridionale 45 4. Persistenti aporie 46 5. Il circolo chiuso 47 6. La prospettiva storica mondiale 48 7. Economia-mondo e Mezzogiorno 51 CAP. IV DALL'UMANITÀ IN GUERRA ALLA UMANITÀ DIALOGANTE 1. La dissoluzione del principio umanità 54 2. Dal sacrificio alla libertà 55 3. La secessione dall'origine 56 4. Il marchio originario 58 5. Rendere più chiara la scena 59 6. Per la critica dell'interculturalismo istituzionale 61 7. Apartheid telematico 63 8. Lo spazio delle differenze dialoganti 65 9. L'avvento dei diritti globali 66 10. L'alba incerta della cittadinanza globale 67 11. La sfida delle culture e delle didattiche dialoganti 68 12. Cosmovisione e passaggio al futuro 69 4 Cap . I MATRICI, MODELLI ED EFFETTI DELLA CIVILIZZAZIONE Nella discussione del tema civiltà/emarginazione due sono i concetti chiave che vanno affrontati preliminarmente: cultura e crisi. Intorno ad essi si vanno costruendo diversi modelli teorici e prassi di intervento, per l'evidente circostanza che in tutti i processi di esclusione sociale giocano un ruolo significativo sia componenti di "antagonismo culturale" che processi materiali di crisi. Ovviamente, in questa sede, non possiamo procedere ad una disamina esaustiva intorno ai concetti di cultura e crisi1. Cercheremo, più semplicemente, di esplorare alcune delle loro dimensioni che fanno intersezione con le problematiche che afferiscono alla coppia civiltà/emarginazione, cominciando con il concetto di cultura. 1. Dall'agire comunicativo all'agire emarginativo Come è noto, l'indirizzo più propriamente antropologico, che ha in Tylor il suo precursore2, fornisce della cultura una concettualizzazione universalizzante, in un duplice senso: a) configurandola come totalità onnicomprensiva, ricca di sfaccettature e determinazioni interne; b) categorizzandola come concetto/situazione avente una relazione non di alterità, ma di isomorfismo con la civiltà, della quale sarebbe un costrutto semantico intercambiabile; l'ap-proccio filosofico, storicistico e sociologico, dall'inizio del XX secolo, si incaricherà di capovolgere tale assunto, incuneando un contrasto irredimibile tra cultura e civilizzazione3. Molto dell'impostazione antropologico-culturalista resiste e viene recuperato nel dibattito sociologico e informativo-comunicazionale che si è andato affermando negli ultimi decenni DEL Novecento. Negli anni '60 e '70, con propaggini che arrivano alla prima metà degli anni '80, si è sviluppata un'accesa e non univoca discussione intorno alla nozione di cultura, a lato delle trasformazioni sistemico-ambientali intervenute nelle società industriali avanzate. In Italia, questo dibattito viene prontamente recepito e dà luogo a indirizzi variamente motivati e in competizione tra di loro4. Probabilmente, un discrimine di tale discussione è stata la riflessione, 1 Per una prima parziale ricognizione intorno al concetto di cultura, si rinvia, comunque, ad Associazione culturale Relazioni, Cultura ed istituzioni locali, Avellino, Associazione culturale Relazioni, 1993. Per quanto riguarda, invece, il concetto di crisi, si rinvia alla sintetica analisi che si propone nel § 4 del presente capitolo. 2 E. B. Tylor, Primitive Culture, London, 1871. 3 Sulla contrapposizione civiltà/cultura, si rinvia alle classiche pagine di N. Elias, Il processo di civilizzazione, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1988; in particolare, si rinvia ai due capitoli che compongono la Parte Prima ("Civiltà e Cultura") de "La civiltà delle buone maniere", rispettivamente: 1) "Genesi sociale dell'antitesi "civiltà" e "cultura" in Germania" (pp. 109-144); 2) "Genesi sociale dell'antitesi "civiltà" e "cultura" in Francia (pp. 145-163). Tra il primo e il secondo conflitto mondiale, è particolarmente nell'area culturale di lingua tedesca che il dibattito conosce una di-rompente ripresa: cfr. G. Marramao, Potere e secolarizzazione. Le categorie del tempo, Roma, Editori Riuniti, 1983, pp. 187223. 4 Per seguire questo dibattito, cfr. F. Alberoni, L'élite senza potere, Milano, Vita e pensiero, 1963; L. Cavalli, Sociologia delle comunicazioni di massa, in AA.VV., Antologia delle scienze sociali, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1963; U. Eco, Apocalittici e integrati. Milano, Bompiani, 1964; M. Livolsi (a cura di), Comunicazioni e cultura di massa, Milano, Hoepli, 1969; G. Bechelloni (a cura di), Politica culturale?, Bologna, Guaraldi, 1970; C. Manucci, La società di massa, Comunità, 1970; F. Rositi, Contraddizioni di cultura?, Bologna, Guaraldi, 1971; A. Abruzzese, Forme estetiche e società di massa, Padova, Marsilio, 1973; G. Statera, Società e comunicazioni di massa, Palermo, Palumbo, 1974; A. Abruzzese, Verso una sociologia del lavoro intellettuale, Napoli, Liguori, 1979; G. Bechelloni, Modelli di cultura e classe politica, Roma, Officina, 1979; G. Fabris, Sociologia delle comunicazioni di massa, Milano, Angeli, 1980; F. Rositi, Mercati di cultura, Bari, De Donato, 1982; R. Williams, Sociologia del- 5 sul punto, proposta da E. Morin, dagli anni '50 alla prima metà degli '805. Come si sa, per Morin, a partire dalla modernità, nelle società occidentali si sono insediati tre tipi di cultura: a) la cultura umanistica; b) la cultura scientifica; c) la cultura di massa6. Non intendiamo qui discutere il paradigma tripolare di Morin. Ci interessa, invece, riflettere sulle considerazioni che, in particolare, egli formula sulle concatenazioni semantiche tra i diversi tipi di cultura e sui caratteri di senso della cultura di massa. Siamo indotti a ciò dalla registrazione di un'evidenza empirica: con l'avvento della cultura di massa e la planetarizzazione degli stili di vita e dei modelli di consumo da essa veicolati, i fenomeni di emarginazione sociale e culturale sono andati, da un lato, approfondendosi e, dall'altro, assumendo crude e impensate forme di espressione. Prerogativa della cultura di massa, osserva Morin, al pari di quella scientifica, è l'elaborazione di una mole impressionante di informazioni. Ma, diversamente da quella scientifica, la cultura di massa non dà luogo a rappresentazioni logico-matematiche; bensì trascrive informazioni non strutturate sotto forma di rumore: "Nella cultura di massa una nuova nube di informazione scaccia via quella del giorno prima"7. Il rumore elevato dalla cultura di massa si erge come un muro di interdizione elevato di contro alla riflessione sistematica e globale, antico requisito della cultura umanistica. Al contrario, la cultura scientifica inibisce la riflessione, attraverso la proliferazione degli specialismi. La cultura nelle società contemporanee, conclude Morin, sia nelle forme umanistiche che in quelle scientifiche e di massa, si caratterizza per la sua sistematica a-riflessività: In definitiva, il nodo della tragedia culturale moderna è la tragedia della riflessione. Mentre la conoscenza sembrava destinata a essere pensata, discussa, riflessa, per essere incorporata nell'esperienza della vita, la riflessione si degrada dappertutto, anche nella cultura umanistica, il cui mulino gira a vuoto, non potendo più afferrare i materiali della cultura scientifica per rifletterli. Anche tra filosofia e scienza le comunicazioni sono diventate molto rare. La difficoltà di acquisire il sapere scientifico specializzato rende impossibile alla cultura umanistica di svolgere il suo ruolo di riflessione sulla conoscenza dell'uomo nel mondo. Nella cultura scientifica, l'accumulazione delle conoscenze nelle anonime banche dati, il lavoro al computer fanno correre il rischio, anche in tal caso, che lo spirito umano venga espropriato del sapere; e fanno temere l'irru-zione di un nuovo tipo di ignoranza per accumulazione di conoscenze. La cultura di massa, infine, dà il colpo di pollice a questa degradazione della possibilità riflessiva. Del resto, a questa degradazione corrisponde nella società una promozione di tecnocrati, tecnici, esperti specializzati. Assistiamo al paradosso di una cultura come la nostra che ha aspetti molto ricchi nella sua pluralità, perché mantiene insieme tre tipi di cultura molto vivi; e al tempo stesso produce sviluppi di barbarie, oltre al gran vuoto culturale sul terreno del quotidiano e della vita sociopolitica. Qui c'è una terra di nessuno culturale. Alcuni commentatori radiotelevisivi, cercando di riflettere non solo sui fatti di ieri, ma anche su piccoli fatti della civiltà (droga, alcolismo, insicurezza, ecc.), riempiono un po' questo vuoto, ma alla svelta. I pedagoghi e gli istitutori non sono capaci di riflettere questa cultura che appare loro concorrenziale, perché sanno che gli alunni preferiscono la televisione ai loro compiti. A parte il fatto che la vita politica rimane sotto il dominio la cultura, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1983; A. Abruzzese, Ai confini della serialità, Napoli, Sen, 1984; G. Bechelloni, L'immaginario quotidiano, Torino, Eri, 1984. 5 La parte più significativa degli interventi di Morin sulla cultura, relativamente al periodo considerato, è possibile reperirla in Sociologia della sociologia, Parte terza ("Le culture della nostra cultura"), Roma, Edizioni Lavoro, 1985, pp. 207-285. L'opera in questione traduce le parti 1, 2 e 4 di Sociologie, Paris, Fayard, 1984. Per i temi qui in discussione, si confronti, altresì, l'informata e approfondita prefazione di A. Abruzzese all'opera di Morin appena citata. 6 E. Morin, op. cit., pp. 206-210 e passim. 7 Ibidem, p. 209. 6 dei miti, delle illusioni, degli errori, del rumore e del furore... La reintroduzione di una comunicazione fra queste tre culture è la grande necessità culturale del nostro secolo. E questa comunicazione sarà reintrodotta soltanto se ci sarà un movimento critico autoriflessivo all'interno di ognuna di esse8. Ora, è proprio in questo vuoto culturale, in questa terra di nessuno culturale che germina e nidifica la polisemia del concetto di cultura, che ricontestualizza in un ambito multidimensionale i tre tipi di cultura isolati da Morin. Ambito che, di fatto, riamalgama in sé, differenziandole in subcodificazioni funzionali, tutte le concettualizzazioni "fondazionali": a) l'approccio culturalista organico: cultura come sistema compiuto e dotato di senso specificamente umano, in contrapposizione agli habitat e ai codici della natura; b) l'approccio culturalista residuale: cultura come condotta selettiva e differenziata che raccoglie tutto ciò che non rientra nelle scienze umane e sociali e che si concentra nell'ambito sensibile-psicologico; c) l'approccio culturalista esistenzialista: cultura come modalità dell'esistere. Puntualmente, Morin coglie il senso strutturante dei primi due approcci e il senso esistenziale del terzo. Ciò indurrebbe a considerare la "cultura come un sistema che mette in comunicazione, dialettizandole, un'esperienza esistenziale e un sapere costituito"9. L'approccio di Morin, con tutta evidenza, sospende i paradigmi separatisti della tradizione sociologica, per i quali la cultura è un unicum di valori e princípi, in relazione contrappositiva ed escludente con la civiltà che stratificherebbe, invece, i suoi dati e i suoi attributi per accumulazione oggettiva e impersonale10. Inoltre, Morin, concependo la cultura come sistema metabolico11, di fatto, indirizza una critica puntuale sia alla posizione marxista che a quella funzionalista: proprio in quanto circuito metabolico, la cultura ricongiunge l'infrastrutturale al sovrastrutturale, il reale all'immaginario, il mitico al pratico12. La conseguenza pratica dell'approccio è rilevante. Quanto più la cultura è metabolizzante, tanto più interconnette dimensioni di senso differenziate: vale a dire, tanto più il profilo dei contesti sociali e di senso tra/e dentro i quali avviene la metabolizzazione culturale si specifica per la sua policulturalità. A differenza delle società arcaiche, osserva, Morin, la società complessa è una società policulturale13. Possiamo, anzi, dire: il tratto specifico che differenzia e connota la complessità sociale è la policulturalità. Ciò non solo e non tanto nell'accezione individuata da Morin: policulturalità come compresenza (in un unico pattern globale differenziato per intrecci e antagonismi interni) della cultura umanistica, delle culture nazionali, delle culture religiose, delle culture politiche e della cultura di massa; quanto nel senso che la situazione di policulturalità diviene veicolo di trasversalità culturale. Nelle condizioni della differenziazione comunicativa e della complessità sociale, la compresenza ravvicinata e proliferante di matrici culturali diverse potenzia oltremodo i processi della trasversalità culturale. Non a caso, uno dei tratti distintivi del procedere delle investigazioni in tutti i tre "tipi fondamentali" di cultura è quello della narrazione metaforologica. Paradigmi e figure mitopoietiche vengono trasliletterati da un campo culturale all'altro e sempre più gli stessi saperi specialistici fanno un uso progressivamente dirompente di costrutti fondazionali che si qualificano per aver rotto il cordone ombelicale con le logiche rigide della predicibilità razionale, assegnando un posto rilevantissimo al caso, all'imprevedibile, all'oscuro, al latente e/o al virtuale. La filosofia della scienza e l'epistemologia vanno sciogliendo il loro statuto in avvolgenti codificazioni simboliche, definitivamente sottratte 8 Ibidem, pp. 209-210; corsivi nostri. 9 Ibidem, p. 213. 10 È ancora questo il punto di vista affermato da R. K. Merton nell'importante articolo Civilization and Culture, "Sociology and Social Research", XXI, 1936, p. 112. Sul punto, è agevole rinvenire l'influenza delle concettualizzazioni di F. Tönnies, Comunità e società, Milano, Comunità, 1963. Per una panoramica critica su questo snodo particolare e sull'intera tematica, cfr. C. Kluckhohn-A. L. Kroeber, Il concetto di cultura, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1972, pp. 24-25 ss. 11 E. Morin, op, cit., p. 215. 12 Ibidem. 13Ibidem. 7 al modello cartesiano e post-cartesiano di razionalità scientifica, in tutte le sue possibili varianti e riattualizzazioni14. Morin medesimo, con alcune sue opere fondamentali, è stato uno dei pionieri nell'apertura di questi nuovi orizzonti di ricerca15. Ora, policulturalità e trasversalità culturale, differentemente da quanto a tutta prima si è portati a ritenere, velocificando i flussi comunicazionali tra "generi", "tipi" e "contesti" culturali diversi, conducono ad un innalzamento dei tassi di conflittualità e interconflittualità disciplinare tra/e nei vari campi e soggetti culturali. Si apre un fenomeno doppiamente connotato. Difatti, la fludificazione policulturale: a) da un lato, migliora la comunicazione e comunicatività del messaggio di ogni singolo campo/soggetto, contaminandone e arricchendone l'identità con apporti provenienti da altri campi/soggetto; b) dall'altro, accentua le pulsioni tendenti alla difesa ad oltranza della propria identità, minacciata proprio dall'urto del flusso della contaminazione culturale. I due fenomeni non sono in alternativa l'uno all'altro; ma convivono permanentemente nello stesso campo/soggetto. Anzi, è proprio questa compresenza a determinare le condotte principali attraverso cui passano i processi di formazione e consolidamento dell'identità (singola e collettiva) nella società globale e planetaria attuale, caratterizzata come è da una situazione permanente di trasversalità culturale. La policulturalità è, nello stesso tempo: a) veicolo dialogico e, dunque, espressione di avvicinamento e di vicinanza; b) fattore disseminatore di differenze e, dunque, elemento moltiplicatore di antagonismi. I processi dissociativi che, dalla caduta del "muro di Berlino", hanno proliferato a livello planetario e all'interno di ogni singola comunità nazionale e/o locale trovano in ciò una delle loro cause scatenanti. La fine del bipolarismo, ben lungi dal segnare "pace, ordine e sicurezza", ha dato luogo all'esplosione di violenti conflitti sul piano regionale ed ha aperto, nel contempo, una competizione simbolica irriducibile tra rappresentazioni orientali e occidentali del mondo e della vita. Nella società planetaria interamente occidentalizzata, diversamente da quanto alcuni avevano desiderato e altri pronosticato, non reggono più gli stili di vita, le culture e gli archetipi che la civiltà occidentale, dalla scoperta dell'America in avanti, è andata diffondendo in tutto il mondo e nelle coscienze dei singoli. Quanto più la società complessa occidentale si è scoperta policulturale, tanto più ha rappresentato l'urgenza di una valorizzazione delle differenze che, a tutti i livelli, costituiscono l'elemento precipuo che ne definisce il profilo. Ma omettendo di riconoscere pienamente e fino alle estreme conseguenze l'autonomia e le sfere di libertà delle differenze, la società globale occidentale ha consentito che la loro difesa e la loro espressione potessero avvenire esclusivamente nelle forme del fondamentalismo culturale. La policulturalità a cui è approdata la civiltà occidentale, non prolungandosi in pieno e totale riconoscimento dell'Altro, si è andata capovolgendo in una variante ultramodernizzata di fondamentalismo. L'atteggiamento di superiorità culturale, tipico della civiltà occidentale, ha, così, trovato modo di esprimersi in forme ancora più invasive e autoritarie. Laddove la policulturalità non viene presa sul serio, i conflitti tra identità non trovano canalizzazione, esplodendo in maniera virulenta sotto forma di fondamentalismi. La policulturalità e il trasversalismo culturale, da occasione per il superamento dell'emarginazione 14 Uno dei percorsi esplicativi di tali tendenze epistemologiche sta nei due seguenti lavori: a) G. Bocchi-M. Ceruti (a cura di), La sfida della complessità, Milano, Feltrinelli, 1983; M. Ceruti-P. FabbriG. Giorello-L. Petra (a cura di), Il caso e la libertà, Milano, Il Saggiatore, 1994; ai due testi si rinvia per una esauriente bibliografia generale. All'interno di questa linea di sviluppo si inserisce un'intensa attività convegnistica tenuta negli anni '90. Qui citiamo, a titolo esemplificativo, due Convegni particolarmente significativi del 1994: a) "Con Darwin al di là di Cartesio", organizzato dai Dipartimenti di Fisica e Storico-geografico dell'Università di Pavia, dal Politecnico di Milano, dalla Fondazione Bernasconi e dal Centro di Cultura scientifica "A. Volta" di Como, Pavia-Como, 17-19 novembre 1994 (cfr. M. Porro, Simmetria e fantasia, dal caos all' ordine, "il manifesto", 17/11/1994); b) "Ordine e caos", organizzato dal Goethe-Institute, Roma, 16-18 novembre 1994 (cfr. G. Ba., Il caos fa bene al cuore e alla mente, "il manifesto", 18/11/1994). 15 Basti, al riguardo, ricordare due testi: Il metodo. Ordine, disordine, organizzazione, Milano, Feltrinelli, 1983; Introduzione al pensiero complesso, Milano, Sperling & Kupfer, 1993. 8 dell 'Altro, si sono trasformati in situazione di guerra e sottomissione dell'Altro. Gli antagonismi non si parlano, ma si scontrano violentemente; meglio: si parlano, attraverso lo scontro violento. I mezzi della comunicazione (interculturale e policulturale) sono quelli che più degli altri palesano tale evidenza. Si pensi agli scenari di guerra, di sofferenza e di morte ("guerra del Golfo", guerre civili nell'ex Jugoslavia, in Somalia, in Ruanda e Burundi, morte per fame e denutrizione per milioni di esseri umani, crescita esponenziale della violenza omicida e anomica in tutti gli angoli del mondo, ecc.) che in questi ultimi anni, grazie all'uso massivo e capillare dei media, sono entrati dolorosamente nel campo di esperienza di tutti, tracciando un crudele, se non sadico, "spirito dei tempi". Un flusso comunicativo-simbolico tragico a sequenza illimitata parte da questi avvenimenti e irrompe nelle nostre coscienze, accerchiandole. L'orrore che ad essi si accompagna, con il suo letale deposito simbolico, invade il nostro vissuto personale, a misura in cui noi facciamo esperienza del medium che li diffonde e mette nel circuito della informazione e comunicazione. Eppure, proprio per l'asetticità con cui il medium avvolge il messaggio, sono polarmente lontani e irraggiungibili dalla nostra responsabilità e dalla nostra esperienza diretta. L'uso fondamentalista e, insieme, pervasivo del medium incute terrore nelle nostre coscienze, gratificandole con forti dosi di deresponsabilità. Siamo posti così vicini e, nel medesimo istante, talmente lontani dall'Altro da non ritenerci affatto responsabili del suo destino. L'Altro qui vive per noi solo come una doppia minaccia: a) ci inquieta, per la carica di alterità che connota la sua identità; b) ci terrorizza, per la fine cruenta che il "destino" gli ha assegnato. Siamo, perciò, indotti a sentirci talmente vicini a lui, da rifuggirlo imperiosamente. Soltanto mantenendolo lontano, potremo evitare di patire la sua stessa fine: cioè, potremo continuare a vivere. Non si tratta qui di staccarsi dall'Altro; al contrario, dopo averne sentito e visto l'agonia mortale, occorre decisamente e decisivamente evitare che lui ci raggiunga, ci "tocchi" con la sua sofferenza e con il carico dei suoi interrogativi. Ognuno si condanna e condanna l'Altro a rimanere nella posizione in cui già è collocato: qui il Sé e l'Altro sono uniti solamente dall'impossibilità ad agire il cambiamento, pena il dolore, l'infelicità o la morte addirittura. Il dolore e la morte si elevano qui a medium comunicativo supremo. Col che la policulturalità, anziché un "agire comunicativo", mette in campo un agire emarginativo. A questo estremo limite spingono quei fondamentalismi che si nutrono materialmente e simbolicamente dell'emarginazione dell'Altro, vanificando tutte le occasioni di trasversalità e policulturalità pure rese possibili dal tempo storico. In ballo non sono unicamente i "fondamentalismi islamici", come i sistemi mediatici dei paesi avanzati amano accreditare. Le responsabilità della civiltà e delle culture occidentali sono, in proposito, rilevantissime. L'agire emarginativo obbedisce alla razionalità del dominio e della discriminazione; anche nel senso che finalizza l'esercizio del potere e le sue condotte simboliche alla crescita delle diseguaglianze sociali. Le aree dell'emarginazione, così amplificate, vengono trattate con i codici culturali dello stigma e le strategie politiche della ghettizzazione sociale. Qui i fenomeni dell'esclusione sociale non solo vengono giustificati culturalmente e incoraggiati politicamente; ma divengono la base materiale dell'oppressione dei soggetti emarginati. Al punto che, nel circuito culturale ufficiale, opzioni discriminatorie ed escludenti sono metabolizzate come comportamenti normali. La risultanza più inquietante sta proprio nell'assunzione dell'agire emarginativo come agire normale. I paradigmi della democrazia multiculturale, al pari del "sogno americano" del melting pot e di tutti i modelli di democrazia politica che abbiamo finora conosciuto, si rivelano un puro orpello formale, assolutamente incapaci di fare i conti con i montanti fenomeni di razzismo e xenofobia che dagli ani '90 hanno invaso il mondo16. Le varie operazioni di "pulizia etnica" in opera nel pianeta non sono che la punta di iceberg di un più generale processo di accumulazione di forme ipermodernizzate di fascismo etnico che 16 Sul punto, cfr. il contributo del sociologo francese M. Wiewiorka, Racisme et xénofobie in Europe, Paris, La Decouverte, 1994. Che il razzismo costituisca uno dei problemi latenti delle democrazie avanzate, pronto ad esplodere ciclicamente, è dimostrato da un libro di molti anni fa di C. Murray-R. Herrnstein (The Bell Curve) divenuto immediatamente un best-seller negli Usa, il cui obiettivo era dimostrare la "base genetica" dell'inferiorità intellettuale e culturale dei neri rispetto ai bianchi (cfr. F. Tonello, Razze contro, "il manifesto", 18/10/1994). 9 nell 'etnocidio sembrano trovare uno dei loro principali canali di espressione nel rapporto con l'Altro. I casi dell'ex Jugoslavia, del Ruanda e del Burundi non hanno fatto che rendere palese un processo latente, dispiegatosi in profondità dagli anni '60 in avanti, con il proliferare di nuove forme di colonialismo, basate sul controllo politico-economico delle ex colonie da parte non solo delle "potenze madri", ma anche di organismi sovranazionali quali il Fondo monetario internazionale e la Banca mondiale. La differenza, in quanto tale, viene condannata e isolata, prima ancora che socialmente e politicamente, sul piano culturale e simbolico. Una catena discriminante ed opprimente stringe tutti i diversi: il diverso fisico (disabile, "minorato", malati in genere); il diverso razziale (negro, ebreo, extracomunitario); il diverso sessuale (donne, omosessuali); il diverso mentale (psicopatico); il diverso generazionale (anziani, bambini); il diverso territoriale (meridionale, contadino, straniero); il diverso professionale (professioni umili e/o basse); il diverso espressivo (analfabeta, semianalfabeta, straniero)17. La relazione comunicativa assume una modalità emarginante: il medium e il messaggio comunicano emarginazione ed esistono in quanto veicolo di emarginazione. L'agire emarginativo si va, così, ad incardinare sul codice binario amico/nemico, facendo propri gli assi portanti del pensiero decisionista e realista che, dal Cinquecento al Novecento, hanno largamente caratterizzato il modo d'essere della relazione politica, sul piano dell'ordine interno e degli equilibri internazionali. Ciò che deborda il sistema delle codificazioni ufficiali viene metabolizzato come alterità culturale. L'altero culturale non è altro che una maschera del "nemico" e, perciò, è qui posto sotto il controllo coattivo delle strategie dell' emarginazione. All'interno della formazione della soggettività critica, registriamo proprio a questo livello uno scardinante processo controintenzionale. Nella intersezione epocale in cui siamo collocati, i codici e i simboli della tecnologia elettronico-informatica si prolungano in maniera invasiva soprattutto nelle coscienze infelici di chi autorappresenta la propria identità come alterità assoluta del medium. E ciò in un duplice senso: a) sia perché non è possibile sottrarsi alla signoria semantica, simbolica e comunicativa del medium; b) sia perché la vittima sacrificale per eccellenza del medium, per ovvi motivi, è proprio il campo/soggetto altero al sistema metabolico culturale dominante18. È possibile lottare (o perlomeno resistere a) i poteri complessi e pervasivi dei media, unicamente assumendo la loro esistenza come radicale punto di svolta e di non ritorno della civiltà (occidentale). Occorre, in altre parole, fare i conti con i sistemi di comunicazione e i retrostanti circuiti metabolici culturali, attrezzandosi ad un livello maggiore di complessità, senza riporre alcuna speranza in archeologie salvifiche e fondamentalismi etici, politici, etnici e religiosi. Il fondamentalismo, anzi, è una sottospecie rozza dell'agire emarginativo che si sprigiona dai media, nei cui selettori razionali finisce risucchiato e neutralizzato. La risorsa estrema in mano al fondamentalismo è la guerra, in tutte le sue forme: da quelle simbolico-culturali a quelle coercitivo-militari. Ma è proprio tale estremo limite ad essere sussunto e rielaborato dai poteri informatici. In primo luogo, perché nella società globale planetaria chi è in grado di mettere in campo i poteri e i mezzi comunicativi più complessi si trova a godere, in qualunque tipo di guerra, di una posizione di inestimabile vantaggio. In secondo, perché il ricorso alle forme della guerra non fa che sovralimentare e cristallizzare come dato ontologico proprio le condotte dell'agire emarginativo. In terzo, perché tutte le contraddizioni, le diseguaglianze e le ingiustizie, dal piano culturale e simbolico a quello sociale e politico, vengono surrettiziamente spostate in un ordine di discorso in cui la soluzione 17 Sul tema cfr. G. Sarpellon, Emarginazione e dinamiche sociali, "Animazione sociale", n. 1, 1988, p. 16; A. Chiocchi, L'emarginazione sociale, "Società e conflitto", n. 9/10, 1994, pp. 474-475. 18 L'intreccio fenomenologico di questi processi di estensione illimitata, nel tempo e nello spazio, dei poteri elettronici è analizzato in maniera puntuale, molti decenni fa, da M. McLuhan in un'opera che, per quanto animata da una "sostanza politica" apertamente conservatrice, resta su molti punti geniale e profetica: Gli strumenti del comunicare. I significati psicologici e sociali di ogni sistema di comunicazione, Milano, Il Saggiatore, 1967 (ma New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1964); Milano, Garzanti, 1977. Oggi l'estensione dei poteri dei media è praticamente illimitata, al punto che nel dibattito politico e informativo-comunicazionale sono, ormai, invalse espressioni quali "mediacrazia", "telecrazia", "democrazia elettronica" e simili. 10 emarginatoria e discriminatoria viene mistificata come ineluttabile. È a questo punto che l'agire emarginativo corona il suo disegno strategico manipolatorio: porsi quale modalità esclusiva della relazione con l'Altro e della relazione comunicativa tout court. 2. Alfabetizzazione dell'ignoranza e agire identificativo Le condotte dell'agire emarginativo hanno, dunque, processi retrostanti di formazione e alimentazione culturale. Ecco perché il pensiero critico e tutte le forme di espressione dell'arte radicale hanno sferrato una critica acuminata alla cultura, ai suoi archetipi e ai suoi codici. Col che incrociamo un poco indagato paradosso: l'uso della cultura, per la contestazione della cultura. La contestazione della cultura è stato un tema forte di alcuni filoni dell'Illuminismo, delle avanguardie artistiche nei primi decenni del Novecento, della "teoria critica" di matrice francofortese, del situazionismo e del post-situazionismo, della "macchina di sapere" messa a punto da Foucault e, per avvicinarci ad alcune delle tonalità politiche più caratteristiche del nostro passato prossimo, dei movimenti degli anni '60 e '70, con in testa il Maggio francese19; tanto per fare solo qualche illuminante esempio. Negli anni '60 e '70, la contestazione della cultura a mezzo di cultura diviene, ben presto, precondizione (culturale) della stessa rivoluzione politica. Ma qui la rivoluzione culturale non soltanto è un a priori ontologico ed epistemologico della rivoluzione politica; più esattamente, la eccede. Il campo di incidenza di questi "modelli culturali" si allarga a tutto il pianeta: poteva essere diversamente nel "villaggio globale"? I temi della rivoluzione culturale dall'ambito europeo e nordamericano si trasferiscono ai modelli della rivoluzione politica cinese, partorendo il modello della "rivoluzione culturale proletaria". Non è nostra intenzione entrare nel merito della massa dei fenomeni che abbiamo stringatamente evocato che, tra l'altro, mantengono tra di loro non trascurabili differenze. Vogliamo esclusivamente sottolineare quanto nella società globale la circolazione dei discorsi e la messa in opera delle prassi avvenga in tempi iperveloci e su scale spaziali planetarie. Ciò, ovviamente, non cancella e omologa le differenze; bensì si nutre delle differenze, dirottandole verso aree di senso sussunte sotto poteri sapienzali assai complessi e smisuratamente freddi. Dobbiamo prendere in considerazione una delle intenzionalità politiche più significative della contestazione della cultura (a mezzo della cultura) dei movimenti degli anni '60 e '70: trasmettere cultura, per reintegrare nell'uso della lingua e della parola chi ne è escluso ed emarginato20. Entra in gioco un tema tanto cruciale quanto delicato: quello del linguaggio e 19 E. Morin (op. cit., pp. 227-233) inserisce questa magmatica successione fenomenologica in una tendenza profonda: la "crisi della cultura colta", i cui elementi latenti rinviene nell'epoca di Luigi XIV, da cui si avviano fino all'esplosione del XVIII secolo, con il "processo di liberazione della parola" e/o della "sovranità della parola". In questa prima fase, sostiene Morin, prende luogo un processo dialettico, in virtù del quale ciò che è originariamente "marginale" ruota sino a diventare "centrale" (culturalmente e politicamente). Senonché, continua Morin, il processo della "dialettica culturale" e/o della "rotazione culturale" subisce una dirompente cesura, a cavallo del XIX e XX secolo. La crisi della "cultura colta" diviene, da qui in avanti, "crisi dell'arte" che, a sua volta, produce dei "neomodelli". Secondo Morin: "La crisi comincia davvero quando viene a mancare il modello da sostituire, cioè quando irrompe la prima ondata che non reca un contromodello, l'ondata dada. La crisi dell'arte comincia con Rimbaud e il surrealismo. L'arte al di sopra della vita, regno magico e incantato, paradiso della cultura colta, appare come un universo artificiale e vano. L'estetica e la vita stessa prendono il sopravvento sull'arte, nei punti in cui fermentano l'avanguar-dia negatrice e la corrente controculturale. Si cerca lo stupore nel caso (surrealismo), nel quotidiano finora sordido, nel sottoprodotto della cultura di massa (pop art). Anche qui, certamente, entrano in gioco i processi di recupero che utilizzano la crisi per la rifertilizzazione del sistema: il cinema diventa la settima arte, il fumetto, la nona. La nozione di arte si allarga. L'antioggetto diventa oggetto, come l'antiletteratura diventa letteratura" (op. cit., pp. 228-229). 20 Ecco come si esprime, in un famoso documento del giugno 1968, la "Commissione Cultura e contestazione" dell'Università di Nanterre: "Nostro compito immediato è ... aiutare i lavoratori ad uscire dalle loro condizioni di esclusione dalla lingua, spezzare la repressione disumana che la mancata disponibilità del discorso impone ai lavoratori (poiché il linguaggio è ciò che tiene insieme l'umanità), dimostrare che l'esclusione dei lavoratori dal discorso ha le sue radici nella divisione tra 11 dell 'identità. I fenomeni dell'esclusione e dell'emarginazione, prima ancora che essere causalizzati a dinamiche sociali e politiche, vengono ricondotti a motivazioni di ordine culturale. L'esclusione e l'emarginazione sono ritenute dislocate al livello primario dell'inibizione alla lingua e l'identità emarginata che consegue a tale interdizione si palesa come identità a cui, con la lingua, è sottratta la parola. La contestazione della cultura si pone l'obiettivo dichiarato di includere nella lingua, per restituire alla parola i soggetti emarginati. Da qui l'intenso, vario e non-conformista uso che i movimenti fanno, soprattutto per opera delle ali cosiddette "creative", di tutti gli strumenti culturali, artistici e comunicativi che la società globale mette a loro disposizione. Le "università critiche" e/o "alternative", i "controcorsi" nelle loro varie forme di espressione (da Berkeley a Berlino, da Nanterre a Trento), procedono alla messa in forma di un vero e proprio processo di culturizzazione, avente espliciti obiettivi di contestazione sociale. Meglio: mettono al centro dei processi di culturizzazione i soggetti sociali culturalmente emarginati, non solo e non tanto per stimolarli o recuperarli all'azione, quanto per porli nelle condizioni di costruire in autonomia e in libertà la loro identità e la loro azione. Così stando le cose, non si assiste ad un mero progetto di recupero e integrazione dell'emarginazione culturale e dell'esclusione sociale; bensì ad una rottura del totalizzante e soffocante ordine del discorso culturale dominante, scardinato per linee interne dall'irruzione di soggetti, tattiche, strategie e progetti in posizione di alterità rispetto alle codificazioni esistenti. Ecco perché i processi e i progetti della critica della multiversità e della presa di parola sono tra i fuochi interni più vitali dei movimenti del '68 in America e in Europa. Da essi dobbiamo ripartire, rianalizzandone in breve le attribuzioni di senso più prossime al campo dei significati oggetto della nostra ricerca. In prima istanza, isoleremo i loro punti forti; successivamente, cercheremo di individuare i loro limiti. Tattica e strategia della critica della multiversità partono da un convincimento base: l'alienazione (degli studenti) non trova il suo punto di ancoraggio in processi socio-economici, bensì ha come sua molla motivazionale centrale il processo educativo21. Il fatto è che l'alienazione è una componente essenziale ed insostituibile di qualunque processo educativo che, attraverso la devitalizzazione delle coscienze, esiste in funzione della manipolazione dei fatti, per puri fini di dominio e controllo. Ciò è individuato con estrema chiarezza da S. Golin, giovane studente della Brandeis: Fino al momento della laurea noi siamo edotti di una serie di fatti separati dal loro significato... Nessuna meraviglia quindi che i nostri corsi, salvo poche eccezioni, ci appaiano insignificanti per la nostra vita. Nessuna meraviglia che siano così noiosi. La noia è condizione necessaria per ogni tipo di educazione che miri alla manipo- le classi... Trasmettere cultura non significa riprodurre la rigidezza dei rapporti pedagogici tradizionali, ma piuttosto avviare un lavoro comune reale e concreto che rende tale trasmissione possibile ed efficace." (cit. da P. Ortoleva, Saggio sui movimenti del 1968 in Europa e in America, Roma, Editori Riuniti, 1988, p. 299). 21 Il tema è svolto con impegno e acume da C. Davidson, Tattica e strategia nella multiversità, Bari, De Donato, 1969, pp. 11-29. In particolare, merita di essere riportato un lungo brano della lettera di una studentessa al "New York Times" del 29/11/1964: "Sono arrivata a questa scuola pensando che non ce l'avrei fatta. Sbagliavo. Ce la faccio. Posso perfino piazzarmi tra i primi. La mia tabella di marcia giornaliera è dura. Mi alzo alle 6,30... Dopo cena lavoro fino a mezzanotte e mezzo. In principio, più o meno alle prime settimane, sto bene. Poi comincio a chiedermi che significato abbia tutto questo: mi sto educando? La risposta ce l'ho... Mi sto educando come loro vogliono. Così mi convinco che l'unico motivo per cui sto facendo tutto questo è di prepararmi; e contemporaneamente mi accorgo di buttare via questi anni di preparazione. Non sto imparando quello che voglio imparare... Non mi importa niente del sistema feudale. Io voglio sapere della vita. Voglio pensare e leggere. Ma quando?... La mia vita è un turbine, da cui vengo travolta, senza esserne cosciente. Io sono quello che voi chiamate vitale, ma, non so come, io non vi trovo nulla di vitale... Così posso prendere un 30... ma quando ci ritorno sopra scopro che questo 30 non significa niente. È un numero che voi usate per farmi andare avanti... Mi chiedo che cosa io stia facendo qui. Mi sento contraffatta; io non mi appartengo... Vi chiedete le ragioni della delinquenza minorile. Se ne farò parte, vi dirò perché è successo. Mi sento chiusa in una bara e non posso muovermi e neppure respirare. La mia vita non vale nulla. Si svolge racchiusa in alcune costruzioni di un campus; ma non va più in là. Ho deciso di ribellarmi" (cit. da C. Davidson, op. cit., pp. 14-15). 12 lazione dei fatti, astraendoli dal loro significato"22. Il processo educativo devia e, quindi, concentra una quantità crescente di attenzione, informazione e saperi su temi e problemi che nella realtà vanno costantemente perdendo di rilevanza23, per cui finisce con l'incuneare delle profonde cesure tra i processi acquisitivi di conoscenza e la vita reale, tra il soggetto/oggetto del processo educativo e la realtà. Ora, quanto più tale modello di educazione/formazione si massifica, tanto più le coscienze sono investite da un processo di depauperizzazione cognitiva e la manipolazione dei dati reali si va progressivamente approfondendo ed estendendo. Con l'avvento della cultura di massa e le ibridazioni triangolari da essa inverate con la cultura umanistica e la cultura scientifica, il fenomeno dell'alienazione culturale si stratifica in maniera diffusiva nell'ordito di tutte le relazioni sociali. Inoltre, quanto più si intensifica l'alienazione culturale, tanto più si dilata l'alienazione linguistica: il soggetto del processo educativo viene gettato in un campo relazionale e comunicativo, in cui stenta a procurarsi le parole attraverso le quali dire e rappresentare la propria mutilazione identificativa, smarrendo progressivamente se stesso. Il senso delle biografie personali si va rivelando in tutta la sua indigenza, sotto l'imperio di codici di dispotismo culturale e sociale che trasformano i processi di educazione in industria del sapere, finalizzata, come ogni industria che si rispetti, all'accumulazione di potere e profitto per ristrette élites. In virtù di tali meccanismi, istanze di pianificazione economica, programmi di sviluppo tecno-scientifico, strategie di controllo politico si saldano in un congegno unitario, solcato da una rete di articolazioni funzionali: la multiversità. Alla multiversità sono riconducibili tutte le prestazioni imputate al "sistema universitario" che, dagli anni '50 e '60, vanno creando nuove professioni intellettuali: assistenti e tecnici di ricerca, consulenti industriali, impiegati per l'amministrazione, dirigenti per i progetti di ricerca, ecc. Per rendersi conto della rilevanza del fenomeno, basti pensare che, negli Usa, già nel 1959 ben il 20% del lavoro di "Ricerca & Sviluppo" avviene direttamente nelle università24. Nessuna meraviglia, dunque, se, su questa base: "... la multiversità diventa l'avanguardia dello status quo, chiave per introdurre senza scosse un Nuovo Ordine alla 1984"25. La multiversità del dispositivo di comando è saldamente intrecciata all'unidimensionalità del flusso comunicazionale e dei suoi imperativi culturali. Giustappunto, la compenetrazione tra la multiversità del contesto e l'unidimensionalità del messaggio costituisce, come per primo ha intuito Herbert Marcuse26, la sostanza letale delle tecnologie del controllo repressivo nelle società avanzate. Il contenuto unidimensionale dei processi educativi della multiversità è presto detto: alfabetizzare l'ignoranza. Prende lena da qui un immane processo di acculturazione dell'adattamento acritico allo status quo che, per questa via, intenderebbe risolvere alla radice il problema e la sussistenza stessa dell'emarginazione e dell'esclusione sociale27. La critica della dimensione culturale dei processi di alienazione, attraverso i "controcorsi" e le "università alternative", riverbera tre importanti conseguenze: a) la "fondazione culturale" della mobilitazione politica; b) la connessione indissociabile tra attività di ricerca teorica e azione politica; c) l'autorganizzazione delle risorse culturali e politiche, all'interno di un progetto e di una prassi di cambiamento radicale della società e della vita degli esseri umani. Tutti e tre questi processi fanno intersezione tra di loro e danno luogo ad una vera e propria efflorescenza di iniziative culturali dal basso che, di volta in volta, anticipano, direzionano, seguono o sono influenzate dalla mobilitazione collettiva. La ricomposizione del momento politico col momento culturale, della dimensione della teoria con quella della prassi costituisce: a) a confutazione conseguente della multiversità strumentale del sistema universitario, 22 S. Golin, in "New Left Notes", 7/10/1966; cit da C. Davidson, op. cit., p. 17; corsivo nostro. 23 Cfr. C. Davidson, op. cit., p. 17 ss. 24 Inchiesta della "Monthly Rewiew", luglio-agosto 1959; cit. da C. Davidson, op. cit., p. 34. 25 C. Davidson, op. cit., p. 35. 26 H. Marcuse, L'uomo a una dimensione. L'ideologia della società industriale avanzata, Torino, Einaudi, 1967. 27 Ma proprio qui, si sostiene, sta il punto debole della multiversità: "... tutti i tentativi per insegnare l'ignoranza al posto della conoscenza sono finiti male" (C. Davidson, op. cit., p. 47). 13 quale perno dell'alfabetizzazione dell'ignoranza e della docilizzazione conformistica delle intelligenze; b) la base di sviluppo di un fenomeno ancora più esplosivo: la presa di parola28 dei soggetti per l'innanzi esclusi ed emarginati dal circuito della comunicazione politica e dell'espressione culturale29. Intendiamo i processi di presa di parola, affermati dai movimenti degli anni '60, come una "componente di senso strategica" che attraversa tutte le modalità d'essere e di espressione della mobilitazione collettiva di quegli anni; non unicamente il campo circoscritto e limitato delle strategie, dei mezzi e delle attività di comunicazione in senso stretto. Con la presa di parola, non si passa semplicemente da una posizione storica di invisibilità ad una, invece, di visibilità; da una situazione di non-comunicazione e incomunicabilità ad un'altra di comunicazione e comunicatività, acquisendo padronanza e rielaborando le tecnologie della comunicazione sociale. Più esattamente, la presa di parola è indicativa della tensione ad afferrare i rivoli sparsi delle identità collettive e di quelle singole, riconoscendo l'Altro come identità differente e il Sé come identità propria; identità entrambe da verificare, ricostruire e rimettere in dialogo in permanenza. Riaccedere alla lingua e alla parola significa poter finalmente riscoprirsi liberi, costruire e riconoscere in autonomia la propria e l'altrui libertà. Pensarsi, sapersi e costruirsi in libertà sono i tre fuochi di una nuova modalità dell'agire: l'agire identificativo. La presa di parola affranca dalla condizione di emarginazione culturale ed esclusione sociale e, nel contempo, situaziona nel vivo del flusso delle relazioni sociali, là dove esse erompono e ribollono. Non soltanto si dà il distanziamento critico dai selettori dell'agire emarginativo; ma trova anche puntuale demistificazione la razionalità dell'agire comunicativo30 che postula una riappropriazione/reinvenzione del linguaggio e della dialogica interumana, senza andare ad in- 28 Come correttamente informa P. Ortoleva (op. cit., p. 216, nota n. 3), la formulazione della categoria si deve a M. de Certeau, La prise de la parole, Paris, Desclée de Brouwer, 1968. Ortoleva, del pari, rinvia ad un altro importante testo di quegli anni: G. Lantieri Laura-M. Tardy, La révolution étudiant comme discours, "Communications", n. 12, 1968; va ricordato che l'appena menzionato n. 12/1968 di "Communications" è monografico sul tema: "Mai '68. La prise de la parole". Si riferisce all'opera di de Certeau menzionata anche E. Morin, op. cit., pp. 212-213; ma qui, dell'Autore in questione, viene considerato l'approccio "esistenzialista" alla cultura. Un riferimento all'opera di de Certeau è, infine, reperibile anche in B. Bongiovanni, Attraverso le interpretazioni del maggio francese, in A. Agosti-Luisa Passerini-N. Tranfaglia (a cura di), La cultura e i luoghi del '68, Milano, Angeli, 1991, pp. 103-123; si tratta degli "Atti" del Convegno di studi ("Università e società italiana. Le culture e i luoghi del '68"), organizzato nel novembre del 1988 dal Dipartimento di Storia dell'Università di Torino. Nel nostro lavoro, anziché di presa della parola, abbiamo preferito "parlare" di presa di parola che ci sembra proponga un'accezione della categoria più dinamica e meno condizionata da concettualizzazioni di tipo dogmatico-universalistico. Diciamo ciò per un ulteriore, e non secondario, ordine di motivazioni: riteniamo che non sia possibile "prendere" la parola, afferrarla sino a divenirne il demiurgo; piuttosto, se ne può fare "impiego", "ritrovandola", reinventandola e rigettandosi nel vortice degli eventi reali, delle passioni e dei sentimenti. Se questo risponde al vero, non si dà presa della parola, anche per la decisiva circostanza che la parola stessa "prende"; o, meglio: la parola è (anche) "presa " di vita reale. 29 Non sono, questi, fenomeni esclusivi dei movimenti degli anni '60 e '70; anzi, si rivelano come una delle costanti storiche delle più grandi mobilitazioni politiche dalla fine del Settecento in avanti. Nota con acume il fenomeno P. Ortoleva: "Nel corso della rivoluzione francese, nel '48, nella Comune, nel Biennio rosso, i momenti "alti" della partecipazione di massa al processo insurrezionale erano sempre stati accompagnati da uno straordinario intensificarsi della circolazione di giornali, opuscoli, appelli, e dalla creazione di sedi di dibattito in cui venivano affrontati, insieme, i problemi immediati dell'azione politica e le grandi questioni della società presente e futura. L'ingresso nella sfera pubblica di strati che ne erano stati in precedenza esclusi, in tutte queste occasioni, si accompagnò all'impetuoso incremento della comunicazione politica: frutto di una "presa della parola" da parte di quegli stessi strati, e ancor più da parte degli intellettuali (generalmente "marginali" anch'essi) che se ne facevano portavoce" (op. cit., p. 83). 30 La costruzione teorica dei paradigmi dell'"agire comunicativo", come è noto, si deve a J. Habermas, Teoria dell'agire comunicativo, 2 voll., Bologna, Il Mulino, 1986. Senza nulla togliere all'importanza e al rigore del discorso teorico di Habermas, proponiamo implicitamente un diverso impiego concettuale della categoria, articolando, inoltre, alcune esplicite linee di critica. 14 cidere criticamente nel cuore infetto di quei processi culturali di alienazione che incubano emarginazione ed esclusione, "limitandosi" alla critica della razionalità strumentale e della ragione sistemico-funzionale. L'agire identificativo insedia tre vettori direzionali, i quali integrano un'area di senso così articolata: a) il campo dell'autoidentificazione; b) il campo dell'identificazione dell'Altro; c) il campo dell'identificazione da parte dell'Altro. L'area di senso così delimitata non disloca soltanto problemi comunicativi. Anzi: a) nel loro atto sorgivo: i problemi della comunicazione si costituiscono come problemi di identificazione; b) nel loro farsi e operare: i flussi comunicazionali si danno sempre tra identità in autocostruzione e in metamorfosi; nel duplice senso che si rimodella e va costantemente ripensato non solo il rapporto con l'Altro e l'altrui identità, ma anche e soprattutto con il Sé e l'identità propria. Il problema dell'identità, dunque, si pone come questione prioritaria. In questo senso, l'agire identificativo precede ed eccede l'agire comunicativo. O, per meglio dire: la comunicazione è relazione dell/all'identità, nel triplice percorso del Sé verso stesso, del Sé verso l'Altro e dell'Altro verso il Sé. Forme e modi del comunicare rinviano sempre ad un che di precostituito, in via di costituzione e/o di ridefinizione costante: i processi di formazione e variazione dell'identità. L'occlusione e/o la repressione delle condotte di formazione ed espressione dell'identità ostruiscono i canali di espressione della comunicazione, sino a porli in uno stato di eterodirezione culturale, politica e sociale. Libertà del comunicare è prima di tutto libertà delle identità in comunicazione o che, più esattamente, si vanno cercando nel campo identificativo prima ancora che in quello comunicativo. Il controllo della comunicazione è ciò che registriamo a valle di un processo iniziato a monte, come controllo dell'identità. Ecco perché le ricerche decennali di Foucault sulle tecnologie di controllo e repressione della soggettività acquisiscono una particolare rilevanza31. Non a caso, Foucault è tra i primi (e tra i pochi) a individuare che il problema dell'identità è la questione politica centrale sollevata dalle lotte studentesche degli anni '6032. 3. Dialogica della memoria e dell'identità Dopo aver circoscritto sinteticamente il territorio di senso positivo delimitato dai movimenti del '68, dobbiamo individuarne i limiti; beninteso, continuando a rimanere ancorati al campo 31 Sul punto, cfr. A. Petrillo, "Critica della verità" e ricerca della vita in Michel Foucault. Questioni di metodo, "Società e conflitto", n. 7/8, 1993; ora raccolto in Saperi a confronto. Talcott Parsons e Michel Foucault, Avellino, Associazione Culturale Relazioni, 1995. 32 "L'affermazione di una identità è stata la grande questione politica messa in evidenza dagli studenti a partire dagli '60. Penso che, dopo gli anni '60, la soggettività, l'identità, l'individualità costituiscano un problema politico di primo piano. È pericoloso, secondo me, considerare l'identità e la soggettività come componenti profonde e naturali, non determinate da fattori politici e sociali. Dobbiamo liberarci del tipo di soggettività di cui trattano gli psicanalisti. Siamo prigionieri di una certa idea di noi stessi e del nostro comportamento. Dobbiamo cambiare la nostra soggettività, il rapporto che abbiamo con noi stessi" (M. Foucault, Il potere della finzione, "il manifesto", 5/10/1994). Si tratta di una intervista rilasciata da Foucault alla rivista americana "The Three Penny Rewiew" nel 1980, ora ripubblicata in Dits et écrits 1954-1988 (a cura di D. Defert-F. Edwald), Paris, Gallimard, 1994, su cui è stata condotta la trad. italiana proposta da "il manifesto" (presumibilmente di Anna Maria Merlo). L'opera raccoglie tutti gli articoli e le interviste di Foucault comparsi su giornali francesi e stranieri, nonché interventi di varia natura, per un complessivo di 365 testi organizzati in sequenza cronologica. L'insieme di questi scritti foucaultiani è articolato in quattro volumi: a) I volume: 1954-1969, pp. 860; b) II volume: 1970-1975, pp. 846; c) III volume: 1976-1979, 846 pp.; d) IV volume: 1980-1988, pp. 904. Resta da dire che, in appendice ai testi di Foucault, J. Lagrange cura la bibliografia completa di tutta l'opera di Foucault. Per tutte queste informazioni e altro ancora, si rinvia ad Anna Maria Merlo, L'ordine del discorso in presa diretta, "il manifesto", 5/10/1994. Feltrinelli, dal 1996 ha tradotto in tre volumi questa opera foucaultiana con il titolo "Archivio Foucault". 15 investigativo che ci siamo riproposti di scandagliare33. La contestazione della cultura a mezzo della cultura, proprio nel suo insopprimibile tendere verso una permanente "rivoluzione culturale", dà luogo a neomodelli culturali, nella forma di "contromodelli": le "università alternative" e i "controcorsi" non sono che alcune delle forme perspicue, così, elaborate. Più in generale ancora, il neomodello culturale, instaurando una relazione di antagonismo nei confronti della cultura accademica, va cristallizzandosi in un movimento di controcultura che è, insieme, confutazione radicale della cultura ufficiale e suo ricambio potenziale in atto. Da questo lato, la "controcultura" è molto di più che un semplice troncone interno ai movimenti studenteschi34. Ma i neomodelli culturali rivoluzionari: a) talora in maniera coerente e altre in modo controintenzionale, sono attraversati da tensioni universalizzanti e centralistiche, al pari dei modelli culturali vigenti; b) sono fisiologicamente governati da una relazione schizofrenica di amore/odio verso la cultura35; c) oscillano nel situare la cultura ora in "funzione di servizio" della politica rivoluzionaria, ora nella posizione di determinante centrale della prassi rivoluzionaria; d) pendono ora verso i modelli della "cultura alta" (il momento della "ricerca teorica"), ora verso quelli della "cultura popolare" (il momento della mobilitazione e della propaganda). Le aporie interne appena segnalate discendono da alcuni vizi strutturali: a) un modello statico di "rivoluzione culturale"; b) un'epistemologia ristretta di critica culturale; c) una nozione monca dell'agire. Vediamo meglio, con ordine. Il modello di "rivoluzione culturale" configurato e messo in prassi si risolve in una rotazione semplice: nel senso che tende a rimpiazzare integralmente quello ufficiale, attraverso slittamenti critico-surrogatori. La rotazione culturale descrive un movimento da "polo" a "polo", esaurendo in ciò le sue funzioni. Le culture per l'innanzi emarginate ambiscono, in tal modo, a stabilizzarsi, occupando il "centro" della scena comunicativa e del teatro culturale. La "rivoluzione culturale" qui si specifica, per l'appunto, come rotazione dal polo dell'emarginazione al polo dell'inclusione. Emerge, a quest'altezza, un doppio limite: a) la "rivoluzione culturale" si traduce in una mera inversione di posizione e di segno tra polarità dell'emarginazione e polarità dell'integrazione; b) il movimento di "rivoluzione culturale", così, codificato si ipostatizza come termine finale della rivoluzione: o, meglio, come ultima rivoluzione necessaria e possibile. In tutti e due i casi, in maniera tanto coerente quanto controintenzionale, la "rivoluzione culturale" si svela come un movimento finalistico-salvifico teso insopprimibilmente alla cancellazione della rivoluzione dall'ordine del giorno del calendario politico e dell'immaginario simbolico-culturale. Il corollario più in vista (e più esiziale) di un esito siffatto è, così, riassumibile: il potere rivoluzionario (della politica e della cultura rivoluzionarie) non abbisogna (più) di rivoluzione alcuna. Statica della rivoluzione e dinamica della storia e della vita degli esseri viventi fi- 33 Per una discussione più generale del campo positivo e di quello negativo dei movimenti degli anni '60 e '70, con specifico riferimento al "caso italiano", si rinvia ad A. Chiocchi, Movimenti. Profili culturali e politici della conflittualità sociale in Italia negli anni '60 e '70, Mercogliano (Av), Quaderni di "Società e conflitto", n. 9, 1996. 34 In tema di "controcultura", il testo più significativo rimane T. Roszak, Nascita di una controcultura, Milano, Feltrinelli, 1969. Sull'argomento, spunti interessanti si trovano anche in P. Ortoleva, Sui movimenti del 1968..., cit.; 35 Questa contraddizione, non adeguatamente avvertita e padroneggiata dai movimenti, è magistralmente descritta da E. Morin: "È uno sbalorditivo connubio (vissuto del resto permanentemente dall'autore di queste righe) tra l'odio della cultura, nel senso in cui questa è "inversione della vita", e l'amore della cultura, nel senso in cui questa non è solo quintessenzialità e concentrazione della vita, ma sembra possedere la forza di cambiare la vita, almeno nell'imma-ginario... È proprio nel Maggio del 1968 che si coniugano tutti gli assalti culturali-anticulturali, l'aggressività estetica contro l'arte e l'aggressività etica contro la cultura. Da una parte questa rivolta assume un aspetto ideologico ben noto; dall'altra un aspetto esistenziale di rivoluzione culturale" (op. cit., pp. 230-231; corsivi nostri). 16 niscono letalmente col coincidere. I punti di approdo di tale parabola rendono più espliciti un secondo e non meno rilevante limite di fondo: la dimensione della critica culturale è letteralmente espunta dall'orizzonte concettuale e dalle determinazioni dell'agire. Non solo il modello di rivoluzione qui messo in codice omette flagrantemente di ritornare su se stesso, smarrendo l'autoriflessività critica; ma delegittima e impossibilita la critica in quanto tale, espellendola dal campo del pensiero e della prassi. I due movimenti si intrecciano, congiurando verso inquietanti scenari, entro i quali la rivoluzione (culturale), proprio in quanto tale, è sempre dalla parte della ragione. Pertanto, in linea ontologica, non è assoggettabile alle categorie della critica. Il campo della critica, come si vede, patisce una indebita restrizione epistemologica: a) tutto è criticabile a partire dalla rivoluzione; b) niente è criticabile discutendo la rivoluzione. In realtà, il contenuto di senso più autentico di ogni rivoluzione (culturale) e la struttura epistemologica di ogni sapere critico-rivoluzionario prevedono geneticamente la costante rimessa in questione delle idee e delle culture rivoluzionarie, sia attraverso l'attivazione dell'autoriflessione critica, sia per il tramite dell'irruzione della soggettività critica, nelle forme materiali e culturali che si vanno determinando storicamente. Il concetto di "rivoluzione permanente" (elaborato da Marx e ripreso da Trockij e dalla stessa "rivoluzione culturale proletaria" cinese) tiene, in un qualche modo, conto di questo campo problematico; anche se omette di svilupparsi coerentemente in "rivoluzione nella e della rivoluzione". "Rivoluzionare la rivoluzione", sottoporre costantemente ad interrogazione critica il "certo", il "dato", il "sensibile", le forme di sapere "presupposte" e le culture "metabolizzate", anche a rivoluzione avvenuta, costituisce la struttura epistemologica della cultura rivoluzionaria e della rivoluzione della cultura. In questo senso, "rivoluzione culturale", è anche (o soprattutto): a) critica delle idee e delle culture della rivoluzione; b) libertà dalla rivoluzione. Solo in tal modo, può trovar modo di affermarsi la libertà della rivoluzione. Proprio questo reticolo epistemologico, prima ancora che politico-esistenziale, ha reso sempre oltremodo difficile, se non ardua, la relazione tra rivoluzione e cultura, tra potere rivoluzionario e arte. Da qui l'esigenza avvertita dall'arte e dalla cultura, per sfuggire alla presa stritolante dei poteri normativi e totalizzanti della rivoluzione, di pensare e praticare la sovversione culturale degli archetipi e degli stilemi rivoluzionari: "Sade, il revolver surrealista, Artaud, conducono l'assalto contemporaneamente ai rivoluzionari"36. Ma è il movimento dada a costituire il primo punto di solidificazione della sovversione dell'arte e della rivoluzione a mezzo dell'arte e del richiamo utopico alle correnti profonde e arcane della vita reale. Il detournement situazionista non fa che allocarsi intimamente in questi rivoli sotterranei e, non a caso, anticipa, accompagna e segue l'esplosione del Maggio del '68. Per non parlare della resistenza culturale e artistica avverso il "sistema del socialismo reale", a cominciare dalla tragica sconfitta del futurismo libertario ed inventivo di Majakovskij. Da un lato, i movimenti del '68 costituiscono gli eredi autentici di queste tendenze; dall'altro, ne arretrano gli assi culturali, cognitivi ed epistemologici, con il loro non venire a capo della relazione critica/rivoluzione. L'arretramento è particolarmente significativo e gravido di conseguenze negative, poiché le condotte dell'agire identificativo, pur travalicanti l'agire comunicativo, rimangono spossessate, per linee interne, delle loro risorse poietiche migliori. L'impossibilità di trascendere l'orizzonte politico della rivoluzione; l'inibizione della messa in discussione e del superamento dell'identità della rivoluzione e del soggetto rivoluzionario; la cristallizzazione normativa ed esistenziale delle culture, delle idee e dei comportamenti rivoluzionari cancellano, dalla teoria e dalla prassi, il movimento ininterrotto, vario e assolutamente libero della creazione e della creatività. L'agire identificativo viene deprivato della sua dimensione poietica in senso stretto, dovendo costantemente arretrare rispetto ai codici della "rivoluzione culturale". Se l'agire comunicativo si mostrava orfano dell'agire identificativo, qui l'agire identificativo si rivela monco dell'agire poietico. La soppressione della relazione poietica introduce una situazione limite letale: la dialogica tra identità differenti corre il rischio tragico di congelare in linea contrappositiva soggettività altere, irriducibili a qualunque presa di contatto. Non vengono, così, smarrite unicamente le vie della comunicazione; piuttosto, è il Sé che perde le strade del proprio autoriconoscimento e, tanto più, si accanisce sull'Altro ed è preso 36 E. Morin, op. cit., p. 230. 17 d 'assalto dall'Altro. I conflitti di identità, in tal modo, operano una secessione dalle sfere della dialogica, allocandosi in quelle della competizione concorrenziale per il potere (interno o esterno che sia). Tutti i conflitti di identità non risolti, originatisi ed esplosi rovinosamente entro il seno delle varie componenti dei movimenti studenteschi e tra questi e gli altri movimenti e le istituzioni partono da qui. Il depotenziamento della dimensione poietica è causa di un rapporto indigente tra reale ed immaginario, anche per la decisiva circostanza che è l'immaginario della rivoluzione fattasi realtà che infeuda sotto di sé l'immaginario individuale e collettivo tout court. Ora, la prevalenza titanica dell'immaginario rivoluzionario non è che la faccia speculare dei fenomeni di derealizzazione e culturalizzazione della società affermatisi su scala allargata, a partire dagli anni '50 e '60, con l'irrompere della crisi di tutti e tre i tipi fondamentali di cultura (cultura umanistica, cultura scientifica e cultura di massa) e delle ibridazioni a cui essi avevano dato luogo37. Già Debord e i situazionisti, sulla base della geniale analisi marxiana del "carattere di feticcio della merce"38, avevano colto le tendenze alla spettacolarizzazione immanenti nei processi di cosificazione propri alle società superaccumulate: la società dello spettacolo, da questo lato, non è che l'incubazione esemplare dell'integrale mercificazione e derealizzazione dell'habitat della vita sociale e relazionale. Siffatti processi, negli ultimi decenni del Novecento, a fronte della planetarizzazione degli stili di vita, dei costumi e dei consumi e della mondializzazione della produzione, dell'informazione e comunicazione, sono letteralmente esplosi, accentuando vertiginosamente i fenomeni di implosione delle coscienze e delle intelligenze. In tutto ciò un ruolo rilevante è giocato dalla pubblicità39, soprattutto quella visiva, che si rivela un formidabile veicolo di raccolta di 37 Per un'analisi circonstanziata ed acuta del processo, cfr. M. Perniola, Simulacri del potere e potere dei simulacri, in La società dei simulacri, Bologna, Cappelli, 1983, pp. 7-16; si tratta della Relazione letta al Convegno "Pratiche dell'immaginario, pratiche del reale", Mantova, 21/10/1978. 38 Cfr. G. Debord, La società dello spettacolo, Firenze, Vallecchi, 1979. Le migliori analisi di Marx sull'argomento sono reperibili nei seguenti testi: Il Capitale, Libro I, Torino, Einaudi, 1975; Manoscritti economico-filosofici del '44, in Opere filosofiche giovanili (a cura di G. Della Volpe), Roma, Editori Riuniti, 1968. 39 Illuminanti, al riguardo, le affermazioni di G. Malgara, "gran signore" della pubblicità italiana a metà degli anni '90 (presidente di Upa, Auditel e Audipress), il quale, in un' intervista a "Prima comunicazione" del mese di ottobre del 1994, individua "con candore" i mercati tendenzialmente strategici della pubblicità: "Primo, tempo libero e turismo. Il 70% del mercato mondiale del turismo è costituito da giovani al di sotto dei 25 anni, che si muovono in modo pazzesco. E qui, in questo moto vorticoso dei giovani, sta una delle cause della mondializzazione dei marchi. Vanno in Russia? Vogliono la Coca Cola anche in Cina, i McDonald anche a Mosca, l'Haagen Dazs anche in Italia. Secondo mercato: istruzione. L'istruzione è diventata un bene prezioso, è la via del futuro. E si comincia a spendere in istruzione. Al Mit o alla Harvard Business School non vanno più soltanto i figli delle grandi famiglie e degli industriali. Può essere un obiettivo, un'ambizione per tutti. Esagero, ma mi serve per spiegare il fenomeno. Istruzione: un mercato immenso fatto di lingue, specializzazioni, formazioni interdisciplinari, ritorno all'università per crescere intellettualmente e per rigenerare la propria cultura, tecniche di apprendimento e nuove tecnologie connesse, letture, documentazioni. Nuovo mercato, mercato gigantesco, senza limiti o confini. E ancora nuovo denaro. E poi il terzo mercato di domani: la salute. Un mercato di dimensioni enormi che noi abbiamo affrontato in modo sempre passivo. La salute era un bene che nei mercati del passato era presa in considerazione fino a una certa spesa. Al di là di quella non ci si poteva curare, si moriva. Mancavano le strutture, mancava il valore attribuito alla parte finale della vita. Roba inutile, inutile spenderci. Fine. Mancavano i soldi per costruire il mercato della salute. C'era Lourdes ma non c'era il mercato, se mi passa questa immagine un po' tosta ma efficace. Ora i soldi per la salute si trovano, si mettono da parte. Si fanno le assicurazioni... Diciamo che nel mondo della salute abbiamo vissuto per anni di illusioni, ora possiamo e vogliamo avere certezze. Le illusioni costavano niente, le certezze costano, e molto. Ecco un altro mercato gigantesco. E poi il quarto mercato del futuro, ma che è già dietro l'angolo: la vecchiaia. Cos'è stato fino ad oggi il vecchio in Italia? Una panchina al parco con prati mortaccini e spelati, cappello di paglia, pantofole, giornale. Una cosa molto triste. Invece oggi al vecchio dobbiamo dare assistenza medica, psicologica, vacanze e, se possibile, un reinserimento in qualche nicchia lavorativa. E questo costa denaro. E chi lo paga? Certamente non il sistema, che mette a disposizione le strutture che, però, vanno pagate. Un altro mercato gigantesco, con connotati anch'esso mondiali" 18 profitti e di consenso ideologico-culturale. La mercificazione globale con cui conviviamo e che subiamo è qualche cosa di più e di diverso dalla "società dello spettacolo" che pure l'ha partorita, a partire dall'etica cinico-amorale che secerne in ogni istante/luogo, coscienza/intelligenza aggrediti dalla sua invasività e pervasività40. L'immaginario della rivoluzione non fa che offrire un contesto di significati altrettanto derealizzati e derealizzanti. Se è vero che la cifra del '68, da questa angolazione di osservazione, si gioca prevalentemente sull'immaginario41, è altrettanto rispondente al vero che l'immaginario del '68 ha un contrassegno altamente reificante: non tanto perché impoverisce e appiattisce le proprie virtualità più ricche di senso, ma soprattutto poiché rimane prigioniero, suo malgrado, dei contesti di derealizzazione e culturalizzazione sociale che, pure, intende fieramente combattere. L'apparato delle strutture di senso del '68, giusto perché mutilato del dispiegamento del proprio potenziale poietico, nella generale derealizzazione della società tenta di conficcare l'immaginario della rivoluzione ridotta ad immagine. I moduli culturali della rivoluzione immaginata, in tal modo, ritengono di poter venire a capo della realtà alienata, prendendo su di essa il sopravvento. Qui, allo stesso modo con cui la poesia (da dada in avanti) si va pensando come prassi, la rivoluzione immaginata si pensa come realtà42. Entro l'ambito della "rivoluzione culturale", il rapporto di congruità tra politica e realtà salta dall'interno, poiché è la relazione cultura/immaginario che si frange; fino a dimidiarsi, nella società del segno e del simbolo, dando luogo alla prevalenza dell'immaginario sulla cultura. Non diversamente, ma secondo genealogie e metamorfosi di senso speculari, accade all'interno del campo della cultura ufficiale e delle istituzioni cui essa è imputata. Con la prevalenza dell'immagine sulla cultura, viene positivamente messa in crisi la funzione rivoluzionaria dell'avanguardia (politica e culturale). Non essendo più imputata di alcuna funzione culturale, ma avendo da svolgere un mero ruolo di immagine, l'avanguardia, in quanto tale, vede franare (cit. da S. Menichini, Vecchi e malati, mercato del futuro, "il manifesto", 25/10/1994). Come dire: prima si produce alienazione, malattia ed emarginazione; dopo si lucra su alienazione, malattia ed emarginazione. Il cerchio si chiude con assoluta precisione. 40 Puntuali e attuali osservazioni sull'argomento si trovano in M. Beaud, Il mondo si ribalta. Capitalismo senza alternative, mercificazione senza limiti, "Le Monde diplomatique/il manifesto", n. 6, ottobre 1994, pp. 14-15. Riportiamo alcuni passaggi dell'articolo: "Saranno mercificati e già hanno cominciato ad esserlo tutti i momenti della vita umana, tutte le funzioni della società e, in misura sempre maggiore, tutte le dimensioni di una Terra ridotta ad essere ormai soltanto l'ambiente di vita della specie umana. In sintesi, la mercificazione dell'uomo, delle società e della Terra stessa... La dinamica principale del nostro tempo è l'estendersi dei rapporti mercantili e capitalistici a quasi tutti i campi: dal sostentamento al benessere delle persone all'andamento delle imprese e delle organizzazioni, dal funzionamento dei sistemi di informazione e di decisione alla gestione delle attività politiche, dei sistemi sociali, dell'ambiente e della Terra stessa... Il suo terreno di coltura è la generalizzazione della merce: la mercificazione dell'uomo (sanità, commercio del sangue, degli organi, della procreazione, con la prospettiva della gestione genetica della sua intera esistenza), delle funzioni sociali (istruzione e formazione, conoscenza e gestione dell'opinione pubblica e in prospettiva delle decisioni politiche, delle tensioni e dei conflitti), delle attività umane superiori (ricerca scientifica, elaborazione delle conoscenze, delle opere intellettuali e artistiche e in futuro la gestione dei princípi e dei valori), rapporto con la natura (misure anti-inquinamento, produzione e urbanistica non inquinanti e domani la gestione del pianeta) ecc. ... Tenuto conto delle caratteristiche della merce generalizzata, trovarsi in una posizione di punta di questo capitalismo significa essere padroni delle nuove conquiste tecnologiche: l'informazione (con la gestione dei sistemi complessi), la teletrasmissione (con le nuove prospettive della digitalizzazione), le biotecnologie (con le cartografie e le terapie genetiche): tutte tecnologie che, per numerose applicazioni, si collegano o si associano tra di loro" (p. 14). Le dichiarazioni prima riportate di Malgara, nel quadro appena tracciato, si rivelano essere semplicemente "realistiche" e confermano la spietata analisi di Beaud: il trionfo della merce globale conduce all'epoca dell'irresponsabilità illimitata, in cui tutto è deciso dalle "regole del mercato" e dalle logiche interne ai flussi monetari-finanziari (p. 15). 41 M. Perniola, op. cit., pp. 8-9. 42 In questa direzione, già M. Perniola, op. cit.; ma non sempre, qui e in seguito, il filo delle nostre analisi e delle nostre conclusioni converge con quello di Perniola. 19 sotto i suoi piedi la base di esistenza. Pertanto: a) o si costringe alla dissolvenza nella prassi e/o nell'immediato; b) oppure riproduce tutti gli arcaicismi politici e culturali delle proprie funzioni esterne di comando. Così, la fine dell'epoca del dominio del reale sull'immaginario non diventa, come pure era largamente possibile, l'occasione per una messa a punto di una relazione poietica più stringente tra reale ed immaginario, tra teoria e prassi, tra cultura e politica, tra critica e rivoluzione. Resta senza soluzioni all'altezza un altro e ben più dirompente problema storico: il tramonto irreversibile del monopolio del 'politico' sul reale e sulla società. A fronte della sovversione storica del flusso relazionale tra reale e immaginario, tra politica e cultura e politica e società, la politica e la rivoluzione, le culture e le prassi della rivoluzione andavano non semplicemente pensate e immaginate su se stesse, ma ricostruite, partendo e ripartendo da altro e da altrove: il potenziale di senso di libertà e di liberazione di cui storia e soggetti sociali erano i contraddittori depositari e portatori. Le domande di libertà e di liberazione inoltrate dal tempo storico, dalla situazione epocale, dalle identità singole e collettive, dai soggetti sociali non trovano una puntuale recezione. Una sorta di strabismo culturale ed epistemologico le accoglie, curvandole verso il passato e inchiodandole al presente, nel momento stesso in cui le si proietta verso un futuro derealizzato che, più che essere il frutto di un'immagine viva e di un immaginario ardente, è la proiezione dei desideri e dei sogni del passato. Non che il presente e il futuro debbano rimanere orfani dei sogni e dei desideri del passato; al contrario. Ma desideri, sogni, pulsioni e tensioni utopiche del passato possono essere recuperati solo a partire dalla capacità di desiderare, sognare e costruire il presente verso il futuro. È sempre e solo un presente diverso e radicalmente trasformato che può recuperare il passato, rilanciarlo e vivificarlo sull'asse del futuro; è solo e sempre un presente aperto al suo futuro (cioè: radicalmente altro dal passato) che può "catturare" e rielaborare il suo passato. La mutilazione dell'agire poietico, a quest' approdo, si rivela essere una cesura irrimediabile e fatale delle complesse relazioni di continuità/discontinuità dello spazio e del tempo, delle categorie della metamorfosi storica, della genealogia delle culture, della disseminazione della soggettività sociale. Il campo di ogni condotta umana, di ogni determinazione storica, di ogni istanza politica e di ogni attribuzione culturale è sempre insieme: a) un continuo di discontinuità; b) un discontinuo di continuità. Le rotture più radicali sono quelle che sanno reinterrogare la storia e il passato; soprattutto, la loro storia e il loro passato. E fanno ciò per separarsene radicalmente, senza, tuttavia, azzerare o seppellire nell'oblio il loro senso e il loro significato. La memoria e l'identità del presente e del futuro nascono da una dialogica ininterrotta con la memoria e l'identità del passato. La memoria del tempo e delle identità che lo solcano è sempre (anche) la riscoperta attualizzata dell'onda calda delle origini e, insieme, dei loro atroci limiti. Portiamo sempre con noi le stigmate delle nostre origini e sempre ad esse dobbiamo volgerci, patendone la miseria e traendo da esse lo slancio e il desiderio indomabile della svolta. Laddove si interrompe o destabilizza la dialogica della memoria e dell'identità: a) il "marginale", al termine di un processo di rotazione culturale, tende ad assolutizzarsi come "centrale"; b) l'emarginazione culturale si fa movimento unidimensionale, tendente ad assurgere quale orizzonte normativo "altro" dell'integrazione culturale; c) l'esclusione sociale pone in essere conflitti di identità irresolubili che hanno come loro risultante la soccombenza dei "soggetti deboli"; d) la soggettività critica viene riassorbita e destrutturata attraverso i selettori via via più larghi dell'inclusione culturale e le procedure di istituzionalizzazione del conflitto politico, in funzione di conservazione dello status quo. L'agire identificativo, deprivato della dialogica della memoria e dell'identità, rimane orfano dell'agire dialogico. Ciò lo getta in pasto alle sue aporie interne; sino al punto di non riuscire nemmeno più a valere come critica coerente e dispiegata della razionalità illuministica dell'agire comunicativo. Le istanze di superamento degli specialismi e dell'unidimensionalità della multiversità; l'esigenza di assestare la proposta politica su un discorso culturale critico; la tensione a ricondurre ricerca teorica e azione politica entro un contesto unitario; l'autorganizzazione delle risorse culturali e politiche in funzione di un progetto/processo di 20 cambiamento del reale restano sospese a mezz' aria. Pur palesandosi come giuste intuizioni di rottura, non riescono a perforare, del tutto, il manto delle codificazioni culturali vigenti. La vanificazione dell'agire dialogico le mette in cortocircuito. Uniche loro vie d'uscita restano l'implosione o l'esplosione, a seconda del loro moto pendolare tra: a) cultura come matrice di rivoluzione; b) politica rivoluzionaria come matrice di cultura rivoluzionaria. E tuttavia, i movimenti e le culture del '68, fermi rimanendo questi loro profondissimi limiti, hanno il merito considerevole di porsi le domande giuste, a cui assai sovente forniscono risposte impercorribili. Tra tutti, uno dei pregi che si lascia più apprezzare è quello di aver prefigurato concettualizzazioni e partizioni più pregnanti delle categorie dell'agire, attraverso le dislocazioni dell'agire comunicativo, dell' agire identificativo e dell'agire dialogico. Tali dislocazioni, pur rimaste grandemente deficitarie sul piano teorico e largamente incompiute su quello pratico, vanno assunte come ineludibili strutture di riferimento critico, per una nuova semantica e una nuova esperienza della libertà e della liberazione43. 4. Crisi e modalità dell'agire Nei paragrafi precedenti, abbiamo passato in veloce rassegna qualcuno dei percorsi caratterizzanti della crisi dell'agire comunicativo e dell'agire identificativo. Ciò ci ha consentito di sospingere le sonde dell'analisi in quel magma in cui la cultura è base fondante e tramite di intercomunicazione contraddittorio e complesso tra identità e crisi. Il che, in ulteriore determinazione, ci ha mostrato, per così dire, "sul campo" come la cultura sia, al tempo stesso, risorsa e fonte di crisi. Proprio questo profilo bifronte della cultura ci induce: a) a non liquidare frettolosamente come catastrofici gli emergenti o stagnanti processi di crisi della cultura contro i quali impattiamo o che subiamo; b) a non celebrare l'apologia acritica della cultura. In tutti e due i casi, l'imperativo permanente è quello di alimentare il campo della creazione e definizione di nuove e più avanzate culture: autoriflessive e capaci di correggersi; suscettibili di rigenerarsi nell'abbraccio con le alterità e diversità; non totalitarie ed universalistiche; disposte a lasciare la scena, allorché il loro tempo scade. Per tenere aperta tale possibilità, una delle condizioni base è approcciarsi in maniera più flessibile e, allo stesso tempo, complessa alla nozione di crisi. Qui forniamo semplicemente l'istantanea del problema Come ci ricorda Morin, due sono i portati euristici immediati e falsamente "ingenui" della crisi: il suo essere (i) rivelatore ed (ii) effettore di una realtà processuale altra e altrimenti non attingibile e non consapevolizzabile44. In questo senso, la crisi è un evento straordinario che: a) rivela il latente, il virtuale, l'invisibile, il possibile e l'incosciente, giocandoli contro il manifesto, il reale, il visibile, l'attuale e il cosciente; b) ha per effetto la trasformazione generale della società, di cui diviene un fulcro decisivo45. Detto ciò, si è detto l'essenziale della genetica, della morfogenesi e dell'epistemologia della 43 Per l'analisi critica dei profili culturali e politici dei movimenti degli anni '60 e '70, si rinvia ai testi richiamati alla nota n. 33. 44 E. Morin, op. cit., p. 191; ma, più in generale, pp. 191-203. Le pagine in questione costituiscono il punto conclusivo ("Per una teoria della crisi") della parte seconda del libro. 45 Ibidem, pp. 191-192. In questo "doppio carattere" del concetto di crisi, Morin legge un'origine marx-freudiana, divenuta poi vera e propria genealogia, col suo trasferirsi e proliferarsi nelle scienze sociali e nelle scienze umane. Nel caso di Marx, per rimanere fermi al "campo sociologico", questo è solo parzialmente vero. In Marx, la crisi non è un dato ontologico che, di per sé e spontaneamente, funge quale fattore modellante della rivoluzione. Essa integra solo una delle condizioni dell'attivazione del processo rivoluzionario, su cui agisce l'opera modellatrice e interventistica della soggettività critica rivoluzionaria. In altri termini, in Marx, la crisi non è l'oggetto della rivoluzione; tantomeno, ne è il soggetto e/o il motore. È la rivoluzione ad essere, per lui, soggetto/oggetto. Per una ricostruzione critica della teoria della rivoluzione in Marx, sia consentito rinviare ad A. Chiocchi, Rivoluzione e conflitto. Categorie politiche, Avellino, Associazione culturale Relazioni, 1995; in particolare, i §§ 3 e 4 del cap. III. 21 - (nozione di) crisi. Ma, prima di addentrarci in questi campi, resta altro da dire: esiste, del pari, un'assiologia della crisi. Nel senso, assai evidente e palpabile, che la crisi, a livello cognitivo ed esistenziale primordiale, prende forma da/e dà forma ad una incertezza dei/sui valori46. L'incertezza si accompagna ineliminabilmente ad una critica dei valori, dando luogo ad un vero e proprio conflitto di valori, il quale altro non è che una delle forme primigenie del conflitto tra identità. In questo caso, la situazione di crisi non nasce tanto dal deperimento dei valori vigenti, quanto dalla critica che viene contro di essi indirizzata. Il che importa, conseguentemente, un movimento critico attivo che, più che subire, agisce la crisi in funzione e in vista del cambiamento, al quale sono collegati ben determinati interessi, aspirazioni, aspettative, tensioni, desideri e pulsioni che investono tutte le sfere dell'essere sociale, individuale e intraindividuale. L'aver spostato l'angolo di osservazione sull'assiologia della crisi ci mette nelle condizioni di acquisire, sul piano euristico e quello epistemologico, che: a) la crisi è uno dei campi specifici del conflitto culturale, politico e sociale; b) il conflitto di valori è un conflitto fra identità e culture differenti, investite o interessate in misura diversa dalla crisi; c) il conflitto critico ha una topologia di senso multidimensionale. Tutti insieme questi fenomeni rivestono una rilevanza cruciale e chiariscono un dato, per solito, sottovalutato: la crisi non è soltanto la causa, ma anche la risultante di un conflitto. Questo significa che come nessuna crisi può venire a capo del conflitto, così nessun conflitto è risolutivo della crisi. Il movimento polare conflitto-crisi-conflitto/crisi-conflitto-crisi caratterizza in permanenza le condizioni della storicità, della socialità, dell'individualità e dell'intersoggettività. Ma ritorniamo al campo più strettamente epistemologico. Come ci rammenta Morin, i Greci attribuiscono a krisis il significato di decisione 47. Il suo significato originario è, dunque, indicativo di certezza che chiarisce l'incertezza; meglio: la crisi è qui quella certezza del decidere, attraverso cui si fuoriesce dalla paralisi dell'indecisione. Essa non è, pertanto, solo diagnosi; ma anche prognosi. Non è solo prognosi, ma anche strategia attiva che sorregge una prassi e intorno cui la teoria stessa deve misurarsi. Il senso del concetto di crisi è, così, di natura poliassorbente e polivalente, fin dall'inizio greco. Diversamente da quanto a tutta prima potrebbe sembrare, la polisemia del concetto di crisi sta rintanata fin dentro il suo significato originario di decisione. Niente come la decisione richiama la unitarietà e la contestualità di teoria e prassi, diagnosi e prognosi, previsione e azione. La sostanza dispiegata della decisione è: "decidere qualcosa su qualcosa". Ciò indica che la decisione è pensata ed agita; vale a dire: essa si fa e si volge nell'unità di pensiero ed azione, riflettendo e intervenendo su universi reali micro o macro, di cui propone assetti, significati e relazioni in contrasto con quelli esistenti. La certezza del processo del decidere non può mai essere assimilata come invarianza delle costanti del decidere, nel senso di assegnare alla decisione regolarità e tonalità performative in via ultimativa. La decisione stessa è un che di plastico, di fluido che, così come manca spesso i suoi bersagli, non ha fondazioni euristiche, cognitive ed epistemologiche certe. Dunque, krisis come decisione è, ben lungi, dal significare decisione come risoluzione. Al contrario, la decisione è l'atto/pensiero che più di ogni altro è sballottato nei flutti degli eventi e accadimenti impredicibili dell'esistente e del vivente. E questo è vero proprio a partire dai Greci: la decisione critica si oppone alle incertezze, ma non le elimina; più propriamente, le rielabora, conferendo loro senso. Presso i Greci, soprattutto nell'età arcaica, la decisione non è mai sospensiva e risolutiva del mistero e dell'incerto; anzi, ad essi si avviluppa profondamente, attraverso il mito e le sue figure. A ben vedere, la medesima ratio della krisis/decisione è fortemente impregnata 46 Coglie questo elemento, pur se su un percorso di ricerca sociologica su base fondamentalmente (se non esclusivamente) filosofica, N. Abbagnano, Problemi di sociologia, Torino, Taylor, 1967, p. 79 ss. Per Abbagnano, la cultura contemporanea è, per definizione, "cultura della crisi" (Su questo "topos", cfr. M. Cacciari, Krisis, Milano, Feltrinelli, 1976). Da qui quell'aporia dei valori che sospingerebbe l'uomo in un spazio storico in cui la sua vita individuale e sociale perderebbe ogni protezione, in quanto "nessuno dei valori che... può assumere a sua guida e mettere a base della sua formazione sfugge alla negazione o alla possibilità della negazione" (p. 79). L'aporia dei valori qui è solo una componente interna al fluire del più generale processo delle aporie dell'educazione; le altre due determinazioni di questo processo sarebbero l'aporia della comunicazione e l'aporia della tecnica (cfr. pp. 75-83). 47 E. Morin, op. cit., p. 192. 22 di razionalità mitologica, a partire dal richiamo alle figure mitopoietiche degli eroi tragici che, invariabilmente, si trovano presentificati in ogni poro dell'atto decisionale e decisionista. La dinamica decisionale, dunque, non si lascia perforare da analisi ermeneutiche di dettaglio e non coincide con i comportamenti sociali e/o individuali esterni che la modulano. Che, a seguito di un processo decisionale, si dia sempre una modalità determinata (o, meglio, differenti modalità determinate storicamente) di comportamento non significa che tra comportamento sociale e decisione si dia una relazione di corrispondenza lineare. E questo lo sanno soprattutto i Greci. È, piuttosto, all'alba della modernità che si tenta di stringere in un flusso unilineare il legame decisione/comportamento, assumendo la razionalità come anima potente del linguaggio scientifico, della comunicazione sociale e della relazione politica. Al punto che la sovranità diviene la chiave di volta della decisione, in quell'universo politico che da Bodin e Hobbes si spinge fino a tutto Schmitt e il decisionismo post-schmittiano. Non diverso (anzi) il caso delle scienze giuridiche, per le quali decidere assume il significato precipuo di discriminare tra due ipotesi/realtà, selezionando la soluzione corretta, la quale è una e una soltanto. I Greci sapevano, invece, che decisione è opzione tra possibilità indecidibili con i meri strumenti razionali: ecco perché è la nozione di krisis che va a connotarla. Ancora: nell'universo concettuale dei Greci l'opzione tra possibilità differenti non è sciolta mai una volta per tutte, poiché sempre è data la "possibilità" (appunto) non solo del ritorno alla/e della situazione ante, ma anche dell'approdo a possibilità impreviste. Questo movimento dialettico è dato coglierlo perfino nella parmenidea ontologia dell'essere e nel principio di non-contraddizione aristotelico. Nel caso di Parmenide, è proprio il dualismo irricomponibile essere/non essere che sospinge ogni dato sensibile, ogni enunciato concettuale e ogni realtà effettuale, appunto per "essere", nel vortice della mutazione, in un ininterrotto fluire per tutti gli stadi della loro evoluzione. Se consideriamo il principio di non-contraddizione formulato da Aristotele, poi, ci accorgiamo agevolmente che il fatto che A=A e solo ad A, apre la possibilità dell'esistenza di B e solo di B e, di conseguenza, di infinite altre entità e identità, aprendo, tra l'altro, il campo della plurisignificazione linguistica. Il senso più profondo che va attribuito al concetto di crisi e che è, in larga parte, un'inferenza dalla nozione di krisis (= decisione) dei Greci ci pare sia questo: nessuna decisione può essere risolutiva del conflitto. Meglio ancora: ogni decisione è sempre, in positivo o in negativo: a) riformulazione di un conflitto; b) rielaborazione delle motivazioni dei soggetti in conflitto e, per questa via, rimodulazione delle loro posizioni. Se così stanno le cose, non è dato opporre un concetto di krisis quale decisione (presso i Greci) ad un altro di krisis quale indecisione (dal XX secolo in avanti)48. Nel concetto di krisis, le determinazioni della decisione e dell'indecisione si coappartengono, proprio perché è nella straordinarietà della crisi che si disvelano in maniera concentrata le motivazioni e i soggetti del conflitto. La crisi non è deterministicamente il catalizzatore della trasformazione sociale e il metabolizzatore del conflitto culturale. Più propriamente, è essa stessa una determinazione interna della trasformazione e del conflitto. E lo è in un duplice senso, data la contestualità bidirezionale del suo senso e del suo segno: a) agendo/reagendo verso la conservazione dello status quo e/o il cambiamento emancipatorio; b) manipolando e veicolando il conflitto culturale in termini di pluralismo e apertura all'Altro e/o di emarginazione ed esclusione dell'Altro. Niente come la crisi disvela le polarità escludenti dell'agire emarginativo e le incongruenze dell'agire comunicativo. Niente come la crisi pone all'ordine del giorno la necessità del passaggio all'agire identificativo. Niente più della crisi sottolinea i limiti interni allo stesso agire identificativo e pone l'indifferibilità del salto all'agire dialogico. Sicché possiamo lecitamente concludere: la crisi si qualifica propriamente per aprire e mantenere aperte tutte le modalità dell'agire. 48 Questa posizione è esemplarmente e acutamente sviluppata da E. Morin, op. cit., p. 193 ss. 23 Cap . II EMARGINAZIONE DA CIVILIZZAZIONE 0. Premessa Il concetto di emarginazione ha un profilo a più facce, nel senso che incrocia e connette vari campi di esperienza e ambiti disciplinari tra i quali non sussistono relazioni lineari. Più che un campo definitorio, il concetto di emarginazione approssima e disegna una mappa concettuale smossa, sottoposta a continue modificazioni, strappi e innesti. Ancora più complessa e di difficile decifrazione è la situazione sul piano storico-empirico. In linea generale, l'emarginazione è considerata fattore e/o funzione, se non addirittura effetto, di un contesto storico-culturale più ampio che la determina e, nello stesso tempo, la "periferizza" nella scala delle gerarchie di valore e dei processi decisionali. Secondo alcuni approcci classici, la matrice modellante fondamentale dell'emarginazione starebbe nella struttura economica; per altri, nel sistema politico; per altri ancora, nei sistemi di simbo-lizzazione e codificazione culturale; e così via. Approcci successivi e più sofisticati, invece, assumono che la matrice modellante abbia un carattere multidimensionale, nel senso che i reticoli motivazionali dell'emarginazione starebbero nell'intreccio indissolubile delle matrici causali prima esposte. Ora, indipendentemente dalla varietà delle analisi e dei loro risultati, tutti questi approcci appaiono accomunati da un limite strutturale di natura epistemologica: essi concepiscono l'emarginazione sempre e solo come precipitato "residuato" da processi di "primo ordine" e giammai come rete causale che interagisce con i processi di "primo ordine", concorrendo a determinarne la morfogenesi. In altri termini, si tende a considerare l'emarginazione più un mero risultato ultimo che (anche) una causa agente. Ad essa, pertanto, viene attribuita un' identità di seconda natura, ricavata esclusivamente per differenza negativa, senza alcuna autonomia poietica. Da queste angolazioni, l'emarginazione appare essere semplicemente "ciò che resta fuori": o, meglio, quello che la razionalità funzionale dei "processi centrali" (economici, sociali, politici, culturali, simbolici, ecc.) centrifuga ed espelle dalle condotte di senso dominanti, per il mantenimento e il consolidamento dell'equilibrio sistemico. Tra i vari paradigmi dell'emarginazione in competizione \sussiste, dunque, un accordo involontario e non consapevolizzato che si annida nella struttura profonda dell'epistemologia dei concetti e dei significati. È solo "dopo", sulla sovrastante rete delle descrizioni e degli enunciati linguistici, che si irradiano le differenziazioni, anche antagonistiche, tra i diversi approcci. Tutto, in gran parte, ruota sui giudizi di valore che si formulano sui "fenomeni centrali" e/o sui "fenomeni emarginati". Se è al "centro" che è allocato il "positivo" (della società, del sistema politico e dei sistemi culturali), ne discende che l'emarginazione ha un valore interamente ed esclusivamente negativo; al contrario, se è "fuori dal centro" che è allocato il "positivo" (della società, del sistema politico e dei sistemi culturali), con tutta evidenza, l'emarginazione diventa "posizione" da difendere e valorizzare. Sussiste, infine, un approccio intermedio: quello che, confermando il posizionamento delle "allocazioni di valore" al "centro", sostiene la necessità di un trasloco dell'emarginazione dalla "periferia" verso il "centro", attraverso un processo di ribaltamento posizionale dei valori, dei ruoli e delle funzioni. Nello schema descrittivo che abbiamo appena tratteggiato, si riconosceranno agevolmente, pur non avendoli nominati direttamente, i vari approcci teorici e indirizzi politici con cui è stata interpretata e classificata l'emarginazione. Ci confronteremo con essi, formulando in positivo il nostro discorso, anziché passarne dettagliatamente in rassegna l'architettura concettuale. Tra tutte le situazioni che costantemente l'emarginazione incrocia, la marginalità è, certamente, quella che appare avere la maggiore rilevanza. Ciò anche perché, spesso, i due fenomeni si trovano combinati in una soluzione simbiotica ad alto tasso di differenziazione interna. A sua volta, la marginalità fa da pendant con altre non meno irrilevanti fenomenologie/patologie, quali la povertà, la devianza, la criminalità. In questo capitolo, cercheremo di approssimare, in primo luogo, la mappa concettuale erratica dell'emarginazione, tentando di far emergere con nettezza sia il suo profilo poliforme, sia la sua doppia natura di "prodotto agito" e "causa agente". 24 - Rinviamo al prossimo capitolo, invece, la discussione del tema emarginazione/marginalità. 1. Civilizzazione come stratificazione di emarginazione e diseguaglianza Assumiamo come primo punto di partenza elastico della nostra esplorazione storica e concettuale la formazione dell'epoca moderna; vale a dire, quel processo che segna l'oltrepassamento della civiltà medioevale e l'incubazione di quei tratti specifici che si è soliti designare come "moderni". Si tratta, in breve, del più significativo, se non epocale, processo storico di differenziazione sociale e culturale che: a) segna delle nette e irreversibili linee di frattura rispetto all'universo antico paganocristiano che dalla polis greca (e prima) si prolunga all'impero romano fino a tutta la "respublica christiana" del Medioevo e le lotte tra "poteri temporali" e "poteri religiosi"; b) accompagna e, in un certo senso, determina la formazione degli Stati nazionali e la rivoluzione dei paradigmi scientifici, culturali e politici della classicità paganocristiana. In genere, la nozione di modernità è stata assunta come sinonimo di progresso e civilizzazione. Conseguenzialmente, ciò che è messo "ai margini" dal suo incedere ed estendersi è stato connotato in senso negativo, se non dispregiativo. Il concetto di emarginazione ha, dunque, l'ancestrale e non detto significato di "incivile". Ciò che è escluso ed emarginato dai selettori automatici della civilizzazione non viene ritenuto degno di "sviluppo" e, se sopravvive, "merita" di essere sospinto in una posizione periferica, sempre meno influente e sempre più indigente sul piano culturale e materiale. Il processo di civilizzazione di cui stiamo parlando ha, pertanto, recitato due ruoli distinti, ma complementari: a) ha teso a globalizzare gli stili di vita, le culture, i costumi e i modelli di razionalità da esso veicolati e diffusi; b) ha inteso neutralizzare e colonizzare, dal piano culturale a quello politico, codici, soggetti, comportamenti, tradizioni, visioni della vita e del mondo non riconducibili alle sue logiche di funzionamento e di estensione. Soltanto con il sopravvenire dei primi elementi interni di saturazione simbolica e culturale, tale processo viene sottoposto a censure. È, questa, la fase che segna la competizione sfrenata tra gli Stati nazionali per la conquista coloniale dei "nuovi mondi" e che, tra XV e XVII secolo, ridisegna i confini politici e culturali del pianeta. Ancora: è, questo, il periodo della formulazione delle prime utopie, le quali confutano costumi, culture e imperativi politici dei "popoli civilizzati", collocando il perfettibile socio-umano in un altrove spaziale che va ruotando proprio intorno ai "nuovi mondi" colonizzati1. Sotto la forma dell'utopico, l'emarginato e il rimosso ritornano in scena come fulcro di una diversa architettura degli affetti umani e delle relazioni socio-politiche. Ma è tra il XVII e XVIII secolo, con l'irrompere dei primi embrioni di quella cultura illuministica che si va caratterizzando in termini egualitari, che il teatro di senso del processo di civilizzazione conosce i suoi più rilevanti livelli di deflagrazione interna: a) dalle satire sferzanti sulla "civiltà delle buone maniere" (dai "Viaggi di Gulliver" di Swift" alla "Favola delle api" di Mandeville); b) alle utopie del "buon selvaggio" (dal mito russoviano al "Robinson" di D. Defoe). Si va delineando un nuovo sistema culturale di riferimento che, seppure non ancora in forma compiuta e coerente, subisce criticamente il processo di civilizzazione, il quale, dopo alcuni secoli di dispiegamento, rivela pienamente il suo profilo bifronte: a) portatore di eguaglianza per i soggetti/valori che include, a partire dai soggetti/valori che lo decidono e governano; b) distributore e diffusore di diseguaglianza per i soggetti/valori esclusi ed emarginati. 1 Tommaso Moro scrive la sua Utopia nel 1516; Campanella, la Città del Sole, nel 1602. In queste due opere, l'utopia ha solo una ridislocazione spaziale e non anche temporale: Moro colloca "Utopia" in un' isola sperduta contrapposta alla Europa civilizzata e razionalizzata; Campanella, la "Città del Sole" nell' isola di Ceylon. È con la Nuova Atlandide (scritta nel 1621 e pubblicata postuma nel 1627) di F. Bacone che l'utopia diviene un altrove anche sul piano temporale. 25 - L'eguaglianza acquisisce un carattere inclusivo e si rivela essere una particolare modalità di integrazione distributiva, attorno ad un nucleo centrale di valori, princípi e modelli di razionalità, gestiti e protetti dai nuovi soggetti culturali, politici ed economici della modernità. Ma l'integrazione distributiva non solo si regge sull'emarginazione escludente; ne viene, a sua volta, fortemente modellata: l'emarginazione è un architrave attivo del ridisegno (sempre più) restrittivo della mappa dei diritti, dei valori, dei princípi e delle culture. Il processo di civilizzazione non solo emargina e discrimina, ma allarga e diffonde le scale della diseguaglianza: è sull'emarginazione e sulla diseguaglianza che vengono scritte le tavole dei diritti diseguali, in tutte le sfere dell'essere e dell'agire socio-umano. Non appare, pertanto, strano che siano state le "teorie della diseguaglianza" a dedicare un' attenzione tutta particolare ai temi dell'emarginazione, a principiare dall'approccio comparativo. Nell'albero genealogico di tale indirizzo, un posto di rilievo spetta a Rousseau, per il quale, come è noto, la diseguaglianza è di origine sociale; essendo gli uomini tutti eguali in natura2. Registriamo qui una singolare confluenza col pensiero di Hobbes, per il quale, come è parimenti noto, le condizioni di civilizzazione sociale sono portatrici di grandi diseguaglianze3. Ne discende che lo stato di diseguaglianza è uno status sociale; mentre lo stato di natura è lo status dell'eguaglianza. Conferendo maggiore rigore analitico e capillarità storica alla nostra indagine, possiamo, pertanto, dire: a) lo stato di diseguaglianza si accompagna allo stato della civilizzazione moderna; b) l'emarginazione che deriva dalla diseguaglianza non è che un portato del processo di civilizzazione coniugato dalla modernità. Non è ancora tutto: il processo di civilizzazione moderna, producendo e riproducendo diseguaglianza/emarginazione, è esso stesso determinato e plasmato dalle forme della diseguaglianza e dell'emarginazione. Per l'assetto sistemico di una data formazione socio-politicoculturale, la diseguaglianza e l'emarginazione giocano un ruolo decisivo: a) a partire dall'allocazione posizionale dei valori, dei princípi e delle ricchezze; b) per finire con i meccanismi di regolazione politica delle macchine di potere e di controllo imputate allo Stato e ai dispositivi di governo istituzionale ed extraistituzionale della società e della comunità. Ma il processo di civilizzazione produce emarginazione come diseguaglianza, anche per l'innegabile circostanza che progetta e materializza un processo di stratificazione sociale. La civilizzazione moderna ha di specifico un progetto/processo di stratificazione che alle "società di corte", alle "monarchie assolute" e all'"ancien régime" ha progressivamente sostituito la "società industriale" e lo "Stato borghese". Da questo punto di vista, la rivoluzione americana e quella francese non sono limitatamente un "punto di svolta" del processo di civilizzazione iniziato intorno al XV secolo; rappresentano anche la continuazione di quel processo, alla luce delle nuove condizioni storiche. Per molti versi, anzi, le rivoluzioni americana e francese portano a coronamento esemplare alcune forme e alcuni codici della modernità, realizzandoli storicamente e culturalmente: si pensi, solo per far qualche esempio, ai princípi di razionalità scientifica ed esclusione politica incarnati dal capitalismo nascente e dallo Stato borghese in formazione; all'approfondimento dell'occidentalizzazione del pianeta; al primato degli interessi forti; ecc. Ciò è elemento rilevatore di come il processo di civilizzazione proceda non solo per salti discontinui, ma anche attraverso profonde linee di continuità. L'approfondirsi dei processi e dei sistemi di stratificazione sociale mette in forma e denuncia curve espansive di emarginazione e diseguaglianza. Si può dire: con il complessificarsi del processo di civilizzazione, i sistemi di stratificazione si fanno sempre più capillari, fungendo quale fattore della crescita dell' emarginazione e della diseguaglianza. L'intreccio di emarginazione/diseguaglianza/stratificazione inizia a descrivere le sue curve apicali proprio con la formazione e lo sviluppo della società capitalistica, da un lato, e il consolidamento dello Stato borghese, dall'altro. Marx ha colto magistralmente alcune delle linee di fondo di questo processo; anche se, poi, ne ha derivato teorie che hanno teso ad attribuire all'alienazione economica e alla conquista del potere politico un ruolo in ultima istanza determinante, finendo, 2 Sul punto, di J. J. Rousseau rilevano particolarmente Il contratto sociale (a cura di V. Gerratana), Torino, Einaudi, 1966; Discorso sull'origine e i fondamenti dell'ineguaglianza fra gli uomini, Roma, Editori Riuniti, 1968. 3 Cfr. T. Hobbes, Il Leviatano, Firenze, La Nuova Italia, 1976; Id., Opere politiche, Torino, Utet, 1959. 26 così : a) con il trascurare altri e non meno fondamentali fattori: da quello culturale a quello simbolico a quello esistenziale, ecc; b) con l'opporre ad un'analisi sociale segmentale una teoria politica centrica 4. Il processo di civilizzazione stratifica per emarginare e discriminare ed, emarginando e discriminando, allarga le sfere della stratificazione, aumentando le distanze e le disparità tra le varie "posizioni" e i vari "status" che classi e soggetti occupano nell'architettura sociale e nell'ordine simbolico-culturale. Se la stratificazione è/e diventa una condizione dell'emarginazione e della diseguaglianza, è esattamente perché emarginazione e diseguaglianza sono i presupposti forti della stratificazione. Quanto più una società è emarginante e diseguale, tanto più stratifica; quanto più stratifica, tanto più emargina e discrimina. Tutto ciò avviene all'interno di/e rimodella una relazione sinergica, in virtù della cui morfogenesi non si registrano meri mutamenti di quantità, ma si originano delle vere e proprie metamorfosi delle qualità sociali del processo di civilizzazione e della qualità sociale della vita associata e dei singoli. Appuntando la nostra attenzione sulla stratificazione, quindi, non centriamo semplicemente l'analisi sulle "gerarchie di status", trascorrendo verso una lettura più puntuale della dinamica di organizzazione/distribuzione del potere5. Piuttosto, conferiamo globalità e, insieme, capillarità alla indagine, non limitandoci a centrare bersagli investigativi unilateralmente determinati. Ciò consente di sottoporre a scandaglio, con maggiore cognizione di causa: a) gli effetti delle decisioni e delle azioni del potere sulle variabili di classe e di razza; b) il combinato plurifattoriale delle motivazioni etico-culturali e simboliche delle azioni e delle decisioni; c) i mezzi e gli assetti organizzativi che ruotano intorno alle decisioni e alle azioni. Ora, gli esseri che vivono in società, in comunità, in gruppo o in solitudine discriminano fra le cose e le persone, assoggettando le une e le altre alla valutazione. Il principio di valutazione è, pertanto, una delle molle segrete che regolano la diseguaglianza, la stratificazione e, dunque, l'emarginazione. Questo principio è strettamente connaturato ai codici della modernità, come abbiamo avuto modo di segnalare; non è, quindi, una mera categoria inferibile dai processi di differenziazione funzional-sistemica, senza, con questo, voler nulla togliere al, pur innovativo, contributo di definizione categoriale elaborato da Parsons6. Ma valutare non è ancora sufficiente: è necessario organizzare le valutazioni in maniera stringente. Se il principio di valutazione costituisce la prima caratteristica di ogni società, l'organizzazione ne costituisce la seconda. Vediamone le implicazioni. Il principio di organizzazione implica che la titolarità dell'esercizio del potere e delle funzioni di dominio sia imputata a pochi. Mentre le decisioni vincolanti si riverberano su tutti, il potere di decidere si concentra nelle mani di pochi. Ciò, come è facilmente intuibile, introduce forti elementi di discriminazione e, dunque, crea strutture organizzative stratificate, specializzate nella creazione di disuguaglianza. Sicché si è potuto concludere: a) se il principio di valutazione e il principio di organizzazione sono coessenziali all'esistenza delle società moderne, b) ne consegue che essi sono il fondamento dell'ordine e della coesione sociale 7. 4 Per l'analisi della stratificazione e della diseguaglianza in Marx, il luogo focale continua ad essere Il Capitale, Libri I-III, Torino, Einaudi, 1976. 5 Questo rimane ancora l'orizzonte di A. Béteille, a cui va, peraltro, riconosciuto un notevole merito nel rinnovamento degli studi della stratificazione e dell'emarginazione: cfr. A. Béteille, (ed.), Social Inequality Selected Readings, London, Harmondswort, 1969; nell'antologia curata da Béteille si segnala il saggio di R. Dahrendorf, On the Origin of Inequality among Men. 6 Cfr. T. Parsons, Il sistema sociale, Milano, Comu-nità, 1965; Id., La struttura dell'azione sociale, Bologna, Il Mulino, 19703. Per la discussione di quest'ultima opera di Parsons, calata nel dibattito culturale e scientifico dell'epoca, si rinvia ad A. Petrillo, Saperi a confronto. Talcott Parsons e Michel Foucault, Avellino, Associazione culturale Relazioni, 1995; segnatamente, il cap. I. 7 È, questo, un principio cardine e universale della sociologia contemporanea, soprattutto di quella più marcatamente elogiativa dei princípi e delle prassi del liberalismo (prima) e della democrazia rappresentativa (dopo): cfr., per tutti, G. Sarpellon, Emarginazione e dinamiche sociali, "Animazione sociale", n. 1, 1988. 27 - Ma la conclusione è valida solo entro certi limiti. Resta da aggiungere – e non è poco – che ordine e coesione sociale si riverberano nel loro opposto: diseguaglianza, discriminazione sociale ed emarginazione. Ogni modello di ordine e di coesione, pertanto, non solo è risoluzione del "caos" e del "disordine"; ma anche e soprattutto si regge su gerarchie valutative e strutture organizzative che riproducono relazioni diseguali e discriminanti, le quali vengono stratificate e gerarchizzate socialmente. A partire dalla formazione e dallo sviluppo dell'industrialismo, attraverso i selettori e gli automatismi della stratificazione, l'emarginazione e la diseguaglianza vengono socializzate; vale a dire: diffuse, capillarizzate e legittimate dal piano sociale a quello politico e simbolico-culturale. Al potere (valutazione) e alla posizione sociale (organizzazione) corrispondono degli status di carattere simbolico, gerarchico, politico ed economico, i quali ruotano attorno a mappe di valori. Ora, tali valori sono diffusi dalla valutazione e cristallizzati dall'organizzazione. I meccanismi di comando/obbedienza (sociale e intraindividuale) sono regolati da questi inputs e outputs. Allora, fino a quando la vita sociale sarà imperniata sul principio della valutazione e sul principio dell'organizzazione, il problema della diseguaglianza e della stratificazione si porrà come un rompicapo insolubile8. Ad un esito differente pervengono gli approcci weberiani e neoweberiani9 e quelli funzionalisti10. È largamente noto che Weber parta dalla distinzione tra (i) potere politico, (ii) classe economica e (iii) status sociale. Vediamo lo schema che è implicito in questa tripartizione: a) l'ordine economico comprende le classi; b) l'ordine sociale comprende gli status; c) l'ordine politico comprende i partiti. In Weber, la stratificazione sociale ha una scala tridimensionale, poiché è la risultante complessa delle interazioni e variazioni che si danno tra ordine economico, ordine sociale ed ordine politico. I soggetti entrano in conflitto, si differenziano e cooperano, a seconda delle modalità attraverso cui potere (politico), classe (economica) e status (sociale) interagiscono. Se la scala della stratificazione ha questa interattività tridimensionale, ne consegue che l'emarginazione, al di là delle intenzioni inclusive dell'approccio, rappresenta il fondo della scala11. Da qui si ingenera una situazione conflittuale. Il conflitto, ora, ammette una pluralità di soggetti e una pluralità di temi posizionali: si distribuisce lungo tutta quanta la scala della stratificazione sociale, non più, come nella teoria marxista, ai due poli dello schieramento di classe (borghesia/proletariato). E su questo singolo punto, certamente, il discorso di Weber è più avanzato di quello di Marx. Il modello di Weber è stato complessificato per linee interne da variegate teorie (neo-weberiane) della stratificazione sociale. Seguiamone il percorso, partendo dai punti di comunanza. Come già in Weber, si ritiene che una società non è semplicemente differenziata; essa è anche stratificata. Cioè: le differenze sociali e individuali esprimono anche diseguaglianze ingenerate dalla diversificazione dei processi di appropriazione e gestione delle risorse, a loro volta, regolati da una catena di interessi conflittuali. Va ricordato che, in Weber, il "gruppo di status" si forma intorno alle reti di relazione dell'identità, dell'appartenenza, della coscienza sociale, degli stili di vita, dei valori condivisi, ecc. Per dirla marxianamente, il gruppo di status weberiano costituisce un caso di "classe per sé". Dal punto di vista weberiano, ancora, sarebbe il gruppo di status, non già la classe (e/o la sua avanguardia organizzata), ad essere portatore della leniniana "coscienza di classe". 8 A questa conclusione, realisticamente e onestamente, perviene lo stesso Béteille, op. cit. 9 Di M. Weber, sul punto, rileva Economia e società, Milano, Comunità, 1974. L'approccio neoweberiano dà luogo ad impostazioni diverisificate che trovano i loro maggiori esponenti in G. Lensky, Power and Privilege: A Theory of Stratification, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1966; W. G. Runciman, Ineguaglianza e coscienza sociale, Torino, Einaudi, 1972; J. Turner, Societal Stratification: A Teoretical Analysis, New York, Columbia Un. Press, 1984. 10 Rilievo particolare ha il discorso di T. Parsons: Sistemi di società, I. Le società tradizionali, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1971; Sistemi di società, II. Le società moderne, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1973. Vanno, parimenti, considerati i contributi di Davis, Moore, Tumin e altri contenuti in S. M. Lipset-R. Bendix (a cura di), Classe potere e status, I. Teorie sulla struttura di classe, Padova, Marsilio, 1969. 11 Il dato è, con acume, colto da G. Sarpellon, op. cit., p. 10. 28 - Ora, le teorie della stratificazione sociale hanno, in prevalenza, il limite di descrivere, attraverso il ricorso alle categorie, piuttosto che esplicare, attraverso la precisazione socioempirica delle condizioni dei diversi tipi e gradi di diseguaglianza12. Due sono i modelli principali: a) il modello pionieristico di Lensky13; b) l'analisi multidimensionale di Turner14. Cominciamo con Turner, il cui approccio è definibile come teoria del possesso delle risorse. Egli elabora un modello articolato su sei dimensioni, in luogo di quello tridimensionale di Weber. Vediamolo in schema: a) concentrazione della ricchezza materiale; b) formazione di gruppi culturali; c) distribuzione del prestigio; d) formazione di gruppi culturali omogenei; e) classificazione in base allo status dei gruppi culturali; f) mobilità sociale. Per parte sua, Lensky elabora una teoria della distribuzione della ricchezza a mezzo del potere. Secondo Lensky, la ripartizione generale della ricchezza si articola in due filoni principali: a) la ricchezza necessaria per mantenere in vita la popolazione, distribuita secondo il bisogno; il che garantisce la vita di una quota della popolazione che altrimenti morirebbe; b) il surplus che eccede la quantità minima necessaria: quanto maggiore è il surplus tanto più ampia è la stratificazione sociale. Attribuzione, appropriazione e redistribuzione del surplus rientrano direttamente nelle sfere di attribuzione ed esercizio del potere. Come sostiene Collins, nel modello comparativo di Lensky, l'ineguaglianza è determinata da due fattori: a) la dimensione del surplus economico; b) la concentrazione del potere15. Le società che maggiormente stratificano diseguaglianza sono quelle che, attraverso tecnologie produttive via via più avanzate, estraggono quote crescenti di surplus. La civilizzazione, da questo punto di vista, è stata la transizione progressiva da società meno stratificate e diseguali a società più stratificate e diseguali; ma non è questa la conclusione di Lensky. Considerando la "lunga durata" storica, Lensky configura il passaggio tra "formazioni sociali" così idealtipicizzate: (i) caccia e pesca; (ii) orticoltura; (iii) agricoltura; (iv) industria. Secondo lui, nella transizione da una formazione sociale all'altra, il surplus economico, la diseguaglianza della ricchezza e la concentrazione del potere procederebbero secondo tre curve diverse. Nel dettaglio: a) la curva del surplus economico andrebbe crescendo costantemente; b) quella della diseguaglianza della ricchezza si incrementa nelle fasi che vanno dalla "caccia e pesca" all'"orticoltura" ed "agricoltura"; mentre tenderebbe a scendere nel passaggio dall'"agricoltura" all'"industria"; c) quella della concentrazione del potere tocca i suoi valori massimi nel passaggio dall' orticoltura all'agricoltura, mentre si va assestando verso il basso nel passaggio successivo dall'"agricoltura" all'"industria". Meno rigido ed "ottimista" il modello di Turner, per il quale la concentrazione del potere cresce anche nella fase industriale. Passiamo ora ad esaminare come le teorie della stratificazione si innestano sul ceppo del funzionalismo. Come ben si sa, per il funzionalismo la società è retta da un sistema di disuguaglianze, le quali avrebbero, però, una funzione positiva. La conseguenza immediata rilevante è la seguente: il problema non è eliminare la diseguaglianza, ma farla funzionare correttamente e razionalmente. Alcuni correttivi a questo asserto teorico di fondo, sono apportati dalle innovazioni intro- 12 Per questa linea critica, cfr. più diffusamente R. Collins, Teorie sociologiche, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1992, pp. 196-207. 13 G. Lensky, op. cit. 14 J. Turner, op. cit. 15 R. Collins, op. cit., p. 198. 29 dotte in questi filoni dai contributi prima citati di Davis, Moore e Tumin. Secondo questi studiosi, ogni società ha un suo funzionamento specifico; ma, per poter funzionare, deve assicurarsi che i compiti su cui si impernia vengano svolti adeguatamente e razionalmente. A tal fine, è necessario: a) distribuire razionalmente i membri della società; b) motivarli a svolgere bene i compiti loro affidati. Ogni posizione articola dei compiti; attorno ai compiti si sviluppa una raggiera di motivazioni sufficienti. Le persone (più) capaci debbono, dunque, svolgere i compiti (più) importanti. Ecco, in sintesi, il sillogismo cognitivo e metodologico su cui si regge l'indirizzo qui in esame. Ne discende che differenziato non è soltanto il sistema delle motivazioni; ma anche il sistema delle ricompense. In questo modo, la diseguaglianza viene individuata e fatta fungere quale meccanismo di ottimizzazione permanente dell'equilibrio sociale. Essa viene assunta e metabolizzata come un automatismo funzionale agente a livello non consapevolizzato. Attraverso questo automatismo, l'ordine sociale si assicurerebbe che le posizioni più importanti siano ricondotte sotto la responsabilità delle persone più qualificate. Come si può vedere, l'istanza meritocratica, combinandosi con quella efficientistica, va saldandosi con forti pulsioni tecnocratiche. In questo approccio, la diseguaglianza viene assunta come un selettore di efficienza tecnica, qualora si ponga la società intera sotto il controllo posizionale delle responsabilità più meritevoli ed efficienti. Ma i processi di selezione e stratificazione non sono semplificabili in questo modo. Innanzitutto, risulta ben chiaro che una diseguaglianza sociale, così istituzionalizzata, ha degli effetti controintenzionali che ne minano la razionalità interna e gli schemi teleologici. L'istituzionalizzazione della diseguaglianza, difatti, finisce con il fungere come un meccanismo bloccato che ostacola la mobilità sociale (all'interno di ogni funzione e competenza e tra le varie funzioni e competenze), disfunzionandola. L'istituzionalizzazione della diseguaglianza funge quale ostacolo alla libera circolazione delle persone tra le varie posizioni sociali16. Si ingenera, dunque, una struttura di relazioni sociali squilibrate. Intanto, viene meno la garanzia della mobilità razionale tra una posizione/funzione e l'altra. Inoltre, la distribuzione dei vantaggi/benefici avviene secondo una scala sperequativa. Tutte e due le risultanze retroagiscono proprio contro quel meccanismo di allocazione dei più capaci nelle posizioni a maggior coefficiente di responsabilità, da cui il modello fa muovere le sue analisi e le sue proposte operative. Proprio a fronte di tali limiti ed aporie, l'approccio conflittualista della marxiana lotta di classe mantiene la sua rilevanza, pur con le inadeguatezze cui si è fatto cenno. Per Marx e il marxismo, come è largamente noto, gli effetti della diseguaglianza, dell'emarginazione e della stratificazione sono rimuovibili unicamente eliminandone la causa; vale a dire: la struttura economica, sociale e politica capitalistica. Lo schema cognitivo e argomentativo di base è il seguente: a) se dalla struttura derivano conflitti sociali; b) se tale struttura è strategicamente immodificabile per linee interne; c) la risoluzione dei conflitti sociali e, dunque, della diseguaglianza e dell'emarginazione può avvenire soltanto eliminando la struttura, costruendone un'altra di segno e senso alternativi Come fa notare Marx e non dimenticano i suoi migliori eredi, i conflitti sociali e politici hanno come posta (anche) l'appropriazione e la distribuzione delle risorse, per un superamento della situazione di diseguaglianza sociale provocata dal capitalismo17. Nella posta in gioco del conflitto va, dunque, inserita anche la conquista delle istituzioni che presiedono all'assegnazione dei vantaggi e dei benefici (non solo materiali, ma anche simbolici). Osserva pertinentemente Parkin che tali sistemi istituzionali non comprendono unicamente organismi politici e strutture governative formali, ma anche sottosistemi produttivi, culturali, educativi e formativi, intorno cui si incardinano le agenzie della socializzazione. I quali sottosistemi sono strettamente interrelati alle genzie istituzionali (amministrative, giuridiche e normative) che elaborano/impongono le leggi dello Stato e, con 16 Ancora una volta, il fenomeno è puntualmente colto da G. Sarpellon, op. cit., p. 9. 17 Sul punto, è particolarmente meritevole di attenzione il discorso di F. Parkin, Disuguaglianza di classe e ordinamento politico. La stratificazione nelle società capitalistiche e comuniste, Torino, Enaudi, 1976. 30 questo , la sua autorità, legalità e legittimità. Possiamo, a questo punto, procedere alla disamina delle determinanti concettuali polifunzionali dell'emarginazione. Sono stati, allo scopo, definiti degli indicatori generali di riferimento. Vediamoli: a) precarietà dei ruoli; b) mancata o insufficiente interiorizzazione delle norme culturali societarie e/delle norme subculturali tipiche di una classe, di un ceto, di un ruolo; c) lontananza dal centro della società; o meglio: da ciascuno dei suoi centri concentrici che elaborano, delimitano e istituzionalizzano stabilità strutturali, ruoli, culture e gerarchie; d) percezione della mancanza di: i) tutela istituzionale (sindacato); i) canalizzazione espressiva (partiti, sindacati, gruppi di pressione); e) consapevolezza della: (i) totale o parziale rilevanza del ruolo svolto; (ii) mancata acquisizione di un ruolo sociale18. L'emarginazione, quale risultante/agente di questo complesso processo, finisce con l'essere quell'area e quell'insieme di soggettualità che rimangono senza riconoscimento politicoistituzionale e senza canalizzazione espressiva. Su siffatta modalità concettuale Statera innesta una rilevazione empirica di questo tipo: le aree dell'emarginazione "sono presenti in diverse classi sociali e sono particolarmente estese in in quelle che si potrebbero forse definire "classi sociali sommerse", o "formazioni sociali sommerse" che si configurano come vero e proprio terreno di coltura di guerriglia diffusa"19. L'analisi di Statera trasforma l'emergenza del sommerso (leggi: la canalizzazione espressiva dell'emarginazione) in un problema di ordine pubblico. Conseguentemente, i problemi dell'emarginazione vengono causalizzati al disadattamento (sociale e psichico), senza essere individuati quali: a) agenti disvelatori della diseguaglianza sociale; b) elementi allusivi di una nuova e diversa organizzazione sia delle relazioni sociali che del rapporto Stato/mercato/soggetti sociali. Se è vero, come assume Statera, che l'emarginazione ha una dimensione ruolizzante e valoriale, è altrettanto vero che ruoli e valori emarginati ed esclusi dalle agenzie ufficiali e dai networks simbolico-comunicativi istituzionalizzati non possono essere liquidati in termini di pura e semplice sovversione sociale, di ideologia estremista. A questo livello di indagine, ci imbattiamo in una delle più cogenti aree di confluenza tra emarginazione e marginalità. In questa sede, ci limitiamo a due ordini di osservazione: a) la dinamica della stratificazione e della diseguaglianza crea delle intersezioni entro cui l'emarginazione va saldamente intrecciandosi con la marginalità; b) la marginalità germina, in gran parte, dall'intreccio tra emarginazione, diseguaglianza e stratificazione. Per essere più precisi: a questo angolo di confluenza si insediano sistemi marginali, i quali si costruiscono: a) intorno agli assi dei modi di produzione (economici, culturali e politici) prevalenti; b) ma anche in una relazione di continuità con modi precedenti non riconducibili a quelli dominanti. Va, pertanto, dislocandosi una disseminazione di forme sociali e culturali non riconducibili alle dominanti; in quanto tali, doppiamente agenti: non solo dentro, ma anche contro i modi e i codici normativo-culturali dell'ufficialità ritualizzata e delle istituzioni. In tal senso, all'intersezione di emarginazione e marginalità, è possibile: a) reperire non soltanto ruoli e funzioni di modellazione complementare rafforzativa dei codici dominanti; b) ma anche e soprattutto individuare aree di crisi e di critica dei codici dominanti. L'analisi ha l'urgenza di sventagliare il suo sguardo verso tutte le relazioni tra la centralità 18 Per una ricostruzione di questa griglia concettuale, cfr. G. Statera, Emarginazione e sovversione sociale, Roma, Edizioni Politecnico, 1980. 19 Ibidem, p. 8. 31 del sistema e le altre fasce/forme sociali. Il rapporto centri/margini, così, concettualizzato ammette due modalità fondamentali: a) l'inclusione/esclusione funzionale, articolata in due forme generali: (i) la "dipendenza in senso strettamente funzionale o produttivo"; (ii) il "sistema di gratificazioni": servizi e prestazioni vale a dire: il clientelismo20. b) la consapevolezza critica dei limiti del flusso posizionale centri/margini; dimensione a partire dalla quale si dà la possibilità effettuale dell'elaborazione di codici culturali e normativi e del dispiegamento di sistemi di decisioni e azioni in alternativa ai processi di "valorizzazione del centro". L'identificazione di questa complessa trama di (inter)relazioni ci consente di sottoporre a salutare critica tutti quegli approcci sociologici che assegnano all'emarginazione/marginalità un mero ruolo di dipendenza passiva. Ora, tali assunti non sono presenti esclusivamente nei paradigmi classici che abbiamo criticamente passato in rassegna; al contrario, sono stati sommamente sviluppati dalla sociologia americana dei processi di immigrazione (negli Usa), i quali hanno, così, inteso liquidare i fenomeni relativi alla transizione dalla posizione di "sfavore" alla posizione di "centralità". Il che non fa che esprimere, allo stato puro, una visione centripeta della marginalità21. Ad una concezione centripeta dell'emarginazione/marginalità, come è agevolmente intuibile, è possibile ricondurre anche il marxismo. Ma ritorniamo ad inseguire da vicino l'emarginazione nel suo (i) intreccio posizionale di diseguaglianza e stratificazione e nel suo (ii) doppio profilo di "prodotto" e "causa". Allo scopo di recuperare e compensare le quote crescenti di diseguaglianza e stratificazione e di scongiurare che l'emarginazione funga da centro attrattore di atteggiamenti critici e pratiche di rivolta, i poteri della civilizzazione (prima) e delle società complesse (dopo), hanno l'indifferibile necessità di approntare strategie, prassi e rituali di recupero e addomesticamento simbolico dell'esclusione sociale. L'istituzionalizzazione dei processi catartici è uno dei mezzi più efficaci per l'evitamento dell'esplosione dei meccanismi della violenza diffusa 22. Ora, le condizioni generali che rendono possibile l'esistenza di processi catartici sono così sintetizzabili: a) il soggetto dev'essere percepito nell'area del potere; b) vale a dire: la credibilità del soggetto è emanazione diretta della sua appartenenza all'area del potere. Possiamo congruamente ribadire: affinché "vi sia efficacia nel meccanismo di espiazione catartica, occorre che questa non sia posta e percepita come una vendetta, cioè non può essere una faida ... La faida porta sempre nella sua logica interna ad una catena senza fine di rappresaglie continue. L'espressione catartica, invece, è l'ultimo atto che trascende e supera la logica della faida"23. In ultima analisi, il processo catartico assicura il trascendimento della logica della faida. Richiede la "legittimazione di una partecipazione corale ritualizzata, cioè occorrono forme istituzionali legittimate da un consenso più largo possibile"24. Non a caso, l'uso del codice catartico è stato assai intenso da parte dei teorici della restaurazione e della conservazione: si ponga mente, p. es., alla concezione della guerra come elemento purificatore. È possibile un uso diverso, da sinistra, dei codici catartici? Bonazzi ritiene di sì. Nella rivoluzione, comunque essa sia orientata, il "momento catartico è compresente ad un uso alternativo delle risorse, ad un'imposizione di valore, di norme di istituzioni differenti da quelle del passato"; la contropartita è data dall'espiazione catartica, dalla progettualità storica25. Ciò che, insomma, avviene è un processo di transfert. Le operazioni di transfert canalizzano 20 P. Crespi, "Intervento", in G. Statera, Emarginazione e sovversione sociale, cit., p. 43. 21 Osserva G. P. Prandstraller: "questa concezione della marginalità non è altro che l'invidia della centralità, cioè colui che si trova al di fuori della zona centrale deve con tutte le sue forze collocarsi al centro, possibilmente spiazzando quelli che ci sono oppure trovando dei compromessi con loro" ("Intervento" in G. Statera, Emarginazione e sovversione sociale, cit., p. 48). 22 In tale direzione, con uno specifico riferimento alle lotte sociali italiane degli anni '70, cfr. G. Bonazzi, "Intervento" in G. Statera, Emarginazione e sovversio-ne sociale, cit, p. 65 ss. 23 Ibidem, p. 65. 24 Ibidem. 25 Ibidem, pp. 66-67. 32 punizioni esemplari (più o meno cruente), le quali mettono in codice e in espressione comunicativa processi di colpevolizzazione simbolica. Il problema della società italiana degli anni '70, conclude Bonazzi su queste basi, è che essa è "come un corpo che non sa espellere le proprie tossine, le esprime a livello di riflusso e di terrorismo"26. Ma, ora, il peso preponderante assegnato alle operazioni di transfert e ai codici di espiazione catartica è in ragione diretta del "blocco" egemonico dei circuiti politici di decisione e azione, nonché della chiusura istituzionale delle condotte di espressione e comunicazione. Allora, la "questione delle questioni" non è tanto l'espulsione delle "tossine sociali" prodotte, quanto la riaperura dei canali della partecipazione politica e della comunicazione simbolica. Si tratta di liberare i codici politici e quelli della comunicazione simbolica dalla sindrome del dualismo amico/nemico, uno dei precipitati estremi del dualismo funzionale del processo di civilizzazione e complessificazione sociale, incentrato sulla coessenzialità di progresso ed emarginazione, "civiltà" ed "inciviltà"27. Operazione culturale e politica, questa, che non può non ripartire da una profonda riconsiderazione critica: a) del processo di civilizzazione e della complessità sociale; b) delle relazioni tra il Sé e l'Altro, tra l'Identico e il Diverso. In questo senso, mappa e morfologia dell'emarginazione che abbiamo precedentemente approssimato vanno assunte quali elementi indicatori e apportatori di: a) una sfida culturale ai modelli culturali e razionali ufficiali; b) una sfida politica ai codici della politica ufficiale; c) una sfida simbolica ai codici della comunicazione simbolica ufficiale. L'analisi, se non si limita alla mera registrazione del dato, deve interpretare queste sfide, le quali non sono né latenti e nemmeno virtuali, ma si addensano in aree sociali, esistenziali e tematiche di forte sofferenza e malessere, il cui raggio di estensione e profondità va progressivamente crescendo. Ove lo sguardo critico e analitico manca questo "ancoraggio visuale", di fronte ai fenomeni dell'emarginazione sociale e individuale non rimangono aperte che due strade: a) la rimozione e l'invisibilizzazione; b) la criminalizzazione. Soluzioni che, sovente, si combinano tra di loro ad un alto tasso di integrazione e densità. 2. Emarginazione come differenzialità I processi di stratificazione/emarginazione sociale che abbiamo discusso sono assumibili, sul piano funzionale-normativo, come processi di differenziazione. A cavallo tra il XIX e il XX secolo, con il comparire della società di massa e la nascita delle metropoli contemporanee, nell'ordito delle produzioni sociali, delle esperienze individuali e dei legamenti relazionali, viene dislocata e sventagliata una massa differenziata, ma intercomunicante di frammenti autonomi, consistenti non soltanto in soggetti e oggetti, ma anche in ruoli, funzioni, posizioni, valori, norme di comportamento, atteggiamenti, modi di simbolizzare, ecc. G. Simmel e W. Benjamin sono stati tra i primi e geniali osservatori di questo immane processo di mutamento rielaborante delle radici della modernità28. Per un verso, si tratta di un vero e proprio fenomeno di esplosione della modernità; per 26Ibidem, p. 68. 27 Una chiave di lettura della modernità simile, ma limitata al rapporto religione/ragione, è stata qualche anno fa elaborata da G. Filoramo, Le vie del sacro, Torino, Einaudi, 1994. 28 G. Simmel, come è noto, si è occupato della "differenziazione sociale" sin dal 1890, nello scritto giovanile Über soziale Differenzierung. Soziologische und psychologische Untersuchungen. Ma i testi simmeliani sulla differenziazione vanno letti congiuntamente alle sue riflessioni sull'estetica, sull'ambiente metropolitano, sul nesso etica/cultura/conflitto nella modernità: cfr. L'etica e i problemi della cultura moderna, Napoli, Guida, 1968; Metropoli e personalità, in AA.VV., Città e analisi sociologica (a cura di G. Martinotti), Padova, Marsilio, 1968; Saggi di estetica (a cura di M. Cacciari), Padova, Liviana, 1970; Il conflitto della cultura moderna (a cura di C. Mongardini), Roma, Bulzoni Editori, 1976. Di W. Benjamin cfr., perlomeno: Angelus Novus, Torino, Einaudi, 1982; L'opera d'arte nell'epoca della sua riproducibilità tecnica, Torino, Einaudi, 1966; Immagini di città, Torino, Einaudi, 1971. Per un puntuale inquadramento della complessa posizione simmeliana, cfr. A. Dal Lago, Il conflitto della modernità. Il pensiero di Georg Simmel, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1994. 33 l 'altro, di uno sradicamento dell'esperienza umana, la quale resta come immemore dei suoi luoghi, dei suoi tempi e delle sue ragioni, a fronte della possibilità della riproducibilità tecnica non solo e non tanto dell'"opera d'arte", ma della vita e della condizione umana tout court. I cantori poetici e tragici, ad un tempo, di questo avvento della differenziazione estrema che sconfina nel gelido mare morto dell'indifferenziazione assoluta sono, su registri assolutamente alteri eppur avvinti, Nietzsche, Kafka, Joyce, Proust e Musil. Per quello che riguarda più da vicino il nostro oggetto di indagine, dobbiamo limitarci a rilevare che la stratificazione/differenziazione sociale si accompagna a un non meno rilevante fenomeno: la differenziazione dell'ordine normativo. La rilevazione di questo dato mette in risalto l'obsolescenza delle varie teorie (monocentriche o multidimensionali che siano) della "valorizzazione del centro". Possiamo agevolmente osservare che "etnie", "razze", "comunità", "classi", "soggetti", "ceti", "gruppi", "strati sociali", ecc. tendono ad assumere come referente normativo valori, princípi, culture, tradizioni assolutamente differenti. Engels, nel disegnare la situazione della classe operaia inglese in relazione a quella della borghesia imprenditrice, individua con acume il problema: "Gli operai parlano altri dialetti, hanno altre idee ed altre convinzioni, altri costumi e altri princípi morali, altra religione e altra politica. Sono due popoli del tutto differenti, come possono esserlo soltanto due razze diverse"29. Il che, paradossalmente, sospende un importante asserto marx-engelsiano: quello secondo cui le idee dominanti sono sempre quelle della classe dominante30; e, nel contempo, apre la strada alla formulazione dei paradigmi delle "due nazioni" nella spiegazione sia della stratificazione sociale che del conflitto di classe31. Oggi, il paradigma di Engels ci appare eccessivamente rigido e non, certo, in grado di lumeggiare le trasformazioni dell'epoca contemporanea. Nondimeno, è importante rimarcare le intuizioni engelsiane sulla differenziazione normativa. La differenziazione degli ordini normativi ci pone di fronte a un fenomeno delicatissimo che si segmenta lungo due rette d'azione, tanto complementari quanto divergenti tra di loro: a) la disseminazione dei referenti valoriali; b) l'emarginazione progressiva dei referenti valoriali in relazione di non congruenza con quelli ufficiali. Su questa base, il processo di stratificazione/emarginazione ha la triplice esigenza di: a) allargare ed elasticizzare i propri referenti normativi; b) periferizzare i referenti normativi alteri; c) internizzare e addomesticare i referenti normativi periferici. Il processo di differenziazione, in particolare nelle società complesse, è, da un lato, animato dalla "poliarchia dei valori" e, dall'altro, è afferrato dal demone della globalizzazione dei propri valori portanti. Pertanto, a misura in cui costruisce il "villaggio globale" e tenta di introiettarne le logiche e i meccanismi in ogni interstizio dei contesti locali, emargina e ricopre gli universi normativi che non si riconoscono nella dinamica della globalizzazione o che da essa cercano di cavar fuori la messa in comunicazione del valore delle differenze. Così impostato il problema, entriamo subito in rotta di collisione con l'approccio funzionalista. Come è noto, i classici del funzionalismo sostengono il carattere unitario del sistema dei valori32. Meglio ancora: assumono il processo di differenziazione e di sviluppo adattivo come generalizzatore di valore, a mezzo del quale si allargano e innovano i circuiti culturali e politici della coesione sociale. In particolare, Parsons annette alla differenziazione un ruolo chiave nel processo di modernizzazione ed è attraverso essa che, sostanzialmente, legge sia il passaggio dalle 29 F. Engels, La situazione della classe operaia in Inghilterra, Roma, Editori Riuniti, 1972, p. 160. 30 K. Marx-F. Engels, L'Ideologia tedesca, Roma, Editori Riuniti, 1975. Il passo in questione, del resto conosciutissimo e abbondantemente discusso, è il seguente: "Le idee della classe dominante sono in ogni epoca le idee dominanti; cioè, la classe che è la potenza materiale dominante della società è in pari tempo la sua potenza spirituale dominante. La classe che dispone dei mezzi di produzione materiale dispone con ciò, in pari tempo, dei mezzi della produzione intellettuale, cosicché ad essa in complesso sono assoggettate le idee di coloro ai quali mancano i mezzi della produzione intellettuale". 31 Cfr. F. Parkin, Disuguaglianza di classe e ordi-namento politico..., cit. p. 85 ss. 32 Oltre ai testi di Parsons già richiamati, cfr. R. K. Merton, Teoria e struttura sociale, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1966. 34 - "società tradizionali" alle "società moderne" che le loro evoluzioni interne. Conseguentemente, egli assume il "salto di modernità" come la capacità di un sistema sociale dato di adattarsi alla differenziazione. Pertanto, quest'ultima finisce con l'acquisire una "funzione" di mantenimento e di integrazione degli equilibri sistemici dati, attraverso la loro evoluzione genetica interna. La posizione parsonsiana ha il pregio di leggere l'equilibrio sistemico in maniera dinamica, individuando le sue capacità di autometamorfosi. Rimane, però, irretita in un contesto unilateralmente definito, a misura in cui imprigiona la differenziazione in un ruolo adattivo: adattamento all'ordine e dell'ordine sistemico. Non a caso, in Parsons, centrale è la categoria di sviluppo evoluzionistico (per differenziazione)33. Un limite epistemologicamente e teoreticamente non dissimile da quello di Parsons è presente nel discorso di Luhmann sui nessi e sugli esiti della differenziazione sociale: Luhmann appare preoccupato più del governo delle disfunzioni e delle entropie sistemiche che di un'analisi coerente e conseguente della "crisi della democrazia" nella complessità sociale34. La pluralizzazione dei valori, discendendo dai processi di differenziazione culturale e sociale, pone dei seri problemi di controllo sociale e culturale. Con le teorie dello sviluppo evoluzionistico e dell'unità dei valori si tenta, appunto, di fornire risposte efficaci al problema del controllo sociale e culturale nelle società complesse e frammentate. Ora, come è certo che la pluralizzazione degli stili di vita e dei comportamenti legittimati dagli ordini normativi ufficiali va sempre più territorializzandosi nell'ordito delle relazioni sociali e nelle coscienze individuali, solcando trasversalmente differenze di classe, di nazioni, di razze e di status, altrettanto vero è che il cerchio della legittimazione normativa presenta innumerevoli falle. Intanto, perché non regge assolutamente il ritmo delle mutazioni e delle contaminazioni simbolico-culturali intorno cui si incarnano e proliferano atteggiamenti, comportamenti e opzioni che ne debordano e lacerano le linee di confine. Inoltre, ma non secondariamente, perché sino a che l'integrazione e la partecipazione: a) passeranno attraverso i selettori della diseguaglianza e dell'emarginazione; b) sino a che esse corrisponderanno a simulazioni manipolatorie o a un immaginario surrogatorio e distorto, anziché a coerenti e dispiegati processi culturali e materiali; c) si produrranno, in via latente ed effettuale, delle vie di fuga normative, alla ricerca di valori e princípi capaci di dare risposte e costruire percorsi di libertà. Uno degli obiettivi principali delle strategie del controllo sociale e culturale nelle società complesse è proprio quello di destrutturare le vie di permanenza e di fuga verso universi normativi alteri, attraverso la saturazione simbolica che accompagna e caratterizza la differenziazione. Sicché il processo di differenziazione, proprio perché allarga le maglie dell'emarginazione e della diseguaglianza, va specializzandosi (meglio: "deve" specializzarsi) nelle funzioni di deviatore delle vie di fuga normative: a) o centripetandole, attraverso un capzioso svuotamento/rimodellamento culturale manipolatore e/o repressioni più o meno dirette e dure; b) oppure centrifugandole in una perenne riserva di marginalità culturale, ininfluente rispetto ai cardini dell'equilibrio sistemico. Il punto, allora, diviene questo: la differenziazione non è semplicemente fattore di emarginazione e diseguaglianza, ma assume la funzione di vettore di ingabbiamento e sprofondamento nella condizione di emarginazione/diseguaglianza, a misura in cui si combina con le/e detta le mosse alle strategie del controllo sociale e culturale. Così stando le cose, la sinergia differenziazione/controllo sociale partorisce delle strategie specifiche: le strategie differenziate 35. La razionalità sistemica delle strategie differenziate non riposa nella coniugazione del principio di differenza con il principio di libertà. Al contrario, essa è volta alla predisposizione di 33 Cfr., in particolare, T. Parsons: Sistemi di società, I. Le società tradizionali, cit.; Sistemi di società, II. Le società moderne, cit. 34 Sul punto, di N. Luhmann è essenziale Potere e complessità sociale, Milano, Il Saggiatore, 1979. 35 Una delle esemplificazione su scala micro delle strategie differenziate è data dalle politiche penitenziarie applicate nelle società avanzate dagli anni '70 ai '90, di cui l'Italia costituisce uno dei casi limite (cfr. A. Chiocchi, La pena impietosa. Luoghi, tempi e culture del carcere, Mercogliano (Av), Quaderni di "società e conflitto", n. 12, 1997). Un'esemplificazione su scala macro è, invece, data dalla regolazione normativa del rapporto tra i sessi e tra etnie forti ed etnie deboli. 35 mezzi culturali e materiali, calibrati sull'assoluta specificità delle condizioni in cui si trovano allocati i vari soggetti sociali, allo scopo di accentuarne gli scarti, le fratture e gli antagonismi con gli universi relazionali e identificativi circostanti. In breve, l'obiettivo delle strategie differenziate è quello di isolare i soggetti delle differenze, per consegnarli inermi e deboli nelle mani dei codici del potere. In questo modo, è occluso proprio quel passaggio che dal principio di differenza conduce al principio di libertà; e viceversa. La camicia di forza che, così, si istituisce (la "gabbia d'acciaio", volendo far uso del lessico weberiano) trova il suo fuoco principale nel nesso differenziazione/differenzialità, attorno cui le differenze sono impossibilitate a comunicare, avvitandosi sulla loro propria autoreferenzialità. La mutazione delle differenze in differenzialità: ecco l'anima progettuale e modellatrice delle strategie differenziate. Le differenze possono parlare e parlarsi, dando luogo a dialogiche che fanno irrompere nel teatro della comunicazione, dell'espressione e dell'azione umana universi di senso e ordini normativi proliferanti ed eccedenti i codici comunicativi ed espressivi dei poteri della società complessa. Da qui l'esigenza autoritativa e simbolica di tradurle in termini di differenzialità. Le strategie differenziate tendono a gettare ogni differenza nelle condizioni dell'autoreferenzialità assoluta, allo scopo di farle implodere in un universo di senso in via di progressiva consunzione. La differenzialità è precisamente quella situazione limite che segna il culmine del processo di deriva storico-esistenziale che dalla differenza conduce all'autoreferenza. Ed è, appunto, tale situazione limite di implosione permanente che i poteri complessi della differenziazione, con il concorso delle strategie differenziate, intendono normare e rendere "condizione normale" di esistenza delle aree dell'emarginazione, dell' esclusione e della marginalità. Ma la differenzialità non declina semplicemente profili e ordini normativi implosivi. Essa ha, del pari, una struttura di senso, per così dire, esplosiva, a misura in cui porta a compimento e complessifica, fino alla saturazione comunicativo-espressiva, i processi di normativizzazione dello stigma36. La differenzialità non si limita a strappare e negare l'identità alle differenze; ma sulla negazione dell'identità costruisce processi di identificazione e autoidentificazione estraneanti ed alienanti. La negazione dell'identità tende a convertirsi in identità sradicata e smemorata, inconsapevole dei processi di frantumazione culturale e mutilazione simbolica che l'hanno forgiata. La progressiva perdita di un rapporto aperto con la propria e altrui identità getta in una paralisi decisionale ed esistenziale. Non perché qui non si agisca e decida; quanto per il fatto che si sono smarriti i fili di autodeterminazione del proprio Sé e di interrelazione con l'Altro, da cui possono discendere percorsi di costruzione identificativa ricchi ed emancipanti. I codici complessi del potere, così come le "formano", tendono ad eterodirigere le identità sradicate e cristallizzate nel circuito dell'autoreferenza, attraverso una rete capillare di inputs/outputs simbolici, culturali e comunicazionali. Le strategie differenziate, quindi, non hanno un mero profilo negativo: l'occlusione delle condotte di intercomunicazione dalle differenze alla libertà e dalla libertà alle differenze; esse sono caratterizzate, parimenti, da una matrice positiva: trasformare la negazione del principio di differenza e del principio di libertà nell'azione della differenzialità. Per i codici del potere, non si tratta solo e tanto di operare un tacitamento di massa dell'opzione critica; quanto e soprattutto di far apparire, essere, agire e comunicare masse silenti, combinando tra di loro unità differenziali sradicate e autoreferenti. Il passaggio che le strategie differenziate tentano di organizzare e incorporare nel tessuto relazionale-comunicativo è, così, sintetizzabile: dall'emarginazione come opera sistemica all'emarginazione all'opera per gli equilibri sistemici. 3. L'emarginazione politica: la cittadinanza negata In quanto depositario unico del principio di legalità, lo Stato viene posto come garante della libertà: la vulnerazione della personalità dello Stato configura la lesione della legalità e della libertà. La concentrazione della legalità nell'impersonalità della macchina statuale è stata assunta come transizione dalla legittimità dell'autorità monarchica alla legalità dello Stato di diritto37. Lo Stato si fonda sul diritto esattamente perché diviene l'involucro e il baricentro della 36 Sui fenomeni dello stigma, cfr. il classico E. Gofmann, Stigma. L'identità negata, Bari, Laterza, 1970. 37 Su questo passaggio, cfr. R. Bendix, Stato nazionale e integrazione di classe, Bari, Laterza, 1969. 36 legalità in tutti i sottosistemi sociali, in particolare negli ambiti economici (libertà del mercato, libera concorrenza, libera competizione degli interessi) e politici (suddivisione dei poteri, ecc.). La figura dello Stato di diritto diviene isomorfa alla figura di Stato legale ed entrambe alla figura di Stato liberale. Una delle premesse storico-materiali della costituzione dello Stato di diritto è la vigenza del modo di produzione capitalistico. Non casualmente, il passaggio dalle monarchie assolute allo Stato di diritto (dalla rivoluzione inglese: 1640-1689, alla rivoluzione francese: 1789-1794) si concreta nelle fasi che precedono e accompagnano la rivoluzione industriale e segna l'ascesa definitiva della borghesia alle posizioni di potere. Lo Stato di diritto, corpo e anima del principio di legalità, estende le sfere della libertà dal privato al pubblico, riconoscendo espressamente la libertà politica e la parità dei cittadini di fronte alla legge. Con efficacia, è stato fatto notare che nello Stato di diritto i sudditi divengono cittadini. Lo Stato di diritto è, al tempo stesso, uno Stato minimo e uno Stato massimo. È uno Stato minimo, perché si fonda sul rispetto delle libertà del singolo e dei commerci individuali e di gruppo, con cui non interferisce. È uno Stato massimo, perché il quadro dei comportamenti normati come legali non tollera la messa in discussione dei cardini del meccanismo complessivo: la proprietà privata e il monopolio pubblico della coercizione. Le deroghe dal quadro legale non sono ammesse, quanto più in basso nella scala sociale è collocato il trasgressore e/o il deviante. L'eguaglianza dei cittadini di fronte alla legge è puramente formale; in realtà, sono perseguiti razionalmente quei comportamenti devianti che smagliano la trama delle codificazioni e degli equilibri sociali. Per i soggetti che inducono la smagliatura viene eretto uno spazio senza diritti e senza possessi che va dall'emarginazione al carcere. In generale, allo Stato di diritto compete la definizione e l'esercizio del complesso di norme che regolano l'uso della violenza legittima. Nella società, lo Stato liberale si appropria del 'politico', delegando il comando sui poteri economici e sociali agli "interessi forti". Lo Stato di diritto, come è stato ricordato dagli studiosi più attenti e conseguenti (da Kelsen a Bobbio), si pone esplicitamente come regolatore dell'uso della forza, quale unico soggetto politico abilitato a tracciare le regole, l'intensità, la durata, le finalità, i limiti e i casi concreti dell'impiego della coazione. Dovrebbe essere sufficientemente chiaro, a questo snodo del nostro argomentare, che uno dei limiti più profondi del discorso e della pratica della democrazia è il loro fermarsi fuori dal perimetro dell'emarginazione, entro cui i diritti di democrazia non hanno vigenza. È risaputo che la democrazia liberale preveda: (i) la libertà personale; (ii) la libertà di stampa e di opinione; (iii) la libertà di riunione; (iv) la libertà di associazione. Il passaggio dallo Stato di diritto allo Stato democratico, nel mentre conferma i diritti di libertà dell'individuo, riconosce in pieno i diritti di organizzazione, associazione e partecipazione politica dei gruppi. Connotati essenziali della democrazia post-liberale sono, dunque, la libertà personale e il pluralismo politico, tanto che essa di frequente è (tautologicamente) definita democrazia pluralista. L'innovazione apportata dalla democrazia post-liberale sta nella estensione della libertà di associazione dalle sfere religiose, culturali, di mestiere, ecc. alla sfera specificamente politica, con la costituzione vera e propria dei partiti politici e delle organizzazioni politiche in senso lato. Ora, per le costituzioni democratiche moderne, alcuni diritti di libertà (democrazia liberale+democrazia post-liberale) presentano la qualifica dell'inviolabilità. Nel caso della Costituzione italiana, inviolabili sono i diritti garantiti dagli artt. 13 (libertà personale), 14 (libertà di domicilio), 15 (corrispondenza e comunicazione). Inoltre, in maniera ancora più pregnante ed estensiva, ma anche meno precisa, la Costituzione italiana garantisce i "diritti inviolabili dell'uomo" (art. 2). Le teorie e le dottrine costituzionaliste più sensibili e avvertite hanno inteso saldare il riconoscimento dell'inviolabilità dei diritti dell'uomo con la protezione di inviolabilità espressamente accordata ad alcune tipologie di diritti, estendendo a tutti i diritti di libertà la clausola dell'inviolabilità; in particolare, la protezione dell'inviolabilità è estesa alla libertà di manifestazione religiosa (art. 19), di espressione del pensiero (art. 21), di riunione (art. 17), di associazione (art. 18). Possiamo concludere questo tornante del nostro excursus, rilevando il carattere di universalità che lo Stato democratico, facendo proprie le acquiszioni dello Stato di diritto e ulteriormente sviluppandole e perfezionandole, attribuisce ai diritti di libertà. Il problema della democrazia è che, in genere, ogni agglomerato organizzato e aggregato comunitario o di gruppo, nel suo funzionamento, tende a limitare fortemente l'universalità dei diritti di libertà. Ciò tanto al suo interno che al suo esterno. Problema dei problemi è, poi, la 37 sospensione del principio di libertà e del principio di democrazia nei territori mossi dell' emarginazione e all'interno delle reti comunicative chiuse, in cui vige una relazione di supremazia speciale 38: dal rapporto uomo/donna alla famiglia; dall'amministrazione pubblica alla scuola, dalla fabbrica alla caserma; dal carcere a tutte le istituzioni totali. Come è stato fatto osservare, il carattere distintivo delle relazioni di "supremazia speciale" è che esse assegnano ai diritti di libertà "garanzie e tutele minori, e talvolta minori fino a zero, di quelle di cui godono entro l'ordinamento generale"39. Le istituzioni totali, in quanto collettore normativo dell'emarginazione e della devianza, rappresentano l'organizzazione spazio/temporale e storico-politica del grado zero della libertà e della democrazia. Tutti i tentativi, pur fatti, di deviare da questo progressivo tendere verso lo zero dei diritti nelle zone della/e per i soggetti dell'emarginazione sono più o meno rientrati, per non aver voluto o saputo affrontare il "nocciolo duro" delle teorie e prassi della libertà, dello Stato e della democrazia; non solo e non tanto delle teorie dell'emarginazione e della devianza, delle teorie della penalità e della pena. La questione politica generale che qui emerge si scompone in tre segmenti: a) la democrazia pone dei limiti all'universalizzazione dei diritti di libertà; b) la democrazia pone dei limiti all'esercizio dei diritti di associazione e partecipazione politica; c) la democrazia pone dei limiti all'applicazione delle regole democratiche. Dal reticolo di questi dilemmi della democrazia possiamo più agevolmente risalire alle metamorfosi delle forme della statualità. Diversamente da quanto postulato da un topos classico della politologia, lo Stato di diritto (liberale) non è univocamente rappresentabile come articolazione della strategia (liberale) di difesa della società contro lo Stato, con l'espressa previsione del non intervento di quest'ultimo negli "affari" sociali, economici e personali. È proprio la distinzione (liberale) tra Stato e società che fa dello Stato il "pilone di sostegno" della politica; base indispensabile per le future politiche di intervento sociale equitativo che, a partire dal "sistema di assicurazioni sociali obbligatorie" di Bismarck (1883-1889), trovano diretta imputazione nello Stato. Lo Stato liberale ha il monopolio della politica ed è proprio tale monopolio a "garantire" e "tutelare" lo sviluppo della società, secondo le regole della libera concorrenza e la competizione tra gli interessi (individuali). Funzioni non secondarie, anzi di primissima rilevanza, sono dalla società incanalate verso lo Stato; in particolare, le politiche della "difesa sociale". Qui è lo Stato che difende la società. Lo Stato democratico eredita queste funzioni e le porta, come abbiamo appena visto, a compimento. Come sappiamo, lo Stato democratico scambia sicurezza contro autorità. Nel senso che in cambio del riconoscimento della sua autorità garantisce la sicurezza sociale. Della sicurezza sociale, fino agli ultimi decenni dell Ottocecento, il carcere continua ad essere il presidio; esattamente nella misura in cui la fabbrica continua ad essere il "centro" del meccanismo di produzione e riproduzione della ricchezza e della stratificazione sociale. L'insieme di queste coordinate centrali comincia a venir meno a cavallo del XIX e XX secolo: a) a fronte del processo di formazione della metropoli contemporanea; b) con la progressiva estensione della produzione di massa che, incardinata sulla incorporazione della tecnologia e della scienza nel rapporto di produzione, nel volgere di pochi decenni, scalza il lavoro vivo dalla posizione di "centro" della valorizzazione; c) con la caduta del monopolio statuale della politica. La mappa delle fenomenologie e delle problematiche sociali viene sconvolta. La conseguenza che più ci preme sottolineare è che, nel pieno di queste trasformazioni delle forme sociali, l'offerta di sicurezza apprestata dallo Stato democratico, nonostante l'ipertrofia, ormai, conseguita dagli spazi della reclusione, abbassa progressivamente le sue soglie. Entrano, pertanto, in crisi i circuiti della legittimazione democratica. Il controllo concentrazionario dell'emarginazione e della devianza non risolve la richiesta di sicurezza che viene dalla cittadinanza, a fronte del ramificarsi di profondi processi di diseguaglianza e 38 Per la definizione di questa categoria, cfr. G. U. Rescigno, Manuale elementare di diritto pubblico, Bologna, Zanichelli, 1983, pp. 471-474. 39 G. U. Rescigno, op. cit., p. 473; corsivo nostro. 38 discriminazione sociale. La legittimazione dell'autorità democratica40 deve, a questo punto, passare per la porta stretta di politiche sociali atte a recuperare, con un intervento di bilanciamento equitativo, le distorsioni che in termini di appropriazione e distribuzione delle risorse e dei beni sono prodotte dal libero funzionamento delle "regole del mercato" e dalla competizione sfrenata tra i "gruppi di interesse". Intorno a queste nuove esigenze, in opera già sul finire dell'Ottocento nelle società industriali più avanzate ed "esplose" nel ventennio che segue il secondo conflitto mondiale, va maturando il passaggio dallo Stato democratico allo Stato sociale. Nelle nuove condizioni, la garanzia della sicurezza non si risolve più: a) nella tutela delle libertà personali e del libero funzionamento del mercato; b) nel pieno riconoscimento degli attori politici organizzati e nella progressiva riconduzione del conflitto alle cerchie legali del gioco democratico. Ora le politiche della sicurezza sociale rivestono la funzione di ammortizzatore delle contraddizioni e differenze sociali. A questa funzione eminentemente politica se ne affianca un' altra di carattere economico. Lo Stato sociale, difatti, non solo ammortizza le tensioni sociali, ma ossigena il mercato, stimolando la crescita della domanda: le politiche keynesiane rappresentano questo cruciale punto di passaggio nel rapporto tra Stato e mercato, politica ed economia. Lo Stato sociale deve regolare, sul punto, una trasformazione di fondo: la perdita di centralità del sistema di fabbrica all'interno del processo di produzione e realizzazione del plusvalore, a cui si accompagna la perdita di centralità del carcerario entro il sistema del controllo sociale41. Ciò anche perché, nel frattempo, una trasformazione non meno rilevante interessa la devianza sociale, la cui fenomenologia non è più riconducibile ad una "serie comportamentista" monocausale, negazione simmetrica e complementare del carattere monocratico del principio di legalità. I processi della differenziazione e della complessità sociale intenzionano pratiche devianti diffuse e "illegalismi" di massa, i quali non sono riconducibili alla pura e semplice "trasgressione della norma", ma richiamano, altresì, altre "forme" e altri "codici" di normalità. Si pensi, per fare un esempio onniesplicativo, alle lotte intorno al "senso" e all'"identità" condotte dai movimenti sociali negli anni '60 e '70 in tutti i paesi capitalistici avanzati, a cui abbiamo avuto modo di fare cenno nel primo capitolo. È nell'impatto dell'emarginazione col sistema di sicurezza sociale che cadono progressivamente di tensione le politiche welfaristiche. Nei paesi capitalistici avanzati, il sistema di Welfare ha funzionato come garanzia contro: a) la disoccupazione; b) la malattia; c) la vecchiaia. Su quest'asse, abbiamo conosciuto due crisi del Welfare. La prima si è risolta nell'impossibilità della risoluzione dei problemi storici della sicurezza e dell'assistenza, in quanto si è verificato un ingorgo nella struttura delle istituzioni pubbliche, gravate da una domanda di soddisfacimento di bisogni e di consumi in eccesso rispetto alle possibilità dell'offerta. La seconda si è risolta nel fallimento dell'obiettivo della perequazione e dell'equità sociale. Si è storicamente verificato che la redistribuzione della ricchezza sia rimasta, prevalentemente, ristretta all'interno dei ceti medi, così rivelandosi una causa addizionale di sperequazione e diseguaglianza. 40 Sulle forme del processo di legittimazione dello Stato e la relativa crisi, cfr. C. Offe, Lo Stato nel capitalismo maturo, Milano, Etas Libri, 1977; A. Wolfe, Ai confini della legittimazione. Le contraddizioni politiche del capitalismo contemporaneo, Bari, De Donato, 1981. 41 Per il caso italiano, M. Pavarini sostiene: "La crisi del carcere, come strumento principale di controllo sociale, è una realtà che caratterizza la storia della politica criminale italiana già dall'unificazione e con un andamento sempre più accentuato negli ultimi cinquant'anni" ("Concentrazione" e "diffusione" del penitenziario. Le tesi di Rusche e Kirchheimer e la nuova strategia del controllo sociale in Italia, Appendice a G. Rusche-O. Kirchheimer, Pena e struttura sociale, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1983, pp. 146-147). Sul punto, Pavarini si rifà alla seguente documentazione: D. Melossi, Statistiche "della criminalità" e carcerarie in Italia, "Inchiesta", 1976; ISTAT, Sommario di statistiche storiche dell'Italia. 1861-1975, Roma, 1976; ISTAT, Annuario statistico italiano, Roma, 1976; E. Resta, Conflitti sociali e giustizia, Bari, De Donato, 1977. 39 - L'emarginazione, a partire dalla dilatazione irreversibile delle aree di marginalità e della disoccupazione strutturale, è l'altra faccia della rivoluzione tecnologica, esattamente nella misura in cui le "nuove povertà" sono l'altra faccia dello Stato del benessere42. La combinazione industrializzazione/produzione di massa/Stato del benessere collega l'emarginazione ai "bisogni post-materialisti", non semplicemente a quelli "materiali". Temi essenziali della mobilitazione collettiva e delle aspettative del singolo diventano: il Sé, l'Altro, la solitudine, l'amore, la frustrazione, il tempo libero, la dipendenza culturale, ecc. Le aree dell'emarginazione sociale e dell'esclusione politica tendono a divenire sempre più zone di disagio collettivo e di sofferenza individuale, in cui sono precipitati soggetti deboli a cui, di fatto, vengono negati l'accesso all'arena dei diritti e la possibilità stessa di comunicare e trasmettere la loro esperienza dolorosa della vita. Sono come cancellati dalla scena sociale, andando a costituire una società che nessuno vuol vedere e che tutti, nella difesa del proprio interesse gruppuscolare o singolo, sono disposti a penalizzare. La "società che nessuno vuol vedere" è la società senza rappresentanza politica: vale a dire, la società dei senza diritti, nuovi paria delle società avanzate che affollano i suoli amorali e desolidarizzanti della vita metropolitana43. Ai soggetti dell'emarginazione la cittadinanza è negata. A questo livello di articolazione dell'indagine, esplode in tutta la sua pienezza la crisi delle "teorie della cittadinanza" e si palesa, senza veli, il loro carattere escludente ed elitario44. 42 Per l'analisi del rapporto tra "Stato del benessere" e "nuove povertà", si rinvia ad Antonio Petrillo, Linee di frontiera. Carcere, marginalità e criminalità, Mercogliano (Av), Quaderni di "società e conflitto", n. 10, 1996. 43 Negli anni '90, uno degli atti meglio esemplificativi di questa tendenza è stata la "legge 187" in California (novembre 1994), con la quale si disponeva la privazione dei diritti civili e sociali a tutti gli immigrati, iscritti regolarmente o meno agli uffici del lavoro. Per un commento critico, cfr. E. Pugliese, Noi, latinos, "il manifesto", 17/11/1994. 44 Per una indagine criticamente motivata di queste problematiche, cfr. A. Petrillo, Crisi della cittadinanza e controllo sociale. Il gioco tra interessi e identità, Relazione al Convegno "Cittadinanza o cittadinanze. Crisi economica e riorganizzazione del Welfare", Università degli Studi del Molise, Campobasso, 18-19 novembre 1993; successivamente negli "Atti" del Convegno: Cittadinanza o cittadinanze: la crisi dello Stato sociale tra universalismo e logica delle appartenenze (a cura di Paola Di Nicola-A. Saporiti), Campobasso, Università degli Studi del Molise, 1994. 40 Cap . III TRA SVILUPPO ED EMARGINAZIONE: IL MEZZOGIORNO D'ITALIA 0. Premessa A questo punto della nostra ricognizione critica, una delle questioni cruciali da sottoporre a scandaglio è la preliminare messa in chiaro, perlomeno parziale, del campo vasto e intricato dei nodi di carattere storico-concettuale e storico-metodologico che si addensano nei campi relazionali in cui insistono sviluppo, modernizzazione e urbanizzazione. Teorie dello sviluppo e teorie della modernizzazione si sono incrociate con teorie del sottosviluppo, della dipendenza e della marginalità urbana della più varia natura e valenza politica, con effetti di ricaduta indiretti, se non "occulti", sulla riflessione intorno ai reticoli urbani (con particolare riferimento al Mezzogiorno d'Italia). Dagli esiti di questo dibattito non è possibile prescindere, se si vuole, laddove è necessario, rifondare gli strumenti cognitivi, i metodi di indagine e di intervento della teoria politica e della teoria sociale. Al campo delle revisioni e delle rifondazioni non sfuggono le teoriche e le politiche meridionaliste (anzi). La carica di suggestione collegata alla verifica in campo locale delle strutture teoretiche portanti del dibattito sullo sviluppo, sul sottosviluppo, sulla dipendenza, sulla modernizzazione, sulla marginalità e sull'urbanizzazione è indubbiamente grande. Anche perché non sempre il meridionalismo, soprattutto quello di impostazione classica, ha saputo connettere le sue analisi entro un quadro storico, teorico e sociale più largo, comprensivo dei fenomeni di rilevanza progredienti sulla scala internazionale e nazionale. Deve, proprio per questo, esser chiaro che una conferma o una disconferma in campo locale delle teorie generali è quanto di meno scientifico sia dato immaginare. Le strutture concettuali elaborate per dare ragione del livello macro solo entro una certa misura trovano rispondenza al livello micro. All'opposto, le categorie imperniate sulle "scienze del locale" non possono rivendicare lo statuto di strumenti cognitivi ricostruttivi dello "scenario globale", attraverso l'interazione dialettica o la causazione cumulativa degli "universi locali". Il passaggio da un campo all'altro richiede l'elaborazione, la sperimentazione e la verifica di strutture concettuali e interpretative ad hoc. Si reclamano mediazioni cognitive che, a loro volta, abbisognano di una scienza degli stadi di passaggio; vale a dire, una scienza delle intersezioni, delle biforcazioni e delle transizioni. Cercheremo, in questa sede, di approssimare primi rudimenti in tale direzione, con particolare riguardo alla situazione del Mezzogiorno d'Italia e alle "tradizioni teoriche" meridionaliste, con particolare riguardo al periodo che si distende va dalla costituzione della repubblica agli anni '90. 1. Lo sviluppo come problema Il problema dello sviluppo, come è ampiamente noto, è stato da sempre un tema cruciale, se non assiale, dell'economia politica classica, da Smith e Ricardo fino a Mill. La stessa monumentale opera di Marx di confutazione dell'economia politica classica finisce col ruotare, in gran parte, intorno alla problematica dello sviluppo e dell'accumulazione di cui, attraverso la sua teoria del plusvalore, fornisce una teoria critica storico-sistematica. L'economia politica post-classica (in particolare, il marginalismo), tra fine Ottocento e inizio Novecento, nonostante la forte carica critica, aggiunge sostanzialmente poche varianti all'edificio dei classici. Per registrare le prime novità, occorre aspettare il contributo teorico sullo "sviluppo economico" di Schumpeter del 19121. Ma il grosso delle novità interviene con gli economisti keynesiani e post-keynesiani e l'opera di W. W. Rostow del 19602; filoni entrambi nati, particolarmente quello inaugurato da Rostow, con lo specifico intendimento di costruire un'alternativa teoricopratica alla posizione elaborata da Marx. 1 J. A. Schumpeter, Teoria dello sviluppo economico, Firenze, Sansoni, 1971. 2 W. W. Rostow, Gli stadi dello sviluppo economico, Torino, Einaudi, 1962. 41 - Sul troncone dell'economia politica classica è germogliata l'economia neoclassica, keynesiana e post-keynesiana, etc. Sul ceppo della posizione marxiana in tema di sviluppo e accumulazione hanno, invece, preso vigore i marxismi nei primi decenni del Novecento e il neomarxismo intorno agli anni '50 e '60. La competizione e il conflitto tra i vari indirizzi si sono enucleati non soltanto tra le due posizioni fondamentali (l'economia politica classica e il marxismo), ma anche all'interno di ognuna di esse, tra i vari sottoinsiemi teorici partoriti nel corso del tempo. Non è, evidentemente, questa l'occasione per sviscerare i termini del dibattito teorico tra le varie scuole in materia di sviluppo economico. Ci interessa qui richiamare tale dibattito, solo per meglio chiarire il campo delle problematiche che dobbiamo sottoporre a investigazione. Per i temi che concernono più da vicino la nostra ricerca, particolare significato hanno le analisi di W. Sombart e M. Weber, per il ruolo da essi assegnato ai processi di riassetto del territorio e alla costituzione delle città nella formazione del capitalismo3. In stretta interazione con lo sviluppo economico è stato letto il processo di modernizzazione, i cui tratti salienti sono stati così efficacemente sintetizzati da Gallino: a) "l'inserimento della massa della popolazione nel sistema economico e politico nazionale"; b) "l'urbanizzazione"; c) "lo sviluppo di un potente apparato giuridico-amministrativo centrale"; d) "la diffusione del principio di razionalità in tutte le sfere della vita sociale"; e) "il forte incremento della differenziazione sociale e della divisione del lavoro"; f) "la moltiplicazione di associazioni, organizzazioni e istituzioni specializzate nello svolgere funzioni un tempo inesistenti o fuse in ruoli generici entro la sfera familiare, come gran parte delle funzioni produttive ed educative"; g) "l'eliminazione dei privilegi ereditari e l'incremento generale della scolarità"4. Va tenuto presente che, per tutta una lunga fase iniziale, gli studi sulla modernizzazione hanno interamente definito le fenomenologie che, nel ciclo storico 1945-1975, hanno accompagnato l'affrancamento di molti paesi del Terzo Mondo dalle condizioni di colonia. È con particolare riferimento ai temi intrecciati dello sviluppo economico e della modernizzazione che, a partire dagli anni '50, è nata la "sociologia dello sviluppo" che prevede come sua sottobranca specifica la "sociologia del sottosviluppo". Meglio: facendo convergere gli strumenti di indagine dello sviluppo con quelli dell'esplorazione delle aree arretrate, si è definito un nuovo punto di osservazione teorica, secondo cui "sviluppo" e "sottosviluppo" costituiscono due facce della stessa medaglia5. Ma la presa in carico del campo sviluppo/sottosviluppo è stata messa in difficoltà dal-le tendenze alla specializzazione da parte delle scienze sociali, le quali hanno disgiunto l'analisi dei meccanismi economici da quella dei fattori socio-culturali6. I contraccolpi sono stati consistenti per le indagini dei processi di modernizzazione che sono in maniera rilevante connotati da fattori di natura socio-culturale. La transizione dall'antico al moderno è pure transizione di modelli culturali. In questa transizione, i modelli della tradizione non si dissolvono, ma persistono e si riconfigurano. Il fenomeno è stato particolarmente e acutamente indagato da G. Germani, per il quale nel "processo di modernizzazione" persiste il "ruolo funzionale" dei modelli tradizionali; di più: modelli tradizionali e processo di modernizzazione possono essere "compatibili" 3 W. Sombart, Il capitalismo moderno, Torino, Einaudi, 1971; M. Weber, Economia e società, Milano, Comunità, 1974. 4 L. Gallino, Dizionario di sociologia, voce: Modernizzazione, Torino, Utet, 1983, p. 438. 5 Le opere che danno avvio a questo indirizzo sono: P. Baran, Il "surplus" economico e la teoria marxista dello sviluppo, Milano, Feltrinelli, 1962 (ma 1957); G. Myrdal, Teoria economica dei paesi sottosviluppati, Milano, Feltrinelli, 1966 (ma 1957); F. H. Cardoso-E. Faletto, Dipendenza e sviluppo in America Latina. Saggio di interpretazione sociologica, Milano, Feltrinelli, 1971 (ma 1967); A. G. Frank, Capitalismo e sottosviluppo in America Latina, Torino, Einaudi, 1969 (ma 1967); Id., America Latina: sottosviluppo e rivoluzione, Torino, Einaudi, 1974 (ma 1967); Id., Sociologia dello sviluppo e sottosviluppo della sociologia, Milano, Feltrinelli, 1970 (ma 1967); C. Furtado, La formazione economica del Brasile, Torino, Einaudi, 1969; G. Arrighi, Sviluppo economico e sovrastrutture in Africa, Torino, Einaudi, 1969. 6 C. Furtado, Obstacles to Development in Latin America, New York, 1970, p. XIV. 42 all 'interno di "istituzioni moderne"7. Quanto questo approccio abbia conseguenze importanti per la lettura dei fenomeni del sottosviluppo e della marginalità del Mezzogiorno è immediatamente visualizzabile solo che si corra con la mente alla pionieristica opera di E. De Martino8; e più avanti emergerà con maggiore evidenza. L'impatto tra modelli tradizionali e modelli moderni, dal livello politico-economico a quello simbolico-culturale, ha sedimentato nel Mezzogiorno specifiche tipologie di fenomeni sociali: l'industrializzazione dipendente, l'emigrazione, la terziarizzazione in chiave di sussidio, la concentrazione urbana povera, la desertificazione rurale, la marginalità sociale e culturale, etc.9. Fenomeni che sono stati assunti dalla ricerca sociologica come fattori ed elementi disvelatori della "degradazione sociale". I processi della modernizzazione del Mezzogiorno hanno preso principio col secondo dopoguerra e possono ritenersi conclusi con la seconda metà degli anni '70; epoca a partire dalla quale il Mezzogiorno d'Italia non è più definibile come "unità di sottosviluppo", ma si mostra con una molteplicità di "modelli di sviluppo" e di "persistenze di sottosviluppo"10. La modernizzazione del Mezzogiorno è stata pilotata dalle strutture politico-istituzionali dello Stato repubblicano. La diffusione dall'alto del principio di razionalità, la sottrazione di intere sfere di influenza ai reticoli parentali-familisti, il predominio delle strutture politiche su quelle educative ed amministrative, l'organizzazione periferica dello Stato e la nuova divisione internazionale del lavoro, in particolare, hanno eroso le tradizioni, le culture, i comportamenti e gli stili di vita delle popolazioni meridionali. V'è una regolarità nella storia antica e moderna del Mezzogiorno: il rapporto contraddittorio tra strutture del potere e classi popolari. Nel senso che l'un termine del rapporto è fortemente attratto e, allo stesso tempo, respinto dall'altro. Le strutture del potere si sono sempre sovraimposte ai vincoli parentali-familistici delle classi sociali popolari. Ne è conseguito che le seconde, da un lato, si sono rivolte alle prime per esigenze di protezione e di sussidiazione; dall'altro, si sono immunizzate da esse, organizzando la "famiglia" e la "parentela" come "gruppo sociale di difesa e di vita alternativa"11. Il ciclo storico repubblicano ha confermato e rafforzato, a suo modo, tali tendenze. Tra "l'alto" e il "basso" della politica e della società si sono sempre insinuate delle linee di cesura non facilmente ricomponibili e, in ogni caso, mediate e recuperate da complesse procedure di rappresentazione e comunicazione simbolica. Importante è, in proposito, il ruolo di "collante" giocato dagli usi e costumi delle tradizioni locali che hanno garantito il mantenimento di un "ponte" tra la "classe superiore" e la "classe subordinata", onde "impedire fratture e risentimenti che potrebbero diventare pericolosi"; paradigmatici, in proposito, i "vincoli di comparatico"12. Sul punto, reperiamo in azione sia le "capacità di risposta" e di "rielaborazione culturale" delle classi subalterne che le capacità di coagulazione e socializzazione indotta tipiche delle culture alte. L'applicazione del modello industrial-urbano delle "società del benessere", incardinate sulla crescita di scala dei beni strumentali, non è valsa a trarre d'impaccio dalla marginalità e dall'arretratezza le aree depresse, sia al livello nazionale che a quello internazionale. Anzi, proprio l'applicazione di tale modello, con i corollari del "mito dello sviluppo", del "mito dell'industrializzazione" e del "mito dell'urbanizzazione", ha aggravato le cause di depressione 7 G. Germani, Sociologia della modernizzazione. Il caso dell'America Latina, Bari, Laterza, 1975, pp. 18-19. 8 Di E. De Martino cfr. Morte e pianto rituale nel mondo antico, Torino, Einaudi, 1958; Sud e magia, Milano, Feltrinelli, 1966. 9 Sul complesso di tali fenomeni cfr., per tutti, A. Del Monte-A. Giannola, Il Mezzogiorno nell'economia italiana, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1978; AA.VV., Crisi industriale e sistemi locali nel Mezzogiorno, Milano, Angeli, 1985; M. D'Antonio (a cura di), Il Mezzogiorno degli anni '80: dallo sviluppo imitativo allo sviluppo autocentrato, Milano, Angeli, 1985; Associazione culturale Relazioni, Dall'emergenza allo sviluppo? Stato e sistemi locali nell'industrializzazione post-sismica della provincia di Avellino, Avellino, Associazione culturale Relazioni, 1990. 10 Cfr. AA.VV., Crisi industriale sistemi locali..., cit; Associazione culturale Relazioni, Dall'emergenza allo sviluppo? ..., cit. 11A. Drago-R. Mangaro, Religiosità del sottoproletariato napoletano e gruppi ecclesiali: interpretazione psicosociologica, "Animazione sociale", gennaio-marzo 1973; cit. da F. D'Agostino, La "grammatica" dello sviluppo, Napoli, Liguori, 1984, p. 29. 12 A. Pizzorno, Familismo amorale e marginalità storica, in E. Banfield, Le basi morali di una società arretrata, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1976, pp. 246-247. 43 e di stagnazione delle aree e delle economie povere. Non che sviluppo, industrializzazione e urbanizzazione siano un "male in sé"; nemmeno sono, però, un "bene in sé". Ciò che importa sono i processi materiali e i modelli differenziali attraverso i quali sviluppo, industrializzazione e urbanizzazione aderiscono alla particolarità delle situazioni in cui intervengono, rispettandone l'humus culturale e fertilizzandone l'habitat circostante. Allora, ciò che rileva non è l'approccio econometrico che risolve lo sviluppo, l'industrializzazione e l'urbanizzazione nella quantizzazione delle "risorse materiali". L'ipotesi quantitativa è stata prevalente nelle politiche economiche occidentali contemporanee, perlomeno a partire dal "Punto quarto" di Truman e dal "Piano Marshall", secondo cui il difetto di risorse è, in primo luogo, se non esclusivamente, deficit di capitali. Pertanto, l'aumento del volume dei capitali si risolverebbe automaticamente nell'aumento corrispettivo del volume delle risorse materiali. Così non è stato: l'impiego di masse di capitali costantemente crescenti non ha attenuato il ritardo delle aree sottosviluppate a confronto di quelle sviluppate; anzi. Il fatto è che, in questo modello, si sono ignorate le specificità storico-culturali e socio-economiche delle aree a sviluppo ritardato. "Dimenticanza" che ha dato luogo a un effetto perverso di portata esiziale: il volume delle risorse monetarie impiegato ha finito col contrapporsi alle capacità e alle trame relazionali dei sistemi locali13, pietrificandone i ritardi a tutti i livelli. La tendenza si è dispiegata secondo una legge di proporzionalità diretta: quanto maggiore è stato ed è il volume delle risorse monetarie, tanto maggiore è risultato e risulta essere l'effetto di shock prodotto nei sistemi locali caratterizzati da sviluppo ritardato. 2. I dilemmi dello sviluppo Soltanto negli anni '70 si afferma un approccio di confutazione conseguente dell'ipotesi quantitativa dello sviluppo. Siffatto approccio è definibile ecologico-sistemico ed è opera di W. Wiesskopf14. Esso verte sulla concezione dell'essere umano quale ecosistema, le cui pluridimensioni e i cui plurilivelli debbono ricevere pari attenzione e alimentazione; garantendo, ovviamente, la comunicazione e la interazione tra le dimensioni e i livelli differenti. Le variabili dell'ecosistema di Wiesskopf, oltre a quella dello sviluppo economico, possono così riassumersi: a) la dimensione del significato: lo sviluppo spirituale; b) la dimensione dei valori: lo sviluppo normativo; c) la dimensione dell'ignoto: lo sviluppo trascendentale; d) la dimensione del sentimento: lo sviluppo affettivo; e) la dimensione dell'amore: lo sviluppo della vita in comune15. L'approccio ecosistemico torna particolarmente calzante, a fronte dei processi di mondializzazione dell'economia, degli scambi e delle comunicazioni, entro i quali si afferma il "paradosso" della crescita dei fenomeni della marginalità e del degrado urbano, sia nei sistemi centrali che in quelli periferici. La redistribuzione delle risorse tra le varie dimensioni dell'ecosistema umano e delle relazioni economiche internazionali risulta bloccata in punti chiave. Ancora di più: per quello che concerne da vicino l'Italia, la produzione stessa delle risorse incontra punti limite non facilmente superabili, conservando i paradigmi e i moduli di intervento prevalenti. Il costante crescere del divario tra Mezzogiorno e Centro-Nord del paese, il rapido e inarrestabile decadimento del patrimonio infrastrutturale e del potenziale urbano del Mezzogiorno traducono a scala locale questi fenomeni esogeni; alimentati, del pari, dalle carenze tipiche della base endogena. Una lettura dello specifico meridionale deve, pertanto, darsi in chiave esogena/endogena. Il meridionalismo, fino a tutti gli anni '80, è venuto meno proprio di fronte a questa esigenza di lettura integrata, nella dimensione in cui ha apprestato modelli dualistici in- 13 Per rilevazione del vuoto di analisi intorno alle capacità e ai rapporti presenti nelle "economie del benessere", cfr. H. Gintis, A Radical Analysis of Welfare Economics and Individual Development, "Quarterly Journal of Economics", novembre 1972; M. Agostin, Economics Welfare and Wievs of Man, "Alternatives", II, 1976; F. D'Agostino, op. cit., cap. II. 14 W. Wiesskopf, Alienation and Economy, New York, 1971. 15 Cfr. F. D'Agostino, op. cit., p. 45. 44 teramente fondati sulla base endogena o sulla base esogena16. Per quanto concerne la base esogena, torna particolarmente stimolante il discorso che, nel 1976, propone F. Hirsch a proposito dei "limiti sociali" allo sviluppo17. Uno dei dilemmi dello sviluppo capitalistico, per Hirsch, riposa nella circostanza che aliquote consistenti del "prodotto reale" delle economie delle società avanzate sono sottratte alla produzione di beni e servizi materiali, per essere dirottate verso i "beni posizionali". Per beni posizionali sono, secondo Hirsch, da intendersi le qualità e le funzioni proprie delle "aree residenziali", le quali quanto più sono soggette ad impiego, tanto più deperiscono ed entrano in congestione. Ora, mentre la dinamica dei beni e dei servizi materiali è soggetta ad espansioni di scala, la dinamica dei beni posizionali è caratterizzata da una relazione domanda/offerta assai rigida, per il semplice motivo che l'offerta di beni posizionali non può essere illimitatamente aumentata. Le aree residenziali e le relative funzioni urbane si contraggono: a misura della loro contrazione, lievitano i prezzi e i flussi monetari che vi sono collegati. È, questo, un fenomeno capillarmente indagato dai sociologi urbani; e investigato per la prima volta da Marx, con le sue analisi sulla "rendita differenziale"18. Hirsch, a dire il vero, è ancora più preciso e identifica, in proposito, una divaricazione perversa tra (i) sviluppo dell'economia dei beni strumentali e (ii) sviluppo dell'economia dei beni posizionali. Il primo è funzione del "reddito reale assoluto"; il secondo, del "reddito individuale relativo". Cosicché, mentre la crescita dei beni strumentali importa l'incremento dello sviluppo economico, l'espansione dei beni posizionali si traduce in un detrimento dello sviluppo economico: nella proporzione in cui aumenta il ruolo e si accrescono le funzioni dei beni posizionali, si indeboliscono i fattori causali dell'espansione economica. Lo stadio dello sviluppo, a questo snodo, si imbottiglia in un circolo chiuso: «Oggi tutte le cose più appetibili nella nostra società sono posizionali. Il risultato è una frustrazione dello sviluppo reale, dovuta all'impossibilità di espandere l'offerta dei beni più richiesti»19. Lo spazio urbano tende a divenire lo spazio dei beni posizionali, in cui gli scambi, le interazioni e le relazioni comunicative sono afferrati dalla logica egotico-gruppuscolare della lievitazione del differenziale di ricchezza immanente alle posizioni individuali, in un gioco sequenziale di corrosione delle quote della ricchezza altrui. Più che alla produzione di qualità sociali nuove, si assiste alla lotta senza quartiere per la spartizione e la redistribuzione funzionali delle qualità sociali preesistenti, in una sorta di crudo "corpo a corpo" tra individui e gruppi sociali contrapposti. Le città e i luoghi dell'abitare e del vivere, nel centro come nelle periferie del mondo, sono letteralmente divorati da questi limiti etico-sociali connaturati ai loro processi di formazione. Lo spazio urbano di rango superiore, laddove effettivamente si giocano i ruoli e le qualità urbane avanzate, è interessato da una compressione geometrica costante, ai confini di cui si dilatano e proliferano i territori marginali. Si riproducono, così, i territori divisi eppur comunicanti dello spazio compresso e dello spazio marginale, in cui: a) il bene casa diviene un bene sempre più raro, in una sorta di imbuto le cui qualità sociali scadono in una progressione inarrestabile; b) gli ecosistemi urbani vengono interessati da crescenti processi di inquinamento e degrado ecologico-etico; c) si dilatano a macchia d'olio i fenomeni di implosione/esplosione del legame sociale e di caduta dei vincoli di solidarietà; d) la devianza giovanile e la solitudine degli anziani, da dato patologico, tendono ad assumere il ruolo di elemento fisiologico-strutturale nella mappa del degrado urbano. Prendono luogo da qui processi di marginalità urbana strettamente collegati a processi di marginalità posizionale. Particolarmente nelle periferie urbane e nelle zone periferiche dello sviluppo, come nel caso del Mezzogiorno, l'intreccio di marginalità urbana e marginalità posizionale costituisce una miscela altamente esplosiva. La dinamica di accesso allo spazio urbano e ai beni posizionali, oltre a produrre fasce e aree sociali di marginalità, promuove la costituzione dell'individuo marginale, i cui diritti civico-politici ed etico-materiali sono formalmente 16 Per una critica di primo approccio a queste tendenze, cfr. G. Bonazzi-A. Bagnasco-S. Casillo, Industria e potere politico. L'organizzazione della marginalità in una provincia meridionale, Torino, L'Impresa Edizioni, 1972; in particolare, il cap. I. 17 F. Hirsch, I limiti sociali allo sviluppo, Milano, Feltrinelli, 1981. 18 K. Marx, Il Capitale, Libro III, cit. 19 F. D'Agostino, op. cit., p. 60. Sul punto, cfr. anche M. Paci, Discussione su "I limiti sociali allo sviluppo" di Fred Hirsch, "Stato e mercato", n. 1, 1981. 45 garantiti , ma nella sostanza elusi. La sociologia americana, intorno agli anni '30, ha argomentato di "uomo marginale" con esclusivo riferimento agli immigrati (ebrei), ai mulatti e altre minoranze che, nel corso delle generazioni, conservano legami forti con le loro tradizioni originarie, ritrovandosi, così, in una posizione di marginalità da non-appartenenza20. Di contro si ergeva ed erge la nozione della marginalità (di derivazione marxista) concepita quale esclusione dalle strutture di comando economiche, sociali, politiche e culturali, particolarmente elaborata dalla sociologia latinoamericana21. In un universo teorico assai prossimo all'impostazione marxista e neomarxista è stata definita la categoria di "marginalità meridionale"22. 3. La marginalità meridionale Il concetto di marginalità che stiamo progressivamente approssimando si discosta da tutti questi indirizzi, pur non prescindendo dalle loro risultanze analitiche. Innanzitutto, a monte dei processi della marginalità identifichiamo e situiamo fenomeni polifunzionali e multivalenti, non riconducibili univocamente o alla causale economica o alla causale sociale o alla causale politica o alla causale culturale. Inoltre, la scala della marginalità non è di tipo evoluzionista: la prospettiva marginale non contrassegna in esclusiva lo stadio inferiore del sottosviluppo o della dipendenza, ma anche quello superiore dello sviluppo e della crescita economica. Infine, il margine è indissociabile dal centro: i processi urbano-sociali, economico-politici e simbolico-culturali che sono alla base della produzione del centro sono invariabilmente a monte della produzione del margine; e viceversa. Esistono un centro nel margine e un margine nel centro; un centro marginale e un margine centrale. Tra margine e centro, dunque, non si dà quella dialettica degli stadi di passaggio lineari che, dagli anni '60 ai '90 del Novecento, è stata variamente concettualizzata. La razionalità degli stadi di passaggio, al contrario, è di tipo nonlineare, poiché entro le medesime scale nazionali e internazionali, fino a quelle locali, margine e centro sono in un'inscindibile relazione di intercomunicazione funzionale. La marginalità attiene sia a situazioni di non-sviluppo che a situazioni di sviluppo. A questo punto dell'analisi, si rende necessaria la ricognizione su alcuni topoi delle teorie della "marginalità meridionale". Agli inizi degli anni '70, va prendendo forma un nuovo meridionalismo che pone come principale fuoco delle proprie analisi il meccanismo dello "sviluppo ineguale", letto in termini di polarizzazione centro/periferia. Il centro è assunto come "polo di sviluppo" industriale-urbano che, nella sua evoluzione socio-economica, produce aree di marginalità al suo interno e al suo esterno. L'industrializzazione per poli e l'urbanizzazione non controllata del Mezzogiorno, secondo questo approccio, riproducono nel medesimo tessuto meridionale la dialettica centro/periferia, modificando radicalmente i termini storici e politici della 20 Cfr. R. E. Faris, Human Migration and the Marginal Man, "American Journal of Sociology", XXXIII, 1928; E. V. Stonequist, The Marginal Man, New York, 1937. 21 Cfr. F. H. Cardoso, op. cit.; Cuadernos Desal (Centro Para el desarollo economico y social), Marginalidad en America Latina. Un ensayo de diagnostico, Herder, Barcellona, 1969; J. Petras, Politics and Sociale Structure in Latin America, New York, Monthly Rewiew, 1970; H. Cardoso, Commentario sobre los conceptos de sobrapopulacion relativa y marginalidad, "Revista Latino-americana de Ciencias Sociales", n. 12, 1971; D. Ribeiro, El desafio de la marginalidad, "Estudios Internacionales", IV, 1971; J. Nun, Proposte per lo sviluppo della marginalità e della partecipazione in America Latina, "Community Development", n. 25-26, 1971; AA.VV., Imperialismo e urbanizzazione in America Latina, Milano, Mazzotta, 1972; G. Germani, Aspectos teoricos de la marginalidad, "Revista paraguaya de Sociologia", IX, 1972; Gabriella Turnaturi (a cura di), Marginalità e classi sociali, Roma, Savelli, 1976. 22 Cfr. C. Donolo, Sviluppo ineguale e disgregazione sociale. Note per l'analisi delle classi nel Meridione, "Quaderni piacentini", n. 47, 1972; C. Donolo-R. Scartezzini, Sviluppo ineguale e marginalità: elementi per l'analisi sociale del Meridione, "International Rewiew of Community Development", n. 27-28, 1972; R. Catanzaro-R. Moscati, Classi sociali e riproduzione della marginalità nel Mezzogiorno, "Quaderni di Rassegna sindacale", n. 71, 1978; A. Bianchi-F. Granato-D. Zingarelli (a cura di) Marginalità e lotte di marginali, Milano, Angeli, 1979; E. Pugliese, Evoluzione della struttura di classe nel Mezzogiorno, in A. Graziani-E. Pugliese (a cura di), Investimenti e disoccupazione nel Mezzogiorno, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1979; F. D'Agostino, op. cit. 46 - "questione meridionale". La caratteristica precipua del Mezzogiorno starebbe nella convivenza dei fenomeni della marginalità esterna (con riferimento alle scale extrasistemiche internazionali e nazionali) con i fenomeni della marginalità interna (con riferimento alle scale infrasistemiche locali). La marginalità interna al polo di sviluppo viene qui, pertanto, vista funzionare come "momento cruciale nella struttura sociale", fino ad assumere il ruolo e le funzioni di "portatore della contraddizione principale prodotta dal meccanismo di sviluppo"23. Allora, sia il non-sviluppo che lo sviluppo sono processi generatori di marginalità. Lo sviluppo genera fenomeni di marginalità centrale e periferica nelle aree territoriali in cui insiste; il non-sviluppo funge quale dislocatore e accentratore di marginalità diffusa. Su queste basi, si è costruita una morfologia generale della marginalità meridionale: a) marginalità sistemica; b) marginalità empirica; c) relazioni di marginalità24. Sul piano più strettamente storico, invece, il passaggio identificato è quello che conduce dalla marginalità storica alla emarginazione nello sviluppo e alla deprivazione relativa 25. Nelle condizioni di emarginazione nello sviluppo e di deprivazione relativa, la marginalità si sostanzia in maniera deleteria in un dirottamento dei "trasferimenti alle famiglie" e dei "contributi alla produzione" verso «attività di intermediazione, di creazione di rendite e verso attività produttive non in grado di promuovere sviluppo»26. In questa ottica, la marginalità è il prodotto dello «sviluppo dipendente e la sua crescita si esprime nella crescente distanza tra centro e periferia con la separazione e ghettizzazione della sua formazione. Essa diviene il "milieu" dove si formano i poveri, gli analfabeti, le vittime e non solo i soggetti della violenza»27. I processi della dipendenza, secondo la dialettica centro/periferia, sono qui alla base della marginalità che, a sua volta, diviene il terreno di coltura di comportamenti illegali e di fenomeni di caduta dei vincoli etico-solidaristici. Quanto più si accentuano le fenomenologie della dipendenza, tanto più si consolidano modelli di organizzazione sociale che sfuggono alle mediazioni e al controllo delle strutture istituzionali, dando luogo a processi di gerarchizzazione sociale e territoriale sempre più eccentrici rispetto al patronage statuale e sempre più attratti nelle cerchie della razionalità del dispositivo criminale28. Mafia e camorra costituiscono, da questo lato, «modelli riusciti di organizzazione sociale là dove lo stato e le strutture pubbliche o aziendali falliscono nel generare attività autopropulsive e perpetuano la dipendenza dal welfare state»29. 4. Persistenti aporie Al di là delle importanti acquisizioni positive dovute alla ricategorizzazione e rimessa in campo della "marginalità meridionale" che abbiamo appena schematizzato, vanno rilevati alcuni limiti di fondo. Limitandoci all'insieme delle implicazioni che più direttamente ineriscono i temi e i problemi della nostra ricerca, dobbiamo reperire l'involontario e contraddittorio ancoraggio a un teorema forte dell'economia politica classica e neoclassica. Quello secondo cui alla crescita lineare dello sviluppo corrisponderebbe la crescita lineare della modernità30; dal quale viene, di fatto, dedotto un corollario che collega alla crescita lineare di sviluppo e modernità la 23 C. Donolo, op. cit., p. 108. 24 F. D'Agostino, op. cit., p. 93. 25 C. Donolo, op. cit., pp. 113-115. Per il concetto di "deprivazione relativa", si rinvia a W. G. Runciman, Relative Deprivation and Social Justice, London, Routledge & Keagan Paul, 1966. Per la discussione del concetto e la sua applicazione al Mezzogiorno italiano, si rinvia ad Antonio Petrillo, Linee di frontiera ..., cit. 26 R. Catanzaro, Struttura sociale, sistema politico e azione collettiva nel Mezzogiorno, "Stato e mercato", n. 8, 1983, pp. 294-295. Ma dello stesso autore già: Le cinque Sicilie. Disarticolazione sociale e struttura di classe in un'economia dipendente, "Rassegna italiana di sociologia", n. 1, 1979; L'imprenditore assistito, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1979. 27 F. D'Agostino, op. cit., p. 94. 28 Sia consentito rinviare ad A. Chiocchi, Spirali. Genealogie e strategie di mafia e camorra, Mercogliano (Av), Quaderni di "Società e conflitto", n. 11, 1996. 29 F. D'Agostino, op. cit., p. 95; corsivo nostro. 30 Per la critica di tale indirizzo e delle relative "scuole", cfr. G. Bonazzi-A. Bagnasco-S. Casillo, op. cit., pp. 24-27. 47 lineare dilatazione dell'economia e della fenomenologia marginali. Al "modello endogeno omogeneo" dello sviluppo proprio del teorema31 finisce col corrispondere un modello omogeneo della marginalità che è tipico del corollario; pur permanendo tra teorema e corollario una spiccata relazione di alterità, soprattutto in termini di predisposizioni e collocazioni politiche. Il che conduce a situare quei nessi opposizionali tra marginalità e modernità, tra sviluppo autosostenuto e sviluppo eterosostenuto, mediante cui ritornano sulla scena le dicotomie del meridionalismo classico. Nella catena delle relazioni binarie qui in competizione valgono vincoli euristici aventi carattere strategico. Per il teorema del modello endogeno omogeneo, il principio strategico positivo è dato dalla valenza di universalità dello sviluppo; per il corollario del modello omogeneo della marginalità, il principio strategico positivo risiede nel differenziale locale dello sviluppo. Per il primo, lo sviluppo economico omologherebbe a livello planetario società originariamente diverse32; per il secondo, solo i differenziali dello sviluppo autosostenuto sarebbero in grado di rompere il cerchio della dipendenza e tutte le implicazioni connesse. Per il primo, le società arretrate altro non possono essere che la fotocopia di quelle più avanzate; per il secondo, le società arretrate debbono assomigliare il meno possibile, se non per niente, alle società avanzate. In tutti e due i casi, si rompono, su fronti speculari, anelli decisivi della catena complessa dei processi di sviluppo, modernizzazione e marginalità. Le teorie della "marginalità meridionale", nonostante l'innegabile progresso a confronto del meridionalismo storico e la messa a punto di una mole di analisi capillari e stimolanti, finiscono preda del circolo vizioso della falsa alternativa universalismo/particolarismo. Rovesciando gli assiomi dei modelli universalistici, esse imputano un massimo di staticità alle società sviluppate e un massimo di dinamicità alle società arretrate, in ragione direttamente proporzionale alla messa in opera dei moduli dello sviluppo autopropulsivo. Ora, pare largamente accertato che il tipo di sviluppo concretatosi nelle società occidentali avanzate non sia applicabile su scala planetaria e che, altresì, rechi al suo interno strutturali limiti di carattere etico-sociale. Nondimeno, questa tipologia dello sviluppo non può essere superata, muovendo unicamente dalla dimensione locale/periferica; ma agendo dall'interno della sua struttura complessa (locale/globale), attraverso processi di trasformazione costruttivi di ordini caratterizzati da un più elevato grado di civiltà ed emancipazione, da un sistema diffuso di equità sociale e da efficaci princípi di giustizia distributiva, da culture e relazioni di comunicazione, cooperazione e solidarietà più avanzate ed evolute. Si tratta di avviare e mandare a segno un concreto e indifferibile programma per un corretto e produttivo rapporto fra tradizione, modernità e mutamento; programma particolarmente urgente per i sistemi locali del Mezzogiorno italiano33. Secondo la importante lezione di Barrington Moore jr., in questione è un mutamento di Weltanschauung: dalla visione olistica e consensuale della società è necessario trascorrere alla visione pluralistica e conflittuale della società34. Soprattutto il Mezzogiorno d'Italia reclama l'elaborazione e la messa in pratica di una più avanzata e flessibile nozione di democrazia: la democrazia delle differenze 35. 5. Il circolo chiuso Ma esiste un ulteriore e non meno interessante profilo definitorio della "marginalità meridionale": quello secondo cui essa sarebbe l'idealtipo di un ambito spazio-temporale e storicoculturale che genera se stesso all'infinito. Il circolo chiuso della marginalità che riproduce marginalità è collegato alle "grandi narrazio- 31 Ibidem, p. 25. 32 Una confutazione di tale approccio, si trova in R. Bendix, Stato nazionale e integrazione di classe, Bari, Laterza, 1969. 33 La discussione più articolata della problematica si trova in A. Chiocchi, Il filo e la trama. Culture, identità e codici politici nel Mezzogiorno, Mercogliano (Av), Associazione culturale Relazioni, 1997. Per una prima enucleazione positiva del discorso, cfr. l'"Editoriale": Multiversum meridionale, del monografico Cultura, poteri locali e società nel Mezzogiorno. Percorsi di analisi dall'Ottocento al Novecento (a cura del C.Ri. Mez.), "Società e conflitto", n. 13/14, 1996. 34 B. Moore jr., Le origini sociali della democrazia e della dittatura, Torino, Einaudi, 1969. 35 Gruppo di Ricerca su "Società e conflitto", Sinistra e Mezzogiorno tra centro e periferia, "Società e conflitto", n. 1, 1990, p. 208; successivamente in Snodi. Percorsi di analisi sugli anni '60 e '70, Avellino, Quaderni di "Società e conflitto", n. 5, 1995. 48 ni " partorite da due letture diametralmente opposte: a) quella che posiziona la possibilità del mutamento come risultante dell'intervento correttivo della mano pubblica36; b) quella che sostiene l'impossibilità di un intervento correttivo-riformatore del meccanismo di sviluppo capitalistico37. A seconda dell'applicazione della prima o della seconda chiave interpretativa, l'analisi dei risultati e i relativi giudizi storico-politici delle politiche pubbliche meridionaliste si capovolgono di significato e di contenuto38; soprattutto, a fronte della circostanza che ambedue le chiavi di lettura hanno agganci con la struttura sociale dei processi e dei cambiamenti avvenuti nel Mezzogiorno d'Italia. Da questo dato obiettivo partono Bonazzi, Bagnasco e Casillo, per approssimare un "modello interpretativo nuovo", idoneo a cogliere "la realtà nella complessità dei suoi aspetti multiformi e contraddittori", più adeguato "alla comprensione dei variegati aspetti del social change in Italia"39. Si può senz'altro dire: È vero che gli interventi correttivi hanno provocato risultati positivi, ma è anche vero che questi si sono verificati nelle situazioni di relativamente minore marginalità; è vero che le situazioni di marginalità estrema si sono ridotte, ma è anche vero che nel loro interno la logica della marginalità si è ulteriormente rafforzata... dall'osservazione di quanto è avvenuto in Italia, ci sembra che la tesi di Myrdal possa essere integrata dall'ipotesi che, coeteris paribus, l'efficacia degli interventi vari grandemente a seconda del grado di marginalità in cui essi sono attuati40. La delimitazione di quest'angolo di osservazione pare certamente più equilibrata, convincente e fondata. V'è, però, da osservare che in questo profilo definitorio resta da precisare meglio proprio l'oggetto specifico dell'analisi: la marginalità. Il campo della "marginalità che produce se stessa" è, sì, operante con relativa autonomia, ma solo se non si astrae dalla problematica relazionale centro/margine che abbiamo identificato nelle pagine che precedono. Fuori dal campo di influenza del centro non si dà margine; bensì miseria e povertà. Per converso, fuori dal campo di vigenza e comunicazione della marginalità non si dà "produzione del centro da parte del centro". In questo senso, colgono nel segno Bonazzi, Bagnasco e Casillo laddove ci avvertono che esiste una "logica più generale", coinvolgente "centralità e marginalità in un unico e continuo processo dialettico, di portata nazionale"41. 6. La prospettiva storica mondiale La particolare complessità e importanza del rapporto centro/margine attiene non soltanto al livello nazionale, ma anche ai patterns dello sviluppo economico a livello mondiale in quest' ultimo cinquantennio. Sul finire degli anni '80, G. Arrighi ha proposto una lettura del quadro sistemico di tali processi42. Sul lungo periodo (in questo caso: l'ordine temporale di mezzo secolo) e sulla scala planetaria, Arrighi non rileva sostanziali balzi in avanti nello sviluppo economico e nella crescita del benessere. Definiti tre livelli di reddito/benessere procapite (alto, intermedio e basso), egli rileva, nel raggruppamento degli Stati e della popolazione mondiale, fenomeni di mobilità stagnante dall'alto in basso e dal basso in alto, con una situazione stazionaria intorno al livello intermedio; in ulteriore determinazione, gli sbalzi dall'alto in basso e dal basso in alto, sul lungo termine, tendono ad essere compensati da movimenti simmetrici43. I fenomeni della mobilità si dispiegano tutti sul breve termine; essi, pertanto, definiscono una 36 G. Myrdal, op. cit. 37 Cfr., in particolare, le opere di Baran e Frank citate nella nota n. 5. 38 Per un'acuta rassegna critica delle due tesi, cfr. G. Bonazzi-A. Bagnasco-S. Casillo, op. cit., pp. 49-52. 39 Ibidem, p. 51. 40 Ibidem, p. 51. 41 Ibidem, p. 52. 42 G. Arrighi, Le relazioni Nord-Sud in una prospettiva storica mondiale, Nord e Sud", n. 4, 1989. 43 Ibidem, p. 123. 49 situazione di developmentalist illusion 44. La situazione di "illusione dello sviluppo" fa sì che i differenziali di livello siano in aumento sul lungo periodo e in diminuzione sul breve-medio. Nell'analisi di Arrighi, solo due sono i casi di mobilità verso l'alto: a) dal livello basso al livello intermedio: Co-rea del Sud, Taiwan; b) dal livello intermedio al livello alto: Giappone, Italia. c) Uno soltanto, invece, il caso di mobilità verso il basso: d) dal livello intermedio a quello basso: Ghana. Ecco come Arrighi descrive la dinamica Nord/Sud sul lungo periodo: Al riavvicinamento è seguito un drammatico ampliamento di entrambi i divari, per cui oggi essi sono tanto ampi quanto cinquant'anni fa in termini relativi e molto più in termini assoluti. Particolarmente drammatica è stata la perdita di ricchezza in termini assoluti e relativi del gruppo intermedio di Paesi che negli anni Ottanta ha perso tutto quello che aveva guadagnato nei trent'anni precedenti45. La curva della stabilità della distribuzione della ricchezza su scala mondiale, nel lungo periodo, è contestuale a quella delle immani trasformazioni sociali avvenute in tutti i paesi, soprattutto nel livello intermedio, nel corso del ciclo storico 1950-1975. Come avverte E. Hobsbawm, in un testo del 1986: ... il periodo dal 1950 al 1975... ha vissuto il cambiamento sociale più spettacolare, rapido, profondo, di grande portata e diffuso della storia... è stato il primo periodo in cui la classe contadina è diventata una minoranza, non soltanto nei paesi industrialmente sviluppati, in molti dei quali ha conservato una certa forza, ma anche nei paesi del Terzo mondo46. Se questo è il quadro sistemico, Arrighi ne deduce la crisi: a) delle teorie della modernizzazione: le quali «incontrano difficoltà insormontabili nello spiegare come e perché mezzo secolo di sforzi generalizzati per lo sviluppo abbiano prodotto così poco in termini di cambiamenti nella distribuzione della ricchezza»; b) delle teorie della dipendenza: le quali «incontrano difficoltà altrettanto insormontabili nello spiegare come e perché un processo così diffuso di industrializzazione abbia preso piede e, soprattutto, come e perché un così vasto gruppo di paesi intermedi sia sfuggito alle tendenze polarizzanti dell'economia mondiale»47. Passiamo ad illustrare gli elementi principali dello schema tripolare strutturale centro/semiperiferia/periferia di Arrighi48: 1) Le innovazioni politiche, economiche e sociali costituiscono il "momento centrale" dell' accumulazione e dell'espansione della ricchezza nazionale. Il centro viene, con ciò, a trovarsi in una situazione di vantaggio decisivo, in quanto inizializzatore dei processi di innovazione; inoltre, esso protegge/nasconde tali processi dall'interferenza degli altri due livelli, delle cui innovazioni, comunque, si appropria. La posizione di centro cumula, dunque, una mole considerevole di "vantaggi comparati"; i quali "vantaggi comparati" spiegano la "stabilità della distribuzione globale della ricchezza nel lungo periodo. 2) I paesi del livello intermedio (la semiperiferia) sono quelli dotati delle più elevate capacità 44 Ibidem, p. 123. Arrighi si era già occupato del tema, in un saggio elaborato assieme a Jessica Drangel, The Developmentalist Illusion: A Reconceptualization of Semiperispheral Zone, "Rewiew", 1986. Successivamente è tornato sull'argomento con una Relazione presentata alla XXX "Conferenza di economia politica dei sistemi-mondo", tenuta all'Università dell'Illinois a Urbana-Champaign (2830 aprile 1989). Da questa Relazione ha tratto il saggio L'illusione dello sviluppo. Una riconcettualizzazione della semiperiferia, "Marx centouno", n.s., n. 6, 1991. 45 G. Arrighi, Le relazioni Nord-Sud..., cit., p. 134. 46 Cit. da G. Arrighi, op. ult. cit, pp. 124-125. 47 G. Arrighi, op. ult. cit., p. 125. 48 Come è noto, il concetto di semiperiferia si deve essenzialmente a I. Wallerstein, The Capitalist World Economy, New York, Cambridge Un. Press, 1979. Arrighi lo rielabora in qualche punto in un importante saggio scritto con Jessica Drangel: La stratificazione dell'economia mondo. Un'esplorazione della zona semiperiferica, "Marx centouno", n. 6, 1987. 50 di imitazione. In virtù di siffatta abilità di mimesi, da un canto, mantengono a debita distanza i paesi del livello basso (la periferia) e, dall'altro, stimolano i paesi centrali a introdurre ulteriori innovazioni che "riproducono ed approfondiscono il gap di ricchezza" che si trovano a subire. 3) La concentrazione dell'accumulazione del capitale nelle aree centrali si è espressa in sovraffollamenti periodici che hanno fatto lievitare la rendita e i salari a scapito dei profitti. Da qui la saturazione geografica dell'accumulazione, nel senso della spinta alla sua globalizzazione a scala planetaria in difesa del profitto. Tale stadio è raggiunto a cavallo del XIX e XX secolo. 4) Nel primo decennio del secondo dopoguerra, sotto l'egemonia degli Usa, avviene la ristrutturazione delle relazioni tra le imprese dell'economia mondiale e tra i paesi capitalistici, con l'obiettivo di favorire una nuova fase di espansione capitalistica sulla scorta del modello keynesiano-fordiano. 5) Nel ciclo che va dagli anni Cinquanta ai Sessanta, l'economia mondiale capitalistica ha conosciuto un periodo di espansione senza alcun precedente storico. Si è trattato di una fase di sviluppo economico generalizzato, con trasmissione alla periferia e alla semiperiferia di parziali benefici, "sotto forma di una domanda costantemente in espansione dei loro prodotti e delle loro risorse". 6) Intorno agli anni Settanta, si delinea un sistema di parità a tre fra Usa, Giappone e Germania, con la conseguente creazione di un serio sovraffollamento al centro nell'economia mondiale: l'accumulazione del capitale "fu caratterizzata da una serie di tendenze completamente nuove". 7) Si incuba qui un fenomeno di selettività del processo economico assai più rilevante che non in passato. La "espansione totale" subisce un rallentamento; la crescita "continuò nella semiperiferia per un altro decennio", con una novità sostanziale. Si deve rilevare che: La forza motrice della crescita semiperiferica negli anni Settanta fu diversa rispetto a quella del periodo di espansione generalizzata. La crescita semiperiferica cessò di essere un complemento della crescita del centro e ne divenne un sostituto. Il sovraffollamento rese un numero crescente di attività manifatturiere nel centro non profittevoli. Ne conseguì una corsa al taglio dei costi tra le imprese e i paesi del centro che, tra l'altro, favorì il decentramento delle attività manifatturiere più standardizzate verso la periferia. 8) Una delle conseguenze più eclatanti dell'aumento di selettività economica, in questa fase, sta nella riduzione del gap di ricchezza e nella scomparsa del gap di industrializzazione tra i paesi del centro e quelli della periferia. Al livello intermedio si introvertono, da qui, effetti negativi: Ma più la periferia si industrializza e la sua forza lavoro dipende dal salario per la sua riproduzione, tanto più diminuisce la competitività della semiperiferia come ubicazione delle attività manifatturiere, non soltanto rispetto al centro, che recupera parte della sua precedente competitività, ma anche rispetto a determinati paesi periferici caratterizzati da un costo di manodopera sostanzialmente inferiore. 9) Con gli anni Ottanta (Carter-Reagan) si apre una nuova fase dell'accumulazione di capitale su scala mondiale, contrassegnata da tre processi generali tra loro correlati: (i) la "rinascita finanziaria"; (ii) la "ricentralizzazione del capitale"; (iii) la dislocazione dell'Asia orientale quale "luogo privilegiato delle attività manifatturiere". Accanto a questi tre processi centrali si enucleano altri fenomeni di rilievo: (i) il "fallimento economico" delle economie a "pianificazione centralizzata"; (ii) il fallimento di molte "economie di mercato" nei paesi semiperiferici; (iii) il collasso economico-finanziario della maggioranza dei paesi latino-americani. 10) La congiuntura specificamente reaganiana presenta questi tratti distintivi: (i) pressione finanziaria generalizzata; (ii) concorrenza crescente di alcune economie semiperiferiche (Corea del Sud, Taiwan, Cina); (iii) riallocazione al centro delle risorse globali locali; (iv) riallocazione in periferia (Asia dell'Est) delle attività manifatturiere standardizzate; (v) collasso della semiperiferia sotto forma di incapacità/impossibilità di gestione dei nuovi livelli della competizione economica internazionale, con contestuale perdita degli standards faticosamente guadagnati 51 nei precedenti trent'anni49. 7. Economia-mondo e Mezzogiorno È interessante seguire l'applicazione al Mezzogiorno che Arrighi fa del suo schema tripolare. Innanzitutto, Arrighi individua due fasi dello sviluppo dell'economia sociale italiana e, conseguenzialmente, del Mezzogiorno. La prima fase ricopre il periodo che va dallo Stato post-unitario agli anni '60 del Novecento. Questa fase è eminentemente caratterizzata dalla "posizione anomala" che l'Italia occupa nello scacchiere internazionale, al livello delle relative gerarchie della ricchezza mondiale. L' Italia, difatti, si trova a metà strada tra il livello dei paesi centrali e il livello intermedio dei paesi della semiperiferia, andando a configurare una sorta di "perimetro del centro"50. La seconda fase si enuclea negli anni '70, in cui l'Italia tenta di sorpassare la "terra di nessuno" propria della posizione di "perimetro del centro". La riuscita del tentativo dipende da due fattori: a) la cooptazione politico-economica da parte degli Usa, nel clima delle politiche dei blocchi e della "guerra fredda"; b) la peculiarità della polarizzazione Nord/Sud del nostro paese che ha "protetto" dalla concorrenza internazionale le imprese nazionali51. Entro questo quadro il Mezzogiorno d'Italia gioca un ruolo lungo queste direttrici fondamentali: 1) Dà risposta positiva alla crescente domanda di forza-lavoro "elastica e poco costosa", in assonanza con quanto richiesto dai moduli della ristrutturazione keynesiana-fordista delle economie regionali più ricche dell'Europa, incluse quelle dell'Italia settentrionale. Nel ciclo 1955fine anni '60, il Mezzogiorno funziona come serbatoio della forza-lavoro più congeniale a questa tipologia di ristrutturazione, contribuendo in maniera rilevante allo sviluppo dell'economia italiana, sotto un duplice ordine di conseguenze: (i) l'allentamento dei vincoli della bilancia dei pagamenti, i quali avrebbero potuto, altrimenti, funzionare quali fattori di blocco dell'espansione economica del paese; (ii) la fornitura illimitata di forza-lavoro "semi-specializzata" alle industrie dell'Italia settentrionale, che ha consentito di adottare i nuovi standards di produzione attivati ai livelli alti dello sviluppo. 2) Questo ciclo si avvia ad un veloce esaurimento. L'emigrazione di massa degli anni '60 ha, sì, deperito le capacità di autoproduzione e vulnerato la competitività della forza-lavoro meridionale, ma anche segnato l'apertura di nuovi processi di mobilitazione sociale. Con la partecipazione degli operai meridionali immigrati alle lotte sindacali degli anni '60 e inizio '70 e con le coeve lotte nelle aree urbane meridionali per la casa, per il lavoro e per il reddito si estingue quel ciclo storico che ha visto funzionare il Mezzogiorno quale serbatoio di forza-lavoro ad alti contenuti di elasticità e a bassi tassi di remunerazione. 3) La mobilitazione della forza-lavoro meridionale coincide con le nuove tendenze al "taglio dei costi nell'economia mondiale". Non essendo più serbatoio di forza-lavoro a basso costo, il Mezzogiorno è stato tagliato fuori dalle nuove ristrutturazioni dell'economia internazionale. Così, alla fase dello sfruttamento fa seguito quella dell'esclusione52. Nel modello di Arrighi i flussi centro/margine sono intermediati dalla semiperiferia, concettualizzata a livello dei quadri sistemici dell'economia mondiale. L'impostazione ha il pregio di far meglio cogliere la dinamica e la statica dei processi economico-sociali a scala internazionale e nazionale. Ciò che non appare soddisfacente è la trasposizione lineare del modello sulla scala locale. O meglio: ciò che risalta è la mancata articolazione del modello sulla scala locale. I quadri analitici dello sviluppo autopropulsivo, al contrario, presentavano – come si è visto – il vantaggio di una migliore articolazione sul livello locale e una carenza fondamentale sul piano dell'indagine dei livelli globali. Si tratta, come già argomentato, di ricondurre ad una chiave di lettura complessa e articolata tanto la base endogena che quella esogena, tanto i processi centrali che quelli marginali, se si vuole (come si deve) correttamente identificare il "margine del centro" e il "centro del margine". Impostazione che sola può: 49 G. Arrighi, Le relazioni Nord-Sud..., cit., pp. 126-129. 50 Ibidem, p. 129. 51 Ibidem, pp. 130. 52 Ibidem, pp. 131-132. 52 a ) dar ragione della proliferazione dei modelli centrali in uno con la proliferazione dei modelli marginali; b) individuare la pluricausalità dei fattori complessi sottostanti. Con questo, intendiamo significare che: (i) al "centro" medesimo si segmenta una pluralità di centri; (ii) nel margine si stratifica una pluralità di margini; (iii) non tanto sul piano quantitativo quanto su quello qualitativo. La discussione sui divari interni 53 al Mezzogiorno può, in tal modo, essere fecondamente messa in comunicazione con quella sui divari esterni, per una più perspicua indagine e una migliore presa di consapevolezza delle identità e delle differenze dei sistemi centrali e dei sistemi locali. Un secondo limite è presente nell'ipotesi di Arrighi e, più in generale, riguarda sia l'approccio caratteristico dell'"economia-mondo" (a cui egli si richiama esplicitamente) che la stessa posizione marxista. Intendiamo riferirci al deficit teorico che risolve la problematica dello sviluppo nella problematica dell'accumulazione del capitale. La dialettica tripolare centro/semiperiferia/periferia qui non è che il risvolto della tripartizione sul territorio delle risorse e degli uomini operata dall'accumulazione capitalistica. Sviluppo del territorio e sviluppo industriale-accumulativo finiscono inesorabilmente col coincidere. Interamente inesplorati rimangono i flussi di relazioni che costruiscono e ricostruiscono materialmente il territorio e lo differenziano, nel corso del tempo e negli ambiti spaziali, al di là degli insediamenti produttivi, delle attività economiche e delle corrispettive reti di interazione e comunicazione. Il problema del territorio, con i suoi insiemi e sottoinsiemi spazio-temporali, è un problema cruciale nella formazione e nella elaborazione delle mappe delle identità di un popolo e di una nazione; di un gruppo etnico e di una formazione sociale; di una città metropolitana come di un piccolo e sperduto villaggio; di classi e ceti sociali come di singole individualità. L' esperienza e la percezione del territorio sono alcune delle esperienze e delle percezioni fondanti della condizione umana. L'analisi e le proposte debbono, pertanto, prestare massima attenzione ai sistemi di organizzazione, scomposizione e governo del territorio, in tutte le loro articolazioni. Tra gli "ordini" dello sviluppo economico e gli "ordini" dello sviluppo del territorio non si istituiscono rapporti lineari o di mera corrispondenza logico-formale; bensì catene relazionali discontinue e differenziali. I processi attraverso cui un modello di sviluppo e una formazione sociale si fanno territorio, spazio delle relazioni umane e delle città, ambito degli scambi, dei traffici e delle comunicazioni disegnano un ordito specifico che resta tutto da decifrare. Vi sono soggetti, strategie, piani, progetti, istituzioni specificamente imputati alla configurazione e al "taglio" del territorio, non coincidenti affatto con quelli attinenti alla sfera economica. "Ritagliare" il territorio non risponde a mere esigenze economiche, ma anche a bisogni di natura sociale e politico-istituzionale. La trama del disegno e del governo del territorio si compone di strategie di valorizzazione di alcune aree e di alcuni segni-messaggio e di devalorizzazione di altre aree e di altri segni-messaggio. La valorizzazione delle aree e dei segnimessaggio del centro e la devalorizzazione delle aree e dei segni-messaggio del margine non possono essere portate a compimento da strategie di pura connotazione economica. Esse rientrano in complessi processi di governo e riallocazione del territorio. Niente di più fuorviante che immaginare il territorio come l'inerte teatro dell'azione delle relazioni e delle decisioni economiche. Certo, nella pura logica delle relazioni economiche, esistono orientamenti prevalenti che concepiscono e usano il territorio in base alle considerazioni della maggiore utilità, a partire dalla partizione primaria tra spazio utile e spazio disutile. Partizione secondo cui lo spazio utile è sinonimo di spazio urbano centrale e lo spazio disutile è sinonimo di spazio marginale. Una razionalità di tipo accumulativo si impossessa dei sistemi e delle procedure di governo del territorio; ma giammai consente loro di domare sistematicamente e ultimativamente i fenomeni urbani e i potenziali territoriali. Ciò che deriva da questa sorta di "demone dell'accumulazione" è un meccanismo seriale di guasti e dissesti operati sul patrimonio urbano e ambientale, a cui è sempre più urgente porre rimedio. Solo da politiche del territorio emendate dal "demone dell'accumulazione" è lecito sperare l'attivazione di controtendenze alla riproduzione dello spazio marginale. Ora, se il processo di sviluppo coincidesse in toto con il processo di accumulazione, siffatta controtendenza sarebbe di impossibile attivazione e non si uscirebbe dal lacerante dilemma: marginalità o rivoluzione. Non è un caso – come si è visto – che imbottigliati in un dilemma di questo tipo siano finiti i modelli dell'insostenibilità dell'intervento correttivo dei 53 Per una puntuale e recente discussione del problema, cfr. G. Bottazzi, I Sud del Sud. I divari interni al Mezzogiorno e il rovesciamento delle gerarchie spaziali, "Meridiana", n. 10, 1990. 53 cicli accumulativi, a cui le "teorie della semiperiferia" e dell'economia-mondo debbono più di uno spunto di rilievo. 54 Cap . IV DALL'UMANITÀ IN GUERRA ALL'UMANITÀ DIALOGANTE 1. La dissoluzione del principio umanità In questo capitolo, ci proponiamo di allargare l'orizzonte temporale e spaziale dell'analisi. Partiamo da una considerazione base: molte pagine della storia della civiltà occidentale (ma non solo) sono state e tuttora sono segnate da una contraddizione lacerante: il principio umanità è stato ed è solennemente affermato e, nel contempo, flagrantemente violato. L'incongruenza tra l'enunciato formale del principio e i comportamenti etici, sociali e politici discende da una serie complessa e intricata di ragioni. Alcune di queste trovano alimento, prima ancora che in opzioni di tipo etico, in modelli di azione finalizzati a un utile particolaristico, grazie all'esercizio di molteplici forme di potere sull'Altro. Per giustificarsi, come abbiamo visto nei precedenti capitoli, il potere sull'Altro ricorre a codici di interpretazione culturale e rappresentazione sociale che qualificano la differenza e il diverso come un gradino inferiore nella scala evolutiva della civiltà umana. Trasformato culturalmente nell'inferiore che ci minaccia, l'Altro può essere eticamente aggredito in piena coerenza. Nostri sarebbero i valori; suoi i disvalori. Nostro sarebbe il diritto; suo il torto. Nostra sarebbe la pace; sua la guerra. Anche quando gli muoviamo guerra, lo faremmo in nome della pace: della nostra pace. Ci autoconvinciamo, insomma, che aggrediamo l'Altro, per neutralizzarne preventivamente le aggressioni, difendere la nostra civiltà e, con essa, la nostra superiorità. In realtà, stiamo difendendo prerogative e proiezioni di potere. Gli stereotipi culturali che vediamo proliferare sotto i nostri occhi nascono da questi archetipi che trasformano il principio umanità nel principio supremazia: il presunto primato della nostra cultura e della nostra civiltà si converte in tangibilità della potenza e la potenza in effettività del potere sull'Altro. Dire umanità qui significa solo e sempre dire: Io e Noi. L'Altro è escluso dall'umanità. Ma questo è solo il primo stadio del processo. Ben presto, l'Io tende a schiacciare il Noi, costituendolo come un Io generalizzato. All'interno delle stesse comunità dichiaratesi civili e superiori, sempre meno sono tollerate le differenze, le distonie, gli intrecci, gli incroci. Minoranze potenti vanno progressivamente riducendo gli spazi e i diritti di ampie fasce dei loro stessi simili, schiacciandoli sempre più verso il basso della scala sociale e culturale. Le comunità dell'Io generalizzato sono comunità chiuse, dispotiche e intolleranti: fanno il vuoto intorno a se stesse. Si aprono, per chiudere ciò che le circonda. E sono circondate da arcipelaghi di esclusione sociale e culturale, dai quali si dissociano e, insieme, proteggono, ricorrendo ad apparati e strumenti di controllo complessi e capillari, sul piano simbolico, culturale, comunicativo, politico, regolativo e sociale. La crisi del principio umanità toglie la maschera alla crisi dei saperi e delle culture: i primi servono la potenza; le seconde, il potere. L'asservimento dello statuto dei saperi e delle culture è smascherato, in via crescente, dai cicli della mobilitazione della società civile planetaria, con l'ingresso nel nuovo millennio. Cicli che, in primo luogo, costituiscono la proiezione di un altro sguardo sui saperi, sulle culture e le loro istituzioni. Uno sguardo altro che, però, non è, di per sé, apertura all'Altro. L'apertura, per essere tale, ha bisogno di allargare varchi, attraversare frontiere, abbattere muri. Il principio umanità non si basa sulla potenza e sul potere; ma sulla fratellanza e sull'amore che si nutrono di differenze e di conflitti tra alterità solidali. Attraverso di esso, il volto dell'Altro ci guarda e ascolta. Possiamo, dunque, dire: il principio umanità è principio d'amore, in tutte le sue forme e declinazioni possibili. Come ci ha insegnato Emily Dickinson:tutto imparammo dall'amore1. Ma è ancora più vero e bruciante che dall'amore tutto dobbiamo reimparare daccapo, ancora e sempre. Se questa è la rotta di navigazione, ben comprendiamo che principio umanità non significa soltanto, come ci ha indicato Kant, che ogni persona è un fine in sé e, dunque, non va mai impiegata come mezzo. Principio umanità significa, soprattutto, andare oltre e altrove, stando in amore con l'umanità che ci è prossima e distante. E, del resto, con-vivere significa vivere nella simbiosi che le differenze in conflitto costruiscono e decostruiscono in una relazione 1 Emily Dickinson,Tutte le poesie, Milano, Mondadori, 2005. 55 d 'amore, mai eguale a se stessa. L'essere più vitale e profondo dell'umanità è essere altro con l'Altro e per l'Altro: cioè, è un essere regolato dall'amore. Quanto oggi questo principio e questo essere siano in crisi non è, purtroppo, difficile da cogliere. La crisi del principio umanità misura la distanza abissale che i saperi e le culture hanno frapposto tra se stessi e i mondi delle passioni, dei sentimenti, delle emozioni e degli affetti, irreggimentandoli e mettendoli sotto custodia, al fine di scatenarli ricorrentemente, per puri fini di potenza e di potere. Bisogna amaramente constatare che la storia dell'umanità, in gran parte, è storia di questo scatenamento. Inesorabilmente, un'umanità guerriera finisce col nutrirsi e servirsi di saperi e culture belligeranti. In particolare e malauguratamente è, questo, il sigillo con cui è marchiata a fuoco la nostra epoca. Non ci rimangono che pensare e realizzare diversi modi di animare, abitare e amare il mondo nel quale siamo chiamati a vivere. Per uscire dalla crisi del principio umanità, allora, è necessario anche elaborare, maneggiare e sperimentare altri saperi e altre culture, trasformandoli senza posa nel senso e nel segno dell'amore con e per l'Altro. 2. Dal sacrificio alla libertà Vogliamo ora considerare un aspetto particolare della crisi dei saperi e delle culture, così come si va dipanando sotto i nostri occhi. Nello spazio della comunicazione globale in tempo reale, i saperi non sono più collegati a un luogo specifico, con il richiamo alle sue tradizioni e culture2. I saperi costruiscono un rapporto con le culture non più mediato dalle lingue e dai linguaggi locali. I luoghi non sono più ritenuti depositari legittimi di culture, ma puri involucri di prodotti e processi standardizzati. L'accelerazione impressionante dell'estinzione delle lingue madri parte da qui. Ai luoghi vengono sovraimposti saperi e culture che, spesso, ne deturpano la complessità creativa e creatrice. Si è, in proposito, parlato di globalizzazione del nulla3. L'espressione è, indubbiamente, felice, ma la realtà sembra essere più articolata. In verità, i processi di standardizzazione culturale suscitano dappertutto forme di resistenza, più o meno estese e intense. Anzi, riconducono a delle vere e proprie riscoperte e rivalutazioni del differente e del distinto, alimentando anche processi di riappropriazione e rimemorizzazione di saperi e culture antichi che sembravano irrimediabilmente perduti. Tra i processi di standardizzazione culturale e l'emergere continuo delle differenze si apre uno spazio di conflitto, il cui esito non è dato prevedere, ma che costituisce già oggi un campo di tensione in sommovimento continuo. In questo campo, prosperano anche le risposte neoidentitarie che della globalizzazione non accettano le ridislocazioni spaziali e culturali. Nondimeno, il neoidentitarismo approfitta di tutto l'arsenale liberticida che la globalizzazione neoliberista mette a sua disposizione. Ciò ci fa capire come non esista una contraddizione assoluta tra neoidentitarismo e globalizzazione; si danno, più esattamente, degli scarti interni. Non possiamo stupirci che una delle regolarità dello spazio unitario della globalizzazione neoliberista sia il securitarismo, il quale ha la funzione supplementare di coagulare intorno a sé tutti gli attori neoliberisti, recuperando fratture e divisioni mano a mano insorgenti. I saperi e le culture del neoidentitarismo e della globalizzazione neoliberista hanno in comune la pulsione profonda di negare l'Altro, per controllarlo in maniera ferrea e assoluta. V'è un ulteriore intreccio tra saperi e culture che merita di essere preso in esame. Le società globali si caratterizzano per essere società che si specializzano nell'offerta di prodotti immateriali: conoscenza, informazione, saperi, comunicazione, entertainment, formazione, cultura ecc.. Le merci classiche sono sostituite da una nuova tipologia di merci immateriali che sono alla base della generazione di nuovi tipi e stili di consumo. Un nuovo tipo di produzione è, dunque, abbinato a un nuovo tipo di consumo. Ciò, in senso rigoroso, significa che non si può più parlare di consumo: i prodotti immateriali non si consumano; sono, difatti, fruibili all'infinito, secondo la varietà delle forme che, di volta in volta, assumono4. Saperi e culture entrano ora direttamente nel ciclo produttivo e lo rideterminano. Il processo, per solito, è stato designato come formazione e valorizzazione del capitale 2 M. Cini, Lo statuto dei nuovi saperi, "Cosmopolis", n. 2, 2007. 3 G. Ritzer, La globalizzazione del nulla, Bra (Cn), Slow Food Editore, 2005. 4 M. Cini, op. cit. 56 intellettuale5 . Non entriamo qui nel merito di questo paradigma, limitandoci a osservare che, nella nuova epoca storica, la ricchezza effettiva delle imprese riposa sui beni intangibili: la conoscenza, prima di tutti gli altri. Le dispute attorno all'impossessamento del sapere e della conoscenza delimitano, dunque, nuovi conflitti di proprietà e nuove strategie di appropriazione delle risorse strategiche. L'affermazione crescente dei network della conoscenza e dell'informazione esalta il fenomeno. Da qui nasce la riformulazione del rapporto tra saperi e conoscenze, da un lato, e diritti, dall'altro, con in testa il diritto d'autore. Tali problematiche incidono pesantemente sul destino delle popolazioni delle aree arretrate del mondo, condannate a un esponenziale incremento del pauperismo conoscitivo. L'appropriazione privatistica dei saperi e delle conoscenze è un potente fattore di discriminazione, emarginazione e impoverimento. I beni pubblici sono trasformati in beni privati, il cui godimento è riservato a fasce sociali sempre più ristrette. La privatizzazione dei saperi e delle conoscenze è particolarmente evidente nei processi di educazione, apprendimento e formazione. Le istituzioni imputate della socializzazione delle conoscenze e dei saperi hanno fatto propri, a scala mondiale, quegli approcci economicisti che tendono a capitalizzare le conoscenze e i saperi, in funzione della profittabilità degli investimenti6. L'alfabetizzazione conoscitiva che si sprigiona sotto il segno della privatizzazione dei saperi è, conseguentemente, caratterizzata da unilateralità e rachiticità di senso, oltre che essere viziata in radice da profonde carenze di equità. I progetti globali di capitalizzazione dei saperi e delle culture, proprio per il loro codice genetico, non si pongono nemmeno i problemi globali dell'educazione e dell'alfabetizzazione informatica per tutti. Anzi, proprio qui mostrano la loro faccia feroce di negatori del diritto fondamentale al sapere e alla conoscenza; negazione che, nei Sud del mondo, equivale a una vera e propria condanna a morte. E la condanna a morte è simbolica, prima ancora che fisica. La circostanza conduce il nostro sguardo sulla vita di sofferenza che qui anticipa la morte. Cosa è intervenuto nell'intermezzo simbolico che abbiamo appena alluso? Che i saperi e le culture hanno finito con l'assumere il ruolo di castratori del senso umano. René Girard ha parlato di castrazione del significato, a proposito del divorzio tra umanità e sintassi, tra realtà e linguaggio7. Qui siamo collocati in una dimensione ancora più terribile: il divorzio è tra l'umanità e se stessa. Scopriamo, a questo livello di profondità, il rilevante ruolo giocato dai saperi e dalle culture nella precipitazione della crisi del principio umanità. La secessione dell'umanità da se stessa origina dalla castrazione del senso della vita umana. La tela di ragno stesa da saperi e culture si nutre del dolore dell'umanità e, così, immola il genere umano sull'altare dell'utile particolaristico. Per i saperi e le culture funzionalizzati al calcolo monetario, gli esseri umani diventano vittime sacrificali. E nei Sud del mondo il numero delle vittime sconvolge e angoscia per la sua rilevanza. Ora, la possibilità della libertà nasce proprio dalla possibilità del rifiuto del sacrificio. Il genere umano ha la possibilità di sottrarsi al sacrificio, contrariamente a quanto sostenuto da Girard8. Al principio umanità non resta che percorrere la distanza polare che separa il sacrificio dalla libertà. 3. La secessione dall'origine Spostando la riflessione verso luoghi ancora più caldi, dobbiamo osservare che la secessione dell'umanità da se stessa appare come secessione dalle sue origini: vale a dire, dalla natura umana. Si è insediata una frattura crescente tra natura umana e natura civile, dove l'una è agita come il contraltare dell'altra e nessuna delle due riesce più a comunicare all'altra le proprie virtù. La comunicazione tra natura umana e natura civile, nelle società industrializzate e 5 T. A. Stewart, La ricchezza del sapere. L'organizzazione del capitale intellettuale nel XXI secolo, Milano, Ponte alle Grazie, 2002. 6 AA.VV., Università globale. Il nuovo mercato del sapere, manifestolibri, Roma, 2008. 7 M. Casali, I castratori di significato. Decostruzione e microeugenetica, "AdVersuS", n. 8/9, aprile-agosto 2007. 8 Cfr. M. Kilani, Guerra e sacrificio, Bari, Dedalo, 2008; Anna Maria Rivera, La teologia estrema dei contrapposti "imperi del male", "Liberazione", 2 aprile 2008. 57 ipertecnologizzate , si frange contro muri invalicabili e inospitali: il post-umano si costruisce come negazione dell'umano9. Con l'avvento della globalizzazione, la civilizzazione va sempre più assumendo i tratti inquietanti della sofferenza dell'umanità. Siamo qui trascinati a metà strada tra un paradosso e un esito di esemplare coerenza logica. Un paradosso, perché, con i diritti umani, la civilizzazione nega il meglio di sé: i diritti civili, sociali e politici. Un esito coerente, perché la razionalità del calcolo economico e della pianificazione politica è predestinata a fare tabula rasa dei diritti che incontra sulla sua strada. Rivolto lo sguardo verso questi luoghi di origine, non possiamo non rilevare che all'origine di tutto v'è la lingua madre. Essa costituisce la lingua con cui cominciamo a pensare e parlare, quando non ancora sappiamo pensare e parlare. Inoltre, è il luogo d'origine verso cui si inerpicano le emozioni, i simboli e i segni che non trovano alcun corrispettivo linguistico. Col trascorrere degli anni, lo stato della lingua madre nel mondo diventa sempre più tragico: i processi di estinzione progressiva si espandono con un'accelerazione spaventosa, come una sorta di metastasi che avvolge il pianeta. La mappa che, nel 2009, l'UNESCO ha ridisegnato, in occasione della giornata mondiale della lingua madre, è impressionante. Dal 1950, si sono estinte 219 lingue; 538 sono a serio rischio di estinzione; 502 gravemente minacciate; 632 in via di estinzione; 607 ad altissimo rischio. Meno di una decina di persone parla 99 lingue, tra le quali il Karaim (noto a sei persone in Ucraina) e il Wichita (usato in Oklahoma, negli USA)10. L'atlante dell'UNESCO ha catalogato ben 2.498 lingue tra le estinte e a rischio di estinzione. Se allarghiamo la prospettiva dell'osservazione, dobbiamo rilevare che nell'ultimo secolo si sono estinte 600 lingue: il processo di estinzione ha seguito il ritmo di una lingua ogni cinque giorni11. Se il fenomeno non sarà adeguatamente contrastato, con questo trend di sviluppo, il 90% delle lingue oggi parlate nel mondo sarà avviato a estinzione prima della fine del secolo in corso12. Ora, l'ONU e le sue agenzie, a partire dall'UNESCO, sono concordi nel sostenere l'assoluta rilevanza della difesa della lingua madre, per la salvaguardia dell'identità culturale e della dignità dei popoli autoctoni e delle loro tradizioni13. In questa prospettiva, va salutata con favore la decisione dell'assemblea generale dell'ONU del 16 maggio 2007 di dichiarare il 2008 anno internazionale delle lingue14. Nel suo messaggio di celebrazione dell'anno internazionale della lingue madri, Koichiro Matsuura fa fatto rilevare: «Nel giro di poche generazioni, più del 50% delle 7.000 lingue parlate nel mondo rischia di sparire. Meno di un quarto di esse sono oggi utilizzate a scuola e nel cyberspazio e, il più delle volte, soltanto sporadicamente. Numerose lingue, quantunque perfettamente padroneggiate e usate come quotidiano mezzo di espressione, sono assenti dai sistemi educativi, dai media e dalla sfera pubblica in generale»15. Un patrimonio culturale e storico non altrimenti sostituibile corre il rischio di perdersi definitivamente, senza che governi e istituzioni internazionali facciano concretamente tutto il necessario per arrestarle il fenomeno. Al contrario, col tempo, la tendenza procede in maniera sempre più inarrestabile. In ballo è il patrimonio delle conoscenze e l'eredità spirituale e culturale dell'umanità. Con la perdita delle lingue madri, l'umanità non smarrisce soltanto la ricchezza della sua diversità culturale, ma compromette la stessa diversità biologica e ambientale. L'impoverimento spirituale progressivo dell'umanità è strettamente connesso con l'impoverimento progressivo della specie, della natura e dell'ambiente. I due fenomeni sono assolutamente interdipendenti e codeterminano un immane processo di decadimento e dissipazione dei potenziali naturali, umani e sociali. Se la lingua madre è origine delle origini, la sua estinzione progressiva non fa che segnare 9 P. Barcellona, L'epoca del postumano, Troina (En), Città aperta Edizioni, 2007. 10 UNESCO – United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization -, Atlas of the World's Languages in Danger – Statistics as 17 February 2009, in www.unesco.org 11 ONU, Rapport de la réunion du groupe d'experts internationaux sur les langues autochtones, gennaio 2008, in http://documents.un.or. 12 Ibidem. 13 Ibidem. 14 ONU, General Asembly Proclaims 2008 International Year of Languages, in effort to promove unity in diversity, global understanding, 2007, in http://documents.un.org 15 K. Matsuura, 2008 Année internationale des langues, 2008, in www.unesco.org 58 l 'origine della fine: la fine dell'umanità a più voci e a più colori che abbiamo conosciuto. Una fine che eredita soltanto e per intero il lato oscuro della storia dell'umanità, cancellandone le luci e le illuminazioni. Con tutta chiarezza, la storia della secessione dalle origini dell'umanità è scrittura della storia della decadenza dell'umanità. A fronte di ciò, compito dell'epoca è riaprire il dialogo tra origine e meta, tra natura e civiltà al punto della loro massima tensione relativa. 4. Il marchio originario La questione dei popoli indigeni nasce nel 1492, con la scoperta dell'America. Se oggi essa si sgrana in uno scenario a forti contenuti di tragicità, è perché altamente drammatico, fin dall'inizio, fu l'incontro tra la civiltà conquistatrice della vecchia Europa e le civiltà amerinde. Non è, questo, il luogo per approfondimenti storici, culturali ed etici. Ci preme solo sottolineare che la nascita della modernità occidentale è segnata dal sangue sparso dai Conquistadores. Ancora oggi, in proposito, noi occidentali parliamo di incontro fra due culture; ancora oggi, più propriamente, i popoli indigeni parlano di conquista. Già qui sono delineati i termini di una contraddizione che, nel corso dei secoli, si è sempre più acuita, fino ad assumere le sembianze catastrofiche che ha nel presente. Anziché a un incontro, nel 1492, abbiamo assistito a uno scontro di civiltà, attivato unilateralmente da una delle due parti in campo. Quell'approccio belligerante alla presenza dell'Altro marchia, a tutt'oggi, le culture dominanti in occidente. Anzi, si è fatto ancora più intenso. Per contro, è osteggiato, in maniera ancora più violenta e rudimentale, da strategie e pratiche di terrorismo globale. I popoli indigeni si trovano, così, presi tra due fuochi: le strategie di conquista, da un lato; le controstrategie terroristiche, dall'altro. La globalizzazione neoliberista, tra gli altri, ha avuto anche questo effetto letale. Alla depredazione delle risorse si è andata, sempre più strettamente, affiancando la spoliazione delle tradizioni locali, coniugando forme sempre più intense di neocolonialismo politico e culturale. Che le culture precolombiane siano estremamente complesse e articolate al loro interno, dal piano della mitologia a quello della cosmogonia e teogonia, è ben chiaro grazie alle puntuali e dense ricerche degli anni Ottanta e Novanta di Federico Gonzàlez16. Che esse siano depositarie di uno statuto scientifico di rilievo è un'acquisizione più recente, principalmente dovuta alle iniziative e ai programmi dell'UNESCO. Sul suo sito, qualche anno fa, l'UNESCO ha aperto una sezione dedicata ai"Sistemi di saperi locali e autoctoni", così definendoli: «insiemi cumulativi e complessi di sapere, saper-fare, pratiche e rappresentazioni trasmesse e sviluppate nel corso di una interazione di lunga durata tra le popolazioni con il loro ambiente naturale. Questi sistemi cognitivi fanno parte di un insieme che include la lingua, l'adesione intima al luogo, la spiritualità e la visione del mondo». L'agenzia ONU non manca di documentare esperienze positive dei saperi locali indigeni. Viene, in proposito, ricordato il tentativo positivo di arresto del disboscamento della riserva di Bosawas, operato dai Mayangnas e dai Miskitos in America centrale, nella zona transfrontaliera tra Nicaragua e Honduras, ridando slancio alle attività agricole e alla pesca. Osservano Paule Gros e Douglas Nakashima: «Il sapere mayangna non si limita a una raccolta di osservazioni empiriche, ma può essere un utile complemento delle conoscenze scientifiche e un importante coagulante dei rapporti tra Stato e popolazioni indigene ... il sapere mayangna è un complesso mosaico che intreccia l'empirico e il simbolico, la natura e la cultura, in una visione unificata e unitaria del mondo che è indigena»17. Un'altra significativa iniziativa proposta dall'UNESCO è il forum sul cambiamento climatico, lanciato il 12 giugno 2008 e interamente centrato sui saperi indigeni18. L'azione rientra nella piattaforma UNESCO incardinata sui sistemi di sapere locale e autoctono. Il cambiamento climatico è una minaccia remota per gran parte dell'umanità, ma attuale per i popoli indigeni che vivono nelle piccole isole, nell'Artico circumpolare, nelle regioni di montagna e nelle zone 16 F. Gonzàlez, I simboli precolombiani. Mitologia, Cosmogonia, Teogonia, Roma, Edizioni Mediterranee, 1993. 17 P. Gros-D. Nakashima, Le savoir de Mayangnas au coeur de la Mésoamérique, "Planète Science", n. 3/2008, in www.unesco.org 18 D. Nakashima, Un Forum sur les effets du changement climatique à travers le savoirs autochtones,"Pachamama", n. 2/2008, in www.unesco.org 59 desertiche . Essi hanno già dovuto affrontare l'innalzamento del livello dei mari, le mareggiate, la salinizzazione delle riserve di acqua dolce e dei terreni. Hanno, quindi, affinato saperi e pratiche che li avviano verso positive soluzioni delle nuove problematiche19. I popoli indigeni sono degli attenti e acuti osservatori dei fenomeni collegati al cambiamento climatico: «Nel corso dei secoli hanno accumulato un vasto corpo di conoscenze e competenze, per adattarsi alle nuove situazioni. La loro conoscenza può svolgere un ruolo cruciale nel dibattito sull'impatto del cambiamento climatico e le relative strategie di adattamento. A Sachs Harbour, sulla costa occidentale del Canada artico, gli Inuits già si servono della loro conoscenza approfondita degli animali e dei cambiamenti climatici, per modificare le loro tecniche di caccia e di viaggio, adattandosi alla nuova situazione ... Gli Inuits si affidano alla loro capacità di rispondere ai cambiamenti, in nome di una filosofia che accetta l'incertezza e il mutamento, piuttosto che opporvisi»20. La progressiva estinzione delle lingue madri accompagna, con la graduale sparizione dei popoli indigeni, la scomparsa di saperi e culture millenari, ancora oggi vitali e creativi. Dal passato al presente, in tutti i casi, le ragioni sono comuni: pulsioni egemoniche, sul piano culturale; calcoli di profitto, sul piano economico; pianificazione di potere, sul piano politico. Una lingua muore, se i soggetti viventi che la parlano sono cancellati dalla storia. I soggetti parlanti muoiono, se la loro lingua è divorata dalla storia. E con questa muoiono i saperi e le culture intanto originati e che avevano conferito ricchezza spirituale e materiale al mondo. Il primo e più terribile risultato dell'estinzione delle lingue madri è la messa in stato di cattività dei popoli indigeni, con la perdita di tutto il bagaglio conoscitivo, culturale ed esperenziale di cui erano e sono portatori. Ciò che avveniva ieri, ancor oggi avviene; nonostante i saperi e le culture dei popoli indigeni, su molti versanti, rivelino tuttora un più elevato e denso livello di maturità e complessità, a confronto degli ossificati schemi, entro cui i nostri codici scientifici e culturali dominanti si vanno sempre più rinserrando. Da questa perversione ha preso cominciamento la modernità occidentale. A questa perversione occorre dichiarare un'aperta contrarietà, per riconciliarsi col principio umanità. 5. Rendere più chiara la scena Dobbiamo ricondurre le difficoltà crescenti incontrate dal dialogo interculturale e dalla diversità culturale alla crisi del principio umanità e dello statuto dei saperi e delle culture. Con ciò, le rendiamo di più agevole comprensione. Il rischio che, con altrettanta chiarezza, emerge è che dialogo interculturale e diversità culturale diventino stanche e impotenti retoriche. Da questa visuale di osservazione, intendiamo gettare uno sguardo sul dialogo interculturale, dall'interno del dialogo interculturale. Al fine di rendere più chiara la scena, facciamo un passo indietro. Partiamo dalla considerazione elementare che tutte le società sono sempre state multiculturali21. Oggi noi riferiamo la multiculturalità a un modello di relazione sociale e culturale specifico, in gran parte, collegato alle migrazioni nelle società complesse e globali22. La presenza di milioni di migranti impone l'elaborazione di nuovi modelli di relazioni e di nuove strategie retoriche di inclusione, assimilazione o esclusione23. Svariati sono stati i modelli proposti per il governo e il controllo della multiculturalità24. 19 Cfr. P. Bates, Un Forum aux premières loges du changement climatique, "Planète Science", n. 3/2008, in www.unesco.org; D. Nakashima, op. cit. 20 P. Bates, op. cit. 21 Cfr. R. De Angelis, Che cos'è il multiculturalismo?,"ResetDoc", in www.resetdoc.org, 26 novembre 2008; P. Malizia, Al plurale. Declinazioni di una società multietnica e multiculturale, Milano, Franco Angeli, 2009; P. J. Nederveen Pieterse Jan, Mélange globale. Ibridazioni e diversità culturali, Roma, Carocci, 2005; F. Pompeo (a cura di 2007), La società di tutti. Multiculturalismo e politiche dell'identità, Roma, Meltemi, 2007. 22 G. Kaczynski (a cura di), Il paesaggio multiculturale. Immigrazione, contatto culturale e società locale, Milano, Franco Angeli, 2008. 23 Cfr. R. De Angelis, op. cit.; G. Kaczynski (a cura di), op. cit.; F. Pompeo (a cura di 2007), op. cit. 24 M. Russo, Accoglienza e integrazione degli alunni stranieri a scuola in Europa, Tesi di laurea, 60 Inevitabili e innumerevoli, inoltre, le implicazioni che si stabiliscono tra pluralismo giuridico e multiculturalismo, coinvolgendo direttamente le problematiche che attengono ai diritti fondamentali25. Non staremo qui a ricordare né quei modelli, né quelle implicazioni. Vogliamo solo porre al centro dell'attenzione il teatro sociale a cui le relazioni e le strategie della multiculturalità sono ricondotte e a cui, a loro volta, danno vita. Un teatro di decisiva importanza, perché ci consente di mettere a fuoco un incrocio delicatissimo e nevralgico: quello tra umanità e cittadinanza. A questo incrocio vivono gli esseri viventi in carne ossa. Dobbiamo convenire che l'umanità multiculturale non è un universale, ma il mosaico diseguale in cui trovano ospitalità l'universale e il particolare, nel cui gioco va sostenuta la libertà da ogni tipo di oppressione26. Ma la problematica esige ulteriori approfondimenti. L'umanità multiculturale apre un nuovo terreno dei diritti di cittadinanza: i diritti globali; come cercheremo di mostrare più avanti. Registriamo qui il passaggio dalla cittadinanza cosmopolitica alla cittadinanza globale. Per adesso, è sufficiente osservare che i diritti globali sono, sì, strettamente avvinti alla crisi della sovranità nazionale27, ma l'eccedono; che essi non sono semplicemente configurabili come richiesta di riconoscimento28, ma aprono un nuovo orizzonte di espressione dell'umanità e, quindi, proprio dei diritti29. Le sintetiche osservazioni che precedono, ci consentono di porre in correlazione la crisi del dialogo interculturale e della diversità culturale con la crisi del multiculturalismo, della quale ci ha parlato già Amartya Sen30. La crisi discende, fondamentalmente, dalla circostanza innegabile che nel multiculturalismo ogni cultura rimane intrappolata nel suo guscio semantico, senza riuscire a sfondare le proprie e altrui barriere comunicative. Si stratificano, così, livelli culturali che comunicano tra di loro, cristallizzando i loro valori, prinìipi e schemi cognitivi. Le culture qui non escono dalle strutture stratificate dai loro livelli: il multiculturalismo è l'organizzazione di questa separazione strutturata. In realtà, nel multiculturalismo le culture non dialogano, ma si giustappongono. Inevitabilmente, vince il livello di strutturazione culturale più forte. Il multiculturalismo manca della chiave di attraversamento fornita dalla reciprocità della critica. Il repertorio delle opzioni possibili, in ogni tipo di scelta etica, politica e culturale, finisce col contrarsi e schiacciarsi sul livello di strutturazione culturale di appartenenza. Come dice Sen, manca la vera libertà culturale della scelta, perché il modo di vivere di ognuno non rimane influenzato, riproponendosi eguale a se stesso, a prescindere o proprio a causa del contatto multiculturale31. Questo limite interno al multiculturalismo si trasferisce, pari pari, al dialogo interculturale e alla diversità culturale, facendo sì che anche loro sedimentino strutture rigide e non comunicanti. Usando le parole di Sen, in questo modo, si favorisce l'adesione automatica alle tradizioni32, quando, invece, si tratta di metterle in discussione. E, del resto, quale dialogo interculturale effettivo vi può mai essere, senza ridiscutere le culture di tutti i soggetti in rapporto? Dialogare significa creare la differenza, agli antipodi di ogni tipo di automatismo culturale. Siamo ora in grado di dire che il dialogo interculturale e la diversità culturale chiedono di strappare, a noi e all'Altro, le maschere culturali, per potersi vedere e parlare effettivamente, col calore e con i colori di tutta la propria umanità. Le maschere funzionano come bunker Facoltà di scienze della formazione, Libera Università di Bolzano, Anno accademico 2006-2007, in www.cestim.org 25 Alessandra Facchi, I diritti nell'Europa multiculturale, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 2008. 26 C. Galli, L'umanità multiculturale, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2008. 27 Seyla Benhabib, Cittadini globali. Cosmopolitismo e democrazia, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2008. Sul tema decisivo dei diritti globali, rinviamo all'annuale Rapporto sui diritti globali, promosso dall'Associazione SocietàINformazione e coordinato da S. Segio, pubblicato da Ediesse dal 2003 in avanti e di cui è prevista a maggio l'uscita dell'edizione del 2012. 28 J. Habermas-C. Taylor, Multiculturalismo. Lotte per il riconoscimento, Milano, Feltrinelli, 2008. 29 M. Mascia (a cura di), Dialogo interculturale, diritti umani e cittadinanza plurale, Venezia, Marsilio, 2007. 30 A. Sen, Confusioni illiberali, "Corriere della Sera", 23 agosto 2006. 31 Ibidem. 32 Ibidem. 61 simbolici , dietro cui si nasconde l'egemonismo culturale occidentale33. Togliere le maschere vuole dire uscire dai propri bunker simbolici. Ciò mette in gioco anche problematiche etiche e di tipo educativo, intorno all'affermazione della diversità culturale34. Come dice Sen: «Il valore che la diversità può avere, in termini di libertà, deve dipendere proprio da come viene determinata e affermata»35. Dobbiamo, perciò, chiederci: come determiniamo e affermiamo il nostro libero vivere insieme? La vita delle differenze richiede di ricomporsi, rideterminarsi e svilupparsi nel dialogo universale delle differenze. 6. Per la critica dell'interculturalismo istituzionale Dobbiamo ricordare ancora che il 2008 è stato dichiarato l'anno del dialogo interculturale dal Parlamento europeo e molteplici sono state le iniziative e i progetti lanciati e appoggiati dalla Commissione europeo36. Pur sottolineandone i molteplici meriti, dobbiamo rilevare sostanziali deficit dell'approccio comunitario al dialogo interculturale. Il limite di fondo è dato da un approccio che non taglia i ponti con quelle impostazioni anacronistiche che non distinguono tra multiculturalismo e interculturalità e che fanno slittare verso la stratificazione di modelli comunicativi che conservano le culture così come sono, anziché attraversarle e innovarle. L'attraversamento e il riattraversamento creano i campi culturali di espressione del nuovo: in essi la contaminazione e il métissage generano modi di essere e di pensare che non sono riconducibili a questa o a quella cultura, ma costituiscono il frutto inedito della simbiosi critica tra di esse. Un frutto inedito che ha un profilo globale: nel senso che è la globalità delle culture che si contaminano a creare il dialogo. E qui il dialogo assume il suo senso più profondo: dire e inventare parole nuove, spostandosi verso modi di essere inediti e più ricchi. Non esiste una scienza della diversità: cioè, una pluralità finita di culture, a ognuna delle quali ogni essere umano appartiene in maniera definitiva37. Le identità ultimative sono, in realtà, identità in maschera. Esse, cioè, sono ricoperte da veli che tendono a oggettivare socialmente sia l'autoriconoscimento che il riconoscimento, rendendoli non intenzionali38. Riconoscersi qui significa, appunto, riconoscere le maschere indossate in maniera non intenzionale. Le persone qui non sono altro dalle maschere che indossano. L'oggettivazione sociale della messa in maschera, sin dal nascere, azzera il dialogo formativo e creativo, a favore di quello informativo, entro cui tutte le informazioni sociali sono, in un certo qual modo, culturalmente e socialmente preconfezionate. Il coronamento del riconoscimento è qui dato dalla ricezione; non dalle libere intenzionalità che cooperano e si trasformano. All'opposto, il dialogo formativo e creativo fa sbalzare dal proprio campo di appartenenza culturale e lo mette in questione, con irruzioni nel campo altrui. Le lingue, le voci e i cuori si plasmano insieme, plasmando altre lingue, altre voci e altri cuori. Si è cittadini globali, perché la globalità delle culture e della socialità può pacificamente e creativamente abitare in ognuno, perché coopera in tutti. Qui il retaggio da superare non è solo l'universalismo vecchia maniera, ma anche il differenzialismo nuova maniera: entrambi condannano alla prigionia dentro il proprio bunker culturale. Un bunker che, facilmente, può diventare rivendicazione settaria della propria identità culturale, oppure tolleranza illuminata dell'identità altrui. Nel primo caso, debole non è solo il concetto di dialogo interculturale, ma anche quello di identità, ridotta a una figura pietrificata sempre uguale a se stessa; nel secondo, il concetto di dialogo interculturale viene ridotto alle retoriche del multiculturalismo che accettano di dialogare, solo dopo aver 33 Anna Maria Rivera, La guerra dei simboli. Veli postcoloniali e retoriche dell'alterità, Bari, Dedalo, 2005. 34 Cfr. M. Di Cintio, La maschera dell'altro. Etica e dialogo interculturale nella civiltà complessa, Lecce, Pensa multimedia, 2008; A. Vaccarelli, Dal razzismo al dialogo interculturale. Il ruolo dell'educazione negli scenari della contemporaneità, Pisa, ETS, 2009. 35 A. Sen, op. cit. 36 Per farsene un'idea abbastanza precisa, è sufficiente consultare il sito web dedicato: www.interculturaldialogue2008.eu 37 F. Dei, Diversità culturale, "ResetDoc", 21 novembre 2006, in www.resetdoc.org 38 A. Pizzorno, Il velo della diversità. Studi su razionalità e riconoscimento, Milano, Feltrinelli, 2007. 62 trasformato le culture in livelli giustapposti39. Il dialogo, così stando le cose, non coinvolge solo la sfera pubblica, ma anche quella privata40. Una volta di più, i diritti globali investono l'interezza dell'incrocio tra umanità e cittadinanza. Per un verso, la globalizzazione alimenta la standardizzazione dei modelli di cultura e dei modi di pensare; per l'altro, forgia la resistenza di isole culturali, votate alla sconfitta, se si ritraggono in se stesse. La via d'uscita in avanti è data dai diritti globali; quella all'indietro, dall'identitarismo e dall'egemonismo culturale. Per i diritti globali, la diversità culturale è compartecipazione che non struttura potere; per l'identitarismo e l'egemonismo culturale, invece, è un "costrutto ideologico" indissolubilmente associato o associabile al potere. Prendiamo ora in considerazione le strategie dell'UNESCO che, pur presentando un superiore livello di maturità e complessità rispetto a quelle comunitarie, non sfuggono a critiche di merito. Il dialogo interculturale è visto come un corollario della diversità culturale: la sua ineliminabile proiezione e, insieme, la sua rielaborazione perenne: «Diversità e dialogo devono procedere strettamente avvinti, affinché si rinforzino reciprocamente. La promozione della diversità culturale è indissociabile dall'incoraggiamento al dialogo, se si vuole facilitare l'interazione sociale armonica all'interno delle culture e tra le culture, nella prospettiva della pace, al livello locale come a quello globale»41. Il legame indissolubile tra diversità e dialogo consente all'approccio dell'UNESCO di uscire dalle secche delle strategie retoriche del multiculturalismo. In azione simultanea reperiamo la diversità per il dialogo e il dialogo per la diversità. Le maschere, i veli e i bunker simbolici sono fatti crollare, stanati come sono nei loro luoghi di formazione. Il dialogo della diversità e la diversità del dialogo creano un nuovo linguaggio della comunicazione. Lo sguardo dell'Altro illumina la scena e anche quando è fuori di essa fa sentire le proprie voci. La diversità è sempre al centro della comunicazione socio-umana che viene ora alla luce come teatro delle diversità dialoganti. Dove è, allora, il punto debole delle strategie dell'UNESCO? Partiamo dalla considerazione, fatta propria anche dall'UNESCO, che la diversità linguistica è da intendersi come un elemento della diversità culturale. Il multilinguismo che ne discende, però, non va inteso come un elemento di armonizzazione sociale che istituzionalizza le voci della diversità. Se appare necessaria l'apertura delle istituzioni alla diversità, quest'ultima non potrà mai sciogliersi nell'abbraccio istituzionale. Seguendo questa inclinazione egemonica, le istituzioni si pongono come luoghi di stabilizzazione della diversità culturale. Semmai, deve essere vero il contrario: è la diversità a dover produrre istituzioni diverse, anche per sfuggire alla loro presa che può rivelarsi soffocante. Occorre, allora, muovere non verso la costituzione delle istituzioni della diversità (che, tra l'altro, costituiscono una contraddizione in termini), bensì verso la costruzione di istituzioni diverse. Tocchiamo qui con mano il limite di fondo dell'approccio dell'UNESCO. L'impostazione ha un'evidente derivazione illuministica che privilegia la direzione dall'alto, anziché la creatività dal basso. Il teatro delle diversità dialoganti tende a essere canalizzato verso i piani di scorrimento veicolati dalle decisioni istituzionali. L'ansia istituzionale di dar voce alla diversità culturale si perverte: il dialogo tra istituzioni e diversità sovraimprime e copre il dialogo vero delle e tra le diversità. Per parlare alla diversità, le istituzioni non lasciano parlare liberamente le diversità. Il risultato finale è che, ancora una volta, si parla della diversità, anziché lasciarla parlare. Il deficit appena individuato funziona come un meccanismo interno corrosivo che indebolisce la cifra e la soglia della diversità culturale. Ed è proprio l'infiacchimento della diversità che trasforma in retoriche le strategie del dialogo interculturale. Le strategie dell'UNESCO consentono di aprire strade nuove; ma i sentieri, così, aperti si smarriscono nelle strettoie del decisionismo democratico istituzionale. Lo sbocco coerente, ravvisabile sul punto, è il sistematico privilegiamento del rapporto con i governi e con gli Stati, anziché con i popoli e la società civile mondiale. Non che il coinvolgimento di Stati e governi su questo terreno sia da scartare; anzi. Ma la partecipazione deve partire dal basso, altrimenti la 39 Seyla Benhabib, La rivendicazione dell'identità culturale. Eguaglianza e diversità nell'era globale, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2005. 40 Ibidem. 41 UNESCO – United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization -, Stratégie a moyen terme pour 2008-20013, 2008, in www.unesco.org 63 stessa reclamata riforma democratica dell'ONU si risolve in una operazione di reingegnerizzazione istituzionale che poco o niente di sostanzialmente nuovo introduce. Il limite ha modo di palesarsi su un'altra problematica cruciale: l'accesso universale all'informazione e alle conoscenze, per l'edificazione delle società del sapere. Sul punto, il merito dell'UNESCO è di grande rilievo, perché nessuna istituzione aveva prima sollevato, con tanto rigore e tenacia, la questione dell'accesso ai nuovi saperi come ammissione ai (nuovi) diritti fondamentali. Grazie alle elaborazioni dell'UNESCO, è stato chiaro che i diritti fondamentali si vanno spostando verso aree di nuova generazione: il sapere e la conoscenza. Il nutrimento primario dell'umanità è ora costituito proprio dal sapere e dalla conoscenza. Essere alfabetizzati, educati, formati e informati non basta; è necessario padroneggiare i nuovi saperi e le nuove conoscenze. La problematica è affrontata negli obiettivi specifici 114-119 del piano a medio termine che abbiamo in precedenza citato42. Le società del sapere sono qui intese come costruzioni dall'alto, pilotate da istituzioni democratiche illuminate che intessono una rete mondiale di connessioni e di accessi. Alle società, agli Stati e ai governi che escludono viene chiesto di favorire l'accesso ai nuovi saperi. E ciò è giusto e sacrosanto. Ma non può bastare, se non si determinano, in basso, le forme, le modalità e le qualità dell'accesso. Accesso a cosa, per chi, in quali forme e perché: ecco le domande base eluse dagli obiettivi del piano a medio termine. Determinare, dal basso, qualità, forma e finalità dell'accesso significa, tra l'altro, rideterminare, dal basso, qualità, forma e finalità delle istituzioni democratiche. L'universalità dell'accesso, cioè, va assicurata e garantita a una molteplicità di soggetti, aventi culture, condizioni di vita, gradi di alfabetizzazione e acculturazione estremamente differenziati. Chiedersi, preliminarmente, "Chi è?" il soggetto che esercita il diritto all'accesso è fondamentale, per definire in itinere progettualità e finalità dei piani operativi. Chiederselo preliminarmente, ha anche il senso di partire proprio dal quel "Chi è": cioè, accoglierne i sentimenti e i bisogni, seguendone il cammino. Società del sapere democratiche, del resto, sono edificabili unicamente da popoli, soggetti, individui e comunità che dialogano liberamente intorno alla diversità dei loro saperi, trasfondendoli gli uni negli altri. Non esistono gerarchie epistemologiche tra i saperi: il sapere antico e indigeno, per esempio, dà dei punti a molte delle più sofisticate teorie scientifiche contemporanee. I nuovi saperi possono ricevere una rigenerante ricodificazione dai saperi indigeni; e viceversa. Ma ciò non accadrà mai, se rimaniamo ancorati al postulato secondo cui i nostri saperi e le nostre istituzioni sono già il meglio che esista al mondo. Parlare di diritti globali vuole dire anche questo: globalità delle linee di passaggio e riattraversamento dei saperi e delle conoscenze. Ognuno accede ai saperi di tutti e tutti, insieme, generano nuove forme di sapere e conoscenza. Il pregiudizio etnocentrico e l'egemonismo culturale-scientifico possono essere, così, buttati alle nostre spalle. L'accesso universale ai saperi e alle conoscenze di tutti da parte di ognuno rende partecipe tutti gli esseri umani al patrimonio che l'umanità intera ha costruito e distribuito nel passato e nel presente, muovendosi verso il futuro. 7. Apartheid telematico L'accesso universale ai saperi e alle conoscenze riguarda da molto vicino la ricaduta delle nuove tecnologie dell'informazione e della comunicazione (ICT) su tutte le attività umane e sociali. Il dato più appariscente è che le informazioni strategiche e anche quelle della quotidianità circolano in forma digitale e, quindi, passano attraverso circuiti che digitalizzano conoscenze e scambi comunicativi. Dobbiamo partire dal dato che la nostra è l'epoca della rivoluzione digitale043. 42 Ibidem. 43 Cfr. C. Bordoni, Società digitali. Mutamento culturale e nuovi media, Napoli, Liguori, 2007; Maria Pia Caruso-Lina Falvella (a cura di), La rivoluzione digitale. Come cambia la nostra vita e quali regole per tutelarla, Soveria Mannelli (Cz), Rubettino, 2004; Collettivo per l'Accesso Universale, Comunicazione, rivoluzione digitale e spazio globale, in "Società e conflitto", n. 45-46/2012; C. Formenti Carlo, Cybersoviet. Utopie postdemocratiche e nuovi media, Milano, Raffaello Cortina, 2008; A. Granelli, Il sé digitale. Identità, memoria, relazioni nell'era della rete, Milano, Guerini e Associati, 2006; G. Latini, Forme digitali, Roma, Meltemi, 2007; G. Lotito, Emigranti digitali. Origini 64 L 'esigenza crescente di informazioni complesse in tempo reale è il risvolto che rende sempre più produttive e appetibili le ICT. Essere tagliati fuori dal bacino delle informazioni che si va dislocando attraverso la digitalizzazione delle conoscenze equivale a essere emarginati oggi ed essere predestinati a una emarginazione futura ancora più bruciante. La diffusione di scala e la socializzazione delle tecnologie digitali si sono dispiegate a livello planetario con l'esplosione di Internet, nei primi anni Novanta. Non a caso, la rete comunicativa globale è stata battezzata "rete delle reti". La mappa del web traccia inesorabilmente la mappa delle ICT; e viceversa. Entrambe procedono in maniera sinuosa, secondo profonde asimmetrie: il loro sviluppo è diseguale topograficamente, socialmente e culturalmente. Le istituzioni internazionali, a partire dall'ONU, si sono rivelate finora impotenti a fronteggiare adeguatamente il digital divide finendo, fondamentalmente, col subire la mappatura restrittiva delle conoscenze e dei diritti globali che ne è derivata. Emblematico, in tal senso, è il piano comunitario di inclusione digitale denominato "i2010"44. Innanzitutto, il programma lanciato dall'UE ha un taglio riduttivo, in quanto privilegia le grandezze economiche che hanno un effetto immediato sulla "crescita e l'occupazione". Il carattere deficitario dei risultati raggiunti dipende proprio da questo motivo base. Creare più e migliore occupazione, più e migliori posti di lavoro è un'intenzione lodevole; ma non più limitarsi al potenziamento della banda larga e al miglioramento delle competenze digitali. L'einclusione è, prima di tutto, un fatto culturale e politico; le tecniche vengono dopo. Se non si sviluppano approcci interculturali alle ICT e processi di appropriazione democratica delle nuove tecnologie, l'e-inclusione è destinata al fallimento. La Commissione è consapevole della modestia dei risultati raggiunti. Tuttavia, nel ridefinire il quadro strategico delle sue azioni, continua a fare perno sulla correzione delle lacune in tema di banda larga, accessibilità e divari di competenza45. In questo quadro, gli obiettivi fissati all'orizzonte del 2010 sono stati raggiunti soltanto in minima parte, come era agevole pronosticare. Completamente insoddisfacenti, poi, sono stati gli standard di efficacia puramente numerici, con cui la Commissione ha letto alcuni avanzamenti dei processi solennemente definiti di einclusione46. A dire il vero, i miglioramenti in tema di banda larga, di accesso a Internet e competenze informatiche, decantati dalla Commissione, sono stati più il risultato di processi spontanei e di tendenze sociali che la risultante di politiche attive ad hoc. Anzi, gli Stati membri hanno brillato per la loro sostanziale latitanza. Le politiche per l'accesso democratico ai diritti digitali sono risultate, del tutto, incongrue rispetto allo scopo. La realtà a cui assistiamo, purtroppo, è ben diversa da quella illustrata dalla Commissione. La società dell'informazione si sta capovolgendo nella società dell'esclusione e delle disuguaglianze47. Viene scandendosi nel tempo e allargandosi nello spazio un vero e proprio apartheid telematico. Fattori socioeconomici e culturali sono alla base della diffusione di queste tendenze, il cui baricentro sta nella crescente divaricazione dei sistemi dei redditi a livello planetario e nei vari e futuro della società dell'informazione dal 3000 a.C. al 2000 d.C., Milano, Bruno Mondadori, 2008; A. Mazzarella, La grande rete della scrittura. La letteratura dopo la rivoluzione digitale, Torino, Bollati Boringhieri, 2008; M. Padula Marco-Amanda Reggiori, Fondamenti di informatica per la progettazione multimediale. Dai linguaggi formali all'inclusione digitale, Milano, Franco Angeli, 2006; A. Preta, Economia dei contenuti. L'industria dei media e la rivoluzione digitale, Milano, Vita e Pensiero, 2007. 44 Commissione Europea, Iniziativa europea i2010 sull'e-inclusione. Partecipare alla società dell'informazione, 2007, in www.ec.europe.eu 45 Ibidem. 46 Ibidem. 47 Cfr. Sara Bentivegna, Disuguaglianze digitali. Le nuove forme di esclusione nella società dell'informazione, Bari, Laterza, 2009; Cristina Demaria-Patrizia Violi (a cura di), Teorie e pratiche di genere nelle ICT, Bologna, Bonomia University Press, 2008; R. La Valle, Agonia e vocazione dell'Occidente. Produrre, appropriarsi, dominare: alle radici del nuovo apartheid globale, Milano, Terre di Mezzo, 2005; Laura Sartori, Il divario digitale. Internet e le nuove disuguaglianze sociali, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2006; P. Morone, Conoscenza, nuove disuguaglianze e tecnologia dell' informazione, Soveria Manelli (Cz), Rubettino, 2004. 65 sottosistemi locali. La forbice tra i redditi, a sua volta, è la piattaforma su cui si fonda il divario dell'accesso all'istruzione, con particolare riferimento alla istruzione superiore. In un mondo che non garantisce l'educazione primaria per tutti, ancora meno garantito è l'accesso all'istruzione superiore48. L'evoluzione del web raccoglie al suo interno queste fenomenologie di emarginazione culturale, in maniera esemplare. A partire dall'osservazione elementare che la lingua madre artificiale di Internet è l'inglese. Non solo. Web e apartheid telematico diventano le vie maestre per l'esclusione alla partecipazione politica e culturale, nell'epoca dei diritti globali. In linea puramente di principio, l'accesso alla rete non presenta alcun problema: sono sufficienti un computer e un modem. Tuttavia, i divari di accesso sono notevoli, non solo tra i Nord e i Sud del mondo, ma all'interno delle stesse aree sviluppate49. Consideriamo, per esempio, le nostre aree urbane e rurali: le disuguaglianze di accesso riguardano fasce di utenza giovanile emarginate, pensionati e lavoratori stessi, per i quali la rete rimane un'illustre sconosciuta. Nella realtà concreta, quelle dell'accesso e dell'inclusione digitale si rivelano, più che altro, delle strategie retoriche. Il discorso sulla cittadinanza digitale e sull'e-government mostra qui tutta la sua incoerenza e la sua bassa soglia di efficacia, anche a fronte dell'evidenza che le amministrazioni pubbliche (non solo in Italia) non offrono, certo, servizi on line di alto livello50. La ragnatela dell'apartheid telematico si va allargando all'intero pianeta. Possiamo, più propriamente, parlare di un apartheid che, in maniera differenziata e puntiforme, si riverbera dal livello globale a quello locale, da cui retroagisce verso le dimensioni globali, in una sorta di moto perpetuo. Le mappe delle conoscenze e dei diritti del pianeta vengono, in continuazione, ridisegnate e riequilibrate da questo movimento puntuale e complesso, con effetti di esclusione culturale e disuguaglianza sociale prima mai visti e neanche sospettati. Da veicoli potenziali di emancipazione e democraticizzazione, le ICT e il web vengono trasformati in nuovi fattori di asservimento. Dalle retoriche dell'inclusione digitale e dell'egovernment si viene scagliati verso la dura realtà dell'invasione digitale: le ICT invadono il pianeta ed escludono le persone. Ecco, così, svelate le nuove forme di neocolonialismo ed egemonismo culturale dell'Occidente. Certamente, il neocolonialismo telematico è ben più insidioso di tutte le forme di colonialismo fin qui conosciute. Esso è il compimento perfetto dell'assassinio delle lingue madri; nel contempo, è la causa agente primaria che ridefinisce e generalizza tale assassinio nelle condizioni presenti. Qui, ancora, viene condotta verso la degenerazione estrema la perversione originaria: la messa in cattività dei popoli indigeni. In un certo senso, si corona con coerenza la storia del lato oscuro della civiltà occidentale iniziata con la modernità: partiti dai Conquistadores siamo pervenuti all'invasione digitale. 8. Lo spazio delle differenze dialoganti I diritti globali a stento riescono a trovare i loro linguaggi: non poteva essere diversamente, visto che la contemporaneità celebra la morte delle lingue madri. Quando parliamo di linguaggi, non intendiamo semplicemente riferirci a un lessico da inventare o ritrovare; bensì alla germinazione di luoghi di incontro entro cui ogni cultura parli la propria lingua, senza rimanere prigioniera del proprio assolutismo e senza patire quello altrui. Uno spazio comune di questo tipo è non solo nemico del fondamentalismo, ma anche del relativismo assoluto, in forza del quale ogni cultura non riesce a fuoriuscire dai propri ambiti comunicativi, pregiudicando, così, la costruzione in itinere di uno spazio comune come spazio delle differenza che creano51. I linguaggi dei diritti globali possono discendere solo dalla valorizzazione senza riserve del dialogo interculturale e della diversità culturale. Nello spazio interculturale i linguaggi si incontrano e rimescolano, generando percorsi di riconoscimento che recano l'impronta di tutte le culture. Nascono da qui linguaggi che parlano tutte le culture, perché sono parlati da tutte le 48 UNESCO, op.ult. cit. 49 Cfr. Bentivegna, op. cit; Global Information Society Watch, Report 2008, 2008, in www.giswatch.org; Sartori, op. cit. 50 G. Iorio, L'attesa. Inchiesta sulla cittadinanza digitale nei municipi italiani, Milano, Vita e Pensiero, 2008. 51 E. Marchettoni, Cultura e traduzione, "Jura Gentium", n. 1/2009, in www.juragentium.unifi.it 66 culture . L'assolutismo e il relativismo assoluto, seppure in maniera diversa, delimitano uno spazio asfittico che non ammette vera conoscenza e vera partecipazione. Il loro orizzonte culturale è quello entro il quale ogni cultura dialoga con il riverbero restituitogli dal suo specchio. Prigioniera dentro il proprio specchio, ogni cultura è talmente insicura di sé che non è disposta ad allontanarsi di un millimetro dal suo riflesso, anche là dove mette in scena finzioni comunicative. Lontana da sé si sente persa. In realtà, è vero il contrario: è rimanendo incollata a se stessa che essa si perde, smarrendo la conoscenza della pluralità dei luoghi e delle lingue del mondo che diventano, perciò, i luoghi e le lingue dello sradicamento, dell'estraneazione, della paura, del sospetto e della belligeranza. Il luogo plastico dell'incontro e dell'aggregazione delle lingue madri segna l'atto di nascita di nuovi e più autentici spazi comunicativi. La cultura qui cessa di essere la base della coltivazione del genere umano, come ancora nei modelli classici; del pari, smette di porsi come lo scopo ultimo del genere umano, come ancora reperiamo nei modelli illuministi. La cultura rimane lo spazio che l'illuminismo ha aperto a tutti; ma questo spazio ora tutti concorrono a crearlo. Il dialogo interculturale non si limita a favorire l'accesso universale alla cultura e ai saperi. Rende, piuttosto, possibile la generazione di nuove culture e nuovi saperi nello spazio comunicativo nuovo creato dalla diversità culturale: il dialogo delle differenze ordisce un mosaico di nuova composizione. Le lingue madri si parlano e, parlandosi, creano nuovi linguaggi. I diritti globali hanno questo luogo di inseminazione: possono nascere soltanto dai linguaggi che hanno saputo affratellare le lingue madri e le culture che intorno a esse proliferano. Affratellare le lingue madri significa tenere conto del rilievo universale che le loro espressioni e le loro estensioni hanno per il genere umano. I diritti si parlano, se imparano a parlare i linguaggi della diversità. Da qui prende origine il carattere globale che oggi li permea. Ma, ora, affratellare le lingue madri vuole anche, se non soprattutto, dire affratellare tutti gli esseri umani: affratellati ora come cittadini del mondo comune che abitano e solcano. Essere fratelli e, insieme, cittadini dello stesso mondo sommuove i criteri di attribuzione della cittadinanza, così come sono ancora codificati dai vari ordinamenti nazionali. Ogni diritto ora richiama la trasversalità dei diritti; tanto più che la titolarità di ogni diritto richiama l'esercizio trasversale dei diritti. Perciò, parlare ora di diritti globali significa configurare una prospettiva storica che va oltre i diritti di cittadinanza: i diritti globali proiettano verso la cittadinanza globale. Se vogliamo continuare a prendere sul serio i diritti, non abbiamo altra scelta concreta, al di fuori di questa proiezione. 9. L'avvento dei diritti globali La globalizzazione ha, senza dubbio, accelerato la crisi dei diritti, così come li abbiamo fin qui classicamente intesi. Nel contempo, ha posto all'ordine del giorno la declinazione di nuovi diritti, finalmente sottratti agli incantesimi culturali e alle interdizioni politiche che ne hanno finora depotenziato il profilo e l'efficacia. La globalizzazione non ha significato soltanto l'avvento della deregolazione selvaggia; ma ha anche tratteggiato l'aurora di un nuovo tempo. Essa ha aperto una nuova era dei diritti: l'era dei diritti globali. Ora, partire dai diritti globali ci fa rendere meglio conto che le società umane si stratificano una dentro l'altra, ognuna col carico e il portato delle proprie culture e dei propri saperi, su cui si sedimentano apparati normativi e codici di comportamento che evolvono nel corso del tempo. Il passaggio dai diritti naturali ai diritti politici, civili e sociali si inscrive in questo solco. Allo stesso modo con cui nel presente stiamo transitando verso i diritti globali. Il nucleo dei diritti globali sta in questo enunciato base: i diritti dell'Io non sono più separabili dai diritti dell'Altro. Riposa qui il riconoscimento pieno della presenza ineliminabile dell'Altro nell'orizzonte di vita dell'Io. Parlare di diritti globali vuole, appunto, dire che non v'è diritto che possa prescindere dall'Altro. La cittadinanza non può essere che globale, a partire da questo fondamentale nucleo di verità. Una delle conseguenze di maggiore rilievo che è possibile desumere dal discorso che stiamo argomentando è questa: se mai lo fosse stato in passato, oggi non è più possibile istituire una gerarchia tra cosiddette"culture primitive" e cosiddette "culture civilizzate". Cultura non è affatto sinonimo di "cultura civilizzata"; al contrario, la civilizzazione principiata con l'epoca moderna si è proprio macchiata dell'oppressione delle culture indigene. Le culture altre hanno 67 eguale dignità delle proprie e, dunque, i diritti dell'Altro hanno lo stesso valore dei diritti propri. E questo è ancora più vero nel tempo della globalizzazione: la sofferenza e la negazione dei diritti nel più sperduto angolo del pianeta mettono in gioco la responsabilità e i diritti di tutti, in ogni angolo del pianeta. Oggi tutti siamo responsabili del futuro del pianeta e dei diritti di ogni essere umano, qualunque sia la sua dimora geografica, il colore della sua pelle, la sua posizione sociale e le sue culture di provenienza e di elezione. Come il dialogo interculturale supera i confini di ogni cultura, transitando attraverso esse, così i diritti di ognuno transitano verso l'Altro. Nel corso di questo transito, viene tracciata la mappa dei diritti globali. L'appartenenza al suolo e/o al sangue viene superata: è l'appartenenza al mondo che qui emerge come discrimine. Il mondo è ora la casa di tutti, con le infinite sfaccettature e diversità che, al suo interno, pullulano e nascono senza posa. Nel mondo diventato la dimora universale di tutti, diritti globali e cittadinanza globale sono gli uni premessa e, insieme, conseguenza dell'altra. Si è ora cittadini del mondo non in virtù di un'opzione cosmopolitica, tendente alla ricomposizione delle fratture esistenti fra i singoli Stati nazione. Si è ora cittadini del mondo in senso globale, in quanto le barriere degli Stati nazione sono traforate e dissolte dalla globalizzazione. La cittadinanza globale non ricama la sua tela tra i circuiti nazionali; ma si colloca oltre gli Stati nazione, attraversandoli. 10. L'alba incerta della cittadinanza globale L'acquisizione da parte dei migranti della cittadinanza degli Stati entro i quali sono andati a vivere e lavorare è un buon indicatore del profilo transnazionale, ormai, acquisito dai vecchi Stati nazione, ma anche del persistere di pregiudizi e indisponibilità. Nell'UE a 27, per esempio, vi sono sostanziali differenze nei processi di attribuzione della cittadinanza ai migranti. Alcuni Stati sono più elastici nell'accogliere le richieste di cittadinanza; altri, invece, persistono in atteggiamenti di chiusura52. Rimane il fatto indubitabile che, persino, gli ordinamenti giuridici, con la loro formalità e la loro proverbiale lentezza di movimento, testimoniano il processo di transnazionalizzazione intervenuto negli Stati contemporanei, al tempo della globalizzazione. L'intreccio tra diritti globali, cittadinanza globale e transnazionalità degli ordinamenti giuridici demolisce un luogo canonico della cultura occidentale: intendiamo riferirci alla dottrina aristotelica degli "schiavi per natura". A essa si sono rifatti i teologi cristiani agli albori della modernità, per giustificare la "conquista" del nuovo mondo53. Oggi nessun teologo e nessun filosofo si sognerebbe di parlare apertamente di schiavitù e tutti, anzi, fanno professione di liberalismo e democrazia. Sta di fatto, però, che le situazioni di oppressione e segregazione dell'Altro e dei suoi mondi sono il contrassegno della contemporaneità. I princìpi della schiavitù naturale rivivono trasfusi nella colonizzazione del mondo operata dalla globalizzazione neoliberista che comporta una selvaggia messa in discussione dello stesso diritto alla vita, con i tutti i genocidi che ne conseguono. La sospensione del diritto alla vita è, ormai, una costante del funzionamento della sovranità della globalizzazione neoliberista. Popoli, poveri, strati sociali deboli, gruppi svantaggiati, fasce sociali marginali o emarginate perdono, in via crescente, il legame con l'autocostruzione della propria vita: vengono loro negati gli strumenti e le risorse non solo per progettare la vita, ma perfino per sopravvivere. Nei Nord come nei Sud del mondo, il numero dei morti per fame, per miseria, per carenza di cure, per deficit di istruzione è in aumento esponenziale. Dietro questa cruda realtà sta la trasformazione di masse sterminate in una nuova classe di meteci globali. Stiamo parlando dei differenti da noi che stanno vicino a noi e che si mescolano continuamente con noi e che noi abbiamo ridotto allo stato di non liberi. Qualche volta, con ipocrisia, li chiamiamo pure cittadini. Ma, proprio in quanto non liberi, non possono essere ritenuti cittadini. Come quelli dell'antichità, i meteci globali sono non-cittadini. La cittadinanza globale rimane per loro una conquista; come lo rimane per noi. Soltanto l'affratellamento che passa da parte a parte i diritti può condurre verso l'aperto della cittadinanza globale. La cittadinanza globale non abbatte i confini; bensì li oltrepassa, ponendoli in 52 Eurostat, Aquisition de nationalité dans l'UE. Comuniqué de presse, 10 dicembre 2008, in http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu 53 G. Tosi, Alle origini della modernità: i diritti degli indigeni nel Nuovo Mondo, "Jura Gentium", n. 1/2007, in www.juragentium.unifi.it 68 comunicazione . Non sradica il diritto e i diritti dal territorio; bensì li riedifica, apprestando le linee di attraversamento dei confini. Non elimina lo ius proprium e il diritto di proprietà; ma li sbatte in faccia ai diritti globali. Nella globalizzazione, gli equilibri interni dello ius proprium, dello ius commune, del diritto di proprietà e del diritto pubblico deflagrano dall'interno, per effetto dell'irruzione transnazionale dei diritti dell'Altro. Nel mulinello vorticoso della globalizzazione, il proprio e il comune sono indisgiungibili dall'Altro. Il proprio, il comune e il pubblico ora non sono il mio o il tuo, il nostro o il vostro: il proprio e il comune passano attraverso la definizione e l'esercizio dei diritti dell'Altro. Il diritto cessa di essere il contrassegno di identità territoriali chiuse e contrapposte: si apre, finalmente, alla parola e alla lingua dell'Altro. La cittadinanza globale è anche la cittadinanza delle lingue madri. Qui non nasce un diritto senza identità e/o sradicato; bensì il diritto che si impasta nelle voci, nei confini e nei territori dell'Altro. Possiamo dire: la cittadinanza globale va al di là dello spazio chiuso, perché solca comunicativamente gli spazi. Essa, cioè, apre e rende vitali e viventi gli spazi anche sul piano ordinamentale. Grazie alla cittadinanza globale, ha termine l'estenuante e antico dilemma: lo spazio è il fondamento del diritto, oppure il suo semplice ambito di attuazione? Per un verso, la cittadinanza globale squarcia gli spazi e, dunque, non può avere un fondamento spaziale; per l'altro, non ha natura prescrittiva e, dunque, non può essere un mero campo di tensione per l'attuazione delle norme. Essa ridisegna e conferisce nuova vita sia allo spazio dei diritti che alla costellazione della norma: non si incardina su nessuno dei due, ma li mette in comunicazione, iniziando a scrivere la fine delle loro antiche contrapposizioni. L'epoca dei diritti globali sollecita la nascita della cittadinanza globale. Nella transizione che abbiamo delineato lo spazio occupato dall'educazione, dalla cultura e dalle didattiche, come è agevolmente intuibile, è di rilevanza decisiva. Solo nuovi orizzonti culturali, educativi, formativi e didattici possono sostenere adeguatamente i diritti globali e la cittadinanza globale. La scuola è uno dei luoghi nevralgici, a partire da cui l'interculturalità, la diversità culturale e la globalità dei diritti possono trarre impulsi profondi o essere, viceversa, avviati verso l'affossamento. 11. La sfida delle culture e didattiche dialoganti Uno dei maggiori nodi critici del rapporto tra istituzioni scolastiche e studenti sta, certamente, nella relazione tra le culture di cui gli adolescenti sono portatori e le culture di cui le istituzioni sono depositarie. Non siamo semplicemente posti di fronte a una trasmissione culturale di tipo gerarchico e verticistico; piuttosto, registriamo l'assenza di dialogica. Le istituzioni sono completamente all'oscuro delle culture e degli stili di vita degli adolescenti: non conoscono affatto coloro che, pure, dovrebbero istruire ed educare54. Si crea, già al primo impatto, un cortocircuito comunicativo. Le culture delle istituzioni scolastiche sono incapaci di colloquiare con il portato della diversità culturale, di cui gli adolescenti sono portatori. E dunque, non possono entrare in empatia con i loro universi simbolici e le loro aspettative di vita. Si alimenta, già sul nascere, una relazione di disaffezione degli adolescenti all'istituzione che è destinata ad aumentare nel tempo. Osserva, in proposito, Maurizio Muraglia: «Ė capace la scuola di "inquisire" la cultura degli adolescenti, fatta di musica, sport, media, gossip, gergalità, sessualità, affettività, pulsionalità e quant'altro, attraverso un uso delle discipline che non privilegi in prima battuta la trasmissione dei contenuti, ma le modalità, che le discipline consentono, di approccio al reale?»55. Alla domanda dobbiamo amaramente rispondere di no. Qui cogliamo in azione il limite di inattualità della scuola, la sua distanza stellare dai mondi culturali degli esseri viventi che in essa abitano. Diventa, in partenza, difficile impostare percorsi formativi e didattici congrui, efficaci ed efficienti. Gli scenari culturali aperti dall'istituzione scolastica non sono coinvolgenti: non interagiscono con il teatro culturale che gli adolescenti mettono in scenda prima e dopo, dentro e fuori la scuola. Un atteggiamento di empatia nei confronti delle culture degli adolescenti richiama la necessità di approntare didattiche centrate sull'ascoltare altrimenti . In un qualche modo, gli 54 M. Muraglia,Saperi e inclusione, in Daniela De Scisciolo-C. Fiorentini-M. Muraglia, Quale scuola per il biennio obbligatorio, Roma, Edizioni CIDI, 2008. 55 Ibidem. 69 adolescenti sono degli stranieri per gli adulti e, in particolare, per le istituzioni scolastiche. Su questo diaframma residuo si fondano le politiche educative. Non può stupire, pertanto, il loro costante insuccesso. L'insegnamento dialogante si fonda su saperi dialoganti, i quali sono aperti a tutti. Anche nel senso che tutti possono concorrere alla loro scrittura. Nello specifico, la mossa preliminare sta nell'interrogare le culture degli adolescenti, lasciandosi da loro interrogare. Si tratta di stabilire e ristabilire punti di contatto empatico che non rendano la scuola un'istituzione estranea, fredda e alienante. La didattica, prima di approntare modelli educativi, deve interpellare e ascoltare. Si svilupperebbe, così, un sapere della scuola che non è solo dell'istituzione, ma è di tutti i soggetti che la abitano e la formano. Un sapere circolare che include, perché motiva; che motiva, perché accoglie le istanze di libertà che scuotono le fondamenta dell'istituzione. Culture e didattiche dialoganti sono, dunque, culture e didattiche circolari, trasversali e problematiche. Esse, cioè, consentono il pieno coinvolgimento critico dei soggetti nei percorsi di apprendimento56. Ma, per incamminarsi lungo questo percorso, resta da sciogliere un nodo preliminare: conferire un significato esistenziale ai saperi57. La frattura tra insegnamento e vita va colmata. Ma non privilegiando la relazione finalistica con il mondo delle imprese, pena la riduzione della vita degli adolescenti a mera appendice esecutiva della macchina produttiva globale. L'intero, complesso e articolato significato della vita deve plasmare i saperi dialoganti, di cui ora la scuola deve diventare titolare. La complessità vivente dell'insegnamento e dell'apprendimento è l'altra faccia della complessità della vita. Tra questi due universi viventi vanno gettati ponti comunicativi. Solo a questo stadio è possibile dire: «Lo studente competente è lo studente diventato capace di affrontare situazioni e compiti di realtà – di cittadinanza, si potrebbe dire – richiamando in essere, al momento opportuno, quanto ha imparato a scuola»58. Nascono qui un sapere di cittadinanza e una cittadinanza che sa, a misura in cui vive e costruisce la libertà di tutti Siamo, così, in grado di individuare meglio quali debbono essere le competenze che le didattiche dialoganti devono favorire: le competenze di cittadinanza59. Ora, le competenze di cittadinanza non stanno nelle singole discipline; piuttosto, sono competenze delle discipline, nel loro intrecciarsi continuo in maniera trasversale. La sfida didattica, allora, sta proprio nel "correre insieme" delle discipline verso le competenze di cittadinanza. Si può, perciò, dire: «L'inclusione passa attraverso un curriculo che è sapere, costruire insieme il sapere, essere insieme con il sapere»60. Essere per il sapere della vita e per la vita del sapere, in fondo, è la chiave di volta del senso della didattica. Una chiave di volta utile anche per uscire da quel sistema misto pubblico-privato che umilia la libertà e creatività delle culture, delle didattiche e dei saperi. 12. Cosmovisione e passaggio al futuro Ritorniamo, per finire, alle origini delle origini: la lingua madre e i popoli indigeni. Ripartiamo dalla cosmovisione dei popoli indigeni. Una visione cosmica delle differenze è proprio quello che si impone come svolta culturale, etica, poetica, scientifica e politica. Risalendo alle origini, veniamo catapultati immediatamente verso il futuro, passando per il soggiorno critico e costruttivo nel presente. Avere cosmovisione delle differenze significa accogliere l'eredità più preziosa delle culture e dei saperi indigeni, ritraducendoli nella complessità della condizione contemporanea. Significa imparare a danzare sui confini, attraversandoli e lasciandosene permeare. Lo sguardo che attraversa i confini non è semplice ibridismo culturale. Masse sterminate si muovono ora nello spazio globale e nel tempo accelerato della globalizzazione. Non solcano semplicemente confini culturali; piuttosto, ne spezzano le catene, facendoli saltare tutti in aria. 56 Ibidem. 57 Ibidem. 58 Ibidem. 59 M. Castoldi, Competenze chiave di cittadinanza: una cornice internazionale, "Scuola e Didattica", n. 9, 15 gennaio 2009; Muraglia, op. cit. 60 Muraglia, op. cit. 70 Si creano, così, non semplicemente i tempi e gli spazi della diaspora (cioè, confini nuovi dentro confini vecchi), ma più pregnantemente nuovi spazi e nuovi tempi, in cui le nazionalità si dissolvono e sbocciano i germogli degli intercampi transnazionali. Il luogo d'origine della diaspora è ben dentro il luogo di insediamento della diaspora e deve, necessariamente, farvi i conti. In dialogo non sono le identità diasporiche con il luogo di origine, ma le origini diasporiche con le origini dei luoghi di insediamento. Il passaggio al futuro si insedia qui: esso non è dialogo tra i confini, ma oltre i confini. Le diversità dialoganti si lasciano alle spalle ognuna i propri confini: ora possono incontrare il proprio Sé e l'Altro solo oltre confine. Quell'oltre entro cui diversità e dialogo interculturale ricamano i territori mobili dei diritti globali. La cittadinanza globale, soltanto così, può raccogliere l'intero patrimonio della storia millenaria delle civiltà umane. L'epoca delle origini, soltanto così, può intrecciarsi creativamente con l'era dei diritti globali. Sotto i nostri occhi, resi miopi dalla denutrizione spirituale e presbiti dallo sfavillare della virtualità, è in atto la riaggregazione e la ricostruzione del mondo, oltre tutte le barriere culturali, politiche e territoriali. A scapito della nostra vita, è in atto, da parte delle nuove élites del potere, l'occultamento sistematico di questi processi di riunificazione e affratellamento mondiale, attraverso la riproduzione e l'esaltazione mediatica del rancore delle differenze. Le guerre dei mondi entro il cui vortice siamo precipitati dai processi di comunicazione e rappresentazione sociale sono il risultato di un progressivo e sempre più ampio processo di smarrimento di quelle telluriche tensioni unitarie che soltanto una visione cosmica può restituirci. Solo una visione cosmica può ricondurci nelle braccia del principio umanità, al suo più alto livello di maturità. Solo una visione cosmica può situarci oltre le barriere artificiali degli inganni e degli idoli di cui siamo finiti prigionieri. Solo una visione cosmica può ridare visibilità a ciò che il potere e il denaro rendono invisibile. Il mondo diviso che vediamo in superficie non corrisponde affatto al mondo solidale delle profondità. E ora proprio delle profondità avvolgenti delle differenze abbiamo perduto lo sguardo. Per questo, nella migliore delle ipotesi, continuiamo a misurare i diritti di cittadinanza sempre in termini di integrazione e/o esclusione; giammai come valicamento di confini che, ormai, sopravvivono unicamente negli incubi e nei deliri di coscienze individuali e collettive impaurite e, insieme, assetate di potere. I territori della paura e dell'odio vanno, così, tracciando le geografie terrifiche della coscienza infelice. Il ritorno alle lingue madri e la promozione viva del dialogo interculturale segnano il passaggio al futuro, a patto che i linguaggi delle differenze cessino di essere i linguaggi della divisione. A condizione, cioè, che la comunicazione tra lingue madri sia capace di trovare le parole stesse della divisione, solcandone i sentieri in tutte le direzioni possibili e immaginabili. A partire dalla divisione tra umani e tra l'umano e il cosmico. Le culture e i saperi indigeni ci aiutano anche in questa direzione, poiché pongono il dono alla base delle relazioni interumane e del rapporto tra il mondo umano e l'ordine cosmico. Da qui occorre ripartire e questo punto di origine occorre arricchire, riabitando e riabilitando la contemporaneità. Scopriamo qui il nucleo caldo della cittadinanza globale: essa è tale, proprio perché deve ricondurre la meta all'origine e trasformare l'origine, partendo dalla meta. Globalità dei diritti è, prima di tutto, solidarietà dei tempi e degli spazi di vita del genere umano: abbraccio di presente, passato e futuro, con tutte le loro cadute e le loro promesse. Prende forma un nuovo mosaico dei tempi, dei diritti, delle responsabilità, delle esperienze di vita dissimili tra di loro: il rispetto dei diritti dell'Altro non è che la declinazione di un'etica planetaria che non fa altro che interiorizzare un'etica cosmica. L'anima del mondo si rispecchia qui nell'anima del cosmo e da essa ricava tutta la linfa, per la responsabilità che ora deve assumere nei confronti di tutte le forme dell'umano e del non umano. La vita qui è dono perché è percorsa dalla gratitudine di essere al mondo: una gratitudine che diviene responsabilità dei diritti dell'Altro prima dei propri, perché fuori e contro quelli dell'Altro non si dà alcun diritto61. Oggi più che mai, la negazione dei diritti dell'Altro implica il disconoscimento dei diritti. Stringendo in maniera assorbente tutto il discorso fin qui fatto, possiamo concludere: la transizione verso la cittadinanza globale ci proietta oltre le culture di morte e oppressione che hanno contagiato la storia della modernità e della contemporaneità occidentale, di cui dobbiamo assumerci il carico. Essa apre e si apre a culture di vita e della vita fa il suo motore 61 Su questo campo di problemi, sia concesso rinviare ad A. Chiocchi, L'altro e il dono, Avellino, Associazione culturale Relazioni, 2012. 71 perpetuo , con tutte le contraddizioni e i conflitti che l'attraversano. Sono proprio nuove culture di vita a farci consapevoli che nella condivisione di culture, saperi e diritti, non già nella competizione, stanno il presente e il futuro del genere umano. Verso questo orizzonte di luce occorre liberare anche il passato. L'intero mondo è ora la nostra casa ed è sempre un paese che non ci appartiene. Dobbiamo amarlo, non perché ci appartiene, ma perché gli apparteniamo.

Beijing Law Review, 2016, 7, 371-399 http://www.scirp.org/journal/blr ISSN Online: 2159-4635 ISSN Print: 2159-4627 DOI: 10.4236/blr.2016.74031 December 29, 2016 The Graduate Law Degree Holders in the Legal Education Market: Evidence from the US, Rankings and Implications Kiyoung Kim, Shahin Borhanian, Koo-Tae Chung, Yong-Hyun Park, Won-Sang Lee, Jae-Hyung Kim Department of Law, Chosun University, Gwang-ju, South Korea Abstract Given that the law is helpful, essential and non-separable with our lives, we surely would like to know the people that make laws and who practice in the legal profession. This query is the recent theme we have pursued in this and other related projects . The investigation has revealed a knowledge economy (savoir-faire) that has entwined law and the actions of law people, which growingly became edged to explain their behavior and moral and professional conduct. The expectation has been that graduate law classes are for foreign lawyers who would return to their home country to work as international lawyers or as professors. That has long been deemed as a given; but the precise reality has not been previously unraveled. With this backdrop, the current paper purports to survey the status and performance of graduate law degree holders in US law school, to rank global law schools, and explore the implications and findings concerning the processes and outcomes of their missions. Keywords Law School, Legal Education, Research Impact, Faculty Recruitment, Educational Rankings, Academic Degree 1. Introduction Would a lawyer be the worst of neighbors? There is a traditional Korean proverb that says just that. Nevertheless, the profession is thought by some to be one of the oldest on earth, perhaps comparable in antiquity with priests, monks or emperors1. 1It is sad, nevertheless, if the Empire of Law, as dreamed by R. Dworkin, is not perfect within the international community. The theme, "taking rights seriously", simply diverges from the political or public life although it evinced the epitome of legal academia. How to cite this paper: Kim, K., Borhanian, S., Chung, K.-T., Park, Y.-H., Lee, W.-S., & Kim, J.-H. (2016). The Graduate Law Degree Holders in the Legal Education Market: Evidence from the US, Rankings and Implications. Beijing Law Review, 7, 371-399. http://dx.doi.org/10.4236/blr.2016.74031 Received: October 5, 2016 Accepted: December 26, 2016 Published: December 29, 2016 Copyright © 2016 by authors and Scientific Research Publishing Inc. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution International License (CC BY 4.0). http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ Open Access K. Kim et al. 372 The practical use of laws also has had plenty of modern examples: We can ask for civil damages in case of an unfortunate traffic accident or seek recourse in case of an unexpected termination of pension benefits without due process of law. If aggrieved by unjust layoffs, we are entitled to fight for our rights with the assistance of a lawyer. Most importantly, many of us are beneficiaries of a democratically engendered legal process that helps to maintain our civilized lives with fundamental rights to protect life, limb and property being duly proclaimed and sustained by the polity or nation. The psychological benefits, alone, from a stable system of law, should be immeasurable if we take into consideration the resulting freedom from constant fear of non-predictable others. The kind of Hobbesian imagination of chaos if unchecked would be neither so radical nor remote if we see the turmoil of lawless communities in the movies or in a TV scene (Sherman & Cohn, 1989). The zombie ghosts from a contagious death-as depicted in violent scenes in a recent Korean film, titled "Train to Pusan"-would not be irrelevant to an imagination of real life lawlessness of humans living in an uncontrolled community. Since the current form of modern democracy and free market capitalism has been founded, legal professionals have turned out to be one of the most important societal groups to sustain it. Lawyers have always been politically involved and their job is the most probable to help lead the nations. While many lawyers have been inculcated with the values of revolutionary ideals, the greatest of them have even been destined to proclaim the vision of supreme national documents. Given that the law is helpful, essential and non-separable with our lives, we surely would like to know the people that make laws and who practice in the legal profession and are responsible for the authority and prestige of law professionals (Glendon, Gordon, & Osakwe, 1994; Pistor, Wellons, & Sachs, 1999). This query is the recent theme we have pursued in this and other related projects. As background, this research planned to address the trending diversity of global education and law disciplines with increasing attention to ubiquitous socio-cultural terms that characterize the personalities and thoughts that trend in the traditional economic or political world. This study purports to elucidate a grey area of legal education that generally has been neglected out of the main concern of legal educators. Its focus on professionalization or graduate level education is also correlated with the fast changing intensity and diversity of market demand or knowledge economy. The taught-based doctorate, what we know as JDs in US law schools, would perhaps be more unique, and educational reform to crown the professionals with further graduate level degrees will seemingly continue to respond to new market demand. Executive MBAs or a different form of Doctor of Education than the traditional PhD in education may be one outcome to approximate JDs in law school. The sorting or ranking of graduate law degree holders, in this respect, can assist with a more refined understanding and could be a seminal work for spectators and interest holders of the legal education market, including graduate law students themselves, law teachers, investors and policy makers in this area (Korobkin, 1998). The traditional ranking sources dealing with law schools are fortunately diverse or more specific given the relatively popular atK. Kim et al. 373 traction of the legal market, more so than that of other departments. The National Jurist, Brian Leiter's and many other student guides actually produced meet these kinds of needs. They lack, however, a serious inquiry into the arena of graduate law degree holders. To address this gap, we have collected data and evidence to assess the status and performance of LLMs and SJDs within the US law teaching market and analyzed them, ranking graduate law degree programs to appreciate the nature and quality of graduate law education. We also hope this research can fulfill a pioneering role to motivate further research. In Section 2, we will briefly state the problem leading to this research, the purpose of research, and how it was conducted. Though it is a comprehensive survey, the research has some limitations that are briefed in Section 3. In Section 4, we will present the analysis of data and implications of analyzed results. A short conclusion will follow in Section 5. 2. Background of This Study 2.1. Problem Who is it that leads and shapes the important institutions and groups of people that are involved in the legal profession? More specifically to suit the purpose of this research, who is in charge of developing their important frame of reference and the legal research that not only sustains the law schools, but also shapes legal education and the real world of law practice? One aspect of the answer to this question requires that we survey the educational background of law professors and legal practitioners and rate their performance (Laband, 1986; Masuoka, Grofman, & Feld, 2007; McCormick & Bernick, 1982; Schmidt & Chingos, 2007)2. Interestingly within the US legal education system, we can find a dual class of degrees, JDs and graduate law ones, including those we denote as LLM, SJD or PhD in law. We have commonly in mind that legal education produces jurists, and law schools have long been held of import to the process of creating JDs, who would be deemed to be the majority in number and the foremost in providing professional legal services (Amsterdam, 1984; Wizner, 2001). The presumption is that the holders of this degree would become law professors, federal or state judges, state attorneys, and conduct the practice of law in large or medium size firms or in small firms or in the solo form. The expectation has been that graduate law classes would be for foreign lawyers and that they would return to their home countries to serve as international lawyers or professors. That has long been deemed as an undeniable given, but the precise reality has yet to be unraveled. Since the ranking of certain things in this inquiry would be an important beginning point to appreciate their nature and quality, we resolved to survey the reality of the above assumption to yield a ranking which hopefully could develop through further research concerning the students who attend graduate law schools and the outcome of their studies (Brian Leiter's 2016; Brophy, 2Often the rankers tend to maintain a focus on the performance of faculty or credentials of admitted student, and other temporary variables. In comparison, the degree-based and all-time approach could be vested and durable in view of assessing and generating a ranking. Given the use of ranking sources, the approach can also have a strength to guide prospective students and investors, who essentially have to be have a long-term view of years or decades in life management. K. Kim et al. 374 2015; Fox, 2001; Sisk, Aggerbeck, Farris, McNevin, & Pitener; 2015). 2.2. Purpose and Method In this backdrop, the purpose of this research, firstly, is to assess the statistics and performance of LLMs, SJDs and PhD in laws within US law schools. Secondly, it will rank graduate law programs across those degrees to help the audience and interested players appreciate the nature and quality of the professionals with those training backgrounds. In order to address the purpose, we employed a quantitative method that investigated the whole of all of the US law school websites identified according to their ranking in US News and World Report (USWR)3. Often quantitative researchers use public surveys with samples and scaled questionnaires (Creswell, 2013). However, such methodology would be less than relevant to the purpose since the theme does not pertain to the psychological or social perspectives. Therefore, the method of this study is similar to the national census for demographics, and this paper deals with the overall parameters relevant to our interest. Viewed globally, the research can be considered to deal with the most prominent cluster of relevant examples, namely, US law schools in some level of global prestige. The lead author of this paper had previously published the consulting-based SJD ranking (on fixed scale with 15/15/15/55), which was created from the Shapiro's and truly global since it was compiled on the basis of Hein Online and ISI (Kim, Ju, & Khatun, 2015). The investigation in this paper, on the other hand, is based on US law schools, but could be translated as global since the professionals are highly mobile to build their career paths. Also, the LLM program is a short year course, whose holders are more than widespread through the scope of the search and significantly internationalized. The SJD degree costs the students more years to complete – hence possibly less internationalized-but it still is not irrelevant since many holders are from the international context. The point is that the LLMs, SJDs or PhDs in law across the globe can be taken equal and analogous to those that pursue the law teaching market in the US in furtherance of their legal career. Therefore, the result can be read within the national context of US legal education on one hand, and could be viewed globally on the other or taken as the kind of ideal, "perfect market" conceived by Adam Smith4. 3One law school around a middle-low rank had a concise website without the educational background of professors and the website of another law school in Puerto Rico was defunct and could not be retrieved. Therefore, two law schools were unfeasible to investigate, which, however, is negligible in effect. 4According to our experience, the international rankers, such as QS, ARWU, THE, began their commitment on the assumption that the market of knowledge economy or university institution can be idealized and universal despite local contingencies-such as language or culture and other provincial impacts on the system. Hence the basic assumption is objectivized as supported by the perfect market thesis of Adam Smith. The idea may be married with globalization or neo-liberalization as a virtue of global capitalism, which has been a principle for decades, but with the inevitable resistance, adjustment and transformation. Many may agree that the thesis of "glocalization (global + local)" is better received more realistic and practical for the citizens of global village. In terms of the educational aspect, the regional ranking of QS and use of regional reputation by USWR for the ranking of global universities could be seen as one kind of adjustment or transformation. The paper begins to accept the reasoning of this theoretical phenomenon, but with a care for the growing conservative ethos of nationalism or conservative ideals in the world of real politics. Practically-we mean by this to be in comparison with the ideal or statistical assumption abovementioned-and results can be taken as global to see who is more cognizant or is more scholarly in the US law than others among global LLMs or research doctorates in law. K. Kim et al. 375 The investigation had been performed roughly two months this summer along with the assistance of research aides. 10 or 20 law school websites were analyzed on a daily basis except for a recess period of one week to allow for attending the international schedule arranged during the last days of July, 2016. Since our focus had been on the research impact of law professors, and to avoid undue expense in time and energy, the faculty labelled "clinical", "visiting", "adjunct" and "other classes" less relevant to the role of devoted research was discarded. Since their product and citations are often minimal, new law professors, labelled "lecturer" and "assistant professor" were also excluded out of the investigatory scope. Therefore, the data that captured the purpose was such that covered those, who were designated with the title of "associate professor of law", "professor of law" and "emeritus (APEs)". We reasonably assumed that they would comprise the core of the people whose statistics would show the contemporary reality of professional research in the US law schools. As appears in the Table A1 of Appendix, the number of faculty per graduate had been made one component of four variables in the final ranking that the lecturers or assistant professors may be partly implicating. The assumption, however, is that the APEs could be proportional of new faculty recruitment. Contemporary raters popularly focus on the number of publications and citations, which often are converted into per capita productivity. This perspective basically guided the aura and direction of the paper's methodology. Therefore, the ranking is essentially per capita, except for the total of citations, which, we believe, helps to see the whole picture of interest. This allows one to also use the number of faculty as an indication of publications given that the average law professor yielded 2 4 articles or books yearly. 3. Limitations of Study This investigation relies upon the scholarly works available on the Internet depository at "scholar.google.com (SGC)" or publicly open records in accordance with the best available evidence principle. While the concept of research impact is equivalent to that of Shapiro and is based on citations or the recently coined term, citology, the standard of quality obviously came out different, and is admittedly rough and less than ideally defined. A strict dividing line to preserve the distinct identity of legal science held faithfully by Shapiro was necessarily sacrificed due to the counting of the whole of the available data (Shapiro, 2000, 2012)5. Therefore, the citations of staff papers, unpublished SSRN materials and monographs or even informal writings as well as products or citations by non-legal sources were included (Black & Caron, 2006). For similar reasons, Joseph Raz and John Finnis-British educated legal scholars-had far more counts than that of the Shapiro's article published in 2000. Nevertheless, Shapiro's care to comply with the "less than half rule" for identification of the "legal scholars" as opposed to those of "social science" has been maintained since merging the social and legal science data would likely produce an egregious result. Such confounded data would 5This way of dealing, therefore, is close to the approach of Webometrics that ranks global scholars and institutions. K. Kim et al. 376 efface the identity of the legal education system as a whole (Shapiro, 2000, 2012). For this reason, Max Weber, a doctorate in law from Germany-if assumed as an emeritus professor in US law schools-has been excluded although he should have been counted based on the Hein Online or law-related ISI data6. This same rationale has been applied to exclude B.S. Santos, who is a graduate law from Yale and currently has a post at UW-Madison law school. In this respect, the refinement of the classification by Shapiro, distinguishing such categories as law review articles, legal books, text writers, non-legal materials or method to determine the standard of law journals had a very good and vital cause. Generally, his method is crucial to preserve the identity of law, legal science, and the law school system, and we have partly and to the extent possible adhered to it through the work-and deviated from it, however, only to broadly sketch the area of contemporary exposure (Priest, 1983)7. It was also not possible to strictly filter the citations to reduce the numbers counted multiple times although they were made by one article, and the counts were made to reflect maximum totals8. The accuracy of counts, however, was attended to the best of human effort. Nevertheless, it was true that we faced some difficulties when the authors did not have an author page on Google Scholar9. Therefore, a margin of error in counts might be present, but it is believed that the efficacy of the final ranking will not be affected. Since there are a number of law-related graduate law degrees, identifying them is not so simple, and they could have variant titles and distinct characteristics according to their program purpose. The MLS degree of Yale or Illinois and MLI of Wisconsin10 are examples of degrees that serve the need of legal study by scholars of other disciplinary backgrounds or whose principal purpose is more to teach the basics of US laws to prepare participants for the LLM or SJD courses than it is to deepen legal knowledge. With this understanding, we have discarded the professors of those degrees who do not also hold traditional master of law degrees. One problem is that although the MAs, MPhils and diplomas from British or European institutions may well be no less significant, their confirmation was impossible unless the information best available, such as a resume of each professor, specified the same as comparable to an LLM or traditional master of law degree. Those professors as vague or impossible to confirm degrees have, 6In this interest, you also can refer to the system of ranking law journals, for example, the website of Washington and Lee University Law School. 7For example, if the applicability of "less than half rule" is ambiguous because of close number, the citation count had been adjusted to portray the most proximate result for the impact of legal education. 8Therefore, the way differs from any popular standard to count the cites, say, "one count per paper than one count to cites." 9As we see in the Webometrics ranking, the personal or institutional account and webpage in the SGC is highly implicating for the performance of global scholars. The scholars from other disciplines, often with more than citations, tend to manage it, which is significantly less relating with the law professors. This means that most of counts had been hand-on carried, which consumed much time for accuracy and verification. It also implies the hybrid nature of law school or legal education as professional, while the legal science stands at the centre of knowledge economy along the growing economy and technology advancement. 10It was recently changed of name for the LLM-Legal Institution, but considered to be excluded because of the same characteristics as before and, more importantly, no relevance to this study scope for the change's recentness. K. Kim et al. 377 therefore, been foregone without consideration. On the other hand, LLM programs are becoming more specialized to focus on topics of public interest or other special legal merit. Most notably, the LLM in taxations offered by NYU impacted much on the jurisprudence, and the environmental law program by Vermont notwithstanding its degree-based impact had a stark presence as a successful example of specialization11. In some cases, even the SJD program is trending toward specialization as we see in the Pace University's program for environmental law, Case Western's program for health law and University of Florida's SJD for taxation12. The graduate law programs are diverse according to the context of each school and display varying gross size differences. The size of each graduating class was confirmed to the best of available evidence, for which the LLM Guide of World Universities was an invaluable help. The chatting space of interested students as well as each school's website also served as a source of verification about the LLM class size. The final number has been adjusted by adding five to six SJD admissions, which is reflected in the whole size of the graduate law programs. Information from students and other interested actors was thought to be crucial to know the nature and quality of these programs. Across the webpages of alumni chatrooms, the LLMs seemingly had many interests about the admission policy and statistics of the programs, while the SJDs emphasized their scholarly experience along with the general prestige of law schools13. Besides the generalized law school rankings, a more focused ranking on LLM program was available as assessed by the American Universities Admission Program (AUAP)14. My previous study on the consulting based-ranking of SJD program also could be referenced in this respect (Kim, Ju, & Khatun, 2015). 11Years recently, Dean of Vermont law school had a chance to visit South Korea, and remarked very proudly that an eager student of environmental law had dropped his admission to the JD program of Yale law school, and decided to accept the offer of Vermont. It implies that the research quality of law schools can affect not only graduate law students, but also the JD applicants. 12The SJD students are very few and a few law schools had offered the program as the website from the Lewis and Clark introduced, "Very few U.S. law schools offer this degree, and very few people obtain it, as it is very rarely required even for law professorships in the United States. However, if you must obtain a Ph.D.-level degree in order to become a professor or for other professional reasons, this is the degree for you." For example, the SJD program in UCLA had only recently been created in the new millennium. Around the time when the lead author was a graduate law student in 1990's, about 30 law schools have offered the program, which were prominent with respect to the university as a whole and the prestige of law school. Now more than 50 law schools boast of their SJD program that became more popular through the Wake Forest, Pace and Case Western. Still the University of Texas-Austin had no ads about the SJD program. Therefore, the consulting-based ranking of SJD program in the Table A1 would not be available in some cases or sharp against the usual law school rankings. 13In terms of research methodology, the research on law subject or law schools as a whole (as referred to the QS/USWR ranking in Table A1) could be more easily quantifiable (for example, undergraduate GPAs or faculty and student ratio), which is less pertinent to assess the nature and quality of graduate laws, especially for the SJD programs. The qualitative inquiry could reveal more than the quantitative method in the case of graduate laws and, in a sense, can be the proper mode to understand them. In this respect, it may be a good practice that the quotes of previous SJD students are provided by Washington University in Saint Louis in its school webpage. 14The website provides, "As a service to the International Law community, AUAP establishes... this classification. based on the program quality, admissions rate, world image of the university, average starting salary and satisfaction index of international students. This classification is global and does not reflect the comparative strength of each program in a specific field of Law (such as the international civil law, taxation, Internet, intellectual property etc.)." K. Kim et al. 378 4. Analysis and Implications Table A1 and Table A2 include the key findings of this research that show the final ranking as compared to other sources of law school ranking as well as the share of faculty with graduate law degrees compared to the whole of the APEs. As shown, the results, to an extent, corroborate with others on the general nature of law school rankings, but also differs with respect to the contingencies of each law school. The results, therefore, imply that the graduate laws need to be viewed as distinct, in which the job placement rate and research impact are a more significant indicator for the mind of graduates. The research impact of faculty is often used to assess the strength of programs or institutions, but this study rather focused on the degree holders. The rationale is that the graduate law students generally could be considered quasi-scholars so as to be more precisely rated in same way related to the faculty themselves. They also are not soinsignificant that the share of representation is less minimal than as shown in Table A2. This finding is against the general presumption that the programs are exclusively for the foreign lawyers who will return to their home countries upon graduation. As appears in the Table A3, NYU and Georgetown had the most sizable LLM class while Yale, Lewis & Clark15 and Wisconsin had the smallest classes. Most law schools received 50 80 students yearly. The table shows that the class size is relevant to the production of law faculty as seen in the larger numbers in Columbia, NYU and Georgetown. However, Harvard excelled those schools producing 256 law faculty, although it had roughly half of those schools in terms of the total number of graduates. Yale produced around 121 law professors despite relatively small class size. Yale topped this variable, which would possibly influence the focus of other schools on legal academia, for example, UW-Madison, which also scored well in this category, ranking 2nd behind Yale. In a sense, the graduates and programmatic designers of these schools are likely to have more of an interest and focus on the prospect of academia in terms of career management and student selection policies. These could be compared with Harvard, Columbia, NYU, and Georgetown, where the graduates also hope to be able to land lucrative high profile law jobs besides their prospects of securing a teaching position. In either case, the statistics generally show the high impact of two most prestigious law schools on the US jurisprudence and legal teaching market. As we see, contemporary jurisprudence has a temperament of one of three groups in terms of scholarly vogue and elaboration, what may be classified as the law and economics, technology and critical legal studies groups-which serve as a kind of legal monitors of modern capitalism. The first two relate to the essentials of current capitalist production and the third would be either an antithesis or a category of American realism to expose negative or problematic judicial boundedness. Richard Posner and Mark Lemley would be a notable example for the first two and Catherine Mackinnon, Richard Delgado or Kimberle Crenshaw could be in the third group. As an approach to determine the importance of research to a law school system, the legal philosophy that breeds a particular kind of 15The class size of Lewis Clark had not been presented here, but the number of faculty representation as well as citations is shown in the Appendix. K. Kim et al. 379 scholar could be one factor that renders a school program like that of UW-Madison a possible modality to inspire other law schools16. As you see in Table A4, that the graduate laws of Oxford have fared better than those of Cambridge corroborates our general recognition of a distinction between the humanity or social science and natural science modalities. Two schools also serving as the destination of Rhode scholars and enjoying the top caliber US college graduates, who are often related with their JDs, are Harvard and Yale. The British scholars are no less pertinent to the findings of this study. Nevertheless, they highly tend to focus on the subject of international law or social philosophy, which contrasts somewhat with the US-based national legal scholars, whose productivity and impact largely comes within the constitutional, criminal or criminal procedure, administrative and civil law field areas. The distinction also is a factor determining the research impact of British scholars, which had been represented by a relatively small number in Shapiro's aforementioned article. Interestingly, Cornell and UCLA turned out to have a small share of faculty and consequently produced less citations, although they are considered leading law schools. Ironically, however, the Cornell LLM program, for most of the relevant years, had been rated a top school globally ahead of Harvard and Yale by AUAP17. UCLA law school, with four law faculty, has also consistently been rated around 15th amongst 200 US law schools, which makes the result a little surprising. However, the LLM graduates of both law schools appear to prefer obtaining a prestigious law job with a high salary or alternatively to work as a law professor back home (2012 Rankings of American LLM). A similar context of low research performance can be found in this study at USC and Washington University in Saint Louis. However, the latter boasts of a 97 percent success rate for students landing a job upon graduation according to its webpage. Vanderbilt, UNC, Boston College, University of Minnesota, University of Iowa, Ohio State, College of William and Mary, UC-Irvine, UC-Hastings and other similarly ranked law schools also are internationally and regionally prominent with respect to the employment of graduates, and are steady with respect to their educational mission, although not visible here in the paper. Therefore, this study is indicative, but not an absolute measure of performance since the preferences of graduates are not all inclusive and performance measures can be diverse. For example, Ruthann Robson, a Berkeley LLM graduate and professor of CUNY, was acclaimed as a best law professor in the nation by Harvard, which is squarely within the expected role of a law professor. She also is a very competent researcher with approximately 1000 citations, but could not be so acclaimed if purely measured on the basis of her numbers and research impact. Other high ranked law schools showed good numbers as indicated by Table A5. Berkeley yielded 22 law professors with 20,996 citations in total, and Stanford was represented by 34 law professors 16As stated, the school showed strength with a high ratio of faculty to the production of graduates. This is indebted to the LLMs of Hastie fellowship, that is despite the considerable number of non-Hastie LLMs and SJDs. Beyond the aspect of program design, its Hastie fellowship program can have a precious purpose if law envisages the protection of minorities and promotion of social justice. 17Supra note 14. K. Kim et al. 380 with 32,260 citations in total. The graduate law ranking in this study reported that Berkeley rounded out at 12th overall and Stanford at 6th. The reputation of subject ranking by USWR is more than significant in some cases, such as Temple law school's LLM in trial advocacy, which performed highly with the production of 58 law faculty and 11,194 citations. This is comparable with the LLM in taxations of NYU. Temple University is ranked around 50th in the USWR law school assessment, but found at 15th for the assessment of graduate law program in this study. This implies that the specialization effort of law schools can have much more say to produce the quality LLMs than a 3.5 undergraduate GPA of the JD entering class. The law schools of Midwestern region or Committee of Institutional Cooperation (CIC) schools fared well, and Illinois, Michigan, Chicago and Wisconsin were rated highly. That appears because these law schools have a strong research tradition university-wide and inherent passion in the region for academics. As has been introduced, this study is an all-time conceptualization as a kind of semi-Shapiro's. However, the earliness of university education could have some impact, but seems not definitive since Stanford already yielded LLMs and JSDs in the 1960s, which is the temporal foundation of this study. The region usually would be considered a rust belt in terms of econo-political transformation, and its impact on academia would not be minimal18. But the prospect is not entirely gloomy if the academia would have a lagged impact as we see in the cases of Oxford and Cambridge at the global rating, which are the universities of past global hegemony19. Furthermore, the promise of redevelopment for the rust belt is often a top list for the presidential election. Given that the econo-political impact on the culture, intelligence and public education is not definitive, the strategy of each university and law schools in the region would be a more probable factor to address the challenges that they face, especially with respect to the quality of graduate law programs. Actually, the current trend of US college graduates shows a likely preference for medical schools or PhDs than JDs, which threatens the traditional business of law school administrators. The highly ranked law schools may not be affected, but those of upper-middle and middle range are pressed for a new response against the diminished number of applicants. Low ranked law schools may have to redefine their prospects with a new rationalization and inputs of professors or investment. Hence, the strategic aspect of school administration cannot be minimized merely because of the public esteem and dignity of legal education. It is needless to mention its importance when considering the educational effect of graduate laws programs. 18For example, UW-Madison law school was ranked around 19th nationally in the early 1990's, but now 33rd in 2016 USWR. 19As stated, many interested intellectuals perceive that the international rating of global universities and other educational performance could be hyped in support of the globalization thesis. The thesis also supports the need of global capitalism for any market expansion. On the other hand, it is one lesson that the classic theory of liberal economy culminates with a monopoly in the end. In a sense, the matter also may be cultural and political beyond the economics or liberal market and besides the indicators used if the QS, THE, ARWU, US global and national rating produce a separate top-no monopoly in other words-for any check and balances as well as other implications. The knowledge economy, in this aspect, would have a multifaceted character, say, economic, social, cultural and even political as we see in the names of UNESCO and UN. K. Kim et al. 381 Another noteworthy finding is that Yale has recently created a law PhD program besides the traditional research doctorate, JSD, which perhaps is similar to the PhD in Asian law provided by the University of Washington20. The title of PhD is more significant if we examine the astronomical number of citations from the economics or biological PhDs and the journals of other discipline, such as Physical Letters or IEES. Three recent graduates of Yale law PhD successfully landed law professorships in the job market this year, which could be a variable in the future to test the mode of graduate law in terms of scholarly productivity (Brian Leiter's, 2106). Of course, they were not included in this study since its scope is restricted to professors with years of engagement. The University of Washington, however, does not seem to reap much in this regard despite the degree name since the PhDs majoring in Asian law are less significant than other areas of legal topic. However, we can find a good society of Asian law research in Lung-chu Chen who has been active in New York Law School with nearly 2000 citations and collaborated with his eminent peers, such as MacDougal. In this context, the general prestige also visibly matters to a graduate's profile. Other strong law schools produce good professors with the LLM and SJD background, such as Northwestern, George Washington, Duke and Boston Universities, and University of Texas-Austin. The general law school rankings can be said less relevant at the University of Florida, which is relatively low in the law school ranking and is represented with 26 professors, but is above the University of Chicago and University of Berkeley in this variable. Nevertheless, the citations of Florida are more than small with 2121, which comes in some contrast with those of traditionally strong law schools. We often assume that LLMs or SJDs are for foreign attorneys who wish to learn about US laws and related specialized subjects. The ads and websites of law schools for their graduate law programs also express a penchant for the attraction of foreign attorneys. Duke, for example, so introduced its graduate law program, which may possibly create a misunderstanding if it is presumed to be exclusively for foreign lawyers. However, the study found good results at Duke, and a considerable number of Duke LLMs native of the US currently work as law professors. The citations of Duke amounted to 5272. Another interesting finding is that the LLMs of the US Military's Judge Advocate School of Law are represented more than some law schools with 13 law professors, but with a relatively small number of citations, totaling around 1348. John Marshall law school, a relatively low ranked law school boasts approximately 10,000 citations, which is a significant number. This is due in no small part to one productive scholar, and shows an important relevance of the popular approach in library science entitled "most cited" legal scholars, law review articles, and "most cited" journals of other disciplines. Most LLMs and SJDs perform better or comparably with the JD professors without an LLM degree. Assuming that, on average, the citations of a normal professor range around 150 300, the numbers are comparable with the professors of other back- 20The two schools are unique in conferring the PhD in law degree in the United States although the dual degree in collaboration with other departments, e.g., JD/PhD, is not unusual in the business of law schools. K. Kim et al. 382 grounds, such as JDs without an LLM degree. The most notable dual degree form was found to be JD/PhDs as expected-though not presented in this study. The reason for this mix is indicated to be a preference of students for exposure to the different modes of study between the taught-based and research-based degrees, and seems to reflect on the interdisciplinary context of legal research. Another reason seems to lie in the convenience that the mix would be popular or even commercialized as a set in American graduate education, as we also see in the case of MD/PhDs. As visible in Table A2, LLM or SJD graduates are not negligible among the whole class of APEs. In proportionality with the number of graduates from both programs, say, JD's and graduate law, their share is not grossly disparate. This indicates that the law graduates consider the graduate law degree not mere ornamental, but a chance to deepen their legal knowledge as career legal educators (Cf. Sheldon & Krieger, 2007). Nevertheless, the vein of legal academia in the US is still steered and dominated by JD degree holders, who often are great scholars of basic legal subjects, such as the constitutional and criminal laws, criminal procedure, administrative laws, torts and contracts- a kind of Napoleonic rubric of modern laws and obviously the first year courses of law schools21. LLM study seems to be a significant entry point of scholarship because of its specialization, and SJD degree can be a strong stimulus to accelerate scholarly devotion in other cases22. Such specialized study also bears relevance to address the needs of a scholar on his or her interdisciplinary conceptualization of research themes, such as law and economics23. Added to these factors inherent in the graduate law study is the finding that about all LLM degree holders had experienced the basic legal education of US law schools, while some of SJDs have no US law degree, but only LLBs of foreign law department or law schools24. The distribution of faculty and citations had been tabulated specifically according to 21This summer, Marc D. Falkoff, a professor of Northern Illinois law school visited South Korea and presented the theme of legal education in the US. He described the three years of law school as felt by the typical student essentially as follows, "The first year is all the time that is available to learn the essential law... the second year of law school feels like a time for students to collaborate with their professors, and the third year is a period of waiting for completion and their employment prospects. This implies the importance for the first year courses in terms of learning the law". 22Once the lead author ranked the consulting-based ranking of SJD programs with much emphasis on the degree-based research impact. The high percentage of 55, as compared with the relatively small percentage of general reputation including the rank of law school's law review, faculty productivity or citations and so, was due to the fact that the graduate law degree implicates a quasi-status and character for scholars and their time is important to prepare themselves as independent researchers. One other consideration is that the doctoral degree is more durable than that of bachelor or master through the course of life-time career years, and should be consistent with "the benefit principle" or the "cost allocated to the benefit" principle. In other words, degree-based impact as a quasi-scholar or professor could be more "weightily translated" as the ranking indicator while the faculty impact "directly reflects" the productivity of each professor. 23In this area, a palpable trend is notable with combined degree holders. The trend can penetrate professors of economics PhD and SJD, as is the case with L. A. Bebchuk and his peers at University of Tel Aviv. 24One example would be S. J. Cho, a full time faculty at the Chicago and Kent, who is interestingly a scholar of Korean origin. He is a high impact scholar in this study with around 2000 citations, and has an LLB (JD equivalent) and MPA degrees from Seoul National University (his home country) as well as SJD from Harvard. His case also could support the conclusion that his study and successful completion of SJD degree stimulated his scholarly path, if without a JD degree. K. Kim et al. 383 the rank of law schools except for the Extra group, and within six categories25. As appears in Table A5, it is manifest that the law faculty of the top percentile, about thirty law schools in this study, produced many more citations than those of other percentiles. The implication is that the scholarship of LLM or SJD professors can be affected by the law schools they serve. Another significant finding is the importance of leadership within the scholarly community and professional communication through law reviews, which as we see in Shapiro's most cited legal scholars and text writer categories, are strong factors to determine the research impact of LLMs and SJDs as a whole. This correlative accords with previous studies based on review of Shapiro's three articles. The numbers of "most cited" law review articles also come very close to being determinative in accounting for the whole of citations by the same authors. In other words, citations of one most cited law review article possibly can excel the whole number of other articles of respective author and well over that of other authors. The citations from "most cited scholars" can even be ten or over twenty thousands, and the citations of top percentile law schools account to three times higher than other percentile law schools. This never means that the whole range of investigation would be meaningless. Provided that 100 or 200 citations indicates a good performance for law professors, we can confidently assert that 500 1000 citations should be interpreted as leaving a remarkable footprint in US jurisprudence. These numbers are steady and good indicators of the product of many law professors who are unlisted in the Shapiro's "most cited" category. A final ranking, as shown Table A1, has been produced for the least number, averaged with the rank of four variables-per capita production of law faculty (representations), whole citations, per capita citations of faculty, and per capita citations of graduates. In the Appendix, you can refer to the statistics in details. Besides the final ranking in Table A1, Table A2 informs on the share of faculty with the graduate law degree holders among the total APEs, and Table A3 shows each school's number of yearly graduates and faculty representation. Table A4 includes the analyzed result of four variables with rankings. The Table A5 presents the detailed distribution of each school. Table A6 shows the faculty and total citations of global law schools or departments that have more than five representations. The Table A7 has penetrated all the remaining, whose schools at least have one faculty representation in US law schools. As shown in Table A6 and Table A7, we still can see a gap between the Latin community with the English-style alphabets and Asian nations. History and culture also can be a factor with respect to graduate law scholars of European and Latin American origin who are serving in US law schools, although in the least numbers. 5. Conclusion Through the investigation, we have learned that a knowledge economy (savoir-faire) has entwined law and the actions of people in society, and growingly became edged to 25The Extra category had been arranged with around 15 mostly modest and low rank of law schools. Within the fifth percentile are the University of Hawaii, University of Maryland, Indiana University-McKinley, and one of two Penn States were included, which could possibly range around third and four percentiles. K. Kim et al. 384 explain their behavior and moral and professional conduct. The growth of economy and development of technology are two essential horns leading them bullishly to a more competitive model of growth needing a constant mode of new learning. The knowledge economy has an indispensable ingredient, which is the "research" applied to each respective field, and that serves as a base or ultimate background to claim its cause for being and the participants' identities within the community. As we see, law schools sell their educational services by sporting their own libraries independent from the university-wide ones, and their compilations of books and articles compiled through heritage and history have been critical assets to reap their relatively high tuitions. On the other hand, legal education also should serve to increase practical knowledge and ability to practice law instantly upon the graduation (Edwards, 1992). This combination has been a critical dyad, long embedded on the minds and hearts of legal educators and system builders. Through this hybrid, law professors hope to find their meaning and purpose, and judges and state attorneys enjoy their social status along with their affordable salaries. It is well known that income differentials upon graduation are a component of the law school's ranking and also are predetermined in part by it. We generally do not dispute that the success of the legal education and its system are highly dependent on the research and the database they produce (Savoy, 1970). This would be a reason why almost all law schools recruit graduates with the master of library science (the other MLS than master of legal studies) degree for their library professorship. Their depository shelves are enormously stacked with scholarly sources and materials of law practice, such as federal reporters and state or regional legal documents. The authority and social interactions of law personnel are ultimately based on the research or practice products between the duality of practice and scholarship (Kennedy, 1982), and it has been hitherto unknown whether the graduate laws could perform comparably with O. W. Holmes, one of most impactful legal scholar and judge or with Richard Posner, Mark A. Lemley and C. R. Sunstein, and other most productive researchers with non-graduate laws. Is the graduate law degree merely an ornament or a dead casket found within the profiles of century old professors? Despite their relatively minority status, their share of representation within the whole faculty, their mindedness and mode of intellectual activity (i.e., more independent and subjective-yet scientific, and tending toward seminar-based learning and semi-scholarly term papers), their impact on specialization and aspects of personal stimulation through the scholarly decades, all seems still to be meaningful to the extent they impact the vestiges of scholarship. We hope that the findings and implications of this paper can help us to appreciate the nature and purpose of graduate law programs and the phenomenon of the lives and products of people relating with them (Patton, 1990; Reynolds, 2015). Limitation in this research must be present as evidenced by the lack of prior research on this subject. Since the work is exploratory to an extent, there are many issues that need to be discussed further or refined. The expectation is that subsequent research could make this work more perfect and developed to suit the goals of legal education as well as the needs of the legal teaching market. Although it is designed to impart the sigK. Kim et al. 385 nificant impact of degree based research and the contribution of graduate versus entering professors, it's clear, for example, that publications have been curtailed under the assumption that they are produced as proportional to the number of faculty. That result could be improved with further research. This research also can be complemented with the future work, for example, dealing with a comparison between the JDs or LLBs and graduate laws. One notes through this research that the international ranking scheme has recently grown to show the socio-culturally ubiquitous implications of the global village. The education market may likely experience a transnationalism akin to McDonald® and its presence within the global corners of neighborhoods or communities. Higher education is the most important public venue to breed leadership in each field and at each level. Educators and readers of ranking sources need to be mindful of this change, rather than focusing merely on the traditional national context of public education and consciousness. Scientific indicators and field data indicate important significance in the international dimension, which differs from the devotional loyalty or general public consciousness within the nation or local community. For example, it now has to be odd to say that Harvard or Yale and its departments are plenary to other schools or departments without any more competitive data. A contemporary understanding of social or community leadership should be different from what it was before the new millennium and the burgeoning years of new international ranking sources, such as QS and ARWU, expanding now through the Times and USWR. Without this change of mind, we may propagate an unwholesome and pernicious propaganda or quandary to inadvertently harm the development and promotion of potential national leaders or prospective national elites in various fields, such as politics, business and academic world, who, of course, are often highly educated. That is because of the substantial impact that such international dealings may have on scholarship and social and political discourse in the local context, not to mention the glocalization effect. This aspect can be further related to the increasing need for interdependence of scientific minds, the global public or open access movement of the scholarly community as well as the implications of growing competition within the knowledge economy. This paper can hopefully contribute to this area of interest with the expectation that further research will complement, critique and develop it. References 2012 Rankings of American LL.M/Master of Law. http://www.auap.com/llm.html Amsterdam, A. G. (1984). Clinical Legal Education-A 21st Century Perspective. Journal of Legal Education, 34, 612-618. Black, B. S., & Caron, P. L. (2006). Ranking Law Schools: Using SSRN to Measure Scholarly Performance. Indiana Law Journal (Symposium on The Next Generation of Law School Rankings), Vol. 81, 2006; U of Texas Law, Law and Econ Research Paper No. 52; U of Cincinnati Public Law Research Paper No. 05-14. http://ssrn.com/abstract=784764 Brian Leiter's Law School Report. http://leiterlawschool.typepad.com/ Brophy, A. L. (2015). Ranking Law Schools, 2015: Student Aptitude, Employment Outcome, and K. Kim et al. 386 Law Review Citations. UNC Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2624399, 28 June 2015. http://ssrn.com/abstract=2624399 https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2624399 Creswell, J. W. (2013). Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. Edwards, H. T. (1992). The Growing Disjunction between Legal Education and the Legal Profession. Michigan Law Review, 91, 34-78. https://doi.org/10.2307/1289788 Fox, M. F. (2001). Women, Science, and Academia Graduate Education and Careers. Gender & Society, 15, 654-666. https://doi.org/10.1177/089124301015005002 Glendon, M. A., Gordon, M. W., & Osakwe, C. (1994). Comparative Legal Tradition: Text, Materials, and Cases on the Civil and Common Law Traditions, with Special Reference to French, German, English, and European Law. Saint Paul: West. Kennedy, D. (1982). Legal Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy. Journal of Legal Education, 32, 591-615. Kim, K., Ju, H.-M., & Khatun, M. (2015). A Teacher and Researcher: A Scratch on the Science Community and Meaning of Evaluation with the Research Doctoral Programs Ranking. International Journal of Philosophy, 3, 34-46. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijp.20150304.11 Korobkin, R. B. (1998). In Praise of Law School Rankings: Solutions to Coordination and Collective Action Problems. Texas Law Review, 77. Laband, D. N. (1986). A Ranking of the Top U.S. Economics Departments by Research Productivity of Graduates. Journal of Economic Education, 17, 70-76. Masuoka, N., Grofman, B., & Feld, S. L. (2007). The Production and Placement of Political Science Ph.D.s, 1902-2000. PS: Political Science and Politics, 40, 361-366. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1049096507070576 McCormick, J. M., & Bernick, E. L. (1982). Graduate Training and Productivity: A Look at Who Publishes. Journal of Politics, 44, 212-227. Patton, M. Q. (1990). Qualitative Evaluation and Research Methods. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. Pistor, K., Wellons, P. A., & Sachs, J. (1999). The Role of Law and Legal Institutions in Asian Economic Development, 1960-1995. New York: Oxford University Press. Priest, G. L. (1983). Social Science Theory and Legal Education: The Law School as University. Journal of Legal Education, 33, 437-441. Reynolds, P. D. (2015). Primer in Theory Construction: An A&B Classics Edition. London & New York: Routledge. Savoy, P. N. (1970). Toward a New Politics of Legal Education. The Yale Law Journal, 79, 444-504. https://doi.org/10.2307/795144 Schmidt, B. M., & Chingos, M. M. (2007). Ranking Doctoral Programs by Placement: A New Method. PS: Political Science & Politics, 40, 523-529. https://doi.org/10.1017/s1049096507070771 Shapiro, F. R. (2000). Most-Cited Legal Scholars. The Journal of Legal Studies, 29, 409. https://doi.org/10.1086/468080 Shapiro, F. R., & Pearse, M. (2012). The Most-Cited Law Review Articles of All Time. Michigan Law Review, 110, 1483-1520. Sheldon, K. M., & Krieger, L. S. (2007). Understanding the Negative Effects of Legal Education on Law Students: A Longitudinal Test of self-Determination Theory. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 33, 883-897. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167207301014 K. Kim et al. 387 Sherman, L. W., & Cohn, E. G. (1989). The Impact of Research on Legal Policy: The Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment. Law and Society Review, 23, 117-144. https://doi.org/10.2307/3053883 Sisk, G. C., Aggerbeck, V., Farris, N., McNevin, M., & Pitner, M. (2015). Scholarly Impact of Law School Faculties in 2015: Updating the Leiter Score Ranking for the Top Third. 12 University of St. Thomas Law Journal 100 (2015); U of St. Thomas (Minnesota) Legal Studies Research Paper No. 15-12. http://ssrn.com/abstract=2642056 https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2642056 Wizner, S. (2001). Law School Clinic: Legal Education in the Interests of Justice. Fordham Law Review, 70, 1929. K. Kim et al. 388 Appendix Table A1. The Final Ranking (Above 7 and more than 1000 citations)1. Graduate Law Ranking Institutions Average Column (Rankings of four variables in the Table A4 added) US News/QS2 AUAP Global LLM Ranking Consulting-Based Research Doctorate in law Ranking (15/15/15/55)3 14 (1) Univ. of Wisconsin-Madison 12 33/51 150 1 2 (2) Yale Univ. 14 1/4 12 2 3 (3) Harvard Univ. 15 2/1 5 3 4 Univ. of Oxford 16 NA/2 3 5 5 (4) Univ. of Michigan-Ann Arbor 31 8/30 31 Around 9 6 (5) Stanford Univ. 33 2/5 7 Around 7 7 (6) Columbia Univ. 37 4/10 11 4 6 7 (6) Univ. of Virginia 37 8/39 100 Around 9 9 (8) Univ. of Chicago 40 4/9 15 11 4 10 Univ. of Cambridge 42 NA/2 3 6 10 (9) NYU 42 6/5 3 Around 8 12 (10) UC-Berkeley 44 8/9 17 Around 9 13 (11) Univ. of Illinois-UC 49 40/151 200 Around 21 14 (12) Georgetown Univ. 52 14/17 27 20 Around 12 15 (13) Temple Univ. 53 50/Behind the Top 200 s Around 31 16 (14) George Washington Univ. 61 25/51 150 Around 15 17 (15) Northwestern Univ. 64 12/45 100 Around 11 18 (16) Duke Univ. 70 11/39 47 8 Around 10 19 (17) US Military 72 NA/NA Not Pertinent5 20 (18) Univ. of Florida 78 48/101 200 Around 32 21 (19) SMU (Southern Methodist) 81 45/Behind the Top 200s Around 22 22 (20) Univ. of Washington 83 33/101 150 Around 20 23 (21) Univ. of Pennsylvania 85 7/24 29 2 6 24 (22) Univ. of Texas-Austin 93 15/51 100 Not Pertinent 25 (23) Boston Univ. 94 20/51 100 7 Not Pertinent 1The superannuated professors active with an emeritus title or other professorship in scope almost entirely were graduate law students around 1960's through 1990's. In order to understand this study in terms of a graduate law guide for the student's choice and investment decision on each school's graduate program, the temporal relevance could span from 1990 through 2020. The year of 1990 through the current would be a burgeoning or flourishing and culminating period of scholarly activity for the professors in scope, and the year of 2020 would be around the time of their diminished impact. The data compiled in this paper should be read as set for the time of late July, 2016, meaning that they constantly are changing and augmenting. 2The QS ranking has been proximate through four years of its production (2013-2016) for a law subject ranking. 3You may refer to the ranking at DOI: 10.11648/j.ijp.20150304.11. 4The rank is global while the rank in parenthesis is national. 5"Not Pertinent" means that the school does not offer the SJD program in any official manner. K. Kim et al. 389 Table A2. Status Table I. Total of APEs within the Law School Around 6000 Faculty with the Graduate Law Degrees 1371 (Excluding the U of London, Paris and the rest of law schools) Ratio 0.2285 Table A3. Status Table II (Alphabetical Order/Above 7 and more than 1000 citations). 25 Institutions Graduates Yearly Faculty Representations (=Number of faculty with the graduate law degree from each institution) Boston 100 9 Columbia 218 125 Duke 78 15 Georgetown 456 168 George Washington 305 40 Harvard 185 256 NYU 445 230 Northwestern 95 19 SMU 30 7 Stanford 85 34 Temple 49 58 UC-Berkeley 85 22 U. Cambridge 159 31 U. Chicago 85 13 U. Florida 65 26 U. Illinois 76 26 U. Michigan 35 39 U. Oxford 55 25 U. Penn 123 11 U. Texas 60 8 U. Virginia 55 39 U. Washington 80 9 U. Wisconsin 15 40 US Military 20 13 Yale 30 121 K. Kim et al. 390 Table A4. Analysis Table (Alphabetical Order/Above 7 and more than 1000 citations)1. 25 Institutions Total Citations Rep./Graduates Citations/Rep. Citations/Graduates Boston 1267 (23) 0.09 (24) 140.77 (22) 12.67 (25) Columbia 60,338 (5) 0.57 (8) 482.70 (13) 276.77 (9) Duke 5272 (18) 0.19 (18) 351.47 (16) 67.59 (18) Georgetown 48,134 (7) 0.37 (13) 286.51 (17) 105.56 (15) George Washington 24,825 (12) 0.13 (21) 620.63 (11) 81.39 (17) Harvard 228,863 (1) 1.38 (3) 894.00 (7) 1237.10 (4) NYU 80,984 (4) 0.52 (9) 352.10 (15) 181.99 (14) Northwestern 8080 (17) 0.2 (17) 425.26 (14) 85.05 (16) SMU 1057 (24) 0.23 (16) 151 (21) 35.23 (20) Stanford 32,260 (9) 0.40 (11) 948.82 (6) 379.53 (7) Temple 11,194 (16) 1.18 (4) 193 (20) 228.45 (13) UC-Berkeley 20,996 (14) 0.26 (15) 954.36 (5) 247.01 (10) U Cambridge 37,057 (8) 0.19 (18) 1195.38 (4) 233.06 (12) U Chicago 30,398 (10) 0.15 (20) 2338.31 (2) 357.62 (8) U Florida 2121 (21) 0.40 (11) 81.58 (25) 32.63 (21) U Illinois 18,317 (15) 0.34 (14) 704.5 (9) 241.01 (11) U Michigan 26,238 (11) 1.11 (5) 672.77 (10) 749.66 (5) U Oxford 90,219 (2) 0.45 (10) 3608.76 (1) 1640.35 (3) U Penn 2676 (19) 0.09 (24) 243.27 (19) 21.76 (23) U Texas 1055 (25) 0.13 (21) 131.88 (23) 17.58 (24) U Virginia 22,990 (13) 0.71 (6) 589.49 (12) 418 (6) U WA 2245 (20) 0.11 (23) 249.44 (18) 28.06 (22) U Wisconsin 52,023 (6) 2.66 (2) 1300.58 (3) 3468.2 (1) US Military 1348 (22) 0.65 (7) 103.69 (24) 67.4 (19) Yale 86,667 (3) 4.03 (1) 716.26 (8) 2888.9 (2) 1The number in parenthesis indicates a rank among 25 institutions. The Table A4 includes four variables (total citation/per capita faculty production/per faculty citation/per graduate citation) to yield a final ranking in Table A1. K. Kim et al. 391 Table A5. Distribution chart of LLM/SJD/PhD in law-alphabetical order and above 81. 24 Institutions2 Representations (APEs)/Citations Boston University Faculty Citations 1st percentile3 LNI4 LNI 2nd percentile LNI LNI 3rd percentile 2 828 4th percentile LNI LNI 5th percentile 6 394 Extra 1 45 Total 9 1267 Most cited Paul L. Caron Columbia University Faculty Citations 1st percentile 9 21,530 2nd percentile 16 7844 3rd percentile 37 11,501 4th percentile 17 4996 5th percentile 34 8385 Extra 12 6082 Total 125 60,338 Most cited Robert. P. Merges; Lea Brilmayer; M.A. Drumbl; Leila N. Sadat Duke University Faculty Citations 1st percentile 4 2570 2nd percentile 4 2388 3rd percentile 3 173 4th percentile 1 21 5th percentile 2 LNI Extra 1 120 Total 15 5272 Most cited R. Krotoszynski; H. W. Baade; J. A. Tanford Georgetown University Faculty Citations 1st percentile 31 9319 2nd percentile 25 15,005 3rd percentile 36 10,086 K. Kim et al. 392 Continued 4th percentile 19 3645 5th percentile 49 6982 Extra 8 3097 Total 168 48,134 Most cited D. A. Harris; J. A. Barron; J. G. Hodge; J. Dunoff; N. R. Cahn; A. Camacho George Washington University Faculty Citations 1st percentile 3 4005 2nd percentile 4 1200 3rd percentile 12 5177 4th percentile 7 3689 5th percentile 11 10,174 Extra 3 580 Total 40 24,825 Most cited M. Cherif Bassiouni; Michael Blumm; J. B. Ruhl; S. L. Schooner Harvard University Faculty Citations 1st percentile 66 144,000 2nd percentile 35 17,803 3rd percentile 53 26,343 4th percentile 27 10,273 5th percentile 53 14,614 Extra 22 15,830 Total 256 228,863 Most cited Robert Howse; L. A. Bebchuk; Paul Robinson; H. P. Monaghan; M. J. Matsuda; M. Wyman; Lynn M. Lopucki; M. S. Moore; Richard W. Wright New York University Faculty Citations 1st percentile 31 46,979 2nd percentile 34 8242 3rd percentile 45 6542 4th percentile 27 3996 5th percentile 63 6625 K. Kim et al. 393 Continued Extra 30 8600 Total 230 80,984 Most cited John C. Coffee; Peter H. Schuck; L. C. McClain; B. E. Hernandez; Susan Daicoff Northwestern University Faculty Citations 1st percentile 1 20 2nd percentile 1 50 3rd percentile 8 4135 4th percentile 1 1430 5th percentile 6 345 Extra 2 2100 Total 19 8080 Most cited V. P. Nanda; F. Teson; Lung-chu Chen Stanford University Faculty Citations 1st percentile 5 19,608 2nd percentile 7 3631 3rd percentile 5 4118 4th percentile 3 2170 5th percentile 14 2733 Extra LNI Total 34 32,260 Most cited Neil W. Netanel; Robin West; Dan L. Burk; Ted Schneyer; F. Valdes Temple University faculty Citations 1st percentile LNI LNI 2nd percentile 1 180 3rd percentile 13 3375 4th percentile 13 3435 5th percentile 25 3314 Extra 6 890 Total 58 11,194 Most cited E. S. Podgor; R. K. Neumann; Llewellyn J. Gibbons K. Kim et al. 394 Continued University of California-Berkeley Faculty Citations 1st percentile 9 17,325 2nd percentile 2 410 3rd percentile 4 911 4th percentile 1 1170 5th percentile 5 1175 Extra 1 5 Total 22 20,996 Most cited P. C. Mavroidis; Ugo Mattei; Francesco Parisi; Gideon Parchomovsky; Ruthann Robson University of Cambridge Faculty Citations 1st percentile 7 28,049 2nd percentile 6 3268 3rd percentile LNI LNI 4th percentile 1 60 5th percentile 10 1813 Extra 7 3867 Total 31 37,057 Most cited J. H. H. Weiler; John H. Langbein; S. D. Murphy; Ralf Michaels; Kevin Outterson University of Chicago Faculty Citations 1st percentile 3 27,300 2nd percentile 4 2406 3rd percentile 1 250 4th percentile 2 393 5th percentile 3 49 Extra LNI LNI Total 13 30,398 Most cited Lawrence Friedman; G. P Fletcher; W. H. Page University of Florida Faculty Citations 1st percentile LNI LNI 2nd percentile LNI LNI K. Kim et al. 395 Continued 3rd percentile 5 1312 4th percentile 5 223 5th percentile 11 451 Extra 5 135 Total 26 2121 Most cited G. L. Germain University of Illinois Faculty Citations 1st percentile 3 3500 2nd percentile 4 9500 3rd percentile 3 1820 4th percentile 7 1391 5th percentile 7 1816 Extra 2 290 Total 26 18,317 Most cited Dan Dobbs; J. Norton Moore; R. P. Malloy University of Michigan Faculty Citations 1st percentile 10 16,225 2nd percentile 8 4102 3rd percentile 6 1680 4th percentile 4 1649 5th percentile 6 1222 Extra 5 1360 Total 39 26,238 Most cited R. E. Scott; Gerald Torres; D. Rendleman; Harold G. Maier; ZJB Plater University of Oxford Faculty Citations 1st percentile 14 85,437 2nd percentile LNI LNI 3rd percentile 6 1033 4th percentile LNI LNI 5th percentile 2 949 Extra 3 2800 Total 25 90,219 K. Kim et al. 396 Continued Most cited Joseph Raz; John Finnis; Jeremy Waldron; Benedict Kingsbury; Stephanos Bibas; MW Janis; RN Gardner University of Pennsylvania Faculty Citations 1st percentile 1 120 2nd percentile 2 216 3rd percentile 2 40 4th percentile LNI LNI 5th percentile 2 1980 Extra 4 320 Total 11 2676 Most cited David Kairys University of Texas Faculty Citations 1st percentile 2 700 2nd percentile LNI LNI 3rd percentile 1 63 4th percentile 2 83 5th percentile 3 209 Extra LNI LNI Total 8 1055 Most Cited Dennis J. Hutchinson University of Virginia Faculty Citations 1st percentile 5 5602 2nd percentile 6 4890 3rd percentile 6 3342 4th percentile 6 872 5th percentile 11 1746 Extra 5 6538 Total 39 22,990 Most cited C. Slobogin; J. J. Paust; S. D. Murphy; Edward Brunet University of Washington Faculty Citations 1st percentile LNI LNI 2nd percentile 4 2200 K. Kim et al. 397 Continued 3rd percentile LNI LNI 4th percentile 2 LNI 5th percentile 3 45 Extra LNI LNI Total 9 2245 Most cited John O Haley; Toshiko Takenaka University of Wisconsin Faculty Citations 1st percentile 9 45,860 2nd percentile 1 680 3rd percentile 16 3118 4th percentile 7 736 5th percentile 1 96 Extra 6 1533 Total 40 52,023 Most cited W. LaFave; Kimberle Crenshaw; Catherine Fisk; M. Goodwin; Jan G. Laitos US Military (Judge Advocate) Faculty Citations 1st percentile 1 150 2nd percentile 2 600 3rd percentile 3 165 4th percentile 1 53 5th percentile 6 380 Extra LNI LNI Total 13 1348 Most cited E. Talbot Jensen; Eugene R. Milhizer Yale University Faculty Citations 1st percentile 31 44,493 2nd percentile 15 3194 3rd percentile 20 2531 4th percentile 10 8578 K. Kim et al. 398 Continued 5th percentile 32 18,699 Extra 13 9172 Total 121 86,667 Most cited W. Michael Reisman; Gideon Parchomovsky; L. L. Riskin; Chinkin Crhristine; Henry Manne; L. Brickman 1The listing was made in alphabetical order of school name. "Most cited" below had not been made of order that does not indicate more counts or comparison with other schools. The names had been cursorily selected that just were illustrative to represent each school. 2Another institution for the final ranking is the Southern Methodist law school as listed in Table A6, and could help to complete top 25 in Table A1. 3The column represents law schools that the graduate laws are now serving, and percentiles are accorded with the USWR ranking of law schools-with a minor exception as mentioned and besides Extra. 4LNI means "least in number or non-identifiable". Table A6. Other Schools above 5 (Faculty/Citations Only)1. Faculty Citations University of London 31 26,042 University of Paris 10 10,510 John Marshall Law School 6 9140 Lewis & Clark 5 1402 NIU-Ireland 5 456 Pace U. 6 1200 SMU 7 1057 Tulane U. 6 59 U. of Arkansas 5 650 U. of Denver 5 677 U. of Houston 7 277 U. of Missouri 7 672 Washington U. St. Louis 5 2830 1The most cited graduate law degree holders are M. Cherif Bassiouni for John Marshall Law School and George C. Thomas for the Washington University St. Louis. • U. Paris and U. London had just been given the statistics that were excluded from the final ranking scheme since the information of status was not confirmed. The ranking would be around the mid-low (15th 20th) if approximate and included. K. Kim et al. 399 Table A7. The rest of schools (faculty representation/citations). Result (Nothing implicated with order) Schools (Faculty/ Citations) UCLA (4/1590)1; Hebrew University (2/22,550); U. of Vienna (1/600); Emory University (5/30); Goethe U. (1/0); Belgrade U. (1/110); U. of Sydney (1/320); U. of Warwick (2/300); U. of Edinburgh (3/2400); Cornell U. (2/320); U. of Utah (2/450); U. of Toronto (4/1695); UDC law school (1/0); Queens U. (1/597); Hamburg U. (2/170); U. of Arizona (1/145); U. of Cologne (2/850); Free U. Brussels (2/485); Pontifical U. (2/134); U. of Dares Salaam (1/0); U. of Brescia (1/110); U. of Georgia (1/30); Penn State (1/0); McGill U. (4/936); U. of Buenos Aires (2/524); UC Hastings (1/2); U. of Geneva (1/1050); York U. (3/2352); U. of Hong Kong (1/0); U. of Exeter (2/370); U. of Telaus (1/392); U. of Freiburg (1/250); St. Johns U. (1/0); U. of New Hampshire-Franklin Pierce (4/92); College William and Mary (1/20); Cardozo Law School (1/0); U. of Amsterdam (2/19,780); Charles U. Prague (3/688); U. of Alabama (1/0); Jean Maria Lyon (1/0); Katholiek U. (1/160); Brooklyn U. (1/15); U. of Warsaw (1/270); U. of Freiburg (1/800); U. of Konstanz (2/83); U. of Oslo (1/120); UBC (3/410); U. of Wayne State (5/1319); American U. (3/620); U. of Notre Dame (4/435); Catholic U. (1/719); Antioch-Washington D. C. (1/398); U. of Complutense Madrid (1/0); U. of Delhi (1/300); Fudan U. (1/0); U. of Manitoba (1/6); U of Santa Clara (2/60); U. of Bonn (1/900); U. of Sheffield (1/390); U. of Malawi (1/390); Case Western Reserve U. (1/100); U. of Nottingham (2/1183); U of Miami (2/0); U del Pais Vasco (1/2); Pontifical U.-Italy (1/21); Indiana U.-Bloomington (1/0); U. of Queensland (1/0); U. of Vermont (2/434); Widener U. (1/0); Golden Gate U. (2/73); Kiev State (1/159); Free U. of Amsterdam (1/1159); SUNY-Buffalo (1/0); U. of Singapore (1/104); U. of Aberdeen (1/22); U. of Lagos (1/11); Ohio Northern U (1/0); St. Thomas U. (1/33); U. of Tubingen (1/1230); U. of San Francisco (2/117); U. of Iowa (1/344); U. of Connecticut (2/62); Boston College (1/0); U. of Heidelberg (1/900); U. of Wellington (1/100); Frankfurt U. (1/5,000); U. Augsburg (1/700); U. of Ljubljana (1/3000); U. of Louvain (1/300); Liege U. (1/1300); Leiden U (2/2494); Gottingen U. (1/200); U. of Marburg (1/200); Marquette U. (1/0); Kiel U. (1/855); Louisiana State U. (1/133); Bremen U. (1/60); Loyola U. Chicago (1/40); Bristol U. (1/800); U. of Montreal (1/1600); U. de Nantes (1/1600) The degree origin not included thus far had been distributed across the universities of European states, such as Poland (1/490), Euro Institute (2/265), Germany (1/105), Spain (3/0), Italy (1/3000), and some others in a minimal number. India (1/850) besides the Puerto Rico (2/0) also had a representation. 1The most cited graduate law degree holder is W. J. Aceves for UCLA. Submit or recommend next manuscript to SCIRP and we will provide best service for you: Accepting pre-submission inquiries through Email, Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, etc. A wide selection of journals (inclusive of 9 subjects, more than 200 journals) Providing 24-hour high-quality service User-friendly online submission system Fair and swift peer-review system Efficient typesetting and proofreading procedure Display of the result of downloads and visits, as well as the number of cited articles Maximum dissemination of your research work Submit your manuscript at: http://papersubmission.scirp.org/ Or contact [email protected]

English language and philosophy* Jonathan Tallant† James Andow‡ Abstract Philosophical enquiry stands to benefit from the inclusion of methods from the digital humanities to study language use. Empirical studies using the methods of the digital humanities have the potential to contribute to both conceptual analysis and intuition-based enquiry, two important approaches in contemporary philosophy. Empirical studies using the methods of the digital humanities can also provide valuable metaphilosophical insights into the nature of philosophical methods themselves. The use of methods from the digital humanities in philosophy should be expected to follow a similar trajectory to another attempt to introduce empirical methods in philosophy. Experimental philosophers use empirical methods from the cognitive sciences to bear on philosophical questions. At first, we should expect the main contribution of methods from the digital humanities in philosophy to be at the metaphilosophical level. Then, given the right impetus and support, we are optimistic that methods from the digital humanities can make important and sustained contributions to first-order philosophical enquiry. This chapter gives two case studies of recent studies in which methods from the digital humanities are used to address metaphilosophical questions about the use of the word 'intuition' and the methods of philosophy and physics. It gives three examples of contemporary first-order philosophical debates to whichmethods from the digital humanities could make an important contribution in epistemology, metaphysics and philosophy of language. The chapter discusses some methodological challenges and limitations which are of particular importance when considering the application of methods from the digital humanities in philosophy, including concerns about the demographic representativeness of widely available corpora. *This is an author post-print. The chapter is published in The Routledge Handbook of English Language and Digital Humanities available here †University of Nottingham ‡University of East Anglia 1 1 Introduction There are many different views about the nature of philosophical enquiry. On many of these views, there is a significant philosophical contribution to be made by empirical enquiry into the ways that language is used in the real world by what we might call 'ordinary language users'. However, philosophers have rarely taken up the opportunity to study language systematically and empirically. The digital resources now available for studying language use in the corpus and other approaches in the digital humanities afford a real opportunity for philosophers to do just this. This chapter addresses a number of questions. Why would evidence about language use be helpful for philosophers? What resistance might there be to this idea? How might this resistance be reflected in the ways that philosophers make use of corpus research and other approaches in the digital humanities? We begin with an overview of some of the ways in which philosophical enquiry has been carried out. 2 Background In this section we outline two popular conceptions of philosophical enquiry and argue that those who conceive of philosophy in any of these ways ought to accept that systematic empirical enquiry into language use has an important contribution to make in philosophy. Philosophers investigate a range of topics: morality, freedom, identity, existence, time, knowledge, gender and so on. When philosophers think about things like (for instance) freedom, and when they try to provide answers to questions like 'What is it to be free?' it seems important that what they mean by 'free' has got some connection with ordinary thought and talk about freedom.1 If the philosopher ends up talking about some completely new concept that isn't that of freedom, but is somewhat close to it (unimaginatively, let us call it 'schmeedom'), then there is a sense that the philosopherwill havemissed the point. We started off asking about freedom, and now the philosophers are off talking about something else – schmeedom (whatever that is and however, if at all, it is connected to the concept of freedom). If we wanted to know about what it is to be free, how that connects with morality, politics, science and so on, then talking about schmeedom just isn't going to help. With this background in mind, let's now explore some of the ways in which philosophical enquiry has proceeded. 1We'll employ the convention of using single quotes only when we want to say something about the words or expressions themselves. 2 2.1 Conceptual analysis Conceptual analysis is an attempt to analyse concepts. Concepts are, in the relevant sense, constituents of thought. To analyse them is to break them down, to understand their structure in more basic terms. The idea that conceptual analysis is central to philosophical enquiry can be traced back to Socrates (Beaney 2015). One oft-discussed example is the (flawed) analysis of knowledge as justified, true belief. The idea was that the concept of knowledge might be analysed in terms of the more basic concepts of justification, belief and truth. Were the analysis correct, thenwe could correctly say that a subject, S, knows that p, if and only if, S has a justified true belief that p. One traditional assumption was that a philosophical analysis of a concept would produce something like a definition, providing a set of necessary and sufficient conditions. Providing something like a definition is, however, just one example of how one might attempt to analyse a concept in terms of something more basic. Following psychologically informed criticism, philosophers have become more open to the idea that the result of analysing a concept might be something other than a definition, for example, the concept might take the form of a prototype, exemplar or theory (see Laurence andMargolis 1999).2 It is important to register that even among proponents of conceptual analysis, there are different views about where the project of conceptual analysis should get you (Goldman 2007). Some take the endpoint to be an articulation of the concept of one's linguistic community, whereas others take the endpoint to concern a universally shared concept, or to reveal the nature of the relevant phenomenon itself (e.g. knowledge, via revealing the concept of knowledge). Now we said earlier that there was a close tie between language use and philosophical methodology. So, what's the connection between analysing concepts and language use? Philosophers will have various opinions about this. We're going to play safe and simply set aside two extreme, implausible positions. (1) Language use and concepts have nothing to do with each other. It might seem simply obvious that this is an implausible position. However, it is worth articulating why. Language expresses thoughts, and concepts are constituents of thoughts. It would therefore be very strange if language in noway reflected the nature of our concepts. For instance, if a philosopher's analysis of a concept bore no resemblance to the way anyone ever used the word 'knowledge' then it wouldn't be an analysis of the concept of knowledge. The analysis would have failed. If that's right, then there should be scope for systematic empirical investigation into real language use to provide evidence which can inform the project of analysis. 2For a recent, psychologically informed account of how conceptual analysis might work, see Machery (2017). 3 This said, it is also important for us to note that (2) is also completely implausible.3 (2) A community's concept of knowledge can be simply 'read off' their use of certain words. To illustrate the problem with this approach, let us use an example. This understanding of the relation between words and language is committed to the idea that when a community apply the word 'fish' to something this is to be interpreted as a correct application of their concept. But that's implausible, and wouldn't permit a community to discover that, after all, they'd been wrong to think the concept of fish extended to whales. We cannot simply 'read off' which applications of a concept are correct from the use of language within a community. It is perfectly possible for communities to just get it wrong. Whatever the relation between language production and conceptual content, it is not as straightforward as (2) would suggest. Our claim, then, is that there is scope for corpus research, and other lines of research within the digital humanities, to discover previously unknown facts about the factors and associations that, for example, underpin people's use of (for instance) 'knows'. For example, were a close analysis of a corpus to reveal the widespread phenomena that competent language users were prepared to assign knowledge to an agent, even in a variety of contexts where that agent has no justification for their belief, then that would have served to put pressure on the claim that we can analyse the concept of knowledge as the concept of justified true belief. In pursuing this line, we advocate a position that we think is taken by Rosenbloom (2012). We are not opposed to philosophical methodology as it has been practised. We recognise that it has value and that it helps us to gather insight. Nonetheless, one way to consider the scope of the digital humanities in general is as of giving us additional methodological tools with which to approach old questions (as well, of course, as providing us with more questions to ask – more of which at the end of the chapter). Our general approach to philosophy, as incorporated within the digital humanities is largely summarised thus: The scientific method provides a validated approach for developing insights, but it is not the only method, nor necessarily always the most appropriate method. For any particular domain, and any particular problem within that domain, there may be zero, one, or more methods applicable to them. If we define the strength of a method for a domain or problem as the degree of veracity it can guarantee for the results it generates, good science should in general be pursued via one from among the strongest applicable methods. Using 3Although, naturally, were you to think that, then you would need little persuasion of the main claims in this chapter. 4 weaker methods when stronger ones are available can be one of the hallmarks of bad science. We need to be careful, though, about what is meant by twomethods being applicable to the same problem, and thus the circumstances under which a stronger method should necessarily dominate. If two methods can yield the same insights and one provides more assurance with respect to these insights, then the two are applicable to the same problem and the stronger should be preferred. However, if the problems are nominally the same but the two methods provide different insights about it, then the weaker method may still be of value, and the problems they tackle are in an important sense different. The potential diversity of appropriate methods, both within and across domains, does suggest a form of methodological pluralism in which multiple methods may be necessary to increase our understanding of individual domains (Rosenbloom 2012: 7–8). Not every philosophical question is well treated by the more scientifically oriented aspects of the digital humanities. That's fine. Nonetheless, the methods that we can draw upon – as we shall show in a moment – do allow us to generate additional insight and give us more data with which to approach long-standing problems. Our primary aim in this chapter is to demonstrate that this is so and to make the case for the inclusion of methodologies from the digital humanities within philosophical enquiry. 2.2 Intuition-based enquiry Many contemporary conceptions of philosophical enquiry give an important role to something they call 'intuitions'. Philosophers variously treat intuitions as data, as infallible evidence, as defeasible or pro tanto evidence, as inspiration and so on. We shall group all these under one heading. What justifies treating all these approaches under one banner is that they all in some sense treat philosophical enquiry to be limited or guided by what is congruent with our intuitive judgements about philosophically interesting things – knowledge, morality, freedom and so on.4 The motivation for this way of approaching philosophy can be somewhat similar: if a philosopher's account of justice were to be completely divorced from our intuitive ways of thinking about justice, it would be unclear what made the account an account of justice rather than something else. What is an intuition? Here, again, we encounter a variety of opinion. We can't hope to do justice to all of them.5 We think we can say, however, that most have in mind something like a fairly quick, non-inferential, pre-theoretic judgement about whether something applies. Sometimes a reliance upon intuitions is cast explicitly in linguistic terms – 'intuitively, 4Some ways of cashing out the project of conceptual analysis also give an important role to intuitions. But we'll treat the two separately here. 5For a brief introduction to some of them, see Jenkins (2014), Pust (2014) and Cappelen (2012). 5 we wouldn't say that such a person was free' – but often it is not. A fairly typical idea might be that if a theoretical position entails a picture of the world which runs completely counter to our intuitive way of thinking, then this counts against the theory in some way. Given the audience of this chapter, we should probably mention Chomsky. Some philosophers have drawn connections between philosopher's use of 'intuition' and that in linguistics postChomsky Hintikka 1999). However, Chomsky's philosophical inspirations notwithstanding, in the majority of cases, contemporary philosophers' use of 'intuition' does not indicate anything like judgements of grammaticality, nor reflect a belief in a special faculty of intuition analogous to a universal grammar. In many cases, philosophers' use of 'intuition' doesn't indicate any strong commitment to a distinctly a priori mode of enquiry. There's no straightforward consensus concerning the connection between intuition use and language use. However, we're inclined to endorse a similar line of reasoning to that considered earlier when talking about conceptual analysis: the idea that what people say can provide no insight into their intuitive ways of thinking about the world is pretty farfetched. If ordinary intuitive ways of looking at the world are thought to place limitations on which philosophical theories are plausible, or provide evidential support for or against theories, then it looks like corpus linguistics can have a hand to play. For, of course, what corpus linguistics can do for us is to reveal precisely the contexts in which people assert various different claims and so, on the assumption that people do not typically make widespread use of turns of phrase that are 'counterintuitive' corpus linguistics can give us some insight into their intuitions about whether particular uses of a term are 'intuitive' or not. 3 Current contributions and research To remind the reader: our aim here is to make the case that philosophy has something to gain from broadening its scope and including particular methodologies from the wider digital humanities. To show that this is the case, we want to consider two particular cases. Methodologically we are looking to show particular cases where digital methods have provided value and then look to generalise from these cases. The two case studies we consider here concern papers which we wrote (although not together). Of course, we are neither the first to suggest that the philosophical enquiry might benefit from looking at language use in a systematic way nor the first to put such recommendations into practice (the Oslo school did both – see e.g. Naess 1938). However, these two cases studies help make clear a number of points that we want to bring out and that demonstrate the further insight that the digital humanities can bring to philosophical questions. The first is to help make clear the contribution that both quantitative and qualitative approaches to looking at usage can make to philosophical debate. The second is to demonstrate that examination of language usage, in addition to helping those engaged in 6 conceptual analysis or intuition-using philosophy, can help advance our understanding of philosophical methods themselves – this metaphilosophical theme is one we'll pick up again later. 3.1 Exploding intuitions Andow (2015b) examines an aspect of current debate about the methods philosophers use. A number of high-profile commentaries on the philosophical methods have noted that philosophers use the word 'intuition' a lot more than they used to. Andow presents a quantitative study to investigate this phenomenon – to see what might underpin this change, and indeed to confirm whether there has been a change. Andow uses JSTOR as a corpus of academic writing. Unlike other available bodies of text, JSTOR allows for fine-grained diachronic study, as articles are tagged by publication year. JSTOR also allows for a comparison of academic disciplines, as articles are tagged by subject areas. Andow was able to track the proportion of articles in each discipline by decade which made use of one or more of the following terms 'intuit', 'intuition', 'intuitive', 'intuitions', 'counter-intuitive', 'intuitively' and 'counter-intuitively'. The headline finding was that, surprisingly, while the proportion of philosophy articles mentioning at least one of these words has risen dramatically, the same has happened across a broad swathe of academia. The import of this finding is that whatever does underpin the explosion of 'intuition' in philosophy it is likely not to be something philosophy specific. Indeed, Andow also reports data from the Time Magazine corpus and Google Ngrams (fiction) which suggest that the frequency of 'intuition' has risen more generally. This means that any metaphilosophical conclusions one might have been tempted to reach on the basis of noting the increase in use of 'intuition', for example, that there has been an increase in the use of intuition, seem not to be warranted. 3.2 Intuitions in physics This second case study also concerns intuitions and philosophical methodology. Tallant uses the results of a qualitative analysis of the use of the word 'intuition' in physics (Tallant 2013) to make an important point about methods in an area of philosophy called metaphysics (Tallant 2015).6 Tallant aims to offer some resistance to those who claim metaphysics is not in good epistemic standing on the basis that metaphysicians use intuitions. Tallant is interested in 6Tallant also draws on an ethnographic study by Marton et al. (1992) of interview data from Nobel laureates and survey data from a study by Martinson et al. (2005) concerning scientists' use of 'gut feelings'. 7 giving a kind of parity defence: physics uses intuitions, too, and there is no doubting the success of physics, so we shouldn't think metaphysics so badly off just because it uses intuitions. Tallant's opponents don't accept this parity. Ladyman and Ross (2007), for instance, claim there are important differences between what is going on when a metaphysician uses the word 'intuition' and when a scientist uses the word. It is frequently said of, for example, a good physicist that he or she has sound physical intuition. . .However, the meaning of 'intuitions' in these uses differs sharply from the metaphysician's. The physicist . . . [refers] to the experienced practitioner's trained ability to see at a glance how their abstract theoretical structure probably – in advance of essential careful checking – maps onto a problem space. (p. 15) Tallant notes that this move requires an empirical claim for which Ladyman and Ross present no evidence. Tallant uses his own recent empirical work (2013) to challenge Ladyman and Ross's assumptions about use of 'intuition' in physics. Tallant (2013) makes use of a number of techniques. First, like Andow (2015b), earlier, Tallant presents the basic proportions of articles in a number of top physics journals (Physical Review Letters, Review of Modern Physics, Physical Review AE, Physical Review Special Topics Energy Beams) between 2001 and 2010 which use 'intuitive' (including 'intuition' and 'counter-intuitive'). It is around 9 percent. However, Tallant goes beyond these crude numbers and provides some qualitative assessment. Second, Tallant presents a basic thematic analysis of the uses of 'intuitive' in this corpus based on a small subset of articles. Third, Tallant also presents findings relating to one journal in particular (The Review of Modern Physics) relating the number of uses of 'intuitive' which fall under each theme. Building on this, Tallant (2015) has analysed the data concerning the use of intuitions in physics and the use of intuitions in metaphysics and argued that it is not at all clear that the arguments against metaphysics go through.7 4 Future directions Whether one thinks looking at the corpus is a worthwhile activity for a philosopher depends on how one thinks of philosophical enquiry. Earlier, we noted some conceptions of philosophical enquiry which could be quite friendly to this sort of research. However, it is worth noting that these conceptions are themselves not uncontroversial. 7Again, there are subtleties to this debate, and Tallant (2013, 2015) offers only a partial defence. Please turn to the original papers for the full story. This brief account suffices for our purpose here. 8 One helpful way to make this point is to consider the case of experimental philosophy. Experimental philosophy is a relative newcomer on the philosophical scene. It is around 15 years old at the time of writing. The main characterising feature of experimental philosophy is the idea that systematic empirical investigation into how people think about philosophically interesting things, like freedom, morality and the rest, can help advance philosophical debate about those things (Knobe and Nichols 2008). To that end, experimental philosophers advocate the use of experimental methods from social psychology, and the cognitive sciences more broadly.8 Experimental philosophers motivate their use of these methods by appealing to precisely the same kind of considerations that we have given to motivate systematic empirical study of language use. Experimental philosophers too have appealed to popular conceptions of philosophical enquiry such as conceptual analysis and intuition-using philosophy (See Knobe and Nichols 2008).9 The lesson we can learn from this concerns the resistance experimental philosophers have faced from some other philosophers (e.g. Cappelen 2012, 2014; Deutsch 2010; Kauppinen 2007). One of the responses that experimental philosophers face is that their work is fundamentally misconceived – that the kind of data they were collecting, for example, what ordinary people think about morality, is irrelevant to what the correct moral theory might be. This response relies upon the idea that conceptions of philosophical enquiry as being conceptual analysis or using intuition are mistaken – or at least that the ways of understanding these projects such that they are amenable to empirical enquiry of the kind advocated by experimental philosophers are mistaken. Accordingly, advocates of corpus-based methods in philosophy should be prepared for similar resistance. We'll return to this thought shortly. First, however, it is interesting to consider a respect in which this resistance shaped the trajectory of experimental philosophy. This relates to the point we made earlier about the contribution made by our two case studies being predominantly metaphilosophical. A dominant trend in early experimental philosophy was it was not involved in 'firstorder' philosophy, for example, using experiments to inform philosophical theorising about morality, but rather in metaphilosophy. A number of much-discussed papers were published that tried to challenge commonmetaphilosophical assumptions: for example, to make the case that philosophers couldn't safely assume that their intuitions were reliable or that 8There is room for debate about how exactly to characterise experimental philosophy. Some have advocated conceptions broad enough such that the approaches we are advocating here would snuggle in under the umbrella. We are inclined to think there is reason to keep empirical approaches focused on language use separate, however. 9Although, one of us has argued that this is problematic (Andow 2016). 9 their intuitions were representative of the population at large.10 This early metaphilosophical flavour to experimental philosophy should, in some respects, not be too surprising given the nature of the resistance experimental philosophy faced. Metaphilosophical work faced less resistance at least in the sense that it was far less easy for philosophers to dismiss the work as irrelevant – the conclusions might be wrong but not irrelevant – these metaphilosophical experimental studies raised direct challenges to standard philosophical practice and, even if philosophers thought the challenges were mistaken, it was recognised that these studies needed to be discussed. It is thus then not so surprising that there is a metaphilosophical flavour to our two case studies.11 Andow (2015b) and Tallant (2013, 2015) also share another feature in common with early work in experimental philosophy.12 Another type of study which was prominent in the early days of experimental philosophy was that which picks up on empirical claims made in the philosophical literature. Sometimes these were explicit claims which clearly played the role of premises in an argument (e.g. Nichols et al. 2003). This is what Tallant (2015) did – picking up on Ladyman and Ross's claim concerning the role of intuition in science. Other times, the relevant empirical claims were not necessarily used as premises in any explicit argument, but nonetheless betrayed a particular underlying understanding of some particular phenomenon (see, e.g. Stich andWeinberg 2001; Knobe 2007's description of the inspiration for the now-rich literature on whether non-philosophers are compatibilists). This is what Andow did – challenging the idea that the major factor underlying philosophers' use of the word 'intuition' are philosophy-specific factors. These sorts of cases encounter less resistance because the relevance of the empirical work to the philosophical debate is simply obvious: when philosophers make empirical assumptions, these are open to empirical challenge. 10In fact, more generally, one of the major influences of experimental philosophy has been to lead philosophers to think carefully about their methodological assumptions. For example, various parties have come out in force articulating conceptions of intuition-using philosophy which do not rely on assumptions that philosophers' intuitions would be representative of some wider population (e.g. Williamson 2007). One of the latest trends is to argue that while it might look like philosophers use intuitions as evidence, in fact they don't do anything of the kind (Deutsch 2015; Cappelen 2012). 11This early trend in experimental philosophy has not persisted. This kind of metaphilosophical work has now largely given way to other projects. Only 1.1 percent of experimental philosophy papers published in the period 2009–2013 were of this kind (Knobe 2016). 12This feature is also shared by an example of research in the history of philosophy that uses the tools of corpus research. Edward Slingerland and colleagues use corpus tools to evaluate empirical claims about a historical philosophical corpus (e.g. Slingerland 2013; Slingerland and Chudek 2011; Slingerland et al 2017). They use quantitative tools to reanalyse the corpus of ancient Chinese philosophy to challenge a standard narrative that the idea of mind–body dualism is absent in ancient Chinese philosophy (and perhaps peculiar to Western philosophy). 10 The lessons to take from all this is that we should not expect philosophers to start pursuing conceptual analysis using serious corpus research overnight. We should expect similar resistance to the employment of methods from corpus linguistics. But the parallel with experimental philosophy also gives a source of hope. Experimental philosophy has flourished. Further, it has not confined itself to metaphilosophical contributions and testing philosophers' empirical claims. The bulk of current work in experimental philosophy is engaged in a serious attempt to understand how people think about philosophically interesting things. So, we think there is reason to think that – given the right impetus and support – the use of systematic empirical study of actual language use will also be able to flourish and develop serious empirical programmes investigating how people talk about philosophically interesting things.13 5 Critical issues It is well and good for us to argue that there is scope for these tools to be used. There will be issues faced along the way. We wish to discuss some of these here in the interests of trying to argue further in favour of their uptake. The proponent of use of methods from corpus linguistics (and the digital humanities more generally) in philosophy should be encouraged by the fate of experimental philosophy. We must also keep in mind certain facts from the recent history of philosophy. One school of thought in philosophy, prevalent in the early-to-mid twentieth century, focused almost exclusively on language use. This school, called ordinary language philosophy, treated the sole task of philosophy as reflecting on linguistic practice. In part for reasons we give earlier, and in part for other reasons, this approach to philosophical enquiry has become markedly less popular in recent years. Philosophers tend to see the words that we use as a guide to how we think reality is (and given the fact that these thoughts appear in successful scientific theories about the world, how the world itself is), but their focus extends beyond the words and into the world itself. We would be sensitive, then, to any criticism that what we are extolling here is an approach to philosophy that just focuses on the way that people use words. We take the view that the approach that we are arguing in favour of here is one that incorporates the linguistic data available via (e.g.) corpus linguistics and applies them in a range of different cases. To illustrate, we provide to cases that we think are ripe for exploration via corpus linguistics or other methods that might all fall under the remit of the digital humanities. 13One space to watch is the work of Alfano and colleagues. In recent articles, they make the case for greater use of data mining and data visualisation in philosophy (Alfano and Higgins 2019) and put it into practice (Alfano et al. 2018). 11 The first case is drawn from epistemology. Within epistemology, there are longstanding problems. In particular, there is a question about whether or not knowledge is possible. It seems obvious that it is, of course. For example, you know that you're reading this chapter. But things are not so straightforward. For it seems at least possible that you're wrong about that. Isn't it possible (in the most expansive sense of the word 'possible') that you're being deceived? Might you not be installed in some vat – à la The Matrix? It seems you can't rule out the possibility and if you can't rule out the possibility of being a brain in a vat, then it seems false to say that you know that you are reading this chapter. One popular recent response has been to argue that this is an example of the standards for the term 'knows' applying varying from context to context (for an overview see Rysiew 2011). In normal contexts, it seems obviously correct to say that you know that you are reading the paper. But once we introduce some sceptical possibilities, we 'raise the standards' required for knowledge. The idea, very roughly, is that the term 'knows' functions similarly to the term 'tall': the term tall can be truthfully applied to Jack in some contexts (when Jack is visiting his daughter's primary school class), but it can also be truthfully said of Jack in other contexts that he is 'not tall' (for instance, if he is visiting an NBA team). We do not propose to delve into the debates about the term 'knows' or to involve ourselves in the intricacies of the different positions available, but we do note that all parties in this debate appeal to linguistic data. It is common enough to see philosophers in this literature claim that within a particularly stylised context, the correct use of a particular term is x, where x then supports their theory or undermines the theory of their opponent.14 Where we think that corpus linguistics may get some traction, then, is in determining whether there are such cases 'in the wild' and whether the terms being discussed are used as the philosophers claim. We might, thus, move the literature beyond philosophers swapping their linguistic intuitions, and deploy large datasets to determine which usages really are viewed as apt.15 Our second case is drawn from metaphysics – in particular, the metaphysics of time. One semi-popular view in this literature is presentism – the view that only present objects exist. This view, presentism, is often motivated by the claim that it is particularly intuitive; that it is the view of the 'person on the street' and is particularly commonsensical. To the best of our knowledge, these claims have never been verified. One way to test these claims would be via interviews or surveys – the latter are used regularly enough in the experimental philosophy that we described earlier; interestingly we know of no one using interviews. 14Indeed, Hansen (2014) construes this debate as a contemporary form of ordinary language philosophy. 15This is a particularly promising area because it is somewhat common for epistemologists to recognise the potential import of data from the corpus and to make some limited use of this (e.g. Nagel 2013, n.22), and there is already a big experimental philosophy literature in this area (see Buckwalter 2012 for a survey). 12 Another way in which to test these claims would be via corpus study. For, presumably, if presentism really is the most intuitive view of time, and really is the common-sense view of the 'person on the street', then we should expect to see that reflected in their use of language. Very crudely: we might expect to see past objects described as 'non-existent'; we might expect to see future objects described in such a way as to imply their non-existence. And were we to not find that, it might well put some pressure on the claim that presentism is especially intuitive, or really is the common-sense view of the person on the street. Our third and final case is drawn from the branch of philosophy that explores propositions. Very roughly a proposition is thought to be that which is expressed by sentences – the meaning of what is said and thought, if you will. (Thus, two sentences in different languages can be used to express the one and the same proposition; the two sentences can have the same meaning.) One debate about the nature of propositions concerns whether different tokens of the same type of sentence, uttered at different times, express different propositions, or whether they express the same proposition – though a proposition that can change with respect to whether it is true or false. Consider the sentence: (1) Nixon is president On a temporalist reading, what is expressed by (1) may change its truth-value over time: once it was true, now it is not. Nonetheless, there is but one proposition expressed by (1) at the two times under consideration, and it changes its truth-value. In contrast, on an eternalist reading, the proposition expressed by (1) does not change over time. Rather, at different times the same sentence can be used to express different propositions. Very crudely, we might think that something like the following is going on if eternalism is true. Uttered in 1970, (1) expressed a proposition that had the form: at 1970, Nixon is president. Uttered in 2016, (1) expresses the proposition that has the form: at 2016, Nixon is president. It is clear enough that the latter is false and that the former is true. However, such propositions are, if true at all, eternally true. The proposition at 1970, Nixon is president is true now, it was true in 1970 and it will be true in a thousand years' time. One recent piece of work on this topic, due to Mark Richard (2015) explores this issue by considering a range of possible assertions, using these as evidence to favour one of these two views. Throughout the book, where he deals with a range of different issues, Richard draws on the ways that, he thinks, people will think about and respond to the cases that he considers (2015: 116 is especially vivid). In his own terms, here is Richard describing his methodology: 2015: 3 – our italics): the argument is resolutely empirical: if we look at the way that we talk about belief, assertion, and so on, we find it poorly understood in terms of transiently true propositions. Now, be that as it may, Richard does not engage in any of the tools that the digital humanities might provide us with: he does not deploy corpus linguistics, he does not use 13 surveys, he does not interview respondents. In other words, there are a number of tools that would help us to look at the way that we talk about belief, assertion and so on, and these are not being exploited. He is not alone in this field. We think that Richard's work is very powerful, as is the work of others in this field, but it may be that augmenting it with the resources from the digital humanities would render it even more so (see Tallant (forthcoming) for further discussion). 5.1 Mastering corpus research methods for use in philosophy Here again we can learn lessons from the fate of experimental philosophy. The general narrative told about experimental philosophy is that it has grown to be very empirically sophisticated and expert from rather less sophisticated and expert beginnings. There are various reasons for this. Early experimental philosophers didn't have an extensive grounding in statistics or survey design. They had to learn on the job. They were creating research traditions and had to develop new experimental paradigms. They had to develop new tools to look at philosophically interesting issues which the psychological literature didn't address. Similar issues will face proponent of empirical investigation of language-use in philosophy. For example, we definitely recognise (1) that our corpus case studies discussed earlier have their limitations and (2) that the fact we were newcomers to corpus-based work and we were asking new types of questions held us back in certain regards. There was no pre-existing corpus structured in such a way that would allow one to address the questions Andow (2015b) addresses and the skills needed to develop the necessary corpus are far beyond a philosophers' usual skillset. While Andow was able to be creative – utilising JSTOR – this means the study has important limitations, e.g. an inability to look closer at different uses (as one can't look within articles except by manually checking some sample of those to which the researcher has institutional access), and a lack of frequency data.16 The study carried out by Tallant also had certain limitations. As noted earlier, the approach that Tallant took was to search for instances of the words 'intuition' and 'intuitive' in a range of scientific literature. But this approach is, we suggest, rather simplistic. For instance, the approach that Tallant (2013) takes ignores the issue of whether or not these instances of terms are in fact referring to a use of intuition or whether they appear as (for instance) something like a verbal tic (see Cappelen 2012). Thus, on the basis of this evidence Tallant (2013) fails to establish (though admittedly does not take to have established) 16In fact, Andow (2015b) did suggest several potential explanations of his results, and he did follow up this study with a qualitative study of intuition talk across contemporary academic use (Andow 2015a). However, due to a lack of familiarity with applied linguistics, one potential explanation was overlooked. This, and its metaphilosophical implications, are now explored in Andow (2017). 14 that intuitions really are being used in physics (though Tallant (2015) is more definite in this regard). Similarly, Tallant fails to track whether or not other terms in the scientific literature might stand proxy for 'intuition' in particular contexts. We note, here, that there is discussion in the philosophical literature as to whether or not apparent cognates of 'intuitive' like 'it seems common sense' and 'it seems right to suggest' really do all refer to intuition. But as will be familiar to those with a background in corpus linguistics, the norm when engaging in a study such as Tallant's (2013) is to generate a 'coding manual' that allows the researcher to look for a particular term and its cognates, thus identifying cases where intuition (or another concept) is being referred to, but in an indirect fashion. All such uses were missed by Tallant (2013). As alluded to earlier, philosophers are interested in whether particular concepts or ideas are being used, and are not interested in cases where words are used with alternatice meanings, or cases where, as just suggested, a term might not be referring to a particular concept, but might simply be a product of a particular fashion of writing. It is therefore pressing that philosophers employing the methods from corpus linguistics do so with an appropriate respect for the methodology required by the linguistic approach. Here another lesson can be learned from experimental philosophy. Experimental philosophy really came into its own through genuine collaboration between philosophers and psychologists, and through the interest and enthusiasm of graduate students whose dissertation projects included empirical elements. For these things, you need the right supportive environment. This includes things like willingness to work collaboratively across disciplinary boundaries, willingness to co-supervise PhD students outside one's own area and an openness and receptiveness to new methodological approaches. One might then expect the value of corpus linguistics to philosophy to become evident only once the project is properly up and running. In general, though, these teething issues are to be expected. Though tools and methods from the digital humanities have not fully broken through into philosophy as yet, they have begun to do so in other disciplines. In her discussion of the development of these methods, Terras (2016: 1641) notes that: the most difficult, intellectual work of applying technology in the humanities still occurs before the chasm has been crossed, in the phase of innovation, and early adoption, where we are looking at the technologies that cross our path and saying 'how can I use, or develop this tool for use, in my research?', much like those in the 1950s or 1960s who were coming across university mainframes and asking how best to apply that in the literary and linguistic arena. And though we take ourselves to be making the case for particular uses of these methods within philosophy, it's clear enough that more work will need to be done. But – and this really is our point here – that work has not yet really been done. In the absence of clear and 15 well-developed discussions in the wider philosophical literature as to how these different methodologies can be deployed, it's unsurprising that there is not yet a significant body of heavily digitally driven philosophical research. 5.2 Worries about chauvinism The profound questions of philosophy are not supposed to be English questions. Historically that should be clear. The big questions of Anglophone philosophy are ones which can trace their discussion through ancient Greek, Latin, Arabic and many of the modern European languages. Moreover, these discussions have analogues in philosophical traditions from around the world, including various African, Indian and Chinese traditions. Questions about existence, human nature and freedom are simply not language-specific questions. So, approaching them solely through usage of English words in English corpora risks adopting an intrinsically chauvinist methodology.17 Now, of course, this is mitigated a bit by the fact that we would never expect a philosopher to be using corpora as their sole resource. And there are probably some philosophers who would be happy restricting philosophical enquiry to the analysis of culturally specific ways of thinking and talking about such things.18 Nonetheless, for many philosophers, the worry will be there. This worry is in some ways analogous to worries that many have raised about the demographic breakdown of participants in psychology experiments (Henrich et al. 2010a, 2010b). Similar worries extend to many studies in experimental philosophy. It is also analogous to certain worries that various people have raised about relying on intuitions in philosophy – where a contingent matter of fact relying on intuitions typically means relying on the intuitions of a very demographically homogeneous group. Given that the worry is analogous, one might expect the solution to be the same. In these other cases, the solution (or part of it) is typically to diversify your sample in some way. In experimental philosophy and psychology, to make sure one has a diverse sample or to encourage cross-cultural studies and replication attempts.19 In traditional philosophy, one can take extra steps to encourage those from under-represented demographic groups into 17Worries in this vicinity seem less urgent and perhaps even irrelevant for corpus research, where the primary objective is to better understand something about language, a specific language or a specific culture. 18Although, even so-called 'ethno-philosophers' tend to place emphasis on using comparing and contrasting different ways of thinking (e.g. Maffie 2002). 19Stephen Stich and Edouard Machery have a project underway to help do just this – Intellectual Humility and Cultural Diversity in Philosophy: An Examination of the Extent and Implications of Cultural Diversity in Philosophical Intuition (see thethrivecenter.org/research/research-projects/the-science-of-intellectual-humility). 16 the profession.20 In the case of corpus research, the analogous solution brings difficulties. How does one diversify the sample? The obvious way is to look at multiple languages. This brings obvious practical difficulties. But, more importantly, the problem of a non-diverse sample may already be embodied in the existing materials, for example, there are structural problems in how representative corpora are in the first place. For obvious reasons, corpora of English are much better established (even than other European languages, e.g. French) (Sharoff 2006). There might also be worries about the representation of the language-use of various groups within the corpora philosophers might use. Seildhofer (2012) notes the language compiled in BNC/COCA is effectively defined as "what has been produced by so-called educated and predominantly British and American (etc.) native speakers" (p.136). Auer et al. (2014) note "the upper layers of society and men are over-represented in diachronic corpora" (p.10). The underrepresentation of the language-use of women in corpora has been noted from the Early Modern period (Culpeper Kytö 2010, p.26), to internet corpora (Sharoff 2006, p.444). Of course, there are sophisticated techniques available to help create corpora with better representation of, for example, female writers and to allow for cross-linguistic work. For instance, the use of web crawling (à la the WaCky initiative – Baroni et al. 2009) and the creation and use of parallel and comparable corpora (see McEnery and Xiao 2007). However, philosophers probably oughtn't to be expected to be able to jump in at the deep end. It seems likely that those interested in bringing corpus-based methods to philosophy will have to content themselves with more established, freely available and straightforward resources for the time being. Inmany cases, this will likely mean focusing on use of English. Nonetheless, making sure that their findings don't simply reflect quirks ofEnglish usage will be something such researchers will need to look out for.21 And, more generally, we must recognise that philosophy is not unique and will follow a well-trodden path. If we can derive value from the digital humanities, then it seems likely that we will have to continue to do so cautiously in the longer term. The Gartner Hype Cycle. . . looks at how technologies are launched, mature, and are applied (so people know when to invest). The premise of this is that when technologies are first triggered, everyone thinks they are going to be the Next Big Thing, and so they reach 'the peak of inflated expectations', before 20Various projects are underway to help do this. For example, see Minorities and Philosophy (mapforthegap.com) and Gendered Conference Campaign (feministphilosophers.wordpress.com/gendered-conferencecampaign). 21Note again, that the metaphilosophical bent of Andow and Tallant's case studies means that they are (to some extent) isolated from such worries given the nature of the academic writings relevant to their research questions as their questions do concern specific communities. 17 crashing down into a 'trough of disillusionment' when those adopting them realise they are not that great at all. It is hard work to get technologies up the 'slope of enlightenment' where useful, useable applications are found. (Terras 2016: 1642–1643) As we say, we assume that philosophy will be no different. It will be difficult to generate uptake of new methods and, if we can, this may well lead to an inflation of expectations – a risk that all new technologies carry with them. Our development of these methods will thus need to be rigorous and cautious. Nonetheless, it is clear that philosophy is a discipline that has much to learn and much to benefit from when it come to the digital humanities. Indeed, we want to move on with a note of optimism. The methodology that we are proposing, here, has promise. While there may be worries about focusing on English and the demographic representativeness of widely available corpora, it is important to note that, while imperfect, use of corpora is almost immediately an improvement on, for example, the standard philosophical practice of interrogating only one's own and other philosophers' ideas about 'what people would say'. Large and widely available corpora such as COCA and BNC incorporate usage from speech, fiction, popular magazines, newspapers, etc., and allow one to focus on particular types of use. This gives some traction into the question of how ideas and concepts are used a long way outside the academy. Similarly, one might think that access to corpora of web-based usage (e.g. UKWaC) and particularly social media (e.g. HERMES) would allow another insight into how language is used (in highly nonacademic contexts). These are exciting possibilities. If we can take advantage of them, then this will likely allow philosophers to explore language-use in ways which they have not been able to, to this point. 6 Summary The potential for corpus-based research to contribute to philosophical enquiry is clear. Many ways of conceiving of philosophical enquiry make it amenable to empirical enquiry. However, the road to the use of such methods being accepted in philosophy won't be a smooth one. There are important issues to be addressed and metaphilosophical questions to be asked and answered. Just like experimental philosophy, corpus-based research in philosophy should be expected to encounter heated resistance and raise heated discussions about the nature of philosophical enquiry. If the fate of corpus-research in philosophy were to be anything like that of experimental philosophy, corpus research will probably at first contribute largely at the metaphilosophical level (raising challenges and spurring debate) and in putting philosophers' empirical claims to the test before becoming established as a field and developing clear research programmes of its own. 18 We close on a rather different note. For many subjects, there is a philosophy of that subject: physics, chemistry, biology, psychology, mathematics, economics – the list goes on. What mainstream philosophy has not yet managed to produce is a substantial philosophy of the digital humanities (or of any of the sub-fields contained therein). Of course, that is not to say that these areas are devoid of philosophical interest or that no good philosophy is being done in those fields. We make no such claims. Indeed, tentatively, we think that there are areas where careful philosophical analysis may prove useful – though we wish to only suggest such a conclusion. One central question to which philosophy may be able to add something concerns the question of when a corpus is representative, and what it is representative of. Indeed, more generally, applied linguistics itself is a field that encompasses a considerable variety of approaches and stepping off points (see, e.g. Scholz et al. forthcoming). Making appropriate use of philosophical tools (conceptual analysis, for instance) may ultimately prove a useful way of making progress here. There are considerable bodies of work within the philosophical canon that explore what it is to represent something; what representation itself is. Deploying these notions may well be of use in the development and refinement of new corpus methods. Future reading 1. Bluhm, R. (2016). Corpus Analysis in Philosophy In Martin Hinton (ed.), Evidence, Experiment and Argument in Linguistics and the Philosophy of Language. Peter Lang, pp. 91–109. 2. Caton, Jacob N. (2020). Using Linguistic Corpora as a Philosophical Tool. Metaphilosophy. 51(1): 51-70. 3. Scholz, Barbara C., Pelletier, Francis Jeffry and Pullum, Geoffrey K. (2016). Philosophy of Linguistics, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.). Available here References Alfano, M. and Higgins, A. (2019). Natural language processing and semantic network visualization for philosophers. In E. Fischer and M. Curtis (eds.), Methodological advances in experimental philosophy. London: Bloomsbury. Alfano, M., Higgins, A. and Levernier, J. (2018). Identifying virtues and values through obituary data-mining. The Journal of Value Inquiry 52(1): 59–79. Andow, J. (2015a). How distinction is philosophers' intuition talk? Metaphilosophy 46(4–5): 515–538. 19 Andow, J. (2015b). How 'intuition' exploded. Metaphilosophy 46(2): 189–212. Andow, J. (2016). Intuitions (a critical notice of Rowbottom and Booth. eds. Intuitions. OUP.). Analysis 76(2): 232–246. Andow, J. (2017). Intuition-talk: Virtue or vice. Philosophia 45(2): 523–531. Auer, A., Laitinen, M., Gordon, M. and Fairman, T. (2014). An electronic corpus of letters of artisans and the labouring poor (England, c. 1750–1835): Compilation principles and coding conventions. In V. Lieven, K. Davidse, C. Gentens and D. Kimps (eds.), Recent advances in corpus linguistics: Developing and exploiting corpora. Amsterdam and New York: Rodopi, pp. 7–29. Baroni, M., Bernardini, S., Ferraresi, A. and Zanchetta, E. (2009). The WaCky wide web: A collection of very large linguistically processed web-crawled corpora. Language Resources and Evaluation 43(3): 209–226. Beaney, M. (2015). Analysis. In E.N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy, Spring 2015 ed. Available here (Accessed 9 April 2019). Buckwalter, W. (2012). Non-traditional factors in judgments about knowledge. Philosophy Compass 7(4): 278–289. Cappelen, H. (2012). Philosophy without intuitions. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Cappelen, H. (2014). X-Phi without intuitions? In A.R. Booth and D.P. Rowbottom (eds.), Intuitions. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Culpeper, J. andKytö, M. (2010). Early modern English dialogues: Spoken interaction as writing. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Deutsch, M. (2010). Intuitions, counter-examples, and experimental philosophy. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1(3): 447–460. Deutsch, M. (2015). The myth of the intuitive: Experimental philosophy and philosophical method. London: MIT Press. Goldman, A.I. (2007). Philosophical intuitions: Their target, their source, and their epistemic status. Grazer Philosophische Studien 74(1): 1–26. Hansen, N. (2014). Contemporary ordinary language philosophy. Philosophy Compass 9(8): 556–569. Henrich, J., Heine, S.J. and Norenzayan, A. (2010a). Most people are not weird. Nature 466(7302): 29. Henrich, J., Heine, S.J. and Norenzayan, A. (2010b). The weirdest people in the world? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33(2–3): 61–83. 20 Hintikka, J.(1999). The emperor's new intuitions. The Journal of Philosophy 96(3): 127–147. Jenkins, C. (2014). 'Intuition', intuitions, concepts and the A priori. In A. Booth and D. Rowbottom (eds.), Intuitions. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kauppinen, A. (2007). The rise and fall of experimental philosophy. Philosophical Explorations 10(2): 95–118. Knobe, J. (2007). Experimental philosophy. Philosophy Compass 2(1): 81–92. Knobe, J. (2016). Experimental philosophy is cognitive science. In J. Sytsma andW. Buckwalter (eds.), A companion to experimental philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell. Knobe, J. andNichols, S. (2008). An experimental philosophymanifesto. In J. Knobe and S. Nichols (eds.), Experimental philosophy, vol. 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 3–14. Ladyman, J. and Ross, D. (2007). Every thing must go. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Laurence, S. and Margolis, E. (1999). Concepts and cognitive science. In S. Laurence and E. Margolis (eds.), Concepts: Core readings. London: MIT Press, pp. 3–81. Machery, E. (2017). Philosophy with its proper bounds. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Maffie, J.(2002). Why care about Nezahualcoyotl? Veritism and Nahua philosophy. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 32(1): 71–91. Martinson, B.C., Anderson, M.S. andDe Vries, R. (2005). Scientists behaving badly. Nature 435(7043): 737. Marton, F., Fensham, P. and Chaiklin, S. (1994). A nobel's eye view of scientific intuition: Discussions with the nobel prize-winners in physics, chemistry and medicine (197086). International Journal of Science Education 16(4): 457–473. McEnery, A. and Xiao, R. (2007). Parallel and comparable corpora: What is happening. Incorporating corpora. The Linguist and the Translator: 18–31. Naess, A. (1938). 'Truth' as conceived by those who are not professional philosophers. Oslo: I Kommisjon Hos Jacob Dybward, pp. 12–15. Nagel, J. (2013). Knowledge as a mental state. Oxford Studies in Epistemology 4: 275–310. Nichols, S., Stich, S. and Weinberg, J.M. (2003). Metaskepticism: Meditations in ethnoepistemology. In S. Luper (ed.), The skeptics. Aldershot: Ashgate, pp. 227–247. Pust, J. (2014). Intuition. In E.N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy, Fall ed. Available here (Accessed 9 April 2019). Richard, M. (2015). Truth and truth bearers: Meaning in context, vol. 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 21 Rosch, E. and Mervis, C. (1975). Family resemblances: Studies in the internal structure of categories. Cognitive Psychology 7: 573–605. Rosenbloom, P. (2012). Towards a conceptual framework for the digital humanities. Digital Humanities Quarterly 6(2): 219–233. Rysiew, P. (2011). Epistemic contextualism. In E.N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy, Winter 2011 ed. Available here (Accessed 9 April 2019). Scholz, B.C., Pelletier, F.J. and Pullum, G.K. (2016). Philosophy of linguistics. In E.N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy, Winter 2016 ed. Available here (Accessed 9 April 2019). Seildhofer, B. (2012). Corpora and English as a Lingua Franca. In K. Hyland, C. M. Huat and M. Handford (eds.), Corpus applications in applied linguistics. London: Bloomsbury. Sharoff, S. (2006). Creating general-purpose corpora using automated search engine queries. In M. Baroni and S. Bernardini (eds.),Wacky! Working papers on the web as corpus. Bologna: Gedit, pp. 63–98. Slingerland, E. (2013). Body and mind in early China: An integrated humanities – science approach. Journal of the American Academy of Religion 81(1): 6–55. Slingerland, E. and Chudek, M. (2011). The prevalence of mind – body dualism in early China. Cognitive Science 35: 997–1007. Slingerland, E., Nichols, N., Neilbo, K. and Logan, C. (2017). The distant reading of religious texts: A 'big data'approach to mind-body concepts in early China. Journal of the American Academy of Religion 85(4): 985–1016. Stich, S. and Weinberg, J. (2001). Jackson's empirical assumptions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62(3): 637–643. Tallant, J. (2013). Intuitions in physics. Synthese 190: 2959–2980. Tallant, J. (2015). Metaphysics, intuitions and physics. Ratio 28: 286–301. Tallant, J. (Forthcoming). Critical review. Analysis. Terras, M. (2016). A decade in digital humanities. Journal of Siberian Federal University: Humanities & Social Sciences 7: 1637–1650. Williamson, T. (2007). Philosophy of philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell.

| ISSN: 0120-131X • ISSN: 2389-9980 (en línea) | Vol. 46 | No. 106 | Julio-diciembre • 2019 | pp. 410-415 Cuestiones Teológicas | Medellín-Colombia doi: http://doi.org/10.18566/cueteo.v46n106.a09 Fecha de recepción: 18 de julio de 2019 Fecha de aceptación: 22 de agosto de 2019 Reconocimiento - No Comercial GallaGher, T.M. (2016). Discernimiento De espíritus. Guía iGnaciana para la viDa cotiDiana. Barcelona: herder Carlos Alberto Rosas Jiménez1 1 Magíster en Bioética por la Universidad Libre Internacional de las Américas. Biólogo por la Universidad de los Andes, Colombia. Filósofo, Bachiller canónico en Filosofía y Bachiller en Sagrada Teología por la Universidad Pontificia Bolivariana, Colombia. Docente en la Universidad de la Sabana. Correo electrónico: carlosalbertorosas@ hotmail.com Cuestiones Teológicas, Vol. 46, No. 106 (Julio-diciembre, 2019) | 411 Gallagher, T.M. (2016). Discernimiento de espíritus. Guía ignaciana para la vida cotidiana. Barcelona: Herder Discernimiento de espíritus, como muchos otros libros que comentan los Ejercicios Espirituales de san Ignacio de Loyola, describe lo que se conoce como el discernimiento de espíritus. Sin embargo, se dedica a explicar, ilustrar y, sobre todo, aplicar el discernimiento de espíritus en la experiencia espiritual cotidiana y común de las personas. El autor recalca que en la actualidad existen muchos factores personales y sociales que, impidiendo el cultivo del silencio interior y exterior, aumentan la dificultad de adentrarse en la propia conciencia y, por ende, contribuyen a una profunda resistencia de las personas del mundo de hoy a vivir hacia adentro, es decir, hacia el encuentro consigo mismos. Dado que esta no es una tarea fácil, este libro está dirigido a quienes tengan la valentía –la virtud que quizá más repite el autor a lo largo de todo el libro– de ser espiritualmente conscientes de su vida. Nuestro autor, el padre Timothy Gallagher, fue ordenado en 1979 como miembro de la congregación de los Oblatos de la Virgen María, una comunidad religiosa dedicada a retiros y formación espiritual, siguiendo los Ejercicios espirituales de san Ignacio. Obtuvo su doctorado en 1983 por la Universidad Gregoriana de Roma, y desde entonces se ha dedicado plenamente a la enseñanza de la tradición espiritual ignaciana y a la dirección espiritual en diversos países del mundo. Es autor de varios libros sobre la enseñanza espiritual de san Ignacio de Loyola y actualmente ocupa la cátedra "San Ignacio para la formación espiritual" en el Seminario Teológico St. John Vianney en Denver, Estados Unidos. La presente obra está dividida en 14 capítulos con una introducción y un prólogo previos al desarrollo de los capítulos, finalizando con una muy breve conclusión. Los capítulos desarrollan cada una de las 14 reglas del discernimiento que expone san Ignacio en sus Ejercicios Espirituales. Quisiéramos, antes de mencionar algunos aspectos sobre cada una de dichas reglas, destacar algunos interrogantes que plantea el autor sobre la necesidad del conocimiento de sí mismos, y que pueden motivar la profundización en la propia vida espiritual de las personas y la consiguiente lectura de este libro. Podría uno preguntarme entonces si: [...] ¿Hay alguna situación que me desanime frecuentemente? ¿Alguna situación que suela despojarme de la energía espiritual? ¿Hay circunstancias en las que, con frecuencia, me invada el miedo? ¿Y circunstancias que 412 | Cuestiones Teológicas, Vol. 46, No. 106 (Julio-diciembre, 2019) Carlos Alberto Rosas Jiménez me agoten? ¿Y circunstancias en las que me sienta espiritualmente desamparado? ¿Hay alguna cosa que parezca disminuir la mayor parte de mi energía para amar y servir a los demás? ¿Hay algo que habitualmente me desanime en la oración? ¿Y algo que a menudo me haga dudar del amor de Dios? ¿Hay algún patrón recurrente de estas experiencias? (p. 368). Si se contestó afirmativamente a alguno de estos interrogantes, la lectura de este libro es para usted. Además, podrá encontrar luces a otros interrogantes sobre usted mismo y sobre el avance o retroceso de su vida espiritual. El recorrido de las 14 reglas comienza con las personas que se alejan de Dios y que, por ende, se acercan a faltas graves que fracturan esa relación con Dios, consigo mismos, con los demás y con el mundo que los rodea; así mismo, se describe cómo actúan en estas personas los espíritus (1o. Regla). Posteriormente, considera a las personas que están "en el servicio de Dios nuestro Señor de bien en mejor subiendo" (p. 99) y el modo en que los espíritus obran sobre estas personas (2o. Regla). Tras haber descrito los dos tipos de movimientos espirituales (la consolación espiritual y la desolación espiritual –3o. y 4o. Reglas–, Ignacio da instrucciones para poder resistir a la desolación espiritual –de la 5o. a la 9o. Regla–. Después señala algunas enseñanzas clave para prepararse para la desolación espiritual antes de su comienzo, almacenando en tiempos de consolación espiritual la energía que necesitarán para resistir en el futuro a dicha desolación –10o. Regla–. En este punto, Ignacio invita a las personas de discernimiento a vivir con equilibrio y madurez espiritual, ni imprudentemente en lo alto durante la consolación espiritual, ni desesperadamente en lo bajo durante la desolación espiritual –11o. Regla–. Por último, Ignacio se centra en las tentaciones del enemigo, y guía a las personas fieles para que les opongan resistencia desde el comienzo mismo –12o. Regla–, por medio de la valentía de hablar de las astucias y persuasiones del enemigo con la persona espiritual apropiada –13o. Regla–. En esta serie de reglas, se alcanza el máximo perfeccionamiento del discernimiento cuando las personas de discernimiento se vuelven capaces de vencer los ataques personalizados del enemigo, antes incluso que este los emprenda –14o. Regla–. Cuestiones Teológicas, Vol. 46, No. 106 (Julio-diciembre, 2019) | 413 Gallagher, T.M. (2016). Discernimiento de espíritus. Guía ignaciana para la vida cotidiana. Barcelona: Herder De esta manera, el crecimiento espiritual descrito a lo largo de este itinerario de discernimiento es inmenso. Se comienza con la persona que se aleja de Dios y se concluye con la persona que está "en el servicio de Dios nuestro Señor de bien en mejor subiendo" (p. 99), preparada para derrotar al enemigo incluso antes del comienzo de su acción. Las catorce reglas de san Ignacio constituyen un programa para crecer progresivamente en el discernimiento de espíritus. El esfuerzo humilde y perseverante de vivir de acuerdo con la sabiduría de estas reglas, con la ayuda de un guía espiritual y con confianza en la gracia de Dios, "que siempre es suficiente" (p. 372), va formando poco a poco a una persona con madurez espiritual, capaz de discernir y superar los engaños del enemigo, al tiempo que cumple con fidelidad la voluntad de Dios y crece en el amor. Este es el objetivo del discernimiento de espíritus. Queremos destacar algunos puntos fundamentales que hacen de este libro una lectura muy aterrizada y encarnada de los Ejercicios Espirituales Ignacianos para el cristiano actual. En primer lugar, el discernimiento de espíritus puede obtenerse de dos formas: como don o carisma del Espíritu, o por medio de la aplicación de las reglas de discernir. El primer camino hacia el discernimiento puede estar simplemente dado por Dios; mientras que el segundo camino hacia el discernimiento, que es mediante el aprendizaje y la aplicación de las reglas del discernimiento, va presentándose gradualmente y a través de la práctica constante (cfr. pp. 376-377). Este segundo camino es el centro de la reflexión de este libro y no pretende ser un libro para fanáticos religiosos ni espiritualoides. En segundo lugar, el autor insiste en que el punto de partida del discernimiento y la puerta hacia la libertad espiritual (Cfr. pp. 275; 299) es la decisión de vivir esa constante conciencia espiritual favorecida por los espacios de silencio exterior que contribuyen significativamente al silencio interior. No hay cambios en la vida espiritual sin decisiones firmes, algo opuesto al pensamiento débil y la sociedad líquida del siglo XXI. En tercer lugar, esa decisión requiere mucha valentía, pues es necesario "procurar permanecer lo suficientemente dentro como para que lo que se mueve espiritualmente en nuestro corazón se haga presente a nuestra 414 | Cuestiones Teológicas, Vol. 46, No. 106 (Julio-diciembre, 2019) Carlos Alberto Rosas Jiménez conciencia" (p. 60). En ese sentido, muchas veces puede ser muy difícil enfrentarse a una herida psicológica que se ha ido acumulando a través de los años en la historia personal de cada uno, cosa que impide a muchos hacer frente a su propia vida espiritual. En cuarto lugar, queremos destacar aquello que el autor menciona varias veces como la diferenciación entre el "yo" y el "yo-que-reflexionasobre-el-yo-en-desolación" (cfr. 203; 339), ya que en los momentos de desolación espiritual se da la mentira (p. 179) que incluye una falsa identificación entre lo que la persona siente en su desolación y lo que realmente es espiritualmente (p. 155). Sin embargo, es necesario para comprender mejor qué nos pasa en los momentos de desolación espiritual, que nos situemos en la posición del "yo-que-reflexiona-sobreel-yo-en-desolación"; así, podremos ver desde una perspectiva diferente, tomando un poco de distancia de nosotros mismos, y ver la desolación espiritual como parte de un conjunto que incluye la totalidad de nuestra historia personal y nuestra realidad presente. En quinto lugar, este libro responde a dos dificultades de capital importancia en nuestra sociedad: la de la desesperanza y la del querer controlar todo. Queda increíblemente claro cómo dejar de luchar en la desolación es causa directa de una experiencia de desánimo y desesperanza, las cuales, juntas, conllevan a la desconfianza en Dios y al consiguiente alejamiento de Él. Por otro lado, el deseo de controlar todo en nuestra sociedad y pretender ser dueños del tiempo, de nuestro dinero, ejercer el poder sobre personas o estructuras nos lleva a tener siempre "la sartén por el mango". No obstante, únicamente cuando renunciamos a controlar la obra de Dios en nuestro corazón, descubrimos que la oscuridad en nuestro interior se disipa gradualmente (cfr. p. 186). A pesar de la claridad y fluidez que se puede tener en la lectura de este libro, es llamativo que los ejemplos que pone el autor son un poco ingenuos o demasiado simples, pues cuando habla en algunas partes del libro sobre los momentos de desolación espiritual, comenta distracciones en la oración, desánimo en la labor apostólica o algunas dudas sobre si seguir o no la vocación al sacerdocio. No obstante, queremos enfatizar que, si bien son una manera de ilustrar cada una de las reglas del discernimiento de espíritus, Cuestiones Teológicas, Vol. 46, No. 106 (Julio-diciembre, 2019) | 415 Gallagher, T.M. (2016). Discernimiento de espíritus. Guía ignaciana para la vida cotidiana. Barcelona: Herder son ejemplos que no ilustran muchas de las crisis o fuertes desolaciones que pueden experimentar laicos, religiosos o sacerdotes. Las grandes desolaciones son cuando nos peleamos con Dios, cuando le reclamamos porque no comprendemos su plan con nosotros; cuando no nos parece la manera como avanzan las cosas en nuestras vidas o cuando vemos que después de muchos años de servicio, oración, entrega amorosa y generosa a los demás no vemos los frutos o vemos que a otros que hacen menos o casi nada de esto, aparentemente les va mejor. Ahí es cuando realmente nos desanimamos, nos desilusionamos o nos enfadamos con Dios. Pareciera que el autor tiene un cierto temor de hablar claro de estas experiencias como si estuviera mal vivirlas o pasar por ellas; siendo que quizá son más comunes de lo que parece. Además, el autor menciona que esas desolaciones espirituales duran unas horas, días o máximo semanas. Lo cierto es que pueden durar varios años, con estadios prolongados de desánimo y desesperanza; y ahí es cuando realmente está el reto de la utilización de las reglas ignacianas de discernimiento, porque podría parecer que no sirven. El autor hubiera podido poner más ejemplos de esto último para evidenciar que sí son de gran utilidad incluso en esas profundas desolaciones espirituales. Finalmente, quisiéramos justamente repetir con el autor que todo crecimiento en general lleva tiempo, y el crecimiento en el discernimiento no es la excepción a esta ley universal. Así que el progreso en la capacidad de llevar una vida discernida espiritualmente se da a través de la continuidad en la oración, en los esfuerzos, en la conversación con un guía espiritual, y en todos los medios que Ignacio describe en sus reglas (cfr. p. 376), cosa muy contraria a la cultura de lo provisorio o del inmediatismo en el que vivimos sumergidos. Concluimos simplemente que la temática del libro está creativa y sistemáticamente adaptada para quienes deseen ahondar más en cómo llevar a la vida cotidiana y a su esfuerzo por alcanzar la santidad, las enseñanzas del Evangelio, teniendo como guía los Ejercicios Espirituales de san Ignacio de Loyola.

Unknowable Color Facts Brian Cutter University of Notre Dame [email protected] Abstract It is common for an object to present different color appearances to different perceivers, even when the perceivers and viewing conditions are normal. For example, a Munsell chip might look unique green to you and yellowish green to me in normal viewing conditions. In such cases, there are three possibilities. Ecumenism: Both experiences are veridical. Nihilism: Both experiences are non-veridical. Inegalitarianism: One experience is veridical and the other is non-veridical. Perhaps the most important objection to inegalitarianism is the ignorance objection, according to which inegalitarianism should be rejected because it is committed to the existence of unknowable color facts (e.g., facts about which objects are unique green). The goal of this paper is to show that ecumenists are also committed to unknowable color facts. More specifically, I argue that, with the exception of color eliminativism, all major philosophical theories of color are committed to unknowable color facts. 1. The puzzle of normal variation Norma and Norm look at a Munsell chip. To Norma, the chip looks unique green-a shade of green without any admixture of yellowishness or blueishness. To Norm, the chip looks yellowish green. Both Norma and Norm qualify as normal perceivers according to standard tests of color vision, such as the Munsell-Farnsworth 100 hue test, and both are viewing the chip in normal perceptual conditions. This is a case of 'normal variation'-variation in color perception among normal perceivers in normal viewing conditions-and cases of this kind are surprisingly common. In any such case, it's natural to wonder: whose experience is veridical? The following possibilities partition logical space: Ecumenism: Both experiences are veridical. Nihilism: Neither experience is veridical. Inegalitarianism: One experience is veridical and the other is non-veridical. 2 Each option comes with prima facie costs. The main problem with ecumenism is that it evidently contradicts the plausible color exclusion principle that nothing can be both unique green and yellowish green (all over at the same time). At least, ecumenism is inconsistent with this exclusion principle given the following attractive principle connecting the look of an object to the notion of a veridical experience: If x looks unique green (yellowish green) to S, then S's visual experience is veridical only if x is unique green (yellowish green). The main problem with nihilism is its apparent commitment to color eliminativism, the thesis that nothing is colored. For it is reasonable to assume that some normal perceiver would accurately perceive the chip's determinate color if it has one, so if neither experience is veridical, that is presumably because the chip has no determinate color.1 And if the object has no determinate color, then presumably it lacks the determinable property being colored, for a thing cannot have a determinable property without having any of its determinates.2 And if the chip isn't colored, that is presumably because nothing-at least, no external material thing- is colored, in which case color experience is a massive illusion. This is not an incoherent view, but I assume on general anti-skeptical grounds that we have reason to trust the testimony of experience in the absence of sufficiently strong countervailing considerations. There are, then, at least prima facie grounds for rejecting nihilism. That leaves us with inegalitarianism. One common objection to inegalitarianism is the systematic-error objection: like nihilism, inegalitarianism evidently implies that most people, 1 For simplicity, I assume there are only two determinate colors the chip is disposed to present to normal human perceivers in normal conditions. This assumption is unrealistic, but nothing philosophically significant hangs on it. We could drop the assumption by considering a scenario involving a larger class of normal perceivers-one for each of the many determinate colors the chip is apt to present to normal perceivers in normal conditions, but this would burden our discussion with needless complications. 2 Or so it is generally supposed (Funkhouser 2006, p. 549; Cutter 2019), though see Wilson (2013) and Gert (2017). 3 most of the time, misperceive the determinate colors of objects.3 Still, the systematic misperception to which inegalitarianism is committed is far less radical. The inegalitarian can hold that typical experiences of determinate color are approximately veridical. Moreover, the inegalitarian can hold that our experiences of determinable colors (e.g., green) are typically veridical, as are our color judgments, since these are usually only concerned with relatively determinable colors. The inegalitarian can take further comfort from the fact that our visual perception of determinate spatial properties evidently involves small but systematic errors. For example, it has been known for over a century that objects visually appear to stand in patterns of spatial relationships that subtly but systematically violate Euclidean geometric principles (principles that are, of course, satisfied by those objects' actual spatial relationships, ignoring negligible relativistic effects), and there is abundant experimental evidence that perceived angle size is distorted in systematic ways by factors like orientation and tilt.4 We therefore have independent reason to reject what seems to be an underlying assumption of the systematic-error objection: that experiences of normal perceivers in normal conditions are always, or at least usually, perfectly (not just approximately) veridical. Another common objection to inegalitarianism is the arbitrariness objection: because there is no evident reason to privilege Norma's experience over Norm's, or Norm's over Norma's, any answer we might give to the question of whose experience is veridical would be arbitrary.5 The premise is very plausible. It would indeed be arbitrary to declare that Norma's experience is uniquely veridical, and it would be equally arbitrary to declare that Norm's is 3 See, e.g., Byrne and Hilbert (1997, pp. 272-4), Block (1999, p. 46), Shoemaker (2000), Kriegel (2009, p. 86). 4 For a summary of the empirical literature on visual geometric distortions, see Wagner (2006). For relevant philosophical discussion, see McLaughlin (2016) and Masrour (2017). 5 See, e.g., Jackson and Pargetter (1987, p. 134) Hardin (1988, ch. 2), Kalderon (2007, p. 566), Cohen (2009, ch. 2), Kriegel (2009, p. 86). 4 uniquely veridical. Fortunately, the inegalitarian can avoid arbitrariness by making neither declaration. She claims only that exactly one of the two experiences is veridical. She needn't (and shouldn't) claim to know which. 'God knows', as Michael Tye remarks in his defense of inegalitarianism, but we may have no way of knowing (Tye 2006, p. 177). This brings us to what is perhaps the most important objection to inegalitarianism, and the primary concern of this paper: the ignorance objection. According to the ignorance objection, inegalitarianism should be rejected because it leads to irremediable ignorance of this kind.6 Put another way, it should be rejected because it is committed to something like the following claim: CHROMATIC IGNORANCE: Some color facts are unknowable (e.g., facts about which things are unique green). As Hardin puts the objection, given inegalitarian forms of color realism, [...] the spectral locus of unique green must be a matter of fact. If it is a matter of fact, there ought to be some way of determining what it is. It is clear enough that the just by looking principle will not suffice, unless we can be given some reason why the looking of some normal observers is to be preferred over the looking of others. The brute fact is that, to date, no color realist has offered even a plausible suggestion of how one might go about making this determination. (Hardin 2003, p. 199) Inegalitarians generally concede that their view leads to CHROMATIC IGNORANCE.7 But, they ask, so what? What's so objectionable about unknowable color facts? After all, we shouldn't assume that all truths are knowable (and not only because, as Fitch (1963) showed, this assumption 6 See, e.g., Hardin (1988, ch. 2; 2003, p. 199), Averill (2003, p. 22), Dennett (2003, p. 788), Triplett (2007), Brogaard (2015, pp. 142-3), Gert (2017, p. 58), Morrison (forthcoming, pp. 4-6), 7 See, e.g., Byrne and Hilbert (2003; 2007), Tye (2006), Allen (2016). 5 entails that all truths are known). The universe seems mostly indifferent to our practical ambitions; why should it be so accommodating to our epistemic ambitions? These are reasonable questions, and in my view, they have not been adequately answered by opponents of inegalitarianism, but I will not pursue them here.8 Here I take a different approach to defending inegalitarianism against the ignorance objection: I shall argue that, whether or not there is anything objectionable about unknowable color facts, it is not only the inegalitarian who is committed to them. The ecumenist is too. The ignorance objection therefore cannot be used to support ecumenism over inegalitarianism. A bit more specifically, I shall argue that, with the exception of color eliminativism, every major philosophical theory of color leads to CHROMATIC IGNORANCE. First, however, I must say a few words about how CHROMATIC IGNORANCE is to be understood. 2. Chromatic ignorance To a first approximation, the ignorance thesis under consideration says: CHROMATIC IGNORANCE: Some color facts are unknowable. The thesis requires clarification. First, it should be read as implicitly restricted to facts about objects that are, in some reasonable sense, available to us for investigation. Perhaps we are irremediably ignorant of the colors of objects in far-off galaxies, or the colors of items that are too small or short-lived to be reliably observed or measured. But no one in this debate is 8 For attempted answers, see Brogaard (2015), Triplett (2007), and Morrison (forthcoming). Brogaard's answer relies on the verificationist principle that '[h]ypotheses that are empirically untestable are typically regarded as meaningless' (Brogaard 2015, p. 143; cf. Hardin 2003, p. 200). But as Byrne and Hilbert remark, 'This tune from Old Vienna, it goes without saying, does not sound convincing' (Byrne and Hilbert 2007, p. 88). Triplett's and Morrison's answers are less clear, but they seem to think that we should reject unknowable color facts on Occamist grounds. I find this motivation puzzling. It's hard to see how Occamist considerations would tell against views that reductively identify unknowable color facts with physical facts of a kind that everyone accepts (e.g., reflectance facts). Of course, there may be an Occamist objection to irreducible unknowable color facts, which some color primitivists accept, but here the problem is surely their irreducibility, not their unknowability. After all, even if everyone's perceptions agreed about which things are unique green, this wouldn't blunt the force of the Occamist objection to the view that unique green is an irreducible property. 6 concerned with this type of ignorance. The type of ignorance relevant to the ignorance objection is ignorance of the colors of nearby, medium-sized items that can be investigated and manipulated by scientific instruments at our leisure. We should understand the thesis of CHROMATIC IGNORANCE to be implicitly restricted to color facts of this kind. Beyond these banal qualifications, I want to clarify the thesis by laying down two constraints on what it would take to avoid commitment to CHROMATIC IGNORANCE. In formulating these constraints, my guiding assumption is that we should understand CHROMATIC IGNORANCE in such a way that inegalitarians can plausibly be said to be committed to it. (There are, after all, some ways of understanding the notion of 'unknowable color facts' on which the inegalitarian isn't committed to them. To take a silly example: in a very weak sense of 'possible', it is possible that we will be visited by an omniscient oracle who will tell us which experience is veridical. In a correspondingly weak sense of 'knowable', all color facts are knowable. We therefore shouldn't understand the notion of knowability in this very weak sense, at least if we want to maintain that inegalitarians are committed to CHROMATIC IGNORANCE.) After formulating the two constraints, I shall argue in §§3-4 that ecumenists are unable to meet them. Here is the first constraint: The Chromatic Guise Constraint: To avoid CHROMATIC IGNORANCE, it must be possible to know all relevant color facts under a guise that involves color concepts (rather than, say, co-referring scientific concepts, such as reflectance concepts). To see why this constraint is needed, consider the inegalitarianism of Tye (2000; 2006) and Byrne and Hilbert (2003; 2007). Setting aside some complications that are irrelevant for our purposes, Tye, Byrne, and Hilbert accept reflectance physicalism about color, the view that colors are identical to surface reflectance types. It arguably follows that color facts are identical 7 to reflectance facts. For example, if unique green is reflectance type R, then the fact that a certain object is unique green is presumably identical to the fact that it has reflectance type R. But reflectance facts of this sort are knowable by scientific means. So, even an inegalitarian can hold that all color facts are in some sense knowable, at least if reflectance physicalism is true. The point of the chromatic guise constraint is to block this escape hatch. We may choose to individuate facts in such a way that the identity of unique green with reflectance-type R implies the identity of the fact that o is unique green with the fact that o has reflectance type R. But in that case, it will be possible for one and the same fact to be known under one 'guise'-one structured collection of concepts, if you like-but unknown under another, just as a fact about Venus can be known under a guise involving the concept Hesperus without being known under a guise involving the concept Phosphorus. To avoid CHROMATIC IGNORANCE on its intended reading, it is not enough for the relevant fact to be knowable under a guise involving scientific concepts. It must be knowable under a guise involving color concepts-for example, the guise one would naturally express with the sentence, 'the chip is unique green'. I wish to remain neutral about the nature of color concepts. The only assumption I make is that color concepts, unlike reflectance concepts and most other scientific concepts, have some close connection to color experience. This modest assumption is compatible with many different views about what this connection looks like. According to some theorists, color concepts are functional concepts that pick out colors in terms of the experiences they cause. Thus, the concept red might be something like the concept: the property that causes reddish experiences.9 According to others, color concepts are dispositional concepts, such as: the disposition to cause reddish experiences.10 Still others hold that color concepts are unanalyzable concepts that 9 See, e.g., Jackson and Pargetter (1987), McLaughlin (2003), Chalmers (2012). 10 See, e.g., McGinn (1983), Peacocke (1984), Levin (2000). 8 directly pick out the qualities presented in color experience.11 On this view, color experience doesn't figure in the analysis of color concepts, though it plausibly plays an enabling role in allowing us to have and use color concepts. Although I personally favor the latter view, the arguments in this paper are compatible with any of these views. To introduce the next constraint, it will be helpful to consider another potential response to the ignorance objection: the perfect-psychosemantics response. Inegalitarians-especially those of a reductionist bent, like Tye, Byrne, and Hilbert-might argue that all relevant color facts could be known once we discover what Jonathan Cohen calls 'the One True Psychosemantics' (Cohen 2009, p. 59). The One True Psychosemantics is the correct and complete theory of how mental states represent the world. Such a theory would tell us exactly which external properties are represented by an organism's brain states, at least given all relevant (intrinsic and extrinsic) physical and functional facts about the organism. We could therefore figure out, at least in principle, exactly which external properties are represented by the relevant states of Norma's and Norm's visual systems. (Given reflectance physicalism, we could also figure out which reflectance type is identical to unique green: it would be whichever reflectance type is represented by Norma's brain state.) From here we could determine whose experience is veridical by straightforward scientific means, simply by determining which of the two represented properties actually belongs to the chip.12 I think it should be conceded that, given inegalitarianism, knowledge of the One True Psychosemantics could put us in a position to know whose experience is uniquely veridical, and also whether the chip is unique green. Thus, anyone who maintains that inegalitarianism leads to CHROMATIC IGNORANCE must say that the One True Psychosemantics is somehow epistemically 11 See, e.g., Moore (1903), Byrne and Hilbert (1997), Tye (2000), Chalmers (2006), Allen (2016). 12 Cf. Byrne and Hilbert (2003, p. 8). 9 inaccessible, at least if inegalitarianism is true.13 The latter claim isn't totally implausible. Suppose that tomorrow someone comes up with a psychosemantic theory that implies that only one of the two perceivers-say, Norma-is accurately perceiving the chip. Cohen suggests that, in virtue of making this contentious prediction, 'this imagined psychosemantic story would be no less controversial than the disputed matter of color ontology; since many who have considered these matters believe that such a prediction would be erroneous, they would regard any psychosemantics that licensed that prediction as ipso facto unacceptable' (Cohen 2009, p. 61). I think it would be too quick to conclude that the One True Psychosemantics is absolutely unknowable. Perhaps the true theory, once formulated, will be seen to exhibit such elegance and simplicity, and to get so many of the uncontroversial cases right, that any reasonable person would trust its verdicts on the controversial cases (even if that means revising previously held opinions) instead of rejecting the theory. Still, it can plausibly be said that knowledge of the One True Psychosemantics is in some sense 'infeasible' for us, at least in our current epistemic situation. Let's say that knowledge of a fact is infeasible if the fact cannot be known without some major philosophical or scientific breakthrough, perhaps of a kind that's currently hard to even imagine. Knowledge of a fact is feasible, then, only if it is possible to achieve this knowledge given something like our current scientific and philosophical understanding, or nonrevolutionary extensions thereof. In light of the perfect-psychosemantics response to the ignorance objection, those who maintain that inegalitarianism leads to CHROMATIC IGNORANCE should understand CHROMATIC IGNORANCE in terms of infeasibility: a color fact is unknowable, in the relevant sense, when knowing it is infeasible. For without something like this 13 A proponent of the ignorance objection might, of course, argue that we have independent grounds for thinking that the One True Psychosemantics won't yield an inegalitarian result. But then all the argumentative work would be done by those independent grounds. The appeal to unknowable color facts would be otiose. 10 understanding of an unknowable color fact, it's hard to see how defenders of the ignorance objection could sidestep the perfect-psychosemantics response. This gives us the following constraint on what it would take to avoid CHROMATIC IGNORANCE, properly understood: The Feasibility Constraint: To avoid CHROMATIC IGNORANCE, attaining knowledge of relevant color facts must be feasible. With these clarifications out of the way, we can now turn to the central project of this paper, which is to argue that all major realist theories of color are committed to CHROMATIC IGNORANCE. Color realism, as I use the term, is the view that colors belong to ordinary external objects, such as tomatoes, carrots, and Munsell chips. Realist theories of color can be divided into two groups: subjectivist theories and objectivist theories. Subjectivist theories hold that colors are response-dependent properties of external objects-that is, properties of external objects, such as a tomato's disposition to produce reddish visual sensations, whose instantiation depends on the subjective responses of perceivers. Objectivist theories hold that colors are response-independent properties of external objects, properties whose instantiation does not depend on the subjective responses of perceivers. The objectivist/subjectivist distinction crosscuts the inegalitarian/ecumenist distinction. Hereafter, I take for granted that any inegalitarian view will lead to CHROMATIC IGNORANCE, so in the coming sections, I focus on ecumenist versions of subjectivism and objectivism. My strategy is to divide and conquer. In §3, I argue that ecumenist versions of subjectivism lead to CHROMATIC IGNORANCE. In §4, I argue the same for ecumenist versions of objectivism. 3. Why subjectivism leads to chromatic ignorance To a first approximation, the subjectivist holds that what it is for an object to be (say) red is for it to be disposed to look red, where an object's 'looking red' is a matter of its causing (non11 deviantly) a certain type of mental state. The relevant mental state is commonly taken to be a phenomenal state (a 'phenomenally reddish' experience, we could call it), but some versions of subjectivism characterize the mental state in representational terms (say, the state of perceptually representing an object as red). For now, I'll focus on the phenomenal version of subjectivism, the version that identifies colors (roughly) with dispositions to cause certain phenomenal states. After arguing that this version of subjectivism leads to CHROMATIC IGNORANCE (§§3.1-3.2), I'll argue that the same goes for the representational version of subjectivism (§3.3). Subjectivism standardly comes with a commitment to the perceiver-relativity of color. For, as McGinn notes, once we accept that being red is a matter of being disposed to look red, 'the question arises, to which perceiver or perceivers the red object is disposed to look red' (McGinn 1983, p. 9). Subjectivists commonly emphasize that, in many cases of perceptual variation, there is no principled basis for favoring one perceiver over the others. Therefore, to avoid arbitrariness, they typically conclude that we should reject the absolutist idea that redness is a monadic property, a property that objects have or lack simpliciter. Rather, redness is polyadic: nothing is red simpliciter, but only red relative to (or red 'for') this or that perceiver. (Subjectivists typically also relativize color to a circumstance of perception, but we'll ignore this parameter for simplicity.) The only monadic properties in the vicinity are the many 'plugged' properties of the form red for S, which receive analyses along the following lines: An object x is red for a subject S iff x looks (or is disposed to look) red to S. In what follows, I take for granted that my subjectivist opponent endorses biconditionals of this kind, and I assume she holds that looking red is a matter of causing (in an appropriate way) a certain type of phenomenal state. More generally, I shall assume that the subjectivist accepts something like the following picture: for each color K, there is a type of phenomenal state Q such 12 that an object is K for S iff it produces or is disposed to produce (in an appropriate way) state Q in S. Admissible values of K include ordinary mid-level colors (e.g., red, purple, green) as well as highly determinate colors (e.g., red17, unique green) and the maximally determinable color property being colored. Corresponding values of Q will then have a corresponding level of specificity or determinacy.14 A distinct but closely related view of color is 'realizer functionalism'.15 Realizer functionalists endorse claims along the following lines as conceptual analyses for our color concepts: 'Redness for S in C [...] is the property which causes (or would cause) objects to look red to S in C' (Jackson and Pargetter 1987, p. 134). Since the property that occupies this functional role is generally taken to be an objective physical property, this view technically qualifies as a form of objectivism, though it holds that colors are picked out by way of functional descriptions that make reference to the subjective responses of perceivers. I won't discuss realizer functionalism explicitly in the arguments below, but it should be clear how these arguments, if successful, would equally show that realizer functionalism leads to CHROMATIC IGNORANCE. My argument for the claim that subjectivists are committed to CHROMATIC IGNORANCE relies on the following thesis: PHENOMENAL IGNORANCE: Some relevant phenomenal facts are unknowable. Phenomenal facts are facts specifying (partially or fully) what it's like to be an individual at a given time. Relevant phenomenal facts are facts about an individual's color phenomenology. 14 Subjectivist theories of color along these lines are defended by McGinn (1983), Peacocke (1984), Levin (2000), and Cohen (2009). 15 See, e.g., Jackson and Pargetter (1987), McLaughlin (2003), Chalmers (2012). 13 PHENOMENAL IGNORANCE is compatible with the assumption, which I will grant for the sake of argument, that all physical facts about color vision are knowable (under physical concepts). For there is, famously, an 'epistemic gap' between the physical facts and the phenomenal facts. In other words, there is no a priori or conceptual entailment from the physical facts to the phenomenal facts. The existence of an epistemic gap is nowadays widely accepted, even among physicalists, and I shall assume its existence in this paper.16 What is more controversial is whether the epistemic gap has any metaphysical significance-in particular, whether it entails or provides grounds for accepting a corresponding ontological gap between the physical and phenomenal domains. Here I remain neutral on the legitimacy such inferences, as well as on the existence of an ontological gap. Note that I do not claim that the epistemic gap entails PHENOMENAL IGNORANCE. My present claim is much more modest: given the epistemic gap, PHENOMENAL IGNORANCE is not ruled out by the assumption that all physical truths concerning color vision are knowable. The argument below will focus on two kinds of phenomenal ignorance: general and specific phenomenal ignorance. The first refers to irremediable ignorance of whether a given creature enjoys any color phenomenology at all. The second refers to irremediable ignorance of the specific phenomenal character of a creature's color experience (for example, ignorance of whether a creature is undergoing a phenomenally reddish experience). In what follows, I argue that both types of phenomenal ignorance are actual and each leads the subjectivist into a corresponding type of chromatic ignorance-general chromatic ignorance (irremediable ignorance of whether an object is colored for a given creature) and specific chromatic ignorance 16 For physicalist endorsements of the epistemic gap, see, among many others, Hill and McLaughlin (1997), Papineau (2002), Block (2006), and Balog (2012). 14 (irremediable ignorance of what specific color an object has for a creature). Let us consider these in turn. 3.1 General ignorance Our epistemic position is sometimes characterized by general phenomenal ignorance- irremediable ignorance of whether certain creatures have any color phenomenology at all-or so I shall argue here. Philosophers who are especially impressed with the problem of other minds may think we are subject to this kind of ignorance with respect to other human beings, perhaps because they hold that we cannot know whether our fellow humans are phenomenally conscious at all. But I don't want to defend general phenomenal ignorance by relying on any extreme form of skepticism about other minds. Perhaps it is a consequence of the epistemic gap that we can never achieve certainty about the existence of other conscious minds. But, at least for the sake of argument, let's agree to be good fallibilists and allow that knowledge is sometimes possible even where certainty is unwarranted. Even on generous fallibilist assumptions, however, there are many real-life cases in which there is no feasible way to determine whether a creature is phenomenally conscious. Consider insects. Many insects, such as ants, butterflies, and bees, have color vision, at least in a purely functional sense involving visual capacities for responding differentially to different wavelengths of light, and we can assume they have color experiences of some kind if they have experiences (i.e., phenomenally conscious states) at all. But do they? I have no idea. To begin with, the behavioral evidence for insect consciousness is far from conclusive. On the one hand, insects fail to exhibit many forms of behavior associated with consciousness in the human case. Most obviously, they don't issue verbal reports, and they don't exhibit anything like the degree of behavioral flexibility and sophistication that human consciousness enables. They similarly fail 15 to exhibit many of the behaviors associated with specific conscious states like pain, such as moving to protect injured body parts.17 On the other hand, insects can learn to avoid noxious stimuli, which might be taken as evidence that they feel pain. Moreover, there are several experiments showing that insects injected with morphine behave as we would expect if the morphine had the effect of diminishing their experience of pain.18 The evidence for insect consciousness is no less ambiguous when we turn from behavior to the brain. On the one hand, insect brains lack many of the structures and functions associated with human consciousness. Their brains do not include anything like the mammalian neocortex, and consequently they lack many specific cortical functions that have been proposed as neural correlates of consciousness in the human case, such as recurrent activity connecting low-level and high-level cortical sensory areas,19 or prefrontal cortical functioning associated with higherorder awareness.20 On the other hand, as Klein and Barron (2016) emphasize in a recent defense of insect consciousness, insect brains seem to support a behavioral 'core control system' that is functionally analogous to integrated midbrain structures associated with consciousness in vertebrates. This core control system integrates information from multiple senses to construct an action-guiding egocentric model of the environment and the organism's changing position within it. Klein and Barron maintain that the integrated midbrain structures in vertebrates that perform analogous functions are sufficient for phenomenal consciousness, from which they conclude that insects are probably phenomenally conscious as well. The inference is plausible enough, but its key premise-the sufficiency thesis-is extremely controversial. They cite the work of Bjorn Merker (2007) to support the sufficiency thesis, but the evidence Merker offers is far from 17 See Eisemann et al. (1984), Tye (2016, pp. 137-8). 18 Balderama et al. (1987). 19 Lamme (2006). 20 Lau and Rosenthal (2011), Odegaard, Knight, and Lau (2017). 16 conclusive. For example, much of Merker's argument is based on evidence that interfering with midbrain functioning can impair or eliminate consciousness. But as Hill (2016) notes, evidence of this kind only supports a necessity thesis, not a sufficiency thesis. A full review of the evidence for and against insect consciousness is beyond the scope of this paper, but the points above should convey some of the difficulties involved in answering the question. As to the general question of which animals are conscious and which are not, our epistemic situation is nicely summarized by Christof Koch, who reports that 'we have literally no idea at what level of brain complexity consciousness stops' (Fox 2007). Granted, if we had in our possession the One True General Theory of Consciousness, a detailed specification of exactly which physical/functional properties are necessary and sufficient (at least nomologically) for a creature to be conscious, we could determine empirically whether any given creature is conscious. Speaking for myself, I doubt we'll ever know the One True General Theory of Consciousness, even to a reasonable approximation-enough to know whether, say, ants are conscious. One difficulty is the sparsity of the data concerning the distribution of consciousness in nature. After all, we can only directly check whether consciousness is present in the human case. Because the introspective data are so sparse, there will be many hypotheses about the necessary and sufficient physical/functional conditions for consciousness that fit the data. These include physical/functional properties that always come and go together in the human case and only diverge in the non-human case, such as pairs of properties that make slightly different demands on the type of cognitive architecture their bearers must possess, but where both demands are satisfied by the human cognitive architecture. This can happen because the human cognitive architecture, like everything in the universe, falls under indefinitely many distinct types, some of which are more abstract or inclusive than others (e.g., 17 types that require only subcortical functions vs. those that require cortical functions as well, or types that require a capacity for higher-order awareness vs. types that permit but don't require such a capacity). In addition to the sparsity of the data, another significant difficulty is that the usual abductive methods by which we extend our scientific knowledge beyond the data are particularly impotent in this domain. For unless interactionist dualism is true, every explicable physical phenomenon can be explained in terms of prior physical or functional states that are, at least in principle, describable in wholly non-phenomenal terms.21 Maybe it would be too quick to conclude from these difficulties that the One True General Theory of Consciousness is absolutely unknowable. Perhaps the correct theory, once formulated, will be seen to exhibit such elegance and simplicity, and to get so many of the uncontroversial cases right, that we would be rationally warranted in accepting it, and doing with such a high degree of confidence that our acceptance might amount to knowledge. Still, pinning one's hopes on the eventual discovery of the One True General Theory of Consciousness is relevantly like pinning one's hopes on the eventual discovery of the One True Psychosemantics. Knowledge of either would require a revolutionary scientific or philosophical breakthrough of the sort relevant to our feasibility constraint. Given subjectivism, knowing whether things are colored for (say) ants requires that we know whether ants are phenomenally conscious. If knowledge of whether ants are phenomenally conscious requires knowledge of the One True General Theory of Consciousness, then the subjectivist ecumenist, like the inegalitarian, fails to satisfy the feasibility constraint. A color subjectivist with a physicalist view of consciousness might try a different response. She might say that what it is to have color phenomenology just is to be in a certain 21 Cf. Chalmers (1996, pp. 156, 158, 163-5) on the 'explanatory irrelevance of experience'. 18 physical or functional state. We can know empirically, at least in principle, what physical/functional states are produced in any given creature by any given object. Therefore (the response continues), all facts about color phenomenology are empirically knowable, and given color subjectivism, all color facts are thereby knowable as well. The problem with this response is that it violates the chromatic guise constraint. Suppose we know that an object causes ants to instantiate physical property P. And suppose that P is identical to the phenomenal property having color experience. Still, if we are ignorant of this psychophysical identity, then we will not know that the object is disposed to produce color experience in ants. Thus, even given the generous assumption that subjectivism can be known, so we can know that The object is colored for the ant if and only if it is disposed to produce color experience in the ant, this knowledge wouldn't put us in a position to know (under the appropriate color concept-the concept colored) that the object is colored for the ant. Alternatively, one might concede that subjectivist ecumenism leads to unknowable color facts for the reasons given above, but respond that, nonetheless, the ignorance to which the subjectivist ecumenist is committed is importantly different from, and somehow less objectionable than, the kind to which the inegalitarian is committed. It might be said that CHROMATIC IGNORANCE is especially problematic for the inegalitarian because the existence of unknowable color facts stands in tension with the typical inegalitarian commitment to the objectivity of color. If colors are 'out there', waiting to be studied, why would we be prevented from acquiring knowledge of these properties? By contrast, if colors are essentially tied to mental states, as the subjectivist maintains, then knowledge of color is necessarily tied to familiar 19 epistemic problems about other minds. Thus, it might be argued that the chromatic ignorance to which the subjectivist ecumenist is committed is both expected (given standard epistemic worries about other minds) and linked to broader epistemic limitations, while the chromatic ignorance to which the inegalitarian is committed is novel and unexpected.22 Upon closer examination, however, the two kinds of chromatic ignorance turn out to be more similar than they initially appear. Consider first the claim that the chromatic ignorance associated with subjectivist ecumenism is linked to broader epistemic limitations concerning other minds. This is true, but the same holds for the chromatic ignorance associated with many inegalitarian views. For the subjectivist ecumenist, chromatic ignorance is linked in the following way to ignorance of certain phenomenal facts: Assuming that subjectivism is both true and knowable, all relevant color facts would be knowable if only we were given full knowledge of the phenomenal facts, e.g., knowledge of whether ants have color phenomenology. (Alternatively: if we were given suitably detailed knowledge of the way in which phenomenal facts depend on the empirically available physical/functional facts-'the One True Theory of Consciousness'.) Likewise, for the inegalitarian reflectance physicalist, chromatic ignorance is linked to ignorance of certain representational facts, as we saw in our discussion of the 'perfect-psychosemantics response' in §2. Indeed, the link takes the very same form: Assuming that reflectance physicalism is both true and knowable, all relevant color facts would be knowable if only we were given full knowledge of the representational facts, e.g., facts about which reflectance properties are represented by which brain states (Alternatively: if we were given suitably detailed knowledge of the way in which 22 Thanks to an anonymous referee for raising this concern. 20 representational facts depend on the empirically available physical/functional facts-'the One True Psychosemantics'). Thus, while it is true that, for the subjectivist ecumenist, chromatic ignorance is connected to broader epistemic limitations concerning other minds, the same holds for many inegalitarians. Still, this doesn't entirely answer the charge that, if colors are objective properties-'out there', waiting to be studied-it is mysterious why the fine-grained colors facts would be epistemically inaccessible to us. But this epistemic limitation is no more mysterious than the parallel epistemic limitation regarding the phenomenal states of other creatures. Although the phenomenal states of other creatures are 'subjective' in one sense, they are nonetheless 'objective' or 'out there' in the sense that they don't depend on the attitudes that we, the inquirers, take toward those creatures. (In the same sense, of course, the fact that an object is disposed to produce a certain phenomenal state in another creature is an 'objective' fact. Hence, even for the color subjectivist, there is a perfectly good sense in which colors are 'out there', waiting to be studied.) In my view, these two epistemic limitations have similar explanations. As we've seen, the existence of irremediable phenomenal ignorance is explained, at least in part, by the existence of an epistemic gap between the physical/functional facts and the phenomenal facts. If there were an a priori conceptual link from physical/functional facts to phenomenal facts, there would presumably be no irremediable phenomenal ignorance. We could simply deduce that a creature is conscious, or has a certain kind of color experience, from the relevant physical/functional facts (after achieving knowledge of the latter by ordinary scientific means). But given the epistemic gap, even complete physical knowledge about a creature doesn't guarantee knowledge of its phenomenal states. (This holds even if its phenomenal states are 21 identical to some of the physical states that we discover through third-personal scientific investigation, since the epistemic gap, which has to do with our physical and phenomenal concepts, is consistent with the absence of any corresponding ontological gap between the referents of those concepts.) Now, as several philosophers have noted, there appears to be a similar epistemic gap between the physical facts and the chromatic facts (Shoemaker 1996, p. 248; 2003, p. 256; Johnston 2004, p. 146; Byrne 2006, pp. 230, 237-8; Cutter 2018, p. 46; Allen 2016, pp. 77-82). Find a bright yellow object, and attend to its yellowness, the quality you perceive to be spread across the object's surface. For any purely physical description φ that the object satisfies, it seems we can coherently conceive of something that is φ without having that quality.23 This epistemic gap can explain, at least in part, why certain chromatic facts are unknowable. If there were no such epistemic gap, there would presumably be no chromatic ignorance. We could simply deduce that a color chip is (say) unique green from its physical description (after achieving knowledge of the latter by ordinary scientific means). But given the physicalchromatic epistemic gap, even complete physical knowledge doesn't guarantee knowledge of fine-grained color facts. (Again, this holds even if colors are identical to some scientifically discoverable physical properties, since the epistemic gap is consistent with the absence of any ontological gap.) 23 Nor, in my view, would the epistemic gap be closed if we added phenomenal truths to the inferential base. Even if subjectivists are right, and colors are just dispositions to produce certain phenomenal states, this does not seem to be a conceptual truth. More generally, there does not seem to be any purely conceptual entailment from objects' having certain phenomenal effects to their having a certain color. If there were, then color eliminativists, who hold that nothing is yellow while acknowledging that (for example) lemons are disposed to be experienced as yellow, would be making a conceptual error instead of a mere factual error. This is implausible. As Pautz remarks in response to a similar suggestion, 'while such a version of Eliminativism might be false, we cannot rule it out a priori' (Pautz 2006, p. 560). 22 Given the epistemic gap between the scientifically discoverable physical facts and the facts about color, it is not terribly surprising that scientific inquiry would fail to settle all questions about the precise colors of objects. In cases of normal variation, inegalitarians typically concede that we cannot know an object's precise color just by looking, since it's plausible that our perceptual justification to believe that the object has a given precise color is undermined by our knowledge of the existence of normal variation. But if we cannot know an object's precise color just by looking, and we cannot know its precise color by deducing it from the object's scientifically discoverable physical properties, then it is unsurprising that we cannot know it at all. The objector may be correct that, for the subjectivist ecumenist, chromatic ignorance is in some sense 'expected', or unsurprising, at least when we are reminded of the familiar epistemic difficulties concerning other minds. But chromatic ignorance is also unsurprising for the typical inegalitarian, at least when we are reminded of the epistemic gap between the physical facts and the chromatic facts. The objection therefore fails to establish any philosophically significant disanalogy between the kind of chromatic ignorance to which the subjectivist ecumenist is committed and the kind to which the typical inegalitarian is committed. 3.2 Specific ignorance We are not only subject to general phenomenal ignorance. Sometimes our epistemic position is characterized by specific phenomenal ignorance, irremediable ignorance about the specific phenomenal character of a creature's color experience. Specific phenomenal ignorance has many sources. To begin with, we can readily imagine cases in which we do not know whether an individual's color experience is phenomenally the same as our own (a form of specific phenomenal ignorance) because we do not know exactly which level of functional organization is relevant to determining phenomenal sameness and 23 difference. Imagine we've built an AI that is functionally isomorphic to you, but whose functional states are realized in silicon hardware. Like you, it has sensors that respond differentially to different wavebands of light. It also has mechanisms that process the signals from these sensors in ways that simulate the neurocomputational processes that occur in your visual system, using opponent channels to code stimuli along an R/G axis, a Y/B axis, and a brightness axis, for example. Suppose we present the AI with an object that looks red to you, like a ripe tomato. Does it look red to the AI? In other words, when the AI sees the tomato, does it undergo a color experience qualitatively like the experience you undergo when you see the tomato? I say we don't know, and without a major theoretical breakthrough in our understanding of the physical basis of consciousness, we won't ever know. Part of the difficulty is that we may be unable to know whether the AI is conscious at all. But let's waive that difficulty and assume that it is. Assuming the AI is conscious, we might be able to know something about what the AI's experiences are like. For example, if the AI is functionally isomorphic to you, it's reasonable to believe that its experiences would resemble yours in structural respects. For example, its phenomenal quality space(s) would probably exhibit the same resemblance structure and dimensionality as yours. But intuitively, phenomenal structure underdetermines phenomenal character. That's why inverted-spectrum scenarios, in which phenomenal structure is held fixed while phenomenal qualities are inverted, or alien-spectrum scenarios, in which the same phenomenal structure is filled in with alien phenomenal qualities, are a priori coherent, at least prima facie. To know whether the AI's experiences are qualitatively the same as yours or radically different (perhaps utterly alien), we would need to know whether the material realizers of perceptual functioning are relevant to phenomenal character. 24 Moreover, even if we could know that some form of functionalism is true, such that phenomenal properties are insensitive to the ultimate material realizers of our mental functioning, this leaves unsettled the question of exactly which levels of functional description are relevant. Too many discussions in the philosophy of mind implicitly assume that there are just two options to choose from, the 'functional' level and the 'biological' level. But as Lycan (1987) emphasizes, this is a gross oversimplification. Brain processes can be characterized at many levels of functional description, and even paradigmatically biological processes are often multiply realizable with respect to lower chemical and microphysical levels. Presumably, to duplicate phenomenal properties, it's not enough just to duplicate the highest functional level (i.e., the input-output function computed by your brain). Do we need to duplicate neuron-level functioning? Sub-neuronal functioning? Or is it enough to duplicate the mid-level algorithms that, in us, are implemented by neural-signaling patterns. For each well-defined level of functional description, we can consider a possible AI that duplicates your functioning at that level while massively diverging from you at lower levels of description. Without a fully worked out theory of the physical/functional basis of consciousness, we will not be in a position to know whether these functional isomorphs duplicate your phenomenology. Thus, given subjectivism, we will not be in a position to know whether tomatoes are red for them. It might be objected that this case is merely hypothetical: we don't (yet) have AIs that functionally resemble humans. But similar points hold for real-life cases. In fact, it's plausible that, given subjectivism, we cannot know exactly which colors things have for other humans in standard cases of normal variation. Consider a slight variation on our original case: You and Norma are normal perceivers who locate unique green at slightly different spectral locations. What you call unique green is described as blueish green by Norma, 25 and what she calls unique green, you describe as yellowish green. Right now, you and Norma are looking at different color chips. Both of you (sincerely) report your experiences with the words, 'The chip looks unique green'. Question: is your chip exactly the same color for you as Norma's chip is for her? Given subjectivism, the answer is 'yes' if and only if the chip produces the same color phenomenology in you that it does in her. Does it? I think we don't know. Perhaps this claim will strike many readers as overly skeptical. If we set aside radical forms of skepticism about other minds, one might think, surely we can be confident that you and Norma enjoy the same color phenomenology when you both report seeing 'unique green'. But we needn't entertain radical forms of skepticism about other minds to be unsure whether your 'unique green' experiences are qualitatively the same as someone else's, especially when the other person locates unique green at a different spectral location. After all, although you and Norma both report unique-green experiences, you nonetheless differ in many ways. It's far from obvious that color phenomenology is totally insensitive to these differences. It's far from obvious, for example, that color phenomenology is insensitive to the fine-grained functional differences between the neural realizers of your color experiences, such as the differences in the memory associations they are apt to trigger, or the roles they play in object classification. Suppose Norma is a botanist, so her perceptual state is implicated in recognitional capacities for, say, identifying types of leaves, but your perceptual state plays no corresponding functional role in you. Is it obvious that this functional difference wouldn't be associated with at least a small difference color phenomenology? Or consider the wide or 'long-arm' functional difference between your brain state and Norma's: they are caused by different external properties, corresponding to the different spectral locations you assign to unique green. Is it 26 obvious that long-arm functional differences of this kind are irrelevant to color phenomenology?24 Given subjectivism, the question of whether your chip is the same color for you as Norma's chip is for her depends, inter alia, on whether color phenomenology is sensitive to functional differences of this kind. Unfortunately, there is no straightforward way to know whether it is. More generally, there will be cases of specific phenomenal ignorance (and hence, given subjectivism, specific chromatic ignorance) unless we can somehow discover a correct and detailed theory of how color phenomenology depends on physical functioning. This theory would have to tell us (i) whether (and if so, how) color phenomenology depends on the material realizers of our mental functioning, (ii) exactly which levels of functional description are relevant to color phenomenology, (iii) exactly how broad the phenomenology-determining functional role is (e.g., does it extend outside the head?), and (iv) exactly how fine-grained the phenomenologydetermining roles are. Discovering answers to these questions at the level of detail necessary for the subjectivist to avoid CHROMATIC IGNORANCE seems no more feasible than discovering the One True Psychosemantics or the One True General Theory of Consciousness. One might respond that we can nonetheless know (at least by fallibilist standards) that your experience is very similar to Norma's. I don't dispute this. But given subjectivism, this would only give us knowledge of the relatively coarse-grained color fact that the chip has approximately the same color for you as it has for Norma. But the kind of ignorance at issue in the ignorance argument was ignorance of fine-grained color. That argument does not purport to 24 As a sociological matter, those who hold that phenomenology depends on wide functional properties tend to endorse objectivist views of color (Dretske 1995; Lycan 1996; Tye 2000; Byrne and Tye 2006). But there is no barrier in principle to combining wide functionalism with color subjectivism. 27 show that the inegalitarian is committed to ignorance about coarse-grained color facts, such as that the chip is green or that it is approximately unique green. Let me conclude this section by making the core claims of my argument a bit more explicit. We can say that a general theory of consciousness is a theory that specifies, in physical/functional terms, what it takes for an individual to be phenomenally conscious. And we can say that a specific theory of consciousness is a theory that specifies which physical/functional similarities and differences make for phenomenal similarities and differences. The argument of this section relied, in effect, on two central claims: (i) We are subject to general phenomenal ignorance-and hence, subjectivists are committed to general chromatic ignorance-because knowledge of a suitably complete general theory of consciousness is infeasible. (ii) We are subject to specific phenomenal ignorance-and hence, subjectivists are committed to specific chromatic ignorance-because knowledge of a suitably complete specific theory of consciousness is infeasible. 3.3 Representational subjectivism A subjectivist might try to block the inference from PHENOMENAL IGNORANCE to CHROMATIC IGNORANCE by adopting a 'non-phenomenal' subjectivism, a form of subjectivism that analyzes colors without explicit reference to phenomenal states. As I've mentioned, the subjectivist could instead analyze colors in terms of something like color representation, as follows: An object x is red for S iff x is disposed to cause S to visually represent x as red. 28 Let's call this view 'representational subjectivism'. Because the representational subjectivist does not analyze colors explicitly in terms of phenomenal states, we cannot straightforwardly infer a commitment to CHROMATIC IGNORANCE from the truth of PHENOMENAL IGNORANCE.25 However, there are multiple reasons to think that representational subjectivism also leads to unknowable color facts. First, the move to representational subjectivism only helps if the cases of irremediable phenomenal ignorance discussed in §§3.1-3.2 are not also cases of irremediable representational ignorance. At a minimum, this would require that we have a grip on the notion of 'visually representing an object as red' (for example) that is suitably independent of visual phenomenology, such that we can know whether a creature is representing an object as red without knowing what its visual states are like in phenomenal respects. But it is not clear that we do. Return to the AI scenario above, in which we don't know whether the AI has reddish color phenomenology or alien color phenomenology. Apart from any general philosophical theory about the precise relationship between color representation and color phenomenology, the following claims seem intuitively correct: (i) If the AI has reddish color phenomenology, then the object looks red to the AI. (ii) If the object looks red to the AI, then the AI is visually representing the object as red. (iii) If instead the AI has alien color phenomenology, then the tomato doesn't look red to the AI, but rather looks to have some alien color-a color outside human color space. (iv) If the object looks to have some alien color to the AI, then the AI is visually representing the object as having an alien color. 25 Thanks to an anonymous referee for suggesting this response. 29 (Note that it is a virtue of 'phenomenal' forms of subjectivism that they can easily accommodate claims like (i)-(iv), though of course many objectivist views can as well.) Now, if (i)-(iv) are true (or even epistemically possible, taken in conjunction) then the subjectivist cannot avoid commitment to CHROMATIC IGNORANCE by analyzing colors in terms of visual representation. For given (i)-(iv) (or just their epistemic possibility), as long as we don't know whether the AI has reddish phenomenology, we won't know whether it represents the object as red. Of course, there are controversies in the philosophy of perception about the exact relationship between visual representation and visual phenomenology, and I shall not attempt to settle all these controversies here. Nonetheless, the considerations above suggest that representational notions are quite plausibly tied to phenomenal notions in a way that leaves the representational subjectivist unable to block the move from PHENOMENAL IGNORANCE to CHROMATIC IGNORANCE. Second, even if visual representation is suitably independent of visual phenomenology, there is still a plausible argument that representational subjectivism leads to CHROMATIC IGNORANCE. The argument is structurally similar to the arguments in §§3.1-3.2. Those arguments concluded that standard forms of subjectivism lead to CHROMATIC IGNORANCE because we cannot (feasibly) know all relevant phenomenal facts, even given complete knowledge of the physical/functional facts. Roughly, this is because knowledge of the One True (general and specific) Theory of Consciousness is infeasible for us. In the same way, representational subjectivism will lead to CHROMATIC IGNORANCE if we cannot (feasibly) know all relevant representational facts, even given complete knowledge of the physical/functional facts-for example, if we cannot (feasibly) know whether a certain creature is representing an object as red, or whether a certain creature is representing an object as colored. Now, just as our inability to 30 know whether certain creatures have certain phenomenal states is a natural consequence of our inability to know the One True Theory of Consciousness, presumably there will be cases of this kind if knowledge of the One True Psychosemantics is infeasible. But as I argued in §2, knowledge of the One True Psychosemantics does not appear to be feasible. Indeed, as we saw in §2, the charge that inegalitarians are committed to unknowable color facts depends on the assumption that knowledge of the One True Psychosemantics is infeasible (at least if inegalitarianism is true). Of course, the representational subjectivist can simply assert that-somehow, someday- we will discover the One True Psychosemantics, a fully worked out theory that enables us to read off the representational facts from the empirically available physical/functional facts. We would then be in a position to know all the color facts, at least on the generous assumption that representational subjectivism is both true and knowable. But as we saw in §2, an inegalitarian can make the very same assertion. Unless some reason can be given for regarding the former assertion as more credible (and I cannot think what that reason might be), we should conclude that the representational subjectivist is no less vulnerable to unknowable color facts than a typical inegalitarian. 4. Why objectivism leads to chromatic ignorance Let us next turn our attention to the objectivist version of ecumenism. According to this view, colors are mind-independent properties of objects, and in at least some cases of normal variation, both perceivers' experiences are veridical because the object has multiple mindindependent colors (e.g., unique green and yellowish green). I'll use the name 'selectionism' for the combination of color objectivism and ecumenism. The name, which I borrow from Kalderon (2007; 2011), is supposed to suggest an alternative to the subjectivist's conception of the 31 relationship between colors, perceivers, and circumstances of perception. For the selectionist, objects have whatever colors they have independently of the way perceivers respond to them. The role of the perceiver and perceptual circumstance is not to give color to the object, but to select one of the object's many colors to be perceived.26 Selectionists can be distinguished according to the form of color pluralism they accept. Radical selectionists hold, roughly, that everything has every color. ('Roughly', because 'everything' presumably needs a restriction to avoid absurd results, such as that the number 4 is turquoise. The question of exactly how to restrict the quantifier will turn out to be important and will be addressed shortly.) Moderate selectionists hold that objects have multiple determinate colors (within human color space), but not every color. (The restriction to human color space is needed because I am not here concerned with views according to which objects have only one determinate human color, but also have distinct colors from other color families, such as pigeon color space.) The path from moderate selectionism to CHROMATIC IGNORANCE is fairly straightforward. Let's first consider the moderate physicalist selectionism defended (tentatively) by Byrne and Hilbert (1997), prior to their conversion to inegalitarianism. Byrne and Hilbert identify determinate colors with (disjunctions of the members of) sets of surface spectral reflectances (SSRs), where an SSR is a complex disposition to reflect a certain percentage of the incident light at each wavelength within the visible spectrum. Thus, Norma's experience, which represents the chip to be unique green, is veridical only if the chip has a reflectance that belongs to a certain set, SSRug. And Norm's experience, which represents the chip to be yellowish green, is veridical only if the chip has a reflectance that belongs to a different set, SSRyg. Moderate 26 In this section, I ignore realizer-functionalist forms of objectivism. As mentioned above, the arguments in §3, if successful, would show that realizer-functionalism leads to CHROMATIC IGNORANCE. 32 selectionism enters the picture with Byrne and Hilbert's suggestion that these two sets may partially overlap. If they do, then the chip could instantiate both unique green and yellowish green, so long as the SSR of the chip lies in the intersection of SSRug and SSRyg. In that case, both experiences would be veridical. Of course, this view violates the intuition that yellowish green and unique green are contraries. But Byrne and Hilbert do not regard this as a significant cost (at least not at this point, though in later work they give this intuition much more weight (Byrne and Hilbert 2003; 2007)). As they point out, this moderate selectionist view can at least accommodate the nearby claim that nothing can simultaneously appear unique green and yellowish green, as well as the claim that unique green and yellowish green are distinct properties, and perhaps that is enough. This view leads to CHROMATIC IGNORANCE just as surely as their later inegalitarian view. (They don't appear to be under any illusions about this point. For Byrne and Hilbert, the motivation for the 'overlapping sets' picture is that it avoids widespread illusion, not that it avoids CHROMATIC IGNORANCE.) The fundamental issue for both is that we have no feasible way to know exactly which SSRs are included as disjuncts within the real definition of unique green. Thus, there are bound to be cases in which we are unable to know whether an object is unique green, even given complete information about its reflectance properties, its effects on human perceivers, and so forth. Even if we assume (perhaps on general anti-skeptical grounds) that all normal perceivers have veridical color experiences in normal circumstances, this would only tell us that SSRug includes all the SSRs of objects that are experienced as unique green by at least some normal perceiver. But how far beyond that does SSRug extend, if at all? Moderate selectionism provides minimal guidance; it tells us that SSRug doesn't include the SSRs of everything (otherwise we'd have radical selectionism), but this very weak constraint leaves many 33 questions wide open. For example, does SSRug include the SSRs of things well outside the class of objects that look unique green to some normal perceiver, such as objects normally experienced as unique yellow? It's hard to see how this question could be settled on empirical or conceptual grounds. The moderate selectionist might suggest that we can reasonably assume that SSRug includes, at least roughly, all and only the SSRs of objects that look unique green to some normal perceiver. However, in the setting of moderate selectionism, there is no reason to treat this as the default assumption. (If we could help ourselves to this assumption, we might still be left with some residual ignorance in borderline cases, such as objects that only look unique green to borderlinenormal perceivers. But this would arguably be the sort of ignorance associated with vagueness more generally, and nothing distinctive to color. My claim is that moderate selectionism leads to a more interesting kind of ignorance, a kind not present generally in cases of vagueness. The ignorance at issue is not merely an inability to locate precise cutoffs or settle a few borderline cases, but an inability to know even roughly or approximately how broad the extension of unique green is.) Even if it's reasonable on anti-skeptical grounds to hold that objects that are experienced as unique green (by some normal perceiver) are unique green, the moderate selectionist has no clear justification for converse assumption that things that aren't normally experienced as unique green aren't unique green. In particular, the moderate selectionist is not entitled to reason from the premise that an object is (say) unique yellow to the conclusion that it's not unique green, since this reasoning relies on color exclusion principles of the very same kind she rejects elsewhere. Essentially the same points hold for primitivist forms of moderate selectionism. Primitivists generally maintain that colors at least supervene in some fashion on underlying 34 physical properties, such as SSRs (Campbell 1993, Watkins 2005, Yablo 1995, Allen 2016). But just as moderate physicalist selectionists have no feasible route to knowing exactly which SSRs figure as disjuncts in the real definition of unique green, moderate primitivist selectionists would seem to have no feasible route to knowing exactly which SSRs metaphysically necessitate the instantiation of unique green. Nor would it help to deny supervenience. If anything, loosening the modal ties between empirically available physical properties and colors would make the selectionist's epistemic problems harder, not easier. Let us turn to radical selectionism, the view, roughly, that everything has every color.27 As far as I know, no one defends radical selectionism. Still, it is worth considering, partly for the sake of logical completeness, and partly because radical selectionism may seem less vulnerable to CHROMATIC IGNORANCE than other realist views. Given radical selectionism, there is no difficulty determining whether the chip is unique green, whether it's yellowish green, or for that matter, whether it is bright pink. Radical selectionism delivers the answers: yes, yes, and yes. In my view, the main problem with radical selectionism is its intrinsic implausibility. It has prima facie absurd consequences, such as that blue jays are neon green, and it unabashedly flouts color-exclusion intuitions, like the intuition that nothing can be both bright pink and charcoal gray all over at the same time. The intrinsic implausibility of radical selectionism isn't entirely irrelevant to the question of whether its truth would allow us to avoid unknowable color facts. For suppose radical selectionism is true. It follows that charcoal is bright pink. Still, I probably cannot know that charcoal is bright pink except by inferring it from radical selectionism, or some closely related philosophical theory of color. (I certainly cannot know it in the ordinary way by sight.) And presumably I cannot know by inference that charcoal is bright 27 Views in the neighborhood of radical selectionism are discussed in Price (1932, p. 41n) and Pautz (forthcoming, ch. 5). 35 pink unless I know the premise of the inference-radical selectionism. But the intrinsic implausibility of radical selectionism makes it harder to know it even if it happens to be true, for the same reason that achieving knowledge that a man rose from the dead is harder-requires more evidence and better arguments-than achieving knowledge that a man rose from a nap. But let's set aside the intrinsic implausibility of radical selectionism. Let's even grant that we could somehow know that radical selectionism is true. Even so, we are still left with unknowable color facts, or so I shall argue. How could this be? Doesn't radical selectionism tell us that everything has every color? Well, as I've indicated, this claim clearly needs to be restricted. Surely the number 4 isn't colored. The question is: exactly how should the thesis be restricted? At a minimum, it should be restricted to concrete objects. But should we go further? For example, should our restriction include only material objects, or should we also allow empty regions of space (or spacetime) to be colored? Should we include only extended objects, or should we also include point-sized entities (e.g., spacetime points or point particles, if there are such things). Should we only include continguous objects, or scattered objects as well? Even if we knew that some radical form of selectionism is true, this wouldn't help us to know which specific version of radical selectionism is true. And without this knowledge, there will be things-specifically, things that fall under some but not all reasonable candidate restrictions, such as the spherical region of space in the center of my office-such that we cannot know whether they are colored. Thus, even the radical selectionist seems to be stuck with a kind of ignorance: ignorance about the range of entities that are colored. In some respects, this ignorance goes beyond the ignorance associated with other theories of color. For example, an inegalitarian reflectance physicalist needn't plead ignorance about which entities have some color or other. Presumably these will be just the entities that reflect and absorb light. But in other respects, the 36 ignorance associated with radical selectionism more limited. Given that an object has color, there is no ignorance about which colors it has. While the ignorance here is somewhat restricted, it's nonetheless noteworthy that even radical selectionism-a view that seems optimized for avoiding unknowable color facts, a view that has almost nothing to recommend it besides its apparent ability to avoid unknowable color facts-does not, in the end, manage to avoid them altogether. Of course, if we adopt, and somehow come to know, some specific version of radical selectionism, then we could know whether any given thing is colored. But an inegalitarian can make an analogous claim. If we adopt, and somehow come to know, a specific version of (say) inegalitarian reflectance physicalism (one that not only endorses the general thesis that colors are reflectance types, but also specifies which reflectance types are identical to which colors), then we could know whether the chip is unique green. But just as there is no feasible route to knowing which specific version of reflectance physicalism is true (even if the general thesis of reflectance physicalism is true and knowable), it's hard to imagine a feasible route to knowing which specific version of radical selectionism is true (even if the general thesis of radical selectionism is true and knowable). Thus, even radical selectionism appears to be committed to CHROMATIC IGNORANCE. 5. Conclusion I've argued that, with the exception of color eliminativism, every major philosophical theory of color leads to CHROMATIC IGNORANCE. The fact that inegalitarianism leads to CHROMATIC IGNORANCE therefore cannot be used to support ecumenism over inegalitarianism. Those who are convinced that there is something deeply objectionable about unknowable color facts may take my arguments to support color eliminativism. But I hope others will take my arguments as an 37 occasion to reevaluate the widespread assumption that all facts about color should be within our epistemic reach. If almost everyone is committed to unknowable color facts, perhaps they are not so bad after all.28 References Allen, K. 2016, A Naive Realist Theory of Colour (Oxford: Oxford University Press) Averill, E.O. 2003, 'Perceptual Variation and Access to Colors', Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1), pp. 22-22. Balderrama, N., Diaz, H. Sequeda, A., Nunez, J., and Maldonado, H. 1987, 'Behavioral and Pharmacological Analysis of the Stinging Response in Africanized and Italian Bees', in R. Menzel and A. Mercer (eds.), Neurobiology and Behavior of Honeybees, (New York: Springer-Verlag), pp. 121-8. Balog, K. 2012, 'In Defense of the Phenomenal Concept Strategy', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1), pp. 1-23. Block, N. 1999, 'Sexism, Ageism, Racism, and the Nature of Consciousnses', Philosophical Topics 26 (1), pp. 39-70. Block, N. 2006, 'Max Black's Objection to Mind-Body Identity', Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 2, pp. 3-78. Brogaard, B. 2015, 'The Self-Locating Property Theory of Color', Minds and Machines 25 2, pp. 133-147. Byrne, A. 2006, 'Color and the Mind Body Problem', Dialectica 60 (2), pp. 223-44. Byrne, A. and D. Hilbert 1997, 'Colors and Reflectances', in A. Byrne and D. R. Hilbert (eds.), Readings on Color, Volume 1: The Philosophy of Color (Cambridge: MIT Press). -------2003, 'Color Realism and Color Science', Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1), pp. 321. -------2007, 'Truest Blue', Analysis 67 (293), pp. 87-92. Byrne, A. and M. Tye 2006, 'Qualia Ain't in the Head', Noûs 40 (2), pp. 241-255. Campbell, J. 1993, 'A Simple View of Colour', in J. Haldane and C. Wright (eds.), Reality: Representation and Projection, (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 257-68. Chalmers, D. 1996, The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press). -------2006, 'Perception and the Fall from Eden', in T. Gendler and J. Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 49-125. -------2012, Constructing the World (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Cohen, J. 2009, The Red and the Real: An Essay on Color Ontology (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Cutter, B. 2018, 'Paradise Regained: A Non-Reductive Realist Account of the Sensible Qualities', Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (1), pp. 38-52. -------2019, 'Indeterminate Perception and Colour Relationism', Analysis 79 (1), pp. 25-34. Dennett, D. 2003, 'Forestalling a Food Fight Over Color', Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (6), pp. 788-789. 28 Thanks to Jeff Speaks and Adam Pautz for helpful discussion and feedback on an earlier draft, and to two anonymous referees for their exceptionally helpful comments. 38 Dretske, F. 1995, Naturalizing the Mind (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press). Eisemann, C.H., Jorgensen, W.K., Merritt, D.J., Rice, M.J., Cribb, B.W., Webb, P.D., and Zalucki, M.P. 1984, 'Do Insects Feel Pain. A Biological View', Experientia 40, pp. 1647. Fitch, F. 1963, 'A Logical Analysis of Some Value Concepts', The Journal of Symbolic Logic, 28, pp. 135–142. Fox, D. 2007, 'Consciousness in a cockroach'. Discover Magazine. http://discovermagazine.com/2007/jan/cockroach-consciousness-neuron-similarity. Funkhouser, E. 2006, 'The Determinable-Determinate Relation'. Noûs 40 (3), pp. 548–569. Gert, J. 2017, Primitive Colors: A Case Study in Neo-Pragmatist Metaphysics and Philosophy of Perception (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Hardin, C.L. 1988, Color for Philosophers: Unweaving the Rainbow (Indianapolis: Hackett). -------2003, 'A Spectral Reflectance doth not a Color Make'. Journal of Philosophy 100 (4), pp. 191-202. Hill, C. 2016, 'Insects: Still looking like zombies', Animal Sentience 9(20). Hill, C. and B. McLaughlin 1999, 'There are Fewer Things in Reality than are Dreamt of in Chalmers's Philosophy', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (2), pp. 445454. Jackson, F. & R. Pargetter 1987, 'An Objectivist's Guide to Subjectivism about Colour', Revue Internationale de Philosophie 41, pp. 127-41. Johnston, M. 2004, 'The Obscure Object of Hallucination', Philosophical Studies 120, pp. 11383. Kalderon, M. 2007, 'Color Pluralism', Philosophical Review 116 (4), pp. 563-601. -------2011, 'The Multiply Qualitative', Mind 120 (478), pp. 239-262. Klein, C. and A. Barron 2016, 'Insects have the capacity for subjective experience', Animal Sentience 9(1). Kriegel, U. 2009, Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Lamme, V. 2006, 'Towards a True Neural Stance on Consciousness', Trends in Cognitive Sciences 10(11), pp. 494–501. Lau, H. and D. Rosenthal 2011, 'Empirical Support for Higher-Order Theories of Conscious Awareness', Trends in Cognitive Sciences 15(8), pp. 365–373. Levin, J. 2000, 'Dispositional Theories of Color and the Claims of Common Sense', Philosophical Studies 100 (2), pp. 151-174. Lycan, W. 1987, Consciousness (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press). --------1996, Consciousness and Experience (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press). Masrour, F. 2017, 'Space Perception, Visual Dissonance, and the Fate of Standard Representationalism', Noûs 51 (3), pp. 565-593. McGinn, C. 1983, The Subjective View: Secondary Qualities and Indexical Thoughts (Oxford: Clarendon Press). McLaughlin, B. 2003, 'The Place of Color in Nature', In R. Mausfeld and D. Heyer (eds.), Colour: Connecting the Mind to the Physical World (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 475–505. -------2016, 'The Skewed View from Here', Philosophical Topics 44 (2), pp. 231-299. Merker, B. 2007, 'Consciousness without a cerebral cortex: A challenge for neuroscience and medicine', Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30, pp. 63-81. 39 Moore, G.E. 1903, Principia Ethica (Mineola: Dover Publications). Morrison, J. forthcoming, 'Perceptual Variation and Structuralism', Noûs. Odegaard, B., R.T. Knight, and H. Lau, 2017, 'Should a Few Null Findings Falsify Prefrontal Theories of Conscious Perception?', Journal of Neuroscience, 37(40), pp. 9593–9602. Papineau, D. 2002, Thinking about Consciousness (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Pautz, A. 2006, 'Can the Physicalist Explain Colour Structure in Terms of Colour Experience?', Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (4), pp. 535–564. -------2010, 'Do Theories of Consciousness Rest on a Mistake?', Philosophical Issues 20 (1), pp. 333-367. -------forthcoming, Perception (London: Routledge). Peacocke, C. 1984, 'Colour Concepts and Colour Experience', Synthese 58 (March), pp. 365-82. Price, H.H. 1932, Perception (London: Methuen). Shoemaker, S. 1996, The First-Person Perspective and Other Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). -------2000, 'Introspection and Phenomenal Character', Philosophical Topics 28 (2), pp. 24773. -------2003, 'Content, Character, and Color', Philosophical Issues 13 (1), pp. 253-78. Triplett, T. 2007, 'Tye's Missing Shade of Blue', Analysis 67 (2), pp. 166-170. Tye, M. 2000, Consciousness, Color, and Content (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press). -------2006, 'The Puzzle of True Blue', Analysis 66 (3), pp. 173-178. -------2016, Tense Bees and Shell-Shocked Crabs: Are Animals Conscious? (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Wilson, J. 2013, 'A Determinable-Based Account of Metaphysical Indeterminacy', Inquiry 56, pp. 359–85. Yablo, S. 1995, 'Singling Out Properties', Philosophical Perspectives 9, pp. 477-502. Watkins, M. 2005, 'Seeing Red: The Metaphysics of Colours without the Physics', Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (1):33-52. Wagner, M. 2006, The Geometries of Visual Space (London: Erlbaum).

La música popular es un caos de estilos, subestilos y miles de músicos que tocan a su manera según su instinto y su talento explotando los hallazgos musicales, trucos y técnicas que van encontrando a lo largo de su vida. Así lo vemos en los cientos de métodos de guitarra y de otros instrumentos que se publican en los USA desde hace decenios. En cada uno de ellos encontramos la explicación de algún truco o técnica que no conocíamos, porque su autor es uno más de los millones de músicos populares que , con los años, ha descubierto trucos y técnicas particulares suyas. La música popular es el reino de la multiplicidad, de millones de particulares haciendo cada uno su música a su manera explotando lo que cada particular tiene de único ( sea su físico, su mente o su talento especial en algo) . Por ello surgen millones de músicas distintas como reflejo de los millones de particulares que existen en cada generación en el mundo , cada uno de ellos con "algo " especial que, cuando es aplicado a la música, crea "algo" especial y único también en ese arte, aunque solo sea una única nota que nadie más toca. Los filósofos medievales se pasaron varios siglos estudiando el problema de los particulares y los universales. Veían que el mundo estaba poblado por millones de particulares, cada uno con su talento especial, su visión del mundo, su personalidad, su físico, su estilo de vida y sus ideas. Como en la torre de Babel, los millones de particulares nunca coincidían en nada, ni en ningún pensamiento ni en ninguna acción conjunta ni en ninguna ideología. Todos hablaban lenguas distintas y era imposible que se pusieran de acuerdo en nada. Los filósofos medievales buscaron el universal, es decir aquello que compartían los millones de particulares y que podían reconocer como común a todos ellos y que los unía de alguna manera. Algunos filósofos encontraron este Universal en el Ser puesto que todos compartimos tener un Ser, otros lo encontraron en la Vida puesto que todos estamos vivos, otros en el interés común puesto que todos formamos parte de una sociedad y nos interesa que esta sociedad funcione, otros lo encontraron en la ideología política capaz de unir a muchos hombres en una lucha general, otros lo encontraron en el arte que podía emocionar a muchos hombres de naturalezas distintas, otros en la ciencia que desde Descartes y el método científico buscaba las verdades comprobadas y ciertas que todos los particulares pudieran aceptar, especialmente en la medicina que interesaba a todos que fuera efectiva. Los filósofos encontraron este Universal en la misma filosofía que es la única disciplina que permite a los particulares dialogar y argumentar sobre temas universales como la ética o el bien a pesar de no conocer cada filósofo las circunstancias internas de cada particular. Los músicos , por su parte y especialmente a partir del Renacimiento, buscaron una música que fuera más elevada que la música vulgar donde miles de trovadores cantaban y componían , cada uno según sus propias técnicas y trucos. A esta música se la ha llamado "clásica" desde entonces o académica porque es la que se enseña en los Conservatorios. Es una música que se considera una ciencia y está regulada por muchas reglas de composición, de armonía, de las formas musicales, de la teoría musical y de las técnicas de interpretación con los instrumentos. La música llamada "clásica" aspira a superar el caos que es la música popular con sus millones de particulares cada uno haciendo música a su manera, para reducir toda esa multiplicidad a unas pocas técnicas y reglas musicales , las más civilizadas, estudiadas y razonables. Como dicen los músicos populares, estudiar música en un Conservatorio es perder la libertad y entrar dentro de un corsé de reglas y técnicas obligatorias. Eso es precisamente lo que busca la música "clasica". Además, por un largo aprendizaje de muchos años, los músicos clásicos saben someterse a los dictados de las partituras y de los directores de orquesta sin caer en los enfrentamientos personales habituales en la música vulgar. Tampoco deforman sus manos y dedos por tocar durante años la misma pieza sino que al usar las técnicas más refinadas simplemente sus manos van adaptándose al trabajo requerido poco a poco y con los años de estudio. Por ello no se convierten en monstruos que han desarrollado unas manazas con las que pueden tocar cualquier cosa ( como el guitarrista de blues Robert Johnson que en los años 30 se retiró durante 6 meses a una cabaña para practicar con la guitarra sin descanso y cuando volvió tocaba con una facilidad que sus amigos llamaban "diabólica", como si hubiera vendido su alma al diablo para tocar así) y que por ello pierden de vista el valor de cada música porque han perdido la dimensión justa de lo que es tocar música. Los músicos clásicos también desconfían de aquellos músicos vulgares que explotan unos instrumentos más fáciles de tocar que los instrumentos de conservatorio y que por ello se permiten el lujo de tocar pasajes de la música clásica fácilmente hasta desvirtuarlos , cosa que también hacen con sus propias músicas porque al tocar con instrumentos fáciles de tocar que usan muchos efectos de sonido electrónicos, la música pierde valor y esos músicos vulgares se ven obligados a seguir manteniendo la atención del público a base de caer en el virtuosismo vacío y el exhibicionismo. La música clásica intenta evitar todos estos males , buscando instrumentos que sean difíciles de tocar ( pero no imposibles de tocar), que requieran varios años de estudio y con los cuales se pueda hacer música trabajada y no fácil ni futil. En los países anglosajones, especialmente Australia, hay una clara distinción entre la música clásica y la música popular. La música clásica se enseña en las Universidades y se la llama "ciencia musical" porque sus practicantes aspiran a saber qué es lo que están haciendo con cada nota que tocan, qué función tiene cada acorde y qué técnica en concreto están usando con cada movimiento de su dedo. Se estudia científicamente la composición de cada pieza , nota a nota . La música popular se enseña en los colegios de artes y oficios ( llamados TAFE en Australia) en dos años, junto a otros oficios como peluquero, mecánico, jardinero, contable. La enseñanza de oficios es muy práctica en Australia de manera que en solo dos años salen de esas escuelas miles de músicos que saben tocar desde jazz hasta country y muchos otros subestilos. En Inglaterra estas escuelas se llaman Art Schools y en ellas se enseña pintura, diseño, fotografía, música, confección. La mayoría de los músicos ingleses de rock han estudiado en estas escuelas ( por ejemplo los de Pink Floyd y de Yes). La musica popular es aceptada como actividad profesional en bares, pubs, discotecas, salas musicales ,shows de televisión. La música clásica solamente pueden trabajar en ella los que tengan la carrera de Ciencia Musical y sus lugares de trabajo son las óperas y salas de concierto. Al aceptar en esos países que existen estos dos tipos de música, la popular y la clásica, aceptan también que los hombres son en su mayoría irreducibles a ser cortados por un mismo patrón y que por ello siempre existirán millones de particulares, cada uno distinto y , por lo tanto, también existirá la música vulgar formada por millones de variantes que correspondan a los millones de particulares que la practican. Pero también se reconoce que existe la posibilidad del Universal , es decir, de encontrar aquello en lo que puedan estar de acuerdo millones de particulares: este universal puede ser el Estado moderno que provee de servicios a su población, puede ser una lengua común como el inglés o el español que permita a todos los particulares entenderse, al menos en asuntos prácticos, para evitar el efecto de Torre de Babel, puede ser una ciencia estable y comprobada en la que todos estén de acuerdo, puede ser una música elevada con cuyas reglas y normas estén de acuerdo sus practicantes y sus oyentes: es la música clásica. Curiosamente, no estamos oyendo ninguna declaración proveniente de los músicos clásicos contra internet y su música gratuita que está arruinando a los músicos populares. Y es que los músicos de carrera, de Conservatorio, están viendo con gran regocijo cómo se les acaba el chollo a los músicos populares que durante muchos años, desde la invención del gramófono, la guitarra eléctrica y los amplificadores, han dominado la música en los países, cantando sus cancioncillas llenas de recursos musicales impactantes para un público lerdo que llenaba estadios de fútbol para verlos cantar y que compraba en número de millones sus discos. Ahora los músicos populares, muchos de los cuales no saben música y cantan de oído, ya no venden discos y ya no ganan tanto dinero desde que existe internet y sus descargas ilegales de música. Es como una justicia que llega tarde para los músicos de Conservatorio, que se han pasado largos años estudiando para sacar su carrera de músico clásico, estudiando asignaturas de composición, teoría musical, técnica instrumental, dirección de orquesta, armonía, contrapunto para ver luego cómo músicos sin estudios ganaban mucho dinero haciendo cancioncillas para un público ignorante mientras ellos, los músicos de carrera, veían como las salas de conciertos de música clásica cada vez tenían menos público, así como las óperas y ellos se veían obligados a ganarse la vida trabajando como profesores de música en conservatorios y colegios. Durante muchos años los músicos de carrera se han quejado de esta situación injusta pero ningún gobierno ni ninguna legislación les ha atendido, cuando para los otros oficios y profesiones se pide un curso de esto o de lo otro para ser contratado por una empresa. En la música es la única actividad remunerada donde cualquier gil sin estudios puede cobrar por hacer un trabajo que en los otros oficios se considera intrusismo profesional ilegal. Ahora por fin los músicos de carrera están viendo cómo los músicos populares dejan de ganar tanto dinero por un trabajo que no lo vale y vuelven a ser lo que fueron en otros siglos, cantantes de taberna y de tugurios que cobraban cuatro duros por sus canciones. Y es que cuando aparece el invento del gramófono, hace ya más de 100 años , y después aparece el invento de la guitarra eléctrica en los años 30 con los amplificadores de gran potencia, la música entra en una crisis parecida a la crisis en la que entró la pintura cuando se descubrió la fotografía. Ya no tenía sentido pintar paisajes y retratos puesto que una fotografía los hacía mejores y en pocos segundos . Los pintores se vieron obligados a encontrar otros motivos para pintar. En la música ocurrió igual. Cuando se inventa el gramófono se puede escuchar cualquier pieza musical una y otra vez, sin necesidad de esperar varias semanas a que esa pieza musical vuelva a ser tocada por alguna orquesta en directo. Cuando se inventa la guitarra eléctrica y sus amplificadores, ya no se necesita una gran orquesta de 100 músicos para hacer mucho ruido e impresionar al público sino que con una sola guitarra eléctrica conectada a varios amplificadores se puede hacer todavía más ruido espectacular. Además , hasta entonces la guitarra clásica había sido un instrumento poco explotado debido a su pobre potencia sonaro, pero cuando aparece la guitarra eléctrica las inmensas posibilidades de la guitarra con todas sus sutilidades y matices son descubiertas por fin puesto que ahora el más mínimo sonido producido tocando la guitarra es amplificado y transformado por pedales de efectos. El mundo descubre un nuevo instrumento de posibilidades inmensas que hasta entonces había estado ocultado por la poca sonoridad de la guitarra española. Aparecen en estos 70 años de historia de la guitarra eléctrica cientos de virtuosos de ella que exploran y explotan alguna de sus miles de posibilidades de sonido y de ejecución. Aparece toda una serie de subestilos musicales creados expresamente para explotar alguna característica de la interpretación a la guitarra eléctrica. Al mismo tiempo se da también una confrontación entre los músicos "clásicos" y los nuevos músicos que aparecen especializados en tocar con estos instrumentos electrónicos, no solamente con la guitarra sino también con el órgano y el bajo. Hasta hace bien poco, los músicos "clásicos" renunciaban a tener nada que ver con la música "pop" y "rock" y ni tan solo con el "jazz" (Andrés Segovia no quería saber nada de la guitarra de jazz) por considerarlas músicas vulgares y ruidosas. Por su parte, los virtuosos que aparecen para explotar estos nuevos instrumentos electrónicos toman prestado de la música "clásica" una gran cantidad de frases, motivos, secuencias, acordes y páginas enteras que adaptan primero a la nueva música eléctrica popular y luego toman como punto de partida para crear sus propios temas musicales. Durante décadas los músicos "clásicos" y los nuevos músicos "pop" no se hablan. En ese estado de cosas aparece el "Concerto" de Jon Lord que intenta mostrar a una orquesta sinfónica y a un grupo de rock , primero peleándose y luego colaborando. Jon Lord simboliza como nadie este conflicto en la música de los últimos 50 años. Jon Lord tenía una formación clásica pero tocaba en un grupo de rock. Jon Lord tenía dos personalidades. Cuando prevalecía su personalidad "clásica" era un hombre caballeroso, civilizado, culto que podía componer piezas inspiradas en Bach , Stravinsky o Elgar. Cuando prevalecía su lado "rockero" se convertía en un tipo violento, vulgar, agresivo que podía pasarse mucho rato destrozando su órgano Hammond en un concierto con su grupo Deep Purple o tocando solos exhibicionistas. El conflicto interno de Jon Lord es un conflicto que han vivido muchos músicos en estos últimos 50 años. Jon Lord se inspiraba en lo que había aprendido tocando música clásica, para enriquecer las canciones de su grupo Deep Purple con acompañamientos de calidad. Pero no soportaba tener que tocar al piano la "Patética" de Beethoven en una sala de conciertos de música clásica y necesitaba salir de gira con su grupo de rock y tocar "rock and roll" como un loco. Miles de músicos de los últimos 50 años han vivido el mismo conflicto interior. A pesar de reconocer la superioridad de la música clásica, no podían evitar caer en la tentación de tocar los nuevos y maravillosos instrumentos electrónicos, que además eran mucho más fáciles de tocar y más divertidos. La disciplina muy rígida y la falta de libertad que caracterizaban a la música clásica y a la vida diaria en los Conservatorios saltaban por los aires cuando esos músicos se ponían a improvisar en un tema de jazz o de rock. Cicerón Figuras retóricas musicales EL REINO DE LO RACIONAL Y LO IRRACIONAL Como decía el filósofo medieval Boecio, la música es el reino donde chocan lo racional y lo irracional. El músico es racional en tanto que sigue unas técnicas estudiadas al tocar, sigue una partitura y un ritmo y no puede equivocarse. Pero el músico es también irracional , sobretodo cuando improvisa o cuando compone, entonces se deja llevar por un "no-se-qué" llamado "inspiración" o "genialidad" pero que se parece más a los arrebatos de Dioniso, Pan o Orfeo. Es una irracionalidad sin explicación que los griegos antiguos intentaron formalizar con esos mitos de Dioniso, Pan y Orfeo y que Platón detestaba , a él le ponía enfermo todo lo que fuera irracional. El músico es irracional cuando decide qué acordes y qué notas componen su obra musical porque no sabe por qué escoge esas notas y acordes y tampoco sabe por qué esas notas y acordes van a gustar a su público. La música es el reino donde se relacionan la parte racional del hombre con su parte irracional. Siempre ha sido así y cada nueva figura de la música que aparece repite el mismo esquema: compone e interpreta música sin saber casi nunca cómo lo hace y su público la adora de una manera irracional y la elogia diciendo que es " genial". Al mismo tiempo, esta parte irracional de la música es también la responsable que en este negocio haya tan mal ambiente, tantas rencillas entre músicos, tantas envidias y tan mal rollo. La irracionalidad de los músicos los lleva al enfrentamiento y a la incompatibilidad entre ellos. Solamente se libran de estos males aquellos músicos de carrera que poseen además una sólida cultura general que les permite controlar, hasta cierto punto, esa parte irracional que tiene la música. Pero en los músicos "pop" falta esa sabiduría y los malos rollos surgen enseguida entre ellos porque este tipo de músicos no sabe casi nunca lo que está haciendo ni cómo lo está haciendo y en ese ambiente de irracionalidad, la discordia y las tensiones aparecen muy fácilmente. El infierno siempre ha sido concebido por los poetas como un lugar donde falta la razón y donde todos se odian por los más mínimos motivos. Ahora bien, si el músico es lo suficientemente fuerte para aguantar esas tensiones y ese mal ambiente, entonces se convertirá en una estrella de la música, una estrella de ese reino tan especial donde se enfrentan la racionalidad y la irracionalidad humanas, como decía Boecio. Quien no posea esas condiciones, que no se meta en ese negocio infernal.

ORIGINAL PAPER The use of software tools and autonomous bots against vandalism: eroding Wikipedia's moral order? Paul B. de Laat1 Published online: 2 September 2015  The Author(s) 2015. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com Abstract English-language Wikipedia is constantly being plagued by vandalistic contributions on a massive scale. In order to fight them its volunteer contributors deploy an array of software tools and autonomous bots. After an analysis of their functioning and the 'coactivity' in use between humans and bots, this research 'discloses' the moral issues that emerge from the combined patrolling by humans and bots. Administrators provide the stronger tools only to trusted users, thereby creating a new hierarchical layer. Further, surveillance exhibits several troubling features: questionable profiling practices (concerning anonymous users in particular), the use of the controversial measure of reputation (under consideration), 'oversurveillance' where quantity trumps quality, and a prospective loss of the required moral skills whenever bots take over from humans. The most troubling aspect, though, is that Wikipedia has become a Janus-faced institution. One face is the basic platform of MediaWiki software, transparent to all. Its other face is the anti-vandalism system, which, in contrast, is opaque to the average user, in particular as a result of the algorithms and neural networks in use. Finally it is argued that this secrecy impedes a much needed discussion to unfold; a discussion that should focus on a 'rebalancing' of the anti-vandalism system and the development of more ethical information practices towards contributors. Keywords Bots  Disclosive ethics  Profiling  Surveillance  Vandalism  Wikipedia Introduction Communities that thrive on the contributions from their respective 'crowds' have been with us for several decades now. The contents involved may be source code, text, or pictures; the products created may be software, news, reference works, videos, maps, and the like. As argued before (de Laat 2012b, using Dutton 2008), the basic parameters of such open content communities are twofold: on the one hand their technological web design, which may range from sharing (1.0), co-contributing (2.0), to co-creation (3.0); on the other hand their conditions of admission to the collaborative work process, which may be fully open or more restricted (say, only for experts). Some telling examples are Linux, Slashdot, Reddit, NowPublic, Wikipedia, and YouTube. Open channels of communication invite all kinds of contributions to the collective process. Inevitably, they also solicit contents that are disruptive and damaging to the goals of the community: off-topic, inappropriate, improper, offensive, malicious content and the like. Obviously, this issue is most urgent in those open-content communities that focus on co-contribution or co-creation without any restrictions on entry. Most of such 'open collaboration' projects (a term coined by Forte and Lampe 2013), therefore, have had no choice but to develop systems that detect improper contributions and subsequently eliminate them in appropriate ways. In short, anti-intrusion systems have been introduced. Several varieties can be discerned.1 A default solution is that professional editors of the site police contributions for improper content, before and/or after publication. Most social news sites and citizen journals are a case in point. As & Paul B. de Laat [email protected] 1 University of Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands 1 The next two paragraphs mostly follow de Laat (2012a). 123 Ethics Inf Technol (2015) 17:175–188 DOI 10.1007/s10676-015-9366-9 a rule, though, the incoming flow of content is simply too large to be handled in this way alone; therefore the crowds are called to the rescue. Such help may take various forms. First, contributors can be asked to scout for improper content as well. Any purported transgressions are to be reported to the managing editors who will deal with them. If necessary, additional workers are hired for the moderation of reported contents. Facebook and YouTube reportedly outsource this kind of moderation globally to small companies that all together employ thousands of lowlypaid workers. Many of the call centres involved, for example, are located in the Philippines (Chen 2014). Secondly, contributors can be invited to vote on new content: usually a plus or a minus. It was, of course, Digg that pioneered this scheme ('digging'). As a result of this voting, contributions rise to public prominence (or visibility) more quickly, or fade away more quickly. Quality gets sorted out. Both reporting and voting are common practice now in social news sites and citizen journals. Thirdly, contributors can be invited to change contributions that are deemed inappropriate. Usually, of course, this means deleting the content in question. It is common practice in communities that operate according to a wiki format that allows contributors unrestricted write-access. Cases in point are Citizendium, Wikinews, and Wikipedia. Finally, contributors can be invited to spot improper contributions-but only those who have proved themselves trustworthy are allowed to act accordingly. This hierarchical option is common practice in communities of open-source software: after identifying them as genuine bugs, only developers (with write-access) may correct such edits by eliminating or fixing them in the main code tree. In order to present a unified framework in the above I have been talking indiscriminately about improper and/or disruptive content. Such neutral language of course conceals a lot of variety between communities concerning what is to be counted as such. Moreover, impropriety and disruption only exist in the eyes of the particular beholder. These observations immediately raise many associated questions. What are the definitions of impropriety in use? Who effectively decides on what is to count as such? Is it the crowds that have been solicited or only a select few? If the latter, how did the select few obtain their position of power: by appointment from above or by some democratic procedure? Ultimately the crucial question is: do such decisions on what counts as proper content bring us any closer to the particular 'truth' being sought? Obviously, the answers are bound to vary depending on which type of community is under scrutiny. Let me just state here a few, select generalities. As concerns the kind of content being pursued, some communities are after an exchange of opinions about topical issues (social news, citizen journals), others are on a quest for the 'facts' about certain fields of interest (encyclopedias) or for source code that meets certain technical criteria (open-source software); their criteria for propriety obviously differ widely. Correspondingly, coming closer to the 'truth' is much harder for the latter types of community than for the former. Further, the size of the community involved matters: the larger it becomes, the more tendencies towards stratification and differentiation of power are likely to manifest themselves. Moreover, a multitude of elites may be forming, each with their own agendas. Keeping these questions in mind let us return to the phenomenon of disruptive contributions and focus on their scale. It can safely be asserted that in the largest of all open-content encyclopedias, Wikipedia, disruption has reached gigantic proportions. For the English language version of the encyclopedia in particular, estimates hover around 9000 malicious edits a day. A few reasons behind this vandalism on a large scale can easily be identified. On the one hand, the Wikipedia corpus involved has assumed large proportions (almost five million entries), making it a very attractive target for visitors of bad intent; on the other, Wikipedia allows co-creation (3.0) with full write-access for all, a collaborative tool that is very susceptible to disruptive actions by mala fide visitors. From the beginning of Wikipedia, in 2001, several approaches to curb vandalism have been tried. Some of them have been accepted and endured; others have been discarded along the way. In the following, the various tools and approaches are spelled out, with a particular emphasis on the ones that are still being used. It is shown that within Wikipedia a whole collection of anti-vandalism tools has been developed. These instruments are being unfolded in a massive campaign of collective monitoring of edits. This vigilance is exercised continuously, on a 24/7 basis. In the process, human Wikipedians are being mobilized as patrollers, from administrators at the top to ordinary users at the bottom; in addition, several autonomous bots are doing their part. In a short detour, this system of surveillance is analysed from the viewpoint of robotic ethics, and shown to conform to the recent trend of 'coactivity' between humans and bots. In the central part of this article, subsequently, the moral questions that emerge from this mixed human/bot surveillance are discussed. The analysis is to be seen as an exercise in 'disclosive ethics' (Brey 2000): uncovering features of the anti-vandalism system in place that are largely opaque and appear to be morally neutral-but, in actual fact, are not so. Based on a careful reading of Wikipedian pages that relate to vandalism fighting and a period of participant observation as a practising patroller I draw the following conclusions. As for power, next to administrators, strong anti-vandalism tools are shown to be only distributed to trusted users, thus creating dominance 176 P. B. de Laat 123 for a new hierarchical layer. As far as surveillance is concerned, filtering of edits becomes questionable when it focuses on editor characteristics like anonymity or reputation. Is Wikipedia engaging in objectionable profiling practices? Further, the system raises the issues of 'oversurveillance' and of the loss of the display of moral skills towards newcomers. Moreover, concerning the institution as a whole, the system of surveillance operates largely as an invisible and opaque technology, hidden from sight to Wikipedian contributors at large. It is argued that as a result, the encyclopedia's governance has become Janusfaced. The wiki platform is an open invitation for all to participate, exemplifying the assumption of trust, but underneath tight surveillance is exercised that starts from the assumption of continuous suspicion. Finally it is argued that in view of these objections the anti-vandalism system needs rebalancing. Also, fair information practices towards contributors need to be developed that highlight the ins and outs of anti-vandalism operations and ask for consent concerning the use of their contributions. Anti-vandalism tools in Wikipedia Basically, vandalism fighting in Wikipedia consists of two phases: edits to entries are selected and subsequently inspected. Any vandalistic edit that has been detected is corrected by its deletion ('reversion', 'undoing'); usually, an edit comment is attached making mention of vandalism. Performing these steps has always been part and parcel of the write-access permission granted to (almost) all users. The buttons involved that have to be pressed are readily available. This default mode of vandalism fighting-to be denoted the 'basic mode'-soon revealed itself to be insufficient in view of the rising quantity of vandalism. From about 2005 onwards, therefore, a wide range of new tools has been developed by Wikipedians themselves to remedy the situation and achieve more anti-vandalism power. I will not try to give an overview that respects the chronological order in which these were developed; instead, I focus on their basic functions. Moreover, I only present a selection of the available tools: those that are most convenient and/or powerful and (therefore) mostly in use. The first phase of selection of edits for inspection has been facilitated as follows. Patrol options have been developed that allow seeing a complete list of recent changes to all entries. The list is refreshed continuously. A common way to obtain these edits is by means of RSS feeds or IRC. In order not to be overwhelmed by this massive flood of edits, filtering options have been developed. Three options can be distinguished. First, one can filter out types of entries involved. One may focus on edits in a specific namespace; say the main namespace only (the entries themselves). Further, users may compose a list of specific entries they are interested in (their own personal 'watchlist'), and then select all recent changes to that watchlist only. Another focus that has been enabled is the sensitive category of entries about living people. Secondly, one may choose to focus on the content of contributed edits: those with bad words, those with massive blanking, those that delete a whole entry, etc. Blacklists of suspect words and expressions are assembled for this purpose. Thirdly, specific types of editors may be targeted. A focus on anonymous contributors, on new accounts, on warned contributors, on users that figure on one's personal 'blacklist'-the possibilities are endless. Similarly, categories of users can be excluded from scrutiny: no administrator edits, no bot edits, no whitelisted users, etc. Further, modern tools allow combining various filtering options. For example, a focus on large deletions as committed by IP-accounts can be realized. After edits have been selected, the second phase of inspection of edits begins. Obviously, any detected vandalistic edit gets reverted. But beyond this action, several buttons have been developed that trigger specific actions deemed appropriate. A patroller may easily leave a warning message on the talk page of the supposed vandal, ask for administrator intervention against the supposed vandal ('blocking'), ask for the page to be 'protected' (i.e., lower level users may no longer contribute), propose the entry to be deleted as a whole (even 'speedily'), etc. Another powerful option is a 'rollback' button: after a vandalistic edit has been spotted, it permits not only the reversion of the edit involved but of all antecedent edits to the entry as committed by the same suspected vandal as well, reverting them all in one go. It reverts a whole consecutive series of (supposedly) vandalistic edits, not just the most recent one. All these options to raise the anti-vandalism powers of Wikipedian patrollers have found their way into various concrete tools (for a selection of them, see Table 1). I will mention some of them here. On the #cvn-wp-en freenode channel (accessible via Chatzilla, a Firefox extension), IRC bots (such as SentryBot or CVNBot1) display a continuous stream of edits that are deemed to be suspicious. Moreover, the various reasons for suspicion that apply are mentioned, each reason with its own colour (possible gibberish, large removal, edit by blacklisted editor, edit by IP-account, etc.). Vandal Fighter offers about the same functionalities, though the reasons for suspicion are rendered more succinctly. Lupin is a tool using RSS feeds for displaying recent edits and filtering them by various criteria; subsequently, various buttons are available that come into play after edit reversion. Twinkle installs a menu of buttons on the patroller's screen to facilitate edit correction. The rollback tool, finally, consists of just one button on the patroller's screen for swift reversal (cf. above). The use of software tools and autonomous bots against vandalism: eroding Wikipedia's moral... 177 123 Recently, though, with the tools just mentioned already in place, the fight against vandalism received a giant boost by two more or less independent developments. For one thing, edit filters (or abuse filters) as a means to prevent intrusion have been developed. These are extensions to the Wikipedian platform that set specific controls on user activities: whenever a user tries to commit an edit, it first has to pass through these filters before ending up in the encyclopedia itself. At the time of writing, after severe testing and discussions, close to a hundred filters have been approved of and are activated on the platform. They can have many a focus, but vandalistic actions are particularly well represented. A particular watch is on the combination of new and/or unregistered users performing such actions. Upon spotting a potentially disruptive edit, various automated actions are possible. The edit may be tagged as potentially vandalistic; such tags can be focussed on by subsequent patrollers. The user may be warned ('are you sure you want to proceed?'), possibly preventing the edit to be submitted at all. The edit may be stopped ('disallow'): it does not pass the filter; the editor is warned in appropriate ways. Finally, filters can have built-in so-called 'throttle': disruptive actions are allowed up to a threshold (say blanking large chunks of text up to once per hour). Passing that threshold triggers the filter into action. Note that most filters in use are public, that is, their functioning can be looked up on a Wikipedian page. Some, however, are kept private and cannot be inspected by the ordinary user. This is done to keep potential vandals in the dark about the possibilities of evading the filter in question (for all remarks in this paragraph, see the links mentioned under WP:Edit filter). Another recent boost to fighting vandalism, in a carefully tailored way this time, is provided by computational approaches to detect vandalism. Research in this area has crystallized into four categories of algorithm (Adler et al. 2011). Algorithms may focus on language features (like bad words, pronoun frequencies), on language-independent textual features (like the use of capitals, changes to numerical content, deletion of text), on metadata of edits (like time and place of the edit, anonymity, absence of revision comment), or on the editor's reputation as a trustworthy contributor. For the latter measure various approaches are in circulation (for reputation as conceived of in the so-called 'Wikitrust model' see Adler and de Alfaro 2007). Computer scientists have been struggling with the question which approach to the detection of vandalism is the most fruitful. Based on a computer tournament with all approaches in the competition the provisional answer seems to be: a combination of all four algorithms works best (Adler et al. 2011). These vandalism detection algorithms are useful weapons in the struggle against vandalism. They can be enlisted as useful assistants to humans in the phase of selecting edits. If so instructed, algorithms can calculate and assign a probabilistic vandalism score to each and every fresh edit that has passed the abuse filters and comes in. These scores are used to make ordered lists of edits, with the most suspect edits on top. 'Engines' of this kind have found two ways of employment. On the one hand, they have been incorporated as detection engines in 'assisted editing' tools. The prime example is the STiki tool (Table 1). At its back-end, all fresh edits from the Wikipedian servers are continuously monitored for vandalism and vandalism scores assigned to them. The method employed in the original implementation was the third, metadata approach; currently, the neural network approach has been enabled also (cf. below). At the front-end, subsequently, using IRC, suspect edits are served to human patrollers in an ordered queue. The filtering task has Table 1 Anti-vandalism tools used in Wikipedia and their affordances beyond the 'basic mode' of fighting vandalism (selection; cf. WP:OLDSCHOOL) Phase: Selection of edits Inspection of edits Operators with their tools Human operator using Vandal Fighter Use of filters Human operator using #cvn-wp-en Use of filters (also in combination) Human operator using Lupin Use of filters Use of buttons Human operator using Twinkle Use of buttons Human operator using rollback Use of button Human operator using WPCVN Use of scoring algorithms Human operator using Huggle Use of scoring algorithms Use of buttons Human operator using STiki Use of scoring algorithms Use of buttons Autonomous bot Use of scoring algorithms Autonomous action Notes Before their potential acceptance, edits are filtered by several edit (or abuse) filters; 'basic mode' means that only the basic facilities of the Wikipedian architecture are employed (no additional tools are used); tools mentioned in the table can sometimes usefully be employed together (e.g., Lupin and Twinkle; WPCVN and Twinkle); WPCVN is out of order since January 2014; a recently developed tool, igloo, is not included in the table while still in alpha development 178 P. B. de Laat 123 effectively been taken over by the machine: humans just work through the queue. Edits can be accepted (classified as innocent or pass, the latter optionmeaning the patroller is not quite sure), or reverted (classified as good-faith revert if no malicious intent seems to be present, or as vandalism if such intent is obvious). Good-faith reversions can be commented on; the diagnosis of vandalism automatically triggers a warning note to be placed on the vandal's talk page.A similar 'assisted editing' tool for the whole process is Huggle (Table 1). Fresh edits are monitored and rated according to a mixture of language, textual and metadata features. Subsequently, in a default queue, these are served to human operators at the front-end, who have a repertoire of actions at their disposal quite similar to the ones described above for STiki. On the other hand, vandalism detection algorithms have been extended and turned into fully autonomous bots (see Table 1) (for a useful overview of the bot landscape in Wikipedia, for several other purposes than anti-vandalism as well, one is referred to Livingstone 2012: 126–132, 180–227 and Nielsen 2014: 17, 35–38). After severe testing they may be let loose on the Wikipedian edit stream. While hundreds of bots are currently in operation, several of them are tailored towards vandalism (another 10–20 of the kind have now been 'retired'). They routinely scan incoming edits for vandalism right after they are published on Wikipedia. A bot intervenes like any human patroller: after identifying a vandalistic edit, it reverts the edit and leaves a warning note on the vandal's talk page. Which kind of algorithm detection is being used? In the beginning most bots relied on the first method: language features. Blacklists (of words) were commonly used. Of late, the four classical methods listed above have (largely) been set aside. Instead, the most recent bots operate as neural networks that gradually learn to distinguish between bad edits and good edits. In order to learn the bots have to be fed continuously with edits as actually classified by humans. Especially this latter type of bot is a promising development. The top scorer among them is ClueBotNG, which can boast of almost three million reversions in total (since 2011). It typically checks edits within 5 seconds of their appearance and reverts about one of them every minute. Assessment of the robotic landscape So the fighting of vandalism on Wikipedia has assumed large proportions, mobilizing literally thousands of volunteers and several bots. Now, how is this amplified process to be understood? Is it business as usual though on a larger scale, or has the process assumed a different character? Are the changes only of a quantitative kind, or also of a qualitative kind? Geiger and Ribes (2010), elaborating on how the Wikipedian process of 'banning a vandal' has been transformed, firmly take the latter position. They argue that the combined force of humans and bots allows a process of 'distributed cognition' to unfold, in which collaborators unknown to each other are knitted together in the common purpose of eradicating vandalism. In it, the talk page plays a pivotal role: all warning messages end up there, enabling a coordinated response to ongoing vandalism. So it is only by the creation and deployment of the anti-vandalism tools discussed above that vandalism patrolling becomes possible at all. A sea change has taken place. I do not quite agree with their diagnosis. Fighting vandalism has been possible in Wikipedia from the beginning. Focussing on specific types of edit or editors has always been possible (though cumbersome); reverting edits while leaving comments about the reversal and/or warning messages on talk pages has always been possible as well (though cumbersome). I want to argue that it is the creation of the Wikipedian platform and the associated wiki tools that must be seen as the cradle for distributed cognition in Wikipedian fashion. The revolution took place in 2001, not around 2011. Of course, the developed tools combined with the large influx of human volunteers have enabled a much larger scale of vandalism fighting. Patrollers may work vastly more efficiently with these tools. Only edits singled out as suspect have to be inspected, only a few buttons have to be pressed for dealing with edits found to be wanting. Without the computational powers involved in particular, vandalism fighting would not have 'scaled' so easily (from watching over a corpus of a handful of entries to almost 5 million entries by now). And without those computational powers, Wikipedia would have been corrupted on a large scale. Geiger and Ribes (2010:124) also mention 'delegated cognition': parts of the patrolling task are shifted to computational tools. Edit filtering can be steered by algorithms; edit filtering, inspection, and correction combined can be performed by autonomous bots. It is this delegation that stands out as novel, meriting closer attention indeed. How is this shifting of the burden to be understood? Let me first remark that the anti-vandalism bots in operation can be interpreted as an instance of 'explicit ethical agents' (Moor 2006). They perform calculations and decide to act depending on the outcome, similar to chess robots. Since they can make decisions on their own, they may exhibit surprising behaviour. If this interpretation is accepted, what about the responsibility of humans vis-à-vis their robotic creations? In what ways are responsibilities for their actions to be distributed between them? In particular, can a responsibility gap be detected here (cf. Johnson 2013 for an overview of this issue)? One position is to argue that, since their behaviour is no longer The use of software tools and autonomous bots against vandalism: eroding Wikipedia's moral... 179 123 under the control of their creators/operators, the bots involved are to be considered as responsible agents in their own right-a position advanced by Matthias and Sparrow. Another position is to argue that their creators/operators are still to be blamed, either from the point of view of the juridical profession where this is quite normal (Santoro), or on account of their professional responsibility (Nagenborg et al.).2 It is interesting to observe that in Wikipedia this issue is answered unequivocally: creators of algorithms and a fortiori of bots are held accountable. Lengthy procedures institutionalize this conception. Programmers have to test their new tools extensively in protected trials. Subsequently they have to submit their tools to a committee (Bot Approvals Group, BAG) that asks for logs about the testing and discusses the tools thoroughly on their talk pages. In those discussions the possible damage these tools can inflict on Wikipedian spaces looms large. Letting loose bots that behave erratically or inflict a lot of damage that necessitates elaborate reversal operations is not appreciated. The bot involved will be 'suspended' (for all remarks in this paragraph cf. WP:Bot policy). From the angle of the moral design of robots, an interesting characterization can be made. The vandalism fighting tools that operate autonomously are only allowed to 'act' under very strict and limiting conditions: the threshold of the vandalism probability that triggers action on their part has to be set high with regard to minimizing the false positives rate. The underlying argument is that humans are very sensitive to being falsely reprimanded by a bot. The BAG is keen on minimizing such occurrences. As a result of these limitations, many edits that bots are fairly sure represent vandalism, slip through the net. Hence, much of the anti-vandalism effort continues to rest on human shoulders. Assisted editing tools are indispensable in that regard. These can be seen to occupy a halfway position between humans with (non-computational) tools and bots. In cases like the employment of Huggle and STiki we observe a fusion between human and computer power. These instruments can readily be interpreted as emanating from the conception of 'coactive design' (Johnson et al. 2010). Such design moves away from making bots more autonomous; instead, its focal point is to make agents more capable of joint activity with interdependent people. In the case of Wikipedia, the sharing reads as follows. Autonomous bots reap the low-hanging vandalistic fruit; subsequently, humans and bots joined in coactivity reach higher for the remaining rotten fruit. Relations of work and power After this overview of the counter-vandalism mechanisms installed, I proceed to investigate questions related to changes inWikipedian governance as a result. First, how does the revamped monitoring system change the ways in which contributors work together on expanding and refining the Wikipedian repository (relations of work)? To answer this question I rely on a former analysis of mine of the management of trust within open-content communities (de Laat 2014; cf. also de Laat 2010, 2012b).3 I argued thatWikipedia from the start has opted for a policy of fully open readand write-access for all. This is an institutional gesture of trust towards participants: the gesture signals that they are assumed to be trustworthy in both a moral and an epistemological sense. The introduction of surveillance around the clock for each and every freshly contributed edit significantly qualifies the former gesture. New edits are no longer reviewed casually, as it were, whenever a fellow Wikipedian happens to walk by; now they are put under almost immediate scrutiny. Edits successively have to pass the edit filters installed, survive the swift perusal by autonomous bots like ClueBotNG, and withstand scrutiny from patrollers that preferably use tools like Huggle and STiki. All this is done with one single purpose in mind: keeping Wikipedian namespaces free of damaging contributions. The dominant concern is damage avoidance. While before the platform was completely unprotected from vandals, now an army of silicon and human patrollers stands ready to prevent intrusions. Thereby the grant of discretion to ordinary users, as the exercise of one's skills and judgment, has changed. They still have full powers of contributing the contents they wish; full write-access still obtains. At the same time, however, an immediate vandalism check is likely to be performed. As a result, their discretion has been reduced; not by eliminating any of the Wikipedian editing permissions but by much faster performance review. While keeping this conclusion in mind, another question immediately imposes itself: who actually have obtained the powers to exercise this scrutiny of fresh edits using the anti-vandalism tools available? Who are these gatekeepers who arguably qualify the powers of the ordinary Wikipedian? And, as a consequence, what changes can be observed in the amount of influence on the day-to-day production of entries as exercised by the various levels involved? As it turns out, by no means anyone is entitled to watch the gates with all available tools; on the contrary. The basic rationale underlying the distribution of countervandalism tools is the following. Just by pressing some 2 Precise references to all authors just mentioned can be found in Johnson (2013). 3 The remainder of this paragraph is a short abstract of de Laat (2014). For full substantiation of the steps in the argumentation that follows one is referred to the article itself. 180 P. B. de Laat 123 buttons, these tools may potentially inflict much damage on Wikipedian namespaces. The stronger the tools are, the more harm can be done. Therefore, the stronger tools are basically granted to administrators only, and to those who can prove (as a rule to those same administrators) that they are trustworthy enough for the patrolling task. This line of reasoning applies in particular to tools developed earlier such as the rollback permission, and to tools developed later such as those geared towards assisted editing (Huggle, STiki). Let me give an indication of the numbers involved. Against a backdrop of millions of ordinary contributors (of which over 22 million have registered), currently about 1400 administrators are active; by default they all have the rollback permission. In addition, they granted that permission to almost 5000 other users (WP:Wikipedians). For the-arguably stronger-Huggle and STiki tools the numbers that have obtained permission to use them are considerably less: currently each tool may be used by about 800 trusted users in total (note that rollbackers obtain the permission by default if they care to ask for it). It turns out that once permission has been obtained, subsequently only some 10–20 % of them actively use the acquired tool(s) over a longer period. The common Wikipedian, though, has to contend himself with the display of suspect edits through #cvn-wp-en or Lupin, and the filter & button affordances that tools such as Lupin and Twinkle offer; only the modest tools in the anti-vandalism Wikipedian repertoire are readily available to those who care to take up patrolling. With this conclusion I challenge, therefore, the observation by Livingstone (2012: 213) that ''as watching functions are [...] available to all users, the control element of surveillance remains largely distributed across the [Wikipedian] site.'' He simply overlooks the harsh requirements (in terms of editing experience) for obtaining effective patrolling tools. In sum, institutional trust to watch on fresh edits (as a specific kind of editing) extends to anyone-but the sophisticated heavy instrumentation that effective watch requires is only entrusted to the selected few that have actually proved to be trustworthy members of the community. Can this arrangement be justified? Of course, administrators could no longer handle the vandalism problem on their own. They were in need of more eyeballs to watch the bugs (i.e., vandalistic edits) injected into the Wikipedian corpus of entries (and beyond). They then chose to recruit a special police force, and arm them with dedicated and powerful weapons. This, of course, created a new layer in the otherwise rather flat Wikipedian hierarchy, basically only consisting of administrators and common users. Was the disturbance of the valuable asset of largely egalitarian relations a necessity in view of the struggle against vandalism? Can the unbalancing of power relations be justified by the argument that the integrity of Wikipedia is to be maintained? At the end I return to these questions, which allows us to take other factors into consideration as well, such as several troubling aspects of the implemented surveillance and the opaqueness of the anti-vandalism system as a whole (to be discussed). Surveillance After this overview of the tools against vandalism and their users, it is time to ask the question: does the surveillance in place respect moral intuitions? In the following I maintain that both the use of editing tools by humans and the practices of bots raise serious ethical concerns. Profiling A first problem emanates from the phase of selecting possible candidates for vandalism. Sorting out bad edits may proceed on the basis of edit characteristics: language features, textual features, and the like. Whether incorporated in filters or full blown algorithms, the practice seems unproblematic: after all, vandalism detection is all about spotting non-appropriate textual edits. Sorting, however, can also proceed on the basis of editor characteristics. Whenever these relate to the user's past behaviour in regard to vandalism (being warned before, on a blacklist, and the like), or to the user's present behaviour arousing suspicion (e.g., omitting an edit commentary when this reasonably seems indicated), the method is uncontroversial. I would argue that even an enabled focus on new accounts can be defended: full credit as a trustworthy contributor does not have to be given straight away. But a few other editor characteristics used for closer inspection do seem controversial. What are we to think of a criterion such as being a nonregistered user (anonymous, with IP-account only)? Filtering out anonymous contributors is enabled in many a tool (Vandal Fighter, #cvn-wp-en, and Lupin). Confronted with an avalanche of fresh edits on the screen a patroller may easily make a choice and focus specifically on anonymous users (such edits are usually indicated by a special colour). For the dedicated chaser of 'anons' (as anonymous contributors are called in Wikipedian parlance) there is even a website that exclusively displays anonymous edits in realtime from all over the world, with the precise country where they are committed (RCMap at http://rcmap.hatnote.com; not in Table 1); with one click they pop up on one's screen ready for inspection. In all these instances the choosing of edits submitted by IP-accounts is a very alluring option to a patroller in view of the returns it may bring (since such accounts are known to be more vandalism-prone). The use of software tools and autonomous bots against vandalism: eroding Wikipedia's moral... 181 123 In a more sophisticated fashion, several assisted editing tools (Huggle, STiki) offer their operators a queue of edits that have already been filtered and ordered according to an algorithm that, besides many other factors, includes anonymity as a warning sign. So routinely, for the designers of these tools, being an unregistered user triggers extra suspicion and generates an increase in surveillance. There can even be a subtle multiplier effect at work here, specifically for these tools. When using the priority queue in Huggle or STiki (or WPCVN as well), operators can actually see whether the suspect edit on top of the queue is performed anonymously or not, and may-whether unconsciously or not-proceed to give it extra scrutiny. In these instances, effectively, anonymous edits are given amore severe check. Letme stress that it is not farfetched to assume that human patrollers, whether using simpler tools likeVandal Fighter or more sophisticated assisted editing tools, will indeed choose to weigh the odds against anonymous users. In many discussions about vandalism, considerable aggression is ventilated against supposed vandals, and anonymous users are often depicted as being almost synonymouswith vandals (cf. various quotes in de Laat 2012a). Now, what is the problem I want to stipulate here? All practices of filtering as just described are instances of profiling: an ensemble of dimensions is bundled together into what is called a profile that by design based on past experience yields higher chances of catching vandals than just random screening (for an elaborate discussion of profiling cf. Schauer 2003). Such profiling is understandable and justifiable, given the quest for optimal detection of vandalism using scarce resources. In many of these profiles, however, whether consisting of just one or of many dimensions, anonymity figures as an important feature. This is simply due to the fact that anonymous contributors (contributing about 15 % of all edits) demonstrably commit much more vandalism than users operating from a registered account; including anonymity in a profile then produces more 'hits' and eliminates more instances of vandalism. Nevertheless, such profiling on anonymity seems questionable, since it risks enhancing stigmatisation of contributors who for one reason or another choose to remain anonymous. Anonymous users turn into a category to be treated with ever growing suspicion.4 Many of us condemn our police forces for relying on profiles that include the criterion of race and our custom authorities at airports for using profiles that include ethnic and religious criteria. Incorporating such 'sensitive' dimensions, the argument goes, can only aggravate existing social tensions. Shouldn't we similarly condemn profiling along the lines of anonymity in the Wikipedian case? A comparison with the Turnitin plagiarism detection system as discussed by Vanacker (2011) may be useful here. Often, students in class are required to submit their papers to the system, in order to preclude plagiarism. Is such a practice permissible the author asks? He answers that it is, since the checks are to the benefit of the whole educational system and uphold the value of their certificates. This would be otherwise, he remarks, if only ''student athletes or transfer students'' were to be singled out for inspection of their papers (idem: 329). I subscribe to his position, in view of the divisions that would otherwise be created. And on condition that we accept the analogy between plagiarism and vandalism, we are obliged to extend the same stance to Wikipedia: profiling along the lines of anonymity, although purportedly contributing to more efficient detection of vandalism, is to be avoided since it relays the message that anonymous contributors are up to no good. Some more questionable profiling is taking place, though on a minor scale compared to the focused attention on edits from IP-accounts. The time and place an edit was made are also singled out as criteria for increased vigilance: the metadata-based queue in STiki uses a classifier that incorporates these data. The rationale is that vandalism appears to occur more regularly during specific time intervals (between 8AM and 8PM, and during weekdays as opposed to weekends), yielding time-of-day and day-of-theweek as indicators. Further, vandalism to EnglishWikipedia has been observed to bemore prevalent among American (as well as Canadian and Australian) users than among European (Italian, French, or German) users; so being American turns into awarning sign (for both kinds of data cf.West et al. 2010). In combination, therefore, we observe the following, STiki-specific profiling: being an American contributing to Wikipedia during regular work hours is raising suspicion per se and triggers increased vigilance. Reputation Further, the use of a reputational measure is questionable. For the moment, it has only been used as a scoring tool in assisted editing (STiki), not in bots since its incorporation in them appears problematic. The measure orders the queue that is displayed to its human operators. Apart from being a very complex and very expensive undertaking since by definition it amounts to real time computing, the concept of reputation itself seems hard to operationalize. Based on the Wikitrust model a measure for reputation has been proposed, roughly the sum total of edits by a specific contributor that have survived the testing by subsequent editors 4 Note that anonymous accounts are not necessarily new accounts (a factor just mentioned as a justifiable element in a profile). Many IPaccounts belong to institutions (educational or otherwise) that grant their members collective access to Wikipedia. Vandalism may then erupt at the first edit, but just as well only many edits later, whenever a malevolent individual member of the institution decides to access Wikipedia and commit a vandalistic edit. 182 P. B. de Laat 123 and remained intact. Since then, a whole literature has been developing about the issue, and ever more subtle measures are being proposed. Two tricky issues, though, are connected with the reputational measure (for both issues cf. de Laat 2014; based on West et al. 2012, Adler and de Alfaro 2007). In order to explain this, its meaning and functions more generally first have to be spelled out. Reputation is not a particular characteristic of an editor at the moment that (s)he submits a specific edit (as in other vandalism algorithms), but it indicates a current summary of all of someone's achievements so far in the community. It is intended to be a measure of what can be expected from him or her. As such it can be used more broadly than just as an indicator for possible vandalism: to motivate members to continue performing, to regulate the distribution of editing privileges, to promote contributors to higher ranks, etc. Used in these ways, reputation becomes decisive for one's whole career in the community (cf. de Laat 2014). After this short detour the first tricky issue connected with using reputation as an intelligent routing tool for detecting vandalism can be spelled out: is the measure to be made publicly available or is reputation to be tracked in silence? The first option has much to say for it. For one thing, it would satisfy principles of openness and transparency, which are clearly desirable given the broad importance of the measure for one's life chances in the institution. For another, it allows reputation to function as an incentive for proper behaviour – much like in eBay. As mentioned above, seeing one's efforts reflected in (higher) reputation is supposed to be stimulating. Unfortunately, such visibility would at the same time invite 'gaming' the system in various ways (such as by dividing a contribution into smaller consecutive edits) and thereby undermine the measure's accuracy. As yet, no solutions to such vulnerabilities have been found. Switching to the alternative of tracking reputation in silence, then, is the other option- similar to how things are presently done in some corners of Wikipedia. However, although gaming the system is no longer an issue, any incentive for proper behaviour would be eliminated. More importantly, transparency would be forfeited. So one way or another, efficiency and morality always seem to clash here: either the measure conforms to moral standards but is not very efficient (public reputation), or the measure is reasonably accurate but violates moral intuitions considerably (secret reputation).5 The second thorny issue connected with any measure of reputation is a technical issue: which starting value is to be chosen? Putting it in short terms: given its range (say from 0 to 1) a starting value at the middle (1/2) is preferable, with this value going up and down as a contributor's actions unfold. Unfortunately, this allows vandals after 'bankruptcy' to start all over again from a new account. So this option does not deter any vandalism. Starting at value zero avoids this problem; but then newcomers and vandals receive the same kind of vigilance, which is clearly suboptimal (as well as slightly immoral). In view of these problems, any measure of reputation is bound to be problematic. Its use as the basis for queuing would amount to a capricious and haphazard surveillance practice. No wonder, that after some try outs on dumps from Wikipedia for research purposes, apart from use in WPCVN and STiki, as of today reputational algorithms are nowhere in use in Wikipedia. Oversurveillance Yet another moral issue has to do with a tendency towards overuse. As anti-vandalism tools become stronger and more sophisticated, they are more easily prone to be overused; as a result, quantity trumps quality, defeating the original purpose of these tools. Let me explain. First consider assisted editing tools like Huggle and STiki. Since they display new edits in an instant (the ever present priority queue), they represent an invitation to treat edits ever faster. One may always press the buttons involved faster and faster. The practice turns into a computer game that may properly be called 'shooting the vandals'. Unwittingly or not, STiki in particular is specifically stimulating such practice, by maintaining daily leader boards of STiki editors that display the amount of edits treated by them and the actual reversion scores obtained (WP:STIKI/L). 'Gamification' has taken hold of the patrolling domain. Some troubling figures emerge from these leader boards. Some patrollers treat hundreds of suspect edits a day (on average). Actual reversion scores on account of vandalism vary wildly between STiki patrollers: from a modest 5 % up to 80 and 90 %. And it has to be borne in mind in this regard that the edit queue cannot be chosen here; there is always just one obligatory next edit a patroller cannot escape from. I would argue that the figures yield reasonable indications of overuse of the tool by at least some patrollers.6 A parallel tendency applies to bots. Bots too can be turned into overzealous patrollers. That is to say, their parameters for action can be tuned in order to increase the catch of vandalistic edits; whether innocent edits are 5 Note that I come back to the transparency vs. obscurity issue below, since it pertains to the anti-vandalism system as a whole, not just to the use of reputation in an engine for detecting vandalism. 6 Playing games is the province of men rather than women. Would the tendency toward gamification signalled above by any chance reflect or even reinforce the current male predominance in the Wikipedian population as a whole? (Thanks for this suggestion are due to an anonymous reviewer of this journal). The use of software tools and autonomous bots against vandalism: eroding Wikipedia's moral... 183 123 eliminated in the process matters less. Or in technical terms: the tracking rate ('recall') is set ever higher, at the expense of the false positives rate also rising. It has to be mentioned here that this problem of fine-tuning has not gone unnoticed in Wikipedia. The Bot Approvals Group has discussed the issue at length, and maintains a rule that bots should have a false positives rate at most equal to the rate that humans achieve in practice.7 A bot should perform better than humans, in the sense of hardly bothering innocent editors-not so much in terms of the number of vandals caught. With both humans and bots potentially overstretching their reach, one should not lose sight of the fact that the basic algorithms underlying their patrolling actions are often generated by machine learning. The rationale of such results is inherently opaque: neural networks just learn in their machine way. The results can be surprising, even to their creators. I have no specific evidence of this happening, but it is an aspect worth keeping in mind. Bots taking over Over the last few years, there has been a notable tendency of bots taking over the chores of vandalism fighting from humans. According to recent estimates bots already eliminate half of all vandalistic contributions. Numerous are the messages from human patrollers on the bots' talk pages, congratulating them on their speed and accuracy. This advance of the bots has several troubling aspects. First, patrolling against vandalism is not only a technical task, of adequately identifying a vandalistic edit and taking appropriate action. If done well, it also demands the exercise of moral skills that make up the character of the virtuous patroller (for the introduction of this term in the context of new technology cf. Vallor 2015). These have to do with displaying restraint, with being tactful, forgiving, and supportive in gentle ways. Not all supposed vandals are what they seem to be. By exercising these skills, wellmeaning newcomers may be saved for the Wikipedian project, instead of being pushed away, never to come back. With bots taking over, then, we may ask whether the required moral skills are exercised at all. After all, the present bots just leave behind preformatted templates, delivered and signed by a name ending with BOT. Such a treatment can hardly be considered inviting. It has been observed, similarly, that already one-third of newcomers to Wikipedia obtain their first return messages from a bot. Significantly, many human users 'caught' by an anti-vandalism bot are reported as trying to talk back to the bot- overlooking the bot label. Secondly, in line with the foregoing, if bots really take over from humans in the future, the associated moral skills may well be lost among human patrollers themselves: such skills erode when not in use. Patrolling vandals is-and should be-a continuous practice in restraint and diplomacy. That kind of schooling is in danger of fading away. All that remains then is the metal tone of the bots scouting Wikipedia on their own. Bots taking over, though, is not really the policy at Wikipedia. Out of fear of alienating too many potential contributors, bots may only revert the very high probabilities; any edits scoring lower are left for human patrollers. 'Coactivity' of algorithmic power and humans is the current policy (cf. above). This is a fortunate trend. After all, what is vandalism, let alone obvious vandalism? An edit per se can (almost) never be labelled vandalism. Any change of numbers; any change of names; any change of web link; any paragraphs added or deleted-it all depends on the context as to whether this is vandalism or not. And associated with this, any vandalism can only be obvious to a patroller who is familiar with the context. Let me quote from my own experience. Changing the number of Jews murdered in WWII from 6 million to 6 thousand is an obvious bad faith vandalistic change to me-but not every patroller is familiar with WWII. The number change I came across that took place in the sales figures of a particular company turned out to be vandalism as well. But this was not obvious to me since I am not acquainted with that type of company; I had to do some research before reaching my verdict. Similarly, the deletion of several paragraphs in a specific entry without leaving a comment seemed obvious vandalism to me at first; any other patroller would draw the same conclusion. Then it emerged that the editor involved had been talking it out on the associated talk page; the deletions were part of a consensus for action reached there. (S)he protested and I had to apologize and revert my own reversion of the deletion. These musings serve to underline that the trend in Wikipedia to include both bots and humans in patrolling is a fortunate one indeed-vandalism detection can never be automatic and foolproof at the same time. Wikipedia as a Janus-faced institution The-to my view-most alarming aspect of the Wikipedian anti-vandalism system as a whole is the air of secrecy and opaqueness in which it operates. In order to develop this argument it is most appropriate to portray the encyclopedia as a Janus-faced institution. As Johnson 7 Human Wikipedians roughly achieve a false positives rate of 0.25 %: one in 400 legitimate edits is mistakenly classified as a vandalistic edit. ClueBotNG initially started off with the same false positives rate. By now, this rate has been lowered to 0.1 %; that is, at most one in 1000 legitimate edits is mistakenly identified as a vandalistic edit (WP:CLUEBOT). 184 P. B. de Laat 123 (2004) has argued, evolving ICT impinges on the instrumentation of human action, by creating new ways for doing the things we can do already as well as possibilities for doing novel things. In the case of Wikipedia the advance of the associated technologies has resulted in a particular instrumentation of human action: the tools for human action may be interpreted as having bifurcated into two contrasting types.As a result, the institution has acquired two quite opposed faces. The contrast may usefully be drawn out by taking recourse to the distinction between transparent technologies on the one hand and opaque technologies on the other, as elaborated by Lucas Introna in the context of the politics of surveillance cameras (Introna 2005). The basic platform of Wikipedia (an implementation of MediaWiki software), consisting of main pages, talk pages and the like, presents itself in an accessible way to all users alike. They are invited to become involved and assist in developing entries. Further, all contributions are logged and publicly available. So transparency can be said to reign. Things are quite otherwise for the whole array of anti-vandalism tools, whether humanly operated or fully autonomous bots. For one thing, these tools are normally hidden from view: as long as co-creative editing goes smoothly, nobody will notice that checking for vandalism is taking place continuously. Only when humans or bots start to interfere by carrying out reverts and/or leaving warning templates, will participants become aware of the patrolling in the background. As well, the patrolling is a form of surveillance that does not need any extra involvement from the surveilled; they can just carry on their editing. Finally, and most importantly, operation and outcomes of the tools are most obscure. The operation is steered by a variety of algorithms; the more sophisticated they become, the more opaque they are (cf. metadata algorithms and neural networks). Theymay properly be considered black boxes in their own right. So I argue that taken together the set of anti-vandalism tools in use can aptly be denominated an opaque technology. The Wikipedian technologies involved arguably follow closely the distinctions laid out by Introna. It is worth noticing here that earlier I denominated the second face a 'background' mechanism (de Laat 2012b), and Geiger (2011) referred to it as the 'hidden order' of Wikipedia-though he mainly had bots in view. Another difference between the two Janus faces has to do with the purposes of the technology involved. The Wikipedian platform on the surface exemplifies the invitation for all to collaborate on entries and let the encyclopedia prosper. ''We trust you all'' is the signal it emits. The array of surveillance practices below the surface, however, is the embodiment of suspicion. Edits from (almost) all contributors are systematically checked, behind their backs, in order to avoid possible damage. The system of surveillance signals: ''You are to be watched closely.'' This contrast, added to the transparent-opaque distinction drawn by Introna, only serves to accentuate the tension between the two faces. Remarkably, the two faces are also decoupled technologically. The MediaWiki platform on the one hand and the anti-vandalism tools on the other are not a technologically integrated system. The latter tools are simply a collection of browser extensions, standalone programs, and bots, installed on and operated by the individual patrollers' computers. While not running on the Wikipedian servers, they do not impede the platform's performance. Geiger dubs this 'bespoke code' and estimates that the number of lines of code involved in all of them together is higher than the size of the code base of the MediaWiki platform itself (Geiger 2014). Notice though that edit filters (cf. above) as part of the anti-vandalism system are the exception to this rule: they run directly on the Wikipedian platform. This contrast between the transparent wiki face and the opaque anti-vandalism patrolling face of Wikipedia is related to a dichotomy signalled by Stegbauer (2011). His thesis is that the encyclopedia's ideology is gradually changing from an 'emancipation ideology' which stresses that everybody is welcome to contribute, to a 'production ideology' emphasizing that high-grade entries have to be produced. The former ideology developed in Wikipedia's earlier years; later on, with the size of the encyclopedia growing beyond comprehension, the latter ideology took hold. It became embodied in the appointment of administrators with the powers to protect pages and block users: they keep a watchful eye over vandals, trolls, IPs, and difficult and unreasonable people in general. As a result, as of now, newcomers have an ambiguous experience. The emancipation ideology entices them to participate ('the encyclopedia that everybody can edit'); subsequently, they have the sobering experience of a myriad of rules they have to follow and a range of functionaries they have to obey. Notice in this regard that in my interpretation of the recent discussion among Wikipedians about a system of reviewing edits before they appear on the screen (the so-called flaggedrevisions scheme) a similar dichotomy between 'process' and 'product' ideology surfaced (cf. de Laat 2012a).8 The connection of the Stegbauer thesis with the growth of antivandalism tools and the recruitment of patrollers in particular may be clear: such patrolling is only the latest step in the expansion of the hold of the 'product ideology'. This Stegbauer thesis about Wikipedia is an exciting one. It is tempting to go one step further and interpret it as a particular instance of the Iron Law of Oligarchy as 8 For a broad overview of the bureaucratic problems facing Wikipedia see Simonite (2013). In the article these problems are argued to be (partly) responsible for the declining number of editors and the continuing lack of editor diversity (predominantly male, technologically-minded, and from the Western hemisphere). The use of software tools and autonomous bots against vandalism: eroding Wikipedia's moral... 185 123 formulated by Robert Michels in 1911. According to that law, all organisations, whether or not of democratic origin- like trade unions and political parties, tend to evolve towards oligarchy. Would that law by any chance also hold for webbased open content communities-Wikipedia in particular? Obviously, this opaqueness of the anti-vandalistic face of the Wikipedian institution goes against the basic principles of transparency and accountability. Wikipedia, in particular, as a site that projects itself as an encyclopedia for all, cannot allow itself to just slide away, step by step, into developing surveillance practices in the background that operate ever so silently and opaquely. This threatens to erode Wikipedia's moral order as a whole. In a democratic institution such practices cry out for clarification and justification, for the exercise of democratic control. Conclusions It has been argued that in Wikipedia surveillance in order to fight vandalism has assumed morally questionable proportions. In the process, some users have established themselves as more powerful actors than others. Profiling of anonymous users has become a routine procedure; questionable measures of reputation have also come under consideration for surveillance purposes. Further, overzealous patrollers and/or bots may become a nuisance for good faith contributors. As well, the ever needed moral skills in 'treating' vandalism are in danger of being eroded. Finally, an air of secrecy and opaqueness surrounds the whole patrolling venture, in particular as a result of the antivandalism algorithms and neural networks in use that are opaque to all concerned-ordinary users and experts alike. All of this is in need of public discussion. Some may argue at this point (or already earlier on), that mystery or no mystery, vandalism is an evil that may destroy the reliability of Wikipedia as an encyclopedia for all. Reliability that has been built up gradually is in danger of being eroded. Of course I can only agree with this diagnosis-without considerable anti-vandalism efforts the encyclopedia would have been doomed to failure a long time ago already. The whole point is, however, whether this threat alone is enough to force us to swallow any amount and any type of such activities unfolding, thereby effectively closing the discussion. I would argue that instead a more nuanced and extended discussion should take place about the pros and cons of the several aspects of surveillance. We should seek to acquire a better balance concerning the various issues involved. Such discussion, however, is severely hampered precisely by the opaqueness in which the whole anti-vandalism technological apparatus is clouded. That mystery is not only objectionable in itself; it likewise hampers public discussion developing about the pros and cons of such patrolling. Similar observations about 'obscure' technologies as immune to public scrutiny can be found in Introna (2005) concerning surveillance cameras, and in Stahl et al. (2010) concerning computer security and computer forensics. It is also the same kind of conclusion as Friedland (2014), a lawyer, writing after the Snowden revelations, draws concerning modern day surveillance practices and privacy. He argues that these practices become more and more invisible. Thus, the targets of surveillance (i.e., all of us) have no knowledge of being surveilled and see no reason to raise their voices. As a result, the necessary exercise of their democratic rights of speech is thwarted. Only transparency can do justice to the intentions as worded in the US constitution, and enable a fine-tuning of checks and balances concerning privacy in this age of omni-present surveillance. The foregoing comparison is not in any way intended to suggest that the hidden face of Wikipedia is of comparable importance or causes similar harm as the hidden face(s) of current surveillance practices-such is obviously not the case. Nor is this to suggest that Wikipedia as an institution operates as mysteriously and in the dark as the secret services of the Western nations. At various spots on Wikipedia details of its practices of collective monitoring are documented and even discussed-absolute secrecy or confidentiality does not apply. If they persist, diligent Wikipedian users can take up their accountability in this and piece together information about the anti-vandalism tools that are operative-at least if they have the time and energy to invest in the undertaking. A serious obstacle to overcome though is the circumstance that such information is very much scattered all over Wikipedian namespaces.9 In order for this discussion to unfold I would argue that Wikipedian functionaries (whether paid or unpaid) have a special responsibility-after all, they are running the day-today affairs of the encyclopedic site. In taking up this responsibility they must as it were put effort into reverting any (natural) trend towards oligarchy-thereby testifying to the fact that Robert Michels' law may not be an iron law after all. One cannot expect from an ordinary Wikipedian that he/ she takes the lead in such matters. I have to grant that many discussions about various such issues are already being conducted all over the place-but it is mainly the seasoned Wikipedians who know where to find them and how to take part in them. The enlargement of the base of discussants and 9 The hardest nut to crack is the opaqueness of the algorithms in use: the inner workings of tools like Huggle and STiki, as well as autonomous bots, can only be grasped fully by actually putting the tools to use and seeing what happens. For that reason I have invested time in actually patrolling Wikipedia with them and finding out the intricate details involved. 186 P. B. de Laat 123 the mutual coordination of-now scattered-discussions about (algorithmic) transparency would seem to be imperative. At any rate, whatever the outcome of this rebalancing discussion, the Wikipedian community has to develop more ethical information practices towards its contributors. As of now they are cordially invited to contribute and enjoy the collaborative process-be bold is the motto. In the process, they are urged to remain polite, to do no harm, and to respect copyright laws. Consent (implicit, informed consent that is) is only sought for handing over their edits with a Creative Commons License 3.0 (CC-BY-SA), which stipulates that other users may read, distribute, and modify the edit (while attaching the same license again) (for all the above see Wmf:Terms of Use). But no consent is sought for the ways in which their personal edits are used and processed subsequently; only some vague allusions to this can be found in the privacy policy that applies (Wmf:Privacy Policy). A comparison might be useful here. In his discussion about the morality of using Turnitin software against plagiarism, Vanacker (2011) argues that 'fair information principles' would require the institution to develop a 'code of ethics' for instructors in the classroom. His discussion, however, mainly revolves around the use of personal data and concerns of privacy. Our case, however, is neither about personal data (in the strict sense), nor about privacy. It is about the several ways in which the data about their personal edits are employed for anti-vandalism purposes. Accordingly, contributors have to be warned about this. They have to be made aware that their edits are routinely surveilled in order to detect vandalism, by a multitude of human patrollers and autonomous bots. Mistakes, they must be told, are inevitable (false positives). Moreover, they should be alerted to the fact that secondary use is involved as well. Both edit and editor data are used as input for several machine learning tools associated with Wikipedia, can be aggregated into a measure of reputation, and-a point not mentioned before-can be downloaded by any computer scientist who wants to analyse dumps of Wikipedian data for research purposes. A whole spectrum of secondary use of information is at stake. Potential editors, then, must be presented an explicit choice: a basic opt-in that grants consent to the anti-vandalism practices employed, a more expanded opt-in that grants consent to secondary uses as well-or refrain from participation. Other options (such as just submitting one's edit-as-is, without allowing any further processing) are simply not feasible. Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://crea tivecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made. References All websites below have last been accessed on December 29, 2014. Adler, B. T., & de Alfaro, L. (2007). A content-driven reputation system for the Wikipedia. In Proceedings of the 16th international conference on World Wide Web, May 8–12, 2007, Banff, Alberta, Canada. doi:10.1145/1242572.1242608. Adler, B. T., de Alfaro, L., Mola-Velasco, S. M., Rosso, P., & West, A. G. (2011). Wikipedia vandalism detection: Combining natural language, metadata, and reputation features. In CICLing '11: Proceedings of the 12th international conference on intelligent text processing and computational linguistics, LNCS 6609 (pp. 277–288). Tokyo, Japan. Brey, P. (2000). Disclosive computer ethics. Computers and Society, 30(4), 10–16. Chen, A. (2014). The laborers who keep dick pics and beheadings out of your facebook feed. Wired October 23. http://www.wired. com/2014/10/content-moderation/. de Laat, P. B. (2010). How can contributors to open-source communities be trusted? On the assumption, inference, and substitution of trust. Ethics and Information Technology, 12(4), 327–341. de Laat, P. B. (2012a). Coercion or empowerment? Moderation of content in Wikipedia as 'essentially contested' bureaucratic rules. Ethics and Information Technology, 14(2), 123–135. de Laat, P. B. (2012b). Navigating between chaos and bureaucracy: Backgrounding trust in open content communities. In K. Aberer, et al. (Eds.), Social informatics. 4th International conference, SocInfo 2012; Lausanne, Switzerland, 5–7 December, 2012; Proceedings, LNCS 7710 (pp. 534–557). Heidelberg: Springer. de Laat, P. B. (2014). From open-source software to Wikipedia: 'Backgrounding' trust by collective monitoring and reputation tracking. Ethics and Information Technology, 16(2), 157–169. Dutton, W. H. (2008). The wisdom of collaborative network organizations: Capturing the value of networked individuals. Prometheus, 26(3), 211–230. Forte, A., & Lampe, C. (2013). Defining, understanding, and supporting open collaboration: Lessons From the literature. American Behavioral Scientist, 57(5), 535–547. Friedland, S. (2014). The difference between invisible and visible surveillance in a mass surveillance world. Elon University Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2014-02. Available at SSRN. http://ssrn.com/abstract=2392489. Geiger, R. S. (2011). (2011) The Lives of Bots. In G. Lovink & N. Tkacz (Eds.), Critical point of view: A Wikipedia reader (pp. 78–93). Amsterdam: Institute of Network Cultures. Geiger, R. S. (2014). Bots, bespoke, code and the materiality of software platforms. Information, Communication & Society, 17(3), 342–356. Geiger, R. S., & Ribes, D. (2010). The work of sustaining order in Wikipedia: The banning of a vandal. In CSCW 2010, February 6–10, 2010, Savannah, Georgia. Introna, L. D. (2005). Disclosive ethics and information technology: Disclosing facial recognition systems. Ethics and Information Technology, 7(2), 75–86. Johnson, D. G. (2004). Computer ethics. In L. Floridi (Ed.), The Blackwell guide to the philosophy of computing and information (pp. 65–75). Hoboken, NJ: Wiley. Johnson, D. G. (2013). Negotiating responsibility in the discourse on moral robots and other artificial agents. In: E. Buchanan, P. B. de Laat & H. T. Tavani (Eds.), Ambiguous technologies: Philosophical issues, practical solutions, human nature. Proceedings The use of software tools and autonomous bots against vandalism: eroding Wikipedia's moral... 187 123 of the tenth international conference on computer ethics- Philosophical Enquiry, 2013 (pp. 182–193). Lisbon, Portugal. Johnson, M., Bradshaw, J. M., Feltovich, P. J., Jonker, C., Sierhuis, M., & van Riemsdijk, B. (2010). Toward coactivity. In: HRI '10: Proceedings of the 5th ACM/IEEE international conference on human–robot interaction (March 2010). Livingstone, R. M. (2012). Network of knowledge: Wikipedia as a sociotechnical system of intelligence. Dissertation, University of Oregon, September 2012. Moor, J. H. (2006). The nature, importance, and difficulty of machine ethics. IEEE Intelligent Systems, 21(4), 18–21. Nielsen, F. A. (2014) Wikipedia research and tools: Review and comments. Working paper. Most recent update obtained from http://www2.imm.dtu.dk/pubdb/views/publication_details.php?id= 6012. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2129874. Schauer, F. (2003). Profiles, probabilities, and stereotypes. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Simonite, T. (2013). The decline of Wikipedia. MIT Technology Review, 116(6), 51–56. Stahl, B., Elizondo, D., Carroll-Mayer, M., Zheng, Y., & Wakunuma, K. (2010). Ethical and legal issues of the use of computational intelligence techniques in computer security and computer forensics. In: Proceedings of the 2010 international joint conference on neural networks, July 18–23, 2010, Barcelona, Spain. Stegbauer, C. (an interview with). (2011). Cultural transformations in Wikipedia or 'from Emancipation to Product Ideology'. In G. Lovink & N. Tkacz (Eds.), Critical point of view: A Wikipedia reader (pp. 342–350). Amsterdam: Institute of Network Cultures. Vallor, S. (2015). Moral deskilling and upskilling in a new machine age: Reflections on the ambiguous future of character. Philosophy & Technology, 28, 107–124. Vanacker, B. (2011). Returning students' right to access, choice and notice: A proposed code of ethics for instructors using Turnitin. Ethics and Information Technology, 13(4), 327–338. West, A. G., Chang, J., Venkatasubramanian, K. K., & Lee, I. (2012). Trust in collaborative web applications. Future Generation Computer Systems, 28(8), 1238–1251. doi:10.1016/j.future.2011. 02.007. West, A. G., Kannan, S., & Lee, I. (2010) Detecting Wikipedia vandalism via spatio-temporal analysis of revision metadata. In EUROSEC'10: 22–28, Paris, France. Wikipedia-related references Irc://freenode/cvn-wp-en, opens in Chatzilla (an IRC-client to be enabled on Firefox). Wmf:Privacy Policy. https://wikimediafoundation.org/wiki/Privacy_ policy Wmf:Terms of Use. https://wikimediafoundation.org/wiki/Terms_of_ Use WP:Bot policy. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Bot_policy WP:CLUEBOT. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User:ClueBot_NG WP:Edit filter. Combined information obtained from https://en.wiki pedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Edit_filter, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Special:AbuseFilter, and https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:Tags WP:Huggle. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Huggle WP:Lupin. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User:Lupin/Anti-vandal_tool WP:OLDSCHOOL. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Cleaning_ up_vandalism/Tools WP:STiki. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:STiki WP:STIKI/L. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:STiki/leaderboard WP:Twinkle. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Twinkle WP:VandalFighter. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Vandal Fighter WP:Wikipedians. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Wikipedians 188 P. B. de Laat

Paternalism K Grill, Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden a 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. Glossary Hard paternalism Submitting to paternalism a person whose choice or action is known to be sufficiently voluntary to be genuinely hers. Interference In this context, an action that may involve paternalism because it diminishes or fails to respect some liberal value, typically by limiting liberty or violating autonomy. Libertarian paternalism Designing or mildly affecting choice situations in order to promote the chooser's good. Moralism (1) Interference with a person aimed at protecting or promoting morality; (2) invoking the promotion or protection of morality as a reason for interference with a person. Paternalism (1) Interference with a person aimed at protecting or promoting her good; (2) invoking the protection or promotion of the good of a person as a reason for interference with her. Soft paternalism Submitting to paternalism a person whose choice or action is known not to be sufficiently voluntary to be genuinely hers; sometimes also interference with a person aimed at establishing to what extent her choice or action is voluntary. Introduction Paternalism is a theoretical concept. It means, roughly, interference with a person's liberty or autonomy for her good. The concept is much disputed, as will be reflected in this article. Paternalism is opposed by the liberal tradi- tion, with an early and significant criticism in John Stuart Mill's On Liberty (1859). The Latin root pater suggests paternalism is being or behaving like a father. However, paternalism does not refer to all behavior that is typical of fathers toward their children, but specifically behavior that involves some form of restraint and some form of benevolence. The word 'paternalism' gained usage in the late nine- teenth century. It was then mostly used to refer to more or less strategic benevolence in hierarchical relationships, such as that between king and subject, factory owner and worker, and owner and slave (revealing a rather pessimis- tic view of fatherhood). This use remains to some extent today. The word is also used pejoratively for government activity in general and in particular for expansions of government activity. In contemporary moral philosophy, paternalism refers to benevolent restraint, regardless of power structures. In that context, no gender distinction is intended by the term, which could, if we were more open to terminologi- cal change, be replaced with 'parentalism.' The etymological connection with parenthood and hierarchi- cal relationships may explain why paternalism is sometimes thought to involve an attitude of superiority, signaling that the person acted toward does not know her own good well enough or is unable to protect or promote it satisfactorily. Actual psychological attitudes of this sort are sometimes taken to define paternalistic behavior. Paternalism can also be taken to manifest such attitudes regardless of the actual state of mind of the paternalist. However, the central aspect of paternalism is the combi- nation of an action that interferes with some person and a reason for that action that concerns the same person's good, regardless of attitudes. Historical Overview Paternalism has some historical connection with patri- archic theories of political power. In the seventeenth century, Robert Filmer defended the divine right of kings to rule by invoking the 'right of fatherhood,' which, he claimed, had passed down from Adam to the kings and princes of his own time. This theory was famously criticized by John Locke by invoking indivi- duals' natural right to life, liberty, and property, independently of any government. Liberal philosophy from Locke to John Stuart Mill emphasized the limited right of the state to interfere with individuals. In Mill's mid-nineteenth-century work, individual liberty is defended not mainly against monarchs but explicitly against democratic government, as well as against society more generally. Mill's position in On Liberty is that people should be free to do as they like as long as their behavior does not harm others. People may be harmed not only by action but also by inaction. However, in such matters that concern only a person herself and consenting others, 359 360 Paternalism society has no right to intervene. Mill is mainly con- cerned with social as opposed to individual paternalism, although not only with the law but also with public opinion, which he argues can be as invasive as political oppression. Mill's arguments are in part practical. He claims that every person knows best what is in her interest and is most concerned to promote that interest. He argues that making one's own choices tends to develop one's char- acter. He calls for experiments in living, which enrich our collective view of the possible and so promote all our well-being. However, there is also a perfectionist streak in Mill. He embraces the values of development and indivi- duality, which he sees as fundamental aspects of well- being. Underpinned by these value commitments, Mill's liberty principle is not easily set aside by practical circumstances. The contemporary discussion on paternalism was ignited by the debate between Patrick Devlin and H. L. H. Hart following the 1957 report of the UK Wolfenden committee, which recommended that homosexual behavior between consenting adults in private should no longer be a criminal offense. Devlin was critical of this recommendation, arguing that homosexual acts harm the moral fabric of society and can in the long term lead to its disintegration. Hart, support- ing the recommendation, argues that Devlin's unacceptable legal moralism must be distinguished from acceptable legal paternalism. In defending paternalism, Hart argues that Mill was overly optimistic in assuming that individuals are the best judges of their own interest and act accordingly. He points to inadequate attention to consequences, transitory desires, inner psychological compulsion, and subtle manip- ulation by others. Such obstacles to fully voluntary choice have since been at the heart of discussions on paternalism. Following the Hart–Devlin debate in the 1960s, the 1970s and 1980s saw considerable philosophical debate both on the nature of paternalism and on its moral status. Among contemporary works, Joel Feinberg's Harm to Self is arguably the most influential. Feinberg defends a Millian anti-paternalism but develops the restriction to competent and informed agents that Mill only hints at. He calls the resulting principle ''soft paternalism'' because it allows benevolent restriction of insufficiently voluntary choice. After the outburst of articles and books on the topic in the 1980s, there was a lull in the discussion on paternalism until it again intensified during approxi- mately the past decade. Philosophers such as Richard Arneson and Peter de Marneffe have questioned the prevailing and, in their view, extreme resistance to all forms of benevolent restraint of voluntary choice. Meanwhile, drawing on research in behavioral econom- ics, the economist Richard Thaler and the legal scholar Cass Sunstein have defended what they call ''libertarian paternalism'' – promoting healthy choice by conscious design of choice situations, allegedly without limiting liberty. More typical libertarians, of course, continue to oppose all forms of government benevolence. Liberals of all types tend to be anti-paternalists in the sense that they hold paternalism to be at least prima facie wrong – that is, typically wrong, although perhaps acceptable in some circumstances. Normative and Nonnormative Definitions Philology aside, we are interested in paternalism because of its normative properties, most typically the claim that paternalism is always prima facie wrong or, similarly, that the fact that an action involves paternalism is always a pro tanto reason against performing that action or judging it to be justified. However, we may or may not define paternalism in normative terms. Nonnormative defini- tions must specify such terms as 'interference' and 'good' without using normative terms. Normative definitions can allow that these terms are specified by what exactly is, allegedly, prima facie wrong with paternalism. Philosophers disagree on what is best. A nonnormative definition makes it possible to agree on what paternalism is without necessarily agreeing on its moral status. This is an advantage if we want to use the term paternalism to describe the world without getting into normative questions. Once defined, we can then argue about the moral status of paternalism. Because a nonnormative definition does not track moral sentiments, however it is very likely that it will exclude some actions that are opposed on typically anti-paternalist grounds and include some actions that are not opposed on such grounds. As a result, argument about the moral status of paternalism will likely be futile. We get a normative definition if we take the antipaternalist opposition as our starting point and define paternalism as that which this opposition is aimed at. The advantage of this approach is that we may avoid complex nonnormative conceptual issues and engage directly the more pressing matter of what exactly is claimed to be prima facie wrong and whether or not this claim is convincing. Paternalistic Actions and Paternalistic Reasons Normally, the label paternalistic is attached to actions or policies. We think of laws, medical practices, or private actions as being potentially paternalistic. This is also how philosophers normally define the concept. Definitions typically include the following: Paternalism 361 1. An interference condition that delimits the kind of action that may be paternalistic, most often excluding nonintrusive actions such as greeting someone in the street (when this is not a sign to fellow paternalists to capture the person and force her to be more prudent). 2. A consent condition that limits paternalistic actions to such actions as have not been consented to – excluding actions that are performed in response to explicit consent and possibly also tacit and inferred consent. 3. A benevolence condition that limits paternalistic actions to such actions as are motivated, and perhaps also justified, by the good of the person(s) interfered with Very often, there is also the following: 4. A superiority condition that restricts paternalism to such actions as are performed by an agent who considers herself in some way superior to the person(s) interfered with. On some accounts, interference with substantially nonvoluntary behavior cannot be paternalistic. Most often, however, such interference (when benevolent and not consented to) is called soft paternalism. For this and other reasons, voluntariness should not be considered a necessary condition of paternalistic actions. Voluntariness is further discussed later. The four conditions are specified in different ways by different authors, giving rise to a plethora of definitions. The three major conditions, conditions 1–3, are discussed in the following three sections, and superiority is dis- cussed briefly in the section titled Anti-Paternalism. In the short definitions of paternalism in the glossary, con- ditions 1 and 2 have been integrated into the single concept of interference, and condition 4 has been omitted. There are two definitions of paternalism (and moralism) in the glossary because there is an alternative to attaching the label paternalistic to actions. The standard approach is to take for granted that what should be defined is paternalistic action. This approach is convenient because we are often interested in judging the moral status of actions. However, some philosophers claim that paternalism has more to do with reasons than with actions. They point to the fact that there may be multiple rationales for any given action, making it diffi- cult to state when an action is motivated or justified by the protection or promotion of a person's good. For example, one reason for prohibiting drunk driving is that it will reduce risks for drunk drivers, a typically paternalistic rationale. However, another important reason for this policy is that it will reduce risks to other road users, a typically nonpaternalistic rationale. It may therefore be difficult to determine if the policy as such is paternalistic. One possible reaction to the prevalence of multiple rationales is to define paternalism not in terms of actions but instead in terms of the invocation of reasons for actions. This leads to the second, alternative definition in the glossary. On such more reason-focused definitions, condition 3 defines a type of reason and conditions 1 and 2 (and 4) define a type of action. Paternalism is the invocation of such reasons for such actions. In other words, with this move the components remain the same, but the way they are related to one another changes. Opposition to paternalism on reason-focused accounts is not opposition to any particular action or policy but, rather, opposition to counting certain reasons for an action or policy as valid or good reasons. Interference Paternalism can be described on a more general level as a value conflict between some liberty value and some other value, where both values concern the same person or group. In the typical, individual case, limiting one per- son's liberty promotes some other value for her, such as her physical, economic, or moral well-being. As Mill recognized, we may certainly try to affect people, for their good, by noninterfering means such as reasoned argument (in most circumstances). Indeed, Mill had no problem with sin taxes either, as long as the revenue was needed for government essentials. Why then may we not promote people's good by slightly more interfering means? Defining interference, and so the limits of bene- volence, is an unavoidable and difficult task for anyone who takes a general stand on paternalism. Liberty and Autonomy Liberty is most typically understood as the availability of an adequate range of options. Limitation of liberty can then be understood as the restriction of this range by the exclusion of some alternatives. This view fits well with typical cases of paternalism such as the prohibition of certain activities – for example, recreational drug use or driving without a seat belt. However, the view would seem to exclude other typical cases, such as mercy killing and treating an unconscious person in conflict with her preferences or values, for example, by transfusion of blood to an unconscious Jehovah's witness (whose religion for- bids such procedures). If we understand limiting liberty as restriction of choice, therefore, we must either accept that such actions are not paternalistic or accommodate them by somehow extending the meaning of 'choice.' Autonomy is most typically understood as self-deter- mination, and so violation of autonomy may, in the context of paternalism, be understood as substitution of a person's judgment or agency, where the paternalist judges or acts in place of the subject. Substitution of judgment is more common in the literature, in the sense 362 Paternalism of deciding for the subject. Substitution of agency can take place when the subject prefers some option but fails to act on this judgment for some reason, such as lack of deter- mination or weakness of will. The substitution strategy can accommodate cases in which the subject is affected in other ways than having her options restricted. On the other hand, it may seem to exclude cases in which some, perhaps marginal, options are restricted, but the person is left to decide and act among the remainder. Substitution must therefore be understood broadly to include partial restrictions that do not amount to full substitution of judgment in the normal sense of the term. Alternatively, interference can be defined disjunctively as substitution of judgment or restriction of choice. The restriction of choice and the substitution of judg- ment (or agency) strategies together account for many proposed specifications of interference in the literature. However, they share a common weakness. People may well wish to choose and make judgments concerning things that principally concern others and so are not under their legitimate control. Both strategies must there- fore presuppose that the restriction or substitution takes place within an area of legitimate control where the person's choice, judgment, or agency should be decisive. Only within this area can restriction or substitution be interference. The so-called private sphere is sometimes thought to be such an area. The private sphere is suppo- sedly that area of life or conduct which affects only the subject herself and consenting others. However, almost any part of a person's life has some effect on nonconsent- ing others. Moreover, the mere fact that some conduct does not affect nonconsenting others does not imply that it should not be restricted in order to protect the subject herself, who is indeed affected. The delimitation of an area of legitimate control is therefore largely an unsolved puzzle. In the face of this puzzle, one option is to refer the matter to some more general moral theory and so strip paternalism of independent moral importance. For example, paternalism could be understood as wronging someone for her good, whatever wronging is according to the correct moral theory. Another option is to retreat to the general liberal notions of interference with liberty or violation of autonomy, vague as they are, or look to other specifications of these notions. Libertarian Paternalism In discussions of so-called libertarian paternalism, the interference condition has allegedly been lifted. It is not interference, the thinking goes, to adjust a choice situation so that it promotes the chooser's interests, as long as he is free to make his own choice in that situation. In response, it may be thought that choice situations should support chooser preference. However, people very often have no preference independently of the choice situations they face. The way information is presented, the context in which the decision is made, and what the default option is all tend to have a very strong influence on choice, even when all alternatives are readily available. These effects have been noted in preferences over everything from medical treatment to retirement savings plans. People may possibly have preferences over choice situations, but the same indeterminacy may just as well reappear on this meta-level. Very often, therefore, neither preferences over alternatives nor preferences over the way alternatives are presented can determine what choice situations should look like. Even when people do have well-defined preferences over choice situations, it is not clear that it would be an interference if these preferences are not treated as decisive, especially so because choice situations must often have the same structure for every- one in a certain group (e.g., patients at the hospital, employees at the company, and customers at the cafe- teria). I return to this aspect of group cases later. If libertarian paternalism is truly noninterfering, it is not a form of paternalism in the normal sense of the word. Paternalism should be distinguished from the wider notion of benevolence. The rationale for libertarian paternalism is that it is better to promote good choice than to leave matters to chance. Of course, there may be other reasons to design choice situations in certain ways, such as the designer's self-interest. When there are no conflicting interests, however, truly libertarian paternalism can be opposed only by citing side effects, such as the standard argument that power corrupts – in this case, the power to design choice situations. Sometimes, libertarian paternalism is supposed to allow not only that necessary features of choice situations, such as setting the default option, are manipulated or designed but also that small or even sub- stantial costs are imposed on choosing certain alternatives. This, however, clearly approaches standard, interfering paternalism because there is no clear distinction between imposition of costs and outright prevention. Consent If a person gives her genuine consent to some action that interferes with her for her good, she is not a target of paternalism. For example, I can consent to medical pro- cedures that would clearly have been intrusive were it not for my consent. Forcing (old or confused) people to take their medicine against their will is paternalistic, but even cutting a person open and removing some of his organs may not be – if he has given his consent. This condition may be considered an instance of the old Roman formula Volenti non fit injuria – to a willing person, no harm is done. Explicit consent should not be confused with different forms of hypothetical consent, which are not consent in a Paternalism 363 strict sense. However, consent need not always be given by uttering the words ''I consent'' or even be verbal. In some circumstances, silent and tacit consent can be inferred from the circumstances. The consent, however, must be genuine – that is, voluntary. The same standard can be applied to the voluntariness of consent as to the voluntariness of actions, to be discussed later. Normally, there is a delay between the giving of consent and the action that is consented to. This raises the possibility that the person may change her mind. In research contexts, for example, it is established practice that subjects have the right to withdraw from a study at any time. On the other hand, we often have reason to restrict our future options, for example to help ourselves resist temptation. In an often cited example of consent, Odysseus asked his sailors to tie him to the mast when they approached the Sirens' island in order that he would hear their singing without risking his ship or his life trying to reach the island. Once the singing started, Odysseus clearly wanted his sailors to untie him. However, Odysseus had foreseen his own reaction and specifically instructed the sailors not to listen to his future self. The sailors' refusal to untie Odysseus is therefore not considered a case of paternalism, or is considered a special case – self-paternalism. It is an open and difficult question, however, in what circum- stances and in what time frame a person may restrain her future self and when others may help a person to do so. A related question concerns the possible scope of con- sent – whether consent must be specific to certain situations or whether it can be more open-ended. It seems we can consent to someone else directing parts of our life for us, for example, by hiring a professional to manage our finances. Such consent can normally be revoked at any time. However, consent can be both wide in scope and future-oriented. For example, we can appoint someone to be the guardian of our interests if we become incapacitated and later be unable to revoke that appointment. If such consent is valid, our guardian can interfere with us for our good without engaging in paternalism. When a person becomes unconscious or otherwise incapacitated and has not made prior arrangements, we face another sort of difficulty. No consent can be given, but we can make educated guesses concerning what the person would have chosen if he or she were capable, based on the available facts, including the person's earlier decisions and behavior. Such an estimated consent is sometimes called 'individual hypothetical consent' and is, although hypothetical and not strictly a form of con- sent, likely to be in harmony with the person's values. This should be distinguished from 'reasonable man hypothetical consent,' which estimates what a rational and informed person would choose in the person's circumstances, with no regard for the person's specific character and preference. Both kinds of hypothetical consent are sometimes argued to preclude paternalism even for conscious, mature, and healthy individuals who merely have got the facts wrong by human error or reasonable mistake. For example, this is Mill's solution to the apparently paternalistic and acceptable action of restraining someone who is about to severely harm himself. If someone risks harm by unknowingly crossing an unsafe bridge, Mill reasons, it is not even an interference to physically restrain her. This makes sense because there are many cases in which people would simply be grateful for being prevented from making dangerous mistakes. However, invoking hypothetical consent whenever someone does not anticipate the full consequence of her action would open the door to a wide range of interferences, certainly more so than Mill would have been prepared to accept. So-called 'subsequent consent' is not a form of consent either but, rather, refers to expressing a positive attitude to something that has already happened. Unless a person has undergone great changes, however, subsequent con- sent is an indication, after the fact, that the person would have consented had she been able. Proxy consent is not consent by the person in question but, rather, by another person who, perhaps temporarily, acts as the person's guardian, without her consent. Parents are generally allowed to give proxy consent for their children, although only within boundaries. Depending on how interference is specified, it may be that there is no such thing as consenting to interference. In other words, just as consent precludes harm in some legal contexts, it may preclude interference. If so, the consent condition and the interference condition are integrated, with consent one factor determining whether or not an action is interfering. Indeed, a possible specification of interference is 'to affect matters that are under some person's legitimate control, without her consent.' Benevolence Paternalism is always benevolent in some sense. Normally, this benevolence is directed at the person who is interfered with or affected. In so-called 'impure' cases of paternalism, however, the interference is pri- marily directed at someone other than the benefactor. For example, when a prohibition forbids the sale of recreational drugs, the supposed benefactor is the buyer, but the primary target for interference is the seller. Even in impure cases, however, there is arguably some interference with the benefactor, who is prevented from doing what he wants to do or getting what he wants to get, though indirectly. Interfering with con- sensual interactions must be distinguished from 364 Paternalism interfering with one person or group in order to prevent harm or provide benefit to third parties: Preventing a robbery for the good of the victim is not a case of impure paternalism. On most definitions of paternalism, the benevolence is supposed to be first and foremost a psychological motive for the interference. This means that actions can involve paternalism even if they do not in fact benefit the person interfered with in any way, as long as the agent believes that such benefit is forthcoming. The focus is on the agent; assessments of the situation by third parties cannot be paternalistic (unless they amount to interference in their own right). Alternatively, the benevolence may lie on the level of justification. This means that actions can be evaluated independently of motives. If so, policies and laws can involve paternalism in force of their (alleged and/or actual) rationale, regardless of why exactly they were first instigated and enacted. Arguably, both motives and justifications can be paternalistic, and thus definitions should ideally accommodate both kinds of reasons. Mixed Cases Benevolence may or may not be the only reason for an interfering action. When benevolence is only part of the rationale, we have a 'mixed case.' As mentioned pre- viously, paternalism may be defined either in terms of actions or in terms of reasons for action. Mixed cases pose no theoretical difficulty for reason-focused accounts, which are partly proposed as a way of dealing with such cases. If paternalism is the invocation of benevolence as a reason for interference, this is quite independent of whether or not other reasons are also invoked for the same interference. The interference as such cannot be paternalistic on reason-focused accounts. Action-focused accounts, on the other hand, must somehow set a standard for which mixed cases, if any, qualify as paternalism. There are two main strategies. The first is to draw a line for how important the benevolent reason must be in the total set of reasons for an action to be paternalistic. Benevolence may most typically be required to be the only reason, the main reason, or a necessary reason in some sense. The second strategy is to make the benevolence condition apply gradually so that interferences are paternalistic to the degree that their rationale is benevolence. This may be understood either relative to the strength of other reasons for the interference or independently in terms of the absolute strength of the benevolence reason. The specification of paternalistic actions in mixed cases is further complicated by the fact that reasons may be either motives or justifications. In other words, the prevalence of mixed cases make fully developed action-focused accounts very complex. It is difficult, perhaps even impossible, to take proper account of the moral importance of all other kinds of reasons for action while opposing certain actions because they are partly motivated and/or justified by benevolence. Reason-focused accounts, on the other hand, although well suited to deal with mixed cases, are complex in their own right, with their refusal to label actions as either paternalistic or nonpaternalistic. Perhaps this is the reason why most authors prefer to stick with action-focused accounts and deal only with unmixed cases. Theories of the Good Strictly speaking, paternalism is independent of con- flicting theories of the good. Paternalism is interfering with a person for her good, regardless of what that good consists of exactly. However, which theory of the good one adopts affects how much room there is for patern- alism. On subjectivist theories of the good, something can only be good for a person if she finds it good. If such a theory is correct, benevolent interference with a person can only be efficient in cases in which she fails to bring about what she finds good or even allow that others bring it about. Such cases are not uncommon, however. For example, a person may agree that coer- cive treatment would do her more good than harm and yet decline to consent to such treatment out of fear or because she is more concerned to spare her family the expense. Furthermore, a person may be mistaken about what means would contribute to her ends and so resist taking them. On less subjectivist theories of the good, something can be good for a person even though she does not find it so, leaving even more room for paternalism. In the literature, paternalism is often associated with objectivist theories of the good. This may be because justifying an interference with a person aimed at promot- ing some end that she does not endorse requires both an objectivist theory of the good and acceptance of patern- alism. In that sense, the two are bedfellows. As we have seen, however, paternalism is consistent with subjectivist theories of the good. It does not require disregard for a person's view of her good. A presumptive paternalist may of course fail to do good because she is confused or mistaken about the ben- efits of her interference. The mistake may be either practical (her interference will not bring about what she aims to bring about) or normative (what her interference brings about is not good). In either case, her interference is pointless and trivially undesirable. Paternalism 365 Moralism and Types of Good The good that benevolent reasons concern or refer to can be of any kind. Most typically, the good is physical health or survival. Paternalism may also aim to promote people's finances, such as by mandatory retirement savings, or to protect a person's autonomy or promote her future lib- erty, such as by coercive drug rehabilitation or intrusive dissemination of information. A category of special inter- est is moral and religious paternalism, which aims to protect or promote some person's soul or virtue. For example, missionaries have often forced people to take part in religious services in order to save their souls from eternal damnation, and prohibitions on relatively harm- less recreational drugs may be aimed at protecting people's good character from deteriorating into passivity or excessive creativity. Moral paternalism should be distinguished from mor- alism, which is interference aimed at protecting or promoting morality in general, independently of any individual's virtue. Cursing may be thought to blemish a person's soul or character, but it may also be thought to make the world an uglier place. Less benevolent mission- aries may try to save the heathens not for their own sakes but, rather, for the greater glory of God and his kingdom on earth. The government may prohibit gay soldiers from announcing their sexual preference not for their own sakes but, rather, in service to the nation's pride and purity. As shown by the latter example, arguments for moralism may overlap with arguments for the preserva- tion or protection of society. If (implausibly) the essence of some society depends for its preservation on some set of general conduct or opinion, a shift away from that conduct or opinion would spell the end of that society. More practically, social trust is a common asset and if certain behavior damages this trust, perhaps without directly harming any one individual, interference with such behavior may be motivated by the protection of all in some sense, rather than by the preservation of morality as such. Such potential overlap can make it difficult to distinguish moralism from paternalism in practice, although they are quite distinct in theory. Voluntariness Some behavior is so much an effect of forces external to an agent that it can be questioned whether it is in any real sense her behavior – it is substantially involuntary. Reflexes and sleepwalking are obvious cases, but also actions performed under heavy intoxication, complete ignorance, or extreme time pressure may qualify. Some human beings cannot act voluntarily at all, such as infants and some severely developmentally disabled. Interference with substantially involuntary behavior is often called soft paternalism and is generally considered acceptable. (To complicate matters, some authors, espe- cially economists, use the term soft paternalism quite differently to refer to paternalism where the interference is mild.) Naturally, interference with involuntary beha- vior can be morally problematic if it is harmful or unkind but not simply because it is benevolent, not consented to, and perhaps done with a (very reasonable) sense of superiority. Depending on one's preferred definition of paternal- ism, soft paternalism may not be a form of paternalism at all. 'Hard paternalism,' in contrast, is interference with voluntary choice and so unquestionably paternalism. Voluntariness comes in degrees and depends on such factors as how informed the agent is, how well she reasons about her available alternatives, how free she is from manipulation and external pressure, how free she is from internal compulsion, and how calm and collected she is. Most behavior, of course, is neither completely involuntary nor fully voluntary. The soft–hard categor- ization is normally supposed to be exhaustive, however, and so a line must be drawn between hard and soft at some degree of voluntariness. Because of the widespread accep- tance of soft paternalism and rejection of hard paternalism, it is important where this line is drawn. Very often, we do not know to what degree some behavior we observe is voluntary. Typically, if the beha- vior is harmful to the agent, it is considered acceptable to interfere with him in order to find out to what extent he knows what he is doing and whether he intends to do it. Such interference, therefore, is often considered a form of soft paternalism as well. As with degrees of voluntariness, lines must be drawn for what type and degree of uncer- tainty warrants such inquiring interference. If it should be value-neutral, the distinction between soft and hard paternalism must be determined indepen- dently of the seeming reasonableness of the behavior under consideration. Naturally, some behavior is so senselessly self-destructive that we automatically assume involuntariness, such as stepping into the road before an oncoming truck. To be sustained, however, the assump- tion of involuntariness must stand up to closer scrutiny. If we persist in classifying some behavior as involuntary or possibly involuntary, independently of the mental state and practical circumstance of the agent, but only in light of its undesirable consequences, then we are imposing our own standards of reasonableness on the agent. This may perhaps be morally permissible in some situations, but it is certainly paternalistic. An agent's degree of voluntariness naturally varies over situations. We know more about some things and we reason better in some situations. However, the thresh- old of sufficiently voluntary choice may either be rigid over situations or may depend on how much is at stake. As an example of the latter, we may require a higher degree 366 Paternalism of voluntariness before we allow that giving up one's life is voluntary than we require before we allow that giving up one's blood for donation is voluntary. Indeed, the require- ments in the former case may be so strong that we can in practice never be sure that they are fulfilled. In legal and medical contexts, voluntariness is often discussed in terms of (mental) competence or (decision- making) capacity. These are generally considered thresh- old concepts, which makes sense in light of their practical implications: Competent or capable persons are consid- ered qualified to make decisions regarding their own treatment as well as their lives more generally. The threshold may or may not coincide with the threshold between soft and hard paternalism. Definitions of compe- tence and capacity are normally expected to capture whether or not a patient or legal subject should be allowed to decide over her own affairs. In that sense, the concepts are normative. An alternative approach is to try to keep these concepts nonnormative and allow that there may be other factors besides the subject's degree of voluntariness that weigh on whether or not she should be allowed to make her own decisions. The great importance often attributed to the soft– hard distinction depends on the assumption that inter- ference with substantially involuntary behavior is not morally problematic, or only marginally so. This assumption can be questioned. I may, for example, resist interference with my private life even when I act con- trary to my intentions – due to mistake, confusion, or emotion – simply because of a preference against outside involvement. When the behavior is harmless or only trivially harmful to the agent, such preferences are very reasonable and widespread. Moreover, behavior that is locally involuntary, so to speak, may still be globally voluntary in the sense that the agent considers it authentic and in line with her (foolhardy, careless, or spontaneous) character. Anti-Paternalism Within the broad liberal tradition, paternalism is gener- ally considered prima facie or pro tanto morally wrong. This is the anti-paternalist position or doctrine (although the term can also refer to the much stronger position that paternalism is always wrong, all things considered). Antipaternalism most obviously draws support from the fact that paternalism involves some kind of interference with individual choice or action. This no doubt gives us a pro tanto reason against any action involving paternalism. However, paternalism is aimed at protecting or promot- ing individual good. If the interference fulfills this aim and we care about individual good (health, survival, finances, and long-term autonomy), this should give us a pro tanto reason for the action. Indeed, we may even think that good intentions are good reasons independently of effects. At least in cases of effective paternalism, we would seem to stand before a moral conflict rather than a moral wrong. The anti-paternalist can respond to this observa- tion in a number of ways. The most straightforward defense of anti-paternalism is to accept that good-promotion gives us reason for action but insist that interference with (sufficiently volun- tary) choice or action always gives us stronger reason against. This may seem reasonable given the liberal assumptions that people generally know their own inter- ests and are the ones most capable to further them. However, there are plenty of cases in which minor inter- ference leads to enormous good, such as when a person is forced to step back from the edge of the cliff and is thereby saved from certain death, or when a population is forced to wear seat belts and thousands of deaths are thereby prevented. It seems incredible that our (liberty) reasons against interference are stronger than our (survi- val) reasons for action in such cases. It is true that in many cases in which the interference is mild and the benefit large, the targeted behavior is not very voluntary. However, in other cases, the person is relatively informed and rational but happens to make a mistake, is inattentive or lazy, or is acting on a passing impulse. Another way of defending anti-paternalism is to accept that promoting good may sometimes be more important than avoiding interference but to claim that interfering with a person for her own good entails a special sort of insult that goes beyond the interference as such. The benevolent motive quite literally adds insult to injury or, rather, to interference. This position implies that it is better to interfere with a person on a whim, for no special reason, than to interfere with her for her sake. This may seem implausible, especially for those who want to make room for care in ethics, but it could be accepted by devoted individualists. Even so, the insult must be very large in order to underpin general anti-paternalism, because our reasons for interference can be very strong. Perhaps what is insulting is not the benevolent inter- ference as such but, rather, the attitude displayed by the paternalist. On some definitions, as previously discussed, the paternalist always considers herself in some way superior to the person she interferes with. This may seem insulting. However, if an interference would benefit a person, this must be because something is stopping the person from securing this same benefit on her own. The paternalist is in fact superior in the specific sense that she is more able to produce this benefit. For example, I may have brought a pack of cigarettes on a hike in the wild, failing to take this chance to quit smoking because it is too difficult for me. My friend, on the other hand, may have no trouble tossing the package into the mountain stream. In general, of course, it is not morally problematic to consider oneself more able than others in certain respects. Paternalism 367 The anti-paternalist must explain why it is especially problematic to consider oneself more able to promote a person's good than she herself is. The most promising defense of anti-paternalism is arguably to point to our often strong reasons against inter- ference and add some empirical assumptions about our tendency to selfishness, corruption, and incompetence with regard to benefiting others, especially in institutional settings. Although we can sometimes, in theory, benefit others by interfering with them, a large enough dose of pessimism will entail that whenever we try, we will either fail or cause greater harm – for example, by setting danger- ous precedents, discouraging individual responsibility, or strengthening existing power concentrations. A final option, of course, is to reject general antipaternalism and accept that benevolent interference with voluntary choice is sometimes justified, all things considered. Anti-paternalism is the doctrine that patern- alism is always prima facie or pro tanto wrong. If this doctrine is false, liberty and autonomy can still be very important values, just not values that automatically trump other values. Given a strong commitment to liberal values, avoiding paternalism will very often be a sensible rule of thumb, although it can be set aside when the circumstances are grave enough and the means available to improve them efficient enough. Legal Paternalism The liberal criticism is mainly focused on paternalism by the state. When such paternalism is backed up by the criminal law, it may be called legal paternalism. Legal paternalism most typically consists of prohibitions, such as against driving a motorcycle without a helmet or using heroin. Economic policy such as taxing and subsidizing may also be paternalistic if it is interfering. Examples include sin taxes on alcohol and cigarettes and subsidies for exercise. Legal paternalism is often impure in that it targets consensual interactions, such as assisted suicide or the sale of recreational drugs. Legal paternalism is special in several respects. The state is normally the supreme authority in terms of phy- sical force within its domain, determining the basic rules by which a society functions. On the one hand, this makes paternalism by the state especially intrusive because gov- ernment policy can have far-reaching and comprehensive effects on what opportunities are available in society. On the other hand, the basic rules of a society partly deter- mine people's legitimate expectations, and so limiting liberty on this basic level may not upset those expecta- tions and may in that sense be especially nonintrusive. Either way, because the effects of state policy are so farreaching, it is important that it should tend to protect and promote people's good. Large Numbers Legal paternalism normally affects large numbers of peo- ple, with no regard for their individual preferences and special circumstances. The state may have to limit the liberty of all to protect or promote the good of some. For example, the state may want to restrict the sale of poten- tially harmful recreational drugs for which some people develop a dangerous addiction (e.g., alcohol). Such cases involve not only weighing some people's liberty against their good but also weighing the liberty of some against the good of others. If the rationale for a policy is to benefit certain people through interference with them (e.g., by limiting their access to alcohol), this is undoubtedly paternalistic. That other people are also interfered with, without further benefit, is simply a negative side effect, whether or not it is severe enough to make the policy unjust, all things considered. People often welcome liberty-limiting policies because these policies help them secure important bene- fits. Examples include seat belt laws and mandatory retirement savings. If all those affected welcome a lib- erty-limiting policy, that policy arguably does not involve paternalism. More often, however, only some of those affected welcome the policy, making it nonpaterna- listic for them but paternalistic for the remainder. Such cases pose a difficult challenge for action-focused accounts of paternalism, which must be fine-tuned to determine whether or not a policy is, on the whole, paternalistic. The standard approach is to follow the motive of the policymakers, judging a policy nonpaterna- listic if it is intended to benefit the consenters but paternalistic if it is intended to benefit the nonconsenters. This approach gives no guidance to policymakers who intend to benefit all or who simply wonder what their intention ought to be in this situation. Also, there remains the general problem with defining paternalism in terms of motives – namely that on such definitions a policy is nonpaternalistic if the policymakers' motive is not to benefit but, for example, to further their own careers, even if the policy is accepted and preserved because it is generally considered to be justified by the benefits to those it interferes with. On reason-focused accounts, what is paternalistic is invoking some people's good as a reason for interfering with them. If such reasons can be avoided, a policy can be enacted without paternalism. In the case of liberty-limit- ing policies that are welcomed by some but not by all, paternalism can be avoided if the benefits to the consen- ters are large enough to justify the interference with the nonconsenters. At least this is true if the consenters con- sent out of self-interest. If they consent because of the benefits to the nonconsenters, they join purposes with the policymakers, arguably becoming paternalists themselves and further complicating the analysis. 368 Paternalism Paternalism may also be avoided if a policy that inter- feres with a group in order to benefit that group produces the benefit for each member through interference with other members. This is typically true for policies that are not considered paternalistic, such as prohibitions on theft and assault – these core elements of the criminal law restrict the liberty of everyone, in everyone's supposed best interest. More typical 'paternalistic' policies may have the same structure: Product safety regulation partly aims to protect people from being harmed by each other with dangerous products, such as cars or explosives. Because legal paternalism involves weighing the inter- ests of various groups, issues of fairness arise. Those who benefit most from a liberty-limiting policy are typically the bad choosers – those least able to make decisions beneficial for themselves in the absence of interference. People who are bad choosers in one area tend to be bad choosers in other areas. Therefore, avoiding benevolent legal interference will tend to favor the better off at the expense of the worse off. Medical Paternalism Paternalism is close at hand in medical settings because caregivers are normally in a privileged position vis-à-vis their patients. Treatment choices are complex, and patients' decision-making capacity is often impaired. In contrast to an earlier acceptance of medical paternalism, advocacy of patient autonomy is now the norm in medical ethics. Sometimes this is taken to imply that patients should always be informed of available treatment options and encouraged to actively choose between them. However, patient autonomy may also be respected by allowing patients to choose not to get informed but, rather, trust their caregiver or their families to decide for them. There are good practical (consequentialist) reasons to respect patient autonomy. Like any person, a patient is most likely to know her own circumstances and preferences, including non-health-related circumstances such as her family responsibilities and financial situation, which the care- giver may not know anything about. Adding to the general instrumental and possibly intrinsic value of autonomous choice, patients have to some extent lost control over their own lives and bodies and so have an extra need to re- establish their sense of self-direction. Also, adherence and thus effective treatment is promoted by some respect for patient autonomy. Furthermore, at least in modern, indivi- dualist societies, trust and respect in the relationship between caregiver and patient generally make people more likely to seek treatment and more receptive to recommendations. On the other hand, the medical context provides ample examples of how interference can be beneficial. Generally able people can refuse best treatment because they are anxious or upset, because they mistrust their doctors, because they are misinformed or make mistakes, or simply because they fail to bring themselves to accept a risky or painful procedure. Several ethical codes and declarations after World War II have emphasized the importance of informed consent, first to participation in research and later also to treatment. Early on, informed consent served mainly as protection against exploitation and misconduct. Over time, it became increasingly more integrated with respect for patient autonomy. Today, asking patients to give informed consent is standard procedure, but it has been criticized for inefficiency, for failing to protect autonomy, and for inducing caregivers to shrink from their profes- sional responsibility. The formal use of informed consent forms should be distinguished from actual consent by informed people, whether or not the former is intended to capture the latter. Medical paternalism in institutional settings is much like legal paternalism in that it targets groups with little possi- bility for individual variation. However, medical paternalism is also a feature of personal relationships between individual caregivers and their patients. Relationships can be openly paternalistic in that the care- giver assumes the role of benevolent authority, issuing wellintended directives and expecting to be obeyed. Relationships can also be secretively paternalistic in that caregivers manipulate patients for their own good, for example by mixing medicine into food or drink. In both cases, an alternative is an equal and honest relationship in which caregiver and patient reason together about the available options and perhaps even make decisions together. What is the right approach in a certain situation depends on whether anti-paternalism is a correct doctrine and on what is the value of health, of equality, and of self-direction. See also: Advance Directives; Autonomy; Euthanasia (Physician-Assisted Suicide); Informed Consent; Liberalism; Public Health Ethics; Right to Know and Right Not to Know. Further Reading Archard D (1994) For our own good. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72: 283–293. Arneson R (1989) Paternalism, utility, and fairness. Revue International de Philosophie 43: 409–437. Arneson R (2005) Joel Feinberg and the justification of hard paternalism. Legal Theory 11: 259–284. De Marneffe P (2006) Avoiding paternalism. Philosophy and Public Affairs 34: 68–94. Dworkin G (1972) Paternalism. Monist 56: 64–84. Feinberg J (1986) Harm to Self. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Gert B and Culver CM (1976) Paternalistic behavior. Philosophy and Public Affairs 6: 45–57. Grill K (2007) The normative core of paternalism. Res Publica 13: 441–458. Hart HLA (1963) Law, Liberty and Morality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Husak DN (1981) Paternalism and autonomy. Philosophy and Public Affairs 10: 27–46. Paternalism 369 Kleinig J (1983) Paternalism. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press. Mill JS (1991 [1859]) On liberty. In: On Liberty and Other Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Shiffrin S (2000) Paternalism, unconscionability doctrine, and accommodation. Philosophy and Public Affairs 29: 205–250. Thaler RH and Sunstein CR (2003) Libertarian paternalism is not an oxymoron. University of Chicago Law Review 70: 1159–1202. Van de Veer D (1986) Paternalistic Interference. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Relevant Websites http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mill-moral-political – Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 'Mill's Moral and Political Philosophy.' http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/paternalism – Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 'Paternalism.' Biographical Sketch Kalle Grill earned his Ph.D. in Philosophy from the Royal Institute of Technology in Stockholm in 2009 on the thesis Anti-paternalism and Public Health Policy. He has published articles on paternalism in Journal of Medical Ethics, Public Health Ethics, and Res Publica, as well as in the anthology The Philosophy of Public Health (2009). He likes being a father (as well as a big brother) but is not so fond of making decisions about his own life.

PEOPLE: International Journal of Social Sciences ISSN 2454-589 946 Available Online at: http://grdspublishing.org/ Zafer Gunduz, 2017 Volume 3 Issue 2, pp. 946 964 Date of Publication: 21st September, 2017 DOI-https://dx.doi.org/10.20319/pijss.2017.32.946964 This paper can be cited as: GUNDUZ, Z. (2017). A Crıtıcal Approach to Culture and Socıety Defınıtıons. PEOPLE: International Journal of Social Sciences, 3(2), 946-964. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Non-commercial 4.0 International License. To view a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ or send a letter to Creative Commons, PO Box 1866, Mountain View, CA 94042, USA. A CRITICAL APPROACH TO CULTURE AND SOCIETY DEFINITIONS Zafer GUNDUZ Research Assistant, PhD. Student, Philosophy Department, Cumhuriyet University, Sivas, Turkey [email protected] ___________________________________________________________________________ Abstract The point that is stressed by definitions of culture, which rely on its authenticity and considerations that it entails individuality (diversity), is its diversity. Being diverse and acknowledgement of authenticity of the diversity, involves forwardness in itself. Though the acknowledgement of diversity and the impression of integrity formed by the acknowledgement seem to pose a coherence, yet it bears a negative aspect internally. Despite so-called acknowledgement of diversity, coherence and integrity formation seem to be more important. Since coherence of the integrity is based on measures of the seeking subject, forwardness aims to preserve things that are available or to simply fill the gaps. Hence complexity and diversity bear a negative meaning for available things. Because of centered approach which basically is putting familiar things into a closer circle while putting others aside. It brings concretization to the culture. To the extent of concretization endeavor, it leads us to study culture as belonging to a society (the privatization aim here even breaks down culture to a subculture level). Concretization of culture itself might seem as understanding and acknowledgement of culture, however, the aim for making a definition involves detaching the existent from existence forms and from the environment that it exists in. This article is to discuss, with philosophical terms, how different cultures embrace sincerity in exposing themselves while interacting with other cultures given our definitions of culture and the PEOPLE: International Journal of Social Sciences ISSN 2454-589 947 Available Online at: http://grdspublishing.org/ seeking for multiculturalism. Thanks to developments in transportation and means of technology, different cultures and societies meet and interact easily. Though we have a heritage of drawing borders, these borders hardly preserve their existence. The issues under discussion have evolved from the endeavor to build a common identity-culture-society to acknowledgement of diversity and difference. Keywords Culture, Individuality, Multiculturalism, Centered Approach, Others ___________________________________________________________________________ 1. Introduction Along with the developments in technology, increasing communication means have revealed to us the information of other cultures and lives beyond the borders –which already became symbolicwe live in. Our boundaries affect our everyday life, depending on whether good or bad the developments are outside the local borders we live in. The news and social media are conveying the developments in the different regions of the world every day. Increasing population, decreasing resources, destruction of natural resources, wars, struggles of refugees to survive are on the way to becoming a problem of our everyday life. The fact that we do not face directly with some of these problems, means that we come to ignore the existence of these problems. Unfortunately, we are not able to avoid the psychological impact of problems that we are physically far from being in. The opportunities provided by the developing technologies and the widespread use of social media and the internet enable us to realize the existence of separate lives apart from the country, culture and religion we live in (Soykan, 2015, 322). For this reason, discussing the possibilities of living together and providing the most probable conditions for it seem like the greatest issue of our time. In general, the conditions and possibility of living together are only given by the existence of some prior acknowledgments. The formation of a "self" as an individual requires the presence of these pre-acceptances. To become a "self" requires forming a boundary and defining the self and the other against itself (Agamben, 2013, 3-4). To form this boundary, one must accept the existence of the environment, society, beliefs, cultures in which the individual lives together. With these assumptions, the individual can now differentiate things as those for herself/himself and those not for herself/himself. Although psychological and conceptual explanations are given for acceptance of the self, the fact that it is for practice provides that it forms itself and its boundaries, giving meaning to its notions for an integrity PEOPLE: International Journal of Social Sciences ISSN 2454-589 948 Available Online at: http://grdspublishing.org/ and concreteness only within a practice 1 . In short, the self can only be provided meaning by directing itself to what is practiced. The existence of the individual as a being with others and the emergence of the possibility of self-formation in this order requires the existence of the „other‟. From this point of view, the individual as the existing one always derives her/his own boundaries from being directed towards the others (Jenks, 2007, 90). Being directed to the other is the line where being together and being distinct become clearer. "The self" has to be in a diversity (the other, culture, faith, society). Obligation is necessary for her/him to form her/his boundary. This and being together in a limited sense that not only the other. As we point out to her/him being with the same species as herself/himself, it includes everything outside of it. 2. Culture and "Self" The aim of this study, rather than making a distinction of "self" and "not self" based on the notion of "self", is to make a logical inquiry for living together grounded on a culture oriented and centrality approach which we would really like to discuss by prioritizing the subject first in forming the boundaries regarding the "self" (Russell, 1975, 29-30). For this reason, it is necessary to emphasize the coexistence where the individual distinguishes herself/himself from the „other‟. Coexistence and the „other‟ also have a context that expresses the diversity (being different) of others. While diversity is everything around the "self", in particular it has a design for the "self" which directs it to the others of its same genre. In other words, all intentions expressed by the words like „diversity‟, „other‟, and „different‟ put all particular things together under the same genre with the "self" (Welsch, 2013, 513-532). While the awareness, which belongs to the self and is limited by a specific field, receives criticisms like the "self" forgets its own existence and that it is in a world together with other existents, this forgetfulness now stands there as a concrete reality. The individual is making an order of importance for the existent and in the effort to preserve its existence order. She/he ranks importance of existents for the sake of closeness to and usefulness 2 for 1 Etimologically, creating boundaries, existing among things is one of the possibilities of objects as in the sense of being in the world. Being in the self, however, is beyond existing among things for the subject. She/he, as intervening subject who retains its authenticity at the same time, is not there as a simple existent with other things. She/he is there as part of a demonstration. Unlike with the things, it is aimed at the practice, and with its the intervening trait. Levinas, Sonsuza Tanıklık, p62. 2 Chris Jenks, quoting Harris in his work „Subculture‟, positively associates living together and being a society with proximity, mutual support and solidarity. However, in its further chapters he recognizes that living together PEOPLE: International Journal of Social Sciences ISSN 2454-589 949 Available Online at: http://grdspublishing.org/ herself/himself, separatetly from the classifications like being a unique existent in its own genre, between beings and inanimate things, being a rare existent or being a unique genre. This seems to be more of a benefit to herself/himself. There seems to be an approach towards blessing itself and a display that it is special (Jenks, 2007, 65). The effort to separate itself from the „other‟ and other existents is reflected in its practice of living together in the course of its entire life. Every expression she/he makes associated with the „other‟ refers to the things/beings that she/he has to live together considering importance and usefulness, similarity, and identity around her/his centrality and within limits of tolerance. To attain "self-consciousness", since it hosts the „other‟ in itself, all our actions and interpretations fall within "being together". While "being together" and "self and the other" do not pose any problem, we need to understand why difficulties arise associated with living together and getting to know the „other‟. Making hasty conclusions asserting that these problems arise due to inequalities like opportunity gap, education, and wealth leads us to a superficial analysis rather than the real cause of the problem. Definitions that ground on human being‟s being born into a culture-society are debated a lot. 3 What is a man, what is the culture, the possibilities of being together, etc., are deeply controversial topics that can be started quickly (Eagleton, 2011, p9-43. Mejuyev, 1987, p2122. River 1998, p122-123. Uygur, 2013, p18. Karsli, 2016, p38-58). One of the reasons for such discussions is that the concerns of creating an initial point or an analytical foundation are shifting to a point where the existent is ignored. The existent lives through an oblivion (of herself/himself) with producing an inception and an effort to understand such as first cause. Part of the oblivion is the possibility of being together with the self and the nearest „other‟. First of all, forgetting the life cycle that we exist together and are a part of (where we are positioned as the nearest) produces the different and the not different. Making the distinction as closest and farthest to herself/himself and making this distinction not in a sense of coexistence but in an assumption of inception (where the self is positioned in the very center) have caused us to overlook the fact that we are in a mutual coexistence in this world. Since our effort for creation / acceptance of an inception has a strong basis within our history of existence, the hypotheses for definition of inception have both direct and indirect certainty in and being a society also bear a negative connotation by differentiating between social classes and other differences. Jenks, Altkültür, p29-38. 3 As a sociological theory, talking about the existence of human being in a society includes harmony and inception endeavors in itself. There is also an endeavor to classify societies as to their religion, language, race, region and socioeconomic traits. In this way, definitions of popular culture and being cultivated are made. Berger, Kültür Eleştirisi, p141-143. PEOPLE: International Journal of Social Sciences ISSN 2454-589 950 Available Online at: http://grdspublishing.org/ itself for the existent (Açıkgenç 2008 28-29). The certainty is the search for persuasion in others. One of the means of this persuasion effort is the culture. Cultural definitions also have implications for teaching and for the „other‟ to be in harmony by ignoring its differences and drives it to long for being the desired „other‟. Hence, addressing any approach like pluralism, other culture or multiculturalism is sacrificed unilaterally. When we talk about cultural pluralism or differences; what we do is bringing to the foreground the points that belong to the „other‟ and differentiate us from it. The expressions we have made for the different have the opposite meaning as they have an intention to bring out similar aspects with the self in essence. Because she/he is the other than the self. As far as the the „other‟ is concerned, it gets further away from the self. This diversion brings pollution for the self. Since the pollution and the incompleteness are features of it, the responsibility of keeping belongings of the self clean feels its weight more. The "self" cares that the different one needs to move away from herself/himself so that its belongings are not not contaminated. Increasing similarities between the „other‟ and the self will increase pollution. Since this is a compromise, proximity between the self and the other will produce the idea that the self will begin to lose its attributes as being authentic and clean (Douglas, 2007). She/he will start losing her/his qualities and start questioning why she/he is so similar to what is standing far from itself. This is a sign of contamination. However, the presumption that the pollution is caused by creation of ambiguity and by the endeavor for creating abundancy is just derived from readings throughout the history (Mejuyev, 1987, 21-38). Historicity is filled with, or interpreted as, the struggle to get rid of the complexities of living together with the other. To recover from complexity and uncertainty is tried to be facilitated through the redundancy of expressions of certainty. Likewise, since the desire for certainty includes getting rid of ill-defined or contaminated things and uncertainty, the other is unable to recognize it from the very beginning as it is a victim of this desire 4 . The other needs to to learn about this certainty. Since learning includes approaching to the certainty (desire for satisfaction) the reliable evidence encounters with a state of recovery from misconception. The possibility of taking action, with this credible evidence will facilitate the approach towards action. Since she/he acts with the intention of being at the center of these definite presumtions, her/his feeling 4 The Turkish edition of Newton's Mathematical Principles for Philosophy of Nature translated by Aziz Yardımlı, clearly distinguishes the nature of the definite (rational) and the indefinite (irrational) in the foreword as follows: "The universe is rational and can only be understood by an equally rational mindset. The world is also equally irrational for an irrational mindset. Scientific knowledge is knowledge of science or reality, or it is absolute knowledge should you wish to put it in another waythe knowledge of noncelestial, but simply unchanging, unchangeable; it is the knowledge of existent and the existent is the rational. Or the irrational is the non-existent, simply an imagination designed by fantasies of someone." Newton, 1998, p8. PEOPLE: International Journal of Social Sciences ISSN 2454-589 951 Available Online at: http://grdspublishing.org/ suspicion that these definite presumtions of herself/himself being blurred in a form of "what if" quest is due to her/his proximity with her/his same genre, belief, culture, nation and family. In circumstances where she/he maintains proximity, she/he classifies herself/himself as a center, and classifies others with criteria such as importance, usefulness, and maintains "what if" quest as to such classification. As she/he moves out of this classification, she/he will assume adjectives such as different, lacking, dirty, primitive and evil. For this reason, as the criteria of being different increase, she/he will get further away from laying the importance on being together. 5 As the proximity deepens, the orientation towards the other and coexistence will again be an orientation towards the self and understanding of it. It is not just a psychological struggle to identify the the self. On the contrary, the self does not feel just psychologically central; she/he is within this effort in a physical/experiential way. In the experience-oriented direction, the effort to go to the desired result is the most significant plan. It is not only the results of the following experiments, but also the judgments drawn from them guide our experience of learning. Because a behavior that should bear importance and usefulness direct our actions (as required by our understanding of being central). Of course, there is nothing wrong with us to act like this. An established proposition is like a tool for a certain use. "I'm totally sure" does not mean that every single person is sure. It means that we are part of a community that science and education bring together (Wittgenstein, 2009, 49). The saying is actually an acceptance‟s content. It is the satisfaction of a certain community and the acceptance of its closeness to the desired outcome (Wittgenstein, 2009, 49). For this reason, the following inference can be made easily: a certain community derives its togetherness from its potential for proximity within. The potential of the the self and the society for being together is maintained as a result of self‟s orientation towards the other with a sense of proximity 6 . For the self, to be within a society with the other is a desired situation. In this 5 For Chicago school, as urban organism becomes increasingly complex, it produces a centralized decentralization idea which makes it difficult for centralization to be determined. This approach, which is an ecological model / representation, emphasizes that the domino effect is not ignored while addressing social problems. Chris J., Altkültür, s94. 6 In Language, Truthfulness and Logic, Ayer says that our knowledge is based on certainty, and that consequently the acceptance of logical things, which are definite in their existence, is a tradition. The precision statement for an existence will always be false. Because the proposition is a synthetic structure. For this reason, no synthetic statement is logically touched. Traditionally, generating an initial proposal and introducing a property related to it require defining tautology that is, creating an analytic proposition. But putting a syntactic proposition on this one, which is an acceptance, leads us to a ridiculous result. For this reason, its functional and understanding direction must be foregrounded from the certainty of the suggestion. This is to talk about the proclamations of things and things. Proximity means proposition; is strongly verifiable. Ayer, A.J. (1984). Dil, Doğruluk ve Mantık, trans. by Vehbi Hacıkadiroglu, Istanbul: Metis Publications, p152. PEOPLE: International Journal of Social Sciences ISSN 2454-589 952 Available Online at: http://grdspublishing.org/ respect, togetherness is not coincidental, it contains causality. Along with togetherness, the proposal itself that will be produced alongside provides its certainty over this closeness‟ measurement. Therefore, plurality is not a unit that is formed at all. On the contrary plurality is formed by units, each one is different from the other (Zellini, 2011, 55). The plurality mentioned here is the togetherness of the self and the other. The togetherness here is about coming together of different things within proximity. Within a mutual importance classification and usefulness, this integrity here derives its existence from the existence of this potential. This possibility is continuous to the extent and validity of the proposals that it presents. The awareness of this continuity is rationalization. This is no longer just a continuity for the self, but a rationalization for the self who is with the other. Although there are reasons / needs (security, food) within the tendency to centralize and the individual tends to be with others through these reasons / needs, the self is at the core of this tendency and certainty. It is necessary to establish protection and harmony of this environment since the need for living together, which is maintained through proximity, has its diversity and the other in itself. This environment, which occurs in a direction, carries various propositions based on the action, which are not so evident since they have to bear requirements of direction in advance. The orientation that holds the society together, and propositions that maintain self-disclosure against ambiguity and practice all belong to the culture. Because culture produces conditions for the self to express itself and the other within proximity and for the integrity to hold within the soceety which comes through practice. For this reason, culture must contain in itself the possibility of belonging for the self. The self on the other hand, is in an orientation towards the other and is together with the other to the extent of proximity. Culture therefore, like the self, must be in an endeavor for maintaining proximity and centralization. When we say culture of something, we emphasize its features that are different from others. Here there is a manifest of harmony with the other in a sense of proximity. The different one needs to be clarified in order to clarify its own existence. Culture plays an important role in this clarification. For the self, thanks to this, the other will always be different. The culture, thanks to its mentioned role here and since it has an endeavor to reveal the differences and move the differences away from itself, manifests its functional (practical, useful) side more rather than its substantive and integrative sides. 7 7 By quoting from Wright Mills in his work Subculture, Jenks states that, "stability" and "order" efforts have become obscured by "humanitarian ideals". However, such concepts always produce a pathological case as a socially "healthy" structure, an invocation of will. Chris Jenks, Altkültür, s100. PEOPLE: International Journal of Social Sciences ISSN 2454-589 953 Available Online at: http://grdspublishing.org/ The fact that the culture is oriented towards practice, hence it requires a continual formation within it (Jenks, 2007, 16). This existence, in itself, includes a possibility for existence belonging to the self, and phenomenons it has and does not have. What she/he has is determined by what she/he does not have. Since things she/he does not have will produce fear that will reveal her/his deprivation, she/he will try to either remove them or establish authority over them. This is purely an existence at all senses. Existence, at any single time, occurs between composition of the limited (peras) and unlimited (aperion). The limit is what determines the logical order of each object, at any moment drawing them out of pure causality as much as possible, giving form and character to them, making them exist tangibly. On the other hand, besides the limit, there could have been no history or any progress, unless there was no anti-born principle which prevented an object from being fixed on the edges of its existence which established it with the limit principle (Zellini, 2011, 9-10). 3. Belonging and Ignoring Others Culture‟s effort to be oriented towards the limit and the belongings of the other, which could be expressed as belogings that it does not have, and its endeavor for being unlimited (its desire to be authoritarian) reveal its concern for action (practice). This concern will keep formation and movement constant. Because this effort involves a completeness and the impossibility of achieving the unlimited, motion will keep the culture alive and dynamic as a constant attribute. Culture exists, before anything else, by being belonging to the self. This has gained vitality in the extent of communication between the self and the other 8 . Considering our quest for understanding the culture, what is missed is the fact that she has acquired this harmony by belonging to the self, even if definitions say that she pursues to preserve the existence of being together. The concern of the self also exists in the culture. Togetherness is nothing more than a simple manifestation of a concern. It is a concern towards certainty, in the effort for centralization and over the self and the other. Future orientation and harmony pursuit of this effort, which we can also express as a practical concern, leads it to communicate with other cultures. The quest to understand other cultures and the desire for harmony, lead it to understand the reasons behind and rightness of its own existence, question the necessity for being different, and finally defend the righness and possibilitie of being being such different. As such, it is necessary and sovereign. She either 8 In the definitions of civilized cultures, the culture is emphasized for its function as a tool. This emphasis can also be interpreted in the form of a cultural concern. Culture is a form of humanization of the nature, and similarly, human beings are a product of culture. Nermi Uygur, Kültür Kuramı, p18-19. PEOPLE: International Journal of Social Sciences ISSN 2454-589 954 Available Online at: http://grdspublishing.org/ dominates the limits she lives in or she has to do so. Culture is culture as far as it is directed towards the other. It is different in the way it belongs to the self. Belonging to lifestyle of the self renders her dynamic and practical. Yet the concern for producing basic expressions (propositions) with the quest for certainty, and the endeavor for coherence and harmony disengages it from the possibility of being self (belonging to something). To the extent of universalization, she puts herself in a privileged position above others, trying to define them. This is an incidence of centralization. To the extent of centralization, it will lose its trait of belonging to the self. Making it autonomous and authentic by ignoring that it belongs to the self is rendering living together as a problem. Our effort to understand culture leads us first to the understanding that it belongs to something and that it must be read through this belonging. For this reason, the relationship between the self and the other is tried to be expressed first as priority regarding for harmony, centralism and authoritarian side (Levinas, 2011, 89). But this ontic priority will cause us, though we are trying to avoid, to get away from the possibilities of being together and ignore dynamic side of the culture. Studying culture alone within a relationship of belongingnesss would not be enough for us to understand the culture and this would even be a wrong and flawed study too. Its authenticity is tried to be surrounded by belongingness (Mejuyev, 1987, 56-57). Its belongingness to the self produces an artificiality. But it has gained an authentic potential by being equally pragmatic, having continuity and movement as its attributes, and concern for practice (Bauman, 2011, 63). However, the emphasis has been put on the localization through all the readings to date. This effort has turned to other through centralization and tried to get rid of it in its endeavor to solve the problems that it has produced to the extent of potentials of being together (Moles, 2012, 125). The concern about cultural practice also contains usefulness and development during its reading. Because her future orientation and search for harmony are tried to be read through the self, and similarly the same definitions of fear, security, interest, economy and politics lay on the basis of readings about the self, it contains usefulness and development in itself (Bauman, 2011, 11-12). Benefits and development are at the main points of the requirements that drive society to harmony regarding being together and culture. In this case, approaching the other will naturally not accept it as it is, and it will cause the problem of representation by expressing herself (UNESCO Report, 1982, 5-21). The acceptance of the existence of diversity and the necessity of living with differences have begun to be discussed and the definitions about the culture like as it is an PEOPLE: International Journal of Social Sciences ISSN 2454-589 955 Available Online at: http://grdspublishing.org/ artificial phenomenon attributed to the subject and is tried to be restricted are losing ground to some extent. Although it seems to be a detriment to this discourse and determination effort, it has not prevented it from continuing its centralization in accordance with the new conditions. Cultural diversity is again in harmony. Regarding speech and representation, it continues to maintain the existence of national culture, religious culture, integrity and fundamental truths. Such continuity seems to get stretched as the other insists in its desire for representing itself. But stretching is not voluntary, and it has a conscious negative orientation too (Gramsci, 2003, 261). The basic expressions of truth and coherence, which it grounds itself on and which are at the same time dominated by it, are now not just a stand-alone acceptance and an absolute stagnation, but a moving measure to the extent of the stretch. This moving dimension of representation imposes itself to the other as to the extent the other longs to represent itself. This imposition does not take its existence from a visible necessity. On the contrary, it is grounded on a negative influence (Badiou, 2015, 47-48). This imposition on the other offers us a unique potential to emphasize the authenticity of the culture. Because culture, acquiring its possibilities of existence through the possibilities that belong to the self, takes an authentic effort to be directed to practice. Now the culture does not place the self in the center, but start to place itself right there (Uygur, 2013, 19). This reveals her authenticity. She neglects her own basic propositions and certainty, her belongingness to the self, and imposes her sense of belonging on the self 9 . It becomes a phenomenon on its own as a represented. It tries to be an authority for itself as a phenomenon on its own (Russell, 1975, 93). As such, there is truth, flaw and orientation in itself. The practical orientation of the culture needs a protective structure to protect its current situation. This will take us to the self. The self has therefore been part of the culture which emerged through its own actions and through its orientation towards the other, and has strived to exist under culture‟s determinations. The cycle between the self and culture has shaped itself to comply with the necessity of living with the emergence of differences (the necessity of living together). Difference (I use it in the sense of individuality) has diversity in it. Today, almost all of the existing states or societies are heterogeneous in terms of ethnicities, religions, social groups, politics, and 9 Levinas emphasizes the ambiguity of being neutral in his dialogue with Andre Dalmas. He tells him that he tries to avoid from ambiguity, stating that those who exist the system do negation and affirmation. That is why people who are in a range say that they take refuge in the ambiguity of the neutral and try to gain vitality with concern. In the system (actual world, physical world, and real world) such despair which belongs to the individual seeks possibilities to for relief. Levinas, E. (2011). Maurice Blanchot Üzerine, p69. I think that one of the means of this quest is the virtual world. PEOPLE: International Journal of Social Sciences ISSN 2454-589 956 Available Online at: http://grdspublishing.org/ lifestyles they host, and these different sub-groups even host differences withing each. Multiculturalism is a definition given to the coexistence of different people in this respect 10 . The practical and dynamic aspect of this difference should not be overlooked. Contents of culture change constantly depending on time and place. Talking about a culture for this reason requires taking into consideration the change it has undergone so far. Considering that the possibilities and awareness for change are increasing today, it is necessary to think and discuss our approach to culture and multiculturalism 11 (Monod, 1997, 18). 4. Authentic Structure The regularity and adaptation endeavor that belongs to the culture is perceived as getting the other more close to this direction. The other should express herself/himself in this culture, which is an ontological priority. In terms of representation the other has to go into a formation where it loses its differences. It‟s because culture claims integrity in itself. It possesses its own existence and rightness as it‟s in the center. It is through this rightness that it is authoritarian. The other is just a single part of this whole. Impressions like the other, as just a part of the whole, alone forms the whole would simply mean that our reading, as we mentioned at the beginning of the article, is in a wrong way. Because, given the belongingness to the self, as a product of an orientation and a practical concern, the culture has acquired an authentic structure. With its authentic structure, its integrity goes beyond the belongingness to the self (national culture, religious culture, etc.). In order to protect its integrity, it is necessary to protect its authentic possibilities. Any single whole (culture as a whole) would always be broken down into smaller pieces by dividing it into halves, and even the smallest parts of the division were actually present in the whole before the division process begins. Their presence (parts) must be in the whole and obvious; because they cannot escape from it and when the division process inevitably reaches them, they will be in a limited form of belongingness which is implicitly necessitating it (Zellini, 2011, 31-32). In this way, culture will preserve its authenticity towards practice. Each and every single different one has 10 Critics of culture believe that culture plays an important role in social and political development as well as in the development of individual identity. We can divide culture in two ways, by its individual and collective orientations. The individual culture that leads the individual to the acquisition of a personal identity and to become a self (appearance, intelligence, personality, etc.), and the social culture, with collective orientations, which is oriented towards the society (sexual, economic, racial, ethnic, religious, etc.) that the individual belongs to. Multiculturalism manifests itself by expressing these distinctions. Arthur A.B., Kültür Eleştirisi, p. 144-45. 11 Saying "I know it" necessitates the determination of the possibilities that make it happen. Once it has been decided what is the decisive factor for that proposition, it now reveals something meaningful. But this meaning is oriented towards use/practice. However, it is used within the context of space and time of the moment – the usage is limited with the potential of that context. Wittgenstein, Kesinlik Üstüne + Kültür ve Değer, p. 11-14. PEOPLE: International Journal of Social Sciences ISSN 2454-589 957 Available Online at: http://grdspublishing.org/ to exhibit itself for representation sake, but not through the possibility of being different, on the contrary, by the desire for belonging to a whole and being a part of it. Through the ages, actuality and limits have provided the necessary proposals for theories of knowledge (such as social theories, and even this can be extended to physical sciences), and the indispensable criteria for conceptual abstraction and classification (Zellini, 2011 33). This authentic structure, which makes the self to prioritize itself against the other, allows culture to preserve its integrity. Because classical literacy and historical approach have always been in an attempt to reflect itself with a desire to produce centralization, protection and righteous propositions (Bauman, 2015 50). The question of multiculturalism, culture, and the possibility of living together cannot be enough to produce a solution from the point of ignoring the fact that integrity will move with the effort to protect itself (Lukacs, 1978, 154157. Cushing, 2006, 264-272). Protecting itself involves the reproduction and transmission of itself. The reason for the complication is our age itself. It is argued that one of the methods for the culture to preserve its own authenticity is its belongingness to a particular society. Thus, society will find itself surrounded by the represented culture. The individual will be protected from the different by this means. Culture will now guarantee its own existence. As determined and in a form of instrumentality, culture assumes an authoritarian possibility. Utility will no longer be mentioned for the individual but the culture. It has been the source of a possibility for belongingness (UNESCO, 1982, 5-21). This important task of the culture is often emphasized in terms of time. Because it is not needed anymore protecting the potential of creating the basis for living together. Living together, which is now forgotten, the other‟s authenticity, and togetherness of different were all compromised for harmonization, development, and orientation for the future. The most important responsibility and tool of this effort is presented as belonging to the culture. Vague expressions like national culture (effort to classify the culture) have a utility to propagate modernity 12 . This is a historical change and development discourse (Tomlinson, 1999: 138-139). Note that these expressions are related to the dimension of cultural representation. It is indisputable that there is an effort of practice by the culture in favor of the self. Here the self, based on readings of culture, lives in a structure 12 Considering the debate about modernity and nation, protection of national integrity and orientation towards national resources (not only natural resources but also beliefs, ethnic structure, socioeconomic structure, culture, etc.) have continued to be debated in non-Western societies. Though there are reasons for this, like psychological and spiritual needs, there still can be something useful in the west (so-called modern societies). This is eventually a situation of coexistence. But as a reality, science and technology inevitably impose itself on these cultures. Protecting its own existence against this imposition can cause serious problems in a society. For the modernity and the products of modern societies, coexistence provides a comfortable opportunity to produce its own existence. Cushing, Fizikte Felsefi Kavramlar 2, p286-287. PEOPLE: International Journal of Social Sciences ISSN 2454-589 958 Available Online at: http://grdspublishing.org/ where its acts are more of the culture of sovereign. However, it is ignored that culture is in an endeavor for maintaining its own autonomy since the authenticity culture is ignored too 13 . Such criticism is becoming more frequent with the ability of technology to reach beyond the national borders and allow the different to express themselves. What is addressed here is that culture has an effort to protect itself. Culture is in a state of authoritarianism that is constantly practicing because it is trying to take away what is different from itself and to get the self into its limits. Bauman says that he would certainly not tolerate the mixture of culture (Bauman, 2015, 6). In the same book, where he also talks about Bourdieu, he says that the culture is a construct for the creation and preservation of social class differences and social hierarchies (Bauman, 2015, 6). In this new age, it has to be faded, quantitatively, the effort for being closed, protecting own existence and the cultural ground for existence. The technology has just accelerated the experience of change, which has already been exercised slowly on everyday life by the media. This in itself contains a vague quantitative increase, not a sequential increase. Recently, especially the growing interest in social media has brought up the reality that culture is a tool for the self. In this kind of environment, self-expression of the self and her/his approach to the different is not based on proximity and protection need, but rather on decreasing these to extinction level. It is not mentioned much about a monolithic culture, a culture that has an authentic possibility, a culture that protects and cares harmony. The self does not have such an aim in mind for practice. For this reason, representation does not form a single unity. Given by the physical possibilities of coexistence, the distinctions such as deprived, bad, not good, etc. can not exist in these environments fully. In the social/virtual environment, the attribute of being a cultural belonging for the self cannot fully make a sense in terms of representation. For this reason, there is no condition that lead to discrimination based on differences put in the center as criteria. Because in the virtual environment the other is the self herself/himself. In a physical environment, cultural assumptions can surround and limit the self, however, virtiual environment removes this possibility from culture. Again, aware of this weakness of cultural proposals, it tries to bring forward the transformation of culture, conservation and future 14 . If we look closely, the most important 13 The other, who is the reason to culture‟s creation, is dominated by the culture itself. Though national unity is maintained and national culture is created by the culture, culture also destroys them back. Terry E., Kültür Yorumları, p177. 14 Being protective, as a result will move the existence into a discourse of certainty. Because the protection is determination of the limit. This means that it is not weak. It makes its own certainty by trying to convince the other. Wittgenstein, Kesinlik Üstüne + Kültür ve Değer, p37-38. PEOPLE: International Journal of Social Sciences ISSN 2454-589 959 Available Online at: http://grdspublishing.org/ challenge of our times comes out to be technology and virtual environment. It is even more effective to intervene in the authoritarian side of the real world from the virtual world, where there is a degree of solidarity and togetherness. Through the virtual environment, the existent has started to be evaluated with an approach using statements like "what if", "could be different", and "could be changed" without really considering the real conditions led to what happened (Bauman, 2015, 83). The distinction between the physical world and the virtual world does not, of course, make one feel so certain. Because the self, first of all, is a part of the world and she/he is also involved in the culture as being in the world. There are cultural influences in all of the thoughts that she/he has acquired. In this way, the change of a nested whole does not show itself as easy and short. For the self, the presence of this representation does not make itself felt in every environment where she/he expresses herself/himself. However, the self, who belongs to the place where she/he lives in, is able to get rid of the sense of living in a space. In this manner she/he gains the possibility for getting out of the borders of the physical space and the culture she/he lives in. She/he gets the opportunity to enter into the depths of her/his own existence and conditions of existence that she/he has forgotten and threw into the back of her/his consciousness due to the facts like culture. Representation is further differentiated in the virtual environment than in the physical world. We can also make a conclusion that it has the possibility of creating the conditions of being free. In a flowing culture, she/he can recognize that the space and the certain propositions of her/his acquired culture are different in virtual world. 5. Virtual Environment can be Solution The arguments such as "can be different" or "must be different" used for the culture, where the self is in with all its senses affected by are used mainly in discussions. The authoritarization of culture and her/his authentication are also the reasons for this. This approach, which belongs to the individual, has opened the way for authoritarianization of the culture and preservation of the harmony for the future. What is overlooked is, because of authoritarianization and authentication of culture, the fact that it is something acquired by learning, and that it exists in life with an acceptance in the form of belief. The recognition that she/he is achieved through an experience of learning and acceptance leads us to the fact that its certainty, righteousness, and its centralization attitude are wrong 15 . It is from the fact that 15 "The child learns to believe in many things. According to these beliefs she/he learns to be in action. Parts of a system of believers arise, and in this system some things are steadfastly stable, and some things are very playful. It is not because the steady thing is self-evident or convincing in itself." Wittgenstein, Kesinlik Üstüne + Kültür ve Değer, p31. PEOPLE: International Journal of Social Sciences ISSN 2454-589 960 Available Online at: http://grdspublishing.org/ the individual is born in a society and hence she/he acquires the cultural attributes of that society such as a safe dependency, proximity distinction and usefulness. The virtual environment totally ignores this reality (Wittgenstein, 2009, p33). The redundancy of situations such as safe dependency, proximity, protection, etc. in virtual environment creates a different sense of space in which the the self will express itself. The world we exist in always leads the other to a conclusion, due to the quest for certainty, that she/he needs to be convinced by the expressions of certainty. Since learning includes an orientation towards the certainty (satisfaction), the reliable evidence sought for encounters with a situation where the illusion disappears 16 . The possibility of being in action will provide an action orientation with this credible evidence. In the virtual environment, there is no effort of the learner to acquire certainty. It might even just be moving her/him away from the learning where there is a classical quest for certainty. We learn not only the result of experiments in learning, but also the judgments derived from them. Of course there is nothing wrong with us to act like this. An established proposition is known to be a tool for a particular use. "I am completely confident" does not mean that every single person is sure, but means that we are part of a community that science and education have assembled together (Wittgenstein, 2009, 49). While being in a sense of belongingness, if the certainty acquired as a result of experience cannot build rapport with the unity (the culture) we are in, then we would tend to choose the unity where we belong to. Hence, the effort to define the different as autonomous and to define it as a separate being remain superficial. Representation of the different within the virtual environment is representation of the other in terms of the self, while the self turns out to be the other in virtual world in terms of representation 17 . As descriptions of culture emphasize that she belongs to the self, her individuality and subjectivitiy are emphasized accordingly too. Emphasizing the self‟s and culture‟s authonomy produces a problem regarding possibility of togetherness to take place. Accordingly, culture must be independent of external control and protected from/independent of the other who bears the possibility for practice (Tomlinson, 1999, 147-148). She can keep the society as a whole together as long as its autonomy is maintained. Her continuity is guaranteed to the extent that she is integrative. 16 There is proving for the existent in learning. Moving from the premises, which are considered to bear the truth, to reach the truth of conclusions, that is to say, starting from the acceptance of the initial proposals, and being forced for conviction at the end of the chain. Abraham M., Belirsizin Bilimleri, p122. 17 According to Connolly, "the identification process takes place within the 'paradox of difference' defined by it: the individual does not have identity without an 'other' that will differentiate itself; And in the 'other' she/he finds, it becomes a threat for her/his own existence in this process.". Ongur, H.Ö. (2010). "Kimlik, Uluslararası İlişkilerde Kuram Yapımı ve 11 Eylül 2011 Olayları" Istanbul Commerce University Journal of Social Sciences, p153-163. PEOPLE: International Journal of Social Sciences ISSN 2454-589 961 Available Online at: http://grdspublishing.org/ In the virtual environment, there is no emphasis on this autonomy. Because everything there belongs to everyone. Once the represented starts to share, it also turns out to be available to the other and there will not be a negative effect regarding what is shared. She/he will not have a problem in terms of representation, unless there is a real value created (Kuban, 1999). In this respect, belonging to an individual will not produce an authentic possibility. Since there is no authenticity to mention, centralization does not hold too. Definitions of culture have a possibility of practical concern, as well as a system of meanings attributed to the field of thought and actual reality. For this reason, as well as the practical aspect of the culture, she also has an influence on the intellectual structure. Therefore, her effect on socioeconomic structure would not be one dimensional. Culture has always been a historically specific phenomenon which is authentic and conditioned by social class structure of the society. The contradictory class structure in a capitalist society has led to the emergence of a divided cultural space, essentially parallel to the class structure. Again, Giddens argues that structure should be deemed as something external to individuals (Smith, 2005, 196-201). Aside from sharing a common knowledge and culture, he asserts that human action is one the reasons to culture‟s creation as it tends to reproduce the social order. He says that people need to have a sense of trust and are afraid of uncertainty. He calls it as ontological desire for security. Much of the social life has become routine and ordinary, whereby people feel safe, open to encounters, and can negotiate. In the virtual environment, culture lacks the possibility to reveal its practical concern. As to the representation, the effect that the practical concern produces will not be the same as in real world experiences. For this reason, routinized intellectual patterns will not be able to represent themselves at the same level as in real world. For the self, there is the possibility of a decentralization and mobilization (Russell, 1975, 93). Goffman asserts that much of the everyday social life is made up of small ceremonial exchanges whereby people re-identify their identities as talented people (Smith, 2005, 87-94). Mauss defines this change as gift culture (Smith, 2005, 106-109). Ceremonial exchanges such as the obligation to give a gift, the corresponding obligation to respond the gift with a gift, the necessity that the latter gift needs to be different from the former, etc. are the means of culture‟s adaptation effort to the new world and display realization of culture‟s desire for harmony. These small ceremonial exchanges are compulsory actions of living together for the self. Culture, in this way, is able to reproduce itself at every level. Through continuity and a dynamic structure, it will be able to maintain its certainty and authority. In the virtual PEOPLE: International Journal of Social Sciences ISSN 2454-589 962 Available Online at: http://grdspublishing.org/ environment, however, these small ceremonial exchanges do not provide the potential for togetherness as they do in real environment. The logical emphasis in this distinction between the virtual environment and the real environment (the real world, the physical world) is that the latter neglects the diversity it contains in itself for the sake of certainty in expressing itself. In the real world, the quest for recovery from mistake and protection of the existent have been perceived as formalism. Approaching to the existent and the culture with our precise laws and measures, has made us object of these laws and measures over the time. The virtual environment, however, provides opportunity to the self to express her/his objection to this. The individual, who has became to be expressed statistically in the world which is again expressed with statistics, gains the possibility to have a space where she/he can express her/his own existence in the virtual environment. This space, which produces an ambiguous environment, has a potential for the individual to understand herself/himself and reveal herself/himself as the other. We can only experience the opportunity to avoid rational thinking in an environment that is not rational (Moles, 2012, 321-335). Social sciences, since early times, have always encountered vague phenomena and ambiguous concepts. They have established their entire world with the desire to get rid of these ambiguities. However, efforts to escape from this ambiguity have led them to get away from the existent. This is the reason for our concern and confusion considering all our experiences. For today, concern and confusion stand as a psychological problem when there is lack of solution. Therefore, the possibilities of living together could not be derived from itself or with its own dynamics. Since the effort of determination and centralization has no intention of creating limits of tolerance for togetherness for the individual, hence the individual strives to exclude the other and thereby remove her/his practical concerns. For the individual, suppressing this vague situation by force and usefully seem far from saving her/him from the problems. For this reason, presence of an environment where the concern and the other can can express itself and herself/himself respectively will produce a possibility for the existent to reveal herself/himself. Expressing herself/himself as the other, leads the self (the self, the other) to see that ambiguity is not something to be afraid of in understanding the other and this leads to mobilization. REFERENCES Açıkgenç, A. (2008). "Yeni Bir Toplum Felsefesine İlk Adım", Teoman Durali'ya Armağan (ed. Cengiz Çakmak), Istanbul: Dergah Publicaitons. PEOPLE: International Journal of Social Sciences ISSN 2454-589 963 Available Online at: http://grdspublishing.org/ Agamben, G. (2013). "Kişisi Olmayan Kimlik", Bir Arada Das Zwischen In-Between (trans. Meryem Mine Çilingiroğlu), (ed. Sanem Yazıcıoğlu), Istanbul: İşbankası Publishing. Akarsu, B. (1998). Felsefe Terimleri Sözlüğü, Istanbul: İnkılap Bookstore. Ayer, A.J. (1984). Dil, Doğruluk ve Mantık (trans. Vehbi Hacıkadiroğlu), Istanbul: Metis Publishing. Badiou, A. (2015). Model Kavramı (trans. Alp Tümertekin), Istanbul: İthaki Publishing. Bauman, Z. (2105). Akışkan Modern Dünyada Kültür (trans. Ihsan Çapcıoğlu-Fatih Ömek), Ankara: Atıf Publishing. Berger, A.A. (2014). Kültür Eleştirisi (trans. Özgür Emir), Istanbul: Pinhan Publishing. Cushing, J.T. (2006). Fizikte Felsefi Kavramlar 2 (trans. B. Özgür Sarıoğlu), Istanbul: Publications of Sabancı University. Eagleton, T. (2011). Kültür Yorumları (trans. Özge Çelik), Istanbul: Detay Publishing. Gramsci, A. (2003). Hapishane Defterleri (trans. Adnan Cemgil), Istanbul: Belge Publishing. Jenks, C. (2007). Altkültür (trans. Nihal Demirkol), Istanbul: Detay Publishing. Karsli, Ö. (2016). "Ernst Cassirer‟de Kültürün Anlamı", Journal of Management, Economic, Literature, Islamic and Political Sciences, vol 1(2). Kuban, B. (1999). "Technological Determinism and Social Control of Technology", International Symposium on Science, Technology and Society, Istanbul: ITU Institute of Social Sciences Publishing, vol 1(1). Levinas, E. (2011). Maurice Blanchot Üstüne (trans. Kudret Aras), Istanbul: Monokl Publishing. Levinas, E. (2016). Sonsuza Tanıklık (trans. Gaye Cankaya), (ed. Zeynep Direk-Erdem Gökyaran), Istanbul: Metis Publishing. Lukacs, G. (1978). Birey ve Toplum (trans. Veysel Atayman), Istanbul: Günebakan Publishing. Mejuyev, V. (1987). Kültür ve Tarih (trans. Suat H. Yokova), Ankara: Başak Publishing. Moles, A. (2012). Belirsizin Bilimleri (trans. Nuri Bilgin), Istanbul: YapıKredi Publishing. Monod, J. (1997). Rastlantı ve Zorunluluk (trans. Vehbi Hacıkadiroğlu), Ankara: Dost Bookstore. Ongur, H.Ö. (2010). "Identity, Theory of International Relations and the Events of September 11, 2011", Istanbul Commerce University Journal of Social Sciences, Istanbul: İstanbul Ticaret Üniversitesi Publishing, Vol 9 (17). PEOPLE: International Journal of Social Sciences ISSN 2454-589 964 Available Online at: http://grdspublishing.org/ Russell, B. (1975). Yetke ve Birey (trans. Ayseli Usluata), Istanbul: Cem Publishing House. Smith, P. (2005). Kültürel Kuram (trans. Selime Güzelsarı-İbrahim Gündoğdu), Istanbul: Babel Publishing. Soykan, O.N. (2015). "İnsanın Bir Varoluş Tarzı Olan Kültür, Neden Çatışmalara Yol Açıyor?", Ortak Yaşama Kültürü ve Felsefesi (ed. Celal Türer), Ankara: Turkish Philosophical Society. Tomlinson, J. (1999). Kültürel Emperyalizm (trans. Emrehan Zeybekoğlu), Istanbul: Detay Publishing. UNESCO (1982). Final Report of the World Conference on Cultural Policies: Mexico City, Paris: SoreGraph. http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0005/000525/052505eo.pdf. Uygur, N. (2013). Kültür Kuramı, Istanbul: YapıKredi Publishing. Welsch, W. (2013). "Heidegger Ontological Human Centricism", Bir Arada – Das Zwischen – In-Between, trans. Mehmet Baris Albayrak (ed. Sanem Yazıcıoğlu), Istanbul: İş Bankası Publishing. Wittgenstein, L. (2009). Kesinlik Üstüne + Kültür ve Değer (trans. Doğan Şahiner), Istanbul: Metis Publishing. Zellini, P. (2011). Sonsuzun Kısa Tarihi (trans. Fisun Demir), Ankara: Dost Bookstore.

Issues and Problems in the Blending of Cognitive Science, Evolutionary Psychology, and Literary Study Tony E. Jackson English, North Carolina at Charlotte The present issue of Poetics Today brings together seven different writings that in one way or another have to do with the interdisciplinary mix of cognitive science, evolutionary psychology, and literary studies. For the sake of discussion I will separate the essays into different kinds based on different qualities, even though all share the qualities to some degree.We have samples of two main kinds of interdisciplinary work, namely metalevel discussions of large issues and working examples of practical interpretation. In the first category we begin with Mark Turner, who gives us a generalized overview of the current situation and its prospects and focuses on one interpretive device, conceptual blending, which he considers to be the primary crossover concept from the realm of cognitive studies into the realm of the humanities. We get from Ellen Spolsky a different overview of the issues. In terms of both evolutionary theory and cognitive psychology, she shows why no absolute divide need exist between empirically based critical approaches and the post-structuralist approaches that still dominate literary studies. From Paul Hernadi we get what might be considered a ground laying of fairly general ideas about ''literature's role in the coevolution of human nature and cultures.'' Reuven Tsur, extrapolating from studies of prosody, makes the case that cultural forms or programs ''have solid cognitive foundations and are shaped and constrained by the natural capacities and constraints of the human brain.'' The remaining essays, though they all make at least some generalized claims, are most notable for giving us Poetics Today : (Spring ). Copyright ©  by the Porter Institute for Poetics and Semiotics. 162 Poetics Today 23:1 models of the other main kind of interdisciplinarity, practical interpretation.Within this groupwe have examples of the two primary kinds of practical criticism that we are most likely to see. Lisa Zunshine and Francis Steen use concepts from cognitive scientific studies to interpret specific literary texts. Alan Richardson uses what cognitive science now shows us about the mind to look anew at the way older versions of mind-both scientific and folk-psychological-operated in literary texts. Of course other applications are possible, but bringing specific concepts to bear in specific interpretations (as Zunshine and Steen do) and examining historical versions of mind/body to interpret specific texts (as Richardson does) give us the two broadest categories of application. As respondent I look at these essays as examples of an emerging interdisciplinary field. In my discussion I try to illuminate certain general issues that in my view ought to matter to anyone trying to bring cognitive science, evolutionary psychology, and humanistic studies together. For this reason I have created subtitled sections that address certain of these general concerns. First, we consider what we may call interdisciplinary necessity: if we are to have an inter-disciplinarity, thenwe require some reasonable necessity for bringing the concepts ormethods of one discipline into working relation with the concepts ormethods of another discipline.Our focus in this respect will be conceptual blending. Second, we consider the issue of the different kinds of truth production involved. Next, we look at how current literary theory and practice can be compared to certain key concepts in cognitive science and evolutionary psychology.Then we discuss two recurring issues in evolutionary psychological explanations of culture: the specter of social Darwinism and the speculativeness of claims. In the fifth section we investigate how arguments based on empirical science of whatever kind can be expected to hold a reasonable significance for a humanities audience. Sixth, we have a look at interdisciplinary necessity from the angle of what we may call the historical study of the mind/brain in literature. Next, we consider some likely extensions of some of the ideas included in this volume. Finally, we consider what I take to be one of the primary difficulties of any blend of an empirical scientific and a humanistic discipline. In a sense I try tomake plain the kinds of objections hovering in the background ofwhat has actually beenwritten. Aswe proceedwe need to remember that these are early entries in cognitive literary studies. These writers are still working out fundamental concepts and operating procedures. In fact in the future we may well look back at these kinds of attempts as part of a phase or stage on the way to a more full-blown interdisciplinarity to come. My response hopes to help push things along. Jackson • Issues and Problems 163 Conceptual Blending and the Issue of Interdisciplinary Necessity MarkTurner is wise to begin his general explanation of the cognitive study of art, language, and literature by situating the new theory within the history of classical rhetoric. This is wise because he thereby plants cognitivescientific study of the humanities in a historical field that students of the humanities will recognize and acknowledge and he avoids the evangelical tone that sometimes shows up in writings proclaiming a revolution in criticism. But on the other hand he takes a necessary risk in doing this because he will now have to show how his new approach to the humanities significantly differs from classical as well as contemporary rhetoric. If he fails to make the case for a real and critically productive difference between the new and the already established approaches, the cognitive sciences simply may not become much of a force in the humanities. So when he speaks of ''conceptual blending,'' for instance, which is thus far one of his own mostresearched ideas and one of the main imports from cognitive studies to literary studies, we may ask: Will this idea be sufficiently different from discussions of metaphor (to take the most likely figure) that might be possible without bringing in another disciplinary perspective? Do we really need cognitive science to do what Turner describes? The answer is yes and no. On the one hand he provides us with a strikingly useful method for unpacking figurative language, be it in literary or everyday use.We linguistic creatures operate constantly, without having to think about it, by ''combining two mental packets of meaning-two schematic frames of knowledge or two scenarios, for example-selectively and under constraints, to create a third mental packet of meaning that has new, emergent meaning.'' To use some of his other terms, we map selected elements from one mental space onto elements of another space, and the result is a third space whose properties are more than any sum of the two. This ''advanced ability for conceptual integration'' is, he argues, ''the central capacity of cognitively modern human beings.'' Turner gives us a number of analyses of specific blends to help make his case: ''This surgeon is a lumberjack,'' for example.We have one packet of meaning associated with surgeons, the other with lumberjacks, but the actual meaning we get is a third packet created, automatically in the majority of cases, from only part of the possible elements in each source packet. Other writings of his have provided yet more, equally potent examples (Turner ). In becoming aware of this operation in this way we gain what seems to me a valuable method of looking at figurative language of whatever kind. I would recommend an understanding of conceptual blending as an interpretive tool to any student of literature or rhetoric because it provides a systematic way 164 Poetics Today 23:1 of identifying qualities or elements that do and do not become involved in figurative speech.The basic idea of conceptual blending then is quite useful. Also it seems indisputably true to the facts of language. But then, to get to the ''no'' side of my ''yes and no,'' it must also be said that the idea is equally indisputable without cognitive science to make the case. As far as I can tell, if we set out to unpack any metaphor or other linguistic figure and we consider the relevant elements of the (at a minimum) two items brought together to render a third meaning, we can use much the same method Turner does without knowing anything about cognitive science. Turner himself shows an awareness of this objection when he acknowledges in a footnote that Arthur Koestler in The Act of Creation () had already in a roundabout way made use of the concept of blending.1 But Koestler regarded ''blending as exceptional'' rather than as a fundamental activity of the everyday mind, and he had ''no theory of its structural and dynamic operation.'' True enough, but this did not prevent Koestler from actually doing more or less the same kind of interpretation Turner does. Another hint that Turner is trying to head off this objection is found in his abstract. There he writes that the ''cognitive turn in the humanities . . . drawsmuch of its content, many of its central research questions, andmany of its methods from traditions of the humanities as old as classical rhetoric.'' What Turner does not say is that his particular interpretive methodology may have been generated and perfected by his studies in cognitive sciences, but themethodologyworks quitewell without the science as simply another, smart version of ancient methods of analyzing figurative language.2 The Issue of Epistemologies We are led to ask: How can the cognitive sciences (we will consider evolutionary psychology below) matter for the humanities? The essays of practical interpretation will help answer these questions, but let us first look generally at the present state of interactions between literary (for it is with this one of the humanities that I deal) and cognitive scientific study. At this dawning interdisciplinary moment, we commonly find some form of the following epistemological process. In one or more of the current areas of cognitive-scientific study-cognitive psychology, cognitive anthropology, cognitive rhetoric, cognitive linguistics-certain facts about human cogni- . Turner (: ) also mentions Koestler in The Literary Mind. . The same might possibly be said of Turner's claims about cognitive neuroscience in relation to history. But he is giving us only a general introduction in this respect. Given the context in which the article was delivered, he simply lacked time to give us an example, so it is not easy to see how exactly this mix would actually work. Jackson • Issues and Problems 165 tive architecture have been (at least) adequately established through empirical research. Sometimes these facts have been augmented by neurological research on the brain as the biological cause of themind. Alongwith this we often find an analogical process at work in which generalizations are made at a level of abstraction sufficient to enable us to compare concepts across the three areas of knowledge, that is, neuroscience, cognitive science, and literary study. In what seems to be the ideal model, the brain is shown by neuroscience to perform a certain function in a certain way, the architecture of a certain mental capacity is shown by cognitive science to operate in a way analogous to the brain function, and a psychological or cultural artifact or process is shown to operate in the same analogous way. In The Literary Mind, for instance, Turner (: –) brings in neuroscientific claims about perceptual image schemata, which support psychological claims about conceptual image schemata, which in turn back up his claims about linguistic conceptual blends. He does much the same with his discussion of integration as an aspect of blending (–). In this manner a writer can make claims about literature that, at least compared to the usual literary argument, are scientifically based.The degree of scientificity does vary.Turner uses brain science sparingly and judiciously. ''It is important,'' he writes in the essay included here, ''to realize that having one foot in cognitive neuroscience does not mean uncritically adopting the ideas of cognitive neuroscientists for recycling within literary studies.'' But scientific empiricism matters, and perhaps unavoidably the support of neuroscience, the ''hardest'' science in all this, seems always to be expected (not just by Turner) as a final arbiter of the claims all along the line. And why not? The urge for more solid forms of truth making in literary interpretation flowers up regularly, and scientific truth, even when we are hyperskeptical of it, retains a kind of argumentative solidity that has few equals. But literary interpretation as it is commonly practiced seems to me to lie somewhere in the uncomfortable middle of a continuum of truth production that runs from hard science on the one end to the ''truths'' we find in artworks on the other. I do not mean to say of course that scientists have no aesthetic element in their work or that artists are all natural geniuses, but still this distinction carries weight. As one result scientists (many at least) consider our literary-interpretive claims to be purely subjective if not goofy, and artists (many at least) consider our literary-interpretive claims to be murder by academic dissection.To the scientists we are would-be artists; to the artists, we are would-be scientists. And I for one have to say that at times I feel a certain agreement with both sides, which is what must be expected of being in the middle of this continuum.What I write interpretively about a given text can seem, even though it may be publishable, uncomfortably 166 Poetics Today 23:1 nebulous as a truth claim if I think of what I write in relation to the kinds of claims made in certain other disciplinary contexts. At the same time I can feel not quite right about the entire operation of recasting the text out of itself and into the form of discursive argument, just as you might do with any old object in the world that you wanted to explain. I take it that literature is not just any old object in the world but is in fact a special kind of linguistic object (though I canmake the arguments to show that I amwrong about this specialness). Those who bring cognitive scientific and evolutionary psychological studies to bear on literary interpretation also, as far as I can tell, take literature to be a special linguistic object, but not special in such a way that it would fall altogether outside scientific or science-based explanations. For them to consider literature and interpretation apart fromwhat the cognitive sciences have to say about the ''embodiedmind'' is in a way to dowith literature what René Descartes gets credit for doing with the mind: separating it from the flesh and the blood and the foul rag and bone shop of the beating heart. But of course in blending William Butler Yeats with Descartes just now I have confused things. Yeats did not really mean the heart as a biological organ, and it is hard to imagine him having much time for anyone who would bring in the biological factuality of that organ in a discussion about its importance either to literature or to that part of the human being that can be seen as somehow other than biological. Yeats, and likely most poets, would agree that literature has much to do with humans in their animality but would see the literary investigation of that situation as entirely different from anything like a scientific investigation of it. He would have lots of company, I suspect, among literary scholars. Of course many of those same scholars, I suspect, would likely have a pretty strong, if not absolute, commitment to the idea that a human being in principle is ultimately biological and only biological. If the mind is a function of the brain and body, as I assume most scholars would admit, then why should not biological explanations be relevant for whatever human activity we might consider? The answer of course is that the biological explanation simply may not be relevant to all levels of investigation. Though all we think and do may be the outcome of biological processes, some of these outcomes are too far removed from those ultimate causes, to an extent that biology just will not explain the actual subject of inquiry. The next question is: Given this, how exactly are biological and, say, literary explanations related? At one extreme it may be that biological explanations are to psychological and cultural affairs as quantum mechanics is to the everyday Newtonian universe. At some point in specifying an explanation of, for instance, how a surgeon's knife moves through flesh, we Jackson • Issues and Problems 167 would presumably come to a quantum level of matter. After all the flesh is made up of cells that are made up of molecules that are made up of atoms that are made up of subatomic (voilà!) particles. Yet though all this is true, quantum explanations are not generally relevant to everyday physics. Such a comparison probably overstates the difference of levels between biology and culture. In fact cognitive science appeals in part, it seems to me, because it falls in between strictly biological explanations and the usual literary-interpretive explanations. Its claims arise from empirical studies but primarily from studies of people doing relatively people-y things. At least it investigates a mental organ. Therefore it can be seen as providing a possible anchor for interpretations, so truth production does not seem like little more than a function of disciplinary fashion. At the same time it can be seen as not constraining interpretation in a hard-science way. Empiricism of whatever scientific variety cannot be brought into the discussion without certain consequences. At times these writers are subject to questions from the scientific side about their understanding of the science and their use of the science outside its immediate contexts. At other times they are equally subject to questions from the literary-critical side about the entire idea of explaining literature by means of any overtly scientific concept or approach.Whatever else may be said, it takes a blend of nerve and intellectual curiosity even to attempt to push into this interdisciplinary frontier. The Issue of Interdisciplinary Compatibility Opening up the frontier in a way that others may follow requires a sense of both sameness and difference. We have had a number of statements of difference, of how cognitive and evolutionary studies will revolutionize the study of literature by overthrowing the rule of poststructuralism (Turner ; Carroll ; Storey ). But herewe also haveEllen Spolsky calmly and clearly explaining the conceptual similarities between certain key poststructuralist conclusions and certain key claims of contemporary Darwinism and cognitive psychology, all of which she understands quite well.Yes, this blend of disciplines will be critically different; no, it will not necessarily banish all the literary-interpretive concepts presently in operation. She brings together the findings of poststructuralism about the instability of meaning, Stanley Cavell's more optimistic understanding of the same idea, general concepts of evolutionary theory about the necessary imprecision of natural processes, and the modularity theory of cognition. In this case the primary analogy finds that contemporary Darwinism ''is attractive to literary theory because the processes it hypothesizes for the natural world 168 Poetics Today 23:1 of plants and animals, that is, spontaneous change/variation followed by survival and loss and temporarily stable subspeciation, are consistent with many of the most interesting recent theories of mind, knowledge, meaning, and interpretation.'' She shows by analogy how writings by Noam Chomsky and Ludwig Wittgenstein about language, Stephen Greenblatt about the ''circulation of social energy,'' and Lorraine Code about feminist epistemology all bear strong conceptual similarities to Darwinian theory.This is useful ground-laying work that obviously hopes to head off a certain poststructuralist skepticism at the pass. Interdisciplinary Issues with Evolutionary Psychology Most writers who bring these relatively scientific disciplines into contact with literary studies are strongly aware of at least one thorny, fundamental epistemological issue: the causal relationship between the realms of biology and the realms of culture and psychology. As I have argued in an earlier number of Poetics Today (Jackson ), getting things wrong with this issue can be especially serious because it can easily lead into not just any misconception of the actual nature of things but into a misunderstanding that can then lead straight into some version of social Darwinism. In part, social Darwinism succeeds as a putatively scientific notion because of the mistaken idea that biology simply causes psychology or culture. All of the writers here understand this situation, and all attempt to offset it, typically by making the case for a dialectical understanding of cause and effect. We find this well illustrated in Paul Hernadi's hypothesis about the coevolution of literature and the brain. To put it simply, we may say that the most common notion of evolutionary change runs as follows: over a very long period of time a random genetic mutation happens to lead to some larger-scale, viable, new physiological and/or anatomical element, which, if the environment happens to be favorable, leads to a reproductive advantage, which leads to an increase in the number of creatures endowed with the new element. With respect to cause and effect, this scenario tends to move in one direction.The environment plays a crucial but essentially passive part. But when we come to evolutionary psychology, we will probably need a much more dialectical notion of cause and effect. For this reason such books as Terrence Deacon's The Symbolic Species () have become an important source for evolutionary-psychological arguments.To oversimplify again, Deacon argues against the idea that the evolution of an anatomical change from a smaller to a larger brain brought about language and thus modern human beings in a more or less direct causal sequence. A larger brain was a necessary but not sufficient condition for the emergence Jackson • Issues and Problems 169 of Homo sapiens. Rather, language itself played as large a role in determining the nature of the brain as vice versa. According to Deacon (: ) the ''human brain should reflect language in its architecture the way birds reflect the aerodynamics of flight in the shape andmovements of their wings.'' If language coevolved with the brain and if literature is a specifiable, universal kind of language, then can a case be made for literature's part in evolutionary psychology? Hernadi says yes and offers us some specific hypotheses by which to consider this conceptual extension from the idea of the coevolutionary effects of language. Citing generally agreed-upon qualities of literature and literary experience, he explains how these qualities might have led to certain reproductive advantages in early human life. His essay is an exemplary model for this kind of argument, especially because he is so clearly aware of the generic difficulty with all such arguments- they seem like just-so stories that cannot be proved in the way of, say, arguments for biological evolution. For this reason he judiciously qualifies his language, writing always that an element of literature could have or might have helped bring about a certain advantage. Still, just here is where interdisciplinarity becomes as much a problem as a solution. Hernadi is a fine writer, yet his essay suffers unavoidably from the use of such words as may and can at the most important moments. For a close look at our main example of evolutionary psychology, consider the following statement by Hernadi: ''I do not claim to know what kind of neurological evidence would corroborate or undermine the folk psychological intuition that human emotion, cognition, and volition are both distinguishable and intertwined dimensions of the mind.'' This statement rather perfectly captures some of the tensions built into evolutionary psychology as a discipline.We see the strong desire for a hard-science grounding in neurology, which may be difficult or in some sense impossible to obtain for these elements of human being.3 Along with this we see the compelling interest of folk psychology. Folk psychology is of course nonscientific, may be leaky with self-contradiction, and often enough is not even articulable by the ''folk.'' Still it is a quite specifiable, real, and powerful understanding of the mind. On the one hand, because folk psychology in some form exists universally, it must have emerged over time as a result of regularly occurring interactions between biologically similar human beings in relatively stable environments; it must then somehow be based on ultimately biological predispositions. For this reason neuroscience might possibly ''corroborate'' folk psychology. On the other hand, . Yet cognitive science has already pushed into such categories. Perhaps the most famous example of this would be Damasio . 170 Poetics Today 23:1 because folk psychology is a cultural phenomenon, it may be simply untrue to the neurological facts and therefore undermined by neurology in much the way that racism is untrue to and therefore undermined by the genetic facts. In any event neuroscience or some other empirical science automatically takes place as the final judge of the cultural or psychological phenomenon.Until we have that kind of grounding, evolutionary-psychological arguments will seem relatively speculative, necessarily claiming only what ''may'' have been. In elaborating this dilemma, I suspect I say nothing that Hernadi himself would not acknowledge, nor do I want to discourage this kind of thinking.We are still early in our efforts to relate cultural and psychological affairs to contemporary evolutionary theory.Writings such as Hernadi's are setting methods and directions for further thought. The Issue of Interdisciplinary Significance Because Reuven Tsur's ''Some Cognitive Foundations of 'Cultural Programs' '' is perhaps the most thoroughly mixed case of theory and application here, I turn to it as a transition from themore metalevel to the more directly interpretive essays. In someways this piece is also exemplary.The first third of the essay makes the case for the ways certain cognitive universals can explain the historical appearance of certain more or less universal elements of prosody. This involves combining cognitive psychological claims about short-term memory, gestalt rules of perception, and what amount to statistical surveys of poetic lines with a view to formulating specific ''intercultural principles.'' The next third of the essay explains the ways ''in which intercultural principles have been individuated,'' which is to say, how differences among these universals can be accounted for, at least in general ways.The last third discusses some possible counterexamples to his claims. Making the case for sameness (cognitive universals) and difference will of necessity be a central requirement for much work in this kind of interdisciplinary endeavor. Just claiming that a cognitive universal is operating may be true but will not usually be an act of literary interpretation. To be interpretive a writer will have to make some claim about what it means that a cognitive universal is operating in just the way it is in just this particular kind of textual example. Nevertheless Tsur's essay is also exemplary because, even though he deals with difference, the kind of difference explained is a kind that will find only a small audience among literary scholars. He himself says his main example of prosodic conventions ''may appear marginal to many readers.'' Another way of saying this is that his explanation of difference, the individuation of the universals, does not really move out of the realm of science into the realm of culture. In the last paragraph of his Jackson • Issues and Problems 171 essay Tsur alludes to just what I mean when he speaks of the metaphysical conceit as a form of ''adaptation devices turned to aesthetic ends'' that tend to show up in times of ''great social, political, and ideological upheaval.'' If cognitive literary studies is to become truly inter-disciplinary (on which more below), its explanations of difference will have to involve some dialectical interaction between cognitive universals and variations of cultural forms, for example, great social, political, or ideological upheaval. Otherwise, though the reasoning may be convincing, it will still read as if we are being persuaded only that a cognitive affect is present in a literary object, and that is not likely to interest most scholars in the humanities. With the issue of the kind of significance that can matter, we may turn to the essay of Francis Steen. In setting uphis argument Steenwrites that ''even as the claim that literature has real social effects has attained the status of a truism, the underlying reasons literature works have been left largely unexplored.'' Of course Steen means that a certain kind of underlying reasons has not been explored, but in any case he will now need to put forth underlying reasons that presumably only become available as a result of insights from some realm of cognitive science. Steen does this by bringing blending theory into play in his consideration of Aphra Behn's Love-Letters between a Nobleman and His Sister (). It seems necessary that any cognitive literary study would be trying to reveal underlying, which is to say unconscious, reasons for some manifest element of the text.This is what will make cognitive literary study interesting. Just as cognitive science reveals the ways the embodied mind works to generate cognition that is part of but also apart from our conscious awareness, so cognitive literary studies would be revealing the ways the embodied mind works as part of but also apart from our conscious awareness with respect to literary phenomena. As we have seen, we will need to show what it canmean that a given cognitive function is at work, and oneway to do this is to explain the cognitive function in relation to a historical context, as Steen does in some detail. Care must be taken in doing this, though, because it is easy to make claims about historical change that will be difficult to square with the biology. Steen says of the late seventeenth century that a momentous change was underway ''from subject to citizen.'' But this change was ''not simply institutional; it required a new cognitive organization, a new economy of the imagination.'' If he means that human cognitive architecture as such was undergoing a specifiable historical change, then we have a remarkable claim because it would involve not just a social change but a qualitative biological change in the basic way we apprehend the world. A skeptic may be led to ask: Given Steen's claim, just how fundamental to human being is this concept cognitive? If it is as fundamental as it seems to 172 Poetics Today 23:1 be in the scientific literature, it must change only very seldom and over evolutionarily long periods of time. If the term is not being used in this way, then it ought to be distinguished from its usual cognitive-scientific usages. Otherwise a reader can fail to see how the term cognitive carries a meaningful difference from other possible, nonscientific terms, such as ideolo
or subjectivity. In fact Steen does not really stay with this large claim, but one should nevertheless be aware of the implications of such a statement. Again, Steen's argument depends much on blending theory to make its points. He takes off from the basis of a cognitive universal (conceptual blending) and tries to show how this universal can illuminate the nature of certain contradictions in the text. As with other literary-interpretive approaches, focusing on contradictions is rhetorically smart because contradictions automatically need to be explained. He gives us a detailed and convincing reading of the novel, showing how historical contexts can determine the nature of specific literary blends. But as with Turner we have to ask: How necessary to his reading is the cognitive science? Steen understands blending theory and makes a diligent attempt to use it in a comprehensive interpretation, so what I have called the issue of necessity shows up rather clearly. At times Steen stays with the language of blending theory; at times he does not. He writes at one point that the ''tension in Behn's dramatization of the story [of the Earl of Berkeley's daughter] relies on the conjunction of a patriarchal perspective on power and a feminist perspective on love. Clearly adapting the father's point of view would have provided a topical and ideologically correct mapping of the [real-world] scandal onto the [real-world] political debate'' about the relation of the king to his subjects. ''The act of mapping [real-world] politics onto the domain of love opens up a possibility space where the significance of political relations can be transformed'' in play, so to speak, without the risks of real-world consequences.This seems true and insightful, but we do not really need cognitive science in order to make these claims. In fact, for long stretches of the essay Steen argues the issues without using words like ''mapping'' or ''domain'' and the like.The several-page explication of political and sexual crossovers in the story of Melinda, Silvia, the count, and Philander has little such language and does not need it.The interpretation only needs what it most has: Steen's close reading of the surrounding history, of Behn's biography, and of the novel along with his ability to see analogies between fictional, political, and cultural levels of meaning. Later on in the explication of this same story we do get what appears to be a return to the science: In the language of structured connectionism, the rhetoric of the lovers coactivates the domains of love and politics. Each of these have rich sets of logical Jackson • Issues and Problems 173 implications. The domain of love calls for associations of the physically erotic, of the natural, of going beyond convention, of passion, compulsion, and irresistible urges. On the other hand, love also involves the dangers of deceit, of guileful seduction bordering on rape with the attendant loss of virginity, honor, reputation, social standing. Structured connectionism and domainmay be necessary terms in the context of psychological theory and practice. But here we might as well say: ''In the language of new (or possibly old) historicism, the rhetoric of the lovers is constituted from the discourses of love and politics of the time. Each discourse contributes its own set of elements. The seventeenth-century discourse of love brings in, as do all discursive structures, certain contradictions the covering over of which is a constitutive necessity,'' and so forth. Or something of the sort. Too often it seems that the vocabulary of cognitive rhetoric is simply being plugged into the interpretation. In fact it begins to seem as if that vocabulary should be either much more prominent or else not present at all. Steen himself almost reveals what I mean when he turns to the work of Dorrit Cohn toward the end of his essay. After quoting some of Cohn's definitions of fictional narrative, Steen says, ''Clearly what Cohn describes are cognitive processes as much as formal characteristics of texts.'' If so, what can we get from the apparatus of cognitive science that we cannot get from Cohn? So far the answer to this question is not clear, but this does not mean the question cannot be answered. Going forward with blending theory will require, I would argue, some further specification of how it operates in the embodied mind, some further empirical understanding of perhaps how it can turn out to be a problem itself as well as a solution to a problem or of how it can conflict with other elements of our cognitive architecture. In the meantime writing such as Steen's shows us where to begin. Interdisciplinary Necessity and the Historical Study of the Mind/Brain Alan Richardson employs cognitive-scientific ideas of the embodied mind to make the case that ''the relation between bodies and minds is of more consequence, at least in Persuasion, than critics of Austen have wanted to acknowledge.'' His argument gives us a clear and well-informed account of debates about the nature of mind in Austen's day. This enables him to show how Austen generated a representation, in both form and content, of an ''embodied epistemology'' without really knowing that was what she was doing. Further she did so more or less in historical tandem with the emerging ''physiological psychologies'' of her time. Once again we have a skilled critic. Novelistic and historical detail come 174 Poetics Today 23:1 together in a solidly convincing argument. Toward the end, however, we read that it ''could be objected that this new view of Persuasion, relying as it does primarily on Romantic-era documents, could have been produced without the inspiration of recent neuroscience and cognitive theory.'' Though some readers might find this self-defeating, I feel it is rhetorically wise. Richardson adequately makes the case that his own reading in cognitive psychology has caused him to see certain textual elements in new ways. And that really is a kind of bottom line for justifying an approach. Once an approach has caused certain textual and historical elements to show up differently, it can often seem that some other approach could have worked as readily. But the key consideration must be whether or not the new perspective actually causes specifiable elements to show up differently than before. I would argue that so far blending theory has failed to do this. Again, the cognitive understanding of blending may have led to a useful method of unpacking metaphor, but it does not really reveal much that would not be revealed by a fine-tuned rhetorical analysis. However, Richardson does in fact notice specific aspects of the text that show up in a new way because of his knowledge of the embodied mind. And yet to his credit, he can sense a certain kind of skeptical reader and so at least tries to anticipate some of the questions I have felt the need to ask. Further, he situates himself at the beginning of the cognitive literary project so that, as with Steen, we can see this kind of work as a phase that will lead to other investigations that will meet this objection. Interdisciplinarity Looking Forward I have saved Lisa Zunshine's essay to the end for reasons that will become apparent. Zunshine sets out to interpret Anna Laetitia Barbauld'sHymns in Prose for Children () ''by deploying a conceptual framework made available by recent theoretical breakthroughs in cognitive anthropology,'' specifically in the area of our evolved, innate ability to distinguish between the categories of ''natural kinds and artifacts.'' She also brings in blending theory.Tomymind the use of blending theory seems stronger here, but this is because it is not the focal interdisciplinary concept. Rather, it serves as support for the concept of categorization, which seems to me the strongest interpretive use of a cognitive finding in this volume. Zunshine is admirably clear in laying out both the general case for cognitive approaches and the specific case for the innate human ability to categorize. Citing work from actual cognitive research by Scott Atran and Frank Keil, she explains that from infancy human beings make a distinction between natural and artificial kinds and that we endow natural kinds with Jackson • Issues and Problems 175 an essence we do not ascribe to artificial kinds. She shows how Barbauld represents children as a blend of both natural and artificial kinds. She then shows how the tension embedded in this kind of ''ontological ambiguity'' gets resolved ideologically. In other words, she brings into play a specific cognitive universal, a specific textual contradiction, and a dialectical relationship between biology and culture. Importantly she also shows how, in more sophisticated texts, the same kind of ambiguity serves to increase rather than overcome tension. As an example she mentions Mary Shelley's Frankenstein (), one of the classic representations of a creature that is both an artifact or made creature and a human being, that is, a natural kind. The cognitive explanation here not only provides a convincing new explanation for an old enigma, it also opens the door to other interpretations. We could, with the help of this particular cognitive-anthropological finding, look historically at the wealth of human-but-not-fully-human images in world literature. In other words, we have our category of sameness: a creature that is both an artificial and a natural kind. On this basis, what can we make of the differences in the various versions? If this image always carries, as Zunshine says, a ''cognitive challenge,'' a disorienting element of ontological uncertainty, what makes it more prominent in one time and/or place than in another? What cultural codes are invoked in the particular qualities attributed to a given version of this image? Finally, Zunshine shows certain contradictions between Barbauld's conscious, folk-psychological understanding of child development-a blank slate ready to be filled-and what she actually writes or implies about the nature of children, which sometimes presumes that children in fact arrive in the world with specific mental predispositions.This compares interestingly to Richardson's essay and shows us two variations on this one approach. Richardson finds a rough parallel between the embodied mind and contemporaneous thinking about psychology; Zunshine finds a contradiction between the two. With these we have an entire new area of investigation opening up. Given the findings of contemporary cognitive studies, we may return to earlier times and look through a new lens at representations, implicit or explicit, of mind-body relations. It will be reasonable to make the working assumption that what we now know of the embodied mind was always present oneway or the other in earlier texts.This would be not unlike the way contemporary findings in, say, feminism or psychoanalytic theory enable us to see immanent properties in texts written long before the advent of the theory. How does the embodied mind show up in earlier texts, and what cultural factors are at work to cause it to show up in the precise way that it does? The possibilities are just beginning. Zunshine, however, does miss an opportunity to distinguish more explic176 Poetics Today 23:1 itly between two important categories in this arena of thought. She explains that the tendency to ascribe natural essences to elements of the world ''became part of our cognitive makeup'' because ''it was selected for in thousands of consecutive generations.'' This, she goes on, ''means . . . that it remains easy for us-though not at all necessary since nothing about it is 'biologically determined'-to jump to essentialist conclusions when dealing with other human beings.'' Evidently a cognitive ability is innate but still not rawly determining in a biological way. This is a difference that needs to be made quite clear, at least for a humanities audience, because once again the shadow of social Darwinism looms near. To explain what I think is meant here, we may think of a parallel. It is not just easy but biologically necessary for us in normal conditions to see certain wavelengths of light. Conversely, it is easy but not biologically necessary for us to attribute essences to objects in the world.This brings us to a key quality of the findings of cognitive science. For the most part cognitive science uncovers innate mental structures that have been determined by our formative evolution over thousands of generations. But though these structures are innate and arise from our interactions as animals with the world, the structures are still mental and therefore not rigidly constrained like breathing, walking, metabolism, and so on. Cognitive structures can be violated or vitiated in ways that biological structures cannot. This fact opens the door for nonscientific contributions to a given explanation. Because cognitive structures are not determined in a strictly biological sense, specific cultural practices and ideologies will have a strong part to play in the actualmanifestation of a given cognitive universal, and the humanities scholar, one way or another, is already the authority on culture and ideology. Thus we have a stronger possibility of a true interdisciplinarity. In Conclusion: The Issue of Inter-disciplinarity To end my response I want to address a question that regularly mystifies those scholars who find cognitive science so compelling for literary studies: Why has the academic literary establishment not welcomed cognitive studies into the fold? I argue that we encounter a fundamental difficulty with this version of inter-disciplinarity. Knowledge production in whatever academic context involves at least the following three common aspects: it combines a theory with some more (in the sciences) or less (in the humanities) formalized method to drive a practice. Typically we find a dialectical relationship between the theory and practice. Thereby the theory determines the investigative practice, but the practice can, at least in principle, recursively affect the theory.The practice can cause us to feel stronger about the Jackson • Issues and Problems 177 validity of the theory, to modify the theory, or possibly to toss it out. Obviously (though the terminology might differ) this is the heart and soul of the empirical sciences, but it operates just as strongly in literary interpretation. Not the theory and practice as such but the epistemological foundations and the nature of the formalized method are what most differentiate humanistic from scientific study.We can find many examples of this in literary and cultural studies. Compare for instance how Michel Foucault's theories of discourse are both employed and changed by someone like Nancy Armstrong () or howFranz Fanon's theories of the psychology of colonialism are both employed and changed by Homi Bhabha (). As far as I can tell, this dialectical relationship between theory and practice cannot be the case with cognitive literary studies because the originating theory cannot, even in principle, be recursively affected by the investigation. We take off from a significantly different theoretical base, namely empirical science of one kind or another. An application of that theory to literature may well change something of our understanding of literature, but it is difficult to see how the interpretive practice can possibly change the theory. If empirical-scientific theory could be changed by what must be considered the nonscientific practice to which we literary scholars put it- no controlled experiments, no quantitative data-then little reason would exist to bring it into play in the first place: it would not be substantially different in conceptual kind from the theories that already operate within literary criticism.4 For example, as we have seen in Zunshine's essay, cognitive anthropology has established empirically based theories about how humans apprehend natural kinds as opposed to artifacts. But although these theories can of course be disputed, only objections arising either from the same kind of scientific disciplinary practices or from relevant philosophical grounds will have the epistemological weight to affect the theory. Presumably if we set out to interpret a literary text with a theory from cognitive anthropology and begin to find the text itself somehow undermining the theory, we will do mental work to bring the interpretation around to the theory or else give up and start over with some other approach. It is difficult to see how we could legitimately disprove or revise the theory by using it in our usual, nonempirical-scientific interpretive practice. On the other hand, let us take the example of Bhabha's theories about the postcolonial condition. These . I would speculate that the obverse interdisciplinarity–say, rhetorical studies of scientific texts–encounters the same problem, and this is part of the reason most scientists dismiss such studies. No dialectic exists between theories of rhetoric on the one hand and science as a kind of truth production on the other; therefore the originating theory cannot be affected by the interpretive practice. 178 Poetics Today 23:1 we could possibly revise or disprove by taking up the actual theories and/or texts he himself used to make his case and showing through the samemethods of argument how he has been untrue to either the theories, the texts, or both. If interdisciplinary tends to mean grounding a practice from one discipline in a theory from another discipline in such a way that theory cannot be affected by practice, then we may have a hard time achieving the truly inter blend that would seem to be the spirit of the term interdisciplinary.The separation of the theory from the investigative practice is just what makes cognitive literary study appealing to some and uninteresting to others. Those who find cognitive approaches appealing will object that, no matter what else, their investigative practice reveals true facts about literature, therefore anyone interested in literature ought to be interested in their findings. But of course, perversely enough, simply being true will not necessarily make a claim or theory interesting. It may also be objected that this kind of interpretation does not actually bear a ''practice'' relation to cognitive theory in the way I have been using these terms.We take the theory as true and then set out simply to show what new things it can tell us about the world, as opposed to showing by practice the validity of the theory. If so, the problem still remains: we do not really have an inter-discipline. Failing to have this dialectic does not mean we cannot learn anything new. But it does mean that, unless certain kinds of rhetorical moves are made, cognitive literary study will have a hard time becoming influential. For whatever reasons a truly dialectical relationship between theory, method, and practice seems to provide a basic intellectual appeal to the majority of scholars.The rhetorical moves that will overcome this problem will in general involve what I have tried to make clear above: making the case for the relevance of specific cognitive universals to the study of literary texts, showing how some element of culture and/or psychology relates to a particular version of the given universal, and making the case for the significance of that version in terms of some larger nonscientific concept, such as culture, genre, ideology, politics, or what have you. This means of course that literary interpretation will remain uncomfortably but intriguingly in between scientific work on one end and artistic work on the other. This seems to me just where interdisciplinary study ought to be. References Armstrong, Nancy  Desire and Domestic Fiction: A Political History of the Novel (New York: Oxford University Press). Jackson • Issues and Problems 179 Bhabha, Homi  The Location of Culture (London and New York: Routledge). Carroll, Joseph  Evolution and Literary Theory (Columbia: University of Missouri Press). Damasio, Antonio  Descartes' Error (New York: G. P. Putnam). Deacon, Terrence  The Symbolic Species: The Co-Evolution of Language and the Brain (New York: W.W. Norton). Jackson, Tony E.  ''Questioning Interdisciplinarity: Cognitive Science, Evolutionary Psychology, and Literary Criticism,'' Poetics Today : –. Koestler, Arthur  The Act of Creation (New York: Macmillan). Storey, Robert  Mimesis and the Human Animal: On the Biogenetic Foundations of Literary Representation (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press). Turner, Mark Reading Minds: The Study of English in the Age of Cognitive Science (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).  The Literary Mind (New York: Oxford University Press).

Reason Papers Vol. 37, no. 2 Reason Papers 37, no. 2 (Fall 2015): 214-220. Copyright © 2015 Dennett, Daniel. Intuition Pumps and Other Tools for Thinking. New York: W. V. Norton and Company, 2013. In Intuition Pumps and Other Tools for Thinking, Daniel Dennett offers seventy-seven different analogies, metaphors, thought experiments, terms, and concepts designed to build support for his conclusions regarding content and meaning, evolutionary theory, the relationship between computers and minds, the nature of consciousness, and free will. While many of these are drawn from Dennett's earlier works, there is also a significant amount of new or revised content, and the book's unique format often helps to provide a new context for existing examples. Early on, Dennett cites Richard Feynman's Surely You're Joking, Mr. Feynman! as an inspiration, 1 and the book has a number of autobiographical elements, most notably detailed recollections of Dennett's arguments with Stephen Jay Gould, Jerry Fodor, Noam Chomsky, John Searle, Thomas Nagel, and others over the past fifty years. As Dennett himself notes, however, his purpose is not so much autobiography as persuasion, in order to get the reader to "think about these topics my way" (p. 5). In this respect, the book is somewhat reminiscent of Karl Popper's Unended Quest, which, like Intuition Pumps, 2 blends elements of intellectual autobiography with personal reflections on philosophical methodology and its appropriate relationship to the sciences. Like Popper (who himself features as an opponent of Dennett in an early, humorous anecdote), Dennett's presentation of the historical arguments with which he has been involved clearly reflects his own conclusions, and it seems likely that his opponents would disagree with some of his descriptions. However, Dennett's concern for understanding his opponents' arguments is clearly discernible throughout the book, and his commitment to writing in a manner understandable by non-specialists is, in general, commendable. In the introduction, Dennett introduces the central concept of "intuition pumps," which are thought experiments "designed to provoke a heart-felt, table-thumping intuition-'Yes, of course it has to be so!'-about whatever thesis is being defended" (p. 6). Dennett originally introduced this notion in his criticism of Searle's well-known "Chinese Room argument." He now classifies thought experiments such as this as "boom crutches" that "only seem to aid in understanding but that actually spread darkness and confusion 1 Richard Phillips Feynman, "Surely You're Joking, Mr. Feynman!": Adventures of a Curious Character (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1985). 2 Karl R. Popper, Unended Quest: An Intellectual Autobiography (Chicago, IL: Open Court, 1976). Reason Papers Vol. 37, no. 2 215 instead of light" (p. 14). Dennett also offers a brief defense of the central role that intuition and metaphor often play in philosophy. He argues that, unlike in the sciences, the sorts of problems that philosophers attempt to solve often have no "fixed points" or "axioms" that might serve to anchor more precise and rigorous methodologies. Dennett's reflections on philosophical methodology continue into Chapter 2, "A Dozen General Thinking Tools," where he argues that the history of philosophy is "in large part the history of very smart people making very tempting mistakes" (p. 20), and that one major reason for studying this history is to avoid making the same mistakes. In an argument that is again reminiscent of Popper, he goes on to argue that we learn far more from aiming high and learning from our "grand mistakes" (p. 23) than we do from restricting our ambition in a misguided attempt to avoid them. Dennett also offers brief discussions of such topics as reductio ad absurdum arguments, Ockham's Razor, false disjunctions, the suppression of evidence, and the importance of charity in interpreting philosophical arguments. Major concepts introduced include "Goulding" (a class of fallacious reasoning named after Dennett's aforementioned frequent interlocutor Gould) and "deepities," or statements that gain their seeming profundity by equivocating between interpretations on which they are trivially true and those on which they are obviously false. Dennett begins Chapter 3 by offering a number of brief vignettes aimed at undermining the Language of Thought Hypothesis (LoTH). These stories aim to "pump intuitions" in favor of both "holism of the mental"-the impossibility of having "just one belief" (p. 67)-and for the possibility of "sorta" beliefs that meet some, but not all, criteria classically associated with beliefs. Later, Dennett defends the central role that the "sorta" operator plays in his own thinking, suggesting that philosophical opposition to this bydegrees way of thinking is often motivated by the (mistaken) view that "nothing counts as an approximation of any mental phenomenon; it's all or nothing" (p. 97). Chapter 3 also sees Dennett introduce a number of his best-known concepts from previous books. He describes "folk psychology" as a talent that we all have for predicting and explaining the behavior of so-called "intentional systems," including both other humans and selected non-humans (such as animals or computer programs). An intentional system is, in turn, simply a system that can usefully be approached using the "intentional stance," which involves acting as if the system in question were a rational agent with certain beliefs, desires, and intentions (p. 79). Finally, Dennett's "homuncular functionalism" contends that we can account for the capacities of highly complex intentional systems (such as human persons), by breaking them down into simpler sub-personal systems, each of which can itself often be modeled using the intentional stance (as a somewhat simpler and stupider agent). This "cascade of homunculi" (p. 91) ends only when we reach systems simple enough to be understood without use of the intentional stance. Reason Papers Vol. 37, no. 2 216 In Chapter 4, "An Interlude About Computers," Dennett introduces a number of concepts borrowed from computer science-such as "Turing machine," "register machine," "virtual machine," and "algorithms"-to provide concrete examples of how simple (and non-intentional) systems can, when built up the right way, be used to accomplish cognitive tasks of almost indefinite complexity. For Dennett, the relevance of this to debates over mind is clear: "you know that if you succeed in getting a computer program to model some phenomenon, there are no causes at work in the model other than the causes that are composed of all the arithmetical operations" (p. 131). Dennett returns to the issue of intentionality in Chapter 5, "More Tools about Meaning." Along the way, he introduces a number of new intuition pumps, and also discusses such philosophical "classics" as Twin Earth, Swampman, and Quinean radical indeterminacy. An early target is the LoTH-associated concept of "original intentionality," according to which artifacts (such as tools, machines, and computers) are limited to a sort of derivative meaning inherited from the "intrinsic" intentionality of their human creators. Dennett goes on to argue that brains ought to be conceived of as rulefollowing "syntactic engines" that approximate idealized, meaning-tracking "semantic engines." He closes the chapter with an ingenious thought experiment concerning two connected computers-two "syntactic systems" designed to mirror the same "semantic system" (p. 193)-which he uses to argue for the necessity of the intentional stance in our efforts to explain and predict real-world systems. Chapter 6 turns to the question of evolution. Dennett begins by introducing the Borges-inspired "The Library of Mendel," which includes every possible DNA sequence, and "design space," which includes all possible designs (including both living beings and artifacts). He then distinguishes between two different ways of how that life might "move" through design space. Where "skyhooks" consist of miraculous "leaps" that cannot be accounted for by the process of evolution via natural selection, "cranes" are naturally evolved subprocesses that allow a local "speeding up" of the process of natural selection. Intelligent Design's appeal to the intentions of a creator, on Dennett's account, would be an example of a skyhook; by contrast, the emergence of things such as the eukaryotic cell and sexual reproduction count as paradigmatic cranes. Whereas many popular writers on evolution have been wary of talking about the "design" of living beings, Dennett shows no such compunction. On his account, the evolutionary process (which can itself be approached with the intentional stance) has designed organisms in accordance with "free-floating rationales," or the "reasons tracked by evolution" (p. 234). While these "reasons" are not internally "represented" by either the evolutionary process or by the organisms themselves, Dennett argues (via the example of gazelles' "stotting") that they are nevertheless crucial to offering successful evolutionary explanations. He ends the chapter with brief arguments highlighting the continuity between living organisms and the artifacts they create, the importance of random "noise" within the Reason Papers Vol. 37, no. 2 217 evolutionary process and the limitations this places on modeling, and on the problems with identifying genes with DNA sequences. In Chapters 7 and 8, Dennett tackles the contentious problems of consciousness and free will, respectively. Here, he considers in detail some of the intuition pumps from the philosophical literature that might seem to cut against his naturalistic explanations of these phenomena. These include philosophical zombies, the Chinese Room argument mentioned above, and Mary the color scientist, among others. In each of these cases, Dennett "turns the knobs" on the thought experiments, and purports to show that the seemingly stable intuitions they generate are in fact highly dependent on the particular manner in which the case has been described. With a more careful and complete examination of these cases, Dennett suggests, the apparent inescapability of their conclusions is nowhere near as evident as their authors had originally contended. In order to counteract the appeal of these purported "boom crutches," Dennett offers a few thought experiments of his own-including "The Curse of the Cauliflower" (p. 296), "The Tuned Deck" (p. 310), and "Rock, Paper, and Scissors" (p. 370)-that are intended to diminish the intuitive appeal of such notions as qualia, libertarian free will, or absolute responsibility for one's actions. In their place, Dennett argues for the adoption of "heterophenomenology" as a methodology for studying the "subjective" experience of consciousness and for embracing compatibilism with respect to free will. As Dennett grants, his brief arguments are unlikely to convince his most committed opponents, but he argues that they do show that the thought experiments offered by these opponents are ill-suited to play the definitive role in philosophical argumentation that they are sometimes thought to. With respect to David Chalmers (a defender of zombies), he thus notes, I cannot prove that there is no Hard Problem [of consciousness], and Chalmers cannot prove that there is one. He has one potent intuition going for him, and if it generated some striking new predictions, or promised to explain something otherwise baffling, we might join him in trying to construct a new theory of consciousness around it, but it stands alone, hard to deny but otherwise theoretically inert. (p. 316) Later, he suggests something similar concerning a thought experiment concerning free will, writing that "I'm not claiming that my variations prove that people are or can be responsible in spite of being determined; I am just claiming that this particular intuition pump is not at all to be trusted since the (available, permissible) knob settings are interfering so much with our judgments" (p. 405). Dennett ends Intuition Pumps with a few brief chapters in which he reflects on the practice of philosophy as a whole, and gives his suggestions for improving it. He offers particular praise for the history of philosophy and the philosophy of science-even seeing a place for the intuition-laden methodology of analytic metaphysics-so long as these are reconceived as Reason Papers Vol. 37, no. 2 218 tools for the auto-anthropological exploration of folk beliefs (and of the "manifest image") rather than as privileged methods for investigating the ultimate nature of reality. Finally, he warns aspiring philosophers against getting caught up in meaningless research, suggesting a rule of thumb for how to do this: make sure that one can adequately explain the importance of what one is studying to people outside of academic philosophy. By its very design, Intuition Pumps has an exceptionally wide scope for a philosophy book; it offers a good overview of Dennett's many contributions to a variety of ongoing debates, ranging from intentionality to evolutionary biology to free will. However, Dennett's earlier works have covered much of this same ground in much greater detail. Because of this, it would be unfair to evaluate the cogency of his positions merely in the light of the thought experiments offered here, which are often formulated for novice audiences. With this in mind, I'll spend the remainder of the review considering Intuition Pump's contributions to recent debates over philosophical methodology. Over the past twenty years, there has been considerable debate over the appropriate status of the role of intuition within philosophical argument. Dennett offers a mixed verdict. While he argues that intuition pumps can be irreplaceable tools for introducing concepts and clarifying difficult-toformulate problems and questions, he firmly resists the idea that the intuitions "pumped" by popular philosophical thought experiments have the sort of striking, anti-naturalist conclusions about mind, evolution, or free will that his opponents have sometimes claimed. This is not to say that Dennett thinks that philosophers should mindlessly accept scientists' claims about the connotations of their theories. Indeed, many of the hypotheses Dennett targets-that Darwinian evolution is incompatible with living beings showing design, that folk psychology might be eliminated by advancing science, and that contemporary neuroscience shows the impossibility of free will-have themselves often been defended by prominent scientists. While Dennett does not provide a comprehensive discussion of the role of intuitions within philosophical argumentation, he offers several suggestions. First, in his discussion of zombies, Dennett expresses disagreement with the Cartesian notion of "conceivability" as a "kind of direct and episodic act, glomming without bothering to picture" (p. 289). In contrast to René Descartes, who argued that conception was a mental act independent of imagination, Dennett argues that we cannot really conceive of something unless we can imagine it. However, imagination is difficult; the fact that we cannot readily conceive of a certain theory (e.g., DNA, string theory) being true is not, by itself, an argument that it might not be true, anyway. As Dennett say, "Conceiving of something new is hard work, not just a matter of framing some idea in your mind, giving it a quick once-over and then endorsing it. What is inconceivable to us now may prove to be obviously conceivable when we've done some more work on it" (p. 430). Second, Dennett suggests that philosophers have paid too little attention to how their favorite thought experiments work and what the effects Reason Papers Vol. 37, no. 2 219 might be if subtle changes ("turning the knobs") were made to them. For example, Dennett's criticisms of Searle's Chinese Room argument contends that if the thought experiment were changed to incorporate more accurately the details that distinguish normal "minds" (such as learning new things, applying these theories to new cases, making use of past knowledge, etc.), the contention that this system understood Chinese would not be so implausible. He contends something similar concerning zombies, Mary, and attacks on compatibilism: in each case, a careful (and fully transparent) manipulation of the details shows that the intuitions generated are not nearly as stable as they may initially seem. Finally, there is Dennett's idea that these intuitions, at least in many cases, can be seen as telling us something important about the manifest image. One major task of philosophy, on this picture, is to show how our prescientific concepts of folk psychology, moral responsibility, and so on can be reconciled with the emerging scientific image of the world. Dennett, unlike many others, has confidence that such a task is both possible and worthwhile. For example, he strongly resists arguments (such as those from some defenders of qualia) to have found something that can never be addressed by scientific methods; conversely, he also criticizes arguments that science has disproved free will. While I've focused here on Intuition Pumps' claims about intuitions and philosophical methodology, there are a number of other aspects of the book worth briefly remarking on. First is Dennett's repeated emphasis on the importance of being able to explain key philosophical concepts to interested non-specialists, and his corresponding choice to focus on brief thought experiments and concise vignettes over lengthy, rigorous argument. While this works well in the context of a book such as this, if interpreted too strictly, it also risks inhibiting serious engagement with those among Dennett's opponents who (by virtue of defending complex and often counterintuitive conclusions) cannot easily accommodate this methodological rule. Second, and closely related to this, there is Dennett's idea that we ought to prefer making grand mistakes to the careful, methodical correction of extant philosophical concepts and arguments. Again, while Dennett clearly recognizes the limited scope of this claim, this conception of philosophy arguably risks understating the contributions made by the many academic philosophers who, like their colleagues in other disciplines, spend much of their day-to-day work on highly local and specialized problems, the full import of which they may not always be able to explain fully. These few reservations aside, Intuition Pumps serves as an excellent introduction both to Dennett's work and to the sorts of philosophical and scientific debates to which he has contributed for the past five decades. It also provides a valuable contribution to the ongoing debate over philosophical methodology and how this relates to the sciences. Finally, Dennett is, as always, an excellent and provocative writer, who shows almost encyclopedic knowledge of both the philosophical terrain and the relevant science. This importance of these traits cannot be understated, especially in a time when Reason Papers Vol. 37, no. 2 220 academic philosophy has been challenged to explain its continuing relevance to "real world" problems. Brendan Shea Rochester Community and Technical College, and Minnesota Center for Philosophy of Science

Experiential Awareness: Do You Prefer It to Me? Abstract In having an experience one is aware of having it. Having an experience requires some form of access to one's own state, which distinguishes phenomenally conscious mental states from other kinds of mental states. Until very recently, Higher-Order (HO) theories were the only game in town aiming at offering a fullfledged account of this form of awareness within the analytical tradition. Independently of any objections that HO theories face, First/Same-Order (F/SO) theorists need to offer an account of such access to become a plausible alternative. My aim in this paper is twofold. In the first place, I wish to widen the logical space of the discussion among theories of consciousness by offering a distinction, orthogonal to that between F/SO and HO theories, between what I will call 'Self-Involving' (SI) and 'Mental-State-Involving' (MSI) theories and argue in favor of the former one. In the second place, I will present the basics of a characterization of such a Self-Involving theory in Same-Order terms. 1 Subjective Character Conscious experiences have a subjective dimension, undergoing them feels some way or, borrowing Nagel's expression, it is like something for the subject of experience to undergo them. When I look at the red apple close to my computer, there is something it is like for me to have this experience. The way it is like for me to have the experience is the phenomenal character of the experience. Theories of consciousness aim at offering a comprehensive account of phenomenal character. One interesting way of facing this task is a divide-and-conquer one (Kriegel 2009; Levine 2001) that begins by making a conceptual distinction between two components of phenomenal character―the qualitative character and the subjective character―and the two associated problems. A theory of qualitative character accounts for what it is like for me to undergo the experience, the concrete way it feels to undergo it. In this sense, the qualitative character is what distinguishes the kind of experience I have while looking at my red apple from the one I have while, say, looking at a golf course. A theory of subjective character explains what it is like for me to undergo the experience. It abstracts from the particular ways having different experiences feel and concentrates on the problem of what makes it the case that having a conscious experience feels at all. Hence, the qualitative character is what makes a state the kind of phenomenally conscious state it is, and the subjective character what makes it a phenomenally conscious state at all (Kriegel 2009).1 Conscious experiences differ in a relevant sense from other kinds of states. Conscious experiences are not states that merely happen in me, states that I merely "host," as the beating of my heart or subpersonal states, but states that are for-me. This is the problem of the subjective character of the experience. In having a conscious experience as of a red apple I am not merely aware of some features of the apple but also somehow AWARE2 of my experience. I will call this form of awareness 'Experiential Awareness'. As Kriegel presents the idea: [W]hen I have my conscious experience of the sky, I must be aware of having it. In this sense, my experience does not just take place in me, it is also for me. (Kriegel 2006, 199) It is often assumed that we can understand any form of awareness as some form or other of representation. I will grant this assumption and focus on the kind of representation required to make sense of the subjective character of the experience: conscious experiences require a certain form of self-representation. My aim in this paper is to explore the logical space for understanding the required sense of self-representation and the problem of the subjective character of the experience in such a way. The expression 'self-representation' is ambiguous: it can mean (i) representation of the state itself or (ii) representation of oneself. This contrast allows me to build a distinction, orthogonal to the well known one between First/Same-Order and Higher-Order (introduced in section 2.1), between what I will call 'Mental-State-Involving theories' and 'SelfInvolving theories'. In section 3 I will defend the Self-Involving view, and in section 4 I will present the 1 This paper focuses on the subjective character and remains neutral on the relation between subjective and qualitative character (for instance, on whether one of them constitutively depends on the other) and on theories of qualitative character. It is perfectly compatible with this conceptual distinction that there are no states that exhibit qualitative character while lacking subjective character, as I believe is the case. 2 In what follows, I will use 'experiential awareness' and 'AWARENESS' with capital letters interchangeably to refer to this second relation, distinguishing it to the former and making clear that there is no need for them to be of the same kind. basics for an understanding, in terms compatible with naturalism, of self-involving representation without the need of a higher-order state. 2 The Logical Space for Experiential Awareness. 2.1 First-Order (FO), Same-Order (SO), and Higher-Order (HO) Theories Until very recently, HO theories were the only game in town aiming at offering a fulledged account of experiential awareness within the analytical tradition. Based on the idea that a conscious state is a state whose subject is AWARE of being in (Lycan (2004); Rosenthal (2005)), HO theorists explain the difference between conscious and nonconscious states by appealing to a higher-order representation. Conscious states are the objects of some kind of higher-order process or representation. There is something higher-order, a meta-state, in the case of phenomenally conscious mental states, which is lacking in the case of other kinds of states.3 The kind of representation that is required by the theory marks a basic difference between different HO theories. The main concern is whether higher-order states are belief-like or perception-like. The former are called HigherOrder Thought (HOT) theories (Gennaro 1996, 2012; Rosenthal 1997, 2005) the latter Higher-Order Perception (HOP) or 'inner-sense' theories (Armstrong 1968; Carruthers 2000; Lycan 1996). According to the former ones, when I have a phenomenally conscious experience as of red I am in a mental state with certain content, call this content RED. For this mental state to be phenomenally conscious, there has to be, additionally, a HOT targeting it, whose content is something like 'I am seeing RED.' On the other hand, HOP theories maintain that what is required is a (quasi-) perceptual state directed on the firstorder one, and making me thereby AWARE of it. Many philosophers since Aristotle (Caston 2002) have opposed HO theories. Among them, it is worth mentioning philosophers in the phenomenological tradition (Brentano 1874/1973; Husserl 1959; Merleau-Ponty 1945; Sartre 1956; Zahavi 2005). They are, 3 This definition is rough enough as to make room for both a theory (i) that identifies the property of having a conscious experience with that of being in a state that is adequately represented by a higher-order one and a theory that (ii) identifies the property of having a conscious experience with that of having the right kind of higher-order representation to the effect that one is in a certain state or that a certain state obtains. Although there has been a tendency to interpret HO theories as committed to (i) philosophers like Rosenthal (2005) and even more explicitly Rosenthal (2011) and Weisberg (2011), who seem to endorse (ii). however, mainly interested in the structure of consciousness and are not very interested in reductive theories of consciousness (explaining consciousness in nonconscious terms). According to these views, experiential awareness or self-representation should be better understood in first-order or same-order terms and not as something conferred by another state, as in HO theories. Reductive FO theories have typically focused on the problem of qualitative character and have often been blamed by their opponents of either ignoring the problem of subjective character or failing to offer a comprehensive account of it. Consider, for example, Tye's popular PANIC theory (Tye 1997, 2002). According to Tye, phenomenal character is constituted by representational content of a certain kind. Concretely, he characterizes this content as PANIC: Poised, in the sense that it is available to first-order belief-forming and behavior-guiding systems; Abstract, meaning that the intentional content is not individuated by the particular things represented; and Nonconceptual in the sense that it is not structured into concepts. Granting the possibility of nonconscious, abstract and nonconceptual intentional content,4 Poise is presumably the part of the theory responsible for the distinction between phenomenally conscious states and other kinds of states and therefore the part responsible for accounting for the subjective character of experience. The difference between conscious and non-conscious mental states is a difference in functional role: the former but not the latter is available to first-order belief-forming and behavior-guiding systems. PANIC maintains that the content of the mental state should not be accessed but accessible. But Poise, as some philosophers have noted cannot be the right kind of property that accounts for experiential awareness because the latter is something occurrent or manifest and the former a mere dispositional property- see Burge (1997) and Kriegel (2009) for elaboration on this line of objection. The kind of theories we are considering attempt to explain experiential awareness in representational terms: i.e., it is in virtue of having certain content that a state is phenomenally conscious. Same-Order (SO) theories locate themselves in between HO and FO theories. Both SO and HO theories accept that in having an experience one is AWARE 4 See Merikle and Daneman (1999) for a review of the empirical evidence in favor nonconscious perception. of (oneself as) being in a certain state and hence that in having the experience we are not just aware of the world-namely, that having an experience is not just a matter of being in a state that represents the world as being a certain way- but deny that such an experiential awareness is conferred by a different state. We should not, therefore, look for the difference between HO and SO theories in the content but rather in the conditions for a mental state to have such content:5 SO theorists demand whereas HO theories deny that the presence of the "world-directed" state (the "first-order" state) is necessary for a mental state to have the required content. An alternative to HO would have to be able to construct self-representation without postulating an independent state.6 2.2 Self-Involving (SI) Vs. Mental-State-Involving (MSI) It is, independently of the former debate, ambiguous how we should unpack selfrepresentation. The expression 'M is self-representational' can mean either: 1. M represents itself. or 2. M represents oneself. The following two quotes of Brentano illustrate respectively the two senses: [Every conscious act] includes within it a consciousness of itself. Therefore, every [conscious] act, no matter how simple, has a double object, a primary and a secondary object. The simplest act, for example the act of hearing, has as its primary object the sound, and for its secondary object, itself, the mental phenomenon in which the sound is heard. (Brentano 1874/1973, 153-154) [T]he mentally active subject has himself as object of a secondary reference regardless of what else he refers to as his primary object. 5 On the other hand, as we are about to see, the discussion between SI and MSI theories that I want to present is a discussion about what the content is and hence orthogonal to the one between HO and FO/SO theories. 6 One of the aims of this paper is to offer an alternative theory of subjective character to that of HO theories. For this reason I will pack First and Same-Order theories together despite their differences and distinguish between them when required. (Brentano 1874/1973, 276-277, also quoted in Kriegel 2003) I will call 'self-involving' those theories that maintain that the correctness conditions of experience concern the individual that is having the experience and 'mental state-involving' those theories that maintain that it is merely the state itself that enters the content of experience.78 The distinction between MSI and SI is clearly orthogonal at the very least to that between SO and HO theories. It seems reasonable to see HOP theories (Carruthers 2000; Lycan 1996) as defending an MSI view because they typically construct experiential awareness as a form of higher-order perception, which is about or represents the "worlddirected" state, without any need for an appeal to oneself in the correctness conditions of this higher-order state. For instance, in Carruthers's (2000) theory, some of the first-order perceptual states acquire, at the same time, a higher-order content by virtue of their availability to the Theory of Mind faculty combined with the truth of some version of consumer semantics.9 This way, a percept of red might be at the same time a representation of red and a representation of seeming red or an experience of red. States with this latter content are phenomenally conscious states. HOT theories clearly endorse a SI position. According to HOT theories (Gennaro 2012; Rosenthal 2005), the higher-order state has the form of a thought to the effect that one is oneself in a certain state. Naturalistic F/SO theories, that take subjective character into serious consideration in the analytic tradition are rare, Kriegel's (2009) same-order theory being a notorious exception.10 The tendency is quite the opposite in other philosophical traditions like the 7 Note that SI theories do not deny that the state itself be part of the content of experience; what is at issue is whether the correctness conditions of the state concern the subject that is having the experience or not. I am grateful to Richard Brown for pressing me at this point. 8 The distinction I am presenting between MSI and SI theories should not be confused with that well known in the literature between 'non-egological' and 'egological' theories (Gurwitsch 1941). See footnote 15 for further clarification. In getting clear about the relation between Gurwitsch's distinction and the one I am presenting here I have benefited enormously from fruitful exchange with Ken Williford. 9 Very roughly, the main idea of consumer semantics is that the content of a mental state depends on the powers of the organism which 'consumes' that state (Millikan 1984, 1989; Papineau 1993; Peacocke 1995). For instance, what a state represents will depend on the kinds of inferences that the cognitive system is prepared to make in the presence of that state. 10 See also Levine (2001) and Williford (2006). phenomenological one. Whereas Brentano, for example, seems to endorse clearly an MSI position, where consciousness is directed at the same time at its primary object (say an apple as in an experience as of a red apple) and at itself as a secondary object, other philosophers like Husserl and Zahavi have defended a SI position.11 Phenomenologists are mainly interested in the structure of consciousness but not in a reductive explanation of it, and theories of consciousness within the analytical tradition have paid much less attention to this position. The following chart presents some theories and their position in the debate:12 MSI SI HO Carruthers(2000); Lycan(1996) Gennaro(2012); Rosenthal(2005) F/SO Brentano(1874/1973); Kriegel(2009) Husserl(1959); Zahavi(2005) Tab. 1: The Logical Space of Self-Awareness HO theories, however, have been deeply studied. It is well known that they face some serious objections (Block 2007a, 2011a, 2011b; Caston 2002; Kriegel 2009; Neander 1998; Sebastian 2013; Shoemaker 1968), but it is also true that HO theorists have tried to rebut 11 The claim that Husserl maintains a self-involving position is controversial. See Zahavi (2005), especially chapter 2. 12 This is not, of course, the only interesting way to divide such a space of possibilities. Brown (2012), for example, distinguishes theories that accept the idea that in having the experience one is AWARE of (oneself as-if one prefers the SI formulation) being in a certain state from those that do not, and the former into what he calls 'relational' and 'nonrelational' views depending on whether a state becomes conscious in virtue of "becoming part of a complex state that has as its parts a HO awareness [experiential awareness] directed at a lower-order mental state." Brown's distinction between relational and nonrelational views matches some authors' way of distinguishing HO and SO theories (Kriegel 2009). As such, I prefer the way I have spelled out the difference between HO and SO-as a difference in the conditions for having the required content- for it is not clear to me what would justify the claim that a conscious state cannot occur unless the "lower-order" also does (a relational view) if the latter is not required for having the relevant content, considering that having such content-the one that accounts for experiential awareness-is what explains the difference between conscious and nonconscious states in the framework we are considering. Gennaro (2012) presents an example of a HO (the self-representational content is conferred independently of the presence of the first-order state) but relational theory (conscious states are complexes of the higher-order and the first-order state). It seems reasonable in this case to demand a justification of the relational claim: why do they constitute a complex? See Brown (2012) for a closely related and more detailed criticism. More importantly for my purposes, the distinction between 'relational' and 'nonrelational' theories also cuts across that between SI and MSI theories. them (Brown 2011; Rosenthal 2005; Rosenthal 2011a; Weisberg 2011), and most of them still remain controversial. It is beyond the purpose of this paper to evaluate these arguments and their rejoinders. I will focus on the discussion between MSI and SI theories, a discussion that has been ignored or pushed into the background, and on making plausible an SO account of self-involving representation that is compatible with naturalism. 3 SI Vs. MSI 3.1 The Phenomenological Observation. The subjective character of experience is a property all, and only, phenomenally conscious experiences have in common. In that sense, it accounts for what makes an experience a conscious experience at all. This common element is manifest in our conscious experiences. To a first approximation, the best way to point out this common element is, I think, by similarities. Experiences as of different shades of red are more similar, phenomenologically speaking, to each other than either is to an experience as of green. But all three experiences are also similar in some sense and differ phenomenologically from, say, visual experiences of forms, like a visual experience as of a square. And it seems that the phenomenal character of all visual experiences is, in a sense, similar. The same is true for other modalities: tactile experiences have something in common, the same for auditory experiences, visual experiences, taste experiences, pains, orgasms, etc.; and all experiences have something phenomenological in common. They are, so to speak, marked as my experiences. Phenomenally conscious experiences happen for me (the subject that is having the experience) in an immediate way, they are implicitly marked as my experiences. All conscious experiences have in common their distinct first-personal character: a quality of for-meness or me-ishness (Block 2007a; Kriegel 2009). A more detailed characterization of such a phenomenology is offered by Gallagher and Zahavi (2006): There is something it is like to taste chocolate, and this is different from what it is like to remember what it is like to taste chocolate, or to smell vanilla, to run, to stand still, to feel envious, nervous, depressed or happy, or to entertain an abstract belief. Yet, at the same time, as I live through these differences, there is something experiential that is, in some sense, the same, namely, their distinct first-personal character. All the experiences are characterized by a quality of mineness or for-me-ness, the fact that it is I who am having these experiences. All the experiences are given (at least tacitly) as my experiences, as experiences I am undergoing or living through. All of this suggests that first-person experience presents me with an immediate and non-observational access to myself, and that consequently (phenomenal) consciousness consequently entails a (minimal) form of selfconsciousness. The idea of qualities of the experience being presented to the subject that undergoes such an experience is introduced by Tyler Burge (2007) as follows: Phenomenal consciousness in itself involves phenomenal qualities being conscious for, present for, the individual [...] I think that this relation can be recognized a priori, by reflection on what it is to be phenomenally conscious. Phenomenal consciousness is consciousness for an individual. (405, my emphasis) I am going to call this 'the phenomenological observation': it is the observation that, in phenomenally conscious experiences, phenomenal qualities are presented to the individual of experience, as Burge maintains, or that they are marked as my experiences as I presented it in the previous example. The phenomenological observation suggests that a certain form of self-awareness is constitutive of the phenomenal character of experience; in having an experience, a quality is presented to oneself. If experiential awareness is to explain the subjective character (namely, what makes a state a phenomenally conscious state at all), then it has to explain this first-personal character that, the phenomenological observation suggests, is common to all and only phenomenally conscious mental states. Hence, if experiential awareness is to be unpacked as a form of representation, then the content of experience is not merely that such-and-such is the case, but that such-and-such is presented to the subject that enjoys the experience: it is in the nature of experience that its correctness conditions concern the subject that is having the experience.13 3.2 F/SO-MSI As we have seen, F/SO MSI theories have been proposed in the (pre-) phenomenological tradition by Brentano (1874/1973). In the analytic tradition, Uriah Kriegel (2009) has recently developed a neo-Brentanian reductive theory according to which my conscious experience of the apple is a state that represents certain features of the apple and also the state itself.14 But Kriegel's proposal fails to satisfactorily account for the phenomenological observation. I have suggested that what is phenomenologically manifest is the presence of the qualities of experience for the subject; the phenomenal character is self-involving: what my experience reveals is that both the apple and myself are constitutive of the content of the experience (the content is SI in opposition to merely MSI). The content of my experience is not merely that such and such is the case, but that such and such is presented to myself. In having phenomenally conscious experiences like this, I do not merely attribute certain properties to the object causing the experience, I attribute to myself the property of being in a certain state, that of being presented with an object with these properties.15 13 Ideas along these lines can be found in Frank (2007); Peacocke (MS); Zahavi (2005). 14 The idea of self-representation might appear contradictory to some at first glance. Kriegel, however, unpacks this idea in a way clearly compatible with naturalistic theories of mental content. To this aim, Kriegel introduces the notion of indirect content and makes use of the mereological distinction between complexes and sums. Roughly, the difference between mereological sums and complexes is that the way parts are interconnected is not essential for the former but it is for the latter. Kriegel concludes that a phenomenally conscious state, M, is a complex state that has two states, M* and M+, as proper parts, such that M* represents M+ directly and M indirectly in virtue of representing one of its proper parts. M is not a mere mereological sum of M* and M+, but a mereological complex. It is therefore clear why Kriegel's theory is a SO one: the presence of the "world-directed" state (M+) is necessary for M to have the required content. The difference between HO and Kriegel's SO theory depends on the distinction between complexes and sums, a distinction upon which one might cast reasonable doubts; see Sebastian (2012) for elaboration. 15 Philosophers like Sartre (1956) have tried to show how a reflexive structure of consciousness together with the temporal connection of consecutive episodes can explain the phenomenological observation. This kind of position illustrates a non-egological self-involving theory and shows how the distinction I am making here cuts across Gurwitsch's one. The discussion between SI and MSI theories is a semantic one, that is, a discussion about the content of experience. The distinction between egological and nonegological theories, like the one between HO and SO as I have presented, is a metasemantic discussion: a discussion about what is required to account for such content. Although there are some proposals, like Williford (2006) and especially Williford, Rudrauf, and Landini Kriegel concedes that the phenomenological observation reveals these facts, but denies that they are constitutive of phenomenal consciousness. What is constitutive of a phenomenally conscious mental state is having a content like 'this mental state is occurring' and not something like 'I am in this mental state'. If I were to make another unpedestrian phenomenological assertion, I would say that my current experience's pre-reflective self-consciousness [experiential awareness] strikes me as egological [self-involving]16 that is a form of peripheral self-awareness. My peripheral awareness of my current experience is awareness of it as mine. There is an elusive sense of selfpresence or self-manifestation inherent in even a simple conscious experience of the blue sky. It is less clear to me, however, that this feature of peripheral inner awareness, its being self-awareness and not mere inner awareness [SI and not merely MSI], is constitutive of the phenomenology. (Kriegel 2009, 177) Kriegel holds that whereas the experience is self-involving in normal human adults, this fact is not constitutive of the phenomenology: experiential awareness is often selfinvolving but not constitutively so (2009, 178). He thinks that infants' and animals' experiences lack this feature. But, if phenomenal consciousness is essentially selfinvolving, then Kriegel's neo-Brentanian condition (a state representing itself) does not suffice for an experience to have subjective character. I see no pre-theoretical reason for maintaining that infants' and animals' phenomenally conscious experiences differ in this respect from mine and are not SI-it is phenomenologically manifest that my experiences are somehow experiences of mine and not merely that they represent themselves. Kriegel could claim that my consideration is due to the fact that I am a human adult and human adults' experiences are SI. He could further (2012), that elaborate on Satrean ideas, they do not pursue a representational project-the background assumption of this paper-but rather to find models that satisfy the observed reflexive structure of consciousness. It is widely accepted that structure does not suffice for mental content and therefore these proposals are not satisfactory for my current purposes. It is open to further analysis whether these two projects are compatible ones or not; for example, Williford (2011) appeals to similar structures as those proposed in the next section although, as noted, with different purposes. 16 Note that what is at issue in Kriegel's claim is what is conveyed by the experience: a semantic question. Therefore, the discussion is whether the experience is constitutively self-involving or not independently of the metasemantic question-whether something like an ego is required to account for such a content. claim that, on the contrary, infants' or animals' experiences are not SI because of the highly cognitive demand that that would require, which in turn would entail that they do not enjoy conscious experiences. In the sequel, however, I will offer a notion of SI under which it is intuitive that infants and animals may have that kind of states. One reason for rejecting SI theories is that they seem to be committed to postulate some sort of obscure experiencing entity, the ego, prior to the experience, which is the object of consciousness.17 This is, I think, misguided, for, as we are about to see, oneself is not represented as an object in the experience but, as Wittgenstein puts it, as a subject. Let me start the outline of a positive proposal by elaborating on this idea. 4 Sketch for a Self-Involving Theory Self-Involving F/SO theories have their roots in Husserl's writings. However, there hasn't been, to the best of my knowledge, any attempt to elaborate on these ideas in naturalistically acceptable terms. I have argued that the phenomenological observation supports the claim that in having an experience I am AWARE of myself as being in a certain state, which in the representational framework we are considering is a matter of representing myself as being in a certain state. Imagine Marta who is looking at a red apple. She has an experience as of red. Her experience conveys, in a nonconceptual manner, that she herself (Castañeda 1966) is confronted with a red object. Her experience does so without any need to identify herself with any kind of entity and is prior to any such identification. Marta might fail to know that she is Marta and thereby not know that Marta is confronted with any object. A characterization of the content of experience requires the so-called essential indexical (Perry 1979); the correctness conditions of phenomenally conscious states concern the very same individual that is undergoing the experience as such: the content of experience is de se (Castañeda 1966; Chisholm 1981; Lewis 1979).18 That is, in having an experience Marta 17 Namely, that SI theories are committed to egological views. 18 Understanding the content of experience as de se content offers two further advantages: First, as Egan (2006), following Shoemaker (1994, 2000), shows, it offers a proper characterization of the content of the experience that makes compatible representationalism about qualitative character and the empirical evidence in favor of shifted spectrum (Block 2007b). Second it offers an understanding of the sense of unity among my experiences that make them essentially different to others' experiences from my point of view. attributes to herself (she represents herself as having) the property of being in a certain state, say that of being presented with a red apple. The experience is about the apple and in a sense about herself. Shoemaker (1968) has presented a closely related idea. He distinguishes, following Wittgenstein (1958), two different uses of the word 'I' (or 'my'): a use as an object and a use as a subject. Although both entail a self-attribution of a property, the latter but not the former attribution is Immune to Error through Misidentification relative to the first-person pronoun (IEM) and is the one involved in the self-ascription of mental states in general and in experiential awareness in particular. For illustration we can consider Wittgenstein's examples as in the following two sentences: 1. My arm is broken. 2. I am in pain. Imagine that Marta sees a person with an arm covered by a cast. She believes that she is in front of a mirror and comes thereby to have a belief that she would express with sentence (1). It makes sense to ask her whether she is sure that it is she who has the broken arm. This is an example of a use as an object. It requires identification with a particular person, and such identification is subject to error. Compare this with (2), which illustrates the use as a subject. As Wittgenstein puts it, "To ask 'are you sure it is you who have pains?' would be nonsensical": no error seems possible in this regard. Shoemaker goes on and argues that the use as a subject is not reducible to the use as an object because the use as an object requires identification and not every self-ascription could be grounded on an identification of a presented object as oneself-see also Frank (2007) for an elaboration of these ideas focusing on experiential awareness.19 19 This poses a serious problem for HOT theories. According to these theories a mental state is conscious in virtue of being targeted by a higher-order thought whose content includes the concept 'I'. The problem for conceptualism is to spell out the reference fixing mechanisms of the concept 'I' without appealing to the experience. Gennaro (2012) maintains that there are different I-concepts that might play the desired role: I qua this thing (or body), as opposed to other physical things, I qua experiencer of mental states, I qua enduring thinking thing. Gennaro convincingly argues that infants and most animals do have, at minimum, a self-concept like the first one. It is unclear what the relation between such a concept and the content of experience as de se content-which would require something along the lines of the second one (qua experiencer of mental state)-is. Now, in order to possess such a concept one arguably needs to undergo experiences, that in turn, according to conceptualist HOT theories, require one to possess the adequate concept. This challenge is faced by Rosenthal (2011b). He agrees that the reference of the pronoun 'I' in the higher-order thought refers to oneself as such, as the individual that does the referring. Rosenthal Coming back to the example of Marta's experience while looking at the red apple, the apple is represented as an object of the experience, whereas she is not represented as an object in her experience but as the subject of it. This is precisely what the de se content amounts to in the case of experience: her experience represents both the apple as an object and herself as a subject. This distinction can be illustrated by noticing that whereas she can be mistaken about what is represented as object (she can hallucinate a red apple, suffer an illusion, and see a green apple as red), it is not plausible to maintain that she can be mistaken about the fact that she herself is the one undergoing the experience. The content of my experience is not merely that such and such is the case, but that such and such is presented to myself: the content of experience is de se. In having an experience I self-attribute a certain property (Lewis 1979), that of being in certain state. And according to Shoemaker such self-attribution is immune to error through misidentification. What requires further clarification is how a mental state comes to have such content: what it takes to self-attribute the property of being in a certain state, at least in the particular case of experiences. I will deal with this question in 4.2, but it will be useful to briefly outline the project of naturalizing mental content in general and present an example first. This is the purpose of the next subsection. 4.1 Understanding and Naturalizing Mental Content I like the view of mental content according to which the role of mental states is to distinguish between different possibilities (Stalnaker (1999)). Mental states have traditionally been taken to be correct or incorrect relative to a way the world might be: they divide the space of possibilities determining sets of possible worlds. Consider for example one's belief that there is a red apple on the table. This belief distinguishes two ways the world might be-it might be such that there is a red apple on the table or such that there is maintains that it is the disposition to identify an individual as the thinker of a thought including 'I'- thereby rejecting IEM-that secures the reference; this way, he goes on, self-reference seems to be independent of self-description altogether. But this explanation seems to be unsatisfactory because, as we saw in the case of Tye's POISE, experiential awareness is a categorical property, which cannot be satisfactorily explained in terms of a disposition: what happens when a subject lacks such a disposition because of say a memory problem? Would she thereby lack consciousness? In order to evaluate the merits of this proposal the categorical basis of this disposition has to be spelled out. not-and one takes part for one side of the distinction: it is correct or appropriate in the first case and incorrect otherwise. Such a partition of the space of possibilities is typically determined by the attribution of properties to objects; i.e., by representing objects as having properties-like that of being red to the apple in the example. Naturalistic theories of mental content attempt to explain what it takes to attribute a property to an object: they attempt to explain the relation that holds between the vehicle of representation and its content, how we represent the world as being a certain way-in a way that is compatible with the truth of materialism. One of the most promising family of theories in this project is the teleosemantic one. I will present them as an example and I will make use of their core ideas in presenting my own proposal in the next subsection. Dretske (1988) has defended that the notion of representation is intimately connected to that of indication (tracking of information) but that we don't want to maintain that a mental state M represents all the things that it indicates; M represents exclusively those entities that it indicates in normal conditions. This is a normative notion that has to be unpacked, and for this purpose teleological theories appeal to the teleological function of M.20 Dretske maintains that a representing system is one that has the teleological function of indicating that such-and-such is the case, being such-and-such its intentional content: (Teleological) A state M represents C because M has the teleological function of indicating C.21 According to these theories, a mental state, M, represents that there is a red object (attributes the property of being red to an object) because M has the teleological function of indicating red objects. Teleological, as an example of a metasemantic theory, attempts to explain the attribution of properties to objects, but this does not suffice for understanding mental states whose content is de se-as I have argued it is in the case of conscious states. The reason is that they make finer-grained partitions (Lewis 1979; Perry, 1979; cf. Stalnaker 2008) than that among possible worlds: they are not correct or incorrect relative 20 According to it, the function of a trait is not necessarily something the trait does, but rather something that the trait is supposed to do. Function attributions seem to be normative in this sense. For example, it is said that the function of kidneys is to filter toxins and waste products from the blood, even in the case of someone suffering from renal insufficiency. 21 This rough characterization is intended to capture the insight of teleological theories. For further and different elaboration of the details, see, for example, Dretske (1988); Millikan (1984, 1989); Mossio, Saborido, and Moreno (2009); Neander (1991); and Schroeder (2004). to a way the world might be but also relative to an individual.22 Following Lewis (1979), such partitions are determined not by attribution of properties to objects but by selfattribution of properties. In having an experience I self-attribute a certain property: that of being in a certain state. To a first approximation (leaving worries about circularity and reduction aside for the moment) this idea can be expressed in ordinary English by saying that in having an experience as of a red apple I attribute to myself (self-attribute) the property of being confronted with an object that is causing an experience as of a red apple in me in normal circumstances.23 Let me recapitulate before moving on into a positive proposal. The kind of theories I am considering in this paper attempt to explain experiential awareness in representational terms. In section 2 I have made a distinction among these theories depending on how they characterize the content that accounts for it; whether the correctness conditions concern the subject having the experience or merely the mental state itself and argue that the former is to be preferred: experiential awareness is explained as representing myself as being in a certain state. We have seen that, if the project has naturalistic ambition, besides offering a characterization of the content that accounts for experiential awareness a metasemantic theory is required-an explanation of how a mental state comes to have the content it has. Metasemantic theories like teleosemantics are promising in offering such an explanation in the case of propositional attitudes and help us understand what it takes to attribute a property to an object; but, as we have seen, this is not sufficient for states whose content is de se like conscious experiences. We need an answer to the question of what it takes to selfattribute a property. Offering a reply to it in SO terms in the particular case of conscious states is the purpose of the next subsection. 22 More formally, whereas the content of propositional attitudes determine a set of possible worlds, centered propositions, understood as the content of de se attitudes, determine sets of centered worlds, that is sets of pairs of possible worlds and individuals (<w,i>). Propositions are determined by the attribution of properties to objects, centered propositions by a self-attribution of properties. Following Lewis (1979) the latter is not reducible to the former but not so the other way around. For further details, see, for example, Egan (2006) and Lewis (1979). 23 Let me remark once again that the fact that the content of an experience is expressible through these complex English sentences does not entail that the subject needs to have the corresponding conceptual capacity in order to have an experience. The content of, at least some, experiences is nonconceptual (Crane 1992; Dretske 1981; Evans 1982; Peacocke 1986). 4.2 Naturalizing De Se Content. My experience represents myself in a particular way that we have characterized as representation as a subject: the correctness conditions of the experience concern the very same individual that is undergoing the experience as such. In having an experience I selfattribute (I represent myself as having) a certain property, where in Lewis's words, "Selfascription of properties is ascription of properties to oneself under the relation of identity"24 (1979, 543, my emphasis). Furthermore, this self-attribution should better not involve identification if Shoemaker is right-cf. Rosenthal (2011b). The first question that should be faced is what kind of entities are individuals in the claim above. In a naturalistic framework, organisms are probably the best candidates for this. Organisms are prior to experiences; this does not mean that representations of organisms are prior to the experience nor that I have to recognize myself as being a certain organism-I do not have to identify myself with a certain organism. Having an experience as of a red apple cannot be a matter of representing one privileged organism and representing the apple. In this case we would have two representations as an object, and it is unclear how, and Shoemaker has argued not possible that, I can come to identify myself with such an entity. We need to explain how the organism represents itself as having a certain property, how such a self-ascription is possible without identification. Organisms are continuously changing entities that remain nonetheless as functional unities, as unique systems, during the organisms' life. A widespread view in biology holds that living organisms are self-maintaining systems. The notion of a self-maintaining system has a long history in philosophy dating back to Aristotle (Godfrey-Smith 1994; McLaughlin 2001). In contemporary science it was popularized by cyberneticians but more recently, after Ilya Prigogine won the Nobel Prize in 1977 for his work on dissipative structures and their role in thermodynamics, many scientists started to migrate from the cybernetic approach to the thermodynamic view of self-maintaining systems. In a self-maintaining system, the dynamics of the system tend to maintain the inherent order; its organizational pattern appears without a central authority or external element 24 It is important to recall that a subject S might attribute to S a property without self-attributing it: Perry might believe that Perry is making a mess without believing that he himself is making a mess (Perry 1979). imposing it through planning. This globally coherent pattern appears from the local interaction of the elements that makes up the system. The organization is, in a way, parallel, for all the elements act at the same time, and are distributed, for no element is a coordinator.2526 If organisms are self-maintaining systems it seem appealing to look for the mechanisms that guarantee the stability within the organism's boundaries as the mechanisms that ground the distinction between what is part of the system-the organism -and what is not me, the distinction between what is me and what is not, and might also be justified by the phenomenological sense of unity of all my experiences as being present for the same individual or self. One interesting proposal in this direction is Damasio's notion of proto-self. In his book, The Feeling of What Happens, Damasio (2000) presented the proto-self as a constitutive element of our experiences.27 According to Damasio, The proto-self is a coherent collection of neural patterns which map [represent], moment by moment, the state of a physical structure of the organism in its many dimensions...[t]hese structures are intimately involved in the process of regulating the state of the organism. (Damasio, 2000, 154) It is an integrated collection of separate neural patterns that map, 25 A simple example of these self-maintaining systems is the flame of a candle. In the flame of a candle, the microscopic reactions of combustion give rise to a macroscopic pattern, the flame, which makes a crucial contribution to maintaining the microscopic chemical reaction by vaporizing wax, keeping the temperature above the combustion threshold, etc. The flame itself favors the conditions that enable it to work. This is an example of the minimal expression of self-maintenance, called 'dissipative structures': Dissipative structures are systems in which a huge number of microscopic elements adopt a global, macroscopic ordered pattern (a 'structure') in the presence of a specific flow of energy and matter in far-from-thermodynamic equilibrium (FFE) conditions. Mossio, Saborido, and Moreno (2009, 822) 26 Teleological theories of mental content are typically etiological theories. According to them, the function of a trait depends on the causal history of (tokens of the type of) the trait, evolution typically: the function of the trait is what the trait has been selected for (Cao 2012; Dretske 1995; Millikan 1989; Neander 1991; Papineau 1993; Shea 2007; Tye 2002). Many have thought that the metaphysical possibility of a microphysical duplicate of a human being lacking an evolutionary history-a Swampman- jeopardizes this kind of theories. Appealing to the contribution of a trait to a self-maintaining system one might try to unpack the normativity-the "normal conditions"-in the relation of representation getting rid of the causal history of the trait. For details, see Mossio, Saborido and Moreno (2009). 27 For a further development of Damasio's ideas about consciousness and the self see Damasio (2010). moment by moment, the most stable aspects of the organism's physical structure. (Damasio, 2010, 190) The proto-self does not just map the internal milieu (the extracellular fluid environment) but also, for example, the musculoskeletal and visceral musculature. I will make use of this proto-self in my elaboration of the conditions under which a mental state becomes to have de se content-in the particular case of experiences. I think that we can offer an account of such de se content by characterizing a conscious state as a complex of two states that I will call 'proto-self' and 'the proto-qualitative state'. On the one hand, the proto-self is a brain structure that has the function of regulating the homeostasis of the organism. It regulates the internal environment and tends to maintain a stable, constant condition required by the self-maintaining system; the stability required for life. On the other hand, the proto-qualitative state is another brain structure that has the function of indicating that such-and-such state of affairs obtain in the world-for example, the function of indicating that there is a red apple-as in teleological.28 Different phenomenally conscious states are constituted by different proto-qualitative states. Proto-qualitative states are not phenomenally conscious: the proto-qualitative state doesn't have the required content. The proto-self is not a phenomenally conscious state either. It is the interaction between both of them that gives rise to a phenomenally conscious mental state that has the function of indicating that the very same organism that the protoself regulates is being affected by the object the proto-qualitative state represents.29 When looking at the red apple in front of me I undergo a phenomenally conscious experience. My visual system will generate a representation of the properties of the apple; this is a proto-qualitative state (PQ). Let me focus on the redness of my experience, accept, following teleological, that the content a mental state is what it has the function of 28 Formally, one could think of the content of proto-qualitative states as the properties that result from fixing the individual in the centered features that I have argued constitute the content of experience. The content of a proto-qualitative state PQ would therefore be a set of worlds and not a set of centered worlds. 29 One should not find puzzling the idea that the PS-PQ complex have different representational properties that those PS and PQ conjointly have. For there is nothing particularly mysterious, at least prima facie, in the fact that the interaction between parts gives rise to complexes having different properties than those held by the conjunction of the parts. Just consider two atoms of hydrogen and one of oxygen that do not constitute a molecule on the one hand and a water molecule on the other. indicating and, for the sake of simplicity, that PQ has the function of indicating what is disposed to cause it in normal conditions,30 which in this case would be something like 'via the particular visual pathPQ under particular lighting conditionsPQ'.31 An object would have the property that PQ represents only if the object is disposed to cause the activation of PQ via the particular visual pathPQ under particular lighting conditionsPQ. Imagine that if an object reflects light with, say, a wavelength of 650nm in these lighting conditions, then it can cause PQ via the particular visual pathPQ. The surface of the apple reflects light, in these particular lighting conditionsPQ, with a wavelength of 650nm and is therefore represented by PQ: when the system is in PQ, it attributes to the apple this surface reflectance. The proto-qualitative state indicates a certain shade of red (assuming colors are surface reflectances). But this is, still, an unconscious representation. On the other hand, the organism has a subsystem, the proto-self, that monitors and controls the homeodynamics of the organism. The proto-self represents the status of certain internal state like the extracellular fluid environment, the musculoskeletal structure and the visceral musculature.32 This latter representation is altered by the processing of the apple- changes in the retina or in the muscles that control the position of the eyeball, but also changes in the smooth musculature of the viscera, at various places of the body, corresponding to emotional responses, some of them innate. At the level of content, this interaction will explain why the content of the complex state constituted by the proto-self and the proto-qualitative state is de se. What is relevant for the correctness of this mental state is not only the properties that the object of the experience (say, the apple) has; that the apple is causing the activation of a certain neural network (PQ) in normal conditions, but the fact that it is causing the activity of the neural network and that this neural network 30 For more detailed characterizations see any of the teleological proposals mentioned in fn. 26. Nothing relevant for my current purposes hinges on these details. 31 PQ1 doesn't have the function of indicating Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation or any drug, even if both are disposed to cause its activation. For that reason something like 'via the particular visual pathPQ' is included. In the case of vision, the normal conditions would also include particular lightning conditions. These normal conditions have to be fixed by the teleological function of PQ, assuming the truth of a teleological theory of mental content. 32 Two things are worth stressing to avoid misunderstandings. First, the proto-self does not have the function of indicating the presence of the PQ state, the PQ state is not part of its content. Second, the proto-self indicates a certain state of the organism. Its content would be something like 'there is such and such internal state' or 'organism O is in such and such internal state'. It does not indicate that I am in a certain state, its content is not de se. plays a relevant role in the homeodynamic regulation of a particular organism, the very same organism that the proto-self happens to regulate. The function of this complex is not just to indicate (to track information about) an object with certain surface reflectance nor to indicate that such-and-such bodily state obtains, but to indicate that the very same system that is doing the representing (given that the PS is part of the complex) is in a certain perceptual state. When the organism is in this complex state it does not attribute a property to another object but it attributes a property-that of being in certain perceptual state-to itself, to the very same organism that the proto-self regulates, "under the relation of identity": the system attributes the property to the very same system that is doing the representing without any need of an identification. This complex state represents that the organism itself (Castañeda 1966) is presented with an object that PQ represents: the object that is disposed to cause PQ in normal conditions (via particular visual pathPQ under particular lighting conditionsPQ).33 Figure 1 illustrates the model. To remark that this is not an HO proposal, causal and representational relations are indicated in red and green respectively. A stimulus S causes the activation of the proto-qualitative state (PQ). On the other hand, PQ represents S because S is what causes PQ in normal conditions: PQ has the function of indicating S. Something similar happens in the case of the proto-self, a collection of states that have the function of indicating the situation of bodily internal states. There are furthermore, causal connections that might involve some further structures (Interrelation Structures), between the proto-self and the proto-qualitative state. These causal processes are a constitutive part of a phenomenally conscious state for they allow for the interaction between the proto-self and the proto-qualitative state that is required for giving rise to a state with de se content according to the proposed theory. 33 One might object that this kind of interaction between a state and the proto-self might happen entirely unconsciously. As a conceptual possibility it cuts no ice against the proposal. I argue that experiential awareness should be explained in de se terms and make an empirical claim about the kind of brain structures interaction that would account for such content. Surely, if we were to find empirical evidence that such an interaction were to obtain in an unconscious process, this would falsify this part of the presented proposal. Figure 1. The proto-self interacts with the proto-qualitative state. Green arrows in fig.1 also show that the conscious state (in magenta) is concerned with the apple and the proto-qualitative state-both constitutive of the perceptual state- but also with the organism itself. A different color (light green) marks the discussed particular sense in which the organism itself enters the truth conditions of the conscious state. At the neural level, the total neural correlate of an experience as of red will be constituted by the proto-qualitative state, the proto-self and the structures that implement the interaction between the proto-self and the proto-qualitative state plus the mechanisms that allow these areas to perform their function.34 Figure 2 illustrates some of the involved areas (see Damasio [2000, 2010]; Laureys and Tononi [2008] for empirical evidence suggesting that these areas are constitutive of the neural correlate of our conscious experiences), according to the colors in fig.1.3536 34 I call these mechanisms 'enablers'. An example of an enabler is the reticular formation. 35 The brain pictures are copyrighted by the University of Washington (Digital Anatomist Program). 36 The proposal above is an example of non-cognitive theory (Overgaard and Gruennbaum, 2012) and is perfectly compatible with the most popular account of our cognitive access to our mental states, the Global Workspace theory (GWS) (Baars (1988); Dehaene (2009)). This theory postulates a kind of memory system, the GWS, which encodes the content of certain states. The content of this memory is broadcast for global control and can be freely used in reasoning, reporting, and rational control of action. According to the GWS theory, allied processes compete for access to the GWS, forming assemblies striving to disseminate their messages to all other processes in an effort to recruit more cohorts and thereby increase the likelihood of achieving their goals. Phenomenally conscious mental states have good Fig. 2: Structures involved in phenomenal consciousness 5 Conclusions It is platitudinous that in having an experience one is AWARE of having it. The characterization of this relation underlies the problem of the subjective character of experience and is essential to any theory of consciousness. I have offered an orthogonal distinction to that between HO and F/SO theories between Self-Involving theories and Mental-State-Involving theories, and argued that what is phenomenologically manifest is the former: in having an experience I represent myself as being in a certain state. It is in the nature of the content of experience that it concerns the subject that is having the experience. The content of the experience is de se. In order to have an alternative to HO theories, I have sketched, in naturalistically acceptable terms, a characterization of such de se content and the basics of a possible model of what it takes for a mental state to have self-involving content. A model supported by chances of gaining access to the GWS. The proto-qualitative state and the proto-self are examples of those assemblies: the recurrent loops between them that help to constitute the phenomenally conscious mental state would at the same time increase the likelihood that the phenomenally conscious state will access the GWS. Arguably further processes are required in order to gain access to the global workspace. Attention is likely to be one of the mechanisms involved (see Kentridge 2011; Koch and Tsuchiya 2007; and Prinz 2011; for discussion on the relation between consciousness and attention). current biological theories and neurological evidence.37 37 I am deeply grateful to Ned Block, David Chalmers, Marta Jorba, Uriah Kriegel, Manolo Martinez, Farid Masrour, Myrto Mylopoulos, David Pineda, David Rosenthal, Pepa Toribio, Stephan Torre and Josh Weisberg for useful discussion on the topics presented in this paper. Some of the ideas of this paper were presented in the Cognitive Science talks at CUNY Graduate Center in summer 2010 and, as a poster, in the ASSC conference in Toronto. This paper was presented in the 10th Biennial Toward a Science of Consciousness and in the 4th Consciousness Online Conference (CO4). I am very grateful to the audience of these events, and especially to Richard Brown, Rocco Gennaro, Robert Lurz and Ken Williford for their detailed and thoughtful comments and discussion during CO4 and afterwards. Financial support for this work was provided by the Committee for the University and research of the department of Innovation, Universities and Company of the Catalunya government and the European Social Fund and also by the DGI, Spanish Government, research project FFI2009-11347, the ConsoliderIngenio project CSD2009-00056, the AGAUR of the Generalitat de Catalunya (2009SGR-1077) and the postdoctoral fellowship program in the UNAM. References • Amstrong, D. 1968. A Materialist Theory of the Mind. London: Routledge • Baars, B.J. 1988. A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness. Cambridge University Press • Block, N. 2007a. "Consciousness, accessibility, and the mesh between psychology and neuroscience." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30:481-548 • Block, N. 2007b. "Wittgenstein and qualia." Philosophical Perspectives 21(1):73-115 • Block, N. 2011a. "The higher order approach to consciousness is defunct." Analysis 71(3):419-431 • Block, N. 2011b. "Perceptual consciousness overflows cognitive access." Trends in cognitive Science. • Brentano, F. 1874/1973. Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint. International Library of Philosophy • Brown, R. 2011. "The myth of phenomenological overflow." Consciousness and Cognition 21:599604. • Brown, R. 2012. Review of Gennaro R "The Consciousness Paradox: Consciousness, Concepts, and Higher-Order Thoughts." Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. • Burge, T. 1997. "Two kinds of consciousness." In: Ned Block OF, Guzeldere G(eds) The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates, Cambridge: MIT Press • Cao, R. 2012. "A teleosemantic approach to information in the brain." Biology and Philosophy 1:4971. • Burge, T. 2007. Foundations of Mind (Philosophical Essays). Oxford University Press, USA • Carruthers, P. 2000. Phenomenal Consciousness: A Naturalistic Theory, 1St edition edn. Cambridge University Press • Castañeda, H.N. 1966. "'He': A study in the logic of self-consciousness." Ratio 8:130-157 • Caston, V. 2002. "Aristotle on consciousness." Mind 111(444):751-815 • Chisholm, R.M. 1981. The First Person: An Essay on Reference and Intentionality. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press • Crane, T. 1992. "The nonconceptual content of experience." In: Crane T (ed) The Contents of Experience, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press • Damasio, A. 2000. The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness, 1st edn. Mariner Books • Damasio, A. 2010. Self Comes to Mind: Constructing the Conscious Brain, 1st edn. Pantheon • Dehaene, S. 2009. "Neural global workspace." In: Tim Bayne AC, Wilken P (eds) The Oxford Companion to Consciousness, Oxford university press • Dretske, F. 1981. Knowledge and the Flow of Information. Cambridge: MIT Press • Dretske, F. 1988. Explaining Behavior: Reasons in a World of Causes. MIT Press • Egan, A. 2006. "Appearance properties?" Noûs 40(3):495-521 • Evans, G. 1982. The Varieties of Reference. Oxford University Press, USA • Frank, M. 2007. "Non-objectal subjectivity." Journal of Consciousness Studies 14:152-173 • Gallagher, S., Zahavi, D. 2006. Phenomenological approaches to self-consciousness. URL: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/selfconsciousnessphenomenological/ • Gennaro, R. 1996. Consciousness and Self-Consciousness: A Defense of the Higher-Order Thought Theory of Consciousness. John Benjamins • Gennaro, R. 2012 The Consciousness Paradox: Consciousness, Concepts, and Higher-Order Thoughts. MIT Press • Godfrey-Smith, P. 1994. "A modern history theory of functions." Noûs 28(3):344-362 • Gurwitsch, A. 1941. "A non-egological conception of consciousness." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 1:325-338 • Husserl, E. 1959. Erste Philosophie II 1923-24, Husserliana VIII. Den Haag: Martinus Nijho. • Kentridge, R. 2011. "Attention without awareness: A brief review." In: Mole C, Smithies D, Wu W (eds) Attention: Philosophical and Psychological Essays. Oxford University Press • Koch, C., Tsuchiya, N. 2007. "Attention and consciousness: two distinct brain processes." Trends in cognitive Science pp 16-22 • Kriegel, U. 2003. "Consciousness, higher-order content, and the individuation of vehicles." Synthese 134(3):477-504 • Kriegel, U. 2006. "Consciousness: Phenomenal consciousness, access consciousness, and scientific practice." In: Thagard P (ed) Handbook of Philosophy of Psychology and Cognitive Science, Amsterdam: North-Holland • Kriegel, U. 2009 Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory. Oxford University Press, USA • Laureys, S., Tononi, G. 2008. The Neurology of Consciousness: Cognitive Neuroscience and Neuropathology, 1st edn. Academic Press • Levine, J. 2001. Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness. Oxford University Press • Lewis, D. 1979. "Attitudes de dicto and de se." Philosophical Review 88(4):513-543 • Lycan, W.G. 1996. Consciousness and Experience. The MIT Press • Lycan, W.G. 2004. "The superiority of HOP to HOT." In: Gennaro RJ (ed) Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology, John Benjamins • McLaughlin, P. 2001. What Functions Explain. Functional Explanation and Self-reproducing Systems. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press • Merikle, P.M., Daneman, M. 1999. "Conscious vs. unconscious perception." In: Gazzaniga, M.S. (ed) The new cognitive neuroscience, The MIT press • Merleau-Ponty, M. 1945. Phénoménologie de la perception. Paris: Édition Gallimard; trans. C. Smith. Phenomenology of Perception, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962. • Millikan, R.G. 1984. Language, Thought and Other Biological Categories. MIT Press • Millikan, R.G. 1989. Biosemantics. Journal of Philosophy 86:281-297 • Mossio, M., Saborido, C., Moreno, A. 2009. "An organizational account of biological functions." British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60(4):813-841 • Neander, K. 1991. "Functions as selected effects: The conceptual analyst's defense." Philosophy of Science 58(2):168-184 • Neander, K. 1998. "The division of phenomenal labor: A problem for representationalist theories of consciousness." Philosophical Perspectives 12(S12):411-434 • Overgaard, M., Gruennbaum, T. 2012. "Cognitive and non-cognitive conceptions of consciousness." Trends in Cognitive Sciences 16(3):137-138. • Papineau, D. 1993. Philosophical Naturalism. Blackwell • Peacocke, C. 1986. "Analogue content." Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 60:1-17 • Peacocke, C. 1995. A Study of Concepts. The MIT Press • Peacocke, C. MS. "Self and self-representation" URL http://itunes.apple.com/us/itunes-u/self-selfrepresentationaudio/id418891992 • Perry, J. 1979. "The problem of the essential indexical." Noûs 13:321 • Prinz, J. 2011. "Is attention necessary and sufficient for consciousness?" In: Christopher Mole DS, Wu W (eds) Attention: Philosophical and Psychological Essays, Oxford University Press • Rosenthal, D.M. 1997. "A theory of consciousness." In: Block N, Flanagan OJ, Guzeldere G (eds) The Nature of Consciousness, MIT Press • Rosenthal, D.M. 2005. Consciousness and Mind. Oxford University Press • Rosenthal, D.M. 2011a. "Exaggerated reports. Reply to Block." Analysis 71:431437 • Rosenthal, D.M. 2011b. "Awareness and Identification of Self": In JeeLoo Liu and John Perry, ed., Consciousness and the Self: New Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) • Sartre, J.P. 1956. Being and Nothingness. trans. Hazel E. Barnes New York: Philosophical Library • Schroeder, T. 2004. "New norms for teleosemantics." In: Clapin H (ed) Representation in Mind, Elsevier • Sebastian, M.A. 2012. Review of Kriegel U "Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory" Disputatio, vol IV(32):413-417. • Sebastian, M.A. 2013. "Not a HOT dream." In: Brown R (ed) Phenomenology and the Neurophilosophy of Consciousness, Studies in Brain and Mind. Springer Press. • Shea, N. 2007. "Consumers Need Information: supplementing teleosemantics with an input condition." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75:405-435. • Shoemaker, S. 1968. "Self-reference and self-awareness." The Journal of Philosophy 65:555-567 • Shoemaker, S. 1994. "Phenomenal character." Noûs 28(1):21-38 • Shoemaker, S. 2000. "Phenomenal character revisited." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60(2):465-467 • Stalnaker, R.C. 1999. Context and Content: Essays on Intentionality in Speech and Thought. Oxford University Press, USA • Stalnaker, R.C. 2008. Our Knowledge of the Internal World. Oxford University Press, USA. • Tye, M. 1997. Ten Problems of Consciousness: A Representational Theory of the Phenomenal Mind. The MIT Press • Tye, M. 2002. Consciousness, Color, and Content. The MIT Press • Weisberg, J. 2011. "Abusing the notion of what-it's-like-ness: A response to Block", Analysis 71:438443 • Williford, K. 2006. "The self-representational structure of consciousness." In: Kriegel U, Williford K (eds) Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness, The MIT Press. • Williford, K. 2011. "Pre-reflective Self-consciousness and the autobiographical ego." In Webber J (ed.) Reading Sartre: On Phenomenology and Existentialism. Routledge. • Williford, K., Rudrauf, D. and Landini, G. 2012. "The Paradoxes of Subjectivity and the Projective Structure of Consciousness." In Miguens S, Preyer G (eds) Consciousness and Subjectivity (Philosophical Analysis). Ontos Verlag. • Wittgenstein, L. 1958. The Blue and Brown Books. New York: Oxford • Zahavi, D. 2005. Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person Perspective MIT Press

Folia linguistica et litteraria 175 UDK 821.111.09-21 The Aesthetic Response: The Reader in Macbeth Abstract: This article seeks to explore the different strategies the Bard uses in order to evoke sympathy in the reader for Macbeth who is so persistent in the path of evil. What strategy does Shakespeare use in order to provoke such a deep emotional response from his readers? By using paradoxes in the play, the Bard creates a world of illusion, fear and wild imagination. The paradoxical world in Macbeth startles us into marvel and fear, challenges our commonly held opinions, and reshapes our thought in the process (Platt 8). As the text involves the reader in the formation of illusion and the simultaneous formation of the means whereby the illusion is punctured, "reading reflects the process by which we gain experience. Once the reader is entangled, his own preconceptions are continually overtaken so that the text becomes his present while his own ideas fade into the past. As soon as it happens, he is open to the immediate experience of the text" (Iser, The Implied Reader 290). Mesmerised by Macbeth's powerful imagination and poetic language, the reader engages in a dialogical interaction with the play and eventually finds light in the murky world of the text. Regardless of Macbeth's diabolical world, the reader ventures into it, shares it with him and ultimately wakes up from its dizzying stupor. In reading Macbeth, the reader leaves behind the familiar world of his experience in order to participate in the adventure the text offers him. The edifying effect of the tragedy in the end is the reward the reader reaps after eventually waking up from the nightmarish dream of the text. Key Words:Iser, reader, Macbeth, Shakespeare, evil, paradox Fear and Desire in Macbeth Basically, there are two responses to Macbeth. Some readers may see him as a murderer, butcher and tyrant while there are some others who clearly see him as the personification of devil. Macbeth constantly vacillates between fear and desire. What he fears is what he desires and what he desires alarms him tremendously. It seems that part of him draws him to good and part of him pulls him with all force to evil. The soul of Macbeth in a word becomes an arena for the battle between the good and evil with the latter getting the better of him. He is an advocate of evil but he is perennially self-tortured. This quality in Macbeth makes the reader identify with him as a human being with all his Ali Salami, University of Tehran 176 Journal of Language and Literary Studies imperfections. This "Bellona's Bride" who strikes fear into the hearts of enemies and smites them with no mercy becomes the personification of fear in the face of evil. Lady Macbeth berates him for being "too full o" the milk of human kindness" (1.5.15) which is dramatically ironic. In reality, Macbeth is "too full" of "a lofty awareness of his own humanity" (Elliott 17). Fear manifests itself in Macbeth in his encounter with the weird sisters when he learns that he will be the Thane of Cawdor and the King hereafter. The "things that do sound so fair" (1.3.50) strike fear in the heart of Macbeth. Banquo is as surprised as the reader when he expresses his amazement at Macbeth's horror at the news: Good sir, why do you start; and seem to fear Things that do sound so fair? I" the name of truth, Are ye fantastical, or that indeed Which outwardly ye show? (1.3.51-54) Macbeth's reaction to the news should be one of joy as it heralds his kingship in future. Instead, he is seized with such great fear that he starts to shiver. There are two assumptions here as offered by Bradley: "Either this thought was not new to him, or he had cherished at least some vaguer dishonourable dream, the instantaneous recurrence of which, at the moment of his hearing the prophecy, revealed to him an inward and terrifying guilt" (344). Although Macbeth is overcome with fear, Banquo shows no psychological disturbance and demands the witches speak about him: To me you speak not. If you can look into the seeds of time, And say which grain will grow and which will not, Speak then to me, who neither beg nor fear Your favours nor your hate. (1.3.55-59) There is no logical reason for Macbeth's fear unless we assume with Bradley that his psychological disturbance at the news stems largely from an aforethought which he had long entertained for murdering the king and taking his place. In a similar vein, Coleridge states: The questions of Banquo are those of natural curiosity – such as a girl would make after she had heard a gypsy tell her schoolfellow's fortune – all perfectly general or rather planless. Macbeth, lost in thought, raises himself to speech only by their being about to depart: Stay, you imperfect speakers! and all that follows is his reasoning on a problem already discussed in his mind, on a hope which he welcomes and the doubts concerning its attainment he wishes to have cleared up (qtd. in Wain 78). Folia linguistica et litteraria 177 The witches choose "to meet with Macbeth" because he is fertile soil for the seed of evil. The prophecy of the weird sisters only serves to give an impetus to an idea long articulated and nurtured by Macbeth's mind. An active reader may even visualize that Macbeth had already discussed the murder of Duncan with Lady Macbeth on a number of occasions. However, Dover Wilson argues that the murder of Duncan comes too quickly, indeed abnormally quickly. Empson argues that the whole point about Macbeth is that he is hurried into an ill-considered action, or that he refuses to consider it himself: "Let not light see" – "the eye wink at the hand" – "which must be acted ere they may be scanned." The play is crowded with such phrases and its prevailing darkness is a symbol of his refusal to see the consequences of his actions. (140) As the play proceeds, we realize that he initially lacks the will to put this idea into practical shape on account of moral considerations. Macbeth is torn between evil as a necessary act for attaining his goals and a bitter consciousness of evil, which he knows, will catapult him onto the path of eternal damnation. In a Faustian way, he dallies with evil until he succumbs entirely to the overpowering temptations of the devil. From a religious perspective, he sells his soul to the devil when he stabs the "gracious Duncan" to death. Immediately after the murder, he expresses regret not because he "has sold his soul but because he has sold it so cheaply" Lings 59): For Banquo's issue have I filed my mind; For them the gracious Duncan have I murder"d; Put rancours in the vessel of my peace Only for them; and mine eternal jewel Given to the common enemy of man, To make them kings, the seed of Banquo kings! (3.1.64-69) To the reader, these lines indicate that Macbeth is bitterly conscious that he has traded his "eternal jewel" (his soul) for something not valuable with the devil. This can be taken as a clear confession to the fall of his soul. Macbeth creates a hell within and a hell without: a hell within himself and a hell for others. In the hell he creates within him, he burns in the "murk and nightmare torment of a conscious hell" (Knight 140). Once man treads on the path of evil, he cannot easily get out of it. For Macbeth, evil comes with consciousness, remorse, fear and gradual realization of nihilism. Fear manifests itself both verbally and emotionally. As a feeling it grips his soul from the beginning and as a word, it keeps appearing in virtually every 178 Journal of Language and Literary Studies speech he utters after he has murdered Duncan. In other words, fear finds an entity, which becomes a perennial part of Macbeth's speech. The bipartite form of fear takes hold of Macbeth to the point where it becomes impossible for him to cast it out. The sense of fear is also conveyed to the reader and the play turns into a uniquely horrifying one among Shakespearean tragedies. The reader is made to feel fear from the beginning of the play with the appearance of the weird sisters and the feeling is intensified in him after Macbeth murders Duncan. L. C. Knights calls the play a "statement of evil" and says that "Macbeth defines a particular kind of evil – the evil which results form a lust for power" (39). This kind of approach to Shakespeare limits the imaginative scope of the play. Macbeth's mind shows the stunning workings of an imagination hitherto unknown to any Shakespearean hero. In fact, he has Shakespeare's own imagination. Macbeth imagines things beyond the realm of the material world; his imaginings then turn into fear and he translates his fear into action by killing. He sees everything in its infinity. As Firkins says: There is a grip, a clutch, an insistence, a tenacity, in his mental processes, which suggests the idea of possession. An image conquers, masters, enslaves, engrosses him; he is in its leash; he obeys and cringes. Sight has for him the power of touch: the crown sears his eyeballs; the bloody hands pluck out his eyes. He cannot rid himself of a visual image; the imaginary dagger side by side with the real one which he has drawn to disprove its existence retains its actuality. If the murderer had merely told him that Banquo was dead, Macbeth would have seen no ghost at the supper. (418) The beauty of the play does not lie in the nature of evil but in how Shakespeare shows man's conscious subordination to it. The weird sisters, I believe, forebode evil more than they can embody evil as some critics suggest. Evil in Macbeth is so overpowering that it alarms the reader. Macbeth symbolizes the human being with all his imperfections and the reader feels compelled to identify with him in order to know him and his motivations better. I am not suggesting that every reader can be Macbeth but that evil, when unleashed, can dehumanize every human being and turn him into a beast of a man. The experience of reading Macbeth can be very horrifying and edifying at the same time; horrifying in the sense that the reader may doubt the very force of evil within him and edifying in the sense that evil can be selfdestructive and devastating. That is why Shakespeare provides necessary ambience for self-identification with Macbeth. In view of this assumption, Folia linguistica et litteraria 179 Macbeth comes very close to the Aristotelian definition of tragedy that it creates a cathartic effect in the reader/audience by arousing fear and pity. Despite all his valour in the face of danger and his great victories against the enemies, Macbeth loses to the common enemy of man, the devil. The devil, Shakespeare hypothesizes, is not an external force (e. g. the weird sisters) but an internal one. Allusions to the fallen angel are galore in Macbeth. The Porter mentions "Belzebub" to convey to the reader an idea of the diabolical qualities which lurk in Macbeth's soul. Elsewhere, Malcolm says that "Angels are bright still, though the brightest fell" (4.3.22). The opening scenes begin with a description of "two swimmers that do cling together" and depict Macbeth as a hero and a future traitor. As two spent swimmers, that do cling together And choke their art. The merciless Macdonwald- Worthy to be a rebel, for to that The multiplying villanies of nature Do swarm upon him-from the Western Isles Of kerns and gallowglasses is supplied; And Fortune, on his damned quarrel smiling, Show'd like a rebel's whore. But all's too weak; For brave Macbeth-well he deserves that name- Disdaining Fortune, with his brandish'd steel, Which smoked with bloody execution, Like valour's minion carved out his passage Till he faced the slave; Which ne'er shook hands, nor bade farewell to him, Till he unseam'd him from the nave to the chops, And fix'd his head upon our battlements. (1.2.8-23) The language of this opening scene portrays Macbeth as a man of exceptional bravery. From the beginning of the play, the reader is introduced to a man who disdains fortune and is capable of journeying into the unknown. These opening scenes are partly responsible for the reader's sympathy for Macbeth. The fast pace of the dramatic action, the darkness, war, blood and the weird sisters all contribute to the creation of a sense of sin and evil in such a way that the hero becomes somehow immune to the reader's hatred and subsequently susceptible to his sympathy. Indeed, the opening scenes are "so arranged that we never know quite enough about the hero's guilt, and he captures our sympathetic attention as it were under cover of darkness" (Honigmann 128). Yet, the play is replete with references to devilish Macbeth (4.3.117). He is a "hell-kite" (4.3.217), and a hellhound (5.8.3). 180 Journal of Language and Literary Studies Not in the legions Of horrid hell can come a devil more damn"d In evils to top Macbeth. (IV.iii) In the first scene where the weird sisters meet to discuss their rendezvous with Macbeth, Shakespeare creates an atmosphere of horror by depicting a scene charged with fear, uncertainty and ambiguity. Textual ambiguities function like a puzzle that the reader has to solve for himself. Ambiguities stimulate the reader into trying to balance all the more intensively the contradictions that we have produced. Just as the reciprocal disturbance of the gestalten brings about the dimension of the event, in which illusion-building and illusion-breaking are integrated, here too we have a need for integration. (Iser 1980: 129) In Macbeth, fear is created in the reader even before he gets to know Macbeth. There is thunder and lightening. There is darkness and a desert scene. All these images function to create a prevailing sense of fear, anxiety and ambiguity. As for the weird sisters, they represent "a world of dire evil and disorder, of dubiety and incessant sudden questioning" (Elliott 35). Although they represent evil, they do not have any influencing power over Macbeth. They are vested with the power of prophecy. Every prophecy they make comes true. They foresee that Macbeth will be the Thane of Cawdor, and he is. They also foresee that Macbeth will become king and he does; that he should beware of Macduff and he should; that none of woman born shall harm Macbeth, and he murdered by Macduff who was "from his mother's womb untimely ripped" (5.8.16). They predict that "Macbeth shall never vanquished be until Great Birnam Wood to high Dunsinane Hill shall come against him" (4.1.91-92), and in the final, terrifying scenes of the play, Birnam Wood does indeed come against him. Finally they predict that Banquo will be father to a line of kings: "Lesser than Macbeth, and greater" (1.3.63), "Thou shalt get kings, though thou be none" (1.3.65). That the witches can foresee the future, however, does not mean they control that future. As mentioned earlier, they have only the power of prophecy; they do not even try to seduce or tempt Macbeth into murder. The innate evil in Macbeth, which has been somehow curbed by the power of morality in him gradually goes unleashed and gets the better of him. It has been suggested by some critics that the weird sisters symbolize the devil while an active reader hardly finds any evidence suggesting that they are devils. As Professor Bradley rightly says: Folia linguistica et litteraria 181 Speaking strictly we must affirm that he (Macbeth) was tempted only by himself. He speaks indeed of their "supernatural soliciting"; but in fact they did not solicit. They merely announced events: they hailed him as Thane of Glamis, Thane of Cawdor, and King hereafter. No connection of these announcements with any action of his was even hinted by them. For all that appears, the natural death of an old man might have fulfilled the prophecy any day. In any case, the idea of fulfilling it by murder was entirely his own. (344) Their limited power to harm is suggested to the reader in the first scene when one of the witches expresses her anger at a sailor's wife for refusing to share her chestnuts with her. She is clearly seen to lack any power over the sailor's wife but to cast a spell over her husband's ship only with the help of other witches. She can prophesy, torment the man, or tempt him, but his bark cannot be lost. She cannot kill him. They only hail Macbeth as Thane of Glamis, Thane of Cawdor, and king hereafter. First Witch All hail, Macbeth! hail to thee, thane of Glamis! Second Witch All hail, Macbeth, hail to thee, thane of Cawdor! Third Witch All hail, Macbeth, thou shalt be king hereafter! (1.3.48-50) Immediately in the second scene, the reader learns about the bravery of Macbeth in war and how he split Macdonwald the rebel from gut to jaws and perched his head on the camp wall. In the next scene, the reader is given a clearer image of the weird sisters: First Witch Where hast thou been, sister? Second Witch Killing swine. Third Witch Sister, where thou? First Witch A sailor's wife had chestnuts in her lap And munched, and munched, and munched. "Give me," quoth I. "Aroint thee, witch,"the rump-fed runnion cries. Her husband's to Aleppo gone, master o'th'Tiger: But in a sieve I'll thither sail, And like a rat without a tail, I'll do, I'll do, and I'll do. (1.3.1-9) One of the witches has been killing swine and the other one who is angry with a sailor's wife for withholding her chestnuts is going to hex the sailor's ship as revenge. Therefore, the reader realizes that they are indeed only capable of petty mischief. Soon, he realises that they can see into the future. Macbeth's 182 Journal of Language and Literary Studies desire to ascend to the throne and take the place of the gracious Duncan is strengthened by his wife who helps dispel fear in Macbeth. His letter to his wife, if read carefully, casts light on his unconscious desire to kill the king. His intention in writing the letter to his wife is only to find an accomplice in his murderous reflections. To an ingenious reader, the letter misses a few important facts about Macbeth's encounter with the weird sisters. They met me in the day of success: and I have learned by the perfectest report, they have more in them than mortal knowledge. When I burned in desire to question them further, they made themselves air, into which they vanished. Whiles I stood rapt in the wonder of it, came missives from the king, who all-hailed me "Thane of Cawdor;" by which title, before, these weird sisters saluted me, and referred me to the coming on of time, with "Hail, king that shalt be!" This have I thought good to deliver thee, my dearest partner of greatness, that thou mightst not lose the dues of rejoicing, by being ignorant of what greatness is promised thee. Lay it to thy heart, and farewell. (1.5.1-14) His letter clearly shows a limited narrative of the events. Macbeth says how the witches "met me in the day of success," how "I burned in desire to question them further," "how I stood rapt in the wonder of it," how "came the missives from the king, who all-hailed me 'Thane of Cawdor'," and how the "weird sisters saluted me and "referred me to the coming on of time, with "Hail, king that shalt be!" Macbeth does not make any mention of Banquo and refuses to reveal that the weird sisters had made any prophecy about Banquo. The letter tells the truth but it does not tell everything. In fact, Macbeth proves to be an imperfect speaker. What more does Macbeth wish to hear from the witches when he demands: "stay you imperfect speaker!"? There are two assumptions here: either he seeks to know the means for becoming a king or he thinks that the witches are privy to his secret intentions and that he wants them to approve of them. In view of the content of the letter, the second assumption sounds more plausible. The reader is aware that Macbeth knows more than what he reveals in the letter to his wife. The letter leaves many gaps in the mind of the reader. The blanks designate a vacancy in the overall system of the text, the filling of which brings about an interaction of textual patterns. In other words, the need for Folia linguistica et litteraria 183 completion is replaced here by the need for combination. It is only when the schemata of the text are related to one another that the imaginary object can begin to be formed, and it is the blanks that get this connecting operation under way. (Iser 1980:183) What the letter lacks shows a mind loath to reveal the whole truth. Besides, the letter contains words such as "burned in desire," "rapt," and "rejoicing," which indicate great desire in the writer. Therefore, temptation has crept into his soul even before he talks to Lady Macbeth. The letter is but meant to tempt the reader (Lady Macbeth) to goad Macbeth into choosing a path he does not desire to tread on alone. Therefore, Lady Macbeth's response to the letter is one of temptation and murderous thoughts: Glamis thou art, and Cawdor; and shalt be What thou art promised: yet do I fear thy nature; It is too full o' the milk of human kindness To catch the nearest way. (1.5.15-18) She immediately broods on the "nearest way" but she is afraid of Macbeth being "too full o' the milk of human kindness." However, in the play the reader does not see any "milk of human kindness" in Macbeth. Be it as it may, Lady Macbeth cannot be seen as the embodiment of evil for she proves weak on the path and kills herself out of complete despair for what she has become. To see her thus in league with evil is only to shift the blame from Macbeth to her. Taking a radical view in this regard, Honigmann says, "Lady Macbeth appears to be somehow in league with evil and Macbeth its victim, a fly in the spider's web who struggles mightily but cannot escape" (Honigmann 131). After all, the choice to kill Duncan comes from Macbeth who takes up the action consciously and resolutely: I am settled, and bend up Each corporal agent to this terrible feat. (1.7.79-80) Oblivious to the effects the murder will have on his mind, he translates his desire into action and kills Duncan and his servants in cold blood. Man is free to choose between good and evil and he will have to bear the consequences of his own actions. Macbeth chooses the path of evil consciously and becomes increasingly aware of his own existence and true self. This horrible awareness which he achieves as a result of his own deeds terrifies him to the point of despair: "To know my deed, "twere best not know myself" (2.2.70). This is the point, I believe, where the reader starts sympathizing with Macbeth as a man 184 Journal of Language and Literary Studies who brings about his own downfall. The reader gradually sees in Macbeth the fall of a man who could have achieved great success in view of his valor and merit if he had not chosen evil as his company. In killing Duncan, he does "murder sleep, the innocent sleep, Balm of hurt minds." (2.2.36). His agony starts to isolate and alienate him from his surroundings. The great degree of his agonized fear echoes in the sounds he hears: "Methought I heard a voice cry: Sleep no more!" (2.2.32). By making his hero refer to himself by his three titles, "Shakespeare shows a sense of dispersed identity in him" (Honnigmann 128): Glamis hath murder'd sleep, and therefore Cawdor Shall sleep no more; Macbeth shall sleep no more. (2.2.39-40) From the beginning, he is depicted as a warrior who does "memorise another Golgotha" in the battlefield. It is true that warriors are warriors and they kill without mercy. However, apart from that, he is not presented throughout the play with any mercy for anyone. Strangely enough, McAlingdon suggests that the Tragedy of Macbeth is that of a kind man who degenerates into a butchering tyrant; but since a tyrant is almost by definition a man who lives in dread of those whom he terrifies, his tragedy is also that of a courageous soldier who becomes cowed by fear. (133) There is no obvious reason for McAlingdon to say that Macbeth is a kind man as we are barely given the chance to see him in the light of human compassion or kindness and that no such thing has been ever suggested or evinced throughout the play. Of great importance in the character of Macbeth, which makes the reader sympathize with him, is his consciousness of the evil act he has committed. In fact, readers respond to and sympathise with Macbeth because he is torn like any human being between evil and desire and creates an internal hell by consciously choosing evil and losing his very human essence. He makes deliberate choices and determines his life. According to the existential view, the human agent is "endowed with rational potencies and determines his existence by deliberate choice" (Guignon 53). In Macbeth, Shakespeare deviates from the normal morality play by depicting a hero who "begins evil doing with complete understanding of the course he is laying out for himself and with complete willingness to sacrifice his soul in the next world in exchange for the gifts of the world" (Farnham 79). Shakespeare also breaks away from the Elizabethan view that man is part of the divine order and that any political, social or religious violation of this order will Folia linguistica et litteraria 185 be punished. This view does not apply to Macbeth. The reader is shocked to learn about Macbeth's full understanding of the nature of the crime he is about to commit. His apocalyptic vision of his crime becomes manifest in his reflections before the crime: this Duncan Hath borne his faculties so meek, hath been So clear in his great office, that his virtues Will plead like angels, trumpet-tongued, against The deep damnation of his taking-off; And pity, like a naked new-born babe, Striding the blast, or heaven's cherubim, horsed Upon the sightless couriers of the air, Shall blow the horrid deed in every eye, That tears shall drown the wind. (1.7.16-25) In his projection of the deed, Duncan becomes the Christ-like victim, and Macbeth the Judas-like traitor and Herod-like judge who will himself be judged. With its winds, weeping, pleading, and trumpet-tongued angels, the imagined scene conflates features of several typologically related cycle plays, notably those of the Crucifixion and Last Judgement. (Felperin 130) His biblical allusions are an indication of his inward battle between good and evil. What happens in the mind of Macbeth is more than temptations. When one is temped into evil, he becomes oblivious to its consequences but he can imagine horrible imaginings afterwards. The reader is constantly shocked and even appalled by Macbeth's dedication to evil which comes from his unquenchable thirst to know the limits of his soul. Also suggestive of the horrid deed he is about to commit is the objectification of his evil thought in the form of a dagger: Is this a dagger which I see before me, The handle toward my hand? Come, let me clutch thee. I have thee not, and yet I see thee still. Art thou not, fatal vision, sensible To feeling as to sight? or art thou but A dagger of the mind, a false creation, Proceeding from the heat-oppressed brain? I see thee yet, in form as palpable As this which now I draw. (2.1.33-41) 186 Journal of Language and Literary Studies The dagger he sees in his fatal vision seems to him as palpable as the dagger he soon draws. What he desires, he imagines, what he imagines he objectifies and what he objectifies he translates into action. In his excellent book, The Meaning of Shakespeare, Goddard makes a fine analogy between Macbeth and Crime and Punishment: Macbeth, like Crime and Punishment, is a study of evil through a study of murder. Each is its author's most rapid, concentrated, terrific, and possibly sublime work. Each is a prolonged nightmare lifted into the realm of art. King Lear and The Brothers Karamazov are also studies of evil; but if they sound no lower depths, they do climb to greater heights than Macbeth and Crime and Punishment. All four fight through again the old war between light and darkness. But in Macbeth and Crime and Punishment we have "night's predominance," as Shakespeare phrases it, and the light is that of a star or two in the blackness, while in King Lear and The Brothers Karamazov the stars are morning stars and there is dawn on the horizon. I know how preposterous this will sound to those who consider King Lear the pessimistic masterpiece of the ages. (108) To sympathise with someone who ignorantly falls on evil is not difficult but to sympathise with one who has complete understanding of his evil actions is difficult. In Crime and Punishment, Raskolnikov, an impoverished student kills a hated, unscrupulous pawnbroker for her money in order to solve his financial problems and rid the world, as he argues, of an evil, worthless parasite. However, he is later seized with pangs of conscience and remorse although he keeps justifying his action. The reader can easily sympathise with Raskolnikov for two apparent reasons: 1. He is seized with great remorse after the murder. 2. He does not persevere in evil. Dostoyevsky wrings sympathy from the reader on the strength of the fact that Raskolnikov kills because he is miserable and not because he is evil and since he is miserable, the reader sympathises with him. In Macbeth, however, the hero deliberately takes evil to be his good and consciously sinks deeper into evil by committing crime after crime. How can such a character create any sympathy in the reader? It may be objected, however, that Macbeth alone of Shakespeare's great tragic figures is fully aware of the evil of the act by which he sets in motion the train of events leading to his ruin. His consciousness of crime seriously weakens the sympathy of many. Macbeth is endowed with an exceptional poetic gift, which suffices to arouse the interest of the reader in this character. Although Duncan is said to be a goodly king, the reader knows no particular details about him. So the interest of the reader is reserved for Macbeth and Lady Macbeth. Wayne Booth argues that everything necessary for a complete response is given to the Folia linguistica et litteraria 187 reader. A highly individualised noble person, he says, is sent to complete moral, intellectual and physical destruction. In order to maintain our sympathy for Macbeth, Shakespeare tries to "keep two contradictory dynamic streams moving simultaneously: the stream of events showing Macbeth's growing wickedness and the stream of circumstances producing and maintain our sympathy for him" (Booth 28-29). The first instance is Shakespeare's treatment of Duncan's murder. He takes great care in avoiding any representation of the murder itself. It is not even narrated. The reader only hears details of how the guards reacted to the murder. We see nothing. We hear nothing. What appals the reader is not the murder itself but Macbeth's later response: Me thought I heard a voice cry 'sleep no more! Macbeth doth Murder sleep"-the innocent sleep, Sleep that knits up the ravell"d sleeve of care, The death of each day's life, sore labour's bath, Balm of hurt minds, great nature's second course, Chief nourisher in life's feast- (2.2.46-51) From this onwards, Macbeth knows that repose will be denied him and a selfconscious hell is created within him. This feeling of self-conscious hell makes the reader sympathise with Macbeth. A second precaution is Shakespeare's treatment of Duncan before the murder. Duncan is known as a good king and that is all we hear about him. The reader never sees him do any noble thing and he is compelled in a sense to take Shakespeare's words for granted that Duncan is indeed a good king. So the reader never really finds any chance to become emotionally or intellectually attached to Duncan. Therefore, there is "little personal interest for him at the time of his death" (Lyndon Shanley 30). Desire is generally accompanied by a feeling of fear. Macbeth's critical moment comes when he says that he has "almost forgot the taste of fears"(V.v.9). In other words, he is left with no more desires and his being is consequently pervaded by a bitter realization of absurdism which finds painful echoes in his "Tomorrow, and tomorrow, and tomorrow" speech upon the news of Lady Macbeth's death: Tomorrow, and tomorrow, and tomorrow Creeps in this petty pace from day to day To the last syllable of recorded time, And all our yesterdays have lighted fools The way to dusty death. Out, out, brief candle. 188 Journal of Language and Literary Studies Life's but a walking shadow, a poor player That struts and frets his hour upon the stage, And then is heard no more. It is a tale Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, Signifying nothing. (V.v.19–27) The reader may wish to dissociate himself from this view of life and say that life may be meaningless to Macbeth because he has brought meaninglessness to it. As Bloom aptly says in this regard: In his isolation Macbeth feels like an actor without an audience. The idea touched on in earlier plays, that we see ourselves only in the eyes of others, is taken deeper here. The actor exists only in the perception of the audience, and when there is no audience to hear him there is nothing of him left. At the personal level, Macbeth's speeches (and therefore Macbeth) have been meaningless without Lady Macbeth to hear and reply. Finally, he is not even an actor, with the freedom and the initiative an actor has to conduct his own performance. Everyone is a character in a story, with no existence outside the voice of the narrator; the story's language is meaningless noise, and the narrator is an idiot. But if life is a tale told by an idiot, who is the idiot? Iago mischievously imagined God as a peeping Tom; Macbeth's blasphemy cuts far deeper. With Lady Macbeth he took part in a dialogue, a drama, in which each had a voice. Now there is only one voice, neither hers nor his, but the voice of a cosmic idiot telling a story that means nothing. (382) What is left for Macbeth is a deep sense of isolation and emptiness. For him, the meaning of life is that "there is no meaning. Macbeth's fear of becoming insensitive to suffering and transgression is fully realized here. Once again, the existential significance of moral vocabulary is deepened" (Mousley 105). Thus he becomes emotionally dead even to the news of the one he used to love. His sense of absurdity deepens even more a few lines later when a messenger arrives and tells him that while guarding on the hilltop, he had seen the Birnam wood moving. Upon hearing these words, he begins to "doubt the equivocation of the fiend/That lies like truth" (V.v.43-44). And he expresses his utmost desire for the sun to stop shining and for the world to come to standstill: I 'gin to be aweary of the sun, And wish the estate o' the world were now undone. (V.v.49-50) Folia linguistica et litteraria 189 By showing a character who traverses the realm of fear and desire by treading onto the path of evil, Shakespeare ingeniously effects a catharsis in the audience/reader. Macbeth's "doubts and fears" turn into certitude and spiritual submission when he identifies himself with evil: I have supp'd full with horrors; Direness, familiar to my slaughterous thoughts Cannot once start me. (V.v.13-15) Now he knows that he is the devil himself and establishes an honest relation with his surroundings. That is the limit from which he cannot go any further. As Wilson Knight comments: He has won through by excessive crime to an harmonious and honest relation with his surroundings. He has successfully symbolised the disorder of his lonely guilt-stricken soul by creating disorder in the world and thus restores balance and harmonious contact. This mighty principle of good planted in the nature of things then asserts itself, condemns him openly, brings him peace. (156) In the end, Macbeth proves a poor player who has done a lot of strutting and fretting on the stage of the world "but is heard no more" on account of his deplorably poor performance as a human person. With the death of Macbeth, the hero and the reader are liberated from the feeling of dread that haunts and startles them from the beginning. Bibliography Booth, Wayne C. The Essential Wayne Booth. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 2006. Elliott, George Roy. Dramatic Providence in Macbeth. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1958. Farnham, Willard. Shakespeare's Tragic Frontier. Princeton: Uof Ca/Princeton, 1963. Felperin, Howard. Shakespearean Representation: Mimesis and Modernity in Elizabethan Tragedy. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1978. Guignon, Charles. The Existentialists: Critical Essays on Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Sartre (Critical Essays on the Classics). Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003. Honigmann, E. A. J. Shakespeare: Seven Tragedies Revisited. New York: Palgrave, 2002. 190 Journal of Language and Literary Studies Iser, Wolfgang. The Act of Reading: A Theory of Aesthetic Response. New Ed ed. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins UP, 1980. Iser, Wolfgang. The Implied Reader: Patterns of Communication in Prose Fiction from Bunyan to Beckett. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins UP, 1978. Knight, G. Wilson. The Wheel of Fire (Routledge Classics) (Routledge Classics). 2 ed. New York: Routledge, 2001. Print. Low, Lisa. "Ridding Ourselves of Macbeth." The Massachusetts Review 24.4 (1956): 826-837. Print. Lyndon Shanley, J. "Macbeth: The Tragedy of Evil." College English 22.5 (1961): 305-311. McAlindon, T. Shakespeare's Tragic Cosmos. New York: CUP, 1996. Mousley, Andy. Re-Humanising Shakespeare: Literary Humanism, Wisdom and Modernity. Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 2007. Platt, Peter G.. Shakespeare and the Culture of Paradox (Studies in Performance and Early Modern Drama). Oxford: Ashgate, 2009. Wain, John. Shakespeare-Macbeth: A Selection of Critical Essays--Casebook Series. New York: Macmillan, 1969. Folia linguistica et litteraria 191 UDK 821.163.3.09-32 Intertekstualne varijante u savremenoj makedonskoj priči: vakantna citatnost Marija Gjorgjieva Dimova, Ss. Cyril and Methodius University, Skopje, Apstrakt: Predmet interesa ovog teksta je vakantna citatnost u savremenoj makedonskoj priči. Konkretan predmet analize je priča РакописотодКитаб-ан makedonskog autora Vlade Uroševića. Interpretacijom dominantnih postupaka ovog citatnog modela (pseudocitatnost, deduktivna naracija, mistifikacija, paradoks), potenciraju se i njegove metatekstualne funkcije: funkcija implicitnog komentara intertekstualnosti, ali i komentara koji se odnosi na proučavanju fenomena intertekstualnosti. U tom smislu, Urošević sugeriše stanje epistemološkog skepticizma u nauci i stanje ontološkog relativizma literature, ali i u literaturi. Ključne reči: intertekstualnost, vakantna citatnost, metatekstualnost, epistemološki skepticizam, ontološki relativizam. Naturalmente, un manoscritto. Umberto Eco Preliminarije Interes za intertekstualne varijante u savremenoj makedonskoj priči kontekstualizuje naš interpretativni fokus u dvostruki okvir: 1. citatnost, kao osobito frekventna intertekstualna praksa, koja u tipologiji Žerara Ženeta predstavlja tipičan primer restriktivno shvadene intertekstualnosti kao „efektivnog postojanja jednoga teksta u drugome" (8); 2. vakantna citatnost, kao jedna od citatnih podvrsta. Teorijski ram, relevantan za daljnje tumačenje, vezuje se za teoriju citatnosti, afirmisanu u hrvatskoj intertekstualnoj paradigmi od strane Dubravke OraidTolid. U njenoj teoriji, književna citatnost, kao deo šire kulturne citatnosti, označava citatnu relaciju kao dominantu jednoga teksta, autorskog idiolekta, umetničkog žanra, stila ili kulture – u okviru kojih se postavlja kao ontološki i semiotički princip (Oraid 5). Vakantna citatnost, koja tipološki spada u grupu

Ted Poston, Reason and Explanation: A Defense of Explanatory Coherentism, Palgrave Macmillan, 2014, 208pp., $95.00 (hbk), ISBN 9781137012258. Reviewed by William Roche, Texas Christian University This is a book worthy of careful study. Poston develops and defends an explanationist theory of (epistemic) justification on which justification is a matter of explanatory coherence which in turn is a matter of conservativeness, explanatory power, and simplicity. He argues that his theory is consistent with Bayesianism. He argues, moreover, that his theory is needed as a supplement to Bayesianism. There are seven chapters. Below I provide a chapter-by-chapter summary along with some substantive concerns. In Ch. 1 ("Introduction"), Poston gives a brief history of coherentism, critiques some standard objections to coherentism, and gives an overview of the remainder of the book. One of the objections he critiques is the "input" objection (which can be put as follows): Input Objection (IO): Coherence is solely a matter of relations between beliefs. So coherentism implies that experience plays no role in justification. But this implication is false. So coherentism is false. Poston argues in response that there is room for non-doxastic varieties of coherentism on which the coherence requirement is defined in part in terms of the propositional contents of the subject's experiences. He notes that his theory in particular is a variety of just that sort and so, contra IO, does not imply that experience plays no role in justification. In Ch. 2 ("Epistemic Conservatism"), Poston develops and defends a version of epistemic conservatism. His version, as with any version (I take it), implies that belief in p is at least sometimes sufficient to generate justification (or positive epistemic merit) for p. He argues that there is much to recommend epistemic conservatism. He notes, though, that, despite this, epistemic conservatism is very much unpopular in epistemology. He considers several objections to epistemic conservatism and argues that each of them fails against his version. One objection is the "extra boost" objection (which can be put as follows): Extra Boost Objection (EBO): Suppose S's evidence for q is counterbalanced and her credence in q is 0.5. She then gains some evidence for p (a different proposition) and comes to have a high credence in p. Suppose she subsequently realizes that p entails q and so comes to believe q. Suppose her credence in q is 0.8. Then by epistemic conservatism it follows that S's belief in q generates justification for q and that her credence in q should increase yet further to, say, 0.85. But, clearly, S's credence should not increase yet further. There is no extra boost in the credence she should have. So epistemic conservatism is false. 2 Poston agues in response that EBO fails against his version of epistemic conservatism because his version is restricted to cases of "empty symmetrical evidence". These are cases where there is no evidence for or against the target proposition.1 Since S, in the case at hand, has evidence for q, viz., p, the case is not a case of empty symmetrical evidence. Poston clarifies that the "boost" idea is incorrect even with respect to cases of empty symmetrical evidence. The view, rather, is this: if S believes p, and has no evidence for or against p, then it rational for her to continue believing p. Poston ends the chapter by arguing, in part, that his version of epistemic conservatism is supported by the perspectival character of epistemic justification. Because of the restriction to cases of empty symmetrical evidence, Poston's version of epistemic conservatism is immune to objections concerning cases of non-empty symmetrical evidence. It is natural to worry, though, that the restriction is ad hoc. Why not instead restrict things to cases of symmetrical evidence whether empty or non-empty? Poston argues that if belief is not sufficient for justification in cases of empty symmetrical evidence, then skepticism is true. Even if Poston is right in this, the worry above-that the restriction to cases of empty symmetrical evidence is ad hoc-remains. All cases of symmetrical evidence, whether empty or non-empty, are cases where S's total evidence (which might be empty) is neutral with respect to the target proposition. If belief is sufficient for justification in some such cases, then, the worry goes, belief is sufficient for justification in all such cases. Poston conceives of his theory of justification as a coherentist theory. It might be worried that Poston's theory is coherentist in name only. Take a case where Poston's version of epistemic conservatism implies that S's belief in p generates justification for p. By hypothesis the case is such that S has no evidence for or against p. The justification in question is thus non-inferential. But no coherentist theory, the worry goes, allows for non-inferential justification. Poston addresses this worry in Ch. 3 ("Reasons without First Philosophy). He stresses that though his theory allows for non-inferential justification, it runs counter to the characteristically foundationalist idea that there can be cases where a justified observational proposition (or conjunction of justified observational propositions) by itself serves as a reason for another proposition. His theory involves what he calls "the framework view of reasons". This view can be put as follows: Framework View of Reasons (FVR): A proposition p is a reason for a proposition q for a subject S at a time t if and only if (i) S is justified at t in believing p, (ii) p by 1 Are there propositions such that (at least in some cases) a subject has no evidence for or against them? Poston gives several examples of propositions he takes to be of that sort. One is the proposition that meaning is stable. Another is the proposition that objects persist through time. 3 itself is insufficient for q's justification, and (iii) there is a set of propositions Γ such that (a) p is a non-redundant part of Γ, (b) Γ is unnecessary but sufficient for q's justification, and (c) S is justified at t in believing the propositions in Γ. The crucial point is that FVR is to be understood so that (iii) is true only if certain of the members of Γ are non-observational propositions concerning the explanatory virtues. This means that there can be no cases where a justified observational proposition by itself-and thus independently of a framework of justified propositions some of which concern the explanatory virtues-serves as a reason for another proposition. The taxonomic issue of whether Poston's theory of justification is coherentist in name only is of no real importance. The important issue is whether Poston's theory is plausible qua theory of justification. I return to this issue below. In Ch. 4 ("Explanation and Justification"), Poston spells out his theory in more detail. The theory is this: Ex-J: S has justification for believing p if and only if (i) p is a member of a sufficiently virtuous explanatory system E and (ii) E is more virtuous than any competing system E'. Poston clarifies that Ex-J is different than the following: Ex-J': S has justification for believing p if and only if (i) p is a member of a sufficiently virtuous explanatory system E and (ii) there is no system E' such that E' is more virtuous than E. Suppose p is a member of E whereas not-p is a member of E'. Suppose each of E and E' is sufficiently virtuous, E and E' are equally virtuous, and no system is more virtuous than E or E'. By Ex-J' it follows that S has justification for believing p. Things are different with Ex-J. Given that E' is a competing system with respect to p, and given that E is not more virtuous than E', it follows by Ex-J that it is not the case that S has justification for believing p. This is supposed to be the desired result. Poston notes that Ex-J, as he means it to be understood, is both mentalist and evidentialist. Here is the rough idea. Ex-J implies that any two subjects who are alike in terms of their mental states are also alike in terms of justification. This makes it mentalist. Ex-J implies that any two subjects who are alike in their evidence are also alike in terms of justification. This makes it evidentialist. Poston also notes, however, that Ex-J runs counter to the evidentialist thesis that S is justified at t in believing p if and only if S's evidence at t on balance supports p. He defends this point on the grounds that Ex-J implies that in cases of empty symmetrical evidence S has justification for believing p. 4 This defense is a bit surprising. Poston seems to hold that p is a member of a sufficiently virtuous explanatory system E only if p is involved in an explanans or an explanandum in E. He writes: What is it to be a member of an explanatory system? A proposition is a member of an explanatory system by being a part of an explanans or part of an explanandum. (p. 87, emphasis original) The problem is that cases of empty symmetrical evidence are cases where, presumably, p is not involved in an explanans or an explanandum and thus are cases where (i) in Ex-J is false. So, it seems, Ex-J needs to be reformulated a bit so that it is consistent with Poston's version of epistemic conservatism. Why accept Ex-J? Poston answers, in part, by setting out a host of test cases and arguing that Ex-J does better overall on those cases than reliabilism and Conee and Feldman's evidentialism. I return to Poston's argument below. Ch. 4 also contains a discussion of explanation and the explanatory virtues. Poston argues that explanation is primitive and that the explanatory virtues are three in number: conservativeness, explanatory power, and simplicity. Ex-J, along with Poston's argument for it, should be understood accordingly. Do explanatory power and simplicity admit of precise characterizations? Poston answers in the negative. This is somewhat disappointing (at least to me). But, if Poston is right, then there is simply no getting around it. I want to be very brief with Ch. 5 ("BonJour and the Myth of the Given") and Ch. 6 ("Is Foundational A Priori Justification Indispensable?") so that I can get to Ch. 7 ("Bayesian Explanationism"). In Ch. 5, Poston critically examines two recent theories at odds with Ex-J on the justification of so-called "phenomenal beliefs". One is a theory defended by BonJour. The other is a theory defended by Chalmers. In Ch. 6, Poston addresses BonJour's arguments for the indispensability of foundationalist a priori justification. Poston argues that each of BonJour's arguments is problematic. The main issue in Ch. 7 is whether explanationism (short for "explanationist theories such as Ex-J") is consistent with Bayesianism. Poston answers in the affirmative. He writes: My goal in this chapter is to argue for a new compatibilist position regarding the relationship between Bayesianism and explanationism. I argue that explanationism is consistent with Bayesian requirements of coherence and conditionalization. Furthermore, I argue that inductive confirmation requires explanatory information. ... The view I stump for may be described as explanatory Bayesianism. It requires that a subject's prior probability distribution reflect explanatory virtues. A Pr-function 5 ought not have priors that give simpler theories lower priors than complex theories. A Pr-function should reflect the power of an explanatory hypothesis in the relevant likelihoods. A Pr-function should distribute probability over the most fundamental explanatory parameters instead of the Platonic heaven of all possible explanatory parameters. In light of new mysteries, one should seek a new prior distribution that departs least from one's previous prior distribution while maximizing simplicity and explanatory power. (pp. 149-150, emphasis original) There is a lot going on here. I want to focus on the claim that explanationism is consistent with Bayesian conditionalization (the thesis, roughly, that if S learns e, and nothing more, then S's new credence in h should be equal to her old credence in h given e). Poston gives a case meant to show (or at least illustrate the point) that explanationism is consistent with Bayesian conditionalization. Suppose there are two coins. One is fair. The other is a two-headed coin and so always comes up heads. Suppose one of the coins is randomly selected and is to be flipped ten times. Let h1 be the hypothesis that the coin selected is the fair coin but comes up heads on all ten flips. Let h2 be the hypothesis that the coin selected is the two-headed coin. Suppose the coin comes up heads on each of the first seven flips. Let e be the proposition that the coin selected comes up heads on each of the first seven flips. Poston writes: Which hypothesis has greater confirmation after observing seven heads? Clearly, [h2]. Why? Because [h2] explains the evidence, whereas [h1] merely entails the evidence. [h1] leaves the positive run of seven heads entirely mysterious. (p. 174) Poston then argues that this is consistent with Bayesian conditionalization. He argues for this by arguing that Pr(h1 | e) / Pr(h2 | e) = Pr(h1)Pr(e | h1) / Pr(h2)Pr(e | h2) = Pr(h1) / Pr(h2) which is very small. I am not sure I understand the argument. Poston writes (throughout the argument) in terms of "confirmation". But confirmation can be understood in different ways, and Poston never clarifies what he has in mind.2 Perhaps the idea is this: explanationism implies that upon learning e you have justification for believing h2 but you do not have justification for believing h1; so explanationism implies that upon learning e your new credence in h2 should be greater than your new credence in h1; Bayesian conditionalization implies that upon learning e your new credence in h2 should be greater than your new credence in h1; so explanationism and Bayesian conditionalization are in agreement in the case at hand.3 2 Poston also uses the term "favors". This term, as with the term "confirmation", can be understood in different ways. 3 It is easy to see that Bayesian conditionalization implies that upon learning e your new credence in h2 should be greater than your new credence in h1. Pr(h2 | e) = Pr(h2)Pr(e | h2) / [Pr(h2)Pr(e | h2) + Pr(not-h2)Pr(e | not-h2)] where not-h2 is in effect the hypothesis 6 It does not follow, of course, that explanationism and Bayesian conditionalization are in agreement in all cases. Are there cases in which explanationism runs counter to Bayesian conditionalization? Are there cases in which Ex-J in particular runs counter to Bayesian conditionalization? Recall that Poston defends Ex-J by, in part, setting out a host of test cases and arguing that Ex-J does better overall on those cases than reliabilism and Conee and Feldman's evidentialism. One test case concerns so-called "explanatory theories". He writes: Is one ever justified in believing an explanatory theory on the basis of its explanatory merits? Many of the views we accept purport to be justified in this way. Scientific theories are advocated on the basis of their explanatory merits. ... If it turns out that no one is ever justified in believing a theory on the basis of its explanatory merits then the reach of skepticism is vast. (p. 100) Poston argues that since an explanatory theory (of the kind in question) involves a large number of propositions each of which is less than certain, it follows that an explanatory theory's probability (on the evidence in a given case) is low (less than 0.5). He then argues that this is problematic for reliabilism and Conee and Feldman's evidentialism but not for Ex-J. He writes: Given Ex-J the final conjunctive probability of a theory is not relevant for determining justification. Rather what is relevant is the explanatory merit of the theory in comparison with its competitors. If the theory itself is simple, fits with background evidence, explains, and beats its competitors then one has justification for that theory. The fact that the final conjunctive probability of a grand theory is low does not itself provide any specific challenge to one's view. The cost of an explanatory theory is available at no lower cost. (pp. 101-102) This is a rather remarkable passage. Let h be an explanatory theory. Let e be an evidence proposition such that (i) Pr(h | e) is less than 0.5 and (ii) Poston would claim that if S learned e, then, by Ex-J, S would have justification for believing h. Suppose S learns e. Then by Ex-J, as Poston means for it to be understood, it follows that S has justification for believing h and so, presumably, it is not the case that she should have a credence in h less than 0.5. By Bayesian conditionalization, in contrast, S should have a credence in h less than 0.5. The result, it seems, is that Ex-J is not consistent with Bayesianisn conditionalization and thus is not consistent with Bayesianism. that the coin selected is the fair coin. Pr(h2)Pr(e | h2) / [Pr(h2)Pr(e | h2) + Pr(not-h2)Pr(e | not-h2)] = (0.5)(1) / [(0.5)(1) + (0.5)(0.5)7] = 0.992 (with rounding). It follows that Pr(not-h2 | e) = 0.008. Since h1 entails not-h2, it follows that Pr(h1 | e) ≤ Pr(not-h2 | e). By Bayesian conditionalization it follows that your new credence in h2 should be equal to 0.992 whereas your new credence in h1 should be less than or equal to 0.008. 7 Ex-J, of course, is framed in terms of all-or-nothing belief as opposed to credence (or degree of belief). It is not implausible, though, that all-or-nothing belief and credence are connected at least in that S has justification for believing h only if it is not the case that she should have a credence in h less than 0.5. Perhaps some varieties of explanationism are consistent with Bayesianism. But, it seems, Poston's variety is not among them.4 4 Thanks to Ted Poston for helpful feedback on an earlier version of this review.

A Reply to the Synchronist (Forthcoming in Mind) Abelard Podgorski 1. Introduction On the face of it, in ordinary practices of rational assessment, we criticize agents both for the combinations of attitudes, like belief, desire, and intention, that they possess at particular times, and for the ways that they behave cognitively over time, by forming, reconsidering, and updating those attitudes. Accordingly, philosophers have proposed norms of rationality that are synchronic concerned fundamentally with our individual time-slices, and diachronic concerned with our temporally extended behaviour. In the former camp, we find familiar norms of consistency in belief and intention, of adherence to the probability calculus in credences, and of the constraint our current evidence places on our attitudes. In the latter camp, not quite so well-explored, we find Bayesian demands that we update our credences according to Conditionalization1, and requirements that our attitudes exhibit various sorts of stability across time. The impulse to unsheathe Ockham's razor and trim the excess in our theory is strong, however. It is perhaps not surprising, then, that a handful of epistemologists have recently begun to question whether an account of rationality requires both kinds of norms. It is synchronic norms which have the deeper history, and with the notable exception of Barry Lam (2007)2, these would-be-barbers3 have attempted to cast doubt on the plausibility of diachronic norms altogether. My aim in this paper is to address what I take 1 According to Conditionalization, one's credence in P after learning some evidence E should equal one's prior conditional credence Pr(P/E). See Teller 1972 for a canonical defense. 2 Lam argues for a thesis he calls dynamicism, the view that rational norms apply fundamentally to changes of belief. Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to argue, I join Lam in endorsing a purely diachronic approach to rationality, though the process-oriented picture of diachronic norms I sketch in this paper differs substantively from his view that such norms apply to mere attitude change. 3 See particularly Sarah Moss (unpublished, forthcoming), who explicitly sympathizes with this project, and David Christensen (2000), who does not, but who argues against a large class of diachronic norms. 2 to be the most direct and general recent attack on diachronic epistemic rationality, the arguments for socalled 'time-slice epistemology' by Brian Hedden (2015). I argue that Hedden's attempt to motivate the rejection of diachronic rational norms ultimately fails, and in particular that an independently attractive view about the nature of such norms, namely one on which such norms govern processes, escapes his assault unscathed. 2. Time-Slice Rationality As Hedden understands it, time-slice epistemology involves the conjunction of two claims: Synchronicity: What attitudes you ought to have at a time does not directly depend on what attitudes you have at other times. Impartiality: In determining what attitudes you ought to have, your beliefs about what attitudes you have at other times play the same role as your beliefs about what attitudes other people have. (p. 4) Although Hedden's paper largely consists in the application of arguments for Synchronicity and Impartiality to refute two specific norms, Conditionalization and Reflection, it is clear that Hedden takes the larger project of time-slice epistemology to be inconsistent with the existence of diachronic norms of rationality altogether4. Because my interest is in defending the possibility of diachronic norms, I will not discuss Impartiality, which functions mainly as a constraint on synchronic norms and which I take to be wellmotivated5. I will focus attention instead on Synchronicity and the arguments meant to establish it, showing in the next section that even if the claim were true, it would not be sufficient to motivate the rejection of 4 Hedden informally characterizes time-slice epistemology as the thesis that 'the relationship between time-slices of the same person are not importantly different, for purposes of rational evaluation, from the relationship between time-slices of different persons' and that 'the locus of rationality, so to speak, is the time-slice rather than the temporally extended agent' (p. 1) and elsewhere as committed to the claim that 'All requirements of rationality are synchronic.' (p. 3) 5 Motivation for Impartiality can be found in Christensen 1991 and Arntzenius 2003. 3 diachronic norms (even, plausibly reformulated, those Hedden explicitly addresses), and sketching a view of such norms that I will defend in the face of the considerations Hedden marshals against them. 3. The Argument from Internalism Hedden gives two arguments for Synchronicity. The first I will consider is an argument from Internalism. The core internalist intuition, as Hedden presents it, is that 'being rational is a matter of believing and behaving sensibly, given your perspective on the world' (p. 4). What is rational for an agent, according to the internalist, supervenes on her perspective. But, he argues, one's perspective on the world at a time is surely constituted by what one's mental life is like at that time. So, it looks like it follows that what is rational for you to believe at a time is fully determined by what your mental states are at that very time. The internalist intuition is not uncontroversial, and Hedden does not himself go so far as to endorse it outright, but he notes that this formulation of internalism is weak enough to be compatible even with Timothy Williamson's view that what is rational to believe is determined by what one knows, given that knowledge is a mental state. (p. 5) I myself take the internalist intuition to have a compelling basis and will not reject it here6. Indeed, we may even safely grant that the argument just presented is sound. The problem, I suggest, is that Hedden's formulation of Synchronicity is simply too weak to motivate the rejection of diachronic norms. Recall: Synchronicity states that what attitudes an agent ought to have at a time is wholly determined by their mental states at that time. For this to fully vindicate a purely synchronic model of rationality, however, an additional claim must be added: facts about what attitudes agents ought to have at particular times exhaust the demands of epistemic rationality. And this, I argue, the diachronist should reject. The mistake Hedden makes is much like the one underlying Zeno's infamous paradox of the arrow. Zeno notices that at each moment in time, an arrow does not change its position it merely occupies its own space. So at each instant, the arrow does not move. Since there is no instant at which the arrow 6 For a typical challenge, see Goldman 1999. It is defended in Conee and Feldman 2001. 4 moves, he concludes, it never moves. Analogously, Hedden argues, according to internalism, what is rational for an agent at a time is determined by what they are like at that time. So at each instant, what is rational for an agent is determined purely synchronically. Since what is rational for an agent at each instant is determined purely synchronically, he implicitly concludes, rationality is purely synchronic. But the correct diachronist response here is likewise analogous to the proper response to the paradox of the arrow. The final step in either argument is invalid just because there is no instant at which a phenomenon occurs does not mean that it never occurs. For there may be phenomena which are essentially diachronic, properties that temporal slices cannot possess but which temporally extended objects can. Motion is such a feature. And diachronists should say that rationality and irrationality, in at least some of its forms, is also such a feature. Some rational requirements, they can claim, are like the policeman's command 'Don't move!' There is no individual time-slice at which one violates this command, only intervals during which one does so. Such norms tell us what is rational for agents over intervals in a way not reducible to what is rational for them at times. This does not mean abandoning or trivializing the internalist insight. We may insist that the internalist claim, that what is rational for an agent supervenes on their perspective, is perfectly true. And it is perfectly true that what your perspective is at a moment is determined by what your mental states are like at that moment. But this is just a special case of a more general truth: what your perspective is like over any interval of time is determined by what your mental states are like during that interval. It follows that your rationality during an interval supervenes on your mental states during that interval. So the constraint internalism places on diachronic requirements is this: whatever fundamentally diachronic cognitive phenomena are assessable for rationality, their rationality will supervene on the agent's mental life during the interval in which they occur. Hedden misses this because the diachronic norms he considers are formulated as requirements on 5 the attitudes one must have at a time, in virtue of facts about one's mental history, rather than requirements on essentially diachronic phenomena, in virtue of one's concurrent mental life. That is, they are historical norms on states rather than ahistorical norms on temporally extended objects. It could not plausibly be suggested that norms of the latter sort are outside the scope of his paper, for even his explicit target, Conditionalization, can be formulated so as to claim nothing about what attitudes are rational at individual times, instead describing only what changes in attitude are rational or irrational, a change being a paradigmatic example of an essentially diachronic unit. Though the view that rationality applies to mere changes is immune to the argument from internalism, it is not the one I would like to defend. I suggest a different approach to diachronic norms. Just as we expect synchronic norms to be requirements on the most natural synchronic cognitive units, attitudes such as belief, we should look for diachronic norms to govern the most natural diachronic cognitive units processes such as reasoning. The notion of a process is a thicker one than that of mere change; it includes, significantly, a causal element. Norms on mere attitude change will not, in contrast to norms on processes, be able to distinguish shifts in opinion brought upon by pristine reasoning from those brought upon by repeated lightning strikes to the head. The view I propose, then, is that diachronic norms govern processes, temporally extended, causally continuous patterns of mental states. In light of internalism, those requirements will supervene on internal features of the agent during those processes. This sort of view is one that Hedden and other recent time-slice theorists do not explicitly address their paradigm candidates for diachronic requirements are either norms that apply to mere changes, like Conditionalization, or norms that require broad coherence between our cognitive behaviour now and our cognitive behaviour in the (possibly remote) past (Hedden 2013, 2015, Moss forthcoming). We have seen that by taking the norms to apply to diachronic phenomena rather than states, our picture avoids the argument from Internalism. In what follows, we will see how the causal patterns approach in particular has the resources to deflect Hedden's second, and in his eyes, more central, objection. 6 4. The argument From Personal Identity Hedden's second argument goes something as follows: to determine whether a diachronic principle is satisfied, one needs to know facts about the agent's personal identity over time. But one can know all there is to know about what an agent rationally ought to believe without settling the facts about personal identity. So one can know all there is to know about an agent's rationality without invoking diachronic principles. To defend this argument, Hedden invites us to consider a case of fission such as those described by Derek Parfit (1971, 1984). An agent (Pre) steps into a teletransporter, which vaporizes her body and creates two duplicates (Lefty and Righty) in separate cities. It is not obvious what happens to Pre whether she survives as Lefty, or Righty, or both, or neither. But to determine what Lefty and Righty rationally ought to believe, he claims, we do not need to know whether they are identical with Pre we just need to know their current evidence. A diachronic principle like Conditionalization, which constrains future credences by past ones, would require us to settle the question of identity before settling what Lefty ought to do. 5. R-Relatedness Hedden anticipates a response that arises naturally from Parfit's own discussion of the fission cases. The objector rejects the significance of identity in favor of the significance of some psychological relation, call it 'R', which both duplicates may bear to Pre. Since whether R holds is settled in the case described, the case is no counterexample, provided the diachronic norms govern how we must be related to our Rancestors rather than our past selves. But Hedden thinks that this response fails for two reasons. First, as Parfit notes (1984, p. 298) the R-relation comes in degrees. So, Hedden suggests (p. 7), it is natural to expect the degree to which a person's time-slices exhibit the R-relation to have some upshot for the way they are rationally assessed. But it is hard to see how rational requirements like Conditionalization 7 can plausibly be made sensitive to these matters of degree. Second, Hedden thinks there is an explanatory challenge the defender of the R-relation account should explain why the R-relation has its unique significance for rational assessment why collections of time slices united by the R-relation are importantly different, from the point of view of rationality, from other collections of time slices. He is skeptical that the challenge could be answered. These worries may have force against norms like Conditionalization, but if we understand the Rrelation in the usual way, as some kind of causal psychological connectedness, the view about diachronic norms I suggested in the previous section, on which they are norms governing processes, can answer both challenges. We can both provide a natural account on which rational assessment is sensitive to differences in degree of R-relatedness, and explain why the R-relation in particular distinguishes those collections of time-slices that are subject to rational norms from those that are not. Notice that R-relatedness, on this picture, is a matter of how ones' mental states are causally related. So, differences in degrees of R-relatedness go hand in hand with differences in which causal patterns of mental states are exhibited. Processes, like reasoning, deliberation, and belief formation, in turn, just are causal patterns of mental states. Since these are exactly the things which are, on our view, the fundamental objects of diachronic rational assessment, facts about rationality will closely depend on the strength of the R-relation among time-slices.7 This same feature promises an explanation for why R-relatedness between time-slices, among the countless relations time slices might bear to each other, has special rational significance. Hedden's skepticism makes sense if one assumes that all diachronic norms resemble Conditionalization. Whether an agent conforms to Conditionalization depends only on what the temporal series of their credal mental 7 It is worth adding: it is not clear that R-relatedness being a matter of degree generates a problem unique to the diachronist. Any view on which norms of any sort apply to subject matter vulnerable to Sorites or vagueness concerns will run into a similar problem. And even those features that distinguish agential time-slices from time-slices that are not rationally assessable will exhibit vagueness and continuity at the margins. So more needs to be said about why the diachronist is at a special disadvantage here. 8 states looks like, and not on any deeper relations between them. An agent can satisfy Conditionalization by having their credences rearranged by an appropriate sequence of lightning strikes. So it is indeed a mystery on such a view why rationality would only govern those collections of time-slices connected by the Rrelation. But this stems from a feature of Conditionalization inessential to diachronic norms. On the process account, the explanation is simple. R-relatedness is a matter of causal psychological connectedness; this connectedness is a matter of the causal relations between states; and causal patterns of states is precisely what diachronic rationality is all about. So it's no mystery at all why only collections bound by the R-relation would be the proper subjects of diachronic rational requirements. 6. Synchronic Sufficiency The R-relation response allows us to explain why we do not need to settle facts about personal identity to settle facts about rationality in the fission case. But Hedden's argument has a second layer. In addition to the claim that facts about identity are not necessary to account for the rationality of belief, Hedden suggests (p. 4, p. 7) that facts about the synchronic relation between each time slice and its evidence are sufficient to settle facts about rationality. If he is right about this latter claim, then appeal to the R-relation will not be enough to defend diachronic norms, for while the facts about R-relatedness may not, in the test cases, be in dispute in the way facts about identity are, neither are they doing any work. The appeal Hedden makes to justify this thought is something like this: consider each time-slice and the evidence it possesses. Ask yourself "what ought this time-slice rationally believe?" Intuitively, Hedden expects, we will say "it ought to believe exactly whatever its evidence favors." The matter is thus settled without need for more information. So purely synchronic considerations are sufficient to account for the rationality of belief, and the time-slice picture is vindicated. But here we recall the main lesson gleaned from evaluating the Internalism argument: showing that what attitudes it is rational to have at particular times is determined synchronically is not sufficient to show that rationality is synchronic. For some rational requirements may apply not to the rationality of attitudes, 9 but to the rationality of diachronic phenomena like belief change or reasoning. Synchronicity, as formulated by Hedden, is too weak to refute the existence of diachronic norms. This response applies with equal strength to the argument here. Even granting that the evidence of each time slice suffices for what attitudes are rational for that time-slice, there may be other questions we can ask about rationality that are not so easily dispensed with. We may ask whether a certain instance of belief formation was rational, whether someone is reasoning rationally, whether a certain pattern of attitudes they exhibit is rational, and so on. And these are not straightforwardly answered merely by looking at isolated time-slices. Moreover, there are positive reasons to think that important facts about rationality cannot be settled synchronically. I will give several examples concerning the rationality of belief formation. 7. Belief Formation On the face of it, the synchronist has an explanation handy for the rationality of belief formation: belief formation is a way we bring ourselves into compliance with synchronic norms when our evidence changes. We gain some new evidence, our total evidence now supports a new belief, and we bring ourselves to comply with the synchronic demand that our beliefs match our evidence by forming a new belief. This picture, I suggest, is mistaken. Rational belief formation cannot be explained by appealing to synchronic relations of evidential support, falsifying the sufficiency claim. I will be using a very weak assumption: that in the normal course of things, for finite human agents like us, responding to evidence takes time. For our purposes, this time may be vanishingly small. It is sufficient that the time at which we initiate forming a belief in response to our evidence and the time at which it is fully formed are not identical. Imagine that my friend Minnie promises that she will come to my birthday party. Like most of my friends, Minnie is an odd duck; she is a pathological liar who delights in making promises she intends never to keep and rejoices in the disappointment of others. So the fact that Minnie tells me that she is coming to my birthday party is normally excellent reason to believe she will not. However, Minnie is also extremely 10 superstitious, and believes that breaking a promise made on the thirteenth of each month will curse her. So she always keeps promises made on the thirteenth of the month, which, it so happens, is today's date. All this is known to me. Having incorporated this evidence at t0, suppose that the earliest time at which I can deliberately fully form a belief regarding Minnie's presence or absence (about which I am, at t0, agnostic) is t1. Now imagine that, unbeknownst to me, exactly at t1, I will suddenly forget that it is the thirteenth (so that I do not have this knowledge at t1). What belief is it rational for me to form at t1? According to the synchronist, the belief that it is rational for me to form at t1 is the belief that Minnie will not be at the party, since this is the belief that is supported by the evidence I will have at that time. But, I claim, this is the wrong result. Because what belief I form at t1 is determined by the process of belief formation that operates before that time, forming the belief that Minnie will not be at the party would require me to, before t1, ignore the perfectly compelling evidence I have that she will. It is true that at t1, my epistemic state has changed in a way that may require me, going forward, to cease believing that Minnie will come to my party. But at t1, I have not yet had any chance to respond to this sudden epistemic impoverishment, and so my failure to take it into account cannot be rationally impugned. We may imagine a variation of this case which differs only in that I know, beforehand, that I am about to forget the decisive evidence concerning Minnie's reliability. I am deciding now what to believe, knowing that my current evidence supports Minnie's presence, but that by the time I form a belief, my impoverished evidence will support her absence. Which belief should I decide to form? Again, I maintain, forming the belief that is synchronically supported by my evidence at t1 is bizarre. I am deciding now what belief to form, am now better informed than I will be at t1, and have every reason to think Minnie will be at the party. Whatever belief I form will be formed as a response to my current mental state, so my choice is between using all the information now available to me or effectively handicapping myself by treating perfectly good evidence as though it had no weight. To reject a belief we have every reason to think is true 11 in favor of a belief that coheres with evidence we know to be misleading is, it seems to me, to disrespect the fundamental epistemic concern with truth. In both of these cases, then, it looks rational to form the belief that Minnie will make it to my party at t1. But either case would be enough. By t1, it is too late for that belief to bring me to satisfy a synchronic relation of evidential support. So if the judgment I suggest in either of these cases is correct, the synchronist is not in a position to explain the rationality of belief formation. The lesson here is that belief formation is something that happens going forward. But the attitudes that rationalize it, the evidence one is responding to, when one is being properly evidence-responsive, is evidence one has during the process of deliberation, before the belief is formed. The rationality of belief formation cannot be captured merely by looking at what attitudes are justified synchronically before, during, and after deliberation. Another kind of case underscores the importance of causal relations between temporal parts in the rationality of belief formation. Consider the following two worlds. In the first, an agent A performs a typical act of good reasoning, forming a new belief in response to some newly acquired evidence E. In the second, there are two agents, B1 and B2, similar to A except for the following bit of history: B1 gains the evidence E and begins the very same act of reasoning completed by A, but halfway through, after the evidence has made its causal contribution but before the new belief is formed, is hit by lightning, causing them to forget E and cease the reasoning. Elsewhere in the world, B2 is struck by lightning, causing them to gain or remember E and scrambling their brain as though it were halfway through the aforementioned act of reasoning, so the evidence makes no causal contribution but the belief is formed to completion. On the time-slice model, there should be nothing relevant to rationality that happens in the first world that does not also happen in the second world cutting a sequence of time slices from B1 and setting them against a sequence from B2 allows us to replicate the pattern of consecutive mental states experienced by A. But this seems wrong. A formed a belief in response to her evidence. And this is an event of normative significance. This event does not occur in the second world B1 does not form a belief because she is 12 interrupted, and B2 forms a belief, but not in response to her evidence. If this is right, there is a certain kind of event the formation of a belief as a causal response to evidence, whose rational properties are not reducible to the rational properties of its instantaneous parts. This kind of event is the sort of essentially diachronic object of rational assessment that only a correspondingly diachronic set of norms can adequately describe. 8. Uniqueness I have argued that Hedden's positive arguments for the time-slice picture and, consequently, the rejection of diachronic rational norms, do not succeed. Hedden has one final explicit aim in the paper relevant to our concerns here: to show that a synchronic view has the resources to capture intuitions about rational agency that on their face seem best explained diachronically. In particular, synchronic norms look ill-poised to explain why agents should exhibit stability in their beliefs and credences over time. Individual time slices may differ drastically in their attitudes and still be, in isolation, rational. On the time slice picture, any sequence of such time-slices will exhibit no rational failure. Intuitively, though, agents who fluctuate wildly in their attitudes are not rational. Hedden argues (pp. 14 -17) that we can accommodate this intuition on a synchronic picture, provided we accept Uniqueness, the claim that there is only one rational set of attitudes to have given a set of evidence. If Uniqueness is correct, then provided we do not gain or lose significant amounts of evidence, a rational agent's beliefs will remain relatively stable. The problem with this is not just that Uniqueness is at best highly controversial8. Even granting it, the principle will not rule out the rationality of intuitively objectionable instability without a complementary notion of "evidence". On one view, one's evidence is determined by states like belief. This will be no help to the synchronist, however, since an agent who wildly fluctuates in their beliefs is thereby 8 Proponents of the thesis include Roger White (2007) and Ballantyne and Coffman (2011), but a rebuttal can be found in Kelly (forthcoming), and Schoenfield (2012) argues for a qualified rejection of uniqueness in favor of a moderate permissivism. Chapter Three of this dissertation discusses the issue of uniqueness in more depth. 13 fluctuating in their evidence. It is not much better if evidence is knowledge, since plausibly, wild fluctuations in beliefs can, in various ways, undermine knowledge as well. If evidence is something like perceptual experiences, then on a model that limits such evidence to the present time-slice, one's evidence will simply be too spare to justify much at all. Hedden needs an account of evidence where it is both plausibly the sufficient grounds for our attitudes and resists being gained or lost through an agent's bizarre cognitive behaviour, and there does not seem to be one in easy reach. Meeting this challenge matters for Hedden's project because as long as a synchronic understanding of the irrationality of radical cognitive instability looks out of our grasp, we have an additional reason to be skeptical of the time-slice view. 9. Conclusion I conclude, then, that there is no reason to think that diachronic norms have unacceptable implications concerning cases where personal identity is a matter of dispute, no reason to think that they violate plausible constraints of internalism, and no reason to think that they can easily be done away with without sacrificing an explanation of apparently rational cognitive inertia. Hedden's arguments rest on the assumption that it is an agent's attitudes at individual times that are the sole fundamental target of rational assessment an assumption the diachronist should reject. Furthermore, we have sketched a picture of diachronic norms, one on which such norms govern cognitive processes like belief formation and reasoning, and shown that it is independently plausible and especially well placed to answer the criticisms leveled by time-slice epistemologists. It may be time, then, for enthusiasts of parsimony in the realm of rational norms to accept that the rational man is more than the sum of his parts. 14 References Arntzenius, Frank 2003: 'Some Problems for Conditionalization and Reflection'. Journal of Philosophy, 100, pp. 356-370. Ballantyne, Nathan and Coffman, E.J. 2011: 'Uniqueness, Evidence, and Rationality'. Philosophers' Imprint, 11, pp. 1-13. Christensen, David 1991: 'Clever Bookies and Coherent Beliefs'. Philosophical Review, 100, pp. 229-247 --2000: 'Diachronic Coherence versus Epistemic Impartiality'. Philosophical Review, 109, pp. 349-371. Conee, Earl, and Richard Feldman 2001: 'Internalism Defended'. American Philosophical Quarterly, 38, pp. 1-18. Goldman, Alvin 1999: 'Internalism Exposed'. Journal of Philosophy, 96, pp. 271-293. Hedden, Brian forthcoming: 'Time-Slice Rationality'. Forthcoming in Mind. --2013: 'Options and Diachronic Tragedy'. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 88. Kelly, Tom forthcoming: 'How to be an Epistemic Permissivist'. Forthcoming in Matthias Steup and John Turri (eds): Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Malden, MA: Blackwell. Lam, Barry. (2007) 'The Dynamic Foundations of Epistemic Rationality'. Dissertation, Princeton University. Moss, Sarah. (Unpublished) 'Credal Dilemmas' --forthcoming: 'Time-slice Epistemology and Action Under Indeterminacy'. Forthcoming in Oxford Studies in Epistemology. Parfit, Derek A. (1971). 'Personal Identity'. The Philosophical Review, 80, pp. 3-27. --1984: Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Schoenfield, Miriam. 2012: 'Chilling Out on Epistemic Rationality'. Philosophical Studies, 158, pp. 197-219. 15 Teller, Paul 1973: 'Conditionalization and Observation'. Synthese, 26, pp. 218–258. White, Roger 2007: 'Epistemic Permissiveness'. Philosophical Perspectives, 19, pp. 445-459.

HOW TO LEGISLATE WITH WISDOM AND ELOQUENCE HOW TO LEGISLATE WITH WISDOM AND ELOQUENCE The Art of Legislation Reconstructed from the Rhetorical Tradition Luis Alberto Marchili Author's Edition 2016 Marchili, Luis Alberto How to Legislate with Wisdom and Eloquence. The Art of Legislation Reconstructed from the Rhetorical Tradition. 1st edition, spanish, Editorial Dunken, Buenos Aires, 2009, 498 p. 16x23 cm. ISBN 978-987-02-4047-1. Author's English translation, Author's Edition, ebook (pdf), 333 pp. Buenos Aires, 2016. Philosophy of Law. Rhetoric. Art of legislation. Legislative Drafting. © 2016 Luis Alberto Marchili e-mail: [email protected] All rights reserved: no part of this book may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, without prior written permission from the author. "[...] the orator that we look for, and who we want to make the chief of the State council, [will be] the author of the resolutions to be taken by the government, and either in the senate or in the assemblies, will always make his opinions prevail by the force of wisdom and eloquence." Cicero (106-43 B.C.)1 1 "Entre celles-ci, la secte qui combat pour la volupté, quand même ses principes auraient quelque apparence de vérité, ne peut convenir en rien à l'orateur que nous cherchons, et dont nous voulons faire le chef du conseil de l'État, l'auteur des résolutions à prendre pour le gouvernement, et celui qui, dans le sénat comme dans les assemblées, fera toujours prévaloir ses avis à force de sagesse et d'éloquence." "Ex illis autem, quae remanent, ea philosophia, quae suscepit patrocinium voluptatis, etsi cui vera videatur, procul abest tamen ab eo viro quem quaerimus, et quem auctorem publici consilii, et regendae civitatis ducem, et sententiae atque eloquentiae principem in senatu, in populo, in causis publicis esse volumus." Cicero, De Oratore, III, XVII Cicéron, De l'Orateur, III, XVII; dans Oeuvres Complètes de Cicéron, Traduction de S. Andrieux, Revue avec le Plus Grand Soin par M. Charpentier, Garnier Frères, Libraires Éditeurs, Tome Troisème, Paris, 1906, p. 346. In memory of Alfredo Colmo, Argentine jurist of international fame (1876-1934)2 2 Born on August 21st 1876, he was baptized "Juan Alfredo Colmo", but did not use his first name. "[...] law does have compulsive power, and it is reason proceeding from a kind of practical wisdom and intellect." Aristotle (384-322 B.C.)3 "Besides, though ruler and master of all things, it exercises its authority without the use of arms and force on the contrary, law itself does away with force; nay, it rules by persuasion and governs willing subjects. For it is because it first persuades men and secures their approval that law comes into being and acquires its own power." Dio Chrisostom (c 40 – c 120)4 'VI.5 FORMULA OF APPOINTMENT TO THE QUAESTORSHIP. [...] 3. [...] Think of the honour and responsibility you have in equal measure. If I am in any doubt, I ask the Qaestor, who is a treasure of public reputation, a store-room of the laws, ever ready for the unexpected; and as Tully [Cicero], the master of eloquence puts it, nothing "seems more remarkable than the ability, by speech, to hold men's minds, to attract their inclinations, to drive them whither, or to lead them whence he wills" [De Oratore I.30]. For, if it is the proper part of the orator to speak with gravity and style that he may move the minds of the judges, how much more eloquent must be who is known to admonish the people with their prince's mouth that they should love the right, hate the wrong, praise good men without ceasing, and zealously denounce the evil. So, punishment may be given holiday where the power of eloquence prevails. He must imitate the ancients with intelligence; he must correct the morals of others, and preserve his own with due integrity.' Magnus Aurelius Cassiodorus Senator (c 490-583)5 3 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book X, 9, 1180a20. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book X, 9, 1180a, Translated and Edited by Roger Crisp, Cambridge University Press, First published in printed format, 2000, ebook (net library), 2004, p. 201, text reproduced above. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book X, 9, 1180a20, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation, Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Princeton University Press, Second Printing 1985, Volume II, p. 1865. The text of two versions is accompanied also, one in English and the other in Spanish: "[...] law does have the power to compel, and law is reasoned speech that proceeds from prudence and intellect of some sort." Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 10.9, 1180a20, The Politics of Aristotle, Translated with Introduction Analysis and Notes by Peter L. Phillips Simpson, The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill and London, 1997, p. 3. "[...] la ley tiene fuerza obligatoria, y es la expresión de cierta prudencia o inteligencia." Aristóteles, Ética a Nicómaco, Libro X, 9, 1180a20, Edición Bilingüe y Traducción por María Araujo y Julián Marías, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid, 1981, p. 171. 4 Dio Chrysostom, The Seventy-fifth Discourse: On Law, 4; in Dio Chrysostom, with an English Translation by H. Lamar Crosby, in Five Volumes, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, William Heinemann Ltd, London, 1985, Volume V, pp. 242-245. 5 The Questor (Quaestor) had then two functions: to write laws and to answer petitions. The Variae of Magnus Aurelius Cassiodorus Senator, Book VI. 5, 3. The Right Honourable and Illustrious Ex-Quaestor of the Palace, Ex-Ordinary Consul, Ex-Master of the Offices, Praetorian Prefect and Patrician, Being Documents of the Kingdom of the Ostrogoths in Italy, Chosen to Illustrate the Life of the Author and the History of his Family and Translated with Notes and Introduction by S.J.B. Barnish, Liverpool University Press, 1992, p. 96. The text is accompanied also in the original language: "FORMULA QUA[E]STURA V [...] Considerate quid ponderis habeatis pariter & decoris. Quaestore Si quid dubitamus, a Quaestore requerimos: qui est officium. thesaurus famae pubilicae, armarium legum, paratus semper ad subitum, & (ut ait Tullius magister "Which must be the art of making laws We must provide healthy help for making laws, prepare us to make good works, as the ancient did, and we want to teach in what way to make statutes, and in what way he who makes laws must have learned the art of making laws." Fuero Juzgo (649 ó 653)6 eloquentiae) Nihil praestabilius videtur, quam posse dicendo tenere hominum mentes, allicere voluntates, impellere quo velit, unde autem velit deducere. Nam orator. si oratoris est proprium, grauiter & ornare dicere, ut possit animos iudicu commouere: quanto facundior debet esse, qui ore principis populos noscitur admonere? ut recta diligant, peruersa contemnant, bonus sine fine laudent pessimos vehementer accusent. Ut pene feriata sit distinctio, vbi praeualet eloquentiae fortitudo. Sit imitator prudentissimus Antiquorum, mores alienos corrigat, & suos debita integritate custodiat." Magni Aurelii Cassiodori Senatoris V.C., Variarum libri XII, Apud Sebastianum Niuellium, sub Ciconis, via Iacobae, Parisiis, 1589, pp. 129-130. 6 "Qual deve ser el arte de fazer las leyes Nos que devemos dar ayuda de salud por el fazemiento de las leyes, apareiamos nos de fazer buena huevra, cuemo fizieron los antigos, é queremos ensennar en qual manera se deve fazer la ley, y en qual manera el qui la faze deve aver ensennamiento ó arte de la fazer." Fuero Juzgo, Libro Primero, Título I, Del Facedor de la Ley; Los Códigos Españoles Concordados y Anotados, Imprenta de la Publicidad, a cargo de M. Rivadeneyra, Tomo Primero, Madrid, 1847, p. 105. Ayuda de salud: auxilio, ayuda saludable. Apareiar: disponerse, preparar; aparejarse, prepararse. Huevra: obra. Víctor Fernández Llera, Gramática y Vocabulario del Fuero Juzgo, Real Academia Española, Madrid, 1929, pp. 118, 107 y 201. Warnings to the reader A great number of notes with quotes has been introduced to invite the reader to drink from the best fountains, far from any pedantic style.Thus, there is not always a complete identity between the opinion sustained by the author of this work and those of the authors quoted in every note,7 not even between the opinion sustained by the said authors and the cites of their works here. Those works, more than testimonies of arcane and infallible oracles, may be read as store-rooms of tradition, since sometimes the opinions of others exposed or quoted by the authors to criticize them, are, perhaps, more important than the own ones, since they may generate different and valuable opinions and concerns. Plato was opposed to rhetoric in his Gorgias dialogue,8 but then he accepted a philosophical rhetoric in his Phaedrus,9 to educate or govern the souls by means of speech (psychagogy10). The opinions opposite to his, which he 7 As becomes clear from the beginning of the Notice of the Civil Code of Chile, written by the eminent grammarian, legislator and humanist Andrés Bello, author of the project: "It must be warned that there is not always a complete identity between a provision of the Code and the statute or doctrine quoted; since these are sometimes adapted with some enlargement, restriction or explanation, or alleged by way of resemblance or of analogy." ("Debe advertirse que no siempre hai una completa identidad entre la disposición del Código i la lei o doctrina que se cita; adaptándose a veces éstas con alguna ampliación, restricción o esplicación, o alegándose por vía de semejanza o de analojía"). Código Civil de la República de Chile, Edición autorizada por el Supremo Gobierno, Imprenta Chilena, Santiago de Chile, julio de 1858, p. 359. 8 Diogenes Laertius, Life, Doctrines and Judgments of Illustrious Philosophers, Book III, Plato. Diogenes Laertius quotes the work as "Gorgias or of the Rhetoric", and qualifies it as a refutation type of dialogue. Diogène Laërce, Vie, Doctrines et Sentences des Philosophes Illustres, Traduction, Notice et Notes par Robert Genaille, Garnier-Flammarion, Tome I, Livre III, Platon, Paris, 1965, p. 181 and n. 303. Plato, Gorgias, 464d-465a. Plato denied that the rhetoric was an art, because it cannot account for the nature of things and indicate the cause of each one, and reduced it to an empiricism, like a species of flattery, which tries to achieve the pleasant without worrying for the good. Plato, Gorgias, 464d-465a, Translated with Notes by Terence Irwin, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1979, p. 33. Platón, Gorgias, 464d-465a, Traducción, Introducción y Notas de Ángel Cappelletti, Eudeba, Buenos Aires, 1967, p. 143. Platon, Gorgias, 464d-465a, Texte Établi pair Alfred Croiset avec the Collaboration of Louis Bodin, dans Platon, Oeuvres Completes (sic), Tome III, 2e Partie, Gorgias-Ménon, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Paris, 1923, pp. 133-134. Platon, Gorgias, 464d-465a; dans Oeuvres Complètes of Platon, Traduction Nouvelle et Notes par Léon Robin, Librairie Gallimard, Tome I, Paris, 1950, p. 400. Platone, Gorgia, XIX, 464d-465a, a Cura di N. Sabbatucci, Editore Laterza, Bari, 1956, pp. 60. 9 Plato, Phaedrus, 277b. Philosophical rhetoric needs: a) the knowledge of the truth about the things on which one speaks or writes; b) the definition and division of the things up to the indivisible species; c) the definition and division of the soul up to the indivisible species; d) the discovery of the species of speech that adapts itself to each soul species. Platón, Fedro, 277b, Edición Bilingüe, Traducción, Notas y Estudio Preliminar por Luis Gil Fernández, Instituto de Estudios Políticos, Madrid, 1957, pp. 79-80. Platon, Phédre, 277b, Texte Traduit pair Léon Robin; dans Platon, Oeuvres Complètes, Tomo IV, 3e Partie, Phédre, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Paris, 1933, p. 92. Platon, Phédre, 277b; dans Oeuvres Complètes of Platon, Traduction Nouvelle et Notes pair Léon Robin avec the Collaboration of M. J. Moreau, Éditions de la Nouvelle Revue Française, Takes II, Paris, 1942, p. 63. Platone, Fedro, 277b, Testo Critico, Introduzione e Commento di Giuseppe Ammendola, Casa Editrice Carlo Signorelli S.p.a., Milan, pp. 261-262. 10 Plato, Phaedrus, 261a. expressed or quoted with the view to criticize them, far from disappearing, were perpetuated, since their texts were turned into essential documents to reconstruct the history of Greek rhetoric, and have inspired, inspire and will inspire many people, including those who have assumed, assume and will assume positions different from the ones held by the outstanding Greek philosopher. Unless otherwise indicated, all English translations in the text and notes are by the author of this book. Platón, Fedro, 261a, Edición Bilingüe, Traducción, Notas y Estudio Preliminar por Luis Gil Fernández, Instituto de Estudios Políticos, Madrid, 1957, p. 54. Platon, Phédre, 261a, Texte Traduit par Léon Robin; dans Platon, Oeuvres Complètes, Tomes IV, 3e Partie, Phédre, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Paris, 1933, p. 63. Platon, Phédre, 261a; dans Oeuvres Complètes of Platon, Traduction Nouvelle et Notes par Léon Robin avec the Collaboration of M. J. Moreau, Éditions de la Nouvelle Revue Française, Tome II, Paris, 1942, p. 55. Platone, Fedro, 261a, Testo Critico Introduzione e Commento di Giuseppe Ammendola, Casa Editrice Carlo Signorelli S.p.a., Milan, pp. 185-186. Prologue Busy reader: any human activity of certain social importance is the object of a specific art, founded on a determined method, which provide a system of observations, principles, rules and examples designed for its well performance. Nevertheless, the legislative activity, despite its importance, has not been provided with a model explaining it with the dignity of a genuine source of law,11 and has remained freed at random or subjected to the empiricism of mere practice, since the art of legislation does not exist today as a true doctrine body, because it has not been incorporated into a fundamental system, into an acknowledged methodical base on which a well assembled construction may be erected.12 The legislative activity presents a multiplicity that chance exaggerates, a routine practice that falsifies the unit, or a mixture of both, without a specific art having managed to reduce it to a true unit, by means of a theory making its problems more understandable and its solutions more understandable and realizable.13 The true art of legislation, that had been lost, is reconstructed here from classical tradition, which conceives laws as wise and eloquent civic speeches and rhetoric, the art of persuading with wise and eloquent civic speeches, as its methodical base recognized for almost two thousand and five hundred years. The above mentioned theoretical hypothesis and its respective methodical base enrich the art to speak well (ars bene dicere) and found the art to legislate well (ars bene legislandi), as it will be proved in this book, in such a way, that the return to ancient rhetoric will be a progress for the art of legislation.14 The art of legislation reconstructed as a system of observations, principles, rules15 and examples,16 founded on rhetoric, makes it possible to overcome the stages of mere 11 Jeremy Waldron, The Dignity of Legislation, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999, p. 1. 12 Robert Walter, "Die Lehre von der Gesetztechnik", Österreischische Juristen-Zeitung, 18 Jahrgang, Heft Nr. 4, 26 Februar 1963, II, p. 84. 13 On the realization of the law, see: R. Von Ihering, L'Esprit du Droit Romain dans les Diverses Phases de son Développement, Traduit sur la 3e. Édition avec l'Autorisation de l'Auteur par O. de Meulenaere, A. Maresq Ainé, Éditeur, Tome III, Paris, 1877, p. 15. 14 Giuseppe Verdi, Letter from Genoa, of 1/5/1871, to Francesco Florimo, librarian of the R. Collegio Di Musica of Naples, whom they had offered him the Direction of the above mentioned School; there he recommends him, about the art of education of young pupils: "Return to the ancient and it will be a progress." "Tornate all'antico e sará un progresso", Giuseppe Fumagalli, Chi l'Ha Detto?, Tesoro di Citazioni, Ulrico Hoepli, Editore-Libraio della Real Casa, Milano, 1934, Ristampa Anastatica, 1951, pp. 117-118. 15 Rules on the art of legislation are also included on these two works: Jérémie Bentham, Vue Générale d'un Corps Complet de Législation, dans Oeuvres de Jérémie Bentham, par Ét. Dumont, Société Belge de Librairie, Troisième Édition, Tome Premier, Bruxelles, 1840, p. 341. Jeremy Bentham, Nomography or the Art of Inditing Laws; in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Published under the Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring, Simpkin, Marshall & Co., Volume III, London, 1848, pp. 230-295. It makes interesting comments about the Bentham's Nomography: Courtenay Ilbert, The Mechanics of Law Making, Columbia University Press, New York, 1914, pp. 91122 16 For numerous rules and examples, see: G. C. Thorton, Legislative Drafting, Butterworths, First Edition, London, 1970; Second Edition, 1979; Third Edition, 1987; Fourth Edition, 1996; Fourth Edition Reprinted by Tottel Publishing Ltd., West Sussex, 2005, Reprinted 2006 (Twice), 2008 (Twice). practices without giving reasons and of isolated answers about a heap of problems. It may be applied both in Common Law and Civil Law systems, and also in any other positive law, historical, current or future, previous adaptation of the legislation to the multiplicity of languages and juridical systems, which knowledge is presupposed, as it happens with rhetoric. It may also be learned without teachers' help, as it will be proved in the development of this book and by those who follow the same model, as it has been proved by the large number of publications that have kept the rhetorical tradition alive. This book will be of immediate utility for the readers who, on account of their legal education or in their capacity as specialists in other disciplines, when asked to give their opinions or designated to collaborate in legislative tasks, will be able to grasp in just a short time, such knowledge as the author was able to acquire only after more than thirty years of study and seven of experience as legislative adviser. It will likewise be of immediate utility for the State, because the improved quality of the laws will diminish the complexity and number of the judicial cases and administrative proceedings, since it will encourage the spontaneous compliance of the law, which is the normal conduct, since compulsory execution is a therapy to cure non-performance, which is a pathological conduct. The author cannot conclude this prologue without confessing that had he chosen a subject-matter proportioned to his strenghts, pondered the burden that his shoulders would carry,17 he would not have even attempted to write this book. But, since he chose an elevated topic and flew off with it,18 after a long time and much effort, he managed to capture it. Now, frightened, he publishes it with the hope that, if it will be read with recurrent fervour and loyalty,19 it will be a light for the soul20 against chance and 17 Horace, Ars Poetica, 38. Horace, Ars Poetica, 38; Satires, Epistles and Ars Poetica, with an English Translation by H. Rushton Fairclough, The Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University-William Heinemann Ltd., Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, 1961, pp. 452-453. Quinto Horacio Flaco, Arte Poética, 38, Introducción, versión rítmica y notas de Tarsicio Herrera Zapién, Bibliotheca Scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum Mexicana, Universidad Autónoma de México, México, 1970, p. 2. Horace, Art Poétique, 38; Traduit et Annoté par E. Taillefert, Librairie Hachette, Paris, 1920, p. 6. 18 Montesquieu, Pensées, pensée 1450; Pensées [et] Le Spicilège, Édition Établie par Louis Desgraves, Ed. Robert Laffont, Paris, 1991, p. 477. 19 Jorge Luis Borges, Sobre los Clásicos, Otras Inquisiciones, Obras Completas, Tomo I, Volumen II, 1952-1972, Emecé Editores, 20 edición, Buenos Aires, 1994, p. 151. 20 "[...] que no me dexa tiempo para hazer alguna recompensa, leyendo otros que sean luz del alma." Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra, El Ingenioso Hidalgo Don Quijote de la Mancha, Parte Segunda, Cap. LXXIV, Obras Completas de Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra, Edición Publicada por Rodolfo Schevill y Adolfo Bonilla, Gráficas Reunidas S.A., Tomo IV, Madrid, 1941, p. 398, línes 7-9. "[...] que no me deja tiempo para hacer alguna recompensa, leyendo otros que sean luz del alma." Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra, El Ingenioso Hidalgo Don Quijote de la Mancha, Parte Segunda, Cap. LXXIV, Nueva Edición Crítica por Francisco Rodríguez Marín, Ediciones Atlas, Tomo VIII, Madrid, 1948, p. 253, línes 4-6. "[...] que no me deja tiempo para hacer alguna recompensa leyendo otros que sean luz del alma." Miguel de Cervantes, Don Quijote de la Mancha, Segunda Parte, Cap. LXXIIII, , Edición del Instituto Cervantes, 1605-2005, Dirigida por Francisco Rico, con la Colaboración de Joaquín Forradellas, Galaxia Gutenberg, Círculo de Lectores, Centro para la Edición de los Clásicos Españoles, Navarra, 2004, p. 1330, líneas 10-12 The source of the preceding quote from Don Quixote, in different editions, was the book: ["Luz del alma cristiana contra la ceguedad é ignorancia", por Fr. Felipe de Meneses, dominico, Catedrático de Alcalá, y Rector del Colegio de S. Gregorio de Valladolid, Salamanca, 1556, Medina del Campo 1567, y otras tres ediciones, la última en Valencia 1594.] empiricism, for those who may be looking for initiation or improvement in the secrets of the true art of legislation. Luis Alberto Marchili Julio Cejador y Frauca, La Lengua de Cervantes, Gramática y Diccionario de la Lengua Castellana en El Ingenioso Hidalgo Don Quijote de la Mancha, Tomo II, Diccionario y Comentario, Establecimiento Gráfico de Jaime Ratés, Madrid, 1905, p. 671, columna 2. Contents Prologue Chapter I Introduction 1. Object 2. Method 3. Denominations 4. Definition 5. Expository plan Part I: History Chapter II Ancient and Medieval History 1. Ancient history a. Orient Mesopotamian codes Ptahhotep and Merikare Confucius The School of the legists Manu, Kautiliya and Asoka b. Greece Onomacritus Seven wise men Foreign legislators Orators and sophists Protagoras Isocrates, Plato and Aristotle Callimacus c. Rome Law of the XII Tables Orators, sophists and bureaucrats Cicero 2. Medieval history a. Boethius and Cassiodorus b. Isidore of Seville c. Alcuin d. Ars dictaminis Alberico di Montecassino and Giovanni di Gaeta Alberto di Morra Boncompagno da Signa Rolandino Passagieri Giovanni di Bonandrea e. Ars arengandi Guido Fava, Matteo de Libri and Albertano da Brescia f. The education of the Podestá Oculus Pastoralis Liber de Regimine Civitatum Li Livres dou Trésor g. The Humanists Coluccio Salutati Leonardo Bruni Lorenzo Valla Chapter III Modern and Contemporary History 1. Modern history a. Bacon b. Hopper c. Montesquieu d. Mably e. Filangieri 2. Contemporary history a. Bentham b. Later Part II: System Chapter IV Legislative Genres 1. Prescriptive speeches a. Systematizing genre Juridical system Systematizing laws External systematizing laws Arranged texts Compilations Digests Internal sistematizing laws Institutional laws Consolidations Codifications b. Fragmentary genre Casuistic laws Laws of principles Amending laws Spatial validity Temporal validity Suspension Extension in time Repeal Tacit repeal Express repeal Amendement method Textual amending laws Suppression Addition Substitution Division Reunion Transposition Not-textual amending laws 2. Persuasive speeches a. Species Preambles The "Whereas" section Exposition of Motives Messages and Reports Notes Epilogues b. Refutation of certain frequent objections c. Need for persuasive speeches Chapter V Investigation 1. Previous instructions 2. Previous knowledge a. The State of the cause b. Defensibility Easy Defensibility Difficult Defensibility Doubtful Defensibility c. Determination of the legislative genre and its species 3. Instruments 4. Promptuary of the things to say a. Forms b. Double reasons (dissoi logoi) c. The colors of good and evil d. Topics e. Sophisms 5. Topics a. Public opinion b. Opinion of the interested sectors c. Opinion of the experts d. Legislation e. Custom f. Case Law g. Juristic Writings h. Character of the legislator (ethos) i. Hope and fear of the recipients of the laws (pathos) j. Reasonableness of legislative speeches (logos) Legislative examples Legislative enthymemes Legislative definitions Conceptual definitions Nominal definitions Mixed definitions Persuasive definitions Genres Species Similarities Differences Contrarieties Concomitances Precedent, consequent and incompatible Causes Effects Comparisons Possibility Feasibility Probability Necessity Opportunity Merit Justice Expediency Juridical security Harmonization of the justice, the expediency and the juridical security 6. Sophisms a. Sophisms in general Sophisms that depend on the language only to cause deceit Sophism of excessive vagueness Sophism of semantic ambiguity (homonymy) Sophism of syntactic ambiguity (amphibology) Sophism of combination Sophism of division Sophism of accentuation (more properly, ambiguity only in the writing speech with regard to the oral speech) Sophism of the expression form (or word figure) Sophisms that do not depend on the language only to cause deceit Sophism of the accident Sophism of the absolute and not absolute sense Sophism of the begging the question Sophism of the consequent Sophism of a cause that is not a cause Sophism of several questions in only one Sophism of ignorance of the refutation b. Legislative sophisms in the wide sense Deliberative sophisms Sophisms that intended to postpone the debate (dilatory) Sophism of the quietist Sophism of false consolation Sophism of the most opportune future Sophism of gradualism Sophism of the distraction maneuver Sophism of the Danger Sophisms intended to confuse the debate (confusionist) Sophism of the only word that implies approval or rejection (epithet) Sophism of the impostor term (euphemism) Sophism of vague generalities Sophism of the Allegorical idols Sophism of the Popular corruption Sophism of the antithinkers Sophism of the paradoxical affirmations Sophism of the confusion of the obstacle with the cause Sophism of the Bias Sophism of the end that justifies the means Sophism of the universal opponent Sophism of the rejection instead of the modification Sophisms intended to prevent the debate (impedimental) Sophism of the wisdom of our ancestors Sophism of the absence of precedents Sophism of the irrevocable laws Sophism of the laudatory personalities Legislative sophisms in the strict sense Sophism of the oligarchy Sophism of the ochlocracy Counter example: Refutation of two previous sophisms Chapter VI Systematics 1. Prescriptive speeches a. Natural order b. Artificial order Parts of the speech Elaboration of the expository plan 2 . Persuasive speeches a. Exordium Direct exordiums Indirect exordiums Virtues and vices of the exhordium b. Agon Narration Digression, proposition and division Confirmation Refutation Refutation of the criticism to the bill proposed Refutation of other positions c. Epilogue Enumeration of the arguments Emotional appeals Hope and fear Amplification and attenuation Chapter VII Style 1. Virtues a. Purity b. Clarity Common words Proper words c. Ornament Election of words, tropes and other figures of speech Words Tropes Metaphors (fictions) Metonymies (presumptions and alterations) Synecdoches Syllepses Other figures of speech Figures of words Figures of thought Mixed figures Composition of sentences Degrees of elaboration Free sentence Coordinate sentence Periodic sentence Placement of words Order Junction Rhythm d. Aptitude 2. Style Genres a. Plain style b. Middle style c. Elevated style Epilogue Select Bibliography Index Chapter I Introduction This Chapter deals with several notions previous to the development of the art of legislation: object, method, denominations, definition and expository plan. 1. Object Every art requires, at least, to prove what its object is and through what method we can make it ours.21 The law is a "decree of prudent men" (decretum vero prudentiam hominum), according to Justinian's Digest (I.3.2), the source of which is Martian, who took the formula from Demosthenes s First Speech Against Aristogiton.22 The above mentioned precedents allow to see other of the speeches of the "Counsellor of the People", as the great orator was usually called, to better understand the meaning of "prudent men": those capable of "giving better counsels than the others in the deliberations"23. 21 Longino, On the Sublime, I.1. Dyonisius or Longinus, On the Sublime, I.1, With an English Translation by W. Hamilton Fyfe; in Aristotle, The Poetics, "Longinus", On the Sublime, [and] Demetrius, On Style, The Loeb Classical Library, First Published 1927, Revised and Reprinted 1932, Reprinted 1939, William Heinemann Ltd., London, [and] Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1939, pp. 122-123. "Longino", Sobre lo Sublime, 1, Introducción, Traducción y Notas de José García López; en Demetrio, Sobre el Estilo [y] "Longino", Sobre lo Sublime, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1979, pp. 147-148. [Anonyme] Du Sublime, I.1, Texte Établi et Traduit par Henri Lebègue, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Paris, 1939, p. 2. Pseudo-Longino, Del Sublime, I.1, Traduzione, Introduzione e Note a Cura di Giuseppe Martano, Casa Editrice Gius. Laterza & Figli, Bari, 1965, p. 1. 22 Digesta, I.3.2. Digesta, I.3.2, in Corpus Iuris Civilis, Editio Stereotipa Octava, Volumen Primum, Institutiones, Recognovit Paulus Krueger, [et] Digesta, Recognovit Theodorus Mommsen, Apud Weidemanos, Berolini, 1899, n. 19, p. 5. El Digesto del Emperador Justiniano, I.3.2, Traducido y Publicado por el Licenciado Don Agustín Rodriguez de Fonseca, Nueva Edición Aumentada con la Traducción de los Proemios, Completada y Revisada con Arreglo a los Textos más Autorizados de las Ediciones Modernas, Imprenta de Ramón Vicente, Madrid, 1872, Tomo I, p. 41. Demosthenes, Against Aristogiton, I.16. Demosthenes, Against Aristogiton, I.16, "[...] every law is an invention and gift of the gods, a tenet of wise men [...], in Demosthenes, With an English Translation by J. H. Vince, The Loeb Classical Library, William Heineman Ltd., London, [and] Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1935, p. 525. Vince believes that this speech is false, p. 515. Demóstenes, Contra Aristogitón, I.1.6., "[...] toda ley es una invención y regalo de los dioses, una decisión de hombres sabios [...]"; en Demóstenes, Discursos Políticos, Introducción, Traducción y Notas de A. López Eire, Editorial Gredos, Tomo III, Madrid, 1985, p. 232. The First Speech Against Aristogiton, unlike the Second, considered false, is generally regarded authentic. López Eire supports its authenticity and remembers that they doubted neither Pseudo Longino, Plutarch, Hermógenes nor Libanio, pp. 221-222. 23 Demosthenes, Navyboards, 8. "dar mejores consejos que los demás en las deliberaciones", Acerca de Las Agrupaciones, 8, en Manuel Fernández Galiano, Nueva Versión Directa, Demóstenes, Editorial Labor S.A., Barcelona, 1947, p. 46. From here comes my English translation between inverted commas in the main text. Demosthenes, Navyboards, 8, in Demosthenes, Minor Public Speeches, With an English Translation by J. H. Vince, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, [and] G. Putnam Sons, New York, 1930, pp. 386-87. In Athens, the previous opinion of the Council (Boulé) was requiered on any matter, even for legislation, before the debate in the Assembly of the People.24 In Rome, during the Republic, the Senate was usually consulted before the presentation of any bill before the people gathered in assemblies (Comitia centuriata, Comitia tributa and, after the law Hortensia, Concilia Plebis), but the romanists argue about whether or not was a legal obligation.25 The law is the solution recommended in the consultation, the answer given by "prudent men" to the problems that usually happen in certain circumstances to its multiple recipients. The emphasis placed on the political decision of those who exercise power upon the approval of such answers since it is the most important act of government in peace times26 has darkened the wise and eloquent counsel instrumented by legislation. The consuls of the Roman Republic received this denomination because they were "those that take consultation".27 The senatusconsultum was the result of a process of advisory nature, as its own name reveals in a transparent way. The consul who had requested a meeting of the High Body, in the respective session asked: "What is the convenient decision to take on this matter?", or required to directly vote on it. In the latter case the senators could demand that counsel be asked from each of them by using the formula: "Consul, consults" (Consul, consule). The text of the senatusconsultum was written after the voting, in the language proper of a consultation, not in an imperative form, since it was not a command.28 The senatusconsultum, during the Republic, did not have in theory any binding force, but in practice enjoyed such an authority that, except when vetoed, they were always complied with, thus acquiring legal force. In times of Demóstenes, Sobre Las Sinmorías, 8, en Demóstenes, Discursos Políticos, Introducción, Traducción y Notas de A. López Eire, Madrid, Tomo I, Gredos, 1980, p. 306. 24 Aristotle, Constitution of Athens, 45.4. Aristotle, Constitution of Athens, 45.4; in Aristotle's Constitution of Athens and Related Texts, Translated with an Introduction and Notes by Kurt von Fritz and Ernst Kapp, Hafner Publishing Company, New York, 1950, p. 119. Aristóteles, La Constitución de Atenas, 45.4, Edición, Traducción y Notas, con un Estudio Preliminar por Antonio Tovar, Instituto de Estudios Políticos, Madrid, 1948, pp. 160-161. Aristote, Constitution d'Athénes, XLV.4, Texte Traduit par Georges Mathieu et Bernard Haussoullier, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Paris, 1922, p. 48. 25 He supports that it was not a legal obligation and, in the note 4, quotes Mommsen and Lange for it, and Peter, Marquardt and Schwegler against it, P. Willems, Le Droit Public Romain, depuis l'Origine de Rome jusqu'à Constantin Le Grand, ou Les Antiquités Romaines Envisagées au Point de vue des Institutions Politiques, Seconde Édition, Louvain, 1872, p. 179. 26 Bacon, History of King Henry VII; in The Works of Francis Bacon, Popular Edition, Based on the Complete Edition of Spedding, Ellis and Heath, [Tome] II, Literary and Religious Works, Houghton, Mifflin, and Company, The University Press, Cambridge, Boston, s.d., pp. 147-148. Bacon, History of the Reign of Henry VII; in The Works of Francis Bacon, Collected and Edited by James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis, and Douglas Denon Heath, Vol. VI, Literary and Professional Works, Vol. I, Longmans & Co. [etc.], London, 1861, p. 97, The Works of Francis Bacon, FaksimileNeudruck, Der Ausgabe von Spedding, Ellis, und Heath, London, 1857-1874; in Vierzehn Bänden, Sechster Band, Friedrich Fromman, Verlag Günther Holzbooc, Stuttgart-Bad Constatt, 1963. 27 H. Stuart Jones, "Administration"; in The Legacy of Rome, Edited by Cyril Bailey, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1923, reprinted 1936, p. 96. 28 J. B. Mispoulet, La Vie Parlementaire à Rome sous la République, Essai de Reconstruction des Séances Historiques du Sénat Romain, Albert Fontemoig, Éditeur, Paris, 1899; Chapitre II (De la Forme des Déliberations), Chapitre III (La Rédaction des Sénatus-Consultes), pp. 67-68; p. 88. the Empire they become binding on account of their inclusion in a clause of the pretor s edict; after Adriano, certain senatusconsultum were given immediate legal force.29 Laws usually comprise two discourses: one that persuades to take the reasonable decision and other that prescribes the reasonable conduct.30 Sometimes a consideration of the persuasive discourse is omitted, since not all laws are published with explanatory preambles, previous arguments an such other precedents as may have led to take the adopted decisions. The prescriptive discourse, which consists only of the instrumentation of the counsel, without being accompanied by the persuasive discourse, has perhaps facilitated the positivist conception of the law as a mere set of imperatives or coercive norms, leaving aside the eloquence that persuades to behave with wisdom, forgetting that, in Cicero s words, the laws are "the rational criterion of a prudent man".31 One of the secrets of politics, perhaps the most occult mystery of the State for the inexpert, consists in knowing that to rule means to make one obeyed, not just to give commands; that power is persuasion, not force. Pericles, the greatest Athenian politician, held that all that men force others to do without persuasion, whether or not by means of a law, is not law, but force.32 This must not be interpreted as an attack against democracy, which would be a blasphemy against one of its illustrious founders, author of one of its most beautiful praises,33 but rather as statement fostering that reasonableness should be preserved against the arbitrary exercise of power. 29 Arnoldo Momigliano, Tim J. Cornell, senatus consultum; The Oxford Classical Dictionary, Third Edition, Edited by Simon Hornblower and Antony Spawforth, Oxford University Press, Oxford, New York, 1996, p. 1388. 30 Plato, The Laws, 723c-d. Plato, The Laws, 723, Translated with an Introduction by Trevor J. Saunders, Penguin Books, First Published in this Translation 1970, Reprinted 1972, London, 1972, p. 186. Platón, Leyes, 723c-d, en Platón, Diálogos VIII, Leyes (Libros I-VI), Introducción, Traducción y Notas de Francisco Lisi, Editorial Gredos S.A. Madrid, 1999, p. 390. Platón, Las Leyes, 723c-d, Edición Bilingüe, Traducción, Notas y Estudio Preliminar por José Miguel Pabón y Manuel Fernández Galiano, Instituto de Estudios Políticos, Tomo I, Madrid, 1960, p. 157.. Platon, Les Lois, 723c-d; dans Oeuvres Complétes de Platon, Traduction Nouvelle et Notes par Léon Robin avec la Collaboration de M. J. Moreau, [Tome] II, Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, Paris, 1942, p. 774. Platone, Le Leggi, 723c-d, Nuova Edizione a Cura di Attilio Zadro, Editori Laterza, Bari, 1952, p. 123. Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, printed 1780, published 1789 and 1823; in The Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham, Edited by J.H. Burns and H.L.A. Hart, With a New Introduction by F. Rosen, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1996; Preface by Bentham, p. 9. 31 Cicero, The Laws, I.6.19. Cicerón, Las Leyes, 1.6 19, "el criterio racional del hombre prudente", Marco Tulio Cicerón, Las Leyes, Edición Bilingüe, Traducción, Introducción y Notas por Álvaro d'Ors, Instituto de Estudios Políticos, Madrid, 1970, pp. 66-67. From here comes my English translation between inverted commas in the main text. Cicero, De Legibus, I.vi.19, "...it is the mind and reason of the intelligent man...", Cicero, De Legibus, With an English Translation by Clinton Walker Reyes; in Cicero, De Re Publica [and] De Legibus, William Heinemann Ltd., London, [and] Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, first published 1928, reprinted 1943, 1948, 1952, 1959, 1961, 1966, pp. 318-319. 32 Xenophon, Memorabilia, I.ii.45. Xenophon, Memorabilia, I.ii.45, With an English Translation by E. C. Marchant; in Xenophon, Memorabilia and Oeconomics, Loeb, William Heinemann Ltd., London, [and] G.P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1923, p. 35. Xenophon, Entretiens Mémorables de Socrate, I.ii, Expliqués Littéralment, Traduits en Francais et Anonotés par E. Sommer, Librairie Hachette, Onzième Édition, Paris, s.d., p. 57. 33 Donald Kagan, Pericles of Athens and the Birth of Democracy, The Free Press, a Division of Macmillan, Inc., New York, Collier Macmillan Canada, Toronto, Maxwell Macmillan Canada, New York, Oxford, Singapore, Sydney, 1991, pp. 46-64. The true complex nature of laws is best comprehended, when they are not studied as pure acts of power, since they are also wise and eloquent civic speeches. This must not be interpreted as a merely lyric or principle-based position, but as a deeply political and practical viewpoint, since otherwise laws could not last, being that experience shows the validity of a control of natural reasonableness: the custom opposite to the law (desuetudo), the existence of which, even if some positive laws insist on not to recognize it, is an invisible potency by means of which, without any agitation or stir, peoples do justice to themselves against bad laws, as Portalis said.34 PRINCIPLE: The true nature of the laws is complex, since they are acts of government (politics) as well as wise and eloquent civic speeches (rhetoric). Few rulers can legislate for themselves. Many understand those who counsel and discounsel them. But, regrettably, there are also rulers who do not understand those who counsel and discounsel them, and there are counsellors who do not know how to counsel or discounsel rulers. In the determination of the object of the art of legislation both the activities to counsel and discounsel are included, so that the rulers may understand their counsellors and the counsellors may knowhow to counsel and discounsel rulers. In the Common Law system, the composition of the laws is not a task merely inherent to lawyers, but rather to officers expert in legislative writing (legislative drafting). In the Civil Law system, it is believed that knowledge of the law and of the national language is enough, and the lawyers specialized in each branch of law constitutionalists, criminal lawyers, experts in private law, etc., limit themselves to criticizing the legislative work, in the production of which, in general, they have not been directly involved.35 The activities of composition and criticism are also Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, II.37. "We have a form of government which does not emulate the practice of our neighbours: we are more an example to others than an imitation of them. Our constitution is called a democracy because we govern in the interest of the majority, nor just for the few. Our laws give equal rights to all in private disputes, but public preferement depend on individual distinction and is determined largely by merit rather than rotation: and poverty is no barrier for office, if a man despite his humble condition has the ability to do some good to the city. We are open and free in the conduct of our public affairs and in the uncensorious way we observe the habits of each other's daily lives: we are not angry with our neighbour if he indulges his own pleasure, nor do we put on the disapproving look which falls short of punishment but can still hurt. We are tolerant in our private dealings with one another, but in all public matters we abide by the law: it is fair above all which keeps us obedient to the authorities of the day and to the laws, especially those laws established for the protection of the injured and those unwritten laws whose contravention brings acknowledged disgrace." Partial transcription of the famous funeral prayer of year 431 b.C. to war fallens, attributed to Pericles by Thucydides. English translation from: Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, Translated by Martin Hammond, With an Introduction and Notes by P.J. Rhodes, Oxford World's Classics, OUP, New York, 2009, p. 91. Tucídides, Historia de la Guerra del Peloponeso, Traducción de Francisco Rodríguez Adrados, Libro II.37, Editorial Hernando, Madrid, reimpresión 1984, Tomo I, pp. 255-256. 34 Portalis, Discours Préliminaire, Code Civil; La Legislation Civile, Commerciale et Criminelle de la France ou Commentaire et Complément des Codes Francais, par Le Baron Locré, Treutel et Wurtz Libraires, Strasbourg et Londres, Tome I, Paris, 1827, pp. 269-70. 35 Legislative criticism allows lawyers to take part sometimes in the composition of legislation. The above mentioned criticism will shift from passive to active, from negative to positive, from indirect to direct, when taken into consideration by the new law. It is not ephemeral, then, on having joined the system of positive law, although the name of the lawyer who formulated it may not be revealed, he may reach immortality, like the writer whose use of the language happens to be a part of common speech. contemplated in the determination of the object of the art of legislation, to include not only the active position but also the passive one.36 When the enactment of a law is under debate, two types of legislation are discussed: the current one and the projected one. In the Athenian procedure, five official defenders of the current legislation were appointed, the accusation was in charge of those who fostered the projected law, and a special jury (nomothetes) had to decide on the matter.37 In Rome, the vote against the proposed legislation was cast with a slat marked with an "A" (from the initial antiquare: "ancient" or "current"), whereas the vote supporting the enactment of the bill was cast with a slat with a "U" (from uti rogas: "as you ask").38 The one who proposes a bill counsels that the one that he has composed must be enacted and discounsels and criticizes the current legislation or other bills. The one who discounsels the proposed bill criticizes it, and counsels the current legislation or another bill -already composed or to be composedbe enacted. In the present work "legislation" means all juridical norms of any of the Powers of the State, provided always that they are general, that is to say, prescribed to classes of acts, activities or persons. The object of the art of legislation having been determined, let us now deal with the method through which we can make it ours. 2. Method One might object that the method of legislation does not exist; if it exists, it is impossible to find; if it is possible to find, it is impossible to know; if it is possible to know, it is impossible to teach; and, finally, if it is taught, it is impossible to apply. To raise the achievement of any human activity to the category of an art, the above mentioned affirmations must be previously refuted. The activity that consists of composing and criticizing, counselling and discounselling the enactment of general juridical norms, is of a clear existence. The argument is subtler: it affirms that hardly it is reduced to the formulae and rules of an art.39 Some legislate occasionally, at random; others, on the merits of a capacity acquired through experience. The former, if right, do it by chance; the latter, as a matter of habit, but they can neither give reasons nor teach others except with the example. 36 Kelsen is an exception, since he criticizes every text and composes the texts proposes by him. See: Hans Kelsen, Legal Technique in International Law, Geneva Studies, A Textual Critique of the League, Geneva Studies, Volume X, No. 6, Dec. 1939, 178 pp. Another exception is: Gustave Rousset, Science Nouvelle des Lois, Tome Second, Troisième Partie, Analyse critique et Rédaction Nouvelle des 228 Premiers Articles du Code Civil, Durand & Pédone, Marchal & Cie., Paris, 1871, 365 pp. 37 Demosthenes, Against Timócrates, 23. Demosthenes, Against Timocrates, 23; in Demosthenes, With an English Translation by J. H. Vince, Loeb, William Heineman, Ltd, London, [and] G. Putnam Sons, New York, 1935, p. 387. Demóstenes, Contra Timócrates, 23; en Demóstenes, Discursos Políticos, Introducción, Traducción y Notas de A. López Eire, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, Tomo III, 1985, p. 131. 38 Cicero, The Laws, 3.38. Marco Tulio Cicerón, Las Leyes, 3.38 y nota 851, Edición Bilingüe, Traducción, Introducción y Notas por Álvaro d'Ors, Instituto de Estudios Políticos, Madrid, 1970, p. 233. 39 It refers in general to the art, the juridical skills, the legislative skills and, especially, to the art of formulating a law: Filippo Vassali, La Missione del Giurista nella Elaborazione delle Leggi; in Scritti Giuridici in Onore di Franceso Carnelutti, Volume Primo, Filosofia e Teoria Generale del Diritto, Cedam, Padova, 1950, p. 496. Since it turns out to be feasible to observe the causes for which those who legislate occasionally as well as those who do it for habit only sometimes are successful, nobody can deny that it is possible to follow a method and to establish a teacheable system of observations, principles, rules and examples, born out of experience and founded on reason, as Aristotle did with his Rhetoric for civic speech in general.40 The art of legislation does exist. Where may the art of legislation be found? It is not in the books of moral, politics, history, law, etc., i.e., of humanities, although all of them provide materials for the observations that make possible to reconstruct it. The idea of logos or speech, which includes reason (ratio) and speech (oratio), differentiates men from animals, since, as it has allowed us to persuade one another, has made it possible for human beings to live in society, found cities and make laws on just and unjust things,41 civic speeches that perpetuate the wisdom and eloquence of rulers and counsellors. The word "rhetoric", from the Greek rhetoriké, means the art of a rhetorical person or rhétor. The latter term, in its origin, designated such politician as was capable of formulating a bill or rhétra, in the ancient Dorian-speaking Hellenic peoples, like the famous Great Retra of Lycurgus. Rhetér, in Ionian language, designated the orator, but the Dorian term rhétor, together with the lessons taught by Corax and Tisias authors of the first Western rhetorical art, both from Syracuse, a Dorianspeakig city, spread out all over Greece.42 When Syracuse was democratized, in 467 B.C., Corax, who was still 40 Aristotle, Rhetoric, I.1,1354a. Aristotle on Rhetoric, I.1,1354a, Newly Translated, With Introduction, Notes, and Appendices by George Kennedy, Oxford University Press, New York, 1991, p. 29. Aristotle, Rhetoric, I.1,1354a; in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation, Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume Two, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1984, Second Printing 1985, p. 2152. Aristóteles, Retórica, I.1,1354a, Introducción, Traducción y Notas por Quintín Racionero, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1990, p. 162. Aristote Rhétorique, I.1,1354a, Texte Établie et Traduit par Médéric Dufour, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Tome Premier, Paris, 1932, p. 70. Aristotele, Retorica. I.I, 1354a, a cura di Armando Plebe, Editore Laterza, Bari, 1961, p. 1. 41 Isocrates, Nicocles, 5-7; and Antidosis, 253-55. Isocrates, Nicocles, 5-7; and Antidosis, 253-55; in Isocrates, With an English Translation by George Norlin, in Three Volumes, Loeb, William Heinemann Ltd, London, [and] G.P. Putnam's Sons, Vol. I, New York, 1928, pp. 78-80; Vol.II, New York, 1929, pp. 326-27. Isócrates, Nicocles, 5-7; y Sobre El Cambio de Fortunas (Antidosis), 253-55; en Isócrates, Discursos, Traducción, Introducciones y Notas de Juan Manuel Guzmán Hermida, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1980, Tomo I, pp. 286-87; Tomo II, pp. 139-40. Isocrate, Nicocles, 5-7; et Sur l'Échange, 253-255; dans Isocrate Discours, Texte Établi et Traduit par Georges Mathieu et Émile Brémond, Cinquiéme Tirage Revu et Corrigé, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Tome II, Paris, 1967, p. 121; Tome III, Paris, 1942, p. 165. Aristotle, Polítics I.2, 1253a15. Aristotle, Politics, I.2, 1253a15; in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation, Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume Two, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1984, Second Printing 1985, p. 1988. Aristotle, The Politics of Aristotle, 1.2, 1253a15, Translated with Introduction, Analysis and Notes, by Peter L. Phillips Simpson, The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill and London, 1997, p. 11. Aristóteles, Política, I.2, 1253a15, Edición Bilingüe y Traducción por Julián Marías y María Araujo, Instituto de Estudios Políticos, Madrid, 1970, p. 4. 42 Antonio López Eire, "La Etimología de [...] y los Orígenes de la Retórica", Faventia, 20/2, 1998, pp. 61-69. " [...] " they substitute the Greek characters of the original title that allude to rhétor. Antonio López Eire, Javier de Santiago Guervós, Retórica y Comunicación Política, Ediciones Cátedra S.A., Madrid, 2000, pp. 25-26. active, developed the tripartite systematics of deliberative speech (prologue, agon -that included narrationand epilogue), to help the citizens who had to speak out in the Assembly meetings;43 and Tisias, his disciple, taught rhetoric and wrote judicial speeches for others (logographer). The origin of the aforesaid first art of rhetoric usually links it with the judicial genre, since it appeared after the fall of the tyranny in Sicily, when the controversies between individuals, after a long interval, were submitted once again to the authority of the courts.44 Since people had to sue and defend themselves on their own behalf, they all needed to learn how to speak in public, either reciting speeches bought from a logographer or composing and delivering their own. But it is not less true that, once the tyranny was eliminated and democracy established or restablished, the preparation and the debate of bills shifted from the restricted circle of the tyrant to that of the Council, formed by a group of elected citizens, and then to the crowed Assembly, where any citizen could have a say and a vote. Democracy generated a demand for education in political oratory, whether for legislative matters or not, in addition to the judicial oratory, a situation that should be remembered when we study the origin of Western rhetoric.45 Laws are literary works.46 "Making laws" is said leges scribere in Latin; a Antonio López Eire, Retórica y Política; en Retórica, Política e Ideología desde la Antigüedad hasta Nuestros Días, Actas del II Congreso Internacional, Salamanca, Noviembre 1997, Volumen I, Retórica Clásica y Edad Media, Prólogo, Logo: Asociación Española de Estudios sobre Lengua, Pensamiento y Cultura Clásica, 1a. Edición, Salamanca, 1998, p. 9; y Volumen III, Ponencias, 1a. Edición, Salamanca, 2000, p. 107. 43 George Kennedy, The Art of Persuasion in Greece, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1963, Sixth Printing 1974, p. 59. Antonio López Eire, Retórica y Política; en Retórica, Política e Ideología desde la Antigüedad hasta Nuestros Días, Actas del II Congreso Internacional, Salamanca, Noviembre 1997, Logo: Asociación Española de Estudios sobre Lengua, Pensamiento y Cultura Clásica, Volumen III, Ponencias, 1a. Edición, Salamanca, 2000, p. 110. 44 Cicero, Brutus, XII. On its historical attribution to Aristotle, see: Cicerón, Brutus XII; Cicéron Brutus et de la Perfection Oratoire, Texte Établi, Traduit et Annoté par François Richard, Librairie Garnier Frères, Paris, p. 35. 45 On the deliberative and not judicial origin of the rhetoric, see: Stanley Wilcox, Corax and the Prolegomena, American Journal of Philology, Vol. 64, No. 1. (1943), pp. 1-23; p. 23. 46 Plato, The Laws, 858c. "AT. In the cities, it seems to me, there are literary works and speeches in treatrises of many writers. But also the works of the legislator are writings and speeches 44. 44. The passage is based on the important double meaning of the word grámmata that means 'written' and in its wider sense, 'written law'." Translation from Spanish to English by the author of this book. ("AT. En las ciudades, me parece, hay obras literarias y discursos en tratados de muchos escritores. Pero también las obras del legislador son escritos y discursos 44. 44. El pasaje está basado sobre el doble significado de la palabra grámmata que significa tanto 'escrito' como, por extensión, 'ley escrita'.") Platón, Leyes, 858c., en Platón, Diálogos IX, Leyes (Libros VII-XII), Introducción, Traducción y Notas de Francisco Lisi, Editorial Gredos S.A. Madrid, 1999, p. 137, source of the text reproduced and translated. Plato, The Laws, 858, Translated with an Introduction by Trevor J. Saunders, Penguin Books, First Published in this Translation 1970, Reprinted 1972, London, 1972, p. 364. Platón, Las Leyes, 858c, Edición Bilingüe, Traducción, Notas y Estudio Preliminar por José Miguel Pabón y Manuel Fernández Galiano, Instituto de Estudios Políticos, Tomo II, Madrid, 1960, pp. 107-108. Platon, Les Lois, 858c; dans Oeuvres Complétes de Platon, Traduction Nouvelle et Notes par Léon Robin avec la Collaboration de M. J. Moreau, [Tome] II, Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, Paris, 1942, p. 962. Platone, Le Leggi, 858c, Nuova Edizione a Cura di Attilio Zadro, Editori Laterza, Bari, 1952, p. 275. "legislator" –not the one who proposes a law, but the author of the billcommunicates with the following expressions: qui leges scribit, legum scriptor or legum inventor,47 a terminology proper of rhetoric. Laws includes two speeches: the prescriptive speech, which obliges, prohibits, permits, rewards and punishes conducts; and the persuasive speech which explains the prescriptive one, justifies and tries that it is approved, interpreted and applied, in accordance with the pursued purpose. Being literary and political works, both speeches are subject to rhetoric, the art of persuading with wise and eloquent civic speeches. As all speeches subject to rhetoric, laws should also teach (docere), please (delectare) and motivate (movere) the audience.48 The prescriptive speech should teach what wise conduct models to follow and to avoid, pleasing and motivating with eloquence so that such models are spontaneously fulfilled in order to obtain rewards and avoid punishment. The persuasive speech should teach with wise explanations the content and justification of the prescriptive speech, and please and motivate with eloquence so that it is approved, interpreted and applied in accordance with the pursued purpose. The art of legislation is found in the books on rhetoric. According to Aristotle's rhetoric, there are three speeches genres: deliberative, judicial and demonstrative.49 A speech is demonstrative, when an orator, in a ceremony, speaking in present tense, praises or vituperates, and the audience, as mere spectator, limits itself to evaluate the orator s skills. A speech is judicial, when an orator, before a court, speaking in past tense, accuses or defends, and the audience must absolve or "[...] laws fall down below of what letters and lawyers are."("[...] las leyes caen debaxo de lo que son leyes y letrados."): Miguel De Cervantes Saavedra, Don Quijote de la Mancha; en Obras Completas de Miguel De CervantesSaavedra, Edición Publicada por Rodolfo Schevill y Adolfo Bonilla, Primera Parte, CapítuloXXXVIII, líneas 5-6, Gráficas Reunidas, Madrid, 1931, p. 198. "[...] las leyes caen debajo de lo que son letras y letrados.": Miguel De Cervantes Saavedra, El Ingenioso Hidalgo Don Quijote de la Mancha, Nueva Edición Crítica con el Comento Refundido y más de Mil Notas Nuevas Dispuesta por Francisco Rodríguez Marín, Parte Primera, Capítulo XXXVIII, Que Trata sobre el Curioso Discurso que Hizo Don Quijote de las Armas y las Letras, Ediciones Atlas, Tomo III, Madrid, 1948, p. 158, líneas 13-14. "[...] las leyes caen debajo de lo que son letras y letrados.": Miguel De Cervantes Saavedra, El Ingenioso Hidalgo Don Quijote de la Mancha, Primera Parte, Capítulo XXXVIII, Que trata del curioso discurso que hizo don Quijote de las armas y las letras, Miguel de Cervantes, Don Quijote de la Mancha, Edición del Instituto Cervantes 1605-2005, Dirigida por Francisco Rico, con la colaboración de Joaquín Forradelas, Estudio Preliminar de Fernando Lázaro Carreter, Galaxia Gutenberg-Círculo de Lectores, Centro de Edición de los Clásicos Españoles, Barcelona, Volumen I, p. 489. 47 C. Meissner, Latin Phrase-Book, Translated from the Sixth German Edition, With the Addition of Supplementary Phrases and References, by H. W. Auden, Macmillan, London, Melbourne, Toronto, St. Martin Press, New York, 1966, p. 219. 48 Cicero, De Oratore, II, XIX, 80. Cicéron, De l'Orateur (De Oratore), II, XIX, 80, Texte Établi et Traduit par Edmond Courbaud, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Livre Deuxième, Paris, 1927, p. 39. Cicero, Brutus, LXXX. Cicéron, Brutus, LXXX; dans Brutus et de la Perfection Oratoire, Texte Établi, Traduit et Annoté par François Richard, Librairie Garnier Frères, s.d, Paris, pp. 182-183. 49 Aristotle, Rhetoric, I.3, 1358a37-1359a6. Aristotle, Rhetoric, I.3, 1358a36-1359a25; The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation, Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume Two, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing 1985, pp. 2159-2161. Aristóteles, Retórica, I.3, 1358a37-1359a6, Introducción, Traducción y Notas por Quintín Racionero, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1990, pp. 193-196. Aristote, Rhétorique, I.3, 1358a 36-1359b5, Texte Établii et Traduit par Médéric Dufour, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Tome I, Paris, 1932, pp. 83-85. Aristotele, Retorica. I.III, 1358a-1359a, a cura di Armando Plebe, Editore Laterza, Bari, 1961, pp. 14-17. condemn. A speech is deliberative, when an orator, before the Council or the Assembly of the People, speaking in future tense, counsels or discounsels, and the audience must accept or reject the political measure under debate. Legislation was one out of the five most important topics of deliberations; the other four were: the acquisition of resources, war and peace, defense of the territory and imports and exports.50 "To persuade [so that laws are approved]" is said legum suadere in Latin ; "to dissuade [the approval] of laws", legum dissuadere,51 a terminology that also belongs to rhetoric. The art of legislation may be known by considering laws as a species of the deliberative genre of rhetoric. It has been said that the art of legislation is difficult to teach,52 and only learned by practice.53 Practice is one of the essential requisites to learn not only the art of legislation, but also rhetoric and any other art. The practical exercise of the respective art, if constant, allows that the maker acquires such a habit as will facilitate the application of the knowledge previously acquired by him and reach excellence: "[...] since what we need to learn before doing, we learn by doing, for example we become builders by building and lyre-players by playing the lyre; [...]".54 Rhetoric has been the teaching and learning model followed by Western education for almost two thousand and five hundred years, with some interruptions.55 It is possible to teach and learn the art of legislation by considering laws as a species of the deliberative genre of rhetoric. 50 Aristotle, Rethoric, I.4., 1359b20-24. Aristotle, Rhetoric, I.4, 1359b19-21; in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation, Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume Two, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing 1985, p. 2161. Aristóteles, Retórica, I.4, 1359b20-24, Introducción, Traducción y Notas por Quintín Racionero, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1990, p. 200. Aristote, Rhétorique, I.4, 1359b19-23, Texte Établi et Traduit par Médéric Dufour, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Tome I, Paris, 1932, p. 87. Aristotele, Retorica. I.IV, 1359b, a cura di Armando Plebe, Editore Laterza, Bari, 1961, p. 18. 51 C. Meissner, Latin Phrase-Book, Translated From the Sixth German Edition, With the Addition of Supplementary Phrases and References, by H. W. Auden, Macmillan, London, Melbourne, Toronto, St. Martin Press, New York, 1966, p. 217. 52 Filippo Vassalli, La Missione del Giurista nella Elaborazione delle Leggi; in Scritti Giuridici in Onore di Franceso Carnelutti, Volume Primo, Filosofia e Teoria Generale del Diritto, Cedam, Padova, 1950, p. 496. 53 Elmer A. Driedger, The Composition of Legislation, Second Edition, Revised, Published by The Department of Justice, Ottawa, 1976, p. vii. 54 Aristotle, Ethics, II.1, 1103a30. Aristotle, Ethics, Book II.1, 1103a, Translated and Edited by Roger Crisp, Cambridge University Press, First published in printed format, 2000, ebook (net library), 2004, p. 23, text reproduced above. Aristotle, Ethics, II.1, 1103a30; in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation, Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume Two, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing 1985, p. 1743. Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, II.1, 1103a30; in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation, Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume Two, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing 1985, p. 1743. Aristóteles, Ética a Nicómaco, II.1, 1103a30, Edición Bilingüe y Traducción por María Araujo y Julián Marías, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid, 1981, p. 19. 55 Marrou points out that, in this sense, Isocrates wins over Plato, another teacher of classical tradition, Henri-Irénée Marrou, Histoire de l'Education dans l'Antiquite, Éditions du Seuil, Paris, 1948, p. 122. To the last objection of the imposibility to apply the art of legislation, the answer is: the art of legislation may be applied to any positive law, historical, current or future, previous adaptation to the multiplicity of languages and juridical systems, the knowledge of which is presupposed, as in rhetoric. The art of legislation may be applied in universal form, by considering laws as a species of the deliberative genre of rhetoric. The art of legislation reencounters its method in rhetoric, but this does not mean to put new wine in old wineskins or to follow a temporary fashion, merely speaking in the "rhetorical way". It allows that knowledge of a millennial art is used to reconstruct other knowledge that had been lost. The rhetorical art will be enriched with all the possibilities that the legislative species offers within the deliberative genre. The art of legislation will recover a knowledge system rhetoric, which will substitute the personal remarks that, with more or less talent and fortune, have been formulated by those who tackled the problems before the author of the present work, forgetting the historical precedents of legislative activity. In the future, if the rhetorical model of the art of legislation is adopted, the quality of the laws will not depend on occasionally inspired individuals, but on common effort, because it will be possible to be rely on a reasonable knowledge, born out of experience, which, transmitted from generation to generation, will allow for the methodical continuity of the struggle to govern and be governed in civilized form, by means of wise and eloquent laws. The lost art of legislation will be reconstructed as such, identifying the applicable parts of the rhetorical tradition, developing the insufficient and creating others. Since this art has received numerous denominations, here follows the most widely known and the justification for the choice of the selected one. 3. Denominations In Common Law countries, the following denominations have been used: mechanics of law making, nomography or the art of inditing laws, practical legislation, legislative technic, legal writing style, legal drafting, legislative drafting, bill drafting, composition of legislation, art of the statute, art of legislation.56 56 Arthur Symonds, The Mechanics of Law Making, Intended for the Use of Legislators, and all Other Persons Concerned in the Making and Understanding of English Law, Schulze and Co., London, 1835. Jeremy Bentham, Nomography or the Art of Inditing Laws, in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Publishing under the Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring, 11, Vols., William Tait, Edinburgh, Simpkin, Marshall, & Co., London, 1838-1843; Vol. III, 1843, p. 231. Lord Thring, Practical Legislation, The Composition and Language of Acts of Parliament and Business Documents, John Murray, London, 1902. Ernst Freund, Legislative Technic, Modern Legal Philosophy Series, Vol. IX, Science of Legal Method, Selected Essays by Various Authors, The Boston Book Company, Boston, 1917, p. 558. Henry Weihofen, Legal Writing Style, West Publishing Co., St. Paul, Minn., 1961. Reed Dickerson, The Fundamentals of Legal Drafting, Published for The American Bar Association by Little, Brown and Company, Boston-Toronto, 1965. Reed Dickerson, Legislative Drafting, Originally Published in 1954 by Little, Brown and Company, Boston, Reprinted in 1977 by Greenwood Press Inc. in 1977. Elmer A. Driedger, The Composition of Legislation, Second Edition, Revised, Published by The Department of Justice, Ottawa, 1976. Jack Stark, The Art of the Statute, Rothman & Co., Littleton, 1996. On the use of art of legislation as denomination, see: Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, printed 1780, published 1789 and 1823; in The Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham, Edited by J. H. Burns and H. L. A. Hart, With a New Introduction by F. Rosen, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1996, Preface by Jeremy Bentham, p. 9. On the use of bill drafting as denomination, see: In Civil Law countries, the following denominations have been used: pratica legislativa (legislative practice), science nouvelle des lois (new science of the laws), nomotécnica, nomothesia, técnica legislativa (in Spanish, Portuguese and Italian), technique legislative (legislative technic), gesetzgebungstechnik (technic of legislation), tecnica delle leggi (technic of the laws), legislative technik (legislative technic), rechtstechnik (technique of law), légistique (legistics), légistique formelle (formal legistic), légistique matérielle (material legistic), la forma de las leyes (form of the laws), el estilo de las leyes (style of the laws), rédaction des lois (drafting of the laws), composition des lois (composition of the laws), método legislativo (legislative method), art de faire les lois (art of law making), art législatif (legislative art), kunst der gesetzgebung (art of legislation), legisprudence (legisprudence)57 Catalog of the Library of the Congress of the United States of America. 57 Francesco Carrara, Lineamenti di Pratica Legislativa Penale, Fratelli Bocca, Roma, Torino, Firenze, 1874. Gustave Rousset, Science Nouvelle des Lois, Durand & Pédone, Marchal & Cie., Paris, 1871. François Geny, La Technique Législative dans la Codification Civile Moderne, A Propos du Centenaire du Code Civil; dans Le Code Civil 1804-1904 Livre du Centenaire, Publiée par la Société d'Études Législatives, Tome Second, Le Code Civil à l'Étranger, La Question de la Revision, Documents, Arthur Rousseau, Editeur, Paris, 1904, pp. 986-1038. Alexandre C. Angelesco, La Technique Législative en Matiére de Codification Civile, Thése pour le Doctorat, Université de Paris, Faculté de Droit, E. de Boccard, Éditeur, París, 1930, p. 30. Marcelino Menéndez Pelayo, Historia de las Ideas Estéticas en España, en su resumen y comentario del Gorgias de Platón, Edición Nacional de las Obras Completas de Menéndez Pelayo, por Enrique Sánchez Reyes, Aldus S.A. de Artes Gráficas, Tomo I, Santander, 1946, p. 24 (nomotécnica). Joachim Hopper, Seduardus, sive de Vera Iurisprudentia, ad Regem Libri XII. Nempe: Nomothesia, sive de Iuris & Legum Condendarum Scientia, Libri IIII. Rerum Divinarum et Humanorum, sive de Iure Publico, Libri IIII, Ad Pandectas, sive de Iure Civili Privato, Libri IIII, Adiectus est eiusdem Auctoris De Institutione Principis Liber Singularis, Antuerpia, in Officina Plantiniana, Apud Viduam, et Ioanem Moretum, 1590. Alfredo Colmo, La Técnica Legislativa del Código Civil Argentino, Segunda Edición, Librería Bartolomé Mitre de Hall y Acevedo, Casa Editora, Buenos Aires, 1927, p. 24. Jorge Tapia Valdés, La Técnica Legislativa, Facultad de Ciencias Jurídicas y Sociales de la Universidad de Chile, Seminario de Derecho Público, No. 4, Editorial Jurídica de Chile, Santiago de Chile, 1960, p. 64. Hésio Fernandes Pinheiro, Técnica Legislativa, Constituiçoes e Atos Constitucionais do Brasil, Livraria Freitas Bastos S.A., Rio de Janeiro, 2a. Ediçao, Sao Paulo, 1962. It is named "arte de componer leyes", en Carlos Sánchez Del Río y Peguero, "Notas para un Ensayo sobre la Forma de las Leyes", Revista General de Legislación y Jurisprudencia, Año XCII, No. 3, Marzo 1947, Segunda Época, Tomo XIII, 181 de la colección, p. 285. Nicolás Pérez Serrano, El Estilo de las Leyes, Conferencia Pronunciada el 30/1/47, Ministerio de Trabajo, Escuela Social de Madrid, Madrid, 1947, 36 pp. e índice. Dr. Robert Walter, "Die Lehre Von Der Gesetzestechnik", Ostreichische Juristen-Zeitung, 18. Jahrgang, Heft Nr. 4, 26 Februar 1963, II, p. 84, n. 4. Louis Phillippe Pigeon, Rédaction et Interpretation des Lois, Cours Donné en 1965 aux Conseillers Juridiques du Gouvernement du Québec, Québec, 1965, 56 pp. Montesquieu, De l'Esprit des Lois, Texte Établi et Présenté par Jean Brethe de la Gressaye, Livre XIX, De la maniêre de composer les loix; dans Oeuvres Complètes de Montesquieu, Société Les Belles Lettres, Paris, 1961, Tome IV, p. 125. Ruini mentions "art", "method" and "skill"; but he chooses "legislative technic": Meuccio Ruini, La Funzione Legislativa (Tecnica delle Leggi e Lavori Parlamentari), Dott. A. Giuffrè Editore, Milano, 1953, p. 17. For the denomination "l'art de légiferer", see: Georges Ripert, Les Forces Créatrices du Droit, Librairie Générale de Droit et Jurisprudence, Paris, 1955, p. 346. Dominique Rémy, Légistique, L'Art de Faire les Lois, Éditions Romillat, Paris, 1994, pp. 351. Légistique Formelle et Materielle, Sous la Direction de Charles Albert Morand, Presses Universitaires d'Aix-Marseille, Aix-En-Provence, 1999, 334 pp. The word "technique", of Greek origin, was translated into Latin as ars and from there it was transfered to English as "art", which means, objectively: the method to do some thing, the manual in which it is taught, the work produced according to its rules; and, subjectively, the skills of the artist who possesses the art. It will not be difficult, according to the context, to identify what the pertinent meaning is; in the present work "legislation" was added, to refer to the activity to which it is applied, as well as the medicine is the art of health, rhetoric the art of persuasion, etc. This follows the meaning of "legislation" as "the process of making or enacting laws"58 and the conceptual line of an ancient Hispanic precedent –Fuero Juzgo-, which reads in its Book I, Title I, "What must be the art of statute law making".59 4. Definition After having determined the object, the method and the denomination of the art of legislation, now this art will be defined with a formula that synthesizes the preceding exposition. The art of legislation is a teacheable system of observations, principles, rules and examples, to compose and criticize, to counsel and discounsel general juridical norms, founded on the rhetorical tradition. 5. Expository plan The expository plan consists of seven chapters. Chapter 1, Introduction, includes several notions previous to the development of the art of legislation: Purpose, Object, Method, Denominations, Definition and Expository plan. The rest of the book is divided in two parts: History and System. Part I History: Chapter II, Ancient and Medieval History; and Chapter III Modern and Contemporary History. Part II System: Chapter IV, Legislative Genres, establishes the basic types of general juridical norms to compose and criticize, to counsel and discounsel. The last three: Chapter V, Investigation (what to say); Chapter VI, Systematics (where to say it); and Chapter VII, Style (how to say it), develop the algorithm that, after completion of the succesive rhetorical operations, will result in obtain a work produced in accordance with the rules of the art: a law. The following Part I: History, includes Chapter IVAncient and Medieval History and Chapter V Modern and Contemporary History. Wintgens, Luc J., editor, Legisprudence, A New Theoretical Approach to Legislation, Hart Pubishing, Oxford, 2002, viii, 150 pp. 58 Oxford Dictionary On Line,"legislation", "the process of making or enacting laws" (http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/legislation?q=legislation), downloaded 05/24/2012. 59 "Qual debe ser el arte de fazer las leyes." Los Códigos Españoles Concordados y Anotados, Tomo Primero, Madrid, 1847, p. 105. Part I: History Chapter II Ancient and Medieval History It would have proved of great utility to have a history of the lost art of legislation, from Ancient times to our days, to continue the efforts made by the predecessors of the rhetorical model that is reconstructed in this work. Despite an extensive research which turned out fruitless, the author had to feel satisfied with the following outline, which point out moments, places, authors and works that could serve as precedents, and will say something new about old things and will prove how certain old things taken for modern are. The precedents obtained will only be mentioned in this part of the book. They will be used further on upon developing each topic, for the purposes of avoiding useless repetitions. Furthermore, it would be very satisfactory if others could be led to carry out a search of the forgotten texts of the lost art of legislation, as Renaissance humanists did back then with Greek and Latin classic texts.60 This Chapter addresses the art of legislation in ancient and medieval history. 1. Ancient history According to a traditional division, ancient history includes Orient, Greece and Rome. a. Orient Mesopotamian codes The Code of Ur-Nammu,61 the first king of the third dynasty of Ur (Sumer), who ruled c 2112-2095 B.C.,62 seems to be the oldest organic legal text,63 the authorship of which is also attributed to his son Shulgi (2093-2046 B.C.).64 Since there are more than five hundred thousand documents collected, between tablets and stones, waiting to be studied by experts in cuneiform law, other even older organic legal texts could be finded in so numerous set of documents. Following the Code of Ur-Nammu, there appeared, in chronological order: the Laws of Eshnunna65 (according to some authors c 1950 B.C., 60 R. Sabbadini, Le Scoperte dei Codici Latini e Greci ne' Secoli XIV e XV, G.C. Sansoni Editore, Firenze, 1905, ix + 233 pp. 61 Código de Shulgi, in Los primeros Códigos de la Humanidad, Estudio Preliminar, Traducción y Notas de Federico Lara Peinado y Federico Lara González, Edit. Tecnos, Madrid, 1994, pp. 53-71. 62 Código de Shulgi, in Los Primeros Códigos de la Humanidad, Estudio Preliminar, Traducción y Notas de Federico Lara Peinado y Federico Lara González, Edit. Tecnos, Madrid, 1994, p. 53, n. 2. 63 Samuel Noah Kramer, History Begins at Sumer, Originally Published by The Falcon's Wing Press in 1956, Doubleday & Company, Inc, Garden City, New York, 1959, p. 51. 64 Código de Hammurabi, Estudio Preliminar, Traducción y Notas de Federico Lara Peinado, Edit. Tecnos, 2a. edición, Madrid, 1992, p. xix. 65 Les Lois d'Eshnunna, Transcription, Traduction et Commentaire [par] Émile Szlechter, Publication de l'Institut de Droit Romain de l'Université de Paris, Recueil Sirey, Paris, 1954. For typographically reasons "Eshnunna" has been written and has been added the letter "h" next of the letter "s", for failing to have the pertinent diacritical sign. and according to others c 1840 B.C. or 1790 B.C.);66 the Code of Lipit-Ishtar,67 who ruled Sumeria (c 1934-1924 B.C.); and the Code of Hamurabi, Hammurabi or Hammurapi,68 who reigned over Babylonia (c 1798-1750 B.C.). Their complete texts comprised three parts: the prologue (preamble), the main body (law sections) and the epilogue; that is to say, a complete discourse from the rhetorical point of view. In them, the persuasion (prologue and epilogue) and the prescription (law sections) coexisted, without intermingling or hindering themselves, because they had been assigned a respective place in the systematic adopted method. The epilogue, now outdated in modern legislation, was curiously addressed to the succeeding legislators, exhorting them to keep the codes unchanged, and blessing or cursing them depending on their compliance or non compliance with such wish. The Code of Lipit-Ishtar reads as follows: "(4) When I established the Law in Sumer and in Akkad, I erected this stele. (5) May the man who neither commits any degradation with regard to her, destroys my work, deletes my inscription, nor writes his name on top of it, be granted a long life, be raised very high in the Ekur; may the brilliant forehead of Enlil turns towards him from the sky. (6) May the man who commits a degradation with regard to her, destroys my work, enters the sanctuary (and) changes (the stele's) pedestal, erases my inscription and writes [his name] above it, and makes another comit (this bad action) because of these curses, be a king], be [a in] −, [...], tear up (and, even), if [in his house] (a child) is born, may be deprived of a hereditary successor. (7) May Ashnan (and) Sumuqan, masters of abundance, take away [...], which he may have obtained by way of gift, may he suppress. (8) May god Utu, judge of heavens and earth [...] tear up [...] his foundation [...]. May he turns his villages into ruins; may he turn unstable the foundations of his country, not be a king."69 The Code of Hammurabi reads as follows: "If this man has kept under custody the decrees that I have written on my stele, (if) he has not departed from my legislation, (if) he has not revoked my decrees, (if) he has not destroyed my writings, this man will be like me, a king of justice. May Shamash lengthen his reign, may he guide his people in equity. (But) if this man has not kept under custody the decrees that I have written on my stele, and (if) he has despised my curses, and (if) he has repealed the law that I have promulgated, (if) he has revoked my decrees, (if) he has destroyed my writings, (if) he has deleted my written name in order to write his own (or if) because of these curses, he has commissioned other man to do so, may the great Anum, father of the gods that my government has proclaimed, take away this man, whether a king, a lord, a ruler (or any other person) who is called by a name, the splendor of royalty, break his scepter (and) curses his destiny."70 66 Código de Hammurabi, Estudio Preliminar, Traducción y Notas de Federico Lara Peinado, Edit. Tecnos, 2a. edición, Madrid, 1992, p. xxvii. 67 Código de Lipit-Ishtar, Los Primeros Códigos de la Humanidad, Estudio Preliminar, Traducción y Notas de Federico Lara Peinado y Federico Lara González, Código de Lipit-Ishtar, Edit. Tecnos, Madrid, 1994, pp. 83-107. 68 Código de Hammurabi, Estudio Preliminar, Traducción y Notas de Federico Lara Peinado, Edit. Tecnos, 2a. edición, Madrid, 1992, cxxxix + 230 pp. 69 Los Primeros Códigos de la Humanidad, Estudio Preliminar, Traducción y Notas de Federico Lara Peinado y Federico Lara González, Código de Lipit-Ishtar, Edit. Tecnos, Madrid, 1994, pp. 103-104. Hammurabi also adds the people as the addressee of his discourse, when he says: "May the oppressed man who is involved in a legal proceeding come before my statue as "King of Justice" and may my written stele be read to him so that he may listen to my beautiful words. May my stele show him his proceedings, may my stele show him his case, may his heart calm down (and proclaims): "Hammurabi is a lord, he is like a real father to his people"."71 He introduces himself as a wise man, when he says: "I (am) a very wise ruler, the one who has reached the source of wisdom; the one who has saved the people of Malgum from catastrophe; the one who has solidly placed his people in abundance; [...]."72 It might be the first time that, in a legislative work, the union of wisdom and eloquence with the ideal of the reputation of the legislator is expressed, as he says: "I am Hammurabi, king of justice, to whom Shamash has conferred the truth. My words are the most selected, my works are like no others. It is only for the foolish for whom they are vain; for the prudent, they are destined to glory."73 Those laws, like so many other already discovered and others yet to be discovered, were not made by amateurs, but by professionals, known as "scribes", who enjoyed the protection of gods: Nabû in the Mesopotamia, son of Ea, god of wisdom; and Thoth in Egypt, god of writing and wisdom, who composed the sacred books of the law. To the Mesopotamian, Syrian or Egyptian scribes dominating the written language was technically very difficult, since in the Mesopotamia there were three different languages (Sumerian, Acadian and, later, Aramaic) and, in Egypt, three different writing systems (hieroglyphic, hieratic and, later, demotic).74 The oriental scribe, the official who put his writing to the service of the administration, composed and criticized, counselled and discounselled Laws. 70 Código de Hammurabi, Estudio Preliminar, Traducción y Notas de Federico Lara Peinado, Edit. Tecnos, 2a. edición, Madrid, 1992, XXVI to 50. For typographic reasons "Shamash" has been written an one has added the letter "h" next of the letter "s" for not being provided with the pertinent diacritical sign. 71 Código de Hammurabi, Estudio Preliminar, Traducción y Notas de Federico Lara Peinado, Edit. Tecnos, 2a. edición, Madrid, 1992, XXV to 20, p. 43. 72 Código de Hammurabi, Estudio Preliminar, Traducción y Notas de Federico Lara Peinado, Edit. Tecnos, 2a. edición, Madrid, 1992, Prólogo, ANV., IV up to 20, p. 5. 73 Código de Hammurabi, Estudio Preliminar, Traducción y Notas de Federico Lara Peinado, Edit. Tecnos, 2a. edición, Epílogo, XXV from 90 up to XXVI incipit, Madrid, 1992, p. 44. For typographic reasons Shamash has been written and one has added the letter "h" next of the letter "s" for not being provided with the pertinent diacritical sign. 74 Henri Irénée Marrou, Histoire de l'Education dans l'Antiquité, Éditions du Seuil, Paris, 1948, pp. 2021. On the scribe in general, see: Dom Hilaire Duesberg, O.S.B., Les Scribes Inspirés, Introduction aux Livres Sapientiaux de La Bible, Le Livre des Proverbes, Desclée de Brouwer, Paris, 1938, 592 pp. Ptahhotep and Merikare In Egypt, at the beginning, the Pharaoh prepared the general juridical norms together with his chiefs of secrets or secretaries (heri sesheta) of each department. Later on, with he did so with the help of specialized officials: the secretaries of the royal commands (heri sesheta n audj medou). During the V dynasty (2750-2625 B.C.), the Pharaoh was assisted by a true legislative council formed by the chiefs of secrets of all the royal decrees (heri sesheta n oudj medou neb n nisout), however through this historical evolution, he never stopped consulting with the chiefs of each department, according to their respective specific competence.75 The technical ability of writing, reading and filing documents was not eough for the scribes to serve as effective and efficient officers who, to climb to a higher positions in the bureaucratic hierarchy and live between the powerful and the humble, tried to avoid the anger of their superiors, the envy of their peers and the malice of their subordinates. Therefore, it was necessary to acquire a higher education based on the union of wisdom and eloquence transmitted by the spoken and written word, by rules and examples, from parents to children, from teachers to disciples, from superiors to subordinates, from authors to readers. Ptahhotep, an old Egyptian Vizier for King Issi or Assa, belonged to a family of officers, and was the author of The Instructions (or Maxims) that took his name (c 2877, or 2675, or c 2400 B.C.). It is, perhaps, the most ancient book of the world, the first code of ethics for scribes and an example proposed for literary imitation, which still moves readers for its wisdom and eloquence. It is based on the practice of certain virtues: self-control, moderation, kindness, generosity, justice and veracity moderated by discretion, which had to be practised equally before all the people. The military virtues are not mentioned, since the ideal was a peaceful man, not a warrior.76 It consists of a prologue, thirty seven maxims and an epilogue, in such a way that it also constitutes a complete discourse from the rhetorical point of view. The paragraph preceding the enunciation of the maxims, which sums up the content and the purpose of the work in full, is perhaps the most remote precedent of an exhortation to the scribes from them to pursue the ideal of the union of wisdom and eloquence. It reads as follows: "Beginning of the formulations of the excellent discourse spoken by the Prince, Count, God's Father, God's beloved, Eldest Son of the King, of his body, Mayor of the city and Vizier, Ptahhotep, in instructing the ignorant in knowledge and in the standard of excellent discourse, as profit for him who will hear, (50) as woe to him who would neglect them."77 75 Jacques Pirenne, Histoire des Institutions et du Droit Privé de l'Ancienne Égypte, Tome II, La V Dynastie (2750-2625), Fondation Égyptologique Reine Élisabeth, Bruxelles, 1934, p. 104. 76 The Instructions of Ptahhotep, in Miriam Lichtheim's, Ancient Egyptian Literature, Vol. I: The Old and Middle Kingdoms, University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 1973, p. 62 Other versions: Les Maximes de Ptahhotep, Eugéne Revillout, Revue d'Egyptologie, 10, 1902, pp. 101-145; Les deux Préfaces du Papyrus Prisse, Revue d'Egyptologie, 7, 1896, pp. 188-198. The Instruction of Ptahhotep, in Adolf Erman, The Literature of the Ancient Egyptians (Die Literatur der Aegypter, Leipzig, 1923) Translated by Aylward M. Blackman, first published 1927, reissued 1971 by Benjamin Blom, Inc., reprint edition by Arno Press, Inc., New York, 1977, pp. 54-66. 77 The Instruction of Ptahhotep, in Miriam Lichtheim's, Ancient Egyptian Literature, Vol. I: The Old and Middle Kingdoms, University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 1973, p. 63. The prologue, a concrete example of wisdom and eloquence, in accordance with human nature, describes the effects of old age, introduces the wisdom literature in the form of counsels of a wise father to his son,78 and shows how an aged officer prepares his retirement upon requesting that his son be appointed to succed him: "O king, my lord! Age is here, old age arrived, Feebleness came, weakness grows, [Childlike] one sleeps all day, Eyes are dim, ears deaf, Strength is waning through weariness, The mouth, silenced, speaks not, The heart, void, recalls not the past, The bones ache throughout. Good has become evil, all taste is gone, (20 =5, 2) What age does to people is evil in everything. The nose, clogged, breathes not, [Painful] are standing and sitting. May this servant be ordered to make a staff of old age, (30) So as to tell him the words of those who heard, The ways of the ancestors, Who have listened to the gods. May such be made for you, So that strife may be banned from the people, And the Two Shores may serve you! Said his majesty of this god: Instruct him then in the sayings of the past, May he become a model for the children of the great, (40) May obedience enter him, And the devotion of him who speaks to him, No one is born wise."79 Ptahhotep's grave is still kept in Saqqarah,80 a city that today represents a great tourist attraction. The Instructions to Merikare deal with a Pharaoh who receives wisdom and eloquence from his father, another Pharaoh, one of the many rulers that took the name of Khety (Akhtoi), of the ninth or tenth dynasty, whose identity could not be determined with certainty. It is a royal testament, the oldest of the texts that have come to us,81 although it was not the first one of the above mentioned literary genre (speculum regum), since another one from a predecessor is known by reference. A fragment thereof, evidencing the value given to wisdom and eloquence, is transcribed below: 78 The Instruction of Ptahhotep, in Adolf Erman, The Literature of the Ancient Egyptians (Die Literatur der Aegypter, Leipzig, 1923) Translated by Aylward M. Blackman, first published 1927, reissued 1971 by Benjamin Blom, Inc., reprint edition by Arno Press, Inc., New York, 1977, p. 54. 79 The Instruction of Ptahhotep, in Miriam Lichtheim's, Ancient Egyptian Literature, Vol. I: The Old and Middle Kingdoms, University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 1973, pp. 62-63. In note 3 of her translation, Lichtheim textually says: "Staff of old age" is a metaphor for "son" or "successor". 80 Giulio Farina, "EGITTO", Enciclopedia Italiana, Istituto Giovanni Treccani, Roma, 1932, Vol. XIII, p. 559, col. 1. 81 Miriam Lichtheim's, Ancient Egyptian Literature, Vol. I: The Old and Middle Kingdoms, University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, p. 97. "[THE VALUE OF SPEAKING WELL AND OF WISDOM] Be a crasftsman in speech, so that thou mayest prevail, for the power of (a man) is the tongue, and speech is mightier than any fighting.----He that is clever, him the learned attack not, if he is learned, and no (harm) happened where he is. Truth cometh to him fully kneaded, after the manner of that which the forefathers spoke. Copy thy fathers, them that have gone before thee----. Behold, their words endure in writing. Open (the book) and read and copy the knowledge, so that the craftsman too may become a wise man (?)."82 If we leave Egypt and go to China, the doctrines of Confucius and those of the school of legists must be taken into consideration. Confucius Confucius (551-479 B.C.), an aristocrat of a long-established ancestry and scarce fortune, after having two menial public jobs, keeper of the grain and of pastures, and upon realizing that the rulers' purpose was to govern for their own benefit, at the age of twenty-two opened a private school in which he only admitted students based on the intellectual and moral merit of each one, to educate perfect officers who could provide the people with happiness from their high-ranking positions in the administration. He persuaded rulers from different administrations to appoint his graduates and, on reaching full maturity, he traveled with his disciples for thirteen years; however, he could not get that any leader to entrusted him with the highest positions for enough time to make lasting changes. Nevertheless, some centuries later his lessons became the Chinese official thought as regards government affairs, during the Han dynasty (206 BC.-220 A.D.) and, since then, such lessons remain the foundation of the culture of Chinese officers.83 The rigorous examination system open to all candidates and their selection in accordance with the merit of each one of them was applied from 622 to 1905, without interruption. The synthesis and comments of the outstanding figures of the Chu Hsi Confucianism have been since the year1200 his basic bibliography, later on known as The Four Books.84 Confucius affirmed that he was not innovating, that he was limiting himself to the study of classsical figures. Although it is true that he relied more on custom (li) than on law (fa), he deserves to be remembered here for the high level to which he raised the morals of civil servants. Li Ki, the book of "Memories on the Uses for Respecting and 82 The Instruction for King Merikere, in Adolf Erman, The Literature of The Ancient Egyptians (Die Literatur der Aegypter, Leipzig, 1923), trad. Aylward M. Blackman, 1a. ed.1927, reissued 1971 Benjamin Bloom, Inc., Reprint Edition Arno Press, Inc., New York 1977, pp. 75-76, text reproduced above. Another edition: The Instruction Addressed to King Merikare, in Miriam Lichtheim's, Ancient Egyptian Literature, Vol. I: The Old and Middle Kingdoms, University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 1973, p. 99. 83 Carmelo Elorduy, El Humanismo Político Oriental, edit. Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, Madrid, 1976, pp. 207-246. 84 E. A. Kracke Jr., Family vs. Merit in the Examination System, in The Chinese Civil Service: Career Open to Talent?, edited by Johanna M. Menzel, D.C. Heath and Company, Boston, 1963, p. 1; R. Huang, 1587 a Year of No Significance: The Ming Dynasty in Decline, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1981, p. 203. Both cites have been taken from: Mr. J. D. Tucker, Administrative History, Lecture Notes & Readings, University of Queensland Library, internet edition, 4.8. y 4.10, respectively. Htpp://www.library.uq.edu.au/eres/, downloaded 6/6/98. the Ceremonies", composed by his seventy-two disciples, after the death of the Master, got lost until hundreds of years later it was found in the demolition of his house. The current text dates back to the II century A.D. and, in Chapter XXVIII, Jou Hing ("The Conduct of the Learned"), in a dialogue between the old Master and Ngai, Prince of Lou, the ethical code of the Learned Chinese, disciple of wisdom, is formulated along nineteen eloquent paragraphs. The end reflects the persuasion obtained by Confucius: "This Prince, after listening to the explanations of the philosopher, gives to the word learned its true meaning and recognizes that the conduct of a true learned is irreproachable. "Never, during the rest of my life [he says], I will let myself to apply the learned's title by derision"." The School of the Legists Due to the preponderant importance they gave to the law as an instrument to rule, a group of four Chinese authors, known as "the school of the legists or legalists" may come to our minds: The Master of Shang, Shen Buhai, Shen Dao and Han Fei Tzu, all of them from the Warring States Period (403-221 B.C.).85 Han Fei Tzu should be given special consideration since, among other things, he taught about the dangers of the discourse and rhetorical persuasion86 and also established rules concerning the relationship between cousellors and politicians, which still today proves to be useful. If we leave Confucius and the school of the legists, but continue along the lines of wisdom and eloquence in ancient India, we find the Laws of Manu, the Arthasastra or Kautiliya s Arthasastra and the Edicts of King Asoka. Manu, Kautiliya and Asoka The 2685 verses that compose the Laws of Manu continue the tradition of wisdom and eloquence. They are called like that because the name of his author, "Manu", means "he who is wise", but it also designates the king who was the mythological ancestor of the human race, the Indian "Adam". It is a sharp denomination, which refers to the one who is wise and belongs to the human race.87 With regard to eloquence, it possesses unquestionable literary values, which have contributed to its preservation and universal transcendence, in addition to the historical and religious ones, among others. Kautiliya or Kautalaya, also known as Canakya or Visnugupta (c 321 B.C.), who according to the tradition was an adviser to Candragupta or Chandragupta, whom he helped to defeat the Nandas and found the Empire of the Mauryan dynasty, is the author of a manual on the art of politics which, considered from the practical point of view of ruling, is the most complete and oldest known to date.This work, which takes its title after the name of the genre to which it belongs, Artashastra, had been lost for centuries, and was published in 1909 by R. Shama Sastry. It systematically organizes the works of 85 León Vanderméersch, La Formation du Légisme, Recherche sur la Constitution d'une Philosophie Politique Caractéristique de la Chine Ancienne, École Francaise d'Extrême-Orient, Paris, 1965, XI + 299 pp. 86 Han-Fei-tse ou Le Tao du Prince, Présenté et Traduit du Chinois par Jean Levi, Chapitre III Dangers du Discourse, Chapitre XII Les Écueils de la Rhétorique, Éditions du Seuil, Paris, 1999, pp. 83-85; pp. 139143. Han Fei Tzu, Basic Writings, Translated by Burton Watson, Columbia University Press, The Difficulties of Persuasion (Section 12), New York, pp. 73-79. 87 The Laws of Manu, with an Introduction and Notes, Translated by Wendy Doniger with Brian K. Smith, Penguin Books, London, England, 1999, p. xviii. previous authors which went missing, as it usually happens after a masterly synthesis. Book 2 (The Activity of the Heads of Departments), Chapter Ten, Section 28 ("The Topic of Edicts"), contains sixty three rules on the art of legislation.88 The ambitious and cruel king Asoka (c. 274 -250 B.C.), Chandragupta's grandson, took power by force and by committing fratricide. After a painful battle, sickened by the brutality of war, he decided to rule with persuasion, proclaiming righteous conduct Edicts published through inscriptions all over his kingdom, in which he adopted and spread Buddhism, which Third Council he sponsored.89 b. Greece In this section the contributions made by Onomacritus, the Seven Wise Men, foreign Legislators, Orators and sophists, Protagoras, Isocrates, Plato, Aristotle and Callimacus will be considered. Onomacritus If we leave the East and move to Occident, to ancient Greece, we find Onomacritus. It has been said that he was the first expert in legislation, a specialty that he practised in Crete, although he was from Locri.90 So far there are no precisions about his legislative work or his aptitude to justify in writing his rational skill to make laws, since we have not come across any laws or art of legislation produced by him, not even in fragments or titles that may let us infer they have existed. Seven Wise Men In accordance with an established Greek practice, when a new city was founded, an old one was re-founded or serious crises took place, a new complete constitution and the 88 Kautiliya, Arthasastra, 2.10.1-62, The Kautiliya Arthasastra, R. P. Kange, 2.10.1-62, Second Edition, Bombay University, 1972, Reprint: Delhi, 1986, 1988, 1992, Motilal Barnasidass Publishers Private Limited, Delhi, 1992, T. II, Chapter Ten, Section 28 The Topic of Edicts, pp. 92-96, text in English; T. I, text in Sanskrit; T. III, Study, pp. 83-91. He translates the index of the whole work, and he titles the chapter "XXVIII Cancelleria degli editti": G. B. Bottazzi, Precursori di Niccoló Machiavelli in India e in Grecia Kautilya e Tucidide, Stab. Tip. Succ. FF. Nistri, Pisa, 1914, Estratto dagli Annali Della R. Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa, Vol. XXVI, p. 39. 89 For the text and the translation of the edicts, see: E. Hultzsch, Inscriptions of Asoka, Oxford, 1925; R. Mookerijti's, Asoka, London, 1928; D. R. Bandarkar's, Asoka, Calcutta, 1925, cited by Edward Thomas, The History of Buddhist Thought, Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., First edition 1933, Second edition 1951, Reprinted 1953, London, n. 1, p. 153. 90 Aristotle, Polítics, 1274a25. Aristotle, Politics, 1274a25, The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation, Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, Volume Two, Second Printing, 1985, p. 2022. The Politics of Aristotle, 1274a22, Translated, with introduction, analysis, and notes, by Peter L. Phillips Simpson, The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill and London, 1997, p. 72. Aristóteles, Política, 1274a25, Edición Bilingüe, traducción de Julián Marías y María Araujo, Instituto de Estudios Políticos, Madrid, 1970, p. 64. Aristote, Politique, Traduction Thurot, revue par H. Bastian, Garnier, Paris, p. 87. In general, see: Michael Gagarin, Writing Greek Law, Cambridge University Press, 2008, xi + 282 pp. most important laws had to be passed. If the common procedure was not suitable due to the circumstances, an eminent citizen would then draft the bills and, should a local citizen not be available, a foreigner −also eminent− would be summoned to such end. As for the citizen legislators, it is worth remembering the Seven Wise Men of Greece.91 They were neither always the same individuals nor the same number, since in the oldest enumeration Plato included Myson instead of the usual Periander; some authors would add three or four idividuals (Myson, Pherecydes, Epimenides and even Pisystratus) and some lists included twenty-three names. Nevertheless, an agreement was reached on at last four of them: Thales, Bias, Pittacus and Solon. Thales and Bias had a political activity; Pittacus legislated on drunkenness as an aggravating circumstance of crimes, which doubled the punishment. Solon (c. 630-560 B.C.) was the most famous Athenian legislator and his name still remains in Occident's memory as the legislator's paradigm. He personifies the virtue of moderation, since, when he had to legislate in a divided society, he did not want to be a dictator and drafted the laws without fully admitting that any of the conflicting parties was right, and immediately travelled abroad for ten years so that he would avoid interpreting them personally and, thus, he let the norms be imposed by wisdom and eloquence. Curiously, in order to defend them, he used poetry, since he was skillful both in prose and verse. We should not forget to mention Pythagoras, who was a legislator and opened a school for legislators,92 and his oral lessons, from which his followers formed the Biblion, a "Book of Moral and Political Laws."93 Foreign legislators From the school of Pythagoras, and also from the Academy of Plato, many disciples exited to act as legislators in different Greek cities, of which they were not natives. In relation to the foreigners summoned to legislate, it is also worth remembering the case of Pericles who, upon founding the Athenian Thurii colony, (444 B.C.), entrusted the drafting of its legislation to his friend, the sophist Protagoras of Abdera 94 (c 485411 B.C.), a wise and eloquent man, a figure of importance for the art of legislation, as we will study next. Orators and sophists In normal times, and in accordance with the procedure established by Solon, bills had to be submitted in writing to the Council (Boulé) and be set out in public places for the citizens' consideration, before being discussed by the Council and by the Assembly. In theory, any Athenian citizen who had not been subject to a judicial condemnation could speak at the Assembly; but, in practice, out of the regular five thousand attendants, on averageon the important occasions, of a whole of twenty, thirty or forty thousand citizens of classic Athens, thirty or, at most, fifty of them, had the habit of 91 Kathleen Freeman, The Pre-socratic Philosophers, First Published 1946, Second Edition 1959, Reprinted 1953, Reprinted 1959, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1959, pp. 44-45. 92 Voyages de Pythagore, red. par Sylvain Maréchal, Chez Deterville, Libraire, An Septième, T. I., pp. iiiiv . 93 Le Biblion de Pythagore. Livre des Lois Morales et Politiques, Première Traduction Complète par Albert Slosman, Éditions Robert Laffont, Paris, 1980, p. 18. 94 Mario Untersteiner, I Sofisti, Einaudi, Torino, 1949, p. 11. speaking from the tribune.95 The most eloquent ones, who would always play the leading roles and would catch everyone's attention, were never more than ten. Each orator was accustomed to taking certain matters: one, foreign policy, other, finance, etc.; they acted like our current Ministers or Secretaries of State, each one with his own specific portfolio. Those interested in composing and criticizing, counselling and discounselling general juridical norms had to contact them. It is widely known that there were no lawyers in Athens. Each one had to defend or accuse in court on his own behalf, therefore the logographers come into existence who, confidentially or not, wrote speeches so that others could deliver them in the courts. The orators would also take part in bills, since the interested parties used to make sure to have for themselves the most eloquent voices speak for them; which gave rise to the spreading of rumours on the moral and political integrity of Demosthenes and others famous orators of those times.96 A legal action was available against the authors of bills passed in violation of the procedure or when the opposite laws had not been previously repealed. In those cases, in addition to the respective penal condemnations, another legal action was available to render the illegal norm innefective, as did Demosthenes in his speech Against the Law of Leptines, in which he criticized it in detail and advised the enactment of another bill to replace it, which he promised to promote.97 The wisdom and eloquence of the orators were judged by their fellow citizens who, due to their natural admiration for words and thoughts, educated their taste on the frequent occasions when they could listen to the good speeches, that civic life was providing them, delivered in Courts, at the Assembly or the Council, and in funerals and holidays. The habit of appreciating speeches was widely spread, and the demand levels were so high that even Demosthenes could not make himself be heard during his first attempt before the Assembly, because of the mockery and the noise provoked by his style and pronunciation, despite his reputation as recognized judicial orator by then.98 The first great Greek political orators were educated by the example and the exercise of the affairs of the State. Pericles, who represents a period of transition, received Damon's teachings, the wisest man of the time as regards music, which include the culture of the soul, even poetry, in contrast with that of the body, which was dealt by gymnastics. He also received the teachings of Anaxagoras,the philosopher, from whom he learned to remain calm while delivering his speeches, imperturbable before the fury of the crowd.99 After Pericles, nobody could reach success without a rigorous rhetorical 95 Georges Perrot, L'Éloquence Politique et Judiciaire a Athènes, édit. Librairie Hachette et Cie., Paris, 1873, p. 22. 96 Démosthène, Harangues, Texte Traduit par Maurice Croiset, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Paris, 1924, Tome I, p. XII. 97 Demosthenes is pressumed to be the author of the bill: Démosthène, Discours Contre la Loi de Leptine, expliqué littéralment, traduit en français et annoté par Stièvenart, Librairie Hachette et Cie., Paris, 1880, pp. 118-119; n. 1, p. 229. Apsephion is pressumed to be the author of the bill: Demosthenes, Speech Agaist Leptines, 95-97, J. H. Vince, The Loeb Classical Library, William Heineman Ltd.-G. P. Putnam's Sons London-New York, 1930, pp. 554-556; n. a, p. 556. Demóstenes, Acerca de la exención de cargas. Contra leptines, 95-97, en Demóstenes, Discursos Políticos, trad. A. López Eire, ed. Gredos, Madrid, 1985, Tomo II, pp. 220-221; n. 108 p. 221. 98 Plutarque, Vie de Démosthene, Expliqué Littéralmente, Annoté et Revu pour la Traduction Francaise, par E. Sommer, VI, Librairie Hachette et Cie., Paris, 1890, pp. 24-27. Plutarque, Vies, Démosthène-Cicéron, Texte Établi et Traduit par Robert Flacelière et Émile Chambry, Démosthène 6.3, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Paris, 1976, p. 21. 99 Georges Perrot, L'Éloquence Politique et Judiciaire a Athènes, Librairie Hachette et Cie., Paris, 1873, 26. education the art of wise and eloquent civic speeches, in addition to the necessary familiarity with the affairs of the State. Since Homer100 there existed the ideal of a man skillful in words and actions, an orator and a warrior. The education of young people was provided by certain men, mature and experienced in the struggles of speeches and weapons, not by professional teachers: it was for honour, not for money. This aristocratic education turned out insufficient upon the rise of democracy, in the context of which the votes of the people had to be obtained by means of speeches.101 Then there appeared the sophists, itinerant teachers of wisdom and eloquence, educators who, looking for a remuneration in money, travelled in search of disciples through different Greek cities, delivering public speeches and private talks, satisfying the pedagogic demands of those who, being wealthy enough, had political aspirations.102 Protagoras Protagoras of Abdera (c. 485 B.C.), nicknamed Logos, was one of the most famous sophists. Democritus, known as "Wisdom", was his teacher. Protagoras developed in his disciples the faculty of a good advice or eubolia: "[...] capacity to give a good advise to onself as regards family property, for the purpose of administering their own home in the best way, and as regards the business of the city, for the purpose of being more effective in deeds and words [...]."103 He had legislative experience, since he was commissioned by Pericles to write the Constitution of the new colony Thurii, and he also had a theoretical knowledge which he included in a work that went lost, Antilogic, which in its third section, had several chapters concerning the laws and the polis,104 where, perhaps, an art of legislation was included, but which today is missing. Isocrates, Plato and Aristotle Isocrates (436-338 B.C),105 was the first to establish, as a teacher, a fixed and permanent school, perhaps earlier in Quios, certainly in Athens (c. 390 B.C.), which 100 Illiad, IX, 440. Homer, The Iliad, by A. T, Murray, The Loeb Classical Library, William Heineman Ltd.-G. P. Putnam's Sons London-New York, first printed 1924, reprinted 1965, T. I., pp. 414-415. Iliada, IX, 440, La Ilíada de Homero, traslado de Alfonso Reyes, Primera Parte, Aquiles Agraviado, Fondo de Cultura Económica, México-Buenos Aires, 1951, p. 194. Homère, Iliade, 420-460, Introdution et Notes de Robert Flacelière, Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, Librairie Gallimard, Paris, 1955, p. 244. 101 Henri Irénée Marrou, Histoire de l'Education dans l'Antiquité, Éditions du Seuil, Paris 1948, p. 83. 102 They taught how to speak in public and areté, or effectiveness in civic life. George A. Kennedy, Sophist and Physicians of the Greek Enlightenment, in The Cambridge History of Classical Literature, P.E. Easterling y B.M.W. Knox, Cambridge, 1985, p. 72. 103 Plato, Protagoras 317B "Questa scienza consiste in una capacità di ben consigliarsi torno al bene famigliari, allo scopo di amministratre nel modo migliore la propria casa, e intorno agli affari della città, allo scopo di essere assai efficace nell azione e nella parola..." Sofisti, Testimonianze e Frammenti, Mario Untersteiner, La Nuova Italia, T. I, Firenze, 1967, p. 31, 140, textual cite of Plato, Protagoras 317B. 104 Mario Untersteiner, I Sofisti, Einaudi, Torino, 1949, p. 20. 105 In general, see: was next to the gymnasium named "Lyceum". He was paid significant sums of money to train efficient citizens, wise and eloquent men. He criticized both the sophists and the philosophers, and placed rhetoric as the dominant, architectural discipline, under the denomination of "philosophy", the culmination of the education provided by him. Plato (c. 427-348 B.C.), later on, competed against Isocrates and set up another school, the "Academy" (c. 385 B.C.), also near a Athenian gymnasium, named "Academy" in memory of the hero Academus or Hecademus, but located in the opposite side of the city. Education was not available for everyone and no fees were paid, since the Academy was sort of a non-profit association, where both democracy and the education by the sophists, especially rhetoric, were criticized, raising philosophy, with its dialectical method, to the architectural category, as a superior discipline to which the others had to subordinate. Isocrates did not devote himself directly to the political activity, because he had a weak voice and was extremely shy.106 Plato felt disappointed in regard to politics, on account of his juvenile collaboration with the aristocratic government of the Dictatorship of the Thirties, formed by relatives and friends of the philosopher, and on account of his later character of governed during the restoration of the Athenian democracy, during which Socrates was condemned to death and, above all, on account of the outcome of his first visit to Syracuse, in his capacity as adviser, invited by the tyrant Dionysius I, whom he failed to instill his ideal of the king philosopher.107 In their respective Athenian establishments, Isocrates and Plato coincided, in fact, to educate the politicians of the whole Greece. The shock was inevitable.108 George Kennedy, The Art of Persuasion in Greece, Princeton University Press, sixth Printing, New Jersey, 1963, pp. 174-203. Thomas Conley, Rhetoric in The European Tradition, University of Illinois-Champaign, Longman, New York-London, 1990, pp. 17-20. Georges Perrot, L'Éloquence Politique et Judiciaire a Athènes, ed. Librairie Hachette et Cie., Paris, 1873, pp. 286-352. Octave Navarre, Essai sur la Rhétorique Grecque Avant Aristote, Librarie Hachette et Cie., Paris, 1900, pp. 177-207. Alfred Croisset et Maurice Croisset, Histoire de la Littérature Grecque, Tome. IV, Periode Attique, Eloquence, Histoire, Philosophie, par Alfreed Croisset, Troisième Édition Revue et corrigée, E. de Boccard, Éditeur, Paris, 1921, pp. 477-519. Georges Mathieu, Les Idées Politiques d'Isocrate, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Paris, 1925, 228 pp. Paul Cloché, Isocrate et son Temps, Annales Litteraires de l'Université de Besancon, Vol No. 54, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Paris, 1978, xiv + 140 pp. 106 Pseudo-Plutarch, Life of the Ten Orators, 4. [Plutarco] Vida de los Diez Oradores, 4, en Isócrates, Discursos, trad. de Juan Manuel Guzmán Hermida, ed. Gredos, Madrid, 1979, p. 48. [Plutarque] Vies des Dix Orateurs, 4, dans Isocrate, Discours I, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Paris, 1928, pp. XXVII-XXVII. 107 Plato, Letter VII, 324-326. Platón, Carta VII, 324-326, Cartas de Platón, Edición Bilingue y Prólogo, Margarita Toranzo, Revisado por José Manuel Pabón y Suárez de Urbina, Instituto de Estudios Políticos, Madrid, 1970, pp. 60-64. Platon, Lettre VII, 324-326, dans Oeuvres Complètes de Platon, Traduction Novelle et Notes par Leon Robin avec la Collaboration de M. J. Moreau, Bibliothèque de La Pleiade, NRF, Paris, 1942, T. II, pp. 1185-1189. Giovanni Reale, Storia della Filosofia Greca e Romana, Volume Terzo, Platone e l'Academia Antica, Tascabile Bompiani, Milano, 2004, p. 10, n. 1. 108 Werner Jaeger, Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture, Translated from the German Manuscript by Gilbert Highet, Volume II, In Search of the Divine Cetre, Oxford University Press, New York, 1943, pp. 77 immediately following; Volume III, The Conflict of Cultural Ideals in the Age of Plato, Oxford University Press, New York, 1944, pp. 182-262 (Plato); pp. 46-155 (Isocrates). Although Plato was Socrates' undeniable disciple, Isocrates also introduces himself as one, to such an extent that rumour has it that the day after the death of the Master, he went in mourning throughout Athens.109 Isocrates did not consider appropriate that the education offered by Plato, which neither helped the discourse nor the action, was named "philosophy", for which reason he considered it to be an intellectual gymnastics and a propaedeutics of philosophy.110 He used to say that, since it is not in a man's nature to reach a science with which we could know what we should do or say, he called a "wise man" to the one whom, because of his powers to surmise, was capable of generally arriving at the best decision, and a "philosopher" to the one whom deal with studies by which this capacity could be faster obtainable. He called "philosophy"111 to the higher education that he provided: a study on the wise and eloquent speech to reach social preeminence,112 aimed at having his disciples learn to behave in practical life, and to rule in their own house as well as the public affairs of the city, as Protagoras had earlier taught.113 Isocrates was different from the sophists of those times since he taught Werner Jaseger, Paideia: los Ideales de la Cultura Griega, traducción al español de Joaquín Xirau (Libros I y II) y Wenceslao Roces (Libros III y IV), Primera Edición en un sólo volumen, 1962, Segunda reimpresión, 1967, Libro III En Busca del Cetro Divino, pp. 373 y sgtes.; Libro IV, El Conflicto de los Ideales de la Cultura en el Siglo IV, pp. 982-998 (Platón), 830-856 (Isócrates), Fondo de Cultura Económica, México, 1967. He blamed Jaeger for having sacrificed Isocrates before Plato and gives his own vision of the opposition: Henri Irenee Marrou, Histoire de l'Education dans l'Antiquité, Éditions du Seuil, París, 1948, p. 490, n. 2; pp. 99-120; pp. 121-136. 109 Pseudo-Plutarch, Life of the Ten Orators, 35. [Plutarco] Vida de los Diez Oradores, 35, en Isócrates, Discursos, trad. Juan Manuel Guzmán Hermida, Edit. Gredos, Madrid, 1979, T. I, p. 52. [Plutarque] Vie des Dix Orateurs 35, dans Isocrate, Discours, Georges Mathieu, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Paris, 1928, T. I., p. XXXI. Doubt: George Norlin, in Isocrates, The Loeb Classical Library, William Heineman Ltd.-G. P. Putnam's Sons London-New York, 1928, T. I. p. XVII, n. b. 110 Isocrates, Antidosis, 266. Isocrates, Antidosis, 266, in Isocrates, George Norlin, The Loeb Classical Library, William Heineman Ltd-G. P. Putnmam's Sons, London-New York, 1929, T. II., pp. 332-333. Isócrates, Antidosis, 266, en Isócrates, Discursos, traducción, introducción y notas de Juan Manuel Guzmán Hermida, Edit. Gredos, Madrid 1980, T. II, p. 142. Isocrate, Sur l'Echange 266, dans Isocrate, Discours, Georges Mathieu, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Paris 1942, T. III, p. 168. 111 Isocrates, Antidosis, 270. Isocrates, Antidosis, 270, in Isocrates, George Norlin, The Loeb Classical Library, T. William Heineman Ltd-G.P. Putnmam's Sons, London-New York, 1929, T. II, p. 335. Isócrates, Antidosis, 270, en Isócrates, Discursos, traducción, introducción y notas de Juan Manuel Guzmán Hermida, Edit. Gredos, Madrid 1980, T. II, pp. 143-144. Isocrate, Sur l'Echange, 270, dans Isocrate, Discours, Georges Mathieu, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Paris 1942, T. III, pp. 168-169. 112 Isocrates, Antidosis, 308. Isocrates, Antidosis 308, in Isocrates, George Norlin, The Loeb Classical Library, T. William Heineman Ltd-G.P. Putnmam's Sons, London-New York, 1929, T. II, p. 355; p. 357. Isócrates, Antidosis, 308, en Isócrates, Discursos, traducción, introducción y notas de Juan Manuel Guzmán Hermida, Edit. Gredos, Madrid 1980, T. II, p. 152. Isocrate, Sur l'Echange, 308, dans Isocrate, Discours, Georges Mathieu, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Paris 1942, T. III, pp. 177-178. 113 Isocrates, Antidosis, 285. Isocrates, Antidosis, 285, in Isocrates, George Norlin, The Loeb Classical Library, T. William Heineman Ltd-G.P. Putnmam's Sons, London-New York, 1929, T. II, p. 343. at a fixed place, and lived with a few disciples for years, to transmit them a general culture and the art of speech as a harmonic whole. The method consisted of having students receive theoretical explanations and carry out practical composition exercises and criticism of speeches of the Master, their class mates, those made by themselves, and also present analysis and reports on the visits made to courts, hearings and public acts.114 They had to study the "Hellenic and political" speeches of the Master, as he called them, that taught "good things" to think, to speak and to act well. These "good thoughts and words", that served to them as examples, were so familiar to them that, through imitation, they were led to behave well. Moreover, in order to persuade by means of speech, they had to appear themselves like "good men".115 Plato considered that "philosophy" was the application of his dialectical method, that is to say, the use of definition, division and classification of concepts, which culminated in the study of mathematics, through dialogues which refuted or proved theses on matters of great interest and importance such as good, beauty, truth, justice, etc. In the Gorgias dialogue he stated that the health of the soul had to be taken care by politics, which comprised two real arts: legislation and justice; and that the health of the body, which lacked a proper denomination, comprised other two real arts: gymnastics and medicine. The false arts did not look for the best but for the most pleasant thing and consisted of a species of flatteries that were not founded on the nature of things, so they could not give reasons and explain causes, and they pretended take the place of real arts. Thus, in the soul sophistics replaced legislation and rhetoric replaced justice, whereas in the body, cosmetics replaced gymnastics and cooking replaced medicine.116 Those who Isócrates, Antidosis, 285, en Isócrates, Discursos, traducción, introducción y notas de Juan Manuel Guzmán Hermida, Edit. Gredos, T. II, Madrid 1980, p. 147. Isocrate, Sur l'Echange, 285, dans Isocrate, Discours, Georges Mathieu, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Paris 1942, T. III, p. 172. 114 Alfonso Reyes, La Crítica en la Edad Ateniense, ed. El Colegio de México, Fondo de Cultura Económica, Méjico 1941, p. 197. 115 Isocrates, Antidosis, 280. Isocrates, Antidosis, 280, in Isocrates, George Norlin, The Loeb Classical Library, T. William Heineman Ltd-G.P. Putnmam's Sons, London-New York, 1929, T. II, p. 337. Isócrates, Antidosis, 280, en Isócrates, Discursos, traducción, introducción y notas de Juan Manuel Guzmán Hermida, Edit. Gredos, T. II, Madrid 1980, p. 146. Isocrate, Sur l'Échange, 280, dans Isocrate, Discours, Georges Mathieu, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Paris 1942, T. III, p. 171. 116 Plato, Gorgias, 463e-466a. Plato Gorgias Translated with Notes, Terence Irwin, Cornell University, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1979, pp. 32-34 (text); p. 226-236 (notes). Plato Gorgias, A Revised Text with Introduction and Commentary, E.R. Dodds, At The Clarendon Press, Oxford 1959, pp. 226-227 (commentary). Platón, Gorgias, 463e-466a, Platón, Gorgias, Introducción, Traducción y Notas de Angel J. Cappelletti, Eudeba, Buenos Aires, 1967, pp. 141-142. Platon, Gorgias, 463e-466a, dans Oeuvres Complètes de Platon, Tome III, 2e. Partie, Gorgias-Menon, Texte Établi et Traduit par Alfred Croiset avec la Collaboration de Louis Bodin, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Paris, 1923, pp. 131-135. "Rhetoric, is, here, the corruption of the art of the judiciary; sophistics, the corruption of the art of legislation" ("Retorica, e, qui, la corruzione del arte giudiziaria; sofistica, la corruzione dell'arte legislativa "): Platone, Gorgia, A Cura di N. Sabbatucci, Editore Laterza, Bari, 1956, n. 1, pp. 60-61.Translation from Italian into English by the autor of this book. In a defence of rhetoric upon Plato's attack, see: Brian Vickers, In Defence of Rhetoric, Chap. 2, Plato's Attack on Rhetoric, Clarendon Press, Oxford, First published 1988, First issued as paperback whith corrections and additions 1989, reprinted 1990 (twice), New York, 1990, pp. 83-147. keep this position, should be reminded that rhetoric includes, in addition to the judicial and epidíctic genres, the deliberative genre, one of whose model cases consists of counselling and discounselling, composing and criticizing laws (general juridical norms in the material sense). When rhetoric is conceived as the union of wisdom and eloquence as Protagoras, Isocrates, Cicero and their successors of this conception, there is no reason to be afraid of the criticism formulated in the Gorgias, which considers it to be a false art, a species of flattery, an exclusive patrimony of the sophists since, as it has been demonstrated in Chapter I hereof, rhetoric constitutes the foundation of the art of legislation. Before ending their careers, both Teachers had moderated their respective points of view. Isocrates, in his Antidosis speech, asserted that, as well as in gymnastics, which is a part of physical education, professors teach the positions invented for physical competitions, philosophy professors teach all forms of speech through which the mind expresses itself. Knowledge cannot include all the circumstances that may arise, but the most attentive disciples capable of observing what usually happens will face them correctly, in most cases.117 Perhaps an echo of that wisdom still resounds in Justinian's Digest, where it is affirmed that the law in general deals with the things that often or usually happen and that, as regards things that may happen by chance, no laws are established.118 Isocrates admits philosophy, although "rhetoriced", as a useful knowledge for practical life. Plato, in his Phaedrus dialogue, admits the possibility of including in his system a "philosophiced" rhetoric based on the knowledge of passions and systematically explained in accordance with his dialectical method of definitions, divisions and classifications, like a genuine art for education and leading of the souls or psichagogia, founded on the knowledge of the truth of speech and not on its verisimilitude.119 Aristotle, at Plato's request, taught rhetoric at the Academy. Afterwards, when he opened his own school, at the same gymnasium that Isocrates had used before, named it "Lyceum" as that gymnasium was known. He fulfilled Plato's project regarding a 117 Isocrates, Antidosis, 183-184. Isocrates, Antidosis, 183-184, in Isocrates, George Norlin, The Loeb Classical Library, T. William Heineman Ltd-G.P. Putnmam's Sons, London-New York, 1929, T. II, pp. 289; 291. Isócrates, Antidosis, 183-184, en Isócrates, Discursos, traducción, introducción y notas de Juan Manuel Guzmán Hermida, Edit. Gredos, T. II, Madrid 1980, pp. 123-124. Isocrate, Sur l'Échange, 183-184, Antidosis, dans Isocrate, Discours, Georges Mathieu, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Paris 1942, T. III, pp. 148-149. 118 Digesta, I.3.3. y I.3.4. Corpus Iuris Civilis, Digesta, I.3.3.; I.3.4., Editio Stereotipa Octava, Volumen Primum, Digesta, Recognovit, Theodorus Mommsen, Apud Weidemanos, Berolini, 1899, p. 5. El Digesto del Emperador Justiniano, I.3.3 y I.3.4, Traducido y Publicado por el Licenciado Don Agustín Rodríguez De Fonseca. Nueva Edición Aumentada con la Traducción de los Proemios, Completada y Revisada con Arreglo a los Textos más Autorizados de las Ediciones Modernas, Imprenta de Ramón Vicente, Madrid, 1872, Tomo I, p. 41. 119 Platón, Fedro, 269d-274d. Platón, Fedro, 269d-274d, Edición Bilingüe, Traducción, Notas y Estudio Preliminar por Luis Gil Fernández, Instituto de Estudios Políticos, Madrid, 1957, pp. 67-75. Platon, Phèdre, 269d-274d, dans Oeuvres Complètes de Platon, T. IV, 3a. Partie, Texte Traduit par Leon Robin, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Paris, 1933, pp. 79-87, with a significant preliminary research, Notice, VI, Rhétorique et Dialectique, pp. CXLII-CLXXV. Platon, Phèdre, 269d-274d, dans Oeuvres Complètes de Platon, Traduction Novelle et Notes par Leon Robin avec la Collaboration de M. J. Moreau, Bibliothèque de La Pleiade, NRF, Paris, 1942, T. II, pp. 6775. Platone, Fedro, 269d-274a-d, Testo Critico, Introduzione e Commento di Giuseppe Ammendola, pp. 227250. philosophical rhetoric and, although he quoted Isocrates, both expressely and implicitly, he was in fact his competitor. Cicero recalls that Aristotle, who witnessed Isocrates' success, suddenly changed the type of education that he offered and began to recite a poem from Philoctetes (the tragedy of Sophocles), modifying it; where the hero expressed he was embarrased for keeping silence and letting barbarians speak, he would replace "barbarians" for "Isocrates". He combined the theoretical study of things and the practice of eloquence, a merit which was noticed by Philip of Macedon, who entrusted him whit Alexander's education, in order that the prince might learn to act well and speak well at the same time,120 in accordance with the Homeric ideal. Isocrates' efforts to make his disciples Theopompus or Isocrates of Apollonia teach Alexander, although fruitless, have left a beautiful testimony in Letter V addressed to Alexander, in which he praises the future emperor because, without underestimating the utility of eristics in private discussions, he prefers: "[...] the training which rhetoric gives, which is of use in the practical affairs of everyday life and aids us when we deliberate concerning public affairs. By means of this study you will come to know how at the present time to form reasonable opinions about the future, how not ineptly to instruct your subject peoples what each should do, how to form correct judgements about the right and the just and their opposites and, besides, to reward and chastise each class as it deserves"121 Isocrates, in his praises to the logos, creator of civilization, had mentioned the establishment of laws as one of its examples.122 Later, driven perhaps by his desire to polemicize, since Plato was writing his dialogue "The Laws",123 he admitted the importance of the laws for the well-being of human life, but he asserted that it was necessary to estimate more the creators of speeches like his, which are rare, difficult, and demand a greater intellectual dedication, and serve to govern Greece as a whole fairly and usefully for Athens, since those who must propose laws find help among the great number of existing ones and do not need to find new ones, given the fact tha they must only compile those praised elswere, this beeing an easy task for anyone, while the orators are in the opposite situation, since most of the topics have been discussed and, if they were to repeat what has already been said, they would be regarded as shameless 120 Cicerón, De Oratore, III, XXX, 141. De l'Orateur, Ciceron, Texte Établi par Henri Bornecque et traduit par Edmond Courbaud, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Paris, 1930, III, XXXV, 141, p. 55. 121 Isócrates, Letter V to Alexander, 4. Isocrates, Letter 5 To Alexander, 4, Isocrates, Larue Van Hook, The Loeb Classical Library, T. William Heineman Ltd-G.P. Putnmam's Sons, London-New York, 1961, T. III, p. 429. Isócrates, Carta V, A Alejandro, 4, en Isócrates, Discursos, traducción, introducción y notas de Juan Manuel Guzmán Hermida, Edit. Gredos, T. II, Madrid 1980, p. 304. Isocrate, Lettre V A Alexandre, 4, dans Isocrate, Discours, Texte Établi et Traduit par Georges Mathieu et par Émile Brémond, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Deuxième(sic) Tirage, Paris, 1972, IV, Lettre V A Alexandre, 4, p. 215. 122 Isocrates, Nicocles III, 6. Isocrates, Nicocles III, 6, Isocrates, George Norlin, I, The Loeb Classical Library, London: William Heinemann Ltd., New York: G. O. Putnam's Sons, 1928, p. 79, text reproduced above. Isócrates, Nicocles, 6, en Isócrates, Discursos, traducción, introducción y notas de Juan Manuel Guzmán Hermida, Edit. Gredos, T. I, Madrid 1979, p. 287. Isocrates, Nicocles III, 6, dans Isocrate, Discours, Georges Mathieu et Émil Brémond, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Paris 1967, T. II, p. 121. 123 Isocrate, Sur l'Echange, dans Isocrate, Discours, Georges Mathieu, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Paris 1942, T. III, p. 123, n. 1. babblers and, if they were to look for new topics, these would be difficult to find.124 Aristotle replied to him, without mentioning his name, and criticizing the sophists, when he affirmed that it was not easy to legislate by just assembling the laws which had acquired the best reputation, as if that selection did not require intelligence and good judgement was not the most difficult skill to achieve by the inexpert.125 The author of this work considers opportune to point out that Aristotle could also have refuted Isocrates using the arguments that the latter had supported in the Panegyric of Athens, when he wrote that rhetoric and the other arts would progress enormously if no honour was done or admiration expressed to those who started each one of them instead of doing so to those who exercised them the best; or to those who thought to speak about things on which none had ever spoken before rather than to those who could say them as anyone else could.126 He could also have refuted Isocrates by alleging that the laws are not appreciated by their novelty, because there are like wines: the older they are the better. If they have remained in force for a long time, they have already proven their wisdom and eloquence to this experimental laboratory of society kown as "history". Isocrates was the author of the Constitution of Quios and in his capacity as teacher, a disciple of his is known: Lacritus, who was an Athenian nomothetes.127 It is said that Plato was asked to legislate in Megalopolis, but declined the offer and perhaps his visits to Syracuse gave rise to the composition of bills that he then used in his dialogue "The Laws". The Academy was a place for consultation for those who needed experts in 124 Isocrates, Antidosis, 79-83. Isocrates, Antidosis, 79-83, Isocrates, George Norlin, The Loeb Classical Library, T. William Heineman Ltd-G. P. Putnmam's Sons, LondonNew York, 1929, T. II, pp. 229-231. Isócrates, Antidosis, 79-83, en Isócrates, Discursos, traducción, introducción y notas de Juan Manuel Guzmán Hermida, Edit. Gredos, T. II, Madrid 1980, pp. 98-99. Isocrate, Sur l'Echange, 79-83, dans Isocrate, Discours, Georges Mathieu, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Paris 1942, T. III, pp. 123-125. 125 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1181a15-20. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1181a15-20, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, Second Printing, 1985, Volume Two, p. 1866. Aristóteles, Ética a Nicómaco, 1181a15-20, Edición Bilingüe y Traducción por Marìa Araujo y Julián Marías, Introducción y Notas de Julián Marías, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid, 1981, p. 173. Isocrates, Against the Sophists, 16-17. Isocrates, Against the Sophists, 16-17, Isocrates, George Nolin, The Loeb Classical Library, T. William Heinem Ltd,-G.P. Putnam's Sons , London-New York, T. II, 1929, pp.172-173. Isócrates, Contra los Sofistas, 16-17, en Isócrates, Discursos, Traducción, Introducción y Notas de Juan Manuel Guzmán Hermida, Edit. Gredos, Madrid, 1979, pp. 162-163. Isocrate, Contre les Sophistes, 16-17, dans Isocrate, Discours, Georges Mathieu, Société d Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Paris, 1928, T.I, pp.148-149. 126 Isocrates, Panegyricus, 10. Isocrates, Panegyricus, 10, in Isocrates, George Norlin, The Loeb Classical Library, T. William Heineman Ltd-G.P. Putnmam's Sons, London-New York, 1928, T I, p. 125. Isócrates, Panegírico, 10, in Isócrates, Discursos, traducción, introducción y notas de Juan Manuel Guzmán Hermida, Edit. Gredos, T. I, Madrid 1979, p. 202. Isocrate, Panégyrique d'Athenes, Expliquè Litteralment et Annoté par E. Sommer, Librairie Hachette et Cie., Paris, 1897, pp. 11-13. Isocrate, Panegyrique, 10, dans Isocrate, Discours, Georges Mathieu et Emile Brémond, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", T. II, Paris, 1967, pp. 16-17. 127 [Plutarch] Lives of the Ten Orators, 8, 11. Vida de los Diez Oradores, 8, 11, in Isócrates, Discursos, traducción, introducción y notas de Juan Manuel Guzmán Hermida, Edit. Gredos, T. I, Madrid 1979, pp. 48-49. [Plutarque] Vie des Dix Orateurs, dans Isocrate, Discours, Georges Mathieu et Emile Brémond, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Paris 1928, T. I, p. XXVIII. legislation,128 as it arises from Letter V, in which he recommends his disciple Eufreus to Perdiccas.129 It is known that several of his disciples were sent to different cities to legislate, at the request of the respective governments, such asAristonymus to Arcadia, Phormus to Elis, Menedemus to Pyrra and Eudoxus to Cnidos.130 Aristotle wrote the Constitution of Stagirus, his hometown, an honour granted to him by Alexander The Great, his former student.131 Callimachus Callimachus (born c 310 B.C.) divided the entire Greek literature kept at the Library in Alexandria in eight categories in his lost work: "Table of Illustrious Writers and their Works",132 known as Pinakes (Tables or Pictures). The above mentioned categories were: drama; epic and lyric poetry; legislation; philosophy; history; oratory; rhetoric; and miscellanea. They were contained in separated books, one hundred and twenty in total, in which the authors were listed alphabetically or chronologically,133 maybe both, together with a biographical note. There, judgement was made on the authenticity of each work, on their respective attribution, and the first words of each one were indicated (incipit). It was the first comprehensive and systematic history of Greek literature and was used as a catalogue of the famous Library.134 The laws thus obtained their philological establishment as literary works and legislation as a literary genre on its own and, some legislators, perhaps, as writers worthy of study and imitation, established their reputation by means of criticism founded on reason; but regrettably no material of this sort has come to us in a systematic way. 128 G.C. Field, The Philosophy of Plato, Second Edition with an Appendix by R. Cross, Oxford University Press, London-Oxford-New York, 1969, pp. 2-3. 129 Plato, Letter V. Platón, Carta V, Cartas de Platón, Edición Bilingue y Prólogo, Margarita Toranzo, Catedrático de Griego., Revisado por José Manuel Pabón y Suarez de Urbina, Catedrático de la Universidad de Madrid, Instituto de Estudios Políticos, Madrid, 1970, pp. 55-56. Platon, Lettre V, dans Oeuvres Complètes de Platon, Traduction Novelle et Notes par Leon Robin avec la Collaboration de M. J. Moreau, Bibliothèque de La Pleiade, NRF, Paris, 1942, T. II, pp. 1180-1181. 130 Plutarch, Against Colotes, 32. A.E. Taylor, Plato The Man and his Work, Meridian Books Inc., reprinted by arrangement with The Humanities Press Inc, from the sixth edition, reprinted 1952, New York, sixth printing, April 1960, p. 464. Plutarque, Contre Colotés, 32, dans Oeuvres Complétes de Plutarque, Oeuvres Morales et Oeuvres Diverses, Traduites en Francais, Victor Bétolaud, Librarie Hacchette et Cie., T. IV, Paris, 1870, pp. 638639. 131 Plutarch, Against Colotes, 32. A.E. Taylor, Plato The Man and his Work, Meridian Books Inc., reprinted by arrangement with The Humanities Press Inc, from the sixth edition, reprinted 1952, New York, sixth printing, April 1960, p. 464. Plutarque, Contre Colotés, 32, dans Oeuvres Complétes de Plutarque, Oeuvres Morales et Oeuvres Diverses, Traduites en Francais, Victor Bétolaud, Librarie Hacchette et Cie., T. IV, Paris, 1870, p. 639. 132 "Tableaux des écrivains illustres de leurs oevres" Translation from French into English by the author of this book. Alfred Croiset, Histoire de la Litterature Grecque, T. V, Periode Alexandrine, Ancienne Librairie Thorin et Fils, Albert Fonteimoing, Editeur, París, 1901, pp. 132-133. 133 The Late Sir John Sandys, History of Scholarship, A companion to Greek Studies, Edited by Leonard Whilbley, M.A., Fourth Edition, Revised, Cambridge University Press, VIII.6, Cambridge, 1931, p. 744. 134 L.S. Schmitz, Callimachus, in Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, Edited by William Smith, Vol. I, London 1844, p. 572. A. W. Bulloch, Hellenistic Poetry, The Cambridge History of Classical Literature, I, Greek Literature, P.E. Easterling, B.M.W. Knox, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1985, p. 550. c. Rome This section will deal with the Law of XII Tables, the orators, sophists and bureaucrats, and with Cicero. Law of the XII Tables The first Roman laws enacted during the monarchy (leges regiae), which are of doubtful existence and content, might have been compiled by Sexti Papirii, for which reason they are known as ius Papirianum. The Law of the XII Tables (c. 451 B.C.) has also generated historical doubts. According to the tradition, three Romans patricians were sent to Athens to bring a copy of Solon's laws and to report about Greek law. Then, a legislative commission composed of ten members (decemviri), drafted the norms, which were engraved on ten Tables. Subsequently, a similar commission added more precepts, which gave rise to other two Tables, which were added to make up the Twelve Tables.135 Orators, sophists and bureaucrats As regards the subsequent legislative procedure, bills had to be proposed in writing, with the prior advice of the Senate, before their debate in the Assemblies, as it was done in Athens. The Senatus Consultum and the laws show such a degree of uniformity of scheme and style that they reveal the use of forms to produce them, which were improved by the clerks of both the Senate and the magistrates with legislative initiative. Following the great republican debates held in the Senate and in the Assemblies, the laws of the Empire were first generated in the Council of the Prince (Consilium Principis) and, after the accentuation of the monopolistic tendency, in the Imperial Counsel (Consistorium) or in the Central Imperial Chancellery. The legislative task always demanded certain professional skill.136 The bureaucrat jurists who integrated these bodies were the real authors of the imperial juridical norms, the composers and inspirers of the great codifications, like the first two (private) collections of constitutions by Gregorius and Hermogenianus, and the (official) Codex Theodosianus and, finally, Justinian's Corpus Juris Iuris Civilis, where Tribonianus, who had already 135 Digesta justinianus, I.2.2.2. Corpus Iuris Civilis, Editio Stereotipa Octava, Volumen Primum, Digesta I.2.2.2, Recognovit, Theodorus Mommsen, Apud Weidemanos, Berolini, 1899, p. 2. El Digesto del Emperador Justiniano, I.2.2.2. Traducido y Publicado por el Licenciado don Agustín Rodríguez de Fonseca. Nueva Edición Aumentada con la Traducción de los Proemios, Completada y Revisada con Arreglo a los Textos más Autorizados de las Ediciones Modernas, Imprenta de Ramón Vicente, Madrid, 1872, Tomo I, p. 34. For the reconstruction of the legislative texts, see: Textes de Droit Romain, Publiés et Annotés par Paul Frederic Girard, Quatrième Édition Revue et Augmentée, Paris, 1912, Leges Regiae, pp. 3-5 (notices), pp. 5-9 (texts in Latin); Law of XII Tables, pp. 9-11 (notices) and pp. 12-23 (text in Latin). 136 Fritz Schultz, History of Roman Legal Science, First Published 1946, Reprinted from Corrected Sheets of the First Edition with New Addenda, Oxford 1963, p. 12; p. 87. John Crook, Consilium Principis. Imperial Councils and Counsellors From Augustus to Dioclecian, Cambridge, at The University Press, 1951, reprinted Arnold Press, New York, 1975, p. 113. been in charge of the highest offices of the State, played a key role.137 Therefore, the Roman law from an organic legislative source began with the Law of the XII Tables; it developed for centuries thanks to the forms silently and anonymously elaborated by clerks who attended the Senate and by the magistrates with initiative to promote legislation; it then grew in the Council of the Prince, the Imperial Council and the Imperial Chancellery; and became kown through the legislative, prudential and doctrinal work of the great bureaucrat jurists which culminated with Tribonianus, the soul of Justinian's great codification, with which the cycle is closed. The traditional Roman education system started within the family and continued in the house of some eminent citizen who, only for the sake of honour, and with his own example, both through actions and words, in the Forum, in the Assemblies, in the Senate, or in the battlefield, revealed the secrets of the Roman civil and military virtues to young people. The Greek rhetoricians, who offered in exchange for money an education based on the wise and eloquent word to form efficient citizens, were expelled from Rome by a senatus consultum in 161 B.C., due to the pressure exerted by traditionalists.138 In order to attract them back, a century later, Julius Caesar (c. 100-44 B.C.), granted them the Roman citizenship. The process was completed by Emperor Titus Flavius Vespasianus (9-79 A.D.) who, in addition to granting tax exemptions to them, established in Rome two official rhetoric chairs, one Greek and the other one Latin, with a fixed annual remuneration paid by the imperial Treasury, and also surrounded himself with a new type of jurists, used to working in public offices during most of their lives, because of the honour that fulfilling such positions entailed and also, because of the salary. This change of attitude in educational politics was caused by the Roman imperial government's need to have both a military service and a civil service. Roman bureaucrats were recruited in rhetoric schools.139 Cicero Marcus Tullius Cicero (106 B.C.-43 A.D.), a continuator of the ideas of Isocrates about the union of wisdom and eloquence, considered that knowledge without eloquence was seldom useful to the cities, and that eloquence without wisdom was always harmful, never useful.140 137 Fritz Schultz, History of Roman Legal Science, First Published 1946, Reprinted from Corrected Sheets of The First Edition with New Addenda, Oxford 1963, p. 267. 138 The text is in Aulus Gellius, in his Attic Nights, XV. Also see: M. Victor Cucheval, Histoire de l'Éloquence Latine Depuis l'Origine de Rome Jusqu'a Ciceron, d'Après des Notes de M. Adolphe Berger, Ancien Professeur a la Faculté des Lettres de Paris, Ovrage Couronne par l'Academie Francaise, Deuxième Édition, T. II, Appendice, Librarie Hachette et Cie., Paris 1881, p. 341. 139 Henri-Irinée Marrou, Histoire de l'Education dans l'Antiquité, Éditions du Seuil, Paris 1948, p. 385; p. 412. For a study on the concrete influence of rhetoric on the law in general, on the republican edicts and especially on those of the early empire, see: Margaretta Benner, The Emperor Says, Studies in the Rhetorical Style in Edicts of the Early Empire, Studia Graeca et Latina Gothoburgensia XXXIII, Acta Universitatis Gothoburgensis, Goteborg, Sweden, 1975, xi + 202 pp. 140 Cicero, De Inventione, I.I.1. Cicéron, De la Invención Retórica, en Obras Completas de Cicerón traducidas del Latín por Marcelino Menéndez y Pelayo, Biblioteca Clásica, Madrid, 1879, Tomo XIV, Tomo I, p. 1. Cicéron, De l'Invention, I.I.1, Texte Revue et Traduit avec Introduction et Notes par Henri Bornecque, Garnier, Paris, p. 1. He asserted that, as soon as the cities were established, eloquent men were needed to persuade through their speeches what they had found by means of their wisdom, so that the almighty, thanks to their physical force, might abide by the rule of law without violence, and admit as equals those whom they could dominate in fact, thus relinquishing a custom which favoured them.141 Quintilian criticizes Cicero for having attributed the origin of eloquence to the founders of cities and to legislators, since there exist nomadic peoples, without cities or laws, in charge of legations, which accuse and defend, and also believe that some of them speak better than others.142 It could be replied to Quintilian that both legislative and customary norms require a speech to be created, applied, modified or repealed, since they are all founded, at least, on the opinion that they are necessary for the city (opinio cive necessitatis), an opinion without which the laws cannot exist, since they may only be created and kept by means of wise and eloquent speeches, whose method is taught by rhetoric. 2. Medieval history This section will deal with Boethius, Cassiodorus, Isidorus Hispalensis, Alcuinus, the ars dictaminis, the ars arengandi, the education of the Podestá, and humanists Salutati, Bruni and Valla. The Corpus Iuris Civilis by Emperor Justinian, has already been mentioned as the culminating work of the Roman bureaucrats jurists. a. Boethius and Cassiodorus The first renaissance of the classical culture took place in the Italic peninsula under the Ostrogothic king Theoderic the Great (454-526) who, as a hostage, was first held physically captive in Rome, and then held intellectually captive, since he had become a great admirer, keeper and spreader of the Roman civilization. Once he reached power, he preserved everything that survived and restored everything that had declined, both as regards institutions and buildings, which he had ordered to repair with his own money, something that had not happened since the time of the caesars who had built and maintained them.143 Boethius and Cassiodorus, together with Theodoric, at whose service they were, are the three protagonists of this renaissance. 141 Cicero, De Inventione, I.II.3. Cicéron, De la Invención Retórica, en Obras Completas de Cicerón traducidas del Latín por Marcelino Menéndez y Pelayo, Biblioteca Clásica, Madrid, 1879, Tomo XIV, Tomo I., pp. 2-3. Cicéron, De l'Invention, Texte Revue et Traduit avec Introduction et Notes par Henri Bornecque, Garnier, I.II.3, Paris, p. 5. 142 Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria, III.2.4. Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria, III.2.4, The Institutio Oratoria of Quintilian with an English Translation by H.E. Butler, William Heinemann, London, G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1921, p. 383. Quintilien, Institution Oratoire, III.ii.4, Texte Établi et Traduit par Jean Cousin, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Tome II, Livres II Et III, Paris, 1976, p. 147. 143 Maurice Rey, Théodoric Le Grand, dans Hommes d'Etat, Desclée de Brouwer, T. I., Paris, 1936, pp. 421-511. Paul Renucci, L'Aventure de l'Humanisme Européen au Moyen-Age (IV-XIV Siécle), Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", La "Renaissance " de Thédoric et l'élaboration du Moyen'Age, Paris, 1951, pp. 1822. Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius (c. 480-c 524), a Roman nobleman appointed by Theoderic to the charges of Consul and Magister Officiorum, transmitted the classical hereditage to the Middle Age. He is remembered in this work for his two books about the topica, In Ciceronis Topica144 and De Topicis Diferentiis,145 both very important in the stage of invention or investigation of a bill, as will be explained in Chapter V. Flavius Magnus Aurelius Cassiodorus, Senator (c. 490-c 585), was appointed Quaestor by Theoderic, as a reward for the speech of praise that he had pronounced in his honour. One of his tasks was to draft norms.146 Cassiodorus preserved from forgetfulness the formula for the appointment of the Quaestores, in which the tradition of the art of legislation is continued. There, in addition to quoting textually a praise for eloquence taken from Cicero, expressly mentioning him, although without quoting the place from which it was taken (locus), he explains that Qaestores were appointed because of their reputation of wise and eloquent men, that norms should be rhetorically effective and juridically valid so that nobody could criticize them, and that punishment turned in something almost superfluous whenever the power eloquence prevailed,147 since then the law was spontaneously fulfilled, without the need to resort to the use of force. Out of the copious production of his vast bureaucratic experience, he selected and assembled a collection entitled Variae, which served as a form and model of the art of writing official documents, which, fortunately, is available to us.148 144 Boethius's in Ciceronis Topica, Translated, with Notes and an Introduction by Eleonore Stump, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1988, xi + 277 pp. 145 Boethius's De Topicis Diferentiis, Translated with Notes and Essays on the Text, by Eleonore Stump, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1978, 287 pp. 146 James J. O'Donnel, Cassiodorus, University of California Press, 1979; Hypertext Version Posprint 1995, Chapter 3: The Variae, text and note 3, with a quote from Notitia Dignitatum, Occ. 10.3-5. http://ccat.s.o.s.upenn.edu/jod/texts/cassbook/toc.htm, downloaded on 5/19/98. New address, 10/25/2011: http://faculty.georgetown.edu/jod/texts/cassbook/toc.htm It holds that the Ostrogothics did not legislate and that the qaestores were not legislative drafters, although they applied the forms of edicts to the existing law: Barnish, Cassiodorus: Variae, Translated whith notes and Introduction, Liverpool University Press, Liverpool, 1992, p. xli. They affirm that the quaestors were writing laws for the Imperial Consistory: Erns Badian, Tony Honoré, quaestor, The Oxford Classical Dictionary, Third edition, Oxford University press, Oxford, New York, 1996, p. 1287, column 2. 147 James J. O'Donnel, Cassiodorus, University of California Press, 1979; Hypertext Version Posprint 1995, Chapter 3: The Variae, cite Variae 6.5., without mentioning Cicero: http://ccat.s.o.s.upenn.edu/jod/texts/cassbook/toc.htm, bajado el 19/5/98. New address, on 10/25/2011: http://www9.georgetown.edu/faculty/jod/texts/cassbook/toc.htm For the full text translated into English of the formula of appointment as Quaestor, see: Cassiodorus: Variae, Translated whith notes and Introduction by S.J.B. Barnish, Liverpool University Press, Liverpool, 1992, pp. 96-97, who explain that the Cicero's locus citatus belongs to De Oratore, I.30. A pertinent fragment, Variae, VI.5.3., is reproduced in Latin and translated into English among the epigraphs of this book. 148 S.J.B. Barnish, Cassiodorus: Variae, Translated whith notes and Introduction, Liverpool University Press, Liverpool, 1992. Ake J:son Fridth, Terminologie et Formules dans les Variae de Cassiodore, Etudes Sur le Développement du Style Administratif aux Derniers Siècles de l'Antiquité, Studia Graeca et Latina Gothoburgensia II, Almqvist & Wiksell, Stockholm, 1956. Gunhild Viden, The Roman Chancery Tradition. Studies In the Language of Codex Theodosianus and Cassiodoro Variae, Studia Graeca et Latina Gothoburgensia XLVI, Acta Universitatis Gothoburgensis, Goteborg, Sweden, 1984. Cassiodorus is an archetypal example, since as an oriental scribe, he had it in his blood. Both his grandfather and his father had been officers and, the latter, who became Theodric's Prefect of the Prethorium, initiated his son in the bureaucratic career as his Consiliarius. Boethius, Theoderic's Magister Officiorum, was executed by him o the grounds of conspiracy. On the other hand, Cassiodorus, who replaced Boethius as Theoderic's Magister Officiorum, became Prefect of the Prethorium during the regency of Queen Amalasuntha and, after a successful and long bureaucratic career, with some intervals, under the reigns of kings Athalaric, Theodate and Vitiges, he went on a retreat in good terms with the latter. When he returned from exile, he came back to his country house in Squillace and founded the monastery of Vivarium, where he installed a magnificent library, taught the monks the rudiments of Greco-Roman culture in a work named "Institutions" (Institutiones), he ordered the tranranslation and copy of manuscripts and, at the age of ninety-three, provided them with a compilation of orthographic rules.149 He was a man who got the reputation of being wise and eloquent, as it was required in the Varieae to be appointed quaestor: "And therefore, prompted by the fame of your wisdom and eloquence, for this indiction, I allot you, by God favour, the Quaestorship, the glory of letters [...]"150 He made barbarian monarches think, feel and speak like civilized Romans and bequeathed to posterity examples of the art of writing official documents (Variae) and a compendium of rhetoric and classic culture (Institutiones), on which the above mentioned art is based. Likewise, numerous translations, copies of manuscripts and the mentioned compilation of orthographic rules are also a part of his legacy. Cassiodorus, in addition to the remembered family backgrounds, belonged to the imperial bureaucratic tradition. Before him, Antiochus Chuzon and Tribonian had held the position of Quaestor. Antiochus Chuzon, a bureaucratic jurist, presided over the commission in charge of the writing of the Codex Theodosianus (438). Tribonian, was the soul of Justinian's Corpus Iuris Civilis, given the fact he was a member of the commission in charge of writing the Codex (528-529) and the manager of the Digest (530-533) and of the second edition of the Codex (534) and, after re-assuming the position, he kept on writing the Novellae, until he died. b. Isidore of Seville Isidorus Hispalensis, bishop of Seville (c. 560-636), the next protagonist in the process of transmission of the classic culture, in his work Etimologiae, medieval encyclopedia, enunciated the following PRINCIPLE: "xxi What sort of law should be made (Qualis debet fieri lex) A law should be honourable, just, feasible, in agreement with nature, in agreement with the custom of the country, appropriate to the place and time, necessary, useful, and also clear, lest in its obscurity it contain something deceitful, and it should be writing not for private convenience, but for the common benefit of the citizens."151 149 Cassiodorus, De Orthographia, H Keil, Grammatici Latini 7, 1880. 150 Cassiodorus: Variae, Translated with notes and introduction by S.J.B. Barnish, Liverpool University Press, Liverpool, 1992, VI.5, pp. 96-97. 151 The Etymologies of Isidore of Seville, Translated, with Introduction and Notes, by Stephen A. Barney, W.J. Lewis, J.A. Beach, Oliver Berghof, with the collaboration of Muriel Hall, Cambridge University Press, First Published 2006, Third Printing 2007, V, xxi, p. 119. c. Alcuin Emperor Charlemagne (c. 748-814) and Alcuin of York (c 735-804), the master who was at his service, were the protagonists in the second renaissance. Charlemagne wanted to restore the ancient Roman Empire and, for that purpose, in addition to the diplomatic, military and political conquests, he needed that the Greco-Roman tradition be restored. Provided with a splendid library and a magnificent group of teachers, he was able to could create a school of classical culture in his palace to educate the court and form its officers and, as a leader, he set the example, and became one of Alcuin's students. Alcuin, who had been entrusted with the task of restoring classical education, wrote a work in which he taught rhetoric to give an answer to the needs of the new administration, and entitled it Disputatio de Rhetorica et deVirtutibus Sapientissimi Regis Karli et Albini Magistri152 (The Dialogue of the most Wise King Charles and Master Alcuin Concerning Rhetoric and the Virtues). It consists of a dialogue between the Emperor and his palatine teacher, in which Charlemagne recalls, among other remarks, that it is necessary to study rhetoric because it deals with civil quaestiones, an ancient significant formula that he re-interpreted with the meaning of the occupations of the prince and the palace, in the following words: "1. CHARLEMAGNE. [...] I remember you once said that the strength of this art lay wholly in dealing with public questions. As you very well know, in the course of the duties of government and the cares of State, we are constantly wont to be busy with questions of this kind; and it seems absurd not to know the rules of an art when the necessity of using it confront us daily."153 The Disputatio de Rhetorica was not only a mere compendium of the rhetorical tradition for students in schools, since the virtues about which it dealt with belonged to the ideal king, Charlemagne, who would appear to his subjects to be admired as the portrait of the model leader, ad therefore, that would implicitly mean it was also a work of political nature, a mirror of princes (speculum principis). Alcuin, until his death and far from having been a humble school teacher, was a shrewd and energetic officer at the service of Charlemagne, who was in the centre of the events of the court.154 152 M. Roger, L'Enseignement des Lettres Classiques d'Ausone a Alcuin, Introduction a l'Histoire des Écoles Carolingiennes, Alphonse Picard et Fils, Éditeurs, Paris, 1905, pp. 396-397. 153 "1. [...] te olim memini dixisse, totam eius artis vim in civilibus versari quaestionibus. Sed ut optime nosti propter occupationes regni et curas palatii in huiuscemodi quaestionibus assidue nos versari solere, et ridiculum videtur eius artis nescisse praecepta, cuius cotidie occupatione involvi necesse est." The Rhetoric of Alcuin & Charlemagne, A Translation, with an Introduction, the Latin Text, and Notes, by Wilbur Samuel Howell, The Dialogue of the Most Wise King Charles and the Master Alcuin Concerning Rhetoric and the Virtues, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey; Humphrey Milford, London, Oxford University Press, 1941, pp. 66-67. 154 Thomas Conley, Rhetoric in The European Tradition, University of Illinois-Champaign, Longman, New York-London, 1990, pp. 83-84 d. Ars dictaminis In the third renaissance, which begun to be insinuated in Italy by the XI century, the need to form more and better drafters of public and private, secular and ecclesiastic documents emerged. The examples of official documents contained in the Variae by Cassiodorus and in the existing forms, among which Liber Diurnus Romanorum Pontificum stood out,155 from within the papal chancellery, turned out to be insufficient upon the variety and intensity of the economic, political and social activities caused by the flowering of independent cities with their respective local governments, due to the relations that they kept with each other, with the feudal lords, with the Empire and on account of the struggle between these two in order to get control over all the rest. In the course of the XI and XII centuries there were a rhetorical education and a rhetorical tradition, the ars dictandi or ars dictaminis, to form the expert scribes who wrote, in the chancelleries, epistles and legal texts for princes, prelates and other high ranking dignataries of the State.156 The Benedictine monasteries that traditionally provided the Bishop's Curia and the Roman Chancellery with notaries and chancellors, used to teach the rules to write epistles in their schools of liberal arts as a new genre of rhetoric. The classical authors of the ars dictaminis would not write their manuals, but rather dictate them to their secretaries; for this reasson they had imposed the meaning of composing to the Latin verb dictare and, thus, dictamen turned out to be a synonymous term for elaborated or artistic prose157 and, as the intellectual editor (dictator) was distinguished from the secretary (scriptor), the art of writing epistles became known ars dictaminis or ars dictandi.158 155 A. Giry, Manuel de Diplomatique, Nouvelle Édition, Librairie Felix Alcan, Paris, p. 487, quotes the following editions: E. Roziére, Liber diurnus ou recueil des formules usitées par la chancellerie pontificale du Ve. au Xe. siècle publ. d'apres les ms. des Archives du Vatican avec les notes et dissert. du P. Garnier et le commentaire inédit de Baluza, Paris, 1869, in 8. Th.-E. v. Sickel, Liber diurnus romanorum pontificum ex unico codice Vaticano, Vienne, 1889, in 8. 156 Hastings Rashdall, The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages, A new Edition in Three Volumes, Edited by F. M. Powicke And A. B. Emden, Volume I, Salerno-Bologna-Paris, At The Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1936, p. 110, n. 3. It was the Business Course of the universities in the Middle Age, in which professionals got their education, from humble scribes up to Secretaries of the State. Louis John Paetow, The Arts Course at Medieval Universities with Special Reference to Grammar and Rhetoric, University of Illinois, University Press, The University Studies Vol. III No. 7, January 1910, Urbana-Champaign, pp. 67-91. Pedro Martín Baños, El Arte Epistolar en el Renacimiento Europeo, 1400-1600, Universidad Deusto, Bilbao, 2005, 736 pp., p. 115. Alfredo Galletti, Storia dei Generi Letterari Italiani. L' Eloquenza (Dall'Origine al XVI Secolo) Casa Editrice Francesco Vallardi, Milano, 1904-1938, p. 449. 157 "Prose dictamen is extended speech according to the speakers pleasure (ad'lib') and not bound by the laws of meter. Or prose dictamen is an art, namely a collection of precepts. But it should not be called an art, rather the mother or (sic) all arts, because all writing originates from prose. For rhytms and meters are beggarly suffrage, which originate from prose.", Franceso di Capua, Ars Dictaminum, da Enciclopedia Italiana, Istituto Giovanni Treccani, Roma, 1929, Vol. IV, p. 674. Opera omnia Boncompagni (1194-1243), 4., Palma Boncompagni-Translation, 6, Steven M. Wight, Internet Edition: http://www.loop.com~swight/palman.htm, Los Angeles, 1998, download 6/15/98. On 10/25/2011, new addres: http://scrineum.unipv.it/wight/palman.htm 158 From the point of view of the rhetoric, see: In an anonymous ars dictaminis, the Aurea Gemma <Gallica>, we find a lost link between the medieval scribes and their predecessors and between wisdom and eloquence. There it is affirmed that letters and testaments were invented in the Egyptian city of Menphis, to protect the memory of industrious human actions, against floods and famine, so that the progeny might view the actions of their ancestors as in a mirror and understand that the need had imposed on them the virtues of probity and love glory, so that the memory of past actions might raise their minds until they found virtue.159 In this stage of the Middle Ages, the liberal arts schools, either monastic or not, upon addressing the judicial genre of rhetoric, provided their students with the only juridical knowledge that was taught,160 to such an extent that Anselm of Besate, in his work Rhetorimachia (1046-1048),161 could affirm that rhetoric and law go together, like two faces of the same science.162 Law was a branch of rhetoric, and its education as independent subject could not break its intimate connection with the writing of official documents, since the ars dictaminis, which was a key aid for the writing of legal instruments, received in the XII century a strong stimulus, due to the renaissance of literature and knowledge in general, to the cultivation of Latin letters and to the study of the law in particular.163 The liberal arts schools in Bologna, historical precedents of the famous School of Law, gave birth to the famous University. When he was a student, Irnerio, learned the trivium (grammar, dialectics and rhetoric), the most common elements of the law and the essentially practical part of the administration. Both in those schools, as well as in the University of Bologna, officials from the bureaucratic offices belonging to the communes, to the great feudal lords and to the ecclesiastic institutions were recruited.164 According to documents which date back to 1118, Irnerio, the famous Charles Sears Baldwin, Medieval Rhetoric and Poetic (to 1400) Interpreted from Representative Works, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1928, Republished 1976, Scholarly Press, Inc., Michigan, pp. 206227. James J Murphy Rhetoric in the Middle Ages, A History of Rhetorical Theory from St. Augustine to the Renaissance, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1974, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1974, First Paperback Printing, 1981, pp. 194-268. James Murphy, La Retórica en La Edad Media, Historla Teoría de la Retórica desde San Agustín hasta el Renacimiento, Traducción de Guillermo Hirata Vaquera, Fondo de Cultura Económica, México, 1986, pp. 202-274. Alfredo Galletti, Storia dei Generi Letterari Italiani. l'Eloquenza (Dall' Origine al XVI Secolo), Casa Editrice Francesco Vallardi, Milano, 1904-1938, pp. 449-451. 159 3. Aurea Gemma <Gallica>, 2.3-2.3.5, Medieval Diplomatic and the Ars Dictandi, Steven M. Wight, Internet Edition: http://www.loop.com~swight/2gn3-/.htm, Los Angeles, 1998, downloaded on 05/31/98. On 10/25/2011, new address: http://scrineum.unipv.it/wight/index.htm 160 Hastings Rashdall, The Universities of Europe in The Middle Ages, To new Edition in Three Volumes, Edited by F. M. Powicke and A. B. Emden, Volume I, Salerno-Bologna-Paris, at The Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1936, n. 3, pp. 101-102. 161 George A. Kennedy, Classical Rhetoric and its Christian and secular Tradition from Ancient to Modern Times, The University of North Carolina Press, Chapell Hill, 1980, p. 1 162 R. R. Bolgar, The Classical Heritage and its Beneficiaries, Cambridge University Press, First Published 1954, Reprinted 1958, 1963, 1973, 1977, London-New York Melbourne, p. 143; p. 410. 163 Ch. H. Haskins, Studies In Mediaeval Culture, Chapter IX, The Early Arts Dictandi In Italy, Oxford, 1929, p. 170. 164 Irnerio's rhetorical origin and school of arts of Irnerio remain in his work: tone delicacy, formal taste, discreet elegance of expression, dialectical discussion, logical content. Albano Sorbelli, Storia della Universitá di Bologna, Volume I, Il Medioevo (Secc. XI-XV), Nicola Zanichelli Editori, Bologna, 1944, pp. 36-37. protagonist of the juridical renaissance, appears as Magister Artium,165 i.e. he was connected to the liberal arts throughout his career, first as a student and then as a teacher. Six personalities of the ars dictaminis will be remembered: Alberico di Montecassino, Giovanni di Gaeta, Alberto di Morra, Boncompagno da Signa, Rolandino Passageri and Giovanni di Bonandrea. Alberico di Montecassino and Giovanni di Gaeta Alberico di Montecassino,166 senior (c 1030-c 1105), according to the tradition, might be the first who set out in writing the rules of the art of dictating, in two works: Flores Rhetorici or Radii Dictaminum, and Breviarum de Dictamine.167 When Pope Urban II visited Montecasino in the year 1088, he took Giovanni di Gaeta, a disciple of Alberico's as his secretary, so that he would restore the leonine cursus, an ancient prosaic rhythm of the clauses in the documents of the Curia. Giovanni restored it when he become Chancellor's and, later on, he confirmed it with his own authority, upon being elected Pope under the name of Gelasius II.168 The cursus, in addition to its beauty, allowed for the distinction of genuine documents from false ones, and even today it is studied in the auxiliary science of history called "diplomatic".169 Alberto di Morra Since the style of the papal chancellery was the model imitated throughout Europe, another personality of the ars dictaminis should be remembered: Alberto di Morra or Mora, of Benevento, also Chancellor of the Roman Church (1187) and Pope, under the name of Gregory VIII, who in his work Forma Dictandi, set out the style of the Curia which, to his homage, is usually called "Gregorian".170 The ars dictaminis passed from Montecassino to Bologna,171 where it achieved an autonomous university level and then gave rise to the ars notaria. It reached the French 165 Franz Wieacker, Historia del Derecho Privado de La Edad Moderna (Privatrechts-Geschischte der Neuzeit unter Besonderer Beruckssichtigung, edited for Vanderhoeck & Ruprecht, Gottinga), traducción de Francisco Fernández Jardón, Aguilar, Madrid, 1957, p. 42. 166 A. Lentini, Alberico di Montecassino, Senior, Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani, Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, Vol. 1, Roma, 1960, pp. 643-645. 167 Alberic of Monte Casino, Flowers of Rhetoric, translated by Joseph M. Miller, in Joseph. M Miller, Michael Prosser y Thomas W. Benson, Readings in Medieval Rhetoric, Bloomington, Indiana, 1973, pp. 131-161. Breviarum de Dictamine has been completely edited by Peter-Christian Groll, in part 2 of his doctoral thesis Das "Enchiridion de prosis et de rithmis" des Alberich von Monteccassino un die anonymi "ars dictandi", Freiburg im Breisgau, 1963, according to Martin Camargo, Ars Dictaminis, Ars Dictandi, Typologie des Sources du Moyen Age Occidental, Fasc. 60, A.V.A2*, Brepols, Turhnout-Belgium, 191, p. 51, n. 88. 168 Tomasso Lecissotti, Montecassino, Badia di Montecassino, 1967, pp. 222-223. 169 A. Giry, Manuel de Diplomatique, Nouvelle Édition, Librairie Felix Alcan, Paris, 1925, pp. 479-492. 170 James J. Murphy, Rhetoric in The Middle Ages a History of Rhetorical Theory from St. Augustine to The Renaissance, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1974, p. 250. James Murphy, La Retórica en La Edad Media, Historla Teoría de la Retórica desde San Agustín hasta el Renacimiento, Traducción de Guillermo Hirata Vaquera, Fondo de Cultura Económica, México, 1986, p. 257. Ars Dictaminum, Francesco di Capua, da Enciclopedia Italiana, Istituto Giovanni Treccani, Roma, 1929, Vol. IV, p. 674. 171 For the school of Bologna see: schools located in Blois, Meung, Tours and, especially, Orleáns, which at some point got to mar the original places, until the Italians re-emerged as the undisputed masters of such art.172 Boncompagno da Signa Boncompagno,173 Buoncompagno o Boncompagnus da Signa (c. 1165-c 1240) also sought to join law and rhetoric in his work,174 since he thought that both princes and officials of the Commune and of the Curia, i.e. all those dealing with politics, had the need to have good jurists who knew how to write a letter, a diploma, a treaty, even a speech, as the case might be.175 He was the most famous teacher of the ars dictaminis in the school of Bologna and wrote numerous works. Among them, Boncompagnus (or Candelabrum, or Pratum Eloquentia, or Rhetorica Antiqua) 176 related to the ars dictaminis, and Rhetorica Novissima,177 which competed against the book De Inventione, also known as Rhetorica Vetus, by Cicero. In the prologue of Rhetorica Antiqua, in the juridical form of the author's testament, Boncompagno named his heiress in the epistolary style, and affirmed that she would be the empress of liberal arts and of the students of both civil and canonical laws.178 In the brief work titled Cedrus Von Franz-Josef Schmale, Die Bologneser Schule der Ars Dictandi, Deutsches Archiv zur Erforschung des Mittelalters 13 (1957), pp. 16-34. Giuseppe Vechi, Il Magistero delle " Artes" Latine a Bologna nel Medioevo, Publicazioni della Facolta di Magistero, Universitá di Bologna, N. 2, Casa Editrice Prof. Ricardo Patron, Bologna, 1958, 27 pp. 172 Martin Camargo, Ars Dictaminis, Ars Dictandi, Typologie des Sources du Moyen Age Occidental, Fasc. 60, A.V.A2*, Brepols, Turhnout-Belgium, 191, pp. 47-50. 173 V. Pini, Boncompagno da Signa, Dizionario Biografico Degli Italiani, Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, Vol. 11, Roma, 1969, pp. 720-725. 174 Francesco di Capua, Boncompagno da Signa, da Enciclopedia Italiana, Istituto Giovanni Treccani, Roma, 1930, Vol. VII, p. 396. 175 Alfredo Galletti, Storia dei Generi Letterari Italiani. L' Eloquenza (Dall' Origine al XVI Secolo), Casa Editrice Francesco Vallardi, Milano, 1904-1938, p. 452. 176 V. Pini, Boncompagno, da Dizionario Biografico degli italiani, Istituto Giovanni Treccani,, Roma, 1969, p. 721. To read a partial edition of The Rhetorica Antiqua, with the preface, the complete table of six books, fragments of the books I, III – VI and conclusion, see: L. Rockinger, Briefsteller und Formelbucher des Elften bis Vierzehnten Jahrhunderts, en Quellen und Erorterungen Zur Bayerischen un Deutschen Geschischte, IX, 1863, pp. 128-174, according to V. Pini, Boncompagno, da Dizionario Biografico Italiano, Istituto Giobanni Trecani, Roma, 1969, p. 722, columna 2, which the author of this book has failed to see. There is a complete Latin edition of Rhetorica Novissima: Bibliotheca Iuridica Medii Aevi Edidit Augustus Gaudentius, Scripta Anecdota Glossatorum, Volumen II, Boncompagni Rhetorica Novissima, Bononiae, In Aedibus Petri Virano Olim Fratrum Treves, Anno MCCCLXXXXII, pp. 251-297. Boncompagno, Opera omnia Boncompagnus (1194-1243), 13. Boncompagnus, Medieval Diplomatic and the Ars Dictandi, Steven M. Wight, Internet Edition: http://www.loop.com~swight/bonproln.htm, Los Angeles, 1998. This edition contains the text in Latin and some translations into English of other works by Boncompagnus, in addition to the Rhetorica Antiqua and Rhetorica Novissima as well the ars dictaminis by other authors. New address, on 10/25/2011: http://scrineum.unipv.it/wight/bonproln.htm 177 Boncompagno da Signa, Franceso di Capua, Enciclopedia Italiana, Istituto Giovanni Treccani, Roma, 1930, Vol. VII, p. 396. V. Pini, Boncompagno, en Dizionario Biografico degli italiani, Istituto della Enciclopedia Treccani, Roma, 1969, p. 722. 178 Boncompagno, Opera omnia Boncompagnus (1194-1243), 13. Boncompagnus, Medieval Diplomatic and the Ars Dictandi, Steven M. Wight, Internet Edition: and without detriment to the others, he particulary deals with the composition of the laws.179 As in the case of other famous scribes who are still remembered and paid tribute to, the library of his hometown was named after him, Boncompagno da Signa. Rolandino Passageri In this brief sketch on the art of legislation Rolandino Passageri, chancellor of the Commune of Bologna (notario dictator) in the XIII century (c 1217), will also be remembered. He participated in the writing of the famous decree dated August 26, 1256 by means of which the serfdom was abolished in Bologna, before any other Italian city. After becoming one of the greatest notaries and teachers of the notarial art, also the author of the famous Summa Artis Notariae, he acquired a great deal of prestige as politician and legislator. His mortal remains are still kept in a funeral ark, a beautiful sepulchral monument at the Square of Santo Domenico, in Bologna.180 Giovanni di Bonandrea An interesting case, which illustrates the exchange between practice and teaching, is that of Giovanni di Bonandrea, a notary and chief of the chancellery of the Commune of Bologna, who was appointed teacher of rhetoric at the University in 1303, due to the prestige he had acquired as officer.181 He was the author of an influential work, Summa Dictaminis or Brevis Introductio,182 in which we may find exemples of letters and model speeches. He is still remembered as a "renowned teacher".183 http://www.loop.com~swight/bonproln.htm, Los Angeles, 1998. The quote is taken from the translation into English of the Prologue of the Boncompagnus. New address, on 10/25/2011: http://scrineum.unipv.it/wight/bonproln.htm. 179 Steven M. Wight, Opera Omnia Boncompagni (1194-1243), 7. Cedrus, Medieval Diplomatic and the Ars Dictandi, Internet Edition: http://www.loop.com~Nswight/cedrusn.htm, Los Angeles, 1998, bajado el 3/6/98. New address, on 10/25/2011: http://scrineum.unipv.it/wight/bonproln.htm Steven M. Wight, Opera Omnia Boncompagni (1199-1243), 13, Boncompagnus, Medieval Diplomatic and the Ars Dictandi, Internet Edition, http://www.loop.com~swight/bonproln.htm, Los Angeles, 1998, downloaded 5/2/98. New address, on 10/25/2011: http://scrineum.unipv.it/wight/bonproln.htm 180 Arturo Palmieri, Rolandino Passageri, Nicola Zanichelli Editore, Bologna, 1933, p. 50; pp. 74-82; pp. 207 and subsequent pages. 181 Hastings Rashdall, The Universities of Europe in The Middle Ages, A New Edition in Three Volumes, Edited by F.M. Powicke and A.B. Emden, Volume I, Salerno-Bologna-Paris, at The Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1936, n. 3, p. 111. 182 Edited by James Banker, like Appendix A, pp. 329 et seq, in his doctoral thesis, Giovanni di Bonandrea's " Ars dictaminis " Treatise and the doctrine of Invention in the Italian Rhetorical Tradition of the Thirteen and Early Fourtheen Centuries, Diss. Rochester 1972, according to Martín Camargo, Ars Dictaminis, Ars Dictandi, Typologie des Sources du Moyen Age Occidental, Fasc. 60, A.V.A2*, Brepols, Turhnout-Belgium, 191, p. 52, text and note 90. 183 Albano Sorbelli, Storia della Universitá di Bologna, Volume I, Il Medioevo (Secc. XI-XV), Nicola Zanichelli Editori, Bologna, 1944, p. 120. e. Ars arengandi The ars dictaminis, a new art integrated by sets of examples (models of letters and outlines of speeches), rules or both, emerged due to the fact that in the independent Communes, as in the city-states of the classical Greece, rhetoric had a fundamental practical importance, being that the legal, political and diplomatic matters used to develop by means of formal speeches and debates.184 Among the authors who stood out for their works related to public speeches, called ars arengandi or ars dicendi, the following will be remembered: Guido Fava, Matteo de'Libri and Albertano da Brescia. Guido Fava, Matteo de'Libri and Albertano da Brescia Guido Fava or Faba (c 1190-1240)185 was a grammar and rhetoric teacher in Bologna, where he competed against Boncompagno for academic prestige. As for the ars dictaminis, he wrote two important works: Summa Dictaminis186 (system of rules) and Gemma Purpurea187 (set of examples included in a form of official letters). With regard to the ars arengandi, he was the author of compilations of speeches, one in Latin, Arengae, and the other one in common language, Parlamenti et Epistole, which also included two or three samples of letters in Latin.188 Matteo de'Libri (c1250) published a collection of speeches in common language, destined to the most important officers in the Communes, Dicerie di Ser Matteo de'Libri da Bologna.189 In the year 1245, Judge Albertano da Brescia wrote a work for his son Stefano,190 called "The Art of Speaking and of Being Quiet" (Ars Loquendi et Tacendi) which, 184 Quentin Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, Volume One, The Renaissance, Cambridge University Press, First Published 1978, Reprinted 1979, 1980, 1988, 1990, 1992, 1994, 1996, Cambridge, 1996, pp. 30-31. 185 Quentin Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, Volume One, The Renaissance, Cambridge University Press, First Published 1978, Reprinted 1979, 1980, 1988, 1990, 1992, 1994, 1996, Cambridge, 1996, p. 30. 186 Published by Augusto Gaudenzi, see: Il Propugnatore 23 (N.S. 3) (1890),I, 287-338 y II, 345-393, according to James J. Murphy, Rhetoric in The Middle Ages, A History of Rhetorical Theory From St. Augustine to The Renaissance, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1974, p. 256, n.116. James Murphy, La Retórica en La Edad Media, Historla Teoría de la Retórica desde San Agustín hasta el Renacimiento, Traducción de Guillermo Hirata Vaquera, Fondo de Cultura Económica, México, 1986, p. 263, n. 116. 187 Critical edition of E. Monaci, Rome, 1901, according to Alfredo Galletti, Storia dei Generi Letterari Italiani, L' Eloquenza (Dall' Origine al XVI Secolo) Casa Editrice Francesco Vallardi, Milano, 19041938, p. 628, n.; p. 462-466. 188 Alfredo Galletti, Storia dei Generi Letterari Italiani, L'Eloquenza (Dall'Origine al XVI Secolo), Casa Editrice Francesco Vallardi, Milano, 1904-1938, pp. 462-466, who mentions in the note of p. 628 that "Parlamenta et epistulae" was published by A. Gaudenzi in his book "I nomi, le forme e le parole dell' odierno dialetto della citá di Bologna", Torino, 1889, pp. 127. 189 Published by Luigi Chiappelli, Pistoia, 1900, according to Alfredo Galletti, Storia dei Generi Letterari Italiani, L'Eloquenza (Dall'Origine al XVI Secolo), Casa Editrice Francesco Vallardi, Milano, 1904-1938, pp. 473-474, p. 629, n. 190 Published as Albertani Causidice Briaeniensis Tratactu de arte loquendi et Tacendi, appendix in Della Vita e delle Opere di Bruneto Latini, de Sundry-Renier, Firenze, 1884, pp. 475-506, according to Alfredo Galletti, Storia dei Generi Letterari Italiani, L' Eloquenza (Dall' Origine al XVI Secolo), Casa Editrice Francesco Vallardi, Milano, 1904-1938, p. 467; p. 629. The text of Ars Loquendi et Tacendi can be found on the Internet: http://freespace.virgin.net/angus.graham/Loquendi.htm; downloaded 10/23/2004. either in a conscious form or not, follows the tradition of wisdom ad eloquence transmitted from parents to children. f. The education of the Podestá During the XIII and XIV centuries, in the Italian republics, we may find the Rector Civitatis or Podestá, the maximum officer in charge of justice, administrative affairs and foreign relationships. This position emerged as that of a delegate of the emperor, but then, owing to the instability caused by the internal, political and military struggles, in the cities, it represented a compromise, an acceptable solution for all. The person holding this position had to be a noble person, from an ancient family, known to be brave, prudent and honest.191 He ended up being a foreign temporary and civil officer, usually from a friendly city, between thirty and sixty years old, responsible before the people, elected and paid for by the Commune. He had to form his own Curia of subordinate officers with foreigners: judges, notaries, chancellors and sheriffs; he would pay to all of them out of his own funds, rather than out of the Commune's. He was entrusted with passing ordinances and establishig petty fines, convening and presiding assemblies and councils, as well as over public celebrations.192 To satisfy the need to educate the Podestá and his officers a special literature (podesteril) came to light, also deriving from the ars dictaminis and the ars arengandi. The authors of the above mentioned literature mostly came from the academic world, where they devoted themselves to teaching rhetoric to those aspiring to hold positions and, upon directly addressing magistrates with theirs advices books, they became the natural political advisers to "rulers and cities".193 There were also some cases of magistrates which, from the political arena become academicians, such as the above mentioned Giovanni di Bonandrea. The three most famous works used for the education of the Podestá were: Oculus Pastoralis, Liber de Regimine Civitatum and Li Livres dou Trésor. Oculus Pastoralis The Oculus Pastoralis, an anonymous work written c 1222, was published for the first time in the XVIII century by Ludovico Muratori, who surmised that its author might have been some member of the regular clergy and later insinuated that such autorship belonged to Boncompagno.194 191 Alfredo Galletti, Storia dei Generi Letterari Italiani, L' Eloquenza (Dall' Origine al XVI Secolo), Casa Editrice Francesco Vallardi, Milano, 1904-1938, pp. 454-456; p. 454. 192 Gian Piero Bognetti, Podestá. Storia del Diritto, da Enciclopedia Italiana, Istituto Giovanni Treccani, Roma, 1935, Vol. XXVII, pp. 578-579. 193 Quentin Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, Volume One, The Renaissance, Cambridge University Press, First Published 1978, Reprinted 1979, 1980, 1988, 1990, 1992, 1994, 1996, Cambridge, 1996, p. 33. 194 Alfredo Galletti, Storia dei Generi Letterari Italiani, L' Eloquenza (Dall' Origine al XVI Secolo), Casa Editrice Francesco Vallardi, Milano, 1904-1938, p. 457. Oculus Pastoralis, Ludovico Muratori, Antiquitates Italicae Med. Aevi, 6 Vol., Milan, 1738-1742, Vol. IV, pp. 93-132, según Quentin Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, Volume One, The Rennaissance, Cambridge University Press, First Published 1978, Reprinted 1979, 1980, 1988, 1990, 1992, 1994, 1996, Cambridge, 1996, p. 264. Oculus Pastoralis, Ludovico Muratori, Antiquitates Italicae Med. Aevi, Vol. IV, Milan, 1741, repr. Bologna, 1966, pp. 93-132, according to Terence O. Tunberg, Oculus Pastoralis, PHD Thesis, University It was a sort of manual on the "perfect Podestá", in which laymen of a poor culture could find wise advices and eloquent speeches for the most important occasions that they might be involved in while in office, as it is inferred from the Prologue. It includes chapters about the wisdom of the Podestá: what he must do when, upon being elected, he arrives for the first time in the territory where he will perform his duties (Part I, Cap. III); ways, criteria and sagacity to govern in order to acquire a good reputation without offending the governed (Part II, eleven Chapters); and modesty and discipline (Part VI, Cap. V). It contains nearly twenty-three models of eloquent speeches, most of them to be used by the Podestá, but also by ambassadors, advisers and even by private citizens, as in the four that refer to war and peace.195 Liber de Regimine Civitatum Giovanni da Viterbo is the author of Liber de Regimine Civitatum,196 also a work of the XIII century. It is based on the experience he acquired as an adviser to the Podestá of Florence and his knowledge both on civil law and the Latin classics, since he used the following works as sources of his book: De Ira, De Clementia and Epistolae, by Seneca; De Officis, by Cicero; Rethorica ad Herennium; and Controversiae, by Séneca the elder or the rhetorician. It has a Prologue, where he tells that he did all the writing at nights and in the rarely free time that he had available being an adviser to the Podestá, as well as one hundred forty eight chapters. The knowledge of the Podestá is developed in Chapters CXVII-CXLVIII, which deal with the way he must behave: in front of the people and at citizens' councils; with ambassadors; with other Podestás from nearby cities; in war and peace times; in the administration of justice and finances; and with the authorities of the empire and the papacy. Eloquence is there represented by examples of official correspondence, as in Chapters XII-XXIII, as well as by speeches, some of which have the exordium written in common language and the scheme in Latin, in Chapters LVI-LVII.197 Chapter CXLI deals with law reform.198 Li Livres dou Trésor As from mid XII century to the Renaissance humanism, Oculus Pastoralis, an anonymous work, and Liber de Regimini Civitatum, by Giovanni da Viterbo, together with Parlamenti et Epistole, the two versions of the Arengae by Guido Fava or Faba, and Dicerie di Ser of Matteo de'Libri da Bologna, were studied by the young Italians who aspired to politics, first as officers of the communes and then as advisers and ministers to the Signoria.199 Furthermore, from the second half of the XIII century, there was an encyclopedic work in common language, Li Livres dou Trésor, with all the necessary knowledge for Of Toronto, 1986, p. 1, n. 1.The above mentioned thesis contains a preliminary study (pp. 1-131) and a critical edition of the Latin text, with notes (pp. 131-244). 195 Alfredo Galletti, Storia dei Generi Letterari Italiani, L' Eloquenza (Dall' Origine al XVI Secolo) Casa Editrice Francesco Vallardi, Milano, 1904-1938, p. 457, pp. 460-461. 196 Liber of Regimine Civitatum, ed. C. Salvemini, Bibliotheca Juridica Medii Aevi, ed. Augustus Gaudentius, 3 vols, Bologna, 1888-1901, Vol. 3, pp. 215-280. 197 Alfredo Galletti, Storia dei Generi Letterari Italiani. L' Eloquenza (Dall' Origine al XVI Secolo), Casa Editrice Francesco Vallardi, Milano, 1904-1938, pp. 468-473. 198 Liber de Regimine Civitatum, ed. C. Salvemini, Bibliotheca Juridica Medii Aevi, ed. Augustus Gaudentius, 3 vols, Bologna, 1888-1901, Vol. 3, pp. 278. 199 Alfredo Galletti, Storia dei Generi Letterari Italiani, L' Eloquenza (Dall' Origine al XVI Secolo) Casa Editrice Francesco Vallardi, Milano, 1904-1938, pp. 474-475. the education of those who had to rule a city. The work comprised three books: the first one, about the birth of all things; the second one, about ethics; and the third one, about rhetoric and politics.200 The author of Li Livres dou Trésor is Brunetto di Bonaccorso Latini, better known as Brunetto Latini. He was born c 1220 and he was a son of Bonnacursus Latini of Lastra, Imperiali Auctoritate Judex et Notarius. After working as notary and travelling on diplomatic missions, he returned from the French exile and, on August 20, 1267 he was appointed as official notary of the vicarial government of Florence, Dittatore del Commune. As an intellectual, he had Guido Cavalcanti and Dante, who used to call him il mio maestro, as faithful disciples. He was highly respected, since, apart from serving as an officer, he taught how to rule and speak well to the Florentine Republic. He died in 1294; his remains are buried in the crypt of the Church of Santa Maria Maggiore, in Florence, where, in one of the four columns supportig the sarcofhagus, the following inscription may be read: Sepulcrum Brunetti Latini et filiorum.201 g. The Humanists Humanism affirmed the need to join wisdom with eloquence. Three professionals rhetoricians and civil servants defended the subordination of eloquence to wisdom (Salutati), their equality (Bruni) and the superiority of eloquence (Valla). Coluccio Salutati Humanist Coluccio Salutati (1331-1405?),202 a professional rhetorician and civil servant, after working as chancellor in Lucca, and then in Florence from the year 1375 till his death,203 initiated the Florentine tradition of writers who put their culture to the service of the art of governing.204 The subordination of eloquence to wisdom fully arises from the following passage taken from Salutati's collection of letters: "The best thing is for wisdom and eloquence to join together, so that the second expounds what the first comprehends. In a contest over which was to be preferred, give the palm to wisdom. Never think it is useless, however, to give individual, especial and continued attention to eloquence. For the pursuit of eloquence is itself a duty of wisdom. Eloquence is placed under wisdom, and contained in it as in the sum of all things which can be known, so that whoever pursues wisdom necessarily pursues eloquence at the same time. Accordingly as the two can be separated by the intellect, however, eloquence is more difficult than wisdom, since rarity is a most certain evidence of difficulty in those attainments which are the products of study and 200 Li Livres dou Trésor by Brunetto Latini, Edition Critique par Francis J. Carmody, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, California, 1948, XXV-XXVI; Livre III, pp. 317-422. 201 Li Livres dou Trésor by Brunetto Latini, Edition Critique par Francis J. Carmody, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, California, 1948, Introduction, p. XIII, pp. XVIII-XX. 202 Jean Delorme, Chronologie des Civilisations, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1956, p. 434. Seigel asserts that Bruneto Latini died in 1406: Jerrold E. Seigel, Rhetoric and Philosophy in Rennaissance Humanism, The Union of Eloquence and Wisdom, from Petrach to Valla, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, p. 65. 203 Jerrold E. Seigel, Rhetoric and Philosophy in Rennaissance Humanism, The Union of Eloquence and Wisdom, from Petrach to Valla, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, pp. 64-65. 204 Emilio Santini, Enciclopedia Italiana, Istituto Giovanni Treccani, Roma, 1930, Vol. VII, Bruni, Leonardo, p. 974. industry, and which we obtain through effort. Let it be added that the intention, zeal, and opportunity for speaking well spurs us in the desire to know; so that the pursuit of eloquence is a means to the end of seeking wisdom. For nothing can be well said which is not most perfectly known. We can know many things, however, which we do not know how to say clearly and with the required ornament or grandeur of speech.Therefore eloquence, with its connection to the pursuit of wisdom, ought especially to be studied."205 Leonardo Bruni Leonardo Bruni (1379-1444), also known as "The Aretino", was a disciple of Coluccio Salutati and, on his recommendation and on that of Poggio Bracciolini's, he served as Secretary for the papal Curia from 1405 to 1410, and during 1410 he acted for a few months as Chancellor of Florence, a position which he reasumed in 1427, upon succeeding his teacher, and held until 1444, when he died.206 He was one of the most important figures of humanism in the times of Cosimo di Medicis. He spread the classics, specially from the Greek culture, translated Demosthenes, Aeschines, Xenophon, Plutarch, Plato and Aristotle; he also wrote in Latin, but defended the use of the common language and was a famous historian. Due to his knowledge and experience on governmental issues, his opinions were rarely contradicted in the Consiglio della Signoria. Solemn funerals were held in his name and his mortal remains are buried in Della Santa Croce Church, Florence, in a mausoleum built by Bernardo Rossalino, which may still be admired.207 Unlike Salutati, who by the end of his life subordinated eloquence to wisdom, Bruni neither criticized rhetoric nor doubted its harmonic relation to philosophy throughout his career, and kept a positive attitude towards continuing the union of wisdom and eloquence unscathed.208 Lorenzo Valla Lorenzo Valla (1407-1457), a disciple of Leonardo Bruni, was the most famous humanist of the first half of the XV century; he exemplified the spirit of free investigation and independence typical of the Renaissance and set the foundations of philology and historical criticism.209 Valla, unlike Bruni, who defended the harmonic equality between wisdom and eloquence, subordinated the ancient philosophy and the scholasticism to rhetoric, in line with his intention to take the defence of eloquence against its slanderers.210 205 Jerrold E. Seigel, Rhetoric and Philosophy in Renaissance Humanism, The Union of Eloquence and Wisdom, from Petrarch to Valla, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, pp. 83-84. 206 Jerrold E. Seigel, Rhetoric and Philosophy in Rennaissance Humanism, The Union of Eloquence and Wisdom, from Petrach to Valla, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, pp. 99-100. 207 Jerrold E. Seigel, Rhetoric and Philosophy in Rennaissance Humanism, The Union of Eloquence and Wisdom, from Petrach to Valla, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, p. 136. Emilio Santini, Bruni, Leonardo, Enciclopedia Italiana, Istituto Giovanni Treccani, Rome, 1930, VII, p. 974. 208 Jerrold E. Seigel, Rhetoric and Philosophy in Rennaissance Humanism, The Union of Eloquence and Wisdom, from Petrach to Valla, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, p. 98; p. 103. 209 Jerrold E. Seigel, Rhetoric and Philosophy in the Rennaissance Humanism, The Union of Eloquence and Wisdom, from Petrach to Fence, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, p. 137. 210 Jerrold E. Seigel, Rhetoric and Humanism, The Union of Eloquece and Wisdom, from Petrach to Valla, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, pp. 137-139.  "Philosophy is like a soldier or tribune under the command of oratory, the queen, as a great tragedian calls it," wrote Valla".211 The next Chapter will deal with the Modern and Contemporary History of the art of legislation. 211 On the True Good, Scritti [Filosofici e Religiosi, Firenze, 1953], pp. 30-31; Opera [Torino, 1962], pp. 906-907: "Siquidem philosophia velut miles est aut tribunus sub imperatrice oratione, et ut magnus quidem Tragicus appellat, regina", above transcription and this note from Jerrold E. Seigel, Rhetoric and Humanism, The Union of Eloquence and Wisdom, from Petrach to Valla, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, p. 142, according to bibliographical information in n. 1 of p. 138 of his book. Chapter III Modern and Contemporary History 1. Modern history From modern history, the following authors will be remembered: Bacon, for his disquisition on the certainty of laws and rhetorical investigation (inventio); Hopper, for constructing a general juridical theory of legislation and recognizing the importance of rhetoric for law professionals; Montesquieu, for making a rich source of argumentations out of a single book; Mably, for strongly pointing out the importance of the study of passions (pathos); and Filangieri, for developing such study. a. Bacon Here the humanist officer reappears, the son of an officer, as the oriental scribe used to be. Nicholas Bacon, Francis's father, was a famous Adviser to Queen Elizabeth and Lord Keeper of the Great Seal for more than twenty years in charge, until he died.212 An act of Parliament declared that Lord Keeper of the Great Seal had Lord Chancellor's same rights and duties to avoid doubts about Nicholas Bacon's authority. Francis Bacon (1561-1626), like his progenitor, held the office of Lord Keeper of the Greaçt Seal, but he overcame him in the bureaucratic and political career, since he was formally appointed Lord Chancellor, both offices fulfilled under James I. As for dignities, he was first Knight, then Baron of Verulam and finally Viscount of Saint Alban, until he lost them all for being a self-confessed corrupt (1621).213 He was a great orator in the Courts of Justice, in his capacity as attorney-at-law, prosecutor or judge, and also for a long time in the House of Commons, barely as a member of the opposition party, but most times as a member of the government party, all of this under the reigns of Elizabeth I and James I. In order to keep him as a representative, the above mentioned House (1613) granted him the right to remain a member, in spite of having been appointed Attorney General, since both positions could not be held at the same time.214 With Francis Bacon the deliberative genre of rhetoric was reborn, after one thousand six hundred years of silence.215 Ben Jonson (1573-1637) said in this regard: 212 Dr. Rawley's Life of Bacon, in The Works of Francis Bacon, Popular Edition, based upon The Complete Edition of Spedding, Ellis, and Heath, I. Philosophical Writings, Houghton, Mifflin and Company, The University Press, Cambridge, Boston, p. 55. Charles de Rémusat, Bacon sa Vie, son Temps, sa Philosophie, et son Influence Jusque a Nos Jours, Didier et Ce., Libraires Éditeurs, Paris, 1858, p. 8. 213 Dr. Rawley's Life of Bacon, The Life of the Honourable Author, in The Works of Francis Bacon, Popular Edition, Based upon The Complete Edition of Spedding, Ellis, and Heath, I. Philosophical Writings, Houghton, Mifflin and Company, The University Press, Cambridge, Boston, p. 42; p. 43, n.2. Charles de Rémusat, Bacon sa Vie, son Temps, sa Philosophie, et son Influence Jusque a Nos Jours, Didier et Ce., Libraires Éditeurs, Paris, 1858, pp. 102-121. 214 Bacon, Oeuvres Philosophiques de Bacon, Publiées d'Après les Textes Originaux, avec Notice, Summaires et Éclaircissemens, par M. N. Bouillet, Tome I, Librairie Classique et Élémentaire de L. Hachette, Notice sur Bacon, Tome I, Paris 1834, p. XXI. 215 George A. Kennedy, Classical Rhetoric and its Christian and Secular Tradition from Ancient to Modern Times, The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1980, p. 216. "Yet there happened in my time one noble speaking, who was full of gravity in his speaking. His language (where he could spare or pass by a jest) was nobly censorious. No man ever spoke more neatly, more pressly, more weightily, or suffered less emptiness, less idleness, in what he uttered. No member of his speech but consisted of his own graces. His hearers could not cough, or look aside from him, without loss. He commanded where he spoke; and had his judges angry and pleased at his devotion. No man had their affections more in his power. The fear of every man that heard him was, lest he should make an end."216 In addition to having been a great orator, he is one of the first English classic writers,217 to such an extent that some polemicists consider him as the author of Shakespeare's works and his books are still being re-edited today. If this mastery of the spoken and written prose is hard to find, it is even harder to believe that he had also written about rhetoric and influenced its historical development, following Cicero's precedent.218 From the point of view of his contributions to rhetoric in general, he extended the stage of invention or investigation, included the forms and the promptuary along with the topics, and expanded the use of the colours of good and evil to dress the valid arguments as well as the sophistic arguments, as it will be discussed in detail in Chapter V of this book. Although owing to his lack of wisdom he committed the offense that led him to end his career and be criminal punished, his vast experience in official affairs and his intellectual capacity, together with his eloquence as orator and writer, bloomed in works where he could show his political wisdom, such as in both versions of his Advice to Villiers, on his performance as King's Favorite,219 and in The Essayes or Counsels, Civil and Moral.220 He had a lot of experience in the art of legislation, both as regards the composition and the criticism of general juridical norms, which can be verified, between with these examples, amongst others: the criticism of a Criminal Code bill221 and the composition 216 Dr. Rawley's Life of Bacon, The Life of the Honourable Author, The Works of Francis Bacon, Popular Edition, Based upon The Complete Edition of Spedding, Ellis, and Heath, I. Philosophical Writings, Houghton, Mifflin and Company, The University Press, Cambridge, Boston, p. 50, n. 1. 217 [Bacon], Oeuvres Philosophiques de Bacon, Publiées d'Après les Textes Originaux, avec Notice, Summaires et Éclaircissemens, par M. N. Bouillet, Tome I, Librairie Classique et Élémentaire de L. Hachette, Notice sur Bacon, Tome I, Paris 1834, p. X. 218 As regards his contribution to rhetoric, see: Karl R. Wallace, Francis Bacon on Communication & Rhetoric or: The Art of Applying Reason to Imagination for the Better Moving of the Will, The University of North Carolina Press, Chappel Hill, Chapter Twelve, Bacon's Contribution, pp. 205-218; Chapter Thirteen, Bacon and Post-Elizabethan Rhetorical Theory, pp. 219-227. He holds that what Bacon said about rhetoric was not so new as it had sometimes been presented: Thomas M. Conley, Rhetoric in The European Tradition, Longman, New York & London, 1990, p. 164. 219 Francis Bacon, Advice to Villers, in The Works of Francis Bacon, Volume XIII, The Letters and Life, Volume VI, Works of Francis Bacon, Collected and Edited by James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis, and Douglas Denon Heath, Longmans, Green, Reader, and Dyer, London, 1872, pp. 13-26; pp. 27-56. 220 Francis Bacon, in The Works of Francis Bacon, Popular Edition, based upon the Complete Edition of Spedding, Ellis, and Heath, II. Literary and Religious Works, Houghton, Mifflin and Company, The University Press, Cambridge, Boston, Part II, 281 pp. 221 Francis Bacon, A Certificate to His Majesty Touching the Projects of S. Stephen Proctor relating to the Penal Law (1608), dans Oeuvres Philosophiques de Bacon, Publiées d'Après les Textes Originaux, avec Notice, Sommaires et Éclaircissemens, par M. N. Bouillet, Tome I, Librairie Classique et Élémentaire de L. Hachette, Notice sur Bacon, Tome I, Paris 1834, p. XX, n. 3. of the Procedural Ordinances of the Chancery, when he was in charge of it.222 A long permanence in Parliament, as well as his positions as Adviser, Keeper of the Great Seal and Chancellor, gave him frequent opportunities to counsel or discounsel general juridical norms. He projected a Digest of the Laws of England, which he failed to achieve, but from his effort223 the following works emerged: Maxims of the Law, Proposal for Amending the Laws of England, De Diversis Regulis Juris, De Dignitate et Augmentis Scientiarum, from which the well-known "Justitia Universalis sive of Fontibus Juris" was taken (Book VIII, Chapter 3, final part).224 In his book The Advancement of Learning, published in 1605, he observed: "Notwithstanding, for the more public part of government, which is Laws, I Think good to note only one deficiency; which is, that all those who have written of laws, have written either as philosophers or as lawyers, and none one as statesman. As for the philosophers, they make imaginary laws for imaginary commonwealths; and their discourses are as the stars, which give little light because their are so high. For the lawyers, they write according to the states where they live, what is received law, and not what ought to be the law: for the wisdom of the lawmaker is one, and of a lawyer is another."225 In the Latin version of the above-mentioned work, notably ammended and augmented, which was published in 1623, under the title De Dignitate et Augmentis Scientiarum, he divided the civil knowledge into three parts, in accordance with three succinct actions of a society: to converse, to negotiate and to govern. Legislating is a part of the wisdom to rule or the wisdom of the State,226 an activity for which he enunciated the following PRINCIPLES: 222 A considerable number of these Ordinances were his, because of his intention to purify the Chancellery. Among the ones that belong to him, the Hundred Rules of Court established the practical issues and made a defined Court of Justice, under an organized Government, not just a mere Court of Conscience, with erratic measurements of equity in a disordered and gracious way. James E. G. de Montmorency, Francis Bacon, Baron of Verulam, in Great Jurist of the World, Edited by Sir John Macdonell and Edward Mason, with an Introduction by Van Vechten Veeder, with Portraits, Little, Brown, and Company, Boston, 1914, p. 155; pp. 167-168. 223 James E. G. de Montmorency, Francis Bacon, Baron of Verulam, in Great Jurist of the World, Edited by Sir John Macdonell and Edward Mason, with an Introduction by Van Vechten Veeder, with Portraits, Little, Brown, and Company, Boston, 1914, pp. 151-153. 224 Francis Bacon, Of the Dignity and Advancement of Learning, Book VIII, Chapter III, Example of a Treatise on Universal Justice or the Fountains of Equity, by Aphorisms: one Title of it, in Works of Francis Bacon, Collected and Edited by James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis, Douglas Denon Heath, Volume V, Translations of the Philosophical Works, Vol. II, New Edition, Longman & Co. etc, London 1889, pp. 88-110. Francis Bacon, De Dignitate et Augmentis Scientiarum, dans Oeuvres Philosophiques de Bacon, Publiées d'Aprés les Textes Originaux, avec Notice, Sommaires et Éclaircissemens, par M. N. Bouillet, Librairie Classique et Élémentaire de L. Hachette, Tome I, Paris 1834, pp. 438-474. Francis Bacon, Essai d'un Traité sur la Justicie Universelle ou les Sources du Droit, latin-français, J. B. De Vauzelles, Chez B. Wareé, Paris, 1824. 225 Francis Bacon, The Advancement of Learning, Second Book, in The Works of Francis Bacon, Popular Edition, Based upon The Complete Edition of Spedding, Ellis, and Heath, I. Philosophical Writings, Part III, Houghton, Mifflin and Company, The University Press, Cambridge, Boston, p. 389. Francis Bacon, The Advancement of Learning and New Atlantis, with a Preface by Thomas Case, Oxford University Press, London, 1906, reprinted 1913, 1929, 1944; reset 1951, reprinted 1956, 1960, pp. 236237. 226 Francis Bacon, The Advancement of Learning, Second Book, in The Works of Francis Bacon, Popular Edition, Based upon The Complete Edition of Spedding, Ellis, and Heath, I. Philosophical "7. But Before I proceed to the actual body of particular laws, I will take a brief survey of the virtues and dignities of law in general. That the law may be set down as good, which is certain in meaning, just in precept, convenient in execution, agreeable to the form of government, and productive of virtue in those that live under it."227 Out of all these principles, regrettably, he only developed the one related to certainty. In spite of that, it was a very important milestone in the historical continuity of the art of legislation, since he also followed the wisdom and eloquence of classic tradition to write it. It represented progress because, although some of his predecessors had included the art of legislation in the art of government, he adopted the practical point of view of the experienced and reasonable statesman, thus managing to write a small great work about certainty, in ninety-seven aphorisms,228 with a depth, scope and elegance never seen before in ancient or contemporary philosophers, politicians and lawyers. Since then, this work has been a mandatory reference for posterity. b. Hopper Jochim Hopper (1523-1576) was born in Sneek, Friesland. Following his solid juridical and humanistic education, he devoted himself to teaching until 1554, when he left the academic life and engaged in politics under the Spanish crown, an activity that he developed in The Netherlands and in Madrid, where he died.229 Writings, Part III, Houghton, Mifflin and Company, The University Press, Cambridge, Boston, p. 348; pp. 389-391. Francis Bacon, The Advancement of Learning and New Atlantis, with to Preface by Thomas Case, Oxford University Press, The Advancement of Learning, The Second Book, Chapter XXIII, 2; 49, London, 1906, reprinted 1913,1929, 1944; reset 1951, reprinted 1956, 1960, p. 206; pp. 236-238. Francis Bacon, Of the Dignity and Advancement of Learning, Book VIII, Chapter I, in Works of Francis Bacon, Collected and Edited by James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis, Douglas Denon Heath, Volume. V, Translations of The Philosophical Works, Vol. II, New Edition, Longman and Co. etc, London 1889, London, 1889, p. 32. Francis Bacon, De Dignitate et Augmentis Scientiarum, Liber Octavus, Caput I, dans Oeuvres Philosophiques of Bacon, Publiées d'après they Textes Originaux, avec Notice, Sommaires et Éclaircissemens, pair M. N. Bouillet, Takes I, Librairie Classique et Élémentaire of L. Hachette, Takes I, Paris 1834, p. 386. 227 Francis Bacon, Of The Dignity And Advancement of Learning, Book VIII, Chapter III, Example of a Treatise on Universal Justice or the Fountains of Equity, by Aphorisms: one Title of it, Aphorism 7, in Works of Francis Bacon, Collected And Edited By James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis, Douglas Denon Heath, Vol. V, Translations of The Philosophical Works, Vol. II, New Edition, Longman & Co. etc, London 1889, pp. 89-90. Francis Bacon, Essai d'un Traité sur la Justicie Universelle ou les Sources du Droit, latin-français, J. B. De Vauzelles, Chez B. Wareé, Paris, 1824, Aphorisme 7, p. 47. Francis Bacon, De Dignitate et Augmentis Scientiarum, Liber Octavus, Caput III, dans Oeuvres Philosophiques de Bacon, Publiées d'après les Textes Originaux, avec Notice, Summaires et Éclaircissemens, Par M. N. Bouillet, Tome I, Librairie Classique et Élémentaire de L. Hachette, Tome I, Paris 1834, Aphorismus VII, pp. 452-453, text in Latin. 228 Francis Bacon, Of The Dignity and Advancement of Learning, Book VIII, Chapter III, Example of to Universal Treatise on Justice or the Fountains of Equity, by Aphorisms: one Title of it, in Works of Francis Bacon, Collected and Edited By James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis, Douglas Denon Heath, Vol. V, Translations of The Philosophical Works, Vol. II, New Edition, Longman and Co. etc, London, 1889, pp. 88-110. 229 Manuel Jesús Rodríguez Puerto, La Modernidad Discutida (Iurisprudentia frente a isunaturalismo en el siglo XVI), Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Cádiz [1998], XI + 470 pp, pp. 45-46. Out of the twelve books composing his main work, Seduardus,230 dedicated to Phillip II, the first four deal with nomothesia, "a civil and regal art, which by means of laws and rights induces the republic and men to justice", 231 subdivided in turn into a theoretical part dedicated to the most general concepts of law, and a practical part dedicated to legislation making. He created a "general theory of legislation" from a technical and juridical conception, not merely political, something unusual in his time, and he also acknowledged the importance of rhetoric for law professionals.232 Those who be willing to learn about Hoppers' nomothesia in more detail may consult, in addition to the book by Rodriguez Puerto, the following work: Nomothesia sive de Iuris et Legum condendarum scientia, Versuch einer Bearbeitung der Bücher I-IV der Werkes "Seduardus sive de vera iurisprudentia" von Joachim Hopper (1523-1576), Dissertation, vorgelegt der Johannes Gutenberg Universitãt in Mainz, von Regierungsrat Paul Schäaus Mainz, Referent: Professor Dr. Th. Viehweg, Korreferent: Profesor Dr. P. Noll, Tag der mündlichen Prüfung: 21, febrar 1967, XXXI + 416 pp + X pp. c. Montesquieu Charles Louis de Secondat, Baron de la Brède et de Montesquieu (1689-1755), a provincial magistrate, position which he had inherited from his uncle and then sold legally, a successful writer, an habitué of the great Parisian literary lounges, managed to became a memeber of the Academy of France.233 Without any political experience or a significant juridical education, in spite of his university studies and judicial activities,234 as fruit of a solitary investigation and personal reflection during twenty years,235 in 1748 he published De l'Esprit des Lois (The Spirit of the Laws), a work that caused sensation and, although included in the Index of Prohibited Books of the Catholic Church,236 became a great political, juridical and philosophical outstanding classic. Before its publication, the work already had its detractors, such as the famous Marquess D'Argenson (1694-1757), the Secretary of State of Luis XV, who affirmed: "It is said that he aspires and prepares himself to publish finally his great work on the laws. I already know some fragments that, supported by the reputation of the author, cannot but increase it. But I am afraid that the whole work is insufficient, and that there 230 Seduardus, sive de Vera Iurisprudentia, ad Regem, libri XII. Nempe: Nomothesia, sive de Iuris & Legum Condendarum Scientia, Libri IIII. Rerum Divinarum et Humanorum, sive de Iure Civili Publico, Libri IIII. Ad Pandectas, sive de Iure Civili Privato, Libri IIII, Adiectus est eiusdem Auctoris De Institutione Principis Liber Singularis, Antuerpiae, in Officina Plantiniana, Apud Viduam, et Ioanem Moretum, 1590, 231 Manuel Jesús Rodríguez Puerto, La Modernidad Discutida (Iurisprudentia frente a isunaturalismo en el siglo XVI), Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Cádiz [1998], p. 361, text and note 489. 232 Manuel Jesús Rodríguez Puerto, La Modernidad Discutida (Iurisprudentia frente a isunaturalismo en el siglo XVI), Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Cádiz [1998], p. 361, text and note 489. 233 Montesquieu, Penseés, Le Spicilege, Édition Établie par Louis Desgraves, Chronologie, Édition Robert Laffont S.A., Paris, 1991, p. 122. 234 The education received at the University of Bordeux was not the most effective one, because of the deficiences of the faculty; he was not a great magistrate either, see: Robert Shackleton, Montesquieu, A Critical Biography, Oxford University Press, 1961, p. 8; p. 18. 235 Montesquieu, De l'Esprit des Lois, Texte Établi et Présenté par Jean Brethe de la Gressaye, Société les Belles Lettres, Tome Premier, Préface, Paris, 1950, p. 11. 236 Robert Shackleton, Montesquieu, A Critical Biography, Oxford University Press, 1961, pp. 370-377; p. 375. are many pleaseant chapters to read, many ingenious and seductive ideas, other than real and useful instructions on the way in which laws should be written and understood. Nevertheless, this is the book that we should but do not still have, although much has been written so far on this matter. We have good institutes from the Roman civil law, some fairly good from French law, But we do not have anything of the general and universal public law. We have nothing from the spirit of the laws, and I strongly doubt that my friend, president Montesquieu, may give us one that could serve as a compass to every legislator in the world. I admit he has all the possible spirit. He has acquired most grasslands [sic] [a vast] knowledge, both in his trips and in his retreats to the country. But I predict, once again, that he will not give us the book that we should have, even though we may find in the one that he is writing many deep ideas, new thoughts, surprising images, the splendor of the spirit, genius and a multitude of curious facts, which application, yet, may imply more taste than study."237 While the first edition of the book De l'Esprit des Lois, under the care of Jacob Vernet was beeing printed in Geneva, at Jacques Barrilot's publishing house, Montesquieu added238 Book XXIX, "De la Manière de Composer les Lois" (How to Compose Laws), which Chapter XVI, entitled "Choses à Observer dans la Composition des Lois" (Issues to Bear in Mind while Composing Laws), contains some rules to write laws.239 237 "On prétend qu'il (Montesquieu) se prépare enfin a publier son grand ouvrage sur les lois. J'en connais déja quelques morceaux, qui soutenus par la réputation de l'auteur, ne peuvent que l'augmenter. Mais je crains bien que l'ensamble n'y manque, et qu'il n'y ait plus de chapitres agréables a lire, plus d'idées ingenieuses et séduisantes, que de véritables et utiles instructions sur la façon dont on devrait rédiger les lois et les entendre. C'est pourtant là le livre qu'il nous faudrait, et qui nous manque encore, quoiqu'on ait dejá écrit sur cette matière. Nous avons de bons instituts de droit civil romain, nous en avons de passables de droit francais; mais nous n'en avons absolument point de droit public universel. Nous n'avons point l'esprit des lois et je doute fort que mon ami le président de Montesquieu, nous en donne un qui puisse servir de guide et de bussole à tous les législateurs du monde. Je le connais tout l'esprit possible. Il a acquis les connaissances les plus pastes [sic], tant dans ces voyages que dans ces retraites à la campagne. Mais je prédis encore une fois qui'il ne nous donnera pas le livre qui nous manque, quoique l'on doive trouver dans celui qu'il prépare beaucoup des idées profondes, des pensées neuves, d'images frappantes, de saillies d'esprit et de génie, et une multitude de faits curieux, dont l'aplication suppose encore plus de goût que de l'etude." Sir Courtenay Ilbert, Montesquieu, in Great Jurists of the World, Edited by Sir John Macdonell and Edward Mason, with an Introduction by Van Vechten Veeder, with Portraits, Little, Brown, and Company, Boston, 1914, pp. 433-434, n. 1, Memoires du Marquis d'Argenson (ed. 1825), pp. 430-431, text reproduced above. See also: Mémoires et Journal Inédit du Marquis D Argenson, Ministre des Affaires Étrangers sous Louisa XV, Publiés et Annotés par M. le Marquis D Àrgenson, Paris, 1858, Tome V, pp. 89-90., Kraus Reprint, Nendeln/Liechtenstein, 1979, online: www.gallica.bnr.fr. 238 Robert Shackleton, Montesquieu, A Critical Biography, Oxford University Press, 1961, p. 241. 239 Against the above mentioned rules: Destutt de Tracy, in a book comprising all The Spirit, which he wrote for Thomas Jefferson, where he included an unpublished Condorcet text with regard to Book XXIX, Commentaire sur l'Esprit Des Lois, Paris, Madame Lévi, Libraire, 1828, De Tracy, pp. 356-357; Condorcet, pp. 360-391, especially with regard to the Chapter XVI, pp. 376-377. In favour of the above mentioned rules: François Geny, with a transcription of some aphorisms extracted from the mentioned Chapter XVI, in La Technique législative dans la Codification civile moderne (à propos du Centenaire du Code Civil), Le Code Civil 1804-1904, Livre du Centenaire Publiée par La Societé d'Etudes Législatives, Arthur Rousseau, Éditeur, Paris, 1904, Tome Second, pp. 1005-1006. A lot has been and will still be argued on the merit of Montesquieu's masterpiece. Nevertheless, while critics keep on debating its virtues and defects, well-informed legislators and advisers find in the above mentioned work a great variety of wise and eloquent argumentations to compose and criticize, counsel and discounsel general juridical norms. There, in the same book, a rich source of inspiration is available, which consists in abundant rhetorical syllogisms, political maxims and historical examples, but difficult to remember, due to the lacking of a systematical order allowing for its opportune use. Thus, Montesquieu showed the desire that led him to write The Spirit of the Laws: "If I could act in a way that those who are in charge increased their knowledge about what they must prescribe, and that those who obey found a new pleasure in obeying, I would believe to be myself the happiest of mortals."240 Next, some passages written by Montesquieu are transcribed. Reasonableness of the prescriptions: "Law, in general, is human reason, inasmuch as it governs all the people of the Earth; and the political and civil laws of each nation ought to be only particular cases to which this human reason is applied."241 Political maxims: They are spread throughout his entire work, due to his stylistic tendency towards the use of epigrams. "Many things govern men: [... among them] the government maxims [...]."242 240 "Si je pouvais faire en sorte que ceux qui commandent augmentassent leurs connoissances sur ce qu'ils doivent prescrire, et que ceux qui obéissent trouvassent un nuveau plaisir à obéir, je me croirais le plus heureux des mortels." Montesquieu, De L'Esprit Des Lois, Avec des notes de Voltaire, de Crevier, de Mably, de la Harpe, etc., Nouvelle Édition Revue sur les Meilleurs Textes, Suivie De La Défense De L'Esprit Des Lois par L'Auteur, Paris, Garnier Frères, Libraires-Éditeurs, without date, Préface, p. II, text reproduced above. See also: Montesquieu, De l'Esprit des Lois, Texte Établi et Présenté par Jean Brethe de la Gressaye, Société Les Belles Lettres, Tome Premier, Préface, Paris, 1950, p. 12. 241 "La loi, en général, est la raison humaine, en tant qu'elle gouverne tous les peuples de la terre; et les lois politiques et civiles de chaque nation ne doivent être que les cas particuliers où s'applique cette raison humaine." Montesquieu, De L'Esprit Des Lois, Avec des notes de Voltaire, de Crevier, de Mably, de la Harpe, etc., Nouvelle Édition Revue sur les Meilleurs Textes, Suivie De La Défense De L'Esprit Des Lois par L'Auteur, Paris, Garnier Frères, Libraires-Éditeurs, without date, Livre I, Chapitre III, p. 8, text reproduced above. See also: Montesquieu, De l'Esprit des Lois, Texte Établi et Présenté par Jean Brethe de la Gressaye, Société Les Belles Lettres, Tome Premier, Livre Premier, Chapitre III, Paris, 1950, p. 44. 242 "Plusieurs choses choses gouvernent les hommes [...] les maximes du gouvernement [...]" Montesquieu, De L'Esprit Des Lois, Avec des notes de Voltaire, de Crevier, de Mably, de la Harpe, etc., Nouvelle Édition Revue sur les Meilleurs Textes, Suivie De La Défense De L'Esprit Des Lois par L'Auteur, Paris, Garnier Frères, Libraires-Éditeurs, without date, Livre XIX, Chapitre IV, p. 275, text reproduced above. See also: "In any magistracy it is necessary to compensate the magnitude of power with the brevity of its duration."243 Historical examples, although the accuracy of some of them has been questioned, serve as imaginary examples, where historical truth fails. Fables are considered as such in the rhetorical tradition, since they are not introduced as sophisms, to cheat knowingly, but to teach with hypothetical special cases in political speeches, given the scarce number of examples on real similar cases.244 In spite of the strong criticism that he received in his time, posterity could not avoid praising the eloquence showed in Montesquieu's book, as Ilbert once wrote: "The leading definitions are loose and vague; the treatment is unmethodical and uncritical; half the statements of facts are inaccurate; half the inferences are mere guesses. And yet it changed the thought of the world. What is the explanation of this paradox? Much, no doubt, was due to charm of style. If you want to be read, still more if you want to be widely read, you must be readable. In Montesquieu's time, books on political and legal science were, as a rule, unreadable. But the Spirit of Laws was, and still is, an eminently readable book. No one before Montesquieu had dealt so lively and brillant a manner with the dry subject of laws and political institutions."245 Chevalier D'Aydie, a friend of Montesquieu's, predicted that The Spirit of the Laws: "[...] will contribute to make kings, ministers and people wiser in the future [...]"246 Montesquieu, De l'Esprit des Lois, Texte Établi et Présenté par Jean Brethe de la Gressaye, Société Les Belles Lettres, Tome Troisième, Livre Dix-neuvième, Chapitre IV, Paris, 1958, p. 7. 243 "Dans toute magistrature, il faut compenser la grandeur de la puissance par la brièveté de sa durée": Montesquieu, De L'Esprit Des Lois, Avec des notes de Voltaire, de Crevier, de Mably, de la Harpe, etc., Nouvelle Édition Revue sur les Meilleurs Textes, Suivie De La Défense De L'Esprit Des Lois par L'Auteur, Paris, Garnier Frères, Libraires-Éditeurs, without date, Livre II, Chapitre III, p. 15, text reproduced above. See also: Montesquieu, De l'Esprit des Lois, Texte Établi et Présenté Par Jean Brethe de la Gressaye, Société Les Belles Lettres, Tome Premier, Livre Deuxième, Chapitre III, Paris, 1950, p. 44. 244 Aristotle, Rhetoric, 1394a. Aristotle, Rhetoric, 1394a, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation, Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume Two, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing 1985, p. 2220. Aristóteles, Retórica, 1394a, Introducción, Traducción y Notas por Quintín Racionero, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1990, p. 408. Aristote Rhétorique, Livre Premier, 1394a, Texte Etabli et Traduit par Médéric Dufour, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Paris, 1932, p. 106. Aristotele, Retorica, 1394a, a cura di Armando Plebe, Editore Laterza, Bari, 1961, p. 133. 245 Sir Courtenay Ilbert, Montesquieu, in Great Jurists of the World, Edited by Sir John Macdonell and Edward Mason, with an Introduction by Van Vechten Veeder, with Portraits, Little, Brown, And Company, Boston, 1914, p. 431. 246 "[...] contribuera à rendre, à l'avenir, les rois, les ministres et les peuples plus sages [...]", dans Louis Desgraves, Introduction, dans Montesquieu, Penseés, Le Spicilège, Édition Établie par Louis Desgraves, Chronologie, Édition Robert Laffont S.A., Paris, 1991, p. 96. d. Mably Abbot De Mably (1709-1785), brother of Condillac's, the philosopher, who was also an abbot, met Montesquieu at Madame de Tencin's literary lounge. Either due to a desire to emulate or to an independence of judgment, as Montesquieu had published in the 1734 Considérations sur les Causes de la Grandeur des Romains et de leur Décadence (Considerations on the Causes of the Greatness of the Romans and their Decline), Mably's first work was published in 1740, Paralèlle des Romains et des Français par Rapport au Gouvernement (Parallel between the Romans and the French with Regard to Government).Thus, De l'Esprit des Lois first appeared in 1748, Mably's De la Législation ou Principes des Lois (On the Legislation or Principles of the Laws) appeared in 1776.247 Montesquieu, upon describing what the spirit of the laws was consisting, had said: "They must be related to the physical [aspect] of the country, the freezing, torrid or moderate climate; the quality of the territory, its situation, its extension, the genre of life of its peoples, farmers, hunters or shepherds: they must be related to the degree of freedom that the Constitution can support; the religion of the inhabitants, their inclinations, their wealth, their number, their commerce, their customs, their ways of behaving. Anyway, they relate to each other; to their origin, to the purpose of the legislator, to the order of things on which they are established. It is within the framework of all these points of view that it is necessary to consider them.This is what I begin to do in this work. I will examine all these relations: they all form what is known as the SPIRIT OF THE LAWS."248 Without mentioning Montesquieu, Mably said: "On the contrary, a pretended philosophy, upon taking what is done out of senselessness in the world as the rule of what should be done, has come to help ours prejudices, and has given them who knows what reason to eternize its empire.The chatterboxes have flattered our caprices; and, willing to teach us before even overcoming their own ignorance, their beautiful spirit could not have given them anything more than sophisms that we have taken as truths, and we go lost with method. They have not descended in any way inside our heart; they have not studied in any way our passions; it is within things, so to speak, outside men, that they have looked for the laws and the establishments that should make society happy. If they should be believed, the 247 M. Villemain, Cours de Litérature Française, A. Jamar, Éditeur, Bruxelles, 1840, Tableau du DixHuitième Siècle, Première Partie, 1827, Dix Septième Leçon, p. 155. 248 "Elles doivent être relatives au physique du pays, au climat, glacé, brûlant o temperé; à la qualité du terrain, à sa situation, à sa grandeur, au genre de vie de ses peuples, laboreurs, chasseurs ou pasteurs: elles doivent se rapporter au degré de liberté que la constitution peut souffrir; à la réligion des habitants; à leurs inclinations, à leur richesses, à leur nombre, à leur commerce, à leurs moeurs, à leurs manières. Enfin, elles ont des rapports entre elles; elles en ont avec leur origine, avec l'objet du législateur, avec l'ordre des choses sur lesquelles sont établies. C'est dans toutes ces vues qu'il faut les considérer. Montesquieu, De L'Esprit Des Lois, Avec des notes de Voltaire, de Crevier, de Mably, de la Harpe, etc., Nouvelle Édition Revue sur les Meilleurs Textes, Suivie De La Défense De L'Esprit Des Lois par L'Auteur, Paris, Garnier Frères, Libraires-Éditeurs, Livre I, Chapitre III, without date, p. 8, text reproduced above. See also: C'est ce que je entreprends de faire dans cet ouvrage. J'examinerai tous ces rapports: ils forment tous ensamble ce que l'on appelle l'ESPRIT DES LOIS." Montesquieu, De l'Esprit des Lois, Texte Établi et Présenté par Jean Brethe de la Gressaye, Société les Belles Lettres, Tome Premier, Livre Premier, Chapitre III, Paris, 1950, p. 26. providence has made different types of happiness for the ancient and for us; for Asia, Africa, America and Europe.They will seriously say to you that the good laws in the tenth grade of latitude, are no longer valuable any more under the thirtieth degree; truthfully: shouldn't a legislator consult the affections of our heart rather than a thermometer, to know what to order or prohibit? Are plains, mountains, a drier, more humid, more or less fertile soil, the neighborhood of the sea or a big coast, and hundreds of similar geographical features important to decide what the most suitable laws to make man happy are? Does the nature of climates change the nature of their heart? Are the same needs not everywhere, the same organs, the same senses, the same inclinations, the same passions and the same reason? Are the attraction for pleasure and fear of pain not the motives of our thoughts and of our actions? Are they not everywhere equaly bound to cheat the desire we have to be happy? Under the Equator as well as under the Pole, inside the plains and the valleys as in the mountains, does each of our senses not open our soul for a hundred different passions? Which are the soils favored by the sky where avarice, ambition, indolence and voluptuousness cannot germinate? Within which climates will these poisoned plants grow with impunity? Within a certain place, our passions will be more imperious, and within other one they will be more disciplinables; there they will be exposed to more frequent temptations; here particular features will slow down development and progress, and I consent to all that you wish to say about the power of climates. But these passions everywhere are not the source of our happiness or of our unhappiness, depending on whether they are well or badly regulated? Everywhere they have the need of a brake and a driver, the law must begin by straightening them up. But this great art of governing our passions: who will teach it to me? Where will I drink its secrets from? In the study of the human heart."249 249 "Au-contraire, une prétendu philosophie prenant ce qui se fait d'insensé dans le monde por la règle de ce qui doit se faire, est venue a secours de nos préjugés, et leur a donné je ne sais quel air de raison propre à éterniser leur empire. Des charlatans ont flatté nos caprices; et voulant nos instruire avant que d'être eux-mèmes sortis de leur ignorance, leur bel esprit n'a pu leur fornir que des sophismes que nous avons pris pour des vèrités, et nous nous égarons avec méthode. Ils ne sont point descendus dans nôtre coeur; ils n'ont point étudié nos passions; c'est dans des choses, por ainsi dire, étrangèeres à l'homme qui'ils ont cherché les lois et les établissements qui doivent faire la bonheur de la societé. S'il faut les croire, la providence a fait des bonheures differens pour les anciens et pour nous, por l'Asie, l'Afrique, l'Amérique et l'Europe. Ils vous diront gravement que des lois bonnes au dixièeme degrè de latitude, ne valent plus rien sous le trentième; en verité un législateur ne devroit'il pas plutôt consulter les affections de nôtre coeur qu'un thermomêtre, pour savoir ce qu'il doit ordonner ou défendre? Qu'importen des plaines, des montagnes, un sol plus sec, plus humide, plus o moins fertile, le voisinage de la mer ou d'une grande rivière, et cent autres pareils accidens, pour décider des lois plus propres à faire le bonheure de l'homme? La nature des climats change-t-elle la nature de son coeur? N'a-t-il pas partout les mèmes besoins les mèmes organes, les mèmes sens, les mêmes penchants, les mèmes passions et la mème raison? Partout l'attrait du plaisir et la crainte de la doleur ne sont-t-ils pas les mobiles de nos pensées et de nos actions. Partout ne sont y'ils pas également sujets à tromper le desir que nous avons d'être hereux? Sous l'equateur comme sous le pôle, dans les plaines et des vallès comme sur les montagnes, chacun de nos sens n'ouvret-il pas nôtre ame à cent passions diffèrentes? Quelles sont les terres favorisées du ciel où l'avarice, l'ámbition, la paresse et la volupté ne puissent pas germer? Dans quels climats ces plaintes empoisonnées se produiront-elles impunément? Dans un lieu, si l'on veut nos passions seront plus impérieuses, et dans l'autre plus disciplinables; là elles seront exposées à des tentations plus frequentes, ici des accidens particuliers retarderont le développementy et le progrès; et je consens à tout ce que vous voudrez dire du puvoir des climats. Mais partout ces passions ne sont elles pas la source de nôtre bonheur, suivant qu'elles sont bien ou mal réglées? Partout elles ont donc besoin d'un frein et d'un conducteur, la loi doit donc commencer par les rendre droites. Mais ce grand art de gouverner nos passions, qui me l'apprendra? Où puisserai-jai les secrets? Dans l'etude du coeur humain." Mably, Oeuvres Complètes de l'Abbé de Mably, Tome Douziéme, De la Législation ou Principes des Lois, Livre Premier, Chapitre Premier, a Toulouse, Chez N. Etienne Sens, a Nismes, Chez J. Gaude, 1793, pp. 24-26. Nevertheless, Montesquieu had asserted: "There is this difference 1 between the nature of [each of the forms of] government and its principle, that its nature is what makes it be such [as it is]; and its principle what makes it act. One is its particular structure, and other the human passions which set it in motion. 1 This distinction is very important, and I will extract abundant consequences: she is the key of an infinity of laws."250 According to Montesquieu, the principle of the Republic is political virtue; the principle of monarchy, honor; and the principle of despotism, fear.251 He had limited his initial generalization about the spirit of the laws when, referring to the general spirit and to customs and habits, he said: "Many things govern men: the climate, the religion, the laws, the maxims of government, the examples of past things, the customs, the habits; from which it forms a general spirit that from it results. As, in every nation, when one of these causes acts with more force, the others weaken proportionally. Nature and the climate dominate savages almost by themselves; habits govern the Chinese, laws tyrannize Japan; custom had formerly all its influence on Lacedaemon; the maxims of government and the ancient customs had also all their influence on Rome."252 250 "Il y a cette difference 1 entre la nature du gouvernement et son principe, que sa nature est ce qui le fait être tel; et son principe ce qui le fait agir. L'une est sa structure particulière, et l'autre les passions humaines qui le font mouvir. 1 Cette distinction est très important, et j'en tirerai bien des consequences: elle est la clef d'une infinité des lois." Montesquieu, De L'Esprit Des Lois, Avec des notes de Voltaire, de Crevier, de Mably, de la Harpe, etc., Nouvelle Édition Revue sur les Meilleurs Textes, Suivie De La Défense De L'Esprit Des Lois par L'Auteur, Paris, Garnier Frères, Libraires-Éditeurs, without date, Livre III, Chapitre 1, p. 19, text reproduced above. See also: Montesquieu, De l'Esprit des Lois, Texte Établi et Présenté par Jean Brethe de la Gressaye, Société Les Belles Lettres, Tome Premier, Livre Troisième, Chapitre I, Paris, 1950, p. 55. 251 Montesquieu, De l'Esprit des Lois, Texte Établi et Présenté par Jean Brethe de la Gressaye, Société Les Belles Lettres, Tome Premier, Livre Troisième, Chapitre IX, Paris, 1950, pp. 64-65. 252 "Plusieurs choses gouvernent les hommes: le climat, la religion, les lois, les maximes du gouvernement, les exemples des choses pasées, les moeurs, les manières; d'où il se forme un esprit général qui en résulte. A mesure que, dans chaque nation une de ces causes agit avec plus de force, les autres lui cèdent d'autant. La nature et le climat dominent presque seuls sur les sauvages; les manières gouvernent les Chinois; les loix tyrannisent le Japon; les moeurs donnent autrefois le ton dans Lacédemone; les maximes de gouvernement et les moeurs anciennes le donnaient dans Rome." Montesquieu, De L'Esprit Des Lois, Avec des notes de Voltaire, de Crevier, de Mably, de la Harpe, etc., Nouvelle Édition Revue sur les Meilleurs Textes, Suivie De La Défense De L'Esprit Des Lois par L'Auteur, Paris, Garnier Frères, Libraires-Éditeurs, without date, Livre XIX, Chapitre IV, p. 275, text reproduced above, without note 2. See also: Montesquieu, De l'Esprit des Lois, Texte Établi et Présenté par Jean Brethe de la Gressaye, Société Les Belles Lettres, Tome Troisième, Livre Dix-neuvième, Chapitre IV, Paris, 1950, pp. 7-8. In an unpublished manuscript from his time, which Mably may have read, Montesquieu had asserted, before the publication of l'Esprit des Lois: "Les causes morales forment plus le caractère général d'une nation et décident plus de la qualité de son esprit que les causes physiques." Mably, omitting the above mentioned passages and others that can be found dispersed in the work he criticizes, diminishes the importance of the factors pointed out by Montesquieu, but he is right when he claims the need for the study of human passions for the art of legislation. Before Mably, Plato had demanded the study of the soul, so that rhetoric should rise to the category of the art of educating them or of leading them (psychagogy).253 Aristotle fulfilled the desire of his teacher, describing passions and characters, with certain detail, but not as a foundation of rhetoric, but as one of the means of proof that depends on the technical skill of the orator upon delivering his speech, which is distinguished from those who are already given to him (witnesses, contracts, etc.).254 e. Filangieri Cavalier Gaetano Filangieri (1752-1758), a Neapolitan young nobleman, author of a famous book divided into VII volumes and published between 1780 and 1785, now almost forgotten, reproduces and extends the above paragraph by Bacon, without mentioning him, to explain his intention and the title that he has chosen, in the following way: "It is a strange thing: among so many writers who have devoted themselves to the study of the law, there is someone who has treated this subject just as a legal expert, someone who has done it as a philosopher, another one as a politician, without taking into consideration more than only one part of the immense building; there [is] someone, like Montesquieu, who has reasoned more on what has been done that on what should be done, but none has provided a complete and reasoned system of legislation; none has "Moral causes form more the general character of a nation and decide more the quality of its spirit, than physical causes." Essais sur les Causes qui Peuvent Affecter les Esprits, transcript by Étiemble, Montesquieu, Enclyclopédie de la Pléiade, Histoire des Littératures, III, Littératures Françaises, Connexes et Marginales, Volume Publié sous la Direction de Raymond Queneau, Librairie Gallimard, Paris, 1958, p. 704. This Essai, 1734-1732 (sic 1742?), it was published for the first time in Mélanges Inédits de Montesquieu, ed. Baron de Montesquieu et T. Céleste, Bordeaux et Paris, 1892, according to Robert Shackleton, Montesquieu, A Critical Biography, Oxford University Press, 1961, p. 400; p. 406. Produced before 1742, in accordance with Montesquieu, Penseés, Le Spicilège, Édition Établie par Louis Desgraves, Chronologie, Édition Robert Laffont S.A., Paris, 1991, (113) 1, p. 932. 253 Plato, Phaedrus, 261a; 271c. Platón, Fedro, 261a; 271c, Edición Bilingüe, Traducción, Notas y Estudio Preliminar por Luis Gil Fernández, Instituto de Estudios Políticos, Madrid, 1957, p. 54 ("seducir"); p. 70. Platon, Oeuvres Complètes, Tome IV, 3a. Partie, Phèdre, 261a; 271 c, Texte Traduit par Léon Robin, Socièté d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Paris, 1933, p. 63; p. 82. Platon, Phèdre, 261a; 271c, dans Oeuvres Complètes de Platon, Traduction Nouvelle et Notes par Léon Robin avc la Collaboration de J. Moreau, Bibliothèque de la Pleiade, Volume II, Paris, 1942, p. 53; p. 70. 254 Aristotle, Rhetoric, 1355b-1356a; 1378a-1391b. Aristotle, Rhetoric, 1355b-1356a; 1378a-1391b, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation, Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume Two, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing 1985, pp. 2153-2156; pp. 2194-2217. Aristotle, Rhetoric, 1355b-1356a; 1378a-1391b. Aristóteles, Retórica, 1355b-1356a; 1378a-1391b, Introducción, Traducción y Notas por Quintín Racionero, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1990, pp. 174-175; pp. 309-391. Aristote Rhétorique, Livre Premier, 1355b-1356a, Texte Etabli et Traduit par Médéric Dufour, Societé D'Edition Les Belles Lettres, Paris, 1932, p. 76. Livre II, 1378a-1391b, Paris, 1938, pp. 60-99. Aristotele, Retorica, 1355b-1356a; 1378a-1391b, a cura di Armando Plebe, Editore Laterza, Bari, 1961, pp. 5-8; pp. 80-125. yet reduced this matter to a safe science, joining the means to the rules, and the theory to the practice. This is what I undertake to do in this work, entitled: The Science of Legislation."255 He did not mentioned Mably either, but took responsability for his claim on the need to include the study of passions, which Filangieri had announced in the reasoned plan of his work, in Book I, where, referring to his future Book IV, he wrote: "From the direction of education to that of the passions, we will see the analysis of the second virtue-producing force, without the knowledge, without the use of which legislation will always be the most formless, more useless, more pernicious work, that may come out of the hand of men. This will be one of the most interesting parts of this work, because the refutation of some errors depends on it, that the politics of the century, in spite of its progress, has adopted banefully because the establishment of a truth that is of interest to know more than all others depends on that one too, but it requires a better development, like that one, which hits against a common prevention."256 In 1785 the volume VII was published, the last one appearing during the life of the author. Although he left the work incomplete, he managed to fulfill his promise to develop the topic of passions in legislative matters, as it can be appreciated from the transcription of the pertinent titles in the Index of Book IV, Part II: Laws that are related to Customs and Public Instruction: Chapters: XXXIV Object of this part of Legislative Science; XXXV Possibility of Achieving the mencioned object; XXXVI The only original passion of Men and the effects of their modification in the diverse dominating artificial passions in diverse peoples; XXXVII Physical, moral and political circumstances which form the dominating passions of the peoples, and the double and main existing influence between these and Legislation; XXXVIII The connection of the preceding ideas and the examination to which they lead; XXXIX How the dominating passions of the people proceed to get or to lose the object proposed; XL Continuation of the same matter. The conducive passions; XLI The love for one's homeland, and its necessary dependence on the knowledge of laws and government; XLII Appendix to previous Chapter. The Effects of the Passion for glory in a people where the passion for one's homeland reigns; XLIII The means that Legislation should use to introduce, establish, expand, invigorate the passion for glory; XLIV Continuation of the 255 "E cosa strana: fra tanti scritori, che si sono consacrati allo studio della legge, chi a trattata questa materia da solo giureconsulto, chi da filosofo, chi anche da politico, ma non prendendo di mira, che una sola parte di questo immenso edificio; chi come Montesquieu ha raggionato piuttosto sopra quello, che si è fatto, che sopra quello, che si dovrebbe fare; ma niuno ci ha dato ancora un sistema compiuto, e ragionato di legislazione, niuno ha ancora ridotta questa materia ad una scienza sicura, ed ordinata, unendo i mezzi alle regole, e la teoria alla pratica. Questo è quello, que io intraprendo di fare in quest'opera, che ha per titolo: La Scienza della Legislazione." Filangieri, La Scienza della Legislazione, del Cavalier Gaetano Filangieri, Nella Stamperia Raimondiana, Napoli, 1780, Tomo I, p. 14. 256 "Dalla direzione dell'educazione passando a la passioni, noi verremo all'analisi delle seconde forza produttrice della virtù, senza la conoscenza, senza l'uso della quale la legislazione sarà sempre il lavoro più informe, più inutile, più pernicioso anche, che può uscire dalle mani dell'uomo. Questa sarà una delle parte più interessante di quest' opera, perchè da questa dipende la confutazione di alcuni errori, chi la politica del secolo ha, malgrado i suoi progressi, funestamente adottati perchè da questa dipende lo stabilimento d'una verità, che interessa di sapere più di tutte le altre, ma che ha bisogno di essere molto ben più sviluppata, como quella, che urta contro una prevenzione comune." Filangieri, La Scienza Della Legislazione, Del Cavalier Gaetano Filangieri, Nella Stamperia Raimondiana, Napoli, 1780, Tomo I, 40-41. same Matter; XLV Objection; XLVI The real cause for which wealth may have led, lead and may lead to the corruption of the people; XLVII The absence of these causes in a people which the Legislative System that forms the object of this work, was adopted.257 2. Contemporary history In contemporary history, Bentham will be remembered for having analyzed almost every topics on the art of legislation; afterwards, this chapter will synthetically deal with what happened after his death. a. Bentham Jeremy Bentham (1748-1732), a prodigy who began to study Latin at the age of four and could write it by the age of five and nine months, attended Westminster School (1755) and the Queens College, Oxford (1755-1763), where he graduated with a Bachelor of Arts degree; was admitted into Lincoln's Inn (1763), went back to Oxford and graduated with a Master's degree of Arts (1766), on the following year dropped out of Oxford University, returned to London and was admitted to the English bar (1769). Being the grandson and son to lawyers, despite the hopes of his father, who had wanted a succesful son to continue with family profession so as to became a Chancellor, he did not practice the profession in the conventional way. Although he lived long periods in accommodations for lawyers, such as Lincoln's Inn and Middle Temple, he failed to became Chancellor, despite his studies, the disciples who helped him, the interest that he showed on legislation and the intellectual influence that he had in its reform, both within and without his country.258 He neither litigated in courts, defended private interests, described the current law in special jurist work, taught in universities, nor finished his career as parliamentarian, Judge or Minister of the Crown, as any traditional English lawyer used to do. 257 INDICE DE CAPITOLI COMPRESI NEL VII, VOLUME, LIBRO IV. DELLE LEGGI CE RIGUARDANO L'EDUCAZIONE, I COSTUMI, E L'ISTRUZIONE PUBBLICA. PARTE SECONDA. Delle Leggi, che riguardano i costumi, CAP. XXXIV Scopo di questa parte della Scienza legislativa. XXXV Della possibilitá di giugnere all'indicato scopo, XXXVI Della passione unica originaria dell'uomo, e degli effetti delle sue modificazioni nelle diverse passione fattizie dominanti ne' diversi popoli, XXXVII Delle circonstanze, fisiche, morale e politiche, che concorrono a formare la passioni dominanti de' popoli, e della doppia, e principale influenza, che vi ha tra queste e la Legislazione, XXXVIII Del nesso delle antecedenti idee, e dell'essame, al quale essi si conducono, XXXIX Come dalle passioni dominanti de'Popoli proceda il consegimento, o lo smarrimento del proposto scopo, XL Prosseguimento dell'estesso soggetto. Delle passioni conducenti, XLI Dell'amor della patria, e della sua necesaria dipendenza dalla sapienza delle leggi e del governo, XLII Appendice all'antecedente Capo. Sugli effetti della passione della gloria in un poppolo, ove regna quella della patria, XLIII De mezzi, che la legislazione deve impiegare per introdurre, stabilire, espandere, invigorire la passion della gloria, XLIV Proseguimento dell'istesso soggetto, XLV Obbiezione, XLVI Delle vere cause, per le quali la richezza son divenute, divengano, e possono divenire le corrompitrice de'popoli, XLVII Dell'assenza di queste cause in un pópolo, nel quale il sistema legislativo, che forma l'oggetto di quest'Opera, verrebbe adotatto." Filangieri, La Scienza Della Legislazione, Del Cavalier Gaetano Filangieri, Nella Stamperia Raimondiana, Napoli, 1785, Tomo VII, pp. 1-108. 258 Ross Harrison, Bentham, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, Boston, Melbourne and Henley, 1983, first published as a paperback in 1985, p. 16. Bentham, The Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to The Principles of Morals and Legislation, Edited by J. H. Burns and H. L. A. Hart, with a New Introduction by F. Rosen, Clarendon Press, Oxford, Introduction of F. Rosen, 1996, p. xxxiii. All his work was related to the problem of the law that should be, not the problem of the law that is; it related to the reform of the laws, not to the explanation or application them. During his long life, and according to the plan that he had designed for himself, he wanted to create a new art of legislation, with the purpose of smoothing the path for the writing of two parallel and connected systems: 1) a complete body of laws and 2) its political justification; both adaptable to any particular State.259 To such an end, Bentham considered that: "4. [...] in as far as the measures it [the art of government] displays itself in are of permanent nature, is generally distinguished by the name of legislation: as it is by that of administration, when they are of temporary nature, determined by the occurrences of the day 4. [...]."260 "20. [...] Private ethics teaches how each man may dispose itself to pursue the course most conducive to his own happiness, by such motives as offer of themselves: the art of legislation (which may be considered as one branch of the science of jurisprudence) teaches how a multitude of men, composing a community, may be disposed to pursue that course which upon the whole is the most conducive to the happiness of the whole community, by means of motives to be applied by the legislator [...] ii. Jurisprudence, its branches. 21 Jurisprudence is a fictitious entity: nor can any meaning be found for the word, but by placing it in company with some word that shall be significative of a real entity. To know what is meant by jurisprudence, we must know, for example, what is meant by a book of jurisprudence. A book of jurisprudence can have but one or the other of two objects: 1. to ascertain what the law is: 2. to ascertain what it ought to be. In the former case it may be styled a book of expository jurisprudence; in the latter, a book of censorial jurisprudence: or, in other words, a book on the art of legislation. 22. A book of expository jurisprudence is either authoritative or unauthoritative. It is styled authoritative, when it is composed by him who, by representing the state of the law to be so and so, causeth it so to be; that is of the legislator himself: unauthoritative, when it is the work of any other person at large".261 Every morning of his long life, he would write from ten to fifteen pages, in single sheets, indicating the place that they had within the general plan of all the works and within the scheme of each one of them in particular. Whenever a topic was unclear to him, he would interrupt his work and devote himself to clarify it in a new work, without going back to the former one for further revision. His disciples were entrusted with the hard task of transforming these originals into publishable works. In the first hours of every evening, after dinner, while walking around his desk, he usually dictated his texts, as he did with his autobiography, among others.262 This easily explains the fact that, after his death, the publication of a collection of his works has amounted to eleven 259 It should have been the introduction to a Penal code, it was printed in 1780, but it was published for the first time in 1789 and then repubished in 1823. Bentham, The Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham, an Introduction to The Principles of Morals and Legislation, Edited by J. H. Burns and H. L. A. Hart, with a New Introduction by F. Rosen, Clarendon Press, Oxford, Preface by Bentham, 1996, p. 6; p. 9. 260 Bentham, The Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to The Principles of Morals and Legislation, Edited by J. H. Burns and H. L. A. Hart, With a New Introduction by F. Rosen, Chapter XVII, Of the Limits of the Penal Branch of Jurisprudence, i. Limits Between Private Ethics and the Art of Legislation, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1996, p. 283. 261 Bentham, The Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to The Principles of Morals and Legislation, Edited by J. H. Burns and H. L. A. Hart, With a New Introduction by F. Rosen, Chapter XVII, Of the Limits of the Penal Branch of Jurisprudence, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1996, pp. 293-94. 262 Ross Harrison, Bentham, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, Boston, Melbourne and Henley, 1983, first published as a paperback in 1985, p. 4. volumes,263 of which the last two contain the story of his life and an elaborated index. As for his manuscripts, there are one hundred forty eight boxes at the University College in London with approximately seventy thousand free sheets, which – fortunately– have already microfilmed; some others are kept at the British Library, and the rest is beeing kept at the Bibliothèque Publique et Universitaire de Genève (Public and University Library of Geneva).264 The Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham is a scholarly new edition, which began to be published in 1968 and, some time later, under the editor F. Rosen and the care of different specialists from the prestigious Clarendon Press, from Oxford University.265 He did not manage to became a legislator in any nation,266 but he gave counsel to several governments. He had a great influence, both within and without his country. In France, the Assembly neither accept his parliamentary rules, nor his report on the reform of the Judiciary, not even his model jail (Panopticon), but he was granted the title of citizen (1792). The translation and systematization of his works by Genevan Étienne Dumont, Traités de Législation Civile et Pénale (1802), in successive editions extended under the title of Oeuvres, sold forty thousand copies in Spanish America, as calculated in 1830, and had an influence on their constitutions and legislations. In Spain his work influenced Jovellanos and the Constitution of that country, as well as the Constitution of Portugal and other States.267 In England, due to the irony of life, the Reform Bill of 1832 which established the ideas he had anticipated in his Plan of Parliamentary Reform of 1817, obtained Royal Assent one or two days after his death.268 Although he wrote numerous bills and criticized some others, and intervened in debates in which he counseled and discounseled general juridical norms, he never performed direct legislative functions, since his influence was based on his reputation both as a writer and as an independent adviser. 263 Bentham, The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Published under the Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring, William Tait, Edinburgh; Simpkin, Marshall & Co., London, 1838-1843. 264 A. Taylor Milne, Catalogue of the Manuscripts of Jeremy Bentham in the Library of University College, London, 2nd. edition, London, 1962. Bentham, The Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction To The Principles of Morals and Legislation, Edited by J. H. Burns and H. L. A. Hart, With a New Introduction by F. Rosen, Clarendon Press, Oxford, Introduction of F. Rosen, 1996, pp. lxxi-lxxii. Ross Harrison, Bentham, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, Boston, Melbourne and Henley, 1983, first published as a paperback in 1985, p. 1. 265 For consulting a not exhaustive but very useful list of the works by Bentham, since they are enumerated individually, by year of publication, from 1774, with a brief title, stating whether it is original and if not, the name of the person who was in charge, also including the new edition as "New Collected Works", see: Ross Harrison, Bentham, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, Boston, Melbourne and Henley, 1983, first published as a paperback in 1985, p. XV-XXIV. 266 Bentham, The Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to The Principles of Morals and Legislation, Edited by J. H. Burns and H. L. A. Hart, with a New Introduction by F. Rosen, Clarendon Press, Oxford, Introduction of F. Rosen, 1996, p. xlviii. 267 John Maxcy Zane, Jeremy Bentham, in Great Jurists of the World, Edited by Sir John Macdonell and Edward Mason, With an Introduction by Van Vechten Veeder, with Portraits, Little, Brown, and Company, Boston, 1914, pp. 537-538; 540. 268 Ross Harrison, Bentham, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, Boston, Melbourne and Henley, 1983, first published as a paperback in 1985, p. 2, says on the following day; in p. 22, two days later. Bentham analyzed almost all the topics of the art of legislation, but he failed to establish a well assembled fundamental system, just as any other author has also failed to do so far. b. Later... In the XIX century, the development of the art of legislation was centered in France, Germany and England. In France, through the tasks developed by the State Council, Legislation Section in the enactment of the 1804 Civil Code and in the speeches of Portalis on this matter. In Germany, early that same century, throught the controversy between Thibaut and Savigny on the codification, and, upon its end, with the publication of interesting works on the art of legislation, led by the arguments concerning the 1900 Civil Code. In England, through the Parliamentary Reform of 1832 and, in the second half of the century, through the creation of the Office of The Parliamentary Counsel to TheTreasury. During the first half of XX century, publications kept on emerging in Germany motivated by the enactment of the Civil Code of 1900 (Zitelmann, Kohler); in France, by the centenary of the Civil Code of 1804 (Geny); and in England, emerged from the experience acquired in the Office of The Parliamentarian Counsel to The Treasury (Thring, Courtenay Ilbert). In the second half, in the United States of America and in Canada, the interest in the art of legislation increased, due to a search for uniformity in states legislation and the teaching of legislation as a subject matter at university level. In the 1970s, the expectation that England might enter the European Economic Community and the scarcity of legislative drafters in the Commonwealth also increased the interest in this type of studies. As from 1990, the market economy and the globalization have generated the need to reform the laws in many nations, with the consequent demand for handbooks, teachers and experts in the art of legislation. The following Part II: System, includes Chapter IV Legislative Genres, Chapter V Investigation, Chapter VI Systematics and Chapter VII Style. Part II: System Chapter IV Legislative Genres Laws should comprise two speeches: one prescriptive and other persuasive.269 The functions of persuasive speeches, as bills, consist in counseling and discounseling the debate and enactment of general juridical norms and, as laws enacted and published, consist in aiding their interpretation and application, according with the purpose sought by legislators. The functions of prescriptive speechees consist in: obliging, prohibiting, permitting, rewarding or punishing conducts.270 This chapter will firstly address the prescriptive speech because it precedes the persuasive one in the composition, although the latter follows the former in the presentation of a bill. 1. Prescriptive speeches Prescriptive speeches comprise two legislative genres: the systematizing genre and the fragmentary genre. 269 Plato, The Laws, IV, 723d. Plato, The Laws, IV, 723, Translated with an Introduction by Trevor J. Saunders, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middlessex, England, First Edition 1970, Reprinted 1972, p. 186. Platón, Las Leyes, IV, 723d, Edición Bilingüe, Traducción, Notas y Estudio Preliminar por José Manuel Pabón y Manuel Fernández-Galiano, Clásicos Políticos, Instituto de Estudios Políticos, Primera Edición, Madrid, 1960, Tomo I, p. 157. Platón, Leyes, IV, 723d, Introducción, Traducción y Notas de Francisco Lisi, en Platón, Diálogos VIII Leyes (Libros I-VI), Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1999, p. 390. Platon, Oeuvres Complètes de Platon, Traduction Nouvelle et Notes par Léon Robin, avec la Collaboration de M. J. Moreau, Éditions de la Nouvelle Revue Française, Volume II, Les Lois, IV, 723d, Paris, 1942, p. 775. Platone, Dialoghi, Vol. VII, Le Leggi, IV, XII 723d, Nuova Edizione a Cura di Attilio Zadro, Editori Laterza, Bari, 1952, p. 123. Giacomo Gavazzi, La Motivazione delle Leggi, Il Politico, a. 39, no. 2, giugno 1974, pp. 173-193. 270 The Digest foresaw to command, to prohibit, to permit and to punish. D.1.3.7 D.1.3.7. "Modestinus, liber I. Regularum.Legis virtus haec est: imperare, vetare, permittere, punire." D.1.3.7. "Modestinus, libro I. De las Reglas.La naturaleza o esencia de la ley es esta: mandar, vedar, permitir y castigar." El Digesto del Emperador Justiniano, 1.3.24, Traducido y Publicado por el Licenciado don Bartolomé Agustín Rodriguez de Fonseca, Nueva Edición Aumentada con la Traducción de los Proemios, Completada y Revisada con Arreglo a los Textos más Autorizados de las Ediciones Modernas, Imprenta de Ramón Vicente, Madrid, 1872, Tomo. I, p. 42. D.1.3.7. "Modestinus, liber I. Regularum.Legis virtus haec est imperare, vetare, permittere, punire." Corpus Iuris Civilis, Editio Stereotipa Octava, Volumen Primum, Digesta, Recognovit, Theodorus Mommsen, Apud Weidemanos, Berolini, 1899, p. 6. The project of Civil Code prepared by the Commission of the Government, which was giving birth to the Napoleonic Code (1804), had an article, 7, later suppressed, that added the rewards, in the following terms: "She [the law] orders, she allows, she prohibits, she announces the rewards and the punishments." "Elle [la loi] ordonne, elle permet, elle défend, elle annonce des recompenses et des peines"). Jean Ray, Essai sur la Structure Logique du Code Civil Francais, Librairie Félix Alcan, Paris, 1926, p. 46. a. Systematizing genre The prescriptive speeches that reduce a multiplicity of texts to the currrent unity of a single arranged text, a compilation or a digest; or that reduce a multiplicity of norms and principles to the unity of an institutional law, a consolidation or a code belong to the systematizing genre. The prescriptive speeches that fail to systematize their norms or principles in institutions (casuistic laws, laws of principles)271 or that introduce unsystematizing changes to other laws, either partially to their texts, or to their validity (amending laws) belong to the fragmentary genre,272 Juridical system Before dealing with such species of laws as belong to the systematizing genre, it is necessary to rely on a theoretical model of juridical system, which advisers and legislators should always take into consideration as an implicit context for every genre of speech and every legislative species. PRINCIPLE: Laws shall be composed and criticized, advised and dissuaded, in accordance with the criterion with which they shall be interpreted and applied, taking into consideration the whole text of the law (explicit context), not only some of its parts,273 and the whole juridical system (implicit context), not only some of its parts. The concept of juridical system or juridical order274 imposes on legislators, administrators, judges, lawyers and jurists in general the duty to maintain the reasonableness of positive law, preserving the juridical cosmos from falling into the chaos of arbitrariness. The knowledge of a juridical system characterizes an expert and separates him from a lay person275 who, no matter how educated he may be, is unable to appreciate the 271 For the distinction between the casuistic method and the method of the laws of principles, see: R. von Ihering, L'Esprit du Droit Romain dans les Diverses Phases de son Développement, Traduit sur la 3a. Édition avec l'Autorisation de l'Auteur, par O. de Meulenare, Liv. II, Ie. Part., Titre III, Technique, Chap. I., Sect. 2. Concentration Logique, # 45, Tome III, A. Marescq, Ainé, Éditeur, Paris, F. Clemm, Gand, 1877, p. 44. 272 Similar, although not equal, to Geny's distinction, between the fragmentary legislation (isolated laws) and codification. The difference lies in having isolated laws that are systematizing (institutional laws), as it will be discussed later on. On Geny's distinction, see: François Geny, La Technique Législative dans la Codification Civile Moderne (A Propos du Centenaire du Code Civil), dans Le Code Civil, 1804-1904, Livre du Centenaire Publié par la Société d'Études Législatives, Arthur Rousseau Éditeur, Tome Second, Paris, 1904, p. 994. 273 D.1.3.24 D.1.3.24. "CELSUS liber VIIII digestorum Incivile est nisi tota lege perspecta una aliqua particula eius proposita indicare vel respondere.", Corpus Iuris Civilis, Editio Stereotipa Octava, Volumen Primum, Digesta, Recognovit, Theodorus Mommsen, Apud Weidemanos, Berolini, 1899, p. 6. D.1.3.24. "Celso, libro IX del Digesto.Es contra derecho el juzgar ó responder en vista de alguna parte de la ley, sin tenerla toda muy presente." D.1.3.24. "Celsus liber IX Digestorum.Incivile est, nisi tota lege perspecta, una aliqua particula eius proposita iudicare, vel respondere." El Digesto del Emperador Justiniano, 1.3.24, Traducido y Publicado por el Licenciado don Bartolomé Agustín Rodriguez de Fonseca, Nueva Edición Aumentada con la Traducción de los Proemios, Completada y Revisada con Arreglo a los Textos más Autorizados de las Ediciones Modernas, Imprenta de Ramón Vicente, Madrid, 1872, Tomo. I, p. 43. 274 Norberto Bobbio, Teoria Generale del Diritto, G. Giappichelli Editore, Torino, 1993, p. 159. 275 Plato, The Laws, I, 632c-d. wisdom of a certain norm, due to the fact he does not know the point at which it should be inserted in the juridical system to incorporate it, as the intermediate terms between the norm and its ultimate motivations, since he lacks the general vision and the logical perception of the whole.276 An adviser or legislator, before composing and criticizing, advising and dissuading general juridical norms, for any genre of legislative speech and any species of law, must know the point of insertion of the new law into the juridical system as the reasons for which he chooses such point, thus foreseeing the consequences, either desired or undesired, but always noticed, of such an insertion. In past times, Civil Law277 countries were characterized by the notion of juridical system; now, this notion also characterizes Common Law countries,278 although both maintain their respective tendencies, rationalist the former and empiricist, the latter. Today, both types may be considered systematic, i.e. like a set of laws (general norms) and judicial precedents (individual norms), since there has been a modification of the relative importance of the above mentioned sources of law. In Civil Law countries, which did not admit judicial precedents, legislation is still the starting point, but judicial precedents are increasingly being resorted to. In Common Law countries, based on case law, legislation had a secondary function, but, as from Roosvelt's New Deal, the norms contained in the legislation are increasingly taken as a starting point which is then followed by judicial precedents.279 A convergence between both positive law types has taken place in terms of considering legislation and judicial precedents as sources, and in both types, positive law is considered as a system, not a chaos born out of the whims of legislators, judges, or both. A system or set is defined as any multiplicity that can be though as a unity.280 Systematization tasks shall reflect the above mentioned idea of system, without any defects or excesses. Plato, The Laws, I, 632, Translated with an Introduction by Trevor J. Saunders, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middlessex, England, First Edition 1970, Reprinted 1972, p. 56. Platón, Las Leyes, I, 632c-d, Edición Bilingüe, Traducción, Notas y Estudio Preliminar por José Manuel Pabón y Manuel Fernández-Galiano, Clásicos Políticos, Instituto de Estudios Políticos, Primera Edición, Madrid, 1960, Tomo I, pp. 12-13. Platón, Leyes, I, 632c-d, Introducción, Traducción y Notas de Francisco Lisi, en Platón, Diálogos VIII Leyes (Libros I-VI), Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1999, pp. 205-206. Platon, Les Lois, I, 632c-d, dans Oeuvres Complètes de Platon, Traduction Nouvelle et Notes par Léon Robin, avec la Collaboration de M. J. Moreau, Éditions de la Nouvelle Revue Française, Volume II, Paris, 1942, p. 646. Platone, Le Leggi, I, 632c-d, da Dialoghi, Vol. VII, Nuova Edizione a Cura di Attilio Zadro, Editori Laterza, Bari, 1952, p. 14. 276 R. von Ihering, L'Esprit du Droit Romain dans les Diverses Phases de son Développement, Traduit sur la 3a. Édition avec l'Autorisation de l'Auteur, par O. de Meulenare, Liv. II, Ie. Part., Titre III, Technique, Chap. I., Sect. 2.-A, But de la Technique, # 43, Tome III, A. Marescq, Ainé, Éditeur, Paris, F. Clemm, Gand, 1877, p. 15. 277 Enrico Allorio, "Scienza Giuridica Europea", JUS, Dicembre 1952, pp. 433-70. 278 All jurisprudence, its general theory of the law, is, in a certain way, an explanation of that assumption, Julius Stone, Legal System and Lawyers' Reasonings, First Printing, 1964, Second Printing, 1968, Maitland Publications, Sydney, 1968, p. 20. For an analysis of Austin's theories (scarse), Bentham, Kelsen and Hart, see: Joseph Raz, The Concept of a Legal System, An Introduction to the Theory of Legal System, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1970, 212 pp. 279 Miles O. Price and Harry Bitner, Effective Legal Research, A Practical Manual of Law Books and Their Use, Little Brown and Company, Boston-Toronto, 1953, p. 6. 280 Cantor, the creator of the set theory, affirms that he was inspired in the Philebus dialogue by Plato to define the set concept. RULE: The attempts of systematization shall stay below the idea of system if multiplicity fails to reach unity; they shall stay above, if they try to reach unity, more or less, but lack multiplicity.281 When a system is difficult to understand, one can resort to a well-known understandable system, with fundamental similarities, to consider the one which is difficult to understand as if it were the one already well-known. If the similarities were only verbal, a metaphor –a mere figure of speech – would be obtained. Whenever the simmilarities are deeper, as those founded on the equality of the elements, the structure (isomorphism), the function (homology) or the properties, a theoretical model would thus arise, which will provide for a transference of both the terminology and the knowledge, from one system to the other, which will facilitate the understanding of the most difficult of them both.282 A juridical system is integrated by the following elements: juridical norms (individual and general), juridical principles, juridical institutions and juridical branches (or branches of the law). The non-customary general juridical norms, are the answers provided by legislators to solve the problems raised by certain facts, acts and activities of social importance. Cantor, Fondements d'une Théorie Générale des Ensambles, Mathematische Annalen, XXI, pp. 545-586, traduction par J. Miller, dans Cahiers pour l'Analyse, La Formalisation, Revue Trimestrelle Publiée par La Société du Graphe, Imprimée et Difusée par Les Éditions du Seuil, 10, Hiver 1969, p. 35, n. 1. Plato, Philebus, 16c-17a; Phedrus, 265a-266c, 273e, 277b. Platon, Philèbe, 16c-17a, Phèdre 265a-266c, 273e, 277b, dans Platon Oeuvres Complètes, Traduction Nouvelle et Notes par Léon Robin, avec la Collaboration de M. J. Moreau, Éditions de la Nouvelle Revue Française, Volume II, Paris, 1942, pp. 557-558; pp. 60-63, p. 73, pp. 78-79. Platón, Fedro, 265a-266c, 273e, 277b, Edición Bilingüe, Traducción, Notas y Estudio Preliminar por Luis Gil Fernández, Instituto de Estudios Políticos, Madrid, 1957, pp. 60-63, p. 72, pp. 79-80. Platon Phèdre, 265a-266c, 273e, 277b, dans Oeuvres Complètes de Platon, Tome IV, 3e. Partie, Phèdre, Texte Traduit par Léon Robin, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Notice, Deux procédés, La division, Paris, 1933, CLIV-CLVIII; pp. 70-73, p. 86, pp. 92-92. Cicero, De Oratore, I, 186-188. Cicéron, De l'Orateur, I, 186-188, Livre Premier, Texte Établi et Traduit par Edmond Courbaud, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Paris, Première Édition 1922, Sixième Tirage 1967, pp. 66-67. M.F.C. de Savigny, Traité de Droit Romain, Traduit de l'Allemand par Ch. Guenoux, Librairie de Firmin Didot Frères, Paris, 1855, Tome Premier, Chapitre IV, XXXIII, p. 207. 281 Friederich Karl Von Savigny, Metodología Jurídica [Curso de Invierno 1802-1803] (Juristische Methodenlehre, K.F. Koehler Verlag, Stuttgart, 1951), Traducción de J. J. Santa Pinter, Ediciones Depalma, Buenos Aires, 1979, p. 35; p. 37. Friederich Karl Von Savigny, Juristische Methodenlehre, K.F. Koehler Verlag, Stuttgart, 1951, pp. 35-36; p. 37. 282 As regard the models, see: Mary Hesse, Models and Analogy in Science, The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, The Macmillan Company & The Free Press, New York Collier Macmillan Limited, London, 1967, pp. 354-359. Max Black, Modelos y Metáforas, translation by Víctor Sánchez de Zavala, Capter XIII, Modelos y arquetipos; as read at the University of Pennsylvania 9th December 1958 firstly published in Both Human and Humane, ed, de C. E. Bowe, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1960, Tecnos, Madrid, 1967, pp. 20-38. Enrico di Robilant, Modelli nella teoria del diritto; it reproduces the text of a conference in German dated January 22 th, 1970 in Hoschule für Verwaltungswissenschaften of Spira and dated January 26 th, 1970 at the University of Mainz, Rivista Trimestrale. di Diritto e Procedura Civile, 1970, pp. 705-721. The juridical institutions are integrated by sets of general juridical norms283 related to certain facts, acts and activities of social importance, founded on certain juridical principles. The branches of the law are sets of institutions related to certain facts, acts and activities of social importance, founded on certain juridical principles of their own. Whenever the principles are proper of the branches, it is said that these are autonomous; whenever they are not proper, it is said that these branches are special. The difference is important since, beeing that the special branches lack principles of their own, after resorting to analogy, the general principles of the law are directly applied in order to integrate their gaps. The juridical principles, i.e., the reasons or foundations of the norms (individual and general), are elements even more general and abstract than the norms themselves. They may be established in such a way that they remain isolated; together with norms but without integrating sets with them; or otherwise integrated in sets. Whenever they are integrated in sets, the principles serve as a foundation to institutions, the branches and the systems. This is the reason why it is necessary to distinguish which the considered level of abstraction is: the institution (principles of marriage, of property, etc.), the branch (civil law principles, criminal law principles, etc.), the internal juridical system (general principles of law), or the international juridical system ("general principles of law recognized by civilized nations"284). The empirical level of the juridical system, which allows it to make contact with the reality of the social system and is common to all levels of abstraction, is the set of certain concrete facts, acts and activities of social importance, which supports the relevant juridical relations. The increasing levels of abstraction are determined by: the norms (individual and general); the principles, the institutions; the branches; the internal order; and the international order. In the systematical conception of the Law underlies the idea of the double way of abstraction and concretion, of ascend and descend of understanding. A great lawyer is that whose understanding allows him to consider the general problems in a particular case and the particular cases in a general problem, while his will keeps on devising the most just solutions for the problems that he may cope with. The structure of the juridical system is the logical relation between its elements: the norms, the principles, the institutions and the branches, within the internal order (national, regional, provincial or local), and within the international order (other national, regional juridical systems or the universal system). To find the best-known system that may serve as a theoretical model of the juridical system, two types of logical systems will be considered, in accordance with their respective structures: deductive and classificatory systems. Geometry is an example of the deductive systems; botany and zoology are examples of the classificatory systems. Among the elements that integrate a juridical system, principles play a fundamental role. In a juridical system of a deductive structure, principles are considered as axioms from which branches, institutions and norms can be deduced. The multiplicity of the elements of the juridical order is conceived as a unity, because the more general elements allow to deduce the less general, as subsequent links are bound to the first 283 Bernardo Windscheid, Diritto delle Pandette, Traduzione dei Professore Carlo Fadda e Paolo Emilio Bensa, Nuova Ristampa Steriotipa, Unione Tipografico-Editrice Torinense (UTET), Torino, 1925, T. I, 370, pp. 110-111. 284 Formula established in Article 38, section c) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. ones to create a chain. The logical relationship existing among the elements of the juridical system is a deduction. In a juridical system of a classificatory structure, principles are considered as the fundamental criteria allowing for the inclusion of norms, institutions, branches and the juridical order as subsets, in accordance with the relevant similarities and differences among the above-mentioned elements, as synoptic tables, as the parts that make up a tree.285 The multiplicity of the elements of the juridical system is conceived as a unity, because the less general elements are included as subsets within the more general: the norms within the institutions, the institutions within the branches, the branches within the internal order and the internal order within the international order, as in a synoptic table allowing for a clear vision and easy memory of the set and its elements. The logical relationship existing among the elements of the juridical system is the inclusiveness among classes, the classification in genres and species.286 The fundamental opposition between the juridical systems as classificatory or deductive was clearly seen by Ascarelli, among others: "7. Early in the XVII century, reasoning was generally made in a strictly mathematical fashion. Hobbes does not escape this method. Actually he not longer considers genres and species, but connections and relations. He seeks to create models which may capture connections and not elaborate classifications which may allow for the identification of species."287 The deductive model of a juridical system, in the same fashion as geometry (more geometrico), had its well-known supporters, such as the above-mentioned Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), in the Anglo-Saxon world; and Samuel Puffendorf (1632-1694) and Christian Wolff (1679-1754), in the European continental world,288 under the 285 Claude du Pasquier, Introduction à la Théorie Génerale et a la Philosophie du Droit, Deuxième Édition, 1942, p. 148. 286 The distinction between the syllogistic and the tabular methods is taken from: Logique de Kant, Traduction par J. Tissot, Paris, 1862, p. 21. For the deductive systematization and the classificatory systematization in traditional logic, see: Christopher Sigwart, Logic, Translated by Helen Dendy, London, Swan Sonneschein & Co., New York, Macmillan & Co., Vol. II, pp. 508-528. For the difference between hypothetical inclusive systems, like biology, and hypothetical deductive systems, like mathematics, see: Jean Piaget, Introduction a l'Epistèmologie Gènètique, Presses Universitaires de France (PUF), Tome III, p. 22. For the logical aspects of biological classifications, see: Jean Piaget, Traité de Logique, Essai de Logistique Operatoire, Librairie Armand Colin, Paris, 1949, pp. 66-70, pp. 81-125. Also see: John Greeg, The Language of Taxonomy, An Aplication of Symbolic Logic to the Study of Classificatory Systems, Columbia University Press, New York, 1954, IX, 70 pp. George Gaylord Simpson, Principles of Animal Taxonomy, Columbia University Press, New York and London, First printing 1961, Fourth printing 1969, xii pp., 247 pp. 287 "7. Au début du XVIIe. siècle on raisonnait généralement d'une façon rigoureusement mathématique. Hobbes n'échappe pas a cette méthode. Il ne considère plus, en effet, les genres et les spèces, mais les rapports et les relations. Il cherche à créer des modéles qui permettraient de saisir des rapports et non à élaborer des classifications que permettraient d'identifier des espèces." Tullio Ascarelli, Étude introductive traduite par Claude Doucouloux-Favard, dans Th. Hobbes, A dialogue between a Philosopher and a Student of the Common Law of England, G. W. Leibniz, Speciemen Quaestionum Philosphicarum Ex Jure Collectarum.De Casibus Perplexis.Doctrina Conditiunum.De Legum Interpretatione, Dalloz, Paris, 1966, p. 13. 288 For the history and theory of juridical systematizing, see: Giorgio La Pira, La Genesi del Sistema nella Giurisprudenza Romana, I. Problemi Generali, Studi in Onore di Filippo Virgilii nel XL Anno d'Insegnamento, Societá Editrice del Foro Italiano, Roma, 1935, pp. 159-182 (non vidi). Giorgio La Pira, II. L'Arte Sistematrice, Bulletino dell'Istituto di Diritto Romano Vittorio Scialoja, XLII (Vol. I Nuova Serie), pp. 336-355. Giorgio La Pira, III. Il Metodo, Studia et Documenta Historiae et Iuris, I, 1935, N. 1, pp. 319-348. Giorgio La Pira, IV. Il Concetto di Scienza e Gli Strumenti della Costruzione Scientifica, Bulletino dell'Istituto di Diritto Romano Vittorio Scialoja, XLIV (Vol. III Nuova Serie), 1936-1937, pp. 131-159. Luis Sánchez Agesta, Historia del Sistema de la Ciencia del Derecho Privado, Boletín de la Universidad de Granada, España, 1941, pp. 507-524; pp. 633-666. Vincenzo Arangio-Ruiz, La Formation du Système des Commentaires de Droit Civil dans la Science Juridique Romaine, Annales de la Faculté de Droit d'Istambul, Turquie, 1953, 2-3, pp. 136-145. Michel Villey, Recherches sur la Litérature Didactique du Droit Romain (A propos d'un texte de Cicéron De oratore 1-188 à 190), Les Éditions Domat-Montchrestien, Paris, 1945, p. VI, p. 84. Michel Villey, Logique d'Aristote et Droit Romain, Revue Historique de Droit Français et Etranger, 1951, pp. 309-328. Michel Villey, Questions de Logique Juridique dans l'Histoire de la Philosophie du Droit, Travaux du Centre National de Recherche de Logique, Volume II, Droit et Logique, Les Lacunes en Droit, Etablissements Emile Bruyland, Bruxelles, 1967, pp. 3-23. Michel Villey, La Formation de la Pensée Juridique Moderne. Cours d'Histoire de la Philosphie du Droit 1961-1966, Les Éditions Montchrestien, Paris, 1968, 715 pp. Helmut Coing, Historia y Significado de la Idea de Sistema en la Jurisprudencia (Geschichte un Bedeutung des Systemgedankes i der Rechtswissenchaftf, Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main, 1956), Traducción de Robert S. Hartman y José Luis González, Cuaderno No. 1, Centro de Estudios Filosóficos, Universidad Autónoma de México, Mexico, 1959, pp. 21-36. Theodor Viehweg, Tópica y Jurisprudencia (Topik und Jurisprudenz, C. H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, Munich, 1963), Prólogo de Eduardo Garcia de Enterría, Traducción de Luis DiezPicazo de León, Taurus, Madrid, 1964, 144 pp. + Index. Theodor Viehweg, Topica e giurisprudenza (Topik und Jurisprudenz, C.H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, München, 1953), a cura di Giuliano Crifó, Giuffrè Editore, Milano, 1962, xxiv + 128 pp., Index, with a preface by the author for the Italian edition and important introduction by the translator. Ricardo Orestano, Introduzione allo Studio Storico del Diritto Romano, Ristampa della Seconda Edizione, G. Giappichelli, Torino, 1963, pp. 39-112. Max Kaser, En Torno al Método de los Juristas Romanos (Zur Methode der Römischen Rechtsfindung, Nachristen der Akademie der Wissenchaften in Göttingen, Phililig-hist Klasse, Gotinga, 1962), Traducción por Juan Miquel, Publicaciones de los Seminarios de la Facultad de Derecho de Valladolid, Valladolid, 1964, 55 pp. Mario G. Losano, Sistema e Struttura nel Diritto, Volume Primo Dalle Origini alla Scuola Storica, Università di Torino, Memorie dell'Istituto Giuridico, Serie II, Memoria CXXXIV, G. Giappichelli, Torino, 1968, 302 pp. + XXXII, Indice, Introduzione, Torino, 1968. Mario G. Losano, Giuscibernetica, Macchine e Modelli Cibernetici nel Diritto, Piccola Biblioteca Einaudi, Torino, 1969, 206 pp. Mario G. Losano, The Legal System from Theology to Technology, Archiv. fur Recht-und Sozialphilosophie, 1971, pp. 485-501. Kauius Tuori, The Myth of Quintus Mucius Scaevola Founding Father of Legal Science, The Legal Story Review, Volume LXXII, 2004, pp. 243-262. Jean G. Renauld, La Systematisation dans le Raisonnement Juridique, Logique et Analyse, 1958, 3-4, pp. 168-183. Giorgio Lazzaro, Sistema Giuridico, Novissimo Digesto Italiano, UTET, Torino, pp. 459-464. Joseph Raz, The Concept of a Legal System, An Introduction to the Theory of Legal System, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1970, ix + 212 pp. Claus-Wilhem Canaris, El Sistema en la Jurisprudencia (Systemdenken und Systembegriff in der Jurisprudenz; entwicklelt am Beispiel des deutschen Privarechts, 2. überaibeitete Auflage, Berlin, 1983), Traducción de Juan Antonio García Amado, Fundación Cultural del Notariado, Madrid, 1998, 186 pp. Norberto Bobbio, Teoria Generale del Diritto, G. Giappichelli Editore, Torino, 1993, Parte Seconda, Teoria dell'Ordinamento Giuridico, pp. 159-292. influence of the rationalism of René Descartes (1596-1650). In the XX century Alphonse Ménard's traditional geometric version,289 the most modern versions of the axiomatic deductive system influenced by the contemporary development of the mathematical logic by Elemér Kováts, Miklós Ajtai, Luigi Ferrajoli290 and, by the deontic logic, by Carlos E. Alchourrón and Eugenio Bulygin291, are worth to be remembered. The deductive inference is important for the application of juridical norms. The logical structure of the juridical norms may be represented as follows: If A were, B must be, where If A were is the part of the statement which describes the facts, acts and activities of social importance and their necessary and sufficient requisites (the antecedent); and B must be is the part of the statement that prescribes the obligatory, prohibited, permitted, rewarded or punished conducts that are imputed (the juridical consequence). The application of juridical norms is usually represented as a syllogism, in which the norm is its major premise, the subsumption of the facts, acts and activities is its minor premise, and the logical conclusion is the application of the norm.292 Beccaria, a classic criminal law author, said: "In each crime the judge has to do a perfect syllogism: the major premise must be the general law; the minor premise the action conform or not to the law; the consequence freedom or punishment. When the judge is restrained, or wants to do at least two syllogisms, a door to uncertainty is opened."293 Aristotle had previously said: "I call perfect syllogism to that which, in addition to all that has been assumed, requires nothing else to reveal the need for deduction; and I call, in turn, imperfect syllogism to that which requires the addition of one or several objects, which are rather necessarily required by the terms placed in the base, but which have not been assumed through the premises."294 289 Alphonse Ménard, Essai d'une Critique Objective de la Technique Juridique en Matière d'Obligation, Librairie de la Société du Recueil Sirey, Paris, 1926, 376 pp. + errata and index. 290 Miklós Ajtai, [Le] Chemin le plus court de la pensée juridique, Exposé de l'Ideographie Juridique de M. Elemér Kováts, Avocat à la Cour de Budapest, avec une êtude sur l'Axiomatisation des Sciences Morales, Presses Universitaires de France, 1930, 128 pp. Luigi Ferrajoli, Teoria Assiomatizzata del Diritto, Parte Generale, Dott. A. Giuffrè, Milano, 1970, 208 pp. 291 Carlos E. Alchourrón y Eugenio Bulygin, Normative Systems, Springer-Verlag, New York, Wien, 1971, xviii, 208 pp. 292 "From the logical point of view, any decision of the courts evokes a syllogism. Premises are placed inside motives, by a juridical norm, general and abstract as major [premise] and a really particular and concrete situation as minor [premise]. The conclusion is deduced in the prescriptive part." English translation from French by the author of this book. "Du point de vue logique, toute décision de justice évoque un syllogisme. Les prémisses en sont posées dans les motifs, par une règle de droit, génerale et abstraite qui tient lieu de majeure et une situation de fait particulière et concrete faissant l'office de mineure. La conclusión est tirée au dispositif.", dans: Roger Mendegris, Le Commentaire d'Arrêt, Dalloz, Paris, 1975, p. 10. 293 "In ogni delito si deve fare dal giudice un sillogismo perfetto: la maggiore dev'essere la legge generale; la minore l'azione conforme o no alla legge; la conseguenza la liberta o la pena. Quando il giudice sia costretto, o voglia fare anche soli due sillogismi, si apre la porta alla incertezza." Cesare Beccaria, Dei Delitti e delle Pene, da Beccaria e il Diritto Penale, Cesare Cantú, Barbera Editore, Firenza, 1862, p. 391. 294 Aristotle, Prior Analytics, I, 24b. The English version was translated from the foIlowing Italian version: Here follows an example of what is commonly considered a judicial syllogism: If someone kills a person, he shall be punished with imprisonement for not less than 8 and not more than 25 years (law). John Doe killed a person (subsumption). Therefore, John Doe shall be imprisoned for 25 years (sentence). From the logical point of view, norms are applied when the antecedent has been proved, in accordance with a hypothetical syllogism in modus ponens extended to make it applicable to the juridical reasoning. The modus ponens, typical of the propositional logic, originally was one of five basic arguments of the stoic logic that did not require any demonstration, since its validity was evident. The scheme of the argument was: If the first, then the second. The first. Therefore, the second. The example that used to be quoted was the following: If it is day, then it is light. It is day. Therefore, it is light.295 The modus ponens extended to logically express the judicial syllogism could be formulated as follows: If A were, B shall be. A has been proved. Therefore, B shall be applied. But the most serious difficulty for the judicial application of the norms does not generally lie in going from the premises to the conclusion, that is to say, in making the deductive inference that, as it has been pointed out, consists in applying the modus "Chiamo dunque sillogismo perfetto quello che oltre a quanto è stato assunto non ha bisogno di null'altro,affinché si rivelli la necessità della deduzione, e chiamo invece imperfetto il sillogismo che esige l'aggiunta di uno o di parecchi oggetti, i quali sono bensí richiesti necessariamente dai termini posti alla base, ma non sono stati assunti attraverso le premesse.", Aristotele, Primi Analitici, I, 24b, Organon,a Cura di Giorgio Colli, Adelphi Edizione S.P.A., Milano, 2003, pp. 92-93. Aristotle, Prior Analytics, I, 24b, 23-26, The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford Translation. Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume One, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 40. Aristotle, Prior Analytics, A1, 24b, 20-25, translated with introduction, notes and commentary by Robin Smith, Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis/Cambridge, 1989, p. 2. Aristóteles, Analíticos Primeros, 1, 24b, en Aristóteles, Tratados de Lógica (ORGANON) II, Sobre la Interprtación, Analíticos Primeros, Analíticos Segundos, Introducciones, Traducciones y Notas por Miguel Candel Sanmartín, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1995, p. 95. 295 Benson Mates, Stoic Logic, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, California; Cambridge University Press, England, London, 1953, p. 67, pp. 69-70. ponens, which is a very simple logical rule, but in being able to find the relevant texts and reconstruct the applicable norm (major premise), as well as in proving its antecedent (minor premise). The judge reconstructs the norm from the texts, since rarely do the letter of the law and the complete legal norm which will serve as a major premise coincide, a circumstance which becomes serious due to the legislative hyperinflation. For the judge to enter a sentence for homicide, having a person killed another, is just only one of prerequisites, since others should be borne in mind, such as criminal responsability, illegality, guilt, etc. Acknowledging the antecedent of the norm as proven will neither be easy for him, since the subsumption requires that the judge has verified the performance of certain facts, acts and activities, and that he has qualified them as included in the antecedent of the norm.296 Once the applicable norm has been obtained and the performance of certain facts, acts and activities, qualified as included in the antecedent of the former has been proved, yet expressly assuming everything that is necessary for the inference, and once such delicate juridical operations have been completed, the judge will then have the major and the minor premises of the perfect syllogism which will make it possible for him to apply the norm "automatically",297 due to the simplicity of the logical rule used (modus ponens). If someone goes from the judicial interpretation and application of the juridical norms to the legislative task, the deductive system also turns out inadequate, among other reasons, because it would be obscure for lay people due to its length, since they could not follow the thread of a thought from a very distant starting point and for its verbiage, since obvious things would be said upon listing the propositions of each one of the syllogisms.298 The function of a deductive system consists in expressing what is implied in axioms and in propositions that necessarily derive from them through deductive logical inferences. In a juridical system conceived as deductive, Law is created only by the constituent power; everything else is a direct application of or a consequence deducted from the Constitution. The interpretation is not necessary; only deductive logical 296 Chaim Perelman, La Distinction du Fait et du Droit. Le Point de Vue du Logicien, Dialectica, 59/60, Vol. 15, No. 3/4, 15-9,15-12, 1961, p. 603. 297 "This way, in the so called subsumption, what is decisive is almost exclusively the finding of the premises: once the "major premise" and the "minor premise" are sufficiently specified and syntonized which each other to which end the formal logic is not essential the real task of the jurist has been fulfilled; from this moment on, the conclusion is extracted, so to say, automatically." English translation from Spanish by the autor of this book. "Así, en la llamada subsunción lo decisivo es casi exclusivamente el hallazgo de las premisas: una vez que la "premisa mayor" y la "premisa menor" están suficientemente concretadas y entre sí sintonizadas para lo cual la lógica formal no es esencial está cumplida la verdadera tarea del jurista; a partir de ese momento la conclusión se extrae, por así decir, automáticamente." Claus-Wilhem Canaris, El Sistema en la Jurisprudencia, traducción de Systemdenken und Systembegriff in der Jurisprudenz, Dunker und Humboldt, Berlin, 1983, por Juan Antonio García Amado, Fundación Cultural del Notariado, Madrid, 1998, p. 31. 298 As observed by Aristotle in relation to the enthymeme, the rhetorical syllogism. Aristotle, Rhetoric, II, 1395b25-27. Aristotle, Rhetoric, II, 1395b25-27, The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford Translation. Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume Two, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 2224. Aristóteles, Retórica, Libro II, 1395b, 25-30, Introducción, Traducción y Notas por Quintín Racionero, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1990, p. 417. Aristote, Rhétorique, Livre II, 1395b23-27, Texte Établi et Traduit par Médéric Dufour, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Tome Première, Paris, 1938, p. 111. Aristotele, Retorica II. 1395b, A cura di Armando Plebe, Editore Laterza, Bari, 1961, p. 139. inferences from the Constitution are needed. In order to apply the norms to an individual case the facts, acts and activities are qualified or subsumed as if it were an automatic mechanism. Since no gaps may exist in the law, because what is not regulated or derived by analogy is not law, integration seems to be unnecessary. Some have imagined juridical systems of such a nature, but their impracticability prevents any reasonable man from believing that they could have existed as positive law or descriptive sciences of such Law. Both the positive law and the science of the law are open systems299, interacting with society, in which it is always necessary to harmonize the requirements of juridical security, the foundation of certainty,300 with the requirements of justice, the foundation of the law, not only when constitutions are established. As for certainty, both positive law and the science of the law use natural language, but they also use a specialized, more precise language, although not exempted from ambiguity and vagueness. There are procedures intended to eliminate ambiguity and to reduce vagueness, as it will be discussed when dealing with legislative definitions. Nevertheless, it is impossible to avoid interpretating norms or to consider the qualification of all the cases as automatic, as those supporting the traditional deductive juridical system expect, or perhaps, as some of the supporters of the modern deductive juridical system may dream about. The latter wish they had a formalized language and an axiomatic system capable of eliminating interpretation and application as art tasks, reducing the controversies to a mere calculation, as Leibniz desired.301 As for justice, unforeseen problems or undesired effects of the adopted solutions result in the emergence of law gaps that will have to be filled, so that the integration of the juridical system could neither be avoided. The taxonomic or classificatory model of a juridical system began with Quintus Mucius Scaevola Pontifex, at the beginning of the first century B.C., and culminated with Rudolf Von Ihering (1818-1892). Scaevola reduced the multiplicity of the civil law of his time to the unity of eighteen books,302 under the influence of his own family, especially his cousin, Quintus Mucius Scaevola Augur and the stoic Panaetius of 299 For the open system see: Ludwig von Bertalanffy, General Systems Theory, 6, The Model of Open System, Penguin University Books, 1973, pp. 146-162. 300 Flavio López de Oñate, La Certeza del Derecho (La Certezza del Diritto, Casa Editrice Gismondi, Roma, 1942), Traducción de Santiago Sentís Melendo y Marino Ayerra Redin, EJEA, Buenos Aires, 1953, p. 73. 301 Louis Couturat, La Logique de Leibniz, Félix Alcan, Éditeur, Paris, 1901, p. 98 y n. 3. 302 D.1.2.41. (D.1.2.41. "After these Quintus Mucius, son of Publii's, was the first one who, being a Maximum Pontiff, arranged methodically the whole Civil Law, reducing it to eighteen books.") D.1.2.41. "Después de éstos Quinto Mucio, hijo de Publio, fue el primero que siendo Pontífice Máximo, ordenó metódicamente todo el Derecho Civil, reduciéndolo a diez y ocho libros." D.1.2.41. "Pos hos Quintus Mucius, Publii filius, pontifex maximus ius civile primus constituit, generatim in libros decem et octo redigendo." El Digesto del Emperador Justiniano, 1.2.41. Traducido y Publicado por Bartolomé Agustín Rodriguez de Fonseca, Nueva Edición Aumentada con la Traducción de los Proemios, Completada y Revisada con Arreglo a los Textos más Autorizados de las Ediciones Modernas, Imprenta de Ramón Vicente, Madrid, 1872, Tomo. I, p. 39. D.1.2.41. "Pos hos QUINTUS MUCIUS Publii filius pontifex maximus ius civile primus constituit generatim, in libros decem et octo redigendo.", in: Corpus Iuris Civilis, Editio Stereotipa Octava, Volumen Primum, Digesta, 1.2.41, Recognovit, Theodorus Mommsen, Apud Weidemanos, Berolini, 1899, p. 4. Rhodes.303 It was a work much admired in the ancient world so, there, for the first time, as for the content, civil law was synthesized, which avoided the task of resorting to previous special works304 and, as for the form, a turn was made from casuistry to a systematical classification by genres305 and species, which although critized,306 made it possible to notice the existence of the respective principles, in such a way that the knowledge of the law was raised from an empirical state, which fails to provide reasons, to a technical state, which is capable of giving them. In the XIX century, Ihering found in natural history, a discipline that describes the things of the mineral, vegetable and animal kingdom,307 the model of the juridical techique: "[...] in the same way a naturalist classifies the objects of natural history, we must coordinate all the juridical bodies in a one and only systematical order."308 The taxonomic model, which considers the juridical system as a classificatory system, similar to botany or zoology, is the conception that prevails in the European continental juridical science.309 This is the reason why, nearly a century after Ihering, it could be held that: "And when the jurist rises to concepts of a higher and more comprehensive order, such as rights in rem, obligations, juridical capacity, private or public law, etc., he does nothing else but follow the same logical process of abstraction and generalization. There is no difference between the logical work and the construction of concepts, of institutes and of the systems inasmuch as there is no difference in the 303 Gabriel Lepointe, Quintus Mucius Scaevola, Sa Vie et son Oeuvre Juridique, Ses doctrines sur le Droit Pontifical, Thèse por le Doctorat, Société Anonyme du Recueil Sirey, Paris, 1926, p. 41. 304 Gabriel Lepointe, Quintus Mucius Scaevola, Sa Vie et son Oeuvre Juridique, Ses doctrines sur le Droit Pontifical, Thèse por le Doctorat, Société Anonyme du Recueil Sirey, Paris, 1926, p. 44. 305 Antonio Guarino, Storia del Diritto Romano, 4a. Ed., Casa Editrice Dott. Eugenio Jovene, Napoli, 1969, p. 321. 306 Fritz Schulz, History of Roman Legal Science, Oxford University Press, First Published 1946, Corrected Sheets of the First Edition with New Addenda, 1953, 1963, Oxford, p. 64. 307 (Natural history) Historia Natural. Enciclopedia Universal Ilustrada Europeo-Americana, Espasa-Calpe, Tomo XXVII, p. 1793. Histoire, 10, Fig., dans: E. Littré, Dictionnaire de la Langue Français, Tome Deuxième, D-H, Librairie Hachette et Cie., p. 2028. 308 "[...] de le même manière que le naturaliste classe les objects d'histoire naturelle, nous devons coordonner tous ls corps juridiques dans un ordre systematique unique." The translation from French into English was done by the autor of this book. R. Von Ihering, "Nôtre Programme" (Jahrbücher fur die Dogmatik des Heutingen Romischen und Deutschen Rechts, T.I. Jena 1837, Gesammelte Aufsätze. T. I, p. 1. Jena 1881.), Études Complémentaires de L'esprit du Droit Romain, IV, Mélanges, traduit par O. de Meulenaere, Librairie A. Maresq, Aîné, Chevalier'Maresqu et Cie., Éditeurs, Paris, 1902, p. 10. R. Von Ihering, L'esprit du Droit Romain dans les Diverses Phases de son Développement, Tome III, Livre Deuxième, Systéme du Droit Stricte (Suite), Titre III, Technique du Droit Ancien, Traduit de la 3e. Édition avec l'autorisarion de l'auteur par O. Meulenaere, Librairie A. Maresq, Aîné, Chevalier'Maresqu et Cie., Éditeurs, Paris, Gand: F. Clemm, 1877, 355 pp. Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), before Ihering, showed that the means of invention and the method models, toghether with metaphysics, physics, and medicine, were discovered by him in natural history, in Linneo. Jérémie Bentham, Traités de Législation Civile et Penale par Ét. Dumont, dans: Oeuvres de Jérémie Bentham, Troisème Édition, Société Belge de Librairie Hauman et Ce., Bruxelles, 1840,Tome Premier, pp. 6-7. 309 Ricardo Orestano, Introduzione allo Studio Storico del Diritto Romano, Ristampa della Seconda Edizione, G. Giappichelli, Torino, 1963, p. 244. classification of animals that a naturalist does as regards orders, types of families, species. Formation and classification of juridical concepts: here lies a jurist's main job."310 Classifications are useful to express the natural relations among things and to allow the subsumption of particular things with ease and certainty.311 A juridical classificatory system is not aimed at deducing as principal function, but rather at showing the similarities and differences among its elements. It makes easier to find the norm sought for its application, provides an implicit context to interpret it and, should the norm not exist, it provides an implicit context to create it by analogy and thus insert it in the proper place, that is to say, to integrate it, which in turn, will also allow it to be remembered, interpreted, applied, suspended, repealed, restored or to create another by analogy. The classificatory conception facilitates the discovery of both the norm which serves as the major premise and of the one which serves as the minor premise. The subsumption is also facilitated by virtue of the mental habit that is acquired upon contrasting the similarities and differences of the abstract elements of the juridical system with the concrete facts, acts and activities, to determine whether the individual case, only identical to itself, coincides or not with the description contained in the relevant norm. Therefore, it is worth of remembering that, as it has been said for another taxonomic discipline: "Before continuing, it should be convenient to distinguish two processes which, in Biology, are often confused: "classification" and "determination". The first implies ordering or arranging living beings in definite classes which, finally, will constitute a system. Determination is a task subsequent to the classification and consists in specifying the position of an organism within a system possibly in use. Unities are classified, specimens are determined. Classification is a synthesis activity, whereas determination is basically analytical. Thus, when the keys of a manual of the flora of a region are used, the plant that has been collected or observed, already classified, is being determined. Only when unknown specimens are found, are they classified, named and given position within the system. Since taxonomic hierarchies are defined as concepts of classes of individuals, a plant or concrete an animal is "determined" [,] not "identified", since there are not two beings exactly equal in nature, even though they may seem so. Identity only works with regard to an individual."312 310 "E quando il giurista assurge a concetti di ordine piú comprensivo ed levato, come diritto reale, obbligazione, capacitá giuridica, diritto privatto o pubblico, etc., non fa che seguire lo stesso processo logico di astrazzione e generalizzazione. Nessuna differenza di lavoro logico esiste tra la costruzioni dei concetti, degli istituto e dei sistemi come niun divario corre tra la classificazione che degli animali, fa il naturalistia in ordini, tipi famiglie, specie. Formazione e classificazione di concetti: ecco il lavoro principale del giurista." The translation from Italian into English was done by the autor of this book. G. Maggiore, La Dottrina del Metodo Giuridico e la sua Revisione Critica", Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia del Diritto, 1926, p. 379. 311 Christoph Sigwart, Logic, Second Edition, Revised and Enlarged, Translated by Helen Dendy, Vol. II, Logical Method, Chapter V Systematization, Swan Sonnenschen & Co., London, Macmillan, New York, 1895, p. 508. 312 "Antes de continuar es conveniente distinguir dos procesos que, en Biología, se confunden a menudo: "clasificación" y "determinación". Lo primero implica ordenar o disponer los seres vivos en clases definidas que, por último, constituirán un sistema. La determinación es una labor posterior a la clasificación y consiste en precisar la ubicación de un organismo dentro de un sistema eventualmente en The parts of the juridical system or the dogmatic science that describes them, in which maximum certainty is demanded (as in criminal law and tax law) do not admit analogy for interpretation, integration and application purposes, but are neither considered deductive subsystems conceived as syllogisms chains, but as tables of crimes or taxes, i.e., as classificatory systems. Whenever the principles of reservation and legality are respected, advisers, legislators and authors of juristic writings, motivated by the gap noticed upon examining the crimes and taxes contemplated in the juridical system in view of the conducts observed in the social system, may promote the passage of new types of crimes or taxes closed, never open, similar to the ones already in force. In the criminal and tax subsystems, analogy is restricted, as far as the art of judging (ars judicandi) is concerned, but it is admitted as an art of investigating or inventing laws (ars inveniendi), since the examples provided by history and by comparative law are the main source of knowledge for advisers and legislators. The contemporary positive law is almost unmanageable, due to the diversity of sources and the number of accumulated norms. Today, more that ever, it is necessary to consider it as a classificatory system, to easily know and remember its main guidelines,313 by means of a synoptic vision, which is some sort of a map or mental description of the set,314 a guide to go through it and to remember its routes and accidents, since the following affirmation of Linneo is also applicable to the law: "A system is Ariadne's thread to Botany, without it this science is nothing but chaos. Those who have stretched this thread deserve the acknowledgement of all centuries; without it Botany would not offer but meanders in the middle of which it would be impossible not to be shipwrecked."315 uso. Las unidades se clasifican, los ejemplares se determinan. La clasificación es una actividad de síntesis, mientras que la determinación es básicamente analítica. Así, cuando se emplean las claves de un manual de la flora de una región, se está determinando la planta que se ha coleccionado u observado, la cual está ya clasificada. Sólo cuando se encuentran especímenes no conocidos aún, se los clasifica, dándoles un nombre y un puesto en el sistema. Como las jerarquías taxonómicas son por definición conceptos de clases de individuos, una planta o animal concreto se "determina" [,] no "identifica", ya que no hay en la naturaleza dos seres exactamente iguales, por más afines que sean. La identidad sólo funciona con respecto al individuo." Spanish into English translation by the author of this book. Elías R. de la Sota, La Taxonomía y La Revolución en las Ciencias Biológicas, Departamento de Asuntos Científicos, Unión Panamericana, Secretaría General, Organización de los Estados Americanos, Serie Biología, Monografía No. 3, Washington, 1967, p. 2. 313 Cicero, De Legibus (Laws) II, XVIII 45-46 Cicero, De Legibus (Laws) II, XVIII 45-46, in De Re Publica, De Legibus, with an English Translation by Clinton Walker Reyes, The Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann Ltd., London, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1966, pp. 428-429. Marco Tulio Cicerón, Las Leyes, II, 18, 45-46, Traducción, Introducción y Notas por Alvaro d'Ors, Instituto de Estudios Políticos, Reimpresión de la Primera Edición de 1953, Madrid, 1970, pp. 164-167. 314 Leibniz, Nova Methodus Discendae Docendaeque Jurisprudentiae (1667), Gottfried Whilhem Leibniz, Philosophische Schriften, Herausgegeben von der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenchaften, Erster Band 1663-1672, Otto Reichl Verlag Darmstadt, 1930, p. 296. Roscoe Pound, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Law, New Haven and London, Yale University Press, Seventh Printing, March 1965, p. 25. 315 "Un Système eft le fil d'Arianne pour la Botanique, sans lui cette science n'est qu'un chaos. Ceux qui ont tendu ce fil méritent la reconoissance de tous les siècles; sans lui la Botanique n'offriroit que des moendres au milieu desquelles il seroit impossible de ne pas égarer." French into English translation by the author of this book. Neither will a level of certainty be reached, nor will computer systems for the storage and retrieval of information be fit for improving it, if users lack a theoretical model of the juridical system that works like an implicit context, in which it is possible to include the relevant information obtained. If, in the past, ignorance of the law consisted in not having current juridical texts available, on file by and for a minority, now such ignorance arises from the huge number of texts, the validity of which is impossible to determine with certainty in every case, especially in those regarding a tacit repeal. It is indispensable to promote the certainty of the law,316 providing the juridical system with such reasonable precision and fixedness as may facilitate the knowledge of the juridical qualification of hypothetical behaviors, since certainty finds its foundation in the juridical security that makes it possible to foresee the juridical consequences of human actions, so that law-abiding subjects may direct their respective conducts, because, as Bacon said: "Certainty is so essential to law, that law cannot even be just without it. "For if the trumpet give an uncertain sound, who shall prepare himself to the battle ?" 1 So if the law give an uncertain sound, who shall prepare to obey it? It ought therefore to warn before it strikes. It is well said also, "That is the best law which leaves least to the discretion of the judge; 2 and this comes from the certainty of it. 1 Corinth., xiv.8. 2 Arist. Rhet.I. 1."317 To satisfy the function of certainty, based on the juridical security that it offers, a juridical system must comprise certain properties: consistency (absence of contradictions or antinomies); completeness (absence of loopholes or gaps); and economy (absence of unnecessary or superfluous elements).318 It is interesting to remember that, in the ancient law of Athens, the thesmothetai were the magistrates in charge of the drafting, publication and conservation of the laws,319 Linné, Philosophia Bothanica, p. 98, Revue Générale des Ecrits de Linné par Richard Poultney, Traduit de l'Anglais par L. A. Millin de Grandmaison, avec Notes et Additions du Traducteur, Paris, 1799, note 105, p. 170. 316 Flavio López de Oñate, La Certeza del Derecho (La Certezza del Diritto, Casa Editrice Gismondi, Roma, 1942), Traducción de Santiago Sentís Melendo y Marino Ayerra Redin, EJEA, Buenos Aires, 1953, pp. 71-89. 317 Bacon, Translation of The Augmentis Scientiarum, Book VIII, Chap. III, [...] Example of a Treatise on Universal Justice or The Fountains of Equity, By Aphorisms: One Title of It] [...] Title I. Of the Primary Dignity of Laws, that they Be Certain [...], Aphorism 8, in [Bacon] The Works of Francis Bacon, Collected and Edited by Robert Leslie Ellis, and Douglas Denon Heath, Vol V, Translation of the Philosophical Works, Vol. II., New Edition, Longman & Co.; etc., London, 1883, p. 90. 318 The Section Juridique, Centre National de Recherches de Logique, directed by Chaim Perelman published two collective works, one on antinomies and other one on gaps, which include a final synthesis essay in each one by Perelman himself: Les Antinomies en Droit, Dialectica, 69/72, Vol. 18, No. 1-4, 1964, 408 pp. Le Problème des Lacunes en Droit, Etablissements Emile Bruylant Aristotle, Bruxelles, 1968, 554 pp. 319 Aristotle, Constitution of Athens, 3-4. Aristotle, Conatitution of Athens, 3-4, in Aristotle's Constitution of Athens and Related Texts, Translated with an Introduction and Notes by Kurt Von Fritz and Ernst Kapp, Hafner Publishing Company, New York, 1950, pp. 69-72. Aristóteles, La Constitución de Atenas, 3-4, Edición, Traducción y Notas, con Estudio Preliminar, por Antonio Tovar, Instituto de Estudios Políticos, Madrid, 1948, p. 49. which they meticulously checked every year, to verify whether a law was inconsistent whith another, or was not longer in force among the current ones, or whether more than one law was related to the same action. They had to file a detailed report to the Assembly of the People so that a legislative commission of nomothetai could be appointed, entrusted with voting the laws that would be eliminated and those which would remain in force, in such a way that only a law would remain in force for each action.320 Any citizen could propose laws before the Assembly of the People in which all the legislation was ratified when it was convened at the beginning of each year.321 Legislative contradictions or antinomies are defects that must be avoided,322 since the consistency of the system contributes both to the predictability of the qualification of conducts and to promoting a feeling of equality among its recipients,323 through the restriction of arbitrary interpretations and applications. In philosophy, the principle of Ockham's razor, with which he presumably shaved Plato's beard, asserts that entities must not be multiplied unnecessarily.324 Although it is Aristote, Constitution d'Athènes, III, 4, Texte Traduit par Georges Mathieu et Bernard Haussoullier, Sociètè d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Paris, 1922, p. 3. 320 Aeschines, Against Ctesiphon, 38-39. [Aesquines] The Speeches of Aeschines, with English Translations by Charles Darwin Adams, III. Against Ctesiphon, 38-39, The Loeb Classical Library, William Heineman, London, G. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1919, pp. 337-339. Eschine, Discours Contre Ctésiphon, Traduit par M. Sommer, Librairie Hachette et Cie., Paris, 1908, pp. 47-49. Eschine, Discours, Tome II, Texte Établie et Traduit par Victor Martin et Guy de Budé, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", III. Contre Ctésiphon, 38-39, Paris, 1928, pp. 28-29. 321 Demosthenes, Against Timocrates, 20-23; 25. Demosthenes, Against Timocrates, 20-23; 25, in Demosthenes with an English Translation by J. H. Vince, The Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, G. P., Harvard University Press, Massachusetts, 1935, pp. 385-387. Demóstenes, Contra Timócrates, 20-23; 25, en Demóstenes, Discursos Políticos, Introducción Traducción y Notas de A. López Eire, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1985, Tomo III, pp. 130-132. 322 Contradiction is the most feared of all defects: Meijer, De la Codification en Général et de Celle de l'Angleterre en Particulier, Série de Lettres Adrésses à Mr. C.P. Cooper par J.D. Meijer, Diederichs Frères, Éditeurs, Amsterdam, 1830, pp. 187-188. Antonio Texeira da Freitas, Nova Apostilla a Censura do Senhor Alberto de Moraes Carvalho Sobre o Proyecto do Codigo Civil Portuguez, Rio do Janeiro, 1859, p. 116. 323 Henri Battifol, Aspect Philosophiques du Droit International Privé, Éditions Dalloz, Paris, 1956, pp. 291-292. 324 "Odd Entia sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem", which correctly represents Ockham's thought, has not been found in any of his writings. In the most similar fragment he asserted: "Nunquam ponenda est pluralitas sine necessitatem, Supper Quattuor Sententiarum, Ed. Lugud, 1495, i, dist 27, qu. 2, K., but it could not be denied that he bore in mind the principle of economy: "Frustra fic per plura quod potest fieri per pauciora", Summa Tottius Logica, i, 12." William Kneale and Martha Kneale, The Development of Logic, Oxford University Press, First Published 1962, From Corrected Sheets of The First Edition 1964, 1966, 1968, 1971 (with corrections), p. 243; p. 243 n.2. Jöel Biard points out that Ockham attributes the principle of economy to Aristotle in Quaestiones in libros Physicorum Aristotelis, d. St. Brown, "Opera Philosophica", VI, St Bonaventure, New York, 1984, qu. 11, p. 420 and qu. 38, p. 496, with reference to Physica, I, 188th 17-18, but he considers that it is difficult to provide a general statement of the above mentioned principle, which, on the other hand, although later attributed to Ockham, may be also found in Duns Escoto. See: Guillaume d'Ockham, Somme de Logique, Première partie, traduit du Latin pair Jöel Biard, 2e. Édition revue et corrigé, Trans-Europ-Repress, Bramepan, F-32120 Mauvezin, 1988 1re. èdition, 1993, 2e. èdition, p. 10, n. 2. true that it is a more esthetic than logical principle,325 linked to the elegance of the system, since from a strictly logical point of view it is not essential, it is also an economic principle. In the juridical world it is highly inconvenient to cumulate unnecessary materials, since one ends being crushed by a continuosly growing mass, succumbing under the weight of its own wealth,326 as it presently happens withlegislative hyperinflation. PRINCIPLE: The essential properties of the juridical system, namely consistency or unity (absence of contradictions or antinomies), and completeness or universality (absence of loopholes or gaps), have only one and the same base, unity, which will be negatively restored by removing the contradictions or antinomies and, positively, by filling the loopholes or gaps).327 RULE: Advisers and legislators shall excercise control over economy and elegance. Negatively, by abstaining from legislating, unless it turns to be indispensable, in order to avoid adding superfluous elements to the juridical system; and, positively, by promoting the enactment of arranged texts, compilations, digests, consolidations, codifications and institutional laws, in order to simplify and grant certainty to the juridical system. The procedures designed for the elimination of antinomies by means of interpretation are also useful for advisers and legislators, either because they may use them to remove the existing ones from the system, by promoting the enactment of an interpretative law, or to prevent the bill proposed from having internal contradictions, or conflicting with other bills or with the juridical order. The plenitude of the juridical order does not mean that there are no gaps but, that when they do appear, judges or legislators must fill them in. It is convenient to distinguish the doubtful cases, which call for interpretation, from the unforeseen cases, which call for the integration of the gaps. RULE: Advisers and legislators shall not promote the enactment of a law should they verify that it is possible to integrate the gaps by means of case law in a timely fashion. RULE: Advisers and legislators shall take into consideration the taxonomic model of juridical system, as an implicit context, when they compose and criticize, advise and dissuade the enactment of general juridical norms. 325 Robert Blanché, L'axiomatique, Presses Universitaires de France, 1re. édition 1955, 3e. édition 1965, p. 44. 326 R. von Ihering, L'esprit du Droit Romain dans they Diverses Phases of sound Développement, south Traduit the 3rd one. Édition avec l'Autorisation de l'Auteur, pair O. de Meulenare, Liv. II, Ie. Part., Titre III, Technique, Chap. I., Sect. 2.th. End of the Technique, # 43, Tome III, A. Marescq, Ainé, Éditeur, Paris, F. Clemm, Gand, 1877, p. 22. 327 F. C. de Savigny, Traité de Droit Romain, Traduit de l'Allemand par Ch. Guenoux, Librairie de Firmin Didot Frères, Paris, 1855, Tome Premier, p. 253. Somehow, unity, coherence and completeness would be a reflex of the three fundamental logical principles of identity, non contradiction and excluded third or middle, see: Gaetano Carcaterra, Metodologia Giuridica, da Corso di Studi Superiori Legislativi, 1988-89, a cura di Marco d'Antonio, etc., Cedam-Casa Editrice Dott. Antonio Milani, Padova, 1990, p. 159. Systematizing laws Systematizing laws reduce a multiplicity of texts or norms, principles and institutions, to the unity of a law in force in just one arranged text, compilation, digest, code or institutional law. There are two species: the external and the internal systematizing laws. External systematizing laws Sistematizing laws are external when they just gather in a single text in force the scattered texts of a law which was subjected to many amendmends, without introducing any changes in its wording, except for such grammatical, numerical and nomenclature updates as are necessary to carry out the arrangement (arranged texts);328 when they just gather in a single collection all texts in force related to certain matter scattered in multiple laws that do not modify the same law, arranged in accordance with a chronological plan, without introducing changes in their wording (compilations); and when they are arranged in accordance with a systematic plan (digests). They are internal when they reduce to the unity of a new complete legislative body, without antinomies and redundancies, a multiplicity of scattered norms, principles and institutions, and the law in force is rewritten, without introducing any changes to its content, in accordance with a proper systematic plan of exposition (consolidations); when they consolidate and introduce changes in content of the law in force, or only introduce changes in the content of the law in force and regulate a complete branch of the law (codifications); and when they legislate in the same fashion as codifications, but only regulate up to the level of institutions (institutional laws). Arranged texts Whenever a law has been subjected to amendements to such an extent that it is uncertain or troublesome to determine the text in force, it is necessary to systematize it, reducing the multiplicity of amendments to the unity of the amended text, so as to get a single text in force (arranged text). The original text of the law is then compared to the amendments, and numerical and gramatical modifications as well as nomenclature updates indispensable to obtain a single text in force are introduced. In addition to the single text in force, the legal sources of the included and excluded texts, as well as the updated nomenclature, are described in attached charts. From a theoretical point of view it is a task of philological nature, which turns out very practical if performed as if it were the critical edition of a classical work.329 328 In the Italian law they are known as "testi unici": Rodolfo Pagano, Introduzione alla legistica. L'arte di preparare le leggi, Dott. A. Giuffrè, Milano, 1999, 1.9.3., p. 65. In Spanish law "texto refundido": Curso de Técnica Legislativa, Gretel, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid, 1989, p. 315. 329 For those who lack philological knowledge, see: Gustave Rudler, Les Techniques de la Critique et de l'Histoire Littéraires en Littérature Française Moderne, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1923, XIV + 204 pp.; Chapitre IV Critique de RestitutionPrincipes des Éditions Critiques, pp. 59-97; Chapitre V Critique de Restitution (Suite). Un Peu de Philologie, pp. 98-116. PRINCIPLE: The changes to be introduced in arranged texts shall be the least indispensable ones and shall be exhaustively explained, leaving no doubts as regards their only purpose, which consists in establishing with certainty which the updated single text in force of the original amended law is. The task seems very simple, but many times difficulties arise, since it is necessary to find the amending texts, which could be anywhere within the juridical order and, although reduced to the indispensable minimum number, the interpretation about the scope of the amendments introduced may not be eliminated. Since there should not be any remaining doubts, the intervention of the legislative organ is needed, either directly or through the express delegation of the power to draft the relevant arranged text, this being not a question of a mere republication, but a very delicate technical operation. The approval of arranged texts on a regular basis, like in the case of tax and social security laws, contributes to juridical certainty. Approving arranged texts sporadically, erratically, without a plan, or authorizing such approval by norms of a rank lower than Executive Orders, adds uncertainty instead of eliminating it, since, if the arranged text does not reach its potential recipients, a new factor of disturbance is created for everyone. RULE: The bodies in charge of the publication of the laws shall keep and disseminate an updated list of all arranged texts, describing the following information in detail: title, norm by which they were approved, means of publication, date and page thereof; effective term, and chronological-numerical indexes of topics and of updated nomenclature. Uncertainty is also generated whenever there is a text in force that already solves a specific problem but, due to ignorance of or fear about its validity, unnecessary laws are introduced, a vicious practice also used when the objective is to avoid an amendment to a relevant law in force, contributing to legislative hyperinflation and to a higher entropy or disorder of the juridical system. Juridical certainty could be fostered if the new amending laws were clear-cut about the resulting amended text, establishing the respective arranged text without hampering the urgent need to legislate. RULE: The new amending laws shall approve the arranged text of the laws amended by them. Whenever reasons of urgency, which shall be expressly stated in its motivations, made the approval of the arranged text inconvenient, the prescriptive part shall determine which body shall be entrusted with such a task, and shall set a reasonable term for such fullfilment, under the warning of specific penalties in the event of unjustified nonfullfilment. Compilations When the norms related to a certain matter are scattered in multiple laws and fail to amend a same law, since if it were the same amended law one could resort to the method of the arranged texts, it is necessary to systematize them, creating a collection with all the texts in force, to facilitate their consultation (compilation), with two indexes, one of them containing a numerical-chronological order of laws included there and the other one, an alphabetical order of the topics dealts with. Digests When a compilation is insufficient to facilitate consultations, then it becomes necessary to arrange the collection in accordance with a systematical plan (digest), with three indexes: first, a systematical index of the whole work; second, a chronologicalnumerical index of the laws included in it and third, and alphabetical index listing the topics dealts with in alphabetical order. It has already been said that the arranged texts are similar to critical editions of classical works; now it could be affirmed that compilations and digests are similar to anthologies. Internal systematizing laws The internal systematizing laws comprise three species: institutional laws, consolidations and codifications. Institutional laws The laws that reach the level of abstraction of institutions (institutional laws) reduce a multiplicity of norms to the unity of a single text in force, grouping them around principles, either new or traditional although with certain innovations, respectively done by the laws on organ transplants, on protection of privacy, etc., and by those of bankruptcy proceedings, companies, etc., in decodifyng processes. Consolidations The inclusion of juridical norms within the relevant institution; the institutions within a branch; the branches within an internal, local, provincial, regional or national order; and internal orders within an international, regional or universal order, may be uncertain, since they are hard to find and, since once they are found, their texts in force may not be determined with a reasonable degree of certainty. Furthermore, if there is not a basic original law allowing to resort to the method of arranged texts and the interpretation of scattered laws, which often overlap with one another, is quite uncertain all of which prevents from the use of compilations or digests then it turns out necessary to resort to a more complex technical operation: consolidation. A consolidation consists in reducing a multiplicity of scattered norms, principles and institutions, to the unity of a new legislative body, without antinomies and redundancies, thus drafting again the law in force, without introducing a new content, within an only explicit legislative context, in accordance with a proper systematic expository plan, in harmony with the juridical system, implicit context of the speech. If arranged texts are similar to critical editions of classical works and the compilations and digests to anthologies, consolidations are like those masterly treatises that reshape the content of scattered topics in articles, monographs and other treatises that, without introducing new knowledge, establish the current status of the matter. Many times, tasks are delayed on account of the obstacles that usually come up. Before such tasks are commenced, it may be necessary to enact laws which facilitate consolidation and, afterward, should the government promote laws on the same matter, it will be necessary to wait for their enactment to include them. Among other obstacles, it may be remembered that usually drafters are only a few, that high-ranking officials of the departments in charge of the enforcement of the laws to be consolidated are usually under pressure and have to deal with other priority tasks and therefore are unable to give advise with its thorough knowledge of the current law, etc..330 Consolidations are measures abstractly praised by everyone, but which nobody feels like complying with. Added to the technical difficulties mentioned before, is the lack of interest of political authorities, who think they cannot obtain any benefits, and of theirs advisers, who refuse to change the form of the laws with which they are familiar and whose preparation might imply a lot of time, both theirs and of their subordinates.331 RULE: The preparation of arranged texts, compilations, digests and consolidations shall be entrusted to only one public, technical and specialized body which, as primarily responsible for such task, may require cooperation from other public or private entities, as well from specialists. Codifications Unity is achieved by bringing together all the scattered modifying texts in force, related to a same law, in a single text of the modified law (arranged texts); by bringing together all the scattered texts in force related to a subject, in a single collection arranged in numerical-chronological fashion (compilation) or systematical (digest); by gathering all the texts in force on certain subject in a single legislative body, without antinomies and redundancies, in accordance with a proper systematical plan (consolidation). In arranged texts, compilations and digests, as well as in consolidations, it is always a question of the law in force, without filling in the gaps that may exist at the moment of their approval. Although codification332 also grants certainty to a part of the law in force at the time of its approval, since the historical experience shows that it is very difficult to change it 330 The Preparation of Legislation, Report of a Committee Appointed by The Lord President of the Council, Chairman: The Rt. Hon Sir David Renton, Presented to Parliament by the Lord President of the Council by Command of Her Majesty, May 1975, Her Majesty's Sationery Office, Cmnd. 6053, Chapter XIV Consolidation, The Main Obstacles, London, 1975, pp. 89-92. 331 Courtney Ilbert, The Mechanics of Law Making, Columbia University Press, New York, 1914, pp. 3940. 332 With a highly selective criterion, see: Thibaut y Savigny, La Codificación, Una Controversia Programática Basada en sus Obras sobre la Necesidad de un Derecho Civil General para Alemania y De la Vocación de Nuestra Época para la Legislación y la Ciencia del Derecho, Con Adiciones de los Autores y Juicios de sus Contemporáneos, Introducción y Selección de Textos de Jacques Stern, Traducción del Alemán de José Díaz García, Aguilar S.A. de Ediciones, Madrid, 1970, Advertencia Preliminar xiv + Introducción y Textos, 282 pp., Índice Sistemático. Bentham, De la Codification, dans Oeuvres de Jérémie Bentham par Ét. Dumont, Société Belge de Librairie, Hauman et. Cie., Troisème Édition, Bruxelles, 1840, Tome Troisième, pp. 91-123. Portalis, Discours Préliminaire, Code Civil, dans La Législation Civile, Commerciale et Criminelle de La France ou Commentaire et Complément des Codes Français, par Le Baron Locré, Treutel et Wurtz, Libraires, Strasbourg et Londres, Paris, 1827, Tome I, pp. 251-316. Meijer. De la Codification en Général et de Celle de l'Angleterre en Particulier, Série de Lettres Adrésses à Mr. C.P. Cooper par J.D. Meijer, Diederichs Frères, Éditeurs, Amsterdam, 1830. Helmut Coing, An Intellectual History of European Codification in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, Problems of Codification, Edited by S.J. Stoljar, Department of Law, Research School of Social Sciences, The Australian National University, Canberra, 1977, pp. 16-32. Barbara Shapiro, "Codification of the Laws in Seventeenth Century England", Wisconsin Law Review, Volume 1974, pp. 428-465. S.A. Baytich, "La Codificación en el Derecho Civil y en el Common Law (Estudio Comparativo)", Traducción de Jorge Larrea Bravo, Boletín Mexicano de Derecho Comparado, Año III, No. 7, Enero- completely, it also has another purpose, its main purpose: to enact a reform that, in addition to granting certainty, may do justice. Antinomies and redundancies are thus removed, but gaps of the juridical system are also filled in, introducing changes in both the form and content of the law in force. In the XIX century, the multiplicity of sources of the law legislation, custom and case law corresponding to the fundamental branches of the juridical system, were limited to the unity by means of the eactment of the civil, commercial, criminal and procedural codes. From the XX century on, no branch of the law is usually demanded for every code; it is sufficient if it regulates a matter of social importance, like traffic, customs, food, etc. A triple process is also noticed: recodification, which unifies the civil branch with the commercial one in private law codes; decodification, which separates certain institutions from codes, like legislation on: adoption, bankuptcy, corporations, negotiable instruments, etc.; and institutionalized, where new sets of norms appear regarding facts, acts and activities of social importance grouped according to certain principles, such as organ transplantation, privacy protection of computerized information, etc. Arranged texts are like critical editions of classic texts, compilations and digests are similar to anthologies, and consolidations to masterly treatises that reshape the content of a scattered matter in articles, monographs and other treatises, without introducing any new knowledge. Codes are similar to masterly treatises that, in addition to stating the current knowledge, rectify the state of the relevant juridical science and introduce new knowledge which establish them as paradigms to be followed by scientists as models of the normal science that relegate previous paradigms to the history of the relevant discipline, until the appearance of another one causes a new scientific revolution.333 Unlike arranged texts, compilations, digests and consolidations, codifications grant political credit and personal prestige. Napoleon, in spite of his victories in times of war, considered that he would be remembered more as a legislator than as a soldier. Since the French Revolution, all attemps to codify the civil legislation had failed, but Napoleon, who wanted to achieve such codification as soon as possible, created a commission that drafted the bill in just four months, and he personally participated in the subsequent debate held at the Council of the State.334 Enacted as the French Civil Code, it increased the reputation of its promoter; it was later denominated "Napoleonic Code", the name with which it is known nowadays. He may have inspired in Machiavelli, who had written: Abril 1970, pp. 3-57, a wider and updated version of the original published in Civil Law and the Modern World, Ed. Yiannopoulus, sponsored by Lousiana Law Institute, 1965. 333 On the comparison between code and book, "[...] as Alberdi says Posthumous works, t. vii, p. 285 - "a book is a code of ideas", wherefrom it is inferred that a code is a book of juridical norms [...] " (Sobre la comparación entre código y libro, "[...] como dice Alberdi – Obras Póstumas, t. vii, p. 285 – "un libro es un código de ideas", de donde se infiere que un código es un libro de normas jurídica [...]"). Alfredo Colmo, Técnica Legislativa del Código Civil Argentino, Segunda Edición, Librería Bartolomé Mitre de Hall y Acevedo, Buenos Aires, 1927, p. 25 (in the reprint of Abeledo-Perrot, Buenos Aires, 1961, p. 38). About the paradigms, the normal science and the scientific revolutions, see: Thomas S. Kuhn, La Estructura de las Revoluciones Científicas (The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, by Thomas Khun, Chicago University Press, Chicago, 1962), y Posdata: 1969, Traducción de Agustín Contín, Primera Edición en Español, Fondo de Cultura Económica, México, 1971, 319 pp. 334 Jean Ray, south Essai Structure Logique du Code Civil Français, Librairie Félix Alcan, Paris, 1926, p. 26. "And no thing gives so much honor to a new man who emerges, as a new law and the new orders found by him. These things, when they are properly founded and have greatness in themselves, make him respectable and admirable."335 No bureaucrat would ever refuse to appear among the codifiers of his country. b. Fragmentary genre Laws are fragmentary when they do not systematize their norms or principles in institutions (casuistic laws and laws of principles),336 or when they introduce unsystematic changes to other laws, either partially in their texts, or otherwise in their validity (amending laws). Casuistic laws Casuistic laws usually emerge in the first stages of the development of a statute law, when, from the experience acquired from problematic cases and their previous individual solutions, the legislator passes a text vested with authority, with the maximum degree of concretion and the minimum degree of abstraction. Isolated norms multiply, even though they respond to the same principle, instead of using wide formulae that produce the logical concentration of the matter dealt with. Casuistic laws should not be confused with the prolix but internal systematizing laws, although they descend to the regulation of the details that come up, they have principles which serve as their basis, whose consequences the legislator prefers to specify in sets of explicit norms and around principles which serve as foundation to them (institutions), instead of leaving them to custom, case law or juristic writings. Laws which only contain principles, only norms, or principles and norms isolated which fail to be systematized in institutions, should not be confused with internal systematizing laws. RULE: Casuistic laws should not be confused with the prolix but internal systematizing laws. Nor shall the laws which only contain principles, only norms, or principles and 335 "[15] E veruna cosa fa tanto onore ad un uomo che di nuovo surga, quanto fa le nuove legge e li nuovi ordini trovati da lui; queste cose, quando sono bene fondate et abbino in loro grandezza, lo fanno reverendo e mirabile." Niccolò Machiavelli, De Principatibus, Testo Critico a cura di Giovanni Inglese, Istituto Storico Italiano per il Medio Evo, Fonti per la Storia dell'Italia Medievale, Antiquitates, 1, Roma, 1964, p. 309. Italian into English translation by the author of this book. Other editions: Machiavelli, Il Principe by Niccolò Machiavelli, Edited by L Arthur Burd, with an Introduction by Lord Acton, at The Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1891, p. 369. Nicolò Machiavelli, Il Principe, Tutte le Opere di Nicolò Machiavelli a cura di Guido Mazzoni e Mario Casella, G. Barbera Editore, Firenze, 1929, p. 50. Machiavelli, The Prince, Edited by Quentin Skinner and Russell Price, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, New York, New Rochelle, Melbourne, Sydney, First Published 1988, p. 89. Niccolò Machiavelli, Il Principe, Nuova edizione a cura di Giorgio Inglese, Einaudi Tascabili, Torino, 1995, pp. 171-172. 336 For the distinction between the casuistic method and the method of the laws of principles, see: R. von Ihering, L'Esprit du Droit Romain dans les Diverses Phases de son Développement, Traduit sur la 3a. Édition avec l'Autorisation de l'Auteur, par O. de Meulenare, Liv. II, Ie. Part., Titre III, Technique, Chap. I., Sect. 2. Concentration Logique, # 45, Tome III, A. Marescq, Ainé, Éditeur, Paris, F. Clemm, Gand, 1877, p. 44. norms isolated which fail be systematized in institutions, be confused with internal systematizing laws. Whenever a legislator faces new problems calling for urgent concrete solutions, but fails to have available new principles allowing him to implicitly include the relevant norms in laws of principles or to pass internal systematical laws such as institutional laws, in spite of not being in a primitive stage of the historical development, he usually resorts to casuistic laws to satisfy such urgent social need. RULE: Whenever new problems shall need urgent legislative solutions, and there is no possibility of enacting laws of principles or of having these ones serves as a foundation to enact institutional laws, then casuistic laws may be resorted to. Casuistic laws, when understood as exceptions to established principles, form a singular law (ius singulare). However it should be borne in mind that, when they appear for the first time, it may be the right historical moment for the inception of a new principle of a more abstract nature than the urgent solution of the concrete problem.337 This new principle, once explicit, will allow the legislator to concentrate the matter logically, by grouping norms which had been scattered, eliminating the superfluous ones and adding others that are a consequence of the aforesaid principles; so that new institutions will form, allowing the juridical system to overcome the exceptional situation raised by the existence of the singular law. RULE: Before opting for casuistic laws, it shall be verified whether it is the right historical moment for the inception of a new principle, which would allow norms to be grouped in institutions, in which case institutional laws shall be resorted to. Laws of principles Legislators may required neither to enact a special norm for each and every concrete situation that may emerge in real life, nor to show all principles so clearly that the consequences applicable to all the cases may derive from them.338 Therefore, principles and norms coexist in every mature juridical system. The natural place for principles is the persuasive speech, but sometimes, principles are included in the prescriptive speech in the form of concise formulae and norms are not systematized in institutions, when it is prefered that norms or institutions be inferred from custom, case law or juristic writings. RULE: Principles shall be included, without systematizing the norms in institutions, whenever a legislator may prefer that norms or institutions be inferred from custom, case law or juristic writings. 337 R. von Ihering, L'Esprit du Droit Romain dans they Diverses Phases of sound Développement, Traduit sur la 3rd one. Édition avec l'Autorisation de l'Auteur, par O. de Meulenare, Liv. II, Ie. Part., Titre III, Technique, Chap. I., Sect. 2--A. But de la Technique, # 43, Tome III, A Marescq, Ainé, Éditeur, Paris, F. Clemm, Gand, 1877, p. 30. 338 Judgment entered by the German Supreme Court, RGI. Zs. 2.2. 1889, RGZ 24, 50, quoted by: Josef Esser, Principio y Norma en la Elaboración Jurisprudencial del Derecho Privado (Grundsatz und Norm in der Richterlichen Fortbildung give Privarechts, J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), Tübingen, 1956), Traducción de Eduardo Valenti Fiol, Edit. Bosch, Barcelona, 1961, 498 pp., pp. 5-6, n. 2. Amending Laws Amending laws introduce unsystematic changes to the text or to the validity of other laws, as parts of a complex speech formed by the law introducing the changes (amending law) and those who turn out to be changed (amended laws). The basic principle of amending laws consists in the fact that they must be adapted to the respective amended laws and, therefore, should not introduce in them alien matters that may turn them difficult to retrieve, or different styles that may cause unnecessary interpretative doubts, since in both cases the juridical certainty of the system would be adversely affected. PRINCIPLE: Amending laws shall be adapted to the modified laws and no alien matters or different styles shall be introduced to them, so that the certainty of the juridical system may remain unaffected. Spatial validity Laws amending the spatial validity of other laws are usually used in serious situations, such as droughts, floods, epidemics, rebellions, wars, etc. Temporal validity Laws amending the temporal validity either suspend, extend or repeal the validity of the amended laws. Suspension There are some species of laws not very well-known or studied, the so-called laws of dispensation or laws of waiver, which suspend the application of other laws, either in whole or in part, without repealing or abrogating them.339 The laws of provisional dispensation, generally passed in times of crisis or serious disorders, suspend the application of ordinary or regular laws, which recover their validity once such crisis or disturbances have been overcome. They are also passed when legislators wish not to re-open the debate of a very controversial law but to avoid its application, as in the case of the Decree-law 4070/56 which suspended Section 31 of Law 14.394, which had admitted absolute divorce in the Argentine Republic. The laws of definitive dispensation, besides suspending the application of the ordinary or regular ones, establish different regulations that are not reached when the suspendend laws recover their application. They can be of defeasance (leges annulatoriae), as those of amnesty, which render punishments ineffective, or those related to the cancellation of debts, which render claims ineffective (Hebrew jubilee, Solon s Seisachtheia, etc.). They are confirmatory (leges confirmatoriae), when they make certain null and void acts produce legal effects, as in the case of notarized instruments made by French notaries before only one witness, against the law that required the presence of either a notary and two witnesses, or of two notaries. This ground for nullity could not have been ignored by judges, the norm having been so clear; however, its very serious consequences were avoided by a special Law of 339 Paul Roubier, Le Droit Transitoire (Conflit des Lois dans le Temps), 2e. Édition Entièrement Refondue, Éditions Dalloz et Sirey, Paris, 1960, pp. 17-21. Confirmation dated June 21, 1843. The retroactiveness of this type of laws has been justified, because it respects the intentions of the parties, despite any defects in the solemn formulae, and tends to peace and the settlement of past transactions.340 Extension in time Laws that extend the application of other laws in time are also amending laws,341 generally non textual, but they could be so, should the transitory disposition of the amended law be replaced for other extending its validity in time. Both merely transitory laws and those of dispensation are usually extended when the reasons for their enactment remain or when new reasons arises. Contemporary laws on fiscal moratorium (taxes, social security matters), have denatured their name, since they do not limit themselves to establish time extensions for payments, due to the fact that they also establish deductions, debts cancellations, and amnesties of applicable fines and interests. Repeal Under Roman law there used to be a distinction between abrogation (abrogatio), wich caused another law to be completely ineffective, and repeal (derogatio), which caused another law partially ineffective.342 Today it is frequent to speak of a total or partial repeal. 340 "Aphorism 49. Laws which strengthen and confirm the real intentions of acts and instruments against the defects of form and usages very properly includes past actions. For the principal inconvenience of a retrospective law is that it creates disturbance; but confirmatory laws of this sort tend rather to peace and the settlement of past transactions. We must however take care not to call in question matters already adjudged.", in Bacon, The Works of Francis Bacon, Collected and Edited by Robert Leslie Ellis, and Douglas Denon Heath, Vol V, Translation of The Philosophical Works, Vol. II., New Edition, Longman & Co.; etc., Translation of The Augmentis Scientiarum, Book VIII, Chap. III, London 1889, p. 97. "XILX. Leges quae actorum instrumentorum veras intentiones contra formularum aut solemnitatum defectus roborant et confirmant, rectissime praeterita complectuntur: legis enim quae restrospicit, vitium vel praecipuum est, quod perturbet. At hujusmondi leges confirmatoriae ad pacem et stabilimentum eorum quae transacta sunt espectant. Cavendum tamen est ne convellantur res judicata." [Bacon] Oeuvres Philosophiques de Bacon, Publiées d'Après les Textes Originaux, avec Notice, Summaires et Éclaircissemens, par N.M. Bouillet, Tome I., De Dignitate et Augmentis Scientiarum, Liber Octavus, Caput III, Exemplum Tractatus de Justitia Universalis, Sive de Fontibus Juris, In uno Titulo, per Aphorismos, Aphorismus XLIX, Livrairie Classique et Élémentaire de L. Hachette, Paris, 1834, p. 460. 341 GRETEL (Grupo de Estudios de Técnica Legislativa), La Forma de las Leyes, 10 Estudios de Técnica Legislativa, VII, Las Leyes Modificativas, Edit. Bosch, Barcelona, 1986, p. 203. M. Teresa Castiñeira Palou, Las Leyes Modificativas, in the collective work Curso de Técnica Legislativa, GRETEL (Grupo de Estudios de Técnica Legislativa), Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid, 1989, p. 178. 342 D.50.16.102. D.50.16.102. "Idem [Modestinus]; Reglas, Libro VII.Se deroga la ley o se abroga: se deroga quando se quita alguna parte de ella, se abroga quando enteramente se quita." ("The same [Modestinus]; Rules, Book VII. – A law may by repealed or abrogated: it is repealed when some part thereof is removed from it; it is abrogated when it is totally removed.") D.50.16.102. "Idem [Modestinus] I free VII Regularum. Derogatur legi, aut abrogatur; derogator legi, quum pars detrahitur, abrogatur legi, quam prorsus tollitur." El Digesto del Emperador Justiniano, Traducido y Publicado por el Licenciado don Bartolomé Agustín Rodríguez de Fonseca, Nueva Edición Aumentada con la Traducción de los Proemios, Completada y Revisada con arreglo a los Textos más Autorizados de las Ediciones Modernas, Imprenta de Ramón Vicente, Tomo III, Madrid 1874, p. 816. Whether the law expressly refers to the repeal of all opposed provisions or whether it says nothing in that regard, there will always be a tacit repeal of the opposed previous laws, due to the principle that establishes that later or subsequent laws repeal previous ones (lex posterior derogat priori). Tacit repeal RULE: There shall be a tacit repeal343 of a previous law, whenever a later law complies with all the following requisites: a) equality of matters; b) identity of recipients; c) contradiction and incompatibility of the ends sought; d) equal or higher normative hierarchy. Express repeal To avoid interpretive doubts about tacit and organic repeals as a result of the enactment of a later law, it is also preferable to expressly repeal all the norms related to the previous law that are not wished to be kept in force. RULE: Whenever a new law is enacted and the previous law is completely repealed, all the norms related to the previous law that are not wished to be kept in force shall be explicitly repealed, so as to avoid interpretative doubts. RULE: Whenever a purpose in a general law is to repeal a special law, the method of express repeal shall be used in the prescriptive text to avoid interpretative doubts. RULE: Whenever a law expressly repeals another law, it may state that it shall produce its effects inmediately, as from a term, or retroactively.344 This last hypothesis shall be exceptional and not always valid. Amendment method Amending laws, from the viewpoint of the method through which they may be formulated, present two species: textual amending laws and non-textual amending laws.345 D.50.16.102. "IDEM [Modestinus] liber septimo regularum "Derogatur" legi aut "abrogatur", derogatur legi, cum pars detrahitur: anbrogatur legi, cum prorsus tollitur." Corpus Christi Iuris Civilis, Editio Stereotipa Octave, Volume Primum, Digesta, Recognovit, Theodorus Mommsen, Apud Weidemanos, Berolini, 1899, p. 861. 343 Bernardo Supervielle, De la Derogación de las Leyes y demás Normas Jurídicas, Apartado del Libro Estudios Jurídicos en memoria de Juan José Amézaga, Montevideo, 1958, pp. 153, p. 34. 344 Raoul Ruttiens-Mansart, De l'Abrogation. Étude de Technique Législative, Recueil de Jurisprudence du Droit Administratif et du C. E., 4 e. Trimestre 1960, No. 4, pp. 209-212; p. 210. 345 For textual and non-textual modifications, see: The Preparation of Legislation, Report of a Committee Appointed by The Lord President of The Council, Chairman: The Rt. Hon Sir David Renton, Presented to Parliament by The Lord President of The Council by Command of Her Majesty, May 1975, Her Majesty's Sationery Office, Cmnd. 6053, Chapter XIII Amending Existing Legislation, London, 1975, pp. 76-84. Textual amending laws RULE: Textual amending laws shall partially and expressly amend the texts of the amended laws by means of suppression, addition, substitution, division, reunion or transposition.346 Suppression A suppression repeals part of the text of the modified law. Addition An amending law may add text to the amended law; this change has also been known as integration.347 Substituition Substitution consists in the repeal, generally partial, of the text of the amended law and the addition of the text introduced by the amending law. Whenever a law is completely changed by another one, the new law is usually passed and the old one is totally repealed, without substituing the text of the old for the text of the new, unless the name and the number of the old law are to be kept. Frequently, the text of the amended law is partially changed. Legislators proceeds as a publisher who publishes an erratum or an addendum, mentioning which parts of the text of the old law must be substituted by the text of the new law.348 It would be preferable to use legislative systematical units such as subsections, sections, etc., instead of grammatical units, like words, phrases etc. In this case the interpreter is entrusted with the task of reconstructing the text of the systematical unit as it will be after the substitution, but it is preferable that such task be directly carried out by legislators. If, furthermore, a comparative chart showing the differences between the old text and the new one is attached, the understanding of the scope of the amendments is facilitated, both for legislators and for the interpreter. RULE: Whenever a new law substitutes partially the text of an old law, the whole partial legislative systematical unit of the later shall be substituted and a comparative chart of both texts shall be attached in a special annex. 346 It refers to the ideas contained in bills, not to the text of modified laws, but their categories are also useful here: Bentham, De la Codification, dans Oeuvres de Jérémie Bentham par Ét. Dumont, Société Belge de Librairie, Hauman et. Ce., Troisième Édition, Tactique des Assemblées Politiques Délibérantes, Bruxelles, 1840, Tome Premier, p. 393. 347 Ermanno Bonazzi, L'Informatica delle Modifiche Legislative. Un Esperimento sulla Normativa Regionale, Rosenberg & Sellier, Torino, 1979, pp. 48-49. 348 The Preparation of Legislation, Report of a Committee Appointed by The Lord President of The Council, Chairman: The Rt. Hon Sir David Renton, Presented to Parliament by The Lord President of The Council by Command of Her Majesty, May 1975, Her Majesty's Sationery Office, Cmnd. 6053, Chapter XIV Consolidation, The Main Obstacles, London, 1975, 13.2, p. 76. Division RULE: Upon deliberation, everything that may be separated for better understanding, voting and application shall not be considered as a whole, to which end the provisions shall be divided until the simplest systematical units be reached. Reunion RULE: Whenever systematical units are scattered, they shall be reunited, in order to homogenize the explicit context. Transposition RULE: Whenever a systematical unit is not placed where it belongs according to the fundamental criterion adopted, such unit shall be transposed. Non-textual amending laws Non-textual amending laws introduce partial and implicit changes to the regulation of conducts which have already been regulated by other laws. Due to the complexity of the contemporary juridical system, worsened by the number and poor quality of the laws, it is very difficult to reach the knowledge of the law currently in force in a precise form and before its application. It is also difficult to exactly determine the effects that a new law will produce, since they will be like a stone thrown in a pond, which sinks at a certain spot, but the waves of which reverberate in almost the whole surface, or like an ink jet, which colours the surface wherever it falls and then vanishes away in water. Non-textual amending laws, usually enacted without this previous knowledge, would not have been enacted more than once had legislators foreseen their incidence on other norms.349 RULE: When permitted by the circumstances and the political intentions, textual amending laws shall be preferred, without referrals, as long as they shall preserve juridical certainty and forbid interpretations as may be feasible, but opposite to the purpose sought by legislators. 2. Persuasive speeches Persuasive speeches are adapted to the nature of prescriptive speeches and may be considered from two points of view: as prologues and as speeches per se. As prologues, like the preludes in music or overtures in concerts, operas and ballets, they introduce the works instead of beginning them directly in their main part. They smooth the way, prepare the audience, trying that they show themselves attentive (attentos), docile (docile) and benevolent (benivolos).350 As speeches per se, they try to teach (docere), please (delectare) and move (movere).351 349 Bernardo Supervielle, Derogación de las Leyes y demás Normas Jurídicas, Apartado del Libro Estudios Jurídicos en Memoria de Juan José Amézaga, Montevideo, 1958, 153 pp.; p. 33. 350 [Aristotle], Rhetoric to Alexander, Ch. 29; Ch. 36. [Aristotle], Rhetoric to Alexander, Ch. 29; Ch. 36., in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation, Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume Two, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, pp. 2296-2299; pp. 2306-2308. RULE: As prologues of prescriptive speeches, persuasive speeches, shall try that their addresees show themselves attentive, docile and benevolent and, as speeches per se, they shall try to teach, please and move. RULES: Persuasive speeches shall fulfill two functions: to counsel and to discounsel. To those who may be in a position to enact or reject bills they shall counsel, on the one hand, the enactment of the bill; and, on the other hand, they shall criticize and discounsel them, implicitly or explicitly, either to keep the current juridical system unchanged, or to come up whith other solutions different from the bill proposed. Legislators, when composing and counseling the enactment of a bill seeks, as supreme ideal, the introduction of the proposed changes and not of others to the juridical order; or, as a realistic alternative, the introduction of other changes, provided always that they are acceptable; but they shall only admit that no change be made, should those changes be unacceptable. The other recipients who shall also have to be persuaded are all members of public opinion, most of it, most of the wise men, the most distinguished of those, and those who will have to interpret and apply the laws, either spontaneously or forcibly. As persuasive speeches have certain characteristics of their own, it will be very useful to consider their species. Since the use of persuasive speeches has been questioned, the most frequent objections will be then refuted and it will be established when the above mentioned speeches turn out to be necessary. [Cicero], Rhetorica ad Herennium, Libro Primero, IV, 6. [Cicero], Rhetorica ad Herennium, I.iv.6, with an english translation by Harry Caplan, The Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, First published 1954, Reprinted 1964, 1968, 1977, 1981, 1989, 1999, London, England pp. 12-13. [Cicerón], Retórica a Herenio, Libro Primero, IV, Traducción, introducción y notas de Juan Francisco Alcina, Bosch, Casa Editorial S.A., Barcelona, pp. 68-69. [Cicéron], Rhétorique a Hérennius, Livre Premier, IV, 6, Traduction Nouvelle de Henri Bornecque, Librairie Garnier Frères, Paris, pp. 8-9. Cicero, De Inventione I, XV, 20. Cicéron, De l'Invention (De Inventione), Livre I, XV, 20, Texte Revu et Traduit avec Introduction et Notes par Henri Bornecque, Librairie Garnier Frères, Paris, pp. 30-31. Cicero, De Oratore, II, XXVII, 115. Cicéron, De l'Orateur (M. Tulli Ciceronis, De Oratore), Texte Établi et Traduit par Edmond Courbaud, Livre II, XXVII, 115, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Paris, 1927, p. 53. Cicero, Brutus, LXXX. Cicéron Brutus ou Dialogue des Orateurs Illustres (M. Tulli Ciceronis, Brutus seu Dialogus de Claris Oratoribus), Texte Établi, traduit et Annoté par François Richard, LXXX, Librairie Garnier Frères, Paris, 1934, pp. 182-183. Octave Navarre, Essai sur la Rhétorique Grecque avant Aristote, Librairie Hachette et Cie., Paris, 1900, p. 213. 351 Cicero, Brutus, LXXX. Cicéron, Brutus ou Dialogue des Orateurs Illustres (M. Tulli Ciceronis, Brutus seu Dialogus de Claris Oratoribus), LXXX, Texte Établi, traduit et Annoté par François Richard, Librairie Granier Frères, Paris, 1934, pp. 182-183. Cicero, De Oratore, II, XXVII, 115. Cicéron, De l'Orateur (M. Tulli Ciceronis, De Oratore), Livre II, XXVII, 115, Texte Établi et Traduit par Edmond Courbaud, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Paris, 1927, p. 53. a. Species The most common species of persuasive speeches are: the preambles, the "whereas" section, the exposition of motives, and the messages, reports, notes and epilogues. Preambles Preambles were a very important tool to restore the origins and the purposes, the past and the future, that is to say, the ontological and teleological aspects of legislation, until they fell in disuse,352 except in constitutions. The preamble of the Constitution of the United States of America, which may serve as an example of this species of persuasive speech, indicates the source from which its title comes in order to be obeyed, the people of the United States, and sets forth the great purposes of the Constitution established by it: "We the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and to our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America"353 The "WHEREAS" section The "WHEREAS" sections of executive orders and resolutions, which also precede the prescriptive speeches, are more concrete than preambles of constitutions and, therefore, similar to the grounds of court judgments, which consist of two parts that come before the judgement in strict sense: the "WHEREAS" and the "AND ALSO CONSIDERING" sections.354 The persuasive speeches of executive orders and resolutions may be composed of only one part, the "WHEREAS" section; or by two parts, when the "AND ALSO CONSIDERING" section is added. RULE: In the WHEREAS section of executive orders and resolutions, the problems to be solved shall be detailed or reference shall be made to the documents in which they are detailed; the AND ALSO CONSIDERING section shall describe in detail the explanations and justifications of the solutions to be adopted. The understanding of the sense of AND ALSO CONSIDERING seems clear, while that of the WHEREAS part needs to appeal to the maxim of political wisdom that recommends controlling that things are not only real and fair or just, but that they also look as such, with the typical verisimilitude of the rhetoric, this being the reason why Roman senators and judges, who gave so much value to appearance, would render their 352 N J. Jamieson, Towards a Systematic Statute Law. Appendix E, 8, Otago Law Review, Volume 3, No. 4, 1976, p. 582. 353 Federal Textbook on Citizenship, Our Constitution and Government, Prepared by Catheryn SecklerHudson, M-7, (Revised 1978) N, United States Government Office, Washington, 1978, p. 80. 354 The observation about the similarily between executuve orders and judicial decisions was made by Silvia Myriam Marchili, daughter of the author of this book. decisions by beginning with the verb videri,355 a historical backround that would explain the current use. Exposition of Motives The expositions of motives are persuasive speeches that also precede prescriptive speeches, although separated from one another. They are not part of the same text, together with the prescriptive speech, like the Preamble of a constitution and the WHEREAS and the ALSO CONSIDERING sections of an executive order or resolution. They provide explanations on the relations among the different parts of the prescriptive speech, both among themselves as well as with regard to the current law, and they also provide justifications that state the reason for each adopted solution, providing clarifications and materials356 to which one may resort for the debate, interpretation and enforcement of the law. Jean Étienne Marie Portalis (1745-1807) has left to posterity three models of expositions of motives. The first one is his famous Preliminary Speech of the Civil Code Bill. The second one is the General Exposition that he personally delivered in the session of the Legislative Body on the 3rd day of frumaire of year X. The third one is the Exposition of Motives also personally delivered by him in the Legislative Body session on the 28th day of ventose of year XII, upon presenting the bill for which the civil laws were reunited in a single body entitled "Civil Code of the French,"357 a piece less known, but still significant to be imitated. Messages and Reports Messages are typical of the Executive Power in the exercise of its authority to initiate laws.They are also persuasive speeches, separated from the prescriptive speeches that explain and justify them. They differ from expositions of motives because they accompany the complete bill (persuasive and prescriptive speeches) before the legislative organ and emphasize more the political aspects than the technical ones, trying to move recipients so that the prescriptive speech is discussed, approved, interpreted and applied in accordance with the purpose sought by the legislator. The Reports issued by Legislative Commissions, typical of the Legislature, are also persuasive speeches separated from prescriptive speeches, of a political and juridical nature, based on which the members of the respective Commissions vote before sending the relevant bill to the Plenary session of each Chamber. 355 Vico, Il Metodo degli Studi del Nostro Tempo. Prolusione Tenuta alla Gioventú Studiosa delle Lettere Il 18 Ottubre 1708 in Ocasione della Solenne Inaugurazzione della Regia Università del Regno di Napoli indi Accresciuta (De Nostri Tempore Studiorum Ratione [...]), Giambattista Vico, Opere Filosofiche, Introduzione di Nicola Badaloni, Testi, Versione e Note a Cura di Paolo Cristofolini, Sansoni Editore, Firenze, 1971, p. 810, p. 812; italiano; p. 813, latin. 356 Prof. Dr. Eugène Huber, Code Civil Suisse, Exposé des Motifs de l'Avant-Projet du Département Féderal de Justice et Police, Tome Premier, Introduction. Droit des Personnes et de la Famille, Imprimerie Büchele & Co., Berne, 1901, p.1. 357 Locré, La Législation Civile, Commerciale et Criminelle de la France, ou Commentaire et Complément des Codes Français, par le Baron Locré, Treuttel et Würtz, Libraires, Strasbourg et Londres, Tome Premier, Paris, 1827, Discours Préliminaire, pp. 251-316; Exposé Géneral, pp. 316-336; Exposé de Motifs, pp. 337-350. Notes A persuasive speech may accompany the prescriptive one as if it were a scientific work, explaining the bill in notes published as footnotes, as in the Argentine Civil Code,358 or published all together at the end, after all sections, as in the Chilean Civil Code.359 Although they may just indicate the sources of the sections, notes of the prescriptive speeches are persuasive speeches which provide information and work as arguments of authority that justify the relevant parts of the prescriptive speeches. Epilogues The preambles, expositions of motives, messages and reports are persuasive speeches that precede prescriptive speeches. Epilogues, which are also persuasive speeches, close prescriptive speeches, but they are not longer used. In ancient times they were included to dissuade subsequent legislators from changing the respective laws, thus exhorting them to maintain them, cursing them or blessing them depending on whether or not they satisfied such a desire, as it has been said and exemplified in Chapter II upon recalling the Mesopotamian codes by Lipit-Ishtar and Hammurabi. b. Refutation of certain frequent objections No one would ever dare to question prescriptive speeches as a tool to which may be resorted to under certain circumstances, except anarchists; but persuasive speeches have been subjected to objections against the use of their best-known species, the preambles. Two criticisms usually come up: that preambles make laws lengthier, when these should be briefer so that they may be memorized more easily, and that laws should order, not teach, since they order to be obeyed, not to be questioned.360 As it will be said upon discussing style, it is worth noting that brevity in itself is not a virtue of the laws and moreover it may also turn them obscure. 358 Código Civil de la República Argentina, Edición Oficial, Establecimiento Tipográfico "La Pampa", Buenos Aires, 1883. 359 Código Civil de la República de Chile, Edición Autorizada por el Supremo Gobierno, Imprenta Chilena, Santiago De Chile, Julio de 1858, pp. 359-404. 360 The classic citations are from Seneca and Bacon. Seneca is in favor and not against the persuasive speech, since he quotes Posidonio to refute it: ("[...] Besides, laws also of assistance towards good habits, if they instruct as well as command. On this point I disagree with Posidonius, who says:"Why Plato's laws should have principles added to them? A law should be brief, in order that the ignorants grasp it all more easily. It should be a voice sent down feom heaven; it should command, not argue. Nothing seems to me duller or more useless than a law with a preamble. Warn me, tell me what you wont me to do; I am not learning but obeying.") "[...] las leyes también aprovechan para las buenas costumbres si, además de mandar, encima enseñan. En este punto disiento de Posidonio, quien dice: "¿Por qué a las leyes de Platón se anejan los principios? La ley ha de ser breve para que los ignorantes las retengan con facilidad. Sea la ley como una voz venida del cielo; mande no discuta. Nada me parece más frío ni más inepto que una ley con preámbulo. Adviérteme, dime lo que quieres que haga, no aprendo; obedezco." Spanish to English translation by the author of this book. Lucio Anneo Séneca, Obras Completas, Discurso Previo, Traducción y Notas de Lorenzo Riber, Cartas a Lucilo, Libro XV, Carta XCIV: Utilidad de los Preceptos, Aguilar S.A. de Ediciones, Madrid, 1949, p. 669. Bacon admits the utility of the persuasive speech, although with restrictions, in his aphorisms 69, 70 and 71, as will be discussed later on. RULE: Persuasive speeches shall explain, justify361 and exhort the enactment and application of the relevant prescriptive speeches, in such a way that the interpretation, the memory and the application of these be facilitated. Some laws may even be more concise, not only brief, when preambles show their principles, since this would allow thelegislator to reduce the use of prolix formulae in prescriptive speeches, replacing them with others which are more general.362 As preambles lead prescriptive speeches, those who challenge their mandatory force generally explain that preambles are not part of prescriptive speeches, but that they precede them, as it has been said about the Preamble of the Constitution of the United States of America.363 Including prescriptions in the persuasive speech to oblige, prohibit, permit, reward or punish conducts, instead of doing so in the prescriptive speech, constitutes a violation of the rules of the art of legislation, since a persuasive speech is not appropiated for such purpose; but disregarding the persuasive speech to interpret the prescriptive one represents a hermeneutic error. RULE: Persuasive speeches shall not include prescriptive texts to oblige, permit, prohibit, permit, reward or punish conducts, but to explain and justify them. Without denying the utility of preambles, it is recommended that certain vices be avoided when possible, because preambles tend to be insufficient as they describe the intention of the law, limiting themselves to exemplify certain passages and leaving aside other significant ones; or excessive, as they include restrictions of the law which do not require an explanation364 and prescriptions referred to in the text of the law, making it more obscure and less safe.365 361 Capitant, Vocabulaire Juridique, Redigé par des Profeseurs de Droit, des Magistrats et des Jurisconsultes, sous la Direction de Henri Capitant, mots "Exposé des motifs", Les Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1936, p. 244. 362 It will be as a compass that will indicate the desired course and an anchor that will fix the legislative texts in memory. Bentham, Oeuvres de Jérémie Bentham, par Et. Dumont, Troisième Édition, Société Belge de Librairie, Hauman et Ce., Tome Troisième, De la Codification, Section IV, Rationnel de La Loi, ou Commentaire Justificatif, Bruxelles, 1840, p. 96. Bentham, The Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham, "Legislator of The World": Writings on Codification, Law and Education, Edited by Philip Schofield and Jonathan Harris, Clarendon Press, Letter V, III, Of Justifiedness, as applied to a Body of Law, Oxford, 1998, p. 141; p. 145. 363 Corwin affirms that the Preamble, strictly speaking, is not a part of the Constitution, but that it precedes it; by itself alone, it can afford no basis for a claim either of governmental power or private right, with a quotation from Jacobson v. Mass., 197 U.S. 11. Edward S. Corwin, La Constitución Norteamericana y su Actual Significado (The Constitution and what it Means Today), Traducción del Dr. Rafael M. Demaría, Prólogo del Dr. Juan Agustín Moyano, Editorial Guillermo Kraft Ltda., Buenos Aires, 1942, p. 1. 364 [Bacon] The Works of Francis Bacon, Collected and Edited by James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis and Douglas Denon Heath, Vol V., Translations of The Philosophical Works, Of the Dignity and Advancement of Learning. Book VIII, Example of a Treatise on Universal Justice or The Fountains of Equity, by Aphorism: one Title of it, aphorism 70, Vol. II., New Edition, London, Longmans & Co. etc., 1883, pp. 102-3. 365 [Bacon] The Works of Francis Bacon, Collected and Edited by James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis and Douglas Denon Heath, Vol V., Translations of The Philosophical Works, Of the Dignity and Advancement of Learning. Book VIII, Example of a Treatise on Universal Justice or The Fountains of Equity, by Aphorism: one Title of it, aphorism 71, Vol. II., New Edition, London, Longmans & Co. etc., 1883, p. 103. RULE: Persuasive speeches shall deal with such parts of a bill as may require an explanation and shall not include prescriptions referred to in the text of the law, so as to prevent the latter from becoming more obscure and less safe, thus disrupting their functions. RULE: Defects should be avoided, instead of avoiding the use of persuasive speeches because they may bring about defects. In judging laws, not only their brevity should be considered, but whether that makes them better or worse, since their lengthiness can be good, if it fulfills a useful function.366 The storage of wisdom, this being understood as pieces of advice on life, is largely found in literature written with eloquence, either as prose or poetry. Laws, presently written in prose, are also eloquent expressions of wisdom. They deserve the greatest attentions367 and should not be considered orders to be obeyed, but conduct models to be imitated or avoided. But even when they are considered orders, having the legislator's persuasive speech at hand as a resource of education, they are of an undeniable utility;368 this is how peoples transmit their culture generation to generation, since when orders are well understood they are better obeyed. 366 Plato, The Laws, IV, 722 and X, 891 Plato, The Laws, IV, 722 y X, 891, Translated with an Introduction by Trevor J. Saunders, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middlessex, England, First Edition 1970, Reprinted 1972, p. 184 y p. 419. Platón, Las Leyes, IV, 722a; X, 891a, Edición Bilingüe, Traducción, Notas y Estudio Preliminar por José Manuel Pabón y Manuel Fernández-Galiano, Clásicos Políticos, Instituto de Estudios Políticos, Primera Edición, Madrid, 1960, Tomo I, p. 155 y Tomo II, p. 155. Platón, Leyes, IV, 722a; X, 891a, Introducción, Traducción y Notas de Francisco Lisi, en Platón, Diálogos VIII Leyes (Libros I-VI), Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1999, p. 386; Diálogos IX Leyes), Libros VII-XII), Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1999, p. 199. Platon, Oeuvres Complètes de Platon, Traduction Nouvelle et Notes par Léon Robin, avec la Collaboration de M. J. Moreau, Éditions de la Nouvelle Revue Française, Volume II, Les Lois, IV, 722a y X, 891 a, Paris, 1942, p. 772 y p. 1012. Platone, Dialoghi, Vol. VII, Le Leggi, IV, XII 722a y X, 891a, Nuova Edizione a Cura di Attilio Zadro, Editori Laterza, Bari, 1952, p. 121 y p. 312. 367 Plato, The Laws, IX, 858. Plato, The Laws, IX, 858, Translated with an Introduction by Trevor J. Saunders, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middlessex, England, First Edition 1970, Reprinted 1972, p. 364. Platón, Las Leyes, IX, 858c-d, Edición Bilingüe, Traducción, Notas y Estudio Preliminar por José Manuel Pabón y Manuel Fernández-Galiano, Clásicos Políticos, Instituto de Estudios Políticos, Primera Edición, Madrid, 1960, Tomo II, p. 108. Platón, Leyes, IX, 858c-d, Introducción, Traducción y Notas de Francisco Lisi, en Platón, Diálogos IX Leyes), (Libros VIIXII), Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1999, pp. 136-137. Platon, Oeuvres Complètes de Platon, Traduction Nouvelle et Notes par Léon Robin, avec la Collaboration de M. J. Moreau, Éditions de la Nouvelle Revue Française, Volume II, Les Lois, IX, 858cd, Paris, 1942, pp. 962-963. Platone, Dialoghi, Vol. VII, Le Leggi, IX, IV 858c-d, Nuova Edizione a Cura di Attilio Zadro, Editori Laterza, Bari, 1952, p. 275. 368 "[...] laws are also of assistance towards good habits if, in addition to order, they teach." "[...] las leyes también aprovechan para las buenas costumbres si, además de mandar, encima enseñan." Translation from English to Spanish by the autor of this book. Lucio Anneo Séneca, Obras Completas, Discurso Previo, Traducción y Notas de Lorenzo Riber, Cartas a Lucilo, Libro XV, Carta XCIV: Utilidad de los Preceptos, Aguilar S.A. de Ediciones, Madrid, 1949, p. 669. RULES: The legislator's persuasive speech shall be useful, whether prescriptive speeches are considered orders to be obeyed or pieces of advices (conduct models to be imitated or avoided), since laws that are well understood are better obeyed. The persuasive speech of a law, once written, remains fixed and, although it is true that it cannot answer the questions of whoever wants to learn, as it happens in oral dialogues,369 it is not less true that, as a pedagogic resource, it remains always ready for the scrutiny of the slow-witted in understanding, who may examine it again and again.370 The assistants to medical doctors, in classical Greece, were either free men or slaves who, due to their regular contact with the practice of medical doctors, learnt that when certain symptoms appeared, specific treatments had to be applied; but they neither knew nor could explain the reasons why it should be like that and not otherwise. In general, they were slaves who, to relieve medical doctors from the burden of their tasks, took over the treatment of sick slaves, to whom they prescribed medications with a speed typical of their ignorance and with the confidence of a tyrant who only demands obedience, without accepting or giving reasons. Unlike their assistants, medical doctors generally treated sick free men, and talked with them in order to identify the causes of the illness out of their symptoms and choose the right medication and, only then, they would tell their patiens the reasons underlying their illness and persuade them to follow the advised treatment.371 369 Platón, Fedro, 275d. Platón, Fedro, 275d, Edición Bilingüe, Traducción, Notas y Estudio Preliminar por Luis Gil Fernández, Instituto de Estudios Políticos, Madrid, 1957, p. 77. Platon, Oeuvres Complètes de Platon, Tome IV, 3e. Partie, Texte Traduit par Léon Robin, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Phédre, 275d, Paris, 1933, pp. 89-90. Platon, Oeuvres Complètes de Platon, Traduction Nouvelle et Notes par Léon Robin, avec la Collaboration de M. J. Moreau, Éditions de la Nouvelle Revue Française, Volume II, Phédre, 275d, Paris, 1942, p. 76. 370 Plato, The Laws, X, 891. Plato, The Laws, X, 891, Translated with an Introduction by Trevor J. Saunders, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middlessex, England, First Edition 1970, Reprinted 1972, p. 419. Platón, Las Leyes, X, 891a, Edición Bilingüe, Traducción, Notas y Estudio Preliminar por José Manuel Pabón y Manuel Fernández-Galiano, Clásicos Políticos, Instituto de Estudios Políticos, Primera Edición, Madrid, 1960, Tomo II, p. 155. Platón, Leyes, IX, 858a, Introducción, Traducción y Notas de Francisco Lisi, en Platón, Diálogos IX Leyes, (Libros VIIXII), Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1999, p. 199. Platon, Oeuvres Complètes de Platon, Traduction Nouvelle et Notes par Léon Robin, avec la Collaboration de M. J. Moreau, Éditions de la Nouvelle Revue Française, Volume II, Les Lois, X, 891a, Paris, 1942, p. 1012. Platone, Dialoghi, Vol. VII, Le Leggi, X, IV 891, Nuova Edizione a Cura di Attilio Zadro, Editori Laterza, Bari, 1952, p. 312. 371 Plato, The Laws, IV, 720-723. Plato, The Laws, IV, 720-723, Translated with an Introduction by Trevor J. Saunders, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middlessex, England, First Edition 1970, Reprinted 1972, pp. 181-185. Platón, Las Leyes, IV, 720a-723a, Edición Bilingüe, Traducción, Notas y Estudio Preliminar por José Manuel Pabón y Manuel Fernández-Galiano, Clásicos Políticos, Instituto de Estudios Políticos, Primera Edición, Madrid, 1960, Tomo I, pp. 152-155. Platón, Leyes, IV, 720a-723a, Introducción, Traducción y Notas de Francisco Lisi, en Platón, Diálogos VIII Leyes, (Libros I-VI), Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1999, pp. 382-389. Platon, Oeuvres Complètes de Platon, Traduction Nouvelle et Notes par Léon Robin, avec la Collaboration de M. J. Moreau, Éditions de la Nouvelle Revue Française, Volume II, Les Lois, IV, 720a723a, Paris, 1942, pp. 768-773. A legislator who discusses the interests affected by a law with its recipients turns out to be pleasent and nice, shows his benevolence, that he loves them well as if he were a parent372 or a friend373 who gives them wise and eloquent pieces of advice,374 not a tyrant that threatens to punish them. Those who consider that laws are orders and value brevity as a manifestation of power, should be told that, even though a legislator may apparently lose his majestic brevity, he is in fact acquiring more power over the spirit of his recipients,375 since his words are worth of more credit, and the prescriptive speech is then more easily received by them. The persuasive speeches of medical doctors during the treatment of free men did not only inform them of their illness and medications, because they were not trying to train a professional in the art of medicine, but to educate patients so that they could consider, Platone, Dialoghi, Vol. VII, Le Leggi, IV, X-XII 720a-723a, Nuova Edizione a Cura di Attilio Zadro, Editori Laterza, Bari, 1952, pp. 119-122. 372 Plato, The Laws, IX, 859. Plato, The Laws, IX, 859, Translated with an Introduction by Trevor J. Saunders, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middlessex, England, First Edition 1970, Reprinted 1972, p. 365. Platón, Las Leyes, IX, 859a, Edición Bilingüe, Traducción, Notas y Estudio Preliminar por José Manuel Pabón y Manuel Fernández-Galiano, Clásicos Políticos, Instituto de Estudios Políticos, Primera Edición, Madrid, 1960, Tomo II, p. 108. Platón, Leyes, IX, 859 a, Introducción, Traducción y Notas de Francisco Lisi, en Platón, Diálogos IX Leyes, (Libros VII-XII), Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1999, p. 138. Platon, Oeuvres Complètes de Platon, Traduction Nouvelle et Notes par Léon Robin, avec la Collaboration de M. J. Moreau, Éditions de la Nouvelle Revue Française, Volume II, Les Lois, IX, 859a, Paris, 1942, p. 963. Platone, Dialoghi, Vol. VII, Le Leggi, IX, IV 859a, Nuova Edizione a Cura di Attilio Zadro, Editori Laterza, Bari, 1952, p. 276. 373 Mably, De la Législation ou Principes des Lois, Livre Second, Chapitre III, Oeuvres Complètes de l'Abbé de Mably, Tome Douzième, N. Étienne Sens, Toulouse, J. Gaude, Nismes, 1793, p. 280. 374 ("XXXII 4595 A father who can advise you is more than a father, he's a friend; so it's as a friend I warn you to be on your guard in life: you can never know what corner 4600 your enemy's lurking in"). "XXXII 4595 "Un padre que da consejos más que padre es un amigo; ansí como tal les digo que vivan con precaución: naides sabe en qué rincón 4600 se oculta el que es su enemigo" José Hernández, Martín Fierro, Edición con Estudio, Notas y Vocabulario de Eleuterio D. Tiscornia, Editorial Losada S.A., Buenos Aires, Primera Edición 1939, Segunda 1941, Tercera 1945, Parte II La Vuelta de Martín Fierro XXXII, 4595-4600, p. 250. "32 4595 Un padre que dá consejos más que padre es un amigo, ansí como tal les digo que vivan con precaución naide sabe en qué rincón 4600 se oculta el que es su enemigo." José Hernández, Martín Fierro, Edición Crítica de Carlos Alberto Leumann, Ángel Estrada y Cía. S.A., Buenos aires, Primera edición 1945, Segunda edición 1951, La Vuelta de Martín Fierro, 32, 4595-4600. 375 Mably, De la Législation ou Principes des Lois, Livre Second, Chapitre III, Oeuvres Complètes de l'Abbé De Mably, Tome Douzième, N. Étienne Sens, Toulouse, J. Gaude, Nismes, 1793, p. 280. accept,376 interpret and apply the prescribed theraphy, in accordance with the purpose sought by the medical doctors, educating and leading their souls (psycagogy)377 to a healthy life. If prescriptive speeches were never accompanied by persuasive speeches, they would be like orders given by ignorant slaves and tyrants convinced that they would all be obeyed, that it is enough to prescribe medications in order to heal. Legislators, who do not belong to a superior species and speaks to other reasonable men, being themselves subjected to errors, must give and accept reasons.378 RULE: Persuasive speeches shall explain prescriptive speeches to their recipients, with teachings and justifications, as parents or as friends, who love them well and give wise and eloquent pieces of advice to them, nicely, not as a tyrant who threatens to impose a punishment on them. RULE: Persuasive speeches shall motivate recipients of prescriptive speeches to consider, pass, interpret and apply the conducts to be imitated and avoided, in accordance with the purpose sought by legislators. Persuasive speeches are composed after prescriptive speeches, thus providing an excellent opportunity to control the quality of the later, modify the noticed defects and rebut probable criticism in advance, in the event that waiting for a debate is not preferable. RULE: Upon the composition of a persuasive speech, the quality of the prescriptive speech shall be controlled and any probable criticism shall be rebutted in advance, in the event that waiting for a debate is not preferable. The juridical reason (ratio juris) is specified in custom by the requirement of the need in public opinion (opinio cive necessitatis), in court decisions by the exposition of the reasons on which such decision are grounded (ratio decidendi) and in the law, which is a general decision, by the reasons which justify it (ratio legis). 376 Still the one who does not aprove preambles at all, admits their persuasive function in order that laws be passed, both by Parliament and by the people: "Nor should I at all approve of the preambles of laws, which were formerly deemed impertinent, and which represent laws disputing and not commanding, if we could endure the ancient manners. But as times now are, these preambles are necessarily used in most cases, not so much to explain the law, as to persuade Parliament to pass it, and also to satisfy the people. But avoid preambles as much as possible, and let the law commence with enactment.", in Bacon,The Works of Francis Bacon, Collected and Edited by James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis and Douglas Denon Heath, Vol V., Translations of The Philosophical Works, Of the Dignity and Advancement of Learning. Book VIII, Example of a Treatise on Universal Justice or The Fountains of Equity, by Aphorism: one Title of it, aphorism 69, Vol. II., New Edition, London, Longmans & Co. etc., 1883, p. 102. 377 Plato, Phaedrus, 271c Platon, Phédre, 271c, in Platon, Oeuvres Complètes de Platon, Tome IV, 3e. Partie, Texte Traduit par Léon Robin, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", , Paris, 1933, p. 82. Platon, Phèdre, 271c, in Platon, Oeuvres Complètes de Platon, Traduction Nouvelle et Notes par Léon Robin, avec la Collaboration de M. J. Moreau, Éditions de la Nouvelle Revue Française, Volume II, Paris, 1942, p. 70. 378 Mably, De la Législation ou Principes des Lois, Livre Second, Chapitre III, Oeuvres Complètes de L'Abbé De Mably, Tome Douzième, N. Étienne Sens, Toulouse, J. Gaude, Nismes, 1793, pp. 279-280. Persuasive speeches serves as barriers379 that may limit the power of legislators. If they are prudent, they will refrain from using the prescriptive speech spontaneously, because of the absence of acceptable reasons that justify it and, in case they achieve acceptance, it may be possible to judge whether the means chosen are proportional to the purposes sought, to which end there are usually institutional remedies, like a veto by the Executive Power, or a declaration of unconstitutionality by the Judiciary due to lack of reasonableness. RULE: Persuasive speeches shall act as barriers for legislators, whenever they prudently set limits to themselves, or when those speeches allow judging whether the means chosen are proportional to the purposes sought (reasonableness), to which end there are usually institutional remedies, like a veto by the Executive Power, or a declaration of unconstitutionally by the Judiciary. c. Need for persuasive speeches There are those who hold that laws must always be provided with their corresponding persuasive speech, as a sort of complete treatise, a reasoned comment that should accompany them all.380 Persuasive speeches may be composed for any prescriptive speech, but there are not always necessary.381 To determine when they are necessary, the level of defensibility of bills should be taken into consideration, which allows for their classification as easy, difficult and doubtful. They are not necessary when they are: easily defensible, as in honest prescriptive speeches, which coincide with the feelings of public opinion; clearcut, which do not need major efforts to understand the meaning of the problems to be resolved and the proposed solutions; and humble, of little importance, except when it is 379 Bentham, The Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham, "Legislator of the World": Writings on Codification, Law and Education, Edited by Philip Schofield and Jonathan Harris, Clarendon Press, Letter V, III. Of Justifiedness, as applied to a Body of Law, Oxford, 1998, p. 142. Mably, De la Législation ou Principes des Lois, Livre Second, Chapitre III, Oeuvres Complètes de L'Abbé De Mably, Tome Douzième, N. Étienne Sens, Toulouse, J. Gaude, Nismes, 1793, pp. 280-281. 380 Mably, De la Législation ou Principes des Lois, Livre Second, Chapitre III, Oeuvres Complètes de l'Abbé de Mably, Tome Douzième, N. Étienne Sens, Toulouse, J. Gaude, Nismes, 1793, pp. 280-281. Bentham, Oeuvres de Jérémie Bentham, par Et. Dumont, Troisième Édition, Société Belge de Librairie, Hauman et Ce., Tome Premier Promulgation des Lois, Promulgation des Raisons des Lois; Tome Troisième, De la Codification, Section IV, Rationnel de la Loi, ou Commentaire Justificatif, Bruxelles, 1840, p. 249 y p. 96. Bentham, The Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham, "Legislator of The World": Writings on Codification, Law and Education, Edited by Philip Schofield and Jonathan Harris, Clarendon Press, Letter V, III. Of Justifiedness, as applied to a Body of Law, Oxford, 1998, p. 144. 381 Plato, The Laws, IV, 723. Plato, The Laws, IV, 723, Translated with an Introduction by Trevor J. Saunders, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middlessex, England, First Edition 1970, Reprinted 1972, p. 186.Platón, Las Leyes, IV, Platón, 723d, Edición Bilingüe, Traducción, Notas y Estudio Preliminar por José Manuel Pabón y Manuel Fernández-Galiano, Clásicos Políticos, Instituto de Estudios Políticos, Primera Edición, Madrid, 1960, Tomo I, p. 157. Platón, Leyes, IV, 723d, Introducción, Traducción y Notas de Francisco Lisi, en Platón, Diálogos VIII Leyes, (Libros I-VI), Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1999, p. 390. Platon, Oeuvres Complètes de Platon, Traduction Nouvelle et Notes par Léon Robin, avec La Collaboration de M. J. Moreau, Éditions de la Nouvelle Revue Française, Volume II, Les Lois, IV, 723d, Paris, 1942, p. 775. Platone, Dialoghi, Vol. VII, Le Leggi, IV, XII 723d, Nuova Edizione a Cura di Attilio Zadro, Editori Laterza, Bari, 1952, p. 123. necessary to defeat the inertia so that they may be discussed and approved. They are necessary when their defensibility is difficult, either because the proposed solutions differ from the ones supported by public opinion, as in the case of awkward and obscure matters, or because they are important.382 They are also necessary when easy and difficult parts are combined, making them of a doubtful defensibility, since the resulting strength or weakness cannot be established. Therefore, in a persuasive speech rebuttals shall anticipate any probable criticism to the prescriptive speech, to leave the prospective opponents of the bill without arguments in the debate stage. Finally, they are also necessary in those prescriptive speeches for the interpretation and application of which it is generally not foreseen that lawyers be consulted, since all trust their own judgment, for which they need the most complete explanation possible.383 RULES: Persuasive speeches shall be composed, whenever the prescriptive speech has: a) little importance, so that it may be debated and enacted; b) a difficult defensibility, as in awkward matters, so that it may decrease; as in obscure matters, so that they may be cleared up; as in important matters, to show the pertinent care; c) a doubtful defensibility, to leave the opponents in the debate without arguments; d) a direct interpretation by the interested parties, without consulting with their lawyers, since they will need the most complete explanation possible. A speech is the result of a rhetorical process which comprises five stages: investigation, systematization, style, action and memory.384 Investigation (inventio) 382 Roland Barthes, L'Ancienne Rhetorique, dans Communications, 16, 1970, p. 215, he refers to the exordium for any speech, based on the judicial genre. Relevance as fundamental criterion is established in Plato, The Laws, IV, 723d. Plato, The Laws, IV, 723, Translated with an Introduction by Trevor J. Saunders, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middlessex, England, First Edition 1970, Reprinted 1972, p. 186. Platón, Las Leyes, IV, 723d, Edición Bilingüe, Traducción, Notas y Estudio Preliminar por José Manuel Pabón y Manuel Fernández-Galiano, Clásicos Políticos, Instituto de Estudios Políticos, Primera Edición, Madrid, 1960, Tomo I, p. 157. Platón, Leyes, IV, 723d, Introducción, Traducción y Notas de Francisco Lisi, en Platón, Diálogos VIII Leyes, (Libros I-VI), Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1999, p. 390. Platon, Oeuvres Complètes de Platon, Traduction Nouvelle et Notes par Léon Robin, avec La Collaboration de M. J. Moreau, Éditions de la Nouvelle Revue Française, Volume II, Les Lois, IV, 723d, Paris, 1942, p. 775. Platone, Dialoghi, Vol. VII, Le Leggi, IV, XII 723d, Nuova Edizione a Cura di Attilio Zadro, Editori Laterza, Bari, 1952, p. 123. 383 [Bacon] The Works of Francis Bacon, Collected and Edited by James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis and Douglas Denon Heath, Vol V., Translations of The Philosophical Works, Of the Dignity and Advancement of Learning. Book VIII, Example of a Treatise on Universal Justice or The Fountains of Equity, by Aphorism: one Title of it, aphorism 68-69, Vol. II., New Edition, London, Longmans & Co. etc., 1883, p. 102. 384 Benedetto Riposati, Problemi di Retorica Antica, en la obra colectiva Introduzione alla Filologia Classica, Dott. Carlo Marzorati, Editore, Milano, 1952, pp. 727-777. Heinrich Lausberg, Handbook of Literary Rhetoric, A Foundation for Literary Studies, Foreword by George A. Kennedy, Translated by Matthew T. Bliss, Annemiek Jansen, David Orton, Edited by David E. Orton & R. Dean Anderson, Brill, Leiden, Boston, Köln, 1998, number 255, pp. 112-113. Heinreich Lausberg, Manual de Retórica Literaria. Fundamentos de una Ciencia de la Literatura, Traducción de José Pérez Riesco del Original Alemán Hanbuch der Literarischen Rhetorik. Eine Grundlegung der Literaturwissenchaft, Max Hueber Verlag, München, 1960, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1966, T. I, número 255, pp. 226-228. Edward P.J. Corbett and Robert J. Connors, Classical Rhetoric for the Modern Student, Oxford University Press, New York-Oxford, 1999, pp. 17-23. consists in finding the things to say; systematization (dispositio), in placing the things to say in order; style (elocutio), in to dressing the things to say with words; action (actio), in selecting the voice and the gestures with which the speech will be pronounced; and memory (mnemé) in retaining the things to say in the spirit, placed in order, with the words that express them and the voice and the gestures that are to be used upon delivering the speech. Written speeches comprise only three stages: investigation, systematization and style.385 Whether three stages are considered, as in the written speech (investigation, systematization and style), or the five stages, as in the oral speech (investigation, systematization, style, action and memory), it is all about successive operations inside a process, an iter, a way that is followed to obtain the good speech promised by rhetoric as the art of good saying (ars bene dicendi)386 and, in the present work, the good law promissed by the art of good legislation (ars bene legislandi). Since contemporary laws are, in general, written speeches, Chapter V will discuss Investigation; Chapter VI, Systematization; and ChapterVII, Style [Cicero], Rethorica ad Herennium, I, II [Cicero] Rhetorica ad Herennium, with an English translation by Harry Caplan, I.ii.3, The Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, First published 1954, Reprinted 1964, 1968, 1977, 1981, 1989, 1999, London, England, p. 6 (latin), 7 (english). [Cicerón], Retórica a Herenio, Traducción, introducción y notas de Juan Francisco Alcina, Bosch, Casa Editorial S.A., Libro Primero, II, Barcelona, pp. 64-65. Cicero, Partitiones Oratoriae, I.3. Cicéron Divisions de l'Art Oratoire, Texte Établi et Traduit par Henri Bornecque, Deuxième Édition, Les Belles Lettres, I.3, Paris, 1960, p. 3. Cicero, De Inventione, I, 9. Cicéron, De l'Invention (De Inventione). Texte Revu et Traduit avec Introduction et Notes par Henri Bornecque, Librairie Garnier Frères, Livre I, 9, Paris, pp. 12-15. Cicero, De Oratore, I, XXXI, 42. Cicéron, De l'Orateur, Texte Établi et Traduit par Edmond Courbaud, Livre Premier, XXXI, 142, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Paris, Première Edition 1922, Sixième Tirage, 1967, p. 141. Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria, III, 3.1-3. Quintilian, The Institutio Oratoria of Quintilian, with an English Translation by H.E. Butler in Four Volumes, The Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, G.P. Putnam Sons's, New York, Volume I, Book III, iii, 1-3, London, 1921, pp. 382-385. Quintilien. Institution Oratoire, Texte Établi et Traduit par Jean Cousin, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Tome II, Livre III, 3.1-3, Paris, 1977, p. 147. 385 Gustave Lanson, Conseils sur l'Art d'Écrire, Treizième Édition, Librairie Hachette, Première Partie. Préparation générale, pp. 1-40; Deuxième Partie, Invention, pp. 41-107; Troisième Part, Disposition, pp. 106-164; Quatrième Part, Élocution, Paris, 1926, pp. 165-248. Roland Barthes, L'Ancienne Rhétorique. Aide Memoir, dans Communications, École Pratique de Hautes Études, Centre d'Études des Communications de Masse, 16, Seuil, Paris, 1970, pp. 172-223, B.0.5, p. 197. 386 Roland Barthes, L'Ancienne Rhétorique. Aide Memoir, Communications, École Pratique de Hautes Études, Centre d'Études des Communications de Masse, 16, Seuil, Paris, 1970, pp. 172-223, B.0.5, pp. 197-198. Chapter V Investigation The first stage in the drafting of a bill, like in the case of any other speech, consists in determining what to say. In the rhetorical tradition this is called heuresis (Greek) or inventio (Latin), which has preferably been translated into "investigation",387 because it is referred to a way towards the arguments (via argumentorum),388 in order to recover them from the place where they are, more than to create them.389 The author of the present work uphold that the investigation stage includes all the relevant things to say in prescriptive or persuasive speechees, unlike those who limit such stage to the arguments. But, before beginning the development of the investigation stage, it turns out suitable to deal with two previous matters: instructions and knowledge. 1. Previous instructions RULE: Rulers shall establish the politics, which shall consist in the determination not only of the targets to be hit in the social system but also in the legislative changes to be introduced in the juridical system,390 giving previous instructions to their advisers about both aspects. 387 Bacon, Of the Dignity and advancement of Learning, The Fifth Book, Chap. I; Chap. III, in The Works of Francis Bacon, Collected and Edited by James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis, and Douglas Denon Heath, Vol. IV, Translation of the Philosophical Works, Vol. I, New Edition, Longman & Co., etc, London, 1883, p. 407; p. 421. 388 Roland Barthes, L'Ancienne Rhétorique, Aide-memoire, dans Communications, 16, 1970, Seuil, Paris, p. 198. 389 Bacon, Of the Dignity and advancement of Learning, The Fifth Book, Chap. I; Chap. III, in The Works of Francis Bacon, Collected and Edited by James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis, and Douglas Denon Heath, Vol. IV, Translation of the Philosophical Works, Vol. I, New Edition, Longman & Co., etc, London, 1883, pp. 421-422. It is mentioned among Bentham's manuscripts, but it has not been published yet, "On invention in legislative matters" "De la invention en matière de législation"), in Oeuvres de Jérémie Bentham, par Ét. Dumont, Troisième Édition, Société Belge de Librairie, Tome Premier, Discours Préliminaire, Bruxelles, 1840, p. 5. It has not been possible for the author of this book to consult it. Perhaps this is a question of the manuscript catalogued under box"CI", pp. "385-405. Logic, Ch X Of the art of invention", of the year 1814, see: A. Taylor Milne, Catalogue of the Manuscripts of Jeremy Bentham in the Library of University College, London, First Issued 1937, Second Edition, University of London, The Athlone Press, Bristol, 1962, p. 31. 390 "For the sake of brevity, from now on we will call political element of the Law to the connection in which it meets the general life of people, and technical element of the Law, to the scientific life separated from the same." "Por razones de brevedad, en lo futuro llamaremos elemento político del Derecho a la conexión en que éste se encuentra con la vida general del pueblo, y elemento técnico del Derecho a la vida científica separada del mismo.": Savigny, De la Vocación de Nuestra Época para la Legislación y la Ciencia del Derecho, (1814), Thibaut y Savigny, en La Codificación, Una Controversia Programática Basada en sus Obras Sobre la necesidad de un Derecho Civil General para Alemania y De la Vocación de Nuestra Época para la Legislación y la Ciencia del Derecho, con Adiciones de sus Autores y Juicios de sus Contemporáneos, Introducción y Selección de Textos de Jacques Stern, Traducción del Alemán de José Díaz García, Aguilar, Madrid, 1970, p. 57. On juridical politics, see: Jean Dabin, La Technique de l'élaboration du Droit Positif Spècialement du Droit Privé, Établissements Émile Bruylant, Bruxelles, Librairie du Reçueil Sirey, Paris, pp. 36-56. RULE: Previous instructions shall be given in writing, with sufficient reasons to sustain the fostered politics, in the form of conclusions deriving from a report that will contemplate, at least, the following points: a) the accredited controversial facts, in accordance with the submitted proofs; b) the opinions about the sectors involved, in accordance with the proof of the declarations made by them; c) other opinions that have been or could be adopted.391 Should the rulers fail to establish the legislative politics, this shall be decided by theirs advisers, who will have worked in vain if the rulers, founded on political reasons, reject such bills as may have been submitted to them. RULE: In the absence of instructions from the rulers, the advisers shall try to request them from the rulers, assisting them with diplomacy. The instructions may be completed by oral hearings and by the reading of other documents, if necessary. The instructions must not be substituted for an already drafted bill, which may lead to misinterpretations about the purpose sought, except when such purpose is expressly established in the corresponding persuasive speech, in which case it will play the role of the instructions. In spite of a good interpretation of the purpose sought, it is usually expected that the bill will be reviewed and returned on the same day or the following one, which is often the last one of the useful term. The creative imagination of the advisers is also restricted, inciting them to a mere review. Had the bill circulated, it will generate resistance from those who participated before and must review it again, since they will not admit any attempt of altering its fundamental structure, hoping to find something similar to what they had already considered.392 RULE: The written instructions to legislate shall not be substitued for an already drafted bill. 2. Previous knowledge After studying the instructions received and before the drafting of the prescriptive and persuasive speeches, certain previous knowledge (noesis; intellectio)393 is required Alf Ross, Sobre el Derecho y la Justicia (On the Law and Justice, Stevens & Sons Limted, London, 1968), traducción de Genaro Carrió, Capítulos XV-XVII, Eudeba, Buenos Aires, 1963, pp. 317-364. 391 Taylor unifies points b and c, and adds that if it is recommended to legislate, a bill and the speech of proposition to the legislature should be prepared, as part of an exercise for the education of the young people who will devote themselves to the public administration (civil service), consisting in the study of the papers related to an already debated matter, without the reports, and the drafting of a proper report, with the text of the law that would execute the recommended intentions and of the speech with which the proposed law should be introduced, if it is recommended to legislate: Henry Taylor, The Statesman, Original Edition London, 1836, with a New Introduction by C. Northcote Parkinson, a Mentor Book, Published by The New American Library, First Printing, New York, December 1958, p. 29. 392 Elmer A. Driedger, The Composition of Legislation, First Edition, Edmond Cloutier, Queen's Printer and Controller of Stationery, Ottawa, 1957, pp. xvi-xvii; Second Edition Revised, Published by The Department of Justice, Ottawa, 1976, p. xix. 393 George A. Kennedy, Greek Rhetoric Under Christian Emperors, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1983, p. 104. in connection with the state of the cause, the defensibility of the initiative and the determination of the legislative genre and its species. a. The state of the cause394 Those who take the initiative to legislate know that they will face a struggle with the opposition or with the government party, an agonistic situation that determines the fundamental position that they must adopt in terms of the performance expected from the opponent, who can question it, mainly taking into consideration the topics developed in point 5 of this Chapter. Heinrich Lausberg, Manual de Retórica Literaria, Fundamentos de una Ciencia de la Literatura, Traducción de José Pérez Riesco del Original Alemán Handbuch der Literarischen Rhetorik, Eine Grundlegung der Literaturwissenchaft, Max Hueber Verlag, München, 1960, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1966, T. I, número 97, pp. 130-131 y T. III, número 1243, p. 115. Heinrich Lausberg, Handbook of Literary Rhetoric, A Foundation for Literary Study, Translated by Mattew T. Bliss, Annemiek Jansen, David Norton, Edited by David Orton & R. Dean Anderson, Brill, Leiden, Boston, Koln, 1998, number 97, pp. 47-48; number 1244, I), p. 685. 394 Stasis (Greek), status or constitutio (Latín), consists in the main question evaluated from the position held by the orator to whom a penal case is entrusted. See: Benedetto Riposatti, Problemi di Retorica Antica, in Introduzione alla Filologia Classica, Dottore Carlo Marzorati, Editore, Milano, 1952, pp. 657-787, Teoria Degli Status Causae, pp. 708-726, p. 709, n. 3. Roland Barthes, L'Ancienne Rhétorique. Aide Memoir, Communications, École Pratique de Hautes Études, Centre d'Études des Communications de Masse, 16, Seuil, Paris, 1970, pp. 172-223, B.1.26, p. 211. Although it is more developed in the judicial genre, it is also applicable to the deliberative genre. See: Heinrich Lausberg, Manual de Retórica Literaria, Fundamentos de una Ciencia de la Literatura, Traducción de José Pérez Riesco del Original Alemán Handbuch der Literarischen Rhetorik, Eine Grundlegung der Literaturwissenchaft, Max Hueber Verlag, München, 1960, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1966, T. I, números 224-238, pp. 203-212. Heinrich Lausberg, Handbook of Literary Rhetoric, A Foundation for Literary Study, Translated by Mattew T. Bliss, Annemiek Jansen, David Norton, Edited by David Orton & R. Dean Anderson, Brill, Leiden, Boston, Koln, 1998, numbers 224-238, pp. 97-102. Cicero, Rethorica ad Herennium, Book I, xi-xv. Cicerón, Retórica a Herenio, Libro I, XI-XV, Traducción Introducción y Notas de Juan Francisco Alcina, Erasmo, Textos Bilingües, Editorial Bosch, Barcelona, 1991, pp. 84-97. Cicéron, Rhétorique a Herennius, Livre I, 18-25, Ouvrage Longtemps Attribué a Ciceron, Texte Revue et traduit avec Introduction et Notes par Henri Bornecque, Librairie Garnière Frères, Paris, pp. 20-33. Cicero, De Inventione, Book I, 10-16. Cicerón, De la Invención Retórica, en Obras Completas de Marco Tulio Cicerón, Traducidas del Latín por Marcelino Menéndez Pelayo, Biblioteca Clásica, Tomo XIV, Tomo I, pp. 1-103, Madrid, 1879, Libro Primero, pp. 6-9. Cicéron, De l'Invention (De Inventione), Livre I, 10-16, Texte Revu et Traduit avec Introduction et Notes par Henri Bornecque, Librairie Garnier Frères, Paris, pp. 14-25. Quintilian, The Institutio Oratoria of Quintilian, Book III, vi. Quintilian, The Institutio Oratoria of Quintilian, Book III, vi, With an English Translation by H.E. Butler in Four Volumes, The Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, G.P. Putnam Sons's, New York, Volume I, London, 1921, pp. 406-463. Quintilien, Institution Oratoire, Livre III, VI, Texte Établi et Traduit par Jean Cousin, Société d'Edition "Les Belles Lettres", Tome II, Paris, 1977, pp. 160-188. Hermogenes, Staseis. Hermogène, Les États de Cause (Staseis), dans L'Art Rhétorique, Première Traduction Française Intégrale, Introduction et Notes par Michel Patillon, Préface de Pierre Laurens, L'Age d'Home, Paris, 1997, pp. 153-208. b. Defensibility395 An initiative may be of an easy, difficult or doubtful defensibility. Easy defensibility RULE: Defensibility shall be easy in the case of honest, clear and humble initiatives. Such inititiatives will be: a) honest, if they coincide with the feelings of public opinion; b) clear, if no major efforts are required to understand their respective meaning; c) humble, if they solve problems of minor importance. Difficult defensibility RULE: Defensibility shall be difficult in the case of awkward, dark or important initiatives, that is to say, in the case of initiatives opposite to those of easy defensibility. Doubtful defensibility RULE: Defensibility shall be doubtful when the initiatives combine easy and difficult elements, without the resulting strength or weakness being established. 395 On Genera causarum in the the rhetorical tradition, see: Heinrich Lausberg, Manual de Retórica Literaria, Fundamentos de una Ciencia de la Literatura, Traducción de José Pérez Riesco del original alemán Handbuch der Literarischen Rhetorik, Eine Grundlegung der Literaturwissenchaft, Max Hueber Verlag, München, 1960, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1966, T. I, número 64, pp. 109-110. Heinrich Lausberg, Handbook of Literary Rhetoric, A Foundation for Literary Study, Translated by Mattew T. Bliss, Annemiek Jansen, David Norton, Edited by David Orton & R. Dean Anderson, Brill, Leiden, Boston, Koln, 1998, number 64, pp. 34-38. Cicero, Rethorica ad Herennium, LIbro I, III. Cicerón, Retórica a Herenio, Libro I, III, Traducción Introducción y Notas de Juan Francisco Alcina, Erasmo, Textos Bilingües, Editorial Bosch, Barcelona, 1991, pp. 66-69. Cicerón, Retórica a C. Herennio, en Obras Completas de Marco Tulio Cicerón, Traducidas del Latín por Marcelino Menéndez Pelayo, Biblioteca Clásica Tomo XIV, Tomo I, pp. 105-210, Madrid, 1879, Libro Primero, p. 109. Cicéron, Rhétorique a Herennius, Livre I, III, 5, Ouvrage Longtemps Attribué a Cicéron, Texte Revue et traduit avec Introduction et Notes par Henri Bornecque, Librairie Garnière Frères, pp. 6-7. Cicero, De Inventione, Book I, III, 5. Cicerón, De la Invención Retórica, en Obras Completas de Marco Tulio Cicerón, Traducidas del Latín por Marcelino Menéndez Pelayo, Biblioteca Clásica Tomo XIV, Tomo I, pp. 1-103, Madrid, 1879, Libro I, p. 12. Cicéron, De l'Invention (De Inventione), Livre I, 20, Texte Revu et Traduit avec Introduction et Notes par Henri Bornecque, Librairie Garnier Frères, Paris, pp. 30-31. Quintilian, The Institutio Oratoria of Quintilian, Book IV, i, 40. Quintilian, The Institutio Oratoria of Quintilian, Book IV, i, 40, with an English Translation by H.E. Butler in Four Volumes, Volume II, The Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, G.P. Putnam Sons, New York, 1921, pp. 26-27. Quintilien. Institution Oratoire, Livre IV, 1, 40, Texte Établi et Traduit par Jean Cousin, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Tome III, Paris, 1976, p. 28. RULE: If the defensibility of the initiative is: a) easy, the answers to the foreseeable objections shall be reserved up to the discussion of the bill, to favor victory in the debate; b) difficult, a prescriptive speech without these objections shall have to be prepared with the view to avoid the expected criticism; c) doubtful, the answers shall be anticipated in the persuasive speech, so as to deprive the opposition of suitable arguments. c. Determination of the legislative genre and its species RULE: After having evaluated the defensibility of the initiative, the legislative genre and the species of the bill to be prepared shall be determinated, in order to entrust the investigation tasks and to fix the term in which the corresponding report shall have to be submitted. In the case of either a persuasive or prescriptive speech, in the task of finding the things to say (investigation), the legislators and their advisers may not relay only on their respective memory and imagination or fantasy,396 in matters of such a vast scope as legislative issues are. The above mentioned natural skills are perfected, facilitating their opportune exercise when they are promoted by the art of legislation, since legislators and advisers are used to perform certain intellectual operations as a means to obtain abundant things to say in each case (instruments)397 and previously keep on file such things to say as are convenient to have available for repeated use (promptuary).398 396 Memory and imagination or fantasy are necessary for orators and jurists alike. Giambattista Vico, Il Metodo degli Studi del Nostro Tempo, 1708, da Opere Filosofiche, Introduzione di Nicola Badaloni, Testi, Versioni e Note a Cura di Paolo Cristofolini, Sansoni Editore, Firenze, 1971, III, p. 796. 397 Aristotle, Tópics, I, 13-18. Aristotle, Topics, I, 13-18, in The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford Translation Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume One, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, pp. 175-181. Aristóteles, Tópicos, I, 13-18, en Aristóteles, Tratados de Lógica (Organon), I, Categorías, Tópicos, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, Introducciones, Traducciones y Notas de Miguel Candel Sanmartín, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1982, pp. 109-121. Eug. Thionville, De la Théorie des Lieux Communs Dans les Topiques d'Aristote, et des Principales Modifications qu'elle a subies jusqua nos Jours, Thése présentée a la Faculté des Lettres de Paris, Réimpresion de l'Édition de 1855, Osnasbrück, Otto Zeller, 1965, pp. 47-54. Aristote, Topiques, I, 13-18, Texte Établi et Traduit pat Jacques Brunschwig, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Paris, 1967, Tome I, Livres I-IV, p. 18-33. W.A. de Pater, La fonction du lieu et de l'instrument dans les Topiques, in Aristotle on Dialectic, Proceedings of the Third Symposium Aristotelicum, Edited by G.E.L. Owen, Oxford at The Clarendon Press, 1968, pp. 164-188. Ivan Pelletier, La Dialectique Aristotélicienne, Les Principes Clés des Topiques, Montréal, Bellarmin, Montréal, 1991, pp. 321-322. Aristotle, Topics, I, 13-18, in Aristotle Topics Books I and VIII, Translated with a Commentary by Robin Smith, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1999, pp. 11-19. Paul Slomkowski, Aristotle's Topics, Brill, Leiden, New York, KÖln, 1997, pp. 54-58. Stéphanie Grégoire, The Dialectic Tools: Theory and Practice, Thèse Présentée à la Faculté des Études Supérieures de l'Université Laval pour la obtention du grade de Philosopiae Doctor (PH.D), Faculté de Philosophie Université Laval, Novembre 1999, Bibliothèque Nationale du Canada 0-612-47571-9, 350 pp. The author of this book extends the application of the Instruments to the securing of the abundant and available things to say, for their opportune use, wheter or not they work as premises or conclusions. 3. Instruments As well as there are procedures to obtain abundant words to say (copia verborum),399 there are instruments to obtain abundant things to say in connection with each bill (copia rerum), which perfect the exercise of the natural imagination and memory as well as the use of the artificial resources included in the promptuary. RULE: To obtain abundant things to say in connection with each bill, one shall resort to the following four intellectual operations (instruments):400 Aristotle applies the instruments only to the acceptable things to say (endoxas) that work as premises (arguments). 398 Bacon, Of the Dignity and Advancement of Learning, the Fifth Book, Chap. III, in The Works of Francis Bacon, Collected and Edited by James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis, and Douglas Denon Heath, Vol. IV, Translation of The Philosophical Works, Vol.I, New Edition, Longman & Co., etc, London, 1883, pp. 422-423.Karl R. Wallace, Francis Bacon on Communication & Rhetoric, the University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hil, 1943, p. 56. The author of this book extends the conception of Bacon's Promptuary, incorporating the Topics to it. On the other hand, Bacon supports that the provision of arguments for the speeches is obtained in two different ways: with the Promptuary (the arguments are composed in advance and remain to be used) and with the Topics (the places where the things must be looked for are marked, as if they were indexed): Bacon, Of the Dignity and Advancement of Learning, The Fifth Book, Chap. III, in The Works of Francis Bacon, Collected and Edited by James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis, and Douglas Denon Heath, Vol. IV, Translation of The Philosophical Works, Vol. I, New Edition, Longman & Co., etc, London, 1883, p. 422. 399 Erasmo in his treatise De Duplici Copia Rerum et Verborum, or De Utraque Verborum ac Rerum Copia (1511), usually quoted as "On Copia" ("On Abundance"), lists 150 ways of saying "I liked your letter very much" in Latin and 200 ways of saying, also in Latin, "I will remember you as long as I live", according to George A. Kennedy, Classical Rhetoric and its Christian and Secular Tradition from Ancient to Modern Times, The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1980, p. 206. 400 The instruments in Aristotle's Topics are applied to reasonings, deductive arguments, deductions, or to syllogisms and inductions, according to the different translations of Aristotle, Topics, I, 13, 105a20. To reasonings: Aristóteles, Tópicos, I, 13, 105a20, en Aristóteles, Tratados de Lógica (Organon), I, Categorías, Tópicos, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, Introducciones, Traducciones y Notas de Miguel Candel Sanmartín, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1982, p. 109, Ivan Pelletier, La Dialectique Aristotélicienne, Les Principes Clés des Topiques, Montréal, Bellarmin, Montréal, 1991, p. 329. To deductions: Aristotle, Topics, I, 13, 105a20, in The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford Translation.Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume One, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 175, Aristotle, Topics, I, 13, 105a20, Aristotle Topics Books I and VIII, Translated with a Commentary by Robin Smith, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1999, p. 11. To deductive arguments: Aristote, Topiques, I, 13, 105a20, Texte Établi et Traduit pat Jacques Brunschwig, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Paris, 1967, Tome I, Livres I-IV, p. 19, To syllogisms: Aristotele, Topici, I, 13, 105a20, da Aristotele, Organon, a Cura di Giorgio Colli, Adelphi, Edizioni, Milano, 2003, pp. 422-423. Aristotle, Topics, I, 13, dans Stéphanie Grégoire, The Dialectic Tools: Theory and Practice, Thèse Présentée à la Faculté des Études Supérieures de l'Université Laval pour la obtention du grade de Philosopiae Doctor (PH.D), Faculté de Philosophie Université Laval, Novembre 1999, Bibliothèque Nationale du Canada 0-612-47571-9, p. 118, To syllogisms and inductions: a) to obtain acceptable and relevant things to say in connection with each bill, whether they are included in the promptuary or not; b) to distinguish how many ways there are to say each thing; c) to find the differences; d) to examine the resemblances. RULE: The acceptable and relevant things to say in connection with each bill shall be ordained401 in accordance with the following divisions: a) ethical402 (includig political), physical and logical issues;403 b) in increasing universality grades, being that the species are included in the genres;404 c) in decreasing authority grades: in terms of the coincidence with the opinion accepted by all or the majority, by all the wise persons or the majority or the most reputed ones; of the similarity or contradiction with the opposite ones; and of agreement with recognized techniques.405 4. Promptuary of the things to sayRULE: To deal with the vast scope of legislative matters and to be able to find the acceptable things to say in a rapid manner, a file shall Aristote, Topiques, I, 13, dans Eug. Thionville, De la Théorie des Lieux Communs Dans les Topiques d'Aristote, et des Principales Modifications qu'elle a subies jusqua nos Jours, Thése présentée a la Faculté des Lettres de Paris, Réimpresion de l'Édition de 1855, Osnasbrück, Otto Zeller, 1965, pp. 48. In this book the instruments are applied to the whole Promptuary and to all things to say, whatever their origin may be (memory, imagination, books, magazines, Internet, etc.). 401 Ivan Pelletier, Dialectique Aristotélicienne, Les Principes Clés des Topiques, Montréal, 1991, Bellarmin, Montréal, 1991, pp. 368-369. 402 Aristotle, On Rhetoric, A Theory of Civic Discourse, Newly Translated with Introduction, Notes, And Appendixes by George A. Kennedy, Oxford University Press, New York, Oxford, p. 51. 403 Aristotle, Topics, I, 14, 105b20-25. Aristóteles, Tópicos, I, 14, 105b20-25, en Tratados de Lógica (Organon), I, Categorías, Tópicos, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, Introducciones, Traducciones y Notas de Miguel Candel Sanmartín, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1982, p. 110. Aristotle, Topics, I, 14, 105b20-25, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation, Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume One; Princeton University Press, Princeton, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, pp. 175-176. Aristote, Topiques, I, 14, 105b20-25, Texte Établi et Traduit pat Jacques Brunschwig, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Paris, 1967, Tome I, Livres I-IV, p. 20-21. 404 Aristotle, Topics, I, 9; 14, 105b32-33. Aristotle, Topics, I, 9 y 14, 105b32-33, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation, Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume One,; Princeton University Press, Princeton, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, pp. 172-173; p. 176. Aristóteles, Tópicos, I, 9; 14, 105b34-36, en Tratados de Lógica (Organon), I, Categorías, Tópicos, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, Introducciones, Traducciones y Notas de Miguel Candel Sanmartín, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1982, pp. 103-104; p. 110. 405 Aristotle, Topics, 1, 14, 105a35-105b. Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume One,; Princeton University Press, Princeton, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, pp. 175-176. Aristóteles, Tópicos, I, 14, 105a 35-105b, en Tratados de Lógica (Organon), I, Categorías, Tópicos, Sobre Las Refutaciones Sofísticas, Introducciones, Traducciones Y Notas De Miguel Candel Sanmartín, Editorial Gredos, Madrid , 1982 , pp. 109-110. Aristotle, Topics, I, 14, 105a35-105b5, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation, Aristote, Topiques, I, 14, 105a35-105b5, Texte Établi et Traduit pat Jacques Brunschwig, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Paris, 1967, Tome I, Livres I-IV, p. 19-21. be prepared in advance and kept available for immediate use when needed (promptuary).406 RULE: They promptuary shall be composed of: a) the most common acceptable things to say, free from any particular circumstances407 (forms); b) the arguments for and against relevant issues (dissoi lógoi or double reasons); c) the most favorable colors to promote the acceptance of the things to say (colors of good and evil); d) an ordained set of things acceptable to say (topics); e) an ordained set of things acceptable to say only in appearance (sophisms). a. Forms In ancient Greece, before the emergence of rhetorical rules, oratory was learned by way of examples, imitating the speeches of the great orators. The teaching of the first sophists consisted in making their disciples learn by heart speeches that they could use to compose or criticize other speeches, changing the particular circumstances mentioned in them. In the Middle Ages, forms appeared firstly, followed by the manuals on ars dictaminis.408 Prologues and epilogues are those parts of persuasive speeches that turn out most suitable to form collections of examples to be used when the favorable occasion arises. Fifty six Demosthenes' prologues have come up to us.409 Cicero, perhaps, also had a collection of prologues, as it might be inferred from the apologies asked from his good friend Atticus for having sent to him his work On Glory with the same prologue that had appeared in the third book of the Academics, anticipating him that he had already sent a new one to him.410 In his "Promptuary". Bacon included digressions, transitions, intimations about that which will next happen, excusations and other similar "interstices of the speech", which he denominated "Lesser Forms", whose description finished with the four following 406 Bacon, Of the Dignity and Advancement of Learning, the Fifth Book, Chap. III, in The Works of Francis Bacon, Collected and Edited by James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis, and Douglas Denon Heath, Vol. IV, Translation of The Philosophical Works, Vol. I, New Edition, Longman & Co., etc, London, 1883, pp. 422-423; the Sixth Book, Chap. III, pp. 455-493. 407 Cicerón, De Oratore, II, XXX, 130. Cicéron, De l'Orateur, Livre Deuxième, XXX-130, Texte Établi et Traduit par Edmond Courbaud, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Paris, 1927, pp. 58-59. 408 With regard to ars dictaminis, see: A. Giry, Manuel de Diplomatique, Nouvelle Édition, Librairie Félix Alcan, Paris, 1925, p. 482. 409 Demosthenes, Exordia. Demosthenes, Exordia, in The Orations of Demosthenes, Translated by Charkles Rann Kennedy, Bohn's Classical Library, George Bell, Sons, Vol. V, London, pp. 302-337. Demosthenes, Exordia, Translated by Norman W. de Witt and Norman J, de Witt, The Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, William Heinemann Ltd., London, Vol VII, pp. 86-193. Demóstenes, Proemios de Discursos Políticos, en Discursos Políticos III, Introducción Traducción y Notas de A. López Eire, Editorial Gredos Madrid, 1985, pp. 340-407. 410 Cicero, Letter to Atticus, XVI, 6. Cicero, Letter to Atticus, XVI, 6, in Cicero, Letters to Atticus III, with an English Translation, by E. O. Winstedt, The Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann Ltd, London, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1961, pp. 393. EXAMPLES: "A CONCLUSION IN A DELIBERATIVE [SPEECH] So may we redeem the fault passed and at the same time prevent the inconveniences to come."411 "COROLLARY OF AN ACCURATE DISTRIBUTION That all may know that I have no wish either to evade anything by silence or to obscure it by speech1. 1. Cic. Pro Cluent. c. i. A TRANSITION WITH HINT Let us pass these things, and yet no without marking and turning back to look at them as we go by.1 1. Cic. Pro. Sext. C. 5. A FORM TO PREOCCUPY THE MIND AGAINST AN OPINION PREVIOUSLY FORMED I will make you understand in all this business how much is truth, how much error, and how much envy.2 2. Cic. Pro Cluent. C. 4."412 From times immemorial, the chancelleries have relied on forms for the writing of their documents; like for example the ones that existed in the Middle Age, before and after the appearance of the manuals on ars dictaminis.413 In the art of legislation of the modern times, the respective forms of Ilbert, Russell, Driedger and Crabbe may be remembered.414 The official rules of legislative drafting, both North American and European, are usually accompanied by examples to be imitateed and forms to be filled in.415 411 Bacon, Of the Dignity and Advancement of Learning, the Sixth Book, Chap. III, in The Works of Francis Bacon, Collected and Edited by James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis, and Douglas Denon Heath, Vol. IV, Translation of The Philosophical Works, Vol. I, New Edition, Longman & Co., etc, London, 1883, p. 492. 412 Bacon, Of the Dignity and Advancement of Learning, the Sixth Book, Chap. III, in The Works of Francis Bacon, Collected and Edited by James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis, and Douglas Denon Heath, Vol. IV, Translation of The Philosophical Works, Vol. I, New Edition, Longman & Co., etc, London, 1883, pp. 492-493. 413 A. Giry, Manuel de Diplomatique, Nouvelle Édition, LIbrairie Félix Alcan, Paris, 1925, pp. 479-492, on the forms and manuals; pp. 661-820, on the chancelleries. 414 Sir Courtney Ilbert, Legislative Methods and Forms, Oxford at The Clarendon Press, 1901. Sir Alison Russell, Legislative Drafting and Forms, Butterworth & Co.(Publishers) Ltd., Fourth Edition, London, 1938. Elmer A. Driedger, Legislative Forms and Precedents, Ottawa, 1963, later attached to a previous work in The Composition of Legislation, Legislative Forms and Precedents, Second Edition, Published by The Department of Justice, Ottawa, 1976. V.C.R.A.C. Crabbe, Legislative Drafting, Cavendish Publishing Limited, London, 1993. V.C.R.A.C. Crabbe, Legislative Precedents, Volume II, Cavendish Publishing Limited, London, 1998. 415 For Canada, from 1949, see: RULE: The forms, a section that integrates the promptuary, shall include such persuasive and prescriptive speeches, or parts thereof, as are likely to be used as they are or with certain particular circumstances being specified. The preparation of the forms, as classical tradition requires, is a personal task performed by legislators and advisers or an institutional task entrusted to specialized organs. RULE: The forms shall include a selection of successful persuasive and prescriptive speeches, as well as others that might also achieve success. After the print appeared, notebooks were replaced by dictionaries of quotations, perhaps in the future the personal and institutional forms will be replaced by national, regional and international forms, but nothing will prevent legislators and their advisers from treasuring and composing persuasive and prescriptive speeches, to use them when the favorable occasion arises. b. Double reasons (dissoi logoi) Double reasons, antithesis of things, contradictions, arguments for and against certain important topics, were already known in ancient Greece (dissoi logoi), among them, the famous ones by sophist Protagoras of Abdera (c 490-420 B.C.).416 To have an idea of the topics argued about, one should remember the antithesis by an anonymous author, traditionally placed after the works of Sextus Empiricus (c ends of the II century), concerning good and evil, the beautiful and the awkward, the just and the unjust, the true and the false, whether wisdom and virtue are likely to be taught, whether magistratures should be elected by drawing lots, and whether the practise and teaching of an art may be merged in the same person, including in the development of the latter topic an incomplete praise of the advantages of memory.417 Uniformity of Legislation in Canada-An Outline and Rules of Drafting, Published by The Conference of Commissioners on Uniformity of Legislation in Canada, 1949, 41 pp., and the successive Annual Meeting Proceedings. For The United States of America, see the style manuals of the different States, among which the following one stands out: Minnesota Revisor's Manual, With Styles and Forms, by The Office of The Revisor of Statutes, St. Paul, Minessota, 2002. At Federal level, see: A Guide for Drafting Federal Legislation, Department of Air Force, Judge Advocate General, AFP 110-11, 12December, 1951, 9 pp. Style Manual for Drafting Regulations in The Department of Transportation, Department of Transportation, Office of The General Counsel, 17 pp. Preparation of Papers Related to Legislation (Other than Appropiation Bills) Executive Orders, and Proclamations, Headquarters, Department of The Army, Memorandum No. 340-6, Washington DC, 21 november 1972, 44 pp., especially the Appendixes, pp. 28-44. For Europe, see: Rodolfo Pagano, Introduzione alla Legistica, L'Arte di Preparare Leggi, Dott. A. Giuffrè, Appendice n. 2, Elenco di Testi Ufficiale di Direttive di Legistica ed Altri Testi Attinenti alla Produzione Legislativa, Milano, 1999, pp. 303-310. 416 Mario Untersteiner, I Sofisti, Giulio Einaudi, Torino, 1949, pp. 17-54. 417Sofisti, Testimonianze e Frammenti, Introduzione, Traduzione e Commento a Cura di Mario Untersteiner, Fascicolo Terzo, La Nuova Italia Editrice, Firenze, 1a. edizione 1954, 1a. ristampa, 1967, pp. 150-191. As an example of an orator held contradictory positions in successive speeches reference is often made to skeptic Carneades of Cyrene (214/213-129 B.C.) who, together with other two Greek philosophers, peripatetic Critolaus and stoic Diogenes, integrated the embassy to Rome in 155 B.C., to defend the interests of Athens before the Senate. The three of them took advantage of their stay in Rome to give lessons or deliver lectures in the city, which impressed the youth. Carneades, in two successive and contradictory speeches, argued for the justice one day and agains it on the next, following the custom among Academicians, with like eloquence, not based on philosophical conviction, but as an intellectual exercise, to support arguments for and against an important topic. Nevertheless, the scandal was so great among the Romans, that Cato the censor demanded and obtained the rapid departure of the Athenian delegation, to protect the youth from the bad influence of the aforesaid philosophers.418 In the Middle Ages, there were four fundamental methods applicable to disputes419 for and against a thesis: common, Socratic, megarian and syllogistic. When the common method was used, the orators expressed their respective contradictory speeches with great freedom. With the Socratic method practised in the platonic Academy and also in the educational institutions of the Middle Ages, given a question that admitted only two contradictory answers, one of the parties took over one of two admissible answers and tried to answer the questions of the other one, without incurring contradictions with the answer given at the beginning; and the party who asked the questions did so to obtain an answer contradicting the initial one. According to the megarian method, each party tried to show that the assertions of the other implied a contradiction. In the employment of the syllogistic or scholastic method, of medieval origin, this way of arguing for and against was strictly followed.420 While forms included complete speeches or parts of them, which may be used as they are or specifying the particular circumstances involved, in the case of double reasons there is a higher abstraction level, because the arguments are synthesized for and against important and recurrent topics in concise and sharp sentences, so that they may be easily memorized. The existence of opposite or contradictory speeches is not required, as long as they serve to sustain each of both positions, to amplify them in a concrete confirmatory or refutatory speech and, in the latter case, so that the author may be warned and prepared for an opportune reply.421 418 George Kennedy, The Art of Rhetoric in the Roman World, 300 B.C.-A.D. 300, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1972, pp. 53-54. 419 For the distinctions between the common, Socratic methods and silogístico, see: Ivan Pelletier, La Dialectique Aristotélicienne, Les Principes Clés des Topiques, Bellarmin, Montréal, 1991, p. 104, n. 16. For the distinction Socratic between the methods Socratic, megarian and syllogistic, see: Ignacio Angelelli, The Techniques of Disputation in the History of Logic, The Journal of Philosophy, 57 (1970), p. 802, n.7. 420 Martín Grabmann, Filosofía Medieval, traducción de Salvador Minguijón, Editorial Labor, Barcelona, 1928, p. 36. 421 Aristotle, Topics, VIII, 14, 163b1-16. Aristotle, Topics, VIII, 14, 163 b, 1-16, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation, Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume One, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 276. Robin Smith, Aristotle Topics, Books I and VIII, Translated with a Commentary, Clarendon Preess, Oxford, 1997, pp. 38-39. Aristóteles, Tópicos, VIII, 14, 163b1-16, en Tratados de Lógica (Organon), I, Categorías, Tópicos, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, Introducciones, Traducciones y Notas de Miguel Candel Sanmartín, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1982, pp. 302-303. RULE: In double reasons, a section that integrates the forms, arguments shall be synthesized for and against important and recurrent topics in concise and sharp sentences, so as to facilitate their opportune memorization and amplification. Bacon collected forty seven antitheses, under the following titles: I. NOBILITY, II. BEAUTY, III. YOUTH, IV. HEALTH, V. WIFE AND CHILDREN, VI RICHES, VII. HONOURS, VIII. EMPIRE, IX. PRAISE, REFUTATION, X. NATURE, XI. FORTUNE, XII. LIFE, XIII. SUPERSTITION, XIV. PRIDE, XV. INGRATITUDE, XVI. ENVY, XVII. UNCHASTITY, XVIII. CRUELTY, XIX. VAIN-GLORY, XX. JUSTICE, XXI. FORTITUDE, XXII. TEMPERANCE, XXIII. CONSTANCY, XXIV. MAGNANIMITY, XXV. KNOWLEDGE, CONTEMPLATION, XXVI. LEARNING, XXVII. PROMPTITUDE, XXVIII. SILENCE IN MATTERS OF SECRECY, XXIX. FACILITY, XXX. POPULARITY, XXXI. LOQUACITY, XXXII. DISSIMULATION, XXXIII. BOLDNESS, XXXIV. CEREMONIES, PUNTOS, AFFECTATION, XXXV. JESTS, XXXVI. LOVE, XXXVII. FRIENDSHIP, XXXVIII. FLATTERY, XXXIX. REVENGE, XL. INNOVATION, XLI. DELAY, XLII. PREPARATION, XLIII. MEETING THE FIRST MOVE, XLIV, VIOLENT COUNSELS, XLV. SUSPICION, XLVI. THE WORDS OF THE LAW, XLVII. FOR WITNESS AGAINST ARGUMENTS.422 Only three antitheses will be transcribed, as examples representating the collection: EXAMPLES "XXI. FORTITUDE. For. Against. Nothing is to be feared A noble virtue, to be willing except fear itself. to die yourself in order to kill another! There is nothing either solid A noble virtue, which a man may in pleasure,or secure in virtue, acquire by getting drunk! where fear intrudes. He that looks steadily at He that is prodigal of his dangers that he may meet own life is dangerous to other them sees also how he may men's. avoid them. Other virtues free us from Fortitude is the virtue of the domination of vice, the iron age. fortitude only from the domination of fortune."423 As a curiosity and a sample of its contemporary employment, it is necessary to remember that President Franklin Delano Roosvelt (1882-1945), in its First Inaugural Speech, said: 422 Bacon, Of the Dignity and Advancement of Learning, The Sixth Book, Chap. III, in The Works of Francis Bacon, Collected and Edited by James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis, and Douglas Denon Heath, Vol. IV, Translation of The Philosophical Works, Vol. I, New Edition, Longman & Co., etc, London, 1883, pp. 473-493. 423 Bacon, Of the Dignity and Advancement of Learning, The Sixth Book, Chap. III, in The Works of Francis Bacon, Collected and Edited by James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis and Douglas Denon Heath, Vol. IV, Translation of The Philosophical Works, Vol. I, New Edition, Longman & Co., etc, London, 1883, p. 481. "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself." Similar statements, in addition to those of Bacon and Roosvelt, are found in the Bible and in Montaigne, Wellington and Thoreau.424 "XXVII PROMPTITUDE. For. Against. Wisdom that comes not The wisdom that is ready at quick comes out of season. hand does not lie deep. He that quickly errs quickly Wisdom is like garment, amends his error. it must be light if it be for speed. He that is wise in He whose counsels are not deliberation and not upon ripened by deliberation, his the moment does no great wisdom will not ripen with age. matters Things speedily devised speedily fall out of favour."425 ""XLI. DELAY For. Against. Fortune sells many things Opportunity offers the handle to him that is in a hurry, of the bottle first, and which she gives to him that waits afterwards the belly. While we hasten to take Opportunity is like the hold of the beginnings of Sibyl; she raises the price as things, we grasp shadows. she diminishes the offer. While things are wavering, Speed is Pluto's 426 helmet. watch; when they have taken Things that are done their direction, act. betimes are done with judgement; Commit the beginnings of things that are put off too late, Actions to Argus, 427 the end by circuit.1 to Briareus. 428 1. Per ambitum: meaning, I suppose (if the reading is correct) that first you can choose the best way, but at last you must take the way that offers.J. S."429 424 John Bartlett, Familiar Quotations, Fourteen Edition, Revised and Enlarged, Emily Morison Beck, Editor, The Macmillan Press Ltd., London, etc., 1977, p. 189, n. 4.; p. 971. 425 Bacon, Of the Dignity and Advancement of Learning, The Sixth Book, Chap. III, in The Works of Francis Bacon, Collected and Edited by James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis and Douglas Denon Heath, Vol. IV, Translation of The Philosophical Works, Vol. I, New Edition, Longman & Co., etc, London, 1883, p. 483. 426 Pluto (Plutus, in Latin) personifies wealth, under the appearance of a blind old man. Kevin Clinton, "Plutus", The Oxford Classical Dictionary, Third Edition, Edited by Simon Hornblower, Antony Spawforth, Oxford University Press, Oxford-New York, 1996, p. 1202. 427Argus or Panoptes, a superman of a hundred eyes, some of them always open. Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, Edited by William Smith, Published by Taylor and Walton, London, 1844, Vol. I., p. 282. 428Briareus or Aegaeon, a monster of a hundred and fifty arms. Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, Edited by William Smith, Published by Taylor and Walton, London, 1844, Vol. I., p. 24. 429 Bacon, Of the Dignity and Advancement of Learning, The Sixth Book, Chap. III, in The Works of Francis Bacon, Collected and Edited by James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis and Douglas Denon Heath, c. The colors of good and evil In addition to having the sections corresponding to forms and double reasons available, it is necessary to consider the cases in which reason alone is insufficient to move the will of the recipients of prescriptive and persuasive speeches, to which end the colors of good and evil must be resorted to. RULE: When reason alone turns out insufficient to move the will of the recipients of the prescriptive and persuasive speeches, one shall appeal to imagination and to the basic political emotions (hope and fear), resorting to the colors of good (usefulness) and evil (uselessness or harmfulness) and, should this be impossible, comparatively maximizing the good (hope) and minimizing the evil (fear) or vice versa. The will of the recipients of persuasive and prescriptive speeches usually succumbs to the force of emotion, because emotion shows the good and the evil as real and immediate. Since reason shows the good and the evil as underlying, deep and mediate, to gain the above mentioned wills, it is necessary to appeal to imagination and to introduce the reasonable goods and evil as currently present in the minds of the recipients,430 with more liveliness and strenght. EXAMPLE: "Yours enemies will be glad with this", instead of: "this will be bad for you."431 RULE: Persuasive and prescriptive speeches shall be introduced by resorting to the colors of good (usefulness) and evil (uselessness or harmfulness), applying reason to imagination, so that the latter will show problems and solutions as currently present in the minds of the recipients, to move their wills in the desired direction. d. Topics The topics method, a section made a part of the promptuary, facilitates the finding of things to say in persuasive and prescriptive speeches on any legislative matter. Likewise, it facilitates the avoidance of confrontations, to which end it takes as a starting point the opinions acceptable for all or for the majority, for all or the majority of the wise persons or for the most reputed ones, provided always that they are not paradoxical or contrary to the opinion of the majority. This method also takes as a starting point the opinions similar to the acceptable ones, those that contradict the opinions contrary to the above and those that are consistent with recognized techniques. Such starting opinions, on which men agree, become acceptable just by making reference to them or by enunciating them, without the need to justify them (endoxa)432 Vol. IV, Translation of The Philosophical Works, Vol. I, New Edition, Longman & Co., etc, London, 1883, pp. 489-490. 430 Bacon, Of the Dignity and Advancement of Learning, The Sixth Book, Chap. III, in The Works of Francis Bacon, Collected and Edited by James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis and Douglas Denon Heath, Vol. IV, Translation of The Philosophical Works, Vol. I, New Edition, Longman and Co., etc, London, 1883, p. 455. 431 Bacon, Of the Colours of Good and Evil, Preface, in The Works of Francis Bacon, Popular Edition Based Upon the Complete Edition of Spedding, Ellis and Heath, II, Literary and Religions Works, III Houghton, Mifflin and Company, The University Press, Cambridge, Boston, p. 458. 432 See, in general: and, when used as principles, they allow for systematization of the prescriptive speech and for motivation of the persuasive speech. Topics will be developed in point 5 of this Chapter. e. Sophisms If the acceptable, normal things to say, found or not with topics, painted or not with the colors of good and evil, were acceptable only in appearance, because they endure certain secret pathologies (sophisms), then it shall be necessary to describe in systematical form how to diagnose them and to prescribe how to apply the corresponding therapies to cure them. Sophisms will be discussed in point 6 of this Chapter. 5. Topics The use of acceptable opinions, the justification of which turned out unnecessary, already existed in the ancient Greece. They were used by Sócrates, who upheld that Homer could characterize Ulysses as a man of "sure word", because he used them too.433 The method was systematized by Aristotle in a special work made a part of his logical writings, Organon or Instrument, and applied in his Rhetoric.434 Adapted to the L. M. Régis, L'Opinion Selon Aristote, Libr. Philosophique J. Vrin, Paris, Inst. d'Études Medievales, Ottawa, 1935, 284 pp. 433 Homer, Odyssey,VIII, 171. Homero, Odisea, Introducción de Manuel Fernández Galeano, Traducción de José Manuel Pabón, VII, 171, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1982, p. 212. Homère, Odyssée, Chant VIII, 171, dans Poésie Homerique, Texte Établi et Traduit par Victor Bérard, Quatrième Édition, Tome II Chants VII-XV, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Paris, 1946, p. 9. Jenofonte, Memorabilia, IV, 6, 15. Xenophon Memorabilia and Oeconomics, With an English Translation by E.C. Marchant, The Loeb Classical Library, Memorabilia, IV, vi, 15, London: William Heiemann, New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1923, pp. 346-347. Xenophon, Entretiens Mémorables de Socrate, IV, VI, Expliqués Littéralment Traduit en Français et Annoté par E. Sommer, Librairie Hachette et Cie., Paris, 1886, p. 131. Émile Boutroux, Socrate Fondateur de la Science Morale, dans Études d'Histoire de la Philosophie, Félix Alcan. Éditeur, Troisième Édition, Revue, Paris, 1908, p. 45. 434 Aristotle, Topics, I, 1a 17-21; 100b,24-27; 104a8-13. Aristotle, Topics, I, 1, 100a 20-23, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation, Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume One, 100b20-22; 100; 104a9-15, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 167; p. 73. Aristóteles, Tópicos, I, 1, a17-21; 100b,24-27; 104a8-13, en Aristóteles, Tratados de Lógica (Organon), I, Categorías, Tópicos, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, Introducciones, Traducciones y Notas de Miguel Candel Sanmartín, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1982, pp. 89-90; pp. 104-105. Aristotle, Rhetoric, Libro I, 2, y II, 18-26. Aristotle, Rhetoric, I, 2; II, 18-26, in The Complete Works Of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford Translation. Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume Two, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, pp. 2217-2237. Aristóteles, Retórica, Libro I, 2; II, 18-26, Introducción, Traducción y Notas por Quintín Racionero, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1990, pp. 173-192 y pp. 391-470. Aristote, Rhétorique, Livre I, 2 ; II, 18-26, Texte Établii et Traduit par Médéric Dufour, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Tome Première, Paris, 1932, pp. 76-83; pp. 98-135. Aristotele, Retorica, Libro I, I y II, 18-24, A cura di Armando Plebe, Editore Laterza, Bari, 1961, pp. 614; pp. 126-166. Georgiana Paine Palmer, The Topoi of Aristotle's Rhetoric as Exemplified in the Orators, A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the Division of Humanities in Candidacy for the Degree of Doctor in law and spread by Cicero,435 it culminated in ancient Latin times with a final synthesis by Boethius, 436 who pointed out that topics promise something great, a footpath to discovery, that the ignorants people believe is owed only to natural talent, without noticing how much is acquired through its study, of that which gives force to art and power to nature.437 Bacon, with his promptuary method, preserved the sophistic tradition of topics: to memorize speeches or its parts (forms), to argue for and against (antithesis of things), and revalued the acceptable opinions (topics), but fought those that were so in appearance (sophisms regarded as colors of good and evil). Vico also preserved the importance of topics against the attacks of Descartes' followers, but detected insufficiencies in the followers of certain ancient and modern schools: in those of the Academy, the platonic ones, because they identified dialectics with the art of invention, and in those of the Porch, the stoics, because they identified it with the art of judging, and none of them understood that neither can invention be true without judgment, nor judgment without invention.438 He advised young people to begin with the topics method, which prepares the materials, to judge them later with logic, as he himself did, following the natural course of the ideas, which are firstly learned, then judged and finally reasoned, preventing them from being arid and dry in their explanations, for not having done anything and for trying to judge everything.439 In the light of the overvaluation of topics by the ancient ones (the platonic) and the scorn of the modern ones (Descartes' followers), Vico was salomonic in the quarrel. He considered that if truth is one, verisimilitudes multiple and falsities infinite, then topics represent a defective method, because it often assumes true things as false; and that the critical method of Descartes's followers is also defective, because it rejects what is verisimilar.440 Cicero, who had already criticized the stoics for having deal with judgment only, and recognized Aristotle as the prince of both arts (inventing and judging), describes the concrete motives that led him to write about a method to find the arguments (Topics).441 Philosophy, Department of Greek Language and Literature, 1932, Private Edition, Distributed by The University of Chicago Libraries, Chicago, Illinois, 1934, 84 pp. 435 On the resemblances and differences between the Topics of Cicero and Aristotle, see: Benedetto Riposati, Studi Sui "Topica" di Cicerone, Edizioni Dell'Università Cattolica del S. Cuore, Serie Pubblicazioni Volume XXII, Società Editrice Vita e Pensiero, Milano, 1947, pp. 290-291; pp. 294-299, who supports Cicero's originality, that, on having joined two ideals of ancient culture, philosophy and rhetoric, in a theoretical and practical work, a mature synthesis of the opinions of the previous authors and of its own writings, systematized rhetorical invention. 436 Sten Ebbesen, Commentators and Commentaries on Aristotle's Sophistici Elenchi, A Study of PostAristotelian Ancient and Medieval Writings on Fallacies, Volume I The Greek Tradition, E.J. Brill, Leiden, 1981, p. 120. 437 Boethius's The Topicis Diferentiis, Book I, 1182D31-34, Translated, with Notes and Essays on the Text by Eleonore Stump, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1978, p. 42. 438 Vico, L'Antichissima Sapienza Degli Italici da Ricavarsi dalle Origine della Lingua Latina Libri Tre (1710), Giambatista Vico, Opere Filosofiche, Introduzione di Nicola Badaloni, Testi, Versioni e Note a Cura di Paolo Cristofolini, Sansoni Editore, Firenze, 1971, p. 120. 439 Vico, Vita di Giambatista Vico Scritta da se Medesimo (1725-1728), da Giambatista Vico, Opere Filosofiche, Introduzione di Nicola Badaloni, Testi, Versioni e Note a Cura di Paolo Cristofolini, Sansoni Editore, Firenze, 1971, p. 12. 440 Vico, Il Metodo Degli Studi del Nostro Tempo (1708), da Giambatista Vico, Opere Filosofiche, Introduzione di Nicola Badaloni, Testi, Versioni e Note a Cura di Paolo Cristofolini, Editore, Firenze, 1971, III, Svantagi della Nuova Critica, p. 798; p. 800. 441 Cicero, Tópics, I, 1-6. He says that he was at his library in Tusculano, with a friend, jurist C. Trebatius, consulting the works, each one independently from the other and according to their respective tastes, when a book entitled "Topics" called Trebatius's attention and, stung by curiosity, he asked what it was about. When Cicero said to him that in said book Aristotle exposed an infallible method to find arguments, a lively desire to know such method awoke in him and he asked Cicero to explain it to him. Cicero advised him to read it alone or with the help of a rhetor that he recommended to him. Later on, as Cicero knew that, on account of the darkness of the work and the rhetor's ignorance,Trebatius had not achieved success, during a trip by ship, not to appear as ungrateful or proud, with no books at hand, he wrote a special work, known as "Topics to C. Trebatius",442 which he dedicated to him, with examples taken from the law, except when others were necessary,443 fortunately for his friend and for posterity.444 Cicero's Topics proved useful to jurists romanists and law philosophers. Together with the Topics by Aristotle, Boethius, Bacon and Vico, now all of them prove useful to the art of legislation. Topics may be applied with little efforts to the persuasive speech, traditionally included in the deliberative genre of rhetoric, through which the enactment of a bill is counselled or discounselled. More effort is needed with regard to the prescriptive speech, that is, to that part of a bill intended not to argue, but to oblige, prohibit, permit, punish and reward conducts. Without it being necessary to take sides in the controversy between jusnaturalism and juspositivism, it is convenient to bear in mind that, to be incorporated and remain in a positive juridical system, except for a few temporary exceptions, only the norms based on acceptable reasons or principles (endoxa) make it possible to obtain such consent from the rulers and governed people as is required for their approval, interpretation and application in an effective and lasting manner. While it is easy to find a hidden thing if the place where it remains has been marked and recognized, to trace arguments we must know the topics or places (topoi, loci) where they are located, as if they were their seats.445 The method is infallible to Cicerón, Tópicos a Cayo Trebacio, en Obras Completas de Marco Tulio Cicerón Traducidas del Latín por Marcelino Menéndez Pelayo, Imprenta Central a Cargo de V. Saiz, Madrid, 1879, Tomo I, p. 214. Cicéron, Topiques, I, 1-6, dans Cicéro, Divisions de l'Art Oratoire, Topiques, Texte Établi et Traduit par Henri Bornecque, Deuxième Édition, Société d'Édition "Les Belles-Lettres", Paris, 1960, Les Topiques de M. Tullius Cicéron Adressés a C. Trebatius, pp. 66-69. 442 Cicero, Tópicos, I, 1-5. Cicerón, Tópicos a Cayo Trebacio, en Obras Completas de Marco Tulio Cicerón Traducidas del Latín por Marcelino Menéndez Pelayo, Imprenta Central a Cargo de V. Saiz, Madrid, 1879, Tomo I, pp. 213-214. Cicéron, Les Topiques de M. Tullius Cicéron Adressés a C. Trebatius, dans Divisions de l'Art Oratoire, Topiques, Texte Établi et Traduit par Henri Bornecque, Deuxième Édition, Société d'Édition "Les BellesLettres", Paris, 1960, I, 1-5, pp. 66-69. 443 Cicero, Topics, VII, 32. Cicerón, Tópicos a Cayo Trebacio, Obras Completas de Marco Tulio Cicerón Traducidas del Latín por Marcelino Menéndez Pelayo, Imprenta Central a Cargo de V. Saiz, Madrid, 1879, Tomo I, p. 219. Cicerón, Les Topiques de M. Tullius Cicéron Adressés a C. Trebatius, VII 32, dans Cicéron, Divisions de l'Art Oratoire, Topiques, Texte Établi et Traduit par Henri Bornecque, Deuxième Édition, Société d'Édition "Les Belles-Lettres", Paris, 1960, pp. 66-69. 444 Cicero, Topics, XIX, 72. Cicerón, Tópicos a Cayo Trebacio, Obras Completas de Marco Tulio Cicerón Traducidas del Latín por Marcelino Menéndez Pelayo, Imprenta Central a Cargo de V. Saiz, Madrid, 1879, Tomo I, p. 229. Cicéron, Divisions de l'Art Oratoire. Topiques, Texte Établi et Traduit par Henri Bornecque, Deuxième Édition, Société d'Édition "Les Belles-Lettres", Paris, 1960, Les Topiques de M. Tullius Cicéron Adressés a C. Trebatius, XIX 72, p. 91. 445 Cicero, Topics, II, 7-8. overcome more quickly the absence of ideas, the syndromes of slowness and silence in an improvised oral speech, or that of a white sheet in a written speech. As we spontaneously associate the question with the acceptable opinions (endoxa), or review those that compose the promptuary or others suggested by them, using the Instruments to select such topics as may be adequate to deal with the concrete question, something relevant to say will usually arise in our mind. It is so because this method stimulates memory,446 one of the parts of prudence,447 as well as imagination or fantasy, which is the source, the eye of ingenuity. This is the faculty to join diverse and separate things; it is sharp when it penetrates with more speed and facility, and joins the diverse things more closely, like an angle narrower than a rectum; it is obtuse when it penetrates more slowly and with difficulty, leaving things separated and distant, like an angle wider than a rectum.448 To invent or to investigate does not consist in constructing new combinations with already well-known entities, since many of them prove useless, but in choosing those that reveal unsuspected kinships between certain entities that have beeing mistakenly considered strange, forming analogies with elements taken from very distant domains, some of which, very rare, are the most fecund of all.449 Cicerón, Tópicos a Cayo Trebacio, Obras Completas de Marco Tulio Cicerón Traducidas del Latín por Marcelino Menéndez Pelayo, Imprenta Central a Cargo de V. Saiz, Madrid, 1879, Tomo I, p. 214. Cicéron, Divisions de l'Art Oratoire. Topiques, Texte Établi et Traduit par Henri Bornecque, Deuxième Édition, Société d'Édition "Les Belles-Lettres", Paris, 1960, Les Topiques de M. Tullius Cicéron Adressés a C. Trebatius, II 7-8, p. 69. Aristotle, Topics, VIII, 163b28-30. Aristotle, Topics, VIII, 163b28-30, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation, Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume One, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 276. Aristóteles, Tópicos, VIII, 163b28-30, en Aristóteles, Tratados de Lógica (Organon), I, Categorías, Tópicos, Sobre Las Refutaciones Sofísticas, Introducciones, Traducciones y Notas de Miguel Candel Sanmartín, 446 "But one must get hold of a starting-point. This explains why it is that persons are supposed to recollect sometimes by starting from "places". The cause is that they pass swiftly from one point to another, e.g. from milk to white, from white to mist, and thence to moist, from which one remembers Autumn if this be the season he is trying to recollect. " Aristotle, On Memory, 2, 452a14-17 Aristotle, On Memory, 2, 452a14-17, The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation, Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume One, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 718. 447 ("Prudence is the knowledge of the good, the bad and the indifferent things. Its Parts are: memory intelligence and providence. Due to memory, a man remembers what it was; due to intelligence he knows what it is, due to providence he sees something before it happens.") "Prudencia es el saber de las cosas buenas, malas é indiferentes. Sus Partes son: memoria inteligencia , providencia. Por la memoria recuerda el hombre lo que fue; por la inteligencia concoce lo que es, por la providencia ve algo antes que suceda." Cicero, De Inventione, II, LII, 160. Cicerón, De la Invención Retórica, en Obras Completas de Marco Tulio Cicerón, Traducidas del Latín, por Marcelino Ménéndez Pelayo, Biblioteca Clásica, T. XIV, Madrid, 1879, T. I, p. 98. Cicéron, De l'Invention (De Inventione), II, LII, 160, Texte Revu et Traduit avec Introduction et Notes par Henri Bornecque, Librairie Garnier Fères, Paris, p. 256 (latin), p. 257 (french). 448 Giambattista Vico, Opere Filosofiche, Introduzione di Nicola Badaloni, Testi, Versioni e Note a Cura di Paolo Cristofolini, L'Antichissima Sapienza degli Italici da Ricavarsi dalle Origine della Lingua Latina Libri Tre, 1710, Sansoni Editore, Firenze, 1971, III, La Memoria e la Fantasia, are synonymous in Latin, pp. 114-115; IV L'Ingegno, is a synonymous for "nature" in Latin, sharp or obtuse, p. 116; V La Facoltà Propria del Conoscere con Certezza, the fantasy is the eye of ingenuity, p. 126. 449 Henri Poincaré, L'Invention Mathématique, Conférence Faite a l'Institut Général Psychologique le 23 Mai 1908, Revue Générale des Sciences Pures et Appliqueés, T. 19 (1908), p. 522. Here follows a discussion about the following topics: public opinion, opinion of the interested sectors and opinion of the experts; legislation, custom, case law and juristic writings; character of the legislator (ethos), hope and the fear of the recipients (pathos), and reasonableness of the speeches, examples and enthymemes (logos): definitions, genres, species, similarities, differences, contraries, concomitances; antecedent, consequent and incompatibly, causes, effects, comparisons, possibility, feasibility, probability, need, opportunity, merit, antinomy, justice, expediency and harmonization of justice, expediency and juridical security. a. Public opinion To learn about public opinion, reports by spies were resorted to; later on, in the XIX century, press releases were taken into account; and from the XX century on, other mass media, like radio, television and the Internet were added; finally, surveys450 are almost decisive at present. Since surveys are conducted by specialized public, private and mixed entities, legislators and advisers, before using them, should evaluate how reliable they are.451 RULE: Before using public opinion surveys, their reliability shall be determined through the evaluation of: a) the identity of the sponsor and the background of the surveyor; b) the objective and exact linguistic formulation of the questions; c) the care with which the sample was defined and its size and the method selected; d) the percentage of real answers and its relation with partial and total ones; e) the consultation way (personal or by mail, phone, Internet); f) the period during which the surveys were performed, since supervening events may make respondents change their opinions. In addition to public opinion, it is necessary to know the opinion of the interested sectors b. Opinion of the interested sectors A complete list of the interested sectors to be affected by the enactment of a bill is not always made available to legislators and advisers. RULE: Legislators and advisers shall be provided with a complete list of such interested sectors as will be affected by the enactment of a bill, to consult them and to evaluate the effects that will take place in the stages of drafting, promotion, debate, rejection, enactment, veto, publication and dissemination. It is convenient to remember that the opinions of the interested parties almost always will subsume the sectorial interest in the general interest.This is the reason why it is necessary to consider them with a critical spirit, but without an automatic disqualification. 450On the surveys about legislative public opinion, its differences with the referendum; the importance of the consensus and the legislator's freedom, see: J. Carbonnier, Sociologie Juridique, Armand Colin, Paris, 1972, pp. 310-313. 451 W. Phillip Davison, "Public Opinion", in Encyclopaedia Brittanica, 15 Th. Edition, 1978, p. 215. RULE: The opinion of the interested sectors subsumed in the general interest shall not automatically discredit the critics or the formulated proposals. c. Opinion of the experts The experts may be independent or be proposed by the interested parts; experience indicates that their attitude tends to be less objective in the latter case. In addition to not coloring his opinions with interests foreign to the art practiced by him, a specialist although independent, should always be able to say on time "I do not know it", so as not be later forced to say "I was wrong because I did not know it", since not only the scope of his knowledge will be evaluated: he will also be demanded to have the exact notion of what he ignores.452 RULE: The opinions of the experts shall be considered both in terms of their impartiality and of the scope and limits of their knowledge. d. Legislation Aristotle studied one hundred fifty eight constitutions of Greek and barbarian peoples, as materials gathered for his work Politics, of which only the Constitution of Athens, found by Sir Frederic Kenyon and published in 1891,453 has come to us in its historical and systematical aspects. Perhaps Aristotle also used it in connection with his role as legislator of his reconstructed hometown,454 Stagirus, or for the benefit of his disciples, so that they could learn the art of legislation or practice it as legislative advisors. He considered useful both the study of the current laws in the past and of other peoples in the present, for which latter purpose he recommended reading voyage stories.455 The legend goes that, for the preparation of the Laws of XII Tables, three patrician Romans were sent to Athens to obtain a copy of Solon's Laws.456 In the past, laws were very different and difficult to obtain; today, as a result of globalization, they have become more uniform, given the similarity of problems and 452 According to the opinion of Dr. Brouardel, quoted by M. P. Fabreguettes, La Logique Judiciaire et l'Art de Juger, Librairie Générale de Droit & Jurisprudence, Paris, 1914, p. 153. 453 Bernard Haussoullier, Aristote, Constitution d'Athènes, Texte Traduit par George Mathieu et Bernard Haussoullier, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", París, 1922, Introduction, pp. I-II. 454 Plutarque, Contre Colotés, 32, dans Oeuvres Complétes de Plutarque, Oeuvres Morales et Oeuvres Diverses, Traduites en Français par Victor Bétolaud, IV, Librairie Hachette et Cie., Paris, 1870, pp. 638639. A.E. Taylor, Plato, The Man and his Work, Meridian Books Inc., Reprinted by Arrangement with the Humanities Press Inc, from the Sixth Edition, Reprinted 1952, New York Sixth Printing, April 1960, p. 464. 455 Aristotle, Rhetoric, Book I, 1360a31-39. Aristotle, Rhetoric, I, 4, 1360a31-37, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation, Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume Two, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, pp. 2162-2163. Aristóteles, Retórica, Introducción, Traducción y Notas por Quintín Racionero, Libro I, 1360a31-39, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1990, p. 395; n. 219, pp. 396-398. Aristote, Rhétorique, Livre I, 4, 1360a30-37, Texte Établii et Traduit par Médéric Dufour, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Tome Première, Paris, 1932, pp. 88-89. Aristotele, Retorica, I, 4, 1360a, A cura di Armando Plebe, Editore Laterza, Bari, 1961, p. 20. 456 Pietro Bonfante, Storia del Diritto Romano, Seconda Edizione Riveduta ed Ampliata, Milano, 1909, pp. 135-137; pp. 569-607. solutions, and easier to obtain on account of the development of communications, especially across Internet. Today, more than ever, it is necessary to be able to compare the laws, considering them as a whole, not in isolation,457 before transplanting them,458 so that rejections do not take place in the juridical system, with pertinent care practices, as if it were a question involving high complex surgery. RULE: Before transplanting laws, their operation in the system of origin shall be studied as much as their hypothetical reception in the system of destination, to prevent them from becoming invalid or ineffective or from producing undesired effects. RULE: In order not to prepare a bill in vain and to avoid its rejection or, if approved, the annulment of the pertinent law, it shall be necessary to avoid: a) the incompetence of the organ that will take the initiative and that of the one that will receive it (status traslationis, status conmutationis),459 and the invalidity of the procedure to be followed by the legislative function that will be exercised (formal legality); b) the antinomy (leges contrariae) with other bills under analysis or with current laws,460 if the legislator does not wish it or if, wishing it, he lacks the authority required to withdraw such bills or to repeal such law (material legality). 457 Montesquieu, De l'Esprit des Loix, Oeuvres Complètes de Montesquieu, Texte Établi et Présenté par Jean Brethe de la Gressaye, Tome IV, Livre XXIX, Chapitre XI, Société "Les Belles Lettres", Paris, 1961, pp. 132-133. 458 Bentham, De l'Influence des Temps et des Lieux en Matière de Législation, Chapitre III-IV, Oeuvres de Jérémie Bentham, Ét. Dumont, Troisième Édition, Société Belge de Librairie, Tome Second, Bruxelles, 1840, pp. 269-275. 459 In the rhetorical tradition, the incompetence exception isc called status traslationis or commutationis, because after the orator has no competition, the auditorium, or both, the question should be transferred to others or changed, see: Benedetto Riposati, Problemi di Retorica Antica, en AAVV., Introduzione alla Filologia Classica, Dottore Carlo Marzorati, Editore, Milano, 1952, p. 710. 460 For leges contrariae in the rhetorical tradition, see: Aristotle, Rhetoric, I, 15, 1375b. Aristotle, Rhetoric, I, 15, 1375b, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation, Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume Two, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 2190. Aristóteles, Retórica, Libro I, 1375b, Introducción, Traducción y Notas por Quintín Racionero, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1990, pp. 292-293. Aristote, Rhétorique, Livre I, 15, 1375b, Texte Établii et Traduit pair Médéric Dufour, Société d'Édition "Belles Lettres", Tome Premier, Paris, 1932, pp. 136-137. Aristotele, Retorica, I, XV, 1375b, a Cura di Armando Plebe, Editore Laterza, Bari, 1961, p. 72. Rhetorica ad Herennium, Book I, XI, 20; Book II, X, 15. Rhetorica ad Herennium, Book I, XI, 20; Book II, X, 15, With an English Translation by Harry Caplan, The Loeb Classical Library, LCL 403, Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachussets, London, England, pp. 36-37; pp. 84-85. Retórica a Herennium, Libro I, XI, Libro II, XV, Traducción, Introducción y Notas de Juan Francisco Alcina, Erasmo, Textos Bilingües, Editorial Bosch, Barcelona, 1991, pp. 86-87, pp. 122-123. Cicerón, Retórica a Cayo Herennio, Obras Completas de Marco Tulio Cicerón, Traducidas del Latín por Marcelino Menéndez Pelayo, Biblioteca Clásica Tomo XIV, Tomo I, pp. 105-210, Madrid, 1879, Libro Primero, p. 115, Libro Segundo, pp. 128-129. Rhétorique to Herennius, Livre I, XI, 20; Livre II, X, 15, Ouvrage Longtemps Attribué to Cicéron, Texte Revue et traduit avec Introduction et Notes pair Henri Bornecque, Librairie Garnière Frères, Paris, p. 25; p. 55. Cicero, De Inventione, II, 144-147. e. Custom Sometimes it turns out preferable not to legislate and leave the solutions of problems to custom or case law. In most cases, in spite of having been legislated, custom establishes the prevailing interpretation and integration, as a result of spontaneous fulfillments or of court decisions, since law is also made with the aid of time. RULE: The legislator may entrust the solution of some problems to custom or case law. He shall bear in mind that custom, in most cases, will establish the prevailing interpretation and integration of the law, as a result of spontaneous fulfillments or of court decisions. f. Case law In connection with case law, the reason why a case was decided (ratio decidendi) differs from other considerations mentioned in the fundamentals of the judgment (obiter dicta). The former constitutes the precedent as such and from there its obligatory force arises, while the latter are statements lacking binding force, but which may be used as a source of inspiration in the art of legislation, since they arise from the experience of the judges, who compose one of the law users' sectors, in their capacity as public authorities entrusted with the administration of justice. RULE: When case law is studied, the reasons why the cases were decided shall be taken into consideration as much the criticism of the current law and the suggested amendments. g. Juristic writings Without succumbing to the technocratic danger of believing that juristic writings are the only authorized source of law, it is necessary to consult them. Jurists have been [Cicerón], Obras Completas of Marco Tulio Cicerón, Traducidas del Latín por Marcelino Menéndez Pelayo, Biblioteca Clásica Tomo XIV, Libro I, De la Invención Retórica, pp. 1-103, Madrid, 1879, Libro II, pp. 93-94. Heinrich Lausberg, Manual de Retórica Literaria, Fundamentos de una Ciencia de la Literatura, Traducción de José Pérez Riesco del Original Alemán Handbuch Der Literarischen Rhetorik. Eine Grundlegung Der Literaturwissenchaft, Max Hueber Verlag, München, 1960, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1966, T. I, números 218-220, pp. 198-201 y número 225, p. 204. Heinrich Lausberg, Handbook of Literary Rhetoric, to Foundation for Literary Study, Translated by Mattew T. Bliss, Annemiek Jansen, David Norton, Edited by David Orton and R. Dean Anderson, Brill, Leyden, Boston, Koln, 1998, number 218-220, pp. 93-95. Benedetto Riposati, Problemi di Retorica Antica, AAVV., Introduzione alla Filologia Classica, Dottore Carlo Marzorati, Editore, Milan, 1952, p. 711, p. 713; pp. 723-724. Cicéron de L'Invention (De Inventione), Livre II, 144-147, Texte Revu et Traduit Avec Introduction et Notes par Henri Bornecque, Librairie Garnier Frères, Paris, pp. 244-249. [Quintilian], The Institutio Oratoria of Quintilian, Book VII, vii. [Quintilian], The Institutio Oratoria of Quintilian, Book VII, vii, With an English Translation by H.E. Butler in Four Volumes, Volume III, the Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, G.P. Putnam Sons, New York, 1921, pp. 142-149. Quintilien, Livre VII, 7, Institution Oratoire, Texte Établi et Traduit pair Jean Cousin, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Tome IV, Paris, 1976, pp. 171-173. Friedrich Karl Von Savigny, Metodología Jurídica (Juristische Methodenlehere, K. F. Koehler Verlag, Stuttgart, 1951, que corresponde al curso de invierno 1802-1803), Traducción de J. J. Santa Pinter, Ediciones Depalma, Buenos Aires, 1979, p. 39. assigned two tasks, which must be neither confused nor mutilated: the objective and systematic description of the current or historical, local or comparative law (juridical dogmatic), which takes the existing law as a material (lege lata); and the law imagined for the future (lege ferenda). Juristic writings should not be identified with juridical dogmatics, since they must also include the criticism and the composition of the laws. RULE: When juristic writings are studied, the objective and systematic descriptions of the law shall be taken into consideration as much as the criticism and composition of the laws. Classical rhetoric establishes that speeches may appeal to three technical resources to try to obtain persuasion: the favorable presentation of the orator's character (ethos), the excitement or calmness of the emotions of the audience (pathos) and the reasonableness of the speeches (logos).461 Next, in accordance with the rhetorical model adopted in the present work, the orator will be concretized in the legislator, the emotions, in the hope and fear of the recipients of the laws, and the reasonableness of the speeches, in the examples and legislative enthymemes. h. Character of the legislator (ethos) The enactment of a bill and the interpretation, spontaneous fulfillment or enforcement, publication and dissemination of the enacted law are facilitated if the character of its author is presented in the most favorable way, as a virtuous person and a legislator worthy of credit, who deserves the authority vested in him. The general character of a virtuous person and the particular character of a wise, eloquent, honorable and benevolent legislator must arise out of the prescriptive or persuasive speech itself. RULE: The general character of a person with the virtues of justice, prudence, fortitude and temperance, and the particular character of a legislator with wisdom, eloquence, 461 Aristotle, Rhetoric, I, 2, 1355b35; 1356a. Aristotle, Rhetoric, I, 2, 1355b35; 1358 [sic] 1356a, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation, Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume Two, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 2155. Aristóteles, Retórica, Introducción, Traducción y Notas por Quintín Racionero, Libro I, 1355b35; 1356a, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1990, p. 174 y p. 175. Racionero translates "ethos" as "talante". Aristote, Rhétorique, Livre I, 2, 1355b35; 1356a1, Texte Établii et Traduit par Médéric Dufour, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Tome Première, Paris, 1932, p. 76. Aristotele, Retorica, A cura di Armando Plebe, I, 2, 1355b; 1356a, Editore Laterza, Bari, 1961, pp. 6-7. Plebe use "trovare" to (find) with regard to the technical arguments, which he distinguishes from the extratechnical staff (equivalent nomenclature to "with art" and "without art", to "intrinsic" and "extrinsic"). It is preferred on having "invented" of other versions, since it better denotes the idea of investigating and its happy achievement by means of the speech, as it is usually said where the expression "literary find" (in spanish expression: "hallazgo literario") is used. Roland Barthes, L'Ancienne Rhétorique, Aide Memoire, Communications, École Pratique de Hautes Études, Centre d'Études des Communications de Masse, 16, Seuil, Paris, 1970, pp. 172-223; p. 199; pp. 211-12. Benedetto Riposati, Problemi di Retorica Antica, AA.VV., Introduzione alla Filologia Classica, Dott. Carlo Marzorati, Editore, Milano, 1952, pp. 730-735. Edward P.J. Corbett and Robert J. Connors, Classical Rhetoric for the Modern Student, Oxford University Press, New York-Oxford, 1999, pp. 31-84. honorableness and benevolence shall arise from the prescriptive or persuasive speech itself, so as to arise fortitude and temperance and favor the enactment of the bill proposed, as well as the interpretation, spontaneous fulfillment or enforcement, publication and dissemination of the enacted law. RULE: A prescriptive or persuasive speech shall not denote ignorance of the facts or of the law, incompatible interests or grudge against the recipients of the norms since, if the legislator was prestigious, he will lose such prestige and, had he not background, he will gain a bad reputation.462 i. Hope and fear of the recipients of the laws (pathos) The enactment of a bill and the interpretation, application, publication and dissemination of the enacted law are also facilitated by exciting or calming down the emotions of its recipients. No reference will be made here to emotions in general or to each one of them in particular, but only to the basic political emotions, namely, hope (spes) and fear (metus)463 since, when these are excited or calmed down, they predominate and stop the 462 Isocrates, Antidosis, 278. Isocrates, With an English Translation by George Norlin, Volume II, Antidosis, 278, William Heineman Ltd., London, G.P.Putnam's Sons, New York, 1929, pp. 338-339. Isócrates Discursos, Introducción Traducción y Notas de Juan Manuel Guzmán Hermida, Editorial Gredos, Tomo II, Sobre el Cambio de Fortunas, Madrid, 1980, p. 145. Isocrate, Discours, Texte Établi et Traduit par Georges Mathieu et Émile Brémond, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Tome III, Sur l'Echange, 278, Paris, 1942, pp. 170-171. Demosthenes, De Falsa Legatione, 339-340. Demosthenes, De Falsa Legatione, 339-340, J.H. Vince, The Loeb Classical Library, William Heineman Ltd. London, G.P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1926, pp. 468-469. Demóstenes, Discursos Políticos, Introducción, Traducción y Notas de A. López Eire, XIX, Sobre la Embajada Fraudulenta, 339-340, Edit. Gredos, Tomo II, Madrid, 1985, p. 160. Démosthene, Harangue sur les Prevarications de l'Ambassade, expliqué littéralment, traduit en français par Stiévenart, Librairie Hachette et Cie., Paris, 1848, pp. 430-431. Aristotle, Rhetoric, Book II, 2, 1378a6-15. Aristotle, Rhetoric, II, 2, 1378a7-15, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation, Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume Two, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 2194. Aristóteles, Retórica, Libro II, 1378a6-15, Introducción, Traducción y Notas por Quintín Racionero, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1990, pp. 308-309. Aristote, Rhétorique, Livre II, 2, 1378a6-15, Texte Établii et Traduit par Médéric Dufour, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Tome Première, Paris, 1938, p. 60. Aristotele, Retorica, A cura di Armando Plebe, II, 2, 1378a, Editore Laterza, Bari, 1961, p. 80. Roland Barthes, L'Ancienne Rhétorique, Aide Memoir, Communications, École Pratique de Hautes Études, Centre d'Études des Communications de Masse, 16, Seuil, Paris, 1970, pp. 172-223, B.1.28, p. 212. Edward P.J. Corbett and Robert J. Connors, Classical Rhetoric for the Modern Student, Oxford University Press, New York-Oxford, 1999, The ethical Appeal, pp. 71-77. 463 Two main affections of the deliberative genre, spes and metus, of the rhetorical tradition: Heinrich Lausberg, Handbook of Literary Rhetoric, A Foundation for Literary Study, Foreword by George A. Kennedy, Translated by Matthew T. Bliss, Annemiek Jansen, David E. Orton, Edited by David E. Orton & Dean Anderson, Brill, cite Isid. Orig. 2.4.4), Leiden, Boston, Köln, 1998, p. 98. Heinrich Lausberg, Manual de Retórica Literaria, Fundamentos de una Ciencia de la Literatura, Traducción de José Pérez Riesco del Original Alemán Handbuch der Literarischen Rhetorik, Eine Grundlegung der Literaturwissenchaft, Max Hueber Verlag, München, 1960, Editorial Gredos, con cita de Isid. Orig. 2.4.4., Madrid, 1966, T. I, número 229, p. 205. Aristotle, Rhetoric to Alexader, 37, 1446a5-6. others in the internal government of the minds and in the government of the states, like when in the latter case it turns out necessary to stop a faction with another one.464 When Pericles realized: "For example, whenever he saw the dangerously over-confident, he would make a speech which shocked the into s state of spprehension, and likewas he could return them from irrational fear to confidence."465 RULE: Men shall be more difficult to govern than other live beings when they are not treated in an intelligent way,466 but when reasonable hope and fear are generated in them, they will be easier to govern. Some recipients of the laws know and approve good conduct, but nevertheless they adopt the worse one, letting them be driven by the emotional impulse of reaching the actual good. Reason, when applied to imagination, showing future and remote things as present in the spirit and probable in reality, takes emotion to its side and moves the will in a better way, motivating good conduct. RULE: Reason shall be applied to imagination, exciting hope or fear,467 showing future and remote things as present in the spirit and probable in reality, to move the wills of the recipients of the laws in a better way: Aristotle, Rhetoric to Alexander, 38, 1446a5-6, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation, Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume One, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 2313. Cicero, Partitiones Oratoriae, IV, 11. Cicerón, Particiones Oratorias, Obras Completas de Marco Tulio Cicerón, Traducidas del Latín por Marcelino Menéndez Pelayo, Biblioteca Clásica Tomo XIV, Tomo I, Madrid, 1879, p. 242. Cicéron, Divisions de l'Art Oratoire, Texte Établi et Traduit par Henri Bornecque, Deuxième Édition, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", IV. 11, Paris, 1960, p. 6. 464 Bacon, Of the Dignity and Advancement of Learning, The Seventh Book, Chap. III, in The Works of Francis Bacon, Collected and Edited by James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis, and Douglas Denon Heath, Vol. V, Translation of The Philosophical Works, Vol. I, New Edition, Longman & Co., etc, London, 1883, pp. 422-423; The Sixth Book, Chap. III, p. 24. 465 Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, II, 65. English translation from: Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, Translated by Martin Hammond, With an Introduction and Notes by P.J. Rhodes, Oxford World's Classics, OUP, New York, 2009, p. 91. Tucídides, Historia de la Guerra del Peloponeso, Traducción de Francisco Rodriguez Andrados, Editorial Hernando, Tomo 1, Madrid, Reimpresión, 1984, II, 65, p. 283. Translation from Spanish to English by the author of this book. 466 Xenophon, Cyropaedia, I,i,3. Xenophon, Cyropaedia, With an English Translation by Walter Miller, In Two Volumes, I.i.3, Loeb Classical Libray William Heinemann, London, G.P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1925, pp. 4-5. James Tatum, Xenophon's Imperial Fiction, On the Education of Cyrus, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1989, p. 62. 467 Digest, I, 1, 1. ("FIRST BOOK TITLE I On justice and the law 1. Ulpiano in the first book of the institutions.  For any prospective law student, it is convenient to know, in the first place, the origin of this name, of justice, because as elegantly defined by Celsus, it is the art of the good and the equitable. 1 For such reason anyone may call us priests: since we cultivate justice; profess the news and science of the good and the equitable, separating the just from the unjust, discerning the licit from the illicit; in our a) in the prescriptive speech, through awards, punishments, or other measures that maximize usefulness and minimize harmfulness; b) in the persuasive speech, by explaining the motives for the awards, punishments, or other measures that maximize usefulness and minimize harmfulness. j. Reasonableness of legislative speeches (logos) The topics associated to the reasonableness of speeches (logos) serve as a check list that assures that the matter debated has been contemplated from many of the reasonable points of view that could appear, so that it may be well distinguished. They suggest concepts, judgments and reasonings, for the association of ideas. They facilitate the finding of an idea that joins other two about the debated question, the art of finding the wish to make men good, not only for fear of punishment, but for the hope of reward: strongly desiring (if I do not deceive myself) the true and not the apparent philosophy.") "LIBRO PRIMERO TÍTULO I De la justicia y del derecho 1. Ulpiano en el libro primero de las instituciones.  El que haya de estudiar el derecho, conviene que primero sepa de donde trae origen este nombre; de la justicia, porque según la define elegantemente Celso, es el arte de lo bueno y equitativo. 1 Por lo cual nos puede llamar cualquiera sacerdotes: pues cultivamos la justicia; profesamos la noticia y ciencia de lo bueno y equitativo, separando lo justo de lo injusto, discerniendo lo lícito de lo ilícito; deseando hacer buenos a los hombres, no solo por el miedo de las penas, si también con la esperanza del premio: deseando con vehemencia (si no me engaño) la verdadera filosofía, y no la aparente." D. I, 1, 1, El Digesto del Emperador Justiniano, Traducido y Publicado por el Licenciado don Agustín Rodriguez de Fonseca, del Colegio de Abogados de esta Corte, Nueva Edición Aumentada con la Traducción de los Proemios, Completada y Revisada con Arreglo a los Textos más Autorizados de las Ediciones Modernas, Imprenta de Ramón Vicente, Tomo I, Madrid, 1872, p. 31. 1 ULPIANUS LIBRO PRIMO INSTITUTIONUM. Iure operam daturum prius nosse oportet unde nomen iuris descendat est autem a nostra appellandum: 1 nam ganter Celsus definit, ius est ars boni et aequi. Cuius merito quis nos sacerdotes appellet: iustititia namque colimus et boni et aequi notitiam profitemur, aequm ab iniquo separantes, licitum et illicito discernentes, bonus non solum metum poenarum, verum etiam praemiorum quoque exhortatione efficere cupientes, veram nisi fallor philosophiam, non simmilatam affectantes." D. I, 1, 1, Corpus Iuris Civilis, Editio Stereotipa Octava, Volumen Primum, Digesta, Recognovit, Theodorus Mommsen, I, 1, 1, Apud Weidemans, Berolini, 1899, p. 1. See the work of the founder of the legists school: Shang Yang, Le Livre du Prince Yang, Traduit du chinois et présenté par Jean Lévi, Chapitre IX De l'Établissement des lois, Flammarion, Paris, 1981, p. 107, chapter written after the death of Shang, as indicated in n. 1, p. 31. Lord Shang, The Book of Lord Shang, Translated by J.J.L. Duyvendak, Original Edition, Probssthain, London, 1928, Introduction by Robert Wilkinson, Wordsworth Classics of World Literature, Hertfordshire, 1998, Chapter 3, 9 Establishing Laws, p. 187. Plato, Laws, I, 644c. Platón, Las Leyes, I, 644c, en Platón, Diálogos VIII, Libros I-VI, Introducción, Traducción y Notas de Francisco Lisi, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1999, p. 230. Platon, Les Lois, I, 644c, dans Oeuvres Complètes de Platon, Traduction Nouvelle et Notes par Léon Robin avec la Collaboration de M. J. Moreau, Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, Édition de la Nouvelle Revue Française, Paris, 1942, Paris, T. II, p. 663. "Hope is the prospect of pleasure [...] Fear, is the prospect of pain [...]": Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, in The Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham, Edited by J.H. Burand H.L.A. Hart, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1966, p. 18. Bentham, Théorie des Peines et Récompenses, dans Oeuvres de Jérémie Bentham, par Ét. Dumont, Troisiéme Édition, Société Belge de Librairie, Tome Second, Bruxelles, 1840, pp. 1-234. "middle term"468 allowing for the formulation of syllogisms and enthymemes, that is to say, where and how to look in order to find propositions containing the aforesaid middle term that may serve as premises necessarily leading to the conclusion in the desired sense, because they relate the two "extreme terms" of the proposition to be proved. The classic example of a syllogism in logic manuals, which does not belong to Aristotle, since he "does not introduce singular terms or premises into his system"469, is: All men are mortal, Socrates is a man, Socrates is mortal. "Men" is the middle term that allows to join two "extreme terms" , namely, "Socrates" and "mortal" (it appears in the major premise and in the minor premise but not in the conclusion). RULE: In any prescriptive speech, topics shall facilitate the finding, choice and use of principles and norms in a consistent, complete and, if suitable, concise manner, without being overwhelmed or getting lost; for such purpose the probable problems shall be considered and acceptable solutions (norms) shall be designed, taking as a starting point certain relevant endoxas that will provide them with reasonable support (principles). RULE: In any persuasive speech, topics shall allow for the finding, choice and use of inductions and syllogisms and of examples and enthymemes, that will explain and justify the prescriptive speech. As well as there are two types of logical inferences: inductions and syllogisms, two are the reasonable means of persuasion and prescription: rhetorical inductions (examples), and rhetorical syllogisms (enthymemes).470 468 Giambattista Vico, L'Antichissima Sapienza degli Italici da Ricavarsi dalle Origine della Lingua Latina Libri Tre, 1710, da Opere Filosofiche, Introduzione di Nicola Badaloni, Testi, Versioni e Note a Cura di Paolo Cristofolini, Sansoni Editore, Firenze, 1971, p. 163. Giambatista Vico, Institutiones Oratoriae, Testo Critico Versione e Comento di Giuliano Crifò, Istituto Suor Orsola Benincasa, Napoli, 1989, [30], pp. 182-183, pp. 186-189. In addition to the topics, in medieval logical tradition, the search for the middle term in syllogisms was called "inventio medii", for this purpose a mnemonic formula (Thomas Bricot), or a diagram known as "pons asinorum" (bridge of the donkeys), because its obvious difficulty (Petrus Tartaretus), was used : I.M.Bochenski, A History of Formal Logic (Formale Logik, Verlag Karl Alber, Freiburg-München, 1956), Traslated and Edited by Ivo Thomas, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, Indiana, 1961, pp. 219-221. Anton Dumitriu, History of Logic (Istoria Logicii, Revised Updated and Enlarged Translation of the Second Edition of the Single Volume Roumanian Work Istoria Logicii, Published by Editura Didactica, Bucharest, 1975, Translated by Duiliu Zamfirescu, Dinu Giurcaneano, Doina Doneaud, Translation Edited by The Staff of Abacus Press, T. Wells, Kent, England, 1977, Volume II, pp. 118-120. On "inventio medii" and the Aristotelian logic, see: Carlo Cellucci, La Ragione della Logica, Prima Edizone 1998, Quarta Edizione, Gius, Laterza & Figli Spa, Roma-Bari, 2005, pp. 15-17; pp. 124-125. 469 "First, the premiss "Socrates is a Man" is a singular proposition, as is subject "Socrates" is a singular term. NowAristotle does not introduce singular terms or premises into his system." Jan Lukasiewicz, Aristotle's Syllogistic from the Standpoint of Modern Formal Logic, First Edition 1951, Second Edition Enlarged 1957, Reprinted from Sheets of the Secondd Edition, Oxford University Press, London, 1958, p. 1. 470 Aristotle, Rhetoric, Book I, 2, 1356b5. Legislative examples Examples are imperfect inductions,471 since they are not as numerous as to allow for an induction, but turn out to be acceptable for analogy purposes. Induction climbs up from the individual or particular to the universal. An example or analogy goes from the individual or particular to a similar individual or particular.472 The use of examples to prescribe, not only to persuade, is very clear in the Common Law system, where courts pronounce judgments following what has been decided in previous similar cases (stare decisis), that is to say, on the basis of the analogy existing between a previous case (precedent) and the one to be decided.473 Legislative precedents mentioned in the form of notes in the prescriptive speech are persuasive examples, arguments of authority based on the prestige of their origin. When they are used to oblige, prohibit, permit, punish and reward conducts, although their respective origins are not mentioned in the notes, they are prescriptive examples adopted as a result of their resemblances with the problems, the solutions, or both, reasonably imitating their models, by way of analogy. RULE: When more than one example is used in the same provision of a prescriptive speech to facilitate its comprehension, it shall be made clear that it is not a question of a limited enumeration, to avoid useless controversies. Legislation is not an easy task, in which it was enough to be provided with a collection of laws and choose the best, as if choosing examples and harmonizing them did not demand certain intelligence and a correct reasoning to such an end were not very important.474 Legislating is not an arbitrary practice that may remain freed to mere Aristotle, Rhetoric I, 2, 1356b4-5, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation, Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume Two, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 2156, he translates "deductions" instead of "syllogisms". Aristóteles, Retórica, Introducción, Traducción y Notas por Quintín Racionero, Libro I, 1356b5, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1990, p. 180. Aristote, Rhétorique, Texte Établii et Traduit par Médéric Dufour, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Tome Première, Livre I, 2, 1356b4-5, Paris, 1932, p. 78. Aristotele, Retorica, I, 2, 1356 b, A cura di Armando Plebe, Editore Laterza, Bari, 1961, p. 8. 471 Boethius's The Topicis Diferentiis, Book II, 1184A17-23, Translated, With Notes and Essays on the Text by Eleonore Stump, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1978, p. 45. 472 Friedrich Ueberweg, System of Logic and History of Logical Doctrines, Translated from the German with Notes and Appendices by Thomas M. Lindsay, Longmans Green, and Co., p. 476; p. 492. 473 Edward P.J. Corbett, Robert J. Connors, Classical Rhetoric for the Modern Student, Fourth Edition, Oxford University Press, New York, Oxford, 1999, p. 119. On reasoning by means of examples and rules in the North American Law, see: Benjamin N. Cardozo, La Naturaleza de la Función Judicial, Con Prefacio de Carlos Cossio, Traducción de la primera edición en inglés, The Nature of the Judicial Process, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1921, por Eduardo Ponssa, Ediciones Arayu Buenos Aires, 1955, 148 pp. Edward H. Levi, Introducción al Razonamiento Jurídico, Traducción, Revisión Técnica y Notas de Genaro R. Carrió, Eudeba, Buenos Aires, 1964, 148 pp. e índice, de la obra original An Introduction to Legal Reasoning, The University of Chicago Press, séptima reimpresión, Chicago, 1961. 474 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, X, 1181a15-1181b11. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, X, 1181a15-1181b11, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation, Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume Two, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, pp. 1866-1867. hazard or to the simple intuition of the inexpert one, but a reasonable activity submitted to the rules of the art of legislation. RULE: Practitioners of the art of legislation shall choose the best examples of laws, to imitate them, and the worst examples, to reject them, in accordance with the topic of reasonableness (logos), on account of the resemblance or structural and functional analogy between the law to be transplanted (comparative law) or re-implanted (history) and the juridical system that will receive it. Usually, experienced advisers and legislators keep in their files a select repertoire of bills and laws, to use them as examples to be imitated in future similar cases, as they arose or were transformed into forms, like those used by notaries public and lawyers in their respective professional practice.475 With or without experience, with or without repertoires or forms, it may be affirmed that no advisor or legislator sets aside the precedents provided by history and comparative law, since examples476 constitute the main source of the invention or investigation to produce both prescriptive and persuasive speeches. Although situations are never equal, sometimes it is possible to find relevant resemblances, whether in the problems, in the solutions or in both simultaneously, since: PRINCIPLE: Although analogy is not a strong method to judge, it is a very fecund method to invent. Legislative enthymemes A legislative principle, the reason for which one legislates (ratio legis), is a species of the juridical reason (ratio juris). RULE: Principles shall not accompany their respective norms in the prescriptive speech, when: Aristóteles Etica a Nicómaco, Edición Bilingüe y Traducción por María Araujo y Julián Marías, Introducción y Notas por Julián Marías, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, X, 9, 1181a-1181b, Madrid, 1981, pp. 173-174. 475 Elmer A. Driedger, Legislative Forms and Precedents, Second Edition, Revised, Published by The Department of Justice, Ottawa, Canada, 1976, pp. 143-316, published as an independent book in its first edition, in 1963, and in this second edition, toggether with the second edition of The Composition of Legislation, pp. V XXIX, pp. 1-141, the first edition of which was published in 1956. 476 Quintilian, The Institutio Oratoria of Quintilian, Book III, viii. Quintilian, The Institutio Oratoria of Quintilian, Book III, viii, 36, With an English Translation by H.E. Butler in Four Volumes, The Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, G.P. Putnam Sons's, New York, Volume I, London, 1921, pp. 496-497. Quintilien, Institution Oratoire, Livre III, 8.36, Texte Établi et Traduit par Jean Cousin, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Tome II, Paris, 1977, p. 205. Heinrich Lausberg, Handbook of Literary Rhetoric, A Foundation For Literary Study, Foreword by George A. Kennedy, Translated by Matthew T. Bliss, Annemiek Jansen, David E. Orton, Edited by David E. Orton & Dean Anderson, Brill, number 61, point 2b, Leiden, Boston, Köln, 1998, p. 33. Heinrich Lausberg, Manual de Retórica Literaria, Fundamentos de una Ciencia de la Literatura, Traducción de José Pérez Riesco del Original Alemán Handbuch der Literarischen Rhetorik, Eine Grundlegung der Literaturwissenchaft, Max Hueber Verlag, München, 1960, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1966, T. I, número 61, punto 2b, p. 109. a) the norms were known and accepted in advance or the principles would clearly arise from the reading of the norms;477 b) it will be enough that the principles are only made a part of the persuasive speech. RULE: Principles shall accompany their respective norms in the prescriptive speech, when: a) the solutions were controversial, unusual or opposite to commonly accepted ones (paradoxical);478 b) the norms were systematized around the principles (internal systematic laws). Although it is true that reasonings would be improper in the style of a contemporary prescriptive speech, which is meant to oblige, prohibit, permit, reward and punish conducts, a legislator resorts to enthymemes, since a good prescriptive speech is reasonable in itself, be the principle explicite or not, when he systematizes the norms. Enthymemes are rhetorical syllogisms designed for ordinary people, who would neither arrive at a deductive conclusion starting from very distant premises, since such deduction would turn out obscure because of the length of the syllogisms chain, nor even admit the development of all the steps leading to the conclusion, since this means verbosity, as obvious things would be said.479 With regard to the above mentioned, it is convenient to know that the word "enthymeme", of Greek origin, means, in accordance with its etymology, to keep in the spirit (in thumo)480 or in mind,481 and it is commonly used to name the imperfect, incomplete syllogism, in which one of the premises has been omitted, generally the major one (First Order enthymeme), the minor one (Second 477 Aristotle, Rhetoric, II, 21, 1394b11-16, with regard to the maxims. See Aristotle, Rhetoric, II, 21, 1394b9-16, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation, Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume Two, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 2222. Aristóteles, Retórica, Libro II, 1394b11-17, Introducción, Traducción y Notas por Quintín Racionero, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1990, p. 411. Aristote, Rhétorique, Livre II, 21, 1394b11-16, Texte Établii et Traduit par Médéric Dufour, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Tome Première, Paris, 1938, p. 107. Aristotele, Retorica, A cura di Armando Plebe, II, 2, XXI, Editore Laterza, Bari, 1961, p. 135. 478 Aristotle, Rhetoric, II, 21, 1394b8-9, with regard to maxims. Aristotle, Rhetoric, II, 21, 1394b8-9, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation, Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume Two, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, pp. 2221-2222. Aristóteles, Retórica, Libro II, 1394b8-10, Introducción, Traducción y Notas por Quintín Racionero, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1990, p. 411. Aristote, Rhétorique, Livre II, 21, 1394b8-10, Texte Établii et Traduit par Médéric Dufour, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Tome Première, Paris, 1938, p. 107. Aristotele, Retorica, II, 2, XXI, 1394b, A cura di Armando Plebe, Editore Laterza, Bari, 1961, p. 135. 479 Aristotle, Rhetoric, II, 21, 1395b25-27. Aristotle, Rhetoric, II, 21, 1395b25-27, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation, Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume Two, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 2224. Aristóteles, Retórica, Introducción, Traducción y Notas por Quintín Racionero, Libro II, 1395b25-30, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1990, p. 417. Aristote, Rhétorique, Livre II, 21, 1395b23-27, Texte Établi et Traduit par Médéric Dufour, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Tome Première, Paris, 1938, p. 111. Aristotele, Retorica, II, 21, 1395b, A cura di Armando Plebe, Editore Laterza, Bari, 1961, p. 139. 480 Roland Barthes, L'Ancienne Rhéthorique, Aide-Memoire, Séminaire Donné à l' école Pratique de Hautes Études, Paris, 1964-1965, Communications 16, Seuil, Paris, 1970, p. 202. E. Littré, Dictionnaire de la Langue Françoise, Librairie Hachette et Cie, Paris 1889, T. II, p. 1424. 481 W. S. Jevons, Elementary Lessons in Logic, Macmillan And Co., London, 1870, p. 153. Order enthymeme), or the conclusion (Third Order enthymeme).482 But it is not necessary to identify the rhetorical syllogism (enthymeme) with the incomplete syllogism, since an enthymeme may present iself as a complete or incomplete syllogism. It usually appears as incomplete because its premises or conclusion are acceptable opinions that do not required any further proposition to achieve acceptability (endoxas). Enthymemes, as incomplete rhetorical syllogisms, are the ordinary way in which men express their reasonings, suppressing such propositions as will be easily replaced, for being too clear or well-known, since the spirit goes more rapid than words, so that, as the speech is being abridged, it is given more force and liveliness, pleasing the vanity of the interpreter at the same time, making the user of his own intelligence, without allowing him to fall down in the boredom to which prolixity leads.483 If to a maxim, that is, a general formula related to such human actions as must be chosen or avoided,484 one adds its respective reason, in an explicit or implicit way, a rhetorical syllogism or enthymeme is formed.485 When to a legislative juridical norm, that is a species of the maxims genre, one adds its respective principle or ratio legis, a legislative enthymeme is formed. In the contemporary prescriptive speech, there is neither an explicit principle for each norm, nor a norm for each principle, joined by logical particles such us "since", "because", "since then", "so", etc., and nor two premises at least, or a premise and the conclusion are made explicit. 482 W. S. Jevons, Elementary Lessons in Logic, Macmillan And Co., London, 1870, pp. 153-154. 483 Aristotle, Rhetoric, II, 21, 1395b1-12. Aristotle, Rhetoric, II, 21, 1395b1-12, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation, Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume Two, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 2223. Aristóteles, Retórica, Libro II, 1395b1-13, Introducción, Traducción y Notas por Quintín Racionero, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1990, pp. 413-414. Aristote, Rhétorique, Livre II, 21, 1395b1-12, Texte Établii et Traduit par Médéric Dufour, Société d' Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Tome Première, Paris, 1938, pp. 109-110. Aristotele, Retorica, A cura di Armando Plebe, II, 21, 1395b, Editore Laterza, Bari, 1961, pp. 138-139. Antoine Arnauld et Pierre Nicole, La Logique ou l'Art de Penser, Sur la Cinquieme Édition, Revue & de Nouveau Augmenteé; Faite a Paris, Paris, Chez Guillaume Defprez, & C. en 1683, Chapitre XIV, Des Enthymêmes & des Sentences Enthymématiques, Introduction de Louis Martin, Paris, Flammarion, 1970, pp. 285-286. 484 Aristotle, Rhetoric, II, 21, 1394a21. Aristotle, Rhetoric, II, 21, 1394a21, in The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford Translation. Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume Two, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 2221. Aristóteles, Retórica, Introducción, Traducción y Notas por Quintín Racionero, Libro II, 1394a20, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1990, p. 409. Aristote, Rhétorique, Livre II, 21, 1394a19, Texte Établi et Traduit par Médéric Dufour et André Wartelle, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Tome Deuxième, Paris, 1938, p. 106. Aristotele, Retorica, II, XXI, 1394a, A cura Di Armando Plebe, Editore Laterza, Bari, 1961, p. 134. 485 Aristotle, Rhetoric, II, 21, 1394a31. Aristotle, Rhetoric, II, 21, 1394a31, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation, Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume Two, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 2221. Aristóteles, Retórica, Libro II, 21, 1394a31, Introducción, Traducción y Notas por Quintín Racionero, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1990, p. 410. Aristote, Rhétorique, Livre II, 21, 1394a31, Texte Établii et Traduit par Médéric Dufour, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Tome Première, Paris, 1938, p. 107. Aristotele, Retorica. A cura di Armando Plebe, Libro II, XXI, Editore Laterza, Bari, 1961, p. 134. Internal systematic laws (consolidations, codifications and institutional laws), as mentioned in Chapter IV of this work (Legislative Genres), use principles in their explicit or implicit form to systematize the prescriptive speech. Section 1134 of the Napoleonic Code (1804) illustrates the incorporation of a principle, when the solution hass been controversial and turns to be paradoxical like its systematization function. The above mentioned section, after an interesting debate, was finally written in this way: "Legally formed conventions are like a law for those who have made them. They may be revoked only by their mutual consent, or for the causes authorized by law. They must be performed in good faith."486 The first two paragraphs of this section introduced the principle of autonomy of the will and one of its consequences, legal rescission, with a reference to other causes authorized by the law to render conventions ineffective. The third paragraph, which creates the obligation to perform conventions in good faith, is a clear norm, the historical inception of the principle of good faith, since this principle not only comprises performance as a whole, but also all its stages: the ones before inception (precontractual negligence), that of inception (included in the bill), interpretation, integration, modification and termination of the conventions, and the subsequent stage (postcontractual obligations). The above mentioned principle includes not only conventions or contracts, but also, juridical acts in general, as legal reasoning and experience were able to prove later on. The Court of Cassation had already accepted the principle of autonomy of the will, but some jurists were still against it, because, without having been struck other than by the general will, that of the law, they did not want to acknowledge in contracts, in the will of the individuals, an emanation of the law itself, not less sacred than the former. Favard, in its report to the Tribunate, described and explained the above mentioned situation, justifying the incorporation of the principle of autonomy of the will: "But there will not be any more uncertainty about this principle; it is founded on a positive law which secures the authority of the contracts, and consequently the fortune of the individuals; and, what is even more precious, the good faith that must dominate the performance of conventions. Thus, whenever a convention shall have been legally formed, and its causes acknowledged by law, such convention will be a law in itself, and any judgment supporting its violation will be submitted to the censorship of the courts entrusted by the constitution with the preservation of them all, and with protecting them againts arbitrariness."487 486 "Les conventions légalment formées tiennent lieu de loi à ceux qui les ont faites. Elles ne peuvent être revoquées que de leur consentement mutuel, ou por les causes que la loi autorise. Elles doivent être exécutées de bonne foi." Le Baron Locré, La Législation Civile, Commerciale et Criminelle de la France, Ou Commentaire et Complément des Codes Françaises, Treuttel et Würtz, Libraires, Tome Douzième, París, 1828, p. 14. 487 "Elles tiennent lieu de la loi à ceux qui les ont faites. Dejá le tribunal de cassation avait consacré ce principe: quelques jurisconsultes trop rigoristes improuvaient sa jurisprudence; ils n'étaient frappés que de la violation faite à la volonté générale, qui est la loi; ils ne voulaient pas voir que le contrat légalment formé était una émanation de la loi même, en non moins sacré qu'elle. Mais il n'y aura plus d'incertitude sur ce principe; il sera désormais fondé sur une loi positive et garante de l'autorité des contrats, garante par conséquent des fortunes des particuliers; et, ce qui est plus précieux encore, garante de la bonne foi qui doit régner dans l'exécution des conventions. Bigot-Préameneu, in his Exposition of Motives, with reference to obligations and the systematization function of the principle of autonomy of the will, said: "Having the necessary elements to form a valid obligation, the consent of the parties, their capacity, a thing or fact that were the object and matter of the commitment and a legitimate cause been compiled, now the effects of the obligations must be regulated. Here there immediately appears the principle that serves as a basis for this part of the Civil Code, and that is expressed in clear and simple terms. "Legally formed conventions are like a law for those who have made them. They may be revoked only by their mutual consent, or for the causes authorized by the law. They must be entered and performed in good faith. They oblige not only to what is expressed, but also to all the consequences that equity, use or the law attributes to the "obligation according to its nature." There is no species of obligation, whether of giving, doing or refrain from doing, that does not rest on these fundamental rules: it is to these rules that one resorts for their interpretation, performance or determination of all their effects."488 For further clarification,489 an enthymeme may be explicitly expressed either as a complete or and incomplete syllogism. Ainsi toutes les fois qu'une convention aura été légalement formée, et dont les causes seront avouées par la loi, cette convention sera elle même une loi, et le jugement qui la violera sera soumis à la censure du tribunal chargé par la constitution de les conserver toutes, et de les garantir de l'entreprise de l'arbitraire." Le Baron Locré, La Législation Civile, Commerciale et Criminelle de la France, Ou Commentaire et Complément des Codes Françaises, Rapport Fait au Tribunat par M. Favard, dans la Séance du 13 Pluviose an XII (3 février 1804), Treuttel et Würtz, Libraires, Tome Douzième, París, 1828, p. 430. 488"Aprés avoir ressemblé les éléments nécessaires pour former une obligation valable, le consentement des parties, leur capacité, une chose ou un fait qui soit l'objet et la matière de l'engagement, une cause légitime, on a eu à régler quels sont les effets des obligations. C'est ici que se présent d'abord le principe qui sert de base à cette partie du Code Civil, et qui se trouve exprimé en ces termes clairs et simples. "Les conventions légalment formées tiennent lieu de loi à ceux qui les ont faites. Elles ne peuvent être révoquées que de leur consentement, ou pour les causes autorisées par la loi. Elles doivent être contractées et executées de bonne foi. Elles obligent non seulement à ce qui y est exprimé, mais encore à toutes les suites que l'équité, l'usage ou la loi donnent à la "obligation d'après sa nature." Il n'est aucune espèce d'obligations, soit de donner, soit de faire ou de ne pas faire, qui ne repose sur ces règles fondamentales: c'est à ces règles qu'on a recours pour les interpréter, pour les exécuter, pour en déterminer, tous les effets." Le Baron Locré, La Législation Civile, Commerciale et Criminelle de la France, Ou Commentaire et Complément des Codes Françaises, Exposé de Motifs Fait par M. Bigot-Préameneu, Conseilleur d'Etat et Orateur du Gouvernement, dans la Séance du 6 Pluvieuse an XII (27 janvier 1804), Treuttel et Würtz, Libraires, Tome Douzième, París, 1828, pp. 325-326. 489 A similar didactic method has been used when reason expresses itself in the same proposition that enunciates a maxim (ethymematic statement), that is the most reputable one, as it may be noticed in the following example and its explicit reasoning: Maxim (as an enthymematic statement): "Being mortal, do not keep an immortal rancor." Aristotle, Rhetoric, II, 21, 1394b18-25. "Siendo mortal, no guardes un rencor inmortal",.Aristóteles, Retórica, Libro II, 1394b20-27, Introducción, Traducción y Notas por Quintín Racionero, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1990, p. 412. English translation by the author of this book. Aristotle, Rhetoric, II, 21, 1394b18-25, in The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford Translation, Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume Two, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 2222. EXAMPLE: Complete syllogism If constitutionally formed laws are obligatory upon all, because they arise from the general will (major premise) and legally formed conventions are like a law for those who have made them, because they arise from the will of the individuals (minor premise), then legally formed conventions are obligatory upon those who have made them (conclusion). EXAMPLE: Incomplete syllogism If legally formed conventions are like a law for those who have made them, because they arise from the will of the individuals (minor premise), then legally formed conventions are obligatory upon those who have made them (conclusion). In the enacted formula, the major complete premise was omitted, since it was obvious that laws were obligatory upon all, because they emerged from the general will. The conclusion was also partially omitted, because if the only enacted formula were the explicit norm establishing that conventions were obligatory for the parties, not all would accept it and many would consider it paradoxical. As the legislator wanted to explain, in the very text of the prescriptive speech, why conventions were obligatory, without explicitly mentioning their obligatory nature, he introduced the principle of autonomy of the will, that is to say, that the individuals could establish norms for themselves. To such end, he included only the minor, but incomplete premise, without saying that "conventions are obligatory", but associating the conventions to the laws in an explicit manner, and the particular will, generator of obligations, in an implicit manner, to the general will, generator of the law, an indisputable source of obligations. Whenever enthymemes are incomplete syllogisms, reasoning remains semisecret, since only one proposition is omitted, be one of the premises or the conclusion. In this example, two complete propositions were omitted, namely, the major premise and the conclusion, and also the part of the minor premise that deals with the particular will as generator of obligations, and reasoning stays completely secret, thus leaving an explicit principle (autonomy of the will) and an implicit norm (that conventions are obligatory upon the Aristote, Rhétorique, Livre II, 21, 1394b20-26, Texte Établi et Traduit par Médéric Dufour, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Tome Première, Paris, 1938, p. 108. Aristotele, Retorica, II, XXI, 1394b, A cura di Armando Plebe, Editore Laterza, Bari, 1961. 136. An enthymeme (as species of incomplete syllogism): If you are mortal (minor premise), then your hate is not immortal (conclusion). An enthymema (as species of perfect or complete syllogism): If the one who is mortal must not heep an immortal hate (major premise), and since you are a mortal (minor premise), then you must not keep a an inmortal hate (conclusion). Antoine Arnauld et Pierre Nicole, La Logique ou l'Art de Penser, Sur la Cinquième Édition, Revue & de Nouveau Augmenteé; Faite à Paris, Chez Guillaume Defprez, &c. en 1683, Chapitre XIV, Des Enthymêmes & des Sentences Enthymématiques, Introduction de Louis Martin, Paris, Flammarion, 1970, p. 286. parties). Having said that conventions are like the law, the legislator refers to their obligatory effect, but also to the reason behind them: they are obligatory for those who have made them because they arise from the will of the individuals, as well as the laws are obligatory for all because they arise from the general will of the people. This is not an enthymeme, but an enthymematic statement,490 a statement that, lacking the form of an enthymeme, which require two statements at least, produces its effects, because the principle or the norm and the logical inference between both remain implicit; in this case, it is a question of an explicit principle. Principles usually takes the form of sententious sayings, and the juridical norms, the form of paraphrased principles.491 Sententious sayings are resorted to because they are remembered more easily, and paraphrases, because they allow for the exemplification of the application of the principles and give more clarity to them. Sometimes, when the use of some word or figure of speech is undesired, an euphemism is used. EXAMPLE: The above mentioned section 1134 of Napoleonic Code, reads as follows: "Legally formed conventions are like a law [euphemism for obligatory] for those who have made them", so as to avoid saying: "Legally formed conventions are obligatory for those who have made them". Principles, in addition to their usefull systematization purposes, also serves to fill the gaps by autointegration (within the same juridical order).492 Since to fill the gaps one resorts to the general principles of law, the principles of the branches of law, the principles of the institutions, and to analogy, it is necessary to highlight that, from the point of view of rhetoric, principles are, in general, the endoxas that form enthymemes and enthymematic statements, and that analogy is an incomplete induction, a reasoning by example. Enthymemes and examples provide reasonableness to prescriptive or persuasive speeches. To obtain enthymemes and examples, stronger arguments and reasonable things to say not regarded as arguments, it is possible to resort to legislative definitions and to other topics. Legislative definitions It has been repeatedly claimed that definitions in the laws are improper for being useless and dangerous. Useless, because there would no be provisions inside the law, but rather the result thereof, and they would not have a binding force on the interpreter, since laws should only order, not teach, a task proper of juristic writings. Dangerous, 490 Antoine Arnauld et Pierre Nicole, La Logique ou l'Art de Penser, Sur la Cinquième Édition, Revue & de Nouveau Augmenteé; Faite à Paris, Chez Guillaume Defprez, &c. en 1683, Chapitre XIV, Des Enthymêmes & des Sentences Enthymématiques, Introduction de Louis Martin, Paris, Flammarion, 1970, p. 286. 491 Claude du Pasquier, Introduction a la Thèorie Générale et a la Philosophie du Droit, Deuxième Édition, Revue et Mise a Jour, Éditions Delachaux, Niestlé S.A., Neuchatel, Suisse, Paris, France, 1942, p. 62. 492 Norberto Bobbio, Teoria Generale del Diritto, G. Giappichelli Editore, Torino, 1993, p. 262. because they would be very difficult to establish and, if turned out vicious, they may lead to false consequences.493 A provision may contain a complete juridical norm, like the definitions of crimes in the codes and special penal laws, which prescribe each crime (murder, assault and battery, robbery, theft, etc.) in the form of a figure of speech, the imprecation, which consists, in one of its variants, in threatening,494 in this case, enforcement of the respective punishment against those whom may perform certain conducts. There is not always a coincidence between the provision and the juridical norm (fact and consequence; in the aforesaid examples, crime and punishment). The provision may contain a part of a juridical norm, of a penal nature or otherwise, which, together with other provision or provisions, forms a complete juridical norm. Thus, from the point of view of the art of legislation, there would be implicit referrals,495 since, when the defined term is used in the same or other provision, it is considered that the interpreter will have to replace it mentally by the defined concept, as it happens with nominal and mixed definitions. But when a concept is formulated, whether or not denominated, without the same or other provisions mentioning the denomination, the definition might also be useful if the defined concept integrates, not in redundant form the factual or the juridical consequences of the norm in question. It is true that some definitions proper of juristic writigs are the result of the provisions, that is, a brief description of the content of the latter, namely, the rules of law, which, as such will be true or false; but this does not imply that the legislator, in the excercise of his powers, should not use definitions. 493 In the discussion of the project of Civil Code in the Council of the State Session of January 27, 1803, presided over by Napoleon, as the definition of donations was dealt with, it was stated: "M. REGNAUD (of Saint-Jean-d'Angely) thinks that definitions are useless, because they are not dispositions inside the law." ("M. REGNAUD (de Saint-Jean-Angely) pense que les définitions sont inutiles, puisque elles ne sont pas dispositions dans la loi."); "M. BERENGER says that the definitions belong to case law, not law; they are very difficult. It is then dangerous to include them in a code because if they turned out vicious, they would lead to false consequences. ("M. BÉRENGER dit que les définitions appartiennent à la jurisprudence, et non à la loi; elles son très difficiles. Il est donc dangereux de les placer dans un code car si elles étaient vicieuses elles conduiraient à de fausses conséquences.); Definitions are the result of the provisions of a code, they fall within the scope of science: whereas a code is what it is done by the legislator. (Les définitions sont le résultat de les dispositions du code, elles son donc du domaine de la science: or le code es le fait du législateur.") Le Baron Locré, La Législation Civile, Commerciale et Criminelle de la France, Teutel et Würtz, Libraires, Tome Onzième, Paris, 1827, pp. 88-89 (REGNAUD), p. 90 (BÉRENGER). "In law all general rules and conceptions are liable to cause catastrophes, as it is impossible, when formulating a rule, to foresee all possible complications which life may bring about." Fritz Schulz, Principles of Roman Law, Translated from a Text Revised and Enlarged by the Author, by Marguerite Wolff, at The Clarendon Press, Oxford, First English Edition 1936, reprinted, 1956, 1967, p. 41. Original German First Edition, Prinzipien Des Römischen Rechts, Duncker Und Humblot, Munich, 1934. 494 Antonio de Capmany and Montpalau, Filosofía de la Elocuencia, Londres, 1812, p. 459; pp. 463-465. 495 Definitions would be not independent norms according to Hans Kelsen, Théorie Pure du Droit, Traduction française de la 2e édition de la Reine Rechtslehre, Franz Deuticke, Viena, 1960, par Charles Eisenmann, Dalloz, Paris, 1962, p. 77. Incomplete juridical propositions are either explanatory, limitative or referencial. Explanatory propositions are either definitory ones, which usually refer to the factual antecedent, and complementary ones, which clarify a juridical consequence. Karl Larenz, Metodología de la Ciencia del Derecho, Traducción de Enrique Gimbernat Ordeig del original Methodenlehre der Rechstwissenchaft, Springer Verlag OHC, Berlin, Göttingen, Heidelberg, 1960, Ediciones Ariel, Barcelona, 1966, pp. 175-176. RULE: Definitions shall be used in the prescriptive speech, provided that they will serve to oblige, prohibit, permit, punish or reward conducts, where it will not be considered suitable to leave them in charge of custom, case law or juristic writings. When the definitions of custom, case law or juristic writings precede the legislator, he will not unnecessarily detach himself from pre-existent concepts and usual words, since, in contrast to the formal propositions in logic and mathematics, juridical norms are formulated in a natural language that admits stipulative definitions, but does not tolerate arbitrary stipulations, since the legislator or the interpreter will rarely forget the previous meaning and substitute it for the new one. They often end up saying one thing and doing another, a real danger posed by legislative definitions.496 RULE: Definitions shall not unnecessarily be detached from pre-existent concepts and usual words, because both of them are of a very difficult replacement in the minds of legislators and interpreters. Justinian's Digest states that any definition is dangerous in civil law, since subverting it is not possible in very few ocassions.497 It was dangerous for the parties, for historical reasons, because in the "actions of the law" (legis actiones) they had to recite the exact words before the pretor (in iure civilis) since, as Gaius remembers a person whose vineyards had been knocked down lost his claim for having said "vineyard" instead of "trees", which was the general term used in the formula of the Law of the XII Tables.498 It has been ad still is also dangerous for lawyers, because when the denomination of a fact, act or activity is argued about, if any of them risks a definition, as his adversary criticizes a word or adds or removes another one, he shall witness how such adversary snatches it off his hands and turns it against him.499 A definition, which always uses words, may linguistically formulate a concept without naming it (conceptual definition); establish the concept denomination (nominal definition); or linguistically formulate a concept and establish its denomination (mixed definition). Concepts should not be confused with the words or things.500 No mistake 496 Sebastián Soler, Las Palabras de la Ley, Fondo de Cultura Económica, México, 1969, pp. 172-173. 497 D. 50.17.202. D.50.17.202, Corpus Iuris Civilis, Editio Stereotipa Octava, Volumen Primum Digesta, Recognovit, Theodorus Mommsen, apud Weidemanos, Berolini, 1899, p. 873. D.I.17.202, El Digesto del Emperador Justiniano, Traducido y Publicado por el Licenciado don Agustín Rodriguez de Fonseca, del Colegio de Abogados de esta Corte, Nueva Edición Aumentada con la Traducción de los Proemios, Completada y Revisada con Arreglo a los Textos más Autorizados de las Ediciones Modernas, Imprenta de Ramón Vicente, Tomo III, Madrid, 1874, p. 851. It is taken from Iavolenus, eleventh book epistolarum. 498 [Gaius], The Institutes of Gaius, Part I, Text With Critical Notes and Translation, by Francis de Zulueta, Clarendon Press, Oxford, First Edition 1946, Reprinted 1951, Book IV, 11, Oxford, 1958, pp. 234-235. Gaius, Institutes, Texte Établi et Traduit par Julien Reinach, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", III, 11, Paris, 1950, p. 140. Stella Maranca, Le "Regulae Iuris" e la "Definitio in Iure Civilis", Reçueil Gény, T. II, Paris, 1934, pp. 91-111; p. 97. 499 Cicero, De Oratore, II, XXV, 108. Cicéron, De l'Orateur, Livre II, XXV, 108, Texte Établi et Traduit par Edmond Courbaud, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Paris, 1927, pp. 50-51. 500François Geny, La Technique Législative dans la Codification Civile Moderne (A Propos du Centenaire du Code Civil), Le Code Civil, 1804-1904, Livre du Centenaire, Arthur Rousseau, Editeur, T. II., Paris, 1904, p. 993. should be made about the most useful sequence to deal with the above mentioned aspects which, from the point of view of the interpretation, application and criticism is: words, concepts, things; and, from the perspective of the composition, is: concepts, words, things. Conceptual definitions Conceptual definitions, that is, the explanations of concepts in words,501 must not be confused either with the concepts themselves, since concepts differ from their formulation by means of language;502 or with nominal definitions. Conceptual definitions are speeches that explain things existing in reality, that can be looked at or touched, like farms, leaks, etc.; or in the mind, like usucaption, guardianship, etc.503 The definitions of systematical concepts are more frequent in Civil Law, as it happens in the French Civil Code with the concepts of property (section 544), usufruct (section 578), easement (section 637), contract (section 1101), etc., while the definitions of non-systematic concepts are more frequent in the Common Law world.504 Should a speech admits two or more meanings, it would suffer from ambiguity,505 which can arise either from the way in which words are linked together (syntactic ambiguity) or from the words themselves (semantic ambiguity). In the case of syntactic ambiguity it is difficult to immediately identify the subject and direct object of the sentence, as in the following example: Cicero recommends Tyro to Curius, since only those who knows that Tyro was a slave much valued by Cicero can interpret with certainty that said slave is the recommended one.506 501 Friedrich Karl Von Savigny, Metodología Jurídica (Juristische Methodenlehere, K. F. Koehler Verlag, Stuttgart, 1951, que corresponde al curso de invierno 1802-1803), Traducción de J. J. Santa Pinter, Ediciones Depalma, Buenos Aires, 1979, p. 39. 502 R. Von Ihering, L'Esprit du Droit Romain dans les Diverses Phases de son Développement, Traduit sur La 3e. Édition avec l'Autorisation de L'Auteur par O. de Meulenaere, Liv. II, Ie. Part., Titre III, Technique, Chap. I. Sect. 2. B. 3., Construction.  46. 3. 1. Notion et distinction des corps juridiques, Maresq, Ainé, Éditeur, Paris, F. Clemm, Gand, 1877, p. 54. 503 Cicero, Topics, V, 26-27. Cicéron, Topique, V, 26, dans Cicéron, Divisions de l'Art Oratoire, Topiques, Texte Établi et Traduit par Henri Bornecque, Deuxième Édition, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Paris, 1960, p. 74. 504 Alf Ross, Definition in Legal Language, Logique et Analye, Nouvelle Serie, 1e. Année, Août 1958, p. 147. Jean Ray, Index du Code Civil, Contenant Tous les Mots qui Figurent dans le Texte du Code Accompagnés des Références a Tous les Articles où ils se Trouvent et Illustrés de Citations qui Peuvent en Éclairer le Sens ou l'Emploi, Librairie Félix Alcan, Paris, 1926, Préface IX pp., Abréviations 1 p., Index 117 pp., Addenda 1 p. This work was inspired in a similar one for the B.G.B., Wörtverrzeichnis Zum Börgerlichen Geserzbuche, O. Gradenwitz, 1902, Préface, p. V. 505 Rhetorica ad Herennium, Book I, XI, 16. Rhetorica ad Herennium, Book I, XI, 16, with an English Translation by Harry Caplan, The Loeb Classical Library, LCL 403, Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachussets, London, England, pp. 84-85. Retórica a Herenio, Libro I, XI, Traducción Introducción y Notas de Juan Francisco Alcina, Erasmo, Textos Bilingües, Editorial Bosch, Barcelona, 1991, p. 122. Rhétorique a Herennius, Livre II, XI, 16, Ouvrage Longtemps attribué a Ciceron, Texte Revue et traduit avec Introduction et Notes par Henri Bornecque, Librairie Garnière Frères, Paris, pp. 56-57. 506 Real Academia Española, Gramática de la Lengua Española, Nueva Edición Reformada, de 1931, Madrid, 1962, punto 482, p. 443. RULE: To eliminate syntactic ambiguity (it is difficult to immediately identify the subject and direct object of the sentence), words shall be given a different placement, or linked with other particles, or any of the latter shall be omitted. EXAMPLE: Cicero recommends Tyro to Curius. (Who is the recommended one?). Tyro is recommended by Cicero to Curius. The semantic ambiguity refers to the comprehension of the concept, its typical properties, the core of meaning. Vagueness refers to the extension, to the class of elements with properties typical of the concept, contemplated on the border of meaning, from a half-light area.507 RULE: To eliminate semantic ambiguity, equivocal words shall be replaced by unequivocal ones, or they shall be defined. Because the present work uses the taxonomic model of the juridical system, then: RULE: Definitions following the method of the next genre and the specific difference shall be preferred.508 507 "The fact is that all words are undoubtedly attributable in certain domain, but become questionable inside a half-light area, out of which they are again undoubtedly not attributable. Someone might try to obtain precision in the use of words, by saying that no word may be applied in the half-light area; but fortunately half-light itself is not exactly definable, and the whole ambiguity given by it to the primary use of the words, is also given by it as we try to fix a limit to its undoubtful applicability." Spanish to English translation by the author of this book. "El hecho es que todas las palabras son sin duda atribuibles en cierto dominio, pero se tornan cuestionables dentro de una zona de penumbra, fuera de la cual nuevamente son sin duda no atribuibles. Alguien podría tratar de obtener precisión en el uso de las palabras, diciendo que ninguna palabra puede ser aplicada en la zona de penumbra; pero por fortuna la penumbra misma no es excatamente definible, y toda la vaguedad que confiere al uso primario de las palabras, la confiere también cuando tratamos de fijar un límite a su indudable aplicabilidad." Bertrand Russell, Vaguedad ("Vagueness", The Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy, 1, 1923, p. 84), en Antología Semántica, compilada por Mario Bunge, Traducciones de Mario Bunge, Emilio O. Colombo, Estela Arias y Lilia Fornasari), Ediciones Nueva Visión, Buenos Aires, 1960, pp. 1718. 508 Aristotle, Topics, I, 8, 103b14-15. Aristotle, Topics, I, 8, 103b14-15, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation. Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume One, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 172. Aristóteles, Tópicos, I, 8, 103b14-16, en Tratados de Lógica (Organon), I, Categorías, Tópicos, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, Introducciones, Traducciones y Notas de Miguel Candel Sanmartín, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1982, p. 102. On Aristotle's Topics, see: Eug. Thionville, De la Théorie des Lieux Communs dans les Topiques d'Aristote et des Principales Modifications qu'elle a Subies jusqu'a nous Jours, Thèse Présentée a la Faculté des Lettres de Paris, Réimpression de l'édition de 1855, Osnabrück, Otto Zeller, 1965, 132 pp. Aristote Topiques, Tome I, Livres I-IV, Texte Établi et Traduit par Jacques Brunschwig, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Paris, 1967, CXLVIII pp., 177 pp. Aristotle On Dialectic, The Topics, Proceedings of the Third Symposium Aristotelicum, Edited by G.E.L. Owen, At The Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1968, viii pp., 346 pp. Ivan Pelletier, La Dialectique Aristotélicienne, Les Principes Clés des Topiques, Bellarmin, Montréal, 1991, 419 pp. Alike any other writer who uses natural language, a legislator may eliminate both syntactic and semantic ambiguity, whereas vagueness may not be eliminated, only reduced. Doubts will always exist if some marginal concrete cases likely to appear remain included or excluded from formulated abstract definitions. To reduce the ambiguity of quantitative concepts, numbers may be used; in the case of qualitative concepts, all their species (divisio) or all their parts (partitio) may be enunciated, or replaced by other quantitative concepts, for example, the maturity that capacity requires upon attainment of the legal age, established by a certain number of birth anniversaries.509 RULE: To reduce ambiguity: a) in the definitions of quantitative concepts, numbers shall be used in their formulation. b) in the definitions of qualitative concepts, all their parts shall be enunciated (partitio), all their species (divisio),510 or qualitative concepts shall be replaced by quantitative concepts. Nominal definitions In nominal definitions, the equivalence between the meaning of a name and the linguistic formula of a concept is established; thus the speech is abridged, since it is enough to use the name instead of the set of words that constitutes its linguistic formula. The introduction of a definition just to abridge the speech is only justified if it turns out very uncomfortable to repeat the linguistic formulation of the concept511 and no appropriate usual name exists. Robin Smith, Aristotle Topics, Books I and VIII, Translated with a Commentary, Clarendon Preess, Oxford, 1997, XXXV pp., 207 pp. Paul Slomkowski, Aristotles's Topics, Brill, Leiden, New York, Koln, 1997, VIII pp., 218 pp. Alexander of Aphrodisias, On Aristotle Topics 1, translated by Johannes M. Van Ophuijsen, Cornell University Press, 2001, X, 228 pp. Aristotele, Topici, Organon, a Cura di Giorgio Colli, Adelphi, Edizioni, Milano, 2003, pp. 407-643; pp. 917-1003. Cicero, Topics, VI, 29. Cicéron, Topiques, VI, 29, dans Cicéron, Divisions de L'Art Oratoire, Topiques, Texte Établi et Traduit par Henri Bornecque, Deuxième Édition, Société d'Édition Les Belles Lettres, Paris, 1960, pp. 75-76. On Cicero, Topics, see: Studi sui "Topica", di Cicerone, Benedetto Riposati, Edizioni dell'Università Cattolica del S. Cuore, Serie Pubblicazioni, Volume XXII, Società Editrice "Vita e Pensiero", Milano, 1947, Sommario, Introduzione XV pp., Pianta Topica s.p., 338 pp; La definitio, pp. 53-79; La Partium Enumeratio, pp. 80-84. Boethius's in Ciceronis Topica, Translated, with Notes and Introduction, by Eleonore Stump, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1988, 277 pp. Tobias Reinhardt, A Commentary on Cicero's Topica, Corpus Christi College, Submitted for: D. Phil, 2000, British Thesis Service, 339 pp., D 211110. Tobias Reinhardt, Cicero's Topica, Edited with an Introduction, Translation, and Commentary, Oxford University Press, New York, xvi + 435 pp. 509 Jean Dabin, La Technique de l'Élaboration du Droit Positif Spècialement du Droit Privé, Établissements Émile Bruylant, Bruxelles, Librairie du Reçueil Sirey, Paris, Le procedé du "chiffrage", pp. 122-127; Les Spécificatios par énumération, pp. 128-143. He does not distinguish partition (partitio) from division (divisio), like in the rhetorical tradition, where there are two methods of defining when the enumerations of the members (partitio) or of the species (divisio) are exhaustive. 510 Cicero, Topics, V, 28, VI-VII, 30-31. Cicéron, Topique, V, 28, VI-VII, dans Cicéron, Divisions de l'Art Oratoire, Topiques, Texte Établi et Traduit par Henri Bornecque, Deuxième Édition, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Paris, 1960, p. 25, p. 76. RULE: Nominal definitions shall be introduced only to abridge the speech, when it turns out very uncomfortable to repeat the linguistic formulation of the concept and no appropriate usual name exists. RULE: Neither shall the same name be used as an equivalent for the linguistic formulae of several concepts, nor more than one name shall be used as an equivalent for the linguistic formulae of the same concept.512 When the purpose sought consists in abridging the exposition only, but once the equivalence between the meaning of a name and the linguistic formula of a concept is established the name is no longer used in the rest of the speech, the definition turns out unnecessary, since there will be no opportunity to carry out replacements. RULE: When definitions are established only to abridge the exposition (nominal definitions), but the name is no longer used in the rest of the speech, they shall turn out unnecessary. The mental replacement of the linguistic formulation of a concept by a name not only abridges the speech, but also favors memorizing it, enhances the comprehension of the meaning and facilitates the discussion of the issues raised. It has the advantage of simplifying the speech, since what is understood with only one strike of attention, which in turn depends on the length of the symbols used, is better received; but it has the disadvantage of disregarding that the presence of many words serves to remember that a complex issue is being dealt with.513 RULE: Nominal definitions shall abridge the speech, favor memorizing it, facilitate the comprehension of the meaning and simplify the discussion of the issues raised, but they shall lead to forgetting that a complex issue is being dealt with. Mixed definitions A mixed definition formulates a concept linguistically and establishes the only denomination of such concept that will be consistently used in the rest of the speech. Due to the disparity of certain concepts and denominations in juristic writings, the German Civil Code of 1900 (B.G.B), established mixed definitions. It formulated the concepts and placed the respective nomen iuris only once between parentheses. With the linguistic formulation of the concept, it intended to eliminate the discrepancies existing among juristic writings and, as it established the nomen iuris, it looked for the concision of the prescriptive speech, since it turned out unnecessary to repeat the linguistic formulae of the concepts to use them in other provisions, since beeing it enough to use their denomination.514 511 Richard Robinson, Definition, Oxford University Press, Reprinted from Corrected Sheets of the First Edition, Oxford, 1954, 1962, 1965, pp. 80-81. 512 Richard Robinson, Definition, Oxford University Press, Reprinted from Corrected Sheets of the First Edition, Oxford, 1954, 1962, 1965, pp. 81-82. 513Richard Robinson, Definition, Oxford University Press, Reprinted from Corrected Sheets of the First Edition, Oxford, 1954, 1962, 1965, p. 68; p. 79. 514 Code Civil Allemand, Traduit et Annoté, par R. Saleilles, Paris, 1904, p. XXXI. RULE: A mixed definition shall extend, restrict or formulate a concept and shall establish the only denomination of such concept which will transparent it consistently, so that the prescriptive speech will gain clarity and concision. Persuasive definitions Conceptual, nominal and mixed definitions serve to obtain clarity and concision in the speech. Clarity, because they reduce ambiguity and eliminate vagueness, introducing, extending or restricting the meaning of words. Concision, because they allow to use a denomination instead of the linguistic formulation of a concept. However, persuasive definitions are not formulated to achieve clarity or concision in the speech, but as emotional arguments (pathos).515 Persuasive definitions are those that, with an apparent impartiality, re-defines the descriptive meaning of words while retaining their emotional meaning, so that, generally in a secret way, they direct the emotion to the new object,516 to move the wills. They will be open to criticism if they remain secret and without the respective reasonable justification in the persuasive speech. In a nutshell: RULE: Definitions may be resorted to when it is intended to: a) introduce, extend or restrict concepts; b) reduce ambiguity; c) eliminate ambiguity; d) abridge the speech; e) re-define the descriptive meaning and retain the emotional meaning, if acceptable reasons are given to justify them in the persuasive speech. RULE: To introduce definitions, the following formulae shall be used, depending on whether such definitions are: a) conceptual: X, where X represents the linguistic formulation of the concept; b) nominal: "In the present law "X" will be denominated "Y", where "X" mentions the linguistic formulation of the concept, and "Y" mentiones the nomen iuris; c) mixed: X (Y) where X, without quotation marks, represents the linguistic formulation of the concept, and (Y) the nomen juris appears between parentheses, instead of appearing between quotation marks, as in the nominal definition. All definitions, whether nominal, conceptual, mixed or persuasive, make the tasks of both legislators and interpreters heavier, because instead of abiding only by the established meaning, they also have to remember the equivalence stipulated between the 515Perhaps it would be necessary to add the definitions intended to show the legislator in a more favorable way (ethos). 516 They considers them to be a particular argument species: C. L. Stevenson, Persuasive Definitions, Mind, XLVII (1938), pp. 334-350, in Ethics And Language, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1944. The article of Mind also was reproduced then in Facts and Values, Studies in Ethical Analysis, Yale University Pres, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1963, pp. 32-54. Richard Robinson, Definition, Oxford University Press, from Corrected Sheets of the First Edition 1954, 1962, 1965, London, p. 168. Douglas Walton, "Persuasive Definitions and Public Policy Arguments", Argumentation and Advocacy, The Journal of the American Forensic Association. 37 (Winter 2001), pp. 117-132. concept, its linguistic formula and the nomen iuris, and to practice a mental replacement in a consistent way as they used or interpret the nomen or the formula,517 these beeing the reasons why it is convenient to introduce the least possible number of definitions. RULE: It is convenient to introduce the least possible number of definitions, so as not to make both the legislator's expression and the interpreter's comprehension heavier. RULE: Before finishing the composition of a prescriptive speech, useless definitions, persuasive definitions not justified in the persuasive speech and the inconsistent use of the language with regard to the admitted definitions shall be eliminated. For the purposes of obtaining reasonable things to say, in addition to legislative definitions, the following topics may be resorted to. Genres RULE: The things, which genres are different, shall themselves be different as well.518 Species RULE: The properties of the genre shall survive in its species.519 Similarities RULE: When the same quality appears in different things (similarity), the proposition shall be the same and only one.520 Differences RULE: When things are different, the proposition shall not be the same and only one.521 517 Cesare Grassetti, Le Definizioni Legale e la Riforma dei Codici, Studi in Onore di Giovanni Pacchioni, Facoltá di Giurisprudenza della R. Universitá di Milano, Dott. A. Giuffrè, Milano, 1939, pp. 312-313, n. 32. Richard Robinson, Definition, Oxford University Press, Reprinted from Corrected Sheets of the First Edition, Oxford, 1954, 1962, 1965, p. 78. 518 Cicero, Topica, III, 13. Cicéron, Topique, III, 13, dans Divisions de l'Art Oratoire. Topiques, Texte Établi et Traduit par Henri Bornecque, deuxième Édition, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Paris, 1960, p. 71. Boethius's The Topicis Diferentiis, Book III, 1197C8-9, Translated, with Notes and Essays on the Text by Eleonore Stump, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1978, p. 66. 519 Cicero, Topica, III, 14. Cicéron, Topique, III, 14, dans Cicéron, Divisions de l'Art Oratoire. Topiques, Texte Établi et Traduit par Henri Bornecque, deuxième Édition, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Paris, 1960, p. 71. Boethius's The Topicis Diferentiis, Book III, 1197C189, Translated, with Notes and Essays on the Text by Eleonore Stump, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1978, p. 66. 520 Boethius's The Topicis Diferentiis, Book III, 1197 D, 33-35, Translated, with Notes and Essays on the Text by Eleonore Stump, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1978, p. 66. 521 Boethius's The Topicis Diferentiis, Book III, 1197 D, 33-35, Translated, with Notes and Essays on the Text by Eleonore Stump, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1978, p. 66. Contraries RULE: Where contraries were: a) adverse (white/black); exclusive (justice/injustice), negatives (to live/not to live), it shall not be possible to reconcile one another; b) relative (master/servant), one will not happen without the other.522 Concomitances RULE: When things were associated with others, it will be possible to consider concomitant circumstances,523 in which case a rebuttable or disputable presumption shall be established, in line with the force of conviction of such circumstances. Precedents, consequents and incompatibles RULE: When a proposition is conditional: a) if the precedent is affirmed, the consequent will follow;524 b) if the consequent is negated, the precedent will be negated;525 c) the consequences of contraries (incompatibles), will not be found at the same time in the same thing;526 Causes RULE: When an efficient cause happens, the effect shall not be absent.527 Effects RULE: When an effect happens, the efficient cause shall not be absent.528 Comparisons RULE: When comparisons are made: 522 Boethius's The Topicis Diferentiis, Book III, 1197B36-40; 1198A1-12 Translated, with Notes and Essays on the Text by Eleonore Stump, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1978, pp. 66-67. 523 Cicero, Topica, XI, 50-52 Cicéron, Topique, XI, 50-52, dans Cicéron, Divisions de l'Art Oratoire, Topiques, Texte Établi et Traduit par Henri Bornecque, Deuxième Édition, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Paris, 1960, pp. 82-83. Boethius's The Topicis Diferentiis, Book III, 1198 A-B, 12-35, Translated, with Notes and Essays on the Text by Eleonore Stump, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1978, p. 67. 524 Boethius's the Topicis Diferentiis, Book III, 1198D26-27, Translated, with Notes and Essays on the Text by Eleonore Stump, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1978, p. 68. 525 Boethius's the Topicis Diferentiis, Book III, 1198D28-29, Translated, with Notes and Essays on the Text by Eleonore Stump, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1978, p. 68. 526 "Together", must be understood as "in the same thing": Boethius's the Topicis Diferentiis, Book III, 1199A30-36, Translated, with Notes and Essays on the Text by Eleonore Stump, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1978, p. 68; Notes To Book III, 38, p. 133. 527 Boethius's Topicis Diferentiis, Book III, 1199A (in fact B) 5-6,Translated, with Notes and Essays on The Text by Eleonore Stump, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1978, p. 69. 528 Boethius's Topicis Diferentiis, Book III, 1199A (in fact B) 11-12, Translated, with Notes and Essays on the Text by Eleonore Stump, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1978, p. 69. a) what will be reputed good for the biggest thing, shall be reputed good for the smallest one.529 b) what will be reputed good for the smallest thing, shall be reputed good for the biggest one;530 c) with regard to equal things, the proposition shall be the same and only one.531 Possibility (status coniecturae)532 RULE: When the problem or the proposed solution may not even happen,533 it is not necessary to deliberate, to prepare either the prescriptive speech or the persuasive one. He who shall notice the impossibility, shall see beyond between parentheses the others. If the bill were enacted and published, it would not contain legal prescriptions applicable to all, being that the impossible thing does not oblige, not even in any of the cases described above, since such prescriptions would represent mere pious desires, which would not achieve the purpose sought by the legislator at the time he established them. An old example of impossibility of application is to have punished those who committed adultery with the deprivation of sight in a case in which the accused was a blind person. 529 Boethius's Topicis Diferentiis, Book III, 1199A (in fact B) 22-23,Translated, with Notes and Essays on the Text by Eleonore Stump, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, p. 69. 530 Boethius's Topicis Diferentiis, Book III, 1199A (en realidad B) 32-33Translated, with Notes and Essays on the Text by Eleonore Stump, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1978, p. 69. 531 Boethius's Topicis Diferentiis, Book III, 1199A (really B) 39-40, Translated, with Notes and Essays on the Text by Eleonore Stump, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1978, p. 69. 532 On Status conieturae in the rhetorical tradition, see: Aristotle, Rhetoric, Book II, 19, 1392a-b. Aristotle, Rhetoric, II, 19, 1392a-b, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation, Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume Two, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, pp. 2217-2219. Aristóteles, Retórica, Introducción, Traducción y Notas por Quintín Racionero, Libro II, 1392a-b, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1990, p. 395; n. 219, pp. 396-400. Aristote, Rhétorique, Livre II, 19, 1392a-b, Texte Établii et Traduit par Médéric Dufour, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Tome Deuxième, Paris, pp. 100-101. Aristotele, Retorica, II, XIX, 1392a-b, A cura di Armando Plebe, Editore Laterza, Bari, 1961, pp. 127130. Quintilian, The Institutio Oratoria of Quintilian, Book III, viii, 16. Quintilian, The Institutio Oratoria of Quintilian, Book III, viii, 16, with an English Translation by H.E. Butler in Four Volumes, Volume I, The Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, G.P. Putnam Sons, New York, 1921, pp. 486-487. Quintilien, Institution Oratoire, Livre III, 8, 16, Texte Établi et Traduit par Jean Cousin, Société d' Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Tome IV, Paris, 1976, p. 200. Heinrich Lausberg, Manual de Retórica Literaria. Fundamentos de una Ciencia de la Literatura, Traducción de José Pérez Riesco del Original Alemán Handbuch der Literarischen Rhetorik. Eine Grundlegung der Literaturwissenchaft, Max Hueber Verlag, München, 1960, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1966, T. I, número 231, pp. 206-207. Heinrich Lausberg, Handbook of Literary Rhetoric, A Foundation for Literary Study, Translated by Mattew T. Bliss, Annemiek Jansen, David Norton, Edited by David Orton & R. Dean Anderson, Brill, Leiden, Boston, Koln, 1998, number 231, pp. 98-99 533Hermogenes, Progymnasmata, 27. Hermógenes, Ejercicios de Retórica, 27, en Teón, Hermógenes, Aftonio, Introducción, Traducción y Notas de Ma. Dolores Reche Martínez, Ejercicios de Retórica, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1991, p. 199. Feasibility RULE: If norms were very difficult to apply, they shall be equated to impossible ones. To have ordered not to lie in a public square is another old example, in this case of the assimilation of the impracticable to the impossible thing.534 Probability RULE: If the problems to be resolved by means of legislation are possible, but highly improbable, no legislation shall be enacted either, since it shall fall short of contemplating all the things likely to happen some day; it will be enough to legislate on the things that happen ordinarily.535 It would be possible, but improbable, for example, to establish stringent earthquakeproof rules in a zone that has never suffered from either earthquakes or earth tremors and is far away from areas exposed to these dangers, according to the unanimous opinion of the experts in the matter. Necessity RULE: A bill shall be necessary when it answers a social request, provided always that the contemplated result may be obtained not by means of other available, political or juridical instruments, but by means of a law.536 Opportunity A bill may have been convenient or inconvenient yesterday and stop being so today or tomorrow; the prudence of a legislator, like that of a navigator or a medical doctor, in addition to the knowledge of the rules of their respective arts, requires the ability to identify the propitious moment for the action or abstention, an ability that turns very difficult to teach and learn.537 534 For the previous example of the blind person and this one, see: Aelius Théon Progymnasmata, 131-132, Texte Établi et Traduit par Michel Patillon avec l'Assistance pour l'Arménien de Giancarlo Bolognesi, Société d' Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Paris, 1997, pp. 99-100. 535 Digest, 1.3.10. Digesta 1.3.10, Corpus Iuris Civilis, Editio Steriotipa Octava, Volumen Primum Digesta, Recognovit, Theodorus Mommsen, apud Weidemans, Berolini, 1899, p. 6. Digesto 1.3.10, El Digesto del Emperador Justiniano, Traducido y Publicado por el Licenciado don Agustín Rodriguez de Fonseca, Nueva Edición Aumentada con la Traducción de los Proemios, Completada y Revisada con Arreglo a los Textos Más Autorizados de las Ediciones Modernas, Imprenta de Ramón Vicente, Tomo I, Madrid, 1872, p. 42. 536 Both Thibaut and Savigny wanted certain, just civil laws, and the unity of the nation and of the scientific efforts towards the same target, but the former first asked for a Code, whereas the latter sought for an organic and progressive science of the law that could be common to the whole nation: Savigny, "De la Vocación de Nuestra Época para la Legislación y la Ciencia del Derecho" (1814), in Thibaut y Savigny, la Codificación, una Controversia Programática Basada en sus Obras sobre La necesidad de un Derecho Civil General para Alemania y de la Vocación de Nuestra Época para la Legislación y la Ciencia del Derecho, con Adiciones de sus Autores y Juicios de sus Contemporáneos, Introducción y Selección de Textos de Jacques Stern, Traducción del Alemán de José Díaz García, Aguilar, Madrid, 1970, pp. 168-169. 537 Isocrates, Against the Sophists, 13; Helen, 11; Panegiricus, 9. RULE: A project will be opportune if promoted in the propitious time for its approval; inopportune, if promoted in the propitious time for its rejection, unless rejection has been looked for. Merit RULE: Rewards and punishments shall be established in accordance with the merit of the respective conducts, and they shall be neither insufficient nor excessive.538 Justice Justice539 shall consist in the virtue of producing or distributing equality,540 that is to say, in the constant and perpetual will to give each one what is his,541 so that, there shall be injustice in the cases of inequality. Isocrates with an English translation by George Norlin, Volume I, Panegyricus, 9, William Heineman Ltd., London, G.P.Putnam's Sons, New York, 1928, pp. 124-125; Volume II, Against the Sophists, 13, 1929, pp. 170-171; Volume III, with an English translation by Larue Van Hook, Helen, 11, First Printed 1945, Reprinted 1954, 1961, pp. 66-67. Isócrates Discursos, Introducción Traducción y Notas de Juan Manuel Guzmán Hermida, Editorial Gredos, Tomo I, Contra los Sofistas, 13, Madrid, 1979, p. 162; Elogio de Helena, 11, p. 169; Tomo II, Panegírico, 9, p. 202. Isocrate Discours, Texte Établi et Traduit par Georges Mathieu et Émile Brémond, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Tome I, Contre Les Sophistes, Paris, 1928, pp. 147-148; Éloge d'Hélène, 11, p. 166; Tome II, Cinquième Tirage Revu et Corrigé, Panégyrique, 9, París, 1967, p. 16. Aristotle, Magna Moralia, Book I, 1196a38; Nicomachean Ethics, Book II, 1104a5. Aristotle, Magna Moralia, Book I, 1196a38; Nicomachean Ethics, II, 1104a5, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation, Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume Two, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 1894; p. 1744. Aristóteles Ética a Nicómaco, II, 1104a5, Edición Bilingüe y Traducción por María Araujo y Julián Marías, Introducción y Notas por Julián Marías, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, 1a. Edición 1949, 2a. Edición 1970, 3a. Edición 1981, Madrid, 1981, pp. 20-21. Pierre Aubenque, La Prudence Chez Aristote, PUF, Paris, 1re Édition 1963, 2a. Édition 1976, pp. 95-105, p. 102. 538 Theon, Progymnasmata, 132. Aelius Théon, Progymnasmata, 132, Texte Établi et Traduit par Michel Patillon avec l'Assistance pour l'Arménien de Giancarlo Bolognesi, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Paris, 1997, p. 101. On the principle of proportionality between crime and punisment, and on the universal silence of the legislation at that time, see: Beccaria e il Diritto Penale, Saggio di Cesare Cantú, G. Barbera Editore, Appendice, Dei Delitti e Delle Pene XXII, Firenze, 1862, p. 461 (Come si Prevengono i Delitti. Ricompense), pp. 430-432 (Proporzione fra Delitti e le Pene). Cesare Beccaria, De los Delitos y de las Penas, Edición Crítica Bilingüe y Estudio Preliminar por Francisco P. Laplaza, Ediciones Arayú, Buenos Aires, 1955, p. 305 (XLIV Recompensas) y p. 453 (XLI Come si Pre vengono i Delitti); pp. 192-195 (VI Proporción Entre los Delitos y Las Penas), pp. 397-402 (XXIII Proporzione Fra Delitti e le Pene). 539 Demosthenes, XX Against Leptines, 94. Demosthenes, XX Speech Against Leptines, 94, in Demosthenes with an English Translation by J. H. Vince, The Loeb Classical Libra William Heinemann Ltd, London, G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1930, pp. 552-554. Demóstenes, XX Contra Leptines, 94, Introducción, Traducción y Notas de A. López Eire, en Demóstenes, Discursos Políticos, Editorial Gredos, Tomo II, Madrid, 1985, pp. 219-220. 540 Aristotle, Topics, VI, 5, 143b15-16. Expediency Expediency shall consist in utility or profit, so that there shall be unsuitability in the cases of uselessness, of harmfulness, or of both simultaneously. RULE: The approval of a bill shall be suitable if it shall preserve the current advantages and add new ones, if it shall get rid of current disadvantages and not create new ones. Juridical security542 Juridical security shall consist in the predictability of the juridical consequences of human actions, so that the subjects under the law may relay on such result and direct their respective conducts with the guarantee of the law.543 Harmonization of justice, expediency and juridical security Experience indicates that the best laws harmonize the requirements of justice, expediency and juridical security, and reveal the secular process of the enhancement of the wisdom and eloquence that supports them, irrespective of the historical circumstances in which the political tensions in every society are overcomed. When any of the requirements exceeds certain limits, whether in the short, medium or long term, the laws shall not be spontaneously complied with and, irrespective of how much coercion may be inflicted, they shall finally be no longer applied.544 Topics, VI, 5, 143b15-16, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation, Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume One, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 241. Aristóteles, Tópicos, VI, 5, 143b16-17, en Tratados de Lógica (Organon), I, Categorías, Tópicos, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, Introducciones, Traducciones y Notas de Miguel Candel Sanmartín, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1982, p. 235.Aristotle, Aristotele, Topici, VI, 5, 143b 16-17, Organon, a Cura di Giorgio Colli, Adelphi, Edizioni, Milano, 2003, p. 563. 541 Digest I.1.10. D. I. 1. 10, Corpus Iuris Civilis, Editio Stereotipa Octava, Volumen Primum Digesta, Recognovit, Theodorus Mommsen, Apud Weidemanos, Berolini, 1899, p. 1. D. I. 1. 10, El Digesto del Emperador Justiniano, Traducido y Publicado por el Licenciado don Agustín Rodriguez de Fonseca, Nueva Edición Aumentada con la Traducción de Los Proemios, Completada y Revisada con Arreglo a los Textos más Autorizados de las Ediciones Modernas, Imprenta de Ramón Vicente, Tomo I, Madrid, 1872, p. 33. 542 In general, see a selection of the works presented in the Third Congress of Philosophy of the Law and Juridical Sociology, held in Rome, 1937-1938, in: Le Fur, Delos, Radbruch, Carlyle, Los Fines del Derecho, Bien Común, Justicia, Seguridad, traducción de Daniel Kuri Breña, Universidad Autónoma de México, Segunda Edición, Imprenta de la Universidad, 1958 (primera edición en español, Editorial Jus, S.A., 1944), México, 1958, 163 pp. Especially, see: Sebastián Soler, Las Palabras de la Ley, Fondo de Cultura Económica, México, 1969, pp. 181-190. Paul Roubier, Théorie Géneral du Droit, 2e. édition revue et augmentée (1re. édition, 1947), Librairie du Recueil Sirey, Paris, 1951, pp. 317-334. 543 Paul Roubier, Théorie Géneral du Droit, 2e. édition revue et augmentée (1re. édition, 1947), Librairie du Recueil Sirey, Paris, 1951, p. 324. 544 In relation to the conflict between justice and juridical security, to which expediency may be added: "It is possible that order reigns in an unjustly organized society where the power will manage to impose it perhaps momentarily; but the apparent peace founded on fear, and the order imposed by force, will have a very ephemeral life. The conflict between justice and juridical security always happens within certain limits very close to one another. When an arbitrary power tries to penetrate them, and create a security RULE: A prudent legislator shall harmonize the requirements of justice, expediency and juridical security, whenever possible. After having obtained the acceptable things to say, the things to say acceptable only in appearance (sophisms), the last item of the promptuary will be dealt with next. 6. Sophisms Here follows a discussion over sophisms in general and, in particular, over legislative sophisms in the wide sense (deliberative sophisms and legislative sophisms in the strict sense). a. Sophisms in general The things to say or already said, acceptable only in appearance, are called sophisms, because they were used in ancient Greece times by certain itinerant teachers of rhetoric, the sophists, who, in exchange for money, promised to teach the art of winning any discussion (eristics), both with acceptable things and with things acceptable only in appearance, since they and their disciples preferred to appear as wise persons without being so, rather than to be wise persons without appearing as such, according to the interpretation of Plato545 and Aristotle546 about the sophists. They are also called state on the foundations of a completely unjust law, security disappears, the bad law is violated, and resistance is organized, to culminate, in extreme cases, with a revolution and the violent rupture of an unbearable situation. What was said as regards the whole juridical system, may be said as regards any norm in isolation. The authority is capable of applying coactively an unjust law; but if the injustice of the precept goes beyond certain limit, its recipients refuse to comply with it, and violate it systematically." Translation from Spanish to English by the author of this book. "Es posible que en una sociedad injustamente organizada impere el orden; el poder logrará quizás imponerlo momentáneamente; pero la paz aparente, fundada en el temor, y el orden impuesto por la fuerza, tendrán vida muy efímera. El conflicto entre justicia y seguridad jurídica se da siempre dentro de ciertos límites, muy cercanos entre sí. Cuando un poder arbitrario intente traspasarlos, y crear un estado de seguridad sobre los cimientos de un derecho completamente injusto, la seguridad desaparece, la ley mala es violada, y la resistencia se organiza, para culminar, en casos extremos, con la revolución y la ruptura violenta de una situación insostenible. Lo que se afirma en relación con todo un sistema jurídico, puede decirse en relación con cualquier norma aislada. La autoridad es capaz de aplicar coactivamente una ley injusta; pero si la injusticia del precepto va mas allá de cierto límite, sus destinatarios se resisten a cumplirla, y lo violan sistemáticamente." Eduardo García Maynez, El Problema Filosófico-Jurídico de la Validez del Derecho, Imprenta Mundial, México, 1935, p. 85. 545 Plato, The Sophist, 268c. Platon, Le Sophiste, 268c, dans Oeuvres Complètes de Platon, Traduction Nouvelle et Notes par Léon Robin avec la collaboration de M.J. Moreau, Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, T. II, pp. 337-338. 546 Aristotle, On Fallacies, 1, 165a20-30. Aristotle on Fallacies, or the Sophistici Elenchi, I., with a Translation and Notes, by Edward Poste, Macmillan and Co., 1866, p. 5. Aristotle, On Fallacies, 1, 165a 20-30, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation. Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume One, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 279. Aristóteles, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, 1, 165a20-30, en Tratados de Lógica (Organon), I, Categorías, Tópicos, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, Introducciones, Traducciones y Notas de Miguel Candel Sanmartín, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1982, pp. 310-311. Aristotele, Confutazione Sofistiche, 1, 165a 20-30, da Organon a Cura di Giorgio Colli, Einaudi, 1995, Adelphi, 2003, pp. 648-649. fallacies, because the Latin word fallacia means "deceit"547 and because it comes from the Greek sphal, "cause of the fall", related to the struggle, but also used to express "cause of the fall due to argument".548 The things to say or already said, acceptable in appearance only (sophisms), conceal defects that, if noticed, would make them unacceptable. They must be studied to avoid deceit, not to teach how to cause them, like poisons are studied in medicine: to treat illnesses or to discover crimes, not to teach how illness may be worsened or injuries and murders committed. Thus, potentially cheated dividuals will be able to know in advance the diagnosis and therapy applicable to sophisms, whether they be provoked by involuntary errors (of their own or of third parties) or voluntarily by third parties (simulations and dissimulations). PRINCIPLE: Sophisms shall to be studied in order to refute them, not to commit them. PRINCIPLE: Legislators and advisers shall not let themselves be deceived by sophisms, shall not cheat others, and shall prevent others from deceiving themselves or from cheating others.549 The target of Aristotle's attacks would not be the sophists of the first generation (Protagoras, Gorgias, Hippias, etc.), but the Megarians. Aristóteles, Les réfutations sophistiques, 1, 165a 20-30, Introduction, traduction et commentaire par Louis-André Dorion, Préface de Jacques Brunschwig, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Presses de l'Université Laval, Canada-France, France, 1995, Introduction, pp. 52-53; 111-112; pp. 120-121. Without having to determine if the target there were two generations of sophists, only the first one, or only the second one, it is not possible to forget the Megarians, a Socratic school of philosophy founded by Euclides of Megara (c 450-380 B.C.), since: 1) in the discussions they were attacking, generally with questions, not the premises, but the conclusions of the adversary, leading him to contradict these: Anton Dumitriu, History of Logic, Revised, updated and enlarged translation of the second edition of the single volume Roumanian work, Istoria Logicii, by Anton Dumitriu, published by Editura Didactica, Bucarest, 1975, Translated by Duiliu Zamfirescu, Dinu Giurcaneanu, Doina Doneaud; translation edited by the staff of Abacus Press, England, printed in Roumania, Volume I, pp. 130-131; 2) "megarian questions" was the nickname given to sophistry: The Oxford Classical Dictionary, Third Edition, Edited by Simon Hornblower and Antony Spawforth, Oxford University Press, New York, 1996, megarian school, p. 951; 3) Eubulides of Miletus, disciple of Eucleides of Megara, was Aristotle's enemy and often criticized him: Diogène Laercë, Vie, Doctrines et Sentences des Philosophes Illustres, Traduction, notice et notes par Robert Genaille, Garnier-Flamarion, Vol. I, Paris, 1965, p. 143. 547 Félix Gaffiot, Dictionnaire Illustré Latin Français, Librairie Hachette, Paris, 1967, p. 651. 548 Douglas Walton, A Pragmatic Theory of Fallacy, The University of Alabama Presss, Tuscaloosa and London, 1995, p. 250. 549 Aristóteles, On Fallacies, 1, 165a24-25. Aristotle on Fallacies, or the Sophistici Elenchi, with a Translation and Notes, by Edward Poste, Macmillan and Co., 1866, I, pp. 4-5. Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford Translation. Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume One, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, 1, 165a 24-25, p. 279. Aristóteles, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, en Tratados de Lógica (Organon), I, Categorías, Tópicos, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, Introducciones, Traducciones y Notas de Miguel Candel Sanmartín, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1982, 1, 165 a 24-25, p. 311. Aristotele, Confutazione Sofistiche, Organon a Cura di Giorgio Colli, Einaudi, 1995, Adelphi, 2003, 1, 165 24-25, pp. 648-649. Aristote, Les réfutations sophistiques, Introduction, traduction et commentaire par Louis-André Dorion, Préface de Jacques Brunschwig, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Presses de l'Université Laval, CanadaFrance, France, 1995, 1, 165a 24-25, p. 120. The study of sophisms in certain opinions acceptable only in appearance, will begin with the Colours of Good and Evil, dealt with in the book Of the Dignity and Advancement of Learning (De Dignitate et Augmentis Scientiarum), of Francis Bacon.550 The study of the sophisms in general will be based on Aristotle's Sophistical Refutations.551 Neither of these works will be exposed completely, nor will the study of sophisms be reduced to them; they will be just the starting point. Refutations may be normal or pathological. Normal refutations contradict the sayings of others with arguments. Sophistical Refutations belong to the genre of the occult pathological arguments: they are apparent refutations. It has already been said, when dealing with the integral parts of the Promptuary, that opinions may paint themselves up with the colors of good and evil to motivate conducts and, also, to pretend acceptability and conceal defects (sophisms). Bacon wrote a set of twelve examples of sophisms in the opinions, with their corresponding "answers" (refutations), of which only two will be transcribed, the first and the fifth ones, as a genuine sample of the aforesaid set. EXAMPLES: "Examples of the Colours of Good and Evil, both Simple and Comparative. "SOPHISM 1. What men praise and honour is good; what they dispraise and condemn is evil. ANSWER. This Sophism deceives in four ways; by reason of ignorance, of bad faith, of party spirit and factions, of the natural dispositions of those who praise and blame. By reason of ignorance; for what is popular judgment worth as a test of good and evil? Better was Phocion's inference, who when the people applauded him more than usual, asked whether he had done wrong.1 By reason of bad faith, because in praising and blaming, men are commonly thinking of their own business, and not speaking what they think. Laudat venales, qui vult extrudere, merces.2 And again; "It is naught, it is naught (says de buyer); but when he is gone his way, he will vaunt."3 By reason of factions; for any man may see that men are wont to exalt those of 550 [Bacon], The Works of Francis Bacon, Collected and Edited by James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis, and Douglas Denon Heath, Vol. IV, Translation of the Philosophical Works, Vol. I, Of the Dignity and Advancement of Learning, The Sixth Book, Chap. III, New Edition, Longman & Co., etc, London, 1883, pp. 458-472. 551 Aristotle on Fallacies, or the Sophistici Elenchi, VI, with a Translation and Notes by Edward Poste, Macmillan and Co., 1866, 252 pp. Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation, Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume One, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, pp. 278-314. Aristóteles, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, en Tratados de Lógica (Organon), I, Categorías, Tópicos, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, Introducciones, Traducciones y Notas de Miguel Candel Sanmartín, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1982, pp. 307-382. Aristotele, Confutazione Sofistiche, da Organon a Cura di Giorgio Colli, Einaudi, 1995, Adelphi, Milano, pp. 647-725; pp. 1007-1030. Aristote, Les réfutations sophistiques, Introduction, traduction et commentaire par Louis-André Dorion, Préface de Jacques Brunschwig, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Presses de l'Université Laval, CanadaFrance, France, 1995, X pp; 476 pp. Scott G. Schreiber, Aristotle on False Reasoning, Language and the World in The Sophistical Refutations, State University Of New York Press, New York 2003, XV pp; 248 pp. their own party with immoderate praises, and depress below their desert those of the contrary. By reason of natural disposition; for some men are by nature formed and composed for servile adulation, while others on the contrary are crabbed and captious; so that in praising and blaming they do but gratify their own dispositions, with little regard for truth. 1 Plutarch, in Phocion, c. 8. 2 Hor. Ep. ii 2. 11. [The merchant praises what he wants to sell.] 3 Proverbs, xx. 14."552 "SOPHISM. 5. That which the other parties or sects agree in giving the second place (each putting itself first) seems to be the best; for it seems that in taking the first place they are moved by zeal and partiality, but in bestowing the second by truth and merit. So Cicero argues that the sect of the Academics, which maintained the impossibility of comprehending truth, was the best of the philosophies. "For (said he) ask the Stoic which is the best philosophy, and he will prefer his own to the rest; then ask him which is the next best, and he will acknowledge the Academic. So again the Epicurean (who will hardly deing to look at a Stoic), after he has placed his own philosophy at the head, will place the Academic next."1 In like manner, when a place is vacant, if the prince ask to each candidate whom he would most recommended next to himself, it is probable that their second votes would meet in the most able and deserving man. ANSWER. This sophism deceives by reason of envy. For next to themselves and their own party, men generally incline to those who are weakest and least formidable, and have given them least trouble; in despite of those who have most insulted or inconvenienced them. 1. Cf. the fragment of the Academ. ad Verr. preserved by St. Augustine."553 In classical tradition, the examples of sophisms are usually taken from the dialogue Euthydemus or The Disputant, by Plato554 and the systematic method, with its rules, from the work On the Sophistical Refutations (Sophistici Elenchi, in Latin transliteration), by Aristotle.555 The words elenchi and sophistici in the title, whether 552Bacon, The Works of Francis Bacon, Collected and Edited by James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis, and Douglas Denon Heath, Vol. IV, Translation of The Philosophical Works, Vol. I, Of the Dignity and Advancement of Learning, The Sixth Book, Chap. III, New Edition, Longman & Co., etc, London, 1883, p. 459. 553 Bacon, The Works of Francis Bacon, Collected and Edited by James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis, and Douglas Denon Heath, Vol. IV, Translation of The Philosophical Works, Vol. I, Of the Dignity and Advancement of Learning, The Sixth Book, Chap. III, New Edition, Longman & Co., etc, London, 1883, pp. 461-462. 554 Euthydème ou le Disputeur, dans Oeuvres Complètes de Platon, Traduction Nouvelle et Notes par Léon Robin avec la Collaboration de M. J. Moreau, Bibliothèque De La Pléiade, Édition de la Nouvelle Revue Française, Paris, 1950, Paris, T. I, pp. 559-611, notes, pp. 1295-1303. "[...] the most famous thesaurus of sophisms in Greek literature is Plato's Euthydemus." Sten Ebbesen, Commentators and Commentaries on Aristotle's Sophistici Elenchi, A Study of PostAristotelian Ancient and Medieval Writings on Fallacies, Volume I, The Greek Tradition, E.J. Brill, Leiden, 1981, p. 15, 555 Aristotle on Fallacies, or the Sophistici Elenchi, with a Translation and Notes, by Edward Poste, Macmillan and Co., 1866, pp. 1-95, n. 97-172. Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation, Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume One, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, pp. 278-314. included by the author, its publishers or commentators, provide a good synthesis of the main content of the work. Refutation was the most important of five targets enunciated by Aristotle to gain discussions; it is in the title because it is the main topic (twenty-five out of thirty four Chapters), which eclipses the others four targets, which are briefly discussed (to make the adversary incur in: paradoxes, falsities, solecisms and mechanical repetitions of the same words).556 Elenchus is a transliteration to Latin of a Greek term,557 which, among other meanings, means "refutation", but also "catalog".558 In addition to being used as a transliteration, in Latin, one of its two meanings is "appendix of a book".559 The translation "Sophistical Refutations" indicates that they are of a special type, different from dialectical refutations in general and from those of Socrates and Plato in particular. Sophistical Refutations is not an independent work, but a part of the Topics, not only because the author himself560 and several of his commentators561 say so, but also because, the author does so. In the Topics he presents Aristóteles, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, en Tratados De Lógica (Organon), I, Categorías, Tópicos, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, Introducciones, Traducciones y Notas de Miguel Candel Sanmartín, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1982, pp. 307-384. Aristotele, Confutazione Sofistiche, da Organon a Cura di Giorgio Colli, Einaudi, 1995, Adelphi, 2003, pp. 645-725, n. pp. 1005-1030. For a comparison between the Eutidemo and the Sophistical Refutations, see: Les réfutations sophistiques, Introduction, traduction et commentaire par Louis-André Dorion, Préface de Jacques Brunschwig, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Presses de l'Université Laval, Canada-France, France, 1995, pp. 91-104. 556 Ebbesen, Commentators and Commentaries on Aristotle's Sophistici Elenchi, A Study of PostAristotelian Ancient And Medieval Writings on Fallacies, Volume I, The Greek Tradition, E.J. Brill, Leiden, 1981, p. 6. Aristote, Les réfutations sophistiques, Introduction, traduction et commentaire par Louis-André Dorion, Préface de Jacques Brunschwig, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Presses de l'Université Laval, CanadaFrance, France, 1995, pp. 23-24. 557 It mentions that "elenchus" is a transliteration of the Greek word that Aristotle uses as "refutation", and which Boecio translates from the Latin word "redargutio": William of Sherwood's, Introduction to Logic, translated with introduction and notes by Norman Kretzmann, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1966, p. 155, n. 129. 558 Henry George Liddel and Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, a New Edition Revised and Augmented Throughout by Sir Henry Stuart Jones, with the assistance of Roderick Mckenzie, and with the cooperation of many scholars, At The Clarendon Press, New (ninth) Edition completed 1940, reprinted 1948, 1951, 1953, Oxford, p. 531. 559 Félix Gaffiot, Dictionnaire Illustré Latin Français, Librairie Hachette, "elenchus, i, m... appendice d'un livre", Paris, 1934, p. 581. 560 Aristóteles, Sophistical Refutations, 34, 183b10. Aristotle on Fallacies, or the Sophistici Elenchi, XXXIV, with a Translation and Notes, by Edward Poste, Macmillan and Co., 1866, p. 93. Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 34, 183b10, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation, Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume One, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 313. Aristóteles, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, 34, 183b 10, en Tratados de Lógica (Organon), I, Categorías, Tópicos, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, Introducciones, Traducciones y Notas de Miguel Candel Sanmartín, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1982, p. 381. Aristotele, Confutazione Sofistiche, 34, 183b10, Organon a Cura di Giorgio Colli, Einaudi, 1995, Adelphi, 2003, p. 723. Aristote, Les réfutations sophistiques, 34, 163b10, Introduction, traduction et commentaire par LouisAndré Dorion, Préface de Jacques Brunschwig, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Presses de l'Université Laval, Canada-France, France, 1995, p. 202. 561 "[...] On Sophistical Refutations, an addendum to the Topics.", in: a "catalog" of acceptable arguments (topic places) and the way to find them; and in Sophistical Refutations, a "catalog" of arguments acceptable in appearance only (sophistic places) and the way to refute them. These two catalogs differ in their content, but are identical as to the taxonomic method and the purpose sought: to facilitate the finding of really acceptable normal arguments and refutations, to be used (Topics); and of pathological arguments and the apparent refutations, sophisms, which deceive about their acceptability, to facilitate the corresponding diagnosis and therapy (Sophistical Refutations). The taxonomic method consists in the description of certain entities by means of a systematic classification and a transparent nomenclature (that facilitates visualization of the described entity) and concise (that facilitates memorizing), to "store" data about the respective entities and "to recover them" as information when it will be desirable to use them. Further examples of certain objects of study and their respective taxonomic disciplines are: the animal kingdom and zoology; the vegetable kingdom and botany; human health and medicine; law and juridical dogmatic. Under the taxonomic method two fundamental operations are clearly distinguished: the inclusion of a new entity as a species in the classification and the determination of a concrete specimen as belonging to some of the classified species; the rule for these operations is usually expressed with the following formula: species are classified, specimens are determined. The classification of sophisms species and the determination of their specimens may not be an easy task,562 but they should be regarded as two different operations. If a previous classification of the species did not exist, the concrete specimens could not be determined as belonging to any of them. But, if it turns out impossible to determine, then a new species will be created in the classification to include it in the catalog, in the corresponding place and with the appropriate nomenclature. In the Topics, the taxonomic method allows to prepare a catalog of the species of really acceptable arguments and refutations, to facilitate their generation and use in speeches. The taxonomic method, in the Sophistical Refutations, makes it possible to Robin Smith, Aristotle Topics. Books I and VIII with excerpts from related texts, Translated with a Commentary, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1977, Introduction, p. xvi. "Some of the fallacies discussed here are to be trated in Sophistical Refutations, which is an appendix to Aristotle Topics.", in: Aristotle on Rhetoric, A Theory of Civic Discourse, Newly translated with Introduction, Notes, and Appendices by George A. Kennedy, Oxford University Press, New York, Oxford, 1995, p. 205. "[...] des Réfutations sophistiques, comme celles des Topiques don elles sont une sorte d'appendice [...]", dans: Aristote, Les réfutations sophistiques, Introduction, traduction et commentaire par Louis-André Dorion, Préface de Jacques Brunschwig, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Presses de l'Université Laval, CanadaFrance, France, 1995, Préface, p. IV; p. 25, n. 3. 562 Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 33, 182b30. Aristotle on Fallacies, or the Sophistici Elenchi, XXXIII, with a Translation and Notes, by Edward Poste, Macmillan and Co., 1866, p. 89. Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 33, 182b30, in The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford Translation. Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume One, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 312. Aristóteles, Sobre Las Refutaciones Sofísticas, 33, 182b30, en Tratados de Lógica (Organon), I, Categorías, Tópicos, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, Introducciones, Traducciones y Notas de Miguel Candel Sanmartín, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1982, p. 378. Aristotele, Confutazione Sofistiche, 33, 182b30, da Organon, A Cura di Giorgio Colli, Einaudi, 1995, Adelphi, 2003, p. 720. Aristote, Les réfutations sophistiques, 33, 182b30, Introduction, traduction et commentaire par LouisAndré Dorion, Préface de Jacques Brunschwig, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Presses de l'Université Laval, Canada-France, France, 1995, p. 199. catalog such arguments and refutations as are acceptable in appearance only, due to their defects or secret pathologies (sophisms),563 to facilitate the corresponding diagnosis and therapy.564 The diagnosis, which consists in determining the presence of some specimen of the species of sophisms in a speech, is facilitated because the catalog describes both the causes of the appearance of acceptability and the secret defects that they endure.565 The therapy is facilitated because suitable answers are described for every species in the catalog. Aristotle, who foresaw the difficulty of detecting and resolving sophisms in the heat of a debate,566 dedicated nine chapters of his Sophistical Refutations to indications to recognize (diagnosis) the sophisms (apparent normality and secret pathology), and fifteen chapters to prepare answers intended to resolve them 563"A catalogue of the varieties of apparent evidence which are not real evidence, is an enumeration of Fallacies." John Stuart Mill, System of Logic Rationative and Inductive, in two volumes, Longmans, Green, Reader, And Dyerr, Vol. II, London, 1872, p. 300. 564 The plan of exposition in the Sophistical Refutations or On Fallacies is not given by the division of the Chapters as the point of view of the one that asks about (1-15) and of the one that answers (Chapters 1634), but from the point of view only of the one that answers: a description of the pathological symptoms of the respective sophisms (4-11), to facilitate the diagnosis to him; and a description of the corresponding recommended treatment (16-33), to facilitate the therapy to him. Works of medicine always describe the symptoms of the illnesses and the treatments recommended from the point of view of the medical doctor, who must diagnose and recommend the therapy, although the symptoms are endured and even sometimes reportedby the patients. 565 Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 33, 182b5. Aristotle on Fallacies, or the Sophistici Elenchi, XXXIII, with a Translation and Notes by Edward Poste, Macmillan and Co., 1866, p. 89. Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 33, 182b5, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation, Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume One, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 311. Aristóteles, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, 33, 182b 5, en Tratados de Lógica (Organon), I, Categorías, Tópicos, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, Introducciones, Traducciones y Notas de Miguel Candel Sanmartín, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1982, pp. 376-377. Aristotele, Confutazione Sofistiche, 33, 182b5, da Organon, A Cura di Giorgio Colli, Einaudi, 1995, Adelphi, 2003, p. 719. Aristote, Les réfutations sophistiques, 33, 182b5, Introduction, traduction et commentaire par LouisAndré Dorion, Préface de Jacques Brunschwig, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Presses de l'Université Laval, Canada-France, France, 1995, p. 197. Saint Thomas d-Aquin, Sur les tromperies, á quelques nobles artistes, traduction par Yvan Pelletier, Chapitre IV, #645, dans: www.profs.fr.ulaval.ca/YPelletier/site_yp/Textes/trad/Tromperies.pdf, p. 8; de Divi Thomae Aquinatis, "Opuscula Philosophica", Cura et studio P. Fr. Raymundi M. Spiazzo, O.P., Torino, Marietti, 1954. pp. 223-240, según e@mail del profesor Pelletier de fecha 23/08/04. Scott G. Schreiber, Aristotle on False Reasoning, Language and the World in The Sophistical Refutations, State University Of New York Press, New York 2003, p. 81. 566 Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 16, 175a20. Aristotle on Fallacies, or the Sophistici Elenchi, XVI, with a Translation and Notes, by Edward Poste, Macmillan and Co., 1866, p. 53. Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 16, 175a20, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation, Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume One, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 297. Aristóteles, Sobre Las Refutaciones Sofísticas, 16, 175a20, en Tratados de Lógica (Organon), I, Categorías, Tópicos, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, Introducciones, Traducciones y Notas de Miguel Candel Sanmartín, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1982, p. 348. Aristotele, Confutazione Sofistiche, 16, 175a20, da Organon, A Cura di Giorgio Colli, Einaudi, 1995, Adelphi, 2003, p. 688. Aristote, Les réfutations sophistiques, 16, 175a20, Introduction, traduction et commentaire par LouisAndré Dorion, Préface de Jacques Brunschwig, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Presses de l'Université Laval, Canada-France, France, 1995, pp. 161-162. when the occasion arises (recommended therapy).567 Many of the works that deal with sophisms fail to include the above mentioned answers in the catalog, and leave the therapy freed at random to the improvisation, that is to say, out of the art of refutation. In the Topics, the acceptability is based on the maxims that guarantee it, such as "what is attributed to the genre, is also attributed to the species". Topical maxims are distinguished and denominated for the differences that they present between themselves: genre, species, whole, part, etc. The topical maxim of the genre allows arguing: "if Socrates is a man, then he is mortal".568 The sophistic maxim of the species: "what is attributed to the species is also attributed to the genre", does not allow to be argued validly:" if Socrates is mortal, then he is a mortal", because there are mortal beings that are not men, like animals, since the maxim could refer, for example, to a pet called "Socrates". Topical maxims and acceptable premises are usually omitted on account of their obviousness, and make room for enthymemes. Sophistic maxims and unacceptable premises also are omitted, but for different reasons, not because of their obviousness, but because if they were explicit they would stop cheating, since the secret defect in the argumentation or refutation would become clear; this is why sophisms are apparent –not real– enthymemes. In the example of Socrates, the relation between genre and species, valid in the topical maxim and invalid in the sophistic maxim, is the cause of the apparent acceptability, since the sophistic maxim remains secret and the topical maxim appears in implicit form, due the relation between genre and species, but without the valid logic relation being distinguished from the invalid one, thus provoking deceit through confusion. The method of the Sophistical Refutations, like that of the Topics, consists in the anticipated preparation of a catalog, which also integrates the Promptuary. RULE: The catalog of sophisms shall contain the taxonomy of their species, as if it were a vademecum of pathological medicine,569 and shall make explicit: a) both the causes for the apparent acceptability and the pathologies or secret defects endured by every sophism species, to facilitate the determination of the specimens that will appear in the speeches (diagnosis); 567 Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, Chapters 1,4-11; and 16-30, respectively. Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 1,4-11; 16-30, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation, Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume One, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, pp. 278, 280-292; pp. 297-310. Aristotle on Fallacies, or the Sophistici Elenchi, I, IV-XI; XVI-XXXIII, with a Translation and Notes, by Edward Poste, Macmillan and Co., 1866, pp. 2-5, 7-41; 50-85. Aristóteles, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, 1,4-11; 16-30, en Tratados de Lógica (Organon), I, Categorías, Tópicos, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, Introducciones, Traducciones y Notas de Miguel Candel Sanmartín, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1982, pp. 309, 312-339; pp.348-373. Aristotele, Confutazione Sofistiche, 1, 4-11; 16-30, da Organon, A Cura di Giorgio Colli, Einaudi, 1995, Adelphi, 2003, pp. 647-648, 650-677; pp. 687-716. Aristote, Les Réfutations Sophistiques, 1, 4-11; 16-30, Introduction, traduction et commentaire par LouisAndré Dorion, Préface de Jacques Brunschwig, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Presses de l'Université Laval, Canada-France, France, 1995, pp. 119-121, 124-150; pp. 161-192. 568 Saint Thomas d'Aquin, Sur les tromperies, á quelques nobles artistes, traduction par Yvan Pelletier, Chapitre 4, #644, en www.profs.fr.ulaval.ca/YPelletier/site_yp/Textes/trad/Tromperies.pdf, pp. 7-8; de Divi Thomae Aquinatis, "Opuscula Philosophica", Cura et studio P. Fr. Raymundi M. Spiazzo, O.P., Torino, Marietti, 1954. pp. 223-240, según correo electrónico del profesor Pelletier, de fecha 23/08/04. 569Brunschwig qualifies Aristotle's Topics as a "vademecum of the perfect dialecticalician", Aristote Topiques, Tome I, Livres I IV, Texte Établi et Traduit par Jacques Brunschwig, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Paris, 1967, p. IX. b) the abstract refutations applicable towards every sophism species, to facilitate the opportune concrete refutations of the sophism specimens determined in the speeches, without having to improvise the refutations (recommended therapy); c) the inclusion of the respective sophism species of in an explanatory order based on the distinction between those that only depend and those that do not only depend on language to cause deceit (basic division), which facilitates the comprehension and memorization of the catalog; d) the denominations of sophism species: transparent, to visualize the concepts; and concise, to memorize them. RULE: Whenever in any speech the existence of a specimen of any of the sophism species in the catalog is determinated (diagnosis), then it shall be possible to remember or to consult also the adequate answer for its opportune refutation, without having to improvise the latter (recommended therapy). RULE: Whenever in the analysis of any speech both the cause of the apparent acceptability and the secret defect are made explicit, but it is impossible to determine as a specimen of any of the species in the catalog of sophisms (diagnosis), then a new sophism species will be classified, to which end: a) it will be included in the catalog, as dependent on or independent from language, as the case may be; b) it will be named in a transparent and concise way; c) the adequate answer shall be indicated (recommended therapy)for the opportune refutation of another specimen, without having to improvise it. Sophisms are usually ordained on the basis of the distinction between those that only depend and those that do not depend on language only to cause deceit.570 Although it is true that all sophisms depend on language to be expressed, some of them, also, depend only on language to cause deceit. Aristotle, the origin of the aforesaid order, enumerates thirteen sophisms species; six that only depend on language: homonymy, amphibology, combination, division, accentuation and form of expression; and seven that do not depend on language only to cause deceive: accident, absolute and not absolute sense, consequent, petition of principle (petitio principii), cause that is not a cause, several questions in one, and ignorance of the refutation (ignoratio elenchi);571 but he thinks 570 Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 4, 165b20. Aristotle on Fallacies, or the Sophistici Elenchi, IV, with a Translation and Notes, by Edward Poste, Macmillan and Co., 1866, p. 7. Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 4, 165b20-25, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation, Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume One, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 280. Aristóteles, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, 4, 165b20, en Tratados de Lógica (Organon), I, Categorías, Tópicos, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, Introducciones, Traducciones y Notas de Miguel Candel Sanmartín, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1982, pp. 312-313. Aristotele, Confutazione Sofistiche, 4, 165b 20-25, Organon, A Cura di Giorgio Colli, Einaudi, 1995, Adelphi, 2003, pp. 650-680; p. 650. Aristote, Les réfutations sophistiques, 4, 165b23-25, Introduction, traduction et commentaire par LouisAndré Dorion, Préface de Jacques Brunschwig, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Presses de l'Université Laval, Canada-France, France, 1995, p. 124. 571Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 4, 165b25; 166b20. Aristotle on Fallacies, or the Sophistici Elenchi, IV; V, with a Translation and Notes, by Edward Poste, Macmillan and Co., 1866, p. 7; p. 11. that all the species may come down to only one: ignorance of the refutation.572 Excessive vagueness is added by the author of the present book as the seventh sophism that depends on language to cause deceit. Next, under the concise style of a vademecum, the catalog of the sophisms will be exposed, divided into two parts: those that only depend and those that do not depend on language only to cause deceit. Sophisms that depend on language only to cause deceit Sophism of excessive vagueness573 diagnosis: apparent normality: a word or phrase is used as if it had a precise field of application; secret pathology: the field of application of the word or phrase is so doubtful that it exceeds the area of admissible half-light (excessive vagueness); recommended therapy: to reduce the excessive vagueness: in quantitative concepts, use numbers; and in qualitative concepts, enunciate all the species (divisio), all the parts (partitio), or replace them with quantitative Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 4, 165b25; 166b20, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation. Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume One, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 280; p. 281. Aristóteles, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, 4, 165b25; 166b20, en Tratados de Lógica (Organon), I, Categorías, Tópicos, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, Introducciones, Traducciones y Notas de Miguel Candel Sanmartín, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1982, p. 313; p. 317. Aristotele, Confutazione Sofistiche, 4, 165b25; 166b20, Organon, A Cura di Giorgio Colli, Einaudi, 1995, Adelphi, 2003, p. 650; p. 654. Aristote, Les Réfutations Sophistiques, 4, 165b25; 166b20, Introduction, Traduction et Commentaire par Louis-André Dorion, Préface de Jacques Brunschwig, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Presses de l'Université Laval, Canada-France, France, 1995, p. 124; p. 127. 572 Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 6, 168a15-20. Aristotle on Fallacies or the Sophistici Elenchi, VI, with a Translation and Notes, by Edward Poste, Macmillan and Co., 1866, p. 19. Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 6, 168a15-20, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation, Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume One, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 284. Aristóteles, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, 6, 168a15-20, en Tratados de Lógica, Organon, I, Categorías, Tópicos, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, Introducciones, Traducciones y Notas de Miguel Candel Sanmartín, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1982, p. 322. Aristotele, Confutazione Sofistiche, 6, 168a 15-20, Organon, A Cura di Giorgio Colli, Einaudi, 1995, Adelphi, 2003, p. 659. Aristote, Les Réfutations Sophistiques, 4, 168a 17-20, Introduction, traduction et commentaire par LouisAndré Dorion, Préface de Jacques Brunschwig, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Presses de l'Université Laval, Canada-France, France, 1995, p. 133. Scott G. Schreiber, Aristotle on False Reasoning, Language and the World in The Sophistical Refutations, State University of New York Press, New York 2003, for it it supports that are twelve sophisms, Preface, p. xiii. 3, and n. 13, p. 192. In the pp. 72-74; p. 80; pp. 90-92; 206 n. 18, implicitly reduce them to eleven, since he believes that two sophisms, composition and division, are two different descriptions of the same sophism, as he interprets Aristotle to have considered in Rhetoric II, 24. 573 Aristotle does not distinguish vagueness from homonymy. concepts example of vagueness: if in towns life is calmer than in cities and XX is a town, then life in XX is calmer; diagnosis: apparent normality: the words "towns" and "cities" are used as if the difference between them was precise; secret pathology: "towns" and "cities" are words that endure an excessive ambiguity because, in many cases, it is not known when to apply one or the other: Is XX a town or a city?; recommended therapy: if life is calmer where there are less than one hundred thousand inhabitants and XX has less than one hundred thousand inhabitants, then life is calmer in XX. RULE: Whenever a word or phrase is used as if it had a precise field of application (apparent normality), but the latter is so doubtful that it exceeds the area of admissible half-light (secret pathology), then the sophism of the excessive ambiguity shall be incurred in (diagnosis). RULE: The therapy recommended for excessive vagueness sophisms shall consist, when concepts are: a) quantitative, in the use numbers; b) qualitative, in the expression of all the species (divisio), or of all the parts (partitio) or in their replacement by quantitative concepts. Sophism of semantic ambiguity (homonymy) diagnosis: apparent normality: a phrase is used as if it had only one meaning; secret pathology: semantic ambiguity of the word (homonymy); recommended therapy: to eliminate semantic ambiguity by substituting homonymous words by unequivocal ones, to formulate definitions, or make homonymy explicit; example of homonymy: if eagles are hunted and this is an eagle specimen,574 then this specimen is hunted; 574 The word "eagle", as an example of homonymy in fallacies, but without it being used as such, may be found in: Edward Poste, Aristotle o Fallacies o The Sophistici Elenchi, VI, with a Translation and Notes, Macmillan and Co., 1866, p. 19. Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 6, 168a 15-20, in The Complete Works Of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford Translation. Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume One, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 284. diagnosis apparent normality: the word "eagles" is used as if referred to an animals species only; secret pathology: "eagles" may refer both to certain birds and to certain fish; recommended therapy: make the homonymy of the word "eagles" explicit and transform the sophism into an acceptable argument: if birds are hunted and fish are fished, and word "eagles" is used to refer both to birds aand to fish, then "eagles" that are birds are hunted and "eagles" that are fish are fished; RULE: Whenever a word is used as if had only one meaning (apparent normality), but with more than one meaning (secret pathology), then the sophism of semantic ambiguity shall be incurred in (diagnosis). RULE: The therapy recommended for sophisms of semantic ambiguity (homonimy) shall consist in replacing homonymous words for unequivocal others, in defining them, or in making homonymy explicit. Sophism of syntactic ambiguity (amphibology) diagnosis: apparent normality: a phrase is used as if it had only one meaning; secret pathology: syntactic ambiguity of the phrase (amphibology); recommended therapy: to eliminate the syntactic ambiguity (amphibology), change words order or join them with other grammatical particles, or make amphibology explicit; example of amphibology: if Aristotle s books are good and this is an Aristotle's book, then this book is good; diagnosis: apparent normality: the formula "Aristotle's books"575 is used as if Aristóteles, Sobre Las Refutaciones Sofísticas, 6, 168a 15-20, en Tratados de Lógica (Organon), I, Categorías, Tópicos, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, Introducciones, Traducciones y Notas de Miguel Candel Sanmartín, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1982, p. 322. Aristotele, Confutazione Sofistiche, 6, 168a 15-20, Organon, A Cura di Giorgio Colli, Einaudi, 1995, Adelphi, 2003, p. 659. Aristote, Les Réfutations Sophistiques, 4, 168a 17-20, Introduction, traduction et commentaire par LouisAndré Dorion, Préface de Jacques Brunschwig, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Presses de l'Université Laval, Canada-France, France, 1995, p. 133. 575For "Aristotle's book" in singular, as an example of an ambiguous phrase, see: Sur les tromperies, á quelques nobles artistes, par saint Thomas d'Aquin, traduction par Yvan Pelletier, Chapitre 7, #652, en www.profs.fr.ulaval.ca/YPelletier/site_yp/Textes/trad/Tromperies.pdf, p. 11; de Divi if it had only one meaning; secret pathology: it may be interpreted that it means "books the property of which belong to Aristotle"," books the authorship of which belong to Aristotle" or "books the property and authorship of which belong to Aristotle"; recommended therapy: make the amphibology of the phrase "Aristotle's books" explicit and transform the sophism into an acceptable argument: if the books the property of which belong to Aristotle are good and this book is Aristotle's Property, then this book is good; if the books the author of which is Aristotle are good and this book is of Aristotle s authorship, then this book is good; if the books the property and authorship of which belong to Aristotle are good and this book is of Aristotle's property and authorship, then this book is good. RULE: When a phrase is used as if it had only one meaning (apparent normality), but with more than one meaning due to its syntactic ambiguity (secret pathology), then the sophism of syntactic ambiguity or amphibology shall be incurred in (diagnosis). RULE: The therapy recommended for sophisms of syntactic ambiguity (amphibology) shall consist in changing the words orders, in joining words with other unequivocal grammatical particles in the respective context, or in making the amphibology explicit. Sophism of combination (or composition)576 diagnosis: apparent normality: as they are pronounced,577 the terms of an initial expression that was divided, are combined as if the resulting meaning does not change; Thomae Aquinatis, "Opuscula Philosophica", Cura et studio P. Fr. Raymundi M. Spiazzo, O.P., Torino, Marietti, 1954. pp. 223-240, according to Professor Pelletier email of 08/23//2004. 576It uses "combination": Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 7, 169a25, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation, Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume One, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 286. They use "composition": Edward Poste, Aristotle on Fallacies, or the Sophistici Elenchi, VII with a Translation and Notes, Macmillan and Co., 1866, p. 25.Aristóteles, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, 20, 177b20, en Tratados de Lógica (Organon), I, Categorías, Tópicos, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, Introducciones, Traducciones y Notas De Miguel Candel Sanmartín, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1982, p. 358. 577William of Sherwood's, Introduction to Logic, translated with introduction and notes by Norman Kretzmann, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1966, 3.1.3., pp. 140-141, 141, n. 52. secret pathology: although it is true that often the combination of the terms of an expression does not change the resulting meaning, sometimes it does;578 recommended therapy: to divide expressions combined later as they were before, to make explicit the difference of the meaning of both expressions (divided and combined), to ratify that only the (true) divided expression and not the (false) combined expression was accepted; example of combination: is it true to say now you_have_been born? ("now" divided from "you have been born") −Yes. −Then now_you_have_been born. ("now" combined with "you have been born")579 diagnosis: apparent normality: it is assumed that: "to say now you_have_been-born", and "to say now_you_have_been-born" have the same meaning; secret pathology: divided, it is a true expression: ("It is true to say now you_have_been-born"); combined, it turns out to be a different 578 Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 7, 169a25; Edward Poste, Aristotle on Fallacies, or the Sophistici Elenchi, VII with a Translation and Notes, Macmillan and Co., 1866, p. 25. Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 7, 169a25, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation, Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume One, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 286. Aristotele, Confutazione Sofistiche, 7, 169a25, Organon, A Cura di Giorgio Colli, Einaudi, 1995, Adelphi, 2003, p. 664. Aristóteles, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, 4, 169a25, en Tratados de Lógica (Organon), I, Categorías, Tópicos, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, Introducciones, Traducciones y Notas De Miguel Candel Sanmartín, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1982, p. 326. Aristote, Les Réfutations Sophistiques, 7, 166a25, Introduction, Traduction et Commentaire par LouisAndré Dorion, Préface de Jacques Brunschwig, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Presses de l'Université Laval, Canada-France, France, 1995, p. 137. 579Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 20, 177b20; Edward Poste, Aristotle on Fallacies, or the Sophistici Elenchi, XX, with a Translation and Notes, Macmillan and Co., 1866, p. 63. Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 20, 177b20, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation, Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume One, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 302. Aristóteles, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, 20, 177b20, en Tratados de Lógica (Organon), I, Categorías, Tópicos, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, Introducciones, Traducciones y Notas De Miguel Candel Sanmartín, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1982, p. 358. Aristotele, Confutazione Sofistiche, 20, 177b20, Organon, A Cura di Giorgio Colli, Einaudi, 1995, Adelphi, 2003, p. 698. Aristote, Les Réfutations Sophistiques, 20, 177b20, Introduction, Traduction et Commentaire par LouisAndré Dorion, Préface de Jacques Brunschwig, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Presses de l'Université Laval, Canada-France, France, 1995, p. 173. expression, which is false: ("To say now_you_have_been-born"); recommended therapy: to divide "It is true to say now_you_have_been-born", which is a false expression, to explain that it is not the same to say "It Is true to say now you_have_been-born", which is a true expression, and the only one that was accepted. RULE: When, as it is pronounced an initially divided expression is combined as if this combination does not change the resulting meaning (apparent normality), but the meaning changes, the sophism of combination shall be incurred in (diagnosis). RULE: The therapy recommended for the sophism of combination shall consist in dividing the expression combined later, as it was at the beginning (divided); in making explicit the difference of the meaning of both expressions (divided and combined); in confirming that only the divided expression, as it was at the beginning (true), not the expression combined later (false) was accepted. Sophism of division diagnosis: apparent normality: as they are pronounced,580 the terms of an initially combined expression are divided, as if this does not change the resulting meaning; secret pathology: although it is true that often the division of the terms of an expression does not change the resulting meaning, sometimes it does;581 recommended therapy: to combine expressions divided later as they were before, to make explicit the difference of the meaning of both expressions (combined and divided), to ratify that only the (true) combined expression, not the (false) divided expression was accepted; 580William of Sherwood's, Introduction to Logic, translated with introduction and notes by Norman Kretzmann, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1966, 3.1.3., pp. 140-141, 141, n. 52. 581 Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 7, 169a25; Edward Poste, Aristotle on Fallacies, or the Sophistici Elenchi, VII with a Translation and Notes, Macmillan and Co., 1866, p. 25. Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 7, 169a25, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation, Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume One, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 286. Aristóteles, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, 4, 169a25, en Tratados de Lógica (Organon), I, Categorías, Tópicos, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, Introducciones, Traducciones y Notas De Miguel Candel Sanmartín, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1982, p. 326.Aristotele, Confutazione Sofistiche, 7, 169a25, Organon, A Cura di Giorgio Colli, Einaudi, 1995, Adelphi, 2003, p. 664. Aristote, Les Réfutations Sophistiques, 7, 166a25, Introduction, Traduction et Commentaire par LouisAndré Dorion, Préface de Jacques Brunschwig, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Presses de l'Université Laval, Canada-France, France, 1995, p. 137. example of division: −May a number be simultaneously a pair and an odd? −No. −But isn'five two_and_three? −Yes. −And are not two and three respectively a pair and an odd number? −Yes. −Then five is a pair and an odd number;582 diagnosis: apparent normality: it is assumed that "two_and_three and "two and three" have the same meaning; secret pathology: "two_and_three" (combined) are five "two and three" (divided) are a pair and an odd recommended therapy: to divide "two_and_three are a pair and an odd", which is a false expression, to explain that this not the same expression as "two and three are five", which is a true expression and the only one that was accepted. RULE: Whenever, as it is pronounced an initially combined expression was combined, as if this does not change the resulting meaning (apparent normality), but the meaning does change, the sophism of division shall be incurred in (diagnosis). RULE: The therapy recommended for sophisms of division shall consist in combining the expression later divided, as it was at the beginning (combined); to make explicit the difference of the meaning of both expressions (combined and divided); to confirm that only the (true) combineded expression, as it were at the beginning, not the expression divided later (false) was accepted Sophism of accentuation (more properly, "ambiguity" only in the written speech with regard to the oral speech) diagnosis: apparent normality: a word or phrase is used in the written speech as 582 Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 4, 166a33-35. Aristotle on Fallacies, or the Sophistici Elenchi, IV, Edward Poste, with a Translation and Notes, Macmillan and Co., 1866, p. 11. Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 4, 166a33-36, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation, Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume One, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 281. Aristóteles, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, 4, 166a33-35, en Tratados de Lógica (Organon), I, Categorías, Tópicos, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, Introducciones, Traducciones y Notas de Miguel Candel Sanmartín, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1982, p. 314. Aristotele, Confutazione Sofistiche, 4, 166a30-35b, Organon, A Cura di Giorgio Colli, Einaudi, 1995, Adelphi, 2003, pp. 652-653. Aristote, Les Réfutations Sophistiques, 4, 166a33-35, Introduction, traduction et commentaire par LouisAndré Dorion, Préface de Jacques Brunschwig, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Presses de l'Université Laval, Canada-France, France, 1995, p. 126. if it had only one meaning; secret pathology: a word or phrase is used in an ambiguous way only in the written speech (it is written in like manner but may be given more than one meaning),583 despite the fact that in the oral speech it does not suffer from any ambiguity whatsoever (different pronunciation, according to the respective meaning);584 recommended therapy: to eliminate the ambiguity of the written speech with signs of accentuation and punctuation to express, to the largest extent possible, the wealth and the tones of the voice and the gesture proper of oral speech; example: in a Greek oral speech the word "ou" with a grave accent and a soft aspiration means "no" and, with a circumflex and inhaled accent, it means "where";585 before the widespread use of accentuation and punctuation signs, this case of ambiguity could appear only in the written speech; diagnosis: apparent normality:  the place ou you inhabit it is obviously a house? Yes. And "ou you live:" is not the denial of "inhabit"? Yes. But you have said that ou you inhabit is a house. Yes. Then a house is a denial. secret pathology: in certain historic period the Greek pronunciations of denial (ou=no) and place (ou=where) adverbs were written in the same manner, which could provoke an ambiguity sophism in the written speech, although there 583 Scott G. Schreiber, Aristotle on False Reasoning, Language and the World in The Sophistical Refutations, 20, State University of New York Press, New York 2003, pp. 59-60. 584 Augustus de Morgan, Formal Logic or the Calculus of Inference Necessary and Probable, Taylor and Walton, London, 1847, Elibron Replica Edition, Adamant Media Corporation, 2003, considers that the fallacy of accent and that of prosody are the same and only one, p. 248 and that when a person quotes another one and omits or adds the signs that show the animus of the original meaning, irony, sarcasm, emphasis, etc., as well as when in this way he enhances his own assertions to imply more than he might say openly, he incurs in a "fallacia accentus", p. 249. 585 Edward Poste, Aristotle on Fallacies, or the Sophistici Elenchi, with a Translation and Notes, Macmillan and Co., 1866, XXI, p. 65. Aristóteles, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, 6, 168a15-20, en Tratados de Lógica (Organon), I, Categorías, Tópicos, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, Introducciones, Traducciones y Notas de Miguel Candel Sanmartín, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1982, p. 359, n. 81. was not any ambiguity in the oral speech; recommended therapy: to eliminate the ambiguity of the written Greek word " ou": the place hoû (where) you live is obviously a house? Yes. And it is not true that "ou you do not live" is a denial of "inhabit"? Yes. But you have said that the place hoû (where) you live is a house. Yes. Then a house is not a denial. RULE: Whenever a word or phrase is used in the written speech as if it had only one meaning (apparent normality), but two or more meanings are distinguished in the oral speech by means of pronunciation (secret pathology), the sophism of accentuation shall be incurred in (diagnosis). RULE The therapy recommended for sophisms of accentuation shall consist in using the appropiate accentuation and punctuation orthographic signs to express the unequivocal oral speech. Sophism of the form of expression (or word figure)586 diagnosis: apparent normality: an equal form of expression is used as if it were the explanation that the things to which it refers will also be equal;587 secret pathology: an equal form of expression may refer to different grammatical categories (a masculine expression referred to a feminine thing, or vice versa, etc.), or to different categories of things (a qualitative expression referred to quality, or vice versa, etc.);588 this being the reason why 586 Peter of Spain, Language in Dispute, An English Translation of Peter of Spain Tractatus Called Afterwords Summulae Logicales, VII, 88, word-figure (figura dictionis), Translated by Francis P. Dinnen, John Benjamins Publishing Company, Amsterdam/Philadelpia, p. 115. 587 Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 4, 166b10. Aristotele, Confutazione Sofistiche, 4, 166b10, Organon, A Cura di Giorgio Colli, Einaudi, 1995, Adelphi, 2003, p. 653. Aristote, Les Réfutations Sophistiques, 4, 166b10, Introduction, traduction et commentaire par LouisAndré Dorion, Préface de Jacques Brunschwig, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Presses de l'Université Laval, Canada-France, France, 1995, p. 126. 588 Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 4, 166b10-15. Aristotle on Fallacies, or the Sophistici Elenchi, IV, Edward Poste, with a Translation and Notes, Macmillan and Co., 1866, p. 11. Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 4, 166b10-15, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation, Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume One, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 281. deceit is produced as the equality of the things referred to is inferred from the equality of the form of expression, without any further arguments; recommended therapy: to differentiate the things to which reference is made in equal forms of expression, using grammatical categories (feminine and masculine genres, active and passive voice, etc.) or a category of things (action and passion, quality and quantity, etc.)589 to warn about the absence, or partial or total concordance, between language, thought and reality; example: "−it is perhaps possible that a passion be an action? −No. Then the expressions: it is chopped, it is burned, it is affected by a sensitive object, are not perhaps similar in their form, and not all of them indicate a passion? On the other hand, the expressions: to say [dire], to run [correre], to see [vedere], are similiar to one another to the form. Nevertheless, it is true that seeing is to be impressed by sensitive objects, and [,] therefore seeing will be a passion and an action at the same time.";590 Aristóteles, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, 4, 166b10-15, en Tratados de Lógica (Organon), I, Categorías, Tópicos, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, Introducciones, Traducciones y Notas de Miguel Candel Sanmartín, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1982, p. 316. Aristotele, Confutazione Sofistiche, 4, 166b10-15, Organon, A Cura di Giorgio Colli, Einaudi, 1995, Adelphi, 2003, pp. 653-654. Aristote, Les Réfutations Sophistiques, 4, 166b10-15, Introduction, traduction et commentaire par LouisAndré Dorion, Préface de Jacques Brunschwig, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Presses de l'Université Laval, Canada-France, France, 1995, p. 126. 589 Aristóteles, Refutaciones Sofísticas, 22, 178a5; Aristóteles, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, 22, 178a5, en Tratados de Lógica (Organon), I, Categorías, Tópicos, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, Introducciones, Traducciones y Notas de Miguel Candel Sanmartín, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1982, p. 359. Edward Poste, Aristotle on Fallacies, or the Sophistici Elenchi, XXII, with a Translation and Notes, Macmillan and Co., 1866, p. 65. Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 22, 178a 5, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation. Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume One, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 303. Aristotele, Confutazione Sofistiche, 22, 178a 5, Organon A Cura di Giorgio Colli, Einaudi, 1995, Adelphi, 2003, p. 700. Aristóteles, Les réfutations sophistiques, 22, 178a 5, Introduction, traduction et commentaire par LouisAndré Dorion, Préface de Jacques Brunschwig, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Presses De L'Université Laval, Canada-France, France, 1995, p. 175. 590 Aristóteles, Refutaciones Sofísticas, 22, 178a 10; Aristóteles, Sobre Las Refutaciones Sofísticas, 22, 178a 10, Tratados De Lógica (Organon), I, Categorías, Tópicos, Sobre Las Refutaciones Sofísticas, Introducciones, Traducciones y Notas de Miguel Candel Sanmartín, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1982, p. 360. Edward Poste, Aristotle On Fallacies, or the Sophistici Elenchi, XXII, with a Translation and Notes, Macmillan and Co., 1866, p. 65. diagnosis: apparent normality: to "say" [dire], to "run"[correre] and to "see" [vedere], are words with the same form of expression (the termination), this being the reason why all of them refer to actions; "it is burned", "it is chopped" and it is "affected" have the same form of expression "it is (...)ed", this being the reason why all the aforesaid forms of expression would refer to passions; secret pathology: like the remaining senses (hearing, touch, taste and smell), sight, the capacity of seeing, is a passion ("to be affected by a sensitive object"); this being the reason why deceit is produced as the equality of the thing referred to is inferred from the equality of the form of expression, without any further argument; recommended therapy: the apparent incompatibility between action and passion disappears if it is not taken for granted that seeing is an action and it is assumed that it is a passion (res), in spite of the form in which the word finishes (verba);591 in which case, there would not be any refutation. RULE: Whenever an equal form of expression is considered as if it were the explanation that the things to which it refers shall also be equal (apparent normality), but the equality of the things referred will not necessary follow the equality of the form of expression, without any further arguments (secret pathology), then the sophism of the form of expression shall be incurred in (diagnosis). Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 22, 178a 10, in The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford Translation. Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume One, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 303. It has been used for the translation into English that appears in the main text between quotation marks: Aristotele, Confutazione Sofistiche, 22, 178a 10, Organon A Cura di Giorgio Colli, Einaudi, 1995, Adelphi, 2003, p. 700. Aristóteles, Les réfutations sophistiques, 22, 178a 10, Introduction, traduction et commentaire par LouisAndré Dorion, Préface de Jacques Brunschwig, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Presses De L'Université Laval, Canada-France, France, 1995, p. 175. 591 Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 178th 15-25. Edward Poste, Aristotle On Fallacies, or the Sophistici Elenchi, XXII, with a Translation and Notes, Macmillan and Co., 1866, pp. 65-66. Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 22, 178a 10, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation. Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume One, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 303. Aristóteles, Sobre Las Refutaciones Sofísticas, 22, 178a 10, Tratados De Lógica (Organon), I, Categorías, Tópicos, Sobre Las Refutaciones Sofísticas, Introducciones, Traducciones y Notas de Miguel Candel Sanmartín, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1982, p. 360. Aristotele, Confutazione Sofistiche, 22, 178a 10, Organon A Cura di Giorgio Colli, Einaudi, 1995, Adelphi, 2003, p. 700. Aristote, Les Réfutations Sophistiques, 22, 178a 10, Introduction, traduction et commentaire par LouisAndré Dorion, Préface de Jacques Brunschwig, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Presses De L'Université Laval, Canada-France, France, 1995, p. 175-176. RULE: The therapy recommended for sophisms of the form of expression shall consist in differentiating the objects to which reference is made in equal form of expression, for which purpose grammatical categories (feminine and masculine genres, active and passive voice, etc.) or categories of things (action and passion, quality and quantity, etc.) shall be used, to warn about the absence partial or total congruity between language, thought and reality. The general therapy for the sophisms which depends on language only to cause deceit;592 described above, may be formulated in this way: PRINCIPLE: The therapy recommended for any sophism that depends on language only to cause deceit, shall consist in supporting an admissible interpretation, opposite to the secret pathology chosen to produce the sophism and in interpreting: a) the excessive vagueness of the significant, with a meaning opposite to the meaning chosen in the sophism; b) the semantic or syntactic ambiguity, with an opposite meaning admitted by the meaning chosen in the sophism; c) the composition chosen in the sophism, with the division and the division chosen in the sophism, with the composition; d) the grave accent chosen in the sophism, with the acute accent and the acute accent chosen in the sophism, with the grave accent; e) the form of expression chosen in the sophism, with the form of the opposite expression. Sophisms that do not depend on language only to cause deceit It has been said before that it is true that all sophisms express themselves by means of language, although some of them depend on language only to cause deceive and others not. Hre follows a description of the latter, namely: sophisms of the accident, of the absolute and not absolute sense, of begging the question, of the consequent, of a cause that is not a cause, of several questions in only one, and of ignorance of the refutation. Sophism of the accident diagnosis: apparent normality: it is upheld that "[...] an attribute whatsoever is considered to belongs in the same way to the subject and to the accident";593 592 Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 23, 179a11. Edward Poste, Aristotle on Fallacies, or the Sophistici Elenchi, XXIII, with a Translation and Notes, Macmillan and Co., 1866, pp. 70-71. Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 23, 179a11-25, in The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford Translation. Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume One, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 305. Aristóteles, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, 23,179a11-25, Tratados de Lógica (Organon), I, Categorías, Tópicos, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, Introducciones, Traducciones y Notas de Miguel Candel Sanmartín, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1982, pp. 363-364. Aristotele, Confutazione Sofistiche, 23, 179a11-25, Organon A Cura di Giorgio Colli, Einaudi, 1995, Adelphi, 2003, pp. 704-705. Aristote, Les réfutations sophistiques, 23, 179a11-25, Introduction, traduction et commentaire par LouisAndré Dorion, Préface de Jacques Brunschwig, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Presses De L'Université Laval, Canada-France, France, 1995, p. 179. secret pathology: "[...] as the same subject receives numerous accidents, it is not necessary that all the same attributes belong simultaneously to all predicates and to the subject with regard to which they are predicated.";594 recommended therapy: to show with a counter example that the conclusion does not necessarily follow from the premises;595 example: if a triangle has angles equal to two recta and a triangle is a figure, 593 Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 5,166b28. "[...] un attribut quelconque est considéré appartenir de la même façon au sujet et à l'accident.": Aristote, Les Réfutations Sophistiques, 5, 166b28, Introduction, traduction et commentaire par LouisAndré Dorion, Préface de Jacques Brunschwig, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Presses de L'Université Laval, Canada-France, France, 1995, p. 128. Translation from French to English by the author of this book. Edward Poste, Aristotle on Fallacies, or the Sophistici Elenchi, V, with a Translation and Notes, Macmillan and Co., 1866, p. 13. Translation from french to english by the author of this book. Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 5, 166b30, The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford Translation. Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume One, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 281. Aristóteles, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, 5, 166b28, Tratados de Lógica (Organon), I, Categorías, Tópicos, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, Introducciones, Traducciones y Notas de Miguel Candel Sanmartín, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1982, p. 317. Aristotele, Confutazione Sofistiche, 5, 166b30, Organon A Cura di Giorgio Colli, Einaudi, 1995, Adelphi, 2003, p. 654. 594 Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 5, 166b30. "[...] comme le même sujet reçoit de nombreux accidentes, il n'est pas nécessaire que tous les mêmes attributs appartiennent à la fois à tous les prédicats et au sujet dont ils sont prédiqués.": Aristote, Les Réfutations Sophistiques, 5, 166b30, Introduction, traduction et commentaire par LouisAndré Dorion, Préface de Jacques Brunschwig, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Presses de l'Université Laval, Canada-France, France, 1995, p. 128. Translation from French to English by the author of this book. Edward Poste, Aristotle on Fallacies, or the Sophistici Elenchi, V, with a Translation and Notes, Macmillan and Co., 1866, p. 13. Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 5, 166b30, in The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford Translation. Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume One, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 281. Aristotele, Confutazione Sofistiche, 5, 166b30, Organon, A Cura di Giorgio Colli, Einaudi, 1995, Adelphi, 2003, p. 654. Aristóteles, Tratados de Lógica (Organon), I, Categorías, Tópicos, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, Introducciones, Traducciones y Notas de Miguel Candel Sanmartín, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1982, p. 317. 595 Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations,24, 179a30. Edward Poste, Aristotle on Fallacies, or the Sophistici Elenchi, XXIV, with a Translation and Notes, Macmillan and Co., 1866, p. 73. Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 24, 179a30, The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford Translation. Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume One, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 305. Aristóteles, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, 24, 179a30, Tratados de Lógica (Organon), I, Categorías, Tópicos, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, Introducciones, Traducciones y Notas de Miguel Candel Sanmartín, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1982, p. 364.Aristotele, Confutazione Sofistiche, 24, 179a30, Organon A Cura di Giorgio Colli, Einaudi, 1995, Adelphi, 2003, pp. 705-706. Aristote, Les Réfutations Sophistiques, 24, 179a30, Introduction, traduction et commentaire par LouisAndré Dorion, Préface de Jacques Brunschwig, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Presses de l'Université Laval, Canada-France, France, 1995, p. 180. then a figure has angles equal to two recta;596 diagnosis: apparent normality: since the form of the sophism is similar to that of a valid syllogism (antecedent: if a triangle has angles equal to two recta and a triangle is a figure) and the two propositions integrating the purported precedent are true, it turns out easy to make believe that the purported consequent necessarily follows and is also true, when it is actually false;597 secret pathology: the second proposition integrating the purported antecedent, although as true as the first one, is predicated as an accident,598 which does not allow for convertibility with the respective subject (all triangles are figures but not all figures are triangles), since for a figure it is an "accident" to be a triangle, which prevents the purported conclusion to be validly inferred (all the figures 596 Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 6, 168a40. Edward Poste, Aristotle on Fallacies, or the Sophistici Elenchi, Vi, with a Translation and Notes, Macmillan and Co., 1866, p. 21. Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 6, 168a40, The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford Translation. Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume One, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 285. Aristóteles, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, 6, 168a40, Tratados de Lógica (Organon), I, Categorías, Tópicos, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, Introducciones, Traducciones y Notas de Miguel Candel Sanmartín, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1982, p. 323. Aristotele, Confutazione Sofistiche, 6, 168a40, Organon A Cura di Giorgio Colli, Einaudi, 1995, Adelphi, 2003, p. 661. Aristote, Les Réfutations Sophistiques, 6, 168a40, Introduction, traduction et commentaire par LouisAndré Dorion, Préface de Jacques Brunschwig, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Presses de L'Université Laval, Canada-France, France, 1995, p. 134. 597John Buridan, Summulae de Dialectica, an annotatd translation, with philosophical introduction by Gyula Klima, Yale University Press, New Haven / London, 7.4.1 The fallacy of accident, pp. 548-549. 598Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, I, 4, 73a35-b24. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, I, 4, 73a35-b24, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation, Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume One, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, pp. 118-119. Aristóteles, Analíticos Segundos, I, 4, 73a35-b24, en Aristóteles, Tratados de Lógica (Órganon), II, Sobre la Interpretación,, Analíticos Primeros, Analíticos Segundos, Introducciones, Traducciones y Notas por Miguel,Candel Sanmartín, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, Primera Edición 1988, Primera Rimpresión, 1995, pp. 322-323. Aristotele, Secondi Analitici, I, 4, 73a35-b24, da Aristotele, Organon, A cura di Giorgio Colli, Einaudi, 1995, Adelphi, 2003, pp. 287-288. "In case of the accident, the absence of logic consists in assuming that what is said about the subject is also said about the predicates of this subject, and vice versa." ("Dans le cas de l'accident la faute de logique consiste à assumer que ce qui se dit du sujet se dit aussi des predicats de ce sujet, et viceversa"): Aristote, Les Réfutations Sophistiques, 6, 168a40, Introduction, traduction et commentaire par LouisAndré Dorion, Préface de Jacques Brunschwig, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Presses de L'Université Laval, Canada-France, France, 1995, p. 71. John Buridan, Summulae de Dialectica, an annotatd translation, with philosophical introduction by Gyula Klima, Yale University Press, New Haven / London, 7.4.1, The fallacy of accident, p. 550. have angles equal to two recta), since the angles are equal to recta because the figure is a triangle, not merely a figure;599 recommended therapy: to mention at least a geometric figure with angles not equal to two recta like, for example, a square. RULE: Whenever an attribute is considered to belong in the same way to the subject and to the accident (apparent normality), but it were a predicate by accident, which shall not allow for convertibility between subject and predicate (secret pathology), the sophism of the accident shall be incurred in (diagnosis). RULE: The therapy recommended for sophisms of the accident shall consist in mentioning at least one counter example, to prove that the purported conclusion shall not necessarily follow from the purported premises. Sophism of the absolute and not absolute sense diagnosis: apparent normality: what is said to a certain extent (relative) is considered as if it had been said without any restriction (absolute);600 secret pathology: the deduction of a contradiction does not exist because there are restrictions related to the object, aspect, place, manner or relation;601 599 Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 6, 168a40. Edward Poste, Aristotle on Fallacies, or the Sophistici Elenchi, Vi, with a Translation and Notes, Macmillan and Co., 1866, p. 21. Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 6, 168a40, The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford Translation. Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume One, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 285. Aristóteles, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, 6, 168a40, Tratados de Lógica (Organon), I, Categorías, Tópicos, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, Introducciones, Traducciones y Notas de Miguel Candel Sanmartín, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1982, p. 323. Aristotele, Confutazione Sofistiche, 6, 168a40, Organon A Cura di Giorgio Colli, Einaudi, 1995, Adelphi, 2003, p. 661. Aristote, Les Réfutations Sophistiques, 6, 168a40, Introduction, traduction et commentaire par LouisAndré Dorion, Préface de Jacques Brunschwig, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Presses de L'Université Laval, Canada-France, France, 1995, p. 134. 600 Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 5, 167a. Edward Poste, Aristotle on Fallacies, or the Sophistici Elenchi, V, with a Translation and Notes, Macmillan and Co., 1866, p. 13. Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 5, 166b-167a, The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford Translation. Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume One, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 282. Aristóteles, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, 5, 167a, Tratados de Lógica (Organon), I, Categorías, Tópicos, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, Introducciones, Traducciones y Notas de Miguel Candel Sanmartín, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1982, p. 317. Aristotele, Confutazione Sofistiche, 5, 166b-167a, Organon A Cura di Giorgio Colli, Einaudi, 1995, Adelphi, 2003, p. 655. Aristote, Les Réfutations Sophistiques, 5, 166b-167a, Introduction, traduction et commentaire par LouisAndré Dorion, Préface de Jacques Brunschwig, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Presses de L'Université Laval, Canada-France, France, 1995, p. 128. recommended therapy: to examine the conclusion in the light of its purported contradictory one and to verify whether they deal with the same thing, in the same manner or in the same relation;602 example: If an Ethiopian is black and his teeth are white, then he is black and not black;603 diagnosis: apparent normality: it would seem that it is the same to affirm that an Ethiopian is black, without qualification, and that an Ethiopian is of black skin, with qualification; 601 Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 25, 185a23. "[...] an expression that it is not used legitimately without a restriction (be it of object, aspect, place, manner or relation), that is to say not to be used purely and simply [...]" ("[...] une expression qui ne s'emploie légitimement qu'avec une restriction (que ce soit d'objet, d'aspect, de lieu, de manière ou de rélation), cést-à-dire qui ne s'emploi pas pure et simplement [...]", dans: Aristote, Les Réfutations Sophistiques, 25, 180a23, Introduction, traduction et commentaire par LouisAndré Dorion, Préface de Jacques Brunschwig, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Presses de L'Université Laval, Canada-France, France, 1995, p. 184. Translation from french to english by the author of this book. Edward Poste, Aristotle on Fallacies, or the Sophistici Elenchi, XXV, with a Translation and Notes, Macmillan and Co., 1866, p. 77. Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 25, 180a23, in The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford Translation. Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume One, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 307. Aristotele, Confutazione Sofistiche, 25, 180a23, Organon A Cura di Giorgio Colli, Einaudi, 1995, Adelphi, 2003, p. 709. 602 Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 25, 180a25. Edward Poste, Aristotle on Fallacies, or the Sophistici Elenchi, XXV, with a Translation and Notes, Macmillan and Co., 1866, p. 77. Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 25, 180a25, in The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford Translation. Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume One, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 307. Aristóteles, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, 25, 180a25, Tratados de Lógica (Organon), I, Categorías, Tópicos, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, Introducciones, Traducciones y Notas de Miguel Candel Sanmartín, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1982, p. 367. Aristotele, Confutazione Sofistiche, 25, 180a25, Organon A Cura di Giorgio Colli, Einaudi, 1995, Adelphi, 2003, p. 709. Aristote, Les Réfutations Sophistiques, 25, 180a25, Introduction, traduction et commentaire par LouisAndré Dorion, Préface de Jacques Brunschwig, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Presses de L'Université Laval, Canada-France, France, 1995, p. 128. 603Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 5, 167a10. Edward Poste, Aristotle on Fallacies, or the Sophistici Elenchi, V, with a Translation and Notes, Macmillan and Co., 1866, p. 13. Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 5, 167a10, The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford Translation. Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume One, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 282. Aristóteles, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, 5, 167a10, Tratados de Lógica (Organon), I, Categorías, Tópicos, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, Introducciones, Traducciones y Notas de Miguel Candel Sanmartín, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1982, p. 318. Aristotele, Confutazione Sofistiche, 5, 167a10, Organon A Cura di Giorgio Colli, Einaudi, 1995, Adelphi, 2003, p. 655. Aristote, Les Réfutations Sophistiques, 5, 166b-167a, Introduction, traduction et commentaire par LouisAndré Dorion, Préface de Jacques Brunschwig, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Presses de L'Université Laval, Canada-France, France, 1995, p. 129. secret pathology: this is not the case of an absolute term (an Ethiopian), despite the fact that it is presented without qualification, but of a relative term (the skin of the Ethiopian) opposed to other relative term (the Ethiopian's teeth) and, as both refer to different things that can have different colors, there is no valid deduction of a contradiction between the first proposition of the purported antecedent and the purported conclusion, so that there is no a valid refutation either; recommended therapy: to examine the purported conclusion in the light of its apparent contradictory proposition and to show that it does not necessarily follow from the propositions integrating the purported precedent, since it does not refer to the same thing (the Ethiopian) without qualification (absolute sense), but to two different colors (black and white) of two different things belonging to the Ethiopian (his skin and his teeth) and, because they are not the same thing, there is not deduction and, because they are not contradictory with regard to the same thing (the Ethiopian), there is not refutation either. RULE: Whenever what was said to a certain extent (relatively), is considered to have been said without restriction (absolutely), or vice versa (apparent normality), but not with regard to the same thing, manner or relation (secret pathology), the sophism of the absolute and not absolute sense shall be incurred in (diagnosis). RULE: The therapy recommended for the sophisms of the absolute and not absolute sense shall consist in examining the purported conclusion in view of its purported contradictory proposition, to verify if reference is made to the same thing, in the same manner, in the same relation. Sophism of begging the question diagnosis: apparent normality: that which started the discussion is petitioned, obtained and assumed as if it were a premise604 or a 604Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 5, 167a37. Edward Poste, Aristotle on Fallacies, or the Sophistici Elenchi, V, with a Translation and Notes, Macmillan and Co., 1866, p. 15. Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 5, 167a37, The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford Translation. Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume One, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 283. Aristóteles, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, 5, 167a37, Tratados de Lógica (Organon), I, Categorías, Tópicos, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, Introducciones, Traducciones y Notas de Miguel Candel Sanmartín, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1982, p. 319. valid conclusion secret pathology: the conclusion is not proved, because it is difficult to notice when the premise605 is equal to the point in issue to be proved or because the conclusion has been assumed; recommended therapy: if the maneuver were clear, the premise should not be granted; had it been granted, deny that the conclusion has been proved, having the point at issue been assumed in the premise606 or in the conclusion; example: "Banker: who can give your references? Client: my friend Jones can give them. Banker: how do we know that Jones may be reliable? Client: I assure you that Jones may be reliable";607 Aristotele, Confutazione Sofistiche, 5, 167a37, Organon A Cura di Giorgio Colli, Einaudi, 1995, Adelphi, 2003, pp. 656-657. Aristote, Les Réfutations Sophistiques, 5, 167a37, Introduction, traduction et commentaire par LouisAndré Dorion, Préface de Jacques Brunschwig, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Presses de L'Université Laval, Canada-France, France, 1995, p. 130. 605Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 5, 167a37. Edward Poste, Aristotle on Fallacies, or the Sophistici Elenchi, V, with a Translation and Notes, Macmillan and Co., 1866, p. 15. Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 5, 167a37, The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford Translation. Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume One, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 283. Aristóteles, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, 5, 167a37, Tratados de Lógica (Organon), I, Categorías, Tópicos, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, Introducciones, Traducciones y Notas de Miguel Candel Sanmartín, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1982, p. 319. Aristotele, Confutazione Sofistiche, 5, 167a37, Organon A Cura di Giorgio Colli, Einaudi, 1995, Adelphi, 2003, pp. 656-657. Aristote, Les Réfutations Sophistiques, 5, 167a37, Introduction, traduction et commentaire par LouisAndré Dorion, Préface de Jacques Brunschwig, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Presses de L'Université Laval, Canada-France, France, 1995, p. 130. 606 Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 27, 181a15. Edward Poste, Aristotle on Fallacies, or the Sophistici Elenchi, XXV, with a Translation and Notes, Macmillan and Co., 1866, p. 81. Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 27, 181a15, in The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford Translation. Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume One, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 309. Aristóteles, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, 27, 181a15, Tratados de Lógica (Organon), I, Categorías, Tópicos, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, Introducciones, Traducciones y Notas de Miguel Candel Sanmartín, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1982, p. 371. Aristotele, Confutazione Sofistiche, 27, 181a15, Organon A Cura di Giorgio Colli, Einaudi, 1995, Adelphi, 2003, p. 713. Aristote, Les Réfutations Sophistiques, 27, 181a15, Introduction, traduction et commentaire par LouisAndré Dorion, Préface de Jacques Brunschwig, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Presses de L'Université Laval, Canada-France, France, 1995, p. 188. 607Black, Max, Critical Thinking: An Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method (1946), Second Edition, Englewood Cliffs, N. J., Prentice-Hall, 1952, p. 236, cited in Hamblin, C. L., Fallacies, Methuen & Co. Ltd., London, 1970, p. 34. diagnosis: apparent normality: the client's credibility based on the credibility of the person givig references is assumed as if it were a valid conclusion; secret pathology: the banker asked for references because he needed to prove the client's credibility on the basis of the statement of a third party, not of the client, whose credibility had to be proved; recommended therapy: the banker will have to ask for references from a third party whose credibility does not depend on the client's statements. RULE: Whenever something equivalent to that which started the discussion is petitioned, obtained and assumed as if it were a valid premise, because the incapacity of the one who shall have granted it to distinguish the identical from the different (apparent normality), but the conclusion was postulated (secret pathology), then the sophism of begging the question shall be incurred in (diagnosis). RULE: The therapy recommended for the sophisms of begging the question shall consist, should the maneuver be clear, in not granting the purported premise and, had it been granted, in denying that the conclusion has been proved, because the point at issue is assumed in the purported premise. Sophism of the consequent diagnosis: apparent normality: the relation between antecedent and consequent is regarded convertible, so that if the consequent happens the antecedent necessarily happens;608 secret pathology: the relation between antecedent and consequent is not convertible, so that if the consequent happens, the antecedent does not necessarily happen;609 608Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 5, 167b1-3. Edward Poste, Aristotle on Fallacies, or the Sophistici Elenchi, V, with a Translation and Notes, Macmillan and Co., 1866, p. 15. Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 5, 167b1-3, The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford Translation. Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume One, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 283. Aristóteles, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, 5, 167b1-3, Tratados de Lógica (Organon), I, Categorías, Tópicos, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, Introducciones, Traducciones y Notas de Miguel Candel Sanmartín, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1982, p. 319.Aristotele, Confutazione Sofistiche, 5, 167b1-3, Organon A Cura di Giorgio Colli, Einaudi, 1995, Adelphi, 2003, p. 657. Aristote, Les Réfutations Sophistiques, 5, 167b1-3, Introduction, traduction et commentaire par LouisAndré Dorion, Préface de Jacques Brunschwig, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Presses de L'Université Laval, Canada-France, France, 1995, p. 130. 609Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations,5, 167b1-3. Edward Poste, Aristotle on Fallacies, or the Sophistici Elenchi, V, with a Translation and Notes, Macmillan and Co., 1866, p. 15. recommended therapy: to give at least one counter example; example: if, after raining, the land remains drenched and now the land remains drenched, then it has rained;610 diagnosis: apparent normality: the land soaked by water makes us assume that it has rained, which is the most frequent thing; secret pathology: land may be soaked by water due to a cause different from rain; recommended therapy: to mention as counter example the land soaked by a flood caused by the opening of the floodgates of a dam during a drought. RULE: Whenever it is considered that the relation between antecedent and consequent is convertible in such a way that if the consequent happens the antecedent will necessarily happen (apparent normality), but the relation between the antecedent and consequent were not convertible (secret pathology), then the sophism of the consequent shall be incurred in (diagnosis). RULE: The therapy recommended for sophisms of the consequent shall consist in mentioning at least one counter example, to prove that the consequent does not necessarily follow from the antecedent. Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 5, 167b1-3, The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford Translation. Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume One, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 283. Aristóteles, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, 5, 167b1-3, Tratados de Lógica (Organon), I, Categorías, Tópicos, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, Introducciones, Traducciones y Notas de Miguel Candel Sanmartín, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1982, p. 319. Aristotele, Confutazione Sofistiche, 5, 167b1-3, Organon A Cura di Giorgio Colli, Einaudi, 1995, Adelphi, 2003, p. 657. Aristote, Les Réfutations Sophistiques, 5, 167b1-3, Introduction, traduction et commentaire par LouisAndré Dorion, Préface de Jacques Brunschwig, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Presses de L'Université Laval, Canada-France, France, 1995, p. 130. 610Aristóteles, Refutaciones Sofísticas, 5, 167b1-3. Edward Poste, Aristotle on Fallacies, or the Sophistici Elenchi, V, with a Translation and Notes, Macmillan and Co., 1866, p. 15. Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 5, 167b6, The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford Translation. Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume One, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 283. Aristóteles, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, 5, 167b6, Tratados de Lógica (Organon), I, Categorías, Tópicos, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, Introducciones, Traducciones y Notas de Miguel Candel Sanmartín, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1982, p. 319. Aristotele, Confutazione Sofistiche, 5, 167b6, Organon A Cura di Giorgio Colli, Einaudi, 1995, Adelphi, 2003, p. 657. Aristote, Les Réfutations Sophistiques, 5, 167b6, Introduction, traduction et commentaire par LouisAndré Dorion, Préface de Jacques Brunschwig, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Presses de L'Université Laval, Canada-France, France, 1995, p. 130. Sophism of a cause that is not a cause diagnosis: apparent normality: something is added to the speech as if it were the cause of the absurd conclusion;611 secret pathology: the thing added (a cause that is not a cause) to the speech does not make the absurd612 conclusion necessarily follow; recommended therapy: to suppress what was added in the speech as the cause of the absurd conclusion and to verify that the absurd conclusion remains, but necessarily follows from a different cause;613 611Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 5, 167b21. Edward Poste, Aristotle on Fallacies, or the Sophistici Elenchi, V, with a Translation and Notes, Macmillan and Co., 1866, p. 17. Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 5, 167b21, The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford Translation. Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume One, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 283. Aristóteles, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, 5, 167b21, Tratados de Lógica (Organon), I, Categorías, Tópicos, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, Introducciones, Traducciones y Notas de Miguel Candel Sanmartín, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1982, p. 320. Aristotele, Confutazione Sofistiche, 5, 167b21, Organon A Cura di Giorgio Colli, Einaudi, 1995, Adelphi, 2003, p. 658;. Aristote, Les Réfutations Sophistiques, 5, 167b6, Introduction, traduction et commentaire par LouisAndré Dorion, Préface de Jacques Brunschwig, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Presses de L'Université Laval, Canada-France, France, 1995, p. 130. 612Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 5, 167b21. Edward Poste, Aristotle on Fallacies, or the Sophistici Elenchi, V, with a Translation and Notes, Macmillan and Co., 1866, p. 17. Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 5, 167b21, The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford Translation. Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume One, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 283. Aristóteles, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, 5, 167b6, Tratados de Lógica (Organon), I, Categorías, Tópicos, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, Introducciones, Traducciones y Notas de Miguel Candel Sanmartín, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1982, p. 320. Aristotele, Confutazione Sofistiche, 5, 167b21, Organon A Cura di Giorgio Colli, Einaudi, 1995, Adelphi, 2003, p. 658. Aristote, Les Réfutations Sophistiques, 5, 167b6, Introduction, traduction et commentaire par LouisAndré Dorion, Préface de Jacques Brunschwig, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Presses de L'Université Laval, Canada-France, France, 1995, p. 130. 613 Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 29, 181a32. Edward Poste, Aristotle on Fallacies, or the Sophistici Elenchi, XXIX, with a Translation and Notes, Macmillan and Co., 1866, p. 83. Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 29, 181a32, in The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford Translation. Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume One, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 309. Aristóteles, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, 29, 181a32, Tratados de Lógica (Organon), I, Categorías, Tópicos, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, Introducciones, Traducciones y Notas de Miguel Candel Sanmartín, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1982, p. 372. Aristotele, Confutazione Sofistiche, 29, 181a32, Organon A Cura di Giorgio Colli, Einaudi, 1995, Adelphi, 2003, p. 714. Aristote, Les Réfutations Sophistiques, 29, 181a32, Introduction, traduction et commentaire par LouisAndré Dorion, Préface de Jacques Brunschwig, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Presses de L'Université Laval, Canada-France, France, 1995, p. 190. example: if soul and life are the same thing, and generation is opposite to corruption, and a certain generation is the opposite to a certain corruption; and death is certain corruption opposite to life; then life is generation [change of a non existent substance for a new substance614] and living [process of change of a substance that persists during the process615] is to be generated (impossible conclusion); this being the reason why the statement that soul and the life are the same thing is refuted on the basis of absurdity; diagnosis: apparent normality: it turns out impossible that what has been generated (something previously nonexisting) and life (process of change of a substance that persists during the process) which are species of mutually exclusive changes, are equal (impossible conclusion); and on having presented it as if it had necessarily followed from the statement that "life and soul are the same thing", it would seem that this statement was refuted on the basis of absurdity; secret pathology: "life is generation and living is to be generated" (impossible conclusion) does not necessarily follow from the statement that "life and soul are the same thing" (a cause that is not a cause); recommended therapy: to suppress "life and soul there are the same thing" (a cause that is not a cause) and to verify that "life is generation and living is to be generated" (impossible conclusion) also necessarily follows, but for a different cause; RULE: Whenever something is added in a speech as if it were the cause of the conclusion (apparent normality), but the conclusion did not necessarily follow from such addition (secret pathology), then the sophism of a cause that is not a cause shall be incurred in (diagnosis). RULE: The therapy recommended for sophisms of a cause that is not a cause shall consist in suppressing what has been added and in verifying that the same conclusion will necessarily follow, but for a different cause. Sophism of several questions in only one diagnosis: apparent normality: several questions are formulated as if they were only one616 calling for only one answer; 614In Aristotle's conception, Scott G. Schreiber, Aristotle on False Reasoning, Language and the World in The Sophistical Refutations, State University Of New York Press, New York 2003, p. 108. 615In Aristotle's conception, Scott G. Schreiber, Aristotle on False Reasoning, Language and the World in The Sophistical Refutations, State University Of New York Press, New York 2003, p. 108. secret pathology: it is ignored that a premise needs only one predicate for only one subject;617 recommended therapy: to distinguish the several questions from the beginning;618 example: JOHN: if A is a good thing and B is a bad thing: are A and B good or bad? PETER: A and B are neither good nor bad, because A is not bad and B is not good; JOHN: then the same thing is at the same time good and bad, and neither good nor bad!; 616 Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 30, 181a36-37. Edward Poste, Aristotle on Fallacies, or the Sophistici Elenchi, XXX, with to Translation and Notes, Macmillan and Co., 1866, p. 83. Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 30, 181a36-37, in The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford Translation. Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume One, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 309. Aristotle, On the Sophistical Refutations, 30, 181a36-37, Treaties of Logic (Organon), I, Categories, Topics, Refutaciones Sofísticas, Introducciones, Traducciones y Notas de Miguel Candel Sanmartín, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1982, p. 372. Aristotele, Confutazione Sofistiche, 30, 181a36-37, Organon A Priest I gave Giorgio Colli, Einaudi, 1995, Adelphi, 2003, p. 714. Aristote, They Réfutations Sophistiques, 30, 181a36-37, Introduction, traduction et commentaire pair Louis-André Dorion, Préface de Jacques Brunschwig, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Presses de L'Université Laval, Canada-France, France, 1995, p. 191. 617Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 6, 169a15-16. Edward Poste, Aristotle on Fallacies, or the Sophistici Elenchi, VI, with a Translation and Notes, Macmillan and Co., 1866, p. 23. Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 6, 169a15-16, The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford Translation. Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume One, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 286. Aristóteles, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, 6, 169a15-16, Tratados de Lógica (Organon), I, Categorías, Tópicos, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, Introducciones, Traducciones y Notas de Miguel Candel Sanmartín, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1982, p. 325. Aristotele, Confutazione Sofistiche, 6, 169a15-16, Organon A Cura di Giorgio Colli, Einaudi, 1995, Adelphi, 2003, p. 663-664;. Aristote, Les Réfutations Sophistiques, 5, 167b6, Introduction, traduction et commentaire par LouisAndré Dorion, Préface de Jacques Brunschwig, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Presses de L'Université Laval, Canada-France, France, 1995, p. 130. 618 Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 30, 181a36-37. Edward Poste, Aristotle on Fallacies, or the Sophistici Elenchi, XXX, with a Translation and Notes, Macmillan and Co., 1866, p. 83. Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 30, 181a36-37, in The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford Translation. Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume One, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 309. Aristóteles, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, 30, 181a36-37, Tratados de Lógica (Organon), I, Categorías, Tópicos, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, Introducciones, Traducciones y Notas de Miguel Candel Sanmartín, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1982, p. 372. Aristotele, Confutazione Sofistiche, 30, 181a36-37, Organon A Cura di Giorgio Colli, Einaudi, 1995, Adelphi, 2003, p. 714. Aristote, Les Réfutations Sophistiques, 30, 181a36-37, Introduction, traduction et commentaire par LouisAndré Dorion, Préface de Jacques Brunschwig, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Presses de L'Université Laval, Canada-France, France, 1995, p. 191. diagnosis: apparent normality: as "good thing" and "bad thing" are two contradictory attributes presented as if they were predicates of the two subjects "A" and "B", "then the same thing is at the same time good and bad, and neither good nor bad" seems to necessarily follow; secret pathology: "A" and "B" are "good things" with regard to "A" and bad things" with regard to "B", not in an absolute manner ("the same good and bad thing, and neither good nor bad"); recommended therapy: to distinguish the relative sense from the beginning: good thing with regard to A and a bad thing with regard to B, so that the apparent contradictory conclusion will not take place. RULE: Whenever several questions are formulated as if they were only one requiring only one answer (apparent normality), but the rule that a premise needs only one predicate for only one subject is ignored (secret pathology), then the sophism of different questions in only one shall be incurred in (diagnosis). RULE: The therapy recommended for sophisms of different questions in only one shall consist in distinguishing the different questions from the beginning. Sophism of the ignorance of the refutation diagnosis: apparent normality: the purported contradictory conclusion appears as if it had satisfied all the requisites demanded by the definition of refutation; secret pathology: not all the requisites demanded by the definition of refutation have been satisfied. "A refutation is in effect the contradiction of a single and identical attribute, not of a word but of a thing, and not of a synonymous word but of the same one; it necesarily follows from the premises granted (not taking into consideration as a premise that what is at the beginning [of the discussion and to be proved]) [except in the case of reasoning via absurdity] and it is carried out according to the same point of view, with regard to the same thing, in the same manner and in the same time.";619 619 Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 5,167a23-28. "Une réfutation est en effet la contradiction d'un attribut unique et identique, non pas d'un mot mais d'une chose, et non pas d'un mot synonyme mais du même; elle découle avec nécessité des prémisses concédées (en ne prenant pas en compte ce qui est au début) et elle s'effectue selon le même poin de vue, par rapport à la même chose, de la même manière, et dans le même temps." Aristote, Les Réfutations Sophistiques, 5, 167a23-28, Introduction, traduction et commentaire par LouisAndré Dorion, Préface de Jacques Brunschwig, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Presses de L'Université recommended therapy: to examine the purported conclusion in the light of its apparent contradictory proposition and to show that it does not satisfy the requisites of the definition of refutation; example: like other sophisms contained in the present vade mecum they do not satisfy some or a number of the requisites of the definition of refutation,620 its respective examples are also examples of the present sophism of ignorance of the refutation, which, by definition, is the unit to which the multiplicity of all other sophisms may be reduced. RULE: All sophisms contained in this vade mecum are species of sophisms that ignore the requisites of the definition of refutation. There shall only be a refutation,621 when: a) what must be proved shall not appear as a premise, except in the argumentations via absurdity; b) the conclusion shall necessarily follow from the premises; c) the conclusion shall deny the same predicate affirmed by the answerer; d) the predicate will deny: 1) the signified thing, not only the name; 2) the signified thing meant by the same name assigned by the answerer; 3) the thing qualified precisely in the same manner as it was affirmed by the answerer. Laval, Canada-France, France, 1995, p. 129. Source of the main text (translation from french to english and aggregations between square brackets belong to the author of this book). Edward Poste, Aristotle on Fallacies, or the Sophistici Elenchi, V, with a Translation and Notes, Macmillan and Co., 1866, p. 15. Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 5,167a23-28, The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford Translation. Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume One, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 282. Aristotele, Confutazione Sofistiche, 5, 167a24-29., Organon A Cura di Giorgio Colli, Einaudi, 1995, Adelphi, 2003, p. 656. Aristóteles, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, 5, 167a23-28, Tratados de Lógica (Órganon), Categorías, Tópicos, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, Introducciones, Traducciones y Notas de Miguel Candel Sanmartín, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1982, p. 319. 620Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 6. Edward Poste, Aristotle on Fallacies, or the Sophistici Elenchi, VI, with to Translation and Notes, Macmillan and Co., 1866, pp. 23-25. Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 6, The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford Translation. Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume One, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, pp. 284-286. Aristóteles, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, 6, 167a23-28, Tratados de Lógica (Órganon), Categorías, Tópicos, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, Introducciones, Traducciones y Notas de Miguel Candel Sanmartín, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1982, pp. 322-326. Aristotele, Confutazione Sofistiche, 6, Organon A Priest I gave Giorgio Colli, Einaudi, 1995, Adelphi, 2003, pp. 659 664. Aristote, Les Réfutations Sophistiques, 6, Introduction, traduction et commentaire pair Louis-André Dorion, Préface de Jacques Brunschwig, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Presses de L'Université Laval, Canada-France, France, 1995, pp. 133-136. 621Scott G. Schreiber, Aristotle on False Reasoning, Language and the World in The Sophistical Refutations, State University Of New York Press, New York 2003, p. 88. Out of the seven sophisms that depend on language only to cause deceit, the excessive ambiguity ignores the requisite of "c" (the conclusion does not deny the same predicate affirmed by the answerer); the semantic ambiguity (homonymy), the syntactic ambiguity (amphibology) and the form of expression, they ignore the requisite of "d," paragraph 1 (the predicate does not deny the signified thing, only the name), while the others three: the sophisms of composition and division, and of the accentuation violate so the requisite of "d", paragraph 1 as well that of paragraph 2 (the predicate does not deny "the signified thing meant by the same name assigned by the answerer ").622 Out the seven sophisms that do not depend on the language only to cause deceit, if that of the ignorance of refutation is excluded, six remain: that of begging the question and that of the absolute and not absolute sense, which ignore the requisite of "d", paragraph 3 ("the thing qualified precisely in the same way as it was affirmed by the answerer"); and the sophisms of the accident, of the consequent, of a cause that is not a cause, of begging the question and of several questions in only one, which ignore the requisite of "b" ("the conclusion shall necessarily follow from the premise").623 That is to say, all sophisms in the vade mecum may be reduced to the unit of the sophism of ignorance of the refutation.624 b. Legislative sophisms in the wide sense It has been said that the history of sophisms is the political history of the human race625 and that the main sophisms should be taught in schools to such youngsters as may wish to hold public offices.626 Nevertheless, not all politicians use sophisms, but no politician should allow that they are used against him or against others. The main sophisms should be taught in schools to young people at large, not only to those who aspire to govern, but also to those who will be governed, to those who may cheat and those who may be cheated, so that they lose their character of secret knowledge,627 a privilege of the few ones initiated in their mysteries. 622Scott G. Schreiber, Aristotle on False Reasoning, Language and the World in The Sophistical Refutations, State University Of New York Press, New York 2003, p. 90. 623Scott G. Schreiber, Aristotle on False Reasoning, Language and the World in The Sophistical Refutations, State University Of New York Press, New York 2003, p. 97. 624Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations,6, 168a20. Edward Poste, Aristotle on Fallacies, or the Sophistici Elenchi, VI, with a Translation and Notes, Macmillan and Co., 1866, p. 19. Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, 6, The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford Translation. Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume One, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, pp. 284. Aristóteles, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, 6, 168a20, Tratados de Lógica (Organon), I, Categorías, Tópicos, Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas, Introducciones, Traducciones y Notas de Miguel Candel Sanmartín, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1982, p. 322. Aristotele, Confutazione Sofistiche, 6, 168a20, Organon A Cura di Giorgio Colli, Einaudi, 1995, Adelphi, 2003, p. 659. Aristote, Les Réfutations Sophistiques, 6, 168a20, Introduction, traduction et commentaire par LouisAndré Dorion, Préface de Jacques Brunschwig, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Presses de L'Université Laval, Canada-France, France, 1995, p. 133. 625Baron de Reiffemberg, Principes de Logique Suivies de l'histoire et de la Bibliographie de cette Science, Lois Hauman et Compagnie, Éditeurs, Bruxelles, 1833, num. 210, p. 106. 626Wilfred Châteauclair, TheYoung Seigneur; Or Nation-Making, Wm. Drysdale & Co., Publishers, Montreal, 1888, Chapter XXVI, The Ideal State, p. 128. 627On politics as a secret or as a secret knowledge, see: All arts hide certain secrets only kept by teachers, who seldom discovered them by themselves, like geniuses and who most times obtained them when, still as disciples, their respective teachers decided to initiate them in such occult knowledge. Political sophisms are part of the "secrets of power"(arcana imperii).628 But "political sophisms" is too wide a denomination for "legislative sophisms", although both of them happen to be appropriate if the former is used for the genre and the latter for the species. In the treatment of legislative sophisms in the wide sense, as a genre, the denomination "deliberative sophisms" has been preferred for one of its two species, because it reveals the matter treated (discussion of the laws) more properly and is more clearly opposed to the denomination of the other species, namely "legislative sophisms in the strict sense" (laws as sophisms).629 The study of deliberative sophisms will be based on the "Treaty of the Political Sophisms" (French version) or on "The Book of Fallacies" (English version), both by Bentham630 and, that of legislative sophisms in the strict sense, on Book VI (IV), Chapter 13 of "The Politics" by Aristotle.631 Deliberative sophisms Deliberative sophisms affirm without arguing, or affirm with apparent arguments, intended to postpone the respective legislative debates (dilatory sophisms), for the Peter S. Donaldson, Machiavelli and Mystery of State, Cambridge University Press, First Published 1988, First Paperback Edition, New York, 1992, pp. 111-140. Michel Senellart, Les Arts de Gouverner. Du Regimen médiéval au Concept de Gouvernement, Éditios du Seuil, Paris, 1995, pp. 206-277. 628 Arnoldi Clapmarii, De Arcanis Rerumplublicarum Libri Sex, ed. Johannes Clapmarius, Bremen, 1605 (the first edition, posthumous). Arn. Clapmarii, De Arcanis Rerumpublicarum Libri Sex, apud Ludovicum Elzevirium, Amsterodami, 1641, Arcana imperii, Lib. I, Cap. II, pp. 4-6; Lib. II, Cap. 1-23, pp. 57-113. 629Bentham, The Book of Fallacies, Edited by a Friend [Peregrine Binham], 1824, in The Complete Works of Jeremy Bentham, Published Under the Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring, Volume II, Simpkin Marshall, & Co., London, 1848: Bentham, Introduction, Section IV, "POLITICAL FALLACIES THE SUBJECT OF THIS BOOK", p.380. [Peregrine Bingham], PREFACE BY THE EDITOR OF THE ORIGINAL EDITION [1824], [...] the subject of which, indeed, -Fallacies employed in debate,[...]", p. 376. 630Jérémie Bentham, Traité des Sophismes Politiques, dans Oeuvres de Jérémie Bentham, par Ét. Dumont, Société Belge de Librairie, Hauman et Cie., Bruxelles, 1840, Tome Premier, pp. 435-504. Jeremías Bentham, Tratado de los Sofismas Políticos, Prólogo y Traducción [from french] de Francisco Ayala, Editorial Rosario, Rosario, 1944, Palabras del Editor pp. V-IX; Prólogo, pp. XXI-XIII.; 223 pp. e Indice. Bentham, The Book of Fallacies, Edited by a Friend [Peregrine Binham], 1824, in The Complete Works of Jeremy Bentham, Published Under the Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring, Volume II, Simpkin Marshall, & Co., London, 1848. Jeremías Bentham, Falacias Políticas, Estudio Preliminar de Benigno Pendas, Traducción [from english] de Javier Ballarín, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid, 1960, pp. 109. 631Aristotle, Politics, VI (IV), 13 Aristotle, Politics, IV, 13, in The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford Translation. Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume Two, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, pp. 2059-2060. Aristotle, Politics, VI (IV), 13, in The Politics of Aristotle, Translated with Introduction, Analysis and Notes, by Peter L. Phillips Simpson, The University of North Caroline Press, Chappel Hill and London, 1997, pp.194-196. Aristóteles, Política, Libro VI (IV), Cap. 13, Edición Bilingüe y Traducción por María Araujo, Introducción y Notas por Julián Marías, Instituto de Estudios Políticos, Madrid, 1970, pp. 191-193. purpose of avoiding them and, when it is no longer possible to avoid them, to confuse the use of reason (confusionist sophisms) or to prevent it (impedimental sophisms).632 Sophisms intended to postpone the debate (dilatory) Six species of dilatory sophisms shall be included: those of the quietist, of false consolation, of the most opportune future, of gradualism, of the distraction maneuver and, finally, of the danger. Sophism of the quietist diagnosis apparent normality: since no complaints have been raised on the alleged problems that the proposed bill would resolve, then it would not be necessary to debate it,633 least of all approve it; secret pathology: the fact that no complaints have been raised perhaps for fear, uselessness of previous complaints, economic or bureaucratic difficulties, etc.  does not mean that the problems do not exist or will not probably exist and that a prudent legislator should not propose now a bill meant to resolve or prevent them;634 recommended therapy: to show that the evils that the proposed bill is 632On dilatory political sophisms, see: Jérémie Bentham, Traité des Sofismes Politiques, dans Oeuvres de Jérémie Bentham, Société Belge de Librairie, Hauman et Ce., Bruxelles, 1840, Tome Premier, p. 461. Jeremías Bentham, Tratado de los Sofismas Políticos, Prólogo y Traducción de Francisco Ayala, Editorial Rosario, Rosario, 1944, Palabras del Editor pp. 69-109 For the dilatory political fallacies, to see: Jeremy Bentham, The Book of Fallacies, in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Published Under the Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring, Simpkin, Marshall & Co., London, 1843, Volume II, p. 430. Jeremías Bentham, Falacias Políticas, Estudio Preliminar de Benigno Pendas, Traducción de Javier Ballarín, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid, 1960, pp. 107-121. 633Jeremy Bentham, The Book of Fallacies, in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Published Under the Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring, Simpkin, Marshall & Co., London, 1843, Volume II, p. 430. Jeremías Bentham, Falacias Políticas, Estudio Preliminar de Benigno Pendas, Traducción de Javier Ballarín, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid, 1960, pp. 109. Jérémie Bentham, Traité des Sofismes Politiques, dans Oeuvres de Jérémie Bentham, Société Belge de Librairie, Hauman et Ce., Bruxelles, 1840, Tome Premier, p. 461. Jeremías Bentham, Tratado de los Sofismas Políticos, Prólogo y Traducción de Francisco Ayala, Editorial Rosario, Rosario, 1944, p. 73. 634Jeremy Bentham, The Book of Fallacies, in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Published Under the Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring, Simpkin, Marshall & Co., London, 1843, Volume II, pp. 430-431. Jeremías Bentham, Falacias Políticas, Estudio Preliminar de Benigno Pendas, Traducción de Javier Ballarín, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid, 1960, p. 110. Jérémie Bentham, Traité des Sofismes Politiques, dans Oeuvres de Jérémie Bentham, Société Belge de Librairie, Hauman et Ce., Bruxelles, 1840, Tome Premier, p. 462. Jeremías Bentham, Tratado de los Sofismas Políticos, Prólogo y Traducción de Francisco Ayala, Editorial Rosario, Rosario, 1944, p. 74. intended to remedy exist at present or will probably exist in an immediate future; to excite the fear of suffering damages and the hope to avoid them with the measures adopted, this being the reasons why it will be necessary to debate and approve the proposed bill as soon as possible; example: "The measure is unnecessary; nobody complains of disorder in that shape in which it is the aim of your measure to propose a remedy to it: even when no cause of complaint has been found to exist, especially under governments which admit of complains, men have in general not been slow to complain; much less where any just cause of complaint has existed."635 For these reasons, since the measure is unnecessary, it turns out unsuitable to waste the resources of the State in idle debates;636 counter example: Although it is true that men in general have been slow to complain, this slowness is not due to the nonexistence of problems, but to inertia, fear, uselessness of previous complaints, economic or bureaucratic difficulties, etc. Be that problems exist at present, or that they will probably arise in the immediate future, a prudent legislator will avoid the possibility that the people suffer from serious losses, by repairing or preventing them. For these reasons, and for the specific and concrete motives exposed upon the introduction of the bill, it turns out opportune and expedient to invest the resources of the State in the debate and approval of a bill so necessary and prudent as the one proposed.637 Sophism of the false consolation diagnosis: apparent normality: consolation is given to the people of the country where a bill was proposed to remedy certain abuses, remembering them that the people of other countries suffer from the same particular abuses and, also, 635Jeremy Bentham, The Book of Fallacies, in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Published Under the Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring, Simpkin, Marshall & Co., London, 1843, Volume II, p. 430. Jeremías Bentham, Falacias Políticas, Estudio Preliminar de Benigno Pendas, Traducción de Javier Ballarín, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid, 1960, p.109. 636Paragraph added by the author of this book. 637Counter example by the author of this book. from other general abuses, but are not so happy as they are. secret pathology: the people of the country where a bill was proposed to remedy certain abuses, instead of resigning themselves with the false consolation that the people of other countries suffer from the same particular abuses and, also, from other general abuses, but are not so happy as they are, would not have to keep on bearing the abuses, but should demand that the bill proposed to remedy should be debated and approved as soon as possible; example: "What is the matter with you?" "What would you have?" Look at the people there, and there: think how much better off you are than they are. Your prosperity and liberty are objects of envy to them; ─your institutions are the models which they endeavour to imitate."638 Remember the ancient saying: "Other' evils provide –or give– consolation"639, and be aware that there is not need to debate the proposed bill.640 counter example: Although it is true that our people are in a much better condition than the people of other countries, that we enjoy prosperity and freedom, and that our institutions are models that other countries try to imitate, it is not less true that our people should not resign themselves with the false consolation that the people of others countries suffer from the same particular abuses and, also, from other general abuses, but they are not so happy as we are. Remember the ancient saying: "Other' evils are no consolation for ours"641 and be aware that we have need to debate and approve the proposed bill as soon as possible. 638Jeremy Bentham, The Book of Fallacies, in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Published Under the Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring, Simpkin, Marshall & Co., London, 1843, Volume II, p. 431. Jeremías Bentham, Falacias Políticas, Estudio Preliminar de Benigno Pendas, Traducción de Javier Ballarín, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid, 1960, p. 111. Jérémie Bentham, Traité des Sofismes Politiques, dans Oeuvres de Jérémie Bentham, Société Belge de Librairie, Hauman et Ce., Bruxelles, 1840, Tome Premier, p. 464.Jeremías Bentham, Tratado de los Sofismas Políticos, Prólogo y Traducción de Francisco Ayala, Editorial Rosario, Rosario, 1944, p. 81. 639"Mal ajeno, hace –o prestaconsuelo"). Francisco Rodríguez Marín, Más de 2.100 Refranes Castellanos, no Contenidos en la Colección del Maestro Gonzalo Correas, Tip. de la Revista de Archivos, Madrid, 1930, p. 193. 640Paragraph added by the author of this book. 641"Mal ajeno, para el nuestro no es consuelo". Francisco Rodríguez Marín, 12.600 Refranes Más no Contenidos en la Colección del Maestro Gonzalo Correas, Tipográfica de la Revista de Archivos, Madrid, 1930, p. 193. Sophism of the most opportune future diagnosis: apparent normality: it is affirmed that the most opportune future has not come yet, and that it is necessary to wait a little longer to deliberate on the proposed bill; secret pathology: neither is an argument given to support that "the most opportune future has not come yet", nor is a reasonable term fixed to wait for it, all of which allows to suppose that what is really wanted is to avoid not only the debate but also the approval of the proposed bill, without anticipating an opinion against it, since the objection lies in the will, not in the judgment;642 example: A legislator, like a medical doctor, must wait for the propitious moment to apply the remedy that will cure a sick patient. The same remedy, applied at the wrong time, not only fails to cure the sick patient but may even damage his health, whether the patient be a human being or the social body. For these reasons, it will be necessary to wait untill a More favorable opportunity arises to debate the proposed bill, being it inconvenient at the present time to give an opinion on its advantages or disadvantages. counter example: It is true that a legislator, like a medical doctor, has to wait for the propitious moment to apply the remedy that will cure a sick patient, and that the same remedy, applied at the wrong time, not only fails to cure the sick patient but may even damage his health, whether such patient be a human being or the social body. Nevertheless, if legislators, as well as medical doctors are prudent as they addresss free men like us, they should persuade us by explaining the reasons why this is not the propitious moment, what requisites should be fulfilled and within what probable term will the opportunity arise, instead of formulating mere affirmations without reasonable 642Jeremy Bentham, The Book of Fallacies, in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Published Under the Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring, Simpkin, Marshall & Co., London, 1843, Volume II, p. 432. Jeremías Bentham, Falacias Políticas, Estudio Preliminar de Benigno Pendas, Traducción de Javier Ballarín, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid, 1960, p.. Jérémie Bentham, Traité des Sofismes Politiques, dans Oeuvres de Jérémie Bentham, Société Belge de Librairie, Hauman et Ce., Bruxelles, 1840, Tome Premier, p. 462. Jeremías Bentham, Tratado de los Sofismas Políticos, Prólogo y Traducción de Francisco Ayala, Editorial Rosario, Rosario, 1944, p. 75. arguments supporting them. For these reasons, there is no motive why we should wait for an opportunity more favorable than the present one to debate and approve the proposed bill, being that such opportunity and its advantages have been sufficiently explained in its exposition of motives. Sophism of the gradualism diagnosis apparent normality: upon the emergence of a complex problem needing the adoption of several measures, coordinated in a concurrent or successive form, within brief periods, the arguments go: "one thing at a time", "not so fast", "slow but safer form", as if the gradual debate and approval a set of measures coordinated in the proposed bill were a more prudent action;643 secret pathology: complex problems need the adoption of several measures, coordinated in a concurrent or successive form, within brief periods to be effective and, even when they could be executed gradually, partially or within longer periods, they will always delay the achievement of the results sought, a delay that turns out unacceptable when no reasonable arguments justifying it are given; example: The proposed bill implements a set of measures that it would be more prudent to debate and approve gradually, one at a time, not so fast, in a slow but safer form. 643Jeremy Bentham, The Book of Fallacies, in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Published Under the Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring, Simpkin, Marshall & Co., London, 1843, Volume II, p. 433. Jeremías Bentham, Falacias Políticas, Estudio Preliminar de Benigno Pendas, Traducción de Javier Ballarín, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid, 1960, p. 115. Jérémie Bentham, Traité des Sofismes Politiques, dans Oeuvres de Jérémie Bentham, Société Belge de Librairie, Hauman et Ce., Bruxelles, 1840, Tome Premier, p. 463.Jeremías Bentham, Tratado de los Sofismas Políticos, Prólogo y Traducción de Francisco Ayala, Editorial Rosario, Rosario, 1944, p. 77. counter example: Real prudence resolves complex problems with a set of measures coordinated in a concurrent or successive form within brief periods to be effective. Even if it was possible to debate, approve and execute them gradually without losing efficacy, it would be highly imprudent to accept the resulting delays, without demanding such reasonable arguments as may justify them. Sophism of the distraction maneuver diagnosis apparent normality: another bill that turns out more attractive to debate is proposed;644 secret pathology: this it is the case of a distraction maneuver, because there is not intention of presenting the bill immediately and such presentation shall be postponed with the excuse that there are more urgent matters to debate and, if the bill is debated and approved, the author of the initiative will try to take charge of its execution, to keep on delaying the same.645 example: I cannot but acknowledge the usefulness of the bill to debate, but I wonder: why this bill and not this other one?, which, considering the limited time available, is much more important and deserves all the attention that we may focus on. 644Jeremy Bentham, The Book of Fallacies, in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Published Under the Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring, Simpkin, Marshall & Co., London, 1843, Volume II, p. 435. Jeremías Bentham, Falacias Políticas, Estudio Preliminar de Benigno Pendas, Traducción de Javier Ballarín, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid, 1960, p. 120. Jérémie Bentham, Traité des Sofismes Politiques, dans Oeuvres de Jérémie Bentham, Société Belge de Librairie, Hauman et Ce., Bruxelles, 1840, Tome Premier, p. 470. Jeremías Bentham, Tratado de los Sofismas Políticos, Prólogo y Traducción de Francisco Ayala, Editorial Rosario, Rosario, 1944, p. 107. 645Jeremy Bentham, The Book of Fallacies, in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Published Under the Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring, Simpkin, Marshall & Co., London, 1843, Volume II, p. 435. Jeremías Bentham, Falacias Políticas, Estudio Preliminar de Benigno Pendas, Traducción de Javier Ballarín, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid, 1960, p. 121. Jérémie Bentham, Traité des Sofismes Politiques, dans Oeuvres de Jérémie Bentham, Société Belge de Librairie, Hauman et Ce., Bruxelles, 1840, Tome Premier, p. 471. Jeremías Bentham, Tratado de los Sofismas Políticos, Prólogo y Traducción de Francisco Ayala, Editorial Rosario, Rosario, 1944, p. 108. counter example: I cannot but acknowledge the importance of the new bill proposed either, but I cannot but warn that its treatment turns out not to be incompatible with the other bill on debate, which, in addition, has the advantage of having overcome the stage of mere initiatives and is a concrete bill, ready to be debated, approved and executed immediately, capitalizing all the time already spent, while the other proposal, because of its importance, will need a greater investment of the available time, for the preparation of the concrete bill as well as for its later debate, approval and execution. Sophism of the danger diagnosis: apparent normality: it is affirmed that the proposed bill is so bad that it should not be even debated, be it for the nastiness or inconsistency with the positions previously assumed by those who initiated it and now support it, without it being known what they hide behind; or be it because any innovation is dangerous;646 secret pathology: the mere affirmations of nastiness or inconsistency of the positions previously assumed by those who initiated the bill and support it, without it being known what they hide behind; or be it because any innovation is dangerous, both affirmed without any evidence, do not contradict the advantages of the bill described in the speech that accompanied it, and it does not even necessarily follow from such mere affirmations that the bill is so bad that it should not be debated, least of all approved; 646Jeremy Bentham, The Book of Fallacies, in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Published Under the Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring, Simpkin, Marshall & Co., London, 1843, Volume II, pp. 413-430. Jeremías Bentham, Falacias Políticas, Estudio Preliminar de Benigno Pendas, Traducción de Javier Ballarín, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid, 1960, p. 73-106. Jérémie Bentham, Traité des Sofismes Politiques, dans Oeuvres de Jérémie Bentham, Société Belge de Librairie, Hauman et Ce., Bruxelles, 1840, Tome Premier, pp. 465-468eremías Bentham, Tratado de los Jeremías Bentham, Sofismas Políticos, Prólogo y Traducción de Francisco Ayala, Editorial Rosario, Rosario, 1944, pp. 85-99. example: If those who took the initiative and those who now support the proposed bill have a bad intention or, an evil character, act for a bad motive, have fallen in inconsistencies with their previous positions criticizing similar bills and supporting the opposite ones; are intimate friends or, at least, hold frequent meetings with certain persons with dangerous intentions and dangerous principles like John Smith and James Jones, or share some or all their opinions, without it being known what they hide behind,647 or because any innovation is dangerous; then the proposed bill is so bad that it should not be debated, least of all approved. counter example: It is argued that the bill is so bad that it should not be debated, least of all approved, affirming that those who took the initiative and those who now support the above mentioned bill have a bad intention or an evil character; act for a bad motive; have fallen in inconsistencies with their previous positions, criticizing similar bills and supporting the opposite ones; are intimate friends or, at least, hold frequent meetings with certain persons with dangerous intentions and principles, like John Smith and James Jones and share some or all their opinions without it being known what they hide behind; or because any innovation is dangerous. These serious charges are mere insulting affirmations In the absence of relevant evidence supporting them, and do not contradict the reasons exposed in the message that accompanies the proposed bill on the advantages that it will bring about if approved. In addition to sinning against logic and the constitutional right of the presumption of innocence and to falling in the prejudice of believing that any innovation is bad, even if proved, this would be not the first or the last time in which villains make something good, which does not redeem them but at 647Jeremy Bentham, The Book of Fallacies, in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Published Under the Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring, Simpkin, Marshall & Co., London, 1843, Volume II, p. 414. Jeremías Bentham, Falacias Políticas, Estudio Preliminar de Benigno Pendas, Traducción de Javier Ballarín, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid, 1960, p. 75. Jérémie Bentham, Traité des Sofismes Politiques, dans Oeuvres de Jérémie Bentham, Société Belge de Librairie, Hauman et Ce., Bruxelles, 1840, Tome Premier, p. 465. Jeremías Bentham, Tratado de los Sofismas Políticos, Prólogo y Traducción de Francisco Ayala, Editorial Rosario, Rosario, 1944, p. 85. least provides a benefit to others worthy of protection, a benefit which no legislator should deprive them of, because it would be unjust and imprudent. For all these reasons, the proposed bill should be debated and approved as soon as possible. Sophisms intended to confuse the debates (confusionist) Confusionist sophisms spread deep darkness on the matter dealt with, with the expectation that the approval or rejection of a bill be thus avoided, in the middle of the resulting darkness for the uses of reason,648 in such debates as may no longer be avoided. Twelve species of sophisms will be included as confusionist ones: that of the only word, of the impostor term, of vague generalities, of allegorical idols, of popular corruption, of the antithinkers, of paradoxical affirmations, of the confusion of the obstacle with the cause, of the partiality, of the end that justifies the means, of the universal opponent and, finally, of the rejection instead of the modification. Sophism of the only word that implies approval or rejection (epithet) diagnosis: apparent normality: only one word is used as if it were neutral with regard to the approval or rejection of the bill on debate, without adding any reasonable argument to support the approval or rejection of the aforesaid bill; secret pathology: this single word, used as seemingly neutral, in fact, implicitly means the approval (praise) or rejection (condemnation) of the bill on debate, without any reasonable argument to support it, thus surreptitiously introducing the sophism of begging the question;649 648Jérémie Bentham, Traité des Sofismes Politiques, dans Oeuvres de Jérémie Bentham, Société Belge de Librairie, Hauman et Ce., Bruxelles, 1840, Tome Premier, p. 474. Jeremías Bentham, Tratado de los Sofismas Políticos, Prólogo y Traducción de Francisco Ayala, Editorial Rosario, Rosario, 1944, p. 113. 649Jeremy Bentham, The Book of Fallacies, in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Published Under the Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring, Simpkin, Marshall & Co., London, 1843, Volume II, p. 436-438. Jeremías Bentham, Falacias Políticas, Estudio Preliminar de Benigno Pendas, Traducción de Javier Ballarín, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid, 1960, pp. 125-126. Jérémie Bentham, Traité des Sofismes Politiques, dans Oeuvres de Jérémie Bentham, Société Belge de Librairie, Hauman et Ce., Bruxelles, 1840, Tome Premier, p. 481. Jeremías Bentham, Tratado de los Sofismas Políticos, Prólogo y Traducción de Francisco Ayala, Editorial Rosario, Rosario, 1944, pp. 145-146. examples: The bill on debate improves650 the current law avoiding the current disadvantages. This is the reason why the approval of the aforesaid bill is requested. The bill under debate worsens the current law, aggravating the current disadvantages. This is the reason why the rejection of the aforesaid bill is requested. counter example: The mere use of a word of praise ("improves") or of condemnation ("worsens") without any reasonable arguments to support it may not replace the debate, which consists in an exchange of ideas, not in the exchange of sentences where the prevailing word has an implicit meaning of approval or of rejection. This is the reason why I am begging the distinguished orators that preceded me to add such reasonable arguments as will support their respective positions. After having listened to them attentively, we will be in better conditions to continue with the present debate. Nothing further, Mr. President. Sophism of the impostor term (euphemism) diagnosis: apparent normality: a seemingly acceptable term is used to name something; secret pathology: the seemingly acceptable term is used to substitute another one which, although proper, turns out unacceptable;651 650The examples and the counter example belong to the author of this book; the word "improves" is taken from: Jeremy Bentham, The Book of Fallacies, in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Published Under the Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring, Simpkin, Marshall & Co., London, 1843, Volume II, p. 437. Jeremías Bentham, Falacias Políticas, Estudio Preliminar de Benigno Pendas, Traducción de Javier Ballarín, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid, 1960, p. 128. Jérémie Bentham, Traité des Sofismes Politiques, dans Oeuvres de Jérémie Bentham, Société Belge de Librairie, Hauman et Ce., Bruxelles, 1840, Tome Premier, p. 482. Jeremías Bentham, Tratado de los Sofismas Políticos, Prólogo y Traducción de Francisco Ayala, Editorial Rosario, Rosario, 1944, pp. 148. 651Jeremy Bentham, The Book of Fallacies, in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Published Under the Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring, Simpkin, Marshall & Co., London, 1843, Volume II, p. 138. Jeremías Bentham, Falacias Políticas, Estudio Preliminar de Benigno Pendas, Traducción de Javier Ballarín, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid, 1960, p. 130. example: The bill on debate regulates, with suitable zeal, the exercise of the freedom of cults established in our Constitution. counter example: The bill on debate, with an apparent zeal to regulate the exercise of the freedom of cults establisheded in our Constitution, actually restores the religious persecution of those who do not belong to the official cult.652 Sophism of vague generalities diagnosis: apparent normality: an expression more generic and undetermined than an specific and determined one, which would be grammatically proper, is used ; secret pathology: the expression may mean something good or something bad, depending on the circumstances;653 example: The utility to and need of the government, the law, the moral and the religion have been always respected in this honorable place and this orator will not be the one to subvert them. counter example: The bill on debate preserves the utility and need of the good government, the good law, the good moral and the good religion, because it avoids determined Jérémie Bentham, Traité des Sofismes Politiques, dans Oeuvres de Jérémie Bentham, Société Belge de Librairie, Hauman et Ce., Bruxelles, 1840, Tome Premier, pp. 484-485. Jeremías Bentham, Tratado de los Sofismas Políticos, Prólogo y Traducción de Francisco Ayala, Editorial Rosario, Rosario, 1944, pp. 157-158. 652The composition of the example and of the counter example belongs to the author of this book; the terms "zeal" and "persecution" are taken from Bentham: Jeremy Bentham, The Book of Fallacies, in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Published Under the Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring, Simpkin, Marshall & Co., London, 1843, Volume II, p. 438. Jeremías Bentham, Falacias Políticas, Estudio Preliminar de Benigno Pendas, Traducción de Javier Ballarín, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid, 1960, p. 130. Jérémie Bentham, Traité des Sofismes Politiques, dans Oeuvres de Jérémie Bentham, Société Belge de Librairie, Hauman et Ce., Bruxelles, 1840, Tome Premier, p. 484|. Jeremías Bentham. Tratado de los Sofismas Políticos, Prólogo y Traducción de Francisco Ayala, Editorial Rosario, Rosario, 1944, p. 157. 653The composition of the example and of the counter example belongs to the author of this book; the expressions "law", "government", "moral" and "religion", are taken from Bentham. Jeremy Bentham, The Book of Fallacies, in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Published Under the Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring, Simpkin, Marshall & Co., London, 1843, Volume II, p. 440. Jeremías Bentham, Falacias Políticas, Estudio Preliminar de Benigno Pendas, Traducción de Javier Ballarín, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid, 1960, p. 134 Jérémie Bentham, Traité des Sofismes Politiques, dans Oeuvres de Jérémie Bentham, Société Belge de Librairie, Hauman et Ce., Bruxelles, 1840, Tome Premier, p. 483. Jeremías Bentham, Tratado de los Sofismas Políticos, Prólogo y Traducción de Francisco Ayala, Editorial Rosario, Rosario, 1944, p. 153 evils, as it is indicated in full detail in its exposition of motives, the attentive reading of which will clear such implicit doubts as could have been left by the insinuations of the orator who has preceded me, who does not distinguish between the good thing that we must preserve and the bad thing that we must fight against in the present circumstances and in those that will probably emerge in the near future. Sophism of allegorical idols diagnosis: apparent normality: a person who holds a public office is denominated with the name of the institution; secret pathology: the institution generally implies the attribute of excellence; but the one who holds a public office may have had a good or a bad performance in the fulfillment of his duties;654 this is the reason why this sophism has also been denominated "sophism that protects official prevaricators";655 example: The purported abuses, the description of which is enjoyed by some opponents, are not reasonable critics to the performance of some officers. To attack us is to attack the Government. They want to destabilize us! counter example: Without analyzing, for the time being, whether the abuses denounced by the opposition have been committed or not, it is necessary to point out that the officers charged may have had a good or a bad performance in the fulfillment of their respective duties, but they neither may nor must be identified with the Government to avoid control over their conducts by public opinion and the others Powers of the State authorized to do so, by surreptitiously seeking protection in the prestige of the institution to the excellence of which they should contribute.656 654Jeremy Bentham, The Book of Fallacies, in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Published Under the Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring, Simpkin, Marshall & Co., London, 1843, Volume II, p. 448. Jeremías Bentham, Falacias Políticas, Estudio Preliminar de Benigno Pendas, Traducción de Javier Ballarín, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid, 1960, p. 150. Jérémie Bentham, Traité des Sofismes Politiques, dans Oeuvres de Jérémie Bentham, Société Belge de Librairie, Hauman et Ce., Bruxelles, 1840, Tome Premier, p. 483. Jeremías Bentham, Tratado de los Sofismas Políticos, Prólogo y Traducción de Francisco Ayala, Editorial Rosario, Rosario, 1944, p. 153. 655Jérémie Bentham, Traité des Sofismes Politiques, dans Oeuvres de Jérémie Bentham, Société Belge de Librairie, Hauman et Ce., Bruxelles, 1840, Tome Premier, p. 490. Sophism of popular corruption diagnosis: apparent normality: the corruption of the people is alleged to avoid the introduction of political reforms; secret pathology: in fact the term "corruption" is used to discredit the people in an undetermined form or attributing it a bad moral nature or mental frame, confusing the ideas, since true and concrete corruption is that of the rulers who bribe one another sacrificing the common interest to obtain their own profit;657 example: "[...]The source of that corruption to which the honorable member alludes is in the minds of the people; so rank and extensive is that corruption, that no political reform can have any effect in removing it. Instead of reforming others – instead of reforming the State, the Constitution, and everything that is most excellent, let each man reform himself! let him look at home, he will find there enough to do without looking abroad and aiming at what is out of his power [Loud cheers.]"658 Jeremías Bentham, Tratado de los Sofismas Políticos, Prólogo y Traducción de Francisco Ayala, Editorial Rosario, Rosario, 1944, p. 175. 656The example and the counter example belong to the author of this book; inspired in the expressions "You are an enemy to government" and "Your endeavour is to destroy government!" (equivalent to the more updated "they want to destabilize us!"), that belong to Bentham, according to the editions by Dumont and Bowring, respectively: Jeremy Bentham, The Book of Fallacies, in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Published Under the Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring, Simpkin, Marshall & Co., London, 1843, Volume II, p. 448. Jeremías Bentham, Falacias Políticas, Estudio Preliminar de Benigno Pendas, Traducción de Javier Ballarín, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid, 1960, p. 151. Jérémie Bentham, Traité des Sofismes Politiques, dans Oeuvres de Jérémie Bentham, Société Belge de Librairie, Hauman et Ce., Bruxelles, 1840, Tome Premier, p. 483. Jeremías Bentham, Tratado de los Sofismas Políticos, Prólogo y Traducción de Francisco Ayala, Editorial Rosario, Rosario, 1944, p. 153 657Jeremy Bentham, The Book of Fallacies, in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Published Under the Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring, Simpkin, Marshall & Co., London, 1843, Volume II, p. 453. Jeremías Bentham, Falacias Políticas, Estudio Preliminar de Benigno Pendas, Traducción de Javier Ballarín, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid, 1960, p. 161. 658Fallacies of Antireformers, A review of "The Book of Fallacies: from Unfinished Papers of Jeremy Bentham, by a Friend. London, 1824", Edinburgh Review, 42 (1825), pp. 367-389, p. 388. It is a fragment corresponding to this fallacy, of the famous "Noodle's Oration" of Sydney Smith (17711845), the "Friend" author of the aforesaid review that, in the end, composed a speech covered in which it threaded, with certain irony, successive proper examples of the fallacies descripted by Bentham. counter example: It is not necessary to confuse ideas and things by attributing to the people, in an undetermined and apparent form, a bad moral nature on which any reform would depend, exhorting each one to reform himself, since the real corruption, the concrete and actual corruption takes place between the rulers who bribe one another, sacrificing the common interest to obtain their own profit. The sophism of the antithinkers diagnosis: apparent normality: the measures on debate are discredited by means of epithets and set phrases, as if the exercise of thinking in itself were incompatible with a useful and successful practice; secret pathology: discredit arises in the absence of reasonable arguments to reject such measures as impair the defended interests;659 example: The proposed measures are mere theoretical, romantic, fantastic and utopist speculations . They may seem good in theory, but, beyond any doubt they will turn out bad in practice. If someone dares thinking that the measures are good, it would be necessary to warn him that they are too good to be practicable. The proposed measures should be rejected, due to Their confusion between the ideal level of thought and the concrete reality of the problems to be resolved. counter example: The prudent man, who is characterized for thinking before acting, cannot despise the exercise of thought, which distinguishes him from the irrational beings. A debate is an exchange of ideas, not of mere epithets and set phrases to discredit to the thought of others. This latter resource is typical of those who try to defend the interests impaireded by the 659Jeremy Bentham, The Book of Fallacies, in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Published Under the Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring, Simpkin, Marshall & Co., London, 1843, Volume II, p. 457. Jeremías Bentham, Falacias Políticas, Estudio Preliminar de Benigno Pendas, Traducción de Javier Ballarín, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid, 1960, p. 170. Jérémie Bentham, Traité des Sofismes Politiques, dans Oeuvres de Jérémie Bentham, Société Belge de Librairie, Hauman et Ce., Bruxelles, 1840, Tome Premier, p. 474. Jeremías Bentham, Tratado de los Sofismas Políticos, Prólogo y Traducción de Francisco Ayala, Editorial Rosario, Rosario, 1944, p. 123 measures on debate, when they lack reasonable arguments to oppose them.660 Sophism of paradoxical affirmations diagnosis: apparent normality: the denomination of the debated question is attacked with vehemence, as if it was the question itself; secret pathology: as the debated question turns out unassailable with reasonable arguments, the attack is directed towards the denomination with which it is known, confusing the denomination of what is debated with the debated question, so that the rejection of the denomination provokes the rejection of debated question itself;661 example: Not always the lack of interest of an officer proves praiseworthy, since sometimes it is a sign of corruption, for example, when he gives up collecting his compensation, which makes it reasonable to presume that he hopes to gain much more with what he will receive in unofficial form! counterexample: When an officer gives up collecting his compensation, one should presume that his lack of interest is a sign of corruption, since it should not be forgoten that in addition to those interested in money there are also those who seek honors, this being the name with which ancient Romans denominated the civil service: a "career of honors" (cursus honorum).662 660The composition of the example and the counter example belong to the author of this book. Bentham refers to the abuse of the following words: "speculative", "theoretical", "chimerical", "utopian" and to the phrases: "Good theoretically, villain in practice", "too good to be practicable". Jeremy Bentham, The Book of Fallacies, in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Published Under the Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring, Simpkin, Marshall & Co., London, 1843, Volume II, pp. 457-462. Jeremías Bentham, Falacias Políticas, Estudio Preliminar de Benigno Pendas, Traducción de Javier Ballarín, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid, 1960, p. 170-179. Jérémie Bentham, Traité des Sofismes Politiques, dans Oeuvres de Jérémie Bentham, Société Belge de Librairie, Hauman et Ce., Bruxelles, 1840, Tome Premier, pp. 474-477. Jeremías Bentham, Tratado de los Sofismas Políticos, Prólogo y Traducción de Francisco Ayala, Editorial Rosario, Rosario, 1944, pp. 123-132. 661Jeremy Bentham, The Book of Fallacies, in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Published Under the Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring, Simpkin, Marshall & Co., London, 1843, Volume II, p. 462. Jeremías Bentham, Falacias Políticas, Estudio Preliminar de Benigno Pendas, Traducción de Javier Ballarín, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid, 1960, p. 180. 662The composition of the example and of the counter example belong to the author of this book. Bentham quotes a speech by Edmond Burke on the Official Economy Bill in which Burke supports that the resignation of official emoluments is "a mark of the basest profigacy"; the distinction between love for wealth and love for reputation belongs to Bentham. Sophism of the confusion of the obstacle with the cause diagnosis: apparent normality: after praising an excellent system, one of its parts is also praised, as if it were the cause of excellence; secret pathology: the praised parts as if it were the cause of excellence, is in fact, an obstacle for the system, but an obstacle the preservation of which is sought due to the interests it favors;663 example: "In virtue and knowledge-in every feature of felicity, the empire of Montezuma outshines, as evereybody knows, all the sourrounding states, even the commonwealth of Tlascala not excepted. Where (said an inquirer once, to the hight priest of the Temple of Vitzlipultzli,) is it that we are to look for the true cause of so glorious a pre-eminence? "Look for it!", answered the holy pontiff-where shouldst thou look for it, blind sceptic, but in the copiousness of the stream in which the sweet and precious blood of innocents flows daily down the altars of the great God?" "Yes," answered in full convocation and full chorus the archbishops, bishops, deans, canons, and prebends of the religion of Vitzlipultzli: "Yes answered in semi-chorus the vice chancellor, with all the doctors, both the proctors and masters regent and non-regent of the us yet uncatholiced university of Mexico: "Yes, in the copiousness of the stream in which the sweet and precious blood of the innocents flows daily down the altars of the great God."664 Jeremy Bentham, The Book of Fallacies, in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Published Under the Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring, Simpkin, Marshall & Co., London, 1843, Volume II, pp. 464-465. Jeremías Bentham, Falacias Políticas, Estudio Preliminar de Benigno Pendas, Traducción de Javier Ballarín, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid, 1960, p. 183. 663Jeremías Bentham, Tratado de los Sofismas Políticos, Prólogo y Traducción de Francisco Ayala, Editorial Rosario, Rosario, 1944, p. 133 Jérémie Bentham, Traité des Sofismes Politiques, dans Oeuvres de Jérémie Bentham, Société Belge de Librairie, Hauman et Ce., Bruxelles, 1840, Tome Premier, p. 476. Jeremías Bentham, Falacias Políticas, Estudio Preliminar de Benigno Pendas, Traducción de Javier Ballarín, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid, 1960, p. 187.. Jeremy Bentham, The Book of Fallacies, in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Published Under the Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring, Simpkin, Marshall & Co., London, 1843, Volume II, p. 466. 664Jeremy Bentham, The Book of Fallacies, in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Published Under the Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring, Simpkin, Marshall & Co., London, 1843, Volume II, p. 468, text reproduced above. Jeremías Bentham, Falacias Políticas, Estudio Preliminar de Benigno Pendas, Traducción de Javier Ballarín, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid, 1960, p. 190. counter example: A current historian may recognize the persuasive value of such answers at that time, but should not allow to be deceived by accepting that the cause of the preeminence of Moctezuma's empire was the practice of human sacrifices, one of its most objectionable aspects. The reasonable arguments of a current historian will distinguish between the real causes for the preeminence of Moctezuma's empire over its neighbouring peoples, and its objectionable and indifferent aspects. Sophism of the partiality diagnosis: apparent normality: bad parts are omitted as if the whole was good; or are considered as if they were less than the good ones;665 because the abuse it is not a valid argument agains the use; secret pathology: whether the bad parts are omitted or presumed less than the good ones, bad parts should be neither omitted nor presumed, but weighted together with the real good ones, to judge them later; example: In spite of the efforts that I have made I have not been able to find any bad part in the law the reform of which is sought. Moreover, I am persuaded that even in the hypothetical case that some defects are found, they will always be less in relation to the virtues that the current law has proved to possess. For these reasons, I request that the amendment bill On debate is rejected. counter example: No reasonable legislator, either of the government party or of the opposition, could deny merits to the current law. However, we are not debating its abrogation, but an amendment bill, because we cannot remain impassive in the light of such defects as are described in full detail in the Message, if we want to preserve immaculate the undeniable virtues that the law in force has proved to possess, by adapting it to Jéremie Bentham, Traité des Sofismes Politiques, dans Oeuvres de Jérémie Bentham, Société Belge de Librairie, Hauman et Ce., Bruxelles, 1840, Tome Premier, p. 478 Jeremías Bentham, Tratado de los Sofismas Políticos, Prólogo y Traducción de Francisco Ayala, Editorial Rosario, Rosario, 1944, pp 134-135. 665Jeremy Bentham, The Book of Fallacies, in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Published Under the Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring, Simpkin, Marshall & Co., London, 1843, Volume II, p. 469. the current reality. For these reasons, I request that the amendment bill in debate is approved.666 Sophism of the end that justifies the means diagnosis: apparent normality: arguments for the measures are given as if the end sought by them justified the means used to obtain it; secret pathology: for the end to really justify the means used to obtain it, it is required that such end be good, that the means be also good in themselves or that the evil inherent to them be less than the goodness of the end, and that the evil be less than other means that could be used to obtain the same end;667 example: It is true that some of the proposed measures are not completely good, if they are considered in themselves, but one should not forget that the end justifies the means. For these resons, I request that the bill on debate is approved. counter example: The end justifies the means is an old maxim, which has been much criticized, because it established the separation between morality and politics. Those who go so far as to admit it dare not support it in absolute form, but submit it to certain requirements: that the end be good, that the means be good in themselves or that the evil inherent to them be less tha the goodness of the end, and that the evil be less than other means that could be used to obtain the same end. For these reasons, I request that the bill on debate is rejected.668 Sophism of the universal opponent diagnosis: apparent normality: it is argued that the measures, not the men, or that the men, not the mesures, are important to obtain the 666Both the example and the counterexample belongs to the author of this book. 667Jeremy Bentham, The Book of Fallacies, in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Published Under the Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring, Simpkin, Marshall & Co., London, 1843, Volume II, pp. 469-470. Jeremías Bentham, Falacias Políticas, Estudio Preliminar de Benigno Pendas, Traducción de Javier Ballarín, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid, 1960, p. 191. 668The composition of the example and of the counter example both belong to the author of this book, based on Bentham. end;669 secret pathology: both the measures proposed and the men entrusted with their execution, are important to obtain the end; examples: Although it is true that the proposed measures seem reasonable, regrettably it is not possible to affirm the same of the persons entrusted with their execution, this being the reason why, much to my sorrow, I am inclined to vote against the bill on debate. Although it is true that the proposed measures are perfectible, the men entrusted with their execution undoubtedly fit from the moral as well as from the intellectual viewpointg, this beeing the reason why I am inclined to vote for the bill on debate. counter example: It turns out inadmissible that arguments are given against the bill on debate considering only the measures or the men entrusted with the execution, as if it were not indispensable to consider both arguments at the same time! Sophism of the rejection instead of the modification diagnosis: apparent normality: objections are raised as if they were sufficient to reject the proposed measures; secret pathology: objections are really not preponderant or irremediable and, therefore, the former may be ignored and the latter, or both, may be rectifieded through the mere amendment of the bill;670 example: The political party that I represent is opposed to the creation of a new bureaucratic organism, for economic reasons and because it means another example of the ambition for power of the authorities in office. 669Jeremy Bentham, The Book of Fallacies, in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Published Under the Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring, Simpkin, Marshall and Co., London, 1843, Volume II, pp. 470-471. Jeremías Bentham, Falacias Políticas, Estudio Preliminar de Benigno Pendas. Madrid, 1960, pp. 192-193. 670Jeremy Bentham, The Book of Fallacies, in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Published Under the Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring, Simpkin, Marshall & Co., London, 1843, Volume II, p. 471-472. Jeremías Bentham, Falacias Políticas, Estudio Preliminar de Benigno Pendas, Traducción de Javier Ballarín, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid, 1960, p. 194. Jérémie Bentham, Traité des Sofismes Politiques, dans Oeuvres de Jérémie Bentham, Société Belge de Librairie, Hauman et Ce., Bruxelles, 1840, Tome Premier, p. 478. Jeremías Bentham, Tratado de los Sofismas Políticos, Prólogo y Traducción de Francisco Ayala, Editorial Rosario, Rosario, 1944, p. 137-138. counter example: Instead of using well known universal objections, over and over again, let's focus the debate on the need, opportunity and expediency of the bill with reasonable arguments. Then, let's see if the budget of the new organism is too bulky and if too many powers are granted to the officers and, in the affirmative, let's introduce appropiate modifications. Let's not fall in the pitfall of rejecting the bill with objections that are neither preponderant nor irremediable, when we are able to ignore the former and the latter or when both of them may be rectified through the mere amendment of a bill of great utility, rather than through its rejection.671 Sophisms intended to prevent the debate (impedimental) Impedimental sophisms are mere arguments of authority, intended to substitute and prevent the use of reason in already inevitable debates. Four species of impedimental sophisms will be included: those of the wisdom of our ancestors, of the absence of precedents, of irrevocable laws and of laudatory personalities.672 Sophism of the wisdom of our ancestors diagnosis apparent normality: one affirms the purporteded repugnance of the proposed bill based on the opinion of those who long ago lived in the country of those who now deliberate, by merely quoting the opinion of some writer, or laws or institutions existing at that time, as sufficient reason to justify the rejection of the aforesaid bill;673 secret pathology: if: "Experience is the mother of wisdom", between contemporary persons, the older ones are wiser, because of their greater experience; while between generations, the more recent ones are wiser, because of their greater experience, since they add their own to that of the previous ones;674 671The composition of the example and of the counter example they belong to the author of this book. 672Jérémie Bentham, Traité des Sofismes Politiques, dans Oeuvres de Jérémie Bentham, Société Belge de Librairie, Hauman et Ce., Bruxelles, 1840, Tome Premier, p. 447.eremías Bentham, Tratado de los Sofismas Políticos, Prólogo y Traducción de Francisco Ayala, Editorial Rosario, Rosario, 1944, pp. 1112. 673Jeremy Bentham, The Book of Fallacies, in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Published Under the Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring, Simpkin, Marshall & Co., London, 1843, Volume II, p. 398. Jeremías Bentham, Falacias Políticas, Estudio Preliminar de Benigno Pendas, Traducción de Javier Ballarín, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid, 1960, p. 41. Jérémie Bentham, Traité des Sofismes Politiques, dans Oeuvres de Jérémie Bentham, Société Belge de Librairie, Hauman et Ce., Bruxelles, 1840, Tome Premier, p. 447. Jeremías Bentham, Tratado de los Sofismas Políticos, Prólogo y Traducción de Francisco Ayala, Editorial Rosario, Rosario, 1944, p. 25. example: "What would our ancestors say to this, Sir? How this measure tally with their institutions? How does it agree with their experience? Are we to put the wisdom of yesterday in competition with the wisdom of centuries ? [Hear! Hear] is beard less youth to show no respect for the decisions of mature age (Lout cries of hear! hear!)"675 Our wise ancestors, the prudence of ours parents, the good sense of old times, the venerable antiquity are sufficient reasons for the rejection of the proposed bill and the closing of the debate.676 counter example: Our ancestors could not say anything because neither the problem nor the solution existed in their times. Why should it be taken into account whether the measure is consistent with their institutions? The mesure must be consistent with ours institutions, with the current ones, not with those then existing. If: "Experience is the mother of wisdom", unlike contemporary persons, between whom the older ones are wiser, because of their larger experience, between generations, the current ones are wiser, because they add their own experience to that of the previous ones. Mere affirmations about our wise ancestors, the prudence of our parents, the good sense of the old times, the venerable antiquity, in addition to trying to replace the use of reason, do not refute the advantages of the proposed bill, the fundamentals of which have been sufficiently explained in its exposition of motives. For these motives, if no reasonable arguments are raised against it, the proposed bill must be approved without any further debate.677 674Jeremy Bentham, The Book of Fallacies, in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Published Under the Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring, Simpkin, Marshall & Co., London, 1843, Volume II, p. 398-399. Jeremías Bentham, Falacias Políticas, Estudio Preliminar de Benigno Pendas, Traducción de Javier Ballarín, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid, 1960, p. 41-44. Jérémie Bentham, Traité des Sofismes Politiques, dans Oeuvres de Jérémie Bentham, Société Belge de Librairie, Hauman et Ce., Bruxelles, 1840, Tome Premier, p. 447. Jeremías Bentham, Tratado de los Sofismas Políticos, Prólogo y Traducción de Francisco Ayala, Editorial Rosario, Rosario, 1944, pp. 25-26. 675Fallacies of Antireformers, A review of "The Book of Fallacies: from Unfinished Papers of Jeremy Bentham, by a Friend. London, 1824", Edinburgh Review, 42 (1825), p. 367-389, p. 386. This is a fragment corresponding to this fallacy in the famous "Noodle's Oration", by Sydney Smith (1771-1845), the "Friend" author of the aforesaid review that, in the end, composed a fluent speech in which he inserted, with certain irony, successive proper examples of the fallacies described by Bentham. 676Added by the author of this book. 677Counter example of the author of this book. Sophism of the absence of precedents diagnosis apparent normality: the absence of precedents is affirmed without any relevant evidence, as if it were sufficient reason to justify the rejection of the proposed bill;678 secret pathology: whenever it is not possible to use the sophism of "the wisdom of our ancestors" because they do not exist or because there are neither previous opinions to be quoted, nor previous laws or institutions, the sophism of "the absence of precedents" is resorted to; proved or not, there is not motive why this sophism should hinder the use of reason to deliberate on the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed bill, least of all serve as sufficient reason for its rejection; example: "The proposition is new and of an unprecedented nature: this is, not doubt, the first time that any such thing was ever heard of in this House. [...] Deliberate well before you act, as you have not precedent to direct your course."679 "If this measure be right, would it have escaped the wisdom of those Saxon progenitors to whom we are indebted for so many of our best political institutions? Would the Dane have passed it over? Would the Norman have rejected it? Would such notable discovery have been reserved for these modern and degenerate times?"680 678Jeremías Bentham, Tratado de los Sofismas Políticos, Prólogo y Traducción de Francisco Ayala, Editorial Rosario, Rosario, 1944, p. 33. Jérémie Bentham, Traité des Sofismes Politiques, dans Oeuvres de Jérémie Bentham, Société Belge de Librairie, Hauman et Ce., Bruxelles, 1840, Tome Premier, p. 449. Jeremías Bentham, Falacias Políticas, Estudio Preliminar de Benigno Pendas, Traducción de Javier Ballarín, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid, 1960, p. 65-66. Jeremy Bentham, The Book of Fallacies, in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Published Under the Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring, Simpkin, Marshall & Co., London, 1843, Volume II, p. 410. 679Jeremy Bentham, The Book of Fallacies, in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Published Under the Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring, Simpkin, Marshall & Co., London, 1843, Volume II, p. 410. Jeremías Bentham, Falacias Políticas, Estudio Preliminar de Benigno Pendas, Traducción de Javier Ballarín, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid, 1960, p. 65-66. Jérémie Bentham, Traité des Sofismes Politiques, dans Oeuvres de Jérémie Bentham, Société Belge de Librairie, Hauman et Ce., Bruxelles, 1840, Tome Premier, p. 449. Jeremías Bentham, Tratado de los Sofismas Políticos, Prólogo y Traducción de Francisco Ayala, Editorial Rosario, Rosario, 1944, p. 33. 680Review of "The Book of Fallacies: from Unfinished Papers of Jeremy Bentham, by a Friend. London, 1824", by Sydney Smith (1771-1845) in Edinburgh Review, 42 (1825), pp. 367-389, pp.386-387. No! Mr. President of this Honorable Chamber: the absence of precedents in itself constitutes sufficient reason for the rejection of the proposed bill and for the closing of the debate.681 counter example: The distinguished member of the opposition who preceded me in taking the floor, has wondered: "If this measure be right, would it have escaped the wisdom of those saxon progenitors to whom we are indebted for so many of our best institutions? Would the Dane have passed it over? Would the Norman have rejected it? Would such notable discovery have been reserved for these modern and degenerate times?" Yes!, Mr. President of this Honorable Chamber: the absence of precedents usually stems from different causes, among which I cannot set aside the permanent influence exercised by the powerful, everlasting interests, which have been adversely affected by the measures, or from the fact that neither the problem to be resolved nor the proposed solutions existed at the times of our wise ancestors.682 Furthermore, the absence of precedents, in itself, does not constitutes sufficient reason for the rejection of the proposed bill and for the closing of the debate. For these motives, if no reasonable arguments are Raised against it, the proposed bill must be approved as soon as possible.683 Sophism of irrevocable laws diagnosis apparent normality: once enacted, laws are irrevocable, whethe they are regarded as founded on a contract or on a solemn oath;684 It is a fragment corresponding to this fallacy of the famous "Noodle's Oration", of the aforesaid review that, in the end, includes a speech in which, with certain irony, successive proper examples of the fallacies described by Bentham are given. 681Paragraph added by the author of this book. 682Jeremy Bentham, The Book of Fallacies, in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Published Under the Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring, Simpkin, Marshall & Co., London, 1843, Volume II, p. 401. Jeremías Bentham, Falacias Políticas, Estudio Preliminar de Benigno Pendas, Traducción de Javier Ballarín, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid, 1960, p. 49. Jérémie Bentham, Traité des Sofismes Politiques, dans Oeuvres de Jérémie Bentham, Société Belge de Librairie, Hauman et Ce., Bruxelles, 1840, Tome Premier, pp. 449-450. Jeremías Bentham, Tratado de los Sofismas Políticos, Prólogo y Traducción de Francisco Ayala, Editorial Rosario, Rosario, 1944, pp. 34-35. 683 Counter example by the author of this book. secret pathology: unless enacted as temporary, laws are permanent, but this principle is confused with their perpetual nature and its consequence, irrevocability, taking the argument based on "the wisdom of our ancestors" to an extreme, also forgetting that "perpetual" is not a synonymous for irrevocable, when both the circumstances and the reasons on which laws are founded are altered;685 example: "If this were an ordinary mesure, I should not oppose it opposition with so much vehemence; but, Sir, it calls in question the wisdom of an irrevocable law." It was enacted in the memorable period of the founding fathers of our Homeland, at the beginning of our national organization: What right do we have to demolish this firm column on which the great men that preceded us stamped their eternal wisdom?686 No, Sir, the proposed bill deserves to be immediately rejected just because it cast doubts on the eternal wisdom of our more glorious ancestors!687 counter example: Mr. President of this Honorable Chamber: the proposed bill, like the laws enacted by the founders of our Homeland, maintains the same spirit of those times with regard to the promotion of the well-being of the people without distinctions, as those founders did and as we must do now. In the world of nature, the validity of laws lies in the 684Jeremy Bentham, The Book of Fallacies, in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Published Under the Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring, Simpkin, Marshall & Co., London, 1843, Volume II, pp. 401-402. Jeremías Bentham, Falacias Políticas, Estudio Preliminar de Benigno Pendas, Traducción de Javier Ballarín, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid, 1960, p. 49-50. Jérémie Bentham, Traité des Sofismes Politiques, dans Oeuvres de Jérémie Bentham, Société Belge de Librairie, Hauman et Ce., Bruxelles, 1840, Tome Premier, pp. 451-452. Jeremías Bentham, Tratado de los Sofismas Políticos, Prólogo y Traducción de Francisco Ayala, Editorial Rosario, Rosario, 1944, pp. 41-42. 685Jeremy Bentham, The Book of Fallacies, in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Published Under the Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring, Simpkin, Marshall & Co., London, 1843, Volume II, p. 407. Jeremías Bentham, Falacias Políticas, Estudio Preliminar de Benigno Pendas, Traducción de Javier Ballarín, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid, 1960, p. 59. Jérémie Bentham, Traité des Sofismes Politiques, dans Oeuvres de Jérémie Bentham, Société Belge de Librairie, Hauman et Ce., Bruxelles, 1840, Tome Premier, p. 455. Jeremías Bentham, Tratado de los Sofismas Políticos, Prólogo y Traducción de Francisco Ayala, Editorial Rosario, Rosario, 1944, p. 52. 686Review of "The Book of Fallacies: from Unfinished Papers of Jeremy Bentham, by a Friend. London, 1824", by Sydney Smith , Edinburgh Review, 42 (1825), pp. 367-389, p. 387. This is a fragment corresponding to this fallacy in the famous "Noodle's Oration" by Sydney Smith (1771-1843), thr "Friend" author of the aforesaid review that, in the end, composed a fluent speech in which he inserted, with certain irony, successive examples proper of the fallacies described by Bentham. The text between quotation marks reproduces the original, the rest is an adaptation by the author of this book. 687Paragraph added by the author of this book maintenance of the experimental conditions in which they were verified, while in the legal world, the validity of laws lies in the maintenance of the circumstances and reasons on which they were founded upon their enactment. Neither the current circumstances are the same that our glorious ancestors lived, nor the reasons that they had upon the enactment of the law, the amendment of which is now proposed, are applicable now. Nevertheless, the proposed bill is imbued with the same spirit promoting the well-being of the people and is also based on the same unyielding will of the founders of our Homeland. For these reasons, and for the considerations that arise from the Report of the Commission of [...] of this Honorable Chamber, which has accompanied the bill Now on debate, if the opposition does not raise any reasonable arguments for its rejection, the bill should be approved as soon as possible.688 Sophism of laudatory personalities diagnosis apparent normality: a person who enjoys certain high position confesses, with ironic modesty, that he cannot render an opinion on the proposed bill because he does not understand it, to underestimate it without having to judge it; or tries that a majority trusts his negative judgment, without analyzing the purported inconveniences that it would have, through a self praise about the purity of the motives that guide him and the integrity of his life;689 secret pathology: be it for ironic modesty or for the self-proclaimed authority, the secret pathology consists in rejecting the bill without any reasonable arguments against it.690 688Counter example by the author of this book. 689Jérémie Bentham, Traité des Sofismes Politiques, dans Oeuvres de Jérémie Bentham, Société Belge de Librairie, Hauman et Ce., Bruxelles, 1840, Tome Premier, p. 459. Jeremías Bentham, Tratado de los Sofismas Políticos, Prólogo y Traducción de Francisco Ayala, Editorial Rosario, Rosario, 1944, p. 64. Jeremy Bentham, The Book of Fallacies, in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Published Under the Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring, Simpkin, Marshall & Co., London, 1843, Volume II, p. 412. Jeremías Bentham, Falacias Políticas, Estudio Preliminar de Benigno Pendas, Traducción de Javier Ballarín, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid, 1960, p. 69. 690Jeremy Bentham, The Book of Fallacies, in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Published Under the Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring, Simpkin, Marshall & Co., London, 1843, Volume II, pp. 412-413. Jeremías Bentham, Falacias Políticas, Estudio Preliminar de Benigno Pendas, Traducción de Javier Ballarín, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid, 1960, p. 69-70. example: Mr. President of this Honorable Chamber, I must confess that I do not understand the proposed bill, in spite of my long lasting parliamentary experience, this being the reason why I am not able to render my opinion about its approval or rejection. counter example: Mr. President of this Honorable Chamber: I must acknowledge that it would have been very useful to rely on the authorized opinion of the distinguished parliamentarian who preceded me in taking the floor, but, because of the time spent in the study of the topic now on debate, we must deprive ourselves of his illustrated judgment, so as not to delay the enactment of a law of such an importance to the happiness of the people and the greatness of the Nation. If no reasonable arguments are raised against the bill, we should approve it without any further delay. example: Mr. President of this Honorable Chamber: the purity of the motives that have always guided me and the integrity I have demonstrated in many years of hones parlamentarian life, in the government party as well as in the opposition, impose on me the moral and political duty to move for the rejection of the proposed bill whithout any further debate. counter example: Mr. President of this Honorable Chamber: nobody can deny the parliamentary experience, the purity of the motives and the integrity demonstrated in many years of honest parliamentary life, so in government party as well as in the opposition, of the distinguished member of this High Body who has preceded me in taking the floor. However, since character is demonstrated by conduct and not conduct by character,691 I invite him, with the Jérémie Bentham, Traité des Sofismes Politiques, dans Oeuvres de Jérémie Bentham, Société Belge de Librairie, Hauman et Ce., Bruxelles, 1840, Tome Premier, pp. 451-45. Jeremías Bentham, Tratado de los Sofismas Políticos, Prólogo y Traducción de Francisco Ayala, Editorial Rosario, Rosario, 1944, p. 66. 691Jeremy Bentham, The Book of Fallacies, in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Published Under the Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring, Simpkin, Marshall & Co., London, 1843, Volume II, p. 413. Jeremías Bentham, Falacias Políticas, Estudio Preliminar de Benigno Pendas, Traducción de Javier Ballarín, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid, 1960, p. 70. Jérémie Bentham, Traité des Sofismes Politiques, dans Oeuvres de Jérémie Bentham, Société Belge de Librairie, Hauman et Ce., Bruxelles, 1840, Tome Premier, p. 459. Jeremías Bentham, Tratado de los Sofismas Políticos, Prólogo y Traducción de Francisco Ayala, Editorial Rosario, Rosario, 1944, p. 67. utmost cordially respect, to let us know in detailed his authorized opinion about the purported specific inconveniences of the bill on debate that have led him to move for its rejection without any further debate. If neither he, nor any other member of his political party, or of other political parties, is able to illustrate us about the rejection of the bill with reasonable arguments, then I will move for its immediate approval, on the basis of the considerations contained in the Report of the Commission of [...] that has accompanied it.692 b. Legislative sophisms in the strict sense Deliberative sophisms, although also applicable to many other political debates not about laws, take the discussion of the laws as a model. Legislative sophisms in the strict sense are those incurred by the law itself; diagnosis: apparent normality: the law grants exemptions to certain persons for the optional exercise of certain activity, as if this would benefit them, and imposes sanctions on other persons who fail to exercise the above mentioned activity, as if this would damage them; secret pathology: in fact, since the purported beneficiaries will not exercise the optional excercise that the law granted to them, because they will not be fined for being exempted or, since when a fine is established on the the enrolled citizens who fail to excercise the aforesaid activity, they will not register themselves for fear of being fined, in any of two cases the ones purportedly damaged are those actually benefited with the exclusive exercise of the activity thus regulated. Examples: Sophism of the oligarchy693 Due to the little participation of the citizens in Assemblies of the People, the magistratures and the administration of justice, it turns out necessary, 692Both the example and the counter example belong to the author of this book. 693Aristotle, Polítícs, Book IV, Cap. 13, 1297a15-25. Aristotle, Politics, IV, 13, 1297a15-23, in The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford Translation. Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume Two, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 2059. Aristotle, Politics, VI, 13, 1297a14-25, in The Politics of Aristotle, Translated with Introduction, Analysis and Notes, by Peter L. Phillips Simpson, The University of North Caroline Press, Chappel Hill and London, 1997, p.195. Aristóteles, Política, Libro VI (IV), Cap. 13, 1297a15-25, Edición Bilingüe y Traducción por María Araujo, Introducción y Notas por Julián Marías, Instituto de Estudios Políticos, Madrid, 1970, p. 191. opportune and expedient to encourage them to participate. Therefore, THE ASSEMBLY OF THE PEOPLE DOES HEREBY ENACT THE FOLLOWING LAW: ARTICLE 1: The citizens with an annual income equivalent to or higher than [...] drachmas who have failed to participate in the Assemblies of the People, or in the administration of justice, or who have resigned from their offices in the magistratures, shall, in any of the aforesaid cases, pay a fines amounting to [...] drachmas for each day of absence. ARTICLE 2: The citizens with an income lower than [...] drachmas will be entitled to participate in the Assemblies of the People, the administration of Justice and the magistratures. They will remain exempt from the imposition of fines if they fail to participate in the former cases or resign their offices in the later case. ALTERNATIVE ARTICLE 1 and 2: The citizens who shall register in a special record will be entitled to participate in the Assemblies of the People, the administration of justice and the magistratures. The citizens registered in the aforesaid special record who not participate in the Assemblies of the People or in the administration of justice, or who shall resign their offices in the magistratures, shall pay a fine amounting to [...] drachmas, for each day of absence. ARTICLE...: On the relevant formalities. Sophism of the ochlocracia694 Due to the little participation of the citizens in the Assemblies of the People, the administration of justice and the magistratures, it turns out necessary, opportune and expedient to encourage them to participate. 694Aristotle, Politics, Book IV, Cap. 13, 1297a35. Aristotle, Politics, IV, 13, 1297a35, in The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford Translation. Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume Two, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 2060. Aristotle, Politics, VI, 13, 1297a34, in The Politics of Aristotle, Translated with Introduction, Analysis and Notes, by Peter L. Phillips Simpson, The University of North Caroline Press, Chappel Hill and London, 1997, p. 195. Aristóteles, Política, Libro VI (IV), Cap. 13, 1297a35, Edición Bilingüe y Traducción por María Araujo, Introducción y Notas por Julián Marías, Instituto de Estudios Políticos, Madrid, 1970, p. 192. Therefore, THE ASSEMBLY OF THE PEOPLE DOES HEREBY ENACT THE FOLLOWING LAW: ARTICLE 1: The citizens with an income higher than [...] drachmas, will be entitled to participate in the Assemblies of the People, the administration of justice and the magistratures. They shall remain exempted from the imposition of fines if they fail to participate in the former cases or resign their offices in the latter case. ARTICLE 2: The citizens with an annual income equivalent to or lower than [...] drachmas, will be entitled to participate in the Assemblies of the People, the administration of justice and the magistratures. They shall receive a subsidy of [...] drachmas for each day of participation. ARTICLE 3: On the relevant formalities. counter example: Refutation of two previous sophisms695 Due to the little participation of the citizens in the Assemblies of the People, the administration of justice and the magistratures, it turns out necessary, opportune, expedient and fair, to encourage them to participate. Therefore, THE ASSEMBLY OF THE PEOPLE DOES HEREBY ENACT THE FOLLOWING LAW: ARTICLE 1: The citizens who, without any Reasonable justification, shall not participate in the Assemblies of the People, the administration of justice, or who shall resign their offices in the magistratures, in any of the aforesaid cases, shall pay a fine equivalent to [...] % of their annual income, for each day of absence. ARTICLE 2: The citizens with an income equivalent to or lower than [...] drachmas, shall 695Aristotle, Politics, Book IV, Cap. 13, 1297a15-25. Aristotle, Politics, IV, 13, 1297a15-23, in The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford Translation. Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume Two, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 2059. Aristotle, Politics, VI, 13, 1297a14-25, in The Politics of Aristotle, Translated with Introduction, Analysis and Notes, by Peter L. Phillips Simpson, The University of North Caroline Press, Chappel Hill and London, 1997, p. 195. Aristóteles, Política, Libro VI (IV), Cap. 13, 1297a15-25, Edición Bilingüe y Traducción por María Araujo, Introducción y Notas por Julián Marías, Instituto de Estudios Políticos, Madrid, 1970, p. 191. receive a subsidy of [...] drachmas for each day of participation in the Assemblies of the People, the administration of justice or the magistratures. ARTICLE 3: On the relevant formalities. Those willing to enlarge their knowledge on political sophisms in general and on legislative sophisms in the wide sense (deliberative and legislative in the strict sense), may look for inspiration in Tacitus (55 c. 117 A.D.)696, who narrated some historical examples of "secrets of the power"("arcana imperii");697 in Arnoldus Clapmarius (1574-1604), who included Aristotle's "political fallacies" in the "arcana imperii" from Tacitus, and systematized the whole subject matter with numerous cites of them both and of other classical authors;698 in William Gerard Hamilton (1729-1796), who detailed a large number of observations and rules from and for an astute parlamentarian,699 and in George Junkin (1790-1868), who wrote about the false assumptions and the refutations of the fallacies incurred with regard to the civil war in the United States of America.700 The things to say that were found will have to be chosen once weighted and selected by means of previous reflection, by using the Instruments. Although it is true that there is nothing more fertile than a spirit cultivated by studying, it is not less true that, as well as fecund lands produce good grains and also bad grasses that damage the grains, the Promptuary registers in a systematical form not only the good thinks to say, but also the bad, the weak or the useless ones701 to compose and criticize, to counsel and discounsel 696The Oxford Companion to Classical Literature, Compiled and Edited by Sir Paul Harvey, Oxford University Press, First Published October 1937, Reprinted with Corrections 1940, 1946, Oxford, p. 413. 697Tacitus, Annals II, 36. The Annals of Tacitus, II.xxvi, in Tacitus II, Annals, Books I-III, The Annals with an English Translation by John Jakson, The Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemenn Ltd., Harvard University Press, First Printing 1931, Reprinted 1943, 1951, 1956, pp. 436-438. Tácito, Anales II, 36, en Cayo Cornelio Tácito, Obras Completas, Traducción, Introducción y Notas, Obra Publicada Bajo la Dirección de Vicente Blanco y García, Aguilar, Madrid, 1957, pp. 146-147. 698Arn. Clapmarii, De Arcanis Rerumplublicarum Libri Sex, ed. Johannes Clapmarius, Bremen, 1605 (primera edición, póstuma). Arn. Clapmarii, De Arcanis Rerumpublicarum Libri Sex, apud Ludovicum Elzevirium, Amsterodami, 1641, Arcana imperii, pp. 73-113 (the cites correspond to this edition). 699William Gerard Hamilton, Parliamentary Logick, To which plows Subjoined Two Speeches Delivered in the House of Commons of Ireland, and other Pieces, With an Appendix, Containing Considerations on the Corn Laws, by Samuel Johnson, Never Before Printed, Printed by C. And B. Baldwin, London, for Thomas Payne, Pall-Mall, 1808, Preface xlvi pp.; 1-100 pp. Guillermo Gerardo Hamilton, Logical Parliamentarian, The Modern Spain, Madrid, s.f., 96 pp. 700 George Junkin, Political Fallacies: An Examination of the False assumpyions, and Refutation of the Sophistical Reasoning, which have Brought on this Civil War, Charles Scribner, New York, 1863, 325 pp. 701 With regard to the topics especially: Cicerón, El Orador, 15, 47-49. Marco Tulio Cicerón, El Orador, ( M. Tulli Ciceronis Orator), 15, 47-49, Texto Revisado y Traducido por Antonio Tovar y Aurelio Bujaldón, Ediciones Alma Mater S.A., Barcelona, 1967, pp. 20-21. Cicéron, L'Orateur (M. Tulli Ciceronis Orator ad M. Brutus), XV, 47-49, Texte Établi et Traduit par Albert Yon, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Paris, 1964, p. 18. the corresponding prescriptive and persuasive speeches, since before they are used it is necessary to value them with regard to every particular occasion. RULE: Before begining with the Systematics stage, it shall be verified that all the parts of the Promptuary (Form, Double reasons, Colors of Good and Evil, Topics and Sophisms) have beeng considered, like a check list, but not all the things to say that have been found shall be used without previous reflection, through the employment of the Instruments, about their respective utility to compose and criticize, to counsel and discounsel, in each occasion, the corresponding persuasive and prescriptive speeches. The things to say that were found and chosen in the Investigation stage will be distributed in accordance with the explanatory plan to be adopted, this beeing the second of the three stages of the algorithm established for the drafting of a bill, which will be developed in the following Chapter, dedicated to Systematics. Chapter VI Systematics The rhetorical algorithm that will result in a written, prescriptive or persuasive speech, connects the previous stage, investigation, which provided the things to say (res), with the following one, style, which will state them (verba). After going out of one and before entering into the other one, it is necessary to arrange the content in a suitable form (taxis, dispositio), in accordance with a systematics, also known as order, method, plan, disposition or economy. RULE: The systematics shall be suitable when it facilitates distribuing, finding, understanding and remembering the contents of the speech, as well as its internal and external references. It will vary depending on whether the speech is prescriptive or persuasive. 1. Prescriptive speeches Systematics has been one of the most studied topics by Romanist scholars as they criticized the Institutes of Gaius, the Digest and the Institutes of Justinian, and by Civil Law scholars, as they examined the respective codes and compared them with Napoleon's Code (1804), the German Civil Code (1900), and the Italian Civil and Commercial Code (1942). It has also been one of the most studied topics in the works on the art of legislation, both in the Civil Law and Common Law, but, curiously, it has not been related to the taxis or dispositio of the rhetorical tradition. The order, method, plan, disposition, economy or systematics of legislation is of the utmost importance both in the composition and criticism of the general juridical norms, and in their interpretation, approval, application and amendment, since it determines the explicit context, what is stated, and also determines the implicit context,702 what is not stated, but assumed: the idea of a juridical system. a. Natural order The juridical system has a classificatory structure already given to legislators like a pre-existing natural order (ordo naturalis), that they will follow under normal circumstances.703 This structure consists in the relationship of logical inclusion between 702 "The context of the law shall serve to illustrate the sense of each of its parts, so that between all of them there is a proper correspondence and harmony. The obscure passages of a law may be illustrated by means of other laws, particularly if they are about the same matter." "El contexto de la ley servirá para ilustrar el sentido de cada una de sus partes, de manera que haya entre todas ellas la debida correspondencia y harmonía. Los pasajes oscuros de una ley pueden ser ilustrados por medio de otras leyes, particularmente si versan sobre el mismo asunto." Código Civil de la República de Chile, Edición Autorizada por el Supremo Gobierno, Imprenta Chilena, Santiago de Chile, Julio de 1858, art. 22, p. 3. 703 It is the ordo naturalis of the rhetorical tradition, which is already given, does not depend on the orator and is followed under normal circumstances: Heinrich Lausberg, Handbook of Literary Rhetoric, A Foundation for Literary Studies, Foreword by George A. Kennedy, Translated from Handbuch der Literarischen Rhetorik, Eine Grundlegung der the sets of norms, institutions, branches, the internal juridical orders, and the international juridical order, all of them founded on the respective levels of principles (normative, institutional, proper of each branch, internal, international, general of the law and of civilized nations). It denotes the close link between the relevant differences and similarities that join together all the integral elements of a juridical system, reducing to a unity the multiplicity of materials originated in the sources of law (legislation, custom, case law, and juristic writings). RULE: The things to say found and chosen at the investigation stage, shall be shown in accordance with the systematics that will determine the explicit context of the speech, following, under normal circumstances, the classificatory structure of the implicit context (juridical system), so that it will facilitate distribuing, finding, understanding and remembering the content of the speech, as well as its internal and external references, for its opportune interpretation, approval, application and amendment. A set of separated materials is not the same as those materials combined in a house constructed with them. Members just smelt, are not the same as joined in the statue for which they were destined. RULE: The systematics order shall be natural, when it makes its integral parts so tightly cohesive that its sutures are not noticeable, forming a single body, instead of members only joined with each other.704 b. Artificial order If the speech is like a body, a good cook will cut it by its natural joints, trying not to break any part, like an inept cook would.705 PRINCIPLE: Divisions shall follow the natural order, but if special circumstances indicate the conveniency or utility of a separation (ordo artificialis), others may be used,706 as long as, in accordance with the principle of just tolerance, they do not Literaturwissenchaft, Max Hueber Verlag, München, 1960, Second Edition, 1973, by Matthew T. Bliss, Annemiek Jansen, David Orton, Edited by David E. Orton and R. Dean Anderson, Brill, Leyden, Boston, Köln, 1998, numbers 447-448, p. 213. Heinreich Lausberg, Manual de Retórica Literaria, Fundamentos de una Ciencia de la Literatura, Traducción de José Pérez Riesco del original alemán Handbuch der Literarischen Rhetorik, Eine Grundlegung der Literaturwissenchaft, Max Hueber Verlag, München, 1960, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1966, T. I, numbers 447-448, p. 373. 704 Quintilian, The Institutio Oratoria, III, VII, Preface, 1-2; VII.10.16. Quintilian, The Institutio Oratoria of Quintilian, with an English Translation by H.E. Butler in Four Volumes, The Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, G.P. Putnam Sons's, New York, Volume III, Book VII, Preface, 1-2, London, 1921, pp. 2-5, VII.x.16, pp. 170-171. Quintilien, Institution Oratoire, Texte Établi et Traduit par Jean Cousin, Societé d'Edition "Les Belles Lettres", Tome IV, Livre VII, Avant-propos, 1-2, Paris, 1977, p. 106, 7.10.16. 705 Plato, Phaedrus, 265d-e. Platon, Phédre, 265e, dans Platon Oeuvres Complètes, Traduction Nouvelle et Notes par Léon Robin, avec la Colaboration de M.J. Moreau, Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, Tome II, Paris, 1942, p. 62. Platón, Fedro, 265d, Edición Bilingüe, Traducción, Notas y Estudio Preliminar por Luis Gil Fernández, Instituto de Estudios Políticos, Madrid, 1957, pp. 61-62. 706 It is the ordo artificialis or ordo artificiosus of the rhetorical tradition, which consciously sacrifices the natural order (artistically), on account of special requirements of the cause (utilitas). destroy the real unity of the institutions, nor assemble heterogeneous elements, nor distort their harmony, and nor alter their truly essential features, thus obscuring the matter and becoming an obstacle to distributing, understanding,707 finding and remembering the speech, as well as internal and external references, for their opportune interpretation, approval, application and amendment. The systematics facilitates the understanding of a speech, since the context enables to omit words without generating reasonable interpretive doubts, like, for example, when the spanish word gato (meaning "cat" and "jack") "cat" is used to refer to the domestic animal in an animal protection law, or when it is used to refer to the device in a law establishing the rights of import of hardware, since nobody will find any ambiguity in their respective contexts. RULE: When the provisions are grouped in accordance with their similarities and differences, it shall be easier to: a) find those with the same topic, because they are together; b) remember them, because of the association of ideas; c) refer to them, mentioning the respective systematic units. RULE: The audience of a bill is not a single one, since it is integrated, successively, by those who shall put it forward, approve it, publish it, spread the knowlege of it, fulfill it and apply it. They are all its addresees, who shall previously interpret it. For this reason, the addreessees shall have to be borne especially taken into account by the legislator and his advisers, since they form a multiple audience. In the past, owing to the imperfect distribution of the matters, especially in Justinian's Digest, the explicit context and the descriptors that had to indicate the content did not have much weight in the interpretation, whether with the argument pro subjecta materia, or, to lesser degree, with the argument a rubrica.708 Nowadays, the Heinrich Lausberg, Handbook of Literary Rhetoric, A Foundation for Literary Studies, Foreword by George A. Kennedy, Translated from Handbuch der Literarischen Rhetorik, Eine Grundlegung der Literaturwissenchaft, Max Hueber Verlag, München, 1960, Second Edition, 1973, by Matthew T. Bliss, Annemiek Jansen, David Orton, Edited by David E. Orton & R. Dean Anderson, Brill, Leiden, Boston, Köln, 1998, number 452, p. 214. Heinreich Lausberg, Manual de Retórica Literaria, Fundamentos de una Ciencia de la Literatura, Traducción de José Pérez Riesco del Original Alemán Handbuch der Literarischen Rhetorik, Eine Grundlegung der Literaturwissenchaft, Max Hueber Verlag, München, 1960, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1966, T. I, número 452, pp. 375-376. 707 F.C. Savigny established the principle of "just tolerance" in the scientific exposition, which does not establish indifference in the event of an imperfection, but pays homage to the independence of the human spirit in its individual development. F. C. Savigny, Traité de Droit Romain, Traduit de l'Allemand par Ch. Guenoux, Librairie de Firmin Didot Frères, Paris, 1855, Tome Premier, Chapitre I, LIX Des Divers Systèmes de Classification du Droit, pp. 395-396. This principle also applies, according to the author of the present work, to legislative exposition. 708 The forceful value of the argument a rubrica was still a controversial matter at the beginning of XX century. La Logique Judiciaire et l'Art de Juger par P. Fabregettes, Librairie Générale de Droit & de Jurisprudence, Paris, 1914, pp. 384, 391-392. place of the norm in the legislative text, its explicit context, provides a hint for its systematical interpretation.709 PRINCIPLE: The legislator shall maintain the coherence, completeness and economy of the classificatory system, in the juridical system (macro) and in the respective bill (micro), avoiding antinomies, gaps and redundancies, in such a way that in the prescriptive speech, there will be a place for every-thing and every-thing will be in its place. Parts of the speech The parts stressed next appear in any prescriptive speech. They are natural insofar as they arise from their prescriptive nature, but they also are artificial,710 because they belong to the art of legislation that perfects them with its rules. RULE: The body of any prescriptive speech shall have two essential parts: a) the first part may have one or more sections and, in the event of many sections, it will be preceded by one or more Preliminary Titles or a General Part,711 followed by the most important divisions, grouped in a Special Part, if there is a General Part; b) the second part may limit itself to the last section (on the relevant formalities), or also include complementary provisions, provisions approving anexes, and transitory and repealing provisions. RULE: The provisions may be: a) complementary, if they may neither be included in the existing divisions, nor form a homogeneous class justifying another division; b) approving of annexes or a set of information, generally with technical contents, which will serve to interpret and apply the law, except in the case of the systematic legislation, usually enacted as an annex to the law that approved its text; 709 Giorgio Lazzaro, L'Interpretazione Sistematica della Legge, Universitá di Torino, Memorie dall'Istituto Giuridico, Serie II, Memorie CXXII, Torino, 1965, pp. 121-122. 710 [Cicero] Rhetorica ad Herennium, III, IX, 17. [Cicero] Rhetorica ad Herennium, With an English Translation by Harry Caplan, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, III, ix, 17, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England, First Published 1954, Reprinted 1964, 1968, 1977, 1981, 1989, 1999, pp. 184-187. [Cicerón] Retórica a Herenio, Traducción, Introducción y Notas de Juan Francisco Alcina, Erasmo, Textos Bilingües, Editorial Bosch, Libro III, IX, Barcelona, 1991, pp. 196-197. Cicerón, Obras Completas de Marco Tulio Cicerón, Traducidas del Latín por Marcelino Menéndez Pelayo, Biblioteca Clásica Tomo XIV, Tomo I, Retórica a Cayo Herennio, Libro III, Madrid, 1879, p. 154. [Cicéron] Rhétorique a Herennius. Ouvrage Longtemps Attribué a Ciceron, Texte Revue et traduit avec Introduction et Notes par Henri Bornecque, Librairie Garnière Frères, Livre III, IX, 17, Paris, p. 123. 711 The provisions of the General Part apply to all the topics in the Special Part. R. Saleilles, Introduction a l'Étude du Droit Civil Allemand, 1904, p. 105. After the division into a General Part and a Special Part of the German Civil Code of 1900, this systematic was not used again in the Swiss Civil Code of 1912, or in the Italian Civil Code of 1942, and it gave rise to an interesting debate in the French Civil Code Reform Commission. Code Civil Suisse, Exposé des Motives de l'Avant-Projet du Département Féderal de Justice et Police, Tome Premier, Introduction, Droit des Personnes et de la Famille, Berne, 1901, pp. 18-21. Travaux de la Commission de Reforme du Code Civil, Année 1945-1946, Librairie du Recueil Sirey, Paris, 1947, pp. 159-161. Année 1946-1947, París, 1948, p. 14-110, 229-277. c) transitory, if they establish exceptions to the principles governing the publication, entry into force, and existence of the law; d) repealing, if they render other norms partialy innefective; e) abrogative, if they render other norms completely ineffective, without replacing them. RULE: Complementary provisions shall precede transitory ones and transitory provisions shall precede repealing ones. Transitory and repealing provisions shall follow complementary ones, since both will be exhausted upon their respective fulfillment. RULE: The section on relevant formalities shall be at the end, because, in addition to its prescriptive content, which shall also will be exhausted, it shall indicate -in implicit formthat it is the last section of the prescriptive speech. RULE: Any division shall contain more than one section. Should there be only one section, a marginal rubric will suffice. RULE: When the change to be introduced to modify a law consists in adding a concept, it shall be advisable to subdivide an existing systematic unit,712 rather than to create a new one, of equal or higher status, provided that the resulting text preserves the homogeneity of the prescriptive speech. Although today it seems obvious, the numbering of the laws was one of the ideals pursued in the XVII century, as it may be seen in Leibniz.713 It has been a great advance, because it has facilitated references, but also a source of technical gaps, due to the possible errors or omissions in the amending legislation. RULE: Any legislative change shall be preceded and accompanied by the explicit control written in specific charts, of the crossed references in the bill itself and in relation to the current law, before and after the proposed changes, to avoid errors and technical gaps. Elaboration of the expository plan RULE: When the matters are distributed to two antithetic members of the set, tension shall be underlined; when they are distributed to three members, completeness shall be underlined.714 712 Jack Stark, The Art of the Statute, Fred B. Rothman, Littleton, 1996, p. 47. 713 Gottfried Whilhelm Leibniz, Philosophischen Schriften, Herausgegeben von der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Erster Band 1663-1672, Otto Reischl Verlag Darmstadt, Nova Methodus Discendae Doceandaeque Jurisprudentiae, Herbst 1667, Druck C. (Frankfurt 1667), "Catalogus Desideratum Hic Esto: Ad perficiendam Jurisprudentiam fiant, [...] (20) Leges Numeratae", Berlin, 1930, p. 364, desarrollado en el párrafo 61, pp. 334-335. 714 Heinrich Lausberg, Handbook of Literary Rhetoric, A Foundation for Literary Studies, Foreword by George A. Kennedy, Translated from Handbuch der Literarischen Rhetorik, Eine Grundlegung der Literaturwissenchaft, Max Hueber Verlag, München, 1960, Second Edition, 1973, by Matthew T. Bliss, Annemiek Jansen, David Orton, Edited by David E. Orton & R. Dean Anderson, Brill, Leiden, Boston, Köln, 1998, number 443, p. 209. Heinreich Lausberg, Manual de Retórica Literaria. Fundamentos de una Ciencia de la Literatura, Traducción de José Pérez Riesco del Original Alemán Handbuch der Literarischen Rhetorik, Eine RULE: Systematic criteria go from the simple to the complex, from general to special, from the abstract to the concrete, from the universal to the particular, from the highest to the lowest, from cause to effect and from precedent to consequent. RULE: In elaborating an expository plan, it shall be practical to start by concisely describing the topics to be developed in each systematical unit, starting with sections,715 in the case of simple laws, or with higher units, like Chapters, Titles, Parts and Books, in the complex ones, to group or to separate them later on, in accordance with the noticed relevant similarities and differences between them. RULE: The marginal rubrics716 of sections, like the denominations of Chapters, Titles, Parts, Books, Special Part, General Part, or of the prescriptive speech as a whole, shall be understood as headings or descriptors giving an idea of the topic dealt with, not as summaries of their content. RULE: Descriptors shall be grouped in homogeneous classes, in accordance with their relevant similarities and differences. Those repetitively used may indicate the need to form a General Part, with its respective subdivisions. The descriptors of the Special Part shall indicate the content of Books, Parts, Titles, Chapters and Sections. RULE: Complex systematical units shall be divided into simple systematical units, begining with Sections. RULE: To facilitate the debate and the voting, sections shall be subdivided into subsections and paragraphs, so that it may be possible to discuss, approve or reject them separately.717 No Section should exceed one hundred words, or else it becomes difficult to understand. The French Civil Code of 1804, an example of legislative clarity, does not contain any section exceding a hundreed words. RULE: Sections shall not exceed one hundred words, to facilitate the understanding of their respective meanings. Grundlegung der Literaturwissenchaft, Max Hueber Verlag, München, 1960, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1966, T. I, número 443, p. 368. In relation to the Roman jurist's tendency to use symbolic numbers and artificial symmetries, number 3 is remembered as and odd number bringing good luck; divine power, as in the Hindu mythology Vishnu, Siva and Brahama and the Christian Trinity; representation of the beginning, middle and end of everything and also of the space dimensions in Pythagoras, Plato and the neoplatonists; finally, the modern superstition of the English saying "The third time is the lucky one" or the German "Aller gutten sollen drei sein". Henry Goudy, Artificiality of Roman Juristic Classifications, Studi in Onore di Carlo Fadda, T. V., Napoli, 1906, pp. 210-211. 715 R.M.M. King, Manual on Legislative Drafting, Commonwealth Secretariat, London, 1976, p. 5. 716 Thus called because the epigraphs or signs of the ancient books used to be written in red ink. Diccionario de la Lengua Española, Decimonovena Edición, Real Academia Española, rúbrica, acepción 3, Madrid, 1970, pp. 1161. 717 For the division of the very complicated original proposals, which allows for partial rejections, see: Bentham, Oeuvres de Jérémie Bentham, Ét. Dumont, Troisième Édition, Société Belge de Librairie, Tome Premier, Tactique des Assemblées Politiques Délibérantes, Chapitre XXI Des Ammendements, Societé Belge de Librairie, Bruxelles, 1840, p. 393. Care should be taken with the terminology of legislative systematics in comparative law, since, in Civil Law countries, Secciones (Parts) may precede Títulos (Titles), like in the Argentine Civil Code, or appear later, before the Capítulos (Chapters), as in the Argentine Code of Commerce and in the Civil Code of Brazil; Common Law Sections are denominated Artículos,718 a Division is a Capítulo (a set of Sections), a Subsection is an Inciso, which is named Paragraphe in French, while an English Paragraph is equivalent to a French Alinéa.719 The latter systematical category begins to the left of the line, with a capital letter according to an interpretation, and ends with a period (Council of the State, General Secretariat of the Government and, in general, the administrative services); according to another interpretation, it also begins to the left, but it ends on the following line (services of the parliamentary assemblies).720 RULE: To write the marginal notes of Sections and rubrics of the other systematical units, as well as the whole prescriptive speech, the terminology used shall be transparent, to brings its meaning to mind, and also concise, to facilitates its memorization. 2. Persuasive speeches From Corax, active in Syracuse after democracy was restored (467 B.C.) and the author of the first handbook on Greek rhetoric, persuasive speeches have been split into three systematical parts: exordium, agon or struggles (of ideas, in this case) and epilogue.721 RULE: Persuasive speeches shall be split into three parts: exordium, agon and epilogue. a. Exordium The persuasive speech precedes the prescriptive speech, takes it as its object, and serves as an exordium or preface to it in preambles, whereas, exposition of motives, messages and reports. These species of exordiums, as well as the footnotes, notes inserted at the end and epilogues, which also are persuasive speeches, considered in themselves as whole speeches, may have an exordium or preface the purpose of which, 718 For the Brazilian Civil Code and the equivalence between the Spanish Artículo and Sección, see: Hésio Fernandes Pinheiro, Técnica Legislativa, Constituçoes e Atos Constitucionais do Brasil, 2.a Ediçåo,Livraria Freitas Bastos S/A, Rio De Janeiro, Säo Paulo, 1962, p. 111, text and n. 60. 719 In addition to the equivalence between Article in Civil Law and Section in Common Law, for other remarks, see: Louis-Philippe Pigeon, Rédaction et Interprétation des Lois, Cours Donné en 1965 Aux Conseilleurs Juridiques du Gouvernement du Quebec, 1965, pp. 18-19. 720 Dominique Rémy, Légistique. L'Art de Faire les Lois, Éditions Romillat, París, 1994, p. 180. 721 George Kennedy, The Art of Persuasion in Greece, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1963, Sixth Printing, 1974, p. 59. Among the first authors of handbooks Tisias is also usually mentioned, but they are apparently the same person, since "Corax", which means crow in Greek, was allegedly his nickname. George A. Kennedy, A New History of Classical Rhetoric, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1994, p. 34 y n. 10, con cita de Cole, Thomas, Who was Corax?, Illinois Classical Studies 16 (1991), pp. 65-84. as in the preambles, expositions of motives, messages and reports, is to obtain the attention, docility and benevolence from the audience.722 RULE: In persuasive speeches, as in any speech, the exordium shall try to obtain the attention, docility and benevolence from the audience. RULE: The exordium may be omitted in honest bills, which are those that coincide with the feelings of the public opinion, given the absence of prejudices against the legislator, the bills or the regulated matter. RULE: When the exordium is omitted, the speech shall begin with the proposition, which is a summary of the problem to be solved, which will facilitate the understanding and approval of the solutions. The proposition may be supplemented by a division of the topics, so that those unfamiliar with the issue may understand the exposition throughout, postponing to obtain the attention, docility and benevolence from the audience.723 There are two exordiums species: the direct ones, which clearly, immediately and openly try to obtain the attention, docility and benevolence from the audience; and the indirect ones, which mediately, secretely, subtly or by insinuation, pierce through the soul of the audience.724 Direct exordiums RULE: In honest bills, an exordium shall show why it coincides with the feelings of the public opinion, or announce the topics to be developed,725 to reinforce sympathetic feelings or to serve as an expository plan. 722 [Cicero], De Inventione, I, XV, 20. Cicéron, De l'Invention (De Inventione), I, XV, 20, Texte Revu et Traduit par Henri Bornecque, Librairie Garnier Frères, Paris, 1932, pp. 30-31. 723 [Aristotle] Rhetoric to Alexander, 29, 1436a35; 1437b34. [Aristotle] Rhetoric to Alexander, Translation E. S. Forster, The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation Edited by Jonathan Barnes, 29, 1436a 35, 1437b34, Volume Two, Princeton University Press, Second Printing, New Jersey, 1985, pp. 2296-2297, 2299. [Cicero] Rhetorica ad Herennium, with an English Translation by Harry Caplan, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, I, iv, 6, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England, First Published 1954, Reprinted 1964, 1968, 1977, 1981, 1989, 1999, pp. 12-13. [Cicéron] Rhétorique a Herennius, Ouvrage Longtemps Attribué a Cicéron, Texte Revu et Traduit par Henri Bornecque, Librairie Garnier Frères, Livre I, IV, 6, Paris, 1932, pp. 8-9. 724 [Cicero] Rhetorica ad Herennium, I, IV, 6. [Cicero] Rhetorica ad Herennium, with an English Translation by Harry Caplan, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, I, iv, 6, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England, First Published 1954, Reprinted 1964, 1968, 1977, 1981, 1989, 1999, pp. 10-13. [Cicerón] Retórica a Herenio, Traducción, Introducción y Notas de Juan Francisco Alcina, Erasmo, Textos Bilingües, Editorial Bosch, Libro I, IV, Barcelona, 1991, p. 68. [Cicéron] Rhétorique a Herennius, Ouvrage Longtemps Attribué a Cicéron, Texte Revu et Traduit par Henri Bornecque, Librairie Garnier Frères, Livre I, IV, 6, Paris, 1932, pp. 6-7. Cicéron, de L'Invention (De Inventione), I, 20. Cicéron, de l'Invention (De Inventione), Texte Revu et Traduit par Henri Bornecque, Librairie Garnier Frères, I, 20, Paris, 1932, pp. 30-31. 725 [Cicero] Rhetorica ad Herennium, I, IV, 6. RULE: In humble bills, which are those about problems of minor importance, the exordium shall try to emphasize the obtaining the attention726 of the audience of persuasive and prescriptive speeches, to which end, such attention shall be directly requested727 or arguing that the problem: a) although not important at present, if not dealt with and if a solution is not adopted, important damages will be caused in the future; b) does not register precedents, or requires innovative solutions; c) does not affect the interest of the government only, but also of the State in general and the audience in particular. RULE: In obscure bills, the exordium shall try to emphasize the obtaining of the docility of the addressees of persuasive728 and prescriptive speeches. Docility consists in enabling the addressees to better understand such speeches, providing them a summary of their contents so that they may follow the exposition more easily.729 RULE: In doubtful bills, which combine easy assumptions for their honesty with difficult ones for their awkwardness, beeing it impossible to establish the resulting strenght or weakness, the exordium shall try to emphasize the benevolence, in such a way that the awkwardness will not be harmful to the legislator.730 [Cicero] Rhetorica ad Herennium, with an English Translation by Harry Caplan, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, I, iv, 6, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England, First Published 1954, Reprinted 1964, 1968, 1977, 1981, 1989, 1999, pp. 12-13. [Cicerón] Retórica a Herenio, Traducción, Introducción y Notas de Juan Francisco Alcina, Erasmo, Textos Bilingües, Editorial Bosch, Libro I, IV, Barcelona, 1991, pp. 68-69. [Cicéron] Rhétorique a Herennius, Ouvrage Longtemps Attribué a Cicéron, Texte Revu et Traduit par Henri Bornecque, Librairie Garnier Frères, Livre I, IV, 6, Paris, 1932, pp. 8-9. 726 [Cicero] Rhetorica ad Herennium, I, IV, 6. [Cicero] Rhetorica ad Herennium, with an English Translation by Harry Caplan, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, I, iv, 6, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England, First Published 1954, Reprinted 1964, 1968, 1977, 1981, 1989, 1999, pp. 12-13. [Cicerón] Retórica a Herenio, Traducción, Introducción y Notas de Juan Francisco Alcina, Erasmo, Textos Bilingües, Editorial Bosch, Libro I, IV, Barcelona, 1991, pp. 68-69. [Cicéron] Rhétorique to Herennius, Ouvrage Longtemps Attribué to Cicéron, Texte Revu et Traduit pair Henri Bornecque, Librairie Garnier Frères, Livre I, IV, 6, Paris, 1932, pp 8-9. 727 Octave Navarre, Essai sur la Rhétorique Grecque avant Aristote, Librairie Hachette et Cie., Paris, 1900, pp. 215-216. 728 Octave Navarre, Essai sur la Rhétorique Grecque avant Aristote, Librairie Hachette et Cie., Paris, 1900, p. 214, n.1. 729 [Aristotle], Rethoric to Alexander, 29, 1436a35. [Aristotle] Rhetoric to Alexander, Translation E. S. Forster, The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation Edited by Jonathan Barnes, 29, 1436a35, Volume Two, Princeton University Press, Second Printing, New Jersey, 1985, pp. 2296-2297. 730 [Cicero] Rhetorica ad Herennium, I, IV, 6. [Cicero] Rhetorica ad Herennium, with an English Translation by Harry Caplan, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, I, iv, 6, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England, First Published 1954, Reprinted 1964, 1968, 1977, 1981, 1989, 1999, pp. 12-13. [Cicerón] Retórica a Herenio, Traducción, Introducción y Notas de Juan Francisco Alcina, Erasmo, Textos Bilingües, Editorial Bosch, Libro I, IV, Barcelona, 1991, pp. 68-69. [Cicéron] Rhétorique a Herennius, Ouvrage Longtemps Attribué a Cicéron, Texte Revu et Traduit par Henri Bornecque, Librairie Garnier Frères, Livre I, IV, 6, Paris, 1932, pp. 8-9. To ensure benevolence it is necessary to consider whether the addresees will be well disposed, bad disposed, or indifferent towards the bill.731 RULE: When the addresees of the bill are well disposed, this state of mind may be briefly remembered in the exordium, to maintain or increase their benevolence. EXAMPLE: To have to show my just attitude towards public matters, for which invariably I preferred personal sacrifices instead of reaping any advantage at the expense of the State; to have to show that I always had the best intentions and that my bills turned out to be profitable laws for all; it does not seem necessary to say it, because it is of public knowledge. My efforts will go to show the merits of the law I now propose, which, as in the previous occasions, I hope will achieve the same results. RULE: When the addresees of the bill are indifferent towards it, the exordium shall try to obtain their benevolence, pleasing them with the modesty oratory of the legislator and alleging the benefits that all of them will obtain with the approval of the bill. EXAMPLE: It is appropiate and convenient to listen favorably to those who have not yet proved their legislative prudence, if, as it is habitual among the addresees of the bill, they are regarded objectively and sensitively. The present initiative does not pretend to obtain credibility by the oratorical skills of the person who proposes it, since he has not such skills, and they are not even necessary in this case, in the light of the evident benefits that everybody will obtain if the bill is debated, passed, interpreted and applied in accordance with its purpose: the common good. The addresees of the bill may be bad disposed against it due to prejudices against the legislator, the matter legislated, or the prescriptive speech in itself. RULE: When the addresees of the project are bad disposed against it due to prejudices against the legislator, the exordium shall capture their benevolence, refuting in advance the most frequent prejudices: a) imputation of crimes not judged, with the accusers' lack of interest in prosecute the criminal proceedings, the defendant's presumption of innocence and the objective assessment of the bill; b) judged and punished crimes, including the irregular nature of criminal proceedings, and the fact that the convict has served the imposed sentence; c) youth, with the early interest, the updated knowledge, the successful experiences, the new problems to resolve, and the absence of experts (who have not been sufficiently trained yet); 731 [Aristotle] Rhetoric to Alexander, 29, 1436b35. With some changes, it follows: [Aristotle] Rhetoric to Alexander, Translation E. S. Forster, The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation Edited by Jonathan Barnes, 29, 1436a35, Volume Two, Princeton University Press, Second Printing, New Jersey, 1985, pp 2296-2297. d) old age, with the deep knowledge, long experience of the concrete problems to be solved, a lucid memory of undisclosed reasons, and the absence of experts (who are no longer available). EXAMPLES: This legislator knows very well, perhaps too well, that he has to face prejudice against him, but it will be immediately proven that such prejudice lacks any foundation, in the case of: a) imputation of crimes not judged: Those who have pressed the charges have no interest in the proceedings, but are afraid of them, since the falsity of the accusations would be demonstrated and they should answer for their statements. For this reason they pose all kinds of obstacles to his efforts to enable trial to take place, which would prove his innocence, since any accused would do nothing to go ahead with the proceedings if he were guilty. It should also be borne in mind that any accused is pressumed innocent until found guilty; hence, he is waiting for the court judgment with confidence. Finally, those who shall decide whether this bill is to be discussed, approved or rejected, should not let themselves be carried awy by prejudice against its author, but they should carefully and dispassionately analyze the bill in itself, to make a just and convenient decision, which will brings happiness to everyone. b) crimes judged and punished: The charges are false, since [...] The proceedings are irregular, since [...] Finally, although he has been condemned, he has already paid his price to society, and nobody should any longer discredited on account of the same fact, since this is the case of a settled account. c) youth: The author of the present bill doesn't ignore that young people who promote bills faces prejudices on account of their inexperience. The matter regulated, which is new, has interested and been studied by him from a very early age. Besides, the author has succesfully applied his knowledge on many occasions. Finally, it should be remembered that now there is a shortage of experts available to enlighten us with their advice and, since the deliberation can't take place on other oportunity, it would be imprudent not to treat or approve a just and convenient bill on the basis of a mere prejudice, like the youth of the person who proposes it. d) old age: This legislator knows very well that elderly people who promote bills faces prejudices on account of their age, because it is thought that they should cease to do so. Since now there are no other experts available to enlighten us with their advice, and since the deliberation can't take other oportunity, it would be imprudent not to treat or approve a bill promoted by someone with deep knowledge and long experience in the matter. Finally, it should be added, in his favor, that he knows the underlying reasons for the successes and defeats related to these matters, which are not always known by the public at large, because he has read about some and has lived through others during his lifetime, and is still lucid enough to tell younger people about them. A just and convenient bill should not be rejected on the basis of a mere prejudice, like the ripe old age of the person who proposes it. RULE: When the addresees of the bill are bad disposed against it due to prejudices against the matter legislated, the exordium shall try to obtain their benevolence, quelling the fears for affecting powerful interests or debating controversial matters. EXAMPLES: a) When powerful interests are affected: Fears will always exist when powerful interests are affected, but nothing will be more powerful than the truth revealed and the common interest. b) When controversial matters are debated: It is true that one should not legislate on controversial matters, but it is not less true that, when the absence of uniform solutions makes the resuling uncertainty unbearable, it is necessary and opportune to put an end to that situation, implementing the most just and convenient solutions from the possible alternatives, as in the bill that we have the honour of submitting for your consideration. RULE: When the addresees of the bill will are bad disposed against it because the prescriptive speech is: a) very long, one shall allege the complexity of the problems and the precision required by the solutions adopted; b) of a very old fashioned style, one shall allege that it is a question of traditional formulae, which everybody knows how to interpret and apply; c) slightly convincing, one shall allege that all the fundamental reasons will be given in the persuasive speech. EXAMPLES: a) If it is said to be very long: The bill is long, but not for an unnecessary verbosity, but because it is so required by the complexity of the problems and the precision of the solutions to be adopted. b) If it is said to be of a very old fashioned style: It is true that at first sight the style of the bill seems very old fashioned, but this is due to the existence of traditional formulae associated to the matter involved, which everybody knows how to interpret and apply, and it is not advisable to introduce, in addition to changes of content, formal innovations that would only generate confusion, despite any possible aesthetic achievement. c) If it is said to be slightly convincing: The prescriptive speech might not sound convincing at first sight, and that's why it is preceded by this persuasive speech, which contains the reasons of the former, as it will be proved next. RULE: In awkward or shameful bills, direct exordiums shall not be used. Indirect exordiums RULE: The attention, docility and benevolence of the addresees, which should be maintained throughout the speech, shall be obtained at the beginning by a direct exordium. Should any inconvenience arise it shall be obtained by an indirect exordium or by insinuation.732 RULE: An indirect exordium, which tries to obtain the attention, docility and benevolence of the addresees by insinuation, mediately, secretely, and subtly, shall be used when the direct one is not convenient,733 because the bill: a) implies something awkward or shameful, opposed by the public opinion; b) is preceded by other bills that were supported by or tired public opinion out. RULE: When the bill implies something awkward or shameful, the legislator734 shall state that: a) there are other persons, things, or circumstances related to the bill, so that they may attract sympathy; 732 [[Cicero] Rhetorica ad Herennium, I, VII, 10. [Cicero] Rhetorica ad Herennium, with an English Translation by Harry Caplan, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, I, vii, 10, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England, First Published 1954, Reprinted 1964, 1968, 1977, 1981, 1989, 1999, pp. 20-21. [Cicerón] Retórica a Herenio, Traducción, Introducción y Notas de Juan Francisco Alcina, Erasmo, Textos Bilingües, Editorial Bosch, Libro I, VII, Barcelona, 1991, pp. 74-75. [Cicéron] Rhétorique a Herennius, Ouvrage Longtemps Attribué a Cicéron, Texte Revu et Traduit par Henri Bornecque, Librairie Garnier Frères, Livre I, VII, 11, Paris, 1932, pp. 14-15. 733 [Cicero] Rhetorica ad Herennium, I, VI, 9. [Cicero] Rhetorica ad Herennium, with an English Translation by Harry Caplan, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, I, vi, 9, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England, First Published 1954, Reprinted 1964, 1968, 1977, 1981, 1989, 1999, pp. 16-17. [Cicerón] Retórica a Herenio, Traducción, Introducción y Notas de Juan Francisco Alcina, Erasmo, Textos Bilingües, Editorial Bosch, Libro I, VI, Barcelona, 1991, pp. 72-73. [Cicéron] Rhétorique a Herennius, Ouvrage Longtemps Attribué a Cicéron, Texte Revu et Traduit par Henri Bornecque, Librairie Garnier Frères, Livre I, VI, 9, Paris, 1932, pp. 10-11. 734 In general, see: [Cicero] Rhetorica ad Herennium, I, VI, 9. [Cicero] Rhetorica ad Herennium, with an English Translation by Harry Caplan, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, I, vi, 9, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England, First Published 1954, Reprinted 1964, 1968, 1977, 1981, 1989, 1999, pp. 16-19. [Cicerón] Retórica a Herenio, Traducción, Introducción y Notas de Juan Francisco Alcina, Erasmo, Textos Bilingües, Editorial Bosch, Libro I, VI, Barcelona, 1991, pp 72-73. [Cicéron] Rhétorique a Herennius, Ouvrage Longtemps Attribué a Cicéron, Texte Revu et Traduit par Henri Bornecque, Librairie Garnier Frères, Livre I, VI, 9, Paris, 1932, pp. 10-13. Cicerón, De la Invención, I, XVII, 24. Cicéron de l'Invention (De Inventione), Texte Revu et Traduit par Henri Bornecque, Librairie Garnier Frères, I, XVII, 24, Paris, 1932, pp. 36-37. b) he would share the indignation that the bill has caused, if the causes were real; c) even if these causes were real, they are totally unrelated to him, or to the opportunity and nature of the bill proposed; d) he will quote the opinions of other prestigious legislators in bills of equal, higher or lower importance that have set valuable precedents, and he will gradually show its analogy to the opportunity and nature of the bill proposed; e) he does not intend to criticize those who have criticized without reason, whether in good faith or not, and that he will not even bring to attention other matters, but that he will make the respective references to arouse the relevant antipathies. Virtues and vices of the exordium RULE: The exordium will be virtuous if it obtains the attention, docility and benevolence of the addresees. Vicious,735 if it distracts, hinders understanding, or turn bad disposed the addresees. A exordium shall be vicious, among other things, when it: a) contains unusual vocabulary, a style too high, or verbose, due to its lack of spontaneity; b) may be applied to many bills, whether due to its vulgarity or to its dangerous application to other bills proposed; c) is not closely related to the statement of the facts (narration), or to the summary of the problem and the solution adopted in the prescriptive speech (proposition), in such a way that it does not look like a member of the same body, on account of its lack of naturalness. RULE: The legislator shall try to make the exordium encourage its addresses to read the bill, just as an architect tries to make the foyer encourage visitors to enter the building.736 b. Agon The nucleus of a persuasive speech is the agon, the struggle between ideas, an anticipated debate. RULES: The agon shall comprise three main parts: narration, confirmation and refutation; and three accessory parts: digression, proposition, and division. 735 [Cicero] Rhetorica ad Herennium, I, VII, 11. [Cicero] Rhetorica ad Herennium, with an English Translation by Harry Caplan, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, I, vii, 11, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London England, First Published 1954, Reprinted 1964, 1968, 1977, 1981, 1989, 1999, pp. 20-21. [Cicerón] Retórica a Herenio, Traducción, Introducción y Notas de Juan Francisco Alcina, Erasmo, Textos Bilingües, Editorial Bosch, Libro I, VII, Barcelona, 1991, pp. 74-75. [Cicéron] Rhétorique a Herennius, Ouvrage Longtemps Attribué a Cicéron, Texte Revu et Traduit par Henri Bornecque, Librairie Garnier Frères, Livre I, VII, 11, Paris, 1932, p. 14-15. Cicerón, De inventione, I, XVII, 26. Cicéron de l'Invention (De Inventione), Texte Revu et Traduit par Henri Bornecque, Librairie Garnier Frères, I, XVIII, 26, Paris, 1932 ?, p. 38-41. 736 Giambatista Vico, Institutiones Oratoriae, Testo Critico Versione e Comento di Giuliano Crifò, Istituto Suor Orsola Benincasa, Napoli, 1989, [25], pp. 144-145. Narration RULE: In the narration the facts shall be stated,737 with all the useful circumstances738 that may facilitate the approval of the bill. It may include the facts causing such problems as may make solutions arise in the spirit of the legislator (occasio legis),739 insofar as they contribute to the best understanding of the purpose sought, provided always that they coincide with the foundation of the bill (ratio legis) and the drafting of the prescriptive speech. RULE: The narration may be avoided in brief bills. Simple topics shall be started by the proposition. RULE: The narration states important facts of the past, presents the current ones, and predicts those that will happen in the future,740 by way of reasons for the changes to be introduced in the juridical system, to achieve the results desired for the social system. RULE: The virtues of the narration are its clarity, concision and verisimilitude, which shall facilitate the understanding, memorization and proof, respectively.741 RULE: For a clear narration, an appropriate vocabulary, usual between its addresees shall be used, and the facts shall be presented in chronological order.742 737 [Cicero] Rhetorica ad Herennium, I, VII, 11-12. [Cicero] Rhetorica ad Herennium, with an English Translation by Harry Caplan, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, I, vii, 11-12, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London England, First Published 1954, Reprinted 1964, 1968, 1977, 1981, 1989, 1999, pp. 22-23. [Cicerón] Retórica a Herenio, Traducción, Introducción y Notas de Juan Francisco Alcina, Erasmo, Textos Bilingües, Editorial Bosch, Libro I, VII, Barcelona, 1991, pp. 76-77. [Cicéron] Rhétorique a Herennius, Ouvrage Longtemps Attribué a Cicéron, Texte Revu et Traduit par Henri Bornecque, Librairie Garnier Frères, Livre I, VII, 12, Paris, 1932, p. 14-15. Cicerón, De inventione, I, XX, 28. Cicéron de l'Invention (De Inventione), Texte Revu et Traduit par Henri Bornecque, Librairie Garnier Frères, I, XVIII, 26, Paris, 1932, pp. 42-43. 738 Giambatista Vico, Institutiones Oratoriae, Testo Critico Versione e Comento di Giuliano Crifò, Istituto Suor Orsola Benincasa, Napoli, 1989, [26], pp. 164-165. 739 A.F.J. Thibaut, Teoria dell'Interpretazione Logica del Diritto in Generale e del Diritto Romano in Particolare (Theorie der Logischen Auslengung des Römischen Rechts, Altona, 1799, 1806), Trad. Donatantonio de Marinis, Giuseppe Marghieri editores, Napoli, 1872, pp. 53. Hortensius de Saint-Albin, Logique Judiciaire, ou Traité des Arguments Légaux, Joubert, LibraireEditeur, Seconde Edition, Paris, 1841, 143, pp. 118. 740 [Aristotle] Rhetoric to Alexander, 30, 1438a4-6. [Aristotle] Rhetoric to Alexander, 30, 1438a4-6, Translation E. S. Forster, Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume Two, Princeton University Press, Second Printing, New Jersey, 1985, p. 2299. 741 [Aristotle] Rhetoric to Alexander, 30, 1438a20. [Aristotle] Rhetoric to Alexander, 30, 1438a20, Translation E. S. Forster, The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume Two, Princeton University Press, Second Printing, New Jersey, 1985, p. 2300. Cicero, De Inventione, I, XX, 28. Cicéron, De l'Invention (De Inventione), I, XX, 28, Texte Revu et Traduit avec Introduction et Notes par Henri Bornecque, Librairie Garnier Frères, Paris, pp 42-43. 742 Giambatista Vico, Institutiones Oratoriae, Testo Critico Versione e Comento di Giuliano Crifò, Istituto Suor Orsola Benincasa, Napoli, 1989, [26], pp. 166-167. RULE: For a concise narration, it shall begin and end with the relevant events, without useless digressions, with the words necessary for a restricted speech,743 without harming its clarity and verisimilitude. RULE: For the verisimilitude of the narration, the past, present or future circumstances, shall agree with persons and things, times and places, causes, the nature of things and men, usages and common sense, so that what is said appears as it usually happen.744 RULE: The narration shall try to avoid the following vices: obscurity, verbosity and improbability. Digression, proposition and division RULE: The agon may include: a) matters unrelated to the problems to solve (digressions), if they make the approval of the bill more acceptable, or allow a better knowledge of what will be stated in the confirmation and refutation. When digressions are omitted, the proposition should be made in such a way that it arises spontaneously from the narration itself;745 b) a summary of the problem and the solution instrumented in the prescriptive speech, to facilitate the understanding and approval of the bill (proposition). When the narration, the public opinion and the opposition all agree, the proposition may be omitted or simplified. When they partially agree, a distinction shall be drawn between the coincidences and the dissents with the public opinion or with the opposition746 that will remain controversial, for its opportune confirmation or refutation. c) the topics and the order in which they will be presented (division or partition), in a concise way, in three or four parts at the most,747 so that the speech may be easily followed, turning the addresees well disposed. It may be omitted when the topics are simple and the speeches are brief, except when is desirable to amplify the speech. Confirmation RULE: In the confirmation, which shall be the nucleus of the agon, the arguments to counsel the approval of the bill proposed shall be stated, while, in the refutation the arguments to discounsel the maintenance of the juridical system unchanged or the introduction of changes different from those of the bill proposed shall be stated. RULE: The confirmation shall argue on: a) the verisimilitude of the narration, since from the knowledge of the nature, meaning and effects of things, it arises that it is a question of ordinary facts, which usually 743 Giambatista Vico, Institutiones Oratoriae, Testo Critico Versione e Comento di Giuliano Crifò, Istituto Suor Orsola Benincasa, Napoli, 1989, [26], pp. 166-167, quien se refiere a la brevedad. 744 Giambatista Vico, Institutiones Oratoriae, Testo Critico Versione e Comento di Giuliano Crifò, Istituto Suor Orsola Benincasa, Napoli, 1989, [26], pp. 166-167. 745 Giambatista Vico, Institutiones Oratoriae, Testo Critico Versione e Comento di Giuliano Crifò, Istituto Suor Orsola Benincasa, Napoli, 1989, [27], pp. 176-177. 746 He refers only to the adversary: Giambatista Vico, Institutiones Oratoriae, Testo Critico Versione e Comento di Giuliano Crifò, Istituto Suor Orsola Benincasa, Napoli, 1989, [28], pp. 178-179. 747 Giambatista Vico, Institutiones Oratoriae, Testo Critico Versione e Comento di Giuliano Crifò, Istituto Suor Orsola Benincasa, Napoli, 1989, [29], pp 180-181. happen,748 or of extraordinary ones, which, although they do not usually happen, contain no falsity affecting their verisimilitude; b) the justice, convenience or utility of the bill, with a special emphasis on the latter, for the benefits it will produce or the damages it will avoid (sympheron, utilitas),749 and the safety it will grant. RULE: To confirm the verisimilitude of the narration, the topic of probability shall be used, owing to the congruity of the real past, present or future circumstances, with the persons, things, times, nature of things and men, usages, customs and common sense, in such a way that what is said appears as usually happens. RULE: To confirm the justice and convenience or utility of the bill, the arguments may deal with the following topics: 748 Quintilian, The Institutio Oratoria of Quintilian V, 10,15. Quintilian, The Institutio Oratoria of Quintilian, with an English Translation by H.E. Butler In Four Volumes, The Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, G.P. Putnam Sons's, New York, Volume II, Book V, x, 15, London, 1921, pp. 208-209. Quintilien, Institution Oratoire, Texte Établi et Traduit par Jean Cousin, Societé D'Edition "Les Belles Lettres", Tome III, Livre V, 10, 15, Paris, 1976, p. 131. Digest, 1.3.10. El Digesto del Emperador Justiniano, Traducido y Publicado por el Licenciado Don Agustín Rodriguez De Fonseca, 1.3.10, Nueva Edición Aumentada con la Traducción de los Proemios, Completada y Revisada con Arreglo a los Textos más Autorizados de las Ediciones Modernas, Imprenta de Ramón Vicente, Tomo I, Madrid, 1872, p. 42. Corpus Iuris Civilis, Editio Steriotipa Octava, Volumen Primum Digesta, Recognovit, Theodorus Mommsen, 1.3.10, Apud Weidemans, Berolini, 1899, p. 6. 749 In Greek sympheron, in Latin utilitas, which would be the eminent purpose that should reach by the persuasive speech, according to Aristotle, since nobody would confess that he advises harmful things or dissuades convenient things. Aristotle on Rhetoric, I, 3, 1358b. Expedience, harmfulness: The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford Translation. Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume Two, Rhetoric, I, 3, 1358b, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 2160. Advantageous, harmful: Aristotle on Rhetoric. A Theory of Civic Discourse, Newly Translated with Introduction, Notes, an Appendixes by George A. Kennedy, Oxford University Press, I, 3, 1358 b, New York, Oxford, 1991, p. 49 y n. 81. Conveniente (convinient), perjudicial (detrimental): Aristóteles, Retórica, Introducción, Traducción y Notas por Quintín Racionero, Libro I, 3.2., 1358 b, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1990, p. 195. Utile, nuisible Aristote, Rhétorique, Texte Établi et Traduit par Médéric Dufour, Societé d'Édition les Belles Lettres, Tome Premier, Livre I, 3, 1358b, Paris, 1932, p. 84. Utile (useful), nocivo (detrimental): Aristotele, Retorica. A cura di Armando Plebe, I, III, 1358b, Editore Laterza, Bari, 1961, p. 15. Rhetórica ad Herennium, III, II, 3. [Cicero] Rhetorica ad Herennium, with an English Translation by Harry Caplan, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, III, ii, 3, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England, First Published 1954, Reprinted 1964, 1968, 1977, 1981, 1989, 1999, pp. 160-161. [Cicerón] Retórica a Herenio, Traducción, Introducción y Notas de Juan Francisco Alcina, Erasmo, Textos Bilingües, Editorial Bosch, Libro III, II, Barcelona, 1991, pp. 178-179. [Cicéron] Rhétorique a Herennius, Ouvrage Longtemps Attribué a Cicéron, Texte Revu et Traduit par Henri Bornecque, Librairie Garnier Frères, Livre III, II, 3, Paris, 1932, pp. 104-105. a) formal and material legality, since it was the initiative of a competent organ, following valid procedures (formal legality), and is consistent with the content of norms of a highest rank (material legality); b) possibility and practicability, due to the existence of circumstances that facilitate the achievement of things, because, in the absence of such circumstances the achievements of things would be impracticable,750 since one does not legislate on the impossible, and the impracticable is equated to the impossible; c) probability, due to the frequency of events, since laws are enacted only on what usually happens,751 unless they rule extraordinary, seen or foreseen facts, requiring emergency solutions; d) necessity, because of the problems existing in the social or juridical system requiring satisfactory legislative solutions; e) opportunity, because of the favorable occasion to introduce legislative changes which should not be delayed; f) justice, prudence, temperance and courage of those who propose the bill, of the bill itself, and as stimulus of these virtues to the addresees; g) honesty,752 equality and concord promoted753 among the audience; h) systematicity, due to its easy interpretation, application and insertion in the juridical system; and for the consistency, completeness and economy of the bill itself and with regard to the rest of the juridical system, except for the inconsistencies wanted by the legislator in implicit or explicit repealing norms; i) the stability of the harmonic balance between the requirements of justice, juridical security and convenience, which any mature juridical system should satisfy. 750 Cicero, De Inventione, I, XXVII, 41. Cicéron, De l'Invention (De Inventione), I, XXVII, 41, Texte Revu et Traduit avec Introduction et Notes par Henri Bornecque, Librairie Garnier Frères, Paris, pp. 60-61. 751 Cicero, De Inventione, I, XXIX, 46. Cicéron, De l'Invention (De Inventione), I, XXIX, 46, Texte Revu et Traduit avec Introduction et Notes par Henri Bornecque, Librairie Garnier Frères, Paris, pp. 64-65. 752 [Cicero] Rhetorica ad Herennium, III, II, 3. [Cicero] Rhetorica ad Herennium, with an English Translation By Harry Caplan, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, III, ii, 3, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England, First Published 1954, Reprinted 1964, 1968, 1977, 1981, 1989, 1999, pp. 162-163. [Cicerón] Retórica a Herenio, Traducción, Introducción y Notas de Juan Francisco Alcina, Erasmo, Textos Bilingües, Editorial Bosch, Libro III, II, Barcelona, 1991, pp. 180-181. [Cicero] Rhetorica ad Herennium, with an English Translation By Harry Caplan, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, III, ii, 3, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England, First Published 1954, Reprinted 1964, 1968, 1977, 1981, 1989, 1999, pp. 162-163. [Cicéron] Rhétorique a Herennius, Ouvrage Longtemps Attribué a Cicéron, Texte Revu et Traduit par Henri Bornecque, Librairie Garnier Frères, Livre III, II, 3, Paris, 1932 ?, pp. 104-107. Cicerón, De Inventione, II, LIII, 159. Cicéron, De l'Invention (De Inventione), II, LIII, 159, Texte Revu et Traduit avec Introduction et Notes par Henri Bornecque, Librairie Garnier Frères, Paris, pp. 256-257. 753 [Aristotle] Rhetoric to Alexander, 2, 1424b 15-20. [Aristotle] Rhetoric to Alexander, 2, 1424b 15-20, Translation E. S. Forster, The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume Two, Princeton University Press, Second Printing, New Jersey, 1985, pp. 2277. Refutation RULE: Both the criticism of the bill proposed and other positions adopted (not supporting legislative changes to the juridical system or advising changes different from those introduced by the bill) may be refuted. Refutation of the criticism to the bill proposed RULE: In the refutation of the probable or formulated criticism to the bill proposed, when the arguments: a) of the confirmation were stronger, a single refutation shall be opposed against each single criticism;754 b) of the confirmation were weaker, several refutations shall be opposed against each single criticism (amplification of the refutation), or a single refutation shall be opposed to several criticism (attenuation of the criticism);755 c) of the accesory criticism depend on the main criticism, as the links of the same chain, only the main criticism shall be refuted.756 Refutation of other positions RULE: In the refutation of other positions (not supporting legislative changes to the juridical system or advising changes different from those introduced by the bill proposed), the arguments may deal with the following topics: a) improbability of the narrations; b) injustice and inconvenience or uselessness of introducing changes different from those introduced by the bill proposed; c) harmful resulting from not changing the juridical system, or from approving changes different to those of the bill proposed. RULE: To refute the verisimilitude of other narrations, the topic of probability shall be used, owing to the congruity of the real past, present or future circumstances, with persons, things, times, the nature of things and men, the usages, custom and common sense, in such a way that what is said will not appear as usually happens. RULE: To refute the justice and convenience or utility of introducing legislative changes different from those of the bill proposed, the arguments may be deal with the following topics: 754 [Aristotle] Rhetoric to Alexander, 33, 1439b14. [Aristotle] Rhetoric to Alexander, 33, 1439b14, Translation E. S. Forster, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume Two, Princeton University Press, Second Printing, New Jersey, 1985, p. 2302. 755 Although it does not state anything on the weakness of the arguments of the confirmation, that might be implied because the refutation of the arguments one by one is recomended when the confirmation arguments are stronger, see: [Aristotle] Rhetoric to Alexander, 33, 1439b4-14. [Aristotle] Rhetoric to Alexander, 33, 1439b4-14, Translation E. S. Forster, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume Two, Princeton University Press, Second Printing, New Jersey, 1985, p. 2302. 756 Giambatista Vico, Institutiones Oratoriae, Testo Critico Versione e Comento di Giuliano Crifò, Istituto Suor Orsola Benincasa, Napoli, 1989, [32], pp. 220-221. a) formal and material illegality, since it was not the initiative of a competent organ, following valid procedures (formal illegality), and is not consistent with the content of norms of a higher rank (material illegality); b) impossibility and impracticability, due to the non-existence of circumstances that facilitate the achievement of things, because, in the absence of such circumstances the achievements of things would be impracticable, since one does not legislate on the impossible, and the impracticable is equated to the impossible; c) improbability, due to the infrequency of events, since laws are enacted only on what usually happens, unless they rule extraordinary, seen or foreseen facts, requiring emergency solutions; d) unnecessary solutions, because of the non-existence of problems in the social or juridical system; or if such problems do exists, because the legislative solutions proposed will not solve them satisfactorily; e) absence of opportunity, because of the non-existence of a favorable occasion to introduce such legislative changes. f) injustice, imprudence, intemperance and cowardice of those proposing the bill, of the bill itself, and of its lack of stimulus to the justice, prudence, temperance and fortitude of the addresees; g) dishonesty, discrimination, and discord promoted among the audience; h) unsystematicity, for its difficult insertion in the juridical system; and for the inconsistency, incompleteness and lack of economy in the bill itself and with regard to the rest of the juridical system, except for the inconsistencies wanted by the legislator in implicit or explicit repeals. i) instability of the harmonic balance between the requirements of justice, juridical security and convenience, which any mature juridical system should satisfy. RULE: To refute the harmful caused for not supporting legislative changes to the juridical system and for advising changes different from those introduced by the bill proposed, it may be argued that the problems narrated will not be solved by the mere course of time, or through other sources of law, but, much on the contrary, they will at best remain the same, and, at worst, they will worsen, in accordance with the nature and imminence of the predicted harm. RULE: In the confirmation and the refutation,757 the arguments shall be placed as follows: a) at the beginning and at the end, the strongest ones, since, after the narration the addresees expects evidence confirming it, and the last thing said is better remembered; after the confirmation the addresees expects evidence refuting what has been said, and the last thing refuted is better remembered; b) in the middle, those of medium-sized force and those that, albeit neither useless nor essential for the proof, but weak if considered separated or individually, become strong and plausible when joined with others. 757 [Cicero] Rhetorica ad Herennium, III, X, 18. [Cicero] Rhetorica ad Herennium, with an English Translation by Harry Caplan, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, III, x, 18, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England, First Published 1954, Reprinted 1964, 1968, 1977, 1981, 1989, 1999, pp. 188-189. [Cicerón] Retórica a Herenio, Traducción, Introducción y Notas de Juan Francisco Alcina, Erasmo, Textos Bilingües, Editorial Bosch, Libro III, X, Barcelona, 1991, pp. 198-201. [Cicéron] Rhétorique a Herennius, Ouvrage Longtemps Attribué a Cicéron, Texte Revu et Traduit par Henri Bornecque, Librairie Garnier Frères, Livre III, X, 18, Paris, 1932, pp. 122-125. c. Epilogue RULE: The last division of the speech, namely, the epilogue (in Greek epilogos) or peroration (in Latin peroratio), shall be subdivided into two parts: the enumeration of the arguments (enumeratio argumentorum) and the motion of affections (affectuum commotio)758 or emotional appeals. Enumeration of the arguments RULE: In the enumeration of the arguments, the topics announced in the partition or division shall be said to have been proven, summing up the content of the confirmation and the refutation, in the respective order used in these two, to refresh the memory of the addresees of the persuasive speech.759 Emotional appeals RULE: The most suitable parts of the persuasive speech to give it color, exciting or calming the emotions of the addresees (pathos), shall be the exordium, which tries to obtain their attention, docility and benevolence from the beginning, and even more the epilogue, the last opportunity offered by the persuasive speech to obtain the decisions needed by the legislator, where the intelligence, the feelings and the will of the addresees are captured. EXAMPLE: "To make me believe, it is enough to show me that things are so; to make me act, it is necessary to show me that the action will answer some end. That can never be an end to me which gratifies no passion or affection in my nature. You assure me, "It is for my Honour." Now you solicit my pride, without which I had never been able to understand the word. You say, "It is for my interest." Now you bespeak my self-love. "It is for the public good." Now you rouse my patriotism. "It will relieve the miserable." Now you touch my pity."760 758 Giambatista Vico, Institutiones Oratoriae, Testo Critico Versione e Comento di Giuliano Crifò, Istituto Suor Orsola Benincasa, Napoli, 1989, [33], pp. 222-223. Cicero, Partitiones oratoriae, XV, 52. Cicerón, Obras Completas de Marco Tulio Cicerón, Traducidas del Latín por Marcelino Menéndez Pelayo, Biblioteca Clásica Tomo XIV, Tomo I, Particiones Oratorias, XV, Madrid, 1879, pp. 251-252. Cicéron, Divisions de L'Art Oratoire, Topique, Texte Établi et Traduit par Henri Bornecque, Deuxième Édition, Société d'Édition les Belles Lettres, Paris, 1960, Divisions de L'Art Oratoire, amplificationem, enumerationem, XV, 52, p. 21. 759 [Cicero] Rhetorica ad Herennium, I, XXX, 47. [Cicero] Rhetorica ad Herennium, with an English Translation by Harry Caplan, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, III, xxx, 47, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England, First Published 1954, Reprinted 1964, 1968, 1977, 1981, 1989, 1999, pp. 147-144. [Cicerón] Retórica a Herenio, Traducción, Introducción y Notas de Juan Francisco Alcina, Erasmo, Textos Bilingües, Editorial Bosch, Libro II, XXX, Barcelona, 1991, pp. 168-169. [Cicéron] Rhétorique a Herennius, Ouvrage Longtemps Attribué a Cicéron, Texte Revu et Traduit par Henri Bornecque, Librairie Garnier Frères, Livre II, XXX, 47, Paris, 1932, pp. 94-95. 760 George Campbell, The Philosophy of Rhetoric, a New Edition, Harper & Brothers, Publishers, New York, Book I, Chapter VII, Section IV, pp. 99-100. RULE: The arguments shall aim at the intelligence so that the reasons adduced are understood. They shall be dressed in the colors of hope and fear, to stir up emotions and induce the will of the legislators to approve the bill, and so that the enacted law shall be interpreted and applied in accordance with its spirit, procuring its spontaneous fulfillement. Hope and fear Hope is the believable possibility of obtaining awards or other benefits and of avoiding punishment or other damages, if the bill is approved. Fear is the believable possibility of not obtaining the awards or other benefits and of suffering serious and irreparable, past, present or imminent damages, if the bill is not be approved. RULE: To excite hope in the addresees, they shall be persuaded to believe that what they wish will happen. To calm fear, they shall be persuaded to believe that what they do not wish will not happen, or that, if it happens, it will not be so imminent or serious. RULE: The legislator shall capture the addresees' will by motivating them by his own character (pathos), by emotions (pathos) and reasonings (logos), in such a way that: a) they shall experience hope and fear at the same time, so that they will judge the reasons facilitating and hindering the fulfillment of their wishes.761 b) they will judge the existence of a connection between the gratification of hope or the evanescence of fear, on the one hand, and the required actions, on the other. The actions required are the approval of the bill proposed and the rejection to maintain the juridical system unchanged, with non-legislative changes, or with legislative changed different from those contained in the bill proposed, so that the enacted law shall be interpreted and applied in accordance with its spirit, procuring its spontaneous fulfillement. 762 Amplification and attenuation RULE: To increase the credibility of the arguments, they shall be amplified; to diminish it, they shall be attenuated. It has been written that in the amplification and the attenuation lies all the orator's power.763 Whether the use of these rhetorical instruments is blamed or praised, their importance to obtain persuasion cannot be denied, whether it is about the emotions of the addresees (pathos), about the character of the legislator (ethos), or about the 761 Descartes, Oeuvres de Descartes Publiées par Charles Adams & Paul Tannery, Léopold Cerf, Imprimeur-Editeur, Tome XI, Les Passions de L'Ame, Article CLXV, Paris, 1909, p. 456. 762 "[...] in order to persuade, there are two things which must be carefully studied by the orator. The first is, to excite some desire or passion in the hearers; the second is, to satisfy their judgement that there is a connexion between the action to which you should persuade them, and the gratification of the desire or passion which he excites." George Campbell, The Philosophy of Rhetoric, a New Edition, Harper & Brothers, Publishers, New York, Book I, Chapter VII, Section IV, p. 100. 763 Quintilian, The Institutio Oratoria of Quintilian VII, 3, 89. Quintilian, The Institutio Oratoria of Quintilian, with an English Translation by H.E. Butler in Four Volumes, The Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, G.P. Putnam Sons's, New York, Volume III, Book VII, iii, 89, London, 1921, pp. 260-263. Quintillien, Institution Oratoire, Tome V, Livres VIII et IX, Texte Établi et Traduit par Jean Cousin, Societé d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres, Livre VIII, 3, 89, Paris, 1978, p. 85. reasonable arguments (logos), so much so that paraphrasing a famous proverb that goes "say to me with whom you walk and I will say to you who you are", it might be said "say to me what argument you amplify or attenuate, how and with which emotions, and I will say to you what class of legislator you are." RULE: In the motion of the affections or emotional appeals of the epilogue, the most important favorable arguments shall be amplified, and the most important unavoidable critical arguments that could not be refuted shall be attenuated. For this purpose: a) emotions shall be excited or calmed, or the existing excitement or calmness shall be increased or diminished;764 b) hope shall increase to become illusion, and fear to become horror, under extraordinary circumstances;765 or illusion shall be diminished to become hope, if it is not possible to eliminate it, and the horror to become fear, if it is not possible to eliminate it. RULE: To calm unfavorable emotions, try to eliminate or diminish the object producing them, or excite another passion to counter it; taking into consideration that hope and fear are passions that dominate the others and are countered by each other. Fear of the bill proposed and hope for maintaining the juridical system unchanged, with nonlegislative changes, or with legislative changes different from those contained in the bill proposed, are considered very unfavorable emotions. RULE: For the amplification or the attenuation, the following may be used:766 a) only words: superlative or diminutive, repetition, increase or decrease in the force in an enumeration of synonyms; b) only things: increase or decrease in their quantity, or ascent and descent in their hierarchy; confrontation, to emphasize the biggest or the smallest ones; syllogism, to reveal even more of what was previously exaggerated; enumeration of many things, so that they will seem bigger or smaller; enumeration of many acts under the same virtue or vice, to reinforce the feeling of love or hate, admiration or disdain; c) words and things: expression of the same thing with different words, so that it will seem different, in such a way that it enables to emphasize or minimize, clarify and inculcate an important argument into the mind and heart of the addresees (exhaustion). Before going on to the following stage, the syle, it should be verifed whether the persuasive speech includes a minimum content. 764 Cicero, Topica, XXVI. Cicerón, Obras Completas de Marco Tulio Cicerón, Traducidas del Latín por Marcelino Menéndez Pelayo, Biblioteca Clásica Tomo XIV, Tomo I, Tópicos a Cayo Trebacio, XXVI, Madrid, 1879, p. 235. Cicéron, Divisions de l'Art Oratoire. Topique, Texte Établi et Traduit par Henri Bornecque, Deuxième Édition, Société d'Édition Les Belles Lettres, Paris, 1960, Topique, XXVI, 98, p. 100. Benedetto Riposati, Studi sui "Topica" di Cicerone, Societá Editrice "Vita e Pensiero", Milano, 1947, pp. 282-283. 765 Vico mantains that the motion of affections shall not limit itself that the hope and fear born, but, shall also to incite to the audacity and to feel the horror among decision makers. He does not state that it shall be under extraordinary circumstances. Giambatista Vico, Institutiones Oratoriae, Testo Critico Versione e Comento di Giuliano Crifò, Istituto Suor Orsola Benincasa, Napoli, 1989, [33], pp. 224-225, 766 With some differences: Giambatista Vico, Institutiones Oratoriae, Testo Critico Versione e Comento di Giuliano Crifò, Istituto Suor Orsola Benincasa, Napoli, 1989, [31], pp. 210-217. RULE: The persuasive speech shall include, at least, the following:767 a) the purpose, which shall indicate exactly what the bill intends to achieve; b) the reasons for which it is thought that the purpose will be achieved by the bill, and why the bill is necessary to achieve such purpose; c) the mention of the effects expected of the law, including costs and collateral effects, and the reasons that make these effects acceptable; d) the reports with recommendations, had they been received; e) the explanation of the reasons that make it desirable or necessary to depart from the recommendations and from the solutions of the general laws, had they not been followed; f) the legality of the bill and the reasons that clear up any doubt in that regard; g) the explanation of each unclear sections.768 The ideas arranged in accordance with the respective systematics shall be expressed by means of the language, the third stage in the making of the bill, which will be developed in the following Chapter, dedicated to Style. 767 Kees Waaldijk, Motiveringsplichten Van de Wetgever, Lelystad: Koninklijke Vermande 1994 (The Legislature's Duties to Give Reasons, Doctoral Thesis, Defended at the University of Masstricht), Summary, pp. 398-399. http://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/1887/3592/1/170_01.pdf. 768 It does not distinguish between clear Sections or not: Kees Waaldijk, Motiveringsplichten Van de Wetgever, Lelystad: Koninklijke Vermande 1994 (The Legislature's Duties to Give Reasons, Doctoral Thesis, Defended at the University of Masstricht), Summary, p. 399. http://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/1887/3592/1/170_01.pdf. Chapter VII Style The rhetorical algorithm that ends up in oral speech consists of five stages: investigation, systematics, style, memory and action. In written speeches, like, generally, the laws are, only the first three stages turn out to be indispensable: the things found and chosen in the investigation (what to say) are checked and arranged in the systematics (where to say), to be expressed in writing, in the style, lexis or elocutio769 (how to say), the topic of this Chapter. Absent a linguistic expression, there is no speech, but if there is no things to saying, in a orderly manner, there is no speech either. Nevertheless, out of the five stages of the rhetorical algorithm proper to oral speech, under the influence of Petrus Ramus (1515-1572),770 an author who had related investigation and systematics to logic, omitted memory and respected action, when oratory declined and literature rose, rhetoric ended up being identified with style.771 The art of legislation has also been identified with style, whether from the active point of view (composition) or from the passive one (criticism) in Common Law system, or has been limited to mere literary criticism of legislative expressions, in the Civil Law system. Style comprises two major topics: virtues and genres.772 1. Virtues The classical virtues of style are four: purity (latinitas, puritas), which is grammatical, and three truly rhetorical ones: clarity (perspicuitas), ornament (ornatum), and aptitude (aptum).773 769 It is named Style due to the awl with which the ancient people wrote on waxed boards, Diccionario de la Lengua Española, Decimonovena Edición, Real Academia Española, vocablo estilo, Madrid,1970, p. 583. 770 George A. Kennedy, Classical Rhetoric and its Christian and Secular Tradition from Ancient to Modern Times, The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1980, p. 210. 771 Edward P. J. Corbett and Robert J. Connors, Classical Rhetoric for the Modern Student, Oxford University Press, New York Oxford, 1999, p. 504. Charles Waddington, Ramus (Pierre de la Ramée), Sa Vie, ses Écrits et ses Opinions, Librairie de Ch. Meyrueis et Ce, Éditeurs, Paris, 1855, 480 pp., it is the classic work on this important author, who influenced juridical systematics with his dialectics, as can be seen, among others, in Riccardo Orestano, Introduzione allo Studio Storico del Diritto Romano, G. Giappichelli, Editore, Prima Edizione 1958, Seconda Edizione 1961, Ristampa della Seconda Edizione, Torino, 1963, pp. 66-67. 772 Heinreich Lausberg, Handbook of Literary Rhetoric, A Foundation of Literary Style, Foreword by George A. Kennedy, Translated by Matthew T. Bliss, Annemiek Jansen, David E. Orton, Edited by David E. Orton and R. Dean Anderson, from the Second German Edition, Max Hueber Verlag, Ismaining Bei München, 1973, Brill, Leyden, Boston, Köln, 1998, numbers 458-1077, pp. 216-471, numbers 10781082, pp. 471-478. Heinreich Lausberg, Manual de Retórica Literaria, Fundamentos de una Ciencia de la Literatura, Traducción de José Pérez Riesco del Original Alemán Handbuch der Literarischen Rhetorik, Eine Grundlegung der Literaturwissenchaft, Max Hueber Verlag, München, 1960, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1967, T. II, números 458-1077, pp. 11-391, y números 1078-1082, pp. 391-401. 773 The Four virtues have been preserved and transmitted in rhetorical tradition, according to the systematization originated in Theophrastus. George Kennedy, The Art of Persuasion In Greece, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1963, Sixth Printing, 1974, p. 275. For the distinction between purity as a grammatical virtue and clarity, ornament and aptitude as rhetorical virtues, and the order in which they are enunciated, see: Heinreich Lausberg, Handbook of Literary Rhetoric, A Foundation of Literary Style, Foreword by George A. Kennedy, Translated by Matthew T. Bliss, Annemiek Jansen, David E. Orton, Edited by David a. Purity Correct language, in accordance with polite people's use, constitutes the purity of style,774 which should not be confused with "purity" as a demand for excluding "[...] everything that is not the pure and simple expression of the legislator's will [...]", about which Bentham wrote.775 RULE: The most frequent vices against purity are: a) by defect, the "barbarisms" in vocabulary (foreign words, archaisms, and neologisms) and the "solecisms"776 in syntax (concordance, government and construction777); b) by excess, the purism as affectation.778 E. Orton and R. Dean Anderson, From the Second German Edition, Max Hueber Verlag, Ismaining Bei München, 1973, Brill, Leyden, Boston, Köln, 1998, number 460, p. 216. Heinreich Lausberg, Manual de Retórica Literaria, Fundamentos de una Ciencia de la Literatura, Traducción de José Pérez Riesco del Original Alemán Handbuch der Literarischen Rhetorik, Eine Grundlegung der Literaturwissenchaft, Max Hueber Verlag, München, 1960, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1967, T. II, número 460, p. 11. 774 Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria, I, VI, 45. Quintilian, The Institutio Oratoria of Quintilian, with an English Translation by H.E. Butler in Four Volumes, The Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, G.P. Putnam Sons's, New York, Volume I, Book I, I,vi,45, London,1921, pp. 132-133. Quintilien. Institution Oratoire, Texte Établi et Traduit par Jean Cousin, Société d'Édition "Belles lettres", Tome I, Livre I, VI, 45, Paris, 1975, pp. 116-117. 775 "I call purity in the composition of a body of law the absence of any heterogeneous matter, of any strange miscellany, of everything that is not the pure and simple expression of the legislator's will." "J'appelle pureté dans le composition d'un corps de droit, l'absence of tout matière hétérogène, of tout mélange étranger, de tout se qui n'est pas l'expression pure et simple de la volonté du législateur." Jéremie Bentham, Vue Générale d'un Corps Complet de Législation, Chapitre XXXII De the Pureté dans la Composition d'un Corps de Droit, dans Oeuvres de Jérémie Bentham, Ét. Dumont, Troisième Édition, Société Belge de Librairie, Tome Premier, Société Belge de Librairie, Bruxelles, 1840, p. 339, text translated and quoted above. 776 "Barbarism" comes from "barbarians", who for the Greeks were others, for the Romans who were neither Greeks nor Latins, that they were corrupting the words; for Nebrija, also they were others, excepted Greeks and Latins, but it was including those of its own language, if they were committing some vice in the use of Spanish. "Solecism" comes of Soli, the city of Cilicia that Solon populated, mixing other peculiar nations, which began to corrupt the Greek language in the union and the order of the parts of the sentence. Nebrija, Gramática sobre la Lengua Castellana que Hizo el Maestro Antonio de Lebrija, Salamanca, 1492, g.i., y g.i. vuelta, Edición en Facsímil, Espasa Calpe-Argentina, S.A., Madrid, 1976. 777 Andrés Santa María y Augusto Cuartas, Diccionario de Incorrecciones y Particularidades del lenguaje, Segunda Edición Corregida y Aumentada, Editorial Paranifo, Madrid, 1967, p. 50. 778 Tyrtamus, who had been born in Eresus, was so eloquent that was called Theophrastus by Aristotle, for the divine character of its speech. Diogenes Laertius, The Lives of the Philosophers, 5.36; 5.38); Name and Manner of Speaking, 5A (Strabo, Geography, 13.2.4), 5B (Cicero, Orator 62), in Theophrastus of Eresus, Sources for his Life, Writings Thought and Influence, Edited and Translated by William W. Fortenbaugh, et al., Part One, Life, Writings, Various Reports, Logic, Physics, Metaphysics Theology, Mathematics, E.J. Brill, Biography, 1, Leyden, New York, Köln, 1992, pp. 21, 53, 55. Nevertheless, only one word said by Theophrastus was sufficient so that an Athenian woman, already brought in years, was speaking to him calling it foreign, and when he asked how she realized, told that it seemed to her that it was using a too much attic language. Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria, VIII, I, 2. Quintilian, The Institutio Oratoria of Quintilian, with an English Translation by H.E. Butler in Four Volumes, The Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, Without going into matters proper to grammar, given that legislation is aimed at governing human behavior, few comments are required about verbs, the part of the sentence with which actions are expressed. RULE: Active voice is preferable to passive voice, to avoid ambiguities about whom the subject is. The subject must always be determined explicitly, in case of doubts. Nevertheless, sometimes, the passive voice is the best or the only practical form; for example, when the prescriptive speech refers to itself (This law..., The present law...), in establishing its coming into effect, including a fiction, a definition, etc.779 RULE: When the prescriptive speech refers to itself, the passive voice is the best or the only practical form. RULE: In English the present tense of the indicative mood is now preferable to the traditional practice of the future tense of the subjunctive mood (e.g. "shall..."), because "often enunciates the law more simply and clearly". 780 Nevertheless, when the prescriptive speech establishes a fiction, the subjunctive mood is better than the indicative (e.g. "as though he where a citizen instead of as if he is a citizen").781 RULE: When the prescriptive speech establishes a fiction, the subjunctive mood is more simple and clear. RULE: In Spanish the future imperfect tense of the subjunctive mood, "which other Romance languages do not have", except Portuguese and Valaco,782 is preferable to the G.P. Putnam Sons's, New York, Volume III, Book VIII, i, 2, London, 1921, pp. 196197. Quintilien. Institution Oratoire, Texte Établi et Traduit par Jean Cousin, Société d'Édition "Belles lettres", Tome V, Livre VIII, I, 2, Paris, 1978, p. 53. 779 Elmer A. Driedger, The Composition of Legislation, Chapter V Verbs, Edmond Cloutier, Queen's Printer and Controler of Stationery, Ottawa, 1957, pp. 36-41, p. 36. Elmer A. Driedger, The Composition of Legislation, Chapter II The Verb in Legislation, Second Edition Revised, Published by The Department of Justice, Ottawa, 1976, pp. 7-17, p.7. 780 Driedger holds that it is necessary to use the present, because it is supposed that the law is always spoken. Elmer A. Driedger, The Composition of Legislation, Chapter V Verbs, Edmond Cloutier, Queen's Printer and Controler of Stationery, Ottawa, 1957, pp. 36-41, p. 37. Elmer A. Driedger, The Composition of Legislation, Chapter II The Verb in Legislation, Second Edition Revised, Published by The Department of Justice, Ottawa, 1976, pp. 7-17, p. 8. V.C.R.A.C. CRABBE, Legislative Drafting, Cavendish Publishing Limited, London, 1993, First edition 1992, Reprinted 1994, p. 144, text reproduced above. 781 V.C.R.A.C. CRABBE, Legislative Drafting, Cavendish Publishing Limited, London, 1993, First edition 1992, Reprinted 1994, p. 144, text reproduced above. 782 "73 (n. 470). Not only in Spanish has the future hypothetical subjunctive mood been kept, but it also exists in Portuguese and in Valaco." Andrés Bello, Gramática de la Lengua Castellana destinada al Uso de los Americanos, Vigésima Edición Hecha sobre la Ultima del Autor con Extensas Notas y Copiosos Índices Alfabéticos de Rufino José Cuervo, R. Roger y F. Chernoviz, Editores, París, 1921, pp. 124-125, Rufino José Cuervo, nota 73 (n. 470), p. 75. present indicative, according to traditional practice, to avoid "the danger of a rapid disappearance of this verbal form". 783 The future tense in subjunctive mood is preferred in Spanish, also because any juridical norm, from a logical point of view, has two parts, the factual assumption and the consequence attributed to it. From a grammatical perspective, this is a conditional sentence, in which its protasis, in the subjunctive mood, expresses the assumption, and its apodosis, in indicative mood, the consequence.784 The future imperfect tense is 783 "[...] this future imperfect of the subjunctive, a beautiful patrimony which other Romance languages do not have which we can kiss goodbye if we do not react soon against to the nonchalance gradually expressed from the top downwards by the so-called cultured classes as far as good speech is concerned. Anybody who wants to see the danger of a rapid disappearance of this verbal form should compare any current legal text of our days with the Civil Code, for example." "[...] ese futuro imperfecto del subjuntivo, precioso patrimonio de que carecen otras lenguas romances, y del cual nos podremos ir despidiendo si no se reacciona pronto contra la despreocupación, que en materia de bien hablar, van infiltrando de arriba abajo las clases que llamamos cultas. El que quiera apreciar el peligro de rápida desaparición en que se halla esta forma verbal, compare cualquier texto legal de nuestros días con el Código Civil, por ejemplo", text reproduced above. Julio Casares, Nuevo Concepto del Diccionario de la Lengua y otros Problemas de Lexicografía y Gramática, Segunda Parte Gramática, I Gramáticas Oficiales, III, Espasa-Calpe, S.A., Madrid, 1941, p. 222. 784 "469 (221). It is necessary to recognize two different subjunctive moods: the so-called common subjunctive, because it covers a wide variety of cases, and the so-called HYPOTHETICAL subjunctive, due to its conditional or hypotetical meaning, that now we discuss. 470 (a). This mood is peculiar to Spanish conjugation since it did not exist in Latin, an it does not exist in ant Romance dialect 73; it has only two forms of its own, the simple one (cantare, trabajare, partiere), and the compound one, which derives from the former (hubiere cantado, hubiere trabajado, hubiere partido) * * [...] it should be pointed out that notable writers sometimes mistake the common subjunctive mood, ending in -ara, -ese, -era, of the common subjunctive mood, for the hypothetical one, ending in -ere, -are, saying, for example: si alguien llamase, le abrirás; si llegase a tiempo, le convidaré. The difference that I spot here does not depend on any theory, because it is the practice of the best times of the language, and the ordinary one among those who speak and write correctly nowdays. We can give to the least educated readership a rule that will preserve them from becoming confused with moods and tenses, which is happening more and more frequently, especially among Americans: "Whenever the form ending in –ara, -ase, -ese may be replaced with a form ending in –are, -ere (there is not room for error here among Spanish native speackers), we may be certain that the latter form is correct." "73 (n. 470). Not only in Spanish has the future hypothetical subjunctive mood been kept, but it also exists in Portuguese and in Valaco." ( "469 (221). Es preciso reconocer dos subjuntivos diversos: el que llamamos común, porque se extiende a una gran variedad de casos, y el de que ahora tratamos a[l] que por su constante significado de condición o hipótesis damos el nombre de HIPOTÉTICO. 470(a). Este modo es peculiar de la conjugación castellana pues no lo hubo en latín, ni lo hay en ninguno de los otros dialectos romances 73; y sólo tiene dos formas suyas, la simple (cantare, trajere, partiere), y la compuesta que nace de ella (hubiere cantado, hubiere traído, hubiere partido)*. * [...] obsérvese que en muy estimables escritores se confunde a veces la forma en ara, ese, era, del subjuntivo común, con la ere, are, del hipotético, diciendo, por ejemplo: Si alguien llamase, le abrirás; Si llegase a tiempo, le convidaré. La diferencia que yo en este punto señalo no depende de ninguna teoría, porque es la práctica de los mejores tiempos de la lengua, y la ordinaria entre los que hablan y escriben correctamente en el día. Podemos dar a los lectores menos instruidos una regla que los preservará de caer en una confusión de modos y tiempos, que va cundiendo, sobre todo entre los americanos: "Siempre que a la forma en ara, ase, ese, vemos que consiente la lengua sustituir la forma en are, ere (acerca de lo cual no cabe error en los que tengan por lengua nativa la castellana), podemos estar seguros de que esta segunda es la forma propia." preferred because, when prescriptive speeches conform a bill, it contains political decisions to be made and, when it becomes law, and comes into effect, it at first does not apply retroactively, since it works like counsel to the addressees about the behaviors to be followed and to be avoided. In addition to norms, the juridical system is integrated by institutions, branches and orders, with their respective principles, which are also elements of the juridical system. The elements of prescriptive speech (subsection, section, division, etc.), whether grouped or not in special and general parts, are linguistic entities. An element of the juridical system may be expressed by only one element of the prescriptive speech (that is, a norm in only one article), but this is not always the case, since an element of the juridical system is, more often than not, expressed by more than one element of the prescriptive speech (that is, a norm in more than one article), without which a technical gap would be created. RULE: If an element of the juridical system requires more than one element of the prescriptive speech, none of the prescriptive speech elements should be missing, to avoid technical gaps. When the law develops to some extent, prescriptive speech is expressed by descriptive language,785 since the elements of the juridical system used to regulate behaviors, the implicit context, already exist in practice, in other laws, in case law, or in juristic writings, and they are seldom exclusively created by the new legislator. b. Clarity Clarity (perspicuitas) consists of making speech more easily comprehensible, intelligible.786 It is a fundamental virtue, since in its absence, the speech could not "73 (núm. 470). No sólo en castellano se ha conservado el futuro del subjuntivo hipotético; existe también en el portugués y en valaco.") Andrés Bello, Gramática de la Lengua Castellana destinada al Uso de los Americanos, Vigésima Edición Hecha sobre la Ultima del Autor con Extensas Notas y Copiosos Índices Alfabéticos de Rufino José Cuervo, R. Roger y F. Chernoviz, Editores, París, 1921, pp. 124-125, y para la nota 73, Notas, p. 75. Bello was a notable grammarian and, also, author of the Civil Code of the Republic of Chile Código Civil de la República de Chile, Edición Autorizada por el Supremo Gobierno, Imprenta Chilena, Santiago de Chile, Julio de 1858, 418 pp., Mensaje del Ejecutivo al Congreso IX pp., Índice, pp. 419-426. "In the apodoses of conditional sentences, the indicative mood, rather than the subjunctive, is used." "En las oraciones condicionales no se usará el subjuntivo en las apódosis, sino el indicativo." Gramática de la Lengua Española, Real Academia Española, Nueva Edición Reformada, de 1931, Madrid, 1962, números. 302 y 434, c), pp. 275 y 393. 785 For some other interesting remarks on this matter, see: Jean Ray, Essai sur la Structure Logique du Code Civil Français, Librairie Félix Alcan, Première Partie, La Règle, Chapitre Premier, Du Fait que les Dispositions du Code Civil se Présentent Très Souvent Sous la Forme Énonciative et non sous la Forme Impérative, Paris, 1926, pp. 41-49. Georg Henrik Von Wright, Norm and Action, A Logical Enquiry, Routledge and Kegan Paul, VI, Norms, Language, and Truth, London, 1963, pp. 93-106. 786 Explanatio, for [Cicero] Rethorica ad Herennium, IV, XII, 17. [Cicero] Rhetorica ad Herennium, IV, xii, 17, with an English Translation by Harry Caplan, The Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, London, England, First published 1954, Reprinted 1964, 1968, 1977, 1981, 1989, 1999, pp. 268-271. [Cicerón] Retórica a Herenio, Traducción, Introducción y Notas de Juan Francisco Alcina, Erasmo, Textos Bilingües, Editorial Bosch, Libro IV, XII, Barcelona, 1991, pp. 260-261. fulfill its symbolic function of conveying meaning,787 to communicate. Clarity and the purity (latinitas) constitute elegance (elegantia).788 RULE: To obtain clarity in speech, common and proper words shall be chosen.789 [Cicéron] Rhétorique a Herennius, Ouvrage Longtemps Attribué a Cicéron, Texte Revue et Traduit avec Introduction et Notes par Henri Bornecque, Librairie Garnière Frères, Livre IV, XII, 17, Paris, pp. 180-183. It is not enough for the language of the law to be understood: it must be easily understood. David Mellinkoff, The Language of The Law, Little, Brown and Company, Boston, Toronto, First Printing, 1963, Third Printing, Paperback Edition, 1978, pp. 415-416. 787 Aristotle, Rhetoric, Book III, 1404b. Aristotle, Rhetoric, III, 1404b, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation, Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume Two, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 2239. Aristóteles, Retórica, Introducción, Traducción y Notas por Quintín Racionero, Libro III, 1404b, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1990, p. 395 y n. 219; p. 396-398. Aristote, Rhétorique, Texte Établi et Traduit par Médéric Dufour et André Wartelle, Société d'Édition "Belles Lettres", Tome Troisième, Livre III, 1404b, Paris, p. 41. Aristotele, Retorica, A cura di Armando Plebe, III, 1404b, Editore Laterza, Bari, 1961, p. 170. For the French clarity from the perspective of the rhetorical tradition, see: Daniel Mornet, Histoire de la Clarté Française, Ses Origines, Son Evolution, Sa Valeur, Payot, Paris, 1929, 358 pp. 788 [Cicero] Rhetorica ad Herennium, IV, XII, 17. [Cicero] Rhetorica ad Herennium, IV, xii, 17, with an English Translation by Harry Caplan, The Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, London, England, First published 1954, Reprinted 1964, 1968, 1977, 1981, 1989, 1999, pp. 268-271. [Cicerón] Retórica a Herenio, Traducción, Introducción y Notas de Juan Francisco Alcina, Erasmo, Textos Bilingües, Editorial Bosch, Libro IV, XII, Barcelona, 1991, pp. 260-261. [Cicéron] Rhétorique to Hérennius, Ouvrage Longtemps Attribué a Cicéron, Texte Revue et traduit avec Introduction et Notes par Henri Bornecque, Librairie Garnière Frères, Livre IV, XII, 17, Paris, pp. 180183. 789 [Cicero] Rhetorica ad Herennium, IV, XII, 17. [Cicero] Rhetorica ad Herennium, IV, xii, 17, with an English Translation by Harry Caplan, The Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, London, England, First published 1954, Reprinted 1964, 1968, 1977, 1981, 1989, 1999, pp. 268-271. [Cicerón] Retórica a Herenio, Traducción, Introducción y Notas de Juan Francisco Alcina, Erasmo, Textos Bilingües, Editorial Bosch, Libro IV, XII, Barcelona, 1991, pp. 260-261. [Cicéron] Rhétorique to Hérennius, Ouvrage Longtemps Attribué a Cicéron, Texte Revue et traduit avec Introduction et Notes par Henri Bornecque, Librairie Garnière Frères, Livre IV, XII, 17, Paris, pp. 180183. The German Civil Code of 1900 is the classic example of the use of a rigorous technical language; for its characteristics, see: R. Saleilles, Introduction a l'Étude du Code Civil Allemand, 1904, pp. 110-117. The Swiss Civil Code of 1912 is the typical representative of the use of a common language, since: "III. The language of the bill and its economy. [...] 1. As for the language, the dominant idea is that the bill, as has been stated above, should be intelligible to all; we have tried to attain this goal choosing simple and clear expressions." "III. La langue du projet et son économie. [...] 1. En ce qui concerne la langue, l'idée dominant est que le projet, comme on l'a dit plus haut, devrait être intelligible à tous; nous avons cherché à atteindre ce but en choissant des expressions simples et claires." Civil Code Suisse, Exposé des Motives de l'Avant-Projet du Département Féderal de Justice et Police, Tome Premier, Introduction, Droit des Personnes et de la Famille, Berne, 1901, p. 12. For a summary compararison of the opinions on the drafting of the German, Swiss and French Civil Codes, see: Jean Ray, Essai sur la Structure Logique du Code Civil Français, Librairie Félix Alcan, Complément A, Paris, 1926, pp. 261-263, Common words Unlike poetry, which arouses admiration through the use of unusual words, the rhetorical prose uses common vocabulary,790 so that everybody will understand. Except in the early times of law making, when poetry prevailed, the prescriptive speech has always been rhetorical prose. It requires not only bona fide people to comprehend it; but also avoidig people in bad faith may misinterpret it,791 against the purpose sought by the legislator. RULE: For clarity, facilitating bona fide people's understanding shall not suffice; also, requires avoiding people in bad faith may misinterpret it, against the purpose sought by the legislator. Certain matters in everyday life belong to private law, hence called droit commun in Civil Law systems, which regulations use more often usual language than juridical vocabulary. This vocabulary consist of common words, with a technical meaning (contract, marriage, etc.) and other specific words of the law (mortgages, antichreses, etc.) for precision and economy reasons, avoid giving definitions too often, and because, the denomination (nomen iuris) alone is sufficient to evoke the desired meaning. But when the behavior refers to facts, acts or activities of great social importance, which requires higher technical precision, as is the case with death and organ transplants, medical vocabulary cannot be avoided. Also the multiple addreesees of the speech should be taken into account. RULE: To obtain clarity in prescriptive speech, provided that the resulting text remains intelligible to its different addreesses, words shall be chosen: a) common, with their usual meanings, for the addressees at large; b) technical of the matter regulated, for the related addressees and experts; c) juridical technical, for legal advisors; d) juridical technical and technical of the matter regulated, for the judges and law enforcement authorities It should be pointed out that there are two classes of terminology or sets of words of a specialty: transparent ones, which let see concepts, which enable to easily understand the meaning evoked by words; and opaque ones, in which the concepts must be looked up in their respective definitions. Both in prescriptive and persuasive speech, a transparent terminology is preferable, to facilitate both understanding and memorizing, since transparent denominations are remembered better than opaques ones. 790 Isocrates, Evagoras, 9-10. Isocrates, Evagoras, 9-10, in Isocrates with an English Translation by George Norlin, Volume III, with an English Translation by Larue Van Hook, William Heinemann Ltd, London, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachussets, First Printed 1945, Reprinted 1954, 1961, pp. 8-9. Isócrates, Evágoras, 9-10, en Isócrates Discursos, Introducción, Traducción y Notas de Juan Manuel Guzmán Hermida, Editorial Gredos, Tomo I, Madrid, 1979, pp. 305-306. Isocrate, Evagoras, 9-10, dans Isocrate Discours, Texte Établi et Traduit par Georges Mathieu et Émile Brémond, Société d'Édition "Belles Lettres", Tome II, 1re Édition 1938, Cinquième Tirage Revu et Corrigé, Paris, 1967, p. 148. 791 Charles de Martens, Le Guide Diplomatique, Cinquième Édition, Entierement Refondue par M.F.H. Geffeken, Tome Second, Première Partie, Du Style des Compositions Diplomatiques, Observations Génerales, F.A. Brockhaus, Leipzig, 1866, p. 2. RULE: Transparent denominations are preferable to opaque ones, to facilitate both the comprehension of their meanings and their memorizing. Proper words Words that are effective in conveying the ideas meant are proper, because those who coined them are supposed to have "appropiated them."792 RULE: Words shall be chosen in such a way, that the meaning conveyed reflects the exact thought of the legislator (proper)793 calling things by their name, to avoid extensive or restrictive interpretations, to eliminate ambiguities and to reduce vagueness, in accordance with the precision demanded by the relevant branch of law. Sometimes, the words are common and proper, their respective meanings are clear, there is not semantic ambiguity and, nevertheless, the sentence turns out obscure. This is so because there is syntactic ambiguity, which arises from the grammatical relation between the words in the sentence, in such a way that it is difficult to immediately ascertain the meaning. The consistent use of the same words, phrases and sentences to express the same ideas, without homonymous or synonymous, in the same formula, contributes to the clarity of the speech and avoids unnecessary interpretative doubts.794 PRINCIPLE: To avoid unnecessary interpretive doubts and to contribute to speech clarity, when the same ideas are expressed, the same words, phrases, and sentences shall always be be chosen and used in the same formula. RULE: Style is precise when there are rigorous concision and accuracy.795 RULE: Concision exists whenever only the sufficient is said for the understanding of the speech. 792 Gregorio Mayans I Siscar, Rhetorica de don Gregorio Mayans I Siscar, Segunda Edición, Valencia, 1776, Tomo II, p. 45. 793 Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria, VIII, I, 2. Quintilian, The Institutio Oratoria of Quintilian, with an English Translation by H.E. Butler in Four Volumes, The Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, G.P. Putnam Sons's, New York, Volume III, Book VIII, ii, 1, London, 1921, pp. 196-197. Quintilien. Institution Oratoire, Texte Établi et Traduit par Jean Cousin, Société d'Édition "Belles lettres", Tome V, Livre VIII, II, 1, Paris, 1978, p. 54. 794 "4th. Same ideas, same words" ("4th. Mêmes ideés, mêmes paroles"). Jérémie Bentham, Vue Générale d'un Corps Complet of Législation, Chapitre XXXIII Du Style give Lois, Société Belge of Librairie, dans Oeuvres de Jérémie Bentham, Ét. Dumont, Troisième Édition, Société Belge De Librairie, Tome Premier, Bruxelles, 1840, p. 341. Expressive consistency is a "golden rule" of legislative drafting, see: Reed Dickerson, The Fundamentals of Legal Drafting, Published for The American Bar Association by Little, Brown And Company, with a quote of Piesse and Smith, The Elements of Drafting 32 (2d. ed. 1958), Boston, Toronto, 1965, p. 12 and n.9. Rather than a rule, although a golden one, on account of its generality, it seems a principle of style, the counterstrophe of the interpretative apothegm that affirms: where the law does not distinguish, we must not distinguish (ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemus). 795 Diccionario de la Lengua Española, Decimonovena Edición, Real Academia Española, Madrid, 1970, p. vocablo precisión, acepción 3, p. 1057. Concision was considered to be a fifth virtue by the Stoics.796 It is true that the fewer words, the easier it is to memorize speech,797 but many a time word number comes into conflict with clarity, in which case the latter must prevail. Clarity not only requires easy understanding, but also leaving no room for interpretations contrary to the legislator's purpose. RULE: Concision helps memorize speech, but if come into conflict with clarity, the latter shall prevail. Concision, the virtue of avoiding the vice of verbosity, should not be confused with brevity, since the speech must be neither too long nor too short, but of a justifiably length, as taught by Prodicus.798 Brevity is justified as a stylistic ideal in military orders, where there is no time for long exchanges in the middle of a battle, hence the current reminiscense of Spartans when one speaks about laconicism. But the law refers to recurrent problems that must be answered, and solutions take time to be expressed, comprehended and remembered. Although laws are no longer considered of absolute permanence, as in the classical doctrine, they are usually of prolonged transitoriness, which gives them a relative permanence. RULE: Both tedious verbosity and haughty brevity shall be avoided, using enough wisdom to moderate the speech according to the occasion and the matter799 to be ruled by the bill. RULE: Rigorous accuracy, which illuminates partially the area of half-light of vague meaning, should not be confused with property, which is related to the nucleus of the meaning, to avoid ambiguity. In calling things by their name, so that they will correspond to the thoughts of the legislator, it will be avoided to sin for defect or for excess, which may give rise to future extensive or restrictive interpretations, as the case may be. In the branches of the Law which norms have to be restrictively interpreted, regardless of the fact that the legislator has sinned for defect or excess, such as criminal law and tax law, rigorous accuracy results from a requirement imposed by the nature of 796 Diogène Laërce, Vie, Doctrine et Sentences des Philosophes Illustres, Traduction, Notice et Notes par Robert Genaille, Garnier-Flammarion, Zénon, Paris, 1965, T. II, p. 70. 797 "2. The law must be concise, in order that she fix easily on memory. Clarity, brevity, are therefore the two essential qualities." "2. Que la loi soit concise, afin qu'elle fixe aisément dans the memoire. Clarté, brièveté, voilà donc les deux qualités essentielles." Jérémie Bentham, Vue Générale d'un Corps Complet of Législation, Chapitre XXXIII Du Style des Lois, dans Oeuvres de Jérémie Bentham, Ét. Dumont, Troisième Édition, Société Belge of Librairie, Tome Premier, Société Belge of Librairie, Bruxelles, 1840, p. 339. 798 Plato, Phaedrus, 267b Platón, Fedro, 267c-d, Edición Bilingüe, Traducción, Notas y Estudio Preliminar por Luis Gil Fernández, Instituto de Estudios Políticos, Madrid, 1957, p. 64. Platon, Phèdre, 267b, Platon, Oeuvres Complètes, Tome IV, 3e Partie, Phèdre, Texte Traduit par Léon Robin, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Paris, 1933, p. 74. Platon, Phèdre, 267b, dans Platon, Oeuvres Complètes, Traduction Nouvelle et Notes par Léon Robin, avec la Colaboration of M.J. Moreau, Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, Tome II, Paris, 1942, p. 64. 799 Oculus Pastoralis, anonymous work c 1222, quote and italian translation by Galletti. Alfredo Galletti, Storia dei Generi Letterari Italiani, L'Eloquenza (Dalle Origine the XVIth Secolo), Casa Editrice Dottor Francesco Vallardi, Milan, 1904-1918, p. 462. the respective matter. But in other matters, owing to probable changing circumstances, legislators can turn to more flexible formulas, through a deliberate decision, rather than by technical error. On the one hand, there is the legal definition of crimes, which requires maximum certainty; on the other hand, the juridical standard800 the average correct social conduct, for example, under civil law, the formula deliberately vague:"the diligence of a good father of family". Crime definitions in the law privileges certainty; the juridical standard, the adaptability801 to the circumstances. Both instruments are available, and must be used in accordance with the rigorousness demanded by the branch of the Law and the prudence of rulers and advisors. RULE: In matters of restrictive interpretation, a rigorous accuracy must be procured, in matters that allow an extensive interpretation, juridical standard technique may be resorted to. c. Ornament The correct (pure) and easily understandable (clear) use of language enables to convey ideas, to teach (docere), but it is not enough to delight (delectare), to stir emotions, to motivate (movere), which require another virtue of speech: ornament (ornatus). Ornament consists in force to move and beauty to delight, either of thoughts (res) or of linguistic expressions (verba).802 Under the classical rhetorical tradition it was not argued about the admissibility of the ornament, but about the extent to which it was suitable for each genre of speech.803 RULE: The ornament must assist, rather than interfere with, obstruct or replace the purpose of the speech. It is surprising that any human product, whether handmade or industrial, is expected not only to be useful, but also to possess esthetic qualities that may make it more acceptable in the market, while one of the most useful intellectual products, laws, is designed irrespective of beauty for better conception, systematization, expression, enactment, publication, dissemination, memorizing, interpretation, and application, as if it were unnecessary to make laws more acceptable to society.804 800 For the juridical standard, see: Roscoe Pound, Introduction to the Philosophy of Law, Yale University Press, First Edition 1923, Revised 1953, Seventh Printing, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1965, pp. 55-59. Marcel O. Stati, Le Standard Juridique, Préface de René Demogue, Librairie de Jurisprudence Ancienne et Moderne Edouard Duchemin, L. Chauny et L. Quinsac, Successeurs, Paris, 1927, 398 pp. 801 Marcel O. Stati, Le Standard Juridique, Préface de René Demogue, Librairie de Jurisprudence Ancienne et Moderne Edouard Duchemin, L. Chauny et L. Quinsac, Successeurs, Paris, 1927, pp. 109110. 802 Heinrich Lausberg, Elementos de Retórica Literaria, Introduction al Estudio de la Filología Clásica, Románica, Inglesa y Alemana, Version Española de Mariano Marín Casero, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1975, números 162-164, pp. 89-90, (Elemente Der Literarischen Rhetorik, Max Weber Verlag, München, 1963). 803 Eduard Norden, Die Antike Kunstprosa VI. Jahrhundert a. Chr. bis in die Zeit der Renaissance, 3rd. Ed., B.G. Teubner, Stuttgart, 1915, La Prose d'Arte Antica, Dal Secolo VI B.C. all'Età della Renascenza, Edizione Italiana a Cura di Benedetta Heinemann Campana, con una Note di Aggiornamento di Gualterio Calboli e una Premessa di Scevola Mariotti, Salerno Editrice, Rome, 1986, Tomo I, p. 18. 804 Few authors have written on the beauty in the law, and minor is still the number of the significant contributions as the following ones: A very frequent use of the same words, prhases and sentences constitutes the vices of poverty and monotony,805 since it denotes a poor vocabulary and produces a tedious repetition, as opposed to the literary virtue of elegant variation. Nevertheless, a speaker or drafter should not be afraid of repeating a word somewhat frequenty if it helps understand the speech better.806 Unlike other literary genres, in prescriptive and persuasive speeches expressing always the same ideas with the same words is a virtue, since it leaves no room for interpretative doubts, while to use synonymous and various turns of phrase, instead of equal formulae, constitutes a vice of the legislative style, which sins against the clarity of the speech. RULE: In prescriptive and persuasive speeches, elegant variations shall be avoided. Although, in prescriptive and persuasive speeches elegant variations should be avoided, beauty may be attained through other rhetorical procedures, whether words are considered isolately (in verbis singulis), or in groups, in the composition of a literary work (compositio). Election of words, tropes and other figures of speech The ornament may be achieved by choosing the most beautiful words (electio verborum), tropes and other figures of speech. Words To choose words, their graphic symbols, sounds and meanings must be considered, from the point of view of the beauty that the legislator may convey to the addressees of the norms. A graphic symbol is considered as the union of the typography and the design of the written page; the sound, as the expression of the legislator's character and the creation of impressions and arousal of emotions, rather than as the representation of R. Von Ihering, L'Esprit du Droit Romain dans les Diverses Phaces de son Développement, Traduit sur la 3e. Édition Avec l'Autorisation de l'Auteur Par O. De Meulenaere, Liv. II Ie. Part. Titre III Technique, Chap. I. Sect. 2. B. 3. Construction. § 46. 3. La loi du beau juridique (3.The law of the juridical beautiful thing), A. Maresq, Ainé, Éditeur, Paris, F. Clemm, Gand, 1877, pp. 69-72. Gustav Radbruch, Introducción a la Filosofía del Derecho, Traducción de Wenceslao Roces, IX La Estética del Derecho, Primera Edición en Español 1951, Fondo de Cultura Económica, México-Buenos Aires, 1955, pp. 134-152. (Vorschule der Rechtsphilosophie, 1948). Giuseppe Maggiore, Estetica del Diritto, Scritti Giuridici in Onore di Francesco Carnelutti, Volume Primo, Filosofia e Teoria Generale del Diritto, CEDA Casa Editrice Dott. Antonio Milani, Padova, 1950, pp. 275-294. K.N. Llewellyn, Belleza y Estilo en el Derecho, Traducción y Prólogo por José Puig Brutau, Bosch, Casa Editorial, Barcelona, 1953, 80 pp. "[...] it corresponds to one of the lectures that the author gave himself in the University of Chicago during the spring 1941, partially reproduced then in The University of Chicago Law Review (1942)." "[...] corresponde a una de las conferencias que el autor pronunció en la Universidad de Chicago durante la primavera de 1941, parcialmente reproducidas luego en The University of Chicago Law Review (1942).", Prólogo, pp. 7-8. 805 Gramática de la Lengua Española, Real Academia Española, Nueva Edición Reformada, de 1931, Madrid, 1962, número. 483, pp. 443-445. 806 Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria, IX, I, 24. Quintilian, The Institutio Oratoria of Quintilian, with an English Translation by H.E. Butler in Four Volumes, The Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, G.P. Putnam Sons's, New York, Volume III, Book IX, i, 24, London, 1921, pp. 360-361. Quintilien. Institution Oratoire, Texte Établi et Traduit par Jean Cousin, Société d'Édition "Belles lettres", Tome V, Livre IX, I, 24, Paris, 1978, pp. 162-163. meanings; the meaning, as an emotional or descriptive representation, not only like a persuasive or logical definition.807 As an example, the following rule is formulated: RULE: Words shall be chosen by the beauty of their graphic symbols, sounds and meanings. When the norms permit or reward, words should be chosen to characterize the legislator more favorably and to create impressions and arouse pleasant evocations at the sight, ear and understanding of their addressees. When the norms oblige, prohibit or punish, the worthiest words shall be chosen. This matter, despite its importance, has not been developed yet, and the author, much to his regret, in the face of the vastness of this work, leaves it for future editions or for other authors.808 Tropes Tropes are extensions of the meaning of words, from the original, direct one, to another derived, indirect, figurative meaning. When these extensions serve to name something without a special name, they are called "catachresis". When they come into habitual use among educated persons, lexicographers enrich the articles of their dictionaries, and it is possible to properly choose from among the different meanings or entries of each word, whether literal or figurative, common or technical, as was the case in the juridical language with some expressions. EXAMPLES of catachresis: "corpus delicti"; "sources of the law". RULE: Tropes are more convenient in poetry than in prose and, in legislative prose, more convenient in persuasive speech than in prescriptive specch, which also uses them (metaphors, metonymies and synecdoches). Metaphors (fictions) In a metaphor, the extension of the meaning is implicit. EXAMPLES of metaphors: "lions", instead of "brave"; "foxes", instead of "crafty". In an image, the extension of the meaning is explicit. EXAMPLES of images, similarities or comparisons: 807 N.S. Troubetzkoy, Principes de Phonologie, Traduits Par J. Cantineau, Reimpression de la 1e. Édition, 1949, Librarie C. Klincksieck, Paris, 1957, Phonologie et Phonostylistique, pp. 16-29. 808 It would be very interesting that some philologist will study the beauty of the vocabulary in the fragments of the Laws of Solon, who in addition to legislator was a poet in a people as the Athenian so sensitive to the esthetic values. "bravely as a lion"; "crafty as a fox". A metaphor might be said to be a brief image, and an image might be said to be an extended metaphor that expresses the comparison.809 Juridical fictions,810 which cover facts not included in a current qualification, to include or to exclude certain consequences,811 without delay, also are metaphors or images, according to whether they are formulated in brief form (x is y) or extended (x is as if it were y). Thus, the reference is concealed, instead of making generic or specific and exhaustive references; to describe the new fact assumption (antecedent) and refer to the consequence; or to regulate both the antecedent and the consequent of the norm. In Roman Law there existed case law fictions, as the treatment of foreigners as citizens so that they could file an action or be prosecuted for theft; juristic fictions, like the continuation of the personality of the decedent's existence to account for successions by descent; legislative fictions, like the Lex Cornelia de captivis, which considered a Roman citizen taken captive by the enemies of the Roman People and died in that state, as dead from the time of his capture, in order to consider his testament made before his captivity valid, as if he died a free roman citizen, without the capitis deminutio suffered by the died captive apud hostes. 809 Aristotle, Rhetoric, III, 1406b20-1407a15. Aristotle, Rhetoric, III, 1406b20-1407a15, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation, Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume Two, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, pp. 2243-2244. Aristóteles, Retórica, Introducción, Traducción y Notas por Quintín Racionero, Libro III, 1406b201407a15, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1990, pp. 501-504. Aristote, Rhétorique, Texte Établi et Traduit par Médéric Dufour et André Wartelle, Société d'Édition "Belles Lettres", Tome Troisième, Livre III, 1406b20-1407a15, Paris, pp. 49-50. Aristotele, Retorica, A cura di Armando Plebe, III, 1406b-1407a, Editore Laterza, Bari, 1961, pp. 178179. Cicero, De Oratore, XIX, 158. Cicéron, De l'Orateur, Texte Établi et Traduit par Edmond Courbaud, Livre Troisième, XIX, 158, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Paris, 1930, p. 62. Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria, VIII, 6, 8-9. Quintilian, The Institutio Oratoria of Quintilian, with an English Translation by H.E. Butler in Four Volumes, The Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, G.P. Putnam Sons's, New York, Volume III, Book VIII, I saw, 8-9, London, 1921, pp. 304-305. Quintilien. Institution Oratoire, Texte Établi et Traduit par Jean Cousin, Société d'Édition "Belles lettres", Tome V, Livre VIII, VI, 8-9, Paris, 1978, pp. 105-106. 810 Referring to the historical function that has fulfilled the fiction in the law, it points out that it has played severely identically that of the metaphors in the language: Pierre de Tourtoulon, Les Principes Philosophiques de l'Histoire du Droit, Librairie Payot and Cie, Lausanne, Paris,1908-1919, p. 451. 811 "If a complicated law often refers to the wheat and a reform wants to extend its norms to the barley, the legislative drafter should trace all the times that the word "wheat" appears and to insert after each of its appearances "and barley". The easy way consists of saying "The word "wheat" includes to the barley", but then one would incur a definition out of the meaning that normally there use the persons to whom there is assigned the law, which would be open to criticism for violating a fundamental principle of the communication. If a legal fiction will be necessary, one advises not to say "The terms "son" and "born" include the foster child", but "A child adopted as any person will be treated as if he will be a son of his own blood", Reed Dickerson, The Fundamentals of Legal Drafting, Published for The American Bar Foundation by Little, Brown And Company, Boston Toronto, 1965, p. 104. In the first example, it might say: "The norms established in the present law for the wheat, also will be applied to the barley", instead of the image: "In the present law the barley will be considered as if it will be a wheat." Irrebuttable legal presumptions (jure et de jure), are based on what usually happens, but they do not admit contrary proof, since they are established to avoid doubtful questions or scandalous arguments. They assume certain facts to be true, although such facts are merely possible in reality, like the presumption of fatherhood of the husband who has lived together with his wife and infant's mother during the period of the marriage in which the infant could have been conceived by both. Legal fictions, assumes as true something false, known by everybody to be false, but has certain resemblance to reality that justifies the fiction, it being irrelevant to prove their falsity or truth, since that is not their purpose. They are established to include or to exclude juridical consequences without delay, like hidden references,812 when legislators are not in situation to regulate with generic or specific and exhaustive references, or with complete norms.813 Fictions, on regarding new thing as is were old, close gaps without waiting ideas and formulae to come to fruition, avoiding antinomies and redundancies, suggesting analogies,814 but voluntarily and obviously altering the meaning of the existing formulae. PRINCIPLE: Legal fictions are useful as temporary remedy and indicate the point on which the efforts will have to concentrate to find definitive solutions. They815 became dangerous if they cause delay or the abandonment of efforts to find definitive solutions, or if they end up being taken as true and conclusions are drawn beyond the justicerelated reasons that first warranted their introduction. Private civil law, which is a developed branch, is full of fictions: succession representation, conditions deemed unwritten, declaratory partition, putative marriage, etc. With all the more reason, there are fictions in international law, a less developed branch, but nobody lets himself be taken in by its concepts and artificial terminology, 812 Hidden references, created to assign certain juridical consequences, are distinguishe from hidden limitations, created to exclude the current consequences assigned, by: Karl Larenz, Metodología de la Ciencia del Derecho, Traducción de Enrique Gimbernat Ordeig de Methodenlehre der Rechstwissenchaft, Springer Verlag OHC, Berlin, Gottingen, Heidelberg, 1960, Editiciones Ariel, Barcelona, 1966, pp. 181-182, 813 "[...] the Romans' general attitude of clinging to traditional things, whithout remaining tied to them if they no longer answered to a new dominant popular opinion, was conspicuos. Therefore, the Roman Law History allways shows, up to the classic period, a gradual, completely organic development. If a new juridical form arises, it is directly related to a previous form still in force, which makes the new one as firm and developed as the previous one. This is where the concept of legal fiction comes into play, since it is extremely important to the development of Roman Law and often ridiculously unknown by moder scholars [...]" "[...] era visible el carácter general de los romanos de aferrarse a lo tradicional, sin quedar atados por ello, si es que lo tradicional no respondía ya a una nueva opinión popular dominante. Por ello, la historia del Derecho romano muestra en todas partes, hasta la época clásica, un desarrollo paulatino, completamente orgánico. Si surge una forma jurídica nueva, es enlazándola directamente con una forma vieja subsistente, con lo cual toma la firmeza y el perfeccionamiento de la misma. Aquí entra en juego el concepto de ficción, que es sumamente importante para el desarrollo del Derecho romano y a menudo ridículamente desconocido por los modernos [...]" Federico Carlos Von Savigny, De la Vocación de Nuestra Época para la Legislación y la Ciencia del Derecho, en Thibaut y Savigny, La Codificación, Una Controversia Programática, Introducción y Selección de Textos de Jacques Stern, Traducción del Alemán de José Díaz García, Editorial Aguilar, Madrid, 1970, pp. 71-72. 814 Like theoretical models in science, which explain an unknown complex phenomenon, as if it were a system also complex, but well-known, transferring the knowledge of one to other; or hypotheses ad hoc, which temporarily avoid changing a traditional theory that scholars wish to keep. 815 René Dekkers, La Fiction Juridique, Librairie du Reçueil Sirey, Paris, 1935, pp. 234-235. arising out of a prodigious ingenuity to avoid susceptibilities, aimed at keeping up appearances in the struggle for preserving world peace, since there is not branch more realistic than international law.816 Sometimes, figures in common language mislead legislators, as it happened with a Lombard law prohibiting the marriage of any woman who had taken the veil, even if she had not consecrated herswelf to the veil, on the grounds that, if a husband engaged by a wedding ring could not marry legally somebody else, let alone the wife of God or of the Saint Virgin; the legislator was mislead by the rhetorical figure of speech, since it was a metaphor. PRINCIPLE: In establishing laws, legislators shall reason from reality to reality, rather than from reality to the figure or from the figure to reality.817 Fictions will not disappear as a technical resource,818 since they owe their existence to the limitations of legislators, who, for different reasons, are not always in an immediate position to make generic or specific and exhaustive references; to describe the new fact assumption (antecedent) and refer to the consequence; or to regulate both the antecedent and the consequent of the norm, with a terminology that transparent the concepts and a name that indicates the place of the new phenomenon in the explicit context of the law and in the implicit context or juridical system, which is thus conceived as a natural and open classification, covering the new phenomena that appear in the world of the law, in a complete, consistent and economic fashion. When concepts and terminology come to fruition, perhaps the fictions established by direct regulations might be replaced. EXAMPLE of traditional fiction: An conceived child, so that he will be able to acquire some rights,819 816 Georges Renard, Le Droit, la Logique et le Bon Sens, Société Anonyme du Recueil Sirey, Paris, 1925, pp. 279-85 (fictions politiques), pp. 288 (it calls "rhetorical figures" to the mentioned fictions of the private law); 292-293 (international law). 817 The example of the Lombard law and the rule belong to Montesquieu. Montesquieu, De L'Esprit Des Lois, Avec des notes de Voltaire, de Crevier, de Mably, de la Harpe, etc., Nouvelle Édition Revue sur les Meilleurs Textes, Suivie De La Défense De L'Esprit Des Lois par L'Auteur, Paris, Garnier Frères, Libraires-Éditeurs, without date, Préface, Livre XXIX, Chapitre XVI, Choses à observer dans la composition des lois, p. 534. See also: Montesquieu, De l'Esprit des Loix, Texte Établi et Présenté par Jean Brethe de la Gressaye, Tome IV, Livre XXIX, Chapitre XVI, Choses à observer dans la composition des loix, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Paris, 1961, p. 140. 818 They might be a consequence of the weakness of the spirit, which, unable to be always creating juridical concepts perfectly adapted to reality, must make things and facts fall within pre-established concepts, which do not adapt exactly. François Geny, Science et Technique en Droit Privé Positif, III Troisème Partie, Élaboration Technique du Droit Positif, Librairie de la Société du Recueil Sirey, Paris, 1921, pp. 378, 426, 431. Although case law fictions might be justified while there are no legislative solutions, for the purpose of maintaining the apparent continuity of the law, the same is not true with those in juristic writings and of legislative ones, which should strain to be promptly eliminated: Paul Roubier, Théorie Générale du Droit, Histoire des Doctrines Juridiques et Philosophie des Valeurs Sociales, 2e. édition revue et augmentée, Librairie du Recueil Sirey, Paris, 1951, 13. Style et vocabulaire juridique, p. 116. 819 Infans conceptus pro natur habetur quotiens de commodo ejus agitur ("An conceived child is considered to have been born whenever there is some utility"): is considered as if he will have already been born and, if he will be born dead, considered to have never existed; EXAMPLE of direct regulation: The Section 31 of the Swiss Civil Code replaced the traditional fiction of the conceived child with the following formula: "Personality begins upon the birth of a living child; she ends upon death.The conceived child enjoys civil rights, on the condition that he is born alive."820 RULE: Legal fictions may be used when is desirable to include or to exclude certain juridical consequences without delay and legislators are not in a position to use generic or specific and exhaustive references, nor direct regulations of factual antecedents andthe respective consequents. Regarding legal fictions as metaphors is not a merely academic exercise, since it enables to use general stylistic requisites,821 in special legislative style. RULE: A legal fiction shall be well done, when the similarity has the following features: a) proper (real rather than supposed or equivocal); b) luminous (taken from well-known objects, easy to understand and making an impact on the addresses' spirit on account of the precise and real relations shown); c) noble (not taken from low and unpleasant objects; if it aimed at something vile and degrading, it will prove worthy and beyond its origin); d) natural (not taken from a remote and far-fetched similarity); e) coherent (without mutually exclusive terms). Metonymies (presumptions and alterations) Any trope causes an extension of meaning. In a metaphor, by reason of the similarity; in a metonymy, by reason of the correspondence to its way of existing or being,822 like referring to the cause instead of the effect, to the instrument instead of the cause, to the effect instead of the cause, to the container instead of the content, etc. It has already been stated that juridical fictions, such as metaphors or images, are based on a similarity, and that presumptions are based on the verisimilitude about what usually happens, each pursuing different purposes: the inclusion or exclusion of Digest of Justinian I, 5,7, applied in the French Civil Code, Sections 725, 906 and 961: Vocabulaire Juridique sous la Direction de Henri Capitant, PUF, Paris, 1936, Adages, p. 10. In Vocabulaire Juridique, Publié sous the Direction of Gérard Cornu, Association Henri Capitant, PUF, Paris, 1987, p. 835, quotes of the Digest and of the French Civil Code are omited. 820 "La personnalité commence avec naissance accomplie de l'enfant vivante; elle finit par la mort. L 'enfant conçu jouit des droits civils, à la condition qu'il naisse vivant." René Dekkers, Fiction Juridique, Librairie du Reçueil Sirey, Paris, 1935, pp. 201-202. 821 Fontanier refers to the style in general and indicates these requisites for the good metaphor, see: Pierre Fontanier, Manuel Classique pour l'Étude des Tropes ou Éléments de la Science des Mots, 4e. Édition, 1830, dans Fontanier Les Figures du Discours, Introduction par Gérard Genette, Flammarion, Paris, 1977, pp. 103-104. 822 Pierre Fontanier, Manuel Classique pour l'Étude des Tropes ou Éléments de la Science des Mots, 4e. Édition, 1830, dans Fontanier, Les Figures du Discours, Introduction par Gérard Genette, Flammarion, Paris, 1977, p. 79. consequences, on the one hand, and the simplification or the exclusion of the evidence, on the other hand. Just as fictions are metaphors, presumptions are metonymies, since proving the existence of the controversial fact depends on the verisimilitude established, on the probable truth (juris tantum), or irrefutable truth (jure et de jure), which are taken as the cause of such proof. PRINCIPLE: When an abstract formula, albeit fair in relation to the theoretical idea upon which it is based, is not easily applicable in practice, initial purity shall be altered and the concomitant requisites that usually happen shall be established, which may admit proof into opposite (juris tantum) or do not admit proof into opposite (jure et de jure), but are more able to be recognized in an easier and safe way. EXAMPLES: When a law on legal, political or criminal responsability,823 is passed, the basic idea of intellectual maturity must be replaced with a number: age.824 Synecdoches The extension of meaning in case of a metaphor is based on the similarity; in a metonymy, on the correspondence to the way of existing or of being; in a synecdoche, on a connection in a set by virtue of which the existence or the idea of one is included in the existence or the idea of the other(s), like the whole and the parts, the genre and the species, etc. 825 RULE: When it does not affect its purpose or generate difficulties in its interpretation or application, if some word is unacceptable, the word that refers to the whole may be replaced with the one that refers to the part and vice versa; the one that refers to the genre may be replaced with the one that refers to the species and vice versa, etc. Syllepses Mixed tropes, or syllepses, consist in using a word in a literal and a figurative sense at the same time, and may be used with metaphors, metonymies or synecdoches. EXAMPLE of sylepses with a metaphor: "The day is not purer than the bottom of my heart", physical purity of the day (literal), moral purity of the heart (figurative meaning by similarity)." 823 R. Von Ihering, L'Esprit du Droit Romain dans les Diverses Phaces de son Développement, Traduit sur la 3e. Édition Avec l'Autorisation de l'Auteur par O. de Meulenaere, Maresq, Ainé, Éditeur, Paris, F. Clemm, Gand, 1877, Tome Premier, pp. 54-55. 824 For other examples, see: Jean Dabin, Technique de l'Élaboration du Droit Positif Spècialement du Droit Privé, Établissements Émile Bruylant, Bruxelles, Librairie du Reçueil Sirey, Paris, pp. 144-156. 825 Pierre Fontanier, Manuel Classique pour l'Étude des Tropes ou Éléments de la Science des Mots, 4e. Édition, 1830, dans Fontanier Les Figures du Discours, Introduction par Gérard Genette, Flammarion, Paris, 1977, p. 87. EXAMPLE of syllepses with a metonymy: "It is not possible to conquer Carthage other than inside Carthage itself", Carthage population, Carthaginians (figurative meaning by the contents), Carthage city (literal meaning by the container); EXAMPLE of syllepses with a synecdoche: "Punishing, madam, a father is always a father", father, who punishes (literal meaning by the whole), father's feeling, the way in which he punishes (figurative meaning by the part).826 Syllepses must not be used in laws, since they would introduce doubts about whether the word has only one sense, literal or figurative, or two, one literal and another figurative, and, in the latter case, about which one is used in a literal sense and which one in a figurative sense. RULE: In prescriptive and persuasive speeches, syllepses shall not be used. Other figures of speech In tropes, there is always a change of meaning, while that is not the case in others figures of speech.827 The Latin word figura is the translation of the Greek word schema, taken from the theatrical vocabulary, in which it mean the actors' wardrobe and gestures. From there it was taken to rhetoric, because, just as the variety of characters and emotions that want to be depicted determines the election of the appropiated wardrobe and gestures, also speech, following the variety of matters discussed, is dressed up in a certain fashion and enlivened with various gestures.828 The mere expression of thoughts only enables others to know the ideas, but, when figures of speech are used, given that they are like notable and ornate dresses, thoughts become beautiful and forceful enough to ignite imagination and arouse passions. There829 is no more effective method to direct imagination and passion than a suitable use of the figures of speech, since if the forehead, eyes and hands are effective in moving the spirits, more effective is the physiognomy of speech, the aspect of style itself, when is chosen with a view to the effect intended.830 826 Pierre Fontanier, Manuel Classique pour l'Étude des Tropes ou Éléments de la Science des Mots, 4e. Édition, 1830, dans Fontanier les Figures du Discours, Introduction par Gérard Genette, Flammarion, Paris, 1977, pp. 105-108, for the three examples of syllepses. 827 M. Crevier, Rhétorique Française, Chez Saillant et Desaint, Tome Second, Paris, 1767, p. 80. Fontanier names the tropes "figures of signification": Pierre Fontanier, Manuel Classique pour l'Étude des Tropes ou Éléments de la Science des Mots, 4e. Édition, 1830, dans Fontanier Les Figures du Discours, Introduction par Gérard Genette, Flammarion, Paris, 1977, p. 77. 828 Gregorio Mayans I Siscar, Rhetorica de Don Gregorio Mayans I Siscar, Segunda Edición, Valencia, 1776, Tomo II, pp. 82-83. 829 Hugh Blair (1718-1800), Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres, Complete in One Volume, London, 1823 (First Edition 1783), p. 138. 830 Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria, IX, I, 21. Quintilian, The Institutio Oratoria of Quintilian, with an English Translation by H.E. Butler in Four Volumes, The Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, G.P. Putnam Sons's, New York, Volume III, Book IX, i, 21, London, 1921, pp. 358-359. Rhetoric declined in importance between the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century because, in the previous period, out of the five stages for the production of speech ‒investigation, systematics, style, memory and action‒, it had been reduced to style and style had been reduced to figures of speech. One of the sharpest criticisms that such reductionism deserved was expressed by Samuel Butler's (1612-1680) following verses: "For all a Rhetoricians Rules Teach nothing but to name his Tools."831 With regard to figures of speech, the terminology, the concepts, the classifications and the quantities do not even coincide.832 In classical Latin works, there were 35 in Quintilian, 65 in Herennius, more than 90 in Cicero and up to 200 in a minor Latin rhetorician as Aquila Romanus,833 while in the Renaissance, although they decreased to 184 in The Garden of Eloquence, by Henry Peacham, 1577 edition, they exceded 200 in a writer as Shakespeare.834 Nevertheless, it does not seem reasonable to deny the utility of a set of figures of speech, like a sort of detailed inventory of one of the available artistic resources that best serve to cause esteem for the legislator's character (ethos), to excite or to calm the passions of the addressees (pathos), and to safely and conveniently indicate the meaning of certain points (logos), thus securing support for the measure proposed in the proper text of the bill.835 Not all figures are usable in prescriptive Quintilien. Institution Oratoire, Texte Établi et Traduit par Jean Cousin, Société d'Édition "Belles lettres", Tome V, Livre IX, I, 21, Paris, 1978, p. 162. 831 Samuel Butler, Hudibras, Part I, song i, 89-90, cited by: Adam Smith, Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres Delivered in The University of Glasgow by Adam Smith Reported by a Student in 1762-1763, Edited with an Introduction and Notes by John M. Lothian, Foreword by David Potter, Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale and Edwardsville, Feffer and Simons, Inc, London and Amsterdam, 1971, p. 24, note 1. Peter Dixon, Rhetoric, Methuen, London and New York, first printed 1971, reprinted twice, Reprinted 1984, p. 74. 832 Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria, IX, I, 10. Quintilian, The Institutio Oratoria of Quintilian, with an English Translation by H.E. Butler in Four Volumes, The Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, G.P. Putnam Sons's, New York, Volume III, Book IX, i, 10, London, 1921, pp. 352-353. Quintilien. Institution Oratoire, Texte Établi et Traduit par Jean Cousin, Société d'Édition "Belles lettres", Tome V, Livre IX, I, 10, Paris, 1978, pp. 158-159. 833 For Aquila Romanus: James J. Murphy, A History of Rhetorical Theory From St. Augustine to the Renaissance, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1974, p. 185. La Retórica en la Edad Media. Historia de la Teoría de la Retórica Desde San Agustín Hasta el Renacimiento, de James J. Murphy, Traducción de Guillermo Hirata Vaquera, Fondo de Cultura Económico, México, 1986, p. 193. For additional information, see the following note. 834 For information on Herennius, Peacham and Shakespeare, see: Edward P.J. Corbett and Robert J. Connors, Rhetoric for the Modern Student, Oxford University Press, New York Oxford, 1999, p. 378. Cousin counts 35 in Quintilian, about 50 in Herennius, and more than 90 in Cicero: Quintilien. Institution Oratoire, Texte Établi et Traduit par Jean Cousin, Société d'Édition "Belles Lettres", Tome V, Livre IX, Notice, Paris, 1978, pp. 141-142. 835 Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria, IX, I, 21. Quintilian, The Institutio Oratoria of Quintilian, with an English Translation by H.E. Butler in Four Volumes, The Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, G.P. Putnam Sons's, New York, Volume III, Book IX, i, 21, London, 1921, pp. 358-359. Quintilien. Institution Oratoire, Texte Établi et Traduit par Jean Cousin, Société d'Édition "Belles lettres", Tome V, Livre IX, I, 21, Paris, 1978, p. 162. speeches, and not all those usable in the prescriptive and persuasive speeches will be discussed here, since that would require a very detailed analysis, which others may conduct better, or perhaps the author of this work may do so in future editions. There are two species of figures: those of thoughts, connected with the gross materials obtained in the stage of investigation (inventio); and those of words, related to the linguistic expression (style, elocutio, in restricted sense). In the former ones, the ornament is conceptual and derives from ideas rather than from words; in the latter ones, it is verbal and derives from the "fine polish of the language itself".836 The latter disappear if the words used change; the former ones will always survive, regardless of the words used to produce the desired effect.837 Nonetheless, it is not always easy to distinguish them and, in fact, the same figures are included in one or another species by different authors, situation that is complicated due to the polemic among the followers of the interpretation of the law according to its letter or to its spirit.838 Figures of words The following figures of words or diction will be considered: pleonasms, ellipses, periphrasis, euphemisms and antithesis. A pleonasm adds words for more clarity or energy of expression of a thought, although such words may not be indispensable to understand the meaning of the speech.839 If they did not make the expression clearer or more energetic, they would only constitute a grammatical vice. As stated above, in prescriptive and persuasive speeches it is inadvisable to use synonymous as elegant variations, now, add no to use pleonasms, since in both cases the expression sins against clarity and concision. Every extra word overloads the memory and rises unnecessary doubts that may lead to interpretations contrary to the legislator's purpose. RULE: In prescriptive and persuasive speeches, pleonasms shall not be used. In the passage quoted, it refers to any orator and speech, rather than to a legislator and the law. He also asserts that figures serve to avoid monotony, to use varied language, but as it has already been stated in this work when discussing elegant variation, this general virtue becomes a special vice in prescriptive speech, since it may give rise to interpretative doubts. 836 [Cicero] Rhetorica ad Herennium, IV, XII, 18. [Cicero] Rhetorica ad Herennium, IV, xiii, 18, with an English Translation by Harry Caplan, The Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, London, England, First published 1954, Reprinted 1964, 1968, 1977, 1981, 1989, 1999, pp. 274-275. [Cicerón] Retórica a Herenio, Traducción, Introducción y Notas de Juan Francisco Alcina, Erasmo, Textos Bilingües, Editorial Bosch, Libro IV, XIII, Barcelona, 1991, pp. 264-265. [Cicéron] Rhétorique a Herennius, Ouvrage Longtemps Attribué a Cicéron, Texte Revue et traduit avec Introduction et Notes par Henri Bornecque, Librairie Garnière Frères, Livre IV, XIII, 18, Paris, pp. 184185. 837 Cicero, De Oratore, III, LII, 201. Cicéron, De l'Orateur, Texte Établi et Traduit par Edmond Courbaud, Livre Troisième, LII, 201, Société d'Édition "Les Belles lettres", Paris, 1930, p. 83. 838 For the latter traditional topic, with an interesting section on literal interpretation and the writing of the law, see: Bernard Vonglis, La Lettre et L'Esprit de la Loi dans Jurisprudence Classique et la Rhétorique, Sirey, Paris, 1968, 220 pp., pp. 61-69. 839 Pierre Fontanier, Traité Géneral des Figures du Discours autres que les Tropes, 4e. Édition, 1830, dans Fontanier, Figures du Discours, Introduction par Gérard Genette, Flammarion, Paris, 1977, pp. 299300. In pleonasms, there is a superabundance of words; in ellipses, an eliminaton.840 It is convenient to remember that, if, in an attempt to be brief, the expression turns out to be obscure,841 clarity should be preferred. Concision is a virtue, unlike brevity or extension of the prescriptive and persuasive speeches, which depends on the circumstances. RULE: Ellipses shall not be used, if they render the prescriptive and persuasive speeches obscure.842 In a periphrasis or circumlocution an idea that might have been conveyed with few words or only one word is conveyed evasively with several words, but more beautifully, energetically, or skillfully.843 They may be of great utility if they avoid an unnecessary or inopportune discussion, but lengthen speech and, therefore, must be used only when they are indispensable. RULE: Periphrases or circumlocutions may be used if they avoid unnecessary or inopportune discussions. In a euphemism, a simple direct expression that would otherwise prove hard or indecorous is replaced with a figurative, softer and proper one, to make it more acceptable.844 They are generally used in the prescriptive speech in two situations. First, when there are contrasting evaluations and the legislator wants to arrive at an acceptable commitment solution, like in a French law of 1982, which, instead of using the word "unemployed", used the expression "workers deprived of employment", using a periphrasis, and in the Italian law of 1977, n. 10, Section,15, which mandated a 840 Pierre Fontanier, Manuel Classique pour L'Étude des Tropes ou Éléments de la Science des Mots, 4e. Édition, 1830, dans Fontanier, Figures du Discours, Introduction par Gérard Genette, Flammarion, Paris, 1977, p. 223. 841 Cicero, De Oratore, I, 41, 187. Cicéron, De l'Orateur, Texte Établi et Traduit par Edmond Courbaud, Livre Premier, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Paris, 1930, p. 67. Boileau, L'Art Poetique, dans Oeuvres de Boileau, Introduction de André Thérive, Chant I, Firmin Didot et Cie., Paris, 1928, p. 190. 842 The rule is obvious to those who consider an ellipsis entails an omission of the words necessary for a grammatical construction rather than of the words that make meaning clear, like the definition of this figure, considered to be grammatical, in: Diccionario de la Lengua Española, Decimonovena Edición,Real Academia Española, Madrid, 1970, p. 508. 843 Diccionario de la Lengua Española, Madrid, 1970, pp. 583 and 1008. Pierre Fontanier, Traité Général give Represent du Discours Autres que les Tropes, 4e. Édition, 1830, dans Fontanier, Les Figures du Discours, Introduction par Gérard Genette, Flammarion, Paris, 1977, p. 361. 844 Dictionary of the Spanish Language, Nineteenth Edition, the Spanish Royal Academy, Madrid, 1970, p. 591. Heinreich Lausberg, Handbook of Literary Rhetoric, A Foundation of Literary Style, Foreword by George A. Kennedy, Translated by Matthew T. Bliss, Annemiek Jansen, David E. Orton, Edited by David E. Orton and R. Dean Anderson, From the Second German Edition, Max Hueber Verlag, Ismaining bei München, 1973, Brill, Leyden, Boston, Köln, 1998, number 1246, p. 871. Heinreich Lausberg, Manual de Retórica Literaria, Fundamentos de una Ciencia de la Literatura, Traducción de José Pérez Riesco del Original Alemán Handbuch der Literarischen Rhetorik, Eine Grundlegung der Literaturwissenchaft, Max Hueber Verlag, München, 1960, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1968, T. III, número 1245, p. 341. confiscation, but expressed it as a free acquisition, using a metonymy. Second, when social sensibility changes and accordingly, a formerly modest activity is ennobled, like the case of the road sweeper who started to be called "an ecological operator", using a synecdoche.845 RULE: When an acceptable commitment solution is sought, or social sensibility changes, euphemisms may be used. In antitheses of diction or words (antitheton, contentio), unlike in antitheses of thought, words are quickly opposed in speech. Example of antithesis of words: "You show yourself conciliatory to your enemies, inexorable to your friends."846 Figures of thought Figures of words or diction are born and die in their linguistic formulations; in figures of thought or judgment, it is possible to choose from among several possible linguistic formulations847 to express the same conceptual content. In Law it is mandatory to choose the same linguistic formula for each concept, with only one name, as stated when discussing nominal definitions. Two figures of thought will be considered here: imprecations and antithesis of thoughts. Imprecations are vehement figures used to provoke fear, through scoldings, complaints and threats.848 Although it is true that modern legislators, in principle, avoid excesses, trying to appear moderate and more rational than pathetic, and that complaints are not proper to prescriptive speech, it is equally true that the punishments established by legislators, from a rhetorical point of view, are imprecations that express their desire 845 Rodolfo Pagano, Introduzione alla Legistica. L'Arte di Prepare le Leggi, Dott. A. Giuffrè Editore, Milan, 1999, pp. 133-34. The examples of euphemisms belong to the above mentioned author and the qualifications of the figures used like periphrasis, metonymy and synecdoche, belong to the author of this book. 846 [Cicero] Rethorica ad Herennium, IV, XLV, 58. [Cicero] Rhetorica ad Herennium, IV, xlv, 58, with an English Translation by Harry Caplan, The Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, London, England, First published 1954, Reprinted 1964, 1968, 1977, 1981, 1989, 1999, pp. 376-377. [Cicerón] Retórica a Herenio, Traducción, Introducción y Notas de Juan Francisco Alcina, Erasmo, Textos Bilingües, Editorial Bosch, Libro IV, XLV, Barcelona, 1991, pp. 340-341. [Cicéron] Rhétorique to Herennius, Ouvrage Longtemps Attribué a Cicéron, Texte Revue et traduit avec Introduction et Notes par Henri Bornecque, Librairie Garnière Frères, Livre IV, XLV, 58, Paris, pp. 250251. 847 Heinreich Lausberg, Handbook of Literary Rhetoric, A Foundation of Literary Style, Foreword by George A. Kennedy, Translated by Matthew T. Bliss, Annemiek Jansen, David E. Orton, Edited by David E. Orton and R. Dean Anderson, From the Second German Edition, Max Hueber Verlag, Ismaining bei München, 1973, Brill, Leyden, Boston, Köln, 1998, number 755, p. 335. Heinreich Lausberg, Manual de Retórica Literaria, Fundamentos de una Ciencia de la Literatura, Traducción de José Pérez Riesco del Original Alemán Handbuch der Literarischen Rhetorik, Eine Grundlegung der Literaturwissenchaft, Max Hueber Verlag, München, 1960, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1967, T. II, número 755, p. 189. 848 Antonio De Campany y De Montpalau, Filosofía de la Elocuencia, Segunda Edición, Londres, 1812, pp. 457-465. to retaliate against the evil of the crime, reprimanding and threatening the criminal with punishment, as it has been held by the juristic writings of the classical school of criminal law. In the word or diction antitheses, there is a quick opposition of words in the speech, whereas, in the antitheses of thought, there is an opposition of such concepts in the speech, as are compared with each other.849 Mixed figures Mixed figures, which combine figures of word or diction with figures of thought, judgment or idea, produce in speech the same effects as the contrast of colors in painting, or the contrast of tones in music.850 Among them, only the antitheses will be mentioned. Mixed antitheses, double antitheses of words and ideas, are more effective than each of the others two classes,851 because, if figures of words or diction give splendor and figures of of thougt or judgment give force, the mixed ones give splendor and force at the same time. Composition of sentences The first stage in the search for the ornament was the election of the most beautiful words, tropes and other figures of speech, to gather materials. At this second and last stage of the style, called composition (compositio), words, whether or not tropes or other figures of speech, are jointly considered in the construction of the literary work, to be in a transit from thought to language. In the art of speech, like in every art that gathers a variety of materials and produces a work (construction of houses, carpentry, embroidery, etc.), composition is the second stage in the logical order, following selection, but it is the first one in potency, since the best materials are useless if they are not aptly assembled.852 849 [Cicero] Rhetorica ad Herennium, IV, XLV, 58. [Cicero] Rhetorica ad Herennium, IV, xlv, 58, with an English Translation by Harry Caplan, The Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, London, England, First published 1954, Reprinted 1964, 1968, 1977, 1981, 1989, 1999, pp. 376-377. [[Cicerón] Retórica a Herenio, Traducción, Introducción y Notas de Juan Francisco Alcina, Erasmo, Textos Bilingües, Editorial Bosch, Libro IV, XLV, Barcelona, 1991, pp. 340-341. [Cicéron] Rhétorique to Hérennius, Ouvrage Longtemps Attribué a Cicéron, Texte Revue et traduit avec Introduction et Notes par Henri Bornecque, Librairie Garnière Frères, Livre IV, XLV, 58, Paris, pp. 250251. 850 Pierre Fontanier, Traité Général des Figures du Discours autres que les Tropes, 4e. Édition, 1830, dans Fontanier, Figures du Discours, Introduction par Gérard Genette, Flammarion, Paris, 1977, p. 379. 851 [Aristotle] Rhetoric to Alexander, 1435b35. [Aristotle] Rhetoric to Alexander, 1435b35, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation, Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume Two, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 2296. [Aristotle] Rhetorica ad Alexandrum with an English Translation by H. Rackham, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, William Heinemann Ltd., London, First Printed 1937, Revised And Reprinted 1957, 1965, 1983, XXVI, 1435 b35, pp. 372-373. 852 Dionysius of Halicarnassus, On Literary Composition, 2. Dionisyus Of Halicarnassus, On Literay Composition, 2, Dionisyus of Halicarnassus, The Critical Essays in two Volumes, with an English Translation by Stephen Usher, The Loeb Classical Library No. 466, Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusets, William Heinemman Ltd., Vol. II, London, 1985, p. 23. The composition of sentences has two aspects: degrees of elaboration and placement of words. Degrees of elaboration A grammatical sentence is usually defined as a set of words "expressing a complete thought."853 Rhetoric, style and ornament, are interesting in knowing how a set of words completes a thought, for which purpose three degrees of elaboration have been distinguished in sentences: free, coordinated and periodic.854 Free sentence The flowing of thoughts in a sentence may be compared to a race (cursus). In a free sentence (oratio soluta), it runs cross-country, freely, since there is no path, it makes the path as it goes. In daily speech, in a conversation on everyday matters, thoughts flow freely in sentences, loosely (oratio soluta), since syntactic correction is enough to make oneself understood, without rhetoric devices. When a free sentence is imitated, for example in the vulgar dialogues contained in literary works or in ordinary correspondence, there is the first degree of elaboration of the prose of art. The rules of such prose go beyond linguistic correction (recte dicere), proper to grammar, since they aspires at good speech (bene dicere), proper to rhetoric: in a dialogue, at realism; in the ordinary correspondence, at imitating a conversation between absent people. RULE: For a simple style, free sentences shall be used. 853 Dionysius Trax (c.170-c. 90 B.C.), quoted by: R.H. Robins, A Short History of Linguistic, Longmans, First Published, London, 1967, p. 33, text reproduced above. "La oración es la combinación de palabras en prosa que expresa un sentido completo." Dionisio Tracio, Gramática, in Gramática and Comentarios Antiguos, Introducción y Notas de Vicente Bécares Botas, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 11. De La Palabra, p. 50. Bello still says: "proposition or set of propositions that forms a complete thought" ("proposición o conjunto de proposiciones que forma sentido completo): Andrés Bello, Gramática de la Lengua Castellana destinada al Uso de los Americanos, Vigésima Edición, Hecha Sobre la Ultima del Autor, con Extensas Notas y Copiosos Índices Alfabéticos de Rufino José Cuervo, R. Roger y F. Chernoviz, Editores, 308(157), Paris, 1921, p. 84. "The speaker's intention divides the elocution into units of complete sense themselves called sentences" "La intención del hablante divide la elocución en unidades de sentido completo en sí mismas llamadas oraciones." Esbozo de una Nueva Gramática de la Lengua Española, Real Academia Española (Comisión de Gramática), Espasa-Calpe, S.A., Madrid 1973, 3.1.2., p. 349. For a criticism, see: Luis Juan Picardo, El Concepto de Oración, Universidad de la República, Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias, Investigaciones y Estudios, Montevideo, 1954, 3.1, pp. 10-12. 854 Heinreich Lausberg, Handbook of Literary Rhetoric, A Foundation of Literary Style, Foreword by George A. Kennedy, Translated by Matthew T. Bliss, Annemiek Jansen, David E. Orton, Edited by David E. Orton and R. Dean Anderson, From the Second German Edition, Max Hueber Verlag, Ismaining bei München, 1973, Brill, Leyden, Boston, Köln, 1998, number 913, p. 412. Heinreich Lausberg, Manual de Retórica Literaria, Fundamentos de una Ciencia de la Literatura, Traducción de José Pérez Riesco del Original Alemán Handbuch der Literarischen Rhetorik, Eine Grundlegung der Literaturwissenchaft, Max Hueber Verlag, München, 1960, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1967, T. II, número 913, pp. 302-303. Coordinated sentence In a coordinated or continuous sentence (oratio perpetua), thoughts runs on a straight track in which the finish line is not seen until they arrives at it, so the runner easily becomes tired because on the way he does not know how much further ahead the finish line is and, if he reaches it, he arrives breathless and exausted, since he could not measure and save energy throughout the stages covered. It happens when simple sentences are joined by conjunctions or are juxtaposed, forming a continuum that, although it has a starting point and a route, is devoid of linguistic indicators that enable to see and wait for the termination of the complex sentence, which may end in any of the simple sentences, since the structure is based only on the contents expressed, and not on the linguistic form that expresses it. Periodic sentence Thoughts in a free sentence runs cross-country; in a coordinated sentence, on a straight track; in a periodic one (periodos, circuitus, circumscriptio, comprehensio, continuatio, ambitus), on a curvey track, circunscribed855 by a rising linguistic tension (protasis), which makes the addresseee expect for its complement, the falling linguistic distension (apodosis) that provides a meaning and end to the sentence. It does not advance in a straight line, like a coordinated sentence (oratio perpetua), but in a circle, making around (periodos, circuitus, ambitus), like in a race on the track of an Olympic stadium, where the finishing line is also the starting point, after one or more laps, so the runner may manage his energy, since he knows how much he has run and how much longer he has to go.856 In poetry, strophes consist in lines of verse, which in turn consist in hemistichs; in artistic prose, a period, similar to a strophe, is composed of members (colon) and elements of members (comma).857 The members, which are longer, indicate the end of a complete thought, or of a part, which is itself complete, of a bigger thought, like an arm, which is a part that has its own limits and parts, which are also also themselves 855 Like locked up in a circle until it stops: Cicero, Orator, 66, 204. Cicerón, El Orador, 66, 204, Texto Revisado y Traducido por Antonio Tovar y Aurelio R. Bujaldón, Ediciones Alma mater, S.A., Barcelona, 1967, p. 92. Cicéron, L'Orateur, Texte Établi et Traduit par Albert Yon, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", LVI, 204, Paris, 1964, p. 79. 856 On the comparison with runners, who run out of breath and become weak in the curves, and do not stop running when the finishing line is in sight, see: Aristotle, Rhetoric, III, 9, 1409a30-35. Aristotle, Rhetoric, III, 9, 1409a30-35, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation, Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume Two, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 2248. Aristóteles, Retórica, Introducción, Traducción y Notas por Quintín Racionero, Libro III, 9, 1409a30-35, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1990, pp. 523-524. Aristote, Rhétorique, Texte Établi et Traduit par Médéric Dufour et André Wartelle, Société d'Édition "Belles Lettres", Tome Troisième, Livre III, 1409th 32-35, Paris, p. 59. Aristotele, Retorica, A cura di Armando Plebe, III, IX, 1409th, Editore Laterza, Bari, 1961, pp. 188-189. 857 The following author indicates the triple correspondence; he quotes Cicero, Orator, LXVI, 223, on the verse and the member: Aldo Scaglione, The Classical Theory of Composition from its Origins to the Present Day, A Historical Survey, The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1972, p. 34. complete: the forearm and the fingers.858 The members have a recognizable rhythmic pattern at the end, a cadence or clause, while the comma does not have such pattern and is shorter.859 In a free sentence, words form a correct syntactic structure, but, from the rhetorical point of view, they are like a pile of stones. In a coordinated sentence, in addition to a correct syntactic structure, there is a rhetorical structure that organizes the words in members and shorter elements (comma), like a road that begins at a certain point and streches in a straight line, but indefinitely, in which, looking backwards, one can know how much has been covered, but not how much longer one has to go because, since the finish line cannot be seen, counting the members is not enough, since the coordinated sentence can end upon the end of any of them: it has the shape of a semi-straight line. In a periodic sentence (period), words are supported by each other, they are compact, such like the stones that support a domed roof, in a rising construction (protasis) and falling one (apodosis), with a tension that keeps them together and enables to expect the apodosis from the protasis, but suspending the entire meaning until the end of the sentence. With only one look, enables to cover the set (period) and to count its elements (members –colon– or shorter elements –comma–), so that the multiplicity is reduced to a unit, with definite numbers that facilitate understanding and memorizing, like verses within a strophe in poetry860: it has a rounded shape.861 The members must not be very short, so that the runner will not stumble over them, in case the period end before expected, or very long, so that he will not late, as if he were running for the exterior side of the track, while the period was running for the interior side.862 If it is too long it turns out to be slow; if it is too brief, unstable.863 858 Demetrius, On the Style, I, 2. Demetrius, On Style, I, 2, With Introduction and English Translation by W. Rhys Roberts, The Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachussets, William Heineman Ltd., London, First Published 1927, Revised and Reprinted 1932, Reprinted 1939, pp. 306-307. Demetrio, Sobre el Estilo, I, 2, Introducción, Tranducción y Notas de José García López, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1979, pp. 27-28. 859 Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria, IX, IV, 122-123. Quintilian, The Institutio Oratoria of Quintilian, Book IX, iv, 122-123, with an English Translation by H.E. Butler in Four Volumes, The Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, G.P. Putnam Sons's, New York, Volume III, London, 1921, pp. 574-577. Quintilien. Institution Oratoire, Livre IX, IV, 122-123, Texte Établi et Traduit par Jean Cousin, Société d'Édition "Les Belles lettres", Tome V, Paris, 1978, pp. 265-266. 860 Aristotle, Rhetoric, III, 9, 1409b5. Aristotle, Rhetoric, III, 9, 1409b4-5, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation, Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume Two, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 2248. Aristóteles, Retórica, Introducción, Traducción y Notas por Quintín Racionero, Libro III, 9, 1409b5, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1990, p. 524. Aristote, Rhétorique, Livre III, 1409b4-5, Texte Établi et Traduit par Médéric Dufour et André Wartelle, Société d'Édition "Belles Lettres", Tome Troisième, Paris, p. 59. Aristotele, Retorica, III, IX, 1409b, A cura di Armando Plebe, Editore Laterza, Bari, 1961, p. 189. 861 The idea of comparing the members with a pile of stones, one on another, in a free sentence, and with domed roofs, in the period, belongs to Demetrius. Demetrius, On The Style, I, 12. Demetrius, On Style, I, 12, With Introduction and English Translation by W. Rhys Roberts, The Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachussets, William Heineman Ltd., London, First Published 1927, Revised And Reprinted 1932, Reprinted 1939, pp. 306-307. Demetrio, Sobre el Estilo, I, 12, Introducción, Traducción y Notas de José García López, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1979, pp. 32-33. 862 Aristotle, Rhetoric, III, 9, 1409b15-25. RULE: When a member is too long, it shall be slow; when it is too brief, it shall be unstable. RULE: When anybody wishes to verify the quality of a period, he shall read it to himself aloud and fluently, in only one breath.864 A period may have one or more members. A simple period, of only one member, requires certain length and a rounded end,865 and is also called "single", because it consists in only one member (colon), but it must always be integrated of at least by two parts (comma), of which the first one constitutes the protasis (or proposition); and the last one, the apodosis (correspondent statement or redditio). EXAMPLE: "What thieves do not steal, perishes in corners."866 RULE: When a period is simple or single, it shall have at least two shorter elements (comma), one as protasis and another as apodosis. A compound period may have as many as six members. If it has more members, it will not be perceived as a unit and completely remembered, due to a limitation of the Aristotle, Rhetoric, III, 9, 1409b15-25, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation, Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume Two, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 2248. Aristóteles, Retórica, Introducción, Traducción y Notas por Quintín Racionero, Libro III, 9, 1409b15-25, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1990, p. 526. Aristote, Rhétorique, Livre III, 1409b18-30, Texte Établi et Traduit par Médéric Dufour et André Wartelle, Société d'Édition "Belles Lettres", Tome Troisième, Paris, p. 60-61. Aristotele, Retorica, III, IX, 1409b, A cura di Armando Plebe, Editore Laterza, Bari, 1961, p. 190. 863 Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria, IX, IV, 125. Quintilian, The Institutio Oratoria of Quintilian, Book IX, iv, 125, with an English Translation by H.E. Butler in Four Volumes, The Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, G.P. Putnam Sons's, New York, Volume III, London, 1921, pp. 576-579. Quintilien. Institution Oratoire, Livre IX, IV, 125, Texte Établi et Traduit par Jean Cousin, Société d'Édition "Les Belles lettres", Tome V, Paris, 1978, p. 266. 864 Aristotle, Rhetoric, III, 9, 1409b15. Aristotle, Rhetoric, III, 9, 1409b15-16, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation, Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume Two, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 2248. Aristóteles, Retórica, Introducción, Traducción y Notas por Quintín Racionero, Libro III, 9, 1409b15, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1990, p. 525. Aristote, Rhétorique, Livre III, 1409b15-16, Texte Établi et Traduit par Médéric Dufour et André Wartelle, Société d'Édition "Belles Lettres", Tome Troisième, Paris, p. 60. Aristotele, Retorica, III, IX, 1409b, A cura di Armando Plebe, Editore Laterza, Bari, 1961, p. 189. 865 Demetrius, On Style, I, 17. Demetrius, On Style, I, 17, With Introduction and English Translation by W. Rhys Roberts, The Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachussets, William Heineman Ltd., London, First Published 1927, Revised And Reprinted 1932, Reprinted 1939, pp. 308-309. Demetrio, Sobre el Estilo, I, 12, Introducción, Traducción y Notas de José García López, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1979, p. 34. 866 "Lo que no hurtan ladrones, perece en rincones." Gregorio Mayans I Siscar, Rhetorica de Don Gregorio Mayans I Siscar, Segunda Edición, Valencia, 1776, Volume II, p. 314, sic "parece". human mind, which is incapable of processing any more units at the same time.867 The average number of members recommended by classical rhetorical authors is four.868 RULE: Complex periods shall have an average of four members, because, if they had more than six, they would not be perceived like units and completely remembered. Juridical norms, from a logical point of view, are hypothetical propositions (if A were, B must be); from a grammatical viewpoint, they are conditional sentences (if someone kills another, he shall be imprisoned or subject to forced labor from eight to twenty-five years); and, from a rhetorical one, they are periods (if someone were kills another ‒protasis of one member‒ he shall be imprisoned or subject to forced labor from eight to twenty-five years ‒apodosis of one member‒). It is like that, because juridical norms need to be easily understood and remembered, like maxims869 and also possess certain dignity and gravity, characteristics of rhetorical periods. It is not casual that the translations of norms of ancient cultures use the rhetorical period, in the form of conditional sentences, in spite of the differences between the source and target languages. EXAMPLES: "1. If a man has committed murder, such man shall be killed." Code Shulgi or of Ur-Nammu (Sumeria, 2112-2095, B.C.).870 867 George Miller, The Psychology of Communication, Basic Books, Inc. Pub., New York London, Versión Castellana de Maria Inés Dates, Supervisión de Eduardo J. Blackish, Editorial Paidós, 1. Información y Memoria, pp. 11-19, especialmente p. 14 (Scientific American, Vol. 195, No. 2. August, 1956, pp. 42-46); 2. El Mágico Número Siete, más o menos Dos; Algunos Límites de Nuestra Capacidad para Procesar Información, pp. 20-43 (Psychological Review, Vol. 63, No. 2, March, 1956, pp. 81-96). 868 Cicero, Orator, 66, 221-222. Cicerón, El Orador, 66, 221-222, Texto Revisado y Traducido por Antonio Tovar y Aurelio R. Bujaldón, Ediciones Alma mater, S.A., Barcelona, 1967, p. 99. Cicéron, L'Orateur, LVI, 221-222, Texte Établi et Traduit par Albert Yon, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Paris, 1964, pp. 85-86. Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria, IX, IV, 125. Quintilian, Oratorical The Institutio of Quintilian, Book IX, iv, 125, With an English Translation by H.E. Butler in Four Volumes, The Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, G.P. Putnam Sons's, New York, Volume III, London, 1921, pp. 576-579. Quintilien, Institution Oratoire, Livre IX, IV, 125, Texte Établi et Traduit par Jean Cousin, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Paris, 1978, p. 266. Aldo Scaglione, The Classical Theory of Composition from its Origins to The Present Day, A Historical Survey, The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1972, p. 34. 869 [Cicero] Rhetorica ad Herennium, IV, XIX, 27. [Cicero] Rhetorica ad Herennium, IV, xix, 27, with an English Translation by Harry Caplan, The Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, London, England, First published 1954, Reprinted 1964, 1968, 1977, 1981, 1989, 1999, pp. 296-297. [Cicerón] Retórica a Herenio, Traducción, Introducción y Notas de Juan Francisco Alcina, Erasmo, Textos Bilingües, Editorial Bosch, Libro IV, XIX, Barcelona, 1991, pp. 280-281. [Cicéron] Rhétorique to Herennius, Livre IV, XIX, 27, Ouvrage Longtemps Attribué a Cicéron, Texte Revue et traduit avec Introduction et Notes par Henri Bornecque, Librairie Garnière Frères, Paris, pp. 198-199. 870 "Si un hombre ha cometido un asesinato, se matará a ese hombre." Los Primeros Còdigos de la Humanidad, Estudio Preliminar, Traducción y Notas de Federico Lara Peinado y Federico Lara Peinado González, Editorial Tecnos, Madrid, 1994, p. 60. Translation from Spanish to English by the autor of this book. "If a citizen, (who) does not believe in another citizen, keeps (nevertheless) as a guarantee a slave of (such) citizen, and if he causes the death of the guarantee (the slave) that he has in his house, he shall indemnify the slave's owner (with the value) of two slaves." The Laws of Eshnunna, Section 23 (c 1980 B.C.).871 "153. If the wife of a gentleman, through the fault of another man, has caused the death of her husband, such woman shall be impaled." Code of Hammurabi (1730-1686 B.C., Babylonia).872 All conditional sentences that begin with the structure "if..." are periodic, but not all periods are conditional sentences. The linguistic tension that links the protasis with the apodosis may be generated by antithesis, parallelisms, balances, or symmetries. RULE: Juridical norms shall be preferably expressed by periodic sentences, to facilitate their understanding and memorizing, and to respect their dignity and gravity. Placement of words In the preceding part, three degrees of elaboration of sentences were mentioned: free, coordinated, and periodic. In this part, placement of words in the sentence will be discussed from three points of view: order, junction and rhythm, qualities that, put together, would make the ornament perfect but that rarely concur, since it is often necessary to accept a compromise with the requirements of other virtues of style.873 871 "Si un citoyen (qui) n'a plus la moindre créance sur un autre citoyen, garde (néanmoins) comme gage l'esclave de (ce) citoyen, et s'il cause la morte du gage (de l'esclave) qu'il détien dans sa maison, il doit indemniser le maitre de l'esclave (de la valeur) de deux esclaves." Les Lois D'Eshnunna, Transcription, Traduction et Commentaire, par Emile Szlechter, Publications de l'Institut de Droit Romain de l'Université of Paris, XII, Ed. Recueil Sirey, Paris, 1954, p. 21. Translation from French to English by the autor of this book. 872 "153. Si la esposa de un señor, por culpa de otro varón, ha causado la muerte de su marido, esa mujer será empalada." Código de Hammurabi, Estudio Preliminar, Traducción y Notas de Federico Lara Peinado, Editorial Tecnos, Madrid, 1a. Edición, 1986, 2a. Edición, 1992, p. 26. 873 Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria, IX, IV, 22; 27. Quintilian, The Institutio Oratoria of Quintilian, Book IX, iv, 22; 27, With an English Translation by H.E. Butler in Four Volumes, The Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, G.P. Putnam Sons's, New York, Volume III, London, 1921, pp. 516-517; pp. 520-521. Quintilien, Institution Oratoire, Livre IX, IV, 125, Texte Établi et Traduit par Jean Cousin, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Paris, 1978, pp. 237-238., 1967, T. II, números 948-949, pp. 322-323. Heinreich Lausberg, Handbook of Literary Rhetoric, A Foundation of Literary Style, Foreword by George A. Kennedy, Translated by Matthew T. Bliss, Annemiek Jansen, David E. Orton, Edited by David E. Orton and R. Dean Anderson, From the Second German Edition, Max Hueber Verlag, Ismaining bei München, 1973, Brill, Leyden, Boston, Köln, 1998, numbers 948-949, p. 425. Heinreich Lausberg, Manual de Retórica Literaria, Fundamentos de una Ciencia de la Literatura, Traducción de José Pérez Riesco del Original Alemán Handbuch der Literarischen Rhetorik, Eine Grundlegung der Literaturwissenchaft, Max Hueber Verlag, München, 1960, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1967, T. II, números 948-949, pp. 322-323. Aldo Scaglione, The Classical Theory of Composition from its Origins to the Present Day. A Historical Survey, The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1972, p. 74. Order Words, whether considered separately or in groups, should appear in the sentence in an order (ordo) with rising force, preventing the strong ones from preceding the weak ones. The succesive order "thief", "sacrilegius" is preferasble to "sacrilegius", "thieving"; "insolent, bandit" is preferable to "bandit, insolent". That is why Cicero chose: "You, with that throat, those lungs, that strength, that would do credit to a prizefighter, in every limb of your body", since it had lost force begining874 with: "You, with all your body..." There is a natural order imposed by custom, which makes such combinations like "men and women", "day and night", "rising and setting" preferable.875 RULE: Words, whether considered separately or in groups, shall appear in the sentence in an order with rising force, preventing the strong ones from preceding the weak ones and following the natural order imposed by custom. Some words becomes useless if the successive order is inverted, like for example, "twin siblings", since, if the first word is "twins", it is not necessary to add "siblings"876, except when the context does not solve an ambiguity: gemelos (meaning "twins", "calf muscles" and "cufflinks" in Spanish). RULE: The words whose meaning becomes useless upon an inversion of successive order may be eliminated, except when they avoid an ambiguity not resolved by the context. 874 Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria, IX, IV, 23. Quintilian, The Institutio Oratoria of Quintilian, Book IX, iv, 23, With an English Translation by H.E. Butler in Four Volumes, The Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, G.P. Putnam Sons's, New York, Volume III, London, 1921, pp. 518-519, for above english quotations. Quintilien, Institution Oratoire, Livre IX, IV, 23, Texte Établi et Traduit par Jean Cousin, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Paris, 1978, p. 237. 875 Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria, IX, IV, 23. Quintilian, The Institutio Oratoria of Quintilian, Book IX, iv, 23, With an English Translation by H.E. Butler in Four Volumes, The Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, G.P. Putnam Sons's, New York, Volume III, London, 1921, pp. 518-519, for above english quotations. Quintilien, Institution Oratoire, Livre IX, IV, 23, Texte Établi et Traduit par Jean Cousin, Société d'Édition, "Les Belles Lettres", Paris, 1978, p. 237. Heinreich Lausberg, Handbook of Literary Rhetoric, A Foundation of Literary Style, Foreword by George A. Kennedy, Translated by Matthew T. Bliss, Annemiek Jansen, David E. Orton, Edited by David E. Orton and R. Dean Anderson, From the Second German Edition, Max Hueber Verlag, Ismaining bei München, 1973, Brill, Leyden, Boston, Köln, 1998, number 951 a), pp. 425-426. Heinreich Lausberg, Manual de Retórica Literaria, Fundamentos de una Ciencia de la Literatura, Traducción de José Pérez Riesco del Original Alemán Handbuch der Literarischen Rhetorik, Eine Grundlegung der Literaturwissenchaft, Max Hueber Verlag, München, 1960, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1967, T. II, número 951 a), pp. 323-324. Aldo Scaglione, The Classical Theory of Composition from its Origins to the Present Day. A Historical Survey, The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1972, pp. 75-76. 876 Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria, IX, IV, 24. Quintilian, The Institutio Oratoria of Quintilian, Book IX, iv, 24, With an English Translation by H.E. Butler in Four Volumes, The Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, G.P. Putnam Sons's, New York, Volume III, London, 1921, pp. 518-519,. Quintilien, Institution Oratoire, Livre IX, IV, 24, Texte Établi et Traduit par Jean Cousin, Société d'Édition, "Les Belles Lettres", T. V, Paris, 1978, pp. 237-238. The direct successive order of the words in a sentence means that nouns precede the verbs, verbs precede adverbs, and epithets and pronouns follow nouns, but this rule should not be exaggerated, since the inverse order often produces beautiful effects.877 When a change is introduced in the successive order in which the words in a simple sentence and simple sentences in compound ones must be placed, the figure of construction is called "hyperbaton."878 RULE: In the direct successive order of words in a sentence, unless the language in question formulates other principles for a regular syntax, nouns shall precede verbs and verbs to adverbs; epithets and pronouns shall follow nouns. To avoid ambiguities, to provide force or beauty, a hyperbaton may be used. Junction Junctions (iunctura) shall be considered with regard to letters, syllables or words. RULE: Junctions between vowels should be avoided (hiatus). RULE: The following succesion of syllabes should be avoided: a) several brief ones, due to their similarity to the sound of a rattle (droning);879 b) several long or several brief ones, due to their monotony; c) when the last one of a word and the first of the following one forms a bad word. 880 RULE: The succession of words of equal volume and morphological class should be avoided, owing to the tedium they might provoke.881 877 Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria, IX, IV, 24. Quintilian, The Institutio Oratoria of Quintilian, Book IX, iv, 24, With an English Translation by H.E. Butler in Four Volumes, The Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, G.P. Putnam Sons's, New York, Volume III, London, 1921, pp. 518-519. Quintilien, Institution Oratoire, Text Établi et Traduit par Jean Cousin, Livre IX, IV, 24, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Paris, 1978, pp. 237-238. 878 "In addition to the hyperbaton, regular syntax gives other liberties that constitute the figurative syntax, to provide with more energy and elegance, ornament, such as the ellipses, pleonasm, and sylepses. An elimination of words necessary to complete the grammatical construction, whenever meaning is still understood, when such words would otherwise deprive the sentence of energy and brevity, constitutes an ellipsis. The addition of seemingly redundant words that, however, clear doubts in relation to the meaning and provide more force and coloring to the expression, constitutes a pleonasm. The use of certain words with a concordance different from the grammatical correct one, grounded on what they represents not on what they say, constitutes a sylepsis." Real Academia Española, Gramática de la Lengua Española, Nueva Edición Reformada, de1931, Madrid, 1962, Capítulo XXVII, De la Sintáxis Figurada, números 471-475, pp. 431-436. For more figures of construction, see: Pierre Fontanier, Traité Général des Figures du Discours Autres que les Tropes, 4e. Édition, 1830, dans Fontanier, Figures du Discours, Introduction par Gérard Genette, Flammarion, Paris, 1977, pp. 481-483. 879 Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria, IX, IV, 60; 66. Quintilian, The Institutio Oratoria of Quintilian, Book IX, iv, 60; 66, With an English Translation by H.E. Butler in Four Volumes, The Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, G.P. Putnam Sons's, New York, Volume III, London, 1921, pp. 540-541; pp. 544-545. Quintilien, Institution Oratoire, Livre IX, IV, 60; 66, Texte Établi et Traduit par Jean Cousin, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Paris, 1978, pp. 247-248; pp. 249-250. 880 In spanish: "poca gana." Gregorio Mayans I Siscar, Rhetorica de Don Gregorio Mayans I Siscar, Segunda Edición, Valencia, 1776, Tomo II, p. 284, who remembers that the Greeks were naming it kakemphaton, in Spanish gazafatón. Rhythm There are three secret principles in the innermost depths of the art of legislation. The first two, already discussed, establish that rhetorical persuasion, in addition to force, is the foundation of the laws (Chapter I) and that legislative sophisms must be known in order to refute them, not to incur in them (Chapter V). Now the third one, the rhythm in legislative prose, will be discussed. PRINCIPLE: The use of the rhythm of the prose is a very powerful secret resource to persuade the addressees of the laws. Musical instruments enable to arouse feelings with admirable potency. The most prodigious musical instrument imaginable, the human voice,882 in singing, poetry, free poem and rhythmic prose, in descending order, lets sound stir up emotions in the soul of man. Most Greek poetry was sung with lyre or flute accompaniment, increasing the intensity of the feelings suggested by the words, instead of subordinating the words to the music, as it is the case in modern opera. When dance was added, the most perfect beauty could be achieved, coordinating body movements (space) and their duration, with the rhythm of the music and of the words (time).883 The classic Greek education aimed at familiarizing the children's bodies and souls with rhythm and harmony, to make them more civilized, felicitously regulated in their movements, balanced, and capable of making themselves be appreciated as orators and men of action, since it was founded on the conviction that the entire human life needed both a well regulated activity and a balance.884 Melody is very likely to have originated in spoken language, since the combination of the accents of tone (low or high-pitched) gives it harmony, while those of quantity 881 Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria, IX, IV, 42-43. Quintilian, The Institutio Oratoria of Quintilian, Book IX, iv, 42-43, With an English Translation by H.E. Butler in Four Volumes, The Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, G.P. Putnam Sons's, New York, Volume III, London, 1921, pp. 530-531. Quintilien, Institution Oratoire, Livre IX, IV, 42-43, Texte Établi et Traduit par Jean Cousin, Tome V, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Paris, 1978, pp. 242-243. Heinreich Lausberg, Handbook of Literary Rhetoric, A Foundation of Literary Style, Foreword by George A. Kennedy, Translated by Matthew T. Bliss, Annemiek Jansen, David E. Orton, Edited by David E. Orton and R. Dean Anderson, From the Second German Edition, Max Hueber Verlag, Ismaining bei München, 1973, Brill, Leyden, Boston, Köln, 1998, numbers 956-958, pp. 427-428. Heinreich Lausberg, Manual de Retórica Literaria, Fundamentos de una Ciencia de la Literatura, Traducción de José Pérez Riesco del Original Alemán Handbuch der Literarischen Rhetorik, Eine Grundlegung der Literaturwissenchaft, Max Hueber Verlag, München, 1960, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1967, T. II, números 956-958, pp. 326-327. 882 Discursos Leídos ante la Real Academia Española en la Recepción Pública del Excmo. Sr. D. Francisco Asenjo Barbieri, el Día 13 de Marzo de 1892, Imprenta de José M. Ducazcal, Madrid, 1892, pp. 7-8 [Discurso de Barbieri]. Also published as: La Música de la Lengua Española, La España Moderna, 1892, IV, num. 40, quoted by Tomás Navarro, Estudios de Filología Española, Siracusa University Press, New York, 1946, p. 110, n., 1. 883 L. Laurand, Manuel des Études Grecques et Latines, Éditions Auguste Picard, Paris, 1934, T. I. Grèce, pp. 126-127. 884 Plato, Protagoras, 326b. Platon, Protagoras 326b, dans Platon Oeuvres Complètes, Traduction Nouvelle et Notes par Lion Robin, avec la Colaboration of M.J. Moreau, Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, Tome I, Paris, 1950, p. 95. (long or short), or intensity (strong or weak), marke the rhythm.885 Out of the union between harmony and rhythm is born the melody, both in music and in speech.886 As for harmony, Gaius Sempronius Gracchus (murdered in 121 B.C.) should be remembered here, because he was the great orator who inflamed Roman citizens with his legislative reforms and used to deliver his speeches with a flautist behind him, who gaves the appropriate tones to him.887 Rhythm, in accordance with Aristoxenus of Tarentum (born c 370 B.C.) is "the order of the times",888 which in classical Greek and Latin was regulated by certain typical combinations of long syllables (one time), symbolized with a long hyphen ( ), and short (half a time), symbolized with a semicircle (U). It was accepted that a long syllable was equivalent to two short ones. These combinations were called "feet", because they were used to mesure speech. The Romans called the "rhythm" of the Greeks "number".889 It was an artistic number of feet selected and placed in an attempt to bring about certain effects, in accordance with certain established rules, rather than a random number produced in speech regardless of such attempt. In any speech the sequences of long and short syllables may be identified, but their combinations may occur at random; on the other hand, when speech is produced grounded on feet, to achieve certain effects, this already is the aplication of rules of the art of prose, which brings an order to the times, through typical combinations of long and short syllables (feet). Applying resources of poetry to oratory, Gorgias of Leontini (Sicily, c 485-c 380), in 427 B.C., as the ambassador of his hometown, surprised and seduced the Athenians with his speeches, and, in the following years he was considered the best-known rhetorical personage in Greece, both in the practice and in the teaching of oratory.890 The rhythm of prose was invented and used in excess by Thrasymachus of Chalcedon (who flourish c 430-400 B.C.) while, although it is false that it was invented by Isocrates, nobody used it better.891 885 Percy A. Scholes, Melody, 2, in The Oxford Companion to Music, (First Edition, 1938), Tenth Edition, Revised and Reset 1970, Edited by John Owen Ward, Oxford University Press, Second Impression, London, New York, Toronto, 1970, p. 619. 886 Eduard Norden, Die Antike Kunstprosa VI. Jahrhundert a. Chr. bis in die Zeit der Renaissance, 3rd. Ed., B.G. Teubner, Stuttgart, 1915, La Prosa d'Arte Antica, Dal Secolo VI B.C. all'Età della Renascenza, Edizione Italiana a Cura di Benedetta Heinemann Campana, con una Nota di Aggiornamento di Gualterio Calboli e una Premessa di Scevola Mariotti, Salerno Editrice, Roma, 1986, Tomo I, p. 60. 887 Hugh Blair, Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres, Complete in One Volume, London, 1823, p. 128. 888 "est l'ordre des temps": Salomon Reinach, Manuel de Philolgie Classique, Deuxième Édition, Librairie Hachette et Cie., Paris, 1907, p. 1294. "An ordening of times": Seymour Chatman, A Theory of Meter, Mouton and Co., London, The Hague, Paris, 1965, p. 18. 889 Cicero, Orator, 51, 170. Cicerón, El Orador, 51, 170, Texto Revisado y Traducido por Antonio y Aurelio R. Bujaldón, Ediciones Alma mater, S.A., Barcelona, 1967, p. 75. Cicéron, L'Orateur, LI, 170, Texte Établi et Traduit par Albert Yon, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Paris, 1964, p. 65. 890 George A. Kennedy, The Art of Persuasion in Greece, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1963, Sixth Printing, 1974, pp. 61-68. George A. Kennedy, Classical Rhetoric and its Christian and Secular Tradition from Ancient to Modern Times, The University of North Carolina Press, Chapell Hill, 1980, pp. 29-31. George A. Kennedy, A New History of Classical Rhetoric, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1994, pp. 17-21. 891 Cicero, Orator, 52, 175. The rhythm of prose,892 an echo of the soul that it seduces through the ears, is one of the most arduous topics of rhetorical art,893 since it is not easy to perceive, to understand and to explain. It must not be noticed during the speech since, if the addresses become cognizant of the device, they will not be persuaded and become distracted because, instead of paying attention to the contents they will pay attention to the form, trying to anticipate the parts in which a foot will reappear, as if it were poetry.894 RULE: In prescriptive and persuasive speeches, the rhythm shall not be noticed, so that it will not sound contrived and will not distract its addressees. Rhythm is related to physiology, since the "shortest" quantity, the minimal possible lenght of time of a syllable, the unit which feet are measured, is the pulse of the heart of any average human being. For the unit of a period, breath is generally used, that is to say, inhaling (pause) and exhaling with voice (sound), or the movements of muscular and spiritual tension and distension involved in spoken or writing.895 The impact of speech on the listeners' or readers' nervous systems also affects muscular tension and, sometimes, even breathing, as evidenced by the common expressions "breathtaking" and "catch one's breath", since the body make a duo with the soul.896 When the rhythm adheres to thought, for example, in successful periods, it facilitates the interpretation of the speech, since the sound serves as suitable mount to the meaning. Whether rhythm is marked by an accent of quantity or by an accent of intensity, the number always puts and end to the indeterminate nature of the prose, thus facilitating its memorizing, like in poetry and maxims. When Jorge Luis Borges Cicerón, El Orador, 52, 175, Texto Revisado y Traducido por Antonio Tovar y Aurelio R. Bujaldón, Ediciones Alma mater, S.A., Barcelona, 1967, p. 78. Cicéron, L'Orateur, LII, 175, Texte Établi et Traduit par Albert Yon, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Paris, 1964, p. 67. 892 Diplomatics, an auxiliary science of the history that studies ancient diplomas to determine their authors and dates, sorting out forged ones from real ones, takes into consideration the rhythm of the prose recommended in the works of ars dictaminis as one of the criteria to determine the authenticity of the medieval documents: A. Giry, Manuel de Diplomatique, Nouvelle Edition, Librairie Felix Alcan, Paris, 1925, p. 4, with a good summary of the ars dictaminis, pp. 479-492. 893 Cicero, Orator, 53, 179. Cicerón, El Orador, 53, 179, Texto Revisado y Traducido por Antonio Tovar y Aurelio R. Bujaldón, Ediciones Alma mater, S.A., Barcelona, 1967, p. 78. Cicéron, L'Orateur, Texte Établi et Traduit par Albert Yon, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", LIII, 179, Paris, 1964, p. 67. 894 Aristotle, Rhetoric, III, 8, 1408b20-25. Aristotle, Rhetoric, III, 8, 1408b21-25, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation, Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume Two, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 2246-2247. Aristóteles, Retórica, Introducción, Traducción y Notas por Quintín Racionero, Libro III, 8, 1408b20-25, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1990, p. 517-518. Aristote, Rhétorique, Livre III, 8, 1408b21-24, Texte Établi et Traduit par Médéric Dufour et André Wartelle, Société d'Édition "Belles Lettres", Tome Troisième, Paris, p. 57. Aristotele, Retorica, III, VIII, 1408b, a Cura di Armando Plebe, Editore Laterza, Bari, 1961, p. 189. 895 RHYTHME/Rythm, Hoseph Strelka, State University NewYork: http://wwwditl.unilim.fr./ART/rythme.htm, downloaded on March 31, 2001. Seymour Chatman, A Theory of Meter, Mouton and Co., London, The Hague, Paris, 1965, p. 20; p. 28 896 Amado Alonso, El Ritmo de la Prosa, in Materia y Forma en Poesía, Gredos, Segunda Edición, Madrid, 1960, pp. 240-248. (1899-1986), the great Argentine writer of world renown, whent blind, since he was no longer able to write drafts, he had to stop writing prose and return to poetry, gradually abandoning the free verse, because, as he stated in its Autobiography: "[...] a rhymed verse is portable. You can walk along the street or travel on the subway while you compose and polish a sonnet, since the rhyme and the meter have mnemonic virtues."897 Memorizing maxims turns is easy because certain typical rhythmic structures are repeated, dancig on the muscles of the mouth and the larynx, like schemes available to all lips,898 proper to the oral style. Some maxims are heard or read once and will always be remembered: "Tellme the company you keep, and I'll tell to you who you are." The same holds true of some legislative provisions, like Section 1382 of Napoleonic Code: "Any fact of a man that causes damage to another, oblige the person through whose fault the damage was caused to repair it." 899 The Argentine Civil Code, in the first part of Section 1109, provides as follow: "Anyone who executes a fact, that throught his fault or negligence causes a damage to another, is obliged to repair such damage."900 Both the maxim and the section are rhetorical periods in which the tension and distension between their elements facilitates their memorizing as full units of sense. Memorizing the maxim is even facilitated due to the concision of the period. 897 "[...] el verso rimado es portátil. Uno puede caminar por la calle o viajar en subterráneo mientras compone y pule un soneto, ya que la rima y el metro tienen virtudes mnemotécnicas." Jorge Luis Borges, Autobiografía Autobiographical Essay, The New Yorker, September 19, 1970), Traducción de Marcial Souto y Norman Thomas di Giovanni, El Ateneo, 1999, pp. 127-128. Retranslated from Spanish to English by the autor of this book. 898 Marcel Jousse, Études sur la Psychologie du Geste, Les Rabbis d'Israel, Les Récitatifs Rhythmiques Parallèles, I Genre de la Maxime, Éditions Spes, Paris, 1929, p. XXIV. 899 "Toute fait quelconque d'un homme, qui cause à autrui un dommage, oblige celui par la faute duquel il est arrivé, a le réparer." Anthoine de Saint-Joseph, Concordance Cogive entre les Codes Civils Étrangers et le Code Napoléon, Libraire de Conseil d'Etat, Paris, 1856, Tome Premier p. 138. Translation from French to English by the autor of this book. 900 "Todo el que ejecuta un hecho, que por su culpa o negligencia ocasiona un daño a otro, está obligado a la reparación del perjuicio." (Modern private editions) In modern private editions of the Argentinian Código Civil, the accents of conjunction "o" and two prepositions ("a") have been eliminated and the word "reparacion" of the Official Edition has been stressed. The Official Edition provides as follows: "Todo el que ejecuta un hecho, que por su culpa ó negligencia ocasiona un daño á otro, está obligado á la reparacion del perjuicio." Código Civil de la República Argentina, Edición Oficial, Establecimiento Tipográfico "La Pampa", Buenos Aires, 1883, p. 294. The section would be easier to remember, if a certain parallelism were added to the missing concision, as follow: "Anyone who, through his fault causes a damage to another, is obliged to repair such damage to such another." Laws, so as not to be forgotten, in ancient Greece, before being written, were sung and, in ancient Rome, the Laws of Twelve Tables, based on the Greek laws, even those drafted by Solon, in spite of being written, were learned by hart by the children, a practice abandoned afterwards.901 Solon, one of the seven Greek wise men included in all the lists and also the first Athenian poet in all the histories of literature, remains like the legislator by antonomasia in the Western memory.902 Most of its poetry intended to explain or to defend from criticism his legislative work,903 since poetry was easier to remember than rhythmic prose. Children, from the beginning of their education, learned his poems by hart, and orators, in the courts of justice and in political assemblies, quoting him as the classical expression of the civic soul. For that reason, Solon has been recognized as the creator of the Athenian political culture.904 The prose rhythm (rhythmus) also serves to excite or calm the addresses' passions (pathos) and, hence, it is no wonder that Thrasymachus of Chalcedon, its inventor, was the most skillful artist in the the pathetic style.905 When a passage of emotional prose is said to be slow or fast, soft or abrupt, these are all references to the suggestion produced by rhythm.906 901 Aristotle affirms that certain songs were still called nomes, probably by virtue of those first legislative songs. Aristotle, Problems, XIX, 28, 920a. Aristotle, Problems, XIX, 28, 920a, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation, Edited By Jonathan Barnes, Volume Two, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 1434. Cicero remembers that when he was a child, the Law of Twelve Tables was learned by hart, as a obligatory recitation, while nobody did so anymore wen he was writing the dialogue, and that the provisions on the decrease in the expenses and on the funeral laments were almost translations of Solon's laws. Cicero, Laws, II, 23, 59. Cicero, Laws, XXIII, 59, in Cicero, Of Re Publica, Of Legibus, with an English Translation by Clinton Walker Keyes, The Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann Ltd., London, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1966, pp. 444-445. Cicerón, Las Leyes, II, 23, 59, Texto Latino, Traducción, Introducción y Notas porÁlvaro D`Ors, Institutode Estudios Políticos, Reimpresión de la 1a. Edición de 1953, Madrid, 1970, pp. 180-181. 902 B.M.W. Knox, Solon, in The Cambridge History of Literature, I Greek Literature, Edited by P.E. Easterling and B.M.W. Knox, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1985, p. 147. 903 Augusto Rostagni, Storia della Letteratura Greca, Edizione Scholastiche Mondadori, XVIII Edizione, 1950, pp. 79-80. 904 Werner Jaeger, Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture, Translated from the Second German Edition by Gilbert Highet, Oxford University Press, New York, 1939, Vol. I, Book One, Chapter 8, Solon: Creator of Athenian Political Culture, p. 134. 905 Plato, Phaedrus, 267c-d Platón, Fedro, 267c-d, Edición Bilingüe, Traducción, Notas y Estudio Preliminar por Luis Gil Fernández, Instituto de Estudios Políticos, Madrid, 1957, p. 64. Platon, Phèdre, 267c-d, dans Platon, Oeuvres Complètes, Tome IV, 3e. Partie, Phèdre, Texte Traduit par Léon Robin, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Paris, 1933, p. 75. Platon, Phèdre, 267c-d, dans Platon, Oeuvres Complètes, Traduction Nouvelle et Notes par Léon Robin, avec la Colaboration of M.J. Moreau, Bibliothèque de La Pléiade, Tome II, Paris, 1942, p. 64. 906 Charles Sears Baldwin, Composition Oral and Written, Longmans Green and Co., 1909, First Greenwood Reprinting, 1968, p. 305. In Athens there was the nomic melody, which public officials had to use to promulgate laws to the people, since an improper reading, for example a hardly worthy rhythm, made such laws exposed to contempt.907 RULE: The rhythm of the legislative prose shall: a) facilitate interpretating and memorizing its meaning (logos); b) reflect the legislator'wise and eloquent character and avoid contempt (ethos); c) increase hopes to obtain rewards and fear of suffering punishment; the former in a soft and slow rhythm, and the latter in an abrupt and rapid rhythm (pathos). Thrasymachus of Chalcedon used the foot called "paean" in composing the sentences that were part of his artistic prose. Aristotle recommended for beginnings the paean formed by a long syllable and three short ones (–UUU) and, for ends, the paean of three short ones and a long one (UUU–).908 The beginnings of sentences are good places for the prose rhythm because, precededby a pause, they wake up the attention and cause the first impression, which usually prevails. The ends are better, since they are easier to remember, given that they are the last part heard or read, and even better if there are periods, because they eabled to unload the accumulated tension (distension). RULE: The beginnings of sentences are good places for the prose rhythm because, preceded by a pause, beginings catch the attention and cause the first impression, which usually prevails. The ends of sentences are better, because, followed by a pause, which also attracts attention, they are easier to remember, given that they are the last part heard or read and, if they are periods, even better, because they unload the accumulated tension. To finish this brief analysis of such a broad topic, it is noteworthy to remember Osvaldo Magnasco (1864-1920), a jurist, politician and writer, one of the greatest Argentine orators, evoked by his compatriot Saavedra Lamas, a Nobel Prize, in a conversation held with Ramón Columba, to whom he said: "[...] He posseded the art of oratory, cultivated in the harmony of the phrase and in the elegance of the gesture −adds my interlocutor −. He rehearse both things in his house, 907 The following author refers to the improper tones and does not mention the rhythm, but the nomic melody: Hugh Blair, Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres, Complete in One Volume, London, 1823, p. 128, (1st. ed. 1783). Alludes to the unworthy "intonation" and does not mention rhythm: José Coll y Vehi, Diálogos Literarios, 4a. Edición con un Prólogo de Marcelino Menéndez Pelayo y la Biografía del autor por Teodoro Baró, Librería de Antonio J. Bastinos, Editor, Barcelona, 1896, p. 192. The inclusion of rhythm arises from the nature of things, since it is also possible use it to despise, bearing in mind that rhythm, together with the harmony of tone, integrates the melody. The tone or burlesque rhythm is a very clear example of provoked contempt. 908 Aristotle, Rhetoric, III, 8, 1409th. Aristotle, Rhetoric, III, 8, 1409a, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation, Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume Two, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 2247-2248. Aristóteles, Retórica, Introducción, Traducción y Notas por Quintín Racionero, Libro III, 8, 1409a, Rhetoric, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1990, p. 520. Aristote, Rhétorique, Livre III, 8, 1409a, Texte Établi et Traduit par Médéric Dufour et André Wartelle, Société d'Édition "Belles Lettres", Tome Troisième, Paris, p. 58. Aristotele, Retorica, III, VIII, 1409a, a Cura di Armando Plebe, Editore Laterza, Bari, 1961, pp. 187-188. in front of a metronome, chronometric pendulum suitable to adjust his word's compass. He had his rules to speak and gave me advise, said: "When you wish to speak with the parliamentarian's rhythm, who must speak seated, rest your back on the backrest of the seat.Thus you' ll see that words takes a singular cadence, which is lost if you inclines on the seat.""909 In homage to the great orator s memory, such advice is adapted and incorporated into this book, in the form of a rule of the art of legislation. RULE: To compose or to criticize the rhythm of a speech, it shall be expressed aloud, seated, the back flat rested on the backrest, not lean forward, so that words will take their singular cadence. d. Aptitude A speech may feature purity, clarity and ornament, but its style will be defective if he does not have the last of classical rhetorical virtues, the suitable use of available resources: aptitude. It is also called "property" (prepon, propietas),910 but "aptitude" has been preferred to avoid confusions with grammatical "property", that is the "exact correspondence between the word and the concept that it intends to express."911 In spite of the wide variety of possible circumstances, it is possible to set a principle and to formulate some rules with respect to the aptitude in legislative style. PRINCIPLE: To achieve the aptitude of legislative style, diplomats' tact when they write their documents shall be taken as a model: just proportion concerning people and circumstances,912 self-control of passions, aknowledge about the value of the terms used, the means to change them and the usual formulae.913 909 "[...] Poseía el arte de la oratoria, cultivada en la armonía de la frase y en la elegancia del gesto −añade mi interlocutor−. Ambas cosas las ensayaba en su casa, frente a un metrónomo, péndulo cronométrico al que ajustaba el compás de su palabra. Tenía sus reglas para hablar y me aconsejaba, diciéndome: "Cuando usted quiera exponer con el ritmo que corresponde al parlamentario que tiene que hablar sentado, haga descansar la espalda sobre el respaldo del sillón.Verá usted que la palabra toma una singular cadencia, la que se pierde si usted se inclina sobre la banca."" Ramón Columba, El Congreso que yo he Visto, Texto y Dibujos, Editorial Ramón Columba, Buenos Aires, 1952, p. 178. 910 Prepon (Greek) or proprietas (Latin): George A. Kennedy, A New History of Classical Rhetoric, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1994, p. 85. Aptum: Heinreich Lausberg, Handbook of Literary Rhetoric, A Foundation of Literary Style, Foreword by George A. Kennedy, Translated by Matthew T. Bliss, Annemiek Jansen, David E. Orton, Edited by David E. Orton and R. Dean Anderson, From the Second German Edition, Max Hueber Verlag, Ismaining bei München, 1973, Brill, Leyden, Boston, Köln, 1998, number 1055, p. 460. Heinreich Lausberg, Manual de Retórica Literaria, Fundamentos de una Ciencia de la Literatura, Traducción de José Pérez Riesco del Original Alemán Handbuch der Literarischen Rhetorik, Eine Grundlegung der Literaturwissenchaft, Max Hueber Verlag, München, 1960, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1967, T. II, número 1055, p. 374. 911 "correspondencia exacta entre la palabra y el concepto que se quiere expresar" Julio Casares, Diccionario Ideológico de la Lengua Española, Editorial Gustavo Gili, S.A., Barcelona, the Segunda Edición, Puesta al Día (8a. Tirada), Barcelona, 1977, p. 683. 912 Cicero, in a concise formula, advises to regulate the elocution considering the people and circumstances: Cicero, De Oratore, III, XV, 54. The style shall express the legislator' wise and eloquent character, 914 saying neither to little nor too much, because, as expressed by the maxim of one of the seven Greek wise men, inscribed in the temple of Apollo, into the shrine of Delphi: "Nothig in excess". The legislator's must be a moderate spirit. It seemed to Montesquieu that he had done his work only to prove this point, but also warned that: "Laws always find the legislator s passions and prejudices. Sometimes they go through and are dyed; sometimes they stay there, and are incorporated there."915 RULE: The style shall express the legislator's wise and eloquent character, with moderation and dignity. Law bills must respect the style of current legislation, case law, custom and juristic writings on the specific matters and on similar ones, unless there is sufficient reason to change it, other than the style for style itself, since the potential advantages to be Cicéron, De L'Orateur, Livre Troisième, XV, 54, Texte Établi et Traduit par Edmond Courbaud, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Paris, 1930, p. 53. Quintilian does an extensive, detailed and particular exposition: Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria, XI, I, 1-93. Quintilian, The Institutio Oratoria of Quintilian, Book XI, i, 1-93, With an English Translation by H.E. Butler in Four Volumes, The Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, G.P. Putnam Sons's, New York, Volume IV, London, 1922, pp. 154-210. Quintilien, Institution Oratoire, Livre XI, I, 1-93, Texte Établi et Traduit par Jean Cousin, Tome VI, Société d'Edition "Les Belles Lettres", Paris, 1979, pp. 179-206. Aristotle takes a middle course, since he discussed the matter briefly but substancially: Aristotle, Rhetoric, III, 7, 1408a10-b20. Aristotle, Rhetoric, III, 7, 1408a10-b20, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation, Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume Two, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 2245-2247. Aristóteles, Retórica, Introducción, Traducción y Notas por Quintín Racionero, Libro III, 7, 1408a10-b20, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1990, pp. 512-517. Aristote, Rhétorique, Livre III, 7, 1408a-b20, Texte Établi et Traduit par Médéric Dufour et André Wartelle, Société d'Édition "Belles Lettres", Tome Troisième, Paris, pp. 54-56. Aristotele, Retorica, III, VII, 1408th, A Cura di Armando Plebe, Editore Laterza, Bari, 1961, pp. 184-186. 913 H. Meisel, Cours de Style Diplomatique, J.P. Aillard, Libraire, Tome Premier, Paris, 1826, p. 25. 914 Aristotle, Rhetoric, III, 7, 1408a25-30. Aristotle, Rhetoric, III, 7, 1408a25-30, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation, Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume Two, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 2246. Aristóteles, Retórica, Introducción, Traducción y Notas por Quintín Racionero, Libro III, 7, 1408a25-30, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1990, p. 515. Aristote, Rhétorique, Livre III, 7, 1408a25-30, Texte Établi et Traduit par Médéric Dufour et André Wartelle, Société d'Édition "Belles Lettres", Tome Troisième, Paris, p. 55. Aristotele, Retorica, III, VII, 1408th, A Cura di Armando Plebe, Editore Laterza, Bari, 1961, pp. 184-185. 915 "Les lois rencontrent toujours les passions et les préjugés du législateur. Quelquefois elles passent au travers, et s'y teignent; quelquefois elles y restent, et s'y incorporent." Montesquieu, De L'Esprit Des Lois, Avec des notes de Voltaire, de Crevier, de Mably, de la Harpe, etc., Nouvelle Édition Revue sur les Meilleurs Textes, Suivie De La Défense De L'Esprit Des Lois par L'Auteur, Paris, Garnier Frères, Libraires-Éditeurs, without date, Livre XXIX, Chapitre XIX, p. 538, text reproduced above. See also: Montesquieu, De l'Esprit des Loix, Texte Établi et Présenté par Jean Brethe de La Gressaye, Tome IV, Livre XXIX, DE LA MANIERE DE COMPOSER LES LOIX, Chapitre XIX, Des législateurs, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Paris, 1961, p. 146. obtained will always be less than the uncertainty generated, which damages the juridical security, since there will not be missing interpreters who will attribute another meaning to such changes. The current style should be imitated, as was advised by an "expert" friend to Cervantes in the Prologue of the Quixote: "You only have to take advantage of imitation in what you will be writing, because more perfect the imitation is, so much better what your written work will be."916 RULE: In amending laws, the style of the amended laws shall be imitated, to avoid doubts about their interpretation and application. In bills of systematizing laws, there shall be more leeway, but the current legislation, case law, custom and juristic writings on the specific matters and on similar ones shall still be taken into account, and mere stylistical innovations shall be avoided. The style shall be proportional to the importance of the regulated matter,917 so that it will not be above or below918 the matter in question. If, to legislate about conflicts caused by a leaking gutter between walls dividing neighbors, high-flown words and periods are chosen, as if it were a question of the utmost importance, the style would lack aptitude, since it would be ridiculous. RULE: The style shall be proportional to the importance of the regulated matter, so that it will not be above or below such matter. 2. Style genres To find the just proportion between the importance of the matter and the style, it is necessary to consider the thoughts to be conveyed, the words to be choosen, the 916 "Sólo tiene que aprovecharse de la imitación en lo que fuera escribiendo, que, cuanto ella fuere más perfecta, tanto mejor será lo que se escribiere." Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra, El Ingenioso Hidalgo Don Quijote de La Mancha, Nueva Edición Crítica, Dispuesta por Francisco Rodríguez Marín, Tomo I, Parte Primera, Prólogo, Madrid, 1947, p. 39. "Sólo tiene que aprouecharse de la imitación en lo que fuere escriuiendo; que quanto ella fuere más perfecta, tanto mejor será lo que se escriuiere." Miguel de Cervantes, Don Quijote de la Mancha, Edición del Instituto Cervantes, 1605-2005, Dirigida por Francisco Rico, con la Colaboración de Joaquín Forradellas, Galaxia Gutenberg, Círculo de Lectores, Centro para la Edición de los Clásicos Españoles, Primera Parte, Prólogo, Navarra, 2004, pp. 18-19. "Solo tiene que aprouecharse de la imitación en lo que fuere escriuiendo; que quanto ella fuere más perfecta, tanto mejor sera lo que se escriuiere." Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra, Don Quijote de la Mancha, en Obras Completas de Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra, Tomo I, Primera Parte, Prólogo, Edición Publicada por Rodolfo Schevill y Adolfo Bonilla, Gráficas Reunidas, S.A., Madrid, 1928, p. 37, líneas 15-18. 917 Aristotle, Rhetoric, III, 7, 1408a11. Aristotle, Rhetoric, III, 7, 1408a11, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation, Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume Two, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, p. 2245. Aristóteles, Retórica, Introducción, Traducción y Notas por Quintin Racionero, Libro III, 7, 1408a11, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1990, p. 512. Aristote, Rhétorique, Livre III, 7, 1408a11, Texte Établi et Traduit par Médéric Dufour et André Wartelle, Société d'Édition "Belles Lettres", Tome Troisième, Paris, p. 54. Aristotele, Retorica, III, VII, 1408a, a Cura di Armando Plebe, Editore Laterza, Bari, 1961, p. 184. 918 Charles de Martens, Le Guide Diplomatique, Cinquième Édition, Entierement Refondue par M.F.H. Geffeken, Tome Second, Première Partie, Du Style des Compositions Diplomatiques, Observations Génerales, F.A. Brockhaus, Leipzig, 1866, p. 2. sentences to be composed and the ornament to be used. For this purpose it is useful a classification of the style genres (elocutionis genera),919 showing their grades, so that it facilitates choosing the appropiate one for each case.920 This classification should not be confused with the classification of speech genres (judicial, deliberative and epideíctic), or with that of legislative genres (systematizing and fragmentary), already dealt with. RULE: Legislators may use three legislative styles that, sometimes regardless of the matter, correspond to orator's duties: a) plain to teach; b) middle to please, c) elevated to touch.921 a. Plain Style The plain or simple style (subtile, tenue, acutum, summissum, humile)922 aims mainly at clarity.923 It is keeped at ground level, imitates established uses with simple thoughts, plain words, free composition and a sober ornament, wich avoids ostentation.924 It is 919 Elocutionis genera: Heinreich Lausberg, Handbook of Literary Rhetoric, A Foundation of Literary Style, Foreword by George A. Kennedy, Translated by Matthew T. Bliss, Annemiek Jansen, David E. Orton, Edited by David E. Orton and R. Dean Anderson, From the Second German Edition, Max Hueber Verlag, Ismaining bei München, 1973, Brill, Leyden, Boston, Köln, 1998, number 1078, p. 491. Heinreich Lausberg, Manual de Retórica Literaria, Fundamentos de una Ciencia de la Literatura, Traducción de José Pérez Riesco of the German Original Handbuch der Literarischen Rhetorik, Eine Grundlegung der Literaturwissenchaft, Max Hueber Verlag, München, 1960, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1967, T. II, número 1078, p. 391. 920 Cicero, Orator, 22, 73; 23, 74. Cicerón, El Orador, 22, 73; 23, 74 Texto Revisado y Traducido por Antonio Tovar y Aurelio R. Bujaldón, Ediciones Alma mater, S.A., Barcelona, 1967, pp. 30-31. Cicéron, L'Orateur, XXII, 73; XXIII, 74, Texte Établi et Traduit par Albert Yon, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Paris, 1964, p. 27. 921 Cicero, Orator, 21, 69. Cicerón, El Orador, 21, 69, Texto Revisado y Traducido por Antonio Tovar y Aurelio R. Bujaldón, Ediciones Alma mater, S.A., Barcelona, 1967, p. 28. Cicéron, L'Orateur, XXI, 69; XXIII, 74, Texte Établi et Traduit par Albert Yon, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Paris, 1964, p. 25. 922 Benedetto Riposati, Problemi di Retorica Antica, in the collective work Introduzione alla Filologia Classica, Dott. Carlo Marzorati, Editore, Milan, 1952, p. 768. 923 Demetrius, On Style, IV, 190. Demetrius, On Style, IV, 190, in Aristotle The Poetics, "Longinus" Sublime On The, Demetrius On Style, The Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusets, First Published 1927, Revised and Reprinted 1932, Reprinted 1939, Demetrius, On Style, With An English Translation by W. Rhys Roberts, pp. 418-419. Demetrio, Sobre el Estilo, I, 12, Introducción, Traducción y Notas de José García López, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1979, p. 88. 924 Montesquieu, De L'Esprit Des Lois, Avec des notes de Voltaire, de Crevier, de Mably, de la Harpe, etc., Nouvelle Édition Revue sur les Meilleurs Textes, Suivie De La Défense De L'Esprit Des Lois par L'Auteur, Paris, Garnier Frères, Libraires-Éditeurs, without date, Préface, Livre XXIX, Chapitre XVI, Choses à observer dans la composition des lois, p. 532. See also: Montesquieu, De l'Esprit des Loix, Texte Établi et Présenté par Jean Brethe de la Gressaye, Tome IV, Livre XXIX, DE LA MANIERE DE COMPOSER LES LOIX, Chapitre XVI, Choses à observer dans the composition des loix, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Paris, 1961, pp. 138-139. The most basic premise of the plain language movement, seems to be that that the goal of the text must be the readership's quick and easy comprehension, as explained and criticized by Stark. easily enjoyable and difficult to imitate,925 and at the same time it does not look like a thin, dry and bloodless body.926 It will not give rise to admiration, but it will not be ridiculous either; without its addreesees realizing, the orator achieves his purpose with his speech.927 Lysias' speeches (458/8-c 380 B.C.) are usually taken as paradigms of a simple style.928 In the art of legislation, a simple style is used for matters of minor importance, unless, in a matter of great importance, if it is intended that the laws will be understood by the greatest possible number of their addressees. Thus, in civil codes, in either minor questions (associated to party walls) or major ones (related to family and successions), a plain style is used because, in both cases it is the style apt to didactic works.929 RULE: A plain or simple style, which must aim mainly to clarity, shall: a) imitate established uses, with simple thoughts, plain words, a free composition, a sober ornament, and must not look like a thin, dry and bloodless body; b) be apt to matters of minor importance or when it is intended that the laws be understood by the greatest possible number of their addressees. Julius Caesar reported, with a simple style, his own warlike exploits, apparenty to put material available to historians, but so superbly that, in fact, he discouraged them from writing those stories.930 Napoleon Bonaparte, who personally took part in the making of the French Civil Code of 1804, a well-known example of a simple style, perhaps had the same secret desire as Caesar, since it is said that, when he knew that Zachariae, a professor in Strasbourg, was writing a commentary, he wanted to imprison him.931 He gave up all hope to avoid juristic writings and exclaimed: "My Code is lost!", when Jacques de Jack Stark, The Art of the Statute, Fred B. Rothman and Co, Littleton, Colorado, 1996, pp. 1-3. 925 Cicero, Orator, 23, 76. Cicerón, El Orador, 23, 76, Texto Revisado y Traducido por Antonio Tovar y Aurelio R. Bujaldón, Ediciones Alma mater, S.A., Barcelona, 1967, p. 31. Cicéron, L'Orateur, XXIII, 76, Texte Établi et traduit par Albert Yon, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Paris, 1964, p. 27. 926 [Cicero] Rethorica ad Herennium, IV, XI, 16. [Cicerón] Retórica a Herenio, Traducción, Introducción y Notas de Juan Francisco Alcina, Erasmo, Textos Bilingües, Editorial Bosch, Libro IV, XI, Barcelona, 1991, pp. 258-259. [Cicero] Rhetorica ad Herennium, IV, xi, 16, with an English Translation by Harry Caplan, The Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, London, England, First published 1954, Reprinted 1964, 1968, 1977, 1981, 1989, 1999, pp. 266-267. [Cicéron] Rhétorique to Herennius, Livre IV, XI, 16, Ouvrage Longtemps Attribué a Cicéron, Texte Revue et traduit avec Introduction et Notes par Henri Bornecque, Librairie Garnière Frères, Paris, pp. 180-181. 927 L. Laurand, Manuel des Études Grecques et Latines, Éditions Auguste Picard, Paris, 1933, T. III. Rome, Ap. II-32.-a), p. 69. 928 Dionysius of Halicarnassus, I, 1. The Ancient Orators, On The Style of Demosthenes, 2, in The Critical Essays in Two Volumes, With an English Translation by Stephen Usher, The Loeb Classical Library, LCL 465, William Heinemann, London, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusets, 1974, pp. 244-247 929 M. Crevier, Rhétorique Française, Chez Saillant, Desaint, Paris, 1797, Tome Second, p. 285 930 Cicero, Brutus, LXXV. Cicéron, Brutus LXXV, dans Brutus et Perfection Oratoire, Texte Établi, Traduit et Annoté par François Richard, Librairie Granier Frères, Paris, 1934, pp. 172-173. 931 Hennebiq, Généralites Abstraits du Droit Economique, Intr. A L'étude du Droit Comparé (in honor of Lambert), 1938, II IV, p. 491 quoted in Derecho Civil de España, Parte General I, por Federico de Castro y Bravo, Instituto de Estudios Políticos, Madrid, 1955, n. 4, p. 497. Maleville, who had been the Secretary of the Drafting Comission, published in 1805 his Reasoned Analysis of the Discussion of the Civil Code in the Council of State.932 The Napoleonic Code did not arise spontaneously or at random, since it imitated examples taken from a long and slow historical evolution, established by the wisdom and eloquence that the simple style had consolidated in the late 18th century, in the formulas of customary law expressed in writing, royal ordinances, laws of the Revolution, and in the works of some jurist writings of the last period of the Monarchy, like d'Aguesseau, Domat, Pothier and Montesquieu.933 Henri-Mari Beyle (1783-1842) known under the pseudonym of Stendhal, in a letter to Honoré de Balzac (1799-1850), on October 16, 1840, said to him: "When composing the Charterhouse, to take the tone, I was reading every morning two or three pages of the Civil Code."934 It is the apt style of laws created for the common people, without logical subtleties, for the simple reason of any father of family, as Montesquieu wanted and is now advocated by the plain language movement in the Anglo-Saxon world.935 b. Middle style The middle style (medium, modicum, mediocre, temperaturm),936 as its name indicates, is characterized by a thought that is neither simple nor grave; words that are neither plain nor elevated; a free, coordinated, or periodic composition; an ornament that is neither sober not sublime, but more brilliant than the simple one. Its level is keeped to that of the water, like a transparent and calm course, shaded by the green in 932 Jacques de Maleville, Analyse Raisonée of Civil Discussion du Code au Conseil d'État, Vve. Nyon, Paris, An XIII (1805). 933 François Geny, Technique Législative dans Codification Civile Moderne (A Propos du Centenaire du Code Civil), Him Code Civil, 1804-1904, Livre du Centenaire, Arthur Rousseau, Éditeur, T. II., Paris, 1904, p. 1003, p. 1005. 934 "En composant la Chartreuse, pour prendre le ton, je lisais chaque matin deux ou trois pages du Code Civil." Stendhal, Correspondence (1836-1842) X, Étabissement du Texte et Préface par Henri Martineau, Le Divan, Paris, 1934, 1514, p. 282. In the draft of p. 277, he had written "[...] I used to reading some pages of the Civil Code from time to time." ("[...] je lisais de temps en temps quelques pages du Code civil."). 935 Montesquieu, De L'Esprit Des Lois, Avec des notes de Voltaire, de Crevier, de Mably, de la Harpe, etc., Nouvelle Édition Revue sur les Meilleurs Textes, Suivie De La Défense De L'Esprit Des Lois par L'Auteur, Paris, Garnier Frères, Libraires-Éditeurs, without date, Préface, Livre XXIX, Chapitre XVI, Choses à observer dans la composition des lois, p. 532. See also: Montesquieu, De l'Esprit des Loix, Texte Établi et Présenté par Jean Brethe de la Gressaye, Tome IV, Livre XXIX, DE LA MANIERE OF COMPOSER LES LOIX, Chapitre XVI, Choses à observer dans la composition des loix, Société Les Belles Lettres, Paris, 1961, p. 141. Ernest Gowers, The Complete Plain Words, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London, First Edition September 1954, Fifth Impression, With Amendments, February 1958. Ernest Gowers, The Complete Plain Words, Revised by Bruce Fraser, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England, 1973. David Mellinokff, The Language of The Law, Little Brown and Company, Boston, Toronto, First Printing 1963, Third Printing, Paperback Edition, Boston Toronto, 1978. 936 Benedetto Riposati, Problemi di Retorica Antica, in the collective work Introduzione alla Filologia Classica, Dott. Carlo Marzorati, Editore, Milan, 1952, p. 768. both banks,937 and it does not look like a flaccid body, without nerves or joints.938 Isocrates (436-338 B.C.) speeches, usually are taken as paradigms of a middle style, among orators.939 It is apt to matters that are neither minor nor of major importance, or when are intended to be specially agreeable to their addressees.940 RULE: The middle style shall be apt to matters that are neither minor nor of major importance, or when laws are intended to be specially agreeable to their addressees. In order for the middle style not to be lowered to a plain one, and not to be raised to an elevate one, it shall be characterized by: a) neither simple nor grave thoughts; b) neither plain nor elevated words; c) a free, coordinated or periodic composition; d) a neither sober nor sublime ornament, which must not look like a flaccid body. c. Elevated style The elevated style (amplum, magnificum, copiosum, acre, ardens, vehemens)941 is characterized by its grave thoughts; elevated words; a free, coordinated or periodic composition; and a sublime ornament. Vehement like a stream that sweeps along stones and floods banks,942 without looking like a swollen body,943 Demosthenes's (384-322 B.C.) speeches are usually taken as paradigms of an elevated style, among orators.944 937 Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria, XII, X, 60. Quintilian, The Institutio Oratoria of Quintilian, Book XII, x, 60, With an English Translation by H.E. Butler in Four Volumes, The Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, G.P. Putnam Sons's, New York, Volume IV, London, 1922, pp. 484-485. Quintilien, Institution Oratoire, Livre XII, X, 60, Texte Établi et Traduit par Jean Cousin, Tome VII, Société d'Edition "Les Belles Lettres", Paris, 1989, p. 131. 938 [Cicero] Rethorica ad Herennium, IV, XI, 16. [Cicero] Rhetorica ad Herennium, IV, xi, 16, with an English Translation by Harry Caplan, The Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, London, England, First published 1954, Reprinted 1964, 1968, 1977, 1981, 1989, 1999, pp. 266-267. [Cicerón] Retórica a Herenio, Traducción, Introducción y Notas de Juan Francisco Alcina, Erasmo, Textos Bilingües, Editorial Bosch, Libro IV, XI, Barcelona, 1991, pp. 258-259. [Cicéron] Rhétorique a Herennius, Livre IV, XI, 16, Ouvrage Longtemps Attribué a Cicéron, Texte Revue et traduit avec Introduction et Notes par Henri Bornecque, Librairie Garnière Frères, Paris, pp. 180-181. 939 Dionysius of Halicarnassus, I, 1. The Ancient Orators, On The Style of Demosthenes, 3, in The Critical Essays in Two Volumes, With an English Translation by Stephen Usher, The Loeb Classical Library, LCL 465, William Heinemann, London, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusets, 1974, pp. 246-247. 940 L. Laurand, Manuel des Études Grecques et Latines, Éditions Auguste Picard, Paris, 1933, T. III. Rome, Ap. II-33.-b), p. 69. 941 Benedetto Riposati, Problemi di Retorica Antica, in the collective work Introduzione alla Filologia Classica, Dott. Carlo Marzorati, Editore, Milan, 1952, p. 768. 942 Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria, XII, X, 61. Quintilian, The Institutio Oratoria of Quintilian, Book XII, x, 61, With an English Translation by H.E. Butler in Four Volumes, The Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, G.P. Putnam Sons's, New York, Volume IV, London, 1922, pp. 484-485. Quintilien, Institution Oratoire, Livre XII, X, 60, Texte Établi et Traduit par Jean Cousin, Tome VII, Société d'Edition "Les Belles Lettres", Paris, 1980, p. 131. 943 [Cicero] Rethorica ad Herennium, IV, X, 15. [Cicero] Rhetorica ad Herennium, IV, XI, With an English Translation by Harry Caplan, The Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, London, England, First published 1954, Reprinted 1964, 1968, 1977, 1981, 1989, 1999, pp. 264-265. RULE: The elevated style shall be apt to matters of major importance, or when are intended to excite the fear or the hope, due to its greater oratorical force. It shall be characterized by: a) grave thoughts; b) elevated words; c) a free, coordinated or periodic composition; d) a sublime ornament, which must not look like a swollen body. The author formulates a last rule, previously to the epilogue of this book: RULE: The style shall be plain or middle for legislation, and elevated for constitutions. [[Cicerón] Retórica a Herenio, Traducción, Introducción y Notas de Juan Francisco Alcina, Erasmo, Textos Bilingües, Editorial Bosch, Libro IV, X, Barcelona, 1991, pp. 256-257. Cicéron] Rhétorique a Herennius, Livre IV, X, 15, Ouvrage Longtemps Attribué a Cicéron, Texte Revue et traduit avec Introduction et Notes par Henri Bornecque, Librairie Garnière Frères, Paris, pp. 178-179. 944 L. Laurand, Manuel des Études Grecques et Latines, Tome III, Compléments, Atlas, Tables, Editions Auguste Picard, Paris, Ap. II-34.-c),Paris, 1933, pp. 69-70. Epilogue Before this book, the legislative activity, despite its importance, has remained freed at random or subjected to the empiricism of mere practice, since it was thought that the art of legislation did not existed as a true doctrine body, because it had not been incorporated into a fundamental system, into an acknowledged methodical base on which a well assembled construction might be erected. In this book, the legislative activity, according to its importance, is provided with a true art of legislation, that had been lost and is reconstructed here from the classical tradition, which conceives laws as wise and eloquent civic speeches and rhetoric, the art of persuading with wise and eloquent speeches, as its methodical base recognized for almost two thousand and five hundred years. One might object that the method of legislation does not exist; if it exists, it is impossible to find; if it is possible to find, it is impossible to know; if it is possible to know, it is impossible to teach; and, finally, if it is taught, it is impossible to apply. The method of legislation exist in the rhetorical tradition, which is possible to find, to know, to teach and also to apply to any positive law, historical, current or future, previous adaptation to the multiplicity of languages and juridical systems, the knowledge of which is presupposed, as in rhetoric. After this book, the author hope that the lost art of legislation will be perfected as such, identifying the applicable parts of the rhetorical tradition, developing the insufficient and creating others, since if the rhetorical model of the art of legislation is adopted, the quality of the laws will not depend on occasionally inspired individuals, but on common effort, because it will be possible to rely on a reasonable knowledge, born out of experience, which, transmitted from generation to generation, will allow for the methodical continuity of the struggle to govern and be governed in civilized form, by means of wise and eloquent laws. SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY An exhaustive printed bibliography becomes outdated more quicly nowdays, with major speed than in other epochs, given for the substancial increase in the number of publications. Since on the Internet it is easy to compile lists and keep them updated, it will be more useful for readers to be provided with a select bibliography of general works with regard to rhetoric, rhetoric and law, and the art of legislation as such, because, if the problem once used to be obtaining the information, now is not to be overwhelmed by that information. RHETORIC Handbooks The De Arte Rhetorica (1568) by Cyprian Soarez, S.J., A Translation with Introduction and Notes by Lawrence J. Flynn, S.J., Phd. Thesis, University of Florida, August 1955, UMI Dissertation Services, Catalog Number 0016926, vi + 444 pp. John Quincy Adams, Lectures on Rhetoric and Oratory, in two volumes, Hilliard and Metcalf, Cambridge [Massachusetts], 1810, Reprinted with a New Introduction by J. Jeffery Auer and Jerald L. Banninga, Russell & Russell, New York, 1962; vol. I, 8 pp.(Introduction) + x + 431 pp.; vol. II, iv + 400 pp. John Quincy Adams, Curso de Lecturas sobre Retórica y Oratoria, Escrito en Inglés por John Quincy Adams, Traducido al Castellano por Vicente Ballivian, Londres, 1833, xvi + 546 pp. W. Kroll, "Rhetoric", Paulys Real-Encyclopäedie der Classischen Altertumswissenschaft, Supplementband 7, Stuttgart, 1940, pp. 1039-1138; not consulted. Benedetto Riposati, "Problemi di Retorica Antica", Introduzione alla Filologia Classica [autori diversi], Editore Dott. Carlo Marzorati, Milano, 1952, pp. 657-787. Roland Barthes, "L'Ancienne Rhétorique, Aide-mémoire", Communications, 16 (1970), pp. 172-229. Peter Dixon, Rhetoric, Methuen, London, New York, 1971, Reprinted 1984, 88 pp. Heinrich Lausberg, Handbook of Literary Rhetoric, A Foundation of Literary Style, Foreword by George A. Kennedy, Translated by Matthew T. Bliss, Annemiek Jansen, [and] David E. Orton, Edited by David E. Orton & R. Dean Anderson [from the Second German Edition, Max Hueber Verlag, Ismaning bei München, 1973], Brill, Leiden, Boston, Köln, 1998, 922 pp. Heinrich Lausberg, Manual de Retórica Literaria, Fundamentos de una Ciencia de la Literatura, Versión Española de José Pérez Riesco [del original alemán: Hanbuch der Literarischen Rhetorik, Eine Grundlegung der Literaturwissenchaft, Max Hueber Verlag, München, 1960], Editorial Gredos, Madrid, t. I, 1966, 382 pp.; t. II, 1967, 517 pp.; t. III, 1968, 402 pp. Edward P.J. Corbett, [and] Robert J. Connors, Classical Rhetoric for the Modern Student, Oxford University Press, First Edition, 1965, Fourth Edition, 1999, 562 pp. History George A. Kennedy, A New History of Classical Rhetoric, ix + 301 pp., Princeton University Press, Princetoin, 1994. Cristina Pepe, The Genres of Rhetorical Speeches in Greek and Roman Antiquity, xvii + 618 pp, Brill, Leiden-Boston, 2013. Fundamental works Aristotle [Aristotle], Rhetoric, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation, Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume Two, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition 1984, Second Printing, 1985, pp. 2152-2269. Aristotle, On Rhetoric, A Theory of Civic Discourse, Newly Translated with Introduction, Notes, and Appendices by George A. Kennedy, Oxford University Press, New York, Oxford, 1991, xvi pp. + 336 pp., second edition 2007, xiv pp. + 338 pp. E.M. Cope, An Introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric, With Analysis Notes and Appendices, Macmillan and Co., London and Cambridge, 1867, xvi + 464 pp. [Aristotle], The Rhetoric of Aristotle with a Commentary by the Late Edward Meredith Cope, Revised and Edited for The Syndics of The University Press by John Edwin Sandys, Cambridge at The University Press, 1877, Volume I, xx + 304 pp.; Volume II, 340 pp.; Volume III, 270 pp. Aristotle, Rhetoric I, A Commentary, by William M.A. Grimaldi, S.J., Fordham University Press, New York, 1980, viii + 362 pp. Aristotle, Rhetoric II, A Commentary, by William M.A. Grimaldi, S.J., Fordham University Press, New York, 1988, x + 378 pp. Aristóteles, Retórica, Introducción, Traducción y Notas por Quintín Racionero, Editorial Gredos, Madrid, 1990, 626 pp. Aristote, Rhétorique, Tome I et II, Texte Établi et Traduit par Médéric Dufour, Societé d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Tome I, Paris, 1932, 144 pp.; Tome II, Paris, 1938, 136 pp.; Tome III, Texte Établi et Traduit par Médéric Dufour et André Wartelle, Paris, 1ère édition, 1973, 2e tirage, 1980, 174 pp. Aristotele, Retorica, A cura di Armando Plebe, Editore Laterza, Bari, 1961, 228 pp. Cicero Cicero, On the Ideal Orator (De Oratore), Translated, with Introduction, Notes, Appendixes, Glossary, and Indexes, by James M. May, Jakob Wisse, Osford University Press, New York, Oxford, 2001, x + 374 pp. Marcus Tullius Cicero, Topica, Edited with a Translation, Introduction and Commentary, by Tobias Reinhardt, Oxfor University Press, Oxford, New York, First Published 2003, First Paperback Edition 2006, xvi + 436 pp. Marco Tulio Cicerón, El Orador (Orator), Texto Revisado y Traducido por Antonio Tovar y Aurelio Bujaldón, Ediciones Alma Mater, Barcelona, 1967, XXXI + 148 pp. Cicéron, De l'Invention (De Inventione), Texte Revu et Traduit avec Introduction et Notes par Henri Bornecque, Librairie Garnier Frères, Paris, 280 pp. Cicéron, Brutus et la Perfection Oratoire (De Optimo Genere Oratorum), Texte Établi, Traduit et Annoté par François Richard, Librairie Garnier Frères, Paris, 294 pp. Cicéron, De l'Orateur (De Oratore), Texte Établi et Traduit par Edmond Courbaud, Societé d'Edition "Les Belles Lettres", Livre Premier, Sixième Tirage, Paris, 1967, XXXIII + 96 pp.; Livre Deuxième, Paris, 1927, 160 pp.; Livre Troisième, Paris, 1930, 118 pp. Cicéron, L'Orateur (Orator) [et] Du Meilleur Genre d'Orateurs (De Optimo Genere Oratorum), Texte Établi et Traduit par Albert Yon, Societé d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Paris, 1964, CCIII + 198 pp. Cicéron, Divisions de l'Art Oratoire (Partitiones Oratoriae) [et] Topiques (Topica), Texte Établi et Traduit par Henri Bornecque, Deuxième Édition, Societé d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Paris, 1960; Divisions..., XVII + 138 pp.; Topica, 120 pp. Quintilian [Quintilian], The Institutio Oratoria of Quintilian, with an English Translation by H.E. Butler in Four Volumes, The Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, G.P. Putnam Sons's, New York, 1921, Volume I, xiv + 544 pp.; Volume II, vi + 532 pp.; Volume III, viii + 596 pp.; Volume IV, 1922. 550 pp. Quintilian, The Orator's Education, Edited and Translated by Donald D. Russell, The Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachussets, London England, 2001, Volume I, viii + 430 pp; Volume II, xii + 335 pp., Volume III, xii + 483 pp.; Volume IV, xii + 404 pp.; Volume V, xii + 432 pp. Quintilien, Institution Oratoire, Texte Établi et Traduit par Jean Cousin, Societé d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres", Paris, Tome I, 1975, CXXVI + 190 pp.; Tome II, 1976, 284 pp.; Tome II, 1976, 256 pp.; Tome IV, 1977, 240 pp.; Tome V, 1978, 334 pp.; Tome VI, 1979, 378 pp.; Tome VII, 1980, 312 pp. Hermogenes Hermogène, L'Art Rhétorique, Exercices Préparatoires, États de Cause, Invention, Catégories Stylistiques, Méthode de l'Habilité, Première Traduction Française Intégrale, Introduction et Notes par Michel Patillon, Préface de Pierre Laurens, L'Age d'Homme, Paris, 1997, 640 pp. Pseudo Aristotle [Aristotle], Rhetoric to Alexander, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation, Edited by Jonathan Barnes, Volume Two, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, First Edition, 1984, Second Printing, 1985, pp. 22712315. Pseudo-Aristote, Rhétorique à Alexandre, Texte Établi et Traduit par Pierre Chiron, Deuxième tirage, Paris, Les Belles Lettres, 2002, clxxiv + 270 pp. Pseudo Cicero [Cicero], Rhetorica ad Herennium, with an English Translation by Harry Caplan, The Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachussets, London, England, first edition 1954, reprinted 1999, lxii + 434 pp. [Cicerón], Retórica a Herenio, Traducción, Introducción y Notas de Juan Francisco Alcina, col. Erasmo, Textos Bilingües, Editorial Bosch, Barcelona, 1991, 372 pp. [Cicéron], Rhétorique a Herennius, Ouvrage Longtemps Attribué a Cicéron, Texte Revue et traduit avec Introduction et Notes par Henri Bornecque, Librairie Garnier Frères, Paris, xx + 288 pp. [Cicéron], Rhétorique a Herennius, Texte Établi et Traduit par Guy Achard, Quatrième tirage, Les Belles Lettres, Paris, 2012, lxxxiv + 264 pp. RHETORIC AND LAW Giovanni Stroux (1), Summum Ius Summa Iniuria, Un Capitolo Concernente la Storia della Interpretatio Iuris, Versione del Tedesco di G. Funaioli, Con Prefazione di S. Riccobono, Annali Palermo, 1921, pp. 639-691. (1) La dissertazione fu pubblicata da B.G. Teubner in una raccolta di scritti gratulatori oferti il 16 ottobre 1926 al giurista svizzero PAOLO SPEISER SARASIN [Festschrift Paul Speiser-Sarasin zum 80 Geburtstag]. Il volume non é in comercio. Theodor Viehweg, Topik und Jurisprudenz, C.H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, München, 1953. The Italian and Spanish versions have been used. Theodor Viehweg, Topica e Giurisprudenza, A Cura di Giuliano Crifò, Giuffrè, Milano, 1962, XXIV + 130 pp.; con Prefacio del autor para la edición italiana e importante Introducción del traductor. Theodor Viehweg, Tópica y Jurisprudencia, Prólogo de Eduardo García de Enterría, Traducción de Luis Diez-Picaso Ponce de León, Taurus, Madrid, 1964, 146 pp. Ch. Perelman et L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, La Nouvelle Rhétorique. Traité de l'Argumentation, Tomes I-II, PUF, Paris, 1958, 734 pp. Geoffrey Deron Klinger, Jurisprudence Recovered: Philosophical and Rhetorical Traditions in the Theory of Law, A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillmemnt of the Requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy Degree in Communication Studies in the Graduate College of The University of Iowa, May 1998, UMI Microform 98334477, Ann Arbor, Michigan, VI + 390 pp. ART OF LEGISLATION The bibliography prior to the XIX century may be looked for in the notes to Chapters II, Ancient and Medieval History and, III Modern and Contemporary History. The works below have been selected from among those that the author of this book consulted and have been published in relation to the family of Western Law. They are arranged according to whether they belong to the Anglo-American system or to the Continental European system, and, within each, according to the cultural area and, in principle, chronologically. Also mentioned are some works that it has not been possible to consult, but whose importance lies in the fact that they are frequently quoted by other authors. a. Anglo-American system i. British area A work of reference exists: Bibliography of Materials on Legislative and other Legal Drafting and the Interpretation of Statutes, Commonwealth Secretariat, London, Revised 1977, 42 pp.; it contains 479 items. In the British area, the following authors are remembered: Bentham, Symonds, Coode, Thring, Ilbert, Thorton, Russell, Motiwal, Bakshi, Renton, King and Crabbe. Bentham, The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Published under the Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring, 11 vols., William Tait, Edinburgh, Simpkin, Marshall, & Co, London, 1838-1843; speciallly, Nomography or the Art of Inditing Laws, in vol. III, 1843, pp. 231-257. Bentham, Oeuvres de Jérémie Bentham, par Ét. Dumont, Tome Premier, Traités de Législation Civile et Penale, Tactique des Assemblées Politiques Délibérantes, Traité des Sophismes Politiques, Troisième Édition, Societé Belge de Librairie, Hauman et Cie, Bruxelles, 1840, 540 pp.; Tome Second, Théorie des Peines et Récompenses, Traité des Preuves Judiciaires, Troisième Édition, Bruxelles, 1840, pp. 452., Tome Troisième, De l'Organisation Judiciaire et De la Codification, Essai sur la Situation Politique de l'Espagne, Défense de l'Usure, Essai sur la Nomenclature des Principales Branches d'Art et Science, Déontologie ou Science de la Morale, Troisième Edition, Bruxelles, 1840, 540 pp. Bentham, Catalogue of The Manuscripts of Jeremy Bentham in The Library of University College, London, Compiled by Tailor Milne, First Issued 1937, Second Edition, University of London, The Athlone Press, 1962, vii + 104 pp. Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, An Autoritative Edition by J.H. Burns and H.L.A. Hart, with a New Introduction by F. Rosen and an Interpretative Essay by H.L.A. Hart, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1966, cxii + 344 pp. Bentham, Legislator of The World, Writings on Codification, Law an Education, Edited by Philip Schofield and Jonathan Harris, The Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1998, lviii + 450 pp. Arthur Symonds, The Mechanics of Law-Making. Intended for the Use of Legislators, and all other Persons Concerned in the Making and Understanding of English Laws, Edward Churton, London, 1835, xv + 400 pp. Samuel Higgs Gael, A Practical Treatise on the Analogy between Legal and General Composition, Intended as an Introduction to the Drawing of Legal Instruments, Public and Private, H. Butterworth, London; Milliken and Son; Dublin; and T. Clark, Edinburgh, London, 1840, xvi + 328 pp. George Coode, Coode On Legislative Expression or the Language of the Written Law, Second Edition, 1852, in The Composition of Legislation. Legislative Forms and Precedents, by Elmer A. Driedger, Second Edition Revised, Published by The Department of Justice, Ottawa, 1976, Appendix I, pp. 317-378. Lord Thring, Instructions for Draftsmen, 1869, 41 pp.; internal document kindly sent to the author of this bookç, in a photocophy, by Linda Fraser, General Officer Manager, Parliamentary Counsel Office, July 2001. Lord Thring, Practical Legislation, The Composition and Language of Acts of Parliament and Business Documents, John Murray, London, 1902, 140 pp. Courtney Ilbert, Legislative Methods and Forms, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1901, xxxi + 372 pp. Courtenay Ilbert, The Mechanics of Law Making, Columbia University Lectures, Columbia University Press, New York, 1914, vii + 210 pp. Sir Alison Russell, Legislative Drafting and Forms, Fourth Edition, Butterworth & Co. (Publishers) Ltd., London, 1938. G. C. Thorton, Legislative Drafting, Butterworths, First Edition, London, 1970, xi + 330 pp; Second Edition, 1979, Third Edition, 1989; Fourth Edition, 1996; Fourth Edition Reprinted by Tottel Publishing Ltd., West Sussex, 2005, Reprinted 2006 (Twice), 2008 (Twice), xxi + 448 pp.; Fifth Edition, edited by Professor Dr. Helen Xanthaki, with a foreword by Garth Thorton, Haywards Heath: Bloomsbury Professional, xxxii, 557 pp., London, 2013. P.M. Bakshi, An Introduction to Legislative Drafting, N. M. Tripathi Privated Limited, First Edition 1956, Second Edition 1972, Bombay, 1972, 112 pp. O. P. Motiwal, The Principles of Legislative Drafting, Journal of The Indian Law Institute, vol. 16, 1, 1974, pp. 11-47. Sir David Renton, The Preparation of Legislation, Report of a Committee Appointed by the Lord President of the Council, Chairman: The Rt. Hon. Sir David Renton, Presented to Parliament by the Lord President of the Council by Command of Her Majesty, May 1975, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, Cmnd. 6053, London, 1975, xi + 184 pp. R. M. M. King, Manual of Legislative Drafting, Commonwealth Secretariat, London, 1976, 46 pp. V.C.R.A.C. Crabbe, Legislative Drafting, Cavendish Publishing Limited, London, 1993, xxii + 294 pp. V.C.R.A.C. Crabbe, Legislative Precedents, Volume II, Cavendish Publishing Limited, London, 1998, xxii + 268 pp. Helen Xanthaki, Drafting Legislation. Art and Technology of Rules and Regulations, Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland Orewgon, 2014. xxvi + 374 pp. ii. North America Area The bibliography in the following publication may serve as reference: Steven C. Cross [Editor], Minnesota Revisor's Manual with Styles and Forms, by the staff of the Revisor of Statutes, January 1, 1979, pp. 293-339, In the North America area, the following authors will be remembered: 1) From the United States of America: Dickerson, Nutting, Elliot, Peacock and Stark. Reed Dickerson, Legislative Drafting, Originally Published in 1954 by Little, Brown and Company, Reprinted by Permission of Little Brown and Company, Greenwood Press, Publishers, Westport, Connecticut, 1977, xvi + 150 pp. Reed Dickerson, The Fundamentals of Legal Drafting, Published for The American Bar Foundation by Little, Brown And Company, Boston, Toronto, 1965, XV + 204 pp. Charles B. Nutting, Shelden D. Elliot, Reed Dickerson, Cases and Materials on Legislation, West Publishing Co., St. Paul, Minn., 1950, 1955, 1964, Fourth Edition, 1969, 650 pp. James Craig Peacock, Notes on Legislative Drafting, REC Foundation, Inc., Washington, 1961, vii + 72 pp. Jack Stark, The Art of the Statute, Fred B. Rothman & Co., State of Wisconsin Legislative Reference Bureau, Littleton, 1996, 124 pp; 2) From Canada: Pigeon and Driedger. Louis Philippe Pigeon, Rédaction et Interpretation des Lois, Cours Donné en 1965 aux Conseillers Juridiques du Gouvernement du Québec, 56 pp. Elmer A. Driedger, The Composition of Legislation, Legislative Forms and Precedents, Second Edition Revised, Published by The Department of Justice, Ottawa, 1976, xxix + 408 pp. b. European continental system The following works may serve as reference: M. Ainis e R. Pagano, Guida Bibliografica al Drafting Legislativo, da Rodolfo Pagano, Introduzione alla Legistica, L'Arte di Preparare le Leggi, Dott. A. Giuffrè Editore, Milano, 1999, Appendice n. 3, pp. 311-350. Antonio Anselmo Martino [Director de la Edición], Manual de Técnica Legislativa, Colegio de Abogados de la Capital Federal, Universidad de Buenos Aires, Facultad de Derecho, Ministerio de Justicia y Derechos Humanos, Buenos Aires, 2001; ver Anexo II, pp. 58-80. Five areas are distinguished: German, French, Italian, Portuguese and Spanish. i. German area In the German area, the following works may serve as very selective bibliography: Peter Noll, Gesetzgebungs-lehre, Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag GmbH, Hamburg, 1973, pp. 294-296; which also includes classic works in other languages. The following authors are remembered: Thibaut, Savigny, Zitelmann, Kohler, Schäpfer, Walter, Müller y Noll. Thibaut y Savigny, La Codificación, una Controversia Programática Basada en sus Obras sobre La Necesidad de un Derecho Civil General para Alemania y La Vocación de nuestra Época para la Legislación y la Ciencia del Derecho, con Adiciones de los Autores y Juicios de sus Contemporáneos, Introducción y Selección de Textos de Jacques Stern, Traducción del Alemán de José Díaz García, Aguilar, 1970, XLVII + 286 pp. Robert Walter, Die Lehre von der Gesetzestechnik, von Univ. Prof. Dr. Robert Wiener, Graz, Österreichische Juristen-Zeitung, 18. Jahrgang, 26. Februar 1963, Heft Nr. 4, pp. 84-90. (II, p. 84-90). Hanswerner Müller, Handbuch der Gesetzgebungstechnik, Unveränderte Zweite Auflage, Carl Heymanns Verlag KG, Köln, Berlin, Bonn, München, 1968, XVI + 350 pp. Peter Noll, Gesetzgebungs-lehre, Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag GmbH, Hamburg, 1973, 314 pp. Works not consulted: E. Zitelmann, Die Kunst der Gesetzgebung, Zahn & Jaensen, Dresden, 1904, 48 pp. (see a summary, which has been consulted, in Emilio Betti, "Metodica e Didactica del Diritto Secondo Ernst Zitelmann", Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia del Diritto, V, 1925, pp. 68-76); J. Kohlers, "Technik der Gesetzgebung", Archiv für die Zivilistische Praxis, 1905, p. 345 et seq; E. Schläpfer, Die Lehere von der Gesetzestechnik, Stampfli & Cie., Bern, 1930. ii. French area In the French area, the bibliography in the following book may serve as reference: Alexandre C. Angelesco, La Technique Législative en Matière de Codification Civile, Thèse pour le Doctorat, Faculté de Droit, Université de Paris, E. de Broccard, Éditeur, Paris, 1930, pp. 809-844. The following authors are remembered: Portalis, Rousset, Gény, Angelesco, Ripert, Rémy, Bécane, Couderc, ad a collective work directed by Morand and Bergeal. Jean Etienne Marie Portalis will be remembered by his three important speeches on the French Civil Code that are in the following publication: Baron Locré, La Législation Civile, Commerciale et Criminelle de la France ou Commentaire et Complément des Codes Français, Treuttel et Würtz, Libraires, Paris, 1826, Tome Premier: 1) Discours Préliminaire du Projet de Code Civil de la Comission, pp. 244-316; 2) Exposé Général du Système du Code Civil, Consideré dans son Ensamble et ses Diverses Parties, dans la Séance du Corps Législatif du 24 Novembre 1801, pp. 316336; 3) Exposé de Motifs, dans la Séance du 28 Ventose An XII du Corps Législatif, en Présentant le Projet de la Loi du 30, Relative à la Réunion des Lois Civiles en un seul Corps, sous le Titre DE CODE CIVIL DES FRANÇAIS, pp. 337-350. Gustave Rousset, Science Nouvelle des Lois, Principes Méthodes et Formules Suivant Lesquelles les Lois Doivent Être Conçues, Rédigées et Codifiées, Durand & Pèdone-Marchal & Cie., Éditeurs Libraires, Paris, 1871; Tome Premier, 396 pp.; Tome Second, 372 pp. François Geny, La Technique Législative dans la Codification Civile Moderne, dans Le Code Civil, 1804-1904, Publié par la Société d'Études Législatives, Arthur Russeau, Éditeur, Tome Second, Paris, 1904, pp. 987-1038. Alexandre C. Angelesco, La Technique Législative en Matière de Codification Civile, Thèse pour le Doctorat, présenté et soutenue le mardi 25 novembre 1930 à 14 heures par Alexandre C. Angelesco, Président M. René Demogue, Professeur; Suffragants M.Rouast, M. Niboyet, Professeurs, Faculté de Droit, Université de Paris, E. de Broccard, Éditeur, Paris, 1930, 860 pp. Georges Ripert, Les Forces Créatrices du Droit, Librairie Générale de Droit et Jurisprudence, R. Pichon et R. Durand-Auzias, Paris, 1955, VII + 432 pp. Dominique Rémy, Légistique, L'Art de Faire les Lois, Éditions Romillat, Paris, 1994, 352 pp. Jean Claude Bécane et Michel Couderc, La Loi, Dalloz, Paris, 1994, XVI + 302 pp. Charles Albert Morand [Directeur], Légistique Formelle et Materielle, Presses Universitaires d'Aix'Marseille, Aix-En-Provence, 1999, 334 pp. Catherine Bergeal, Rédiger un Texte Normatif, Préface de Renaud Denoix de Saint Marc, Berger'Levrault, Paris, 2004, 304 pp. iii. Italian area In the Italian area the following authors are considered: Ruini, Lucifredi, Bertole y AA.VV., d'Antonio y AA.VV., and Pagano. Meuccio Ruini, La Funzione Legislativa (Tecnica delle Leggi e Lavori Parlamentari), Dott. A. Giuffrè-Editore, Milano, 1953, 152 pp. Roberto Lucifredi, "Metodi Pratici per Preparare Buone Leggi e Favorire la Migliore Applicazione", Lezione Tenuta al Primo Corso di Addestramento per Funzionari Direttivi dell'Amministrazione dello Stato Il 12 Agosto 1952, La Scienza e la Tecnica della Organizzazione nella Pubblica Ammnistrazione, Annata 1955, pp. 3-21. Sergio Bartole was in charge of the publication and update of the course taught by several professors: Lezioni di Tecnica Legislativa, Pubblicazioni dell'Istituto Superiore per l'Adestramento del Personale delle Regioni degli Enti Locale (ISAPREL), Cedam Padova, 1988, 1990, 304 pp. Mario d'Antonio was also in charge of the publication of a course taught by several professors: Corso di Studi Superiori Legislativi 1988-1989, Scuola di Scienza e Tecnica della Legislazione (ISLE), Cedam, Padova, 1990, 864 pp. Rodolfo Pagano, Introduzione alla Legistica, L'Arte di Preparare le Leggi, Dott. A. Giuffrè, Milano, 1999, VII, 350 pp. iv. Portuguese area In the Portuguese area, the following authors are remembered: Hésio Fernandes Pinheiro, Técnica Legislativa, Constituçoes e Atos Constitucionais do Brasil, 2a. Ediçao, Livraria Freitas Bastos s/a, Rio de Janeiro, San Pablo, 1962, 550 pp. Kildare Gonçalves Carvalho, Técnica Legislativa, 3a. Ediçao Revista, Atualizada e Ampliada, Del Rey, Belo Horizonte, 2003, xi + 200 pp. v. Spanish area In the Spanish area, the following authors are remembered: Colmo, Tapia Valdés, AA.VV. del Grupo de Estudios de Técnica Legislativa (GRETEL), Vethencourt Velazco, AA.VV. de la Asociación Española de Letrados de Parlamentos and Leiva Fernández. Alfredo Colmo, Técnica Legislativa del Código Civil Argentino, Segunda Edición, Librería Bartolomé Mitre, de Hall & Acevedo, Casa Editora, Buenos Aires, 1927, Reimpresión Abeledo Perrot, Buenos Aires, 1961, 366 pp. Jorge A. Tapia Valdés, La Técnica Legislativa, Editorial Jurídica de Chile, Santiago de Chile, 1960, 102 pp. GRETEL, Grupo de Estudios de Técnica Legislativa, was in charge of two collective works: La Forma de las Leyes, 10 Estudios de Técnica Legislativa, Casa Editorial Bosch, Barcelona, 1986, 318 pp. Curso de Técnica Legislativa, Serie de Técnica Legislativa 1, Cuadernos y Debates, 14, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid, 1989, 324 pp. Belkys Vethencourt Velazco, Manual de Técnica Legislativa, Banco Central de Venezuela, Colección de Estudios Jurídicos, Caracas, 1993, 240 pp. Asociación de Letrados de Parlamentos, La Técnica Legislativa a Debate, Tecnos, 1994, 332 pp. Luis F. P. Leiva Fernández, Fundamentos de Técnica Legislativa, La Ley, Buenos Aires, 1999, XLIV, 402 pp. Virgilio Zapatero, El Arte de Legislar, Thompson-Aranzadi, Navarra, España, 386 pp. Luis Alberto Marchili, Cómo Legislar con Sabiduría y Elocuwencia. El Arte de Legislar Reconstruido a Partir de la Tradición Retórica, Editorial Dunken, Buenos Aires, 2009, 498 pp. Index Addition (Textual amending laws, Amending method, Amending laws, Fragmentary genre, Prescriptive speeches, Chapter IV, Legislative Genres) Agon (Exordium, Persuasive speeches, Chapter VI Systematics) Alberico di Montecassino and Giovanni di Gaeta (Ars dictaminis, Medieval history, Chapter II Ancient and Medieval History) Alberto di Morra (Ars dictaminis, Medieval history, Chapter II Ancient and Medieval History) Alcuin (Medieval history, Chapter II Ancient and Medieval History) Alphabetic index Amendement method (Amending laws, Fragmentary genre, Prescriptive speeches, Chapter IV, Legislative Genres) Amending laws (Fragmentary genre, Prescriptive speeches, Chapter IV Legislative Genres) Amplification and attenuation (Emotional appeals, Epilogue, Chapter VI Systematics) Ancient and Medieval History (Chapter II Ancient and Medieval History ) Ancient history (Chapter II Ancient and Medieval History) Aptitude (Virtues, Chapter II Style) Arranged texts (External systematizing laws, Systematizing laws, Systematizing genre, Prescriptive speeches, Chapter IV Legislative Genres) Ars arengandi (Medieval history, Chapter II Ancient and Medieval History) Ars dictaminis (Medieval history, Chapter II Ancient and Medieval History) Artificial order (Prescriptive speeches, Chapter V Systematics) Bacon (Modern history, Chapter III Modern and Contemporary History) Bentham (Contemporary history, Chapter III Modern and Contemporary History) Boethius and Cassiodorus (Medieval history, Chapter II Ancient and Medieval History) Boncompagno da Signa (Ars dictaminis) Callimacus (Greece, Ancient history, Chapter II Ancient and Medieval History) Case Law (Topics, Chapter V Investigation) Casuistic laws (Fragmentary genre, Prescriptive speeches, Chapter IV Legislative Genres) Causes (Reasonableness of legislative speeches (logos),Topics, Chapter V Investigation) Character of the legislator (ethos) (Topics, Chapter V Investigation) Cicero (Rome, Ancient history, Chapter II Ancient and Medieval History) Clarity (Virtues, Chapter VII Style) Codifications (Internal systematizing laws, Systematizing laws, Systematizing genre, Prescriptive speeches, Chapter IV Legislative Genres) Coluccio Salutati (The humanists, Medieval history, Chapter II Ancient and Medieval History) Common words (Clarity,Virtues, Chapter VII Style) Comparisons (Reasonableness of legislative speeches (logos), Topics, Chapter V Investigation) Compilaciones (External systematizing laws, Systematizing laws, Systematizing genre, Prescriptive speeches, Chapter IV Legislative Genres) Composition of sentences (Ornament, Virtues, Chapter VII Style) Conceptual definitions (Legislative definitions, Reasonableness of legislative speeches (logos),Topics, Chapter V Investigation) Concomitances (Reasonableness of legislative speeches (logos), Topics, Chapter V Investigation) Confirmation (Agon, Exordium, Persuasive speeches, Chapter VI Systematics) Confucius (Ancient history, Chapter II Ancient and Medieval History) Consolidations (Internal systematizing laws, Systematizing laws, Systematizing genre, Prescriptive speeches, Chapter IV Legislative Genres) Contemporary history (Chapter III Modern and Contemporary History) Contrarieties (Reasonableness of legislative speeches (logos),Topics, Chapter V Investigation) Coordinate sentence (Degrees of elaboration, Composition of sentences, Ornament, Chapter VII Style) Counter example: Refutation of two previous sophisms (Legislative sophisms in the strict sense, Sophisms, Chapter V Investigation) Custom (Topics, Chapter V Investigation) Defensibility (Previous knowledge, Chapter V Investigation) Definition (art of legislation) (Chapter I Prenotions) Definition (Legislative definitions, Reasonableness of legislative speeches, Topics) Degrees of elaboration (Composition of sentences, Ornament, Chapter VII Style) Deliberative sophisms (Legislative sophisms in the wide sense, Sophisms, Chapter V Investigation) Denominations (Chapter I Prenotions) Determination of the legislative genre and its species (Previous knowledege, Chapter V Investigation) Differences (Legislative definitions, Reasonableness of legislative speeches (logos),Topic, Chapter V Investigation) Difficult Defensibility (Defensibility, Previous knowledge, Chapter V Investigation) Digests (External systematizing laws, Systematizing laws, Systematizing genre, Prescriptive speeches, Chapter IV Legislative Genres) Digression, proposition and division (Agon, Exordium, Persuasive speeches, Chapter VI Systematics) Direct exordiums (Exordium, Persuasive speeches, Chapter VI Systematics) Division (Textual amending laws, Amendement method, Fragmentary genre, Prescriptive speeches, Chapter IV Legislative Genres) Division (Sophism of Division, Sophisms in general, Chapter V Investigation) Double reasons (dissoi logoi) (Promptuary of the things to say, Previous knowledge, Chapter V Investigation) Doubtful Defensibility (Defensibility, Previous knowledege, Chapter V Investigation) Easy Defensibility (Defensibility, Previous knowledege, Chapter V Investigation) Effects (Reasonableness of legislative speeches (logos),Topics, Chapter V Investigation) Election of words, tropes and other figures of speech (Ornament, Virtues, Style Genres, Chapter VII Style) Expository plan (Artificial order, Prescriptive speeches, Chapter VI Systematics) Elaboration of the expository plan (Artificial order, Prescriptive speeches, Chapter V Systematics) Elevated style (Style Genres, Chapter VII Style) Emotional appeals (Persuasive speeches, Chapter VI Systematics) Enumeration of the arguments (Persuasive speeches, Chapter VI Systematics) Epilogue (of the book) Epilogue (Persuasive speeches, Chapter VI Systematics) Epilogues (Persuasive speeches, Chapter IV, Legislative Genres) Exordium (Artificial order, Prescriptive speeches, Chapter V Systematics) Expediency (Reasonableness of legislative speeches (logos), Topics, Chapter V Investigation) Exposition of Motives (Persuasive speeches, Chapter IV, Legislative Genres) Expository plan (Chapter I Prenotions) Express repeal (Repeal, Temporal validity, Amending laws, Fragmentary genre, Prescriptive speeches, Chapter IV, Legislative Genres) Extension in time (Temporal validity, Amending laws, Fragmentary genre, Prescriptive speeches, Chapter IV, Legislative Genres) External systematizing laws (Systematizing laws, Systematizing genre, Prescriptive speeches, Chapter IV Legislative Genres) Feasibility (Reasonableness of legislative speeches (logos), Topics, Chapter V Investigation) Figures of thought (Other figures, Election of words, tropes and other figures, Ornament, Virtues, Chapter VII Style) Figures of words (Other figures, Election of words, tropes and other figures, Ornament, Virtues, Chapter VII Style) Filangieri (Modern history, Chapter III Modern and Contemporary History) Foreign legislators (Greece, Ancient history, Chapter II Ancient and Medieval History) Forms (Promptuary of the things to say, Previous knowledge, Investigation, Chapter V Investigation) Fragmentary genre (Prescriptive speeches, Chapter IV Legislative Genres) Free sentence (Composition of sentences, Ornament, Virtues, Chapter VII Style) Genres (Reasonableness of legislative speeches (logos),Topics, Chapter V Investigation) Giovanni di Bonandrea (Ars dictaminis, Medieval history, Chapter II Ancient and Medieval History) Greece (Ancient history, Chapter II Ancient and Medieval History) Guido Fava, Matteo de Libri and Albertano da Brescia (Ars arengandi, Medieval history, Chapter II Ancient and Medieval History) Harmonization of the justice, the expediency and the juridical security (Reasonableness of legislative speeches (logos), Topics, Chapter V Investigation) Hope and fear (Emotional appeals, Epilogue, Chapter VI Systematics) Hope and fear of the recipients of the laws (pathos) (Topics, Chapter V Investigation) Hopper (Modern history, Chapter III Modern and Contemporary History) Indirect exordiums (Exordium, Persuasive speeches, Chapter VI Systematics) Institutional laws (Internal systematizing laws, Systematizing laws, Systematizing genre, Prescriptive speeches, Chapter IV Legislative Genres) Instruments (Previous knowledge, Investigation, Chapter V Investigation) Internal sistematizing laws (Systematizing laws, Systematizing genre, Prescriptive speeches, Chapter IV Legislative Genres) Investigation (Chapter V Investigation) Isidorus of Seville (Medieval history, Chapter II Ancient and Medieval History) Isocrates, Plato and Aristotle (Greece, Ancient history, Chapter II Ancient and Medieval History) Junction (Placement of words, Composition of sentences, Ornament, Chapter VII Style) Juridical security (Reasonableness of legislative speeches (logos), Topics, Chapter V Investigation) Juridical system (Systematizing genre, Prescriptive speeches, Chapter IV Legislative Genres) Juristic Writings (Topics, Chapter V Investigation) Justice (Reasonableness of legislative speeches (logos), Topics, Chapter V Investigation) Later... (Contemporary history, Chapter III Modern and Contemporary History) Law of the XII Tables (Rome, Ancient history, Chapter II Ancient and Medieval History) Laws of principles (Fragmentary genre, Prescriptive speeches, Chapter IV Legislative Genres) Legislation (Topics, Chapter V Investigation) Legislative definitions (Reasonableness of legislative speeches (logos),Topics, Chapter V Investigation) Legislative enthymemes (Reasonableness of legislative speeches (logos),Topics, Chapter V Investigation) Legislative examples (Reasonableness of legislative speeches (logos),Topics, Chapter V Investigation) Legislative Genres (Chapter IV Legislative Genres) Legislative sophisms in the strict sense (Sophisms, Chapter V Investigation) Legislative sophisms in the wide sense (Sophisms, Chapter V Investigation) Leonardo Bruni (The humanists, Medieval history, Chapter II Ancient and Medieval History) Li Livres dou Trésor (Ars arengandi, Medieval history, Chapter II Ancient and Medieval History) Liber de Regimine Civitatum (Ars arengandi, Medieval history, Chapter II Ancient and Medieval History) Lorenzo Valla (The humanists, Medieval history, Chapter II Ancient and Medieval History) Mably (Modern history, Chapter III Modern and Contemporary History) Manu, Kautiliya and Asoka (Ancient history, Chapter II Ancient and Medieval History) Medieval history (Chapter II Ancient and Medieval History) Merit (Reasonableness of legislative speeches (logos), Topics, Chapter V Investigation) Mesopotamian codes (Ancient history, Chapter II Ancient and Medieval History) Messages and Reports (Persuasive speeches, Chapter IV, Legislative Genres) Metaphors (fictions) (Tropes, Election of words, tropes and other figures, Ornament, Virtues, Style Genres, Chapter VII Style) Method (Chapter I Prenotions) Metonymies (presumptions and alterations) (Tropes, Election of words, tropes and other figures, Ornament, Virtues, Chapter VII Style) Middle style (Style Genres, Chapter VII Style) Mixed definitions (Legislative definitions, Reasonableness of legislative speeches (logos), Topics, Chapter V Investigation) Mixed figures (Other figures, Election of words, tropes and other figures, Ornament, Virtues, Chapter VII Style) Modern and Contemporary History (Chapter III Modern and Contemporary History) Modern history (Chapter III Modern and Contemporary History) Montesquieu (Modern history, Chapter III Modern and Contemporary History) Narration (Agon, Exordium, Persuasive speeches, Chapter VI Systematics) Natural order (Prescriptive speeches, Chapter V Systematics) Necessity (Reasonableness of legislative speeches (logos), Topics, Chapter V Investigation) Need for persuasive speeches (Persuasive speeches, Chapter IV, Legislative Genres) Nominal definitions (Legislative definitions, Reasonableness of legislative speeches (logos),Topics, Chapter V Investigation) Notes (Persuasive speeches, Chapter IV, Legislative Genres) Not-textual amending laws (Amending method, Amending laws, Fragmentary genre, Prescriptive speeches, Chapter IV, Legislative Genres) Object (Chapter I Prenotions) Oculus Pastoralis (Ars arengandi, Medieval history, Chapter II Ancient and Medieval History) Onomacritus (Greece, Ancient history, Chapter II Ancient and Medieval History) Opinion of the experts (Topics, Chapter V Investigation) Opinion of the interested sectors (Topics, Chapter V Investigation) Opportunity (Reasonableness of legislative speeches (logos),Topics, Chapter V Investigation) Orators and sophists (Greece, Ancient history, Chapter II Ancient and Medieval History) Orators, sophists and bureaucrats (Rome, Ancient history, Chapter II Ancient and Medieval History) Order (Placement of words, Composition of sentences, Ornament, Chapter VII Style) Orient (Ancient history, Chapter II Ancient and Medieval History) Ornament (Virtues, Style Genres, Chapter VII Style) Other figures of speeech (Tropes, Election of words, tropes and other figures, Ornament, Virtues, Chapter VII Style) Parts of the speech (Artificial order, Prescriptive speeches, Chapter V Systematics) Periodic sentence (Degrees of elaboration, Composition of sentences, Ornament, Chapter VII Style) Persuasive definitions (Legislative definitions, Reasonableness of legislative speeches (logos),Topics, Chapter V Investigation) Persuasive speeches (Chapter IV Legislative Genres) Persuasive speeches (Chapter V Systematics) Placement of words (Composition of sentences, Ornament, Chapter VII Style) Plain style (Style Genres, Chapter VII Style) Possibility (Reasonableness of legislative speeches (logos), Topics, Chapter V Investigation) Preambles (Persuasive speeches, Chapter IV, Legislative Genres) Precedent, consequent and incompatible (Reasonableness of legislative speeches (logos), Topics, Chapter V Investigation) Prescriptive speeches (Chapter IV Legislative Genres) Prescriptive speeches (Chapter VI Systematics) Previous instructions (Chapter V Investigation) Previous knowledge (Chapter V Investigation) Probability (Reasonableness of legislative speeches (logos),Topics, Chapter V Investigation) Prologue (of the book) Prenotions (Chapter I Prenotions) Promptuary of the things to say (Previous knowledge, Investigation, Chapter V Investigation) Proper words (Clarity, Virtues, Style Genres, Chapter VII Style) Purpose (Chapter I Introduction) Protagoras (Greece, Ancient history, Chapter II Ancient and Medieval History) Ptahhotep and Merikare (Ancient history, Chapter II Ancient and Medieval History) Public opinion (Topics, Chapter V Investigation) Purity (Virtues, Style Genres, Chapter VII Style) Reasonableness of legislative speeches (logos) (Topics, Chapter V Investigation) Refutation (Agon, Exordium, Persuasive speeches, Chapter VI Systematics) Refutation of certain frequent objections (Persuasive speeches, Chapter IV, Legislative Genres) Refutation of other positions (Refutation, Agon, Exordium, Persuasive speeches, Chapter VI Systematics) Refutation of the criticism to the bill proposed (Refutation, Agon, Exordium, Persuasive speeches, Chapter VI Systematics) Repeal (Temporal validity, Amending laws, Fragmentary genre, Prescriptive speeches, Chapter IV, Legislative Genres) Reunion (Textual amending laws, Amending method, Amending laws, Fragmentary genre, Prescriptive speeches, Chapter IV, Legislative Genres) Transposition (Textual amending laws, Amending method, Amending laws, Fragmentary genre, Prescriptive speeches, Chapter IV, Legislative Genres) Rhythm (Placement of words, Composition of sentences, Ornament, Chapter VII Style) Rolandino Passagieri (Ars dictaminis, Medieval history, Chapter I Ancient and Medieval History) Rome (Ancient history, Chapter II Ancient and Medieval History) Select Bibliography Seven Wise Men (Greece, Ancient history, Chapter II Ancient and Medieval History) Similarities (Legislative definitions, Reasonableness of legislative speeches (logos),Topics, Chapter V Investigation) Sophism of a cause that is not a cause (Sophisms that do not depend on the language to cause deceit,Topics,Chapter V Investigation) Sophism of accentuation (more properly, ambiguity only in the writing speech with Regard to the oral speech) Sophism of combination (Sophisms that depend on the language to cause deceit,Topics, Chapter V Investigation) Sophism of division (Sophisms that depend on the language to cause deceit,Topics, Chapter V Investigation) Sophism of excessive vagueness (Sophisms that depend on the language to cause deceit,Topics, Chapter V Investigation) Sophism of false consolation (Sophisms that intend to pospone the debate (dilatory), (Deliberative sophisms, Legislative sophisms in the wide sense, Sophisms, Chapter V Investigation) Sophism of gradualism (Deliberative sophisms, Legislative sophisms in the wide sense, Sophisms, Chapter V Investigation) Sophism of ignorance of the refutation (Sophisms that do not depend on the language to cause deceit,Topics, Chapter V Investigation) Sophism of semantic ambiguity (homonymy) (Sophisms that depend on the language to cause deceit,Topics, Chapter V Investigation) Sophism of several questions in only one (Sophisms that do not depend on the language to cause deceit,Topics, Chapter V Investigation) Sophism of syntactic ambiguity (amphibology) (Sophisms that depend on the language to cause deceit,Topics, Chapter V Investigation) Sophism of the absence of precedents (Sophisms intended to prevent the debate (impedimental), Deliberative sophisms, Legislative sophisms in the wide sense, Sophisms, Chapter V Investigation) Sophism of the absolute and not absolute sense (Sophisms that do not depend on the Language to cause deceit, Topics, Chapter V Investigation) Sophism of the accident (Sophisms that do not depend on the language to cause deceit,Topics, Chapter V Investigation) Sophism of the Allegorical idols (Sophisms intended to confuse the debate (confusionist), Deliberative sophisms, Legislative sophisms in the wide sense, Sophisms, Chapter V Investigation) Sophism of the antithinkers (Sophisms intended to confuse the debate (confusionist), Deliberative sophisms, Legislative sophisms in the wide sense, Sophisms, Chapter V Investigation) Sophism of the begging the question (Sophisms that do not depend on the language to cause deceit,Topics, Chapter V Investigation) Sophism of the Bias (Sophisms intended to confuse the debate (confusionist), Deliberative sophisms, Legislative sophisms in the wide sense, Sophisms, Chapter V Investigation) Sophism of the confusion of the obstacle with the cause (Sophisms intended to confuse the debate (confusionist), Deliberative sophisms, Legislative sophisms in the wide sense, Sophisms, V Investigation) Sophism of the consequent (Sophisms that do not depend on the language to cause deceit,Topics, Chapter V Investigation) Sophism of the Danger (Deliberative sophisms, Legislative sophisms in the wide sense, Sophisms, Chapter V Investigation) Sophism of the distraction maneuver (Deliberative sophisms, Legislative sophisms in the wide sense, Sophisms, Chapter V Investigation) Sophism of the end that justifies the means (Sophisms intended to confuse the debate (confusionist), Deliberative sophisms, Legislative sophisms in the wide sense, Sophisms, Chapter V Investigation) Sophism of the expression form (or word figure) (Sophisms that depend on the language to cause deceit,Topics, Chapter V Investigation) Sophism of the impostor term (euphemism) (Sophisms intended to confuse the debate (confusionist), Deliberative sophisms, Legislative sophisms in the wide sense, Sophisms, Chapter V Investigation) Sophism of the irrevocable laws (Sophisms intended to prevent the debate (impedimental), Deliberative sophisms, Legislative sophisms in the wide sense, Sophisms, Chapter V Investigation) Sophism of the laudatory personalities (Sophisms intended to prevent the debate (impedimental), Deliberative sophisms, Legislative sophisms in the wide sense, Sophisms, Chapter V Investigation) Sophism of the most opportune future (Deliberative sophisms, Legislative sophisms in the wide sense, Sophisms, Chapter V Inveestigation) Sophism of the ochlocracy (Legislative sophisms in the strict sense, Sophisms, Chapter V Investigation) Sophism of the oligarchy (Legislative sophisms in the strict sense, Sophisms, Chapter V Investigation) Sophism of the paradoxical affirmations (Sophisms intended to confuse the debate (confusionist), Deliberative sophisms, Legislative sophisms in the wide sense, Sophisms, Chapter V Investigation) Sophism of the Popular corruption (Sophisms intended to confuse the debate (confusionist), Deliberative sophisms, Legislative sophisms in the wide sense, Sophisms, Chapter V Investigation) Sophism of the quietist (Sophisms that intend to confuse the debate (confusionist), Deliberative sophisms) Legislative sophisms in the wide sense, Sophisms, Chapter V Investigation) Sophism of the rejection instead of the modification (Sophisms intended to confuse the debate (confusionist), Deliberative sophisms, Legislative sophisms in the wide sense, Sophisms, Chapter V Investigation) Sophism of the only word that implies approval or rejection (epithet) (Sophisms intended to confuse the debate (confusionist), Deliberative sophisms, Legislative sophisms in the wide sense, Sophisms, Chapter V Investigation) Sophism of the universal opponent (Sophisms intended to confuse the debate (confusionist), Deliberative sophisms, Legislative sophisms in the wide sense, Sophisms, Chapter V Investigation) Sophism of the wisdom of our ancestors (Sophisms intended to prevent the debate (impedimental), Deliberative sophisms, Legislative sophisms in the wide sense, Sophisms, Chapter V Investigation) Sophism of vague generalities (Sophisms intended to confuse the debate (confusionist), Deliberative sophisms, Legislative sophisms in the wide sense, Sophisms, Chapter V Invention) Sophisms (Promptuary of the things to say, Previous knowledge, Chapter V Investigation) Sophisms (Topics, Chapter V Investigation) Sophisms (Chapter V Investigation) Sophisms in general (Topics, Chapter V Investigation) Sophisms intended to confuse the debate (confusionist) (Deliberative sophisms, Legislative sophisms in the wide sense, Sophisms, Chapter V Investigation) Sophisms intended to prevent the debate (impedimental) (Deliberative sophisms, Legislative sophisms in the wide sense, Sophisms, Chapter V Investigation) Sophisms that depend on the language only to cause the deceive (Topics, Chapter V Investigation) Sophisms that do not depend on the language only to cause deceit (Topics, Chapter V Investigation) Sophisms that intended to postpone the debate (dilatory) (Legislative sophisms in the wide sense, Sophisms, Chapter V Investigation) Spatial validity (Amending laws, Fragmentary genre, Prescriptive speeches, Chapter IV Legislative Genres) Species (Persuasive speeches, Chapter IV Legislative Genres) Species (Legislative definitions, Reasonableness of legislative speeches (logos) Topics, Chapter V Investigation) Style (Chapter VII Style) Style Genres (Chapter VII Style) Substitution (Textual amending laws, Amending method, Amending laws, Fragmentary genre, Prescriptive speeches, Chapter IV Legislative Genres) Suppression (Textual amending laws, Amending method, Amending laws, Fragmentary genre, Prescriptive speeches, Chapter IV Legislative Genres) Suspension (Temporal validity, Amending laws, Fragmentary genre, Prescriptive speeches, Chapter IV Legislative Genres) Syllepses (Tropes, Election of words, tropes and other figures, Ornament, Virtues, Chapter VII Style) Synecdoches (Tropes, Election of words, tropes and other figures, Ornament, Virtues, Chapter VII Style) Systematic index Systematics (Chapter V Systematics) Systematizing genre (Prescriptive speeches, Chapter IV Legislative Genres) Systematizing laws (Systematizing genre, Prescriptive speeches, Chapter IV Legislative Genres) Tacit repeal (Repeal, Temporal validity, Amending laws, Fragmentary genre, Prescriptive speeches, Chapter IV Legislative Genres) Temporal validity (Amending laws, Fragmentary genre, Prescriptive speeches, Chapter IV Legislative Genres) Textual amending laws (Amending method, Amending laws, Fragmentary genre, Prescriptive speeches, Chapter IV Legislative Genres) The "Whereas" section (Persuasive speeches, Chapter IV Legislative Genres) The colors of good and evil (Promptuary of the things to say, Previous knowledge, Chapter V Investigation) The education of the Podestá (Ars arengandi, Medieval history, Chapter II Ancient and Medieval History) The Humanists (Medieval history, Chapter II Ancient and Medieval History) The School of the legists (Ancient history, Chapter II Ancient and Medieval History) The State of the cause (Previous knowledge, Chapter V Investigation) Topics (Promptuary of the things to say, Previous knowledge, Chapter V Investigation) Topics (Chapter V Investigation) Tropes (Election of words, tropes and other figures, Ornament, Virtues, Style Genres, Chapter VII Style) Virtues (Style Genres, Chapter VII Style) Virtues and vices of the exhordium (Exordium, Persuasive speeches, Chapter VI Systematics) Words (Election of words, tropes and other figures, Ornament, Virtues, Style Genres, Chapter VII Style).

Emotion Management in Crisis Situations 59 Gheorghe-Ilie FÂRTE "Al.I.Cuza" University of Iaşi (Romania) Emotion Management in Crisis Situations Abstract: In this paper I try to clarify and systematize some contributions with regard to (a) the main aspects of crisis situations that impose the management of emotions, (b) the correlation of certain social emotions with the factors that trigger them and their related tendencies to act, (c) the essential elements of emotional experience, (d) the differentiation of appropriate emotional reactions to a crisis situation from the inappropriate ones; (e) the instances in which emotions can be managed, and (f) the balance between rationality and affectivity in the organization's response to the risks or crises which it faces. By means of logical correlations I arrived at the following conclusions. Regardless of the social sphere in which the crisis makes itself felt, regardless of its type, phase or damage control strategies, the rational control of emotions contributes significantly to overcoming the crisis situation. Beyond the specificities, crises involve digressions form the norms of rightful conduct, breaches of the social norms that support institutions (as spontaneous order structures) and maladaptive reactions to reality. They can be corrected through a good management of emotions, with the caveat that we are not dealing with a problem of knowledge, but rather with one of will and character. All people can identify the adaptive emotional responses to a crisis situation, but only a few prefer them and train assiduously to use them. Keywords: crisis, (social) emotion, norm, rightful conduct, adaptive vs. maladaptive reaction 1. Introduction In any period of history, the life of any human society depends on the dialectic relationship between its institutions and its organizations. Institutions are spontaneous order structures resulting from the voluntary activities of individuals interested in reaching personal goals (Hayek 1968, 11). These by-products of individual actions respond to certain social Farte, Gheorghe-Ilie. 2013. "Emotion Management in Crisis Situations." Argumentum. Journal of the Seminar of Discursive Logic, Argumentation Theory and Rhetoric, 11 (2): 59-70 Gheorghe-Ilie FÂRTE 60 needs, but they are not intentionally created by planning. Spontaneous order structures can neither be known, nor controlled completely, but anyone can understand their essential aspects and use their resources (Easterly 2011). For instance, no-one can fully master institutions such as language, the market, marriage, school, spiritual guidance, entrepreneurship or risk insurance (in cases of death, illness, accident, fire, etc.), whereas anyone can be usefully trained at a given point in time during their lives. By contrast, organizations are planned order structures in which each constitutive factor is assigned certain tasks and resources with a view to the completion of certain goals (Hayek 1968, 11). The performance and even survival of organizations depend on their degree of adequacy to the regulatory principles, systemic resources, fundamental values and retroactions that define the corresponding institutions (Fârte 2012, 9). For instance, my family, the "Emil Racoviţă" National College of Iaşi, the Orthodox Romanian Church and the Commercial Romanian Bank cannot accomplish their planned goals nor last in time unless the essential aspects of marriage, school, spiritual guidance, entrepreneurship and the market are understood and fructified. Obviously, institutions are not immutable, but they evolve permanently under the influence of the organizations that embody them, but also under that of the flux of emotion that sustains the subjacent social norms. The flexibility and heterogeneity of marriage or the social responsibility incorporated in the institution of entrepreneurship are conclusive examples in this respect. The hayekian distinction between 'institution' and 'organisation' allows us, on the one hand, to highlight the limits of planning and controlling in the managerial act, and on the other, to underline the importance of the emotional dimension in the life of any organisation, especially in the management of crisis situations. So as not to be accused of 'emotional anorexia' (especially in the context of cutbacks and significant personnel lay-offs or of crises that question the legitimacy of their existence), organisations (mostly companies) show interest in the emotional dimension of social interaction, through appealing phrasings of their mission and vision, the cultivation of their brand personality, the counselling or training of employees, client relationship management, etc. Unfortunately, these often fall prey to the pitfall of 'marketization' and the instrumentalization of emotions, i.e. the transformation of emotions into products that can be sold, bought and used as means of reaching purposes (Fineman 2000, 102). However, the management of emotional reactions does not only (and firstly) target the instrumentalization of emotions, but their correlation with the rules of rightful behaviour. Crisis Emotion Management in Crisis Situations 61 situations can be successfully prevented or overcome if the efforts directed at the accomplishment of planned purposes are subordinated to the social norms that define the right behaviour, while the emotions represent excellent indicators of the adequacy/inadequacy of such standards. In the following, we propose to clarify and systematize some contributions in the following directions: (a) the knowledge of the main aspects of crisis situations that impose the management of emotions; (b) the differentiation of certain social emotions according to the factors that trigger them and their related tendencies to act; (c) the knowledge of the essential elements of emotional experience; (d) the differentiation of appropriate emotional reactions to a crisis situation from the inappropriate ones; (e) the knowledge of the instances in which emotions can be managed: recognition, expression and guidance; (f) the understanding of the balance between rationality and affectivity in the organization's response to the risks or crises which it faces. 2. Are crisis situations (un)avoidable? Humans are imperfect beings living in an imperfect world or, at least, in a world that does not correspond to their needs, wishes, preferences or whims perfectly. Their beliefs and wishes, as mental representations of things as they ought to be (Griffiths 2004, 246), condemn them to a permanent succession of changes on the level of both their own persons and that of the environment in which they live. We only have a partial and, sometimes, erroneous knowledge of the circumstances in which we want to act and seek, most often, to satisfy unrealizable wishes (due to their contradictory nature). As part of a very competitive environment, organizations (companies, in particular) focus their attention and resources on obtaining results, ignoring the fact that all cause entails, aside from the immediate intended effect, several series of consequences, most of which unknown and unintentional. Therefore, it is not surprising that all companies reach a point where they face unexpected events, often highly profiled in the media, which unsettle their current activities or even question their existence, demanding that important decisions (of allocating scarce resources) be taken under strong temporal pressure. These (unavoidable) events form the extremely heterogeneous category of crises (cf. Coman 2009, 13-32). The social phenomenon of crisis has received copious treatment in scholarship. The contributions of reputed authors such as Ian I. Mitroff (1987), William L. Benoit (1997), John J. Burnett (1998), W. Timothy Gheorghe-Ilie FÂRTE 62 Coombs (2004) or Cristina Coman (2009) outline an accurate view on crises concerning definitions, the factors that trigger them, types, analysis models, evolution stages, crisis management plans and crisis communication strategies. Deeming the analytic survey of the aforementioned contributions unnecessary, we note, in the context of the discussed topic – the management of emotions in crisis situations – only a few succinct data. First and foremost, one must take note of the fact that each crisis implies (a) change1, (b) disruption or blockage, (c) excessive and unwanted visibility (or mediatization) (d) scarcity of resources (of time, particularly), (e) uncertainty/ vulnerability and (f) vital decision-making under pressure. Crises can be triggered by factors from within the organization or by certain factors from the environment, such as human/social/ organizational or techno-economical factors. Crisis situations can be ranked and ordered according to several criteria: (a) the degree of danger, (b) the degree of probability, (c) the level of temporal pressure (d) the degree of control over the situation, (e) the number of possible answers to requests from the environment, (f) the presence vs. absence of the intentional dimension, (g) the scale of the impact on the organization etc. (The identification of crisis types allows the efficient allocation of the resources and the fair attribution of responsibilities for the occurrence of crisis situations). The crisis, as well as the crisis management process, comprises several stages. Thus, it is agreed that a crisis successively passes through (a) the incubation phase, (b) the acute phase (c) the chronic phase and (d) the closure phase. On the other hand, the crisis management process would entail the stages of (a) research/ diagnosis/ scanning/ detection, (b) prevention (where possible), (c) control/ planning and objective implementation, (d) return to 'normal' and (e) assessment/ learning/ drawing of useful conclusions for the future. Finally, crisis communication is regarded as synthesis of the following discursive strategies: (a) denial (denial proper and blaming a third party), (b) evasion of responsibility (presenting the action as a response to a challenge, underlining the lack of information or skills, claiming to have been unable to control all environmental parameters, alleging hazard or bad luck and highlighting good intentions), (c) diminishing the negative nature of the action (stressing the positive features, minimizing the negative effects, discriminating from other congeneric actions, approaching the problem 1 Often, current activities and the very existence of an organization are jeopardized by a mood rather than an event. However, in the acute phase (when the crisis is acknowledged) the crisis situation is correlated with a triggering event. Emotion Management in Crisis Situations 63 from a superior plane, attacking the opposite camp and compensation), (d) correction (re-establishing the initial state of things and adoption of a preventive attitude) and (e) mortification (the organization confesses its mistake and apologizes to the public). Entirely justified from a managerial point of view, the aforementioned contributions attribute quite a low importance to the emotional charge of crisis situations. In all fairness, the strategies particular to crisis communication implicitly lead to certain emotions, suggesting their instrumentalization with a view to overcoming the crisis. For instance, the victim compensation strategy supposes compassion, while the mortification strategy, guilt and regret. The emotional terms of the crisis situation, however, deserve a much more analytical approach. If the emotional factors are strategically used only for satisfying one's own interests and if the emotions of the other involved individuals are ignored or disregarded, the crisis situation is not defused, but, on the contrary, is prolonged (often under hidden forms). The most important thing at stake is the identification and management of emotions that signal the observance or the breach of the rules that define the rightful behaviour (in the eyes of the parties involved). The proximity to the rules of rightful behaviour – by countless trials and errors, obviously – constitutes, from our point of view, the royal path to overcoming crisis situations. 3. Emotions as a means of supporting social norms First and foremost, to prevent entering futile distinctions that would make the sophist Prodicos envious, we acknowledge the synonymy of the terms that form the cluster of affective concepts: emotion, passion, feeling, affect and sentiment. Obviously, each term bears a specific connotation, referring, in turn, to the motive that prompts someone to undertake action, to fervour and lack of self-control, to awareness of a sensation, to change and finally, cognitive attitudes (Rorty 2004, 270). Acceptation notwithstanding, we can agree with Alan Turing and Geoffrey Jefferson that emotional experience is a defining criterion that helps distinguish the human being from the machines capable of performing related cognitive tasks. Thus, no machine can experience the pleasure of success, the bitterness of failure, the warmth of praise, the shame of error, the anger or depression caused by the inability to obtain the wished-for thing etc. (Sabini 1998, 4). Emotions are correlated with the individual's convictions, wishes, goals, preoccupations and values (cf. Sabini 1998, 14). They represent the fundamental and universal survival Gheorghe-Ilie FÂRTE 64 kit of vulnerable species, whose existence depends on the maintenance of a fragile balance between the hierarchically constituted power, the mutual dependence between individuals and the relationship of (mis)trust manifest within the species (Rorty 2004, 276). In a similar way to other (human) behaviors, emotions are reactions to certain factors or stimuli. Their specificity is ensured by the following essential traits (Griffiths 2004, 242-244; Rorty 2004, 270-276; Bennett and Bennett 2011): • Emotions provide a first judgment of assessment or appreciation, be it unconscious, involuntary, hasty, incomplete or mistaken; • Emotions draw our attention to certain aspects that are very important for our safety and personal welfare; • Emotions are accompanied by certain physiological changes: accelerated pulse, high blood pressure, panting, pallor etc; • Emotions are simpler than cognitive reactions, but more complex than tropisms, reflexes and homeostatic reactions; • As long as the will is not involved, emotions cannot be considered either good or bad. They are provided with a moral aspect only when we choose to respond in a certain way when we become aware of them; • Through emotions we have an intuition of good and a suspicion of evil. Emotions motivate us to seek good and avoid evil; • Emotions cannot be neither eradicated, nor fully controlled, but they can be guided through the use of reason and will; • Emotions can blind the intellect and debilitate the will ; • As a part of our genetically inherited constitution, our temperament significantly influences our emotional reactions. As we can ascertain, emotions are evasive and ambivalent in nature. They rarely appear isolated and, very often, morph into something different, sometimes their opposites. A stimulus from the environment can trigger different emotional reactions even in the case of the same individual. For this reason it is very difficult to outline a precise and complete picture of human emotions and all the more difficult to pinpoint an infallible mechanism to manage them. From the wealth of human affects, in the context of crisis situations it is worth taking note of social emotions, i.e. emotional reactions to persons who observe and break the social norms. Jon Elster (2004, 152; 2007, 98-99) has surveyed 11 such emotions – arrogance, affection, pride, admiration, gratitude, shame, contempt, hatred, guilt, anger and (Cartesian) indignation – which he correlated with their triggers, as well as the action tendencies they entailed: Emotion Management in Crisis Situations 65 The table of social emotions after Jon Elster Emotion Trigger Action tendencies Arrogance A person assesses their own character positively. Looking down on others. Affection A person assesses somebody else's character positively. Closeness, efforts are made to ingratiate oneself with the liked person. Pride A person assesses their own character positively. (Moderate) self-praise, encouraging the receipt of praise from others. Gratitude A person assesses somebody else's behavior towards them positively. Direct or indirect reciprocity. Admiration A person assesses somebody else's behavior towards a third party positively. Praising the person that is the object of admiration. Shame A person assesses their own character negatively. Isolation, withdrawal from peers, suicide. Contempt A person assesses somebody else's character negatively, deeming it inferior. Ostracization, avoidance. Hatred A person assesses somebody else's character negatively, deeming it (intrinsically) bad. The physical removal of the hated person, the destruction of his or her reputation. Guilt A person assesses their own behavior negatively. Self-punishment, confession, fixing the mistake. Anger A person assesses somebody else's behavior to himself or herself negatively. Revenge (applying the 'eye for an eye' law) Indignation A person assesses somebody else's behavior to a third party negatively. Punishing the person that harms their peers. To these social emotions, envy and jealousy could be added. Envy occurs when a person assesses that somebody else owns an object that he/ she themselves desire (and that he/ she will probably never have) and generates the tendency to destroy the envied object (in accordance to the 'sour grapes' saying). Jealousy is experienced by a person who suspects somebody is trying to deprive him/ her of a personal asset. The jealous person tends to eliminate the suspected person or to destroy the asset that he/ she risks losing. Gheorghe-Ilie FÂRTE 66 All these social emotions can be easily identified in the media. In very many cases, they have had serious consequences for the persons and organizations that mismanaged them. For instance, very likely because of arrogance, former Prime Minister Gordon Brown labelled a British voter2 a 'bigot', while president of Uruguay Jose Mujica called Cristina Kirchner, the president of Argentina,3 an 'old hag'. Mass-media provides evident testimonies of affection and admiration towards Pope Francis4 and of contempt or hatred towards Traian Băsescu5. Former New York governor Eliot Spitzer experienced strong feelings of shame and guilt following his involvement in a prostitution scandal6, while citizens involved in the 'Occupy Wall Street'7 and 'Los indignados'8 movements loudly manifested their feelings of anger, hatred and indignation in the public space. In each of these cases, the negative emotions were directly correlated with the unfolding of a crisis. 4. The essential components of an emotional crisis In an excellent article published in the Management Communication Quarterly – A Framework for the Study of Emotions in Organizational Contexts magazine – Greg Fiebig and Michael Kramer (1998, 537-544) provide us with a precise description of the main components of the emotional experience: (a) expectations, (b) catalysts, (c) awareness, (d) emotion management, (e) communication behavior and (f) impact. The first component – expectations – reunites personal and organizational expectations. Personal expectations are shaped by the parental influence, by socialization practices during childhood, by the assignation of tasks in the family etc. and regard the initiation, the maintenance, the modification and the breaking of social relations, the means of task completion, behavior in work relations etc. Organizational expectations are fixed to the prescribed roles by the employer, roles that 2 http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/election/article-1269486/Election-2010-Gordonrowns-bigoted-woman-insult-Gillian-Duffy.html 3 http://www.dcnews.ro/2013/04/gafa-uriasa-vezi-cine-a-numit-o-pe-lidera-argentineihoasca-batrana/ 4 http://www.thespec.com/news-story/3240715-do-you-have-the-face-of-pope-francis-/ 5 http://adevarul.ro/news/politica/antonescu-nu-simt-ura-traian-basescu-mai-repededispret-respingere-1_50aebd6f7c42d5a6639fc74b/index.html 6 http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2008/03/the-shame-of-el.html 7 http://occupywallst.org/ 8 http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2013/apr/28/spain-indignados-protests-stateofmind Emotion Management in Crisis Situations 67 often limit the range of emotional expressions of employees. (For instance, a necessary condition for the filling of the position of flight attendant is the ability to remain calm during incidents). The catalysts of emotional experiences are the discrepancies that occur between the expectations (personal or organizational) and the experience of the persons concerned proper. Any event can play the part of catalyst of an emotional experience, as long as each of us are simultaneously preoccupied with several aspects and follows multiple goals at the same time. No event can satisfy all our expectations. Of the discrepancies between expectations and reality, some go unnoticed, while others move us at the physiological and cognitive level. The physiological or cognitive modifications are recognized as the manifestation of the presence of emotions. The stronger is an emotion felt, the more probable is its expression. The lack of energy entails a disorderly expression of emotions or, on the contrary, their internalization (in other words, 'privatization'). In an organizational context, employees are encouraged to internalize adequate expression norms of their emotions. By means of semiotic behaviors, people with an emotional experience can choose to sincerely express or to dissemble/ hide their true feelings. Obviously, performance in the communication of emotions is determined by the individual's ability to recognize and verbalize these emotions. The emotional experience is completed by the retroactive loop which consolidates or, conversely, modifies expectations and, consequently, all other components of the affective process. One must note that the emotional experience is not linear. Often, there are gaps in passing from one component to another and, even more often, there is disproportion between accumulations of events and effects. For instance, an employee can stand the overcharging of his job description and salary cuts without a problem, but not having to move from one office to another. 5. Adaptive vs. maladaptive emotional responses Generally, all moderate emotions that bring value to our lives, creating a mood of well-being, can be considered adaptive. On the contrary, all excessively intense emotional reactions, which debilitate our personality in the long run, can be termed maladaptive. As a rule, a maladaptive response is a clue that something needs to be rectified either in the environment, or in the person's inner structure (Bennett and Bennett 2011). Moreover, it signals a deviation from the 'rules of rightful Gheorghe-Ilie FÂRTE 68 behavior' ('to each their own'). Adaptive and maladaptive emotions can be discerned by integrating the answers to the following questions (Bennett and Bennett 2011): • Does the emotional response correspond to the current situation, or was my response too weak or too strong? • Does the emotional reaction help me cope with the situation, or is it rather an impediment or an obstacle? • Does the emotional response affect my liberty of will and selfcontrol? • Are there, in the situation I am dealing with, sources of irritation that replay unpleasant feelings from the past and make me react excessively? • Does my emotional response provide an accurate signal of what I feel towards others, or does it occasion their confusion and rejection? • Am I capable of adjusting my emotions, as well as their forms of expression so that they fit the current situation? • Do I feel burdened and overwhelmed by my emotions and moods? If I am sad, can the others console me? • Do I feel entangled in the web of my own emotions, incapable of expressing them or of making a decision? • Do I experience more often and more intensely emotions that are positive, or rather negative? Given that emotions (a) help us orient in accordance with the rules of rightful behaviour (b) support social norms (c) outline the spontaneous order structures (i.e. social institutions), it seems logical to assume the fact that their recognition, expression and guidance are commonsensical rather than at the level of 'experts in emotional intelligence'. Indeed, reasonable persons (i.e. persons who submit their emotions to reason) dispose of the necessary competence to distinguish and correct maladaptive emotional responses, even during crisis situations. Thus, if we take into account the control questions mentioned above, it is reasonable to catalogue as maladaptive the emotions that (a) appear disproportionate, (b) paralyze or obstruct action, (c) prevent the person from coping with the situation, (d) annihilate or debilitate free will, (e) inflate by contagion with negative emotions from the past, (f) create confusion or rejection in other persons, (g) reject adjustment or adaptation to the context, (h) burden the conscience, (i) are difficult to express and even more difficult to vent in pro-social action and (j) are essentially negative. Once known, they can be avoided or counteracted. (The virtues could be seen as adaptive responses to maladaptive emotional responses, but this is a separate research topic). Emotion Management in Crisis Situations 69 6. Conclusions Regardless of the social sphere in which the crisis makes itself felt, regardless of its type, phase or damage control strategies, the rational control of emotions contributes significantly to overcoming the crisis situation. Beyond the specificities, crises involve digressions form the norms of rightful conduct, breaches of the social norms that support institutions (as spontaneous order structures) and maladaptive reactions to reality. They can be corrected through a good management of emotions, with the caveat that we are not dealing with a problem of knowledge, but rather with one of will and character. All people can identify the adaptive emotional responses to a crisis situation, but only a few prefer them and train assiduously to use them. References BENNETT, Art and BENNETT, Laraine. 2011. The Emotions God Gave You: A Guide for Catholics to Healthy and Holy Living. Frederick (MD): Word Among Us Press. Kindle Edition. BENOIT, William L. 1997. "Image Repair Discourse and Crisis Communication". Public Relations Review 23: 177-186. BURNETT, John J. 1998. "A Strategic Approach To Managing Crises". Public Relations Review 24 (4): 475-88. COMAN, Cristina. 2009. Comunicarea de criză: Tehnici şi strategii. Iaşi: Polirom. COOMBS, W. Timothy. 2004. "Impact of Past Crises on Current Crisis Communication: Insights from Situational Crisis Communication Theory". Journal of Business Communication 41: 265-289. EASTERLY, William. 2011. "Complexity, Spontaneous Order, blah, blah, blah...and Wow." Aid Watch. January 19. ELSTER, John. 2007. Explaining Social Behavior. More Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press ELSTER, Jon. 2004. "Emotion and Action." In Thinking about Feeling: Contemporary Philosopher on Emotions, edited by Robert C. Solomon, 151-162. Cary (NC): Oxford University Press. FÂRTE, Gheorghe-Ilie. 2012. "Some Libertarian Ideas about Human Social Life." Argumentum. Caietele Seminarului de Logică discursivă, Teoria argumentării şi Retorică 10 (2): 7-19. FIEBIG, Greg and KRAMER, Michael. 1998. "A Framework for the Study of Emotions in Organizational Contexts". Management Communication Quarterly 11 (4): 536-572. Gheorghe-Ilie FÂRTE 70 FINEMAN, Stephen. 2000. "Commodifying the Emotionally Intelligent". In Emotion in Organizations, 2nd edition, edited by Stephen Fineman, 101114. London: Sage Publications Inc. GRIFFITHS, Paul E. 1998. What Emotions Really Are: The Problem of Psychological Categories. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. GRIFFITHS, Paul E. 2004. "Is Emotion a Ntural Kind?" In Thinking about Feeling: Contemporary Philosopher on Emotions, edited by Robert C. Solomon, 233-249. Cary (NC): Oxford University Press. GROSS, James J. 2006. Handbook of Emotion Regulation. New York: Guilford Press. HAYEK, F.A. 1968. The Confusion of Language in Political Thought. Tonbridge: The Institute of Economic Affairs. http://aidwatchers.com/2011/01/complexity-spontaneous-order-blahblah-blah-and-wow/ LAZARUS, Richard S. 1991. Emotion and Adaption. Cary (NC): Oxford University Press. MITROFF, Ian I., SHRIVASTAVA, Paul and UDWADIA, Firdaus E. 1987. "Effective Crisis Management". The Academy of Management Executive 1 (4): 283-292. RORTY, Amélie Oksenberg. 2004. "Enough already with 'theories of the emotions'." In Thinking about Feeling: Contemporary Philosopher on Emotions, edited by Robert C. Solomon, 269-278. Cary (NC): Oxford University Press. SABINI, John. 1998. Emotion, Character, and Responsibility. New York: Oxford University Press.

Externalism and a priori knowledge of the world: Why privileged access is not the issue In Dialectica 60:4, 2006 (almost final draft) Maria Lasonen-Aarnio Abstract: I look at incompatibilist arguments aimed at showing that the conjunction of the thesis that a subject has privileged, a priori access to the contents of her own thoughts, on the one hand, and of semantic externalism, on the other, lead to a putatively absurd conclusion, namely, a priori knowledge of the external world. I focus on arguments involving a variety of externalism resulting from the singularity or object-dependence of certain terms such as the demonstrative 'that'. McKinsey argues that incompatibilist arguments employing such externalist theses are at their strongest, and conclusively show that privileged access must be rejected. While I agree on the truth of the relevant externalist theses, I show that all plausible versions of the incompatibilist reductio argument as applied to such theses are fundamentally flawed, for these versions of the argument must make assumptions that lead to putatively absurd knowledge of the external world independently of the thesis of privileged access. 1. Michael McKinsey has argued that semantic externalism is incompatible with the thesis that subjects have privileged, a priori access to the contents of their own thoughts.1 The incompatibility is supposed to result from the fact that the conjunction of the two theses leads to a putatively absurd conclusion, namely, the possibility of a priori knowledge of the external world. The original argument is of the following form, where the proposition that p is object-dependent, and the proposition that E concerns the subject's environment: (1) Suzy can know a priori that she is thinking that p. (2) The proposition that Suzy thinking that p logically implies the proposition that E. 1 McKinsey (1991, 2001, 2002a, 2002b, 2003). 2 Therefore, (3) Suzy can know a priori that E. McKinsey argues that for externalism to be a non-trivial thesis, externalist entailments must hold as a matter of logical or conceptual and not merely metaphysical necessity.2 Given, for instance, that it is metaphysically impossible for anyone to exist without biological parents, being in any mental state will metaphysically entail the existence of an object external to me, namely, my mother.3 But then, McKinsey argues, given the logical entailment in (2), Suzy can just deduce (3) from a premise she knows a priori.4 There are several closure principles that the incompatibilist might rely on to get from the privileged access and externalist premises (1) and (2) to the conclusion (3). Below I subject the candidate closure principles to scrutiny. Though my focus will be on arguments of form (1) – (3) above, I should mention that the incompatibilist reductio argument is sometimes circulated in the following form, which doesn't require externalism to be logically true, though it does require it to be a priori knowable: (1) Suzy can know a priori that she is thinking that p. (2*) Suzy can know a priori that if she is thinking that p, then E. Therefore, (3) Suzy can know a priori that E. 2 McKinsey (1991, 2001, 2002a, 2002b, 2003). 3 McKinsey (2002: 201–202). See Kripke (1972: 112 113) for essentiality of origin. 4 Arguments of this and closely related forms have also been employed, for instance, by Boghossian (1998) and Brown (1998). 3 Again, a closure principle is needed for generating the conclusion of the argument.5 My reason for focusing on McKinsey's version of the incompatibilist argument is that at first sight it seems more resilient to a problem that I raise and that McKinsey himself acknowledges, a problem deriving from the assumption that externalist theses can be known a priori. I will refer to both versions of the reductio argument as 'McKinsey-style incompatibilist arguments'. Recent debates have seen a number of responses to McKinsey-style incompatibilist arguments, but the discussion so far has taken it for granted that if filled in with externalist theses involving appropriately specific environmental entailments and if sound, such arguments do provide interesting, non-trivial reasons for doubting whether the conjunction of semantic externalism and the thesis of privileged access can be retained.6 I will argue that at least many of the incompatibilist arguments on the market, of the above and amended forms, aren't interesting reductio ad absurdums of the conjunction of the two theses in question. The reason for this is that such arguments must rely either on the assumption that externalist theses can be known a priori, or some other assumption that is practically as strong, and this alone, with other plausible assumptions, leads to putatively absurd knowledge of the external world. Hence, an alternative argument with a conclusion of form (3) can be constructed from the ingredients of the original reductio without even relying on the privileged access premise. 5 For this form of the argument, see, for instance, Boghossian (1998: 275) and Brown (1998; 2003; 2004). 6 One main line of attack has been directed at the second premise either by questioning whether externalist theses can be known a priori, or whether externalist theses should be construed as involving logical or conceptual implications (see Gallois and O'Leary Hawthorne (1996), McLaughlin and Tye (1998), McLaughlin (2000: 112), Brown (2004), Brueckner (1998)). Another popular criticism has been to challenge the argument on the grounds that Suzy could not come to know that E by performing the deduction, since the argument exemplifies a failure of warrant transmission (see Davies (2003), Wright (2000), Wright (2003); see also McLaughlin (2003), McKinsey (2003), Brown (2003)). 4 I will focus on incompatibilist arguments involving externalist theses that follow from the object-dependent or singular nature of certain terms or concepts. Many philosophers agree that such terms include at least demonstratives and proper names.7 McKinsey agrees, arguing that the problem of incompatibility is at its sharpest in connection with externalist theses involving such terms.8 For simplicity I will focus on demonstratives. I take there to be very strong support for the claim that demonstratives function as singular terms (not quantifiers) that rigidly designate an object with respect to all possible worlds, and that if a non-referring demonstrative term occurs in a sentence, then that sentence fails to express a proposition.9 However, these claims, and the sort of externalism they support, do not require a directly referential semantics. I leave open the possibility that demonstratives have senses, as long as these senses are 'object-dependent'10: as long as a demonstrative term can have a sense, thereby making a contribution to the proposition expressed by the sentence in which it figures, only if it also has a reference.11 Take, for instance, a case where Suzy has a demonstrative thought about Fred to the effect that he is poisonous. Let (THAT2)12 be the following thesis: (THAT2) The proposition that Suzy is thinking13 that that [Fred]14 is poisonous logically implies the proposition that that [Fred] exists.15 Here is the McKinsey incompatibilist argument, applied to (THAT2): 7 For classic defences, see Kripke (1972) and Kaplan (1989). 8 See, for instance McKinsey (1991). 9 See Kaplan (1989). 10 For object-dependent senses, see, e.g., McDowell (1977, 1984). 11 Hence, I will ignore the possibility of 'gappy' or 'incomplete' propositions. 12 Please see the Glossary for the abbreviations and acronyms used throughout the paper. 13 Let thinking that p be entertaining the content that p, that is, having any mental state with p as its content. 14 I use square brackets merely to indicate which object is being demonstrated. 15 For now I am just following McKinsey in formulating the externalist thesis as involving a logical implication. 5 (THAT1) Suzy can know a priori that she is thinking that that [Fred] is poisonous. (THAT2) The proposition that Suzy is thinking that that [Fred] is poisonous logically implies the proposition that that [Fred] exists. Therefore, (THAT3) Suzy can know a priori that that [Fred] exists. I mentioned above that the second premise is more commonly circulated in the form of a material implication. I shall refer to the following, alternative externalist premise as (THAT2*): (THAT2*) If Suzy is thinking that that [Fred] is poisonous then that [Fred] exists. In this paper I try to undermine the viability of McKinsey-style incompatibilist arguments by establishing two claims: A) Such arguments must either assume that Suzy can have a priori knowledge of externalist theses such as (THAT2) or (THAT2*), or they must assume something that, with some very plausible assumptions, implies this. B) Given the assumption that Suzy can know externalist theses such as (THAT2) or (THAT2*) a priori, the conclusion (3) of the original reductio can be generated without relying on the privileged access premise (1). In order to have an interesting reductio argument of the conjunction of externalism and privileged access, the incompatibilist must tell some additional story about how externalist theses can be known a priori, and in particular of how such knowledge depends on the thesis of privileged access. It is far from obvious how it would go. 6 In §2 I argue for A). In §3 I argue for B): any rationale for saying that Suzy can know an externalist thesis such as (THAT2) or (THAT2*) a priori will also put her into a position to see, a priori, that the thesis in question itself has an externalist entailment, namely, the existence of that (Fred). In the course of my argument I will make use of the following two closure principles. The first states that a priori knowledge is closed under a priori knowable logical implication: Closure under a priori knowable logical implication (CAKL) Necessarily, for any person x and any propositions that p and that q, if x can know a priori that p and x can know a priori that the proposition that p logically implies the proposition that q, then x can know a priori that q. The second states just that a priori knowledge is closed under a priori knowable implication: Closure under a priori knowable implication (CAK) Necessarily, for any person x and any propositions that p and that q, if x can know a priori that p and if x can know a priori that if p then q, then x can know a priori that q. I will bracket worries about formulating closure principles in modal terms. If such formulations prove to be unsuccessful, then friends of closure had better find some alternative way of capturing the intuitions lending support to these principles. But this is irrelevant for my present purposes, since at any point of my argument I only rely on closure principles that the proponent of McKinsey-style incompatibilist arguments needs to assume. 7 2. If, in addition to the privileged access premise, it it is assumed that Suzy can know the externalist thesis (THAT2) a priori, then the conclusion of the incompatibilist reductio follows straightforwardly by an application of closure under a priori knowable logical implication (CAKL). In the alternative form of the argument, if Suzy can know (THAT2*) a priori, then the conclusion follows by an application of (CAK). But for reasons given in §3 and acknowledged by McKinsey, the incompatibilist might not want to make the unconditional assumption that Suzy can know an externalist thesis of either form (THAT2) or (THAT2*) a priori. In brief, the problem is that if a priori knowledge of externalist theses such as (THAT2) or (THAT2*) is assumed, then the putatively absurd conclusion of the reductio appears to follow independently of privileged access. So how might the incompatibilist try to derive the conclusion of the reductio without making the unconditional assumption that Suzy can know (THAT2) a priori?16 The incompatibilist can take one of two alternative routes to the conclusion of the argument.17 One of these doesn't at any step assume a priori knowledge of externalist thesis such as (THAT2); the other assumes such knowledge, but attempts to make it conditional on the truth of the privileged access premise. The first route employs the following closure principle: Closure of a priority under logical implication (CA) Necessarily, for any person x and any propositions that p and that q, if x can know a priori that p, and the proposition that p logically implies the proposition that q, then x can know a priori that q.18 16 I won't discuss the incompatibilist argument employing as its second premise (THAT2*) or some other externalist thesis taking the form of a material implication, since there doesn't seem to be any way of getting the conclusion to follow from the premises without assuming a priori knowledge of (THAT2*). 17 McKinsey (2002a: 208–210). 18 McKinsey (2002a: 207). 8 (CA) asserts that that the possibility of a priori knowledge is closed under logical implication. In other words, Suzy can have a priori knowledge of any of the propositions logically implied by propositions she can know a priori. If (CA) is right, (THAT3) follows from the conjunction of (THAT1) and (THAT2). Note also that (CA) entails (CAKL). The second route to the conclusion (THAT3) relies on (CAK) and the following principle: Partial closure under logical implication (PLC) Necessarily, for any person x and any propositions that p and that q, if x can know a priori that p, and the proposition that p logically implies the proposition that q, then x can know a priori that if p then q.19 Applied to (THAT1) – (THAT3), (PLC) states that if the first, privileged access premise is true – if Suzy can know a priori that she is thinking that that [Fred] is poisonous – then she can know a priori that if she is thinking that that [Fred] is poisonous then that [Fred] exists, which amounts to a priori knowledge of (THAT2*). (CAK) can then be used to derive the conclusion that Suzy can know a priori that that [Fred] exists. An argument relying on (PLC) attempts to give the privileged access premise (THAT1) an essential role by making a priori knowledge of an externalist entailment of form (THAT2*) conditional on its truth. But independently of whether or not (PLC) is well-motivated, it is not a much weaker principle than a principle stating that for any propositions that p and that q, if the proposition that p logically implies the proposition that q, then a subject can know a priori that if p then q. And of course, from this principle it would follow that if 19 McKinsey (2002a: 209). I don't see why McKinsey formulates the consequent of (PLC) as stating that x can know a priori that if p then q, rather than that x can know a priori that the proposition that p logically implies the proposition that q. But this has no implications for my argument. 9 (THAT2), then a subject can know (THAT2*) a priori. With the very plausible assumption that there is at least one proposition that Suzy can know a priori – say, the proposition that 2 + 2 = 4 – the conjunction of (PLC) and (CAK) gives Suzy a priori knowledge of externalist implications. The same holds for (CA). Let me spell this out. Assume that Suzy can have a priori knowledge of at least one proposition, and let this be the proposition that r. In particular, we need the assumption that Suzy can have a priori knowledge of at least one proposition other than the proposition that she is thinking that that is poisonous (since this would entail the truth of the privileged access premise (THAT1)). Assuming that some propositions can be known a priori and that Suzy is a normal human subject, this is a very plausible assumption. Let the proposition that r be the proposition that 2 + 2 = 4. Now, suppose that the proposition that s logically implies the proposition that u. This will mean that it is logically true that if s then u. But a logical truth is logically implied by any proposition whatsoever, including the proposition that r. Hence, The proposition that r logically implies that (if s then u).20 We assumed that Suzy can know a priori that r (that 2 + 2 = 4). By (PLC), it follows that Suzy can know a priori that if r then (if s then u), or r ⊃ (s ⊃ u). Hence, (PLC) validates the following principle: 20 I don't want to assume any system of modal logic for the purposes of this paper. However, by making a few assumptions, we can also show that a logical implication is logically implied by any proposition and hence, that The proposition that r logically implies that (the proposition that s logically implies the proposition that u). First, we need to take the notion of logical implication at play in externalist theses such as (THAT2) to be informal: a proposition P logically implies a Q if and only if in every logically possible world, the material implication if P then Q holds and hence,  (P ⊃ Q). To get the conclusion that a logical implication is logically implied by any proposition, in addition we must assume a system of modal logic such as K4 or S4 in which the accessibility relation is transitive so that for any P,  P is equivalent to   P. Thanks to Tim Williamson for giving me a proof. Any mistakes are due to myself. 10 Necessarily, for any subject x and any propositions that s and that u, if there is some proposition that r such that x can know a priori that r, and if the proposition that s logically implies the proposition that u, then x can know a priori that if r then (if s then u). But now (CAK) validates the following argument: Suzy can know a priori that r. Suzy can know a priori that if r then (if s then u). Therefore, Suzy can know a priori that if s then u. The same conclusion can be derived even more directly from (CA) alone. Replacing 'r' in the above argument by '2 + 2 = 4', 's' by 'Suzy is thinking that that [Fred] is poisonous', and 'u' by 'That [Fred] exists', we get the conclusion: Suzy can know a priori that if Suzy is thinking that that [Fred] is poisonous, then that [Fred] exists. This amounts to a priori knowledge of (THAT2*).21 Let me sum up the lesson. The incompatibilist resorted to (PLC) to avoid assuming that externalist theses such as (THAT2) or (THAT2*) can be known a priori. (PLC), it was hoped, would make the possibility of a priori knowledge of externalist entailments conditional on the privileged access premise. However, (PLC), 21 If we accept the idea that a logical implication is logically implied by any proposition, then by (PLC) and (CAK) we can derive the conclusion: Suzy can know a priori that the proposition that s logically implies the proposition that u. And consequently, Suzy can know a priori that the proposition that she is thinking that that [Fred] is poisonous logically implies the proposition that that [Fred] exists. This is the claim that Suzy can know (THAT2) a priori. 11 (CAK), an externalist thesis such as (THAT2) and the assumption that any subject the incompatibilist argument is supposed to apply to has a priori knowledge of at least one proposition entail (at least) that the subject can know an externalist thesis of form (THAT2*) a priori. The same holds for an argument relying on (CA). In the next section I say why it is so bad for the incompatibilist to assume that Suzy can know externalist theses such as (THAT2*) a priori: I argue that any rationale for allowing Suzy to know (THAT2*) a priori will also allow her to know a priori that if (THAT2*) then that [Fred] exists. But then, I will argue, we don't really need the privileged access premise to arrive at the conclusion of the incompatibilist reductio. 3. In the previous section I argued that the conclusion of McKinsey-style incompatibilist arguments only follows by assuming that the externalist premise can be known a priori, or by resorting to closure principles that entail with some very plausible assumptions that at least an externalist thesis of form (THAT2*) can be known a priori. I will now argue that the conclusion of the incompatibilist argument can be generated independently of the privileged access premise given the assumption that Suzy can know either (THAT2) or (THAT2*) a priori. Recall that externalist theses such as (THAT2) and (THAT2*) are supported by the object-dependence of the content that [Fred] is poisonous – if Suzy is thinking that content, then the demonstrative element that must refer to something. The two theses differ only in how strong the entailment between entertaining an objectdependent thought and the existence of the object the thought is about is. But (THAT2) and (THAT2*) are themselves precisely the sorts of propositions with 12 externalist entailments, as the proposition that [Fred] is poisonous is embedded in both of them.22 Consequently, the considerations supporting (THAT2) also support the following: (*) (THAT2) logically implies the proposition that that [Fred] exists. Similarly, the considerations supporting (THAT2*) can be applied to (THAT2*) itself, and so (**) If (THAT2*), then that [Fred] exists. Now, the problem for the incompatibilist is that there doesn't seem to be any rationale that would allow Suzy to have a priori knowledge of (THAT2) or (THAT2*) but not of (*) or (**). A priori knowledge of (THAT2) or (THAT2*) would have to be based on being able to recognise, a priori, that the proposition that that [Fred] is poisonous is objectdependent – whether this would involve recognising that it is a Russellian proposition with Fred as a constituent, that it has an object-dependent sense thatFRED as a constituent, or something else. But if Suzy could know a priori that the proposition that that [Fred] is poisonous is object-dependent, she should also be able to know a priori that propositions in which it is embedded are object-dependent. (THAT2) and (THAT2*) are precisely such propositions. If Suzy can know both (THAT2) and (*) a priori then she is in a position to know a priori that that [Fred] exists: 22 McKinsey (2002a: 208) points out that such propositions are singular. His reason for denying that propositions such as (THAT2) or (THAT2*) can be known a priori is that such knowledge would require making an empirical assumption about the existence of an external object (in this case Fred), but one cannot know a priori that an externalist object exists. 13 Suzy can know (THAT2) a priori. Suzy can know a priori that (THAT2) logically implies the proposition that that [Fred] exists. Therefore, Suzy can know a priori that that [Fred] exists. The conclusion follows by an application of (CAKL). Hence, the assumption that Suzy can know (THAT2) a priori leads to precisely the sort of a priori knowledge of the environment that the incompatibilist thinks only ensues from the conjunction of privileged access and semantic externalism. Similarly, if Suzy can know (THAT2*) a priori and she can know (**) a priori, then we can construct the following argument: Suzy can know (THAT2*) a priori. Suzy can know a priori that if (THAT2*), then that [Fred] exists. Therefore, Suzy can know a priori that that [Fred] exists. The conclusion of this argument follows by an application of the closure principle (CAK). In the previous section I argued that any McKinsey-style incompatibilist argument – at least any argument so far proposed – must make assumptions that at least imply that Suzy can know (THAT2*) a priori. But if Suzy can know (THAT2*) a priori, she can also know (**) a priori. Then, she can know a priori that that [Fred] exists, which is the conclusion of the original McKinsey-style reductio argument. Nothing so far has been said about whether it is plausible that Suzy could know (THAT2) or (THAT2*) a priori in the first place. The point is simply that the 14 incompatibilist seems committed to the possibility of at least knowing (THAT2*) a priori, and any rationale for allowing Suzy to have a priori knowledge of (THAT2*) would put her into a position to have a priori knowledge of the external world wholly independently of the truth or falsity of the privileged access premise. Given the closure principles he commits himself to, McKinsey is wrong in thinking that the externalist who ascribes to (THAT2) can avoid the conclusion of the incompatibilist argument by giving up privileged access.23 Even if incompatibilists are not warranted in assuming that arguments like (THAT1) – (THAT3) provide interesting reductio ad absurdums of the conjunction of privileged access and semantic externalist, it might still turn out that the putatively absurd conclusion (THAT3) only follows assuming both theses. In particular, it still remains to be seen whether arguments for the a priori knowability of externalist theses make appeal to privileged access. But this places the ball squarely within the court of the incompatibilist. To conclude, setting aside potential problems with the closure principles employed by the incompativilist, my argument leaves open four options (they might not be mutually exclusive): (i) Reject externalism. (ii) Deny that externalist theses such as (THAT2) or (THAT2*) can be known a priori. 23 It is doubtful whether the conclusion I reached concerning incompatibilist arguments such as (THAT1) – (THAT3) applies across the board. For some externalist theses state that it is the possession of a concept by a particular individual that has environmental entailments, and not the objectdependence of that concept. This is true, in particular, of some externalist theses that concern natural kind concepts like water, such as: (WATER2) If Suzy is thinking that water is wet then she has had causal interactions with water. 15 (iii) Argue that a priori knowledge of such externalist theses depends on privileged access in some so far unforeseen way. (iv) Accept that there can be some a priori knowledge of the world. Of these options, I would opt for (iv), as I don't think a priori knowledge of the external world is at all absurd. But that is a topic for another paper. Conclusions I have discussed McKinsey-style incompatibilist arguments purporting to show that either semantic externalism resulting from the singular nature of certain terms or privileged access to mental states must be rejected, as their conjunction leads to the absurd conclusion that it is possible to have a priori knowledge of the external world. I argued, first, that such arguments must make assumptions that are practically as strong as the assumption that it is possible to know externalist theses a priori. Second, I argued that given this assumption, it is rather straightforward to generate the conclusion of the original incompatibilist reductio arguments independently of the privileged access premise. The upshot seems to be that either McKinsey-style reductio arguments rely on false assumptions, or giving up privileged access won't help the semantic externalist avoid a priori knowledge of the world.24 In the latter case, the externalist might seem to be in yet deeper trouble. 24 I am indebted to Tim Williamson for discussions and comments on numerous earlier drafts. I would also like to thank Ville Aarnio, the audience at a Research Seminar in Helsinki in April 2005, Michael McKinsey, and anonymous referees of Dialectica. Most of this paper was written on a Kone Foundation scholarship. 16 Glossary of acronyms and principles: (THAT1) Suzy can know a priori that she is thinking that that [Fred] is poisonous. (THAT2) The proposition that Suzy is thinking that that [Fred] is poisonous logically implies the proposition that that [Fred] exists. (THAT3) Suzy can know a priori that that [Fred] exists. (THAT2*) If Suzy is thinking that that [Fred] is poisonous then that [Fred] exists. (CAKL) Necessarily, for any person x and any propositions that p and that q, if x can know a priori that p and x can know a priori that the proposition that p logically implies the proposition that q, then x can know a priori that q. (CAK) Necessarily, for any person x and any propositions that p and that q, if x can know a priori that p and if x can know a priori that if p then q, then x can know a priori that q. (CA) Necessarily, for any person x and any propositions that p and that q, if x can know a priori that p, and the proposition that p logically implies the proposition that q, then x can know a priori that q. (PLC) Necessarily, for any person x and any propositions that p and that q, if x can know a priori that p, and the proposition that p logically implies the proposition that q, then x can know a priori that if p then q. (*) (THAT2) logically implies the proposition that that [Fred] exists. (**) If (THAT2*), then that [Fred] exists. Bibliography Boghossian, Paul 1998 'What The Externalist Can Know A Priori', in Wright, Smith, and MacDonald (eds.) 1998, pp. 271–284. Brown, Jessica 1998 'The Incompatibility of Anti-Individualism and Privileged Access' in Ludlow and Martin (eds.) 1998. 2003 'The Reductio Argument and Transmission of Warrant' in Nuccettelli (ed.) 2003, pp. 117–131. 2004 Anti-Individualism and Knowledge, Cambridge, MA & London, England: MIT Press. Brueckner, Anthony 1998 'What an Anti-Individualist Knows A Priori', in in Ludlow and Martin (eds.) 1998, pp. 197–207. Davies, Martin 17 2003 'The Problem of Armchair Knowledge', in Nuccettelli (ed.) 2003, pp. 23–57. Gallois, André and O'Leary-Hawthorne, John 1996 'Externalism and Scepticism', Philosophical Studies 81, pp. 1–26. Kaplan, David 1989 'Demonstratives', in Themes from Kaplan, Almog, J., Kaplan, D., Perry, J. & Wettstein, H. (eds.), New York & Oxford: oxford University Press, pp. 481–563. Kripke, Saul 1972 Naming and Necessity, Oxford: Blackwell. Ludlow, Peter and Martin, Norah (eds.) 1998 Externalism and Self-Knowledge, CSLI Publications. McDowell, John 1977 'On the Sense and Reference of a Proper Name', in Mind, Vol. 86, No. 342, pp. 159–185. 1984 'De Re Senses', The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 34, No. 136, pp. 283 – 294. McKinsey, Michael 1991 'Anti-Individualism and Privileged Access' Analysis 51, pp. 9-16. 2001 'The Semantic Basis of Externalism', in Meaning and Truth, J. Campbell, M. O. Rourke and D. Shier (eds.), New York: Seven Bridge's Press, pp. 34–52. 2002a 'Forms of Externalism and Privileged Access', Philosophical Perspectives, 16, Mind and Language, pp. 199-225. 2002b 'On Knowing Our Own Minds', The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 52, No. 206, pp. 107–116. 2003 'Transmission of Warrant and Closure of Apriority', in Nuccetelli (ed.) 2003, pp. 97–117. McLaughlin, Brian 2000 'Self-Knowledge, Externalism, and Skepticism', in The Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume LXXIV, pp. 93-117. 2003 'McKinsey's Challenge, Warrant Transmission, and Scepticism', in Nuccetelli (ed.) 2003, pp. 79–97. McLaughlin, Brian and Tye, Michael 1998 'Externalism, Twin Earth, and Self-Knowledge', in Wright, Smith and Macdonald (eds.) 1998, pp. 285-321. Nuccetelli, Susan (ed.) 2003 New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge, Cambridge, MA & London, England: MIT Press. Wright, Crispin; Smith, Barry C.; Macdonald, Cynthia, (eds.) 1998 Knowing Our Own Minds, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Wright, Crispin 2000 'Cogency and Question-Begging', Philosophical Issues 10, pp. 140–164. 2003 'Some Reflections on the Acquisition of Warrant by Inference', in Nuccettelli (ed.) 2003: 79–97.

POSTData 23, No 2, EL GOBIERNO SUBLIME Y EL GOBIERNO AMABLE. UN CRUCE ENTRE LA TEORÍA ESTÉTICA Y POLÍTICA EN LA OBRA DE EDMUND BURKE por Fabricio E. Castro* El político y pensador británico Edmund Burke (1729-1797) es considerado el padre del conservadorismo moderno, cuyo nacimiento se enmarca en el contexto de la Revolución Francesa de 1789. La manualística sobre el pensamiento conservador lo coloca en un lugar eminente de la historia de la teoría política, pues Burke habría inaugurado un novedoso modo de pensar a partir de sus críticas a la Asamblea Nacional revolucionaria (Nisbet 1986, Harbour 1969, Viereck 1962). En 1790, nuestro autor presenta sus Reflexiones sobre la revolución en Francia, un largo texto en forma de epístola escrito a un colega francés en el que revaloriza el saber práctico de la política y la función de los hábitos y los prejuicios para la constitución de un orden social, frente a la pretensiones abstractas y ahistóricas emanadas de la Declaración de los derechos del hombre. Sus posiciones tendrán una enorme repercusión sobre otros conservadorismos europeos, convirtiéndose en una fundamental base ideológica de la restauración1. No obstante, la carrera intelectual de Burke se inicia en realidad varias décadas atrás de sus Reflexiones..., con un importante ensayo que devendrá un clásico para la teoría estética, Indagación filosófica sobre el origen de nuestras ideas acerca de lo sublime y de lo bello, publicado en 17572. En este tratado, expone * Conicet, Instituto de Investigaciones Gino Germani, Universidad de Buenos Aires, Argentina. E-mail: [email protected]. 1 Para profundizar en la influencia de Burke sobre el romanticismo alemán, ver Raynaud (1989) y Heller (1930), y sobre su recepción en los contrarrevolucionarios franceses, ver Draus (1989). 2 Por esos años, también publica un texto satírico contra Bolingbroke: Vindicación de la sociedad natural, escrito de difícil lectura, pues como destaca Pagano (2009) en su presentación del texto, es difícil distinguir cuáles son las ideas de Burke y cuáles las que combate. POSTData 23, No2, Oct./2018-Mar./2019, ISSN 1515-209X, (págs. 421-451) postdata 23 2c.pmd 12/11/2018, 19:17421 422 una novedosa distinción, aunque no incompatibilidad, entre la noción de belleza y la de lo sublime, a la vez que describe su presencia en los objetos a partir de las características que éstos presentan, para así observar cuáles de ellos desatan las ideas de lo bello o de lo sublime en los observadores. El texto es una referencia ineludible para la historia de las ideas estéticas, encumbrando a su tratado como uno de los más importantes de la época (Bozal 2000). Posteriormente a la aparición de su Indagación..., la intención del autor de continuar una carrera literaria se ve truncada por su acercamiento a la política, al interior de la facción Whig. A partir de allí, ejercerá una abundante tarea de polemista mediante sucesivas intervenciones parlamentarias ulteriormente editadas como discursos3. Es decir que entre la teoría estética de Burke y sus consideraciones sobre la Revolución Francesa median un conjunto de alocuciones que evidencian preocupaciones políticas constantes y cuya relevancia posterior lo convertirán en un autor de fuste para la tradición de las ideas políticas. La desestimación de la estética burkeana Entre estos dos textos, la Indagación... de 1757 y las Reflexiones... de 1790 pareciera existir un consenso acerca de la incompatibilidad entre ambos, pues sus temáticas no serían conciliables. Tal es así, que podría realizarse una distinción entre un Burke estético, competente para la disciplina estética y un Burke político, exclusivo de la teoría política. Esta duplicación surge de considerar con estricta separación a dos esferas de las ciencias humanas, a tal punto que sería imposible intentar un cruce. Cada disciplina lee al Burke que le corresponde a su campo de estudio, sin que sea posible establecer alguna vinculación entre ellos, al menos para rescatar alguna lección que acreciente nuestro conocimiento sobre cualquiera de las dos facetas del irlandés. Además, la ausencia de trabajos burkeanos en teoría estética a partir de 1760 refuerza la división, dado que podría pensarse que el autor abandona finalmente dicha disciplina en favor de la política parlamentaria, como una 3 Entre ellos destacan el Discurso a los electores de Bristol de 1774, de notoria influencia para la teoría de la representación política, y su Discurso sobre la conciliación con América, escrito un año después y en el cual reivindica los reclamos de las colonias norteamericanas ante la monarquía inglesa. Fabricio E. Castro postdata 23 2c.pmd 12/11/2018, 19:17422 423 POSTData 23, No 2, etapa superada, dejando atrás las conclusiones a las que allí arribó, bajo la excusa de que pertenecerían a un interés del pasado. Al respecto, Vicente Herrero (1996: 9), quien introduce una compilación de escritos políticos de Burke, se limita a mencionar su obra estética como un dato biográfico sin demasiada importancia: "la Investigación sobre el origen de nuestras ideas acerca de lo bello y lo sublime no ha sido considerada generalmente como obra de primera magnitud, pero tiene importancia en la historia de las ideas estéticas por haber influido directamente en Lessing, que la considera como la más valiosa de las obras contemporáneas acerca de la materia". Del mismo modo, para el prologuista Carlos Mellizo (2013: 8) "Poco antes [de 1757] habían visto la luz sus dos primeros libros: una obra satírica (...) y un tratado de estética (...) Pero fue en la década de los sesenta cuando comenzó a establecer su carrera política en Londres". Es decir, Burke habría abandonado el campo de la estética apenas logró insertarse en los avatares políticos de su tiempo. El Burke estético parece agotarse en un solo libro, finalizar alrededor de 1760 y preceder al Burke político. Por su parte, Macpherson es especialmente enfático en reproducir la división de la que hemos dado cuenta: "La teoría de la estética presentada en Lo sublime y lo Bello es de escaso interés teórico. No tiene ninguna dimensión moral (...) Puede decirse que da testimonio de la naturaleza empírica de la mente de Burke, pero no une lo empírico a lo moral" (1984: 38). Unas consideraciones primarias sobre esta intervención. La teoría política burkeana es profundamente moral, en cuanto a que el orden político no puede ser disociado de una ética universal de la que ese orden debe dar cuenta, ya que para lograr la estabilidad social es necesario apaciguar las pasiones siempre destructivas de los hombres. Es por eso que para nuestro comentador, la aparente ausencia de reflexiones morales en los escritos estéticos de Burke inhabilitan toda relación con lo político. Distinto es el punto de vista de Strauss, para quien la Indagación... es precisamente la única obra teórica del autor. En ella, se observa la misma rivalidad filosófica que años después impulsará a Burke contra los revolucionarios franceses, pues allí recategorizará a la belleza por fuera de la noción de perfección, de origen platónico4, evitando definir de este modo "la belleza 4 Recordemos que en el momento en que Burke escribe, una de las escuelas estéticas británicas en boga era la de los denominados platónicos de Cambridge o los intuicionistas, siendo Shaftesbury el de mayor renombre (Bozal 2000, Murcia Serrano 2009). El gobierno sublime y el gobierno amable... postdata 23 2c.pmd 12/11/2018, 19:17423 424 visible o sensible a la luz de la belleza intelectual" (2013: 338). Por lo tanto, el pensamiento de Burke se unifica en la crítica a la razón, hilo conductor de raíz epistemológica que opera en la base de sus ideas. En estética, los platónicos, y en política, los revolucionarios; ambos forman parte de la misma lógica de atribuir a la razón una capacidad final para valorar lo real. En trabajos contemporáneos, existen algunas referencias que nos resultan de interés, aunque no siempre con el detalle necesario para desplegar acabadamente una hipótesis. La mayor parte de las veces, las intervenciones que logran unir las dos teorías limitan su aporte a señalar el carácter sublime que tiene para Burke la Revolución Francesa. Es el caso de Adánez (2008: 7-8), quien se vale de la idea burkeana de lo sublime para caracterizar a la Revolución Francesa como aquel suceso histórico que brinda "una experiencia falsa, engañosa de lo sublime" debido a su pretensión de trastocar todo el cuerpo social. Mayor despliegue realiza Diez Álvarez, cuya lectura hace foco en la distinción, presente en la obra de Burke, entre Inglaterra y la Francia revolucionaria en términos estéticos: "El carácter sublime de la Revolución es contestado por Burke, que no oculta su asombro ante ella, enfatizando la belleza de la identidad histórica y constitucional de su país" (2007: 177)5. El intento del parlamentario irlandés tiene como meta evitar "sucumbir a la fascinación que ejerce lo sublime" (2007: 189), o con otras palabras, a la sorpresa y magnificencia de la revolución. Finalmente, desde la teoría estética, Scheck (2009), sin dar mayores detalles, reconoce los corolarios políticos presentes en nuestro autor al atribuirle a lo sublime una utilidad descriptiva más allá del terreno artístico. A medida que desarrollemos nuestra posición, quedará clara nuestra diferencia con los argumentos de los autores anteriores, aunque coincidimos respecto a la intención de rescatar la utilidad de la obra estética de Burke. En términos generales, refutar la radicalidad de la suposición de Macpherson es uno de los objetivos principales de este trabajo, pues ésta es la posición más frecuente, ya sea por omisión o por conclusión. 5 En un libro posterior y exclusivamente dedicado a Burke, Diez Álvarez (2010), llamativamente, no recupera ninguna referencia a la relación entre lo sublime y lo bello aplicado a la política. Fabricio E. Castro postdata 23 2c.pmd 12/11/2018, 19:17424 425 POSTData 23, No 2, Hipótesis de trabajo Una vez que nos adentramos en la obra estética de Edmund Burke, sorprende todavía más la falta de atención dada por la teoría política a la Indagación... Allí encontramos varios apartados cuya temática es netamente política. En especial, hay un espacio dedicado al poder (Punto V de la parte II6), con menciones al poder político y religioso. Aparecen tópicos relativos al temor de Dios, al poder de las religiones para dominar a los hombres y hasta se traza una relación entre el gobierno despótico y lo sublime. Todo esto autoriza al menos a poner entre paréntesis las afirmaciones (o las omisiones) de nuestros comentadores y nos habilita a regresar al texto para realizar un análisis más profundo. En definitiva, la Indagación... es algo más que una obra sobre la belleza. Es un tratado sobre las pasiones y los efectos que los objetos o los hechos de cualquier naturaleza producen en los hombres. Si adscribimos a la afirmación de que detrás de toda ideología política existe un fundamento antropológico (Schmitt 1991) y si la Indagación... es más que un texto sobre el arte, entonces nos interesará especialmente analizar la Indagación... y las Reflexiones... para observar si acaso es posible extraer lecciones políticas de la estética burkeana que puedan aumentar nuestra comprensión sobre sus ideas en esta materia. Tal vez, incluso lo inverso sea posible: observar si en su tratamiento sobre la revolución pueden elaborarse conclusiones que faciliten entender al Burke estético. Nuestras hipótesis pueden resumirse en tres pasos. En primer lugar, la sospecha de que la desestimación de Macpherson es incorrecta, puesto que en la obra de Burke podemos encontrar que una de las características intrínsecas a las instituciones de gobierno es precisamente lo sublime. En segundo lugar, nuestra misión será comprobar cómo para Burke la autoridad política tiene la tarea inexcusable de suscitar la idea de lo sublime en los súbditos, como un modo de lograr la obediencia política. Es más, incluso es factible decir que si un gobierno no logra ese efecto, en verdad no gobierna. Por último, si estas tesis son ciertas, será posible contrastar la relación que tejen con lo sublime los gobiernos despóticos y los moderados. Nuestro argumento sostiene que a pesar de presentarse en ambos casos, la aplicación directa del Terror en los despotismos borra la percepción de lo sublime para 6 En la edición consultada, la ubicación está mal indicada. La sección relativa al poder pertenece correctamente al apartado VI de la segunda parte. El gobierno sublime y el gobierno amable... postdata 23 2c.pmd 12/11/2018, 19:17425 426 trocarlo en dolor-terror sin la mediación exigida por dicha noción. Este es el caso de la Revolución Francesa. Como contrapartida, en los regímenes moderados, un gobierno debe ser capaz de suscitar la belleza para matizar el efecto de lo sublime. Es decir, un buen gobierno debe combinar ambas categorías. La monarquía constitucional inglesa es aquí el modelo. Para resumir nuestro punto de vista, diremos que: 1) La Indagación... es una obra esencial para la teoría política de Burke, 2) que la sublimidad es una condición inevitable para toda clase de gobierno y, finalmente, 3) que es posible distinguir entre gobiernos moderados y despóticos a partir del uso que éstos hagan de las ideas de lo bello y lo sublime. Con estas tres hipótesis, evidenciaremos que los conceptos estéticos burkeanos aportan lecciones respecto a cuáles son los elementos necesarios de una obediencia política sólida de los súbditos/ciudadanos. Este aspecto es central para la legitimidad política, y a su vez permitirá distinguir un componente propio de los gobiernos despóticos y de los moderados, pues si ambos son sublimes, no lo son del mismo modo. Con el aporte proporcionado por las Reflexiones..., puede ilustrarse esta clasificación a través del elogio de Burke al sistema inglés (gobierno moderado) junto con sus opiniones negativas acerca de la Revolución Francesa (gobierno despótico). Algunas aclaraciones. Naturalmente, no sostenemos la existencia de puentes evidentes entre los dos textos. Burke no se refiere explícitamente a la Indagación... en sus textos políticos. Sin embargo, creemos que no puede desestimarse tan sencillamente su teoría estética para una comprensión de sus ideas políticas. Para probarlo, en los apartados siguientes nos dedicaremos a reconstruir las nociones de lo sublime y lo bello, así como los objetos a los que se aplica, con especial atención a la relación con el poder. Posteriormente, en una segunda etapa, sumaremos las Reflexiones... para observar cómo se comporta un gobierno despótico frente a uno moderado a partir de lo trabajado en la parte inicial. En la sección final, intentaremos a modo de cierre compilar las respuestas a las que habremos arribado. La teoría estética de Edmund Burke El interés de Burke concerniente a lo sublime no es casual, muy por el contrario, se inserta en un contexto particular de la historia de las ideas estéticas. De acuerdo con Pérez Carreño (2000), en el transcurso del siglo Fabricio E. Castro postdata 23 2c.pmd 12/11/2018, 19:17426 427 POSTData 23, No 2, XVIII se producen importantes cambios en el modo de concebir la noción de belleza, cuyo centro es el proceso de subjetivización del enfoque estético. Lo dicho, no significa otra cosa más que poner el acento menos en los objetos y más en el sujeto que los contempla, para estudiar cuáles son las reacciones y las pasiones provocadas. De este modo, las reflexiones se distancian del objetivismo de tradición platónica por el cual la belleza era un concepto universal imputable a un objeto, si éste se adecuaba exclusivamente a unos parámetros estables y puros. Lo bello es para el siglo XVIII británico un sentimiento, un sentir espontáneo e inmediato, y por lo tanto no mediado por el entendimiento o la razón, producido por ciertos estímulos externos sobre el sujeto, y de ahí que la estética del período se vuelva empirista. Tanto Addison, Hutcheson, Hume como el propio Burke, todos pensadores destacados en esta materia, repartirán sus objetos de interés en problemas tales como el del gusto, lo sublime y lo pintoresco, tres categorías igualmente referidas al observador. Contra este fondo debe entenderse la preocupación de Burke por la idea de lo sublime. En los párrafos que siguen, esbozaremos una breve reconstrucción de los principales argumentos de su estética expuestos en el texto de 1757, central para nuestras observaciones posteriores. De acuerdo con Burke (2001), los seres humanos pueden sentir placer y dolor, entendidos como ideas simples que, por serlo, son recibidas a través de los sentidos. Distanciándose de otras concepciones que no menciona, Burke intenta justificar la independencia del uno con respecto al otro. Ni el placer tiene que ver con el dolor, ni viceversa. Una disminución del placer no es equivalente al dolor, ni una reducción del dolor proporciona placer. En los hombres, la indiferencia es el estado normal, roto una vez introducido un estímulo ocasionado por un objeto y cuya consecuencia puede ser el placer o el dolor. Ambas ideas tienen gradaciones o, como las denomina Burke, modificaciones, surgidas de los matices que dan lugar a un efecto de menor intensidad, exigiendo por ello una diferenciación conceptual. Así nacen el pesar, como remoción del placer y modificación del dolor, y el deleite como sustracción del dolor y modificación del placer. El pesar y el deleite se parecen al dolor y al placer sin llegar a serlo, pues nacen de la sustracción de la idea opuesta. Con esto en mente, Burke destaca la existencia de dos aspectos claves que habilitan la clasificación de las ideas que causan impresión en los hom- El gobierno sublime y el gobierno amable... postdata 23 2c.pmd 12/11/2018, 19:17427 428 bres. El primero de ellos se deriva del dolor y de los peligros relativos a la autoconservación. Generan miedo, evocan la representación de la muerte y de lo doloroso. Las pasiones de la autoconservación son las más fuertes de todas, sobre todo si recordamos que para Burke el dolor y el placer no se hallan al mismo nivel, sino que tanto en el extremo como en sus decantaciones el primero le gana al segundo7. En otras palabras, sufrir el máximo dolor posible es mayor al placer más alto experimentado. A partir de estas consideraciones (que el dolor es siempre mayor que el placer, que las pasiones de la autoconservación son las más intensas), se levanta la idea8 de lo sublime, central en su trabajo estético y fundamental para la argumentación que desplegaremos en este escrito. Antes de profundizar en la noción de lo sublime, debemos completar el esquema de las pasiones presentado por Burke. El autor clasifica a las pasiones que pertenecen a la sociedad distinguiéndolas de las que atañen a la autoconservación. Dentro de las pasiones sociales, es decir, de aquellas que invitan al agrupamiento, nos interesa especialmente anotar una de ellas: la simpatía. Es social porque es definida como aquella capacidad para ponerse en el lugar del otro, lo que explica, según Burke, que experimentemos deleite en la desgracia de los demás9. Así expresado, podría parecer una cualidad 7 Las palabras utilizadas por Burke en su construcción conceptual proceden del espíritu filosófico de su época, marcado por el empirismo inglés. En su tratado, el autor evita definir gran parte de estos términos, probablemente por suponerlos conocidos. Tampoco es claro quién o quiénes son sus influencias más importantes, aunque es posible que su mayor referente sea John Locke, y no David Hume, contemporáneo suyo (Gras Balaguer 2001). Con todo, su razonamiento sigue la premisa básica del empirismo clásico: la experiencia es la fuente de todo conocimiento. El contacto con el mundo exterior a través de los sentidos causa impresiones en la mente llamadas ideas simples. Vinculadas a éstas se hallan las pasiones, emociones o afecciones, términos que Burke parece no distinguir. Por ejemplo, la idea de dolor trae consigo emociones relacionadas con el horror o el miedo. 8 Lo sublime y lo bello son ideas porque se derivan de una experiencia relativa a un objeto o un hecho (artístico o no) que produce una reacción en la mente de los hombres. Es decir, el contacto con el mundo empírico suscita o desata, si el objeto efectivamente posee las propiedades correctas, la idea simple sublime o la idea simple belleza y sus correspondientes emociones: miedo, terror, amor, etc. 9 "la simpatía [sympathy] debe considerarse como una especie de sustitución, por la que se nos coloca en el lugar de otro hombre, y nos vemos afectados, en muchos aspectos, al igual que él" (Burke 2001: 33). La simpatía refiere a una situación ajena de placer o de dolor, por lo que puede ser una fuente tanto de lo sublime como de lo bello. Fabricio E. Castro postdata 23 2c.pmd 12/11/2018, 19:17428 429 POSTData 23, No 2, perversa. Sin embargo, nos fue otorgada por Dios, puesto que la posibilidad de ponerse en el lugar de los demás y el deleite asociado a la desgracia ajena permiten la proximidad con el afectado. Caso contrario, si produjera repulsión, entonces no existiría ayuda ni consuelo porque ningún individuo podría siquiera arrimarse a un entorno miserable. El placer y el dolor, el deleite, las pasiones de la autoconservación y la simpatía son los primeros tópicos necesarios para abordar el problema de lo sublime. Nuestra intención es proporcionar un breve esquema para disponer los elementos de la teoría estética burkeana. Las fuentes de lo sublime Como hemos visto, lo sublime es uno de los problemas abordados por la estética empirista británica. Pero este abordaje también tuvo su historia particular, pues el interés sobre esta categoría emerge durante el siglo XVIII luego de que Nicolás Boileau-Despréaux tradujera al francés un viejo tratado medieval atribuido a Dionysius Longinus, con gran éxito. Las reediciones y traducciones se incrementaron y se extendieron especialmente a Gran Bretaña y Alemania, donde el problema de lo sublime alcanzó a importantes pensadores, desde Hume, el mismo Burke, hasta Kant. El concepto fue mutando en manos de los autores modernos, quienes ampliaron su significado, inicialmente limitado por Longinus a la retórica, para extenderlo a otros campos, incluso potencialmente más allá de la estética. (Pérez Carreño 2000, Scheck 2009). Analicemos las novedosas palabras de Burke en relación a lo sublime: "todo lo que resulta adecuado para excitar las ideas de dolor [pain] y peligro [danger], es decir, todo lo que es de algún modo terrible [terrible], o se relaciona con objetos terribles, o actúa de manera análoga al terror [terror], es una fuente de lo sublime [sublime]10; esto es, produce la emoción más fuerte que la mente es capaz de sentir" (2001: 29). Lo sublime se asocia a cierta intensidad. Las evocaciones que provoca en los hombres se emparentan con el miedo, el terror y la posibilidad de la muerte. Todas estas son fuentes de lo sublime y de ahí que nuestro autor lo asimile a la autoconservación. Su fortaleza como idea resulta de la superioridad del dolor respecto del placer. 10 Los términos en su idioma original están tomados de la edición en inglés de la Indagación... Ver Burke (1856). Para esta cita en particular, ver Burke (1856: 51). El gobierno sublime y el gobierno amable... postdata 23 2c.pmd 12/11/2018, 19:17429 430 A su vez, el temor o el miedo [fear] es definido como la "percepción del dolor o de la muerte, [que] actúa de un modo que parece verdadero dolor" (Burke 2001: 42, cursivas nuestras), convirtiéndose así en una fuente predominante de lo sublime11. A su vez, lo sublime puede generar asombro [astonishment]12, y en un nivel inferior, admiración, reverencia y respeto, dado que toda fuerza superior induce al temor porque cualquier fuerza capaz de hacernos daño es mayor a nosotros y representa un riesgo que desata el miedo y el horror, ambos propios de la experiencia sublime. Anclado en estas definiciones, Burke prosigue indagando acerca de cuáles son las fuentes de lo sublime. Más precisamente, se interesará por describir las características de aquellos entes u objetos que pueden desatar en el hombre la idea de lo sublime. Una de las que más nos interesan tendrá que ver con el poder, al que dedicaremos el apartado siguiente. Por el momento, baste decir que todo poder superior, toda fuerza ubicada por encima de las capacidades del observador da cuenta de una superioridad compatible con la evocación sublime. Esto incluirá al poder político (sobre todo despótico, pero no únicamente) y al Dios de cualquier religión, en virtud de que poseen una fuerza pasible de generar asombro, temor, reverencia, u otros derivados. En tanto lo sublime es una idea, existen propiedades de los objetos que pueden suscitarlo a través de los sentidos, de un modo simple e inmediato. Varias de ellas son también utilizadas por el poder político. Burke las distingue de acuerdo con sus efectos sobre cada uno de los cinco sentidos. A modo de ejemplo, se incluyen la oscuridad, la vastedad, la grandeza de dimensiones, aquello de colores fuertes, entre otras. Asimismo, Burke destaca los sonidos fuertes y bruscos, los gritos de los animales, los sonidos bajos y susurrantes, los olores fuertes y los sabores agrios, cuya intensidad son condición de posibilidad para el efecto sublime. Una aclaración importante a retener en relación a lo observado es la advertencia que realiza Burke en diversos pasajes de su Indagación... acerca de la diferencia entre lo sublime y el dolor real. Aclara el autor que "el terror 11 "Es imposible mirar algo que puede ser peligroso, como insignificante o despreciable" (Burke 2001: 42). Para Burke, tenemos miedo de aquello que puede suponer un riesgo para nosotros. Nada riesgoso para nuestro bienestar es indiferente, lo que nos da una dimensión de la potencia de lo sublime. 12 El asombro es uno de los grados más altos correspondientes a lo sublime. Burke (2001:42) lo define como "aquel estado del alma, en el que todos sus movimientos se suspenden con cierto grado de horror". Fabricio E. Castro postdata 23 2c.pmd 12/11/2018, 19:17430 431 POSTData 23, No 2, es una pasión que siempre produce deleite cuando no aprieta demasiado" (2001: 35), porque "Cuando el peligro o el dolor acosan demasiado, no pueden dar ningún deleite13, y son sencillamente terribles; pero, a ciertas distancias y con ligeras modificaciones, pueden ser y son deliciosos, como experimentamos todos los días" (2001: 29). Es necesaria una mínima distancia, un cierto alejamiento del dolor real. Este padecimiento establece un límite para la figura de lo sublime, que no deja de ser una representación, una idea relativa a la percepción de cierto peligro que, de concretarse efectivamente, no es más que dolor. Dicho esto, estamos en condiciones de estabilizar el concepto. De acuerdo con Bozal (2000) y Scheck (2009, 2012), lo sublime es una forma de deleite frente a lo doloroso, a lo que nos provoca temor o es de algún modo terrible. Pero la experiencia de la sublimidad no se da bajo cualquier condición. Es esencial lo que estos autores llaman distancia estética, que significa el resguardo necesario del observador para deleitarse con lo sublime. El dolor directo y el peligro probable eliminan la posibilidad de lo sublime, para convertirse en algo que hace imposible el deleite. En otras palabras, es condición imprescindible ser un espectador del hecho terrible. Por ejemplo, observar un instrumento de tortura puede producir el efecto de la sublimidad, pero no ser torturado. El grito furioso de un animal feroz también puede evocar lo sublime, jamás el ataque de éste sobre nosotros. Pero no cualquier espectador es válido. La contracara de la distancia estética es la simpatía. Para adquirir el deleite de la situación terrible, lo sublime debe producir una sensación similar a la del afectado. Es decir, debemos simpatizar con el objeto o el hecho, hasta el punto en que no sea dañino. Debemos por lo tanto ser espectadores no indiferentes, dotados de la capacidad de "ponernos en el lugar del otro y sentirnos afectados por el sufrimiento ajeno, pero distinguiéndolo del propio" (Scheck 2013: 119). Asimismo, otro recurso central de lo sublime se cifra en la idea de fuerza. El temor/terror es desatado principalmente por el dominio de algo o alguien sobre nosotros. Este será el caso del poder, como veremos. Pero si ese poder se aplica contra nosotros ya no invita a ninguna sensación relativa a lo sublime y es directamente violencia. 13 Recordemos que el deleite es "la sensación que acompaña la remoción de dolor o peligro" (Burke 2001: 27) y es necesario distinguirlo del simple placer porque el deleite no es más que un placer relacionado con el dolor. El gobierno sublime y el gobierno amable... postdata 23 2c.pmd 12/11/2018, 19:17431 432 En suma, la distancia estética, el espectador no indiferente y toda forma de poder son tres nociones ilustrativas vinculadas a la posibilidad del deleite surgida de lo horroroso, que hemos denominado lo sublime. A su vez, los objetos o los hechos deben cumplir con ciertas propiedades para dar lugar a este preciado efecto, relativo a cualidades privativas. En contraste, pero no en oposición a lo anterior, encontramos a la idea de belleza [beauty]. Las fuentes de la belleza gozan de atributos que lejos de ser negativos como en el caso de lo sublime (oscuridad, grandeza, superioridad, fuerza) son más bien positivos. Lo delicado, lo suave, lo gradual, lo de colores opacos; en suma, las "cualidades de los cuerpos, por las que éstos causan amor" (Burke 2001: 67) son las específicamente bellas. Con todo, el contraste evidente entre la belleza y lo sublime no debe entenderse como oposición. No son incompatibles e incluso pueden coexistir en un mismo objeto. Así como no son opuestos, tampoco van necesariamente juntos. Por lo tanto, no es lo sublime la contracara de lo bello, sino la fealdad [ugliness]. De ésta última, debe decirse que también puede pertenecer a un objeto evocador de lo sublime. Lo bello y lo sublime no son más que resultados derivados de fuentes diferentes, asociados en sus fundamentos al placer y al dolor, mientras que la fealdad está compuesta de las cualidades contrarias a las señaladas sobre la belleza. Para acercarnos todavía más a nuestro objeto de estudio específico, en el apartado siguiente nos concentraremos en la relación entre el poder y lo sublime, explicado con algo de detalle por Burke en su Indagación... El poder político de lo sublime En la sección VI de la segunda parte de la Indagación..., Burke se detiene en la relación existente entre lo sublime y el poder. El argumento para justificar este tratamiento es el siguiente: el poder es una modificación del dolor porque se deriva de un poder superior ejercido sobre uno inferior. El objeto afectado se atemoriza frente al peligro del poder de quien es más fuerte. La consecuencia es el temor/terror de enfrentarse ante una fuerza imposible de contrarrestar. Por ejemplo, la contemplación de un animal peligroso suscita enseguida la fantasía de un posible ataque, temor resultante de la proyectada incapacidad del sujeto de oponerle una reacción equivalente. Recordemos lo citado más arriba: "Es imposible mirar Fabricio E. Castro postdata 23 2c.pmd 12/11/2018, 19:17432 433 POSTData 23, No 2, algo que puede ser peligroso, como insignificante o despreciable" (Burke 2001: 42)14. Por lo tanto, el poder entendido como fuerza es asimilado a la percepción acerca de la incapacidad de dominar a algo o a alguien, a la imposibilidad de someter aquello cuya fuerza es superior. Dicha situación es una fuente extraordinaria de lo sublime: "allí donde encontremos fuerza, y sea cual sea la luz bajo la cual consideremos el poder, observaremos juntamente lo sublime que acompaña el terror" (Burke 2001: 49). Ahora bien, para Burke, también el poder político recibe estos aspectos de lo sublime. A nuestro modo de ver, en el tratamiento burkeano de este punto habita una contradicción, aunque solo aparente y momentánea. En el texto que hemos venido analizando existen únicamente dos citas en las que el autor hace referencia al poder político. En la primera, Burke ejemplifica la oscuridad como cualidad sublime de los objetos a través del despotismo: Aquellos gobiernos despóticos, que se fundan en las pasiones de los hombres, y principalmente en la pasión del miedo, mantienen a su jefe alejado de la mirada pública tanto como pueden. La religión, en muchos casos, ha practicado la misma política (2001: 43). Sin embargo, algunas páginas más adelante, el poder político ya no es únicamente vinculado a lo sublime mediante los gobiernos despóticos, sino que esta vez cualquier poder de gobierno constituye un ejemplo acerca de cómo la percepción de la superioridad coercitiva desata lo sublime: El poder institucionalizado de reyes y dirigentes tiene la misma conexión con el terror [Que la fiereza de los animales salvajes]. Los soberanos son saludados frecuentemente con el título de Pavorosa Majestad. Y puede observarse que las personas jóvenes, 14 Esta característica, la fuerza, no evoca a lo sublime cuando se ejerce en nuestro provecho. Cuando la temeraria capacidad de un animal trasunta en una utilidad para nuestro beneficio o para el mero disfrute del domesticador, estamos en presencia de una relación contraria a la descripta hasta aquí: el más débil en fuerza somete al más poderoso. Lo sublime, en consecuencia, se borra porque, según Burke (2001: 84) "nos sometemos a lo que admiramos, pero amamos lo que se nos somete; en un caso nos vemos obligados a condescender y en el otro se nos halaga para ello". El gobierno sublime y el gobierno amable... postdata 23 2c.pmd 12/11/2018, 19:17433 434 poco conocedoras del mundo (...) sienten de pronto un temor reverencial que les quita el libre uso de sus facultades (2001: 50). La cita remarca específicamente la sublimidad del poder institucionalizado. En consecuencia, cabe preguntarse si lo sublime es inherente al poder político o si, por el contrario, aparece a raíz de las manifestaciones degradadas de las instituciones. Es decir, ¿Cuál es la diferencia entre un gobierno despótico y uno institucionalizado en su relación con lo sublime? ¿Participan ambos de dicha idea? Y si la respuesta es afirmativa, ¿La diferencia entre los gobiernos despóticos y los moderados tiene vinculación con lo sublime? Este dilema intentaremos resolverlo a partir de un análisis sobre la Revolución Francesa desde la crítica de Burke, trabajada en el apartado siguiente. Para ir adelantando las observaciones, resulta un aporte significativo observar el tratamiento burkeano sobre el poder religioso. Como es esperable, la idea de Dios, al ser la mayor idea de fuerza que se pueda evocar (una idea de fuerza infinita a tal punto que es inaprensible no más que por la analogía, siempre insuficiente) es invariablemente una fuente de importancia central para la evocación de lo sublime. En este punto, podríamos preguntarnos si esta relación abarca a cualquier tipo de religión o sólo a las monoteístas. En otras palabras, si es equivalente cualquier construcción trascendente para lo sublime o si acaso existen diferencias entre las diversas religiones. Al respecto Burke (2001: 52) nos dice: Es en base a que la verdadera religión tiene y debe tener una mezcla de temor saludable; y que las religiones falsas generalmente solo se sostienen por el miedo. Antes de que la religión cristiana hubiera por así decir humanizado la idea de la Divinidad y de algún modo nos la hubiera aproximado, se había hablado muy poco del amor de Dios. Tomando en consideración la cita precedente es interesante remarcar su semejanza con las dos anteriores, relativas al poder político. Aquí también, en el poder religioso, pareciera existir una manifestación despótica, ligada a las religiones falsas incapaces de preguntarse por el amor de Dios y recurriendo al miedo permanente para lograr obediencia, y otra manifestación moderada, en este caso debido a la incorporación del amor de Dios, Fabricio E. Castro postdata 23 2c.pmd 12/11/2018, 19:17434 435 POSTData 23, No 2, clave en el catolicismo. Es decir, en este último caso, aparece una noción de belleza (amor de Dios) conectada a un objeto capaz de generar lo sublime. Hasta el momento, tenemos que tanto el poder político como el religioso pueden distinguirse a través de una forma extrema y otra moderada. Esta distinción no hiere en absoluto que en los dos casos exista participación de lo sublime. Las tres citas que hemos agrupado lo confirman. El poder político institucionalizado o moderado participa de lo sublime en virtud de su superioridad frente a los súbditos. El título Pavorosa majestad al que se hacía referencia describe el miedo de los gobernados frente a un poder que los excede en capacidad y magnanimidad. Por su parte, los despotismos se centran en la utilización del miedo para generar terror, del mismo modo que recurren a la oscuridad y al misterio para reforzar esta sensación. Por su parte, el poder religioso también evoca la idea de lo sublime. Exige siempre el temor a Dios, pero no todas las religiones se vinculan con sus fieles de la misma manera. La religión verdadera (el equivalente en este caso al poder político moderado o institucionalizado) atempera la producción del temor a través de la introducción de la idea del amor que, recordemos, se emparenta con lo bello. Todos los demás cultos, a saber los no católicos, se sustentan exclusivamente sobre el temor, sin recurrir a ningún tipo de evocación de la belleza. Sólo hay temor y misterio, mismos recursos utilizados por el poder político despótico. Ahora bien, es posible hacernos la pregunta inversa acerca de cuál es el lugar exacto de la belleza en el ámbito público. Sorprende Burke en un apartado, cuando algo intempestivamente, lanza la siguiente afirmación "Aquellas [virtudes] que atraen a nuestros corazones, que nos impresionan con un sentimiento de encanto son las virtudes más suaves; temperamento tranquilo, compasión, amabilidad y liberalidad; aunque, ciertamente, estas últimas son de interés menos inmediato y trascendental para la sociedad, y menos dignas" (2001: 82, cursivas nuestras). ¿A qué se refiere Burke? ¿Es el mundo privado el terreno propio de la belleza? ¿Es el mundo público lo propio de lo sublime? Como mínimo, esto quiere decir que en la relación sublime/bello en el mundo político, prima siempre lo sublime. Es posible afirmar, entonces, que lo sublime es un componente esencial de los poderes públicos. Esto se debe a que su característica saliente reside en la conformación de una fuerza superior a cualquier hombre, sea bajo la fantasía de una coerción probable o de un castigo sobrenatural, y que genera inevitablemente el miedo necesario para obtener consentimiento so- El gobierno sublime y el gobierno amable... postdata 23 2c.pmd 12/11/2018, 19:17435 436 cial. En la familia de términos de lo sublime comprobamos su asociación con dicha obediencia: el respeto, la veneración, el miedo, etc. El mismo Burke (2001: 84) aclara, como hemos citado, que "nos sometemos a lo que admiramos, pero amamos lo que se nos somete; en un caso nos vemos obligados a condescender y en el otro se nos halaga para ello". La presencia de estas características inspiradoras de lo sublime es inevitable e inherente a todo gobierno, sea cual sea su comportamiento. Lo sublime se eleva así como una nota fundamental para la legitimidad política, y la efectividad de la obediencia depende de la ductilidad con la que los gobernantes hagan uso de ella. Lo sublime crea entonces un tipo de percepción imprescindible para la autoridad pública. El poder monárquico y el eclesiástico pueden combinarse con otras cualidades estéticas ya vistas para reforzar todavía más la dominación. Los palacios enormes, las sonoras marchas militares, las apariciones públicas y magnánimas de los monarcas, entre otros ejemplos, aumentan la evocación de lo sublime15. Llegados hasta aquí, sigue pendiente la pregunta por la especificidad de los gobiernos extremos, tanto religiosos como políticos. Hemos visto ya que en el poder despótico se ejerce una explotación particular del miedo y del terror como método exclusivo para lograr el orden político. La generación constante del temor compensa la pérdida de obediencia. Ahora bien, una diferencia posible con los gobiernos moderados reside en que la distribución del terror en los primeros provoca dolor real. Si bien el terror es una inspiración para lo sublime, los gobiernos despóticos a menudo trascienden la percepción de lo sublime para introducirse en la esfera del dolor, la represión directa y la muerte. Lo sublime sigue estando presente, como en todo gobierno, pero en los despotismos el miedo-terror puede desbordar esta idea y convertirse en violencia constante. Recapitulando, hemos comprobado que todo gobierno necesita de la participación de lo sublime si quiere lograr la obediencia política, y esto con independencia del carácter despótico del ejecutivo. Trasladado al terreno de la 15 Al respecto, es especialmente sugerente el trabajo de Cannadine (2002), quien rastrea la evolución del ceremonial de la monarquía inglesa a través de varios siglos de historia. Comprueba que a medida que la figura monárquica es asimilada a la idea de Nación pierde sus facultades de poder específicas. Como contraparte, su rol representativo se fortalece mediante el ritual ceremonial. Esto quiere decir que la importancia de la autoridad monárquica y su sacralización eran inversamente proporcionales al grado en que se involucraba en la política efectiva. Fabricio E. Castro postdata 23 2c.pmd 12/11/2018, 19:17436 437 POSTData 23, No 2, religión, la operación es análoga: las religiones "falsas" también se fundan principalmente en el miedo. La religión verdadera opera en función de un temor de Dios que no se enfrenta constantemente con el terror, sino que lo suaviza. Para consolidar lo expuesto, estudiaremos al gobierno despótico por excelencia, según Burke: el surgido de la Revolución Francesa de 1789. Armados con el arsenal de la Indagación..., procederemos a comprobar si acaso pueden extraerse lecciones de dicha experiencia histórica para la relación entre lo sublime y el poder. De ser cierto el cruce que proponemos entre el Burke estético y el político, debería ser posible hallar en las Reflexiones... referencias a las ideas mencionadas hasta ahora. La Revolución Francesa, ¿paradigma de lo sublime? Sostienen algunos comentadores que el estilo literario de los textos políticos de Burke es excesivamente profuso en adjetivaciones, exageraciones e imágenes literarias que, por momentos, van a contramano de su argumentación (Herrero 1996) y dificultan enormemente su traducción (Adánez 2008, Mellizo 2013). A nuestro modo de ver y sin dejar de coincidir en que la situacionalidad de los textos de Burke afecta en muchos casos la prolijidad de sus postulados (y también el formato: las Reflexiones..., están escritas en forma de epístola), el esteticismo con el que describe a la Revolución Francesa, lejos de ser hijo de una vocación literaria o de una carencia argumentativa es más bien un recurso del autor para pensar políticamente. La acusación de la aparente desprolijidad de las Reflexiones... omite a nuestro modo de ver que dicho escrito opera en dos planos. Precisamente, estudiar esta obra a la luz de los conceptos estéticos del irlandés permite identificar, por un lado, a un Burke conmovido por la situación revolucionaria, como un espectador cautivado por la experiencia sublime de tamaño acontecimiento. Pero por otro lado, el mismo despliegue de los argumentos del texto lo hace considerar la situación de los súbditos del gobierno de la Asamblea Nacional, quienes también, por encontrarse bajo un régimen despótico, padecen los hechos de una manera particularmente sublime. Aún más, el escrito se encuentra dirigido a un ciudadano francés con quien Burke comparte su indignación a la vez que simpatiza con su desgracia16. 16 Decimos simpatiza en el sentido de la definición burkeana vista en la primera parte. El gobierno sublime y el gobierno amable... postdata 23 2c.pmd 12/11/2018, 19:17437 438 Considerado lo anterior (que Burke se encuentra él mismo afectado como espectador de lo sublime de la Revolución Francesa) la larga epístola de las Reflexiones... puede reinterpretarse como la descripción de la afectación de nuestro autor al presenciar dicho acontecimiento. Por eso, su retórica, lejos de ser un artilugio para esconder los argumentos es más bien la causa de ellos. Lo que le permite pensar políticamente a Burke es justamente esta conmoción. Nuestro autor nunca ha pretendido trascender las esferas de la observación política coyuntural y si lo ha hecho fue debido al grosor de las reflexiones que produjo, más que a una intención deliberada. Por lo dicho, nuestro análisis de la obra se duplica. En una primera parte, haremos foco en el Burke espectador para dejar el campo libre a los aportes del segundo apartado, el que más nos interesa, aquél relativo a la relación entre los súbditos/ciudadanos y el gobierno francés. Burke como espectador de la Revolución Para Edmund Burke, lo ocurrido en Francia desde 1789 significa "una gran crisis, no sólo de los asuntos de Francia sino de toda Europa y acaso más que Europa (...) la Revolución Francesa es lo más asombroso [astonishing]17 que ha ocurrido hasta ahora en el mundo" (1996: 48, cursivas nuestras). La utilización de la palabra asombro coincide a todas luces con una de las fuentes de lo sublime18.Para nuestro autor, dicho fenómeno revolucionario importa una cierta curiosidad estética compatible con lo sublime. Esta compatibilidad se revela mediante un breve repaso por las abundantes adjetivaciones relativas a lo sublime con las que el irlandés describe a los acontecimientos19. 17 Ver Burke (1819: 14) para corroborar el término de esta importante cita en su idioma original. 18 El asombro es central para la experiencia de lo sublime. Al respecto, ver la cita 11. 19 Una pista de la envergadura de la sorpresa de Burke nos la da el hecho de que mencione, en la edición inglesa, unas 33 veces la palabra Fear. Lo mismo sucede con otros términos importantes. Danger y sus derivados (dangerous, dangered, endangered) aparecen 21 veces, mientras que horror lo hace unas 19. Por su parte, astonishing y astonished se leen en diez oportunidades. La terminología restante tiene una presencia menor: awe (siete veces) y terrible, pain y afraid menos de cuatro veces. Ver Burke (1819), para confirmarlo. El repaso por esta terminología es ilustrativo del carácter literario del texto, así como de su afinidad con la obra estética burkeana. Fabricio E. Castro postdata 23 2c.pmd 12/11/2018, 19:17438 439 POSTData 23, No 2, La actitud de Burke que se trasluce en sus páginas cumple con todas las características del espectador sublime. No sólo la revolución es asombrosa, sino que le produce grandes niveles de indignación. Burke le pregunta a sus líderes, reprochándoles: "¿Eran necesarias todas estas cosas terribles? (...) Las recientes ruinas de Francia (...) son manifestación de una autoridad desconsiderada y presuntuosa" (1996: 74). Luego, descalifica a los asamblearios del siguiente modo: "Los argumentos de la tiranía son tan despreciables como terrible su fuerza" (1996:134), y la confiscación de las propiedades de la Iglesia le producen "indignación y horror" (1996: 141). Podrían amplificarse los extractos, pero el acontecimiento que resume toda la experiencia estética del propio Burke se descubre en un comentario suyo sobre el suceso histórico conocido como la Marcha sobre Versalles del 6 de octubre de 1789. Ese día, el reclamo popular por el precio del pan, inalcanzable por su elevado costo, desembocó en la invasión del palacio de Versalles, generando la huida de la reina y poniendo en peligro su vida. Tal escena le inspira a Burke una sentencia sobre el curso de la revolución: "complots, matanzas, asesinatos, les parecen a algunas gentes precio trivial para conseguir una revolución (...) [Los revolucionarios y sus seguidores] Necesitan un gran cambio de escena, un efecto escénico magnifico, un gran espectáculo que excite la imaginación" (Burke 1996: 97). Probatorio de la exaltación de las pasiones producida en Francia, la Marcha de Versalles, le parece a Burke "desagradable (...) para el gusto moral de todo espíritu bien nacido" (Burke 1996: 99), y confía en que el receptor francés de su carta haya considerado dicho espectáculo con "vergüenza y horror" (1996:99). Este horror por el poder revolucionario de las masas incontroladas montando un espectáculo lo analiza Burke dentro del marco del desorden generalizado del país, es decir, de la ausencia de un poder bien constituido que pueda suavizar las pasiones de la multitud. El hecho resume la conmoción de nuestro autor por el horror en el que se ha sumido a Francia. El ultraje a la reina llena de sensibilidad a Burke y le manifiesta públicamente simpatía con su sufrimiento: "Nunca hubiera imaginado, cuando ella iba añadiendo títulos de veneración a los de un respetuoso y entusiasta amor distante, que alguna vez se viera obligada a guardar en su seno un agudo antídoto contra la desgracia; nunca hubiera imaginado que iba a vivir para ver tantos desastres cayendo sobre ella" (Burke 2013: 127, cursivas nuestras). Como puede verse, la revolución cumple con todas las condiciones necesarias para desatar lo sublime, afectando de sobremanera a nuestro au- El gobierno sublime y el gobierno amable... postdata 23 2c.pmd 12/11/2018, 19:17439 440 tor/espectador. En primer lugar, hay asombro frente a un hecho incomparable en la historia de la humanidad, pero cuya contemplación se mantiene dentro de los márgenes de la seguridad geográfica o, más propiamente, de la distancia estética. En segundo lugar, Burke expresa simpatía hacia a su compañero francés. A través de la escritura, deja ver una cierta conmiseración hacia él por su desgracia. Hay entonces un observador que no es indiferente (Scheck 2012). De hecho, a Burke también lo atemoriza que los sermones del doctor Price, auspiciados por la Sociedad de la Revolución, logren importar las ideas revolucionarias a la isla, por lo que en su sublimidad hay una dosis de cercanía reforzada por la expectación. En tercer lugar, podríamos argüir que la naturaleza del deleite de Burke nace de la desgracia ajena por aquella nación excelente ahora en ruinas, dado que no es la nación inglesa la que se encuentra sufriendo los avatares revolucionarios. Esto también compone una condición de posibilidad de lo sublime, subsumible bajo la noción de la simpatía del espectador. Los motivos por los cuales nos interesa diferenciar esta faceta de lo sublime en las Reflexiones... obedecen a que las interpretaciones que alcanzan a ver la vinculación entre la estética y la política burkeana se limitan a decir que la Revolución Francesa es un acontecimiento sublime, para Burke. No suelen observar que la misma experiencia francesa, por involucrar una crisis política y de gobierno, permite otro análisis más profundo sobre el rol del concepto de lo sublime para la legitimidad política20. La aplicación del terror en el gobierno despótico francés El gran temor que lleva a Burke a escribir sobre Francia reside en las repercusiones habidas en algunas organizaciones de la sociedad civil inglesa (en particular en la Sociedad de la Revolución comandada por Mr. Price) que luchan para extender la ideología de los derechos del hombre por toda Inglaterra. Nuestro autor se propone concientizar lo que le esperaría a Europa de extenderse la revolución, siendo el efecto más grave el encontrarse bajo 20 Por ejemplo, Diez Álvarez (2007) lee una distinción entre el gobierno bello inglés y el gobierno sublime revolucionario. Para nosotros, el comentador pierde de vista que todo gobierno es sublime y que sobre esta base puede construirse una oposición entre el poder despótico y el moderado. Fabricio E. Castro postdata 23 2c.pmd 12/11/2018, 19:17440 441 POSTData 23, No 2, el yugo del despotismo político. En las líneas que siguen, reconstruiremos los motivos exactos por los cuales Burke considera a la Asamblea Nacional un gobierno corrupto, paso previo a la justificación de nuestra tercera hipótesis. Los ingleses que apoyan a la Asamblea Nacional gala arguyen la supuesta concordancia entre los principios de la revolución gloriosa de 1688 y la francesa de 1789. Para refutarlos, Burke (1996) se preocupa precisamente por recordar que la gran diferencia entre estos dos hechos anida en que la experiencia inglesa no buscó romper con la estructura institucional. No deseaba la ruptura total con el pasado ni la construcción de una forma política nueva y radical. Más bien, La revolución inglesa recuperó el gobierno de la corrupción del rey Jacobo II, a la vez que introdujo una serie de mejoras, pero que se insertaron sobre el molde institucional heredado de los antepasados durante siglos21. Francia, en vez de reformar sus instituciones quiebra toda conexión con ellas y levanta sobre sus ruinas un modelo político cuya procedencia es puramente teórica, hija de la ilustración y enemiga de la experiencia. Por lo dicho, Burke es un anti-revolucionario en el sentido específicamente francés de este término22, pues todo intento humano de modificar de plano lo que las costumbres, los hábitos y la herencia del pasado, en suma, lo que la historia ha podido desplegar a lo largo de los siglos, implica un ataque inaceptable contra ese contrato social que dio origen a la sociedad y cuyos participantes son los hombres presentes, y también los pasados y los futuros. Una sociedad es un compromiso histórico. La generación presente no puede desentenderse del legado antiguo para respaldarse en sus propios caprichos fundadores. Esta es la esencia de la crítica burkeana a los Danton, Mirabeau y compañía. Un ejemplo que da a ver de modo más claro esta cuestión es la discusión sobre los Derechos del hombre proclamados por la asamblea nacio21 La constitución de la revolución inglesa "Mantuvo las partes antiguas exactamente como estaban para que la parte nuevamente recobrada puede ser adecuada a aquellas. Actuó por medio de los estamentos organizados de antiguo dentro del molde de la vieja organización" (Burke 1996: 58). Nótese la utilización de la palabra recobrada y no creada. 22 La reconversión del concepto ha sido estudiada por Arendt (2003). Para la autora, el viejo concepto de revolución se asociaba a una vuelta a los orígenes, y fue posteriormente resignificado hasta lograr su definición actual, más ligada a la transformación radical de la sociedad por vía de la violencia. El gobierno sublime y el gobierno amable... postdata 23 2c.pmd 12/11/2018, 19:17441 442 nal. Aquí se observa con particular claridad el carácter ficticio y racionalista de la ilustración francesa que inspira a los revolucionarios. A diferencia de la afirmación de unos derechos previos a la constitución de un Estado, para Burke el gobierno no se establece para garantizar una nómina de derechos naturales creada artificialmente, sino para instrumentar y organizar la satisfacción de las necesidades humanas. Para lograr una convivencia social pacifica, el gobierno tiene como misión atemperar las pasiones, de modo tal de permitir la vida en común y el usufructo de los beneficios logrados con el esfuerzo personal. En rigor, Burke no está en contra de los argumentos que parten del estado de naturaleza, propios del contractualismo moderno. Sólo que en su caso son una modificación de inspiración lockeana: los hombres tienen derechos naturales, algunos de los cuales son resignados al momento de entrar en sociedad para elevar otros que los benefician más (por ejemplo, se renuncia a ser juez de las causas propias). A la vez, la sociedad debe restringir los impulsos y las pasiones del hombre. Fruto de esta combinación entre libertad y restricciones históricas, son los recursos y libertades finales de que puede disponer el súbdito. Sin embargo, su extensión no puede definirse a priori, pues está ligada a las circunstancias23. Los derechos del hombre suponen una imposición irreal que ignora los procesos históricos. Además de su carácter abstracto, dichos derechos rompen con los merecidos privilegios adquiridos a lo largo de los siglos por el clero y la nobleza, excusándose bajo una reflexión racional sobre lo que es justo para el hombre y perturbando el orden histórico que les otorga a estas clases su posición eminente. En suma, los revolucionarios franceses combaten la sabiduría de la historia, la experiencia y los derechos adquiridos. Ignoran que el gobierno y la política constituyen una práctica, una responsabilidad con los antepasados y con la realidad posible más que deseable. Al revolucionarlo todo, Francia se ha convertido en un gobierno despótico, cuyo irrespeto por la propiedad, por las jerarquías establecidas, por las costumbres y por la institución monárquica, no le dejan otra legitimidad más que el miedo y la violencia represiva. 23 "Las restricciones puestas al hombre del mismo modo que sus libertades han de ser consideradas como sus derechos. Pero como las libertades y las restricciones varían con los tiempos y las circunstancias y admiten infinitas modificaciones, no pueden establecerse mediante una regla abstracta; y no hay nada tan estúpido como discutirlas basándose en ese principio" (Burke 1996: 93). Fabricio E. Castro postdata 23 2c.pmd 12/11/2018, 19:17442 443 POSTData 23, No 2, Estos son los argumentos de Burke para demostrar el carácter despótico del nuevo gobierno francés (que éste, en su afán de trastocar los cimientos de la sociedad ha alterado y violentado principios conformados durante siglos), desarrollo que permite entender la denuncia a la violencia que se vive en Francia. La revolución es un acto de intimidación explícita, caracterizada por matanzas, desordenes y subversiones a la autoridad, en un contexto político que de ninguna manera lo hubiera justificado, porque era posible una reforma en Francia, según Burke. Los revolucionarios, al remover todas las estructuras y las instituciones, acabaron con un régimen todavía rescatable. La aplicación del terror es inevitable en un gobierno cuya intención es barrer con las instituciones prolijamente construidas durante siglos. Por eso, el dolor es moneda corriente en una revolución repleta de "fraudes, violencia, rapiñas, incendios, asesinatos, confiscaciones" (Burke 1996: 149) causadas por "[la crueldad de los revolucionarios, que] no ha sido resultado vil del miedo. Ha sido el efecto del hecho de sentirse plenamente seguros al autorizar las traiciones, robos, crímenes, asesinatos, matanzas e incendios por todo el ámbito de su devastado país" (Burke 1996: 74-75). Parece claro que la situación de caos impide la evocación de lo sublime constitutiva del súbdito y de su obediencia al gobierno. La violencia directa coloca con demasiada frecuencia el peligro real amenazando los cimientos de la nación francesa. Cuando eso sucede, lo sublime desaparece y la situación del poder superior exige la represión pública. Este no es el caso en un poder bien instituido. No es necesario el recurso constante de la violencia directa en los gobiernos moderados. La Revolución Francesa adoleció de un elemento fundamental para lograrlo. Lo aclara una cita clave: Todas las ilusiones agradables que hacían suave el poder y liberal la obediencia, que armonizaban los diversos matices de la vida y que mediante una asimilación fácil incorporaban a la política los sentimientos que embellecen y suavizan a la sociedad privada, van a ser disueltos por este nuevo imperio conquistador de la luz y la razón (Burke 1996: 107, cursivas nuestras). El poder político siempre es sublime, como hemos visto, pero su moderación exige la inserción de elementos propios de la evocación de lo bello (la suavidad y el embellecimiento). La tranquilidad pública y la auto- El gobierno sublime y el gobierno amable... postdata 23 2c.pmd 12/11/2018, 19:17443 444 ridad bien constituida a través de una legitimidad política en la cual el recurso a la violencia sea el último, también produce efectos embellecedores en la sociedad civil, pues se suavizan las pasiones y se corrigen las maneras, las costumbres y los hábitos de una nación24. El paradigma de esta actitud es la monarquía inglesa, en quien piensa Burke en esta cita. Veamos otra cita importante donde se refuerza esta opinión, nuevamente contra los revolucionarios: En este sistema de filosofía barata [el de la ilustración francesa], hijo de corazones fríos y de inteligencias cenagosas, desprovisto de sabiduría sólida y de todo gusto y elegancia, las leyes se van a apoyar únicamente en el terror (...) No queda nada que suscite afectos hacia la comunidad. Dados los principios de esta filosofía mecánica nuestras instituciones no pueden encarnarse en personas, creando así en nosotros amor, veneración, admiración o afecto (Burke 1996: 108, cursivas nuestras). Aquí, por segunda vez, Burke reconoce la necesidad de revestir a los regímenes políticos de cualidades relativas a lo bello (las relativas al amor, que pertenece a su definición) cuyo efecto es fundamental para la obediencia política. Al tambalear la legitimidad política de los sucesivos gobiernos de Francia, el recurso al dolor se revela el único eficaz. El contraste con el gobierno inglés es bien marcado. La monarquía constitucional, desde 1688, respeta la máxima de que "Para hacernos amar a nuestro país, nuestro país debe ser amable" (Burke 1996: 108), pero ello se debe a un respeto casi reverencial por la autoridad, que es lo que corresponde a un gobierno bien constituido. Los británicos, nos asegura Burke, "Tememos a Dios, miramos con veneración a los reyes; con afecto a los Parlamentos; con sumisión a los magistrados; con reverencia a los sacerdotes y con respeto a la nobleza" (1996: 116). Además, recordemos el efecto del temor de Dios sobre lo sublime. La fuerza que una imagen como la divina ocupa en la mente de los hombres, claro 24 Esto no significa, por supuesto, que la monarquía francesa fuera un gobierno ideal. Nuestro autor no duda de que el rey de Francia cometió abusos. No obstante, combatir contra ellos por la vía revolucionaria constituyó un grave error: "Vuestro gobierno de Francia (...) tenía muchos abusos (...) ¿Es, pues, verdad que el gobierno francés era absolutamente incapaz o no merecedor de reforma?" (Burke 1996: 151). Fabricio E. Castro postdata 23 2c.pmd 12/11/2018, 19:17444 445 POSTData 23, No 2, objeto pasible de sublimidad, también interesa al gobierno político. En efecto, en la teoría burkeana es indisociable de un buen gobierno la participación de la Iglesia, pues ella está especialmente dotada para prestar consuelo a los hombres y controlar las pasiones, evitando así la coacción estatal directa y permanente sobre los súbditos desobedientes. En palabras de Burke: "La consagración del Estado mediante una religión estatal, es necesaria para producir una fuerte impresión en los ciudadanos libres" (1996: 121). Observaciones finales Motivó nuestra exposición la creencia en la posibilidad de realizar un cruce entre la obra estética y la más importante obra política de Burke. De nuestro recorrido, si ha sido fructífero, se derivan a nuestro entender tres conclusiones importantes derivadas de nuestras hipótesis. En primer lugar, hemos identificado que la consideración de Macpherson (1984) es desacertada. Del mismo modo que otros comentaristas citados a lo largo del texto, quienes relegan al Burke político, este autor desestima la relevancia de la teoría estética burkeana para pensar los fenómenos relativos a la política. Su desacierto ignora una larga sección dedicada al poder en la Indagación... y omite, además, rastrearlo en su obra madura. Es cierto que las referencias comparables entre los dos textos son veladas y en muchos casos esparcidas de modo inconexo25. Pero ha quedado claro que los comentarios estéticos sobre la Revolución Francesa no son azarosos y están justificados en sus trabajos previos y no en el mero capricho literario del autor. Así, el Burke de 1757 sustenta al de 1790. En segundo lugar, lo sublime es determinante para el poder político. Esto es dicho explícitamente en la Indagación... y significa que lo estatal/lo político (Burke no realiza una distinción tajante entre los dos términos, al menos en este trabajo) son pasibles de evocar la idea de lo sublime en los súbditos. La conformación misma del poder político exige esa evocación, puesto que necesita convencer de su superioridad en fuerza, en grandeza y en 25 Incluso puede objetarse la ausencia del término sublime en las Reflexiones..., que sólo aparece dos veces y sin el sentido otorgado en la Indagación... Rápidamente puede ser descartada la objeción: no aparece el concepto, pero aparecen sus fuentes, que lo representan del mismo modo. El gobierno sublime y el gobierno amable... postdata 23 2c.pmd 12/11/2018, 19:17445 446 autoridad. Sin provocar esta idea un gobierno no puede gobernar. De ser este el caso, nos hallaremos en una situación de anarquía o en una situación revolucionaria, en donde el orden es o bien inexistente o bien opresivo, como es el caso de la violencia de la Revolución Francesa. Para lograr una obediencia correspondida, el poder político debe valerse también de lo religioso, que a través del temor a Dios refuerce la legitimidad, mediante una alianza entre el Estado y la Iglesia capaz de mantener a raya a las pasiones destructivas de los hombres en lo social. Lo sublime es así constitutivo del poder político y un instrumento esencial para la política. Genera el miedo suficiente para controlar las pasiones de los hombres, a través de una demostración de autoridad, fundamental para prevenir situaciones revolucionarias. Se recurre al auxilio de lo sublime buscando una obediencia política legitima. Si la función legitimadora es propia de todos los gobiernos, Burke destacará que también los despotismos se caracterizan por afrontar lo sublime a través del miedo, del horror y del terror en el ejercicio del poder. Nuevamente, esto exige una tercera consideración, puesto que si los gobiernos despóticos son sublimes, pero todo poder político es sublime, debería ser posible hallar una distinción para reconocer su particularidad en relación con los gobiernos bien constituidos. Por lo tanto, es posible aumentar todavía más el detalle de los pensamientos de Burke sobre el gobierno. Una vez determinada la relación indisociable entre lo sublime y lo político, hemos notado que existen referencias a los gobiernos despóticos que a primera vista podría hacernos suponer que la idea de lo sublime se refiere exclusivamente a ellos. En realidad, dado que todo gobierno constituye una fuerza superior, la presencia lo sublime se encuentra en todas las formas políticas. Sin embargo, la pregunta es ¿en qué se diferencia un gobierno moderado de un gobierno despótico en relación a lo sublime? A nuestro modo de ver, el poder estatal institucionalizado y moderado se caracteriza por recurrir a lo bello para sofrenar los efectos impactantes de lo sublime-político. Procura maneras suaves a la que vez que no pierde autoridad. Suscita afectos positivos en los ciudadanos en combinación con las irrenunciables características privativas que todo Estado posee desde el punto de vista de sus súbditos/ciudadanos (fuerza, superioridad, grandeza). Genera amor en ellos al mismo tiempo que el miedo hacia la institución gobernante y eclesiástica solidifica la obediencia. En palabras del autor: "Para hacernos amar a nuestro país, nuestro país Fabricio E. Castro postdata 23 2c.pmd 12/11/2018, 19:17446 447 POSTData 23, No 2, debe ser amable" (Burke, 1996:108). En otras palabras, el poder político debe ser capaz de fomentar los afectos públicos hacia la comunidad, la nación y el Estado26. En particular, la Revolución Francesa ha sido incapaz de suscitar estos afectos. Resultado de una filosofía insensible y racionalista, "desprovista de todo gusto y elegancia, las leyes se van a apoyar únicamente en el terror que siembran" (Burke 1996: 108, cursivas nuestras). Por culpa de estos acontecimientos en Francia "No queda nada que suscite afectos hacia la comunidad (...) creando así en nosotros amor, veneración, admiración o afecto" (Burke 1996: 108). Nótese esta particular combinación de pasiones elegidas por Burke en la cita, que aglutinan el respeto y la veneración a la autoridad (lo sublime) junto a una condición positiva hacia la comunidad cifrada en el amor (lo bello) y que la Asamblea no pudo satisfacer. ¿Qué caracteriza entonces a un gobierno despótico? Burke afirma: gobernar a través del miedo. Sin embargo, cualquier Estado suscita el miedo en sus ciudadanos, incluso la religión lo hace. La diferencia está en que la Revolución Francesa basaba solamente su autoridad en el terror. Era el elemento sustancial para lograr una legitimidad política siempre tambaleante. Pero, por otro lado, y esto es fundamental, el despotismo revolucionario aplica de forma directa la represión, o bien deja vía libre al pueblo (por ausencia de controles, por autorización velada) para cometer todo tipo de abusos, los cuales se convierten lisa y llanamente en dolor. El ejercicio de la violencia ya no inspira lo sublime (desde el punto de vista de los súbditos, no desde la mirada privilegiada del Burke espectador), porque lo sublime es una idea que como tal exige cierta distancia del dolor directo. Los despotismos se desbordan con mucha frecuencia: generan sufrimientos inmediatos y cor26 En el Discurso sobre la conciliación con América (1775) y frente a un problema político no muy distinto (y que de hecho culminará en la Revolución Americana de 1776) sorprende que Burke replique este punto de vista, cuando aconseja al parlamento inglés descartar el recurso de la fuerza contra los colonos: "mi opinión está más en favor de un arreglo prudente, que en favor de la fuerza, porque considero que la fuerza es un medio no solo odioso, sino débil para mantener a un pueblo tan numeroso (...) y tan lleno de espíritu como es éste, en una conexión provechosa y subordinada con nosotros" (1996: 319), por eso, lo fundamental es la construcción de legitimidad. De ahí que diga Burke que "El poder y la autoridad se compran a veces con la amabilidad, pero no pueden nunca mendigarse como limosna por una violencia empobrecida y derrotada" (1996:320, cursivas nuestras). El gobierno sublime y el gobierno amable... postdata 23 2c.pmd 12/11/2018, 19:17447 448 póreos en sus ciudadanos27. Y eso ya no tiene nada de sublime, como sentencia Burke: "Cuando el peligro o el dolor acosan demasiado, no pueden dar ningún deleite, y son sencillamente terribles; pero, a ciertas distancias y con ligeras modificaciones, pueden ser y son deliciosos" (Burke 2001:29). No obstante, es posible entrever que la división entre los gobiernos moderados y los despóticos en su relación con lo sublime y lo bello es más bien de grado que de concepto. Ambos se fundan en lo sublime, pero los gobiernos moderados persisten en su inclinación hacia lo bello, para evocar estas ideas en los ciudadanos con el objetivo de hacer apacible y duradera la dominación política. Los gobiernos moderados constituyen así un ejemplo característico de la convivencia en un mismo objeto de lo sublime y de lo bello, pues ambos elementos participan del poder institucionalizado. En cambio, la inclinación del gobierno despótico es hacia el desborde de lo sublime, desplazándose muy a menudo más allá de la evocación del terror, para inclinarse sencillamente hacia su aplicación. En dichos estados, prima la percepción del miedo y el padecimiento del dolor. En los moderados, se destaca la sublimidad derivada del miedo por una fuerza superior, aunque matizada por los afectos positivos de lo bello (suavidad de maneras, amabilidad, etc.). Ello no obsta, por supuesto, la aplicación de la violencia directa en este tipo de gobiernos, pero reducida al mínimo. En resumen, se ha podido trazar un puente que liga ambas teorías y el efecto ha sido reciproco. La Indagación... nos deja aprender más sobre los efectos de ciertas ideas estéticas en la legitimidad política; mientras que las Reflexiones... nos brindan un valioso ejemplo de la composición en un mismo objeto de lo sublime y de lo bello (el gobierno moderado de Inglaterra) y del despotismo del miedo y el terror (la Revolución Francesa). Bibliografía Adánez González, Noelia (2008) "Presentación", en Revolución y descontento: selección de escritos políticos de Edmund Burke, Madrid, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales. Arendt, Hannah (2013) Sobre la revolución, Madrid, Alianza. Bozal, Valeriano (2000) "Edmund Burke", en Bozal, Valeriano (comp.) Historia de las ideas estéticas y de las teorías artísticas contemporáneas, Vol. I, Madrid, La balsa de la medusa. Burke, Edmund (2013) [1790] Reflexiones sobre la revolución en Francia, Madrid, Alianza. Fabricio E. Castro postdata 23 2c.pmd 13/11/2018, 16:32448 449 POSTData 23, No 2, Burke, Edmund (2001) [1757] Indagación filosófica sobre el origen de nuestras ideas acerca de lo sublime y de lo bello, Madrid, Tecnos. Burke, Edmund (1996) [1790] "Reflexiones sobre la Revolución Francesa", en Textos políticos, México D.F., Fondo de Cultura Económica. Burke, Edmund (1996) [1774] "Discurso sobre la conciliación con América", en Textos políticos, México D.F., Fondo de Cultura Económica. Burke, Edmund (1819) [1790] "Reflections on the Revolution in France", en The British Prose Writers, Vol. XXI, Londres, John Sharpe. Burke, Edmund (1856) [1757] A Philosophical Inquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful, Nueva York, Harper and Brothers publishers. Cannadine, David (2002) "Contexto, representación y significado del ritual: la monárquica británica y la invención de la tradición ", en Hobsbawm, Eric y Terence Ranger (comps.) La invención de la tradición, Barcelona, Crítica. Diez Álvarez, Luis Gonzalo (2010) Edmund Burke y la moderna guerra ideológica, Madrid, Cuadernos americanos Francisco de Vitoria. Diez Álvarez, Luis Gonzalo (2007) Anatomía del intelectual reaccionario: Joseph de Maistre, Vilfredo Pareto y Carl Schmitt. La metamorfosis fascista del conservadurismo, Madrid, Biblioteca Nueva. Draus, Franciszek (1989) "Burke et les Francais", en Furet, Francois y Mona Ozouf (comps.) The transformation of Political Culture. 1789-1848, Vol. 3, Oxford, Pergamon Press. Gras Balaguer, Menene (2001) "Estudio preliminar", en Indagación filosófica sobre el origen de nuestras ideas acerca de lo sublime y de lo bello, Madrid, Alianza. Harbour, William (1982) El pensamiento conservador, Buenos Aires, Grupo Editor Latinoamericano. Heller, Hermann (1930) Las ideas políticas contemporáneas, Barcelona, Labor. Herrero, Vicente (1996) "Introducción", en Textos políticos, México D.F., Fondo de Cultura Económica. Macpherson, C. B. (1984) Burke, Madrid, Alianza. Mellizo, Carlos (2013) "Prólogo", en Reflexiones sobre la revolución en Francia, Madrid, Alianza. Molnar, Thomas (1975) La contrarrevolución, Madrid, Unión Editorial S.A. Murcia Serrano, Inmaculada (2009) "Lo sublime de Edmund Burke y la estetización postmoderna de la tecnología", en Fedro. Revista de Estética y Teoría de las Artes, N°8. Nisbet, Robert (1986) Conservadurismo, Madrid, Alianza. Pagano, Frank (2009) "Introducción", en Vindicación de la sociedad natural, Madrid, Trotta. El gobierno sublime y el gobierno amable... postdata 23 2c.pmd 12/11/2018, 19:17449 450 Pérez Carreño, Francisca (2000) "La estética empirista", en Bozal, Valeriano (comp.) Historia de las ideas estéticas y de las teorías artísticas contemporáneas, Vol. I, Madrid, La balsa de la medusa. Raynaud, Philippe (1989) "Burke et les Allemands", en Furet, Francois y Mona Ozouf (comps.) The Transformation of Political Culture. 1789-1848, Vol. 3, Oxford, Pergamon Press. Scheck, Daniel (2009) "Lo sublime en la modernidad. De la retórica a la ética", en Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofía, Vol. XXXV, N°1, otoño. Scheck, Daniel (2012) "El espectador y lo sublime: condiciones estéticas y exigencias éticas en Addison, Burke y Kant", en Boletín de Estética, N°22, diciembre. Scheck, Daniel (2013) "Lo sublime y la reunificación del sujeto a partir del sentimiento: la estética más allá de las restricciones de lo bello", en Signos filosóficos, Vol. XV, N°29, enero-junio. Schmitt, Carl (1991) El concepto de lo político, Madrid, Alianza. Strauss, Leo (2013) Derecho natural e historia, Buenos Aires, Prometeo. Viereck, Peter (1959) Conservadorismo: desde John Adams hasta W. Churchill, Buenos Aires, Ágora. Resumen El presente artículo explora la relación entre las ideas estéticas y las ideas políticas en la obra de Edmund Burke. De dicho análisis, surge, en primer lugar, la relevancia de sus reflexiones sobre las nociones de lo bello y de lo sublime para la teoría política, usualmente desestimadas por los comentadores. En segundo lugar, la afirmación de que la idea de lo sublime es una característica imprescindible de todo gobierno político, y el trazado, en tercer lugar, de una distinción entre los gobiernos moderados y despóticos a partir de las diferencias estéticas observables en la monarquía constitucional inglesa y la asamblea nacional revolucionaria de 1789. Se concluye la dependencia recíproca de ambas disciplinas para comprender con mayor exactitud el pensamiento del autor irlandés. Palabras clave Sublime Bello Revolución Francesa Edmund Burke Gobierno despótico Fabricio E. Castro postdata 23 2c.pmd 12/11/2018, 19:17450 451 POSTData 23, No 2, Abstract This article explores the relationship between aesthetic and political ideas in the work of Edmund Burke. This analysis sheds some light on a number of questions. First, the relevance of his reflections about the beautiful and the sublime for the political theory, an aspect which is usually underestimated by his commentators. Second, the assertion that the idea of the sublime is an essential characteristic of every political government and third, the distinction between moderate and despotic governments based on the aesthetic differences observable in the English constitutional monarchy and the National Revolutionary Assembly of 1789. The conclusions highlight the necessary and reciprocal dependence of both disciplines to better understand the thought of the Irish author. Key words Sublime Beauty French Revolution Edmund Burke Despotic Government El gobierno sublime y el gobierno amable... postdata 23 2c.pmd 12/11/2018, 19:

Verifiche XLIII (1-3), 2014, pp. 41-76. HOLISM, ORGANICISM AND THE RISK OF BIOCHAU-1 VINISM 2 3 by Charles T. Wolfe 4 5 6 Abstract. In this essay I seek to critically evaluate some forms of holism 7 and organicism in biological thought, as a more deflationary echo to Gilbert 8 and Sarkar's reflection on the need for an 'umbrella' concept to convey the 9 new vitality of holistic concepts in biology (Gilbert and Sarkar 2000). Given 10 that some recent discussions in theoretical biology call for an organism concept 11 (from Moreno and Mossio's work on organization to Kirschner et al.'s 12 research paper in Cell, 2000, building on chemistry to articulate what they 13 called "molecular vitalism," studying the "vitalistic" properties of molecular, 14 cellular, and organismal function, and Pepper and Herron's suggestion in 15 their 2008 paper that organisms define a category that evolutionary biology 16 cannot do without), the question, what concept of organicism are they calling 17 for? To what extent are such claims philosophically committed to a non-18 naturalistic concept of organism as organizing centre, as a foundational rather 19 than heuristic concept – or possibly a "biochauvinism," to use Di Paolo's 20 term (Di Paolo 2009)? My aim in this paper is to conceptually clarify the 21 forms of holism and organicism that are involved in these cases (and I 22 acknowledge that the study of early 20th-century holisms [Peterson 2010] 23 indicates that not all of them were in fact 'organicist' or 'biologistic'). I suggest 24 that contemporary holists are still potentially beholden to a certain kind of 25 vitalism or "biochauvinism"; but that when they reduce their claims to mere 26 heuristics, conversely, they risk losing sight of a certain kind of organizational 27 "thickness", a "vital materiality" (Wheeler 2010) which is characteristic of 28 biological systems (Bechtel 2007). And I ask if it is possible to articulate a 29 concept of biological holism or organicism which is neither an empirical 30 'biochauvinism' nor a metaphysical 'vitalism'? 31 32 33 I. A question sometimes asked in recent reflections at the in-34 tersection of the philosophy of biology and so-called 'historical 35 epistemology' is, do organisms have an ontological status? Now, 36 we should note immediately that there are at least two very differ-37 ent ways to answer this question in the affirmative. One is more 38 Charles T. Wolfe Articles 40 philosophical, and seeks to provide criteria, e.g. of individuals 1 which organisms instantiate particularly well; from Aristotle to 2 Hegel and Jonas, this can be termed a strong holist option, but let 3 us again stress, in a philosophical context, for as we shall see, it is 4 possible to defend a holist claim for the ontological uniqueness of 5 organisms, on a biological basis as well (to be clear, I do not have 6 in mind a distinction between 'metaphysical' and 'experimental' 7 here). A philosophical defense of strong holism as regards biolog-8 ical individuals will tend to be more stipulative, appealing for 9 instance to the nature of whole/part relations and insisting that in 10 organisms, there is a special type of interrelation between parts. 11 In contrast, strong holism of the biological sort will typically 12 appeal to the empirical criteria defining actual organisms – but 13 which criteria?, would be the immediate retort, pointing to the 14 lack of any unifying concept for the diversity of actual organisms, 15 from drosophila to the Portuguese man-o-war1. 16 There are also diverse answers of the negative variety, which 17 I will be less interested in here. They include a kind of absolute 18 physicalism, which is more of an intellectual vue de l'esprit than a 19 position actually encountered amongst most working natural 20 philosophers: on this view, what is real is the entities specified in 21 fundamental physics, and since organisms do not belong to this 22 class of entities (however much some former physicists struggled 23 in the 1960s to find 'organismic laws', like Walter Elsasser2), they 24 can have nothing other than a 'folk', 'cultural' or perhaps 'psycho-25 logical' status. More common is a general dismissal of the very 26 question, in the favor of a kind of evolving, instrumentalist con-27 sensus, according to which there is no point in debating the 28 ultimate reality or ontological status of organisms, since what 29 matters is the theoretical terms science uses in its work, and these 30 constantly evolve (thus 'organism' gave way to 'gene', but even 31 'gene' now seems like a construct, since it can no longer be 32 1 J. PEPPER, M HERRON, Does biology need an organism concept? «Biological Reviews», 83, 2008, pp. 621–627. 2 W.M. ELSASSER, Quanta and the concept of organismic law, «Journal of Theoretical Biology», 1(1), 1961, pp. 27-58 ; Reflections on a Theory of Organisms. Holism in Biology, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1998. Articles The Risk of Biochauvinism 41 thought of as «an inherently stable, discrete stretch of DNA that 1 encodes information for producing a protein», which is copied 2 faithfully before being passed on; rather, we now know that 3 «stability lies in the system as a whole, not in the gene»3). 4 Closer to my general interests, although I will not explore 5 this option here, is a more 'historicized' approach, in which the 6 reality of organisms is neither bluntly asserted – as is predomi-7 nant in theoretical biology and most Continental 'biophilosophy'4 8 – or denied, in favor of atoms, molecules, or selfish genes. In-9 stead, it is examined in a diversity of historical régimes, contexts, 10 sometimes with an increased focus on the nature of the experi-11 mental scientific apparatus involved. For instance, Hans-Jörg 12 Rheinberger describes experimental systems while emphasizing a 13 cognitive, constructed level of the effectivity of scientific practic-14 es: experimental systems do not just inhabit a world of 'things' 15 but also, what he calls «graphematic spaces», capable of «differen-16 tial reproduction»5. Thus for our purposes, the reality of organ-17 isms for an embryologist in the school of Wilhelm Roux is not 18 the same, e.g., as that experienced by an eighteenth-century 19 Montpellier medical vitalist insisting on the difference between 20 medical mechanistic models of the body and the 'animal econo-21 3 E. JABLONKA, M.J. LAMB, Evolution in Four Dimensions: Genetic, Epigenetic, Behavioral and Symbolic Variation in the History of Life, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 2005, p. 7. 4 'Biophilosophy' is a term that was popular in the post-war decades in French 'épistémologie' (and to some extent also in the German versions, where authors like Kant and/or Hegel played a greater role, e.g. Gerhard Vollmer). It was often presented as not being guilty of the reductionist excesses of analytically oriented 'philosophy of biology'. My interest here is not to choose between the two but to judge the claims of certain forms of biological holism. On the emergence of philosophy of biology as a discipline in contrast to 'biophilosophy' see J. GAYON, La philosophie et la biologie, in Encyclopédie philosophique universelle, vol. IV, ed. J.-F. Mattéi, PUF, Paris, 1998, pp. 21522171, which he has reprised with the more specific focus of 'vitalism' in his Vitalisme et philosophie de la biologie, in Repenser le vitalisme, ed. P. Nouvel, PUF, Paris, 2011, pp. 15-31. 5 H. J. RHEINBERGER, Experimental Systems – Graphematic Spaces, in T. LENOIR, (ed.), Inscribing science: scientific texts and the materiality of communication, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1998, p. 287. Thanks to Claudia Manta for suggesting this reference. Charles T. Wolfe Articles 42 my' (a term often used in that period to describe the functionally 1 interdependent, physiological system of the body, as distinct from 2 the mere machine). Curiously, both friends and foes of ho-3 lism/organicism6 ignore the potential resources the historical 4 view would afford them, being content instead to assert or deny 5 an ontological state of affairs. 6 Here I will not pursue this more historical route, as I shall be 7 concerned with some varieties of biological holism, mainly in the 8 twentieth and twenty-first centuries, which I will seek to evaluate, 9 primarily in the form of a brief internal critique. To be clear, I am 10 not arguing for one sharply delimited 'reductionist' or 'holist' 11 position, but rather, I am evaluating some of the tensions or 12 excessive commitments carried by various forms of holism, in 13 order to see what can be saved therein. My goal is to assess a 14 potential legitimacy of a certain kind of holism or organicism, 15 which, I shall suggest, needs to steer clear of a variety of wrong-16 headed, anti-naturalistic or otherwise excessively falsifiable an-17 swers to the initial question. To borrow an expression from 18 Daniel Dennett, the issue is: which varieties of organicism are 'worth 19 wanting'? Since Scott Gilbert and Sahotra Sarkar's reflection on 20 the need for an 'umbrella' or 'organizing' concept to convey the 21 new vitality of systemic or holistic concepts in biology7, seconded 22 by Manfred Laubichler's paper proclaiming the return of the 23 'organism' as such an organizing concept8, some scholarly work 24 has been done which dispels earlier prejudices and gives us a 25 more useful, nuanced sense both of these concepts in biological 26 science and their possible pertinence today9. 27 6 I'll refrain from using the potentially convenient two-letter acronym. 7 S. GILBERT, S. SARKAR, Embracing complexity: organicism for the 21st century, «Developmental Dynamics», 219, 2000, pp. 1-9. 8 M. LAUBICHLER, The Organism is dead. Long live the organism! «Perspectives on Science», 8 (3), 2000, pp. 286-315. 9 See e.g. P. HUNEMAN, C.T. WOLFE (eds.), The Concept of Organism: Historical, Philosophical, Scientific Perspectives, special issue of History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences, 32 (2-3), 2010 and T. CHEUNG, From the Organism of a Body to the Body of an Organism: occurrence and meaning of the word 'organism' from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries, «British Journal of the History of Science», 39, 2006, 319339, on the history and theory of organism. Articles The Risk of Biochauvinism 43 In addition, there has been some sustained work on these 1 concepts in current biology. To name three recent examples, (1) 2 in theoretical biology, the effort to articulate a model of «orga-3 nized systems» and «organizational closure», in Alvaro Moreno 4 and Matteo Mossio's research, alone or with collaborators10. A 5 question arising in reaction to this research is the extent to which 6 philosophically it is committed to a non-naturalistic concept of 7 organism as organizing centre, as a foundational rather than 8 heuristic concept – or possibly a «biochauvinism», to use Di 9 Paolo's term11. He does not define it, but we can imagine that 10 biochauvinism would be the present-day, naturalistic form of 11 what was attacked by the Vienna Circle and others as vitalism: no 12 longer the claim that there are immaterial vital forces which play a 13 causal role in the functioning of living beings, but simply the 14 claim that living beings, as distinct from tables, chairs and pro-15 tons, are ontologically specific, not to say special. This is not an 16 essay devoted to the work of Moreno et al. but I will state right 17 away that I find their work especially free of these more inflated 18 metaphysical claims that are characteristic of other, comparable 19 theorists (including Francisco Varela, Robert Rosen and Evan 20 Thompson). 21 (2) In biochemistry, Kirschner et al.'s research paper in Cell 22 (Kirschner et al. 2000) on what they called «molecular vitalism» : 23 they suggested that, faced with the limitations of genomics, re-24 searchers should investigate what the authors «whimsically» 25 termed the «vitalistic» properties of molecular, cellular, and organ-26 ismal function: «the organism has fashioned a very stable physiol-27 ogy and embryology [...] It is this robustness that suggested ʻvital 28 forcesʼ, and it is this robustness that we wish ultimately to under-29 10 M. MOSSIO, A MORENO, Organisational closure in biological organisms, «History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences», 32(2-3), 2010, pp. 269-288; A MORENO, M. MOSSIO, Biological autonomy. A Philosophical and theoretical enquiry, Springer, Dordrecht, forthcoming, and earlier, K. RUIZ-MIRAZO, A ETXEBERRIA, A MORENO, J. IBÁÑEZ, Organisms and their place in biology, «Theory Bioscience», 119, 2000, pp. 209-233. 11 E. DI PAOLO, Extended Life, «Topoi», 28, 2009, p. 10. Charles T. Wolfe Articles 44 stand in terms of chemistry. We will have such an opportunity in 1 this new century»12. 2 (3) In evolutionary biology, Pepper and Herron's 2008 paper 3 suggests that organisms define a category that evolutionary biolo-4 gy cannot do without, because it «relies heavily on the compara-5 tive method, and effective comparison requires that we first 6 define a class of comparable entities», and they seek to articulate a 7 «robust and general operational definition» of organism, which 8 should distinguish between «which biological entities are organ-9 isms and which are not», particularly from parts of organisms and 10 groups of organisms13. 11 The above examples indicate that different trends in biologi-12 cal theory are articulating – or calling for – an organism concept. 13 However, only the first of these three cases directly contributes to 14 an explicitly holistic and organismic framework, which is the main 15 focus of this essay. 16 My aim is to conceptually clarify these forms of holism and 17 organicism. I acknowledge that the study of early twentieth-18 century holisms indicates that not all of them were in fact 'organ-19 icist' or 'biologistic'. That is, some of the original forms of self-20 described holism (I am not speaking of purported holists who 21 include such diverse figures as Spinoza, Hegel and Whitehead) 22 were primarily interested in systems as such, although they waver 23 on the issue, sometimes even seeking to derive principles from 24 biological systems for the understanding of other systems, as in 25 Walter Cannon's suggestion that 26 27 It seems not impossible that the means employed by the more 28 highly evolved animals for preserving uniform and stable their 29 internal economy (i.e., for preserving homeostasis) may present 30 some general principles for the establishment, regulation and 31 control of steady states, that would be suggestive for other kinds 32 12 M. KIRSCHNER, J GERHART, T. MITCHISON, Molecular "Vitalism", «Cell», 100, 2000, p. 87. 13 J. PEPPER, M. HERRON, Does biology need an organism concept? , pp. 625, 621. For more on the issue of 'what units do biologists count?' see the original article by E. CLARKE, The Multiple Realizability of Biological Individuals, «The Journal of Philosophy», CX (8), 2013, pp. 413-435. Articles The Risk of Biochauvinism 45 of organization-even social and industrial-which suffer from 1 distressing perturbations14. 2 3 What is holism? As mentioned above, it is intimately bound 4 up with systems theory, and with formally driven methods which 5 sought to give a new kind of coherence to biology, although this 6 'systems' interest was not always specifically biological. The 7 person often presented as the first theorist of holism, the South 8 African segregationist statesman (and specialist of Walt Whitman) 9 Jan Christiaan Smuts, as well as John von Neumann and Ludwig 10 von Bertalanffy later, wavers between defining holism as a total 11 systemic standpoint (with no particular reference to a special 12 status for living entities) and holism as an approach or model 13 which sheds particular light on embryology and how organisms 14 are not mere machines (with reference to teleology and the "his-15 torical" or "learned" character of organisms). 16 Deliberately or inadvertently mirroring various other epi-17 sodes in the history of mechanistic and organismic theories (in-18 cluding the Leibniz-Stahl debate), these original holists also speci-19 fy abstract terms on which ʻmerely mechanical aggregatesʼ are 20 different from genuine wholes, including chemical compounds, 21 and then specify that biological organisms are the exemplars of 22 ʻcreative wholesʼ, as Smuts calls them, i.e., wholes which create 23 structures different from their constituents or parts15. Here I will 24 not be concerned with holism as a general systems theory, but 25 rather with holism/organicism as a claim to define what is unique 26 in biological systems, i.e., a kind of biochauvinism. 27 28 29 14 W.B. CANNON, The Wisdom of the Body (1932), revised and expanded edition, Norton, New York, 1963, p. 25 (thanks to Yelda Nasifoglu for help with this reference). 15 J.C. SMUTS, Holism and Evolution (1926), Sherman Oaks, CA, Sierra Sunrise Books, 1999, pp. 140–141. The best general analysis and reconstruction of holism and organicism in early twentieth-century biological thought is E. PETERSONS' dissertation, Finding Mind, Form, Organism, and Person in a Reductionist Age, PhD, 2 vols., Program in History and Philosophy of Science, University of Notre Dame, 2010. Charles T. Wolfe Articles 46 II. Two critical remarks on two strangely apposite pitfalls of 1 holist-organicist theory: 2 (1) There is a strange appeal of Kantianism for these schools 3 of thought, notably Varela's16. There is something deeply flawed 4 in a procedure which invokes the authority of the Kantian 'pro-5 jective' approach to organisms17 in order to assert a set of onto-6 logical specificities about organisms. First, because this is precise-7 ly what the Kantian regulative ideal concept was designed to 8 avoid, in explicit contrast to what he would have called 'rational 9 metaphysics'. To provide an empirical set of criteria for why 10 living beings are special and to claim that this supports or is 11 supported by a Kantian framework, is not a good idea if this 12 framework explicitly rejects the idea of giving empirical defini-13 tions of organism, inasmuch as Kant's organism concept is ex-14 plicitly built around his notion of regulative ideal18. For Kant, 15 organism is a «reflective» construct rather than a «constitutive» 16 feature of reality, and reflective judgments are «incapable of 17 justifying any objective assertions»19. 18 Second, because it is not clear in any case why it counts as an 19 argument against 'mechanistic science' or 'reductionism' to simply 20 produce a list of key definitory features of Life, most classically, 21 self-preservation, self-reproduction, self-reparation, and self-22 regulation20, or in a more updated form, «reproduction, life-23 cycles, genetics, sex, developmental bottlenecks, germ-soma 24 16 Instances of such confusions can be found in A. WEBER, F.J. VARELA, Life after Kant: Natural purposes and the autopoietic foundations of biological individuality. «Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences», 1, 2002, pp. 97-125; S. KAUFFMAN, G. LONGO, No Law Entails The Evolution Of The Biosphere, 2011, http://lifeboat.com/blog/2011/07/no-law-entails-theevolution-of-the-biosphere; G. LONGO, M. MONTÉVIL, S. KAUFMAN, No entailing laws, but enablement in the evolution of the biosphere, 2012, http://arxiv.org/pdf/1201.2069.pdf 17 P. HUNEMAN (ed.), Understanding Purpose: Collected Essays on Kant and the Philosophy of Biology, University of Rochester Press, North American Kant Society Publication Series, Rochester, 2007. 18 I. KANT, Critique of Judgment (1790), tr. W. Pluhar, Hackett, Indianapolis, 1987, § 73, p. 276. 19 I. KANT, Critique of Judgment, § 67, p. 259; § 73, p. 277. 20 Cf. J. SCHLANGER, Les métaphores de l'organisme, Vrin, Paris, 1971, p. 14. Articles The Risk of Biochauvinism 47 separation, policing mechanisms, spatial boundaries or contiguity, 1 immune response, fitness maximization, cooperation and/or 2 conflict, codispersal, adaptations, metabolic autonomy, and func-3 tional integration»21 (but precisely, the list is neither absolute nor 4 stable, which is why many thinkers, including prominent biolo-5 gists, have declared that «Life as such does not exist»22), including 6 because mechanistic explanations have shown themselves to be 7 far more flexible and capable of integrating inter-level relations 8 than the depiction of them as taking apart systems into compo-9 nent parts and leaving them there like broken toys. 10 Another puzzling feature of these projects in theoretical bi-11 ology that invoke Kant but primarily seek to defend versions of 12 self-organization, might be expressed as: why the need for phi-13 losophy? Why run the risk of lapsing into a kind of naïve, indeed 14 precritical metaphysics of selfhood and interiority, or of anti-15 materialism? How could a working natural scientist take on board 16 proclamations such as Thompson's: «Life is not physical in the 17 standard materialist sense of purely external structure and func-18 tion. Life realizes a kind of interiority, the interiority of selfhood 19 and sense-making. We accordingly need an expanded notion of 20 the physical to account for the organism or living being»23? This 21 opposition between materialism and interiority is reminiscent of 22 post-Kantian denunciations of attempts to find the ʻseat of the 23 soulʼ. Further, here Thompson is calling for an expanded notion 24 of the physical, but often these kinds of theories, as I discuss 25 below, end up explicitly recommending that we disregard materi-26 ality altogether – ironically given the desire on the part of, e.g., 27 developmental systems theorists to move away from a disembod-28 ied understanding of biological information, towards a kind of 29 vital materiality. More generally, if theoretical biology wants 30 21 E. CLARKE, The Multiple Realizability of Biological Individuals, cit., p. 415. 22 A. SZENT-GYÖRGI, The Living State: With Observations on Cancer, Academic Press, New York, 1972, p. 1 (thanks to Gil C. Santos for this reference). 23 E. THOMPSON, Mind in life: biology, phenomenology, and the sciences of mind, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 2007, p. 238. Would Thompson also endorse Hegel's assertion that « The spatiality of the organism has no truth whatsoever for the soul » (G.W.F. HEGEL, Philosophy of Nature, trans. A.V. Miller, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1970, § 248Z, p. 18)? Charles T. Wolfe Articles 48 organizational concepts, seeks to steer our attention away from 1 the sirens of genetic reductionism and the informational gene, 2 why should this entail being anti-materialists?) And I've noted 3 elsewhere24 that I think the appeal of Moreno, Mossio et al. is that 4 they dispense with the somewhat foundationalist metaphysical 5 appeals of these other forms of holism. 6 (2) the problem of seeking to justifying the autonomy and/or 7 ontological uniqueness of Life, organisms, biological agents in 8 terms of empirical criteria, of a laundry list of properties of Life (from 9 the classic, self-preservation, self-reproduction, etc. as mentioned 10 above, to organizational closure, autonomy and so on).25 As I 11 wrote a few years ago, one thinker's homeostasis will always end 12 up being another thinker's homeostat26; or, one theorist's dynam-13 ic equilibrium of hearts, kidneys, termite mounds or chemotaxis 14 will always end up being another theorist's dynamic equilibrium 15 of storms or traffic jams. Not that all attempts to understand 16 such systems have to fall prey to the problems of a foundational 17 or otherwise ontologized empirical set of core criteria for Life: 18 Moreno and Mossio do not, as noted, and speaking of termite 19 mounds, when Turner presents them as a case of «embodied 20 homeostasis»27, he avoids these pitfalls since he does not ontologize 21 the property. The interaction between individual termites, and 22 between the termites and the termite mound, is a form of organi-23 zation rather than a special substance, a point made brilliantly by the 24 systems theorist von Bertalanffy: 25 26 Organisms exhibit the properties of life not because of some 27 special peculiarity of these compounds, but on account of the 28 heterogeneous system into which these compounds are articu-29 24 C.T. WOLFE, Do organisms have an ontological status?, «History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences», 32 (2-3), 2010, pp. 195-232. 25 For a more detailed, and sophisticated attempt to delineate a set of features of 'biological autonomy', see B. ROSSLENBROICH, On the Origin of Autonomy – A new look at the major transitions in evolution, Springer, Dordrecht, 2014. 26 That is, one thinker's purportedly core biological feature can be artificially modeled by another. C.T. WOLFE, Do organisms have an ontological status?. Thanks to Olivier Surel for suggesting I clarify this. 27 J.S. TURNER, The Tinkerer's Accomplice: How Design Emerges From Life Itself, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 2007, p. 27. Articles The Risk of Biochauvinism 49 lated. There is no "living substance" because the characteristic 1 of life is the organization of substances28. 2 3 I note in passing, because that is a topic for a different paper, 4 that one worthwhile holist-organicist strategy that does not invoke 5 definitional properties of life (or barely), is Kurt Goldstein's, in 6 his suggestion that rather than say what is unique about the bio-7 logical, we look to the observer: to be an organism is to have a point 8 of view on organisms; one which produces intelligibility, which 9 reveals organisms as meaning-producing beings29. This approach 10 – which has Kantian antecedents – is further extended after 11 Goldstein, by Georges Canguilhem. 12 Either way, waving lists of properties is a poor way to coun-13 ter the power of reductionism. The reductionist can always reply, 14 in Pierre Duhem's words, that a body is «only provisionally simple; 15 it has remained undecomposed until now, but tomorrow may 16 yield to a new means of analysis»30. 17 18 19 III. Holism or organicism, if it seeks to ontologize or other-20 wise absolutize features of life (digestion, proprioception, inten-21 tionality ...) can run into some categorical problems, that is, 22 category mistakes, but also the danger of making empirical claims 23 to have identified absolute traits of life – à la Elsasser's organis-24 mic laws, or Varela's «autopoiesis is an explication of the auton-25 omy of the living»31, or Thompson's statement of what we might 26 call the vulgate of biological holism, «parts arise from the whole. 27 Part and whole co-emerge and mutually specify each other»32, 28 28 L.V. BERTALLANFY, Modern theories of development, trans. J.H. Woodger, Oxford University Press, H. Milford, London, 1933, p. 48. 29 J. STAROBINSKI, L'idée d'organisme, Centre de Documentation Universitaire/Collège philosophique, Paris, 1956. The field of biosemiotics tarries at the limit between this flexible, non-literal idea of organisms as meaning-makers or world-makers, and a more stubbornly literal program. 30 P. DUHEM Le mixte et la combinaison chimique. Essai sur l'évolution d'une idée (1902); reprint, Fayard-Corpus, Paris 1985, p. 50. 31 F. VARELA, Autonomy and Autopoiesis, in G. Roth and H. Schwegler, eds., SelfOrganizing Systems, Campus Verlag, Frankfurt 1981, p. 14. 32 E. THOMPSON, Mind in life, cit., p. 38. Charles T. Wolfe Articles 50 itself not really an argument – which may in the end go up in 1 smoke, when it emerges that scientists cannot agree on a defini-2 tion of life, and thus find it more helpful to eliminate the concept. 3 If the concept of Life is rejected, as in Albert Szent-György's 4 «Life as such does not exist» or better-known, the partly per-5 formative statement by François Jacob, «On n'interroge plus la 6 vie aujourd'hui dans les laboratoires»33, claims to have found its 7 essential characteristics lose their foundation. 8 Further, sometimes the (former and current) holist and or-9 ganicist insistence on opposing the systems they lovingly study to 10 some apparently inferior opposed entity, whether matter itself, 11 machines, corpses or the dehumanized world of Scientific Revo-12 lution science, starts to sound ideological rather than scientific or 13 philosophically exploratory, even when it is put in deceptively 14 plain terms, such as here in Alva Noë's recent book Out of our 15 heads: «to do biology we need the resources to take up a non-16 mechanistic attitude to the organism»34. What would the mecha-17 nistic attitude be? That of Descartes (who wrote, «the preserva-18 tion of health has always been the principal end of my studies»35)? 19 Of Claude Bernard (for whom «what distinguishes a living ma-20 chine is not the nature of its physico-chemical properties, com-21 plex as they may be, but rather the creation of the machine which 22 develops under our eyes in conditions proper to itself and accord-23 ing to a definite idea which expresses the living being's nature and 24 the very essence of life»36)? Of the contemporary 'mechanist' 25 William Bechtel, for whom mechanism and organization stand in 26 33 F. JACOB, La logique du vivant, Gallimard, Paris, 1970, p. 320. See the interesting reflections on this issue in Michel Morange's review essay M. MORANGE Un retour du vitalisme ?, Histoire de la recherche contemporaine 2(2), 2013, pp. 150-155). 34 A. NOË, Out of Our Heads; Why You Are Not Your Brain, and Other Lessons from the Biology of Consciousness, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New York, 2009, p. 41. 35 In a letter to the Marquess of Newcastle, October 1645, in R. DESCARTES, OEuvres, eds. C. Adam and P. Tannery, 11 vols., Vrin, Paris 1964-1976, vol. IV, p. 329; The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, vol. 3: The correspondence, trans. J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, D. Murdoch and A. Kenny, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1985, p. 275. 36 C. BERNARD, An Introduction to the Study of Experimental Medicine (1865), Henry Schuman, New York, 1927, p. 93. Articles The Risk of Biochauvinism 51 a complex and fruitful interaction? Mechanism, Bechtel suggests, 1 can provide an adequate account of organization by «placing as 2 much emphasis on understanding the particular ways in which 3 biological mechanisms are organized as it has on discovering the 4 component parts of the mechanisms and their operations»37. But 5 this does not reduce to some pure mechanist ontology. In fact, 6 the holist/organicist standpoint minimally «remind[s] mechanists 7 of the shortfalls of the mechanistic accounts on offer», for ideas 8 such as «negative feedback, self-organizing positive feedback, and 9 cyclic organization are critical to explaining the phenomena 10 exhibited by living organism»38. 11 I say sometimes, since biochauvinism, or some weaker form of 12 it, need not be so ideological or oppositional. When it is not, it 13 can be appealing as a stubbornly realist or materialist-friendly 14 emphasis on genuine biological constraints. Consider the (some-15 what restrictive) opposition Andy Clark proposes, between two 16 arguments for embodiment (and here for 'embodiment' we could 17 substitute 'biochauvinism', 'organismicity', etc.): 18 19 One of those strands depicts the body as special, and the fine 20 details of a creature's embodiment as a major constraint on the 21 nature of its mind: a kind of new-wave body-centrism. The oth-22 er depicts the body as just one element in a kind of equal-23 partners dance between brain, body and world, with the nature 24 of the mind fixed by the overall balance thus achieved: a kind of 25 extended functionalism (now with an even broader canvas for 26 multiple realizability than ever before)39. 27 28 I daresay most materialists except ones especially enamored 29 of pure physics would want to say that «the fine details of a crea-30 ture's embodiment» count as «a major constraint on the nature of 31 its mind»; yet these fine details by no means imply that « the body 32 37 W. BECHTEL, Biological mechanisms: Organized to maintain autonomy, in F. BOOGERD, F.J. BRUGGEMAN, J-H.S. HOFMEYER, AND H.V. WESTERHOFF (eds.), Systems Biology: Philosophical Foundations, Elsevier, Amsterdam, 2007, p. 270. 38 Ivi, pp. 296-297. 39 A. CLARCK, Pressing the flesh: a tension in the study of the embodied embedded mind ?, Philos. Phenomenol. Res., 76(1), 2008, p. 56. Charles T. Wolfe Articles 52 is special» in any way, especially not that of an embodied or 1 enactivist phenomenology founding itself on a claim of a founda-2 tional interiority – recall, again, Thompson's «Life is not physical 3 in the standard materialist sense of purely external structure and 4 function. Life realizes a kind of interiority, the interiority of 5 selfhood and sense-making», to which we can add Varela's claim 6 in a late paper that his project is to «reintroduce the subject into 7 biology»40. Now, I am not rejecting as anti-naturalistic the latter 8 part of Thompson's claim – namely, that organisms are engaged 9 in 'sense-making', an idea we could fill in either 'biosemiotically' 10 (with Uexküll's analysis of Umwelt, in which «even the simplest 11 living organism creates a set of preferential partitions of the 12 world, converting interactions with their surrounding media into 13 elementary norms or values, as we will explain more extensively 14 below. And here is where the nature of living systems as autono-15 mous agents, as inventors of worlds with meaning, becomes 16 manifest»41) or in 'constructivist' terms, appealing to Kurt Gold-17 stein's idea that an organism, unlike a skeleton or a watch, is an 18 meaning-producing entity. But these attempts to integrate 'sense-19 making' or 'world-making' into the province of biology have 20 nothing to do with appeals to «the interiority of selfhood» or a 21 «reintroduction of the subject into biology». 22 Selfhood or subjectivity is not a useful biological concept, 23 any more than the soul was a useful medical concept (thus in the 24 eighteenth century, the Montpellier vitalist physician Ménuret de 25 Chambaud could seek to 'eliminate' soul from medical discourse, 26 in an entry on «Death» in the Encyclopédie42). There is too much 27 reliance here on an appeal to interiority, as if it was an unchal-28 lengeable philosophical concept. As Jean-Marie Schaeffer says, 29 «In phenomenology, the problematic of embodiment (corporéité) is 30 part of an approach that continues to accept the epistemic privi-31 40 A. WEBER, F.J. VARELA, Life after Kant, cit., p. 117. 41 K. RUIZ-MIRAZO, A. MORENO, Autonomy in evolution: from minimal to complex life, Synthese, 185 (1), 2012, p. 28. 42 J-J. Menuret de Chambaud, Mort, «Encyclopédie», vol. X, Briasson, Paris, 1765, p. 718b. Articles The Risk of Biochauvinism 53 lege of consciousness's self-investigation as axiomatic»43. From a 1 naturalistic standpoint, 2 3 there are no intrinsically subjective or perspectival facts that are 4 either the special objects of self-regarding attitudes or facts of 5 "what it is like". There are only states of subjects that both 6 function in a particularly intimate way within those subjects and 7 have the subjects themselves and their other states as inevitable 8 referents. And that is all there is to "subjectivity"44. 9 10 No one prevents philosophers from meditating on the inner 11 life, subjectivity or interiority. Thinkers from Augustine to Paul 12 Ricoeur have done so brilliantly45. But again, not only is selfhood 13 or interiority not a recognized biological concept; it is unclear 14 how it could play even a heuristic role therein (as opposed, e.g., 15 to that of organization). To say it more positively, even if one is 16 interested, not in living systems in general, but in 'minded' living 17 systems, it remains the case that «things have a cognitive life 18 because intelligence exists primarily as an enactive relation be-19 tween and among people and things, not as a within-intracranial 20 representation»46. We are better off thinking in terms of relations, 21 systems and interaction than in terms of a substantival life-force, 22 selfhood or interiority. But focusing on relations and networks 23 should not mean leaving out the materiality: «system thinking does 24 not imply forgetting about the material mechanisms that are 25 crucial to trigger off a biological type of phenomenon/behavior; 26 43 J.-M. SCHAEFFER, La fin de l'exception humaine, Gallimard, Paris, 2007, p. 118. 44 W.G. LYCAN, What is the 'Subjectivity' of the Mental? Philosophical Perspectives 4: Action Theory and the Philosophy of Mind, 1990, p. 126. 45 For a critique, see C.T. WOLFE, « Éléments pour une théorie matérialiste du soi », in F. Pépin, ed., La Circulation entre les savoirs au siècle des Lumières, Hermann, Paris, 2011, pp. 123-149. 46 L. MALAFOURIS, C. RENFREW (eds.), The cognitive life of things: recasting the boundaries of the mind, McDonald Institute for Archaeological Research Publications, Cambridge, 2008, Introduction, p. 4. One can also be more charitable to Thompson's enactivism, as he is not always unhappily insisting on a foundational interiority (what some would call 'internalism'); he also describes living interiority as «compris[ing] the self-production of an inside that specifies an outside to which that inside is constitutively and normatively related» (E. THOMPSON, Mind in life, p. 225). Charles T. Wolfe Articles 54 rather, it means putting the emphasis on the interactive processes 1 that make it up, that is, on the dynamic organization in which 2 biomolecules (or, rather, their precursors) actually get integrat-3 ed»47. 4 5 6 IV. In sum, holism/organicism can succumb to two major 7 kinds of temptation: it can present itself as an empirical theory, 8 providing the key empirical characteristics of organisms, over and 9 against the rest of the natural world. Or, conversely, there is what 10 one might call the transcendental problem, in the sense of a 11 transcendentalizing of organism, or the flesh, or embodiment. 12 One can indeed be reluctant to conceive of the organism in 13 purely computational terms without invoking a mysticism of the 14 flesh (from Merleau-Ponty's appeals to transubstantiation in 15 seeking to highlight what is unique in the sensation of an embod-16 ied being48 to Thompson's denial that «life is physical in the 17 materialist sense»). Here, a third problem emerges: the addiction 18 to formalisms at the expense of materiality. 19 Faced with certain holistic excesses, I am not, to repeat, ad-20 vocating the extreme prudence of instrumentalism, in which the 21 moral when it comes to the material realization of biological 22 systems might be 'handsome is as handsome does'. Contempo-23 rary holists are often still potentially beholden to a certain kind of 24 vitalism or «biochauvinism»49; but when, out of extreme caution, 25 47 K. RUIZ-MIRAZO, A. MORENO Basic Autonomy as a Fundamental Step in the Synthesis of Life. Artificial Life, 10, 2004, p. 238. 48 « Just as the sacrament not only symbolizes . . . an operation of Grace, but is also the real presence of God . . . in the same way the sensible has not only a motor and vital significance but is nothing other than a way of being in the world that our body takes over [...] sensation is literally a communion » (M. MERLEAU-PONTY, Phénoménologie de la perception, Gallimard, Paris, 1945, p. 245). 49 Again, this is not an essay in the historical epistemology of organisms, or a suggestion in how to rethink our presuppositions about vitalism, e.g. by revisiting its history. For some efforts in this direction, see C.T. WOLFE, From substantival to functional vitalism and beyond, or from Stahlian animas to Canguilhemian attitudes. Eidos, 14, 2011, pp. 212-235 ; S. NORMANDIN, C.T. WOLFE (eds.), Vitalism and the scientific image in post-Enlightenment life science, 1800-2010, Springer, Dordrecht, 2013. Articles The Risk of Biochauvinism 55 they reduce their claims to mere heuristics, conversely, they risk 1 losing sight of a certain kind of organizational « thickness », a 2 «vital materiality» in Wheeler's terms50; he opposes vital to imple-3 mentational materiality, without really fleshing out the distinction, so 4 to speak, but I assume it is similar to what an earlier, perhaps the 5 first theorist of vital materiality, Denis Diderot, expressed in a 6 nice metaphor: «What a difference there is, between a sensing, 7 living watch and a golden, iron, silver or copper watch!»51. 8 If there was only implementational materiality, (i) we would 9 fail to grasp any meaningful difference between a living watch 10 and a silver or copper watch – and please note, this difference 11 need not be justified in terms of a vital force, an entelechy, an élan 12 vital, a centralizing soul or self, an irreducible intentionality or 13 first-personness52 – and (ii) we would lapse into a kind of lazy 14 multiple realizability position53 which disregards the material in 15 which a system is realized, of the sort classically stated by Varela 16 and later, Robert Rosen. Here is Varela: 17 18 We are thus saying that what defines a machine's organization is 19 relations, and hence that the organization of a machine has no 20 connection with materiality, that is, with the properties of the 21 components that define them as physical entities. In the organi-22 zation of a machine, materiality is implied but does not enter per 23 se.54 24 25 50 M. WHEELER, Mind, things and materiality, in L. MALAFOURIS, C. RENFREW (eds.), The cognitive life of things, pp. 29-37. 51 D. DIDEROT, Éléments de physiologie, in OEuvres complètes, dir. H. Dieckmann, J. Proust, J. Varloot, Éditions Hermann, Paris, 1975-, XVII, p. 335. 52 Contra the Varela first-person business (e.g. F.J. VARELA, J. SHEAR, Firstperson methodologies: why, when and how, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 6(2-3) 1999, pp. 1-14). 53 See the excellent history and analysis of multiple realizability arguments in J. BICKLE, Multiple Realizability. In E. ZALTA (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/multiple-realizability/, 1998; updated 2013. 54 F.J. VARELA, Principles of Biological Autonomy, Elsevier North Holland, New York, 1979, p. 9, cit. in W. BECHETEL, Biological mechanisms, cit., p. 294. To be fair, in context Varela is not calling for multiple realizability, but it is not clear why or how he is not. Charles T. Wolfe Articles 56 Using much the same language, Rosen describes his ap-1 proach as «relational», which we might think of as congenial to 2 the study of specific biological forms of organization, but no: he 3 adds that the relational approach aims to «throw away the matter 4 and keep the underlying organization»55. This is like the central 5 dogma of functionalism, i.e., multiple realizability, by virtue of 6 which the materiality of systems is held to be irrelevant: as ex-7 pressed classically by the arch-functionalist Hilary Putnam, «we 8 could be made of Swiss cheese and it wouldn't matter»56. 9 To conclude, there is something endearing about vitalist 10 claims especially when they don't invoke or rely on a foundational 11 subjectivity, including because they don't revert to explaining 12 biological systems (embodied agents) in fully systemic, formalized 13 terms. So is a small amount of biochauvinism acceptable, or even 14 desirable? If it means the effort to grasp the kind of vital material-15 ity characteristic of biological systems – their organization, in the 16 language of Moreno, and also Bechtel, who, like Scott Turner, 17 invokes Claude Bernard as an important predecessor of this 18 view57. Recall that for Bernard, «In order to study the phenomena 19 pertaining to living beings and discover the laws that govern 20 them, it is not necessary to know the essence of life itself»58. We 21 could enlist Bernard in support of the view that an investigation 22 of vital materiality need not transcendentalize Life or organism. 23 But is this materiality «substance» or «organization»? It is not 24 quite a biochauvinism, or very weakly, because it does not posit a 25 vital substance, a foundational interiority or an absolute set of 26 criteria for Life: recall von Bertalanffy's observation, «There is no 27 55 R. ROSEN, Life Itself, Columbia University Press, New York, 1991, p. 119; cf. «throwing away the physics and keeping the underlying organization» (p. 280). 56 H. PUTNAM, Philosophy and our Mental Life, in Putnam, Mind, Language, and Reality. Philosophical Papers, vol. 2, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1975, p. 291. 57 J. S. TURNER, cit., chapter 2 (on Bernard machines); idem, Homeostasis and the forgotten vitalist roots of adaptation, in S. NORMANDIN, C.T. WOLFE (eds.), Vitalism and the scientific image, cit. 58 C. BERNARD, Histoire de l'expérimentation physiologique – l'art d'expérimenter sur les êtres vivants, Revue des cours scientifiques de la France et de l'étranger, 6e année, Germer Baillière, Paris, 1869, p. 194. Articles The Risk of Biochauvinism 57 "living substance" because the characteristic of life is the organi-1 zation of substances»59. However, as I've said earlier, a focus on 2 organization and relations need not imply that we sacrifice its 3 materiality in favour of 'Swiss cheese' multiple realizability. A 4 biochauvinism implies a degree of ontological commitment (what 5 I termed a «weakly ontological» view of organism in my earlier 6 reflection on the topic60). A tangibility, implicit in what I above 7 pointed to – that most materialists can accept a degree of embod-8 iment (a.k.a. biochauvinism), granting that facts about bodies can 9 act as ʻmajor constraintsʼ on facts about minds. Yet this tangibil-10 ity, this embodiment appeal to no foundational interiority, no 11 special inner life. 12 My suggestion then is that it should be possible to articulate 13 a concept of biological holism or organicism (whether it is locat-14 ed in systems biology, theoretical biology, evolutionary biology or 15 a philosophical reconstruction of several of these) which dispens-16 es with the first-person obsession or the transubstantiation-17 friendly invocation of an ontology of the body as corps propre, 18 although this is not the same as Clark's, Wheeler's or Malafouris' 19 attention to vital materiality. Such a view is neither an empirical, 20 laundry list 'biochauvinism' nor a metaphysical 'vitalism'. 21 22 Acknowledgments 23 Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Embod-24 iment and Adaptation Workshop, University of Pittsburgh, Cen-25 ter for Philosophy of Science (March 2011) and ISHPSSB, Mont-26 pellier (July 2013). Thanks in particular to Matteo Mossio for his 27 comments, although he would not endorse the contents of the 28 paper. 29 30 59 L.V. BERTALLANFY, Modern theories of development, trans. J.H. Woodger, Oxford University Press, H. Milford, London, 1933, p. 48. 60 C.T. WOLFE, Do organisms have an ontological status?, cit.

TEORIE VĚDY / THEORY OF SCIENCE / XXXVIII / 2016 / 2 ////// studie / article /////////////////////////////////////////// POJETÍ MECHANISMU V SOUČASNÉ TEORII VĚDY Abstrakt: Článek podává přehled o pojetí mechanismu v tzv. nové mechanistické fi losofi i (NMF). Nejdříve je popsán vznik a hlavní principy NMF. Je ukázáno, že NMF vznikla do značné míry jako kritická reakce na, do té doby převažující, logický empirismus. Dále jsou představeny hlavní defi niční znaky mechanismu (odpovědnost za daný jev, entity, aktivity a uspořádání), které jsou poté jednotlivě rozebrány. Na závěr jsou diskutovány přednosti a omezení NMF. Je argumentováno, že NMF nabídla nový a realističtější pohled na způsob, jakým se věda dělá a jak se dochází k vědeckým objevům. Má i konstruktivní preskriptivní charakter, neboť povzbuzuje vědce k přemýšlení o vysvětlení jevů prostřednictvím mechanismů. Na straně druhé, pro vysvětlení komplexních jevů jsou heuristiky dekompozice a lokalizace, které tvoří jádro „tradičního" mechanistického přístupu, pouze prvotními aproximacemi a je potřeba je doplňovat dalšími, dynamičtějšími přístupy. Klíčová slova: mechanismus; nová mechanistická fi losofi e; fi losofi e vědy; komplexita Th e Notion of Mechanism in Current Th eory of Science Abstract: Th e article provides a review of the notion of mechanism in the new mechanical philosophy (NMP). First, the origins and main principles of NMP are described. It is shown that NMP has originated mainly as a result of critique of logical empiricism. Th en the main defi ning features of mechanism (responsibility for phenomenon, entities and activities, and their organizations) are specifi ed and described in-depth. Th e article concludes with strong and weak points of NMP. It is argued that NMP provides a new and more realistic perspective on how science is actually realized, and how discoveries happen. It also has constructive normative appeal as it encourages scientists to look for mechanisms that can actually explain some phenomena. At the same time, however, in explaining complex phenomena the heuristics of decomposition and localization must be accompanied by other, more dynamic approaches. Keywords: mechanisms; new mechanical philosophy; philosophy of science; complexity ARNOŠT VESELÝ Katedra veřejné a sociální politiky / Institut sociologických studií Fakulta sociálních věd Univerzity Karlovy v Praze U kříže 8, 158 00 Praha 5 Jinonice email / [email protected] Teorie vědy 2016-2 text.indd 159 24.11.2016 15:04:46 160 Arnošt Veselý Úvod Na konci 90. let 20. století se začal ve fi losofi i a teorii vědy formovat nový přístup, který je označován jako nová mechanistická fi losofi e (dále NMF). Tento směr brzy získal mnoho příznivců, o čemž svědčí jak množství článků publikovaných v posledních patnácti letech na toto téma, tak vysoká míra jejich citovanosti. NMF není jednotný a ucelený směr. Jde spíše o nový rámec pro uvažování o mnoha fi losofi ckých předpokladech vědy v mnoha oblastech, zejména pak ale v biologii, neurovědě a psychologii. V poslední době se s ním stále častěji operuje také v sociálních vědách. Poněkud překvapivě se tento směr do českého vědního diskurzu prosadil jen minimálně. Přesněji řečeno, s pojmem „mechanismus" se setkáváme poměrně často, ale operuje se s ním jako s něčím, co je samozřejmé a co není potřeba dále vysvětlovat. Úplně se přitom opomíjí hlubší (nejen) fi losofi cká debata o tom, co tento pojem přesně znamená a v čem se mechanistické přemýšlení odlišuje od předchozích směrů. Cílem této stati je tak utřídit a shrnout současný stav poznání v této oblasti a zároveň kriticky diskutovat možnosti a meze tohoto přístupu. Stať je strukturována následujícím způsobem. Nejdříve stručně popisuji vývoj NMF a její fi losofi cké základy. Dále se podrobněji věnuji klíčovému pojmu – mechanismu. Rozebírám klíčové součásti „mechanismu". V závěru pak diskutuji přednosti a omezení mechanistického přístupu. Zamýšlím se také nad tím, nakolik je tento přístup uplatnitelný i mimo kontext přírodních věd, především pak ve společenských vědách. Vznik nové mechanistické školy Přestože je jakékoli zobecnění vždy ošidné, s jistou dávkou zjednodušení lze říci, že ve 20. století byl dominantním paradigmatem fi losofi e a teorie vědy především logický empirismus, který se zaměřoval hlavně na abstraktní rysy vědy a relativně malou pozornost věnoval reálné vědecké praxi.1 Oborem, ze kterého se zejména čerpala inspirace a příklady, byla fyzika. V klasických 1 Carl F. CRAVER – James TABERY, „Mechanisms in Science," [online]. 2015. In: ZALTA, E. N. (ed.), Th e Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Dostupné z: <http:// plato.stanford.edu/entries/science-mechanisms/> [cit. 14.8.2016]. Tato studie vznikla v rámci projektu Grantové agentury České republiky „Komparativní výzkum cílových populací v České republice: záleží na obsahu veřejných politik?" (Registrační číslo 1 6–14292S). Autor děkuje dvěma anonymním recenzentům za podnětné připomínky k první verzi článku. Teorie vědy 2016-2 text.indd 160 24.11.2016 15:04:46 161 Pojetí mechanismu v současné teorii vědy pracích R. Carnapa, C. G. Hempela či K. R. Poppera byl hlavní důraz kladen na logickou tvorbu vědeckých teorií spíše než na to, jak v realitě skutečně dochází k vědeckým objevům. Věda byla vykreslena jako činnost, ve které se budují vnitřně konzistentní teorie, chápané jako soustava uspořádaných axiómů. Explanace pak spočívala v logické dedukci. Logický empirismus čelil silné kritice již dlouhou dobu, přinejmenším pak od 60. let 20. století.2 Vznik nové mechanistické fi losofi e na konci minulého století lze do značné míry chápat právě jako reakci na nespokojenost s tradičním přístupem ke klíčovým pojmům fi losofi e vědy, jako jsou explanace, kauzalita nebo redukce, a obecně pak s představou procesu, kterým dochází k vědeckému poznání. Podle některých kritiků logického empirismu je hlavním rysem vědy (laboratorní i teoretické) odhalování mechanismů a neschopnost tradiční fi losofi e vědy toto připustit je považována za její velké omezení. NMF nelze prezentovat jako jednotnou a koherentní školu. To, co spojuje autory NMF, je názor, že značná část vědecké činnosti v různých vědních disciplínách (ať už v laboratořích, nebo mimo ně) spočívá v hledání a odhalování mechanismů. Historii vědy – a všechny velké objevy – je pak třeba interpretovat primárně jako odhalení nových, doposud neznámých mechanismů. NMF byla od počátku rozvíjena především autory, kteří měli zájem o vědeckou praxi (tedy o to, jak se věda reálně dělá) a historii vědy. Zároveň jejich pozornost byla upřena spíše k biologii než k fyzice. Jejich původní příklady mechanismů jsou tedy právě z oblasti biologie, na kterých zejména ukazují nevhodnost mnohých předpokladů logického empirismu. Myšlenky blízké NMF lze zaznamenat již v 60. letech 20. století a objevovaly se právě v souvislosti s kritikou logického empirismu. Nicméně za první koherentní vyjádření myšlenek NMF se považuje až kniha Bechtela a Richardsona Discovering Complexity, publikovaná v roce 1993 (nezměněné vydání, ovšem s novým úvodem, vyšlo v roce 2010).3 Bechtel a Richardson, ačkoli fi losofové, svoji práci založili na důkladné analýze příkladů toho, jak se dělala či dělá skutečná věda v oblasti biologie. Jejich cílem bylo na zá2 Herbert A. SIMON, Th e Sciences of the Artifi cial. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1996 [1962]; Imre LAKATOS, Th e Methodology of Scientifi c Research Programmes: Volume 1: Philosophical Papers. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1980; Th omas S. KUHN, Th e Structure of Scientifi c Revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1962. 3 William BECHTEL – Robert C. RICHARDSON, Discovering Complexity. Decomposition and Localisation as Strategies in Scientifi c Research. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 2010 [1993]. Teorie vědy 2016-2 text.indd 161 24.11.2016 15:04:46 162 kladě podrobných případových studií vytvořit dynamický model vědeckého teoretizování o komplexních systémech, tak jak skutečně probíhá ve vědecké praxi (spíše než normativní model toho, jak by probíhat měla). Zjistili, že výzkumníci, jejichž práci analyzovali, se primárně nezajímali o odkrývání všeobecně platných zákonů (jak to předpokládá logický pozitivismus), ale místo toho se snažili dobrat toho, jak určité prvky pozorovaného systému vedou k určitému pozorovanému jevu. Jejich výzkumné heuristiky byly založeny na dekompozici pozorovaného jevu (rozdělení systému na uchopitelné části) a lokalizaci (identifi kaci aktivit a funkcí). Často přitom přemýšleli o své práci jako o hledání a odkrývání kauzálních mechanismů, nikoli jako o budování vnitřně konzistentních teorií složených z na sebe navazujících tvrzení. Brzy na to Glennan4 a další rozvinuli některé z těchto myšlenek. Do značné míry přelomovou prací se pak stal článek Machamera, Dardena a Cravera,5 kteří propojili doposud formulované myšlenky v konzistentní celek. MDC (jak je tato práce někdy ve zkratce označována) argumentovali, že fi losofi e biologie, ale možná celá fi losofi e vědy by měla být restrukturována dle mechanistických principů. Tato práce vzbudila velký ohlas a na jejím základě byla publikována celá řada dalších prací, jejichž autoři se snažili domyslet různé aspekty MDC.6 Protože mnoho těchto prací bylo vzájemně částečně protichůdných, začaly vznikat i pokusy o shrnutí této diskuse, včetně návrhů „základního minima", které je společné celému NMF.7 Diskuse o povaze NMF jsou stále velmi intenzivní a určitě nikoli ukončené. Dávno překročily rámec biologie i fi losofi e vědy jako takové. Ačkoli se NMF rozvíjela relativně izolovaně od dalších oborů, nelze opomenout, že paralelně se koncept mechanismů začal rozvíjet i v dalších disciplínách, a to zejména ve společenských vědách (především pak v sociologii a politologii). Sociálně-vědní metodologie přitom byla inspirována mnohými myšlenkami NMF.8 Také v sociálních vědách byla hlavním „spouštěčem" zájmu 4 Stuart GLENNAN, „Capacities, Universality, and Singularity." Philosophy of Science, roč. 64, 1997, č. 4, s. 605–626. 5 Peter MACHAMER – Lindley DARDEN – Carl F. CRAVER, „Th inking about Mechanisms." Philosophy of Science, roč. 67, 2000, č. 1, s. 1–25. 6 Přestože jde stále o relativně „mladý" článek, ke dni 16. 8. 2016 měla tato stať ve výběrové databázi Web of Knowledge 608 citací. 7 Phyllis ILLARI – Jon WILLIAMSON, „What is a Mechanism? Th inking About Mechanisms Across the Sciences." European Journal for Philosophy of Science, roč. 2, 2012, č. 1, s. 119–135. 8 Zajímavé přitom je, že vliv sociálně-vědních diskusí o mechanismech na NMF se zdá být relativně malý, a to i přesto, že některé myšlenky zde byly zformulovány ještě před zformováním NMF. Arnošt Veselý Teorie vědy 2016-2 text.indd 162 24.11.2016 15:04:46 163 o mechanismy nespokojenost s dosavadními přístupy k analýze sociálních jevů. Terčem kritiky přitom byl a je především empirický výzkum založený výhradně na statistické analýze dat a spočívající v prostém konstatování o kovariaci dvou proměnných nebo událostí.9 Podle mnohých autorů přitom cílem sociálně-vědního výzkumu není jen prokázání korelace či asociace jevů, ale zároveň je třeba se pokusit vysvětlit, proč k této korelaci dochází, specifi kovat sociální „cogs and wheels".10 NMF se od počátku vymezovala – a dodnes vymezuje – zejména proti logickému pozitivismu a logickému empirismu. Sami autoři mají někdy tendenci prezentovat NMF jako radikální a nesmiřitelný rozchod s dosavadní teorií a fi losofi í vědy. Prezentovat NMF a logický empirismus jako jednoznačná opozita by ovšem bylo příliš zjednodušující, a to i z toho důvodu, že oba myšlenkové směry jsou značně široké a zahrnují celou řadu různých pod-směrů, které mají odlišný přístup k ontologii i epistemologii (logický empirismus je přitom v NMF často prezentován ve značně vyhraněné a zjednodušené podobě). V mnoha ohledech je NMF k dosavadním přístupům spíše komplementární než kontradiktorní. Jde spíše o otázku důrazu na jednotlivé aspekty vědeckého poznání než o zpochybnění všech premis, na základě kterých stojí teorie a fi losofi e vědy (viz dále v textu). Pojetí a defi nice mechanismu Pojem mechanismus je odvozený z řeckého pojmu méchané (μηχανή), tedy nástroj nebo stroj.11 Sám termín mechanismus začal být používán od 17. století a setkáme se s ním například v práci Reného Descarta. I když metafora stroje hrála při vzniku NMF důležitou roli, dnešní NMF se explicitně nehlásí k žádnému tradičnímu fi losofi ckému směru (například mechanicismu). Bechtel a Richardson ve své seminální práci tvrdí, že používají sousloví mechanistická explanace pro zdůraznění faktu, že považují (biologické) systémy za analogické ke strojům: „Stroj je kombinace provázaných částí, z nichž každá má svoji vlastní funkci, které jsou ovšem zároveň poskládány takovým způsobem, že ve svém výsledku přispívají k chování celého sys9 Peter HEDSTRÖM, Dissecting the Social: On the Principles of Analytical Sociology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2005. 10 Jon ELSTER, Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1989. Tedy, volně přeloženo, jak do sebe zapadají jednotlivá „ozubená kolečka". 11 Eduard Jan DIJKSTERHUIS, Th e Mechanization of the World Picture. Princeton: Princeton University Press 1986. Pojetí mechanismu v současné teorii vědy Teorie vědy 2016-2 text.indd 163 24.11.2016 15:04:46 164 tému. Mechanistické vysvětlení identifi kuje tyto součásti a jejich organizaci a ukazuje, jak je chování daného stroje výsledkem působení těchto součástí a jejich organizace".12 V poslední době se ovšem mnozí autoři NMF explicitně distancují od představy mechanismu jako stroje a především pak od představy zjednodušeného světa, ve kterém je jakákoli pozorovaná změna vyvolána omezeným množstvím sil.13 Sami Bechtel a Richardson svoje pojetí později zmírnili s tím, že mechanismy mohou být nesmírně komplexní, dekompozice na dílčí části často velmi složitá, stejně jako stanovení procesů, jak jednotlivé části na sebe navazují, protože tento proces často není lineární a sekvenční. Přidrželi se ovšem názoru, že lokalizace a dekompozice jsou užitečnými heuristikami vědeckého zkoumání i v případě velmi komplexních jevů. Ačkoli bychom tedy mohli pojem mechanismus intuitivně asociovat se stroji a mechanickou fyzikou, v dnešním pojetí NMF má mechanismus k (jednoduchému) stroji daleko. Podle defi nice Machamera, Dardena a Cravera jsou mechanismy „entity a aktivity zorganizované takovým způsobem, který vede k pravidelné změně startovních (původních) podmínek v závěrečné (ukončené) podmínky."14 Podle Bechtela a Abrahamsena je mechanismus „struktura vykonávající určitou funkci jako důsledek operací jednotlivých komponent a jejich organizace. Zorganizované fungování daného mechanismu je zodpovědné za jeden či více jevů."15 Existuje celá řada dalších defi nic.16 Vymezení různých autorů je často odlišné. Nicméně NMF má také určité společné rysy. Toto „společné minimum" asi nejlépe shrnuli v nedávné, ale již hojně citované, práci Illari a Williamson, kteří nabízejí následující defi nici: „Mechanismus nějakého 12 BECHTEL – RICHARDSON, Discovering Complexity, s. 17. 13 Holly ANDERSEN, „A Field Guide to Mechanisms: Part I." Philosophy Compass, roč. 9, 2014, č. 4, s. 274–283; Holly ANDERSEN, „A Field Guide to Mechanisms: Part II." Philosophy Compass, roč. 9, 2014, č. 4, s. 284–293. 14 MACHAMER – DARDEN – CRAVER, „Th inking about mechanisms," s. 3. 15 William BECHTEL – Adele ABRAHAMSEN, „Explanation: A Mechanist Alternative." Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, roč. 36, 2005, č. 2, s. 423 (421–441). 16 Samostatnou kapitolou jsou přitom různé pojetí a defi nice z oboru sociálních věd. Již v roce 2001 Mahoney (James MAHONEY, „Beyond Correlational Analysis: Recent Innovations in Th eory and Method." Sociological Forum, roč. 16, 2001, č. 3, s. 575–593) identifi koval 24 různých defi nic kauzálních mechanismů v sociálních vědách navržených v předchozích 35 letech. K těmto defi nicím přibylo mnoho dalších. V této stati se ovšem zabýváme jen vymezením mechanismů ve fi losofi i vědy. Arnošt Veselý Teorie vědy 2016-2 text.indd 164 24.11.2016 15:04:46 165 jevu se skládá z entit a aktivit uspořádaných takovým způsobem, že tyto entity a aktivity jsou odpovědné za daný jev."17 Tato defi nice navazuje na mnoho předchozích defi nic a diskusí (například z hojně citované defi nice MDC si bere pojmy aktivit a entit). Její vyšší obecnost je dána tím, že se snaží zachytit to, co je všem (nebo velké většině) mechanistických přístupů společné. Zároveň se ovšem Illari a Williamson vymezují proti defi nicím, které jsou podle nich nepřesné nebo příliš omezující. Co tedy, podle těchto autorů, mechanismem není a proč? Za prvé, mechanismus nelze charakterizovat jako strukturu ani jako systém. Myšlenka struktury totiž podle nich implikuje jistou míru nepružnosti. Systém je sice, oproti struktuře, dynamičtější a fl exibilnější, ale zase vykazuje jistou míru vnitřní koherence a komplexnosti, kterou ne všechny mechanismy mají. Některé mechanismy například obsahují dočasný vznik určitých entit, které brzy zanikají (například v případě syntézy proteinů mRNA). Některé mechanismy jsou komplexní, jiné jsou však relativně jednoduché. Jak dále dovozuje Glennan ve svých novějších pracích,18 konfi gurace jednotlivých částí (entit) mechanismu není, na rozdíl od systému, stabilní. Illari a Williamson dále v kritice defi nice MDC namítají, že mechanismy nemají žádné vstupní a výstupní podmínky. Argumentují, že některé mechanismy (jako je například Krebsův cyklus) nemají jasný ani začátek, ani konec. Některé mechanismy mají cyklickou a nepřetržitou povahu. Nyní tedy již k pozitivnímu vymezení mechanismu dle Illariho a Williamsona. Podle nich všechna vysvětlení prostřednictvím mechanismů začínají 1) identifi kací jevu nebo jevů, které mají být vysvětleny; 2) pokračují dekompozicí do entit a aktivit, které jsou pro daný jev relevantní; 3) stanovují organizaci entit a aktivit, která vede k danému jevu. Odhalování mechanismů je často iterativní a neuspořádané, ale vždy zahrnuje odhalení těchto tří prvků. Illari a Williamson potom dále specifi kují tyto tři základní charakteristiky: 1) odpovědnost za daný jev, 2) entity a aktivity a 3) organizace aktivit. Proces objevování v různých vědních disciplínách je složitý a iterativní, ale vždy zahrnuje hledání a popsání entit a aktivit v dané oblasti, vzájemné uspořádání těchto entit a aktivit a zároveň odhalení jevů, za které je toto uspořádání entit a aktivit odpovědné. 17 ILLARI – WILLIAMSON, „What is a Mechanism?" s. 120. 18 Stuart GLENNAN, „Ephemeral Mechanisms and Historical Explanation." Erkenntnis, roč. 72, 2010, č. 2, s. 251–266. Pojetí mechanismu v současné teorii vědy Teorie vědy 2016-2 text.indd 165 24.11.2016 15:04:47 166 Charakteristickým rysem mechanistického uvažování je využívání různých grafi ckých znázornění (diagramů, schémat atd.) k reprezentaci mechanismů a uvažování o nich.19 To představuje výrazný odklon od logického pozitivismu, kde jsou předkládané zákony vyjádřeny slovně či v podobě logických symbolů. Typicky v NMF je mechanismus představen v podobě diagramu, který je hlavním nositelem informace, zatímco slovní doprovod je jen pro lepší pochopení. Díky počítačovým animacím je dnes možné zachytit mechanismy i v dynamické podobě. Některé mechanismy jsou ale natolik komplexní a složité, že je nejde zachytit prostřednictvím grafu či vizuálního modelu a je potřeba se spolehnout na matematické modelování.20 Přes výše shrnuté shody existuje ale i mnoho nedořešených otázek, ve kterých nepanuje shoda. Jednou z nich je ontologický status mechanismů. Jsou entity a aktivity ontologicky reálné? Podle některých autorů lze za entity považovat pouze reálné komponenty (neuron, buňka, ...), případně je považují za „prototyp" entit: „Entity jsou nejčastěji věci, které jednají."21 Podle jiných můžeme za entity považovat i abstraktní pojmy a aktivity. Mnoho mechanismů je totiž natolik složitých, že výzkumnici nepopisují mechanismy samotné, ale modely mechanismů, tj. jakousi zjednodušenou verzi toho, jak k danému jevu dochází.22 Zjednodušení je zde na místě. Na straně druhé, zjednodušení nesmí být až příliš velké a model mechanismu se nesmí příliš vzdálit od mechanismu samotného. Bechtel a Richardson přitom varují před tím, aby pojem mechanismu byl reifi kován. Naopak pobízejí k dalším případovým studiím toho, jak vědci pracují, s tím, že podle toho je třeba upravit pojetí mechanismu. V následujícím výkladu se tedy nepřikláníme k žádné specifi cké defi nici pojetí mechanismu a místo toho vyložíme hlavní znaky mechanismu společné většině přístupů. 19 BECHTEL – RICHARDSON, Discovering Complexity, s. xix. 20 Ibid., s. xxxvi. 21 Peter MACHAMER, „Activities and Causation: Th e Metaphysics and Epistemology of Mechanisms". International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, roč. 18, 2004, č. 1, s. 29 (27–39), zdůraznil A. V. 22 Stuart GLENNAN, „Modeling Mechanisms." Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, roč. 36, 2005, č. 2, s. 443–464; Carl F. CRAVER, „When mechanistic models explain." Synthese, roč. 153, 2006, č. 3, s. 355–376. V některých případech je pravděpodobně možné formulovat pouze modely mechanismů. V oblasti sociálních věd se například často pracuje s entitami – jako jsou individuální lidé nebo instituce – které se během času mění. Jedná se sice o ty samé entity, ale zároveň o entity, které postupně mění svoje vlastnosti – někdy velmi podstatně. Tuto proměnlivost v čase je obtížné grafi cky zachytit. Arnošt Veselý Teorie vědy 2016-2 text.indd 166 24.11.2016 15:04:47 167 Hlavní znaky mechanistického přístupu Odpovědnost za daný jev Všechny mechanismy jsou mechanismy nějakého jevu. Či řečeno obráceně: jevem se rozumí výsledek jednání mechanismu jako celku.23 Například výsledkem mechanismu proteosyntézy je vytvoření bílkovin. V mechanistické literatuře se uvádí, že mechanismy produkují, tvoří základ nebo udržují daný jev. V případě, že hovoříme o tom, že mechanismus produkuje, způsobuje či generuje nějaký jev, implikujeme kauzální souvislost mezi mechanismem (v čase t1) a jevem (v čase t2). U celé řady mechanismů je ovšem lépe hovořit o tom, že mechanismus tvoří základ nějakého jevu, avšak časově mu nepředchází – jev a mechanismus koexistují současně. Například mechanismus pracovní paměti vysvětluje, jak si lidé vybavují informace z paměti, nelze ale říci, že sledovaný jev nastane až po ukončení působení daného mechanismu. Konečně mechanismus může vést i k tomu, že k žádnému jevu nedojde, jako je tomu v případě mechanismu homeostázy. Mechanismy tedy mohou i jev udržovat a nemusí vést k žádné viditelné změně. Illari a Williamson výše uvedené dilema volby správného slovesa řeší tím, že říkají, že mechanismy jsou odpovědné za nějaké jevy. Tím se tak mimo jiné explicitně vyhýbají funkčnímu vymezení mechanismů („funkcí daného M je způsobit jev X"). Je tomu tak proto, že pojem funkce implikuje buď výsledek nějakého přirozeného procesu selekce, nebo záměrný design. Ani jedno ovšem mechanismy nesplňují. V každém případě prvním úkolem výzkumníka je specifi kovat jev, za který může být odpovědný nějaký mechanismus. Jestliže za nějakým jevem nemůžeme najít nějaký mechanismus, pak je třeba „rekonstituovat tento zkoumaný jev".24 Klíčové tedy je, že mechanismy dávají smysl pouze tehdy, pokud jsou propojeny se zkoumáním nějakého jevu, pokud jej nějakým způsobem vysvětlují.25 Například na mechanismus gravitace přišel Newton tím, že pozoroval padající jablko. Všiml si, že tento jev má svoje zákonitosti. Odhadl, že je to důležitý jev, a zkoumal, co je za tento jev odpovědné. 23 Stuart GLENNAN, „Mechanisms and the Nature of Causation." Erkenntnis, roč. 44, 1996, č. 1, s. 49–71; BECHTEL – ABRAHAMSEN, „Explanation: a Mechanist Alternative". 24 BECHTEL – RICHARDSON, Discovering Complexity; Mitchell HERSCHBACH – William BECHTEL, „Mental Mechanisms and Psychological Construction." In: BARRETT, L. F. – RUSSELL, J. (eds.), Th e Psychological Construction of Emotion. New York: Guilford Press 2014, s. 21–44. 25 V terminologii tradiční fi losofi e vědy bychom mohli říci, že jev je explanandum a mechanismus explanans. Pojetí mechanismu v současné teorii vědy Teorie vědy 2016-2 text.indd 167 24.11.2016 15:04:47 168 Zde ovšem vzniká otázka, co to je „jev". Za jev se v NMF zpravidla považuje změna či rozdíl mezi dvěma stavy – mezi stavem počátečním v čase t1 a výsledným stavem v čase t2 (viz defi nice MDC výše).26 Co však konkrétně jevem je a není? Je to něco, co můžeme přímo pozorovat a zkoumat? Anebo to mohou být i jevy nepozorovatelné a abstraktní? Literatura NMF není v tomto ohledu zcela jednotná. Existuje ovšem shoda, že mnoho mechanismů vede k jevům, které nejsou přímo pozorovatelné. Ve vědě jsou někdy odhaleny nejdříve mechanismy a teprve následně se hledají jevy, které existenci těchto mechanismů odpovídají. Jedním z příkladů mechanismu, který byl nejdříve teoreticky předpovězen a teprve poté empiricky doložen, je odhalení mechanismu posunu Pacifi cké desky pod Severoamerickou desku. Pochopení tohoto mechanismu vedlo k hypotéze, že oblast severozápadu USA leží v seizmicky velmi nebezpečné oblasti, přestože k žádným otřesům v této oblasti nedochází. Je to dáno tím, že desky se pod rostoucím tlakem mírně krabatí a „hrbí", zároveň jsou ale do sebe zaklesnuty, takže k otřesům nedochází. Napětí ovšem postupně roste, což vede k tomu, že přibližně jednou za půl tisíciletí sebou kaskádská subdukční zóna „škubne" po celé délce a dojde k obrovskému zemětřesení. Na základě znalosti mechanismu posunu desek bylo i předpovězeno, kdy k takovému škubnutí pravděpodobně došlo naposledy. Pečlivou prací (zejména analýzou geologických vrstev v podmořských údolích) bylo nakonec skutečně i přesně doloženo, kdy k poslednímu zemětřesení došlo.27 Jevy tedy nemusejí být na první pohled zřejmé a přímo pozorovatelné. Někdy je třeba důkladného přemýšlení o mechanismech, aby vědci a výzkumníci věděli, jaký přesně jev se snaží vysvětlit. Jedna z největších debat v NMF se vede o to, do jaké míry musí existovat pravidelnost mezi daným jevem a mechanismem a jak tuto pravidelnost chápat. V ideálním případě by mělo platit, že ve sledovaném jevu existuje jasná a viditelná pravidelnost, s jakou se počáteční podmínky mění v konečné podmínky, a tato pravidelnost je vysvětlitelná daným mechanismem. Pokud bychom ovšem zúžili mechanismy pouze na ty, které vždy vedou k té samé změně v daném jevu, celá řada procesů by nemohla být považována za mechanismy. Některé mechanismy například vedou ke změně jenom 26 Je vhodné připomenout, že takto – výhradně temporálně – defi novaný jev vylučuje výzkumné otázky, které se ptají po rozdílech mezi dvěma typy objektů (například proč lidé s nižším vzděláním volí častěji radikální politické strany). Problém je především v tom, že velmi často známe pouze výsledný, a nikoli původní stav. 27 Jiří SOBOTA, „Všechny zachránit nemůžeme." Respekt, roč. 27, 2016, č. 19, s. 60–62. Arnošt Veselý Teorie vědy 2016-2 text.indd 168 24.11.2016 15:04:47 169 tehdy, když se překročí jistá prahová hranice. Podle Illariho a Williamsona jsou mechanismy odpovědné za daný jev či jevy, ale nutně je nedeterminují. Některé mechanismy mají stochastickou povahu, tj. konkrétní výsledek (pozorovaný jev) nelze přesně předem určit. Klasickým příkladem takového mechanismu je přírodní výběr. Lze sice obecně zformulovat, k čemu přírodní výběr vede, konkrétní výsledek ovšem záleží na náhodě. Jak poznamenal Gould,28 historii nelze reprodukovat tak, že ji jako magnetofonovou pásku přehrajeme nejdříve pozadu a pak zase dopředu. Tím ovšem dochází k rozvolnění vztahu mezi mechanismem a jevem. Jak často musí daný mechanismus vést k dané změně, abychom ho mohli považovat za mechanismus? Přestože se někteří autoři (např. Machamer) domnívají, že zmínku o pravidelnosti je vhodné z jakékoli defi nice mechanismů vyloučit, většina autorů tvrdí, že jistá míra pravidelnosti je základním znakem, bez kterého mechanismy nedávají smysl. Je zřejmé, že pokud daný mechanismus ve většině případů selhává ve vysvětlení a predikci daného jevu, pak těžko můžeme hovořit o mechanismu. Zde ovšem dochází k jisté arbitrárnosti hranice pravidelnosti. V kolika případech musí mechanismus vést k danému jevu, abychom ho ještě považovali za mechanismus? Stačí, když se tak stane jen občas? Někteří autoři29 tvrdí, že některý mechanismus může fungovat pouze jednou (například historické události, které vedly ke vzniku první světové války). Většina autorů se ovšem zdá přiklánět spíše k názoru, že takové pojetí mechanismů není vhodné, protože poznání kauzálních příčin v tomto jednom konkrétním příkladu nám nedává prediktivní schopnost, pokud jde o jiné procesy.30 Klíčovou otázkou, v NMF ovšem v podstatě neřešenou, je, čím je nepravidelnost v pozorovaných jevech dána. NMF předpokládá, že je to v první řadě působením mechanismu, který nemusí být nutně deterministický. Předpokládá se, že jevy jsou ohraničené a lze je jasně oddělit od jevů jiných. Tento předpoklad je zpochybnitelný v samotné biologii a je evidentně zcela nerealistický v sociální oblasti. V sociálním světě je relativně málo pozorovatelných pravidelností. To ovšem nemusí být dáno neexistencí mechanismů vedoucích k určitým jevům, ale faktem, že sociální jevy jsou vzájemně pro28 Stephen Jay GOULD, Wonderful Life: the Burgess Shale and the Nature of History. New York: WW Norton & Company 1990. 29 Peter MACHAMER, „Activities and Causation: Th e Metaphysics and Epistemology of Mechanisms." International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, roč. 18, 2004, č. 1, s. 27–39. 30 Holly ANDERSEN, „Th e Case for Regularity in Mechanistic Causal Explanation." Synthese, roč. 189, 2012, č. 3, s. 428 (415–432). Pojetí mechanismu v současné teorii vědy Teorie vědy 2016-2 text.indd 169 24.11.2016 15:04:47 170 vázané a zpravidla je nelze laboratorně či experimentálně izolovat od prostředí. Je těžké oddělit od sebe různé mechanismy a různé jevy. Vzniká tedy otázka, co je mechanismus, jev a kontext těchto dvou. V důsledku toho se může jevit, že například v sociální sféře žádné mechanismy neexistují. Ve skutečnosti ovšem může být tato neschopnost pozorovat jakékoli pravidelnosti dána překrýváním a vrstvením různých mechanismů a jevů přes sebe. Entity a aktivity Existuje konsensus, že mechanistické vysvětlení vyžaduje vždy dekompozici a že mechanismy mají v zásadě dva hlavní konstitutivní složky: entity (taktéž: části, prvky, komponenty atd.) a aktivity (taktéž: interakce, operace atd.). Pokud jde o entity, neznamená to, že dekompozice mechanismů musí nutně vést k dekompozici na menší části. Mechanistická explanace neznamená vždy „vysvětlovat vyšší nižším". Některé entity mohou být ohromné, některé naopak mikroskopické. Některé entity jsou stabilní a trvalé, jiné jsou pouze dočasné a během času se mění. Druhou složkou mechanismů jsou aktivity.31 Aktivity představují to, „co se děje" (happenings) a co jednotlivě, nebo ve spolupráci s dalšími aktivitami, vede ke změně jiných entit nebo aktivit.32 Aktivity jsou procesy či jednání. Propojují jednu entitu s jinou nebo vedou ke změně dané entity. V diagramech jsou často zachyceny ve formě šipek. Jestliže entity jsou často asociovány s podstatnými jmény, aktivity jsou v přirozeném jazyce vyjadřovány prostřednictvím sloves. Někteří autoři považují aktivity za odvozené od entit, tj. tvrdí, že nemohou existovat nezávisle na entitách (daná aktivita je vždy aktivitou daných entit, například určitý chemický prvek interaguje s jiným prvkem, neuron vysílá elektrický impuls atd.). Podle jiných ovšem nelze říci, že entity mají prioritu (předcházejí) před aktivitami. Například Machamer poznamenává, že kupříkladu „běhání" nepatří k určitému konkrétnímu člověku tak jako jeho strukturální vlastnosti, například jeho nos či oči. „Běhat" zde představuje určitou obecnější kategorii aktivity. Ty samé entity totiž mohou mít různé aktivity. Proto podle Machamera a dalších mohou být aktivity identifi kovány a abstrahovány nezávisle na entitách. Například ti samí dva lidé mohou být v pozici prodávajícího a kupujícího 31 Jim BOGEN, „Causally productive activities." Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, roč. 39, 2008, č. 1, s. 112–123. 32 MACHAMER, Activities and Causation, s. 29. Arnošt Veselý Teorie vědy 2016-2 text.indd 170 24.11.2016 15:04:47 171 (a výsledkem je nějaký uzavřený obchod) anebo si mohou jen tak nezávazně povídat o počasí. Podle Illariho a Williamsona je výhodou konceptualizace mechanismu v podobě entit a aktivit i fakt, že řeší problém arity, tedy otázky vztahu dvou entit. Tento vztah může být unární (například: entita 1 rozloží entitu 2), binární (entita 1 interaguje s entitou 2) či mnohonásobný, ve kterém je těžké určit, které entity se přesně podílejí na dané aktivitě (jako v případě osmózy). Bechtel ukazuje, jak je v reálné vědecké práci důležité propojování entit s jejich aktivitami (či v jeho terminologii component operations).33 Uspořádání (organizace) Třetím defi ničním znakem mechanismů je, že entity a aktivity jsou vždy uspořádány jedinečným způsobem, který ovlivňuje, jakým způsobem mechanismus funguje. Wimsatt dává do protikladu agregaci a mechanistickou organizaci.34 V případě agregace je fungování celku dáno prostou sumou vlastností částí, ze kterých se tento celek sestává. V agregaci lze jednotlivé prvky přeuspořádat jiným způsobem, aniž by to mělo vliv na fungování celku. Takový typ vztahů je ovšem spíše výjimkou. Většinou záleží na tom, jak jsou entity a aktivity vzájemně uspořádány, a podle toho dochází k odlišným jevům. Hlavními dimenzemi organizace je prostorové a časové uspořádání. Časová dimenze obsahuje pořadí, míru opakování a délku trvání. Prostorová dimenze zahrnuje umístění, velikost, tvar, pozici a orientaci jednotlivých částí a aktivit. Mnoho zastánců NMF zdůrazňuje, že mnoho mechanismů má víceúrovňovou povahu, tedy že aktivity probíhají na několika úrovních a žádná úroveň sama o sobě není s to vysvětlit daný jev.35 Tak například mechanismus prostorové paměti obsahuje několik úrovní. V hipokampu se tvoří prostorové mapy, z nichž některé zahrnují buněčné interakce, které jsou zase pro změnu tvořeny molekulárními mechanismy. V žádném případě ovšem nelze říci, že nižší úroveň je nadřazená úrovním vyšším, tj. že fungování vyšších úrovní vyplývá z fungování úrovní nižších. Uspořádání se dlouho zdálo být nejméně kontroverzní charakteristikou mechanismů. Ukazuje se ovšem, že uspořádání entit a aktivit je někdy ex33 William BECHTEL, Mental Mechanisms: Philosophical Perspectives on Cognitive Neuroscience. Oxford: Routledge 2008. 34 William C. WIMSATT, „Aggregativity: Reductive Heuristics for Finding Emergence." Philosophy of Science, roč. 64, 1997, č. 4, s. 372–384. 35 BECHTEL – RICHARDSON, Discovering Complexity, s. xxxix Pojetí mechanismu v současné teorii vědy Teorie vědy 2016-2 text.indd 171 24.11.2016 15:04:47 172 trémně komplexní a je velmi složité jej uchopit. Čím více jsou vztahy mezi aktivitami a entitami provázané a ovlivňují se navzájem, tím méně je možné popsat mechanismus jako sled určitých sekvencí. Naopak tím spíše můžeme hovořit o emergenci, tedy spontánním vzniku nových vlastností celku, jež není možné odvodit z vlastností jejich složek, ale které tyto jednotlivé složky zpětně ovlivňují. Typickým příkladem je fungování mozku a vysvětlení takových jevů, jako je vědomí. Tzv. fázové přechody jsou ale typické i pro sociální jevy: Představa, že postupné a drobné změny mohou vyústit toliko v postupné a dílčí výsledky, je zažitý omyl. [...] Mimo rámec vymezený praktickým lidským záležitostem je příroda nelineárních jevů plná. [...] Nepatrné změny jediného ze základních faktorů nějakého složitého systému mohou vyústit v zásadní, kvalitativní posuny v ostatních faktorech, které na něm závisejí. [...] Milióny individuálních rozhodnutí či postojů mohou v úhrnu způsobit posun celého systému k nějaké nové rovnováze.36 Přínosy, omezení a budoucnost NMF NMF nabídla nový – a pravděpodobně realističtější – pohled na způsob, jak se věda dělá a jak se dochází k vědeckým objevům. Vedla a vede také k novému uvažování o tom, jak lze na vědeckou práci nahlížet. Vědecká práce je chápána nikoli jako odhalování obecně platných zákonů, zorganizovaných do vnitřně konzistentního systému teoretických výroků, ale jako postupná snaha odhalit, proč se věci dějí tak, jak se dějí. Místo velkých objevů v podobě univerzálních zákonů je věda vnímána jako neustálé dílčí úsilí porozumět určitým jevům a snaha vysvětlit je v podobě mechanismů. Toto porozumění se přitom neustále mění, zpřesňuje, zesložiťuje. Zatímco tradiční sociologie a fi losofi e vědy předpokládala „aha efekt" v procesu vědeckého bádání, detailní analýza skutečných případů ukazuje, že tomu tak často není a že proces vědeckých objevů většinou není spojen s nějakým jednoznačně vymezeným okamžikem intuice a „prozření". V praxi jde často o iterativní vylepšování pohledu na daný problém (v duchu hermeneutického kruhu). Mechanistický přístup vzbudil zájem nejen v oblasti přírodních, ale také v oblasti společenských věd, kde na toto téma existuje velmi rozsáhlá lite36 Vilayanur S. RAMACHANDRAN, Mozek a jeho tajemství. Praha: Dybbuk 2013, s. 37–38. Arnošt Veselý Teorie vědy 2016-2 text.indd 172 24.11.2016 15:04:47 173 ratura.37 Lze ovšem říci, že nové mechanistické fi losofi i se podařilo mnohé otázky spojené s pojetím mechanismů dovést dále, než se to podařilo ve společenských vědách (kde je literatura velmi roztříštěná). Ačkoli ani NMF zdaleka není vnitřně jednotná (viz například diskuse o ontologii mechanismů popsaná výše v textu), přesto zde existuje shoda v základních předpokladech a součástech mechanistického uvažování. Na rozdíl od společenských věd je zde téma mechanismů dobře artikulováno a systematizováno. Řada otázek je zde velmi dobře rozmyšlena. NMF má i praktické implikace pro to, jak (ne)dělat vědu. Mechanistický přístup například postuluje, že bychom měli vytvářet jen takové teorie, které vysvětlují nějaký jev (zpravidla alespoň částečně empiricky pozorovatelný). Jde o to porozumět určitým v realitě se vyskytujícím se jevům. Zdá se to samozřejmostí, ale často tomu tak není. Minimálně v oblasti sociálních věd je „terén" zahlcen konstrukcemi, které sice odkazují jedna na druhou, ale nemají žádný vztah k reálnému světu. Zjednodušeně řečeno, zastánci NMF se domnívají, že hlavní podstatou vědy je – a mělo by být – hledání toho, jak věci fungují (how things work). V praxi sociálních věd (ale nejen jich) jsou ale chybně přitom zkoumána témata, nikoli jevy. Zatímco téma je jakýkoli objekt zkoumání (navíc často vymezený abstraktními pojmy), jev je něco, co v sobě má jisté napětí, dynamiku, změnu či otázku. Jev lze vysvětlit, téma nikoli. Stanovení jevu, který je třeba osvětlit, je přitom již objevem samotným. Mechanistická fi losofi e vybízí k přemýšlení o vysvětlení jevů, nikoli k formulaci abstraktních teorií per se. NMF došla během posledních dvou desetiletí velkou proměnou a stále se vyvíjí. Jak jsme ukázali výše, NMF nelze jednoznačně interpretovat jako úplný rozchod s logickým empirismem (byť autoři NMF svůj přístup takto často prezentují). Zároveň lze pozorovat stále větší vzdalování od původního významu slova, který dal směru název, tedy od „tradičního" významu pojmu mechanismu jako stroje. Ačkoli termín mechanismus zůstává ústředním pojmem, současné představy o podstatě biologických 37 Derek BEACH, „Taking Mechanisms Seriously." European Political Science, roč. 12, 2013, č. 1, s. 13–15; Mario BUNGE, „Mechanism and Explanation." Philosophy of the Social Sciences, roč. 27, 1997, č. 4, s. 410–465; John GERRING, „Th e Mechanismic Worldview: Th inking Inside the Box." British Journal of Political Science, roč. 38, 2008, č. 1, s. 161–179; Peter HEDSTRÖM – Richard SWEDBERG, Social Mechanisms: An Analytical Approach to Social Th eory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998; Arthur L. STINCHCOMBE, „Th e Conditions of Fruitfulness of Th eorizing About Mechanisms in Social Science." Philosophy of the Social Sciences, roč. 21, 1991, č. 3, s. 367–388. Pojetí mechanismu v současné teorii vědy Teorie vědy 2016-2 text.indd 173 24.11.2016 15:04:47 174 i sociálních jevů mají velmi daleko k představě stroje, například v podobě hodinového mechanismu, kde na sebe všechna jednotlivá ozubená kolečka krásně navazují a dohromady vytvářejí dobře promazaný stroj. Ukazuje se, že mnohé mechanismy jsou nesmírně složité, mají nelineární a víceúrovňovou povahu a nelze je jednoduše zachytit v podobě diagramu. Mechanismy, které se snažíme odhalit a modelovat, jsou často tak složité a komplexní, že je nelze v úplnosti pochopit, natožpak pak vizualizovat. K vysvětlení těchto složitých způsobů uspořádání se v nedávné době začali mechanisté zabývat speciálními typy uspořádání, inspirováni zejména teoriemi sítí a dynamickými modely (dynamic mechanistic explanation).38 Mnohé mechanismy mají emergentní povahu a tím, že je rozložíme na jednotlivé součástky, se nedobereme jejich podstaty.39 V případě velmi složitých a komplexních mechanismů je heuristika dekompozice a lokalizace do jisté míry omezená: „Čím více jednotlivé operace v daném mechanismu ovlivňují jedna druhou, tím méně úspěšný je sekvenční popis mechanismu, ve kterém je každá operace považována za nezávislou na ostatních."40 Mnohé jevy jsou prostě velmi komplexní – nelze je popsat jako sekvence procesů určitých komponent, protože tyto komponenty se v čase mění a mezi komponentami existují nelineární interakce. Představa, že můžeme vždy odlišit jednotlivé komponenty a jejich roli, prostě neodpovídá realitě. Na straně druhé se i tak zdá, že to je stále jedna z nejúspěšnějších vědeckých strategií. Lze ji využít jako první aproximaci, pokus popsat a vysvětlit určitý jev. V mnoha případech, jak dodávají Bechtel a Richardson, jde ovšem o aproximaci příliš hrubou. Pro vysvětlení komplexních a emergentních jevů je potřeba heuristiky dekompozice a lokalizace doplňovat dalšími, dynamičtějšími přístupy. V poslední době se vynořují i v NMF další otázky, doposud neřešené a nevyřešené. Jednou z nich je otázka prostředí (či kontextu), ve kterém mechanismy působí.41 To je téma, které je dlouhodobě řešeno v oblasti společenských věd, protože zde, na rozdíl od biologie, bylo vždy naprosto zřejmé, 38 Příkladem mohou být small-world networks, kde navzájem si blízké součásti jsou hustě propojeny, zatímco mezi prostorově vzdálenými jednotkami je toto propojení malé. 39 Z tohoto hlediska lze kritizovat například tzv. analytickou sociologii, která je založena na principu metodologického individualismu. 40 BECHTEL – RICHARDSON, Discovering Complexity, s. xxxv. 41 William BECHTEL, „Looking Down, Around, and Up: Mechanistic Explanation in Psychology." Philosophical Psychology, roč. 22, 2009, č. 5, s. 543–564. Arnošt Veselý Teorie vědy 2016-2 text.indd 174 24.11.2016 15:04:47 175 že jakýkoli jev a mechanismus působí vždy v určitém kontextu.42 Zdá se tedy, že NMF by mohla čerpat a více se inspirovat i z jiných oborů, než je biologie, a to například z politologie a sociologie. Společenské vědy se přitom zase mohou z NMF přiučit přesnějšímu vymezení pojmu mechanismus. Do budoucna lze určitě očekávat propojování různých vědních disciplín, které s pojmem mechanismus operují, což povede k dalším pohledům na to, jak pojem mechanismus vnímat. 42 Tulia G. FALLETI – Julia F. LYNCH, „Context and Causal Mechanisms in Political Analysis." Comparative Political Studies, roč. 42, 2009, č. 9, s. 1143–1166. Pojetí mechanismu v současné teorii vědy Teorie vědy 2016-2 text.indd 175 24.11.2016 15:04:

Transversal: International Journal for the Historiography of Science 2019 (6): 49-64 ISSN 2526-2270 www.historiographyofscience.org Belo Horizonte – MG / Brazil © The Author 2019 – This is an open access article Special Issue – Women in Sciences: Historiography of Science and History of Science on the Work of Women in Sciences and Philosophy Sofia A. Yanovskaya: The Marxist Pioneer of Mathematical Logic in the Soviet Union Dimitris Kilakos1 Abstract K. Marx's 200th jubilee coincides with the celebration of the 85 years from the first publication of his "Mathematical Manuscripts" in 1933. Its editor, Sofia Alexandrovna Yanovskaya (1896–1966), was a renowned Soviet mathematician, whose significant studies on the foundations of mathematics and mathematical logic, as well as on the history and philosophy of mathematics are unduly neglected nowadays. Yanovskaya, as a militant Marxist, was actively engaged in the ideological confrontation with idealism and its influence on modern mathematics and their interpretation. Concomitantly, she was one of the pioneers of mathematical logic in the Soviet Union, in an era of fierce disputes on its compatibility with Marxist philosophy. Yanovskaya managed to embrace in an originally Marxist spirit the contemporary level of logico-philosophical research of her time. Due to her highly esteemed status within Soviet academia, she became one of the most significant pillars for the culmination of modern mathematics in the Soviet Union. In this paper, I attempt to trace the influence of the complex socio-cultural context of the first decades of the Soviet Union on Yanovskaya's work. Among the several issues I discuss, her encounter with L. Wittgenstein is striking. Keywords: Sofia A. Yanovskaya; History of Logic; Women in Sciences Received: 2 July 2018. Reviewed 24 March 2019. Accepted: 29 May 2019. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.24117/2526-2270.2018.i6.06 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License. _____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Introduction Sofia Alexandrovna Yanovskaya is a prominent figure for the history of mathematics in the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, though, her contribution remains relatively unknown, especially beyond the former Soviet Union. Yanovskaya is chiefly known as the editor of the first publication of K. Marx's "Mathematical Manuscripts" in 1933. Undoubtedly, this was a significant milestone in her successful career within Soviet academia. However, I maintain 1 Dimitris Kilakos [Orcid: 0000-0002-6174-6741] is a Post-Doctoral Fellow in the Faculty of Philosophy at the Sofia University "St. Kl. Ohridski". Address: 15 Tzar Osvoboditel Blvd., Bulgaria – Sofia 1504. E-mail: [email protected] Sofia A. Yanovskaya: The Marxist Pioneer of Mathematical Logic in the Soviet Union Dimitris Kilakos 50 that Yanovskaya's life and work deserve more scholar interest for several more reasons. In this paper, I trace the influence of the complex socio-cultural context of the first decades of the Soviet Union on her fascinating life and career. S. A. Yanovskaya was born in 1896 into a Jewish family, in Pruzhany, a small village then in Russian Poland (now in Belarus)2. Her birth name was Neimark and her father, Aleksander, was an accountant. When she was almost two years old, her family moved to Odessa; there, in 1905, the 9-year old Sofia witnessed the worker's uprising. After graduating from the gymnasium in 1914 with a gold medal, Sofia Neimark entered the Higher School for Women in Odessa, which was part of the Novorossiisk University. There she studied mathematics, being tutored by Ivan Jure'vich Timchenko (a noted historian of mathematics) and Samuil Osipovich Shatunovsky (a well-known then mathematician in Russia). During her studies in Odessa, she developed her mathematical skills in a variety of topics, as well as her interest in the history of mathematics. In those turbulent revolutionary years, Sofia was politically active. While studying in the Gymnasium, she assisted political prisoners as a member of an underground organization. She actively took part in the social uprising burst out throughout Russia with the Great October Revolution, giving up her studies in the university. In November 1918, she joined the Bolshevik wing of the Russian Communist Party. During the civil war, which broke up since counterrevolutionary forces from inside and outside Russia resisted to the victorious Revolution, she defended the Revolution. In 1919, she served the Red Army as a political commissar.3 Amidst the turmoil, S. A. Yanovskaya married her comrade Isaac Ilyich Yanovsky in 1918. As her friend M.G. Shestopal describes, Isaac was "her mentor and friend, a man of bright individuality, a pure soul and a deep, clear mind. Along with him, Sofia conducted political activities in the ranks of the Bolshevik Party, shared with him the military life in the civil war, repeatedly being exposed to mortal danger" (Shestopal 1982, 116).4 When the Red Army defeated the counterrevolutionary forces, communists had to deal with the even more laborious task of building the new society. Among other duties, of primary importance was the enlightenment of the masses. In that fashion, Sofia became an editor for the "Kommunist" newspaper in Odessa. From 1920 to 1923 she worked for the Odessa Regional Committee of the Bolsheviks. Throughout these years, mathematics was not a priority for Yanovskaya. However, being an earnest and driven communist, soon after she responded to the call for a new intelligentsia to serve new society's needs. Thus, in 1923 Yanovskaya moved to Moscow and returned to her studies, attending seminars at Moscow State University. In 1924, she 2 For a concise, well-informed and accessible to English-speaking readers biography, one may look at the relevant article on MacTutor History of Mathematics archive, written by J. J. O' Connor and E.F. Robertson (URL: http://www-groups.dcs.st-and.ac.uk/~history/Biographies/Janovskaja.html Accessed on October 11, 2018). Several interesting biographical details are also offered in Bashmakova et al. (1966), Gorskii (1970), Bochenski (1973), Anellis (1987a), Anellis (1987b), Bashmakova et al. (1996), Kushner (1996), Trakhtenbrot (1997) and Bazhanov (2001). Levin (2012) is a comprehensive overview of Yanovskaya's life and work. A short and rather modest autobiography is (Yanovskaya 1982). 3 Kilberg describes the following episode from that time: "During the retreat from Odessa, the Whites captured several Red Army soldiers. They shot the prisoners on the bridge, and they fell into the river. Among them [...] was Sofia Alexandrovna. A bullet shot through the high hat's hat. Sofia Alexandrovna fell into the river, managed to swim out and then spent the whole night sitting in the water in the reeds" (Kilberg 1982, 105). 4 Sofia and Isaac had a son, who unfortunately was mentally ill and committed suicide shortly after his mother's death. (Kushner 1991, 71; Bashmakova et al. 1996, 360). Sofia A. Yanovskaya: The Marxist Pioneer of Mathematical Logic in the Soviet Union Dimitris Kilakos 51 entered the Institute of Red Professors, where she became a student of V.F. Kagan (a significant geometer and historian of mathematics and a specialist on Lobachevsky)5. One may not exaggerate in suggesting that those heroic times deeply affected her character. As one of her closest friends writes, S. A. Yanovskaya lived a life imbued with kindness to people. Her whole existence was determined by a sense of duty, selflessness, and unselfish service to the cause. A modest and open-minded person, Sofia Aleksandrovna was exceptionally benevolent towards others. A very lively, cheerful and sociable person, she constantly felt the need to communicate with people [...] The name of Sofia Alexandrovna is surrounded by an atmosphere of moral purity. For everyone she met, she evoked a feeling of sympathy. [...] Being an extremely kind person, unusually delicate, she was always ready to respond to someone else's misfortune, to help a good cause. It was done quietly, with inherent tact. (Kilberg 1982, 104-107) The Quest for "Red Scientists" Before the Great October Revolution, admission to higher education was not an option for the vast majority of young people (especially workers and peasants). Besides the declared vision to raise class-barriers, the situation mentioned above has been troublesome for Soviet authorities: the number of scientifically educated personnel in pre-revolutionary Russia was insufficient for the implementation of the vast program for the reorganization and modernization of the economy and society in general. The pre-revolutionary intelligentsia neither sufficed for nor was in its totality eager to pursue this goal. As long as mathematicians are concerned, it seems that efforts to draw them to Marxism had considerably less success than among other scientists (Joravsky 2009, 158). Arguably, this could be at least partially explained if the long-lasting influence of religious mysticism among leading Russian mathematicians (especially in Moscow) is taken into account; however, a thorough discussion on this issue is far beyond the scope of this paper. In this context, Soviet authorities introduced several multifaceted policies to alter this situation rapidly. They aimed to reinforce the proportion of workers among students and, upon their graduation, in academia. These efforts proved to be remarkably efficient. It is noteworthy, for example, that between 1928 and 1932, the number of students trebled and the teaching staff doubled (Joravsky 2009, 238). As the Soviet mathematician O. Iu. Shmidt mentions, "a young man who studies our science, has every chance of becoming a professor at twenty-five" (Joravsky 2009, 238). Among several initiatives aiming to address the challenge mentioned above, one deserves particular attention for our current purposes, due to S. A. Yanovskaya's participation in it. The Institute of Red Professors of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) was founded in February 1921 in Moscow. It was a specialized higher educational institute, meant to address the shortage of Marxist professors. Its programs were training teachers for higher educational institutions, as well as specialists for scientific research institutions and the Communist Party's and Soviet state's organs. Between 1921 and 1928, 1966 students were accepted for study at IKP, Yanovskaya being one of them. Administration's reports highlighted two main channels of employment after IKP: into party journals and newspapers and into "party-pedagogical work", including IKP itself. In 1928 over half of 5 For further details on those who influenced Yanovskaya's intellectual development and her scholar interests, see (Anellis, 1996). Sofia A. Yanovskaya: The Marxist Pioneer of Mathematical Logic in the Soviet Union Dimitris Kilakos 52 IKP's faculty was its graduates (David-Fox 1997, 165). It is estimated that almost 25% of IKP graduates continued an academic career. In the 1930s, higher education and research institutions in the Soviet Union were sufficiently developed. Hence, IKP gradually lost its importance and finally integrated into the system of higher Party schools of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Yanovskaya's Academic Career While studying at IKP, Yanovskaya also led seminars on the methodology of science and mathematics at Moscow State University by 1925. In this manner, she came into contact with several prominent Soviet mathematicians. The need for university professors who could serve the new society was imminent, and Yanovskaya was a promising candidate. Being talented and skilled in mathematics as well as a militant Marxist, she had already earned respect both in academic circles and among her comrades in the Communist Party. Those years, a considerable portion of Muscovite mathematicians were influenced by the so-called "Moscow-school", which had a profound counterrevolutionary and idealistic background. This background was not compatible with what Soviet authorities held that was needed for the training of young Soviet scientists.6 Yanovskaya portrays a vivid picture of the situation in those years: If there is a low percentage of natural scientists sharing Marxist views, then among mathematicians this percentage is even lower [...] the Old Professorship from the socalled "Moscow school", whose authority among the mathematical milieu was unshakable, made every effort to save mathematics from the malicious influence of materialistic philosophy, which did not hide its Party orientation and its class, proletarian character. Even the word "Comrade" was neither accepted at the Institute of mathematics and mechanics, nor at the Mathematical Society [...] in contrast, among the members of this Society, the percentage of white émigrés is rather high. (Yanovskaya 1930, 88, 94) Accordingly, Yanovskaya was asked in 1926 to teach in Moscow State University's mathematics department, although she was still a student. Being a member of the faculty already for 5 years– and teaching the history of mathematics since 1930 –, she was appointed as a professor in 1931. Simultaneously, she continued her studies and received her doctorate from the faculty of Mechanics-Mathematics of MSU in 1935. In 1936, she started teaching mathematical logic and in 1943, after the Red Army beat the Nazis, Yanovskaya was appointed Director of Seminar in Mathematical Logic at MSU.7 As Uspensky notes, she actually founded this seminar, which was the first such institution in the Soviet Union (Uspensky 1997, 459). In 1946, she started teaching formal logic within the Philosophy Department. In 1951, Yanovskaya was awarded the "Order of Lenin", which was the highest national decoration of the Soviet Union.8 6 For a discussion on this complex socio-cultural context and the problem posed to Soviet authorities by the idealistic foundations of Moscow School, see (Kilakos 2018). For a review of Yanovskaya's involvement, see (Levin 2012). 7 During the war, MSU was temporarily relocated to Perm. 8 The "Order of Lenin" was awarded to Soviet citizens for outstanding services rendered to the State. Sofia A. Yanovskaya: The Marxist Pioneer of Mathematical Logic in the Soviet Union Dimitris Kilakos 53 In 1959, Yanovskaya became the first Head of the newly established Department of Mathematical Logic at Moscow State University; she held the Chair in Mathematical Logic until her death in 1966. Kushner (1991) vividly describes the reminiscences of his first encounter with Yanovskaya in the early '60s, when he attended one of her lectures in the Mathematical School of Moscow University: Near the blackboard stood a little old lady in an out-of-fashion black dress (she almost always wore this dress, as I was to learn later). Her face, rather round in shape, was very kind, and big round glasses were in complete harmony with the face. A small, shabby, leather briefcase on the desk was somehow similar to its mistress and completed the picture. All those non-official and old-fashioned attributes immediately charmed me, as well as the very slow and distinct manner in which the lecture was delivered. (Kushner 1991, 67-68) Bazhanov mentions that it was due to Yanovskaya's efforts that chair in logic and sector of logic were established at Leningrad State and the Institute of Philosophy of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR (Bazhanov 2017, 74). S. A. Yanovskaya's scientific work While Yanovskaya is mostly known for her work in mathematical logic and as the editor of the first publication of Marx's "Mathematical Manuscripts", her scientific work ranged in a variety of fields. Her special place in history is not so much due to her original contributions in research, but due to the credit she deserves for making research in mathematical logic possible to others (Uspensky 1997, 459) and her contribution to the promotion of Soviet studies in logic in the 1940s and 1950s9 (Bazhanov 2001, 4). Yanovskaya contributed to the publication of textbooks, original articles and monographs, and, most importantly, carried out the translation and publication of logical foreign literature (Bazhanov 2017, 74). Yanovskaya worked on the foundations of mathematics, on mathematical logic and on the philosophy of mathematics and logic (getting engaged with the work of Frege, Russell, Couturat, Cantor, etc.), as well as on the history of mathematics. Among other issues, Yanovskaya dealt with ancient Egyptian and Greek mathematics, Rolle's criticisms of the calculus, Descartes' geometry and Lobachevsky's non-Euclidean geometry. The titles of some works she published are indicative for the scope of her interests and activities:10  On the so-called 'Definition by Abstraction', 1936  On the theory of Egyptian fractions, 1947  Michel Rolle as a critic of the infinitesimal analysis, 1947  The leading ideas of N.I. Lobachevsky A combat weapon against idealism in mathematics, 1950 9 A detailed overview of Yanovskaya's efforts to promote the study of logic in the USSR in the 1940s is offered in (Anellis 1996). 10 A more comprehensive bibliography of selected works by S. A. Yanovskaya may be found in (Anellis 1987b, 54-55) and in (Levin 2012). Sofia A. Yanovskaya: The Marxist Pioneer of Mathematical Logic in the Soviet Union Dimitris Kilakos 54  On the philosophy of N.I. Lobachevsky, 1950  On the Weltanschauung of N.I. Lobachevsky, 1951  On the history of the axiomatic method, 1958  On the role of mathematical rigor in the creative development of mathematics and especially on Descartes' 'Geometry', 1966. She also published two major studies on the history of mathematical logic in the USSR:  Foundations of Mathematics and Mathematical Logic, 1948  Mathematical Logic and the Foundations of Mathematics, 1959 Of significant importance is Yanovskaya's translating work (mostly in mathematical logic), not only because due to it some important works became known to and utilizable by Soviet scholars, but also because of the interpretative introductions Yanovskaya wrote for them, which are of original scientific importance. Among other works she translated in Russian, of significant importance are the following:  D. Hilbert and W. Ackermann, Grundzüge der theoretischen Logik (Outlines of theoretical logic – the first foreign book in mathematical logic published in USSR)  A. Tarski, Introduction to logic and the methodology of deductive sciences  G. Polya, Mathematics and plausible reasoning  R. Carnap, Meaning and Necessity  A. Turing, Can machines think? Yanovskaya's Original Marxist Approach of Modern Mathematics Yanovskaya's scientific work reflects her aspiration to contribute to the needs of the new society from the standpoint of an academic, militant Marxist and member of the Communist Party. As she acknowledged, this was a difficult challenge: "the goal of stratifying mathematicians and defining the truly Soviet components is a difficult and urgent problem. A problem that demands maximal vigilance" (Yanovskaya 1930, 94). Explaining these difficulties, she further notes that "[t]he modern crisis of capitalism robs mathematics of materialistic tools and methods (intuitionism), widens the gap between theory and practice, and aggravates its spontaneous and unplanned character" (Kolman and Yanovskaya 1931, 118-119).11 11 Ernst Kolman (1892-1979), who co-authored with Yanovskaya this paper, was a leading Marxist mathematician, philosopher and historian of mathematics during the first decades of the Soviet Union. He was a member of the Soviet delegation to the 1931 International Congress of the History of Science and Technology, held in London. Kolman is a rather controversial figure in the history of Sofia A. Yanovskaya: The Marxist Pioneer of Mathematical Logic in the Soviet Union Dimitris Kilakos 55 Her attempts to address these challenges lead several scholars to describe Yanovskaya as a contradictory figure. This view stems from the inclination of its proponents to juxtapose Yanovskaya's commitment to Marxism and to the interests of Soviet society with the importance of her scientific work. As a Marxist, Yanovskaya severely criticized idealism12 in mathematics, which, according to her, was apparent in the works of Frege, Russell, Cantor, etc. Yanovskaya argued that their views were close to true idealism and mysticism, "the example of which is Platonism." According to her, "bourgeois science in the imperialist era does not evolve from Hegel to Marx, Engels, and Lenin, but regresses" (Kolman and Yanovskaya 1931, 119). Her commentary on A. Tarski's work is indicative of her understanding of modern philosophy of mathematics. According to Yanovskaya, he was a logical positivist, representing "the blatant type of philosophical conservatism", as she wrote in the preface to the translation of Tarski's 'Introduction to logic and to the methodology of deductive sciences' .13 As Anellis comments, Yanovskaya, in her writings on philosophy of mathematics and philosophy of logic, "took the offensive against the idealist philosophy of the bourgeois West, represented in her mind by Gottlob Frege, and against the so-called Machism, that is, conventionalism, represented by Rudolf Carnap and his Principle of Tolerance, according to which in logic one is free to choose one's rules" (Anellis 1987a, 82). In her work, S. A. Yanovskaya proffered a profound analysis of philosophical problems of mathematical logic, which was a troubling issue for Marxists. As Anellis notes, Soviet scholars were facing trouble with drawing a line of demarcation between classical logic and mathematical logic – actually, some of them made no essential distinction between the traditional Aristotelian logic and mathematical logic: to them, both were the hated 'formal' logic (Anellis 1987b, 47). It is impossible to appreciate Yanovskaya's contribution to its full extent, unless one is aware of the context of the relevant discussion among Soviet scholars. Therefore, the following digression is justified. The relation between dialectical logic, which is constituent of Marxism-Leninism, and traditional 'formal' logic of the Aristotelian tradition14 was a compelling philosophical issue for Marxists. Some Soviet Marxist philosophers questioned whether formal logic was early Soviet science, since he is typically considered as an ideological "watchdog" in scientific issues. However, it is noteworthy that in 1938 Kolman removed from his post as Head of the Department of Science of the Moscow City Committee of the Communist Party. In 1976, Kolman fled to Sweden and gained more fame in the Western world as a Soviet dissident. 12 A clarification is necessary, since the term 'idealism' is used throughout this paper in the sense it is understood in Marxism, denoting the philosophical views establishing the primacy of mind (or consciousness, or reason) over matter (or reality), as opposed to materialism. This distinction between idealism and materialism bears significant consequences for ontology as well as for the theory of knowledge. For Marxist dialectical materialism, existence in all its forms is material and everything that is real is material and ultimately cognizable. Thus, in this context, idealism is not confronted with realism, since the latter posits the existence of immaterial entities which may or may not be accessible to cognition. Therefore, for example, realistic trends in philosophy of mathematics, rooted in varieties of platonic ideas, are rendered idealistic from a Marxist standpoint. 13 Bazhanov (2001) offers a different perspective in dealing with Yanovskaya's stance as depicted here, arguing that utterances like those cited here (and by him) resulted from her attempt to compromise with the need to pay tribute to the ideological requirements while at the same time serving the actual needs of an academic community. 14 In such an account, 'formal' logic could broadly be understood as the traditional logic, developed as an autonomous discipline in the Aristotelian trend, enriched by the contributions of medieval scholars and J.S. Mill's considerations about induction. Sofia A. Yanovskaya: The Marxist Pioneer of Mathematical Logic in the Soviet Union Dimitris Kilakos 56 bound to its subject matter, due to its pure abstractness. Another hotly debated issue was the relation of logical laws to the laws of reality, which is ever-changing by law-governed processes according to dialectical materialism.15 These philosophical questions may seem irrelevant to mathematics. However, they became relevant for Soviet Marxist philosophers, who got worried by the growing interest shown by mathematicians in mathematical logic and the foundational issues of mathematics. According to the current understanding, mathematical logic developed as a discipline, spinning-off from formal logic. Its roots were traced back in the second half of the 19th century when rigorous mathematical methods were introduced in the study of logic and symbolic notations were extensively used in logical reasoning. In the view of many Soviet philosophers, mathematical logic was merely a new phase of formal logic, the latter being understood as an incomplete approach to the study of the laws of thought. On these grounds, philosophers and mathematicians were engaged in thorough discussions on whether logic is a philosophical discipline or a special branch of mathematics. Those who argued that logic is a philosophical discipline felt rather uncomfortable with dealing with mathematical logic as logic. In fact, several Soviet philosophers dismissed mathematical logic as being of mathematical interest only and perhaps not even logic at all. In this discussion, Lenin's strictures against 'idealism' and 'formalism' were used to render mathematical logic 'idealistic' and hence incompatible with Marxism-Leninism. The following passage exemplifies the hostile attitude of a portion of Soviet Marxist philosophers: The mathematization of logical relations and operations, and the rise of logical calculi, is one of the sources of idealistic delusion and speculation on the interpretation of thought and the process of cognition, just as the mathematization of physical relations was one of the reasons for the appearance of 'physical idealism'. (Vojsvillo et al. 1959, 176) The content of these disputes very little in common with today's discussion about the various positions in mathematical logic. Therefore, it may surprise those who are unfamiliar with Soviet Marxists' critique of philosophical idealism. However, these discussions are substantial, since, as Bochenski rightfully notes, "not only because they might bring some new insights in this difficult field, but also for the understanding of what is happening in Soviet philosophy" (Bochenski 1961, 34). While Soviet philosophy is not the primary focus of this paper, one should take into account with regard to mathematics that in Yanovskaya's times, these problems, "which were elaborated in hard struggle by Soviet logicians, have never been sufficiently studied, from the modern point of view, by any school of Western logicians" (Bochenski 1961, 33). Thus, albeit the quite idiosyncratic employment of various terms and "-isms" in these discussions, one should bear them to understand Yanovskaya's pivotal role in the development of mathematical logic Soviet Union. To perform this role, Yanovskaya should defend mathematical logic against the misconceptions of those who confused it with the philosophy of mathematics (Anellis 1987b, 47), in which idealistic trends were prevailing. She concisely deploys her views on this issue in a letter to the editors of the highly appreciated Soviet philosophical journal 'Voprosy Filosofii' (Yanovskaya 1950). In this letter, Yanovskaya argues that logic is not a special mathematical discipline; it is merely logic. In this argumentation, Yanovskaya endorses the view expressed by Stalin in his 'On Marxism and linguistics' (1950) on the 15 For a concise yet detailed discussion of this discussion from an anti-Marxist perspective, see (Wetter 1958, 523-535) and Bochenski (1961). Sofia A. Yanovskaya: The Marxist Pioneer of Mathematical Logic in the Soviet Union Dimitris Kilakos 57 distinction between language and linguistics. Hence, Yanovskaya implies that Stalin's line of reasoning supports her view that mathematical logic should be unconfused with the philosophy of logic or philosophy of mathematics. It should be noted that Yanovskaya consistently employed this solid view throughout her work – even before Stalin deployed his views on linguistics. For example, she argued for the distinction between the methodological formalism of mathematical logic and the idealism of the formalist philosophy of mathematics, since mathematical logic "can be considered not only as logic of mathematics but also as mathematics of logic, for it is in large part the result of the application of mathematical methods to the problems of logic" (Yanovskaya 1947a, 341). In the context as mentioned above, Soviet scholars attempted to set up a historical and philosophical study of mathematics based on Marxist dialectics, as A. N. Kolmogorov writes in the entry on mathematics in the Great Soviet Encyclopedia (Kolmogorov 1938, 394). Despite its significance, a study on the foundations of mathematics and mathematical logic was an arduous task for Soviet Marxists theorizing on mathematics. Logicism,16 which was one of the most influential currents for the development of modern mathematics, was rejected by Marxist scholars, who argued that it reduced mathematics to a branch of formal logic, fully detached from the dialectics of practical life and existential conditions (Vucinich 1999, 108). It is reasoning, based on an absolute reign of symbolism, was criticized as "a shortcut to solipsism", as Bammel wrote (Bammel 1925, 57). In short, Soviet Marxists used to accuse logicism of its emphasis on rules and formulas devoid of any specific content. This attitude was extended to several other trends oblivious to content, since –as it was arguedthey could not reflect reality. In this line of reasoning, operating on forms without any content inevitably leads to philosophical idealism. Ergo, this kind of mathematics was incongruous with the acute methodological needs of science and the technical needs of society, amid vast transformative process on both domains. As Vucinich notes, Soviet mathematicians "in contrast to Marxist theorists, showed a clear tendency to refrain from any effort to interpret their science in the light of dialectical materialism" (Vucinich 1999, 111). From a philosophical standpoint, the troubling issue was the accommodation of formal logic within the broader scope of dialectical logic. According to dialectical materialism, formal logic is not capable of grabbing the essence of reality in its motion and its reflection on our understanding and knowledge. At best, formal logic may offer rules for logical inferences and reasoning with fixed concepts and judgments – actually, it is indispensable when one is dealing with such kind of problems. Therefore, any attempt to render mathematics founded on the grounds of formal logic was, in Marxist understanding, detaching them from reality, something unacceptable.17 As one would expect, Yanovskaya was aware of this Marxist critique regarding mathematical logic. She held the view that modern science (including mathematics) should be demystified by the idealistic presumptions guiding its development in capitalist 16 Logicism in philosophy of mathematics tried to define the basic concepts of mathematics by means of logical terms, or, to put it differently, to infer all mathematics from some logical terms. It was grounded on the Kantian doctrine, according to which the truths of logic are paradigm cases of analytic truths, being true only by virtue of internal relations among the linguistic (and mathematical, in the case of mathematics) expressions involved. For a concise yet detailed discussion on logicism and neologicism (the distinction between them is beyond my concerns in this paper), see (Tennant 2017). 17 For a summary of the main points of contention in the debate between the dialecticians and the formal logicians, see (Cavaliere 1990) and (Anellis 1994). Sofia A. Yanovskaya: The Marxist Pioneer of Mathematical Logic in the Soviet Union Dimitris Kilakos 58 countries. However, she firmly believed that knowledge of mathematical logic is indispensable for Marxist mathematicians and philosophers. As Yanovskaya explains in her preface to the Russian translation of D. Hilberts's and W. Ackermann's Grundzüge der theoretischen Logik, ideological struggle with idealistic perversions of bourgeois science presupposes a command of techniques that enable one to swing the enemy's weaponry against himself" (Yanovskaya 1947b, 6). Retaining this view of the matter, Yanovskaya argued on the compatibility of dialectical materialism and mathematical logic. Küng (1961, 39-41) concisely reconstructs her argumentation. By referring to the incompleteness of every formalization as demonstrated by Gödel, Yanovskaya refuted the formalist conception, which treats mathematics as a mere abacus. According to her, the principle of non-contradiction of formal logic could be reconciled with the dialectical conception of the contradictory nature of reality. As she argued, an interpreted axiomatic system can be contradictory unless one undertakes precautionary measures concerning the formulation of the axioms and the applicable means of logical deduction. The trouble, then, is only until any particular question is concretely formulated. If one manages to reach to such a formulation – a course which is guided by dialectic principles – then there is only one, completely determined and unambiguous, answer to the question under study. Thus, actually, Yanovskaya pointed to the fact that dialectical logic is about how any dialectical contradiction, being inherent in reality and reflected on the intellect, is resolved. As she further underscored, "a dialectical contradiction has nothing in common with formal-logic contradiction" (Yanovskaya 1959, 118). Moreover, Yanovskaya emphasized on the fruitfulness of the application of mathematical logic in mathematics and cybernetics and stressed on the connections of mathematical logic with its technical applications. According to her, there was a significant development in the field of mathematical logic in the first half of the 20th century due to the rapid development of computational techniques, to which it contributed (Markov, Kuzichev and Kuzicheva 1996, 5). Thus, focusing on relevance with real-world and problems of substantial economic interest, S. A. Yanovskaya disentangled the advancement of mathematical logic from the philosophical discussion on the relation between formal and dialectical logic. In fact, she proceeded even further, portraying the foundations of mathematics as an issue of interest in the advancement of socialism. As she explicitly stated in her contribution for the book Struggle for Materialistic Dialectics in Mathematics (1931), ''[t]o give a [sound] foundation to mathematics means to rebuild it based on theoretical understanding of the practical problems of constructing Socialism'' (cited by Lorentz 2002, 185). Several scholars who have dealt with Yanovskaya's work (i.e. Bazhanov, Anellis, Kushner, etc.) hold that Yanovskaya's adamant Marxist critique against the idealistic formalism and logicism was a tactical move, serving her purpose to contribute to the establishment of mathematical logic as a discrete discipline in the Soviet Union. However, I maintain that such an understanding diminishes the importance of Yanovskaya's contribution. As I understand her work, Yanovskaya was striving to proffer an original Marxist understanding of modern mathematics. Besides mathematical logic, this also holds for other fields of mathematics she also worked on –among others, for example, in her interesting deployment of a Marxist view of the infinitesimal calculus. According to Yanovskaya, real analysis is understandable as the algebra of motion or the "mathematics of a variable quantity [which] must be of an essentially dialectical character" (Yanovskaya 1983, XI). The proposed understanding of Yanovskaya's attitude towards mathematical logic is arguably omnipresent in her writings. For example, in her (1948), Yanovskaya declared that Sofia A. Yanovskaya: The Marxist Pioneer of Mathematical Logic in the Soviet Union Dimitris Kilakos 59 Soviet mathematicians rejected the view that mathematical propositions say nothing about reality. To support this claim, Yanovskaya pointed to A.N. Kolmogorov's work on intuitionistic mathematics, sharing with dialectical logic the rejection of the Law of Excluded Middle. In her view, the problems faced by mathematical logic and its philosophical interpretation could be responded by the development of constructive logic, in which, for example, the Law of Excluded Middle is rejected. Accordingly, Soviet logicians should axiomatically develop constructive logic while discarding the idealistic philosophy adjoint with Brouwer's intuitionistic logic. In order for this task to be performed, according to Yanovskaya, work should be done on extending the laws of the logic of finite domains to infinite domains. On this line of reasoning, other principles of formal logic, i.e. the Law of Non-Contradiction, could also be eliminated. Notably, if such an attempt proves to be successful, then it would be compatible with dialectical logic. Furthermore, as Yanovskaya argued, Soviet logicians also responded to the logical paradoxes, by developing multivalued logic (for a detailed discussion on these issues and Yanovskaya's argumentation, see Anellis 1996). Prominent Soviet mathematicians, such as A.N. Kolmogorov, V.I. Glivenko, A.A. Markov, D.A. Bochvar, P.S. Novikov, M.I. Sheinfinkel (Schönfinkel) etc., worked along these lines. It should also be noted that plenty of them were participating in the seminar on mathematical logic in MSU, organized and directed by S. A. Yanovskaya. The Adventure of Marx's Mathematical Manuscripts Undoubtedly, one of the most significant milestones in Yanovskaya's fascinating life and career is the fact that she was the editor of the first publication of K. Marx's "Mathematical Manuscripts" in 1933. Let us focus on this milestone. An obvious question that one may ask is why these manuscripts remained unknown and inaccessible to scholars for such a long time after his death. In fact, the story of editing and publishing Marx's Mathematical Manuscripts is a rather adventurous one. After Marx's death in 1883, these manuscripts passed into Fr. Engels' hands, who unfortunately did not have the chance to publish them. After Engels' death, the entire collection of papers by him and Marx passed into the hands of the German Social Democratic Party (SPD), without any plan for their publication. The Great October Socialist Revolution in Russia in 1917 and the birth of the Soviet State renewed the interest in unpublished work of the classics of Marxism. The manuscripts were discovered in SPD archives by D. Ryazanov, the founding director of the Marx-Engels Institute, who created 'MEGA' (Marx-Engels-Gesamtausgabe) aiming to publish the complete works of Marx and Engels. Ryazanov was rather surprised to discover that many Marx's notebooks were devoted to mathematics, amounting to 865 A4 sheets in very small writing. He photographed them and stored them in the Marx-Engels Institute. The first attempt to edit them in order to be published was assigned by Ryazanov to E. J. Gumbel, but the result was found insufficient by the new leadership of the Institute under V. A. Adoratskii; thus, this first attempt did not lead to a publication. In 1932, the task was reassigned to a group of mathematicians led by S. A. Yanovskaya – the other members of the group were D. Raikov and Nakhimovskaya.18 Thus, it was only in 1933 that a selection of them appeared for the first time in public, in Russian translation, in the pages of the magazines Under the Banner of Marxism and Markismi Estestvoznanie. Yanovskaya also wrote a commentary introduction entitled "On the Mathematical Manuscripts of K. Marx". Although the complete edition of Marx's Mathematical Manuscripts was expected to take place quickly after the 1933 publication, the outburst of WW2 posed a necessary 18 For a detailed discussion of this story, see (Alcouffe and Wells 2009). Sofia A. Yanovskaya: The Marxist Pioneer of Mathematical Logic in the Soviet Union Dimitris Kilakos 60 change of plans. The archives and the library of Marx-Engels Institute were shifted from Moscow to the Far East in order to be secured and did not return to Moscow until the Red Army beat the Nazis. Up to then, S. A. Yanovskaya, who remained in charge of the endeavor was also heavily engaged with her work in mathematical logic. In the 1950's, the appointment of K.A. Rybnikov as her assistant for the edition of Marx's Mathematical Manuscripts seemed to provide a good opportunity for the acceleration of the project, but unfortunately until the end of the decade it appeared only the publication of a note entitled "On The Concept of Function" in the journal Voprossy Filosofii (No. 11, 1958). While Yanovskaya died in 1966, her contribution in work done to prepare the complete and annotated publication that finally appeared in 1968, in facsimile and also in Russian and German, was immense. The present paper is not the appropriate venue to discuss in detail Marx's mathematical reasoning, the influences it portrayed19 and its relative position in Marxian work. However, I maintain that a hint could be given, to underline the scope of the work done by Yanovskaya not only for the publication of the manuscripts, but also on a thorough study of Marx's perspective on mathematics. Historical surveys have discovered that Marx's interest and studies in mathematics covered a long period from the late 1850s until the early 1880s and his death. Yanovskaya (1968) notes that Marx's formal studies in mathematics were oriented around the texts that Cambridge students used during this period. Concerning Marx's influences on his mathematical studies, Kol'man and Yanovskaya (1931) stressed the influence of Hegel's Science of Logic. Among the several issues they raise, they discuss in particular the issue of Hegel's notion "quantitative infinities". The relation between Hegel's intuitions in Science of Logic and Marx's studies on mathematics was also noticed by Engels, who, in a letter, he wrote to Marx notes: So old Hegel was quite right in supposing that the basic premise for differentiation was that most variables must be of varying powers and at least one of them must be the power of at least 2 or 1/2. Now we also know why. (Marx & Engels 1992, Collected Works, vol.46, p. 131) In fact, Engels was so enthusiastic about Marx's interest in mathematics that in a letter he wrote to Lange in March 1865 mentions that the only man who has enough understanding of mathematics and philosophy to be able to edit the mathematical manuscripts that Hegel left behind, was Marx (Marx & Engels 1987, Collected Works, vol. 42, p. 138). One could barely imagine the impact of the publication of Marx's Mathematical Manuscripts for militant Marxist mathematicians in the early 1930s and what it reflected for the status of the editor of this publication. Given the discussion in the previous section, Yanovskaya's career before and after the publication proves that she was able to bear the burden of responsibility. Wittgenstein in Moscow One of the most intriguing (especially for the Western reader) episodes in Yanovskaya's career was her encounter with L. Wittgenstein when he visited Moscow in 1935, almost a year and a half after the first publication of Marx's Mathematical Manuscripts. 19 For a concise yet detailed and well-informed discussion on Marx's writings in mathematics and his influences, see (Matthews 2002), on which I have relied for large parts of this section. Perhaps the most classical paper on the issue is (Struik 1948). Sofia A. Yanovskaya: The Marxist Pioneer of Mathematical Logic in the Soviet Union Dimitris Kilakos 61 When his five-year Research Fellowship at Trinity College expired, Wittgenstein was looking for the next step in his career. Among other career-paths, he considered, one of particular interest was the possibility of taking up a career in a Soviet academic institution. Although such interest may seem peculiar to a modern reader, the fact is that Wittgenstein's interest in Soviet Russia was not an instant impulse. In fact, the idea of visiting Soviet Russia was occurring in Wittgenstein's mind for quite a long time, since he first wrote about it to a friend in 1922 (Moran 1972) and he had been taking lessons in Russian since 1933. In order to arrange his travel to USSR, Wittgenstein asked J.M. Keynes to introduce him to the Soviet ambassador in London, I.M. Maiski. The travel was finally arranged and on September 12, 1935, Wittgenstein arrived in Leningrad, from where he traveled to Moscow, arriving there on September 14. After spending almost two weeks in the Soviet Union, Wittgenstein returned to Cambridge on October 1, 1935. Yanovskaya was assigned by Soviet authorities to curate Wittgenstein's stay in Moscow. It is not difficult to think about why she was chosen for that. It is obvious that having such a highly-esteemed visitor from the West, Soviet authorities should assign someone suitable to accompany him. Yanovskaya was an excellent candidate for this task, for several reasons. At first, her partisanship and her commitment to the Soviet state and the Communist Party could not be put into question. Furthermore, she was well aware of the challenges that Soviet academia faced, after its reorganization in the first decades after the Revolution and could convincingly discuss this situation with a Western intellectual of Wittgenstein's caliber. Moreover, even if there is no record that I know of about her possible prior engagement with Wittgenstein's work, the fact that she had studied logical empiricism/positivism and the Marxist critique thereof, made her capable of thoroughly discussing with Wittgenstein on philosophical issues of his interest. Finally, one should not disregard that Wittgenstein's no-content theory of logic in the Tractatus was tantalizingly suggestive about how mathematics could be integrated into an overall empirical theory of the world, as Creath (2017) notes. On this particular issue, Yanovskaya had devoted much of her work. The majority of the scholars who have dealt with Yanovskaya's work and Wittgenstein's visit in Moscow claim that Yanovskaya persuaded him to give up the idea of relocating to Moscow. However, sources close to Wittgenstein offer a different perspective. According to them, Yanovskaya not only did not dissuade him from staying in USSR, but actually (obviously on behalf of Soviet authorities) offered him a job. As Monk recollects from his conversations with Wittgenstein, Yanovskaya recommended Wittgenstein for the Chair of Philosophy at Kazan University (Lenin's old college), as well as for a teaching post at Moscow University (Monk 1990, 351). Cornish also reaffirms the job offer for Kazan University (Cornish 1999, 73-74). According to the same sources, Wittgenstein and Yanovskaya were impressed by each other, had interesting discussions and continued their correspondence even after Wittgenstein's departure from Russia. Moran (1972), who managed to contact and then elicit several comments from some of the Russians involved in Wittgenstein's visit to Moscow, reports A. Soubotine from the Institute of Philosophy recalling a conversation with the Yanovskaya, who said that Wittgenstein impressed her favorably with his friendly simplicity, that he showed an interest in dialectical materialism and that she gathered from their conversations that he was interested in Soviet philosophic thought and followed its development. Moran also refers to G. H. von Wright, one of Wittgenstein's literary executors, who remember Wittgenstein talking about his meeting with Yanovskaya, "a likable woman philosophy professor". It seems that the conversations between Wittgenstein and Yanovskaya were charming and philosophically interesting. According to them, Yanovskaya advised Wittgenstein to "read more Hegel" (Monk 1990, 351, and Rhees 1984, 209). After his return from Moscow, Wittgenstein continued to correspond with Sofia A. Yanovskaya: The Marxist Pioneer of Mathematical Logic in the Soviet Union Dimitris Kilakos 62 Yanovskaya and, as Monk further informs us, when he went away to Norway, he arranged with Fania Pascal for Yanovskaya to be sent insulin for her diabetes" (Monk, 1990, 347). It follows, then, that Yanovskaya not only managed to gain Wittgenstein's respect for her intellectual status and character, but they also developed a friendship. This is certainly indicative of the caliber of Yanovskaya's personality. To Sum up Zinov'ev rightfully characterizes S. A. Yanovskaya as "the pioneer of the discussion of the philosophical problems of modern logic" in the Soviet Union, including "the relationship between constructive and non-constructive methods, the introduction and removal of abstractions of higher orders, the application of the criteria of practice to logic and others" (Zinov'ev 1968, 212). The profoundness and the impact of her contribution justify the assessment that Yanovskaya founded a distinct "school in history and philosophy of mathematics and mathematical logic" (Kushner 1996, 67). Research on the work of this school and the context in which it developed is an issue of significant interest. Future research may focus particularly on the impact of the socio-cultural context within which this school proffered its contributions. It may also inform a more profound understanding of how and why this context favored the emergence of woman as a leader of a distinct school. Furthermore, an issue that deserves further research is the impact of Yanovskaya's leading role on the status of women in the philosophical, mathematical and logical community in the Soviet Union. In this paper, I have attempted to trace the impact of the complex socio-cultural context of the first decades of the Soviet Union on Yanovskaya's intellectual course and academic career. Contrasting other scholars who argue about a purported schism between the "political" and the "scientific" life of Yanovskaya, I argue that her work in its totality was informed by her solid commitment to militant Marxism and her persuasion that she could contribute to the building of the new society by performing her duties as a member of Soviet academia and as a member of the Communist Party. Regardless of the success of my argumentation, I hope that I have at least managed to show that Yanovskaya's fascinating life and work deserves more scholar attention than it has already drawn. References Alcouffe A. and Wells J. 2009. Marx, maths and MEGA2. Paper presented at the 13th Annual Conference of the European Society for the History of Economic Thought, Thessaloniki, Greece, April 2009. <10.13140/RG.2.2.23063.06565>. <hal-01571169> Anellis I.H 1987a. Sof'ja Aleksandrovna Janovskaja (1896-1966). In L.S. Grinstein and P.J. Campbell (eds.), Women of Mathematics (Westport, Conn.), pp. 80-85. Anellis, I.H. 1987b. The heritage of S. A. Janovskaja. History and Philosophy of Logic 8 (1): 4556. Anellis, I.H. 1994. Formal logic and dialectical-materialism in the Soviet Union: Review of Fania Cavaliere, La logica formale in Unione Sovietica: Glianni del dibattito. 1946 - 1965 and A. R. D. Mathias, Logic and Terror. Modern Logic (4): 210-218. Anellis, I.H. 1996. Sof'ya Aleksandrovna Yanovskaya's Contributions to Logic and History of Logic. Modern Logic 6 (1): 7-36. Bammel, G. 1925. Logistika i dialektika. Pod znamenem marksizma (3): 24–60. Sofia A. Yanovskaya: The Marxist Pioneer of Mathematical Logic in the Soviet Union Dimitris Kilakos 63 Bashmakova, I.G, Markov, A.A., Rybnikov, K. A., Uspenskii, V.A. and Yushkevich, P.A. 1966. 'Sof'ya Aleksandrovna Yanovskaya (on the occasion of her seventienth birthday', Russian Mathematical Surveys 21 (3): 213-221. Bashmakova, I.G, Demidov, S.S. and Uspenskii, V.A. 1996. Sof'ya Aleksandrovna Yanovskaya (in Russian). Modern Logic 6 (4): 357-372. Bazhanov, V. A. 2000. Restoration: S. A. Yanovskaya's path in logic. Hist. Philos. Logic 22 (3): 129-133. Bazhanov, V. A. 2017. From Under the Rubble: Logic and Philosophy of Logic in the USSR and the Ideologized Science Phenomenon. Social Epistemology 31 (1): 66-77. Bochenski, J.M. 1960. Soviet Logic. Studies in East European Thought 1 (1): 29-38. Bochenski, J.M. 1973. S. A. Janovskaia. Studies in Soviet Thought 13: 1-10. Cavaliere, F. 1990. La logica formale in Unione Sovietica. Glianni del dibattito, 1946-1965. Firenze: La Nuova Italia Editrice. Creath, R. 2017. Logical Empiricism. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.). URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/logical-empiricism/>. Cornish, K. 1999. The Jew Of Linz. Arrow Books. David-Fox, M. 1997. Revolution of the Mind: Higher Learning among the Bolsheviks, 19181929. Cornell University Press. Figes, O. 1990. The Red Army and Mass Mobilization during the Russian Civil War 19181920. Past & Present 129: 168-211. Gorskii, D.P. 1970. Sof'ja Aleksandrovna Janovskaja (in Russian). In: Studies in systems of logic dedicated to the memory of S A Janovskaja (Izdat. 'Nauka', Moscow), pp. 5-12. Joravsky, D. 2009. Soviet Marxism and Natural Science 1917-1932. Oxon and New York: Routledge (1st ed. 1961, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul). Kilakos, D. 2018. Religion and ideological confrontations in early Soviet mathematics: The case of P.A. Nekrasov. Almagest IX (2): 13-38. Kilberg H.I. 1982. Loyalty to duty. In Mints I.I., Nenarokov A.P. (eds.), Women - revolutionaries and scientists (in Russian) (Moscow: Nauka), pp. 104–107. Kol'man, E. and Yanovskaya, S. A. 1931. Hegel and Mathematics. Pod Znamenem Markzisma, N° 1, pp. 14-115. (Reprinted in English in The Mathematical Manuscripts of Karl Marx (1983). London: New Park Publications, pp. 235-255). Kolmogorov, A.N. (1938). Matematika. In: Bol'shaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia, 8: 359-402. Küng, G. 1960. Mathematical logic in the Soviet Union (1917–1947 and 1947–1957). Studies in East European Thought 1 (1): 39-43. Kushner, B.A. 1996. Sof'ja Aleksadrovna Janovskaja: A Few Reminiscencies. Modern Logic 6 (1): 67-72. Levin V.I. 2012. Sofya Aleksandrovna Yanovskaya. Life and Fate (in Russian). Modern Education, 2: 72-125. DOI: 10.7256/2306-4188.2012.2.296. Lorentz G. G. 2002. Mathematics and Politics in the Soviet Union from 1928 to 1953. Journal of Approximation Theory 116: 169-223. Markov A. A., Kuzichev A.S. & Kuzicheva Z. A. 1996. Sofya Aleksadrovna Yanovskaya's work in the field of mathematical logic. Modern Logic 6 (1): 3-6. Marx, K. and Engels, Fr. (Various). Collected Works. New York: International Publishers. Matthews, P. 2002. The Dialectics of Differentiation: Marx's Mathematical Manuscripts and Their Relation to His Economics. Middlebury College Working Paper Series, Middlebury College, Department of Economics. https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mdl:mdlpap:0203. Monk, R. 1990. Wittgenstein. The Duty of Genius.New York: Vintage. Moran, J. 1972. Wittgenstein and Russia. New Left Review 73, pp.85-96. Sofia A. Yanovskaya: The Marxist Pioneer of Mathematical Logic in the Soviet Union Dimitris Kilakos 64 Rhees, R. 1984. (ed.), Recollections of Wittgenstein. Oxford: Oxford University Press (2nd ed). Shestopal, M. G. 1982. Unlimited love for people. In Mints I.I., Nenarokov A.P. (eds.), Women revolutionaries and scientists (in Russian) (Moscow: Nauka), pp. 116–118. Stalin, J.V. 1950. On Marxism and Linguistics (in Russian). Voprosy Filosofii 4 (1): 3-6. Struik, D. 1948. Marx and Mathematics. Science and Society 12 (1): 181-196. Tennant, N. 2017. Logicism and Neologicism. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.). URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/logicism/>. Trakhtenbrot, B.A. 1997. In memory of S. A. Yanovskaya (1896-1966) on the centenary of her birth. Modern Logic 7 (2): 160-187. Uspensky, V. A. 1997. Mathematical Logic in Former Soviet Union: Brief History and Current Trends. In: M.L. Dalla Chiarra et. al. (eds.), Logic and Scientific Methods, pp. 457-483. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Vojsvillo, E.K., Kuznecov, A.V., Laxuti, D.G., and V. K. Finn, V.K. 1959. Urgent tasks of research and study work in the field of logic (in Russian). Voprosy Filosofii 3: 175-179. Vucinich, A. 1999. Mathematics and Dialectics in the Soviet Union: The Pre-Stalin Period. Historia Mathematica 26: 107-124. Wetter, G. A. 1958. Dialectical Materialism: A Historical and Systematic Survey of Philosophy in the Soviet Union. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Yanovskaya S. A. 1930. The Immediate Tasks of the Marxist Mathematicians (in Russian). Pod Znamenem Marksizma 4: 88-94. Yanovskaya, S. A. 1947a. Michel Rolle as a critic of the analysis of the infinitely small (in Russian). Trudy Instituta Istorija Estestvoznanija 1: 327-346. Yanovskaya, S. A. 1947b. Preface to the Russian edition of Hilbert and Ackermann, Principles of mathematical logic, Moscow, pp. 5-13. Yanovskaya, S. A. 1948. Osnovaniya matematiki i matematicheskaya logika (Foundations of Mathematics and Mathematical Logic). In A. G. Kurosh, A. I. Markushevich & P. V. Rashevskii (eds.), Matematika v SSSR za tridtcat' let, 1917-1947 (Moscow & Leningrad: GITTL), pp. 9-50. Yanovskaya, S. A. 1950. Letter to the Editor. Voprosy Filosofii 3: 339-342. Yanonskaya, S. A. 1959. Matematicheskaya logika i osnovaniya matematiki (Mathematical Logic and the Foundations of Mathematics). Matematika v SSSR za sorok let 19171957. (Moscow & Leningrad: GITTL), pp. 13-120. Yanovskaya, S. A. 1968). Preface to the 1968 Russian Edition of Mathematicheskie Rukopsii. (reprinted in English in The Mathematical Manuscripts of Karl Marx (1983). London: New Park Publications, pp. 7-26. Yanovskaya S. A. 1982. Autobiography. In Mints I.I., Nenarokov A.P. (eds.), Women - revolutionaries and scientists (in Russian) (Moscow: Nauka), pp. 81-82. Yanovskaya, S. A. 1983. Preface to the 1968 Russian edition, S. A. Yanovskaya (editor), C. Aronson & M. Meo (translators), The mathematical manuscripts of Karl Marx (London, New Park Publications, 1983), xi-xxx. (English translation of Matematicheskierukopisi, S. A. Yanovskaya (editor), Moscow, Nauka, 1968). Zinov'ev, A. A. 1968. Logic in the U.S.S.R. In R. Klibansky (editor), Contemporary philosophy: A survey, I, Logic and foundations of mathematics (Firenza, La Nuova Italia Editrice), pp. 209-219.

The Externalist's Demon 399CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY 399 Volume 39, Number 3, September 2009, pp. 399-434 The Externalist's Demon CLAYTON LITTLEJOHN Department of Philosophy and Classics University of Texas at San Antonio San Antonio, TX 78249 USA I Introduction Let's say that two individuals are epistemic counterparts iff they happen to be in precisely the same (non-factive) mental states. If one has a veridical experience, her counterparts will undergo a subjectively indistinguishable conscious experience. If she remembers something, her counterparts will seem to recall the same event or fact. If she knows something to be true, her counterparts will believe it to be true. Counterparts always fi nd the same things intuitive. Any difference between those who know a great deal about the external world and their systematically deceived counterparts is a difference the deceived counterparts could never appreciate.1 1 Brewer (1999) suggests that if you have perceptual knowledge of the external world, you might know that you are not in the unfortunate situation of your deceived counterparts. He might say that there is a sense in which you can appreciate the difference between your situation and the situation of someone deceived while allowing that your counterparts who undergo subjective indistinguishable hallucinatory experiences are in no position to appreciate the difference between their situation and yours. 400 Clayton Littlejohn Suppose that when it comes to her mundane beliefs about her immediate surroundings, Audrey gets things right as a rule. Audrey's counterpart Cooper is systematically deceived. Audrey sees that she is holding a book of matches, knows that she wants to light her stove, and strikes a match to light it. Coop seems to see a book of matches, thinks he has struck a match, and believes he has lit his stove. Because of the demon's efforts, Coop undergoes these experiences in the dark. He strikes non-existent matches with phantom limbs. Intuition suggests that while Coop might be mistaken in nearly everything he believes about the external world, he is no less justifi ed in believing what he does than Audrey is justifi ed in believing what she does. To bolster the intuition and explain why we ought to regard mistaken beliefs backed by hallucinatory experiences as justifi ed and not merely excused, Audi offers these remarks: ... given the vivid hallucination, I am in no way at fault for believing what I do, nor do I deserve criticism. Far from it. I am like a surgeon who skillfully does all that can be expected but loses the patient. There I should feel regret, but not guilt; I should explain, but need not apologize; and when we know what my evidence was, we approve of what I did; we consider it reasonable.2 In general, it seems that what we ought to say about epistemic counterparts is this: Parity: Necessarily, if S and S' are epistemic counterparts, S is justifi ed in believing p iff S' is justifi ed in believing p. Once we accept Parity as true, it is hard to see how we could reject Internalism or refuse to reject Externalism: Internalism: Necessarily, the facts about the justifi cation of a subject's beliefs are fi xed completely by the facts about the subject's non-factive mental states. Externalism: It is not the case that the facts about the justifi cation of a subject's beliefs are fi xed completely by the facts about the subject's non-factive mental states.3 2 Audi (2001: 23) 3 Externalism, so understood, is broad enough to encompass Goldman's (1986) reliabilism, Sutton's (2005) knowledge account of justifi ed belief, and Williamson's (2000) view that a belief is justifi ed by the evidence which consists of propositions known. The Externalist's Demon 401 To see why, consider two versions of Externalism. According to process reliabilism, you cannot have a justifi ed belief about p unless the processes that led to that belief reliably lead to the truth.4 According to the knowledge account, you cannot have a justifi ed belief about p unless you know p.5 While Audrey arrives at her beliefs by means of reliable processes and those beliefs constitute knowledge, Coop arrives at his beliefs by the most unreliable of means and knows nothing of the external world. Assuming Parity is true, we have to say that he is no less justifi ed than she in spite of these external differences. Thus it seems justifi cation must be fi xed by the non-factive mental states that Audrey and Cooper share in common. The point seems perfectly general. If you take the justifi cation of belief to involve some condition that does not strongly supervene on a subject's non-factive mental states, it seems you've adopted a view of justifi cation incompatible with Parity. That your view is incompatible with Parity strongly suggests that your view is mistaken. Most think that Parity and Externalism are incompatible.6 Many think that their incompatibility gives us good reason to reject Externalism.7 I shall argue that there is no good argument from Parity to Internalism. In §II, we will see that there are two problems with arguing from Parity to Internalism. First, some versions of Externalism are consistent with Parity. As these views are incompatible with Internalism, Parity alone cannot give us conclusive reason to accept Internalism. Second, anyone who accepts Internalism on the grounds that Parity is true has to explain away the intuitions and theoretical considerations that motivate Externalism. It seems, ceteris paribus, a view that accommodates the widest range of intuitions and theoretical observations is preferable to a view that requires you to explain away the considerations taken to motivate Internalism or Externalism. In §2, we shall see that Externalism can accommodate the intuitions taken to motivate Internalism if 4 The new evil demon problem fi rst surfaced in Stewart Cohen's (1984) discussion of the reliabilist views defended in Goldman (1979). The intuition fi gures prominently in more recent criticism of externalist views. See Audi (2002), Bird (2007), Conee and Feldman (2004), Graham (forthcoming), Nelson (2002), Pollock and Cruz (forthcoming), and Wedgwood (2002). 5 Defended by Unger (1975) and more recently by Sutton (2005). Such a view seems to be a consequence of Hawthorne and Stanley's (Forthcoming) account of justifi ed use of belief in theoretical deliberation. 6 Notable exceptions to this include Bach (1985) and Engel (1992). 7 A notable exception to this is found in Brewer (1997) who insists that hallucinatory experiences that lead to false beliefs do not give the believer the right to believe, but only appear to. 402 Clayton Littlejohn we revise some commonly held views about the logic of justifi cation ascriptions. In that section, I shall also argue that we have good reason to revise these views about the logic of justifi cation ascription. The aim of this paper is not to settle the debate between internalists and externalists, but to show that Externalism is compatible with the intuitions taken to motivate Internalism and that a strategy for settling this debate is far less promising than internalists have taken it to be. To preview a bit, there are really two thoughts that lead people to say that Externalism cannot be squared with our intuitions. First, there is the observation that considerations wholly inaccessible to a subject cannot be relevant to whether this subject is justifi ed in her attitudes. I shall not take issue with this observation. Second, there is the assumption that only those considerations relevant to whether a subject is justifi ed in her beliefs are relevant to the justifi cation of her beliefs. There is, I shall argue, good reason to distinguish between the considerations that determine whether a believer is justifi ed (i.e., considerations that have to do with personal justifi cation) and the considerations that determine whether a belief is justifi ed (i.e., considerations that have to do with doxastic justifi cation). It is the second assumption that ought to be rejected. If it is possible for a believer to be justifi ed in holding beliefs that are not justifi ed, externalists can say that personal justifi cation is an internalist notion. It would not follow that doxastic justifi cation is also an internalist notion. It may well be an externalist notion. Some will say that the distinction between a believer who is justifi ed in holding a belief and a believer holding a justifi ed belief is ad hoc. I shall offer two reasons for thinking that we ought to distinguish between personal and doxastic justifi cation. The fi rst is that drawing the distinction enables us to accommodate the widest range of intuitions possible. If the distinction is not incoherent, and I shall argue that it is not, the desire to accommodate the widest range of intuitions gives us some reason to recognize this distinction. The second is that such a distinction is needed to make sense of the more familiar distinction between the permissible and excusable. If the personal/doxastic justifi cation distinction is needed to make sense of our ordinary practice of normative appraisal, it cannot be out of bounds to appeal to this distinction in the context of the Internalism/Externalism debate. II The New Evil Demon Problem The problem of combining our theoretical views about epistemic justifi cation with the intuitions about undetectable error (i.e., those that support Parity) is commonly referred to as 'the new evil demon problem.' Nearly everyone thinks it is a problem for Externalism. Many think the The Externalist's Demon 403 problem is insurmountable. Because it seems Externalism clashes so dramatically with our ordinary intuitions, it might be a good idea to start by explaining why someone might think that justifi cation must be an externalist notion. The rationale for Externalism that I fi nd persuasive begins with the observation that anything that could justify believing p now in light of the information available rather than suspending judgment, it had better justify assuming the risk that comes with committing to a view about p rather than remaining agnostic.8 If someone's belief is adequately justifi ed, there must be a justifi cation for that belief that does what justifi cations are supposed to. If that justifi cation does what it is supposed to, it justifi es closing deliberation prior to the acquisition of additional information. From the subject's point of view, having come to believe p she will be inclined to think that any further information that comes to light will confi rm something she's taken herself to know all along (i.e., that p is true), be perceived as misleading evidence (i.e., evidence that misleadingly suggests something she knows is not true), or show that she has made a mistake in having concluded that p is true on the basis of the information she had. Perhaps such a mistake is excusable, but such mistakes show that what she took to be a justifi cation was no justifi cation at all. A defective justifi cation, you might say, is no more a justifi cation than a decoy duck is a duck. You cannot have a justifi ed belief about p without a justifi cation for believing p. You cannot have a justifi cation for believing p if there are considerations that establish that it was wrongful for you to have judged that p is true on the basis of the considerations available to you when they judged that p is true. Why think this picture favors Externalism? I might say that you cannot defend Coop's believing that p in light of the fact that Coop had no evidence that supported his belief that p. Because there is no defending him for having believed p, I might conclude that his belief about p was not justifi ed. That Coop cannot be defended in light of how he came to the belief is something we establish (in part) by examining those facts that supervene on his non-factive mental states. No one should 8 The rationale for Externalism I am offering here is different from the rationale found in earlier defenses of Externalism. Sosa (1985), for example, seems to defend Externalism on the grounds that whatever justifi es a belief cannot be the sort of thing that obtains wholly independently from the truth of the belief because of the role that justifi cation must play in the production of knowledge. The argument offered here rests on no assumptions about the role justifi cation plays in the production of knowledge. Motivated in this way, I think Externalism is immune to the objection that externalists have confl ated justifi cation and warrant. See Pollock and Cruz (forthcoming) for a version of this objection. 404 Clayton Littlejohn deny that a belief might fail to be justifi ed in virtue of how things stand internal to the subject. The reason that this picture is supposed to favor Externalism is that we do not think that beliefs are criticized solely on the basis of considerations available to the believer. If our criticism implies fault, perhaps our criticism is based upon considerations available to Coop. However, not all criticism of someone's belief implies fault. We sometimes we criticize a belief because of considerations we know to be unavailable to believer without implying that the believer ought to be faulted for her mistake. Some externalists will say that it is part of our ordinary practice of epistemic appraisal to say that Coop should not believe p because he is non-culpably mistaken.9 Others will say that it is part of our ordinary practice to say Coop should not believe p because he has unwittingly arrived at that belief by way of a method that is wholly unreliable.10 If what it is to have a justifi ed belief is to have a belief that can be defended against criticism (whether that is criticism based on considerations available to the believer or available only to those who appraise the believer's beliefs) it seems to follow that the conditions that determine whether a belief is justifi ed include those that supervene on our nonfactive mental states but are not limited to such conditions. Justifi cation is an externalist notion because defensibly believing something is an externalist notion. Internalists will likely say that criticisms that appeal to considerations beyond those available to the believer are not criticisms that a justifi cation seeks to address.11 This point, if taken seriously, leads to an odd sort of view. On this view, the justifi cation of a belief is described as something that does not even aspire to show that the subject is right to judge p by showing that considerations not presently accessible to the subject will not show that she was mistaken to judge that p is true on the basis of what was available to her. (If the subject was non-culpably mistaken to judge that p is true on the basis of what was available to her, on many internalist views this shows that there was nothing wrong with the subject's justifi cation.) It does not seem from the subject's point of view that having an adequate justifi cation is neutral on the question as to whether there is some basis for correctly criticizing her belief as mistaken. If it did, theoretical deliberation would not close with the subject taking the available justifi cation to be adequate. Perhaps internalists might say that a justifi cation might succeed in justifying a belief 9 I imagine Sutton (2005) and Unger (1975) might say this. 10 I would expect Goldman (1986) to say something to this effect. 11 This seems to be Bird's (2007) view. The Externalist's Demon 405 while failing to do what it is intended to do or what the subject thinks it must do in order to justify adopting a belief rather than remaining agnostic (i.e., constitute a defense of having come to believe p on the basis of the available information). The awkwardness of such a view emerges when we realize that this view has it that beliefs might be perfectly justifi ed by defective justifi cations or justifi cations the subject is disposed to think of as defective. As odd as such a view might look, internalists are quick to remind us that while we might say that people should not believe what they do because they are mistaken or because they have unwittingly relied on an unreliable process, when our basis for saying that they should not believe something appeals to considerations beyond those that pertain to the subject's non-factive mental states we will say that the subject was justifi ed in believing p. So, we have to address their new evil demon argument against Externalism: (1) Although Coop is systematically deceived, he is justifi ed in believing what he believes about the external world. (2) Because Coop is systematically deceived, he does not come to his beliefs on the basis of reliable processes or the sorts of veridical experiences and genuine memories that can serve as the basis for knowledge. (C) Hence, none of the conditions beyond those that supervene on our non-factive mental states have any bearing on the justifi cation of our beliefs. Although the argument might initially seem quite persuasive, the argument's implicit assumptions are far from innocent. Intuitions about counterparts clearly play an important role in the argument, but the argument does not rest on intuition alone. The additional assumptions needed to argue from Parity to Internalism are assumptions we have good reason to reject. 1. A Hidden Assumption In this section, I want to point to two problems with arguing from Parity to Internalism. First, the argument does not exclude certain forms of Externalism unless we introduce additional assumptions. These assumptions we have little reason to accept and good reason to reject. Second, there are intuitions that seem to favor Externalism and seem to be compatible with the intuitions taken to motivate Parity. Just as the externalist faces the task of accommodating or explaining away the 406 Clayton Littlejohn intuitions taken to motivate Internalism, the internalist cannot claim that theirs is a view unequivocally supported by intuition. The argument from Parity to Internalism is invalid. According to Parity, if two individuals are epistemic counterparts, they are justifi ed in believing the same things. According to Internalism, the facts about the justifi cation of an individual's beliefs strongly supervene on facts about that individual's non-factive mental states. Internalism is logically stronger than Parity. For all that Parity tells us, Audrey and Cooper might be justifi ed in believing precisely the same things even if Audrey's justifi cation for her beliefs differs from Coop's. Parity is consistent with a view on which both Audrey and Cooper believe what they do on the basis of evidence that warrants our saying that they are justifi ed in their beliefs while insisting that Audrey's evidence goes beyond Coop's evidence. If Audrey's evidence outstrips Coop's evidence, it seems Audrey has 'external' epistemic reasons for her beliefs that Coop does not and Internalism tells us could not exist. For all that Parity tells us, Audrey's reasons for her beliefs are better than Coop's. This comparative judgment is incompatible with Internalism, but it is consistent with Parity. Thus, Parity does not entail Internalism. To rule out such responses, what the argument for Internalism requires an additional assumption: Equality: Necessarily, if S and S' are epistemic counterparts, the fact that q is relevant to the justifi cation of what S believes iff the fact that q is true is relevant to the justifi cation of what S' believes. Equality comes with costs I'm not sure we should willingly pay. Assume that some evidence is propositional. Assume knowledge of a proposition's truth is suffi cient for that proposition's inclusion in your evidence. Assume false propositions cannot be part of our evidence.12 Finally, assume that the sceptic is wrong and it is possible to have 12 Williamson (2000) defends each of these assumptions in the course of arguing that our evidence consists of all and only what we know ('E = K' hereafter). A defense of E = K is clearly beyond the scope of this paper. Note that the assumptions listed above did not include what I take to be the most controversial aspect of Williamson's view, which is that knowledge of p's truth is necessary for p's inclusion in your evidence. This assumption has the unfortunate consequence that being in a Gettier case can have an affect on your evidence. Silins (2005) has argued that E = K confl icts with independently plausible assumptions about the sort of access we have to our evidence. Dodd (2007) has argued that E = K commits us to an infallibilist account of justifi cation that engenders scepticism. I address these objections in Littlejohn (ms. a) and (forthcoming). The Externalist's Demon 407 knowledge of the external world. With these assumptions in place, suppose Audrey knowingly infers r from p. Coop mistakenly believes p and infers that r is true. Audrey's knowledge of p is based on veridical experience. Cooper's belief that p is true is induced by hallucinatory experience. If knowledge of p's truth is suffi cient for p's inclusion in Audrey's evidence, among the facts relevant to the facts about the justifi cation of her beliefs is that p is part of her evidence. If the falsity of p is suffi cient for p's exclusion from Coop's evidence, there are reasons for Audrey to believe r that are not among the reasons for Coop to believe this. To save Equality, you either have to say that we cannot have knowledge of propositions about the external world, that there can be false propositions included in someone's evidence, or that knowledge is not enough for a proposition's inclusion in someone's evidence. Whatever reason you have for rejecting one or more of these assumptions, it cannot be that these assumptions confl ict with Parity or the intuitions that motivate it. These assumptions, although incompatible with Equality, are perfectly consistent with Parity. I do not offer this in the hopes of refuting Internalism, but merely to show that an assumption needed to argue from Parity to Internalism comes with costs. I know of no one who thinks that false propositions can serve as evidence. It strikes me as exceptionally odd to say of someone something to the effect of, 'Although they know they have hands, that is no reason for them to believe they are not handless'. Yet, if knowledge of a proposition's truth did not suffi ce for that proposition's inclusion in someone's evidence, I just cannot see how there could be a principled reason to think such a remark must be mistaken. 2. Further Intuitions The fi rst problem with running the argument from Parity to Internalism is that the argument requires an assumption about epistemic relevance that has no clear motivation and comes with real costs. The second problem facing the internalist who wants to claim that theirs is the view supported by intuition is that it seems there are intuitions that support the following thesis: Asymmetry: It is possible for there to be a pair of epistemic counterparts, S and S', such that (a) only one of the pair has good enough reason to believe p and have a justifi ed belief about p or (b) S has better reasons to believe p than S' has. For reasons sketched above, I think it is clear that Asymmetry is incompatible with Internalism. So, if there are some intuitions that support 408 Clayton Littlejohn Asymmetry, it is misleading to suggest that Internalism fi nds unequivocal support in intuition. Imagine Audrey imagines that her counterpart Cooper has been wholly deceived by a Cartesian demon. She thinks to herself: (1) If there is no more reason for me to believe I have hands than there is for Coop to believe he has hands, I should not believe I have them. (2) If my reasons for believing I have hands are no better than his, I really have no good reason for believing I have hands. Intuitively, these strike me as correct. Contrast them with the following thought: (3) Even if there is no more reason for me to believe I have hands than there is for Coop to believe he has hands, there is nothing wrong with my continuing to believe I have hands. I do not think that the oddity of (3) is due to its fi rst-personal formulation. Suppose Audrey is told that Ben and Cooper are both her epistemic counterparts. She is told that Coop is systematically deceived. She is not told whether Ben is systematically deceived or any less reliable in his judgments about the external world than she is. I think it would be right for her to say: (4) If there is no more reason for Ben to believe he has hands than there is for Coop to believe he has hands, Ben should not believe this. (5) If there is no more reason for Ben to believe he has hands than there is for Coop, I would advise him against believing this. If, however, he was in a position to know that he has hands I would not advise him against believing this. If your scorecard is anything like mine, you reject (3) but accept (1), (2), (4), and (5). The intuitions that lead someone to accept (1), (2), (4), and (5) support Asymmetry. If my intuitions are correct, there is intuitive support for both Asymmetry and Externalism. Intuitions being what they are, I cannot assume that they are universally shared. Someone might object that the intuitions I am hoping to elicit are intuitions shared only by infallibilist sceptics or externalists.13 Let me say three things 13 An anonymous referee raised this worry. The Externalist's Demon 409 in response. First, the intuitions do support Externalism, but they do not support infallibilism. Although these intuitions are consistent with infallibilism, they are also accommodated by fallibilist views such as reliabilism or the knowledge account of justifi ed belief.14 Second, even if no one with internalist sympathies shares these intuitions, it is important to remember that the aim of this paper is not to refute Internalism, much less refute Internalism appealing to considerations internalists accept. The aim is to show how it is possible to accommodate the widest range of intuitions possible within an externalist framework. We cannot deny that people have these intuitions even if those intuitions strike us as mistaken. Confronted by those who have such intuitions, we have to choose between taking them at face value and building our theories around them or explaining them away. I would rather accommodate the intuitions of both internalists and externalists if possible. Third, I do not think we can assume that those who fi nd Internalism intuitive will fi nd (1), (2), (4) and (5) counterintuitive. In trying to elicit the intuitions that supported Parity, we stipulate that the relevant subjects are mistaken in their beliefs. This means that the question as to whether we ought to agree with the relevant subjects is no longer open. This shifts our focus away from a question along the lines of, 'What are we to think of what they believe?' to a question more along the lines of, 'Given that they are mistaken, what are we to think of them?' In trying to elicit the intuitions I think support Asymmetry, the question as to whether the subject is mistaken is left open as is the question, 'Given what their reasons are, ought we agree with them in believing what they do?' By focusing explicitly on the quality of reasons rather than on the subject in the wake of that subject's mistaken response, I do not think it would be surprising to fi nd those with internalist sympathies or no settled view fi nding (1), (2), (4), and (5) intuitive. I wish to make one more point in favor of Asymmetry because I think this sort of argument has not yet surfaced in the literature on epistemic justifi cation. Empirical research suggests that when it comes to the justifi cation of action, the folk think that the justifi cation of an action 14 Sutton's (2005) view on which a belief is justifi ed only if that belief constitutes knowledge amounts to a version of fallibilism as it is typically understood. As it is typically understood, the infallibilist asserts that a belief can be justifi ed only if there are infallible grounds or evidence available for that belief. See Cohen (1988). Because of the factivity of knowledge, Sutton's view has the implication that there are no false, justifi ed beliefs. However, the view does not have the implication that there are no justifi ed beliefs based on fallible grounds because there is no reason to assume that knowledge requires having infallible grounds for a belief. Thus, Sutton's view is a version of fallibilism as it is typically understood in spite of the fact that it rules out the possibility of a false belief being justifi ed. 410 Clayton Littlejohn depends on more than just what is in the agent's head. I would be surprised if the folk were disposed to think that the justifi cation of action depends on more than just what is in the agent's head but when it came to the justifi cation of those beliefs that lead to action the justifi cation in no way depended on factors external to the subject's perspective. If folk intuition treats actions motivated by non-culpably held mistaken beliefs as excusable rather than justifi ed, why would the folk think of the beliefs that led to these actions as perfectly justifi ed? An internalist is free to deny the relevance of such intuitions when it comes to selecting between competing theories of epistemic justifi cation, but I think that given their theoretical commitments, internalists will have a diffi cult time making sense of a hybrid view that allows that the justifi cation of action depends (in part) upon features of the objective circumstances while denying that the justifi cation of belief depends on these same features. If the hybrid view does not sit well with the internalist's theoretical commitments, the internalist either has to explain away the folk intuitions about justifi ed action or might help themselves to the sort of distinction I shall argue saves the externalist from the charge that theirs is a view that confl icts with intuition and undermines the new evil demon argument. They can square their view with folk intuition by saying that theirs is a view that concerns personal justifi cation and is thus a theory about what it takes for the person to be justifi ed in the face of certain sort of criticism. In so doing, however, they would have to concede that the new evil demon argument is not a cogent argument against Externalism or externalist accounts of doxastic justifi cation. So, let us consider a view that combines an externalist account of justifi ed action with an internalist account of justifi ed belief. On this hybrid view, the justifi cation of an action depends on whether the agent has acted against an undefeated reason against performing that action. That the agent is unaware of the reason might serve as an excuse, it does not show that the reason does not so much as bear on the justifi ability of the relevant action. If the agent unwittingly harms another and is not culpable in her failure to appreciate that her actions will harm another, the action is prima facie wrongful even though the agent cannot be faulted for having caused the harm. If there is no overriding reason that justifi es the imposition of that harm, the action will turn out to be all things considered wrong. However, on this view, if it seems 'from the inside' that there is no overriding reason to refrain from performing the action and the agent cannot be faulted for failing to appreciate that there is such a reason, the belief that leads her to act (e.g., the belief that this is the thing to do) is itself justifi ed. To see what a view amounts to, let us consider two concrete examples. Ben has fallen behind in his payments to Jacques, a loan shark. The Externalist's Demon 411 Last week, Jacques gave Ben a severe beating with the warning that if he is not paid within the week, he will kill Ben. Ben starts carrying a gun and spending most of his time in public places in the hopes that Jacques would not attack him if there were people present to witness the attack. One afternoon, Ben is in the diner. The story might continue in one of two ways. The fi rst version of the story goes like this. You see Jacques' twin brother enter the diner. You know it to be Jacques' twin, know that Ben knows nothing of this twin, and know that Jacques' twin is harmless. You know he does not look harmless as he looks just like the very dangerous Jacques. Seeing the man approach, Ben produces his gun and yells 'You won't get me Jacques!' You know that if you do nothing Ben will shoot Jacques' twin on the belief that this is necessary for self-defense and so you lunge at Ben. You knock him down, his shot misses Jacques, and Ben is injured as a result. The second version of the story goes like this. You see Ben enter the diner and Jacques follow soon after. Seeing Jacques approach, Ben produces his gun and yells, 'You won't get me Jacques!' You see his fi rst shot miss and Jacques pull out a gun to return fi re. As Ben struggles to reload, you hit Jacques with a chair. You knock him down, he loses his gun, and he is injured as a result of your striking him. It seems that in both situations your reactions were morally justifi ed. In fact, it seems that they were supererogatory. What does this tell us? For one, it suggests that in the fi rst example, Ben lost his right to non-interference. He loses no such right in the second. This suffi ces to explain the further intuition that you owe Ben nothing for his injuries in the fi rst story but would had you intervened in just this same way in the second. It seems so because the grounds of self-defense were not present in the fi rst example. That the grounds of self-defense did not obtain in the fi rst case suggests that his action was less justifi ed than the action he performed in the second case. Yet, it seems that the relevant mental states were the same in both cases. Thus, it seems that it is not true that the justifi cation of Ben's actions depends wholly on Ben's nonfactive mental states. This much seems to be supported by folk intuition. If this much is right but we were to insist that while the justifi catory status of his actions differed in these two cases the justifi catory status of his beliefs were the same in both cases, we would have to reject the following principle, linking justifi ed belief to justifi ed action: Link: If S's belief that -ing is permissible is justifi ed, S's -ing is justifi ed. The idea behind Link is rather straightforward. Suppose we say that Ben's pulling the trigger just was his shooting Jacques. In turn, his 412 Clayton Littlejohn shooting Spike just was his acting on the beliefs and desires that involve, inter alia, the belief that the grounds for self-defense justifi ed his shooting. While believing p and allowing yourself to reason from the belief that p are two different things and Leibniz's Law will not compel us to assign the same deontic status to the believing and the reasoning from the belief, it seems odd to think that there is something about the reasoning from the belief that prevents it from being justifi ed and nothing that prevents the belief itself from being justifi ed. Yet, that seems to be what the hybrid view is committed to insofar as it concedes that the acting on the relevant belief, which just was Ben's shooting, was not justifi ed while the relevant belief (i.e., that shooting is the thing to do) is itself perfectly justifi ed. Such a view would require the internalist to say that there is one set of considerations that determine whether it is permissible to let the belief that p fi gure in deliberation and another that determines whether to believe p. I'm not sure it is coherent to distinguish these considerations in this way. I think we can show that the costs that come with denying Link are costs internalists should be unwilling to pay. Moreover, I think we can establish Link on the grounds that it is incoherent to draw the distinction between the considerations that determine whether relying on the belief that p in deliberation is justifi ed and the considerations that determine whether believing p is justifi ed. First, it is worth noting that you cannot reject Link without also rejecting the following principle: Fault: If S's -ing were unjustifi ed, S could be faulted for having 'd. If you reject Link, it is possible for someone to have 'd having a justifi ed belief that they ought to  even if the -ing itself could not be justifi ed. Surely if someone was not wrong to believe that they ought to  or are permitted to  and 'd from the right sort of motives, they could not be faulted for having 'd. Whatever we pointed to in order to show that they could be faulted would have to be conditions of which they were culpably unaware or aware of but culpably failed to take proper account of in deliberation. Either way, we could not sustain the judgment that the subject's belief about the deontic status of -ing was itself justifi ed. I don't think internalists would be happy to reject Fault since when it comes to justifi ed belief they often wish to say that the conditions you could not be faulted for are conditions that have no bearing on the justifi cation of your beliefs. While they might say that when it comes to belief, conditions for which you cannot be faulted for failing to take account of do not affect justifi cation, but when it comes to action, the situation is different. But, it is not clear how they could defend this. It cannot be defended on the grounds that it is part of the concept of The Externalist's Demon 413 justifi cation that the conditions that determine whether something is justifi ed is determined wholly by conditions the subject can be faulted for failing to take account of. They have just denied this. So, it seems that denying Link is costly for internalists insofar as the denial of Link commits you to the denial of Fault. Not only is the denial of Link costly for internalists, the denial of Link also seems incoherent. On a view that asserts that the justifi cation of action can depend on factors the agent cannot be faulted for failing to take account of but denies that the justifi cation of belief can depend on such factors, it seems that these should be open questions: (6) I know that I should believe that I ought to , but what should I do? (7) I know that he should believe that he ought to , but should he? I don't think these are open questions. From the deliberative perspective, there is no intelligible gap between the judgment that you ought to  and the judgment that you ought to believe that you ought to . From the perspective of the outside observer, there seems to be no intelligible gap between the beliefs you think the advisee ought to hold about what they ought to do and the actions you think the advisee ought to perform. However, if you combined an internalist account of justifi ed belief with an externalist account of justifi ed action, you would have to allow for the possibility of situations in which an agent ought not perform the actions they ought to believe that they ought to form. You would have no explanation as to why these questions seem closed from both an internal and external standpoint. If an internalist were to accept Link, they could avoid these diffi culties but then their view would confl ict with the intuitions that lead people to endorse views on which the justifi cation of an action depends (in part) upon conditions external to the agent's perspective on the situation. Thus, the internalist would be open to the charge that theirs is a view that fails to accommodate intuition much in the way that they suggest the externalist cannot accommodate intuition. Of course, the intuitions that cause trouble for these views are different intuitions, but it is misleading to suggest that Internalism is the view supported by intuition. It is a view that receives support from some intuitions, perhaps, but it confl icts with others and is not unique in its ability to accommodate the intuitions that underwrite the new evil demon argument. At least, that is what I hope to show in the next part of the paper. To sum up, we have seen that internalists that look to motivate their view by appeal to the intuitions backing Parity face a pair of problems. 414 Clayton Littlejohn The fi rst is that those intuitions alone cannot motivate Internalism unless combined with a further assumption about epistemic relevance that may prove costly to accept. Reject Equality and the argument from Parity to Internalism fails. The second is that some hold intuitions that appear to be consistent with the intuitions that support Parity but inconsistent with internalist accounts of epistemic justifi cation. First, there were the intuitions about comparative epistemic judgments that suggested that having a justifi ed belief might require having better reasons than those available to the systematically deceived. Second, there were intuitions about justifi ed action that indirectly seemed to support Asymmetry. As Asymmetry might prove to be consistent with Parity but inconsistent with Internalism, we can now see that the internalist cannot claim that theirs is a view that accommodates the widest range of intuitions possible. Although internalists could deny the relevance of intuitions about justifi ed action when it comes to selecting between competing theories of epistemic justifi cation, to dismiss the relevance of these intuitions the internalists have to reject Link. It seems that such a denial is costly as it forces the internalist to deny that there is any conceptual connection between factors a subject can be faulted for failing to take account of and factors that bear on justifi cation. Moreover, it seemed that the denial of Link is incoherent. In short, the new evil demon argument for Internalism or against Externalism is far more problematic than I think people have appreciated previously. III Justifi cation Ascriptions Taken at face value, a certain kind of intuition supports Parity. Taken at face value, a certain kind of intuition supports Asymmetry. If you thought Parity supported Internalism and Asymmetry entailed Externalism, you might conclude that our intuitions support two incompatible accounts of epistemic justifi cation. The pessimist might conclude that such intuitions cannot be trusted and should not serve as the basis for theory selection. It seems that the intuition that our deceived counterparts are no less justifi ed than our successful epistemic counterparts shows that it is possible for someone to be justifi ed in holding their beliefs provided that things appear a certain way to them regardless of what is actually taking place around them. Other intuitions suggest that the conditions necessary for having a justifi ed belief could only obtain if the reasons someone has for their beliefs are better than the reasons the systematically deceived have for theirs. I think pessimism is unwarranted. We can accommodate both sets of intuitions. The obstacle to accommodating both sets of intuitions seems to be this. Supposing that Audrey knows p on the basis of veridical percepThe Externalist's Demon 415 tion and Coop believes p on the basis of hallucinatory experiences indistinguishable from Audrey's experiences, we want to say: (1) Audrey and Coop are both justifi ed in believing p. In turn, this is supposed to entail: (2) There is suffi cient justifi cation for Audrey and Coop's beliefs about p. We have seen that by denying Equality, a defender of Externalism might accept (1) as well as the inference to (2), but say: (3) The justifi cation that Coop has for his beliefs is suffi cient. It is distinct from the justifi cation that Audrey has for her beliefs as the justifi cation Audrey has incorporates all of Coop's evidence and evidence he lacks.15 The claim that the justifi cation of Audrey's beliefs is overdetermined is, perhaps, true enough. However, this response I think does not quite go far enough. For we have seen that some of our intuitions about counterparts support stronger versions of Externalism that are incompatible with (2). That is to say, we saw in the last part of the previous section that there was some intuitive support for the claim that not only could it be that Audrey's reasons for holding her beliefs are better than the reasons Coop had for holding his, but also that only Audrey's reasons were good enough. And while this is consistent with the idea that Audrey's beliefs are supported by more justifi cation than she might need to permissibly hold her belief, it suggests that there might be something right about a version of Externalism on which (2) turns out to be false. Someone will say that if we reject (2) we must reject (1) as well. And that suggests that we have to reject Parity. In turn, that suggests that internalists are right to say that Externalism clashes with fi rm intuitions about justifi cation. In this fi nal section I shall argue that the way to sort this mess out is to deny that claims like (2) are logically entailed by claims like (1). If this is right, we can say that externalists are right to reject (2) and their critics are wrong to accuse the externalist of failing to accommodate the intuitions that back (1). 15 This seems to be Williamson's (2000) position. Collins (1997) defends a similar view. Because neither author takes account of the intuitions I have claimed support Asymmetry, I think they see this as the only option for Externalism. It is an option, to be sure, but it is not the only one. 416 Clayton Littlejohn On the standard view of justifi cation ascriptions, (1) entails (2). On the standard view of things, we can say that three kinds of justifi cation ascription are related as follows: (SV1) S is justifi ed in believing p iff S's belief that p is justifi ed. (SV2) S's belief that p is justifi ed iff there is a suffi cient justifi cation for S to believe p and this is the basis on which S believes p. According to (SV1), personal and doxastic justifi cation ascriptions are equivalent. According to (SV2), ascriptions of propositional justifi cation are logically entailed by ascriptions of doxastic justifi cation. If, as I shall argue, we ought to revise this account of the logical relations between various kinds of justifi cation ascription by rejecting (SV1), then perhaps we can make sense of a view on which (1) is true and (2) is false. We can try to make sense of a view on which someone can be justifi ed in believing p even if there is not suffi cient justifi cation for the belief they hold. Such a view would make sense of those intuitions that supported Parity and Asymmetry. I shall offer a sketch of an account of justifi cation and explain why someone attracted to such a view of how justifi cations work will likely think that the standard view oversimplifi es matters. Next, I will look at a pair of defenses of the standard view and argue that neither is adequate. I will conclude with an argument for revising the standard view on the grounds that doing so is necessary for making sense of a more familiar distinction between excuses and permissions. 1. What Justifi cations Do Various things call for justifi cation. You might be called on to justify a decision, or a belief, or someone who made a decision or held a belief. What is it that a justifi cation must do if it is to be successful? On the view I would like to propose, we should think of justifi cations as defenses: (JD) To successfully justify something is to successfully defend it. That which cannot call for a defense against criticism is not something that calls for a justifi cation. If a justifi cation is called for and a defense cannot be given, I cannot imagine that a justifi cation might be given in its place. You might worry that there is more to a justifi cation than just a defense. After all, to say that a belief is justifi ed is to say that there is some positive reason for holding it.16 While that is true, I think it causes 16 An anonymous referee raised this objection. The Externalist's Demon 417 no trouble for (JD). The reason I think this does not cause trouble for the proposal is that if we have identifi ed that someone believes p and we know they have no positive reason for holding that belief, this fact alone will prevent us from offering a proper defense of that particular belief. If you assume that someone's believing p is an instance of epistemic irresponsibility and a defense of that belief is going to involve something that establishes that the believer who holds this particular belief has not been irresponsible, it follows from (JD) that this belief cannot be justifi ed precisely because the believer has no positive reason to believe p. Thus, (JD) pronounces such beliefs unjustifi ed. (JD) is a thesis about pleas. We're looking at theories about properties and truth-conditions of statements that ascribe such properties. If I'm to take observations about pleas as observations that favor some account of justifi cation, I need some way of linking claims about pleas to claims about properties. One way to link claims about pleas to claims about properties is by means of the 'process-property integration thesis': (PPI) Something is justifi able only if it has the property or properties that would in principle constitute a successful justifi cation of it if cited.17 If something lacks certain properties, it cannot be defended from criticism or justifi ed and cannot have the status of being justifi ed. We defend things against criticism by citing the features of the thing that show the criticism to be unwarranted. So, on the proposal I am offering here, if we can identify the types of criticism to which something is subject and the conditions under which such criticism can be negated, we can in turn identify the conditions under which the thing is justifi ed. We can save Externalism from the charge that it is unintuitive by drawing a distinction between the conditions under which a believer can be justifi ed and the conditions under which a belief can be justifi ed.18 17 Audi (1993: 305). Note that the view is not that by asserting that a belief has some property, the belief is justifi ed if the audience accepts that the belief has such properties. Rather, the idea is that if the audience takes your assertion at face value, they will agree that the properties you assert that the belief has constitutes a justifi cation for that belief. 18 Bach (1985) and Engel (1992) appeal to such a distinction to defend reliabilism. Bach thinks personal justifi cation ascriptions refl ect our sense of the goodness of the epistemic 'action' that led to a belief. The trouble with explaining the distinction in this way is that if epistemic actions call for justifi cation, we ought to be able to distinguish between a person being justifi ed in an epistemic action and an epistemic action being justifi ed. If such actions do not call for justifi cation, it is not clear how we can say that a person being justifi ed is to be understood in terms 418 Clayton Littlejohn If such conditions need not coincide, according to (JD), it is possible for a believer to be justifi ed when the belief held is not. To see why the standard view does not allow for such a possibility, assume the intuitions that support Parity are correct and that (1) is true. It follows from this and (SV1) that (2) is true. Whereas externalists will say that conditions beyond those that supervene on the subject's non-factive mental states have to be taken into consideration in determining whether someone's belief is justifi ed, it follows from this and (SV1) that in determining whether the subject is justifi ed in believing these same conditions need to be taken account of. As we know that only the conditions that supervene on a subject's non-factive mental states are needed to determine whether, say, Coop is justifi ed in his beliefs, it would follow that only such conditions can determine whether Coop's beliefs are justifi ed. To bring out the tension between the standard view and (JD), defenders of Externalism will say that in order to defend someone's belief about p from criticism, we have to take account of both how things stand with the believer's mental states and in the believer's circumstances. For while we sometimes criticize beliefs on the grounds that they are not supported by the evidence of the believer, we often criticize beliefs for misrepresenting how things are or for being arrived at as the result of a process that is not reliable. If a defense of the belief aspires to show that such criticism is unwarranted and a belief is justifi able only if defensible, a belief could only be justifi ed on those occasions where 'external' criticism (i.e., criticism that does not appeal to conditions the subject can be faulted for failing to take account of) is unwarranted. However, we do not criticize believers on such external grounds. It is no criticism of Coop that he makes a mistake. It is only a criticism of Coop if we say that he is culpable or responsible for the mistake. Here is the argument from (JD) against (SV1): (4) Something can be justifi ed iff it can be defended [(JD)]. (5) A subject, S, can be defended from criticism for having 'd if she is properly excused for having 'd. (6) A subject, S, can be excused for having 'd even if her -ing was all things considered wrong. of our evaluation of epistemic action. Engel suggests that the personal/doxastic justifi cation distinction coincides with the distinction between reliable beliefs and excusably held beliefs and adopts a view similar to Goldman (1988). He does not argue that we need to draw the distinction to accommodate intuition or why we ought to identify excusably held belief with a person being justifi ed in holding that belief. The Externalist's Demon 419 (7) If S's -ing is all things considered wrong, S's -ing cannot be justifi ed. (C) It is possible that S is justifi ed in -ing even if S's -ing is not justifi ed. This conclusion follows from the premises above and it is not clear which premise someone should reject in order to save the standard view. Someone might reject (4), but that requires saying that you can give a defense of something without being able to justify it. What would this defense amount to? Someone might reject (5), but then it would seem that she would say that a subject could be open to criticism for that which she cannot be faulted. In turn, that suggests that the truth of ascriptions of personal justifi cation would potentially depend upon external considerations. If (5) were false, Externalism would be true. If (6) is false, the very notion of excuse must be incoherent. What is to be excused is the wrongness of an action or attitude. The upshot of an excuse is that the wrongness of the action or attitude does not refl ect badly on the agent who performed the action or held the attitude. (7) says that an attitude can only be justifi ed if the attitude is not all things considered wrong. To deny this is to allow that conditions can make it such that a belief is wrongfully held but justifi ably held. From the deliberative perspective, it seems that it would be very odd to judge that a belief is justifi ed and then wonder whether it is wrong to hold the belief. What was the justifi cation doing for the believer in deliberation if it was not, inter alia, establishing that the attitude was not wrongfully held? From an external perspective, it seems that the very conditions I would use to show that a belief is wrongfully held are the conditions I would use to argue that the belief is not justifi ed. Perhaps those who defend the standard view will say that the incompatibility of that view and (JD) shows we ought to reject (JD). We shall look at two arguments for the standard view, but I think neither argument gives us good reason for adopting this view. 2. Ordinary Language Someone might say that the appeal to some distinction such as the distinction between personal and doxastic justifi cation is ad hoc unless there is evidence of such a distinction found in ordinary language. Suppose I am trying to determine whether to believe p. I consider the available evidence and think to myself: (8) I am justifi ed in believing p. Then I ask myself, 'But what of the belief?' Sceptical, perhaps, I add: 420 Clayton Littlejohn (9) There is not suffi cient justifi cation for believing p. If (SV1) is false, it is possible for (8) and (9) to be true. Yet, this is an earbruising assertion: (10) I am justifi ed in believing p, but there is no justifi cation for believing p. The natural explanation as to why (10) strikes us as contradictory is that it is in fact a contradiction. If it is, then contrary to what I have suggested 'S is justifi ed in believing p' entails 'S's belief that p is justifi ed' and 'There is suffi cient justifi cation for S to believe p'. There is no question that (10) seems contradictory. The question is whether (10) is a contradiction. I think that no one could truthfully assert (10). However, I think that what is asserted by (10) could be true. If we formulate it in the third-person, for example, I think there is nothing wrong with asserting: (11) He is justifi ed in his belief. However, there is no justifi cation for that belief. (11) seems no different from: (12) He believes p and I can defend him for believing that. The belief, however, is one I cannot defend. If you think (12) is coherent, note that arguments that would purport to show that (11) is incoherent would show that (12) is incoherent. If you think there is no real difference between a justifi cation and a defense, (12) just says what (11) does. If you still do not know what to make of the distinction between ascriptions of personal and doxastic justifi cation, consider two exchanges. There has been a recent murder and Cooper has been called in to investigate. Over at the hotel, Audrey and Ben are arguing: Audrey: Coop believes that Laura's killer is going to be found soon. Ben: He is a fool. There is no defending a guy like that. He has no good leads, and he should know better than to think he is getting any closer to fi guring out what really happened. Audrey: You have no right to criticize Coop, Ben. If you were in his shoes and did not know how things worked around here, you The Externalist's Demon 421 would think you were getting closer to fi guring out who killed Laura. Sure, maybe none of his leads will pan out, but they seem promising. He is surely justifi ed in thinking that he is going to catch Laura's killer. Meanwhile, Bobby and Donna are talking at the diner: Bobby: Coop believes that Laura's killer is going to be found soon. Donna: Is there any justifi cation for thinking that? Bobby: Not really. He thinks there is, but he has not fi gured out that this town is full of secrets. He will be chasing blind leads for a while now. Not that he is a fool, mind you. Anyone would think they were hot on the killer's trail given his leads. I do not think we have to say that Audrey and Bobby disagree. Audrey explicitly believes that Coop is justifi ed in his beliefs and Bobby seems not unwilling to accept that. However, if we can say Audrey and Bobby are not necessarily in disagreement, it is because we think they are making a distinction between an objective assessment of Coop's beliefs which culminates in a judgment about whether there is a justifi cation of his belief and a more subjective assessment that culminates in a judgment about Coop that also uses the language of justifi cation. If we think they need not disagree, we have to revise the standard view. So, how could it be that (11) and (12) are true even if no one could truthfully assert (10)? When someone acts or believes, there are two kinds of criticism of the action or attitude. Some criticism implies fault. Some criticism implies wrong without implying fault. That is to say that the conditions under which someone can be faulted for having acted or believed are conditions that constitute a kind of wrong that must be absent if the attitude or action is justifi ed. If someone believes that there is no justifi cation for believing p, they can be faulted for believing p. That fact alone is suffi cient to ensure that they are not justifi ed in believing p and there is not suffi cient justifi cation for their belief that p. However, if an outside observer sees that there is not suffi cient justifi cation for the subject's belief and sees that the believer is not in a position to appreciate this, she might defend the believer for having believed what she did while holding off from defending the belief. So, we can explain why (10) could never truthfully be asserted and why its assertion strikes us as contradictory without the assumption that (SV1) is true. Thus, ordinary language does not support (SV1) and the oddity of (10) constitutes no evidence for (SV1). In fact, the dialogue suggests that 422 Clayton Littlejohn ordinary language allows for just the sort of distinction I have drawn between personal and doxastic justifi cation. 3. The Logic of Justifi cation Ascription In their work on the logic of justifi cation ascriptions, Kvanvig and Menzel provide a separate argument for the claim that statements that ascribe personal justifi cation of the form 'S is justifi ed in believing p' entail statements that ascribe doxastic justifi cation of the form 'S's belief that p is justifi ed'.19 They argue that personal justifi cation can be reduced to doxastic justifi cation as follows. First, they offer us an account of the truth-conditions for ascriptions of personal and doxastic justifi cation respectively as follows: (PJ) 'S is justifi ed in believing p' is true iff S has the property of being the x such that x's believing of p is justifi ed. (DJ) 'S's belief that p is justifi ed' is true iff S's believing of p has the property of being justifi ed. Those who want us to heed the (alleged) distinction between saying that it is the person who is justifi ed and saying that it is the belief the person holds that is justifi ed will say that what one does in ascribing personal justifi cation is say that the person is such that a certain kind of evaluation is fi tting. They claim that (PJ) does justice to this insofar as (PJ) captures the idea that an ascription of personal justifi cation is true in virtue of the person having a property (i.e., the property of being the person such that they have a justifi ed belief). As for (DJ), that clearly captures the idea that an ascription of doxastic justifi cation is true in virtue of the belief's having a certain normative property. Note that the right-hand side of (PJ) could only be true if two conditions are met. First, that someone's believing of p is justifi ed. Second, that someone is the subject, S. If the right-hand side of (PJ) is true, it cannot be that the right-hand side of (DJ) is false as it clearly follows from the assumption that S is the individual such that S's believing of p is justifi ed that S's believing of p is justifi ed. If this argument were cogent it would vindicate (SV1). However, this proposal does not capture the spirit of the suggestion that we ought to distinguish personal from doxastic justifi cation. It fails to do justice to 19 Kvanvig and Menzel (1990). They are critical of Bach's (1985) suggestion that we can distinguish between ascriptions of personal and doxastic justifi cation. The Externalist's Demon 423 the idea that an ascription of personal justifi cation is about the person in saying that what it is to ascribe justifi cation to the person is to see them as being in possession of something that is justifi ed. Moreover, if the argument supported (SV1) it would prove far too much. For the argument would show that for any property, F, such that F can be attributed to either the agent or the agent's attitude, there would be no exceptions to this general schema: (GS) S is F in -ing iff S's -ing is F. Suppose while rushing through a crowded market, I knock over a small child. I should have been paying better attention, so we say: (13) I was responsible for knocking that child down. It surely does not follow that: (14) My knocking the child down was responsible. Or, suppose a morally conscientious person is forced to decide between two competing prima facie duties and the kind of confl ict we are considering is the kind of confl ict whose proper resolution reasonable people can disagree about. It seems that an agent compelled to make a decision might fail to discern which of the two duties takes precedence without being culpable for failing to have acted as she ought to have, which might lead us to say: (15) Although she made the wrong decision, she is beyond criticism. (16) Although she made the wrong decision, her decision is beyond criticism. Whereas (15) seems sensible, (16) is surely incorrect. If the subject's failure to do what she ought is a non-culpable failure, that it was non-culpable suggests that (15) is true. That it was a failure suggests that (16) is true. The argument for (SV1), which relies on (GS), if sound, would show that (16) is a consequence of (15). It seems we can use the language of justifi cation to restate (15) and (16): (17) Although she made the wrong decision, she was justifi ed in having acted as she did. (18) Although she made the wrong decision, her decision was justifi ed. 424 Clayton Littlejohn If you think, as I do, that (17) is a restatement of (15) and (18) a restatement of (16), perhaps you will agree that (17) is acceptable, but (18) is not. There would be no question as to whether (17) entailed (18) if (GS) were true or (SV1) were true. How are we to fi x Kvanvig and Menzel's proposal? On the account I favor, to say that 'S is justifi ed in believing p' is to say that in light of the facts about the situation and the facts about S, S can be defended from criticism. To say that 'S's belief that p is justifi ed' is to say that in light of the facts about the situation and the facts about S, S's belief can be defended from criticism. We criticize agents using hypological concepts so that our criticism of agents has to do with fault and responsibility. We criticize attitudes using deontological concepts so that our criticism of attitudes has to do with whether the belief conforms to epistemic norms or there exist permissions to hold the attitudes in question. If we assume that fault constitutes a kind of wrong while assuming that not all wrongs imply fault, it follows that the conditions that determine whether ascriptions of personal justifi cation are true are a subset of the conditions that determine whether ascriptions of doxastic justifi cation are true. That is to say, because the deontological (i.e., the facts about permissibility) does not supervene on the hypological (i.e., the facts about culpability, responsibility, blameworthiness, praise), the facts about doxastic justifi cation do not supervene on the facts about personal justifi cation.20 As the denial of this supervenience thesis allows us to accept both Parity and Asymmetry, it seems we are moving closer to a view that accommodates internalist and externalist intuitions. If we say that the notion of personal justifi cation is to be explicated using hypological concepts and the notion of doxastic justifi cation to be explicated using deontological concepts, the truth-conditions for ascriptions of personal and doxastic justifi cation could be understood as follows: (PJ2) 'S is justifi ed in believing p' is true iff S believes p and S should not have expected that there would be an undefeated reason against believing p. 20 The deontological cannot supervene on the hypological if it is possible for two agents to be equally responsible, blameless, excused, or what have you when one and only one manages to believe or do what there is overall reason to do, manage to do or believe what she ought, believe or do what is permissible, or only one believes or acts wrongly. So, if excusable wrongs are possible, the deontological cannot supervene on the hypological. The Externalist's Demon 425 (DJ2) 'S's belief that p is justifi ed' is true iff S believes p and it is not the case that S should have believed otherwise than believe p.21 4. Justifi cation, Excuse, and Permission I have argued that the denial of the standard view is not incoherent and that we ought to revise the standard account of justifi cation by rejecting (SV1). Even if it is not incoherent to deny (SV1), it does not follow that we ought to deny (SV1). One reason to deny it is that by denying (SV1) we can accommodate a wider range of intuitions than we would if we accepted it. Is there any additional reason for rejecting (SV1)? I think so. I shall argue that you ought to reject (SV1) if you want to make sense of the distinction between permissions and excuses. Regrettably, the argument is complicated. I shall argue as follows. We fi rst focus on the cases 21 To see what this amounts to, consider the view defended by Adler (2002), Bird (2007), and Sutton (2005) that knowledge is the norm of belief: K: You ought not believe p unless you know p. Combined with this account, we would say that 'S is justifi ed in believing p' is true iff S believes p and should not have expected that her belief would not constitute knowledge. This allows us to say that if her belief about p unexpectedly fails to constitute knowledge, she is not unjustifi ed. However, if we say that to give a justifi cation of a belief is, inter alia, to argue that it conforms to the norms of belief, we would say that 'S's belief that p is justifi ed' is true iff S's belief that p constitutes knowledge. Suppose instead that you agree with Boghossian (2003) and Wedgwood (2007) that the norm of belief is the truth norm: T: You ought not believe p unless you know p. We would say that 'S is justifi ed in believing p' is true iff S believes p and should not have assumed that her belief about p would not be mistaken. If we think someone who believes without suffi cient evidence ought not have assumed that they would not be mistaken, it follows from T that you cannot be justifi ed in your beliefs without suffi cient evidence. To say 'S's belief that p is justifi ed' would require us to say that if p is false and you believe it, you ought to believe otherwise. Of course, it does not follow that you are not justifi ed in your belief. Now, could someone who adopted T explain why more than truth is necessary for having a justifi ed belief? I do not see why not. Depending upon your views about fault and permissibility, if you think (as I do) that not all wrongs imply fault but if someone can be faulted for a belief or action the belief or action is thereby wrongful, it follows that an ascription of doxastic justifi cation cannot be true unless an ascription of personal justifi cation is true, too. So, if according to T, the ascription 'S is justifi ed in believing p' can only be true if S has positive evidence to support her belief about p, it follows that the ascription 'S's belief that p is justifi ed' can only be true if S has positive evidence to support her belief about p. 426 Clayton Littlejohn that are taken to illustrate the distinction between permissible action and excusable wrongdoing. After distinguishing between two ways in which we might remove blame for having failed to do what one ought, we shall see that to capture the necessary distinctions between ways of removing blame and ways of denying wrongdoing we will want to draw on a distinction like the distinction between the subject being justifi ed and that which the subject does or believes being justifi ed. So, if you believe that the excuse/permission distinction is both coherent and non-empty and appreciate the difference between removing blame by offering an excuse and removing blame by offering an exemption, you should think of an excuse as suffi cient for the personal justifi cation without being suffi cient for doxastic justifi cation. Intuitively, a justifi ed action is an action such that it is not the case that it ought to have been otherwise. Intuitively, a justifi ed agent is an agent such that it is not the case that she ought to be blamed for that which she is responsible for. Applied to the case of belief, the beliefs that are justifi ed are the ones such that it is not the case that they ought to be replaced by something else (e.g., belief in the negation or suspension of judgment). The believers that are justifi ed are the ones who arrive at their beliefs in such a way that they ought not be criticized for holding the beliefs that they do. Remember how this all started. We wanted to know whether we ought to say that Audrey and Cooper are equally justifi ed in their beliefs and what signifi cance does this have to the debate between the internalists and externalists. What I would like to suggest is that the reason that we can say (correctly) that Coop is justifi ed in believing what he does is that Coop ought to be excused even though he ought to believe otherwise. The reason that we can say (correctly) that only Audrey's beliefs are justifi ed is that it is not the case that Audrey ought to believe otherwise. Against this proposal, many will either insist that you cannot accommodate the intuition that Coop is justifi ed in believing p by saying that he ought to be excused for believing what he does or insist that his being excused for believing p cannot be what suffi ces to establish that the ascription of personal justifi cation 'Coop is justifi ed in believing p' is true.22 I shall try to show that these objections are unwarranted. 22 I shall argue that if an excuse is warranted, it is true that the agent who is excused from criticism was personally justifi ed in committing the wrong for which they are excused. I shall also argue that the cases of non-culpable error are cases in which excuses are appropriate. There will be some who insist that an ascription of personal justifi cation cannot be true simply because the person ought to be excused. Rather than suggest that there is nothing more to the claim that 'S is justifi ed in The Externalist's Demon 427 My proposal is that when Coop comes to mistakenly believe p on the basis of hallucinatory experience his belief is not justifi ed, but he is justifi ed because he ought to be excused for failing to hold a belief for which there is adequate justifi cation, I will begin by looking at what internalists have said in anticipation of my response. Concerning cases of beliefs based on hallucinatory experiences, Audi offers these remarks: ... given the vivid hallucination, I am in no way at fault for believing what I do, nor do I deserve criticism. Far from it. I am like a surgeon who skillfully does all that can be expected but loses the patient. There I should feel regret, but not guilt; I should explain, but need not apologize; and when we know what my evidence was, we approve of what I did, we consider it reasonable. As this passage indicates, Audi thinks that we ought to say that beliefs backed by hallucinatory experiences are justifi ed because we think they are reasonable, think the believer is not to be faulted, and we approve of the belief. Audi believes that there is a difference between justifi ed belief and excusable belief, and to illustrate the difference he asks us to imagine that someone has had a belief 'stamped on the brain,' perhaps through a process of indoctrination or brainwashing, and says, 'an induced belief which one can do nothing to remove no matter how hard one tries is not thereby justifi ed; it is excusable, but not wellgrounded.'23 Wedgwood also offers cases of temporary insanity as his example of excusable wrongdoing. If someone shoots and kills another in self-defense, he says, that is a justifi ed killing. If someone shoots and kills another because he has gone temporarily insane, that killing is excusable.24 Note that both authors take as their example of excusable wrongs examples in which an agent has lost control of her attitudes or actions or has had her capacity for responding to reasons seriously compromised so that in their examples of excusable wrongs, the agent's 'response' to the reasons there is nothing that would lead us to affi rm the subject's normative competence. When someone's actions or attitudes are justifi ed, however, we think that their actions or attitudes are justifi ed because we think that they are reasonable. I think this is inadequate. To believing p' than 'S's believing p is excusable', I could instead offer an error-theory and say that the reason people have mistakenly said that Parity is true and Coop is justifi ed in his beliefs about the external world which are backed by hallucinatory experiences is that they harbor some misconceptions about when excuses are appropriate and when justifi cations are. 23 Audi (1993: 28) 24 Wedgwood (2002: 349) 428 Clayton Littlejohn see why, let us focus on the practical examples. There is nothing wrong with saying that if someone kills in self-defense the killing is justifi ed. It is not an abuse of language to say that someone who kills another because they have gone temporarily insane ought to be excused. However, there is a third case to consider. What are we to say about cases of 'imperfect' self-defense? That is, what are we to make of cases in which an agent kills someone believing mistakenly that self-defense justifi es such a killing?25 I think it is clear that they are not inexcusable. It is clear that if the subject is non-culpably mistaken about the facts of the case (e.g., mistaken in thinking that someone is coming after her with a weapon), she ought to be excused for the killing even if she ought to have acted otherwise. If we think that in cases of imperfect self-defense the killing is excused and the killing is justifi ed, that we think of such cases as excusable wrongs forces us to deny: (JO) If S's -ing is justifi ed, it is not the case that S ought to do other than . But, for reasons alluded to earlier, (JO) is not the sort of thing we ought to deny. If there were more to -ing when one ought than -ing being justifi ed, you get the odd result that someone might know that -ing would be justifi ed without being in a position to judge that she may  or ought to . And if we thought of deliberation as a matter of refl ecting on the reasons to come to a judgment about whether -ing is overall justifi ed, denying (JO) forces us to say that deliberation does not so much as address questions about what one ought to do or believe. (Or, alternatively, deliberation is concerned with questions about what one ought to do or believe, but does not directly concern the justifi cation of the actions or attitudes in question.) If the fact that there is suffi cient justifi cation for S to  were insuffi cient for putting S in a position to  permissibly, it would make sense for an external advisor to knowingly advise S by saying 'There is suffi cient justifi cation for you to ' while conceding that she does not know whether S ought to do other than . Suppose we say that cases of imperfect self-defense are cases of excusable killing and that cases of self-defense are cases of justifi ed kill25 Moore (1997) refers to such cases as cases of imperfect self-defense. It is important that we assume in such cases that the subject is motivated by the belief that the killing would be justifi ed by self-defense, knows what sorts of conditions would justify such a killing, is not culpable for believing falsely that the circumstances are such as to justify such a killing, and is not motivated by malice or anything but the desire for self-defense. The Externalist's Demon 429 ing. What of it? It seems that cases of imperfect self-defense are in some respects like cases of in which someone kills because they have gone temporarily insane and in other respects like cases of justifi able killing in self-defense. Like cases of temporary insanity, the agent who intends to kill in cases of imperfect-self defense has lost the right to non-interference and this reinforces the idea that they ought to act otherwise. Like cases of justifi able killing, however, we can only say that the agent in question ought not be blamed for the killing if we can say that the subject is normatively competent. We would not regard the killing in cases of imperfect self-defense as excusable unless we regarded the agent as reasonable. It is here that Strawson's distinction between excuses and exemptions is useful.26 He observed that there are three ways to remove blame. If S 's and someone blames her for that, you can either show that blame is inappropriate because S ought to have 'd (i.e., offer a justifi cation for S's -ing), show that blame is inappropriate because S ought not be thought of as a responsible agent (i.e., offer an exemption), or show that blame is inappropriate because while S is a responsible agent it is a mistake to take her having failed to  with justifi cation as an indication that she is responsible for the failure (i.e., to offer an excuse in the strict sense). What I shall argue is that the standard view of justifi cation ascriptions stands in the way of making sense of the distinction between excuses and exemptions and that to make sense of this scheme, we will want to do two things. We will want to say that personal justifi cation is insuffi cient for justifi ed action or belief. We will want to say that nothing more than an excuse is necessary for personal justifi cation. So, consider our three cases: (I) S kills S' because S has gone temporarily insane [Exemption]. (II) S kills S' because S believes mistakenly, but non-culpably, that S' is trying to kill S and knows that if S' is trying to kill S, shooting S' is the only way to fend off the attack [Excuse].27 (III) S shoots and kills S' in self-defense [Justifi ed Action]. 26 Strawson (2003). Horder (2004) speaks of this distinction in terms of the distinction between denials of responsibility and excuses. 27 Moore (1997), Robinson (1996), and Zimmerman (2004) would regard imperfect self-defense as an instance of excusable wrongdoing. For an argument that the propriety of such excuses depends on showing the agent's actions in a favorable moral light without thereby offering a crypto-justifi cation, see Gardner (1998). 430 Clayton Littlejohn Suppose a defender of Internalism proposes this scheme: (S1) S is justifi ed in pulling the trigger in (II) and (III), but not (I). If this fi rst scheme is correct, according to (SV1), S's pulling the trigger and killing S' in (II) and (III) is justifi ed. According to (JO), it is not the case that S ought to have done other than pulled the trigger in (II) and (III). But that contradicts the assumption that (II) is an instance of excusable wrongdoing. To avoid this diffi culty, someone might propose this scheme: (S2) S is justifi ed in pulling the trigger in (III), but not in (II) or (I). If we assume (JO), we get the correct result that it is not the case that S ought to have done other than shoot in (III). We avoid the incorrect result that S was permitted to pull the trigger in (II). However, now that we are using the concept of justifi cation to distinguish (II) from (III), we cannot use it in distinguishing (I) from (II). How could someone accept Internalism, (SV1), and (S2) explain the difference between (I) and (II)? How could they explain the difference between someone who ought to be excused for having killed and someone who ought to be exempted from criticism? It seems that the natural way to mark the difference is as follows. The agent who is to be excused is unlike the agent who is to be exempted insofar as the agent is rational and responsible. If we judge of such an agent that she failed to do what she ought and wish to remove blame, we have to think of her response to the demands she was under as being other than they ought to have been, but reasonable. If the shooter were led by unreasonable beliefs to shoot, we would regard her as blameworthy and her action inexcusable. If we say that an agent who is to be excused for having 'd and cannot be exempted for having 'd is such as to have been reasonable in having 'd, (S2) forces us to reject the following claim: (RJ) If S was reasonable in 'ing, S was justifi ed in -ing.28 Can internalists reject (RJ)? I think not. When we judge that someone was reasonable in having 'd, we tend to focus on how things are from their perspective and ask whether someone with such a perspective on 28 Cohen (1984) claims that 'reasonable' and 'justifi ed' are synonymous. While I think there is a sense in which the reasonable and the justifi ed come together, there is another sense in which they do not. The Externalist's Demon 431 the situation should have known better than to assume that in -ing they would not  against an undefeated reason. If we think they should have known better than to assume that, we regard them as unreasonable. If we think they should not have known better than to assume that, we regard them as reasonable. So if the question as to whether S is reasonable is settled by S's non-factive mental states, but the fact that S is reasonable does not entail that S is justifi ed, we have to assume that the facts about justifi cation fail to supervene on the facts about what is reasonable for S to believe or do. And owing to Internalism about the facts about what is reasonable to do, it follows that Internalism fails as a constraint on what facts bear on what there is adequate justifi cation for believing or doing. Internalists cannot reject (RJ). Rejecting (JO) would force us to seriously revise our ordinary practice of normative appraisal. Internalists who insist that the standard view of justifi cation ascriptions is correct cannot make sense of the distinctions we want to draw concerning the cases (I)-(III). That is to say, they cannot make sense of the distinctions between exemptions, excuses, and the justifi cation of actions or attitudes. Revising (SV1), it becomes much easier to make sense of these distinctions. To say that someone is to be excused from criticism (and not exempted) is to describe the agent as being reasonable while remaining neutral on the further question as to whether they ought to have acted or believed in ways other than they actually did. If there is nothing more to show that the person is justifi ed than to showing that the person can be defended from criticism, showing that they are reasonable and affi rming their normative competence ought to suffi ce to show that they are justifi ed. What allows us to maintain the distinction between (a) showing that the person is justifi ed and ought to be excused and (b) showing that what the person did or believed is also justifi ed requires us to reject (SV1). This allows us to say that an action is or an attitude justifi ed only if it is not the case that it ought to have been different. This allows us to maintain the distinction between excusable wrongs and attitudes or actions that justifi ed. IV Conclusion Let's take stock. We began by looking at an argument against Externalism. The new evil demon argument takes intuitions most of us share and tries to show that such intuitions are incompatible with Externalism. I have argued that there is no such incompatibility. The additional assumptions needed for a valid argument from Parity to Internalism are problematic. I then suggested that there were additional intuitions that supported Externalism. Either this means that our intuitions are 432 Clayton Littlejohn an incoherent mess or that there is some way of making sense of the lot of them. I tried to make sense of them by means of the suggestion that the truth of ascriptions of personal justifi cation of the form 'S is justifi ed in believing p' depends upon how things are with S's non-factive mental states while allowing that the truth of ascriptions of doxastic justifi cation of the form 'S's belief that p is justifi ed' can be affected by facts external to the subject's mind. This distinction proves useful not only in trying to make sense of our intuitive sense of which justifi cation ascriptions are appropriate but also in trying to make sense of the more familiar distinction between right action and excusable wrongdoing. The major obstacle to this suggestion is that some doubt the coherence of the distinction, but that obstacle has been overcome. The aim of this paper was not to bring the Internalism/Externalism debate to a close, but to show that an argument that has been taken to bring that debate to a close is far from compelling. The allegation that defenders of Externalism suffer from some sort of tin ear and cannot do justice to our ordinary sense of which justifi cation ascriptions are appropriate is unwarranted. I do think that if externalists were so inclined, they could build an impressive case for their view by appeal to intuition and general theoretical considerations concerning the relationship between justifi cation and other deontological concepts. That will have to wait for another time.29 References Audi, R. 1993. The Structure of Justifi cation. New York: Cambridge University Press. ______. 2002. An Internalist Theory of Normative Grounds. Philosophical Topics 1&2, 19-45. Bach, K. 1985. A Rationale for Reliabilism. The Monist 68, 246-63. Bird, A. 2007. Justifi ed Judging. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74, 81-110. Boghossian, P. 2003. The Normativity of Content. Philosophical Issues 13, 31-45. 29 I would like to thank Al Casullo, Nate Charlow, Mark Decker, John Gibbons, Danielle Hampton, Howard Hewitt, Jonathan Ichikawa, Jon Kvanvig, Sarah Sawyer, John Turri, and Brian Weatherson for discussing the issues addressed in this paper. Special thanks to Robert Audi, Matt Burstein, Doug Ehring, Robert Howell, Leo Iacono, Dan Korman, Jonathan Sutton, Brad Thomson, Mark van Roojen, Charles Wallis, and two anonymous referees for incredibly helpful written feedback on various drafts of this paper. The Externalist's Demon 433 Brewer, B. 1997. Foundations of Perceptual Knowledge. American Philosophical Quarterly 34, 41-55. ______. 1999. Perception and Reason. New York: Oxford University Press. Cohen, S. 1984. Justifi cation and Truth. Philosophical Studies 46, 279-95. ______. 1988. How to Be a Fallibilist. Philosophical Perspectives 2, 91-123. Conee, E. and R. Feldman. 2004. Evidentialism. New York: Oxford University Press. Cruz, J. and J. Pollock. Forthcoming. The Chimerical Appeal of Epistemic Externalism. Darley, J. and P. Robinson. 1998. Testing Competing Theories of Justifi cation. North Carolina Law Review 76, 1095-1143. Engel, M. 1992. Personal and Doxastic Justifi cation in Epistemology. Philosophical Studies 67, 133-50. Gardner, J. 1998. The Gist of Excuses. Buffalo Criminal Law Review 1, 575-98. Goldman, A. 1979. 'What is Justifi ed Belief?' In Knowledge and Justifi cation, G. Pappas, ed. Boston: D. Reidel. ______. 1986. Epistemology and Cognition (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press). ______. 1988. Strong and Weak Justifi cation. Philosophical Perspectives 2, 51-69. Graham, P. Forthcoming. 'Theorizing Justifi cation.' In Contemporary Topics in Philosophy 5: Knowledge and Skepticism, M. O'Rourke, J. Campbell and H. Silverstein, eds. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. Hawthorne, J. and J. Stanley. Forthcoming. Knowledge and Action. The Journal of Philosophy. Horder, J. 2004. Excusing Crime. New York: Oxford University Press. Kvanvig, J. and C. Menzel. 1990. The Basic Notion of Justifi cation. Philosophical Studies 59, 235-61. Littlejohn, C. Forthcoming. From E = K to Scepticism? The Philosophical Quarterly. ______. MSa. Evidence and Armchair Access. ______. MSb. Moore's Paradox and the Norms of Belief. Moore, M. 1997. Placing Blame. New York: Oxford University Press. Nelson, M. 2002. What Justifi cation Could Not Be. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 10, 265-81. Robinson, P. 1996. 'Competing Theories of Justifi cation: Deeds vs. Reasons.' In Harm and Culpability, A. Smith and A. Simester, eds. New York: Oxford University Press. Silins, N. 2005. Deception and Evidence. Philosophical Perspectives 15, 375-404. Sosa, E. 1985. The Coherence of Virtue and the Virtue of Coherence. Synthese 64, 3-28. Strawson, P. 2003. 'Freedom and Resentment'. In Free Will, G. Watson, ed. New York: Oxford University Press. Sutton, J. 2005. Stick to What You Know. Nous 39, 359-96. 434 Clayton Littlejohn Unger, P. 1975. Ignorance. New York: Oxford University Press. Wedgwood, R. 2002. Internalism Explained. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65, 349-69. ______. Forthcoming. 'Normativism Defended.' In Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Mind, B. McLaughlin and J. Cohen, eds. Malden, MA: Blackwell. Williamson, T. 2000. Knowledge and its Limits. New York: Oxford University Press. Zimmerman, M. 2004. Another Plea for Excuses. American Philosophical Quarterly 41, 259-66.

Postgraduate Journal of Aesthetics, Vol. 1, No. 1, April 2004 IMAGINATION, ATTITUDE, AND EXPERIENCE IN AESTHETIC JUDGEMENT1 CAIN SAMUEL TODD LANCASTER UNIVERSITY In this paper I wish to defend a particular form of the traditional, and now almost wholly unfashionable, notion of an aesthetic attitude. It may seem that this notion is a rather quaint fossil of the now outdated disputes that raged in the early days of analytic aesthetics. I shall argue, however, that it offers the non-cognitivist the best basis for understanding the nature of aesthetic judgement. I shall not be concerned here with directly countering realist arguments for the existence of objective aesthetic properties, nor with confronting the error theorist or sceptic who denies that aesthetic utterances are in any meaningful sense judgements. Putting these extreme positions aside, the problem facing the non-cognitivist, of course, is to explain how aesthetic judgements qua expressions of some 'yet-to-be-defined' aesthetic response or other, take the propositional form of genuine assertoric judgements that describe objects in a certain way. I believe that if the imagination is given a prominent role in these responses we can provide a plausible explanation of this phenomenon. To show how this can be, I draw upon the theory of the aesthetic attitude developed by Roger Scruton in his book, Art and Imagination. Essentially, what I propose is a form of quasi-realism regarding aesthetic judgements, and although I shall not be concerned with developing aesthetic quasirealism here, I think that Scruton's own theory can best be interpreted along these lines.2 1 This paper was presented at the Graduate Philosophy Conference, Southampton University, 2003. 2 For a discussion and defence of the quasi-realist theory of aesthetic judgment see C. Todd (forthcoming) 'Quasi-realism, Acquaintance, and the Normative Claims of Aesthetic Judgment', British Journal of Aesthetics, where some of the issues raised below are discussed in greater depth. The only other philosopher I know of who explicitly links quasi-realism with an explanation of aesthetic judgment, and mentions Scruton's theory in this context, is Hopkins (2001). CAIN SAMUEL TODD 11 I Aesthetic attitude theories derive their impetus from the fact that the vocabulary of aesthetic appraisal can in principal be tacked onto anything, which is seen as an indication that anything at all can be appreciated aesthetically. They thus take their point of departure from our linguistic intuitions regarding the broad connotations of 'aesthetic', combined perhaps with the historical variety of tastes, cultural relativism, and worries about the nature and existence of 'objective' aesthetic properties. The thought behind the concept of the aesthetic attitude is that the adoption of some sort of special attitude might account for the (apparently) unitary nature of aesthetic appreciation and appraisal. The aesthetic attitude is usually characterised by the central notions of 'disinterestedness' or 'appreciation of x for its own sake'. As far as they go, these two notions, or at least the latter, offer prima facie plausible ways of demarcating what is special about aesthetic interest and appreciation from other (non-aesthetic) types of appraisal, such as the moral or cognitive or purely sensual. Moreover, the idea of an aesthetic attitude suggests that we can adopt such an attitude to any object at all. However, are there really no conditions an object must satisfy if it is to become the object of aesthetic appreciation? There is a central confusion running through the literature on this subject.3 We are well acquainted with the idea that perception is always cognition-laden and that the attitudes we adopt, or that are evoked in us, are responsible for the different values and meanings we attach to the world around us. Attitudes are dispositions, and it is an important question how much control we have over adopting certain attitudes at any given time towards any given thing. But the idea of adopting an attitude at will is far from clear. For being 'subject to the will' can in fact mean one of two things: on the one hand, it may indicate that we can choose to cultivate a certain way of looking at things, namely disinterestedly or 'for their own sake', by developing the habit or disposition through training so that it comes into play in certain contexts and circumstances, or when confronted by certain objects. On the other hand, it might mean that we can arbitrarily 3 My treatment of the following issues is indebted to the articles of Kemp (1999) and Dickie (1964). CAIN SAMUEL TODD 12 adopt a certain attitude to anything at all whenever we like, irrespective of context or object. Yet another distinction that needs to be made clear here, however, concerns the notion of appreciation, which suggests on the one hand the activity of enjoyment of some thing, and on the other hand some dispositional attitude of 'aesthetic interest'. Now it may indeed be theoretically possible to adopt the aesthetic attitude towards some object or event, and it clearly makes sense to think that sometimes, perhaps, we may through an effort of will force ourselves to regard any object at all with an eye to appreciating it for its own sake. We might call the position that holds that any object so regarded just will be appreciated aesthetically a strong version of the aesthetic attitude. It is clear, however, that even if we can adopt an aesthetic attitude at will towards any object, only some objects may actually repay the attention and become thereby objects of aesthetic appreciation. We might, for instance, try to regard a certain picture or a cricket match disinterestedly (for its own sake) and, for one reason or another, remain completely unmoved and indifferent to it. It is thus also clear that, for any number of reasons, we may not in actual fact always be able 'at will' to regard things disinterestedly; if we are too personally involved with something, interested in it exclusively for various emotional, political, or economic reasons, for example, or simply too familiar with it, we may not be able to take the necessary step back. Furthermore, if we are right in thinking that some objects will reward our aesthetic attention, then, if we understand the aesthetic attitude as the possession of a certain disposition to appreciate certain things aesthetically, we can make better sense of the fact that some objects may simply strike us as being aesthetically worthy without our choosing to adopt any such attitude at all. Our attitude of appreciation may, so to say, be simply thrust upon us. Yet, if this can happen, it might seem to be the case that we do not often exercise any great control over the aesthetic attitude at all, and that it is misleading to talk in anything but an abstract theoretical way of being able to adopt the aesthetic attitude at will towards any object. The two types of attitudinal attention just outlined need not be mutually exclusive. It may well be the case that we can adopt a certain attitude 'at will', at least theoretically if not always practically, even if, as a disposition, it is more often than not 'activated' in the CAIN SAMUEL TODD 13 presence of some objects those that reward our aesthetic attention and not others, without our really exercising any conscious control. The crucial point here, however, is that even if we can in principle adopt the aesthetic attitude whenever we like, once we understand that only some objects will actually repay our aesthetic attention, and that these may do so in a way that 'induces' aesthetic appreciation in us, the idea of an aesthetic attitude cannot offer us a sufficient explanation of aesthetic appreciation. Rather, even if it is a necessary condition of aesthetic appreciation that we possess a certain disposition to regard things as potentially of aesthetic interest, the nature of the objects on which such attention is fixed must play a central role in our account. Clearly, therefore, if some range of objects can be identified as repaying aesthetic interest, or better still, as having the prime function of doing so, we will go a long way towards understanding the nature of aesthetic appreciation. In this light, it might naturally be thought that art works, of all objects, best reward aesthetic interest and induce aesthetic experience more readily than anything else. As Schopenhauer says: 'art plucks the object of its contemplation from the stream of the world's course and holds it isolated before us'.4 Yet, if art is thought to play a special role in aesthetic appreciation, by, as it were, lending itself especially to it, rewarding our aesthetic interest and hence inducing the aesthetic attitude or at least facilitating it, and if we can only fully grasp the notion of aesthetic appreciation by reference to the nature of the objects of that appreciation, it might be thought that the very idea of an aesthetic attitude is rather superfluous to explanatory requirements. For we need only appeal to the nature of objects, such as art works, to explain the nature of our interest in them. In which case, the aesthetic attitude could be accounted neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for aesthetic appreciation, and at best it will collapse into the rather weak position that being in the aesthetic attitude is simply a precondition for the awareness of aesthetic properties. The problem of providing plausible accounts of the judgement and appreciation of art has, therefore, been the real bane of aesthetic attitude theories. The chief problem lies in explicating the relation between the supposed ability to voluntarily adopt the aesthetic attitude to any object, which is needed to explain how anything can be viewed aesthetically, and the passive 'arousal' of aesthetic experience by 4 Schopenhauer (1969) vol. 1: 185. CAIN SAMUEL TODD 14 objects that specifically reward the attention directed at them. For it seems that if the aesthetic attitude is construed too 'actively', we will not understand why some objects should reward appreciation more than others. But if it is too 'passive', the objects themselves will assume centre stage and we will be able to do without the aesthetic attitude altogether. It is, in other words, unclear exactly how much work the aesthetic attitude is supposed to do in delineating the aesthetic nature of our appreciation. In effect, this is a deep problem about the interaction between attitude and object of determining how much the aesthetic object of appreciation is 'given' to us and how much it is a result of being in an aesthetic attitude. The choice to be made has sometimes been framed in terms of deciding whether a causal or intentional story is to be told about the nature of our aesthetic responses and judgements. In fact, however, we do not have to decide between a causal and intentional story, for the relationship between attitude and object of appraisal is to be a two-way street in which subject and object both play important interactive roles, where we may be able to adopt some attitude or other, to ready ourselves for appreciation, but that we must be helped in developing and sustaining it by the nature of the object. We can see this works in the following way. II Expressivist theories do not often clearly distinguish the expression of attitudes from the expression of experiences. But rather than seeing our aesthetic judgements as directly expressive of a variety of different aesthetic attitudes, it is more plausible, I believe, to regard them as expressive of some experience which is the result of viewing an object in a particular way; that is, viewing it with the aesthetic attitude, where this in turn means viewing it as an object of aesthetic appreciation. For this reason, it seems that we ought to make the aesthetic attitude a rather minimal notion, a necessary rather than sufficient condition of aesthetic judgement. We can best do this, I suggest, by adopting the most comprehensive and plausible aesthetic attitude theory available, that of Roger Scruton. Scruton begins with the traditional, intuitive idea that what demarcates aesthetic interest from other sorts is that it involves the appreciation of something for its own sake, and he spells this notion out thus: CAIN SAMUEL TODD 15 a desire to go on hearing, looking at, or in some other way having experience of X, where there is no reason for this desire in terms of any other desire or appetite that the experience of X may fulfil, and where the desire arises out of, and is accompanied by, the thought of X.5 The vital point to note here is that the 'character of aesthetic appreciation will be entirely dictated by its object', for the 'principle manifestation of aesthetic interest is attention to an object, which, since it cannot go beyond the object in the manner of practical or theoretical judgement, must come to rest in the perception of the object itself'.6 As it stands, of course, this does not tell us very much. But this interplay between mind and world, between the freedom of our aesthetic responses and the causal constraints imposed by the object, Scruton thinks lies squarely within the parameters of the activity of imagination. He defines the imagination by appeal to these two conditions: 1) Imagination involves thought which is unasserted, and hence which goes beyond what is believed, beyond 'what is strictly given', and to this extent our imagination is indeed subject to some extent to our will. 2) 'Not any way of going beyond the 'given' will count as imagining X', however, for imagination is a rational activity and involves relating thoughts to an object in a way appropriate to the object.7 When combined with the idea that aesthetic interest is the appreciation of an object for its own sake, we can understand the central role that imaginative attention must play in aesthetic judgement; we go, as it were, beyond the given, but only in a way appropriate to the object. Scruton provides the example where my admiration for the character of Marcus Aurelius becomes embodied, part of the appearance as it were, of the bust of Aurelius which I look at in a museum. Here, 'my attention ceases to stray beyond what I see to the thoughts that are inspired by it, but comes to rest in the perception itself'. And thus, in 'aesthetic appreciation we might say that the perception of an object is brought into relation with a thought of the object...this is one of the main activities of 5 Scruton (1974): 148. 6 Ibid., 154. 7 Ibid., 97-8. CAIN SAMUEL TODD 16 imagination...an aesthetic attitude towards a present object will lead to the thoughts and emotions characteristic of imagination... the object serves as a focal point on which many different thoughts and feelings are brought to bear...'. In this way the activity of the imagination shows what is involved in appreciating something 'for its own sake'.8 In so far as the imagination is free, therefore, we can choose to adopt the aesthetic attitude, but the resulting experiences and judgements will largely be determined by the nature of the object itself. For this reason, it is not surprising that the general nature of an aesthetic attitude as I have just outlined it could not, by itself, possibly explain the intricacies of aesthetic judgement and evaluation. This is particularly so regarding the case of art works, given the range of myriad factors playing some role or other in the complicated institutional artworld economic, social, political, and perhaps even aesthetic. It is clear that judgements concerning art are encrusted by deep layers of convention, comprising the art world and its critics, historical context and contingency, and are governed by all those connections between the world of art and the broader society, with its politics, economy and culture, of which art forms an important part. Nevertheless, the aesthetic attitude can, I would suggest, make some sense of how the institution of art appreciation arises in the first place, by giving us an idea of how a certain way of regarding objects enables them to cater to our aesthetic interest. It is evident that in describing the relation between attitude and object in the case of art appreciation, the attitude seems to be, so to say, institutionally prescribed. That is, we achieve a certain distance from our practical and other concerns and enter a disinterested space of attending to objects for their own sake simply by virtue of the fact that art 'takes place' in museums and galleries we are institutionally isolated from the everyday world and 'forced', as it were, to 'attend aesthetically'. And obviously the idea of appreciating something for its own sake is of great importance in our experience of art works, objects which are (on the whole) created and exhibited and observed as fulfilling just this function. This remains true even if the purpose of some works is to shock, entertain or otherwise educate us by representing or referring to real life events and the world outside art; or 8 Ibid., 154-5. CAIN SAMUEL TODD 17 even if works of art are, or have been, created for specific purposes, such as to eulogise some particular person, to earn money or prizes, or simply to adorn a wall. Certainly art works may make references to this 'real' world, provide knowledge about it, or have been created for 'non-aesthetic' or purely artistic reasons (whatever that might mean), but this reveals merely that our appreciation of art should not and cannot be completely divorced from the rest of our experiential lives. This is made sense of by Scruton's criteria of the imagination. 'Disinterest' has often been construed too puritanically, but if we understand by it that all sorts of relevant associations are imaginatively brought to bear upon some object, we can make better sense of the aesthetic value of art. Certainly, it may be that our attitudes, our aesthetic tastes and preferences, are so highly culturally and socially contingent, such that any talk of the aesthetic attitude equipping us with the ability voluntarily to see any object at all as being of aesthetic interest, is simply misguided. But the idea of an aesthetic attitude does offer at least a minimal explanation of the phenomena, an explanation we ultimately need to understand the complex problems surrounding the notion of aesthetic judgement. REFERENCES DICKIE, G., (1964): 'The Myth of the Aesthetic Attitude', American Philosophical Quarterly, 56-65. HOPKINS, R., (2001): 'Kant, Quasi-Realism, and the Autonomy of Aesthetic Judgement', European Journal of Philosophy Vol. 9: 166-189. KEMP, G., (1999), British Journal of Aesthetics, Vol. 39, 392-99. SCHOPENHAUER, A. (1969): The World as Will and Representation, trans. E. Payne (London: Dover). SCRUTON, R. (1974): Art and Imagination (London: Methuen).

Know-How, Intellectualism, and Memory Systems Felipe De Brigard Department of Philosophy Department of Psychology and Neuroscience Center for Cognitive Neuroscience Duke Institute for Brain Sciences Duke University Correspondence: Felipe De Brigard Duke University 203A West Duke Building Durham, NC 27708-0743 Office: 1+(919) 660-3062 E-mail: [email protected] 2 Know-How, Intellectualism, and Memory Systems Abstract: A longstanding tradition in philosophy distinguishes between know-that and know-how. This traditional "anti-intellectualist" view is so entrenched in folk psychology that it is often invoked in support of an allegedly equivalent distinction between explicit and implicit memory derived from the so-called "standard model of memory". In the last two decades, the received philosophical view has been challenged by an "intellectualist" view of know-how. Surprisingly, defenders of the traditional anti-intellectualist view have turned to the cognitive science of memory, and to the standard model in particular, to defend their view. In this paper, I argue that this strategy is a mistake. As it turns out, upon closer scrutiny, the evidence from cognitive psychology and neuroscience of memory does not support the anti-intellectualist approach, mainly because the standard model of memory is likely wrong. But this need not be interpreted as good news for the intellectualist, for it is not clear that the empirical evidence necessarily supports their view either. I argue that, currently, the philosophical debate is couched in terms that do not correspond to categories in psychological science. As a result, the debate has to either be re-interpreted in a vocabulary that is amenable to experimental scrutiny, or it cannot be settled empirically. Key words: Knowing-how, Knowing-that, Intellectualism, Declarative Memory, Procedural Memory. 3 1. Introduction There is a long-established view in philosophy according to which knowing-how is a fundamentally different kind of cognitive state from knowing-that. Traditionally, philosophers hold this to be a conceptual distinction, for when we say, truthfully, of S, that she knows that p, we are at the very least asserting a relationship between S and a true proposition, p. For example, if I say, of Laura, that she knows that the capital of Venezuela is Caracas, I am at the very least asserting that there is a relationship between Laura and the true proposition stating the fact that Caracas is the capital of Venezuela. By contrast, when we say, truthfully, of S, that she knows how to q, we need not be asserting that there is a relationship between S and a true proposition, q, for knowing q is neither necessary nor sufficient for S to know how to q. For example, if I say, of Joaquin, that he knows how to dance salsa, I need not be saying of him that there is a true proposition he is related to in virtue of which my know-how attribution holds. Joaquin need not know what salsa is, or how it sounds; he may not even need to know that he is dancing salsa when he does it. He may just know how to dance salsa even if he does not know that he's dancing salsa. As a result, it has been customary to say that while knowledge-that is a species of propositional knowledge, knowledge-how is not. This view, often known as anti-intellectualism about knowing-how (henceforth, anti-intellectualism), tends to be attributed to Gilbert Ryle, who sought to "prove that knowledge-how cannot be defined in terms of knowledge-that and further, that knowledge-how is a concept logically prior to the concept of knowledge-that" (1945/1946, p. 4; see also, Ryle, 1949, Ch. 2). Anti-intellectualism stands in contrast to intellectualism about knowing-how which, in its most general form, holds that knowledge-that and knowledge-how are not fundamentally different kinds of cognitive states (Fantl, 2008). A particular version of intellectualism, which Wallis (2008) dubbed neo-reductionist intellectualism (but I'll just call intellectualism here), has been put forth by Jason Stanley (e.g., Stanley & Williamson, 2001; Stanley, 2011a, 2011b). According to this view, knowing-how and knowing-that are not different kinds of cognitive states because, in fact, knowing-how is a sub-species of knowing-that (Stanley, 2011a). More precisely, knowing-how is reducible to propositional knowledge because, viz., to know how to q is equivalent to, first, knowing that there is a way to do q, and second, knowing it in just the right way, i.e., under a practical mode of presentation. Since its proposal, there have been a number of arguments against this novel intellectualist view. Some of these arguments, though, are grounded not on a priori discussions about the very concepts of know-how and know-that, but on empirical findings from cognitive psychology and neuroscience. Specifically, a number of philosophers have argued that intellectualism cannot be true because, as a matter of fact, knowledge-how and knowledge-that are two different kinds of cognitive states supported by entirely different cognitive systems. Proponents of this empirical argument latch onto scientific findings purportedly supporting the so-called standard model of memory (SMM), according to which declarative or explicit memory-i.e., a kind of long-term memory that depends on consciousness and is expressed through reports or declarations-is an entirely different cognitive and neural system from non-declarative, implicit or procedural memory-i.e., a kind of long-term memory that does not depend on consciousness and is expressed through performance (Squire, 1988). Since, allegedly, know-that depends on declarative memory alone, and know-how (which they equate to knowledge of skills) depends solely on 4 procedural memory, then as a matter of empirical fact knowing-how and knowing-that are fundamentally different cognitive states, and the former cannot be reduced to the latter. In the current paper I challenge this empirical argument against intellectualism. Specifically, I question the scientific evidence that has been marshalled in support of the distinction between declarative and procedural memory and argue that, upon closer scrutiny, much of the neuropsychological, behavioral and neural evidence that allegedly supports the fact that know-that and know-how are independent is either misconstrued or incomplete. Additionally, I survey new empirical findings that help to strengthen the case that there is no clear distinction between declarative and procedural memory, further weakening the claim that know-that and know-how are distinct. I do so in Section 4, after briefly outlining the main tenets on the intellectualist view (Section 2), and then carefully articulating the empirical argument against intellectualism and its reliance on the SMM (Section 3). However, my response to the empirical argument against intellectualism should not be considered a defense of intellectualism, because-as I argue in Section 5- it is not clear that the empirical evidence supports intellectualism either. I further argue that the know-how/know-that distinction, as it is employed in philosophy, does not map onto the distinction between declarative knowledge of facts and procedural knowledge of skills, as it is employed by scientists. At the end, I explore some consequences of this mismatch of distinctions for the intellectualism/anti-intellectualism debate. 2. Stanley's Intellectualism Stanley's argument for (neo-reductionist) intellectualism is two-tiered. The first tier is linguistic (Stanley and Williamson, 2001). It begins by pointing out that contemporary defenders of Ryle's anti-intellectualism rely on superficial syntactic differences between sentences expressing know-how, e.g., (1) Joaquin knows how to dance salsa and sentences expressing know-that, e.g., (2) Laura knows that Caracas is the capital of Venezuela to argue for a fundamental distinction between these two kinds of knowledge (e.g., Bechtel and Abrahamsen, 1991). However, Stanley and Williamson point out that according to current syntactic theory, there are only two relevant syntactic differences between sentences like (1) and (2), viz., unlike the latter, the former contains embedded questions and are untensed. But, they argue, both features are amenable to be treated in terms of know-that. Put it simply, they show how strikingly similar sentences like (1) are to other know-whsentences with embedded questions, such as (3) Efraín knows where to find churros. (4) María knows when to press the button. (5) Salomé knows why she's here. which, as it happens, are all amenable to be rendered in canonical know-that forms (Stanley, 2011a), i.e., (3*) For some place p, Efraín knows that he can find churros at place p. (4*) For some time t, María knows that she can press the button at time t. (5*) For some reason r, Salomé knows that she is here for reason r. 5 Ditto, then, for (1): (1*) For some way w, Joaquín knows that he can dance salsa in way w. Rendering (1-4) as (1*-4*) is not sufficient, though, for under a certain reading it may be possible to interpret a sentence such as (3*) as being true, while reading (3) to be false. For instance, Efraín may well know, of p, that it is a place to find churros, but he may not know how to get there; he may-to put it differently-know de re, but not de se, that he can find churros at p (Lewis, 1979). Thus, to make (3) and (3*) equivalent it is also necessary that Efraín knows that one can find churros at p in the right way, that is, under the right mode of presentation. The same goes then for times, t, in (4*), reasons, r, in (5*), and, importantly, for ways, w, in (6*), which are to be known under a practical mode of presentation. Stanley (2011a, 2011b; also Stanley and Williamson, 2001) acknowledges that it is not easy to fully articulate what a practical mode of presentation is, but-he claims-it is not less easy to articulate than other, less controversial ones, such as demonstrative modes of presentation, which are required to grasp indexical thoughts involving 'I' or 'here'. Now, the second tier of the argument moves from language to world, for Stanley wants to claim that his "view of the nature of knowing how to do something is a view about the metaphysical nature of these states, and not a view in semantics" (Stanley, 2011a: 143), even if he develops it by way of investigating the linguistic properties of knowledge ascriptions. And the metaphysical conclusion he draws from the linguistic fact that the semantics of know-whand know-how ascriptions are unified, and the further fact that all are analyzable in terms of know-that, is that there are no metaphysical differences between states of knowing-how and states of knowing-that. More precisely, he argues that, as a matter of fact, knowing-how and knowing-that are not different kinds of cognitive states, but rather knowing-how is a species or a sub-class of the more general kind of propositional knowledge or know-that.1 (Before we continue, let me emphasize that in the current paper I am concerned only with Stanley's version of neo-reductionist intellectualism. In addition to Stanley's, there are currently other arguments for intellectualism that do not rely on linguistic structure but, rather, on the connection between skilled action, intention, and propositional knowledge (e.g., Pavese, 2015a, 2015b, 2018). As far as I can see, nothing of what I say in the current paper affects this other version of intellectualism). 3. The empirical argument In the last decade, Stanley's intellectualism has been challenged. Some challenges deal with the first tier of his argument, either by contending that there are other syntactic differences between know-wh and know-how ascriptions (e.g., Hornsby, 2017), or by arguing that the notion of a practical mode of presentation is particularly problematic (e.g., Glick, 2015). I have nothing to say about this family of arguments. The ones that interest me are those that challenge the second tier of the intellectualist argument on empirical grounds. More precisely, my interest is in an argumentative line put forth by a number of 1 Stanley's argument need not be read as two-tiered. One could read it as inferring-from the linguistic analysis, and from the view that the semantics for know-how ascriptions delivers their truth conditions-that the truth-makers of such ascriptions are cognitive states of propositional knowledge. This reconstruction is probably accurate too. My rendition simply wants to leave open the possibility that one's commitments to the truth-conditions of our know-how ascriptions need not carry ontological weight (I discuss this possibility for propositional attitudes in De Brigard, 2015). 6 philosophers according to which intellectualism cannot be true because, as a matter of empirical fact, knowledge-how and knowledge-that are two different kinds of cognitive states supported by entirely different cognitive systems. To buttress this empirical argument, philosophers make use of behavioral and neuroscientific evidence purportedly showing a clear double dissociation between a cognitive/neural system dedicated to encoding, storing and retrieving declarative memories, and a cognitive/neural system dedicated to encoding, storing and retrieving nondeclarative procedural memories. The next step in the empirical argument is to assert, often without much argument, that knowledge-that is either equivalent to-or, at best, depends solely on-declarative memory, whereas knowledge-how is tantamount to-or at best is supported only by-procedural memory. Consequently, partisans of the empirical argument conclude that intellectualism cannot be true, because as a matter of empirical fact knowing-how and knowing-that are two different cognitive states, resulting from two distinct cognitive and neural processes. As such, the former cannot be reduced to the latter. 3.1. A closer look at the empirical argument In one of the first uses of the empirical argument, Wallis (2008) asserts that the beliefs Stanley and Williamson (2001) demand of us in order to have knowledge-how are likely not needed, as evidenced by "the abilities of brain damaged patients to gain knowledge-how despite lacking the ability to form new declarative beliefs" (Wallis, 2008: 140). In support of this claim he cites empirical evidence purportedly demonstrating that individuals with bilateral hippocampal damage-of which patient H.M. is the paradigmatic case-"show a normal or near-normal learning curve" in tasks that involve motor and perceptual skills "despite being unable to form new declarative beliefs" (Wallis, 2008: 133). He further bolsters this assertion by citing a number of classic papers discussing some of the early behavioral and neuroscientific evidence that constituted the backbone of the SMM: an influential framework according to which short-term and long-term memory are different systems, with the latter in turn being sub-divided into declarative and nondeclarative subsystems (Figure 1)2. The double dissociation between declarative and nondeclarative memory proves, according to Wallis, that Stanley and Williamson's (2001) intellectualism is "clearly and demonstrably false", because of ...the fact that the brain areas operant in the elicitation and generation of such contextually reliable complexes of dispositions are strongly dissociable from areas of the brain responsible for propositional knowledge. Neurological evidence regarding such behavior clearly implicates areas of the brain other than those associated with propositional knowledge (hippocampus and inferior temporal lobe) in the causal generation of such behavior (e.g. the basal ganglia and the motor areas). (Wallis, 2008: 141) In turn, this dissociation is supposed to give reason to reject the reduction of knowledgehow to propositional knowledge, since this claim "has always, and rightly, been understood 2 To the best of my knowledge, the first time Squire published his now famous diagram, the main split occurred between declarative and procedural memory, which in turn he sub-divided into skills, priming, simple classical conditioning, and other (Squire, 1986). Two years later, and perhaps in an attempt to unify the vocabulary employed by other researchers that contributed to perfect the model, procedural memory became a sub-class of non-declarative memory, covering motor, perceptual and cognitive skills (Squire and Zola-Morgan, 1988). Figure 1 is based on Squire and Zola-Morgan's 1991 diagram, in which procedural memory is now simply called memory for skills and habits. 7 as requiring that (1) The knowledge itself be propositional knowledge or at least encoded explicitly as particular linguistic or quasi-linguistic expressions that were (2) causally operant in the manifestation of the knowledge." (Wallis, 2008: 141). Devitt (2011) added his voice to the empirical argument by reviewing human and non-human animal research purportedly demonstrating, once again, a double dissociation between declarative and procedural memory: [T]he psychological distinction between declarative and procedural knowledge, and the related distinctions about memory and learning, are well established in empirical science. As one researcher says, the evidence for them "lies in experimental data that elucidate various dissociations and differences in performance under different conditions." [Sun, Merrill, and Peterson, 2001] And all of this is evidence for the nature of, near enough, the folk distinction between knowledge-that and knowledge-how. [...] So, if the psychologists are right and procedural knowledge does not involve declarative knowledge, then declarative knowledge is not essential to knowledge-how. (Devitt, 2011: 212). Once again, we find the SMM, and the purported double dissociation between declarative and procedural memory, being used as empirical evidence for the claim that knowledgethat and knowledge-how are two entirely different cognitive states. This evidence, as Devitt concludes, "is very bad news for [Stanley and Williamson, 2001]. Knowledge-that is declarative knowledge. So, psychology shows that procedural knowledge, hence knowledge-how, does not require knowledge-that, precisely what [Stanley and Williamson's] Intellectualism claims it does require. Despite disagreement or uncertainty on many other issues, psychologists speak with one voice on this one." (Devitt, 2011: 213). The empirical argument is endorsed by Glick (2011) too, when he asserts that "empirical investigation reveals many cases in which creatures possess and exercise knowledge-how but do not possess or appeal to any propositional knowledge-that could constitute the relevant knowledge-how, so knowledge-how cannot be propositional knowledge." (Glick, 2011: 400). Once again, the kind of "empirical investigation" he alludes to comes from research employed in support of the SMM. For instance, he asserts that "data from cases of amnesia have provided much of the justification for the longstanding view in psychology that procedural memory or knowledge is not a kind of declarative memory or knowledge. [...As] paradigm cases of procedural and declarative knowledge map onto paradigm cases of know-how and ordinary knowledge-that, respectively" (Glick, 2011: 401). He even supports the claim that the declarative/procedural memory distinction is tantamount to the knowledgethat/knowledge-how distinction on account that "some well-known articles in the cognitive science literature have explicitly equated the categories" (referring to Cohen and Squire's 1980 paper, which I discuss below). In a nod to Wallis (2008), Glick concludes: [N]eurological evidence from studies of memory impairment strongly indicates that the exercise of procedural knowledge and of various sorts of know-how involves brain areas dissociable from the hippocampus and medial or inferior temporal lobe, the brain areas associated with declarative knowledge. [...] Thus, from a scientific point of view it is a well-supported empirical hypothesis that there are two sorts of knowledge, one more practical and skill-related and one more closely tied to ordinary knowledge of facts. Wallis equates the latter with 8 ''propositional knowledge'', inferring that even if an agent has such knowledge, it need not be ''causally operant in the manifestation of [knowledge-how]'', contrary to the Intellectualist thesis that one's knowledge of facts plays some crucial role in the exercise of know-how.[...] The case from cognitive science, in essence, is that empirical data shows that know-how can be possessed and exercised even when there is reason to doubt that propositional knowledge is present. (Glick, 2011: 402) Finally, we find yet another endorsement of the empirical argument against intellectualism, in a more recent paper by Brown (2013). In it, Brown argues that if Stanley's intellectualism is really stating something about the nature of knowing-how, rather than merely about the language of its ascriptions, then "we need to appeal to science to determine whether 'knowing-how' refers to a natural kind of knowledge, [and to] the best scientific characterization of its nature and its relation to other kinds of knowledge" (Brown, 2013: 223). She then latches onto behavioral and neuroscientific evidence put forth in support of the SMM to claim that "procedural knowledge is not a subspecies of declarative knowledge, [and] if procedural knowledge were to be identified with knowinghow and declarative knowledge were to be identified with propositional knowledge, then knowing-how would not be a subspecies of propositional knowledge." (Brown, 2013: 224) As such, she concludes: [F]rom the perspective of his naturalist critics, Stanley's reconciliation of intellectualism with cognitive science would be seen as an admission that the category of propositional knowledge does not carve the psychological categories at the joints, and that knowing-how is importantly different from cases of declarative knowledge traditionally understood as paradigms of propositional knowledge. (Brown, 2013: 225). Taken together, and for the sake of simplicity, the variations of the empirical argument I just reviewed (but see also Adams, 2009; Fridland, 2017; Levy, 2017, for more examples) can be captured in the following canonical form: Empirical Argument P1. If knowledge-how is a subspecies of knowledge-that, then there is no fundamental difference in the kind of mental states they are. P2. Knowledge-how is equivalent to (or, at least, exclusively depends on) procedural memory, whereas knowledge-that is equivalent to (or, at least, exclusively depends on) declarative memory. P3. But the scientific evidence captured by the SMM demonstrates that procedural and declarative memory are two entirely dissociable and independent systems. P4. Therefore, there is a fundamental difference in kind between knowledge-how and knowledge-that (P2, P3). C. Therefore, it is not the case that knowledge-how is a sub-species of knowledge-that. (Modus Tollens, P4, P1) In the remainder of this paper I argue that the empirical argument is unsound. The first step-in section 4-is to show that P3 is false, as a closer look at the available empirical evidence reveals that the procedural and declarative memory systems are not fully dissociable and independent. Then, in section 5, I argue, first, that said evidence need 9 not support intellectualism either and, second, that the best account of the available empirical data is such that the relationship between knowledge-how and procedural memory, and knowledge-that and declarative memory, is neither equivalence nor exclusive dependency, which in turn contradicts P2. But first, it is worth clarifying what the SMM is and what is the evidence in its favor. 3.2. The standard model of memory (SMM) What has come to be known as the SMM was initially suggested over 30 years ago as a "tentative taxonomy of memory" 3 (Squire, 1986; see footnote 2 above). Ever since, some version of Figure 1 became a must in pretty much every introductory textbook on memory. Why is this model so influential and (seemingly) widely accepted in the scientific community? My sense is that there are both scientific and sociological reasons, the latter having to do with the stature of its main proponent in the neuroscientific community. My main concern here, though, is with the scientific reasons, which led to the belief that the SMM was the best fit for the available evidence unveiled by research on memory and learning in human and non-human animals. Initially, the evidence that the SMM was set to account for came from human pathological data. This "neuropsychological-neural systems approach", as Squire called it, was later supplemented with further behavioral and developmental evidence from human and non-human animals (Squire, 1992). For the purposes of the present paper, however, non-human evidence is going to be less relevant, given the difficulties inherent in understanding the parallels between declarative memory in human and non-human animals. As such, two main lines of evidence for the SMM are critical for the purposes of understanding P3: neural and behavioral evidence from neuropathological patients and neural and behavioral evidence from healthy controls. [Figure 1] 3.2.1. Evidence from neuropathological individuals No other patient has been as influential for the study of human memory as Henry Molaison, or H.M., as was known until his death in 2008. In 1953, at the age of 27, and after a history of severe epilepsy, William Scoville performed a surgical procedure on H.M. whereby both hippocampi and much of the surrounding medial-temporal lobe (MTL) areas were removed. Four years later, the first post-operative neuropsychological profile of H.M. was published by Scoville and Milner (1957). In it, we were told that H.M.'s IQ improved slightly after the surgery (from 104 to 112) and that "an extensive test battery failed to reveal any deficits in perception, abstract thinking, or reasoning ability" (p. 17), whereas his memory quotient-as measured by Wechsler Memory Scale (Wechsler, 1945)-was very low. It was also reported that while H.M. exhibited complete anterograde amnesia (i.e., incapacity to remember any events that occurred after the surgery), he revealed only partial retrograde amnesia for the three years prior to the surgery. 3 The idea that there are different kinds of memory is not new. At least since Aristotle, both philosophers and psychologists have argued for different kinds of memory (De Brigard, 2014a; Michaelian and Sutton, 2017). Memory taxonomies that aimed to fit empirical evidence, however, were less common. In this regard, Squire's SMM was not the only model available at that time. Tulving (1985), for instance, had suggested a different, nested model based upon single, rather than double, dissociations, whereby episodic memory depended (i.e., phylogenetically, ontogenetically, and causally) upon semantic memory, which in turn depended (i.e., phylogenetically, ontogenetically, and causally) upon procedural memory. Nevertheless, the SMM prevailed, despite its strong commitments to double dissociations, in part- I think-because it was better suited to fit non-human animal evidence, while also accommodating the evidence accounted for by Tulving's model (for an opinionated historical review, see Squire, 2004). 10 In the following years, H.M.'s neuropsychological profile became more precise (Milner, Corkin and Teuber, 1968). We were informed, for instance, that his performance in tests that involved reasoning with spatial relationships was within normal ranges, as was his performance in the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test, which is typically employed to measure executive control and strategic planning. It was reported also that H.M. performed normally in several perceptual tasks, including detection of anomalous features in cartoon drawings, tachistoscopic letter recognition, Mooney face perception tasks, and metacontrast masking, among others. Moreover, we were also told that H.M.'s language and working memory, as measured by digit-span recall, were preserved. Such evidence fueled the claim, central to the SMM, that all these cognitive capacities-i.e., perception, working memory, language, abstract reasoning, problem solving-are independent of the hippocampus and surrounding areas in the MTL. Critically, several post-operatory studies on H.M. seemed to reveal that not all learning was lost, for apparently he was able to acquire new motor skills. At least, this is the notion with which researchers traditionally refer to the kind of learning preserved postsurgically in H.M. The first observation to this effect was reported by Milner (1962), who documented H.M.'s reduction in errors within and across block-trials on a mirror-tracing task. A more comprehensive set of experiments was reported soon after (Corkin, 1968), stating that H.M. was able to improve performance on three motor-learning tasks: rotary pursuit, bimanual tracking, and tapping. Further tests suggested that H.M. was also able to learn perceptual skills, the term employed to categorize a family of tasks including prism adaptation, mirror-reversed words reading and repetition-priming (Gabrieli, 1998). The observation that perceptual skill learning is preserved in individuals with MTL damage was further supported by consistent results involving similar studies with different amnesic patients (e.g., Cermak et al., 1985; Graf et al, 1984; Moscovitch, 1982; Warrington and Weiskrantz, 1974). More importantly, it seemed as though both perceptual and skill learning were preserved in amnesic patients regardless of the etiology of their impairment. In one of the most influential pieces of evidence in favor of the SMM, Cohen and Squire (1980) reported equivalent performance in a number of motor, perceptual, and primingbased skill tasks on eight amnesic patients with three different etiologies: injury, alcoholinduced Korsakoff syndrome, and after-effect of electro-convulsive therapy. The consistency of these findings, involving different individuals with diverse etiologies, suggested that our capacity to memorize new factual and episodic information-which all patients were severely impaired on-is independent from our capacity to learn new skills- which all patients had preserved. Moreover, it also suggested that skill learning did not depend on the hippocampus and surrounding MTL areas, giving researchers further reason to suspect that these two kinds of memory-declarative and procedural-are subserved by two independent and dissociable neural systems: This distinction between procedural or rule-based information and declarative or data-based information, which is reminiscent of the classical distinction between "knowing how" and "knowing that", has been the subject of considerable discussion in the literature of cognition and artificial intelligence. The experimental findings described here provide evidence that such a distinction is honored by the nervous system. (Cohen and Squire, 1980: 209) These findings alone do not support the independence of systems postulated by the SMM; at best, they support only a single dissociation between declarative versus short11 term and non-declarative memories. Nevertheless, partisans of the SMM hold that evidence for double dissociation is also available. Traditionally, the neuropsychological evidence used to support the claim that short and long-term memory systems are independent comes from the study of patient K.F., who exhibited profound deficits in auditory verbal shortterm memory while having no deficits in declarative memory at all (Warrington and Shallice, 1969). To the best of our knowledge, K.F.'s brain damage spared the hippocampus and surrounding MTL areas, as it seem to have affected only his left parietooccipital cortex. Years later, Sullivan and Sagar (1991) offered evidence of double dissociation of short-term and long-term memory for non-verbal material by comparing H.M.'s performance to that of 14 patients with Parkinson's disease-a brain condition that affects the striatum while sparing the MTL. Their results revealed that while H.M. exhibited normal performance in short-term but not in long-term recognition of non-verbal material, the patients with Parkinson's disease showed the opposite pattern of results. As for neuropsychological evidence of impairments in non-declarative memory with sparing of declarative memory, researchers traditionally invoke cases like patient M.S., who also underwent neurosurgery to alleviate intractable epilepsy, but had only right occipital regions removed (Gabrieli et al., 1995). After the surgery, M.S. scored within normal ranges in standardized tests of attention, memory, language, and reasoning. However, when compared to both controls and individuals with MTL amnesia, M.S. showed no effects of visual priming. Similarly, impairments in motor skill learning with unimpaired declarative memory are reported in patients with basal ganglia disorders-such as Huntington's and Parkinson's disease-as they tend to show marked difficulties with the serial reaction time (SRT) task, as opposed to individuals with MTL amnesia who show normal performance (Clark et al., 2014). Finally, regarding so-called cognitive skills, functional dissociations between amnesic individuals and patients with Parkinson's disease have been reported. For instance, Knowlton and colleagues (1996) showed that while individuals with MTL amnesia were able to learn a probabilistic task known as the weather prediction task, patients with Parkinson's disease never mastered it. However, in a recognition test, Parkinson's patients performed on par with controls, while individuals with amnesia were severely impaired. 3.2.2. Evidence from healthy individuals Although most of the human evidence for the SMM comes from pathological cases, some behavioral and neuroimaging results have also been marshalled in its support. For instance, early neuroimaging studies contrasting retention for short and long-term intervals showed preferential engagement of hippocampus for long-term memory, whereas prefrontal activity was associated with short-term memory (D'Esposito et al., 2000; Talmi et al., 2005). More relevant for our current purposes are experiments purporting to reveal functional dissociations between declarative and non-declarative memory. In the early 1980s, a number of studies showed that manipulating depth of encoding of target items- e.g., focusing on the meaning of a word (deep encoding) versus its font (shallow encoding)- affected only explicit recognition tests, as priming performance was unaffected (e.g., Jacoby and Dallas, 1981). Soon after, Weldon and Roediger (1987) elegantly demonstrated the modal specificity of these priming effects by testing participants with word-completion and free-recall tasks after presenting them with both pictures and words. Their results indicated that while free-recall of pictures was better than for words, word-completion was better for words than for pictures. However, when the 12 implicit test included picture-completion tasks, priming for pictures was evident. These and similar studies have been interpreted as evidence that modality and levels of processing (e.g., deep vs shallow encoding) differentially affect explicit tests of declarative memory versus implicit tests of non-declarative perceptual priming. Such differences in processing are thought to provide indirect evidence of distinct neural and cognitive mechanisms engaged in episodic versus perceptual priming tasks (Schacter, Chiu, and Ochsner, 1993). Dissociations between episodic memory and both conceptual and semantic priming have been documented, too.4 In an influential fMRI study, for instance, Wagner and collaborators (2000) showed preferential involvement of left inferior prefrontal cortex during conceptual as opposed to perceptual priming with the same set of stimuli. Importantly, the MTL did not seem to be preferentially involved in either of these tasks. Likewise, semantic priming-which is typically shown by increased speed and response accuracy for words or pictures preceded by semantically related (e.g., "envelope-letter") relative to semantically unrelated (e.g., "broccoli-letter") primes-has been associated with activity in lateral but not MTL regions, which are involved in episodic memory (Rossell et al., 2003). Of note, the behavioral effects of accuracy and speed, as well as the neural effects just mentioned, occur not only in healthy individuals but also in individuals with amnesia, including H.M. and K.C. (Tulving and Schacter, 1990). Together, these and related results suggest that both conceptual and semantic priming recruit regions outside the MTL system, upon which-according to the SMM-declarative memory depends. Finally, a number of studies in healthy individuals have also reported functional dissociations between declarative and procedural memory. As with neuropsychological patients, one of the most widely studied motor sequence learning tasks is the serial reaction time (SRT). In a typical version of this task, participants see four screen locations, and four response keys that may mimic the spatial arrangement on the screen. On each trial, a stimulus appears in one of the locations of the screen, and the subject is asked to respond with the corresponding key. Trials are usually grouped in blocks of ten or twelve, and accuracy and response times are measured. Critically, the stimuli on the screen appear following a particular sequence repeated from block to block, and normally participants' reaction times become faster as the task progresses even though they are unaware of the recurring sequence. Consistent with results from neuropathological populations, several neuroimaging studies with healthy individuals have shown preferential engagement of premotor and supplementary motor cortices, as well as basal ganglia and cerebellum, during variants of the SRT (Hardwick et al., 2013). By contrast, motor adaptation tasks seem to be more reliant on posterior parietal activity, as its disruption via transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) impairs performance (Della-Maggiore et al., 2004). Perceptual skill learning in healthy populations has also been associated with regions outside the MTL. In a classic study, Poldrack and collaborators (1998) showed changes in neural activation in occipital, inferior temporal, superior parietal and cerebellar regions as a function of learning a mirror reading task. Soon after, Gauthier et al. (1999) reported an association between increased expertise in perceptual categorization of 4 Unlike perceptual priming, which is measured by the increased probability of responding with the same target item as the prime when perceptual features are manipulated (e.g., both seeing and responding "envelope" in a word-completion task like "e_v_l_p_"), conceptual priming refers to the increased probability of responding with the same target item as the prime when the manipulation is conceptual (e.g., responding "envelope" in a recognition test more readily after reading about mail than about food). By contrast, semantic priming is understood as the increased probability of responding, not with the same item as the prime, but with a semantically related one. 13 objects-both real and non-real (e.g., greebles)-and neural activity in the right fusiform area. As for cognitive skill learning, researchers have also employed fMRI adapted versions of the weather prediction task, the learning of which seems to increase activity in basal ganglia. However, when combined with a pair-associate task, recognition shows increased activity in the MTL (Poldrack et al., 2001). This pattern of results is consistent with the dissociation, discussed in the previous section, whereby patients with Parkinson's disease show poor performance in the weather prediction task but intact recognition of pairassociates, while individuals with MTL amnesia show the opposite pattern. Taken together, the scientific evidence I just summarily reviewed has traditionally been used in support of the SMM, as it is taken to demonstrate clear double dissociations between, first, short-term and long-term memory and, second, declarative and nondeclarative memory. Moreover, these results have also been taken as evidence that the hippocampus and surrounding MTL areas are uniquely involved in declarative memory, whereas non-declarative memory depends upon distinct brain regions, such as the basal ganglia, and motor and sensory cortices for skill learning and priming (Squire 1988; Gabrieli, 1998). However, as I argue in the next section, a closer inspection of both old and new findings clearly suggests that the evidence is mixed, and that the SMM is a poor fit for a significant number of critical results. 4. Against the empirical argument In this section I discuss three sets of findings and argue that they offer counterevidence against the SMM. First, I argue that if we look closely at H.M.'s actual performance, the picture that emerges does not correspond to the textbook description of his neuropsychological profile. Second, I review some newer findings from neuropathological populations that also contradict some of the main tenets of the SMM. Finally, I survey a number of recent behavioral and neuroimaging findings that are difficult to fit within the standard model. The picture that emerges is one in which the SMM turns out to be an inaccurate representation of the nature of our memory and, more importantly, one in which-contra P3-declarative and non-declarative memory are neither fully independent nor clearly dissociable. 4.1. H.M. Revisited The first piece of countervailing evidence is not new: it comes from H.M.'s own neuropsychological profile. If one looks closely, the story we learn about H.M.'s performance after the surgery, which allegedly fits perfectly with the SMM is, at best, selective and, at worst, distorted. Consider the claim that he had no retrograde amnesia. According to the initial report (Scoville and Milner, 1957), H.M. exhibited only "partial retrograde amnesia for the three years leading up to his operation", and that "early memories [were] seemingly normal" (p.17). However, a few years later this assessment was modified, and we were told that his "apparent retrograde loss is becoming increasingly difficult to delineate" (Milner, Corkin and Teuber, 1968). Then, employing more precise methods to measure autobiographical memory, Corkin and collaborators conducted more extensive testing on H.M., and reported that "the new data confirm the finding that H.M.'s remote memory impairment is temporally limited, but they extend the limits of the deficit back to 1942, 11 years before the medial temporal lobe resection." (Corkin, 1984: 257). In other words, we are told that H.M. conserves no autobiographical memories from the age of 16 to the age of 27, when the surgery took place. Almost two decades later, the record 14 was revised yet again. Employing novel approaches to assess the contribution of episodic and semantic information to autobiographical memory, Schmolck and colleagues (2002) showed that most of the already scarce autobiographical memories from the first 16 years of H.M.'s life were semantic and that most likely he only had two episodic autobiographical memories: one about his first cigarette and one about a plane ride. Certainly, this is not the autobiographical memory of an individual with no retrograde amnesia. More importantly, these results strongly suggest, contrary to the SMM, that intact hippocampi are required for the retrieval of episodic autobiographical memories. The observation that H.M.'s semantic memory for premorbid facts was preserved does not clash with the SMM, since it claims that once consolidated, semantic memories do not depend on the hippocampus to be retrieved. What the SMM does claim is that an intact hippocampus is required to encode all semantic (as well as episodic) memories. Indeed, this is what textbooks typically tell us: that, after the surgery, H.M. was completely unable to encode new declarative information, whether episodic or semantic. However, the discovery of differential forgetting of episodic relative to semantic autobiographical memory motivated researchers to carefully investigate whether H.M. was able to encode new semantic information-and the results suggest that he was. Inspired by H.M.'s occasional references to current events and TV shows, as well as his capacity to complete crosswords whose cues referred to postmorbid facts, Corkin's group wondered whether the bits of post-operative semantic information H.M. was able to retain were learned declaratively or non-declaratively. Initial research showed, for instance, that when prompted with first names of individuals who reached fame after his surgery (e.g., Ray Charles), H.M. would provide the appropriate last name well above chance, suggesting some retained association between the first and the last name. This association, though, could be explained by non-declarative priming, seemingly preserved in H.M.. But what if the association was, not with a simple name, but with a body of knowledge connected with such celebrities? The answer to this question was provided by an elegant experiment conducted by O'Kane and colleagues in 2004 (Exp. 2). In this experiment, H.M. was shown two names, only one of which named a celebrity. His task was simply to identify which name named a famous person. H.M.'s performance in this task was on par with controls: he correctly identified 92% of the premorbid names, and 88% of the postmorbid ones. Critically, after identifying a name as famous, he was asked "why is this person famous?" Impressively, H.M. performed no different than controls for premorbid names, and only minimally worse than controls for postmorbid ones. In fact, he was able to recall very precise information about 12 celebrities that became famous after 1953, and somewhat less precise information about a handful more. The researchers interpreted these results as evidence against the null hypothesis-consistent with the SMM-that H.M. would be unable to retrieve semantic information encoded post-operatively. H.M.'s postmorbid semantic knowledge was also successfully tested with other recognition-based strategies (Corkin, 2013, Chapter 11), and the results all pointed to the same conclusion: H.M. was still able to learn new semantic facts-although at a much slower pace and with more limits than healthy individuals. Nevertheless, this learning cannot be accounted for exclusively in terms of priming. Instead, Corkin and collaborators argue that H.M.'s preserved capacity to learn new facts is due to semantic memory being organized schematically, that is, as related to semantic information already stored in memory. H.M. seemed to have been able to generate new associations between new and 15 old semantic information, albeit slowly and less efficiently than controls. Thus, they argue that although hippocampi may be needed to facilitate the association between semantic information during encoding, it can still occur without them. Critically, this evidence also suggests that, contrary to the dogma accepted by the advocates of the SMM and the empirical argument against intellectualism, H.M. was still able to learn new facts. Finally-and also crucially for our current purposes-the claim that H.M. showed normal skill learning is overblown and imprecise. By 1965, H.M. was tested at least on three occasions about his performance on tasks that were supposed to tap skill learning. The first, well-known test was reported in 1960 by Brenda Milner using a mirror tracing apparatus. H.M. was asked to trace a figure by looking at the reflection of his hand holding a pen. H.M. completed a total of 39 trials over the course of three days, showing marked improvement as measured by a steady reduction in reaction times and errors. This first observation lead Milner to hypothesize that H.M.'s motor skill learning was preserved. But in 1965, H.M. was tested on a sequential maze-task-both visually (Milner, 1965) and tactually (Corkin, 1965)-with abysmal results. In this task, the subject is given a wooden board with metal bolts arranged in a 10 x 10 array, and is asked to find the correct path from the lower left corner bolt to the upper right corner bolt using a metal-head stylus by touching one bolt at a time. If a bolt is in the right path it would make no noise; if it isn't, it would make a loud click. By trial and error a subject would, eventually, find the right path. While controls took on average 17 trials and made approximately 92 errors, H.M. was completely unable to learn the path: after 215 trials and 2,877 errors, testing stopped. In an attempt to reduce the retrieval effort inherent in the task, Milner and colleagues (1968) tested H.M. again with simpler versions of the board: one with a 6 x 4 array and another with a 5 x 4 array. This last array, according to the researchers, allowed the finding of the right path to occur within the span of short-term memory. This modification minimized the role of declarative memory in completing the task, thus enabling H.M. to non-declaratively encode the motor-sequence path. However, even with this simple array, H.M.'s performance was very poor. While controls learned the path in less than 20 trials and were able to show errorless performance 24 hours later, H.M. took 155 trials and had to be brought back to criterion every day after that, for 14 days, until the error curve was comparable to controls. Moreover, to further evaluate whether the motor sequence was truly learned, a slightly longer maze which included the just-learned path was presented to H.M. immediately after session 14 in order to test transfer of learning. Contrary to controls, who showed flawless transfer of learning, H.M. showed no evidence of transfer at all. Hence, the results from these first three studies suggest that H.M. showed improved performance in only one of the three skill-learning tasks he was evaluated with (i.e., the mirror-trace task). His performance in all the variations of the motor-sequence maze tasks was either null or significantly compromised. Corkin was aware of the conflicting evidence regarding H.M.'s alleged capacity to learn new skills. As such, she tested him in three different motor-learning tasks: rotary pursuit, bimanual tracking, and tapping. As mentioned above, her 1968 report of the results is widely cited as showing that H.M. was able to learn all these skills. But a closer inspection at the actual data-indeed, a closer reading at Corkin's own discussion of the results-clearly indicates that this conclusion is unwarranted. Consider the first task: rotary pursuit. In this task, the subject is asked to hold a metal-head stylus in contact with a target point on a rotating metal disk. The objective is to keep the stylus in contact with the target 16 point until the disk stops rotating. Although it is true that H.M.'s mean time on the target improved, his performance is significantly worse than that of controls, not only because controls are better from the start, but also because their learning curves are markedly different (Figure 2A). Specifically, as Corkin remarks, while control subjects' performance improves linearly to optimal performance by session 7, H.M.'s asymptotes on Session 4 at half the level of performance of controls. Not knowing the variance in the control group, it is hard to tell, but it is likely that if we were to fit regressors to both learning curves, their slopes would be significantly different from one another-indeed, is not clear that H.M.'s would even be linear. Moreover, the other measure of performance-mean number of contacts-was entirely different between H.M. and controls (Figure 2B). While control subjects began by making lots of contacts with the target and learned to stay on target for longer periods of time, H.M. showed the exact opposite pattern. It is unclear which pattern of errors constitutes a better performance on the task; what is unquestionable, though, is that H.M.'s behavior here is diametrically different from controls. [Figure 2] A similar story occurs with H.M.'s performance in bimanual tracking. The apparatus for this task consists of one left and one right rotating discs, each containing a different "track" of about 1/4 inches, visible through a horizontal slit of about 3/8 inches. The subject is asked to hold a stylus with each hand and to keep it in contact with the corresponding track while the disc rotates at a rate of 2, 1 or .5 seconds. Corkin only reports the results at the .5 seconds rotation, as controls-but not H.M.-reached optimal performance very quickly at both 2 and 1 second rotations. Since each trial was 20 seconds long, the results depicted in Figure 2C tells us that controls basically hit ceiling (i.e., optimal performance) by session 7. (Had error bars been plotted we would probably dismiss the slightly lower line as reflecting between-subject noise.) By contrast, H.M. starts off at a much lower point than controls, his improvement is erratic and inconsistent, and he never reaches optimal performance. More dramatic is the difference in performance as measured by the mean number of contacts with the track: while H.M. and control subjects start at almost the exact same level, controls reduce the number of contacts with the track linearly and steadily from session to session. By contrast, H.M.'s performance is almost flat. In fact, his best performance on session 13 is on a par with the second worst performance of the control subjects, on session 2. Clearly, H.M.'s performance in bimanual tracking is markedly different from controls'. Finally, in tapping, subjects are shown a circle divided in sectors and are given a stylus to tap them according to a 4-place sequence. Their task is to tap the sectors, in the proper order, as fast as possible. As with the other two tasks, H.M.'s reaction times were slower than controls, and significantly more so when both hands were tested at the same time. Nevertheless, of the three tasks included in this report, tapping is the only one in which H.M.'s performance was equivalent to controls, as both improved comparably from test to re-test. Taken together, the extant evidence on H.M.'s performance in motor-skill tasks is mixed. Only in two tasks-mirror-tracing and tapping-is H.M.'s performance on par with controls. In all other tasks H.M. performs significantly worse. Indeed, as Corkin herself suggests, it looks as though H.M. performed better in the two tasks that were less constrained and required less demanding motor skills. When the tasks demanded better motor skills, H.M. either never learned them or never reached the same level of performance as controls. But if the evidence about H.M.'s actual performance on motor17 skill tasks is so conflicting, why are these results taken to suggest that H.M.'s capacity to learn motor skills was preserved? Part of the reason is that, traditionally, it has been suggested that the discrepancies in H.M.'s performance in motor tasks relative to controls were due to general slowness attributable to long-term effects of his anti-epileptic drugs. However, this explanation is unsatisfactory for at least three reasons. First, the evidence as to whether or not there are significant cognitive effects due to long term anti-epileptic treatments is extremely unclear, with some studies suggesting long-term effects for several cognitive processes including-but not limited to-motor control, and others suggesting no long-term effects at all (Vermeulen and Aldenkamp, 1995). Second, even if there was evidence for slowness specific to motor control, this explanation would still be unsatisfactory, simply because H.M.'s reaction times were sometimes well within the range of that of controls-in fact, some controls were slower than H.M. in the tapping task. And, third, even if we account for the alleged sluggishness in his responses, there are other measures of performance that are markedly worse in H.M. than in controls. So perhaps what happens is that, traditionally, people have been reading more into these results than the data actually support. Both Milner and Corkin took their results to suggest that H.M. was capable of "acquiring certain motor skills despite a severe impairment in learning other kinds of material" (Corkin, 1968: 262). Nevertheless, they also repeatedly acknowledged that H.M.'s performance was not equivalent to controls in most of the tasks. Indeed, Corkin initially suggested that H.M.'s reduced efficiency in certain motor tasks may have been due to his incapacity to recognize the apparatus from day to day, as well as his inability to remember his previous performance, so he wouldn't be motivated to improve upon it. Moreover, she suggested then (Corkin, 1968: 264)-but also more recently (Corkin, 2013: 159)-that the irregular shifts in the bimanual tracking and rotary pursuit tasks may have been hard to predict for H.M., since "this need to anticipate the future may have required input from declarative memory" (ibid). Consequently, she suggested that H.M.'s severe amnesia and his abnormal performance in certain motor tasks were cumulative, not independent, deficits (Corkin, 1968: 264). True, neither Milner nor Corkin were in the business of model building: their purpose was to generate a precise characterization of H.M.'s neuropsychological profile. Nevertheless, neither then (in 1968) nor later (in 2013, that is) when reflecting upon her results was Corkin convinced that they perfectly conformed to the SMM. Her cautious hypothesis was simply "that different motor skills engage separate cognitive and neural processes, [so it is] possible that the particular brain circuit within the striatum recruited for mirror tracing would not be necessary to perform a different skill-learning task, such as learning a specific sequence of responses" (Corkin, 2013: 163). This claim, though, is very different from endorsing a single underlying system for skills. In sum, a closer look at the original data strongly suggests that H.M.'s traditional textbook neuropsychological profile, which was supposed to support the SMM, is highly inaccurate. On the contrary, his performance either conflicts or fails to support the SMM. First, H.M. shows profound episodic retrograde amnesia, suggesting-contra the SMM- that a functioning hippocampus is required for retrieving remote episodic autobiographical memories. Second, H.M. was capable of learning new declarative semantic information, which the SMM explicitly forbids. Finally, H.M.'s performance in most motor skill learning tasks was either null or significantly subpar relative to controls, strongly 18 suggesting-contra the SMM-that his capacity for normal motor skill learning was compromised.5 4.2. Conflicting neuropathological evidence Neuropsychological profiles based on single cases are as accurate as the tests employed to generate them, and they are almost always nuanced and complex. Fortunately, evidence from other neuropathological cases further strengthens the case against the SMM. The first piece of evidence concerns the necessity of functioning hippocampi to retrieve premorbid episodic autobiographical memories. Recall that, according to the standard model, the hippocampus is necessary only for encoding declarative memories. Once consolidated, both episodic and semantic memories are retrieved by brain regions outside of the hippocampal complex. Evidence for this claim was initially supported by two observations: 1) that retrograde amnesia is temporally graded in accordance with Ribot's law (1881)-namely that the more remote a memory is, the more likely it is to survive hippocampal damage-and 2) that the severity of retrograde and anterograde amnesias are correlated. However, 20 years ago, Nadel and Moscovitch (1998) reviewed data from over a dozen studies on retrograde amnesia in individuals who, like H.M., had bilateral hippocampal damage, and showed that both claims are likely false. First, their analysis shows that the temporal gradient of retrograde amnesia is correlated with the severity of the hippocampal damage, so that only individuals with spared hippocampal tissue show retention of premorbid episodic autobiographical memories. When the whole hippocampal formation (i.e., hippocampus, subiculum, and dentate gyrus) is affected, the gradient is minimal, and when the entire hippocampal complex is affected (i.e., hippocampal formation plus entorhinal, perirhinal, and parahippocampal cortices), it is completely flat. Second, retrograde and anterograde amnesia are only partially correlated, for damage to the hippocampus proper is sufficient to generate episodic anterograde amnesia, although it need not generate corresponding retrograde amnesia. Finally, as was the case with H.M., there is evidence of sparing of both retrograde and anterograde semantic memory, indicative of the relative independence of this form of declarative memory from the MTL. This last point is very important because it speaks not only against the SMM- which states that the hippocampus is necessary for the encoding of all declarative information-but also the empirical argument, as it assumes that individuals with MTL amnesia are incapable of learning new facts. However, many of the studies reviewed by Nadel and Moscovitch (1997) suggest otherwise. For instance, the patient from Warrington and McCarthy (1988) showed normal memory for the meaning of premorbid and postmorbid words. The same occurred with a group of non-Korsakoff amnesic patients studied by Verfaellie and colleagues (1995), as well as Holdstock et al.'s (2002) patient, who was able to recognize postmorbid celebrities and famous events. But perhaps the strongest piece of evidence in support of the claim that semantic facts can be learned independently of the hippocampus, comes from well-documented cases of developmental amnesia. In 1997, Vargha-Khadem and collaborators reported the cases of Beth, Jon and Kate, all of whom had severe anoxic episodes in their childhood (at birth, 4 y/o, and 9 y/o, 5 Other aspects of H.M.'s "textbook" neuropsychological profile have been questioned too. For instance, it has been suggested that H.M.'s post-operative language was affected (MacKay, Stewart, and Burke, 1998) and that his working memory may have been impaired too, since it was only minimally tested (Ranganath and Blumenfeld, 2005). However, I prefer not to discuss these two observations at length, mainly because the issue about H.M's postmorbid linguistic abilities is very hard to settle (see Corkin, 2013, Ch. 11), and also because the evidence regarding his working memory capacity is too limited. 19 respectively), leading to sustained hippocampal damage and a profound amnesia. However, their neuropsychological profiles show that despite very low scores in episodic memory tasks, their semantic memory was essentially preserved. Indeed, although incapable of storing new episodic information, all three were able to complete school and went on to live relatively normal lives. Further studies with neuropathological individuals cast doubt upon other tenets of the SMM. For instance, according to it, short term and long term memory are supported by distinct neural systems, as only the latter depends on the hippocampus. However, recent evidence suggests that while working memory for individual words and digits may be preserved in MTL amnesia, working memory for conjunction of items (Olson et al., 2006), faces and scenes (Hannula et al., 2006), and topographical landmarks (Hartley et al., 2007), is impaired (see Ranganath and Blumenfeld, 2005, for a review). Likewise, contrary to the SMM-according to which perception is independent of the MTL-research conducted in the last couple of decades has shown that individuals with hippocampal damage have difficulty solving perceptual discrimination tasks that involve complex and ambiguous scenes (Barense et al., 2010; Lee et al., 2012). Finally, contrary to SMM claim that the MTL exclusively subserves encoding of declarative memory, recent evidence strongly suggests that individuals with MTL damage have trouble in cognitive tasks outside the domain of declarative memory, such as episodic future (Hassabis et al, 2007) and counterfactual thinking (Mullally and Maguire, 2014), as well as certain tasks involved in social cognition (Laurita and Spreng, 2017) and mind-wandering (McCormick et al., 2018). What about skill learning? Surprisingly, after H.M., there have been very few studies specifically on skill learning in individuals with amnesia due to bilateral MTL damage.6 I already have discussed Cohen and Squire's (1980) influential paper, showing intact learning of mirror-reading skill for non-repeated words in 14 patients. Follow-up studies from Squire's group show similar results in individuals receiving electroconvulsive therapy (Squire et al., 1984). However, once we move away from simple mirror-tracing and mirror-reading tasks, and away from Squire's patients, the evidence becomes murkier. Charness and colleagues (1988), for instance, tested two patients on a novel arithmetic skill and only one of them showed improvement. Years later, Tranel and collaborators (1994) tested a large group of patients on rotary pursuit, mirror-tracing and mirror-reading tasks. However, of these patients, only three had bilateral hippocampal damage (of unknown extent) and their results are difficult to interpret, as they are averaged together with several other patients and control data is not reported. More recently, Heyselaar and collaborators (2017) showed syntactic priming in a group of Korsakoff patients; however, their control group did not show the same effect, complicating the comparison. More strikingly, Döhring and colleagues (2017) tested sixteen patients with transient global amnesia on the finger tapping task7. Although their lesions are limited to just one section of the hippocampus, patients did not perform at the same level as controls 6 There are two other studies worth mentioning, one of which is the main topic of section 5. The other one is a brief report by Yamashita, from 1993, where three patients with bilateral hippocampal damage are compared against six controls in the rotary pursuit task. Unfortunately, this study is severely underpowered, and the variance in the data from both patients and controls is so large that it is almost impossible to interpret. 7 Transient global amnesia (TGA) is a rare neuropsychological disorder, usually caused by a temporary anoxic lesion to hippocampal neurons in CA1, and it is normally reversible. During the acute phase, which lasts about 24 hours, patients with TGA present a profound amnesic profile, after which they recover back to baseline but without remembering anything of what happened during that period. 20 either during learning or during re-test within the acute phase. Only when they recovered from their lesion and were tested weeks later were they able to perform normally. A parallel line of research on neuro-rehabilitation shows similarly complex results. Building upon the kind of neuropsychological studies discussed here, researchers and clinicians have worked on evaluating therapeutic strategies to promote skill learning in individuals who become amnesic. In a pioneering study by Glisky, Schacter and Tulving (1986), four patients with different degrees of memory compromise were trained on very simple computer programing skills. Their results show that although there is learning, it is definitively not on par with controls, as patients took much longer, made more mistakes, and needed constant reminders-in the form of semantic information and instructions-to complete the tasks. Other studies have reported similar results, with learning over time but always qualitatively different and never at the same level as controls (e.g., Kime, Lamb and Wilson, 1996). Finally, to further complicate the picture, recent evidence shows that when we start varying certain parameters of tasks whose performance was thought to be independent of the hippocampus, individuals with MTL amnesia show no learning. For instance, as discussed in section 3.2.2., perceptual skills such as probabilistic learning, often measured with variants of the weather prediction task, are allegedly preserved in hippocampal amnesia. However, recent studies show that varying the parameters of the predictive regularities in the stimuli (Schapiro et al., 2014), or even the timing of the feedback from 1 to 8 seconds (Foerde et al., 2013), is enough to impair statistical learning in individuals with MTL amnesia. In sum, evidence from neuropathological individuals suggests that many of the core tenets of the SMM are likely false. First, the hippocampus seems to be needed for both the encoding and retrieval of episodic memories. Second, a functioning hippocampus may facilitate but is definitively not indispensable for learning semantic facts. Third, the hippocampal complex is necessary for a number of cognitive processes outside the domain of memory, including-but perhaps not limited to-perceptual discrimination of ambiguous scenes, episodic and counterfactual thinking, and working memory tasks involving spatial and relational information. Finally-and critical for our current purposes-the evidence in support of preserved skill learning in MTL amnesia is meager and complex, not only because it seems consistent for a very circumscribed set of tasks, but also because it collapses when their parameters are minimally altered. 4.3. Conflicting behavioral and neural evidence Thanks to recent developments in behavioral and neuroimaging methods, which allow researchers to explore brain activity associated with different memory tasks, evidence accrued in the last decade and a half overwhelmingly suggests that the alleged cognitive and neural dissociations assumed by the SMM are far from clear. I have already discussed some results showing hippocampal activation during visual and working memory tasks as a function of material, such a relational, conjunctive and spatial information (Ranganath and Blumenfeld, 2005). More recent evidence has also shown hippocampal activation during working memory tasks involving words (Axmacher et al, 2010) and items arranged in 3D-grids (Hannula and Ranganath, 2008). Consistent evidence comes also from single cell recording studies in macaques, showing that certain neural signatures that were thought to index working memory processing can be recorded in entorhinal cortex, suggesting-contra the SMM-that neuronal populations within the 21 MTL play a very active role in the maintenance of information for short periods of time (Ranganath and Blumenfeld, 2005). Neuroimaging evidence also overwhelmingly shows that hippocampal activity is evident during not only encoding but also retrieval of both episodic and semantic memories (Ryan et al, 2008). Additionally, and consistent with the results from patients, a growing number of neuroimaging studies have reported hippocampal and MTL activity during tasks outside the domain of declarative memory encoding, such as episodic future (Addis et al, 2007) and counterfactual thinking (De Brigard et al., 2013), spatial navigation (Eichenbaum and Cohen, 2014), and certain kinds of perceptual tasks (Lee et al., 2012), among others. And this is only the tip of the neuroimaging iceberg, for the evidence strongly suggest that, contrary to the SMM, the hippocampal complex is not uniquely dedicated to the encoding of declarative memory. But more critical to our purposes is the amount of recent behavioral and neuroimaging evidence showing that the alleged boundaries between declarative and nondeclarative memory are-as some researchers put it-rather "porous" (Dew and Cabeza, 2011). One line of evidence, for instance, has shown significant cognitive and neural overlap between conceptual priming-a process typically associated with non-declarative memory-and familiarity-a process typically associated with episodic memory8. What this research has shown is that a frontal N400 effect, previously linked to familiarity, is also linked to conceptual priming (Voss and Federmeier, 2011). Relatedly, fMRI studies have shown significant overlap in rhinal cortex between familiarity and conceptual priming, further suggesting shared mechanisms between the two processes (Fernandez and Tendolkar, 2006). Additionally, a number of experimental results have shown not only that the hippocampus is sensitive to information previously presented relative to new information (Daselaar et al., 2014), but also that it may be needed to encode new relational information, regardless of whether such information was consciously encoded or not (Duss et al, 2014). That the hippocampus is recruited during the encoding of episodic information regardless of whether or not the subject is conscious of it goes against the very definition of a declarative memory system upheld by the SMM. Finally, there is also plenty of evidence showing that the hippocampus and surrounding MTL areas are involved in the consolidation of motor skill tasks. In a pioneering study, Schendan et al. (2003) showed increased hippocampal activity on a SRT task learned both implicitly and explicitly, relative to a control condition of random sequence blocks. More recently, Albouy and colleagues (2008) showed the involvement of the hippocampus in the consolidation of a different motor sequence task, known as the serial oculomotor reaction time (SORT) task-whereby dots appear, one at a time, in one of four possible locations with sporadic changes of color. Participants are asked to detect color changes. However, unbeknownst to them, the transition of dots follows an ordered sequence, very much in the spirit of the SRT task. Their results showed not only that the 8 Many researchers believe that episodic memories are retrieved by the combination of two relatively distinct subprocesses: recollection and familiarity. The former is characterized as the slow, intentional retrieval of the richly contextual spatiotemporal information that constitute the content of our episodic memories, whereas the latter is a fast, unintentional retrieval of the general gist of the event that brings about a sense of having occurred in one's own past. Moreover, there is now evidence of underlying neural distinctions between the two processes: while recollection has been associated with activity in the hippocampus proper, and has been indexed by posterior late positive components using event-related potentials (ERP), familiarity has been associated with activity in the rhinal cortex and with anterior early negative ERP components (Skinner and Fernandes, 2007) 22 hippocampus was recruited during learning but also that a hippocampus-striatum collaboration overnight is required for the successful consolidation of the memory for the motor sequence. These, along with the aforementioned results, only scratch the surface of a large body of evidence suggesting significant overlaps in the mechanisms involved in declarative and non-declarative memory. 4.4. Reassessing the empirical argument Taken together, the neuropsychological, behavioral, and neuroimaging evidence reviewed in this section strongly suggests that many core tenets of the SMM are likely false. First, it is not the case that the hippocampus and surrounding MTL areas are required only for the encoding of declarative memories: as it turns out, these structures are also required to retrieve episodic memories. Second, the idea that the hippocampus is no longer necessary after an episodic memory has been consolidated is also wrong: functioning hippocampi seem indispensable to retrieve detailed episodic autobiographical memories regardless of their age. Third, the evidence also suggests that the hippocampus may not be indispensable for encoding semantic information. Fourth, contrary to the SMM claim that the hippocampus is exclusively involved in encoding declarative information, the evidence reveals that it is critical for a number of operations outside the memory domain. Fifth, and relatedly, this evidence also shows that a functioning hippocampus may be required for learning certain tasks thought to index skill learning. Finally, some of the most recent results suggest that processes associated with declarative memory (e.g., familiarity; conscious relational memory) share cognitive and neural mechanisms with processes associated with non-declarative memory (e.g., conceptual priming; unconscious relational memory). The scientific importance of this counterevidence against the SMM is unquestionable. In fact, the research community slowly but steadily has come to realize that this old model of memory is profoundly inaccurate, and a number of alternative models have been offered instead (Redder et al, 2009; Henke, 2010; Cabeza et al, 2018). But more important for our current purposes, this counterevidence has profound philosophical consequences for the debate about intellectualism and anti-intellectualism about knowinghow, as it clearly speaks against P3 of the empirical argument. Specifically, it shows that there is no clear distinction between a declarative and a non-declarative system as stipulated by the standard model. Moreover, the reviewed evidence speaks against specific empirical claims made by philosophers who support the use of the empirical argument against intellectualism. For instance, we have seen that it is false that H.M. "shows a normal or near-normal learning curve" in tasks that involve motor skills (Wallis, 2008: 133), or that he was "unable to form new declarative beliefs" (Ibid.)-if "declarative belief" is cashed out in terms of declarative (semantic) memory. Likewise, it is also not true that "the exercise of procedural knowledge [...] involves areas dissociable from the hippocampus and medial temporal lobe" (Glick, 2011: 402) or that "psychologists speak with one voice" when stating that declarative and non-declarative knowledge are distinct (Devitt, 2011: 213): They don't. The SMM is inaccurate, and while the scientific evidence about the relationship between the mechanisms underlying skill learning and declarative memory is inconclusive and complex, one thing is clear: that if-as P2 states-knowledge-that is tantamount to declarative memory and knowledge-how is tantamount to procedural memory, then-contra Cohen and Squire (1980)-such distinction does not seem to be honored by the nervous system. 23 Advocates of the empirical argument may still want to defend a version of it on account that even if H.M. and other individuals with MTL amnesia could still learn new semantic facts, the kinds of facts that matter for intellectualism are not semantic: they are episodic. There are at least two problems with this reply: 1) The brain regions that philosophers have associated with the kind of propositional knowledge required for intellectualism (i.e., medial and inferior temporal lobes [Wallis, 2008; Glick, 2011]) are- as we just saw-fundamentally involved in semantic memory. 2) Why should we accept that the kind of propositional knowledge relevant for intellectualism is episodic rather than semantic? An argument against intellectualism along these lines would need to show that the nature of the propositional knowledge it assumes is, in fact, episodic, not semantic. Alas, such an argument is not in the offing. Another possibility is to claim that, despite what the researchers say, H.M. and other MTL amnesiacs learn factual knowledge nondeclaratively. But this move backfires, for it would mean that the format of factual knowledge is such that it can be handled by the non-declarative system, which is the same system that handles procedural memory-a claim that undermines P2. Finally, another possibility is to focus on the kind of procedural learning H.M. and other individuals with MTL amnesia were able to achieve, and suggest that only those tasks really index skill learning, whereas the other tasks, which were though to measure skill learning, actually do not. The problem with this post hoc response is that it makes the relationship between the experimental tasks and the folk-psychological notion of skill much more mysterious than it already is. Is it true that our folk-psychological notion of skill includes finger tapping but excludes rotary pursuit? Does the concept of skill apply to learning the weather prediction task when the feedback is given within two seconds but not when it is given within ten? I seriously doubt that what we ordinarily mean by skill neatly coincides with precisely the kinds of tasks, in precisely the sorts of conditions, in which individuals with amnesia can reach performance equivalent to controls. 5. Intellectualism vindicated? In section 4 I argued that the scientific evidence does not support the empirical argument against intellectualism, mainly because P3 is false. Does this mean that the empirical evidence supports intellectualism instead? In a recent article, Stanley and Krakauer (2013) defend the claim that motor skills depend on knowledge of facts. In this a paper, they briefly discuss the results of a study by Roy and Park (2010) in a way that could be interpreted as providing evidence in favor of intellectualism. However, this interpretation is far from clear. On the one hand, if one interprets the claim that motor skills depend on knowledge of facts within the dialectic of the empirical argument-i.e., as accepting P2-then the Roy and Park study do not offer convincing evidence to the effect that declarative memory is necessary for motor skills. But, on the other hand, if-as Stanley and Krakauer seem to suggest-one reads the claim that motor skills depend on the knowledge of facts outside of the dialectic of the empirical argument-i.e., as rejecting P2-then it is not clear how to interpret such a claim empirically. The interesting but complex study by Roy and Park (2010) involves one patient, D.A., with severe bilateral hippocampal damage due to herpetic encephalitis, as well as six matched controls. According to the authors, the purpose of the study was "to investigate whether D.A.'s acquisition of novel complex tool knowledge was spared like his procedural memory or impaired like his declarative memory" (Roy and Park, 2010: 3029). 24 To that end, they built 15 novel complex tools-10 targets and 5 lures-using a children's construction toy. Each tool was associated with a particular recipient (e.g., plastic wheel) with which it could interact toward a particular goal (e.g., move the wheel down a path). The study consisted of three 2-hour sessions (S1, S2, S3). There were three days between S1 and S2, and three weeks between S2 and S3. Additionally, each session had three phases: pre-test, training, and post-test. Memory was measured with four tests: a recall test in which participants were shown black and white pictures of the tools and were asked to remember details about them; a recognition test administered also with pictures of the tools; a grasp-to-command test, in which participants were asked to show how to hold the tool if they were going to use it; and a use-to-command test in which participants were asked to demonstrate how to use the tool. As such, the first two measured declarative memory, while the latter two evaluated procedural memory. [Figure 3] The experiment proceeded as follows. During S1 pre-test, participants were presented with the tools, and received all four tests. As expected, both D.A. and controls performed at floor, since they've never encountered such tools before (Figures 3A-B). Then they received the training, in the form of an instructional video followed by a demonstration and practice, until the participant was able to perform the task without making any errors within 90 seconds. Here, the results show that both D.A. and controls have comparable mean completion times (Figure 3D). Then, after a short delay involving in a distracting activity, participants received a post-test, identical to the pre-test. As shown in Figures 3A and 3B, during post-test D.A. performs at floor in the use-to-command task (and also in the grasp-to-command task, which isn't depicted), whereas controls are able to complete the task in about 50 seconds with almost 80% accuracy. In S2 the procedure was just as in S1. Here, however, we see controls performing much better during the pretest than D.A., whose performance remains at floor. Completion time during training was, nevertheless, equivalent between the two (Figure 3D). Yet, after training, only controls showed improved performance; D.A. remained at floor. S3, however, included two variations relative to S1 and S2 (Figures 3A-B). First, the researchers included a recipientcue (RC) use-to-command trial for D.A. immediately prior to post-test. In this trial, unlike all other use-to-command trials, the experimenter placed the recipient in the appropriate position for each tool. The second change was to administer the declarative tests (i.e., the recall and recognition tests) immediately after the RC trial, rather than before the procedural tests, as was done in S1 and S2. These changes significantly altered D.A's performance in two important respects. First, the RC trial improved his completion time and accuracy during the use-to-command post-test so that his performance was no different than controls. However, no such gain was observed for the other procedural task, i.e., grasp-to-command. Second, having the RC trial immediately prior to the functionalassociative recall tests, in which subjects were asked about the function of the tool and the appropriate position of the recipient, improved DA's accuracy so that it was no different than controls (Figure 3C). However, no such improvement was evident for the other tests of declarative memory, i.e. recognition and recall tests of perceptual and functional features of each tool. Stanley and Krakauer's brief discussion of the Roy and Park study seems to focus on S1 and S2, as they rightly point out that, unlike controls, D.A. was unable to even begin to use the novel tools in the preand post-tests. They also remark that he was able to 25 improve performance during training, but only if explicit instruction was provided throughout. Moreover, they point out, that this is no different from the way in which H.M. performed. Unless instruction was provided each day, prior to each task, H.M. would not even know how to begin the task. Consequently, they argue that neither D.A. nor H.M. was really able to perform motor skills, for unless they knew facts about what to do in the motor skill task, they would not have been able to perform it. All H.M. and D.A. show is improvement in motor acuity, not that they learned a new motor skill, for the latter at the very least requires knowing certain facts, such as what to do in order to initiate the task. So, they claim, motor skill depends on knowledge of facts. How shall we interpret this claim? Their suggestion is that motor skill is a complex process involving two components: the purely procedural aspect of motor acuity and a "knowledge component" (Stanley and Krakauer, 2013: 8). Prima facie, the point Stanley and Krakauer seem to be making appears to be merely semantic. After all, both Milner and Corkin repeatedly acknowledged that H.M. needed to be reminded of the nature of the task immediately prior to testing, which clearly indicates that they did not consider this explicit, task-related information to be constitutive of the performance they were trying to measure. Therefore, one may be tempted to read Stanley and Krakauer as merely trying to correct the historical record by making the point that what Milner and Corkin were measuring should have been called "motor acuity" rather than "skill". Upon reflection, though, I think we should interpret Stanley and Krakauer as arguing-as did I in section 4-against the SMM rather than the actual neuropsychological observations of Milner and Corkin. After all, Stanley and Krakauer are quite right that many researchers, especially in philosophy (as we saw in section 2), have taken the SMM's interpretation of H.M. and similar MTL patients' data as demonstrating that the whole process of skill learning-above and beyond motor acuity-is completely independent of our capacity to remember facts about the relevant motor skill tasks. That being said, it is still worth wondering what they mean by the "knowledge component", whether or not it is truly necessary for motor skill, and whether or not such a component, when combined with motor acuity, suffices for motor skill. In philosophical fashion Stanley and Krakauer define knowledge as, "minimally, a state with propositional content, one that is suitable for use in guiding action." (Stanley and Krakauer, 2013: 1) The question now is whether we should interpret this "state with propositional content" as a declarative memory, the way in which partisans for the empirical argument interpret it (i.e., in agreement with P2), or whether we should construe it in some other way. Let's explore the first option first, and assume that the knowledge component in Stanley and Krakauer's account is to be understood as a declarative memory. Would the Roy and Park study provide evidence for the claim that knowledge of facts, i.e., declarative memory, is necessary for motor skill? My sense is that the results of S3 speak against this interpretation. For one, D.A. was able to reach normal performance in the task, without verbal instruction, when he as given the tool with the receptacle in the appropriate position, as in the RC trial. Was this change sufficient to trigger in D.A. a declarative memory about what to do to initiate the task? Alas, the evidence does not support that interpretation, for we don't see an equivalent increase in performance in his declarative tests. Moreover, as shown in S1 and S2, if D.A. engages in a distraction task right after using the tool, and then receives it with the receptacle in the wrong position, he is unable to complete the task. This suggests that whatever information he was holding in working memory, and in virtue of 26 which he was able to initiate the action and even answer two basic questions about the task, was not subsequently consolidated into declarative memory. Whatever "knowledge" allowed him to perform the task during RC in S3 was fleeting and likely non-declarative.9 The alternative is to reject P2 and to interpret knowledge of facts outside the dialectic of the empirical argument, that is, as not corresponding to declarative memory. Indeed, this seems to be precisely what Stanley and Krakauer advocate, when they claim that "just as it is a mistake to identify declarative knowledge with knowledge, it is a mistake to identify procedural knowledge with skill" (Ibid: 3). However, if we reject P2, and agree that the epistemological distinction between knowing-how and knowing-that does not map onto to the scientific distinction between procedural and declarative memory, then it is unclear how empirical results can provide evidence in favor of intellectualism. One possibility, consistent with Krakauer and Stanley (2013) as well as Pavese (2018), requires us to think of know-how in different terms from the way in which partisans of the SMM have thought of skill. Specifically, it asks us to think of know-how, which is characteristically manifested in terms of intentional actions, as essentially requiring an epistemic state akin to how epistemologists think of knowledge. This alternative intellectualist view of know-how could potentially fit the scientific evidence better, but only insofar as we can provide an empirical interpretation of what the knowledge requirements amount to. And my sense is that, to get to that point, we would require further work to clarify how these terms should be operationalized in order to be empirically tractable (see, Pavese, this issue, for a step in this direction). 6. Conclusion Some philosophers have employed variants of the empirical argument to support anti-intellectualism about knowing-how. In this paper I argued against this strategy, not only because the SMM is inaccurate, but also because the empirical evidence about the relationship between declarative and non-declarative memory is messy and inconclusive. In addition, I argued against interpreting "knowing facts about a motor skill task" as being tantamount to having declarative memories about said task. To be sure, I am not claiming that the argument between intellectualism and anti-intellectualism ought to be settled empirically. My argument is simply that if we are going to look at the sciences for evidence either in favor or against one of these views, we will first have to recognize that the actual relationship between knowledge-how and procedural memory, and knowledge-that and declarative memory, is neither equivalence nor unique dependency. As such, "knowinghow" and "knowing-that" join the ever-growing set of folk-psychological notions that do 9 Roy and Park's motivation to include the RC trial in S3 stems from the observation that during S1 and S2 D.A. "made comments suggesting that he knew the function of the tool, but that he did not know how to position to recipient appropriately" (Roy and Park, 2010: 3031). Similar observations can be found in Corkin's report of H.M.'s performance. She reports, for instance, that "at the begging of Rotary-Pursuit and Bimanual-Tracking test session he was allowed to look at the apparatus and then asked to describe the task. His memory for the Rotary-Pursuit task, though somewhat inaccurate, was consistent in specifying that he had to touch the stylus to the target in order to stop the disc from turning. On one occasion he further stated that he was not supposed to "touch that spring part" on the stylus, something that he had in fact been reminded about several times before. H.M.'s description of the Bimanual-Tracking task was consistently accurate from Session Ill on." (Corkin, 1968: 264). Corking called the retention of this fragmentary information "testing habits", and although she did not elaborate on the nature of this retention, it is consistent with her view that H.M.'s capacity to remember information about the task may have contributed to his performance, just as his deficits in remembering it may help to explain why his performance was never optimal. 27 not transparently correlate with constructs in cognitive psychology and neuroscience (De Brigard, 2006; 2014b).10 References Adams, M. P. (2009). Empirical evidence and the knowledge-that/knowledge-how distinction. Synthese, 170(1): 97-114. Addis, D. R., Wong, A. T., & Schacter, D. L. (2007). Remembering the past and imagining the future: common and distinct neural substrates during event construction and elaboration. Neuropsychologia. 45: 1363-77. Albuouy, G. et al., (2008). Both the Hippocampus and Striatum Are Involved in Consolidation of Motor Sequence Memory. Neuron, 58(2): 261 – 272 Axmacher, N., Henseler, M. M. et al. (2010). Cross-frequency coupling supports multi-item working memory in the human hippocampus. PNAS, 107(7): 3228-3233. Barense M. D., Rogers T. T., Bussey T. J., Saksida L. M., & Graham K. S. (2010). Influence of conceptual knowledge on visual object discrimination: insights from semantic dementia and MTL amnesia. Cerebral Cortex, 20: 2568-82 Bechtel, W. & Abrahamsen, A. (1991). Connectionism and the mind. Wiley-Blackwell. Brown, J. (2013). Knowing-how: linguistics and cognitive science. Analysis, 73 (2):220 – 227 Cabeza, R., Stanley, M. L., & Moscovitch, M. (2018). Process-specific alliances (PSAs) in cognitive neuroscience. Trends in Cognitive Sciences. Charness, N., Milberg, W., & Alexander, M. P. (1988). Teaching an amnesic a complex cognitive skill. Brain and Cognition, 8(2), 253-272. Clark, G. M., Lum, J. A. G., & Ullman, M. T. (2014). A meta-analysis and meta-regression of serial reaction time task performance in Parkinson's disease. Neuropsychology, 28(6): 945-958 Cermak, L. S., Talbot, N., Chandler, K., & Wolbarst, L. R. (1985). The perceptual priming phenomenon in amnesia. Neuropsychologia, 23, 615-622. Cohen, N. & Squire, L. R. (1980). Preserved learning and retention of pattern analyzing skill in amnesia: Dissociation of knowing how and knowing that. Science, 210: 207-209 Corkin S. (1965) Tactually-guided maze learning in man: Effects of unilateral cortical excisions and bilateral hippocampal lesions Neuropsychologia. 3: 339-351. Corkin, S. (1968). Acquisition of motor skill after bilateral medial temporal-lobe excision Neuropsychologia. 6: 255-265. Corkin, S. (1984). Lasting consequences of bilateral medial temporal lobectomy: Clinal course and experimental findings in H.M. Seminars in Neurology, 4(2): 249-259. Corkin, S. (2013). Permanent present tense: The unforgettable life of the amnesic patient H.M. Basic Books. De Brigard, F. (2006). Capas limítrofes y dominios de evidencia en ciencia cognitiva. Universitas Philosophica. 46: 53-77. De Brigard, F. (2014a). The nature of memory traces. Philosophy Compass. 9(6): 402-414. 10 I wanted to thank the audiences of the Workshop on Memory and Skill (Duke, 2016), the Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas (UNAM, 2016), and the departments of philosophy at the Universidad Nacional de Colombia (2017) and Tufts University (2018). Special thanks to Carl Craver, Jackie DeRosa, John Krakauer, Bryce Gessell, Paul Henne, Bryce Huebner, Kirk Michaelian, Carlotta Pavese, and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong for comments on previous drafts. 28 De Brigard, F. (2014b). The Anatomy of Amnesia. Scientific American Mind. 25(3): 39-43. De Brigard, F. (2015). What was I thinking? Dennett's Content and Consciousness and the reality of propositional attitudes. In: Muñoz-Suárez, C.M. & De Brigard, F. (Eds.). Content and Consciousness Revisited. N.Y. Springer. pp. 49-71. De Brigard, F., Addis, D., Ford, J.H., Schacter, D.L., & Giovanello, K.S. (2013) Remembering what could have happened: Neural correlates of episodic counterfactual thinking. Neuropsychologia.51(12): 24012414. D'Esposito, M., Postle B. R, & Rypma, B. (2000). Prefrontal cortical contributions to working memory: evidence from event-related fMRI studies. Experimental brain research. 133:3-11. Della-Maggiore, V., Malfait, N., Ostry, D. J., & Paus, T. (2004). Stimulation of the posterior parietal cortex interferes with arm trajectory adjustments during learning of new dynamics. Journal of Neuroscience. 24(44): 9971-9976. Devitt, M. (2011). Methodology and the nature of knowing how. Journal of Philosophy, 108(4): 205 – 218 Dew, I. T., & Cabeza, R. (2011). The porous boundaries between explicit and implicit memory: behavioral and neural evidence. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 1224(1): 174–190 Döhring, J., Stoldt, A., Witt, K., Schönfeld, R., Deuschl, G., Born, J., & Bartsch, T. (2017). Motor skill learning and offline-changes in TGA patients with acute hippocampal CA1 lesions. Cortex, 89: 156-168. Duss, S. B., Reber, T. P., Hänggi, J., Schwab, S., Wiest, R., Müri, R. M., Brugger, P., Gutbrod, K., ... Henke, K. (2014). Unconscious relational encoding depends on hippocampus. Brain: a journal of neurology, 137(Pt 12), 3355-70. Eichenbaum, H. & Cohen, N. J. (2014). Can we reconcile the declarative memory and spatial navigation views on hippocampal function? Neuron, 83(4): 764-70. Fantl, J. (2008). Knowing-how and knowing-that. Philosophy Compass. 3(3): 451-470. Fernandez, G. & Tendolkar, I. (2006). The rhinal cortex: 'gatekeeper' of the declarative memory system. Trends in Cognitive Science, 10(8): 358-62. Foerde, K., Race, E., Verfaellie, M., & Shohamy, D. (2013). A role for the medial temporal lobe in feedback-driven learning: Evidence from amnesia. Journal of Neuroscience, 33, 5698-5704. Fridland, E. (2017). Skill and motor control: intelligence all the way down. Synthese, 174(6): 1539–1560 Gabrieli, J. D. E., Fleischman, D. A., Keane, M. M., Reminger, S. L., & Morrel, F. (1995). Double dissociation between memory systems underlying explicit and implicit memory in the human brain. Psychological Science, 6(2): 72-82. Gabrieli, J. D. E. (1998). Cognitive neuroscience of human memory. Ann. Rev. Psychol. 49(1): 87-115. Gauthier, I., Tarr, M. J., Anderson, A. W., Skudlarski, P., & Gore, J. C. (1999). Activation of the middle fusiform "face area" increases with expertise in recognizing novel objects. Nature Neuroscience, 2, 568573 Glick, E. (2011). Two methodologies for evaluating intellectualism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 83(2): 398 434. Glick, E. (2015) Practical modes of presentation. Nous, 49(3): 538-559. Glisky, E. L., Schacter, D. L. & Tulving, E. (1986) Computer learning by memory-impaired patients: acquisition and retention of complex knowledge. Neuropsychologia. 24: 313-28. Graf, P., Squire, L. R., & Mandler, G. (1984.) The information that amnesic patients do not forget. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 10, 164-178. 29 Hannula, D. E., Tranel, D., & Cohen, N. J. (2006). The long and the short of it: relational memory impairments in amnesia, even at short lags. The Journal of Neuroscience, 26: 8352-9. Hannula, D. E. & Ranganath, C. (2008). Medial temporal lobe activity predicts successful relational memory binding. The Journal of Neuroscience. 28: 116-24 Hardwick, R. M., Rottschy, C., Miall, R. C., & Eickhoff, S. B. (2013). A quantitative meta-analysis and review of motor learning in the human brain. NeuroImage, 67, 283–297 Hartley, T. , Bird, C. M., Chan, D. , Cipolotti, L. , Husain, M. , Vargha-Khadem, F. and Burgess, N. (2007), The hippocampus is required for short-term topographical memory in humans. Hippocampus, 17: 34-48. Hassabis, D., Kumaran, D., Vann, S. D., & Maguire E. A. (2007). Patients with hippocampal amnesia cannot imagine new experiences. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America. 104: 1726-31. Henke, K. (2010). A model for memory systems based on processing modes rather than consciousness. Nat Rev Neurosci.11(7):523-32 Heyselaar, E., Segaert, K., Walwoort, S. J. W., Kessels, R. P. C., & Hagoort, P. (2017). The role of nondeclarative memory in the skill for language: Evidence from syntactic priming in patients with amnesia. Neuropsychologia, 101: 97-105. Holdstock, J. S., Mayes, A. R. et al. (2002). Under what conditions is recognition spared relative to recall after selective hippocampal damage in humans? Hippocampus, 12(3): 341-51. Hornsby, J. (2017) Knowing How in Philosophy of Action. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, 80: 87–104. Jacoby, L. L. & Dallas, M. (1981) On the relationship between autobiographical memory and perceptual learning. J. Exp. Psychol. G. 110(3)Ñ 306-340. Kime, S. K., Lamb, D. G., & Wilson, B. A. (1996). Use of a comprehensive programme of external cueing to enhance procedural memory in a patient with dense amnesia. Brain Injury, 10(1), 17-25. Knowlton, B. J., Mangels, J. A., & Squire, L.R. (1996) A neostriatal habit learning system in humans. Science 273, 1399-1402. Laurita, A. C. & Spreng, R. N. (2017). The hippocampus and social cognition. In D.E. Hannula & M.C. Duff (Eds). Hippocampus from Cells to Systems: Structure, Connectivity, and Functional Contributions to Memory and Flexible Cognition. New York: Springer, pp. 537-538. Lee A. C., Yeung L. K., & Barense M. D. (2012) The hippocampus and visual perception. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience. 6: 91. Levy, N. (2017). Embodied savoir faire: knowledge-how requires motor representations. Synthese, 194(2): 511 – 530. Lewis, D. (1979). Attitudes De Dicto and De Se. Philosophical Review, 88: 513–543. MacKay D. G., Stewart R., & Burke D. M. (1998). H.M. revisited: relations between language comprehension, memory, and the hippocampal system. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience. 10: 377-94. McCormick, C., Rosenthal, C.R., Miller, T.D., Maguire, E.A. (2018). Mind-Wandering in People with Hippocampal Damage. Journal of Neuroscience, 38 (11) 2745-2754. Michaelian, K. & Sutton, J. (2017). Memory. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Milner, B. (1960). Impairment of visual recognition and recall after right temporal lobectomy in man. First Annual Meeting of the Psychonomic Society. Milner, B. (1962). Les troubles de la memoire accompagnant des lesions hippocampiques bilaterales. Physiologie de l'hippocampe. Paris: CNRS. 30 Milner, B. (1963). Effects of Different Brain Lesions on Card Sorting: The Role of the Frontal Lobes. Archives of Neurology. 9: 90-100 Milner, B. (1965) Visually-guided maze learning in man: Effects of bilateral hippocampal, bilateral frontal, and unilateral cerebral lesions Neuropsychologia. 3: 317-338. Milner, B., Corkin, S., & Teuber, H. L. (1968). Further analysis of the hippocampal amnesic syndrome: 14year follow-up study of H.M. Neuropsychologia. 6: 215-234. Moscovitch, M. (1982). Multiple dissociations of function in amnesia. In Human Memory and Amnesia, L. S. Cermak (Editor). Erlbaum, Hillsdale, NJ, 1982. Mullally, S. L. & Maguire, E. A. (2014) Counterfactual thinking in patients with amnesia. Hippocampus. 24: 1261-6 Nadel, L. & Moscovitch, M. (1997). Memory consolidation, retrograde amnesia and the hippocampal complex. Current Opinion in Neurobiology. 7: 217-27. O'Kane G., Kensinger E. A., & Corkin S. (2004) Evidence for semantic learning in profound amnesia: an investigation with patient H.M. Hippocampus. 14: 417-25 Olson, I.R., Page, K., Moore, K.S., Chatterjee, A., & Verfaellie, M. (2006). Working memory for conjunctions relies on the medial temporal lobe. Journal of Neuroscience, 26(17): 4596-4601. Pavese, C. (2015a). Knowing a rule. Philosophical Issues. 25(1): 165-188. Pavese, C. (2015b). Practical senses. Philosophers' Imprint. 15(29): 1-25. Pavese, C. (2018). Know-How, Action, and Luck. Synthese. 1-23. Pavese, C. (In press). The psychological reality of practical representation. Philosophical Psychology. Poldrack, R. A., Desmond, J. E., Glover, G. H., & Gabrieli, J.D.E. (1998). The neural basis of visual skill learning: An fMRI study of mirror reading. Cerebral Cortex, 8, 1-10 Poldrack, R. A., Clark, J., Pare-Blagoev, J., Shohamy, D., Creso Moyano, J., Myers, C., & Gluck, M. A. (2001). Interactive memory systems in the human brain. Nature, 414, 546-550. Ranganath, C. & Blumenfeld, R. S. (2005). Doubts about double dissociations between shortand longterm memory. Trends in Cognitive Sciences. 9: 374-80. Reder, L.M., Park, H., & Kieffaber, P.D. (2009). Memory systems do not divide on consciousness: Reinterpreting memory in terms of activation and binding. Psychological Bulletin, 135(1): 23–49. Ribot, T. (1881). Les maladies de la mémoire, London: Kegan Paul, Trench & Co. Paris: Alcan Rossell, S. L., Price, C. J., & Nobre, A. C. (2003). The anatomy and time course of semantic priming investigated by fMRI and ERPs. Neuropsychologia, 41(5): 550-64. Roy, S. & Park, N. W. (2010). Dissociating the memory systems mediating complex tool knowledge and skills. Neuropsychologia, 48(10): 3026 – 3036. Ryan, L., Cox, C., Hayes, S.M., & Nadel, L. (2008). Hippocampal activation during episodic and semantic memory retrieval: comparing category production and category cued recall. Neuropsychologia. 46: 21092121. Ryle, G. (1945/1946). Knowing how and knowing that. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 46: 1-16. Ryle, G. (1949). The concept of mind. London: Hutchinson Schacter, D. L., Chiu, C. Y. P., & Ochsner, K. N. (1993). Implicit memory: A selective review. Annual Review of Neuroscience, 16, 159-182. 31 Schapiro, A.C., Gregory, E., Landau, B., McCloskey, M., & Turk-Browne, N.B. (2014). The necessity of the medial temporal lobe for statistical learning. J Cogn Neurosci 26:1736–1747. Schendan, H.E., Searl, M.M., Melrose, R.J., & Stern, C.E. (2003). An fMRI Study of the Role of the Medial Temporal Lobe in Implicit and Explicit Sequence Learning. Neuron. 37(6): 1013 1025 Scoville, W.B. & Milner, B. (1957). Loss of recent memory after bilateral hippocampal lesions. Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery, and Psychiatry. 20: 11-21 Schmolck H., Kensinger E. A., Corkin S., & Squire L. R. (2002). Semantic knowledge in patient H.M. and other patients with bilateral medial and lateral temporal lobe lesions. Hippocampus. 12: 520-33 Skinner, E. I., & Fernandes, M. A. (2007). Neural correlates of recollection and familiarity: a review of neuroimaging and patient data. Neuropsychologia, 45(10): 2163-79. Squire, L. R. (1988). The organization and neural substrates of human memory. International Journal of Neurology, 22, 218-222, Squire, L. R. (1986). Mechanisms of memory. Science, 232: 1612-1619. Squire, L.R., Cohen, N.J., & Zouzounis, J.A. (1984). Preserved memory in retrograde amnesia: Sparing of a recently acquired skill. Neuropsychologia, 22: 145-152. Squire, L. R. & Zola-Morgan, S. (1988). Memory: Brain Systems and Behavior. Trends in Neuroscience, 11, 170-175 Squire, L. R. & Zola-Morgan, S. (1991). The medial temporal lobe memory system. Science, 253: 13801386. Squire, L. R. (2004). Memory Systems of the Brain: A brief history and current perspective. Neurobiology of Learning & Memory: 82, 171-177, Squire, L. R. (1992). Memory and the hippocampus: A synthesis from findings with rats, monkeys, and humans. Psychological Review: 99, 195-231. Stanley, J. & Williamson, T. (2001). Knowing how. Journal of Philosophy, 98(8): 411-444. Stanley, J. (2011a). Know How. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Stanley, J. (2011b). Knowing (How). Nous, 45(2): 207-238. Stanley, J., & Krakauer, J. W. (2013). Motor skill depends on knowledge of facts. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 7:503. Sullivan, E. V. & Sagar, H. J. (1991). Double dissociation of short-term and long-term memory for nonverbal material in Parkinson's disease and global amnesia. A further analysis. Brain, 114(2): 893-906. Sun, R., Merrill, E., & Peterson, T. (2001). From implicit skills to explicit knowledge: A bottom-up model of skill learning. Cognitive Science, 25, 203–244. Talmi, D., Grady, C. L., Goshen-Gottstein, Y., & Moscovitch, M. (2005). Neuroimaging the serial position curve. Psychol. Sci.16:716–723. Tranel, D., Damasio, A.R., Damasio, H., Brandt, J.P. (1994). Sensorimotor Skill Learning in Amnesia: Additional Evidence for the Neural Basis of Nondeclarative Memory. Learning and Memory, 1:165-179. Tulving, E. (1985). How many memory systems are there? American Psychologist, 40(4): 385-398. Tulving, E. & Schacter, D. L. (1990). Priming and human memory systems. Science, 247, 301-306. Vargha-Khadem, F., Gadian, D. G., Watkins, K. E., Connelly, A., Van Paesschen, W., & Mishkin, M. (1997). Differential effects of early hippocampal pathology on episodic and semantic memory. Science, 277(5324): 376-380. 32 Verfaellie, M., Croce, P., & Milberg, W. P. (1995) The Role of Episodic Memory in Semantic Learning: An Examination of Vocabulary Acquisition in a Patient with Amnesia due to Encephalitis Neurocase. 1: 291-304. Vermeulen, J. & Aldenkamp, A. P. (1995). Cognitive side-effects of chronic antiepileptic drug treatment: A review of 25 years of research. Epilepsy Research, 22: 65-95. Voss, J. L. & Federmeier, K. D. (2011). FN400 potentials are functionally identical to N400 potentials and reflect semantic processing during recognition testing. Psychophysiology, 48(4): 532-46. Wagner, A. D., Koutstaal, W., Maril, A., Schacter, D. L., & Buckner, R. L. (2000). Task-specific priming in left inferior frontal cortex. Cerebral Cortex, 10, 1176-1184. Wallis, C. (2008). Consciousness, context, and know-how. Synthese, 160.1: 123 – 153. Warrington, E.K., & McCarthy, R.A. (1988) The fractionation of retrograde amnesia. Brain. Cogn. 7(2): 184-200. Warrington, E. K., & Weiskrantz, L. (1974). The effect of prior learning on subsequent retention in amnesic patients. Neuropsychologia 12, 419-428, 1974. Warrington, E. K. & Shallice, T. (1969). The selective impairment of auditory verbal short-term memory. Brain, 92: 885-896. Wechsler, D. (1945). A standardized memory scale for clinical use. J. of Psychol. 19: 87-95. Weldon, M. S., & Roediger, H. L., III (1987). Altering retrieval demands reverses the picture superiority effect. Memory and Cognition 15(4), 269-280. Yamashita, H. (1993). Perceptual-motor learning in amnesic patients with medial temporal lobe lesions. Percept Mot Skills. 77(3 Pt 2):1311-4. 33 Figure 1: Standard Model of Memory. Adapted from Squire, 1992. 34 Figure 2: Results from H.M. vs controls' performance in two motor-skill learning tasks, from Corkin 1968. A) Mean-time on target during the Rotary Pursuit task as a function of session/day. B) Mean-number of contacts with the target during the Rotary Pursuit task as a function of session/day. C) Mean-time on target during Bimanual Tracking as a function of session/day. D) Contact-scores during Bimanual Tracking as a function of session/day. 35 Figure 3: Results from D.A. vs controls' performance in the novel tools task, from Roy and Park, 2010. A) Mean completion time in the use-to-command test. B) Percent correct in the use-to-command test. C). Percentage of correct responses in recall of functional associative information by test trial. D) Mean completion time during training sessions across stages. Error bars indicate SEM.

La conscience et l'appréhension de l'expérience musicale : pour une esthétique phénoménologique Grégorie Dupuis-McDonald, Université Laval Nous éprouvons une fière réjouissance d'avoir assisté à l'événement « De la musique avant toute chose ! » et c'est l'enthousiasme que cette rencontre aura produit qui nous aura poussé à approfondir la réflexion entamée ce jour-là. À tel point que la pluralité et la rigueur des vues exposées par les différentes interventions philosophiques, et encore l'exaltante performance musicale, aurons rendu compte de l'ampleur et de la richesse que revêt la question musicale. D'une part, nous avons compris lors de cet événement à quel point la musique est omniprésente en notre monde et que nous devrions en éliminer sa diffusion superflue. D'autre part, nous avons vu toute la somptuosité de cette forme d'art dans ses multiples manifestations et rapports culturels. Enfin, nous avons appris en quoi la musique nous émeut tant selon les commentaires de différents philosophes traditionnels à travers l'histoire. Or, il n'en demeure pas moins que nous sommes restés dans une impasse : il nous a semblé ardu, voir inextricable, de discerner ce qui nous permettrait de conclure sur ce qui définit ce qu'est une grande musique, de conclure sur ce qui fait la grandeur de cette musique qui nous passionne tant. Pourtant, nous avions l'opportunité « avant toute chose » de faire l'expérience de cette même beauté, de vivre cette grandeur musicale. Aurions-nous dû, afin de trouver une réponse à nos questions, nous tourner vers cette expérience même que nous vivions, réfléchir à ce que nous avions vécu, essayer de comprendre le phénomène immédiatement vécu ? C'est cette question qui nous intéresse. Pour autant que cette interrogation nous intéresse, elle nous place face au large domaine de l'esthétique. Car en effet, nous ne cherchons pas à « écrire » ou à proposer un commentaire sur la musique. Nous cherchons plutôt à nous inscrire dans une recherche proprement philosophique sur la musique ou, plus globalement, sur la chose belle ; par conséquent, une recherche esthétique. Dans une telle perspective, il nous faut d'abord soutenir que l'esthétique représente pour nous un domaine philosophique où la tâche consiste à s'interroger sur le lieu où se situe le beau et sur la place qu'il occupe, d'exprimer de quelle manière le beau se présente et se propose à la connaissance, ou aux sens, d'expliciter la relation entre la beauté signifiée de la chose et de sa conception éventuelle par l'intelligence1. Or, peut-il y avoir connaissance de la chose belle ? Sommes-nous en mesure de présenter, selon une orientation philosophique, comment il peut y avoir connaissance de la chose belle ? En d'autres termes, comment pouvoir expliciter en des conceptions philosophiques comment il y a possibilité pour l'intelligence de se représenter une oeuvre d'art en tant qu'objet d'esprit, d'en former l'idée ? Sommes-nous à même de montrer la relation qui s'opère entre une intelligence et le beau et de dévoiler à quelle expérience nous convie la musique et où se situe cette expérience ? Les termes d'une philosophie peuvent-ils préciser ce qui s'opère véritablement entre nous et la musique ? Ces précédentes interrogations déterminent et tracent les limites de notre problématique. De surcroît, comme nous le montrerons, ce n'est pas par une approche scientifique, évaluant la forme objective d'une oeuvre nous permettant de la connaitre, que nous montrerons l'essentiel de la relation esthétique. De plus, nous ne pouvons nous en remettre à croire en une connaissance subjective, où tout jugement consiste en une vérité, et où aucune conclusion n'est possible. À l'opposé, pour explorer cette problématique, nous montrerons qu'une certaine attitude philosophique est nécessaire afin d'approcher la chose belle et d'en prendre connaissance. En un deuxième temps, nous montrerons qu'une opération peut nous amener à préciser où se situe le véritable lieu de l'expérience esthétique. Enfin, nous arriverons à montrer quelle est la relation entre le sujet et l'oeuvre musicale. Nous tenterons dans cet ordre d'idées de proposer une véritable esthétique, c'est-à-dire une véritable position philosophique par rapport à l'oeuvre d'art. D'entrée de jeu, mentionnons que nous soutenons une philosophie phénoménologique ; notre approche est stricto sensu phénoménologique. Ceci implique de notre part une fidélité face à la méthode phénoménologique mais encore une iconicité de cette philosophie fondamentale. Par conséquent, c'est Husserl qui nous guidera dans notre recherche et nous empruntons le plus rigoureusement les concepts de sa philosophie universelle. L'approche phénoménologique que nous préconisons prendra tout son sens à mesure de l'exploration de notre problématique. Nous, le monde, les choses belles Nous sommes, êtres humains, dans le monde, y prenant place et y existant. Nous sommes là, dans ce monde, spontanément, sans y être forcés ni invités, sans contraintes, instinctivement, naturellement. Nous vivons dans ce milieu déterminé, devenant progressivement et découvrant à mesure notre environnement, la sphère environnante formant notre contexte immédiat et actuel, circonscrivant les limites de notre réalité. Il s'y trouve une multitude de choses, d'êtres, d'événements et d'objets présents là, qui se situent dans toute leur autonomie et dans leurs dispositions et orientations particulières. En effet, et notamment, sont positionnées une foule de choses belles dans cet environnement. Ces choses constituent un ordre naturel ou sont objets de valeur esthétique. Du moment qu'elles ont pris forme, ces choses sont libres de toute dépendance quant à leur existence temporelle. Les oeuvres de la nature, et des artistes, sont là pour nous : des sculptures, des tableaux, des harmonies sonores, des représentations de signes se présentent à nous. Nous, d'autre part, nous sommes afférents devant ces oeuvres d'arts ; nous pouvons être en relation immédiate et logique avec tous ces objets, ceci établissant une correspondance entre nous, et le monde. Chacune de ces oeuvres possède la même détermination formelle et objective pour tous. Ainsi pouvons-nous adopter différentes attitudes rationnelles face à ces choses, à ces oeuvres d'art. En effet, avant même l'appréciation d'une oeuvre, un certain état d'esprit, une certaine disposition d'esprit, motive et influence l'observation et la réflexion. Il nous semble juste d'affirmer qu'il est habituel et courant d'approcher une oeuvre sous un certain angle rationnel. Insistons sur le terme rationnel ; ne comprenons pas ici théorique. Cet état d'esprit qui soumet un angle d'approche rationnel est communément soit objectif, soit subjectif. Soit nous sommes disposés devant l'oeuvre de manière objective, donc à penser que l'oeuvre existe et doit être jugée indépendamment et hors de l'esprit qui l'approche, soit de manière subjective, donc à penser que l'oeuvre existe et doit être jugée dépendamment de la vie psychique du sujet, plutôt que par rapport à ses conditions objectives. Et d'ailleurs, ces approches rationnelles communes font l'objet de théories esthétiques. De fait, ces deux théories de l'art, l'esthétique objectiviste et la subjectiviste, présentent chacune une attitude possible face au beau. Sommairement, la première se résume en une approche positive de l'objet d'art, c'est-à-dire en une approche fondée sur le caractère certain et évident de l'oeuvre, supposant ainsi la connaissance de l'objet par le caractère factuel, réel et observable de celui-ci. Cela ne mène qu'à des considérations exclusives de la forme artistique, subséquemment à un formalisme suffisant. L'art ne serait que démonstration de, qu'évocation de la structure de. Dans une autre perspective, l'esthétique subjectiviste soutient que l'existence de la chose, l'oeuvre d'art sous toutes formes envisageables et son éventuelle constitution réelle en tant que matière de l'esprit, dépend fondamentalement de la certitude et de la conviction du sujet percevant et jugeant. Du coup, toute opinion, tout jugement n'est pas ultimement invalide mais il n'en demeure pas moins qu'à ce point, il y a autant de sujets que d'oeuvres d'art ; de cette manière, l'oeuvre revêt une nouvelle existence à mesure de l'infinité des commentaires et interprétations. En d'autres termes, la corrélation entre l'oeuvre et le sujet percevant est indéterminable et l'analyse de cette réciprocité met en jeu une sociologie et une anthropologie ; l'esthétique passe au rang d'une analyse de cas psychologico-culturel-artistique2. Bref, ces « esthétiques » ne contribuent qu'à l'isolement des parties constituantes de l'expérience de la beauté, ignorant de ce fait la véritable conjonction des éléments du phénomène esthétique. En dépit du bien-fondé de ces considérations théoriques, nous ne pouvons nous en remettre à ces attitudes. À tel point que nous ferons subir une altération radicale à ces thèses. Une autre attitude est possible. L'attitude phénoménologique et la réduction Cette autre attitude, cette attitude phénoménologique, est proprement philosophique et c'est l'accomplissement de son tournant qui nous mènera au coeur de notre conception du véritable enjeu esthétique. Cette attitude détermine et provoque toute la suite de notre entreprise. De sorte que notre attitude face à l'oeuvre d'art, dans le but de la connaitre, est autre et qu'elle s'accompagne d'une position philosophique essentielle. Cette position se veut hardiment de même nature que celle à laquelle Descartes nous invitait remarquablement, dans le dessein d'en arriver à une philosophie fondamentale. Non seulement nous adoptons les principes et conceptions cartésiens, et nous allons aussi du même élan inspirer une philosophie foncière. De ce souffle, il s'agit premièrement de rejeter tout ce qui pourrait être soumis au doute pour en arriver à une évidence précise. Précisons : nous, qui sommes devant une « chose belle », qui voulons saisir cette chose de la manière la plus indubitable possible, qui cherchons donc à la connaitre selon l'évidence, c'est-à-dire en tant que telle, nous pouvons et devons nous placer dans l'incertitude face à toute idée ou thèse qui influencerait l'évidence même de la chose selon qu'elle se présente à nous dans toute son autonomie. Nous cherchons la certitude ; nous cherchons à établir de façon directe la vérité et la réalité de la chose belle selon une connaissance qui s'imposerait. Nous ne pouvons pas présumer la chose avec un angle théorique probable. Ainsi, nous écoutons une pièce musicale comme si elle nous était tout à fait inconnue, comme si elle devait légitimer son existence et son sens présentement. Nous ne présumons pas sa grandeur mais cherchons à la saisir. Du coup, nous ne pouvons que soumettre tout au doute jusqu'à atteindre une évidence selon notre propre connaissance. D'une certaine manière, toute chose ne revêt de caractère objectif et formel que selon ce qu'elle laisse percevoir, et que je peux constater. À cet égard, aucune théorie objective, objectiviste ou subjectiviste, n'est valide. Donc, nous faisons subir à ces thèses objectivistes et subjectivistes une altération radicale3 en ce sens où nous les rejetons foncièrement selon leur principe essentiel même ; nous changeons fondamentalement de perspective et modifions notre position. Nous plaçant dans un tel dénuement d'esprit, nous devrions conséquemment atteindre la chose par une intuition inaltérée de toutes perspectives qui pourrait fausser la perception. Mais encore, toute évidence il y aura, nous ne porterons aucun jugement sur cette chose ; nous nous abstiendrons de tout jugement. Cela signifie non pas que nous dénions la chose, que nous nions son existence, mais plutôt que nous ne visons qu'à supposer son être et sa définition que probablement. Nous supposons son essence sans que cela n'implique que ceci soit cela, que cela soit ceci. Nous n'admettons aucun état de choses. Effectivement, nous sursoyons à toute prise de position et à toute évaluation. En d'autres mots, nous ne prenons aucune position objective quant à la forme et au fond de l'oeuvre musicale. Toute cette entreprise se résume en l'épochè phénoménologique, la réduction phénoménologique, moment crucial dans la voie phénoménologique. En réalité, cette épochè, cette réduction, consiste à écarter, à mettre entre parenthèses, de la sphère d'appréhension de l'expérience esthétique tout ce qui n'est pas nécessaire à la saisie pure de l'expérience. En d'autres mots, nous mettons hors-jeu, hors du domaine que nous voulons circonscrire toutes définitions objectives de la chose et tout jugement qui voudrait l'évaluer4. Ainsi en arriveronsnous à nos propres conceptions, à notre propre évidence. La conscience et les phénomènes vécus Or, que nous amène cette attitude philosophique radicale face à l'oeuvre d'art et ses différentes approches théoriques communes, que cherchons-nous à faire par cette réduction phénoménologique ? En vérité, nous cherchons à évacuer toutes notions superfétatoires qui obstrueraient notre regard face à l'expérience esthétique, afin que se révèle à nous ce qui reste de toute cette opération phénoménologique : le moi, la conscience. Reprenons : nous avons en toute liberté décidé de ne considérer la chose sous aucun angle théorique et formel pour lui enlever tout caractère objectif. Mais aussi, nous avons de plus décidé de ne porter aucun jugement sur cette même chose. Nous avons de ce fait mis la chose entre parenthèses, et nous avons mis hors-jeu tout jugement et présomption sur la définition, sur l'être de la chose. Bref, nous avons douté, nous nous sommes mis dans une certaine incertitude face à la réalité de la chose. Or, nous vivons malgré cela l'expérience esthétique ; nous sommes seulement dans une autre position face à la chose belle. De cette manière, dans cette position, il nous semble indéniable que la seule chose qui puisse subsister à titre essentiel, à titre d'évidence, c'est nous, un moi, face à cette chose belle ; un moi, vivant l'expérience de l'oeuvre d'art. Il n'y a d'évident que moi, en relation avec une harmonie sonore particulière. C'est ici que la méthode phénoménologique prend tout son sens. En doutant de l'être et de l'existence objective de la chose et en ne portant aucun jugement, c'est en tournant notre regard vers la conscience confrontée à la chose, que reste enfin le lieu des expériences et des vécus esthétiques. En effet, que nous reste-t-il d'autre de toute cette réduction que la conscience qui pose ce geste ? Toujours est-il que cette attitude suggère une tout autre relation entre la chose esthétique et ce moi. Puisque la chose est dénuée de son caractère d'existant, elle n'est plus qu'une forme qui apparait, qui se révèle et surgit comme un étant à la conscience. Nous ne pouvons que la saisir, la connaitre à titre d'évidence que de la manière dont elle s'offre à nous et de la manière dont nous la percevons immédiatement. Notre relation avec l'objet d'art est un phénomène, une chose qui n'est que comme elle se manifeste immédiatement, qui n'est que comme elle se présente là à nous. À ce point, cela implique de notre part que nous tournions le regard vers la chose belle, que nous soyons attentif à l'enchaînement des sons, qu'avec cette attitude nous fassions l'expérience de l'oeuvre d'art et que notre conscience soit conscience de quelque chose, conscience de cette oeuvre d'art, conscience de cette combinaison de sons. Malgré cette attitude que nous adoptons, malgré cette absence de considération de toute la sphère objective de la chose et de cette abstention de juger, il n'en demeure pas moins que nous vivons la beauté de la chose, que nous faisons l'expérience de l'oeuvre. Nous ne sommes pas devant un néant où plus rien n'aurait le statut d'existant. Au contraire, tous les moments passés dans cette attitude face à la chose belle constituent des expériences pleines et riches d'éléments, d'abord immédiates, mais que nous pouvons considérer par la réflexion. Nous pouvons en effet réfléchir sur tous ces moments de conscience passés. Voilà de fait quelle est la relation entre l'intelligence et l'oeuvre d'art. C'est ici qu'est possible une véritable connaissance esthétique. Cette connaissance se situe dans la saisie de notre propre expérience de l'oeuvre. Tous ces moments constituent notre vie en relation avec les oeuvres d'arts, nos expériences esthétiques conscientes que nous pouvons saisir par la réflexion. Ces moments sont des actes de conscience, des vécus de conscience. L'ensemble de ces actes constitue le flux de notre vécu de conscience. Autrement dit, après avoir saisi la plénitude de notre conscience face aux choses artistiques, nous dédoublons notre conscience en une conscience de la chose et une conscience du sujet percevant pour saisir ces actes de conscience, pour saisir les phénomènes produits, qui constituent la véritable connaissance, la connaissance de notre expérience artistique5. Le flux du vécu et la perception Nous avons donc établi la conscience en tant que région6 contenant l'essence même de toute expérience esthétique, en tant qu'espace d'investigation de l'expérience esthétique, en tant que champ de connaissance du domaine esthétique. Plus précisément, cette conscience contient de fait tous les phénomènes esthétiques, tous les objets qui se sont présentés à cette même conscience, à ce moi tourné vers la chose. La conscience est ainsi le lieu de l'expérience esthétique, le lieu où nous pouvons rechercher une connaissance. Par extension, tous ces moments de conscience, ces actes et vécus de conscience forment le flux de mon vécu, une abondante pluralité d'intuitions de la chose esthétique. Ce même flux est saisissable par la réflexion, appropriable par un retour de la pensée sur elle-même. Ceci étant dit, nous devons tout de même être curieux quant à l'effectivité de ces expériences esthétiques, de ces intuitions immédiates et de la teneur, du contenu exact de ces objets de conscience. Car bien que leurs essences soient idéales, ces phénomènes impliquent une réalité de faits physiques et empiriques. Il s'agit maintenant de montrer de quoi consistent ces phénomènes. D'entrée de jeu, n'oublions pas que face à la chose belle, nous avons après doute établi le Je, le Moi, comme résidu essentiel ne pouvant être nié. De là, notre attitude est différente. Dans cette perspective, nous faisons l'expérience de l'oeuvre d'art par la perception. En effet, l'oeuvre se présente à nous et nous l'éprouvons, nous la vivons et la discernons par le biais des sens ; nous nous la représentons immédiatement sans intervention aucune de la raison. Car bien que l'ensemble de sons produit par l'orchestre saisisse mes sens, je dois tout de même être conscient de ce que je vis, de ce qui me fait face. L'oeuvre n'accède pas à la conscience ; c'est cette conscience qui vise l'oeuvre. Chaque instant devient un vécu ; ce vécu est actualité lorsqu'il devient objet de pensée, de conscience. Le moi doit prendre conscience de cette chose, être conscience de quelque chose. Ainsi, le vécu devient ce quelque chose. Notre tâche est de saisir l'essence même de ce vécu dans sa forme idéale, dans le ce quoi il est conscience. Tous ces moments réels formant le flux sont l'essence de la conscience. À cet égard, une oeuvre (une chose) peut être notre vis-à-vis sans être un objet saisi et extrait actuellement, de là la distinction entre chose et objet7. En effet, une perception peut ne pas comporter d'essence ; elle peut être vide dû à l'inattention et à la défaillance du moi ; tout vécu de conscience doit être conscience de ceci et de cela. Néanmoins, il faut comprendre qu'entre la perception et la chose ne s'établit pas forcément une unité spontanée. Selon la disposition du sujet face à la chose, la suite successive des perceptions peut comprendre des accrocs ; il n'est pas impossible que notre inattention trouble la sensation complète de la chose. Or, la chose reste identique. Toutefois, le sujet ne peut la percevoir que par des aperçus se succédant les uns après les autres. C'est donc d'une apparence à l'autre, d'une face à l'autre que l'oeuvre prend la forme d'un objet de pensée. Par exemple, nous pouvons être plus ou moins près de la scène où s'exécute l'orchestre, nous pouvons augmenter ou diminuer le volume du son, nous pouvons être plus ou moins sensibles à la qualité de la performance. Toujours est-il que nous saisissons l'oeuvre au fur et à mesure qu'elle se présente, qu'elle se déroule, selon sa présentation dans l'espace-temps. Il s'agit qu'enfin la chose prenne la forme d'une composition complète en l'esprit après la succession des perceptions. Pour autant que le regard du sujet vise l'oeuvre dans toute sa présence, il faut encore que l'opération empirique des sens et de la perception permette de saisir sous toutes ses faces et tous ses angles l'oeuvre qui est là. Ces moments perceptifs seront par ailleurs des représentations de conscience de cette oeuvre que la réflexion considérera pour en préciser et formuler le contenu. Dans cette mesure, l'oeuvre d'art n'a plus la rigidité formelle que l'on serait tenté de lui conférer dans le domaine des relations esthétiques. Certes, elle demeure de toute manière mais, à l'égard du statut d'une possible connaissance esthétique, l'oeuvre possède le caractère de transcendance, c'est-à-dire que son existence véritable se situe à un niveau supérieur dégagé de l'expérience. Tout son sens dépend en fait de la conscience qui la perçoit. La chose en effet emprunte et va chercher sa valeur d'être en une conscience qui la perçoit. En outre, le sujet percevant, le je, le moi, ne constitue pas réellement une partie du monde, une réalité de fait existante : il est je transcendantal. Ce je transcendantal prend tout son sens par rapport à la relation vécue de la chose belle et, en revanche, cette même chose revêt son caractère d'existence véritable que par rapport à l'expérience et à la perception du sujet ; c'est là tout le caractère de la transcendance du phénomène esthétique8. Donnons-nous, à ce point de l'exposé, le loisir de confirmer notre propos en illustrant nos idées par la simulation d'une situation où une expérience musicale et son appréhension phénoménologique seraient possibles. Supposons-nous être face à un orchestre performant une pièce musicale. D'abord, comprenons que notre présence, le fait que nous soyons là pour attester la traduction en actes réels de l'oeuvre, ne rend pas à celle-ci sa valeur de réalité et d'existence. La pièce musicale, en tant qu'objet ou entité formelle, est tout à fait autonome et libre de dépendance. C'est nous, sujet, qui entrons en relation avec celle-ci. L'oeuvre est, indépendamment de nous. Cela compris, nous adoptons une attitude qui nous dispose dans le doute et l'incertitude afin de saisir la pièce musicale sans contraintes. Cette attitude nous mènera jusqu'à douter du genre même de la musique que nous nous apprêtons à écouter, de sa forme même, du style et des formules qui seront déployés. Aucune présupposition n'est en notre esprit. L'oeuvre musicale se dévoilera à nous selon l'évidence qu'elle laissera percevoir. Cependant, la performance dévoilera rapidement les spécificités formelles, harmoniques et thématiques de l'oeuvre. Malgré cela, nous ne portons aucun jugement. Nous nous abstenons d'évaluer et de prendre position sur l'oeuvre. De cette manière, nous faisons émerger et apparaître plus clairement l'activité propre de notre esprit dans cette expérience. Car en effet, avec cette attitude que nous adoptons, nous ne sommes plus face à un « remarquable chef-d'oeuvre de la musique contemporaine » par exemple, mais bien plutôt devant un ensemble de vibrations acoustiques de molécules d'air perturbant l'espace, nous faisant du coup percevoir un ensemble de sensations d'intensité, de hauteur et de timbre9. De sorte que nous inclinons notre esprit à se représenter l'oeuvre et à s'en former l'idée plutôt qu'à rester abasourdi et en extase devant la sublimité de celle-ci. À tel point que cela révèle notre propre présence face à l'oeuvre. Le fait que nous sommes là réagissant à l'oeuvre devient manifeste et indéniable ; chaque moi faisant l'expérience de l'oeuvre pendant qu'elle apparaît, se manifeste et dévoile sa véritable nature selon l'ordonnance des sons dans le temps, selon son tempo, selon ses périodes et ses variations, et devient une évidence actuelle. De là s'établit la relation de phénomène entre nous et l'oeuvre : la musique est comme elle se présente, comme elle se manifeste. Nous prenons conscience de cette harmonie de sons qui, au fur et à mesure de sa manifestation, devient plus que le fruit du hasard et prend la forme d'une musique cohérente. Chaque moment où nous saisissons la venue à l'existence de l'oeuvre devient un élément de réflexion pour une éventuelle connaissance de l'oeuvre, de sa représentation formelle et intellectuelle. L'oeuvre ne sera qu'une suite en D mineur, qu'un concerto ou une pièce de be-bop, de swing ou de post-free jazz que lorsque nous aurons fait un retour de l'esprit sur les moments vécus en pleine conscience d'avoir perçu un tel enchainement de sons, selon tel rythme et telle intensité, selon telle forme de mouvement, joué avec tels instruments, etc. Conclusion Nous avons, tout bien considéré, réussi à organiser et à fonder sur des arguments solides nos propositions philosophiques pour une approche phénoménologique de l'esthétique. Suivant et conformément aux fins que nous nous sommes fixées, cet article aura présenté les grandes lignes de ce en quoi consiste l'expérience esthétique, et où une connaissance de notre expérience de l'oeuvre d'art est possible. En somme, c'est d'une part dans une attitude adéquate et congruente que nous nous sommes préalablement positionné face à la chose belle, nous permettant du coup d'écarter toutes notions objectives et théoriques qui flouerait notre regard et notre considération de l'oeuvre. Par extension, nous avons librement pris l'initiative de surseoir à tout jugement, à toute présomption d'état de choses. Cela a eu l'effet de révéler un sujet pensant incontestable, un je dont seul l'être pouvait être affirmé, un moi présent comme le sein même de toute notre investigation ; une conscience en tant que résidu. Il s'agissait de tourner notre regard vers cette conscience vivant une expérience esthétique, plus précisément pour saisir tous les phénomènes, tous les moments où la chose apparaissait à la conscience, quand celle-ci tournait son regard pour saisir et extraire un objet de pensée. Cette conscience, nous l'aurons montré dans cet article, constitue le véritable lieu esthétique. Cette conscience est en effet la sphère où la relation entre le sujet et l'objet esthétique peut être explicitée. C'est en un retour de la pensée en cette conscience que la réflexion peut évaluer et considérer les moments vécus en relation avec l'oeuvre d'art. Enfin, et d'autre part, nous aurons aussi montré qu'une connaissance de la chose belle est possible par la voie que nous avons décrite, la voie phénoménologique. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 1 Mikel Dufrenne, « Esthétique », dans Dictionnaire de philosophie, Paris, Encyclopaedia universalis et Albin Michel, 2000, p. 550-561. 2 Mikel Dufrenne, « Esthétique », dans Dictionnaire de philosophie, Paris, Encyclopaedia universalis et Albin Michel, 2000, p. 550-561. ! 3 Sur l'altération radicale, cf. Premier chapitre de la deuxième section dans Edmund Husserl, Idées directrices pour une phénoménologie, Paris, Gallimard, 1950, 567 p. et première méditation dans Edmund Husserl, Méditations cartésiennes, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1994, 237 p. 4 Sur l'épochè phénoménologique, cf. Premier chapitre de la deuxième section dans Edmund Husserl, Idées directrices pour une phénoménologie, Paris, Gallimard, 1950, 567 p. et première méditation dans Edmund Husserl, Méditations cartésiennes, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1994, 237 p. 5 Sur les vécus de conscience et le flux du vécu, cf. Deuxième chapitre de la deuxième section dans Edmund Husserl, Idées directrices pour une phénoménologie, Paris, Gallimard, 1950, 567 p. et deuxième méditation dans Edmund Husserl, Méditations cartésiennes, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1994, 237 p. 6 Sur la région de la conscience, cf. Troisième chapitre de la deuxième section dans Edmund Husserl, Idées directrices pour une phénoménologie, Paris, Gallimard, 1950, 567 p. 7 Sur la distinction entre chose et objet, cf. Deuxième chapitre de la deuxième section dans Edmund Husserl, Idées directrices pour une phénoménologie, Paris, Gallimard, 1950, 567 p. 8 Sur la notion de transcendance, cf. Deuxième chapitre de la deuxième section dans Edmund Husserl, Idées directrices pour une phénoménologie, Paris, Gallimard, 1950, 567 p.et deuxième méditation dans Edmund Husserl, Méditations cartésiennes, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1994, 237 p. 9 Dictionnaire de la musique, Paris, Larousse, 2011, 1515 p.!

Precis of The Emotional Mind Tom Cochrane 0. Introduction1 In this precis I'm going to summarise some of the key ideas in The Emotional Mind: A control theory of affective states (Cambridge University Press, 2018). The sections of this precis follow the chapter structure of the book. The book grew out an attempt to give an original account of the emotions. As anyone who has researched this area can tell you, the more you explore the emotions, the more you realise how complex they are. They connect to all sorts of issues about bodily sensations, actions, values, reasoning, character and social interactions. Ultimately, I don't think a proper account of the emotions is possible without understanding how they are placed within the mind as a whole. This is what I try to provide in the book. As a result, I end up with a theory of mental architecture, where the mind is structured around fundamental life-sustaining processes that deploy ever more elaborate forms of representation to serve their aims. First some brief background: The history of the emotions debate since the time of William James has been dominated by a debate between the traditional cognitivist positionthat emotions are a species of evaluative judgement, and the non-cognitive or somaticist positionthat emotions are patterns of bodily sensations. As far as I can tell, everyone these days is searching for the ideal middle ground where evaluative judgement and bodily responses are perfectly synthesized. It is not enough to say that emotions combine bodily responses and judgement. The key adaptive innovation of emotions will lie in how exactly these two features are connected. In recent times the perceptual theory of emotions has presented a particularly strong synthesis. As Prinz (2004) articulates it, the feelings of bodily changes themselves represent the intentional contents of emotions. However, there have been a number of attacks on this theory, 1 This precis draws together and expands on material I provided to The Brains Blog (between 11th -15th Feb 2019) http://philosophyofbrains.com/2019/02/11/a-new-account-of-the-emotions.aspx and the Cambridge University Press blog (11th Feb 2019) http://www.cambridgeblog.org/2019/02/what-is-the-relationshipbetween-reason-and-emotion/ These sources, in addition to this precis, are citable, though preferably direct citation should be made to the book. This precis was updated in August 2019. 2 and in my opinion, the perceptual theory is dead. Michael Brady (2013) has a book length attack on the epistemic analogy with perception, pointing out that emotions do not automatically justify belief in the way that perceptions do. It is also clear that emotions are routinely mediated by other perceptual or mental states (like imagining, memory, and the interoception of bodily responses) in a way that just doesn't fit the profile of perception. See Salmela (2011), Deonna & Teroni (2012: Ch. 6), Barlassina & Newen (2013) for further attacks, plus a few in my own book. A new kind of emotion theory has drawn more deeply on the connection between emotions and action.2 It tries to move beyond the perceptual theory by arguing that bodily responses should be understood less as the representational content of an emotional state, and more like its mode or attitude (see e.g. Deonna and Teroni 2012, also Hufendiek 2016 to some extent). That is, we don't represent danger (or loss, or gain); we represent in a threatened, or protective or welcoming mode, by responding in the ways characteristic of fear, sadness of happiness respectively. I do not go quite as far as Deonna and Teroni, since I still believe that emotions represent a particular kind of content. However I similarly regard the evaluative aspect of emotions not as something that we represent, but as captured in an evaluative manner of representing. That is, I claim that it is part of the representational activity of emotional states to either increase or decrease the presence of their objects. 1. Valent Representation This approach to the emotions needs to be motivated. While it is convenient to say that emotions are evaluative modes of representation, we need a stronger reason to believe in this sort of mental state other than it conveniently combining the bodily and evaluative aspects of emotion. The way I provide this motivation is by digging into the problem of mental content (cf. the approach of Prinz 2004). The basic problem of mental content is how some activity inside the head could be about a specific kind of object in the world. Structural resemblances may well be involved, but resemblance is too cheap to fix objects precisely. Thus a lot of philosophers have thought that 2 Nico Frijda is well-known for emphasising this connection (e.g. 1986). However Frijda's account lacks the kind of conceptual clarity that we seek in philosophy. 3 some kind of pragmatic interaction with the object could fix things precisely. Teleosemantic views are one approach (e.g. Dretske, Millikan). Success semantics is another. Success semantics is roughly the claim that a mental state represents whatever object makes actions based on that state successful. So for example, your mental state is about the chair if, on the basis of your mental state, you are able to successfully interact with the chair. In this sense, interaction with the world is necessary for fixing the reference of the mental state. However a problem for success semantics is that it seems that you need both beliefs/percepts (about the world) and desires (to stimulate actions) to be in place, before any mental state can have any content at all. That is, to guide an action like sitting down, I need to both perceive the chair and desire to sit down in it. To require both percepts and desires to appear simultaneously is implausibly complex as an account to how mental content naturalistically emerges. To get round this problem, we need mental states that serve the duty of percepts and desires simultaneously. To achieve this, I propose a new fundamental sort of mental state which I call 'valent representation'. Valent representations make use of negative feedback loops, as depicted below. An avoidant loop In this loop, as the level of 'heat' gets higher, the activity of the detection node will get higher. This then increases the activity of moving backwards. But if the creature moves backwards, the level of heat (for the organism) will get lower, and so activity in the detection node will fall, eventually leading to inactivity (until the level of heat rises again). Thus the presence of heat for the organism is regulated. I call this an 'avoidant loop'. 4 The great thing about control loops like this is that we don't need separate descriptive and directive representations. One representational node (the detection stage in the diagram above) is doing the work of both functions. We can also have 'attractant loops' where if the level of a good thing like food falls low enough, activity in the detector (or hunger) node increases, triggering a response that will secure food, ultimately leading to the inhibition of the feeding response (see the below diagram). An attractant loop Now because negative feedback loops are common in nature, there's an issue about how we distinguish the representational ones from non-representational ones, and I spend a lot of time in Chapter One of my book justifying various details, including what makes a creature alive. However, I will skip here to the final definition of valent representation. X valently represents Y iff: 1. X is a living creature 2. Y is a type of object or property (the object). 3. An indicator3 of Y either activates or inhibits activity in a system internal to X (the detector). 4. The activity of the detector triggers a physically distinct and specific response (the response). 5. The response is capable of decreasing the present capacity of Y to activate the response via the detector (negative feedback regulation). 3 Note, not Y itself. An indicator is a sign of the object, e.g. the colour or smell of some food. 5 Essentially, valent representation is representation in a valent (i.e. positive or negative) manner. What makes it valent is that the representational activity automatically triggers a bodily response aimed at increasing or decreasing the presence of the object. The theory is still representationalist in the sense that there is an inner state or activity that stands in for the object (i.e. the detection node). But at the same time it incorporates embodied views on cognition, since the response is playing an indispensable role in the activity of representation. The object of the mental state (e.g. 'presence of food') is all and only those conditions that the response can regulate. Finally, an important feature of valent representation is that we can build all sorts of elaborations upon the basic loop structure. For instance, we can make the detection nodes trigger a response only once a certain threshold of activity is reached, or detection can trigger multiple responses, or responses can trigger further responses. Valent representations can also interact with each other, inhibiting and supporting each other. This is how I make sense of the representation of more complex objects. Affective states like pain, pleasure and emotion require more elaborate structures. But ultimately I argue that they all come down to the same fundamental structure of negative feedback control. Indeed, in my more expansive moods I claim that all cognition is ultimately an elaboration upon valent representation. Overall, valent representation elegantly combines the three aspects of the mind: representation, agency, and evaluation. It is a major claim of the book that these three strands start out as merged in the primitive mind, and it is only through various cognitive sophistications that they get teased apart. 2. Pain and pleasure Upon the foundation stone of valent representation, the rest of the mind is built. My first stop is pain and pleasure. The first thing to note that is although valent representation is representation in a valent (i.e. positive or negative) manner, it is not a representation of valence. Indeed, one of the reasons that pain has become such a hot topic lately is due to the recognition that the intrinsically unpleasant aspects of pain are distinct from the representation of damage to the body. A significant justification for this dissociation is the existence of pain asymbolia, which is a 6 condition in which individuals are able to identify a sensation as a pain, and yet not experience this feeling as bad. The very possibility of this condition forces the distinction upon us. Thus philosophers have been trying to give accounts of what exactly makes an experience intrinsically unpleasant, where some also propose symmetrical accounts for the intrinsically pleasurable aspects of experience. Following Murat Aydede (2014) I use the term 'affect' to cover both pleasant and unpleasant aspects of experience. We can then define an affective state as any mental state that involves the arousal of affect. I encourage others to adopt this terminology. An initial point to make about affect is that there must be some connection with valent treatment. Painful and pleasurable affect must involve approach and avoidance responses respectively (even if we're just talking about cognitive kinds of response like making plans or recalling details). If they did not, we would have no way to distinguish affect from non-affective sensations, and no way to oppose pain with pleasure. This is not to deny the existence of cases where we might embrace a pain or avoid a pleasure, but those should be understood as complex and derivative cases. Thus valent treatment is necessary for affect. However, this allows for two options: one where affect is involved in directing the valent treatment, and another where affect is involved in tracking the valent treatment. These options correspond to two broad approaches to affect: evaluativismwhere affect describes the condition of the body (e.g. David Bain) and imperativismwhere affect directs the subject to do something (see e.g. Colin Klein). My approach is basically evaluativist. There are various reasons for this, but one of the major ones is that imperativism does not do well with pleasant affect. This is because a mental state in which one strongly or urgently directs the subject to deliver a certain good is compatible with lacking the good (or the experience of the good) entirely, and such states of yearning are typically quite unpleasant. What we also need for pleasant affect is for such a motivation to coexist with actually having some of the good thing. Thus, pleasurable affect is essentially a representation of success; that the organism is directed towards acquiring some good, and has managed to do so. I call this a 'success theory' of pleasure. I then offer a symmetrical 'failure theory' of pain, where the subject is directed towards avoiding some harm, and yet the harm is still present. The causal schemata for these states is illustrated below. 7 Symmetrical models for pleasurable and painful affect The upshot is that affect is a higher-level representation that combines a representation of harm or benefit, with a representation of the directive response. Thus the model is that on top of regular valent representations there's a higher level node that monitors the presence of the good and the response. Meanwhile, affect itself follows the structure of a negative feedback loop because it also automatically triggers a response of increased attention.4 Again, there are various reasons for thinking that affect directly stimulates attention rather than specific responses, but the main one is that organisms already need to automatically respond to harms and benefits prior to developing the capacities for pain or pleasure. Anyway, since affect automatically triggers attention, it is an intrinsically motivational state, but because increased attention is common to both pain and pleasure, this response cannot distinguish the two. Rather increased attention indirectly serves a valent function by boosting or prioritising the underlying aversive and appetitive responses. A final significant aspect of the account is the following hypothesized equation for affect intensity: Affect = response x object 4 A claim tentatively mooted in the book is that affect is the only driver of attention. 8 That is, the intensity of pleasurable or painful affect is equal to the (detected) intensity of the response multiplied by the (detected) degree to which the harm or benefit is present. This means that if either the object or the response level is detected as 0, the subject should experience no affect. I think this equation could be a significant psychological principle, particularly given the role of affect in directing attention, so I am hopeful that it will be empirically confirmed. 3. Back to Emotions We can now return to the emotional states. As mentioned earlier, like Deonna and Teroni, I am incorporating the evaluative aspects of emotions into the manner or mode of approaching the object, rather than its representational content. Where my theory differs from that of Deonna & Teroni is that I still attribute a constitutive role to cognitive representation in helping us to grasp the object of the emotion and to trigger the appropriate responses.5 That is, if we zoom in on the 'detection' box in the negative feedback loop diagrams, we need to make this box a bit more complex to make sense of what's going on in emotions. An innovation of mine is to describe the characteristic form that these representations take. I claim that emotions valently represent a contrast between the current state of affairs and some other state not in the here and now. For example, fear involves a representation of an upcoming harm (a temporal contrast), jealousy involves a representation someone else getting a good thing (a social contrast), and regret involves a representation of a bad thing that might not have happened (a modal contrast). Even surprise involves a contrast between expectations and reality (a basic kind of modal contrast). I call these situated concerns, to distinguish them from way that pains and pleasures track immediate harms and benefits. It is plausible that many nonhuman animals can represent at least some of these contrasts (i.e. by means of memory or imagination) and thus that we can allow for emotions in non-human animals. Note in particular that contrasts are a way to use structural features of cognition (e.g. the contrast between a percept and memory) to capture content, and thus eliminate the need for symbolic concepts. It is important to note that the representation of contrasts makes emotions more sophisticated than pains and pleasures because the subject is now oriented towards the wider context. This means that the subject can now serve his or her interests in a more contextually sensitive way, 5 I share this view with traditional appraisal theories in psychology. In this respect my theory is more cognitive in flavour compared to some recent theories, yet bodily responses are still playing a constitutive role in fixing what the emotions are about, and the evaluative manner the subject regards these objects. 9 thus making sense of the appearance of the emotional capacity from a selective point of view. Overall, my slogan definition is that emotions are 'valent representations of situated concerns'. This is the minimal requirement for all emotional states. A schema for fear Above I provide a schematic illustration for the emotion of fear. So in this case there is an underlying aversive negative feedback loop (on the left hand side). On top of this loop is built an additional node that detects when the presence of the harmful object is increasing. When this secondary node is activated, it triggers an avoidant response (e.g. to avoid an area where harms may be likely). In particular, this contextually sensitive response may be triggered prior to the avoidant response that would be triggered by the direct presence of the harm. This is because the 'increase' node can be triggered by a relatively low level of presence, whereas the direct avoidant response would require a stronger degree of presence. For example, suppose that the creature is sensitive to various signs associated with the presence of a harm, such as a certain smell. This smell is not yet strong enough to stimulate direct avoidance, but the mere fact of detecting an increasing presence is sufficient to motivate pre-emptive avoidance. Altogether we can (minimally) characterise each emotion in terms of three factors: i) whether the underlying valent representation is positive or negative; ii) the nature of the contrast structure involved (temporal, modal, or social) and; iii) the specific kind of response triggered (e.g. running away versus retching)which helps to specify the type of object. 10 4. Coping Potential A crucial difference between my theory and somaticist theories is that while I think bodily responses play a necessary role in emotions, I do not think the feelings of those changes are necessary for emotions. In particular, it is possible to have an emotion where one is unconscious of one's bodily changes. However, I think bodily feelings play a supplementary role in capturing a distinct, though complementary sort of intentional content which I call emotional bodily feeling (see also my 2017 paper, which is an earlier version of chapter 4 of my book).6 While emotional bodily feelings are not necessary for emotions in general, they are necessary for some emotions, because they add an additional layer of control. The sophistication here is that by tracking one's automatically triggered bodily responses, and anticipating how well this bodily response can manage one's situation, one can then stimulate further responses that modulate or inhibit one's initial reaction. This is analogous to what psychologists like Klaus Scherer (2005) call 'coping potential'. In order to grasp the important role that this extra control level has, let us analyse the emotion of sadness. Sadness requires at least three control layers. First layer: we have an underlying concern. This can be either a positively valent attraction to something (e.g. your beloved), or a negatively valent aversion to something (e.g. being hit). Basic attractions and aversions do not require contrast representations. When the 'level' of the attractant is low, a response is simply triggered to increase the level. Second layer: We represent the attractant as lost (this is a temporal contrast) or an avoidant as gained. This representation automatically triggers a response to reduce the presence of the loss (so it's a negatively valent representation in that sense) by restoring the presence of the lost thing. 6 Indeed my account of emotional bodily feelings resembles Hufendiek's account of emotions, because we both take bodily feelings to represent the capacity of the body to deal with the situation. However, I believe that somaticist theories are overly focusing on this aspect of ordinary emotional experience and failing to properly recognize the work that quite sophisticated cognitive representation is doing in capturing intentional contents, prior to the experience of bodily responses. 11 Third layer: So far, this response is common to both anger and sadness, so we need a third layer to differentiate anger from sadness. The third layer is where the initial bodily response is represented, but then appraised as inadequate to restore the loss. This leads to a secondary response to inhibit the first set of responses, and to engage compensatory responses instead. That is, sadness is overall the valent representation of being unable to restore a loss. Meanwhile, anger is where you do feel powerful enough to meet the challenge, and you gear yourself precisely to do thisto get back the lost thing, or to remove barriers to getting it. However anger can burn itself out if, by trying, you find you can do absolutely nothing about itin which case I would expect the response to switch to sadness. I would also allow the following qualification to the above causal model for sadness. It seems possible that instead of fully triggering the initial restoration response, we simply prepare this response at a neural level. This may be sufficient to generate a bodily feeling, in line with what Antonio Damasio (2000) calls the 'as-if loop' of bodily feeling. It should also be sufficient to enable the individual's coping potential to be calculated, and the response accordingly modulated, prior to triggering useless restoration responses. However, I still claim that it is typical of sadness that an initial restorative response is triggered. For example, in the film Brokeback Mountain, there's a very moving scene at the end where Ennis embraces the shirt of his dead lover Jack. Ennis wants Jack, so he grasps at this token, but he's also keenly aware that he cannot get Jack back, and that is the core of his desperate sadness. A secondary, but I think significant consequence of this theory of coping potential is that it allows for an additional form of value on top of the experience of pleasure. Basically, when one anticipates or judges that one's responses are sufficient to deal with potential demands, one feels confident or powerful. Achieving this feeling can be an important source of motivation. 5. Social Emotions So far we have four control levels: valent representation, affect, contrast representations and coping potential. To make sense of the social emotions we need even more. Often when we think of social emotions we are thinking of particular emotions like jealousy, contempt, or gratitude. However, we should regard social emotionality as an additional layer of regulation 12 that sits on top of regular emotional states. On this view, most human emotions have a social aspect. To explain this, I once again I appeal to control theory. I claim that social emotions are a valent representation aimed at regulating a relationship. In particular, social emotions involve the regulation of what I call a group's 'affiliative status.' The affiliative status between two or more people is defined as a combination of their power relationship and their intimacy relationship. Our intimacy relationship is fixed by the range of things we are disposed to cooperate on (e.g. from bodily pleasures to paying the bills). Our power relationship characterises what we can expect from each other in terms of support (I might serve you more than you serve me). Thus I may have a relatively intimate and equal relationship with my wife, while I have a relatively distant and power-unbalanced relationship with my boss. A group's affiliative status can change over time, but crucially, members form expectations about how other members are supposed to act in conformity with it. This includes both the way we treat each other, and the attitudes we might expect ourselves to share towards events in the shared environment (e.g. finding the same things amusing, disgusting or annoying). Thus if my wife behaves in a way contrary to this expectation, I will respond emotionally in a way aimed at restoring the expected relationship. My wife may equally think that my behaviour fails to cohere with our affiliative status, and thus she may respond emotionally in kind. In this way a social-emotional negotiation will take place, and hopefully we will eventually end up on the same pageemotionally speaking. If not, this will probably lead to a change in our affiliative relationship. The principle mechanism by which social emotions function is via expressions in the face, voice and posture. I largely follow Mitchell Green (2007) in thinking that expressions signal to each other our emotional states for the sake of social negotiation (cf. behavioural ecology views). I supplement this with my analysis of emotional bodily feelings, that is, the experience we have of the bodily changes triggered in emotional states. Both when I trigger the various bodily changes associated with anger, and when I observe someone else doing the same thing, the same mechanism is involved in taking that pattern of responses to represent the capability and disposition of the agent to act in a certain way. For anger in particular, a reciprocal pattern of expressions allow agents to compare their relative preparedness to attack, and negotiate and establish their affiliative status without resorting to physical violence. 13 A crucial part of my account is that an affiliative status does not belong to the individual. No individual can unilaterally establish a settled relationship with anyone else. It has to be agreed by all parties involved. As a result, I argue that the regulative process must be understood as a collective phenomenon. I resist calling this social level of regulation a collective emotion (contra Margaret Gilbert 2000). I think we can do everything we need with the notion of social norms. These norms only exist at the social level, and thus there is something irreducibly collective going on. But we need not suppose the existence of group minds or group mental states. These social norms can moreover spread through a population, allowing for the development of cultural-emotional patterns. In retrospect I should have made more explicit connections in my book to the reactive attitude tradition in ethics, i.e. the idea we get from Peter Strawson that moral relationships are often a matter of feeling and expressing certain emotional states. I talk about social emotionality in larger groups in the book but I only briefly mention the moral community. Note in particular that when the group is larger than a dyad, you can have an emotion aimed at regulating the affiliative status of the group where one group member has harmed another group member, though you are not affected. In this way, my model of social emotions can apply to the resentment or sympathy we might feel for persons we have little contact with, but which are still members of the moral community. 6. Reason and emotion Reason and emotion are often supposed to be at odds with each other. From one perspective, our emotions are like unruly toddlers, demanding and whimsical, that need to be held in check by the adult intellect. From another perspective, the rational mind is cold and calculating and needs the warmth of the passions to grasp what really matters. I don't think that either of these perspectives, properly understood, is wrong. Where they are potentially confusing is if they suggest that emotions and reason are two separate sources of agency vying for supremacy. For instance, Plato encourages this confusion with his tripartite model of the soul (e.g. in The Republic). Kant does the same in the Critique of Practical Judgement (e.g. Bk.I, Ch.3) when he supposes that the rational grasp of moral imperatives can motivate action independently and even in rejection of our passionate impulses. 14 In contrast to Plato and Kant, we must remember that humans (and other animals) are single agents and we have not evolved the resources of emotion and reason to fight against each other, but to ever more effectively protect the things we care about. Given this consideration, I think the correct thing to say is that reason elaborates emotion. That is, it's yet another layer of control. Most philosophers and psychologists of emotion agree that emotions have a descriptive function (alongside their motivational function). Emotions inform us about the state of the worldthat it is dangerous, enviable, disgusting and so on. Naturally, the kinds of properties we are describing rely on the person caring about certain things; they are relative to the individual in this sense. But given that the person cares about certain things (e.g. the integrity of his body, the status of his loved ones) it can be entirely factual that a situation threatens or supports him. Now along comes the capacity for rational inference. This allows the emotions to massively expand their capacity to track the things the individual cares about, to check whether the initial emotional representation is accurate, to infer consequences, and have further emotions towards those consequences. This, I contend, is the main purpose of reason. At the same time, it is misleading to say that reason is slave to passions, as Hume famously declares in A Treatise of Human Nature. I claim that the motivational juice driving all cognition is drawn from our underlying homeostatic regulation systems. Emotions are one cognitive resource for elaborating these systems while rational inferences are a further resource. This means that one concern-regulating system can overrule another, where the first is rationally elaborated and the second is not. The resulting experience can be one where we rationally infer that acting impulsively (say to run away from giving an important speech) could destroy one's reputation and we accordingly stop ourselves. Thus there is room for motivational conflict, but nothing so simple as reason controlling emotion. We could as easily say that one emotion is controlling another emotion here, or that one kind of thinking is controlling another kind of thinking. 7. Character One final layer of control is required before we have a reasonably complete picture of our emotional lives. This is character. I analyse character as essentially the combination of the 15 individual's sentiments. Sentiments are basically long-term attitudes that we bear towards specific individuals, institutions or causes; that is, the things that we love or hate. The important difference that such sentiments make is in making an individual prioritise the regulation of certain concerns over others, in ways that can allow other emotional processes to be overruled. For example, when I love my children, I prioritise their flourishing over most other concerns. For instance, I may act to protect them even when it compromises my own safety. So the fear for my safety can be overruled by the concern for my children. The most distinctive cognitive feature of sentiments is that they require us to track unique individuals, not just general types of aversive or attractive situations. Tracking unique individuals is, I argue, our most sophisticated representational activity. In particular, it necessitates that we generate a narrative history about the individual. These narrative histories pick out individuals so uniquely that they could not be replaced by another individual with the same set of qualities. The replacements lack the same history. Once we understand the way that love uniquely tracks individuals we can make sense of longterm emotions like grief. Peter Goldie (2012) uses to example of grief to defend his narrative model of emotions, because he thinks there is no essential emotional response or representation (instead we have different stages of grief that we link together). However, I argue that we can treat grief as a control process in fundamentally the same manner as other emotions. The key complication of grief over sadness is that the underlying concern attaches to a unique individual. Because the attachment is to a unique individual, this makes it impossible for the usual response to either restore or compensate the loss. Thus a slow process is required where the control system has to gradually learn to no longer seek the presence of the loved one. The changes in strategy will correspond to the different stages of grief. Finally, note that character is not the same as personality. I provide a characterisation of personality in the book in terms of general strategies that individuals develop to regulate their concerns. These strategies standardly combine the sensitivity to a certain concern, say one's social relationships, with capacities, say one's capacity to empathise with others. Like character, personality serves to individuate people, since some people are more sensitive and more capable of regulating certain values than others. Moreover, personality traits are typically stable over the long term. However personality operates at all levels of regulation, so it is not a distinct layer of control in the same way as character. 16 8. A control theory of the mind Overall, in my book The Emotional Mind, I try to show how the incredibly complex range of activities going on in our emotional lives all fit together. The picture I provide is of one elaboration building on another. This, I think, helps us to see that there is some order in the chaos of our emotional lives. The final chapter of my book is on mental architecture. This is where propose a control theory of the mind as a whole. It is perhaps the most ambitious and speculative chapter of a book that is probably already too ambitious for its own good. I am trying to fit together all the various mental processes that I have analysed up to that point (homeostatic processes, pains and pleasures, emotions, bodily feelings, social emotions, emotion driven thinking, and character traits). At the foundations of the mental architecture I propose lie the valent representations; basic negative feedback control mechanisms that track simple properties and automatically trigger regulative responses. As we evolve more sophisticated ways to represent information, new types of affective state emerge. The basic idea is that new kinds of state elaborate the fundamental control structure, each new level building incrementally upon the last. Thus representational sophistications develop for the sake of guiding our regulative processes more effectively. The more purely descriptive cognitive and perceptual functions are by-products of these developments. In more detail, I outline the specific levels in the development of mental architecture, corresponding to the different affective states that I analyse over the course of the book. Here is where the theory is most tentative, but it follows a general logic of how complexity develops step by step. That is, we need cognition of a certain complexity to be in place before cognition of a slightly greater complexity can plausibly emerge. Key to the development of cognitive complexity, in my view, is the interaction and competition between multiple valent representations. First they inhibit each other. That is, the triggering of one valent representation prevents another valent representation from launching a conflicting response. Then valent representations start to associatively support each other, probably 17 because some properties or the responses they trigger are more mutually compatible than others. Mutually supporting systems are motivated by the need to overcome the inhibitions of competing systems. The next step in complexity is the formation of higher-level representations. Higher-level representations infer structures or objects behind first-order appearances (cf. connectionist approaches). They go beyond the mere bundles of properties that association captures. I claim that the model of affect I have outlined, in which 'failure' and 'success' of regulation is represented, is the first higher-order representation. It is higher-order because it represents objects and the individual's own responses as bearing a relationship with each other. This is not a simple appearance. As mentioned above, affect also plays a special role in assigning attention, thus again serving the competition between valent representational systems. Emotions then involve a further sophistication, since they involve not just a representation of states of affairs, but a comparison between the current state of affairs and some other state (e.g. in the past or future). Emotional bodily feelings and our awareness of the emotions of others via their expressive behaviour are the next step, involving a simulation of how an agent may behave in the future. This allows new kinds of calculations to be performed where the individual contrasts their emotional state with the emotions of others, or represents them as coordinated in some respectas in social emotional regulation. The next steps involve the development of symbolic reference and inference rules. This is of course a major development of mind and even in the book I can only roughly sketch how it fits into the architecture. A basic idea is that once we have social-emotional norms, we are coordinating our references to the world, and we thereby have the beginnings of shared symbolic references to the world. For example, the shared expression of disgust comes to symbolically reference the disgusting object. However, when it comes to mental architecture, I think a whole new series of developments in representational sophistication build upon the basic foundation of symbolic thinking. I entertain the possibility that the developments in complexity in our symbolic/inferential capacities parallel the prior development of complexity in affective states. 18 Finally, as described in the previous section, the capacity to generate narrative histories allows us to track unique individuals and to prioritise their well-being over more general or short-term situations. The full table of steps is provided below. In each case I specify i) the kind of property or object that is targeted; ii) the representational sophistication required to target this property or object; iii) the kind of affective state this object is tracked by; iv) and descriptive states of mind that emerge as by-products (such as regular perception that doesn't directly trigger a regulative response). This precis is too compressed to fully make sense of all these levels, but hopefully it can give readers a sense of how the major functions of the mind might be incorporated in this architecture. The book ends with an appendix on emotion dimensions, which concerns the key ways in which we distinguish emotions from each other. Seven dimensions are outlined: valence, power, temporal orientation, probability, social connectedness, temporal duration, and generality.7 The reader may note that all of these concepts have been mentioned at one point or another in the above precis. The combination of these dimensions allows us to differentiate extremely finely 7 This summarises an earlier publication of mine (Cochrane 2009), though in that article I outlined 8 dimensions, and now there is only 7 (I dropped the dimension of freedom). 19 between emotion types and even to map emotional nuances in art and literature that lack linguistic labels in English. References Aydede, M. (2014). How to Unify Theories of Sensory Pleasure: An Adverbialist Proposal. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 5(1), 119-133. Bain, D. (2013). What makes pains unpleasant? Philosophical Studies, 166(1), 69-89. Barlassina, L. & Newen, A. (2013). The Role of Bodily Perception in Emotion: In Defense of an Impure Somatic Theory. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 89(3), 637-678. Brady, M. S. (2013). Emotional Insight: The Epistemic Role of Emotional Experience. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Clark, A. (1997). Being there: Putting brain, body, and world together again. Cambridge, MA: MIT press. Cochrane, T. (2017). The double intentionality of emotional experience. European Journal of Philosophy, 25(4), 1454-1475. Cochrane, T. (2009). Eight Dimensions for the Emotions. Social Science Information, 48(3), 379-420. Damasio, A. R. (2000). The Feeling of What Happens: Body, emotion and the making of consciousness. London: Vintage. Deonna, J. A. & Teroni, F. (2012). The Emotions: A philosophical introduction. Oxford: Routledge. Frijda, N. H. (1986). The Emotions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 20 Gilbert, M. (2000). Sociality and Responsibility: New essays in Plural Subject Theory. Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield publishers. Goldie, P. (2012). The Mess Inside: Narrative, emotion, and the mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Green, M. S. (2007). Self-Expression. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hufendiek, R. (2016). Embodied Emotions: A Naturalist Approach to a Normative Phenomenon. New York: Routledge. Millikan, R. G. (1995). Pushmi-pullyu representations. Philosophical perspectives,9, 185-200. Prinz, J. (2004). Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of Emotion. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Salmela, M. (2011). Can Emotion Be Modelled on Perception? Dialectica, 65(1), 1-29. Scherer, K. (2005). What are emotions and how can they be measured? Social Science Information, 44(4), 695-729. Strawson, P. F. (1962). Freedom and Resentment. Proceedings of the British Academy, 48, 1– 25.

Information in Biology: A Fictionalist Account1 Arnon Levy Department of Philosophy, Harvard University FORTHCOMING IN NOÛS 1. Introduction A striking feature of contemporary biology is the prominence of semantic concepts, especially concepts that have to do with information and communication. Biologists speak of codes and signals, transcription and translation, even of editing and proof-reading. Such notions have a home in descriptions of interactions among intentional agents, but they are nowadays routinely invoked in descriptions of metabolism, physiology and development. Recent decades have seen great strides in our understanding of the chemical and physical basis of life, but the tendency to view biological processes through an informational lens has anything but subsided. This is a puzzling situation: What is biological information? What does it mean to say that cells communicate or that molecules are signals? Does the appeal to informational notions have a genuine theoretical role in biology, and if so what is it? 1 I wish to pay special thanks to Peter Godfrey-Smith for many discussions of information in biology, and for reading a number of earlier versions of this paper. I have greatly benefited from exchanges with Yemima Ben-Menachem, Liz Camp, David Haig, Ned Hall, Daniela Helbig, Nick Shea and Michael Weisberg and from written comments from two anonymous referees for Noûs. 2 Increasingly over the past decade or so, philosophers and philosophically-minded biologists have discussed these questions (Godfrey-Smith & Sterelny, 2008, provide a recent review). For the most part, debate has centered on the role of inherited information in developmental biology – the common but controversial idea that genes code for or supply information for the making of an adult. Information and related notions are certainly prominent in developmental genetics, but appeals to such notions occur regularly in other parts of biology. The role of non-genetic factors in development, the activity of hormones in adults, the exchange of factors between nearby cells – I discuss these examples below – as well as a variety of other cell-level processes are typically explained in terms of signaling and communication. The central goal of this paper is to provide a general view of informational notions in biology, one that takes into account their full range of application. The account I'll develop is a fictionalism of sorts, but one that is intended to illuminate the function of informational concepts in biology rather than deflating them. On the one hand I claim that given the range and character of appeals to informational notions, the most plausible interpretation is that they are fictional – metaphors rather than descriptions that are grounded in genuine semantic properties of cells and macromolecules. However, I will also argue that appeals to information bear theoretical weight by allowing us to reason via a fiction about real causal properties. On this view, invocations of information in biology are not literal descriptions but they are not rhetorical flourishes either. They play a genuine role in biological understanding. One important feature of informational language in biology is that its fictional status often passed undetected. Informational language is what we might call a liminal metaphor – one that operates near the threshold of the noticeable. Liminality is not an uncommon feature of metaphorical language, especially in science. It can have utility when the goal of metaphorical description is not primarily aesthetic. By backgrounding the fact that one is not talking literally one gains a better grip on the insights provided by a metaphor. Nevertheless, I suspect that liminality accounts for some of the confusion surrounding 3 information, and for mistaken interpretations of molecular biology, on which I comment at the end of the paper. In this regard, I shall attempt to walk a tight line between taking information seriously as playing a real theoretical role and refraining from taking it too seriously by assigning it a foundational status in biology. Such a stance raises questions about the status of non-literal devices in science more generally. While a direct engagement with these questions goes beyond the scope of the present discussion, I think it is an important and largely neglected fact that there is a spectrum of literality in scientific discourse, and that a concept's position on this spectrum matters. A secondary goal of this paper is to call attention to a class of scientific concepts that resides somewhere in between the fully literal and the merely ornamental. I begin, in the next section, by reviewing the main themes of the existing debate over information. Section 3 describes some cases of informational explanations outside of genetics. In sections 4 and 5, I argue that existing accounts are unable to handle these cases, and I motivate a fiction-based view. Sections 6 and 7 describe the account I favor in more detail. In closing, I address ways of taking information too seriously, and connect the case of information in biology to the more general issue of the role of fictions in science. 2. The State of the Debate In thinking about development, professionals and laymen alike commonly treat genes as providing the information for adult form. In contrast, other factors are usually thought of as raw materials or as background conditions. Susan Oyama's book The Ontogeny of Information (1985), prompted a number of philosophers to argue that this dichotomy is untenable and that there is no distinct sense in which genes 4 carry developmental information. There seems to be a general agreement that genetic coding, the mapping of DNA base triplets onto the amino acids that constitute proteins, is a legitimate and important theoretical concept. The critics' claim is that a richer, semantic sense of genetic information cannot be rescued from biological usage, nor is it necessary for explaining development. Indeed critics generally think that appeals to information are detrimental. Sarkar (1996) and Griffiths (2001) have argued that lack of care in the use of informational concepts leads to widespread misunderstandings of the explanatory structure of molecular biology: It encourages the belief that phenotypes can be ―readoff‖ genes in a bottom-up manner. Furthermore, some hold that attributing an informational role to genes lends spurious support to genetic determinism (Griffiths, 2006). There exists a highly developed mathematical theory of information, pioneered by Claude Shannon (1948). But most authors who have written on the topic agree that Shannon's notion is not the relevant one here. It is worth recounting – in a brief and non-technical way – why. Shannon's theory allows that anything can be a source of information so long as it has a range of distinct states. One state carries information about another provided that the two are correlated. Information theorists then say that the two states are connected by a channel along which signals are transmitted. Intuitively, an information channel allows the receiver to learn about the state of the sender by consulting the signal. Information theory provides quantitative measures for the amount of information contained in a signal, the capacity of channels, the efficiency of particular coding and transmission schemes and related matters. These tools can be useful in biology, especially in bioinformatics, where large amounts of data pertaining to genes and proteins are analyzed. But in these contexts the apparatus of information theory is used as data analysis tool: Bioinformaticians treat an available data set as carrying information about some process or structure of interest – the structure of a protein, for instance, or the topology of a regulatory network. They are not using information in an explanatory account, as a way of saying what genes do or how they do it. And for good reason. Genes carry Shannon information but so does any 5 other factor that reliably affects protein structure (such as temperature). Genes may carry more information, but if information is understood along Shannon lines, their role isn't qualitatively different. In contrast, the use of informational terminology that is under debate is meant to distinguish genes from other developmental factors. Genes are said to carry developmental information whereas food, also a crucial ingredient in development, doesn't. In accounting for this explanatory use Shannon's notion is of no avail.2 Accepting that Shannon-information isn't the way to go, ―advocates‖ of information have mostly opted for a teleosemantic account (Sterelny, Smith and Dickison, 1996; Maynard Smith 2000; Sterelny 2000; Shea 2007). This view seeks to ground inherited information in natural selection. It relies on the idea that we can think of products of natural selection as having a function, and furthermore that under certain conditions functions can ground ascriptions of content. On the teleosemantic view, genes carry information about (or for) the structure they encode in virtue of being selected for producing that structure.3 Of course, many biological structures have a function but are not information carriers – wings are for flying but they do not carry information about flying. So some further element has to be added to this picture. Maynard Smith (2000) and Sterelny (2000) argue that informational factors are those selected structures that exhibit an arbitrary relation to their effects. Modeled after the relation between words and their referents, the idea is that to have genuine semantic content the structure of a putative signal must be largely unconstrained by the structure of the message; just as the structure of 'table' is largely unconstrained by the structure of tables. If the structure of the message' is too closely connected to the structure of the signal,' we have chemistry or physics and not semantics. It is hard to make this 2 Information theory is put to use in some parts of neuroscience, especially in computational neuroscience (Nelson 2007; Rieke et al. 1996) but these uses are beyond the purview of the present discussion. 3 The teleosemantic view can be seen as an instance of a more general teleosemantic theory of content, as developed by Millikan (1984) and others. But most authors in the present debate have not explicitly drawn on the more general framework. 6 notion of arbitrariness sufficiently clear. One worry is that any effect may seem arbitrary if there are enough causal links separating it from some salient cause (Godfrey-Smith, 2000). Another is that the kind of contingency that is supposed to ground arbitrariness (especially in the paradigm case of the genetic code) isn't essentially different from the historical contingency characteristic of any product of natural selection (Stegmann, 2004). Nicholas Shea (2007) has suggested a more complex teleosemantic view which shifts the locus of function to the level of the inheritance system as a whole – in the case of genes, to the function of the system of genetic inheritance. Shea argues that informational factors in development are those factors that, on an evolutionary time-scale, carry Shannon-information about their outcomes and are elements of an evolved system of inheritance. An inheritance system is an evolved structure consisting of a sender, a consumer and a range of intermediates that coordinate the states of sender and consumer. In such a system intermediates carry (at least a rudimentary form of) content, and it can give rise to ascriptions of information. The heart is not part of an inheritance system so, like most evolved structures, it isn't an information carrier. Genes, on the other hand, as well as some kinds of non-genetic factors such as chromatin marks (Jablonka and Lamb, 1995) are intermediates in an evolved system of inheritance, so we can treat them as carriers of inherited information. It appears that the teleosemantic view, in one version or another, is the most promising option on the table. But I'll argue it cannot be the whole or even the main story about information in biology. We have seen that the teleosemantic view arises in the context of genes and development. As I've noted, informational notions occur in many other areas of biology. Paying attention to this broader range of cases tells against the teleosemantic account. I'll explain why in section 4; first let me describe a few key examples. 7 3. Information Outside of Genetics The first example comes from developmental biology, but is not directly related to genes. It concerns morphogens and ―positional information‖ (Wolpert, 2006). Many animals exhibit a basic division of the body into axes: dorsoventral (back-belly), anterior-posterior (mouth-anus) and lateral (left-right). Axis formation is a very early step in the assignment of spatial identities to the body's different parts. A basic question facing developmental biologists, here as in other early pattern formation processes, is: How do different parts of the embryo differentiate in a location-specific manner? Or, as it is sometimes put: How do embryonic cells know where they are? One important mechanism involves the delivery of positional information by morphogen gradients. A morphogen is typically a transcription factor. Its impact, the particular set of developmental genes that it regulates, depends on its concentration in the immediate vicinity of the cell or within it. In axis specification, morphogens act by forming a concentration gradient along the relevant axis – e.g., highest near the dorsal end and decreasing ventrally. As different genes get transcribed in response to different concentrations of the morphogen, cells along the gradient develop into distinct types and an axis is formed.4 Thus, cells know where they are because they are sensitive to morphogen concentrations, and these map onto location. This important developmental mechanism is typically described by saying that morphogens are signals that supply embryonic cells with positional information. Next, consider hormones. Some hormones act in development, but many don't. In explanations of hormonal activity the language of information and communication is ubiquitous. Hormones are practically defined as signals that coordinate the activity of non-neighboring cells. Typically they are produced by a gland somewhere in the body, say in the brain or in the pancreas, then secreted into the 4 This is perhaps the simplest case. Complex gradients, and interactions between the gradient and cell-level activities are also important. In addition, responders are sometimes nuclei within a multi-nucleated cell (syncitium) – a common situation early in insect development – but the principle is the same. 8 blood stream. Hormones bind to receptors at the target cell and exert their effects, typically metabolic regulation, either directly or via modulating transcription. The action of these receptors is often described in terms of ―perception‖ or ―interpretation‖.5 Once bound to a receptor, a hormone activates a chain of reactions that regulates metabolism either directly or via ―signal transduction cascades‖ that affect transcription. The last example concerns local cell-cell communication. Gap junctions are molecular ring-shape structures that are embedded in membranes, creating a narrow fluid-filled channel that connects the cytoplasm of neighboring cells (Evans et al., 2002) . Gap junctions enable ions and other small molecules to diffuse between adjacent cells. Or, as this is often described, they allow signals to travel between cells, and information to be shared or transferred (Alberts et al. 2002, 835). Note that gap junctions are too narrow for ―sequence‖ molecules such as RNA, enzymes or structural proteins to move through them; the signals are typically small charged species such as ions or peptides. Gap junctions play a part in coordinating the activities of cells within a tissue by allowing rapid transmission of non-genetic signals. Though my description of these examples has been brief, I think it enables us to point to two important features of the language of communication and information. First, it is ubiquitous, occurring in various parts of cellular and molecular biology. DNA and the role of genes in ontogeny are described in informational terms, but so are phenomena quite far removed from genes or development. Second, information is typically invoked in the course of offering mechanistic explanations. A precise notion of mechanistic explanation is not required here (see, e.g. Machamer et al., 2000); suffice it to note that information and related intentional notions usually figure in explanations that show why a certain organ 5 For instance, in a recent review of hormonal regulation of development in plants, Chow and McCourt state that to understand the role of simple organic molecules that serve as hormonal signals in plants, ―first requires an understanding of how they are perceived‖ (2006, 1998). 9 or cellular structure exhibits a certain property or behavior by describing its internal organization and the ordered interaction among its constituent parts. Mechanistic explanation is proximal, i.e. the explanans are non-historical facts that have to do with the causal relations between elements of the system being explained – it is an explanation that appeals to what's ―under the hood.‖ As we shall see in the next section, both the ubiquity of informational language and the fact that it is typically employed in mechanistic explanations are directly relevant to an evaluation of the teleosemantic view. 4. The Inadequacy of the Teleosemantic View Shannon's notion will not, as noted, explain the role of informational language in biology. Nor, of course, will a simple reference to function: It won't distinguish hormones or genes from other evolved body parts. This is what drives more sophisticated teleosemantic accounts to posit further conditions. The result is to narrow down the list of potential informational factors. But the sophisticated accounts are motivated by cases of inheritance, and it is doubtful that they can be made to fit the wider set of cases in which informational descriptions are employed. Shea's account requires that the informational factors be part of a system of inheritance. But while some morphogens are maternally inherited, others are not. Hormones are not typically inherited, and neither are gap-junction-mediated signals. In terms of evolved functions, these factors seem more like the heart than the genome. If we turn instead to Sterelny's and Maynard Smith's notion of arbitrariness – which rests on shaky grounds anyway – it is unclear whether it applies to the relation between signaling molecules and receptors, often a subtle structural match that underlies a specific biomechanical transformation in the receptor. And one may worry that the appearance of an arbitrary connection between, say, insulin and the message it carries (roughly: increase glucose metabolism) is an artifact of the causal distance – the number of links in the causal chain separating them. Nor does it seem that the relation between a flow of ions through a gap 10 junction, and a resultant change in a cell's electrical potential, meets the arbitrariness criterion. This is unsurprising, as these do not appear to be the kinds of cases Sterelny or Maynard Smith had in mind – they were generalizing from features of DNA. Another, deeper, source of trouble for the teleosemantic view has to do with the way it portrays the type of explanations in which information figures. On the teleosemantic view informational notions occur in functional explanations – which proceed by appeal to what informational factors are for. By function' is meant evolved function, i.e. the effect for which the factor in question was selected. Importantly, such functional explanations are distinct from proximal-mechanistic explanations. Shea is explicit on this point. He contrasts the role of information carriers according to the teleosemantic account with ―stage-by-stage description[s] of the causal processes‖ underlying the phenomenon in question (2007, 317). Thus, if the why question addressed by appeals to information is something like: Why does gene g give rise to protein p?,' and the answer given by biologists is that g carries the information for p, then on the teleosemantic account this is a way of saying (roughly speaking) that g was selected for giving rise to p.6 Similarly, in the case of morphogens the explanation for why a morphogen m specifies the dorsoventral axis is said to be that it carries positional information which is interpreted by cells. On the teleosemantic account this is a way of saying that m's selected function is to cause dorsoventral differentiation. Now, it is very likely true, at least in many cases, that genes and morphogens have evolved functions. But it appears that biologists do not use informational notions to describe these functions. For the most part, ―stage-by-stage‖ mechanistic descriptions are exactly where one finds appeals to communication and information. Genes give rise to proteins in the here and now by supplying information in the form of a coding sequence – this is a way of pointing to the properties of 6 On Shea's more subtle account this is a way of saying that g is an intermediate in a system of inheritance that carries some relevant bit of Shannon-information. The basic point I am making, however, holds for this account too. What makes something an inheritance system is its evolved function. Furthermore, the signal carries Shannon-information in virtue of correlations that exists on an evolutionary time scale, as Shea emphasizes. 11 genes in virtue of which they play a key part in producing proteins. In saying that morphogens supply positional information to embryonic cells, developmental biologists take themselves to be describing the mechanism of axis formation (Wolpert et al., 2002, a widely-used developmental biology textbook, is very explicit on this point. See pp. 19-20). Furthermore, the evidence sought to confirm that a particular morphogen is a positional signal – e.g. that its absence results in abnormal axis formation – also suggests that a proximal mechanistic explanation, rather than a distal selection-based one, is at work. Thus, a central idea behind teleosemantic accounts, the idea that informational descriptions explain via implicit reference to evolved function, seems to ill-match the role information plays in many actual cases. Taken together, I think these arguments cast serious doubt on the teleosemantic view. 5. Motivating a Fiction-Based Account There are at least three motivations for thinking that informational language in biology should not be treated literally. The first lies in the fact that a literal understanding of information does not seem forthcoming. Shannon-information is not relevant to the problem, whereas the favored view in the field, the teleosemantic view, loses much of its plausibility when the full range and mechanistic character of informational discourse comes into view. Of course, it is possible that a different literal account will eventually be offered. But as matters stand this does not seem likely. Second, as Alexander Rosenberg (1986, 2006) has noted, ascriptions of information in biology appear, at least in some cases, to differ from ordinary intensional contexts in that they are not opaque: They allow truth-preserving substitution of co-referring terms. Rosenberg makes this claim as part of a defense of a reductionist, gene-centered view of development. Questions about reductionism are largely orthogonal to the present discussion, but I think Rosenberg's observation can be recruited for my 12 purposes as well. It suggests that the description of genes (and possibly other factors) as content-bearing is a thin one, and not a full-blown ascription of intentional properties. The third motivation is textual: The wording of explanations invoking information often suggests that information is used non-literally. As an illustration, consider the following quote from Alberts et al., the ―king‖ of cell biology textbooks. The authors review the activity of Dorsal, a morphogen that specifies the dorsoventral axis in Drosophila. They sum-up by stating: Thus, the regulatory DNA can be said to interpret the positional signal provided by the Dorsal protein gradient, so as to define a dorsoventral series of territories – distinctive bands of cells that run the length of the embryo (2004, 1184; italics in the original). Notice how informational language is hedged by the use of italics, and by the phrase ―...can be said to.‖ Such a tone is not uncommon, although rarely is a non-literal interpretation made explicit. This strongly suggests that something akin to a metaphorical mode of description is being employed. This situation is not surprising – taking information talk to be non-literal is, in a way, the most natural way to take it. After all, why attribute to submicroscopic molecular structures the ability to mean anything, let alone to send and receive messages? The puzzle arises because biologists commonly talk this way, and appear to be talking seriously. Both observations, I think, are true: Information-talk is serious but it isn't literally true. On the account I'll offer, explanations involving information operate indirectly via a fiction. The activity of genes, hormones, morphogens and other factors is described as if it were a process of communication in which a sender transmits a signal that regulates a receiver's behavior. Informational descriptions are telling us something about the causal role that genes, for instance, or morphogens, play. But they do so not by attributing full-blown intentional and semantic 13 properties to cells and molecules, but by using a schema associated with information and its communication (in their ordinary senses) so as to bring to the fore coarse-grained causal properties of the processes in question. Since it is used in a fictional mode, the decision to apply an informational description is not a forced one: Genes or hormones are not objectively signals. However, the causal features which informational language provides access to are not fictional. The following sections will flesh out this fictionalist view in several steps. 6. The Pretense Theory of Fiction An attractive way of understanding fiction and metaphor is found in Kendal Walton's pretense theory of fiction (Walton, 1990). Walton's theory is primarily aimed at explaining representational art, but it can be extended and applied to cover other fiction-involving uses of language such as metaphor and idiom (Walton, 1993; Egan, 2008). For present purposes I will not attend to the distinction between metaphor and related kinds of fiction (and I'll use the terms interchangeably). All we need is a way of understanding how a non-literal use of language allows one to track real, true facts. The pretense theory models fiction on games of make-believe of the sort played by children – directed acts of the imagination, often coordinated among several individuals. In such games there is a set of rules – often implicit – that determines what is to count as true in the game. Walton calls these principles of generation.' Principles of generation instruct participants what it is that they are to pretend when playing the game. In particular, principles of generation often specify what one is to imagine in response to certain non-fictional facts. In the game of cops and robbers, for instance, there is a principle of generation that implies that if I point my index finger at you, my thumb sticking out and the 14 remaining fingers folded, while exclaiming ―bang bang‖, then, fictionally, I have shot you. If we are pretending that clouds are animals, then the shape of a cloud in the sky might make it the case that a reindeer is approaching. Thus, what's true in the fiction may depend, in quite particular ways, on facts in the non-fictional world because the relevant principles of generation specify what participants in the game are to imagine in response to such facts. One important upshot of this is that one can learn real-world facts by consulting fictions. If we are imagining that tree stumps are bears and you say ―wow, check out that huge bear,‖ I can infer, without bothering to look, that there is a large tree stump around. Some metaphors work this way too: I may describe Italy as a boot in order to indicate that Lecce is on the heel. Or, to choose an example closer to the present discussion, I might think of an organism's phenotype as lying in a fitness valley in order to reason about available evolutionary possibilities. In such cases, the fiction is constructed so that what is fictionally true corresponds to what is true simpliciter. Since the fiction employs a familiar setup that makes it easier to handle, we use an indirect route and make fictional statements as a way of reasoning about the real world. To use a tracking metaphor, we use a fictional set-up to track nonfictional truths. Information in biology, I propose, is a pretense of exactly this kind. Biologists metaphorically describe molecules and cells as engaged in communication and information sharing. Such descriptions invoke games of make believe in which participants are to imagine the relevant elements – genes, hormones, cells or whole organs – as if they were sending and receiving messages. Correctly read, this is a way of saying what these elements really are doing. Moreover, applying an informational schema is a way of organizing the causal facts and highlighting particular aspects of a process that have explanatory significance. The pretense is valuable because it enables one to compactly describe and reason about these explanatory facts. The next section will explain which types of causal facts I have in mind and how an informational description organizes them. 15 7. The Theoretical Role of Information There is a generic kind of explanatory context in biology where one wishes to understand how the activity of one cell or structure is regulated by a distinct cell or structure, typically in a complex and adaptive manner. It is in these regulation contexts that one often finds informational language. For instance, many biology texts describe (up)regulation of glucose metabolism in something like the following way. Insulin is a signal that originates in the pancreas by a mechanism that is sensitive to increases in the concentration of glucose; it informs muscle cells that the level of glucose in the blood is high, and directs them to up-regulate the breakdown of glucose in response. On the present account this is a way of describing the coarse-grained causal structure of hormonal action by means of a metaphor according to which pancreatic β-cells communicate with muscle tissue as if the two were intentional agents. We are familiar with the general features of such interactions and have facility in reasoning with them. Likewise with morphogens, in gap-junction mediated signaling and in DNA transcription (I'll return in more detail to these cases below). Invoking an informational pretense consists in treating one element of a causal interaction as a sender, another as a recipient and an intermediate factor as a signal that informs the recipient of some state and/or induces in it an appropriate response.7 In particular, an informational description typically foregrounds a causal pattern with the following features: Directionality. Communication involves designating a sender, a receiver and a direction of influence – from sender to receiver. The directionality in question might be spatial or temporal (most often, both). In biological cases signaling often occurs across an external-internal border, where the recipient, at least, lies within some enclosed space such as a nucleus, a cell or a particular organ. But in genetic regulation and in some cases of local positive or negative feedback loops, one spatiotemporal 7 The distinction between a descriptive representation and an imperative one may be blurry or even nonexistent in simple types of communication systems (Millikan, 1995). 16 part of a process or entity might signal to another – like writing on one's hand as a reminder to a future self. Thus treating some process as an instance of communication typically involves describing the location in time or space of the sender and implies that causal influence runs in a particular direction. Connecting variation. Communication is a way of maintaining a correspondence between variable states of two distinct parts of a system – the receiver changes state as a function of a change on the sender's end. Moreover, it does so in a pre-specified manner, according to what may be thought of as a rule of interpretation. Thinking in terms of an interpretive rule allows one to focus on the connection between the changes at the ends of the causal chain while de-emphasizing intermediate links. An informational description of hormones may highlight the connection between the level of a nutrient and metabolic activity by describing metabolizing cells as interpreting the hormonal signal according to a rule that specifies (e.g.) to elevate metabolism in response to a decrease in signal molecules. Such a description brackets much of the underlying detail of how the correspondence is maintained, but it gains a transparency in pointing to how an overall systematic connection is achieved. Active vs. passive. Designating a certain process as involving communication or information transfer serves to highlight the active character of sender and receiver versus the passive character of the signal. Active and passive here are used metaphorically, I suppose. I intend them to refer to those parts of the system that undergo substantial change in contrast to those that stay relatively static. Knowing which parts of a system do not change is often very informative. The activity of hormones illustrates this picture nicely. Typically, hormonal signaling molecules are sent by a gland in one part of the body, say in the brain or the liver. The signal is carried by the blood stream to its destination. Once bound to the recipient it either activates a ―secondary messenger‖ or enters the cell itself, upor down-regulating metabolism. Hormone molecules remain relatively unchanged in the process whereas the gland and the target tissue change states. Describing this as if it 17 were a case of signaling singles out the variation in the state of the sender (or the bodily parameter it is sensitive to, such as nutrient level) and how a corresponding metabolic activity occurs on the receiving end. The morphogen case has a similar structure. The positional signal travels across the cell membrane (often, across the nuclear membrane as well) inwards to the receiver. It connects variation in the cell's location with changes in developmental fate. Metaphorically, this is described as the morphogen informing the cells as to their location, and the cells employing an interpretion rule to differentiate accordingly.8 The fictional description tends to portray the morphogen as static while responding cells undergo substantial change. DNA transcription shares some important features with hormones and morphogens, although it is a case somewhat unto itself. A signal in the form of a coding sequence is sent from the nucleus to the ribosomal machinery in the cell cytoplasm (or on the exterior of the nucleus). The ribosome then synthesizes a protein on the basis of the sequence, interpreting it in accordance with the genetic code. Here too the sequence stays largely intact while the ribosome is active, and here too there is correspondence between variation in sequence and the activity of the ribosome. But there are differences. The main one is that in the case of DNA it is not entirely clear who the sender is. Indeed it is not clear that there is a sender. We could designate the DNA itself as the sender and mRNA as the signal. But that would be to over-emphasize the differences between these molecules. We could speak of parents – or ancestors more generally – as senders. To some extent this might capture the role of inherited factors in development.9 But treating ancestors as senders does not seem correct in the case DNA transcription in adults. It appears that the role of the sender is less significant in this case. Perhaps 8 For some very explicit uses of this language see Gurdon & Bourillot, 2001; Ashe & Briscoe, 2006 9 But not fully: maternally inherited proteins, morphogens included, are often contrasted with genetic material in being a form of maternal control over development. 18 this is because the signal is maintained in the cell throughout its life and used continuously. It appears more appropriate, within an informational description, to treat DNA as a repository of information and not so much as a sender, and indeed it is often so described. Notably, something similar occurs in the case of morphogens: The sender is often left unspecified, especially when morphogens are maternally transcribed and present in the egg. No doubt this has something to do with the fact that the sender is located, if at all, outside the organism in question. This does not mean that the sender is non-existent but perhaps explains why its role is de-emphasized. As it is far and unlocalized it time and space, its state is less relevant to understanding the mechanics of the system presently described. At any rate, these cases show that informational metaphors have considerable flexibility, and may stray from their paradigmatic form in a particular explanatory context. Apart from foregrounding causal features of a specific biological system, informational descriptions have a bridging role too. As Jablonka (2002) emphasizes, describing a variety of systems – genes, hormones, morphogens – as engaged in information transfer allows one to compare and contrast their overall causal structure and behavior: what is the character of the signal, how is it sent, how does it exert its end-state effect, etc. These comparisons are useful in formulating hypotheses, conceiving of possible mechanisms, and communicating the big-picture among peers and in pedagogical contexts. I have provided some indications of when informational language occurs and which features of a causal process it highlights. But it should be stressed that there isn't, on my view, a set of conditions under which informational language is uniquely appropriate. Many biological processes can be shoehorned into an informational mold – digestion could, if one really wanted, be described as a process in which food molecules are a signal received by the digestive tract. But biologists do not describe digestion this way. It is not easy to say why the language of information and communication is applied in some contexts and not in others. One could focus on cases of regulation or control, but I doubt that regulation' can be defined in a satisfying manner. Presumably, there is a mixture of reasons underlying 19 the decision to employ an informational description. To some extent it has to do with the structure and complexity of the phenomenon, but pragmatic considerations surely play an important role too. Sometimes those aspects that are highlighted by an informational description are not the ones we care to highlight. Sometimes they are uninteresting, or already well-understood. These are good reasons but they mostly have to do with the interests of scientists rather than with objective properties of organisms. That said, it is important to distinguish the reasons for opting for an informational set-up from the status of statements made within it. Once an informational description is found to be helpful and is put to use, there are definite standards of correctness within the fiction it invokes. These standards are answerable to the real features of the process being described. In glucose regulation the pancreas (and not the adrenal or pineal glands) is the sender; muscle cells (and few if any other cell types) are receivers; insulin (not one of the hundreds of other hormones in our body) is the signal; and the message is: glucose levels are up, break glycogen' (and not, say, increase heart rate and reduce digestion'). This is significant, for it shows that once a specific informational framework is in place, it allows us to capture objective properties of the process in question. If one treats the process by which the pancreas controls glucose metabolism in informational terms, one is then obliged to designate the pancreas as a sender, insulin as the signal and so on. In other words, one may choose to view the process as an instance of intra-bodily communication, but it is not up to one what (informational) description the various elements should then receive. This is because the informational language serves as a way of pointing to the real (literally true) causal roles of those elements – the directionality of the process and other features described above. These features are independent of one's choice of whether to employ an informational fiction, and they place constraints on claims made within it. Thus, while informational fictions are put to use on pragmatic and cognitive grounds, once they are invoked there is a right and a wrong in using them. In this sense, although biological information isn't, as it were, really out there, employing a fiction according to which what is out there is sending and receiving messages is a way of tracking the real 20 causal goings-on. 8. Taking Information Too Seriously My fictionalist proposal is motivated by the idea that even if we treat information non-literally we may still take it seriously and assign it a real role in biological understanding. But we shouldn't take it too seriously. If information is a metaphor then it is, after all, untrue that cells and molecules bear semantic content. Let me comment on two issues where this makes a difference. The ―metaphysics‖ of information. 20th-century molecular biology is sometimes taken to have made a fundamental ontological discovery, namely that genes and other informational factors constitute a distinct kind of entity populating the world. Indeed several eminent biologists have expressed such an attitude, suggesting a metaphysical split of sorts between the informational and the chemico-physical. G.C. Williams, for instance, speaks of a ―codical domain‖ which exists alongside the material one.10 In a similar vein, John Maynard Smith and Eörs Szathmary (1999) - in a nontechnical, more reflective version of their seminal work on major transitions in evolution – speak of ―the dual nature of life...metabolic and informational‖ (p.11), and suggest that advances in molecular biology have given us a handle not only on inheritance and development, but also on metaphysics (they tie their discussion to the ideas of Aristotle, Descartes and Leibniz). Sydney Brenner, pioneer of molecular biology and Nobel laureate, has made similar claims. For instance, he states that in biological systems ―in addition to flows of matter and energy, there is also flow of information‖ (1999, 1964). For the most part, these claims about the ontological status of information are not defended in 10 Williams sometimes speaks of ―codices‖ as separate kinds of entities, at other times he seems to think of them as arising from a distinct level of description, and hints at a multiple realizability argument to buttress this idea (1992, ch. 2). If anything, this unclarity strengthens the present point. 21 detail. Information is accorded a prominent role in describing a total worldview, and the justification appears to lay in the prominence of informational notions within the practice of molecular and cellular biology. From a philosophical point of view, the justificatory gap is evident, and it is hard to shake the feeling that these biologists take an over-serious attitude toward information. If some form of materialinformational dualism is a plausible view, it is not because of recent molecular biology. However, if one accepts that informational things exist – as, in some form or other, it appears a literal reading of information implies – then it is difficult to say why. The fiction-based view explains what is wrong with a metaphysics of information, and obviates the inference from the theoretical role of informational descriptions to the existence of informational ―things‖. Informational notions have theoretical significance, but this should not lead us to reify them. Describing hormones or DNA as if they are involved in informational transactions facilitates causal understanding. Williams, Maynard Smith and other information enthusiasts are illicitly taking the cognitive success of information as the basis for an ontological commitment. Information and genetic determinism. Oyama (1985), Griffiths (2006) and others have criticized appeals to information in biology, in part out of a concern that informational discourse lends spurious support tor genetic determinism. Griffiths, for instance, thinks that describing genes in terms of information and communication tends to bring with it unwelcome inference habits. For example, he holds that viewing something as content-bearing leads us to neglect the context sensitivity of its effects. In the genetic case, the thought is that treating genes as carriers of messages obscured the fact that the content of this supposed message depends (so Griffiths thinks) as much on the environment as on the specific features of the gene – its sequence etc. Now, perhaps there is some truth to the observation that we tend to treat semantic content as context-insensitive. But I think the kind of inferences we are inclined to make when describing something as having content depends greatly on the status of that description. Physicists occasionally speak of particles in intentional terms (―the particle doesn't know 22 where it came from, it only cares about its present interactions‖), but such locutions, while helpful at times, are clearly metaphorical. They do not tempt us to outlandish conclusions about the mental states of particles. Similarly, once we take a clear stance according to which informational locutions in biology are fictional,11 our inclination to make some of the bad inferences that Griffiths and Oyama warn against should be weakened at the very least. One may resist genetic determinism while rejecting the inference from information to the inevitability of what's in the genes. 9. Conclusion My argument has been that in biology the language of information and communication is a liminal fiction, one that often escapes notice, but that it nonetheless bears theoretical weight by tracking a certain class of causal facts. It is this cognitive function that makes information and its cognates valuable concepts that contribute to biological understanding, and it is the generic character of the explanatory contexts in which they figure and their flexibility that accounts for their persistence and wide range of application. Now, to some readers the very notion that a fictional description could bear theoretical weight, or could be said to have explanatory value, will be hard to swallow. My response is that scientists employ a range of reasoning strategies that involve imagining away some elements of reality or pretending that things are different than they actually are: idealizations, simplifications, approximations. So long as we can make sense of their cognitive and epistemic contributions to scientific understanding (as I have endeavored to do in section 7), I see no in-principle grounds for excluding fictions and metaphors from the proper conceptual toolkit of science. Philosophers of science often assume, sometimes implicitly, that scientific concepts come in two 11 In the biological case the intentional discourse is more common and more central than in the physical case. 23 flavors – the literal, ontologically committing concepts, and the ―merely‖ metaphorical ones that play an unimportant aesthetic role. My hope is that this discussion of information shows that there are scientific concepts that stand mid-way between the fully literal and the merely ornamental – concepts that have theoretical significance, but function indirectly via a pretense. Other examples come to mind – the treatment of energy as a ―stuff‖ that can be transmitted, consumed or conserved; or the idea that natural selection is a force (as in ―selection pressure‖) – but there might be interesting differences between these cases. Some recent work has suggested that fiction plays a central role in the context of scientific modeling (Godfrey-Smith, 2006; Frigg, forthcoming) and it would be informative to connect fictions of the sort I have discussed to these more regimented, mainstream uses of the imagination in science. The use of fictions in science raises many interesting questions, which I shall leave for another day. But it should be noted that an acknowledgement of the possibility of ―serious‖ non-literality in science is by no means a blanket psychologization of explanation nor does it necessarily open the door for an overly permissive attitude towards standards of rational evaluation of scientific concepts. Acknowledging fictions is taking seriously the thought that as science is a cognitive enterprise, it will have recourse to representational devices that serve the cognitive ends of its makers and consumers. At the same time, it suggests that we have to be very cautious in making inferences from the fact that some set of concepts is theoretically valuable to philosophical conceptions about the structure of the natural world. 24 REFERENCES Alberts, Bruce. Johnson, Alexander. Lewis, Julian. Raff, Martin. Roberts, Keith & Walter, Peter. (2002) Molecular Biology of the Cell 4th edition, New York: Garland Science. Ashe, Hilary L. & Briscoe, James. (2006) ―the interpretation of morphogen gradients‖, Development 133: 385-394. Brenner, Sydney. (1999) ―theoretical biology in the third millennium‖, Philosophical Transaction of the Royal Society, London, B, 354:1963-1965. Egan, Andy. (2008) ―pretence for the complete idiom‖, Noûs, 42(3): 381-409. Evans, W.H. and Martin, P.E.M. (2002) ―gap junctions: structure and function‖, Molecular Membrane Biology, 19: 121-136. Frigg, Roman. (forthcoming), ―models and fiction‖, Synthese. Godfrey-Smith, Peter. (2000) ―on the theoretical role of genetic coding','' Philosophy of Science, 67: 26–44. Godfrey-Smith, Peter. (2006) ―the strategy of model based science,‖ Biology & Philosophy, 21, 725-740. Godfrey-Smith, Peter. & Sterelny, Kim. (2008) ―biological information,‖ The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/information-biological/ Griffiths P.E. (2001) ―genetic information: a metaphor in search of a theory,‖ Philosophy of Science 68: 394-412. Griffiths, (2006), ―the fearless vampire conservator: Philip Kitcher, genetic determinism and the informational gene,‖ In Neumann-Held E.M. and Rehmann-Sutter C. (eds.), Genes in Development: Re-reading the Molecular Paradigm, Duke University Press, Durham, NC. Gurdon, John. and Bourillot, Paul, Y. (2001) ―morphogen gradient interpretation,‖ Nature, 413:797-803. Jablonka, Eva. (2002), ―information: its interpretation, its inheritance, and its sharing,‖ Philosophy of Science 69: 578-605. Jablonka, Eva. & Lamb, Marion, J. (1995) Epigenetic Inheritance and Evolution. Oxford, Oxford University Press. Maynard Smith, John. (2000) ―the concept of information in biology,‖ Philosophy of Science 67: 177194. Maynard Smith, John. and Szathmary, Eörs. (1999) The Origins of Life: From the Birth of Life to the Origin of Language, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Millikan, Ruth. (1984) Language Thought and Other Biological Categories, Cambridge: MIT Press. 25 Millikan, Ruth. (1995) ―pushmi-pullyu representations,‖ Philosophical Perspectives, 9: 185-200. Mousssian, Bernhard. & Roth, Siegfried. (2005) ―dorsoventral axis formation in the Drosophila embryo – shaping and transducing a morphogen gradient,‖ Current Biology, 15(21):R887-99 Nelson, Philip. (2007) Biological Physics: Energy, Information, Life, New York: W.H. Freeman. Oyama Susan. (1985) The Ontogeny of Information: Developmental Systems and Evolution, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Rieke, Fred, Warland, David, de Reuter van Steveninck, Rob & Bialek, William. (1996), Spikes: Exploring the Neural Code, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Rosenberg, Alexander. (1986) ―intention and action among the macromolecules‖, in Rescher, Nicholas. (ed.) Current Issues in Teleology, Lanham, MD: University Press of America. Rosenberg, Alex. (2006) Darwinian Reductionism, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Sarkar, Sahorta. (1996) ―decoding coding – information and DNA,‖ BioScience, 46: 857-864. Sarkar, Sahorta. (2000) ―information in genetics and developmental biology: comments on Maynard Smith,‖ Philosophy of Science 67: 208-213. Shannon, Claude. (1948) ―a mathematical theory of communication,‖ Bell Systems Technical Journal 27: 279-423, Shea, Nicholas. (2007) ―representation in the genome and in other inheritance systems,‖ Biology & Philosophy, 22:313–331. Stegmann, Ulrich. (2004) ―the arbitrariness of the genetic code,‖ Biology & Philosophy 19: 205-222. Sterelny, Kim. (2000) the genetic program' program: a commentary on Maynard Smith on information in biology,‖ Philosophy of Science 67: 195–201. Sterelny, Kim, Smith, Kelly C. & Dickison, Micheal. (1996) ―the extended replicator,‖ Biology & Philosophy 11: 377-403. Walton, Kendall. (1990) Mimesis and Make-Believe, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Walton, Kendall. (1993) ―metaphor and prop-oriented make-believe‖, The European Journal of Philosophy, 1: 39–57. Williams, George C. (1992) Natural Selection: Domains, Levels and Challenges, New York: Oxford University Press. Wolpert, Louis. et al. (2006) Principles of Development, New York: Oxford University Press.

Every Truth Must Be True Rethinking the Principle of Identity Guilherme Gusmão da Silva (See "Logic Beyond Language") The principle of identity as originally formulated by Aristotle states that everything exists in its own way, which is its identity. However, if we take the word "existence" to mean precisely the way by which anything exists, which is its ultimate, concrete "being," then we have that anything must be the same as (the way of) its being, hence that anything must be identical to itself. Meaning, say, a falsehood must be identical to itself: although we may render such an identity meaningless by taking falsehoods as nonexistent, we still cannot say "there is no falsehood" without making all that is false be rather true – if what is false is to be false, then falsehoods must be something. But what is the necessary identity between a falsehood and itself? What means the statement "a falsehood must be precisely that falsehood"? First of all, we have an ambiguity here, since a falsehood can be taken as meaning: 1. Something false. 2. The falsity of something. If a falsehood is taken as meaning something false, then that something becomes the same as its own falsity, so: 1. If we take that falsehood as a being – hence both what is false and its falsity as having that same being – then being false is just a being, so everything is false, by which either there is no truth or truths are the same as falsehoods. 2. If we take that falsehood as a nonbeing – hence both what is false and its falsity as having that same nonbeing – then being false is just a nonbeing, so nothing is false, by which either there is no falsehood or falsehoods are the same as truths. To escape such unsolvable contradictions, we must rather choose the meaning according to which a falsehood is the falsity of something, despite being that something as false. Which combines the two previous options in a third one, by identifying what is false and its own falsity to each other as respectively a nonbeing and a being: 1. If what is false were different from its own falsity, then it would be possibly true – or possibly false – rather than actually false – or impossibly true. 2. If what is false were a being, then it would be a true being, rather than a false one. 1 3. If the falsity of something were nothing, then that something would be true rather than false. Thus, the being of a falsehood is the falsity of something, by which alone it is the nothingness of that something rather than absolute nothingness – which is the falsity of nothing. A falsehood is a being that, as any other being, must itself be true since, if it were false, then it would be the circumstance of whatever is false being true rather than false: the falsity of something must be true as the circumstance of that something being false to be false as whatever that circumstance falsifies – it is itself a truth by being a true falsehood, or it is no longer the falsity of something. Hence, the only way for us to maintain the principle of identity regarding falsehoods – without running into unsolvable contradictions – is by taking any falsehood as meaning its own truth – the true falsity of something – so selfidentity regards only truths – of either true falsehoods or simple truths – to become "every truth must be identical to itself." However, being faithful to the original meaning of such an identity, which is that anything exists in its own way, we must rather say that "every truth must be true," since the proper way of a truth to exist – by which alone it is identical to itself – is to be true.

From Locus Neoclassicus to Locus Rattus: Notes on Laughter, Comprehensiveness, and Titillation By Karl Pfeifer University of Saskatchewan Let's face it: Laughter and humor have been of concern to philosophers at least as long as there has been Philosophy, properly so-called. Both Plato and Aristotle had something to say about it, as have various other philosophical luminaries since, including Cicero, Hobbes, Kant, Schopenhauer, Spencer, and Bergson, to name some names. Although it has had a certain en passant flavor to it in the philosophical mainstream, that may itself be an artefact of historiography and which philosophical writings are regarded as part of the canon: there certainly was no shortage of Renaissance philosophers and philosophes with an interest in laughter and humor. Be that as it may, barely more than a couple of decades ago, in my experience, the study of laughter and humor was not regarded as a fit topic for Philosophy, of the hardnosed sort.1 Fortunately, there has since been a steady trickle of significant writings by philosophers, also of the hardnosed sort.2 Still, despite having shunted laughter and humor to the sidelines, our philosophical tradition officially recognizes three main types of theories of laughter and humor: superiority theories (e.g. Aristotle, Hobbes), incongruity theories (e.g. Kant, Schopenhauer), relief theories (e.g. Aristotle again, Spencer, and that sometime honorary philosopher Freud). I mention these theories only in order to indicate the context for the theory proposed in John Morreall's 1982 1 This attitude was reflected in the referees' remarks on a paper on laughter I submitted for a conference: one thought the topic was "too far beyond what is ordinarily considered to be philosophy", while another wondered "whether it might have been written by a ... psychologist". 2 And perhaps the recent publication of an issue of the Monist on humor (January 2005) is an indication that Philosophy's marginalization of laughter and humor has come to an end. (The articles in that issue deal primarily with the content or ethics of humor, rather than the psychological or behavioral issues I am concerned with here.) © Res Cogitans 2006, vol. 3, 29-46 article "A New Theory of Laughter",3 which can arguably be regarded as a contemporary philosophical locus classicus - or maybe we should match Morreall's titular adjective and say locus neoclassicus - within the conceptual space and problematic marked out by these theories. In that article, and in subsequent writings, Morreall presents and builds upon a simple formulaic theory that enables him to underpin and develop his own positive views on laughter and humor. What are the desiderata for a theory in the wake of the traditional Big Three? It should go without saying that ideally a new theory should explain both what is correct and what is incorrect about such traditional theories. A second desideratum is that the newly proposed theory should be comprehensive; it should apply to all situations in which we laugh.4 This is a tall order, for we laugh in situations that are so very diverse, as Morreall reminds us: "We laugh not only at humor, but also when we are tickled, when a magician makes an object appear or disappear, when we regain our safety after being in danger, solve a puzzle or win a game, run into an old friend on the street, anticipate some enjoyable activity, and feel embarrassed, to name a few representative cases."5 A third desideratum is that the philosophical theory should be useful for other (especially scientific) endeavors, or that it should at least square with the agenda of science. This is of course a matter of degree and propriety. To be sure, 3 John Morreall, "A New Theory of Laughter", Philosophical Studies 42 (1982) 243-254. Reprinted with minor differences as the eponymous chap. 5 of his Taking Laughter Seriously (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1983), which in turn appears in shortened form as the eponymous chap. 16 of John Morreall (ed.), The Philosophy of Laughter and Humor (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987). 4 Although it might do so indirectly, by allowing for some principled exclusions. For example, if the theory is stipulated to pertain to laughter only as a psychological phenomenon, laughter directly caused by brain injury might be excluded given an explanation of how such injury bypasses psychological links in the causal chain. The very status of such so-called laughter as laughter might also be denied on independent grounds, e.g. as when we rightly regard the laughterlike vocalizations of hyenas as not genuine laughter. 5 "A New Theory of Laughter" (1982), p. 243. 30 a theory known to fail in its generality may still have scientific cachet in a restricted domain, and an obviously false conception may still serve as a useful approximation or heuristic. But the situation that most interests us would be where aspects of the philosophical account carry over into or inform science under an initial presumption of general plausibility. I leave it to readers to judge for themselves whether Morreall does justice to his predecessors. As for the second desideratum, the best-case scenario would be that of finding necessary and sufficient conditions for laughter, or a complete set of essential features of laughter. Failing that, we could rest content with merely necessary conditions or a partial set of essential features; this is where Morreall thinks he rests. And failing that, we might still be happy to have some sort of merely sufficient conditions, although that would already fall short of the desired comprehensiveness; failing even that, we could finally just settle for the highlighting of some "symptomatic" features of laughter, fitting some paradigms of interest but not others. But this last alternative would probably just give us back some of the traditional theories, minus their overgeneralization. Morreall alleges that "an essence to laughter"6 is given by the formula that laughter results from a pleasant psychological shift, where a shift is to be understood as a sudden change.7 In other words, laughter per se has, or essentially bears, a causal property and having that relational property is a necessary condition for its being laughter. This falls short of the best-case scenario for the second desideratum, but one essential feature would still be better than none, and taken as a necessary condition for laughter, would be informative relative to an intuitive grasp of enabling, inhibiting, or standing conditions generally. Thus Morreall's formula, if correct, would seem to express a metaphysical truth (about essence), and also a lawlike regularity, thereby ostensibly satisfying the third desideratum as well. Unfortunately, like his predecessors, Morreall is guilty of overgeneralizing on certain paradigms of laughter. Admittedly, our common conceptions of these paradigms are phrased in terms of clichés that have almost the status of memes 6 "A New Theory of Laughter" (1982), p. 243. 7 "A New Theory of Laughter" (1982), pp. 248-9. 31 in popular writings on laughter and humor, namely that laughter is pleasurable or joyful on the one hand and that it involves the suddenness of surprise or of the unexpected on the other.8 But these concomitants, despite their centrality in our reflections on laughter, are not universal for all that: Laughter need not be caused by something pleasant, nor need it express a pleasant feeling. And laughter need not be caused by something sudden, unexpected, or surprising. Since I have illustrated and argued these claims at length in previous writings,9 I will make do with a few brief examples here. Aggressive or antagonistic tickling, e.g. by a playground bully, can make one laugh in spite of oneself, agonizingly and joylessly, as can sudden unpleasant shocks, e.g. a blast of ice-cold water or the unexpected news of a friend's death, shocks that one is not amused by, there and then, or afterwards. Also, one may numbly join in with laughter at a malicious joke on oneself - laughing on the outside but not on the inside, as we sometimes say. As regards suddenness or surprise,10 we need only remind ourselves of so-called standing jokes or running gags, whose defining features are repetition, familiarity, and expectation. Moreover, a slow, continuous, caressing touch, accompanied by a gradual increase of tingliness, can also cause laughter, contrary to Morreall's view that tickling as such involves rapidly and suddenly alternating presence and absence of sensation. 8 Marvin T. Herrick, Comic Theory in the Sixteenth Century (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964), pp. 44, 52, suspects that reference to unexpectedness or surprise as characteristic feature of the cause of laughter, in writings from the 16th Century onward, is due to the influence of Madius's essay, De Ridiculum, in V. Madius and Bartholomaeus Lombardus, In Aristotelis librum de poetica communes explanationes. (Venice: 1550), pp. 301-27. 9 "Laughing Matters", Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review, 22 (1983) 695-697; "Review of Taking Laughter Seriously by John Morreall", Journal of Mind and Behavior, 5 (1984) 115-118; "More on Morreall on Laughter", Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review, 26 1987) 161-166; "Laughter and Pleasure", Humor: International Journal of Humor Research, 7 (1994) 157-172; "The Sudden, the Sudded, and the Sidesplitting", in Kjell S. Johannessen and Tore Nordenstam (eds.), Culture and Value: Philosophy and the Cultural Sciences [Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, Vol. 13] (Kirchberg am Wechsel, Austria: The Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, 1995), 224-232; "Laughter, Freshness, and Titillation", Inquiry 40 (1997) 307-322. 10 Robert C. Roberts, "Humor and the Virtues", Inquiry 31 (1988) 127-149, has also criticized Morreall on this point, arguing for a notion of freshness that subsumes surprise as a special case. Roberts's account is concerned with laughter at humor only. I discuss some problems with freshness in "Laughter, Freshness, and Titillation". 32 It is sometimes claimed that tickling must somehow involve surprise or unexpectedness because we cannot tickle ourselves. But we don't need to avail ourselves of a fancy Rube Goldberg device in an attempt to counter this claim. As it happens, I can tickle myself, with finger or tongue, on the roof of my mouth.11 (Try it, dear reader; perhaps you can too.) So Morreall's proposal does not satisfy the second desideratum after all; nor the third, in the sense in which it presupposes the second.12 Let us now briefly shift the focus to amusement. Amusement is generally regarded as inherently pleasant.13 Humor is much valued as a source of amusement, but it goes without saying that much else can amuse us besides the humorous (i.e. "amuse" narrowly understood in terms of a specific psychological response, not broadly understood in terms of passing time agreeably engaged). Indeed, many of the nonhumorous things previously mentioned that make us laugh can also be said to amuse us. However, even in the absence of cases of laughter caused by nonpleasant (i.e. unpleasant or neutral) feelings, there would still be cases of laughter for which "amuse" and its cognates would be infelicitous: one cannot properly be said to be amused by being manually tickled merely in virtue of its being enjoyable; nor does amusement enter into it when one laughs upon unexpectedly recognizing an old friend in a crowd. Even with the tactic of distinguishing truth-conditions from assertionconditions, it would take quite an artful dodge to construe generally the pleasant feeling caused by and expressed in laughter as amusement. Morreall acknowledges that we have no single word in English for this feeling and thinks this lack has led some theorists not to distinguish clearly between the behavior of laughter and the feeling it expresses. He stipulates that "amusement" is to fill this gap for him.14 However, this cannot be helpful when, in pursuit of a comprehensive general theory, we run up against the cases of nonpleasant 11 To my knowledge, no complementary findings by autofellators have been reported to date. 12 This is not to deny that Morreall's formula can be used to discuss certain subspecies of laughter in an illuminating way. 13 Although there may be borderline cases or vestiges of the older usage mentioned below. 14 In "A New Theory of Laughter" (1982) and (1983), but omitted in (1987). 33 laughter. For then we would be compelled to say that some cases of laughter that are definitely unamusing in an ordinary sense, are nonetheless amusing in Morreall's stipulated sense. That would defeat the purpose of Morreall's stipulation, which is to improve ordinary language, not to contradict it.15 It is noteworthy that Thomas Hobbes did not employ "amuse" or its cognates in his notorious variant of the superiority theory. This is to be expected, since the usual sense of "amuse" in the 17th and 18th Century, according to the Oxford English Dictionary (OED hereafter),16 was "To divert the attention of any one from the facts at issue; to beguile, delude, cheat, deceive." Another, less usual sense was "To divert the attention of (one) from serious business by anything trifling, ludicrous, or entertaining; passing into ... To divert, please with anything light or cheerful; ... esp. (in mod[ern] sense) To excite the risible faculty or tickle the fancy of" [original italics]; apparently the strict association of amusement with the pleasant was a later development, with the additional association with laughter constituting a special case. So in Hobbes's day (early 17th Century), there would have been less standing in the way of enlisting "amusement" as a semitechnical term for the feelings laughter expresses, both pleasant and non. The perceptive reader will have noticed that I just snuck the plural, "feelings", into the last sentence. Another way of responding to Morreall's complaint that there is no single word for the feeling that causes and is expressed by laughter might be that this simply reflects the fact that there is no single such feeling: mirth is not joy, amusement is not delight, jollity is not gaiety, and so forth. However, I would not want to make too much of this in the present context. Granted, there are distinctions, some of them not even subtle, to be drawn among such notions; but we are pursuing a comprehensive general theory of laughter. Just as we are prescinding from different kinds of laughter (joyful 15 Is the contradiction merely apparent? If, as seems to be the case, the stipulated sense is supposed to extend the old range of application of "amusement" (and cognates) to new cases without overturning previous judgements as to what is amusing or unamusing (except those judgements in which the negatives are deployed in opposition to category mistakes, unidiomatic usage, or somesuch), then the contradiction is real enough. 16 Oxford English Dictionary Online (Oxford University Press, 2003). 34 laughter, hollow laughter, cackles, bleats), so we should prescind from different kinds of feeling expressed. Morreall's adjective "pleasant" is already doing that job for him, relative to the inherent pleasantness of mirth, joy, amusement, etc. I have simply been pressing the point that the job description this implies is too narrow, inasmuch as nonpleasant feelings can also cause and be expressed by laughter. The problem here, if there is one, is the arbitrary and pragmatic nature of type/token discrimination: distinct tokens may be conveniently grouped together as belonging to a single type for some purposes but not for others, and the prospective types may belong to very different levels of description to boot. Despite the differences among the tokens of pleasant-feeling involved, there is no objection in principle to Morreall's grouping them together and giving them a name, although it would have been wiser to pick a less problematic one. Likewise we might add, there should be no objection to grouping nonpleasant feelings with pleasant ones. In "Laughter, Freshness, and Titillation", I argued that titillation could serve as a minimal essential feature of laughter. The case for titillation was made with reference to senses of "titillation" found in the OED: "Excitation or stimulation of the mind or senses, esp. [NB: "especially" implies "not necessarily"] pleasing excitement, gratification" and "A sensation of being tickled; a tingling, an itching". Let us emphasize that these are product not process senses.17 The OED also provides citations that refer specifically to "intolerable" and "painful" titillation. Taking the first sense, and adapting Morreall's formula, we might say instead that laughter results from titillation, where the titillation might be neither pleasant nor sudden. Moreover, the titillating item might be sensation, as per the second sense above, or at one remove, whatever is responsible for the sensation (e.g. the act of tickling). Or it might be getting the punchline of a joke, or at one remove, the telling of the joke. Or it might be recognizing the old friend, the eureka feeling of solving a puzzle, and so forth, for whatever makes us laugh 17 Naturally the OED also indicates a process sense for "titillation", whereunder the act of tactile tickling is subsumed. 35 whether humorous or not. All the kinds of cases Morreall wishes to cover by his formula are covered by ours, as well as the additional cases I've argued ought to be covered. What sort of beast is this minimal essential feature of laughter? There are several worries one might have about our replacement formula. Using the example of contagious laughter, Jill McIntosh writes: "Titillation does not seem to capture this facet [contagiousness] of laughter. Recall the definition of 'titillation' offered above: it is excitation or stimulation of the mind or senses, whether or not such excitation or stimulation is occasioned by something humorous, sudden, or surprising, and whether or not it is pleasant or amuses. Now it is true that the laughter of others must, to be perceived, reach us via a stimulation of the senses. But surely this does not qualify it as a case of titillation. If it does, then I am titillated by everything I perceive."18 The short reply is that the OED-inspired so-called definition of "titillation", to which McIntosh adverts, only amounts to a necessary condition for a particular sense of the word. So we are ultimately relying on an intuitive grasp of a sense that is only partially explicated in the dictionary, as we often do when consulting a dictionary. To be sure, when I look at a painting my senses are perforce stimulated in some thin, merely perceptual sense. But the look of the painting may not rouse or stir me, and so I may rightly claim, without contradiction, that the painting failed to stimulate me. The appropriateness of "stimulating" as an unnegated predicate adjective might perhaps be used as a rough guide here to segregate stimulation of the thin sort; the stimulation of my rods and cones just isn't stimulating qua stimulation of rods and cones. Moreover, our recognition of what might rightly be claimed or appropriately used presupposes an understanding of 18 J. S. McIntosh, "The Search for the Grand Unified Theory of Laughter; Titillation, Vervet Monkeys, and Despair: Or, Why I Never Think Before I Laugh". Western Canadian Philosophical Association Conference, Winnipeg, Oct. 1997. 36 the different concepts involved and that may be enough for a number of purposes. It may also be suggested that our replacement formula is somehow questionbegging, circular, or vacuous.19 However, although we did engage in a bit of lexicology in justifying the use of the term "titillation", and in explaining its intended sense, this does not presuppose commitment to any philosophically contentious programs of conceptual analysis.20 Lexicology may involve some provisional a priori cogitation, but it proceeds largely by inference to the best explanation. Therefore our formula need be no more question-begging than induction. Moreover, were the definition of "titillation" to be completed to a set of conditions both necessary and sufficient, the result might only be circular in the benign sense that any process of iterated defining using a finite vocabulary must eventually come full circle;21 vicious circularity is not a foregone conclusion. And neither is our formula circular in that the explication of "titillation" already includes a reference to laughter.22 Finally, we should remind ourselves that our titillation formula, like Morreall's which it mimics, expresses an a posteriori proposition whose supposed necessity is nomic, a matter of lawlike regularity, not analyticity. Although the formula 19 McIntosh tentatively suggests this. 20 As Alan R. White puts it: "Examining the relations between the various ways we classify things, and consequently between the characteristics which things necessarily have in virtue of being what they are, is examining the concepts we use. We can use the traditional word 'analysis' for this examination of concepts without in any way committing ourselves to the assumption that what is being examined is a complex whose component parts are to be revealed in the way that a chemist might analyze a substance...." Alan R. White, "Conceptual Analysis", Charles J. Bontempo and S. Jack Odell (eds.), The Owl of Minerva : Philosophers on Philosophy (New York : McGraw-Hill, 1975), 103-117; see p. 105. A useful discussion of the importance of conceptual analysis specifically in philosophical psychology can be found in Chapter 1 of Robert C. Roberts, Emotions: An Essay in Aid of Moral Psychology (Cambridge University Press, 2003). 21 But the process can be made to bottom out with nonverbal ostension, e.g. indicating the sense of "red" by pointing to red fire-engines (as opposed to verbal ostension, e.g. saying that "red" denotes the usual color of fire-engines). Whether English actually has the finite vocabulary customarily claimed for it depends on how compound words for numbers are accommodated; if compound words count as distinct vocabulary items then of course the vocabulary of English can't be finite. 22 And even if it did, it might not matter; cf. Jerry A. Fodor, Psychological Explanation (New York: Random House, 1968), p. 34 ff. 37 might prima facie be thought trivial or vapid on account of its minimality or extreme generality, that in itself is no bar to truth. Vacuity, insofar as it imputes lack of empirical content, and does so in spite of the formula's not being a tautology or analytic statement, is a less straightforward charge to deal with. Inasmuch as titillation often does not lead to laughter and we don't yet have a story about enabling or inhibiting conditions, it's hard to know what to blame when laughter seemed imminent but failed to occur; indeed an occurrence of titillation (apart from the special case of tickling by touch, perhaps), doesn't seem to make laughter appreciably more probable or predictable. Nevertheless, we can agree that in respects such as these, the empirical content of our titillation formula is not optimal, as is only to be expected of a merely necessary condition or single essential property. But this hardly shows that the formula lacks empirical content to the extent of being immune to falsification or disconfirmation. After all, it is logically possible that, sometimes or always, both laughter and the titillation associated with it have a common cause not apparent from the phenomenology of laughter (where laughter and titillation are also related such that neither one causes the other);23 and it is logically possible as well that, sometimes or always, laughter causes titillation.24 Were either of these possibilities to obtain, our formula would be false. Evidence for either of these possibilities would be disconfirmation of our formula. Of course faced with seemingly disconfirming evidence, the formula might still be retained for all that; background assumptions might be given up, tacit 23 This parenthetical clause is needed to rule out realizations of this possibility that are trivially consistent with our formula. If causation is transitive, whatever causes titillation also causes laughter, and if additionally there are no intermediary causal links between titillation and laughter, whatever causes laughter, except titillation itself, also causes titillation; whereas if causation is neither transitive nor intransitive (the latter being in any case a nonstarter), some causes of titillation are also causes of laughter, and some causes of laughter, except titillation itself, are also causes of titillation. 24 Cf. the causal reversal of (positive) affect and laughter in William McDougall, An Outline of Psychology, 7th ed. (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1936), p. 165 ff; a similar view seems to be implied by the Lange-James theory of emotion, which McDougall discusses on pp. 326-28. 38 assumptions might be made explicit, terminology might be adjusted, data might be reinterpreted, and so forth. But as we know, this is part and parcel of legitimate science too, not just bad science or philosophy. I don't pretend to have a principled answer as to when it is legitimate to retain a theory and when it is not. As Fodor says: "One can rarely determine whether a form of explanation is "vacuous," "cognitively meaningless," and so on simply by inspection. Rather, one must determine the background of theory and experiment in which the explanation is intended to function, including, perhaps, the scientist's own expectations about the kinds of theories in which the explanation may function at some future date. I suspect that it is largely for this reason that the attempt to formalize criteria for empirical significance has invariably proved unsuccessful."25 But to the extent that I can appreciate, for instance, that most astrological claims should get a failing grade - in light of astrology's background of facile reinterpretation, or even flagrant disregard, of its unsuccessful claims or the evidence against them, as well as for the deviously glib vagueness and ambiguity of its claims - to that extent I also recognize that it would be premature to pass similar judgement on our formula. As it happens, our modest titillation formula segues, with a modicum of friction, into a hypothesis that is already under preliminary experimental investigation in psychology, namely the Darwin-Hecker hypothesis.26 In a nutshell, the hypothesis is that "laughter induced by tickle and humour share common underlying mechanisms."27 The Darwin-Hecker hypothesis in effect 25 Fodor, Psychological Explanation, pp. 36-37. 26 Alan J. Fridlund and Jennifer M. Loftis, "Relations between tickling and humorous laughter: Preliminary support for the Darwin-Hecker hypothesis", Biological Psychology 30 (1990) 141-150; Christine R. Harris and Nicholas Christenfeld, "Humour, Tickle, and the Darwin-Hecker Hypothesis", Cognition and Emotion, 11 (1997) 103-110; the latter is tentatively disconfirming. I thank Stefan Iancu for bringing this research to my attention. 27 This is the formulation in the prefacing abstract to Harris and Christenfeld (1997), which I prefer for reasons that will soon be obvious; the abstract in Fridlund and Loftis (1990) places the emphasis 39 mirrors (albeit imperfectly, due to the "friction" just mentioned and about to be explained below) our formula in a different idiom.28 When we say that laughter results from titillation, this implies that both the laughter of tickling (by touch) and the laughter of humor result from excitation or stimulation of the mind or senses [or from "a so-called tickling of the mind" in Darwin's phrase]. So our semitechnical term "titillation" can be regarded as belonging to an intermediate level of description that may eventually be further explained in terms of the underlying physiology. That is to say, "titillation" can be regarded as a placeholder in a functional characterization, a black box (a veritable "Tickle Trunk", to borrow a name from Mr. Dressup),29 eventually replaceable by a mechanistic physiological description. But now the theory expressed by our formula is indistinguishable from the Darwin-Hecker hypothesis. Except maybe for the friction. There are two sources of friction here. One pertains to the issue of the multiple realizability of functional components. If "titillation" is a mere placeholder, the place could end up being filled differently in the cases of tickling-by-touch and humor. However, since the Darwin-Hecker hypothesis is itself not specific on what differences in realization might be subsumed under a common mechanism, the physiology of a tickle-by-touch causing a mental tickle (which then causes laughter) might be very different from the grasping of a punchline causing a mental tickle (which then causes laughter). The word "common" can selectively accommodate similarities that are few, but somewhat differently, referring to "the Darwin-Hecker conjecture that reflexes underlying ticklishness mediate humor." Both formulations entail sundry subsidiary hypotheses, some of which the research also addresses, that we will ignore here. The inspiration for this hypothesis comes from Charles Darwin, The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals (London: John Murray, 1872), chap. 8, and Ewald Hecker, Die Physiologie und Psychologie des Lachen und des Komischen (Berlin: F. Dümmler, 1873); see Fridlund and Loftis (1990), sec. 1. 28 Amusingly, worries about vacuity seem to be mirrored too. An apologetic editor's note to Fridlund and Loftis (1990) states: "This article fits well with the Journal's renewed interest in biologically based explanations of human behavior. No physiological measures are reported, but self report data are related to biologically based theories. Further, the hypothesis developed in this initial report can be readily tested using objective observational and physiological measures." 29 In memory of Ernie Coombs (alias Mr. Dressup), 1927-2001. Coombs hosted a popular Canadian children's television program, Mr. Dressup, in which he would routinely select a costume from a chest whimsically referred to as the "Tickle Trunk". 40 salient, across otherwise significant differences, though this is equally an issue for both accounts if it is an issue at all. The other source of friction pertains to laughter caused by and expressing nonpleasant feelings. The reports of the investigations into the Darwin-Hecker hypothesis do not make explicit pronouncements regarding this possibility. In passing, Fridlund and Loftis mention the independence of laughter from hedonics, namely that it can occur during grief, fear, embarrassment, or anger, as well as happiness, and that it has a connection to crying.30 So they aren't guilty of having forgotten about cases that don't fit the favored stereotype. Such cases, I have argued, at least sometimes are cases in which nonpleasant feelings do direct causal work in producing laughter. But since Fridlund and Loftis do not go into relevant details, it remains indefinite whether they would regard the DarwinHecker hypothesis as subsuming such a possibility or whether they would even countenance such a possibility at all. Harris and Christenfeld likewise do not directly address this question, although they do report that most of the subjects in their tickle study did not find the experience positive, one even referring to being tickled as "torture" despite having laughed.31 One conclusion they draw from their investigation is that "the results also leave open the possibility that tickle shares an internal state with other emotions such as social anxiety and that ticklish laughter might be similar to nervous rather than mirthful laughter."32 But again, since they are silent on relevant details, we cannot infer anything definite about the possibility of a direct causal role for nonpleasant feelings or about the accommodation of such a possibility by the Darwin-Hecker hypothesis. So at present the Darwin-Hecker hypothesis is indeterminate in a way that the titillation formula is not. Here is where the philosophical account can inform the science, increasing awareness of and sensitivity to distinctions or possibilities that have been blurred or ignored. And maybe then, future investigations can 30 Fridlund and Loftis (1990), p. 147. 31 Harris and Christenfeld (1997), p. 109. 32 Harris and Christenfeld (1997), p. 110. 41 determine whether the Darwin-Hecker hypothesis is best viewed as tantamount to the titillation formula or as a special case of it. Let's close with a look at a later development: the supposed discovery of laughter in rats. Jaak Panksepp and Jeffrey Burgdorf write: "Although laughter is a prominent behavior of the human species, reflecting our ability to experience joy and humor, only fragments of data suggest that other species have similar brain functions. Certain vocal patterns of chimpanzees and some lower primates appear to reflect the existence of homologous processes, but credible evidence for other species is marginal. However, considering the clinical evidence that the primal neural mechanisms for human laughter exist in ancient regions of the brain, including thalamus, hypothalamus, and midbrain, the existence of such processes in common laboratory species seems feasible, at least in principle. We now report evidence congruent with the presence of analogous, perhaps homologous, responses in domesticated rats" [embedded citations omitted].33 Apparently adult rats emit two distinctive types of ultrasonic vocalizations (USVs). Short chirping high-frequency USVs, peaking at about 50 kHz, appear to reflect positive forms of arousal that occur at high rates during desired social interactions, whereas long low-frequency USVs, peaking at about 22 kHz, reflect negative arousal related to fear, social defeat, or the "postcopulatory refractory period"34 Noting that young rats also emit an abundance of short high-frequency USVs in their rough-and-tumble play, Panksepp and Burgdorf continue: 33 Jaak Panksepp and Jeffrey Burgdorf, "Laughing Rats? Playful Tickling Arouses High-Frequency Ultrasonic Chirping in Young Rodents", in Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak, and David J. Chalmers (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness III: The Third Tucson Discussions and Debates (Cambridge, MA: MIT press, 1999), 231-244; see p. 232. 34 Ergo post coitum omnis rattus tristis est. 42 "In the following experiments, we determined whether the type of chirping seen during play has any resemblances to human laughter which may suggest a degree of evolutionary kinship between the two phenomena. The easiest way to induce primal laughter and joy in young children is through tickling. ... We have now found that chirping at around 50 KHz is increased markedly in young rats by manual tickling and converging evidence suggests the response has more than a passing resemblance to human laughter [embedded citations omitted]."35 Consideration of the "converging evidence", as well as of the many interesting and suggestive parallels they draw between rat and human laughter cannot be undertaken here. What is of interest for our purposes is that Panksepp and Burgdorf appear to be open to the Darwin-Hecker hypothesis, inasmuch as Fridlund and Loftis (1990) appear among the citations for the following view: "It is a reasonable but not a scientifically established view that ... the intrinsic ability of the nervous system to laugh and experience social joy is an essential precondition for the emergence of the type of mental sophistication that is able to find joy and laughter among the slapstick incongruence of life and the interplay of unpredictable cognitive events [embedded citations omitted]."36 We can be charitable about the ostensible category-mistake involved in the characterization of the nervous system's ability and regard it as a transferred epithet, a respectable enough species of figurative language. Less figuratively, what is responsible for the ability referred to is the "primal neural mechanisms for human laughter [that] exist in ancient regions of the brain"37 or the "evolved emotional systems that we still share with other mammals"38, which mechanisms 35 Panksepp and Burgdorf (1999), p. 233. 36 Jaak Panksepp and Jeff Burgdorf, '"Laughing" rats and the evolutionary antecedents of human joy?', Physiology & Behavior 79 (2003) 533-547; see p. 542, col. 2. 37 Panksepp and Burgdorf (1999), p. 232. 38 Panksepp and Burgdorf (2003), p. 533. 43 or systems, in the case of rats, supposedly produce the laughterlike 50 kHz chirping during tickling and play. So the Darwin-Hecker hypothesis is now given a deeper evolutionary perspective, whereby it can accrue additional empirical content from considerations of comparative biology. Again, we need to ask how this rat-infested take on the Darwin-Hecker hypothesis squares with our titillation formula. And again, we have the friction due to nonpleasant causes of laughter. Panksepp and Burgdorf state outright that "laughter is a simple and robust indicator of joyful social affect [for humans]"39 and also take their experiments to show that "chirping emitted by tickled rats is a robust phenomenon", to which they immediately add, "More than 95% of the young animal[s] we studied so far have unambiguously exhibited the response...."40 So robustness permits nonconformity of at least 5%. Maybe that's enough, in the human case, to cover the laughter caused by nonpleasant feelings, or at least the laughter caused by unpleasant feelings; neutral feelings can always be treated as pleasant by courtesy. But in the case of 50 kHz chirping caused by tickling, the behavioral evidence is that none of the rats seemed to regard tickling as aggression, all reacting playfully when tickled (although some did resist attempts to tickle). So the chirping seems to be caused only by feelings of positive affect (Panksepp and Burgdorf use the term "enjoy"). It might be thought that this counts against our titillation formula, but actually it does not. Our formula regards titillation disjunctively, as either pleasant or nonpleasant, in order to accommodate the diverse phenomenology of human laughter. However, there is no requirement that each disjunct must be realizable for all species that laugh, that for rats there must also be cases of 50 kHz chirping in the absence of "enjoyment". Humans have more going for them than rats: convoluted brainware and intricate cognitive interference may uniquely enable the extra alternative for humans. Even so, this possibility is not yet entirely ruled out for rats. Panksepp and Burgdorf write: 39 Panksepp and Burgdorf (1999), p. 231. 40 Panksepp and Burgdorf (1999), p. 240. 44 "One of the potentially inconsistent findings is the existence of some 50-kHz chirps during aggressive encounters. ... However, we note that it is the intruder animal[s] that exhibit the vast majority of the aggression-related 50-kHz vocalizations, and the levels are so sparse as to be of dubious significance when contrasted to the high levels evident during play and tickling" [embedded citations omitted]."41 "Although Darwin noted in his The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals: "Laughter seems primarily to be the expression of mere joy or happiness", we would note that the motor expressions of laughter and the affective experience of mirth may be elaborated in distinct areas of the brain [embedded citations omitted]."42 The first passage invites a reminder of human cases. Unprovoked and unexpected violent attacks can elicit hollow laughs that reflect shocked surprise, bewilderment, anguish, or dismay, not pleasant feelings like amusement or mirth. Such occurrences may be few and far between, in comparison with the frequency of the aggressor's laughter in such attacks, and in comparison with the usual laughter of play or tickling, but they nonetheless matter. Maybe rats are capable of more complex feelings than are presently dreamed of in our psychology, or less tendentiously, maybe affective states in rats have a facet or two more than has been assumed. The second passage seems to allow for joint "elaborations" that consist of pairings of laughter with feelings other than mirth. Such different pairings are often related to pathological disorders involving compulsive laughter, and such laughter could perhaps be excluded on principled grounds, as we might exclude a toper's flush from counting as a blush. But not all such pairings are manifestations of pathological disorder. Some such pairings may even have an evolved "natural function": think of the kind of mocking laughter that also 41 Panksepp and Burgdorf (2003), p. 538. The intruder rats must be Hobbesian laughers. 42 Panksepp and Burgdorf (1999), p. 241. 45 functions as a warning: "I am not amused." Our language has many such expressions for nonpleasant laughter that carry no implication of dysfunction,43 but reflect instead the rich, complex diversity of our evolutionary heritage. * * * In this paper, I recapitulated the case for an alternative to Morreall's formulaic theory of laughter, an alternative that, while equally minimal, attempts to do justice to instances of laughter that may not be caused by or involve the expression of feelings that are pleasant. This alternative, the titillation theory, was then defended against charges of vicious circularity, triviality, and vacuity, and shown to have empirical content. Furthermore, it was shown that the titillation formula has a close counterpart in a hypothesis already under preliminary scientific investigation, thus raising the possibility of a useful collaboration between philosophy and science. Finally, it was suggested that the titillation account, certain indications to the contrary notwithstanding, can be squared with recent work in psychology alleging the discovery of evolutionary antecedents of human laughter in rats. 43 Cf. the discussion of acerbic laughter in my "Laughter and Pleasure", pp. 163-64.

The received method for ruling out brain areas from being NCC undermines itself Benjamin Kozuch University of Alabama Philosophy Department Abstract : : Research into the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) aims to identify not just those brain areas that are NCC, but also those that are not. In the received method for ruling out a brain area from being an NCC, this is accomplished by showing a brain area's content to be consistently absent from subjects' reports about what they are experiencing. This paper points out how this same absence can be used to infer that the brain area's content is cognitively inaccessible, in which case we would expect its content to be absent from subjects' reports whether its content is (phenomenally) conscious or not. If so, such reports cannot count as evidence against that brain area being an NCC, and the received method fails. An alternative method (one suggested in Block 2007) is considered. Introduction 1 2. The received method for ruling out brain areas from being NCC 1 2.1 Goals of NCC research 1 2.2 The received method for ruling out brain areas from being NCC 1 2.3 Negative reports and the received method 1 2.4 A problem for negative reports 1 3. The failure of the received method 1 3.1 If subjects consistently give negative reports about content in some brain area A, then the content of A is inaccessible 1 3.2 If the content of brain area A is inaccessible, then negative reports about content in A provide no evidence for its content being not conscious 1 3.3 The failure of the received method 1 3.4 A conscious spinal cord? (An objection) 1 4. Consequences and conclusions 1 References 1 2 Introduction Following a protracted absence, the scientific study of experience is again in full bloom. Something currently pursued with enthusiasm is research into the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC), those brain areas (or processes)1 whose activity is closely allied with conscious experience. While there is not yet anything approaching unanimity concerning what the NCC are, the list of candidates at least appears shrinking. However, there is a problem that any science of consciousness faces, one that I think proves particularly troubling for NCC research. A scientific study of consciousness of course requires data concerning consciousness. But what a subject experiences is something discovered only through report. There being this intermediary creates an epistemic space in which a problem appears: Anytime a subject reports not having experienced a stimulus, it is possible that the stimulus was experienced, it is just that the experience was cognitively inaccessible, and therefore unreportable. To some, this might seem an abuse of the concept of consciousness: The possibility just discussed implies that one could have a conscious mental state and yet not know it, but is this not a contradiction? Indeed, it sounds contradictory. But it need not be. Here, it helps to appeal to Block's distinction between phenomenal and access consciousness (1995, 2002). Phenomenal consciousness refers to the experiential aspect that some mental states have: A mental state is phenomenally conscious if and only if there is something that it is like for one to have that mental state (Nagel 1974; Block 1995; Chalmers 1995).2 There is something it is like for one to experience the feel of velour, to have hunger pangs; it is experiential mental states like these that phenomenal consciousness picks out. Access consciousness refers to mental states having a certain kind of cognitive availability: Some mental state is access conscious if and only if its content is poised for use in rational and voluntary control of action-including making reports.3 1 In this paper, we focus only on the research program devoted to finding the brain areas that are NCC, rather than processes. Henceforth, I drop mention of the latter. For examples of work in the latter research program, see Crick & Koch 1990, or Hameroff & Penrose 1996. 2 The inclusion of "for one" in "something that it is like for one to have that mental state" is sometimes thought to lend support to higher-order theories of consciousness, since it implies that each time a mental state is conscious, it is because some subject is "aware" of the mental state (Rosenthal 2002). This "awareness," however, can be understood in a robust or deflationary way, and only the more robust understanding gives support to higher-order theories (Block 2007). 3 There seems to be some variation in how the concept of "phenomenal consciousness" is understood. On a weaker understanding, a mental state's being phenomenally conscious implies only that it is experientially conscious, in the way described by Nagel and Chalmers. On a stronger understanding, a mental state's being phenomenally consciousness implies not only that it is experiential, but that it also fails to be access conscious. 3 Appealing to these concepts, we can see more clearly the problem that a scientific study of consciousness might face: In instances where a subject reports not having (phenomenally) experienced a stimulus, the scientist wants to take this to mean that there was in fact no experience of the stimulus; however, there exists the possibility that there was such an experience, it was just not accessed. (Hereafter, I use the terms "phenomenal consciousness," "consciousness," and "experience" equivalently, except where noted. I also use "access consciousness" and "access" equivalently.) Naturally, this problem arises only if it is possible that experience occurs in absence of access. Block argues strenuously for this thesis (1995, 2005, 2007, 2011; see also Lamme 2006, 2010), but it has its share of detractors (e.g., Chalmers 1997; Rosenthal 2002; Clark 2009; Cohen & Dennett 2011).4 This issue is probably not resolved soon-perhaps not surprisingly, it turns out difficult to give forceful, non-question begging arguments for or against access consciousness being necessary for phenomenal consciousness. Given this, it is worthwhile to wonder what consequences the possibility of unaccessed experiences would have for a science of the NCC. That is what this paper does. As explained below, accomplishing the goals of NCC research requires the ability to identify not just those brain areas whose activity is constitutive of conscious experience, but also those whose activity is not. What I will here argue is that, if it is possible that experience occurs in absence of access,5, 6 then what seemed our most promising method for ruling out brain areas from being NCC turns out to not work- not at all. I will summarize the argument. In the received method for ruling out brain areas from being NCC, one establishes that a brain area is not an NCC7 by showing that its content is consistently absent from subjects' reports about what they are experiencing. But some content's being absent from reports also acts as evidence for its content being inaccessible, since its content being inaccessible would be a good explanation as to why it never shows up in reports. So if a brain area's content is inaccessible, we should expect it to be absent from subjects' reports whether it is phenomenally conscious or not, and its failure to show up in subjects' reports provides no evidence for its content being not conscious. In short, the received method for ruling out brain areas from being 4 See fn. 22 for a more comprehensive list of those commentators on either side of this debate. 5 The modal claim here is one of epistemic possibility. Putting it roughly: Some proposition P is epistemically possible if, given one's present knowledge, one is not justified in thinking that P is false. So the assumption adopted in this paper is that, given our present knowledge, we are not justified in thinking that phenomenal consciousness never occurs in absence of access consciousness. 6 The antecedent of this conditional could be understood as saying that it is possible that there are unaccessed experiences, or that it is possible that there are inaccessible experiences The assumption adopted below is that both are possible. This issue is discussed further in 2.4. 7 The phrase "brain area A is not an NCC" is shorthand for "activity in A is never conscious." Thus when looking for those brain areas that are not NCC, what we are looking for are those brain areas whose activity never contributes to conscious experience. 4 NCC fails whenever it is used. As I argue below, this negatively affects the prospects for accomplishing some goals of NCC research, including determining the "neural natural kind" of experience (Block 2007). The paper proceeds as follows: In Sect. 2, I provide background, explaining some of the goals and focus of current NCC research, and describing the received method for ruling out brain areas from being NCC. I also discuss a problem that the use of reports as data faces if it is the case that experience might occur in absence of access. In Sect. 3, I present the argument described two paragraphs above, concluding that the received method cannot work. In Sect. 4, I discuss consequences this has for NCC research. 2. The received method for ruling out brain areas from being NCC This section performs stage-setting. I start by explaining why accomplishing the goals of NCC research relies on being able to rule out brain areas from being NCC, and then describe the received method for doing this. Next I point out how this method requires using negative reports, reports in which subjects indicate some content is not a part of their experience. Then I describe a problem that any use of negative reports potentially faces, one that I later argue is particularly threatening to the received method 2.1 Goals of NCC research When discussing the target of current NCC research, it should first be noted that the term "neural correlates of consciousness" is a bit of a misnomer. Most NCC researchers seek more than that which merely correlates with consciousness, it being more accurate to say that they are searching for the neural basis of consciousness (Kanwisher 2001; Crick & Koch 2003; Block 2007; Tononi & Koch 2008).8, 9 It is also important to note that it is specifically conscious experience (AKA "phenomenal consciousness") that most NCC researchers take to be the target of their research (e.g., Baars 1988; Milner & Goodale 1995/2006; Damasio 1999; Crick & Koch 2003; Tononi & 8 We can understand the neural basis of an experience E to be whatever neural states would have been minimally sufficient for the occurrence of E (Chalmers 2000): For any experience E, there will probably be some neural states that correlate with E, but which are not essential to the occurrence of E; the idea here is that such mere correlates can be excised by defining the term "neural basis" in terms of minimal sufficiency. 9 The particular term "neural basis" is not used by all of the researchers just cited, but it is clear that they have something along these lines in mind. 5 Koch 2008; Lau 2010; but see Dehaene & Changeux 2004).10 It is conscious experience that gives rise to the vexing problems standing in our way of understanding consciousness (Chalmers 1995, 1996). Indeed, this is why there is such excitement surrounding NCC research: Perhaps such research will shed light where philosophical approaches have thus far been unable to (Baars 1988; Damasio 1999; Crick & Koch 2003; Lau 2010; but see Chalmers 1996, Ch. 3).11 Among the various goals of NCC research, there are two that we focus on below. The first is to determine which brain areas compose the content NCC (Frith, Perry & Lumer 1999; Chalmers 2000; Rees, Kreiman & Koch 2002; Crick & Koch 2003; Hohwy 2009; Overgaard & Overgaard 2010), these being those brain areas12 that directly determine the content of experience.13 More precisely, some brain area A is a content NCC if and only if content C being represented in A (assuming certain background conditions obtain)14 is sufficient for C being represented in experience (cf. Chalmers 2000). It could be, for instance, that there is a brain area such that whenever it represents redness, this constitutes an experience as of redness; if so, such an area is a content NCC for color experience. Much contemporary NCC research is directed at finding the content NCC. A second goal of NCC research is to discover what we might call the NCC, the type of neural activity both necessary and sufficient for experience. Following Block (2007), we can call this the "neural natural kind" of experience. (It is of course possible that there is more than one type of neural activity sufficient for experience, a complication mostly set aside in this paper.)15 In the case of visual experience, hypotheses concerning the neural natural kind include recurrent loops between the striate and extrastriate visual cortex (Lamme 2006; Block 2007; Gennaro 10 I remind the reader that this paper adopts the weaker understanding of "phenomenal consciousness," it being equivalent to "experience" (see fn. 3). And so none of the researchers just cited should necessarily be taken to countenance the idea of experience without access. 11 Crick and Koch, for example, have argued that finding the NCC might make "the problem of qualia clearer," it being "fruitless to approach this problem head on" (2003:119). 12 That there would be brain areas that qualify as content NCC assumes that the neural basis of consciousness can-to some significant degree, and in some sensible fashion-be localized to certain brain areas. This is a common assumption in NCC research (see, e.g., Milner & Goodale 1995/2006; Chalmers 2000; Rees, Kreiman & Koch 2002; Zeki 2003), one that this paper joins in. 13 Content NCC are often contrasted with background NCC, those neural systems whose activity correlates with general modes or levels of experience, such as dreaming, being wide awake, or being disoriented. Some have hypothesized the background NCC are in the upper brain stem (e.g., Crick & Koch 2003; Block 2009). 14 For example, it might be necessary for the background NCC (see previous footnote) to be operating properly. 15 A more sophisticated way of understanding this goal of NCC research would recognize this possibility, saying that the goal is to discover the set of neural properties such that (a) at least one of the properties in the set must obtain if there is to be experience, and (b) any of the properties in the set individually obtaining is sufficient for experience. 6 2012, Ch. 9), synchronized activity between prefrontal and visual areas (Kriegel 2007), and intermediate-level visual processing that is constituted by gamma vectorwaves (Prinz 2012). Important to accomplishing both goals is the ability to show that a brain area is not an NCC. In the case of locating the content NCC, it is important because this goal involves determining not just which brain areas are content NCC, but also those that are not. (That this latter part is a goal of NCC research is made apparent by some examples in 2.2.) The ability to rule out brain areas from being NCC is also important in instances where there are competing hypotheses as to which brain area is the neural basis of some type of conscious content (e.g., experiences as of motion), since it allows us to eliminate some of the hypotheses. In the case of the second goal, that of finding the neural natural kind of experience, being able to rule out brain areas from being NCC is important for showing that some neural property P is necessary for experience, since one important kind of confirmation of this hypothesis would come from instances where a brain area both lacks P and is not an NCC. Plausibly, there are other reasons for which ruling brain areas out from being NCC is important to a science of consciousness.16 Next we examine what would be the obvious method for accomplishing this. 2.2 The received method for ruling out brain areas from being NCC Finding the content NCC is often thought to be accomplished through a process of content matching: One locates the content NCC by finding those brain areas whose content systematically matches the content of experience (Chalmers 2000; Noe & Thompson 2004). The motivation is clear enough: Say we found a brain area such that, whenever it represented content C (e.g., redness), C was represented in experience; plausibly, this would be evidence for that brain area being the neural basis of experiences that have C as their content. More to present purposes, content matching also provides a way to show that brain areas are not NCC. This is accomplished by finding mismatches in content between brain areas and experience. This method is also intuitive: Say some brain area represented content C (e.g., greenness) though the subject was not having an experience as of C (she was instead, say, experiencing redness, or no color at all). It would be odd to think that the brain area in question was the neural basis of that 16 Being able to rule out brain areas from being NCC is likely also important in instances where there are multiple candidates for whatever neural property is sufficient for experience, since an instance in which some brain area both has P and is not conscious falsifies the hypothesis that P is sufficient for experience, thereby eliminating it as a candidate. Similarly, instances in which some brain area both lacks P and fails to be conscious might, under proper circumstances, be considered to confirm the hypothesis that P is sufficient for experience. 7 experience.17 Given this, a mismatch in content between experience E and brain area A can count as evidence against A being an NCC. Furthermore, were it found to be the case that the content of A was consistently mismatched with the content of experience, one might think that this provides justification for thinking that the brain area is in fact not an NCC. This latter idea-that one shows that a brain area is not an NCC by demonstrating its content to be consistently mismatched with the content of experience-I will call the received method for ruling out brain areas from being NCC.18 One brain area looking like it might succumb to the received method is V1 (also known as the primary visual cortex), which is the low-level visual area where a majority of visual information first enters the cortex. There are numerous experiments seeming to demonstrate content mismatches between V1 and visual experience. Probably the best-known of these would be a series of single-cell studies involving binocular rivalry (Logothetis and Schall 1989; Leopold and Logothetis 1996; Sheinberg and Logothetis 1997), in which relatively stable activity was observed in V1, in contrast to the alternating images experienced by subjects during binocular rivalry. In another study, very fine gratings, ones subjects report to look like a uniform field, nonetheless produced aftereffects in V1 that corresponded to the grating's orientation (He & MacLeod 2001). And in another experiment, V1 was shown to represent rapidly flickering colors that subjects experienced as only one color (Gur & Snodderly 1997). Of course, these examples, on their own, only show that activity in V1 is sometimes not constitutive of visual experience. But the idea here would be that, as content mismatches between V1 and conscious experience continue to amass, it gradually increases the degree to which we are justified in thinking that V1 is not an NCC (Chalmers 2000; Rees, Kreiman & Koch 2002; Tononi & Koch 2008). For similar reasons, some commentators have been tempted to say that the so-called dorsal visual processing stream is not an NCC (Milner & Goodale 1995/2006; Jacob & Jeannerod 2003): The dorsal stream is thought to provide those representations that guide visuomotor action, and yet there are numerous studies in which visuomotor actions appear unaffected by consciously experienced visual illusions (e.g., Bridgeman et al. 1979; Aglioti, Goodale & Desouza 1995; Ellis, Flanagan & Lederman 1999; Kroliczak et al. 2006). The received method looks important to NCC research, since it appears able to provide strong evidence against a brain area being an NCC. As seen above, this is something important to accomplishing the goals of NCC research. 17 Justification for this is found in what is known as the "isomorphism constraint," which says that, as a matter of nomological necessity, if some brain area A forms the neural basis of some experience E, then A has the same representational content as E (Noe & Thompson 2004). 18 I note that the received method is not explicitly used in NCC research. Nonetheless, the reasoning embodied in the received method is frequently at work in NCC research, if only implicitly (see, e.g., Chalmers 2000; Prinz 2000, 2012; Rees, Kreiman & Koch 2002; Brogaard 2011). 8 2.3 Negative reports and the received method Something needed for any scientific study of consciousness is data regarding consciousness itself. But consciousness is usually considered private: While each person knows consciousness intimately, one can be acquainted only with one's own experience (Nagel 1974). That experience would be a first-person phenomenon poses a problem for a scientific study of consciousness, since it is often thought that only data that are public are admissible in science (Hempel 1952; Feigl 1953; Sellars 1956; Popper 1959; Railton 1985; Baars 2003). In response to this, there has been broad agreement that it will be reports that constitute the publicly available evidence concerning consciousness (see, e.g., Marcel 1988; Chalmers 1998; Baars 2003; Jack & Roepstorff 2003; Rees 2007).19 Below we are concerned with negative reports, reports in which a subject indicates some content is not a part of her experience. When a subject reports experiencing one continuous color, for instance, though V1 represents the stimulus as flickering, this counts as a negative report about the content of V1. Negative reports are what make content mismatches possible: It is only through the subject giving a negative report about the content of a brain area that we could discover that the brain area's content is mismatched with experience. Thus the received method, with its reliance on content mismatches, must make use of negative reports. 2.4 A problem for negative reports Recall Block's distinction between phenomenal and access consciousness: Phenomenal consciousness picks out mental states that are experiential, access consciousness picks out mental states the contents of which can be used in rational, voluntary control of action, including reports. The phenomenal/access consciousness distinction highlights a potential problem for negative reports, which is that anytime a subject gives a negative report about some content, the content might actually be phenomenally conscious, but fails to be reported because it is not access conscious. We consider an example. Damage to the right parietal cortex can result in hemispatial neglect, a failure to acknowledge objects in the left visual field (Driver & Vuilleumier 2001).20 A neglect patient might not notice that the left half of a depicted horse is actually a cow (Peru et al. 1996), or that the left half of a sketched house is in flames (Marshall & Halligan 1988), though 19 The idea of a "report" should not be equated with verbal report. As the term is commonly used in psychology, one can report being conscious of the stimulus by pushing a button, raising a hand, giving a nod, and so on. 20 Hemispatial neglect can also manifest as a failure to acknowledge the left part of individual objects, the coming two examples being instances of this. 9 indirect measures indicate that such information continues to be represented (the neglect patient might say that an unaltered horse picture looks "more real," or pick the house that is not on fire as the one she would prefer to live in). Because of parietal areas' known role in attention, neglect is often thought a disorder of attention. But some commentators go beyond this, taking it also to be a disorder of consciousness, claiming that in hemispatial neglect there is no experience of leftlocated items (Driver & Vuilleumier 2001; Koch & Tsuchiya 2007; Prinz 2007; Vosgerau & Newen 2008).21 For others, this is hasty: Perhaps when the neglect patient fails to acknowledge an object, there is an experience of the object, but an inability to access the experience prevents its report (Lamme 2006; Block 2007; Jacob & Vignemont 2010). A lack of access might be expected given the impairments of attention that neglect involves. Hemispatial neglect makes vivid what might be a general problem for negative reports: In any case where a subject reports some content C is not a part of her experience, the report underdetermines whether C is experiential or not, since the negative report might result, not from C failing to be experiential, but rather from its failing to be accessed. Of course, this is not a problem if experience never occurred in absence of access. In the argument presented in the next section, I take the possibility of experience without access as an assumption, a starting point for an investigation. I do not think that this is helping myself to too much, since the idea that experience occurs without access is currently the subject of vigorous debate,22 one probably not resolved soon. Indeed, there are a number of experiments plausibly interpreted as instances of experience without access. For example, in some studies of hemispatial neglect,23 neglected faces have been shown to bring about significant activation in the fusiform face area (Driver & Vuilleumier 2001; Rees et al. 2000, 2002), a high-level visual area sometimes thought the neural basis of conscious face perception (Tong et al. 1998).24 In addition, there are a collection of studies based around partial report protocols (Sperling 1960; Landman, Spekreijse & Lamme 2003; Lamme 2010) that are sometimes interpreted as instances 21 More precisely, we can say that these commentators mean to deny that any of the visual states representing left-located items are experientially (i.e., phenomenally) conscious. Here, it is hard to choose terminology that makes everyone happy, as some higher-order theorists (e.g., Rosenthal 1997) would say that the hemispatial neglect patient is conscious of the left-located items ("transitively" conscious), in virtue of her visual system bearing representations of left-located items, but that these representations themselves fail to be ("intransitively") conscious. The issue we are concerned with here is whether these representations are experientially conscious. 22 Commentators giving arguments suggesting that phenomenal experience and access experience cannot come apart include Dennett 1995; Chalmers 1996, 1997; Kriegel 2006; Clark 2007, 2009; Rosenthal 2002, 2007; Brown 2011; Cohen & Dennett 2011; those giving arguments suggesting that they can come apart include Wolfe 1999; Dehaene & Naccache 2001; Lamme 2006; Dretske 2006, 2007; Wallhagen 2007; Block 1995, 2001, 2007, 2011. 23 More specifically, the studies involve a type of neglect known as visual extinction, a disorder in which subjects will ignore a left-located item if a right-located item is presented simultaneously. 24 This last example comes from Block 2007. 10 in which subjects consciously perceive more than they are able to access and therefore report (Block 2007, 2011; Lamme 2010), in part because the abilities subjects display in these experiments are thought to rely on items being represented in recurrent loops between visual areas (Lamme 2004), a type of neural activity closely associated with conscious perception (Pascual-Leone & Walsh 2001; Silvanto 2005; Camprodon et al. 2010). Naturally, whether one takes these studies (see also Vandenbroucke et al. 2013) to demonstrate experience without access will largely be a function of one's pre-existing theoretical predilections. But the point here is not that the explanation according to which these are instances of experience without access is our only plausible explanation of these experiments, but rather that it is one of them. So there seems to be reason to think that the possibility of experience without access is- at very least-not to be brusquely dismissed. But this leaves open the possibility that content must at least be accessible if it is to be experiential. Consider, however, that accessibility is a dispositional property: Some content is accessible if and only if it has the potential to be accessed (e.g., if it would be accessed, if mechanisms of access attempted to recover it). But the property of being conscious appears occurrent: Some content is conscious if and only if it actually manifests the property of being experiential. So, if accessibility is necessary for experience, then it looks as if some content's having a dispositional property (accessibility) can be used to explain its having an occurrent property (being experiential). But this is just the opposite of how one would think that dispositional and occurrent properties are related: Intuitively, the dispositional property of fragility that a glass possesses is explained by whatever occurrent (probably microphysical) properties it has, not the other way around. Indeed, it is sometimes doubted whether dispositional properties are causally efficacious at all (Prior, Pargetter & Jackson 1982).25 Additionally, the idea that accessibility is necessary for experience seems committed to strange predictions. Consider a case in which there is some accessible content C in brain area A, which is conscious from times t-1 to t-2 (somewhere around a few seconds), but never accessed. Next consider the same scenario, but this time, at some point between t-1 and t-2, the connections between A and whatever brain areas might have accessed its content are severed, leaving A's other connections untouched. Now, if accessibility is necessary for experience, then the very instant that the connections are severed, C becomes unconscious. And this is the case even though the connections between brain area A and whatever brain areas might have accessed content C were inactive at the time of severance; and even though activity in A continued the same before and after the severance. Certainly, one could not (without begging the question) rule this scenario out, that C's losing the dispositional property of accessibility would immediately 25 It is true that some first-order (Dretske 1995; Tye 1995) and higher-order (Carruthers 2000) representational theories of consciousness appeal to a dispositional property in order to say what makes a mental state conscious. But this is usually thought to be a cost of holding one of these theories (Rowlands 2001; Jehle & Kriegel 2006). We should expect the same in the present case. 11 result in C losing the occurrent property of being conscious; but this scenario is at least less intuitive than one in which C continues to be conscious. What we saw earlier is that it is hard to dismiss the possibility of experience without access. This raised the question as to whether accessibility might be required for experience, but now we have seen reason to think that it is not. And so it looks as if it is possible that experience occurs without accessibility.26 Be that as it may, I remind the reader that this possibility is something that I intend to take as an assumption. My present goal has just been to provide some motivation for adopting this assumption. Shortly, we look at what consequences the possibility of experience without accessibility would have for NCC research. I will restate this section's main points: One is that accomplishing the goals of NCC research requires (or at least would benefit from) the ability to rule out brain areas from being NCC. Another is that our most promising method for doing so (i.e., the received method) makes use of negative reports. The final point is that, if experience happens in absence of access, then a negative report has the potential to mislead, since there is the possibility that some given negative report results, not from a lack of experience, but rather access. 3. The failure of the received method The received method for ruling out brain areas from being NCC, the reader will remember, recommends finding numerous instances in which the contents of experience are mismatched with the contents of a brain area, using this to infer that the brain area is not an NCC. Let us 26 At this point, one might ask for an account of what an inaccessible experience is. If one has an idea as to what an experiential mental state is, it is not difficult to picture an inaccessible experience. When one has an experiential mental state, there is something it is like for that subject to have the mental state. Now picture the same experiential state occurring, but under conditions in which its content is not able to be enlisted in higher-level cognition, voluntary control of action, or reports; i.e., the kinds of use to which content that is access conscious can be put. An inaccessible experience is just this. Then again, perhaps not everyone will find this so clear-cut. We could imagine someone (e.g., a higher-order theorist) claiming that, when she reflects upon conscious experience, it is obvious that it essentially involves some kind of access-namely, to whatever worldly properties the experience represents -and that this calls into question whether the idea of an inaccessible experience is even intelligible. Unfortunately, it is unclear whether there is any non-question begging line of argument in favor of either the idea that access is essential to experience, or that it is not. While this issue remains a difficulty for the position for which I argue below, space dictates that it be left aside, and I take it as an assumption that the idea of an inaccessible experience is coherent. 12 formalize the reasoning upon which the received method is based. In using the received method, one advances an argument like this: (Received Method Argument, First Pass) 1. If some brain area A is consistently involved in content mismatches, then the content of A is not conscious 2. Brain area A is consistently involved in content mismatches C. The content of brain area A is not conscious So far, so good. However, whether there is a content mismatch in any instance is not something to which the scientist has direct access, this being discovered only through negative reports. We revise the argument to reflect this: (Received Method Argument, Final Pass) 1. If subjects consistently give negative reports about content in some brain area A, then the content of A is not conscious 2. Subjects consistently give negative reports about content in brain area A C. The content of brain area A is not conscious Formulated this way, the received method faces a formidable challenge. More specifically, I think that anytime Premise 2 is shown to be true about some brain area A, it leads to Premise 1 being false about A. This is because Premise 2 being true also sets in motion the reasoning of this argument: (Master Argument) 1. If subjects consistently give negative reports about content in some brain area A, then the content of A is inaccessible 2. If the content of brain area A is inaccessible, then negative reports about content in A provide no evidence for its content being not conscious C. If subjects consistently give negative reports about content in some brain area A, then negative reports about content in A provide no evidence for its content being not conscious 13 Justification for each premise of the Master Argument is provided shortly. For time being, I would have the reader notice the upshot, which is that anytime one manages to carry out the recommendation of the received method-that is, anytime one is able to show that the content of some brain area A is consistently the subject of negative reports (i.e., show that Premise 2 of the Received Method Argument is true about that brain area)-one thereby also triggers the reasoning of the Master Argument. But the conclusion of the Master Argument implies that Premise 1 of the Received Method Argument is false about brain area A, in which case the Received Method Argument no longer goes through. So, if the Master Argument is sound, then the received method fails in any instance it is used. Now we go carefully through each premise of the Master Argument. 3.1 If subjects consistently give negative reports about content in some brain area A, then the content of A is inaccessible Let us consider some hypothetical brain area A, whose content is consistently subject to negative reports. At this point, the received method says that these reports show that the content of A is not conscious, but let us, for now, put aside the question of whether these reports really do this. Instead, let us assess what the consistent negative reports say about the accessibility of content in A. It seems that such reports are evidence for content in brain area A being inaccessible to the mechanisms of report. On the one hand, consider that the inaccessibility of the content of A would act as a good explanation for why subjects consistently give negative reports about the content of A; this is to say, it is plausible to think that subjects make such reports because the content of A is inaccessible to the mechanisms of report (cf. Brogaard 2011). On the other hand, were the content of A accessible, it would be hard to explain why its content never shows up in reports. Given these considerations, the first premise of the Master Argument seems wellsupported: If subjects consistently give negative reports about content in some brain area A, then the content of A is inaccessible. 3.2 If the content of brain area A is inaccessible, then negative reports about content in A provide no evidence for its content being not conscious In approaching the premise entitling this section, let us revisit earlier thoughts. Remember the reason for which the scientist resorts to reports when studying experience, this being the privacy of experience. This was to be overcome by having subjects report upon what they are and are not experiencing. Closer to present purposes, the idea would be that a negative report about content C could be used as evidence for C being not conscious. This is analogous to how a path through 14 a cloud chamber is taken as evidence for an electron having the trajectory of that path, or how Koplik spots are taken as evidence for a patient having measles. But, as I explain now, when it comes to a brain area whose content is always inaccessible (what I will refer to as an "inaccessible brain area"), negative reports do not provide any evidence for its content being not conscious (cf. Block 2007). According to how evidence is often understood (see, e.g., Hacking 1975), an observation of property P is evidence for some other property P* also obtaining if and only if P is a reliable indicator of P*, where reliable indication is grounded in covariation between the two properties. Koplik spots are evidence for measles, for instance, because they accompany measles (and no other disease). It is natural to extend this reasoning, saying that the strength of evidential support that an observation of P provides for P* is a function of how reliably P covaries with P*. If it were the case, for example, that P obtains only if P* also obtains, then one could be sure, on basis of having observed P, that P* also obtains. Likewise, if P* had no covariational relationship with P-more specifically, if P would obtain whether or not P* obtains-then an observation of P plausibly provides no evidence in favor of P* obtaining: If measles neither cause nor prevent Koplik spots, then an observation of Koplik spots would say nothing about whether or not the patient has measles. This brings us to the issue with which we are presently concerned, which is whether a negative report about content C is evidence against C being (phenomenally) conscious, if C is in an inaccessible brain area. If what was just discussed is correct, such reports provide no evidence for this at all: Since C is an inaccessible brain area, C's being conscious could not make it any more likely to be reported as such. Given that negative reports about C have no covariational relationship with C being conscious, they are a (maximally) unreliable indicator of whether C is conscious or not. We must conclude that, if some content C is in an inaccessible brain area, a negative report about C offers no evidence-not even weak evidence-for C being not conscious. 3.3 The failure of the received method The idea behind the received method is that if one finds that subjects consistently give negative reports about the content of a brain area, then one can infer from these reports that that brain area is not an NCC. However, what we just saw is that if one successfully establishes that a brain area's content is consistently the subject of negative reports, one also establishes that its content is inaccessible, since such reports are best explained by such content being inaccessible. But if its content is inaccessible, then negative reports are an entirely unreliable indicator of whether its content is conscious or not, and therefore provide no evidence for its content being not conscious. In sum, in the very process of following the recommendations of the received method, 15 we lose the evidential value of those reports that we had hoped to use to show that a brain area is not an NCC. The received method undermines itself, failing in each instance it is used. Let us now revisit brain area V1 and the dorsal stream. In 2.2, we saw what appeared to be a notable body of evidence against V1 being an NCC: V1 represented a stimulus as being composed of fine gratings, though subjects reported it as appearing uniform; V1 represented flickering colors, though subjects reported the stimulus to look of only one color; and so on. We also saw similar evidence in the case of the dorsal visual processing stream, in the form of numerous instances in which dorsally guided visuomotor actions appeared unaffected by consciously experienced visual illusions. However, if the content of V1 and the dorsal stream were inaccessible, this would prevent these negative reports from counting as evidence against them being NCC, for reasons just discussed. Indeed, there is neuroanatomical data suggesting that these brain areas are inaccessible, as both V1 and the dorsal stream have sparse or no direct connections to those areas in the prefrontal cortex thought necessary for making reports (Felleman & Van Essen 1991). But, as seen above, there is perhaps a stronger reason for thinking this: If the dorsal stream and V1 were inaccessible brain areas, this provides a good explanation as to why subjects consistently give negative reports about the content of these brain areas. If so, then the negative reports cannot be used as evidence for these brain areas being not NCC, and the received method fails in the case of V1 and the dorsal stream. Earlier in paper, we observed that it seemed as if the received method provided some notable, if not conclusive, evidence against V1 and the dorsal stream being NCC. Surprisingly, it looks to provides none at all. 3.4 A conscious spinal cord? (An objection) One might respond to the argument just given by rejecting the kind of reasoning it employs, alleging that it leads to absurd conclusions. Consider that, since neural activity in the spinal cord is inaccessible, we would expect negative reports about its activity whether it is conscious or not. But does this not mean that if we accept the reasoning of the last section, we cannot reject the idea that the spinal cord might be conscious? And yet we know that the spinal cord is not conscious, indicating something is wrong with the reasoning used-or so concludes this objection. However, what I specifically argued for above is that negative reports are unable to provide evidence for an inaccessible brain area being not conscious. If we transpose the reasoning in question so that it concerns the spinal cord, we get the conclusion that negative reports cannot provide evidence against the spinal cord being conscious. So if the objection in 16 question is to go through, it must be the case that negative reports are the only means we have for ruling out the spinal cord from being conscious. Probably, there are other means available. It has sometimes been argued that an absence of evidence for experience serves as evidence for an absence of experience (Huxley 1874/2002).27 In the case of the spinal cord, we are hard-pressed to find anything looking like evidence for its being conscious. So if the principle just mentioned is correct, then we do have evidence for the spinal cord being not conscious. But when it comes to inaccessible brain areas, there does not seem to be the same kind of lack of evidence as in the case of the spinal cord. Consider that, though we lack anything like direct evidence for there sometimes being experience in inaccessible brain areas, there is of course no lack of evidence for there sometimes being experience in brain areas, full stop. This is especially true when it comes to the kind of brain area being considered in this paper, cerebral brain areas. The cerebral cortex is the wrinkly outermost layer of the brain, a phylogenetically recent addition where higher functions like memory, perception, and reasoning are in large part carried out. The cerebral cortex is also often thought to be where consciousness resides (at least in part). The upshot is, even if a brain area is inaccessible, if it is a cerebral brain area (like V1 or the dorsal stream), there is still some evidence for activity in it sometimes producing experience, because the inaccessible brain area is of the genus cerebral brain area, some of whose members we already know to sometimes produce experience.28 In sum, while there appears to be an absence of evidence for experience in the spinal cord, the same is not true in the case of inaccessible brain areas. Given this, there is no worry that the reasoning used to argue against the received method leads to our being unable to dismiss the possibility of a conscious spinal cord. 4. Consequences and conclusions Let us take stock. Earlier in the paper (2.1), we saw reasons why being able to show that a brain area is not an NCC is important to a science of consciousness. One reason comes from how content NCC research aims to identify not just those brain areas that are content NCC, but also those that are not. The ability to rule out brain areas from being NCC is also useful in cases where there is more than one hypothesis concerning what the neural basis of some type of 27 Quoth Huxley, "in the matter of experience...we may hold by the rule, de non apparentibus et de non existentibus eadem est ratio" (1874/2002:25); or "the reason is the same respecting things which do not appear, and those which do not exist." 28 We might not yet know which brain areas produce experience, but we do know that some brain areas must (on the assumption that the brain is responsible for conscious experience). 17 conscious content is (e.g., motion experience), since it allows us to rule out some of the hypotheses. Finally, being able to rule out brain areas from being NCC is helpful toward the end of finding the neural natural kind of experience, since it can provide us with instances where a brain area both lacks neural property P and is not an NCC, a confirmation of the hypothesis that P is necessary for experience. This raised the question as to how we might rule out brain areas from being NCC. The received method looked like the natural way to do so, but turned out not to work: To show that a brain area is not an NCC, the received method recommends that we accumulate instances where content in a brain area is the subject of negative reports; however, doing this turns out to be good only for showing that a brain area's content is inaccessible. Given this, what a science of consciousness needs is an alternative method for showing brain areas to be not NCC; ideally, one that can show this about inaccessible brain areas. We have at least one at our disposal (cf. Block 2007). The method starts by finding whatever neural property P is the neural natural kind of experience (see 2.1), then taking an inaccessible brain area to be an NCC if and only if it has P. And so it seems that this indirect method (as I will call it) provides an alternative way to rule out brain areas from being NCC.29, 30 Perhaps the failure of the received method does not leave a science of consciousness without recourse.31 The indirect method, however, has sizable downsides. For one thing, if the indirect method is all we have at our disposal, it will probably be some time before we can actually show that some brain area is not an NCC: Doing so requires knowing the neural natural kind of experience, and plausibly this is something that we will not know for some time. Another drawback of having only the indirect method is that it might prevent our ever having high confidence in a hypothesis concerning the neural natural kind of experience, qua the kind of 29 The trick here is to measure neural activity in those brain areas whose content we know to be (a) accessible (because subjects sometimes give "positive reports" about its content), and (b) not always conscious (because subjects sometimes give negative reports about its content), the idea being to look for some neural property P that comes and goes with the positive reports. Here, I leave aside the question of whether it will turn out difficult to implement the indirect method; but if it does, the failure of the received method has worse consequences for NCC research than the ones I describe just below. 30 Of course, this method relies on being able to disentangle the neural natural kind of access from the neural natural kind of experience, but there is reason to be optimistic that this can eventually be done. Consider Shea's method (2012; see also Block 2005, 2007): The idea here is to start by looking to see what natural kinds (property-clusters that generate reliable inductions) are associated with subjects' reports of being conscious of a stimulus. If experience happens without access, we should eventually discern two (rather than one) natural kinds. The one that is more closely associated with reports is to be considered the neural natural kind of accessibility, with the remaining one being the neural natural kind of experience. 31 I am grateful to an anonymous referee at Journal of Consciousness Studies for pointing out the importance and potential viability of this alternative method. 18 neural activity both necessary and sufficient for experience. To support the hypothesis that some neural property P is necessary for experience, what we want are a number of instances in which some content's being conscious comes and goes with P. Generally speaking, the more brain areas in which this relationship is observed, the more confident we can be. But if all we have is the indirect method, then the inductive base from which the hypothesis that P is the neural natural kind of experience is generalized can consist only of those brain areas whose content is accessible. Conceivably, these could be few in number. Notably, they will probably not include V1 and the dorsal stream, brain areas that the received method promised to deliver as part of the evidence to be used in determining the neural natural kind of experience. In sum, while the failure of the received method does not look fatal to a science of consciousness, it does mean that a science of consciousness might progress more slowly, and be able to draw less certain conclusions, than we might otherwise have hoped. What would be most helpful at this point is the development of new methods for ruling out brain areas from being NCC. Of course, none of this is a problem if it could definitively be shown that experience cannot happen in absence of access. Thus far, it is unclear how good the prospects for this are.32 References Aglioti, S., Goodale, D. & Desouza, J. (1995). Size contrast illusions deceive the eye but not the hand. Current Biology, 5, 679-85. Baars, B. (1988). A cognitive theory of consciousness. New York: Cambridge University Press Baars, B. (2003). Introduction: Treating consciousness as a variable: The fading taboo. In B. Baars, W. Banks & J. Newman (Eds.), Essential Sources in the Scientific Study of Consciousness, Cambridge: MIT Press. Baizer J., Ungerleider, L. & Desimone, R. (1991). Organization of visual inputs to the inferior temporal and posterior parietal cortex in macaques. Journal of Neuroscience, 11(1),168-90. Block, N. (1995). On a Confusion about a Function of Consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 18, 227-87. Block, N. (2002). Concepts of Consciousness. In D. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Contemporary and Classical Readings. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Block, N. (2005). Two neural correlates of consciousness. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 9(2), 46–52 32 I would like to thank Brian Fiala, Terry Horgan, Uriah Kriegel, Shaun Nichols, and two anonymous referees from the Journal of Consciousness Studies for discussion and comments on drafts of this paper. 19 Block, N. (2007). Consciousness, accessibility, and the mesh between psychology and neuroscience. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 30, 481-548. Block, N. (2009). Comparing the Major Theories of Consciousness. In Gazzaniga, M. (ed.), The Cognitive Neurosciences IV. Cambridge: MIT Press Block, N. (2011). Perceptual consciousness overflows cognitive access. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 15(12), 567–75. Boring, E. (1933). The physical dimensions of consciousness. New York: Century. Brogaard, B. (2011). Conscious vision for action versus unconscious vision for action? Cognitive science, 35(6), 1076-1104. Bridgeman, B., et al. (1979). Relation between cognitive and motor-oriented systems of visual position perception. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 5, 692-700. Brown, R. (2011) The myth of phenomenological overflow. Consciousness and Cognition, 21(2), 599604 Camprodon, J. A., Zohary, E., Brodbeck, V., & Pascual-Leone, A. (2010). Two phases of V1 activity for visual recognition of natural images. Journal of cognitive neuroscience, 22(6), 1262-1269. Carruthers, P. (2000). Phenomenal consciousness: A naturalistic theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chalmers, D. (1995). Facing up to the problem of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2(3),200-19 Chalmers, D. (1996). The Conscious Mind. New York: Oxford University Press. Chalmers, D. (1997). Availability: The cognitive basis of experience. Behavioral and Brain Sciences.20,148-149 Chalmers, D. (1998). On the search for the neural correlate of consciousness. In Hameroff et al. (Eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness. Cambridge: MIT press Chalmers, D. (2000).What is a neural correlate of consciousness? In Metzinger, T. (Ed.), Neural Correlates of Consciousness: Empirical and Conceptual Questions. Boston: MIT press Clark, A. (2007). What reaching teaches: Consciousness, control, and the inner zombie. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 58, 563-94. Clark, A. (2009). Perception, action, and experience: Unraveling the golden braid. Neuropsychologia, 47, 1460–1468 Cohen, M. & Dennett, D. (2011). Consciousness cannot be separated from function. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 15(8), 358-64. Crick, F., & Koch, C. (1990). Towards a neurobiological theory of consciousness. In Seminars in the Neurosciences (Vol. 2, pp. 263-275). Saunders Scientific Publications. 20 Crick, F. & Koch, C. (2003). A framework for consciousness. Nature Neuroscience, 6(2),119-125. Damasio, A. (1999). The Feeling of What Happens. New York: Harcourt Inc. Dehaene, S. & Changeux, J. (2004) Neural mechanisms for access to consciousness. In M. Gazzaniga (Ed.), The Cognitive Neurosciences III. Cambridge: MIT Press Dehaene, S., & Naccache, L. (2001). Towards a cognitive neuroscience of consciousness: basic evidence and a workspace framework. Cognition, 79(1), 1-37. Dennett, D. (1995). The Path Not Taken. Behavioral and Brain Sciences. 18, 252-253 Dretske, F. (1995). Naturalizing the Mind. Cambridge: MIT Press Dretske, F. (2006). Perception without awareness. In T. Gendler & J. Hawthorne (Eds.), Perceptual experience (pp. 147–180). Oxford: Clarendon Press. Dretske, F. (2007). What change blindness teaches us about consciousness. Philosophical Perspectives: Philosophy of Mind, 21, 215-30 Driver, J. & Vuilleumier, P. (2001). Perceptual awareness and its loss in unilateral neglect and extinction. Cognition, 79, 39-88. Ellis, R., Flanagan, J. & Lederman, S. (1999). The influence of visual illusion on grasp position. Experimental Brain Research, 125, 109-14. Feigl, Herbert (1953). The Scientific Outlook: Naturalism and Humanism. In Feigl, H., and Brodbeck, M. (Eds.), Readings in the Philosophy of Science. New York: Appleton-Century-Croft. Felleman, D. & Van Essen, D. (1991). Distributed Hierarchical Processing in the Primate Cerebral Cortex. Cerebral Cortex, 1, 1-47. Frith, C., Perry, R. & Lumer, E. (1999). The neural correlates of conscious experience: an experimental framework. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 3, 105-114. Gennaro, R. (2012) The Consciousness Paradox. Cambridge: MIT Press Gur, M. & Snodderly, D. (1997). A dissociation between brain activity and perception: Chromatically active cortical neurons signal chromatic activity that is not perceived. Vision Research, 37, 377382 Hacking, Ian (1975). The Emergence of Probability. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Haffenden, A. & Goodale, M. (1998). The effect of pictorial illusion on prehension and perception. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience. 10, 122-36. Hameroff, S. R., & Penrose, R. (1996). Conscious events as orchestrated space-time selections. Journal of consciousness studies, 3(1), 36-53. 21 Haynes, J. D., Deichmann, R., & Rees, G. (2005). Eye-specific effects of binocular rivalry in the human lateral geniculate nucleus. Nature, 438(7067), 496-499. He, S. & MacLeod, D. (2001). Orientation-selective adaptation and tilt after-effect from invisible patterns. Nature, 411, 473–476. Hempel, Carl (1952). Fundamentals of Concept Formation in Empirical Science. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Hohwy, J. (2009). The neural correlates of consciousness: new experimental approaches needed? Consciousness and cognition, 18(2), 428-438. Huxley, A. (1874/2002). On the Hypothesis That Animals Are Automata, and Its History. In Chalmers, D. (Ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Contemporary and Classical Readings. Oxford: Oxford University Press Jack, A. & Roepstorff, A. (2003). Why trust the subject? Journal of Consciousness Studies, 10(9-10), v– xx. Jacob, P., & De Vignemont, F. (2010). Spatial coordinates and phenomenology in the two-visual systems model. In N.Gangopadhyay (Ed.), Perception, action, and consciousness: Sensorimotor dynamics and two-visual systems. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Jacob, P. & Jeannerod, M. (2003). Ways of Seeing: The Scope and Limits of Visual Cognition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Jehle, D., & Kriegel, U. (2006). An argument against dispositionalist HOT theory. Philosophical Psychology, 19(4), 463-476. Kanwisher, N. 2001. Neural events and perceptual awareness. Cognition, 79, 89-113. Koch, C., & Tsuchiya, N. (2007). Attention and consciousness: Two different processes. Trends in Cognitive Science, 11(1), 16–22. Kriegel, U. (2006). Consciousness: Phenomenal Consciousness, Access Consciousness, and Scientific Practice. In P. Thagard (ed.), Handbook of Philosophy of Psychology and Cognitive Science. Amsterdam: North-Holland. Kriegel, U. (2007). A cross-order integration hypothesis for the neural correlate of consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition, 16(4), 897-912. Kroliczak et al. (2006). Dissociation of perception and action unmasked by the hollow-face illusion. Brain Research, 23, 9-16 Lamme, V. A. (2004). Separate neural definitions of visual consciousness and visual attention; a case for phenomenal awareness. Neural Networks, 17(5), 861-872. Lamme, V. (2006). Towards a true neural stance on consciousness. Trends in Cognitive Sciences. 10(11), 494-501. 22 Lamme, V. (2010). How neuroscience will change our view on consciousness. Cognitive Neuroscience, 1(3), 204-220. Landman, R., Spekreijse, H., & Lamme, V. (2003). Large capacity storage of integrated objects before change blindness. Vision research, 43(2), 149-164. Lau, H. (2010). Theoretical motivations for investigating the neural correlates of consciousness. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science, 2(1),1-7 Leopold, D. & Logothetis, N. (1996). Activity changes in early visual cortex reflect monkeys' percepts during binocular rivalry. Nature, 379, 549–53. Logothetis, N. and Schall, J. (1989). Neuronal correlates of subjective visual perception. Science, 245, 761–3. Kanwisher, N. (2001). Neural events and perceptual awareness. Cognition, 79(1), 89-113. Marcel, A. (1988). Phenomenal Experience and Functionalism, in Marcel, A. & Bisiach, E. (Eds.) Consciousness in Contemporary Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Marshall, J., & Halligan, P. (1988). Blindsight and insight in visuospatial neglect. 336 (22/29), 766-7 Milner, A. & Goodale, M. (1995/2006). The visual brain in action. Oxford: Oxford University Press Morel, A. & Bullier, J. (1990). Anatomical segregation of two cortical visual pathways in the macaque monkey. Visual Neurosciences 4:555-7 Nagel, T. (1974). What is it like to be a bat? Philosophical Review, 83, 435-50 Noe, A. & Thompson, E. (2004). Are There Neural Correlates of Consciousness? Journal of Consciousness Studies, 11(1), 3-28 Overgaard, M., & Overgaard, R. (2010). Neural correlates of contents and levels of consciousness. Frontiers in psychology, 1. Pascual-Leone, A., & Walsh, V. (2001). Fast backprojections from the motion to the primary visual area necessary for visual awareness. Science, 292(5516), 510-512. Perenin, M. & Vighetto, A. (1988). Optic ataxia: a specific disruption in visuomotor mechanisms. Brain, 111, 643–674. Peru, A., Moro, V., Avesani, R., & Aglioti, S. (1996). Overt and covert processing of left-side information in unilateral neglect investigated with chimeric drawings. Journal of clinical and experimental neuropsychology, 18(5), 621-630. Polonsky, A., Blake, R., Braun, J., & Heeger, D. J. (2000). Neuronal activity in human primary visual cortex correlates with perception during binocular rivalry. Nature neuroscience, 3(11), 1153-1159. Popper, K. (1959) The Logic of Scientific Discovery. New York: Basic Books 23 Prinz, J. (2000). A Neurofunctional Theory of Visual Consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition, 9, 243-259 Prinz, J. (2007) Accessed, accessible, and inaccessible: Where to draw the phenomenal line. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 30, 521-2 Prinz, J. (2012). The Conscious Brain. USA: Oxford University Press Prior, E., Pargetter, R., & Jackson, F. (1982). Three theses about dispositions. American Philosophical Quarterly, 19(3), 251-257. Rees, G. (2007). Neural correlates of the contents of visual awareness in humans. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 362(1481), 877-886. Rees, G., et al. (2000). Unconscious activation of visual cortex in the damaged right-hemisphere of a parietal patient with extinction. Brain, 123(8),1624-1633. Rees, G., et al. (2002). Neural correlates of conscious and unconscious vision in parietal extinction. Neurocase, 8(5), 387-393. Rees, G., Kreiman, G. & Koch, C. (2002). Neural correlates of consciousness in humans. Nature Reviews: Neuroscience, 3, 261-70 Rosenthal, D. (1997). A theory of consciousness. In N. Block, O. Flanagan & G. Güzeldere (Eds.), The Nature of Consciousness. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Rosenthal, D. (2002). How Many Kinds of Consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition, 11, 653-665. Rowlands, M. (2001). Consciousness and Higher-Order Thoughts. Mind & language, 16(3), 290-310. Sellars, W. (1956). Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind. Minnesota studies in the philosophy of science, 1(19), 253-329. Shea, N. (2012). Methodological encounters with the phenomenal kind. Philosophy and phenomenological research, 84(2), 307-344. Sheinberg D.L. and Logothetis, N.K. (1997), The role of temporal cortical areas in perceptual organization. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA, 94, 3408–13. Silvanto, J., et al. (2005). Striate cortex (V1) activity gates awareness of motion. Nature neuroscience, 8(2), 143-144. Sligte, I. G., Scholte, H. S., & Lamme, V. A. (2008). Are there multiple visual short-term memory stores?. PLOS one, 3(2), e1699. Sperling, G. (1960). The information available in brief visual presentations. Psychological monographs: General and applied, 74(11), 1. Tong, F., et al. (1998). Binocular rivalry and visual awareness in human extrastriate cortex. Neuron, 21, 753-759. 24 Tononi, G., & Koch, C. (2008). The neural correlates of consciousness. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 1124(1), 239-261. Tye, M. (1995) 10 Problems of Consciousness: A Representational Theory of the Phenomenal Mind. Cambridge: MIT press Vandenbroucke, A., et al. (2014). Seeing without knowing: neural signatures of perceptual inference in the absence of report. Journal of cognitive neuroscience, 26(5), 955-969. Vosgerau, G. & Newen, A. (2008). Orthogonality of phenomenality and content. American Philosophical Quarterly, 45, 329-348. Wallhagen, M. (2007). Consciousness and action: Does cognitive science support (mild) epiphenomenalism? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58, 539-61. Wolfe, J. (1999). Inattentional amnesia. In V. Coltheart (Ed.), Fleeting memories (pp. 71–94). Cambridge: MIT Press. Wunderlich, K., Schneider, K., & Kastner, S. (2005). Neural correlates of binocular rivalry in the human lateral geniculate nucleus. Nature neuroscience, 8(11), 1595-1602. Young M. (1992). Objective analysis of the topological organization of the primate cortical visual system. Nature, 358,152-5. Zeki, S. (2003). The disunity of consciousness. Trends in Cognitive Sciences. 7(5), 214-18.

Richard Oxenberg 1 On God, Goodness, and Evil: A Theological Dialogue Richard Oxenberg Part One: The Ethical I. Meaning and Value Joseph: Simon, my friend, you are looking very grim today. Simon: Joseph, I feel like I'm in hell. Joseph: Oh, my goodness! Simon: I've been reading accounts of the Holocaust – the gas chambers and crematoria, the medical experiments and mass butchery. I'm...I'm speechless. How can such atrocities have taken place? Joseph: Yes, it's terrible to contemplate. Simon: You consider yourself a man of faith, don't you? Joseph: I try to be. Simon: But how can you be? How can anyone be in the face of this? I don't see how there is any room left for God after the Holocaust. Joseph: Ah, and I would say that the Holocaust has made the need for faith all the more apparent. Simon: But how is faith possible anymore? What is there to have faith in? Has God's absence ever been more obvious? Joseph: No, never. I entirely agree. But this itself is why we must regard the Holocaust as a kind of revelation. Simon: A revelation?! Joseph: Yes, a revelation of the absence of God – and of what it means for God to be absent. But where there is a revelation of God's absence there is also a revelation of God's presence, by way of contrast. Richard Oxenberg 2 Simon: But surely you're not saying that the Holocaust has some sort of redeeming value in this way? Joseph: No, no. I am merely speaking of its meaning. Simon: But it seems to me that the Holocaust just makes everything meaningless! For there to be meaning there must be something to believe in, to hope for. But what the Holocaust 'reveals' is that there is nothing to believe in. There is no bottom to how awful things can get. To try and find meaning in all of this just seems like an affront. Joseph: But an affront to what? Don't you see how self-defeating such a view is? If everything were meaningless then the Holocaust would have no more significance than a baseball game. To suggest this seems to me the greatest offense. What you seem really to be saying is that the Holocaust has driven you to despair. But such despair is not simple meaninglessness, on the contrary, it is a surrender to meaninglessness. But we must fight against this surrender. Simon: Perhaps I need to get clearer on just what you mean by 'meaning'? Joseph: Perhaps. Simon: Because some would say that to suggest that the Holocaust has meaning is to suggest that it served some purpose, that it can be justified. Joseph: But this is not at all what I'm saying! Simon: So what do you mean by 'meaning'? Joseph: Well, this has become a rather difficult question in the modern world, due largely, I think, to the success of empirical science. Simon: Empirical science? Joseph: Yes. The scientist seeks to understand things without regard to what is called 'subjective bias,' which is to say, without regard to the concerns of life. Now that's fine so long as all you want is to examine the purely external relations between things. But such an attitude can disclose nothing about the meanings of life. And yet, the success of the sciences has led many to suppose that life as a whole can be understood in this way. Thus the concept of meaning gets divorced from the concept of value, as if the meaning of things could be reduced to their material relations. But meaning will never be grasped in this way; things have meaning to us in relation to the value they have for us. This is true even at the simplest level. The cup you're drinking from, for instance, has meaning to you because it serves a function that you value. And the word 'cup,' far more than its color, far more than its shape and size, expresses this function. Richard Oxenberg 3 Simon: But is function the same as value? Joseph: Not the same – but the idea of function is dependent upon the idea of value. Something's function is always in relation to the value it serves. The value is the goal, the 'telos,' which the function fulfills. Simon: But what of things that are not functional – a beautiful painting, a song, a spring day? Joseph: Yes, these have an immediate value as opposed to an instrumental one – but still their meaning resides in their value. And I would say that the Holocaust, by its very horror, has meaning in just this sense as well. It lights up, by its very darkness, what we know to be of fundamental value. II. Caring Beings Simon: But now we have just exchanged one difficult concept for another. How do you know what is of "fundamental value"? Where does "value" come from? Joseph: Yes, this is the crux of the matter, and it's certainly not easy to discuss in all its nuance and depth. And yet the essence of it can be expressed rather simply, for value comes from our need to be well. Something is valued in relation to its ability to contribute to our wellness, our well-being. Of course, it's a very big question just what makes us well. Simon: Wellness? That sounds very vague. If value derives from wellness wouldn't this make all value subjective and relative? As they say, one man's drink is another man's poison. If value is subjective then how can you call the Holocaust evil? The Nazis, anyway, felt they derived 'value' from it! Joseph: We need to clean up our words to express this properly. People often use the term subjective to mean something like 'dependent on the will,' but wellness is not subjective in this sense. One does not get to decide what will make one well, and one can be mistaken about it. No, wellness is subjective in the sense that it pertains to the nature of subjectivity, that is, it is a state of the subject – but that is not to say it is subject to the will. And value, stemming from the need for such wellness, is also subjective in this sense – but not arbitrary. Simon: But isn't this a very selfish understanding of value – value is what makes for my wellness? Isn't this a prescription for pure selfishness? Joseph: First we need to get clear about what value is, and then we can try to discriminate between the value of selfishness as opposed to what is sometimes called 'selflessness' – Richard Oxenberg 4 but until we get clear on the meaning of value itself we can't really discuss the matter intelligently. Simon: So you are saying that if there were no beings driven toward wellness there would be no such thing as value? Joseph: How could there be? In order for there to be value there must be something valued and the one who values it. But the one who values will always do so because the thing valued matters in some way, and what matters to us fundamentally is our wellness. Simon: So there could be no value without 'valuing beings' of some sort? Is that what you're saying? Joseph: Yes, of course. Value is not something free-floating, nor is it an empty abstraction. It is rooted in the nature of what you've just called 'valuing beings.' It is derived from our impetus toward wellness. Just to give it a name, let's call this impetus 'caring.' Simon: 'Caring'? Joseph: Yes, because whenever we say we care about something we mean that we value it in some way; it makes a difference to our wellness. It is only because there are caring beings in the universe that there is anything like value. Simon: And if there were no caring beings? Joseph: There could be no such thing as value. Consider: Imagine a universe devoid of anyone who cares. What meaning could 'value' have in such a universe? It would matter to no one whether such a universe continued to exist or came to a sudden end. Even if there were living beings, living non-caring beings, it would make no difference. Such beings might be destroyed or preserved – who would care? What could it mean to say that such beings were harmed? What could it mean to say they were benefited? Insofar as they don't care themselves, insofar as no one cares, it is impossible to say whether what happens to them is good or bad. Such a universe would not merely be devoid of value, it would be devoid of the very possibility of value. Simon: So it seems. Joseph: But now insert into this universe a single caring being. Suddenly everything changes. Suddenly the universe aligns itself, from the point of view of this caring, in terms of good and bad, better and worse, more desirable and less. Suddenly things matter. Suddenly the universe has meaning. It can fulfill or fail to fulfill the caring of this caring being. With the entrance of caring in the universe comes the entrance of value. Something is valuable or not to the extent that it tends toward the fulfillment of the caring of a caring being. Caring is the ground of value. Richard Oxenberg 5 Simon: And what exactly makes a being a 'caring' being in your view? Joseph: A caring being is simply one who cares – one for whom things make a difference, one who is affected in a manner experienced as positive or negative, desirable or undesirable. Simon: But not all things having value are caring beings, are they? We say that money has value, that food has value, that water has value – these are not caring beings? Joseph: No, but they have value in relation to caring beings. I think Aristotle was among the first to distinguish between intrinsic and instrumental value. Something has instrumental value when its value is in service to the value of something else – like a car that has value because it serves my desire to travel, etc. But something has intrinsic value when it is valuable in itself. You can see how things that have instrumental value must derive their value from things that have intrinsic value. Simon: How so? Joseph: Because things of instrumental value have it only by reference to something else. Considered in themselves they have no value at all. The car has value only because someone wishes to drive it. The cup has value only because someone wishes to drink from it. If there were no one who wished to drink or drive these things would have no value. Of course, there can be long strings of things having only instrumental value. The table has value because it supports the cup which has value because it holds the tea which has value because...etc. But even an infinite string of such things would have no value at all unless it were ultimately in service to something of intrinsic value – something that has value in itself. Simon: But what is it about a thing that makes it have value 'in itself'? Joseph: Yes, that is the crucial question. Unless we can identify something of intrinsic value, all talk of value will be meaningless. So we must ask: what is essential to the idea of intrinsic value? Of course, you see that it would be a contradiction in terms to say that something of intrinsic value derived its value from elsewhere, for then its value would not be intrinsic. Simon: Yes, I see that. Joseph: So this means that in order for anything at all to have value there must be that which is a ground of value, that whose nature is of value inherently. Simon: Are you talking about God? Richard Oxenberg 6 Joseph: Well, let's not jump there just yet. I think we can say, from a formal point of view, that anything of intrinsic value must be such as to value itself, to be self-valuing. Simon: Self-valuing? Joseph: Consider the example I gave a moment ago. It's clear that nothing can be of value unless there is someone who values it – the very idea of value is relational. There must be the one who values and the thing that is valued. Simon: Yes. Joseph: But the one who values only does so insofar as he or she cares about the thing valued – to value is to care, isn't this true? Simon: That seems right to me. Joseph: And one who cares, we might say, experiences the 'positive' or 'negative' in relation to the thing cared about – if it fares well they are happy, if not, unhappy. They themselves are affected by what happens to what they care about. If it were otherwise we would say they did not care. Simon: Yes. Joseph: So, in a sense, one who cares always cares not only about the thing cared about, but about himor herself as well. Caring is always self-relational, it always, so to speak, cares for itself. Simon: Caring always cares for itself? I'm not sure I'm following you here. Joseph: Maybe an example will help. Imagine a devoted mother who cares for her child. Now whatever happens to the child affects the mother – two people are affected by what happens to the child, not just the child; the child and the mother are affected. Simon: Yes, I see that. Joseph: Certainly the mother's caring is directed toward the child and the mother may never explicitly think about herself at all – but still the mother is affected. If the child is ill the mother suffers. If the child does well the mother is pleased. Though the mother's caring is directed toward the child it is also a self-relation of the mother to herself. The mother, we might say, and I admit this is an awkward way of putting it, but the mother, in caring for the child, always also cares for her own caring for the child. The caring is a self-relation. Simon: Yes, I think I see what you mean. When I care about something, my caring about it affects me, my caring is a way in which I am related to myself. Richard Oxenberg 7 Joseph: Precisely. Simon: So, you are saying that there is something about the very nature of caring, and hence, value, that entails subjectivity – if we understand subjectivity to be a kind of selfrelation. Joseph: Yes, exactly. Only a subjective being can be a caring being. And that's why the scientist, who considers only objective reality, will never discover anything like value in the universe. But this is not to say it is not there! Simon: So all value stems from this self-relational nature of subjective beings? Joseph: Yes, but of course, it is not just their self-relational nature, it is the fact that the quality of this self-relation matters to them, they care about it. Self-relation is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for value. There must be caring. Simon: But now we seem to be in a definitional circle: a caring being is simply one who cares. Joseph: Yes, but there is no escaping this circle, because we are not proposing a definition but pointing out a feature of reality. There is something about caring that is irreducible to anything else. It cannot be derived from something more primary. It's just a bare fact. We know of caring beings not through inferential reasoning but because we ourselves are instances of such caring beings. We never could have discovered caring from an investigation of the objective world – which, again, is why the sciences can tell us nothing about it. You and I and all people, and perhaps all sentient beings, are caring beings. But the important thing to grasp here is that all value has its ground in the caring of caring beings, and could not derive from elsewhere. Caring beings, thus, are beings of intrinsic value and, as such, are the ground of all instrumental value. In other words, any string of instrumental values, if it is to have value at all, must serve the caring of some caring being. So, the table has value because it supports the cup, the cup has value because it contains the tea, and the tea has value because I desire it, it satisfies my caring in some way. My caring gives value, and meaning, to the tea, the cup, and the table. All value and meaning arise from the caring of caring beings. Simon: And caring beings are of intrinsic value because they care about themselves? Joseph: Because their caring is a self-relation. Again, something can only be of value to the extent that it is of value to someone. But if absolutely everything were of value only because it were valuable to something other than itself, then nothing at all would be of value – for there would be no final term from which value were conferred. There must be something of value to itself; whose value is a self-relation. And this is caring. And, of course, we ourselves are such caring beings. Richard Oxenberg 8 III. The Origin of Caring Simon: Okay, I think I understand you. You're saying that value is relative to each individual caring being? Joseph: Oh, we must be very careful here. This word 'relative' can be treacherous. Ordinarily, when we say that value is relative we mean that it is arbitrary and variable, according to culture or personal whim; as if value were a mere cultural artifact or a matter of volition. But this is not what I'm saying. Caring is not a matter of the will. No one decides to be a caring being, and although some may wish not to be, when things have gone very badly for them, I don't really think anyone has the power to eradicate their caring (what we call escapism is the attempt to do so). No, caring is of the nature of caring beings. It is, to some degree, manipulable by the will, but only within limits. It is grounded in the fundamental nature of being itself, not the will of caring beings. Simon: The fundamental nature of being itself? Joseph: Yes, caring is of the very nature of what-is. Or, to express it in religious terms, it is a feature of the being of God. Simon: God? Our caring comes from God? But wouldn't some say it is a product of evolution – that what you call 'caring' emerges because it has survival value? Joseph: Well, this idea that something might emerge from evolution involves a misreading of evolutionary theory. Natural selection cannot cause anything to emerge, it can just sustain and shape those things that have already emerged. But things can only emerge because they are fundamental potentialities of being itself – evolution can shape the actual but does not determine the possible. Simon: But doesn't evolutionary theory account for biological traits, such as what you call caring, on the grounds that they confer a survival advantage? To use the simplest of examples, the giraffe's long neck allows it to reach the higher leaves and thereby survive in times of food shortage. Mightn't what you call 'caring' arise for the same reason? Those who care about survival are more likely to act in a way that will further their survival. Might this not be the origin of caring? Joseph: But aren't you putting the cart before the horse? True, the giraffe's long neck gives it a survival advantage but this is not to say that the long neck's survival advantage produces the long neck. The survival advantage is the effect of the long neck, not the cause. To mistake an effect for a cause is a basic error in logic. It seems to me that those who suppose that evolutionary theory can serve as a final explanation for biological traits make this mistake. Simon: Then what is the cause? Richard Oxenberg 9 Joseph: But this is just what we don't know. This is a great mystery. Evolutionary theory says 'random mutation' but this tells us little. In order for there to be random mutation there must already be that which mutates, and, however random the mutations, they will always be limited to what is possible for this mutating substratum. What gives rise to this substratum? What is its ultimate nature? What are its potentialities? These are the questions we would need to answer in order to understand this. Evolutionary theory doesn't touch on these questions. Simon: Are you taking the side of the creationists, then, in the creationism debate? Joseph: No, not at all. The creationists attack evolutionary theory on its own territory, but that's not what I'm doing. I'm simply noting the boundaries of that territory. Evolutionary theory helps explain the way organic nature develops over time, and – although I think it would be hubristic for evolutionists to claim that they will never learn anything more about this process than what current theory shows – I think we can say in general that the evolutionists have had great success within their proper limits. But what evolutionary theory does not do, what it cannot do, is explain the ultimate nature of the organic itself. And this is especially to be noted with respect to what we have been calling 'caring,' for it is really impossible to imagine that caring might have emerged through mere mutation, mere changes in form, of that which has no fundamental potentiality for care. One can imagine a universe in which caring beings would simply not be possible, a universe without the potential to produce anything other than configurations of rock and dust. If this were the case no amount of evolution could change it. However much evolution may help to shape the way caring manifests itself under the conditions of nature, the origin of caring cannot be explained by evolution. Simon: So you're saying that caring is of the very nature of the universe itself? Joseph: It is a fundamental feature of being that cannot be explained away as a product of will, culture, or evolution; which is to say that value is also fundamental to being. Simon: But philosophers sometimes make what they call a 'fact-value distinction.' Are you denying the legitimacy of this distinction? Joseph: I'm saying that value – or at least the caring out of which values arise – is itself a 'fact.' It is fundamental to the nature of being, and we cannot understand the world, ourselves – or really anything – without coming to understand it. IV. Intrinsic Value Simon: But if each caring being is its own ground of value, as you say, then all value is relative, is it not? Richard Oxenberg 10 Joseph: Well, as I say, we have to be careful – we have to say, relative to what. Those things of instrumental value to a caring being have value relative to that caring being, of course. But a caring being's value is not relative to anything other than itself. It is valuable to itself. But to speak of a being whose value is 'relative to itself' involves a very paradoxical use of the word relative – for by relative we ordinarily mean relative to something else. If something's value is relative to something else then we can modify the nature or even the fact of that value by modifying that something else. For instance, the value of paper money is relative to a society's willingness to honor it. When that changes, the value of the money changes as well. But this is not the case with a caring being. There is nothing in the world that we can modify that will alter the value of a caring being. Even if everyone in the universe were to decide not to honor the value of some one caring being, that caring being would still have value; for its value is a self-relation, independent of anyone else. So long as that caring being remains in existence it has an intrinsic value that cannot be canceled by another. So in this sense – and this I think really gets to the gist of it – a caring being's value is absolute, not relative in the ordinary sense of the word at all. Simon: So every caring being is an absolute value 'in itself,' you would say? Joseph: That's one way of putting it. Simon: Perhaps this might be better thought of as a pluralism than a relativism? Joseph: Yes, and we can see now what the distinction would be between these two. It is a pluralism because we recognize many centers of value. But it is not a relativism, because each of these centers has an absolute status. V. The Ethical Relation Simon: But are your ideas of absolute and pluralistic value really compatible? You say that each caring being is of absolute value. But if I am of absolute value why doesn't this mean that I get to do anything I like – roll over anyone else in pursuit of my own good? Why should I, or anyone, be limited by another? Joseph: Ah, yes, this brings us to the heart of the ethical question. But in a sense it is rather easily answered: To live ethically is to live in accordance with what has value. Others have value. Hence, to live ethically is to live with respect for the value of others. Simon: But what of my value? Joseph: Of course, you must respect your value as well. Simon: And if there is conflict? Richard Oxenberg 11 Joseph: If there is conflict we must seek a resolution respectful of the value of all. Simon: But what if I choose not to seek such a resolution? Why should I? What will induce me to do so? Joseph: We have to distinguish between why you should do so, from an ethical point of view, and what might motivate you to do so, practically speaking. As for the question of why you should, I've already answered it. You should respect others' value because to do otherwise would be to disregard something of value, and this, I think, is just what we mean by wrong. This is the only possible answer to this question. What if I said, you should do so because God commands it? You might then ask: "But why should I obey God's command?" Now all I could say is that to do otherwise would be contrary to what has value. But now we've just traversed a circle. Simon: Well, the more usual answer, I suppose, would be that to do otherwise would lead to God's punishment, or some other negative consequence. Joseph: But clearly this is an inferior answer, ethically considered. If all we consider are consequences for ourselves, then we are no longer in the domain of ethics at all, but of pure self-interest. We are saying, in effect, that self-interest determines what is right. If we go this route then the idea of right becomes subject to whomever has power over us – maybe Hitler. No, right cannot be predicated on self-interest. Simon: So I should respect the value of others because...? Joseph: ...because they have value. Because to do otherwise is to disregard the truth of the other, and this is a truth of value. Simon: And if I fail to do so...? Joseph: Then you are wrong. Simon: But so what if I'm wrong? If there are no actual consequences what does it matter? Joseph: There are consequences for the person you are wronging! There is no getting around that. But as for yourself, you cannot consistently violate others while maintaining that your own value be respected. Simon: Why not? Joseph: Well, why should anyone else respect your value? Simon: I'm not sure. Richard Oxenberg 12 Joseph: So then would it be acceptable to you if someone raped you, or stole from you, or murdered you, or tortured you? Simon: Of course not! Joseph: Why not? Simon: Well, because...because I don't want them to! Joseph: Precisely, because it would be a violation of your caring. Do you see how that's the only reason there could be? Simon: I'm not sure I see that. Joseph: Any other reason would be of an instrumental sort. Whatever else you gave as a reason might be responded to: but why should anyone respect that reason? Ultimately, the only reason to respect any reason is because it is an imperative of caring. Simon: Okay, so I do not care to be violated by others. I can't deny it. But that still doesn't say why I should respect others. Why not just care about myself? Joseph: In a sense, you are in a place of choice. Remember, I said before that caring does not stem from the will – but now your will must become engaged. You must decide, that is, your will must decide, whether you are going to affirm the value of caring or not. If you choose not to, then you have no basis ever again to protest anyone's violating you – raping you, torturing you, etc. – if you choose to affirm the value of caring then you may not violate the caring of others, for this would be counter to your affirmation. Simon: But what if I choose to affirm the value of caring only for myself? Joseph: Caring doesn't exist only for yourself. That's a fact there is no getting around. Once you acknowledge that two plus two equals four you can't then say, but I only acknowledge this to be true on Thursdays. If it is true, it is true about the relation between two and two and four, regardless of the day. Likewise, in acknowledging that caring has value and ought to be respected you are acknowledging a truth about the nature of caring which is going to be true wherever caring is found. In other words, again, your decision to respect the value of caring does not confer value on caring, caring already has value intrinsically. All you can decide is whether you are going to acknowledge and respect this value or not. But once you acknowledge this value you acknowledge it wherever it occurs. Simon: So let's say I choose not to acknowledge it. Joseph: Well, first I would say you are in error. You are not seeing a truth, a fact about the nature of things. And I can probably make this truth plain to you by torturing you – Richard Oxenberg 13 that is, under extreme violence to your own caring you will almost certainly come to see the value of caring. The moment you protest your torture you acknowledge the extent to which you value your physical well-being. Simon: Mine, but not necessarily others'. Joseph: Right, and I'm not saying that you do, in fact, value the caring of others. I am merely saying that you must acknowledge the value of that caring to the extent that you recognize it to be of a similar nature to your own. Simon: But what if I refuse to recognize that it is similar to my own? Joseph: Then you're a solipsist. You're not, are you? Simon: A solipsist? Joseph: You don't really believe that you are the only caring being in the universe, do you? Simon: No, of course not. Joseph: Well then, enough about that. Simon: So I must acknowledge the value of others...? Joseph: ...to the extent that you acknowledge your own value, and recognize that others are similar to you in this respect. Simon: This sounds something like the Golden Rule. Joseph: It is very much like the Golden Rule. I'd say it is the basis for the Golden Rule. Simon: I must treat others as I would like to be treated, in accordance with my recognition that they are of intrinsic value as I am. Joseph: Exactly. Simon: And if I refuse to do so? Joseph: Well, of course, you can still refuse to do so. But from an ethical point of view we would say you are wrong – and we are now able to give a precise meaning to this word wrong – we mean that you are failing to respect the value of something you indeed recognize has value. Richard Oxenberg 14 VI. The Outlaw Simon: I am still unclear as to why I should care about others, though – I mean, well, maybe this whole idea of 'should' confuses me. What determines what I 'should' do? Joseph: We say that something 'should' be done when it is required by the telos of a value we affirm. Simon: The 'telos'...? Joseph: The end, the goal. Simon: And 'a value we affirm' means...? Joseph: ...one that we acknowledge as an authentic value, a value that deserves respect. Simon: But – and I guess this is what is confusing me – if my values derive from my caring then the only 'shoulds' relevant to me would be one's stemming from my own caring. Why should I care about others? Joseph: For the time being we are not really concerned with the question of whether you should care about them or not; i.e., whether your personal caring should be implicated in theirs, as the mother's is with her child's. From an ethical standpoint, the only question is whether you should respect their caring; that is, acknowledge it and refrain from violating it. This is a matter of your will, not your caring. The ethical should is directed at your will. Simon: But where is it directed from? Whence does it originate? You said that an ethical 'should' expresses the telos of a value we affirm, and that all values arise from caring. But this ethical 'should,' directed at my will, does not arise from my caring. Joseph: No it doesn't. It arises from the caring of the other. It is the other's caring that speaks to your will and confronts it with a should. You can fail to respect this should – which is to say, you can fail to affirm the value of the caring being who issues it, but you cannot do so honestly, for to the extent that you are not a solipsist you do, in fact, acknowledge the existence of other caring beings, and to the extent that you affirm the value of your own caring, you implicitly recognize the value of the caring of others. Simon: So the ethical 'should' is issued by the other? Joseph: Precisely. It is an implication of the other's caring. Simon: And if I fail to acknowledge it? Richard Oxenberg 15 Joseph: You implicitly deny the value of caring as such, and thereby, deny the value of your own caring. Simon: But suppose I do? Suppose I deny both the other's value and my own? Joseph: Well, then, to the extent that we take you at your word, that is, agree with you that you have no value (and of course we don't), then we could simply destroy you. You would be a menace to us and of no intrinsic value yourself – like a disease. We could destroy you without compunction. Simon: But wouldn't you be violating me? Joseph: Not if there were nothing to violate. Not if we agreed with you that you have no value. Simon: Okay, well, then, suppose I insist on my value but simply, willfully, refuse to respect the value of others. What then? Joseph: Then you are simply – what shall we call it? – an outlaw. On some level you recognize the ethical 'should'; i.e., the 'law' (unless you really want us to believe that you are a solipsist – in which case I suppose we should treat you as deranged) but you refuse to abide by it. So you are an outlaw. Simon: And? Joseph: And now we must find a way of bringing you into accord with justice. Simon: By force? Joseph: Perhaps. Simon: But by what right do you do so? Joseph: Right? And by what right does an outlaw speak of right? Simon: So, you're saying that if I refuse to respect the value of others then I lose all my rights? Joseph: Not quite. But you do see how, if we lived according to your rule, the rule of the outlaw, this would follow. Simon: Can you elaborate? Joseph: Yes. Your rule, the outlaw's rule, does not respect the value of others. And if we lived according to your rule then we would certainly not be obliged to honor your value, Richard Oxenberg 16 you being other to us. It is only to the extent that we do not live according to your rule that we have any moral obligation to you at all. In a sense, then, as an outlaw, you no longer have any rightful say as to how you should be treated by us, since you yourself reject the rule that would demand our respecting you. For surely you can't insist upon a value that you yourself refuse to acknowledge. Simon: So once I become an outlaw I have no more rights? Joseph: Well, not quite – because I would say that you haven't so much lost your rights as your right to insist upon them. You are still a caring being. As such you are still of intrinsic value. If we are to be moral we must treat you with more respect than you treat others. By your rule we could treat you in any way we like or, at least, with as much disregard as you've treated others. But we reject your rule. We must still acknowledge your intrinsic value. Your being still has rights, in a sense, but your will no longer does, because it is perverse. Your will has no rights just as long as it refuses to live in accordance with justice. Thus, we have the right to override your will until it does. This is the moral basis of all legal systems, in which coercion is used to force people to behave justly. Simon: You have begun to use the word 'justice' – can you define it? Joseph: Traditionally, justice has meant 'giving to each his due.' On the basis of what we've discussed we can flesh this out a bit more. We can now say what 'due' means. It means, treating each in accordance with the intrinsic value native to each. Simon: And the outlaw? The outlaw can make no claim upon justice? Joseph: The outlaw stands in violation of justice. To fail to constrain the outlaw would be to permit the outlaw's continued violation of others. Thus we have a moral responsibility to constrain the outlaw, and the outlaw, so to speak, has no right to complain – because the outlaw lives in disacknowledgement of right itself. Still, the outlaw remains a being of intrinsic value. We must, therefore, treat the outlaw with mercy. This means two things: First, we must not do more harm to the outlaw than is required to neutralize the outlaw's danger. Secondly, we must provide the outlaw with the opportunity to come back into alignment with justice, and be willing to accept her when she does. Richard Oxenberg 17 Part Two: The Spiritual VII. Gap Simon: Ok, I think I understand your view. I cannot consistently approve of the violation of others while insisting that I not be violated, and I cannot honestly accept my own violation given my caring nature. So this means, I guess, that I can't be both honest and unethical – at least not without recognizing that I am wrong. Joseph: You can't be honest, unethical, and aware. That's right. And that's why ethical violation is almost always accompanied by self-deceit and evasion. Your experience of the value of your own caring is, in effect, your window into the value of others. Through yourself you can see what is true about others as well. This is the basis of the Golden Rule. Simon: Yes, fine – But doesn't this just make the human situation all the more tragic? Our caring, which ought to be respectful of others, is often, actually, only concerned for itself. That seems to be its very nature. It is easy to be indifferent to the caring of others. Just look at the Holocaust, slavery, rape – and countless other examples! I don't see how this helps the case for God. Quite the contrary. This makes the idea of God even less plausible. If God exists why would our caring be so selfish, so cruel, so twisted? Joseph: Well, it is just here that the story of faith begins. The Bible, of course, is very aware of the discrepancy between what we are and what we ought to be. We might almost say that this is its basic theme. The whole of religion is an attempt to close the gap between what we are and what we ought to be. Simon: But why should there be such a gap? What accounts for this gap? If God created us, and created us to be good in the ethical sense you discuss, why are things so fouled up? Joseph: In Christian theology this is attributed to what is called 'the fall.' Simon: Oh, yes, I know about that. Now you're talking about the Garden of Eden. But come – you don't really expect me to believe that all the evils of the world result from someone eating a piece of fruit they shouldn't have? Joseph: I think we need to read the story symbolically. Simon: Ok, but what is it symbolic of? Joseph: Well, now we're heading into some rather deep waters, Simon. Of course, I can only give you my understanding. Richard Oxenberg 18 Simon: Of course. Still, I'd be curious to hear it. VIII. The Caring of God Joseph: Let us begin, then, with a question we raised and laid aside earlier: what is the origin of caring? Clearly human beings are caring beings. Clearly we are not the origin of ourselves. Clearly, as well, caring as such cannot be attributed to some evolutionary process. Nothing essentially non-caring can develop into something that cares. It follows that caring must be fundamental to being itself. It is this fundamental caring that I call God. Simon: You are equating caring with God? But is this Christianity? Joseph: Well, the apostle John writes, "God is love." Love is a mode of caring. Of course there is a lot more to say than this, caring is itself a mystery, but let's try to take it one step at a time. Simon: And yet it is hard to imagine how caring could be 'fundamental to being.' Caring – at least as we know it – is always in response to some kind of desire. We are hungry so we care about food. We are thirsty so we care about drink. What would a caring 'fundamental to being' care about? Joseph: Theoretically, it would be fulfilled in itself, at peace. It would always be satisfied in its desire since, as the basis of everything, it would always already contain whatever might be desired. Simon: Theoretically? Joseph: Considered in itself, apart from what in Christianity we call 'the creation.' But I don't think we can really consider God apart from the creation. The creation disrupts this peace. Simon: Disrupts it? So God is not at peace? Joseph: Does the image of Christ on the Cross appear to you to be an image of a being at peace? Simon: Well, no, but...but isn't Christ the 'prince of peace'? Joseph: Yes, and here it gets complex, and involves categories that strain our understanding. I would put it this way: God is at peace in God's self and in anguish for us; the peace and the anguish exist together, but they are not on the same plane. The peace is the answer to the anguish. We overcome our anguish by tapping into God's peace. In a sense, the whole of religion is contained in this idea. Richard Oxenberg 19 Simon: Joseph, you are losing me. I thought you were going to interpret the Garden of Eden story. Joseph: Yes, I've jumped ahead a bit. So let's get back to that – the Garden of Eden. IX. Eden Joseph: Let us say that the Garden of Eden represents the creation as fully governed by, bathed in, God's eternal peace. Adam and Eve, we are told, are "naked and unashamed." Nakedness is a symbol of honesty – openness to self and other – and vulnerability. That they are unashamed of their honesty and vulnerability means they are in full acceptance of themselves and each other. Simon: But doesn't nakedness also suggest sexuality? Joseph: Yes, and they are sexually fulfilled through each other. Sexuality itself might be seen as but one expression of our drive to unite with one another, to be fulfilled through one another. It also suggests vulnerability, because our need of the other is also our vulnerability to the other. God creates Eve, remember, after noting that "it is not good for the man to be alone." This is the first biblical mention of anything "not good" in the creation. Human beings realize their good – find the satisfaction of their caring – through healthy and open relationship with one another. Without this they are in distress. That Adam and Eve are "naked and unashamed" implies their acceptance of themselves and their openness to one another. Such mutual acceptance and openness, deeply realized, is love. Simon: And love, you say, is God? Joseph: It is caring in its fullest realization. It is, so to speak, caring in its wholeness. And this is the nature of God, considered in God's self. So Eden is an image of the creation in full accord with God. Simon: But this state of love doesn't last, does it? Something disrupts it. Joseph: Yes, there is a serpent in their midst. The serpent tempts Eve to eat from the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil in order to become like God in her own person. Simon: So what does this serpent represent? Why should there be this disruptive serpent in Eden? Joseph: We need to think this through carefully. I think Adam and Eve in Eden are like children who have not yet come into their full humanity. Remember that before God creates Eve he has Adam look for a partner among the other animals, as if it is not Richard Oxenberg 20 entirely clear that Adam is anything more than an animal himself. In this context we might see the talking serpent – the animal who speaks – to represent a stage in human development; the emergence of rationality. Simon: By rationality you mean critical thinking? Joseph: Not just critical thinking. Self-awareness, the awareness of the world as other than oneself, of the distinction between I and not-I, and the capacity for selfdetermination. These are the traits that mark the human as human. Simon: So you're saying that the serpent represents rationality? This is a very unusual interpretation, Joseph. Joseph: Not just rationality. Rationality conjoined with animality – with animal instincts, animal desires, animal needs. Eve's dialogue with the serpent represents the temptation to which this conjunction of rationality and animality leads. Simon: The serpent tempts Eve to eat from the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil. So what does this tree represent? Joseph: Let's recall the dialogue with the serpent. The serpent tells Eve that in eating from the tree she will come to know good and evil as God does. How does God know good and evil? God knows good and evil from God's own nature. What is in conformity with God's nature is good, what is discordant with it is evil. God is universal love. So what is good for God is good for all, what is evil for God is evil for all. But now Eve is tempted to become like God in her own person; to measure good and evil from herself, from her own desires, her own will. We might say that this is the origin of narcissistic egoism. The egoist evaluates the world entirely from the standpoint of his own interests and desires. What is good for me is good. What is bad for me is evil. Simon: So in eating from the tree she becomes egoistic? Joseph: She and Adam now come to see their own individual desires and interests as supreme. They lose sight of the fact that they are part of a greater whole that extends beyond them. They lose sight of God, of God's truth, of God's universal standard of good and evil. Their love circles in on itself. They shift from a reality governed by the universal love of God to a reality governed by their own private self-love. That's the fall. Simon: And then they become ashamed of their nakedness. Joseph: Yes, because, of course, they continue to be contingent beings, vulnerable and dependent. But now they no longer feel themselves continuous with the whole that completes them. So they feel bereft, abandoned to themselves, with no real ground to stand on. And this sense of abandonment and vulnerability feels threatening, so they must Richard Oxenberg 21 hide the truth of themselves from themselves, and from each other. They become ashamed of their vulnerability, their neediness, their 'nakedness.' Simon: But doesn't God warn them that if they eat from this tree they will die? They don't die, do they? Joseph: They are cut off from the Tree of Life. Just as the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil represents the standards pertaining to God's universal love, so the Tree of Life represents God's power of life, God's eternal life. When Adam and Eve become selfenclosed they no longer feel themselves rooted in God's life. They experience their own finite lives as all they have. But, of course, this finite life is limited in extent and destined to end. So now they feel themselves subject to inevitable death. Simon: And this self-enclosure, you're saying, is original sin? Joseph: It is the origin of sin. It is the state out of which all sin proceeds. Simon: How so? Joseph: Adam and Eve now feel themselves entirely rooted in themselves, they lose their experience of rootedness in God. This makes them feel radically vulnerable. In response, they try to make of themselves little 'gods,' to make themselves supreme in their own willfulness. But, of course, we cannot each be supreme. A world of willful beings each vying for supremacy is a world at war. The philosopher Hobbes called it "the war of all against all." In such a world love is shattered; our need for one another cannot be fulfilled. Simon: But isn't this just a function of what you have called caring? I feel my pain, not yours. I feel my hunger, not yours. So I am naturally more concerned with myself than with you. Joseph: Yes. Simon: But then this is not our fault! It's just the way we are! Joseph: It is not our fault, but, from the biblical standpoint, it is our situation – our fallen situation. Simon: But then who is to blame for it? Joseph: I am not sure the category of blame is the best way to think about it. This is where we have to recall that we are dealing with myth. Adam and Eve represent humanity. Before the fall they have not yet come into their full humanity. They haven't yet woken up to themselves, their capacity for self-awareness and self-determination is still unformed. They live in accord with God and nature, but it is an unconscious, strictly Richard Oxenberg 22 instinctual, accord. They haven't yet come into their own as free, self-determined, entities. Simon: But are you saying that they only come into their 'full humanity' by eating the forbidden fruit? By sin? Joseph: I'm saying that they eat the forbidden fruit in response to their development as self-determining beings. As I see it, the dialogue between Eve and the serpent represents a moment in the emergence of human self-awareness. The talking serpent – the "cleverest" animal in the garden – represents a moment in human development; the human emergence into freedom and self-consciousness. Simon: But the serpent tempts Eve to do what is wrong, to eat the forbidden fruit. Joseph: Yes, this emergence into freedom and self-consciousness is, at the same time, a temptation. It tempts us to center all value in ourselves; to see the whole world as revolving around us, to define 'good' and 'evil' strictly in terms of our own private desires and interests. Eve, and then Adam, succumb to this temptation. This is what is represented by their eating from the tree. The story is an origin myth. It is a myth about the origin of human evil. Simon: But was there any possibility that Adam and Eve – that we, humanity – might have avoided succumbing to this temptation? You say that this represents a stage in human development. Was there any way we could have avoided this stage? Joseph: I don't think so. Just as a child has to pass through adolescence before it can become an adult, so we – humanity – have to pass through this stage. Simon: So then, again, it's not our fault? Joseph: It is our situation. It is the human situation. The aim of the story is not to blame us, but to reveal the nature of our situation to us. We are estranged from God, from the garden of God's love, due to our self-enclosure, which is both a product of, and a cause of, our pursuit of individual supremacy. The aim of the Bible as a whole is to show us the nature of our situation and to point the way out of it. And, of course, it is this situation, at its extreme, that leads to Nazism and the Holocaust. X. Evil Simon: That's an interesting interpretation, Joseph, but unusual. Isn't the serpent traditionally identified with Satan? Joseph: Yes, but if we want to get to the bottom of this we have to ask ourselves: what makes Satan Satan? Richard Oxenberg 23 Simon: What do you mean? Joseph: Satan, of course, is a personification of evil. But what makes evil evil? What is it about Satan that makes Satan evil? Simon: He...he wants to destroy others, doesn't he? He has a desire to hurt and destroy. Joseph: Yes, but why? Where does that desire come from? What underlies this desire to hurt and destroy? Simon: I don't know. It sends chills down my spine just to think about it. Joseph: Yes, but if we are really going to come to grips with the Nazis we must think about it, mustn't we? Simon: I don't know where it comes from. It's unfathomable to me. Do you have an answer? Joseph: All I can give you is my speculation. I don't claim to understand it all. Simon: Still, I'd like to hear what you think. Joseph: Let us suppose that caring has a fundamental drive, a basic desire, to achieve a certain wholeness. Let us suppose that this is a function of its fundamental nature, such that it feels fulfilled, satisfied, in its wholeness, and anxious, disturbed, frustrated, when severed from the whole. Simon: Okay. This sounds a little abstract. I'm not sure just what you mean by 'wholeness.' Joseph: It's hard to express, but I think we come closest to feeling whole when we feel fully loved. But that puts it a bit too simply. The emphasis here is not just on love but on we. In other words, it must be we who are fully loved. Or, to put it another way, we must be fully loved in being who we fully are. Simon: But what are we 'fully'? Joseph: Again, this is not easy to say – and all I can give you is my take on it. But I would say that we become fully ourselves as we achieve communion with the whole of being. We have a drive for such communion. Simon: The whole of being? Again, this sounds very abstract, and maybe a little grandiose – you're saying that this is our fundamental drive? Richard Oxenberg 24 Joseph: It becomes less abstract when we think of the many subordinate drives this drive gives rise to – the drive for creativity, for knowledge, for self-expression – the drive to fully actualize our potentialities. This, I would say, is the basic life urge. Simon: But wouldn't biologists say that our basic life urge is for survival? We are driven by a basic urge for self-preservation. Joseph: Yes, but I am suggesting that our drive for self-preservation is but an element within a far greater drive, a drive for wholeness. No one wants mere survival. We want love, we want knowledge, we want creative expression, we want the fulfillment of our potentialities. This is all part of our drive for wholeness. Simon: But what does this have to do with Satan? Joseph: The Satanic urge is the urge to achieve such wholeness by subsuming the world into oneself. It is the attempt to achieve wholeness through the expansion of the domain of the ego. The Satanic drive is not so much for the destruction of others as for supremacy over them. The Satanic person wants command over his world, which entails command over others. The Satanic person glories in his power over others; his ability to subordinate them to his will. He seeks to make the world bow to his determinations of 'good' and 'evil,' and thereby puts himself in the place of God. And this is the temptation the serpent presents to Adam and Eve. Simon: But you say that the serpent represents an element within Adam and Eve. Joseph: The serpent is a symbol of this 'satanic' urge; and, yes, this urge is within Adam and Eve themselves, within us. In Judaism, it is called the "yetzer ha ra," the evil inclination. I see it as a function of the individualization of consciousness together with the power of self-determination. We are tempted to use our power of self-determination to try to become supreme in our individualized selves; to have everyone and everything else revolve around us; to realize our desire for wholeness by subsuming the whole within ourselves. So, yes, the serpent is identified with Satan, with the satanic urge. Simon: But it's impossible to subsume the whole within ourselves, isn't it? if by 'whole' you mean the 'whole of being.' The whole is infinite and we are finite. Joseph: Exactly, it's impossible. This is the origin of greed. The Greeks had a word for this satanic drive. They called it 'pleonexia.' It means the endless desire for more and better. The person driven by pleonexia can never be satisfied. Simon: But if it never leads to satisfaction why would anyone pursue it? Joseph: Underlying pleonexia is a restlessness, a radical anxiety. The Christian philosopher Kierkegaard speaks of it as despair; a despair rooted in our sense of isolation, littleness, inability to satisfy our fundamental drive for wholeness. But such despair is Richard Oxenberg 25 unacceptable to the psyche, so it hides it from itself. We hide ourselves from ourselves. This is represented in the Eden myth as our flight from our 'nakedness.' And now we try to prove to ourselves, in this self-deceitful way, that we can indeed become what we really cannot become. With each success we feel a little thrill that we are making progress. With each failure, of course, we feel deflated and threatened. But on some level – a level we try not to see – we know the pursuit is hopeless. Simon: But doesn't Eve take the fruit because she wants to be like God? Isn't it a good thing to be like God? Joseph: It depends on what we mean by 'like God.' There is a great irony here, Simon. Though the serpent tells Eve she will become like God, what she really becomes is like Satan. God is universal love. Satan is self-love seeking universal dominion. Simon: So the serpent is lying to her. Joseph: Or maybe not. Maybe that's how he thinks wholeness is achieved. Simon: Through universal dominion? Joseph: Yes. Simon: But – wait a minute – what do you mean by 'he'? I thought you said the serpent is a symbol representing something within Adam and Eve. Joseph: Exactly, maybe that's what Adam and Eve think wholeness is. Maybe they don't know any better. You see, I'm saying that this pursuit of supremacy does seem to many to be the ultimate pursuit, to yield ultimate satisfaction if successful. It does seem to be that which would fulfill us. It's not 'Adam and Eve' who are tempted. It's we who are tempted. This temptation is not something that happened at the beginning of human history. It happens again and again. Simon: But, then, what would it really be like to become like God? Joseph: We get that story at the other end of the Bible. That's the story of Christ. Simon: So, then, you see Hitler as someone who has succumbed to the satanic temptation. Joseph: Oh, yes. Simon: And this is why you call the Holocaust a revelation? Joseph: It is a revelation of evil, a revelation of the horror to which the unbridled pursuit of supremacy leads. But a revelation of evil is also a revelation of good, by way of contrast. Richard Oxenberg 26 XI. The War of All Against All Simon: So the Garden of Eden story, on your reading, represents a stage in human development. We have become self-aware and self-determining beings, but this leads us – tempts us – to try to center the world in ourselves. And this gives rise to the pursuit of supremacy, which leads to 'the war of all against all.' Joseph: Exactly, but there is something more that we should not forget. This pursuit of supremacy is troubled, because at its base is the desire for wholeness. But supremacy – to whatever extent we can achieve it, and we can never achieve it fully – is not wholeness. It symbolizes wholeness to us. We take it as a token of wholeness. And this is why the satanic drive can never be satisfied. It functions at a symbolic level. Simon: Symbolic? Joseph: Yes, this is what lies behind pleonexia – the drive for more and better. We want more than others, better than others. Pleonexia is not simply the desire for this or that; it is the desire for more and better of 'this or that' than what others have. We measure our status in being by our status relative to others. And there are two ways to raise our relative status: We can acquire more for ourselves, or we can deprive others of what they have. This is where evil becomes maliciously destructive. We feel a little thrill if we can put someone else down, if we can feel ourselves superior. Simon: So this would account for the 'master race' ideology of the Nazis. Joseph: Oh, yes. And, of course, there is a little bit of 'nazi' in all of us, isn't there? We feel envious of others, not just because we don't have what they have, but because they do have it. Our envy can be resolved, then, not just by getting something for ourselves, but by taking away what they have. This is how the drive for supremacy becomes a drive to hurt and destroy. The Germans have a word for the delight we take in the misfortune of others: schadenfreude. Simon: It's horrible. Joseph: It's deeply sad. And it's upside-down, because what we really want, what really satisfies, is communion with others. But this is the tragedy of human sin. It destroys the possibility of such communion and, finally, abandons us to ourselves. The Bible expresses this in the very next story after Eden, the story of Cain and Abel. Richard Oxenberg 27 XII. Cain and Abel Simon: Abel is Cain's younger brother, am I right? Joseph: Yes, Cain is the first child of Adam and Eve, Abel the second. And Cain kills his younger brother Abel. I don't think it's an accident that the Bible places this story right after the story of the ejection from Eden. This is what the fall leads to – a world of murderous rivalries, where the human family is at war with itself. Simon: But doesn't Cain murder Abel because Abel's gift receives favor from God and Cain's doesn't? Joseph: Yes, that's how the Bible presents it. We're not told any of the details of this; why Abel's gift is more acceptable than Cain's. We might speculate that Abel's gift was offered more earnestly, more wholeheartedly, than Cain's – and there is some suggestion of this in the story itself. God says to Cain that his troubles result from the fact that sin is lurking at his door. We only learn the nature of this sin, though, through what follows, through Cain's murder of Abel. But here is the question: Why should the favor God shows Abel cause Cain to want to kill him? Simon: Well, that's obvious, isn't it? Cain is envious. Joseph: Yes, clearly, but why? What is envy? Once more the Bible presents us with something extraordinary. Notice that the competition between Cain and Abel is not for material goods. Cain doesn't murder Abel in order to gain anything materially. Since Darwin we are accustomed to think that human competition is based in the struggle for material survival, but the Bible sees something else. It is not material things Cain and Abel are competing for, but favor. It is favor, apparently, that is in short supply. Simon: Favor? Joseph: Yes, it is the favor God shows Abel that Cain can't abide. Exactly how God has demonstrated this favor we're not told, but it's not important. Perhaps Abel has had some success that both interpreted as the favor of God. But what enrages Cain is that it is Abel who is favored and not he. But why? Why should this cause him such rage, that is the question. What is 'favor'? Simon: Favor is . . . well to feel favored is to feel that one is especially appreciated. Joseph: Or we might say, especially loved. What is in short supply in Cain and Abel's world is love itself. The Eden story points to the origin of the human pursuit of supremacy, and now we see the consequence of this pursuit. Love is in short supply. Simon: But how does murdering Abel help? Richard Oxenberg 28 Joseph: It doesn't help at all! It only makes matters worse. But it is rooted in Cain's desire to eliminate the testimony to his weakness, his inadequacy; to somehow prove to himself that he is 'more and better' than Abel. Cain is a tragic figure, even more than Abel. And Cain, again, is us. Simon: But we are not all murderers! Joseph: We often have murder in our hearts, Simon. Or, let us say more modestly, in a corner of our hearts. This is the terrible, dirty, secret. Jesus says that the one who so much as says 'raca' to a brother is guilty enough for hell. Raca, apparently, was a term of derision in Aramaic, translated as 'you fool' in some English renditions of the Bible. When one first reads this passage it seems exaggerated in the extreme. Derisiveness toward others is a common human behavior. And yet as one comes to understand what Jesus is saying one realizes the truth of it. We all have Cain inside of us. The desire to put someone down, the snide derisive laugh at another's expense, the superior air we adopt with 'inferiors,' the mockery of another's weakness, the secret delight we take in negatively assessing another's efforts, the gossip through which we conspire with a friend to slander a mutual acquaintance, the little lift we feel at another's misfortune, especially if it is another with whom we have entered into a psychological competition, which is often the case with those we are closest to – all of this is the sin of Cain. Through it we do very real damage to one another, and on a more or less regular basis. Occasionally it flares up into something utterly monstrous, like the Holocaust. But it is there corroding human relations, corroding the very joy of life, all but continually. It is no accident that the Bible represents such murder as the first concrete act of human history. Simon: Not a pretty picture of human beings. Joseph: It is a tragic picture. XIII. The Tower of Sin Simon: But, again, Joseph, I don't see how this helps make the case for God. If this murderousness is rooted in human nature, doesn't this make the existence of a good God even less plausible? Why couldn't God have created us to be good? Joseph: Maybe the very thing that allows us to be good also presents us with the potential to be evil. Maybe goodness requires that we confront and overcome this potential. Simon: Is this what the Bible says? Joseph: Let's continue to follow the biblical narrative for a bit and see where it leads us. Generation begets generation, and things go from bad to worse. We get this obscure little ditty sung by a character named Lamach about how he has killed a man for slighting him. Cain, at least, seemed to feel some remorse at the murder of his brother, but a few Richard Oxenberg 29 generations later Lamach is positively celebrating his murderousness. Finally, in the Noah story God is represented as in such distress over the violence and chaos of the human situation that he decides to end it, put human beings out of their misery. Simon: But he saves Noah. Joseph: Yes, it seems God can't quite abandon his project altogether. Simon: And yet even after Noah things go wrong. Joseph: Right. We now get the story of the Tower of Babel. And this is the story, I think, that bears closest relation to the Holocaust. Simon: The Holocaust? You see the Tower of Babel story as related to the Holocaust? Joseph: It seems to me to mark a new stage of human sinfulness. Up until now all we've seen is individual sinfulness; individual human beings competing with one another as individuals. But in the story of the Tower of Babel we see something new: an entire society cooperating in a massive group effort to achieve supremacy, represented as the effort to reach into heaven. And this, I think, is what we see in Nazism. The 'tower' metaphor is to be especially noted. How does one build a tower? One builds it by laying one brick atop another. Each brick is lifted up by lying atop the bricks below it, and in this way the entire structure, made up of bricks that, by themselves, couldn't get very far off the ground, is able to rise up into something massive, into something that seems godlike. Simon: Are you likening the bricks to people? Joseph: Yes, this is how I interpret it. In the Cain and Abel story we see how people seek to prop themselves up by putting others down. Now, in the Tower of Babel, this becomes the basis for society itself. Each is able to feel supported, both materially and spiritually, because he stands, so to speak, on the backs of those below him. At the very top we have leaders who are able to fancy themselves godlike because of the massive structure they have below them, but of course, they too are only bricks like everyone else in the structure, only able, in their own persons, to rise a bit above the ground. Still, they are able to imagine themselves like gods because of the massive, oppressive, structure of support on which they stand. Simon: But why do the other 'bricks' go along with this? Joseph: Each is fixed in its place. On the one hand, the structure of bricks above them weighs them down and doesn't allow them free movement. On the other, the structure of bricks below them provides them with the illusion that they themselves have a secure basis, so that they are not inclined to challenge the structure, so that they come to associate themselves with the glory of the tower itself. Richard Oxenberg 30 Simon: But what of those on the bottom? Joseph: Exactly, what of those on the bottom: the poor, the persecuted, the slaves, the "huddled masses yearning to breathe free." They are necessary, of course, for the tower itself. They are those on the backs of whom the entire society is erected. Of course, they are also just bricks, no greater and no lesser than the bricks on top. But their destitution makes possible the elevation of the others. What we have in the Tower of Babel is an image of totalitarianism; from the biblical perspective, a massive, societal, tower of sin. And such structures permit human sin to reach a new pitch. Perhaps we see the very epitome of this in Nazism and the Holocaust. XIV. The Thousand-Year Reich Simon: The Nazi state, you're saying, was a kind of 'Tower of Babel.' Joseph: Reflect on the imagery of the 'thousand-year Reich.' What is the good of a thousand-year Reich to a human being who can only hope to live a hundred years at most? And yet there is something about the very idea that exhilarates, that excites, that takes one's breath away. Simon: It evokes awe; it is thrilling to feel yourself part of such an grand enterprise. Joseph: Yes, awesome is a good word here, it is a word we often use in relation to an encounter with God. In awe we experience both our littleness and the transcendence of our littleness through an encounter with that which is great. Simon: By 'great' you mean great in power? Joseph: Power in a particular sense. The ultimate power, of course, is the power over existence itself – to achieve such power is to overcome mortality, to overcome our sense of insufficiency. It is such immortality that is invoked by the symbol of the 'thousand years.' The idea of the thousand-year Reich is the idea of a kingdom in which all human weakness, all vulnerability, all frailty, is eliminated. This was the dream of the Nazis. The ideology of the 'master race' was its articulation. Why, asked Hitler, has this master race failed to achieve its promise – a promise, by the way, that was never spelled out in any detail because it was entirely symbolic. It was the promise of 'glory,' of 'greatness,' of 'mastery,' of power itself – superhuman power, godlike power. But what is godlike power? Thomas Aquinas writes that power by itself cannot serve as an ultimate human goal because power is merely a means to another end, the good of power has strictly to do with the use to which it can be put. Simon: And yet people do seem to pursue power as an end in itself. Richard Oxenberg 31 Joseph: Of course, and the meaning of this lies in just what we have been saying. Power, worldly power, is but a symbol for another kind of power that we crave, the power to be God, to be the basis of our own existence, or, to turn this phrase around, the power to overcome the dread of not being the basis of our existence. So the worldly power sought is not sought so much for what can be done with it but for its symbolic value; it symbolizes the super-worldly power we crave. Simon: But why would this lead the Nazis to commit such atrocities? Joseph: Once one sees that the pursuit of super-worldly power is at the core of Nazism everything falls into place. First of all, there is a certain paradox they must resolve: If the master race is indeed capable of such super-worldly power why have they failed to achieve it? The answer: because they have been contaminated and undermined by the weak, the shiftless, the cloying, the inferior. So if the master race is to achieve its power these must be eliminated. Remember that it wasn't only the Jews who were targeted by the Nazis. The Gypsies, the homosexuals, the mentally feeble were all targets as well. Human weakness itself was the target. Lurking behind this, of course, is a suppressed dread of their own weakness. Simon: But why the Jews in particular? Joseph: Well, two thousand years of anti-Semitism prepared the way for this. But perhaps there was something more as well. For two-thousand years of European history, ever since the destruction of the second temple in Jerusalem, the Jews have played the remarkable role of universal party-poopers. Simon: Party-poopers? Joseph: They refused to join the Tower, whatever that Tower might be; whether that of hegemonic Christianity, or of one or another version of European nationalism. They insisted on their separateness, on the very meekness of their separateness; which is to say, on their right, their duty, to worship God as they understood God; to subordinate themselves to God alone. Simon: And you, a Christian, applaud this? You don't think the Jews should have joined – what did you call it? – 'hegemonic Christianity'? Joseph: I don't think Christ came to found a religious institution, but to reveal the nature of God. Institutional Christianity – like every religion – is flawed. There was no moral imperative for Jews to abandon their Judaism to join this flawed religion. Simon: And you think this refusal of the Jews to become 'joiners' is one of the reasons Hitler targeted them? Richard Oxenberg 32 Joseph: Hitler says as much in Mein Kamf. And in this respect Hitler was absolutely right. The Jews were the mortal enemies of the Nazi state; not politically, but in their very essence. The Jews had the remarkable trait of being proud, even stubbornly proud, of their humility. The Jews, moreso I would say than the Christians whose marriage to power in the early centuries of Christianity had a corrupting influence, represented the piety that eschews worldly tyranny. I am not saying that every individual Jew had this characteristic, of course, but that the Jewish status in the world had this characteristic. Hitler had every reason to hate the Jews. The Jews were the antithesis of the Nazis. They were the anti-Tower. The psychology behind this hatred is not that difficult to understand. Nazism was a flight from human vulnerability and the Jews were a testimony to human vulnerability, not only because they themselves were vulnerable, but because they all but insisted upon vulnerability as a form of piety. In Mein Kamf Hitler tells the story of how he became an anti-Semite. At first, he says, he admired the Jews for their logical skills, their ability to win a rational argument. But then, he writes, he came to see this rationalism itself as a kind of cravenness. The one who is truly master of himself does not need to prove his rightness to himself or others, he simply embodies it and asserts it. He is self-justifying and has no need to justify himself to others. So this need on the part of the Jews to prove themselves to others was, according to Hitler, a sign of their basic inferiority, a spiritual inferiority which – coupled with a long cultivated cunning that developed as compensation for such inferiority – had the effect of undermining the selfassurance, the self-mastery, of the Aryans. And this is why they had to be eliminated. There has been much speculation as to what lay behind Hitler's maniacal anti-Semitism – was his mother harmed by a Jewish doctor? – did he himself have Jewish blood in him that he came to despise? – but Hitler tells us himself why he was an anti-Semite, and I think we can take him at his word. Simon: But you see the Jewish respect for reason and logic as a kind of humility? Joseph: Of course. It is an appeal to universal principles rather than an appeal to self-will. As such, it is respectful of the separateness and dignity of the other. One tries to get the other to see the same truth that one sees oneself, one does not merely try to impose one's will on the other. That Hitler interprets this as weakness tells us everything we need to know about Hitler and Nazism. Simon: But why should his hatred of the Jews have become so ferocious? Joseph: Who did the Nazis really hate? The Jews? No, they hated themselves. They hated their own weakness, their human weakness, their "nakedness." All of this hatred gets directed at the Jews, who are seen as embodying this weakness and, thereby, undermining the Aryan's native strength. The Nazis projected the dread and shame they felt at their own human vulnerability upon the Jews. There is no hatred so intense and so cruel as the hatred of self. And this is also the reason this hatred rose to such a sadistic level. The sadist gets a thrill from the power he wields over the weakness of the other. He enjoys it for its own sake, or rather, for the sake of what it reveals: that he is the master of such weakness, has command over it, and, thus, is not subject to it. The sadist projects his own Richard Oxenberg 33 weakness upon the other and then tortures and torments the other in order to prove to himself that he is its master. This sense of cruel mastery is the thrill of sadism. The monstrous innovation of the Nazis was to make such sadism the basis for an entire social and political order, a monstrous Tower of Babel. Simon: And yet many of the Nazi leaders were anything but 'masters' in the lives they led before Nazism. Many historians have noted that the bulk of them had been failures and misfits in their own lives before their rise to power as Nazis. Joseph: Full of envy and resentment, yes. Of course, that's no surprise. The whole enterprise of Nazism involves a great cover-up; a cover-up of human finitude, of human insufficiency and vulnerability. It is no surprise that those who have been pushed around, those who have felt themselves 'losers,' would be most attracted to this. As horrific as Nazism was we will make a great mistake if we fail to recognize that it grows from something all too common. The spirit behind the derisive laugh, the taunt at another's weakness, the little lift one feels at showing another up as 'a fool' – to give the example Jesus himself gives – that is the soil that produced the Holocaust. XV. The Ethical and the Spiritual Simon: So our ethical failings are rooted in a spiritual failing? Joseph: It results from our failure to know the love of God as our basis. This leads to an inner panic over our sense of baselessness, and this panic leads to all sorts of strategies of denial and self-deception that play themselves out in unethical ways. In an effort to establish ourselves as our own basis we necessarily violate others, for we seek control of the world that we must share with them, and seek to turn them into instruments of our will. That's one side of it. But, as we see in Nazism, the problem goes even deeper than this. In our efforts to convince ourselves of our own prowess we delight in trampling upon the weakness of others; it allows us to believe that we have mastery over weakness itself. This is sadism. And then, should the other defeat us in some way, the dread of our own vulnerability erupts into a rage. Then we get the envious fury we see in Cain. Or, in the masochistic variation of this complex, we surrender ourselves to the masterful other so as to unburden ourselves of our weakness. This is how the tower of sadism gets built. One surrenders oneself to the sadistic leader and becomes sadism's ally and instrument. And, because underlying all of this is a profound sense of shame at our own weakness, all of this is accompanied by self-deceit and denial. Oh, the psychology behind it is quite labyrinthine! But from the religious perspective, we would say that all this evil is rooted in something simple, at least simple to understand: our dread at not having a secure basis, our inability to rest contentedly in the love of God. Simon: But here is where I continue to have a problem. I can recognize in myself the dread of which you speak. At its core, I suppose, it is the dread of death. And it's true that this is not something I like to dwell on. I can also see, as you say, that this dread may well Richard Oxenberg 34 be at the root of much that is ugly in human beings. But what I do not see, what I am unable to see, is this God whose love would take this dread away. Everything you're saying makes sense to me right up to this point. If indeed there is such a God, why do we not know it, why do we not experience it? That is the question that needs to be answered. Joseph: Some of us do experience it, Simon – or at least we feel we experience it. But I think you're right that very few of us experience it fully or continuously, and many don't experience it very much at all. Simon: And why not? Joseph: Because we are too busy experiencing ourselves. Simon: Experiencing ourselves? Joseph: It is like trying to see the stars when the sun is out. The sun, of course, is just one small star, but, because of its proximity to us, when it is in the sky it is the only star we can see. We are each very, very small, Simon, we each occupy just a tiny speck within the whole of being. But, like the sun, we light up the whole world around us. Our individual concerns, our individual cares, these are what are closest to us, this is what we see most of the time. It is hard for us to see beyond ourselves. Simon: Then how can we come to experience this God you speak of? Joseph: Let's continue following the biblical narrative, for this is the very purpose of the Bible: To help us to see God – or our situatedness within God – more fully. Simon: Ok, I'm listening. XVI. The Nations Joseph: It is after the incident of the Tower of Babel that the Bible depicts God as taking an active role in the redemption of humankind. Simon: But doesn't God confuse the tongues of human beings so that they can no longer cooperate with one another? How is that supposed to help? Joseph: What we have here is a mythological account of how the separate nations came to exist. God confuses the languages of human beings at the Tower of Babel so as to prevent them from being able to cooperate in their totalitarian enterprise, an enterprise whose abominable nature we see in Nazism, as we've been saying. As we know from the remainder of the Bible, this alienation of nation from nation is not anything God wants. And yet, in the context of human sinfulness, it allows for checks and balances. No nation can become absolute because it is opposed by other nations. Each nation, looking out Richard Oxenberg 35 upon the others, is forced to acknowledge its own boundaries and limitations. The confusion of languages is a way in which God humbles human beings. Simon: But you say that God does not ultimately want such alienation? Joseph: No, the whole of humankind is a single family. What is ultimately desired is harmony in this family. But the sinfulness of human beings has destroyed the possibility for such harmony. So what God must do is restore the possibility for this harmony. The separation of human beings into opposing nations is a stopgap measure. XVII. Revelation Simon: But now I am becoming confused again. Is the Bible myth, is it history, is it revelation? An anthropologist would certainly deny that the world's disparate languages came about due to a supernatural intervention at the time of the Tower of Babel. And you yourself speak of this story as myth. But if it is myth how can you keep talking about it as if it is true? Joseph: These are important questions, Simon, questions we must come to grips with if we are to understand the nature of biblical truth. As for your question about whether the Bible is myth, history, or revelation, I would say it is all three. The biblical authors weave mythical, legendary, and historical elements together in order to convey their revelatory experience of God. Simon: But did the incidents recorded in the Bible actually happen or not? Joseph: Some of them actually happened. For instance, it is doubtless that there was a King David. Some of them never happened; I don't believe there was a literal Garden of Eden. And some of them are legendary expansions of incidents that may well have had some basis in fact; for instance, the story of the flood may well have been based on the memory of a devastating flood that took place in the region. Simon: But if some of it is myth and some of it is legend, in what sense is it true? Joseph: The truth lies in the revelatory character of the interpretations the biblical authors provide for the incidents they narrate. Simon: Interpretations? Joseph: Yes, what is important in the Bible, and what is true in the Bible, is not the factuality of the incidents it narrates but the meaning it gives to them. Recall that we discussed the meaning of meaning at the beginning of our conversation. Things have meaning in respect to their relevance for our caring. The Bible gives us an interpretation of the meaning of human existence. Richard Oxenberg 36 Simon: But is it just an interpretation or is it truth? Joseph: The truth is in the interpretation. Let's take the Noah story as an example. We find a similar account of a worldwide flood in the Sumerian Epic of Gilgamesh. We don't know what its basis in fact is. But in Gilgamesh the spiritual and ethical dimensions of the story as we find it in the Bible are absent, or, at best, obscure. What seems to have happened is that the biblical authors took this well-known flood legend and interpreted it in accordance with their own understanding of God. Simon: But, again, if it is just a matter of interpretation in what sense is it truth? Joseph: Again, Simon, it is the interpretation itself that is truth. For the person of faith, the interpretation reveals the truth of the human situation in relation to God. This revelatory interpretation is conveyed through mythical, legendary, and historical material. Simon: But when you speak of God taking an active role in the redemption of humankind how am I to understand this? Is there indeed such a supernatural entity who acts within human history, or is the Bible's account of this just an interpretive veneer laid atop events in which no such entity actually played any role? If there is such an entity why does he not make his presence more directly known to us? If there is no such entity, then what meaning can we place in the biblical stories that depict him as playing such a role? Is God really responsible for the fact that there are many languages, or was this just a natural development? If it is just a natural development, what are we to make of the biblical claim that God caused it for a certain purpose? Joseph: Ah, yes, I see the problem. These are good questions. And at this point, Simon, I find myself having to appeal to mystery. You know, the philosopher Kant does a magnificent job showing that reality as we experience it is hopelessly self-contradictory. What actually lies behind the veil of human experience is beyond our capacity to know. What we can say about the Bible is that it provides an interpretation of the human situation in relation to God, who is the basis of our existence. It does so through the use of mythological, legendary, and historical material, with a more or less continual reference to the supernatural and supra-historical context in which the natural and historical play themselves out. This context is itself signified and illustrated through the depiction of supernatural events, for instance, the parting of the Red Sea, etc. Personally, I doubt whether such events actually occurred in the way they are depicted. The supernaturalism of the Bible is itself part of its interpretive message; it is the Bible's way of saying that the ultimate meaning of finite life is not to be found in the finite world itself; that there is a reality that transcends the bounds of the finite, and that it is to this transcendent reality that we must look for our ultimate good. The way we truly make contact with this reality, however, is not through the observation of miraculous events, but inwardly, through piety and faith. So I believe that the narrative the Bible presents of a God who acts as a supernatural agent in history is not likely to be a factual one. The message behind the Tower of Babel story is that, because of human sinfulness, human Richard Oxenberg 37 unity will tend to become totalitarian. Given this, the division of human beings into separate nations is something of a blessing. But did God actually cause this division in the manner presented in the Bible? Was there an historical Tower of Babel? I doubt it. But I believe that behind these biblical narratives is a truth whose essential meaning is conveyed through them. And it is in this truth that we are to put our faith. Simon: And this truth is? Joseph: That the lostness of human life is redeemed through communion with the God of love, whose reality is revealed, sometimes more and sometimes less obscurely, in these narratives. XVIII. Abraham Simon: All right. I am not sure I am entirely convinced or even that I entirely understand what you're saying. How can one place one's faith in a truth that one cannot really know, and that is conveyed through stories that are subject to innumerable, different, interpretations? But perhaps we can save those questions for later. I am curious to know how you interpret God's redemptive activity in history, as the Bible narrates it. Joseph: Your questions about faith are important, Simon, and to the extent that I can answer them I certainly want to. So let's make sure we don't forget them. But perhaps it will be easier to answer them once we have finished our discussion of the narrative itself. Simon: I'll go along with that. Joseph: Good. Simon: Go on. Joseph: What God now sets out to do is establish one nation from among the many whose loyalty will be, not to itself, but to God. This nation, in turn, is to become a 'light' unto the other nations, through which, eventually, all the nations will achieve harmony under the true God. Simon: We still seem a long way from such harmony! Joseph: Indeed we are. Simon: Go on. Joseph: So God appears to Abraham and promises that if he will submit to God, he will make of his progeny a great nation, through his son, Isaac. Richard Oxenberg 38 Simon: Through his son Isaac! But then God asks Abraham to kill Isaac! Joseph: Yes. Simon: So what's the point of that? Joseph: The nation that is to be established through Isaac – whose birth, remember, is itself a miracle – is not to live for itself but for God. Or, to put it better, it is to live for itself in living for God, it is to find in God its ultimate purpose and good. In asking Abraham to sacrifice his 'beloved' son Isaac – and the Bible makes a point of highlighting Abraham's love for Isaac here – God is testing to see that Abraham and Isaac's ultimate allegiance is to God, and not to their own finite concerns. Simon: God is testing him? But . . . but doesn't this seem barbarous to you? Abraham is asked to transgress against his love for his own son! What kind of a test is that? How is this anything other than sheer cruelty? Joseph: He is not asked to transgress against his love. He is asked to trust it to God. Simon: But he is asked to kill Isaac! Joseph: Yes, Simon, and I agree that from a certain point of view this seems monstrous. But one of the aims of the Bible is to challenge our ordinary point of view. For Abraham, who knows God, the power of death is not the final reality, it does not have the final word. God transcends death. This is something we must believe. If we cannot believe that God transcends death then whoever has the power to kill us will also have the power to command us. If death is the ultimate power then Hitler wins, because Hitler can wield the power of death. This story is not about Abraham giving his son over to death but over to God, who transcends death. It is about Abraham's faith that death does not have the final word. This is the faith that is necessary if the God-ordained nation that is to be established through Abraham and Isaac is to realize its calling. That is the meaning of this story. Simon: But isn't Abraham violating Isaac's caring? Isaac wants to live, right? Isn't Abraham's agreement to kill Isaac a violation of Isaac? Joseph: Abraham and Isaac trust themselves to God. They trust that God's love will see them through, even through death. Simon: But what if they're wrong? What if there is no God? What if God is not good? What if Abraham is hallucinating? Joseph: Abraham knows he's not wrong. Simon: He knows it? Richard Oxenberg 39 Joseph: That's what we have to assume. Abraham is presented to us in the Bible as an example of fulfilled faith. He does not see God as those still struggling for faith do – as a remote possibility that may or may not be true. He knows God. And because he knows God, he knows that Isaac will be safe. And, of course, this is something we are to learn from him. We are to learn to trust in God as Abraham does. Simon: So if we hear some strange voice telling us to kill our children we should do it?! Joseph: Abraham does not hear a strange voice, Simon, he hears God. Simon: But. . . Joseph: Look at it this way. If you took your child to a doctor whose expertise and goodness you trusted, and that doctor were to tell you that your child needed surgery, you'd allow it wouldn't you? Simon: Yes, I suppose – if it were really necessary. Joseph: You'd allow it even if the surgeon had to take a scalpel and cut your child open? Simon: If it were absolutely necessary, if I trusted the surgeon – yes, I'd have to allow it. For my child's own good I'd have to allow it. Joseph: Exactly. Abraham hears God. Abraham knows that God is good. Abraham knows that following God's commands will be good. Simon: But how can anyone know that? Joseph: Yes, of course, that's a big question. Again, it's the question of faith. I do want to address it, but let's hold off on it for now. What we can say is that Abraham represents the person of fulfilled faith. Abraham knows God – and that's why death for Abraham is not what it is for you and me. Simon: I've heard some interpretations that suggest that Abraham secretly suspects that God will relent in the end and withdraw the command to sacrifice Isaac. That's why he consents to it. Joseph: That's not how I see it. Abraham suspects nothing. He trusts God. That, to me, is the clear meaning of the story. Abraham trusts that no matter what happens all will be well. But to suggest that Abraham goes along only because he suspects that God will relent in the end is to miss the point. God does not have to relent in the face of death because God is greater than death. Abraham knows a reality greater than death and it is to this reality he has given his entire allegiance, because he knows it to be good and the source of all goodness. And it is to this reality that the Hebrew nation – the nation that is Richard Oxenberg 40 to spring from Abraham through Isaac – is to give its allegiance. And it is through knowing this reality that the entire world is to find healing. This is God's plan for the redemption of the world: Human beings are to place their ultimate trust in the universal love that transcends them as private individuals. This is the resolution of their selfenclosure. XIX. Israel Simon: And yet things don't go easily for this new nation, do they? Aren't they enslaved by the Egyptians for 400 years before they really achieve nationhood? Joseph: Yes, and just to make sure that the reader is aware that all this is part of God's plan, the Bible narrates an episode in which God foretells of this enslavement to Abraham. Simon: Oh, wonderful! And what is the purpose of this? This God does not make things easy, does he? Joseph: Ease is not the human condition. By this time, remember, the Bible has narrated one story after another of envy, rivalry, and exploitation: Cain kills Abel, Sarah expels Hagar, Jacob cheats Esau, and so on. All of this culminates in the story of Pharaoh's enslavement of the Israelites. Through their enslavement, the Hebrew nation is to taste the bitterness of human sin in such a way as never to forget it. Simon: This seems a hard way to make a point. Joseph: It is, but then it's no harder than the reality of sinful existence itself. Remember that the Hebrews are also prone to sin. Indeed, they become slaves only after the children of Jacob, Abraham's grandson, sell their own brother Joseph into slavery, out of envy. Simon: Envy again. Joseph: Yes. And this sale of their brother, through a convoluted sequence of events, leads to their own descendents becoming slaves. This is the tragedy of human sinfulness: today's victims were yesterdays victimizers, and vice-versa. The Hebrews are as subject to this as anyone else. They are not chosen because they are supremely good. They are chosen because their very oppression makes them apt candidates for the struggle with God. Simon: The struggle with God? Joseph: To live in accordance with God is a struggle. The very thing that makes possible our goodness also gives us the potential to be evil. So to live in accordance with God's goodness is a struggle; we must struggle against our inclination to evil. This struggle is Richard Oxenberg 41 foreshadowed by the incident that gives the Hebrew nation its name, Israel. According to the Bible, Israel means: He who struggles with God and prevails. Jacob's name is changed to Israel on the night before he reunites with his estranged brother Esau. Once again, in the story of Jacob and Esau, we have an account of brother fighting against brother. Simon: That seems to be a basic theme. Jacob and Esau are Abraham's grandchildren, right? They are Isaac's sons. You say Jacob is renamed Israel? Joseph: On the night he is given his new name Jacob is camped out in the wilderness. He is fleeing from his uncle, whom he has antagonized. Now his camp is trapped between the antagonistic forces of his uncle and the antagonistic forces of his brother. He can't advance or retreat. Antagonism surrounds him on all sides. Simon: But it's all in the family. Joseph: Exactly. Simon: What caused his estrangement from Esau? Joseph: He cheated Esau out of his birthright as a young man, and now he's afraid that when Esau sees him he'll kill him. Simon: And it is in this context that he receives his new name? Joseph: The Bible tells us simply that an angel appears to Jacob and wrestles with him all night long. When the dawn breaks the angel retreats and renames him Israel, meaning, "he who struggles with God and man, and prevails." Simon: But how does Jacob prevail? Joseph: The next morning he prostrates himself before his brother in what I believe we are to understand as a sincere act of contrition and repentance. Esau is moved, for Esau also longs for reunion with his estranged brother. He embraces Jacob, and Jacob tells him that seeing Esau's forgiving face is like seeing the face of God. This is an important point, Simon. The face of God is not a face that you literally see, visibly. What Jacob experiences upon reconciling with his brother is the spirit of God, God's love. So Jacob prevails by humbling himself, by acknowledging his wrong, by seeking forgiveness, which finally allows him to reconcile with his brother and 'see' the face of God. It is the fact that they have signed on for this struggle to see God – this struggle with the demons of their own nature that obscure the face of God – that makes "the children of Israel" the chosen nation. Richard Oxenberg 42 XX. Enslavement Simon: But Jacob's children don't learn Jacob's lesson, do they? They sell their own brother into slavery out of envy. Joseph: Yet another Cain and Abel story, yes. They sell their brother Joseph to Ishmaelites, who then sell him to Egyptians. Simon: And who are the Ishmaelites? Joseph: They are the descendents of Isaac's step-brother, Ishmael, the son of Abraham and Hagar. Simon: And Hagar was? Joseph: Abraham's Egyptian slave. When Abraham's wife, Sarah, could not conceive, she allowed Abraham to have a child with Hagar. That child was Ishmael. When Sarah and Abraham finally have Isaac, though, Sarah insists that Hagar and Ishmael be evicted from the household. Simon: Not very nice of her. Joseph: There is some suggestion that Sarah is retaliating against Hagar for Hagar's contemptuous attitude toward Sarah during the years of her barrenness. Simon: Oh, my . . . a lot of pain all around. Joseph: Pain that begets pain. A vicious circle. Indeed. Simon: So the Ishmaelites are rejected cousins of Jacob's children? Joseph: Cousins of the children of Israel, yes. It's all one big unhappy family, as you note. And that, of course, is the Bible's point. Simon: So Jacob's children, out of spite and envy, sell their own brother, Joseph, to descendents of Ishmael, who, in turn, sell him to Egyptians. And what happens next? Joseph: Through a convoluted turn of events Joseph rises to prominence in Egypt, and his brothers, suffering from a famine in their own land, are forced to turn to him for food. The victimizers are now at the mercy of their own victim. But all of them are brothers. Simon: I suppose one might understand if Joseph doesn't reach out to help them with an open heart. Richard Oxenberg 43 Joseph: To me this is one of the most poignant passages in the whole of the Bible. Joseph is torn between his love for his brothers and his fury at them. What should he do? On the one hand, he wants to reunite with them. On the other, he wants revenge. Finally, his love wins out. This is his struggle with God. He invites his family to emigrate to Egypt and share in his good-fortune. For some time, we're told, the Hebrews prosper. But their very prosperity eventually causes the Egyptians to turn on them. Simon: Envy again? Joseph: Envy, no doubt, and distrust. The Bible tells us that the Egyptians are afraid the Hebrews will join with Egypt's enemies and attack them. So the enslavement of the Hebrews is a pre-emptive strike based on what seems a general state of suspiciousness, a suspiciousness no doubt justified in a world where brother sells out brother in the ordinary course of affairs. So the Egyptians enslave the descendents of those who enslaved their own brother because they are afraid that, given the chance, these descendents will enslave them! Simon: So we are all victims of our victimizations! Joseph: As Jesus says, we are all slaves of sin. XXI. Liberation Simon: So would you say that the enslavement of the Hebrews is also a symbol – a symbol of the general human enslavement to sin? Joseph: It is an instance of it and a symbol of it; an instance that serves as a symbol. And this may help explain what I mean when I say that the interpretation is the revelation. The Hebrews were neither the first nor the last people to be enslaved by another. But as far as I know, they were the first to interpret such exploitation as sin. The revelatory character of scripture is not in its record of this or that event, but in its interpretation of the meaning of these events. When we say that scripture is inspired what we mean – or what I think we should mean – is that the interpretation is inspired, is truth. Whether or not the individual events actually occurred as recorded is of secondary importance, and I think we can more or less count on the fact that many of them have been modified and shaped to help them better achieve their revelatory intent. Simon: But then what does the story of the liberation of the Hebrews mean? What does it mean to say that God intervenes with "a mighty hand," with "signs and wonders"? Can we or can we not count on such intervention in our lives? By your reading all of this is symbolic. But symbolic of what? If God does not actually intervene to make things better what are we to place our hope in? Richard Oxenberg 44 Joseph: But remember that even if we take the Bible literally we cannot infer from it that God will intervene to end the injustices we encounter. As the Bible presents it, the Hebrews were slaves for 400 years before God intervened. This means that many an individual life, many a generation of individual lives, were consumed in slavery without God's intervention. Even a literal reading of the Bible would not allow us to count on the sort of intervention you're talking about. Simon: But then what does it mean to say that God liberated the Hebrew slaves? What lesson can we draw from this if God is not really going to do such a thing? Joseph: It is not easy to put this into words, Simon, but I'll do my best. Simon: Okay. Joseph: The story as a whole is trying to reveal to us the normative structure of reality. God's condemnation of Pharaoh is the way the Bible indicates that Pharaoh, and the attitude of pride and arrogance represented by Pharaoh, are wrong; and not just wrong in a moralistic sense, but out of sync with what is ultimately true and good. Pharaoh stands opposed to the true nature of reality, and such a stance will eventually bring destruction. So the story stands as a warning to despots. Along with this, it is a story intended to provide hope and solace for the oppressed. It tells us that the structure of the creation is such that evil will finally be unmasked and defeated. Martin Luther King expressed this when he said "the arc of the universe is long, but it bends toward justice." This is something we must have faith in. Finally, the story has a particular meaning for the Jewish nation. It is saying that they owe their freedom to God. Thus, they, in particular, bear a special responsibility to live in accordance with God. Simon: But if the story isn't in fact true, if the events recorded didn't in fact happen, then what meaning can all this have? If the oppressors can in fact continue to oppress, if the oppressed will in fact remain oppressed, where is the warning, where is the hope? If the Jews weren't really liberated by God, where is the responsibility? Joseph: Yes, and here is where it becomes hard to express. The warning, the hope, even the call to responsibility, are meaningful at the spiritual level. Simon: At the spiritual level? Joseph: That place in our souls – which we are not always in direct touch with – that is concerned with the ultimate meaning of life. Simon: I'm not sure I'm following you, Joseph. Joseph: Let me put it this way: We live our lives in the context of – how shall I put it? – a hermeneutic of life. Richard Oxenberg 45 Simon: Hermeneutic? Joseph: An interpretation of life that tells us what is good and what is bad, what is damaging and what is wholesome, what responsibilities we bear to others and what to ourselves. This hermeneutic of life does not exist strictly, or even primarily, at a cognitive level. It is imprinted in our guts, so to speak. It determines the way we react to circumstances. This story – and the Bible as a whole – is intended to foster in us a certain hermeneutic of life, in which we will see oppression and exploitation as wrong, oppressed people as worthy of care and regard, and ourselves as under obligation to concern ourselves with more than just self-interest. Simon: But if this 'hermeneutic of life' isn't actually true – if God can't really be expected to liberate the oppressed "with a mighty hand" – aren't we just deceiving ourselves? Isn't it just wishful thinking, pie in the sky? Joseph: It is pie in the soul. Simon: Pie in the soul? Joseph: This hermeneutic of life is its own good. It is a good of the soul. Simon: What do you mean? Joseph: Deeply realized, it is its own good. To see the world in terms of God's love, in terms of the standards of good and evil, right and wrong, arising from that love, is a good in itself. It is a good of the soul. It is a way of being in touch with the love of God. It restores our access – to put it in mythological terms – to the Tree of Life. And this good of the soul, if deepened and extended to all, will eventually end slavery and oppression and injustice. That is the way God liberates the oppressed. XXII. Signs and Wonders Simon: But what are we to make of all the talk about 'signs and wonders'? Isn't the Bible just offering false hope? Where were those 'signs and wonders,' where was God's 'mighty hand,' in Auschwitz? Joseph: Where was God's mighty hand during the four hundred years of slavery before the Israelites were liberated? Simon: Well, yes, exactly. Where? Joseph: But you see, Simon, we are not to see ourselves as confined within the limits of our finite lives. We are to understand our lives as, ultimately, extensive with God's life. This is what it means to eat from the Tree of Life. This is what it means to "love God Richard Oxenberg 46 with all your heart, mind, and soul." Love is a unitive power. To love God is to join with God. And this, I believe, is the true meaning of the 'signs and wonders.' They are intended to reveal that the finite world we occupy is rooted in something greater; that the finite limits that bind us are not ultimate. They reveal that we are not finally bound to the vicissitudes of the finite. Our lives have an eternal basis. To know this, to experience it deeply, is its own good. Simon: Are you talking about believing in life after death? Joseph: No, I'm talking about the state of our soul now. We can live, now, as if death is the ultimate term of our life, or as if God is our ultimate term. To see death as our ultimate term encloses us within ourselves, and subjects the meaning of our lives to the vicissitudes of the finite. To see God as our ultimate term opens us to communion with the whole of being, and liberates us from these vicissitudes. Simon: But if we can't really count on God to save us from evil or from death, what are we trusting in God to do? Joseph: The trust itself, deeply realized, is the salvation. Simon: The trust is the salvation? Joseph: That is the experience of those who have made some headway in faith. Simon: But doesn't this mean that God is not really a supernatural reality, that God is just a psychological experience? A feeling of love, or trustfulness – a 'hermeneutic of life'? Joseph: But this 'psychological experience,' as you put it, of trusting God, of loving God, of understanding the world in terms of God's love, is, precisely, the way we rest in the supernatural reality of God. How else are you going to experience anything except through your psyche, as a 'psychological experience'? God is indeed a supernatural reality. It is this supernatural reality that we touch upon through the psychological, or better, spiritual, experience of faith, in all its dimensions. In the final analysis it is the experience of this supernatural reality, realized in faith, to which the 'signs and wonders' of scripture point. XXIII. Law Simon: So the Hebrew slaves are liberated from their enslavement with 'signs and wonders,' and these signs and wonders indicate the supernatural reality of God, in which they are to place their trust. Joseph: Yes. But, again, they are to place their trust in the God indicated by these signs and wonders, not in the signs and wonders themselves. If they place their trust in the signs Richard Oxenberg 47 and wonders themselves they will be sorely disappointed, since, as we've discussed, these signs and wonders cannot be counted on – and the Bible itself makes this clear. Simon: Yes, I see that, but I continue to have trouble with it. You seem to be saying that God cannot really be counted on to help us in times of distress, to protect us from our oppressors, to heal our maladies. God, as you present it, is something like a state of the soul – perhaps a benign state of the soul – but not a supernatural power that we can call on to shield us from the evils of life. Joseph: I think I am saying something more subtle, Simon. Faith is a state of the soul. Through it we touch upon the supernatural reality of God, whose ultimate nature is a mystery. Simon: But we can't count on this mystery to make life better, to protect us from evil! Joseph: We can count on God, but not in the way you suggest. The world has its own innate integrity that God does not interfere with. The material world, for instance, proceeds according to its own immanent logic. The sciences are still in the process of trying to understand this logic. They've made much progress but, to my mind, they have far to go. Might there at times be what we call 'miracles' that override this logic to effect a divine purpose? Perhaps, but, if so, it is a mystery beyond our understanding. We can't count on such miracles. This is not what we are to place our faith in. As for human beings, they have freedom to act as they will. God does not override human freedom. Simon: Then what can we count on God to do? Joseph: We can count on God to lead us toward a sanctified life, a life of wholeness. Simon: But then God can't really be counted upon to intervene in the world. Joseph: God's intervention is through us. What God reveals to the Israelites after liberating them from Egypt with 'signs and wonders' is the law through which a sanctified life is lived. It is this law – not the signs and wonders – that is the true liberator. Simon: The law? Joseph: Yes, the law presents the norms through which we live a life of wholeness, a life liberated from evil. Simon: But doesn't Jesus later reject the law? Joseph: No, Jesus protests against the legalistic distortion of the law, the belief that obedience to the letter of the law is an end in itself. Richard Oxenberg 48 Simon: And yet, for instance, the dietary restrictions given in the law at Sinai are no longer observed in Christianity. Joseph: Oh, yes. What we must recall is that the law given in Torah is many faceted. Some of it refers broadly to the human relation to God. The principle law in this respect is: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, with all thy soul, and with all thy strength." When I say that one is to trust oneself to God I am merely paraphrasing this command. This is the supreme commandment given at Sinai. Not only does Jesus not reject this command but he declares it to be the way to eternal life. Beyond these spiritual laws there are the ethical laws, such as the prohibitions against murder and theft, etc. Again, Jesus does not reject these but extends them. He says, for instance, that those who give themselves over to rage are murderers in their hearts. Beyond these, there are the ritualistic laws concerning how the newly established nation of Israel is to conduct its worship of God. It is these laws that cease to be operative for those who enter into communion with God through the new covenant offered by Christ. Simon: And Israel is given these laws because it is to be an especially holy nation? Joseph: God's aim, as we see it clearly in scripture, is the redemption of humankind as a whole. In the end there are no people who are to be more 'holy' than any other. The ideal for all human beings is to achieve the intimacy with God we see in Christ. As the narrative of scripture unfolds, however, the nation of Israel – a name that means, remember, 'one who struggles with God' – is seen as having a particular role to play in the advancement of this goal. Through their own struggles with God, and through the record they produce of these struggles, they provide a model for the general human struggle with God. Whatever else we may think about the revelatory character of Scripture we might note that its claims about the influence that the liberated Israelites will have on the rest of humankind has proven to be an historical fact. Simon: And what is the character of this law the Jews are given at Sinai? Joseph: The law has both an ethical and a spiritual dimension. Ethically, the law prescribes the behavior through which we show respect for the caring of others. The law speaks from beyond anyone's private self-interest. It speaks in the name of the good of all. This is just what makes it holy, an articulation of God's universal love. Spiritually, through prescribing respect for the caring of others, the law lifts us beyond our own selfenclosure. It thereby puts us in touch with God's love. Simon: So you would say that, in the law, the ethical good and the spiritual good coincide? Joseph: Yes, and this goodness is the very meaning of Christ. In Christ, the law is written on the heart, as love. Richard Oxenberg 49 XXIV. Jews and Christians Simon: So, then, with the advent of Christ, have the Jews fulfilled their role as the 'chosen' people? Has the baton been passed to Christianity? Is there no further part for the Jews to play? Joseph: Is all of humankind redeemed? Simon: No. Joseph: Then I would say their role remains. Simon: But hasn't their role been superseded by Christianity? Joseph: Since the inception of Christianity Jews and Christians have been playing out a Cain and Abel story of their own, and the 'supersessionist' theology of Christianity has been part of this. It is terrible to reflect upon the evils that have arisen from this conflict – by people presumably dedicated to the love of God and neighbor! No, Christ did not come to establish 'Christianity' as an end in itself, but to bring people closer to God. Religious institutions are, at best, means to that end. Certainly the Jews continue to play a role in God's redemptive project, perhaps in their very rejection of institutional Christianity. Simon: In their rejection of it? Joseph: Yes, Christianity as a religious institution is imperfect, as its persecution of the Jews makes eminently clear. By standing outside of Christianity the Jews are able to view it with a critical eye and provide a counter to it; a counter that may well be of service to Christianity itself, to help bring it into closer alignment with Christ. Simon: But in its failure to acknowledge Christ you would say that Judaism is also imperfect, wouldn't you? Joseph: All religion is imperfect. And maybe that's why we need different religions. It is like the confusion of tongues at the Tower of Babel. The different religions check and balance each other. They each contain different insights, emphases, and approaches – and different flaws. In faith, we look forward to a time when they will all achieve harmony under the true God. Until then, perhaps we must regard their continued conflict as part of the dialectical process through which God is struggling to reconcile humanity to God. Simon: So the Jews continue to play their part in the redemptive purpose of God by living in accordance with the law revealed to them at Sinai? Richard Oxenberg 50 Joseph: Yes, at Sinai the Israelites enter into a covenant with God. They agree to dedicate themselves as a nation to God. This dedication finds its concrete expression through observance of the law. Simon: And in your view this has a meaning that goes beyond the Jewish nation as such? It has a meaning for the whole of humankind? Joseph: Yes. The Jews are to be a 'priestly nation,' that is, a nation that mediates God to the other nations. Simon: And if I understand you, your belief is that the Jews can already be seen to have succeeded in this, at least to some degree. Joseph: For sure! Just count up the number of Bibles that have been produced and read over the course of history and you can virtually quantify their influence. Of the many prophecies we find in Hebrew Scripture, the claim that the Jewish nation would serve as a medium through which the other nations will come to know the God of Sinai is one we can confirm for ourselves. Simon: And yet, as you point out, this influence has largely taken place through Christianity. Joseph: Yes, that's the irony. In their alienation from Christianity the Jews tend to lose sight of the way their own claim to be 'the chosen people' has been confirmed by history. Simon: So are the Jews wrong to reject Christianity? Joseph: There is no simple answer to this question, Simon. We tend to imagine that the Jews at the time of Jesus were faced with the choice of either accepting Jesus' claims or rejecting them. Historically, though, the matter is far more complex. The vast majority of Jews never heard of Jesus during his lifetime. Jews learned of Christianity and its claims only many years after Jesus' death, after Christianity had achieved some prominence and power in the world. The Christianity they then encountered was a religion that seemed strange to them, dominated by former pagans who took an arrogant stance toward Jews and Judaism, and who demanded that the Jews abandon their heritage and modes of worship. The Jewish rejection of this is perfectly understandable, even admirable. It is rooted in their love of God as God has been revealed to them. Simon: So the Christians misunderstand the Jews and the Jews misunderstand the Christians! Joseph: That's part of it. And beyond this, we all – Jews and Christians misunderstand ourselves. Richard Oxenberg 51 XXV. A Children's Story Simon: But. . . I don't know, Joseph – if this God you speak of really exists why is it all so sloppy? Why is there such misunderstanding and confusion and error? Why doesn't God communicate clearly so that at least those who really want to live Godly lives will know how to do it? Why does he leave us wondering whether Jews have it right, or Christians have it right, or Muslims have it right – with everyone at everyone else's throat? The whole thing is like a comedy of errors! Joseph: A tragedy of errors. Simon: Yes, so why? Why doesn't God make things more clear? Joseph: Because the biblical story I am narrating for you is a children's story. Simon: A children's story??? Joseph: Suppose you wanted to explain Einstein's theory of relativity to a six-year-old. You couldn't expect the child to understand it in all its mathematical complexity and nuance. So you would try to express it in very simple terms that would point the child in the direction of the truth. You would hope that, as the child matures, she would come to understand that truth in more and more sophisticated ways. The reality of God, and the relationship of human beings to that reality, is much more complex than the theory of relativity. We don't begin to have the concepts and categories with which to express it as it really is. So the Bible offers us what amounts to a children's story to try to convey what is essential for us to know in terms that we can apprehend. There is a truth the Bible seeks to unveil. It is a truth about love and its importance. It is a truth about our alienation from love. It is a truth about our connection to one another and our connection with the transcendent basis of our existence. The Bible represents this transcendent basis as if it is just like another person, with whom we can have a simple person-to-person relationship. But the reality of God is beyond this, and the way we can know God is not the way we know another person. Augustine says that God is closer to us than we are to ourselves. This suggests that in order to know God we have to first know ourselves. Jesus says, "Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God." This suggests that the impure in heart will not see God, or will not see God clearly. You ask: Why is our relationship with God so sloppy? The answer is: Because we are so sloppy. That through which we can know God is sloppy. We get to know God only through a process of self-reformation, self-transformation. We must grow into a knowledge of God. Until then, religion will be full of misunderstanding, confusion, and error. That's just the way it is. Simon: So then how is anyone to know the way forward? How is a Jew to know whether or not to become a Christian? How is anyone to know anything? Richard Oxenberg 52 Joseph: We must be guided by the light we have, while all the time seeking to make that light fuller and brighter, and while humbly acknowledging that we don't yet have the whole truth. Simon: And this is why you say it is understandable for the Jews to reject Christianity – even though you yourself believe in Christ? Joseph: They follow the light they have. That's all any of us can do. Simon: And yet you think they are wrong to reject Christ. Joseph: I think we are all wrong in many ways, Simon. Simon: And yet you think they are wrong, specifically, in their rejection of Christ. Joseph: Oh, many Christians are wrong in their acceptance of Christ. Christ is a vehicle through which we approach more closely the reality of God, just as the Bible as a whole is a vehicle. But we can misread the Bible and we can misconstrue the meaning of Christ. Yes, I think that, understood rightly, the revelation that occurs through Christ can help us see and approach God more fully. But understood wrongly it can obscure our vision and impede our approach. The Jews have their own vehicles for seeing and approaching God. For a large host of reasons – many legitimate, as I say – the vehicle of Christ does not serve them now. Given the way Christianity presented Christ to the Jews this is more than understandable. Simon: But you think there may come a day when this will change – when the Jews will see God in Christ? Joseph: St. Paul writes that one day God will be "all in all." On that day we will see God in Christ, we will see God in Moses, we will see God in Mohammed, we will see God in Krishna, we will see God in Buddha, we will see God in every grain of sand on every beach. And then we will see, as well, that all these ways of seeing God have their limitations. Until then, we must struggle to see God as best we can. I see God in Christ. Will the Jews as a people one day come to see God in Christ? Perhaps. But perhaps both Judaism and Christianity will have to mature before that can happen. XXVI. Divine Wrath Simon: Okay, there is another question that has been plaguing me for some time. Joseph: Ask away. Simon: You say that the law is an articulation of the structure of love; that the reality of God is a reality of universal love. Richard Oxenberg 53 Joseph: Yes. Simon: You say that the Bible is a vehicle for helping us see this. Joseph: Yes. Simon: But...excuse me...is this really what we find in the Bible? Don't we see there a God of wrath and judgment far more often than a God of love? God evicts Adam and Eve from Eden with a rash of curses, he drowns almost all the inhabitants of the earth in the time of Noah, he confuses human language at the tower of Babel, he inflicts gruesome diseases upon the Egyptians, he has half the Israelites slaughter the other half at the foot of Mt. Sinai, he threatens the Israelites – his own people – with calamity after calamity through the prophets, and on and on. Does this seem to you to express infinite love? It seems to me more an expression of infinite fury, even hatred. The God of the Bible seems to me far more often a God of violence than of love. Joseph: There is truth to what you say. Simon: So how do you make sense of it? How do you reconcile this with your idea of God as universal love? Joseph: Well, we might appeal to Nietzsche here. Simon: You mean Friedrich Nietzsche, the famous atheist? Wasn't he the philosopher who declared "God is dead"? You're going to appeal to him? Joseph: There is much insight in Nietzsche's writings. Nietzsche's claim is that at the core of Judaism and Christianity is not a spirit of love at all, but of seething hatred rooted in bitter resentment. He saw the originators of Judaism and Christianity as oppressed people, slaves, whose basic feeling was one of outrage at their mistreatment. He called this 'slave resentment.' Since the weakness of the slaves prevented them from expressing their rage directly, they projected it upon God and vented it that way. Simon: But you're not saying you agree with this? Joseph: Oh, I think there is some truth to it. I think the Bible does indeed voice the outrage of the oppressed. But I would draw quite a different conclusion from this than Nietzsche does. Simon: Which is? Joseph: I would say that this spirit of rage is itself an expression of love. Simon: Rage is an expression of love? You're going to have to explain that one to me. Richard Oxenberg 54 Joseph: You know the expression 'Hell hath no fury like a woman scorned'? Simon: Yes. Joseph: Perhaps we might generalize this to: 'Hell hath no fury like the longing for love scorned.' This business of love is not a trivial matter, Simon, and it is not a superficial one. The need for love is at the core of human caring. Its frustration gives rise to all the negativities of human feeling: rage, hatred, depression, anxiety, despair, ennui. These feelings are then vented, at times, through horrific violence. Still, at the root of it all is love. Simon: But are you saying that God has such negative feelings; that God reacts like a spurned lover? Joseph: There are passages of the Bible in which God is represented in just that way. Still, we must remember that the Bible is not God, but revelation. Revelation is a complex phenomenon that depends for its purity on the human beings who receive it. The Bible is a record of the human encounter with God: the breaking through of God's truth into human consciousness. In the Bible that truth often breaks through as a condemnation – which is also a revelation – of the depravity and destitution of the human spirit. This revelatory condemnation takes the form of a threat and a promise. The threat is that if human beings continue in their failure of love the truth of love will itself destroy them, as the truth of gravity will destroy a man who disregards its nature and hurls himself off a cliff. The promise is that if humans will come to abide by love they will find healing for themselves and the world. We see this basic message repeated and illustrated again and again in the Bible. Simon: But do you agree with Nietzsche that the wrath of God as depicted in the Bible is a product of 'slave resentment'? Joseph: I think Nietzsche sees half the truth. Certainly the oppressed feel bitterness, resentment, rage, even hatred at those who oppress them. And from a certain point of view such feelings are not only understandable but legitimate. An outraged victim of the Nazis would certainly deserve our sympathy and support. And I do agree that the biblical image of God is often colored by such moods. But what is remarkable about the Bible, and what makes the Bible revelatory, is that it shows us the meaning of these moods and thereby takes us beyond them. Bitterness, resentment, hatred, and violence are the inevitable result of a world bereft of justice and love. This is the human situation. What we in Christianity call its 'fallenness.' Brother takes up arms against brother. The perpetrators of violence today were its victims yesterday, as the victims today will be the perpetrators tomorrow. The Bible illustrates this in a thousand different ways. The children of Jacob sell their brother into slavery only to have their own descendents fall into slavery as a result. The Hebrew slaves are liberated from their oppressors only to fall prey to the same idolatries that led to their oppression. In a world devoid of love everyone Richard Oxenberg 55 is victim and victimizer. This is the tragedy of the human situation as the Bible reveals it. The prophets are seized with outrage in the face of all this and take this outrage to be the very outrage of God. Simon: But do you agree with them? Is it the outrage of God? Joseph: Perhaps we can begin to sort this out by distinguishing between the immanence and transcendence of God. As immanent, God participates in the brokenness of the human situation and, we might even say, in the pain and outrage generated by that brokenness. So Nietzsche is right in seeing in this outrage 'slave resentment,' but he is wrong in failing to see that this resentment is itself revelatory of truth. It is this revelatory outrage that we hear in the voice of the prophets. It is, at one and the same time, the outrage of the slave and the outrage of God on behalf of the slave. But such outrage is never the final word, and this is what clearly distinguishes it from mere resentment. After the expression of outrage we invariably hear the pleas of God for repentance. God's aim is not to vent outrage but to transform and heal the outrageous situation. Thus in Ezekiel God says to the apostate Israelites: "'Why will you die, O house of Israel? For I have no pleasure in the death of anyone who dies . . . Therefore, repent and live.'" Behind the outrage is love. And we see this especially in the life of Christ. Jesus also expresses outrage at times, especially at the religious authorities who fail in their responsibility to minister God's love to the people. But on the Cross he looks down at all who have crucified him and says, "Father, forgive them, they know not what they do." In this moment he reveals that love is God's final word. To the extent that we do not hear this voice of love in some passages of the Bible I would say that, taken in and of themselves, those passages are deficient. And yet we are not to take them in and of themselves but to read them in the context of the whole. Read from the perspective of Christ's consummate love one can see the entire Bible moving toward it – as if one were watching a motion picture of an overcast day on which the clouds are gradually dispersing. At first one sees little but darkness and dreariness. But as the clouds grow thinner one is able to sense the luminance shining behind them. Finally, in Christ's love, we see the sun blazing through. Simon: You're not saying that God's feelings mature over time? Joseph: I am saying that the human perception of God changes as we approach God, and that it is this human perception of God that is recorded in the Bible. The further we are from God the more terrifying God appears. As we come closer we come to realize that this terror itself was the result of our distance from God. XXVII. The New Covenant Simon: And now, again, I wonder why we are so distant from God. In your interpretation of the Eden story you seem to suggest that this distance is a function of the very structure of human self-consciousness. We are, by our very nature, closed up in ourselves. I Richard Oxenberg 56 experience my pain, not yours, my joys, not yours. So how do we overcome this? In what way can we overcome this? What is the Bible's answer? Joseph: Here is where we must discuss the meaning of Christ. Christ is the revelation of this overcoming; the revelation of the possibility of a human being fully imbued with the universal love of God. Simon: The word 'Christ' is the Greek for 'Messiah,' am I right? Joseph: That's right. Simon: But wasn't the Messiah supposed to be a great holy King who would inaugurate a reign of peace and righteousness on earth? This doesn't seem to have happened, does it? The twentieth century alone was one of the bloodiest in human history. There has been no end to turmoil, wars, and violence since Jesus. In what possible sense, then, can you call him the Messiah? Joseph: Yes, but look at it this way: Even a perfect King could not establish a perfect Kingdom where the subjects remain corrupt. First the heart must be mended. The true Messiah, thus, does not write the law into a political constitution but upon the heart; and when this occurs it ceases to be law and becomes love. Love is the fulfillment of law, it is that to which the law points – and this is what Jesus means when he says "I come not to destroy the law but to fulfill it." It is not enough to change our political systems, we ourselves must be changed. Jesus' very person is a revelation of transformed humanity; humanity in perfect alignment with the love of God. That's what makes him the Christ. Simon: But human beings have not been transformed. Joseph: It's a work in progress, Simon. This is why Christianity speaks of a second coming of Christ. The second coming is the fulfillment of the messianic project begun with the first. Simon: But when will this second coming take place? Joseph: In my understanding, it takes place for each one of us, as we each approach the likeness of Christ. Simon: So it is not going to be an actual return of Jesus? Joseph: It is going to be the birth of Christ in each of our hearts. That's how I understand it. Simon: But what of the world as a whole? Isn't the Messiah supposed to perfect this? Richard Oxenberg 57 Joseph: The closer humanity comes to the likeness of Christ, the more the world will be transformed. You know, there is a Jewish teaching that says that the Messiah will arrive only when the Torah, God's truth, is perfectly observed. The irony, of course, is that if everyone were perfectly observing Torah there would be no need for the Messiah. But implicit in this teaching is the notion that such perfect observance is the presence of the Messiah, the messianic spirit. The second coming of Christ is the fulfillment of Christ's messianic mission. This fulfillment takes place when – as – Christ is born within each of our hearts. Simon: Okay. And what exactly does this 'birth of Christ' mean? Do we return to what Adam and Eve were before they ate the forbidden fruit, before the fall? Joseph: Oh, I wouldn't put it that way. Adam and Eve before the fall had not yet come into their full humanity. In the Hebrew Bible God says "Behold, I put before you life and death; therefore choose life." But such could never have been said to Adam and Eve before the fall, because before the fall they knew nothing of death. Thus, though they might have enjoyed life in God they could never have chosen it; and, in a sense, they could never have become spiritual adults; relating to God in freedom. Simon: So you're saying that the fall was necessary for our spiritual maturity? Joseph: I am saying that what is called 'the fall' represents a stage in human development. And, yes, I think it is a stage we need to pass through to arrive at what is revealed in Christ. Simon: So we actually needed to eat from the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil? Joseph: Let us remember we are dealing with myth. Adam and Eve represent humanity in its emergence. With the emergence of human self-consciousness and freedom human beings are tempted to center all value in themselves. This is represented in the Eden myth by the eating from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. Instead of living by God's law, by the law of universal love, human being's live by their own law, the law of selflove. That's the 'fall.' This cuts them off from their experience of God, and from wholesome communion with one another. Simon: But you don't actually believe there was such a 'fall' historically; that once human beings lived according to the law of universal love and then 'fell' into a life of self-love? Joseph: No, I see the idea of the fall as revelatory: What human beings are fallen from is not what they once were, but what they should be: the image of God. Simon: But it's not our fault. It's just how human self-consciousness is. Joseph: It's not our fault, but it is our responsibility. We are called to transform our limited self-consciousness into divine-consciousness, our self-love into divine-love. This Richard Oxenberg 58 is the meaning of the Bible as a whole. It is expressed in its central commandment: "You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, with all your soul, and with all your might." Simon: Isn't this what Jesus calls "the greatest commandment"? Joseph: Yes, and he couples it with the commandment to love your neighbor as yourself. To love God wholly is to love your neighbor as yourself, for God's very being is universal love. To become such a person of love is to achieve the messianic consciousness revealed in Christ. Simon: And to do this we must somehow 'spit out' the fruit from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. Joseph: Oh, I would rather say we must digest it. Simon: Digest it? Joseph. Yes. Let us imagine three stages of human consciousness. The first stage is that of simplistic innocence, represented by Adam and Eve before the fall. They are "naked and unashamed," living in accord with God, but not yet aware of their own capacity for independence, self-reflection, and self-definition; not yet really differentiated from nature and the other animals. The next stage is represented by the fall. We become aware of our separateness, our independence, our power of self-determination. This tempts us to center all values around ourselves, which severs us from our relationship with God and pollutes our dealings with one another. This is the 'original sin,' where 'sin' here means rupture with God. As we've said, this 'original sin' gives rise to every other sin, to the "war of all against all." But finally, in the third stage, having become aware of the catastrophe to which such self-centeredness leads, we actively, knowingly, self-reflectively, choose to rise to the likeness of Christ, to make universal love our standard of good and evil, rather than our own private, finite, interests and will. Simon: And this, you say, is a digestion of the fruit? Joseph: If we understand the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil to represent the tree of value-knowledge, inherent to the caring nature of God, then in eating from this tree Adam and Eve are indeed ingesting something of God, just as the serpent says. They become able to choose for themselves what they see as good, and spurn what they see as bad. But at first, this makes them morally and spiritually sick, for they haven't the capacity to properly digest this fruit; that is, they haven't the capacity to integrate it with their animal nature. So this God-like capacity to choose makes them willful, prideful, and self-centered, as they accord absolute value to their own private desires and interests. Thus, ironically, their very God-likenesss cuts them off from God and each other. This is the fall. But finally, they – we – do digest the fruit. When we do we are able to become true partners of God, valuing the world, each other, and ourselves, as God does. God is no Richard Oxenberg 59 longer experienced as a force entirely outside of us, telling us what to do. Our will and God's will are now aligned. We have digested the fruit of God's value-knowledge, and have come to understand and value the world as God does. This is Christ. Simon: So is Christ also a symbol, like Adam and Eve? Joseph: I don't think 'symbol' is quite the right word. 'Christ' refers to the consummation of human consciousness, or spirit, as revealed in the person of Jesus. It refers to the state of perfect alignment with God. This is the 'new covenant.' Simon: A covenant is a contract. Joseph: A contractual partnership, yes. When the Israelites arrive at Mt. Sinai after their liberation from slavery they agree to live by the rule of God's law. This is the original covenant. But the Hebrew prophets tell us that this is not to be the final covenant between God and human beings. The prophet Jeremiah writes of a 'new covenant,' in which the law of God will no longer be written on tablets of stone, but on the hearts of human beings. And at that point, as I say, it is no longer law; it has become love. Love is the fulfillment of the law, that to which the law points. Christ is the revelation of this new covenant. Christ is a person whose human spirit is fully imbued with the divine spirit, with divine love. Simon: But isn't Christ supposed to be the incarnation of God? Joseph: Yes, this is the incarnation. To be incarnated is to be made flesh. God is spirit. The spirit of God is love. God's spirit of love becomes flesh, becomes incarnate, in Christ. Simon: But you're saying that this is what we all are to become? We all are to become incarnations of God? Joseph: That's what it means to be the "image of God." We are to become incarnate images of God. The apostle Paul says that, in the end, God will be "all in all." That's not to say that we will cease to be human. Remember that the Christian doctrine is that Christ is fully human and fully divine. Christ is a partnership of the human and the divine, and this partnership makes us more human, not less. It makes us what we should be, the 'image of God.' And yes, we are all to become this. That's how I read it. XXVIII. Salvation Simon: But how do you relate all this to the idea that Christ came to save humanity from the punishment due to sin, from hell? Doesn't Jesus pay the penalty for human sin so that we don't have to pay it ourselves? That's what I've always heard. Richard Oxenberg 60 Joseph: That's one way to put it. But, as always, we have to penetrate beneath the symbol system. Simon: Ah, the symbol system again! Why doesn't God express himself more directly? Joseph: Again, Simon, the relationship between human beings and God is – as the philosophers say – sui generis, that is to say, it is unique, one of a kind, there is nothing quite like it. In order to express it in accessible terms religious writers employ all sorts of models from the sphere of human affairs – just as Jesus used parables. The Bible is full of such models. The relationship is depicted as that between a groom and his bride, as that between two parties to a contract, as that between a sovereign and his subjects, as that between a father and son, as that between a lover and his beloved, as that between a judge and an accused, and on and on. None of these models perfectly reflect the relationship as it is in itself; they are all attempts to express it by analogy to something within common human experience. Simon: So Jesus doesn't really 'pay the penalty' for our sins? Joseph: The traditional interpretation of the Cross as a 'payment for sin' is predicated upon what might be called the 'crime and punishment' model of sin; based upon the notion that sin is a kind of crime committed against God for which God exacts a punishment. This idea is taken from the realm of human jurisprudence and is only with difficulty transferred to the spiritual realm. We see the difficulty the moment we reflect upon it. First of all, a crime requires a victim – but who is the victim of human sin? Presumably God is the victim – and yet it is odd to imagine that a human being could victimize God in any meaningful sense. But not only is God the victim in this model, but he is the judge, jury, and executioner all in one. And yet, again, it is odd that the victim should also be the judge and executioner of punishment; for if the victim had the power to be judge and executioner then presumably he would have had the power to avoid victimization. Beyond this, the crime and punishment are hopelessly out of proportion – the crime being a single act of disobedience on the part of our first parents and the punishment being eternal suffering for all human beings; numbering in the billions, all but two of whom did not willfully commit the crime themselves. True justice requires that a punishment fit the crime, but here there seems to be no correlation between the two. Further, the idea that Jesus, as God incarnate, suffers the punishment in man's stead creates further difficulties. First, from the standpoint of human justice no person can be punished for another – punishment is not transferable in this manner, and we would regard it as a travesty if a man convicted of murder were to offer up a friend, an innocent who is fond of him, to be executed in his place. And this becomes even more problematic when we consider that, in the Christian view, it is God himself who suffers the punishment – in other words, God, who is the original victim of the crime, is now, so to speak, victimized yet again by suffering the punishment for the very crime of which he is the victim, and all so as to allow himself, as judge, to let the actual criminal off scott-free! And this, we are told, is all done in order to satisfy the demands of justice. And yet it Richard Oxenberg 61 should be apparent that we have long since strayed from anything remotely resembling human justice here. Simon: And yet you can't deny that this is the way the Cross has been understood through the centuries. Joseph: Yes and no. I think there has always been an awareness that Christ's death and resurrection constitute a mystery that juridical language only imperfectly captures. Simon: But how account for the fact that this mystery has for so long been represented in these terms if, as you say, they are so inadequate? Joseph: These terms are an inheritance from the Jewish system of sacred law. It is Judaism which first represented the relationship between God and man in terms of a legally binding covenant, or contract, which both Jew and God were obliged to honor. This covenant required the observance of ritual and ethical statutes, and, when violated, demanded reparations in the form of various sacrifices. Simon: And you're saying that this Jewish way of thinking of the human relation to God is inadequate? Joseph: Oh no, I think it is quite adequate within the context of Judaism itself. The Jewish statutes, though burdensome, can nevertheless be fulfilled – there is no cataclysmic 'original sin' that can no longer be undone because it is a universal event. Further, transgression of the statutes have proportional penalties, penalties which the transgressor is always able to pay – and having paid the proper penalty – made the required sacrifice, for instance – the covenantal relation is mended; an individual transgressor has made an individual atonement and reestablished a healthy relation with the community and with God. All of this works quite nicely within its own context. Of course, even in Judaism the juridical model must still be understood as a model – but it is a model that works, conceptually and practically. Simon: And yet this model becomes problematic in Christianity? Joseph: Very much so – as we have seen. Jesus himself said that you cannot pour new wine into an old wineskin, for the wineskin will burst and the wine will be lost. We must see that the juridical wineskin is no longer suitable for the Christian wine. And this, I think, has created many problems for Christianity and its understanding of God. Viewed with a juridical eye, the Christian God appears irrational and arbitrary; the idea of justice, though still touted, seems bent out of shape. A revelation that verbally proclaims 'love' is presented in terms that do not even appear minimally just – and all this is to be accepted on 'faith'; where faith itself is represented as unquestioning, unthinking, acquiescence. Of course, this is one of the reasons the Jews find Christianity strange, a reversion to paganism. Richard Oxenberg 62 Simon: Paganism? Joseph: To the Jews this seems a reversion to a God of pure, arbitrary, might before the giving of law, before the enactment of an ethical covenant. What many Christians do not understand is that in Judaism the covenant binds God as well as man. God, in a sense, binds himself to the law. Thus, the law is a revelation of God's ethical and rational nature; God's respect for right above might. Such a God can be depended upon to respect the dignity of human beings regardless of their power differential – and there is great solace in this thought. A God whose 'justice' is as strange as appears in juridical Christianity is a horror to the Jews. Who is this God who must torture his own son in order to forgive human transgression? The Jews shudder to think of it. Simon: And you say this accounts for the Jewish resistance to Christianity over the centuries? Joseph: I think it certainly accounts for some of it. The Jews look at juridical Christianity and see a burst wineskin with leaking wine, and they say to themselves: "Why should we accept this strange religion with its strange notions – with its justice that is not just and its love that is not loving? Here, in Judaism, we have a fine old wineskin with some fine old wine. And this old wine is good for life and this old wineskin is good for holding this wine – and why should we give them up?' Simon: But still, you see great truth in the Christian revelation. Joseph: Oh, yes. But the Christian revelation's truth lies precisely in its driving us beyond the juridical model. This is something that Paul, the first interpreter of the Cross, seems both to see and not see. He knows that there is something in the Cross of Christ that drives us beyond the 'law' – but he is never able to say quite how and why. And this is not surprising, since he is speaking of matters for which he does not have an adequate vocabulary. He is, after all, a Pharisee himself, well schooled in the juridical model. Paul is certainly the recipient of a great revelation, and he is a man of great heart, but – as anyone who has ever had a deep insight knows – there is a gap between being able to see a truth and being able to say it. Paul struggles to find the words to say that with Christ the 'law,' the juridical relation to God, has been transcended – and he expresses this by saying that the penalty demanded by the law has been paid so that we need no longer fear it. For Paul, long schooled in juridical thinking, this is an exclamation of great joy. Christ has freed us from guilt and fear! But conceptually it is inadequate, for it keeps us within the very juridical categories that are to be overcome. When a criminal pays a penalty he is not thereby 'freed' from the law, he is still bound by law – and yet Paul wants to say that Christ has in some sense freed us from law itself. Simon: But what could free us from law? Joseph: Love frees us from law, by spontaneously fulfilling the law's demands! It is not law per se that we must be freed from, but the experience of law as an oppressive Richard Oxenberg 63 imposition from without. It is love that frees us from this; not because it pays law's penalty, but because it spontaneously seeks what the law requires. The one who loves is, thus, united with the law, he has the law 'written on the heart,' as the prophets say, and thus is no longer 'under' the law. The law is no longer a burden imposed from without. This is the new situation that Christ reveals, and it is this to which he calls us. Such is 'salvation.' This has nothing at all to do with paying a penalty for a crime. It has to do with an inner transformation, a spiritual maturation, of the person. Simon: So 'sin' should not be viewed as a kind of crime? Joseph: Sin is separation from God, from the love of God, from our basis in God's love. We experience ourselves as closed up in ourselves, abandoned to ourselves. This is the state of sin, which gives rise to the many acts of sin – crimes, if you will – through which we violate one another and alienate one another and, thus, further close ourselves upon ourselves. But what is needed in response to this is not punishment, but healing. That is the real meaning of 'salvation,' a word derived from 'salve,' meaning a healing balm. Christ is this salvation. Simon: So we are healed by worshipping Christ. Joseph: We are healed by becoming like Christ. Simon: And how exactly do we do that? Joseph: Christ must blossom in our hearts. Simon: Yes, yes, fine. But how? XXIX. Incarnation Joseph: Let's go back to the Garden of Eden story for a moment. Simon: Okay. Joseph: We've talked about the meaning of 'original sin;' that it is due to the selfenclosure of our consciousness. But if we are to understand how we become Christ-like we need to say something more about this. We need to say what it is that is self-enclosed. Simon: What it is? But you just said it is our consciousness. Joseph: Yes, but what is this consciousness that is self-enclosed? Where has it come from? What is its nature? Simon: Does the Bible have anything to say about this? Richard Oxenberg 64 Joseph: It gives us an image of it. It shows us God breathing his spirit into Adam, to give him life. Simon: So our consciousness is the breath of God, the spirit of God? Joseph: Yes, it is the spirit of God within us that is self-enclosed. In this respect the fall is an apt metaphor. But it is not so much the human being who has fallen, as God who falls in breathing his spirit into man. Simon: I've never heard it put that way before! You're saying that God has fallen? Joseph: Of course, we are dealing in mysteries, expressed in symbols and metaphors that we hope will point us in the right direction. As I said before, the incarnation is revealed in Christ, but doesn't first occur with Christ. In some sense, the entire world is the incarnation of God – the spirit of God made flesh, incorporated in materiality. This idea really isn't so far removed from traditional theology. Traditionally, this gets called the immanence of God. Simon: But you're saying that God is fallen? Joseph: The spirit of God within us is fallen from its association with the whole of God. It is in exile. This exile is what gets symbolized by the ejection of Adam and Eve from Eden: exile from God, from the eternal life of God, the 'Tree of Life.' Simon: But you're saying it is God who is exiled? Exiled from himself? Joseph: In a sense, yes. This is not easy to put into words, or even to understand with any great precision. The categories of same and other don't quite work here. We see this confusion in the doctrine that Christ is both fully man and fully God. How can he be fully both, unless each can be the other? Conceptually, though, we do have analogies. We can say, for instance, that a lion is fully a lion and fully a mammal. There's no confusion there. Simon: But a lion can be fully a mammal only because all lions are mammals. Joseph: Yes. Simon: And so now you're saying that all human beings are God? Joseph: We are not all of what God is, just as a lion is not all of what mammals are. But we are 'of' the spirit of God. That's how I understand it. That's why God is so concerned with us. That's why God can't stop being concerned with us. Our alienation from God is, in some sense, God's alienation from himself. That's why Jesus says, in the gospel of Matthew, that what you do to the least of your brothers, you do to Me. That's why he says Richard Oxenberg 65 that the command to love God and the command to love neighbor are substantially the same. That's why John writes that anyone who says he loves God but doesn't love his brothers and sisters can't be speaking the truth. God is already 'within' us, incarnate within us. And it is because God is already within us that our self-enclosure, our selfenclosed self-love, can be opened up, can become a love of God and neighbor – can become 'Christ-like.' XXX. The God Within Simon: So you're saying – if I'm understanding you correctly – that the human enterprise is something of a grand adventure; an adventure to actualize the God within. Joseph: That's one way of putting it. Simon: And this 'God within' is revealed in the person of Christ? Joseph: It is revealed in all the religions on earth in various ways – but quite prominently and explicitly in the person of Christ. Simon: And yet Christianity has been guilty of some pretty horrendous things, don't you think? – witch hunts, burning of heretics, inquisitions, etc. How do you account for that? Joseph: Oh, well, Christianity is not Christ. Christianity is – even at its best – just a collection of flawed human beings struggling to actualize Christ. Simon: But why is the struggle so difficult? Why does it take such horrendous forms? Joseph: Why must a baby crawl before it can stand? Why must it stand before it can walk? Simon: It's a developmental process? Joseph: Yes, and a difficult and complex one – because our free will plays a part in it. We are struggling to actualize the God within. But that itself is one of the reasons we sin, one of the reasons sin becomes so horrific – one of the reasons for the Holocaust. Simon: The Holocaust was due to our trying to actualize the God within?! Joseph: Yes! What do you think Hitler wanted? – He wanted to be God! He wanted immortality, eternity, endless power – he wanted to overcome his human limitations. This is what Eve wants when she reaches out for the forbidden fruit. Simon: But Hitler was not Christ-like! Richard Oxenberg 66 Joseph: No, of course not. He tried to become God in his own finite person, in his own self-enclosure. But that is not the way. Here we have the meaning of the whole Bible in a nutshell. The self-enclosure of human self-consciousness is experienced as a kind of destitution, it closes us off from our native home in God. In compensation, we seek to become God in our own person. This causes us to abuse one another – as we see in the stories of Cain and Abel, Lamech, Noah, the tower of Babel, Sarah and Hagar, Jacob and Esau, Joseph and his brothers, and, of course, Pharaoh and the Israelite slaves. Hitler is just another – most horrific – instance of this. The entirety of the Bible is an attempt to wake us up to the perversity of this, and to show us another way. Simon: And Christ is this other way? Joseph: Yes, he reveals it and he is it. Or, we might say, he reveals it by being it. He is what we are called to become. He is the blossoming of the God within. And this blossoming is the blossoming of love; a love we both abide in and share with others. That is the 'Kingdom of God.' Simon: And yet it seems easier for most people to follow the way of self-enclosure than the way of love. Joseph: Oh yes, it's easier for a baby to crawl than to walk. Still, walking is its destiny. We human beings – we are still just learning to walk. And we fall frequently. Simon: So we must have patience? Joseph: We must have patience, we must have forgiveness, we must have apology, we must have charity, we must have understanding, we must have faith and hope. This is the way we learn to walk, to walk with God. XXXI. The Cross Simon: So all this talk of Jesus dying for our sins – you're saying it's a mistake, a misunderstanding of the true message? Joseph: I'm saying that it works, and has spiritual utility, within a certain metaphorical framework – the 'crime and punishment' framework. Within that framework it expresses, among other things, the forgiveness and love of God while, at the same time, serving as something of a warning. But I think this crime and punishment framework has worn itself out. It doesn't really work for us anymore. And there is a truer, more profound, framework, lurking beneath this one. Simon: And this more profound framework is? Richard Oxenberg 67 Joseph: Christ is a revelation of God-with-us. In the Gospel of Matthew, the name Jesus, which literally means "God saves," is associated with the name Emmanuel. Emmanuel is the name the prophet Isaiah gives to the Messiah. It literally means "God-with-us." God saves us through being with us. This is the way our self-enclosure is opened, opened to the love of God. Simon: But what has this to do with the Cross? Joseph: Christ on the Cross is a revelation of God-with-us even in the extremity of our suffering, even in the extremity of death and despair, even in the extremity of sin – even in our separation from God. On the Cross Jesus cries out: "My God, my God, why have you forsaken me!" This, of course, is a cry of utter despair. It is the cry of human selfenclosure. It is the cry of our separation from God and each other, our separation from love. But the whole of the biblical message is that God hasn't forsaken us, God doesn't forsake us. Even in the extremities of death and despair God is there, with us, within us, suffering with us, if we would but see it. And if we would but see it we would overcome our sense of forsakenness, of self-enclosure. And that would be the beginning of redemption, of salvation, of resurrection. It is not that Jesus 'pays' the penalty for our sin, it is that he shares it with us, and in so doing he reveals that we are not alone. God is with us, even in our sin, even in our alienation. God's eternal love is with us. To know this is great joy. But we must see it, we must take hold of it. Otherwise we remain on the Cross. Simon: And by 'the Cross' you mean. . . ? Joseph: The anguish of human finitude and isolation, and all that stems from it. The Holocaust, the Inquisition, the genocides, enslavements, murders, and rapes – the horrorshow of human history. In this sense, the Cross represents the death that befalls us due to sin itself. Jesus is crucified by human sin. But Christ on the Cross is the love of God suffering this horror-show with us, struggling to lift us out of it, promising us that death, destruction, horror, is not the final word. So the Cross is – at one and the same time – the Cross of human misery and the Cross of God's salvation. Simon: Both? Joseph: Yes, for it reveals that the reality of this misery – horrible as it is – is not the final word. God is with us, within us – even in the extremity of our darkness. This is the strange, profound, sad, joyous, frightening, awesome, beauty of the Cross. The Cross reveals – at one and the same time – the horror of human sin and God's answer to human sin. Simon: And the answer is that God is with us? Joseph: The universal love that is God – is with us. Always. Even when we can't see it, even when all seems hopeless. Still, God is with us. And we will overcome the horrorRichard Oxenberg 68 show of human history – and of our own individual lives – just to the extent that we can learn to be with God. That's the whole message of the Bible. Simon: But is not the Cross a symbol of repentance? Joseph: Oh, yes! The Greek word translated 'repentance' in the New Testament is metanoia, which might more literally be rendered, 'transformation of heart and mind.' By submitting to the Cross with Christ we are to be transformed. Finally, we are to allow our prideful self-will, our self-enclosure, to die on the Cross with Christ. And we can allow it to die just to the extent that we see that its death is not our death; that our lives are sustained by something beyond ourselves. Thus, as we give up our self-enclosure we become more and more open to the infinite openness that is God; as Paul puts it, we die to the flesh to be reborn in the Spirit. This is the message – the call – of the Cross. Simon: So the Cross is both an image of the consequences of sin and an image of the overcoming of sin? Joseph: Yes, that's the profundity of it. The Cross reveals the death to which sin leads – the horror-show of human existence – but it reveals, at the same time, that death is not the final word. For we are of God, and God is life, not death. When we let go of our selfenclosure, when we open ourselves to the love of God, we transcend the death of sin. And that, of course, is revealed in the resurrection of Christ. XXXII. The Life of Faith Simon: Joseph I. . . I am moved by what you say. I'm not sure I can really embrace it or even believe it, but I am... I am moved by it. Joseph: Ah, well, you know – there is a passage in the gospels in which a man asks Jesus for healing and Jesus says to him that healing comes to those who believe. He responds: "Lord, I believe, help me in my unbelief!" I think that nicely expresses the situation of the person of faith, Simon. We all stand between belief and unbelief. We are all just learning to walk. We see – as Paul says – "through a glass darkly." And sometimes that darkness is very thick. Simon: But why? Why is it so hard to see? Why is it so dark? Joseph: As we've said, Simon, God – our relationship with God – is not anything we really understand. Even the word 'God' is really just a placeholder for something we can't really envision. We get hints, intuitions, moments of clarity, moments of breakthrough. Even what it means to 'understand' is something we don't fully understand. We tend to think of understanding as strictly cognitive, intellectual. But true understanding is more than intellectual, it is visceral, it involves feeling. We don't even understand our own understanding! We human beings look at the other animals on earth and imagine that our Richard Oxenberg 69 consciousness is quite advanced. And in a certain sense it is; from the standpoint of earthly consciousness it is. But if you look at the big picture, I think, you would see that we are like ants trying to climb Mt. Everest. Maybe we have advanced an inch or two beyond ground level. Maybe the other animals have advanced only half an inch. But there are miles and miles to go. We are just at the beginning of our journey. Simon: Then how can you know that any of this is true? Joseph: I don't know. We don't know. We live by faith. We must live by faith. Simon: But what if our faith is wrong? Joseph: Then God will help us grow toward what is right. Simon: But how do you know God will help? How do you know there is a God to help? Joseph: That's my faith. Simon: I'm sorry, Joseph, but isn't this circular reasoning? Joseph: Listen, Simon, faith isn't just a stab in the dark. It's an inner experience. My faith that God will help me is already the help of God. It is already an experience of God-withme. It's not always there. Sometimes, not infrequently, I find myself stumbling in the dark, trying to find the light, trying to remember the light. But sometimes it is quite pronounced. And when it is it seems as real to me – more real – than anything else I know. And I feel called – I don't know how else to put it – I feel called to pursue this faith. Something in me drives me toward it. Something in me tells me I must keep struggling to progress. Might I be wrong? Might I be deluded? Yes, of course. Might my understanding be limited, incomplete? I think that is all but certain. But still I am called forward. You find yourself in the dark and see a light up ahead. You struggle to get to that light. The way is full of twists and turns, and sometimes you lose sight of the light altogether, but, in general, as you advance the light seems to brighten; you seem to see more clearly, more fully. And it is a wonderful light, a glorious light. So you keep trying to make your way to it. That is the life of faith. Simon: It sounds wonderful as you describe it, but. . . I'm not sure I can live this life of faith. Joseph: Oh, I think you've already begun it. You wouldn't be engaged in this dialogue, Simon, if you hadn't already begun it. XXXIII. The Renewal of Light Simon: And so all of this is why you call the Holocaust a revelation. Richard Oxenberg 70 Joseph: It is a revelation – a horrific revelation – of evil. But, as I say, where there is a revelation of evil there is also a revelation of good, by way of contrast. Simon: But evil doesn't reveal the presence of good. All it reveals is the absence of good. Joseph: The presence of good is revealed in the very fact that we see the evil as evil. If we didn't have the good present within us, we wouldn't see evil as evil. Simon: But it takes a lot of faith to believe that this good 'within us' will prevail in this world of hardship and cruelty. I'm not sure I can muster such faith. Joseph: Oh, who can say whether, or when, or how, the good will prevail in the world? We work toward it, we hope for it, but that's all we can do. And perhaps the world is such that the good can never be perfectly realized within it. Simon: Never? Then what hope is there? Joseph: The hope is within you. Simon: But if I am about to die in a Nazi concentration camp, where is the hope? Joseph: The hope is within you. Listen, Simon – it is not just the victims of the Nazis who face death. We all face death. This world – beautiful and awful as it is – is not, cannot be, our true home. We are here for a time, and then we depart. But we have a home – this is what faith teaches us – we have a home, but we must reform ourselves – re-form ourselves – to know it. Simon: Our home is God? Joseph: Yes. Simon: And so at death we return 'home'? Joseph: The one who knows God is already home, in life. Simon: But you said we can't be home in this world. Joseph: We are not home in this world, we are home in God. But God is not someplace else. God is here and now. The world we are in is in God. Simon: That's not so easy to see, Joseph, given all the evils of this world. Joseph: You're right, Simon, God is not so easy to see – because God is that from which one sees. And to see the world from this vantage point, from the vantage point of God's Richard Oxenberg 71 love, requires an inner transformation. And this transformation is not easy, and for very few of us is it complete in this lifetime. Simon: I scarcely know where I'd begin. Joseph: But you have already begun, Simon. Your recoil at the horror of the Holocaust is already an expression of the love that is God. God's love is already within you. Of course, it must be cultivated, it must be deepened and broadened, its full implications must be seen and lived. This cultivation of God's love is the work to which faith calls us. And this, finally, is the answer to the Holocaust. This, finally, is how Hitler is defeated. He is defeated in the mind and heart. He is defeated in spirit. God does not promise what Satan promised. God does not promise us worldly dominion. God does not promise to make life easy, or even secure. For these things one must go elsewhere. But God promises a wholeness of heart; a wholeness of heart to the one who will allow her heart to be made whole. And this wholeness of heart is, finally, the only thing that defeats Hitler, and the endless parade of Hitlers. It is a paradox. It is not what human pride wants. We want a Knight in shining armor to slay the dragons that terrify us, amid great clamor and tumult. We want a great hero of immense worldly power who we can cheer and celebrate, who may even let us kick the dragon ourselves once or twice for good measure. We want to be glorified in our victories and avenged in our humiliations. We don't want this strange, naked man bleeding on a cross; forgiving those who have crucified him. His weakness is an offense to our pride. And yet it is Christ, the spirit of Christ, that defeats Hitler, that defeats the essence of Hitler. He does not defeat him in the physical. But that is not Hitler's true abode. He defeats him in meaning and value. Christ's love exposes the nothingness at Hitler's core. And this love calls to you, my friend, it calls to you with infinite tenderness, it calls to the depths of whatever darkness you are in – it calls to you to lift your eyes from the despair of that darkness to the hope of this love. For that, finally, is the answer to the Holocaust, and to the many, many Holocausts of human life. Simon: I am not sure I can manage such love, Joseph. Joseph: Oh, but none of us can manage it at first. At first we must simply turn toward it. Simon: And still... Joseph: Still? Simon: I am not sure I can even do that. I am not sure I can believe such love possible. Joseph: Ah, I understand. Yes, it is not so easy when we feel immersed in darkness, for we must find this possibility within ourselves, Simon. There is nowhere else we can find it. And perhaps, after all, we should not wish to get off this Cross too quickly. Perhaps we must look at this darkness long and hard; to its very depths. It is, after all, our darkness. But finally we must follow Christ through the darkness, into the light. We must not drown in our despair. We must welcome the renewal of light. We owe it to ourselves to Richard Oxenberg 72 do this. We owe it to those we love. We owe it to the world that needs us. We must allow ourselves to be saved. Simon: Must we? Joseph: That is the only way out of hell.

© LOGOS & EPISTEME, VIII, 1 (2017): 117-127 UNDAUNTED EXPLANATIONISM Kevin McCAIN ABSTRACT: Explanationism is a plausible view of epistemic justification according to which justification is a matter of explanatory considerations. Despite its plausibility, explanationism is not without its critics. In a recent issue of this journal T. Ryan Byerly and Kraig Martin have charged that explanationism fails to provide necessary or sufficient conditions for epistemic justification. In this article I examine Byerly and Martin's arguments and explain where they go wrong. KEYWORDS: epistemic justification, evidentialism, explanationism, explanationist evidentialism Most everyone is an explanationist in the sense that they regularly employ explanatory reasoning/inference to the best explanation. This sort of reasoning is "so routine and automatic that it easily goes unnoticed."1 Recognition of the ubiquity of explanatory reasoning in both our everyday lives and our scientific practices helps make plausible a stronger sense of explanationism. Explanationists of this stronger variety not only accept inference to the best explanation as a legitimate form of reasoning, they contend that all epistemic justification is a matter of explanatory considerations. I am such an explanationist. Along with my fellow Alabama Explanationist, Ted Poston, I have worked to elucidate and defend explanationism in a number of works.2 Fortunately, these efforts have helped spur on discussion and debate concerning the merits of explanationism.3 Most recently, 1 Igor, Douven (2011). "Abduction," in The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (Spring 2011 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/ abduction/. 2 Kevin McCain, "Explanationist Evidentialism," Episteme 10 (2013): 299-315, "Evidentialism, Explanationism, and Beliefs about the Future," Erkenntnis 79 (2014): 99-109, Evidentialism and Epistemic Justification (New York: Routledge, 2014), "Explanationism: Defended on All Sides," Logos & Episteme 6, 3 (2015): 333-349, The Nature of Scientific Knowledge: An Explanatory Approach (Switzerland: Springer, 2016), "Explanationist Aid for Phenomenal Conservatism," Synthese (forthcoming), Kevin McCain and Ted Poston, "Why Explanatoriness Is Evidentially Relevant," Thought 3 (2014): 145-153, and Ted Poston, Reason & Explanation: A Defense of Explanatory Coherentism (New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2014). 3 See, for example, T. Ryan Byerly, "Explanationism and Justified Beliefs About the Future," Erkenntnis 78 (2013): 229-243, T. Ryan Byerly and Kraig Martin, "Problems for Explanationism on Both Sides," Erkenntnis 80 (2014): 773-791, T. Ryan Byerly and Kraig Martin, "Explanationism, Super-Explanationism, Ecclectic Explanationism: Persistent Problems on Both Kevin McCain 118 this discussion has been further advanced by T. Ryan Byerly and Kraig Martin's (hereafter "B&M") critique of explanationism in this journal.4 In their article B&M contend that my recent attempt to defend explanationism fails.5 They maintain that explanationism provides neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for epistemic justification. They are mistaken on both accounts. Nevertheless, B&M's objections are instructive to consider and respond to because doing so helps to clarify explanationism. This clarity helps demonstrate explanationism's viability as a theory of epistemic justification. In this article my primary focus is B&M's most recent attack on explanationism. In light of this, I will not provide a general defense or motivation for explanationism. Instead, I will briefly explain explanationism and then turn to B&M's objections to it. I will explicate the problems with B&M's objections to both the sufficiency and necessity of explanationism. The end result is that despite interesting challenges from B&M explanationists should remain undaunted. 1. Explanationism Before considering the objections that B&M press for explanationism it will be helpful to have a clear statement of the view. The central idea of explanationism is that epistemic justification is fundamentally a matter of explanatory relations. There are a variety of ways that one might spell out this key idea though. Hence, explanationism is perhaps best understood as more of a general approach, or a family of theories, than a particular theory of epistemic justification. Despite this fact, it will be useful to rely on the following specific explanationist theory in the present discussion for two reasons. First, this is a plausible explanationist theory of justification, and it works well as a test for objections to explanationism in general. Second, this is the specific explanationist theory that B&M target in their attack.6 So, from this point on, unless otherwise noted, 'explanationism' will refer to the following account of justification: Sides," Logos & Episteme 7 (2016): 201-2013, William Roche and Elliott Sober, "Explanatoriness is Evidentially Irrelevant, or Inference to the Best Explanation Meets Bayesian Confirmation Theory," Analysis 73 (2013): 659-668, William Roche and Elliott Sober, "Explanatoriness and Evidence: A Reply to McCain and Poston," Thought 3 (2014): 193-199, Gregory Stoutenberg, "Best Explanationism and Justification for Beliefs about the Future," Episteme 12 (2015): 429437, and Gregory Stoutenberg and Bryan Appley, "Two New Objections to Explanationism," Synthese (forthcoming). 4 Byerly and Martin, "Explanationism." 5 McCain, "Explanationism: Defended." 6 They refer to this as 'super-explanationism.' Undaunted Explanationism 119 A person, S, with evidence e at time t is justified in believing p at t if and only if at t S has considered p, and: (i) p is part of the best explanation available to S at t for why S has e or (ii) p is available to S as an explanatory consequence of the best explanation available to S at t for why S has e.7, 8 There are a number of points about explanationism that could stand further clarification, and there are many things that can be said in support of this principle.9 Here, however, it will be sufficient to expound upon just three points related to explanationism. The first point is that S's evidence, e, should be understood to be S's total evidence, not merely a proper subset of S's evidence. This is a key point that I have emphasized repeatedly in my various defenses of explanationism.10 Focusing on a portion of S's evidence rather than S's total evidence ignores the potential impact of defeating evidence. Failure to consider S's total evidence when applying explanationism can lead to misguided objections to the theory as will become clear in the next section. The second point that needs clarified is what it is that makes an explanation the best. A variety of explanatory virtues contribute to making one explanation better than another. Things like "simplicity, explanatory power (the range of phenomena explained and/or how illuminating the explanation is), consistency with [background information], non-ad hocness, [and] predictive power (making 7 McCain, "Explanationism: Defended," 339. In that article I refer to this account as "Ex-EJ 2.0". This account of propositional justification is a key component of my complete theory of epistemic justification, Explanationist Evidentialism, which is a theory of doxastic justification/well-founded belief. Explanationist Evidentialism is explained more fully in my book, Evidentialism and Epistemic Justification. 8 Two important qualifications of explanationism are made clear in footnote 19 of "Explanationism: Defended". "In order for S to be justified in believing that p it must not only be the best available explanation of S's evidence, it must also be a sufficiently good explanation of S's evidence. Similarly, in order for S to be justified in believing an explanatory consequence, p, of the best available explanation of her evidence it has to be that the best available explanation of her evidence would explain p significantly better than it would ~p." Both B&M's criticism of explanationism and the current discussion assume that these conditions are satisfied in the examples in question. 9 See McCain, "Explanationism: Defended" and Nature of Scientific Knowledge for discussion and defense of this exact formulation of explanationism. See McCain, "Explanationist Evidentialism", "Beliefs about the Future", and Evidentialism for defense of a similar principle that appeals to logical entailment rather than explanatory consequence. 10 Poston, Reason & Explanation, makes this point explicit as well. Kevin McCain 120 novel predictions)" are commonly appealed to as explanatory virtues.11 Just as with inferences to the best explanation, the best explanation referred to in explanationism is the one that has the most favorable mixture of these virtues. In some cases it is easy to determine the best explanation. For example, if two potential explanations are alike in all ways except that one is consistent with background information and the other is not, then the former is better than the latter. In other cases it is not easy to determine which explanation is best. When one explanation is simpler than another, but the more complex explanation has more explanatory power it can be difficult to determine which is the best. Fortunately, for present purposes it is not necessary to provide precise details for determining when one explanation is better than another. Instead, it is enough that it is recognized that there are a variety of explanatory virtues and that the best explanation is the one with the most favorable balance of these virtues. It is a mistake to fixate on one explanatory virtue to the exclusion of the others. This point will also be further illustrated in the discussion of the next section. Finally, the third point that needs to be clarified is what it means for p to be an explanatory consequence of the best explanation available to S at t. The idea here is fairly straightforward. p is an explanatory consequence of the best explanation available to S when "p would be better explained by the best explanation of S's evidence available to S at t than ~p would. In other words, if p were true, the best available explanation of S's evidence would better explain its truth than it would the truth of ~p, if ~p were true."12 With these points in hand it is time to turn toward the substance of B&M's attack on explanationism. 2. The Attack on Sufficiency B&M begin their most recent critique of explanationism by arguing that it fails to provide sufficient conditions for justification. More specifically, they argue that there are cases where p is part of the best available explanation for why S has e, and yet p is not justified for S. It is worth quoting the example that they rest their case for this point on in its entirety: Imagine that Sally is the lead detective on an investigation of a burglary. She typically uses an eight-step investigative procedure for crimes of this sort and this procedure involves gathering and analyzing multiple kinds of evidence – physical evidences, forensic evidences, testimonial evidences, psychological evidences, circumstantial evidences, and so on. Sally is now mid-way through her investigative procedure, having completed four of the eight steps. She has 11 McCain, Nature of Scientific Knowledge, 159. 12 McCain, "Explanationism: Defended," 339. Undaunted Explanationism 121 gathered and analyzed the appropriate evidence for these four steps, but has not yet gathered or analyzed evidence that may or may not arise during the final four steps. The list of suspects with which Sally began has been narrowed, and there is one very promising suspect in particular named Jeremy. In fact, the claim (call this the Jeremy hypothesis) is the best explanation available to Sally for all of the evidence she currently has obtained through the first four steps. There are multiple witnesses locating someone who fits Jeremy's description at the scene of the crime at the time at which it was committed. Some drug paraphernalia like that which Jeremy commonly uses to feed his drug habit was found at the scene of the crime. Jeremy seems to display a sense of satisfaction or gladness about the robbery. His bank account reflects a deposit shortly after the incident. Other current suspects, while not ruled out, do not fit the evidence Sally currently has anywhere nearly as well as Jeremy does. The Jeremy hypothesis is the best available explanation for the evidence Sally currently has and it is a very good explanation of that evidence. But Sally isn't justified in believing the Jeremy hypothesis. For, she has good reason to think that there may very well be relevant evidence concerning the burglary that she does not currently have. After all, there have been many times in the past where, after completing step four of her investigation, things took a dramatic swing. It has not at all been uncommon that at these later stages in the process, an alternative suspect emerges who fits the data even better than previous suspects. Thus, while the Jeremy hypothesis is the best available explanation of the evidence Sally currently has, and while it is even a very good explanation of that evidence, Sally is not justified in believing this hypothesis. Believing the Jeremy hypothesis would be premature. The correct explanation for Sally's data may very well not be available at present, and she has good reason to think this.13 B&M claim that in this case the Jeremy hypothesis is the best explanation of Sally's evidence, but she is not justified in believing it. In light of this they claim that satisfying the conditions of explanationism is not sufficient for having justification. In my previous defense of explanationism I pointed out that it seems B&M overlook the requirement that in order to truly satisfy explanationism the proposition (or hypothesis) in question must be part of the best explanation of S's total evidence.14 Importantly, I noted that the best explanation of one's total evidence does not have to be a specific hypothesis; it can be general. The upshot of this earlier discussion is that the explanationist can readily agree that the Jeremy hypothesis is part of the best explanation of a proper subset of Sally's evidence, but this does not pose a problem for explanationism because a more general 13 Byerly and Martin, "Problems for Explanationism," 783. 14 McCain, "Explanationism: Defended." Kevin McCain 122 explanation is the best explanation of her total evidence. Hence, the Jeremy hypothesis does not satisfy the conditions of explanationism, and the fact that Sally is not justified in believing this hypothesis poses no problem for explanationism. Despite my earlier attempt to assuage their worries, B&M remain unconvinced. They say, "The problem with McCain's response is easy to spot...McCain has simply overlooked what we said."15 B&M maintain that the Jeremy hypothesis is the best explanation of Sally's evidence – it is superior to the sort of general hypothesis that I proposed. In support of this they point out that whereas a more general hypothesis such as <Some, as yet unknown, suspect committed the burglary> "does not predict all of the relevant data in the example...the Jeremy hypothesis does."16 B&M point out that the more general hypothesis does not predict "Jeremy's attitude, the facts about his bank account, the reports of eyewitnesses of someone fitting Jeremy's description, or the presence of drug paraphernalia of the same kind known to be employed by Jeremy," but, of course, the Jeremy hypothesis does.17 Consequently, B&M conclude that my attempt to defend explanationism fails because the Jeremy hypothesis really is the best explanation of Sally's evidence, but she is not justified in believing that it is true. Although B&M are certainly correct to emphasize that making accurate predictions is an important explanatory virtue, it seems that they may be fixating on this virtue to the exclusion of others. Additionally, they still seem to be failing to appreciate the qualification that explanationism is restricted to total evidence. In order to see these facts it will be helpful to flesh out some the details of B&M's case and make things clearer. Recall, B&M tell us that Sally has an eight-step process that she goes through when determining who committed a particular crime. Presumably, her process is very accurate when all eight steps are completed. At this point in the process, Sally has completed the first four steps and determined that Jeremy is by far the most likely suspect. B&M make it clear that while there are other suspects, which have not been conclusively ruled out, the claim that any one of these suspects committed the crime is an inferior explanation when compared with the claim that Jeremy committed the crime (the Jeremy hypothesis). They add to this that Sally has good reason to think that there is relevant evidence about the burglary that she currently lacks, "many times in the past" things change in the 15 Byerly and Martin, "Explanationism," 204. 16 Byerly and Martin, "Explanationism," 204. 17 Byerly and Martin, "Explanationism," 204. Undaunted Explanationism 123 later stages of her process, and "it has not at all been uncommon that at these later stages in the process, an alternative suspect emerges who fits the data even better than previous suspects." Given all of this information, it seems that Sally has two sets of evidence. On the one hand, she has E (her current evidence pertaining to the burglary from steps one through four). On the other hand, she has E* (evidence about how her investigative process works). B&M insist that explanationism has a problem because the Jeremy hypothesis is the best explanation of E – it predicts the relevant data and offers a better explanation than all its available rivals. Yet, they also maintain that Sally is not justified in believing the Jeremy hypothesis because of E*. What should an explanationist say in response? The correct response here is simple. B&M's case relies on ignoring the qualification that explanationism should be understood in terms of total evidence rather than just a portion of the evidence. The Jeremy hypothesis is the best explanation of E, but it is not the best explanation of Sally's total evidence, which includes both E and E*. The reason for this is that Sally's total evidence includes strong inductive evidence (E*) for thinking that the hypothesis that is the best explanation at step four in the process is not true. That is, Sally's total evidence includes inductive evidence for thinking that the Jeremy hypothesis is not true. As B&M describe this case Sally's inductive reasons are strong enough to make it so that she should not believe the Jeremy hypothesis. If this is so, then it is plausible that the Jeremy hypothesis is not the best explanation of Sally's total evidence. Instead, Sally's total evidence is better, or at least equally well, explained by the more general hypothesis <Some, as yet unknown, suspect committed the burglary>. After all, B&M tell us that "it has not at all been uncommon that at these later stages in the process, an alternative suspect emerges who fits the data even better than previous suspects." Of course, one might complain, as B&M do, that the explanationist cannot plausibly maintain that the general hypothesis <Some, as yet unknown, suspect committed the burglary> is a better explanation than the Jeremy hypothesis. The Jeremy hypothesis explains relevant data that the general hypothesis does not – all sorts of facts about Jeremy, his bank account, and so on. B&M go so far as to claim that the Jeremy hypothesis predicts "all of the relevant data."18 Consequently, one might maintain that while it is true that Sally should not believe the Jeremy hypothesis, explanationists cannot plausibly claim this because the Jeremy hypothesis is the best explanation of Sally's evidence. 18 Byerly and Martin, "Explanationism," 204. My emphasis. Kevin McCain 124 There are two problems with this complaint. First, contrary to what B&M claim, the Jeremy hypothesis does not predict all of the relevant data. It is true that the Jeremy hypothesis predicts much (or perhaps all) of E, but this is not all of the relevant data! Sally's total evidence includes E and E*. The Jeremy hypothesis does not predict E*. This evidence is better explained by the general hypothesis. So, the fact that the Jeremy hypothesis predicts a portion of Sally's evidence should not be taken to be conclusive evidence for thinking that it is the best explanation of her total evidence. Second, while predicting relevant data is an important explanatory virtue, it is not the only virtue. Fixating on the Jeremy hypothesis' ability to predict a portion of Sally's evidence is a mistake. There are many other explanatory virtues. An important explanatory virtue that bears particularly on this case is conservatism, or fit with background information. Although the Jeremy hypothesis is an excellent explanation when we consider only E, it is not a very good explanation when we consider Sally's total evidence because it fails to fit with her background information about how her investigative process tends to turn out. To see how background evidence can affect the quality of an explanation, consider a situation where you see a particular object. This object looks like a duck, quacks like a duck, walks like a duck, and so on. The best explanation of this information taken in isolation is that the object you see is a duck. However, this is not the best explanation when you add more details such as that you know that you are near a factory that produces large quantities of robotic duck decoys that are very hard to distinguish from real ducks, you are currently in the middle of the desert where ducks cannot survive, and so on. Although the 'duck hypothesis' predicts a lot of your evidence, its failure to fit with background evidence makes it a poor explanation overall. Similar considerations apply to B&M's Jeremy hypothesis. There are good grounds for denying that the Jeremy hypothesis really is the best explanation of Sally's total evidence. As a result, explanationism is not threatened by B&M's attack on its sufficiency. 3. The Attack on Necessity Much of the recent debate concerning whether explanationism provides a necessary condition for justification has focused on the justification we have for beliefs about the future.19 B&M seem to accept that while earlier incarnations of explanationism did not adequately account for the justification that we have for 19 See Byerly, "Beliefs about the Future," Byerly and Martin, "Problems for Explanationism," McCain, "Beliefs about the Future," McCain, Evidentialism, and McCain, "Explanationism: Defended." Undaunted Explanationism 125 believing things about the future, the formulation of explanationism above does.20 Nevertheless, they claim that explanationism still faces problems when it comes to providing a necessary condition for justification. Specifically, B&M argue that cases involving mathematical/logical entailment pose an insuperable problem for explanationism. B&M's most recent discussion of cases of mathematical/logical entailment is very helpful.21 In fact, their discussion has led me to recognize that my previous treatment of this sort of case needs revision.22 Previously, I attempted to account for the justification that we have for beliefs concerning the conclusion of inferences involving appeals to mathematical/logical entailment solely in terms of explanationism's first condition, (i). B&M, however, have helped me see that this is not the best way to understand mathematical/logical entailments when they are combined with empirical claims. Although B&M are correct in claiming that my earlier discussion of these cases in this journal is problematic, they are mistaken in thinking that explanationism lacks the resources to adequately accommodate cases of mathematical/logical entailment. Rather than simply discuss this issue in the abstract or go back to discussing cases that I have dealt with before, I will explain how explanationism does provide the correct results in this sort of case by examining B&M's latest example – a case that they claim poses a problem for all explanationist views, not just explanationism as formulated here. B&M make use of 'surprising correlations' to press their objection to the necessity of explanationism. Here is their case: Most years between 1999 and 2009 where Nicholas Cage appeared in at least 2 films were years between 1999 and 2009 where there were at least 98 drownings, and most years between 1999 and 2009 where there were at least 98 drownings were years between 1999 and 2009 where Cage appeared in at least 2 films. Now, imagine that someone, Joe, comes to know this fact, but does so without coming to know the number of Cage films and drownings for any particular year. Suppose next that Joe learns that in some particular year in the interval, say 2006, Cage was in at least 2 movies. Depending upon exactly the strength of the correlation and the appropriate threshold for justification, it is plausible that Joe would be justified in believing that in 2006 there were at least 98 drownings.23 In my previous article in this journal I offered a way of responding to similar cases that would suggest the following way of accounting for Joe's 20 Byerly and Martin, "Explanationism." 21 Byerly and Martin, "Explanationism." 22 McCain, "Explanationism: Defended." 23 Byerly and Martin, "Explanationism," 211. Kevin McCain 126 justification.24 According to my earlier suggestion, Joe is justified in believing <There were at least 98 drownings in 2006> because this proposition is part of the best available explanation of his evidence. The reason I offered for this is that the truth of <There were at least 98 drownings in 2006> is part of the best available explanation for why Joe is aware, or has a seeming, that <There were at least 98 drownings in 2006> follows from items of his evidence – namely, <most years between 1999 and 2009 where there were at least 98 drownings were years where Cage appeared in at least 2 films> and <In 2006 Cage appeared in at least 2 films>. As B&M point out, though, this is not quite right. The best explanation of Joe's awareness/seeming is not that <There were at least 98 drownings in 2006> is true. As they aptly note, Joe's seeming that <There were at least 98 drownings in 2006> follows from his evidence "isn't explained by there being 98 drownings in 2006. Indeed, the seeming would persist even if there were no Cage films or drownings. It is just a seeming about what makes what probable, not about what there is in the world."25 So, my previous response to this sort of case will not work. Fortunately, the problem with my earlier response is not the result of any failing of explanationism. Explanationism has the means of providing the correct result in these cases in a plausible manner. Essentially, the problem is simply that my previous response cut out important steps. Here is what an explanationist should say about B&M's case. Part of the best available explanation of Joe's evidence is that, as noted above, <There were at least 98 drownings in 2006> follows from <most years between 1999 and 2009 where there were at least 98 drownings were years where Cage appeared in at least 2 films> and <In 2006 Cage appeared in at least 2 films>. It is also part of the best available explanation of Joe's evidence that <most years between 1999 and 2009 where there were at least 98 drownings were years where Cage appeared in at least 2 films> is true. After all, B&M tell us that Joe knows this fact to be true. Additionally, <In 2006 Cage appeared in at least 2 films> is part of the best explanation of Joe's evidence too because B&M inform us that Joe has learned this fact as well. So, Joe has as part of the best explanation of his evidence that <most years between 1999 and 2009 where there were at least 98 drownings were years where Cage appeared in at least 2 films> is true, <In 2006 Cage appeared in at least 2 films> is true, and <There were at least 98 drownings in 2006> follows from these propositions. It is exceedingly plausible that <There were at least 98 drownings in 2006> is true is available to Joe as an explanatory consequence of the best explanation available to him for his evidence. The truth of <There were at least 98 drownings in 2006> is 24 McCain, "Explanationism: Defended." 25 Byerly and Martin, "Explanationism," 211. Undaunted Explanationism 127 much better explained by the best explanation of Joe's evidence than its denial is. The best explanation of Joe's evidence provides a very good explanation of <There were at least 98 drownings in 2006>, but a very poor explanation of its denial.26 In light of this, according to the second condition, (ii), of explanationism, Joe is justified in believing <There were at least 98 drownings in 2006>. The problem with my earlier response was that it focused solely on (i) of explanationism for handling this sort of case, but the full story makes use of (i) and (ii). This is the key insight that B&M's discussion illuminates. Nonetheless, explanationism yields the intuitively correct result. What is the upshot here? B&M's arguments are helpful in that they move the discussion of explanationism forward by making it clear that my earlier response fails to express how explanationism should be understood to handle cases involving mathematical/logical entailments when they are combined with empirical claims. However, at the end of the day explanationism has the tools necessary for providing the correct result in this sort of case. So, B&M's attack on the necessity of explanationism, like the attack on sufficiency, fails. Thus, despite B&M's assertion that explanationism faces 'persistent problems on both sides,' explanationists should remain undaunted.27 26 As I have noted in various works this is perhaps best accounted for by the commonly accepted fact that higher probabilities explain better than lower ones. See Michael Strevens, "Do Large Probabilities Explain Better?" Philosophy of Science 67 (2000): 366-390 for arguments in favor of this fact about explanations. Also, see Jonah Schupbach and Jan Sprenger, "The Logic of Explanatory Power," Philosophy of Science 78 (2011): 105-127 for defense of an account of explanatory power on which higher probabilities offer greater explanatory power. 27 I am grateful to Matt Frise, Jon Matheson, and Ted Poston for helpful comments and discussion.

Synthese (2017) 194:1901–1917 DOI 10.1007/s11229-016-1027-y Rational action without knowledge (and vice versa) Jie Gao1 Received: 3 November 2013 / Accepted: 18 January 2016 / Published online: 8 February 2016 © The Author(s) 2016. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com Abstract It has been argued recently that knowledge is the norm of practical reasoning. This norm can be formulated as a bi-conditional: it is appropriate to treat p as a reason for acting if and only if you know that p. Other proposals replace knowledge withwarranted or justified belief. This paper gives counter-examples of both directions of any such bi-conditional. To the left-to-right direction: scientists can appropriately treat as reasons for action propositions of a theory they believe to be false but good approximations to the truth for present purposes. Cases based on a variant of Pascal's Wager and actions performed by a skeptic also illustrate the point. To the right-to-left direction: in certain circumstances, it can be unreasonable for a scientist to reason from propositions of a theory she knows to be true. Keywords Action * Practical rationality * Knowledge * Belief * Acceptance 1 The epistemic norms of practical reasoning Intuitively, before the result of a lottery is announced, it seems inappropriate for me to sell my lottery ticket for a penny on the basis that I will lose, since I do not know that the ticket is a loser. In the same spirit, I can be criticized for not buying insurance in a situation inwhich I do not know that I will not get sick. On the other hand, if I know that my door is locked, it seems that there is nothing wrong for me not to come back and check whether it is locked. On the basis of similar intuitions about ordinary appraisals and criticisms of action, some philosophers have argued that practical reasoning is B Jie Gao [email protected] 1 School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences, University of Edinburgh, 3 Charles Street, Edinburgh EH8 9AD, UK 123 1902 Synthese (2017) 194:1901–1917 governed by a knowledge norm.1 Consider a specific version of the norm, suggested by Hawthorne and Stanley (2008): Reason-Knowledge Principle (RKP) Where one's choice is p-dependent, it is appropriate to treat the proposition that p as a reason for acting iff you know that p (578).2 RKP can be split into the two following conditionals: NEC: where one's choice is p-dependent, if it is appropriate to treat p as a reason for acting, then S knows that p. SUFF: where one's choice is p-dependent, if S knows thatp, then it is appropriate to treat p as a reason for acting. The claim that knowledge is the norm of practical reasoning has been followed by a wave of criticism. It has been remarked that data about our ordinary use of "know" only provides a very fragile basis for concluding that practical reasoning is governed by such a norm, since sometimes we use "knowing" in a loose sense, meaning "being certain" or "truly believing" (Gerken 2011, 2015; Littlejohn 2009). It has been argued that the same alleged data used to motivate the knowledge norm can be explained assuming other epistemic norms as well (Gerken 2011, 2015; Littlejohn 2009; Neta 2009). Moreover, in some cases the knowledge norm seems to fail to deliver the right verdict. For example, it seems that the knowledge norm cannot accommodate intuitions in Gettier-style cases in which the subject is blameless in treating a justified true belief that p as a reason for acting, even in the absence of knowledge (Brown 2008a, b; Gerken 2011; Littlejohn 2009). Given these difficulties, some philosophers have opted for other weaker principles that not only are compatible with the original data motivating the knowledge norm, but 1 For example, Hawthorne claims that "if p is practically relevant, it is acceptable to use the premise that p in one's practical reasoning if one knows that p and (at least in many cases) unacceptable to use the premise that p in one's practical reasoning if one doesn't know it" (2004, p. 30). Stanley (2005) holds that one should act on p only if one knows that p (9). Fantl and McGrath (2007) argue that S knows that p only if S is rational to act as if p (559). 2 Three remarks about RKP are in order here: First, according to Hawthorne and Stanley, a choice between options x1. . .xn is p-dependent iff the most preferable of x1. . .xn conditional on the proposition that p is not the same as the most preferable of x1. . .xn conditional on the proposition that not-p (Ibid., 578). Such a condition is needed for there aremany cases where p is completely irrelevant to the issue at hand, so it seems odd to say that it is appropriate to treat the proposition that p as a reason for acting, even if one knows that p. Second, the notion of appropriateness in RKP is supposed to be understood as rational permissibility, rather than in terms of obligation. As Hawthorne and Stanley (2008) point out, "it would be overly demanding to require someone to treat all of their relevant knowledge as reasons for each action undertaken". Third, there are two readings of "treating p as a reason for action" but only one of them is compatible with the intuition that RKP is supposed to capture. One is to take "treating p as a reason for action" as "using p as a premise in practical reasoning". This interpretation is in accordance with the formulation endorsed by Hawthorne (2004) and is the most intuitive understanding. According to another stronger reading, nothing less than knowledge can be considered as a reason. This view implies that if p is S's reason for acting, S knows that p. However, if treating p as a reason for acting already entails that p is known, S's reasoning cannot be assessed normatively according to whether S knows that p. Therefore this notion cannot be the one used in RKP. Thus, those who may find the notion "treating p as a reason for acting" vague can safely substitute the notion with "using p as a premise in practical reasoning". Neta (2009) points out that "treating p as a reason for acting" differs from "using p as a premise in practical reasoning" in some respects, but the difference is irrelevant for the discussion here. 123 Synthese (2017) 194:1901–1917 1903 also provide good explanations for the cases in which the knowledge norm delivers the wrong verdict. For instance, Littlejohn (2009, 2012) and Fantl and McGrath (2002) argue that the norm of practical reasoning is justified belief,3 Gerken (2011) suggests that it is belief that p warranted to a degree that is adequate relative to the deliberative context, and Neta (2009) argues that it is justified belief that one knows that p. In spite of the divergence among these proposals, all of them hold that the norm of practical reasoning is belief plus some other property. Let's call these epistemic norms of practical reasoning doxastic norms. As in the case of the knowledge norm, these norms can come in necessity and sufficiency versions depending on whether the relevant doxastic property is necessary or sufficient for appropriateness. Against all these views, I doubt that there is an epistemic norm concerning the appropriateness conditions for treating a proposition as a reason for acting.4 In this paper, I provide two counterexamples to the knowledge norm. I show cases in which it is appropriate for a subject to treat p as a reason for action even if the subject does not know that p. These are cases in which actions are grounded in acceptance and performed by a skeptic. These cases show that knowledge is not necessary for appropriately treating a proposition as a reason for action. Furthermore, I argue that, under a certain interpretation of epistemic norms, the first case constitutes a counterexample also to SUFF, according to which knowing that p is epistemically sufficient for appropriately treating p as a reason for acting. In addition, these cases are also good counterexamples against the alternative doxastic norms mentioned above including belief as a requisite, since in both counterexamples the subject does not even hold a belief about the relevant proposition.My final conclusion is that, even if knowledge, as well as justified belief, warranted belief, and similar doxastic attitudes, play an important role in the rationalization of many our actions, these attitudes are not necessary for appropriately treating a proposition as a reason for action. Moreover, according to a specific understanding of epistemic norms, they are even not sufficient. In many circumstances, different mental attitudes, such as acceptance, provide us with appropriate bases for action. Such cases show that there is no epistemic norm governing practical reasoning.5 Before proceeding further, three clarifications are in order.6 First, the upshot of my arguments is not that there is no norm at all governing practical reasoning. My arguments are consistent, for example, with the existence of other non-epistemic norms governing practical reasoning. The aim of my arguments is rather to provide counterexamples to the claim that practical reasoning is governed by an epistemic norm-a norm whose satisfaction condition is constituted by an epistemic notion such as (jus3 Littlejohn has recently abandoned this view and now defends a knowledge norm. See Littlejohn (2013) for his recent view. 4 Brown (2008a, b) questions the existence of such norms as well. 5 At least if such a norm is conceived as an exceptionless principle valid for every possible premise of a practical reasoning. This is precisely how philosophers engaged in this debate conceive such a norm. The arguments in this article are compatible with epistemic norms ranging on some proper subset of such premises. 6 I would like to thank an anonymous referee for this journal for pointing out to me these important clarifications. 123 1904 Synthese (2017) 194:1901–1917 tified or warranted) belief or knowledge. This is precisely the crux of the debate on epistemic norms of practical reasoning introduced above.7 Second, my examples aim to show that there are cases in practical reasoning in which it is appropriate to reason from premises that are not known or believed. This is compatible with the claim that other premises used in the same reasoning are known or believed. In all my examples below, the subject is rational in using premises she doesn't know or believe in reasoning in which other premises are known. This is sufficient to show that there are no universally valid epistemic norms like RKP. 8 The third clarification concerns the specific sense in which these norms for practical reasoning count as epistemic. According to one obvious understanding, these norms are epistemic in virtue of the fact that they demand that some epistemic condition with respect to p be satisfied for it to be appropriate to use p as a premise in practical reasoning. According to another understanding, such norms are epistemic because they assess whether it is epistemically appropriate to use p as a premise in practical reasoning-where 'epistemically' characterizes the type of appropriateness and differentiates it from other types of appropriateness: prudential, rational, moral, aesthetic, etc.9 While there is agreement on the fact that such norms are epistemic in the former sense, there is no consensus on whether they are also epistemic in the latter sense. Philosophers such as Fantl and McGrath (2009) and Gerken (2011) answer affirmatively to this question, whereas others, such as Brown (2008a, b), remain neutral on this issue, characterizing epistemic norms exclusively in the former sense. Still others, such as Hawthorne (2004) and Hawthorne and Stanley (2008), think that epistemic norms of practical reasoning are standards of rational appropriateness broadly conceived, not strictly epistemic. While my objections to NEC will be effective against both understandings of epistemic norms, my objection to SUFF will be specifically directed to views which do not conceive epistemic norms as standards of strictly epistemic appropriateness, such as the views of Hawthorne and Stanley. 7 For example, Gerken specifies that the type of norms relevant to the present debate only speak to the epistemic conditions under which p may serve as a premise in practical deliberation or as a reason for action. According to Gerken, authors engaged in this debate are interested in the distinctively epistemic conditions on rational use of p (Gerken 2011, p. 531 and fn. 3). For similar remarks see, for example Brown (2012, p. 125). I note also that, though the upshot of my argument is negative, one could eventually draw positive conclusions from it about which non-epistemic conditions can rationalize a practical reasoning. 8 It is worth mentioning here that the specific focus of this paper is on epistemic norms of action. The paper does not address further issues concerning norms of belief. See Benton (2014, Sect. 3) for an overview of recent discussions on norms of belief and for relevant references. The aim of the present paper is not to demote knowledge (or other epistemic attitudes), but rather simply to argue-against (RKP) and other epistemic norms of action-that believing (and thus knowing) that p is neither necessary, nor sufficient to reasonably take p as a reason for action. 9 In this sense, epistemic norms would depend on a genuinely epistemic normative source. For a discussion of different sources of normativity see, for example, Broome (2013, pp. 26–27 and Ch. 7). 123 Synthese (2017) 194:1901–1917 1905 2 Counterexamples to epistemic norms of practical reasoning 2.1 Acceptance and practical reasoning For a long time philosophers of mind used to explain action within a belief-desire framework. According to this model, when we act we seek to realize our intentions and satisfy our desires in the light of what we believe. Similarly, in our practical reasoning we would reason from desires, beliefs and intentions to action. However, this philosophical orthodoxy has been called into question: some philosophers have argued that other attitudes can motivate action and figure as premises in practical reasoning. A mental attitude often discussed in the literature that plays an important role in our practical reasoning is acceptance. In what follows, I will illustrate the close tie between acceptance and practical reasoning and how it poses a serious challenge to the knowledge norm and other doxastic norms of practical reasoning. Before discussing the relation between acceptance and practical reasoning, it is necessary to clarify the notion of acceptance relevant for the present discussion and how it differs from that of belief. According to some stipulative notions of acceptance, belief is a kind of acceptance. For example, David Velleman equates accepting that p with regarding p as true. Since believing necessarily involves regarding a proposition as true, it is a kindof acceptance. ForVelleman, supposing, assuming, andpropositional imagining are other kinds of acceptance (Velleman 2000, pp. 249–250). Similarly, for Crispin Wright, there is acceptance in all cases where the agent acts in a way as if she believes that proposition. Also according to this notion, belief is a type of acceptance. Other attitudes that fall into the category of acceptance include acting on the assumption that p, taking for granted that p and trusting that p for reasons that do not bear on considerations regarding the truth of p (Wright 2004, pp. 177–180). On the contrary, according to a narrower and more natural reading of acceptance that I use here, acceptance and belief are two different kinds of mental attitude. Many have argued that acceptance in this narrower sense is an attitude widely adopted in our ordinary, religious, scientific and technological practices.10 Here is an example adapted from Michael Bratman (1992, p. 5). I am in Rome on a June day and I am planning my journey to visit the city. I do not actually have a belief about whether it will rain or not, nor do I have sufficient reason to believe that it will not rain-e.g., the weather forecast for that day is not available and according to the records there have been some showers in June in past years. Nevertheless, in my present circumstances taking for granted that it will not rain simplifies my planning in a way that is useful. On the basis of that acceptance I decide to leave the umbrella at my hotel. Below I will consider other examples of acceptance. 10 For instance, Alston (1996), Audi (2008), Rey (2007), Sperber (1996) andVan Leeuwen (2014) all argue that religious attitudes are acceptance or acceptance-like rather than belief or belief-like. Cohen (1992), Maher (1990), Mosterín (2002), and Van Fraassen (1980) have argued that it is reasonable for scientists to merely accept the content of their scientific theories but not believe them. Bratman (1992) and Cohen (1989) discuss ordinary examples of acceptance such as the one considered immediately below. 123 1906 Synthese (2017) 194:1901–1917 It has been argued that acceptance differs from belief in at least three respects.11 First, acceptance and belief differ from each other in terms of the requirements of rationality governing the two attitudes. Reasonable belief is peculiarly responsive to truth-conducive, epistemic factors; believing a proposition requires regarding it as true with the aim or commitment of getting its truth-value right.12 On the contrary, acceptance doesn't involve commitments to the truth of the accepted proposition.13 There are no rational requirements to accept a proposition only if it is true. Accepting a proposition only involves treating it as if it were true, regardless of whether it is true or not.14 This doesn't mean that acceptances are not the object of rationality requirements and are not liable to criticisms. Standards for rational acceptance concern non-epistemic factors, such as instrumental, ethical and prudential considerations. Acceptances are assessed according towhether it is useful or convenient for the agent to accept p given her practical purposes, whether accepting p maximizes one's expected utility, and so on.15 Second, while belief is context independent or context invariant, acceptance is context dependent. When we believe something, we regard it as true no matter what our practical situation. By contrast, what one accepts can vary from context to context depending on the particular practical demands of the situation. These demands can sometimes make it reasonable for an agent to accept a proposition in a given context, 11 Philosophers who have defended the distinction between belief and acceptance include Alston (1996), Audi (2008), Bratman (1992). Buckareff (2004), Dub (2015), Engel (1998), Mosterín (2002), Rey (1988), Stalnaker (1984), Tuomela (2000), Van Fraassen (1980), Velleman (2000). Other proposals in characterizing an acceptance-like mental state include de Sousa's 'assent' (1971), Dennett's 'opinion' (1978), Sperber's 'reflective belief' (1996, 1997) andFrankish's 'superbelief' (2004). There are important differences between these authors in the ways they draw the distinction between belief and acceptance, but the three essential differences identified here are common to most of them. 12 For a defense of similar claims see for example, Velleman (2000), Wedgwood (2002, 2013), Shah (2003), Steglich-Petersen (2006), Engel (2013). 13 We use 'commitment' in at least two senses. On the one hand, commitment refers to an attitude of endorsement; on the other hand, it refers to a norm or a requirement. In what we may call the 'requirement' sense, a commitment is a requirement or a norm that an agent is committed to respect. Such a norm would take the following form: accept that p only if p (or only if there is evidence for p). This type of commitment is much discussed in the literature on the normativity of belief (cf. McHugh and Whiting 2014). There are no requirements of this sort on acceptance in the narrow sense relevant here: acceptance doesn't involve a commitment to endorse a proposition only if its content is true, as belief does. If acceptance involves some commitment to the truth, it is in a different sense, which we may call 'endorsement': this is an endorsement or intention that the agent deliberately takes toward a proposition, making as if that proposition were true for practical purposes. 14 For example, Vahid (2006, pp. 323–324) argues that while belief involves regarding p as true for its own sake (or for the sake of getting its truth value right), other attitudes involve regarding p as true for the sake of something else. For example, assuming involves regarding p as true for the sake of argument (i.e. in order to see what it entails), and imagining involves regarding p as true for motivational purposes. An analogous claim can be made for acceptance. In the sense used here, acceptance is regarding p as true for the sake of practical purposes. In a similar vein, Cohen writes that "[t]o accept that p is to adopt the policy of taking the proposition that p as a premise in appropriate circumstances" (1989, p. 374). 15 For similar characterizations of acceptance, see Bratman (1992) and Cohen (1989). My examples in the text will focus on a specific practical functional role of acceptance, that of helping us to make our practical reasoning more economical and faster in some circumstances, allowing us to avoid the use of more complex believed propositions. I just note here that there can be other practical purposes making rational the use of acceptances as premises in reasoning. See the quoted references for other examples. 123 Synthese (2017) 194:1901–1917 1907 even though she would not reasonably accept the same proposition in another context. While in planning my journey for a visit to Rome I reasonably accept that it will not rain, if I were figuring out what odds I would put in a bet on the weather I would not rely on that acceptance (Bratman 1992, p. 5). Contextual dependence of acceptance explains why, while belief is subject to an ideal of agglomeration across contexts- one should be able to or aim to integrate one's various beliefs into one consistent and coherent larger view-one may accept certain things which do not cohere with her other beliefs, for mere practical reasons present in a specific context. Third, acceptance and belief differ fromeach otherwith respect to voluntary control. Normally, believing a proposition is an involuntary mental state. It is a disposition I find myself having, a product of my automatic cognitive mechanism. Furthermore, one cannot form or revise a belief at will regardless of the evidence (or at least not in normal circumstances). By contrast, accepting a proposition is, or is generated by, a mental act involving voluntarily taking on a positive attitude toward a proposition depending on practical considerations.16 By bearing this in mind, we can find a series of cases in which it is reasonable for the subject to accept that p under practical pressure, and appropriate to treat p as a reason for action, in spite of not having good reason to believe it (or even having good reasons to believe the contrary). All the situations in which it is rational to act on a proposition that is accepted but not believed constitute counterexamples to NEC and necessity versions of other doxastic norms. A variant of Pascal's Wager provides us with a good example here. Considerations about how it might be beneficial to live as if God exists cannot ground beliefs about God's existence. Nonetheless, they are indeed good practical reasons for accepting that God exists.17 Suppose one rationally decides to wager for the existence of God purely on the basis of a calculation of expected utility. This person would thereby accept but not believe that God exists. She would then take the proposition that God exists as a premise in her practical reasoning and simply endorse the policies and assent (at least externally) to the doctrines of the Church. She doesn't need to make that calculation over and over again each time this proposition matters to her practical decisions; and 16 Mosterín (2002, pp. 317–319) makes a similar point in terms of the ways of processing information involved in forming belief and acceptance. He observes that belief is typically tied to unconscious processing of information whereas acceptance is generated by conscious, explicit, linguistically articulated decisiondriven processing of information. Dub (2015) has argued that delusions constitute pathological cases of acceptance that are formed involuntarily. If this is correct, acceptances are not always voluntarily formed and under the control of the will. Nonetheless, the possibility that acceptance can be controlled voluntarily still constitutes a genuine difference between acceptance and belief. My examples below will refer exclusively to voluntary cases of acceptance. 17 Notice here an important difference with respect to the original Pascal's Wager case. Pascal's God demands that we believe in him-mere acceptance is not sufficient. According to Pascal, the reason for going to church is to cause oneself to believe that God exists. In the present example I consider a case in which S doesn't take God to ask him to believe in His existence. Instead, S's acceptance of God is merely motivated by how practically beneficial it would be to live as if God existed. Thanks to an anonymous referee for making this difference clear to me. It is also worth mentioning here that a rational agent convinced by this type of Pascalian-like reasoning should have some minimal degree of credence that God exists. This is because part of the Pascalian reasoning relies on attributing at least a small chance that God exists. This subjective chance allows accepting that God exists to maximize expected utility. This wouldn't be the case if the agent's credence that God exists were zero. 123 1908 Synthese (2017) 194:1901–1917 she doesn't even need to treat the believed proposition 'if God exists and I don't behave in accordance with God's doctrines, then I will receive severe punishment after I die' as a reason for action every time she engages in a relevant practical reasoning. Rather, in many circumstances she will simply treat the accepted proposition that God exists as a reason for her action. For example, she may be motivated by this acceptance to spend more time in the church and follow the precepts of religion.18 Moreover, though she merely accepts that God exists, it seems that it is not inappropriate or irrational for her to treat that accepted proposition as a reason in her practical reasoning. Another common situation in which it is appropriate to act on mere acceptance comes from scientific practices. There are cases in which the scientists' actions are based on some background assumptions that they know to be false. For example, nobody in the scientific community believes in the validity and completeness of Newton's theory of motion. But because of its convenience for making calculations in certain contexts, it is warranted for scientists to use Newton's laws as premises in their reasoning, acting as if such laws were true, at least as long as the margins of error permit it. When used in practical reasoning, these laws can provide sufficiently precise predictions given specific practical purposes. This is compatible with scientists knowing that Newtonian laws are false.19 The point can be generalized to the majority of natural laws. It is widely accepted in the scientific community that no contemporary physical theory is actually true. Science is far from having reached conclusive results. However, in practice scientists accept the available natural laws, using them as premises in at least some of their reasoning in order to calculate, design experiments and so on. Accepting natural laws in order to use them in one's reasoning is very convenient in specific circumstances: it helps in achieving reasonably accurate conclusions in a simpler and faster way, even though the scientist is well aware that these laws are false.20 A specific example could be useful here. A scientist, Mary, must deliberate about which specific act of computation she should perform in order to calculate the amount of fuel needed to get to the moon and back in a lunar module. Mary needs to calculate the amount of fuel quickly. She doesn't have time to use General Relativity, which (let's say) she actually knows to be the true theory. She can calculate the amount of fuel more quickly by using Newton's laws, which Mary believes to be false but a good approximation to the truth for her present purposes. While Mary could well use as a premise in her reasoning something she knows- e.g., the complex proposition that [F=ma is the Newton's law necessary for calculating the needed amount of fuel, and F=ma, though false, provides a good approximation given her present practical purposes]- we can well conceive circumstances in which Mary does not use this complex proposition as a premise in her reasoning, but rather reasons as follows: (1) I must calculate the vector sum of the force of O. 18 Maybe such actions will cause her to believe that God exists at some future time, but before that time, most of her actions will be based on acceptance, not belief. 19 Thanks to Jonas Christensen for suggesting this case to me. 20 As a matter of fact, the use of acceptance is quite widespread in many scientific practices. See also Cohen (1992, p. 88). 123 Synthese (2017) 194:1901–1917 1909 (2) The vector sum of the force of an object is equal to the mass multiplied by its acceleration. (3) Therefore I shall multiply the mass of O by the acceleration of O. The use of (2) in Mary's reasoning instead of more complex propositions doesn't look rationally impermissible. Reasoning directly from the accepted Newton's law helps her in achieving the desired results in a faster and simpler way. It seems perfectly natural and reasonable to reason like this in similar circumstances. Indeed nobody would challenge reasoning (1)–(3) as inappropriate or rationally impermissible, and if Mary were asked why she drew conclusion (3), she could well cite in her defense the accepted proposition (2) instead of other known propositions.21 This example seems to be a quite realistic representation of how many scientists engaging in practical reasoning use as premises in their reasoning some accepted proposition that they believe to be false when the desired results must not be overly precise.22,23 If one were not convinced by Mary's case, here is another more familiar example from our philosophical practice. When we calculate the subjective probability of some propositions by updating evidence using Bayesian conditionalization, we know (or at least believe) that there are more precise rules for updating evidence (e.g., Jeffrey conditionalization), and thus that the proposition expressing Bayesian conditionalization is literally false. Nevertheless if we are in contexts in which we are not concerned with a high level of accuracy (for example, if we are trying to solve basic exercises 21 I am not denying here that the belief that (2) is a good approximation to a desired result plays a certain indirect role in the overall explanation, motivating and making reasonable for Mary to endorse the acceptance and use it as a premise in her reasoning. Nevertheless, in the described caseMary doesn't use the complex belief as a premise in her reasoning, but the acceptance (i.e. Newton's law). The knowledge norm is still compromised, for this norm concerns directly the attitudes that one is rational to use as premises in reasoning, not the motivations of the subject to endorse certain types of attitude and use them as premises in reasoning. 22 Two things are worth remarking here: the first is that acceptance of natural laws known to be false in one's reasoning is not something specific to scientific practice. Laws are directly used as premises in reasoning by, for example, engineers and teachers. The second remark is that in Mary's example I focused on a case in which it is urgent to make a decision. This should provide a further reason for Mary not to engage in complex reasoning and instead rely on acceptance. Other factors may influence the preference for acceptance over more complex beliefs. Another is, for example, the presence of multiple consecutive deliberations involving common premises-consider a variant of Mary's case in which she has to repeat the calculation several times; in such case it is simpler to rely on the accepted Newton's law than to repeatedly rely on complex beliefs and more elaborated inferential patterns. 23 An anonymous referee considers the possibility of a pragmatic explanation of the case: while in conversation Mary can express her reasoning as in (1)–(3), that may just be shorthand for a more complex reasoning understood in the conversational context, involving only beliefs as premises. Notice however that as I described the case, there is no conversational context in which Mary talks about her inference. Rather, the case involves a genuine inferential transition from premises (1) and (2) to conclusion (3). This excludes the possibility of explaining the case in terms of conversational implicatures. Another reason to think that a pragmatic account of Mary's reasoning is implausible is the following. To someone who criticizes Mary for relying on a false premise it seems to make perfect sense to answer by saying that, of course, Newton's law is false, but making as if it were true and relying on it in her reasoning makes things simpler and reaches a conclusion whose accuracy is sufficient for present practical purposes. This possible answer seems perfectly fine in this context, but it is incompatible with a pragmatic account, according to which the only correct answer to the challenge should be the resolution of a conversational implicature (for example: "of course, I was not speaking literally. What I really meant was..."). The fact that the former answer seems perfectly appropriate shows that a pragmatic account about this and similar cases is inadequate. 123 1910 Synthese (2017) 194:1901–1917 in a Decision Theory course), we make as if the proposition expressing Bayesian conditionalization were true. When we reason from this proposition in such contexts, we deliberately overlook the fact that it is inaccurate and we move automatically to a conclusion, as we would do in reasoning from a belief. This way of reasoning from accepted propositions that we believe to be false (or at least we would hardly say we believe) in our philosophical practice seems to me both common and perfectly rational. In both the exemplified cases of the Pascalian wager and the scientific practice, it seems perfectly rational for an agent to treat a proposition that is accepted but not believed as a reason for action. These cases constitute counterexamples to NEC and necessity versions of other doxastic norms. From the case of scientific practice, we can also develop a counterexample to certain versions of SUFF. As I said in Sect. 1, while some philosophers interpret epistemic norms as concerning a specifically epistemic sense of appropriateness, others conceive appropriateness in a more liberal sense (for example as substantive rational permissibility). The example I will consider below is problematic for all those endorsing the latter interpretation of SUFF (e.g. Hawthorne and Stanley 2008). A counterexample to this version of SUFF is one in which S knows that p, but given the setting of S's situation, it is not rationally permissible for S to treat p as a reason for acting. Consider again the above scenario in which Mary knows the true and complex physical law of General Relativity necessary to calculate the precise amount of fuel needed for a lunar module to get to the moon and back. We can imagine a similar situation in which it is not rationally permissible for her to take that known proposition as a premise in her reasoning. Suppose again that Mary needs to calculate the amount of fuel only to a rough approximation, but it is particularly urgent that she does that in a very short time (e.g., she has only twenty seconds to enter an estimation of the amount of fuel into the control system of a machine).24 In such a situation, since adopting Newtonian laws would perfectly suffice for the purpose, it would be unreasonable for her to use the complex law in her calculations. This is incompatible with SUFF. Note that Mary's epistemic position with respect to the proposition expressing the true physical law is also strong enough to satisfy the constraints required by other epistemic norms (justified belief that p, warranted belief that p to a degree that is adequate relative to deliberative context, or justified belief that S knows that p). And in the described situation it is inappropriate for her to use that proposition as a premise in her practical reasoning no matter how strong her epistemic position is with respect to that proposition. Therefore, all the sufficiency versions of other epistemic norms, if interpreted in the liberal sense considered above, are confronted with a problem in dealing with this type of case as well.25 24 Parameters including urgency that constitute deliberative contexts are discussed in Gerken (2011). One might worry here that though the agent in those cases seems to be blameless and fully excusable, he/she does violate some epistemic norm. I will address this possible worry in Sect. 2.3. 25 Similar cases against SUFF can be made involving other attitudes. For example, suppose that Karen knows the axioms of number theory, and that Meera, who is reliable with mathematical knowledge, said that p is a theorem (although it is false). It becomes an urgent question for Karenwhether p is a theorem. 123 Synthese (2017) 194:1901–1917 1911 A possible worry here could be that since acceptance doesn't involve rational commitments to the truth of the accepted proposition, acceptances are not liable to rational criticism and thus cannot serve as rationalizers of an action or a deliberationwhen used as premises in practical reasoning.26 However, I think that this worry is misplaced. As I said above, acceptances can be rationally assessed and criticized according to practical standards, and agents using acceptances as premises in practical reasoning are liable to rational criticism according to these standards. For example, if one concludes that accepting that God exists has the best expected utility, but then accepts that God doesn't exist and uses this acceptance as a premise in her reasoning, her acceptance can be assessed as unwarranted, and premising this proposition in her reasoning is liable to criticism. Similarly, consider the case of an engineer who accepts some law of Newton's theory in a context in which this theory doesn't provide sufficiently precise predictions for her specific practical purposes (e.g., for designing a particle collider machine), and she applies such laws as premises in her reasoning in that context (e.g., for making calculations whose results are necessary to design hadron accelerators). The reasoning of this engineer is liable to criticism and her acceptance cannot rationalize her action. This is because that acceptance is unreasonable given the practical purposes of the engineer in that context. 2.2 Rational action performed by the skeptic Consider the following dialogue in which a skeptic (K ) is trying to convince her friend (F) that she doesn't know that there is an external world. K : "Do you know that you are not a brain in a vat?" F : "No, I don't know." K : "If you are a brain in a vat, then you cannot hold this cup of coffee in your hand, because you don't have hands at all. So, since you don't know that you are not a brain in a vat, you don't know that you have a cup of coffee in your hand." After brief thought, F concludes: "Yes, you are right, I don't know that." Thus she suspends her judgment. At the same time, F moves her cup to her lips and drinks the coffee. I assume that: (1) F takes the conversation seriously and answers K sincerely, i.e., F does not give that answer to K due to any non-epistemic considerations, such as social graces and reluctance to displease her friend; rather, F is truly convinced by K 's reasoning and suspends her judgment as a consequence of that reasoning; (2) in moving the cup F genuinely exercises her agency; (3) the proposition that there is a cup of coffee in F's hand (hereafter, H) is one of the reasons motivating her action; (4) The proposition that F treats as a reason for lifting her hand is H, not some complex proposition such as that, whether or not she is a BIV, seemingly lifting her hand will cause a pleasant taste and sensation of warmth. Footnote 25 continued It is unreasonable for her to start reasoning from the axioms-she should instead rely onMeera's testimony. Thanks to an anonymous referee for this point. 26 Thanks to an anonymous referee of this journal for directing my attention to this worry. 123 1912 Synthese (2017) 194:1901–1917 Now, intuitively, it seems that F's action cannot be criticized as irrational.27 According to NEC, if it is appropriate for F to treat H as a reason for acting, then F knows H. But F voluntarily suspended her belief that H. F doesn't believe H anymore, and consequently does not know that H. This is a counterexample to NEC. It might be argued that in the above example there are other beliefs (plausibly amounting to knowledge) which F may be using as premises in her practical reasoning-in particular the belief that there might be a cup of coffee in front of F . Given the low cost of the action, this belief seems sufficient to rationalize it.28 This objection can be addressed by considering other analogous cases in which the skeptic doesn't merely suspend her judgment on the relevant proposition but believes that proposition to be false. Consider domain-relative forms of skepticism, such as skepticism about the existence of objects in the domains of mathematics, modality, ethics, etc. Such forms of skepticism are compatible with fictionalism with respect to each of these domains. For example, a fictionalist skeptic about mathematics holds that we should not believe in the existence of mathematical objects and we should regard sentences about mathematical objects, not as aiming at literal truth, but as telling part of a fictional story. For this skeptic, even if mathematical sentences are all false, engaging in a discourse about mathematics is rational because of its utility (Leng 2015). Similarly, the fictionalist can rationally act as if those sentences were true. Lacking beliefs about mathematical propositions doesn't make the use of these propositions as premises in one's reasoning irrational or unreasonable. A fictionalist mathematician can perfectly well use sentences such as '7 + 5 = 12' or 'There are no square prime numbers' as premises in her reasoning (both theoretical and practical); she can continue doing mathematics by adopting non-doxastic attitudes towards ordinary mathematical propositions.29 In such cases, a skeptic about a certain area of discourse overtly believes that a proposition is false (and thus that it might not be true), but relies on it in her reasoning as if it were true. One can see the skeptic about the external world in my previous example as relying on an analogous sort of attitude in her practical reasoning. One may object that F still involuntarily believes that H even though she would not be voluntarily willing to assent to it (Pritchard 2000, p. 203). If this were the case, according to some externalist account of knowledge, F would know that H as long as some external condition is satisfied-for instance, if F's belief that H were reliably formed. Furthermore, Williamson (2000) convincingly argues that knowledge is not a luminous mental state: one is not always in a position to reflectively know that she 27 Here I don't want to argue that before this conversation F didn't know that there was a cup of coffee in her hand. In fact F may have known that proposition before the conversation, but may have suspended her belief in that proposition as a consequence of the considerations proposed by K . 28 Thanks to an anonymous referee for raising this objection. 29 It has been widely argued that people who refuse to accept the truths of mathematics can still continue doing mathematics by having an attitude towards mathematical objects sometimes referred as make-believe (also acceptance or exploitation) (see e.g. Van Fraassen 1980; Yablo 2006; Daly 2008). 123 Synthese (2017) 194:1901–1917 1913 knows something. In the light of the above observations, one could say that what F lacks in the scenario is the higher-order knowledge that she knows that p, but not the first-order knowledge that p. A possibleway to defend the step from F's claimed suspension of judgment aboutH to F's ignorance of that proposition is by assuming that, even if in general knowledge may not be transparent to a subject, there are possible situations in which a subject in a case like that of F has an appropriate access to her own epistemic states. The possible failure of transparency in some cases does not entail that one is always wrong about her first-order mental states. In particular, it is possible to conceive a scenario like the one described above such that, when F sincerely asserts that she doesn't know that H, she has a full epistemic access to the fact that she withholds her belief that H. In such a possible case, F would thereby not know that H. Even one single possible case like this is sufficient to provide a counterexample to NEC.30 Amore powerful objection is the following. There are possible ways of interpreting what's going on in F's psychology in the above case, some of which is incompatible with the case being a counterexample to NEC. For example, Egan (2008) has recently argued for the view that the systems of belief that we in fact have are fragmented and could include subsets of beliefs which are possibly inconsistent. This view is opposed to idealized models of human cognition according to which our beliefs would be part of a single coherent system. In the above case, one can interpret F's cognitive system as fragmented, her skepticism not affecting her belief that H. If so, F can rely on the belief that H in her action. So described, the case wouldn't constitute a counterexample to NEC.31 I concede that it's a much debated question in philosophy of psychology how to interpret similar cases, and that a "fragmented mind" hypothesis seems a possible way of interpreting what's going on in F's psychology in the above example. I admit that there are several possible interpretations of the case, some of which incompatible with the case being a counterexample to NEC. But remember here that in order to make my point, all that I need is that there be at least one psychologically possible description of the example (or similar examples) under which F doesn't believe that H. The possibility of a single case in which F doesn't believe that H would be already a counterexample to NEC. This is perfectly compatible with there being other descriptions of this and similar cases according to which the subject believes the relevant proposition (as in the "fragmented mind" interpretation). However, in the present context I cannot settle the issue of whether a description of the case that suits my purposes is psychologically possible. For this reason, I will set this issue aside and for the sake of argument I will simply assume that a similar description is indeed possible. My conclusion about the present case will thus be merely conditional: assuming an inter30 Neta (2009) argues that it is possible to know that p even if one believes that one does not know thatp. But Neta's point doesn't conflict with what is suggested here. 31 I thank an anonymous referee for pointing out the need to address this objection. 123 1914 Synthese (2017) 194:1901–1917 pretation of this (or some similar) case as one in which the subject doesn't believe the target proposition, the case constitutes a counterexample to NEC.32 2.3 A reply to a possible objection One could defend the knowledge norm by arguing that though the agent in those cases seems to be blameless, he/she does violate the knowledge norm. Hawthorne and Stanley consider a situation in which someone in a situation of urgency is intuitively blameless in acting on mere partial belief. They claim that this kind of case doesn't ultimately threaten the knowledge norm; according to them, "the fact that we do not blame someone forced into a quick decision is no evidence at all against it" (Hawthorne and Stanley 2008, p. 587). In their view, the agent is blameless because the practical circumstances excuse her for violating the knowledge norm. Similarly, Hawthorne and Stanley could object to the above counterexamples by saying that the agent violates the norm but is excusable, for in these situations practical considerations render it excusable to act on less than knowledge. Here are two replies. First, in the exemplified cases it is hard to see in what sense the agent needs to be excused. Our intuition suggests that the agent does not violate any epistemic constraint on practical rationality. For instance, when scientists have good reasons to use an out-of-date Newtonian law as a premise in their calculation, we neither judge them as acting inappropriately in any sense nor do we feel them in need of excuse for some wrongdoing. In these cases, there is no indication of the violation of some normative standard, either practical or epistemic: no criticizability, no blameability or excusability according to any normative assessment whatsoever. Second, themaneuver of appealing to excuses is rather unpromising. Gerken (2011) points out that unless upholders of the knowledge norm can specify the notions of excuse and/or blamelessness, an appeal to excuses would be ad hoc and thus unconvincing. He then critically considers several possible principled accounts of excuse, and argues that none of them is free from serious problems. It seems evenmore implausible to work out a viable account of excuse able to accommodate the types of cases 32 What could be the mental attitude that F has towards H if it is not belief? There are two possible interpretations here. One is acceptance: F decides to adopt the working hypothesis that she is not massively deceived in order to simplify her thinking, and uses this hypothesis as a premise in her reasoning. Alternatively, we can conceive the example as one in which F relies on H in an unreflective way, without first explicitly performing an act of acceptance. In this case, interpreting the attitude as acceptance would probably not be very accurate. A wide literature on Pyrrhonism suggests that the relevant attitude in such a case would be appearance. Sextus Empiricus (1994) describes an appearance as an involuntary affection (pathos) of the skeptic, something she passively undergoes. Unlike belief, an appearance makes no claims regarding the truth-value of p. Appearances, unlike beliefs, do not aim at truth, in the sense that they are not attitudes directed at correctly representing real states of affairs. Accordingly, they cannot be questioned and criticized with regard to their truth-dimension. Rather, they are appropriately assessed with regard to promoting a life free from turmoil and favoring the achievement of imperturbability. While beliefs involve a commitment to the truth of what is believed, appearances are attitudes supposed to represent with the practical aim of acquiring peace of mind. 123 Synthese (2017) 194:1901–1917 1915 considered above, not to mention that each of them involves completely different sorts of circumstances.33 3 Conclusion What conditions make it appropriate to treat p as a reason for action? In this paper, I argued that neither knowing that p nor believing that p are necessary or sufficient conditions for appropriately treating p as a reason for action. Notice however that the aim of this paper was not to criticize RKP and other doxastic norms of practical reasoning on the ground that knowledge or warranted belief don't play any role for the rationalization of actions. Rather, it was to point out the limits of these principles by showing how rational actions may be based in some cases on other mental attitude such as acceptance. Acknowledgements I would like to thank audience at the Xmas Epistemology Fest (University of Edinburgh, 2012), the Graduate Conference in Theoretical Philosophy (University of Groningen, 2013), and the 87th Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society & Mind (University of Exeter, 2013). I would also like to thankMikkel Gerken, Allan Hazlett, Duncan Pritchard and five anonymous referees from Synthese for their invaluable comments on earlier drafts. A special thank goes to Davide Fassio for his considerable feedbacks and support. I benefited from the China Scholarship Council/University of Edinburgh Scholarship and a Jacobsen Studentship. Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made. References Alston, W. (1996). Belief, acceptance, and religious faith. In D. Howard-Snyder & J. Jordan (Eds.), Faith, freedom, and rationality (pp. 3–27). London: Rowman & Littlefield. Audi, R. (2008). Belief, faith, and acceptance. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 63(1/3), 87–102. Benton, M. A. (2014). Knowledge norms. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Accessed October 4, 2015, from http://www.iep.utm.edu/kn-norms/. Bratman, M. (1992). Practical reasoning and acceptance in a context.Mind, 101(401), 1–16. Broome, J. (2013). Rationality through reasoning. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. Brown, J. (2008a). Knowledge and practical reason. Philosophy Compass, 3(6), 1135–1152. Brown, J. (2008b). Subject-sensitive invariantism and the knowledge norm for practical reasoning. Noûs, 42(2), 167–189. Brown, J. (2012). Assertion and practical reasoning: Common or divergent epistemic standards?Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 84(1), 123–157. Buckareff, A. A. (2004). Acceptance and deciding to believe. Journal of Philosophical Research, 29, 173– 190. Cohen, J. (1989). Belief and acceptance. Mind, 98(391), 367–389. 33 Note that it seems to be even more implausible for upholders of the doxastic norms to use the excuse maneuver for defending their views. Those philosophers reject the excuse maneuver made by proponents of the knowledge norm. That would require developing a notion of excuse that could handle the cases of acceptance and appearance but maintain that there is no need of excuse in cases like the urgency situation considered by Hawthorne and Stanley. 123 1916 Synthese (2017) 194:1901–1917 Cohen, J. (1992). An essay on belief and acceptance. New York: Clarendon Press. Daly, C. J. (2008). Fictionalism and the attitudes. Philosophical Studies, 139(3), 423–440. Dennett, D. (1978).How to change your mind. Mongtomery, VT: D. Dennett, Brainstorms, Bradford Books Publishers Inc, de Sousa, R. B. (1971). How to give a piece of your mind: Or, the logic of belief and assent. Review of Metaphysics, 25(1), 52–79. Dub, R. (2015). Delusions, acceptances, and cognitive feelings. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 91(3), 723–759. Egan, A. (2008). Seeing and believing: Perception, belief formation and the divided mind. Philosophical Studies, 140(1), 47–63. Engel, P. (1998). Believing, holding true, and accepting. Philosophical Explorations, 1(2), 140–151. Engel, P. (2013). Doxastic correctness. Aristotelian Society Supplementary, 87(1), 199–216. Fantl, J., & McGrath, M. (2002). Evidence, pragmatics, and justification. Philosophical Review, 111(1), 67–94. Fantl, J., & McGrath, M. (2007). On pragmatic encroachment in epistemology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 75(3), 558–589. Fantl, J., & McGrath, M. (2009). Knowledge in an uncertain world. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Frankish, K. (2004).Mind and supermind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Gerken, M. (2011). Warrant and action. Synthese, 178(3), 529–547. Gerken, M. (2015). The role of knowledge ascription in epistemic assessment. European Journal of Philosophy, 23(1), 141–161. Hawthorne, J. (2004). Knowledge and lotteries. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hawthorne, J., & Stanley, J. (2008). Knowledge and action. Journal of Philosophy, 105(10), 571–590. Leng, M. (2015). Fictionalism in the philosophy of mathematics. In Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Accessed November 16, 2015, from http://www.iep.utm.edu/mathfict/. Littlejohn, C. (2009). Must we act only on what we know? Journal of Philosophy, 106(8), 463–473. Littlejohn, C. (2012). Justification and the truth-connection. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Littlejohn, C. (2013). The russellian reteat. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 113(3pt3), 293–320. Maher, P. (1990). Acceptance without belief. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, 1990, 381–392. McHugh, C., & Whiting, D. (2014). The normativity of belief. Analysis, 74(4), 698–713. Mosterín, J. (2002). Acceptance without belief.Manuscrito, 25(2), 313–335. Neta, R. (2009). Treating something as a reason for action. Noûs, 43(4), 684–699. Pritchard, D. (2000). Doubt undogmatized: Pyrrhonian scepticism, epistemological externalism, and the "metaepistemological" challenge. Principia-Revista Internacional de Epistemologia, 4, 187–214. Rey, G. (1988). Toward a computational account of akrasia and self-deception. In B. McLaughlin & O. Rorty (Eds.), Perspectives on self-deception (pp. 264–296). London: University of California Press. Rey, G. (2007). Meta-atheism: Religious avowal as self-deception. In Antony (Ed.), Philosophers without gods: Meditations on atheism and the secular life (pp. 243–265). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Sextus Empiricus. (1994). Outlines of Pyrrhonism. (Annas & Barnes, Trans.). Shah, N. (2003). How truth governs belief. Philosophical Review, 112(4), 447–482. Sperber, D. (1996). Explaining culture: A naturalistic approach. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Sperber, D. (1997). Intuitive and reflective beliefs. Mind and Language, 12(1), 67–83. Stalnaker, R. (1984). Inquiry. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Stanley, J. (2005). Knowledge and practical interests. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Steglich-Petersen, A. (2006). No norm needed: On the aim of belief. Philosophical Quarterly, 56(225), 499–516. Tuomela, R. (2000). Belief versus acceptance. Philosophical Explorations, 3(2), 122–137. Vahid, H. (2006). Aiming at truth: Doxastic versus epistemic goals.Philosophical Studies, 131(2), 303–335. Van Fraassen, B. C. (1980). The scientific image. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Van Leeuwen, N. (2014). Religious credence is not factual belief. Cognition, 133(3), 698–715. Velleman, D. (2000). On the aim of belief. In G. Cullity &B. Gaut (Eds.), The possibility of practical reason (pp. 244–281). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Wedgwood, R. (2002). The aim of belief. Philosophical Perspectives, 16(s16), 267–297. Wedgwood, R. (2013). Doxastic correctness. Aristotelian Society Supplementary, 87(1), 217–234. Williamson, T. (2000). Knowledge and its limits. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 123 Synthese (2017) 194:1901–1917 1917 Wright, C. (2004). Warrant for nothing (and foundations for free)? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes, 78, 167–212. Yablo, S. (2006). Non-catastrophic presupposition failure. In J. J. Thomson & A. Byrne (Eds.), Content and modality: Themes From the philosophy of Robert Stalnaker. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

ISSN 2039-2117 (online) ISSN 2039-9340 (print) Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences MCSER Publishing, Rome-Italy Vol 6 No 3 S1 May 2015 602 Discussions on Pagan Theology in the Academia and in the Pagan Community Stanislav Panin Lecturer, D. Mendeleyev University of Chemical Technology of Russia, Moscow, Russia Email: [email protected] Doi:10.5901/mjss.2015.v6n3s1p602 Abstract A concept of Pagan Theology has been producing a number of discussions throughout the last decade and particularly in the last few years both inside and outside Pagan community. In this paper, the author analyzes three aspects of the phenomenon of Pagan Theology and discussions emerged around it. The first aspect is the genesis of the idea of Pagan Theology. It includes an examination of academic and religious roots of this research programme. The second aspect is a view on Pagan Theology from the perspective of the academia. While for some scholars Pagan Theology appears to be a legitimate field of study and/or research programme in Pagan Studies, others describe it is an attempt of Pagan intervention in the academia. Finally, the third aspect is a discussion on Pagan Theology emerged among Pagans, whose reflections of this topic are very ambiguous too. In spite of this fact, the author concludes that the idea of Pagan Theology was a necessary stage of development, both in the conceptualization of contemporary Paganism itself and in Pagan Studies at the same time. Keywords: Pagan Theology, Pagan Studies, Paganism Introduction 1. A concept of Pagan Theology that denotes studies aimed to find and describe the main features of Paganism as a whole is a highly controversial research programme in Pagan Studies, which took its shape in the beginning of the millennium. Debates around this concept are, from my point of view, very important for scholars of new religions and esotericism, because these debates can show us different ways to understand Religious and Esoteric Studies per se as well as show us a number of issues in these fields. They also help us to understand deeper the plurality of opinions existing among Pagans themselves in understanding of what Paganism is and what should be the future of its relations with the academia and with Western rationality in general. Literature Review 2. A concept of "Pagan Theology" is usually associated with Michael York's book Pagan Theology: Paganism as a World Religion (York, 2003). In the book, the author tries to describe some aspects of Weltanschauung and behavior that, as he believes, defines the common ground for all Pagan movements. C. Kraemer used and developed the idea in her book Seeking the Mystery: An Introduction to Pagan Theologies (Kraemer, 2012). Its title with plural form "Theologies" instead of "Theology" shows the accent on plurality and undogmatic essence of Pagan traditions. In contrast with York's book, Seeking the Mystery is a book addressed not to researchers, but rather to insiders participating in courses dedicated to Pagan Theology. The book definitely indicates a transformation of York's research programme into a specific discipline that is in many senses beyond the domain of Religious Studies. On the other hand, the book includes extremely valuable emic materials for further studies of Paganism and an interesting attempt of summarization of Pagan beliefs that can be useful for scholars in their studies of Paganism. The concept of Pagan Theology was in a scope of a number of discussions throughout the last decade and particularly in the last few years both inside and outside the Pagan community. In 2012 and 2013 a related discussion of Pagan Studies emerged with a critical publication of M. Davidsen in Method and Theory in the Study of Religion (Davidsen, 2012) followed by answers published in Pomegranate by E. D. White (2012) and M. York (2013). The discussion had a wide resonance and moved from the pages of academic publications into the Internet. Particularly, M. Harrington, whose works were criticized in Davidsen's article, answered him on her page at academia.edu. The topic was also in a scope of discussions on several academic conferences, for example, during a Conference on Current Pagan Studies 2013 in Claremont (Pitzl-Waters, 2013). ISSN 2039-2117 (online) ISSN 2039-9340 (print) Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences MCSER Publishing, Rome-Italy Vol 6 No 3 S1 May 2015 603 Analysis 3. In this paper, I will try to focus on three important aspects in discussions related to Pagan Theology which are the roots of Pagan Theology and the reactions of the academia and of Pagans on this phenomenon. 3.1 The roots of the Pagan Theology I believe that the birth of the Pagan Theology is reflecting the development of Pagan community itself, or the development of contemporary Paganism as a religion. All religions in their development go through similar states. Almost every religion emerges as a small, esoteric community with a charismatic leader (or leaders), who has a direct mystical experience, and a group of his or her followers. In very ancient times, such a function could belong to a shaman or to the chieftain of a tribe. However, it was the same for Buddhism or for Christianity as well as it is for contemporary Wicca created by a group leading by G. Gardner and, for some measure, by D. Valiente. If a doctrine then becomes popular, it gets more and more followers, and so an esoteric group gives a birth to a new religion. A religion with quite a number of followers and almost no institutional pressure can be undogmatic one, because there is nobody to control what people believe in and how they behave. In such a situation, a wide diversity of currents emerges, like in the early Christianity, for example. It is a good, fertile time; however, it leads to a crisis of identity when people simply cannot understand what does it means to be a follower of this religion. An explanation needed, be it common rituals, common myth or common beliefs. On the other hand, some people involved in this religion, those of the intellectual type, tries to rationalize it. This gives a birth to theology that can be theology of different types: philosophical theology of the Ancient Greek authors is prominently different from Christian or Muslim theology, but both of them are attempts of rationalization of religious beliefs. A level of dogmatism can differs from religion to religion, from country to country, from age to age. For example, Ancient Greeks who were rather liberal about religious beliefs still thought that every member of their community should believe in gods and participate in religious rituals, whereas how exactly did he or she believe in gods was his or her own duty. Nevertheless, when Socrates was condemned to death accusations against him included an invention of new gods, while Anaxagoras leaved Athens because of accusation in atheism for his philosophical ideas. Thus, we can say that, although the Greeks were generally rather liberal about religion, there were some questions where you could not ignore common beliefs, and so there was a type of Ancient Greek "credo". In any case, every religion that reached an advanced stage of development gives birth for a type of theology which can be more dogmatic or less dogmatic in accordance with the frame of mind of the time and of the territory where it appeared. Paganism is not an exclusion, so one can ask if its amorphous form that we see today really an essential feature of Pagan Weltanschauung or just an attribute of its current state of development. Besides internal reasons described above, there was an important external, social reason for the emergence of Pagan Theology. We know that theologies of "traditional" religions, first of all, Christian Theology is a part European and American education system for centuries as well as Philosophy of Religion with its attempts to create a rational foundation for religion (for example, in the works of British philosopher R. Swinburne). This creates an important precedent: if one kind of theology, say Christian Theology, regarded as academic discipline why should not others be regarded the same way? Therefore, we can say with no doubts that the very fact of the existence of Christian Theology itself has given birth to the idea of Pagan Theology. Another social reason supports it: a need in "religious specialists", like priests, who will perform different religious ceremonies and pastoral services and will have a verified qualification to perform it. Nobody wants to be fooled and misguided by a person who know nothing about his or her religion but pretend to be a priest. Therefore, we usually want to be sure that the person we talk to has qualification needed, and proper education is a good indicator of it. Because of these reasons, a Pagan Theology is not only a research programme in Religious/Pagan Studies but it also tends to institutionalize itself as an independent discipline. For now, I have described Pagan Theology as a phenomenon which belongs mostly to the Pagan community, but Pagan Theology has emerged not only from it, but also from the academia. Pagan Theology has emerged in Britain and in the USA and it is by no means a matter of chance. Academic roots of Pagan Theology belong to the Anglo-American tradition of scholarship in Religious and Esoteric Studies, where an influence of "religionism" of Eranos transmitted through M. Eliade and phenomenology of religion brought in the USA by J. Wach has very prominent significance. The former aimed at "exploring historical sources in search of what is eternal and universal" (Hanegraaff, 2012). The latter tried to "perceive religion on its own terms, or essence", "use a comparative approach to reveal what is essential in religion", "maintaining a proper understanding or empathy of religion to prevent a reduction of religion to another plane of formed a group known as the Chicago school of Religious Studies influenced American scholarship in the field of explanation" (Phenomenology of Religion, 2006). Eliade and Wach together with philosopher and theologian P. Tillich ISSN 2039-2117 (online) ISSN 2039-9340 (print) Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences MCSER Publishing, Rome-Italy Vol 6 No 3 S1 May 2015 604 Religious and Esoteric Studies very prominently. The main idea of these scholars was to describe the universal elements that are essential for every religion, the idea that obviously influenced the Pagan Theology looking for such common elements in different pagan traditions. Therefore, it can be regarded as a particular incarnation of this research programme. On the other hand, the History of Ideas was another force that prominently influenced Anglo-American scholarship in the field. The creation of the History of Ideas is usually associated with A. O. Lovejoy, but the concept of the History of Ideas has also the prominent resemblance with ideas of German philosopher E. Cassirer who worked in the USA in 1941 – 1945. In the study of esotericism, L. Thorndike adopted this approach and then famous British scholar F. Yates, who was influenced by Thorndike's works (Yates, 1964). Thorndike wrote about magic: "Some may think it strange that I associate magic so closely with the history of thought <...> The exact meaning of the word, "magic," was a matter of much uncertainty even in classical and medieval times, as we shall see. There can be no doubt, however, that it was then applied not merely to an operative art, but also to a mass of ideas or doctrine, and that it represented a way of looking at the world" (Thorndike, 1923). If we replace here the word "magic" with the word "Paganism", we can easily understand that the approach used by York derives from this tradition. William James' ideas in Epistemology and Philosophy of Religion were one more important component of Anglo-American tradition in Religious and Esoteric Studies. His works brought an accent on religious experience and critical attitude towards to classical empiricism and evidentialism in the field. Therefore, we can see how the concept reflects American and British realities, including those related to specifics of Anglo-American scholarship in Religious and Esoteric Studies. On the other hand, Pagan Theology does not belong only to these countries. Both Pagans and scholars from other countries demonstrate an interest in this concept. At least, after publication of my first paper dedicated to this topic, I have received its appreciation from different countries marking the topic as interesting and important. We can also see very similar tendencies related to conceptualization of Pagan Theology in other countries, for example, in Russia, where this term is usually associated with Russian Pagan current named "Rodnoverie" ( ). If you try to search "Pagan Theology" in Russian on the Internet, you will find a number of entries written by Russian Pagans. The term itself came into Russian Paganism not from the Western sources, but rather from the works of famous Soviet scholar B. A. Rybakov who used it to describe the religious ideas of ancient Slavs, particularly when we writes about Zbruch Idol (Rybakov, 1980) and about Pagan priests (Rybakov, 1987). Rybakov is a very popular author among Russian Pagans and his influence was as prominent as those of M. Murray on G. Gardner. That is why we cannot be surprised when we find out that the concept of Pagan Theology can find a fertile ground in Russia. While Rybakov wrote mostly about ancient Russian Paganism and used this term to describe rather a type of ancient Weltanschauung than a particular research programme or discipline, contemporary Pagans in Russia use the term to describe Pagan beliefs in general and rationalization of these beliefs. On Russian Pagan site "Bujan", for instance, there is an article entitled Questions and Answers about Paganism, where we can read a statement that "Paganism is a world religion" (Questions and Answers, 2012). I believe that the authors of the article have not ever read the York's book, at least they do not mention it in their articles, but their statement is the same as in the title of the book. That shows us the process of creation of Pagan Theology is not only an American or British phenomenon, but also a phenomenon that belongs to contemporary Paganism in general. 3.2 Academic and Pagan reception The second problem we are moving to now is a view on Pagan Theology from the perspective of the academia. While for some scholars Pagan Theology appears to be a legitimate concept, for others it is an attempt of some Pagans to act in the academia according to their personal interests instead of achieving academic goals and that such a behavior is dangerous for the academia. Almost any criticism of Pagan Theology including those of Davidsen is resting on two beliefs: first, that those who criticize knows exactly what is it to be "academic" (or even "scientific") in the study of religion, and second, that his or her Weltanschauung produces perfectly adequate and neutral image of the object studied. As far as in European Religious Studies scientism, empiricism and historicism were three forces which won the battle of research programmes, the most of the authors assume that this perspective and this methodology is the best, the perfect, clean and untouched by any distortion brought only by insider's perspective. It is regarded as given and obvious fact that "an objective study of religion" should be based on "critical-naturalist program" as Davidsen put it or "empiricism" in terms of W. Hanegraaff. So, every critical review or article on the topic is based on the same arguments: any research is compared with the "ideal type" of empirical/naturalistic/scientific research. If it does not fit in this standard, such research is usually stigmatized as "religionism" or "latent esotericism" and a reviewer can proudly say that he or she has done his or her job. On the other hand, those who try to protect Pagan Studies from unjust criticism usually share these believes too. Their answers are ISSN 2039-2117 (online) ISSN 2039-9340 (print) Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences MCSER Publishing, Rome-Italy Vol 6 No 3 S1 May 2015 605 targeted to show that Pagan Studies complies with these standards of scientism, empiricism and historicism and do not analyze methodological assumptions at the heart of the criticism. Instead, they are playing in an empiricist's game on the empiricist's field with empiricist's rules and concentrating around particular mistakes in critical articles. However, why should one really be bothered if some research is not created in accordance with the ideal type chosen by a group of scholars? As far as Davidsen begins his essay with a statement that religionism was criticized as "ideology" "resting on theological or esoteric suppositions" (Davidsen, 2012), one can say the same about "naturalism" or "scientism" that was widely and soundly criticized as a form of dogmatism in number of publications from those of P. Feyerabend to recent anthology Scientism: the New Orthodoxy (Williams, Robinson, 2015). Speaking about Religious or Esoteric Studies it is much more important, at least for me, if a research can bring new perspectives and deeper understanding of the subject or not. I do not interested if it fits in some artificial standards, artificial "ideal types" of academic activity. I believe that in the academia many approaches to the same problem can and should coexist at the same time. These approaches can fight with each other, can criticize each other, but only together they will bring us new perspectives and more holistic view on the subject. The concurrence of different research programmes for me is a very important indicator of healthy situation in the academia. The problem begins when one programme wins and achieve almost unlimited power through institutional control. Winners can impose their approach to other scholars and try to monopolize the field which is an example of monopolism and a kind of totalitarian regime not in economics or politics but in the academia. One can ask is it appropriate not only from the point of view of the academia, but also from the point of view of democratic principles grounding the Western society in general. Thus, I do not believe that academic studies is a line of "paradigms" where better one comes after worse repeatedly and where only one point of view can exist. For me it is rather a field of battle between different research programmes in the sense of Imre Lakatos, programmes with different perspectives and different theoretical foundations. If we look from this perspective, we should agree that empiricist perspective is rather new research programme that is not the only option in Religious Studies either historically or geographically. If we look at the Pagan Theology from this point of view, we can agree that Pagan Theology is an interesting research programme targeted to find, describe and systematize beliefs that a common for Pagans from different ages and countries. Whether this programme will succeed or not, I do not know, but we obviously can give it a chance and see what will happen. Even if it fails, we will get some new ideas, information and inspiration that maybe helps us to improve our understanding of Paganism. However, not only academic but also insider's reflections on this topic are very ambiguous. While some Pagans welcome this concept as a new view on Paganism and an important step in the development of the Pagan community, others are very critical about it, describing it as dogmatic, overgeneralizing and ecumenist approach that is not suitable for Paganism. This discussion reflects the difference in the understanding of Paganism itself that exists among Pagans. Some Pagans are inspired with the idea of bringing some rational elements and critical thinking into their Pagan activities. These Pagans are often academically trained people who think that their historical, psychological or philosophical knowledge can help them to be better Pagans. On the other hand, there is another type of Pagans. These Pagans stress the role of feelings, of direct experience and intuition in Pagan activities. This type of Pagans describes a systematization of teaching as a limitation of their creativity. Even the most liberal Pagans need to describe what Paganism is and therefore they need to choose some important aspects of Paganism and concentrate on them. Therefore, they do exactly the same thing as M. York and just do not call it Pagan Theology. For example, some authors can write about Pagan philosophy when they describe common aspects of Pagan mentality (Sythove, 2010), and it looks fairly similar to Yorks's idea of Pagan Theology. Such projects can be more or less inclusive and imply more or less generalized image of Paganism. York, for instance, uses a very broad definition of Paganism and describes it as a religion where "the two-way relationship that any person or community has with the physical world, with other humans or conscious beings, and/or with the supernatural, or magical dimensions of reality are to be conceived as a sacred, holy, or holistic relationship" (York, 2003). York contrasts Paganism with "Gnosticism" that is another "ideal type" of Theology in York's book. An opposition here is related to an attitude towards to the natural reality: while "Gnostic" religions describes it as an illusion, Paganism is concentrated on the importance of both natural and supernatural realms as well as their interactions. Although this idea is rather interesting and can provoke discussions about an influence of Pagan ideas on different types of Weltanschauung, including Christianity and Atheism, such a broad definition was criticized both by a number of Pagans and by a number of scholars as an overgeneralization. However, it does not mean that its critics believe that we entirely cannot analyze and describe the common aspects of Pagan behavior, and discussions here are generally about the terms that are in use. For many Pagans, the word "Theology" has strong connotations with Christianity and religious dogmatism. Nevertheless, if there were no common beliefs shared by all Pagans, we could not talk about "Paganism" at ISSN 2039-2117 (online) ISSN 2039-9340 (print) Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences MCSER Publishing, Rome-Italy Vol 6 No 3 S1 May 2015 606 all. Any definition requires a set of attributes. When it comes to a Weltanschauung, these attributes usually related to common beliefs and/or common behavior. A selection of these attributes, their description and systematization is what M. York calls Pagan Theology. Therefore, if we believe that "Paganism" really exists and that this term is not a useless overgeneralization, we should agree that Pagan Theology in terms of York is a possible project. Otherwise, we should, first of all, abandon the term itself as well as the idea of Pagan Studies. Conclusion 4. Keeping all that was said above in mind, I believe that the emergence of Pagan Theology is not a matter of chance, but a necessary stage of development, both in the conceptualization of contemporary Paganism itself and in Pagan Studies at the same time. An emergence of Pagan Theology reflects tendencies that one have been observing in these groups for years and that is why we cannot describe it as artificial phenomenon. It looks like Pagan Theology as a specific research programme has emerged in Great Britain and in the USA, and not without reasons. However, nowadays this concept achieves more popularity in other countries too, and I believe that it is reflecting the contemporary situation in the development of Paganism. From the point of view of the academia, Pagan Theology can be described in three ways: as a research programme in Religious or Pagan Studies, as an independent field like Christian Theology and as a profession that can be a subject of professional training in educational institutions. References Davidsen M. A. (2012). What is Wrong with Pagan Studies? Method and Theory in the Study of Religion, 24: 183-199. Hanegraaff W. J. (2012) Western Esotericism: The Next Generation. Mystic and Esoteric Movements in Theory and Practice. History and Discourse: Historical and Philosophical Aspects of the Study of Esotericism and Mysticism. St. Petersburg: Russian Christian Academy for Humanities. Pp. 113-129. Kraemer C. H. (2012). Seeking the Mystery: An Introduction to Pagan Theologies. Englewood: Patheos Press. Pitzl-Waters J. (2013) Pagans Studied: The 2013 Conference on Current Pagan Studies. [Online] Availble: http://wildhunt.org/tag/paganstudies-conference (February 22, 2015). Phenomenology of Religion (2006). Britannica Encyclopedia of World Religions. Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. P. 916. Questions and Answers (2012). Questions and Answers about Paganism (in Russian). [Online] Availble: http://bujan.ru/molva/st2.html (February 22, 2015). Rybakov B. A. (1980). Paganism of Ancient Slavs (in Russian). Moscow: Nauka. Rybakov B. A. (1987). Paganism of Ancient Rus' (in Russian). Moscow: Nauka. Sythove M. (2010). Beyond the Broomstick. Whyte Track. Thorndike L. (1923). A History of Magic and Experimental Science. Vol. 1. New York: Columbia University Press. White E. D. (2012). In Defense of Pagan Studies: a Response to Davidsen's Critique. Pomegranate: The International Journal of Pagan Studies, 14(1): 5-21. Williams R. N., Robinson D. N., eds. (2015) Scientism: the New Orthodoxy. London: Bloomsbury. Yates F. A. (1964). Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. York M. (2013). An Intersubjective Critique of A Critique of Pagan Scholarship. Pomegranate: The International Journal of Pagan Studies, 15(1-2): 136-150. York M. (2003). Pagan Theology: Paganism as a World Religion. New York: New York University Press.

DECIPHERING TRUTH: A JOURNEY THROUGH PERCEPTION, OPINION, AND CONVENIENCE By: Gregory Makuch Jerry, just remember, it's not a lie if you believe it. --George Costanza, Seinfeld Within every field of study man grasps at one simple objective...truth. For mathematics, the truth is in the solution to the equation; in science the truth results from experimentation; and in philosophy the truth is found in understanding. Philosophically, what is meant by truth and the converse, untruth? Children are taught to tell the "truth;" there are legal implications of "truth;" and religious tenets assign "truth" as a factor in salvation. Truth inundates our lives. While most believe they know what is meant by truth, the version of truth we understand is in fact a fallacy. The quote from Seinfeld which opened this examination shows exactly how subjective the idea of truth can be. As this article will show, the idea of personal belief factoring into the concept of truth is not far-fetched and the impact of individuality and personal bias on truth are tremendous. These influences can alter what is meant by truth and by what means truth is derived. Truth is a necessary component of exploration as it serves as both the goal and the guidelines. Within science, truths establish the constants in experiments and allow for the experimentation process to create results which become new truths. But is this truth? What if the constants believed to be true were in fact untrue? What if what was identified as untrue, was in fact truths hidden by perception? These questions are the core of this article. I have found truth to be a term in liberal application throughout philosophical musings, yet the implication of the meaning of truth affects man's understanding of his very existence. 2 At the forefront of this undertaking is the question, "what is truth?" The construct of this article will not allow an attempt to answer something of such magnitude. However, I will attempt to show how truth is used in philosophical writing. Taking four key works: Mary Douglas' Purity and Danger; Georges Bataille's The Accursed Share (Volume 1); Martin Heidegger's Poetry, Language, Thought; and Michel Foucault's The Order of Things, I will examine the role of truth within each. What must be understood is that I am not looking to discredit any of these authors as their truths are just that, their truths. I am however going to attempt to demonstrate the importance of perception and opinion as it pertains to truth because the application of one's own truth enables that truth to validate a philosophical opinion. Without a truthful foundation, the structure of the argument is weak. The very core of these authors' positions lie in the perception that their truths are in fact the only truths. Throughout the article, I will explore Douglas, Bataille, Heidegger, and Foucault with the intent on separating their truths from what I will refer to hereinafter as concrete truths. Concrete truths are those truths which can be considered infallible. By that I mean their validity cannot reasonably be argued. These may also be considered natural laws, but I must be careful in the use of "laws" as our authors apply the term "law" to mean truth very liberally. To establish a baseline for concrete truth, I find Heidegger's definition appropriate: The true is what corresponds to the real, and the real is what is in truth. The circle has closed again. What does "in truth" mean? Truth is the essence of the true. What do we have in mind when speaking of the essence? Usually it is thought to be those features held in common by everything that is true. The essence is discovered in the generic and universal concept, which represents the one feature that holds indifferently for many things. 1 1 Martin Heidegger. Poetry, Language, Thought. Harper Publishing, London (1994), p. 49 3 Concrete truths are universal; they apply without differentiation. This provides a starting point for exploration of the concept of truth derived from perception or opinion; I will refer to these as abstract truths. An abstract truth is not untrue; it is a state of truth which is applicable to the owner of that truth. Abstract truth is well depicted by George Orwell in Nineteen Eighty-Four: "If he thinks he floats off the floor, and if I simultaneously think I see him do it, then the thing happens." 2 The law of gravity, a concrete truth, would not allow one man to simply float; but an abstract truth allows it because it is the truth as they know it. The complexity of what is and is not true can impact thinking. The perceived abstract truth can influence philosophical perspective. It is the presence of abstract truth that I seek to understand and to see truth within philosophical examination of the difficult questions considered by man. Heidegger and the Truth of Things Since Heidegger's definition of truth lies at the center of Poetry, Language, Thought, it is logical to begin with his work. Poetry, Language, Thought is a journey into what it means to create truth and by what means truth is exposed. Heidegger moves through different mediums of truth transmission in order to demonstrate the manner in which man can find truth. The truth created in Heidegger's examination is an abstract truth. Because man exposes truth through a creative process, the exposed truth is the truth of the creator, not a concrete truth. The challenge in interpreting these truths is understanding truth from the creator's perspective not through the interpretation of the observer. The observer will never see the creator's truth from their own perspective; the observer cannot see beyond his own truths. As a result, this creates two truths from one work: the truth of the creator and the truth of the receiver. 2 George Orwell. Nineteen Eighty-Four. Plume Publishing (1949), p. 288 4 Heidegger asserts that to find truth one must look beyond things and determine the thingly-ness of that thing to identify its truth. While this might seem confusing, it is in essence identifying that the truth of an object is not found in that object but in the very essence of what that object signifies. The abstract truth behind a creation cannot be discovered if it is viewed through the lens of preconception. Heidegger makes note that in order for [abstract] truth to be discovered one must, "avoid any attempts that again immediately entail the encroachment of the usual interpretations." 3 To find the creator's truth, our own lens of interpretation must be changed to those of the creator less we continue to exist with two truths instead of one. As one delves deeper into the concepts of the creator, they begin to see the creator's truth instead of their own. The process by which truth is revealed is a result of conflict between what Heidegger calls concealing and unconcealedness or aletheia. This struggle exists as the truth is not readily accessible; it is in fact an elusive objective often mistaken within the concept of concealing. Unconcealedness results from a "revelation of the whole and its relation to the world and earth as truth." 4 The battle between concealing and unconcealedness is necessary as truth does not simply exist in its present form; truth is actually a happening, an active revelation. 5 Heidegger spends a great deal of time exploring the process for truth to be revealed through aletheia. It is the process by which the truth of a thing is imparted upon that thing by the creator, allowing the abstract truth to exist. Without an understanding of the creation process, the truth of the creator cannot be discovered. One does not need to understand how Van Gogh paints or Michelangelo sculpts. One must understand a process takes place and that the creator's truth is imparted during this process, not in the finished product. Truth does not lie in these 3 Martin Heidegger, p. 32 4 Ibid, p. 54 5 Ibid, p. 52 5 things; "truth is found beyond the thingly structure." 6 Their truth will be revealed through the creation of the thing and the relation of the thing within the world. When the sculptor takes chisel to stone, the abstract truth of the object lies in the sculptor, not the stone. One can say it is still a stone, no matter the form and this would be a concrete truth; those who see this way are locked in concealing and will never see beyond the concrete. The reality is they are not seeing truth at all and are deceiving themselves. The stone is not a stone, it is an abstract reality created through a process to reveal a truth unknown before its aletheia and one that could only be created by the artist. The creative process by which an abstract truth is brought forth from concealing to unconcealedness is known as techne. 7 Within the artist's mind, the concept is formed; through creation, whatever the medium, truth is brought forth. The object's truth only exists because of the abstract or personalized truth of the creator. To this point, the focus has been limited to material creations. Non-material creation also needs explanation to demonstrate the importance of abstract truth for Heidegger. Unlike the previous examples, truth revealed through writing does not have a physical sense. There are words on paper and one could argue that this creation is in fact a truth and would not be wrong; it is a truth, a concrete truth. However, the creator's truth does not lie in the physical manifestation of the work, but in the meaning of the created. For composers, their composition is a concrete truth. Anyone who can read music and play an instrument can play a great work. But is this revealing the creator's truth? Unconcealedness of this type lies beyond the physical construction of the symphony. Simply playing the notes will not reveal the composer's truth; one must become the music and feel the relation of the work to the world. In this way, the composer's truth will undergo aletheia. This applies not only to music, but anything created in which 6 Ibid, p. 37 7 Ibid, p. 57 6 language is the means of creation. As Heidegger states, truth does not lie in the words, but in the meaning assigned to the words. The examination of language validates that truth does not exist with the words themselves, it exists in the creator's application of the word. 8 This concept will be of primary importance in the examination of Douglas, Bataille, and Foucault. At this point, cynicism must rear its ugly head. I have noted that this application of truth allows a very ambiguous interpretation in which one could conceivably create their own truths. Heidegger also sees this and points out that truth as he defines cannot be proven through science. In essence, truth that is based on a personal perception cannot be validated or proven. Yet, as I discovered, this is the strength in Heidegger's argument. The application of perceptional truth enables complex philosophical questions to be contemplated. By removing the concrete truths which do not allow for abstract reasoning, philosophers are able to examine questions that do not necessarily comply with natural law. What came first the chicken or the egg? If one applies conventional logic based on concrete truths, they will move in logical circles without ever reaching a conclusion. The concrete truth is that an egg cannot be laid or naturally incubated without the chicken, but the chicken cannot be there to lay the egg without first having come from an egg. These are concrete truths which inhibit a logical solution. However, dispelling with a concrete truth for an abstract truth opens the door for a definitive solution. What if an abstract truth is provided, in this case by religion? The religious doctrine of creationism is an abstract truth which enables this philosophical quagmire to be solved. For those who believe, creationism allows for the chicken to be "created" without first having been an egg. The creation of a chicken is feasible under these conditions and the chicken would be able to then lay and incubate an egg. In this sense, the abstract truth allows philosophy to examine the issue without the previous 8 Ibid, p. 145 7 preconceptions. Not to debate creationism and evolution, this simply provides an example of abstract truth's application in philosophy following Heidegger's logic. Mary Douglas and the "Truth" of Pollution and Taboo As shown with Heidegger, the real strength in abstract truth lies in its ability to allow for explanation of the most difficult questions facing mankind. Previously, I stated that truth is necessary for exploration as it sets the constants by which new truth can be developed. This is how Mary Douglas explores pollution and taboo in her book, Purity and Danger. She utilizes her own abstract truths to create a foundation on which to base her argument. For Douglas, her perception creates an abstract truth which reveals the conditions under which taboo and pollution exist in primitive and non-primitive man. For Douglas, her perception of truth enables a rational argument in which abstract truth is woven together with concrete truth, much like the chicken and egg analogy used previously. The strength of engaging philosophical examination in this manner is the difficulty in separating where concrete truth ends and abstract truth begins. That is not to say that Douglas' truths are invalid; they are in fact more valid because they represent the truth through her perception. The application of this perception allows her to formulate her argument and dispute the truths of other philosophers. She explores this idea in her book: A group of philosophers who could no longer accept revealed religion, and who could not either accept or live without some guiding transcendental beliefs, set about providing that formula. Hence began that still continuing process of whittling away the revealed elements of Christian doctrine, and the elevating in its place of ethical principles as the central core of true religion. 9 Unsatisfied with existing beliefs in philosophy, Douglas examines the concepts of pollution and taboo in order to create a new truth, her truth. The intermingling of concrete and abstract truths throughout Purity and Danger aligns with the mythological concept of "extra embroidery on 9 Mary Douglas. Purity and Danger. Reprint, London: Routledge, 1984, p. 14 8 more solid beliefs." 10 She is not saying that mythology is untrue; she is saying that the truths as perceived by those who believe the myths are strengthened by concrete truths within the tale. A key aspect of Douglas' examination lies in the concept of society. For Douglas, many truths are revealed through the social interaction of man. Within society, man progresses through three stages of development: magic, religion, and science; 11 each of these developments allows new truths to emerge and these truths supplant the old truths. The new truths enable man to better understand the societal values in which he now resides. As these societies develop, man must have a means to transmit these new truths. In Heideggerian fashion, Douglas explains how rituals, symbols, and language play key roles in helping man understand these new social norms. For primitive man, his truths are founded in magic. Magic provides the means in which man can establish abstract truth to better understand concrete truth. That is, the abstract truths exist without opposition to the concrete truths. 12 Douglas' very book is an example of abstract truth redefining what is understood about concrete truth. Within primitive societies, rituals enable the transmission of truth. The use of ritual would be aletheia as described by Heidegger in that it allows for the societal truth, an abstract truth accepted by the society, to be revealed. 13 Like other truths, these truths are concealed, but are revealed through ritual. The understanding of the meaning of ritual is where truth is found. Much like art or poetry, the perceivable truth cannot be gained by the receiver through their own lenses; it must be received through the lens of the creator. For example, !Kung ritual cannot be understood through a conventional perspective; one must perceive the ritual through its meaning to the world and universe as viewed by the !Kung. 10 Ibid, p. 16 11 Ibid, p. 23 12 Ibid, p. 58 13 Ibid, p. 64 9 Rituals are not the only way in which truths are revealed. Douglas also explores how symbols provide a means to communicate truths as well. These, like ritual truths are not concrete, as they represent societal truths. Through symbols left by primitive and to a lesser extent non-primitive man, it is apparent that interpretation can mask truth. From the pyramids of Giza to the step pyramids of the Mayans to the cave paintings in the south of France, symbols provide clues to a society's values and taboos. Symbols and rituals expose the beliefs on which cultural taboos are based. 14 These values and taboos are the truths displayed in the symbols, and like rituals cannot be viewed through our own lens. For the unconcealedness of an abstract truth, it must be seen through the lens of the creator. As Heidegger has opined, language can also reveal truth. The emphasis is on "can" not "will;" Douglas points out that the availability of truth through language is only available to the users of that language. 15 From language, however, perceivable truths can be exposed if the receiver understands the meaning beyond the words. But many never see beyond the ambiguity of the words. Douglas points out that poetry "depends" on this ambiguity; 16 in fact, it is this ambiguity that conceals the truth. Seeing through this ambiguity allows the language of poetry to reveal the abstract truths which the creator intended. The use of language to reveal truth also allows man to define differences. This creates new perceivable truths which will alter social interactions. Abstract truths established through language are the first step in societal separation. From the perceivable truths about society, social awareness is formed and with awareness, differentiation develops. This differentiation can lead to "social coercion, special monetary incentives to conform, special types of punitive sanctions, specialized police and overseers and 14 Ibid, p. 87 15 Ibid, p. 23 16 Ibid, p. 37 10 progress men scanning our performance, and so on..." 17 From social awareness, social control is born. The revealing of abstract truth does not always benefit the entire society. To summarize Douglas and truth, it can be said that individuals within society create their own truth through ritual, symbols, and language. For non-primitive man, religion and science forms the basis for these truths. These truths create their reality. This individualized reality is rooted in their experiences as they pertain to the standardized values of their society. 18 Because abstract truth is based on perception, there is in fact no reality, but an illusion of reality formed by those very perceptions that enabled abstract truth to exist. 19 Truth therefore cannot lie in the essence of thought or thing; truth lies in the perception of meaning as provided by the creator and understood by the receiver in their work. In the end, man cannot even agree to the concrete truthfulness of death as abstract truth creates differing interpretations as to the finality of this act. The Economy of Truth-Examining Bataille Through the common language of economics, Bataille engages the philosophical question of why man does what he does. On the surface, these two topics seem at odds; how can fiscal discussion lead to a philosophical truth about man? The answer is: they cannot unless the truths of economics change to allow for this discussion. From Bataille's perspective, economic movement is governed by laws; 20 these laws however, are not concrete truths as one might believe, they are in fact abstract truths. These are abstract truths because they are created by man and enable a truth to be revealed in accordance with the intent of the creator. Bataille will use these truths to allow the language of economics to account for the creation and expenditure of energy, a key factor in man's action. In fact, Bataille notes that the extension of economic 17 Ibid, pp. 91-92 18 Ibid, p. 38 19 Ibid, p. 89 20 Georges Bataille. The Accursed Share (Volume 1). New York: Zone Books, 1989, p. 21 11 growth on which his premise resides requires the principles of economics to be overturned. 21 Energy through his economics is how Bataille explains the actions of man. The living organism, in a situation determined by the play of energy on the surface of the globe, ordinarily receives more energy than is necessary for maintaining life; the excess energy (wealth) can be used for the growth of the a system (e.g., an organism); if the system can no longer grow, or if the excess cannot be completely absorbed in its growth, it must necessarily be lost without profit; it must be spent, willingly or not, gloriously or catastrophically. 22 And with that, Bataille establishes his first truth in how the economic principles can apply to energy. From this basic premise, Bataille will develop a robust argument compiling concrete and abstract truths to substantiate his beliefs. As with Heidegger's principles, Bataille's cannot be proven by science. The examination of the totality of energy is of a magnitude that makes its very determination impossible. This is the strength of Bataille's argument in that one must see his truth. He acknowledges that this view of energy is paradoxical in that it conflicts with typical perception, but that is by nature truth according to Bataille. 23 But abstract truth is almost always paradoxical because one must remove their own preconceived notions in order to see the truth from the creator. Bataille recognizes the need to establish truths in order to substantiate his economic ideas. To do this, Bataille assigns his own principles to general economy to have it support his philosophical perspective. As with Douglas, this does not weaken Bataille's arguments, it in fact strengthens them since the economic principles Bataille is manipulating were abstract truths to begin with. From one abstract truth, another can be revealed and this new truth can either supplement or supplant the previous. To create the illusion of concrete truth, Bataille refers to his principles as "laws" and establishes the criteria for their use. What is noteworthy is that 21 Ibid, p. 25 22 Ibid, p. 21 23 Ibid, p. 37 12 within Bataille's laws, which are simply his abstract truths, he provides himself an avenue to further manipulate these laws to suit his own needs. "Of course man is not definable once and for all and these laws operate differently – their effects are even neutralized – at different states of history." 24 Bataille establishes a means to meet any objection to his principles in that they can, at time, be neutralized. So any example in which Bataille's laws do not hold true denotes a period of neutralization. His abstract truth creates an infallible argument. Like Douglas, Bataille recognizes the value of ritual; he applies the concept of ritual to energy consumption and power. Within his construct of ritual, Bataille's justification for religion and war is found. Bataille spends a great deal of time dealing with the energy produced and consumed by religion. As with Douglas, religion provides a means for man to find truth. Religion provides a commonality for man, a bonding agent for society. "War means consumption." 25 This consumption is a necessary component of Bataille's economic principles as excess energy must be utilized. This becomes an abstract truth within Bataille's argument. He weaves in historical examples to add validity to his argument. As with Douglas, the connection of historical facts to abstract truths increases their apparent strength. Ritual does not just expend energy, ritual can create power. Many societies have gift giving rituals as part of their social fabric. Cultural norms establish when it is appropriate to give another a gift. Gift giving is much more than simply offering something to someone else; Bataille argues it creates power for the giver. 26 In the old saying, "it is better to give than receive," we see an application of this empowerment based on Bataille's abstract truth. Bataille's central premise is built around the idea that energy is created and expended to create equilibrium. If man does not naturally 24 Ibid, p. 72 25 Ibid, p. 49 26 Ibid, p. 69 13 expend all the energy that is created he will find ways to expend that energy. This is Bataille's truth. A constant in Heidegger, Douglas and Bataille is the use of thing within their books. Each applies thing as an object lacking truth; in The Accursed Share, a thing becomes that which man uses to create or expend energy. The thing is a tool of man and in and of itself possesses no truth. However, the understanding of things allows man to reduce them to what they are. 27 But as Bataille further explores the concept of thing, he admits that there is more ambiguity to what constitutes things than previously thought. Bataille settles on, "We cannot penetrate a thing, and it has no meaning other than its material qualities, adopted or not to some useful purpose, in the productive sense of the word." 28 A thing is only a material thing and the truth of that thing lies not in what it is, but within the owner or user of that thing. Quite simply, truth lies within. Language, Signs, and Perception-Foucault and Truth Michel Foucault explores the relationship between classical knowledge and the roots of modern sciences in The Order of Things. This in and of itself is a vast undertaking and the purpose of this article is not to dispute or refute his findings, it is to examine the root of the truths he utilizes to accomplish this objective. As with the previous authors, Foucault's examination is centered on his perceived truths which allow him to utilize his own ideas to validate existing or known concepts. In this case, his abstract truths relate directly to the use of language and signs as applied to modern science. As the constructs of modern science are well established and accepted, they appear concrete, but are in fact abstract truths as well. Foucault acknowledges that these constructs are interpreted by man. This gives him the latitude to reconstruct the 27 Ibid, p. 57 28 Ibid, p. 132 14 relationship between classical thinking and modern science. It is through the reconstruction that Foucault's abstract truths are presented. At the center of Foucault's study is the understanding of language's role in classical knowledge. Before he even addresses modern science, he spends a great deal of time exploring the role of language on knowledge and understanding. Since knowledge and understanding are perceptions gained from language, this is a logical starting point. To set the stage, Foucault uses what I consider to be the most important analogy in his work, the examination of Don Quixote. For Foucault, Don Quixote is not merely a tale, but an example of the impact language has on perception. Don Quixote lives within his own reality created by the illusions of what things are. Things take on a truth relative to man and do not possess a truth of their own, much like the musings of our previous authors. Foucault argues that language allows man to assign truth to these objects. 29 Language however is not truth; it requires man's utilization to enable it to represent truth. Of course this is an abstract truth for it is the perceived truth of the individual that uses the language. Don Quixote, is continually assigning truth to objects that otherwise would have a different meaning. Barns become castles, bar maids become maidens, windmills become adversaries. The object did not change, the same woman is assigned two different categorizations: bar maid and by Don Quixote, maiden. Neither is untrue; both are abstract truths assigned through language. Language enables Don Quixote's reality to endure, transmitted to others through his book. Eventually, people read his book and understood his truths; they understood him. 30 The result is that Don Quixote's language creates a new reality. 29 Michel Foucault. The Order of Things. Reprint, New York: Random House, 1994, p. 54 30 Ibid, p. 48 15 The first step in understanding how Foucault takes classical knowledge, in this case language and applies it to science can be seen in categorization. The nature of language allows man to categorize and compare. In Don Quixote, language allowed one women to be both bar maid and maiden; but is this in fact truth? To answer with ambiguity: yes and no. It is truth, but not one truth. Categorizations allows for one truth to exist for one person and another truth to exist at the same time. In other words, the categorization of things can be "absolute according to one relation and relative according to another" 31 at the same time. To simplify, if I say it is "hot" outside, this is an absolute truth to me. I perceive the air to be hot. You however do not agree. The idea of hot is understood, but the truth is perception; you do not consider it hot outside. We each create an abstract truth from the same thing, the air, and both our truths are absolute for us and are measured relative to our understanding of hot. The next step in understanding language's relation to modern science is to understand what just happened at the end of the previous paragraph. Language allowed comparison of one truth to another. My truth of hot was compared to my truth of cool in order to determine if a thing (the air) was in fact hot. The result was a classification that the air was hot. This analysis is a function directly related to language and one which is necessary for modern science. So, language allows for analysis and from this analysis, according to Foucault, two types of comparison can be conducted: "relations of equality and inequality" and "differences according to the smallest possible degrees." 32 Analysis and comparison are necessary components of modern science and allow truth to be revealed. This will however be the abstract truth of the examiner who conducted the analysis. 31 Ibid, p. 54 32 Ibid, p. 53 16 Foucault does not limit his examination of truth to language; he recognizes the impact that signs have on classical thinking as well. "On the threshold of the Classical age, the sign ceases to be a form of the world; and it ceases to be bound to what it marks by the solid and secret bonds of resemblance or affinity." 33 Again, a connection between truth and things is made. The sign is a thing, yet it ceases to exist as simply a physical entity because it represents a perceivable truth. Relating signs to truth occurs in three ways: the certainty of the relationship, the type of relationship, and the origin of the relationship. 34 This allows interpretation of the meaning of signs in an attempt to determine truth. This is not to say that all men will interpret the signs the same, but Foucault argues that empirical knowledge will allow some uniformity within their interpretation. This allows signs to form part of classical understanding or classical truth, if you will. The ability to differentiate, analyze, compare, contrast, categorize, and represent permits modern science to function. Together, language and signs form the basis for these things to happen and for the truth of modern science to be unconcealed. The Implications of Truth on Reality It is one thing to understand the philosophical implications of truth, but it is also necessary to understand how truth impacts reality. Given that reality is in fact an abstract truth, in this case my abstract truth, I will briefly discuss the implications of categorization, differentiation, and inequality on man. For each of these abstract truths, they are revealed through a process of unconcealedness. The revelation is not as significant for this discussion as is the acceptance of these ideas as truths. Just because my truth is revealed, it does not have to become your truth; you have to accept it. The idea that we have free will to make our own determinations and create our own realities allows us to choose which truths we will accept. 33 Ibid, p. 58 34 Ibid, p. 58 17 Since man is by nature a social animal, accepted abstract truths can quickly become part of a societal structure making these the truths of the entire group. A by-product of these social truths is often prejudice and discrimination; generally behavior created on the concept of differences. Language enables us to categorize and establish differences; these differences become the basis of inequality. Even among the previous authors, people (slaves) were categorized as things. 35 The U.S. Constitution even differentiated making "other persons" only worth three-fifths that of a white man; this was eventually abolished with the 14 th Amendment. But the perceptible truth existed and to a lesser extent continues. This illustrates the complexity of changing truth from one idea to another. Once a truth is established, particularly within a societal construct, it is very difficult to enact change. This idea is discussed at length in Edward Said's Orientalism. In his study, he examines the consequences of societal truth as they apply to colonization. Said contends that the very concept of colonization is based on the assumed truth that the colonizing power understood the people better than they did themselves. 36 To believe such a truth creates arrogance within a society and enables justification of dominance over another, not for the sake of power, but to the betterment of the subjugated. Said's book reads like a treatise on abstract truth in which a concept of differentiation or inequality permitted the most heinous behaviors among men. The problem begins as society changes. When the "us and them" mentality attempts to remove the rift; old truths can hinder this process. For the United States, the integration of African Americans as full members of society took more than a hundred years and there are still those who hold onto old truths. Within the world community, the acceptance of colonialism changed; no longer were the colonial powers viewed as helping the colonies, but rather 35 Georges Bataille, p. 56 36 Edward Said. Orientalism. New York: Random House, 1978, p. 32 18 exploiting them. With this change a new social truth was born. This truth replaced the old truth yet it took approximately 50 years for colonies to achieve independence and this was often following war; it took war to change truth. Today the implications of abstract truth in the perversion of religion can be seen. Religious zealots use the tenets of their belief to validate their perceived truth. The fervor by which man possesses his own truths guides his actions and relations in both positive and negative ways. The difficulty in changing truth should serve as a warning to what truths man creates. Conclusion This article has focused on the concept of truth. Not looking to explore the "what is truth?" dilemma, I sought to determine how truth impacted philosophical reasoning. Using a base line definition from Heidegger, I explored the idea that truth could be concrete and abstract. Concrete truths were those infallible truths that man cannot dispute. Abstract truths were the perceived truths of man. It was the abstract truths I focused on, but quickly determined there was a need to integrate concrete truths to add validity to arguments. In order to better understand how truth factored into thought, I utilized Poetry, Language, Thought; Purity and Danger; The Accursed Share; and The Order of Things. These books provided not only the framework for truth, but also demonstrated the application of truth in the author's philosophical contemplation. Truth did not simply display itself for all to see; it had to be revealed through a process of unconcealedness. But from this process man did not always gain the truth, he often gained his own truth. The idea that one can restructure the truth to create their own reality must be understood if the deeper questions of life are to be answered. 19 Bibliography Bataille, Georges, and Robert Hurley. The Accursed Share: an essay on general economy. 1967. Reprint, New York: Zone Books, 1989. Douglas, Mary. Purity and Danger: an analysis of concept of pollution and taboo. 1966. Reprint, London: Routledge, 1984. Foucault, Michel. The Order of Things. 1970. Reprint, New York: Random House, 1994. Heidegger, Martin. Poetry, Language, Thought . 1st ed. New York: Harper & Row, 1971. Orwell, George. Nineteen Eighty-Four. Plume Publishing, Penguin Books, London, England, 1949. Said, Edward. Orientalism. New York: Random House,

/8/2017 EJBI :: (de) Biomedizinische Ontologien für die Praxis https://web.archive.org/web/20160319212229/http:/www.ejbi.org/en/ejbi/article/11-de-biomedizinische-ontologien-fuer-die-praxis.html 1/7 About EJBI Editorial Board Instructions to Authors Browse EJBI Special Issues Sponsorship & Ads Downloads Contact ISSN 1801-5603 English German English Biomedizinische Ontologien für die Praxis Brochhausen M.1, Smith B.,1 1. Institute of Formal Ontology and Medical Information Science, Saarland University, Germany 2. Department of Philosophy and New York State Center of Excellence in Bioinformatics and Life Sciences, University at Buffalo, USA Abstract Hintergrund: Biomedizinische Ontologien existieren unter anderem zur Integration von klinischen und experimentellen Daten. Um dies zu erreichen ist es erforderlich, dass die fraglichen Ontologien von einer grossen Zahl von Benutzern zur Annotation von Daten verwendet werden. Wie können Ontologien das erforderliche Mass an Benutzerfreundlichkeit, Zuverlässigkeit, Kosteneffektivität und Domänenabdeckung erreichen, um weitreichende Akzeptanz herbeizuführen? Material und Methoden: Wir konzentrieren uns auf zwei unterschiedliche Strategien, die zurzeit hierbei verfolgt werden. Eine davon wird von SNOMED CT im Bereich der Medizin vertreten, die andere im Bereich der Biologie und Biomedizin von der OBO Foundry. Es soll aufgezeigt werden, wie die Verpflichtung zu speziellen Kriterien der Ontologieentwicklung die Nützlichkeit und Effektivität der Ontologien positiv beeinflusst, indem die Pflege der terminologischen Systeme und ihre Interoperabilität vereinfacht werden. Ergebnisse: SNOMED CT und die OBO Foundry unterscheiden sich grundlegend in ihren Ansätzen und Zielen. Unabhängig davon kann jedoch ein allgemeiner Trend zur strengeren Formalisierung und Fokussierung auf Interoperabilität zwischen unterschiedlichen Domänen und ihren Repräsentationen beobachtet werden. Keywords: Biomedizinische Ontologien, Harmonisierung, Qualitätssicherung, SNOMED CT Einleitung In der Entwicklung terminologischer Ressourcen für Anwendungen in der Biomedizin können wir vier wesentliche Einflussfaktoren unterscheiden, die hier in grober chronologischer Folge aufgelistet werden: 1. Der Einfluss von Bibliothekswissenschaften und elektronischen Terminologiesystemen, der sich deutlich zum Beispiel bei MeSH, einer Indizierungsressource, die von der National Library of Medicine gepflegt wird [1], zeigt. 2. Der Einfluss aus der Datenbankgestaltung und dem conceptual modeling, der durch HL7 illustriert wird [2]. 3. Der Einfluss der Molekularbiologie, der sich am deutlichsten in der Gene Ontology (GO) [3] und anderen Ontologien der Open Biomedical Ontologies (OBO) Foundry [4], [5] nachverfolgen lässt. 4. Der Einfluss einer Orientierung hin zu stärkerer logischer Formalisierung. Dieser Trend zeigt sich bei den momentanen Entwicklungen in SNOMED CT und im Bereich des Semantic Web [6]. Im Folgenden befassen wir uns mit den Fortschritten, die im Hinblick auf die Punkte 3) und 4) gemacht wurden. Mehr und mehr können Ontologien und verwandte terminologische Ressourcen von ihren Vorgängern durch folgende Faktoren unterschieden werden: Die Beschäftigung mit Aspekten der Interoperabilität von Ontologien, die für inhaltlich zusammenhängende, doch unterschiedliche Domänen geschaffen werden. Die Bereitschaft, kohärente Verfahren zur Qualitätssicherung von Ontologien zu entwickeln, die auf dem Feedback durch Nutzer und auf empirischen Tests beruhen. Die Bereitstellung von Techniken zur Pflege von Ontologien, die die Evolution von Ontologien gemäss dem wissenschaftlichen Fortschritt garantieren. Ein zunehmender Grad an Formalisierung, der durch Fortschritte im Bereich der Entwicklung von Softwareanwendungen zur Pflege, Validierung und Verknüpfung von Ontologien beschleunigt wird. Eine gesteigerte Sorgfalt bei der akkuraten Darstellung biologischer Sachverhalte und damit der Realität insgesamt, die durch die terminologischen komponenten des repräsentationalen Artefakts, z. B. der Ontologie, abgebildet werden. Damit ist das Folgende aufs Engste verbunden: Die Bereitschaft genauer zwischen Daten und Informationen auf der einen Seite und Objekten in der klinischen Realität, die durch Daten und Informationen abgebildet werden, auf der anderen zu unterscheiden. An O ffi ci al J ou rn al o f t he E ur op ea n Fe de ra tio n of M ed ic al In fo rm at ic s http://www.ejbi.org/en/ejbi/article/11-de-biomedizinische-ontologien-fuer-die-praxis.html Go APR MAR DEC 19 2015 2016 2017 4 captures 🗔 ⍰❎ f 🐦 19 Apr 2015 31 Dec 2016 ▾ About this capture 12/8/2017 EJBI :: (de) Biomedizinische Ontologien für die Praxis https://web.archive.org/web/20160319212229/http:/www.ejbi.org/en/ejbi/article/11-de-biomedizinische-ontologien-fuer-die-praxis.html 2/7 About EJBI Editorial Board Instructions to Authors Browse EJBI Special Issues Sponsorship & Ads Downloads Contact ISSN 1801-5603 Einige Aspekte hiervon haben wir bereits ausführlich in [7] besprochen, wobei der Fokus dort auf das Problem der Harmonisierung von Ontologien und Terminologien gelegt wurde. Hier konzentrieren wir uns auf zwei unterschiedliche Strategien zur Erhöhung der Nützlichkeit von Ontologien bzw. Terminologien. Für diese beiden Strategien werden als Beispiele SNOMED CT und die OBO Foundry angeführt. Vor allem existieren biomedizinische Ontologien, um der Integration von klinischen und experimentellen Daten zu dienen, sind die Kriterien für deren Erfolg im Grunde die gleichen, die für ein Telefonnetzwerk gelten: Wichtig ist die Menge der Nutzer. Ein Netzwerk, das nur wenige Kunden hat, ist ein Misserfolg, unabhängig davon wie gut die verwendeten Technologien sind. In diesem Artikel werden die beiden oben genannten Strategien auf ihre Anlagen hin untersucht, die Nutzer für die terminologischen Ressourcen gewinnen und nachhaltig daran binden zu können. 1. Anwachsen der formalen Strenge biomedizinischer Ontologien Eine wichtige Tendenz bei der Entwicklung von Ontologien ist der gesteigerte Wert, der formallogischen Verfeinerungen von biologischen Terminologien und verwandten Artefakten beigemessen wird. Sicherlich gibt es immer noch Zweifel in einigen Kreisen, wenn es um die Frage geht, ob verstärkte formale Strenge ein Gewinn für medizinische Ontologien ist. Manche Parteien behaupten, dass medizinisches Wissen zu intuitiv ist (Medizin als Kunst, nicht als Wissenschaft) und ausserdem in einem zu grossen Masse von subjektiven Erfahrungen und örtlichen Traditionen abhängt, um wissenschaftsbasierte, einheitliche Terminologien oder Ontologien schaffen zu können. Aus der Entwicklung der molekularen und genetischen Medizin und den damit verbundenen Technologien entsteht die Notwendigkeit, Daten aus verschiedenen Disziplinen, die sich auf unterschiedliche Granularitätsebenen beziehen, zu integrieren. Diese Entwicklungen werden sicherlich dazu beitragen, dass solche Argumente langsam aber sicher als überholt erkannt werden. Die Entwicklung medizinischer Ontologien und Terminologien sieht sich zunehmend mit Fragen über formale Methoden konfrontiert, was z.B. in der Arbeit der Semantic Web Health Care and Life Sciences Interest Group [8] deutlich wird, aber ebenso bei der Entwicklung einer description logic Infrastruktur für Vokabularien wie GALEN [9], den National Cancer Institute Thesaurus [10] und – von grundsätzlicher Bedeutung für diese Arbeit – den neusten Versionen des SNOMED Vocabulary [11]. Auf Seiten der Biologie haben die zunehmende Bedeutung der Bioinformatik und die enorme Steigerung der Masse der den Forschern zur Verfügung stehenden Daten zu bemerkenswerten Anstrengungen darin geführt, formal stärkere Ontologieressourcen zu entwickeln, die jetzt in der Arbeit des National Center for Biomedical Ontology [12] zusammengefasst werden. Der Erfolg der Gene Ontology führte dazu, dass viele Biologen das OBO Format (ehemals das GO Format) [13] als Repräsentations-sprache für die Ontologieentwicklung bevorzugten. Das OBO Format ist hinsichtlich formaler Möglichkeiten ebenfalls wachsender Aufmerksamkeit unterworfen. Das Ziel lautet, Wege für neue Möglichkeiten algorithmischen Reasonings zu finden, die sowohl die biomedizinische Forschung als auch die klinische Versorgung unterstützen. Die OBO Foundry stellt 53 Ontologien für die biologischen und biomedizinischen Disziplinen zur Verfügung, von denen 49 im OBO Format vorliegen, zusammen mit einer grossen Menge an Daten, die mit ihrer Hilfe annotiert wurden, inklusive über 11 Millionen frei zugänglicher Annotationen, die Produkte von Genen (Proteine und funktionale RNA) mit Ausdrücken in der GO in Verbindung setzen [14]. Ausserhalb der Biologie ist die Web Ontology Language (OWL) die bevorzugte Repräsentations-sprache der Ontology Community. OWL ist ein W3C Standard, und seine algorithmischen Eigenschaften machen es zu einem attraktiven Werkzeug für die Softwareentwicklung. Allerdings ist der ontologische Gehalt, der im ursprünglichen OWL Format repräsentiert werden kann mitunter sehr unausgereift. Dank der Entwicklung eines OBO-OWL Konverters sind ontologische Inhalte von OBO jetzt ebenfalls in auf OWL basierenden Anwendungen möglich. Die OBO Ontologien und die damit verbundenen Annotationen dienen also jetzt als wichtiges Medium für die Ausweitung des Semantic Web in den Gebieten der Lebenswissenschaften. 2. Wachsende Konzentration auf Biologische Realität Während Informatiker sich früher vornehmlich mit Daten beschäftigten, ist ein zweiter Trend bei der jetzigen Entwicklung von Ontologien die steigende Beschäftigung mit der durch diese Daten abgebildete Wirklichkeit. Ontologien werden nach wie vor häufig von Personen aus dem Knowledge Management erstellt. Dadurch wurden Ontologien zunächst hauptsächlich als Möglichkeit zur Abbildung von Information, mitunter unabhängig von einer zugrundeliegenden Wirklichkeit interpretiert. Jetzt aber, wo Ontologien zunehmend von Biologen und Klilniken für ihre eigenen fachspezifischen Bedürfnisse geschaffen werden, tritt die Frage nach der genauen Abbildung der Wirklichkeit immer stärker in den Vordergrund. Diese neue Fokussierung auf die biologische Realität seitens der Bioontologen wird unter anderem durch die letzen Revisionen des SNOMED CT Vokabulars [11], [18], [19] und durch die Entwicklung der OBO Foundry deutlich. Diese stehen für eine Verschiebung von der frühren Beschäftigung mit Daten und Informationen um ihrer selbst Willen hin zu etwas, was wir das realistische Paradigma nennen. Letzteres basiert auf einer Trennung zwischen drei Ebenen der Realität: Mentale Repräsentationen (Ideen oder Gedanken in unserem Bewusstsein, die bestimmte Teile der Realität abbilden). An O ffi ci al J ou rn al o f t he E ur op ea n Fe de ra tio n of M ed ic al In fo rm at ic s 12/8/2017 EJBI :: (de) Biomedizinische Ontologien für die Praxis https://web.archive.org/web/20160319212229/http:/www.ejbi.org/en/ejbi/article/11-de-biomedizinische-ontologien-fuer-die-praxis.html 3/7 About EJBI Editorial Board Instructions to Authors Browse EJBI Special Issues Sponsorship & Ads Downloads Contact ISSN 1801-5603 Repräsentationale Artefakte (einschliesslich Ontologien, Textbücher, usw.), die entwickelt werden, um unsere mentalen Repräsentationen für andere zugänglich zu machen. Die Realität selbst, die den Gegenstand unserer mentalen und physikalischen Repräsentationen, vor allem in der Wissenschaft, darstellt. Für einen Realisten hängt der Erfolg bei der Entwicklung einer Ontologie davon ab, die Trennung dieser drei Ebenen einzuhalten [20]. Diese Trennung der Ebenen impliziert, dass die Realität, für deren Abbildung unsere Repräsentationen entwickelt werden, unabhängig von diesen Repräsentationen existiert. Der konzeptualistische Standpunkt, der unter Informationswissenschaftlern immer noch verbreitet ist, sieht Ontologien als Repräsentationen von Begriffen, die, kurz gesagt, Einheiten von Wissen (oder Bedeutungen) im Bewusstsein von Menschen darstellen. Realisten definieren eine Ontologie im Gegensatz dazu folgendermassen: Repräsentation der Typen von Entitäten, die in einem bestimmten Feld der Wirklichkeit existieren und deren Beziehungen zueinander. Typen sind die Invarianten oder Muster in der Welt, die von den einzelnen Wissenschaften durch Experimente (auch klinische Experimente) ausgemacht werden. Die Beziehung zwischen Typ und Einzelding ist die der Instantiierung. Typen werden an unterschiedlichen Orten und zu unterschiedlichen Zeiten in unterschiedlichen Partikularien oder Einzeldingen instantiiert und normalerweise mit allgemeinen Ausdrücken wie „Hund" oder „Diabetes" bezeichnet [20]. „Hund" ist der Name des Typs, der von meinem Hund Fido und von deinem Hund Rover instantiiert wird. Da Ontologien für Realisten repräsentationale Artefakte sind, die entwickelt werden, um wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen oder ähnliche Unternehmungen zu unterstützen, sind diese mehr auf allgemeine Gesetzmässigkeiten und daher eher auf Typen als auf Instanzen bezogen. SNOMED CT: Die Tendenz hin zu stärkerem Realismus zeigt sich bei SNOMED CT an der aktuellen Deaktivierung von Konzepten, die als „not otherwise specified" (NOS, nicht weiter spezifiziert) qualifiziert werden, zum Beispiel „Brain injury NOS (disorder)" (26286008.) Bereits Cimino [21] hat herausgestellt, das solche Qualifikationen wie „NOS" Probleme bereiten müssen. Von einem realistischen Standpunkt aus können diese Probleme darauf zurückgeführt werden, dass es keine solche Entität wie eine „nicht weiter spezifizierte Gehirnverletzung" gibt; und zwar weder als Typ noch als Instanz. Wenn es zum Zeitpunkt t eine solche Entität geben würde und es würde zu einem späteren Zeitpunkt t' eine Spezifikation dieser Entität erfolgen, so müssten wir entweder davon ausgehen, dass die ursprüngliche Entität durch den schlichten Akt der Aufnahme dieser neuen Information zerstört würde, oder dass diese Entität mit der geplanten neuen Nachfolgeentität ungleich ist. Wie bereits in [22] ausgeführt, referieren „NOS" und ähnliche Terme nicht auf eine bewusstseinsunhabhängige Realität, vielmehr handelt es sich um konfus formulierte Repräsentationen unseres Wissens über die Realität. Selbstverständlich ist es für biomedizinische Informationssysteme unerlässlich die fortschreitenden Veränderungen, denen unser Wissensstand, etwa bei einer medizinischen Untersuchung, unterworfen ist, aufzuzeichnen, zum Beispiel im Hinblick auf die Zuverlässigkeit der Information. Es müssen also beide Arten von Information gesammelt werden: Informationen über die Realität und Informationen über unser Wissen über die Realität. Wenn aber Kodierungsschemata algorithmisches Reasoning in dem Umfang, in dem es in der Biomedizin in Zukunft erforderlich sein wird, unterstützen sollen, dann ist es ebenso wichtig zwischen diesen beiden Informationsarten deutlich zu unterscheiden. Ihre Entwickler haben inzwischen einige Schritte in die richtige Richtung unternommen, aber SNOMED CT enthält immer noch Konzepte wie „unknown living organism" (SNOMED: 89088004) und „presumed viral agent" (SNOMED: 106551006). Diese werden in SNOMED behandelt, als seien es spezifische Arten von Organismen bzw. Viren, tatsächlich handelt es sich aber in solehen Fällen um Repräsentationen eines Wissensstandes. Zudem enthält SNOMED CT einige Terme, wie zum Beispiel „Abszess", die zweifach eingetragen sind, zum einen als Befund, zum anderen als morphologische Anormalität: 128477000 Abscess (disorder), 44132006 Abscess (morphologic abnormality). In solchen Fällen muss es zu Problemen kommen, wenn SNOMED CT als Kodierungsschema genutzt wird, denn es gibt hinsichtlich dieser beiden Terme keinen eindeutigen Unterschied in ihrer Referenz [23], [24]. OBO Foundry: Die Gene Ontology und ihre Schwesterontologien im OBO Repository wiesen eine Reihe antirealistischer Komponenten auf, die zu strukturalen Problemen in der GO führten, wie in [25], [26] dargestellt. Die Gründung der OBO Foundry führte zu einer Reihe tiefgreifender Reformen dieser Ontologien. Zum Hauptziel der Initiative wurde eine akkurate Darstellung des biologischen Gegenstandsbereiches, und, damit verbunden, wurde ein realistischer Standpunkt übernommen. Jede Ontologie, die Mitglied der OBO Foundry ist, enthält strukturierte Repräsentationen der Typen, die in einer spezifizierten Domäne der Realität existieren. Ziel ist es, die Typen gemäss der besten wissenschaftlichen Theorie zum gegenwärtigen Zeitpunkt abzubilden. In diesem Sinne ist jede Ontologie selbst analog zu einer wissenschaftlichen Theorie: sie hat einen vereinheitlichten Gegenstandsbereich, der aus Entitäten besteht, die unabhängig von der Ontologie existieren. Weiterhin wird durch die Ontologie an einer Optimierung der deskriptiven oder repräsentationalen Adäquatheit hinsichtlich dieses An O ffi ci al J ou rn al o f t he E ur op ea n Fe de ra tio n of M ed ic al In fo rm at ic s 12/8/2017 EJBI :: (de) Biomedizinische Ontologien für die Praxis https://web.archive.org/web/20160319212229/http:/www.ejbi.org/en/ejbi/article/11-de-biomedizinische-ontologien-fuer-die-praxis.html 4/7 About EJBI Editorial Board Instructions to Authors Browse EJBI Special Issues Sponsorship & Ads Downloads Contact ISSN 1801-5603 Gegenstandsbereiches in den Grenzen, die durch formale Strenge und Computerisierbarkeit gesetzt werden, gearbeitet. Ein einfaches Beispiel für die Reformen, denen sich die Ontologien der OBO Foundry unterwerfen mussten, ist der Verzicht auf Aussagen wie: 1. biological process is_a Gene Ontology, die bislang gemeinsam mit biologisch zutreffenden Aussagen wie 2. cell development is_a biological process bestanden. Aussagen wie 1. zeigen die Verwendung der is_a Relation in Zusammenhängen, in denen sie ungefähr „ist eine terminologische Komponente von" bedeuten soll. Dies ist jedoch inkonsistent mit der Hauptverwendung dieser Relation in der GO, die die Bedeutung „hat Untertyp (-klasse)" hat. Aussage 2. kann in dem Moment zu Problemen führen, in dem die GO mit anderen Ontologien zusammengeführt wird, zum Beispiel mit solchen, die Informationsobjekte betreffen. Bei der Gültigkeit z.B. von: 3. Gene Ontology has_file_format RDF-XML kann, bedingt durch die Transitivität von is_a, aus 2. und 3. geschlossen werden, dass 4. cell development has_file_format RDF-XML. Dies ergibt natürlich biologisch betrachtet keinen Sinn. Um solche Probleme in der GO und ihren Schwesterontologien zu eliminieren, wird jetzt das Prinzip angewandt, dass alle Aussagen in den Ontologien Relationen verwenden, die eindeutig definiert sind, wie dies in den Definitionen der Relationen in der OBO Relation Ontology musterhaft zu sehen ist [27], [28]. Die Anwendung dieses Prinzips stellt sicher, dass die Bedeutung der Begriffe in Relationen in allen Ontologien die gleiche ist, was die logisch schlüssige Integration solcher Ontologien für ReasoningAnwendungen erleichtert. Ein weiteres Anzeichen für die höhere Gewichtung, die dem Realismus zukommt, ist die Aufnahme des Foundational Model of Anatomy (FMA) in die OBO Foundry. Ziel des FMA war es vom Anfang seiner Entwicklung an, von einem realistischen Standpunkt aus die Repräsentationen von Typen und Relationen vorzunehmen, die notwendig sind, um die Strukturen des Säugetierkörpers, im Besonderen des menschlichen Körpers, computerisierbar zu hinterlegen, und zwar in einer Form, die auch für Menschen verständlich ist [29], [30]. Die Formulierung von Definitionen im FMA, die auch in der gesamten OBO Foundry angenommen wurde, folgt Prinzipien, die erstmalig von Aristoteles niedergelegt wurden. Die Definition einer repräsentationalen Einheit „A" in einer Ontologie, die auf einen Typ A referiert, muss durch die Referenz auf die Oberklasse von A, nämlich B, in der gleichen Ontologie und eines unterscheidenden Kriteriums C, dass von allen und nur von A erfüllt wird, formuliert werden. Aus diesem Prinzip resultieren Definitionen der Form: ein A = ein B, das C erfüllt. Diese Methode ist in der Biologie jedem aus dem Bereich der Taxonomie bekannt, da sich hier nach aristotelischem Muster der Speziesname aus dem Genusnamen einer Differentia zusammensetzt, z.B. Homo sapiens als Bezeichnung der Spezies von Mitgliedern der Gattung Homo, die vernunftfähig sind. Beispiele hierfür aus dem FMA sind: a cell = def. an anatomical structure which consists of cytoplasm surrounded by a plasma membrane a plasma membrane = def. a cardinal cell part that surrounds the cytoplasma Durch das Durchhalten dieser Strategie wird nicht nur die Konsistenz der Verwendung von Begriffen unterstützt, sondern sie trägt auch zur Schlüssigkeit der is_a Hierarchie bei. 3. Modularität biomedizinischer Ontologien SNOMED CT und die OBO Foundry verfolgen zwei unterschiedliche Strategien gerade auch im Hinblick auf Modularisierung. Diese Strategien unterscheiden sich sowohl in ihren theoretischen, wie auch in ihren praktischen Konsequenzen. SNOMED CT: Die ambitionierteste Initiative im Bereich der Vereinheitlichung biomedizinischer Begriffssysteme wurde gerade von der International Health Terminology Standards Development Organization (IHTSDO) übernommen [31]. Diese versucht SNOMED CT als internationale Hauptterminologie für den klinisch-medizinischen Bereich zu etablieren, die die Gesamtheit dieser Domäne in einer Vielzahl von Sprachen abdeckt. Die Basis für dieses Vorhaben ist die englische Version von SNOMED CT, die mehr als 315 000 Konzepte beinhaltet und bereits teilweise in andere Sprachen übertragen worden ist. Die Hauptstränge von SNOMED CT sind in Description Logics darstellbar [32], wenn auch nicht in einer der W3C Standard description logics. Weiterhin wird an Mappings für andere existierende Standards, zum Beispiel die International Classification Of Disease (ICD) 10 der WHO, An O ffi ci al J ou rn al o f t he E ur op ea n Fe de ra tio n of M ed ic al In fo rm at ic s 12/8/2017 EJBI :: (de) Biomedizinische Ontologien für die Praxis https://web.archive.org/web/20160319212229/http:/www.ejbi.org/en/ejbi/article/11-de-biomedizinische-ontologien-fuer-die-praxis.html 5/7 About EJBI Editorial Board Instructions to Authors Browse EJBI Special Issues Sponsorship & Ads Downloads Contact ISSN 1801-5603 gearbeitet. Der zentrale Vorteil von SNOMED CT liegt in der umfassenden Abdeckung des Gegenstandsbereiches, die durch 21 Hierarchien, die zum Beispiel Klinische Befunde, Prozeduren, Substanzen, Sozialen Kontext etc. garantiert werden soll. Das Ziel all dieser Bemühungen ist es für den gesamten Bereich der klinischen Medizin eine einzige terminologische Ressource bereitzustellen. Die Verwendung einer solchen „Master"-Terminologie würde zahlreiche positive Effekte zeitigen, darunter weniger redundante Daten, bessere Durchführbarkeit von longitudinalen Studien und Meta-Analysen, sowie die Sicherstellung der Konsistenz von Patientendaten über die gesamte Lebensspanne hinweg. Die Existenz einer einzigen Ressource ermöglicht die Benutzung gemeinsamer Tools und die Durchführung gemeinsamen Trainings. Trotz all dieser Vorteile, die vor allem der klinischen Entscheidungsfindung und der Datensammlung im Rahmen von Public Health Programmen zu Gute kommen würden, ist es schwer die notwendigen finanziellen Mittel zu mobilisieren, zumal SNOMED CT gut dokumentierte Schwachstellen enthält [33]. Die Tatsache, dass immer noch wenige Institutionen des Gesundheitswesens SNOMED CT zum Kodieren klinischer Daten verwenden, deutet darauf hin, dass die Initiative noch weiter investieren muss, um die Vorteile auch tatsächlich einzufahren [34]. Es steht weiterhin die Frage im Raum, inwieweit die hohen Kosten, die die Implementierung und Nutzung einer hochentwickelten Terminologie wie SNOMED CT im Klinikbereich verursacht, zu amortisieren sind. SNOMED CT zum Beispiel ist nicht wie viele andere Systeme entwickelt worden, um die Rechnungsstellung zu simplifizieren. Letzteres ist jedoch ein zentraler Aspekt des Krankhausmanagements, der aber von wesentlich weniger komplexen Terminologien abgedeckt werden kann und auch wird, die zudem schon sehr weit verbreitet sind. Wie bereits erwähnt, ist auch die Existenz interner Fehler einer der Gründe für die langsame Ausbreitung von SNOMED CT. Es gibt Lücken in der Terminologie, Fehler in der Strukturierung und Probleme mit der Konsistenz, die aus der Anwendung unterschiedlicher Prinzipien bei der Entwicklung unterschiedlicher Zweige der Terminologie herrühren. In letzter Zeit wurden Beweise dafür, dass diese Schwächen effizientes Kodieren verhindern, publiziert [23], [24]. Diese Qualitätsprobleme werden inzwischen von den Kuratoren angegangen. Ein Einwand ganz anderer Art zielt auf die Frage, ob die Strategie einer kompletten Abdeckung des Gegenstandsbereiches in einer Ressource richtig ist oder nicht. OBO Foundry: Im Gegensatz zu SNOMED CT verfolgt OBO einen modularen Ansatz. Die Strategie, die der OBO Foundry [5] zugrunde liegt, ist eine Reihe von interoperablen Ontologien bereitzustellen, die unterschiedliche, nicht überlappende Domänen der biomedizinischen Realität auf der Basis von gemeinsamen Prinzipien der Ontologieentwicklung abbilden. Nur Ontologien, deren Entwickler diese Prinzipien anwenden, können in die OBO Foundry aufgenommen werden. Es gibt zwei Hauptziele der Prinzipien: zum einen sollen sie die Harmonisierung existierender Domänenontologien vorantreiben, zum anderen sollen sie als Leitfaden zur Entwicklung neuer Ontologien und als Beispiel guter wissenschaftlicher Praxis für Neulinge in der Ontologieentwicklung dienen. Immer mehr fallen im biomedizinischen Bereich Teilbereiche auf, für die völlig neue Ontologien entwickelt werden müssen. Leitlinien sind gerade deshalb besonders wichtig, um die Interoperabilität mit Ontologien benachbarter Bereiche sicherzustellen. Das Ziel ist es, eine Situation herbeizuführen, in der die Abdeckung von Wissensbereichen durch terminologische Ressourcen schrittweise über wachsende Domänen der biomedizinischen Realität vergrössert wird. Diese Strategie ist selbstverständlich das exakte Gegenteil der Strategie, die von SNOMED CT verfolgt wird. Aus Sicht der Foundry ist das Ziel von Ontologieentwicklung nicht, eine einzige grosse Ontologie bereitzustellen, die alles abdeckt, was überhaupt existiert. Vielmehr gilt es bessere Wege zu finden kleine Domänenontologien zunächst getrennt zu entwickeln, um so die Vorteile der Arbeitsteilung und die Bildung von domänenspezifischen Kompetenzteams zu fördern. Im Hinblick auf die Harmonisierung, die einen unabdingbaren zweiten Schritt darstellt, muss ein gewisses Mass an zentraler Organisation stattfinden, um die Einhaltung von allgemein anerkannten Leitlinien sicherzustellen. Die Tatsache, dass Versuche unternommen werden, Harmonisierungen von oben durchzusetzen, zeigt, dass Harmonisierungsbestrebungen evolutionär aufgesetzt werden müssen und auch die Leitlinien von Zeit zu Zeit einer Revision unterworfen werden sollten. Die Dokumentation der Leitlinien und ihrer Entwicklung ist jedoch eine wichtige Vorraussetzung dafür, auf die Bedürfnisse unterschiedlicher Interessengruppen einzugehen zu können und somit ihre Unterstützung zu gewinnen. Die Gruppen, die die OBO Foundry vorantreiben, stimmen darüber ein, dass eine minimale gemeinsame Upper Ontology ausreichend ist, um Harmonisierung zu ermöglichen. Eine solche Ontologie kann dazu beitragen von Beginn an Grundlagen einer best practice der Ontologieenwicklung zu realisieren. Diese Vorteile kann eine Upper Ontology allerdings nur bringen, wenn sie selbst nach gut fundierten Prinzipien entwickelt und hinreichend getestet wurde. Ist dies der Fall, dann tritt als weiterer positiver Effekt bei der Benutzung einer Upper Ontology erhebliche Zeitund Ressourcenersparnis hinzu, denn es muss nicht mehr in die Repräsentation der Strukturen der Metaebene investiert werden, die für Fachwissenschaftler unerlässlich sind um ihre Ontologie zu organisieren. Zudem gehen Upper Ontologies in der Regel auf Prinzipien zurück, die ausserhalb der Erfahrung von Fachwissenschaftlern liegt. Die Basic Formal Ontology (BFO), die als Kern des Upper Levels der OBO Foundry Ontologien dient, basiert (ebenso wie SUO und DOLCE) auf der grundlegenden Unterscheidung von continuants und occurrents. Erstere sind Entitäten, die über die Zeit hinweg existieren und Bestand haben. Sie bleiben mit sich selbst identisch, auch wenn sie sich auf unterschiedliche Weisen verändern. Letztere ereignen sich, was An O ffi ci al J ou rn al o f t he E ur op ea n Fe de ra tio n of M ed ic al In fo rm at ic s 12/8/2017 EJBI :: (de) Biomedizinische Ontologien für die Praxis https://web.archive.org/web/20160319212229/http:/www.ejbi.org/en/ejbi/article/11-de-biomedizinische-ontologien-fuer-die-praxis.html 6/7 About EJBI Editorial Board Instructions to Authors Browse EJBI Special Issues Sponsorship & Ads Downloads Contact ISSN 1801-5603 bedeutet, dass sie neben den räumlichen Dimensionen auch die vierte, zeitliche haben. Occurrents (zum Beispiel Prozesse) entwickeln sich in der Zeit in einer Art, die es erlaubt, sie in zeitliche Bestandteile oder Phasen zu unterteilen. Sie haben einen Anfang, eine Mitte und ein Ende. Continuants hingegen (zum Beispiel Organismen) existieren die gesamte Zeit in ihrer Gänze, wenn sie überhaupt existieren. Gleichwohl verlieren sie kontinuierlich Teile, oder erhalten sie dazu im Rahmen von Entwicklung und Wachstum [35], [36]. Die Benutzung einer Upper Ontology fördert die Harmonisierung von Ontologien, indem sie eine einheitliche und kohärente Methodik zur Wirklichkeitsrepräsentation auf der höchsten Organisationsebene vorgibt. Selbstverständlich finden sich die Terme, die für die Praxis von vorrangiger Bedeutung sind, auf den unteren Ebenen. Kriterien, wie sie von einer Upper Ontology nahe gelegt werden, vereinfachen jedoch die Organisation dieser unteren Level immens [37], wobei zu berücksichtigen gilt, dass die Benutzung einer Upper Ontology die Nützlichkeit der Informationsressource insgesamt für den Endbenutzer nicht einschränken darf. Neben diesen qualitätsbezogenen Aspekten widmet sich die OBO Foundry auch Fragen der Motivation. Ontologieentwicklung ist ein kostspieliges Unternehmen, zumal, um ein optimales Ergebnis zu erzielen, auch die Domänenexperten viel Zeit aufwenden müssen, um die Arbeit der Ontologen zu unterstützen. Die bisherigen Erfahrungen zeigen, dass Experten bereit sind, sich im Rahmen der Foundry zu engagieren, da sie, gerade vor dem Hintergrund der Arbeitsteiligkeit und Modularität, direkten Einfluss auf die Ressourcen haben, die sie in der Zukunft verwenden werden [38]. Insofern ähnelt die Strategie der OBO Foundry der in der open source Softwareentwicklung [39]. Ergebnisse Sowohl IHTSDO als auch die OBO Foundry zielen darauf, eine vollständige Repräsentation der klinischen Realität zu schaffen. IHTSDO hat den Vorteil einer grossen, einheitlichen Organisation, die erhebliche finanzielle Ressourcen mobilisieren kann und einem systematischen Plan folgt. Die OBO Foundry, für die die klinische Realität nur eine Untermenge der biomedizinischen Realität ist, hat den Vorteil einer Strategie, der Mobilisierung von Fachexperten und einer grossen, etablierten Benutzergruppe, letztere allerdings vor allem im Bereich der Biologie und noch nicht so sehr unter den Klinikern. Es ist noch zu früh endgültig zu beurteilen, welche der beiden Strategien die anstehenden dringlichen Probleme lösen wird. Aber diese Probleme – Benutzerfreundlichkeit, Reliabilität, Kosteneffektivität und grösstmögliche Abdeckung der Domäne – müssen gelöst werden, wenn die effektive Integration biomedizinischer Daten gesichert werden soll. Danksagung Barry Smiths Beitrag zu dieser Arbeit wurde teilweise durch das National Center for Biomedical Ontology, dass durch das National Institut of Health finanziert wird, im Rahmen der NIH Roadmap for Medical Research, Grant 1 U 54 HG004028 gefördert. Informationen über die National Centers for Biomedical Computing können unter http://nihroadmap.nih.gov/biomedicine abgerufen werden. Literatur [1] http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/sites/entrez?db=mesh [2] http://www.hl7.org [3] http://www.geneontology.org [4] http://obofoundry.org [5] Smith B., Ashburner M., Rosse C., et al.: The OBO Foundry: Coordinated evolution of ontologies to support biomedical data integration. Nature Biotechnology; 25 (11), 2007, pp. 1251-1255. [6] Ruttenberg A., Clark T., Bug W., et al.: Advancing translational research with the Semantic Web. BMC Bioinformatics, 8, 2007. [7] Smith B., Brochhausen M.: Establishing and Harmonizing Ontologies in an Interdisciplinary Health Care and Clinical Research Environment. In B. Blobel, P. Pharow, M. Nerlich, eds. "eHealth: Combining Health Telematics, Telemedicine, Biomedical Engineering and Bioinformatics to the Edge, IOS Press, Amsterdam, 2008, pp: 219-234. [8] http://www.w3.org/2001/sw/hcls [9] http://www.opengalen.org [10] http://nciterms.nci.nih.gov/NCIBrowser/Dictionary.do [11] http://www.ihtsdo.org/snomed-ct [12] http://bioontology.org [13] http://www.geneontology.org/GO.format.shtml [14] http://www.ebi.ac.uk/GOA [15] http://www.w3.org/2004/OWL [16] http://www.berkeleybop.org/ontologie [17] Moreira D. A., Musen M. A.: OBO to OWL: a Protégé tab to read/save OBO ontologies. Bioinformatics, 2007 Jul; 23(14), pp. 1826-70. [18] Ceusters W., Spackman K.A., Smith B.: Would SNOMED CT benefit from Realism-Based Ontology Evolution? In American Medical Informatics Association 2007 Annual Symposium Proceedings, An O ffi ci al J ou rn al o f t he E ur op ea n Fe de ra tio n of M ed ic al In fo rm at ic s 12/8/2017 EJBI :: (de) Biomedizinische Ontologien für die Praxis https://web.archive.org/web/20160319212229/http:/www.ejbi.org/en/ejbi/article/11-de-biomedizinische-ontologien-fuer-die-praxis.html 7/7 About EJBI Editorial Board Instructions to Authors Browse EJBI Special Issues Sponsorship & Ads Downloads Contact ISSN 1801-5603 Biomedical and Health Informatics: From Foundations to Applications to Policy, J.M. Teich, J. Suermondt, C. Hripcsak, Eds. Chicago IL, 2007, pp. 105-109. [19] Schulz S., Suntisrivaraporn B., Baader F., Boeker M.: SNOMED reaching its adolescence: Ontologists' and Logicians' Health Check. Int J Med Inform, 2008; Sep. 10 [Epub ahead of print]. [20] Smith B., Kusnierczyk W., Schober D., Ceusters W.: Towards a Reference Terminology for Ontological Research and Development in the Biomedical Domain. KR-MED 2006. [21] Cimino J.J.: Desiderata for controlled medical vocabularies in the Twenty-First Century. Methods Inf Med; 37(4-5), 1998, pp.394-403. [22] Bodenreider O., Smith B., Burgun A.: The ontology-epistemology divide: A case study in medical terminology. FOIS (Formal Ontology and Information Systems), 2004, pp. 185-95. [23] Andrews J.E., Richesson R.L., Krischer J.: Variation of SNOMED CT coding of clinical research concepts among coding experts. j Am Med Inform Assoc 2007, 14, 4, p. 497-506. [24] Chiang M.F., Hwang J.C. , Yu A.C., Casper D.S. , Cimino J.J., Starren J.: Reliability of SNOMED-CT coding by three physicians using two terminology browsers. AMIA 2006 Symposium Proceedings, 2006, p. 131-135. [25] Smith B., Williams J., Schulze-Kremer S.: The Ontology of the Gene Ontology. In Biomedical and Health Informatics: From Foundations to Applications, Proceedings of the Annual Symposium of the American Medical Informatics Association, Washington DC, November 2003, pp. 609-613. [26] Smith B., Köhler J., Kumar A.:On the Application of Formal Principles to Life Science Data: A Case Study in the Gene Ontology. In Proceedings of DILS 2004 (Data Integration in the Life Sciences), (Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics 2994), Berlin: Springer, 2004, pp. 79-94. [27] http://www.obofoundry.org/ro [28] Smith B., Ceusters W., Klagges B., et al.:Relations in Biomedical Ontologies. Genome Biology, 6:R46, 2005. [29] http://sig.biostr.washington.edu/projects/fm [30] Rosse C., Mejino J.V.L.: A reference ontology for biomedical informatics: the Foundational Model of Anatomy. J Biomed Inform. 2003, 36, pp. 478-500. [31] http://www.ihtsdo.org [32] Donnelly K.:Multilingual documentation and classification. In B. Blobel, P. Pharow, M. Nerlich, eds. "eHealth: Combining Health Telematics, Telemedicine, Biomedical Engineering and Bioinformatics to the Edge, IOS Press, Amsterdam, 2008, pp: 235-44. [33] http://www.hiww.org/smcs2006/talks/Rector.ppt [34] http://www.chcf.org/documents/chronicdisease/SantaBarbaraLessonsLearned.pdf [35] http://www.ifomis.org/bfo [36] Grenon P., Smith B., Goldberg L.: Biodynamic Ontology: Applying BFO in the Biomedical Domain. In Ontologies in Medicine, D.M. Pisanelli, Ed. Amsterdam, IOS Press, 2004, pp. 20-38. [37] Smith B.: From Concepts to Clinical Reality: An Essay on the Benchmarking of Biomedical Terminologies. Journal of Biomedical Informatics 39(3), 2006, pp. 288-298. [38] Smith B.:Ontology (Science). In C. Eschenbach and M. Gruninger (eds.), Formal Ontology in Information Systems. Proceedings of FOIS 2008 Amsterdam: IOS Press, 21-35. [39] Weber S.: The Success of Open Source. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004. An O ffi ci al J ou rn al o f t he E ur op ea n Fe de ra tio n of M ed ic al In fo rm at ic s

Reason Papers Vol. 37, no. 2 Reason Papers 37, no. 2 (Fall 2015): 150-162. Copyright © 2015 Portraits of Egoism in Classic Cinema III: Nietzschean Portrayals Gary James Jason California State University, Fullerton 1. Conceptual Review In the first of the trio of reviews, 1 we distinguished varieties of egoism from each other. "Psychological egoism" is the view that all people (or animals) act solely to maximize their self-interest. "Default egoism" is the view that while occasionally people can act in an ultimately other-regarding fashion (usually toward family and friends), they mainly act to maximize their self-interest. In the second of the trio, 2 we defined the psychological traits of egotism and cynicism, and the personality disorders of narcissism and psychopathology. I won't rehearse the definitions of these concepts again, as they are not important in this review. What is important to recall here is the crucial point that egoistic theories presuppose a view of what is ultimately desirable (or non-morally good). Any philosophy holding that what is morally right (or rational) to do for any person is what maximizes the best results for that person, needs to tell us what "good results" means. A great nineteenth-century philosopher who advances egoism, Friedrich Nietzsche, maintains a striking view about this. Nietzsche believes that power in some sense-perhaps creative power-is the most important ultimately desirable thing. The Nietzschean egoist seeks to exercise his or her will to power. I shall examine how filmmakers have dealt with this view by analyzing the films Compulsion and The Moon and Sixpence. 3 1 Gary James Jason, "Portraits of Egoism in Classic Cinema I: Sympathetic Portrayals," Reason Papers 36, no. 1 (July 2014), pp. 107-21. 2 Gary James Jason, "Portraits of Egoism in Classic Cinema II: Negative Portrayals," Reason Papers 37, no. 1 (Spring 2015), pp. 119-36. 3 Compulsion, directed by Richard Fleischer (Twentieth Century Fox, 1959); The Moon and Sixpence, directed by Albert Lewin (United Artists, 1942). Reason Papers Vol. 37, no. 2 151 2. The Nietzschean Egoist in Film I will not attempt to summarize fully Nietzsche's complex ethical egoist philosophy.4 Suffice it to say that his egoist theory is significantly different from others, in several ways. First, while Nietzsche holds that we are all egoistic (i.e., he was a psychological egoist), he believes that people are quite different in their natures, and his sort of egoism thus varies by person type. He believes that the most important division is between the base, ordinary people-the lowest people, the herd, or "under-men"-and the superior ones, the "over-men" or "supermen." He rejects Christian and Kantian ethics as the disguised egoism of the weak under-men (i.e., herd morality). The over-men require a different egoism, involving the instinctive need to dominate (i.e., the will to power). Second, unlike the consequentialist British philosophers, Nietzsche rejects hedonism. He holds that the over-men, who seek power, are willing to endure suffering so as to achieve great results (or highest excellence). It is not that suffering (as opposed to pleasure) is ultimately desirable, but that it is necessary for the achievement of excellence. Nietzsche is not fully clear on what the supermen are exactly. Are they the profoundly creative or the physically beautiful or strong (as in conquering, heroic warriors)? While he typically calls these people the supermen, must they be men, or could women be supermen? How does his egoistic philosophy deal with women? The pair of films under review here are two "takes" on or interpretations of Nietzsche's brand of egoism, specifically, his notion of the "Overman" or "Superman" (Ubermensch). As some commentators on Nietzsche note, "Interpreting the Overman as a superhero or a superhuman being would be wrong. This misinterpretation was developed by those who have linked Nietzsche's thought to Nazi propaganda. Their misrepresentation was caused partly by the ambiguity of this concept."5 After all, passages from Nietzsche, such as the following, are anything but clear and well-defined: I teach you the superman. Man is something that is to be surpassed. What have ye done to surpass man? All beings hitherto have created something beyond themselves: and ye want to be the ebb of that great tide, and would rather go back to the beast than surpass man? 6 4 The clearest brief exposition of it I have found is in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy; see the entry for "Nietzsche's Moral and Political Philosophy," accessed online at: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nietzsche-moral-political/. 5 See New World Encyclopedia, s.v. "Friedrich Nietzsche," accessed online at: http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Friedrich_Nietzsche. 6 Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spake Zarathustra, trans. Thomas Common (2008), Prologue, sec. 3, accessed online at: http://www.gutenberg.org/files/1998/1998h/1998-h.htm. Reason Papers Vol. 37, no. 2 152 Quotations such as the above, together with Nietzsche's skeptical writings regarding standard Judeo-Christian ethics, have led to the view among some of his readers that superior, powerful individuals can and should transcend agapism (i.e., the ethics of compassion and love). This transcendence strives for a different ethical perspective-an egoism based on happiness, an ethics of power or (perhaps) intellectual creativity. a. Compulsion The first of our films that explores a view of Nietzschean egoism is Compulsion. This movie is one of at least three that are based upon the reallife Leopold and Loeb murder case of 1924, which resulted in what is often called "the trial of the century." (The second film based upon this case is Alfred Hitchcock's 1948 Rope. The third film is Tom Kalin's 1992 Swoon. I think that Compulsion is the superior film, hence it is the object of my focus.) Let's start with a brief review of the actual case. 7 Richard Loeb was a rich, handsome, and brilliant scion of a corporate executive. He was the youngest student ever to graduate from the University of Michigan (at age 17), and was going to enter the University of Chicago law school. His close friend and lover Nathan Leopold was also very bright, with a reported IQ of 210, and the product of a wealthy family. At age 19, Leopold had graduated college and was attending the University of Chicago law school. In college, Leopold had studied philosophy, with a special focus on Nietzsche (whom he apparently could read in the original German). Together, they started committing various minor crimes. Loeb fancied himself as being a criminal mastermind, and Leopold apparently viewed him as a Nietzschean superman. They planned the ultimate perfect crime: a killing so well-crafted that they would never be caught. Their superior intellects would be demonstrated as they rose above the limited Judeo-Christian moral system that venerates the hoi polloi ("the many"). On May 21, 1924, Leopold and Loeb rented a car under a pseudonym, kidnapped fourteen-year-old Bobby Franks (a neighbor and Loeb's distant relative), and killed him with a chisel. Franks was apparently just a target of opportunity. On a stolen typewriter, they typed a ransom note demanding $10,000 and sent it to Franks's parents, with orders that the bag containing the money be thrown from a moving train, where the supermen 7 For reviews of the case, see Jennifer Rosenberg, "Leopold and Loeb," accessed online at: http://history1900s.about.com/od/1920s/qt/Leopold-Loeb.htm; Douglas O. Linder, "The Leopold and Loeb Trial: A Brief Account," accessed online at: http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials//leoploeb/Accountoftrial.html; PBS, "People & Events: The Leopold and Loeb Trial," accessed online at: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/monkeytrial/peopleevents/e_leopoldloeb.html; and "Leopold and Loeb," accessed online at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Leopold_and_Loeb. Reason Papers Vol. 37, no. 2 153 could retrieve it later. They dumped Franks's body in a culvert and showered it with acid to make identification more difficult. Far from being the perfect crime, however, the two genius-supermen made a number of mistakes. First, they didn't hide the body very well, so it was discovered the same night. Second, near the culvert, Leopold dropped his glasses, which the supposedly intellectually inferior, slave-morality-driven cops were able to tie to him because of its very rare spring mechanism. Upon questioning, the men gave the alibi that on the day in question they were out driving around (picking up girls). The alibi broke down when the cops found a note Leopold had written to Loeb, indicating they were sexual partners, and when Leopold's chauffer testified that he had been working on the car all that day. Very quickly-only ten days after the crime itself- the supermen wound up confessing the crime to the under-cops. Loeb's uncle hired Clarence Darrow, the leading defense attorney of his time, to defend the young men. Darrow was deeply opposed to the death penalty, and managed to get the court to spare them that penalty. He did this by pleading them guilty, thus guaranteeing that they would face a judge- rather than an outraged jury-for sentencing. He then pitched a psychological defense, arguing in a classic speech that the defendants were pre-determined to do what they did by their genetics and a bad upbringing, and that their study of Nietzsche was a major causal factor. Crucial to Darrow's success was the ruling by the judge that even though the young men were not pleading insanity, Darrow could introduce psychiatric testimony. The judge sentenced them to life plus ninety-nine years, and recommended against them ever getting parole. About twelve years into his sentence, Loeb was murdered by a fellow prisoner, allegedly because Loeb made a sexual advance on the other man (who was later acquitted of the crime). Leopold was paroled after thirty-three years in prison, and wound up working for a hospital in Puerto Rico. He died at age sixty-six. Compulsion is based on a Broadway play, produced by Darryl F. Zanuck and admirably directed by Richard Fleisher. The story line of both parallels more or less closely much of the real case. 8 The main characters in the film are two extremely rich and intelligent young men attending the University of Chicago law school, named Judd Steiner and Artie Strauss. Judd-the Leopold character-is skillfully portrayed by Dean Stockwell. Artie-the Loeb character-is notably played by Bradford Dillman. The other two main characters are Jonathan Wilk-the Clarence Darrow figure-who is played perfectly by Orson Welles. Welles got top billing, even though his character in this film does not appear until midway through the film. The other eminent actor in the film is E. G. 8 For more detailed synopses, see the Turner Classic Movies entry, accessed online at: http://www.tcm.com/tcmdb/title/71354/Compulsion/; and the University of MissouriKansas Law School entry, accessed online at: http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/leoploeb/LEO_COMP.htm. Reason Papers Vol. 37, no. 2 154 Marshall, who masterfully plays District Attorney Horn. Stockwell, Dillman, and Welles each won a Best Actor award at Cannes for this movie. The film shows Artie as a vicious bully, who dominates the shy, effeminate, and submissive Judd. Both appear arrogant, though Judd in the end turns out to be weak. Artie and Judd have few friends, believing themselves to be superior to all others. They decide to commit the perfect crime, stealing the typewriter from their frat house to type a ransom note, and go out to celebrate their upcoming caper. In driving home, they narrowly miss hitting a drunk, who shouts at them, infuriating Artie, who then orders Judd to run down the man. Foreshadowing Judd's later "weakness" (i.e., his ingrained aversion to hurting the innocent), he swerves at the last minute, which allows the man to escape injury. The following day, we see the arrogant Artie argue with one of his professors about justice, pushing the Nietzschean (or what he takes as the Nietzschean) view that the superman can define his own concept of justice, free from feelings of compassion or other "ordinary" emotions. As chance has it, one of the students in the class is Sid Brooks (played by a young Martin Milner). Brooks, who is not rich, works as a reporter on the side. Sid is assigned to cover the news of a boy who apparently drowned in the local park. But when the coroner concludes that the boy was in fact killed by a blunt instrument, it occurs to Sid that this boy matches the description of a recently kidnapped boy (Paulie Kessler), and conveys this information to the reporter assigned to the kidnapping case, Tom Daly (Edward Binns). Sid learns that some eyeglasses were found near the body, and Paulie's uncle tells them that Paulie didn't wear glasses. Sid now realizes that the killer dropped those eyeglasses. Later, Sid goes to a club to join his girlfriend, Ruth Evans (Diane Varsi). Artie and Judd are there, and when Sid reveals that the killer dropped his eyeglasses, Judd checks and discovers to his dismay that his are missing. Later, after bickering about who is to blame, Artie and Judd devise an alibi. They will, if questioned, say that Judd lost his eyeglasses while bird watching in the park much earlier, but that on the day of the murder they were out cruising for girls in Judd's car. The following day, Lt. Johnson (Robert Simon) and other police are talking to potential witnesses at Paulie's school. Artie can't resist volunteering to help (he was a student at the school when he was younger). Lt. Johnson asks whether Artie remembers any of the old teachers who were strange, and Artie feeds him negative information about several of them and starts phoning in phony "tips" to lead the police astray. Meanwhile, the shy Judd has invited Ruth out to a bird-watching excursion. Artie, who has been questioning Sid about the latest discoveries in the case, learns that the police have identified the typewriter upon which the young men had typed the ransom note. Artie immediately goes over to Judd's house and bitterly criticizes him for not destroying the typewriter. Finding out that Judd will be taking out Ruth, he argues that, in order to experience all that human life can offer, Judd should rape her. Reason Papers Vol. 37, no. 2 155 Judd tries to do this when he and Ruth are in the park, after he gives an incoherent speech about the beauty that is part of evil. However, Ruth-far from begging for mercy or weeping in fear-bravely responds to his aggression with a show of pity. This makes Judd cry in shame. Right after this, the police pick up Judd and take him to District Attorney Horn for questioning. Horn tells Judd that the eyeglasses found at the murder scene have been identified as his (because of their rare hinge mechanism). Under relentless interrogation, Judd finally recants his birdwatching alibi. Horn then has Artie called in for questioning. Artie cleverly claims at first that on the night of the murder, he was alone at the movies, but then retracts that and admits that he was with Judd. This ploy tricks Horn into buying the alibi. Just before Horn releases them, Judd's chauffer blurts out that he was repairing Judd's car all day on the day of the murder, which destroys their alibi of cruising for girls. Horn then tricks the weaker Judd into confessing, which in turn makes Artie so furious that he fingers Judd. The two young men-having completely implicated each other-are arrested. The young men's families at this point hire the famous defense attorney Jonathan Wilk (the Clarence Darrow figure). Wilk pleads his clients guilty, and has psychiatrists testify that Judd is paranoid and Artie is schizophrenic. Wilk also calls Ruth as a witness, and she expresses compassion for Judd. Wilk then gives a long, impassioned closing speech to the judge, which at upwards of fifteen minutes is "the longest true monologue in film history." 9 To get the flavor of the speech, consider one excerpt. At one point, Wilk intones: I think anybody who knows me knows how sorry I am for little Paulie Kessler, knows that I'm not saying it simply to talk. Artie and Judd enticed him into a car and when he struggled, they hit him over the head and killed him. They did that. They poured acid on him to destroy his identity and put the naked body in a ditch. And if killing these boys would bring [Paulie] back to life, I'd say let them go [let them be executed]. And I think their parents would say so, too. Neither they nor I would want them released. They must be isolated from society. I'm asking this court to shut them into a prison for life. And the cry for more goes back to the hyena, goes back to the beasts of the jungle. There's no part of man [in it]. This court is told to give them the same mercy that they gave their victim. Your Honor, if our state is not kinder, more human, more considerate, more intelligent that the mad act of these 9 See AMC Filmsite's entry for Compulsion, accessed online at: http://www.filmsite.org/bestspeeches18.html; the text of the entire monologue is provided at this site. Reason Papers Vol. 37, no. 2 156 two sick boys, then I'm sorry I've lived so long. I know that any mother might be the mother of little Paulie Kessler, who left home and went to school and never came back. But I know that any mother might be the mother of Artie Strauss, Judd Steiner. Maybe in some ways these parents are more responsible than their children. I guess the truth is that all parents can be criticized. And these might have done better, if they hadn't had so much money. I do not know. Ironically, the notorious religious skeptic Wilk appeals in the end to JudeoChristian compassion so as to save the Nietzschean supermen. Wilk succeeds in getting them spared the death penalty, although Artie remains unrepentant. As the young men leave the courtroom, Wilk remarks to a skeptical Judd that in the years to come when he is in prison, he will ask himself whether it was the hand of God that dropped those eyeglasses at the scene. The film reflects the actual case rather closely, with some artistic license-such as showing us Artie arguing about Nietzschean justice with his professor. This is unlikely, since Artie is the Loeb figure, while it was Leopold who was the devotee of Nietzsche. Additionally, the remark that perhaps God caused the eyeglasses to fall at the crime scene was not made by Darrow, but by the prosecutor in the case. Even more noteworthy, while the film ends with the young men going to jail with no possibility of parole, in fact one was eventually paroled and went on to enjoy freedom for many years and the other never got paroled only because he was murdered in prison. Nathan Leopold actually read the book upon which the film was based (published in 1956, by Meyer Levin) while still in prison, and said that the book made him "physically sick," ashamed, and depressed. He said he felt "exposed stark-naked" and took issue with the notion that the murder was a kind of sex act. 10 The film was released into theaters the year after he was released from prison. In the ultimate irony, Leopold sued the film's producers to block its distribution, on grounds of defamation and invasion of privacy. (The suit was eventually dismissed, of course.) This suggests that the film was uncomfortably close to the truth-if so, Leopold's suit was an unintended complement to the film's power. In sum, the actual Leopold and Loeb case, together with the movies made about it, served to give many ordinary Americans a view of Nietzsche's egoist philosophy that was very negative. A student of that philosophy may turn into a self-styled superman who is a smug, arrogant psychopath, killing just to show off. In reality, the murderous boys misunderstood Nietzsche's views on the over-man morality. Yes, he rejects Christian morality as being herd morality, and venerates the over-man together with his striving for creative success. The over-man is thus going to deal with others 10 See "In Nathan Leopold's Own Words," accessed online at: http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/leoploeb/LEO_LEOW.HTM. Reason Papers Vol. 37, no. 2 157 instrumentally, because "he is consumed by his work, his responsibilities, his projects." 11 But of course Nietzsche did not thereby advocate killing simply in order to display superiority, though it is an open question whether the overman's "instrumental use" of others could ever take the form of actual murder. In any case, the next film under review captures more accurately the notion of the over-man using others instrumentally. b. The Moon and Sixpence The second film I will discuss seems to offer a different and more subtle take on the concept of the overman. It is the excellent film The Moon and Sixpence. The film was produced by David L. Loew, with screenplay and direction by Albert Lewin. Lewin's screenplay was based on the eponymous 1916 book by W. Somerset Maugham, who was an extremely popular and prolific British writer. The film, as outstanding as it is, got very little critical acclaim at the time-it earned only one Academy Award nomination (for Best Music Score). I suspect that this is due to the fact that the film was released during the toughest part of World War II, and the lead character is an egoist, which was out of tune with the "we're in this together" war spirit of the time. The story is based very loosely on the life of the French artist Paul Gaugin, founder of the Primitivism school of art. One of the two main protagonists in the film is Geoffrey Wolfe, the fictional counterpart of Maugham (played with urbane sophistication by Herbert Marshall). The other is the character meant to be the fictional counterpart of Gaugin, Charles Strickland (acted impeccably by George Sanders). Wolfe is a writer who is introduced to the Strickland family, by invitation of Mrs. Strickland (played well by Molly Lamont). As a good writer is wont to do, Wolfe observes the people at the Stricklands' dinner party. He notes that Strickland seemed ill at ease and essentially detached from the guests. Talking with the man, he seems absolutely drab-an only moderately successful stock broker with little conversational skills. Not long afterward, Wolfe is surprised when Mrs. Strickland asks for his help. She tells him that her husband has abandoned her, his family, and his career to move to Paris with some woman. Mrs. Strickland asks Wolfe to go to Paris to tell her husband that she will not grant him a divorce, and she wants to reconcile with him. Wolfe agrees to go. When Wolfe gets to Paris and meets with Strickland, however, he is surprised in several ways. To begin with, Strickland is by no means a dull, quiet man, but a forceful, intelligent, and acerbic one. Moreover, Strickland didn't run off with a woman; indeed, he laughs uproariously at the idea. No, he left his family and came to Paris-to paint! He is living in abject poverty as a struggling artist, though he seems quite indifferent to his surroundings. Strickland turns out to be a thoroughgoing egoist. He is completely without guilt, shame, or remorse about leaving his family. He tells Wolfe that 11 See "Nietzsche's Moral and Political Philosophy." Reason Papers Vol. 37, no. 2 158 he has not the slightest inclination to return home, that his children will be fine, and his wife can just file for divorce. Strickland slyly suggests that she will, because while a woman can forgive a man leaving her for another woman, she can't forgive him for leaving her for his work. The only selfjustification he offers is a simple one: he just has to paint. Wolfe is clearly appalled, but intrigued, by this new Strickland. Two quick asides are worth making here. First, Maugham in his novel takes a more observational than judgmental position regarding the characters. But Wolfe, while he certainly has an issue with Strickland's moral worldview, is nonetheless intrigued by it. This fascination is what drives Wolfe to follow Strickland's career to the end. Second, there is a subtext of strange misogyny on the part of Strickland. When he goes to see a woman, he "takes his whip," to use Nietzsche's phrase. This misogyny informs Strickland's relations with the female characters throughout the film, and it seems clearly to be Maugham's take on some of Nietzsche's writings. Specifically, the full quotation is: "Thou goest to women? Do not forget thy whip!" 12 The passage, taken on its face, is flatly demeaning toward women. In the passage, Zarathustra recounts meeting an elderly woman, who tells him that he has talked to women (presumably, about under-man and super-man), but not about them. He replies that women are riddles with only one solution-pregnancy. To women, he says, men exist as tools to enable women to have children. To men, he avers, women exist as "dangerous playthings." Men should be trained for war, and women as recreation for men. Women should dream of giving birth to the super-man. The old woman then tells Zarathustra that he is right about women, and she offers him a "little truth"- the quotation about the whip-which again on its face seems to indicate that women either want or need to be dominated. Whether this reading of Nietzsche's passage reflects accurately his perspective is open to dispute. However, it certainly seems to describe accurately Strickland's attitude toward them, as the film further reveals. Returning to the film, after a period of a few years, Wolfe is back in Paris. He is visiting an interesting character, Dirk Stroeve (intriguingly portrayed by Steven Geray). Stroeve is Wolfe's friend, a modestly successful if essentially untalented painter, but one who can recognize genius in other painters. He is also, I would suggest, a kind of exaggerated portrayal-almost a parody-of a meek, forgiving Christian man of compassion. The movie shows him to be a virtual doormat, completely dominated by Strickland. Wolfe asks Stroeve whether he has ever heard of Strickland, and Stroeve immediately describes Strickland as a genius, even though, unlike Stroeve, Strickland sells nothing and ekes out a living doing menial labor. Stroeve's wife Blanche (nicely acted by a rather dour Doris Dudley) expresses visceral 12 Nietzsche, Thus Spake Zarathustra, "Zarathustra's Discourses," sec. 18. Reason Papers Vol. 37, no. 2 159 hatred of Strickland. We immediately wonder why, since she hardly knows the man. Over Christmas, Stroeve and Wolfe visit Strickland, and find him near death from some unidentified disease (which we suppose is brought on by overwork and poverty), and Stroeve-eager to comfort the afflicted and resurrect the near-dead-manages to convince Blanche to allow him into their home (by striking a rather low blow, as we discover later). Stroeve asks her rhetorically if she hasn't been rescued by a forgiving person. She gives in with evident trepidation. Strickland more than recovers: he comes to dominate, by exuding his will to power, rather like a feral feline exuding pheromones. After just a few weeks, he is so well recovered-with Blanche's surprisingly solicitous support-that he takes over Stroeve's home, even kicking the artist out of his own studio. Stroeve at this point tells Strickland to leave, but to Stroeve's shock, Blanche announces that she is leaving with Strickland. Stroeve is devastated. We now realize why Blanche at first expressed loathing for Strickland, then resisted giving him shelter, but then started devotedly taking care of him, finally leaving with him when he was well. She knew from the moment she met Strickland that she was profoundly sexually attracted to him, and didn't want him around precisely because she knew that she would be seduced by him. When Stroeve manipulated her into letting Strickland move in, she found the temptation irresistible. She couldn't resist going with the strong, dominant, ruthless, and handsome genius, over the weak, submissive, overly compassionate, and silly-looking mediocrity. To this outrage, Stroeve at first responds by trying to choke Strickland, who easily wards him off. After a brief period of time, Stroeve turns his other cheek: he tells his wife that he cannot bear to see her live like this, so he will leave, turning the apartment over to his unfaithful wife and treacherous friend. Wolfe runs into Blanche and Strickland at a restaurant, and they seem like an ordinary couple, but he later hears that Blanche has committed suicide after she was dumped by Strickland. Filled with outrage, Wolfe visits Strickland at his small studio. Strickland first shows him some of his pictures, to which Wolfe (narrating to us) thinks, "The paintings had power, and they gave me an emotion I could not analyze." Wolfe then engages Strickland in a fascinating dialogue: Wolfe: I sense a prodigious effort in your work. You're like a tormented spirit trying to free itself. Strickland: You're a dreadful sentimentalist. Wolfe: I don't know a great deal about painting-I confess I was interested in seeing your pictures mainly because I thought they might give me a clue to your character. Strickland: You must write really bad novels-I must read one sometime. Reason Papers Vol. 37, no. 2 160 When Wolfe then rebukes him for first "taking" Blanche and then leaving her, Strickland tells Wolfe that he has no remorse. Strickland adds that Stroeve (an "absurd little man") enjoys doing things for others and that Blanche-despite outward appearances-was never happy with Stroeve. Stroeve had "rescued" her after she tried to commit suicide. She did this because she had been fired as a maid for a wealthy family when she had an affair with one of the sons. Strickland acerbically adds, "A woman can forgive a man for the harm he does her, but never for the sacrifices he makes on her behalf." After noting that he never wanted Blanche to come along with him- he took her only because he was mildly physically interested in her, and needed a model to study the female form-Strickland makes more provocative claims about the matter. First, "Love is a disease, it's weakness. I can't overcome my desire, but it interferes with my work." And, Strickland adds, "Women have small minds. They want to possess men." These comments clearly upset Wolfe, which leads to a revealing exchange: Wolfe: You're inhuman . . . . Strickland: Can you honestly say that you care whether Blanche Stroeve is alive or dead? (Tellingly, Wolfe is silent). Strickland: You haven't the courage of your convictions. Life has no value. Blanche didn't commit suicide because I left her but because she was a foolish and unbalanced woman. However, Wolfe remains unconvinced by this. He says to this overman who seeks to rise "above" the herd morality, "Do you think it possible for any man to disregard others completely? When you are ill and tired and old, you'll come crawling back to the herd looking for sympathy!" Strickland tells Wolfe that he is going to find an island where the sun is hot and the colors strong. Wolfe then leaves. Strickland is also briefly visited by Stroeve. He gives Stroeve the nude he did of Blanche, saying that it is of no use anymore-Strickland has learned all he needed to from her (and it) of the female form. Stroeve, ever the follower of slave morality, forgives Strickland and even invites him to his father's house, to live simply and humbly-his father being just (what else?) a carpenter. Years pass again, and Wolfe is on a visit to Tahiti. All of the scenes in Tahiti, by the way, are done in tinted black and white, giving this part of the film a bright, golden glow-much different from the stark black-and-white appearance of London and Paris. Wolfe asks an old friend, Captain Nichols (Eric Blore) about Strickland. Nichols introduces Wolfe to Nichol's friend Tiare Johnson (Florence Bates). Wolfe learns that in the years after leaving Paris, Strickland met (through Tiare) a beautiful native girl named Ata (Elena Verdugo). We find out through flashbacks that he married the girl (after warning her that he Reason Papers Vol. 37, no. 2 161 will beat her, to which she replies that she would regard it as a sign of love). They lived happily for some time on her property, where he painted all he wanted, but then Strickland becomes ill. The local doctor, Dr. Coutras (Albert Basserman), is summoned; he sees at once that Strickland has leprosy and bluntly informs him of the diagnosis. Two years later, Coutras is summoned once again by Ata, and he finds their house in disrepair, with Strickland-who had been blind for the last year-now dead. Covering his nose with a handkerchief (because of the sickening sweet odor that lepers with advanced disease give off), he is dazzled. We see (now in Technicolor) that Strickland created a masterpiece- paintings on all of the walls that represent the human condition, from early innocence to later corruption. Coutras and Ata bury Strickland, whereupon Ata burns the house to the ground, carrying out Strickland's last wish. The film ends with Wolfe observing, "Strickland created a masterpiece; and then, in pride and contempt, he destroyed it. But in his last great paintings, he achieved what he wanted. His destiny was fulfilled. His life was complete." This film gives us a picture of the overman as an artist totally focused on his creative work. He hurts others not because (like Artie Strauss) he desires to, but because he needs to create, and in his view human love of any sort-filial, fraternal, or erotic-just impedes that creative process. He will use others, and not deny or disguise what he is doing, while he exercises his genius. However, he is certainly no sybarite, that is, he is not a hedonist seeking pleasure. He is willing to endure real hardship and privation to carry out his work. Strickland's genius becomes manifest to Wolfe (and us) only slowly, but we finally see that it is profound. In the end, however, we can conclude that Wolfe/Maugham judges the artist Strickland negatively. This is implicit in the very title of the film, for it comes from a Cockney expression describing a man being so focused on the heavens that he steps over something important at his feet. The suggestion is that Strickland was so focused on creating great art that he ignored the human relationships which are of ultimate worth. We see this point explicitly in the closing frame of the movie, which displays the message: Such was Strickland. He trod roughshod over his obligation as husband and father, over the rights and sensibilities of those who befriended him. Neither the skill of his brush nor the beauty of his canvas could hide the ugliness of his life, an ugliness that finally destroyed him. I doubt that Nietzsche would see things this way. 3. Final Thoughts I hope that, in this series of reviews, I have provided some persuasive reasons to indicate that a historically important and often dismissed ethical Reason Papers Vol. 37, no. 2 162 perspective, namely, egoism, informs a great many films-far more than I have discussed. We have seen that the egoist perspective gets a reasonably neutral examination in some films, especially in World War II prisoner-of-war films where the characters are seen as trying to survive in a harsh environment. We also reviewed two films wherein the egoist characters are viewed as morally bad or even profoundly evil. And we have examined a couple of films that reflect more of a Nietzschean perspective, one clearly negative with the other more ambivalent. I have touched only the surface of this rich area of cinematic art. Other types of films depict egoist characters as central forces that call out for exploration. These include movies about either powerful or evil business figures as well as gangster films, which I hope to explore in the future.

Chapter 14 Psychoanalysis, representation, and neuroscience The Freudian unconscious and the Bayesian brain Jim Hopkins Abstract This chapter presents a philosophical synthesis of a range of work relating psychoanalysis and neuroscience. The overall argument is (1) material in these and related fields can usefully be integrated via the notion of representation; (2) the appropriate notion of representation is a biological one common both to psychoanalysis and the Holmholtz/Bayes tradition in neuroscience; and consequently (3) the Freudian unconscious may be understood as realized in what is now described as the Bayesian brain. Psychoanalysis began as an extension of the intuitive commonsense psychology in whose terms we make sense of one another in everyday life. In this we understand one another as persons who have subjective experience of an objective world, and whose actions are informed by mental states and processes such as those of emotion, desire, belief, intention, and will. Such states and processes have intentionality: that is, they are about things and situations in the world, and they are capable of both truth (or accuracy) or falsehood (or inaccuracy). This 'aboutness' has historically been regarded as the defining feature of mental phenomena. Recent work in philosophy, however, has enabled us to see that the intentionality of the mental can be understood in terms of the notion of representation; and Ruth Garrett Millikan has argued that representation itself can be seen as a biological phenomenon which has evolved for the selective advantages it confers. So on this account the intentionality of mental phenomena can be understood as realized by the biological functioning of the brain. Such representational functioning is here explicated via the current Helmholtz/Bayes approach to neuroscience developed from work by Geoffrey Hinton and his colleagues. This approach has recently been advanced by Karl Friston in such a way as to unify a number of basic theories in neuroscience and to integrate them with evolution. This framework is particularly relevant for psychoanalysis, since Freud was trained in the school of Helmholtz and framed his early theories in terms of free energy; and this has enabled Friston and Richard Carhart-Harris to relate Freud's claims to data from neuropsychology, neuroimaging, and psychopharmacology. The same framework can also be used to link Freud's theories with the findings of affective neuroscience, including the homeostatic regulatory emotional and motivational systems described by Jaak Panksepp and Antonio Damasio, and the interoceptive system delineated by A. D. (Bud) Craig, and in conjunction with research in attachment and development. In this way we can start to describe the wishfulfilling Freudian unconscious as part of the predictive and error-minimizing working of the computational Bayesian brain. Keywords: conflict, aggression, infancy, attachment, repression, interoception, wishfulfilment, superego 1. Psychoanalysis, commonsense psychology, and the intentional i ty of the mental1 Psychoanalysis began as an extension of the natural and intuitive commonsense psychology, sometimes now described as theory of mind (Wellman, 1990), in whose terms we articulate thought and feeling in daily life. This way of thinking is interwoven with language, and encompasses the motives most basic to our understanding of ourselves. In using it we tacitly but systematically think of one another as persons who are aware of acting on mental states or processes such as seeing, believing, hoping, fearing, and desiring.. This allows us to understand one another with remarkable assurance and accuracy, and so to co-operate and co-ordinate our actions in the far-reaching way characteristic of our species. To take a simple example: we might understand a person's moving her arm as if to reach a glass in front of her, as an intentional action of trying to get a drink. In this we would regard her movement as directed by a desire that she get a drink and a belief that if she reaches for that glass she will do so. Such mental states and processes are said to have intentionality, or intentional content. (Siewert, 2008). That is, they are about things: they present things to us, and in a way many have thought that nothing else (including the material brain) could possibly do. And in this they can accord or fail to accord with the things they are about, in the sense that they can be true or false, accurate or inaccurate, satisfied or unsatisfied, etc. Accordingly if we say that someone sees, and therefore believes, that there is a glass of water in front of her, we describe both her seeing and believing as having the same intentional content, namely that there is a glass of water in front of her. This description entails (i) that the seeing and believing are both about that glass of water and its location in relation to her, and (ii) that these states would accord with the things they are about, in the sense that the perception would be veridical, and the belief would be true, in the same worldly circumstances. (That is, just if the glass of water they are both about really is in front of the person they both are about, as she sees and believes.) As this illustrates, we implement such intentional understanding by using language in a particular way. Roughly, we can say that a person perceives, desires, believes, thinks, hopes, fears, remembers, etc., that P, where we replace 'P' by a sentence-such as 'there is a glass of water in front of her'-which describes the worldly things or situations which the mental state or process is about, and the worldly circumstances in which mental state or process would accord with them in the sense of being true, satisfied, fulfilled, gratified, etc. So in this employment of language we shift effortlessly from describing things in the world (e.g. the glass above) to describing states and processes in persons' minds (the agent's experience of seeing the glass and forming a belief about it). We simply re-use the words and sentences by which we describe worldly things such as glasses of water and their location in space, to describe persons' minds as directed on, or engaged with, these same worldly things. These forms of engagement, in turn, are shown as forms of accord or lack of it (truth or falsity, satisfaction or non-satisfaction, fulfilment or non-fulfilment) between persons' mental states and world. So for example when we describe someone's desire as satisfied or her intention as fulfilled, we describe the world as in accord with how she wanted or intended it to be. Ultimately we can see these forms of accord as variants of the idea of truth or accuracy; for they obtain when the 'P' sentence in terms of which we describe a mental state is or becomes true. (When someone satisfies her desire that she get a drink, the sentence 'she gets a drink' is thereby made true. The satisfying act brings the desire into a form of accord-satisfaction-with the world.) Human beings in all cultures use this mode of description. Like the capacity for language via which it is articulated, it seems, in Chomsky's phrase, 'to grow in the mind'. From shortly after their first uses of words and sentences, children start to embed these in phrases governed by terms such as 'want'. This enables them to make more explicit the way their states of mind mirror the sentences of their language, and so to think and interact with others more efficiently. And in this way they continue their transition from describing the world to describing themselves as persons with minds who relate to this world in their own individual ways. Together with this, and perhaps surprisingly, they also begin tacitly to track the most significant causal relations which hold between their minds and the world (Hopkins, 1982, 1996, 1999a). Thus we intuitively know, for example, that motives like desire prompt us to act. But we also tacitly specify how our desires will cause us to act when we describe them in our commonsense way in terms of their intentional content. Thus when we say that someone wants [that she gets] a drink, we tacitly describe a cause [her desire] in terms of its predicted effects. For by saying this we indicate the effects that her desire will have if she acts on it, both in relation to her future bodily movements [drinking movements are predicted] and also in relation to worldly objects in the immediate environment, with which such movements might engage [those like nearby glasses, whose manipulation might seem a means of getting a drink]. And we constantly improve such predictions as we consider how agents amplify their desires to incorporate their beliefs. Thus suppose our agent naturally amplifies her desire under the impact of her present visual experience so as to report that she wants [that she get] a drink from that glass. Then she and we automatically sharpen our prediction of her forthcoming movements accordingly. In this way, and without explicit use of the notion of cause, our that P way of describing mental states naturally and systematically encodes predictive information about their causal role. And in addition the relations to the environment which we tacitly track in this way reach into our very selves. For when our agent satisfies her desire-as marked by her making the sentence 'I get a drink' true-she thereby engages the deepest and most encompassing of physiological processes: those of homeostasis, by which the brain maintains the physical equilibrium between its body and the rest of the environment which facilitates the basic chemical processes of life. 2. First-person authority and emotional confl ict In using language this way, moreover, we find a striking asymmetry, as between our own case and that of others. We ordinarily arrive at a description of the mental states of others by perceiving their bodily activities, as when we see another start to reach out, and understand her as intending to get a drink. In our own case, by contrast, there is no such reliance on external perception. We simply know the relevant descriptions that apply to ourselves, or can bring them to mind, should we be concerned to articulate what we think, want, or feel. If I want a drink, or believe I can get one by reaching for a glass, then I can also think that this is so, and in the same words as I would use to express it to others. This form of self-awareness-the ability spontaneously to understand one's own mental states and put them into words-is often referred to as first-person authority (Gertler, 2011). It is basic to our role as agents who can think about alternative courses of action in light of our desires, and so choose how to act; and also to the coordination of each person's actions with those of others, as effected by language, which is characteristic of our species. Insofar as people can express their mental states in words we can gather the full details of their thoughts and feelings from what they say. If, wanting a drink, I can utter 'I want a drink', then others can learn what these words mean on my lips, as well as that I am accurate and sincere in my use of them, by matching them with my actions in getting a drink, as well as with my other utterances and actions in other contexts. In this, moreover, we proceed by intuitive interpretive observation, taking nothing just on trust. We tacitly test our tentative understanding of what people say by comparing their utterances with their non-verbal actions (those that 'speak louder than words'), so as to determine the operational significance of words by the way those who utter them act in other ways (Hopkins, 1999a,b). Again, insofar as we can establish such an ongoing understanding of the language and actions of others, then our knowledge of their motives is limited mainly by their ability and willingness to express these motives to us-that is, by the scope of their own first-person authority. But we constantly and tacitly test this as well, by seeing how far what others say about their motives matches the way we would independently explain their actions. In this way, and in a benign circle, we test others' self-expressive first-person authority, even as we use it as a basis for understanding them. In order to understand his patients as fully as possible Freud maximized such evidentially valuable first-person expression on their part. He did this by having them engage in free association. In this they sought to relax and describe the ongoing, rapidly changing, series of their thoughts and feelings, as fully as they could manage, and without omission or censorship. Such full, far-ranging, and informative disclosure was without precedent in previous psychological investigations, and remains without parallel in other forms even now. This enabled Freud to learn as much about the motives of those he was analysing, as they were able to put into words, and to learn yet more from the patterns that emerged in their spontaneous free associations and other expressive behaviour. Among the things he learned was that there were ranges of motive and circumstance for which first-person authority systematically failed-for which there was good and often-repeated reason to ascribe particular motives to explain what people said and did, and also to explain the forms of distress that had brought them to psychoanalytic therapy; but in which their motives remained unconscious, in the sense that they were unable to avow them or think or be aware of them as their own. Briefly, Freud found that first-person authority was liable to fail when persons were in deep emotional conflict, apparently feeling both affection and love, but also hatred and fear, towards one and the same person, characteristically a parent. These conflicts, in turn, were rooted in disparate images of their parents as in relation to them, which Freud called 'the earliest parental imagos' (1933, p. 54); and these went with disparate representations of themselves in relation to their parents as well. In this, as we shall see, Freud anticipated recent work on attachment, which suggests that such representations of the parents have begun to assume a potentially lifeinfluencing form by four months of age (Beebe et al., 2010). In one set of representations, according to Freud, parental figures appeared as good (comforting, nurturing, helpful, etc.) and as engaging affection, devotion, and cooperation-indeed as 'the prototype' of later relations of love. In another, and by contrast, they appeared very bad (punitive, malicious, cruel, and frightening), and as evoking rage and fear. Since these representations and the emotions to which they gave rise were contradictory, both psychological coherence and family cooperation required that in general the former set become dominant, and the latter recessive, in the governance of behaviour. This was effected by excluding one set from conscious awareness and first-person avowal, and so from a full role in thought and choice. Despite this segregation, the early imagos and motives remained active, and expressed themselves in formations that were unchosen and apparently senseless or irrational. These included dreams, bungled actions, and symptoms of mental disorder; and also patterns of feeling and action which were unwanted and self-destructive, as when aggression rooted in the split-off imagos was felt towards others, sabotaging projects and relationships, or again was internalized and turned against the self, as in the ferocious self-criticism which can prompt depression or suicide. Also, and despite their exclusion from reflective awareness, these images were systematically linked with the contents of free association, and liable to be aroused and to become directed towards Freud himself, in what he called transference from their original objects. This enabled Freud to assist his patients in putting the split-off images and motives into words, both as regards the past as they remembered it and also as they felt in relation to his as therapist in the present. As a result his patients were able to extend their first-person authority, so as to acknowledge these images and motives as their own. They could thus seek to integrate the conflict-engendering representations by working them through in feeling and in thought, and thereby modifying and ameliorating them. Such use of insight and feeling to mitigate conflict via the extension of first-person authority remains the hallmark of psychoanalytic psychotherapy. 3. Intentionali ty, mental representation, and the brain Freud's basic explanatory concepts thus included the intentional notions of commonsense psychology, as well as others, such as wishfulfilment,2 discussed below. How do such interpretive mental and intentional notions relate to cognitive science, neuroscience, and other recent approaches to the mind? We can see this more clearly, and move towards integrating these fields, by focusing on the notion of representation-as used, for example, in connection with the Freudian term 'imago' in the paragraphs above. We have seen that mental states are related to the world in a way comparable with the sentences we use to describe them. Thus both the belief that there is a glass of water in front of me and the sentence 'There is a glass of water in front of me' are about that glass and its relation to me, and both are true if that same glass of is water in front of me (and false otherwise). The words and sentences, however, are paradigmatic instances of linguistic representations. We can, for example, classify them together with maps, blueprints, photographs, drawings, etc. Just as a blueprint, drawing, photograph, or map may represent the spatial locations of objects, so does the sentence 'There is a glass of water in front of me'. When we say that a picture is worth a thousand words, we are comparing the efficacy of different kinds of representation. And all these kinds of representation are said to be about the things they depict, and to be capable of accord in the sense of truth or accuracy. But then if representations are marked by the same features as the states to which we ascribe intentionality-if it is in the nature of representations to be about the things they represent, and to be capable of truth or accuracy- it appears that our mental states may have intentionality simply because they are, or embody, forms of representation. This is the representational theory of mind (Pitt, 2008), advocated by many philosophers, psychologists, and cognitive scientists (see, e.g. Horgan and Teinson, 1999; Thagard, 2010). On this account in saying that a person believes that there is a glass of water in front of her, we describe her as mentally representing how things are; as in saying that she desires that she drink from that glass, we describe her as mentally representing how she wants things to be. The ability mentally to represent things, in turn, seems to imply the use of some kind of internal system of representation, as realized in the brain.3 Ruth Garett Millikan (1982, 2005) has recently explicated the notion of representation in biological terms, as precipitated during the course of evolution for the selective advantages it confers. This provides an account of the general notion of biological information (Godfrey-Smith and Sterelny, 2008) to which many accounts of biological regulation refer, and can be applied even to the working of DNA (Shea, 2007). In the light of such accounts we can proceed here on the assumption that all the forms of representation with which we are concerned-including those of commonsense psychology, cognitive science, psychoanalysis, and neuroscience-devolve from those that evolution has conferred upon the brain.4 4. Representation in commonsense psychology and computational neuroscience (the hierarchical Bayesian brain) We can see more about these powers by briefly considering a simplified account of the Helmholtz/Bayes neurocomputational framework now referred to as the 'Bayesian brain' (Doya et al., 2007). This began to emerge in its contemporary form in 1995, in work in which Geoffrey Hinton and a number of his colleagues sought to use an information-theoretic account of free energy to embody basic insights of the account of perception put forward by von Helmholtz in the nineteenth century. (Dayan et al., 1995; Hinton et al., 1995). In a series of recent publications Karl Friston (2003, 2007, 2010a,b) has sought to use this Helmholtz/Bayes framework in a number of closely related ways. First, to unify basic theories in neuroscience (Friston, 2010a); secondly, to integrate neuroscience with the theory of evolution via the mathematical relation of free energy to thermodynamics (e.g. Friston and Stephan, 2007); and third, with Richard Carhart-Harris, to present Freud's theories, which Freud himself had framed in terms of free energy, as consilient with a large range of data drawn from neuropsychology, neuroimaging, and psychopharmacology. In this framework the brain is taken as a predictive 'inference or Helmholtz machine', which uses hierarchical Bayesian inference so as to extract statistical explanatory patterns from data of all kinds, and in a maximally efficient (optimal) way. The Bayesian inferences are realized in hierarchies of representation-producing neural networks which cooperate to 'optimize their representation of the sensorium' by constructing 'top-down prior [Bayesian] expectations about sensory samples from the world' (Carhart-Harris and Friston, 2010). 5. Philosophical antecedents of the Helmholtz/Bayes approach Helmholtz wrote in a tradition founded by Immanuel Kant (1781). His neuroscientific work partly embodies Kant's idea that we can see our basic concepts (Laurence and Margolis, 2011)-that is, our basic but everyday ways of thinking of space, time, substance, objects, events, and the relation of cause and effect-as performing an unconscious synthesis of the 'manifold' of sensory intuition. According to Kant this synthesis transforms the sensory manifold into our manifest conscious image of ourselves as self-aware subjects of experience which is internal to our minds, but which we understand as caused by objects and events in the world external to our minds, which objects and events are in causal relations with one another, and so with our bodies and sensory organs when we perceive them. This philosophical perspective, at once straightforward and profound, has been carried forward via Helmholtz, Hinton, Friston, and others, into the conception of the Bayesian brain. For according to this account the brain uses our concepts in working top-down from what Fuster (2009, p. 2047) calls 'the highest [conceptual] levels of association cortex' so as to represent sensory neural input in terms of 'the causes of exteroceptive and interoceptive sensations' (Carhart-Harris and Friston (2010). This latter terminology was introduced by Sherrington (1906) to describe input to the nervous system by the sources of its sensory origin. So (roughly) exteroceptive input concerns what Kant called outer sense: the detection of light and sound, as by sight and hearing (but also detection of heat via the skin, or non-auditory detection of vibration): of chemicals by odour or their capacity to irritate the skin; of shape and texture by response to pressure or touch, and so forth. Turning to what Kant called inner sense, proprioceptive input comes from the networks which register and control the position and motion of the limbs. And interoceptive input, as discussed in recent work by Craig (2009, 2010), apparently comes from a range of sources inside the body, including Cfibres and networks relating to subcortical mechanisms of homeostasis and emotion. These seem to map via the hypothalamus and thalamus to internal topographic body maps in insular cortex, so as to yield a range of sensations and experiences about how we feel inside. Although this pioneering work will be modified by further observation and theory, it provides a model which we can use in what follows. 6. The central role of sensory input Now it may seem remarkable that a comprehensive account of the working of the brain should (like Kant's account of unconscious conceptual processing) be focused on sensory input as opposed to motor output. But the central role of input seems established by a simple contrast put forward by Damasio (1999) and elaborated in more detail elsewhere (Parvizi and Damasio, 2001, 2003). The main lines of sensory input (exteroceptive, proprioceptive, and interoceptive) are adjacent in the brainstem to those which carry motor output. Damage to the output lines produces the pervasive paralysis of 'locked in' syndrome, in which thought and conscious experience remain intact. Damage to the input lines, by contrast, causes consciousnessand mind-obliterating coma. So it is (broadly) sensory input which drives the basic sense-making and experienceand consciousnessproducing operations with which we are concerned. (And in the Helmholtz/Bayes conception motor output is accordingly taken as governed via the sensory input to which it gives rise.) 7. Fit t ing neuroscience with common sense in representing sensory input as experience of i ts causes We can see these idea at work if we return the thirsty agent we have been imagining from the start, who has seen a glass of water and is intending to drink (from) it. We can now observe two things: (i) We can fit our commonsense forms of description together with the descriptive terms from Sherrington's neuroscience by noting that this agent is using her system of concepts (including those of the self, space, objects such as glasses, etc.,) to understand her current exteroceptive (visual) and proprioceptive neural input (from the fibres innervating her muscles, tendons, joints, inner ear, etc.) as awareness of seeing a glass of water located in front of her body and within reach of her hand. (ii) Likewise (and we will discuss this further below) we can also say that she is understanding her current interoceptive neural input (from inside her own body, as above) as awareness of her own thirst (an internal and homeostasis-related cause itself caused and predicted by hypothalamic activity) and awareness of her own desire to drink (a potential and predictive cause of future action as caused by thirst). That is: insofar as we regard someone as an agent who is conscious of herself in the world-and hence aware of her own motives and environment-we can also regard her brain as representing its own neural input as caused by the external objects and internal states (motives such as thirst, belief, and desire) of which she is aware, and thereby constituting her as a person in the sense of a Kantian subject of internal experience who is an agent acting in the external world.5 We said at the outset that we naturally think of the mind as an inner realm of experiences and other mental states and processes which have the remarkable feature of intentionality. We can now see (at least on the Helmoltz/Bayes conception) that we do this precisely because this is the image of ourselves that our brains create for us. The intentionality of the mind, and the mind's (or brain's) image of itself as a self-aware subject and agent in the world, are realized via the representational powers of the brain. And since this physically produced image includes the inner causes that we regard as reasons, emotions, or motives of other kinds, the working of such motives, and their compatibility with physical causality, should be regarded as integral to our image of ourselves. 8. Hierarchical Bayesian representation We can get an idea as to how the brain might represent input as caused in this way by regarding the representation as generated by hierarchies of neural networks working in the ways described by Hinton and Friston. These would project forward from those which first receive sensory input, through a series of intermediate levels which are progressively more encompassing and integrative, up to those which finally realize person-level concepts, beliefs, and desires. (Thus networks at the sensory peripheries would project forward to intermediary levels, which also project backwards and sideways; networks in the thalamus, perhaps, to others in sensory cortex, which also project backwards and sideways; those in primary sensory to others at a higher level; and so on.) The forward projections are often topographic and drive processing forward and up the levels; the backward are modulating or inhibitory in relation to those below. In this conception, assemblies or networks at each level work simultaneously, both from the top down in relation to those below them, and from the bottom up in relation to those above. That is, each works top-down: (i) To produce accurate predictive representations of activity at the level driving forward from below, so as (ii) To send these representations back as predictions which inhibit and modulate what is happening below. The effect of this is partly to suppress predicted activity, and also, by leaving an uninhibited remainder, to specify and magnify the effect of the unpredicted part of the activity driving forward from below. And also bottom-up: (iii) To send forward enhanced and specific representations of errors in prediction in the suppressive representations sent back by the producers above, so as (iv) To cause those producers to send updated and better suppressing and specifying predictions back again.6 In all this the accuracy of the predictive representations at each level consists simply in their unfolding over time so as to match those unfolding at the level below. This is continuously tested, by all higher-level producers sending current representations back along inhibitory connections to suppress what they match below. The remaining forward-driving representational activity perforce further specifies the errors in the original prediction; and this goes forward to the level above to cause the production of a better match. In this way all representations improve their predictive scope and accuracy at every turn. This architecture is consistent with the 'massive scaffolding of hierarchically organized memory networks in a continuum of increasing network size from the primary cortex to the highest levels of association cortex' described independently in Fuster (2009, p.2047), and seems to fit with other data so far accumulated about the brain. As Hinton and Friston have stressed, such a computational structure can extract all the probabilities it requires for building its constantly selfimproving hierarchies of representation empirically from its initial sensory inputs. And conceptually speaking, it seems that such a process could enable our agent's brain to provide her with the subjective experiences of thirst and seeing a glass in front of her that we take her to have. For as we have said, the most encompassing and integrating representations in her brain would be those realizing the personal level representations of conceptually informed consciousness and belief. In this each of her concepts (thirst, desire, drink, sight, belief, glass, water, etc.) contributes to making her experience intelligible as it occurs, and also in yielding further predictions about how it will unfold. For example her regarding the glass she sees as transparent but solid, and the water within as also transparent but liquid, makes sense of how they look together, move in relation to one another, and so on. And this appearance also predicts to her that she will be able to grasp the glass and pour the liquid into her mouth if she moves like so, as her thirst and unfolding desire and intention to drink will shortly prompt her to do. So as far as we can see by considering the working of our concepts, inhibitory predictions returning from conceptual high level might indeed be reaching an equilibrium with input coming forward from the external senses and inside the body in the way described. The meeting place, in Kantian terms, would be that at which my (downgoing and side-by-side connected) concepts meet my (upcoming) intuitions so that the latter can be understood as my own (inner, subjective, and private) experiences of the (external, public, and objective) world I share with others. By applying concepts from above at the same time as carrying upwards sensory input from below, such a hierarchy of self-correcting representations might indeed impose on neural input a continuous relaxing top-down person-level predictive and error-minimized conceptual representation of experience of its external and internal causes, conceiving these as internal states and external objects of which we are aware. In this what Freud called 'psychic acquisition'-the whole generative predictive model of the world we have attained in experience-would, as he and other early neuroscientists supposed, reside in the (backward, modulating, inhibitory) connections between neurons over the interlinked representation-producing hierarchies of the brain.7 And because the initial parameters of such producers are set by evolution, the model of the world they compose on the basis of sensory input will likely depict it as emotionally significant, motivationally engaging, and presenting opportunities for life-sustaining activity (Friston, 2003, 2010a,b).8 Also, by providing an account of the brain as producing subjective experience of the self as experiencing an objective world, the account serves to fill out previous discussions of consciousness,9 and materials to resolve long-standing philosophical problems about consciousness as well.10 9. An example of confl ict in visual input We can plausibly see both the top-down and bottom-up working of these hierarchies in experiments with artificially induced binocular rivalry. These arrange for the right and left eyes to be given visual input depicting different objects, for example a face on the one hand and a house on the other. In such a situation the experiencing subject oscillates between these alternatives, seeing a face, and then a house, and then a face again, and so on, with elements of one alternative sometimes 'breaking through' before it dominates and the cycle goes on. As Hohwy et al. (2008) have argued, this is how we should expect visual experience in these circumstances to be, if the brain was working at higher levels to represent the input to the eyes as visual experience caused by the objects, that on a Bayesian account would be most likely to have done so. A brain representing input as caused by a house would not also represent that input as caused by a face. Since we never experience faces and houses (or other distinct types of material objects) in the same place at the same time, high-level representation-producers implementing the belief-and experienceinforming concepts face and house would antecedently set the probability of seeing a thing which gave sensory input as simultaneously from both as nil, as is reflected in our inability to vizualize such a thing. These concepts, therefore, will have a strong inbuilt relation of mutual disconfirmation or inhibition, so that initial top-down representation will be of the input as caused by one or the other, but nothing like both. Suppose the concept face initially dominates. Then the overall input will activate the concept face; the visual input will be represented as caused by a face; the experience will be one as of seeing a face; and modulatory and/or inhibitory predictions about probable input caused by a face will be sent back along the hierarchies for matching with the actual input coming forward from the eyes. On Bayesian calculations success in matching will raise the posterior probability that the input was caused by a face, and failure (= prediction error, or again free-energy) will lower it. In this case matching must fail, because no representation of the input as caused by a face will match that coming forward from the house-stimulated eye. Since this failure is uncorrectable-the input from the house-stimulated eye is veridical, and so cannot be explained as coming from perception of a face, and so cannot be 'explained away' by top-down use of the concept face-this failure will lower the posterior probability that the input is caused by a face so as to effect inhibition of the concept face and prompt activation of another. As before, the only concept that would be capable of matching the input-that of something which produces sensations as of seeing a face and house in the same place at the same time-will be ruled out as antecedently improbable and visually unrepresentable (even if it breaks through for a moment as tentative best hypothetical explanation). So now the concept house will dominate; the experience will be that of seeing a house; and the cycle will go on, as it is observed to do.11 10. Confl ict more general ly This illustrates the capacity of the Bayesian approach to provide a compelling account of the subjective content of experience; and at the same time it shows the remarkable ease with which the brain can alter consciousness so as to remove the effects of ongoing and veridical sensory input, in a process that could be taken as akin to Freudian repression. The experiment suggest that what is required for this is simply that the input to be suppressed/repressed is inconsistent with the dominant model that the brain is currently using to make sense of experience. In such Bayesian processes, as we recall, the brain is (i) 'optimiz[ing]. . . representation of the sensorium', by (ii) 'constructing 'top-down prior expectations about sensory samples from the world", by which the brain (iii) represents 'the causes of exteroceptive and interoceptive sensations'.12 With this in mind let us see how the example above can be understood in terms of managing conflict, and in a way which links it with Freud. We can do this in a series of stages, by describing (i) Conflict in current perception, but introducing Freudian terms for Bayesian functions as suggested by Berlin and Koch (2009); and then discussing (ii) Conflict among motives and emotions; and then (iii) Conflict of the kind described as Freudian in 'First-person authority and emotional conflict' above; and so finally (iv) The two basic kinds of Freudian conflict (as between motives directed at a single individual, internalized as conflict between parts or aspects of the self) illustrated in an example from Freud. (In the space available these sketches must perforce be brief and incomplete.) 11. Binocular r ivalry as concept-driven confl ict on two levels The first step is to observe that the example of binocular rivalry we have just considered can be taken as representing how the Bayesian brain works top-down as well as bottom up in seeking to manage conflict. From the top, the brain is seeking to impose incompatible (conflicting) concepts (face, house) on visual input, where this incompatibility is a product of prior assumptions in the underlying generative model. The use of these incompatible concepts, moreover, represents the real and veridical sensory inputs involved in the experiment as incompatible with one another, in the pragmatic sense that (despite their veridicality) each is bound to be treated as error while the other is represented in consciousness as experience of its cause. In consequence, the input kept split off from consciousness is thereby also kept insistent and active while it remains unconscious, in virtue of its role as error signal that cannot be eradicated. Input not subject to such conflict, is, as Friston says, 'explained away',13 by its representation as conscious experience of its cause. This contrast is important, for it indicates that (i) Such Bayesian conflict-suppressed unconscious sensory input as we find in the face/house case has a role closely analogous to that of material subject to Freudian repression, in the sense that it is perpetuated (as error signal) by being rendered unconscious. This entails that (so long as it is active) the input presses upward for conscious representation, and hence remains in causal and representational conflict with the dominant conceptual model. So also (ii) In contrast when non-conflictual input is represented in consciousness its 'energy' can be said to be fully 'bound' (put to use in psychic work) as opposed to 'free' (or at least as opposed to wasting in representational conflict). And in general, as we shall see, emotional conflict will appear as a source of free energy in the Bayesian as well as the Freudian uses of this notion. In addition, we can see that the processes which yield our conscious conceptually informed image of the world are themselves unconscious, and their activity is reflected in the manifest image only after events they represent have already occurred.14 12. Bayesian repression; the Bayesian conscious ego; sensory systems preconscious and unconscious, and a Bayesian superego With this in mind let us follow the lead of Berlin and Koch's (2009) 'Neuroscience meets Psychoanalysis' and substitute 'repression' for 'suppression' where this is appropriate in the Bayesian account. To do this we can: (i) Introduce the term 'dominant (top-down) conceptual model', as used above, for the (evidently vast and interconnected) set of conceptual representations the underlying generative model is currently employing to explain (away) input by representing it as conscious experience of its cause; and also (ii) Describe the veridical input currently successfully explained by the dominant conceptual model as accurately conceived (represented, etc.) in conscious experience (or in consciousness, etc.) as experience of its cause. (In the experiment this would apply first to input from the face-stimulated eye being successfully represented by the dominant conceptual model as visual experience of seeing a face; then to input from the house-stimulated eye being successfully represented by the dominant conceptual model as visual experience of seeing a house, and so on). This allows us to specify a kind of 12(a). General Bayesian repression For now we can describe as repressed and rendered unconscious all veridical sensory input which is accommodated by some conceptual (or proto-conceptual) model but kept from consciousness via conflict with the conceptual model which is dominant overall. This input will be repressed together with its accommodating models, as in the face/house case. (So while the concept face was dominant this would apply to the input to the house-stimulated eye, as accommodated by the concept house now in this unconscious role; and vice-versa as the concept house became dominant so that the conscious experience became that of seeing a house.) In this we do justice to the fact that material which is repressed (in this Bayesian sense) because of conflict between partly veridical models is not just veridical for the models that accommodate it. Rather, as the experiment illustrates, it may also be potentially veridical current conscious experience for the subject concerned. For if input is veridical at least as accommodated and repressed, there may also be a concept on which it would be a veridical part of the dominant model-if only the brain could frame or use this concept, as in the face/house example it cannot do. So overall this gives 12(b). A coherent Bayesian conscious ego, inhibiting and modulating downwards and also interacting with subpersonal systems which deliver information This in turn means that we can roughly but reasonably regard the dominant conceptual model as constituting a conscious ego. For: (i) The dominant conceptual model, like the Freudian Ich, continuously determines the conscious experience of the subject, both as regards awareness of objects in her external environment and also as regards awareness of her own internal states of mind. (That is: according to the Helmoltz/Bayes account, this set of currently cohering conceptual models really is now producing in each of us our overall conscious image of ourselves in the world.15) In addition: (ii) This ego, as we will suggest in more detail later, is continually repressing and keeping unconscious both veridical neural input and veridical models of ourselves which accommodate this input, but which are in conflict with the dominant model. (For again in the face/house case the conscious representation of a house [face] is repressed and rendered unconscious, not because the veridical house-input [face-input] from the sensorium has ceased pressing upward, seeking expression in consciousness; but rather because use of the concept house [face] which accommodates this input has itself been repressed or inhibited.) Again, as we have seen, repression of this (Bayesian) kind must serve to keep the repressed sensory input and accommodating models alive and seeking expression, as this is underwritten by its role as errorsignal that cannot be explained away. (And by now such repression of what does not fit the dominant conceptual model may start seriously to remind us of Freud's claim discussed above in 'First-person authority and emotional conflict', that the 'earliest parental imagos' become recessive but also remain active, owing to their banishment from consciousness.) Also (iii) This ego should interact in a holistic way with subpersonal representation-processing mechanisms-those whose workings are not such as to enter consciousness, but nonetheless inform it. Thus we have subpersonal neural mechanisms which enable us to make and hear sequences of sounds as utterances of sentences expressing thoughts, hopes, desires, threats, etc. Such mechanisms are studied in various ways throughout the mental sciences, and their operations encompass other executive functions that Freud assigned to the ego. Finally (iv) As well as interacting with subpersonal mechanisms this ego will interact with other currently repressed person-level conceptual representations, such as those primed by current experience and ready for interpreting what is in the offing, as well as others relatively remote from predicted experience but ready to enter if required (e.g. to represent a barely noticed movement in the shadows, or an approaching figure, as the dangerous predator it may turn out to be.) Overall these observations suggest that we can regard such an ego's effectiveness and cohesion as depending on the adequacy and coherence of the agent's (or the underlying generative model's) system of concepts. The elements of this will be able to activate, deactivate, and interanimate one another to produce experiences, beliefs, etc. in a side-by-side, cooperating, and holistic way, as the same time as each does its top-down work, again in cooperation with others, in using such beliefs to explain (away), and in this way to bind, input pressing up from the sensorium. Also we should expect the work of producing and using belief (and desire) in this way to be integrated with the use of memory (working and long-term, perceptual and executive) as described in Fuster (2009).16 12(c) Preconscious and unconscious systems, and a Bayesian superego We have so far considered two forms of person-level but repressed/suppressed unconscious functioning: (i) That of conceptual models ready to enter consciousness as required by perceptual input; and (ii) That of conceptual models accommodating one or another kind of veridical sensory input, but which are repressed because they conflict with the dominant conceptual model (as in the face/house case, or again those discussed by Freud). Of these (i) gives us a Bayesian preconscious and (ii) a Bayesian repressed unconscious, which has an overall causal structure strikingly similar to that delineated by Freud. And we can take a further step in Freudian rephrasing by considering another feature of the face/house example. What keeps the Bayesian ego in the perpetual conflict-driven oscillation we observe in this experiment? After all, the ego (or the underlying conceptual system or generative model) seems capable of creating a concept which would explain the novel input and resolve the conflict-that is, a concept of some sort of thing which produces sensory input as of seeing a face and house in the same place at the same time. For this seems to have been the concept the brain was trying to use-in the 'breakthrough' experiences described by participants-to explain the novel input it was confronted with; and (rescinding from impossibilities in visualization) this might have provided an accurate account of the cause of visual experience in the strange but real experimental set-up in which it actually found itself. We have implicitly been celebrating the Bayesian hierarchies as paradigms of powerful learning from experience: but in this case the system-in receipt of input that was both constant and veridical-remained a resolute non-learner. Rather it seems repeatedly to have strangled the new more predictively adequate idea each time it emerged, so as to go on with its now thoroughly discredited cycle of conflict-driven repression, using the now provably inadequate concepts face and house ... Here we can say that the underlying generative model, at the same time as acting as ego, was also acting as a kind of 12(d) conservative Bayesian conceptual superego,17 whose insistence on adherence to prior modes of thought prevented (it in its role as) the ego from employing a concept framed for this new case. (And although on the Helmoltz/Bayes account the brain works empirically with input from the beginning, such conservative conceptual favourites may enjoy legacy admission to consciousness on the basis of ancestral inheritance.) So we can say further that in this case the ego is caught between two masters, the conceptually conservative superego and the sensory id. Unprecedented but veridical faceand housestimulated input is pressing up from the id, seeking expression in consciousness. The concepts the ego naturally first employs for this are inadequate and incompatible, so that the ego perforce continually finds itself repressing veridical input, which therefore continues pressing upward, in a way that might be contained but must remain dynamically active. The ego itself might respond to the input in a way which meets its novelty, that is, by framing a concept of a sensory cause which would enable it to represent the input in consciousness, and so to end the cycle of conflict which the use of prior concepts generates. But the use of such a novel concept is continually aborted by the inbuilt conceptual conservatism of the superego. So the ego, divided against itself, oscillates in producing alternative conflicting states of conscious experience. This too has a certain fit with Freudian concepts: so perhaps something of this part of the Freudian picture is also Bayesian, even in the example we have been examining. 13. Requirements of a Freudian model Now of course even if such redescriptions can be made to reproduce Freud's own, they fall far short of yielding a genuinely Freudian model. The face/house example may instantiate notions of conflict and repression, but it plainly lacks the core Freudian features of emotional conflict and long-term but repressed and active experiential autobiographical memory. Still it provides an account of something which seems akin to hysterical or hypnotically induced sensory illusion or blindness; and Berlin and Koch (2009) suggested the use of 'repression' in binocular rivalry precisely to facilitate comparison with cases of this kind. Thus they cite the patient described in 'Blind and sighted in one person', by Waldvogel et al. (2007). This patient, who suffered from dissociative identity disorder, was originally diagnosed with cortical blindness. She recovered sight after 15 years of psychotherapy. This must have focused on the severe emotional conflicts characteristic of this disorder, which are shown in the dissociations which constitute its symptoms. Her step-by-step recovery, moreover, permitted comparative electroencephalographic (EEG) evaluation of alternating blind and sighted states. This indicated that while blind the patient maintained greatly reduced activity in her primary visual cortices-even while facing input to her eyes which caused readily detectable cortical activation when she was sighted. As Berlin and Koch report, there is no known mechanism by which such an effect could be consciously produced by a subject with open eyes and capable of sight. So this finding (like many others less clearly documented) seems to imply that the brain can intervene at an early stage to suppress visual input, even before it reaches visual cortex. At present there seems no better explanation for such findings than a Bayesian process of the kind we have been describing, but which turns on unconscious emotional conflict of the kind delineated by Freud.18 So how should we extend our discussion to take such conflict into account? 14. Assigning a ful ler role to interoceptive input As already noted, the sources of sensory input which the brain represents as awareness of motives such as thirst and a desire to drink would appear to be those of the interoceptive system, as recently delineated by Craig (see 2009, 2010). In light of this we can follow Solms and Turnbull (2002) in describing the 'inner world' of the interoceptive sensorium by reference to the empirical tradition of affective neuroscience which includes Panksepp (1998), Damasio (1999), and Damasio et al. (2000). Accordingly the neural inputs we are aware of as various forms of motive or emotion-as thirst, or wanting to explore or play, or as feeling the pain (or panic) of separation, or again as rage or fear or wanting to find something out, would trace back 1. To the hierarchies (which on the present account might also be Bayesian) of the 'multi-tiered and evolutionarily set neural mechanism aimed at maintaining organismic homeostasis' in terms of which Damasio and his colleagues (2000, p1049) conceive both homeostasis and emotion, or again 2. To the 'multiple prototype emotional regulatory systems' which Watt and Panksepp (2009, p. 93) describe as 'sitting over homeostasis proper (hunger, thirst, temperature regulation, pain, etc.)' and 'giving rise to attachment', or again, 3. To the process of attachment itself, which Watt and Panksepp (2009, p. 93) describe as establishing the 'massive regulatory-lynchpin system of the human brain'. This system exercises a 'primary [top-down, which again on the present account might also be Bayesian] influence over the prototype systems below'. This would allow us to extend the Helmoltz/Bayes approach to the emotional and motivational depths of the limbic and subcortical areas of the brain, and at the same time directly to consider the sources of emotional conflict involving 'the earliest parental imagos' to which Freud assigned a prototypical role. As he stressed, 'the major needs' provide 'endogenous stimuli' which the brain cannot escape (1895, p. 297). Their demands may conflict, in the sense that they cannot be met by the same patterns of activity; and the infant depends entirely upon its carers for their satisfaction. So here we can also bring a long-standing tradition of empirical psychology to our aid. For while the establishment of these early prototypes (or the proto-concepts which embody them) should be regarded as among the first and most basic empirical tasks of the brain, this process has also been studied intensively in the fields of attachment and developmental psychology. These have recorded an important range of experimental and statistical results. 15. Interoception, motivation, and free energy Even in the deep interoceptive cases we are considering, the sensory inputs we experience as motives are characteristically made conscious in terms of feeling and desire. For it is by producing desire that such input in turn produces intentional action aimed at correcting whatever internal disequilibrium -homeostatic or emotional – is producing free energy (= error in prior calculations as to what action would be optimal.) This is readily illustrated by the thirsty agent we have been considering, who will naturally convert her depictive representation of the environment, which shows a glass of water in front of her, into an action-directing representation, in the form of a desire now to reach out to get that glass and drink from it. Such a representation perforce also predicts her own forthcoming sensory experience, including the experience of satisfying her own desire via the bodily movements leading to and including her drinking water from the glass. So she then straightway acts to make these predictions about the course of her own experience come true, thereby confirming the model of herself in the world on the basis of which these predictions are being formed. (This is the process Friston et al. (2010, p. 6) describe as 'sampl[ing] the world to ensure our predictions become a selffulfilling prophecy'.19 But here this appears in the commonsense form of intentional action aimed at the satisfaction of desire. Such action has two distinct sorts of consequences, which are temporally coordinated: (i) In the short term, the predicted experience of satisfaction (in this case, that of drinking) pacifies the just-generated desire to drink on which the agent has acted, and so suspends the Freudian 'demand for work' embodied in that desire. This allows the agent to turn to other tasks, while the deeper homeostatic adjustment caused by the water she has just taken into her body gets under way. (ii) In the longer term, the water makes its way into the agent's bloodstream, where it accomplishes the work of restoring the original homeostatic imbalance while the agent's desire relating to this remains pacified.20 16. Desire and predict ive representation At this stage it may be worth making more explicit how these hypothesized processes fit with the commonsense psychology with which we began. We know that desires are causes of actions which satisfy them, and that they are pacified-caused to cease to operate-by the experience of their satisfaction. So designating our agent by 'A' and abbreviating 'desire' by 'des' and the appropriate causal relations by '' we can represent the lifecycle of a desire to drink such as we have been discussing as follows. 17. Phases in the satisfaction and pacification of desire A des that A drinks  A drinks  A experiences, believes that A drinks  A's des that A drinks pacified And since this applies to any desire which prompts satisfying action, we can schematize it in a general way by: A des P  P  A exps, bels P  A des P pacified In this artificially simple but schematic representation we find four phases in predictive and causal sequence: (i) The inception of desire in A des P. This, in the discussion above, reflects the initial working of the brain in representing the internal sensory input caused by a lack of water as an experience of its cause (thirst), and hence as generating a further internal cause, namely a desire for action which will relieve the thirst, and in this way will address the underlying homeostatic imbalance. (ii) The satisfaction of desire, in A des P  P, in which the agent actually drinks; and the latter as acting (iii) As in P  A exps, bels P, which represents the sequence of believed and veridical experiences (experiences of satisfaction) of the agent's satisfaction of her desire. These are the experiences predicted both by the agent's thirst and her desire to drink, which as sensory predictions the agent herself makes come true; and finally, (iv) A exps, bels P  A des P pacified. This represents the pacification of the agent's desire to drink which follows upon her experiences of quenching her thirst by drinking in (2) and (3) above. According to the exposition here this is the first phase of the Bayesian version of 'explaining away' which applies to an internal cause of experience such as thirst or a desire to drink.21 18. A contrast between external and internal causes of experience Thus overall we are placing the perceptual experiences of satisfying desire together with those involved in the formation of beliefs about faces and houses at the highest conceptual levels of the Bayesian hierarchy. As noted, however, there is an important contrast between them. In the formation of beliefs about faces and houses on the basis of sensory input the higher conceptual levels suppress input coming from sensory sources below by predicting their activity as caused by experience of objects external to the self. In the formation of beliefs about internal phenomena such as thirst and desire, the conceptual levels likewise represent sensory input as experience of causes, and in this case also endow us with first-person authority about (many of) these causes, as discussed above in 'First-person authority and emotional conflict'. But in the interoceptive case this is often only the first step in a series which leads through intentional action and the accompanying experiences of satisfaction to corrective alterations in the underlying homeostatic or emotional/motivational processes which are the ultimate sources of the desires with which we are concerned. Here, on the present account, the wheel comes full circle. In veridical perception of the environment in general the higher personal and conceptual levels suppress (relax) the lower, by successfully predicting their input as caused by, and so as experience of, external objects. In the perception of the self in desire-satisfying action, by contrast, the hitherto lowly inputs from the external senses suppress (relax) the higher levels, by pacifying the person-level desires and intentions which both predict and cause these inputs, while the activities of satisfaction themselves bring deeper homeostatic or motivational changes. Insofar as this is correct the final units in all hierarchies to be affected in such a cycle of successful action will be those in at the bases of the 'multi-tiered and evolutionarily set' mechanisms for homeostasis and emotion envisaged by Damasio and his colleagues.22 These subcortical networks-which in this account we can see as psychologically as well as physiologically the most fundamental-are the final targets of the quieting of internal disequilibrium (or error or free-energy) effected by getting a drink that one had previously come to desire. Their silencing marks the recovery of a satisfied mind. 19. Attachment and infanti le emotion and experience The central role of attachment-the forming of basic emotional bonds between the infant and its carers, among whom the mother is statistically foremost-is apparent from consideration of the basic (homeostatic, emotional, regulatory, motivational) systems in (1), (2), and (3) above. For these systems enjoy inbuilt relations of excitation and inhibition, and come connected for expression via the newborn's face, voice, and movements. Their early and vigorous activity-for example in a hungry baby's uniquely demanding, distressing, penetrating, and mobilizing cry-is the helpless human infant's main means of directing parental attention to its needs and enforcing investment that will fulfil them and so enable it to thrive. The ensuing dialectic of demand on the part of the infant and satisfaction (or non-satisfaction) on the part of the mother (or other carers) provides the context of what are arguably the most important experiences of life. These are the early experiences of the self as relating to others in a context structured by the basic needs and emotions of the self, which are as yet unknown by the self. These experiences shape the infant's cortex (and hence its nascent and growing concepts) as it begins its own process of post-natal development, via critical phases of synaptic growth, myelination, and experience-dependent neural pruning. Such neural development thus coincides with the infant's use of its experience-and particularly experience of its interactions with the investing mother23-to start to build representations of its own self and the internal causes of its own behaviour as in relation to the other objects of its experiences and emotions. In light of this it appears (1) that we should see complex human feelings as rooted in the orchestration of the basic subcortical mechanisms of homeostasis, motivation/emotion, and attachment, as these have become both corticalized and socialized over the evolution of our familial, articulate, and group-forming species; and (2) that the basic representations fostering this orchestration are achieved via cortical development under the impact of the infant's early experiences of relationship and in contexts first prompted and regulated by these basic subcortical mechanisms. For during this early period the mother responds to her baby's expressions as the principal satisfier of homeostatic needs, pacifier of various forms of distress, provider of opportunities to learn, and securer of ease and peace of mind. So she is, for example, the main object of reward-seeking exploration (Panksepp, 1998), and so the main source of the pleasures of liking, the compulsions of wanting, and the experiences of learning (Smith, Berridge and Aldridge, 2011) as these relate to every source of internal and external sensory input. Again, she is the first partner in play, protoconversation, and other pleasurable social interactions, and the first to be missed, yearned for, or grieved. But then also, in her inevitable shortcomings in such essential respects, this very same mother is the first easily discernable external candidate for the role of cause of all forms of deprivation and frustration. Her imperfect timing (or imposition of order or schedule) is the first salient external cause of hunger, or again of the panic of distress at separation, which in early life might well be as felt threatening loss of all resource. So she is also the first object of full-throated rage and deepseated anxiety and fear, as expressed (perhaps together with distress at separation) in primordial form in a hungry infant's raging cry. Wittgenstein once remarked that 'Anyone who listens to a child's crying with understanding will know that psychic forces, terrible forces, sleep within it, different from anything commonly assumed. Profound rage and pain and lust for destruction' (1998, p. 4e). This may seem exaggerated; but we should bear in mind that our conception of infancy should allow for more than the notion of adorable babies we are all subject to. In particular it should also allow for the development of the astonishing aggression, hatred, and cruelty that we know to characterize our species, particularly as we engage in group conflict. It should therefore not surprise us if such emotions are also rooted in infancy. And researchers on aggression now seem agreed, as Tremblay reports, that aggression is at its most impulsive and forcible early in life, so that from infancy onwards 'rather than learning to physically aggress, children are learning not to physically aggress' (2004, p. 403). In addition such early and survival-promoting expression of rage, fear, and distress at separation occur during the first postnatal stage of parent/offspring conflict (Trivers, 2002, discussed in relation to psychoanalysis in Hopkins, 2003, 2004), and hence when the infant's own genetic interests are most strongly opposed to those of its mother, father, and siblings. From the point of view of the infant and its genome, the mother's body and her will are the key to all resources. Their subjugation and exploitation will enable it to thrive, and without this it risks wasting and death. So it is not beyond possibility that at this time the infant should represent the mother's body as comparable to a territory it must conquer to live, and the father and other siblings (real or imaginary) as potentially life-threatening rivals, to be dealt with later. 20. Bayesian explanation in infanti le experience Finally, we must consider that it may well be deeply in the nature of the case that in early infancy the mother may be (proto-) hated and (proto-) blamed in her infant's mind or imagination, and very far in excess of her actual shortcomings or derelictions. For her infant's Bayesian brain must perforce from the beginnings of consciousness seek to represent a cause for every experience of anxiety, suffering, and pain. And what more salient candidate can there be, than some version of the breast and/or body of the mother the baby is already shaping its brain through learning to represent? Likewise we must consider that the infant may already be deploying early infantile versions of the high-level principles which will later govern the representation of faces and houses in the way we saw in the experiment above. In this case as the infant's experience oscillates between bad and good, its developing brain may at first construct different early episodic real and/or virtual objects as causes of its radically differing-some times very good, sometimes very bad-episodes of experience. (Early conceptual and emotional developments are discussed in more detail in Hopkins, 1987.) Thus it should be regarded as a serious possibility on a Bayesian account that the infant might imagine a very good breast or maternal figure as the cause of its good or pleasurable experiences, and a distinct and very bad breast or maternal figure as cause of bad; and these would go with correlative experience of itself as in relation to such part-objects as well.24 For in the case of the human infant, as our discussion from the next section onwards will indicate, we must consider not only its developing model of its mother or other carers, but also its developing image of itself and its own internal states. These will clearly have complex interrelationships, but it seems likely that insofar as the infant feels itself as in contact with others who are good, it will more likely structure its own model of itself accordingly, and similarly for bad. (We will consider some evidence relating to this shortly.) Moreover insofar as the infant's (or child's) dominant model of itself excludes other models, we may expect the suppression of the excluded models to approximate Freudian repression very closely. So-to take one of many possible scenarios-suppose an infant or child does form an image of its mother or father which provokes its own anger, resentment, and fear to a very high degree. And suppose also that the child needs to cooperate with that same parent, and also has love and affection for her or him, so that models in which child and parent apparently have good relations dominate the alternatives. In this case the child will have a genuine but repressed emotional conflict, in which feelings of anger, resentment, and fear-like input in the face/house case-will remain unconscious but permanently liable to activation in its mind. (Will remain, in Bayesian terms, likely to arise as ineradicable error-signal apparently contradicting the dominant model.) 21. Emotional confl ict in infancy We have good reason to believe that there are such conflicts. For we have just seen that during early infancy the infant directs powerful positive and negative emotions towards one and the same thing, namely its mother. This would seem to constitute a kind of natural liability in our species to emotional conflict of this kind. So such conflicting emotions, and the representations which drive them, would seem to require to be resolved or mitigated by the time the infant comes to conceive of its mother as a single enduring object-for otherwise the infant would scarcely be able to relate to her in a coherent way. Experiments on anger suggest that the baby's developing representations progressively regulate its emotions in this way. In particular, as the baby comes to organize a representation of its mother as bodily and psychologically whole, it changes the expression of anger from direction at bodily parts, so that by seven months it directs anger to the face of the person with whom it is angry; and it does this with a selectivity which shows that it has come to depend on the mother for comfort in coping with the intrusions of strangers, and so is liable to be particularly angry when she fails to play this role.25 Also some evidence suggests that the baby begins to represent its mother as a single lasting (and therefore unique and irreplaceable) being during the fourth month of life, as Melanie Klein, the psychoanalyst who laid greatest emphasis on this development, hypothesized.26 22. Unresolved confl ict and insecurity in attachment Still the resolution achieved in early infancy is often strikingly incomplete, in the sense that representations laid down before the end of the first year may leave the individual liable to emotional conflicts which remain active throughout life. This is demonstrated by the basic measure of security of attachment, the 'strange situation' procedure devised by Ainsworth. This is used on infants of 12 months, so that its administration has been preceded by a series of typical developments. These include (1) the phases of regulation of anger apparent by seven months;27 (2) those of distress at separation from the mother and fear of strangers which arise together at about eight months; and (3) the consequent consolidation of joint attention in an intersubjective and more fully communicative and cooperative relationship with the mother by about 10 months. In the strange situation the mother cooperates with the experimenters in exposing the infant to successive short episodes of (1) encountering a stranger, (2) being left with the stranger, (3) being left entirely alone, and (4) being left entirely alone and then having to cope with the attentions of the stranger. So this procedure (in which each episode is terminated if it proves too upsetting) rouses the distress at separation and fear of strangers the infant has recently overcome, and with this its desires for comforting contact with the mother with whom it has recently consolidated a cooperative relationship. But of course it also rouses the anger the infant has long shown towards the mother whenever she defects from the protective and comforting roles on which the infant has come to rely, and left it, as on this occasion, alone, fearful, and at the mercy of a stranger in increasingly stressing ways. The criteria demarcating secure from insecure attachment, in turn, mainly consist in expressions of conflict as between the anger and fear prompted by the procedure and the infant's desire to be comforted. Babies designated as secure resolve this conflict fairly readily despite their evident distress, and are soon comforted and able to return to exploration and play. Avoidant infants, by contrast, may seem unaffected by separation, but 'stiffen' with anger when mother tries to comfort, and consequently remain stressed for longer. Ambivalent infants alternate 'bids for contact with signs of angry rejection'; and disorganized infants seem 'incoherent', making 'interrupted movements' or 'contradictory sequences or simultaneous behavioral displays' while giving 'indications of fear/apprehension' towards the mother. (Solomon and George, 2008, p. 387). This indicates that the behaviours criterial for insecurity of attachment can also be seen as manifestation of early emotional conflict, rooted in images of the parents, and particularly the mother. These early patterns of conflict, in turn, can be seen to influence behaviour and development in myriad and often deleterious ways, and throughout the whole of life (Cassidy and Shaver, 2008, III, IV, V). Indeed the most serious cases of conflict, those exhibited by infants classed as disorganized, seem to exhibit a kind of oscillatory incoherence reminiscent of an internal version of the face/house example. Their contradictory sequences of behaviour, often seeming to attempt approach while manifesting fear and/or avoidance at the same time, seem just the sort of sequences which might flow from failing management of conflict in regard to experience of emotion felt towards the mother. (And for such infants more successful management of conflict, tellingly, seems to come only years later, and in the form of a permanent predisposition to behaviour which attempts to control the untrusted object of emotion, often by violent means.28) 23. Internal ization of relat ionships by the creation of imaginary internal f igures (vir tual others) To understand the nature of the superego we must also consider another psychoanalytic claim. This is that we humans achieve our remarkable sociality partly by a particular use of the imagination. From early in life, and even when we are alone, we constantly imagine ourselves as in relation to others-virtual internal others-who have various kinds of relationships to us in our minds. We thus constantly in effect construct internal models of ourselves as in relation to others. We can use such models both for regulation and for learning; for in establishing such virtual figures, good and bad, we thereby create internal sources of reward and punishment, and hence of experience which can be evoked in a variety of simulatory ways. It is easy to see this in the play of children. Thus take a child who watched her mother breaking eggs to make a cake, and was told not to break more eggs herself. She was later found saying 'No!' (as to an imaginary figure) and then turning and gleefully breaking an egg, and repeating the process again and again. In this we can see her as reworking and modifying the experience of moral prohibition, by enacting the role of prohibitor (in identification with the mother from whom she had received a prohibition shortly before) and then enacting the role of prohibitee, while replaying the situation as one in which the prohibitee obtains gratification by defying the prohibitor. (And of course there might be some significance in the fact that the prohibited objects were eggs, and so things which might be unconsciously imagined as potential siblings.) In all this, the sensory inputs of the original episode of conflict between parent and child were being both internalized and modified. They were being reworked in terms of experiences, feelings, and actions on the part of the self as in relation to internal imaginary figures who were saying 'No!' to one another and also having 'No!' said to themselves. Freud (1920) discusses an earlier but similar example, concerned with the reworking and management of separation distress, in the game of an 18-month-old child; and the countless roles we can see children assume, repeat, and modify in their imaginative play-as good mother or bad sister to a doll, as destroyer of an attacking monster, etc.-testify to the ubiquity of this phenomenon. 24. The importance of internal ized punishment Together with Klein (Freud, 1930, p. 130, 138; Klein, 1946) Freud took such virtual internal figures to be laid down from infancy in proto-conceptual memory from early and bodily phases. These figures were also able to produce virtual sensory input, as we observe in play and also regularly produce for ourselves when we daydream, ruminate, talk to ourselves, etc. (And we gain a Freudian-and perhaps depressing-perspective on the nature of such imaginative activity when we consider that aids and amplifications for imaginative engrossment in forms of sexuality and aggression are particularly popular on the internet.) Freud's and Klein's observations on the nature of such imagined figures in the minds of children also partly overlap with work in attachment.29 Freud described the 'good' figures laid down in this way in terms of an ego ideal. But he also found that the creation of punitive, cruel, and moralistic figures of this kind served as a principal means by which individuals regulated their aggressive impulses towards members of their families and other ingroups. Such figures were in effect internal repositories of the child's own aggression, as personified in images of others as potentially punitive and retaliatory. But by imagining itself as in relation to such figures, the child modified its own dispositions to aggression via fear of retaliation and punishment from dominant others, and by the development of guilt, shame, remorse, and other social emotions towards them. In this case, however, psychological investigation showed the relevant internal figures to be extraordinarily dominating, punitive, and cruel. (And they often appear as monstrous and frightening in nightmares, such as that of the terrifying paternal figure described in Obama, 2008, 370ff.). 25. Internalized punishment in depression and schizophrenia The internal ferocity of such self-directed aggression often appears clearly in depression and schizophrenia, and in both unconscious and conscious forms. Thus Elyn Saks (2008) describes her depression and schizophrenia in terms the internalization of moralistic aggression. As she became depressed, her thoughts started to run along lines such as I am not sick. I'm just a bad, defective, and evil person. Maybe if I would talk less I wouldn't spread my evil around (Saks, 2008, p. 58). They then went further, e.g. to I am a piece of shit and I deserve to die. I am a piece of shit and I deserve to die. I am a piece of shit and I deserve to die (Saks, 2008, p. 61). 26. Depression, self-directed anger, and the superego That these expressions of self-dissatisfaction were also instances of aggression directed by her against her own self emerged particularly clearly, when with antidepressant medication her depression lifted for a time. She told her doctor 'Strangely, I feel less angry', and reports 'Not until that moment did I realize how much rage I had felt, directed mostly at myself' (Saks, 2008, p. 69). This role of aggression was described clearly by Freud, where he says that the depressed individual 'represents his ego to us as worthless, incapable of any achievement and morally despicable; he reproaches himself, vilifies himself and expects to be cast out and punished ... We see how in him one part of the ego [later to be called the superego] sets itself over against the other, judges it critically, and, as it were, takes it as its object' (1917, pp. 246-7). 27. Disintegration of the superego in schizophrenia Saks' passage from depression into schizophrenia (or depressive psychosis) consisted partly in such a superego disintegrating into a group of virtual others who were insidious moralistic persecutors. Thus she describes how her internal presences began to multiply and change their role, as she herself began to lose her sense of agency in relating to them. As she says 'thoughts crashed into my mind like a fusillade of rocks someone or something was hurling at me-fierce, jagged, and uncontrollable ... You are a piece of shit. You don't deserve to be around people. You are nothing. Other people will see this. They will hate you. They will hate you and want to hurt you. They are powerful. You are weak. You are nothing' (Saks, 2008, p. 83). Finally she 'began to feel I was receiving commands' from 'shapeless powerful beings that controlled me with thoughts (not voices) that had been placed in my head. Walk through the tunnels and repent. Now lie down and don't move. You are evil (Saks, 2008, p. 84). As she was so evil she was commanded to inflict pain on herself, and accordingly started burning herself in various ways, unable to tell others why. At last she spent most of her time alone 'in the music room or in the bathroom, burning my body, or moaning and rocking, holding myself as protection from unseen forces that might harm me' (Saks, 2008, p. 86). 28. Confl ict and Freudian wishfulf i lment This brings us to Freud and unconscious and internalized emotional conflict, which Freud related to free energy.30 Given the stage-setting so far, we will be able to address such conflict only briefly. We can start with a simple example closely related to the one we have already worked through. 29. Wishfulf i lment and the management of confl ict Freud observed that during the night after he had eaten anchovies or some other salty food he was liable to dream that he was drinking delicious cool water. After several repetitions of this dream, he would wake up, feel his thirst, and get up to get a drink. This dream is a clear example of what Freud regarded as wishfulfilment: that is, as a representation (i) caused by, and (ii) representing the satisfaction of, One or more of the agent's desires or wishes. The desire in this case was Freud's desire to drink, which evidently caused him to wake after several repetitions of the wishfulfilling dream. The dream seems to have temporarily pacified this desire, which it also entirely masked from his dreaming consciousness, together with the thirst in which it originated.31 Freud took this wishfulfilment as produced by his ego in order to manage a conflict between his thirst and his wish to sleep-or again between his thirst and the homeostatic mechanisms protecting sleep, to which he assimilated dreaming. We can see some aspects of this conflict-managing process by contrasting the pattern of this dream with that of rational and successful action abstracted above. For such action we have A des P [A drinks]  P [A drinks] A exps, bels P [A drinks]  A des P pacified. In this, as we supposed above, the experiences of satisfaction predicted by the desire serve to pacify it, while its actual satisfaction obtained by drinking addressed the homeostatic imbalance in which it was rooted. In the dream, by contrast, we have A des P [A drinks]  A dream-exps bels P [A drinks]  A des P temporarily pacified. Here, in Freudian terms, the ego (= generative model in one role) apparently short-circuits the route which in action goes via real satisfaction, by producing an illusory or hallucinatory version of the experience of satisfaction predicted by the desire. This illusory experience of satisfaction, on Freud's account, permits sleep to continue.32 The dream thus instantiates an internal version of suppression/repression such as we saw in the house/face case and have elaborated in Freudian terms. In this case, however, the brain is dealing with an internal cause of sensory input which would be represented in consciousness as the experience of thirst or a desire to drink. So it has apparently repressed (and suspended the operation of) this desire rapidly and directly, by producing an internal representation of the experience of satisfaction the desire predicts. This, as Freud supposed, would seem tailored by his ego to enable him (for the time being) to sleep on; and it is done as the Bayesian brain would do, if, as seems possible, it was acting in the interests of homeostasis to keep motivational arousal from causing what it (as ego) calculated would be an uneconomic interference with sleep. But after a short time, apparently-thirst being such a demanding internal cause-the calculations changed in favour of satisfying the desire, and woke Freud up. From the point of view of Freud's rational consciousness, however, this neurologically intelligible way of managing conflict related to internal sensory input appears as a kind of perfect and allencompassing miniature hallucination, in which the deluded dreaming subject utterly obliterates both what is happening in his mind and how things are in the world. For if we take things in commonsense terms, the real underlying state of the dreamer's mind is that he is (unconsciously) thirsty and wanting a drink, and the relevant fact about the world is that he is lying supine in bed and doing absolutely nothing about this. At the same time, however, his dreaming brain (as ego) is producing a double denial of reality, in which he imagines that he is not thirsty but rather enjoying the slaking of thirst; and that he is not passive, frustrated, and asleep, but rather awake and experiencing his own activity in satisfying his desire. So overall the brain (generative model, conceptual system, ego) is temporarily producing a situation such that if that situation were prolonged it would die. This double denial of reality is inherent in Freudian wishfulfilment. In dreams it is clearly harmless, and indeed one might be inclined to suppose that the intense wishfulfilling illusions of dreaming play a role in some form of learning, perhaps in coordination with the process of homeostatic synaptic 'renormalizing' which Greene and Frank (2010) consider in connection with slow-wave sleep. The situation, however, is otherwise in symptoms of mental disorder, as we can see in a slightly more complex case. 30. Symptom, id, and superego The main symptom of Freud's (1909) patient the Rat Man was his compulsive involuntary repetition of episodes of vividly imagining-as if stuck in a waking nightmare-that his beloved (and longdeceased) father and/or the woman whose affection he sought were being subjected to a terrible torture, in which rats ate their way into his body from behind, causing an agonizing death. This, not surprisingly, made him anxious, guilty, and depressed; and he constantly sought to prevent or undo the occurrence of this torture via a variety of obsessional activities. Since this symptom was a cause of guilt and depression, the wishfulfilment may not be as obvious as in the dream of drinking. Still it is quite within the scope of common sense, confronted with someone who compulsively represents another as undergoing a terrible torture, to suppose that hostility on the part of the former towards the latter may be somewhere in the offing. (Similarly one might expect to find sexual desire in the case of somebody who compulsively imagined sexual activity: and compare how we react to in real life when we find that a priest or pedagogue assists his own imaginings with pornography involving children.) And although Freud's analysis of this case is too complex to be discussed in detail here, he did encounter a broad range of evidence that the Rat Man harboured deep unconscious hostility towards his father, and that this was rooted in images of his father as frightening, punitive, and prohibitive, which he both remembered and projected on to Freud during the course of his analysis (Freud, 1909 as discussed in Hopkins, 1982). On this account the symptom is analogous to the simple dream discussed just above. We have the pattern: A des P [A's father tortured]  A imaginarily exps, bels P [A's father tortured]  A's des P temporarily pacified. As in the example of the dream, this pacification of desire can be seen as a Bayesian repression serving to manage conflict. In this case, however, the conflict to which the pacified desire is part is a full-fledged Freudian conflict of the kind considered at the outset, involving basic emotions, longterm (but repressed) autobiographical memory, and a ferociously self-critical and thought-inhibiting part of the self. So here the conflicts among the superego, ego, and id, as sketched earlier in our proto-Freudian description of the face/house case, can be seen as the Freudian real thing. 31. The confl ict ing models in this case In this example the dominant conceptual model-as expressed in the patient's partly faulty firstperson authority-represented the patient and his father as having always been affectionate best friends. For this reason, according to the patient, it was unbelievable that he should harbour any hostility towards his father, who, among other things, had always treated him gently. His associations, however, sometimes qualified this: after one denial, for example, he recalled a story about a woman who had wished that her sister might die so that she could marry her husband, and had committed suicide for being so viscious. He said that it would be fair if he too were to die because of his imaginings, for he deserved nothing less. As this indicated, there was an alternative and repressed model of his relationship with his father, which had been active from his early childhood. This emerged and was revised and partly dissipated in the course of his analysis. In this recessive model the father was represented as punitive, prohibitive, and frightening, and the child as his terrified victim. 32. The ego and the id This conflict in the patient's feelings towards his father was reflected in one between the ego, here taken as the set of conceptual models dominant in the patient overall, and his id, taken as the locus of the subcortical sources of interoceptive input from homeostasis and emotion, particularly rage and fear)., These emotions were apparently mediated by conflicting models of himself as in relation to his parents, presumably formed in infancy and childhood, as reviewed above. For since his images of his father as punitive and terrifying were inconsistent with the dominant model, they-together with the feelings and desires for retaliation they aroused in the patient-had long been excluded from conscious awareness. In consequence they remained liable to activation in which, in dynamic conflict with the ego, they pressed upwards for expression in consciousness (as a signal of error which was unintelligible on the dominant model, and so could not be explained away). 33. Childhood Confl ict. The patient reported that he had been obsessive, depressed, and preoccupied with his father's death since the age of six, which he described as 'the beginning of my illness'; and this was apparently linked with representations of his father and his own sexual gratification as in some sort of lethal opposition. Thus he described how at six he wanted to see girls naked, but had 'an uncanny feeling' that if he thought such things something bad might happen, which, as in his present illness, he had to prevent-such as, that his father might die. Thus, as he said, 'Thoughts about my father's death occupied my mind from a very early age and for a long period of time, and greatly depressed me'. (1909a, p.162) The model from which such thoughts were drawn at six had apparently remained active but repressed in later life as well, as illustrated by his thinking, while first having intercourse, that 'One might do anything for this-murder one's father for example'. (1909b, p.264). It seems to have been activated in the particular way that led to his breakdown by his hearing the 'cruel Captain' describe the Rat torture applied to prisoners of war. As he heard the account he imagined that the lady he venerated and his father were being tortured in the same way, felt that he had now urgently to prevent this (even though his father had been dead for many years), and began a series of obsessional acts aimed at doing so. 34. Thinking and the superego Again as in the case with which we began, the patient (or his ego) was apparently capable of forming a concept, and engaging in a series of thoughts, which would explain his feelings and would serve to render them conscious. The first step, as Freud presented matters, was for the patient to consider that his imagining his father tortured in this distressing way might express hostility to his father which was in conflict with the love he also felt, and to try to explain this situation. (This could be done via the hypothesis that the hostility had been precipitated in some forgotten era of childhood, before his preoccupation with his father's death began.) The patient was able to consider this without difficulty in thinking of his lady. But he could not do so in the case of his father, even though he felt intense guilt towards him. This was an indirect indication of the way his inability to think about this topic (to mentalize, as discussed in the chapter by Fonagy and Luyten, this volume) was a consequence of fear and guilt generated by his superego.33 So his denials continued even after he acknowledged that he regularly used his rat phantasy to attack people to whom he was hostile, including thinking when he first heard Freud's fee 'So many florins, so many rats'. (1909a, p. 213) Indeed the denials only stopped after the analysis brought forward material we can see as relating to his superego, although this case history was written long before Freud explicitly framed this concept. In a particularly striking and dramatic episode, the patient came to feel terrified of Freud, feeling him to be a potential murderer, who might be about to 'fall on him like a beast of prey, to search out what was evil in him'. At the same time he began to remember and relive a beating he had received from his father as a little boy, when he had wet his parents' bed while lying between them. The reference to a beast which searched out evil by biting into the body enables us to see this as an image of the Rat Man's own (oral and bestial) superego, which was almost as murderous and sub-human as the rats he imagined attacking others. This is, of course, a different image than that of the terrifying figure in Obama's dream, or again the invasive persecutors whose presence Saks sometimes felt. But these figures illustrate a continuity between normal dreams, paranoid depressive phantasies, and the kind of phantasy experienced as real in psychoanalytic transference. (And when comparable transference phantasies were active in Saks, so that she was feeling her analyst as a potential murderer, she carried a knife to her sessions-which, of course, she never used.) 35. Revisions in conception and emotion This was a turning point in the analysis, which apparently enabled the patient to revise his image of his father, and so to continue to love him while accepting that he had thought him terrifying and dangerous as a child, and had perhaps wanted to hurt him in consequence. Likewise it enabled him to modify the anxiety and guilt engendered by his superego, and so to think more freely in talking with Freud. On this account, therefore, the same kind of conflict-engendering imagos as drove the wishes expressed in the patient's symptom had also been internalized to form a superego which punished him for his aggressiveness towards his father while at the same time as making it impossible for him to think about this aggression and so to understand it better. The effect of these imagos was thus to keep his ego oscillating between the imagined torture which pacified his uncorrected childhood rage and the guilt and depression he felt for imagining such things.34 The cycle ended only when the imagos were re-experienced, reconceived, and so altered in the way they produced emotion, in his work with Freud. 36. Freudian wishfulf i lment and pacif icatory repression Why? In an explicitly Bayesian context a further answer suggests itself, which coheres with accounts derived from Freud. We have already seen how emotional conflict involves, as well as free energy, a kind of situation we may suppose our generative models function to avoid. This was exemplified above in the overtly contradictory behaviour apparently produced by conflicting internal models of self and other maintained by infants with disorganized attachment. Given that the conflicting desires managed by the Rat Man's brain were simultaneously expressed in his imaging his deeply loved father (true in the long dominant conceptual model, and also true on realistic reflection over the course of his life) father being repeatedly subjected to terrible torture (expressing rage truly felt in early life, as registered in repressed and consequently active but recessive models) we can envisage that the expression of such desires via the patient's motor system would have been incoherent. So we may perhaps be able to see this patient's brain (conceptual system, generative model, ego) as pacifying these desires as soon they as they arose by the most direct means possible, that is- and as in the simple dream we considered above-by falsely but immediately representing the predictions to which the repressed desires gave rise as having been fulfilled. In this way the brain succeeded in suspending the working of such desires, in the absence of any real attempt at satisfaction. This dreamlike process of pacification, however, was also the symptom which rendered the patient anxious, depressed, and obsessional. So here, on this Bayesian account, the mechanism of expression/suppression/repression by which the brain pacifies desire in such a conflict would also partly constitute the illness from which the patient suffers. Given the space available, this sketch lacks detail. Still it may serve as an illustration of principle. Also, as consideration of hysteria and hypnosis suggest, a similar account might be applied to many other phenomena, including the case of 'Blind and sighted in the same person', which initially attracted the attention of Berlin and Koch. So in seeking to apply the kind of account illustrated here to further cases we might start to understand the Freudian unconscious as the natural product, in our conflicted species, of the management of conflict by the Bayesian brain. References Aydede, M. (2010). The language of thought hypothesis. In E.N. Zalta (ed.) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Fall 2010 edn. Online: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/language-thought/. Beebe, B., Jaffe, J., Markese, S., Buck, K., Chen, H., Cohen, P., Bahrick, L., Andrews, H., and Feldstein, S. (2010). The origins of 12-month attachment: A microanalysis of 4-month motherinfant interaction. Attachment and Human Development, 12(1), 3–141. Berlin, H and Koch, C.. (2009). Neuroscience meets psychoanalysis. Scientific American Mind, April/May, 16–19. Bower, T. (1977). Development in Infancy. San Francisco, CA: W.H. Freeman. Braten (1998) (ed.) Intersubjective Communication and Emotion in Early Ontogeny. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Campos, J.,Barret, K., Lamb, M., Goldsmith, H., and Stenberg, C. (1983) Socioemotional Development. In P. Mussen (ed) Handbook of Child Psychology, vol 3, New York: John Wiley. Carhart-Harris, R. and Friston, K. (2010). The default-mode, ego-functions and free-energy: a neurobiological account of Freudian ideas. Brain 133, 1265–1283. Carhart-Harris, R., Mayberg, H.,, Malizia, A., and Nutt, D. (2008). Mourning and melancholia revisited: correspondences between principles of Freudian metapsychology and empirical findings in neuropsychiatry. Annals of General Psychiatry, 7, 9. Cassidy, J. and Shaver, P. (2008). Handbook of Attachment. London: Guildford Press. Clark, A. Whatever Next? Unpublished Manuscript, communicated 2011. Craig, A. (2009). How do you feel-now? The anterior insula and human awareness. Nature Reviews. Neuroscience, 10, 59–70. Craig, A. (2010). The sentient self. In special issue, Brain Structure and Function, 214, 563. Damasio, A. (1999). The Feeling of What Happens. London: Vintage Books. Damasio, A., Grabowski, T., Bechara, A., Damasio, H., Ponto, L., Parvizi, J, and Hichwa, R. (2000). Activity during the feeling of self-generated emotions. Nature Neuroscience, 3(10), 1049. Dayan, P., Hinton, G., Neal, R., and Zemel, R. (1995). The Helmholtz machine. Neural Computation, 7, 1022–1037. Dennett, D. (1991). Consciousness Explained. New York, NY: Little Brown Publishers. Downes, S. (2010). Evolutionary psychology. In E.N. Zalta (ed.) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Fall 2010 edn. Online: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/evolutionarypsychology/. Doya, K., Ishi, S., Pouget, A., and Rao, R. (2007). Bayesian Brain: Probabilistic Approaches to Neural Coding. Boston, MA: MIT Press. Freud, S. (1895/1957). Project for a Scientific Psychology. In J. Strachey (ed.) The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume I, p. 297. London: Hogarth Press. Freud, S. (1900/1957). Analysis of a specimen dream. In J. Strachey (ed.) The Interpretation of Dreams, in Strachey, J., ed., The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume V, pp. 96–121. London: Hogarth Press. Freud, S. (1909a/1957). Notes upon a case of obsessional neurosis. In J. Strachey (ed.) The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XXII, p. 54. London: Hogarth Press. Freud, S. (1909b/1957 'Original record'). Notes upon a case of obsessional neurosis: Addendum, original record of the case. In J. Strachey (ed.) The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume X. London: Hogarth Press. Freud. S. (1917/1957). Mourning and melancholia. In J. Strachey (ed.) The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. London: Hogarth Press. Freud, S. (1920/1957). Beyond the pleasure principle. In J. Strachey (ed.) The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. London: Hogarth Press. Freud, S. (1930/1957). Civilization and its discontents. In J. Strachey (ed.) The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. London: Hogarth Press. Freud, S. (1933/1957). New introductory lectures on psycho-analysis. In J. Strachey (ed.) The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XXII. London: Hogarth Press. Friston, K. (2003). Learning and inference in the brain. Neural Networks, 16(9), 1325–1352. Friston, K. (2005). A theory of cortical responses. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, 360, 815–836. Friston, K. (2010a). The free energy principle: a unified brain theory? Nature Reviews. Neuroscience, 11, 127–138. Friston, K. (2010b) Embodied inference: or 'I think, therefore I am, if I am what I think'. In W. Tschacher and C. Bergomi (eds) The Implications of Embodiment (Cognition and Communication). New York, NY: Imprint Academic. Friston, K. and Stephan, K. (2007). Free-energy and the brain. Synthese, 159, 417–458. Friston, K., Daunizeau, J., Kilner, J., and Kiebel, S. (2010). Action and behavior: a free-energy formulation. Biological Cybernetics, 102(3), 227–260. Friston, K., Mattout, J., and Kilner, J. (2011). Action understanding and active inference. Biological Cybernetics, 104, 137–160. Fuster, J. (2009). Cortex and memory: the emergence of new paradigm. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 21(11), 2047-2072. Gertler, B. (2011). Self-knowledge. In E.N. Zalta (ed.) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Spring 2011 edn. Online: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/self-knowledge/. Godfrey-Smith, P. and Sterelny, K. (2008). Biological information. In E.N. Zalta (ed.) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Fall 2008 edn. Online: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/information-biological/. Greene, R. and Frank, M. (2010). Slow wave activity during sleep: functional and therapeutic implications. The Neuroscientist, 16(6), 618–633. Hinton, G., Dayan, P., Frey, B.J., and Neal, R. (1995). The Wake-Sleep Algorithm for Unsupervised Neural Networks Science, 268, 1158–1160. Hohwy, J., Roepstorff, A., and Friston, K. (2008). Predictive coding explains binocular rivalry: an epistemological review. Cognition, 108(3), 687–701. Hopkins, J. (1982/1995/2007) Introduction: philosophy and psychoanalysis. In R. Wollheim and J. Hopkins (eds) Philosophical Essays on Freud. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Partly reprinted in C. MacDonald and G. MacDonald (eds) (1995) Philosophy of Psychology: Debates on Psychological Explanation. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Hopkins, J. (1987). Synthesis in the imagination: psychoanalysis, infantile experience, and the concept of an object. In J. Russell (ed.) Philosophical Perspectives on Developmental Psychology. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Hopkins, J. (2000a). Psychoanalysis, metaphor, and the concept of mind. In M. Levine (ed.) The Analytic Freud. London: Routledge. Hopkins, J. (2000b). Evolution, consciousness, and the internality of the mind. In P. Carruthers and P. Chamberlain (eds) Evolution and the Human Mind: Modularity, Language, and Meta-Cognition, pp. 276–298. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hopkins, J. (2003). Evolution, emotion, and conflict. In M. Chung (ed.) Psychoanalytic Knowledge. London: Macmillan/Palgrave Press. Hopkins, J. (2004). Conscience and conflict: Darwin, Freud, and the origins of human aggression. In D. Evans and P. Cruse (eds) Emotion, Evolution, and Rationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hopkins, J. (2007). The problem of consciousness and the innerness of the mind. In M. McCabe and M. Textor (eds) Perspectives on Perception, pp. 19–46. Frankfurt: Lancaster Publishers. Horgan, T. and Teinson, J. (1999). Rules and representations. In R. Wilson and F. Kiel (eds) The MIT Encyclopedia of the Cognitive Sciences, pp. 724–726. Cambridge: MIT Press. Kant, I. (1781, 1963). The Critique of Pure Reason. (N. Kemp-Smith, Trans.). London: Macmillan. Kernberg, O. (2009). An integrated theory of depression. Neuropsychoanalysis, 2(1), 76–80. Klein, M. (1946, 1997). Notes on some schizoid mechanisms. In Envy and Gratitude and Other Works, The Melanie Klein Trust, London: Vintage. Klein, M. (1997) Love, Guilt, and Reparation. The Melanie Klein Trust, London:Vintage. Klein, M. (1998) The Psychoanalysis of Children. The Melanie Klein Trust, London: Vintage. Klein, M. (1998) Narrative of a Child Analysis. The Melanie Klein Trust, London: Vintage. Laurence, S. and Margolis, E. (2011). Concepts. In E.N. Zalta (ed.) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Summer 2011 edn. Online: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2011/entries/concepts/. Libet, B. (1982). Subjective antedating of a sensory experience and mind-brain theories. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 114, 563–570. Libet, B. (1985). Unconscious cerebral initiative and the role of conscious will in voluntary action. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 8, 529–566. McLaughlin, B. and Bennett, K. (2010). Supervenience. In E.N. Zalta (ed.) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Summer 2010 edn. Online: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2010/entries/supervenience/. Millikan, R. (1982). Language Thought and Other Biological Categories. Cambridge: MIT Press. Millikan, R. (2005). The language-thought partnership: a bird's eye view. In R. Millikan (ed.) Language: A Biological Model, pp. 92–105. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Obama, B. (2008). Dreams from My Father (A Story of Race and Inheritance). Edinburgh: Canongate Books. Pace-Shott, E., Solms, M., Blagrove, E., and Hanard, S. (2003). Sleep and Dreaming: Scientific Advances and Reconsiderations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Panksepp, J. (1998) Affective Neuroscience: The Foundations of Human and Animal Emotions Oxford: Oxford University Press. Parvizi, J. and Damasio, A. (2001). Consciousness and the brainstem. Cognition, 79, 135–159. Parvizi, J. and Damasio, A. (2003). Neuroanatomical correlates of brainstem coma. Brain, 126, 1524–1536. Pitt, D. (2008). Mental representation. In E.N. Zalta (ed.) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Fall 2008 edn. Online: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/mental-representation/. Prior, V. and Glaser, D. (2006). Understanding Attachment and Attachment Disorders. London: Kingsley Publishers. Robbins, P. (2010). Modularity of mind. In E.N. Zalta (ed.) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Summer 2010 edn. Online: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2010/entries/modularity-mind/. Saks, E. (2008). The Center Cannot Hold: My Journey Through Madness. New York, NY: Hyperion. Samuels, R. (2006). Is the mind massively modular? In R. Stainton (ed.) Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science. Oxford: Blackwell. Segal, H. (1978). Introduction to the Work of Melanie Klein. London: Hogarth Press. Segal, H. (1981a). Klein. Glasgow: Fontana. Segal, H. (1981b). The Work of Hanna Segal. New York, NY: Jason Aaronson. Shea, N. (2007). Representation in the genome, and other inheritance systems. Biology and Philosophy, 22, 313–331. Sherrington, C. (1906). The Integrative Action of the Nervous System. New Haven, NJ: Yale University Press. Schore (2001) Effects of a secure attachment relationship on right brain development, affect regulation, and infant mental health. Infant Mental Health Journal, 22(1–2), 7–66. Siewert, C. (2008). Consciousness and intentionality. In E.N. Zalta (ed.) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Fall 2008 edn. Online: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/consciousness-intentionality/. Smith, K.,, Berridge, K., and Aldridge, W. (2011) Disentangling Pleasure from incentive salience and learning signals in brain reward circuitry. PNAS July 5;108 (27):E255-64. Solms, M. (1997). The Neuropsychology of Dreaming. Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum. Solms, M. and Turnbull, O. (2002). The Brain and the Inner World. London: Karnac Press. Solomon, J. and George, C. (1999). Attachment Disorganization. New York, NY: Guilford. Solomon, J. and George, C. (2008). The measurement of attachment security and related constructs in infancy and early childhood. In J. Cassidy and P. Shaver (eds) Handbook of Attachment, pp. 383–410. London: Guildford Press. Stoljar, D. (2009). Physicalism. In E.N. Zalta (ed.) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Fall 2009 edn. Online: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2009/entries/physicalism/. Thagard, P. (2010). Cognitive science. In E.N. Zalta (ed.) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Summer 2010 edn. Online: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2010/entries/cognitive-science/. Tremblay, R. (2004). The development of physical aggression in infancy. Infant Mental Health Journal, 25(5), 399–407. Trivers, R. (2002). Natural Selection and Social Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Tseng, Y.W., Diedrichsen, J., Krakauer, J.W., Shadmehr, R., and Bastian, A.J. (2007). Sensory prediction errors drive cerebellum-dependent adaptation of reaching. Journal of Neurophysiology, 98, 54–62. Waldvogel, B., Ullrich, A., and Strasburger, H. (2007). Blind und sehend in einer Person. Nevenzart, 78, 1303–1309. Watt, D. and Panksepp, J. (2009). Depression: an evolutionarily conserved mechanism? Neuropsychoanalysis, 2(1), 93. Wegner, D. (2002). The Illusion of Conscious Will. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Wellman, H. (1990). The Child's Theory of Mind (Learning, Development, and Conceptual Change). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Wittgenstein, L. (1998). Culture35 and Value. Oxford: Blackwell. 1 I am particularly grateful to Geoff Hinton, Andy Clark, Jonathan Lear, and Aikaterini Fotopoulou, for providing points of discussion and criticism without which this paper would not have been written; to Tamas Pataki and Sam Guttenplan for penetrating and helpful criticisms of early drafts; and to Karl Friston for reading a late draft and generously expressing an encouraging degree of sympathy with the underlying argument. 2 The simple structure of wishfulfilment, as later described in the text by reference to the dream of drinking, was also used by Freud (1900) to interpret his dream of Irma's injection. There, as discussed in Hopkins (1996, 1999a) this structure was used to integrate the series of memories which appeared in his free associations, and which also cohered in their origin from the deepest sources of his own shame and guilt. (As Freud said in his associations, he seemed to be 'collecting' such examples to 'bring against myself' in the dream.) While the dream can indeed be understood as a straightforward wishfulfilment on the model of the dream of drinking, the explanation of the data Freud provides becomes more detailed and cogent once the wishfulfilment in the dream is seen as an instance of the mechanism of projection, which the dream clearly displays in representing the kinds of dereliction about which Freud was most guilty as in Otto. Likewise, and considering further theoretical developments, the dream seems a clear instance of Kleinian projective identification, as indicated by the way the bodies of figures who appear in the associations bear marks of physical invasion (the necrosis of the skin in the patient whose nasal swellings Freud had treated with cocaine; Irma's infiltrated skin as invaded by Otto's toxic sexual injection, Freud's own shoulder which ached in identification, etc.) Finally the same concept appears in the wishfulfilling aspect of what Freud calls the primary process, by which the brain initially meets present needs with memories of past experiences of satisfaction. These experiences, which are particularly important in both Freudian and Bayesian accounts, provide one of the main links between them. 3 If we understand mental states and processes in this way, we can also give an account of our that P mode of describing them. In this we are using representations to which we have public perceptual access (the words and sentences of our natural language) to describe the internal representations (beliefs, desires, etc.) which prompt and guide our behaviour, but to which we have no such access. (As, indeed, we do not normally have perceptual access to the internal workings of the brain or nervous system.) Commonsense psychology (theory of mind, etc.) thus employs sentences as audible or visible linguistic representations, in order to describe mental representations which govern our behaviour, but are inside us and so imperceptible to these senses. And given some antecedent capacity for verbal expression, it is easy to see how evolution might have nudged this towards the mind-articulating capacity we now enjoy (Hopkins, 2000b). 4 It is perhaps worth stressing that there seems no reason to hold that in its deeper workings the brain employs anything like the 'language of thought' stressed in one tradition in philosophy and cognitive science (Aydede, 2010). For neural representation seems a matter of massive coordinated but differing forms of cellular and subcellular chemical and physiological activity, described by probabilistic functions. Thus as Andy Clark writes in his illuminating 'Whatever Next' (unpublished): Instead of simply representing 'CAT ON MAT' the probabilistic Bayesian brain will encode a conditional probability density function, reflecting the relative probability of this state of affairs (and any somewhat-supported alternatives) given the available information. This information-base will include both the bottom up driving influences from multiple sensory channels, and top-down context-fixing information of various kinds. As I take Clark's description to imply, such probability functions would map to highly distributed physiological processes produced and used by very many hierarchically arranged networks of neural cells, which in turn would map to the very many things and situations they represent in many different ways at once, for the producing and using networks to discharge the functions for which the genes involved in their construction have been selected and maintained. If this is the basic representational situation in the brain there can be no reason to assimilate it to the use of sentence-like representations in a digital compiler. Again the person-level hierarchies here do not seem to be modular (Robbins 2010) in the sense imagined in popularized evolutionary psychology (Downes, 2010). Rather as Fuster argues, we should take seriously the fact that modular accounts of cognitive functions are based on a 'definition of a module' which as regards memory and working memory 'is theoretically and empirically inconsistent with the recent literature' (2009, p. 2049). So apart from basic sensory and motor systems we should expect (not a modular but) an hierarchically integrated processing organization: as in the 'massive scaffolding' cited in the text). The notion of modularity has also been subject to serious philosophical criticism, as in Samuels (2006). 5 There is often said to be an unbridgeable gap, as between the physical working of the brain and our conscious experience of ourselves in the world. As noted below, I take this supposed gap to involve an illusion produced by the working of the brain. But at this point one can say that insofar as there seems to be a gap, the Helmoltz/Bayes account partly consists in the claim that the brain itself crosses it, by transforming sensory input into conscious experience. This yields what seems a non-reductive form of supervenience physicalism (Stoljar, 2009), McLaughlin and Bennett (2010). This account plausibly supports token eventidentity but not type-type identity. for as the quotation from Clark (unpublished) in the previous footnote suggests, the realization of types would appear so local both to environmental circumstance and to variation among brains that strict identities between non-ideopathic types would be ruled out, as argued in Hopkins (2007). 6 This omits a number of complexities in the account by which Friston models this process. 7 Fuster independently stresses the role of the side-by-side and backwards connections, urging, for example, that 'reentry is an integral part of the most plausible computational models of working memory' (2009, p. 2056). 8 This description is of course very rough and covers a number of different approaches. In Friston's formulations representational optimization and error correction are done in accord with the principle of minimizing free-energy as a measure of surprise, which Carhart-Harris and Friston (2010) relate to Freud's discussions of bound and free energy. Such an account, as Friston (2010a,b) stresses, assigns a particularly encompassing role to Bayesian prior expections, and yields an understanding of the role of attention, dopamine, and evaluation or reward which contrasts with many 'reward maximizing' approaches. Likewise the conception of mirror neurons advocated by Friston et al. (2011) differs in many particulars from other versions. Nonetheless surprise-minimizing (= prediction error) and reward-maximizing accounts can be seen as falling within the broader Helmoltz/Bayes tradition. 9 Thus relatively high-level processing involving conceptual metaphor seems to influence the brain's representation of the mind as a kind of internal but non-physical space located within a physical container (perhaps originating in interoceptive feedback from the skin, as suggested in Hopkins 2000a); and the same would hold for the overlap between the fields of conceptual metaphor and symbolism in psychoanalysis more generally. Again, the 'multiple drafts' of Dennett's (1991) will be on file and constantly engaging in mutual revisions in many different levels in many different neural hierarchies; and these, as Dennet claimed, are to be understood as producing, and in that sense explaining, the whole of conscious experience. 10 As argued in Hopkins (2007), the classical philosophical problem of consciousness arises from the apparent contradiction produced by our sense of experience as inner, phenomenal, subjective, and private to ourselves, as opposed to its distal objects, which are outer, physical, objective, and publicly available to all. The present account provides for the resolution of this problem by explicating consciousness in terms of the brain's image of itself, which provides our own from-inside images of our selves. (Hopkins 2000b). For the representation by each individual's brain of its own neural input naturally appears to that individual as phenomenal, as well as inner, subjective, and private, which this representation actually is; whereas the external objects presented in the representation are shown as outer, physical, and public, as in they fact are. 11 As with much else in this essay I owe this example to Clark's (unpublished) 'Whatever next?'. 12 There is often an ambiguity in Bayesian formulations, as to whether the brain is predicting the course of experience (predicting its own sensations) or predicting neural input to its own 'sensorium' by representing that input as sensations and other experiences caused in particular ways, for example by objects such as faces and houses. In fact we should take the brain as doing both, because in representing input as experience of any kind, it perforce also predicts both input and experience. Since both points hold we will ignore this ambiguity in what follows. 13 In representing the input as conscious experience of a particular object the dominant model is said to explain it away, in the sense that aspects of the input predicted by the conscious representation are suppressed at lower levels in the hierarchy, while alternative conceptual explanations are inhibited at the higher. Insofar as the conscious experience is veridical and accurate in its predictions, the suppression it effects leaves no active residual. Unpredicted input, by contrast, is not silenced in the same way: it continues to be sent forward as error signal, and in that sense continues to press upward for conscious expression. 14 Thus for example our awareness of our choices (say as causes of our very experiences of choosing) is synthesized only after the choices themselves. This is to be expected, since an event of conscious awareness of x involves the application of concepts to x, and so must in general occur (at least very slightly) after the x in question has itself occurred. This seems to have caused widespread puzzlement (Libet, 1982, 1985; Wegner, 2002). 15 This is why each of us appears to himor herself as the kind of self repeatedly postulated in philosophy: for example as the subject of Descartes 'I', or again Kant's transcendental self that synthesizes the manifold of sensible intuition. Such representations of the self reflect the way the brain represents perceptual input as experience of the self in the world. 16 This suggests that while we may reasonably think of the ego as realized by the brain operating in default mode, as suggested by Carhart-Harris et al. (2008) and again by Carhart-Harris and Friston (2010), we should think of the real operative factor in the ego as the agent's conceptual system, as embodied in the underlying generative model. It seems to be this-and with it the emotions and thoughts that it serves to regulate-that is, at a flexible equilibrium in what is regarded as the default mode. 17 The claim of conservatism here refers to the fact that the new representation is rejected because it does not fit with Bayesian assignments of prior probability over possible representations or concepts. These are presumably made on the basis of past experience, or are built in, e.g. as innate biases structuring neural processing. The Freudian superego may have a similar and innate structure; for it seems to realize an evolutionarily established direction of moral aggression against the self that may have evolved (together with a related direction of moral aggression against outgroups) by facilitating ingroup cooperation, as discussed in Hopkins (2003, 2004) 18 And of course this case, and the present discussion, admit comparison with similar phenomena in the essays by Bazan and Snodgrass, by Oakley, and by Raz and Wolfson in this volume. 19 Friston, Daunizeau, Kilner and Kiebel (2010) suggest that their model has radical consequences for the notion of action. On their account 'the central nervous system is not divided into motor and sensory systems but is one perceptual inference machine that provides predictions of optimal action, in terms of its expected consequences'. Moreover 'the only thing that action can affect is the prediction error at the sensory level. This means action can only suppress the weighted sensory prediction error variance' so that 'action is just there to explain away unexpected sensory prediction errors.' This, they hold, 'means we can replace the notion of desired movements with expected movements and understand action in terms of perceptual expectations.' But as we have seen, evolution has already built the required notion of expectation into the notion of desire, via our practice of describing desires in terms of the effects they are predicted to produce if acted on. So in 'explaining away unexpected prediction errors' actions satisfy desires by causing the experiences of satisfaction they predict, and thereby minimize the homeostatic or emotional disequilibria (= sources of free energy) which are their source. This is how 'ensuring our predictions become a self-fulfilling prophecy' keeps us in the attractors which avoid internally generated homeostatic surprise – which, as the case of thirst illustrates, is no surprise, in commonsense terms, to those that suffer it. For an example in which sensory prediction errors apparently serve as motor commands see Tseng, Diedrichsen, Krakauer, Shadmehr, and Bastian (2007). 20 For the case of interoceptive input (1) above seems the experience by which sensory input is represented as a cause, and in this sense the initial analogue for the internal case of the Bayesian 'explaining away' of exteroceptive input stressed by Friston. So from the time the agent experiences drinking, and so pacifies the desire in (1) the 'free energy' initially put to work in the desire to drink can be said to remain bound while the underlying equilibration in (2) is effected. But it is also in the nature of such input that the desire suspended in the period between (1) and (2) should be subject to revival and/or strengthening, should (2) fail to occur- as in the psychoanalytic cases we will discuss later in the chapter. 21 The link with the notion of explanation which makes speaking of explaining away appropriate in the exteroceptive case is partly retained here, for both the desire and its underlying homeostatic cause are ultimately pacified via the truth of predictions made by the brain in relation to them. 22 Thus this account also coheres with broad outlines of theories of emotion and consciousness advanced by both Damasio and Panksepp, as described in the discussions of emotion, consciousness, and the self in Solms and Turnbull (2002). These accounts have recently been supplemented by work by Craig on interoception (2009, 2010). 23 For early accounts of infancy highlighting maternal investment in cortical development see Schore (2001); and the essays by Trevarthan and others in Braten (1998) . 24 So this might well be the origin of the origin of what Melanie Klein describes in terms of the splitting of the breast, and later the mother, into bad and good versions, as described and referenced in Segal (1978) and discussed in Hopkins (1987). Also if the infant made use of metaphorical representation as considered in Hopkins (2000a), such thinking might appear in metaphors of the mind as a container, as does the Kleinian notion of projective identification (Segal, 1978). Even the extremities of Klein's account of the baby imagining invading the mother's body to attack versions of the father and siblings within might be consilient with a combination of Bayesian representation and parent-offspring conflict as briefly sketched in Hopkins (2003, 2004). In this context consider the Rat Man's phantasy (for which he expected retribution) of Freud's mother dead, with her breast impaled by the Rat Man's Japanese swords representing marriage and copulation, and Freud and his children eating away at the lower parts of her body, especially her genitals, like the rats of his own phantasy about his father's ongoing torture (Freud, 1909b, 'Original Record', p. 282). This is the kind of phantasied invasion of the mother's body later emphasized by Klein, and there can be no question of it having been produced in the Rat Man by Freud's suggestion. 25 Thus consider some examples from Campos, Barret, Lamb, Goldsmith, and Stenberg (1983) : When someone makes a four-month-old baby angry by impeding its movements, the baby directs its rage at the impeding hand. So despite its impressive capacity for other-directed rage and fear, the four-month-old baby seems not yet to have come to represent another's hand as part of, and so as animated by, an anatomically whole person (and is also an instance of the psychoanalytic notion of an emotional relation to a part-object, which should still apply at this age to the mother generally, and would particularly include her breast.) A seven-month-old baby, by contrast, directs its anger to the impeding agent's face. By this age, it seems, the baby has attained a more coherent representation of the human body, and one which enables it to relate emotionally person to person and face to face. And although the seven-month-old baby protests at being impeded by either its mother or a stranger, it is particularly upset when the mother impedes it after a stranger has done so. So by this time its anger is also regulated by its representation of its mother as providing, and itself as requiring, protection and comfort where strangers are concerned. 26 Hopkins (1987) describes how these developments relate to theories held by Klein and Piaget. But as discussed there and also and briefly in Hopkins (2003, 2004) one experiment seems particularly relevant. Bower (1977, p. 217) describes A simple optical arrangement that allows one to present infants with multiple images of a single object ... If one presents the infant with multiple images of its mother-say three 'mothers'-the infant of less than five months is not disturbed at all but will in fact interact with all three 'mothers' in turn. If the setup provides one mother and two strangers, the infant will preferentially interact with its mother and still show no signs of disturbance. However, past the age of 5 months (after the coordination of place and movement) the sight of three 'mothers' becomes very disturbing to the infant. At this same age a setup of one mother and two strangers has no effect. I would contend that this in facts shows that the young infant (less than five months old) thinks it has a multiplicity of mothers, whereas the older infant knows it has only one. These experiments do seem to admit interpretation as evidence that while at four months the infant takes its mother as a psychological other to whom it relates, it does not yet regard her as a single enduring person, as opposed to a potential multiplicity of presences whose spatiotemporal dimensions are as yet indeterminate. By five months, however, the baby apparently opposes uniqueness to episodic multiplicity, and starts to represent the mother (and by implication/identification its own self) as individual, continuous, and lasting. If this is correct, then the fourto five-month consolidation of the mother's image via the concept of spatiotemporal numerical identity represents a synthesis in the imagination by which the baby integrates the major parameters of its internal and external worlds. We should regard this as a momentous event, particularly in light of the considerations about motivational conflict advanced here. As such it deserves fuller experimental investigation. 27 Cf. the pattern of arousal of anger in relation to provocation by strangers at seven months in the previous note. 28 For more on disorganized attachment, see Solomon and George (1999). 29 Klein's collected writings appear in the bibliography with Klein (1946). For an introduction to her work see Segal (1978), Segal (1981a), or the single essay 'Melanie Klein's technique of child analysis' in Segal (1981b). As noted Hopkins (1987) contains discussion of Klein's ideas which relate to the argument of this paper. For work in attachment which can be related to some of the same emotional themes see 'Assessments of attachment based on the child's internal working model/representation' at pp. 109ff of Prior and Glaser (2006). 30 The role Freud assigned free energy has enabled Carhart-Harris and Friston (2010) to relate the information-theoretic version of this notion to Freud's uses, so as to yield a field of evidence consilient with Freudian claims. But they omit to consider the role of conflict as a generator of free energy (prediction error) even though the role of conflict in neurosis and psychosis is widely acknowledged (Kernberg, 2009), and would fit with the data they survey. Likewise in their admirable 'Mourning and melancholia revisited' CarhartHarris, Mayberg, Malizia, and Nutt (2008) seem to scant the role of the split-off part of the ego which was to become the superego as an internal source personal-level conflict ('self-reproaches and self-revilings') within the self, as illustrated by the material from Saks. Rather they stress only the (also very relevant) role of repression and object-loss instead. Thus they observe that one of the depressed patients who recovered from treatment-resistant depression almost instantly upon receiving stimulation in Cg 25 reported that the experience was like release from being 'locked in a room with 10 screaming children: constant noise, no escape'. This might well be taken to suggest that activity in Cg 25 also relates to the representation of painful internalized emotional conflict, of the kind to be discerned in relation to the superego, and also perhaps to parent/offspring conflict. But the datum was explained in terms of release of repression (of what?) instead. 31 Freud did not describe wishfulfilment in terms of pacification; but it is clear that he regarded the fictitious experience of satisfaction as having this role. He introduced the notion as explaining his own dream of Irma's injection (1900, pp. 96–121), and as 'the first member of a class of abnormal psychical phenomena' including 'hysterical phobias, obsessions and delusions'. As is often the case with such advances, his paradigmatic expositions introduce data which in retrospect we can see as better explained by succeeding theories into which his original ideas were incorporated. Thus for example the wishfulfilment analysed in the Irma dream seems clearly also to be defensive (and against internalized conflict) and projective as well. Much of the material, for example, involves instances of 'lack of medical conscientiousness', mainly involving deadly or harmful injections associated with his own activities, which Freud observes he 'seemed to be collecting to bring up against myself' in the dream. This 'collection' compared his medical derelictions to murders which might prompt talionic revenge, in the form of his own daughter's death (see 'this Mathilde for that Mathilde, an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth' in the associations to I at once called in Dr M.) Later Freud would have regarded this as the work of his own morally punitive superego; and by the end of the dream he had managed to identify himself with this superego, so as to declare 'one does not make injections of that kind so thoughtlessly: and probably the syringe [with which he dreamt Otto had injected Irma] was not clean.' So the wishfulfilment in Freud's paradigmatic dream can also now be seen as a defence against his own superego; and it was straightforwardly projective, since everything related to his own lack of medical conscientiousness (and worse) had been projected into Otto, whose remarks about Irma had roused Freud's guilt and prompted the dream. The signs of damaging physical intrusion which go with this projection also mark it as a complex instance of unconscious Kleinian projective identification (Segal 1978) used to deflect depressive anxiety. 32 The claim that dreams generally have this function, in relation to emotional/motivational arousal which occurs regularly in sleep, has recently been pursued by Mark Solms and others (Pace-Shott et al., 2003; Solms 1997; Solms and Turnbull, 2002). 33 The link between the persecuting internal figures constituting the superego and the capacity to think was stressed in the work of Bion (e.g. 1967). The claim here is that on a Bayesian model these 'earliest parental imagos' may also constitute assignments of prior probabilities which make certain kinds of thinking impossible, as seen in the face/house example. 34 Feud's notes, far in advance of his theories at the time, provide evidence that the origin of the Rat Man's conflicts was to be found in his infantile imagos of his mother. For the episode in which he remembered his father as a fearful punisher, and experienced Freud in the transference as a murderous moralistic invasive beast of prey, seems to have been evoked by Freud's first interpretation of his hatred towards his mother, who in fact dominated his life. The memory of his father evoked by this seems also to have acted as a screen, steering Freud away from this line of enquiry. Freud's interpretation was given in response to the Rat Man's associations which pictured Freud's own mother dead, with the Rat Man's Japanese swords stuck through her breast, and her genitals eaten into by Freud and his children like the rats of his phantasy. Such material, as it appeared regularly in the play of children later in the history of psychoanalysis, was to become the basis of Kleinian inferences about the primary role of hatred towards the mother and her breast, as shown in attacks in phantasy with all kinds of weapons. In Hopkins (2003, 2004), I describe how (I think) this original repressed aggression can be seen as the origin of that shown in outgroup conflict, as perpetuated by processes of group selection.

Can Mathematical Objects Be Causally Efficacious? Abstract Callard (2007) argues that it is metaphysically possible that a mathematical object, although abstract, causally affects the brain. I raise the following objections. First, a successful defence of mathematical realism requires not merely the metaphysical possibility but rather the actuality that a mathematical object affects the brain. Second, mathematical realists need to confront a set of three pertinent issues: why a mathematical object does not affect other concrete objects and other mathematical objects, what counts as a mathematical object, and how we can have knowledge about an unchanging object. Keywords Mathematical Causalism, Mathematical Object, Mathematical Realism Seungbae Park Ulsan National Institute of Science and Technology Republic of Korea [email protected] Park, Seungbae (2018). "Can Mathematical Objects Be Causally Efficacious?" Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy." http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/aj48ey2f9DjtErprQNk8/full https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2018.1432412 http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/0020174X.2018.1432412 1. Introduction According to mathematical realism, mathematical objects are inhabitants of the abstract world, so they are nonspatial, nontemporal, noncausal, and unchanging. An immediate objection to mathematical realism is that it is not clear how we acquire knowledge about them (Benacerraf 1973; Balaguer 2014). We are cognitive agents inhabiting the concrete world, and hence we cannot causally interact with them. We acquire knowledge about concrete objects only by physically interacting with them. But we cannot physically interact with mathematical objects. It follows that we cannot form knowledge about them. This epistemological objection to mathematical realism elicited an original and intriguing response from Benjamin Callard (2007). He argues that though mathematical objects exist in the abstract world, they can nevertheless causally affect human brains and hence can produce mathematical knowledge. Let me call this view mathematical causalism. It is a view about how we can acquire mathematical knowledge under the mathematical realist framework. Mathematical realists might use causalism as a means to overcome Benacerraf's aforementioned epistemological objection. There are other means (Frege 1884; Gödel 1947) of which mathematical realists might avail themselves, but they fall outside the scope of this paper. This paper aims to expose the limitations to Callard's causalist defence of mathematical realism. In Section 2, I demonstrate that a successful defence of mathematical realism requires not merely the metaphysical possibility but rather the actuality that a mathematical object affects the brain. In Section 3, I argue that causalists owe us two positive accounts of why a mathematical object affects the brain, but not other concrete objects and 2 other mathematical objects. In Section 4, I claim that the causalist view that an object, even if causal, is mathematical opens a new debate over what counts as a mathematical object. In Section 5, I raise an objection to mathematical realism that we cannot have knowledge about a mathematical object because it cannot undergo any change. 2. Metaphysical vs. Actual To say that a mathematical object can affect the human brain implies that the mathematical object can impart energy to the brain and receive energy from the brain. It is not clear, however, whether a mathematical object has such capability. Energy is spatial, and it exists in the concrete world. But how can the abstractum have an influence on the concretum? Callard admits that it is metaphysically impossible for a mathematical object to receive energy from the brain, for 'any object receiving energy must change' (2007, 351). He argues, however, that it is metaphysically possible for a mathematical object to impart energy to the brain without itself suffering any change. He says, 'There is no contradiction, or any other conceptual or metaphysical difficulty, in accepting the claim that abstract objects impart energy to us, and thereby change us, without themselves receiving any energy or suffering any change' (2007, 351). Newton's third law of motion, however, prevents an object from imparting energy to another object without receiving energy from it. So the law of action-reaction clashes with the causalist suggestion that a mathematical object can impart energy to the brain without receiving any energy from it. Callard replies that the third law of motion 'is just an empirical truth' (2007, 351); it remains metaphysically possible, although empirically or nomologically impossible, for a mathematical object to impart energy to the brain without receiving any energy from it. He says that 'efficient causal relations between non-spatial, necessary, eternal, unchanging objects and spatial, contingent, changing objects are strongly possible' (2007, 353). In other words, it is conceivable, metaphysically possible, or not self-contradictory for a mathematical object to affect the brain without itself undergoing any change. Callard's foregoing defence indicates that he believes a mathematical object can impart energy to the brain, where 'can' means a metaphysical possibility, not an empirical or nomological possibility. But what does the metaphysical possibility prove? It proves nothing except that it is not self-contradictory that a mathematical object imparts energy to the brain. It is not clear how much the metaphysical possibility helps mathematical realism. A successful defence of mathematical realism requires not merely the metaphysical possibility but rather the actuality that a mathematical object affects the brain. After all, it is not merely a metaphysical possibility but an actuality that we have mathematical knowledge, i.e., it is a plain fact that we have mathematical knowledge. Thus, the question for mathematical realists is not how it is metaphysically possible that we acquire mathematical knowledge but rather how we acquire mathematical knowledge. In other words, an explanandum for causalists is not the metaphysical possibility but the actuality. In general, if an explanandum is an actuality, an explanans should also be an actuality, not merely a metaphysical possibility. Suppose, for example, that you are puzzled over why an apple falls down, and you ask me to provide an account of why it falls down. I say that an apple falls down because it is metaphysically possible that a gravitational force exists between the Earth and the apple. Such an account would hardly satisfy you. By contrast, you might be satisfied if I say that an apple falls down because a gravitational force exists between the Earth and the apple. This example illustrates that an actuality can be explained in terms of another actuality, but not in terms of a metaphysical possibility. Benacerraf is puzzled not over how it is metaphysically possible that we have mathematical knowledge but over how we have mathematical knowledge, i.e., he is puzzled 3 not over the metaphysical possibility but over the actuality. Callard, however, replies that we have mathematical knowledge because it is metaphysically possible for a mathematical object to affect the brain. He has provided the metaphysical possibility as an explanans for the actuality. Such an explanation would hardly satisfy Benacerraf. He would be satisfied if causalists provide the actuality that a mathematical object affects the brain, or at least if causalists provide an account of how neuroscientists can go about establishing the causal relationship between a mathematical object and the brain. Causalists, however, cannot provide such an account. Suppose that a brain state correlated with mathematical knowledge occurs, and that neuroscientists are trying to investigate the cause of the brain state. Where should they look? Should they look inside the brain or outside the brain? When should they look? Should they look before or after the brain state occurs? It is meaningless even to ask such questions, given that a mathematical object is nonspatial and nontemporal. Thus, we return to Benacerraf's epistemological concern. Callard might reply that a mathematical object, although far from the brain, can nonetheless affect it. After all, he claims that it is an intelligible notion that an object affects another object although they are far from each other. He says, 'If "action at a distance"-that is, one physical object causally affecting another without (even indirectly) touching it-is intelligible, then the problem with the idea of causal interactions between ourselves and abstract objects is not to be found in the absence of impacts in the mathematical case (since these would be absent in cases of action at a distance too), but must be sought elsewhere' (2007, 350). Causalists, however, cannot appeal to the notion of action at a distance in order to establish the causal relationship between a mathematical object and the brain. After all, to say that a mathematical object is distant from the brain implies that the mathematical object is spatial, which goes against the realist idea that it is nonspatial. Thus, it is a challenging task for causalists to specify how neuroscientists can locate the mathematical cause of a brain state. 3. Other Concrete and Mathematical Objects Mathematical realists invoking causalism to defuse Benacerraf's epistemological objection to mathematical realism should confront the following two disconcerting issues. First, can a mathematical object affect other concrete objects, such as rocks, water, and trees? There are far more other concrete objects than brains in the concrete world, so it is a priori far more likely that a mathematical object affects other concrete objects than brains. How does a mathematical object affect a rock on a mountain? What mechanism does a mathematical object use to effect a change in a rock? Causalists might answer that a mathematical object, by nature, affects the human brain, but not other concrete objects. Such an answer, however, is ad hoc. Why is it that a mathematical object affects the brain, but not other concrete objects? What is so special about a mathematical object that enables it to have an influence on the brain, but not on other concrete objects? Does it give off a pheromone to which only the brain responds? What is so special about the brain that makes it sensitive to the influence of a mathematical object? Does it contain a gene that is attuned to the pheromone given off by a mathematical object? In short, causalists owe us an account of why a mathematical object affects the brain, but not other concrete objects. Second, why is it that a mathematical object affects the brain, but not other mathematical objects? There are infinitely many mathematical objects, and they all inhabit the same world, viz., the abstract world. By contrast, there are finitely many brains, and they all inhabit a different world, viz., the concrete world. Therefore, it is a priori far more likely that a mathematical object affects other mathematical objects than that it affects the brain. Causalism, however, asserts that a mathematical object does not affect other mathematical 4 objects, although it affects the brain. Such a position is ad hoc unless causalists provide an account of why a mathematical object affects the brain, but not other mathematical objects. Causalists cannot say that a mathematical object, by definition, cannot affect other mathematical objects, for such a semantic move would only invite an opposite semantic move: a mathematical object, by definition, cannot affect the brain. 4. Tricle Mathematical realists utilizing causalism to solve Benacerraf's epistemological puzzle need to address another perplexing issue: What counts as a mathematical object? As we have seen in the introduction of this paper, mathematical realism asserts that a mathematical object is an abstract object, and an abstract object is nonspatial, nontemporal, noncausal, and unchanging, i.e., that a mathematical object has the four properties of being nonspatial, nontemporal, noncausal, and unchanging. Causalism, however, suggests that an object can be mathematical even if it is causal, which implies that an object can be mathematical even if it loses one of the four properties. This new definition of a mathematical object, according to which a mathematical object is nonspatial, nontemporal, unchanging, but causal, opens the possibility that an object can be mathematical even if it loses two of the four properties. Hence, it invites another new definition of a mathematical object: a mathematical object is nonspatial and noncausal, but temporal and changing. What would be an example of an object that fits this latest definition of a mathematical object? Imagine that there is an object that changes its shape from a triangle to a circle and back to a triangle with every second (Park 2017a, 102–103). We can call it a tricle. A tricle is nonspatial and noncausal, given that a triangle and a circle are nonspatial and noncausal. But it is temporal and changing, given that it changes its shape with the lapse of time. Is a tricle a mathematical object or not? Causalists think that a mathematical object does not have to be noncausal. So one might think that a mathematical object does not have to be nontemporal and unchanging either. It would follow that a tricle is a mathematical object. A problem arises, however, if a tricle is a mathematical object. Where does it exist? It cannot exist in the abstract world, for it is not clear how many straight edges it has in the abstract world. Given that time does not pass in the abstract world, it is wrong to say that a tricle has three straight edges at some time intervals, but no straight edge at other time intervals. Causalists might argue that it exists neither in the concrete world nor in the abstract world but in a third world. The third world is inhabited by objects which are nonspatial and noncausal, but temporal and changing. This suggestion, however, is ad hoc. It posits the third world solely for the sake of diverting the argument from a tricle. There should be an independent reason for thinking that the third world exists. Causalists might contend that a tricle is not a mathematical object because it is temporal and changing. This possible contention, however, invites an immediate objection. Why is it that an object can mathematical even if it is causal, but not if it is temporal and changing? Thus, Callard's suggestion that a mathematical object can be causally efficacious opens a whole new debate over what counts as a mathematical object. This new debate is so difficult to resolve that it is not clear whether it is advantageous or disadvantageous for mathematical realists to rely on causalism to solve Benacerraf's epistemological puzzle. 5. Unchanging Mathematical realism is vulnerable to the following objection. To know about things is to act upon them, and if things are acted upon, they undergo changes. For example, to know about a cat is to act upon it. When we act upon a cat, it undergoes a change. But a mathematical object, by definition, cannot undergo any change. Therefore, we cannot know about it. 5 Callard admits that we know about things as a result of their acting upon us, but insists that there is no reason for thinking that knowing 'essentially involves acting on the things known' (2007, 352, footnote). In other words, we can know about things, even if we do not act upon them. Callard is right that we do not have to act upon things in order to know about them. For example, when we look at Jupiter in the night sky, we acquire knowledge about it, but we do not act upon it. However, a refutation of mathematical realism does not require that we should act upon things known. It only requires that the things known should undergo changes. Think about Jupiter again. It emits photons, some of which reach our eyes. As a result, we acquire knowledge about it. Emitting photons means undergoing changes. Without such changes, we cannot form knowledge about it. A mathematical object, however, cannot undergo any change. Therefore, we cannot form knowledge about it. Callard's contention that a mathematical object does not suffer any change, although we form knowledge about it, indicates that he takes the property of unchanging to be an essential property of a mathematical object, i.e., he thinks that an object is not a mathematical object if it does not have the property of being unchanging. Recall, however, that he thinks that the property of being noncausal is an accidental property of a mathematical object, i.e., an object can be mathematical even if it does not have the property of being noncausal. Again, causalism opens the new issue of which properties of a mathematical object are essential and which properties of a mathematical object are accidental. 6. Conclusion I have raised several objections to Callard's contention that it is metaphysically possible for a mathematical object to affect the brain. First, a successful defence of mathematical realism requires not merely the metaphysical possibility but rather the actuality that a mathematical object affects the brain. The prospect of establishing such actuality is dim, given that it is not clear where and when neuroscientists should look in order to establish the alleged causal connection between a mathematical object and the brain. Second, causalists need to confront the issue of why a mathematical object does not affect other concrete objects and other mathematical objects, the issue of what counts as a mathematical object, and the issue of how we can have knowledge about an unchanging object. These objections constitute the prima facie reasons for thinking that mathematical realism is not tenable, and that we should seek an alternative position. There are alternative positions in the literature. For example, mathematical fictionalism is defended by Mark Balaguer (1996, 1998, 2001, 2009), Gideon Rosen (2001), and Mary Leng (2005a, 2005b, 2010). Mathematical inferentialism is defended by Seungbae Park (2017b). Neither mathematical fictionalism nor mathematical inferentialism asserts that s mathematical object is an abstractum, so none of them requires a causal connection between a mathematical object and the brain. I leave the task of examining these alternative positions to future occasions. Acknowledgments: This paper improved a lot thanks to anonymous referees' useful comments. This work was supported by the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Korea and the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF-2016S1A5A2A01022592). References Balaguer, M. 1996. Towards a nominalization of quantum mechanics. Mind 105 (418): 209– 26. 6 ---------1998. Platonism and anti-platonism in mathematics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ---------2001. A theory of mathematical correctness and mathematical truth. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 82 (2): 87–114. ---------2009. Fictionalism, theft, and the story of mathematics. Philosophia Mathematica 17 (2): 131–62. ---------2014. Platonism in metaphysics. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/platonism/>. Benacerraf, P. 1973. Mathematical truth. The Journal of Philosophy 70 (19): 661–79. Callard, B. 2007. The conceivability of Platonism. Philosophia Mathematica 15 (3): 347–56. Frege, G. 1884. Die grundlagen der arithmetic: Eine logisch-mathematische untersuchung über den begriff der zahl. Breslau: Koebner. Gödel, K. 1947. What is Cantor's continuum problem? The American Mathematical Monthly 54 (9): 515–25. Leng, M. 2005a. Revolutionary fictionalism: A call to arms. Philosophia Mathematica 13 (3): 277–93. ---------2005b. Mathematical explanation. In Mathematical reasoning and heuristics. C. Cellucci and D. Gillies (eds.), London: King's College Publication, 167–189. ---------2010. Mathematics and reality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Park, S. 2017a. Two criticisms against mathematical realism. Diametros 52: 96–106. ---------2017b. In defense of mathematical Inferentialism. Analysis and Metaphysics 16: 70– 83. Rosen, G. 2001. Nominalism, naturalism, epistemic relativism. Noûs 35 (s15): 60–91.

Current Criminal Law Volume 9 Issue 3 March 2016 ISSN 1758-8413 Online Current Criminal Law Volume 9 Issue 3 March 2016 Book review: Genetics, Crime and Justice Edward Elgar Publishing (2015) pages 2-30 Current Criminal Law Volume 9 Issue 3 March 2016 ISSN 1758-8413 (Online) 2 Genetics, Crime and Justice Debra Wii llson Edward Ellgar Publl ii shiing (2015) Chell tenham,, Unii ted Kiingdom ISBN 978 1 78347 881 1 (cased) ISBN 978 1 78347 882 8 (eBook) Book review by Sally Ramage Current Criminal Law Volume 9 Issue 3 March 2016 ISSN 1758-8413 (Online) 3 Keywords Australia, behaviour, evidence, genetics, crimes, criminal law, New Zealand, offshore, procedure, recidivism, taxation, United Kingdom, United States. Black letter law Australia Evidence Act 1955 New Zealand Evidence Act 2006 US Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 402 and Rule 404(6) UK Corporation Taxes Act 1970 UK Procedure (Insanity and Unfitness to Plead) Act 1991, s 1(1) UK Criminal Justice Act 1967, s8 UK Criminal Justice Act 2003 UK Income Tax Act 1799 UK Inquiries Act 2005 UK Case law Attorney General Ref (No 2 of 1992) [1993] 3 WLR 982 DPP v Beard [1920] HL Pepper v Hart [1992] UKHL 3 R v Bratty [1963] 72 Crim App Rev 211 R v Charlston [1955] 39 Crim App Rev 37 R v Hennessey [1989] 1 WLR 287 R v Kemp [1957] QB 399 R v McKnight (Sonia), Times, 5 May 2000, CA. R v Moloney [1985] 1 All ER 1025 R v Quick [1973] QB 910 Current Criminal Law Volume 9 Issue 3 March 2016 ISSN 1758-8413 (Online) 4 R v Sheehan and Moore [1975] 1 WLR 739 R v Woollin [1998] 4 All ER 103 US Caselaw Daryl Renard Atkins v Virginia 536 US 304 (2002) 260 va 375, 534 S.E. 2d 319 Abstract This review is unashamedly from the perspective of English law because busy United Kingdom criminal law solicitors and barristers mostly wish to know what the law states, which case is a precedent case and whether the author has provided up-to-date legal information. This is because legal practitioners deal with real and urgent cases. The English Income Tax Act gained Royal Assent in 1799 the first government attempt to stop early tax avoidance. Later, tax avoidance schemes (which in English Law were deemed a legitimate method of minimising one payment of taxation) became de rigueur all over the world and often involved creation of Deeds of Covenant and Trusts, notably Discretionary Trusts under civil law. Man's ingenuity knows no bounds and this applies to man's characteristic of criminality as it does to scholarship, enterprise and innovation. Despite protestations by some countries police agencies, contrary to the rise of crime, the fact is that that crime is increasing exponentially worldwide, but the number of people committing crime is not increasing because many crimes are repeated crimes committed by persons with habitual criminal behaviour, ie hardcore criminals. Unacceptable levels of financial crimes abound in high technology era In times of economic trouble, the well established but nevertheless worrying fact is that fraud and today 'identity fraud' is ever increasing. Identity fraud is the use of a stolen or false identity to obtain goods or services by deception and to take over a person or entity's bank account. A bank takeover occurs when a third party hijacks a victim's existing bank accounts. These crimes are increasing at a tremendous rate, even with the incomplete statistics available. Current Criminal Law Volume 9 Issue 3 March 2016 ISSN 1758-8413 (Online) 5 Source: Google The United Kingdom, according to statistics in recent past years (excluding unknown millions of pounds stolen from banking institutions by computer hackers) have the following patterns of fraud victims, as reported to the police: seven years ago, in 2009, there were 59,000 victims of identity impersonation recorded by UK police between January and September 2009 – representing a 36% increase from the period recorded between January to September 2008. Account Takeover fraud increased by 23% in this 2009 nine-month period, compared with the same period in 2008 and by a 238% from January 2006 to September 2009. Over half of these Account Takeover frauds had been perpetrated against victims' Credit Card accounts such as Visa Accounts, Mastercard Accounts and such. Also in this period between 2008 and 2009, criminal takeover of Mobile Phone Accounts doubled in incidents. UK police calculated, from reported crimes, that most of these Bank Account takeover frauds, Credit Card account takeover frauds and Identity Thefts have occurred in London (south east); Birmingham; Guildford in Surrey; and Reading in Essex postcode areas and identity theft included reported thefts to police from corporations by computer hackers. Damage to corporate reputation if crime is divulged We can never come to correct conclusions with incomplete information and so all papers and books on Genetics, crime and justice can be said to be mere hypotheses. ID theft from corporations damages business reputation; damages customer trust in a bank and costs via the large amount of time spent rectifying the situation after such a fraud occurs. Current Criminal Law Volume 9 Issue 3 March 2016 ISSN 1758-8413 (Online) 6 The extent of corporate fraud is unknown especially hacking of banks, because banks and other financial institutions are especially sensitive to customers trust in them being dented, when customers might move to another bank. Banks never divulge how much fraud is perpetrated against them, added to which fact, changes in government are often followed by rearranging of government agencies and citizens find it very difficult to discover which agency, including the police, is in charge of which crimes. All of these matters complicate the picture, but essentially, the fact remains that, especially because of the anonymity of the Internet, criminal behaviour is rampant. Whether this criminality has been an inherent genetic characteristic in all peoples and has seized the environmental opportunities created by the Internet, or whether mankind has reverted to primitive 'survival' thieving genetic characteristic, when there is not the need to be a thief, has not been researched. Empty vessels make the most noisea characteristic of a nation? The ancient proverb 'empty vessels make the most noise' comes to mind when one considers that there are billions of gigabytes of words on the Internet about 'all and sundry', the majority of which is trite. Source: Google Current Criminal Law Volume 9 Issue 3 March 2016 ISSN 1758-8413 (Online) 7 (For the proverb, see Robert G. Arns and Bret E. Crawford, 'Resonant cavities in the history of architectural acoustics', Technology and Culture, Vol 36, No 1, January 1995, pages 104135). Colloquially, the term describes the characteristic of 'the chav'. Internet noise The huge amount of information, hearsay, nonsense and articles and papers on the Internet make the work of researching 'genetic crime and justice' very time consuming, sifting through the dross to find reports, many of which, even from governments, lack scholarship and tightness. Yet, the reviewer has attended conferences of the highest level to glean that even the most important branches of governments, such as homeland security and ministries of defence, justice, etc, take their information mainly from the Internet and then produce reports, classified and unclassified, which lack rigorous evidential material. One is reminded of an example by way of a case at the Court of Appeal at the Royal Courts of Justice in London, England, in which the three appeal court judges, in their stated decision, included the fact that one highly reputable criminal justice publishers included an incorrect version of the law and on examining the other highly reputable criminal justice law publishers volume for the same year, found the exact same words in that volume, taking 'collaboration' without proper scholarly research a 'step too far'. Scientific evidence on genetics and crime For more than half a century now, there has been scientific evidence that genetics plays a key role in the origins of criminal behaviour. There are many ethical considerations thus raised which governments are reluctant to face and which, if faced, will cost a lot (in financial terms) to implement and to dismantle the old established systems. As the author states, genetics is considered in evidence only in federal United States ( US Federal Rules of Evidence); New Zealand (New Zealand Evidence Act 2006) and Australia (Australia Evidence Act 1955) and not in the United Kingdom, although the UK Criminal Justice Act 2003 does , in some circumstances, allow evidence from relatives about the defendant's character, but this is not expert evidence but merely non-expert opinion, permitted in relation to the defendant's bad character in circumstances as per s 101 CJA 2003. Note that in the US, the Federal Rules of Evidence Rule 402 prevents the submission of irrelevant evidence. Current Criminal Law Volume 9 Issue 3 March 2016 ISSN 1758-8413 (Online) 8 Exception from free will: US -criminal culpability and the mentally retarded The US Supreme Court found the death penalty to be disproportionate to the crime of adult rape. The court's newer proportionality jurisprudence focusses on the proportionality between offenders' culpability and punishment. Thus, the Court in Atkins asked whether the death penalty was disproportionate to the culpability of a class of offenders, the mentally retarded, irrespective of the crime they had committed (see Atkins 536 US at 318-21). By this shift, the US Supreme Court abandoned an integral part of its earlier proportionality analysis. (In earlier cases, the court determined whether a punishment was unconstitutionally disproportionate by analysing whether similar crimes have been punished less harshly within the same jurisdiction. However the court chose not to conduct an intra-jurisdictional review to determine whether similarly culpable individuals with mental retardation were treated as or less harshly than the class of offenders at issue). Scholars have argued that this failure was no accident, for, had the court undertaken an intra-jurisdictional comparison of the mentally retarded and other similar culpable offenders who were not mentally retarded, it would have been forced to conclude that similarly culpable offenders were subject to the death penalty in Virginia. Current Criminal Law Volume 9 Issue 3 March 2016 ISSN 1758-8413 (Online) 9 By not considering jurisdictional analysis the court did not acknowledge the many medical levels mental retardation in the term legally mentally retarded, resulting in arbitrary legislative classifications of mental retardation, such as in Louisiana where that interpretation violates the Equal Protection Clause of the US Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. The exempting categories of people from capital sentencing would have failed had the Supreme Court taken the route of that analysis. Genetics, Crime and Justice: background This review is unashamedly from the perspective of English law because busy United Kingdom criminal law solicitors and barristers mostly wish to know what the law states, which case is a precedent case and has the author provided up-to-date legal information because as practitioners, they must deal with real and urgent cases, with not too much time to cogitate and mull over the matter as academics enjoy. There are some lawyers who think that, as 'genetics, crime and justice' does not yet feature in the criminal justice system of the United Kingdom ('UK') there is no need to pay attention to the subject matter until it takes the form of direct 'black letter law. It will be decades before English criminal procedure experts decide to fully address the topic of 'genetics, crime and culture', in the book reviewer's opinion. However, to ignore this subject matter, which may one day become one very serious criminal evidence issue, is not wise. The reasons are fourfold. Current Criminal Law Volume 9 Issue 3 March 2016 ISSN 1758-8413 (Online) 10 The UK criminal justice system is still very much a common law system in the main (of a singlehuman -judge deciding on a case in the lower court, and then perhaps appealed). The UK is not isolated from transnational crimes. Any writings, commentary, or reviews on this subject quickly become unpopular because the average UK citizen (often media-led and with 'herd-instincts') are against the idea of 'genetics, crime and justice' –the UK culture being known as lovers of 'the underdog'. The fourth reason is the fact that the rate of discovery of new scientific knowledge exceeds the rate of adaptability of this knowledge on the part of our social and legal institutions and these institutions' competence to control the use of such new knowledge for humane purposes, despite the high technology at most people's fingertips, and even though in countries such as the United States of America, New Zealand and Australia, the law has caught up with scientific knowledge. However, the subject of 'genetics, crime and justice' still raises the vexed issue of racism in the UK, which is covertly rampant in this country, even though there are many laws and regulations passed against racism, notwithstanding inherent institutional racism and class division in most British government agencies. Hundreds of years of fallacies still resonating in society in 2016 For all of the above reasons, broaching this subject of genetics, crime and justice in this era is a very brave move by the author, Debra Wilson, who remained objective and cautious in all seven chapters of her monologue. Current Criminal Law Volume 9 Issue 3 March 2016 ISSN 1758-8413 (Online) 11 Genetics or nurture or culture? Source: Sally Ramage The UK criminal justice system has been predicated by the views of social scientists that human conduct is entirely shaped by 'nurture' and not by 'nature', partly due to obvious fallacies spread by the writings of Lombroso1, Hooton2, Holleck3, the Gluecks4, Watson5, Sheldon 6 and Eysenck7 during the past century. Fifty years of medical and scientific genetic evidence For more than half a century now, there has been scientific evidence that genetics plays a key role in the origins of criminal behaviour. There are many ethical considerations thus raised which governments are reluctant to face and which, if faced, will cost a lot in financial terms to implement and to also dismantle the old entrenched systems and in these days of economic recession, that is a big thing to ask any government to face. However, if governments do not face up to scientific truths (rather than 'quack and quasi-scientific writings) the sheer deceptions will 'come back to bite them', so to speak. Current Criminal Law Volume 9 Issue 3 March 2016 ISSN 1758-8413 (Online) 12 Moral and ethical issues There are moral and ethical issues raised by the application and non-application to countries' criminal justice systems. We can fairly be certain today that there is a genetic factor in criminal behaviour and this fact should be imparted as common knowledge to one and all. This knowledge that there is a genetic factor in criminal behaviour does not necessarily mean that in the UK, society will become more totalitarian than it already iseven more than Orwell8 or Huxley9 ever dreamed of. Even without taking into account this knowledge that there is a genetic factor in criminal behaviour, the UK has already become the country with the most technologically watched population in the whole world. Added to this conundrum is the present age of religious terrorism, causing most citizens in many Western countries to live in fear of being bombed as they go about their daily lives10 notwithstanding their fears of being mugged, burglarised, raped or murdered and people's fear is that police can no longer protect them11 fear of walking their CCTV-monitored streets at night; fearing also that the courts12 and prison systems 13 are no longer effective. Current Criminal Law Volume 9 Issue 3 March 2016 ISSN 1758-8413 (Online) 13 The crime of fraud or characteristic of a nation? The present knowledge of the recent years of financial recession14 and the knowledge that financial systems can be easily manipulated by professional criminals who steal billions of pounds through the use of computers15 brings to the fore the issue of genetics and crime in a most uncomfortable way. Source: Google Knowledge of how rampant degrees of fraud is committed by 'decent' people who manipulate the insurance system,16the taxation system,17 the immigration system, the retail system, the embargo systems, and the laws in general, is disturbing. 18 The knowledge that recidivism or repeated criminality is rampant also makes for uncomfortable reading. Police academic incompetence Even more disturbing and alarming is the acknowledgments that police, and indeed other government agencies such as Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs ('HMRC') do not have the skills-set to deal with most cybercrime, be it national or transnational, much less sophisticated tax avoidance schemes. Indeed, it was not until November 2015 that HMRC wrote and published their advice to the public, including the professions of lawyers and accountants, promoters, intermediaries(eg tax agents),and independent financial advisors, a sort of 'disclosure note of tax avoidance schemes' supposedly to make people aware of their responsibilities to disclose tax avoidance schemes. The legal issue with such an Internet publication is the questionable weight it would carry in a court of law, following the precedent in Pepper v Hart [1992] UKHL3, this HMRC note has no statutory strength. At Current Criminal Law Volume 9 Issue 3 March 2016 ISSN 1758-8413 (Online) 14 least when the Crown Prosecution Service issues guidance on a matter, they correctly inform the reader of the statute that applies and the caselaw precedent they have then followed. In Pepper v Hart, the court established the principle that when primary legislation is ambiguous then, in certain circumstances, the court may refer to statements made in the House of Commons or House of Lords in an attempt to interpret the meaning of the legislation. Before this ruling, such an action would have been seen as a breach of parliamentary privilege. However, Pepper v Hart cannot apply as regards the HMRC Internet note about tax avoidance (titled 'Ten things about disclosing a tax avoidance scheme') because we do not know on what criminal law basis, if any, they wrote it. Data theft. Source: Google Concerning the recent shenanigans reported by newspaper reporters who illegally accessed privileged information from client files of an offshore law firm, and breached data protection laws, the situation resembles, on the one had, the 'Wild West' of media reporting criminality, and on the other hand, an exposure of the amazingly brazen criminal continuation of the Rossminster tax avoidance scandal of the 1970s through to 2016unabated. 1970-Rossminster scandal: off-the-shelf tax avoidance schemes devised One recalls that two accountants, Tucker and Rossminster in the 1970s, formed a company with their surnames, in order to sell to anyone who wished to buy it, their tax avoidance offthe-shelf schemes, which made use of loopholes in the UK tax laws, with the knowledge that their product was a tax avoidance scheme, knowing that it is legal for a person to try to minimise his or her tax burden, differentiating their scheme from tax evasion, a criminal offence. Current Criminal Law Volume 9 Issue 3 March 2016 ISSN 1758-8413 (Online) 15 The Rossminster tax avoidance scheme lost billions of pounds from rightfully going to the public purse or Treasury. The Inland Revenue, now called HMRC, bludgeoned into the two accountants' office and homes, as if tax avoidance were a criminal offence and there followed criminal charges and prosecution. It was a case of convoluted tax avoidance schemes involving limited companies registered in London, Douglas, Isle of Man, St Peter's Port, Guernsey, Saint Helier, Jersey, and Panama in South America. Rossminster's tax avoidance treated by Inland Revenue as criminal tax evasion The tax avoidance scheme, was deemed to be tax evasion and after being charged and tried in the Lower Court, the accountants appealed and the case eventually reached the House of Lords, where it was revealed that such tax avoidance was then (and stubbornly continues to be) tax evasion on a massive scale. History has repeated itself with the Rossminster case, continuing to today and we can conclude that government agencies and legal draftsmen have learnt no lesson whatsoever. Current Criminal Law Volume 9 Issue 3 March 2016 ISSN 1758-8413 (Online) 16 2016: alleged serious fraud on BHS' pension fund now in deficitthe deviant elites? Current trauma of thousands of BHS employees who are now unemployed because the longestablished British retail establishment, British Home Stores ('BHS') has failed and been forced into Administration with the employees' pension fund in deficit by £571 million, has been widely reported on BBC News and in the UK newspapers, one such report published in the Times newspaper (see Lucy Fisher, Francis Elliot and Sean O'Neill, 'Tycoon's knighthood at risk over BHS collapse', Times, Wednesday, 27 April 2016, on the Front Page). Gatekeepers are asking for a government Inquiry (UK Inquiries Act 2005) on how this established retail corporation collapsed with such a huge deficit in its pension fund. Characteristic? The greedy wealthy Keeping the examination of 'genetics, crime and justice' focussed in the UK, can a conclusion be made that it is in the British gene pool to be financial manipulators of tax evasion; black marketeers, money launderers, fraudsters and thieves? Are these 'character traits'? Current Criminal Law Volume 9 Issue 3 March 2016 ISSN 1758-8413 (Online) 17 Source: Google Perhaps so, yet no research has approached this important subject, for, as history can verify, the UK has used shenanigan financial instruments for many hundreds of years. History records for us the fact that since the Middle Ages at least, when the 'window tax' was introduced in the year 1796, people in the UK bricked-up their windows to avoid the window tax. The government decided to introduce Income Tax in 1799. Then the wealthy and their tax advisors devised ways to turn highly taxed income into low or untaxed capital until 1962 when government passed taxes on capital. The leech of taxes due was so dire that by 1936 it was well know that the wealthy were secreting their monies abroad by way of the purchases of properties overseas, held by overseas trusts. Deeds of Covenant and Discretionary Trusts In 1970 the government passed the Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1970, after which the loophole was devised of the purchase of tax losses from other companies to offset against profits by acquiring almost defunct companies with a history of trading losses. Another shenanigan devised for tax avoidance purposes was to declare a very large dividend for a shareholder who suffered losses to offset the dividend. Another scheme was devised to Current Criminal Law Volume 9 Issue 3 March 2016 ISSN 1758-8413 (Online) 18 declare a very large dividend to a tax exempt shareholder. Another scheme to avoid taxes was devised to generate documentary losses on shares by declaring an abnormally large dividend, thus reducing assets of the company. Other tax avoidance schemes involved creation of Deeds of Convenant. Covenanted annuity payments to employees, say, were deductible from the wealthy person, thus reducing his or her personal tax bill. The issue of corporate crime does not escape the fact of 'genetics, crime and justice' because corporations are overseen by directorshuman beings. Even corporations overseen by other corporations finally have human directors who make decisions. The Discretionary Trust The Discretionary Trust was devised by cunning lawyers to avoid paying taxes at the relatively high UK rates by channeling income into offshore tax havens in Jersey, Guernsey, Isle of Man, Bahamas, Cayman, Turks and Caicus, British Virgin Islands, Gibraltar, Netherlands Antilles and other foreign shores. Such criminality, as it really is, 'sailing close to the winds' leans more towards an unethical genetic propensity to greed and gluttony. Current Criminal Law Volume 9 Issue 3 March 2016 ISSN 1758-8413 (Online) 19 Such financial criminality kiboshes the idea that crime is committed by the poor, the foreigners and the unemployed and so, by 'nurture' and opportunity, the criminals will change because they can. Sick and troubled society and incorrect assumptions in the CJS The excuse that crime is ever increasing because of higher unemployment; poor housing; traffic congestion; unsanitary conditions; high taxes and corrupt politics, does not wash because today we live in an increasingly sick and troubled society and partially because the justice system is based on incorrect assumptions. It is a fact that crime is increasing but the number of people committing crime is not increasing because many crimes are repeated crimes committed by persons with habitual criminal behavior, ie hard-core criminals. This fact has been known for over five decades. 19 Source: Google Departing from the concept of free will Current Criminal Law Volume 9 Issue 3 March 2016 ISSN 1758-8413 (Online) 20 Our lives are a series of patterns. The English law criminal justice system is based on the idea of free will and also on environmental factors, such that, for example, a poor family environment or social or economic deprivation can forge a person's mental and emotional outlook and thus his or her behavioural patterns. Picture: patterns. Source: Google Modern society with its smart phones and laptop computers owned by almost every UK citizen must surely accept the notion of patterns because this is how computers work. And patterns tell a story. Insanitythe exception to free will In English law, the criminal justice system works on the premise that man acts because of free will but that free will may be distorted by adverse environmental conditions, causing offenders to choose to exercise their free will in antisocial or criminal ways because of their environmentally influenced attitudes. English law provides an exception to 'free will' and the exception applies to the insane (see McNaghten Rules (1893, 10 C & F 200) which clearly provide that a defendant can be regarded as criminally insane if he or she was labouring under a defect of reason, from'disease of the mind', as not to know the nature and quality of the act he or she was doing and today there is an established body of caselaw on this exception. In such case law, expert evidence develops the law to enlighten as to the many cases which constitute an exception, but to date there has been no expert evidence admitted in an English criminal trial as regards 'genetic propensity to criminality'. Let us examine the exception precedent caselaw development. Current Criminal Law Volume 9 Issue 3 March 2016 ISSN 1758-8413 (Online) 21 Intoxicationnot insanityrape & murder of child-DPP v Beard [1920] Whilst drunk the defendant had raped 13 yr old Ivy Wood. He placed his hand upon her mouth to stop her from screaming, pressing his thumb on her throat and she died of suffocation. Drunkenness was no defence unless it could be established that the accused at the time of committing rape was so drunk that he was incapable of forming the intent to commit it. The death of the girl resulted from a succession of acts, the rape and the act of violence causing suffocation, which could not be regarded independently of each other. The trial Judge was mistaken in applying the test of insanity to a case of drunkenness not amounting to insanity. GBH with intentdefence of insanity by arteriosclerosisR v Kemp [1957] A defence of insanity through arteriosclerosis is found in the case law R v Kemp [1957] 1 QB 399, 40 Crim App Rev 121, [1957] 1 QB 399) in which the defendant was charged with causing 'grievous bodily harm with intent.' Kemp suffered from arteriosclerosis. It was common ground that by reason of the disease arteriosclerosis, the defendant is deemed to lack mens rea. However, the medical witnesses for the opposing sides differed as to whether the illness could properly be called a disease of the mind. The word 'mind' is used in the ordinary sense of the mental faculties of reason, memory and understanding in this case. Kemp's defence was of 'automatism' and he asked for a simple acquittal on the grounds that he was not suffering from a disease of the mind. Devlin J ruled that whichever medical evidence was accepted by the jury it would still show that the defendant had a disease of the mind for the purposes of the criminal law. She said: 'In my judgment, the words ... are not to be construed as if they were put in for the purpose of distinguishing between diseases which have a mental origin and diseases which have a physical origin. They were put in for the purpose of limiting the effect of the words "defect of reason." A defect of reason is by itself enough to make the act irrational and therefore normally to exclude responsibility in law. However the Rule was not intended to apply to defects of reason caused simply by brutish stupidity without rational power. The words Current Criminal Law Volume 9 Issue 3 March 2016 ISSN 1758-8413 (Online) 22 ensure that unless the defect is due to a diseased mind and not simply to an untrained one there is insanity within the meaning of the Rule. Hardening of the arteries is a disease which is shown on the evidence to be capable of affecting the mind in such a way as to cause a defect, temporarily or permanently, of its reasoning, understanding and so on ... and so is a disease of the mind ... within the meaning of the Rules'. Epilepsy (psychomotor)insane automatismBratty v AG for NI [1963] HL Lord Denning's decision as stated in Bratty v Attorney General for Northern Ireland [1963] AC 386, HL) disapproved of the ruling in R v Charleston [1955] 39 Crim App Rev 37, that epilepsy or brain tumour were not diseases of the mind, even though may lead to violent and irrational action. A person undergoing an epileptic fit is in a state of automatism. In this very important murder trial, the defence called medical expert to show that Bratty suffered at the time of the criminal offencefrom psychomotor epilepsy, and he therefore lacked mens rea. The trial judge ruled that this was a defence of insanity and that there was no evidence of automatism for the jury to decide on. The prosecution unsuccessfully appealed: automatism due to some cause other than a disease of the mind was upheld by the House of Lords. The majority decision at the House of Lords was that, obiter dictum,22 sleepwalking and concussion were examples of automatism and were not due to disease of the mind. The majority in the House of Lords also expressed, obiter dictum, their opinion that, unlike in the issue of insanity the onus is on the defence to prove insanity, on the issue of automatism, the onus is on the prosecution to negative automatism beyond reasonable doubt.23 Diabeticdefence of automatism for jury to decideR v Quick [1973] In R v Quick [1973] QB 910, 57 Crim App Rev 722, CA, Quick raised the defence of automatism by reason of an imbalance of insulin which, as a diabetic, he was taking on prescription. The trial judge, following Bratty ruled that this amounted to a defence of insanity, whereupon Quick pleaded guilty. In R v Hennessey [1989] 1 WLR 287, was a case Current Criminal Law Volume 9 Issue 3 March 2016 ISSN 1758-8413 (Online) 23 of a diabetic person failing to take insulin, resulting in a hypoglycaemic state (high blood sugar), the defence of automatism is not available because the hypoglycaemia will be regarded as having been caused by an inherent defect (the diabetes), that is, a disease and if that disease causes a malfunction of the mind that manifests itself in violence, the only defence open to such a person is insanity. The prosecution appealed and the Court of Appeal held that the alternative of automatism should have been left for the jury to decide. The Court of Appeal reviewed a number of English and Commonwealth authorities and then stated: 'In this quagmire of law, seldom entered nowadays, apart from those defendants in desperate need of some kind of defence, Bratty provides the only firm ground. Is there any discernible path? We think there is. Judges should follow in a common-sense way their sense of fairness. This seems to have been the approach ... in R v Cottle [1958] New Zealand Law Rev 999 and ...in R v Carter (1959) Victoria Rev... In our judgment, no help can be obtained by speculating ... as to what the judges who answered the House of Lords questions in 1843 meant by disease of the mind... Our task has been to decide what the law means now by the words 'disease of the mind'. In our judgment, the fundamental concept is of a malfunctioning of the mind caused by disease. A malfunctioning of the mind of transitory effect caused by the application to the body of some external factor such as violence, drugs, including anaesthetics, alcohol and hypnotic influences cannot fairly be said to be due to disease. Such malfunctioning, unlike that caused by a defect of reason from disease of the mind, will not always relieve an accused from criminal responsibility. A self induced incapacity will not excuse (Lipman [1970) nor will one which could have been reasonably foreseen as a result of either doing, or omitting to do something, as, for example, taking alcohol against medical advice after using certain prescribed drugs, or failing to have regular meals whilst taking insulin. From time to time difficult borderline cases are likely to arise. When they do, the test suggested ... in R v Cottle... is likely to give the correct result, viz. can this mental condition be fairly regarded as amounting to or producing a defect of reason from disease of the mind?...Quick's alleged mental condition, if it ever existed, was not caused by his diabetes, but by his use of the insulin prescribed by his doctor. Such malfunctioning of his mind as Current Criminal Law Volume 9 Issue 3 March 2016 ISSN 1758-8413 (Online) 24 there was, was caused by an external factor and not by a bodily disorder in the nature of a disease which disturbed the working of his mind. It follows, in our judgment that the Appellant Quick was entitled to have his defence of automatism left to the jury...' Defence of insanity: psychomotor epilepsyR v Sullivan [1984] A.C. 156 The meaning of the expression 'disease of the mind' as the cause of a defect of reason has remained remains unchanged over the years for the purposes of the application of the M'Naghten Rules. The word 'mind' is used in the ordinary sense of the mental faculties of reason, memory and understanding in R v Kemp (Albert) [1957] 1 Q.B. 399). If the effect of a disease is to impair those faculties so severely as to have either of the consequences referred to in the latter part of the answer, it matters not whether the aetiology of the impairment is organic (as in epilepsy) or functional or whether the impairment itself is permanent or is transient and intermittent, provided that it subsisted at the time of the commission of the act. The purpose of the legislation relating to the defence of insanity has been to protect society against a recurrence of dangerous conduct. Accordingly, the duration of a temporary suspension of the mental faculties of reason, memory and understanding (particularly if it is recurrent) cannot be relevant to the application by the courts of the M'Naghten Rules, though it may be relevant to the course taken by the Secretary of State. The ruling in R v Kemp (Albert) [1957] should not be regarded as excluding the possibility of non-insane automatism (for which the proper verdict would be a verdict of not guilty) in cases where temporary impairment, not being self-induced by consuming drink or drugs, results from some external physical factor such as a blow on the head causing concussion or an anaesthetic for therapeutic purposes in R v Bailey [1983] 1 WLR 760). Bratty's appeal was dismissed. The appeal in Bratty v Attorney General for Northern Ireland [1963] AC 386 was that the jury had already negatived the explanation that Bratty might have been acting unconsciously in the course of an attack of psychomotor epilepsy since there was no evidential foundation for the suggestion that he was acting unconsciously which ruled out other causes. Once the jury had rejected the insanity defence the judge correctly refused to leave a decision on automatism to the jury as the suggested basis of the automatism is the Current Criminal Law Volume 9 Issue 3 March 2016 ISSN 1758-8413 (Online) 25 same as for the defence of insanity (psychomotor epilepsy, in this case). The House of Lords rejected the suggestion that R v Sullivan (Patrick Joseph) [1984] AC 156 could be distinguished from Bratty v AG for Northern Ireland on the ground that the medical evidence in R v Sullivan (Patrick Joseph) was that epilepsy was not regarded as a disease of the mind, whereas in Bratty the point was not argued, it being accepted by all the doctors that it was a disease of the mind. OAPA offencesleepwalkinginsane automatism – R v Burgess [1991] Sleepwalking defence was the case in R v Burgess, 93 Crim App Rev 41, CA [1991] 2 QB 92. The defence to this charge of an offence contrary to section 18 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861 was non-insane automatism. However, the trial judge's decision was that the defendant was insane automatism. The Court of Appeal agreed with the trial judge's decision of insane automatism. The violence was committed whilst Burgess was sleepwalking. At trial, expert medical evidence was called, both by the defence and by the prosecution. The trial judge ruled that the medical evidence adduced amounted to evidence of insane automatism within the 1843 M'Naghten Rules. The prosecution appealed and the Appeal Court held that, on a defence of automatism, it is for the trial judge to decide- (i) if a proper evidential foundation had been laid for the defence and (ii) if the evidence showed the case to be one of insane automatism within the M'Naghten Rules, or one of non-insane automatism. The Appeal Court also decided that the lower court judge did properly undertake that task and that the trial judge had correctly concluded that Burgess' state was an abnormality or disorder which, although momentary and unlikely to recur in the form of serious violence, was due to an internal factor, whether functional or organic, which had manifested itself in violence and since this might occur again, it amounted to a 'disease of the mind'. Insanity defenceexpert evidence The opinion of an expert is admissible to furnish the court with scientific information which is likely to be outside the experience and knowledge of a judge or jury (see R v Turner [1975] QB 834, 60 Crim App Rev 80, CA. Any issue as to a defendant's sanity needs expert Current Criminal Law Volume 9 Issue 3 March 2016 ISSN 1758-8413 (Online) 26 evidence, a pre-requisite to an acquittal on the ground of insanity. The Criminal Procedure (Insanity and Unfitness to Plead) Act 1991, s 1(1), states that an insanity verdict cannot be returned except on the evidence of two registered medical practitioners, at least one of whom is 'duly approved' as per s 6(1) of the 1991 Act. Insanity defenceno free will Guilt is premised on free will and punishment is premised on certain assumptions about the human conditionretribution, incapacitation, deterrence and rehabilitation. If we accept that genetics is a factor in crime, then deterrence is not a valid punishment since a criminal's potential behaviour has biological origins by way of genetic defect. Human behaviour moulded by inherited physiological influences As to rehabilitation in the theory of punishment, past negative environmental influences must be countered with future positive environmental influencesnot found in the prison system. Supervised probation and rehabilitative programmes better serve rehabilitation than prison does and supervised probation is a better form of punishment by far. However rehabilitation by supervised probation has not worked and today more and more offenders are sent to prison. Probation does not work because the premise of moulding behavior by environmental factors is false. Human behavior is moulded by inherited physiological influences. Genetic conditions cannot be rehabilitated with environmental therapy. 20 Insanity defence modern black letter law As the author states, genetics is considered in evidence only in federal United States ( US Federal Rules of Evidence); New Zealand (New Zealand Evidence Act 2006) and Australia (Australia Evidence Act 1955) and not in the United Kingdom, although the UK's Criminal Justice Act 2003 does , in some circumstances, allow evidence from relatives about the defendant's character, but this is not expert evidence but merely non-expert opinion, permitted in relation to the defendant's bad character in circumstances as per s 101 CJA 2003. Current Criminal Law Volume 9 Issue 3 March 2016 ISSN 1758-8413 (Online) 27 It is noted that in the US, the Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 402 prevents the submission of irrelevant evidence and so many generalisations will be kept out with a simple 'relevance' objection in court. If the evidence does not meet the low threshold, it may still constitute character evidence, which in the US, is generally banned from trial. If character evidence is admitted in the criminal case, it is because the criminal defendant has opened the door to the use of character evidence and so has brought the problem on himself. Rule 403 provides safeguards against admission of racial stereotypes and broad racist generalisations as with limited probative value or as unduly prejudicial. 21 Conclusion Debra Wilson, author Source: Google My final comment is that it is good that the matter of genetics, crime and justice has been raised by Debra Wilson, a senior lecturer at the University of Canterbury in New Zealand (the issue having been hushed since the 1970s as largely being a 'politically incorrect' topic). English caselaw has helped in expanding by examples, when the insanity defence can apply, as related above. There have been no cases yet of violent crimes linked to environmental pollution; water contamination; chemicals illegally released into rivers and so into the food chain; or brain hemorrhages causing a change in behaviour and personality and crime, due to incorrect dosages of medications such as Warfarin, for example. Watch this space. Endnotes to Book Review Genetics, Crime and Justice 1SeeWatson, K.A. (2010) Forensic medicine in Western society: a history, London: Routledge. Current Criminal Law Volume 9 Issue 3 March 2016 ISSN 1758-8413 (Online) 28 2 Hooton, E.A. (1939) The American criminal: an anthropological study, Connecticut: Greenwood Press. 3 Holleck, S. (1971) Psychiatry and the dilemmas of crime, Berkley, California: University of California Press. 4 Glueck, S. and Glueck, E. (1956) Physique and delinquency, New York: Harper and Brothers. 5 John Broadus Watson, a psychologist, said that 'behaviour, in its simplest terms, can be reduced to a stimulus that brings about a particular response'. Watson rejected even the concept of human consciousness or a 'mind', dismissing their existence as being 'as useless as a monk's lore and as 'old wives' tales'. See Lundin, R.W. (1972) Theories and systems of psychology, London: D.C. Heath & Co. 6 Sheldon, W. (1949) Varieties of delinquent youth, New York: Harper and Brothers, 7 Eysenck, H.J. (1964) Crime and personality, Boston: Routledge & Keegan. 8 Orwell, G. 1911) Nineteen hundred and eighty four', 9 Huxley, A. A brave New World. 10 Chris Summers, 'Brussels airport suicide bomber was an ISIS prison guard: French former hostages identify Islamist who kept watch over them in Syria', Mail Online, 25 April 2016. See www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3553905. 11 There is now a name to this fear which is termed 'scelerophobia', fear of crime in general. See www.fearof.net/fear-of-crime=phobia-scelerophobia/. It must be added that UK police always blame lack of resources or cuts in budgets for apparent incompetence from years ago to today. See Editor, 'Impact of austerity could put London's safety at risk', Police Professional, Issue 478, 22 October 2015, at page 6. 12 Ministry of Justice, (2016) 'Green paper evidence report. Breaking the cycle: effective punishment, rehabilitation and sentencing of offenders', London: TSO. "The increased use of out-of-court disposals and the fall in crime have not reduced pressures on criminal courts and offender-management services....the adult prison population has risen substantially, driven by specifically more offenders being recalled to prison..." 13 Ibid. 14 S. Keen, (2012) 'Instability in financial markets: sources and remedies', NET Conference, Berlin. See also, Hyman P. Minsky, 'The financial instability hypothesis,' The Jerome Levy Economics Institute, Working Paper Number 74, May 1992. Current Criminal Law Volume 9 Issue 3 March 2016 ISSN 1758-8413 (Online) 29 See www.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=161024. 15 Editor, 'Cybercrime', Interpol, 2016. See www.interpol.int/Crimeareas/Cybercrime/Cybercrime. "Cybercrime is a fast-growing area of crime. More and more criminals are exploiting the speed, convenience and anonymity of the internet to commit a diverse range of criminal activities that know no borders, physical or virtual, cause serious harms and pose very real threats to victims worldwide". 16 See A. Blumstein and E. Craddy, 'Prevalence and recidivism in index arrests: a feedback model', 16 (2) Law and Society Review, 265 (1981). See also, National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, (1975) Curbing the repeat offender, New York: Basic Books, at page 199. 17 See Robert Holtfreter, Tiffany McLeod, and Adrian Harrington, 'Identity theft tax refund fraud', Fraud Magazine, March/April 2016. See also Anna Jordan, 'House of Lords report calls for online travel agents to be investigated', LoveMoney.com, 2016 at www.lovemoney.com/news/52028/. 18 Editor, 'Fraud and cybercrime figures double crime estimates', Police Professional, Issue 478, 22 October 2015, at page 9. 19 See A.Blumstein and A. Craddy, 'Prevalence and recidivism in index arrests: a feedback model', 16 (2) Law and Society Review, 265, (1981). 20 See US Department of Justice, (1980) Indicators of crime and criminal justice: qualitative study, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, at page 84. 21 However, character evidence is permitted by Rule 404 (b) of 'other crimes, wrongs and acts'. 22 Obiter dictum is an opinion not necessary to a judgment and therefore not binding as a precedent. 23 The onus is for the prosecution to negative automatism beyond reasonable doubt. This means that proof on this single issue of automatism would be the same requirement as for every criminal prosecution. It is not for the defence to prove automatism but for the prosecution to make a case beyond reasonable doubt to disprove or negative automatism. This means that the prosecutor must ensure that the jury understands the term automatism; they must have sound and strong expert evidence that this is not a case of automatism; and must ensure that they illustrate disproof in facts about the offence; the nature of the offence; the defendant at that moment in time with sound evidence that does not breach criminal procedure rules. Current Criminal Law Volume 9 Issue 3 March 2016 ISSN 1758-8413 (Online) 30 In other words, the prosecution must prove the main fault element of mens rea-intention, so that the jury, having been instructed by the judge to consider the extent to which the defendant foresaw the result of his action. The modern definition of 'intention' is found in the House of Lords' decisions R v Moloney [1985] 1 All ER 1025 and R v Woollin [1998] 4 All ER 103. The trial judge must instruct the jury that to negative automatism, the prosecution must prove intention and foresight, which, by UK Criminal Justice Act 1967, s 8, is a subjective concept (based on what the defendant actually foresaw, and not on what he ought to have foreseen and not on what the reasonable person would have foreseen had he been in the defendant's shoesin other wordsbased on the defendant's state of mind). The law requires a very high degree of foresight before a defendant's state of mind is labelled as having been intentional. ENDS Printed and published by SALLY RAMAGE ®, Copehale, Coppenhall, Stafford, ST18 9BW, United Kingdom. Registered as a Newspaper at the Post Office. International Copyright Sally Ramage ® 2010. All Rights Reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any material form (including photocopying or storing it in any medium by electronic means and whether or not transiently or incidentally to some others use of this publication) without the written permission of the copyright holder except in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Design and Patents Act 1988 or under the terms of a licence issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, Saffron House, 6-10 Kirby Street, London, England EC1N 8TS. Application for the copyright owner's written permission to reproduce any part of this publication should be addressed to the publisher. Warning: the doing of an unauthorised act in relation to a copyright work may result in both a civil claim for damages and criminal prosecution. ISSN 1758-8413 (Online).

Games 2017, 8, 43; doi:10.3390/g8040043 www.mdpi.com/journal/games Article Social Preferences and Context Sensitivity Jelle de Boer Philosophy Section, Delft University of Technology, Jaffalaan 5, 2628 BX Delft, The Netherlands; [email protected] Received: 28 July 2017; Accepted: 6 October 2017; Published: 13 October 2017 Abstract: This paper is a partial review of the literature on 'social preferences'. There are empirical findings that convincingly demonstrate the existence of social preferences, but there are also studies that indicate their fragility. So how robust are social preferences, and how exactly are they context dependent? One of the most promising insights from the literature, in my view, is an equilibrium explanation of mutually referring conditional social preferences and expectations. I use this concept of equilibrium, summarized by means of a figure, to discuss a range of empirical studies. Where appropriate, I also briefly discuss a couple of insights from the (mostly parallel) evolutionary literature about cooperation. A concrete case of the Orma in Kenya will be used as a motivating example in the beginning. Keywords: social preferences; game theory; ethics 1. Introduction Among the Orma in Kenya, cooperation in a one-shot anonymous Public Goods experiment, which has a Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) structure, correlates with wealth, i.e., number of cattle. People with cattle made relatively high contributions in this game, but not so in other games like the Ultimatum Game (UG). On the other hand, Orma without cattle-wage laborers and tradesmen-demonstrated the opposite pattern by making high contributions in the UG and low contributions in the Public Goods experiment. It appeared that the Orma generally associated the Public Goods experiment with a Harambee, a Swahili word for fund-raising for local public projects, such as building a school. In a Harambee one is supposed to contribute in proportion to wealth. That cooperative play among the Orma in the PD experiment has to do with the institution of the Harambee in their daily lives seems fairly obvious, but exactly how is not so clear. After all, the experiment is anonymous and one-shot, whereas the Harambee is more like a repeated game, and is therefore a different kind of strategic situation. This case of experimental gameplay by the Orma derives from a highly influential body of research done by anthropologists and economists in fifteen small-scale societies, which started in the late 1990s and is still underway [1,2].1 Two of the major outcomes so far are, firstly, that the behavior of most experimental subjects, wherever they live, contradicts the Homo Economicus model. This model predicts universal defection in the PD (with monetary outcomes) and minimal offers for proposers and subsequent acceptance by responders in the UG (with monetary outcomes). Secondly, cooperative play in these games varies quite a lot. It varies much more, in fact, than has previously been established by experimental work done in industrialized countries [4]. The aim of this paper is to help in understanding this remarkable variation in cooperative behavior. My method will be rational reconstruction. I will attempt to interpret empirical results in terms of propositional attitudes and reasons. The Orma provide an exemplary case because they manifest two distinct patterns among themselves. I will start by focusing on the Orma and the 1 The particular study of the Orma is [3]. Games 2017, 8, 43 2 of 15 associated Harambee and discuss various hypotheses to explain this case (Sections 2 and 3). In Sections 4 and 5, I review parts of the literature on 'social preferences'. I will focus on the class of expectations-based social preferences and I will portray the corresponding equilibrium of these preferences and expectations by means of a figure-a loop. These mutually referring social preferences and expectations can explain a large part of the contingency of cooperation as observed by the anthropologists. Thereafter I will move beyond this and attempt to apply the central insights of this literature more generally (Section 6).2 2. The One-Shot Game Design In this section I discuss a couple of alternative hypotheses that explain the cooperative behavior, before moving on to the social preferences hypothesis itself. Readers already convinced about the existence of social preferences and how they can be established, and also familiar with the methodological issues around this, may wish to skip this section and go directly to Section 3. The first hypothesis we will consider says that the Public Goods or PD experiment may be designed and conducted as an anonymous one-shot game but that the subjects do not really perceive it in this way. It is too artificial for them; they see this situation as just another moment immersed in their ongoing world, naturally connected with their personal and shared histories and with future consequences. In recent years there has been some discussion among economists whether one-shot games are good experimental designs at all, exactly because in real life, outside of the laboratory, the actions that people perform and the choices that they make are normally elements in a social historic fabric. Nobel prize-winning economist Vernon Smith, for example, has doubts about the usability of such games in experiments: "The abstract concept of single play invokes conditions sufficiently remote from much human experience that it may be operationally difficult to penetrate." He asks whether a one-shot game is really "devoid of a history and a future," and more specifically whether it is "devoid of reputation considerations" [12].3 One way in which Vernon Smith could be right is of course when the experiments fail to be realized according to their protocols. Players in a game like the PD should not be able to see what others contribute, communicate their ideas and intentions to their co-players, influence other players in subsequent experiments (contagion), or be subject to experimenter's bias. Safeguarding this can be troublesome in small-scale societies and it is interesting to read how the various researchers tried to cope with this. Sometimes they failed, but the anthropologist who studied the Orma, Jean Ensminger, appears to have anticipated the pitfalls and to have been able to control the anonymous one-shot nature of the game quite well. For example, contributions were made privately in envelopes which were then shuffled. People were not allowed to talk. Ensminger raced from village to village in order to beat travelling news and thus avoid contagion. She asked her native research assistant to turn his back when offers and contributions were made. Therefore, let us assume that there were no serious leakages and that the experiment mostly worked as planned. However, Vernon Smith's qualm goes further than this. Because even when everything is executed as it ought to be, experimental subjects can, in their thoughts, still reach beyond the laboratory walls and let the real world enter their minds: they can still imagine reputation issues. Contemplating defection in the anonymous one-shot PD experiment, an individual may still feel the presence of his fellow men and think that defection will somehow be bad for his name. That would be a piece of erroneous thinking according to the logic of the game but it can occur. Now the common way to test this is to compare how the same people perform under the condition of repeated play with how they meet single play. Such tests show that the vast majority of subjects play systematically differently under these two conditions. This reveals that they understand reputation building [16]. Smith says he knows the experimental literature that attests that people play 2 Other philosophical work that also discusses this and/or similar material is [5–11]. Bicchieri's (2006) book [5] is influential but in Section 3 I argue that it is ultimately on the wrong track. 3 For the same doubts see [13–15]. Games 2017, 8, 43 3 of 15 differently in repeated games than in one-shot games, but he claims that "this tells you only that reputation-building is more important in repeat play of the same game than in single play, not that it is absent in one-shot games." However, now reputation and its workings seem to become a bit too elusive. How could one possibly refute the reputation effects that according to Smith may linger on in single play? Smith says that one-shot play can harbor reputation building, something that one would only expect in repeated play. However, if repeated play then clearly demonstrates a difference which we would normally attribute to considerations of reputation, then it seems there is little room left still to hypothesize these considerations of reputation in single play. To uphold this claim would require other and independent empirical support. Now Smith indeed also defends his thesis by such work, viz., an experiment conducted by Mary Rigdon, Kevin McCabe, and himself [17]. This experiment showed that people in an anonymous repeated PD play substantially more cooperatively when the experimenters secretly cluster the cooperators as the experiment proceeds. The experimenters observe who cooperate in the early rounds of the game and subsequently match individual players according to how cooperatively they have played until then. In the control group players are randomly matched. In both conditions play is anonymous and no one knows about the sorting. "The trends are unmistakable," Rigdon, McCabe, and Smith say, "as play proceeds through the later rounds, cooperation emerges and is sustained among the sorted subjects, but there is no similar round-effect for the randomly paired subjects."4 These subjects in the sorting group play a series of one-shot games without having a history as in repeated play, where people can monitor each other, but there has nonetheless been a relevant common causal history. This is because what happens in early rounds appears to affect behavior in later rounds. Reflecting on this, Smith asks: Why should a real person see no continuation value across stage games with different but culturally more or less similar strangers? Can we ignore the fact that each person shares cultural elements of commonality with the history of others? (...) Is not culture about multilateral human sociality?5 This is interesting but I find it unclear how this supports the earlier idea that reputation considerations are effective in single play. It more seems like Smith indicates something different at work here, namely, indeed, a kind of "human sociality". The following sections aim to develop a way to understand this sociality in terms other than reputation. 3. Social Preferences, Expectations and Scripts In this section I examine the hypothesis of conditional social preferences as an explanation of cooperative behavior. These social preferences are conditional in the sense that they are based on expectations about whether the other players in the game-theoretic setting are going to cooperate. The next question is then on what these expectations can be based in turn. I discuss and then reject a theory that claims that these expectations are ultimately based on 'scripts'. Another way to explain cooperative behavior in an anonymous one-shot PD experiment is invoking a social preference, e.g., a preference for promoting the well-being of the other players in the game or a preference for fair dealing. People with such preferences can attain the cooperative outcome in a PD (with material payoffs). In the synthesizing and interpretative chapter of their book the anthropologists discuss the possibility that people perhaps have a general inclination to behave socially, which they understand as a disposition that has evolved in a particular physical–social environment (e.g., among the horticulturalists Quichua in the Amazon tropical forest) and which then generally applies to various types of mixed-motive settings within that environment (e.g., PD, UG, etc.). There is a growing consensus among social scientists, including economists, that people regularly act on genuine social inclinations, and that the thesis of universal egoism is false. See the 4 [17] p. 997. 5 [12] p. 9. Games 2017, 8, 43 4 of 15 recent empirical literature on 'social preferences' [18–23]. One kind of social preferences is general or categorical. However, Henrich et al. reject the idea that people have a generalized disposition to behave socially and they do this exactly on the basis of Ensminger's fieldwork among the Orma. A general social disposition in game-theoretic experiments would predict that people play cooperatively in a PD and make high offers in a UG. The Orma, however, are divided on this point. The Orma with cattle play cooperatively in the PD and not in the UG, whereas Orma wage laborers play cooperatively in the UG and not in the PD. This does not undermine the hypothesis that people can have social preferences of some sort but it does undermine the specific idea of general or categorical social preferences. There is now ample evidence that people's willingness to cooperate in experiments like the PD largely depends on them having expectations that the others are going to cooperate, too. Not many people are saints and have unconditional social preferences in such settings. Most of the time social preferences appear to have a conditional nature: I will if you will. The reason is that people want to avoid exploitation. They don't want to be suckered. In other words, they only want to behave cooperatively when they are in good company, when it can be expected that the others are also going to cooperate. So an actual willingness to cooperate is reasonably accompanied by an expectation that others are going to cooperate, too [22,24,25]. It is this relatively abundant type of social preferences that is the subject of the present paper. As said, these conditional preferences are dependent on expectations. This brings us beyond standard game theory and into the territory of psychological game theory. In psychological game theory, expectations have a direct causal impact on the motivation of the players. Expectations become part of utility. Seminal contributions are Rabin (1993) [18] and Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) [26].6 Rabin calls this motivation 'reciprocating kindness' and Charness and Dufwenberg call it 'guilt aversion'. But it is important to note that their actual mathematical models are silent on the precise moral or altruistic content of the preferences. The equilibrium models of these authors simply do not really make assumptions about this content. This is a good thing in a sense; it makes the theory more general. So generally, conditional social preferences are special because, with these, a subject's expectations about his fellow players not merely make a difference for his strategy choice but for his utility. Such expectations thus transform a game, e.g., they could transform a Prisoner's Dilemma into a Stag Hunt game, when the expectations are mutual. The suggestion that follows from this is that the Orma who play cooperatively in the PD experiment do so because they have a social preference that is conditioned by their expectation that the other players will also cooperate. The next question is: where do these expectations come from? Remember that we are working under the assumption that the Orma understand the difference between repeated and single play. Let us then also assume that this understanding is mutual among them in the sense that the subjects also understand that the others understand that they are in a single play situation, i.e., that there is common knowledge to a sufficient degree. This means that their possible expectations that the other players are going to cooperate cannot really be based on considerations that belong to repeated play. They are mutually aware of the fact that the PD experiment is not a stage in a Harambee. So why would one then expect one's fellow players to cooperate in the one-shot game? On what can this expectation be reasonably based? In her 2006 book The Grammar of Society [5] the philosopher Christina Bicchieri argues that 'scripts' ultimately justify people's expectations in social interaction.7 In this section I show that this is not a good way for justifying expectations. Cognitive scientist Roger Shank introduced the term 'script'. Scripts are micro personal theories about how the social world works. They contain roles and tell us what to expect from each other. For example, the script 'restaurant' sets in motion ideas that somebody who approaches your table in a restaurant will offer a menu, then take orders, bring 6 See also [27,28]. For an early contribution in philosophy see [29,30] and cf. [10]. 7 Another prominent scholar who develops an expectation-based theory is Robert Sugden [31]. See De Boer [10], Section 8, for a discussion of this work. Games 2017, 8, 43 5 of 15 drinks and food, and will finally require payment. Scripts, Bicchieri argues, also help to form expectations in mixed-motives situations. Once a situation is categorized as being of a certain type, a script is activated that will involve players' interlocking roles, a shared understanding of what is supposed to happen, and even prescriptions for unexpected occurrences. For example, once a particular 'fair division' script is activated, an individual will have definite beliefs and expectations about other individuals she is interacting with, even if (or especially if) she does not know such individuals personally.8 Bichieri also stresses that scripts mostly do their work below our level of consciousness. What we have instead is implicit, nondeclarative knowledge. (...) Once a schema is activated, we tend to follow the norm by default.9 This analysis seems to fit well with what the anthropologists say in another (and favored) interpretation of their experimental results, apart from the interpretation with the evolved general disposition that we just discussed. The anthropologists argue as follows. For the Orma, as for most people, the laboratory experiment is somewhat alien: it is detached from normal daily life. Therefore, it is not immediately clear what to do, and in such situations people scan their memories for resemblances. The mechanism is that they search for analogue situations from their daily lives that they have already experienced. The PD lab experiment cues a particular analogue from daily life and this association subsequently triggers behavior in the experiment.10 The PD reminds the Orma of the Harambee institution. As the Harambee implies contribution dependent on wealth, the amount of one's own wealth guides individual choice in the PD experiment. In terms of Bicchieri's scripts, the PD activates the Harambee script and this then induces cooperative behavior in Orma in proportion to their stock of cattle. We are examining the hypothesis that the Orma act on a social preference which is conditioned by the expectation that the others in the experiment will cooperate to a sufficient degree. We have assumed that the participants in the game understand the difference between single play and repeated play. The question we are now dealing with is why players would expect others to play cooperatively in a situation of single play. On the script theory the explanation would be that there is a Harambee script which tells one what to do and what to expect from others: cooperate in proportion to wealth and so will the others. The aim of this paper is the same as Bicchieri's: to offer a rational reconstruction of social interaction. This means analyzing social behavior in terms of propositional attitudes and reasons. Using this perspective, we may always ask the 'why?' question. At this point it can be asked why a socially inclined Orma would expect others to follow a script in these circumstances. After all, it is mutually understood among the players, we have assumed, that they are currently not in a Harambee and that each can get away with defection. Why expect others to follow a script in these circumstances? Why expect them to fare on something like an automatic pilot when there is a quite obvious reason not to do this? Single play can be seen as a novelty and this requires that one takes back the controls.11 A script delivers a freeze-frame image of the other players in a game. The others are actually envisioned as states of nature, not as rational agents. People who act on scripts effectively transform a game-theoretic situation into a decision-theoretic one. 4. Social Preferences and Expectations in a Loop Let us take stock. A first part of the explanation for a high degree of cooperation in single play in mixed-motive games is that people act on genuine social preferences. Secondly, these social preferences must not be understood as categorical. This is because they are often based on the 8 [5] p. 94. 9 [5] p. 97. 10 [1] p. 48, 49. 11 Expectation failure is a general problem for the script theory, as Roger Shank himself acknowledges, e.g., http://www.rogerschank.com/biography.html. Games 2017, 8, 43 6 of 15 expectation that there is a fair chance that others in the game are also going to cooperate. Thirdly, let us assume that such expectations are rational throughout, i.e., based on a view of other people as rational creatures just like oneself, with propositional attitudes that are not seen as fixed but contingent. In this section we examine such a view, viz., an equilibrium conception of mutually referring social preferences and expectations. After showing how it works, I will briefly compare it with a biological type of explanation of cooperation and then a decision-theoretic one. Why would someone who is inclined to cooperate in a one-shot PD in material outcomes expect his co-players to cooperate? The general answer from the expectation-based social preferences literature is this: because he believes that the other players are similarly inclined. He expects that the others also have a social preference, which is of the same conditional kind. This connects the two loose ends that we started with. Suppose you and I are in a single play PD in material outcomes. Then our propositional attitudes connect like this: My preference to cooperate is based on my expectation that you will cooperate. My expectation that you will cooperate is based on your preference to cooperate. Your preference to cooperate is based on your expectation that I will cooperate. Your expectation that I will cooperate is based on my preference to cooperate. Our mutually referring propositional attitudes make up a loop. There are no loose ends; the reasoning is closed. Schematically: The arrows indicate the 'based on' relationship which is causal and justificatory, in the ideal type case. For each arrow, what is formulated at the point of the arrow is an answer to a 'why' question about what is formulated at the base of the arrow. As mentioned, the preferences and expectations of the individuals involved in this situation make up a closed loop. By being based on each other these attitudes are in an equilibrium state. The fact that the attitudes of the individuals connect in this way gives the situation a special character. It makes it free-floating. This model differs from Bicchieri's theory which analyses human interaction in the same terms―propositional attitudes and reasons―but which grounds the expectations in static scripts in individual minds that do not track other people's attitudes, while the loop connects people's expectations to the preferences of their companions.12 The scheme is general in the sense that the social preferences can be of various kinds. For example, I may have a social preference that is about inequity aversion. I want to avoid large pay-off differences between you and me (but with the clause 'only if I expect that you are not going to defect on me,' it is conditional). You, on the other hand, can have a social preference that is about fulfilling my expectations. You think that I expect you to cooperate and you want to honor that expectation, you don't want to let me down. Or I think that you are in need of some more money while your motive has to do with fairness. Many combinations are possible. What exact form a social preference has or where it comes from does not matter for the possibility of equilibrium in expectations. As long as the preferences are other-regarding and conditional on the other's assumed cooperation, the loop goes round. To clarify a bit further the distinct character of these looping reason-based attitudes, let me contrast how they mesh with a typical biological explanation and subsequently with a decision-theoretic one. A biological explanation standardly proceeds in terms of organisms with their traits that adapt in response to a changing environment. In this view, something like social 12 I do not deny that this model can be criticized at a deeper level. See, for example, (other) work by Robert Sugden [32] and by John Davis [33,34]. In this paper I simply build on the assumption that human behavior can be adequately explained in terms of individual preferences and expectations. This corresponds with main stream economics, most notably of course micro economics and game theory. Games 2017, 8, 43 7 of 15 inclinations is seen as an outgrowth of a biological past. We are social animals. We have evolved from primates who lived in groups. It is uncontroversial that our social inclinations derive from this long past of living together. As discussed, Henrich et al. [1] considered a hypothesis in this vein, namely that a tendency to play cooperatively in mixed-motives games could have arisen from a particular physical–social environment. They went on to reject this idea on the grounds that the Orma's context sensitivity provided a clear counter-example. But let us now carry on with the biological take on this issue, which goes in terms of organisms in environments. Against Henrich et al.'s rejection, a scholar steeped in evolutionary thought might argue that the concept of 'physical–social environment' includes something more. Because one way or another, he says, it must be something in the environment, sufficiently broadly understood, that has produced a difference in cooperativeness among similar creatures. This is true, but if we follow this line of reasoning we must note that two things are quite special. One has to do with the organism, the other has to do with the environment. The organism, firstly, is special because it is a creature that can learn and therefore adapt during its own lifetime. It does this by modifying dedicated internal states, i.e., intentional states, most notably his expectations and preferences. This addition moves the explanandum into the (overlapping) realm of decision theory. Secondly, the environment is also special. It (partly) consists of similar creatures that can also learn and have expectations. This further moves the explanandum into the realm of game theory. In such a world, with agents who can think and learn and who are not too myopic, a behavioral pattern like human cooperation in a mixed-motive setting cannot be fully explained in typical biological terms of features of organisms that evolve in a changing environment. Also, comprehending the individual in this world as a rational creature but its environment still as ultimately fixed is incomplete. Humans are rational social creatures with mutual expectations and preferences. We all live in certain physical–social environments. But these environments may crucially differ in regard to having people around with particular expectations about one's action or not having such people around. Note that this conditional social preference is not open to exploitation, because it essentially operates by shutting free riders out. This attitude can only evolve in evolutionary time when there is 'positive sorting': creatures with the underlying disposition must be able to find each other. Hamilton already saw that cooperation can evolve without common descent: kinship should be considered just one way of getting positive regression of genotype in the recipient, and that it is this positive regression that is vitally necessary for altruism. (...) in the assortive-settling model it obviously makes no difference if altruists settle with altruists because they are related (perhaps never having parted from them) or because they recognize fellow altruists as such. [35] And, of course, kinship selection itself depends on a kind of recognition. The general thing that must happen in a risky cooperative setting is positive assortment: cooperators must be able to find each other or be brought together somehow. This can happen in a number of ways, for example by reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, signaling, environmental feedback, or by spatial structuring.13 (Or by outsiders who are in the know, like an economist conducting an experiment, or a leader organizing people in groups). We will return to this in Section 5. 13 See Nowak et al. [36] on positive assortment or clustering in general. On how signaling and spatial structuring can help in simulated cooperative games like the PD and the Stag Hunt, see Skyrms [37–39]; cf [40]. Economist Robert Frank has found positive evidence of sufficiently reliable signaling in human subjects in public goods games; see his "Can Cooperators Find One Another?" [41]. Cf. the work by Paul Ekman on human signaling through emotions and their corresponding facial expressions, [42]. The political philosopher David Gauthier makes use of the notion that cooperators can find each other, to a sufficient extent, in his book Morals by Agreement [43]. For some references on indirect reciprocity, see note 25. Games 2017, 8, 43 8 of 15 Presently this disposition can persist, at least in part, by means of mutually referring expectations and preferences―a sophisticated version of signaling, we might say.14 Such mutually referring mental states make human cooperation both rationally and evolutionarily stable. This social preference is rooted in a social disposition that has evolved over time and which is sensitive to sufficient numbers of other people being around with the same disposition. This sensitivity in rational humans consists of mutually referring expectations and preferences. Not everybody has this social disposition or has it to the same extent―in Homo Sapiens there is arguably a variety of behavioral types―but people with a good degree of it have a method to foster cooperation among themselves and ostracize selfish defectors. 5. The Loop in Real Life The suggestion is that cooperatively inclined people in a single play PD believe that their co-players are similarly inclined. But how do they know this? There can be various grounds for this belief. Perhaps a third party was a good source and has informed them about each other. Or the subjects have managed to reliably signal their intentions back and forth. Or they know this on the basis of experience: when they have a shared history of dealing with one another. This is what this section is about: how social preferences in an anonymous one-shot experiment relate to real-life cooperation. A good example of the possibility of sharing a history of cooperation is, of course, the Orma's Harambee. I submit that the Harambee can evidence social preferences among the participants in two ways. Firstly, this real-life institution is an instance of imperfect repeated play. The group of participants is not fixed, as in typical laboratory repeated play, but naturally varies in size and in composition. People move in and out. Most importantly, for present purposes, there is no full transparency. Monitoring others and keeping track of their past behavior is limited. Under laboratory conditions the situation is relatively simple. It can be assumed that all subjects know the game form and how the game will proceed. Also, each knows that everybody else knows this, and that each knows that each knows that everybody else knows this, and so on. In the lab it can be assumed that there will be a nice symmetrical structure of mutual beliefs supporting a possible equilibrium outcome. Real life, in the meantime, is replete with information asymmetries. Some people have more information, others less. Or some people are in the know about something while others have false beliefs. More specifically, one may reasonably get the impression that the usual monitoring is lacking while it accidentally isn't. One then falsely believes that one confronts a pocket of single play. If one's fellow players understand one's perspective and still observe this individual contributing, they have reason to conclude that this individual is led by a social preference. Such circumstances are telling: this is how we normally catch cheaters. A liar believes he can get away with a certain lie and then makes a mistake, with the result that he is noticed. The same circumstance is therefore appropriate to infer that someone is good-hearted. Such instances of epistemic asymmetries can thus demonstrate social preferences. During repeated play these social preferences are perhaps not necessary as reputation may sufficiently bolster cooperation but that does not imply that these preferences are not around. It would be odd to assume that social preferences make themselves felt when defection pays and leave the scene when it does not. It seems more plausible that motives to cooperate are overdetermined during sequences of repeated play. Such overdetermination is often functional. In nature and also in complex artifacts redundancies are commonplace. They are especially appropriate in a turbulent or risky environment. If one mechanism fails, another can kick in.15 This happens when repeated play is punctuated by single play, when other-regarding motivation causes cooperation at a moment that reputation has become irrelevant. It has often been argued that it is difficult to extrapolate from results that indicate social preferences in one-shot experiments to real-life situations when real life resembles a repeated game 14 See De Boer [44] on the relation between signaling and mutual beliefs. 15 Compare this to the idea of "modal robustness" as developed by Alfano and Skorburg [45]. Games 2017, 8, 43 9 of 15 [8,12,15,46,47]. This is because, in a repeated game, self-interested preferences cum reputation considerations can sustain cooperation. This is true, but in my view it is better to characterize the Harambee as an imperfect repeated game. Social preferences can manifest themselves both in laboratory single play and in repeated play with epistemic asymmetries. This is the time to return to Vernon Smith's experiment, which we discussed in Section 2, with the sorting unknown to the participants in one of the conditions. In the first round of this experiment cooperation is around 50%. In the normal randomized group cooperation in the subsequent rounds becomes less, as it usually does in such series. On the model of conditional social preferences we can understand this as follows. A number of subjects who were cooperatively inclined at the beginning meet a defector in the second round and now lose their faith in their counterparts, which causes them to defect in the following round. This then of course further reduces what was left of expectations of socially motivated cooperation. And so on. In the (unknown) sorting group, on the other hand, the opposite happens. Hence, a sizeable group starts out with social preferences accompanied by some good faith in their counterparts, and this increases in the following rounds thanks to the sorting. Through the rounds, these subjects' expectations that the other players will act on their social preferences become gradually reinforced. A second argument that social preferences are active during repeated play is that people typically do not just answer defection by equally defecting in the next round. They do not simply turn their backs on the others. They also get angry; they resent what the other has done. Why? This anger is not just a blind impulse: it is directed at the other person and has a reason. The other has failed. There is something wrong with his attitude. He proves to be selfish, i.e., lacking the social preference. From such a response upon incidental defection in a repeated game we may conclude that a social preference is normally expected. So cooperative behavior during epistemic asymmetries and occasions of disapproval upon defection indicate that social preferences are also at work during real-life repeated play. Presumably, social preferences will ripen through repeated play. How would that work? I hypothesize that this will go as follows. I put it somewhat schematically. Firstly, let us assume that at the initial stages the Harambee indeed approximates repeated play and that epistemic asymmetries are negligible. The social disposition is sufficiently widely spread in the population but its activation is just moderate or low. Repeated play will give people sufficient reason to cooperate. Also assume that cooperation occurs often so that people meet quite frequently. (Of course, meeting each other also happens outside of the Harambee, but let us keep things simple and stick to a model story in which all interaction occurs through the Harambee.) I conjecture that when people go through the rounds their social preferences towards each other will gradually develop and become stronger. This is, in itself, an arational process but we are all familiar with it. Sitting in the same class and doing the same things are conducive to sympathy. How else do people become friends? Sharing experiences and being together breed affective ties in humans. So it seems plausible that successful repeated play can foster mutual affection. Individuals will not develop these attitudes by themselves but by extrapolating, or perhaps they will also suppose these attitudes to be developing in others on the basis of subtle signaling. Later, when the Harambee becomes standard and probably somewhat larger in scale, imperfect repeated play can then show the workings of social preferences.16 In these ways, imperfect repeated play that is already in place can bolster social preferences in newcomers. Rounds of repeated play grow social preferences in people who are thus disposed. Newcomers notice that people are generally not taken advantage of during situations that are not fully transparent. They learn to expect a social attitude in others and this gives them a ground to 16 For a brief historical account of the development of the Harambee, see Waithima [48], the introduction. Games 2017, 8, 43 10 of 15 enact their own social attitude, if they are thus disposed. In this way, institutions can scaffold17 social attitudes.18 Playing cooperatively because one believes that the other person has been cooperative in the past, since one shares a history of cooperation with other people, and the other person is a member of that group, is indirect reciprocity. One then cooperates because the other has cooperated in the past, not necessarily with oneself, but with others. To arrive at a stable norm of cooperation, like the loop, information about past behavior must have been travelling through the group. Who has been good and trustworthy, and who has been cheating? Gossip-third party information about reputation-is an important mechanism to bolster cooperation. From a certain point on, presumably, this information can translate into a generalized expectation that any other player from the same group, without knowing his exact past behavior, will be trustworthy. Of course, specific information about cheating individuals will remain highly functional, but cooperators may be relatively relaxed on information gathering and perceive unknown others as simply group members, who are part of a long history of equilibrium play and can therefore be trusted. So an Orma may play cooperatively in an anonymous one-shot PD game because he knows that the other players are Orma too, who probably have cooperated a lot in the past, as many Orma have.19 At the same time, it is important to see that this is not the only mechanism to sustain the psychological game-theoretic equilibrium, as portrayed by the loop. Social preferences and indirect reciprocity arguably bridge the gap between the anonymous one-shot PD and real-life cooperation. But real-life cooperation can also be facilitated in other ways. The expectations and preferences in the loop can, of course, also originate from direct reciprocity, when two individuals engage in repeated play with each other. A repeated game does not require the presence of social preferences, as argued above, but it does make them likely. Another possible source is signaling. Then one individual sends a reliable signal about one's commitment to cooperate, for example, through facial expressions that are hard to fake or by other telltale clues. 20 Another way, of course, is 17 I borrow this wording from Francesco Guala who wrote: "More effort should be made in investigating how non-costly sanctions, backed up by adequate institutional scaffoldings, may be used to sustain positive reciprocity in a variety of real world settings" [6] p. 15). 18 But doesn't this Harambee history then function much like a script (Section 3)? No, not as Bicchieri understands this. It is true that for the equilibrium something like a script can function as a first mover, so to speak, a way to enter the loop. But remember that for the equilibrium model of explaining and justifying cooperative behavior it does not matter where exactly a social preference comes from (Section 4). That is exactly the point about an equilibrium. Inside the equilibrium, inside the loop, the explanation and justification run in terms of the propositional attitudes that are in place at that very moment. What do I expect from my fellow player? I expect that she is going to cooperate. Why? I expect that she will act on a social preference. Why would she? Well, presumably she expects that I will cooperate. Why would you? I will cooperate because I am socially inclined myself and I expect my fellow player to cooperate. And now we are back where we started. The argument is a (virtuous) circle. Bicchieri's script theory omits this equilibrium part or the explanation, how the social preferences and expectations mutually refer to one another. Put differently, on the present view (1) a script would not count as a reason, a way to justify cooperation, and (2) it is a possible part of the explanation but not a necessary part, as, for example, signaling would be another possibility. 19 To be more precise: a wealthy, cattle owning Orma may play cooperatively in an anonymous one-shot public goods game because he knows that the other players are Orma too, enough of them cattle owners, who have cooperated a lot in the past. This should explain, at least partly, the heterogeneity among the Orma themselves, with the cattle owners playing cooperatively in proportion to their wealth in this experiment, and the non-cattle-owners making low contributions. I must admit that I cannot tell this on the basis of the empirical evidence. An experiment to check this would be to inform the players about the cattle-owning status of their fellow players. According to the model with conditional social preferences, cattle owners will make substantially higher contributions in a one-shot game with other cattle owners and will do so less when they hear that they are on their own, so to speak, only with full-time laborers and tradesmen. 20 For the importance of indirect reciprocity for human cooperation, see the pioneering work of Alexander [49]. Sugden [31] developed a model in which people keep track of each others' "standing"; cf. Nowak and Games 2017, 8, 43 11 of 15 communication. Talking makes a difference and exchanging promises even more. And some people perhaps expect others to cooperate by default-only adjusting when proven wrong. So people do not need to share a history. Equilibrium play can get started in various ways. It is fortunate that there are various routes to make a good guess about somebody's cooperative inclinations. After all, histories must start somewhere. 6. Context Sensitivity and Robustness In this section I will apply the scheme of the loop more broadly, to a variety of empirical findings. Economists Levitt and List [13] have pointed out that, overall, the empirical findings on social preferences are fairly mixed and should therefore be treated with caution. They cannot be extrapolated to financial markets, for example: It seems highly unlikely, for instance, that at the end of a day's trading, a successful trader would seek out the party that was on the wrong side of a market move and donate a substantial fraction of the day's profit to the person who lost-even though parallel behavior is routine in certain experiments. Levitt's and List's conclusion is that social preferences may crop up in some experiments here and there but that they are really quite fragile, and very much dependent on the particularities of the situation. Such context sensitivity, they argue, is also demonstrated in framing experiments. Indeed, many experiments have shown that cooperation in a mixed-motive game can be strongly influenced by the way the game is described to the subjects. It makes a substantial difference, for example, if one's counterpart is referred to as 'partner' instead of 'opponent' [52]. People demonstrated a 31.5% rate of cooperation in a seven-round PD described as 'Wall Street Game', and a 66.1% rate when it was called a 'Community Game' [53]. These findings would be clearly troubling for a view that holds that social preferences are of a categorical or unconditional nature, because such preferences should not be dependent on the type of market one finds oneself in or on how a game happens to be described. However, it is not difficult to accommodate these findings with social conditional expectations. Levitt and List argue that socially disposed people self-select away from an environment like the trading floor, and this explains the absence of social preferences there. This is not implausible; not everybody is the same and behavioral types who can be described as profit maximizers and less concerned about other people may concentrate on trading floors, whereas a number of more social types may keep their distance from such areas. But it is even more clear, I suggest, that trading floors happen to be environments in which social preferences are little called for. The wheeling and dealing on Wall Street mostly functions without them and there are no expectations that traders would allow themselves to be influenced by such inclinations. Thus looping social preferences would predict their absence. Naming the PD the 'Wall Street Game' likewise lowers expectations. I may well be cooperatively inclined in a neutrally described PD but the 'Wall Street' label alters this because I now expect others to defect to a higher degree. Further, I also expect that the others will probably think that I will be less socially inclined and therefore defect. And so on. Had there first been a loop, it would now unravel. The opposite goes for the 'Community Game'. Under this description, I now have less fear of being suckered because I now have stronger expectations about the other players' social preferences, and the same holds for them. This gets the loop going. 'Wall Street' and 'Community' are not just arbitrary names. They actually add information to the game. These names provide meaningful input to people's mutually referring expectations and preferences. Whether the loop obtains among a group of people does not merely hinge on the people, on how they are; it hinges on their interdependency. Hence some people may cooperate just fine while a very similar group fails to do so. Cross-cultural studies are interesting in this regard. Ockenfels and Sigmund's "image scoring" [50]. An exemplary experiment in behavioral economics with a public goods game associated with another game providing information on indirect reciprocity is [51]. Games 2017, 8, 43 12 of 15 Weismann [54] show that former West Germans contribute substantially more than former East Germans in a single play public goods experiment (which has a PD structure). Those from West Germany also have correspondingly higher expectations than the East Germans about the contributions in their own group. But the East Germans are not different people, the authors assert; East Germans are not by their natures less fair-minded or less cooperative types. Social dispositions are presumably not differently spread in these populations. "Behavior might instead depend on norms which differ between the two parts of Germany." Arguably, it is the loop norm that produces the higher level of contribution among the West Germans. Their (measured) higher expectations about their fellow players rationally presuppose that they act on a social preference. The West Germans tend to be cooperative in this experiment, it seems, because they perceive each other as fellow players, members of a group with a productive history. During this history the cooperatively disposed players have formed a generalized expectation that people with the same cultural background will generally not take advantage of them. Hence a large proportion of West Germans, and not East Germans, plays cooperatively. As the authors conjecture, the East Germans have unlearnt this during communist times. If they had a cooperative loop before, it has unraveled; their equilibrium is now mutually defecting. Likewise, Castro [55] demonstrates that British subjects play more cooperatively than Italians. This effect completely disappears when the subjects are (knowingly) mixed. Cooperativeness among the British is apparently conditioned by what can be expected from the others.21 We can infer that the British have high mutual expectations and cooperative inclinations among themselves. Kocher, Martinsson, and Visser [56] report a case of variation in contributions between groups of high school students that live near each other in Cape Town, South Africa, but in markedly different neighborhoods. Levels of contributions in a public goods experiment appear to be inversely related to average income in the neighborhood, with the students from the poorest area contributing most and those from the richer area contributing less. The researchers also measured expectations and found that levels of contribution strongly concorded with the expectations the players have about each other. Secondly, cooperation appeared to vary also with a six-point scale measure of trust in their schoolmates. As trust in other people is in large part a set of expectations about their motives, here too it seems likely enough that cross-referring mutual expectations and social preferences support the cooperation.22 Social preferences are contingent but not whimsical or unpredictably fragile. In a recent study Alexander Peysakhovich, Martin Nowak and David Rand [58] had a large group of subjects play a number of different mixed-motive games online, including prisoner's dilemma, dictator game, ultimatum game, a trust game, and two games with second-party and third-party punishment, respectively. They found that cooperative play strongly correlates across games. It also strongly correlates with helping behavior outside of these games (probed by a question to help the experimenters with providing feedback on the instructions, something the subjects could easily avoid doing). Cooperative play was also stable over time and it proved to be independent of punishing behavior. The researchers concluded that "the cooperative phenotype" shows a "substantial degree of domain generality and temporal stability." As we saw, Levitt and List and also Henrich et al. make the case that social preferences are not domain general but context sensitive. For Henrich et al. the Orma provide the central evidence for this claim. According to the loop model, these ideas are not at odds; in fact they are complementary. People who are generally socially disposed act on social preferences which are contingent on having justified expectations about the other's social preferences being acted upon. 21 Henrich et al. [1] itself is, of course, a landmark study that reports variation in contributions between cultures around the world, as is Gächter, Herrmann, and Thöni [57], but both these studies have not directly researched people's attitudes towards each other. 22 Habyarimana et al. [59] ingeniously demonstrate that, with their experimental subjects, ethnicity mostly works as a coordinating device instead of being a marker of a sort of superiority or inferiority. Games 2017, 8, 43 13 of 15 7. Conclusions In this paper I have reviewed parts of the social preferences literature. The notion of equilibrium play between subjects who have conditional social preferences and expectations seems to give a promising explanation of the large variance in cooperative behavior in different contexts. A theory that portrays social preferences as categorical has a loose end, rationally speaking, since these preferences should be based on expectations about other people. Without relating these expectations back to others' social preferences there would be another loose end. With looping social preferences and expectations these two ends are tied. Social preferences are a robust phenomenon contingent on corresponding expectations. Thus, they can thrive in an environment where an institution with repeated cooperative behavior is in place. In this way, institutions in a society can scaffold pro-social attitudes among its inhabitants. Acknowledgments: Many thanks to Jan Willem van der Rijt and the Philosophy and Economics seminar of Bayreuth University, and to Mark Alfano and Govert den Hartogh for valuable comments. Conflicts of Interest: The author declares no conflict of interest. References 1. Henrich, J.; Boyd, R.; Bowles, S.; Camerer, C.; Fehr, E.; Gintis, H. (Eds.) Foundations of Human Sociality: Economic Experiments and Ethnographic Evidence from Fifteen Small-Scale Societies; Oxford University Press: Oxford, UK, 2004. 2. Ensminger, J.; Henrich, J. (Eds.) Experimenting with Social Norms: Fairness and Punishment in Cross-Cultural Perspective; Russell Sage: New York, NY, USA, 2014. 3. Ensminger, J. Market Integration and Fairness: Evidence from Ultimatum, Dictator, and Public Goods Experiments in East Africa, In Foundations of Human Sociality: Economic Experiments and Ethnographic Evidence from Fifteen Small-Scale Societies; Oxford University Press: Oxford, UK, 2004; pp. 356–381. 4. Roth, A.; Prasnikar, V.; Okuno-Fujiwara, M.; Zamir, S. Bargaining and market behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo: An experimental study. Am. Econ. Rev. 1991, 81, 1068–1095. 5. Bicchieri, C. The Grammar of Society: The Nature and Dynamics of Social Norms; Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK, 2006. 6. Guala, F. Paradigmatic experiments: The ultimatum game from testing to measurement device. Philos. Sci. 2008, 75, 658–669. 7. Guala, F. Reciprocity: Weak or strong? What punishment experiments do (and do not) demonstrate. Behav. Brain Sci. 2012, 35, 1–59. 8. Woodward, J. Social preferences in experimental economics. Philos. Sci. 2008, 75, 646–657. 9. Hausman, D. Fairness and social norms. Philos. Sci. 2008, 75, 850–860. 10. De Boer, J. A Strawson-Lewis defence of social preferences. Econ. Philos. 2012, 28, 291–310. 11. Paternotte, C.; Grose, J. Social norms and game theory: Harmony or discord? Br. J. Philos. Sci. 2013, 64, 551–587. 12. Smith, V. Theory and experiment: What are the questions? J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 2010, 73, 3–15. 13. Levitt, S.; List, J. What do laboratory experiments measuring social preferences reveal about the real world? J. Econ. Perspect. 2007, 21, 153–174. 14. Samuelson, L. Economic theory and experimental economics. J. Econ. Lit. 2005, 43, 65–107. 15. Binmore, K.; Shaked, A. Experimental economics: Where next? J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 2010, 73, 87–100. 16. Camerer, C.F.; Fehr, E. Measuring social norms and preferences using experimental games: A guide for social scientists. In Foundations of Human Sociality: Economic Experiments and Ethnographic Evidence from Fifteen Small-Scale Societies; Oxford University Press: Oxford, UK, 2004; pp. 55–95. 17. Rigdon, M.; MCabe, K.; Smith, V. Sustaining cooperation in trust games. Econ. J. 2007, 117, 991–1007. 18. Rabin, M. Incorporating fairness into game theory and economics. Am. Econ. Rev. 1993, 83, 1281–1302. 19. Bolton, G.; Ockenfels, A. A theory of equity, reciprocity and competition. Am. Econ. Rev. 2000, 90, 166–193. 20. Andreoni, J.; Miller, J. Giving according to GARP: An experimental test of the consistency of preferences for altruism. Econometrica 2002, 70, 737–753. 21. Charness, G.; Rabin, M. Understanding social preferences with simple tests. Q. J. Econ. 2002, 117, 817–869. 22. Camerer, C.; Fehr, E. When does 'Economic Man' dominate social behaviour? Science 2006, 311, 47–52. Games 2017, 8, 43 14 of 15 23. Falk, A.; Fehr, E.; Fischbacher, U. Testing theories of fairness-Intentions matter. Games Econ. Behav. 2008, 62, 287–303. 24. Henrich, J.; Smith, N. Comparative Experimental Evidence from Machiguenga, Mapuche, Huinca, and American Populations; Oxford University Press: Oxford, UK, 2004; pp. 125–167. 25. Cox, J.; Sadiraj, K.; Sadiraj, V. Implications of trust, fear, and reciprocity for modeling economic behavior. Exp. Econ. 2008, 11, 1–24. 26. Charness, G.; Dufwenberg, M. Promises and partnership. Econometrica 2006, 74, 1579–1601. 27. Geanokoplos, J.; Pearce, D.; Stachetti, E. Psychological games and sequential rationality. Games Econ. Behav. 1989, 1, 60–79. 28. Colman, A. Cooperation, psychological game theory, and limitations of rationality in social interaction. Behav. Brain Sci. 2003, 26, 139–198. 29. Den Hartogh, G. A conventionalist theory of obligation. Law Philos. 1998, 17, 351–376. 30. Den Hartogh, G. Mutual Expectations. A Conventionalist Theory of Law; Kluwer: The Hague, The Netherlands, 2002. 31. Sugden, R. The Economics of Rights, Co-operation and Welfare; Palgrave MacMillan: Hampshire, UK, 1986/2005. 32. Sugden, R. Hume's non-instrumental and non-propositional decision theory. Econ. Philos. 2006, 22, 365–391. 33. Davis, J. The Theory of the Individual in Economics; Routledge: London, UK, 2003. 34. Davis, J. Individuals and Identity in Economics; Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK, 2011. 35. Hamilton, W. Innate social aptitudes of man: An approach from evlutionary genetics. In ASA Studies 4: Biosocial Anthropology; Fox, R., Ed.; Malaby Press: London, UK, 1975; pp. 133–153. 36. Nowak, M.; Tarnita, C.; Antal, T. (2010). Evolutionary dynamics in stuctured populations. Philos. Trans. R. Soc. B 2010, 365, 19–30. 37. Skyrms, B. The Evolution of the Social Contract; Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK, 1996. 38. Skyrms, B. The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social Structure; Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK, 2004. 39. Skyrms, B. Signals. Evolution, Learning and Information; Oxford University Press: Oxford, UK, 2010. 40. Zollman, K. Talking to neighbors: The evolution of regional meaning. Philos. Sci. 2005, 72, 69–85. 41. Frank, R. What Price the Moral High Ground? Ethical Dilemmas in Competitive Environments; Princeton University Press: Princeton, NJ, USA, 2004. 42. Ekman, P. Emotions Revealed; Henri Holt: New York, NY, USA, 2003. 43. Gauthier, D. Morals by Agreement; Oxford University Press: Oxford, UK, 1986. 44. De Boer, J. A stag hunt with signaling and mutual beliefs. Biol. Philos. 2013, 28, 559–576. 45. Alfano, M.; Skorburg, G. The embedded and extended character hypotheses. In Philosophy of the Social Mind; Kiverstein, J., Ed.; Routledge: London, UK, 2016. 46. Guala, F.; Mittone, L. Experiments in economics: Extended validity and the robustness of phenomena. J. Econ. Methodol. 2005, 12, 495–515. 47. Smith, E.A. Making it real: Interpreting economic experiments. Behav. Brain Sci. 2005, 28, 832–833. 48. Waithima, A. The Role of Harambee Contributions in Competition. Experimental Evidence from Kenya; ICBE-RF Research Report No. 16/12; 2012. Available online: https://www.researchgate.net/profile/ Abraham_Waithima/publication/268002279_The_Role_of_Harambee_Contributions_in_Corruption_Expe rimental_Evidence_from_Kenya/links/54da1c3f0cf25013d0440362.pdf (access on 9 October 2017) 49. Alexander, R.D. The Biology of Moral Systems; De Gruyter: New York, NY, USA, 1987. 50. Nowak, M.; Sigmund, K. Evolution of indirect reciprocity by image scoring. Nature 1998, 393, 573–577. 51. Milinski, M.; Semmann, D.; Krambeck, H. Reputation helps solve the 'tragedy of the commons'. Nature 2011, 415, 424–426. 52. Burnham, T.; McCabe, K.; Smith, V. Friend-or-foe intentionality priming in an extensive form trust game. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 2000, 43, 57–73. 53. Liberman, V.; Samuels, S.; Ross, L. The name of the game: Predictive power of reputations versus situational labels in determining prisoner's dilemma game moves. Personal. Soc. Psychol. Bull. 2004, 30, 1175–1185. 54. Ockenfels, A.; Weimann, J. Types and patterns: An experimental East-West German comparison of cooperation and solidarity. J. Public Econ. 1999, 71, 275–287. Games 2017, 8, 43 15 of 15 55. Castro, M. Where are you from? Cultural differences in public good experiments. J. Socio-Econ. 2008, 37, 2319–2329. 56. Kocher, M.; Martinsson, P.; Visser, M. Social background, cooperative behavior, and norm enforcement. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 2012, 81, 341–354. 57. Gächter, S., Herrmann, B.; Thöni, C. Culture and cooperation. Philos. Trans. R. Soc. B 2010, 365, 2651–2661. 58. Peysakhovich, A.; Nowak, M.; Rand, D. Humans display a 'cooperative phenotype' that is domain general and temporally stable. Nat. Commun. 2014, 5, 4939, doi:10.1038/ncomms5939. 59. Habyarimana, J.; Humphreys, M.; Posner, D.; Weinstein, J. Coethnicity and trust. In Whom Can We Trust? How Groups, Networks and Institutions Make Trust Possible; Cook, K., Levi, M., Hardin, R., Eds.; Russell Sage: New York, NY, USA, 2009; pp. 42–64. © 2017 by the authors. Submitted for possible open access publication under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).

Ethics in Progress (ISSN 2084-9257). Vol.6 (2015). No.1. 225-238. doi:10.14746/eip.2015.1.9 The Heuristics of Fear: Can the Ambivalence of Fear Teach Us Anything in the Technological Age? Roberto Franzini Tibaldeo (University of Turin) 1. Introduction. In Search of an Ethics for the Technological Age For several reasons our present day civilization has become increasingly complex. Indeed, complexity seems to be one of the most eloquent characteristics which unifies several aspects of today's world, such as epistemology, science, technology, politics, economy, culture, society, and so on. Complexity as the result of the modern age or as its greatest creation. However, complexity has also highlighted the intrinsic limits of modernity: as such, its scientific method and its gnoseological claim to simplicity, abstraction, and reductionism have become inadequate in comprehending and reacting to phenomena which emerged during the closing decades of the twentieth century, such as globalization, financial emergencies, ecological crisis, bioethical issues etc. What is worse, until recently modernity has simply ignored the extent of human technological action upon these events. What is now at stake is not only modernity's legitimacy in relation to previous eras, nor the fact that it has allegedly come to a dead end and ought to be overcome1. Far beyond these theoretical questions, what is now urgent is – to quote Hans Jonas – to go in "search of an ethics for the technological age"2. This is indeed a delicate task, since what is required is to investigate the phenomenon of technology in the light of the present day complexity, which is to be assumed as a sign of the times and an opportunity for reflecting upon the meaning and the consequences of individual and collective action3. 1 For the debate on modernity's legitimacy, see for example Löwith 1949; Heidegger 1954; Koselleck 1979; Del Noce 1964; Del Noce 1970; Blumenberg 1983; Jonas 1966; Jonas 1974; Jonas 1984a; Severino 1971; Severino 1979 (see also: Giddens 1990). 2 See the subtitle of: (Jonas 1984a). 3 Against the abstractness of Cartesianism and against its ideology of simplification, complexity is able to gain a higher degree of comprehension of reality. In terms of complexity, knowledge is not only the result of a theoretical operation, but involves the whole range of human capacities, that is praxis, emotions, imagination, creativeness, care, dialogue, critical thinking, multi--‐logical thinking etc. See: Morin 1991; Lipman 1995; Lipman 2003. On the notion of complexity in relation to politics, The Heuristics of Fear 226 As shown in Hans Jonas' Imperative of Responsibility, twentieth century's technological development marks the peak of three centuries of generalized progress and advancement of the Western societies4. However, in the last century Jonas believes that this overall trend in mankind's achievement has reached unheard--‐of levels in the exploitation of nature. One of the aims appears to be an indiscriminate programme to rule over any form of life and to reduce life to an "artificial phenomenon"5. Hans Jonas6 shows that today's technology – with its "Promethean power" (Jonas 1984a, x) – has achieved such results by means of a qualitative transformation. Indeed, it is able to generate worldwide effects, and only recently has humankind started to gain awareness of the cumulative and irreversible character of such effects on ecological equilibriums (see: Jonas 1984a, Ch. 1). However, problems raised by technology are not only limited to ecological issues. The possibility of achieving forms of manipulation, control globalization and fear, see also: Beck 1992; Giddens 1990; Bodei 1991a; Bauman 1992; Bauman 1999; Beck 1999; Marramao 2003; Pulcini 2013. 4 Among other philosophers who reflect on these topics from a critical perspective, I can mention O. Spengler, M. Heidegger, E. Jünger, J. Ortega y Gasset, G. Anders, B. Croce, H. Arendt, E. Severino, J. Rawls, A. Naess etc. (see: Nacci 2000). 5 See for instance the beginning of Hannah Arendt's The Human Condition: 'The earth is the very quintessence of the human condition, and earthly nature, for all we know, may be unique in the universe in providing human beings with a habitat in which they can move and breathe without effort and without artifice. The human artifice of the world separates human existence from all mere animal environment, but life itself is outside this artificial world, and through life man remains related to all other living organisms. For some time now, a great many scientific endeavors have been directed toward making life so "artificial", toward cutting the last tie through which even man belongs among the children of nature. It is the same desire to escape from imprisonment to the earth that is manifest in the attempt to create life in the test tube' (Arendt 1958, 2). 6 Hans Jonas (1903--‐1993) was a philosopher of Jewish origins. In the 1920s he attended the universities of Freiburg and Marburg, and studied with E. Husserl, M. Heidegger, and R. Bultmann. His earlier research focused on the topic of Ancient Gnosis, which Jonas interpreted in the light of Heidegger's existentialism. However, afterwards Jonas started to doubt about the validity of his teacher's philosophy. The break became even deeper in 1933, when Jonas emigrated from Germany, while Heidegger joined the Nazi party. In 1939 Jonas resolved to fight in the English army against Nazi Germany. After the war he tried to settle in Palestine, but then decided to move with his family to Canada. He started a new life, and also his research changed address. Jonas developed a philosophy of life, which was to overcome the limits of Modernity and of its dualistic and nihilistic interpretation of the phenomenon of life. After moving to New York, where in 1953 he found a post at the New School for Social Research, he developed the ethical and political consequences of his 'biological philosophy' (see Jonas, Phenomenon of Life). However, only in 1979 his ethical thinking found a more complete form in Das Prinzip Verantwortung (The Imperative of Responsibility), the first book he wrote in German after leaving Germany in the 1930s. Das Prinzip Verantwortung signs the beginning of the third period of Jonas' thinking, the aim of which is to reflect on the ethical consequences of human technology on the phenomenon of life. See: Jonas 2008. Roberto Franzini Tibaldeo 227 or power on human and non--‐human life clearly gives rise to fundamental political and bio--‐political, economic, scientific, ethical and bio--‐ethical issues. In Jonas' perspective these enquiries are embedded in an overall ontological horizon, which posits being "absolutely as the better over against nonbeing" (Jonas 1984a, 81) and therefore as a value, and postulates that the capacity to have purposes is real, is 'a good--‐in--‐itself' and therefore is a value (see: Jonas 1984a, 80, also Ch. 3 and Ch. 4; also: Jonas 1966; Franzini Tibaldeo 2009). According to Jonas this "ontological axiom" (Jonas 1984a, 80) provides the foundation of human action and is therefore able to indicate the limits of technological activities. However, apart from these ontological considerations, what is interesting is that Jonas' 'ethics for the technological age' takes the peculiar shape of an ethics of responsibility, whose main characteristics are the intrinsic relationship between freedom and responsibility and the so called 'heuristics of fear'. Indeed, according to Jonas, the fear for the survival of worldly life might be of great help in investigating the possibilities--‐for and limits--‐to technological action. 2. Hans Jonas' Ethics of Responsibility According to Jonas, human beings experience freedom by gaining consciousness of the fact they have (or can have) power over reality. Hence, man experiments the unity of freedom and responsibility. In addition to this, human beings apply their power over reality with the mediation of knowledge and free will (Jonas 1984a, 129--‐130; also Jonas 1966). However, the development of technology seems to lead human freedom into temptation. Technology – believes Jonas – deludes human freedom with two false promises. The first is almightiness, thanks to which all humans can easily realize whatever they desire. The second is innocence, thanks to the fact that technology actually separates freedom from responsibility, and fails to provide human liberty with the due consideration of the impact of its own deeds7. The opposing issues of the ontological axiom and the recent technological threat persuade Jonas to meditate on the complex relationship between freedom and responsibility, in order not to accomplish what is inadmissible (Jonas 1984a, 280--‐281). This is the reason for which Jonas grants 7 Concerning being responsible, Jonas writes: "To be de facto responsible in some respect for someone at some time ... belongs as inseparably to the being of man as his a priori capacity for it – as inseparably indeed as his being a speaking creature – and is therefore to be included in his definition ... In this sense an "ought" is concretely given with the very existence of man; the mere property of being a causative subject involves of itself objective obligation in the form of external responsibility. With this, he is not yet moral, but a member of the moral order, that is, one who can be moral or immoral" (Jonas 1984a, 99). The Heuristics of Fear 228 a privilege to actions which present themselves in the shape of "responsibility for the welfare of others" (Jonas 1984a, 92). The essence and the goal of such acts is indeed nothing else but the other's happiness as such. This is the way by which 'power in its transitive causality becomes committed, and committed in the double sense of being objectively responsible for what is thus entrusted to it, and affectively engaged through the feeling that sides with it, namely, "feeling responsible" (Jonas 1984a, 92). Hence, responsibility means that the fulfilment of others depends to some extent on the power of my freedom. The intrinsic value of this goal is of course independent from me. But the fact that its realization may also depend on my power makes it at the same time something belonging to my concern. Jonas believes that the ontological axiom cries out to man. The outcry addresses the hendiadys of freedom and responsibility, and demands an answer from man. The ontological axiom shows its ethical relevance by acting as a prudential moral law on human freedom, which has the responsibility of willingly ensuring self--‐discipline, self--‐control, and self--‐limitation of its power (see: Jonas 1984a, 129--‐130)8 If this does not happen, because of the reluctance to value natural and ecological limitations, the subject of freedom vanishes. As a consequence, freedom, responsibility or any kind of value are nothing but flatus vocis. For this very reason Jonas points out the following fundamental moral duty: ... the existence of mankind comes first, whether deserved on its past record and its likely continuation or not. It is the ever--‐ transcendent possibility, obligatory in itself, which must be kept open by the continued existence. To preserve this possibility is a cosmic responsibility – hence the duty for mankind to exist. Put epigrammatically: the possibility of there being responsibility in the world, which is bound to the existence of men, is of all objects of responsibility the first (Jonas 1984a, 99). However, there is no way of being assured a priori of the fact that human behaviour, whether individual and collective, will succeed in respecting the ontological axiom. Since freedom is an essentially open, risky and unforeseeable adventure, there is no guarantee that the power of human freedom will actually succeed in protecting life and its ontological value. Quite the opposite, it seems that because of its technological strengthening, human power easily and quickly generates ambivalent effects, or produces consequences which may doom humanity. According to Jonas, the threat is real and tangible. Because of the significance of the prize at stake, Jonas prefers to give priority to "the Bad over the Good Prognosis" (Jonas 1984a, 31). He also firmly claims that the central issues be raised, that adequate priorities for action be chosen, and – what's 8 According to Paul Ricoeur the virtue of prudence suggested by Jonas is rooted in the Greek notion of phronesis (Ricoeur 1994, 44--‐48). Roberto Franzini Tibaldeo 229 more – that the temptation of employing ideology to escape responsibilities be set aside. As examples of such a negative use of ideology, Jonas chooses the "political eschatologies of history" or "the non--‐political belief in endless progress" (Jonas 1984a, 109). In both cases technology has been adopted as a device for fulfilling positive aims (in politics, economics, society etc.). At least, this is what their worshippers believed. However, according to Jonas this is a wholly misled belief. The fact is that – as brilliantly shown in The Phenomenon of Life – technology overthrows the goals of human action: the desired goal becomes a means subjected to the self--‐perpetuation of the technological system as such (see: Jonas 1966, 188--‐210)9. Moreover, this causes a dangerous alteration in ontology and the fact that its practical consequences remain almost veiled. 3. Fear as a Guide to Responsibility At this point of the discussion Jonas introduces the expression of the "heuristics of fear", with which he states the amplified relevance for ethics of the "revulsion of feeling which acts ahead of knowledge, to apprehend the value whose antithesis so affects us. We know the thing at stake only when we know that it is at stake" (Jonas 1984a, 27; see also: Spinelli, Verde 2011). And he continues as follows: "We know much sooner what we do not want than what we want. Therefore, moral philosophy must consult our fears prior to our wishes to learn what we really cherish" (Jonas 1984a, 27). However, Jonas adds that the heuristics of fear ought only to recover an adequate emotional motive for acting responsibly in the face of current ethical dilemmas: 9 In this chapter Jonas considers the specificity of the modern knowledge of nature. He quotes F. Bacon's idea that "knowledge must deliver man from the yoke of necessity by meeting necessity on its ground, and achieves freedom for him by delivering the things into his power" (Jonas 1966, 192). This is precisely what modern science and technology have tried to realize, thanks to their methodological reductionism and quantitative interpretation of being. As a result, 'the modern knowledge of nature, very unlike the classical one, is a "know--‐how" and not a "know--‐what," and on this basis it makes good Bacon's contention that knowledge is power' (Jonas 1966, 204). Any question concerning the "meaning" of being, or its "value", is – therefore – considered unworthy. All that matters, is to gain power over reality and to dominate it with science and technology. "But – writes Jonas – if ever we entrust or resign ourselves wholly to the self--‐corrective mechanics of the interplay of science and technology, we shall have lost the battle for man. For science, with its application governed solely by its own logic, does not really leave the meaning of happiness open: it has prejudged the issue, in spite of its own value--‐freedom. The automatism of its use – insofar as this use carries beyond the recurrent meeting of the recurrent emergency created by itself – has set the goal of happiness in principle: indulgence in the use of things. Between the two poles of emergency and indulgence, of resourcefulness and hedonism, set up by the ever--‐expanding power over things, the direction of all effort and thereby the issue of the good tends to be predecided. But we must not let that issue be decided by default" (Jonas 1966, 208--‐209). As for the modern methodological reductionism (see: Wolters 2010). The Heuristics of Fear 230 "although, in consequence, the heuristics of fear is surely not the last word in the search for goodness, it is at least an extremely useful first word" (Jonas 1984a, 27)10. For humankind the fear for the survival of life on Earth becomes a way of gaining consciousness about the excessive precariousness and risks of the present era11. At the same time, fear elucidates the possible relationship between irresponsibility and the human technical project. Since technology turns human action into an irresponsible excess of action (indeed, "Dynamism is the signature of modernity") (Jonas 1984a, 119), Jonas, on the other hand, believes that an ethics of responsibility ought to preserve "the heritage of a past evolution" (Jonas 1984a, 32), whose ontological value was intensely analyzed by the "biological philosophy" highlighted in The Phenomenon of Life. Jonas insists on the essential solidarity of human life with the general phenomenon of life. The complex dynamics of life's evolution has an ontological, transcendent and metaphysical meaning, and so the humanity – as part of that overall adventure and evolution – has the "supreme duty to preserve it intact" (Jonas 1984a, 33; see: Jonas 1984a, 119--‐122, 127--‐129; Jonas 1985; Frogneux 2001, Franzini Tibaldeo 2009). As a consequence, mankind today is committed to acting so that humankind tomorrow will be able to respond to the outcry of terrestrial life, that is, it will be able to assume the ontological duty of responsibility. So this is our current obligation towards future mankind: This means, in turn, that it is less the right of future men (namely, their right to happiness, which, given the uncertain concept of 'happiness', would be a precarious criterion anyway) than their duty over which we have to watch, namely, their duty to be truly human: thus over their capacity for this duty – the capacity to even attribute it to themselves at all – which we could possibly rob them of with the alchemy of our 'utopian' technology )Jonas 1984a, 42). 10 See also the following extract from The Phenomenon of Life, in which Jonas suggests how to face problems generated by an uncritical use of technology: "Thus even with the pressure of emergencies upon us we need a view beyond them to meet them on more than their own terms. Their very diagnosis (wherever it is not a case of extremity) implies at least an idea of what would not be an emergency, as that of sickness implies the idea of health; and the anticipation of success inherent in all struggle against danger, misery, and injustice must face the question of what life befits man" (Jonas 1966, 209). See also: Jonas 1985, Ch. 3. It is important to notice that, according to Jonas, the imperative of responsibility is absolutely not grounded in the heuristics of fear (as erroneously stated, for instance, by Denis Müller – see: Müller 1993, 223--‐35), but in an overall ontological theory of responsibility. 11 The relevance of Jonas' "heuristic of fear" to understanding vulnerability transformations related to technology has been recently underlined by Mark Coeckelbergh (2013, 102). Roberto Franzini Tibaldeo 231 At first sight, it seems that the prophecy of doom which accompanies Jonas' heuristics of fear casts a pessimistic light on his reflections. However, this is not the case. Instead, Jonas never stops repeating that negative prophecy is always made "to avert its coming" (Jonas 1984a, 120). Because of his criticism of contemporary technology, Jonas cannot be considered a prophet of doom, a reactionary or an opponent of progress12. On the contrary, I believe that the meaning of Jonas' claim for responsibility essentially consists of his will to highlight the basic ambiguity of human freedom. Due to this characteristic, freedom is open to good, but also to bad; it may welcome and respect the bond of ontological value, but it may also choose to violate or ignore that very same value. The ambivalence of freedom is man's most specific feature. According to Jonas, man is truly ambiguous, and so today's homo technologicus cannot but be ambiguous. In this respect, Jonas warns that humankind waits for no utopian improvement, unlike those ideologies and utopias that claim to fight for anthropological enhancement (see: Jonas 1984a, 200--‐201, 383--‐384)13. The ethics of responsibility offers a different kind of hope. Indeed, "hope is a condition for action" (Jonas 1984b, 391) and a heuristics of fear ought to be used "in counterbalance to a heuristics of hope" (Jonas 1984a, 203). However, the ethics of responsibility gives fear "its rightful place": "There are times – continues Jonas – when the drive needs moral encouragement, when hope and daring rather than fear and caution should lead. Ours is not one of them" (Jonas 1984a, 203). On the other hand, fear ought not grow to the extent that action becomes paralyzed. A correct interpretation of fear – states Jonas – ought to inspire the 'courage of responsibility', which takes care of an object whose existence depends on man's ability to act with wisdom, resoluteness, 12 On the contrary, Jonas declares that ethics ought to preserve those values and to prevent falling into a lifeboat situation (see: Jonas 1985). However, this aspect does not seem to be perceived by scholars who believe that Jonas' ethics is antidemocratic and in favour of eco--‐tyranny. See, among others: Landkammer 1990, 423--‐9; Wolin 2001, 123; Frogneux 2007; Seidel & Endruweit 2007. 13 In the last chapter of The Imperative of Responsibility Jonas offers harsh criticism of Ernst Bloch's Das Prinzip Hoffnung (1959) and of his ontology of 'not--‐yet'. Indeed, according to Jonas, the main risk is that such ontology may ally itself with the technological and Baconian ideal (see: Jonas 1984a, 142--‐3, 192--‐200). However, afterwards Jonas admitted that his criticism had been too harsh. The point was that Jonas was frightened that the Blochian philosophy could be subdued to political movements (see: Jonas 1991, 132--‐3; Becchi 2000, 17--‐18). On the relationship between Jonas and Bloch, see: Bodei 1991b, 5--‐13; Bodei 1991c, 231--‐234. As for currently debated topics like human enhancement and transhumanism, Jonas' reflections are highly critical of their melioristic fervour and neglect of the risks related to the irreversibility of technological interventions, leading to consequences which cannot be controlled (see: Jonas 1974b, 143--‐5; Habermas 2003, 62--‐3). Vice versa, the transhumanist philosopher Nick Bostrom criticises both Jonas and Habermas as conservative thinkers (Bostrom 2005a, 33--‐46; Bostrom 2005b, 1--‐25). See as well: Gammel 2013, 239--‐267. The Heuristics of Fear 232 promptness, moderation, and circumspection (see: Jonas 1984a, 204; Jonas 1984b, 391; also: Pulcini 2013)14. The vulnerable phenomenon of terrestrial life – into which human life is rooted – is such an object, and its perpetuation needs man's attentive and active care. According to Jonas, this aim means more than the mere indication of actions not to be done. More than just this, human freedom ought to reflect positively on itself, on its own being--‐in--‐the--‐ world, and on the object of its responsibility – that is, life. The fragile and vulnerable object of responsibility calls for care. What precisely should human responsibility care for? Jonas answers that we are responsible for "the idea of Man, which is such that it demands the presence of its embodiment in the world" (Jonas 1984a, 43). The idea of man specifies the primary imperative for ethics and insists "equally on the that and the what of obligatory existence" (Jonas 1984a, 43; also: Jonas 1966, 106). According to Jonas, human beings personify one of the main ontological characteristics of life, namely its dynamic and self--‐transcending development (see Jonas' biological philosophy in: Jonas 1966). Human life is essentially open to the future and to self--‐transcendence. This is the reason for which an "ought" filters through the "being" of human life: future actions ought to respect the fact that human freedom and life always express more than what, strictly speaking, is there. Individual and collective freedom ought never to put at stake the promise of future which expresses life's ontological feature. For this reason, Jonas ends his masterpiece with an appeal to preserve the integrity of man's essence, since "something sacred" discloses itself through humankind, something "inviolable under no circumstances (and which can be perceived independently from religion)" (Jonas 1979, 393). Against the triumphalism of utopian ideologies, Jonas reaffirms that humanity courageously accepts its demanding task of fulfilling freedom and responsibility: The time for the headlong race of progress is over, not of course for guarded progress itself. Humbled we may feel, but not humiliated. Man's mandate remains exacting enough outside of paradise. To preserve the integrity of his essence, which implies that of his natural environment; to save this trust unstunted through the perils of the times, mostly the perils of his own overmighty deeds – this is not a utopian goal, but not so very modest a task of responsibility for the future of man on earth. (Jonas 1984a, 201--‐202). 14 Although Jonas and Lars Svendsen (who recently published A Philosophy of Fear) share the aim of restoring the full meaning of human freedom and responsibility, they disagree about the role played by fear: while according to Jonas fear ought to play a constructive role, Svendsen is more critical and polemical. He believes that the proper question to be posed is: what role fear ought to be allowed to play in our lives? (see: Svendsen 2008). Roberto Franzini Tibaldeo 233 4. Conclusions The importance of Jonas' reflections lies in the fact that he points out the essential ambivalence of human freedom, and on the fact that he puts this feature in relation to modern technology. The risks connected to and generated by the massive employment of technology made Jonas sensitive to the idea of the preservation of life and of its value for human freedom. However, since technology is a product of human freedom, he also became aware of the fact that humanity ought to use its prerogatives cautiously. In this respect, fear may play an important role. In particular, as far as the ecological crisis is concerned, fear compels us to think no longer about human progress in terms of 'increase', but instead in terms of 'responsibility', 'sobriety', and 'decrease' (for other reflections beyond Jonas on these themes, see: Passmore 1974; Hösle 1991; Latouche 1995; Beck 1999; Marramao 2003). Jonas' Imperative of Responsibility adds something that is most important: any decision about new parameters to be adopted for individual and collective action ought never to forget respect for the essence of man – that is, freedom – and ought never to forget that freedom is indeed ambivalent. So, properly speaking, there is no guarantee that responsibility will effectively succeed in fighting against irresponsibility. Fear – argues Jonas – may therefore be very useful, since it may lead to responsibility and supply a first motive for responsible action. Moreover, negative prophecies and fear may offer powerful devices for ethical theories and practice. The strength of fear consists of its capacity to unify all the dimensions of the human being (individual and collective, rational and emotional, theoretical and practical etc.). Moreover, fear greatly intensifies imagination. Jonas talked also about the possibility of suspending democracy in order to face the problem of the survival of mankind. However, these words are provocative. He hints at eco--‐tyranny only to say that that is what absolutely and in any case ought to be avoided (see: Jonas 1984a, 150--‐151, 173--‐174; Jonas 1987). As shown above, respect for human freedom always comes first. And, secondly, fear is never to be used for ideological purposes, or for purposes which are harmful to freedom and its ambivalence. In the light of the previous speculation, however, there is a possible difficulty concerning the effectiveness of responsibly used fear in resolving problems such as the ecological crisis. On the one hand, it is necessary for freedom to limit itself by containing the impact of its technological effects on nature, economy, society, and so on. In this respect, there certainly are slight signals that it is the democracies that are proceeding in this direction, despite hesitation, sluggishness, resistance, and contradictions. However, on the other hand, human freedom and the democratic handling of ecological politics do not appear to have sufficiently fulfilled their goals (see: Hösle 1991). The risk is that for very many reasons – including a form of overall cultural The Heuristics of Fear 234 backwardness in the face of the complexity of our era – human freedom and democracy fail their duty to propose farsighted actions to face adequately and effectively those global problems. Further problems could arise if this doubt were to spread among people and become frustration, or if it were to cause people to shut themselves in their own fear or interests, or finally if it were to set the premises for a generalized indifference toward public matters. In these cases the positive use of fear would probably be exploited and individual freedom would most likely opt for its irresponsible cupio dissolvi in face of the negative and terroristic use of fear by tyrannies or elitist democracies.15 A possible answer to these contradictions ought to assume the complexity of our times, and ought to handle it through new processes and awareness. The ethical reflection based upon the idea of responsibility and assuming fear as a guide to responsible action may be very helpful. However, the philosophical analysis of the hendiadys of freedom and responsibility ought to be discussed not only from an individual point of view, but also in its public relevance.16 Fear produces positive results if it is discussed in public and if its discussion concerns not only theoretical and formal matters, but is able to involve the whole of the person (practical, emotional, imaginative etc.). As a result, individuals may become aware of the fact that fear is a question of public relevance, a question with which everyone's happiness and realization is deeply intertwined. References Apel, K.--‐O. 1988. Diskurs und Verantwortung. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. Arendt, H. 1958. The Human Condition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Bauman, Z. 1992. Modernity and Ambivalence. Cambridge: Polity Press. Bauman, Z. 1999. In Search of Politics. Cambridge: Polity Press. Becchi, P. (ed.). "Hans Jonas. Due lettere". Ragion Pratica 8 (2000): 17--‐31. Beck, U. 1992. Risk Society. Towards a New Modernity. London--‐Newbury Park: Sage. 15 This is indeed the core thesis of (Svendsen 2008). As regards this topic, the author seems to have been inspired by the reflections of Hans Jonas. 16 This philosophical meditation ought to overcome the formal and abstract paradigm for public ethics set by J. Habermas' and K.--‐O. Apel's Diskursethik (Apel 1988; Habermas 1990). A deeper reflection upon the complex and social meaning of man, rationality and knowledge is required. In this direction, it is possible to consider not only Jonas' ethical meditation, but also other thinkers, such as E. Morin, G. Bateson, U. Bronfenbrenner, and M. Lipman. In the last decades these scholars have developed lines of thought, such as the theory of complexity, the ecology of mind, the ecology of human development, the socio--‐constructivism, and the philosophy for children and community. In spite of their different fields of research, these scholars seem to share ideas such as the complexity of human rationality, the unity of theory and praxis, and of reason and emotions, the relevance of technological development, the ethical relevance of human knowledge etc. See for instance: Tibaldeo 2013. Roberto Franzini Tibaldeo 235 Beck, U. 1999. World Risk Society. Cambridge: Polity Press. Blumenberg, H. 1983. The Legitimacy of the Modern Age. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1983. Bodei, R. 1991a. Geometria delle passioni. Paura. speranza. felicità: filosofia e uso politico. Feltrinelli: Milano. ---. 1991b. "La speranza dopo il tramonto delle speranze." Il Mulino 333: 5--‐13. ---. 1991c. "Principio speranza/Principio responsabilità." Iride 6: 231--‐4. Bostrom, N. 2005a. "In difesa della dignità postumana." Bioetica 13 (4): 33--‐46. ---. 2005b. "A History of Tranhumanist Thought." Journal of Evolution and Technology 14 (1): 1--‐25. Bronfenbrenner, U. 1979. The Ecology of Human Development. Experiments by Nature and Design. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Coeckelbergh, M. 2013. Human Being & Risk. Enhancement, Technology, and the Evaluation of Vulnerability Transformations. Dordrecht: Springer. Del Noce, A. 1964. Il problema dell'ateismo. Bologna: Il Mulino. ---. 1970. L'epoca della secolarizzazione. Milano: Giuffrè. Franzini Tibaldeo, R. 2009. La rivoluzione ontologica di Hans Jonas. Uno studio sulla genesi e il significato di 'Organismo e libertà'. Milano: Mimesis. ---. 2013. "Un'esistenza indivisibile. Complessità, governance e responsabilità in età globale." Governare la paura. http://governarelapaura.unibo.it/ Frogneux, N. 2001. Hans Jonas ou la vie dans le monde. Bruxelles: De Boeck & Larcier. ---. 2007. "Pluralität à la Robinson Crusoe. Ist die Anthropologie von Hans Jonas eingeschränkt durch den Archetyp des Einzellers?." In: R. Seidel & M. Endruweit (eds.) Prinzip Zukunft: im Dialog mit Hans Jonas. Paderborn: Mentis, 167--‐183. Gammel, S. 2013. "Achtung und Verachtung der Natur. Hans Jonas' Denken zwischen Transhumanismus und Biokonservativismus." In: G. Härtung--‐Kristian Köchy, J. C. Schmidt, & G. Hofmeister (eds.), Naturphilosophie als Grundlage der Naturethik. Zur Aktualität von Hans Jonas. Freiburg--‐München: Alber, 239--‐267. Giddens, A. 1990. The Consequences of Modernity. Cambridge: Polity Press. Habermas, J. 1990. Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. Cambridge: Polity. ---. 2003. The Future of Human Nature. Cambridge: Polity Press. Heidegger, M. 1977. "Lectures and Essays." In: idem, The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays. Ed. by W. Lovitt. New York: Harper & Row: 3--‐35. Hösle, V. 1991. Philosophie der ökologischen Krise. München: Beck. Jonas, H. 1964. "Heidegger and Theology." The Review of Metaphysics 18: 207--‐ 33. The Heuristics of Fear 236 ---. 1966. The Phenomenon of Life. Towards a Philosophical Biology. New York: Harper & Row, 1966. ---. 1974a. Philosophical Essays. From Ancient Creed to Technological Man. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice--‐Hall. ---. 1974b. "Biological Engineering – A Preview". In: idem, Philosophical Essays. Englewood Cliffs (NJ): Prentice--‐Hall: 141--‐67. ---. 1984a. The Imperative of Responsibility. In Search of an Ethics for the Technological Age. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. ---. 1984b. Das Prinzip Verantwortung. Versuch einer Ethik für die technologische Zivilisation. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. ---. 1985. Technik, Medizin und Ethik. Praxis des Prinzips Verantwortung. Frankfurt am Main: Insel. ---. 1987. Wissenschaft als persönliches Erlebnis. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. ---. 1988. "Heideggers Entschlossenheit und Entschluss". In: G. Neske & E. Kettering (eds.), Antwort. Martin Heidegger im Gespräch. Stuttgart: Neske: 221--‐229. ---. 1991. Erkenntnis und Verantwortung. Gespräch mit Ingo Hermann in der Reihe 'Zeugen des Jahrhunderts'. Ed. by I. Hermann. Göttingen: Lamuv. ---. 1992. "Fatalismus wäre Todsünde". Freie Universität--‐Info (Berlin Freie Universität) 7: 2--‐3. ---. 2008. Memoirs. Lebanon (NH): Brandeis University Press, 2008. Koselleck, R. 1979. Vergangene Zukunft: zur Semantik geschichtlicher Zeiten. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. Landkammer, J. 1990. "Le domande estreme e le risposte evanescenti di H. Jonas". Filosofia politica 4: 423--‐429. Latouche, S. La Megamachine. Raison techno--‐scientifique. Raison économique et le mythe du Progrès. Essais à la mémoire de Jacques Ellul. Paris: La Découverte. Lipman, M. 1995. "Moral Education Higher--‐order Thinking and Philosophy for Children." Early Child Development and Care 107: 61--‐70. ---. 2003. Thinking in Education. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press. Löwith, K. 1949. Meaning in History. The Theological Implications of the Philosophy of History. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Marramao, G. 2003. Passaggio a Occidente. Filosofia e globalizzazione. Torino: Bollati Boringhieri. Morin, E. 1991. Introduction à la pensée complexe. Paris: ESF. Müller, D. 1993. "L'horizon temporel de l'éthique et le poids de la responsabilité". In: G. Hottois (ed.), Aux fondements d'une éthique contemporaine: H. Jonas et H. T. Engelhardt en perspective. Paris: Vrin: 223--‐235. Roberto Franzini Tibaldeo 237 Nacci, M. 2000. Pensare la tecnica. Un secolo di incomprensioni. Roma--‐Bari: Laterza. Passmore, J. 1974. Man's Responsibility for Nature. Ecological Problems and Western Traditions. London: Duckworth. Pulcini, E. 2013. Care of the World. Fear, Responsibility and Justice in the Global Age. Dordrecht: Springer. Ricoeur, P. 1994. "Le concept de responsabilité. Essai d'analyse sémantique". Esprit 206: 28--‐48. Seidel, R., Endruweit, M. (eds). Prinzip Zukunft: im Dialog mit Hans Jonas. Paderborn: Mentis. Severino, E. 1971. Essenza del nichilismo. Milano: Adelphi. ---. 1979. Techne. Le radici della violenza. Milano: Rusconi. Spinelli, E. Verde, F. 2011. "Hans Jonas: The Function of Fear in Lucretius and Hobbes". Paradigmi 2: 183--‐195. Svendsen, L. 2008. A Philosophy of Fear. London: Reaktion Books. Wolin, R. 2001. Heidegger's Children. Hannah Arendt. Karl Löwith. Hans Jonas. and Herbert Marcuse. Princeton--‐Oxford: Princeton University Press. Wolters, G. 2010. Ambivalenz und Konflikt. Katholische Kirche und Evolutionstheorie. Konstanz: Universitätsverlag Konstanz. The Heuristics of Fear 238 Roberto Franzini Tibaldeo (Turin) The Heuristics of Fear: Can the Ambivalence of Fear Teach Us Anything in the Technological Age? Abstract. The paper assumes that fear presents a certain degree of ambivalence. To say it with Hans Jonas (1903--‐1993), fear is not only a negative emotion, but may teach us something very important: we recognize what is relevant when we perceive that it is at stake. Under this respect, fear may be assumed as a guide to responsibility, a virtue that is becoming increasingly important, because of the role played by human technology in the current ecological crisis. Secondly, fear and responsibility concern both dimensions of human action: private--‐individual and public--‐collective. What the 'heuristics of fear' teaches us, is to become aware of a deeper ambivalence, namely the one which characterizes as such human freedom, which may aim to good or bad, to self--‐preservation or self--‐destruction. Any public discussion concerning political or economic issues related with human action (at an individual or collective level) ought not to leave this essential idea out of consideration. Keywords: Fear, Responsibility, Hans Jonas, Heuristics of Fear, Technological Risks. Ethics in Progress (ISSN 2084--‐9257). Vol. 6 (2015). No. 1. pp. 225--‐238. doi: 10.14746/eip.2015.1.

The Substitution Principle Revisited Jakub Stejskal, Freie Universität Berlin, [email protected] (accepted version, forthcoming in Source: Notes in the History of Art) In their Anachronic Renaissance, Alexander Nagel and Christopher Wood identify two principles upon which, in fifteenth-century Europe, a work of art might establish its validity or authority: substitution and performance.1 One of the recurring themes in the responses to this much debated book has been its indebtedness to Hans Belting's Bild und Kult.2 Specifically, it has been routinely suggested that the dual schema of substitution and performance follows Belting's dualism of the medieval cult of the image and the modern aesthetic system of art. This, I submit, is not just a mistake, but also prevents from evaluating perhaps the book's most ambitious contribution to arthistorical theory on its own merits. An analysis of the structure of the claims made by Nagel and Wood brings to light that the two concepts-substitution and performance-do not play the same role as the conceptual pair of Bild and Kunst in Belting's influential work. In the reactions to Anachronic Renaissance, a lot of attention has been paid-and rightly so-to the substitution principle. This proved to be one of the most highlighted as well as most controversial topics of the book.3 The criticisms of "substitutability" range from its being too vague,4 too schematic,5 to its distorting its subject because of an alleged postmodern bias.6 What ended up more 1 Alexander Nagel and Christopher S. Wood, Anachronic Renaissance (New York: Zone Books, 2010), 13, 31. 2 Hans Belting, Bild und Kult: Eine Geschichte des Bildes vor dem Zeitalter der Kunst (Munich: Beck, 1990). 3 The principle was already discussed in Christopher S. Wood, Forgery, Replica, Fiction: Temporalities of German Renaissance Art (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), 25–60. 4 Frank Fehrenbach, review of Anachronic Renaissance, by Alexander Nagel and Christopher S. Wood, caa.reviews, March 8, 2011, doi:10.3202/caa.reviews.2011.30. 5 Gerhard Wolf, review of Anachronic Renaissance, by Alexander Nagel and Christopher S. Wood, Art Bulletin 94, no. 1 (2012): 139. 6 Walter Cupperi, "Introduction: Never Identical; Multiples in Pre-Modern Art?," in Multiples in Pre-Modern Art, ed. 1 detrimental to its reception, however, was its association early on with Belting's work. According to Gerhard Wolf, "if one sees the authors' substitutional model as the medieval one and their performative one as that of the Renaissance, it is clear that Anachronic Renaissance follows a structure analogous to the shift from Bild to Kunst in Bild und Kult."7 For Frank Fehrenbach, "it is not difficult to recognize Belting's opposition of 'art' versus 'cult' behind" the concepts of performance and substitution.8 Keith Moxey observed that "the imaginative elaboration of the concepts of 'substitutional' and 'performative' [is derived] ultimately from" Bild und Kult.9 Katherine Hunt even suggested that Nagel and Wood applied Belting's ideas "somewhat uncritically."10 In a recent authoritative overview of the research into the epistemic role of images in early modernity, Alexander Marr notes Nagel and Wood's indebtedness to Belting as a matter of course, proving that the association has achieved the status of received wisdom.11 Hunt's remark notwithstanding, commentators usually hasten to add that Nagel and Wood do not just slavishly apply Belting's schema, but that they provide a more nuanced approach that complicates the somewhat over-simplifying narrative of a switch from the veneration of the divine through image to a secularized aesthetic experience of art.12 What remains unchallenged is that when Nagel and Wood speak of substitution and performance, they roughly refer to the same processes as Belting when he discusses Bild and Kunst, though the claim is nowhere to be found Walter Cupperi (Zurich: Diaphanes, 2014), 20. 7 Wolf, review of Anachronic Renaissance, 137. 8 Fehrenbach, review of Anachronic Renaissance. 9 Keith Moxey, review of Anachronic Renaissance, by Alexander Nagel and Christopher S. Wood, Contemporaneity: Historical Presence in Visual Culture 1 (2011): 153, doi:10.5195/contemp.2011.35. 10 Katherine Hunt, "Substitution and Subversion: Two Paths through the Renaissance," Art History 35, no. 4 (2012): 842. 11 Alexander Marr, "Knowing Images," Renaissance Quarterly 69, no. 3 (2016): 1006. 12 E.g., Jeffrey Hamburger, "Hans Belting's Bild und Kult: eine Geschichte des Bildes vor dem Zeitalter der Kunst, 1990," Burlington Magazine 153, no. 1294 (2011), 44. 2 explicitly stated in the book itself. Such a reading misconstrues the distinction Nagel and Wood introduce. In order to get a clearer view of the difference involved, it is important to disentangle two meanings of "substitution" relevant to art history. Nagel and Wood's principle of substitution, or "of continuity of identity across a succession of substitutions,"13 treats art as a "structural object," with a specific artwork serving as the token of a type.14 An art object may be substituted by another material object, provided it partakes of the identity features of the type. These features secure its legitimacy and efficacy as a member of a chain of substitutions usually leading back to a mythical act of creation. By contrast, the principle of performance, or of authorship, traces an artwork's origin to a specific creative gesture and its authority and efficacy rests in its material identity over time and "nonsubstitutability."15 Under the substitution principle, an icon may have been repainted several times, even replaced altogether, or may have existed in several versions at different places, but all its material occurrences were perceived as true instances of the type, often with no sense of contradiction. This was possible because the icon was perceived both as if it were a relic materially linked to its original appearance and as if it were a piece of writing that may be rewritten any time on a different material without any loss of identity. The principle of substitution under which all the instances of a type are perceived as identical; the lack of means to identify at all precisely (and a lack of interest in doing so) the time and place of origin of specific instances; and the general tendency of removing religious imagery from the flow of secular time made it easier to treat replicas as originals. As Nagel and Wood argue, with the rise of humanist scholarship, with the influx of Byzantine icons that were often taken (mistakenly) to be authentic works of Christian antiquity, and with the emergence of the cult of the Great Artist, the incompatibility of the substitution and the performance principles was becoming growingly apparent with the result that this incompatibility 13 Nagel and Wood, Anachronic Renaissance, 14. 14 Ibid., 12. 15 Ibid., 14, 60. 3 itself became the subject of many Renaissance artworks.16 On the rare occasions when Nagel and Wood employ Belting's term Bild, they use it in Belting's sense, that is, to describe the power of holy images to make the divine present.17 The term does describe a kind of substitution, namely, the potential of a picture to stand in or act on behalf of another body or agency. In his Bild-Anthropologie, Belting identified the substitutive function of images-variously referred to as Verkörperung, Stellvertretung, Ersatz-to be as old as the making of images itself and connected it to the desire to provide the deceased (and by analogy, the absent) with an ersatz-body, contrasting it with the Western identification of mimetic image with a medium of remembrance.18 But crucially, that is not the meaning the term "substitution" carries in Anachronic Renaissance. The concept of substitution Nagel and Wood apply is at a remove from Belting's notion. Instead of asking how art objects become effective, whether as surrogate agents or as aesthetic representations, they ask rather how their acquired authority is sustained through time and space. The performance and the substitution principles offer two patterns of this sustenance, two ways of securing the survival of an established link between an art object and its source of authority. Thus, for example, the "models" of the Holy Sepulcher, which sprang up across Europe in the early centuries of the second millennium played not only the role of memorials and "physical reminders," but also of substitutes, tokens participating on the identity of the type. Only because they could be treated as identical to the Holy Sepulcher could they function as sites of veneration-centers of "virtual pilgrimages."19 And something similar applies to the Byzantine icons of the Virgin imported to the West in the fifteenth century: Nagel and Wood discuss copies of the supposed original icon painted by St Luke from the Church of Santa Maria del Popolo in Rome being presented as both replicas 16 Ibid., 71, 109–22, 147–58. 17 Ibid., 118, 122. 18 Hans Belting, Bild-Anthropologie: Entwürfe für eine Bildwissenschaft (Munich: Fink, 2001), 143–88. 19 Nagel and Wood, Anachronic Renaissance, 60–61. 4 and as authentic works of the evangelist.20 In a sense close to how Belting thinks about substitution, already the supposedly genuine St Luke icon in Rome and the Holy Sepulcher in Jerusalem are substitutes, just not in the sense Nagel and Wood have in mind. Because the Holy Sepulcher in Jerusalem was the place of Christ's resurrection, it can stand in for him as the subject of veneration. Because the icon was painted by the evangelist's hand and "from life," it is a relic-like index of the presence of Virgin Mary and thus can stand in for her.21 But the substitution principle Nagel and Wood describe does not address this relationship between the absent agency and its representation.22 What it addresses is how an art object's identity is secured across time and space. So while the replicas of Madonna del Popolo stood in for what they represented in Belting's sense of substitution, they secured this privileged relationship both by instantiating features of her type (substitution principle) and by their claim to material identity (nonsubstitutability). In Nagel and Wood's narrative, the growing awareness of the incompatibility between the relic-like character of a supposedly authentic art object like the Madonna del Popolo and its identity secured through substitution was resolved in favor of its relic status: in the end, the involvement of any act of substitution was denied. It is this denial of substitution in favor of performance that has swayed commentators to view Nagel and Wood's narrative through Beltingian lens: the substitutive logic of Bild is superseded by the performative logic of Kunst. But such a reading misses that the authorial performance principle effectively inherits its relying on nonsubstitutability from what can be called 'the relic principle'.23 In other words, the medieval principle of relic is the same as the principle of authorial performance of the High Renaissance to the extent that both of them secure the identity of 20 Ibid., 109–15. 21 See Horst Bredekamp, Der Bildakt, 2nd. ed. (Berlin: Wagenbach, 2015), 181, 187, 193. 22 As Wolf also notices in his review of Anachronic Renaissance, 137. 23 "Somewhat surprisingly," adds Fehrenbach in his review of Anachronic Renaissance; but the surprise arrives only when one expects a Beltingian break between substitution and performance. 5 an object by its nonsubstitutability. It would then follow that contrary to the Beltingian reading of Anachronic Renaissance, it is not that the performance and substitution regimes coexisted (uneasily) in the Christian West only during the fifteenth century, making it a sort of a buffer zone between the Era of Substitution and the Era of Performance, but rather that something like the performance principle, that is, the relic principle coexisted with the substitution principle in the preceding centuries as well.24 As the tension between performance and substitution grew throughout the fifteenth century, Nagel and Wood argue, it became exploited by the Renaissance artists for artistic purposes. Their notorious example is Botticelli's Portrait of Youth Holding an Icon (ca.1480). In this painting, the authors claim, a fourteenth-century icon is inserted into a fifteenth-century panel painting in order to exemplify the different ways of securing authority. If it indeed was placed there by Botticelli or his contemporary-which is far from certain25-it represents a highly self-aware gesture of the nascent artistic culture: the icon serves to exemplify a whole "system of image transition." It is a picture manifested as antique and sustained across time by substitution. It contrasts with the authorial way of securing artistic authority exemplified by the modern-day portrait: not through a chain of substitutions, but by the supreme authorial gesture. Here, we encounter what Nagel and Wood describe-in a move to distance themselves from Belting-as the creation of a retrospective myth of the Bild, the cult image immune to history, as opposed to a modern portrait manifesting its embeddedness in a secular time.26 But working against this myth, I would argue, is the painting's celebration of progress, acknowledging at the same time the icon as its predecessor, and thus also as the product of an authorial gesture, stripping it of part of its substitutional magic and anchoring it, 24 Clair Farago and Donald Preziosi's criticism of Nagel and Wood thus misses its target, see their Art Is Not What You Think It Is (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), xi–xiii. 25 See Fehrenbach, review of Anachronic Renaissance. 26 Ibid. , 128. See also Valentina Hristova, "Pour une lecture intelligible d'Anachronic Renaissance: contenu et critiques," Studiolo, no. 9 (2012), 315. 6 as it were, in the secular time. The substitution principle, confronted with the authorial principle, does not vanish, but transforms itself – just like the relic principle morphed into the authorial. Botticelli's painting presents itself not just as a relic of a performance that brought it into the world (the index of the artist's action), but also as an instantiation of a type, of a genre of portraiture for which the inserted icon serves as a venerable predecessor that lends it legitimacy. Granted, situating a painting in a linear historical genealogy is hardly the same thing as placing it in a chain of functionally identical substitutes. What remains, however, is the intention to endow an artifact with authority by identifying it with a class of authoritative objects, in Botticelli's case by constructing a Whiggish history of the progress of portraiture painting. I have argued that Nagel and Wood do not present just another, if more nuanced, version of Belting's story of the shift away from substitution. First, their use of substitution differs from Belting's in that it describes primarily a model for sustaining the identity and authority of an art object and not the nature of the relationship to what it represents. And second, the transformation narrated by Nagel and Wood could best be described as a change of relation between the substitution and performance principles rather than as a move from one to the other. In the fifteenth century, a sense of the incompatibility between substitution and performance takes shape and becomes a problem for artists to tackle. But that does not mean that some version of both principles was not at play before and perhaps also after this incompatibility became an artistic problem. As models of securing authority for an artwork, both seeing an artwork as a relic of a performance that brought it into the world (the index of an action) and seeing it as an instantiation of a type may prove much more general and widespread to be each associated with incompatible artistic cultures that briefly clashed in the fifteenth century before the one succeeded the other.

Evil and Imputation in Kant's Ethics Mark Timmons For Kant, moral evil of all sorts - evil that is rooted in a person's character - is manifested in action which, on the one hand, is explicable in terms of an agent's own reasons for action and so imputable, though on the other hand it is, in some sense, irrational. Because such evil is rooted in a person's character, it "corrupts the ground of all maxims"' and thus deserves to be called radical evil. Moreover, according to Kant, not only are human beings susceptible to such evil, being evil is an inescapable condition of being human. These claims raise a number of questions, among them the following: (1) How can we explain the possibility of irrational, yet explicable, freely done actions given Kant's views about human agency? (2) What is the nature of radical evil? (3) In what sense is it a corrupting ground of all maxims? (4) What reason does Kant have for claiming that radical evil is an inescapable part of the human condition? There are other questions to be added to this list, some of them addressed in the recent secondary literature, but for the most part I plan to focus on the ones just mentioned. Specifically, my plan goes as follows. Sections I and II are concerned with some basic themes and distinctions pertaining to Kant's theory of action and practical rationality that will provide a basis for understanding his view of moral evil. In section III, I turn to Kant's analysis of moral evil in its various manifestations in order to provide, in section IV, a general characterization of moral evil. In section V, I consider Kant's claim that radical evil corrupts the ground of all maxims, and what this claim implies about the possibility of actions having moral worth. In section VI, I want to consider what we can call Kant's Universality 1 Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der Blossen Vernunft VI: 37, 32. All references to Kant's works cite the volume and page number of the Prussian Akademie edition of Kant's works, (Kant's gesammelte Schriften, herausgegben von der Koniglich PreuBischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 29 volumes, Berlin, Walter de Gryter & Co. 1902 ff.) followed by the page number of the English translations. The translated works I have used are: The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten), translated by H. J. Paton (third edition) New York: Harper & Row, 1965; The Metaphysics of Morals (Die Metaphysik der Sitten), translated by Mary Gregor, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991; Critique of Practical Reason (Kritik der praktischen Vernunft), translated by Lewis White Beck, Indianapolis / New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1956; and Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone (Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloBen Vernunft), translated by Theodore M. Greene and Hoyt W. Hudson, New York: Harper & Row, 1960. 8 Jahrbuch fur Recht und Ethik, Bd. 2 (1994) 114 Mark Timmons Thesis, viz., his claim that necessarily all human beings are radically evil. What is remarkable about the Universality Thesis (UT) is Kant's apparent argument for it: despite the fact that this thesis supposedly holds with strict universality for all human beings and thus would appear to be a necessary truth, Kant defends it on empirical grounds. In his recent book, Henry Allison has argued that the UT represents a synthetic a priori claim, and he proceeds to provide a 'deduction' for it, something that Kant failed to do. I argue that Allison's deduction does not work, though I am afraid I don't have a deduction of my own to propose on Kant's behalf, nor do I see how to reconcile Kant's own defense of the UT with its alleged a priori status. Kant's UT remains problematic. I. Maxims, Reasons, and Motivation I interpret Kantian maxims as intentions of an agent which can be properly expressed by statements beginning 'I will. . . .' 2 They concern actions to be done or not done or ends to be achieved, and are adopted by agents for reasons, though due to such factors as ignorance and error on the agent's part, the act of adopting them may fail to be rational. Kant distinguishes between the 'matter' 2 Two comments are in order here. First, my claim that maxims are intentions is controversial. John E. Atwell, Ends and Principles in Kant's Moral Thought, Dordrecht/ Boston/Lancaster: Martinus Nijhoff, 1986, pp. 50-51 argues that maxims are not intentions. Onora O'Neill, "Consistency in Action", in: Nelson T. Potter and Mark Timmons, eds: Morality and Universality, Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1985, pp. 161-7 argues that maxims are fundamental intentions - very general intentions that guide agents to accept more specific intentions on the basis of which they perform actions. Space does not permit me to defend my view, but see Barbara Herman, Morality as Rationality, New York: Garland, 1990, ch. 2, and Henry E. Allison, Kant's Theory of Freedom, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, pp. 91-4 for a defense of the view I hold. Second, formulations of maxims may include more or less information about the agent's intentions. Focusing, for a moment on maxims of action, what we might call a simple maxim has the form: 'I will if/whenever . ', where the first blank is filled with a specification of the action and the second with a specification of the circumstances under which the agent intends to perform the action. However, in Metaphysik der Sitten VI: 385, 189, Kant claims that all actions have ends and what we might call a complex maxim has the form: 'I will _ if/ whenever in order to _ _', where the first two blanks are filled as before and the last one mentions whatever end(s) the agent takes this action to serve. I construe complex maxims as a fusion of two distinct maxims: a simple maxim of action plus a maxim of ends. In attempting to understand why an agent performed some action, we often require that the action be related to the agent's ends, and a complex maxim, as I am calling it, expresses this relation. It should be noted that the end mentioned in a complex maxim may or may not represent the agent's most fundamental motive (motivating reason) for adopting a maxim of action. After all, I might intend to enroll in a series of cooking courses with the immediate end of learning fine French cuisine, though my more long range goal (and so what motivates my having this immediate end) is to start my own catering business. One could express this plan as a complex maxim having this form: 'I will._ , if/whenever __, in order to _ ., so that I might bring about Evil and Imputation in Kant's Ethics I 15 of maxims and their 'form.' The matter of a maxim is its content, and concerns that action (or end) to be adopted or avoided and the circumstances under which that action (end) is to be performed (pursued) or avoided. In the rest of this section, I want to focus on the 'form' of maxims by considering a number of themes and theses that are central in Kant's theory of practical reasoning. 1. Motivating Versus Justifying Reasons for Action Since talk about reasons in connection with intentional action is ambiguous, we can avoid confusion if we make the following distinctions. First, let us call any explanation of an agent's action that makes sense of the action as something the agent did (as opposed to something that happened to the agent) a rationalizing explanation. Rationalizing explanations are explanations in terms of a person's reasons for action, and so explain actions from the agent's perspective. Second, let us call motivating reasons those features of the agent's situation that figure in a rationalizing explanation of her actions. In many cases, perhaps typical ones, there are features of some action and her situation that the agent takes to be a good or adequate reason for her performing that action. For example, if an agent is thirsty and believes that the glass before her contains thirst-quenching liquid, then her reason for drinking the liquid is the complex of her thirst together with her belief about the liquid. But here, my talk of motivating reasons is intended quite broadly to cover not only reasons for action that the agent takes to be good or at least adequate reasons for action, but is also meant to include those factors, such as certain desires, emotions or passions that prompt an agent to do or refrain from certain courses of action, but which the agent does not take to be good or adequate reasons for action. For example, a person with a moral conscience but who has sadistic desires or urges may not take those desires or urges to provide any sort of reason for engaging in the sorts of actions those desires prompt. Again, someone addicted to tobacco and wanting desperately to quit may not take her craving cigarettes, or the enjoyment derived from smoking, to provide her with a reason for smoking. In these cases, we explain the actions of the sadist and the smoker by appealing to motivating considerations - the sadist's strong desire to inflict pain on his victim, and the smoker's craving for a cigarette - though such considerations are not taken by these individuals to be good or adequate reasons for action. They are however motivating reasons, at least in the sense that they are the sorts of factors that figure in rationalizing explanations of people's behavior. We can call motivating reasons for action that the agent takes to be good or adequate reasons, endorsed reasons, and those reasons that the agent does not take to be good or adequate reasons, non-endorsed reasons, In addition to motivating reasons, there are justifying reasons, i. e., those considerations that really are good reasons for an agent to adopt this or that ' maxim and act accordingly. I say more about justifying reasons in the next section. 116 Mark Timmons 2. Two Sources of Reasons for Action For Kant, there are two ultimate sources of reasons (both motivating and justifying) for action: one's own happiness and dictates of morality. Happiness is understood here as the satisfaction of one's desires - desires that arise ultimately from one's sensuous nature.3 We may call those reasons for action that stem from considerations of one's own happiness, desire-based reasons for action. But, according to Kant, there is a source of reason for action that stems from our nature as rational creatures. That is, for Kant, some reasons for action depend on there being certain substantive principles of rationality, notably, moral principles. Such moral principles, or categorical imperatives, can be understood as principles of rationality telling an agent what maxims it is rational to adopt and act on. Reasons for action stemming from reason itself, we may call reasonbased reasons for action. In providing rationalizing explanations of a person's action, then, we ultimately appeal to desire-based reasons, non-desire-based reasons, or, in cases of overdetermination, reasons of both sorts. 3. The Incorporation Thesis As I have already mentioned, according to Kant, we make something our maxim through an act of free choice. This is clear from his official definition of a maxim as "a subjective principle of action . . . [that] contains a practical rule determined by reason in accordance with the conditions of the subject (often his ignorance or again his inclinations).. . . "4 Moreover, whatever considerations motivate us to adopt this or that maxim, these considerations are, qua motivating reasons that figure in a rationalizing explanation of maxim adoption, something that the agent chooses. This is made clear in Kant's so-called 'incorporation thesis." This thesis is at the heart of Kant's theory of freedom of the will, and functions to ensure that rationalizing explanations are ultimately not just mechanistic causal explanations of actions. Kant states the thesis as follows: [A]n incentive can determine the will (Willkur) to an action only so far as the individual has incorporated it into his maxim (has made it the general rule in accordance with which he will conduct himself).5 3 This is rough and taken at face value is not plausible. No doubt one's happiness depends on the satisfaction of so-called 'informed desires' - those desires that one would have were one to engage in appropriate reflection on her current desires in light of relevant information. 4 Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten IV: 421, 88n, my emphasis. Also in the Grundlegung at 427, 94 Kant points out that desires and inclinations (settled desires) arise from feelings of pleasure and displeasure, and from these "with the cooperation of reason, there arise maxims." In the Kritik der praktischen der Vernunft V: 79, 82, Kant claims that an interest (which an agent takes up as a result of reflecting on her desires) is the basis, or provides the reason, an agent has for adopting a maxim. Evil and Imputation in Kant's Ethics I 17 Incentives, in Kant's terminology are what I have been calling motivating reasons for action. Kant's point here is that in order for any of the sorts of factors, including desires and emotions as well as beliefs the agent has about her situation and action - factors that may figure in a rationalizing explanation of the agent's actions - to count for the agent as a motivating reason, the agent must 'make,' as Kant says in a number of places, that factor a motivating reason. This claim holds not only for those incentives stemming from our sensuous natures, but holds as well for moral incentives that have a purely rational basis. That even reason-based considerations, in order to be motivating reasons, must be incorporated by the agent is made clear when, in characterizing the predisposition to personality as a capacity to be motivated by respect for the moral law (via moral feeling), Kant remarks that such an incentive becomes a motivating reason "only when the free will (Willkur) incorporates such moral feeling into its maxim. . . ."6 Thus, for Kant, desires (and incentives generally) are not, independently of an agent's choices, motivating reasons for action, though, as I shall explain a bit later, Kant does think that independently of an agent's exerting her free will, certain considerations or incentives are justifying reasons for action. 4. The Structure of Rationalizing Explanations To provide a rationalizing explanation of an action involves citing those motivating reasons of the agent that were effective in bringing about the action in question. Kant's view about the structure of rationalizing explanations is a foundational one, where the terminus or foundation of any complete and full rationalizing explanation of an action is what Kant calls one's disposition (Gesinnung). The pattern of explanation, then, for any action would go as follows. The immediate link explaining why an agent performed some 'outer' action is the agent's intention or maxim of action. Maxims of actions themselves are adopted for reasons, and normally, the immediate link in explaining why the agent adopted some particular maxim of action will involve another maxim(s) the agent has adopted plus certain of the agent's beliefs. In the simplest kind of case, then, what explains (let us suppose) why Alex adopted the maxim of faithfully visiting his aged grandmother is the fact that he intends to impress his fiancee, Gretchen with his (apparent) concern for family, and believes that by visiting his aged grandmother he will indeed impress her. Alex's intention to impress Gretchen represents a maxim of ends, his intention to visit his grandmother represents a maxim of action, and rationalizing explanations typically explain a person's actions (and intentions producing those actions) in terms of goals, ends or projects that the agent has set for himself. Of course, for maxims of ends like the one in question, we can inquire about the agent's motivating reasons for adopting 5 Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft VI: 23-24, 19. o Ibid., VI: 27, 32. 118 Mark Timmons it, and typically the explanation will be in terms of more general ends the agent has adopted. The resulting picture is a hierarchy of maxims where an explanation of specific maxims of action (where the action is within one's immediate voluntary control) appeals to other maxims organized in a series where the terminus of the series is some very general maxim. If the maxim whose adoption is to be explained involves, in the order of explanation, appeal to the most general maxim pertaining to the aim of one's own happiness, then the maxim (and action flowing from it) stem from desire-based reasons for action. Maxims whose explanation ultimately stem from a maxim to comply with the demands of morality are maxims whose ultimate explanation is in terms of reason-based reasons for action. However, since there are two types of motivating reasons for action, and since in some cases at least one might take there to be two sorts of reasons that bear on explaining some action, one can ask which of these types of reason was actually efficacious and why. For instance, if I have a desire-based reason for doing A, but I also have (and recognize) a reason-based reason for refraining from A, then i f I go ahead and do A, then we can ask for a contrastive rationalizing explanation of my action: we can ask why I did A rather than refrain from doing A. In this sort of context, merely citing a series of motivating reasons stemming ultimately from a desire for happiness is not enough for the sort of explanation sought. We want to know, in addition, why the agent, given competing motivating reasons for action, chose to do A rather than refrain from doing A. Explanations that answer this contrastive question may advert to all sorts of phenomena, including such things as lack of willpower, ignorance, and so forth. But here, the terminus of explanation is what Kant refers to as one's disposition, "the ultimate subjective ground of the exercise . . . of man's freedom in general."7 • 5. Disposition (Gesinnung) and the Supreme Maxim In addition to the foundational status of one's disposition, there are four other important features characteristic of one's disposition. First, since one's disposition is something that bears directly on the morality of one's character, it can be either good or evil. Second, the moral quality of one's disposition is only revealed in a series of choices in which one is faced with moral obligations. If, on some lone occasion, one does one's duty solely for duty's sake, one does not thereby have either a good or an evil disposition. Thus, were one capable of a God'seye view of people and their motivation, attribution of a good or an evil disposition would require viewing the agent's choices diachronically. Third, since one's disposition concerns the two sources of motivating reasons for action and whether, in cases involving an agent having a moral duty, one does or does not act on the basis of purely moral incentives, there are only two basic motivational orientations associated with the notion of disposition. If one views one's choices Ibid., VI: 21, 16. Evil and Imputation in Kant's Ethics 1 19 diachronically, then in all cases where one has a duty, either (i) one's sole motivating reason for action is a moral one, or (ii) it is not. This is Kant's socalled character rigorism: with regard to one's disposition (and hence the deepest aspect of one's character) one's disposition cannot fail to have a moral quality, and cannot, at a time, be both good and evil. Fourth, Kant claims that one is responsible for one's disposition; it can be imputed to the agent. This claim is an implication of Kant's theory of freedom: if our adoption of specific maxims can be imputed to us, and if the ultimate subjective ground, as Kant calls it, provides the terminus in any full rationalizing explanation, then this ground must itself be imputed to the agent as something under her voluntary control. Thus, according to Kant, our disposition can be imputed to us as the result of the exercise of one's free choice. Furthermore, since such exercise results in maxim adoption, Kant characterizes an agent's disposition as a maxim, and given its foundational status in the chain of motivating reasons for action, he calls it a 'supreme maxim.'8 To summarize: Maxims are intentions adopted by agents for reasons. These reasons - motivating reasons - become reasons as a result of an agent's giving them motivational influence (the Incorporation Thesis). There are two species of motivating reason, viz., desire-based and reason-based, and reasons of both sort figure in rationalizing explanations of agent's maxim adoption and resulting action. A full and complete explanation of any action will advert to what Kant calls the supreme maxim, representing one's most fundamental motivating orientation (Gesinnung ) vis a vis the two species of reasons for action. The morality of one's character depends on one's motivational orientation in a manner to be elaborated below. II. Error in Practical Reason Talk about an agent's acting rationally on some occasion is ambiguous, an ambiguity reflected in talk about an agent's reasons for action. If we take the agent's perspective, we can ask whether, from the agent's subjective perspective, some action she performed on some occasion was rational. Here, our answer to this question will focus on what reasons the agent took to be good or adequate ones, whether or not they really are. On the other hand, we might take an external perspective appealing to objective canons and principles of rational conduct in s The apparent tension between construing one's disposition as both the result of an act of free choice (for which, it seems, one must have a reason) and a terminus in a series of motivating reasons is the source of interesting puzzles for Kant's view. Kant recognized the tension and claimed that the choice of one's disposition must be represented as a timeless noumenal act whose rationale must remain inscrutable to us. Here, I pass over this difficult issue, though, following Allison (op. cit. f. 2), pp. 135-140 I am inclined to interpret this doctrine of a timeless noumenal choice in a minimalist way as committing Kant only to a claim about the limits of rationalizing explanations. 120 Mark Timmons assessing the rationality of an agent's behavior. In this section, my remarks will concern objective assessments of rational action. Thus, for an agent to act rationally on some occasion (where the standards or principles of rationality being employed are what I am calling objective principles) involves, at a minimum, her having a good or justifying reason for performing that action on that occasion, moreover a justifying reason that is better or weightier than any other reasons an agent may have that favor doing something else. Furthermore, if the act is to be rational, the agent must act in light of her justifying reasons, where acting in light of such reasons involves reasoning according to principles of practical reasoning - practical principles of the sort that Kant calls "objectively valid" - such reasoning figuring in a rationalizing explanation of the agent's action. As I mentioned in my introductory remarks, for Kant, evil represents a kind of irrationality connected with practical reasoning and action. In this section, I want to focus on just what sort of irrationality is involved in evil doings. Kant distinguishes two sorts of practical principles: subjective practical principles, or maxims, and objective practical principles. Objective practical principles are principles of practical reasoning - principles that govern the rational revision of one's maxims or intentions. As such, objective practical principles can be used to guide revision of one's own set of maxims, they can also be used to judge the rationality of an agent's maxim adoption. Because of their status as standards of practical rationality, these principles are, like principles of logic, objective or valid, as Kant would say, for assessing and guiding the maxims adopted by agents. Furthermore, objective principles reflect considerations in virtue of which one has justifying reasons to perform some action (and hence in virtue of which one has reason to adopt the corresponding intention or maxim to perform that action or adopt some end). Kant's formal principle of hypothetical imperatives - what we may call his principle of heteronomy - is best interpreted as a principle of practical reasoning counseling an agent to adopt those maxims of action that are necessary for achieving those ends or goals that she has reason to achieve. For example, if I have reason to loose weight and intend to do so, and if reducing my intake of carbohydrates is necessary for my losing weight, then the principle of heteronomy counsels me to either adopt the maxim of reducing carbohydrates or give up my end, on pain of irrationality. Moral evil represents for Kant a kind of practical irrationality. To perform an action that falls short of full rationality is to be guilty of some error or mistake, an error that can often be traced to one's practical thinking. So, evil behavior must involve some sort of error in practical reasoning. I suggest the sort of error involved here concerns an agent violating an objective practical principle. Let me elaborate. We can think of errors in practical reasoning as involving violations of practical principles. There are two sorts of possible error connected with practical thinking corresponding to two phases of deliberation. If practical thinking aims at revision Evil and Imputation in Kant's Ethics 121 of one's intentions, we can distinguish the phase that precedes the actual revising of one's intentions from the second phase in which one actually engages in revision. In this first phase, there is a process of reflection in which one engages in some or all of the following: envision alternative courses of action, consider possible outcomes of each action, try to vividly imagine what the various possible outcomes would be like, reflect on those considerations that favor doing one act over another, weigh various considerations that favor one action or another in order to determine which considerations provide the best reasons for action, and so forth. I will call those rules that specify what sorts of things one should consider in this reflective phase, rules of reflection.' In the second phase of deliberation, one actually revises one's intentions - adopts new maxims, perhaps revises or even rejects current maxims. I will call those rules or principles governing correct revision of one's maxims, principles of revision. Kant's principle of heteronomy, then, can be understood as a principle of revision prescribing how agents ought to revise their set of intentions given certain means-ends connections. Rules of reflection, then, prescribe the various sorts of things one should consider in practical thinking; principles of revision put constraints on how one is to revise one's intentions. Error in practical reasoning can be understood as a violation of one or more of these rules and principles. Interestingly, it would seem that the Kant's principle of autonomy (the Categorical Imperative) functions both as a rule of reflection and as a principle governing correct revision of one's set of intentions. For example, in one place Kant says that the principle of autonomy can be expressed as claiming that "Maxims must be chosen as if they had to hold as universal laws of nature."10 Moreover, according to Kant, we are to will, i. e., adopt and act on maxims, in accordance with the principle of autonomy." Such passages support the idea that imperatives generally, and specific categorical imperatives in particular, are principles of revision, governing correct modification of intentions. However, other passages where Kant claims that the principle of autonomy functions at least implicitly in people's moral thinking as a "norm of judgment"12 make clear that Kant also thinks of the principle of autonomy as a rule of reflection, governing correct judgment or belief about moral obligation. « See Gilbert Harmon, Change in View, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1986, ch. 1, who distinguishes between two phases of practical reasoning (whether theoretical or practical) and consequently between two sorts of errors of reasoning: errors of reflection and errors of revision. He notes that there are other sorts of mistakes that one might make while reasoning, like starting with false beliefs, but these are not, he claims, errors of reasoning. i» Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten IV: 326, 104. 11 Ibid., IV: 416, 84. 12 Ibid., IV: 404, 71; cf. 390, 57. 122 Mark Timmons It should be clear that the deontic (or as Kant would say, the 'legal') status of actions depends crucially on whether or not the agent violates any of the rules and principles governing correct practical reasoning. Most obviously, if one fails to adopt (and act on) universalizable maxims, then one violates the principle of autonomy - violates a principle of revision. But also, one's action may fail to be rational (and hence is forbidden) if one violates those rules of reflection that would require one to take care in avoiding e. g., bias in formulating maxims for moral consideration. At least both sorts of error can be recognized within Kant's theory of practical reasoning, and, as we shall see below, failure to properly represent the rational weight of moral considerations represents a failure of rationality that is at the root of wickedness. The purpose of this section, and the one preceding it, has been to set the stage for making sense, according to Kant's view of practical reasoning, of moral evil manifested in actions that are imputable (done for reasons) yet irrational. Let us then proceed to Kant's account of moral evil. III. Error and Evil Kant claims that on those occasions where we are morally required to do something, we ought to do what is morally required from the sole motive of duty. Failure to do so involves, then, a kind of error - an error of the sort that indicates, for Kant, moral evil. Moreover, failure to perform one's duty from the motive of duty can be manifested in more than one way. In book I of the Religion, Kant describes three types of moral evil that he labels frailty, impurity, and wickedness. These terms are applied both to actions and to a person's character. If, on some occasion, one fails, through weakness of will, to do what one recognizes one ought to do, one's action exhibits moral frailty. But a single instance of such frailty does not make one a morally weak or frail person, rather, only if such weakness is characteristic of a person's choices is it correct to say that one has a morally weak character. In what follows, the focus will be on prototypical cases of evil action of the sort Kant recognizes.13 13 There are other alleged types of moral evil that are regularly featured in philosophical discussions, including various forms of moral negligence and amoralism. The case of the amoralist (someone who recognizes that she has a moral obligation to do A, but is not at all motivated to do A) is a particularly interesting one, for Kant, since if one construes Kant as an ethical internalist (according to which, roughly, there is a conceptual connection between obligation and motivation), then one can't allow for the possibility of the amoralist. I think there are broad historical reasons for construing Kant as an internalist (see Mark Timmons, "Kant and the Possibility of Moral Motivation", The Southern Journal of Philosophy 23, pp. 377-98), but also there is some textual evidence. In Die Metaphysik der Sitten VI: 379, 185n, Kant writes: "Yet if man looks at himself objectively (under the aspect of humanity in his own person), as his pure practical reason determines him to do, he finds that as a moral being he is also holy enough to break the inner law reluctantly; for there is no man so depraved as not to feel an opposition Evil and Imputation in Kant's Ethics 123 In order to understand moral evil, we need to answer, in connection with each of these types of evil, the following questions: (1) In what sense does behavior manifesting these failures represent a failure of rationality? (2) How can such irrational behavior be imputed to agents who engage in it? (3) What is the underlying nature of such evils; in virtue of what are frailty, impurity and wickedness evils? and (4) What sorts of psychological phenomena are at work in the production of such these forms of irrational behavior. Most of my discussion will focus on answers to the first three questions; I shall only make some passing remarks in response to the fourth question which obviously calls for a complex psychological story that I cannot delve into here. 1. Moral Weakness Kant describes this kind of character flaw and the choices it manifests as follows: [T]he frailty (fragilitas) of human heart is expressed even in the complaint of an Apostle, "What I would, that I do not!" In other words, I adopt the good (the law) into the maxim of my will, but this good, which objectively, in its ideal conception (in thesi), is an irresistible incentive, is subjectively (in hypothesi), when the maxim is to be followed, the weaker (in comparison with inclination). The sort of frailty or moral weakness that Kant has in mind is a species of the general phenomenon of weakness of will. Normally, a person manifests moral weakness whenever that person: (i) judges that some action is morally required in some situation; (ii) takes this fact to provide her with an overriding reason for action (i. e., ranks the reason provided by this moral requirement above other, competing reasons); (iii) she consequently incorporates the moral incentive into her maxim, as Kant would say, i. e., she makes the moral incentive a motivating reason for action; (iv) were there no competing reasons, the moral reasons would be sufficient to motivate the agent to perform the required action in the situation; but (v) she fails to act according to what she judges she has most reason to do; yet (vi) her failure can be imputed to her; and (vii) as a result she experiences feelings of guilt and remorse.14 to breaking it and an abhorrence in himself in the fact of which he has to constrain himself [to break the law]." I read this as claiming that necessarily all moral agents are such that recognition of the moral law is motivating (even though, as Kant goes on to remark in this same passage, other, non-moral motives may get the motivational upper hand on one's moral motivation). Obviously, there is a great deal more to be said about Kant's notion of moral evil than I can hope to cover here. '4 I am not proposing a necessary and sufficient conditions analysis of the concept of moral weakness of will, since, for one thing, I don't think (vii) is a necessary condition of moral weakness, but rather is only associated with typical cases and functions epistemically to indicate that the agent knowingly engaged in moral wrongdoing. So, I intend (i) - (vii) as a description (in partly Kantian terms) of a prototypical case of this sort of failing. 124 Mark Timmons In what sense, then, does such behavior involve an error in practical reasoning in virtue of which it is irrational behavior? And in what sense can such behavior be imputed to the agent? From what was said in the previous section, the answer to the first question is straightforward. If we view the principle of autonomy as a principle for rationally revising one's maxims, then cases of moral weakness, in which one knowingly fails to revise one's maxims according to this principle result in irrationality. That is, the principle of autonomy requires that agents adopt only universalizable maxims on pain of irrationality, and so one way in which the morally weak person's action is irrational is simply that it is morally forbidden ('illegal', as Kant would say). But there is also another sense in which the morally weak person's action is irrational. Another sort of failure of practical rationality results from what we might call a lack of correspondence between those reasons for action that are the best reasons (in the sense of representing considerations having the most rational weight) and a person's strongest motivating reasons. In talking about justifying reasons for action, we may rank them according to the rational weight they possess. Some justifying reasons for action are weightier than others, and we can talk,about some reasons outweighing (in terms of rational strength) other reasons. In cases of conflicting reasons for action, i. e., where, on some occasion, one reason-R' favors doing some action A, and some other reason R" favors doing some other action B, and R' is a better reason than R", let us say that R' overrides R". Talk of some reasons outweighing and overriding other reasons is to be taken, then, as concerning the rational weight or authority of those reasons. When it comes to motivating reasons for action, we can talk about the strength of those reasons, where talk of strength refers to how strongly one is motivated by some consideration. Most obviously, desires vary in degrees of felt strength. In cases where one motivating reason is stronger than some other motivating reason, let us say that the first has (for the agent, on that occasion) motivational dominance over the second. The lack of correspondence I have in mind, then, in connection with weakness of will concerns the relative weight of justifying reasons and their failing to match the relative strength of motivating reasons. That is, we might propose the following Principle of Motivational Correspondence: PMC The strength of one's motivating reasons for action on some occasion ought (rationally) to correspond to the weight of one's justifying reasons for action on that occasion. This principle can be used to explain why any case of weakness of will involves a kind of irrationality; appeal to the requirements of the principle of autonomy, together with PMC, can be used to explain why some particular case counts as a case of moral weakness of will. In cases of the latter sort, then, the principle Evil and Imputation in Kant's Ethics 12? of autonomy provides justifying reasons that outweigh and override any other reasons for action, and insofar as one's choice (and consequent action) is based on non-moral motivating reasons, one's choice (and action) is irrational. As Kant says, in cases of moral frailty the fact that one has a moral reason to act in a certain way, "objectively, in its ideal conception," represents an overriding reason for action, yet it is "the weaker in comparison with inclination." What about imputing such behavior to the morally weak agent? To explain such behavior as something the agent did, and hence as something freely done by the agent, we must be able to explain the action from the agent's perspective, i. e., by appealing to those features of the agent's psychological makeup that would serve as a rationalizing explanation of the behavior. Here, of course, Kant's Incorporation Thesis is important. Recall that according to that thesis, some motivating consideration can become a reason for action only through an agent's making it so. So, it would seem that immoral behavior characteristic of the morally weak agent can be explained in terms of the agent's reasons for action: she does have reasons for acting as she does - considerations bearing on action whose relevance depends on inclination - which she intentionally takes to be a reason for action (and thus, as Kant would say, "incorporates into her maxim"), and which thus provides a rationalizing explanation of her action. Her action (or omission) is thus imputable. But the problem with this sort of rationalizing explanation is that it does not adequately account for the phenomenon in question. We are still left with a puzzle regarding imputation. Although the agent (in the typical case) does have a reason for omitting to do what is morally required, what needs really needs explaining here is why the agent knowingly performed the worse act and not the one backed by the best reasons. To satisfy our constraint on accounting for moral weakness of will, I suggest that we must modify slightly our interpretation of the Incorporation Thesis. My suggestion is that we should allow for two sorts of incorporation, at least when it comes to non-moral motivation. One sort is where inclinations are taken by the agent to be reasons for action. But there is also the case where the considerations bearing on action prompted by inclination are not taken by the agent to be reasons for action, but nevertheless those considerations are allowed by the agent to have motivational push. Notice, that quite apart from the phenomenon of moral weakness, we have to be able to accommodate those cases where the agent acts out of motivational considerations that are not so-called 'endorsed' motivating reasons for the agent. (Recall my examples of the would be non-smoker and the sadist.) I suggest that weakness of will in general, and moral weakness of will, in particular, where what is to be explained (and imputed) is why the agent did what she recognized to be the worse course of action rather than the better, can be explained in terms of the second kind of incorporation. That is, in such cases, there are no considerations that the agent takes to be reasons for doing 126 Mark Timmons the worse instead of the better act, however, she does allow non-moral considerations to have sufficient motivating strength, and in so doing, her resulting action can be imputed to her. Thus, by broadening the Incorporation Thesis, Kant can account for cases of moral weakness as irrational, but explicable behavior.>5 What then is it about the morally weak agent in virtue of which she is evil? The answer for Kant lies in the sort of disposition of the agent that represents, in the series of rationalizing explanations, the terminus of such explanation. As I explained above, one's disposition represents one's most basic orientation of choice in relation to the two sources of reasons for action. Kant's conception of a morally good finite rational agent is one whose basic orientation is such that whenever one is morally required to perform some action (or omission), the moral incentive is the sole and sufficient motivating reason for action. Given Kant's character rigorism, if one is not morally good, then one is morally evil - has an evil disposition. Thus, the morally weak person has an evil disposition. Moreover, this sort of evil - evil at the level of one's disposition - involves a violation of the obligation to "act in conformity with duty from duty."16 So although actions that manifest moral weakness are irrational for reasons men- '5 What sorts of psychological mechanisms are at work that would explain why, in cases of moral weakness, the agent allowed certain desires and perhaps urges to have motivational dominance? One might appeal, as some have, to the phenomenon of selfdeception to explain why the agent engages in such behavior. The idea would be that although the agent "knows in her heart" that the action she performs is morally wrong and that this fact about it provides an overriding reason to refrain from performing it, she nevertheless, through some process of self-deception, proceeds on the belief that the action in question is supported by the weightiest reasons and that, consequently, her action is not wrong. Although self-deception may be one mechanism that explains certain sorts of evil behavior, if my characterization of moral weakness is correct, self-deception can't be at the root of morally weak behavior. A morally weak person knowingly performs the worse act and consequently (in normal cases at least) has feelings of guilt. Henry Allison claims that in order to make sense of Kant's degrees of radical evil one must assume that self-deception is at the root of all three degrees and an essential ingredient of radical evil. In the case of moral weakness he claims that one selfdeceptively depicts "what is in reality a free evaluation on one's parts as a 'weakness' for which one is not responsible." Allison (op. cit. f. 2), p. 159. But I find it hard to see why Allison thinks this. The analysis I provide of radical evil does not require that selfdeception necessarily be involved either in connection with the agent's beliefs about the deontic status of the action she performs or about her responsibility for it. One plausible suggestion about the psychological mechanisms underlying self-deception offered by Ronald Milo appeals to lack of willpower on the agent's part. See Ronald D. Milo, Immorality, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984. Talk of willpower, for Milo, refers not to some mysterious, hidden capacity that we have for overcoming temptation, but refers rather to a battery of mostly acquired skills (such as reminding ourselves of our reasons for avoiding certain behavior and how we will feel afterwards if we cave in to temptation, and so forth) that we use to manage the influence of our desires and emotions one our choices. However, as I said at the outset of this section, theorizing about the psychological mechanisms at work in cases of weakness of will is not our foremost concern here, and so I leave it open just what sorts of mechanisms (compatible with Kant's view) are operative. is Die Metaphysik der Sitten VI: 391, 194. Evil and Imputation in Kant's Ethics 127 tioned above (they flow from non-universalizable maxims of action and violate PMC) they also involve a violation of the principle of autonomy at the level of one's disposition. It is this particular violation of the principle of autonomy, then, that accounts for the irrationality involved in the evil of moral weakness. 2. Moral Impurity Kant describes this form of irrational behavior as follows: [T]he impurity (impuritas, improbitas) of the human heart consists in this, that although the maxim is indeed good in respect of its object (the intended observance of the law) and perhaps even strong enough for practice, it is yet not purely moral; that is, it has not, as it should have, adopted the law alone as its all-sufficient incentive: instead, it usually (perhaps, every time) stands in need of other incentives beyond this, in determining the will to do what duty demands; in other words, actions called for by duty are done not purely for duty's sake." Whereas cases of moral weakness involve immoral or evil wrongdoing, cases of moral impurity do not involve wrongdoing at least as regards the action one performs - the agent acts on a universalizable maxim and so her action is not morally forbidden. However, cases of moral impurity are quite similar to cases of moral weakness in that they manifest the same sort of weakness explained above.ls To see this, we first need to notice that from Kant's description of moral impurity, he has in mind cases where a person does have a moral motivating reason for doing her duty, but she nevertheless, as Kant puts it, "stands in need of other incentives beyond this" in order to do her duty. In other words, for the morally impure agent, although she has made the moral law a motivating reason, and perhaps, at times, does do what is morally required out of her sense of duty, nevertheless, often enough for her, the moral incentive is not sufficient to move her to comply with duty." Now Kant claims that the moral law would always be a sufficient motivating reason for action were there not some other, non-moral motivating reason that the agent allows to have motivational dominance over moral motivating reasons. He writes: "The law, rather, forces itself upon him irresistibly by virtue of his moral predisposition; and were no other incentive working in opposition, he would adopt the law into his supreme maxim as the sufficient determining ground " Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft VI: 29-30, 25. is hi the Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten IV: 406, 74, Kant mentions frailty and impurity as modes of human wickedness. I' For brevity's sake, I am ignoring cases of motivational overdetermination in which an agent does her duty, though she had both moral and non-moral incentives for doing so and incentives of both sort were operative (would figure in a rationalizing explanation of her action). One might claim that in such cases, the agent manifests the sort of moral impurity Kant is talking about here, since the motive of duty was not the sole motive for action. I 2 X Mark Timmons of his will (Willkur)."20 So, in cases of moral impurity, although the agent has made the moral law a motivating reason for action, and indeed, it is even sufficient in cases where no other, competing non-moral motivating reasons are operative, the moral incentive fails to be sufficient because of competing reasons that favor not doing what is morally required. If the agent does in fact perform the morally required action, it will only be because, in addition to those non-moral reasons that favor not doing the required action, the agent also has non-moral reasons that favor performing the dutiful action, and these have motivational dominance over the competing reasons. So, for example, my own laziness and the attraction of laying around watching television may be strong enough on some occasion that unless I take myself to have some very good prudential reason for doing A (which just happens to be my duty), I will not do A. In cases where I do have such a prudential reason, I end up doing my duty, but not for moral reasons. Given these remarks, we can characterize the prototypical case of moral impurity as involving an agent who: (i) recognizes that he has a moral requirement to do A in circumstances C; (ii) takes the fact that doing A in C is morally required to provide an overriding reason to act accordingly; (iii) adopts the maxim of doing A in C; however (iv) the agent also has non-moral reasons that are sufficient to move him to do A in C; and (v) these non-moral considerations (rather than moral reasons) figure in a rationalizing explanation of why he adopted the maxim in question.21 If this form of moral evil is irrational, what sorts of errors in practical reasoning are involved? Given my description of this sort of case, the agent need not be violating any rules of reflection: he recognizes that he is morally obligated and he takes that fact to provide an overriding reason for action. The practical error, then, occurs in connection with the principle of autonomy - a violation of a principle of revision. However, unlike the case of moral weakness, an agent whose will manifests impurity on some occasion does not violate the principle of autonomy as it relates to the deontic status of the person's action, but rather violates that principle as it applies to one's underlying subjective principle of motivation, i. e., one's supreme maxim. That is, one violates the obligation to act from the motive of duty. Agents who knowingly fulfill their moral obligations, but who need (at least on occasion) additional motivational spark from nonmoral considerations in order to do so, fail to have a certain orientation of the will, which, for Kant, means that they fail to have the right supreme maxim. 20 Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vemunft VI: 36, 31. 21 To this characterization we might add that although the agent will not experience feelings of guilt associated with his recognition of the deed as morally required (he did, after, comply with the demands of morality), nevertheless, the agent may experience feelings of guilt associated with the manner in which he complied with duty. The reflective agent will realize that the rational force of moral requirements fails to be matched by his actual motivation. Of course, the agent may not be so reflective, or may engage in a form of self-deception in which he hides from himself his real motivation. However, not all cases of moral impurity need involve such self-deception. Evil and Imputation in Kant's Ethics 129 Moreover, like cases of weakness of will, cases of moral impurity violate the principle of motivational correspondence. In those cases where the agent's moral incentives are not sufficient to move her to perform the dutiful act and she needs a non-moral push to do so, the strength of an agent's moral motivating reasons fail to correspond to their rational status as overriding reasons. So, if my characterization of moral impurity is correct, then this sort of evil involves a kind of weakness on the agent's part: like the prototypical morally weak person, the morally impure person's moral motivation is too weak in the face of other, competing concerns to move her to action, though, luckily, she does have sufficient non-moral reason to take up the motivational slack. The essential difference, then, between morally weak behavior and morally impure behavior is one of moral luck - something that impure behavior manifests that morally weak behavior does not. Making sense of how impure action can be imputed is unproblematic (bracketing, for course, questions about imputing one's disposition). Unlike the case of moral weakness, the agent does perform the act that he judges he has most reason to do, even though he does so by luck: one's non-moral reasons for action just happen to move one to perform one's duty. However, there is a moral fault involved here, since the agent fails to comply with a second-order duty to act from duty. This fault concerns one's basic motivational orientation and explains why moral impurity is a species of moral evil. As we saw above in connection with moral weakness, since the maxim of acting from the sole and sufficient motive of duty (in situations where one has moral obligations) fails to be adopted by the agent as his supreme maxim, the agent fails to have a morally good character or disposition, and is thus (given Kant's character rigorism) necessarily morally evil. 3. Wickedness Kant describes wickedness as involving an inversion of the proper ordering of the reasons for action: [T]he wickedness (vitiositas, pravitas) or, if you like, the corruption (corruptio) of the human heart is the propensity of the will to maxims which neglect the incentive springing from the moral law in favor of other which are not moral. It may also be called perversitas) of the human heart, for it reverses the ethical order [of priority] among the incentives of a free will.22 For the morally wicked person, non-moral reasons for action enjoy motivational dominance over moral reasons for action (which may also be true of the morally weak person) but such motivational dominance is principled. That is, not only does the wicked person fail (as in the cases of weakness and impurity) to have 22 Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft VI: 30, 25. 9 Jahrbuch fur Recht und Ethik. Bd. 2 (1994) 130 Mark Timmons the right supreme maxim, but she has in effect deliberately adopted a supreme maxim that gives priority to non-moral reasons. Whereas cases of moral weakness always involve failing to perform an obligatory action, and cases of impurity are described as cases where the agent fulfills the 'letter' of the moral law and so does the obligatory action, wickedness may or may not involve violations of one's moral obligations. The sort of person who fits Kant's characterization here is someone who: (i) recognizes moral requirements, (ii) not only fails to allow such requirements to have sufficient motivational force, since as Kant says, "in this case no attention whatever is paid to the motivating forces in the maxim,"23 but also (iii) in so denying them their proper motivational role, the agent is committed in a principled way to pursuing non-moral ends, regardless of how they might conflict with moral ends. Making pursuit of non-moral ends a matter of principle is a matter of having adopted a very general maxim that, as Kant would say, deliberately reverses the proper order of the two basic sorts of reasons for action. Kant makes two other claims about wickedness. First, he thinks that wickedness is somehow morally worse than the other two forms. For instance, he claims that as a result of moral evil (represented as something freely chosen), we have a kind of innate guilt of two sorts: "this guilt may be judged in its first two stages (those of frailty and impurity) to be unintentional guilt (culpa), but in the third to be deliberate guilt (dolus) and to display in its character a certain insidiousness of the human heart (dolus malus)."24 Second, he claims that the wicked person engages in self-deception "in regard to its own good and evil dispositions, and, if only its conduct has not evil consequences . . . does not trouble itself about its disposition, but rather considers it justified before the law."25 How can this 'high octane' form of moral evil be represented as both irrational and imputable? And how can we explain the insidious nature of wickedness that sets it apart from the other two forms? Moreover, how is self-deception involved in prototypical ly wicked behavior and character? In order to answer these questions, we should note that from what Kant says about wickedness, the wicked person is apparently someone for whom there is a principled failure of moral reasons to have motivational dominance because that person fails to properly represent the rational authority of moral considerations. That is, the wicked person Kant seems to have in mind fails to rank the reasons for action associated with moral requirements over non-moral reasons.26 23 Ibid., VI: 38, 33. 24 Ibid., VI: 38, 33. 25 Ibid., VI: 38, 33. 2« Actually, in Kant there seem to be at least two cases of moral wickedness to sort out. In addition to the case just described where a perverse value judgment is at the Evil and Imputation in Kant's Ethics 1 3 1 If this is right, then there is a double sense in which the wicked person is irrational. First, and most obviously, one violates the principle of autonomy as a principle of rational maxim revision in having adopted a maxim that gives practical priority to non-moral reasons for action. Again, this character defect can be imputed to agents since it is represented as something one chooses - a maxim one adopts. Moreover, as we have seen in connection with weakness and impurity, this sort of irrationality is the basis of evil in a person's character. But secondly, in misrepresenting the proper authority of reasons stemming from moral requirements, one is violating a principle of reflection. Recall that principles of reflection govern the rationality of the first phase of practical thinking in which one does such things as consider alternative actions, balance and weigh reasons for various courses of action, and so forth. Moral requirements are overriding reasons for action, and failure to accord them that status in one's practical thinking is in violation of a rule of reflection - a rule in effect requiring that one properly represent to oneself the various weights attaching to those considerations bearing on thought and action. Indeed, this kind of irrationality associated with wickedness is what seems to set this form of evil apart from the other two. That is, whereas in cases of weakness and impurity, the agent at least correctly represents to herself the importance or rational weight attaching to moral considerations vis a vis other, non-moral considerations, the wicked agent fails to properly represent to herself the importance of moral considerations. In short, the wicked agent's choices are based on a perverted value judgment. One likely explanation for this perverted value judgment is self-deception. Since, for Kant, the dictates of morality are experienced as categorical requirements, and indeed are naturally experienced by all agents in this way, it is only through something like self-deception, where one somehow gets oneself to believe that moral requirements do not have overriding authority, that one can end up misrepresenting the true authority of these requirements. Importantly, there are places, particularly in the Grundlegung, where Kant mentions the rational authority of moral requirements and the self-deceptive ploy of "juggling with conscience or with other claims as to what is to be called right, or in trying to determine bottom of one's evil disposition, there is the case of moral negligence, where the agent fails to recognize her duty to discharge moral obligations from the motive of duty. The morally negligent person, as I am calling her, may well properly rank moral requirements (requirements featured in common duties to ourselves and others) above non-moral ones, and she may even be disposed to give motivational dominance to moral reasons (perhaps she is moved by a strong sense of sympathy toward others). Her problem is that she fails (perhaps through self-deception) to recognize what Kant claims is the most basic duty regarding one's motivation - to make the moral law the sole and sufficient motive of dutiful action. This case of moral negligence falls under my generic description of wickedness, and some of Kant's remarks in the Religion VI: 38, 33 suggest that this sort of failure is a form of wickedness, though it obviously differs from the case I'm describing in the text. 132 Mark Timmons honestly for its own instruction the value of various actions. . . ,"27 A paragraph later, Kant writes: Man feels in himself a powerful counterweight to all the commands of duty presented to him by reasons as so worthy of esteem - the counterweight of his needs and inclinations, whose total satisfaction he grasps under the name of 'happiness'. But, reason, without promising anything to inclination, enjoins its commands relentlessly, and therefore, so to speak, with disregard and neglect of these turbulent and seemingly equitable claims (which refuse to be suppressed by any command). From this there arises a natural dialectic - that is, a disposition to quibble with these strict laws of duty, to throw doubt on their validity or at least on their purity and strictness. . . ,28 Calling into question the authoritativeness (validity) of moral requirements through a process of 'quibbling' with that authority presumably leads, if one is a good enough quibbler, to the sort of perverse value judgment that I claim is at the root of the Kantian conception of wickedness.29 We can sum up this discussion of the three degrees of moral evil by considering how these character traits - frailty, impurity, and wickedness - involve a lack of moral commitment. The morally frail or weak person is someone whose motivating reasons for action are not in accord with her judgments about the authority of moral requirements: consideration of one's moral requirements which one recognizes provide the best reason for action, fails to have motivational dominance over competing, non-moral reasons. Impurity involves a different sort of lack of commitment: one's commitment to perform one's duty does not stem exclusively from moral considerations; one allows non-moral reasons to function as motivating reasons for complying with the demands of duty. Finally, wickedness involves a principled lack of motivational dominance: one not only fails to give motivational dominance to moral requirements, but this failure is based on a value judgment, viz., the judgment that moral requirements are less important than non-moral ones. The fact that this sort of evil involves a perverse value judgment at its root explains why being wicked is to be in a morally worse state than being either weak or impure. In each case, however, there is a failure of moral requirements to have motivational dominance or, put another way, in each such case, one fails to have as one's supreme maxim the maxim of doing one's duty for the sake of duty alone. This failure is what constitutes moral evil and is that in virtue of which each of the three degrees of evil are evil. 27 Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten IV: 404, 72. 28 Ibid., IV: 405, 73. 29 In the Grundlegung at 424, 92, Kant claims that this natural dialectic (mentioned in the passage just quoted) often has the result that we "permit ourselves a few exceptions which are, as we pretend, inconsiderable and apparently forced on us." (My emphasis.) Evil and Imputation in Kant's Ethics IV. The Nature of Good and Evil Disposition 133 Given the discussion in the previous section, we can define the Kantian notions of good and evil disposition (Gesinnung). Quite simply, to have a good disposition involves having adopted, as one's supreme maxim, the maxim of doing one's duty for the sake of duty (on the relevant occasions) and consequently having a standing commitment to moral concerns that outweighs other, competing nonmoral concerns. Moreover, according to Kant, "Virtue . . . [is] the firmly grounded disposition strictly to fulfil our duty . . ."30 and so this sort of standing moral commitment is the defining characteristic of the morally virtuous person. And, of course, since the possession of one's disposition (good or evil) is imputed to the agent, the notions of a good disposition and good will (as that notion is featured in chapter I of the Grundlegung) are the same. Given Kant's character rigorism, the essence of an evil disposition then, involves a failure to have adopted the moral supreme maxim. A person with an evil disposition lacks a virtuous character. Kant claims that there are two types of non-virtuous character: those persons who merely lack virtue and those whose failure is principled and hence morally vicious. Persons merely lacking in moral virtue exhibit a kind of weakness which, Kant says "is not so much vice (vitium) as rather mere want of virtue, lack of moral strength (defectus moralis) . . . It is when an intentional transgression has become a principle that it is properly called a vice (vituim)."^ Thus, persons merely lacking in moral virtue exhibit moral weakness and / or moral impurity; morally vicious persons are wicked. Though there is some controversy about how to understand Kant's notion of radical evil (see section VI), this notion would seem to be equivalent to the notions of evil disposition and lack of virtue just described. In the Religion, book I, Kant describes radical evil as ^propensity to adopt evil maxims. This propensity, Kant claims, "must in the end be sought in the will (Willkur) which is free, and therefore be imputed, . . . [and so] is morally evil."32 Hence, it must be a maxim, and since it is the "ultimate ground of the adoption or the observance of our maxims,"33 this propensity is one's supreme maxim. Kant describes the nature of this propensity as follows: Hence the distinction between a good man and one who is evil cannot lie in the difference between the incentives which they adopt into their maxim (not in the content of the maxim), but rather must depend upon the subordination (the form of the maxim), i. e., which of the two incentives he makes the condition of the other. Consequently man (even the best) is evil in that he reverses the moral order of the incentives when he adopts them into his maxim. He adopts, indeed, the moral law 30 Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft VI: 23, 19n. 31 Die Metaphysik der Sitten VI: 390, 194. 32 Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft VI: 31, 26. .« Ibid., VI: 32, 27. 134 Mark Timmons along with the law of self-love; yet when he becomes aware that they cannot remain on a par with each other but that one must be subordinated to the other as its supreme condition, he makes the incentive of self-love and its inclinations the condition of obedience to the law; whereas on the contrary, the latter, ought to have been adopted into the universal maxim of the will (Willkur) as the sole incentive.34 Thus, if my analysis is correct, the concepts of a good disposition, a good will, and a virtuous character are equivalent, as are the concepts of an evil disposition, an evil will, a character that lacks moral worth, and one who is possessed of a radically evil will. In a few places, Kant claims that having an evil disposition "may coexist with a will which in general is good,"35 and in the above quote he allows that "even the best" man may still be evil. This claim may seem to conflict with equating a good will with good disposition, given Kant's character rigorism. But in the Grundlegung, the good will that has unconditioned, absolute worth is a will that has a firmly fixed disposition to do duty for duty's sake, what he calls an 'absolutely' good will. And again, in the Religion Kant defines a good person as one who has "the law as it sole and sufficient incentive . . . always.36 A will that is in general good, is not absolutely good precisely because the agent allows occasional "moral holidays." V. Radical Evil and Moral Worth Moral worth is something possessed both by individuals (qua moral agents) and their actions. The moral worth of the individual is determined by that individual's supreme maxim. So, for instance, in the Religion, Kant considers the person whose actions may conform to the letter of the moral law, though they are not done from duty, and writes: "The maxim, then, in terms of whose goodness all moral worth of the individual must be appraised, is thus contrary to the law, and the man, despite all his good deeds, is nevertheless evil."37 The more interesting (and controversial) question about moral worth concerns actions. In the Grundlegung, the moral worth of an action is a matter of its having been performed from the sole motive of duty. Now Kant claims that an evil disposition "corrupts the ground of all maxims," which, given that this sort of disposition is the foundation or ground of all others (it represents the terminus in a rationalizing explanation) means that this disposition (the ground) is corrupt. But it may appear as if Kant is also denying that the actions flowing from such 34 Ibid., VI: 36, 31-32. 35 Ibid., VI: 37, 32; cf: 30, 25. 36 Ibid., VI: 30, 25. 37 Ibid., VI: 31, 26. Evil and Imputation in Kant's Ethics 135 a corrupt or evil will can ever have any moral worth.38 After all, if the moral worth of one's maxim (and the action that flows from it) depends on the kind of motivating reasons that stand behind the adoption of one's maxim, and thus, depends ultimately on one's disposition, then whatever moral quality attaches to one's disposition will be inherited, so to speak, by the maxim in question. Kant, after all, is both a character rigorist and an action rigorist.39 Thus, it seems to follow that if one has an evil disposition, then all of the maxims one adopts (and actions that flow from it) will be evil, hence not good and so lacking in moral worth. So the argument might go. However, if we characterize having an evil disposition as I have, then it becomes clear how, despite having such a disposition, we may still be capable of performing actions that have moral worth. Lack of a good disposition entails, given Kant's rigorism about character, possession of an evil one. Having an evil disposition is a matter of not having a proper orientation of one's reasons for action: one fails to have a fixed supreme maxim of giving motivational dominance to moral requirements. But such a failing does not entail that one has positively reversed, as a matter of fixed principle, the proper ordering of one's reasons for action; wickedness, that is, is not the only form an evil disposition can take. One might be morally committed to some degree (unlike the wicked person), and even, on occasion, perform some dutiful action because, and only because, it is one's duty, yet one still might, from time to time experience bouts of moral weakness. Of course, someone who was chronically weak of will and was never able to summon the moral effort required to overcome competing, non-moral reasons in the face of duty, would not perform morally worthy actions, since that person would chronically fail to do her duty. But one's moral weakness need not be so extreme. Again, a person can, on occasion, fail to make moral reasons the sufficient motivating reasons for action, and so only conform her action to duty in case she finds non-moral reasons sufficient to motivate her to perform that action. Failure to have adopted a fixed supreme maxim that makes moral requirements sufficient for action is to have an evil disposition. But this does not mean that, on occasion, one might not summon the moral strength to conform to duty for duty's sake without the help of non-moral motivating reasons. 38 In his, "Good and Evil Disposition," Kant-Studien 76, 1985, pp. 288-, Daniel O'Connor writes: "And the disposition (if evil) destroys the worth even of his good acts, showing them to be merely 'legal' not 'virtuous'," p. 293. O'Connor holds that Kant's character rigorism, together with fact that an agent's character is good or evil, entails that actions flowing from that person's character have the same moral quality (good or evil) as her character. Emil Frankenheim ("Kant and Radical Evil," University of Toronto Quarterly 23, 1954, pp. 339-353) on the other hand, writes: "Thus, the motive behind an individual action may be respect for duty; and it may yet flow from an over-all maxim which includes the deviation from duty on other occasions," p. 349. I side with Frankenheim. 39 See Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft VI: 22, 18. 136 Mark Timmons What is not possible, on Kant's view, is for someone to have a wicked disposition, and hence a principled devotion to non-moral aims, and yet on any occasion perform an action from the motive of duty. The actions of wicked individuals can never be morally worthy. VI. The Universality Thesis According to the Universality Thesis (UT), all human beings suffer from the sort of defect in character that Kant refers to as radical evil. As Kant says, "the propensity to evil in mankind is universal, or what comes to the same thing, . . . it is woven into human nature."40 Hence this thesis is one of strict universality; a necessary truth, knowable a priori. Kant claims that the thesis is not true in virtue of the concept of humanity, that is, it is not, in Kant's mind, an analytic truth; so it must be synthetic. And, of course, this means that it is a synthetic a priori statement requiring a special 'deduction.' However, Kant's apparent defense of UT simply appeals to empirical evidence: "That such a corrupt propensity must indeed be rooted in man need not be formally proved in view of the multitude of crying examples which experience of the actions of men puts before our eyes."41 Perhaps Kant thought that given his audience, he did not need to provide a deduction of the UT, and that a few examples would suffice.42 If the UT is'supposed to be synthetic a priori, we do not find an explicit deduction of it anywhere in Kant's writings. However, Allison attempts to provide the needed, missing argument on Kant's behalf. He writes: The key to this deduction is the impossibility of attributing a propensity to good to finite, sensuously affected agents, such as ourselves (either to the race as a whole or to particular individuals). This impossibility, together with rigorism, entails the necessity of attributing a universal propensity to evil to agents relevantly like ourselves. And since, as we shall see, the impossibility at issue is not logical, (the notion of a propensity to good is not self-contradictory for Kant), the conclusion has synthetic a priori status.43 As I reconstruct Allison's deduction, the main steps are these. First, Allison provides a definition of a propensity to good, and an argument for the claim that human beings are not capable of a such a propensity. Second, this argument serves to defend a crucial premise in Allison's master argument described in the to Ibid., VI: 30, 25. 41 Ibid., VI: 32-33, 28. 42 Though two paragraphs after the one containing the quote just mentioned, Kant writes: "But even if the existence of this propensity to evil in human nature can be demonstrated by experiential proofs of the real opposition, in time, of man's will (Willkur) to the law, such proofs do not teach us the essential character of that propensity or the ground of this opposition." Ibid., VI: 35, 30-31. 43 Allison (op. cit. fn. 2), p. 155. Evil and Imputation in Kant's Ethics 137 above passage: from the impossibility of human beings possessing a propensity to good, together with Kant's rigoristic thesis about character, viz., that a person's Gesinnung is either good or evil, to the conclusion that human beings are necessarily evil. Crucial to Allison's deduction is his supporting argument for the claim that human beings are incapable of a propensity to good. The impossibility here concerns the fact that human beings are susceptible to moral requirements. It will be helpful to make this argument (and the master argument) explicit. Allison characterizes the sort of goodness in question this way: [A] propensity to good would consist in a kind of spontaneous preference for the impersonal requirements of morality over one's own needs as a rational animal with a built-in desire for happiness. . . for such an agent, the moral incentive would, as a matter of course, always outweigh the incentive of self-love. Consequently, for an agent blessed with such a propensity, there would be no temptation to adopt maxims that run counter to the law and, therefore, no thought of the law as constraining. Within the Kantian framework, this means that the law would not take the form of an imperative and moral requirements would not be viewed as duties.44 From this passage, we can extract a definition of a propensity to good: (G) An agent has a propensity to good =df: that agent has a spontaneous preference for moral requirements; i. e., lacks a susceptibility to temptation to be motivated by considerations of self-love. So the crucial supporting argument for Allison's master argument can be spelled out as follows: 1. Necessarily, for any finite rational agent, such agents have duties. 2. A duty (by definition) is an action to which we are obligated and thus (by definition) one that we are practically necessitated (constrained) to perform. Therefore (from 1 and 2): 3. Necessarily, for any finite rational agent, such agents are practically necessitated to perform certain actions. 4. An agent is practically necessitated to perform an action only if she is susceptible to temptation (to act from non-moral motives). (This is a conceptual claim about the very notion of practical necessitation.) Therefore (from 3 and 4): 5. Necessarily, for any finite agent, she is susceptible to temptation to transgress duty out of self-love (from non-moral motives). Premise (1) is a synthetic a priori proposition - in fact it is the proposition that Kant attempts to demonstrate in Groundwork III.45 Premises (2) and (4) are 44 Ibid., 155. 45 For a detailed discussion of this claim see Mark Timmons, "Necessitation and Justification in Kant's Ethics," Canadian Journal of Philosophy 22, 1992, pp. 377-398. 138 Mark Timmons analytic, and since the conclusion follows from (1) and the other analytic premises, the conclusion is synthetic a priori. The master argument now proceeds as follows: 5. Necessarily, for any finite agent, she is susceptible to temptation to transgress duty out of self-love (from non-moral motives). 6. For any agent who is susceptible to temptation to transgress duty, that agent lacks a propensity to good. (From the definition of propensity to good.) 7. Either a person is good or evil (i. e., either a person's will is characterized by a propensity to good or by a propensity to evil). (Kant's rigorism.) Therefore (from 5-7): 8. Necessarily, all finite agents (all human beings) have a propensity to evil. This deduction, of course, is meant to show that human beings do not, by nature, have a good disposition, therefore, (given Kant's rigorism) they must have an evil disposition by nature. But given Allison's definition of a propensity to good, what this deduction shows (and all it shows) is that human beings are not holy beings. "For finite holy beings (who could never be tempted to violate duty) there would be no doctrine of virtue. . . . "46 But, showing this seems to fall short of showing that all human beings have an evil disposition, in the sense of lacking a proper orientation of the will (at least if my analysis of this notion is correct). That is, there is a gap between the claim that a human being has an ineliminable susceptibility to act from motives of self-love, and the claim that, as a matter of fact, that human beings, in contexts involving moral requirements, at least sometimes fail to act solely from the motive of duty (where, of course, the failure is imputable). The essence (the necessary and sufficient conditions) of an evil disposition or radical evil is the failure of moral motives to have motivational dominance. It is motivational dominance, or lack of it, that is involved in the so-called degrees of radical evil: frailty, impurity, and wickedness. Not only is one tempted to act from motives of self-love, but as a matter of fact, such motives have (at least some of the time) the sort of dominance that should be possessed only by moral motives. This point can be sharpened if we consider the notion of susceptibility to temptation. This notion (as it figures in Allison's deduction) involves essentially two components: (1) first, one freely takes non-moral considerations of self-love to be good reasons for action and thus is disposed to act for such reasons; and thus (2) one is at least capable of failing to give proper motivational dominance to moral requirements. But being capable of failing to give proper motivational dominance to moral requirements is one thing, and actually failing to do so (i. e., adopting as one's supreme maxim "occasional deviation" from the moral law is another. In fact, Allison calls attention to a parallel distinction in connection with Kant's conception of virtue: "Also central to Kant's conception of virtue Die Metaphysik der Sitten VI: 383, 188. Evil and Imputation in Kant's Ethics 1.W is the distinction between actual strength of character or self-control and the mere capacity (Vermogen) for it. The latter is possessed by all rational agents, no matter how weak or evil in virtue of their moral autonomy; the former must be acquired through a process of self-discipline."47 Just as capacity for virtue is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for virtue, so susceptibility to temptation is a necessary condition (one that holy wills lack) but not a sufficient condition for evil. Allison himself worries that since his deduction really only amounts to showing the human beings are not holy wills, Kant's UT thesis, which seems rather remarkable, is thereby trivialized. He writes: Clearly what is needed at this point in order to put some bite back into the doctrine that there is a universal propensity to evil is a reason, apart from the general principle of rigorism, for regarding the lack of a propensity to good as equivalent to, or at least as entailing, an actual propensity to evil. Fortunately, although Kant never spells out his position with sufficient clarity, the basis for an explanation is provided by the previous analysis. The essential point is that the very fact that we only obey the law reluctantly (ungern) indicates not merely a lack of holiness but also an actual propensity to subordinate moral considerations to our needs as sensuous beings, that is, a tendency to let ourselves be tempted or "induced" by inclination to violate the moral law even while recognizing its authority.48 This response (to the sort of worry I have been raising) trades on an ambiguity in talk about an actual propensity to subordinate moral considerations to our needs. Taken in one sense, having such a propensity seems equivalent to merely being susceptible to temptation, in which case, again, the UT thesis simply comes to the claim that humans are not holy. Taken in another sense, talk of an actual propensity is equivalent to having chosen the sort of supreme maxim that characterizes an evil will: a maxim in which the incentives of morality and self-love are not properly ordered. The problem is that the claim: (1) finite rational agents are necessarily susceptible to temptation does not entail the claim: (2) finite rational agents necessarily have adopted an evil supreme maxim (and hence are guilty of being radically evil). Moreover I see nothing in Allison or Kant to bridge this gap. In conclusion, Allison's deduction of the Kant's UT fails to show that all human beings are guilty of radical evil in any interesting sense of the term. This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that if Allison's argument is successful, then it is hard to see how we are responsible for our evil natures. It is intelligible 47 Allison (op. cit, fn. 2), p. 164. 48 Ibid., p. 157. It seems that Allison sometimes construes the notion of radical evil merely in terms of susceptibility to temptation (pp. 155ff, 159, 165, and 167), though at other times he seems to be construing radical evil much in the way I have as essentially involving the adoption by the agent of a certain sort of supreme maxim (pp. 147, 151, and 170). It is the first, weaker reading that is involved in Allison's deduction of the UT; the argument won't fly if one instead inserts the stronger reading of radical evil. 14(1 Mark Timmons to claim that we are responsible for whatever supreme maxim we have (though the claim is not entirely trouble free). However, it does not seem intelligible to claim that we are responsible for our susceptibility to temptation. Susceptibility to temptation and certain 'natural' characteristics like eye color seem to be on a par.49 But surely, any acceptable interpretation of Kant's doctrine must preserve Kant's claim that our evil nature can be imputed to us. Of course, underlying Allison's deduction is a reading of good and evil disposition that differs from the one I have proposed. Since Allison's deduction exploits Kant's character rigorism, talk of a propensity to good is being construed as equivalent to having a good disposition. Contrary to how the notions of good and evil disposition were characterized above, this means that having a good disposition is equivalent to being a holy will, and all other wills, even the person of virtuous character, possesses an evil disposition. I have already made my case for analyzing these notions differently. But the issue here really isn't about how exactly to construe Kant's notions of good and evil disposition (and related notions). However we construe them, Kant faces a dilemma. If one construes the notion of radical evil as Allison does, then we have a deduction of UT, but this the thesis so understood fails to show anything interesting and, in particular, severs the connection between radical evil and imputation. On the other hand, if one construes the notion of radical evil as I have, then Allison's deduction fails, since there is a gap between claiming that one is necessarily susceptible to temptation and the claim that one has adopted an evil supreme maxim.50 VII. Conclusion With some basic themes and distinctions pertaining to Kant's theory of action and practical reasoning on the table, we proceeded to explore in what sense morally evil actions are imputable, irrational, and evil. This provided a basis for an analysis of Kant's notion of radical evil and related notions (good and evil disposition), which we then employed in connection with questions about the relation between radical evil and moral worth. I argued that radical evil is 49 This analogy was suggested to me by Nelson Potter. 50 There is obviously much more to be said about Kant's doctrine of radical evil in general and the UT in particular. For instance, my discussion of Allison raises the question of just how the UT is to be understood. One interpretation is this: All human beings, qua human, are radically evil - an interpretation which apparently rules out the possibility of human beings ever being able to overcome (in this life) their evil natures. Another interpretation is this: All human beings are born into a state of radical evil - an interpretation that allows for the possibility that human beings can, in this life, overcome their evil natures. The former interpretation fits with Allison's story about radical evil, the latter fits with my own. For a more detailed investigation of these matters, see Mark Timmons, "Good Wills, Holy Wills, and Radical Evil," (manuscript in preparation). Evil and Imputation in Kant's Ethics 14! compatible with the possibility of performing actions having moral worth. Finally, we turned to Kant's infamous claim that all human beings are necessarily evil and considered Allison's attempt to provide the missing deduction of this thesis. I argued that Allison's deduction does not work and that this thesis remains problematic.51 Zusammenfassung FUr Kant manifestiert sich das moralisch Bose in alien seinen Varianten - das Bose namlich, das im Charakter einer Person wurzelt - in Handlungen, die auf der einen Seite vom eigenen Standpunkt des Handelnden her expliziert werden konnen und die deshalb zurechenbar sind, die aber auf der anderen Seite in einer gewissen Hinsicht als irrational bezeichnet werden miissen. Weil das Bose im Charakter der Person wurzelt, ,,verdirbt es den Grund aller Maximen" und verdient deshalb ,,das radikal Bose" genannt zu werden. Dariiber hinaus sind menschliche Wesen nach Kant nicht nur fur das Bose anfallig, es ist vielmehr unentrinnbar menschliches Schicksal, bose zu sein. Diese Thesen werfen eine Reihe von Fragen auf, unter ihnen die folgenden: (1) Wie laBt sich, Kants Auffassungen uber die Natur menschlichen Handelns vorausgesetzt, die Moglichkeit irrationalen, aber gleichwohl vom Standpunkt des Handelnden her explizierbaren und also freien Handelns erklaren? (2) Was ist das Wesen des radikal Bosen? (3) In welchem Sinne verdirbt es den Grund aller Maximen? (4) Warum behauptet Kant, das radikal Bose sei unentrinnbares Schicksal des Menschen? Der Beitrag ist diesen Fragen gewidmet. Er befafit sich zuerst mil einigen Grundfragen und Grundunterscheidungen von Kants Handlungstheorie und seiner Theorie der praktischen Vernunft (Abschnitte I und II). Das erlaubt uns, Kants Auffassungen iiber das moralisch Bose zu verstehen. Abschnitt III wendet sich Kants Analyse des moralisch Bosen in seinen verschiedenen Auspragungen zu, um auf dieser Grundlage eine allgemeine Charakterisierung des moralisch Bosen geben zu konnen (Abschnitt IV). Abschnitt V befaBt sich mit Kants Behauptung, das radikal Bose verderbe den Grund aller Maximen, und mit ihren Implikationen fur die Frage nach dem moralischen Wert von Handlungen uberhaupt. In Abschnitt VI geht es um das, was man ,,Kants Universalitatsthese" (UT) nennen kann, d.i. seine Behauptung, menschliche Wesen seien notwendigerweise radikal bose. In seinem jiingst erschienenen Werk iiber Kant's Theory of Freedom vertritt Henry Allison die Meinung, UT enthalte einen synthetischen Satz a priori, und er legt eine ,,Ableitung" von UT vor, was Kant nicht getan hat. Ich versuche zu zeigen, daB Allisons Ableitung nicht schliissig ist, obwohl ich - leider - keine eigene Deduktion anbieten kann, die Kants These stu'tzt, noch einen Weg sehe, Kants eigene Verteidigung von UT mit ihrem angeblich apriorischen Status in Ubereinstimmung zu bringen. Kants UT bleibt problematisch. 51 I wish to thank Nelson Potter for his comments on an earlier draft of this paper. " , • • • - • • ': ' -• 1M ' •iO I:-SMI Jahrbuch fur Recht und Ethik Annual Review of Law and Ethics Herausgegeben von B. Sharon Byrd • J o a c h i m H r u s c h k a • Jan C. Joerden Band 2 Jahrbuch fur Recht und Ethik Annual Review of Law and Ethics Band 2 (1994) Themenschwerpunkt: Zurechnung von Verhalten Imputation of Conduct Herausgegeben von B. Sharon Byrd Joachim Hruschka Jan C. Joerden Duncker & Humblot • Berlin Duncker & Humblot • Berlin

THEORIA 1 (2020) : 63 : str. 5-16 https://doi.org/10.2298/THEO2001005S Originalni naučni rad Original Scientific Paper Pavle Stojanović ON THE STATUS OF NATURAL DIVINATION IN STOICISM1 abstract: Cicero's De divinatione portrays the Stoics as unanimous in advocating both natural and technical divination. I argue that, contrary to this, the earlier leaders of the school like Chrysippus had reasons to consider natural divination to be sig- nificantly epistemically inferior to its technical counterpart. The much more favorable treatment of natural divination in De divinatione is likely the result of changes intro- duced later, probably by Posidonius. key words: Stoicism, divination, knowledge, Cicero, Chrysippus, Posidonius. Barring few notable exceptions-Xenophanes of Colophon, the Epicureans, the Academics under Arcesilaus and Carneades, and the Pyrrhonists-ancient philosophers generally thought that divination is a legitimate method of predicting future events based on divinely supplied signs. Starting with Plato (Phaed. 244a8-d5), it was not uncommon to distinguish between two kinds of divination. According to him, the former involves predicting future events while the diviner is in altered mental states such as dreaming, melancholy, mania, frenzy, etc. The latter is employed by the „clearheaded" (ἔμφρονες), who derive predictions from prolonged and repeated observation of signs such as bird movements, animal entrails, astronomical and meteorological phenomena, etc., and their connections with subsequent events. Among the philosophers who took divination seriously it appears that the former type was usually the preferred method. Plato himself, for instance, held that divination based on divinely inspired mania (μανία) is more perfect and more admirable than the one based on empirical observations because its predictive power results from the immediate divine 1 Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the conference „Nature and the Divine in Ancient Greek Thought" organized by the Interdisciplinary Center for Hellenic Studies, University of South Florida, in March 2018, and at the 18th Annual Independent Meeting of the Ancient Philosophy Society held at Emory University in April 2018. I am thankful for the many thoughtful and useful comments received from the participants. On the status of natural divination in stoicism6 influence on the diviner's soul that is made possible by its being in an altered state (Phaedr. 244d2). For similar reasons, the Peripatetics like Dicaearchus and Cratippus even completely rejected observation-based divinatory methods and accepted only those based on dreams and frenzy (Aet. 5.1 = Ps.-Plut. Plac. 904E; Cic. Div. 1.5). Extant sources on the Stoic theory of divination-which except for Cicero's De divinatione are sadly very sparse-report that, after Zeno and his immediate successor Cleanthes laid the basic theoretical foundations, a number of prominent members of the school wrote books on divination, including Sphaerus, Chrysippus, Diogenes of Babylon, Antipater of Tarsus, Posidonius of Apamea, and Athenodorus.2 Evidence suggest that divination as a method of predicting future events was firmly rooted in Stoic metaphysics, according to which the cosmos is ordered, rational, divine, and benevolent. One of the key metaphysical doctrines in this context was that all events are fully predetermined by antecedent causes (Plut. Fat. 574D; Alex. Aphr. Fat. 202,2). The Stoics called this all-encompassing cosmic chain of causes „fate" (εἱμαρμένη) and, in accordance with their view that everything in the cosmos is imbued by divine reason (λόγος), they held that fate itself is divine, rational, and providential.3 They argued that divination (μαντική) exists based on the existence of fate and providence (πρόνοια), that is, because all events, including those that will occur in the future, are fully causally determined by the divine cosmic order.4 In fact, according to Cicero, who preserves the most detailed version of this argument, the Stoics held that divination exists because gods, who possess the knowledge of the providentially ordered fate and who love and care for us and our well-being, provide us with the signs of future events as well as with the ability to understand these signs (Div. 1.82-3; 2.101-2). Similarly to Plato, the character Quintus, who in Cicero's dialogue De divinatione is defending divination by relying partially on the Stoic position received from Posidonius and partially on the Peripatetic Cratippus,5 also divides divination into two kinds, which he calls „natural" (naturalis) and „artificial" (artificiosa), respectively: [T1:] Namely, there are two kinds of divining, the one dependent on art, and the other on nature. What people or what state is there that is not affected by the prediction of those who examine animal entrails or interpret warning signs and lightning or of augurs or as2 Cic. Div. 1.6; DL 7.149, 7.178. 3 DL 7.142-3; 7.149; Hippolytus Haer. 1.21.1; Aet. 1.27.5 = Stob. 1.5.17-20 W; Alex. Aphr. Mixt. 227,5-10; DL 7.138; Cic. ND 2.57-8; Div. 1.125-8. 4 DL 7.149; Diogenianus apud Euseb. Pr. ev. 4.3.2. 5 It is extremely difficult to discern precisely which views in Quintus' exposition come from Cratippus, which from Posidonius, and which from the earlier Stoics, and this is notoriously a major problem of De divinatione as a source; the literature on this issue is vast, but a good recent survey is provided by Wardle (2006: 31-36). Pavle Stojanović 7 trologers or lots (for these entirely depend on art), or by dreams or prophecies (for these are the two classified as natural)? I definitely think that it is necessary to investigate the outcomes of these practices rather than their causes. For there is certain power and natural force that announces the future both through signs observed over a long time, as well as through some kind of divine instinct and inspiration. (Div. 1.11-12) This and other passages in the dialogue suggest that the Stoics held that artificial divination relies on theorems and conjectures, which are primarily based on long-term repeated empirical observation of signs (bird movements, animal entrails, astronomical and meteorological phenomena, etc.), and their correlation with subsequent events. On the other hand, natural diviners predict the future not through reasoning and conjecture, but by relying on the signs received while their mind is either dreaming or in prophetic frenzy as in the case of oracles, which are mental states that make the soul susceptible to divine inspiration.6 The evidence seems to imply that artificial and natural divination can be distinguished from each other in three important ways. The first difference is related to the mental states involved-artificial divination occurs while the diviners are awake, sane, and sense-perceptive, natural requires them to be temporarily deranged or sleeping. The second is that artificial divination, as its very name indicates, is an art (ars), a body of systematic knowledge and practice, while its natural counterpart is „devoid of art" (carere arte, Cic. Div. 1.34, 70). A Greek source confirms this by reporting that for the former kind of divination the Stoics used the label „technical" (τεχνικόν), and for the latter „nontechnical" (ἄτεχνον) and „unteachable" (ἀδίδακτον).7 This suggests that, unlike artificial divination, the predictions of natural divination involve no reasoning or conjecture. The clue as to why and how this is so is perhaps provided by the final difference. Namely, it seems that, unlike in the case of artificial diviners, who always grasp future events indirectly through interpreting divine signs, in natural divination the future event either directly appears or is explicitly communicated to the diviner by someone in a dream or vision.8 For instance, Cicero says that natural diviners „cer6 Cf. Cic. Div. 1.34, 70-72, 109-110, 127-128 (= T2 below); 2.26-27. 7 Ps.-Plut. Vit. Hom. 2.212 (lines 2592-7). The time of the composition of the text is uncertain; Keaney and Lamberton, who also provide the latest English translation, argue for the late second or early third century C.E. (Keaney & Lamberton 1996: 7-10). If this is correct, then it is chronologically possible that the author was familiar with and perhaps even influenced by Cicero's account of the Stoic theory of divination, as it has been suggested by Wynne (2019: 203, n 30). However, the text does seem to contain bits of information that has no clear parallel in Cicero (e.g. natural divination being ἀδίδακτον, or classification of divinatory signs as ὄττα), which indicates that it may be coming from a source independent from Cicero. 8 For scholars who also take direct representation of future events to be a key feature of natural divination, see e.g. Allen (2001: 168) and Wynne (2019: 204-207); cf. Wardle (2006: 126). On the status of natural divination in stoicism8 tainly see those things they proclaim while prophesizing" (cernunt illa profecto quae vaticinantes pronuntiant, Div. 1.114). The same is suggested by a section in De divi- natione that is apparently inspired by Posidonius: [T2:] For those things which will be do not suddenly come into being, but, like the uncoiling of a rope, the passage of time creates nothing new and only unfolds what was previously there. Both those who have the gift of natural divination as well as those for whom the course of events is known through observation discern this. Though the latter do not see the causes themselves, they still see the signs and marks of these causes; by applying to them memory, diligence, and the records of predecessors, the kind of divination that is called artificial is created, related to entrails, lightnings, portents, and heavenly signs. It is, therefore, not surprising that those things that exist nowhere are foreseen by diviners; all things exist, but are distant in time. As the seeds contain the power of those things that are produced from these seeds, so in causes are stored future things, whose coming the soul sees either when excited or set free in sleep, or reason foresees by conjecture. (Cic. Div. 1.127-128) According to this, Posidonius held that natural diviners „see" (cernunt) future events directly, while artificial diviners do not see the events themselves, but only see the signs (signa) and marks (notae) of them (cf. also Div. 2.47).9 This suggests that Posidonius believed that, while our souls are temporarily deranged or dreaming, they have some kind of special ability that gives them direct cognitive access to future events. Posidonius was not the only Stoic who wrote about natural divination. Cicero reports that Chrysippus, in addition to the general work On Divination, also wrote two shorter pieces On Dreams and On Oracles, which were apparently collections of numerous examples of concrete predictions of natural divination.10 Furthermore, Antipater too collected divinatory dreams, as well as the prophecies that Socrates famously received from his δαιμόνιον.11 All this seems to be consistent with the picture 9 While the text talks about causes (causae) and not about events (eventa), in this context we can take the former to refer to the latter because the Stoic theory of fate implies that every event that happens is caused by a previous event and itself is a cause to a future event. 10 Cic. Div. 1.6, 1.37, 1.39, 2.115, 2.134, 2.144. The title of Chrysippus' two-book work Περὶ μαντικῆς is attested in Diogenes Laertius (7.149) and Περὶ χρησμῶν in Photius (s.v. Νεοττός, Lex. nu 296), while the title of his work on divinatory dreams is attested only in Cicero, Div. 2.134. 11 Div. 1.39, 1.122-3, 2.144. According to Plato, from the early age Socrates started hearing a voice in his head occasionally warning him not to do certain things (Apol. 31d1-4). It is not entirely clear, however, why these instructions should count as instances of natural divination as Cicero portrays it. Perhaps each time Socrates heard the voice he would very briefly fall into some sort of altered mental state (cf. Plut. De gen. Soc. 580E), or perhaps it is because these divine instructions were explicit and required no technical interpretation. Pavle Stojanović 9 painted by Cicero, who in De divinatione portrays the Stoics in no uncertain terms as unanimous in advocating both artificial and natural divination equally. There is, however, a serious complication with this picture, or so at least I shall argue. In order to see how the complication arises, let us begin by examining closely one of the Stoic definitions of divination embedded in the following report by Stobaeus: [T3:] For they deem divination to be theoretical knowledge of signs related to human life that extend from gods and spirits.12 Despite its brevity, the definition provides two very valuable insights. First, divination is a discipline that constitutes-or at least can and ideally should constitute- knowledge (ἐπιστήμη). The Stoics had a peculiar and rather strict view on knowledge. They thought that its foundation is a special sort of representational mental state, which they called the „apprehensive appearance" (καταληπτική φαντασία). They defined the latter as an appearance that is ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος καὶ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ ὑπάρχον ἐναπομεμαγμένη καὶ ἐναπεσφραγισμένη, ὁποία οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἀπὸ μὴ ὑπάρχοντος (SE M 7.248, cited in T4 below; cf. also M 7.402, 410, 426; PH 2.4; DL 7.50). As I have argued in detail elsewhere, this means that the apprehensive appearance is „from what is present, and molded and sealed in accordance with that present [thing] itself, such that it would not come about from what is not present", or in other words, that it is caused by something that is spatiotemporally present for the person having the appearance, and depicts that present thing truthfully and reliably (Stojanović 2019). The Stoics further held that if we give our „assent" (συγκατάθεσις) to an apprehensive appearance of something, we achieve „apprehension" (κατάληψις), an accurate and secure grasp of that thing (SE M 7.153). If our assent is exceptionally firm and stable, then the instance of apprehension counts as knowledge. This special firmness and stability of assent results not so much from the power of each individual instance of apprehension, as from many apprehensions that have coalesced into a coherent system (Stob. 2.73,22-24 W). On the other hand, weakly assenting to apprehensive appearances as well as assenting to nonapprehensive appearances is classified as „opinion" (δόξα, SE M 7.151). According to the Stoics, having apprehensions is relatively common, but knowledge is rare and is achieved only when one becomes a Sage, the paradigm of epistemic and moral perfection. Consequently, they held that only a Sage is a good diviner, since only he possesses divinatory knowledge (Stob. 2.67,13-16 W; Cic. Div. 2.129). 12 εἶναι δὲ τὴν μαντικήν φασιν ἐπιστήμην θεωρητικὴν σημείων τῶν ἀπὸ θεῶν ἢ δαιμόνων πρὸς ἀνθρώπινον βίον συντεινόντων, Stob. 2.67,16-19 W; cf. also Stob. 114,16-18 W and SE M 9.132. This definition of divination was either coined or at least endorsed by Chrysippus because an independent source, Diogenianus (in Euseb. Pr. ev. 4.3.3), confirms that Chrysippus held that divination constitutes ἐπιστήμη. On the status of natural divination in stoicism10 Second, according to T3 above, the subject of divinatory knowledge are „signs" (σημεῖα) sent by the gods and spirits. The Stoics' theory of signs is crucial for understanding the ability of divination to predict the future. They shared the view, relatively common at the time, that there are two general ways of discovering the truth, either by grasping things that are „obvious" (πρόδηλα) directly through perception and (noninferential) thought, or by grasping things that are „hidden" (ἄδηλα) indirectly through inference from signs (SE PH 2.97-9; M 8.144). For example, the fact that it is day now we grasp immediately through sense perception, but that fire is burning in the distance we grasp indirectly through observing that smoke is rising, since the latter is the sign of the former. Many details of the Stoic theory of signs are unclear, mostly because our knowledge of it almost exclusively depends on Sextus Empiricus whose discussion is tainted by his own skeptical agenda.13 Nevertheless, it is possible to say with relative certainty that for the Stoics one of the defining characteristics of a sign is its ability to „uncover" (ἐκκαλύπτειν) or „reveal" (ἐνδείκνυσθαι) the hidden thing it signifies.14 It is precisely in virtue of this revelatory ability that signs, which are by definition directly accessible to us, can transfer apprehension (κατάληψις), as it were, to the thing signified, which not directly cognitively accessible to us.15 The definition in T3 above thus entails that divination is a predictive method that relies on divine signs, which are obvious and grasped through apprehensive appearances, to achieve apprehension and eventually knowledge of future events, which although initially hidden are revealed by these signs.16 This characterization, however, gives rise to two problems related to natural divination that do not apply to its artificial counterpart. First, our sources unanimously report that the Stoics consistently claimed that appearances received while the subject is in an altered mental state are not capable 13 Cf. Allen (2001: 147-148). 14 It is not clear what this power to „uncover" or „reveal" precisely involved for the Stoics. Sextus sometimes suggests that it is a psychological process that simply recalls from our memory a representation of something that is not presently being perceived (cf. ἀνανέωσις or „renewal" in M 8.143, 152-153, 287). However, one problem with this approach is that it is difficult to see how a sign can help us recall something we have never previously perceived, as in the case of things that are „hidden by nature" (φύσει ἄδηλα, cf. SE PH 2.97-99; M 8.145-150). Furthermore, it seems the Stoics explicitly rejected mere recollection from memory as sufficient for uncovering (SE PH 2.141-142; M 8.307-309). This suggests a power that is much more epistemically robust, which perhaps amounted to the ability to produce and transfer apprehension; see below, n. 15. 15 Cf. M 8.253 where Sextus says that signs allow us to „create apprehension" (κατάληψιν ποιούμεθα) of hidden things through observing clear things. 16 Cf. Alexander of Aphrodisias Mantissa 179,16-18: „they [viz. the Stoics] grant both that divination exists and that it gives them cognition of the things which seem to be hidden from others" (διδόντες τε εἶναι μαντικὴν καὶ τῶν ἀδήλων δοκούντων εἶναι τοῖς ἄλλοις γνωστικὴν αὐτὴν τιθέμενοι); see also SE M 8.131. Pavle Stojanović 11 of being apprehensive, even when they happen to be true. Consider, for instance, the following section from one of the most detailed and comprehensive extant accounts of the Stoics' theory of the apprehensive appearance by Sextus Empiricus: [T4:] Among true [appearances] some are apprehensive and some are not; the not apprehensive ones are those that strike people in [a state of] affection. For countless phrenitics and melancholics draw an appearance that is true, yet not apprehensive but occurring in this way externally and by chance, hence they are often not confident about it and do not assent to it. The apprehensive [appearance] is one that is from what is present, and molded and sealed in accordance with that present thing itself, such that it would not come about from what is not present. [...] The first of these [requirements for an appearance to be apprehensive] is its coming about from what is present; for many appearances strike us from what is not present, as in the case of those who became mad, and these would not be apprehensive. (M 7.247-249) According to Sextus, the Stoics held that while appearances entertained by people suffering from an „affection" (πάθος) can sometimes be true, they can never be apprehensive. The affection in this context obviously refers to some sort of mental derangement, such as phrenitis (φρένιτις), melancholy (μελαγχολία), or mania (μανία), conditions that were commonly discussed in ancient medicine. The text suggests that the main epistemological concern regarding the appearances in question is that they are true merely by chance, probably since unlike the apprehensive appearance they are not caused by that which they represent, although they do represent that thing accurately. Namely, phrenitis, melancholia, and mania were conditions often characterized by vivid hallucinations, appearances that the Stoics called „empty" (διάκενος) because they are not caused by things that are actually present.17 Such appearances fail to meet the first among the three necessary requirements for apprehensiveness and cannot be apprehensive, which in turn entails that they cannot provide foundation for knowledge as defined by the Stoics. Since, as we saw above, natural diviners rely precisely on „empty" appearances in predicting future events, it follows that this form of divination can never constitute knowledge, which obviously contradicts the requirement established in T3 above that divination should at least in principle be able to achieve the status of knowledge.18 In fact, this precisely may have been what prompted the Stoics to distinguish 17 Galen Diff. symp. VII.60-1; Loc. aff. VII.225-8. For the Stoic use of διάκενος or κενή in reference to φαντασία, see SE M 8.67 and P.Berol. inv. 16545 (reconstructed in Backhouse 2000), as well as Cicero's Latin translation visum inane in Acad. 2.47-54 and 88-90. Some Stoics including Chrysippus also used the expressions „empty drawing" (διάκενος ἑλκυσμός) and „imagination" (φανταστικόν) to refer to the same representational mental state (cf. SE M 7.2415 and especially Aetius 4.12 quoted as T5 and discussed below). 18 Interestingly, in the second book of De divinatione in which Cicero is laying down the case against divination, he uses this point in 2.126 to call Quintus out on doctrinary inconsistency. On the status of natural divination in stoicism12 technical from nontechnical divination. Namely, they defined „technique" (τέχνη) very similarly to the way they defined knowledge, as „a system of apprehensions organized towards a goal that is useful in life" (Olympiod. In Plat. Gorg. 12.1). Because of this, since natural divination relies on appearances that cannot be apprehensive, this predictive method is incapable of constituting a technique.19 The second problem is that some prominent Stoics may have harbored serious doubts regarding the ability of natural divination to „reveal" future events in the technical sense of the word. This is suggested by the following summary of Chrysippus' views preserved by Aetius: [T5:] [1] Chrysippus says that the following four [things] differ from each other. Appearance is an affection arising in the soul, revealing itself and that which has made it. For example, when through sight we observe the white [of an object], the affection is what is engendered in the soul through vision; and this affection enables us to say that there is something underlying white which activates us. And similarly for touch and smell. [2] Appearance gets its name from „light"; for just as light reveals itself as well as the other things encompassed in it, so too appearance reveals itself and that which has made it. [3] Apparent object is what makes the appearance; the white or the cold, or anything capable of activating the soul, is the apparent object. [4] Imagination is an empty drawing, an affection in the soul that comes from no apparent object, as in the case of people who fight with shadows and punch at thin air. For an appearance has some underlying apparent object, while imagination has none. [5] Phantasm is that which we draw in the imagination's empty drawing. It occurs in people who are melancholic and mad. At any rate, when Orestes in the tragedy says „Mother, I beg you, do not set upon me those bloody–looking, dragon–shaped girls! They, they are attacking me!", he says this as a madman, and sees no one, but merely thinks that he does. [6] That is why Electra says to him „Stay, poor wretch, peacefully in your bed; for you see none of those things you think you clearly know." And similarly Theoclymenus in Homer. (Aetius 4.12.1-6) Namely, if in his dispute with the Academics over the possibility of knowledge Chrysippus himself argued that appearances of those who are dreaming are untrustworthy and unreliable compared to those who are awake (cf. Cic. Acad. 2.87-88), how can the Stoics be in favor of divination from dreams? As I shall suggest below, I believe that this objection can be effectively raised only against the later Stoics like Posidonius (whose position on divination primarily is advocated by Quintus), since Chrysippus and the earlier Stoics accepted the epistemological inferiority of divination from dreams. 19 Here I disagree with Wynne (2019: 200-208), who argues that since Chrysippus believed that divination in general can constitute knowledge, natural divination too is capable of being knowledge, so the distinction between technical and nontechnical divination and classification of natural divination as nontechnical must be later developments. However, if Chrysippus thought that „empty" appearances of natural diviners cannot be apprehensive, as I think T4 and T5 strongly suggest, then one should expect him to hold precisely that natural divination can neither be a τέχνη nor ἐπιστήμη. Pavle Stojanović 13 According to this, for Chrysippus one of the key features of an appearance (φαντασία)-which in this context seems to refer specifically to one that is perceptual-is that it is a mental state produced by the „apparent object" (φανταστόν), that is, something external that has caused the appearance by activating our soul through its sense organs. In contrast, imagination (φανταστικόν) is characterized as „empty drawing" (διάκενος ἑλκυσμός), a mental state that arises without being caused by an external object. 20 This is why imagination is said to represent a „phantasm" (φάντασμα), an image produced by the soul itself, and not a φανταστόν, an external object that appears. Unlike the content of a perceptual appearance, the content of an imagination, therefore, is not causally connected to that which it represents, at least not immediately.21 Furthermore, presumably due its immediate causal connection with the object it represents, perceptual appearance has an important ability-it „reveals" (ἐνδείκνυται) this object. We have already mentioned the concept of „revealing" or „uncovering" above, in the context of the Stoics' view that while we have to rely on signs to reveal indirectly the things that are „hidden" (ἄδηλα), while we have direct cognitive access to things that are „obvious" (πρόδηλα). It seems that this type of direct access is made possible precisely by the ability of perceptual appearances to reveal the object that has caused it and its content that is discussed by Chrysippus in Aetius' summary above. The text, however, is resoundingly silent regarding the ability of imagination to „reveal" that which has caused its content, which is understandable given that imagination is not caused by the object it represents. This suggests that Chrysippus thought that imaginations lack the kind of ability to directly reveal things that perceptual appearances possess. Now, Aetius' summary continues by pointing out that imaginations or „empty drawings" are typically entertained by people who are melancholic and mad, which are precisely the mental conditions in which natural diviners characteristically make their predictions. Indeed, the allusion at the very end of the summary to Theoclymenus, whose case is meant to serve as an example of Chrysippean imagination, is itself an instance of natural divination. Theoclymenus is a prophet who plays the role of a supporting character in Homer's Odyssey, and the reference here is most likely to Od. 20.350-7 where, during the banquet attended by Penelope's rude and disrespectful suitors, Theoclymenus has a vision of them all bloodied and dead; several hours later the suitors are indeed all slaughtered by Odysseus and his entourage. If this example 20 For a more detailed discussion of this passage, as well as for specific reasons for translating διάκενος ἑλκυσμός in this passage as „empty drawing" rather than as „empty attraction" like other scholars, see Stojanović (forthcoming). 21 In some cases, of course, the content of imagination can be causally connected to the object it represents, e.g. when we are imagining a horse that is currently absent but that we had perceived earlier (cf. DL 7.61). But even then the external object is the distant cause, while the immediate or proximate cause is the soul itself. On the status of natural divination in stoicism14 indeed originates with Chrysippus, and there is no reason to doubt that it does, then it suggests that he may have had considerable reservations regarding the epistemological legitimacy of divinatory imaginations in respect to their ability to reveal future events directly as natural divination requires. Perhaps this explains why Chrysippus and Antipater's books on divinatory dreams included not only a record of large number of cases, but also interpretations in accordance with Antiphon's influential theory of dream interpretation (Cic. Div. 1.39; cf. also 2.144).22 This is significant because Cicero reports that interpretation of dreams (somniorum interpretatio), together with the interpretation of oracles and prophecies, was classified not under natural, but under artificial divination (Div. 1.116), probably because like other methods of technical divination it relied on prolonged observation and recording of signs received through dreams and mentally deranged states, and their relationship with the subsequent events (Div. 2.124, 146). The two problems outlined above in my view seriously bring into question Cicero's depiction of the Stoics as being unanimous in considering natural divination to be equally legitimate as its artificial counterpart. But if Cicero's portrayal is inaccurate, what was actually the status of natural divination in Stoicism? Regrettably, extant evidence is painfully inadequate to justify any definite and firm conclusions. Nevertheless, it may still be sufficient to support a developmental account, which would roughly go as follows. The earlier leaders of the school like Chrysippus (and perhaps also his immediate followers such as Antipater), as we have seen above, had good reasons to think that, due to the serious epistemic deficiencies of the mental states characteristically involved in their application, the methods of natural divination are substantially inferior to those of artificial divination and incapable of constituting a body of systematic predictive knowledge. Because of this, the division of divination into technical or artificial and nontechnical or natural was adopted by the school around the time of Chrysippus precisely to clarify that only the former should count as properly scientific, while the latter shouldn't. The fact that Chrysippus and Antipater collected prophecies and predictive dreams suggests that they probably held that divinatory imaginations can be a valuable and legitimate source of signs that are sent to us by gods and spirits, but that without being subjected to reasoning and conjecture that rely on empirical observation-and thus incorporated into a body of systematic technical knowledge-predictions made based on them are scientifically inadequate. Despite this, instead of completely banishing natural divination from the school, they tolerated it and treated it as a part of their general divinatory theory because of its ubiquity and practical usefulness. According to this account, the much more favorable view of 22 Antiphon's work on dream interpretation did not survive. Some extremely limited insight into its content is provided by a handful of extant fragments from other authors, which have been collected, translated and discussed in detail by Pendrick (2002). Pavle Stojanović 15 natural divination that Cicero attributes to the Stoics was probably the result of the changes introduced later, perhaps by Posidonius. Although it is often difficult to separate precisely the ideas of Posidonius from those originating in other sources of De divinatione, it clear that he had elaborate theoretical views on natural divination. Perhaps the most significant among these was his explanation of our ability to foresee the future while dreaming or temporarily deranged that was based on some kind of special power our soul has when it separated from the senses (Cic. Div. 1.63-64; 1.129-130). This explanation, which fits the Platonic and Peripatetic traditions much better than the orthodox Stoic psychology, could have been what led Posidonius to award to natural divination a status that was substantially more elevated than what the earlier members of his school were prepared to allow. Pavle Stojanović Bibliography Allen, James (2001). Inferences from Signs (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Beard, Mary (1986). „Cicero and Divination: The Formation of a Latin Discourse", Journal of Roman Studies 76: 33-46. Bobzien, Susanne (1998). Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Brittain, Charles (2011). „Posidonius' Theory of Predictive Dreams", Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 40: 213-236. Denyer, Nicholas (1985). „The Case Against Divination: An Examination of Cicero's De Divinatione", Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society, new series 31 (211): 1-10. Hankinson, Robert J. (1988). „Stoicism, Science and Divination", Apeiron 21: 123-60. Keaney, John J. and Lamberton, Robert (1996). [Plutarch] Essay on the Life and Poetry of Homer (Atlanta: Scholars Press). Lévy, Carlos (1997). „De Chrysippe à Posidonius: Variations stoïciennes sur le thème de la divination", in Jean-Georges Heintz (ed.), Oracles et prophéties dans l'antiquité (Paris: De Boccard): 321-43. Pease, Arthur Stanley (1920-23). M. Tulli Ciceronis. De Divinatione (Urbana: University of Illinois). Pendrick, Gerard (2002). Antiphon the Sophist: The Fragments (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Schofield, Malcolm (1986). „Cicero for and against Divination", Journal of Roman Studies 76: 47-65. Stojanović, Pavle (2019). „Zeno of Citium's Causal Theory of Apprehensive Appearances", Ancient Philosophy 39/1: 151-174. Stojanović, Pavle (forthcoming). „Chrysippus on Imagination in Aetius 4.12", Classical Quarterly. Tarrant, Harold (2000). „Recollection and Prophesy in the 'De Divinatione'", Phronesis 45/1: 64-76. On the status of natural divination in stoicism16 Wardle, David (2006). Cicero: On Divination, Book 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Wynne, John P. F. (2019). Cicero on the Philosophy of Religion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Pavle Stojanović O statusu prirodnog proricanja u stoicizmu (Apstrakt) Ciceronovo delo De divinatione predstavlja stoike kao jednoglasne u zastupanju i prirodnog i tehničkog proricanja. Nasuprot tome, ja dokazujem da su raniji predvodnici škole poput Hrisipa imali razloga da smatraju prirodno proricanje značajno epistemički podređenim u odnosu na tehničko. Mnogo povoljniji odnos prema prirodnom proricanju u De divinatione je po svoj prilici posledica promena koje su uvedene kasnije, verovatno od strane Posejdonija. ključne reči: stoicizam, proricanje, znanje, Ciceron, Hrisip, Posејdonije.

Is Semantics Really Psychologically Real? Mihaela Popa University of Geneva [email protected] Abstract The starting point for this paper is a critical discussion of claims of psychological reality articulated within Borg's (forth.) minimal semantics and Carpintero's (2007) character*-semantics. It has been proposed, for independent reasons, that their respective accounts can accommodate, or at least avoid the challenge from psychological evidence. I outline their respective motivations, suggesting various shortcomings in their efforts of preserving the virtues of an uncontaminated semantics in the face of psychological objection (I-II), and try to make the case that, at least for a theory of utterance comprehension, a truth-conditional pragmatic stance is far preferable. An alternative from a relevance-theoretic perspective is offered in terms of mutual adjustment between truthconditional content and implicature(s), arguing that many "free" pragmatic processes are needed to uncover the truth-conditional content, which can then warrant the expected implicature(s) (III). I finally illustrate the difficulties their accounts have in predicting the correct order of interpretation in cases of ironic metaphor, i.e. metaphor is computed first, as part of truth-conditional content, while irony is inferentially grounded in metaphorical content (IV). Keywords: psychological reality, minimal semantics, character*-semantics, truth-conditional pragmatics, metaphor, ironic metaphor. I. How Does Semantics Relate To Psychology? Borg's semantic project aims at substantiating the claim that semantic facts depend on psychological facts. This can be established from two different perspectives: metaphysical (i.e. concerning what determines (or fixes) what the speaker means) and epistemic (i.e. concerning what is used by interpreters to identify what the speaker means). Thus, by expressing her allegiance to the Gricean project, Borg signs up for metaphysical dependence, although not in Grice's (1989) sense of explaining semantic content in terms of intentional 498 content, but rather in terms of a psychological module responsible for our linguistic/semantic competence (i.e. knowledge that underpins our understanding of linguistic meaning). From this perspective, facts about semantic content, like words/sentences meaning, ought to be determined via their relation to the mental states speakers express by uttering them. But the conditions for epistemic dependence, according to which "the route to a correct semantic theory runs via an account of the [mental] contents of language-users," don't seem easily met by Grice's or Borg's account. E.g. Grice's assumption that in understanding an utterance the literal sentence meaning is prior to speaker meaning is not psychologically confirmed. The same challenge seems to apply to Borg's account, insofar as she takes the minimal content to be prior to, and independent of, speaker meaning. So her attempt of using psychological facts about linguistic competence in semantic theorizing is vulnerable, until a way out for conforming to psychological evidence is articulated. This challenge is taken up in Borg's (forth.), but before assessing the success of her enterprise, a few words about the foundations of her "Minimal Semantics." Borg's semantic minimalism rests on three main claims. (i) There are "minimal contents (propositions/truth-conditions)" that are "maximally free from contextual effects and provide the literal meanings of sentences;" (ii) Minimal contents are not speech-act content, i.e. what is communicated by a speaker who utters those sentences; (iii) Semantic content is delivered by a modular/computational language faculty. This conception of semantic content entails that there can be no appeal to the intentional states of current speakers at the semantic level. In so doing, it assumes that all (declarative) sentences have semantically determined truth-conditions that are context-dependent when, but only when, obvious context-sensitive elements like demonstratives and indexicals are present. Borg's motivation is, clearly, to provide an explanation of semantic content as being permeable to contextual features in highly constrained ways, by using only well-established syntactic and semantic machinery based on standard linguistic assumptions.1 1 Minimalists, like indexicalists (Stanley 2000), hold that all pragmatic processes involved in the determination of an utterance's truth-conditions are linguistically driven and controlled by the conventional meaning of words. They amount to saturation-i.e. the provision of contextual values for indexicals, morphemes of tenses, genitives and the like-conceived not as a purely contextual process but, rather, as being triggered by a linguistic rule. Since the process occurs just in case the sentence/expression sets up a slot to be contextually filled in, it is thereby mandatory: in every context in which the sentence/expression is uttered, the given contextual ingredient has to be provided, and can never be dispensed with. In confining pragmatics to saturation in this way, indexicalism and minimalism subordinate pragmatics to linguistic meaning in the determination of truth-conditions: in grasping the truth-conditions of an utterance 499 I have, however, my doubts that the semantic assumptions on which Borg rests her minimal semantics can deliver the intuitive truth-conditional content of an utterance, i.e. what is communicated as part of the explicit content in normal conversational contexts. By delivering a truth-conditional content that is minimal (i.e. it excludes all pragmatic/defeasible inferences from semantics), her account seems committed to attributing truth-conditions to sentences that seem to fall short of having them, suggesting that they express weak existential, or "liberal" propositions. E.g. suppose Jack and Jill are in a rush, preparing to go to the cinema. Jill has reached the front door, but Jack has just stepped out of the shower. They say: a. Jill: Let's go b. Jack: I'm not ready Intuitively, Jack speaks truly: he isn't ready (to leave for the cinema)! Minimalists deny this, however: according to Borg, the truth-conditions of (b) are that Jack is not ready for something (or other)2-which is false, since, having stepped out of the shower he is now ready to start dressing.3 The truthconditions posited as part of her minimalist analysis turn out, therefore, to be very different from the truth-conditions normal interpreters would ascribe to the utterance, and take the speaker to have intuitively said. The difficulty, apart from making wrong predictions about the intuitive truth-conditions, is that such minimal contents cannot be, as Borg acknowledges, objects of speech-acts (assertions, questions, commands) falling under speaker's intentions. This makes it difficult to see how her account explains the inferential relations between semantic and pragmatic information. A different kind of criticism is mounted by Recanati (2004) with his 'availability principle' (i.e. language-users have conscious intuitions about what is said, i.e. the intuitive truth-conditions), who aims at showing that the availabilhearers need to go beyond the conventions of language, but their so doing is still governed by the conventions of language. 2 Pace Borg, Bach (2006) argues that there is no need to make the case that sentences that intuitively seem not to express propositions in fact do so; they are simply incomplete, and their semantic contents are sub-propositional "propositional radicals" (what Récanati 2004 calls "semantic schemata"). Propositionality of the minimal content is not the real issue, however. 3 However, indexicalists can agree with what the intuitive truth-conditions of (b) are: that Jack is not ready to go to the cinema. But having agreed with this, they deny that the pragmatic processes that yield them are free, as truth-conditional pragmatics predicts (see III). So, for example, Stanley holds that (b) contains an unarticulated constituent: at the level of logical form; it is not "ready" that occurs but "ready for ...," i.e. the logical form contains a slot that must be filled in contextually. 500 ity constraint, if correct, leads one to give up minimalism. Clearly, speakers/ hearers do not consciously entertain minimal contents in conversational exchanges, for such contents lack in the informativeness or relevance that would make them objects of intentional acts. Hence, they cannot, and should not, be equated to the utterance's truth-conditions. Moreover, they cannot function as the right basis for generating implicatures. So one either needs to postulate an intermediate, pragmatically enriched content which can inferentially warrant the implicature(s) (e.g. Bach's notion of "impliciture," or relevance theorists' notion of "explicature"),4 or explain how speaker meaning is derived directly from minimal contents, eluding thus a level of intuitive truth-conditions. As far as I am aware of, Borg's account does neither. A more specific concern for minimalism, as Borg acknowledges, is that doesn't fit psychological evidence. Since psychological facts are important for semantic theorizing, given her commitment to the metaphysical dependence, her theory faces serious difficulties. In particular, in cases of ellipsis, metaphors, and scalar implicatures, which are problematic for Gricean models, speaker meaning is grasped without the recovery of a minimal content. More specifically, non-sentential assertions (e.g. 'To Bill' as an answer to the question 'Who did you give the ball?') by which the speaker communicates a complete proposition at the level of speaker meaning even though she does not produce a complete sentence, the grasp of that speaker meaning cannot itself depend on a prior grasp of minimal content. In many cases of (conversational) metaphors the speaker's meaning is directly and locally accessed,5 without first retrieving a minimal content (the literal sentence meaning), and only upon realizing a contextual incompatibility, then retrieve the speaker's metaphorical meaning. Further, if cases of scalar implicature (i.e. when a speaker opts to use a weaker or stronger item on a given scale and thereby pragmatically conveys that the alternative terms on the scale do not hold, e.g. 'some A's are B's' convey that 'some but not all A's are B's') were calculated by first deriving the minimal content, the hearer would need to evaluate what the speaker's words say against some contextually-specified level of informativeness in order to exclude more informative alternatives, after having established no other reason for the use of the less informative term (e.g. speaker's ignorance or indifference). 4 For a neo-Gricean motivation of doing so, see Soames (2008) who argues that in understanding numerals the Gricean conversational maxims help determine what is asserted by narrowing the class of possible enrichments to those that most effectively advance the conversation. Such enriched proposition embodies the speaker's primary intention to assert, and therefore contributes to the utterance's truth-conditions. 5 See Bezuidenhout (2001), Carston (2002), Recanati (2004), Sperber & Wilson (2007), Colston & Gibbs (2002). 501 If the empirical evidence for these phenomena is correct, this seems to suggest that pragmatic effects can occur at locally (word/phrase-level), as well as globally (sentence-level). Yet this runs counter the predictions from minimalism. Borg is confident that this is not a problem for her account, because what underpins the semantic competence of language-users, and which explains why they are in a position to recover speaker meaning at all, is tacit knowledge of a theory of meaning which trades in sentence-contents. My worry with such a response is that it merely saves the phenomena, rather than engaging with the real processes of speaker meanings retrievals through which interpretation is actually arrived at. What Borg takes to compensate the vulnerability of her minimalist theory to the psychological challenge does not really engage with criteria of theoretical/explanatory adequacy, and hence is not sufficient to grant her account the desired epistemic dependence of semantic content on psychological content. Her explanation of the minimal content as output of a semantic module impervious to any contextual information is dubious if that content is equated with the truth-conditions of an utterance, because is many cases there is a gap to be bridged between the minimal content and the utterance's truth-conditional content. Even granting that the minimal content delivered by such module is only a schematic input that needs to be fleshed out or adjusted so as to function as communicated (speaker-meant) content, the question arises as to its psychological role in comprehension.6 Borg's attempt to engage with the psychological reality issue is commendable, but her claim that there are structures in the brain representing the basic elements of minimal theory (semantic rules determining sentence meanings from word meanings and syntactic structures), and that the deductive processes determining sentence meaning are supposedly mirrored by interactions between those structures within our brain, is less palpable as to what exactly it amounts to. Be that as it may, the question arises as to the consistency between such empirical predictions and her minimalist postulates. For example, Borg's acknowledgment that pragmatic and semantic processes run in parallel, the former operating on sub-sentential clauses before the semantic interpretation of the sentence is complete, and furthermore, allowing hearers to stop semantic processing whenever they have enough evidence to grasp whatever the speaker is trying to convey, before the semantic module delivered any sentence-content, 6 Relevance theorists and Récanati (2004) hold that the minimal content plays no role in understanding an utterance, and has no psychological reality. Récanati objects that even when we hear a sentence that is semantically incomplete we do not seem to calculate its semantic content and entertain a literal minimal content. Rather, we proceed directly to what the speaker means. 502 seems to me biting the bullet in favour of a truth-conditional pragmatics (TCP) (see III). What's more, conceding the idea advocated by relevance theorists of a "mutual adjustment" between semantic and pragmatic information, combined with the idea of a semantic module seem to make an odd marriage. On any characterisation of modularity, the essence of a modular system is that it operates in accordance with its own dedicated (domain-specific) system of rules and/or procedures, and, on the widely accepted Fodorian definition, the language system is encapsulated from extralinguistic context, including perceptually available information and beliefs about speaker intentions. So there is a real predicament for those who recognize that (i) pragmatics is involved not only in specifying the correct truth-value (when the utterance expresses a truth-evaluable proposition), but also in determining a truth-evaluable proposition that can be ascertained as part of speaker meaning (hen the utterance does not express one, even after disambiguation and reference assignment have taken place), and who at the same time want (ii) to maintain an uncontaminated semantics that delivers the utterance's truth-conditions. One straightforward possibility of remedying this difficulty is to argue that, if semantics is bound to deliver truthconditions, it needs pragmatics in its rescue, or otherwise to give up to (ii). My qualms with minimal accounts, such as Borg's, concern not the task of semantics, which I take it to be that of providing an explanatory account of the growth of our knowledge of meaning and applying it to indefinitely many novel utterances,7 but their disavowing that the relations between semantics and semantic competence are independent of language-users' intentions, and hence of pragmatics, which, as we saw, leads to wrong predictions about the intuitive truth-conditions of utterances. Some semanticists recognize that many semantic facts require pragmatics to be explained. They either opt for (i) an open-ended semantics whose rules of language are materialized in "free variables" at deep syntactic structures (indexicalists), thus allowing for flexibility beyond the usual building-block combinatorics of a closed compositional system, or (ii) for a thin-semantics restricted to encoded linguistic meaning of words/sentences, as illustrated by Carpintero (2007a,b) who allows required pragmatic information 7 The motivation for keeping free (non linguistically-driven) pragmatics away from determining truth-conditions stems from an ambition to provide a systematic explanation of the contribution to truth-conditions in terms of precise semantic constraints: only rule-governed/ convention-bound interpretations of terms in accord with those terms' standing meanings are allowed when uncovering the truth-conditions of the utterance. Minimalists' concern with TCP is that context-sensitivity of the kind TCP envisages undermines the possibility of a systematic account for meaning, and makes it difficult to explain how, given the finiteness of our cognitive resources, we ever come to learn and use a language. We think that such worries are unwarranted, and suggest in III that there are constraints for communicated content, either explicit or implicit. 503 to contribute at an intermediate level of "what is asserted," corresponding to the utterance's truth-conditional content. II. Is Rational Reconstruction Psychologically Real? Carpintero (2007a) defends a character*-semantics restricted to the conventional meaning or character* of expressions/sentences. Aware that Grice's account is not up to the task in delivering what it promised, namely a level of content that is part of speaker meaning, and which is obtained only through semantic consideration of the conventional meaning of words, plus their mode of combination, Carpintero takes the proper object of semantics to be the conventional meaning of linguistic expressions/sentences, thereby rejecting the notion of (truth-conditional) content responsible for the relations holding, in virtue of meaning, between linguistic expressions and the world, as being the proper object of semantics. Like relevance-theorists and Recanati, he recognises that the intuitive truth-conditions of utterances are jointly determined by semantics and pragmatics, which I take to be a safe bet to ensure a neat divide between semantic and pragmatics. On his view, descendent from the Kaplanian distinction between content and character (i.e. a function from contexts of use to content), the character* is semantically incomplete, i.e. it consists of a rule assigning a contextual value to some expression, but is not its semantic value, and hence, it merely serves to constrain the truth-conditional content and help determine it in context. I fully agree with Carpintero's proposal of restricting the semantics to the determination of sentence-character* corresponding to what is literally said, thus treating an enriched what is said, or what is asserted (as benefiting from pragmatic contribution) outside of semantics' scope. I also agree with his idea that language-users have intuitions of characters*, and are consciously aware of how characters* are saturated and freely enriched.8 What I disagree with is (i) his claim that this is in tension with Recanati's phenomenological availability constraint (since Recanati could argue for a local availability by which languageusers are consciously aware of the move from the linguistic meaning of some words to their modulated meanings) but I'm not concerned with this issue here; and (ii) his explanation of such intuitions in terms of rational reconstruction. 8 This claim has been advanced by Carston (2007) as an objection to Recanati's account of primary processes (corresponding to the utterance's truth-conditional content) as being noninferential and insensitive to speaker's intentions. E.g. in cases in which the supplementation of the intended referent is sensitive to speaker's intentions. 504 To understand the sense in which Carpintero claims his characters* to be psychologically real, we'd have to make a long detour through Peacocke's (1986: 101) conception of 1,5 level of explanation (which states the information on which, in his terms, "the algorithm draws").9 For simplicity, here's how Carpintero (2007a: 50) adverts to Peacoke's concept as giving the explanatory force of a semantic theory: "The proponent of a view about the semantics-pragmatics divide such as the one I am advancing says that characters* are psychologically real in that sense [cf. Peacocke]. In particular, the subpersonal mechanisms responsible for the production and interpretation of intelligible speech acts should "draw upon" the information that the semantic theory packages into the relevant characters*[...]. This is compatible with Recanati's views on primary pragmatic processes: the actual processes involved in giving rise, in real time, to what he counts as what is said can be characterized as inferences, but they are merely inferences at the subpersonal level, in which "what is literally expressed" (the character*, on the present view) plays no role as a premise in a conscious inference. The present point is that the same applies to secondary processes in actual cases."10 Be that as it may, I have my reservations as to how Carpintero's character*semantics is psychological real, in that the characters*' psychological reality in virtue of our conscious intuitions of the subpersonal inferences from characters* to saturated and freely enriched contents is not warranted in the psychologically relevant sense, i.e. having intuitions of such inferences as they occur in the actual process of interpretation, rather than supporting rational reconstructions. Although I sympathize with Carpintero's divide of semantics-pragmatics, I remain discontented with his explanation of linguistic understanding in terms of rational reconstruction. The motivation for a rational reconstruction in the face of the challenge from psychological evidence is forcefully defended by neo-Griceans like Bach (2001)11 and Soames (2008). Soames' explanation of the comprehension process consists in offering an idealized model of conversation where an ideally rational 9 Related to language understanding, Peacocke (1986: 113) argues that the informational content of the language-users subpersonal states at level 1,5 "is sufficient to determine the meaning of all the sentences they understand." 10 I am a bit unclear whether the assessment of Recanati's primary processes as being underpinned by inferences, be they subpersonal, is Carpintero's interpretation of how Recanati's primary processes should be conceived of, since on Recanati's view, they are merely associative. I feel the need of an explanation as to how such inferences are derived without relying on a premise of "what is literally expressed" (this was precisely the reason why Recanati rejects an inferential account of primary processes). But that's of no importance here. 11 In response to the psychological objections, Bach (2001: 24; 2006: 67) distinguishes between the character of the information available to the hearer in the process of identifying 505 agent would correctly interpret an utterance if the judgments at which he arrives about what was asserted and implicated matched those of competent speakers who associate semantic content with the sentence, and explicitly employ Gricean and other pragmatic rules. The difference between an idealized model and whatever is really at work psychologically involves the model's use of semantic content as input to interpreting utterances, but this is not a feature of our cognitive architecture. Soames rightly contends, I think, that our linguistic competence doesn't require having "psychologically robust representations which carry all and only the information semantically encoded by our sentences." What is important is that speakers/hearers have substantial uniformity regarding the salient information extracted from utterances in various contexts, namely that conclusions about what has been asserted and implied are inferred using this information. The model is validated if these conclusions match those of real speakers in real speech-situations, and the success of the reconstruction would be evidence that the semantic and pragmatic theories it contained were correct. Therefore, by offering a rational idealization that could track the psychologically real processes of ordinary speakers, neo-Griceans hope to invest in a theoretical adequacy claim without addressing directly the challenge from empirical evidence. I argue, against their skepticism, that hypotheses about the psychologically real processes involved in determining the truth-conditional content and implicatures of utterances are not only necessary in accounting for specific cases of language-use (IV), but they can be naturally construed within a TCP paradigm like that endorsed by relevance-theorists (RT). III. Truth-Conditional Pragmatics RT's lexical-pragmatics is a species of truth-conditional pragmatics (TCP), i.e. the doctrine that pragmatic processes that are "free" (not linguistically driven) play a crucial role in determining the truth-conditions of an utterance. TCP holds that an utterance's truth-conditions are not wholly encoded in the sentence uttered (even allowing for the reference assignment and disambiguation Grice acknowledges); rather, a contextual adjustment is needed. TCP claims that there is a gap between (a) the content generated by the linguistic meaning of a sentence when values are assigned to indexicals or free variables occurring within it, and (b) the utterance's truth-conditions. It holds that the linguistic speaker meaning (including the truth-conditions), and how this information is exploited in online processing. 506 meanings encoded by sentences are highly schematic: they fall very far short of determining the truth-conditional content, and many "free" pragmatic processes are needed to uncover this content. In contrast to Borg's minimal semantics, the semantics approved by relevance-theorists, but also by other species of TCP (Recanati 2004, Bach 2006), need not deliver anything fully propositional; the output of linguistic processing falls well short of answering to ordinary speaker-hearer intuitions about the truth-conditional content of utterances. The TCP embraced by relevance-theorists conceives of speaker meaning as being composed of the truth-conditional content (explicature) and implicature(s). Moreover, it posits precise constraints on the derivation of the truth-conditional content: (i) it is a pragmatic development of the encoded linguistic meaning, and (ii) it must provide inferential warrant for the implicature. The device that regulates these constraints is a mechanism of mutual adjustment from which it follows that a hypothesis about an implicature can both precede and shape a hypothesis about the truth-conditional content. Specifically, the hearer's hypotheses about implicatures, formed on the basis of his expectation of relevance in a conversational situation, can influence the development of the logical form into truth-conditional content, and his retrieval/construction of contextual assumptions. Hence, in function of what he takes the speaker as having implied, he might be able to reason a way to a decision about what she might have said/asserted. Thus, assumptions about the truth-conditional content and assumptions about implicatures are derived in parallel and mutually adjusted to each other until they stabilize in a logical argument with determinate contents: implicatures are logically grounded in the truth-conditional content together with relevant contextual assumptions. This process can involve several (re)adjustments to each of the various kinds of assumptions involved, with hypotheses about any one or combination of truth-conditional content, implicature, and contextual assumptions affecting hypotheses about any of the others. Such a process is predicted to be inferential through and through. Whereas the implicature is warranted by following logically from the truth-conditional content and contextual assumptions, the two latter receive their inferential warrant in different ways. In virtue of the mutual adjustment, they can be confirmed by 'backwards' inference: if the conclusion-implicature-seems a promising hypothesis about the speaker meaning (answering the hearer's question), and the entire interpretation is consistent with the expectations of relevance raised by the utterance, then the hearer has good reason to adjust the premises so that they warrant that conclusion. Hence, the contextual assumptions get their inferential warrant entirely from backwards confirmation, i.e. by fitting into a valid argument together with other assumptions that are in play. On the other hand, the truth-conditional content is inferentially warranted both from the linguistic meanings of constituents, and from backwards confirmation by fitting 507 into an argument where together with contextual assumptions it justifies the implicature. Specifically, the relation between the literal meanings of words and their semantic value is explained via local pragmatic processes of adjusting (e.g. narrowing, broadening) word meanings into modulated meanings such that they feed directly onto the utterance's truth-conditional content. This process of 'free' pragmatic modulation involves backwards inferences: when a contextual implication is derived, the hearer treats it as a potential implicature of the utterance, which may in turn help adjust some word's meaning into a modulated meaning, thus shaping the truth-conditional content which then can warrant the expected implicature. Hence, on this view, what speakers say (as part of what they want to communicate directly and explicitly) by uttering a sentence in a context incorporates the pragmatically adjusted meanings, which are not merely indirectly or implicitly conveyed, as they are for Griceans/neo-Griceans. This is the case with loose talk, metaphorical, metonymical and even hyperbolic utterances. Whereas Griceans/neo-Griceans treat such cases as instances where the hearer understands the speaker to have explicitly said one thing but to have meant something else instead, relevance-theorists and philosophers defending TCP propose an explanation according to which the contextual meanings of words communicated in such cases are pragmatic developments of semantically encoded meanings. Importantly, those local pragmatic processes that determine the relevant contextual meanings are not, however, entirely unconstrained, as critics have pointed out. They are, in effect, enriched or loosened on the basis of the conventional meanings of words, and are tailored in such a way so as to fit the expectations of relevance set by the utterance in the context in which it is uttered. The upshot is a level of content that accords with speakers/hearers intuitions of what has been said, and what makes the utterance true. Hence, an adequate theoretical notion of 'what is said' is one that is grounded in pragmatic considerations about what speakers do in making their utterances, specifically what mental states they want to be taken as defending. IV. Ironic Metaphor I argue that one of the reasons why rational reconstruction is unsatisfactory is that interpretation of ironic metaphor (IM), as in (1)-(3), gives the wrong predictions when allowing a different order of interpretation-irony first and then metaphor-which is predicted from a rational reconstruction perspective. (1) Mary is the Taj Mahal. 508 (2) He is a towering figure. (3) What a delicate lace work! To explain why only a metaphor-first approach gives the right result, I argue for a psychological and logical metaphor's priority thesis (MPT), i.e. in cases of IM, the metaphor is/has to be computed before the irony. Grice (1989: 34) is the first to advocate logical MPT, when he claims that when interpreting a metaphor like "You are the cream in my coffee," the hearer has to reach first the metaphor 'You are my pride and joy' and then calculate an ironic interpretation 'You are my bane' on the basis of metaphor. Unfortunately, however, he does not give an argument for this claim, nor how the passage from metaphorical to ironical meaning is negotiated. We aim to remedy this omission. My strategy involves distinguishing weak from strong versions of both psychological and logical MPT, resulting in four versions of MPT. Weak MPT: in some cases of IM, the metaphor is/has to be computed first. Strong MPT: in all cases of IM, the metaphor is/has to be computed first. In order of increasing strength they are: weak psychological MPT, weak logical MPT, strong psychological MPT, and strong logical MPT. I argue for each in turn. The argument for weak psychological MPT is as follows. It is widely agreed that irony operates globally on propositional contents to determine new contents. But at least sometimes, metaphor operates locally on expressions (before the whole utterance is computed). Since local operations work prior to global operations, this supports psychological MPT in those cases in which the metaphoric interpretation is local, the irony swinging into play only after all interpretations involving words have been calculated. The argument for weak logical MPT relies on a reasoning-by-absurdum which aims at showing that an irony-first approach is conceptually difficult or impossible. Consider the case in which (3) is used concerning a doctor's indecipherable scrawl. If irony has priority over metaphor, it seems difficult to pin down an appropriate contrary to the literal term, which then interpreted metaphorically yields the intended interpretation. Following Stern (2000: 236), I argue that there is no rational route to the literal term's opposite, without priory retrieving the metaphor. Now suppose that from a rational reconstruction viewpoint, an irony-first order of interpretation is available for (3). This can be represented in two-stages: a simple irony generally represented by means of a 509 negation operator as in (3'a), which then requires replacing the literal meaning of 'lacework' with a metaphorical one as in (3'b). (3') a. That's NOT lacework. b. That's NOT beautiful/crafted (handwriting). However, the irony-first interpretation seems to miss its target: it may not apply to the intended referent (doctor's handwriting), as when we wrongly understand (3) to comment on some expensive curtains the cat just ripped to shreds. If such a situation is salient in context, then there is no need for a metaphoric reinterpretation; the interpretation stops at the first-stage with a simple irony, and the ironic metaphor is lost. The problem seems to be rather a matter of scope: if irony is construed as an operator of negation taking in its scope only the literal meaning of the expression, then the result cannot be the intended irony, as part of an IM understanding. Some might argue that it is in the nature of rational reconstruction to take the irony-first interpretation further, replacing the literal meaning within the scope of negation with a metaphorical meaning. However, if one is to understand the irony in relation to the doctor's handwriting, it is essential to have already computed the metaphor, since it is this that gives him access to the intended referent. Since referents have to be established for determining the utterance's truth-conditional content, and since irony builds on such content, then weak logical MPT follows straightforwardly. The difficulty of an irony-first approach is even more patent in (1), where the irony necessarily builds on the metaphor: since what is literally said involves a category mistake which makes it difficult to maintain a plausible literal interpretation, one could hardly avoid a metaphoric interpretation. But then the irony-first reversing the literal meaning of the utterance is pointless, because it merely yields a banal literal truth 'Mary is NOT the Taj Mahal.' I therefore conclude that it is difficult to retrieve the intended irony, unless metaphor is already computed. A similar argument is given by Bezuidenhout (2001) who shows that metaphors launched from irony are difficult, if not impossible. The conclusion she draws is that when other interpretations are present, metaphor must precede them. Consequently, cases of "once-removed metaphors" (i.e. metaphors launched from irony or cases of indirection like indirect requests) are simply difficult, if not impossible. I agree with her conclusion, but I go even further in putting this constraint on the account of the difference between metaphor and irony. While irony takes scope on some propositional content, reversing the literal meaning of the sentence uttered, metaphor takes a subsentential scope, pragmatically adjusting the literal meaning of an expression. This suggests that the scope operated by metaphor ought to have been effected 510 before the irony takes scope on the whole sentence, leading therefore to an order of interpretation of the form IronyMetaphor <P> rather than MetaphorIrony<P>. To buttress the argument, think of an analogous argument concerning the ironic use of idioms. For instance, a quasi-metaphorical idiom 'don't give up the ship' used to communicate that one should persevere in the face of adversity, when it is used in the context of someone giving up, it functions ironically, but only if it is first understood as metaphor for perseverance. Similarly, the idiom 'burying the hatchet' refers to declaring an end to hostilities, or peace, but when it is used in the context of someone NOT making peace, it will function ironically. Other examples of this sort are 'locking the barn door after the cows have fled,' 'striking gold,' 'it's a gold mine,' etc. One way of tackling the strong logical MPT, i.e. in all cases of ironic metaphor, the metaphor has to be computed first, is to admit that irony and metaphor require different mechanisms of interpretation; if they were similar in nature, we would expect more freedom, and hence inversion, in the order of interpretation. A first characterization of this difference comes from relevance theorists for whom metaphors are used descriptively to represent a possible/ actual state of affairs, while ironies are used interpretively to (meta)represent another representation (a possible/actual utterance/thought) that it resembles in content. A more convincing reason for strong logical MPT is, perhaps, the necessity of distinguishing an extra-level of meaning beyond the speaker's meaning qua content, which is imposed by the order of processing of the two figurative meanings. The argument for strong logical MPT relies on a first claim that the correct standard interpretation of an IM, such as (2) is closer to that of the associated simple irony Utterance He is important Ironical meaning He is not important than it is to that of the associated simple (negated) metaphor Utterance He is not a towering figure Metaphorical meaning He is not important Although the content is the same in both cases, the associated irony captures the speaker's attitude of contempt towards his colleague who thinks he's achieved some important discovery (whereas nobody shares that opinion), which is lost with the associated negated metaphor. Despite metaphor's richness, the 511 speaker's attitude is not part of the metaphorical content; the speaker is merely interested in pointing out some similarity, or with the negated metaphor that there is no such similarity. That IM is closer to irony than to metaphor leads to a further claim that this fact is correctly predicted by strong logical MPT, on which the order of interpretation is Metaphor-first proposal Utterance He is a towering figure Metaphor: He is important Irony: He is not important but is not correctly predicted by, the irony-first approach, on which the order of interpretation is Irony-first proposal Utterance He is a towering figure Irony: He is not a towering figure (He is short/diminutive) Metaphor: He is not important Although an irony-first proposal seems prima facie plausible from a rational reconstruction viewpoint, on which irony, even if not relevant, is remedied by metaphoric reinterpretation, this strategy fails to deliver the intended interpretation. Even though the two approaches-metaphor-first and irony-first-deliver the same content, there is something more than speaker meaning qua content that accounts for their difference. This is related to the order of processing of the two figurative meanings. If the hearer goes with irony-first, there is no way to capture the speaker's attitude, as this concerns in fact the colleague's inflated opinion of his important career, as delivered by the metaphoric interpretation, rather than the literal one concerning his height. It seems that the intended interpretation of IM goes beyond speaker meaning qua content; it has to factor in the route by which the two figurative meanings are reached at. Therefore, it is the metaphor-first approach that correctly predicts the target of the ironical attitude, namely a metaphoric claim that is merely pretended or echoed, thus supporting strong logical MPT. The argument for strong psychological MPT consists in looking at hypotheses about the metarepresentational inferences involved in understanding IMs. A first hypothesis is that the metarepresentational inferences required in IMs are reduced as compared to those required for understanding simple ironies. Colston & Gibbs (2002) explain this hypothesis by metaphor's capacity for muting the ironical meaning, thus attenuating the speaker's critical attitude characteristic of irony. However, it is unclear how the metarepresentational 512 inferences are reduced in processing IMs, unless metaphor is treated as expressing its content directly, without going through a metarepresentational premise of the form 'The speaker believes that (P).' Yet, two further hypotheses are available. H1: understanding IM enhances the degree of metarepresentational inferences as compared to processing irony alone. The metaphorical formulation of another's thought, or another's metaphorical thought which the speaker is echoing in IM is expected to increase the inferential steps: {The speaker believes that [X believes that (X believes that ((P))]}. This possibility is in tension with the claim that metaphor is processed as part of what is said, since the utterance should be first interpreted literally, then metaphorically, and then ironically. This possibility is dismissed, though, given the low ratings for understanding metaphors. H2: understanding IM requires the same amount of metarepresentational inferences as processing simple ironies. Adding a metaphor to a speaker's ironic utterance should not complicate the metarepresentations the hearer has to infer; there should be no consequential difference between echoing a metaphorical thought or formulating metaphorically another's thought with IM, and echoing a literal thought with simple irony, since both thoughts are expressed directly. The fact that the hearer has to think about the speaker's thoughts about another's thoughts to understand irony, or about her thoughts about another's metaphorical thoughts to understand IM should not increase the range of secondorder inferences. This shows, I think, that the metaphorical formulation of another's thought or someone else's metaphorical thought that the speaker is echoing in IM has the same contribution as any other literal thought: both contribute to the utterance's truth-conditional content. Furthermore, since it is another's metaphorical thought that is ironized, then metaphor is clearly part of the metarepresentation that needs to be computed for understanding the irony, as part of IM, thus supporting strong psychological MPT. Having argued that in IM, the metaphor is processed first, I argue that in such cases, metaphor is processed directly, i.e. as part of the utterance's truthconditional content. I consider semantic arguments about the behavior of IM with respect to the embeddability criterion and its import to truth-conditions. Since metaphor is embeddable, but irony is not, it follows that IM is not embeddable in the scope of logical operators like the negation in (4a), or the antecedent of a conditional in (4b), or in the scope of a propositional attitude operator in (4c) without losing the irony. (4) a. Mary is not the Taj Mahal, she's the Empire State building. b. If Mary is the Taj Mahal, then I'd love to have her as model. c. Steve believes that Mary is the Taj Mahal. 513 That IM is not embeddable in (4a-c) shows that irony takes scope over metaphor, suggesting that the metaphor is part of the utterance's truth-conditional content. A similar argument comes from responses to IMs, pertaining to the utterance's truth-conditions, as in (5a-b). (5) a.? Sure she is. That's why I don't want to go out with her. b.? That's not true. She has a certain charm and is quite a sophisticated lady. The reason why (5a-b) are failed attempts to respond to an IM is that while the speaker is willing to stick to the metaphorical meaning as being what she said/asserted, she cannot do that with the ironical meaning which is merely suggested. Even if the hearer picks a different metaphorical meaning than what the speaker had in mind she can reply by negative and switch to a different metaphorical reading. The consequence is that, if metaphor is truth-conditional and IM is not, and truth-conditions have to obtain before any implicature is generated from the saying of what is said, then metaphor has to be processed first as part of the utterance's truth-conditional content, and irony is processed afterwards as being grounded into the metaphorical content. This result is not, arguably, what is predicted from the rational reconstruction adopted by neo-Gricean accounts, like Borg's or Carpintero's. First, a minimalist like Borg couldn't account for metaphorical meaning as being part of the utterance's truth-conditions. Second, even if Carpintero might accommodate metaphorical meaning as part of his intermediate level of "what is asserted," there remain concerns as to whether the metaphor-first order of interpretation can be predicted by his rational reconstruction. Even though this is not a crucial criticism of his theory, hopefully the data pertaining to IM interpretation will suggest further answers to the controversial matter of how to draw the borderline between semantics and pragmatics. References: Bach K. 2006. The Excluded Middle: Semantic Minimalism Without Minimal Proposition. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72: 435442(8). Bach K. 2001a. You Don't Say? Synthese 128: 15-44. Bezuidenhout A. 2001. Metaphor and What is Said: a Defense of a Direct Expression View of Metaphor. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 25: 156-186. 514 Borg E. forth. Semantics and the Nature of Psychological Evidence. In S. Sawyer (ed.) New Waves in Philosophy of Language. Ashgate Press. Borg, E. 2007. Minimalism versus contextualism in semantics. In: Preyer, G. & Peter, G. (eds.) Context-Sensitivity and Semantic Minimalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 339-359. Carston R. 2008. Optional pragmatic processes or optiona covert linguistic structure? UCL Working Papers in Linguistics 20: 143-156. Carston R. 2007. How Many Pragmatic Systems are there? In M.-J. Frapolli (ed.) Saying, Meaning, Referring: Essays on the Philosophy of Francois Recanati. Basingstoke: Palgrave-Macmillan. 18-48. Carston R. 2002. Thoughts and Utterances. The Pragmatics of Explicit Communication. Oxford: Blackwell. Colston H. L. & Gibbs R. 2002. Are Irony and Metaphor Understood Differently? Metaphor and Symbol 17(1): 57-80. Garcia-Carpintero M. 2007. Recanati on the Semantics/Pragmatics Distinction. Critica 38: 35-68. Garcia-Carpintero M. 2007b. Bivalence and What is Said. Dialectica 61(1): 167-190. Grice H. P. 1989. Studies in the Way of Words. Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press. Peacocke C. 1986. Explanation in Computational Psychology: Language, Perception and Level 1.5. Mind and Language 1: 101-123. Récanati F. 2004. Literal Meaning, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Soames S. 2008. Drawing the Line Between Meaning and Implicature-And Relating Both to Assertion. Nous 42(3): 529-554. Sperber D. & Wilson D. 2007. A Deflationary Account of Metaphor. In R. Gibbs (ed.) Metaphor and Thought. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 171-203. Stern J. 2000. Metaphor in Context. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Referat na II Interdyscyplinarną Konferencję Młodych Naukowców "Doctor(ant)es", Interdyscyplinarne Koło Naukowe Doktorantów Uniwersytetu Kardynała Stefana Wyszyńskiego w Warszawie, Warszawa, 18-19.06.2009. 1 Andrzej Klimczuk Kapitał społeczny Polaków a rozwój społeczno-ekonomiczny Wprowadzenie W prowadzonych współcześnie debatach nad ważnymi problemami krajowymi dostrzega się potrzebę poszukiwania sposobów na upowszechnianie demokratycznych zasad współżycia i zwiększanie dobrobytu ekonomicznego. Brak jasno sprecyzowanych dróg rozwoju kraju dostrzega się coraz silniej wraz z upływem czasu po rozpoczęciu w 1989 roku transformacji ustrojowej. W ostatnich latach przygotowano chociażby Narodowy Program Foresight „Polska 2020" projekt naukowy Ministerstwa Nauki i Szkolnictwa Wyższego, którego organizatorzy próbowali zachęcić obywateli do określenia wspólnej wizji rozwoju kraju. Za inną istotną inicjatywę należy uznać sporządzony przez Zespół Doradców Strategicznych Prezesa Rady Ministrów „Raport Polska 2030", którego autorzy stwierdzają, że transformacja ustrojowa jako projekt cywilizacyjny uległa wyczerpaniu, a społeczeństwo polskie stoi przed dziesięcioma nowymi wyzwaniami. Wyzwania te to: (1) wzrost i konkurencyjność; (2) sytuacja demograficzna; (3) wysoka aktywność zawodowa oraz adaptacyjność zasobów pracy; (4) odpowiedni potencjał infrastruktury; (5) bezpieczeństwo energetyczno-klimatyczne; (6) gospodarka oparta na wiedzy i rozwój kapitału intelektualnego; (7) solidarność i spójność regionalna; (8) poprawa spójności społecznej; (9) sprawne państwo; (10) wzrost kapitału społecznego Polski. Ostatnie z wyzwań autorzy uznają za kluczowe dla sprostania wszystkim pozostałym celom rozwojowym. Ujęcie to współgra z koncepcjami przyjmowanymi we współczesnej socjologii zgodnie z którymi zmniejszaniu zapóźnień rozwojowych sprzyjają nie tylko środki finansowe, czy dostęp do nowoczesnych technologii, lecz też cechy narodów i społeczności regionalnych (zob. Harrison, Huntington). W niniejszym artykule przyjrzymy się kapitałowi społecznemu, jednemu z przytoczonych wyzwań, z uwzględnieniem jego zróżnicowanych typów, sfer oddziaływania, stanu wśród Polaków i metod budowania. Pojęcie kapitału społecznego Do dalszych rozważań niezbędne jest wyjaśnienie znaczeń wykorzystywanych w pracy pojęć. Rozwój za P. Sztompką rozumiany będzie jako „proces kierunkowy napędzany czynnikami endogennymi, w którym poziom pewnych istotnych zmiennych jest stale Referat na II Interdyscyplinarną Konferencję Młodych Naukowców "Doctor(ant)es", Interdyscyplinarne Koło Naukowe Doktorantów Uniwersytetu Kardynała Stefana Wyszyńskiego w Warszawie, Warszawa, 18-19.06.2009. 2 rosnący" (Sztompka 2002, s. 440-441 i 453). Zgodnie z tym ujęciem za rozwój społecznoekonomiczny możemy uznać różnicowanie się struktur i funkcji, ich ekspansję oraz wzrastającą złożoność i zorganizowanie, przy czym zależą one od mechanizmów wewnątrzspołecznych a nie czynników egzogennych, jak np. zmiany klimatyczne, czy epidemie chorób. Przykładem może tu być np. przekształcanie miast, gospodarstw domowych lub przedsiębiorstw pod względem ich wyposażenia w dobra materialne służące do wykonywania pracy lub odpoczynku. W tym miejscu za zasadę rozwoju przyjmujemy koncepcję zrównoważonego rozwoju, która od 1997 roku ma w Polsce rangę konstytucyjną. Rozwój społeczno-ekonomiczny w myśl tego podejścia powinien się cechować zdolnością do: samopodtrzymywania, trwałości i zrównoważenia. Wzrost gospodarczy ma pozwalać na przeciwdziałanie marginalizacji i dyskryminacji społecznej oraz podnosić stan środowiska naturalnego. Zakłada się przy tym, że celem nadrzędnym jest zrównoważona jakość życia a do jej osiągnięcia niezbędne jest stałe tworzenie i wzbogacanie instrumentarium rozwoju społecznego, gospodarczego i środowiskowego. Poprzez jakość życia za specjalistami Programu Narodów Zjednoczonych ds. Rozwoju rozumieć można „kategorię wyrażająca stopień samorealizacji człowieka w ujęciu holistycznym (przy równowadze dobrobytu, dobrostanu i błogostanu) lub w ujęciu mniej czy bardziej zawężonym, np. z punktu widzenia konsumpcji dóbr materialnych zaspokajających jego potrzeby (przy dominacji dobrobytu nad dobrostanem i błogostanem)" (Borys, Rogala 2008, s. 9). W tym kontekście ocena postaw i zachowań społecznych, w tym kapitału społecznego, jest traktowana jako przykład wskaźników subiektywnej jakości życia, czyli zgłaszanego przez poszczególnych ludzi stopnia zaspokojenia ich indywidualnych potrzeb, obok takich cech jak np. ocena życia fizycznego, stanu posiadania, dobrostanu psychicznego, wsparcia społecznego, oceny swojej sytuacji na rynku pracy, stylu życia, czy skłonności do ryzyka. Dla porównania przykładami wskaźników obiektywnej jakości życia, czyli infrastrukturalnych warunków funkcjonowania zbiorowości społecznych, są: sytuacja dochodowa gospodarstwa domowego i sposób gospodarowania dochodami, wyżywienie, zasobność materialna, korzystanie z pomocy społecznej, kształcenie dzieci, uczestnictwo w kulturze i wypoczynku, korzystanie z usług systemu ochrony zdrowia, ubezpieczenia i zabezpieczenia emerytalne, ubóstwo i bezrobocie. W klasycznych opracowaniach autorstwa P. Bourdieu, J.S. Colemana i R.D. Putnama (zob. Rymsza 2007) kapitał społeczny jest definiowany niejednoznacznie i między ujęciami tych autorów występują różnice. Niemniej można przyjąć, iż najogólniej poprzez kapitał społeczny rozumie się potencjał współdziałania osadzony w powiązaniach międzyludzkich i Referat na II Interdyscyplinarną Konferencję Młodych Naukowców "Doctor(ant)es", Interdyscyplinarne Koło Naukowe Doktorantów Uniwersytetu Kardynała Stefana Wyszyńskiego w Warszawie, Warszawa, 18-19.06.2009. 3 normach społecznych, który może przynosić korzyści osobom, grupom i społeczeństwom. Za A. Sadowskim można uznać, iż kapitał społeczny jest skumulowany w zasobach ludzkich, czyli ludziach wraz z ich umiejętnościami i doświadczeniami, obok kapitału ludzkiego (np. posiadana wiedza, stan cywilny, zawód, wyznanie, stan zdrowia) i kulturowego (np. uznawane wartości, mity, rytuały, kryteria prestiżu, ideologie, ukształtowana tożsamość) (Sadowski 2006, s. 20-38). O pozytywnych efektach zewnętrznych możemy mówić głównie, gdy kapitał społeczny przybiera formę zwaną pomostową lub włączającą (Putnam 2000, s. 22), a więc gdy dochodzi do współpracy i integracji między ludźmi różnych kultur, religii, warstw i grup społecznych. Poza tym na poziom i jakość kapitału społecznego oddziałują mechanizmy kulturowe, takie jak religia, tradycja i historyczne nawyki (Fukuyama 1997, s. 39). Gromadzenie tego kapitału nie może odbywać się z inicjatywy jednostki, lecz wymaga wspólnych działań większych zbiorowości. Pozytywne oddziaływanie kapitału społecznego wymaga rozpowszechnienia i realizowania takich cnót społecznych jak odpowiedzialność, lojalność, umiejętność współpracy, poczucie obowiązku, uczciwość, oszczędność, racjonalne rozwiązywanie problemów i umiejętność podejmowania ryzyka (tamże, s. 57-61). Do wskaźników kapitału społecznego zalicza się m.in. aktywność mieszkańców społeczności lokalnych w rozwiązywaniu problemów społecznych, ich zaradność społeczną, posiadanie ugruntowanej tożsamości politycznej, trwałość rodzin wraz z określeniem zakresu ich współdziałania z instytucjami i organizacjami społecznymi, siłę więzi sąsiedzkich, poziom zaufania, poziom bezpieczeństwa, podejmowanie prywatnych inicjatyw gospodarczych, gotowość do zrzeszania się, zdolność do kompromisu oraz stosunek do ustroju, prywatyzacji, pracy, firm zagranicznych i środków przekazu (Sadowski 2006, s. 28, 32 i 111). Badacze kapitału społecznego zakładają, iż jest to kategoria wielowymiarowa o charakterze ilościowo-jakościowym. M. Theiss zaproponowała dziesięć kryteriów wyróżniania typów kapitału społecznego (Theiss 2007, s. 33-39). Rozgraniczenia te przedstawione w tabeli 1 (Aneks) są jednak umowne, gdyż poszczególne typy kapitału często pozostają ze sobą w ścisłym związku. Przykładowo kapitał społeczny jako dobro klubowe, a więc służące małym grupom czy klikom, jest zarazem kapitałem nieformalnym, których służy realizacji celów partykularnych przynoszących niekiedy efekty sprzeczne z interesem ogółu. Na szczególną uwagę wśród wyróżnianych typów kapitału społecznego zasługuje zaufanie, które może być ograniczone do niewielkich grup lub przyjmować formę uogólnioną, rozciągającą się na obcych, wszystkich ludzi. P. Sztompka analizując pojęcie zaufania określa je „najcenniejszą odmianą kapitału społecznego" (Sztompka 2007, s. 244). Zaufanie w Referat na II Interdyscyplinarną Konferencję Młodych Naukowców "Doctor(ant)es", Interdyscyplinarne Koło Naukowe Doktorantów Uniwersytetu Kardynała Stefana Wyszyńskiego w Warszawie, Warszawa, 18-19.06.2009. 4 koncepcji tego autora to rodzaj zakładu (przekonania i opartego na nim działania) podejmowanego przez jednostkę na temat niepewnych przyszłych działań innych ludzi (tamże, s. 69-72). W zakładzie tym aktor społeczny szacuje na ile działania pozostałych będą dla niego korzystne. Zaufanie daje poczucie przewidywalności zachowań partnerów. Nieufność polega zaś na szacowaniu potencjalnych szkód. P. Sztompka określa też pojęcie braku zaufania, jako sytuacji neutralnej kiedy aktorzy społeczni nie mają zdania na temat pozostałych nie okazują ani zaufania, ani nieufności (tamże, s. 73). Każdy przejaw zaufania wiąże się z ryzykiem, czyli możliwością wystąpienia niekorzystnych skutków np. przykrości psychicznych jeśli osoby obdarzone zaufaniem nie wywiążą się z pokładanych w nich oczekiwań (tamże, s. 84). Ponadto według P. Sztompki poszczególne społeczeństwa można klasyfikować ze względu na poziom zaufania jakim obdarzają się ich członkowie (tamże, s. 243). Jeśli jest wysoki to umacnia się kultura zaufania, a ufność jest istotną normą regulującą zachowania. Jeśli zaś poziom ten jest niski to społeczeństwo jest zdominowane przez kulturę cynizmu, w której przejawy nieufności ulegają racjonalizacji oszukiwanie i podejrzliwość służą „rozwiązaniu problemów". Oddziaływanie kapitału społecznego na rozwój społeczno-ekonomiczny Korzyści z kapitału społecznego dla społeczności można rozpatrywać w trzech sferach: ekonomicznej, społecznej i politycznej (Theiss 2007, s. 76-101). Do pozytywnych skutków oddziaływania kapitału społecznego w pierwszej sferze zalicza się m.in. pobudzanie wzrostu gospodarczego, ułatwienie decentralizacji zadań, tworzenie elastycznych zespołów produkcyjnych, redukcję kosztów transakcyjnych, ograniczenie syndromu „pasażera na gapę" (uchylania się od wysiłków i oczekiwania na efekty działań pozostałych), zmniejszenie kosztów kontroli, usprawnianie wykorzystania dostępnych zasobów, zwiększenie standardu życia gospodarstw domowych (o ile osoby które je tworzą należą do zróżnicowanych organizacji i mają dostęp do różnych informacji), sprzyjanie inwestycjom w dzieci i traktowaniu ich jako dodatkowego zabezpieczenia na okres emerytalny, ułatwianie pożyczania środków finansowych od przyjaciół, sąsiadów i towarzystw pomocy wzajemnej. W sferze społecznej kapitał społeczny m.in. ułatwia poszukiwanie pracy szczególnie osobom z niższych warstw społecznych i w przypadku posad nie wymagających wysokich kwalifikacji, ułatwia awans zawodowy, zmniejsza koszty rekrutacji pracowników, pozytywnie oddziałuje na jakość życia i zdrowie, jest źródłem wsparcia społecznego, Referat na II Interdyscyplinarną Konferencję Młodych Naukowców "Doctor(ant)es", Interdyscyplinarne Koło Naukowe Doktorantów Uniwersytetu Kardynała Stefana Wyszyńskiego w Warszawie, Warszawa, 18-19.06.2009. 5 nieformalnej opieki, zmniejsza nierówności społeczno-ekonomiczne, ułatwia przekazywanie wiedzy, uczenie umiejętności i wzorów działania. Natomiast w sferze politycznej kapitał społeczny m.in. wspiera utrzymanie demokratycznego ładu społecznego, utrwala postawy obywatelskie, integruje z szerszą zbiorowością, ułatwia współdziałanie i zwiększa zaangażowanie w rozwiązywanie problemów społecznych, rozwija solidarność społeczną, pomocniczość, zwiększa kontrolę administracji publicznej, sprzyja inspirowaniu procesu legislacyjnego, zwiększa efektywność instytucji, pozwala na lepszą diagnozę i zaspokojenie potrzeb społecznych. Dostrzega się również wiele możliwych negatywnych skutków oddziaływania kapitału społecznego (Theiss 2007, s. 101-103). Zalicza się do nich m.in. tworzenie zamkniętych grup, gangów, grup nacisku, utrwalanie nierówności społecznych, wykluczanie ze wspólnot, utrudnianie dostępu do zasobów osobom spoza specyficznych grup, wywoływanie konfliktów między grupami, jak też ograniczenie indywidualnej wolności, presję na silną kontrolę społeczną, obciążenie zobowiązaniami, narzucanie zachowań przestępczych, szkodliwych dla zdrowia lub utrudniających edukację. Poza tym na społeczno-ekonomiczne korzyści z kapitału społecznego wyraźnie wskazują analizy zaufania i nieufności (Skarżyńska 2005, s. 81-83; Skarżyńska 2006, s. 105106; Sztompka 2007, s. 305-314). Zaufanie pozwala ludziom skoncentrować swoje zasoby poznawcze i energetyczne na osiąganiu celów, a nie na szukaniu zabezpieczeń na wypadek porażek. Ludzie, który ufają innym są szczęśliwsi, mają więcej przyjaciół i doświadczają wsparcia społecznego. Ponadto są zdrowsi, bardziej twórczy i kooperatywni, skłonni do podejmowania wielu prób osiągania celów, wyrażają mniejszy lęk przed porażką, są też mniej zależni od autorytetów oraz mniej skłonni do popełniania przestępstw i oszukiwania. Zaufanie mobilizuje podmiotowość, spontaniczność, otwartość i nieskrępowane działania wobec innych ludzi. Zmniejsza też odczucie niepewności i ryzyka oraz ułatwia inicjowanie interakcji i utrzymywanie trwałych relacji z innymi. Odwzajemnienie zaufania pozwala na korzystanie z zasobów innych osób. Zaufanie łączy się z takimi postawami, jak optymizm, poczucie sprawstwa, życzliwość i tolerancja. Ufanie innym sprzyja powiększaniu kapitału społecznego i kontaktom z osobami o wyższym statusie społecznym, daje poczucie uznania i akceptacji ze strony innych, otwiera szansę na dodatkowe korzyści, sprzyja otrzymywaniu dodatkowych informacji, dóbr czy innych wartości (np. otrzymywanie rekomendacji wobec osób trzecich). Sprzyja obdarzeniu przez innych „kredytem zaufania", czyli możliwością działania niekonwencjonalnego bez negatywnych sankcji w przypadku porażki. Referat na II Interdyscyplinarną Konferencję Młodych Naukowców "Doctor(ant)es", Interdyscyplinarne Koło Naukowe Doktorantów Uniwersytetu Kardynała Stefana Wyszyńskiego w Warszawie, Warszawa, 18-19.06.2009. 6 Osoby nieufne zaś mają mniejsze poczucie wsparcia społecznego, ich działania są obarczone wysokim poziomem stresu, który obniża wydajność. Nieufność zmniejsza tendencję do kooperacji i podejmowania ryzyka, częstość podejmowania prób innowacji i podwyższa koszty działań (np. wymusza kontrolę zewnętrzną). Nieufni są też częściej skłonni do oszukiwania i przestępstw, mają poczucie niesprawiedliwego traktowania, obojętności lub niechęci do innych oraz gorzej oceniają instytucje społeczne i system polityczny. Nieufność utrudnia inicjowanie interakcji, wymusza uciekanie się do działań rutynowych i prowadzi do odwzajemnienia nieufności. Ponadto rozwija lub umacnia postawy pesymizmu, pasywizmu, poczucia bezsilności, wrogości wobec innych i ksenofobii. Utrudnia wywiązywanie się ze zobowiązań, prowadzi do utraty korzyści płynących ze znajomości innych osób, jak też do utraty reputacji. Obniża samoocenę, nadwyręża tożsamość, sprzyja otrzymywaniu negatywnych sankcji zewnętrznych (np. utrata pracy, wyśmianie, oskarżenie przed sądem) i wewnętrznych (poczucie winy i wstydu, obawa przed kolejnymi sankcjami). Warto jeszcze zwrócić uwagę na fakt, iż w zbiorowościach w których brakuje zaufania powstają jego funkcjonalne substytuty, czyli alternatywne rozwiązania umożliwiające zaspokojenie potrzeb zwykle spełnianych przez zaufanie. Według P. Sztompki substytuty takie występują pod postacią praktyk indywidualnych, praktyk rozpowszechniających się oraz reguł kulturowych (Sztompka 2007, s. 328-333). Siedem takich mechanizmów stanowią:  wiara w opatrzność (uciekanie do losu, przeznaczenia, czy Boga może tłumić niepokój, wzmacniać zaufanie, ale na poziomie społeczeństwa prowadzi do pasywizmu i stagnacji; niemniej wiara religijna jest jednocześnie quasi-kapitałem, gdyż może dawać poczucie bezpieczeństwa, solidarności i wzajemnego wsparcia (tamże, s. 290-291));  korupcja (daje złudzenie kontroli nad innymi i gwarancję ich przychylności);  nadmierna czujność, osobisty nadzór i kontrola nad innymi („branie spraw w swoje ręce", zatrudnianie agencji ochrony i strażników, zakładanie alarmów, odzyskiwanie długów siłą);  uciekanie się do instytucji prawnych (sporządzanie kontraktów, powoływanie świadków, odwoływanie się do rozstrzygnięć sądowych);  gettoizacja (otaczanie się murami, tworzenie granic, zakładanie zamkniętych wspólnot);  paternalizm (poszukiwanie silnego przywódcy, zrzeszanie się w kultach i sektach);  eksternalizacja zaufania (pokładanie zaufania w przywódcach innych społeczeństw, ich organizacjach i produktach, w instytucjach międzynarodowych oraz emigracja w poszukiwaniu zatrudnienia). Referat na II Interdyscyplinarną Konferencję Młodych Naukowców "Doctor(ant)es", Interdyscyplinarne Koło Naukowe Doktorantów Uniwersytetu Kardynała Stefana Wyszyńskiego w Warszawie, Warszawa, 18-19.06.2009. 7 Funkcjonalne substytuty zaufania można uznać za istotne czynniki modyfikujące rozwój społeczno-ekonomiczny, które zmieniają dostrzegalne pozytywne i negatywne skutki oddziaływania kapitału społecznego oraz sprzyjają okazywaniu zaufania lub nieufności. Stan kapitału społecznego Polaków Systematycznie prowadzone badania sondażowe dowodzą, iż członkowie społeczeństwa polskiego powszechnie nie ufają sobie, nie zrzeszają się w dobrowolnych organizacjach oraz są najmniej tolerancyjni i obywatelscy w Europie (Czapiński 2008). Brak efektywnej wspólnoty nie pozwala Polakom na lepsze wykorzystanie dostępnych zasobów i podnoszenie jakości życia. Z badań European Social Survey z 2004 roku wynika, że tylko 11,3% Polaków podziela opinię iż „większości ludzi można ufać" (Czapiński 2007, s. 258). Tym samym pod względem uogólnionego zaufania Polacy zajmują ostatnią pozycję wśród krajów objętych tym badaniem. W „Diagnozie społecznej 2007" na takie samo pytanie odpowiedziało pozytywnie 11,5% badanych (tamże). Ponadto z badań CBOS z 2006 roku dowiadujemy się, że zaufanie do ludzi rośnie wraz z wykształceniem i dochodem (Komunikat nr 3480, CBOS 2006). Według tego badania 79% Polaków sądzi, iż „w stosunkach z innymi trzeba być bardzo ostrożnym". Polacy ufają najbliższej rodzinie (99%), dalszej rodzinie (88%), współpracownikom (70%) i sąsiadom (75%). Nie ufają takim instytucjom publicznym jak: partie polityczne (61%), sejm i senat (54%), administracja publiczna (50%), sądy (51%). Ufają zaś: kościołowi (81%), wojsku (76%), Unii Europejskiej (62%), policji (59%), władzom lokalnym (56%). Raport ten dowodzi również, że w Polsce nie ma istotnego związku między uogólnionym zaufaniem a aktywnością społeczną. B. Lewenstein analizując badania socjologiczne stwierdza, odnosząc się do koncepcji F. Fukuyamy, że polskie społeczeństwo to „społeczeństwo familijne" w którym podstawową jednostką tworzącą więzi między ludźmi jest rodzina (Lewenstein 2006, s. 168-175). W takiej formacji uznaje się silną rodzinę i silne państwo, podczas gdy struktury pośrednie typu stowarzyszeniowego są mniej liczne i uznawane za mniej istotne. Ponadto upowszechnione są niedemokratyczne formy uczestnictwa społecznego, a przejawy działalności obywatelskiej kojarzy się z istnieniem instytucji, a nie z obecnością obywatelskich postaw czy wartości. Kapitał społeczny służy tu osiąganiu celów partykularnych, umożliwia tylko reprodukcję dóbr i nie daje grupom nowych możliwości rozwojowych. Szacuje się, że od 1994 roku w badaniach zaczęto dostrzegać iż kapitał społeczny Polaków zależy od tradycji lokalnej aktywności, przedsiębiorczości i współpracy sięgających do czasów zaborów (tamże, s. 177 i Referat na II Interdyscyplinarną Konferencję Młodych Naukowców "Doctor(ant)es", Interdyscyplinarne Koło Naukowe Doktorantów Uniwersytetu Kardynała Stefana Wyszyńskiego w Warszawie, Warszawa, 18-19.06.2009. 8 189-191). Zaufanie do władz lokalnych jest niższe na byłych ziemiach zaboru rosyjskiego, niż pruskiego i austriackiego. Poza tym Polacy na tym obszarze wolą podejmować działania indywidualne, ustalać rozwiązania w nieformalnych układach lub czekać na inicjatywy władz lokalnych, niżeli podejmować zorganizowane działania zbiorowe. Niski poziom zaufania między Polakami według K. Skarżyńskiej można tłumaczyć na kilka sposobów (Skarżyńska 2005, s. 84-87). Po pierwsze w społeczeństwie są rozpowszechnione symptomy osobowości autorytarnej i makiawelistycznej – Polaków cechuje tradycyjne wychowanie, słabe wykształcenie, wysoka religijność oraz pamięć o życiu w autorytarnym systemie politycznym. Polacy nie starają się zrozumieć zachowań innych, wolą wybierać rozwiązania siłowe, bezpieczne i akceptowane przez autorytety, a nie innowacyjne. Do tego widząc, że inni łamią prawo sami postępują podobnie. Po drugie Polacy posiadają doświadczenia generujące nieufność (pamięć o II wojnie światowej, realnym socjalizmie, trudnościach z transformacją ustrojową i integracją europejską, czy aferach wśród elit politycznych). Poza tym w społeczeństwie polskim rywalizacji w dążeniu do zdobycia społecznie cenionych dóbr nie traktuje się w kategoriach mobilizacji, sposobu na maksymalizację wysiłków i osiąganie doskonałości w jakimś zakresie, lecz jako przejawy agresji, zawiści, łamania norm. Metody budowania kapitału społecznego W literaturze przedmiotu można spotkać się z propozycjami odgórnego i oddolnego wzmacniania kapitału społecznego. W pierwszym przypadku mamy do czynienia z propozycjami reform, zmian w sferze prawa, regulaminów, zarządzeń administracyjnych i działań politycznych. Odgórne stymulowanie wzrostu kapitału społecznego wiąże się również z ustalaniem strategii i programów rozwojowych na poziomie krajowym i regionalnym. Za przykład może posłużyć tu model opisujący powstawanie kultury zaufania zaproponowany przez P. Sztompkę, który jak podkreśla sam autor nie tylko wyjaśnia, ale też określa praktyczne sposoby wytwarzania kapitału społecznego (Sztompka 2007, s. 293-300). Punktem wyjścia jest tu założenie, iż należy dążyć do takiego przekształcania instytucji by swoją pracą zwiększały skłonność członków społeczeństwa do obdarzania innych zaufaniem i spełniania ich oczekiwań. Niezbędne są tu jednoczesne działania na rzecz:  poprawy legislacji (dbałości o spójność norm i prostotę systemu prawnego);  trwałości porządku społecznego (gwarantowania spójności i nieodwołalności zasad np. stałości w dążeniu do prorynkowych i demokratycznych reform); Referat na II Interdyscyplinarną Konferencję Młodych Naukowców "Doctor(ant)es", Interdyscyplinarne Koło Naukowe Doktorantów Uniwersytetu Kardynała Stefana Wyszyńskiego w Warszawie, Warszawa, 18-19.06.2009. 9  przejrzystości organizacji społecznej (otwartego charakteru działań władz, istnienia niezależnych mediów i ośrodków badawczych);  swojskości środowiska społecznego (życzliwości i uczynności reprezentantów instytucji);  odpowiedzialności osób i instytucji (wolnych wyborów, równości wobec prawa). Za odrębny aspekt budowy kultury zaufania P. Sztompka uznaje edukację rozumianą szeroko jako: upowszechnianie dostępu do wiedzy o życiu społecznym, lekcje ufności w życiu rodzinnym, budowa zaufania w szkolnych relacjach nauczycieli uczniów, podtrzymywanie ciągłości stylów życia i zwyczajów, przekazywanie przykładów zaufania przez wspólnoty religijne, uwzględnianie tematyki zaufania i nieufności w debatach publicznych oraz ukazywanie pozytywnych przykładów opłacalności zaufania przez mass media. Do tych odgórnych metod można zaliczyć jeszcze sterowanie różnorodnością (Sadowski 2006, s. 176177; Griffin 2005, s. 190-193), które dzięki ograniczaniu nieufności przedstawicieli różnych grup kulturowych, ma prowadzić do tworzenia wielokulturowych instytucji, społeczności lokalnych, miast i krajów a przez to umożliwić im np. obniżenie kosztów funkcjonowania, ułatwić pozyskiwanie zasobów, ułatwić dostosowanie się do otoczenia, zwiększyć kreatywność i innowacyjność oraz zwiększyć dostęp do informacji użytecznych przy rozwiązywaniu problemów. Z drugiej strony należy zauważyć, iż zaufania nie da się po prostu nakazać, bądź narzucić. Poniżej przedstawiony zostaje zestaw oddolnych metod budowania kapitału społecznego. Lista ta stanowi wzbogaconą wersję opracowania przygotowanego w ramach projektu naukowego Saguaro Seminar, który jeden z głównych autorów koncepcji kapitału społecznego R.D. Putnam prowadzi na Uniwersytecie Harvarda od 1995 roku. Inicjatywa ta zorientowana jest na poszukiwanie sposobów wzmacniania zaufania i uczestnictwa w życiu wspólnotowym a w jej pracach uczestniczy wielu ważnych amerykańskich naukowców, aktywistów, przedstawicieli biznesu i polityków. W wersji tej uwzględniono również godne upowszechnienia pomysły z listy rozwiązań proponowanych przez australijską organizację społeczną Bank of I.D.E.A.S. oraz metody dostosowane przez autora do polskiego kontekstu. 1. Spotykaj się z sąsiadami 2. Uczestnicz w spotkaniach, prezentacjach i pokazach lokalnych instytucji kultury 3. Bierz udział w wyborach i konsultacjach społecznych 4. Podziel się swoimi umiejętnościami z innymi jako wolontariusz 5. Rozmawiaj z przedstawicielami innych religii i grup etnicznych 6. Nagrywaj wspomnienia swoich rodziców i dziel się nimi z dziećmi Referat na II Interdyscyplinarną Konferencję Młodych Naukowców "Doctor(ant)es", Interdyscyplinarne Koło Naukowe Doktorantów Uniwersytetu Kardynała Stefana Wyszyńskiego w Warszawie, Warszawa, 18-19.06.2009. 10 7. Zaplanuj wakacje z przyjaciółmi i rodziną 8. Aktywnie słuchaj innych 9. Unikaj plotek 10. Zaprzeczaj stereotypom i uogólnieniom o zachowaniach, poglądach i ideach przedstawicieli innych kultur, religii i warstw społecznych 11. Promuj postawy antydyskryminacyjne i cnoty obywatelskie 12. Pomagaj innym w naprawach i remontach 13. Zorganizuj ligę sportową i uczestnicz w niej 14. Dołącz do związku działkowców 15. Uczestnicz w spotkaniach i imprezach jeśli zostałeś zaproszony 16. Oddawaj krew i promuj transplantologię 17. Uczestnicz w przedstawieniach, występach i zawodach sportowych swoich dzieci 18. Poznaj nauczycieli swoich dzieci 19. Działaj w drużynach harcerskich 20. Zbieraj i porządkuj informacje o umiejętnościach i zainteresowaniach sąsiadów oraz członków grup i organizacji w których działasz 21. Organizuj comiesięczne spotkania przy herbacie 22. Uczestnicz w spotkaniach w bibliotekach 23. Śpiewaj w chórze, tańcz w zespole, graj w teatrze amatorskim 24. Poznaj bliżej sprzedawców w swoim sklepie 25. Pozostaw w parku wodoodporne szachy lub warcaby 26. Graj w karty i gry towarzyskie z przyjaciółmi i sąsiadami 27. Przekaż 1% podatku na rzecz organizacji pożytku publicznego 28. Wspomóż lokalny bank żywności 29. Nie wstydź się własnego języka 30. Ucz się języków narodów sąsiednich 31. Poznawaj język Esperanto 32. Spaceruj po mieście 33. Studiuj historię swojego miejsca zamieszkania 34. Zachęcaj współpracowników do wolontariatu i promuj społeczną odpowiedzialność biznesu 35. Organizując imprezy, konferencje i prezentacje zbieraj anonimowe opinie i wrażenia uczestników Referat na II Interdyscyplinarną Konferencję Młodych Naukowców "Doctor(ant)es", Interdyscyplinarne Koło Naukowe Doktorantów Uniwersytetu Kardynała Stefana Wyszyńskiego w Warszawie, Warszawa, 18-19.06.2009. 11 36. Dbaj o relacje z otoczeniem instytucji w których działasz 37. Organizuj spotkania opiekunek do dzieci 38. Udzielaj odpowiedzi w badaniach ankietowych 39. Zapraszaj przedstawicieli lokalnych władz do czynnego uczestnictwa w swoich projektach 40. Po zakończeniu projektów społecznych dyskutuj z uczestnikami i rozdaj im pamiątkowe dyplomy 41. Bierz udział w świętach społeczności lokalnej 42. Załóż grupę spędzającą wspólnie czas na świeżym powietrzu 43. Bierz udział w kampaniach politycznych, wspieraj protesty oraz podpisuj petycje i wnioski 44. Uczestnicz w spotkaniach rad osiedlowych 45. Załóż grupę pomagającą seniorom w obsłudze komputerów 46. Dziel się narzędziami z sąsiadami 47. Regularnie spotykaj się z współpracownikami przy obiedzie lub w grupach dyskusyjnych 48. Pomagaj sąsiadom w odśnieżaniu i zagrabianiu podwórka 49. Regularnie dojeżdżaj z sąsiadami do pracy 50. Bież udział w wycieczkach pieszych do lokalnych miejsc historycznych 51. Regularnie zapraszaj rodzinę na obiady 52. Czytaj dzieciom 53. Kandyduj do stanowisk publicznych 54. Reaguj na wypadki, akty przemocy i zasłabnięcia 55. Zorganizuj imprezę dla sąsiadów z bloku lub ulicy 56. Załóż grupę pomagającą w remontach i pracach domowych potrzebującym 57. Pomagaj w pracach komitetów mieszkańców 58. Wstąp do ochotniczej straży pożarnej 59. Pieszo spaceruj z dziećmi do kościoła lub świątyni 60. Pomagaj samotnym starszym sąsiadom 61. Dbaj o dziedzictwo kulturowe i przyrodnicze 62. Dosiadaj się do ludzi samotnie spożywających obiad 63. Przekonaj lokalne restauracje do tworzenia stolików dla samotnych osób, które chcą poznać innych 64. Bierz udział z kursach artystycznych i plastycznych 65. Mów innym „dziękuje" Referat na II Interdyscyplinarną Konferencję Młodych Naukowców "Doctor(ant)es", Interdyscyplinarne Koło Naukowe Doktorantów Uniwersytetu Kardynała Stefana Wyszyńskiego w Warszawie, Warszawa, 18-19.06.2009. 12 66. Wspieraj inicjatywy charytatywne 67. Zbierz grupę sprzątającą osiedla, lokalne cmentarze i parki 68. Gdy słyszysz narzekanie i krytykę, sugeruj innym że też mogą coś zmienić 69. Rozmawiaj z innymi o sposobach na rozwiązywanie problemów społecznych 70. Piecz ciastka i dziel się nimi z sąsiadami i współpracownikami 71. Sadź drzewa i opiekuj się roślinami z sąsiadami 72. Zwracaj zagubione portfele i inne przedmioty 73. Rozmawiaj z ludźmi, których regularnie spotykasz w środkach transportu publicznego 74. Proś innych o pomoc i odwzajemniaj ją 75. Dzwoń do starych znajomych 76. Spotykaj kolegów z lat szkolnych 77. Rozmawiaj ze swoimi dziećmi i rodzicami o tym jak minął ich dzień 78. Mów „dzień dobry" do nieznajomych w windach, autobusach, urzędach i sklepach 79. Oferuj innym podwiezienie autem 80. Organizuj noce filmowe, słuchowiska, prezentacje dzieł sztuki i innych wytworów kultury 81. Zapraszaj nowopoznane osoby do spotkań w których uczestniczysz 82. Ćwicz z przyjaciółmi 83. Bież udział w pracach nad gazetkami lokalnymi 84. Zbieraj zdjęcia, pamiątki i historie mówione od starszych mieszkańców 85. Załóż klub dyskusyjny traktujący o sprawach społecznych, książkach lub innych zainteresowaniach 86. Pomagaj w rozwożeniu obiadów potrzebującym 87. Załóż klub historii lokalnej w swojej bibliotece 88. Prowadź treningi twórczości i kreatywności 89. Zachęcaj innych do rozwijania umiejętności i poszukiwania zajęć 90. Nie przechwalaj się i nie okazuj zazdrości 91. Mów innym o kapitale społecznym i jego znaczeniu 92. Ograniczaj oglądanie telewizji 93. Spędzaj czas z niepełnosprawnymi i chorymi 94. Pomagaj w przenoszeniu ciężkich przedmiotów 95. Uważnie czytaj prasę lokalną 96. Kup grill i zaproś innych na wspólny posiłek 97. Napraw coś nawet jeśli tego nie zepsułeś Referat na II Interdyscyplinarną Konferencję Młodych Naukowców "Doctor(ant)es", Interdyscyplinarne Koło Naukowe Doktorantów Uniwersytetu Kardynała Stefana Wyszyńskiego w Warszawie, Warszawa, 18-19.06.2009. 13 98. Zbieraj śmieci nawet jeśli ich nie porzuciłeś 99. Popieraj twórców lokalnych i produkty regionalne 100. Kibicuj lokalnym drużynom 101. Dziel się pouczającymi kawałami 102. Zatrudniaj młodzież do ciekawych zadań i rozwiązywania lokalnych problemów 103. Stwórz tradycję 104. Organizuj zajęcia dla wszystkich grup wiekowych 105. Bądź uprzejmy dla innych kierowców 106. Rób i dawaj innym prezenty 107. Pomagaj w selekcji odpadów 108. Informuj lokalne media o istotnych problemach, osiągnięciach, wydarzeniach i inicjatywach 109. Wysyłaj listy z podziękowaniami do redaktorów opisujących istotne sprawy lokalnej społeczności 110. Oddawaj zbędne przedmioty potrzebującym, grupom charytatywnym, bibliotekom i szkołom 111. Twórz bibliotekę domową i pozwalaj korzystać z niej innym 112. Pisz listy do znajomych 113. Bierz udział w kiermaszach starych przedmiotów 114. Chodź ze znajomymi na zakupy 115. Stwórz plac zabaw jeśli jest potrzebny 116. Otwieraj innym drzwi gdy mają zajęte ręce 117. Oferuj pilnowanie mieszkania sąsiadowi gdy wyjeżdża 118. Uczestnicz w zajęciach pozalekcyjnych 119. Gdy idziesz do sklepu zapytaj sąsiada czy czegoś nie potrzebuje 120. Oglądaj pamiątki i zdjęcia ze znajomymi 121. Działaj w grupach zrzeszających ludzi z różnych kultur, religii, warstw i grup społecznych 122. Zostań członkiem organizacji samopomocowych np. banków czasu 123. Stwórz grę miejską lub grę planszową związaną z miastem 124. Twórz drzewo genealogiczne 125. Fotografuj, filmuj i spisuj dokumentuj historię miejsca zamieszkania 126. Zaoferuj mentoring młodszej osobie Referat na II Interdyscyplinarną Konferencję Młodych Naukowców "Doctor(ant)es", Interdyscyplinarne Koło Naukowe Doktorantów Uniwersytetu Kardynała Stefana Wyszyńskiego w Warszawie, Warszawa, 18-19.06.2009. 14 127. Stwórz ze znajomymi wspólną wizję przyszłości 128. Zarządzaj czasem i zadaniami tak by nie spędzać całych dni w pracy 129. Zachęcaj szkoły do regularnej organizacji dni w których uczniowie i studenci będą mogli wykazać się aktywnością na rzecz dobra wspólnego 130. Za pośrednictwem internetowych serwisów społecznościowych informuj znajomych o wydarzeniach w których uczestniczysz 131. Uczestnicz w dyskusjach internetowych dotyczących twojego miejsca zamieszkania 132. Dołącz do bractwa rycerskiego lub grupy inscenizacji historycznych 133. Zaproś samotne osoby na święta rodzinne 134. Organizuj lub sponsoruj przeglądy i konkursy 135. Twórz plebiscyty promujące dobre praktyki 136. Dziel się pomysłami w księgach wniosków i skrzynkach sugestii 137. Wyrażaj swoje opinie w radiowych i telewizyjnych programach dyskusyjnych 138. Rozmawiaj i koresponduj z wnukami 139. Podczas wyjazdów pozostawiaj innym ludziom i organizacjom ulotki promujące turystykę twojego regionu 140. Pisz do ludzi, których praca stanowi twoją inspirację 141. Daj swój numer telefonu sąsiadom 142. Pomysłowo reaguj na brzydkie słownictwo 143. Zachęcaj dzieci do zabaw wymagających myślenia i kooperacji oraz nie stosuj kar z użyciem przemocy 144. W sklepie przepuszczaj seniorów, osoby niepełnosprawne i osoby z mniejszą ilością zakupów 145. Zbieraj datki do skarbonki 146. Załóż stronę internetową i dziel się z innymi przemyśleniami o niewykorzystanych możliwościach i szansach lokalnej społeczności 147. Organizuj doroczne imprezy uznania za pracę wolontariuszy, rolników, nauczycieli, urzędników, pracowników służb publicznych, przedsiębiorców itd. 148. Promuj regularne tematyczne spotkania przedstawicieli władz, biznesu, instytucji kultury i nauki oraz organizacji pozarządowych 149. Wyróżniaj historyczne i żyjące osoby istotne dla społeczności lokalnej 150. Pisz poradniki związane z życiem swojego miejsca zamieszkania 151. Przygotuj konkurs opisów lub ilustracji wyobrażonych przyszłych zmian w mieście Referat na II Interdyscyplinarną Konferencję Młodych Naukowców "Doctor(ant)es", Interdyscyplinarne Koło Naukowe Doktorantów Uniwersytetu Kardynała Stefana Wyszyńskiego w Warszawie, Warszawa, 18-19.06.2009. 15 152. Działaj na rzecz oznakowania miejsc związanych z wydarzeniami i postaciami historycznymi 153. Wspieraj szkoły by odkrywały, badały i pisały o lokalnej historii 154. Promuj akcje na rzecz powrotu byłych mieszkańców do miasta 155. Organizuj targi organizacji pozarządowych by mogły zaprezentować swoją działalność i rekrutować wolontariuszy 156. Przygotuj zestaw wskaźników jakości życia społeczności lokalnej i prowadź ich regularne pomiary 157. Zachęć prasę do utworzenia kolumny w której każdy będzie mógł przedstawić swoją wizję miasta 158. Zorganizuj konkurs fotograficzny lub wideo dla młodzieży by mogła pokazać co ceni w społeczności 159. Rozsyłaj informacje o życiu lokalnym do byłych mieszkańców twojej społeczności 160. Twórz i rozpowszechniaj hasła pozytywnie opisujące społeczność lokalną 161. Aranżuj i dekoruj przestrzeń nawiązując do tradycji przodków 162. Notuj pomysły na wywołanie pożądanych zmian 163. Podziel się tą listą z innymi Nie podważając sensowności działań odgórnych należy zaznaczyć, iż budowanie kapitału społecznego zdaje się być niemożliwe bez spontanicznej, oddolnej aktywności członków społeczeństwa. Zwykli ludzie mogą na wiele sposobów samodzielnie rozwiązywać dotyczące ich problemy zrzeszając się, tworząc organizacje pozarządowe, grupy obywatelskie i samorządowe, uczestnicząc w debatach publicznych oraz inicjując i rozwijając ruchy społeczne na rzecz realizacji uznawanych wartości np. ochrony środowiska, praw człowieka, zapewnienia praw mniejszości, czy ograniczenia bezrobocia. Bibliografia Bank of I.D.E.A.S. (2009). 128 Community Projects That Build Social Capital. Dostępne: 14 VIII 2009: http://www.bankofideas.com.au/Downloads/Social_Capital_Handout_2.pdf. Bank of I.D.E.A.S. (2009). 151 Things I Can Do to Build Social Capital in My Community. Dostępne: 14 VIII 2009: http://www.bankofideas.com.au/Downloads/Social_ Capital_Handout_1.pdf. Referat na II Interdyscyplinarną Konferencję Młodych Naukowców "Doctor(ant)es", Interdyscyplinarne Koło Naukowe Doktorantów Uniwersytetu Kardynała Stefana Wyszyńskiego w Warszawie, Warszawa, 18-19.06.2009. 16 Boni, M. (red.) (2009). Raport Polska 2030. Wyzwania rozwojowe. Warszawa: Kancelaria Prezesa Rady Ministrów. Dostępne: 14 VIII 2009: http://www.zds.kprm.gov.pl/ userfiles/raport_polska_2030.pdf. Borys, T., Rogala, P. (red.) (2008). Jakość życia na poziomie lokalnym ujęcie wskaźnikowe. Warszawa: UNDP. CBOS (2006). Zaufanie w sferze prywatnej i publicznej a społeczeństwo obywatelskie. Komunikat z badań nr 3480. Dostępne: 14 VIII 2009: http://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/ 2006/K_024_06.PDF. Czapiński, J. (2007). Kapitał społeczny. W: J. Czapiński, T. Panek (red.), Diagnoza Społeczna 2007 Warunki i jakość życia Polaków. Warszawa: Rada Monitoringu Społecznego, 257-267. Czapiński, J. (2008). Molekularny rozwój Polski. W: J. Szomburg (red.), Modernizacja Polski. Kody kulturowe i mity. Gdańsk: IBnGR, 95-102. Fukuyama, F. (1997). Zaufanie. Kapitał społeczny a droga do dobrobytu. WarszawaWrocław: PWN. Griffin, R.W. (2005). Podstawy zarządzania organizacjami. Warszawa: PWN. Harrison, L.E., Huntington, S.P. (red.) (2003). Kultura ma znaczenie. Jak wartości wpływają na rozwój społeczeństw. Poznań: Zysk i S-ka. Lewenstein, B. (2006). Społeczeństwo rodzin czy obywateli kapitał społeczny Polaków okresu transformacji, Societas/Communitas, t. 1, 1, 163-196. Narodowy Program Foresight „Polska 2020" (2009). Wyniki Narodowego Programu Foresight Polska 2020. Dostępne: 14 VIII 2009: http://foresight.polska2020.pl/export/ sites/foresight/pl/news/files/Wyniki_NPF-Polska_2020.pdf. Putnam, R.D. (2000). Bowling Alone: the Collapse and Revival of American Community. New York: Simon & Schuster. Rymsza, A. (2007). Klasyczne koncepcje kapitału społecznego. W: T. Kaźmierczak, M. Rymsza (red.), Kapitał społeczny. Ekonomia społeczna, Warszawa: ISP, 23-39. Sadowski, A. (2006). Białystok. Kapitał społeczny mieszkańców miasta. Białystok: WSE. Saguaro Seminar: Civic Engagement in America at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government. (2009). 150 Things you can do to build social capital. Dostępne: 14 VIII 2009: http://www.bettertogether.org/pdfs/150things.pdf. Referat na II Interdyscyplinarną Konferencję Młodych Naukowców "Doctor(ant)es", Interdyscyplinarne Koło Naukowe Doktorantów Uniwersytetu Kardynała Stefana Wyszyńskiego w Warszawie, Warszawa, 18-19.06.2009. 17 Skarżyńska, K. (2005). Czy jesteśmy prorozwojowi? Wartości i przekonania ludzi a dobrobyt i demokratyzacja kraju. W: M. Drogosz (red.), Jak Polacy przegrywają, jak Polacy wygrywają. Gdańsk: GWP, 69-92. Skarżyńska, K. (2006). Pracowity jak Polak. Co to dzisiaj znaczy? Kultura współczesna, nr 1 (47), 100-112. Sztompka, P. (2002). Socjologia. Analiza społeczeństwa. Kraków: Znak. Sztompka, P. (2007). Zaufanie. Fundament społeczeństwa. Kraków: Znak. Theiss, M. (2007). Krewni-znajomi-obywatele. Kapitał społeczny a lokalna polityka społeczna. Toruń: Wyd. Adam Marszałek. Abstrakt Koncepcje kapitału społecznego mają istotne znaczenie w podnoszeniu jakości życia. Niemniej skutki oddziaływania nagromadzonego kapitału społecznego w sferach ekonomicznej, społecznej i politycznej mogą być zarówno pozytywne, jak i negatywne. Artykuł przybliża specyfikę zaufania jako kluczowej odmiany kapitału społecznego i jego stan wśród Polaków. Wskazane zostają też różnice między nieufnością, brakiem zaufania i funkcjonalnymi substytutami zaufania. Całość uzupełnia zestawienie oddolnych metod budowania kapitału społecznego. The concepts of social capital are important in improving the quality of life. However, the effects of social capital accumulated in the economic, social and political spheres can be both positive and negative. Article brings the specificity of trust as a key variety of social capital and it's status among the Poles. Indicated are also differences between the suspicion, mistrust and functional substitutes for trust. The whole is complemented by breakdown of bottom-up methods of social capital building. Referat na II Interdyscyplinarną Konferencję Młodych Naukowców "Doctor(ant)es", Interdyscyplinarne Koło Naukowe Doktorantów Uniwersytetu Kardynała Stefana Wyszyńskiego w Warszawie, Warszawa, 18-19.06.2009. 18 Aneks Tabela 1. Typy kapitału społecznego jako zasobu Kryterium podziału Typy kapitału społecznego Zakres pojęcia wyłącznie więzi i normy społeczne więzi, normy społeczne, instytucje i organizacje społeczne więzi, normy, instytucje społeczne, rozwiązania prawne i ekonomiczne (kraju) Poziom analizy socjologicznej i/lub ośrodek koncentracji kapitału społecznego jednostek lub gospodarstw domowych grup społecznych lub środowisk lokalnych instytucji krajów Ekonomiczny rodzaj dobra dobro prywatne dobro klubowe dobro publiczne Charakter efektów zewnętrznych przynoszący negatywne efekty zewnętrzne (anti-social, perverse social capital) przynoszący pozytywne efekty zewnętrzne Cele dysponenta kapitału społecznego zorientowany na realizację celów partykularnych (inward looking) zorientowany na realizację dobra wspólnego (outward looking) Rodzaj powiązań tworzących kapitał społeczny oparty na więzi zrzeszeniowej; łączący osoby o różnym statusie społ.-ekonom (bridging) oparty na głównie więzi naturalnej; łączący osoby o podobnym statusie społ.-ekonom. (bonding) oparty na pionowych zależnościach władzy i zwierzchności (linking) Siła, ekskluzywność i częstotliwość kontaktów w istniejących powiązaniach oparty na silnych powiązaniach i częstych kontaktach (thick social capital) oparty na słabych powiązaniach i sporadycznych kontaktach (thin social capital) Promień zaufania między osobami zróżnicowany – od zaufania ograniczonego do najbliższej rodziny do zaufania zgeneralizowanego Stopień formalizacji kapitału społecznego nieformalny formalny Sfera, w której objawia się kapitał społeczny prywatny/rodzinny obywatelski/kapitał społeczny w sferze publicznej Źródło: M. Theiss, Krewni-znajomi-obywatele. Kapitał społeczny a lokalna polityka społeczna, Wyd. Adam Marszałek, Toruń 2007, s. 34-35. Andrzej Klimczuk, magister socjologii, absolwent Wydziału Historyczno-Socjologicznego na Uniwersytecie w Białymstoku [email protected]

THE ANTINOMY OF THE VARIABLE: A TARSKIAN RESOLUTION Bryan Pickel and Brian Rabern University of Edinburgh -forthcoming in the Journal of Philosophy -- The theory of quantification and variable binding developed by Tarski is a fixed point for many debates in metaphysics, formal semantics, and philosophy of logic. However, recent critics-most forcefully, Kit Fine (2003, 2007)-have posed an intriguing set of challenges to Tarski s account, which re-expose long sublimated anxieties about the variable from the infancy of analytic philosophy. The problem is a version of a puzzle confronted by Russell, which Fine dubs the antimony of the variable . This paradox arises from seemingly contradictory things that we wish to say about the variable. On the one hand, there are strong reasons to deny that x and y are synonymous, since they make different contributions when they jointly occur within a sentence. Consider, for instance, the sentence ∃ ∃ ≤ . One cannot replace the second occurrence of x with y yielding ∃ ∃ ≤ without change of meaning. On the other hand, there is a strong temptation to say that distinct variables x and y are synonymous, since sentences differing by the total, proper substitution of x for y always agree in meaning. For instance, ∀ ≤ and ∀ ≤ are synonymous in the strongest possible sense. As Fine says, they are mere notational variants . We suggest that it is best to construe this very strong synonymy as an identity in structured meanings: the sentences and their corresponding parts are synonymous all the way down. This suggests that the variables occurring in corresponding positions in these formulas are also synonymous. One of the innovations of Tarski s (1935) semantics is that a variable refers to or designates an object only relative to a sequence. One might hope that this goes some way towards resolving the antinomy, since Tarski need not assign any sort of referent to the variable. But this is not enough, since the antinomy concerns whether two variables are synonymous. As we formulate the antinomy, it concerns the variable s contribution to the structured meaning of a sentence that 2 contains it. Even on Tarski s sequence-relative semantics, x and y may designate different individuals even relative to the same sequence. This suggests that their meanings are different. But this leaves Tarski unable to account for the felt sameness of meaning between distinct but corresponding variables in alphabetic variants. These challenges would overturn seemingly settled doctrines about the relationship between language and the world. A dramatic reconceptualization of the role of variables in mathematical practice, in natural language semantics, and even in first-order logic would be called for. Fine suggests semantic relationism , a radical departure from standard compositional semantics. (owever, Tarski s semantics for variables has the resources to resolve the antinomy without abandoning standard compositional semantics. In a neglected passage, Tarski worried about how to determine the value of a variable relative to a sequence. He suggests that, in a given sentence, the first variable should be associated with the first position, the second variable with the second position, and so on. Using a bit of dynamic semantics, we develop this suggestion into a rigorous procedure-which we call dynamic indexing-associating each variable with a position in a sequence. The underlying idea is that the semantic contribution of a variable maps a context to a position in a sequence. On the semantics we offer, x and y will be associated with distinct functions from contexts into positions in sequences. Nonetheless, if x and y occur in corresponding positions in sentences that are alphabetic variants, then (in context) they will be correlated with the same position in a sequence. Thus, we offer a sense in which x and y have the same semantic role and a sense in which they don t, thereby resolving the antinomy. 1. The antinomy of the variable Variables are central to the notation of mathematics and science. Some mathematical and scientific claims are framed using free variables. A 3 mathematician might express the claim that an operator such as + is commutative using the open formula + = + . Free variables are of limited use in expressing generality, however, since one cannot express embedded general claims such as negated universal or multiply quantified statements. For instance, sentence (1) could in principle be rewritten using only free variables. Sentence (2) requires more sophisticated symbolism. (1) Every number is less than or equal to itself. (2) Every number is less than or equal to some number. For this reason, both sentence (1) and (at least one reading of) sentence (2) are regimented using bound variables, which fall under the scope of quantifiers such as for every ∀ and for some ∃ . (1*) ∀ ≤ (2*) ∃ ∀ ≤ Writing quantified sentences using variables resolves ambiguities and facilitates inference because it wears its compositional structure on its sleeve. In particular, the meaning of the complex expression in this notation is determined by the meanings of its syntactic constituents and their order of combination. That is, meaning is compositional. Compositionality helps explain why speakers can grasp the infinitely many sentences of a language. It also constrains the choice of semantic theories, making them more susceptible to empirical disconfirmation. In contrast to the quantified sentences of formal languages, semanticists commonly derive the semantic features of a quantified sentence from natural language-such as (1)-by first regimenting it. Often, they posit a deeper level of representation, which captures the logical form . For example, contemporary linguists provide a syntactic story whereby the quantifier moves out front and leaves behind a trace . The trace is treated as a bound variable (Heim and 4 Kratzer 1998: 178–200). In this way, the syntactic structure-e.g. of (1*)-more directly tracks its semantic evaluation. But what is the syntactic structure of sentences (1*) and (2*)? The standard answer since Tarski (1935) is as follows. In constructing (1*), one starts with the variable x and the two-place predicate ≤ to build the open sentence ≤ .1 One then prefixes the quantifier ∀ yielding ∀ ≤ . Sentence (2*) is constructed similarly. We start with the variables x and y and the two-place predicate ≤ to build the open sentence ≤ , then prefix ∀ to yield ∀ ≤ . Finally, one attaches ∃ resulting in ∃ ∀ ≤ . So, this standard account presupposes what we will call assumption (): Variables are genuine syntactic constituents of quantified sentences. Some approaches to the semantics of quantification dispense with assumption (), and reject the view that variables have an independent semantic role.2 We will address one of these arising from the Fregean tradition. But we will leave other approaches-such as combinatory logic-for future discussion. Assuming that a variable is a genuine constituent of a sentence, it must have some meaning or what Fine (2007: 7) calls a semantic role or linguistic function . )t is the job of semantics to describe this meaning. The antinomy of the variable concerns whether two variables, and , agree in meaning. The difficulty is-as Fine (2007: 7) puts it- we wish to say contradictory things about their semantic role . The conflict arises because two variables occurring in the same sentence seem to behave differently, but occurring in different sentences their behavior is indistinguishable.3 1 Tarski was the first to clearly argue that open sentences belong in the same grammatical category as closed sentence. His argument was that the same operators-negation, conjunction, and so on-could attach to both open and closed sentences (Tarski 1935: 189-91; Tarski 1941: 45). 2 In natural language semantics the roles of quantification and variable-binding are sometime separated. The latter job is done by -binders, which attach to open sentences that contain variables. It follows that variables are still genuine constituents of a sentence. 3 Fine : does not rest content with this form of the paradox. (e asks what it means for x and y to have different semantic roles in a context. (e answers that the pairs of variables x , y and x , x make different contributions to whatever sentences contain them. Since Fine s 5 Difference: When variables and jointly occur in a single sentence, they have distinct meanings. Sameness: In sentences that differ in the total, proper substitution of for , these variables have the same meanings. In what follows, we offer arguments purporting to show that two variables must have these conflicting features, by making explicit the underlying theoretical motivations for ascribing each feature to variables. 1. Why and must not agree in meaning The argument that and have different meaning is straightforward, since substituting one for the other may fail to preserve meaning. Fine (2003: 606) appeals to open sentences containing free variables to make the argument: Suppose that we have two variables, say and ;... [W]hen we consider the semantic role of the variables in the same expression-such as > -then it seems...clear that their semantic role is different. Indeed, it is essential to the linguistic function of the expression as a whole that it contains two distinct variables, not two occurrences of the same variable, and presumably this is because the roles of the distinct variables are not the same. Fine s crucial premise is that expressions differing only by the substitution of one occurrence of a variable for an occurrence of the other differ in meaning. In Fine s example, the occurrence of x in the open sentence > cannot be substituted with y -yielding > -without change of meaning. The argument implicitly appeals to the principle of compositionality, that the semantic features of a whole are determined by the semantic features of their parts and their mode of combination. )n particular, if x and y had exactly the opponents don t offer any semantic characterization of pairs of expressions, we will leave the antinomy as it stands. 6 same semantic features, then, replacing the first occurrence of x with y in > should yield a sentence with the same meaning. But it does not. While intuitive, some may object to Fine s appeal to the meanings of open sentences. One might doubt whether one has direct access to whether the open sentences > and > agree in meaning. The case could therefore be strengthened if it can be established that replacing x with y in a closed sentence does not preserve meaning. This can be directly verified by considering the fact that ∃ ∀ ≤ and ∃ ∀ ≤ differ in meaning-indeed they may differ in truth-value, though they differ only by replacing an occurrence of x with y . )t follows from the principle of compositionality that the variables x and y differ in meaning. 1.2 Why and must agree in meaning Fine s (2003, 606) argument that and must agree in meaning is elusive: Suppose that we have two variables, say and ; ...[W]hen we consider their semantic role in two distinct expressions-such as > and > , we wish to say that their semantic role is the same. Indeed, this would appear to be as clear a case as any of a mere conventional or notational difference; the difference is merely in the choice of the symbol and not in its linguistic function. Undoubtedly, Fine is right that the choice between > and > is purely notational, and thus their meanings must have something in common. But Fine doesn t elucidate the theoretical importance of this commonality. The claim that and agree in meaning (in some important sense) is crucial to Fine s whole project. Without it, there simply is no antinomy. So it is desirable to find some more robust theoretical motivation for the claim. Such a motivation can be found by appealing to a strong notion of synonymy recognized within the formal semantics tradition. This tradition aims at specifying the truth conditions of a sentence in terms of the compositional semantic values of its constituents (Lewis 1970; Montague 1974). The truth 7 conditions of a sentence will be specified as the set of points of evaluation (e.g. sets of possible worlds) in which the sentence is true. The problem is that, even within the formal semantics tradition, truth conditions are recognized as rather too coarse-grained to serve as the meanings of sentences. For instance, assuming all mathematical theorems are necessary, any two theorems such as there are infinitely many prime numbers and two is prime ) are truth conditionally equivalent. But any view counting these sentences as wholly synonymous is missing something.4 This problem is standardly addressed by identifying the meaning of a sentence not merely with its compositional semantic value, but also with the procedure by which the compositional semantic value was derived from the meanings of the sentence s ultimate constituents. Let us call this, the sentence s structured meaning. When the antinomy is construed in terms of structured meanings, it derives its force from the conjunction of assumption () which states that variables are genuine constituents of sentences which contain them with an additional assumption linking a sentence s syntactic constituents to the constituents of its structured meaning. We call this assumption (). () Variables are genuine syntactic constituents of quantified and open sentences of the regimented language. () Each syntactic constituent of a sentence of a regimented language must correspond to a constituent of the structured meaning of that sentence. Assumption () traces back to Carnap s ) strongest notion of synonymy, intensional isomorphism , which requires that the parts of synonymous sentences agree in meaning.5 4 If one thinks that mathematical theorems are contingent-for instance, because one thinks that the existence of mathematical entities is contingent-then the example can easily be altered to our purposes. See the discussion in Heim and Kratzer (1998: §12.4). 5 Carnap (1947) cites C. I. Lewis (1943) as a predecessor, but says that their views developed independently. 8 For similar reasons, Stalnaker (2003: 65) speaks of the meaning of a sentence as the recipe for determining its truth-conditions as a function of the meanings of its components and the compositional rules . As Lewis (1970: 31) says, Differences in intension, we may say, give us coarse differences in meaning. For fine differences in meaning we must look to the analysis of a compound into constituents and to the intensions of the several constituents. ... For still finer differences in meaning we must look in turn to the intensions of constituents of constituents, and so on. Only when we come to non-compound, lexical constituents can we take sameness of intension as a sufficient condition of synonymy. In addition to providing a grip on the pre-theoretic notion of synonymy, structured meanings have been put to work in developing an account of the information value or belief content of a sentence, which can solve puzzles associated with propositional attitude ascriptions. Thus, Carnap (1947: §13), followed by many others, argued that belief ascriptions are neither extensional nor intensional since they do not even permit the substitution of intensionally equivalent sentences. Although there are infinitely many primes has the same intension as + = , the belief ascriptions Sam believes that there are infinitely many primes and Sam believes that + = may differ in truth-value. Fine s claim that x and y agree in meaning can be bolstered by framing it in terms of structured meanings. One corollary of assumption () is that if two sentences are synonymous in the relevant sense, then they must have corresponding constituents which agree in meaning. That is, if � and � are synonymous (i.e. have the same structured meaning), then each component of � must agree in meaning-in the relevant sense-with its counterpart of �. The problem now is that formulae that result from the total, proper substitution of one variable x for another y are synonymous in the strongest sense.6 Consider two regimentations of sentence (1). We regimented this sentence as 6 Church (1956 p. 40 fn. 96 says: ...[an expression] which contains a particular variable as a bound variable is unaltered in meaning by alphabetic change of the variable, at all of its bound occurrences, to a new variable (not previously occurring) which has the same range. See Kalish and Montague (1964, Chapter 7) for an explicit definition of uniform substitution and alphabetic variants. 9 ∀ ≤ , but ∀ ≤ is an equally good regimentation of (1). Indeed, one would read both of these aloud as every number is less than or equal to itself . The fact that alphabetic variants such as ∀ ≤ and ∀ ≤ regiment the same natural language sentence suggests that they are synonymous.7 Some semanticists such as Jacobson (1999: 127) have been so gripped by the synonymy of alphabetic variants, that they have abandoned the use of variables in natural language semantics as somehow a cheat : If the variable names such as and (or, 1 and 2) are actual modeltheoretic objects, then they are of course distinct objects. And yet, when they find themselves in forms which are alphabetic variants, they never make a different semantic contribution... In other words, there is an obvious sense in which and really are not different semantic objects-unlike other distinct model-theoretic objects. To avoid this antinomy, Jacobson herself offers a radical semantic proposal for avoiding variables in her semantics. 8 Another manifestation of this synonymy arises because alphabetic variants seem to express exactly the same belief content. This is reflected in the fact that alphabetic variants are intersubstitutable even in propositional attitude reports.9 Consider sentence (3). (3) John believes that every number is less than or equal to itself. is equally well regimented by John believes that ∀ ≤ and John believes that ∀ ≤ . But, if so, then the structured content expressed by the regimentations of the embedded sentences in context must agree in meaning. 7 Related arguments occur in Kalish and Montague (1964: 165). If, like Quine (1960), one thinks that regimentation need not preserve meaning, then one will be inclined to reject this argument. See also, e.g. Church (1956: 20) and Lewis (1970: 45-46). 8 Related skepticism about variables has also led logicians such as Curry and Feys (1958/1968) to develop alternative variable-free systems. See the notation developed in De Bruijn (1972) for a different approach. Simply getting rid of variables in the syntax doesn t automatically get one off the hook with respect to the general problems concerning the structured meaning of quantified sentences. Given that such systems trade variables in the syntax for an array of combinators in the syntax one might worry that analogous problems will re-emerge. 9 The total, proper substitution of bound variables preserves sense even on Church s : , footnote 5) Alternative (0)-his strictest criterion of synonymy, which is meant to model attitude ascriptions. See also Kaplan (1989a: 557) 10 Thus, sentences differing only by the total, proper substitution of variables look synonymous in the strongest possible sense. They are mere notational variants, if any sentences are at all.10 Thus, their corresponding parts must agree in meaning: x and y must agree in meaning. 1.3 The challenge of the antinomy We have uncovered that x and y must-in some sense-agree in meaning, but also that they must-in some sense-disagree in meaning. Both Carnap (1947: 58-59) and Lewis (1970: 45-46) recognized this tension. They wanted to guarantee that alphabetic variants have the same structured meanings. Yet, on their explicit semantics, distinct variables have distinct semantic values due to the constraints of compositionality, giving rise to what Lewis called a spurious ambiguity between alphabetic variants such as ∀ ≤ and ∀ ≤ . Both Carnap (1947: 58-59) and Lewis (1970: 45-46) introduced artificial, ad hoc maneuvers to relieve this tension and thereby identify the structured meanings of alphabetic variants, even though the corresponding constituents had different semantic values. This type of ad hoc trick undermines the motivation for appealing to structured meanings in the first place. Other proponents of structured contents have been at pains to avoid the antinomy. The basic idea behind the structured contents approach is that a sentence has a content which encodes, or is composed out of, the meanings of [the sentence s] constituents Soames : . One sort of solution adopted by prominent proponents of structured contents approaches-including 10 On Cresswell s : ff) structured meanings approach, a sentence � of arbitrary complexity can be embedded in the that-clause of a belief report. The that operator is polysemous and can operate either on � or on the separate parts of � taken in sequence. In the latter case, the object of belief will be the structured meaning of �, which is identified with the ordered n-tuple of the intensions of � s constituents. Cresswell ibid: 101) does not actually specify intensions for variables, but only intensions relative to an assignment. As a result, his procedure either fails to deliver structured meanings for ∃� and ∃� or-if the semantics for variables is naturally extended to provide them intensions-will assign these sentences different structured meanings, delivering the unwelcome result that they may embed differently under belief ascription. 11 (Salmon 1986: 145-6, theses 27 and 28) and (Soames 1988: 224, thesis 28d)- involves outright denying that the structured meaning of a quantified sentence reflects the meanings of its ultimate components, thereby denying assumption (). In particular, according to Soames and Salmon the structured proposition expressed by a quantified sentence such as ∃ reflects only the meanings of the quantifier ∃ and the predicate abstract, which we will write as . )f we use brackets [...] to denote the contribution an expression makes to the structured meaning of a sentence that contains it, then we could display the structured meaning of ∃ as follows: The semantic contribution of the predicate abstract is not broken down any further. This has the result that the sentence expresses the same structured meaning as its alphabetic variants such as ∃ : As a result, this approach might be used to vindicate a broadly Tarskian semantics. Nonetheless, one might offer three interrelated complaints. First, the approach requires one to intensionalize the contribution of the predicate abstracts so that they reflect the semantic values of some, but not all, of their constituent expressions (Fine 2007: 16-17). This intensionality will be necessary to distinguish the structured content of ∃ from that of, e.g., ∃ = . This leads to the second complaint. Namely, the approach undermines some of the original motivations for structured contents. The structured content of, say, ∃ � � � , will not contain the structured content of Desdemona , but will encode it only in an indirect way.11 The third complaint is 11 An advocate of structured propositions might worry that this opens the door to a generalization, which accounts for belief content and synonymy in terms of hyperintensional, but unstructured meanings as in Church (1951) and Bealer (1982). 12 that the solution seemingly entails that the meanings of some constituent expressions are not even encoded in the structured contents of sentences that express them. In particular, if the meaning of x is encoded in the structured content of ∃ and the meaning of y is encoded in the meaning of ∃ , then the meanings of x and of y would need to be the same. But it is hard to see how this is compatible with the fact that the meaning of x differs from the meaning of y in ∃ ∀ ≤ . If we take the encoding talk seriously, then the antinomy seems to recur at the level of what is encoded rather than contained in the structured content of a sentence. More recently, Jeff King s (1995: 527-9) account of structured contents has attempted to do justice to the idea that all of the meaningful syntactic constituents of a sentence are encoded in the structured contents they express. As a result, he has oscillated in trying to adequately capture the distinct contributions of distinct variables in a sentence and at the same time ensure that alphabetic variants have the same structured contents. This oscillation perfectly reveals the tensions created by the antinomy of the variable. In his early work, King (1995: 533-4, notes 5, 20, and 22; 1996: 498) suggested that distinct variables must make distinct contributions to the structured contents of sentences that contain them. On his official implementation, the variables contribute themselves to the structured meanings, though King allows that the variables may be replaced by suitable proxy objects so long as each variable contributes a different one King : footnote . This semantics has the result that alphabetic variants, since they may contain distinct variables, express different structured contents.12 In more recent work, King (2007: 41-2, 218-222) abandons the view that variables contribute anything at all to the structured contents of sentences that contain them. Each variable contributes a mere gap or an empty argument position . But this makes it difficult to see how ∃ ∀ ≤ and ∃ ∀ ≤ 12 The same problem will plague theories that appeal to linguistic modes of presentation such as the Interpreted Logic Forms of Larson and Ludlow (1993 , since [)LFs] include complete syntactic phrase-markers, including diacritics (e.g., variables and indices (349, note 29). 13 can have different structured meanings. In particular, the semantic values of the simple constituents of these sentences make the same contributions to their structured meanings.13 On our way of viewing the antinomy, it challenges us to articulate a sense in which alphabetic variants are synonymous-have the same structural meanings-despite the fact that the variables x and y exhibit different semantic behavior, and thus have different semantic values. 2. Are There Variables? Problems with variables and the symbolism of generality have a long history in analytic philosophy. For instance, in Principia, Whitehead and Russell observed that distinct variables make different contributions within the context of a single larger sentence.14 Thus, x is hurt and y is hurt make distinct contributions in x is hurt and y is hurt . On the other hand, the content of these open sentences express the same propositional function . Accordingly though x is hurt and y is hurt occurring in the same context can be distinguished, is hurt" and is hurt convey no distinction of meaning at all. (Whitehead and Russell 1910: 15) Similarly, they hold that quantified sentences that are alphabetic variants express the same proposition, or structured content. The symbol . � denotes one definite proposition, and there is no distinction in meaning between . � and . � when they occur in the same context. (Whitehead and Russell 1910: 16) 13 King s view is best understood as embracing a kind of non-compositionality (analogous to that of Fine 2003) so that the contributions of non-terminal nodes to structured meanings of sentences that contain them are not determined by the contributions of their simpler components (see footnote 31 below). Yli-Vakkuri (2013: §3.3.2 charges that King s semantics is non-compositional, but in a different sense. Yli-Vakkuri argues that King s semantics violates the naïve view that the structured content of a sentence in context is its compositional semantic value, so that substituting two sentences with the same structured meanings results in a sentence with the same structured meaning. We reject this naïve assumption and it plays no part in our argument. 14 Russell : assumes variables are fundamental , which seems to validate assumption (). See Russell (1903: §86-93) and Frege (1904) for further early discussion of the anitonomy. 14 Thus, there is an important sense in which x and y agree in meaning, though not when occurring in the same context.15 Despite its august roots, we suspect that many philosophers will feel little patience with the antinomy because it rests on assumption (), that variables are genuine syntactic constituents of sentences. Indeed, there is an important semantic tradition originating with Frege rejecting assumption ( . Frege s suspicions about variables issued from considerations resembling the antinomy of the variable. Frege reasons that if variables are genuine constituents of sentences, then two variables must have the same reference (and perhaps express the same sense).16 We cannot specify what properties x has and what differing properties y has. If we associate anything with these letters at all, it is the same vague image for both of them. (Frege 1904: 109) Since identifying the referents of x and y leads to violations of the principle of compositionality, Frege rejects assumption (). Frege s alternative is that bound variables are ultimately typographic parts of the dispersed quantifier sign. Frege has been followed by contemporary logicians such as Kaplan (1986: 244) who says:17 Variables serve only to mark places for distant quantifiers to control and to serve as a channel for the placement of values. We need no variables. We could permit gaping formulas (as Frege would have had it) and use wiring diagrams to link the quantifier to its gaps and to channel in values. Variables are simply a way of giving the distant quantifiers wireless remote control over the gaps. 15 Wittgenstein (1922) also grappled with the antimony. See his comments in 4.04 regarding the picture theory and the problem of mathematical multiplicity see especially 4.0411). 16 Frege (1893: §28) announces as a leading principle that every well-formed name of his language is to denote something. )n this period every expression of Frege s language is a name . 17 Cf. Quine (1940: 69-70). 15 On this view, variables are typographic parts of the quantifier sign serving only to link the quantifier to the open spaces in predicates. 2.1 The Fregean semantics Frege thought of first-level predicates as incomplete, or as containing gaps which must be saturated by proper names. 18 Quantifiers, in turn, are unsaturated, but at a higher level. Their gaps must be saturated by monadic firstlevel predicates. This renders variables mere typographic parts of the quantifier sign. However, it would be hasty to infer from this that Fregean approaches are immunized against the antinomy of the variable. Russell shows in an appendix to The Principles of Mathematics that there is a syntactic variant of the antinomy of the variable that afflicts even Fregean approaches. Because of the prominence of Fregean approaches in the literature, we will briefly rehearse the Fregean view of quantification and Russell s objection.19 On Frege s view, predicates result from removing occurrences of a name from a sentence. This is the source of their gaps . For instance, beginning with the sentence 7 ≤ 7 , one can remove the first, the second, or both occurrences of to yield the predicates ≤ 7 , 7 ≤ ( , and ≤ , respectively. In the third predicate the gaps must be seen as being filled by the same argument. Frege s universal quantifier is a second-level predicate of monadic first-level predicates. It includes all occurrences of the variable that it binds. Updating for notation, he might write the universal quantifier as ∀ ... ... , where ... can be completed only by the name of a monadic predicate.20 Quantified formulae such 18 Our discussion will focus only on the special case of predicates rather than function names in general. 19 Fine (2007), pp. 16-18 offers his own objections to the Fregean account. The first follows Resnik : , in arguing that Frege s semantics must be intensional, even at the level of reference. The second charges that Fregean theories of quantification entail that quantified sentences exhibit an unwelcome dependence on their instances. 20 Frege (1893: §8) is explicit that the mark corresponding to the bound variable cannot occur except when prefixed by a quantifier and that a quantifier must attach to an expression containing a mark corresponding to a bound variable on the standard syntax. Although Frege 16 as ∀ ≤ 7 , ∀ 7 ≤ , and ∀ ≤ result from saturating the quantifier sign x...x... with the monadic predicates such as ≤ 7 , 7 ≤ , and ≤ ( ) , respectively. 2.2 Russell s application of the antinomy We now have enough of a sketch of the Fregean semantics for quantification on the table in order to see why it too is subject to a variant antinomy of the variable. In particular, recall the syntactic derivation of (1*) ∀ ≤ on the Fregean approach. An expression with two gaps, namely ≤ ( ) , which is a dyadic predicate.21 A single name, such as may saturate both these gaps, resulting in a sentence, 7 ≤ 7 . Then both occurrences of this name may be removed from the sentence to yield a monadic predicate ≤ ( ) , which is inserted as an argument into the quantifier ∀ ... ... , which takes only monadic predicates. The problem is immediately apparent. Nothing in the expressions distinguishes the dyadic predicate ) ≤ ( ) from the monadic predicate ≤ ( ) , which results from removing two occurrences of from 7 ≤ 7 . This is the source of Russell s objection, which he frames in terms of function-names. Frege wishes to have the empty places where the argument is to be inserted indicated in some way; thus he says that in + the function is 2( )3 + ( ). But here his requirement that the two empty places are to be filled by the same letter cannot be indicated: there is no way of distinguishing what we mean from the function involved in + . (Russell 1903: §482) rejects assumption () and prefers to avoid talk of variables , he still has to typographically differentiate various occurrences of the quantifier sign, e.g. x...x... versus y...y... . Rule 2 mandates that in forming an expression of generality one must choose a new German letter: Frege remarks, one German letter is in general as good as any other, with the restriction, however, that the distinctness of these letters can be essential" (1893: §8). (In Frege's notation German letters adorn the quantifier sign, the concavity, and link the quantifier to the open spaces in the relevant predicates.) 21 This dyadic predicate is required to form sentences such as ≤ . The discussion in this section is modeled on Frege s , § syntactic derivation of ∀ = . 17 The worry is that if Frege were to introduce marks capable of typographically distinguishing between these predicates, then that mark would need its own semantic significance, which in this context means designation.22 The problem with conceiving of predicates as expressions with gaps is that nothing distinguishes between an expression with one gap and one with two gaps. On Frege s view, gaps are to be conceived of as omissions of names from sentences. )n the dyadic predicate ≤ ( ) , the two gaps must be capable of being saturated by different proper names. Thus they must have different semantic import. Yet, there is literally nothing corresponding to either gap. There is no sense to be made of the gaps being the same or different. Both gaps are merely gaps, there remains no constituent capable of delivering the requisite difference in semantic import. Thus, the antinomy of the variable has been syntacticized. Of course, we don t take these considerations alone to have refuted the Fregean approach.23 But they do provide sufficient reason to take variables seriously as linguistic units. Indeed, contemporary semanticists, though they take inspiration from Frege, do not follow him in rejecting assumption ().24 3. Tarski and the antinomy There is good reason to admit variables as constituents of quantified and open sentences. As Tarski (1935: 189) showed, quantifiers operate on sentences just as do conjunction and negation. Importantly, they can attach to formulae with arbitrary numbers of free-variables. For this reason, Tarski built a syntax in which variables occur in the same positions as proper names. 22 Frege (1893: §1) introduces the Greek letters  and  to mark the argument places of functions. However, he is clear that these are not part of the official symbolism, but occur only in elucidations . See especially footnote . 23 For further criticism of the Fregean syntax, see Pickel (2010). 24 See, e.g., Montague (1973: 250, category BT; 258, clause (2)) and Heim and Kratzer (1998: §5.5.5). 18 . Tarski s semantics The language he considered includes a set of variables and n-ary predicates. 25 Variables: , , , ... Predicates: �, �, �, ... Variables combine with predicates to form open sentences. These can be combined with further operators to form more complex sentences. Formation rules:  If � is an n-ary predicate and , ... , � are variables, then � ... � is a formula.  If � and � are formulae and is a variable, then � �, , ∀ �, and ∃ � are formulae. In contrast to Frege s semantics, quantified sentences result from embedding an open sentence under a quantifier just as they appear to. Tarski s semantics thereby validates assumption () in the above argument for the antinomy: variables are genuine constituents of sentences that contain them, occurring in exactly the same positions as proper names. Tarski s semantics rests on two related insights. One is that only some expressions receive absolute interpretations (relative to a model), while others require something additional, a sequence of individuals, to be interpreted.26 The 25 An infinite stock of variables and predicates can be specified by priming: ′, ′′, ..., etc. After this initial presentation, we will allow context to determine the adicity of a predicate rather than by explicit indexing. 26 Since this paper only concerns truth and not logical consequence we could in principle provide a fully absolute interpretation that does not relativize to a model. The semantics of Tarski (1935) is absolute in this way, but in later work such as Tarski and Vaught (1956) the semantics is model-relative in the way we outline below. 19 other insight is that truth is displaced as the central notion of semantic theory in favor of satisfaction by a sequence, represented by the function ... �.27 To explain the notion of satisfaction Tarski begins with the notion of satisfaction by an object. An open sentence with one variable x may be true or false relative to different assignments to x . Thus, ≤ may be true or false relative to each number, depending on whether the number is less than or equal to itself. Satisfaction becomes more complicated for formulae with multiple variables. Consider ≤ . An assignment of to x and to y satisfies this formula, but the converse assignment does not satisfy this formula. In general, a formula may have an indefinite number of free variables. If a formula contains n free variables, one must speak of the formula as satisfied or not by n-ary sequences of objects. Further generalizing, Tarski (1935: 191) speaks of an enumeration of all the variables of the language , ... , �, ... .The variables in this enumeration may be jointly assigned to different sequences of objects. Let the set of these sequences of objects be as follows. ‡ , ... , �, ... ‡ = { , ... , �, ... : , ... , � ∈ � = → = } This presentation slightly differs from Tarski s since we allow a variable to occur multiple times in an enumeration. The objects in the corresponding positions of the sequences that serve as values for the enumeration, however, must be identical. One can then define the satisfaction of an atomic open sentence such as ≤ by a sequence � = , 7, , 9, ... in terms of whether the entities in the sequence (in positions corresponding to the variables in the enumeration) are in the 27 One often hears the remark that Tarski's semantics for first-order logic-in particular the treatment of variable-binding operators-isn t compositional see, e.g., Soames 2011: 129). Apparently, Tarksi himself made this remark to Barbara Partee (see Hodges 2013: § 2.1). But the semantics can easily be made compositional, if the semantic value of a variable is a function from sequences to individuals and the semantic value of a formula is a function from sequences to truth-values (see, e.g. Janessan 1997: § 2.4 and Rabern 2013: 395-397). 20 extension of the predicate ≤ . The recursive semantic clauses can be specified relative to a model M = �, , where D is a domain of individuals and I is an interpretation function (which maps an n-ary predicate to a set of n-tuples drawn from D) as follows: Variables: If is a variable, then  α � = � Sentences: If  is an n-ary predicate and , ... � are variables, then  � ... � � = iff �, ... , � � ∈ � If � and � are formulae and is a variable, then  � � � = iff � � = and � � =  ¬� � = iff � � ≠  ∀ � � = iff for every ∈ �, � �[ / ] =  ∃ � � = iff for some ∈ �, � �[ / ] = For any sequence �, variable , and ∈ �, let � = iff � = and is the jth position of the enumeration , ... , � ... . To define -variant sequences let �[ /d] be the sequence � ∈ ‡ , ... , �, ... ‡ varying from � at most such that � = . Some of Tarski s remarks might suggest that he avoids the antinomy because he holds that variables do not possess any meaning by themselves Tarski : 4), by which he means that, if variables had referents, then these referents would be entities of such a kind we do not find in our world at all ibid.).28 In particular, they do not refer to objects. Variables function in a more complicated way. They designate different individuals relative to different sequences. But, there is no absolute designation of the variable without supplementation by a sequence. 3.2 Does Tarski escape the antinomy? 28 Specifically, Tarski says that a numerical variable would have to denote a variable number, which is neither positive, nor negative, nor zero. 21 Tarski has avoided positing referents or designata of the variables. But the antinomy concerns the meaning of variables more generally: do variables agree in meaning? )n Fine s vocabulary, this is equivalent to asking whether they have the same semantic role. In our reconstruction, this is equivalent to asking whether alphabetic variants express the same structured contents. This question may be posed without supposing that a variable refers. Fine formulates an objection to Tarski s semantics, taking as a premise only that the semantic roles of x and y can be compared for same-ness or difference. Yet, Tarski s semantics doesn t directly speak to the roles or meanings of x and y . It merely assigns values to these variables relative to sequences. That is, Tarski offers a semantic theory that assigns designata to variables relative to sequences. So although Tarski has avoided assigning absolute referents to variables, his account leaves open what they mean . The crucial task then, is to extract a meaning of the variable from Tarski s semantic theory which fulfills the desiderata above: distinct variables in the same sentence contribute differently to the sentence s structured meaning but corresponding variables in alphabetic variants make the same contribution. Fine sees only two options. The first option is that the meaning of a variable is the range of values assigned to it by various sequences. That is, the meaning of x is the class { : ∃� � = }, the domain of the variable. Analogously, the meaning of y is the class { : ∃� � = }. The domains of x and y are the same, thus, Tarski can secure a sense in which x and y agree in semantic role. Yet, Fine (2007: 10) rejects this account on the grounds that it doesn t account for the difference between x and y .29 As we saw before, substituting an occurrence of x for an occurrence of y in a formula may result in a new formula 29 Strictly speaking, Fine objects that Tarski doesn t secure a semantic difference between pairs of variables x , x and y , x . This charge is a bit hard to interpret within the Tarskian framework, since Tarski s theory offers no instruction for semantically evaluating pairs of variables. 22 with different satisfaction conditions. So merely assigning a domain to the variables does not capture their full semantic behavior.30 Put in terms of structured meanings, treating the semantic contribution of a variable as its domain would force us to identify the structured meanings of sentences that should remain distinct. This argument requires an assumption, which we will call structure intrinsicalism. Structure Intrinsicalism: If two sentences have the same syntactic structure and the corresponding terminal constituents of these sentences all agree in meaning, then the sentences agree in meaning. Structure intrinsicalism can be thought of as a manifestation of the principle of compositionality. Namely, the semantic values assigned to syntactically composite expressions are determined by the semantic values of their components and their mode of combination. So if there is a difference between structured meanings of two expressions, this must derive ultimately from a difference in structure or a difference in semantic values assigned to terminal nodes. We will revisit this assumption when we discuss Fine s own semantics. Now consider the sentences ∃ ∀ ≤ and ∃ ∀ ≤ . These sentences are not synonymous and so should have different structured meanings. But if the relevant meaning assigned to a variable is its domain, then these two formulas are syntactically isomorphic and their corresponding terminal nodes all agree in meaning. As a result, the formulas themselves agree in structured meanings. If ∃ , ∀ , and ≤ respectively contribute [∃], [∀], and [≤] to the structured meanings of sentences that contain them, while variables x and y contribute their domain �, then the common structured meaning of ∃ ∀ ≤ and ∃ ∀ ≤ can be presented as follows: 30 This echoes (Church 1956: 9-10) who says: "Involved in the meaning of a variable...are the kinds of meaning which belong to a proper name of the range. But a variable must not be identified with a proper name of its range, since there are also differences of meaning between the two. 23 This identity of meaning is obviously unwanted. Fine offers another suggestion for extracting the meaning of a varaible from Tarski s framework. (e suggests-in essence-looking at the contribution that a variable makes to formulae that contain it. In particular, the variable contributes an object relative to any input sequence. So the meaning of the variable could be construed as just this procedure for taking an input sequence and yielding an object that is the value of the variable. This procedure determines a function taking any sequence to the value of the variable relative to that sequence: �� � . One could frame the semantic theory as assigning this function to a variable as its absolute or sequence-invariant meaning: = �� � . This function is what we might call its semantic value , since it is sufficient to account for the full compositional behavior of a variable. Fine : , however, objects that this construal leaves Tarski unable to account for the fact that the semantic role of the variables x and y is the same in the cross-contextual case[.] Since distinct variables x and y have distinct semantic values, i.e. �� � ≠ �� � , the structured meaning approach discussed above will assign different structured meanings to ∀ and ∀ . But this violates the desideratum that alphabetic variants should have the same structured meanings. Nonetheless, one obvious thought is that the semantic role of a variable somehow combines both these aspects. The variable possesses a semantic value, and this distinguishes its meaning from other variables. Yet this semantic value determines a domain, which is common among many variables. Fine (2007: 11) reasons that this in unsatisfactory: What we have at best is a partial identity of semantic role, in that the range of the two variables is the same. But this is something that holds equally of the cross-contextual and intra-contextual cases. 24 Even though the diverse semantic values of x and y determine that they have a common feature-their domain-it nevertheless remains that these values are distinct. Framed in terms of structured meanings the problem is clear: Either the variables x and y will contribute something different to the structured meanings of sentences that contain them or they will not. If they contribute the same thing-say, their domains or gaps or what have you, then the account will over-generate synonyms. If the variables contribute something different-say, themselves or numbers or their semantic values, then the account will distinguish the structured meanings of alphabetic variants. Neither result is desirable. Thus, it seems that the Tarskian approach to variables and quantification cannot meet the challenge posed by the antinomy. 4. Fine's anti-intrinsicalism Fine takes this to motivate a radical solution to the antinomy that involves distinguishing a variable s intrinsic from its extrinsic semantic features. On this view, the meaning of a variable in isolation cannot explain its semantic behavior. Fine s semantics is informally glossed for a small fragment of the language. We briefly develop its central aspects. Fine s crucial move to avoid the antimony involves denying the plausible principle of intrinsicalism, the doctrine that the semantic behavior of a variable derives from its semantic role, understood as a semantic characterization of that variable in isolation from other expressions. Indeed, even Fine (2007: 23) says this principle is hard to dispute . (is motivation for abandoning it is solely to resolve the antimony. 4. Fine s semantics 25 Fine proposes to semantically evaluate a sentence or complex expression in terms of what values its parts may assume when taken in sequence. Thus, Fine would evaluate the sentence + = + for truth or falsity in terms of what values the expressions composing the sequence , +, , =, , +, may assume when taken in that sequence. Fine s (2007: 27) idea is that distinct variables take values independently of one another and that identical variables take the same value. )n our example, the sequence , +, , =, , +, may assume the value 7, +, , =, , +,7 , but not the value 7, +, , =, 5, +,5 . Fine (2007: 25) calls the set of values that a sequence of expressions can assume the semantic connection of that sequence, [t]he aim of relational semantics...is to assign a semantic connection to each sequence of expressions. We will use ‡ ⋯ ‡ to denote the function that takes a sequence of expressions to its semantic connection, the range of values that the constituent expressions are capable of taking in that sequence. A sequence consisting of a single variable is assigned to its domain, D. 1-Membered Sequences: ‡ ‡ = { : ∈ �} The semantic connection on an n-tuple of variables is meant to generalize the notion of a domain for a variable; it is the set of sequences of values that the [variables] are simultaneously capable of assuming Fine : 27). 2-Membered Sequences: ‡ , ‡ = { , : , ∈ � = → = } n-Membered Sequences: ‡ , ... , � ‡ = { , ... , � : , ... , � ∈ � = → = } 26 Since variables are the only elements that are coordinated in semantic connections, it will suffice to focus on them. Fine s semantics derives the truth conditions of a formula � from the semantic connection on its expansion, which enumerates the primitive constituents of �. So the truth conditions of � will be specified as a function of the semantic connection on its expansion. It is worth noting that the recursive procedures are deeply non-compositional. This is partially because the sub-formulae will be evaluated relative to the semantic connection of the whole (see the discussion in Fine 2007: 26). But also, the procedure for evaluating a formula consisting of an operator and two sub-formulae such � � in terms of these components will not proceed by evaluating each sub-formula in isolation, but in terms of its consequences for the whole.31 4. Fine s attempted resolution We can now ask Fine the question he (2007: 10) puts to Tarski: what account, within the framework of the [Finean] semantics, can be given of the semantic role of the variables ? At first pass, Fine s semantics, like Tarski s, doesn t assign any semantic role to the variables. Fine s semantics doesn t traffic in roles , but merely offers a list of sentences characterizing how a variable x contributes to the semantic connection of an arbitrary sequence: ‡ ‡ = { : ∈ �} ; ‡ , ‡ = { , : , ∈ �}; ‡ , ‡ = { , : ∈ �}; and so on. This leaves open the question of how to extract semantic roles from Fine s semantics. 31 As a result, Fine s semantics requires a further twist in order to accommodate the semantics of variable binding: a coordination relation among variables. Though this aspect of Fine s semantics-the coordination scheme-has received the most attention, it ultimately plays little role in the resolution of the antinomy (see Pickel and Rabern manuscript Does semantic relationism solve Frege s puzzle?, for discussion of the coordination schema with an explicit formalization of Fine s relational semantics for first-order logic). 27 Fine suggests that the semantic role of a variable, x , is just the semantic connection on the sequence consisting of just that variable, ‡ ‡ = { : ∈ �}. Since ‡ ‡ = { : ∈ �} = ‡ ‡, x and y have the same semantic roles. But this does not explain the difference in behavior between x and y , since from their respective semantic roles one cannot derive that ‡ , ‡ is { , : , ∈ �} while ‡ , ‡ is {< , >: ∈ �}, which is different. Thus, the semantic connections on pairs of variables are not determined by the semantic connections on those variables taken in isolation. Fine thinks this is as it should be. The semantic connections on , and , are primitive facts about these sequences. To insist on deriving claims about the semantic role of a pair of variables from the semantic roles of the variables themselves, Fine thinks, is to insist on the intrinsicalist doctrine, that there is no difference in semantic relationship without a difference in semantic feature (Fine 2007: 24). According to Fine, the behavior of a variable in a sequence of expressions is an extrinsic feature of that variable. And the extrinsic features of variables need not derive from the semantic roles of the variables themselves. Fine insists that in asserting that the semantic role of x and y is the same, we only wish to assert that their intrinsic semantic features are the same Fine 2007: 22). The difference in semantic roles between the pairs , and , are intrinsic features of these pairs, but extrinsic features of the variables themselves. Thus, Fine believes he has secured the difference in semantic role between these sequences. As he says, [The relational semantics] embodies a solution to the antinomy: the intrinsic semantic features of x and y (as given by the degenerate semantic connections on those variables) are the same, though the intrinsic semantic features of the pairs x, y and x, x (again, as given by the semantic connections on those pairs) are different (Fine 2007: 31-2). This is Fine s attempted resolution of the antinomy.32 32 King (2007: 218-222) also abandons intrinsicalism, since he thinks that x and y contribute the same thing to structured contents, namely nothing, while Fxy and Fxx nevertheless express different structured contents. Salmon (2007: 121, footnote 14) likewise gives up intrinsicalism by assigning a semantic role to an occurrence of x in isolation that cannot be used 28 We have re-interpreted Fine s requirement that two variables have the same semantic role as the claim that sentences that are alphabetic variants should have the same structured meanings. Fine can achieve this, since he can think that a variable contributes its domain to the structured meaning of a sentence that contains it. Of course, this move mimics the first option that Fine offers Tarski, according to which the semantic role of a variable is its domain. The difficulty for Tarski, recall, was that this proposal identifies the structured meanings of sentences such as ∃ ∀ ≤ and ∃ ∀ ≤ since these sentences have the same structure and their terminal nodes have the same meanings . Fine s position, however, is not susceptible to this criticism since he denies intrinsicalism. (e denies that the meaning of a whole follows from the meaning of the parts and their arrangement. So, Fine may say that ∃ ∀ ≤ and ∃ ∀ ≤ have different structured meanings, because they have corresponding constituents with different meanings. )n particular, ≤ and ≤ are corresponding constituents of ∃ ∀ ≤ and ∃ ∀ ≤ , respectively. Fine denies that ≤ and ≤ have the same meaning , even though their ultimate constituents have the same meaning. (In the following structured meanings we explicitly display the semantic connection on an expression immediately below the expression s node in the tree.) to predict the behavior of x in other contexts. Salmon s approach makes use of complicated type-shifting rules, which he assimilates to Frege s indirect reference . Likewise Kellenberg (2010: 231) seemingly gives up the project of deriving the semantic role of a sentence from the semantic roles of the expressions it contains: ...it is a mistake to think that the difference in semantic role between x > y and x > x must be due to a difference in semantic role between the pairs of variable types ( x , y and x , x )... Rather, the expression types x > y and x > x have different semantic roles because the former contains occurrences of two variable types, whereas the latter contains occurrences of only one variable type, although one that occurs twice." Yet, Kellenberg maintains that he s an intrinsicalist. 29 On the other hand, Fine may say that all corresponding constituents of alphabetic variants such as ∀ and ∀ agree in meaning: Thus, Fine s denial of intrinsicalism may also be taken as a denial of what we call structure intrinsicalism: composite expressions with the same syntactic structure may have distinct meanings even though their corresponding constituent expressions agree in meaning. 5. The Tarskian resolution Our puzzle is that x cannot be substituted for y in ∃ ∀ ≤ , yielding ∃ ∀ ≤ , without change of meaning. Yet, alphabetic variants are completely synonymous and so must have the same structured meanings. Fine s resolution to this puzzle involves denying both intrinsicalism and, more generally, compositionality. )n order to respect intrinsicalism, the semantic axioms governing variables x and y must assign them to distinct semantic values. )n Tarski s explicit semantics the variables are ordered in a context-invariant way. The semantic value of the nth variable in the ordering is a function that takes a sequence to the nth position in the sequence. We represent that ordering as a function mapping variables into numbers. Let be a function from the set of variables { , , , ... } to the set of natural numbers N. Then Tarski can be viewed as assigning the following meanings to x and y given the ordering function c: 30 = �� � = �� � On this semantics, and are assigned to different objects, since they occupy different positions in the ordering and so ≠ . The variables do have their domains in common. Yet, as we have seen, the domain is not a suitable candidate to secure the semantic sameness between and . In assigning different semantic values to the variables and , Tarski-and his followers in standard formal semantics-seem unable to account for the fact that alphabetic variants are synonymous. Moreover, the context invariant enumeration is-as Tarski (1935: 191, note 1) himself admits- purely technical . Related approaches popular in formal semantics such as Heim and Kratzer (1998: §5.3.3) likewise face this difficulty, since they simply lexicalize the semantic difference between variables. Indeed, Heim (1982: 166) proposes to identify the objects playing the roles of variables discourse referents simply with numbers. But Tarski is sensitive to these challenges. He suggests that a less stipulative enumeration of the variables could be given in terms of the order of the variables in a formula. [We could number all the variables of every given expression] on the basis of the natural order in which they follow one another in the expression: the sign standing on the extreme left could be called the first, the next the second, and so on. In this way we could again set up a certain correlation between the free variables of a given function and the terms of the sequence. This correlation...would obviously vary with the form of the function in question. (Tarski 1935: 191, note 1) Tarski is proposing that we replace the stipulative, and pre-established, enumeration of the variables-whereby e.g. is associated with the 1st member of a sequence and is associated with the 2nd, etc.-with an enumeration c that is sensitive to the formula being evaluated. In particular, Tarski proposes that if is the nth variable in a formula, then will be associated with the nth position 31 in a sequence. Tarski s brief suggestion, we claim, contains the resources needed to resolve the antinomy.33 On this proposal, each position in any sentence � induces a context which associates the variables in � with positions in sequences. Namely, the value of the variable x for an input sequence will be the object in the �h position of that sequence. If sentences � and �∗ are alphabetic variants and x and y occupy corresponding positions, then x and y will be associated with positions in sequences by and ∗ so that = ∗ and so �� � = �� � ∗ . Thus, x in the context induced by its position in the sentence ∀ will have the same semantic value as y in the context induced by ∀ . Structured meanings should be specified in terms of the context-saturated meanings of the variables not in terms of the context-unsaturated meanings. In practical terms, this means that if a variable x in sentence � is to be evaluated at context c, then the x will contribute its semantic value at c, namely �� � . This is analogous to Kaplan s (1989a) idea that the belief content of a sentence is given by its content (context-saturated meaning) and not its character (contextunsaturated meaning), though with a crucial difference, since our discourse contexts evolve as the sentence is processed.34 33 The semantic axioms for the variables x and y can now be written as = � �� � and = � �� � . This has an interesting pay-off. Although according to the semantics ≠ , it nonetheless assigns them a common semantic property, namely � = � �� � . If one thinks of the semantic role of an expression as its representational function , then it is natural to think of the semantic role of an expression as the property attributed to it by its canonical axiom in the semantic theory. )t follows that these two semantic axioms deliver the result that x and y have the same semantic roles. 34 Kaplan (1989a) proposes two layers of meaning for an expression, the character and the content. These two layers of meaning play different roles in Kaplan s semantic theory: the content is the information asserted in a particular context, whereas, the character of an expression encodes what content the expressions would have in any context. If in context c, A says to B ) am hungry and, in c*, B says to A You are hungry , then they have said the same thing relative to their respective contexts. We likewise propose two layers of meaning, one captures how the value of a variable depends on the discourse context, and the other captures the information value of the variable relative to a discourse context. Variables x and y have different context-unsaturated meanings, but in the context of alphabetic variants, such as ∀ and ∀ , their content is the same. 32 We will provide recursive procedures specifying the truth conditions and the structured meaning of each sentence. Given this semantics, alphabetic variants will have the same structured meanings. On the other hand, if x and y occur in a single sentence �, then they will be evaluated at contexts c and c* such that ≠ ∗ and so �� � ≠ �� � ∗ . As a result, x and y will have different semantic contents in the contexts induced by their respective positions in ∃ ∀ ≤ . As a result, replacing y by x , yielding ∃ ∀ ≤ , will not preserve meaning. This, in essence, resolves the antinomy of the variable. But significant explanatory burdens remain. First, we must explain how to evaluate a variable in a context. We must then explain the formal procedure by which the context evolves as a sentence is processed. As Fine (2007: 8) remarks, the appeal to contexts does not really solve the puzzle but merely pushes it back a step. (e asks, why do we say that the variables x and y have a different semantic role in ∃ ∀ ≤ ? Our answer is that the difference in meaning of x and y in ∃ ∀ ≤ can be explained by a theory describing the evolution of the enumeration in a sentence. This same theory will predict that corresponding variables in alphabetic variants have the same meaning in their respective contexts. 5.1 The evolution of context )n order to implement Tarski s idea compositionally, we assess a variable against a sequence of individuals �, and also a discourse context c, which enumerates the variables. = � �� � = � �� � Following Tarski (1935) we assume that each sequence of individuals � is of infinite length.35 Effectively a sequence � maps numbers onto objects in the 35 Tarski (1935: 195, footnote 1) also considers the possibility of employing finite sequences. Dekker (1994) develops the idea in a different direction more in line with the proposal in the 33 domain. )n Tarksi s semantics every variable has a value relative to a sequence because Tarski stipulates an initial, static mapping c from variables to numbers. The value of a variable x relative to a sequence � and the stipulated enumeration c is � . By way of contrast in our semantics the initial discourse context c-the initial mapping from variables to numbers-does not associate any variables with numbers. There is no pre-established ordering of the variables. Rather the enumeration is determined dynamically as a sentence is processed-newly introduced variables are associated with new positions in sequences. 36 The relevant context will be supplied by the variable s position in the sentence (as we explain below). Collectively, the discourse context and the sequence define an assignment function on the variables in the sentence.37 We can then assign a structured meaning to a sentence by assessing the semantic values of its constituents at the context induced by their position in the sentence. On the resulting semantic theory, the variables x and y contribute functions from sequences into objects to the structured meanings of sentences that contain text. A formula is initially evaluated against a finite or null sequence, which grows as quantifiers are processed. This idea could easily be integrated into the proposal of the text. 36 Our approach integrates ideas from (eim s file-change semantics and Vermeulen s (2000) model of variables as stacks. Pickel (2015: §5.3) also hints at this strategy. 37 Strictly speaking, c, will be a relation, not a function, since a context might evolve by adding multiple indices to x , e.g. { , , , }, as in the formula ∃ ∃ . But since it is only the highest index that will matter we now define as the highest n such that there is a variable and , ∈ . 34 them. These functions are in no way typographic. They lie purely on the non-conventional side of language.38 How are variables introduced into discourse? Since we focus on the semantics of first-order logic, we assume that they are introduced by quantifiers. A quantifier ∃ attached to a formula � is processed first by updating the context so that x is assigned to a new position in the sequence and then by evaluating � with respect to this new context. In our model, we need to keep track of the highest number assigned to a variable in discourse context c. Represent this by = { : ∃ , ∈ } . The basic idea, then, is that one evaluates a quantified formula ∃ � relative to c by evaluating its sub-formula, �, relative to the extension of c that assigns x to the next position in a sequence, to + . Variables: If is a variable, then  = � �� � Sentences: If � is an n-ary predicate and , ... � are variables, then  � , ... , � ,� = iff , � , ... , � , � ∈ � If � and � are formulae and is a variable, then  ¬� ,� = iff � ,� ≠  � � ,� = iff � ,� = and � ,� =  ∀ � ,� = iff for all ∈ �, � ∗,�[ ∗ / ] = , where ∗ = ∪ { , + }  ∃ � ,� = iff for some ∈ �, � ∗,�[ ∗ / ] = , where ∗ = ∪ { , + } 38 See Fine (2007: 11). There may be a residual worry about absolute or context-unsaturated semantic value of the variable. In particular, contexts are modeled as functions from variables into the natural numbers, representing positions in sequences. So the domain of this function may include linguistic items. The worry is that the very appeal to such functions makes the semantics objectionably typographic on the grounds that it has to incorporate the variables themselves [...] into the very identity of their semantic values (Fine 2007: 32). We find this worry misguided. We don t see how the appeal to such a set could be objectionably typographic. There is nothing objectionable about the claim that the semantic role of a predicate is to map entities to truth-values. But many predicates will map themselves to a truth-value e.g. is a predicate ). For us, a context is just a set, that may include ordered pairs of variables and numbers. Perhaps the worry is that the set will have the variables themselves in its transitive closure. But this will also be true of the extensions of many predicates. 35 On our semantics, a formula is evaluated against two parameters, a discourse context c and a sequence of individuals �. We can think of the closed formulae of our language as regimenting sentences of natural language. As Tarski observed in defining truth relative to satisfaction only, if a closed formula is satisfied by one sequence, then it will be satisfied by any sequence. This led him to define truth for a sentence in terms of satisfaction by every sequence. We similarly observe that, for a closed formula � and context c, if � , � = , then � ∗, � = for any ∗. This leads us to a slightly different definition of truth simpliciter than might be offered on the Tarskian model. For us, a sentence � will be true simpliciter if � , � = for the empty discourse context = ∅ and every sequence �. In particular, we find it more natural to think of a sentence as evaluated at an empty discourse context, which evolves as the formula is processed.39 Unlike Fine s semantics, this semantics is strongly compositional insofar as if = and � differs from � only in that is substituted for , then � = ⟦� ⟧. The only plausible candidates for failures of substitution-and the only expressions sensitive to the dynamic enumeration-are variables. But for any variables and , if = , then = . This just reflects the fact that the context-invariant semantic values of any two variables differ.40 39 We do not mean to foreclose the possibility of treating open formulae as representing sentences of natural language as well, such as those containing demonstrative or anaphoric pronouns (Partee 1984/2004: 170-1). Doing so, of course, would require that truth be identified with satisfaction, not by every sequence, but by some contextually salient sequence or sequences. 40 Some ways of construing compositionality are more demanding. They might require for instance that every expression is provided a semantic value, and that the semantic value of every complex expression is determined by the semantic values of its immediate constituents and their mode of combination. The semantics offered here is syncategorematic in the case of sentential connectives, since we haven t assigned them semantic values in isolation but have only provided truth-conditions for constructions that contain them. But we could easily extract a nonsyncategorematic semantics for instance the semantic value of the existential quantifier can be provided as follows: ∃ = � . � ��. ∃ ∗, �[ ∗ / ] = , where ∗ = ∪ { , +}. (In the preceding lexical entry the variables , , �, are meant to be of designated semantic types as follows: ranges over functions from discourse contexts and sequences of individuals to {0,1}; ranges over discourse contexts; � ranges over sequences of individuals drawn from the domain; and ranges over individuals in the domain �.) 36 Nonetheless, the semantic value of distinct variables and may nonetheless coincide in their appropriate respective discourse contexts. In particular, the variable x in ∀ has the same context saturated meaning as y in ∀ . )n evaluating each sentence relative to the null context, one must evaluate the sub-formulas and relative to an updated context in each case. One evaluates in an updated context c* such that ∗ = . Similarly, one evaluates in an updated context c** such that ∗∗ = . Thus, both variables have the same meanings in context: ∗ = ∗∗ = �� � . We will use the meanings in contexts to define structured meanings. On the other hand, consider the variables x and y in the open sentence ≤ embedded in ∃ ∀ ≤ . These variables will be assessed relative to a single context c such that = and = . As a result, x and y will have different context sensitive meanings in this sentence: namely = �� � ≠ = �� � . 5.2 Structured meanings We have now given a truth conditional semantics. We now show how the structured meanings for formulae can be read off the semantic values of their constituents in contexts. We recursively assign structured meanings to every sentence � of the first-order language at any context c, written [�] . (Let = { ∶ ∃ , ∈ } . And, let + = ∪ { , + }. For any logical connective ∈ {¬, , ∀, ∃} let its contribution [ ] be its semantic value.) 37 This procedure recursively specifies a structured meaning for every sentence of the language of first-order logic in terms of the semantic values of the basic constituents of the sentence. Moreover, the structured meanings are appropriate in that the semantics delivers the same structured meanings to pre-theoretically synonymous sentences and distinct structured meanings for sentences that are not synonymous, in the sense of expressing distinct belief contents. Return to our problematic pairs: ∀ and ∀ should have the same structured meanings while ∃ ∀ ≤ and ∃ ∀ ≤ should have distinct structured meanings. This result is delivered by our semantics. The structured meanings of ∀ and ∀ will be the same, namely: )n their respective formulas, x and y are evaluated at contexts that assign them to the same function from sequences into objects. 38 On the other hand, the variables x and y in ∃ ∀ ≤ will be associated with different functions from sequences to objects. They will thereby make different truth conditional contributions which will figure into the structured meaning of this sentence, namely: As desired, the structured meaning of ∃ ∀ ≤ is different from the structured meaning of ∃ ∀ ≤ , namely: As a result we have resolved our puzzle. The variable x cannot be substituted for y in ∃ ∀ ≤ , yielding ∃ ∀ ≤ , without change of meaning. Yet, alphabetic variants are completely synonymous and so must have the same structured meanings. Finally, our view preserves intrinsicalism in two senses. First, we ve assigned distinct semantic values to distinct variables. These semantic values predict the truth conditional contribution of a variable x in a sentential context c, namely . The truth conditional contribution of the variable in a sentential context corresponds to its value in the structured meaning assigned to that sentence. Second, the truth conditional contributions of complex expressions and sentences in wider contexts-and thus their contributions to the structured 39 meanings of sentences that contain them-are a function of the truth conditional contributions of their components in context. It is for this reason that the structured meaning of a sentence can be described in terms of the semantic contributions of its terminal nodes. We don t need to assign emergent semantic contributions to non-terminal nodes, as do anti-intrinsicalists such as Fine (2007) and King (2007). Thus, our Tarskian resolution to the antinomy preserves intrinsicalism.41 References Bealer, George (1982). Quality and Concept. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Carnap, Rudolf (1947). Meaning and Necessity. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Church, Alonzo (1951). A Formulation of the Logic of Sense and Denotation , in Henle (1951): 3-24. Church, Alonzo (1956). Introduction to Mathematical Logic. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Curry, H. and R. Feys (1958/1968). Combinatory Logic. Amsterdam. NorthHolland Publishing Company. De Bruijn, N.G. (1972). Lambda calculus notation with nameless dummies, a tool for automatic formula manipulation, with application to the Church-Rosser theorem. Indagationes Mathematicae (Proceedings). Vol. 75(5): 381–392. Dekker, P. (1994). Predicate Logic With Anaphora , in L. Santelmann and M. Harvey (eds.): Proceedings of the Fourth Semantics and Linguistic Theory Conference. DMLL Publications. Fine, Kit (2003). The role of variables , Journal of Philosophy 100 (12): 605-631. Fine, Kit (2007). Semantic Relationism. Blackwell Publishing. 41 The paper has benefited as a result of comments from Dilip Ninan, Landon Rabern, Anders Schoubye, and an anonymous referee at this JOURNAL. Previous versions of this paper received useful input from audiences at the Early Analytic Group at the University of Stirling, the Institute of Philosophy in London, the Edinburgh Philosophy of Language Group, and the Formal Metaphysics Workshop at the University of St Andrews. Bryan Pickel acknowledges the help of partial funds from projects CSD2009–00056 and FFI2012-37658 (Spanish Government). 40 Frege, Gottlob (1904/1960). What is a Function? , in Geach and Black (1960): 107-116. Frege, Gottlob (1893/1967). The Basic Laws of Arithmetic: Exposition of the System. Furth, M. (trans.) University of California Press, Berkeley, CA. Geach, P. and M. Black (trans.) (1960). Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Haaparanta, L., and J. Hintikka (eds.) (1986). Frege Synthesized. Boston: D Reidel Publishing Company. Heim, Irene (1982). The Semantics of Definite and Indefinite Noun Phrases. PhD. Dissertation: University of Massachusetts at Amherst. Heim, Irene and Angelika Kratzer (1998). Semantics in Generative Grammar. Blackwell Publishers. Henle, Paul (1951). Structure, Method, and Meaning: Essays in Honor of Henry M. Sheffer. New York, NY: Liberal Arts Press. Hodges, Wilfrid, (2013). "Tarski's truth definitions", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.). Jacobson, Pauline (1999). Towards a variable-free semantics , Linguistics and Philosophy 22 (2): 117–185. Janssen, T.M.V. (1997). Compositionality , in J. van Benthem and A. ter Meulen, eds., Handbook of Logic and Language. Amsterdam: Elsevier. Kalish D. and R. Montague (1964). Logic: Techniques of Formal Reasoning. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. Kaplan, David (1986). Opacity , in L. E. Hahn and P. A. Schilpp, eds., The Philosophy of W. V. Quine (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court): 229-288. Kaplan, David (1989a). Demonstratives , in J. Almog, J. Perry and H. Wettstein (eds), Themes from Kaplan, Oxford University Press: 481–563. Kaplan, David (1989b). Afterthoughts , in J. Almog, J. Perry and H. Wettstein (eds), Themes from Kaplan, Oxford University Press: 565–614. Kellenberg, Aleksandar . The antinomy of the variable , dialectica 64 (2): 225-236. King, Jeffrey . Structured propositions and complex predicates , Noûs 29(4): 516-535. 41 King, Jeffrey . Structured propositions and sentence structure , Journal of Philosophical Logic 25: 495-521. King, Jeffrey (2007). The Nature and Structure of Content, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Larson, Richard, and Peter Ludlow . )nterpreted logical forms , Synthese 95.3: 305-355. Lewis, C.I., (1943). The Modes of Meaning , Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 4, No. 2, 236-250. Lewis, David (1970). General semantics , Synthese 22(1): 18–67. Montague, Richard . The proper treatment of quantification in ordinary English , in Montague and Thomason (1974) Formal Philosophy. New Haven, CT, Yale University Press. Partee, B. (1984/2004). Compositionality , in Compositionality in formal semantics: Selected papers by Barbara H. Partee. John Wiley & Sons. Pickel, Bryan (2010). Syntax in Basic Laws §§29-32 , Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 51 (2): 253-277 Pickel, Bryan (2015). Variables and attitudes , Noûs 49(2): 333–356. Quine, W.V.O. (1940/1981). Mathematical Logic, Revised Edition, Harvard University Press. Quine, W.V.O. (1960). Word and Object. Cambridge, MA, MIT Press. Rabern, Brian (2013). Monsters in Kaplan s logic of demonstratives , Philosophical Studies, 164(2): 393-404. Resnik, Michael . Frege s proof of referentiality , in (aaparanta and Hintikka (1986): 177–195. Russell, Bertrand (1903). The Principles of Mathematics. Cambridge: At the University Press. Russell, Bertrand (1905). On denoting , Mind, 14 (56): 479–493. Salmon, Nathan and Scott Soames (1988). Propositions and Attitudes. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Salmon, Nathan (1986). Frege s Puzzle. Atascadero: Ridgeview Publishing. 42 Salmon, Nathan (2007). A theory of bondage , in Content, Cognitions, and Communication: Philosophical Papers II. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 113141. Soames, Scott ( . Direct reference, propositional attitudes, and semantic content , in Salmon and Soames : -239. Soames, Scott (2010). Philosophy of Language. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Stalnaker, Robert (2003). Impossibilities , in Ways a World Might Be: Metaphysical and Anti Metaphysical Essays. Oxford: Claredon Press: 55-68. Tarski, Alfred (1935/1956). The concept of truth in formalized languages , reprinted in Tarski (1956): 152–278. Tarski, Alfred (1941). Introduction to Logic. Oxford, Oxford University Press. Tarski, Alfred (1956). Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics. Oxford, Clarendon Press. Tarski, A., and Robert Vaught (1956). Arithmetical extensions of relational systems , Compositio mathematica, 13, 81-102. Vermeulen, C.F.M. (2000). Variables as stacks , Journal of Logic, Language and Information 9(2): 143–167. Whitehead, Alfred North and Bertrand Russell (1910, 1912, 1913). 3 vols, Principia Mathematica, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1922/1961). Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Pears, D. and McGuinness, B. (trans.). London: Routledge. Yli-Vakkuri, Juhani . Propositions and compositionality , Philosophical Perspectives 27: 237-274.

To appear in Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility 1 (2013). FAIRNESS AND THE ARCHITECTURE OF RESPONSIBILITY1 David O. Brink and Dana K. Nelkin In this essay, we explore a conception of the nature and structure of responsibility that draws on ideas about moral and criminal responsibility. Though the two sorts of responsibility are not the same, the criminal law reflects central assumptions about moral responsibility, and the two concepts of responsibility have very similar structure. Our conception of responsibility draws on work of philosophers in the compatibilist tradition who focus on the choices of agents who are reasons--‐responsive and work in criminal jurisprudence that understands responsibility in terms of the choices of agents who have capacities for practical reason and whose situation affords them the fair opportunity to avoid wrongdoing.2 We treat these two perspectives as potentially complementary and argue that each can learn things from the other. Specifically, we think that criminal jurisprudence needs a more systematic conception of the capacities for normative competence and that ideas from the reasons--‐responsive literature on moral responsibility, some familiar and some novel, can fill this need. However, we think that moral philosophers tend to focus on the capacities involved in responsibility and so tend to ignore the situational element in responsibility recognized in the criminal law literature. Our conception of responsibility brings together the dimensions of normative competence and situational control, and we factor normative competence into cognitive and volitional capacities, which we treat as equally important to normative competence and, ultimately, responsibility. Moreover, we argue that normative competence and situational control can and should be understood as expressing a common concern that blame and punishment presuppose that the agent had a fair opportunity to avoid wrongdoing. Thus, we treat the value that criminal law theorists associate with the situational element of responsibility as the umbrella concept for our conception of responsibility, one that explains the distinctive architecture of responsibility. 1This essay is fully collaborative. The authors are listed in alphabetical order. The ideas for this essay grew out of a graduate seminar that we taught together on the topic of partial responsibility in 2008 and were refined in a seminar on responsibility that DB taught in 2011. Versions of this material were presented at the University of Illinois, the University of Calgary, the Murphy Institute at Tulane University, Cornell University, the University of Western Ontario, and the New Orleans Workshop on Agency and Responsibility. We would like to thank audiences on those occasions for helpful feedback. We owe special thanks to input from Craig Agule, Sarah Aikin, Amy Berg, Mitch Berman, Michael McKenna, Per Milam, Richard Miller, Michael Moore, Stephen Morse, Derk Pereboom, Erick Ramirez, Sam Rickless, Tim Scanlon, David Shoemaker, Jada Twedt Strabbing, Sarah Stroud, Matt Talbert, Michael Tiboris, and Gary Watson. 2The philosophical work in the reasons--‐responsive wing of the compatibilist tradition on which we draw includes Fischer and Ravizza 1998, Wallace 1994, Wolf 1990, and Nelkin 2011. The criminal jurisprudence work on which we draw includes Hart 1957 and 1961; Moore 1997; and Morse 1994, 2002, and 2003. 2 This essay aims to motivate and articulate this sort of fair opportunity conception of the architecture of responsibility. It is part of a larger project that develops this conception and applies it to issues of partial responsibility, involving insanity and psychopathy, immaturity, addiction, provocation, and duress. The details and applications of the fair opportunity conception of responsibility are interesting and important, and we hope to address them more fully elsewhere. But the framework itself is important and requires articulation. 1. RESPONSIBILITY, BLAME, AND THE REACTIVE ATTITUDES P.F. Strawson famously highlighted the link between ascriptions of responsibility and the reactive attitudes (Strawson 1962). The reactive attitudes involve emotional responses directed at oneself or another in response to that person's conduct. Reactive attitudes include hate, love, pride, gratitude, anger, regret, resentment, indignation, and forgiveness. So understood, the reactive attitudes form a large and heterogeneous class. Some of these reactive attitudes have little direct connection with moral praise and blame and responsibility. Consider the difference between anger and resentment. Anger need not have moral content. I might be momentarily angry or upset with a very young child who has carelessly damaged a treasured keepsake of mine. But resentment would seem to be out of order. Resentment seems to involve a kind of anger or upset that presupposes that one has been mistreated or wronged by another in some way. This kind of moral judgment does not seem to apply to a very young child. The idea that assumptions about responsibility are embedded in the reactive attitudes makes most sense if we focus on this narrower class of reactive attitudes that are moralized (cf. Wallace 2004: ch. 2). In particular, we want to focus on the attitudes and practices of praise and blame, especially as they reflect assumptions about responsibility. Some negative reactive attitudes, such as regret, don't seem to implicate responsibility at all. Bernard Williams describes the case of a truck driver who, through no fault of his own, hits and kills a child who has darted into the street (1976: 28). As Williams claims, it is appropriate for the driver to feel a kind of agent--‐regret at being the instrument of the child's death, which is distinct both from the regret or horror that bystanders might feel and from guilt for having been responsible for wrongdoing. Normally, blame only makes sense if the agent is responsible for some kind of wrong. Some philosophers distinguish between two kinds of blame and responsibility. For instance, Gary Watson distinguishes between responsibility as attributability and as accountability (1996). An agent is responsible in the attributive sense, roughly speaking, when her actions reflect the quality of her will in the right way. Some kinds of blame can be a fitting response to the quality of the agent's will. For instance, A might have hard feelings toward B if B injures A through malice, recklessness, or negligence. Here, our reactive attitudes track the insufficient regard that B shows A's interests and rights. But attributability does not guarantee accountability. Consider a situation in which we find out that though B's actions exhibit malice, in no relevant sense did B have an opportunity to do otherwise, perhaps because he suffers from a serious mental illness and is not a competent decision--‐maker as a result. In these cases, we are likely to think that B was not at fault or culpable and so not accountable for the harm he did. Although hard feelings may remain and be perfectly appropriate in such cases, reactive attitudes involving resentment and indignation cease to be appropriate and tend to dissipate. Attributability is necessary, but 3 not sufficient for accountability. In this essay, we are especially interested in responsibility as accountability and its connection with reactive practices and attitudes involving blame, and we rely on an intuitive understanding of the reactive attitudes that seem to be especially responsive to accountability.3 It is this sense of blame and responsibility that we take to be most relevant to the sort of responsibility required for punishment and to capture what is common to both moral and legal responsibility. Thus, our focus in what follows will be restricted to attitudes of praise and blame involving accountability, with special attention to attitudes and practices of blame, rather than praise. We do so because our aim is to combine insights from criminal jurisprudence, which focuses on criminal acts that involve wrongdoing, with those from moral theory. But we believe that there are natural ways of extending what we say here about attitudes of blame and blameworthy actions to praise and praiseworthy actions. Strawson links responsibility and reactive attitudes, such as those of resentment and indignation, in a biconditional fashion. Reactive attitudes involving blame and praise are appropriate just in case the targets of these attitudes are responsible. Call this biconditional claim Strawson's thesis. Strawson's thesis can be interpreted in two very different ways, depending on which half of the biconditional has explanatory priority. According to the first interpretation, there is no external, or response--‐independent justification of our attributions of responsibility. This reading fits with Strawson's view that our reactive attitudes and ascriptions of responsibility, as a whole, do not admit of external justification. Particular expressions of a reactive attitude might be corrigible as inconsistent with a pattern of response, but the patterns of response are not themselves corrigible in light of any other standard. Similarly, particular ascriptions of responsibility might be corrigible in light of patterns in our ascriptions of responsibility, but the patterns themselves are not corrigible in light of any other standards. Responsibility judgments simply reflect those dispositions to respond to others that are constitutive of various kinds of interpersonal relationships. This is a response--‐dependent interpretation of Strawson's thesis. This response--‐dependent interpretation of Strawson's thesis is probably the right interpretation of Strawson.4 But as a systematic, rather than an interpretive, matter, we favor an alternative interpretation of Strawson's thesis that is realist, rather than response--‐ dependent. This interpretation stresses the way that the reactive attitudes make sense in light of and so presuppose responsibility. As such, the reactive attitudes are evidence about when to hold people responsible, but not something that constitutes them being responsible. It's true that the reactive attitudes are appropriate if and only if the targets 3Here, we are in agreement with Watson (1996: 276, 2011). By contrast, T.M. Scanlon develops a conception of blame that seems to presuppose only attributability, not accountability (2008: ch. 4, esp. p. 202). 4Watson defends this response--‐dependent interpretation of Strawson's thesis, at least on interpretive grounds (1987: esp. 222). Wallace defends this interpretation of Strawson's thesis in its own right (2004: 19), though we think other elements in Wallace's account fit better with an alternative realist reading. 4 are responsible, but it's the responsibility of the targets that makes the reactive attitudes toward them fitting or appropriate. In the biconditional relationship between responsibility and the reactive attitudes, it is responsibility that is explanatorily prior, according to this realist interpretation. Strawson points out that the limits of our reactive attitudes are indicated by our practices of exemption and excuse. Because the realist believes that the reactive attitudes presuppose responsibility, she can appeal to our practices of exemption and excuse to help understand the conditions under which we are responsible. This will be a response--‐independent conception of responsibility. A response--‐independent conception of responsibility is hostage to traditional worries about freedom of the will. The problem of free will is the problem of reconciling responsibility with determinism, because responsibility may seem to presuppose freedom of the will, and freedom of the will may seem incompatible with determinism. Our realist approach to responsibility and the reactive attitudes is best articulated as a version of compatibilism that denies that responsibility requires a form of freedom that would be undermined by the truth of determinism. In particular, because our practices of exemption and excuse track forms of normative competence and situational control, rather than the truth of determinism, they promise to ground a compatibilist conception of responsibility. Though we will articulate this compatibilist interpretation of our project, we cannot defend it here (though we return to these issues briefly in §7 below).5 Although Strawson focuses primarily on the relation between the reactive attitudes and responsibility, his thesis fits well with a particular approach to punishment and criminal responsibility. In particular, the realist interpretation of Strawson's thesis fits with a broadly retributive approach to blame and punishment, precisely because the retributivist thinks that the reactive attitudes and our practices of blame and punishment can be appropriate responses to culpable wrongdoing, where culpable wrongdoing is wrongdoing for which the agent is responsible. To see this, it will be useful for us to say more about both blame and punishment. When agents are responsible (accountable) for doing wrong blame is appropriate. Blame typically involves both censure and sanction. When we blame someone, we not only censure her conduct but also censure the agent herself for engaging in that conduct. Parents are often warned to disapprove the bad conduct of their children but not to blame them. This is because blame involves finding fault in the agent and that seems to assume that the agent is responsible (accountable) and could have avoided the conduct. Being blameworthy licenses various kinds of sanction, often informal and sometimes formal. Blame itself can involve overt reproach, which is a kind of sanction, whether directed at 5Because we think that reactive attitudes involving praise and blame presuppose that the targets of these attitudes are responsible, we accept the need to provide a response--‐ independent conception of responsibility and to answer skeptical doubts about responsibility. Consequently, we see response--‐dependent conceptions of responsibility as offering skeptical solutions to skeptical worries (cf. Kripke 1982: 66--‐67). We view skeptical solutions to skeptical problems as, at best, a kind of fallback solution to be entertained only after straight solutions have clearly failed. For a fuller exploration of the compatibilist aspects of this conception of responsibility, see Nelkin 2011. We believe that at least some of what we say here can be accepted by incompatibilists who accept further conditions on responsibility, beyond that of indeterminism. 5 another or at oneself. Sometimes reproach is the only appropriate sanction. But sometimes blameworthiness licenses other informal sanctions, such as public rebuke or social distancing. And in other cases, blameworthiness might license various kinds of punishment, whether personal, social, or legal. To be blameworthy is to be a fitting object of blame, censure, and sanction. It is to be deserving of these attitudes and responses. No doubt, where sanctions are appropriate, they have to be proportionate, and there may be cases in which one is blameworthy and yet it is not on balance appropriate to blame or sanction. But, presumably, even in these cases there is a pro tanto case for blame and at least some informal sanction, if only self--‐reproach, as a fitting response to culpable wrongdoing. On this view, punishment is a species of blame for culpable wrongdoing. On a broadly retributive view of the criminal law, this is true of legal punishment as well. We understand criminal punishment as the authorized deprivation of an agent's normal rights and privileges, because he or she has been found guilty of a criminal act.6 Punishment is a form of blame, and like other kinds of blame, presupposes culpable wrongdoing. Legal retributivism, as we understand it, is the claim that legal punishment is justified on the basis of culpable legal wrongdoing. This claim can take positive or negative forms. According to positive retributivism, culpable wrongdoing is both necessary and sufficient for justifying punishment. The sufficiency claim admits of both strong and weak interpretations. According to strong sufficiency, culpable wrongdoing is a sufficient condition of justified proportional blame and punishment, whereas, according to weak sufficiency, culpable wrongdoing is sufficient for a pro tanto case for proportional blame and punishment. Weak sufficiency allows for the pro tanto case for retributive blame and punishment to be overridden in particular cases by non--‐culpability moral considerations, such as forgiveness or mercy. By contrast, according to negative retributivism, culpable wrongdoing is necessary, but not sufficient, for justified punishment.7 Legal retributivism (in either version) has the virtue of explaining well the two principal forms of affirmative defense in the criminal law. According to the retributivist, justified punishment aspires to track culpable wrongdoing.8 Wrongdoing and culpability are independent variables. Affirmative defenses, whose success justifies acquittal, deny either wrongdoing or culpability. Justifications, such as the necessity defense, deny wrongdoing, insisting that behavior that would otherwise be wrong is not in fact wrong in these circumstances. Excuses, such as the insanity defense, deny culpability or 6Cf. Bedau and Kelly 2010. We aim for a normatively neutral and ecumenical definition of punishment and one that identifies punishment as involving deprivations of certain sorts, but not essentially involving the imposition of pain or suffering. 7Cf. Duff 2008. The view that we have called "negative retributivism" is sometimes called a "mixed theory" of punishment, because it requires more than one type of justificatory reason, typically, both retributivist and consequentialist. It is also worth noting that our definition of retributivism does not commit retributivists to endorsing the thesis that punishment is intrinsically good, as some retributivists claim. 8Precisely for this reason, a skeptic about moral responsibility will deny that any retributivist view of punishment can be correct. For a skeptical view and its relation to punishment, see Pereboom 2012. 6 responsibility, claiming that the agent acted wrongly but was not responsible for her wrongdoing. Here, the criminal law reflects the moral landscape well. Moral retributivism could be understood as the claim that moral blame (that presupposes accountability) and informal sanction are appropriate only as a response to culpable moral wrongdoing. It too has the virtue of explaining the two principal ways of avoiding blame --‐--‐ justifying and excusing conduct. Justification denies wrongdoing, and excuse denies responsibility for wrongdoing. Insofar as moral retributivism says that moral blame ought to track desert, where desert is the product of the two independent variables of wrongdoing and responsibility, it fits our moral defenses like a glove. In this way, the realist interpretation of Strawson's biconditional can appeal to our understanding of excuses to provide a window onto the nature of responsibility.9 An analysis of criminal law doctrines of excuse can be a part of this investigation. In this context, it is worth addressing the relationship between excuses and exemptions. The prototypical case of an exemption is a case in which an actor is not responsible for what he did because of quite general impairments of his agency. So, for instance, insanity and immaturity are sometimes described as exemptions. By contrast, excuses are sometimes claimed to be prototypically case--‐specific in which the agent is otherwise normal and responsible but acted inadvertently or was subject to coercion in a specific situation. Despite the existence of these two different kinds of prototypical cases, we think that it is a mistake to treat exemptions and excuses as disjoint classes. First, while Strawson and others include insanity among the exemptions, the criminal law treats insanity as an excuse. In fact, the criminal law includes all claims to less than full culpability in the single category of excuse. So there is some reason not to assume that exemptions cannot be excuses. Second, the prototypical cases are not exhaustive of the possibilities, as Strawson himself recognized (1962: 79). Strawson's partition is into cases in which the reactive attitudes are generally disabled in regard to a particular agent and cases in which they are selectively disabled due to inadvertence or compulsion. But there are at least three different dimensions on which these paradigm cases can be distinguished: scope, duration, and the location of the obstacle to culpability. Immaturity, for example, or even more temporary conditions, such as depression or even dementia due to dehydration, might undermine responsibility for all sorts of actions during the episode in question, and so have wide scope. In contrast, a particular perceptual deficit, or a compulsive disorder narrowly confined to one area, like kleptomania, might have a relatively narrow scope. Paradigm cases can also be distinguished on the basis of duration. A phobia, for example, might affect one's choices in a narrow area, but be life--‐long, in contrast to a short spell of dementia caused by dehydration. The third dimension is the location of the obstacle as either within or outside of the agent. Immaturity is an example of the former, and low lighting conditions that prevent one from seeing someone else in need is an example of the latter. All three of these are separable in principle, but in the original paradigm cases, go together. For example, childhood is long--‐lasting, has a wide scope (though narrowing as one ages), and seems to 9Moore describes excuse as the "royal road" to responsibility (1997: 548). Whereas the realist regards our practices of excuse as potential evidence of a response--‐independent conception of responsibility, a response--‐dependent conception will understand our practices of excuse as constitutive of responsibility. 7 be explained by the agent's own capacities. Not realizing one is stepping on another's toes, in contrast, is typically short--‐lived, narrow in scope, and explainable by something about the particular situation rather than one's capacities. Recognizing that considerations that mitigate culpability can fall in a variety of places along all three dimensions suggests to us that it would be most useful to consider all of the cases as ones involving potential excuses with varying degrees of scope and duration and with varying locations between the agent and the situation. On the proposal that we favor, exemptions are best understood as comparatively global or standing excuses. The challenge for the realist interpretation of Strawson's thesis is to use the reactive attitudes as evidence to uncover an independent conception of responsibility that can support the reactive attitudes. If we study responsibility by studying excuses, we find that excuses factor into two main kinds on the location dimension. Some excuses reflect compromised psychological capacities of agents. We will conceptualize these as failures of normative competence. Insanity is the most familiar excuse of this type. But some excuses reflect no failure of normative competence. Instead, they reflect a lack of normal situational control. In such situations, though the agent is normatively competent, factors external to her deprive her of the fair opportunity to avoid wrongdoing. Coercion and duress provide excuses of this type. We think that attention to these two kinds of excuse provides the key to understanding the architecture of responsibility. 2. NORMATIVE COMPETENCE If someone is to be culpable or responsible for her wrongdoing, then she must be a responsible agent. So we need to distinguish between responsible and non--‐responsible agents. Our paradigms of responsible agents are normal mature adults with certain sorts of capacities. We do not treat brutes or small children as responsible agents. Brutes and small children both act intentionally, but they act on their strongest desires or, if they exercise deliberation and impulse control, it is primarily instrumental reasoning in the service of fixed aims. By contrast, we suppose, responsible agents must be normatively competent. They must not simply act on their strongest desires, but be capable of stepping back from their desires, evaluating them, and acting for good reasons. This requires responsible agents to be able to recognize and respond to reasons for action. If so, normative competence involves reasons--‐responsiveness, which itself involves both cognitive capacities to distinguish right from wrong and volitional capacities to conform one's conduct to that normative knowledge.10 It is important to frame this approach to responsibility in terms of normative competence and the possession of these capacities for reasons--‐responsiveness. In particular, responsibility must be predicated on the possession, rather than the use, of such capacities. We do excuse for lack of competence. We do not excuse for failures to exercise these capacities properly. Provided they had the relevant cognitive and volitional capacities, we do not excuse the weak--‐willed or the willful wrongdoer for failing to 10In framing our approach to the internal dimension of responsibility this way, we draw on previous work in the compatibilist tradition that emphasizes normative competence (Wolf 1990, Wallace 1994) and reasons--‐responsiveness (Wolf 1990, Wallace 1994, Fischer and Ravizza 1998, and Nelkin 2011) and distinguishes cognitive and volitional dimensions of reasons--‐responsiveness (Wallace 1994, Fischer and Ravizza 1998). 8 recognize or respond appropriately to reasons. If responsibility were predicated on the proper use of these capacities, we could not hold weak--‐willed and willful wrongdoers responsible for their wrongdoing. It is a condition of our holding them responsible that they possessed the relevant capacities.11 Normative competence, on this conception, involves two forms of reasons--‐ responsiveness: an ability to recognize wrongdoing and an ability to conform one's will to this normative understanding. Both dimensions of normative competence involve norm--‐ responsiveness. As a first approximation, we can distinguish moral and criminal responsibility at least in part based on the kinds of norms to which agents must be responsive. Moral responsibility requires capacities to recognize and conform to moral norms, including norms of moral wrongdoing, whereas criminal responsibility requires capacities to recognize and conform to norms of the criminal law, including norms of criminal wrongdoing. Reasons--‐responsiveness is clearly a modal notion and admits of degrees; one might be more or less responsive. This raises the question how responsive someone needs to be to be responsible. This is an important and difficult issue, deserving more careful discussion than we can give it here. We make some preliminary remarks here, which we will refine in later sections. We might begin by distinguishing different grades of responsiveness. Here, we adapt some ideas from John Fischer and Mark Ravizza in their book Responsibility and Control about the responsiveness of the mechanisms on which agents act to our issue about how reasons--‐responsive the agents themselves are.12 We propose to specify the degree to which an agent is responsive to reasons in terms of counterfactuals about how she would believe or react in situations in which there was sufficient reason for her to do otherwise.13 An agent is more or less responsive to reason depending on how well her judgments about what she ought to do and her choices would track her reasons for action. We could begin this process by distinguishing two extreme degrees of responsiveness. 11Sidgwick famously objects to Kant's conception of autonomy as conformity to principles of practical reason that this would prevent us from holding criminals responsible and would allow us to recognize only morally upright behavior as responsible (Sidgwick 1907: 511--‐16). The solution to this problem is for Kant to define autonomy in terms of capacities for conformity to principles of practical reason. 12The conception of reasons--‐responsiveness that Fischer and Ravizza defend is mechanism--‐based, rather than agent--‐based (1998: 38). By contrast, we favor a version of reasons--‐responsiveness that is agent--‐based, rather than mechanism--‐based, precisely because we think that responsibility and excuse track the agent's capacities, rather than the capacities of her mechanisms. For defense of the agent--‐based approach, see Nelkin 2011: 64--‐79 and McKenna 2012. 13For present purposes, in specifying an agent's capacities in terms of such counterfactuals, we can remain agnostic about whether capacities or counterfactuals have explanatory priority, in particular, whether capacities ground the counterfactuals or whether the capacities just consist in the truth of such counterfactuals. 9 • Strong Responsiveness: Whenever there is sufficient reason for the agent to act, she recognizes the reason and conforms her behavior to it. • Weak Responsiveness: There is at least one situation in which there is a sufficient reason to act, and the agent recognizes that reason and conforms her behavior to it. However, it does not seem plausible to model normative competence in terms of either strong or weak responsiveness. Strong responsiveness is too strong for the same reason we gave for focusing on competence, rather than performance. We do not require that people actually act for sufficient reasons to do otherwise; it is the capacities with which they act that matter. The weak--‐willed are, at least typically, responsible for their poor choices. Moreover, weak responsiveness seems too weak. It treats someone as responsive in the actual situation even if she did not respond in the actual situation and there is only one extreme circumstance in which she would recognize and respond to reasons for action. The Goldilocks standard of responsiveness evidently lies somewhere between these extremes. Of course, there is considerable space between the extremes – the gap between always and once. We might stake out an intermediate form of responsiveness in something like the following terms. • Moderate Responsiveness: Where there is sufficient reason for the agent to act, she regularly recognizes the reason and conforms her behavior to it. Moderate responsiveness is deliberately vague; it specifies a range or space of counterfactuals that must be true for the agent to be responsive. Ideally, we would be able to specify a preferred form of moderate responsiveness more precisely. But what is important for present purposes is that reasons--‐responsiveness is a matter of degree and that the right threshold for responsibility is probably some form of moderate responsiveness. So far, this conception of responsiveness is coarse--‐grained in ways that might prove problematic. For one thing, it lumps together cognitive and volitional dimensions of responsiveness. But if they are independent aspects of normative competence, then we may need to assess responsiveness along these two dimensions separately. Moreover, it is at least conceivable that we might require different degrees of responsiveness in cognitive and volitional dimensions of competence. For instance, Fischer and Ravizza distinguish the cognitive and volitional dimensions of reasons--‐responsiveness in terms of "reasons--‐ receptivity" and "reasons--‐reactivity" (respectively). Their conception of reasons--‐ responsiveness is mixed, because it treats receptivity and reactivity asymmetrically. They combine moderate receptivity and weak reactivity (1998: 81--‐82). We ultimately reject this asymmetry, but it represents a conception of responsiveness worth considering. Furthermore, this initial formulation of responsiveness assumes that we consider all situations in which there is sufficient reason to act together. But we may find it more informative to partition possibilities into groups, depending on the kinds of reasons at stake and other aspects of the situations in which agents finds themselves. For instance, in deciding whether an agent had sufficient volitional capacity to overcome fears that stood in 10 the way of her performing her duty, we may think it best to restrict our attention to those counterfactuals in which she faced threats or fears of comparable kind or magnitude. For these reasons, we may need to make our assessments of the degree of an agent's responsiveness more fine--‐grained in several ways. We address some of these complications below. 3. THE COGNITIVE DIMENSION OF NORMATIVE COMPETENCE Normative competence requires the cognitive capacity to make suitable normative discriminations, in particular, to recognize wrongdoing. If responsibility requires normative competence, and normative competence requires this cognitive capacity, then we can readily understand one aspect of the criminal law insanity defense. A full account of the elements of insanity is controversial, as we will see. But most plausible versions of the insanity defense include a cognitive dimension, first articulated in the M'Naghten rule that excuses if the agent lacked the capacity to discriminate right from wrong at the time of action.14 Here is one place it might be important to distinguish between the demands of moral and criminal responsibility. Presumably, moral responsibility requires the ability to recognize moral norms, including norms that specify moral wrongdoing, whereas criminal responsibility requires the ability to recognize criminal norms, including norms that specify criminal wrongdoing.15 The cognitive abilities to recognize these two different kinds of norms might be different, with the result that it might be possible to be criminally responsible without being morally responsible and vice versa. It is common to contrast reason and emotion. This common contrast might lead one to suppose that the cognitive dimension of normative competence is purely cognitive and does not involve emotion or affect. But this conclusion would be misguided. Emotional or affective deficits may block normative competence by compromising cognitive capacity. For instance, lack of empathy may make it impossible or very difficult to recognize actions as injurious and, hence, legally or morally wrong. There is also evidence that congenital damage to the amygdala, which is thought to be the part of the brain responsible for emotional learning and memory, may prevent the formation of normative or, at least, moral concepts. There is emerging research that shows that psychopathy involves both abnormalities in the amygdala and empathy deficits (Blair et al. 2005) Moreover, psychopaths have been thought to have trouble with a psychological test used to discriminate between moral norms and conventional norms.16 These findings raise questions about whether psychopaths have moral concepts and so whether they have the cognitive capacity to distinguish moral right from wrong. Even if they lack cognitive moral competence, it doesn't follow that they lack the capacity to recognize legal wrongdoing. It is at least possible that some psychopaths might be criminally responsible without being 14M'Naghten's Case, 10 Cl. & F. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843). 15There is a debate about whether the cognitive dimension of the insanity test, expressed in M'Naghten's rule, should be formulated in terms of capacities for recognizing criminal or moral wrongdoing. British criminal law has focused on criminal wrongdoing, and American jurisdictions remain divided. 16See Blair et al. 2005: 57--‐59. For some skepticism, see Aharoni et al. 2012. 11 morally responsible.17 These are complicated issues that deserve fuller examination, but they illustrate ways in which emotion and affect can have a bearing on the cognitive dimension of normative competence. Here, emotional capacities may be upstream from normative cognition. 4. THE VOLITIONAL DIMENSION OF NORMATIVE COMPETENCE But there is more to normative competence than this cognitive capacity. We assume that intentional action is the product of informational states, such as beliefs, and motivational states, such as desires and intentions. Though our beliefs about what is best can influence our desires, producing optimizing desires, our desires are not always optimizing. Sometimes they are good--‐dependent but not optimizing, when they are directed at lesser goods, and sometimes they are completely good--‐independent. This is reflected in cases of weakness of will in which we have beliefs about what is best (and perhaps optimizing desires) but in which we act instead on the basis of independent non--‐ optimizing passions and desires. This psychological picture suggests that being a responsible agent is not merely having the capacity to tell right from wrong but also requires the capacity to regulate one's actions in accordance with this normative knowledge. This kind of volitional capacity requires emotional and appetitive capacities to enable one to form intentions based on one's optimizing judgments and execute these intentions over time, despite distraction and temptation. Here, emotion and appetite are downstream from cognition and play a separate, volitional or executive role. If one's emotions and appetites are sufficiently disordered and outside one's control, this might compromise volitional capacities necessary for normative competence. Consider the following obstacles to volitional competence. • Irresistible desires or paralyzing fears that are neither conquerable nor circumventable, as perhaps in some cases of genuine agoraphobia or addiction.18 • Clinical depression that produces systematic weakness of will in the form of listlessness or apathy. • Acquired or late onset damage to the prefrontal cortex in which agents have considerable difficulty conforming to their own judgments about what they ought to do, as in the famous case of Phineas Gage.19 17We suspect that severe psychopathy impairs, but does not eliminate, reasons--‐ responsiveness and that it may make for a better moral excuse than a criminal excuse. Contrast Fine and Kennett 2004. 18Mele understands a desire as conquerable when one can resist it and as circumventable when one can perform an action that makes acting on the desire difficult or impossible (1990). The alcoholic who simply resists cravings conquers his impulses, whereas the alcoholic who throws out his liquor and stops associating with former drinking partners or won't meet them at places where alcohol is served circumvents his impulses. Conquerability is mostly a matter of will power, whereas circumventability is mostly a matter of foresight and strategy. 19Phineas Gage was a nineteenth century railway worker who was laying tracks in Vermont and accidentally used his tamping iron to tamp down a live explosive charge, which 12 Each of these cases involves significant volitional impairment in which agents experience considerable difficulty implementing or conforming to the normative judgments they form. Notice that recognition of a volitional dimension of normative competence argues against purely cognitive conceptions of insanity, such as the M'Naghten test, which recognizes only cognitive deficits as the basis for insanity, and in favor of the more inclusive Model Penal Code conception. Mental Disease or Defect Excluding Responsibility: (1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as the result of a mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law. (2) [T]he terms "mental disease or defect" do not include an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise anti--‐social conduct.20 The Model Penal Code conception of insanity is an important advance on the M'Naghten conception, precisely because it recognizes an independent volitional dimension to sanity and so recognizes a wider conception of insanity as involving significant impairment of either cognitive or volitional competence. Recognizing the volitional dimension of normative competence may require revising the rationality or practical reason conceptions of responsibility employed by criminal law theorists such as Michael Moore and Stephen Morse. Strictly speaking, rationality conceptions of normative competence need not reject the volitional dimension of normative competence. There might be more to rationality than correct belief or knowledge. For instance, one might not count as practically rational unless one's appetites and passions are sufficiently under control to enable one to conform one's will to one's normative judgment. As far as we can tell, Moore is non--‐committal on this issue and could agree with these claims about the importance of the volitional dimension of normative competence, detonated and shot the iron bar up and through his skull. Though he did not lose consciousness, over time his character was altered. Whereas he had been described as someone possessing an "iron will" before the accident, afterward he had considerable difficulty conforming his behavior to his own judgments about what he ought to do. The story of Phineas Gage is related, and its larger significance explored, in Damasio 1994. 20American Law Institute, Model Penal Code §4.01, emphasis added. The Model Penal Code is a model statutory text of fundamental provisions of the criminal law, first developed by the American Law Institute in 1962 and subsequently updated in 1981. The MPC was intended to serve as a model for local jurisdictions drafting and revising their criminal codes. Notice three differences between MPC and M'Naghten: (a) unlike M'Naghten, MPC includes volitional, as well as cognitive, capacities in its conception of insanity; (b) whereas M'Naghten makes complete incapacity a condition of insanity, MPC makes substantial incapacity a condition of insanity; and (c) whereas M'Naghten requires only capacity for normative recognition for sanity, MPC requires capacity for normative appreciation. Here, we focus only on (a), but all three points of contrast between MPC and M'Naghten are potentially significant. 13 folding them into claims about rational capacities. However, Morse is skeptical about the volitional dimension of normative competence. In part because his skepticism finds echoes in Fischer and Ravizza's treatment of reasons--‐reactivity, it is worth considering his complaints about the volitional dimension in some detail. In his essay "Uncontrollable Urges and Irrational People," Morse critically discusses proposals to treat wrongdoers with irresistible impulses as excused for lack of control. He claims, not implausibly, that many with emotional or appetitive disorders are nonetheless responsible, because they retain sufficient capacity for rationality (2002: 1040). In discussing excuses that appeal to uncontrollable urges, he makes clear that his conception of rationality excludes volitional components. This ... Essay claims that our ambivalence about control problems is caused by a confused understanding of the nature of those problems and argues that control or volitional problems should be abandoned as legal criteria [for excuse] [2002: 1054]. But why should we abandon a volitional dimension to normative competence and control? Morse focuses on the alleged threat posed by irresistible urges and makes several (incompatible) claims about them: (1) we cannot make sense of irresistible urges, (2) we cannot distinguish between genuinely irresistible urges and urges not resisted, (3) there are no irresistible urges, because under sufficient threat of sanction we can resist any strong urge. Morse focuses on irresistible urges. This is already problematic, because it ignores the varieties of volitional impairment, which include not just irresistible urges but also paralyzing fears, depression, and systematic weakness caused by damage to the prefrontal cortex. But consider what Morse does say about irresistible urges. He argues against the claim made by the majority in Kansas v. Crane that civil detention be limited to those who are dangerous to themselves or others on account of control problems that are the result of mental abnormality.21 Morse plausibly claims that mental disease or abnormality, as such, is irrelevant to excuse (2002: 1034, 1040). All that mental abnormality signals is something about the cause of urges; by itself, it does not signify anything about the agent's capacities, and so cannot serve as an excuse (2002: 1040). That is surely right, but the Court in Crane did not say that mental abnormality was sufficient for excuse, at most that it was necessary.22 What was critical, the Court claimed, was whether the urges were sufficiently irresistible to present a control problem. A control problem can be understood as a lack of relevant volitional capacities. So the Court is just not making the fallacious argument that Morse rightly criticizes. Demonstrating that abnormality does not imply incapacity does not show that responsibility does not require volitional capacity. So Morse's criticism of the abnormal cause requirement does not support a rationality conception of agency that eschews volitional capacities. Morse goes on to claim that the idea of irresistible urges is not coherent and that, even if it was, we could not distinguish between irresistible urges and urges not resisted 21Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (2002). 22Insofar as the Court is requiring a mental abnormality, perhaps defined on the disease model, we disagree. It is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for excuse. 14 (1994: 1601; 2002: 1062). This is the problem of distinguishing between can't and won't. Finally, he asserts that even if we could distinguish between irresistible urges and urges not resisted, we would find that in actual cases the urges in question would be resistible. In discussing whether an addict's cravings are irresistible, Morse argues that they are not because if you hold a gun to the addict's head and tell him that you'll shoot him if he gives in, he can resist (2002: 1057--‐58, 1070). This is reminiscent of the sort of weak reactivity that Fischer and Ravizza defend and that Kant requires in The Critique of Practical Reason. Suppose that someone says his lust is irresistible when the desired object and opportunity are present. Ask him whether he would not control his passion if, in front of the house where he had this opportunity, a gallows were erected on which he would be hanged immediately after gratifying his lust. We do not have to guess very long what his answer would be [Kant 1788: 30]. But these different complaints about irresistible urges are all resistible. First, there seems to be no conceptual problem with irresistible urges. We can conceive of paralyzing emotions or irresistible desires, as Mele does, as emotional states or appetites that stand in the way of implementing the verdicts of practical reason that are virtually unconquerable and uncircumventable (1990). Resistibility is a modal notion. There is a question about how unconquerable or uncircumventable impulses must be to be excusing, and there may be evidential or pragmatic problems about identifying desires that are genuinely irresistible. But the concept of irresistible desires does not seem especially problematic. Second, consider the worry that we cannot reliably distinguish between an inability to overcome and a failure to overcome such obstacles. First of all, this is an evidentiary problem, not a claim about the ingredients of normative competence. Moreover, this evidentiary problem seems no worse than the one for the cognitive dimension of normative competence, which requires us to distinguish between a genuine inability to recognize something as wrong and a failure to form correct normative beliefs or attend to normative information at hand. Making the distinction between can't and won't is a challenge, but not an insurmountable one, in either the cognitive or volitional case. For instance, there are neurophysiological tests for various forms of affective, as well as cognitive, sensitivity, such as electrodermal tests of empathetic responsiveness (Blair et al. 2005: 49--‐50). Finally, consider Morse's claim that volitional capacity is easily demonstrated insofar as agents can always resist desires and temptations under sufficient threat. Morse's position here bears comparison with that of Fischer and Ravizza. As we saw earlier, while they defend moderate reasons--‐receptivity, they require only weak reasons--‐reactivity.23 In defense of weak reactivity, Fischer and Ravizza claim that reactivity is "all of a piece" --‐--‐ if you can conform in some cases, even one case, that shows that you can conform in any case. (1998: 73). Kant and Morse seem to agree. There are two problems here. First, they want to recognize an asymmetry between cognitive and volitional capacities. Yet, if reactivity were "all of a piece," then why not say the same thing about receptivity? If one can 23It is worth noting that Fischer's and Ravizza's view is doubly asymmetric insofar as they require receptivity to at least some moral reasons, but require reactivity only to reasons in general, not necessarily moral ones (1998: 79). We reject this sort of asymmetry, as well. 15 recognize some moral reasons, one can recognize any. Or if one can recognize them under some circumstances, then one can recognize them under any. This would be to accept weak reasons--‐receptivity, which both Morse and Fischer and Ravizza reject. Second, they are committed to claiming, at least about reasons--‐reactivity, that one can't have weak responsiveness without having moderate responsiveness. Anyone who can resist an urge in one extreme situation can resist it in others. But we see no reason to accept this psychological stipulation. An agoraphobe might have such a paralyzing fear of public spaces that she would be induced to leave her home only under imminent threat of death. There's no reason to assume that we cannot have weak reactivity without moderate reactivity (cf. McKenna 2001, Watson 2001, Pereboom 2006, and Todd and Tognazzini 2008). Our own view is that weak reactivity is simply implausible as a general reactivity condition on responsibility. Cases in which a person would only react differently under a threat of imminent death, because of a paralyzing fear or compulsion, for example, seem to be cases in which we should excuse.24 If a desire is really only resistible in this one counterfactual case, then we think that the agent is not responsible, or at least not fully responsible, in the actual case. That doesn't mean that we can't detain him if he is dangerous to himself or others, but it would mean that it would be inappropriate to blame and punish him. On closer inspection, it seems Morse is really ambivalent between two different kinds of skepticism about the volitional dimension of normative competence and its significance. In some moments, he denies that there is any separate volitional dimension to normative competence, beyond the cognitive dimension. At other times, he recognizes the need for a separate volitional dimension but claims that it is easily satisfied because volitional conformity to what one judges right and wrong is "all of a piece". We hope to have shown that neither form of skepticism is especially promising. 5. SITUATIONAL CONTROL An important part of an agent's being responsible for wrongdoing that she chose and intended consists in her being a responsible agent. This we have conceptualized in terms of normative competence and analyzed into cognitive and volitional capacities. Evidence for this view is that one seems to have an excuse, whether complete or partial, if one's normative competence is compromised in significant ways. The most familiar kinds of excuse – insanity, immaturity, and uncontrollable urges – all involve compromised normative competence. But there is more to an agent being culpable or responsible for her wrongdoing than her being responsible and having intentionally engaged in wrongdoing. Moreover, excuse is not exhausted by denials of normative competence. Among the factors that may interfere with our reactive attitudes, including blame and punishment, are external or situational factors. In particular, coercion and duress may lead the agent into wrongdoing in a way that nonetheless provides an excuse, whether full or partial. The paradigm situational excuse is coercion by another agent, as when one is threatened with physical 24Mele's example of the agoraphobe, who will not leave his house, even for his daughter's wedding, but would leave it if it were on fire, seems coherently described as one in which someone is weakly reactive, but nevertheless, not responsible. 16 harm to oneself or a loved one if one doesn't assist in some kind of wrongdoing, for instance, driving the getaway car in a robbery. Though criminal law doctrine focuses on threats that come from another's agency, hard choice posed by natural forces seems similarly exculpatory, as in Aristotle's famous example of the captain of the ship who must jettison valuable cargo in dangerous seas caused by an unexpected storm (NE 1110a9--‐12). Situational duress does not compromise the wrongdoer's status as a responsible agent and does not challenge her normative competence, but it does challenge whether she is responsible for her wrongdoing. The details of duress are tricky. Some situational pressures, such as the need to choose the lesser of two evils, may actually justify the agent's conduct, as is recognized in necessity defenses. If the balance of evils is such that the evil threatened to the agent is worse than the evil involved in her wrongdoing, then compliance with the threat is justified. But in an important range of cases, coercion and duress seem not to justify conduct (remove the wrongdoing) but rather to excuse wrongdoing, in whole or in part. In such cases, where the evil threatened is substantial but less than that contained in the wrongdoing, the agent's wrongdoing should be excused because the threat or pressure was more than a person could or should be expected to resist.25 The Model Penal Code adopts a reasonable person version of the conditions under which a threat excuses, namely, when a person of reasonable firmness would have been unable to resist, provided the actor was not himself responsible for being subject to duress (§2.09). Whereas the situational aspect of responsibility was recognized by classical writers, such as Aristotle, Hobbes, and Locke, it has been less prominent in more recent philosophical discussions of responsibility. Perhaps because of case law and doctrine involving duress, criminal theorists, such as Moore, and Morse, have clearly recognized the importance of the situational component of responsibility (Moore 1997: 554, 560--‐61; Morse 1994: 1605, 1617; and Morse 2002: 1058). They explain the rationale for this situational component and the associated excuse of duress in terms of the fair opportunity to avoid wrongdoing. The idea is that normatively competent agents, through no fault of their own, due to external threat or hard choice may lack the fair opportunity to avoid wrongdoing. In normal cases, this opportunity may just blend into the background, taken for granted. But in cases of duress it is absent. This not only explains why duress should be 25Exactly when duress justifies and when it excuses is an interesting and difficult question. Much will depend on how the necessity and balance of evils doctrines are understood. Suppose A threatens to rape B's loved one if B doesn't kill C, who is innocent. On one interpretation, this case fails the balance of evils test (murder is worse than rape), so it tends to excuse, rather than justify. But this may be less clear if the balance of evils test is performed using a moral balance employing agent--‐centered prerogatives. We can't get a clear handle on the difference between duress justifications and duress excuses until we fix the moral conception employed in the balance of evils test. But we think that it is safe to assume that however exactly the lines are drawn on these issues about interpreting the balance of evils test there will be some duress excuses. That is especially plausible, we think, when we recognize that duress and excuse can be scalar. That is sufficient to justify our architectural assumption that there should be a separate wing for situational control, whether or not that wing is densely populated. 17 excusing but also alerts us to the importance of this opportunity in the normal case, where duress is absent. 6. TWO MODELS OF NORMATIVE COMPETENCE AND SITUATIONAL CONTROL We think that this emerging picture of the architecture of responsibility in which normative competence and situational control are the two main elements of responsibility is quite attractive. Others have thought so too. For example, in "Negligence, Mens Rea, and Criminal Responsibility" H.L.A Hart seems to accept such a view. What is crucial is that those whom we punish should have had, when they acted, the normal capacities, physical and mental, for abstaining from what it [the law] forbids, and a fair opportunity to exercise these capacities [Hart 1961: 152]. And Moore endorses this idea. Hart thus subdivides the ability presupposed by his sense of 'could' into two components. One relates to the equipment of the actor: does he have sufficient choosing capacity to be responsible? The other relates to the situation in which the actor finds himself: does that situation present him with a fair chance to use his capacities for choice so as to give effect to his decision [Moore 1997: 554]? We see two different conceptions of how these two factors relate to responsibility. On one conception, normative competence and situational control are individually necessary and jointly sufficient but independent factors in responsibility. On this conception, there is an appropriate degree of competence and an appropriate degree of situational control that can be fixed independently of each other and which are both necessary for responsibility, such that falling short in either dimension is excusing. On this picture, we assess an agent in each area separately. We figure out whether she had the relevant capacities (e.g., were they "normal" or "sufficient"), and then we figure out whether she had the fair opportunity to exercise them. This has been the conception of the architecture of responsibility that we have articulated so far. However, an alternative conception of normative competence and situational control is possible that treats them as individually necessary and jointly sufficient but at least sometimes interacting. On this picture, how much and what sort of capacities one needs can vary according to situational features. So, for example, there might be situations in which the wrongdoing in question was especially clear, such as a murder or an assault, and in which there was no significant provocation, duress, or other hard choice. We might think that culpable wrongdoing, in such cases, requires less in the form of cognitive or volitional capacities than in cases in which the normative issues are less clear or in which there is substantial provocation or duress. Or hold constant the wrongdoing in question and compare the interaction of situational factors and competence in different individuals. It's plausible to suppose that normative competence requires an ability to make one's own normative judgments and hold to them despite temptation, distraction, and peer pressure. It's also plausible to suppose that adolescents have less independence of judgment and ability to resist peer pressure than their adult counterparts. But then we might be more excusing of adolescent wrongdoing committed in groups than 18 of comparable adult behavior committed in groups. If so, differential competence may explain why the same level of situational pressure may be excusing for some and not for others (Brink 2004). But then we might prefer a conception of normative competence and situational control in which they are potentially interacting, rather than independent, dimensions of responsibility. Such a conception would also imply that the requisite levels of normative competence and situational control are not invariant, but rather context--‐ dependent. 7. RESPONSIBILITY AS THE FAIR OPPORTUNITY TO AVOID WRONGDOING So far, the conception of responsibility emerging from our discussion is a two--‐factor model twice over. We factor responsibility into normative competence and situational control, and we factor normative competence into partially independent cognitive and volitional capacities, which we treat as equally important. This kind of two--‐factor model seems plausible, in significant part because it promises to fit our practices of excuse in both moral assessment and the criminal law pretty well. Perhaps this is adequate justification. But it would be nice if there were some unifying element to its structure. One possible umbrella concept is control (the concept Fischer and Ravizza associate with reasons--‐responsiveness). Freedom from coercion and duress, cognitive competence, and volitional competence all seem to be aspects of an agent's ability to control her actions. But control seems important, at least in part, because it seems unfair to blame agents for outcomes that are outside their control. But this suggests that the umbrella concept should perhaps be fairness, in particular, the fair opportunity to avoid wrongdoing (the concept that Moore and Morse associate with the situational component), because failure of either normative competence or situational control violates the norm that blame and punishment be reserved for those who had a fair opportunity to avoid wrongdoing. A related proposal would be to treat the umbrella concept as the fair opportunity to avoid blame. For we might also say that fairness requires that we not blame those who lacked normative competence or situational control. While the opportunity to avoid blame is no doubt a by--‐product of the fair opportunity to avoid wrongdoing, we think that it is the latter concept that should be primary in our understanding of responsibility. For one thing, if we understand responsibility (as accountability) as the condition that justifies blame, then appeal to the fair opportunity to avoid blame threatens to introduce circularity into our account. For we would then be explaining what makes actions potentially blameworthy in terms of the fair opportunity to avoid blame. That seems like too small an explanatory circle. Moreover, making the primary focus on blame seems potentially narcissistic --‐--‐ too focused on the agent's moral ledger. It may be that one can avoid blame if one has the fair opportunity to avoid wrongdoing, but being responsible does not seem to be primarily about the agent avoiding blame. Rather, the ability to avoid blame seems consequential on responsibility. We can explain this, without focusing unduly on the responses of others, if we treat the fair opportunity to avoid wrongdoing as the primary concept. If we treat the fair opportunity to avoid wrongdoing as the key to responsibility, we get the following picture of the architecture of responsibility. 19 One way to see the importance of the fair opportunity to avoid wrongdoing is to think about why strict liability is problematic. Strict liability offenses are those for which wrongdoing is sufficient and culpability is not required. While tort law recognizes some strict liability offenses, it is significant that the penalties for such torts are civil monetary damages. Strict liability is extremely problematic within the criminal law, where guilt results in blame and imprisonment. Indeed, the main strict liability crime is statutory rape (consensual intercourse by an adult male with an underage female), where a reasonable belief that the female was not a minor is not exculpatory. But this conception of statutory rape is anomalous. Statutory rape is not treated as a strict liability crime in all jurisdictions, and where it is so treated, it is widely viewed as morally problematic. Indeed, the Model Penal Code condemns criminal offenses for which conviction does not require culpability (§2.02).26 Why exactly are strict liability crimes so problematic? In "Legal Responsibility and Excuses" H.L.A. Hart suggests that the criminal law conditions liability on culpability out of respect for "the efficacy of the individual's informed and considered choice in determining the future" (1957: 46). A corollary of this concern with individual autonomy is the demand for the fair opportunity to avoid wrongdoing. This principle is at work in support of the fundamental legal principle of legality. Legality is the doctrine that there should be no punishment in the absence of public notice of a legal requirement. The principle of legality is usually defended as part of fair notice. Ex post facto or retroactive criminal law would be unfair, because it would punish those for failing to conform to behavioral expectations of which they had not been apprised in advance. Ex post facto law thus threatens individual autonomy and its demand 26For a brief discussion of the anomalous position of strict liability crimes within the criminal law, see Dressler 2009: ch. 11. Fair Opportunity to Avoid Wrongdoing Normative Competence Situational Control Cognitive Competence Volitional Competence 20 of fair opportunity to avoid wrongdoing. But a similar rationale is at work against strict liability crimes. Just as it would be unfair to convict actors for failing to conform to standards that had not been promulgated in advance, so too it would be unfair to convict actors for failing to conform to standards (promulgated in advance) that they did everything within their power to obey. Conviction without culpability denies the fair opportunity to avoid wrongdoing. Some have suggested that fairness requires normative competence as a condition of responsibility.27 Others have suggested that the fair opportunity to avoid wrongdoing requires situational control. We put these ideas together and conclude that the guiding principle underlying our conception of responsibility is the fair opportunity to avoid wrongdoing. Because the fair opportunity to avoid wrongdoing is the central value in our conception of responsibility, it is perhaps worth addressing skepticism about the fair opportunity to avoid wrongdoing. There is a familiar kind of skepticism about responsibility that appeals to incompatibilism and determinism. One form of skepticism alleges that responsibility presupposes the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP), requiring that one could have done other than one did, which determinism shows to be false. Our conception of responsibility is not immune to these sorts of skeptical threats, because we understand responsibility in terms of the fair opportunity to avoid wrongdoing and we understand the fair opportunity to avoid wrongdoing to require alternative possibilities. To have the fair opportunity to avoid wrongdoing, it must be true that when one commits wrong, one could have done otherwise. There are two kinds of challenge to PAP. First, PAP may seem to require indeterminism. Second, alternative possibilities may seem unnecessary for responsibility because of Frankfurt--‐style counterexamples in which an agent chooses to act in a normal and responsible way and in which someone else (the 27See Wallace 1994: 109, 116, 161--‐66. The substance of our conception of responsibility agrees with Wallace on many points, including the idea that responsibility requires normative competence, that normative competence has both cognitive and volitional dimensions, and that normative requirement is a condition of the fairness of blame and punishment. But there are important differences. Wallace's account of excusing and exempting conditions (chs. 5--‐6) fails at many points to distinguish properly between justification and excuse. Also, like Fischer and Ravizza and other philosophers, Wallace tends to focus on the kind of normative competence that fairness requires for responsibility, thus ignoring or at least underestimating the importance of the kind of situational control that fairness also requires for responsibility. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Wallace insists on adopting a response--‐dependent interpretation of this conception of responsibility insofar as he claims that we cannot give an account of the conditions under which an agent is responsible independently of our reactive attitudes and practices of excuse (1994: 19). But while the reactive attitudes and our practices of excuse may be evidence about the conditions of responsibility, on our conception, they point to a conception of responsibility grounded in the fair opportunity to avoid wrongdoing, which itself requires normative competence and situational control. On this conception, it is possible to give a response--‐independent account of the conditions under which the reactive attitudes are justified. 21 counterfactual intervener) stands ready to intervene to cause her to act that way in case she should waver (Frankfurt 1969). These are familiar philosophical issues about responsibility that are quite complicated, and this is not the place to defend compatibilism in any detail. But we can and should indicate the lines along which we would like to defend our commitments. Our response is to understand the "could have done otherwise" clause in PAP as consistent with both the existence of typical Frankfurt scenarios and with determinism. This requires a compatibilist understanding of the ability to do otherwise. A variety of such compatibilist accounts have recently been defended.28 The account we favor is one according to which one has the general ability to do otherwise, manifested in various cognitive and volitional capacities and opportunities, and, at the time of the action, nothing impairs these capacities and opportunities in a relevant way. Such a condition can be satisfied in Frankfurt--‐style cases, and, we claim, in deterministic settings.29 There is, to be sure, another sense of the ability to do otherwise, in which the agents in Frankfurt--‐style cases lack such an ability, but this is not the sense we believe is required by the fair opportunity to avoid wrongdoing. The legitimate threats to the opportunity to avoid wrongdoing and, hence, responsibility come not from the fact that our actions are caused but rather from specific impairments of cognitive and volitional capacities and specific kinds of external interference with our ability to conform to the relevant norms. 8. PARTIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND EXCUSE An important feature of our conception of responsibility is that the components of normative competence and situational control are scalar concepts that admit of degree. This implies that responsibility is itself scalar and that partial responsibility is a real phenomenon.30 Insanity and immaturity are clearly scalar concepts. But so are the ideas of paralyzing emotions, irresistible urges, and a disabling depression. So too is the hardness of a choice, posed by coercion or natural forces, and the question of whether it is more than a reasonable person could resist. Partial responsibility is reasonably well recognized within our assessments of moral responsibility. But the recognition of partial responsibility suggests a basis for criminal jurisprudence reforms. Criminal law trials are bifurcated into two phases --‐--‐ the guilt phase and, if guilty, the sentencing phase. Verdicts at the guilt phase are generally bivalent --‐--‐ guilty or not guilty. There are various possible reasons for a finding of not guilty. The prosecution may fail to prove some element of actus reus or mens rea beyond a reasonable doubt, or the defense 28For example, there have been several attempts to reconcile PAP with determinism by understanding the ability to do otherwise in terms of the having of a disposition. See, for example, Smith 2003, Vihvelin 2004, Fara 2008. For criticism, see Clarke 2009. 29The skeptic might reply that a determined past prevents one from exercising one's capacities. But, as Nelkin has argued (2011: 64--‐79), the fact that the past is deterministic does not make it interference or prevention in the relevant sense any more than is the counterfactual intervener in a Frankfurt scenario. See Wolf (1990: 94--‐116) for a different kind of defense of the conclusion. 30One recent discussion of the scalar character of reasons--‐responsiveness is Coates and Swenson 2012. For a defense of the scalar character of immaturity and the resulting partial responsibility appropriate for juvenile justice, see Brink 2004. 22 may provide adequate evidence of justification, by demonstrating necessity, or excuse, by demonstrating duress or insanity. But the factors determining both justification and excuse would appear to be scalar. One might conclude that in an ideal world guilt verdicts should be multivalent reflecting the degree of justification or excuse the defendant possessed. Insofar as our bivalent system recognizes only perfect necessity as a justification and complete or substantial lack of normative competence as an excuse, its conception of guilt and punishment is over--‐inclusive and punishment is not proportional to just deserts. Perhaps there are legitimate pragmatic reasons for opposing an infinitely multivalent system. But even a trivalent system that recognized partial guilt, as well as guilty and not--‐guilty verdicts, would provide more retributive justice. Justifications do not bear on responsibility, as excuses do. So we focus on partial excuse, rather than partial justification. While some European criminal justice systems recognize partial excuse, American criminal law does not. Instead, we recognize only full excuses, relegating considerations that are relevant to excuse but fall short of full excuse to the sentencing phase of a trial.31 Some commentators have called for the adoption of a trivalent system for the guilt phase in which the accused can be found guilty, not guilty, or guilty but partially responsible.32 A trivalent system would be superior to our current bivalent one. Supplementing a bivalent system with sentence mitigation is an imperfect proxy for recognizing partial excuses. Though one can mitigate sentences to respond to various non--‐culpability factors (e.g. mercy or forgiveness), mitigation is a poor response to reduced culpability. First, mitigation is not always possible where there are mandatory sentencing rules. Second, mitigation, where possible, is largely discretionary. But it shouldn't be discretionary whether to hear and evaluate considerations that would tend to excuse. If complete incompetence is relevant to the guilt phase and a full excuse, then partial competence is also relevant to the guilt phase and a partial excuse, because it appeals to the very same factors that a full excuse appeals to, only to a reduced degree. In effect, the claim is that excuses, whether full or partial, belong to the guilt phase of a trial and that sentence mitigation should be confined to non--‐culpability considerations (or, perhaps, in a trivalent system, to those culpability considerations that fall below the threshold necessary for partial excuse). Our conception of the architecture of responsibility recognizes the scalar nature of the components of responsibility and so justifies findings of partial responsibility. If, as the positive retributivist believes, punishment and the reactive attitudes should be proportional to culpable wrongdoing, then just deserts require that we recognize partial excuses. Otherwise, we punish more than just deserts. As we have seen, not all retributivists are of this sort. Yet all retributivists, positive and negative, believe that punishment and the reactive attitudes should not be out of proportion to culpable wrongdoing. If this is correct, then justice requires that we recognize partial excuses. Presumably, our moral assessments and practices of moral blame can and do already 31The one exception to the generalization that American criminal law does not recognize partial excuse is the provocation defense, under which intentional homicides committed with adequate provocation reduce to an offense of voluntary manslaughter. 32See Morse 2003. Morse's position is especially interesting, because this defense of partial excuse is a reversal of his previous skepticism about partial excuse (Morse 1984). 23 reflect recognition of partial excuses, albeit imperfectly. The conception of responsibility we have sketched suggests that we should recognize a doctrine of generic partial excuse in the criminal law as well and abandon that doctrine only if and when it proves administratively unfeasible or to have worse retributive outcomes overall. 24 BIBLIOGRAPHY • Aharoni, E., Sinnott--‐Armstrong, W., and Kiehler, K. (2012) "Can Psychopathic Offenders Discern Moral Wrongs? A New Look at the Moral/Conventional Distinction" Journal of Abnormal Psychology 121: 484--‐97. • American Law Institute. (1981) Model Penal Code, ed. M. Dubber (New York: Foundation Press, 2002). • Aristotle. (NE) Nicomachean Ethics, trs. T. Irwin (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1985). • Bedau, H. and Kelly, E. (2010) "Punishment" The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2010/entries/punishment>. • Blair, J., Mitchell, D., and Blair, K. (2005) The Psychopath: Emotion and the Brain (Oxford: Blackwell). • Brink, D. (2004) "Immaturity, Normative Competence, and Juvenile Transfer: How (Not) to Punish Minors for Major Crimes" Texas Law Review 82: 1555--‐85. • Clarke, R. (2009) "Dispositions, Abilities to Act, and Free Will: The New Dispositionalism" Mind 118: 323--‐51. • Coates, D.J. and Swenson, P. (2012) "Reasons--‐Responsiveness and Degrees of Responsibility" Philosophical Studies. • Damasio, A. (1994) Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain (New York: Putnam). • Dressler, J. (2009) Understanding Criminal Law, 5th ed. (Boston: LexisNexis). • Duff, A. (2008) "Legal Punishment" The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/legal--‐punishment>. • Fara, M. (2008) "Masked Abilities and Compatibilism," Mind 117: 843--‐65. • Fine, C. and Kennette, J. (2004) "Mental Impairment, Moral Understanding, and Criminal Responsibility" International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 27: 425--‐43. • Fischer, J. and Ravizza, M. (1998) Responsibility and Control (New York: Cambridge University Press). • Frankfurt, H. (1969) "Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility" reprinted in Frankfurt 1988. • Frankfurt, H. (1988) The Importance of What We Care About (New York: Cambridge University Press). • Hart, H.L.A. (1957) "Legal Responsibility and Excuses" reprinted in Hart 1968. • Hart, H.L.A. (1961) "Negligence, Mens Rea, and Criminal Responsibility" reprinted in Hart 1968. • Hart, H.L.A. (1968) Punishment and Responsibility (Oxford: Clarendon Press). • Kant, I. (1788) Critique of Practical Reason, trs. L.W. Beck (Indianapolis: Bobbs--‐ Merrill, 1956) (Prussian Academy pagination). • Kripke, S. (1982). Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (Cambridge: Harvard University Press). • McKenna, M. (2001) "Review of Fischer and Ravizza, Responsibility and Control" Journal of Philosophy 98: 93--‐100. • McKenna, M. (2012) "Reasons--‐Responsiveness, Agents, and Mechanisms" (this volume). 25 • Mele, A. (1990) "Irresistible Desires" Nous 24: 455--‐72. • Moore, M. (1997) Placing Blame (Oxford: Clarendon Press). • Morse, S. (1984) "Undiminished Confusion in Diminished Capacity" The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 75: 1--‐55. • Morse, S. (1994) "Culpability and Control" University of Pennsylvania Law Review 142: 1587--‐1660. • Morse, S. (2002) "Uncontrollable Urges and Irrational People" Virginia Law Review 88: 1025--‐78. • Morse, S. (2003) "Diminished Rationality, Diminished Responsibility" Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law 1: 289--‐308. • Nelkin, D. (2011) Making Sense of Freedom and Responsibility (Oxford: Clarendon Press). • Pereboom, D. (2006) "Reasons--‐Responsiveness, Alternative Possibilities, and Manipulation Arguments against Compatibilism" Philosophical Books 47: 198--‐212. • Pereboom, D. (2012) "Freedom and Punishment" in The Future of Punishment, ed. T. Nadelhoffer (Oxford: Clarendon Press). • Scanlon, T.M. (2008) Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, and Blame (Cambridge: Harvard University Press). • Sidgwick, H. (1907) The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. (London: Macmillan). • Smith, M. (2003) "Rational Capacities, or How to Distinguish Recklessness, Weakness, and Compulsion" in Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality, ed. S. Stroud and C. Tappolet (Oxford: Clarendon Press). • Strawson, P.F. (1962) "Freedom and Resentment" reprinted in Watson 1982. • Wallace, R. J. (1994) Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments (Cambridge: Harvard University Press). • Todd, P. and Tognazzini, N. (2008) "A Problem for Guidance Control" Philosophical Quarterly 58: 685--‐92. • Vihvelin, K. (2004) "Free Will Demystified: A Dispositional Account," Philosophical Topics 32, 427--‐50. • Watson, G., ed. (1982) Free Will (New York: Oxford University Press). • Watson, G. (1987) "Responsibility and the Limits of Evil" reprinted in Watson 2004. • Watson, G. (1996) "Two Faces of Responsibility" reprinted in Watson 2004. • Watson, G. (2001) "Reasons and Responsibility" reprinted in Watson 2004. • Watson, G. (2004) Agency and Answerability (New York: Oxford University Press). • Watson, G. (2011) "The Trouble with Psychopaths" in Reasons and Recognition: Essays on the Philosophy of T.M. Scanlon (New York: Oxford University Press). • Williams, B. (1976) "Moral Luck" reprinted in Williams 1981. • Williams, B. (1981) Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). • Wolf, S. (1990) Freedom Within Reason (New York: Oxford University Press).

As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 1 Roberto Thomas Arruda, D.Phil. 2020 (+55) 11 98381 3956 [email protected] As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 2 Segunda Edição –Ago 2020 ISBN 9798671145632 Tradução do original em inglês "The Blind Shadows of Narcissus –a psychosocial study on collective imaginary" Monee, IL,Jul 2020. Terra à Vista – SP ISBN 9781698132297 O autor é filiado às seguintes instituições: The American Philosophical Association (APA) The British Society for Ethical Theory (BSET) The Ancient Philosophy Society The Metaphysical Society of America (MSA The Philosophical Society of England The Social Psychology Network The International Association of Language and Social Psychology Capa: Foto gentilmente cedida por Chris J Davis. As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 3 As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 4 SINOPSE No presente trabalho, vamos abordar algumas das questões essenciais sobre o imaginário coletivo e suas relações com a realidade e a verdade. Devemos encarar esse assunto em uma estrutura conceptual, seguida pela análise factual correspondente às realidades comportamentais demonstráveis. Adotaremos não apenas a metodologia, mas principalmente os princípios e proposições da filosofia analítica, que com certeza serão evidentes ao longo do estudo e podem ser identificados pelos recursos descritos por Perez[1] : Rabossi (1975) defende a ideia de que a filosofia analítica pode ser identificada considerando-se certas semelhanças familiares. Ele sugere os seguintes traços familiares: uma atitude positiva em relação ao conhecimento científico; uma atitude cautelosa em relação à As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 5 metafísica; uma concepção da filosofia como uma tarefa conceitual, que toma a análise conceitual como um método; uma estreita relação entre linguagem e filosofia; uma preocupação em buscar respostas argumentativas para problemas filosóficos, e procura de clareza conceitual. Esses conceitos centrais envolvem conteúdos culturais, sociais, religiosos, científicos, filosóficos, morais e políticos, pertencentes à existência individual e coletiva de cada um de nós. Neste artigo, não discutiremos nem demonstraremos. Nosso objetivo não é o de sistematicamente criticar ou evidenciar qualquer coisa, de qualquer maneira. O presente trabalho se baseia na reflexão analítica. Apenas especularemos da maneira mais abrangente e profunda que pudermos e expressaremos os resultados de nossos pensamentos. Não obstante a natureza multidisciplinar do assunto e a abertura metodológica para aceitar contribuições de qualquer campo da ciência, este trabalho pertence ao objetivo da psicologia e ontologia ou, em outros termos, da psicologia social e ontológica. A metodologia livre que norteia tais reflexões As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 6 abrange e leva em consideração tudo o que se aproxima da coerência com a epistemologia filosófica e psicológica. Essa metodologia não busca alcançar evidências, mas apenas procura a inter-relação entre evidências já existentes, de qualquer natureza e magnitude, inferindo um significado coerente para as coisas reais. Muitos dos grandes pensadores, a qualquer momento, nunca procuraram demonstrações, teorizações ou sistematizações. Esses pensadores apenas pensavam, meditavam e com a iluminação de sua humildade podiam se aproximar da verdade. Eles serão nossa referência e o exemplo a ser seguido. Com certeza, não encontraremos a verdade, mas podemos ter certeza de alguma coisa: em muitos momentos, chegaremos perto da verdade e, em todos os momentos, estaremos nos afastando da inverdade e da mentira. O escopo principal deste estudo é observar como alguns dos atributos evolutivos essenciais da humanidade, como criatividade, imaginação e associação, podem se tornar uma doença perigosa, abrigada nas sombras enevoadas da inteligência. As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 7 TÍTULO I ARCABOUÇO CONCEPTUAL (Sobre quais bases refletiremos) As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 8 CAPÍTULO I INTRODUÇÃO RAZÃO, VIESES E CRENÇAS Estamos diante de um estudo multidisciplinar e sempre estaremos cercados por três conceitos fundamentais: realidade, verdade e imaginário. Antes de tudo, precisamos ter as ferramentas epistemológicas adequadas para conceituar cada uma delas no momento adequado. Essa conceptualização significa selecionar dentre os inúmeros estudos e teorias existentes fundamentos coerentes, capazes de atribuir uma cogência aceitável às nossas afirmações e conclusões, da mesma maneira que significa desconsiderar muitas outras ideias e conceitos, quaisquer que sejam. Esse triângulo cognitivo significa a confluência dos significados mais debatidos e não consensuais em humanidades, uma estrada intrigante, perigosa e muito convidativa. Qualquer ser humano vivo mergulha neste mar desconhecido de incertezas em um único dia de sua existência, cada um por sua natureza e As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 9 situação. Esses conceitos não são a expressão de algo pertencente à fenomenologia que envolve os seres humanos, mas propriedades intrínsecas do próprio ser, algumas vezes resultando em atividade racional ou mental, status emocional e outros, desencadeando padrões comportamentais. A metafísica, a psicologia, as neurociências e a história da epistemologia nos ajudarão com os elementos intrínsecos dessas conceituações, como independentes e, ao mesmo tempo, materialmente interrelacionadas. Mellone, SH ([2] ) analisaram a abordagem metodológica que adotaremos: Frequentemente, é apontado que o hábito de isolar e abstrair uma investigação de outras dentro da "esfera mágica" da filosofia é uma fonte frutífera de erro e confusão. A filosofia, como Wordsworth Clouda entende, se une: não podemos isolar e chegar a uma conclusão final sobre um problema sem prejudicar nossas conclusões sobre os outros. Sem negar isso, é importante lembrar que a filosofia, ao contrário de uma nuvem, deve ser um conjunto de partes que podem ser inteligivelmente distinguíveis apenas porque estão relacionadas ou conectadas. As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 10 O autor vê essas inter-relações como agregadas estruturalmente ao método e sustenta que "as partes da filosofia não são indagações não relacionadas, mas diferenças do método dentro de uma indagação única". Assim, nosso primeiro desafio é sempre manter o raciocínio inter-relacionado consistente e coerente, guiado o máximo possível pelo pensamento crítico. Justine M. Kingsbury e Tracy A. Bowell, [3], ambos da Universidade de Waikato, abordaram esse problema cognitivo central, implicando todos nós, em um artigo publicado em 2016. Ambos os autores consideram que em nossas percepções cotidianas e superficiais, é comum ter em mente que alguém deve submeter imparcialmente suas percepções e entendimentos da realidade a uma comparação com as evidências existentes Posteriormente, pelas correspondências ou incoerências decorrentes dessa comparação, eles devem confirmar ou modificar seu conteúdo. Em outros termos, devemos, em geral, esperar das pessoas a prática de pelo menos um conceito básico e direto de pensamento crítico em suas vidas e comportamento. No entanto, esse atributo do pensamento crítico enfrenta muitas barreiras, que muitas vezes se sobrepõem à análise racional, "mesmo quando as crenças em questão forem diárias e sejam As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 11 irrelevantes". (op.cit). Os autores estavam concentrados no processo cognitivo e no pensamento crítico de indivíduos e grupos sociais, referindo-se às "barreiras" mais significativas. Essas "barreiras" são nossos "velhos companheiros" em psicologia social e epistemologia: os preconceitos e as crenças. De fato, manter preconceitos e crenças pessoais separados do pensamento crítico não é uma tarefa simples ou fácil e, do ponto de vista realista, poderíamos entender isso como um desejo ou escopo, e não como uma realidade disponível e responsável. De qualquer forma, para alcançar a consistência desejada em nossos raciocínios, devemos aceitar esse desafio de afastar de nossa metodologia todos os nossos preconceitos e crenças, sejam quais forem. O motivo não é que preconceitos e crenças possam estar errados ou certos, mas apenas porque, principalmente, pertencem ao domínio das propriedades únicas de cada indivíduo ou grupo social e, sendo assim, fazem parte do escopo de nossas investigações. e não um elemento cognitivo da nossa metodologia. Uma análise extensa dos preconceitos e crenças humanas não é o objetivo deste trabalho e não se encaixaria neste breve capítulo introdutório. De qualquer forma, levando em consideração o progresso do estudo, devemos trazer à memória, o mais próximo possível, aqueles selecionados como os que ocorrem com mais frequência nos As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 12 contextos que analisaremos adiante. As pesquisas correspondentes a cada uma delas podem ser encontradas na lista de referências. Os vieses individuais foram objeto de incontáveis estudos e experiências, principalmente a partir de 1960, conduzidos com rigorosas metodologias fenomenológicas e revelaram a origem de muitas desconstruções dos processos cognitivos individuais, e as enormes dificuldades em se conduzir coerentemente a percepção e o raciocínio. a) O viés de confirmação: adotando e supervalorizando preferencialmente a importância das evidências em favor de nossa crença já existente, e evitando discuti-la. Wason , P. C & Johnson-Laird, PN (1972) ([4] ) - (Koriat, Lichtenstein e Fischhoff, 1980)[5] , b) Efeito Dunning-Kruger (também conhecido como ilusão de superioridade): decorrente da incapacidade de perceber sua falta pessoal de habilidades ou capacidades e de uma percepção externa errada de pessoas de alta capacidade (Kruger, Justin Dunning, David (1999)[6] . c) A perseverança na crença: a persistência de uma crença, embora as evidências tenham negado as razões para continuar mantendo-a. (Ross, Lepper e Hubbard, 1975)[7] , d) O viés "meu lado" e "lado único": as tendências a dar avaliações mais altas a argumentos que apoiam as suas opiniões, do As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 13 que aquelas que refutam suas posições anteriores, bem como a preferir um argumento unilateral a um argumento equilibrado ( Keith E. Stanovich e Richard F. West 2008)[8] . e) A atribuição causal (teoria da atribuição): -o processo de alguém fazer uma inferência sem bases sobre as causas dos estados mentais ou comportamentos das pessoas. (Mehmet Eskin 2013 )[9] ( Heider, F., 1958) [10] . f) Os equívocos e mal-entendidos na construção psicológica ou social individual da realidade (Viviane Burr, 1995)[11] g) Efeito Ambiguidade: resistência em entender e aceitar alternativas cujos resultados ainda são inseguros ou desconhecidos. (J. Baron 1994)[12] h) Efeito influência contínua: tendência a priorizar informações erradas na memória que já foram corrigidas, desconsiderando tais correções. (HMJohnson, CMSeifert 1994)[13] i) O viés antropocêntrico: a tendência de usar as propriedades e a natureza humanas como base para o raciocínio sobre fenômenos desconhecidos ou não familiares. (Ben Mylius 2018).[14] j) O viés da ancoragem: a tendência de confiar nas informações iniciais, que funcionam como uma "âncora" para a formulação de raciocínios subsequentes. Os vieses sociais são aqueles que afetam a As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 14 percepção interativa e o raciocínio de determinados grupos em uma determinada situação, causando desconstruções na percepção coletiva. Diferentemente dos vieses individuais, os sociais constituem uma influência que vem do grupo para o indivíduo, afetando seus processos cognitivos. a) O viés de admissão: a tendência de se comportar a favor de outros pertencentes ao mesmo grupo que o agente - "espírito de corpo" irracional (MB Brewer 1979),[15] b) O erro de atribuição de grupo: a tendência de entender que as decisões coletivas prevalecem sobre as opiniões individuais, mesmo quando esses resultados subestimam as informações ou evidências disponíveis (Scott T. Allison e David M. Messick 1985),[16] c) Os efeitos manada: um distúrbio comportamental induzido pelo anonimato do grupo, fazendo com que os indivíduos na multidão percam seu senso de auto responsabilidade individual e pessoal. (Gustav Le Bon1895)[17] e ( Jaap van Ginneken 1992)[18] , d) O viés da autoridade: a tendência à obediência a quaisquer ordens dadas por alguém considerado como autoridade, mesmo que elas acreditem que haja algo errado com essas ordens, e mesmo quando não haja uma As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 15 punição por descumprir essas ordens (Milgram 1963)[19] , e) O efeito "líder de torcida": uma crença de que se atinge maior atratividade pessoal ao atuar em grupo do que quando se age sozinho (Walker D 2014)[20] f) Efeito de falso consenso: o viés cognitivo generalizado situacional nas inferências sociais, quando as pessoas tendem a ver erroneamente suas próprias escolhas e julgamentos comportamentais como relativamente usuais e apropriados às circunstâncias existentes (Marks e Miller 1987),[21] g) Teoria da justificação do sistema (ou racionalização do status): a adoção por indivíduos da crença de que a justificação do status quo pode garantir e satisfazer muitas necessidades subjacentes, embora o sistema possa ser desvantajoso para outros ( Jost, JT e van der Toorn, J. 2012)[22] , h) Viés de auto desempenho: é a tendência de atribuir todos os eventos positivos a si mesmo, e todos os eventos adversos a causas e fatores externos (White & Plous 1995),[23] Todos esses acidentes cognitivos afetam, de uma ou outra forma, o conteúdo e as conclusões de nosso estudo, e muitos deles são causais ou determinantes em relação aos fatos e contextos que devemos analisar. Entre todos, destacamos um como sendo As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 16 mais relevante para a compreensão de alguns comportamentos coletivos, que são objeto da análise factual que consideraremos na Parte II deste trabalho. Estamos nos referindo ao viés de crença de longa prazo, primeiramente referido por Ross, Lepper & Hubbard em 1975 como o "viés de perseverança na crença", e recentemente pesquisado em um estudo profundo conduzido por Geoffrey L. Cohen[24] da Universidade de Stanford sobre a psicologia social da identidade e crença. Além de suas próprias descobertas, uma das revelações de sua pesquisa confirma outro viés já pesquisado e amplia sua conclusão, referindose a muitos construtos sociais: As pessoas frequentemente persistem em crenças por longo prazo, mesmo em face daquilo que as invalida. Em um estudo clássico, oponentes e defensores da pena de morte reviram as mesmas e variadas evidências científicas sobre a alegada capacidade da pena de morte de deter futuros assassinatos. Cada lado interpretou, geralmente, essa evidência como confirmatória de suas crenças anteriores (Lord, Ross & Lepper, 1979). Eles tenderam a aceitar a pesquisa que sustentava suas crenças anteriores e a denegrir a pesquisa que as contradizia. As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 17 Como consequência, eles relataram que as evidências os tornaram ainda mais arraigados em suas crenças. A tendência de avaliar novas informações através do prisma de crenças préexistentes, conhecida como viés de assimilação, é robusta e generalizada (Kahan, 2010; Pronin, Gilovich & Ross, 2004; Tetlock, 2005; cf. Gerber & Green, 1999). . Os vieses são sempre elementos situacionais e causais da incoerência dos processos cognitivos individuais ou sociais. Diferentemente disso, as crenças não são situacionais, embora frequentemente sujeitas às consequências de tais inconsistências. Em contraste, as crenças podem ser um produto coerente da evidência e do pensamento crítico, bem como uma expressão do absurdo. Portanto, vieses sempre contêm erros ou impropriedades, e as crenças não são teoricamente atribuíveis de valor "per se". De nossos preconceitos e vieses vêm todas as nossas crenças imperfeitas e muitas vezes ignorantes. Já das evidências e do pensamento crítico nascem todos os nossos conhecimentos e crenças que possam ser coerentes. Ambos seguem o mesmo processo, nascendo, no entanto, de sementes muito diferentes. As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 18 A fertilidade e a coexistência desses fundamentos opostos da consciência fazem parte do paradoxo dialético humano. As crenças humanas são um dos assuntos mais intrigantes das ciências e da filosofia e podem ser vistas como algo comparável aos ossos em relação ao nosso corpo físico: as crenças são o esqueleto do eu. Toda a intrincada e delicada rede de elementos psicológicos, neuronais e comportamentais da identidade de um ser humano existe em torno dos pilares de suas crenças. Nesse sentido, as crenças são causais quando entendidas como um sistema, como mais adiante assumiremos. Se pudéssemos usar estritamente a Navalha de Occam, deveríamos dizer apenas o seguinte: "As crenças são um sistema memorizado de atribuições de valor situacional resultantes da experiência individual." No entanto, como não possuímos as habilidades de Occam, devemos observar esse assunto mais amplamente. Existem diferentes pontos de vista para a análise de crenças. Quando os observamos como um processo, partimos da constatação de que cada indivíduo, no cotidiano, atribui valores a absolutamente tudo relacionado à sua experiência fenomenológica. Os processos As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 19 psicológicos e neuronais determinam essa atribuição, ocorrendo desde o nascimento do indivíduo. Essas atribuições são mantidas na memória e permanecerão ali para sempre, ou até que uma experiência nova e diferente possa vir a modificar o registro de atribuição correspondente. Sensações e ideias puras, como quente, frio, bonito, feio, barato, caro, tedioso, emocionante, muitos, poucos, iniciam o processo de atribuição de valor. Tudo relacionado a tudo o que se experimenta alimenta um imenso banco de dados individual. Ao dizer "tudo o que foi experimentado", queremos dizer que o conteúdo cognitivo que alimenta o registro de atribuição de que estamos falando não se limita à experiência factual e empírica, mas também contém todas as atribuições provenientes do imaginário e do inconsciente coletivo. Contextos e representações, como mundos ou entidades imaginários ou alternativos, e projeção de ideias revolucionárias, podem assumir as formas de um sistema de crenças. Da mesma forma, muitas de nossas crenças centrais não são uma consequência de um processo racional e analítico, mas são a herança de experiências coletivas e aceitas de forma não crítica (Richard 1993).[25] Esses registros incontáveis não existem isoladamente, mas incorporam um sistema As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 20 notavelmente complexo de informações interrelacionadas e continuamente comparativas, a partir das quais resulta uma atribuição de valor específica sobre qualquer situação que envolva os processos perceptivos individuais. Essas atribuições de valor resultantes são chamadas de crenças e comandam referencialmente tudo no comportamento humano. Eles são o esqueleto do eu. Lewis[26] enfatiza a natureza avaliativa e direcional de tais resultados: Crenças são a maneira do nosso cérebro de entender e navegar em nosso mundo complexo. São representações mentais da maneira como nossos cérebros esperam que as coisas em nosso ambiente se comportem e como as coisas devem ser relacionadas umas com as outras os padrões com os quais nosso cérebro espera que o mundo se conforme. Crenças são modelos para um aprendizado eficiente e geralmente são essenciais para a sobrevivência. O processo de formação de crenças chamou a atenção das neurociências nas últimas décadas, desencadeando muitas pesquisas em seres humanos e primatas. Esses estudos evidenciaram que a formação de crenças corresponde a processos cerebrais fundamentais de atribuição As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 21 de significado afetivo à realidade, suficientes para capacitar os indivíduos a elaborar suas escolhas; tomar decisões. Das mesmas pesquisas, surgiu a conclusão de que os resultados desses processos neurais podem ter uma natureza empírica, relacional ou conceptual, conforme expostos por Rüdiger & Angel:[27] Crenças empíricas são sobre objetos, e crenças relacionais são sobre eventos, como no uso de ferramentas e nas interações entre sujeitos que se desenvolvem abaixo do nível de consciência e são atualizadas dinamicamente. Crenças conceituais são mais complexas, baseadas em narrativas e participação em atos rituais. Como se sabe que os processos neurais exigem espaço computacional no cérebro, a formação de crenças cada vez mais complexas exige recursos neurais adicionais. Aqui, argumentamos que a evolução das crenças humanas está relacionada ao aumento filogenético do cérebro, incluindo o córtex frontal parietal e medial em humanos. As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 22 As descobertas desses estudos conduzem as crenças, enquanto processo neural, para o domínio dos fatores biológicos que influenciam a evolução do cérebro humano, numa extensão ainda não identificada. Um corolário de todas essas características do processo é a suposição de que nossos contextos comportamentais são dinâmicos diante de uma fenomenologia em constante mudança, devido à interdependência irredutível entre os lados do triângulo experiência raciocínio – crenças (Usó-Domenech & NescolardeSelva 2016)[28] . Devido à interdependência entre esses elementos causais, podemos ter várias combinações diferentes na origem de qualquer crença. Quando analisamos os resultados variáveis do processo, podemos observar que eles contêm "pontos de conexão" e "preenchimento de lacunas" inescapáveis. Esses "buracos" processuais são preenchidos por outros elementos existentes na estrutura cognitiva humana, como extrapolações, suposições tendenciosas e semelhanças com padrões previamente reconhecidos, não necessariamente coerentes com a realidade. Em nossos processos neurais, nenhum espaço pode ser deixado vazio e, onde ocorre o vazio, nosso cérebro o preenche de conteúdos As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 23 supostamente semelhantes. Esses recursos principais são uma maneira de entender a imperfeição ou perda de precisão de nossas crenças, pois elas resultam de um processo propenso a erros. (Lewis 2018)[29] . Observando os sistemas que derivam da dinâmica das inter-relações de crenças, adotamos o seguinte conceito proposto por UsóDoménech, JL e Nescolarde-Selva, J: "Os sistemas de crenças são estruturas de normas interrelacionadas e que variam principalmente no grau em que são sistêmicas. O que é sistêmico no Sistema de Crenças é a interrelação entre várias crenças. Os sistemas de crenças são as histórias que contamos a nós mesmos para definir nosso senso pessoal de realidade. Todo ser humano possui um sistema de crenças que eles utilizam, e é através desse mecanismo que individualmente, 'entendemos' o mundo ao nosso redor. "[30] Jim Logan[31] , da UC Santa Barbara (2016), referindo-se ao artigo de Noah E. Friedkin, As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 24 "Underlying Beliefs Change", contribui com várias abordagens que devemos levar em consideração. Entendemos Um sistema de crenças em grupo ou coletivo como um modelo dinâmico que define uma coleção de atitudes, opiniões, certezas ou orientação cognitiva em relação a uma pessoa ou afirmação, que é influenciado por crenças relacionadas e pré-existentes em outras questões. "Existe uma consistência cognitiva subjacente que liga várias crenças." Nesse sentido, UC Sant Barbara conduziu um extenso estudo com colaboração interdisciplinar e participação internacional, alcançando modelos matemáticos com foco em dois processos: um é o sistema de influência interpessoal que modela as crenças de uma pessoa, e o outro se relaciona com o processo de mudança de crença. Devemos acrescentar ao raciocínio do autor e modelar um elemento central do processo: a afirmação de que a existência de sistemas de crenças não depende inteiramente da adesão dos seus crentes. "os crentes não abrigam totalmente o sistema de crenças. De fato, é improvável que tenham consciência de mais do que uma pequena parte e, consciente ou inconscientemente, assumem o resto do sistema de crenças como objeto de fé ". ( UsóDoménech e Nescolarde-Selva op.cit.) Na mesma direção, muitos estudos chegaram à conclusão de que algumas inferências lógicas As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 25 sobre crenças são possíveis se estivermos cientes de outras crenças relacionadas, mantidas pelo mesmo indivíduo ou grupo. Essa consistência subjacente e sua dinâmica adequada são elementos essenciais para entender todo o sistema, principalmente quando falamos de instituições sociais como religião, política e economia. Quando analisamos os frequentes e contínuos conflitos desses sistemas organizacionais humanos centrais, perceberemos a presença de tais subjacências. Todos os conflitos entre grupos historicamente registrados, como guerra, conflitos culturais e religiosos, revoluções e outros, são: "Uma batalha entre sistemas de crenças. Os símbolos surgem fortemente em tais conflitos: eles podem ser objetos reverenciados como pedras, escritos, edifícios, bandeiras ou crachás; sejam eles quais forem, eles podem simbolizar o núcleo central do sistema de crenças. Quando as pessoas se tornam símbolos, a pessoa real pode ficar oculta por trás da imagem ou pessoa simbólica projetada."(Usó-Doménech e Nescolarde-Selva -op.cit) As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 26 Os conceitos expostos neste capítulo estão entre as razões pelas quais podemos considerar a identidade humana individual como o construto único de cada sujeito, em vez de uma "essência" pré-existente e abstrata. A identidade surge do processamento psico-neural de todas as nossas consistências lógicas e perceptivas, inconsistências, experiências e referências culturais e emocionais herdadas. Atualmente, essa afirmação é uma evidência fenomenológica consistente, e não apenas um postulado do existencialismo, como nos tempos correspondentes de Kierkegaard, Fyodor Dostoevsky, Heidegger e Jean-Paul Sartre. Em princípio, os fatos abordados neste Capítulo são os elementos cruciais e as "armadilhas" que estarão sendo processados e atuando nas nossas mentes, e os quais enfrentaremos quando encararmos, adiante, a pergunta sem fim: "O que, afinal, poderia significar 'realidade'?" As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 27 CAPÍTULO II REALIDADE A psicologia social oferece o conhecimento analítico e experimental de nossos preconceitos, crenças e comportamento situacional interativo. Ao fazer isso, atributos qualitativos como "errado", "falso", "incompreendido", "ilusório" e "real" designam o resultado de experimentos e raciocínios. Consideraremos, no entanto, que (i) Esses atributos não pertencem à esfera da psicologia. São sujeitos metafísicos, e somente o pensamento e os métodos filosóficos adequados podem tratar seus conteúdos. (ii) Todos esses assuntos integram um vasto labirinto de estudos filosóficos, discussões, tendências e conceituações, e não têm nenhum significado universal indistintamente aplicável a todas as ciências naturais e humanas. Na metafísica kantiana, a realidade é levada em conta como uma categoria distinta, mas intimamente relacionada a outra categoria: As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 28 a atualidade (ou existência)[32]. Como amplamente conhecido na metafísica, as categorias são indivisíveis em essência mas, observando-se uma categoria do lado de suas entidades, é possível analisar seu conteúdo de maneiras distintas. Do lado cosmológico, teremos um entendimento que não é exatamente o mesmo que teremos ao observar do lado do indivíduo humano. Significa apenas uma variação sutil e perceptiva, e a categoria ainda é a mesma. Apesar de pertencer à mesma categoria, a percepção da realidade sob diferentes ângulos é favorável à incorporação de seu significado a diferentes questões científicas e filosóficas. Esse fato explica por que, na psicologia, podemos encontrar frequentemente referências à realidade intrínseca (ou interior), distinta da realidade extrínseca (ou externa). Em princípio, não devemos nos preocupar muito com o uso dessa dicotomia, porque não é uma negação da unicidade da categoria, mas apenas uma ferramenta metodológica útil, permitindo muitas contribuições para o estudo da realidade advindo de abordagens científicas distintas. No entanto, devemos manter nossa atenção nos vários significados dados a esse dualismo conceitual, principalmente pela psicanálise, uma vez que alguns mal-entendidos são possíveis. O desenvolvimento das ideias psicanalíticas As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 29 começou com os estudos de Sigmund Freud (1856 1939) e a exposição de conceitos dos mecanismos dos processos mentais que funcionam como construto psicológico da realidade. As ideias de uma "realidade psicológica" e de uma "realidade física" ocuparam uma posição relevante na psicologia e na filosofia a partir de então, levando em conta cada um desses conceitos como ordens separadas. Em 1891, em "On Afhasia: A Critical Study", Freud propôs a teoria da conexão entre essas duas ordens: as "apresentações das coisas" e as "apresentações do mundo". A psicanálise enfocou o conceito topológico da mente em "três camadas" e os construtos complexos que surgem do inconsciente como contendo apenas "representações de coisas": "uma vida fantasiosa contínua que atua para defender ou realizar na imaginação, nossos desejos instintivos básicos".[33] Em "Formulações sobre os dois princípios do funcionamento mental" (1911), Freud afirmou que, nos estágios iniciais da vida, o sujeito é dominado pelo princípio do prazer e pela satisfação alucinatória. O fracasso em obter tal satisfação força o bebê a "representar por si mesmo o estado real do mundo externo". O pensamento originalmente inconsciente é dividido: uma parte permanece sob o controle do princípio do prazer e constrói fantasias; a As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 30 outra parte, com a linguagem, torna-se consciente e capaz de julgar se uma representação pertence à realidade psíquica interna ou à realidade externa do mundo.[34] Conflitos entre filosofia e a psicanálise foi um efeito esperado diante das ideias de Freud. Antecedendo Freud, desde o período présocrático, a filosofia sempre sustentou e justificou a estrutura da categoria de realidade como Physis e seus elementos centrais, como "ser", "absoluto", forma e "mente". Porém, o universo moderno do realismo científico adotou o entendimento prevalente de que o mundo demonstrado pela ciência é o real, independentemente do que pensamos que possa ser. Algumas inconsistências de Freud em suas abordagens aos conceitos de realidade motivaram fortes rejeições relacionadas às incursões de suas teorias na metafísica: Freud nunca menciona o fato de ter assumido várias posições epistemológicas contraditórias; cada posição é apresentada como se fosse a única a que ele já havia se inscrito. Do tratamento inconsistente de Freud ao assunto da realidade, duas conclusões são tiradas. Primeiro, que Freud foi incapaz de chegar a uma decisão As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 31 firme quanto à capacidade da mente humana de conhecer a realidade; segundo, que a psicanálise não é competente para resolver problemas filosóficos[35] . De fato, o que surge das muitas discussões decorrentes das abordagens psicanalíticas da realidade é a constatação de que essas teorias de alguma forma fundiram conceitos filosóficos categóricos com causalidades individuais de percepção o que não faz sentido. De qualquer forma, as ideias psicanalíticas evoluíram para formas mais elaboradas sob as teorias modernas do construto psicológico da realidade, como a teoria dos três níveis da realidade, com base na hipótese de que "qualquer nível ontologicamente diferente tem sua forma adequada de causalidade". Cada um desses níveis é chamado de "estrato da realidade", gerando novas "séries" categóricas (ou subcategorias) que expressam três estratos diferentes: o psicológico, o social e o material. Porém, como ocorreu com as ideias psicanalíticas, as "teorias do nível da realidade" retornam à mesma inconsistência do pensamento de Freud: fundindo causalidades individuais de percepção com a própria categoria. Poli (2006)[36] expressa atenção justificada a esse assunto: Para evitar mal-entendidos, é As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 32 conveniente começar pela distinção entre níveis de realidade e níveis de interpretação. [...] O problema dos níveis de realidade deve ser mantido o mais separado possível do problema dos níveis de interpretação. Embora a confusão entre os dois não seja pouco frequente, trocar um pelo outro é embaçar ou confundir dimensões ontológicas com epistemológicas. Quaisquer que sejam as relações entre ontologia e epistemologia, de oposição, conexão, inclusão ou qualquer outra coisa, elas são replicadas na diferença entre (níveis de) descrição e (níveis de) realidade. Assim, a expressão "construção psicológica da realidade" deve ser cuidadosamente interpretada, pois pode conter um engano oculto. A mente humana, por meio de suas funções psicológicas e cognitivas, é uma estrutura capaz não apenas de interpretar a realidade, com precisão ou não, mas também de projetar realidades ainda inexistentes, mas possíveis, bem As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 33 como construções que nunca poderiam ser parte da realidade. Portanto, o que existe é uma "construção psicológica da percepção da realidade", que nunca significa um elemento causal da categoria realidade. Nesse processo, a linguagem desempenha uma função central, como sugere o processo cognitivo. Começando com as descobertas de Avram Noam Chomsky ( 1928 ) e mais tarde com George Lakoff (1941), Mark Johnson (1949) e outros estudos notáveis de vários psicólogos cognitivos, os processos perceptivos da realidade tornam-se mais compreensíveis a partir de suas bases semânticas essenciais. Por outro lado, se insistimos no pressuposto de que nossa mente é um elemento causal da realidade e levamos esse conceito a seus extremos lógicos, podemos chegar a algumas suposições simplórias e pseudofilosóficas repetidas com certa frequência em nossa literatura, como segue: a) "Somente o que eu percebo é real. O que eu não percebo não existe." Em outros termos: "A existência do Cosmo pode depender do que está acontecendo no cérebro dos indivíduos, não importando se esses cérebros estão em um crânio ou em um recipiente de laboratório". b) "Tudo o que eu psicologicamente construo é real." Em outros termos: "Poderíamos ter tantas As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 34 realidades e universos diferentes quantos indivíduos humanos". O estudo da realidade não pode desprezar nossa construção psicológica, nem interpretá-la mal, como algo que efetivamente não é. Mais importante do que esses conceitos psicológicos são as contribuições da Física Quântica às nossas noções de realidade. Em 1803, um notável estudo científico, conhecido como "Experimento Young" (Thomas Young, 1773-1829), determinou uma virada crucial na história da ciência, com a demonstração de que a estrutura da luz não é feita de partículas, mas sim de ondas vibratórias. O experimento de Young foi seguido, completado e amplificado nos cento e cinquenta anos subsequentes por muitos cientistas com diferentes estudos e experimentos na mesma direção, como Michael Faraday; Gustav Kirchhoff ,Ludwig Boltzmann ,Heinrich Hertz, Max Planck e Albert Einstein . Em 1924, Max Born usou pela primeira vez o nome de "Física Quântica" para denominar essas bases teóricas e, em 1926, a hipótese de Max Plank de que a própria luz é feita de pequenas unidades indivisíveis, ou quanta de energia, começou a ser chamada de fótons por Gilbert Lewis. A partir de então, as novas descobertas científicas fundamentadas nessas teorias cresceram exponencialmente e mudaram, em As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 35 um curto espaço de tempo, muitos conceitos fundamentais relacionados a quase tudo o que sabíamos antes. As ciências e a filosofia sofreram um forte impacto na medida em que suas conceituações estruturais estão relacionadas. Deveríamos recomeçar todas as nossas perguntas sobre a estrutura da matéria, a ideia de continuidade da matéria, as funções ainda desconhecidas do cérebro, os processos cognitivos humanos, as inter-relações cosmológicas entre corpos e partículas de energia, as noções de relações tempo-espaço, e muitos outros assuntos, o que se afigura como interminável. O que devemos levar em consideração em nosso estudo é a influência da física quântica nos assuntos que sustentam nossas afirmações sobre a realidade: o mundo físico, os temas e as descobertas das neurociências que afetam nossas noções de mente, cognição e construções psicológicas. Tudo o que sabíamos sobre a realidade vem das abordagens filosóficas existentes até o momento, tornadas disponíveis pelo "estado da ciência". Os fundamentos da mecânica quântica impuseram uma visão inteiramente nova do que entendemos como sendo a categoria da realidade, e muitas das questões de revisão resultantes ainda não têm uma resposta. As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 36 Assim, tudo o que já consideramos sobre esse assunto refere-se à realidade "como poderíamos A realidade não é mais apenas o objeto da medição local, mas também seu produto. Assim, qualquer interpretação ontológica coerente da teoria quântica deve incluir uma estrutura conceitual pela qual objetividade e subjetividade, atualidade e potencialidade, global e local, sendo e se tornando, fato individual e processo de individuação, não sejam mais entendidos como meramente epistêmicos, ou binômios mutuamente exclusivos e descritivos de uma realidade já existente e fechada. Devem ser vistos como como categorias ontológicas mutuamente implicativas e explicativas de uma realidade ontogenética aberta e em progresso. Alguns estudiosos exageraram suas primeiras reações, pois estávamos diante de uma realidade totalmente desconhecida e avassaladora, onde tudo o que sabíamos deveria ser jogado fora, afogado em um oceano As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 37 de fótons, gravitons, quarks e hádrons. O pensamento crítico e a análise lógica mostraram, no entanto, que estamos no mesmo velho mundo, imersos na mesma realidade e apenas enfrentando muitas coisas que não sabíamos antes, o que impõe a revisão de várias de nossas afirmações e crenças. O universo muda continuamente por si só, e não por causa de nosso conhecimento ou ignorância da mecânica quântica. O que mudou foram nossas habilidades para uma melhor apreensão. Ananthaswamy [38] (2018) comenta a repercussão desses achados diante das teorias quânticas do colapso de onda: Além do mais, esses experimentos estão mostrando que ainda não podemos fazer reivindicações sobre a natureza da realidade, mesmo que as reivindicações sejam justificadas matematicamente ou filosoficamente. Dado que os neurocientistas e filósofos da mente não concordam com a natureza da consciência, afirmações de que ela colapsa funções de ondas são prematuras na melhor das hipóteses, ou enganosas e errôneas na pior delas. As teorias fundamentais da física pretendem ser tão reais quanto o local. A mecânica quântica contém correlações não-locais que não As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 38 conhecíamos, e isso indica que as construções da realidade não podem ser limitadas a projeções determinísticas e diretas das percepções físicas. Alguns autores atribuíram à mecânica quântica esse tipo de problema, mas a física fundamental é muito mais consistente e demonstrativa quando se considera não apenas o macrocosmo que conhecíamos antes, mas também o microcosmo que estamos começando a explorar. A realidade não mudou. Vivemos a mesma realidade que já vivemos. Nossa percepção mudou e transformou parte da realidade desconhecida em realidade demonstrada, como Peter Rowlands comenta:[39] Muitas pessoas diriam que as teorias físicas atuais nos dão problemas para definir o significado da realidade física. No entanto, pode ser que estamos efetivamente olhando pelo lado errado de um telescópio. Estamos tratando nossas teorias sofisticadas de "alto nível" quanto à linguagem fundamental, em vez de examinar os elementos mais básicos a partir dos quais elas são construídas. A posição, expressa pela maioria dos autores, indica que uma postura epistêmica As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 39 recomendada, diante de nossos modelos e teorias, é a adoção das características do mundo e da realidade conforme as ciências as propõem; esses modelos poderiam ser observáveis ou não. Todas essas teorias e abordagens da realidade, às vezes divergentes ou opostas, oferecem elementos essenciais que funcionam como ponto de partida para a nossa reflexão. Em sua maioria, os conceitos centrais dos estudos revisados neste capítulo estão relacionados à realidade como uma categoria única, estável e permanente: a realidade plena, a realidade em sua integridade ontológica. Essa crença é a herança de nossas tradições, onde a realidade é um conceito fechado, que não admite medidas ou graus diferentes, pois contém a natureza de uma categoria absoluta. A dicotomia lógica, tão frequente em nossas tradições, no entanto, é uma fórmula superada e insuficiente diante do pensamento crítico contemporâneo. A evolução da ciência lentamente corroeu essa tendência para o pensamento absoluto e imutável, o "ou-ou", tendendo a evidenciar a natureza variável e instável de tudo. Nossa observação do mundo inevitavelmente acaba revelando que tudo pode ser variável, mutável, imperfeito, aproximado e mais relativo. O que é realmente no momento "A" As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 40 pode ser diferentemente real, relativamente real ou irreal no momento, "B" Tudo no universo tem essa potencialidade de mudanças e virtualidade. Assim, para entender o mundo em que vivemos, precisamos alcançar conceitos de realidade teleologicamente orientados. Em outros termos, devemos adotar conceitos de valores e categorias, como a realidade, com a percepção de suas finalidades em relação à nossa existência. A realidade, assim como qualquer outra categoria ou entidade, é algo finalista e, quando não atinge essa qualidade, torna-se apenas abstração. Esse ponto de vista, que adotamos, é chamado de "realidade aberta ", conforme explicado por Ropolyi[40] A abertura significa que um ser é considerado não apenas como atualidade, mas como atualidade, juntamente com suas potencialidades. Isso significa que uma realidade aberta pode ser considerada um complexo da realidade na íntegra e suas inúmeras versões potenciais (é claro, essa é uma ideia muito aristotélica). Consequentemente, propomos a adoção de uma posição que sustente um As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 41 modelo de realidade aberta demonstrável , em que ciência e filosofia devem igualmente endossar tudo o que entendemos por evidências e coerência. Não existe uma divisão cognitiva natural da realidade, como vimos anteriormente, mas Inkpen & Wilson (2013) admitem o uso de quadros de classificação como uma ferramenta lógica para raciocínio analítico: A Divisão de Realidade é realizada por pesquisadores que trabalham com um contexto interpretativo único com versões associadas de tipos e entidades. A discussão acima sugere que esses tipos e entidades não correspondem à realidade como ela é, mas à realidade como uma estrutura útil para o pesquisador. As práticas de classificação refletem essa visão da realidade. A classificação é baseada na utilidade para um pesquisador em vez de determinar a estrutura absoluta da realidade. A classificação da realidade, portanto, tornou-se um meio de servir ao pesquisador ou grupos de objetivos dos pesquisadores. Uma classificação é uma ferramenta de pesquisa, como qualquer outra: é um auxílio à interpretação, e não uma afirmação absoluta sobre a As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 42 natureza da realidade. (Inkpen & Wilson 2013) [41] Assim, para seus propósitos teleológicos, supomos que a psicologia social possa adotar a seguinte classificação da realidade, prevendo uma construção melhor e mais analítica de seus experimentos e conclusões: Podemos tomar a realidade como o sistema que agrega todas as entidades, corpos, partículas, energias, vibrações, propriedades, afirmações e fenômenos conhecidos e desconhecidos existentes de qualquer natureza que sejam ou possam ser razoavelmente demonstrados pela experiência ou por outros processos cognitivos coerentes e convincentes. Existência e demonstrabilidade: essas devem ser as propriedades principais da categoria "realidade". Para fins metodológicos, adotaremos a seguinte classificação lógica, como uma "taxonomia dos axiomata": 1) Realidade conhecida: Tudo o que é razoavelmente demonstrado pela experiência ou outros processos cognitivos coerentes e cogentes, incluindo teorias conclusivas, formulações e modelos matemáticos. 2) Realidade desconhecida (ou realidade latente): As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 43 Tudo o que existe e pode ser razoavelmente demonstrado pela experiência ou outro processo cognitivo coerente e convincente ainda não foi realizado. 3) Irrealidade: a) Irrealidade essencial: tudo cuja existência, possibilidade ou probabilidade podem ser negadas pela experiência ou por outros processos cognitivos coerentes e cogentes (o princípio da falsificação de Popper). b) Irrealidade circunstancial: uma projeção mental construtiva de algo cuja existência pode ser negada, mas cuja possibilidade e probabilidade não podem ser negadas. Este é o reino do imaginário coerente, como hipóteses consistentes e projeções criativas. c) Irrealidade acidental: alguns tipos específicos de irrealidade essencial que podem ser distinguidos por suas características únicas, a saber: c.1) Erro ou ilusão: uma falsa suposição de realidade causada por defeitos cognitivos. c.2) Fantasia: um estágio de percepção espelhada construída e projetada, e que é fenomenologicamente inexistente. As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 44 c.3) Mentira: uma falsificação intencional da realidade c.4) Delírio e alucinação: são construções mentais perturbadoras causadas por graves distúrbios na atenção, consciência e cognição, impedindo a associação lógica entre os elementos da realidade. Neste artigo, usaremos essas palavras estritamente com o significado dado neste Capítulo. As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 45 CAPÍTULO III O IMAGINÁRIO [42] Conceptualização "Mundus Imaginalis": o reino do imaginário, pertencente ao universo da "irrealidade circunstancial" ou, não tão corretamente, uma espécie de meta-realidade, é um assunto vasto a ser explorado. Devemos enfrentar esse desafio, tentando alcançar conceitos aceitáveis, indispensáveis para fundamentar as inúmeras questões sobre construções sociais que enfrentaremos adiante. Não há construções sociais sem realidade, sem o imaginário e sem suas relações intrigantes. Numa abordagem muito simplificada e introdutória, deveríamos dizer que o imaginário é um processo mental construtivo, modificador, As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 46 cognitivo e emocional, partindo das percepções da realidade existente e gerando uma nova imagem projetada e reflexiva, diferente dos elementos aplicados no processo . Para entender melhor essa intrincada rede, devemos levar em consideração várias abordagens diferentes, provenientes de diversos pontos de vista, revelando características substanciais desse assunto. Cada uma dessas abordagens é uma contribuição substancial para o aprendizado eficiente do que o imaginário significa. A diferença notável que encontraremos entre essas premissas não deve significar uma oposição excludente, mas uma complementaridade entre conceituações. Em um universo cognitivo tão expansivo, não há um lugar apropriado para as fronteiras de "escolas filosóficas do pensamento"; tudo é pensamento. No pensamento cartesiano, imaginação é o encontro entre a essência e o corpo, a "res cogitans" e a "res extensa". Este conceito está implícito no entendimento da realidade da dualidade corpo-mente de Descartes. Devido ao seu conceito dualista de imaginação e a algumas referências comparativas às qualidades expressas em suas obras, Descartes tem sido muitas vezes incompreendido e tomado como alguém que minimiza as qualidades da imaginação ou, pelo menos, que a deixa ao lado de seu pensamento. . De fato, algumas de suas afirmações poderiam As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 47 sustentar essa conclusão. "Considero que esse poder de imaginação que existe em mim, na medida em que difere da força da compreensão, não é necessário para a essência de mim mesmo, isto é, da minha mente", disse ele. [43] Lyons D. J[44] , porém, corrige esta interpretação inadequada: Para Descartes, a diferença entre a realidade externa e a ideia que temos dela não é rotineiramente descrita em favor do mundo externo. A mente pode, em um sentido mais afirmativo, produzir ideias não apenas do mundo externo como ele existe, mas como tal mundo poderia existir, e assim se abre para possibilidades e para o futuro. De qualquer forma, o pensamento cartesiano não abrigou uma percepção de processos integrativos e construtivos dinâmicos entre os elementos de sua interpretação dualista da cognição humana. Essa discussão se tornou eficaz com as teorias de Hegel (1770 1831). Hegel entende o imaginário como uma atividade ou processo mental a partir do As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 48 conceito de "imagem", e dessa afirmação central surgiram não apenas o nome contemporâneo dado ao processo, como também o fundamento de quase todos os estudos e teorias relacionados ao tema. Hegel argumenta, como fez Descartes, que esta atividade cognitiva utiliza dois elementos diferentes: "a coisa do mundo externo" e o "conteúdo interno da mente ". No entanto, para Hegel, ambos os elementos são versões diversas do objeto: o primeiro é a compreensão sensorial do objeto e suas características como existem no mundo, e o segundo significa o conteúdo interno da mente, composto por muitos ingredientes subjetivos. Esses dois elementos são inicialmente uma idealização em sua determinação independente, mas, por meio de sua interação dialética, perdem sua particularidade, resultante desse processo, uma síntese nova e idealizada dos elementos heterogêneos envolvidos. Essa síntese idealizada é a imagem ( das Bild ), e o imaginário é tudo o que a ela se relacione As teorias do imaginário alcançaram um incremento notável com a primeira edição, em 1940, do filósofo francês Jean-Paul Sartre (19051980), "O Imaginário"[45], Jonathan Webber declara: "O imaginário" de Sartre é o relato mais sustentado e detalhado da natureza da imaginação na literatura filosófica ocidental. "[46] Wulf, C (2019)[47] descreve os resultados desse As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 49 processo, concentrando seu conteúdo: Isso pode ser entendido como um mundo materializado de imagens, sons, tato, olfato e paladar. É a précondição que as pessoas percebem o mundo de maneira histórica e culturalmente influenciada. A imaginação lembra e cria, combina e projeta imagens. Isso cria realidade. Ao mesmo tempo, a realidade ajuda a imaginação a criar imagens. As imagens da imaginação têm um caráter dinâmico estruturando a percepção, a memória e o futuro. O filósofo francês passou mais de dez anos em pesquisas e estudos para alcançar os fundamentos de suas teorias. Elaborado profunda e analiticamente, sob uma rigorosa estrutura metodológica, seu trabalho traz muitos fundamentos que persistem até hoje. Uma dessas virtudes é o fato de Sartre ter conseguido agregar muitos conceitos e ideias válidos, mas ainda escassos, provenientes de vários filósofos, organizando-os interativamente em uma estrutura lógica capaz de sustentar suas ideias em uma teoria extensa e complexa. Ele As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 50 deu coerência e unicidade lógica a várias abordagens fragmentadas. Reforçando a relação essencial entre psicologia e metafísica, como Bergson (1854 1941)[48] fizera antes. A afirmação de Sartre de que "alguém que, no ato da reflexão, se torna consciente de ter uma imagem, não pode se enganar" é uma posição que remete ao "cogito" de Descartes: posso estar enganado sobre a existência de tudo; no entanto, posso ter certeza de que existo desde que penso. "[49] Sua teoria começa com a suposição de que a apreensão da realidade ocorre na forma de imagens: os objetos apreendidos perdem seu significado e particularidade adequados e se tornam uma síntese em uma nova forma, deixando de existir em um estado livre. Nesse raciocínio, a presença das teorias de Hegel se manifesta, dando ao pensamento de Sartre uma natureza dialética inegável. Sartre também aceitou a filosofia fenomenológica de Edmund Husserl (1859 1938 )[50] e seus conceitos correspondentes de cognição. Para o filósofo alemão, toda consciência é a consciência de algo e tem uma estrutura intencional. Percepção, imaginação e cognição se concentram voluntariamente em algo exterior ao sujeito, ao contrário de serem capturas da realidade. Tal é a materialidade e a particularidade fenomenológica da consciência, princípio do qual deriva um dos As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 51 axiomas essenciais da psicologia moderna: a consciência é um ato situacional . Fundamentado nessas ideias, Sartre estruturou sua teoria do imaginário. Percepção, concepção e imaginação são as formas de consciência dadas a um objeto em nossas mentes. Em nossos processos cognitivos, elementos do ambiente fenomenológico oferecem o conteúdo material de nossas experiências, pois a forma será dada por conhecimentos, propósitos, expectativas e emoções que entendemos como atitude. A interação de todos esses elementos definirá a imagem refletida, oferecendo a forma e o significado definidos do objeto. Assim, repetimos, a imagem é sempre uma estrutura refletida. A teoria insiste na subjacência de diversas diferenças entre percepção e imaginação, não apenas pelo fato de serem elas dois elementos diversos do processo mental diante da fenomenologia, mas também por causa de seus diferentes conteúdos e resultados. Enfatizando essas distinções, Sartre indica que: a) Em um processo perceptivo, o conhecimento do objeto ocorre como resultado da experiência. A experiência precede o conhecimento. Na imaginação, a experiência sucede o conhecimento; b) A percepção supõe a observação de todos os elementos do objeto perceptível, ao contrário As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 52 da imaginação, que é possível com apenas uma "quase observação" baseada apenas em alguns de seus elementos ou propriedades. c) O processo perceptivo estabelece uma relação linear entre os objetos, independentemente de qualquer tipo de conhecimento por parte do sujeito. A imaginação é caracterizada por sua natureza construtiva, na qual as únicas relações entre os objetos são aquelas determinadas pelo sujeito, como são imaginadas. d) A imaginação difere da percepção devido ao seu sentimento de espontaneidade. e) Na imaginação, não é necessário que o objeto experimentado tenha um significado "per se", pois é possível obter esse significado, ou parte dele, de outros objetos. Ao refletir sobre a teoria de Sartre, devemos ter em mente que as inúmeras referências que ele faz ao "conhecimento" não têm o conteúdo epistemológico que costumamos supor. Ao usar esse termo, Sartre se refere principalmente a crenças e opiniões, que agregam implicitamente o conceito axiológico de valores à estrutura do imaginário. Tal suposição indica por si só a necessidade de um estudo substancial em paralelo. Finalmente, também devemos considerar que a estrutura imaginária sartreana não se limita a esses elementos cognitivos e emocionais, mas agrega As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 53 dinâmicas sensoriais e kinestésicas, o que vincula o reino imaginário à sua teoria da apreciação estética e oferece um entendimento à semiótica da percepção. A observação do imaginário através de outras lentes, não estritamente ontológicas, remete-nos a contribuições destacadas dos psicólogos Sigmund Freud (1856 1939) e Jacques-Marie Émile Lacan (1901-1981) Com certeza, a psicanálise não é a melhor maneira de entender a dinâmica social e ontológica do imaginário. No entanto, como aprendemos com Sartre, as teorias do imaginário nos enviam para as teorias do valor, como discutiremos adiante. Na medida em que o processo imaginário envolve opiniões, desejos, vontades, afetos e emoções, será inevitável questionar a estrutura desses elementos, principalmente quando, na atribuição de valores ao imaginário, surgirem questões como distúrbios emocionais, ilusão, loucura, delírio e alucinação. . Precisamente por esse motivo, a contribuição da psicanálise é essencial. Freud abordou o imaginário em seu livro "The Interpretation of Dreams ( Die Traumdeutung )", escrito em 1899 e publicado pela primeira vez em 1900.[51] O autor fundamentou sua compreensão da imaginação e do simbolismo dos sonhos no As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 54 âmbito geral de sua Teoria do Inconsciente, a partir da qual a Teoria do Complexo de Édipo mais tarde emergiria. Inicialmente, a teoria freudiana sustentava que o conteúdo e a forma de qualquer sonho são o resultado de uma "realização de desejos" a satisfação involuntária de um desejo através de processos mentais. Sob esse entendimento, a imaginação não começa estritamente a partir da observação de um objeto ou experiência existente (o conteúdo manifesto), mas também de muitos símbolos e representações inconscientes usados para expressar esse desejo oculto (o conteúdo latente). Mais tarde, Freud concordou que o elemento causal dos sonhos não era apenas o impulso da realização dos desejos, mas que outros conteúdos simbólicos poderiam desempenhar o mesmo papel, como expôs em seu ensaio "Além do Princípio do Prazer" (Enseits des Lustprinzips) 1920[52] Com esse passo adiante em sua teoria, Freud concordou que todo sonho em sua origem está de alguma forma ligado à realidade fenomenológica, bem como às experiências particulares do sujeito em face de tal realidade. O sonhador pode selecionar qualquer parte de sua experiência na elaboração de um sonho. A teoria considera quatro fontes possíveis: a) Experiências que são mentalmente significativas; As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 55 b) Uma construção mental da combinação de várias experiências recentes e significativas; c) Uma experiência recente e não significativa que representa no processo outras recentes e significativas; d) Uma experiência recente e não significativa que representa, no processo, as experiências internas, memorizadas e significativas. Quando Freud assume uma distinção entre "construção de imagem" e "atividades analíticas", a primeira como um processo construtivo interno e a segunda como uma atividade interpretativa externa, ele conecta suas teorias aos fundamentos da ontologia e do pensamento crítico, alcançando a maturidade de suas ideias. Mais tarde, a teoria do filósofo foi criticada, principalmente porque a pesquisa correspondente carece de rigor científico e porque muitas ideias não eram sustentáveis pela pesquisa atual. No entanto, embora algumas dessas críticas possam ter fundamento, a importância de seu trabalho ainda é a mesma e suas teorias integram a psicologia moderna como princípios fundamentais. Podemos encontrar essa integração nos notáveis trabalhos de Lacan sobre o imaginário.[53] O psicólogo francês entendeu que é possível dividir a psique em três estruturas correspondentes a diferentes ordens (ou camadas) de desenvolvimento psicossexual: o real, o imaginário e o simbólico. As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 56 A ordem Real (R) é um estado de natureza cujo conteúdo é exclusivamente necessário. Nesse estado, só precisamos e procuramos a satisfação de nossas necessidades sem a percepção das diferenças entre nós mesmos e a realidade externa Esse estado existe apenas na primeira infância e persiste até o início das habilidades linguísticas. Esse momento determina a separação definitiva da pessoa do estado da natureza, embora continue a desempenhar um papel influente pelo resto da vida. O imaginário (I) é a ordem a partir da percepção do indivíduo de que seu corpo é diferente da realidade externa e diferente do corpo de sua mãe. A necessidade primordial é gradualmente substituída pela demanda, que causa sensações de ansiedade e de perda da ordem natural. No que o autor chama de "estágio do espelho", a demanda e o início das habilidades linguísticas determinam a dificuldade do indivíduo em reconhecer sua própria imagem como um eu definido e completo. Essa dificuldade é o motivo, porque a imagem do eu é uma fantasia que o indivíduo cria, como compensação de suas perdas. Lacan designa essa imagem como "ego ideal", o narcisismo fundamental de um indivíduo que cria a imagem de fantasia de si mesmo, bem como seu objeto de desejo. As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 57 Inicialmente, Lacan usou o termo "imaginário" mais próximo da ideia de ilusão e referindo-se quase exclusivamente à relação entre o ego e sua imagem especular como algo inconsequente. Somente em 1953, ele conceituou o imaginário como uma das três ordens, significando a formação do ego no estágio do espelho. Para os fins de nosso estudo, é interessante notar que o imaginário de Lacan não é substituído ou desfeito pela ordem seguinte (a simbólica), apesar de ser um estado intermediário. Pelo contrário, o imaginário persiste por toda a vida do indivíduo e intervém constante e consequentemente na atividade psicológica. Isso aproxima o conceito lacaniano das ideias de Sartre sobre os processos de imaginação. Na mesma direção, a definição do estágio do espelho também mantém alguma harmonia com o conceito sartreano de imagem reflexiva. Essas similitudes, no entanto, são apenas "pontos de contato escassos" de abordagens muito diferentes, como Dylan Evans[54] explica: Lacan tem uma desconfiança cartesiana da imaginação como uma ferramenta cognitiva. Ele insiste, como Descartes, na supremacia da pura intelecção, sem dependência de imagens, como a única maneira de chegar a As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 58 certo conhecimento. É isso que está por trás do uso de figuras topológicas por Lacan, que não podem ser representadas na imaginação, para explorar a estrutura do inconsciente. Essa desconfiança da imaginação e dos sentidos coloca Lacan firmemente do lado do racionalismo, e não do empirismo. A ordem simbólica (S) contém a transformação da demanda no desejo, estruturalmente ligada à linguagem e à narrativa, para as quais o narcisismo do imaginário também é essencial. A linguagem tem aspectos simbólicos e imaginários. O significado e a significação fazem parte da ordem imaginária, mas suas funções semânticas e semióticas pertencem à estrutura simbólica. Aqui começa a inter-relação social. Quando o sujeito entra na linguagem e se relaciona com as regras e comportamentos da sociedade, ações e reações ocorrem na estrutura psicodinâmica, definindo suas ações. A linguagem, as regras comportamentais, as relações sociais, de poder e de parentesco cercam e controlam definitivamente o sujeito, suas imagens, desejos e satisfação, seus acordos e discordâncias, suas aceitações e rejeições. As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 59 Lacan Usou um nó borromeu[55] para explicar as relações entre as três ordens da psique. Matematicamente, o nó borromeano consiste em três círculos topológicos que não são transitoriamente vinculados, em um ternário cíclico, de tal forma que a remoção de qualquer um deles deixa os outros dois desconectados. Usando esse famoso construto matemático para explicar sua teoria topológica tripartida da psique, ele ofereceu uma leitura da descrição ontológica orientada a objetos de suas ideias. As três ordens (R-I-S) são conectadas para construir a psique como uma unidade, mas elas não estão diretamente ligadas uma à outra, e a ausência de qualquer uma dessas ordens imediatamente desfaz a construção inteira Se pretendíamos encontrar um conceito ou característica do imaginário que pudesse ser considerado aceitável pela maioria dos filósofos e psicólogos, com certeza, isso seria a suposição de que o imaginário é um processo criativo e construtivo. No entanto, mesmo sendo uma suposição comum, a natureza dos atributos criativos da imaginação humana ainda é vista de ângulos divergentes, como Glen Dayton[56] considerou: Os psicólogos freudianos preferem ver a criatividade em termos As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 60 redutivos, como uma descarga de emoções conflitantes reprimidas, geralmente em alguma forma de regressão. Os psicólogos humanistas, por outro lado, veem o comportamento criativo não como regressão ao pensamento do processo primário anterior, mas, ao contrário, como um encontro aberto e deliberado entre o eu consciente e o ambiente circundante. Inna Kucherenko[57] alega que também a filosofia russa contemporânea tende a entender a imaginação e a criatividade fundamentada em uma interpretação fenomenológica, e que "dizer-se 'imaginação' significa dizer 'criatividade (Katrechko, 1999)". Essa abordagem, afirma a autora, "pode ser rastreada no trabalho de BP Vysheslavtsev (2010), J. Golosovker (1987), AF Losev (2003), S. Borchikov (em Katrechko, 1999). S. Borchikov, e define imaginação como a capacidade mental da consciência sensorial que possui o conteúdo, a forma, a personificação do objeto e as correspondentes funções epistemológicas". Finalmente, referindo-se à conceituação do imaginário, é interessante considerar que, As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 61 modernamente, a "natureza reflexiva da imagem", segundo os fenomenologistas, ou o "estágio espelho" do seu desenvolvimento, segundo os psicólogos mais idealistas, são entendidos como componentes de um processo mimético exposto por Wulf[58] , que é intencional e projetivo: um ato criativo. : Nos processos miméticos, o mundo exterior se torna o mundo interior e o mundo interior se torna o mundo exterior. Ao se desenvolver, o imaginário estabelece maneiras de se relacionar com o mundo exterior. Novamente em um loop mimético, isso, por sua vez, afeta o mundo interior do imaginário. Esses processos são sensoriais e governados pelo desejo. Todos os sentidos estão envolvidos, o que significa que o imaginário tem várias camadas. Como há uma mistura de imagens, emoções e linguagem, esses processos estão enraizados no corpo e ao mesmo tempo transcendem o corpo à medida que se tornam parte do imaginário (Wulf [2014]; Hüppauf, Wulf [2009]; Paragrana [ 2016]) As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 62 Dessas diversas conceptualizações podemos extrair o nosso entendimento multidisplinar a respeito da estrutura do imaginário e seus processos. O IMAGINÁRIO COLETIVO De antemão, aqui temos uma questão semântica a ser resolvida. Nossa literatura acadêmica oferece milhares de títulos relacionados ao imaginário social. "Imaginário social" é um termo usado em sociologia desde o proeminente sociólogo Cornelius Castoriadis (1975)[59] Introduziu o conceito em estudos sociológicos. Posteriormente, seu uso foi consolidado por Charles Taylor (2007)[60] em sua conhecida "Era Secular". Taylor define imaginários sociais como "a maneira pela qual as pessoas imaginam sua existência social, como elas se encaixam com as outras, como as coisas acontecem entre elas e seus colegas, as expectativas que normalmente são atendidas e as noções e imagens normativas mais profundas que subjazem a essas expectativas". Sob essa definição, é possível As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 63 entender o significado do imaginário social como abrigando principalmente a estrutura social e suas formas, geralmente descrevendo vários elementos internos da sociedade como um todo, sem nenhum elemento considerável capaz de oferecer uma apreensão ontológica. Em Herbrik e Schlechtriemen (2019)[61] ", o imaginário social aparece apenas à margem do debate sociológico. Não pertence ao cânone dos conceitos sociológicos e, portanto, não está incluído nas introduções ou nos dicionários de sociologia (cf., por exemplo, Farzin e Jordan 2008). " Assim, para a sociologia, esse é um conceito secundário e, de certa forma, vago, embora seja referenciado por muitos autores. De fato, a sociologia carece de um conceito ontológico do imaginário, mesmo porque, em face de seu objeto material, não é o campo científico apropriado para tal tarefa. Numerosos sociólogos expressaram sua preocupação com essa aparente imprecisão de alguns conceitos essenciais da sociologia contemporânea, o que reduz a precisão de suas metodologias[62] . Outra designação à qual devemos prestar atenção é "comportamento coletivo. " As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 64 A expressão comportamento coletivo foi usada pela primeira vez por Franklin Henry Giddings (1908) e empregada posteriormente por Robert E. Park e Burgess (1921), Herbert Blumer (1939), Ralph Turner e Lewis Killian (1957) e Neil Smelser (1962) para se referirem a processos e eventos sociais que não refletem a estrutura social existente (leis, convenções e instituições), mas que emergem de maneira "espontânea". O uso do termo foi expandido para incluir referência a células, animais sociais como pássaros, peixes e insetos, incluindo formigas (Gordon 2014). O comportamento coletivo assume muitas formas, mas geralmente viola as normas da sociedade (Miller 2000; Locher 2002). O comportamento coletivo pode ser intensamente destrutivo, como nos tumultos ou na violência da multidão, tolo como nos modismos prosaicos, ou qualquer coisa entre ambos. O comportamento coletivo é sempre impulsionado As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 65 pela dinâmica do grupo, incentivando as pessoas a se envolverem em atos que possam considerar impensáveis em circunstâncias sociais típicas (Locher 2002)[63] . Uma terceira expressão muito usada com significados sociológicos é " imaginação coletiva ". Peter Murphy (2012)[64] introduziu essa expressão, que se concentra na mídia racional, crítica ou ideológica da criatividade de oposição. A oposição molda historicamente as instituições sociais e projeta reações e movimentos que visam mudanças sociais, políticas ou econômicas. Podemos comparar os conceitos de Murphy com os expostos por Castoriadis. Além desses conteúdos sociológicos, a expressão também é mais utilizada popularmente em pesquisas de marketing e trabalhos similares como sinônimo de expectativas dos consumidores em relação aos produtos. Muitos outros termos como "mudança social", "comportamento em grupo", "criatividade social" e "imaginação social" estão em uso atual na literatura diversificada, sem nenhum conteúdo ontológico. O uso indevido desses muitos termos e expressões nos trabalhos acadêmicos pode significar uma inaceitável falta de coerência e consistência, que deve ser evitada de qualquer forma. Neste estudo, não estamos falando sobre As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 66 nenhum desses conceitos, conteúdos ou idéias. Aqui estamos circunscritos ao ambiente dos conceitos e metodologias da psicologia social e ontológica. Alcançaremos a conceptualização psicossocial e ontológica do imaginário coletivo, fundamentada nas teorias da personalidade, comportamento, crença e descobertas experimentais sobre as interações situacionais entre os indivíduos. Ao contrário de uma estrutura social geral, significa a saída da interação dialética entre sistemas de crenças múltiplos e específicos, atuando como um elemento determinante do comportamento. Portanto, diversamente da sociologia, focaremos em como os sistemas de crenças são formados coletivamente, e não em quais sistemas de crenças formados podem determinar estruturas sociais, instituições ou outros elementos externos específicos. Ademais, afirmamos que, desde os trabalhos de Freud, Jung e Lacan, o termo "imaginário coletivo" é uma designação emergindo de conceitos cunhados nos estudos e pesquisas em psicologia, muito antes dos seus usos literários atuais. Dessa forma, estudiosos e pesquisadores devem empregar essa designação exclusivamente com sua significação ontológica As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 67 original, dada pela psicologia, evitando equívocos. Como já assumimos antes, cada indivíduo humano carrega seu próprio e inconfundível sistema de crenças. O uso da palavra "sistema" deriva da suposição de que alguém tem inúmeras crenças, experiências e emoções relacionadas a si mesmo e ao ambiente circundante. Todos esses elementos estão ligados entre si, formando uma rede extraordinariamente complexa e estruturada, que supõe uma hierarquia interna baseada em atribuições de valores pelo sujeito. O conteúdo de qualquer sistema individual de crenças agrega não apenas conteúdos fenomenológicos e experimentais, mas também todo o universo imaginário do sujeito. Devido à nossa natureza de "zoón politicum" e "animais sociais", todos os sistemas de crenças individuais se inter-relacionam na rede social que cerca o sujeito. Portanto, o imaginário não se limita aos processos cognitivos e emocionais, mentais individuais, mas também a um fenômeno social. Tudo o que ocorre em nossa mente tem uma camada social, como Freud considerou, ou uma ordem simbólica, como afirma Lacan. A comunicação entre os indivíduos por vários meios, do toque As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 68 físico ao simbolismo abstrato, linguagem e elementos semióticos incontáveis, é essencialmente uma experiência compartilhada No domínio de nossa existência compartilhada, toda atividade interativa transporta todo o conteúdo de nosso sistema de crenças individuais e seus elementos imanentes como nossa hierarquia imaginária e de valores. Como acontece com a ontogênese individual do imaginário, a construção do imaginário coletivo significa um processo dialético através do qual diferentes sistemas de crenças individuais são processados como constitutivos antitéticos. Essa oposição teórica resulta em uma síntese dos elementos processados, que serão uma nova imagem projetada e reflexiva, diferente de todos os sistemas individuais. Como a identidade individual não pode existir sem um sistema de crenças que contenha o imaginário do sujeito, também a sociedade humana é impossível sem o imaginário coletivo. Portanto, é razoável supor que o imaginário coletivo não corresponde à soma ou coincidência do conteúdo de dois ou mais sistemas de crenças individuais. Ao contrário, é o resultado de um processo dialético de oposição e transformação: um ato coletivo de criação, na linguagem de Sartre. As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 69 Essa imagem criativa e reflexa é uma camada de nosso processo evolutivo caracterizada por três atributos intrínsecos: ser experimental, instável e contínua. Por experimental queremos dizer que, na raiz ontológica do imaginário coletivo, todas as experiências dos seres humanos com o ambiente externo estão presentes. Por instável, entendemos que todas as experiências humanas estão sujeitas a mudanças contínuas e diferentes resultados, impondo variação constante no processo construtivo da imaginação coletiva. Por continuidade, queremos dizer que o imaginário coletivo é um processo ininterrupto de criação e transformação, adquirindo as propriedades de historicidade e transmissibilidade para diferentes situações do espaço-tempo. Quando focamos esses atributos dados ao imaginário coletivo, é possível entender com mais precisão o que Carl Yung[65] entendia por "inconsciente coletivo" e seus arquétipos, bem como a ordem simbólica lacaniana e o conceito de desejo. No imaginário coletivo, a expectativa substitui o desejo e, apesar de várias particularidades, desempenha o mesmo papel. A expectativa pode ter muitas formas de expressão, desde as físicas até as simbólicas, e devido à sua As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 70 consistência cultural, não se limita à experiência empírica do grupo. Quando o processo construtivo encontra uma falta de elementos experimentais, essenciais à sua consolidação, agrega outras imagens irreais, relacionadas, mas não pertencentes à própria expectativa. Desse modo, o imaginário coletivo constrói a imagem do futuro, por se tratar de um processo projetivo, dominando a experiência atual. Uma ideia consistente do mecanismo da relação entre expectativa e experiência como processo cultural é a ficção científica: Jasanoff (2015b, p. 337) refere-se à ficção científica como um "repositório de imaginários sociotécnológicos, visões que integram futuros de crescente conhecimento e domínio tecnológico com avaliações normativas do que esses futuros poderiam e deveriam significar para as sociedades atuais". Da mesma forma, Miller e Bennett (Miller e Bennett, 2008) argumentam que as histórias de ficção científica baseadas em narrativas oferecem ferramentas úteis para o pensamento de longo prazo sobre As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 71 tecnologia e construção de futuros. Isso aponta para uma fonte de novidade potencialmente poderosa e, até agora, não bem compreendida quando se trata da imaginação política. Arte e culturais fenômenos podem fornecer insumos importantes para ou gatilhos para políticos imaginação processos [66] Além de seus recursos fictícios para construir a imagem de um futuro, o imaginário oferece os fundamentos para qualquer outra coisa que entendamos ser elementos de identificação social, como linguagem, cultura, política e religião, em resposta à expectativa coletiva. VALORES DO IMAGINÁRIO Em termos ontológicos, o imaginário coletivo não está valoricamente qualificável, porque é uma atribuição em si mesmo, e não um objeto ou entidade. Os elementos envolvidos pelos indivíduos no processo de sua construção, por sua vez, podem As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 72 ser qualificados e transmitir suas qualidades às imagens resultantes. Absolutamente tudo relacionado à existência e evolução humanas está relacionado ao imaginário, de uma maneira ou de outra, uma vez que é um atributo constitucional de nossa espécie. Do mesmo modo que os pássaros voam, os vírus mudam constantemente seus códigos genéticos, e alguns insetos miméticos fingem ser uma folha, os homens imaginam e vinculam sua estrutura imaginária às dos outros e mudam continuamente seus padrões de conhecimento, sentimento, vida, existência e crenças. Civilização, cultura, sociedade, religião, arte, história, intelecto, ciência, filosofia, estética, tecnologia, presente e passado, espaço e tempo, eu e eles, meus e seus, mal e bem, esperança e desespero, amor e ódio, céu e inferno, sim ou não, e quaisquer formas de vida humana, são produtos diretos ou indiretos do imaginário coletivo. Dos acordes mais sublimes de uma sinfonia perfeita às crueldades mais horrendas de uma guerra estúpida, tudo é produto da imaginação. A ignorância e a alucinação são filhos da imaginação, na mesma medida que a sabedoria e o pensamento crítico o são. Quando atribuímos valores a qualquer coisa, não estamos qualificando o imaginário de onde ele vem, mas seus produtos. Atribuímos valores à lei, As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 73 regras, códigos morais e princípios comportamentais provenientes de nosso imaginário, porque são apenas objetos ou entidades externas resultantes do processo. A experiência e a escolha no imaginário precedem qualquer atribuição de valor, pois a existência precede a essência Inferimos em nossas mentes que somos porque imaginamos: "Eu imagino; portanto sou, e sou como imagino." No entanto, tudo o que comentamos neste capítulo, e que extraímos dos autores mencionados sobre o imaginário, é timidamente superficial. Tudo o que temos é observação empírica e interpretação inferencial dos resultados comportamentais dos processos mentais, cujos elementos e características conhecemos vagamente como fatos externamente não observáveis. Temos falado sobre as sombras na parede em nossa Caverna Platônica com um sentimento de que a ciência nos abandonou. A crença tradicional, vinda dos gregos, sobre a independência da filosofia, parece gradualmente um refúgio obstinado à nossa cegueira. No entanto, algumas imagens vêm lentamente do nosso "mundo exterior". As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 74 Recentemente, as neurociências tomaram a estrutura e as atividades do cérebro humano como um assunto central para enfrentar os mistérios milenares do problema da relação corpo-mente. Apesar de ser um determinista relativista, o neurocientista cognitivo e ontológico Peter Ulric Tse (2015)[67] , do Dartmouth College, assumiu que a física fornece evidências de indeterminismo ontológico e critérios causais entre os neurônios. Uma vez que a física fornece evidências do indeterminismo ontológico, é possível uma base física para um efetivo livre-arbítrio. "Os critérios causais neuronais permitem um grau de autodeterminação que atende aos altos padrões, sem permitir, é claro, um livre arbítrio 'causa sui', o que é impossível." (op.cit) Podemos seguir o raciocínio do autor e sua conclusão surpreendente: Argumento que os circuitos centrais subjacentes ao livre arbítrio envolvem circuitos frontoparietais que facilitam a deliberação entre as opções representadas e manipuladas nas áreas executivas da memória operacional A execução interna de cenários como experiência virtual permite que uma opção acima dos limites perceptivos seja escolhida antes As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 75 que ações motoras específicas sejam planejadas. A opção escolhida pode atender melhor aos critérios mantidos na memória operacional, restringidos pelas condições de vários circuitos avaliativos, incluindo circuitos de recompensa, emocionais e cognitivos. Esse processo também aproveita a aleatoriedade sináptica e finalmente para promover a geração de nova e imprevista satisfação desses critérios. Uma vez cumpridos os critérios, os circuitos operacionais podem alterar os pesos sinápticos em outros circuitos que implementarão uma operação ou ação planejada. [...]No entanto, dado um conjunto desses parâmetros inatos, o cérebro pode gerar opções de reprodução e selecionar uma delas que atenda adequadamente aos critérios, ou gere outras opções. Esse processo está intimamente ligado à manipulação voluntária da atenção na memória As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 76 operacional, mais comumente considerada como deliberação ou imaginação .A imaginação é onde a ação resulta do livre-arbítrio (ênfase nossa) Supondo que o processo neuronal da imaginação humana seja a natividade do nosso livre-arbítrio, Tse pode provocar todo tipo de queixas de muitos deterministas radicais que vivem em suas conchas da chamada "ciência profunda". De qualquer forma, o determinismo radical é, sem dúvida, tudo aquilo que a ciência, a filosofia, a psicologia e a humanidade não precisam. As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 77 CAPÍTULO IV A PROPRIEDADE GRADIENTE DA VERDADE Na filosofia, a verdade é uma propriedade atribuível aos processos cognitivos. Independentemente de ser um substantivo, a verdade, em seu conteúdo lógico, transporta uma qualidade atribuível a outro substantivo, porque não existe "por ipsum" ou em abstrato. Essa propriedade está principalmente relacionada à categoria de realidade, e essa relação ocorre em duas direções interdependentes: ontologicamente, nenhum objeto ou entidade consegue fazer parte da realidade sem poder ser verdadeiro. Da mesma forma, a verdade não existe como propriedade atribuível sem um objeto ou entidade pertencente à realidade. Isso não é um conflito ou paradoxo, mas apenas a percepção da existência de duas camadas ontológicas quando a qualidade pertence à essência do ser: o objeto ou entidade real não pode existir sem a qualidade e a qualidade não existe sem o objeto As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 78 a ser qualificado por atribuição. Dessa forma, definimos a natureza das propriedades essenciais. A verdade é uma delas. Tradicionalmente, o estudo da verdade oferecia três faixas cognitivas: filosofia, ciências e religião. Nos estudos filosóficos, esse assunto foi dissecado pela epistemologia e ontologia por milênios, promovido pelos conceitos de realidade, correspondência e coerência. Nas ciências, a verdade é o princípio material do realismo, expresso pela demonstração de equivalência. Na religião, a verdade é a crença num espelho dos desejos em vozes dos deuses, materializada em todas as formas de revelação. Neste estudo, devemos levar em consideração a conceituação filosófica e psicológica da verdade, abrigando todas as influências existentes nas evidências científicas. Até algumas décadas atrás, um esquema de estudo filosófico sobre a verdade era relativamente fácil de se propor. Todas as teorias eram amplamente conhecidas e a literatura era prolífica no que se refere a críticas, comparações, oposições e debates. Muitos estudiosos contribuíram com análises didáticas e interpretações que visam facilitar a compreensão de textos ou teorias mais herméticas. Inicialmente, adotaremos esse esquema tradicional, através de uma breve visita às importantes teorias existentes. Argumentamos As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 79 que todos eles oferecem conceitos, ideias e pontos de vista valiosos, possibilitando um estudo proveitoso da verdade. Além disso, argumentamos que essas teorias não são reciprocamente opostas nem excludentes: são apenas referências e pontos de vista diferentes do conhecimento sobre as mesmas coisas. Devemos deixar de lado a tendência frequente e estéril ao sectarismo filosófico, uma das demonstrações mais estéreis do narcisismo intelectual. Na nossa opinião pessoal, os "ismos" filosóficos são uma forma sofisticada de obscuridade. No primeiro momento, eles são usados para distinguir metodologicamente um conceito ou teoria do outro, mas muito rapidamente se tornam crenças e convicções pessoais. O que antes era debate se torna uma competição, e o que era questionamento se torna agressão. Deveríamos dizer que, quando começamos a ler um texto filosófico contendo evidências de sectarismo, polarização ou linguagem hermética intencional, devemos imediatamente deixá-lo de lado. Os textos sectários só nos ensinam muito pouco. Nossa tradição filosófica considerava a propriedade da verdade sob os conceitos de teorias primordiais e amplamente conhecidas: a da correspondência, a da coerência, semântica, a deflacionária e as teorias pragmáticas. A teoria da correspondência foi vagamente As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 80 referida na filosofia grega por Platão e Aristóteles em sua Metafísica. Os primeiros empiristas modernos sustentaram as ideias básicas dessa teoria que, em suas origens, foi fundada em uma dicotomia rígida e inflexível, afirmando a identidade entre a proposição e o fato. Era conhecida como a teoria da identidade da verdade. Quando uma proposição é verdadeira, é idêntica a um fato, e a crença nessa proposição é correta (Moore1899; 1902 e Russell 1904). Mais tarde, depois de 1910, os dois filósofos mudaram alguns elementos fundamentais de suas teorias. O mais importante veio da adoção da idéia de crença, substituindo o conceito de uma proposição. "Uma crença é verdadeira se, e somente se,v corresponde a um fato" foi a afirmação fundamental que sustentou a teoria, cuja designação mudou para a teoria da correspondência da verdade. Alguns críticos da teoria questionaram a natureza do "fato", tomado como elemento essencial do conceito de correspondência. Dowden[69] levanta a questão: E o que são fatos? A noção de um fato como algum tipo de entidade ontológica foi declarada explicitamente pela primeira vez na segunda metade do século XIX. A teoria da correspondência permite que os fatos sejam entidades As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 81 dependentes da mente. McTaggart, e talvez Kant, sustentavam tais teorias de correspondência. As teorias da correspondência de Russell, Wittgenstein e Austin consideram os fato como independentes da mente. Ambas as concepções das teorias empiristas estão centradas no objeto da propriedade e não na propriedade em si. Apesar dessa característica, no entanto, as teorias da correspondência são indubitavelmente estruturas ontológicas, na medida em que um fato (um objeto ou entidade pertencente à realidade) deve existir para estabelecer a relação de correspondência. Glanzberg, M (2018)[70] acrescenta que: A forma moderna da teoria da correspondência procura completar a explicação da correspondência recorrendo a proposições. De fato, é comum basear uma teoria da correspondência da verdade na noção de uma proposição estruturada. As proposições são novamente apresentadas como o conteúdo de crenças e afirmações, As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 82 e as proposições têm estrutura que pelo menos aproximadamente corresponde à estrutura das sentenças. Uma afirmação significativa da moderna teoria da correspondência indica que essa propriedade, por sua natureza, consiste em um grau de correspondência na relação entre proposição de objeto ou crença de objeto. A teoria aceita que a mente humana, através da observação e refinamento experimental, possui a capacidade de adquirir consciência do objetos e entidades. Essas idéias centrais se desviam da teoria dos conceitos absolutos ou puros da verdade e abrem nossa pesquisa para a análise da relatividade empírica da verdade. A teoria da coerência é uma concepção idealista monista da verdade, oposta às estruturas ontológicas dualísticas do empirismo, que foram propostas por Harold Henry Joachim (1868-1938) em seu livro A natureza da verdade: um ensaio (1906).[71] . "A verdade em sua natureza essencial é a coerência sistemática que é o caráter de um todo significativo", afirmou o autor (op.cit). Joachim sempre alegou que a verdade tem essa natureza monística: o que é verdadeiro é a verdade inteira e completa, como uma propriedade indivisível e única. Crenças e As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 83 atribuições ou julgamentos variáveis não podem alcançar o sentido completo da verdade: são apenas abordagens fragmentadas . Assim, a verdade de uma proposição resulta de sua interação com outras proposições. Crenças em si mesmas significam sistemas independentes, comparáveis em suas qualidades. Uma crença só pode ser coerente se pertencer a um sistema coerente de crenças. Joachim não explicou com precisão qual é o significado de sua idéia de "coerência sistemática", que ele distinguiu da mera "consistência". Mais tarde, outros filósofos argumentaram que a coerência é uma propriedade que exige pelo menos consistência lógica. Para alguns metafísicos racionalistas, essa consistência lógica significa que uma proposição é verdadeira se e somente se "é consistente com todas as outras proposições verdadeiras" (Bradley, op.cit). No neoclassicismo, as ideias da teoria da coerência enfatizam que a verdade não é uma relação conteúdo-mundo. É exclusivamente uma relação de crença para crença. Charles Henly[72], analisando essa teoria, indica como ela se afasta de qualquer noção empírica ou experimental dos objetos e entidades: De fato, a teoria da coerência abandona os objetos como eles As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 84 realmente são paraconsiderar como base da verdade os objetos, na medida que são construídos ou constituídos pelos conteúdos teóricos e crenças que governam sua observação, bem como a maneira pela qual são experimentados pelos observadores. A mente deve, por uma questão psicológica e de inevitabilidade epistemológica, sujeitar os objetos que procura conhecer às condições em que é capaz de conhecê-los. Teoria Semântica de Tarski A teoria semântica da verdade começou na primeira metade do século XX com as obras do filósofo e matemático polonês Alfred Tarski [73] . Sua teoria multidisciplinar contém uma incursão audaciosa e profunda, começando na lógica formal e crescendo com estruturas filosóficas, linguísticas, semióticas, matemáticas e construções teóricas inter-relacionadas. Por um lado, seu trabalho concebe uma teoria modelo, com base na lógica matemática. Por outro lado, ele traz uma abordagem filosófica única para a ontologia da verdade. Em razão da extensão e complexidade da teoria semântica, apenas um breve olhar sobre a mesma se encaixa nos limites deste estudo. As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 85 Além disso, qualquer apresentação informal da teoria de Tarski não teria êxito. Para se aprofundar adequadamente na concepção semântica da verdade, recomendamos consultar as referências deste capítulo. Neste resumo, podemos dizer que um dos conceitos centrais da teoria é a ideia de satisfação semântica. O argumento considera que uma linguagem carrega uma definição de verdade em suas expressões e construções. Esse conteúdo deve satisfazer, ou preencher com a propriedade da verdade, a relação entre um objeto ou entidade e uma função atributiva. Além disso, essa satisfação deve ser matematicamente demonstrável e precisa. A força da linguagem, por sua vez, é um elemento relevante para tornar a semântica um portador da verdade. O filósofo pretendia reduzir conceitos semânticos a conceitos físicos, prevendo a configuração da semântica como sujeito científico. Para justificar essa redução, Tarsky se refere à propriedade da composicionalidade, significando a exclusão de qualquer contextualidade de uma afirmação, uma vez que a verdade só pode emergir das suas partes constitutivas. Lumpkin dá uma abordagem a essa conceituação[74] : As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 86 Em "A concepção semântica da verdade e os fundamentos da semântica", o objetivo de Alfred Tarski é identificar as condições necessárias e suficientes para uma sentença ser verdadeira e fundamentar a semântica em noções lógicas. A semântica não é uma panaceia para problemas filosóficos à la Wittgenstein, mas uma "ciência modesta" relativa à relação entre entidades linguísticas e o mundo. Ao definir conceitos semânticos na lógica, podemos estar mais convencidos de que nossa linguagem pode ser o melhor espelho possível para o mundo; assim não construiríamos inadvertidamente nossas ciências sobre conceitos linguísticos sem sentido. Hodges [75] explica que "a definição de satisfação de Tarski é composicional, o que significa que a classe de atribuições que satisfazem uma fórmula complexa FF é determinada apenas (1)pelo fato da regra sintática usada para construir FF decorre de seus constituintes imediatos e (2) pelas classes de atribuições que satisfazem esses constituintes imediatos. " As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 87 De fato, Tarski insiste na afirmação de que o conceito de satisfação, geralmente aplicado em matemática, é uma ferramenta eficiente para definir a verdade. Para entender melhor a teoria semântica da verdade em seus conteúdos e características matemáticas, sugerimos um estudo abrangente, envolvendo os seguintes itens, expostos por Wolensky[76] (A) Verdade como propriedade das sentenças; (B) relações entre verdade e significado; (C) diagnóstico de paradoxos semânticos; (D) resolução de paradoxos semânticos; (E) relativização para idiomas; (F) esquema T (A é verdadeiro se e somente se A); (G) O princípio BI da bivalência; (H) Adequação material e formal de uma definição de verdade e as condições impostas a uma metalinguagem para obter uma definição de verdade adequada; (J) A relação entre linguagem e metalinguagem; (K) A própria definição de verdade; As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 88 (L) Maximidade do conjunto de verdades em um determinado idioma; (M) O teorema da indefinibilidade. A teoria deflacionária da verdade surgiu durante o século XX com Frege, G[77] . (1918) "Pensamentos", e seguiu com os trabalhos de muitos outros filósofos, como Quine, WV O[78] . (1970), Ramsey, FP[79] (1927) e Ayer, AJ.[80] (1935). Em sua essência, a teoria abriga uma negação enfática da existência da propriedade denominada "verdade". O conceito deflacionário entende que todas as teorias tradicionais sofrem inicialmente uma distorção pela suposição de fundamentos que não existem. Buscar a verdade é uma tentativa de discutir algo que não existe aqui, ou em qualquer outro lugar. Tudo sobre a verdade tende a uma teoria inútil sobre o nada. Em sua estrutura, a teoria deflacionária gerencia vários elementos linguísticos sintáticos e semânticos, por meio de várias discussões sentenciais e proposicionais, concluindo que a afirmação de que uma afirmação é verdadeira existe apenas para afirmar a própria afirmação. O raciocínio considera que a proposição "sinto o cheiro da violeta" é o mesma que a frase "é verdade que sinto o cheiro da violeta", evidenciando que a atribuição da propriedade As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 89 "verdade" não acrescentou nada ao contexto semântico (Ferge, op.cit.). A falsidade binomial da verdade, de acordo com as ideias deflacionárias, é tratada como algo originado de proposições que são negáveis ou demonstráveis, independentemente da presença implícita ou ausência de qualquer atribuição linguística da propriedade. Em suas apresentações modernas, a teoria deflacionária aplica inúmeras ferramentas metodológicas. Uma das mais importantes é o "esquema de equivalência", conforme explicado por Stoljar e Damnjanovic:[81] Nos últimos tempos, no entanto, a teoria deflacionária tem sido frequentemente apresentada com a ajuda de um esquema, que às vezes é chamado de esquema de equivalência: (ES) <p> é verdadeiro se e somente se p. Nesse esquema, colchetes angulares indicam um dispositivo de formação de nome apropriado, por exemplo, aspas ou 'a proposição de que ...' e as ocorrências de 'p' são substituídas por frases para gerar instâncias do esquema. Com a As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 90 ajuda de (ES), podemos formular deflacionismo como a visão ,a grosso modo, de que as instâncias desse esquema capturam tudo de significativo que pode ser dito sobre a verdade. As teorias que se afastam do deflacionismo negam que o esquema de equivalência nos diga toda a verdade sobre a verdade. Como essas teorias se somam ao esquema de equivalência, são frequentemente chamadas de teorias inflacionárias da verdade. Muitas derivações do pensamento deflacionário surgiram durante as últimas décadas, de tal maneira que a teoria de alguma forma teve sua unicidade esfacelada em discussões intermináveis e polarizadas. De qualquer forma, algumas referências foram preservadas, ou se tornaram aceitáveis para a maioria das variações da teoria. Assim, além do "esquema de equivalência", outros elementos metodológicos foram agregados à maioria das diversas apresentações do argumento deflacionário, como a teoria do significado, a tese da dissociação, a tese da conjunção infinita, a tese da generalização, o predicado da verdade e A Tese da Conexão. O fato é que a teoria deflacionária da verdade As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 91 parecia inicialmente uma teoria trivial ou uma construção inconsistente de idéias e opiniões. No entanto, lentamente despertou um número crescente de oposições dos teóricos tradicionais, além de discrepâncias compostas entre as muitas apresentações de seu conteúdo, até se tornar uma das discussões e conflitos mais intermináveis e polarizados da filosofia moderna. É absolutamente impossível entrar profundamente no labirinto de tais debates em nosso estudo e, por esse motivo, nossa escolha é adotar uma crítica generalizada e compreensível, capaz de contribuir eficientemente para nossa reflexão, como a que é exposta por Anil Gupta.[82] : Deflacionistas acham que a verdade é um conceito simples, ou que permite uma análise igualmente simples. A análise dos teorias deflacionistas podem até ser simples, mas, na realidade, isso faz com que a verdade ser torne um conceito muito mais complexo. A teoria atribui à verdade uma vasta configuração ideológica. Nós examinamos várias tentativas para contornar esse problema, mas nenhuma resultou em uma conceituação plausível do significado de" 'verdadeiro". Agora somos deixados com as perguntas: "No que consiste nossa compreensão do 'verdadeiro' ? As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 92 Alguém pode explicar o significado de 'verdadeiro usando uma ideologia limitada? É um fato que entendemos as atribuições da verdade, mesmo quando a verdade é atribuída a uma sentença (ou pensamento ou representação) que está além dos nossos recursos conceituais? O que, podemos entender por tais atribuições? Parece que estabelecemos algo genérico para que uma sentença (ou pensamento ou representação) possam ser tidos como verdadeiros. Mas o que é isso que nós entendemos? Uma vez que superamos a representação do deflacionismo, não estamos mais inclinados a lapidar essas questões com respostas simples. Nós retomamos nosso senso original de que há algo muito misterioso sobre a verdade e que uma exploração desse mistério pode iluminar a natureza de nosso pensamento e nossa linguagem. TEORIAS PRAGMÁTICAS DA VERDADE "A verdade de uma crença é determinada pela avaliação de quão bem ela satisfaz toda a natureza humana por um longo período de As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 93 tempo: o quanto ela é eficiente no seu funcionamento ?"[83] Este princípio resume a abordagem central da visão pragmática da verdade A denominação dessa abordagem filosófica veio do grego "pragmatikós" (que significa prático) e passou a ser empregada em nossa literatura a partir de 1580. O pragmatismo começou com o "Clube Metafísico", uma denominação irônica dada pelo matemático e lógico Charles Sanders Peirce (1839 -1914)[84] , o psicólogo William James (18421910)[85] , e o jurista Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. (1841 1935)[86] ao seu grupo de estudos filosóficos, no final do século XIX. Os proponentes do pragmatismo, e muitos de seus seguidores, não formularam algo estruturado como uma teoria. Diferentemente disso, eles preferiram definir um conceito ou critério de verdade, que deveria expressar "clareza". Em torno dessa ideia central, tudo sobre o pragmatismo foi proposto, elaborado e discutido por muitos filósofos contemporâneos que adicionaram sua contribuição relevante aos inúmeros estudos, consolidando os significados do pragmatismo, como John Dewey (1859 1952)[87] e Richard Rorty (1931 2007)[88]. O pragmatismo tem sido entendido de diferentes maneiras, considerando a história de sua formulação: tanto como uma atitude mental, quanto como As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 94 um método de investigação e uma teoria da verdade. De fato, pragmatismo é o conjunto dessas três coisas. Como atitude e método de investigação, o pragmatismo se assemelha a alguns princípios da filosofia analítica: "Análise conceitual como método; uma estreita relação entre linguagem e filosofia; uma preocupação em buscar respostas argumentativas para problemas filosóficos; procura de clareza conceitual. "[89] Como teoria, o pragmatismo afirma que a verdade não é uma categoria atribuível a nenhum objeto ou entidade além de nossas crenças. Portanto, não existe essa "verdade suprema" ou qualquer outro significado para a verdade antes ou além de nossas crenças, sua estrutura semântica e seus efeitos. De qualquer forma, a verdade resulta de nossas crenças. De qualquer maneira, a verdade não se tornou transcendental; somente nossas crenças são portadoras da verdade. Crença é uma regra para ação; assim, funciona como um ponto de partida original para nossos pensamentos. O conteúdo de nossas crenças significa a configuração de hábitos, de modo que, pelas particularidades de cada crença, As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 95 possamos distinguir vários modos de ações emergentes. "Verdadeiro é o nome para o que quer que seja bom em termos de crença, e bom também por razões definidas e atribuíveis" (James. Op.cit ). O valor implícito da verdade é sua utilidade, a característica de oferecer uma aplicação útil (pragmática) no mundo Três componentes principais ajudam a observar como a verdade pode qualificar nossas crenças: a investigação, a satisfação e a conformidade com a experiência subsequente. Notadamente, Ramsey (1903 1930)[90] liga a verdade à investigação humana. A investigação corresponde ao conteúdo de nossa crença e significa o único portador da verdade. A investigação corresponde à semântica de nossas crenças e experiências, bem como à única maneira de expressar seu significado: A investigação é um caso especial de semiose, um processo que transforma signos em signos, mantendo uma relação específica com um objeto, cujo conteúdo pode estar localizado fora da trajetória dos signos, ou então ser encontrado no final dela. A investigação inclui todas as formas de revisão de As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 96 crenças e inferência lógica, incluindo o método científico[91] - (Pierce, op.cit) A satisfação de uma investigação é o fim da verdade", pressuposto que introduz um conceito de correlação ou identidade na propriedade. No entanto, esse entendimento não pode ser mal utilizado com as concepções de correspondência com a realidade, conforme formuladas pelas teorias tradicionais. Aqui, a correspondência da verdade é estabelecida exclusivamente com a própria crença. A satisfação significa a realização experimental de uma crença. O confronto entre a investigação e seus resultados (ou entre a crença e a experiência) visa principalmente resolver as dúvidas e preocupações em consideração, e cuja natureza está sendo inquirida. A partir desse processo, surge a crença e, por fim, o conhecimento, contemplando a crença prática e o estabelecimento de hábitos de comportamento cognitivo futuro.[92] A partir daí, podemos deduzir que, em sua essência, a teoria pragmática da verdade necessita abrigar em sua estrutura também uma teoria da aprendizagem. O princípio da satisfação esculpe a máxima As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 97 amplamente conhecida do pragmatismo: "é útil porque é verdade" ou "é verdade porque é útil". A verdade é o que satisfaz o intelecto. Na verdade, o intelecto encontra descanso e satisfação que é seu próprio bem ou fim. "[93] Às vezes, o conteúdo nuclear dessas máximas é mal compreendido e visto em semelhança com ideias utilitárias, resultando em uma percepção falsa. O utilitarismo é um sistema ético-moral baseado na utilidade comportamental objetiva; O pragmatismo é um sistema baseado na verdade normativa. O conformidade com a experiência subsequente, por sua vez, é o elemento que indica que a configuração da verdade não é um resultado sutil e isolado de nossas crenças. Um processo de nossa experiência relacionado ao tempo determina a verdade. O pragmatismo sustenta a busca da "verdade em si" e rejeita a ideia de certeza objetiva. Por esse motivo, a verdade de nossas crenças surge de um processo que envolve não apenas a pronta realização de nossas crenças, mas também nossas experiências e ações futuras. William James assumiu que a teoria pragmática pretende convergir nossas crenças para evidências científicas consolidadas relacionadas a resultados bem-sucedidos da ação humana, e esse é o conceito crítico para entender a epistemologia tradicional do pragmatismo. A submissão da verdade a um processo As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 98 relacionado ao tempo envolve dois conceitos: o falibilismo e o naturalismo. Com o falibilismo, a teoria pragmática aceita os problemas cognitivos e as limitações relacionadas, e o naturalismo se refere à observação de nossos elementos biológicos e sociais. Com[94] a negação de uma "verdade objetiva e concreta", a epistemologia pragmática toma a verdade como uma possibilidade. Nesse sentido, Susan Haacs (1993)[95] sustenta que a justificação vem em graus de acordo com a teoria pragmática. Com suas características, a epistemologia pragmática, em suas inúmeras versões, influenciou as modernas teorias jurisprudenciais, econômicas, psicológicas, linguísticas e de aprendizagem. O ponto de encontro dessas teorias, e de muitas outras, é uma das ideias centrais da epistemologia pragmática: a noção de "senso comum", resultante de nossas experiências, que foram capazes de preservar seu conteúdo ao longo das exposições a novas experiências, ocorrendo em tempos subsequentes. " Eles formam um grande estágio de equilíbrio no desenvolvimento da mente humana, o estágio do senso comum." Muitos conceitos pragmáticos estão espalhados pela filosofia e pelas ciências, de maneira expressa ou implícita, e independentemente da estrutura ou natureza dos objetos As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 99 correspondentes. No presente, é um desafio dizer-se com precisão quais elementos são ou não pragmáticos em filosofia e ciências. CONCLUSÕES DESTE CAPÍTULO. Essas são as teorias que podem nos ajudar em nossa reflexão sobre o "mistério da verdade", como disse Anil Gupta (op.cit.). Nenhuma delas esgota o assunto nem jamais o fará. Por esse motivo, não adotaremos estrita ou totalmente nenhuma delas. Por outro lado, não as negaremos ou desacreditaremos porque, se observarmos todas essas teorias do ponto de vista compatibilista e não reducionista, perceberemos prontamente que todas elas têm algo a nos dizer. Qualquer uma dessas teorias, por mais sutil que seja, oferece uma suposição, um conceito, uma tentativa de demonstração, uma comparação, uma crença ou um fragmento simples, representando uma proposição razoável e coerente. Não importa se esses elementos ou fragmentos escolhidos possam ser considerados triviais pelos teóricos, principalmente porque ninguém é capaz de demonstrar que raciocínios triviais não podem expressar a verdade, nem que teorias herméticas, complexas e elaboradas sempre podem nos dizer o que é verdade. . De nossa posição analítica, não devemos ter medo de como empregar esses elementos metodologicamente ou de organizá-los em um As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 100 sistema, porque não estamos construindo nenhuma teoria, nem propondo teoremas, fórmulas, dogmas ou demonstrando algo desconhecido da ciência ou da filosofia. Estamos apenas olhando para todos os elementos que temos, de maneira crítica, analítica e coerente, buscando nosso melhor entendimento da realidade. Todas as afirmações, crenças e conteúdos teóricos que serão deixados de lado em nossa análise não devem ser entendidos como negados, mas apenas não considerados como o melhor elemento para a proposição específica que estamos afirmando. Resultantes da análise de todos esses tesouros cognitivos oferecidos por nossa literatura filosófica, nossas suposições sobre a verdade são as seguintes: 1 Conceituamos a verdade como uma propriedade convencional dada pelo senso comum ao grau de proximidade com a realidade, atribuível a qualquer processo mental de natureza cognitiva. 2 Argumentamos que qualquer propriedade essencial está subordinada à natureza e substância do seu objeto ou entidade correspondente. Esta é a razão porque a realidade subordina a verdade. 3 Argumentamos que a pura verdade não existe de forma natural, cognitiva, racional ou social. A pura verdade só existe enquanto uma As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 101 teoria. No âmbito da nossa mente, a pura verdade não pode ser provada. O que conhecemos como verdade é apenas uma atribuição relativa. 4 Argumentamos que, uma vez que aceitamos os argumentos de que existimos em uma realidade aberta e de que a verdade está subordinada à realidade, pela mesma suposição, estamos declarando que a verdade é instável e sujeita a variações. A realidade é situacional, relativa ao espaço-tempo e pode mudar abruptamente. Independentemente do fato de que essa afirmação inicia um debate sem fim, a suposição da relatividade da verdade não é nova. Jack W. Meiland (1977)[96] comenta como esse conceito foi considerado, por exemplo, por Husserl: A noção de "verdade relativa" tornou-se especialmente proeminente no pensamento alemão no final do século XIX, quando "historicismo" e "relativismo" floresceram como uma consequência paradoxal do trabalho de Kant e Hegel (paradoxal, pois Kant e Hegel são eles mesmos "absolutistas"). Essa noção foi empregada por teóricos nos campos da metafilosofia, filosofia da história e filosofia da lógica. Assim, Edmund Husserl sentiuse obrigado a examinar o As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 102 conceito de verdade relativa em sua crítica ao psicologismo na lógica . Husserl entendeu que a filosofia moderna e recente se apoia fortemente no relativismo específico, envolvendo as noções de verdade relativa. 5 Argumentamos que a verdade pode existir na teoria, mas não em abstrato. Podemos teorizar a verdade porque, em teorias, usamos conceitos e ideias relacionados à realidade, que podem ser materiais ou não, como números. Na pura abstração, a construção leva em conta apenas princípios lógicos sem referência a nenhum objeto pertencente à realidade. Não podemos pensar na verdade sem pensar em um objeto ou entidade referencial e real, mesmo que essa referência possa ser vaga ou não explícita em nosso raciocínio, ou seja considerada em sua generalidade. Na abstração, os objetos não são mentais e não são sensíveis, carecendo de quaisquer características de objetos paradigmáticos necessárias à atribuição de propriedades qualitativas. 6 Argumentamos que a verdade é convencional e não conceitual. Qualquer conceito ontológico de verdade, que As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 103 ultrapasse o conteúdo de uma simples convenção, nos leva ao desafio de resolver numerosos e complexos problemas, porque o portador da verdade, em qualquer caso, deve preencher os critérios de demonstrabilidade, coerência, probabilidade e razoabilidade em seu próprio conteúdo. É necessária evidência científica do portador para cumprir o critério de demonstrabilidade. Devemos investigar a estrutura lógica do portador. Na medida em que consideramos a coerência, envolvemos, conforme o caso, sua validade matemática e todos os seus elementos intrínsecos, com métodos progressivos e regressivos, incluindo seus fundamentos históricos. A determinação da probabilidade do portador exige, em cada caso, o desenvolvimento de modelos matemáticos adequados e as correspondentes análises e críticas. A razoabilidade do portador depende de sua coerência com todas os conhecimentos disponíveis sobre seu contexto, o que significa uma tarefa crítica bastante complexa. Sem o atendimento de todos esses critérios, qualquer atribuição da verdade, ultrapassando o conteúdo de uma convenção, é reduzida a simples suposições. Esse atendimento impõe classificação e determinação precisa de todos esses componentes essenciais e suas As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 104 combinações exponenciais. Um portador da verdade pode demonstrar graus diferentes e variáveis (ou intensidades) de cada um dos critérios (possibilidade, probabilidade, razoabilidade e coerência), de modo que qualquer modelo matemático concebível, que pretenda resolver essas variantes, supõe o processamento de bilhões de entradas para uma só saída. Além disso, em termos lógicos, esses modelos incontáveis certamente atingiriam uma mesma saída, em todos os casos. É bastante evidente que esta é uma tarefa impossível de ser proposta no domínio da nossa mente, principalmente se relacionada à nossa experiência cotidiana e aos estados cerebrais e mentais correspondentes. A conquista de qualquer conceito ontológico de verdade, além da ideia de uma convenção, é apenas um desafio aos projetos de inteligência artificial, de forma alguma acessíveis à nossa existência comum. 7 Argumentamos que o que entendemos por verdade é o resultado de uma convenção fundamentada no senso comum. Diante da impossibilidade de um construto conceitual da verdade no domínio de nossas mentes, em vez de adotar qualquer conceito de propriedade ontológica, estabelecemos uma atribuição variável de valor aos elementos da realidade, emergindo dos pilares de nossa As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 105 experiência. Essa atribuição é uma convenção social, da mesma forma que a norma legal e os princípios morais, que entendemos como a aceitação generalizada da atribuição de valor resultante da consciência que podemos sustentar com ciência, filosofia, história e mais experiência. . Como muitas outras construções mentais e cognitivas, o que chamamos de atribuição da verdade ocorre intuitivamente e com uma considerável margem de erro. Tudo o que temos para essa atribuição é uma imagem distorcida da verdade, uma aproximação, uma vaga idéia intensamente influenciada por preconceitos, expectativas e crenças. Essa é a razão de tantas nuances de verdade na experiência humana. A verdade é uma propriedade variável e gradiente. Nossas convenções sobre a verdade são um processo cognitivo contínuo que determina inclusões e exclusões ininterruptas de entradas e saídas provenientes da interação da experiência individual e social, cujo resultado é o senso comum, uma construção sistêmica, analítica e crítica. Para este estudo, adotamos o conceito de senso comum proposto por Capps (2020)[97] : As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 106 Por "senso comum", não pretendo me referir a uma posição filosófica específica, como o realismo do senso comum escocês, o senso comum crítico de Peirce ou a posição de Moore em "A Defense of Common Sense" (agradeço a um revisor por ter levantando essa questão). Tomo o senso comum de uma maneira não teórica (senso comum?): "Comum" no sentido de amplamente compartilhado ou, como discutido abaixo, uma linha de base geralmente aceita. Mas também "comum" no sentido de "comum", daí a conexão com a filosofia da linguagem comum (nesse sentido, pode-se argumentar que a filosofia da linguagem comum é uma versão pós-linguística da filosofia do senso comum.), 8) Finalmente, argumentamos que, teoricamente, se pudéssemos atribuir valores efetivos à realidade e aos portadores em qualquer escala lógica, encontraríamos a verdade como um ponto determinado em uma fórmula simples de gradiente de inclinação, onde m = o grau da verdade, y = a realidade de acordo com o senso comum ex = o portador As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 107 CAPÍTULO V AS SOMBRAS CEGAS DE NARCISO INTRODUÇÃO, CONCEITO E NATUREZA O imaginário cego é tão antigo quanto a humanidade, e desde Platão tem sido observado pela filosofia. Muitos nomes diferentes foram dados a esse assunto, nem sempre discutido como um construto, o que pretendemos fazer neste estudo. Como a realidade, o imaginário mostra alguns padrões, alguns efeitos repetidos e muito semelhantes na presença das mesmas causas. Quando começamos a refletir sobre esses efeitos perseverantes no comportamento humano, e deparamos com suas prováveis origens causais, percebemos a existência de muitas entidades distintas, que possuem uma identidade adequada e organização intrínseca, apesar de serem compostas da mesma substância de muitas outras entidades. Se observarmos uma galáxia com um telescópio, veremos seus sistemas solares como pontos destacados ou áreas aparentemente independentes, às quais atribuímos uma identidade. Essa percepção é apenas uma As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 108 ilusão, porque são apenas estrelas, planetas e asteroides flutuando na imensidão mas nós os chamamos de sistemas solares e lhes damos nomes próprios quando entendemos que estão relacionados em uma estrutura organizada, única, e adequada. Qualquer coisa relacionada ao comportamento humano está ligada ao imaginário, de uma maneira ou de outra. Observando seu conteúdo e suas substâncias, podemos perceber estruturas e construções organizadas únicas, com uma natureza ou identidade própria, da mesma maneira que vemos os sistemas solares. Uma dessas estruturas do imaginário chama nossa atenção por estar no centro de todos os assuntos explorados na análise factual deste estudo. Podemos dar a ela o nome que desejarmos, mas aqui vamos chamá-la de " o imaginário cego ". Deveríamos entender o imaginário cego como significando a atitude de negação da verdade e da realidade convencionais, o desprezo pela evidência, o desdém pela ciência, pelo conhecimento, e a deserção da inteligência e do pensamento crítico, em favor de um imaginário conveniente e sem sentido. Considerando seus ingredientes, veremos que o imaginário cego não é uma categoria, nem uma qualidade, como a verdade. Do mesmo modo, não é uma mentira, porque a mentira é um ato de falsificação da verdade, por mais que o As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 109 imaginário cego não seja o oposto da verdade, pois esse oposto deve ser um atributo, o que não é o caso. Estamos falando de uma estrutura atitudinal capaz de determinar o comportamento; é uma ação sistêmica e um modelo comportamental primordial. Aqui usamos a palavra "sistêmica" porque a estrutura desse modelo comportamental contém a inter-relação hierarquicamente organizada de todos os elementos de nossa experiência, emoções, cognição, mente e estados neuronais, bem como todos os nossos preconceitos, desejos e crenças. Todas as qualidades desses elementos estarão refletidas no modelo, como a suficiência de nossa cognição e sua coerência, tanto quanto o absurdo, os nossos medos, desejos e neuroses, o grau de sanidade mental e psicológica, as disfunções neurais e neurônicas, além de incontáveis ingredientes situacionais. Por outro lado, essa ação sistêmica envolve atribuições de valor. Em todos os processos de atribuição que podemos encontrar na psicologia social, a atribuição da verdade é apenas objetiva: refere-se exclusivamente a um objeto particular, externo ao sujeito qualificado. Diversamente, no imaginário cego, a atribuição objetiva é precedida e fundamentada em uma atribuição subjetiva As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 110 de valor dada ao sujeito por ele próprio, proporcionando ao mesmo o poder de determinar, a seu critério, os valores atribuíveis a qualquer coisa. O sujeito, em si mesmo, torna-se a meta-realidade. Conclui-se que, com essa estrutura narcisista do processo crítico, a atribuição objetiva perde seu significado e importância lógica, desde que não expressa mais um conteúdo analítico relacionado à equivalência, demonstrabilidade ou coerência do objeto diante da realidade. . Enquanto mantém seu poder de atribuição auto constituído, o sujeito deixa de ser submetido a evidências, ciência e conhecimento crítico e, imerso em seu imaginário, elabora a imagem reflexa da realidade que melhor satisfaz seus desejos, ansiedades e medos. É evidente que tudo relacionado à cegueira cognitiva abriga elementos conscientes e inconscientes descritos por Lacan na conceituação da segunda ordem (ou segundo anel) da psique: o imaginário. Devemos olhar para este universo com uma inspiração multidisciplinar e flexível. A imagem projetada e defeituosa da realidade que sustenta o modelo não admite a dúvida metódica. As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 111 ou crítica lógica, e se torna um dogma subjetivo, em uma camada existencial em que a cegueira cognitiva envolve a inteligência. O resultado é o estado mental mais vulnerável que um indivíduo pode oferecer aos mecanismos e processos de dominação social, como discutiremos adiante. A dominação floresce na ignorância. Devemos considerar, também, alguns componentes específicos da estrutura do modelo comportamental para ampliar nossa compreensão de sua natureza. Um desses componentes é a nossa capacidade de e intuição para a ilusão, que tem sido extensivamente pesquisada pela psicologia social como um elemento influente do processamento de informações. Isso não significa apenas uma desfiguração cognitiva ou interferência psicológica, mas também um fenômeno dependente de funções neurológicas que devem ser adequadamente estudadas, como Myers[98] comentou: Os psicólogos sociais exploraram não apenas nossos julgamentos retrospectivos propensos a erros, mas também nossa capacidade de ilusão de interpretações errôneas, percepções, fantasias e crenças As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 112 construídas. Michael Gazzaniga (1992, 1998, 2008) relata que pacientes cujos hemisférios cerebrais foram separados cirurgicamente fabricam instantaneamente e dão créditos explicações de seus próprios comportamentos anômalos. Na estrutura do modelo comportamental do imaginário cego, outro componente central é a presença de um desconforto significativo no estado emocional do sujeito. Esse desconforto será o ponto de partida do próxima formulação do modelo. Com certeza, a causa inicial pode variar indefinidamente, mas na maioria dos casos é relacionada à ansiedade causada por desejos insatisfeitos ou pelo medo de sofrimentos existentes ou esperados, impostas por elementos da realidade. A psique do indivíduo, respondendo à presença dessa causa inicial, inconscientemente inicia dois processos primários: um mecanismo de defesa e a estimulação do narcisismo. Ambos os processos são portadores de nossos instintos mais primitivos, denominados por Freud como Eros e Thanatos. Os mecanismos de defesa do eu são o primeiro processo primário. Eles foram exaustivamente estudados desde a última década do século XIX, quando Sigmund Freud, no início da teoria As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 113 psicanalítica, publicou o artigo "Psychoneurosis of Defense" (1894), iniciando um dos fundamentos teóricos mais extensos e controversos da psicologia moderna . O fato foi sua primeira abordagem científica (e de qualquer pessoa) à defesa do ego, seguida por muitas mudanças e revisões pelo próprio Freud e muitos de seus seguidores, principalmente sua filha Anna Freud (1895 1982). No presente, as teorias de defesa não retêm algumas partes das primeiras ideias de Freud, mas certamente não há teoria de defesa sem o contexto freudiano. O entendimento moderno dos mecanismos de defesa não é tão focado em suas origens psiconeuróticas, mas oferece visões funcionais e teleológicas agregadas ao assunto. Rui C Campos (2018)[99] , em seu trabalho " A definição de mecanismos de defesa e sua avaliação: algumas contribuições", explica as diferentes interpretações dadas por aqueles que vieram depois de Freud: a) Anna Freud (1946; 1965) entendeu que todos os mecanismos de defesa identificados poderiam representar formas úteis de adaptação, desde que moderadamente utilizadas, ajudando os indivíduos a gerenciar os requisitos e desafios de sua realidade. b) Ao contrário dessa opinião, Haan (1963) sustentou que todos os mecanismos de defesa do eu conhecidos, em qualquer circunstância, As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 114 estavam associados a estados patológicos da personalidade, agindo como respostas incoerentes do indivíduo. c) Com algumas variações, Vaillant (19781; 1977) e Cramer (1998; 2000; 2006) afirmam que alguns desses mecanismos podem ser primitivos, imaturos e patológicos, enquanto outros podem ser maduros e adaptativos. Vaillant (cit.) Teve o cuidado de classificá-los em quatro níveis: a) patológico, em que o sujeito se distancia da realidade de tal maneira que outras pessoas passam a considerá-lo insano; b) o imaturo, identificado como causador de padrões comportamentais fantasiosos, mais frequentemente observados em adolescentes, c) os neuróticos, como aqueles que expõem padrões comportamentais coincidentes com a descrição clínica da neurose; d) os mecanismos maduros, como aqueles com intenção construtiva de solução de problemas. Objetivamente, os mecanismos de defesa têm o objetivo de proteger o indivíduo da ansiedade excessiva e o eu da agressão direta. Essa opinião é uma posição intermediária, equilibrando as suposições de Anna Freud e Haan. d) Finalmente, Campos considera que, do ponto de vista teleológico adequado, Ihilevich e Gleser (1969)[100] sustentam que os mecanismos de defesa podem distorcer ou manipular a realidade. A distorção ocorre quando os recursos As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 115 pessoais do sujeito são insuficientes para gerenciar conflitos internos ou ameaças externas assim que a percepção identifica experiências dolorosas que podem ser impostas a ele. Chamamos essas percepções de "causas iniciais", como dissemos antes. As formas mais críticas dos mecanismos de defesa do self, para o nosso estudo, são as classificadas como psicodinâmicas. São muitos e, continuamente, a literatura psicanalítica agrega tipos e descrições mais específicos. Manteremos nossa atenção apenas em sete desses mecanismos, listados na tabela a seguir, porque são suficientes para nossos propósitos analíticos. As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 116 Fonte de conteúdo: Os editores da Encyclopaedia Britannica.Título do artigo: Mecanismo de defesa.Website Encyclopaedia Britannica inc.Data de publicação: 31 de janeiro de 2020. https://www.britannica.com/topic/defense-mechanism -Data de acesso: 15 de junho de 2020Tradução livre As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 117 Mais recentemente, psicólogos e psiquiatras enfrentaram o desafio de analisar alguns padrões comportamentais específicos, desconhecidos até 1974, mas repetidos em vários eventos ocorridos nas décadas seguintes: a amplamente conhecida "Síndrome de Estocolmo". Inicialmente, os pesquisadores interpretaram a síndrome como um novo mecanismo defensivo do ego diante de suas principais características, e o qual deveria figurar em nossa tabela. Estudos identificaram esse padrão comportamental como uma resposta psicológica de um indivíduo em cativeiro que começa a estabelecer uma relação empática com seus captores, suas idéias e desejos. Em outros termos, um ato completo de adesão, uma identificação com o agressor. As primeiras pesquisas sobre esse padrão compreenderam que o modelo comportamental continha pelo menos três camadas: a) o sequestrador ameaça ativamente a vida do cativo; b) após a situação "a", o captor demonstra que reconsiderou sua intenção de matar o cativo e decidiu preservar sua vida; c) o alívio do extremo medo e ansiedade do cativeiro é transposto para sentimentos de gratidão para com o captor, estabelecendo a relação empática. No entanto, a literatura, pesquisas metodológicas e experimentos relacionados a esse padrão ainda são muito escassos. A maioria As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 118 das informações referentes aos fatos e comportamentos vem da literatura midiática e não pode ser útil à pesquisa psicológica. Namnyak M, Tufton N, Szekely R, Toal M, Worboys S, Sampson EL. (2007)[101] aceitam que " Isso sugere que um padrão identificável de experiência e comportamento possa existir entre as vítimas descritas pela mídia". Por outro lado, afirmam que o material disponível é insuficiente: Há pouca pesquisa acadêmica publicada sobre a 'síndrome de Estocolmo', embora um estudo de relatos da mídia revele semelhanças entre casos bem divulgados.Isso pode ser devido ao "viés de imprensa e publicidade".[...]Não identificamos nenhum critério de diagnóstico validado para a síndrome de Estocolmo em nenhum dos artigos revisados neste estudo, embora alguns artigos ofereçam sugestões de possíveis critérios (2,12,13). Existe uma grande discrepância em relação à definição de síndrome de Estocolmo entre os artigos revisados. Resumindo, independentemente das muitas possibilidades da existência de formas ainda não pesquisadas de mecanismos defensivos do eu (e a síndrome de Estocolmo poderia ser uma delas), As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 119 para todos os propósitos metodológicos, consideraremos apenas as sete formas contidas em nossa Tabela Torna-se aparente, diante de suas descrições, que qualquer um dos mecanismos de defesa pode desempenhar um papel determinante na formulação do modelo comportamental, resultando em construções imaginárias cegas. A participação do narcisismo é o segundo processo primário que ocorre na construção do modelo. O narcisismo é frequentemente referido de muitas formas triviais, devido à sua relação com muitos comportamentos típicos amplamente conhecidos nas relações interpessoais da vida cotidiana de cada um de nós. Portanto, podemos encontrar centenas de entendimentos superficiais sobre o narcisismo na literatura e qualquer diálogo em nossas vidas sociais. Em nossa reflexão, o que mais importa é entender o conteúdo e a estrutura do narcisismo, e não a elaboração acadêmica de todas as conceituações possíveis. Para nós, "como" é e funciona é mais relevante do que "o que" é ou poderia ser. Nossas primeiras noções de narcisismo vieram do pensamento psicanalítico. Freud (1914)[102] propôs duas noções interrelacionadas de narcisismo: o narcisismo As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 120 primário , originado na primeira infância, e o narcisismo secundário , resultante da adaptação do primário às condições externas. Nas palavras de Freud (op. Cit.) Posso salientar que somos obrigados a supor que uma unidade comparável ao ego não possa existir no indivíduo desde o início; o ego tem que ser desenvolvido. Os instintos auto eróticos, no entanto, existem desde o primeiro; portanto, deve haver algo adicionado ao autoerotismo uma nova ação psíquica para provocar o narcisismo. Freud entendeu que a criança nasce sem uma noção de individualidade, o que significaria o ego. Hewitson (2010)[103] explica o contexto deste período, O narcisismo primário é um primeiro estado, anterior à constituição do ego e, portanto, auto erótico, através do qual o bebê vê sua própria pessoa como objeto de amor exclusivo um estado que precede sua capacidade de se voltar para objetos externos. Daí resulta a constituição do ego ideal. Laplanche e Pontalis (2004)[104] sintetizam o conceito freudiano assumindo que " o narcisismo As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 121 primário denota um estado inicial em que a criança investe emoções e energia em si mesma e sua libido. " O narcisismo secundário corresponde ao estado seguinte, começando com as primeiras interações da criança com a realidade externa. Quando isso acontece, o ego ideal experimenta a exposição aos objetos e estímulos externos. O ego auto erótico perde essa condição, visando relacionar-se com os elementos de sociabilidade do mundo exterior e construindo o conteúdo da sua individualidade. Nesse estágio, o sujeito cria uma imagem do eu ideal, que retorna ao ego como algo a ser perseguido e alcançado. Por esse processo, o ego ideal se converte no ideal do ego. Em uma comparação entre esses dois conceitos, podemos assumir que o relacionamento deles é um espelho da representação entre a realidade e sua idealização. Como argumentou Lacan na análise do que ele chamou de "primeira ordem", o estágio inicial da personalidade ocorre sem relação com o mundo exterior. Nesta camada, chamada "realidade", o sujeito experimenta um tipo de estado perfeito no qual ele é o centro de si e de um universo não relacional, tendo suas necessidades naturalmente satisfeitas. Na ordem seguinte, o "imaginário" lacaniano, o ego ideal ganha uma estrutura inter-relacionada na qual o ego ideal parece perdido para sempre. Revisitando "O narcisismo: uma introdução", de As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 122 Freud , Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor (2020)[105] esclarece: A pessoa, como escreveu Freud, procura recuperar a perfeição narcísica de sua infância sob a nova forma do ideal do ego, que é adiada como uma meta a ser alcançada no futuro. Assim, o ego ideal pode ser visto como a sobrevivência nostálgica de um narcisismo perdido, enquanto o ideal do ego parece ser a formação dinâmica que sustenta ambições em direção ao progresso. A ideia dicotômica freudiana de narcisismo foi relativamente deixada de lado pelos estudos subsequentes, que se concentraram em uma interpretação integrada. Melanie Klein (18821960) abandonou a ideia, e muitas outros questionaram definitivamente seu conteúdo, argumentando que, uma vez baseado em uma situação auto erótica, o narcisismo primário não pode ser adequadamente aceito como narcisismo. Philippe Julien (1995)[106] argumenta que, quando Lacan formulou sua teoria do estágio do espelho (o imaginário), ele unificou a compreensão do narcisismo da seguinte maneira: As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 123 No estágio do espelho, Lacan converteu as duas fases em somente uma. No momento exato em que o ego é formado pela imagem do outro, o narcisismo e a agressividade se correlacionam. O narcisismo, no qual a imagem do próprio corpo é sustentada pela imagem do outro, de fato, introduz uma tensão: o outro à sua imagem me atrai e me rejeita. O narcisismo constitui um elemento causal de muitos transtornos de personalidade, chamados "NPD" ( Heinz Kohutin 1968)[107] . Vários estados psicóticos e sociopatológicos tornam-se parte das taxonomias diversificadas trazidas por estudos e experimentos em vários campos. Dada a abundância desse material, uma classificação completa de seu conteúdo é uma necessidade no presente. Aaron L. Pincus, Mark R. Lukowitsky (2010)[108] sustentam que o critério sobre o narcisismo patológico e seus temas fenotípicos (grandiosidade narcísica e vulnerabilidade narcísica) "devem ser classificados em critérios de diagnóstico e instrumentos de avaliação a serem revistos, eliminando-se referências a narcisismo 'aberto' e 'oculto' as quais materializam esses modos de expressão como tipos narcísicos distintos, para se determinar uma estrutura apropriada para o narcisismo patológico. "(op.cit) As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 124 Essas configurações patológicas do narcisismo são exatamente as que mais interessam à nossa reflexão, dada sua capacidade de provocar distorções graves do pensamento crítico, condição para formular qualquer conteúdo imaginário cego. No presente, o narcisismo patológico expressa dois temas fenotípicos: o narcisismo grandioso e o narcisismo de vulnerabilidade. Estes são conceitos técnicos, não pertencentes à psicologia social, e devemos segui-los literalmente. Stathis Grapsas, Eddie Brummelman, Mitja D. Back e Jaap JA Denissen (2020)[109] , explicam o narcisismo de grandiosidade: O narcisismo de grandiosidade (doravante: narcisismo) é um traço de personalidade marcado por crenças de superioridade pessoal e um senso de direito a tratamento especial (Krizan & Herlache, 2018; Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001). Os narcisistas (isto é, indivíduos com níveis relativamente altos de narcisismo grandioso) tendem a se esforçar para impressionar os outros: eles geralmente cuidam da aparência para atrair a atenção dos outros (Back, Schmukle e Egloff, As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 125 2010), gabam-se (Buss & Chiodo, 1991), e mostram seus talentos e habilidades na frente dos demais (Wallace & Baumeister, 2002). Ao mesmo tempo, os narcisistas costumam combater os outros. Nesses casos, são frequentemente percebidos por confrontos, insultos, depreciativos e intimidações (Holtzman, Vazire & Mehl, 2010; Morf & Rhodewalt, 1993; Reijntjes et al., 2016). A compreensão do narcisismo vulnerável podemos extrair de Czarna, AZ, Zajenkowski, M., Maciantowicz, O. (2019)[110] : O narcisismo vulnerável, enraizado em um senso de auto fragilidade, está associado à baixa autoestima e reflete defesa e insegurança. Envolve sentimentos de inadequação, incompetência e afeto negativo (Cain et al. 2008; Campbell e Miller 2011; Miller et al. 2011; Pincus e Lukowitsky 2010). Enquanto arrogância e exibições abertas de domínio e grandiosidade caracterizam o narcisismo grandioso, a forma vulnerável é descrita por As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 126 sentimentos auto relatados de inferioridade,depressão,esgotamento, propensão ao constrangimento e alta reatividade a eventos avaliativos (Kaufman et al. 2018). O comportamento social dos narcisistas vulneráveis é marcado por hostilidade, arrogância, afastamento social e falta de empatia (Dickinson e Pincus 2003; Hendin e Cheek 1997) .Grandiosidade narcisista e vulnerabilidade podem estar juntas (Krizan e Herlache, 2018). Procurando a relação entre o narcisismo e o processamento do pensamento crítico, e sua influência na formulação do imaginário cego, Zajenkowski Marcin, Maciantowicz Oliwia, Szymaniak Kinga, e Urban Paweł ( 2018),[111] estabeleceram uma correspondência significativa com os conceitos de inteligência emocional (IE) em experimento preciso que realizaram, atingindo resultados significativos. Na primeira etapa, os autores definem a conexão entre inteligência emocional (IE) e pensamento crítico: A inteligência emocional foi definida por Salovey e Mayer (1990 , p.189) como a capacidade de monitorar os sentimentos e As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 127 emoções de alguém e de outros, de discriminar entre eles e usar essas informações para orientar o pensamento e as ações. Em seu modelo, quatro funções foram estabelecidas: Percepção de Emoções (a capacidade de identificar com precisão as emoções de uma pessoa, bem como reconhecer emoções de outras pessoas com base em várias sugestões contextuais; O Uso de Emoções para Facilitar o Pensamento (a capacidade de usar emoções e humores para apoiar e orientar o processamento intelectual); A Compreensão de Emoções (habilidades necessárias para compreender e identificar emoções básicas e complexas; Gerenciamento de Emoções (a capacidade de monitorar e modificar emoções próprias, a fim de aumentar o crescimento emocional e intelectual). Dentro dessa abordagem, a IE é medida de maneira semelhante à inteligência cognitiva por meio de testes de desempenho ( Mayer et al., 2003 ). Os experimentos conduzidos pelos autores demonstram que os temas fenotípicos do As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 128 narcisismo (narcisismo grandioso e narcisismo da vulnerabilidade) estão altamente associados aos traços de IE . Por outro lado, a característica IE e a habilidade IE estão correlacionadas com elos fracos. A conclusão do estudo é que: "Nossos resultados são consistentes com essa visão e indicam que os dois tipos de narcisismo são importantes correlatos da característica IE. Essas descobertas sugerem que o narcisismo pode desempenhar um papel substancial na compreensão da IE, tanto no nível conceitual quanto no de medição" (op.cit). Portanto, a partir de todos esses estudos e opiniões, podemos inferir que o narcisismo pode ser um processo adaptativo normal do eu, assim como pode ser um estado patológico grave da personalidade. Em seu estado patológico e muito usual, o narcisismo é capaz de interferir no pensamento crítico do sujeito e provocar distorções essenciais dos processos de sua psique imaginária e considerável prejuízo de sua inteligência emocional (IE). Além dos mecanismos de defesa do "eu", (nossas ilusões, disfunções cognitivas, preconceitos, imagens refletidas, crenças, medos, desejos e muitos ingredientes situacionais), o narcisismo pode se tornar nosso guia para o imaginário cego ou, em outros termos, para "as. sombras cegas de Narciso." Emergindo de todas essas perguntas, Christopher Herbert[112] assume a As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 129 existência de um conflito aberto entre narcisismo e ciência (ou entre conhecimento e fantasia), como Freud declarou desde o início do pensamento psicanalítico: Freud retrata a história da ciência como uma série de revoluções paralelas, cada uma em seu próprio domínio, infligindo castigo à influência retrógrada do que ele chama de "narcisismo" humano. O mandamento do pensamento científico, segundo Freud, é abolir todas as falácias que surgem do antropocentrismo, atribuir uma posição privilegiada no mundo natural aos valores humanos ou a um ponto de vista humano. A astronomia copernicana, a biologia darwiniana e agora a psicanálise dão expressão a esse motivo primordial da ciência: "a destruição da ilusão narcísica ".[113] CONSTRUTOS SOCIAIS DO IMAGINÁRIO COLETIVO CEGO Concebemos o imaginário cego como um As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 130 modelo comportamental resultante de processos primordiais. Esses processos podem ser individuais ou coletivos porque a vida é, em todos os casos, um processo compartilhado. É bastante desafiadora a distinção entre o que é inerentemente individual em nossas vidas e o que existe em nossa existência e o que foi elaborado com outros, de outros, como outros, para outros e até contra outros. Somos entidades ontologicamente relacionais e interdependentes, sujeitos virtuais. Como entidades ou seres, somos parte de um sistema, tão estruturado quanto variável, existindo em movimento contínuo. Portanto, quando refletimos sobre nossos modelos comportamentais, podemos ter a ilusão de que estamos pensando em nosso eu individual quando, de fato, estamos diante de um objeto coletivo. Nossas identidades individuais são um dos assuntos mais questionados em nosso estado atual da ciência e, sob as lentes da física quântica e das teorias da matéria contínua, até mesmo nossos corpos biológicos têm sua realidade em revisão Não estamos afirmando que a individualidade não existe. Estamos apenas questionando se é o que pensávamos quando as evidências indicam que ele se limita às variáveis de algumas partes de um sistema que, em princípio, não precisam de forma alguma considerar o que acreditamos ser nossos indivíduos. As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 131 Portanto, consideramos que a distinção entre modelos comportamentais individuais e coletivos é semanticamente possível, mas de qualquer forma inútil. Por outro lado, as noções de construções sociais são relevantes na medida em que representam os sistemas ontológicos onde nossa existência ocorre e nossos modelos comportamentais, funcionando como elementos causais da ação humana. Assim, é dentro das construções sociais que podemos observar o significado e os efeitos de nossos modelos, como o imaginário cego. Adotamos uma posição construtivista neste estudo. Concordamos com Albert Schutz (1889 1959 )[114] no pressuposto de que a sociedade é um produto da interação de indivíduos humanos através de redes interpretativas, onde eles criam o mundo em que vivemos. Do mesmo modo, aceitamos as suposições de Berger e Luckmann (1966) [115] , sustentando que os fundamentos da estrutura social surgem do princípio de que a sociedade é um produto humano e da realidade objetiva. Nós abraçamos Frederick Bartlett (1886 1969)[116] em seu argumento de como os humanos usam o conhecimento prévio para entender novos fenômenos: as estruturas ou esquemas mentais pré-existentes . A teoria da inteligência de Jean Piaget (1896 1980) se baseia nesse conceito quando afirma que "o desenvolvimento cognitivo é um processo adaptativo de correção de esquema que As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 132 emprega assimilação e acomodação. Assimilamos novas informações, ajustando-as às estruturas cognitivas já existentes ". [117] O construtivismo é um assunto vasto em ciências e humanidades, mas o que importa para o nosso estudo é a suposição subjacente de que toda a nossa realidade social é a consequência de nossa experiência reunida em modelos cognitivos e comportamentais, nos quais as estruturas mentais pré-existentes são usadas para a interpretação da realidade atual. Localizaremos o objeto de nosso estudo, o imaginário cego, nesse fundamento teórico, como um modelo comportamental hipoteticamente relacionado a um construto social. Como existem incontáveis construções sociais, é bastante lógico procurar as mais universais e primais, levando em conta que assumimos, anteriormente, que o que estamos discutindo é um sistema de comportamento arcaico, começando e agindo através de emoções primitivas. Para estabelecer as correlações entre nosso modelo de comportamento e esse construto primal referencial, devemos usar as mesmas estruturas ontológicas e epistemológicas, como peças separadas do mesmo quebra-cabeças. Se todas essas partes se encaixam em uma imagem lógica, nosso raciocínio deve ser verdadeiro. As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 133 A estrutura de nosso raciocínio abriga as seguintes afirmações: O construto social mais universal e primordial que conhecemos é o inconsciente coletivo e, situando nosso modelo nesse construto, mostrará como ele interage e influencia o próprio construto. Para resumir nosso raciocínio, levaremos em conta a conceptualização freud-junguiana original e direta: o conteúdo do imaginário coletivo restringe-se a instintos e arquétipos. Os instintos são elementos naturais que não podem ser modificados e os arquétipos expressam todas as nossas emoções primordiais e conhecimento construído, independentemente de qualquer experiência individual no presente. No inconsciente humano coletivo, encontraremos emoções primárias incontáveis e suas próprias variações, o que poderia significar uma taxonomia sem fim a ser decifrada em nosso estudo. Por outro lado, é logicamente possível reunir todas essas emoções em poucos grupos principais, o que permite sua observação objetiva e comparação adequada com outras entidades. Tentando alcançar essa taxonomia atômica, assumimos que o inconsciente coletivo possui dois grupos principais de elementos primordiais: os medos e os desejos. Cada um As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 134 desses dois grupos ocupa camadas diferentes, que são diretamente interativas. O primeiro é o grupo dos medos, reunindo três emoções centrais e universais: o medo da morte, o medo das forças naturais e o medo do desconhecido. Intitulamos a camada ocupada por esse grupo, de a camada de percepção e das emoções. Essas três emoções universais e primais serão chamadas de "iniciantes" porque são o ponto de partida para o complexo processo dialético de formação do construto social inconsciente coletivo. O segundo é o grupo dos desejos, reunindo três integrantes centrais e universais, que são respostas aos elementos do grupo dos medos: o desejo de imortalidade, o desejo de dominação e o desejo de conhecimento. Nomeamos a camada ocupada por esse grupo, de a camada da razão, do imaginário e da criatividade. Todas os três integrantes deste grupo chamamos de "oponentes" porque são as reações ou respostas humanas racionais e cognitivas, diante da ameaça imposta pelos "iniciantes" e do intenso desconforto correspondente. Essas duas camadas são antagonistas interativas, correspondendo à tese e à antítese do processo dialético fenomenológico de formação do construto. As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 135 social imaginário coletivo. Chamamos a terceira e última camada da estrutura, de a camada da síntese da atividade comportamental humana. De cada confronto dialético entre os "iniciantes" e os "oponentes", uma síntese chegará na forma da atividade humana correspondente. As interações dinâmicas e contínuas de todas as atividades humanas resultantes do processo constituirão a estrutura da construção social humana mais básica e primária. Da mesma forma que fizemos com os iniciantes, podemos agregar essas sínteses em poucos grupos de grandes estruturas, o que permite sua observação objetiva e comparação adequada com outras entidades. São eles: o grupo de ciências e filosofia (ciências naturais e pensamento crítico), o grupo de ciências e política (tecnologia e humanidades) e o grupo de religião e mitos (teologia, cosmologia teológica e cultura místico-mágica). Damos a esse resultado sintético o nome da construção social triangular básica a partir do inconsciente coletivo. Uma vez que aqui a estrutura de nosso raciocínio é apresentada em sua forma mais sucinta e sua demonstração completa não se enquadra nos limites deste estudo, elaboramos uma explicação gráfica com o objetivo de expor da maneira mais abrangente possível os As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 136 fundamentos de nossas conclusões. C 2020 todos os direitos reservados Observando nossa representação gráfica, podemos alegar que: a) Em nossos processos cognitivos, emocionais e comportamentais, podemos nos referir a todos os elementos e recursos mantidos por nosso construto social básico. Todos esses elementos estão gravados e disponíveis em nosso inconsciente coletivo na forma de um As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 137 esquema: as estruturas mentais pré-existentes (Bartlett, 1932). b) Nos processos mencionados, o esquema pode ser preservado na íntegra pelo sujeito e determinar diretamente seu raciocínio e ação, como podemos ver na representação gráfica. c) Da mesma forma, o esquema pode ser adaptado pelo sujeito a novas informações ou status emocional e cognitivo existentes no presente. Isso significa uma correção do esquema, empregando assimilação e acomodação. "Assimilamos novas informações, ajustando-as às estruturas cognitivas existentes" (Piaget, op.cit.). A adaptação não modifica o esquema como uma estrutura mental préexistente, mas agrega elementos novos e compatíveis à sua estrutura no contexto de um processo mental individual. d) O esquema pode ser influenciado pelos processos cognitivos, emocionais e comportamentais do sujeito, não apenas para a assimilação e acomodação de novas experiências, como Piaget menciona em sua teoria da inteligência. A influência também pode, inconscientemente, rejeitar, negar ou neutralizar arbitrariamente alguns conteúdos do esquema, sob o comando de medos e desejos particulares. Nesse caso, ocorre uma distorção do oponente basicamente oferecida pelo inconsciente As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 138 coletivo, que não está relacionada a nenhum elemento racional e consistente. Como resultado dessa adulteração, o oponente, em sua respectiva camada, perde qualquer conteúdo cognitivo e racional vinculado à realidade. Os desejos de conhecimento são substituídos pelos elementos do imaginário do sujeito, afastando-o do desconforto de seu medo ou insatisfação. Nesse ato inconsciente de substituição ocorre a negação da ciência e da lógica, bem como a obstrução dos processos cognitivos efetivos, porque eles não podem acomodar o desejo do sujeito. A adulteração do oponente determina uma síntese falha do processo: o modelo comportamental do imaginário cego. e) Esse modelo é uma estrutura antissocial porque negligencia o esquema e nunca se tornará parte de um construto social, mesmo resultante de comportamentos coletivos. Além disso, o modelo é evidência de um contexto narcísico em que o sujeito deseja superar toda a experiência existente e todas as ferramentas racionais pertencentes à atividade humana. f) Observando a apresentação gráfica, podemos entender que o medo da mortalidade é o único dos três iniciantes que não podem evoluir do oponente para uma síntese cientificamente demonstrável. A síntese do confronto deste iniciador com seu oponente permanecerá sempre no contexto do As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 139 imaginário, e sua expressão na atividade humana será apenas a religião, os mitos e as culturas místico-mágicas. Para nossa demonstração gráfica, usamos a imagem do "Triângulo de Penrose" intencionalmente[118] por três razões: a) a estrutura de nosso raciocínio é tripartida, o que significa um triângulo ideal; b) o triângulo de Penrose é uma imagem tridimensional e, devido a esse recurso, pode representar visualmente a interação dialética das três camadas diferentes da construção melhor do que permitiria uma imagem simples; c) o triângulo de Penrose é física e matematicamente impossível (é apenas uma ilusão e não uma figura real), como nosso modelo do construto social básico. Nosso modelo pode ser real apenas na teoria porque, no mundo real, incontáveis distorções tornam impossível sua existência na forma pura de nosso estudo. As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 140 TITULO II ANÁLISE FACTUAL (Fatos que expressam nossos conceitos) As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 141 CAPÍTULO VI CONSTRUTOS PRIMAIS DO IMAGINÁRIO CEGO ANIMISMO E DIVINIZAÇÃO [119] Quando nossos ancestrais mais remotos, observando a si e ao universo em suas forças gigantescas a partir da base de seus instintos, conhecimentos e e consciência rudimentares, três medos muito dolorosas começaram a assombrar suas mentes e sentimentos: a superioridade da natureza, o desconhecido, e a morte. Quando se perguntaram pela primeira vez: "Quem somos e por que estamos aqui?" eles só podiam deduzir que eram uma partícula de um todo assustador, e que estavam aqui apenas para sobreviver, reproduzir-se e morrer. Incontáveis milênios depois, e no campo das pesquisas espaciais científicas avançadas, com As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 142 equipamentos sofisticados atingindo os limites do nosso sistema solar, essas questões permanecem intactas, assim como o medo e a dor que impõem. Os três medos primordiais estão entre os arquétipos que podemos estudar na psicologia arquetípica moderna iniciada por James Hillman[120] (1926 2011) e seus seguidores. As sombras deste triângulo original residem para sempre em nosso inconsciente coletivo. Para qualquer sensação de medo invadindo nossas mentes, reagimos imediatamente com um desejo cujo conteúdo é capaz de neutralizar, superar ou, pelo menos, controlar o desconforto indesejado. Essa reação instintiva é um dos mecanismos de defesa mais primordiais do ego, que podemos analisar no capítulo V com a ajuda de nosso modelo gráfico da construção social básica do inconsciente coletivo. O "desejo defensivo" é uma função automatizada e inconsciente do nosso imaginário, e pode variar de várias maneiras, em sendo fundamentalmente situacional. Certamente, o princípio do prazer é o objeto de nossa psique, mas os medos são os fatores que iniciam muitos de nossos desejos. De fato, nosso ancestral reagiu com uma estrutura complexa de desejos imaginariamente capazes de enfrentar essas realidades assustadoras. Esses desejos eram numerosos e correlacionados em um sistema imaginário, que exigia uma base ou plataforma abstrata para As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 143 sua estabilidade: nosso primeiro e metafísico quebra-cabeças. O que nossas mentes elaboraram para essa finalidade teleológica é o conceito abstrato e vasto de transcendência, tecendo um modelo de comportamento concreto. A transcendência, em filosofia e psicologia, pode ser semanticamente entendida como uma propriedade de se sobrepor, ultrapassar, ou super os limites da experiência empírica. Significa um estado de ser ou existir acima e além das fronteiras da realidade. O conceito abriga uma idéia nuclear de superioridade em relação ao que está sendo "transcendido": elevação acima da verdade, excelência, proeminência acima da realidade aparente. Essa superioridade imaginada pretende desviar os medos primordiais e desbloquear os mecanismos comandados pelo princípio do prazer. "É da essência da cultura imaginativa que ela transcende os limites do naturalmente possível e do moralmente aceitável ", escreveu Northrop Frye (1912 1991)[121] A base da transcendência é o contexto que origina todas as culturas e ações místico-mágicas conhecidas pela história humana, permanecendo até As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 144 as culturas modernas, de várias formas. Todas as nossas experiências, crenças, desejos, medos, linguagem, religião, artes e incontáveis elementos semióticos estão gravados em nosso inconsciente coletivo. É o nosso universo de símbolos, substituindo nossa experiência consciente e percepção da realidade, uma vez que é habitada exclusivamente pelas projeções do imaginário. Rejeitando os limites do naturalmente possível (Freye, op.cit.), Qualquer objeto ou entidade transcendental não está sujeito à demonstração nem a provas materiais ou coerência necessária. Objetos transcendentais são feitos exclusivamente de elementos imaginários, emoções, desejos, preconceitos e crenças, muitas vezes inconscientes, em um estado posicionado acima e além dos limites da experiência material. Em sua textura psicológica, a transcendência flutua entre sentimentos ambivalentes, evidenciando a inconsistência de seu conteúdo. Por um lado, um sentimento de dominação, de supremacia acima da realidade aparente, está sempre presente. Por outro lado, como processo mental, a transcendência é um ato de submissão ao que um indivíduo ou grupo inicialmente acredita que é inatingível. Esse cenário configura uma dissonância cognitiva, no significado dado por Festinger (1919 1989)[122] em sua As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 145 teoria. Percebe-se que essa dissonância é a razão pela qual a idéia de transcendência não tem o efeito psicossomático de eliminar a ansiedade causada pelo iniciador, somente limitando-a a um nível tolerável, no qual outros mecanismos de defesa podem funcionar. Para efeitos de análise factual, a base da transcendência é a construção primal essencial do imaginário cego, na medida em que é a condição conceitual para a existência de todas as outras estruturas imaginárias. Nelas, o nosso narcisismo não é limitado ou controlado pela realidade. Como disse Peter Tsé op.cit), o imaginário é o território do livre arbítrio. O animismo é a primeira subestrutura da transcendência e possui vastos conteúdos factuais e fenomenológicos. Na psicologia social, podemos entendê-lo como um conceito ontológico, bem como um modelo comportamental. A palavra "animismo" (do latim "animus" ou "anima" = alma) entrou no vocabulário da literatura moderna através das pesquisas de Sir Edward Burnett Tylor (1832 1917)[123] , que significa " A crença em numerosos seres sobrenaturais personalizados, dotados de razão, inteligência e / ou vontade, que habitam objetos e seres vivos e governam sua existência. Mais As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 146 simplesmente, é a crença de que 'tudo é consciente' ou que 'tudo tem uma alma'. "[124] Conceitualmente, o pensamento animista é sustentado pela crença da existência de algumas entidades conscientes transcendentais (como almas ou espíritos) abrigadas em tudo no mundo circundante, independentemente de serem formas vivas ou objetos inanimados, e expressas por suas forças naturais correspondentes. As relações entre os seres humanos e essas entidades vêm de seu envolvimento natural pelo universo compartilhado ao qual pertencem. A natureza teleológica do animismo é perceptível desde as primeiras pesquisas. James Frazer. (1854-1941)[125] notou que o animismo procurava obter ascendência sobre as forças espirituais através do uso da magia, de uma certa maneira que os espíritos poderiam ajudar na solução de muitos tipos de problemas, desejos e dificuldades da vida humana cotidiana. Em nossos termos, o animismo é uma das muitas expressões da ideia utilitária de transcendência movida pelo desejo de dominar as forças naturais. Um mecanismo de defesa que começou com o medo de elementos naturais e se tornou um produto do imaginário cego. Inicialmente, a consciência da identidade e singularidade das espécies não era tão As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 147 especializada e elaborada como é no presente. Wulf (2019)[126] argumenta que: Nos tempos antigos, pessoas, animais e o meio ambiente faziam parte da natureza viva, a Physis. Eles eram geralmente percebidos como semelhantes um ao outro. Eles eram estimulados pelo poder, pela dinâmica da natureza, pela Physis Nesta afirmação, podemos detectar a natureza mimética do animismo, resultando na indistinção entre espécies, elementos e acidentes naturais na elaboração das expressões imaginárias de transcendência e atribuição de poder e habilidades. A aparência polimórfica dos objetos animistas não era apenas a extrapolação da realidade, mas a miscigenação de seus componentes como percebida pelo homem primitivo. Na história natural, os fenômenos miméticos representam mecanismos defensivos, como podemos ver em muitos animais e plantas. De certa forma, provavelmente esses mecanismos biológicos ainda estão gravados em nosso genoma. As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 148 Essas criações do imaginário nunca foram sistematicamente organizadas por religiões ou doutrinas formais, como o texto editado por Matthew A. McIntosh[127] ressalta Embora o termo "animismo" se refira a uma ampla gama de crenças espirituais (muitas das quais ainda existem nas culturas humanas hoje em dia), ele não denota nenhum credo ou doutrina religiosa específica. A característica mais comum das religiões animistas é sua atenção aos detalhes, como evidenciado pelo número e variedade de espíritos que eles reconhecem. Isso pode ser fortemente contrastado com o universalismo abrangente das tradições monoteístas, panteístas e panenteístas. Além disso, a espiritualidade animista está mais focada em atender às exigências práticas (como necessidades de saúde, nutrição e segurança) do que em resolver dilemas metafísicos abstratos. O animismo reconhece que o universo está vivo com os espíritos e que os humanos estão inter-relacionados com eles. As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 149 Essas criações imaginárias sobreviveram desde suas origens primitivas até os dias atuais, em muitas formas e instâncias, gravadas em estruturas religiosas, culturais, políticas, linguísticas e comportamentais com o mesmo significado original de uma resposta defensiva aos mesmos medos e desejos insatisfeitos. Com certeza, é bastante incomum falar sobre culturas estruturadas animistas modernas, porque outras formas de organização social as substituíram. No entanto, por outro lado, não podemos encontrar nenhuma religião ocidental ou oriental moderna, nenhuma cultura, idioma ou organização social que não contenha a herança do animismo e seus mitos transcendentais originais, que no presente correspondem à ideia de " sagrado". Paolo Bellini (2018)[128] comentou o trabalho de Gérard Bouchard, "The Mythification Process" (2017), onde esses elementos são visíveis com o significado que mencionamos: Para Bouchard, o sagrado é essencialmente sinônimo de inquestionável, intocável, intangível, inviolável e transcendente, de modo que é justaposto ao profano, As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 150 tanto no sentido de se referir a uma rdem divina sobrenatural que poderia ser imanente quanto no sentido de identificar um mera dimensão transcendente genérica que pode ser incorporada em uma ideologia, numa convicção filosófica ou em algo que ultrapasse os limites da experiência possível, num sentido kantiano. Por esse motivo, todas as religiões e culturas tradicionais existentes carregam a imagem imaginária das coisas sagradas como mecanismos defensivos para expressar e preservar suas crenças, convicções ou ideologias. Assim, nos tempos modernos, temos lugares, pessoas vivas e mortas, textos, palavras, objetos, gestos, danças, rituais, animais, sons, formas geométricas, símbolos e até alimentos que simbolizam entidades sagradas ou transcendentais ou, pelo menos, significam sua expressão materializada. As fronteiras entre a realidade e a transcendência imaginária nunca mudaram. Antropologia, filosofia e psicologia ontológica já consideraram animismo como os conceitos centrais que discutimos. Esses conceitos prevalecem em um modelo dualista de mentecorpo, ou matéria e alma (anima), quando consideramos uma relação direta entre realidade e imaginário. As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 151 Além desse âmbito, e com base nas descobertas mais recentes da física, Nick Herbert (2002) [129] propôs a ideia de "animismo quântico", uma vez que, em sua opinião, a consciência é parte integrante do mundo físico, permeado pela mente em todos os seus níveis. O físico argumenta que: Muitos povos primitivos organizaram suas vidas em torno de uma doutrina que chamamos de "animismo", a crença de que todo objeto possui um "interior" sensível como o nosso. O pressuposto da consciência quântica, que equivale a um tipo de "animismo quântico", também afirma que a consciência é parte integrante do mundo físico, não uma propriedade emergente de sistemas biológicos ou computacionais especiais. Como tudo no mundo é, em algum nível, um sistema quântico, essa suposição exige que tudo esteja consciente nesse nível. Se o mundo é realmente dotado de animismo quântico, há uma imensa experiência interior invisível acontecendo ao nosso redor que atualmente é inacessível aos seres humanos, porque nossas próprias vidas interiores estão As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 152 aprisionadas dentro de um pequeno sistema quântico, isolado profundamente no tecido de um cérebro animal. Talvez não precisemos viajar para o espaço sideral para habitar mundos inteiramente novos. Novos mundos experimentais de riqueza e variedade inconcebíveis podem já estar presentes "na ponta dos dedos" mundos compostos de mentes estranhamente inteligentes que silenciosamente cercam e interpenetram nossos próprios modos de compreensão. Werner Krieglstein (2002)[130] explica que o animismo quântico proposto por Herbert difere fundamentalmente de todos os conceitos ontológicos e modelos comportamentais sustentados por nossas tradições. Já entendemos que o animismo propunha que algum tipo de espírito imaginário habita um corpo ou objeto, que eu expresso o espírito por esse dualismo. Por sua vez, o animismo quântico deriva do fato de que todo sistema natural tem uma vida interior, um centro consciente, do qual dirige e observa sua ação. De fato, devemos levar em conta esses argumentos em nossa análise. No entanto, para os propósitos deste estudo, devemos considerar que, apesar de Herbert usar o termo "animismo", As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 153 como fazemos, estamos falando de idéias muito diferentes . Nossa discussão se baseia em conceitos de realismo comum e emprega as suposições lógicas correspondentes. Se transferirmos esses conceitos para o reino da realidade quântica, como Heisenberg propôs, eles se tornarão sem sentido. Do mesmo modo, se tentarmos inserir um significado quântico de animismo sob uma formulação realista comum, não encontraremos nenhum tipo de realidade. Talvez essas diferentes abordagens possam ser de algum modo ajustadas adiante, considerando que ambas, em princípio, rejeitam o imaginário cego ou a dissonância cognitiva como portadoras da realidade. A divinização é outro contexto factual que expressa os conceitos que discutimos nos capítulos da Parte I. As raízes da divinização são primais e podemos encontrar expressões incontáveis do fenômeno em restos arqueológicos do neolítico. Na filosofia antiga, a ideia de divinização (ou theosis) é repetidamente referida na tradição platônica, e a partir do século III dC foi adotada pela tradição cristã, com a Doutrina da Divinização de Santo Atanásio, resultante do silogismo: "Porque o Filho de Deus se tornou homem, para que nos tornássemos Deus" (Santo Atanásio, De inc ., 54, 3: PG 25, 192B). Tal silogismo não pode ser tomado como uma As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 154 estrutura lógica, uma vez que sua premissa é apenas uma suposição imaginária. Como uma idéia religiosa, a divinização se espalhou por muitas culturas e tradições ocidentais e orientais, permanecendo até o presente como uma crença fundamental ou um dogma em algumas religiões. De sua vestimenta mística, que não discutiremos neste trabalho, a divinização é um fenômeno social estudado cientificamente pela história, psicologia social e psicanálise, sendo esse o nosso foco. Na loucura de nosso imaginário cego, criar deuses não é o suficiente. Criamos deuses para nos tornarmos iguais a eles ou a algum deles. O significado inerente da divinização é precisamente isso. A divinização é um mito persistente resultante de uma expressão suprema do narcisismo patológico da grandiosidade. Abriga o desejo obsessivo de poder e dominação, estabelecendo o ponto de encontro histórico do absurdo político com a religiosidade delirante. Na história da humanidade, ambos andaram lado a lado, desde as primeiras civilizações. A ideologia e a força física do armamento sustentam a forma política de divinização; dogmas, mitos e crenças são as armas na forma religiosa. Ambos são mecanismos de controle e dominação, As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 155 geralmente existentes em associação. Podemos encontrar exemplos inumeráveis dessa associação teleológica, mas uma única frase expressara uma das mais recentes e insanas dessas conjunções: "Nosso Führer é o intermediário entre seu povo e o trono de Deus. Tudo o que o Führer profere é religião no sentido mais elevado" Paul Joseph Goebbels, ministrochefe de Hitler de 14 de março de 1933 a 30 de abril de 1945 , e chanceler do Terceiro Reich nos seus últimos dias)[131] . Em 1 de maio de 1945, o autor desta frase e sua esposa Magda cometeram suicídio, não sem antes matar seus seis filhos, com idades entre 4 e 12 anos. Neste estudo, não estamos discutindo a insanidade de um grupo de pessoas. Este é apenas um exemplo. Estamos nos referindo à loucura da humanidade, alimentada por indivíduos e pelo imaginário coletivo cego. Quando tentamos entender como um cenário impensável a exemplo do pesadelo nazista pode acontecer, geralmente seguimos o caminho de nossos preconceitos e observações superficiais, percebendo-os como algo relacionado a uma situação histórica específica, características culturais e raciais de determinada raça ou povo, ou a loucura dos governantes. O resultado falho leva a adquirimos a crença de que o nazismo e a divinização do horror são coisas episódicas pertencentes a uma realidade As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 156 externa, muito diferente e distante da nossa. Os experimentos psicossociais contemporâneos oferecem informações relevantes que conduzem a uma compreensão mais profunda do fenômeno. Um dos principais elementos da tragédia nazista foi a obediência coletiva a comandos absurdos, que tornaram possível a prática de um dos genocídios mais horrendos da história. Não apenas soldados e oficiais alemães, mas também as pessoas reunidas na multidão manifestaram uma aceitação incondicional da divinização de Hitler, bem como uma obediência cega a todos os seus mandamentos, independentemente de sua sanidade ou moralidade. Quando assistimos às imagens disponíveis desse período, todos os personagens parecem hipnotizados e submersos em um transe fanático de contemplação de seu deus falso. Um psicólogo social notável da Universidade de Yale, chamado Stanley Milgram, filho de imigrantes judeus sobreviventes do holocausto, durante muitos anos procurou responder a essas perguntas. Ele pesquisou o comportamento dos oficiais alemães acusados de genocídio pelos Tribunal Criminal de Guerra de Nuremberg e percebeu que eles eram unânimes em sustentar suas defesas no argumento de que estavam apenas seguindo ordens de seus superiores o que eles declararam ser seu dever. As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 157 Mantendo essas evidências, Milgram queria investigar se os alemães eram particularmente obedientes às figuras de autoridade, pois essa era uma explicação comum dada ao tribunal. O interesse do psicólogo era pesquisar até que ponto as pessoas comuns obedeciam ordens que envolvem dano e dor a outra pessoa, e quão facilmente elas poderiam aceitar cometer atrocidades sem sentido. Então, durante os anos 60, o psicólogo conduziu um experimento focado no conflito entre obediência à autoridade e consciência pessoal, a fim de entender o tipo de obediência prevalecente durante o período hitlerista. Milgram procurou candidatos masculinos para participar de um estudo de aprendizagem na Universidade de Yale. Eles eram 40 homens, com idades entre 20 e 50 anos, cujos empregos variavam de não qualificados a profissionais, da área de New Haven. Os participantes estavam envolvidos em um contexto experimental em que acreditavam estar atuando como professores de um suposto aluno, que deveria ser punido com choques elétricos toda vez que desse respostas erradas às perguntas formuladas pelo participante. Eles foram induzidos a acreditar que o experimento estava relacionado à importância da punição nos sistemas de aprendizagem. As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 158 Cada vez que o "aluno" cometia um erro, o "professor" deveria aplicar um choque elétrico progressivo de 15 a 450 volts que ele acreditava ser real, e podia observar o sofrimento crescente do "aluno" e os gritos das vítimas. No caso de recusa do participante em administrar um choque, o pesquisador dava uma série de ordens para garantir que continuassem. Havia quatro comandos, e se um fosse desobedecido, o pesquisador anunciava o seguinte: 1 Continue, 2: O experimento exige que você continue, 3: É absolutamente essencial que você continue, 4: Você não tem outra escolha, a não ser continuar. O resultado foi o seguinte: todos os participantes aplicaram a punição de até 300 volts, sem a interferência do pesquisador, e independentemente dos grityos das vítimas. 65% continuaram a punição ao nível mais alto de 450 volts, estimulado pelos comandos do experimentador. Saul McLeod resumiu as conclusões decorrentes do experimento[132] : É provável que as pessoas comuns sigam as ordens dadas por uma figura de autoridade, até o ponto de matar um ser humano inocente. A obediência à autoridade está arraigada em As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 159 todos nós, desde a maneira como somos criados. As pessoas tendem a obedecer ordens de outras pessoas se reconhecerem sua autoridade como moralmente correta e / ou legalmente fundamentada. Essa resposta à autoridade legítima é aprendida em várias situações, por exemplo, na família, na escola, e local de trabalho. Milgram resumiu no artigo "Os Perigos da Obediência" (Milgram 1974), escrevendo: Os aspectos legais e filosóficos da obediência são de enorme importância, mas dizem muito pouco sobre como a maioria das pessoas se comporta em situações concretas. Montei um experimento simples na Universidade de Yale para testar quanta dor um cidadão comum infligiria a outra pessoa simplesmente porque recebeu ordens de um cientista experimental. A autoridade dominante foi lançada contra os mais fortes imperativos morais dos participantes contra ferir As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 160 os outros e, mesmo os participantes ouvindo os gritos das vítimas, a autoridade venceu com mais frequência. A extrema disposição dos adultos de agir sem limites sob o comando de uma autoridade constitui a principal descoberta do estudo e o fato mais urgente a exigir uma explicação. Apesar de muitas discussões surgidas das conclusões de Milgram, devemos nos concentrar na suposição demonstrada experimentalmente de que a grave loucura do comportamento coletivo, como a divinização da estupidez e a obediência a comandos absurdos, não é uma doença episódica alemã. De fato, significa uma fraqueza da humanidade, em qualquer lugar e tempo, resultando na ruptura da consciência pela ação do imaginário cego ao atribuir divindade, superioridade e dominação a pessoas, grupos e objetos. Outros experimentos e teorias sociopsicológicas significativas confirmaram essa conclusão, como o fenômeno da de-individualização, conforme explicado por Tom Postmes e Felicity M.Turner.[133] , bem como muitas outras pesquisas sobre "formas extremas de violência em massa e sofrimento humano mostraram como pessoas comuns e razoáveis As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 161 anteriormente podiam cometer atos atrozes de crueldade e violência. A questão de como essa transição ocorre foi documentada por um número significativo de teóricos. "[134] . Além de Milgram e outros experimentos, a história contemporânea nos mostrou que não tivemos um único holocausto recente. Nossa história coleciona horrores como o Khmer Vermelho, o Genocídio Albanês, Kosovo e Sarajevo, as guerras tribais e religiosas na África e, anteriormente, o massacre covarde da população nativa na colonização norte e sulamericanas. O que Milgram e estudos subsequentes mostraram dramaticamente é que não precisamos usar um uniforme nazista com uma cruz de ferro no peito para nos tornarmos monstros. A monstruosidade precisa que nosso narcisismo exista, e ninguém está livre desse anátema principalmente se divinizar banalidades e aberrações. Além desses mecanismos político-religiosos universais, podemos encontrar o narcisismo divinizado em qualquer lugar, a qualquer momento e contexto situacional de nossa vida cotidiana sob configurações individuais ou coletivas. O desejo obsessivo e inconsciente de semelhança com a divindade imaginária dita os códigos semióticos de referência para todos os seres humanos. Qualquer um As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 162 que se afaste da mediocridade e alcance performances pessoais, entendidas como inatingíveis pelo senso comum, é simbolicamente divinizado pelo imaginário coletivo, em uma espécie de "viés da divindade". Não precisamos procurá-los nos livros de história. Podemos encontrá-los na porta ao lado. Pessoas muito bonitas, atletas, bil ionários, lutadores, estrelas de cinema e TV, personagens de jet-set, políticos e "heróis" de qualquer natureza são retirados de suas condições humanas e conduzidos a seus tronos divinos com as graças e rituais da fama e a oferta de bem-estar milhares de vezes maior do que um homem comum poderia alcançar. Toda divindade deve receber ofertas, e a contrapartida é a determinação de que nunca mais serão seres humanos: elas são condenadas a serem lindas, ricas, poderosas e dominantes para sempre. Eles não serão mais aceitos como humanos e, por esse motivo, devem construir um alter ego correspondente à sua divindade e viver sob seu domínio. Precisamos deles para construir as imagens espelhadas de nosso narcisismo, para evitar a tragédia de enfrentar nossa insignificância ontológica. Sem nossos mitos a serem desejados, somos apenas nós mesmos, o que significa uma tarefa muito indesejável. As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 163 Podemos mudar nossos mitos muito rapidamente, mas não podemos viver sem eles. Pela mesma razão, sob muitos ângulos, as pessoas divinizadas não são as dominantes, porque são refletidas como escravos do nosso narcisismo. Mudar nossos mitos é algo impulsionado pelas mesmas necessidades e sentimentos, e significa um processo de diversificação de nossas emoções. Criamos o politeísmo em nossa antiga organização social inspirados por essa necessidade de diversificação de expressão, para que pudéssemos inventar uma divindade para cada necessidade essencial que pudéssemos ter. Portanto, o advento subsequente do monoteísmo não teve nenhuma mudança conceitual ou estrutural, mas apenas um processo hegemônico para reforçar e garantir consistência e dominação religiosa através da unificação de várias crenças. Durante o século IV aC, a dominação territorial de Alexandre, o Grande, introduziu notável miscigenação cultural e fusão de culturas, favorável a uma tendência ao sincretismo religioso. Com o desenvolvimento e a influência das tradições judaico-cristãs nas culturas da civilização ocidental, esse sincretismo finalmente As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 164 se converteu em monoteísmo. No entanto, as sementes de nossas estruturas imaginárias primitivas, relacionadas ao animismo e politeísmo, sobreviveram em nosso inconsciente coletivo e, na atual civilização tecnológica, nosso imaginário expressa conscientemente as mesmas necessidades e sentimentos por meio de "super-heróis" e outros personagens da literatura de ficção científica. A diferença significativa com nossa herança politeísta primal é o fato de que agora esse é um produto consciente de nosso imaginário criativo, e não mais uma crença cega profunda na divindade. Sabemos que nossos heróis ou deuses polimórficos não são reais: eles não existem. No entanto, apesar de sua irrealidade, nossas mentes precisam deles para expressar nossos medos e desejos, nossa esperança e desespero, sem a submissão a qualquer tipo de crença. Nesta camada de fantasia madura (empregando a expressão de Anna Freud), não queremos acreditar na realidade de nossos heróis; nós apenas queremos expressar através deles que temos um desejo definitivo de manter nossa esperança de que nossos limites não sejam aqueles que conhecemos. Este é um sentimento evolutivo gravado em nosso genoma. A divindade não precisa ser uma realidade, ou talvez, em nossas mentes, não deva ser; pode ser apenas uma representação projetiva de nossas As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 165 fantasias, que só é possível sob a criação consciente de nosso imaginário. Sem essa consciência da realidade, divinização não pode significar nenhuma expressão simbólica da racionalidade; torna-se apenas uma forma de loucura: a deificação da banalidade. A IMORTALIDADE [135] No pensamento junguiano, a imortalidade não é realmente para ser discutida. Em um comentário sobre "O Segredo da Flor Dourada", ele escreveu: Como médico, faço todos os esforços para fortalecer a crença na imortalidade, especialmente em pacientes mais velhos, quando essas questões se aproximam As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 166 ameaçadoramente. Pois, vista na perspectiva psicológica correta, a morte não é um fim, mas um objetivo e a inclinação da vida para a morte começam assim que o apogeu da vida é ultrapassado.[136] Podemos entender melhor esse argumento pragmático, como expresso pelo jovem filósofo francês Blaise Pascal (1623 1662)[137] A crença no Deus do cristianismo e , consequentemente, na imortalidade da alma é justificada em termos práticos pelo fato de que quem acredita tem tudo a ganhar se estiver certo e nada a perder se estiver errado, enquanto que alguém que não acredita tem tudo a perder se ele estiver errado e nada a ganhar se ele estiver certo. Esses entendimentos pragmáticos sobre mortalidade resultam da percepção de que o medo da morte foi sempre tomado como algo insuportável. Para Santo Agostinho, o medo da morte torna impossível uma vida feliz. O significado de uma vida autêntica inclui eternidade e felicidade. Por isso, devemos enfrentar o medo da morte para permitir alcançar a felicidade. No entanto, como As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 167 podemos enfrentá-lo? Pascal sugere a solução mais direta: basta adotar uma crença religiosa dogmática na imortalidade, até porque é inofensiva: o crente não tem nada a perder e muito a ganhar. Uma vez ausente a crença religiosa na imortalidade, a negação passa a ser a maneira mais comum de tratar o medo da morte. Nas palavras de Pascal: "Para ser feliz, ele teria que se tornar imortal, mas não sendo capaz de fazê-lo, ocorreu-lhe impedir-se de pensar na morte".[138] . A abordagem pragmática de Jung também significa uma negação implícita. Além da simples negação, podemos encontrar outras formas de confronto com o medo da morte. Na filosofia antiga, o estoicismo, epicurismo e ceticismo tratavam esse medo como algo irracional; as propriedades terapêuticas da filosofia poderiam neutralizá-lo. O fundamento desta proposta foi a afirmação de que o medo da morte resulta de falsas crenças que poderiam ser removidas pelo pensamento racional. Lucrécio (99 aC 56 aC), um antecessor de Sêneca, sustentou que, se não tivermos nenhum medo de nosso passado, referindo-se a qualquer momento antes de nosso nascimento, o medo da ausência de uma vida futura após a morte se torna absurdo porque ambos são a mesma coisa. Esse raciocínio ficou conhecido como o "argumento da simetria", que podemos encontrar na filosofia moderna através das obras de Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860) e David Hume ( 1711-1776) . As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 168 O que deduzimos de nosso curto passeio às tradições filosóficas ocidentais é o fato de que a morte e a imortalidade sempre foram abordadas por crenças irracionais, comportamentos pragmáticos ou processos mentais que se imaginava serem eficientes no controle de efeitos psicológicos, como medo, infelicidade e ansiedade. "Não discuta", "Apenas esqueça", "Não é da sua conta", "Acredite fortemente no contrário", "Negue". No entanto, a filosofia contemporânea e principalmente a psicologia moderna, não podem ser cegas ou simplesmente "terapêuticas" diante de uma das as questões ontológicas humanas mais relevantes: "Somos imortais? "Vamos viver outra vida após a morte? A resposta é não. Não vamos. Nós somos mortais, definitivamente mortais. Essa é a nossa natureza, nossa beleza, nosso significado e nossa tragédia. Podemos iniciar incontáveis pesquisas e estudos mais amplos, empregando todo o conhecimento humano agregado, todos os milênios de aprendizado científico e filosófico, e não encontraremos nenhum raciocínio, por mais simplório que seja, capaz de apoiar qualquer suposição afirmativa relacionada à nossa tão desejada imortalidade. Podemos nos apegar desesperadamente a muitas fantasias, mitos e crenças; podemos adotar muitas ferramentas e meios terapêuticos, As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 169 podemos avançar com interferências cirúrgicas em nossos cérebros para esquecer o que sabemos ou introduzir o que queremos, mas nossa mortalidade será a mesma para todos. Quanto mais pesquisarmos, mais saberemos que nem o próprio universo a que pertencemos é eterno, ainda mais a nossa suposta alma. De uma vez por todas, não podemos suportar a ideia da morte. Até o suicida, de uma maneira ou de outra, está preso a uma imagem de perpetuação e imortalidade em sua expressão tanatológica do narcisismo. [ Os seres humanos são a única espécie da Terra dotada de plena consciência de sua natureza, transportando projeções imaginárias e assustadoras. De sua própria morte, em permanente conflito com a força dos instintos de sobrevivência. Sendo racionais em sua consciência, os humanos tornam-se irracionais diante do pavor imposto pela ideia da morte. Este conflito final não pode ser resolvido, em sendo o paradoxo trágico da existência. Não há resposta racional para a morte; sempre a enfrentaremos com as mais intensas emoções e fantasias. Quando abrimos os olhos para a morte, fechamos os caminhos para o pensamento crítico e, mesmo que elaboremos as suposições ou crenças lógicas mais convenientes, nossas emoções permanecerão as mesmas, sempre. As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 170 A morte é a única realidade humana definitiva e inaceitável e, quando pensamos nela, instantaneamente todos os nossos recursos cognitivos e psicológicos, os mecanismos de defesa do eu e o poder do nosso imaginário são convocados, como um exército aturdido em desespero, encarando um inimigo que não pode ser derrotado. Nesse estado, confrontando o nada de nossos egos, inventamos almas eternas, deuses, anjos e demônios, recompensas e punições, infernos e céus apenas para nós, seres humanos, e não para qualquer outra forma de vida. Em nossas mentes e emoções, somos o centro do universo. Assim, tudo pode morrer, exceto nós, seres imortais como os deuses que criamos apenas para nos tornar imortais essa é a nossa fantasia dogmática e insana comentada por Edward Chandler:[140] É bastante narcisista ver a humanidade, entre todas as formas de vida, como a espécie estimação de Deus, tão especiais que nosso universo imediato, bem como uma bem-aventurada vida após a morte, foram criados por Deus, apenas para nosso benefício. Isso é antropocentrismo ao cubo. Portanto, entendemos que a ideia sobre a As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 171 imortalidade do indivíduo humano é desprovida de qualquer racionalidade. Embora às vezes apresentadas sob a aparência de teorias lógicas, raciocínios estruturados e configurações pseudocientíficas, nossas fantasias de imortalidade não resistem ao mais simples confronto com o pensamento crítico elementar. Criamos e defendemos insistentemente teologias e teorias na tentativa desesperada de acreditar que o que sabemos que sabemos sobre nossa finitude é falso. Por esse motivo, todas essas construções são inerentemente dogmáticas: elas não podem ser discutidas criticamente; caso contrário, eles não existiriam. As sombras do medo primal devoram nossas habilidades racionais. A morte é a nossa última doença. A crença ou fé na vida após a morte é cosmologicamente absurda, cientificamente impossível, biologicamente grotesca e logicamente incongruente. Mesmo assim, lutamos para conservá-la, abandonando tudo o que sabemos sobre realidade e verdade. Vestidas de irracionalidade intratável, nossas fantasias de imortalidade nada mais são do que um delírio: a expressão suprema de nosso narcisismo. Com isso, deixamos de perceber que a beleza da vida não é uma imagem demente da imortalidade. A beleza da vida reside em ser As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 172 precisamente como é para tudo o que vive no Cosmo, em suas mudanças e movimentos intermináveis e evolutivos, onde absolutamente nada é para sempre. A racionalidade humana atinge a sua magnitude com a formulação da harmonia ontológica de nós mesmos com essa imensidão, e a sua maior pequenez quando, esmagada pelo medo, abandona a verdade em busca do delírio. Nos estados atuais da ciência e da cultura, é possível trocar as costelas de Adão pelo entendimento quântico da cosmologia científica, a árvore a proibida do conhecimento do bem e do mal por universidades modernas acessíveis e o narcisismo pela a pura contemplação. Jack Sherefkin e Stephen Schwarzman (op.cit) comentam o seguinte: Para o bioeticista Leon Kass, existem virtudes importantes que surgem de nossa mortalidade. "A vida poderia ser séria ou significativa sem os limites da mortalidade? Não é o limite do nosso tempo o motivo de levarmos a vida a sério e vivermos apaixonadamente?" E se o que é mais importante para nós for inseparável de nossa mortalidade e finitude? Se fôssemos imortais, como poderíamos ser corajosos ou As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 173 nobres ou qualquer uma das virtudes que exigem risco e ameaça de morte? Os deuses homéricos, eternamente jovens e bonitos, vivem vidas rasas e frívolas. Permanecemos com a consistência dos conceitos discutidos nos Capítulos da Parte I, e com eles entendemos que talvez nos seja possível aprendermos a viver a partir de quando aprendermos a morrer. Ligados à realidade e à verdade, podemos encontrar isso refletido na sabedoria milenar de um rubai: "Uma parada breve, um trago apenas, Do manancial da vida que não cessa. Logo a caravana retornará ao nada: Anda depressa! " ! ( Ghiyath al-Din Abu'l-Fath Umar ibn Ibrahim Al-Nishapuri alKhayyami 1048 -1131 Quatrain XXXVII) As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 174 OS DEUSES ANTROPOMÓRFICOS [141] Se, por um lado, em nossa busca de fatos que expressam os conceitos adotados neste estudo, não conseguimos encontrar divindade nos seres humanos, por outro, encontramos muitas humanidades nos deuses. Existem muitas semelhanças entre divinização e antropomorfismo, e muitas das suposições que adotamos antes podem persistir intocadas. Em uma parte significativa, isso é verdade. No entanto, há uma diferença determinante entre esses dois fenômenos: divinização significa atribuir divindade aos seres humanos e antropomorfismo significa atribuir humanidade ao divino. São dois processos similares muito As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 175 próximos, indo em direções opostas. O fenômeno é ancestral, atribuindo qualidades humanos à ideia do divino, e muitas vezes incluindo formas humanas, estados mentais e emocionais, bem como interesses e princípios morais emergentes da experiência e necessidades sociais. A partir dos rituais e religiões mais antigos, o antropomorfismo se espalhou por todas as religiões e expressões culturais místico-mágicas, em qualquer período histórico, de duas maneiras: como uma crença literal da natureza e forma do divino, ou como uma ferramenta didática para facilitar o ensino religioso das "explicações sobre a natureza de Deus". Como crença literal, o antropomorfismo religioso é a semente de toda superstição, cultura e crenças místico-mágicas, mantidas sob o misticismo irracional, desprezando qualquer tipo de confronto com a realidade e o pensamento crítico. É o reino do dogmatismo e do sectarismo. Quando visto como uma ferramenta didática para facilitar o aprendizado religioso, o antropomorfismo se torna um discurso fictício ou uma retórica metódica de persuasão. Muitos teólogos contemporâneos apoiam essa prática sob o argumento absurdo de que O antropomorfismo não pode ser eliminado sem eliminar a própria religião por causa de objetos de devoção religiosa que devem ter As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 176 características com as quais os seres humanos possam se relacionar. Por exemplo, a linguagem, amplamente considerada uma característica humana, também deve estar presente nas divindades para que os humanos orem a elas (Guthrie, Stewart E) [142] O argumento pedagógico religioso pode ser substituído pelo seguinte: "Sem contar mentiras, não podemos explicar o que dizemos ser verdade". Em outros termos: "Os humanos são tão estúpidos que, para lhes falar sobre o divino, precisamos conversar metaforicamente, como conversamos com idiotas". A moderna falácia "didático-teológica" em torno de imagens humanizadas do divino nunca poderia ser razoavelmente sustentada. Desde a filosofia antiga, Xenófanes (560-478 aC), o criador da Escola Eleática, já rejeitou as ideias antropomórficas, confrontando as suposições de Platão. Uma vez ele disse: "Se os animais pudessem pintar, eles representariam seus deuses na forma de animais, isto é, como sua própria imagem". Nas tradições teológicas judaico-cristãs e islâmicas, por muitos séculos, a ideia da simplicidade do divino prevaleceu entre muitos As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 177 pensadores proeminentes. Esse argumento é conhecido como Doutrina da Divina Simplicidade (DDS), como explicado por William F. Vallicella:[143] De acordo com o teísmo clássico de Agostinho, Anselmo, Tomás de Aquino e seus adeptos, Deus é radicalmente diferente das criaturas e não pode ser adequadamente entendido da maneira apropriada a elas. Deus é simples, pois Deus transcende toda forma de complexidade e composição familiar ao intelecto discursivo. Uma consequência é que o Deus simples carece de algumas partes. Essa falta não é uma deficiência, mas uma característica positiva. Deus é ontologicamente superior a toda entidade partidária, e a ausência de algumas partículas é um indicador da sua substância [...} Deve ser entendido como uma afirmação da transcendência absoluta de Deus às criaturas. Deus não é apenas radicalmente nãoantropomórfico, mas radicalmente diferente das criaturas em geral, não apenas em relação às propriedades que ele possui, mas As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 178 também em sua maneira de possuílas. Uma discussão teológica não se enquadra neste estudo, porque estamos analisando o imaginário coletivo humano como sujeito sócio epistemológico da psicologia, sob metodologia empírica. No entanto, na medida em que as crenças religiosas se tornam influentes nos processos cognitivos e nos modelos comportamentais, não estamos mais falando sobre religião ou teologia, mas sobre realidade demonstrável. Os deuses antropomórficos, no entanto, sobreviveram até os dias atuais, e muitas vezes mantêm formas humanas corporais ou até adquirem um corpo totalmente humano. Nos tempos modernos, Francis Bacon ( 15611626) sustentou que essa é uma tendência persistente que colabora com a distorção de nossa percepção do mundo. O desenvolvimento do processo histórico atesta que o escritor estava certo. Como sendo uma projeção do nosso imaginário coletivo, a divindade antropomórfica existe exclusivamente por causa dos seres humanos. Nessa concepção, a humanidade é a razão ontológica da existência do divino. O conteúdo conceitual da divindade As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 179 antropomórfica não é cosmológico, nem ontológico. A divindade é algo utilitário ou pragmático. No senso comum, os deuses existem para cuidar dos humanos, dando-lhes vida (que deve ser eterna), escrevendo seus destinos (que devem corresponder aos desejos de cada um). Eles devem preencher nossas ambições, suavizar nossos medos e sofrimentos, proporcionando milagres quando a realidade insiste em ser adversa e escrever ou ditar revelações e textos normativos para regular o comportamento do ser humano, mesmo que para fins econômicos ou políticos cotidianos. Nosso Deus pragmático pode ser intensamente prosaico. Os deuses devem aceitar qualquer imperfeição humana, perdoando nossa estupidez, crueldade e má fé, divinizando-nos a cada dia. Para todos os seres humanos, um paraíso deve ser prometido, garantido e pago antecipadamente por total submissão e obediência: as moedas da fantasia divina. Quando os deuses agem assim, os humanos declaram confiar neles e constroem templos, ou inserem seus nomes nas notas de dinheiro e outros símbolos políticos. Os deuses, no entanto, devem ser dominantes como os governantes humanos, sendo cegamente obedecidos pela multidão de não privilegiados. Os deuses devem manter um sistema contábil preciso, relacionado a qualquer As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 180 ato ou intenção humana, por toda a eternidade, para julgá-los com rigor pela menor desobediência e, quando for o caso, condenalos a um inferno que não poderia ser imaginado sequer por Adolf Hitler, por causa de suas vidas miseráveis. Os deuses devem ser capazes de odiar, jogar jogos trapaceados, mentir, ameaçar e manipular, encobrir a verdade e a inteligência, discriminar e aceitar a miséria, promover a vingança e também abençoar o poder político e os promotores da guerra, para cumprir com as responsabilidades que lhes são dadas pelos seres humanos Na mente dos seus crentes, da mesma maneira que os deuses antropomórficos são o alívio imaginado pelos homens, eles são também os carrascos de seu próprio horror. Sob essas crenças conflitantes, se os humanos não existissem, os deuses não seriam necessários e o universo continuaria sem eles. Por todas essas razões, frequentemente ouvimos pessoas dizendo que os deuses são entidades neuróticas, quando, de fato, esses deuses antropomórficos não existem. O que existe é a divinização da nossa loucura; os deuses antropomórficos são uma construção do imaginário coletiva cego e narcísico. Ao se procurar qualquer abordagem do divino, deve-se deixar rigorosamente de lada qualquer coisa relacionada à humanidade, bem como qualquer tipo de entendimento ou As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 181 representação de nossa realidade. Nossa ciência, nossa epistemologia e filosofia são centradas no ser humano. A cosmologia científica está apenas começando e a teologia, ao longo dos séculos, tornou-se um discurso antropocêntrico retórico e ideológico. Sem qualquer estrutura racional ou apoio à abordagem do divino, também não podemos recorrer ao nosso imaginário, porque sabemos que na escuridão do universo, na solidão sem testemunhas, mentiríamos para nós mesmos, mais uma vez. No momento, estamos sozinhos. Tudo o que somos é poeira ao vento. As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 182 CAPÍTULO VII O UNIVERSO ANTROPOCÊNTRICO [144] CONCEITUALIZAÇÃO Os seres humanos sabem que significam tudo para si mesmos e quase nada para o universo. Vivemos em um universo antropocêntrico. O antropocentrismo é o processo epistêmico através do qual os humanos sempre viram o mundo, os outros, e esculpiram a realidade relacionada a si mesmos. Este universo é o berço do nosso imaginário, o reino em que o eu ensaia seus primeiros passos. As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 183 Assustados e frágeis diante da realidade externa, os homens primitivos iniciaram uma cultura inferindo que "tudo existe ao redor, de nós, humanos; assim, somos o ponto de encontro do universo; nós somos o centro." A imagem espelhada resultante de nossa observação do cosmo tem uma característica imaginária teleológica: "tudo está relacionado à humanidade", da mesma maneira que uma criança supõe, nas primeiras exposições ao mundo externo, que tudo que se percebe de alguma forma se refere a ela. Tudo no universo tem um centro, uma referência gravitacional, até ideias ou átomos. Buscando instintivamente seu centro existencial, nossos ancestrais remotos só puderam encontrar a si mesmos nesse imenso cosmo; portanto, os homens se tornaram seu próprio centro, o dono absoluto de sua solidão. Esse processo epistemológico resulta da natureza e não de desejos ou opções humanas. Nesse cenário, o antropocentrismo refere-se à manifestação mais intensa e universal do imaginário coletivo e de nosso paradigma comportamental. Assim é a nossa natureza, feita de instintos e milênios de experiência empírica. Assim somos nós. Essa origem "centralista" do antropocentrismo induz a idéia grosseira e equivocada de que se As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 184 refere fundamentalmente a uma atitude de superioridade humana e desdém pelo universo não humano. Com certeza, o comportamento antropocêntrico pode expressar um narcisismo patológico, como qualquer outra estrutura do imaginário humano. No entanto, essa não é uma característica ou conteúdo usual do antropocentrismo, cujas origens estão relacionadas ao medo e à solidão, diferentemente do orgulho e do desdém. Algumas outras expressões triviais relacionam o antropocentrismo ao preconceito, religião, sectarismo, doutrina filosófica, contravenção moral, destruição ecológica ou apenas à linguagem vulgar. São ideias superficiais, tendenciosas, fragmentadas e muito simplórias, deixando de lado a complexidade estrutural da questão e limitando indevidamente seu conteúdo e extensão. Portanto, o antropocentrismo é frequentemente mal entendido em muitos estudos, principalmente quando o raciocínio o considera um objeto específico. Sob essa percepção falha, muitos escritores se referem ao antropocentrismo com seus preconceitos pessoais ou culturais, expressando sua rejeição como se estivessem falando de um desrespeito a um código moral, um tipo de estupidez, um crime político ou uma blasfêmia religiosa. Nenhuma dessas idéias é As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 185 apoiada pela ciência; são apenas banalidades ideológicas, desprovidas de qualquer valor. O antropocentrismo faz parte da condição psicobiológica humana, existindo independentemente do pensamento crítico ou da ação voluntária. Do mesmo modo que não há indivíduo sem um eu e um inconsciente coletivo, não há humanidade sem atribuições antropocêntricas à realidade. O antropocentrismo é uma qualidade, uma propriedade atribuível e não um objeto lógico em si. Em termos de sintaxe lógica, precisamos de um objeto para abrigar essa propriedade, possibilitando a atribuição qualitativa, que é entendida pela ciência e pela filosofia como paradigma. O conceito desse objeto referencial é definido por Martyn Shuttleworth e Lyndsay T. Wilson[145], como segue: Um paradigma científico é uma estrutura que contém todas as visões comumente aceitas sobre um assunto, convenções sobre qual direção a pesquisa deve tomar e como deve ser realizada. As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 186 Esse conceito emerge das tradições iniciadas por Platão e Aristóteles e até o presente é um dos pilares principais de qualquer metodologia, conforme estruturado por Thomas Kuhn.[146]. O autor considera as teorias que fazemos sobre a realidade dentro de um paradigma e entende que ele contém e determina: a) o que é observado e medido, b) as questões que levantamos sobre essas observações, c) como as questões são formuladas, d) como os resultados são interpretados; e) como a pesquisa é realizada; f) que ferramentas são apropriadas. As contribuições de Foucault (1926 1984) e a incorporação da linguagem e da semiótica como componentes de sua estrutura enriqueceram metodicamente as afirmações científicas sobre paradigma. O conceito de paradigma tornou-se aplicável a outros campos além das ciências naturais. Portanto, para começar a entender o antropocentrismo, devemos determinar antecipadamente a qual paradigma estamos nos referindo. Nesse sentido, devemos atender aos critérios de Kuhn: "O que é observado e medido?" Na psicologia social e ontológica, que é o caso deste estudo, estamos observando um modelo comportamental coletivo humano, relacionado a determinada situação espaço-tempo-cultura, e cujo contexto recebe a influência dos valores atribuídos ao ser humano no que respeita a As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 187 fenomenilogia externa. Que perguntas fazemos sobre esse modelo? Perguntamos como os elementos causais desse modelo existem e interagem e como os resultados do processo influenciam a percepção e cognição individual e social. Como essas perguntas são formuladas? Eles são baseados na evidência mente-corpo, que pode ser observada na expressão do modelo (comportamento). Como os resultados são interpretados? Eles são submetidos às atuais estruturas conceituais oferecidas pelas ciências naturais e pela psicologia. Como é realizada a pesquisa? Ela se embasa na metodologia aplicável da psicologia social. Além disso, finalmente, quais ferramentas são apropriadas? A análise linguística, cognitiva, cultural e comportamental. Precisamos de todas essas ferramentas para a definição de um paradigma ao qual o antropocentrismo possa ser atribuído. Em nosso raciocínio e argumentos, a compatibilidade entre o modelo comportamental (paradigma) e o atributo deve estar presente, para evitar os mal-entendidos mais irreparáveis. Por esse motivo, devemos entender inicialmente que a qualidade (antropocentrismo) não está relacionada a como os homens tratam o cosmos ou a natureza circundante e seus elementos, mas sim como eles entendem a si mesmos e como expressam esse entendimento. Em muitos casos, podemos encontrar esse erro lógico, principalmente em textos originais As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 188 relacionados à ecologia, referindo-se ao modelo comportamental humano como uma atitude de agressão e expressão de superioridade. . No antropocentrismo, os humanos definem apenas atitudes referentes a si mesmos, que podem suportar, como consequência, o desdém por tudo mais. Essa atitude não é necessariamente ostensiva como agressão, e podemos estudá-la com a ajuda de metodologias psicanalíticas e psicossociais. O modelo comportamental individual ou coletivo intrinsecamente envolve dois elementos como componentes do nosso paradigma: o imaginário e a informação do inconsciente coletivo. O imaginário é um componente relativo ao tempo e pode mudar continuamente; os elementos provenientes do inconsciente coletivo são arcaicos e não mudam. Podemos observar isso mais claramente na representação gráfica no capítulo V, página 136, considerando que nosso paradigma é uma construção social. Uma vez que abriga o imaginário coletivo, o modelo comportamental paradigmático estará sempre sujeito às influências de desvios cognitivos e emocionais em relação à realidade, que já discutimos, incluindo expressões de narcisismo patológico ou até loucura. Essas possibilidades de mudanças fundamentais no paradigma são chamadas de "mudança paradigmática" por Kuhn, como tendo a As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 189 propriedade de promover a evolução da ciência: A transição sucessiva de um paradigma para outro via revolução é o padrão usual de desenvolvimento da ciência madura. (op. cit.) Levando em consideração todos esses princípios e conceitos, chamaremos nosso objeto de "paradigma comportamental humano", permitindo analisar como podemos atribuir o antropocentrismo. Ben Mylius[147] propõe três formas de atribuição: Aqui estão três definições resumidas, que detalharei a seguir. 1.Um paradigma é perceptivamente antropocêntrico se for informado pelos dados dos sentidos que um ser humano recebeu através de seus órgãos sensoriais. 2.Um paradigma também é descritivamente antropocêntrico se, de alguma maneira, começa a partir de, toma como ponto de referência, gira em torno de, focaliza, concentra-se, centra-se ou é ordenado de acordo As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 190 com a espécie Homo sapiens ou a categoria de "humano" .3. Um paradigma também é normativamente antropocêntrico: a) num sentido passivo, se restringe a investigação de uma maneira que de alguma forma privilegia o Homo sapiens ou a categoria de " humano"; b) em um sentido ativo, (i) se contém afirmações ou premissas sobre a superioridade do Homo sapiens, suas capacidades, a primazia de seus valores, sua posição no universo, etc. e / ou (ii) se contém determinações (como deveria / poderia) com base nessas afirmações ou suposições. (ênfase nossa) A abordagem de Mylius significa apoio adequado à nossa análise, uma vez que podemos encontrar muitos fragmentos de evidências factuais das três definições na estrutura de nosso paradigma, reforçando qualquer atribuição de antropocentrismo que possamos expressar em nossa pesquisa. ATRIBUIÇÕES As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 191 A literatura sobre atribuição de antropocentrismo é abundante, mas, infelizmente, apenas uma pequena parte desses trabalhos tem origem e formato acadêmicos. Nas últimas quatro décadas, o tema se tornou um dos temas preferidos das ideologias de pseudociência, pseudofilosofia, e pseudopsicologia-de-fim-desemana . No presente, o assunto é frequentemente considerado como um tema literário trivial, política-religiosa e economicamente contaminado, o que recomenda manter nosso estudo circunscrito às fontes acadêmicas tradicionais. Refletindo sobre o raciocínio de Mylius (op.cit), não é difícil deduzir que não é possível entender o paradigma comportamental humano inteiramente imune às atribuições de valor antropocêntrico à realidade, em qualquer uma de suas formas: a perceptiva, a descritiva ou a normativa. É bastante evidente que, enquanto a existência, desejos e medos humanos participarem ativamente dessa relação de atribuição de valor, os seres humanos sempre perceberão, descreverão e estabelecerão normas de maneira a satisfazer seus desejos. Essa conclusão reduz a atribuição antropocêntrica de valores a um modelo imanente e muitas vezes adequado, capaz de As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 192 proteger os seres humanos da ameaça de seus medos primitivos mais intensos: a morte, as forças naturais e o desconhecido. Assim, argumentar que os humanos devem colocar atribuições antropocêntricas de lado é tão absurdo quanto pretender que os indivíduos abandonem seus egos e seu inconsciente coletivo, ou qualquer um de seus mecanismos de defesa. Em conclusão, as discussões atributivas não podem ser focadas no antropocentrismo em si, mas apenas na extensão em que suas atribuições podem provocar discórdia relevante com a realidade demonstrável, em detrimento da racionalidade, coerência e verdade. Tendo em mente que as atribuições antropocêntricas ao nosso paradigma adotam os mesmos processos de nossas construções imaginárias, devemos adotar os mesmos conceitos analíticos para ambos. Ao fazer isso, concluiremos que o antropocentrismo, como o imaginário, não pode ser um objeto de avaliação; é apenas um processo natural. Não é bom ou ruim, ou qualquer outra coisa; simplesmente existe. O que podemos avaliar são os resultados do processo ou o que o modelo comportamental significa em relação à realidade demonstrável, à racionalidade, à coerência e à verdade. Quando os resultados são racionais e coerentes, o antropocentrismo, em qualquer uma de suas As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 193 formas, significará um elemento contributivo para o processo evolutivo humano. Quando abrigam a obscuridade, a incoerência e o absurdo, devem ser considerados produtos do imaginário cego, com todas as consequências cognitivas e comportamentais discutidas na Parte I. Essa possibilidade lógica, sustentada por qualquer análise factual, é a preocupação expressa por muitos filósofos e cientistas. A preocupação central refere-se à persistente supervalorização do ser humano que ocorre em atribuições antropocêntricas. Christopher Herbert (1991)[148] , observando os estados da cultura e da ciência no final do século XIX, comenta: A acusação de antropocentrismo dificilmente era original para Freud. Por volta da virada do século XX e nas várias décadas seguintes, foi proclamado com uma frequência que parece sinalizar alguma perturbação cultural notável. Um escritor após o outro identifica antropomorfismo ou antropocentrismo como precisamente a antítese, a anulação da ciência. "O antropomorfismo desempenha As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 194 um papel histórico considerável " na gênese do pensamento físico, admite o matemático Henri Poincaré em 1902, "mas pode ser o fundamento de nada que tenha caráter realmente científico ou filosófico". Freud entendeu o antropocentrismo de alguma forma como uma ameaça ao pensamento científico e argumentou que as ciências haviam humilhado a humanidade em três ocasiões particulares: com o heliocentrismo de Copérnico, as teorias da evolução de Darwin e a psicanálise. Podemos deduzir do argumento de Freud, em primeiro lugar, que ele mantinha uma interpretação errada do antropocentrismo, relacionada e limitada exclusivamente a seus resultados, expressando orgulho humano e sentimentos de dominação. O antropocentrismo é muito mais e muito diferente do que esse conteúdo limitado ao narcisismo. Além disso, a suposição de que a ciência humilha os seres humanos é uma premissa equivocada; a ciência já enriqueceu e expandiu a experiência humana, e a tecnologia resultante se incorpora rapidamente à vida cotidiana. Ao contrário, o conhecimento científico está entre os desejos humanos mais intensos e significa uma resposta As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 195 ao medo primal do desconhecido. Os humanos nunca se orgulharam de ser ignorantes, e é isso que a história diz. O que humilha e assusta os homens é o poder da natureza. O que obstrui a ciência não é o antropocentrismo, mas o misticismo e o sectarismo alimentados pelo imaginário cego e protegidos por muitas crenças e preconceitos falsos, para sustentar fantasias e delírios insanos. Estar centrado em si mesmos não significa que os homens se tornem irracionais, estúpidos ou necessariamente ignorantes a ponto de desprezar a ciência e o pensamento crítico. Freud sustentava a opinião de que a presunção humana e o antropocentrismo diminuiriam no século XX. Ele achava que havia uma convergência entre as ciências, levando a esse resultado. Ele estava errado; a humanidade levou o tempo que ele mencionou para usar a ciência para explorar e colonizar o espaço sideral e não há nada mais antropocêntrico do que isso. Além disso, o lugar onde os homens têm mais orgulho de si mesmos é precisamente a chamada ciência profunda. O que mais falta no pensamento freudiano sobre o antropocentrismo é a compreensão do princípio de Kuhn da mudança paradigmática". Na visão freudiana, não haveria correspondência entre o avanço científico e a As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 196 estrutura do paradigma comportamental humano. O contrário aconteceu: todos os nossos modelos comportamentais e, consequentemente, nosso paradigma mudaram profundamente diante de todas as novas descobertas científicas. Diferentemente das posições reducionistas freudianas, muitas vezes focadas no ingrediente narcísico do antropocentrismo, as teorias modernas de atribuição tendem a um argumento ontológico e teleológico, aproximando-se do realismo objetivo e científico. Podemos observar a expressão dessa tendência no estudo de WH Murdy[149] : O antropocentrismo é proposto como um ponto de vista válido e necessário para a humanidade adotar para considerar seu lugar na natureza. [...] O antropocentrismo é consistente com uma filosofia que afirma a inter-relação essencial das coisas e que valoriza todos os itens da natureza, uma vez que nenhum evento ocorre sem algum efeito nos conjuntos dos quais fazemos parte [...] Uma crença antropocêntrica no valor, significado e potencial criativo do fenômeno humano é As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 197 considerada um fator motivador necessário à evolução participativa, que, por sua vez, pode ser necessária para a sobrevivência futura da espécie humana e de seus valores culturais. Essa análise evolutiva, isenta de vieses situacionais e levada a cabo por muitas teorias atuais, possibilita a atribuição discernente do antropocentrismo, de tal maneira que seus desvios cognitivos e emocionais, bem como seus eventuais ingredientes patológicos, possam ser considerados externos ao conceito central da atribuição. Devemos levar em consideração que, durante os últimos 30 anos, os conceitos de atribuição antropocêntrica estimularam muitas abordagens conflitantes em filosofia, sociologia, economia e ciências naturais, em prol dos crescentes problemas ambientais decorrentes das atividades produtivas humanas. Muitas dessas abordagens recentes são tendenciosas, fomentando indiscriminadamente conflitos ideológicos e ansiedade política de todas as partes. O confronto conceitual induziu uma dicotomia imperfeita entre o humano e o meio ambiente, ou em uma descrição trivial, o humano contra o natural. Por ser retórica e meramente discursiva, a As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 198 maioria dessas abordagens não ofereceu nenhuma contribuição consistente para o pensamento contemporâneo e, em muitos casos, acolheram a pseudociência e interesses econômicos, religiosos e políticos específicos, até o ponto em que, muitas vezes, sentimos a existência de duas seitas: o antropocentrismo, como o reino dos predadores irracionais do planeta, e o ecologismo, o universo dos salvadores sábios. Nenhum deles pode dizer o que o antropocentrismo significa apropriadamente. Procuramos elementos lógicos em meio a essa turbulência, porque eles existem, e selecionamos para nossa reflexão, por sua natureza interdisciplinar e consistência lógica, um trabalho acadêmico produzido por Pasi Heikkurinen, (Universidade de Leeds, Instituto de Pesquisa em Sustentabilidade, Reino Unido), Jenny Rinkinen - ( Universidade de Lancaster, Departamento de Sociologia, Demand Centre, Reino Unido), Timo Järvensivu (Escola de Negócios da Universidade Aalto, Departamento de Marketing, Finlândia), Kristoffer Wilén (Escola de Economia Hanken, Departamento de Marketing, Finlândia) e Toni Ruuska (Aalto Escola de Negócios da Universidade, Departamento de Estudos de Gestão, Finlândia) [150] . Em seu artigo, os autores consideram a atual falta de teorização organizacional a partir de uma perspectiva ecológica observada desde os anos As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 199 90, "quando a relação entre organizações e o ambiente natural atraiu a atenção dos acadêmicos (Shrivastava, 1994; Gladwin et al., 1995; Clair et al., 1996).", o que contribuiu para a percepção dicotômica que mencionamos: Apesar da severidade do desafio ecológico, e particularmente do papel significativo que a organização da produção tem na crise climática (Barnosky et al., 2012; IPCC, 2014), questões ecológicas permaneceram na periferia da teoria organizacional contemporânea, conforme revisado por Cunha et al. (2008). Em vez de focar nos aspectos não humanos e materiais do mundo, as pesquisas organizacionais tendem a enfatizar o papel dos seres humanos e os aspectos não materiais da organização (Fleetwood, 2005; Orlikowski, 2010). Conclui-se que os estudos organizacionais tendem a reproduzir a tradição filosófica antropocêntrica e antirrealista da ciência, pois a experiência humana é favorecida às custas do mundo não humano. A ausência de uma perspectiva ecológica sobre a organização da atividade humana parece levar a um caminho mais profundo no Antropoceno, com As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 200 consequências desagradáveis não apenas para a espécie humana, mas também para o ecossistema como um todo. Aplicando sua metodologia adequada, os autores sustentam a conceituação do ecocentrismo como subordinação das estruturas organizacionais humanas ao ecossistema planetário, não relacionadas a valores humanos supostamente superestimados pela atribuição antropocêntrica, em um modelo ontológico antirrealista. A pesquisa atual indica que a nova era geológica do Antropoceno exige uma nova ontologia para guiar a organização das atividades humanas. A ontologia proposta aqui dá uma guinada realista e ecocêntrica para evitar as armadilhas das abordagens antirrealista e antropocêntrica. Partindo das filosofias orientadas a objetos (Harman, 2002, 2009) e ecológicas (Naess, 1973, [1974] 1989)), o estudo propõe três qualidades essenciais comuns a todos os objetos, como autonomia, natureza intrínseca e singularidade. O esboço ontológico As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 201 formado por esses três pontos responde à crítica dos estudos de organização ecocêntrica. Ele demonstra como evitar o dualismo entre a natureza humana e a natureza , considerando cada coisa um objeto enquanto ainda chega a uma visão ecologicamente relevante da realidade. (ênfase nossa) O PROBLEMA DA SUPERVALORIZAÇÃO Em toda conceituação ou teorização relacionada ao antropocentrismo, levando em consideração a supervalorização humana, enfrentaremos um problema insolúvel: o dilema da valorização do humano e do não humano, uma vez que ontologicamente ambos são necessariamente opostos ou comparados ao outro. Para sustentar qualquer concepção de antropocentrismo que contenha a suposição de que os seres humanos atribuem um valor mais alto a si mesmos do que deveriam, uma escala referencial quantitativa deve ser aplicada. Caso contrário, a conceituação não passará de uma falácia vulgar. Se tivéssemos um modelo matemático para essa As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 202 comparação, qualquer teorização seria possível. No entanto, as teorias matemáticas e de valor não oferecem esse tipo de solução. Como, em qualquer análise ontológica tradicional do antropocentrismo, nós abrigamos a preocupação de rejeitar a supervalorização humana, estamos repetidamente empregando um argumento que envolve elementos quantitativos que não podemos demonstrar. Enquanto insistirmos em argumentos avaliativos do humano, chegaremos a meras conceituações discursivas e inseriremos em nossas fórmulas lógicas a pergunta absurda sobre qual é o valor da humanidade diante do universo. Consequentemente, o instrumento mais confiável para a compreensão do antropocentrismo é sua observação consistente como modelo comportamental, com todas as implicações correspondentes. A FRAGMENTAÇÃO SECTÁRIA. Usamos para estudar as ideias "centralistas" do antropocentrismo uma suposição generalizada, provavelmente porque estamos insistentemente procurando uma teorização. No entanto, as manifestações mais potentes e As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 203 relevantes de nosso imaginário coletivo, por meio de atribuições antropocêntricas, não são as expressas por essa percepção geral da humanidade como o centro do universo. Ao contrário, para tornar-se universal e relativo ao tempo-espaço, o antropocentrismo é um modelo comportamental multi-fragmentado. Essa suposição significa que o paradigma antropocêntrico é dividido em partículas comportamentais, cada uma mantendo a mesma estrutura que o paradigma a geral, mas direcionada a objetos particulares. O que acontece nesse processo é que a construção imaginária deixa de eleger os homens como o centro de si mesmos, mas os designa como o centro de outros homens. Assim como são o centro de si mesmos em seu narcisismo, os humanos desejam se tornar o centro de outros seres humanos. Qualquer processo de dominação e subjugação segue esse modelo no qual florescem a política, a ética, o direito, a economia e a organização religiosa. Homine dominatur homo". Cada um desses universos micro psicológicos se torna um modelo antropocêntrico único. Se observarmos isso em indivíduos, encontraremos as sementes do amor e do ódio. Se analisarmos isso no imaginário coletivo, entenderemos melhor o sectarismo. Cada seita é o centro de seus membros: famílias, As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 204 grupos, nacionalidades, religiões, raças, culturas, status social e econômico. O tecido social é uma rede complexa de seitas, em muitos níveis diferentes. Todo membro de uma seita é continuamente referido ao seu centro, porque tudo no universo deve ter um centro. Finalmente, quando os homens estão centrados em suas seitas, o universo externo remanescente não importa, como em qualquer paradigma antropocêntrico. Podemos lembrar as palavras de Domèmech (op.cit.) Citadas na página 18: "Todo ser humano tem um sistema de crenças que eles utilizam, e é através desse mecanismo que nós individualmente" entendemos "o mundo ao nosso redor." Da fragmentação sectária de nosso paradigma comportamental emerge uma das características mais paradoxais da natureza humana: a ambivalência entre antropocentrismo e misoginia. Somos animais dualistas, tomando nossa natureza como nosso centro e protegendo-a como nossa identidade. Com a mesma intensidade, desprezamos a As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 205 humanidade existente fora de nossas seitas e, em algumas circunstâncias, odiamos o fato der nós mesmos sermos humanos. Como acontece em nosso imaginário, o modelo comportamental antropocêntrico contém todos os elementos causais para qualquer tipo de resultado: da grandiosidade das artes e das ciências ao narcisismo mais patológico e à completa loucura da guerra e da destruição. As tentativas de converter o antropocentrismo em um elemento ético a ser classificado e qualificado, ou em um teorema metafísico demonstrável, são totalmente sem sentido. O antropocentrismo é imanente à humanidade, está empiricamente em toda parte, sob qualquer forma. Absolutamente tudo o que é humano passa por um processo antropocêntrico antes de se tornar conhecimento, emoção, criação, crença ou loucura. Somos animais egocêntricos, como todos os outros. A única diferença é que sabemos disso. Nossa cosmologia é limitada à nossa realidade situacional e principalmente às nossas vidas. Nós somos nossa única referência. As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 206 CAPÍTULO VIII O PENSAMENTO PÓS TUDO DOS DIAS ATUAIS (CONCLUSÃO) Todos os conceitos envolvidos em nossa reflexão desempenharam um papel significativo na odisseia evolutiva natural e cultural da humanidade. Desde as experiências interativas mais primitivas, a realidade, a verdade e o imaginário enquadram nossa existência e tudo relacionado ao nosso conhecimento e raciocínio, nossa criatividade e fantasia, as luzes de nossa inteligência e as trevas de nossa ignorância. Tomamos esse triângulo como o centro de nossa reflexão, porque é a partir de sua observação e interpretação que definimos como vemos o mundo existente ao nosso redor e dentro de nós, As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 207 e como entendemos nossa própria existência. Cada um de nós processará uma síntese crítica diferente e única, resultante de tudo o que foi discutido, que será um resultado valioso, independentemente do seu conteúdo. Isso envolverá necessariamente a revisão de nossos principais raciocínios, crenças e desejos. Não é possível revisitar e discutir a realidade, a verdade e o imaginário, sem refletir silenciosamente sobre o nosso universo pessoal mais profundo. Por esse motivo, declaramos inicialmente que este estudo se baseava na reflexão, e não na demonstração ou teorização, mesmo sistematicamente fundamentado em princípios teóricos da psicologia social e ontológica e da filosofia. Qualquer que seja o resultado de cada reflexão, efetivamente todos nós estamos envolvidos em um contexto emergente, obrigando-nos a refletir e tomar novas decisões, além de convidar ao uso de tudo o que discutimos. A dinâmica empírica complexa dos dias atuais provoca contextos culturais sem precedentes, que chamaremos de "o pensamento pós-tudo". Os ciclos tecnológicos determinam nossa história. Sempre foi assim, desde o uso instrumental das pedras e da descoberta da dominação do fogo. Assim será até a morte do último indivíduo de nossa espécie. As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 208 Cada um desses ciclos tecnológicos determinou incontáveis consequências no conhecimento humano, emoções, crenças, valores, comportamento e estilos de vida. Os ciclos tecnológicos são senoidais, considerando seu início (com descobertas e recursos disponíveis muito novos), desenvolvimento (com sua absorção gradual pela sociedade) e declínio (com novas pesquisas relacionadas à sua substituição por melhor alternativa). Essa descrição é um conceito utilitário da história, mas, independentemente da doutrina de onde veio, expressa uma realidade demonstrável. A duração dos ciclos tecnológicos senoidais da história humana está diminuindo exponencialmente no tempo, uma vez que cada nova tecnologia reflete nas probabilidades de acelerar novas descobertas, desenvolvimentos e usos correlatos, em um modelo multiplicador retroalimentado. Se voltarmos ao princípio de mudança paradigmática de Kuhn, entenderemos como a velocidade do desenvolvimento tecnológico determina mudanças em nossos modelos de comportamento, que, por sua vez, introduzirão novas expansões tecnológicas, e assim por diante: As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 209 A transição sucessiva de um paradigma para outro via revolução é o padrão usual de desenvolvimento da ciência madura. (op. cit.) Durante a segunda metade do século XX, um novo ciclo senoidal começou com as tecnologias digitais e as nanotecnologias, a física quântica, as neurociências, a inteligência artificial, a realidade virtual, a engenharia robótica, as descobertas cosmológicas, a biologia e a matemática. As impressionantes consequências dessa onda tecnológica para a humanidade ocorreram em formas, tempos, intensidades e amplitudes nunca antes vistos e nem mesmo eram imediatamente adaptáveis ao nosso imaginário. Este ciclo está apenas começando e uma previsão de sua intensidade ainda não é possível. Em apenas duas gerações, um transcurso insignificante do tempo em termos históricos, os humanos experimentaram mudanças mais substanciais em suas vidas do que nossos antecessores enfrentaram em milênios. Não estávamos preparados para suportar esse impacto catastrófico, mas estamos observando progressivamente que somos capazes disso. O impacto tecnológico determina concomitantemente transformação intensa social, psicológica, emocional, cognitiva, mental e biológica. As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 210 Além dos magníficos resultados em benefício da humanidade, essa transformação impõe a cada um de nós a tarefa diária dolorosa, e às vezes desesperada, de adaptação à sobrevivência. Frequentemente, isso é realizado sem qualquer possibilidade de engajamento do pensamento crítico. Todas as nossas referências e crenças racionais sofreram com o impacto, na medida em que suas fundações foram alteradas ou desconstruídas pela tecnologia recebida. Por milênios, desde os estágios mais primitivos de nossa espécie, entendemos nossa existência como envolvida pela imensidão do macrocosmo, começando com o átomo e terminando além da amplitude do nosso imaginário. De repente, a física quântica chega e nos diz que, na outra direção, de dentro da partícula atômica mínima conhecida, inicia-se um microcosmo, tão imenso e desconhecido quanto o cosmo que conhecíamos antes. Além disso, ambos os universos não têm a estrutura e a constituição que acreditávamos existir. Percebemos que os espiritualistas não deveriam mais procurar por Deus no centro das galáxias, cercado pelos corpos celestes e centros de energia mais luminosos, mas sim na menor partícula vibracional subatômica, apelidada pelos cientistas de "a partícula de deus". que poderia ser a semente de tudo, podendo estar contida no microuniverso de qualquer célula do nosso corpo. As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 211 Em nossas vidas diárias, assistimos as mudanças linguísticas ocorridas para abrigar e expressar um mundo inimaginável, os robôs invadindo fábricas, hospitais, laboratórios e universidades para substituir humanos espantados, as máquinas de guerra adquirindo dimensões apocalípticas, bem como bibliotecas e arquivos gigantescos serem transportados para peças menores que nossas unhas, em formato digital. Submersos em dois cosmos, aprendemos em alguns minutos que a matéria, incluindo nosso próprio corpo, não existe como acreditávamos até o momento. O que entendemos antes sobre nossos corpos é apenas um estado mental perceptivo, porque a matéria é tão vibracional quanto contínua: meu corpo e seu corpo são a mesma coisa. Além disso, esse estado mental não é a criação de nossos desejos e crenças, mas significa um resultado interativo de estados cerebrais que nossa razão não ordena. Além disso, quando pensamos que não tínhamos tempo suficiente para processar essas mudanças tão abruptas, a ciência nos pergunta sobre o que estamos falando, uma vez que todos os conceitos de relações de tempo e espaço que sabíamos não existem mais, bem como tudo o que antes entendíamos como "eu" e "o outro". Nós, as crias da terra, sentimo-nos abandonados por nossas próprias crenças, humilhados pela natureza e por suas leis implacáveis, aprisionados nas cápsulas de nossos conhecimentos e As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 212 habilidades limitados e frágeis. Nós nos sentimos traídos pelos deuses que inventamos à nossa imagem e semelhança, e nos sentimos vazios em nossas identidades, onde os destroços de egos e convicções flutuam em um narcisismo derretido. Sentimos como se tudo tivesse acabado, e que a nossa orfandade impõe que devemos nos reinventar em um universo sem sentido, sem saber por que ou para o que. A aceitação humana da mudança é difícil e resiste a declarações factuais autoritárias, como foi identificado em estudos psicológicos e sociológicos aplicados ( Nyhan, Reifler, Richey e Freed, 2014 ; Prochaska, DiClemente e Norcross, 1992 ). [151] . A resistência a mudanças significativas e diversificadas impõe a substituição de muitos elementos do modelo cultural e, de fato, determina a elaboração de um novo modelo adaptativo. Essa "nova cultura" deve ser entendida como Manadue e Cheer (op.cit) consideraram: Cultura foi definida como "os aspectos simbólicos, ideais e intangíveis das sociedades humanas. A essência de uma cultura não são seus artefatos, ferramentas ou outros elementos culturais tangíveis, mas como os membros do grupo os interpretam, As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 213 usam e os percebem" (Banks & Banks, 2004, p. 8), ou, mais simplesmente, como conhecimentos e comportamentos compartilhados dentro de grupos de indivíduos em Interação (Useem, Useem e Donoghue, 1963). A interpretação das mudanças no comportamento social trazidas pela recente onda tecnológica indica muitos modelos emergindo como respostas. Entre eles, existe um tipo de resposta que poderia ser vista como um modelo subcultural que chamaremos de "cultura do pós-tudo", um contexto cultural em expansão que merece nossa atenção na razão de seu conteúdo. No reino existencial aparentemente caótico causado pelo impacto tecnológico, proliferam a ansiedade e a fantasia, iniciando expressões de um padrão de pensamento defeituoso. Podemos descrevê-lo como a expressão cultural do nada, como a retórica que ouvimos no início desta revolução tecnológica, durante os anos 50 do século XX: o discurso dos beatniks de Jack Kerouak e seu livro The Road "(1957). O conteúdo é exatamente o mesmo: "Estamos sendo mortos e destruídos pela tecnologia dominada pelo poder econômico, e nossa existência, muito mais do que nunca, não faz sentido". O significado de "pós" nesse pensamento emergente não se limita a um conceito As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 214 cronológico, mas refere-se principalmente ao desmoronamento de nossas referências existenciais e às estruturas de nosso conhecimento, crenças e imaginário. Vários conceitos novos e sem sentido foram inventados: "pós-verdade", "pós-moderno", "pósrealidade", "pós-deus", "pós-ética", "póslinguístico", "pós-mercado", "pós-qualquer coisa". Eles soam como palavras mágicas apagando nosso passado como algo velho, inútil e estúpido, condenado à morte porque não sustentava com eficiência nossas crenças, idéias, desejos, medos, fantasias e "eus", diante das novas realidades". Invadidas por esse sentimento de vazio, nossas mentes param de procurar evidências, coerência e uma percepção estruturada da realidade. O mundo ao nosso redor começa a parecer um mar de fragmentos não relacionados. Nosso cérebro, condicionado ao raciocínio lógico e à solução de problemas, não pode reconhecer esses fragmentos como peças ajustáveis de um quebra-cabeças; a verdade e a mentira, a realidade e a irrealidade tornam-se iguais, e nossa criatividade se transforma em fantasias caóticas. No campo do imaginário coletivo, sem estruturas estáveis capazes de sustentar uma conexão ativa com a realidade, o comportamento ético e a percepção dos valores sociais são substituídos pela banalização do nada, do As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 215 sectarismo, da agressividade e do egocentrismo: uma espécie de narcisismo desesperado. O comportamento social do Efeito Manada, estudado por Gustav Le Bon e Jaap van Ginneken (ver Capítulo I), eclode com mais frequência e facilidade, substituindo a reflexão e o livre arbítrio pela irracionalidade coletiva e pela de-individualização severa (ver Capítulo VI). Sob o guarda-chuva desse modelo cultural, muitos movimentos deterministas niilistas e radicais emergiram oportunamente, de todos os cantos, como as hienas que devoram a carcaça da esperança humana. A cultura pós-tudo se torna um grito intenso e insano do nosso narcisismo, como sendo apenas uma ilusão egoísta. Quando enfrentamos dissonâncias interpretativas referentes a uma estrutura ou status cultural, principalmente quando significa um processo informal usando elementos semióticos diversificados, como agora, podemos empregar muitas ferramentas para esclarecer a compreensão de seu conteúdo. Uma dessas ferramentas eficientes é a análise dos resultados correspondentes da ficção científica trazidos pelo modelo. A ficção científica é uma intensa expressão não organizada do imaginário coletivo, oferecendo conclusões difíceis de serem obtidas com outras estruturas semióticas, como Manadue e Cheer(op.cit) indicam com suas pesquisas: As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 216 As descobertas revelaram que a literatura de ficção científica havia sido usada em pesquisas em várias disciplinas, incluindo teologia, semântica, ciências naturais e educação. Duas características do uso da ficção científica na pesquisa tornaram-se evidentes na revisão: seu papel como ferramenta de defesa e insight cultural e sua eficácia como auxílio ao aprendizado e ao ensino. Um limite pouco claro entre ciência real e ciência no imaginário coletivo é problemático para o sucesso da pesquisa, mas a integração proposital de representações ficcionais da ciência (natural e social) na história da pesquisa tem benefícios demonstráveis. A análise do material de ficção científica emergente desse modelo cultural confirma nossas afirmações sobre um niilismo cego, o desprezo da realidade atual, a agressividade irracional e a presença do narcisismo mais patológico. Certamente, esses recursos já existiam antes, mas nas culturas atuais eles aparecem mais extensivamente, e alguns conteúdos destrutivos adquirem intensidade extrema e dominante como guerras tecnológicas, domínio e escravidão robóticos, genocídio, constrição da liberdade com As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 217 controle digital e extinção da humanidade com a destruição do planeta. Esses temas não existiam antes, pelo menos com a frequência e a generalidade atuais. Além disso, apesar de existirem em menor intensidade no passado recente, não invadiram a literatura e o lazer infantis, como acontece hoje em dia, semeando uma cultura niilista e violenta em mentes imaturas, com graves consequências sociais, culturais, psicológicas, cognitivas e ideológicas. que só serão mensuráveis nas gerações futuras. Não existe uma "nova realidade vazia". O universo, com todos os seus fatos e princípios conhecidos e desconhecidos, já existia antes de chegarmos e, independentemente de nosso conhecimento ou existência, seguirá seu curso evolutivo. Todo o nosso passado está lá, no mesmo lugar e forma, gravado em nosso inconsciente coletivo e presente em nossas mentes, emoções e modelos sociais, apesar de qualquer coisa que esteja acontecendo hoje. Essas equivocadas "culturas da crise" são temporárias, prevalecendo apenas quando a experiência humana enfrenta uma transformação extrema, necessária e pertencente ao nosso processo evolutivo. O primeiro escopo deste estudo foi analisar criticamente nossa realidade, fundamentada em conceitos eleitos como coerentes e discutidos racionalmente em filosofia e As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 218 psicologia, com a possível isenção de nossos medos, desejos, preconceitos e crenças um exercício acadêmico crítico a partir do qual poderíamos obter instrumentos úteis para interpretar melhor nossas vidas e nosso universo. Esse escopo é uma tentativa de entender que, no atual estado da ciência e da cultura, podemos parar de olhar para um abismo imaginário, deixando de lado o vazio das tendências do "pensamento pós-tudo" e a velha escuridão das sombras cegas de Narciso. Podemos enfrentar nossa existência individual e coletiva, bem como o futuro com um novo pensamento cultural de "pré-muitas coisas", sob a clareza da ciência, da razão, da nossa criatividade e da boa filosofia. Todos nós, mesmo aqueles que rejeitam o existencialismo, podemos escolher. Podemos abrir a caixa do nosso imaginário a porta do nosso livre-arbítrio e participar com nossa criatividade da geração das alternativas evolutivas que a humanidade tem pela frente e como está escrita no genoma de nossa espécie, e não nas estrelas, em livros lendários ou fantasias mágicas que às vezes sacralizamos com a nossa ignorância. A humanidade pode ser estudada, como fizemos, e talvez entendida, como tentamos. No entanto, isso não é suficiente porque a humanidade existe principalmente para ser vivida e compartilhada. As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 219 NOTAS DO TEXTO (em ordem sequencial) [1] Perez, Diana Ines, "Filosofia Analítica na América Latina", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosop hy (Edição Primavera 2020), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), Https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2020 / inputs / latin-american-analytic / (acessado em 29 de maio de 2020). [2] SH Malone Psicologia, Epistemologia, Ontologia, Comparado e Distinto Mente Nova Série, vol. 3, No. 12 (outubro de 1894), pp. 474-490 Publicado por: Oxford University Press em nome de Mind Association "https ://www.jstor.org/stable/2247848 acessado em abril 27, 2020. [3] Kingsbury, Justine M. e Bowell, Tracy A. "Pensar criticamente sobre crenças é difícil pensar criticamente" - (2016) na Universidade de Windsor, OSSA Conference Archive. Acessado em 28 de abril de 2020 em https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2 255&context=ossaarchive [4] Wason, PC, e Johnson-Laird, PN (1972). " Psicologia do raciocínio: estrutura e conteúdo. Harvard U. Press. na Apa PsycNet – acvessado em https://psycnet.apa.org/record/1973-08484-000 [5] Koriat, Asher e Lichtenstein, Sarah e Fischhoff, Baruch. (1980). Razões para Confiança. Jornal de Psicologia As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 220 Experimental: Aprendizagem Humana e Memória. 6. 107118. 10.1037 / 0278-7393.6.2.107. [6] K ruger, Justin; Dunning, David (1999). "Desqualificado e Desinformado: como as dificuldades em reconhecer a própria incompetência levam a autoavaliações engrandecidas" .Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 77 (6): 11211134CiteSeerX 10.1.1.64.2655 .doi: 10,1037 / 00223514.77.6.1121.PMID10626367 [7] Ross, L., Lepper, MR, e Hubbard, M. (1975). Perseverança na autopercepção e na percepção social: Processos de atribuição tendenciosos, no paradigma de interrogatório.Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 32 (5), 880-892. https://doi.org/10.1037/00223514.32.5.880 [8] Keith E. Stanovich e Richard F. West (2008) " Sobre o fracasso da capacidade cognitiva de prever o viés de pensamento lateral e unilateral", Thinking & Reasoning, 14: 2, 129167, DOI: 10.1080 / 13546780701679764 [9] Eskin, Mehmet (2013) - "Terapia de resolução de problemas na prática clínica" (2013) Elsevier ISBN 9780-12-398455-5 DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/C2011-0 07817-1 [10] Heider, F (1958) "A psicologia das relações interpessoais". N.York: Wiley. [11] Burr, Vivien (1995). "Uma introdução ao construcionismo social". Revista de Filosofia Francesa e Francófona; Vol. 7, n. ° 3 (1995); 267-267. 7. 10.5195 / jffp.1995.375 [12] Barão J. (1994). " Pensando e decidindo ". Cambridge University Press. ISBN978-0-521-43732-5 [13] Johnson HM, Seifert CM (novembro de 1994). "Fontes do efeito de influência continuada: Quando desinformação As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 221 na memória afeta inferências posteriores" .Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition. 1420-1436. doi : 10.1037 / 0278-7393.20.6.1420 [14] Mylius, Ben (2018) - "Três tipos de antropocentrismo" -https: //doi.org/10.5840/envirophil20184564 acessado em 29 de abril de 2020 [15] . Brewer, MB (1979) - " Viés dentro do grupo na situação mínima entre grupos: uma análise cognitivomotivacional. "Boletim Psicológico da Associação Americana de Psicologia 86 (2), 307 https ://psycnet.apa.org/record/1979-25967-001 [16] Allison, Scott T e Messick, David M. - (1985) "O erro de atribuição de grupo" Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 21 (6): 563-579 [17] Le Bon, Gustav (1895) "Psicologia das multidões". Edição. Sparkling Books, (2009). [18] van Ginneken, Jaap (1992) " Multidões, psicologia e política" (1992). Revisões: revistas cooperativas de história 99-3 ; Resumo de periódicos da Cambridge 2942744 [19] Milgram S (outubro de 1963). "Estudo Comportamental da Obediência ." Jornal da psicologia anormal. 67 (4): 371–8. Doi : 10.1037 / h0040525.PMID 14049516 [20] Walker D, Vul E (janeiro de 2014). "A codificação hierárquica faz com que os indivíduos de um grupo pareçam mais atraentes". Psychological Science.25 (1): 230-5. Doi: 10.1177 / 0956797613497969.PMID 24163333 [21] Marks G, Miller N (1987). "Dez anos de pesquisa sobre o efeito de falso consenso: uma revisão empírica e teórica." Psychological Bulletin.102 (1): 72–90.doi: 10.1037 / 00332909.102.1.72 As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 222 [22] Jost, JT e van der Toorn, J. (2012). Teoria da justificação do sistema. Em PAM Van Lange, AW Kruglanski e ET Higgins (Eds.), Manual de teorias da psicologia social (p. 313-343). Sage Publications Ltd. https://doi.org/10.4135/9781446249222.n42 [23] White, Jonathan e Plous, Scott. (1995). - "Autoaperfeiçoamento e responsabilidade social: cuidar mais, mas fazer menos do que outros". Jornal de Psicologia Social Aplicada. 25. 1297 1318. 10.1111 / j.1559-1816. 1995.tb02619. x. [24] Cohen, Universidade Geoffrey L. Stanford - "Identidade, crença e preconceito". https://ed.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/cohen_chap_h anson.pdf - (a ser publicado em J. Hanson Ed., "Ideologia, Psicologia e Direito") acessado em 29 de maio de 2020. [25] R ichard W . P aul " A Lógica da Criatividade e Pensamento Crítico "Primeiro Publicad 10 de setembro de 1993.Research artigo https://doi.org/10.1177/0002764293037001004 recuperadas em maio de 05,2020 [26] Lewis , Ralph MD Centro de Ciências da Saúde Sunnybrook Toronto https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/experts/ralphlewis-md, acessado em 03 de maio de 2020 [27] " Formação de crenças uma força motriz para a evolução do cérebro " Rüdiger J.Seitzab & Angel, HansFerdinand https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bandc.2020.105548 Retirado de https: //www.sciencedirect .com / science / article / pii / S0278262619303860 em maio de 03,2020 [28] Usó-Doménech, JL, Nescolarde-Selva, J. - " O que são sistemas de crenças? "Found Sci 1 , 147-152 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10699-015-9409-z As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 223 [29] Lewis, Ralph- (2018) - "Por que nos importamos, mesmo que o universo não o faça" Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books. [30] Usó-Doménech, JL, Nescolarde-Selva, J.- " O que são sistemas de crenças? " . Sci 21,147–152 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10699-015-9409-z acessado em 3 de maio de 2020 [31] Logan, Jim - "Entendendo a Crença Humana" https://www.universityofcalifornia.edu/news/understandi ng-human-belief -acessado em maio de 05,2020 [32] Warren , Daniel ( 2013) - " Realidade e impenetrabilidade na filosofia da natureza de Kant " Routledge [33] Casey, Edwards (1972) - "Teoria da realidade de Freud: um relato crítico" Review of Metaphysics. 25 (4): 659-690 [34] Realidade Interna / Realidade Externa Encyclopedia.com.https: //www.encyclopedia.com/psychology/dictionariesthesauruses-pictures-and-press-releases/internalrealityexternal-reality acessado em maio de 08,2020 [35] Reines Alvin J. "Conceitos de Realidade de Freud e Deus: Um texto de estudo" União Colégio Hebraico. anual . Vol. 61 (1990), pp. 219-270 . https://www.jstor.org/stable/23508177 Número de páginas: 52 acessado em maio de 08.2020. As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 224 [36] Poli, Roberto (2006) - "Níveis de realidade e estrato psicológico" Revista internacional de filosofia 2006/2 (# 236), páginas 163 180 [37] Epperson, Michael (2020) - "Realismo relacional e o universo ontogenético" Angelaki doi: 10.1080 / 0969725X.2020.1754029 https ://doi.org/10.1080/0969725X.2020.1754029 acessada em 20 de abril de 2020 [38] Ananthaswamy , Anil 2018 Em "Scientific American " https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/observations/whatdoes-quantum-theory-actually-tell-us-about-reality [39] Rowlands , Peter - " Existem alternativas para nossas atuais teorias da realidade física? " Departamento de Física da Universidade de Liverpool, Inhttps: //arxiv.org/pdf/0912.3433 acessado em maio de 09,2020. [40] Ropolyi , László - " Virtualidade e realidade em direção a uma ontologia de representação " Philosophies 2016, 1 , 40–54; doi: 10.3390 / philosophies1010040 [41] Inkpen, Robert & Wilson, Graham - " Ciência, Filosofia e Geografia Física " Routledge, 2013 [42] Trecho da letra da canção "Imagine" - (1971) John Lennon, (1940 -1980) & Yoko Ono (1933) Retirado de https://www.azlyrics.com/lyrics/johnlennon/imagine .html em maio de 13,2020. [43] Rene Descartes - " M editation" 6, NO VII 73 As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 225 [44] Lyons, John D. "Descartes e Imaginação Moderna " Philosophy and Literature, vol. 23 no. 2, 1999, p. 302-312. Projeto MUSE, doi: 10.1353 / phl.1999.0043 . [45] Sartre, Jean Paul "O imaginário uma psicologia fenomenológica da imaginação" Routledge London, 200 4. [46] Webber, Jonathan Introdução filosófica à edição de 2004 Routledge de "The Imaginary". [47] C. Wulf (2019) " A criação mimética do imaginário " . Aistese 12 (1): 5-14. doi: 10.13128 / Aisthesis-25617 [48] Bergson, Henri - "Matéria e memória" (2011) Digireads .com Publishing ISBN: 9781420939385 [49] Webber, Jonathan op.cit [50] Edmund Husserl, " Ideias: Introdução Geral à Fenomenologia Pura " , tr. WR Boyce Gibson (Nova York: Macmillan, 1962) [51] Freud, Sigmund - " Interpretação dos Sonhos" 1994 Barnes & Noble ISBN 1566195764 [52] Freud, Sigmund - . "Além do princípio do prazer " (The Standard Edition) . Trans. James Strachey. Nova York: Liveright Publishing Corporation, 1961. [53] Julien, Philippe - "O retorno de Jacques Lacan a Freud: o real, o simbólico e o imaginário" NYU Press (1994) ISBN10: 0814741983 ISBN-13: 978-0814741986 . As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 226 [54] Evans , Dylan " Um Dicionário Introdutório de Psicanálise Lacaniana", Londres: Routledge, 1996. – acessadoem,"Order." Http://timothyquigley.net/vcs/lacan-orders.pdf em maio 19,2020. [55] Hoedemaekers, Casper. (2008). " Rumo a uma sintomatologia da Organização? " . Ephemera. 8) [56] Dayton Glenn C. , " Criatividade perceptiva: onde a realidade interna e externa se reúnem " Primeira publicação: dezembro de 1976 https://doi.org/10.1002/j.2162-6057.1976.tb00147. acessado em maio de 19,2020 [57] Kucherenko , -Inna Imagonautas 2 (2) / 2012 / ISSN 07190166 - " Construcionismo imaginativo nas teorias sociais de Randall Collins " / pp. 119 130 [58] Wulf, C. (2019) "A criação mimética do imaginário ". Aistese 12 (1): 5-14. doi: 10.13128 / Aisthesis-25617 [59] Castoriadis, Cornelius (1975) - "O imaginário da sociedade" The MIT Press (1998) ISBN-10: 0262531550 ISBN -13: 978-0262531559 [60] Taylor, Charles, (2007) "Uma era secular" Harvard University Press; Edição Kindle ASIN: B002KFZLK2 [61] Herbrik, Regine e Schlechtriemen, Tobias Editorial para a edição especial "Escopos do imaginário social em sociologia" no ÖZS https://doi.org/10.1007/s11614-01900370-3 As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 227 [62] Cole, Stephen (Editor) "O que há de errado com a sociologia"? Editores de Transações; Editora: Koogan; Edição: 1 (2001) ISBN-10: 076580039 [63] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Collective_behavior acessado em 22 de maio de 2020. [64] Murphy, Peter - "A imaginação coletiva: o espírito criativo das sociedades livres" –2012 Routledge ISBN-10: 140942135X ISBN-13: 978-1409421351 [65] Jung, Carl Gustav - "Psicologia do inconsciente" Dover Publications (2003) ISBN-10: 0486424995 ISBN-13: 978-0486424996, e "Man and his Symbols" Dell; Reedição (1968) ISBN-10: 9780440351832, ISBN-13: 9780440351832 ASIN: 0440351839 [66] Milkoreit, Manjana (2017) - - "Política imaginária: mudanças climáticas e fazer o futuro" -. Elem Sci Anth, 5: 62. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1525/elementa.249 Editor-: Anne R. Kapuscinski, Dartmouth, editores associados: Kim Locke, Dartmouth College, EUA; Alastair Iles, Universidade da Califórnia em Berkeley, EUA [67] Tse, Peter Ulric ": A base neural do livre-arbítrio: critérios causais" ( 2015) The MIT Press (1602) ASIN: B015X3Y176 [68] Dowden , Bradley Internet Encyclopedia of Philososophy https://www.iep.utm.edu/truth/acessado em maio de 27.2020. [69] Dowden , Bradley Internet Encyclopedia of Philososophy https://www.iep.utm.edu/truth/acessado em maio de 27.2020. As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 228 [70] Glanzberg, Michael, "Truth", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Edição de outono de 2018), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), acessado em maio de 27.2020 https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/ fall2018 / entries / truth / [71] Johachim, HH "A natureza da verdade: um ensaio" -, Nabu Press, (2009) ISBN-10: 1141268205 ISBN-13: 9781141268207 [72] Hanly , Charles, 'O conceito de verdade na psicanálise'. http://www.psychomedia.it/rapaport-klein/hanly91.htm acessado em 28 de maio de 2020 [73] Tarski, A. 1936, Über den Begriff der logischen Folgerung. Em Actes du Congrès international de philosophie science, Paris 1935, fasc. 7: Logique, Paris, Herman, p. 1–11; Eng. tr. em Tarski 1956, 409-420. Tarski, A. 1944, A concepção semântica da verdade e os fundamentos da semântica., Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4, 341-395; reimpresso em Tarski 1 Collected Papers, v. 2, Birkhäuser, Basileia, pp. 665–699. Tarski, A. 1956, Lógica, Semântica, Metamatemática. Documentos de 1923 a 1938, Oxford, Clarendon Press; 2a ed., Hackett Publishing Company, Indianápolis, Tarski, A., 1956a, O conceito de verdade em línguas formalizadas. Em Tarski 1956, 152–278 [Eng. tr. de Tarski 1935]. Tarski, A., 1969. Truth and Proof. L'age de la Science 1, 279301; reimpresso em Tarski 1986, v. 4, 399-422. As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 229 Tarski, A., 1986, Collected Papers, v. 1-4, Basileia, Birkhäuser [74] Lumpkin, Jonathan, "Uma concepção semântica da verdade" (2014). Teses de Honra Sênior. 60.https paper: //scholarworks.uno.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi article = 1057 & context = honors_theses? acessado em maio de 28,2020 [75] Hodges, Wilfrid, "Definições da verdade de Tarski", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (edição de outono de 2018), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries / tarski-truth / [76] Woleński , janeiro - "A Teoria Semântica da Verdade", em https://www.iep.utm.edu/s-truth/ (Universidade de Tecnologia da Informação, Gerenciamento e Tecnologia da Polônia ) acessado em 01 de maio de 2020 [77] Frege, G., 1918. 'Thoughts', em suas Investigações Lógicas, Oxford: Blackwell, 1977. [78] Quine, WVO, 1970 . Filosofia da Lógica, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall. [79] Ramsey, FP, 1927 . 'Facts and Propositions', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 7 (Suplementar): 153–170. [80] Ayer, AJ, 1935. 'The Criterion of Truth', Analysis, 3: 28– 32 [81] Stoljar, Daniel e Damnjanovic, Nic, "A teoria deflacionária da verdade", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (edição de outono de 2014), Edward N. Zalta As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 230 (ed.), Https://plato.stanford.edu/archives / fall2014 / entradas / deflacionário da verdade / acessado em maio de 05,2020 [82] Anil Gupta "Uma crítica ao deflacionismo" Temas Filosóficos. 21 NO. 2, PRIMAVERA 1993 . https://cpb-usw2.wpmucdn.com/voices.uchicago.edu/dist/9/177/files/2 010/10/A-Critique-of Deflationism.pdf . acessado em maio, 29,2020 . [83] Verdade Queensborough Community College. https://www.qcc.cuny.edu/SocialSciences/ppecorino/INT RO_TEXT/Chapter%205%20Epistemology/Truth.htmret rieved em Jun 01,2020 [84] Peirce , Charles Sanders " Raciocínio e a lógica das coisas " (1898). Editado por Kenneth Laine Ketner (1992) / " Pragmatismo como princípio e método de pensamento correto" (1903) Harvard "Lectures on Pragmatism" em uma edição de estudo Editado por Patricia Ann Turisi, 1997 [85] James, William. Pragmatismo: um novo nome para algumas formas antigas de pensar . Nova York: Longman Green and Co., 1907. [86] Holmes, Oliver Wendell (1995). The Collected Works of Justice Holmes (S. Novick, org.). Universidade Federal de São Paulo (UNIFESP). [87] Dewey , John - " Trabalhos Colecionados de John Dewey, Índice 1882 1953" Editado por Jo Ann Boydston Imprensa da Universidade de South Illinois. 978-0-80931728-8 26/11/1991 [88] Rorty , Richard - "Filosofia e o Espelho da Natureza". Princeton University Press, (1979). / "Consequências do Pragmatismo." Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, (1982) / "Objetividade, Relativismo e Verdade": As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 231 Artigos Filosóficos I. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991 [89] Perez, Diana Ines, "Filosofia Analítica na América Latina", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosop hy (Edição Primavera 2020), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), Https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2020 / inputs / latin-american-analytic / (acessado em 29 de maio de 2020). [90] Ramsey, Frank, p. (1930) - " Sobre a Verdade" , ed. de Nicholas Rescher e Ulrich Majer, Dordrecht, Kluwer. Citado como OT. DOI: 10.1007 / 978-94-011-3738-6 [91] Teoria pragmática da verdade | Wiki Psicologia | Fãclube. https://psychology.wikia.org/wiki/Pragmatic_theory_of_t ruth recuperado em 01 de junho de 2020 [92] Dazzani, Maria Virgínia Machado "O Pragmatismo da Teoria do Conhecimento e da Aprendizagem" UFBA Caderno Digital Ano 14 no 10 V10- (UFBA) Jul / Dez 2008, ISSN 1806-9142. [93] Teoria pragmática uma visão geral | Tópicos do ScienceDirect. https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/computerscience/pragmatic-theory . acessado em Jun, 01,2020 [94] Capps, J. Uma teoria pragmática do senso comum da verdade. Philosophia 48, 463-481 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-019-00099-z [95] Haack, Susan - "Evidência e investigação" Oxford: Blackwell, 1993. As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 232 [96] Meiland, Jack W. - " Conceitos de verdade relativa " The Monist 60 (4): 568-582 (1977) https://philpapers.org/rec/MEICOR [97] Capps, J. Uma teoria pragmática do senso comum da verdade. Philosophia 48 , 463-481 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-019-00099-z [98] Myers, David (2012) - "Psicologia Social" McGraw-Hill Education; Edição 11 ISBN10 : 0078035295 ISBN-13 : 9780078035296 - [99] Campos, Rui C. " A definição dos mecanismos de defesa e sua avaliação: algumas contribuições " Revista Iberoamericana de Diagnóstico e Avaliação e Avaliação Psicológica. RIDEP * No50 * Vol.1 * 149 -161 https ://doi.org/10.21865/RIDER50.1.12 [100] Gleser, GC e Ihilevich, D. (1969). Um instrumento objetivo para medir mecanismos de defesa. Jornal de Consultoria e Psicologia Clínica, 33 (1), 51–60. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0027381 [101] Namnyak, M & Tufton, Nicola & Szekely, R & Toal, M & Worboys, S & Sampson, Elizabeth. (2008). 'Síndrome de Estocolmo': diagnóstico psiquiátrico ou mito urbano? Acta psychiatrica Scandinavica. 117. 4-11. 10.1111 / j.16000447.2007.01112. x. [102] Freud, Sigmund, "Sobre o Narcisismo: Uma Introdução" , ( 1914 ) 1925 CP, 4, 30-59. (Tr. CM Baines. [103] Hewitson, Owen O que Lacan diz sobre o palco do espelho?Parte I https://www.lacanonline.com/2010/09/what-does-lacanAs sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 233 say-about-the-mirror-stage-part-i/ recuperado em junho, 09,2020 [104] Laplanche e Pontalis, " A Linguagem da Psicanálise " , Londres: Karnac, 2004 [105] Sophie de Mijolla-Mellor https ://www.encyclopedia.com/psychology/dictionariesthesauruses-pictures-and-press-releases/ego-idealidealego acessado em 10 de junho de 2020 [106] Julien, Philippe "O retorno de Jacques Lacan a Freud: o real, o simbólico e o imaginário" -NYU Press; Rev. Ed. (1995 ) ISBN: 0814742262 [107] Kohut, Heinz (1968). "O tratamento psicanalítico de transtornos de personalidade narcisista: esboço de uma abordagem sistemática" .O estudo psicanalítico da criança. Londres, Inglaterra: Taylor e Francis. [108] Aaron L. Pincus, Mark R. Lukowitsky - " Narcisismo patológico e Desordem da personalidade narcisista Annu Rev Clin Psychol . .2010; 6: 421-46 doi: 10.1146 / annurev.clinpsy.121208.131215. PMID: 20001728 [109] Grapsas , Stathis ; Brummelman , Eddie ; . Voltar , Mitja D , e Denissen , Jaap JA ' "O 'porquê' e 'como' do narcisismo: Um Modelo de Processo de Estado Narcissistico de Perseguição ' Perspect Psychol Sci. 2020 jan; 15 (1): 150-172 -. Publicado on-line 2019 dez 5.doi: 10.1177 / 1745691619873350 PMCID: PMC6970445 PMID : 31805811 [110] Czarna, AZ, Zajenkowski, M., Maciantowicz, O. et al. "A relação do narcisismo com a tendência de reagir com As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 234 raiva e hostilidade: os papéis do neuroticismo e da capacidade de regulação da emoção". Curr Psychol (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12144-019-00504-6 acessado em 10 de junho de 2020 [111] Zajenkowski Marcin, Maciantowicz Oliwia, Szymaniak Kinga, Urban Paweł " Narcisismo Vulnerável e Grandioso Estão Associados Diferentemente à Capacidade e Traço de Inteligência Emocional " Fronteiras em Psicologia-VOLUME 9 2018 https://www.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389 /fpsyg.2018.01606 DOI = 10.3389 / fpsyg.2018.01606 ISSN = 1664-1078 acessado 10 de junho de 2020 . [112] Herbert, Christopher , " Science and Narcissism " Modernismo / modernidade Volume 3, Número 3, setembro de 1996 Johns Hopkins University Press acessado em Mai 03,2020 [113] Sigmund Freud, "A Dificuldade no Caminho de Psicanálise", em The Standard Edition Obras Completas de Sigmund Freud, vol. 17, trad. e ed. James Strachey (Londres: Hogarth Press, 1955), p. 140. [114] Wagner, HR (1983). Alfred Schutz: Uma biografia intelectual. Chicago e Londres, The University of Chicago Press. [115] Berger Peter L. e Luckmann Thomas A construção social da realidade Um tratado na sociologia do conhecimento Penguin Books [116] Bartlett, FC (1932). Relembrando: Um estudo em psicologia experimental e social. Cambridge University Press. As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 235 [117] Mitcham Carl & Ryder Martin (2005) Social C onstructionism (2020) Enciclopédia de filosofia https://www.encyclopedia.com/social-sciences-andlaw/sociology-and-social-reform/sociology-general-termsand-concepts/social-constructionism Recuperado em 14 de junho de 2020 [118] 1) O triângulo de Penrose, também conhecido como tribar de Penrose ou tribar impossível, é um objeto triangular impossível, uma ilusão de ótica que consiste em um objeto que pode ser representado em um desenho em perspectiva, mas não pode existir como um objeto sólido. Foi criado pela primeira vez pelo artista sueco Oscar Reutersvärd em 1934. Independentemente de Reutersvärd, o triângulo foi usado e popularizado na década de 1950 pelo psiquiatra Lionel Penrose e seu filho, proeminente matemático Roger Penrose, que o descreveu como "impossibilidade em sua forma mais pura". . É destacado nas obras do artista MC Escher, cujas representações anteriores de objetos impossíveis o inspiraram parcialmente. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Penrose_triangle acessado em 15 de junho de 2020 2) Penrose, LS; Penrose, R. (fevereiro de 1958). "Objetos impossíveis: um tipo especial de ilusão visual". British Journal of Psychology . 491): 31-33. doi: 10.1111 / j.20448295.1958.tb00634.x . PMID 13536303 3) Imagem básica creditada a Tobias R. Metoc Trabalho próprio, Domínio Público, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=2520 370 [119] Trecho da letra da canção "Dust in the Wind" As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 236 [120] James Hillman (1983) - "Archetypal Psychology" Edição uniforme, vol. 1 (Spring Publications, 2004. Original 1983.) [121] Sutton, Walter e Foster, Richard - "Modern Criticism, Theory and Practice . "The Odyssey Print N Y 1963 p.303 [122] Festinger, L (1964). Conflito, decisão e dissonância (Vol. 3) . Stanford University Press. Festinger, L. & Carlsmith, JM (1959). Consequências cognitivas do cumprimento forçado. O Jornal de Psicologia Anormal e Social. [123] Tylor, Burnett E. - (1871) - "Cultura primitiva: pesquisas sobre o desenvolvimento da mitologia, filosofia, religião, arte e costume" - (l920) London, Ed. John Murray [124] Uma história do animismo e seus exemplos contemporâneos editada por Matthew A. McIntosh https://brewminate.com/a-history-of-animism-and-itscontemporary-examples/ Publicado em 31 de março de 2019 acessado em 21 de junho de 2020 Originalmente publicado por New World Encyclopedia , 18.11.2016 , [125] Frazer, James G– (1890) " O ramo de ouro; um estudo de magia e religião " [126] Wulf , C. (2019) A criação mimética do imaginário. Aistese 12 (1): 5-14. doi: 10.13128 / Aisthesis-25617 [127] Uma história do animismo e seus exemplos contemporâneos editada por Matthew A. McIntosh https://brewminate.com/a-history-of-animism-and-itscontemporary-examples/ Publicado em 31 de março de As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 237 2019 acessado em 21 de junho de 2020 Originalmente publicado por New World Encyclopedia , 18.11.2016 , [128] Bellini , Paolo - " O imaginário coletivo da civilização moderna " (2018) Filosofia e questões públicas (nova série) , vol. 8, No. 3 (2018): 17-29 Imprensa da Universidade Luiss E-ISSN 2240-7987 | P-ISSN 1591-0660 [129] Herbert, Nick (2002). "Física Holística ou Uma Introdução ao Tantra Quântico" https://southerncrossreview.org/16/herbert.essay.htm acessado em 19 de junho de 2020 [130] Krieglstein Werner J. " Compaixão: uma nova filosofia do outro " 2002 [131] Winkler, Martin M. (2001). "Projeções imperiais: Roma antiga na cultura popular moderna". Baltimore, Estados Unidos e Londres, Inglaterra: The Johns Hopkins University Press. ISBN 0-8018-8268-0. [132] McLeod, SA (2017, 05 de fevereiro). " O experimento de choque de Milgram " . Simplesmente psicologia. https://www.simplypsychology.org/milgram.html acessado em 24 de junho de 2020. [133] Postmes, Tom & Turner, Felicity M., "Psicologia da desindividuação" em Enciclopédia Internacional das Ciências Sociais e Comportamentais (Segunda Edição) , 2015 [134] Bick James Hardie - (2020) " Violência em massa e o continuo da destruição: um estudo de C. P. Taylor's Good" (arte) Int J Semiot Law https://doi.org/10.1007/s11196020 -09718- acessado em 28/06 2020 As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 238 [135] Sêneca "Como tirar a própria vida". Em Epistulae Morales II (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953), p. 175. "apud" Sherefkin, Jack; Schwarzman, Stephen A. (2016) Imortalidade e o medo da morte Biblioteca Pública de Nova York. https ://www.nypl.org/blog/2016/02/04/immortality-feardeath acessado em 26 de junho de 2020 [136] Jung, CG Yates, Jenny ( Introdução) - (1999) " Jung sobre a morte e a imortalidade " Princeton University Press Princeton, Nova Jersey [137] Pascal, Blaise e TS Eliot " . Pensées de Pascal ". Nova York: EP Dutton, 1958. [138] Sherefkin, Jack ; Schwarzman, Stephen . (2016) Imortalidade e o medo da morte Biblioteca Pública de Nova York. https ://www.nypl.org/blog/2016/02/04/immortality-feardeath acessado em 26 de junho de 2020 [139] Sher, Leo Psychiatria Danubina, 2016; Vol. 28, No. 3, pp 307 Carta ao Editor © Medicinska naklada Zagreb, Croácia Perturbação e Suicídio da Personalidade Narcisista http://www.psychiatriadanubina.com/UserDocsImages/p df/dnb_vol28_no3/dnb_vol28_no3_307.pdf acessado em 16 de junho de 2020 [140] Chandler , Edward Beyond Ateismo Uma abordagem secular às práticas espirituais, morais e psicológicas , disponível na Amazon em 14/02/2019. Em https://www.edchandlerandbeyond.com/theblog/2019/1/21/anthropocentrism-relationship-withreligion-and-prejudice-blog2 acessado em 16 de junho de 2020. As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 239 [141] Karnal, Leandro - "O deus Errado " (artigo) Jornal O Estado de S. Paulo, 3 de Maio rd , 2020 acessado a partir https://cultura.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,o-deus errado, 70003290304. [142] Guthrie, Stewart E - "Anthropomorphism" Encyclopaedia Britannica, inc. Publicado em 15 de abril de 2008, https://www.britannica.com/topic/anthropomorphism acessado em 27 de junho de 2020 [143] Vallicella, William F. (20129) - "Divine Simplicity" na Enciclopédia de Stanford of Philosophy https ://plato.stanford.edu/entries/divine-simplicity/ recuperado em 27 de junho de 2020 [144] Crane, Stephen - "A guerra é gentil e outros poemas " Dover Publications ( 2016) ISBN-10: 0486404242 / ISBN-13: 978-0486404240 [145] Shuttleworth, Martyn e Wilson Lyndsay T "O que é um paradigma?-Filosofia da Ciência https ://explorable.com/what-is-a-paradigm acessado em 30 de junho de 2020 [146] Kuhn, Thomas - " A Estrutura das Revoluções Científicas" segunda edição, ampliada Enciclopédia Internacional de Ciência \unificada Volumes I Fundações da Unidade de Ciência Volume II número 2 em extensão: // ohfgljdgelakfkefopgklcohadegdpjf / http : //www.turkpsikiyatri.org/arsiv/kuhn-ssr-2nded.pdf acessado em 30 de junho de 2020. As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 240 [147] Mylius , Ben - " Três tipos de antropocentrismo " em https://www.academia.edu/36367171/Three_Types_of_A nthropocentrism acessado em 30 de junho de 2020 [148] Herbert, Christopher. "Ciência e narcisismo". Modernismo / modernidade, vol. 3 no. 3, 1996. [149] Murdy , WH - " Antropocentrismo: Uma Versão Moderna " Science , 28 de março de 1975 -: vol. 187, Edição 4182, pp. 1168-1172 DOI: 10.1126 / science.187.4182.1168 [150] Pasi Heikkurinen, Jenny Rinkinen, Timo Järvensivu, Kristoffer Wilén e Toni Ruuska Organização no Antropoceno: um esboço ontológico para a teorização ecocêntrica Journal of Cleaner Production Volume 113,1 de fevereiro de 2016, páginas 705-714 https: //doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2015.12.016 [151] Menadue, Christopher Benjamin, Karen Diane Cultura Humana e ficção científica: uma revisão da literatura, 1980-2016 Publicado 3 de agosto de 2017 Research artigo https://doi.org/10.1177/2158244017723690 As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 241 bibliografia completa (em ordem alfabética) A Aaron L Pincus, Mark R Lukowitsky - "Pathological Narcissism and Narcissistic Personality Disorder" -Annu Rev Clin Psychol.2010;6:421-46 -doi: 10.1146/annurev.clinpsy.121208.131215.PMID: 20001728 Abbott, Andrew. 2004. "Methods of discovery. Heuristics for the social sciences". New York/ London: W. W. Norton & Company. Adams, Suzi, Paul Blokker, Natalie J.Doyle, John W.M.Krummel, and Jeremy C.A Smith. 2015. "Social imaginaries in debate".Social Imaginaries (1):15–52.Article Google Scholar Adorno, Th. W., 1984: "Aesthetic Theory". Routledge & Kegan Paul, London. Allison, Scott T and Messick, David M. – (1985) "The Group Attribution Error" – Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 21(6): 563-579 A History of Animism and Its Contemporary Examples Edited by Matthew A. McIntosh https://brewminate.com/a-history-of-animism-and-itscontemporary-examples/ Posted on March 31, 2019 – retrieved on Jun 21,2020 Originally published by New World Encyclopedia, 11.18.2016 Ananthaswamy, Anil 2018In "Scientific American." https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/observations/whatdoes-quantum-theory-actually-tell-us-about-reality As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 242 Anderson, Benedict. 1991. Imagined communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism". London: Verso.Google Scholar Anderson,J. R.(1976) Language, memory, and thought.Erlbaum. [WTN]Google Scholar Anderson,J. R.(1983) The architecture of cognition. Harvard University Press. [WTN]Google Scholar Andrews, Tom. "What is Social Constructionism?" Grounded Theory Review: An International Journal, vol. 11, no. 1, 2012. http://groundedtheoryreview.com/2012/06/01/what-issocial-constructionism/ Anil Gupta "A Critique of Deflationism"PhilosophicaL Topicsvow. 21 NO. 2, SPRING 1993. https://cpb-usw2.wpmucdn.com/voices.uchicago.edu/dist/9/177/files/20 10/10/A-Critique-of Deflationism.pdf. Retrieved on May,.29,2020. Appadurai, Arjun. 1996." Modernity at large: cultural dimensions of globalization." Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.Google Scholar Appadurai, Arjun. 2002. "Deep democracy: urban governmentality and the horizon of politics".Public Culture14(1):21–47. Article-Google Scholar Arendt, Hannah. 1966." The Origins of Totalitarianism". New ed. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World. Arendt, Hannah, Love and Saint Augustine. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996 Arnason, Johann P. 1989." Culture and imaginary significations." Thesis Eleven 22:25–45. Article Google Scholar As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 243 Ayer, A.J., 1935. 'The Criterion of Truth', Analysis, 3: 28–32 Arnheim, R. (1969) Visual thinking. University of California Press. [JG]Google Scholar B Balfou,r Arthur James," A Defence of Philosophic Doubt: Being an Essay on the Foundation of Belief" (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1920). Baron J (1994)." Thinking and deciding". Cambridge University Press.ISBN978-0-521-43732-5 Baars,B. J. (1989) A cognitive theory of consciousness. Cambridge University Press. [rMV, DN]Google Scholar Bartlett, F. C. (1932).Remembering: A study in experimental and social psychology.Cambridge University Press. Beckert, Jens. 2011. "Imagined futures. Fictionality in economic action." MPIfG Discussion Paper11(8):1–30. Bellini, Paolo - "The Collective Imaginary of Modern Civilization" (2018) Philosophy and Public Issues (New Series), Vol. 8, No. 3 (2018): 17-29 Luiss University Press E-ISSN 22407987 | P-ISSN 1591-0660 Berger Peter L. and Luckmann Thomas The Social Construction of Reality A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge – Penguin Books Bergson, Henri – "Matter and Memory" (2011)Digireads .com Publishing ISBN:9781420939385 As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 244 "Berkson's Paradox | Brilliant Math & Science Wiki". brilliant.org. Retrieved 2020-05-06. Bick James Hardie‐ (2020)" Mass Violence and the Continuum of Destruction: A study of C. P. Taylor's Good" (art) Int J Semiot Law https://doi.org/10.1007/s11196-020-09718retrieved on Jun 28, 2020 Bittarello, M.B. Mythologies of virtuality: "Other space" and "shared dimension" from ancient myths to cyberspace. In The Oxford Handbook of Virtuality; Grimshaw, M., Ed.; Oxford University Press: New York, NY, USA, 2014. Bowell, T., & Kingsbury, J. (2015). "Virtue and enquiry: Bridging the transfer gap". In: M. Davies & R. Barnett (Eds.), "Critical Thinking in Higher Education". New York: Palgrave MacMillan. Bowins, B. (2010). "Personality disorders: A dimensional defense mechanism approach". American Journal of Psychotherapy , Boydston, Ann (ed.), Kathleen Poulos (text. ed.), Ernest Nagel (intro.), Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale and Edwardsville, IL, 1986. Brey, P. The physical and social reality of virtual worlds. In The Oxford Handbook of Virtuality; Grimshaw, M., Ed.; Oxford University Press: New York, NY, USA, 2014; pp. 42– 54. Brewer, MB (1979) – "In-group bias in the minimal intergroup situation: A cognitive-motivational analysis."American Psychological Association Psychological Bulletin 86 (2), 307 https://psycnet.apa.org/record/197925967-001 As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 245 Brezinka, W. (1994). "Belief, Morals, and Education: Collected Essays on the Philosophy of Education." Avebury: Aldershot. Burr, Vivien (1995). "An Introduction to Social Constructionism". Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy; Vol 7, No 3 (1995); 267-267. 7. 10.5195/jffp.1995.375 C Campos, Rui C. "The Definition of Defense Mechanisms and their Assessment: Some Contributions"Revista Iberoamericana de Diagnóstico y Evaluación – e Avaliação Psicológica. RIDEP * No50 * Vol.1 * 149 -161 – https://doi.org/10.21865/RIDER50.1.12 Candlish, Stewart and Damnjanovic, Nic, 2018, "The identity theory of truth", in M. Glanzberg (ed.) 2018, 255– 282. Capps, J. A Common-Sense Pragmatic Theory of Truth. Philosophia 48, 463–481 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-019-00099-z Cartwright, Richard, 1987, "A neglected theory of truth", in Philosophical Essays, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 71–93. Casey, Edwards (1972) – "Freuds Theory of Reality: A critical Account" – Review of Metaphysics. 25(4):659-690 Castoriadis, Cornelius (1975) - "The Imaginary of Society - " The MIT Press (1998) ISBN-10:0262531550 ISBN-13:9780262531559 Chandler, Edward Beyond Atheism – A Secular Approach to Spiritual, Moral, and Psychological Practices, available on Amazon on 2/14/2019. In As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 246 https://www.edchandlerandbeyond.com/theblog/2019/1/21/anthropocentrism-relationship-withreligion-and-prejudice-blog2 – retrieved on Jun 16,2020. Chu, Hyejin Iris. "Social Constructionism." International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. Encyclopedia.com. 2008. https://www.encyclopedia.com/social-sciencesand-law/sociology-and-social-reform/sociology-generalterms-and-concepts/social-constructionism Cohen, Geoffrey L. Stanford University –"Identity, Belief, and Bias" https://ed.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/cohen_chap_h anson.pdf - (to appear in J. Hanson Ed., "Ideology, Psychology, and Law") – retrieved on May,29,2020. Cole, Stephen (Editor) "What's Wrong with Sociology"? Transaction Publishers; 1 edition (2001) ISBN-10:076580039X ISBN-13:78-0765800398 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Collective_behavior retrieved on May 22,2020. Cole, Stephen (Editor) "What's Wrong with Sociology"? Transaction Publishers; 1 edition (2001) ISBN-10:076580039X ISBN-13:78-0765800398 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Collective_behavior retrieved on May 22,2020. Collins, R. (1998) "The Sociology of Philosophies: A Global Theory of Intellectual Change". Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Collins, R. (2009) "Four sociological traditions". Oxford University PressLibrary,. Cooley, C.H. (1897)," The process of social change", In J. D. Peters, & P. Simonson, Mass Communication and As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 247 American Social Thought Key Texts 1919-1968 Rowman & Littlefield. Czarna, A.Z., Zajenkowski, M., Maciantowicz, O.et al. "The relationship of narcissism with tendency to react with anger and hostility: The roles of neuroticism and emotion regulation ability".Curr Psychol (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12144-019-00504-6 retrieved on Jun,10,2020 D Damer, B.; Hinrichs R. The virtuality and reality of avatar cyberspace. In The Oxford Handbook of Virtuality; Grimshaw, M., Ed.; Oxford University Press: New York, NY, USA, 2014; pp. 17–41. Davidson, Donald, 1967, "Truth and meaning", Synthese, 17: 304–323. Reprinted in Davidson (1984). Dayton Glenn C., "Perceptual Creativity: Where Inner and Outer Reality Come Together" First published: December 1976 https://doi.org/10.1002/j.2162-6057.1976.tb00147. Dazzani, Maria Virgínia Machado "O Pragmatismo de Peirce como Teoria do Conhecimento e da Aprendizagem" – UFBA – Caderno Digital Ano 14 – no 10 – V10- (UFBA) – Jul/Dez 2008, ISSN 1806-9142 – Free translation by the author. Retrieved on May, 19,2020 Deikman, A. J. (1966) Deautomatization and the mystical experience. Psychiatry 29:324–38. [KRR]CrossRef-Google Scholar Dennett, D. C. (1991) Consciousness explained. Little Brown. [rMV]Google Scholar As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 248 Dennett, D. C. & Kinsbourne, M. (1992) Time and the observer: The where and when of consciousness in the brain. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15:183–200. [rMV] | Google Scholar Descartes, René – "Meditation" 6, AT VII 73 Dewey, John -- "Collected Works of John Dewey, Index 1882 – 1953" Edited by Jo Ann Boydston South Illinois University Press. 978-0-8093-1728-8 11/26/1991 Dewey, John (1938), "Logic: The Theory of Inquiry," Henry Holt and Company, New York, NY, 1938. "John Dewey, The Later Works", 1925–19 Dixon, N. F. (1971) Subliminal perception: The nature of a controversy. McGraw-Hill. [JG]Google Scholar Dowden,Bradley Internet Enyclopedia of Phylosophy https://www.iep.utm.edu/truth/-retrieved on May,27,2020. Durkheim, Emile (1995) "The Elementary Forms of Religious Life". Translated by Karen E. Fields. Free Press, E Easthope, Anthony. The Unconscious. London: Routledge, 1999. Engmann, J. (1976). Imagination and Truth in Aristotle. Journal of the History of Allport, D. A., Tipper, S. P. & Chmiel, N. R. J. (1985) Perceptual integration and postcategorical filtering. In: Attention and performance XI, ed. Posner, M. Erlbaum. [WTN]Google Scholar Epicurus, "Letter to Menoeceus." In The Epicurus Reader: selected writings and testimonial translated and edited, As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 249 with notes, by Brad Inwood and L.P. Gerson; introduction by D.S. Hutchinson. Indianapolis : Hackett, 1994. Epperson, Michael (2020) – "Relational Realism and the Ontogenetic Universe" – Angelaki doi: 10.1080/0969725X.2020.1754029 https ://doi.org/10.1080/0969725X.2020.1754029 retrieved on May,20,2020 Ertz, Susan."Anger in the Sky."New York, London, Harper & brothers [1943]. Eskin, Mehmet (2013)– "Problem Solving Therapy in the Clinical Practice" (2013)– Elsevier ISBN 978-0-12-398455-5 – DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/C2011-0-07817-1 Evans, Dylan "An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis,", London: Routledge, 1996.-Retrieved from," Order." http://timothyquigley.net/vcs/lacanorders.pdf on May 19,2020. F Ferm, Vergilius (1962), "Consensus Gentium?: Goldberg, I., Kingsbury, J., Bowell, T., & Howard, D. (2015). "Measuring critical thinking about deeply held beliefs: Can the California Critical Thinking Dispositions Inventory help?" Inquiry: Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines 30 (1), 4050.Phylosophy Documentation Center https ://www.pdcnet.org/inquiryct/Inquiry:-CriticalThinking-Across-the-Disciplines Frank Fair, Managing Editor ISSN 2153-9871 (online)in Runes (1962). Festinger, L (1964). Conflict, decision, and dissonance (Vol. 3). Stanford University Press. As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 250 Festinger, L., & Carlsmith, J. M. (1959). Cognitive consequences of forced compliance. The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology. Frazer, James George, "The Golden Bough: A Study in Magic and Religion" (New York: Collier Books, 1963 Frazer, James G– (1890) "The Golden Bough; a Study in Magic and Religion" Freydberg, B. (2005)." Imagination in Kant's Critique of Practical Reason." Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. Frege, G., 1918. 'Thoughts', in his Logical Investigations, Oxford: Blackwell, 1977. Freud, Sigmund – "Interpretation of Dreams" 1994 Barnes & Noble ISBN 1566195764 Freud, Sigmund -."Beyond the Pleasure Principle" (The Standard Edition). Trans. James Strachey. New York: Liveright Publishing Corporation, 1961. Freud, Sigmund, "On Narcissism: An Introduction",( 1914) 1925 C.P., 4, 30-59. (Tr. C. M. Baines. Freud, Sigmund "A Difficulty in the Path of PsychoAnalysis," in TheStandard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud,vol. 17, trans. and ed. James Strachey (London: Hogarth Press, 1955), G Galbin, Alexandra. "An Introduction to Social Constructionism." Social Research Reports, vol. 26, 2014, pp. 82-92. https://www.researchreports.ro/anintroduction-to-social-constructionism As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 251 Gergen, Kenneth J. "The Self as Social Construction." Psychological Studies, vol. 56, no. 1, 2011, pp. 108-116. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12646-011-0066-1 Glanzberg, Michael, "Truth", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta(ed.), Retrieved on May,27,2020 https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/truth/ Gleser, G. C., & Ihilevich, D. (1969). An objective instrument for measuring defense mechanisms. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 33(1), 51– 60.https://doi.org/10.1037/h0027381 Grapsas, Stathis; Brummelman,Eddie;. Back, Mitja D , and Denissen, Jaap J. A. 'The "Why" and "How" of Narcissism: A Process Model of Narcissistic Status Pursuit' -Perspect Psychol Sci. 2020 Jan; 15(1): 150–172-. Published online 2019 Dec 5.doi:10.1177/1745691619873350 -PMCID: PMC6970445 PMID:31805811 Grijalva, E., Newman, D. A., Tay, L., Donnellan, M. B., Harms, P. D., Robins, R. W., et al. (2015). "Gender differences in narcissism: a meta-analytic review." Psychol. Bull. 141, 261–310. doi: 10.1037/a0038231 Grimshaw, M., Ed. The Oxford Handbook of Virtuality; Oxford University Press: New York, NY, USA, 2014. Goldberg, I., Kingsbury, J., Bowell, T., & Howard, D. (2015). "Measuring critical thinking about deeply held beliefs: Can the California Critical Thinking Dispositions Inventory help?" Inquiry: Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines 30 (1), 40-50.Phylosophy Documentation Center https ://www.pdcnet.org/inquiryct/Inquiry:-CriticalThinking-Across-the-Disciplines Frank Fair, Managing Editor ISSN 2153-9871 (online) Guthrie, Stewart E - "Anthropomorphism" Encyclopaedia Britannica, inc. – Published Apr 15, 2008, As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 252 https://www.britannica.com/topic/anthropomorphism retrieved on Jun 27, 2020 l H Haack, Susan (1993), Evidence and Inquiry Towards Reconstruction in Epistemology, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, UK. Habermas, Jürgen (1976), "What Is Universal Pragmatics?", 1st published, "Was heisst Universalpragmatik?", Sprachpragmatik und Philosophie, Karl-Otto Apel (ed.), Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main. Reprinted, pp. 1–68 in Jürgen Habermas, Communication and the Evolution of Society, Thomas McCarthy (trans.), Beacon Press, Boston, MA, 1979. Hanly, Charles, 'The Concept of Truth in Psychoanalysis'. http://www.psychomedia.it/rapaport-klein/hanly91.htm retrieved on May,28,2020 Hendin, H. M., and Cheek, J. M. (1997)." Assessing hypersensitive narcissism: a reexamination of Murray's narcissism scale". J. Res. Pers.31, 588–599. doi: 10.1027/1614-0001/a000195 Herbert, Nick (2002). "Holistic Physics – or – An Introduction to Quantum Tantra". https://southerncrossreview.org/16/herbert.essay.htm retrieved on Jun 19,2020 Herbrik, Regine and Schlechtriemen, Tobias - *Editorial for the special issue "Scopes of the Social Imaginary in Sociology" in the ÖZS https://doi.org/10.1007/s11614019-00370-3 Heider, F (1958) "The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations". N.York: Wiley. As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 253 Hewitson, Owen -What Does Lacan Say About the Mirror Stage? – Part I https://www.lacanonline.com/2010/09/what-doeslacan-say-about-the-mirror-stage-part-i/ retrieved on Jun,09,2020 Hoedemaekers, Casper. (2008)." Toward a Symptomatology of Organization?". Ephemera. 8. Hodges, Wilfrid, "Tarski's Truth Definitions", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta(ed.), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/tarski -truth/ Holmes, Oliver Wendell (1995). The Collected Works of Justice Holmes (S. Novick, ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. ISBN 0226349667. Hornsby, Jennifer, 2001, "Truth: The identity theory", in The Nature of Truth, M. P. Horwich, Paul, 1990, Truth, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Lynch (ed.), Cambridge: MIT Press, 663–681. Husserl, Edmund "-Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology", tr. W. R. Boyce Gibson (New York: Macmillan, 1962) I Inkpen, Robert & Wilson, Graham – "Science, Philosophy and Physical Geography"-Routledge, 2013 Internal Reality/External Reality Encyclopedia.com - https://www.encyclopedia.com/psychology/dictionaries -thesauruses-pictures-and-press-releases/internalrealityexternal-realityretrieved on May,08,2020 As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 254 J James Hillman (1983) – "Archetypal Psychology" Uniform Edition, Vol. 1 (Spring Publications, 2004. Original 1983.) James, William. Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking. New York: Longman Green and Co., 1907. Jauk, E., Freudenthaler, H., and Neubauer, A. C. (2016)." The dark triad and trait versus ability emotional intelligence: emotional darkness differs between women and men". J. Individ. Differ. 37, 112–118. doi: 10.1027/16140001/a000166 Jermias J (2001). "Cognitive dissonance and resistance to change: The influence of commitment confirmation and feedback on judgement usefulness of accounting systems". Accounting, Organizations and Society.26(2): 141–160. doi:10.1016/s0361-3682(00)00008-8. Johachim, H.H. "The Nature of Truth: an Essay"-, Nabu Press, (2009) ISBN-10: 1141268205 ISBN-13: 9781141268207 Johnson HM, Seifert CM (November 1994). "Sources of the continued influence effect: When misinformation in memory affects later inferences".Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition. 1420– 1436.doi:10.1037/0278-7393.20.6.1420 Jost, J. T., & van der Toorn, J. (2012). System justification theory. In P. A. M. Van Lange, A. W. Kruglanski, & E. T. Higgins (Eds.),Handbook of theories of social psychology (p. 313–343). Sage Publications Ltd.https://doi.org/10.4135/9781446249222.n42 As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 255 Julien, Philippe – "Jacques Lacan's Return to Freud: The Real, the Symbolic, and the Imaginary"NYU Press (1994) ISBN-10:0814741983 ISBN-13:978-0814741986. Jung, Carl Gustav – "Psychology of the Unconscious" Dover Publications (2003) ISBN-10:0486424995 ISBN-13:9780486424996, and "Man and his Symbols" Dell; Reissue (1968) ISBN-10:9780440351832, ISBN-13:978-0440351832 ASIN:0440351839 Jung, Carl.Gustav.Yates, Jenny (Introduction) – (1999) "Jung on death and immortality" Princeton University Press Princeton, New Jersey K Karnal, Leandro - "O deus errado" (article) Journal O Estado de S.Paulo, May 3rd, 2020 – retrieved from https://cultura.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,o-deuserrado,70003290304. Free translation. Keith E. Stanovich & Richard F. West(2008)"On the failure of cognitive ability to predict my side and one-sided thinking biases,Thinking & Reasoning,14:2,129167,DOI:10.1080/13546780701679764 Kingsbury, Justine M. and Bowell, Tracy A. " Thinking critically about beliefs it's hard to think critically about" – (2016) – at University of Windsor, OSSA Conference Archive . Retrieved in Apr.28, 2020 from https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= 2255&context=ossaarchive Knorr Cetina, Karin. The Manufacture of Knowledge: An Essay on the Constructivist and Contextual Nature of Science. Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1981. As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 256 Kohut, Heinz (1968). "The Psychoanalytic Treatment of Narcissistic Personality Disorders: Outline of a Systematic Approach".The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child. London, England: Taylor & Francis. Koriat, Asher & Lichtenstein, Sarah & Fischhoff, Baruch. (1980). Reasons For Confidence. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Learning and Memory. 6. 107-118. 10.1037/0278-7393.6.2.107. Kosslyn, S. M. (1980) Image and mind. Harvard University Press. [JG]Google Scholar Krieglstein Werner J. "Compassion: a New Philosophy of the Other" 2002 Kruger, Justin;Dunning, David(1999). "Unskilled and Unaware of It: How Difficulties in Recognizing One's Own Incompetence Lead to Inflated Self- "Assessments".Journal of Personality and Social Psychology - .77(6):11211134CiteSeerX10.1.1.64.2655.doi:10.1037/002 23514.77.6.1121.PMID10626367 Kucherenko, -Inna Imagonautas 2 (2) / 2012/ ISSN 07190166 – "Imaginative Constructionism in the Social Theories of Randall Collins" / pp. 119 – 130 Kuhn, Thomas. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962. L La Berge, D. (1981) Automatic information processing: A review. In: Attention and performance IX, ed. Long, J. & Baddeley, A. Erlbaum. [rMV]Google Scholar Lacan, Jacques. "Ecrits: A Selection". Trans. Alan Sheridan. London: Tavistock, 1977 As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 257 Laplanche and Pontalis, "The Language of PsychoAnalysis", London: Karnac, 2004 Latour, Bruno, and Steve Woolgar. Laboratory Life: The Construction of Scientific Facts. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1979. Lennon, John & Ono, Yoko - "Imagine"Excerpt from the lyrics of the song (1971) John Lennon,.( 1940 -1980 ) & Yoko Ono (1933) – Retrieved from https://www.azlyrics.com/lyrics/johnlennon/imagine.html on May,13,2020. Le Bon, Gustav (1895)" Psychology of Crowds." Sparkling Books edition. Sparkling Books, (2009). Lévy-Bruh,l Lucien "Ethics and Moral Science." London: Constable, (1905) Lewis, Ralph M.D. Sunnybrook Health Sciences Centre Toronto https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/experts/ralphlewis-md retrieved in May, 03, 2020 - "Belief formation – a driving force for brain evolution" Lewis , Ralph- (2018)- "Why We Care Even If the Universe Doesn't"Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books. Lewis, Ralph, Finding Purpose in a Godless World: Why We Care Even If the Universe Doesn't (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2018). Libet, B. (1985) Unconscious cerebral initiative and the role of conscious will in voluntary action. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8:529–66. [rMV, AH] |Google Scholar Libet, B. (1991) Conscious functions and brain processes.Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14:685–86. [rMV] |Google Scholar As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 258 Libet, B., Wright, E. W. Jr., Feinstein, B. & Pearl, D. K. (1979) Subjective referral of the timing for a conscious experience: A functional role for the somatosensory specific projection system in man. Brain 102:193–224. [rMV] | Google Scholar |PubMed Logan, Jim – "Understanding Human Belief" https://www.universityofcalifornia.edu/news/understandi ng-human-belief retrieved on May,05,2020 Lyons, John D. "Descartes and Modern Imagination "Philosophy and Literature, vol. 23 no. 2, 1999, p. 302312.Project MUSE, doi:10.1353/phl.1999.0043. Lumpkin, Jonathan, "A Semantic Conception of Truth" (2014). Senior Honors Theses. Paper 60.https://scholarworks.uno.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?art icle=1057&context=honors_theses – retrieved on May,28,2020 M Mahoney MJ (1977). "Publication prejudices: An experimental study of confirmatory bias in the peer review system". Cognitive Therapy and Research.1(2): 161– 175.di:10.1007/bf01173636. McLeod, S. A. (2017, Febuary 05)." The Milgram shock experiment". Simply Psychology. https://www.simplypsychology.org/milgram.html retrieved on Jun. 24,2020. Manuel, Frank E., and ManueL, Fritzie P. "Utopian Thought in the Western World." Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1979 vb-cm. ISBN: 978-0674931862 As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 259 Markovits, H. (2003). "The development of thinking: Commentary". In: D. Fasko (Ed.,) Critical Thinking and Reasoning: Current Research, Theory, and Practice Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press. Marks G, Miller N (1987). "Ten years of research on the false-consensus effect: An empirical and theoretical review."Psychological Bulletin.102(1): 72– 90.doi:10.1037/0033-2909.102.1.72 Massumi, B. Envisioning the virtual. In The Oxford Handbook of Virtuality; Grimshaw, M., Ed.; Oxford University Press: New York, NY, USA, 2014; pp. 55–70. McLeod, Saul - "Defense Mechanisms" (updated 2019) Simply Psychology in https://www.simplypsychology.org/defensemechanisms.html retrieved on Jun,08/2020. Mead, George Herbert. Mind, Self, and Society, edited by C. W. Morris. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934. Meiland, Jack W. - "Concepts of Relative Truth" The Monist 60 (4):568-582 (1977) https://philpapers.org/rec/MEICOR Mellone, S. H. Psychology, Epistemology, Ontology, Compared and Distinguished – Mind-New Series, Vol. 3, No. 12 (Oct., 1894), pp. 474-490 -Published by: Oxford University Mezirow, J. (1990). "How critical reflection triggers transformative learning". In: J. Mezirow (Ed.), Fostering Critical Reflection in Adulthood: A Guide to Transformative and Emancipatory Learning (pp. 1-20). San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass Publishers MHRA Style Guide Modern Humanities Research Association1 January 2013•120pp ISBN: 978-1-78188009-8 As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 260 Mijolla-Mellor,Sophie de https ://www.encyclopedia.com/psychology/dictionaries -thesauruses-pictures-and-press-releases/ego-idealidealego retrieved on Jun,10,2020 Milgram S (October 1963). "Behavioral Study of Obedience."Journal of Abnormal Psychology. 67(4): 371– 8.doi: 10.1037/h0040525.PMID 14049516 Milkoreit, Manjana (2017) - - "Imaginary politics: Climate change and making the future" -. Elem Sci Anth, 5: 62. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1525/elementa.249 Domain Editor-in-Chief: Anne R. Kapuscinski, Dartmouth, Associate Editors: Kim Locke, Dartmouth College, US; Alastair Iles, University of California Berkeley, US Milkoreit, M and Mock, S (2014) "The Networked Mind: Collective Identities and the Cognitive-Affective Nature of Conflict." In: Masys, AJ (ed.), Networks and Network Analysis for Defence and Security, Lecture Notes in Social Networks, 161–188. Springer International Publishing.410001674506 Mitcham Carl & Ryder Martin (2005) Social Constructionism (2020) Encyclopedia of Philosophy https://www.encyclopedia.com/social-sciences-andlaw/sociology-and-social-reform/sociology-generalterms-and-concepts/social-constructionismRetrieved on Jun 14, 2020 More, Thomas. "Utopia." The Complete Works of St. Thomas More. Eds. SURTZ, Edward and J. H. Hexter. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1965. ISBN: 9780300009828. Myers, David (2012) – "Social Psychology" McGraw-Hill Education; 11 edition ISBN10: 0078035295 ISBN-13: 9780078035296 As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 261 Murphy, Peter – " The Collective Imagination: The Creative Spirit of Free Societies "–2012 – Routledge ISBN10:140942135X ISBN-13:978-1409421351 Mylius, Ben (2018) – "Three Types of Anthropocentrism" https://doi.org/10.5840/envirophil20184564 Retrived on Apr.29, 2020 N Namnyak, M & Tufton, Nicola & Szekely, R & Toal, M & Worboys, S & Sampson, Elizabeth. (2008). 'Stockholm syndrome': Psychiatric diagnosis or urban myth? Acta psychiatrica Scandinavica. 117. 4-11. 10.1111/j.16000447.2007.01112. x. Navon, D. (1989) The importance of being visible: On the role of attention in a mind viewed as an anarehic intelligence system. I. Basic tenets. European Journal of Cognitive Psychology 1:191–213. [DN] |Google Scholar Navon, D. (1991) The function of consciousness or of information? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14:690–91. [rMV, DN] | Google Scholar Neely, J. H. (1976) Semantic priming and retrieval from lexical memory: Evidence for facilitatory and inhibitory processes. Memory & Cognition 4:648–54. [WTN] |Google Scholar |PubMed Neely, J. H. (1977) Semantic priming and retrieval from semantic memory: Roles of inhibitionless spreading activation and limited-capacity attention. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 106:227–34. [WTN]Google Scholar Neill, W. T. (1977) Inhibitory and facilitatory-processes in attention, journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance 3:444–50. [WTN]Google Scholar As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 262 Neill, W. T. (1985) Levels of processing in disruptive effects of prior information. Memory & Cognition 13:477–84. [WTN] | Google Scholar | PubMed Neill, W. T. (1989) Ambiguity and context: An activationsuppression model. In: Resolving semantic ambiguity, ed. Gorfein, D. S.Springer-Verlag. [WTN]Google Scholar Neill, W. T. (1991) Consciousness and the inhibitory control of cognition. Invited address to the meeting of the American Psychological Association, San Francisco, 08. [WTN]Google Scholar Neill, W. T., Lissner, L. S. & Beck, J. L. (1990) Negative priming in samedifferent matching: Further evidence for a central locus of inhibition. Perception & Psychophysics 48:398–400. [WTN] | Google Scholar | PubMed Neill, W. T. & Westberry, R. L. (1987) Selective attention and the suppression of cognitive noise. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition 13:327–34. [WTN]Google Scholar Neisser, U. (1976) Cognition and reality: Principles and implications of cognitive psychology. Freeman. [JG]Google Scholar Nussbaum, Martha,The therapy of desire : theory and practice in Hellenistic ethics, Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, 1994 Nussbaum, Martha Craven. "Transcending Humanity." Love's Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990. Nusselder, A. Being more than yourself: Virtuality and human spirit. In The Oxford Handbook of Virtuality; Grimshaw, M., Ed.; Oxford University Press: New York, NY, USA, 2014 As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 263 O Ortega y Gasset, José "The Dehumanization of Art and Other Essays" on Art, Culture, and Literature,trans. Helene Weyl (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1968). P Pascal, Blaise, and T. S. Eliot".Pascal's Pensées". New York: E.P. Dutton, 1958. Paul, R. (1993). "Critical Thinking: What Every Person Needs to Survive in a Rapidly Changing World "Santa Rosa, CA: Foundation for Critical Thinking. Paul, R. (2002). "Critical Thinking: Tools for Taking Charge of Your Professional and Personal Life". Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Financial Times Prentice Hall. Pearson, Karl "The Grammar of Science: Physical" (1892;New York: Macmillan, (1911) Peirce, Charles Sanders "Reasoning and the Logic of Things" (1898). Edited by Kenneth Laine Ketner (1992)/" Pragmatism as a Principle and Method of Right Thinking" (1903) Harvard "Lectures on Pragmatism" in a study edition Edited by Patricia Ann Turisi, 1997 Penrose, L. S.; Penrose, R. (February 1958). "Impossible Objects: A Special Type of Visual Illusion". British Journal of Psychology. 491): 31–33. doi:10.1111/j.20448295.1958.tb00634.x.PMID13536303 As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 264 Perez, Diana Ines, "Analytic Philosophy in Latin America", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2020 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2020/entries/latinamerican-analytic/ (retrieved on May,29,2020.) Piaget, Jean. Genetic Epistomology. Translated by E. Duckworth. New York: Columbia University Press, 1970. Piaget, Jean. The Construction of Reality in the Child. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1955. Poincaré, Henri, "Science and Hypothesis" ,trans. W. S. G.(London: Scott, 1905), Poli, Roberto (2006) – "Levels of Reality and the Psychological Stratum" Revue internationale de philosophie 2006/2 (#236), pages 163 180 Postmes, Tom & Turner, Felicity M., "Psychology of Deindividuation" in International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences (Second Edition), 2015 Pragmatic theory of truth | Psychology Wiki | Fandom. https://psychology.wikia.org/wiki/Pragmatic_theory_of_tr uth retrieved on Jun,01,2020 Pragmatic Theory an overview | ScienceDirect Topics. https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/computerscience/pragmatic-theory. Retrieved on Jun,01,2020 Press on behalf of the Mind Association" https ://www.jstor.org/stable/2247848 retrieved on Apr. 27, 2020. As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 265 Q Quine, W.V.O., 1970. Philosophy of Logic, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall. R Ramsey,Frank,P. (1930) -"On Truth", ed. by Nicholas Rescher & Ulrich Majer, Dordrecht, Kluwer. Cited as OT. DOI :10.1007/978-94-011-3738-6 Ramsey, F.P., 1927. 'Facts and Propositions', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 7 (Supplementary): 153–170. Rao, K. R. (1989) Meditation: Secular and sacred: Review and assessment of some recent research. Journal of the Indian Academy of Applied Psychology 15:51–74. [KRR]Google Scholar Rao, K. R. & Palmer, J. (1987) The anomaly called psi: Recent research and criticism. Behavioral and Brain Sciences10:539–643. [KHR]CrossRef| Google Scholar Reines Alvin J. "Freud's Concepts of Reality and God:A Text Study" Hebrew Union College Annual.Vol. 61 (1990), pp. 219-270. https://www.jstor.org/stable/23508177-Page Count: 52 – retrieved on May,08,2020. Richard W. Paul "The Logic of Creative and Critical Thinking " First Published September 1, 1993 Research Article https://doi.org/10.1177/0002764293037001004 retrieved on May,05,2020 Richardson, A. (1983) Imagery: Definition and types. In: Imagery: Current theory, research, and application, ed. Sheikh, A. A.Wiley. [JG]Google Scholar As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 266 Ropolyi, László – " Virtuality and Reality-Toward a Representation Ontology" -Philosophies 2016, 1, 40–54; doi:10.3390/philosophies1010040 Rorty, Richard- "Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature". Princeton University Press, (1979). / "Consequences of Pragmatism."Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, (1982) / "Objectivity, Relativism and Truth": Philosophical Papers I. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991 Ross, L., Lepper, M. R., & Hubbard, M. (1975). Perseverance in self-perception and social perception: Biased attributional processes in the debriefing paradigm Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 32(5), 880–892.https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.32.5.880 Rowlands, Peter - "Are there alternatives to our present theories of physical reality?" Department of Physics, University of Liverpool, Inhttps://arxiv.org/pdf/0912.3433 – retrieved on May,09,2020. Rüdiger J.Seitzab & Angel, Hans-Ferdinand https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bandc.2020.105548 Retrieved from https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S027 8262619303860 on May, 03,2020 Russell, B. (1948) Human knowledge: Its scope and limits. Simon and Schuster. [KRR]Google Scholar S Sartre, Jean Paul "The Imaginarya phenomenological psychology of the imagination" – Routledge London, 2004. Schiller,F. C. S. "Studies in Humanism"(London: Macmillan,1912), As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 267 Schwitzgebel, Eric, "Belief", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2015 Edition), Edward N. Zalta(ed.), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/beli ef/ Searle, J. R. (1983) Intentionality: An essay in the philosophy of mind. Cambridge University Press. [KRR] | Google Scholar Searle, John.The Construction of Social Reality. New York: Free Press, 1995. Seneca (trans. R.M. Gummere). "On Taking One's Own Life." In Epistulae Morales II (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953) Sher, Leo Psychiatria Danubina, 2016; Vol. 28, No. 3, pp 307 Letter to Editor © Medicinska naklada Zagreb, Croatia Narcissistic Personality Disorder and Suicidehttp://www.psychiatriadanubina.com/UserDocsI mages/pdf/dnb_vol28_no3/dnb_vol28_no3_307.pdf retrieved on Jun 16,2020 Sherefkin, Jack; Schwarzman, Stephen A. (2016) Immortality and the Fear of Death New York Public Library. https ://www.nypl.org/blog/2016/02/04/immortality-feardeath retrieved on Jun 26,2020 Shevrin, H. (1991) A lawful first-person psychology involving a causal consciousness: A psychoanalytic solution. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14:693–94. [rMV] | Google Scholar Sloman, A. (1991) Developing concepts of consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14(4): 694–95. [rMV] | Google Scholar Smith, E. E., Haviland, S. E., Reder, L. M., Brownell, H. & Adams, N.(1976) When preparation fails: Disruptive effects As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 268 of prior information on perceptual recognition. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance 2:151–61. [WTN]Google Scholar | PubMed Sperry, R. W. (1976) Mental phenomena as causal determinants in brain function. In: Consciousness and the brain, ed. Globus, G. G., Maxwell, G. & Savodnik, I.Plenum Press. [KRR]Google Scholar Stanovich, K. E., & West, R. F. (2008). "On the failure of intelligence to predict myside bias and one-sided bias. Thinking and Reasoning". Journal Thinking & Reasoning, volume 14, 2008, Routledge, doi:10.1080/13546780701679764 Stewart, Jon. "Borges on Immortality." In Philosophy and Literature, Volume 17, Number 2, October 1993 Stoljar, Daniel and Damnjanovic, Nic, "The Deflationary Theory of Truth", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/truthdeflationary/ retrieved on May, 05,2020 Stroop, J. R. 1935) Studies of interference in serial verbal reactions. Journal of Experimental Psychology 18:643–62. [WTN] | Google Scholar Sutherland S (2007)."Irrationality: The Enemy Within" - Pinter & Martin.iSBN 978-1-905177-07-3. Sutton, Walter & Foster, Richard – "Modern Criticism, Theory and Practice. " – The Odyssey Print NY – 1963 – p.303 Tylor, Burnett E. – (1871) – "Primitive culture: researches into the development of mythology, philosophy, religion, art, and custom" -(l920) London, Ed. John Murray As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 269 T Tappenbeck, Inka. 1999. Phantasie und Gesellschaft. Zur soziologischen Relevanz der Einbildungskraft.Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann. Tarski, A. 1936, Über den Begriff der logischen Folgerung. In Actes du Congrès international de philosophie scientifique, Paris 1935, fasc. 7: Logique, Paris, Herman, p. 1–11; Eng. tr. in Tarski 1956, 409–420. Tarski, A. 1944, The Semantic Conception of Truth and the Foundations of Semantics., Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4, 341-395; reprinted in Tarski 1 Collected Papers, v. 2, Birkhäuser, Basel, pp. 665¬–699. Tarski, A. 1956, Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics. Papers of 1923 to 1938, Oxford, Clarendon Press; 2nd ed., Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis, Tarski, A., 1956a, The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages. In Tarski 1956, 152–278 [Eng. tr. of Tarski 1935]. Tarski, A., 1969. Truth and Proof. L'age de la Science 1, 279–301; reprinted in Tarski 1986, v. 4, 399–422. Tarski, A., 1986, Collected Papers, v. 1–4, Basel, Birkhäuser Taylor, Charles, (2007) "A Secular Age"Harvard University Press; Kindle Edition ASIN: B002KFZLK2 Taylor, Charles. 2004. Modern social imaginaries. Durham/London: Duke University Press. Taylor, Barry, 1976, "States of affairs", in Truth and Meaning, G. Evans and J. McDowell (eds.), Oxford: Clarendon Press, 263–284. Tipper, S. P. (1985) The negative priming effect: Inhibitory priming by ignored objects. Quarterly Journal of As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 270 Experimental Psychology 37A:571–90. [WTN] |Google Scholar Tipper, S. P., Brehaut, J. C. & Driver, J. (1990) Selection of moving and static objects for the control of spatially directed action. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance 16:492–504. [WTN]Google Scholar | PubMed Tipper, S. P. &Cranston, M. (1985) Selective attention and priming: Inhibitory and facilitatory effects of ignored primes Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 37A:591–611. [WTN] |Google Scholar Tomasello, M., 1999:" The Cultural Origins of Human Cognition", Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. "Truth "Queensborough Community College. https://www.qcc.cuny.edu/SocialSciences/ppecorino/IN TRO_TEXT/Chapter%205%20Epistemology/Truth.htmretrieved on Jun,01,2020 Tse, Peter Ulric ": The Neural Basis of Free Will: Criterial Causation" (2015) The MIT Press (1602) ASIN: B015X3Y176 Tulving, E. (1984) Multiple book review of Elements of episodic memory. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7:223– 68. [JG]CrossRef | Google Scholar U Usó-Doménech, J.L., Nescolarde-Selva, J.- "What are Belief Systems?". Found Sci21,147–152 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10699-015-9409-z retrieved on May,3rd, 2020 As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 271 V Valaskivi, Katja, and Johanna Sumiala. 2014. Circulating social imaginaries: theoretical and methodological reflections. European Journal of Cultural Studies 17(3):229– 243. Vallicella, William F. (20129)- "Divine Simplicity" – in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy https ://plato.stanford.edu/entries/divine-simplicity/ retrieved on Jun 27, 2020 van Ginneken, Jaap (1992) "Crowds, psychology and politics" (1992). Reviews: history cooperative journals 99-3; Cambridge Journals Abstract 2942744 Velmans, M. (1992) Synopsis of "Consciousness, brain and the physical world."Philosophical Psychology 5:155–57. [rMV]Google Scholar Velmans, M. (1992) The world as-perceived, the world asdescribed by physics, and the thing-itself: A reply to Rentoul and Wetherick. Philosophical Psychology 5:167– 72. [rMV]CrossRef | Google Scholar Velmans, M. (1993) A reflexive science of consciousness. In: Experimental and theoretical studies of consciousness. Ciba Foundation Symposium No. 174. Wiley [rMV]Google Scholar Velmans, M. (1991) Is human information processing conscious? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14:651–726. [rMV, JG, AH, DN, WTN, KRR]CrossRef | Google Scholar Velmans, M. (1991) Consciousness from a first-person perspective. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14:702–19. [rMV, DN, KRR]CrossRef | Google Scholar Vision, Gerald, 2004, Veritas: The Correspondence Theory and Its Critics, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 272 W Wagner, H. R. (1983). Alfred Schutz: An Intellectual Biography. Chicago and London, The University of Chicago Press. Walker D, Vul E (January 2014). "Hierarchical encoding makes individuals in a group seem more attractive". Psychological Science.25(1): 230–5.doi: 10.1177/0956797613497969.PMID 24163333 Walker, E. H. (1970) The nature of consciousness. Mathematical Biosciences 7:131–78. [KRR]CrossRef | Google Scholar Walker, E. H (1977) Quantum mechanical tunneling in synaptic and emphaptic transmission. International Journal of Quantum Chemistry 11:103–27. [KRR]CrossRef| Google Scholar Walker, Ralph C. S., 1989, "The Coherence Theory of Truth", London: Routledge. Warren, Daniel (2013)- "Reality and Impenetrability in Kant's Philosophy of Nature" –Routledge Wason, P. C., & Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1972)." Psychology of reasoning: Structure and content. Harvard U. Press." – at Apa PsycNet – retrieved from https://psycnet.apa.org/record/1973-08484-000 Webber, Jonathan – Philosophical introduction to 2004 Routledge edition of "The Imaginary". Weber, Max. 1949. "Objectivity" in social science and social policy. In On the methodology of the social sciences, 49–112. Glencoe: The Free Press. Weller, Anja, and Julien Bucher. 2016. Visualisierte Imaginationen der Lebenswelt und der Einfluss der As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 273 Medien. In Wissensforschung – Forschungswissen, ed. Jürgen Raab, Reiner Keller, 595–607. Weinheim/Basel: Beltz Juventa. White, Jonathan & Plous, Scott. (1995). – "SelfEnhancement and Social Responsibility: On Caring More, but Doing Less, Than Others". Journal of Applied Social Psychology. 25. 1297 1318. 10.1111/j.1559-1816. 1995.tb02619. x. Winkler, Martin M. (2001). "Imperial Projections: Ancient Rome in Modern Popular Culture". Baltimore, United States and London, England: The Johns Hopkins University Press.. ISBN 0-8018-8268-0. Williams, Bernard. "The Makropulos case: reflections on the tedium of immortality." In The Metaphysics of death : Stanford University Press -(1993) ISBN-10: 0804721041 ISBN13: 978-0804721042 edited, with introduction, by John Martin Fischer. Wittgenstein, L. (1998) "Culture and Value "(rev. ed.). G.H. von Wright (Ed.). London: WileyBlackwell. Woleński, Jan – "The Semantic Theory pf Truth", in https://www.iep.utm.edu/s-truth/ (University of Information Technology, Management and Technology Poland) retrieved on May,01,2020 Wulf, C. (2019) "The mimetic creation of the Imaginary". Aisthesis 12(1): 5-14. doi: 10.13128/Aisthesis-25617 Wulf, C. (2009): "Dynamics and Performativity of Imagination: The Image between the Visible and the Invisible", Routledge, London-New York, New Delhi. Y Yates, J. (1985) The content of awareness is a model of the world. Psychological Review 92:249–84. [WTN]CrossRef | Google Scholar As sombras cegas de Narciso Roberto Arruda 274 Yee, P. L. (1991) Semantic inhibition of ignored words during a figure classification task. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 43A:127–53. [WTN]CrossRef | Google Scholar Z Zajenkowski Marcin, Maciantowicz Oliwia, Szymaniak Kinga, Urban Paweł "Vulnerable and Grandiose Narcissism Are Differentially Associated With Ability and Trait Emotional Intelligence" Frontiers in PsychologyVOLUME 9 2018 https://www.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.016 06 DOI=10.3389/fpsyg.2018.01606 ISSN=1664-1078 Retrieved on Jun,10,2020.

SONDERDRUCK aus LANGUAGE, LOGIC, AND PHILOSOPHY PROCEEDINGS OF THE 4th INTERNATIONAL WlTIGENSTEIN SYMPOSIUM 28th AUGUST TO 2nd SEPTEMBER 1979, KJRCHBERG/WECHSEL IAUSTRIAl SPRACHE, lOGIK UND PHILOSOPHI,E AKTEN DES 4. INTERNATIONAlEN WITIGENSTEIN' SYMPGSIUMS 28. AUGUST SIS 2 SEPTEMBER 1979, KIRCHBERGIWECHSEl (OSTERREICH) IT Barry Smith University of Manchester It is reported by Moore in his account of Wittgenstein's Lectures of 1930-33 that Wittgenstein expressed approval of a remark by Lichtenberg to the effect that instead of saying 'I think' we ought to say 'it thinks', 'it' being used as 'es' is used in 'es blitzt'.1 Note that Wittgenstein did not argue, as some have concluded from the most readily available English translation of 'es denkt' that we should say instead of '1 think': 'there is thinking'.2 There is indeed a plausible existential interpretation of sentences such as 'es blitzt', 'il pleut', 'it hungreth me', ... , but certainly in English and German, at least for a very wide variety of cases, this is neither the only possible nor the most natural interpretation. Wittgenstein's remark is just one example of an appeal by a modern thinker to an ontological, psychological and grammatical problem having a long and varied history, the problem of impersonalia. Other examples are provided en masse by Karl Kraus in his writings on Sprachlehre-in particular in the collection of pieces entitled "Subjekt und Pradikat" and in his brilliant essay "Es" (1921)3 which forms the original inspiration of the present paper. The problem was important also for Brentano and his followers and for the early practitioners of linguistic phenomenology.4 Here I want merely to demonstrate by means of some sketchy historical reflections why there is a problem of impersonalia at all. It is of course a problem only for the proponents of the classical subject-predicate/substance-accident metaphysical schemata, which have by now lost their respectability in the eyes of the bulk of philosophers. Yet these schemata formed the common background of almost all Western philosophers up to the time of Wittgenstein. They can be discerned not only in the writings of classical authors such as Descartes, against whose formulation of the theory of (non-corporeal) substance Lichtenberg's remark was principally directed. They occur also in the philosophical ontologies of thinkers as diverse as Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, Leibniz and Bolzano, and even Meinong and Husser!. The extent to which Wittgenstein managed to free himself from these schemata is, to me at least, unclear. Here the role played by grammar in the classical framework is decisive: if Frege and the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus are justified in their claim to have broken with the logical grammar of subject and predicate and to have developed an adequate alternative in terms of a somehow radically different relation of function and argument, then the view of Wittgenstein as a philosopher standing outside the tradition may well be a defensible one. Here however I need take no position in this regard, since my aim is merely to present the classical schemata insofar as they are relevant to the problem of impersonal sentences, and to leave the reader to draw his own conclusions. It will be useful to present these schemata side by side with an account of their quite peculiar institutional status. For it is in virtue of the fact that for so long there was entrenched so heavily in schools and universities across virtually the whole of Europe a more or less faithful, more or less rigidified Aristotelianism or scholasticism, that the above mentioned philosophers, for all their originality, do indeed have so much in common. Each constructed his philosophical grammar, ontology and psychology using what was effectively a pre-determined set of component parts: in some variants one or more of these parts were awarded priority over others, in other variants certain kinds of parts were denied existence altogether. All manner of beast was thereby brought to birth, but each, I want to claim, had an identical philosophical ancestry. 342 ! I I This communal construction kit and the partially fixed, partially fluid philosophical scaffolding which it determined was presented in its crudest possible form in the grammar books of Latin and Greek which formed so important a part of the drill-material of the original monastic institutions and of the classical Gymnasia which took their place. Every student of grammar learned that the simplest form of judgment contains as a matter of necessity two mutually correlat.ive constituent parts, a subject and a predicate, that isolated presentations or words expressing isolated presentations do not suffice to constitute a judgment. For this connection (or, in the case of negative judgments, a separation) of presentation (or correlated linguistic units) is required . Upon this basis or on parallel ontological and psychological bases virtually all other disciplines were erected . As late as 1883, in his Ursprung sittlicher Erkennlnis (pp. 116f.), Brentano characterised the classical account of judgment as a prejudice which has over thousands of years become ever more deeply rooted, a theory which has infiltrated even the elementary schools , . . . and upon which so much else depends that the weight of the load, so to speak , makes the underlying thesis undisplaceable. In all that follows it will be necessary to bear in mind that we are dealing with a crude textbook version of a complex and sometimes sophisticated system of variant theories (nominalistic, conceptualistic, monadistic, and so on). This core theory is of interest however, since it will enable us to present a relatively simple, if then still provisional account of the issue at hand. It is possible to distinguish not only a core (or text-book) grammar, but also a core ontology and a core psychology, presented, for example in Aristotle's works or in an oblique way in successive stages of the educational process in the textbooks of other disciplines, particularly theology, biology and jurisprudence.s Fundamental to the core ontology was the thesis that the states of affairs which make sentences true must contain, as a matter of necessity, at least two components (normally a substance and an accident) mirroring the components of the corresponding judgements; fundamental to the core psychology the thesis that it must be possible to distinguish a correlative multiplicity of components in the mental acts in which sentences are asserted, and so on. Already within the purely grammatical sphere we can see the sense in which a problem is raised for the core model by sentences such as 'es blitzt', 'it thinks', and so on, in that for none of these sentences can we isolate a subject which would become united with the corresponding predicates in the manner required if (the utterers of) these sentences are properly to be acknowledged as expressing judgments. The existential solution to this problem was by far the most popular-though here again we have to distinguish a number of distinct variants. For example Balzano's reading of 'es schneit ' as: 'Die Vorstellung von einem Schneefall in der jetzigen Zeit hat GegensUindlichkeit' (the presentation or idea of a current fall of snow has the character of objecthood), or Steinthal's (later retracted) reading of 'es blitzt' as: 'a certain content, namely that which lies in the root Blitz, is put forward as existing energy' (ist als seiende Energie hingestellt), that is: 6 Blitz t (S) (P) But quite apart from the philosophical sleight of hand which is involved in treating 'exists' and similar terms as predicates, the existential account loses its attractiveness in showing itself inadequate to deal with all but a very small number of impersonalia. Consider, for example, 'es fehlt an Geld', or 'es ist Wurst'. In the former case at least, the English translation 'there is a lack of money' seems on the face of it to support the existential reading,-until we reflect on the absurdity of the idea that the world might contain not only money, snow, and sausages, but also shortages, absences, and Wurst. It was not until the 19th century that philosophers began to pay systematic attention to the 343 problem of impersonalia. The classical grammarians had been content to appeal either to the existential interpretation or to regard impersonalia as modified variants of more tractable sentences, differing from the latter only in some insignificant, formal sense (and here it was possible for them to appeal to the fact that in the writings of Homer the subjectless form of the meteorologica is hardly to be found: it is Zeus who, in each case, rains, blows, thunders, or snows). Zeus himself of course gradually lost popularity amongst grammarians as a candidate subject for impersonalia, though Spinoza still found it possible to defend the view that the single subject of each and every sentence is the one true God. Some of the intuitions underlying the Zeus-type view have nevertheless remainded alive amongst the speakers of Indo-European languages: they are clearest, perhaps, in regard to sentences such as 'the wind blows' where the quasi-personal character of the subject is bound up with the apparent meaningfulness of the idea that the wind might continue to exist whilst also not blowing. In virtue of these intuitions these languages have retained certain structural properties, some of them of a highly subtle character, properties which have unfortunately been all too readily dismissed by grammarians to whom the underlying classical (Aristotelian, scholastic, Judaeo-Christian, patriarchal) forms of life have become alien. It is no accident that it was Karl Kraus, who fought so hard to forestall the erosion of the classical-that is to say, of what he conceived as the natural-patterns of thought, who came nearest amongst modern theorists of language to uncovering these properties, especially in his writings on the impersonalia. The full title of his 1921 essay "Es (Abdeckung des Subjekts)" is almost impossible to translate into English. 'Abdecken' here has first af all the connotation of marking out or delineating or putting an exactly fitting lid (Abdeckplatte) on a field of interest: 'Abdeckung' signifies also a covering or a keeping track of something, e.g. of one's debts or, at least today, of one's opposite number on a football field. But most importantly it signifies lifting the covers off something. In fact Kraus in this essay is attempting to strip away the sheets of modern, mechanical ways of thinking, to reveal the subtle, intricate web of minute connections which lie beneath, connections, which constitute the natural order of thought, and therewith also the natual order of the world as a whole. This natural world is mirrored or reflected in precisely those nuances of language which had, in Kraus's eyes, been ignored by over-regimentative grammarians and philosophers. The uncovering of the minute web of connections in the world, the Abor Aufdeckung der Natur is thereby also an Abor Aufdeckung des Subjekts, or an Abdekantieren of the subject from the predicate, in precisely the classical grammatical sense. Indeed it has been little remarked the extent to which Sprachiehre, for Kraus, rested on the use of instruments of the classical subjectpredicate grammatical tradition. Now naturally there are certain back alleys of language, where the subject is especially difficult to locate; this suggests one possible transposition of the parantheses of Kraus's title into the language of detective fiction as: 'Covering the Case' -where it is of course important to note that 'case' here, like 'Pall' in German, has not only a jurisprudential and a medical but also a grammatical meaning. 7 Kraus castigates the 'regimentative grammarians' who have never truly thought through this 'es' and who are therefore content to regard it in all its occurrences within impersonaiia as a syntactical dummy word. Such grammarians, he argues "have not the slightest presentiment of how, in every form of its mechanical use, this 'es' remains an organism, pervaded by and bound to the life of the spirit". 8 Certainly there are merely formal occurrences of 'es', for example 'es beginnt der Tag', 'es zogen drei Burschen zum Tore hinaus', or even 'it remembreth me upon my youth'. These can readily be transformed into, for example, 'der Tag beginnt' ,-but Kraus is enraged by the assumption that such transformations can be automatically effected in every case. He conceives an almost infinitely complex multiplicity of forms of impersonalia, from 'it is raining'-where already coder Wiener Greuelscherz 'Sie regnet' spiirt das Subjekt der Tatigkeit: Die Natur"9-to 'Es werde Licht'-where, as Kraus puts it, 'es' 344 is just as truly a subject, as in the beginning was the word. It is the most powerful subject in the realm of creation, that which became light, which becomes day, which is about to become evening. (Everything depends upon it; everything can become a relative clause.) It: chaos, the heavenly sphere, the universe, the most powerful, most strongly felt, which is already there before that which in the beginning arose out of it. Light, day, evening are not subjects (as the grammarian assumes in his straightforward way), but predicates; cannot be subjects, because 'it' first of all 'becomes' light, day, evening, unfolds itself thereto. 10 find it difficult to reject out of hand this reading of 'es werde Licht', and I do not see either that similar readings ought not properly to be provided for certain other types of impersonalia if all grammatically relevant nuances are to be preserved. That the magnitude of the task of producing an adequate theory of impersonalia is thereby increased to almost unmanageable proportions ll ought not to lead to the temptation to yield once more to a reductivist, regimentative account. But nor, either, ought it to dissuade the linguistic phenomenologist-as it dissuaded a Kraus or a Wittgenstein-from seeking to produce such a theory, even at the cost of honest toil in areas (such as the philosophy of meteorology) which have hitherto not been counted amongst the most glamorous branches of the discipline of philosophy. ENDNOTES I Moore, G. E., Philosophical Papers (London 1959), p. 309. 2 Cf. e.g. von Wright's article on Lichtenberg in Edward's Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol. 4 (New York 1967). ) Both these essays are published in Kraus's Die Sprache (Munich 1954). 4 Cf. especially Brentano's review of the classic study Subjektlose Siitze (Vienna 1883) by Franz Miklosich, published as an appendix to Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis (Leipzig 1889). Also Marty's "Ober subjektlose Satze und das Verhaltnis der Grammatik zu Logik und Psychologie" (1884-95), repro in Gesammelte Schriflen, vol. II (Halle 1918). Amongst the phenomenological writings see especially Pfilnder's Logik (Halle 1921), p. 200ff.; Reinach, Gesammelte Schriften (Halle 1921), p. 117 ff.; and Ammann, " Zum deutschen Impersonale", Husser! Festschrift (Halle 1929), p. Iff. 1 On the role of jurisprudence in central European thought see my "On the production of ideas: some notes 011 Austrian intellectual history from Bolzano to Meinong", in: Structure and Gestalt: Philosophy and Lilerature in Austria-Hungary (Amsterdam 1980) and the references there given. 6 Cf. Marty (1918), p. 24 n. L 7 On the parallelism of logical and jurisprudential terms in European languages see my "Law and Eschatology in Wittgenstein's Early Thought", Inquiry, vol. 21 (1978), pp. 425 ff. 8 Kraus (1954), p. 289. 9 Kraus (1954), p. 293. 10 Kraus (1954), p. 77. II Cf. Ammann (1929), esp. pp. 3 ff. * * * 345 SCHRIFTENREIHE DER WITfGENSTEIN-GESELLSCHAFf Herausgegeben von Elisabeth,Lelnfellner Ru<fu1f Haller. ~doll HObner. Werner leinfellner. f!!tul Weingartner Ve~eJchnis der T1Iel: I LiSI of publicsuons: WDWlG WlnGENSTEIN. Wlrtelbuch IIIr VoIksschuIen (DIctionary for Bementary Schools) (F.!IitSlmlle ~r Ausgiil;Je VOfII926) Wi~n 1977 Hrsg./Eds. 'A. HObner. W .. unci E. beinleJiner. lOCXVl +44 pp .. Ptl .. 6S 98,-/O'M 14.-. iSBN: 3-209-0019j*)(. WITI1iENSTEIN UNO SaN ElNRUSS AUF DIE GEOENWIRnGE PHILOSOPHIE Akten des 2. Internationalen Wlltgensteto.sYmpQSlums. Kircl)b8Jg am W~ftS~1. 0s.terre1ch 191*1. WIn_STEIN AND HIS IMPACf ON CONTEMPORARY THOUGHT Proceedings 01 tile 2Jld Internalional Wlllgensleln.,Symposium. Kirchberg am WllChsel. A"~trla' 197*7 . Hrsg.JEds' E. unCI W. L~inlelln'er, H. Berghel. A. HObner. Wien 1980. 2. A.lJflage' f2rnJ* 9dIti~). 'pp. 550, Ptl .. OS 520.-. ISBN: 3-209'0020ll-5, WlnGENSnIN. DER WIENER KREIS UNO DEft KRITISCHE RATIONALISMUS Aktefl des 3. Ir:ller,nallonal~n Willgenaleio-SvmposlOms. Kirchberg, am Wechsel. ~terreiCh 1975. WlnGENSTBN, THE VIENNA CIRCLE AND CRITICAL RATIONAUSM Proceedings althe .3rd Inler~Uo.nal Wlllgensleln-SympOslum., Klrcht>erg am Wecl:lsel. Au,slria 1976, Hrsg.lEds. H. Berghel. A, HUbner. E. KOhler*. Wlen 197-9. 544 PP:. ~;.OS 590;-. ISBN: 3-'2Q9,()()226-6. SPRAGHE, lOGlK UNO PHILOSOPHIE Alden des 4. Inlernalienalen WlllgettS'leln-SympoSiur:ns. Kirchberg am Weehsel. Osterreich 1919-. lANGUAGE, LOGIC, AND PHILOSOPHY PrQC'eeding~ '~1 '.lie 4111 Inlernj:lli~al WI~tge'1Sleln-Sym~ium. Kirchgerg am Wechse.l. Ausi,ia 1919. I-:IrsgJEds. Rli(jolf 'Haller. WolIgjlng Grassl. Wien 1980. 619 PP:. Pb-.• ,dS 625.-. ISBN: 3-2~4,g.S. In Vo.lber!'lItmg: lin preparatim:': SPRACIIE UNO ERKENNTNIS Al:S SOZIALE TATSACHE ~itraQe (jas If\ternalionaten Symposiums von Rom '(1979), Hrsg, RudQlf HaUer. ~, 250 W .. Pb. WlnGEN$TElN-lsTHETII UNO TRlNSlEIIDBITAlE PHILOSOPifIE Akten alnes InlernationaJel:l ~mpOslums In Ber~n (Norwegen) 1*98Q. WlnGENSTEIN-AESntmCS AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHILOSOPHY Proce-edlOQs 01 an IntEtmationaJ SympoSium al Bergen (Norway) 1980. Hrsg.lEd!i. Tore Nordenslam, Kiell S~ JQhannessen. ca, 230 pp .. Pb. Aut WunSC'h erhallen.,Sle.9!,naue Inhallsã!l Qer ~lnz~fhEln BanEle. Detailed, inloml81lon on each publlcallon will be senl on requeSt. Iijj, HO,lder-Pichler-Tempsky Verlagsbuchhandlung . *A*l096 Wlen, Frankg'asse 4. Postfach 127. TeJefon 0222/43 89'93 ~

Disgust as Heuristic Robert William Fischer Forthcoming in Ethical Theory and Moral Practice Abstract Suppose that disgust can provide evidence of moral wrongdoing. What account of disgust might make sense of this? A recent and promising theory is the social contagion view, proposed by Alexandra Plakias. After criticizing both its descriptive and normative claims, I draw two conclusions. First, we should question the wisdom of drawing so straight a line from biological poisons and pathogens to social counterparts. Second, we don't need to explain the evidential value of disgust by appealing to what the response tracks. These lessons point toward an alternative: namely, that disgust is a moral heuristic. On the heuristic view, disgust is a trigger for the subconscious use of a particular rule: < If x is disgusting, and we wouldn't do x, then x is morally wrong. > I show how this view fits with a plausible hypothesis about the social function of disgust, and then apply it as well as how it sheds light on Leon Kass's famous use of repugnance to criticize cloning. Kewords disgust; social contagion; Alexandra Plakias; Leon Kass; moral heuristics 1 Disgust and Morality Should we let our disgust guide our moral judgments? Some think not. Martha Nussbaum, for example, maintains that disgust is "especially likely to be normatively distorted," and she submits that it is "problematic and irrational... across the board" to use it as a guide to wrongness (2004: 102). Likewise, Daniel Kelly argues on evolutionary grounds that disgust "is not wise about or acutely attuned to ethical considerations, and "yuck" deserves no special moral credence; rather, repugnance is simply irrelevant to moral justification" (2011: 147).1 Accordingly, let's say that disgust skepticism is the following view: This paper was much improved by the efforts of two anonymous reviewers. I'm also indebted to Elisa Aaltola, Ben Bramble, John Hadley, Burkay Ozturk, Isaac Wiegman, and a helpful audience at the 2015 meeting of the APPE. 1 For similar sentiments in Kekes (1992), Corvino (1997, 2013), Knapp (2003), Singer (2005), and Greene (2008). 2 We aren't justified in believing that actions are wrong based on their being disgusting. Philosophers who endorse disgust skepticism offer several reasons in its favor. First, they note disgust's false positives-such as people being disgusted by, and therefore condemning, gay sex or interracial marriage (Corvino 2013). Second, they call attention to its association with dehumanization. Infamously, the Nazis used the rhetoric of repugnance to help justify "the Final Solution," which is standard fare among those who have pursued genocidal projects (Nussbaum 2004). Third, they point out that its evolutionary history doesn't provide reason to think that it's sensitive to morally-relevant properties, as disgust probably developed to help our ancestors avoid the oral incorporation of harmful substances (Kelly 2011). Finally, they point to the immense variation in what we find disgusting, which gives us reason to doubt that disgust tracks wrongness (Kelly and Morar 2014). But disgust has defenders too.2 In short, they reply that these objections either show too much or too little. The "too much" charge is that these objections show that we can't trust any of our emotions, since they all admit false positives, can be associated with serious wrongdoing, have evolutionary histories that don't perfectly match their current moral use, and vary considerably in their application across cultures. The "too little" charge is that these objections only show that disgust can lead us astray in moral matters, not that it usually does. If these replies are successful, then they make room-but do not directly support-the disgust advocate's position: Sometimes, we are justified in believing that actions are wrong based on their being disgusting. To make this position plausible, we need a model of disgust that forges the right sort of link between disgust and moral justification. My aim here is to sketch a view of disgust that does just that. So in the first part of the paper, I consider an instructive attempt. Alexandra Plakias (2013) suggests that the disgust advocate needs to "identify some property that disgust is tracking-and show that some things do have that property" (2013: 273). Given as much, she proposes that "[t]he disgust advocate's strongest argument [...] is that moral disgust [...] tracks, and presents its elicitor as possessing, social contamination and contamination 2 See, e.g., Hauskeller (2006), Curtis (2011), Demetriou (2013), Plakias (2013), Clark and Fessler (2014), Clark (2015), and Besong (forthcoming). 3 potency" (2013: 276).3 I contend that the disgust advocate shouldn't argue this way. On the one hand, the descriptive claim is either implausible or purely speculative. On the other, the proposal doesn't make it easy to see how disgust is evidence, since it isn't clear that wrongness and social contamination are appropriately related. Still, these problems point the way forward, providing some reason for the advocate to rethink the connection between disgust's biological function and justificatory role in ethics. In the second part of the paper, I develop a better way of viewing disgust's moral significance-namely, seeing it as a moral heuristic. 2.1 Plakias's Proposal on Behalf of the Disgust Advocate Rozin and Fallon (1987: 23) define "core" disgust as "[r]evulsion at the prospect of (oral) incorporation of an offensive object. The offensive objects are contaminants; that is, if they even briefly contact an acceptable food, they tend to render that food unacceptable." This definition hints at their theory of the origin of disgust. On their view, the disgust response evolved to help our omnivorous (and scavenging) ancestors avoid food-born poisons and pathogens by discouraging their oral incorporation. The disgust response managed this in three ways. First, it discouraged disgusted individuals from coming into contact with harmful substances. Second, it helped our ancestors expel harmful (or potentially harmful) substances should contact have occurred-e.g., by gagging and vomiting. Third, it involves a signaling mechanism: the associated gape face is universally recognizable, leading others to avoid the relevant substances too. Given the stakes, false positives are much worse than false negatives. One way to prevent false negatives is to have a response that can be elicited by new objects very quickly, in case poisons or pathogens are somehow transferred from one object to another. After all, natural selection isn't going to write a script that says, < if x is a stick, then x is disgusting >. But if you know that a stick has been sitting in feces, then you'll tend to find the stick disgusting too, even if that waste isn't detectable on it. Hence, we might say that being disgusting is a contagious property: if something is disgusting, that repugnance transfers to those objects it touches. Importantly, such cognitive scripts can be both restricted and extended. Perhaps evolution wrote a script that says, < if slimy, then disgusting >, but the Japanese have restricted it so that it doesn't apply to natto-a stringy and pungent 3 Plakias doesn't explicitly endorse the disgust advocate's position, so it's probably best to read her as defending a conditional: if you think that the disgust advocate's position is true, then you should opt for the view that moral disgust tracks, and presents its elicitor as possessing, social contamination and contamination potency. 4 fermented soybean product-and Sardinians have restricted so that it doesn't apply to Casu Marzu-a maggot-filled cheese. Likewise, evolution surely didn't write a script that says, < if food and on the ground, then disgusting >. But our disgust response is, in part, informed by the germ theory of disease. So we think that candy is yucky after it's hit the floor, and we teach our children to react in kind. As Daniel Kelly (2011) argues, disgust's flexibility means that it can be co-opted for other purposes, such as regulating human social interactions. Of course, there is considerable variation between individuals and across cultures in terms of (a) how "disgustable" people are-i.e., how prone they are to be disgusted, (b) which actions people find disgusting, and (c) how much weight people place on disgust when making moral judgments. Still, people certainly report being disgusted by certain actions, and there appear to be good reasons to take their reports to be accurate (i.e., they aren't-or aren't always-confusing disgust with anger, as Chapman and Anderson (2013) argue). Moreover, their responses seem to play important role in their moral assessments (as Haidt (2001, 2012) argues). In light of the above, how might someone develop the disgust advocate's position? Here is Plakias's proposal: The disgust advocate's strongest argument [...] is that moral disgust has morally relevant representational content: it tracks, and presents its elicitor as possessing, social contamination and contamination potency. But [...] not all contagion is bad contagion. Contagion itself is neither good nor bad; it is the attitudes and behaviors in question that make something contaminating in a deleterious sense. [...] The question of whether some behavior or attitude has the kind of contamination potency disgust ascribes to it [...] can be disambiguated into the question of whether the behavior has potentially deleterious effects and the question of whether the behavior is contagious. Likewise, the question of whether moral disgust is an appropriate response to some act can be disambiguated into the question of whether that act is really immoral, and whether the act is potentially contaminating. But the former is a question for normative ethics, and not for moral psychology (2013: 276). Let's call this "the social contagion view." According to the social contagion view, while disgust might still help us avoid biological poisons and pathogens, it now helps us avoid social poisons and pathogens too. It does this by way of an 5 aversive response to behaviors (or beliefs or attitudes) that have contamination potency. By this, Plakias just means that the behavior is especially shareable. In other words, your being in the presence of that behavior increases the likelihood that you will act similarly. Crucially, Plakias isn't saying that moral disgust tracks all social contagion. Not all contagion is bad contagion: research on happiness, for example, suggests that it too "could be thought of as a form of social infection" (Hill et al. 2010: 3828). However, disgust clearly represents its object in an unfavorable light, so the proposal is that disgust tracks actual social contagion that the agent perceives as negative.4 Of course, we can go on to consider whether there are independent reasons to affirm the agent's negative assessment of the contagious action (or belief, or desire, or what have you). Presumably, the advocate thinks that there often are such reasons. But even if not, disgust can still provide prima facie evidence of wrongness insofar as it's tracking a property that's relevant to the wrongness-namely, the ostensibly-negative contagiousness. Hence, it can provide justification for the belief that the relevant behavior (or what have you) is wrong. 2.2 Evaluating the Descriptive Claim The social contagion view has two parts: a descriptive claim and a normative claim. The descriptive claim concerns what disgust tracks-namely, negatively perceived contagion. The normative claim is that negatively perceived contagion is evidence of wrongness. Our focus in this section is the descriptive part of the theory. Someone might think that the descriptive part of theory is trivially true. It's hard to imagine morally disgusting behavior that wouldn't be negatively perceived. And given that most behavior is contagious, that too looks like an uncontroversial claim. However, the descriptive part of the social contagion view is not trivially true, as I'll now argue. An initial problem with the descriptive claim concerns the strength of the relation it posits between disgust and negatively perceived social contagion: namely, that the former tracks the latter. The standard way to flesh out the claim that x tracks y uses the following counterfactuals: if y were the case, then x would be the case; and if y weren't the case, then x wouldn't be the case.5 4 Plakias has confirmed this interpretation in correspondence. 5 The literature on tracking goes back to Nozick (1981). 6 So we get: if z were negatively perceived and social contagious, then we would find z morally disgusting; and if z were morally disgusting, then z would be negatively perceived and socially contagious. So construed, the view is very implausible. Here, for example, are some counterexamples to the first counterfactual: not declaring your tips on your taxes; using office supplies from work for personal purposes; "borrowing" ideas from websites without citing; sharing gossip that you'd promised not to share; using plastic instead of reusable bags at the grocery store; eating animal products that you know were sourced from factory farms; and laughing at jokes that play on racial or gender stereotypes. I doubt that these are exceptional cases. Indeed, I suspect that most negatively perceived behaviors are socially contagious, at least to some degree or other, and it's plain that disgust is only marshalled against a few of them. (To be clear, the social contagion isn't a function of the negativity, but of the fact that behavior is contagious generally. As Plakias herself observes, "[that] people are influenced by the behaviors of those around them isn't surprising; after all, it's what makes imitative learning possible" (2013: 275).) But we can be more charitable. Suppose we drop the first counterfactual and reinterpret the second probabilistically. This gives us the tendency version of the descriptive claim: If z is morally disgusting, then z tends to be negatively perceived and socially contagious. Is the tendency version of the descriptive claim true? Probably not. Most morally disgusting behavior isn't socially contagious precisely because it's disgusting. News reports of bestiality don't promote bestiality; after disgust has been marshalled to discourage certain behaviors, encountering it doesn't increase the odds that we'll imitate them. In general, we aren't inclined to act in ways that we judge to be repugnant. 7 However, this is a fixable problem. We can patch the tendency version by adding a counterfactual clause: If z is morally disgusting, z tends to be such that (a) z is negatively perceived and (b) z would have been social contagious were disgust not marshalled to discourage it. Let's call this the counterfactual version of the descriptive claim." Is it true? I'm not sure. To see why you might doubt it, consider the story of Armin Meiwes (recounted in Haidt 2012: 146): In early 2001, Armin Meiwes, a German computer technician, posted an unusual advertisement on the Web: "Looking for a wellbuilt 21-to-30-year-old to be slaughtered and then consumed." Hundreds of men responded by email, and Meiwes interviewed a few of them at his farmhouse. Bernd Brandes, a forty-three-yearold computer engineer, was the first respondent who didn't change his mind when he realized that Meiwes was not engaging in mere fantasy. [...] On the evening of March 9, the two men made a video to prove that Brandes fully consented to what was about to happen. Brandes then took some sleeping pills and alcohol, but he was still alert when Meiwes cut off Brandes's penis, after being unable to bite it off (as Brandes had requested). Meiwes then sautéed the penis in a frying pan with wine and garlic. Brandes took a bite of it, then went off to a bathtub to bleed to death. A few hours later Brandes was not yet dead, so Meiwes kissed him, stabbed him in the throat, and then hung the body on a meat hook to strip off the flesh. Meiwes stored the flesh in his freezer and ate it gradually over the next ten months. This strikes me as a paradigmatic instance of morally disgusting behavior. Moreover, we should expect it to be disgusting: the case involves sex, mutilation, and death-known triggers of disgust (see Rozin, Haidt, and McCauley 2008). Still, it seems doubtful that this behavior would spread even if disgust weren't marshalled against it. This is partially because of the strength of our impulse to survive, but also because the contagion is self-undermining. Those who would adopt these practices (already on a tail of some bell curve) wouldn't last for long. Half of them would be dead, and we'd distance ourselves from the rest-or corral them-simply on the basis of the harm they'd caused. It wouldn't matter whether we found their actions disgusting. Moreover, it isn't clear that this case is unique; 8 similar things may well be true of other extremely violent actions. Though disgust has been co-opted to make us averse to them, it isn't plain that it was needed for that purpose. If we weren't disgusted by such actions, we might well be angry about them instead, and anger might be just as good as preventing social contagion. Perhaps such issues can be finessed. My point here isn't that the counterfactual version of the descriptive claim is false. Rather, it's that it isn't obviously true: it's a substantive empirical hypothesis that stands or falls on some speculations about what would happen if we weren't disgusted by things that we currently find disgusting. However, it may well be the case that non-contagion is overdetermined-i.e., the action in question wouldn't be contagious even if we weren't disgusted by it, since there are multiple mechanisms that prevent it from spreading. Alternately, it may be the case that we'd have some other strong reaction (e.g., anger) if we weren't disgusted which would be just as good at preventing contagion. Absent some reason to think that disgust is the sole mechanism that does and could prevent contagion, we should be wary of resting too much on any version of the descriptive claim. 2.3 Evaluating the Normative Claim The normative part of the social contagion view is that negatively perceived social contagion is evidence of wrongness. In the interest of assessing the normative claim, let's grant the counterfactual version of the descriptive claim. It seems to me that the normative claim faces a dilemma. Either social contagion is supposed to explain the relevant wrongness, or it isn't. There are problems either way. Suppose it is, as Plakias's characterization of the view might suggest. (Recall: "moral disgust has morally relevant representational content.") Then, we have a clear story about how disgust could provide evidence: it tracks a wrongmaking property, and so is evidence of wrongness. But to see whether it in fact does, we have to check the cases. In general, can we explain the wrongness of disgusting actions in terms of the hypotheses that they would have been social contagious if disgust hadn't been co-opted to discourage them? It's hard to see how. Take any disgusting action you like: why should a property that it would have had be relevant to whether it's actually wrong? Indeed, that the action isn't socially contagious seems like an important respect way in which it isn't wrong. If a bad act caused others to behave badly, that would be an additional respect in which it was bad. That it doesn't cause others to behave badly is a respect in which it isn't bad. 9 At this point, we might be tempted to revert to the simpler, tendency version of the descriptive claim, maintaining that disgust provides evidence of wrongness because it provides evidence of actual social contagion. But even if the tendency version can be salvaged-and I'm not sure it can-actual social contagion probably won't be the whole story about the wrongness of acts, or even the most important part of the story. Consider, for example, the crime of Johnny Ray Johnson: Johnson was convicted and sentenced to death for the March 27, 1995 capital murder of Leah Joette Smith during the course of committing or attempting to commit aggravated sexual assault. [...] Johnson offered to give Smith, who was addicted to crack cocaine, some crack cocaine in exchange for sex. After Smith smoked the crack, she refused to have sex with Johnson. He became angry and grabbed her, ripped her clothing off, and threw her to the ground. When she fought back with a wooden board, Johnson repeatedly struck her head against the cement curb. After he hit her head against the cement three or four times, she stopped fighting. He then sexually assaulted her. [Afterward,] Johnson stomped on her face five or six times. He walked away, but realized that he had left his wallet at the scene, so he returned. In his confession, he stated that when he saw Joette's body face up and naked, he sexually assaulted her again and then picked up his wallet and her boots and left Smith there on the ground to die.6 Johnson's actions are repugnant; they were also clearly wrong. Were they wrong because of the contagion potential? Perhaps, but that isn't the explanation that leaps to mind. That explanation is going to be in terms of the great harms to Leah Joette Smith, as well as his callousness, cruelty, and apparent sexual sadism. It does seem plausible that encouraging others to act wrongly is itself wrong-it's bad to promote the bad. But there seems to be a mismatch between this point and the force of the disgust response. Even if no one were inclined to imitate Johnson, we'd condemn him just as forcefully. So while contagion might add to the wrongness, it seems unlikely that it adds much. With that in mind, let me propose a principle for assessing theories of moral disgust: all else equal, we should favor a theory of moral disgust that explains why it's triggered by offenses that the disgusted party tends to regard as very serious. According to this version of the social contagion view, moral disgust 6 Johnson v. Quarterman, 483 F.3d 278 (5th Cir. 2007) (Habeas). Retrieved from http://www.leagle.com/decision/2007761483F3d278_1761 on November 3, 2013. 10 is supposed to provide evidence of wrongness because it's triggered by social contagion, where that property is supposed to explain the wrongness of the act in question. And in Johnson's case, it doesn't explain much. So, the social contagion view doesn't do very well by the lights of this principle. Perhaps we can revise the social contagion view so that it doesn't say that would-be or actual social contagion plays any role in the explanation of the wrongness of the relevant act. In that case, let's turn to the other horn of the dilemma. We're now assuming that the wrongness of the disgusting act is to be explained on other grounds. But then disgust is evidence of wrongness only if we have reason to believe one of two hypotheses: 1. When actions are negatively perceived and social contagious, they tend to be wrong. 2. When actions are negatively perceived and would have been socially contagious, were disgust not marshaled to discourage them, they tend to be wrong. Hypothesis #1 is probably true. However, it has nothing to do with disgust-recall the examples that led us to the tendency version of the descriptive claim, such as not declaring your tips on your taxes. What's more, it fails to explain why disgust is directed toward offenses that people perceive as being very serious. Hypothesis #2 is too speculative to assess. We just don't know which actions would have been socially contagious if disgust hadn't been marshaled to discourage them, as I argued at the end of the last section. So, we're in no position to assess whether those actions tend to be wrong.7 3.1 Beyond the Social Contagion View Let's sum up the discussion thus far. The original version of the social contagion view rests on a descriptive claim that's too strong. Once we weaken it- generating the tendency version-we see that it's implausible. We can patch it- generating the counterfactual version of the descriptive claim-but now there's no reason to believe it. Moreover, if the normative claim is true, then either (a) social 7 If the disgust advocate takes the "social contagion doesn't explain" horn of the dilemma, then it might be more charitable to construe the view as a version of phenomenal conservatism in ethics (à la Huemer 2005): if it seems to you that x is morally wrong, then that is some evidence that x is indeed wrong. On such a view, we don't need an argument to the effect that negatively-perceived social contagion is correlated with a wrong-making property. At the same time, though, disgust isn't evidence. Rather, it's seeming to you that p is your evidence, and that seeming happens to be accompanied by a visceral reaction. This is fine as far is it goes, but it isn't what we were promised. 11 contagion should explain why actions are wrong or (b) there ought to be some correlation between social contagion (whether actual or counterfactual) and wrongness. However, neither is plausible. Plakias suggests that the social contagion view is the disgust advocate's best option. If she's right about that, then things aren't looking so good for the disgust advocate. Is there an alternative? I think so. Before sketching it, though, we need to learn some lessons from the social contagion view. On the descriptive side, we should note that it's reasonable to develop an account of disgust's moral significance based on an analogy with its biological significance, as Plakias does. But to be adaptive, disgust doesn't need to track anything, nor even reliably indicate that a certain property is present. Instead, it just needs to give disgustable beings a fitness advantage over non-disgustable beings. Of course, it might do this by tracking a property, as vision does-at least for reasonably close middle-sized dry goods. However, we needn't suppose as much at the outset, and the troubles with the social contagion view give us reason to question the wisdom of drawing so straight a line from biological poisons and pathogens to social counterparts.8 A better option may be to think about moral disgust functionally. Given what we know about it, what end could it serve? On the normative side, we too should be careful to separate the descriptive and normative elements of our theory of disgust, just as Plakias recommends. But the normative part of the social contagion view still depends on social contagion being morally relevant-or, if it doesn't, we aren't in a position to assess the normative part. Given the difficulties we've seen with that hypothesis, it might be better to separate the descriptive and normative claims even more. It would be hard to tell a story about moral disgust where what triggers it plays no role in accounting for its evidential value, but it may be possible to tell a story where it plays a minor role, and some other mechanism does the justificatory work. Before trying to offer such an account, we need to consider two questions that help to put moral disgust in perspective. First, what are moral emotions, at least from an evolutionary perspective? Very roughly, the answer is that the moral emotions are instances of what Daniel Kahneman (2011) calls fast thinking. That is, emotions like disgust, empathy, shame, guilt, and anger are instances of fast and effortless information processing. They are distinguished from other instances of fast thinking by their affective dimension. These quick responses to stimuli increase the odds that agents will behave in certain ways. Some emotions-like fear, which encourages avoiding high-risk situations-benefit the organism directly. But moral emotions tend to be other-directed, benefiting in-group 8 We might also worry about how well we can unpack the metaphor, as attractive as it is. But I'll leave this aside here. 12 members. Insofar as the well-being of group is in the interest of the individual, these emotions provide indirect benefits, and thus contribute to fitness in a roundabout manner. As Joshua Greene puts it, moral emotions are "psychological adaptations that allow otherwise selfish individuals to reap the benefits of cooperation" (2013: 23). Granted, evolution doesn't promote selfishness by default, even if it's helpful to model some episodes in evolutionary history that way. Likewise, it isn't part of this view that people are motivated by self-interest (enlightened or otherwise) when they cooperate. Rather, the idea is that evolution outfitted our ancestors with genuinely other-directed concerns because doing so was fitness-enhancing: those concerns spared our ancestors from prisoners' dilemmas and related non-zero-sum interactions where acting selfishly is a bad long-term strategy. That is, our ancestors acquired emotional dispositions that made them less likely to satisfy immediate interests at the expense of others- including their future selves-and more likely to act in ways that are mutually beneficial. The second question we need to ask is: how, in fact, has disgust been coopted? Kelly (2011) discusses this issue at length, but I'll just mention a few representative examples. We know that people use disgust to regulate food and other substances that enter the body (see Nemeroff and Rozin 1992 on moral disgust at failures to keep kosher, Fessler and Navarrete 2003 on vegetarians being disgusted by meat, and Nichols 2002 on disgust as poor table manners; additionally, see Rozin et al. 1999 on disgust at the use of cigarettes, alcohol, and drugs). Likewise, people use disgust used to regulate sexual practices, thereby policing both what enters the body and that with which the body comes into contact (see Lieberman et al. 2003 on incest and Inbar et al. 2009a on homosexual sex). And then there are cases in which there is no straightforward connection between what's disgusting simpliciter and what's morally disgusting-as, for example, when disgust is marshalled against those who lack the "correct" political commitments (see Inbar et al. 2009).9 Having considered these two questions, we can begin thinking more clearly about the ends that moral disgust could serve. Based on the mechanisms behind disgust (aversion, expulsion, contagion, and signaling), the nature of the moral emotions, and the actual use of disgust for moral purposes, William Miller's hypothesis is quite promising: Disgust [...] is especially useful and necessary as a builder of moral and social community. It performs this function obviously 9 We might worry that the term "disgust" is being used loosely in these studies, reporting mere disapproval rather than revulsion per se. Gert (2015) raises this issue in a forceful way. Chapman and Anderson (2013) make the case for the seeing moral disgust as disgust, but obviously don't address Gert's arguments. I set aside these worries here. 13 by helping define and locate the boundary separating our group from their group, purity from pollution, the violable from the inviolable. It does so also as a consequence of its capacity for being readily experienced vicariously. [...] Disgust and indignation unite the world of impartial spectators into a moral community, as cosharers of the same sentiments, as guardians of propriety and purity (1997: 194-195). On this view, moral disgust draws ingroup / outgroup boundaries by enforcing norms that are connected to group identity, as well as enforcing especially important social norms, since failure to comply leaves one's status as an insider in question. This fits with the dietary norms insofar as those are connected to specific identities: conservative Jew; vegetarian; "civilized person." Likewise, it fits with the sexual norms, at least insofar as we value certain family structures. (This isn't to say that these norms are justified; it's just to say that, in fact, some people value certain family structures that have no room for homosexual relationships, among others.) It also fits neatly with marshalling disgust against contrary political views, insofar as those represent alternate visions of how a society ought to be arranged. And finally, it fits with some of the research that led the skeptics to be skeptics: namely, that disgust can be involved in dehumanizing outgroup members (see, e.g., Harris and Fiske 2006 and Buckels and Trapnell 2013). 3.2 Disgust as Heuristic Recall the disgust advocate's position: sometimes, we are justified in believing that actions are wrong based on their being disgusting. Can we use the material from the last section to offer a theory of moral disgust that supports the disgust advocate? I think so. I propose that we understand moral disgust as a moral heuristic.10 More precisely, I propose that we understand moral disgust as a trigger for the subconscious use of a particular rule: If x is disgusting, and we wouldn't do x, then x is morally wrong. The descriptive claim here is this. When people experience disgust and it's reasonable to attribute to them a belief to the effect that we-wouldn't-do-x, then they will usually judge that x is morally wrong. The normative claim is that, 10 This view is inspired by Sunstein (2005). 14 sometimes, people are justified in believing that x is wrong on this basis. Let's call this the heuristic view. A few clarifications are in order. First, "we wouldn't do x"-which I'll call "the subjunctive clause"-isn't equivalent to "we judge that x is morallywrong." The point is that the action is something that, in fact, we don't think we'd do-where the "we" includes the members of the relevant community. The subjective clause says nothing about why we wouldn't do x, and the silence is intentional. Heuristics needn't explain why they're reliable when they are, and their users needn't be able to explain why the heuristic works when it does. Consider the heuristic: If the listener's arms are crossed, then the listener is closed to what I'm saying. People use such heuristics in various circumstances, but they don't necessarily realize that they're using them, nor will they necessarily be able to explain why, for example, there should be any connection between having crossed-arms and being closed to what's being said. But that's not a problem. When an individual uses a heuristic, she needn't be able to provide reasons for her belief in order to form a justified belief-at least if she has no defeaters for that belief.11 Second, the heuristic view doesn't imply that, if we wouldn't do x, then x is morally wrong. There is no suppressed assumption to the effect that wewouldn't-do-x, all on its own, is a guide to wrongness. Instead, the idea is that disgust plus satisfaction of the subjunctive clause-disgust plus we-wouldn't-dox-is a guide to wrongness. Third, the claim isn't that disgust plus we-wouldn't-do-x is a perfect guide to wrongness. We are, after all, in the realm of heuristics, which need only be good enough in the contexts of ordinary use for ordinary use. It would, for example, be silly to complain that the gaze heuristic-which helps us understand how people catch pop flies (they fix their eyes on the ball and run at a pace that keeps the angle constant)-is no good at helping us catch bullets. Fourth, the subjunctive clause has to be relativized to an ingroup, and both the "in" and "group" parts are important here. The "group" part matters because there are some things that are disgusting-like cleaning toilets or handling garbage-that I might not do, but that people in my community do regularly. As long as we consider those persons members of our community, there is no negative moral evaluation. (Unfortunately, we don't always consider them to be 11 This provides the beginning of a story about what goes wrong in cases of moral dumbfounding (see Haidt 2001), where individuals don't know how to justify their revulsion, but remain unwilling to abandon their moral position. In short, it seems that those people are unwilling to consider defeaters. 15 full members-or, perhaps, not members of the community with which we most closely identify.) The "in" part matters because moral disgust is a guide to wrongness relative to my community's standards.12 3.3 The Heuristic View at Work To see how the heuristic view works, consider Leon Kass's famous appeal to revulsion at the prospect of human cloning, which is often mentioned by disgust's critics: We are repelled by the prospect of cloning human beings not because of the strangeness or novelty of the undertaking, but because we intuit and feel, immediately and without argument, the violation of things that we rightfully hold dear. Repugnance, here as elsewhere, revolts against the excesses of human willfulness, warning us not to transgress what is unspeakably profound. Indeed, in this age in which everything is held to be permissible so long as it is freely done, in which our given human nature no longer commands respect, in which our bodies are regarded as mere instruments of our autonomous rational wills, repugnance may be the only voice left that speaks up to defend the central core of our humanity. Shallow are the souls that have forgotten how to shudder (1997: 20). Obviously, Kass is repulsed by the prospect of cloning. His comments about "the excesses of human willfulness" make it pretty plausible that he's committed to something like "we wouldn't clone." Accordingly, he condemns it. As Kass makes clear in the rest of the essay, his basic concern is that "this age" is open to altering what he regards as sacred: the meaning of the (heterosexual, penis-in-vagina) sex act, the nuclear family (defined as one man, one woman, and their naturally-conceived or adopted children), and so forth. Kass tries to articulate why we might keep these things as he would have them kept, and his critics tend to regard his arguments as poor-just one slippery slope after another. Indeed, Kass realizes that the people of "this age" don't share the 12 Sometimes, of course, it's hard to tell these two aspects apart. As a reviewer pointed out to me, there are lots of things that I find repugnant and wouldn't do-such as tell racist jokes-that are common in my part of the world. Does the fact that people near me tell such jokes show that we aren't members of the same moral community? Alternately, does it show that I'm wrong about the community standards-or that the joke tellers are? Does it show something else entirely? I don't have neat answers to these questions, but perhaps they locate complexity in the right places: namely, the nature of moral communities, and our complex relationships with them. 16 conservative ideals that structure the community of which Kass counts himself a member. So, while he tries to argue without presupposing those commitments, he ultimately has to play up repugnance. As the heuristic view suggests, disgust alone gets no traction without the we-wouldn't-do-x reaction. It doesn't lead to moral condemnation if it can't draw on existing community norms. (And, of course, nothing I've said implies that Kass's conservative commitments are justified, and so nothing I've said implies that he is justified in believing that cloning is wrong based on cloning's repugnance.) So the heuristic view can explain both Kass's moral judgment and the breakdown in communication between Kass and his critics. But can it help us preserve the disgust advocate's position? After all, one of Kass's critics might take this case as supporting disgust skepticism. Didn't disgust lead Kass astray? Yes, but not in a way that tells against the disgust advocate's position. On the heuristic view, moral disgust tells you that community-defining norms are being violated, not whether those norms are ultimately worthy of respect. In the end, whether disgust ends up being a good guide to moral wrongness depends on whether your community has reasons-or whether reasons could be generated- in favor of those norms. Sometimes those reasons are indeed available. So if your community norms can be justified, then you needn't have a defeater for your use of disgust, which means that it can provide justification. Likewise, if the arguments for your community norms are in shambles, then disgust is useless-at least as soon as you realize that those arguments are in shambles, and that no better ones are in the offing. So the heuristic view allows us to say that disgust is a very poor guide to wrongdoing in some communities-e.g. within conservative religious groups when directed toward certain sexual practices-and a much better guide in others-e.g., within pluralistic democracies when directed toward torture.13 Granted, it isn't always transparent to the disgusted person whether there are good reasons in favor of her community-defining norms. However, it's perfectly reasonable to assume that there are such reasons in the absence of defeaters.14 There is a division of cognitive labor too, so we ought to presume that others have thought things through more deeply than we have. It takes some questioning before it's appropriate to conclude that there are no satisfying reasons in favor our community's standards, since it would be hasty to infer from one 13 There are a few papers that defend the place of disgust in a liberal society; these papers generally respond to Nussbaum's arguments for the opposite view. (See, e.g., her 2004.) I see these authors as making a point much like the one I'm making in this paragraph, though without the theoretical framework that I've developed to make sense of it. See, e.g., Kahan (1999), Arneson (2006), Clark and Fessler (forthcoming). 14 As I hinted in the last paragraph, I don't think that being unable to provide cogent arguments for those norms on the spot constitutes a defeater-contra the apparent assumption of Haidt's (2001) work on dumbfounding. 17 poor argument that there isn't a better one in the wings. So, you don't need to be able to defend your community's norms on the spot to be justified. Still, the absence of evidence will eventually become the evidence of absence. Importantly, then, the heuristic view helps us understand when we should and shouldn't trust disgust. We shouldn't throw it out entirely based one failure- or even a string of failures. If disgust is defeated often enough in a particular domain, then disgust does lose all its evidential value in that domain. Nevertheless, that's compatible with it having value in others. More interestingly, it's compatible with disgust's having evidential value in other domains even when we have a hard time coming up with independent arguments that vindicate our revulsion. To see what I have in mind, let's imagine Steve. Steve is repulsed by gay sex, wouldn't engage it in himself, and would be repulsed by others were he to find out that they enjoy it. Initially, the heuristic view says that he's justified in believing that gay sex is wrong. However, Steve soon realizes that his community has no good argument for the conclusion that gay sex is morally wrong, and he has no better argument to offer. So, he learns not to condemn it based on its "yuck factor." Now, disgust offers him no evidence that gay sex is wrong. Steve has similar reactions to, and makes similar discoveries concerning, other sexual acts: certain types of pornography, open relationships, BDSM, and so on. In the early cases, the heuristic view says that he was justified in believing that the practice was wrong based on his disgust, but he loses that justification after discovering that his judgment can't be backed by independent moral considerations. As he confronts more cases, his justification weakens. In due course, though, Steve confronts a novel sexual practice-say, people who like to have sex while dressed as animals-and isn't at all justified in condemning this fetish based on its repulsiveness. At this point, he shouldn't trust disgust in the sexual domain; its repeated failures constitute a persistent defeater. But suppose that Steve is also disgusted by dog fighting rings. Here, it's easy to back up his disgust. Suppose that he's also repulsed by standard practices in factory farms. Again, he finds plenty of reasons in favor of his judgment. Indeed, whenever Steve is disgusted by our treatment of animals, he finds it easy to provide independent reasons in favor of his judgment. At some point, though, he considers stories about slaughter practices in the best family farms, where animals lead fairly nice lives, suffering only a short while when killed. Steve still finds himself disgusted, but isn't sure how to justify his negative evaluation. (Suppose he isn't convinced that animals have rights, so he can't rely on that framework to settle the question.) Here, I think disgust's positive track record suggests that Steve can keep trusting his disgust, at least for a time, even without 18 being able to offer a reason, and even if no one in his community has one either.15 Where our treatment of animals is concerned, disgust looks to be a good heuristic, so there is a strong presumption in its favor compared to other domains. (Of course, consistently being unable to tell any plausible story will count weaken Steve's justification, and eventually eliminate it entirely.)16 All of this makes it easier to appreciate Kass's disgust-based rejection of cloning, even if we aren't impressed by it. Suppose that there were good arguments for Kass's conservative ideals. Then, even if Kass and other conservatives found it difficult to explain why, exactly, cloning was morally wrong, it would have been true that his disgust was a good guide to wrongness in the past. The heuristic view says that, in such circumstances, Kass would be justified in condemning cloning based on its repugnance.17 This helps us to explain why Kass thought he was justified in condemning cloning, even if he wasn't. Surely he takes there to be good reasons to endorse his community's norms, and so he's willing to trust disgust even when it's hard to make out the connection between those norms and cloning. Of course, insofar as we're skeptical of his ideals, we're also going to be inclined to deny that disgust has a great track record in the relevant domain-namely, new technology. But we needn't endorse disgust skepticism to conclude that, at least where cloning is concerned, there is no wisdom in repugnance. 4 Concluding Remarks I suspect that the heuristic view is well-suited to dodging the criticisms of disgust skeptics. First, disgust does admit false positives, but we can learn not to trust the disgust heuristic in those domains. Second, disgust can be used to dehumanize, which probably flows from the way it draws a line between the in-group and outgroup. But my claim is just that disgust is a heuristic, not that it carves the moral universe at its joints. We know full well that we shouldn't dehumanize others, so we can correct for this tendency. Third, it's true that disgust's evolutionary history doesn't provide reason to think that it's sensitive to morally-relevant properties, but it can justify belief without being sensitive to such properties. Finally, there is indeed immense variation in what we find disgusting, but that is no more a 15 This particular example is complicated by the fact that Steve may well find himself at odds with his community by being skeptical about "humane" slaughter. By the lights of the heuristic view, this may mean that Steve is discovering that he was wrong about the moral community of which he's a member. 16 For more on the heuristic view and animals, see Fischer (2014). 17 As with Steve, this justification would be contingent on eventually being able to explain why cloning is wrong, and would weaken the longer it took to provide an explanation. 19 problem than that there is immense variation in what we take to be wrong. The problem of moral disagreement is real, but it is not a special problem for disgust. Given all this, the heuristic view of disgust seems more promising than the social contagion view. According to the heuristic view, moral disgust can provide evidence that community-defining and especially important norms are being violated. And inasmuch as those norms have good moral reasons behind them, disgust is a good moral heuristic. This view rests on an empirical claim about when people are inclined to condemn actions, which could be mistaken. But given what actually elicits moral disgust, the hypothesis-and the heuristic view- deserve further exploration. References Arneson RJ (2007) Shame, stigma, and disgust in the decent society. The Journal of Ethics 11:31-63 Boyd R, Richerson P (2005) The origin and evolution of cultures. Oxford University Press, New York Chapman HA, Anderson AK (2013) Things rank and gross in nature: A review and synthesis of moral disgust. Psychological Bulletin 139:300-327 Clark J, Fessler D (forthcoming) The role of disgust in normativity, and the role of normativity in disgust research: why liberals should embrace moral disgust. Topoi Corvino J (1997) Why shouldn't Tommy and Jim have sex? In: Corvino J (ed) Same sex: debating the ethics, science, and culture of homosexuality. Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, pp. 3-16 Curtis V (2007) Dirt, disgust, and disease: A natural history of hygiene. Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health 61:660–664 Curtis V, Biran A (2001) Dirt, disgust, and disease: Is hygiene in our genes? Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 44:17-31 Curtis V, Aunger R, Rabie T (2004). Evidence that disgust evolved to protect from risk of disease. Proceedings of the Royal Society: Biological Science Series B 271:S131–S133 Demetriou D (2013) There's some fetish in your ethics. Journal of Philosophical Research 38:377-404 Druschel BA, Sherman MF (1999) Disgust sensitivity as a function of the Big Five and gender. Personality and Individual Differences 26:739-748 Ekman P (1999) Basic emotions. In: Dalgleish T, Power M (eds) Handbook of cognition and emotion. John Wiley & Sons, Sussex, pp. 45-60 20 Fessler D, Navarrete C (2003a) Domain specific variation in disgust sensitivity across the menstrual cycle. Evolution and Human Behavior 24:406-417 Fessler D, Navarrete, C (2003b) Meat is good to taboo. Journal of Cognition and Culture 3:1-40 Fischer RW (2014) Disgust and the collection of bovine foetal blood." In Aaltola E, Hadley J (eds) Animal ethics and philosophy: questioning the orthodoxy. Rowman & Littlefield International, London, pp. 151-164 Greene J (2008) The secret joke of Kant's soul. In: Sinnott-Armstrong W (ed) Moral psychology: volume III. MIT Press, Cambridge, pp. 35-79 Greene J (2013) Moral tribes: emotion, reason, and the gap between us and them. Penguin Press, New York Haidt J (2001) The emotional dog and its rational tail: a social intuitionist approach to moral judgment. Psychological Review 108:814-834 Haidt J (2012) The righteous mind: why good people are divided by politics and religion. Pantheon, New York Haidt J, Graham J (2007) When morality opposes justice: conservatives have moral intuitions that liberals may not recognize. Social Justice Research 20:98-116 Haidt J, Rozin P, McCauley C, Imada S (1997) Body, psyche, and culture: the relationship of disgust to morality. Psychology and Developing Societies 9:107-131 Hauskeller M (2006) Moral disgust. Ethical Perspectives 13:571-602 Huemer M (2005) Ethical intuitionism. Palgrave Macmillan, New York Inbar Y, Pizarro D, Bloom P (2009). Conservatives are more easily disgusted than liberals. Cognition and Emotion 23:714-725 Joyce R (2007) The evolution of morality. MIT Press, Cambridge Kekes J (1992) Disgust and moral taboos. Philosophy 67:431-446. Kelly D (2011) Yuck!: the nature and moral significance of disgust. MIT Press, Cambridge Kite ME, Whitley BE (1998) Do heterosexual men and women differ in their attitudes toward homosexuality? A conceptual and methodological analysis. In: Herek GM (ed) Stigma and sexual orientation: understanding prejudice against lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals. SAGE Publications, Thousand Oaks, pp. 39-61 Knapp C (2003) De-moralizing disgustingness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66:253-278 Kurzban R, Leary M (2001) Evolutionary origins of stigmatization: The functions of social exclusion. Psychological Bulletin 127:187-208 21 Lieberman D, Tooby J, Cosmides L (2003) Does morality have a biological basis? An empirical test of the factors governing moral sentiments relating to incest. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London 270:819-826 Miller S (1986) Disgust: conceptualization, development, and dynamics. International Review of Psycho-Analysis 13:295-307 Nemeroff C, Rozin P (1992) Sympathetic magical beliefs and kosher dietary practice: the interaction of rules and feelings. Ethos 20:96-115 Nemeroff C, Rozin P (2000) The makings of the magical mind: the nature and function of sympathetic magical thinking. In: Rosengren K, Johnson C, Harris P (ed) Imagining the impossible. Cambridge University Press, New York, pp. 1-34 Nichols S (2002) On the genealogy of norms: a case for the role of emotion in cultural evolution. Philosophy of Science 69:234-255 Nozick R (1981) Philosophical explanations. Harvard University Press, Cambridge Nussbaum M (2004) Hiding from humanity: disgust, shame and the law. Princeton University Press, Princeton Pizarro D, Inbar Y, Helion C (2011) On disgust and moral judgment. Emotion Review 3:267-268 Plakias A (2013) The good and the gross. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16:261-278 Prinz J (2004) Which emotions are basic? In: Evans D, Cruse P (eds) Emotion, evolution, and rationality. Oxford University Press, New York, pp. 69-88 Prinz J (2013) Morality is a culturally conditioned response. Philosophy Now. http://philosophynow.org/issues/82/Morality_is_a_Culturally_Conditioned _Response. Accessed 19 November 2013 Rozin P, Fallon A (1987) A perspective on disgust. Psychological Review 94:2341 Rozin P (1999) The process of moralization. Psychological Science 10:218-221 Rozin P, Haidt J, McCauley C (2008) Disgust. In: ed. Lewis M, Haviland-Jones JM, Barrett LF (eds) Handbook of emotions, 3rd ed. Guilford Press, New York, pp. 757-776 Rozin P, Haidt J (2013) The domains of disgust and their origins: contrasting biological and cultural evolutionary accounts. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 17:367-368 Singer P (2005) Ethics and intuitions. Journal of Ethics 9:331-352 Stevenson RJ, Oaten MJ, Case TI, Repacholi BM, Wagland P (2010) Children's response to adult disgust elicitors: development and acquisition. Developmental psychology 46:165-177 22 Tybur JM, Lieberman DL, Griskevicius VG (2009) Microbes, mating, and morality: Individual differences in three functional domains of disgust. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 29:103-122 Tybur JM, Lieberman D, Kurzban R, DeScioli P (2013) Disgust: evolved function and structure. Psychological Review 120:65-

Transoral laser surgery for laryngeal carcinoma: has Steiner achieved a genuine paradigm shift in oncological surgery? AT Harris1, A Tanyi A2,3, RD Hart1, J Trites1, MH Rigby1, J Lancaster4, A Nicolaides5, SM Taylor1 1Division of Otolaryngology, Head and Neck Surgery, Department of Surgery, Faculty of medicine, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada 2Department of Philosophy, University of Liverpool, Liverpool, UK 3Collegium Helveticum, ETH/University of Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland 4Department of Head and Neck Surgery, University Hospital Aintree, Liverpool, Merseyside, UK 5Department of Head and Neck Surgery, York Teaching Hospital NHS Trust, UK ABSTRACT Transoral laser microsurgery applies to the piecemeal removal of malignant tumours of the upper aerodigestive tract using the CO2 laser under the operating microscope. This method of surgery is being increasingly popularised as a single modality treatment of choice in early laryngeal cancers (T1 and T2) and occasionally in the more advanced forms of the disease (T3 and T4), predominantly within the supraglottis. Thomas Kuhn, the American physicist turned philosopher and historian of science, coined the phrase 'paradigm shift' in his groundbreaking book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. He argued that the arrival of the new and often incompatible idea forms the core of a new paradigm, the birth of an entirely new way of thinking. This article discusses whether Steiner and colleagues truly brought about a paradigm shift in oncological surgery. By rejecting the principle of en block resection and by replacing it with the belief that not only is it oncologically safe to cut through the substance of the tumour but in doing so one can actually achieve better results, Steiner was able to truly revolutionise the management of laryngeal cancer. Even though within this article the repercussions of his insight are limited to the upper aerodigestive tract oncological surgery, his willingness to question other peoples' dogma makes his contribution truly a genuine paradigm shift. KEYWORDS Head and neck – Oncology – Paradigm Accepted 11 September 2017 CORRESPONDENCE TO Andrew Harris, E: [email protected] Introduction Transoral laser microsurgery (TLM) applies to the piecemeal removal of malignant tumours of the upper aero-digestive tract using the CO2 laser under the operating microscope. This method of surgery is being increasingly popularised as a single modality treatment of choice in early laryngeal cancers (T1 and T2) and occasionally in the more advanced forms of the disease (T3 and T4), predominantly within the supraglottis. In addition, there is growing evidence of its efficacy in treating carcinomas arising from other anatomical subsites such as the pharynx and oral cavity, either as single modality in early disease or in combination with radiotherapy in more advanced disease.1–9 In early glottic carcinoma, TLM offers a credible alternative to radiotherapy, which was the mainstay of treatment, and achieves comparable local recurrence rates with acceptable functional results.4,5 The path of progress of this new approach has not been without contention and remains controversial in some quarters. In fact, the technique was strongly resisted, even derided at the beginning. Traditional laser micro-laryngoscopy had already been accepted by the time TLM appeared and it was not the usual worries about the introduction of new techniques or technology that were of concern but more the particular way in which these established tools were being used to perform the resection. The TLM approach stipulates violating the integrity of the cancerous growth by cutting directly through it, thus raising concerns that cancer cells would be seeded or spread to other parts of the body. We believe that the discarding of such myths and the associated dramatic change in attitude Ann R Coll Surg Engl 2017; 00: 1–4 1 REVIEW Ann R Coll Surg Engl 2017; 00: 1–4 doi 10.1308/rcsann.2017.0190 of what constitutes a safe oncological resection may represent a paradigm shift in oncological surgery. What is a paradigm and how can it be shifted? The traditional conception of scientific advancement is one of slow, gradual and incremental progression. People often think that new knowledge and ideas are gathered together piecemeal, much like building bricks to erect the edifice of modern understanding. Thomas Kuhn, the American physicist turned philosopher and historian of science, realised and subsequently outlined in his groundbreaking book, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, that this only applies to what he described as 'normal science'. Kuhn perceived normal science as a stepwise progression in knowledge and understanding.10 During periods of normal science, Kuhn argued, the task of the scientist is to work within the confines of the prevailing core idea to a point of disregarding results which could threaten it.10 In essence, the aim of research including thought and instrumentation is directed towards achieving a perceived goal, which must always be consistent with the core idea.10 Occasionally, however, major breakthroughs in understanding can occur not through the usual stepwise accumulation of ideas but by the outright rejection of the core idea itself and its replacement with a new one. The arrival of the new and often incompatible idea forms the core of a new paradigm, the birth of an entirely new way of thinking.11 Such a change represents nothing less than a scientific revolution and, quite understandably, is usually met with strong resistance from the scientific community and is not easily adopted. An example of such a paradigm shift would be Copernicus's conception of the heliocentric model with a motionless Sun being orbited by planets, in contrast to the Ptolemaic viewpoint prevalent at the time, which placed a stationary Earth at the centre of the Universe. Kuhn referred to some of the great paradigm shifts in astronomy, physics and biology – those we associate with the scientific revolutions of Copernicus, Newton or Darwin – as 'one conceptual world view being replaced by another'. What was the prevailing core idea in cancer surgery? It is generally agreed that when it comes to cancer surgery it is imperative that the tumour be resected en bloc and that cutting into the substance of the tumour should be avoided at all costs. This basic oncological rule arguably constitutes the core idea that underpins the whole of surgical oncology, although its origins are difficult to trace. In the modern era, one of the famous fathers of surgery, William Stewart Halstead, developed the radical mastectomy for breast cancer.12 In the late 19th century, Halstead noticed that women who had undergone lumpectomies only suffered more recurrences of the disease. Halstead's ideas stemmed from W Sampson Handley, a surgeon working in London, who believed that cancer invaded outwards from a central core. The principle of encompassing a large cuff of normal tissue while the cancer was retained intact within it was adopted, a belief that is still held strongly to this very day. En-bloc resection of cancers is regarded as oncologically safe and represents the gold standard, as it is thought to prevent local recurrence, tumour seeding and spread. Transoral laser surgery (Steiner technique) Horace Green, in 1852, was the first reported surgeon to remove a lesion in the laryngeal ventricle transorally.13 In 1915, Lynch described the resection of nine laryngeal lesions through an endoscopic technique.14 It was not until the introduction of the operating microscope that endoscopic laryngeal techniques became popularised. In the 1970s, Strong and Jako used the CO2 laser in endoscopic laryngeal resection.15,16 These lesions may have been cancerous but as long as the basic oncological principle that they should always be removed en-bloc was adhered to, the endoscopic approach was deemed an acceptable clinical practice. The possibility of piecemeal resection was not even considered as an option at the time because it was contrary to the core oncological principle that the substance of the tumour should never be breeched. TLM, which breaks this rule, only gained acceptance following a landmark paper published by Wolfgang Steiner.4 The study was conducted between 1979 and 1985 and included 240 patients with laryngeal cancer without prior treatment and managed with curative intent. Patients with glottic cancers (Tis, T1 and T2 lesions), were all treated with transoral endoscopic laser resection. There were six local recurrences, with one patient needing total laryngectomy. Adjusted five-year survival rates were 100%. The goals of oncological surgery are the same for both conventional en-block resection and for TLM: complete tumour excision with sufficiently clear resection margins and the accurate histological assessment of these margins. The methods of reaching these goals, however, differ dramatically between the two methods. TLM cuts through the tumour under the microscope, a bespoke approach, rather than excising a large block of normal tissue (i.e. the vocal cord) with the tumour contained within. In TLM, cutting through tumour allows assessment of the depth of the tumour, thus tailoring the extent of the resection to the specific needs of the individual patient. This compares with enbloc resection, where a large cuff of normal tissue is excised unnecessarily with the tumour contained within or a whole organ such as the larynx is sacrificed to remove the cancer within the organ (Fig 1). The technique of laser resection differs from the conventional en-bloc resection as the tumour is being breached, which is why TLM is thought to violate the principles of oncological surgery. Even though it breaks a basic rule of oncological surgery, Steiner's technique offers many advantages as compared with the approach it replaced. By cutting through tumour until disease-free tissue is reached under microscopic guidance, the surgeon can properly assess the depth of invasion and can thereby achieve better deep-margin clearance than would otherwise have been possible 2 Ann R Coll Surg Engl 2017; 00: 1–4 HARRIS TANYI HART TRITES RIGBY LANCASTER NICOLAIDES TAYLOR TRANSORAL LASER SURGERY FOR LARYNGEAL CARCINOMA: HAS STEINER ACHIEVED A GENUINE PARADIGM SHIFT IN ONCOLOGICAL SURGERY? through an en-block resection, even if access were not an issue. This is the core idea behind TLM. The piecemeal resection allows the removal of these tumours through the relatively narrow aperture of a rigid laryngoscope. If there are any areas of concern (such as margin status) while performing TLM, frozen section analysis may be performed. In the words of Steiner, TLM is: 'Oncologically radical, but less surgically radical'. The laser technique theoretically seals blood vessels and lymphatics, preventing the conventional concern about regional and distant spread. In the case of TLM, the surgeon and not the pathologist defines the margin status. The surgeon is operating through a microscope, giving a high-definition view of tumour and normal tissue, hence the surgeon deciphers the difference and can tailor the resection accordingly. Together with the visual aspect of differentiating between normal and cancerous tissue comes the 'feel' of the tissue and how it cuts with the laser. These factors interplay, allowing the surgeon to decide whether tumour clearance has been obtained. If the specimen margin status is positive on conventional histological techniques, a second-look procedure may show no residual tumour as the laser often vaporises the cut margin of tissue. The management choice is then to either rely on the surgeon's experience or to use histological assessment of marginal biopsies. Other considerations are organ-specific factors; for example, tumours of the tongue are known to have finger-like submucosal extensions compared with the vocal cords, where this is not generally the case. Transoral laser resection of tumours of the larynx is possible because the desmoplastic stromal response is thought to equal the underlying invading tumour, thus generally preventing underor over-resection. There is a paucity of lymphatics within Reinke's space and hence T1 vocal fold tumours are thought to 'never' metastasise, allowing for limited resection within the larynx. Taking an extra centimetre of pharyngeal tissue will not have the same effects as taking more vocal cord tissue in a professional singer. The risk factors for these tumours are also taken into consideration; chronic alcohol and cigarette use is known to produce a field change, so larger areas of tissue are taken. The experience of the surgeon is also paramount in achieving a successful outcome. The hallmark of malignancy is its ability to invade adjacent normal tissue. At the site of primary invasion many epithelial tumours induce a desmoplastic response of the host tissues.17 This stromal response is complex, involving fibroblasts, inflammatory cells, proliferating vascular structures, as well as normal parenchymal cells undergoing atrophy at the invasive edge. This response is particularly important when considering laser resection. Some tumours may outgrow the stromal response and may be found invading seemingly normal healthy tissue, making it difficult to obtain clear margins. The converse is also possible, with some tumours showing an intense desmoplastic stromal response, in which case a very large area of tissue needs to be excised containing relatively small tumour volume within it. This scenario poses particular challenges in endoscopic laser resection of laryngeal tumours as the preservation of tissue is one of its most important advantages. At the time that Steiner was undertaking his work on transoral laser surgery, many other surgeons were performing open surgery in the form of partial laryngectomy. This type of surgery kept to the basic oncological principles, produced very low rates of locoregional recurrence and showed good five-year survival rates. However, entering the larynx through an external approach requires a laryngofissure combined with a tracheotomy. This means long recovery times, the need for nasogastric feeding, prolonged hospital stay and risks serious complications, such as poor wound healing and the development of a laryngocutaneous fistula. Such serious complications can be avoided by TLM, with the added benefits of a better functional outcome and greatly reduced hospital stay (most TLM procedures can be done as day cases). In the following year. Steiner and colleagues published details of their work on hypopharyngeal cancer.6 This technique can be applied to virtually any area of the upper aerodigestive tract. Indeed, the authors of this article have applied TLM to the oral cavity and oropharynx. Conclusion Steiner's contribution to the surgical management of laryngeal cancer is clearly significant but can we really describe it as a true paradigm shift? Is it not simply a modification, admittedly an important one, to an existing surgical technique, just like any of a myriad of others that pervade modern surgical practice? Can we really compare it to the great paradigm shifts in astronomy, physics and biology, examples of which we gave earlier? In response, we need to appreciate that it is not the technique itself that is under consideration here but the conceptual breakthrough. Steiner was prepared to reject a whole way of thinking, abandoning the previously (a) (b) Figure 1 Depiction of a right vocal cord tumour: (a) tumour on the right vocal cord; (b) tumour after it has been split (through dotted line 'B') and the anterior portion has been excised. Rather than the traditional en-bloc resection, the tumour is split first (dotted line B, picture a). This allows for depth of tumour to be determined. Following the tumour split both sections are then excised under the microscope (source: Rubinstein M, Armstrong WB. Transoral laser microsurgery for laryngeal cancer: a primer and review of laser dosimetry. Lasers Med Sci 2011; 26: 113–124; reproduced with permission). Ann R Coll Surg Engl 2017; 00: 1–4 3 HARRIS TANYI HART TRITES RIGBY LANCASTER NICOLAIDES TAYLOR TRANSORAL LASER SURGERY FOR LARYNGEAL CARCINOMA: HAS STEINER ACHIEVED A GENUINE PARADIGM SHIFT IN ONCOLOGICAL SURGERY? cherished and seeming inviolable idea of what constitutes sound oncological surgery, coupled with his ability to replace it with a new one that was its exact opposite. His main insight was that by adhering to the principle of enblock resection, surgeons were limiting the role of laser surgery to a small minority of early laryngeal carcinomas and had to resort to either radical radiotherapy or radical open surgery to deal with the rest. By rejecting the principle of enblock resection and by replacing it with the belief that not only is it oncologically safe to cut through the substance of the tumour but in doing so one can actually achieve better results, Steiner was able to truly revolutionise the management of laryngeal cancer. Even though within this article the repercussions of his insight are limited to the upper aerodigestive tract oncological surgery, his willingness to question other peoples' dogmas makes his contribution truly a genuine paradigm shift. References 1. Sandulache VC, Kupferman ME. Transoral laser surgery for laryngeal cancer. Rambam Maimonides Med J 2014; 5(2): e0012. 2. Canis M, Ihler F, Martin A et al. Organ preservation in T4a laryngeal cancer: is transoral laser microsurgery an option? Eur Arch Otorhinolaryngol 2013; 270 (10): 2,719–2,727. 3. Takes RP, Strojan P, Silver CE et al. Current trends in initial management of hypopharyngeal cancer: The declining use of open surgery. Head Neck 2012; 34(2): 270–281. 4. Steiner W. Results of curative laser microsurgery of laryngeal carcinomas. Am J Otolaryngol 1993; 14(2): 116–121. 5. Higgins KM, Shah MD, Ogaick MJ, Enepekides D. Treatment of early-stage glottic cancer: meta-analysis comparison of laser excision versus radiotherapy. J Otolaryngol Head Neck Surg 2009; 38(6): 603–612. 6. Steiner W. Therapy of hypopharyngeal carcinoma. Part V. Discussion of longterm results of trans-oral laser microsurgery of hypopharyngeal carcinoma. HNO 1994; 42: 116–121. 7. Grant DG, Salassa JR, Hinni ML et al. Carcinoma of the tongue base treated by transoral laser microsurgery, part one: untreated tumors, a prospective analysis of oncologic and functional outcomes. Laryngoscope 2006; 116(12): 2,150–2,155. 8. Werner J, Benedikt J. Transoral laser microsurgery in carcinomas of the oral cavity, pharynx, and larynx. Cancer Control 2002; 9(5):379–386. 9. Rigby MH, Taylor SM. Review of transoral laser microsurgery for cancer of the upper aerodigestive tract. J Otolaryngol Head Neck Surg 2011; 40(2): 113–121. 10. Kuhn T. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press; 1962. 11. Bird A. Thomas Kuhn. In: Zalta EN, ed. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Metaphysics Research Lab; 2013. 12. Osborne MP. William Stewart Halsted: his life and contributions to surgery. Lancet Oncol 2007; 8(3): 256–265. 13. Green H. Morbid growths within the larnx. In: On the Surgical Treatment of Polypi of the Larynx, and Oedema of the Glottis. New York, NY: Putnam; 1852, pp46–65. 14. Lynch R. Suspension laryngoscopy and its accomplishments. Ann Otol Rhinol Laryngol 1915; 24: 429–478. 15. Strong M, Jako G. Laser surgery in the larynx: early clinical experience with continuous CO2 laser. Ann Otol Rhinol Laryngol 1972; 81: 791–798. 16. Strong M. Laser excision of carcinoma of the larynx. Laryngoscope 1975; 85: 1,286–1,289. 17. Iacobuzio-Donahue CA, Argani P, Hempen PM et al. The desmoplastic response to infiltrating breast carcinoma: gene expression at the site of primary invasion and implications for comparisons between tumor types. Cancer Res 2002; 62 (18): 5,351–5,357. 4 Ann R Coll Surg Engl 2017; 00: 1–4 HARRIS TANYI HART TRITES RIGBY LANCASTER NICOLAIDES TAYLOR TRANSORAL LASER SURGERY FOR LARYNGEAL CARCINOMA: HAS STEINER ACHIEVED A GENUINE PARADIGM SHIFT IN ONCOLOGICAL SURGERY?

Kant-Studien 101. Jahrg., S. 331–351 DOI 10.1515/KANT.2010.021 © Walter de Gruyter 2010 ISSN 0022-8877 Kant's Non-Absolutist Conception of Political Legitimacy – How Public Right 'Concludes' Private Right in the "Doctrine of Right" by Helga Varden, Urbana, Ill. Abstract: Contrary to the received view, I argue that Kant, in the "Doctrine of Right", outlines a third, republican alternative to absolutist and voluntarist conceptions of political legitimacy. According to this republican alternative, a state must meet certain institutional requirements before political obligations arise. An important result of this interpretation is not only that there are institutional restraints on a legitimate state's use of coercion, but also that the rights of the state ('public right') are not in principle reducible to the rights of individuals ('private right'). Thus, for Kant, political obligations are intimately linked to the existence of a certain kind of republican institutional framework. Keywords: justice, republicanism, legitimacy Introduction1 One of the great appeals of voluntarism is that it presents itself as the only possible alternative to an absolutist conception of political legitimacy, according to which might makes right. Many of Kant's interpreters have accepted this dichotomy, and as a consequence argue that a fundamental problem with Kant's nonconsensual theory of political obligations is its complementary absolutist conception of political legitimacy.2 Indeed, this interpretation appears affirmed by Kant himself, since many of his formulations invite the absolutist interpretation. Never1 I am grateful to Rachel Bryant, Katrin Flikschuh, Beatrix Himmelmann, Pauline Kleingeld, Arnt Myrstad, Arthur Ripstein, Sergio Tenenbaum and Shelley Weinberg. Thanks also to: the audience and my commentator Zach Hoskins at the 2007 Illinois Philosophical Association Conference at Southern Illinois University at Edwardsville, Nov. 9–10; the audience and my commentator Kyla Ebels-Duggan at the 2008 APA Central Division meeting, Chicago, April 17–19, 2008; the Pacific Study Group of the North American Kant Society 2006 Meeting, October 21–22, 2006, University of California-Riverside, Riverside, California. 2 For example, see Sarah Williams Holtman: "Revolution, Contradiction, and Kantian Citizenship", 212–213 and 224–227. In: Kant's Metaphysics of Morals. Edited by Mark Timmons. New York 2002, 209–232; Otfried Höffe: Immanuel Kant. Translated by Marshall Farrier. Albany 1994, 186f; Wolfgang Kersting: "Kant's Concept of the State", 162f. In: Essays on Kant's Political Philosophy. Edited by Howard L. Williams. Chicago 1992, 143–166, but note that Kersting appears to hold a different view in "Politics, freedom, and order: Kant's Political Philosophy", on 361. In: The Cambridge Companion to Kant. Edited by Paul Guyer. New York 1992, 342–366; Allen D. Rosen: Kant's Theory of Justice. New York 1993, 141–148; Howard L. Williams: Kant's Political Philosophy. New York 1983, 198–208. AUTHOR'S COPY | AUTORENEXEMPLAR AUTHOR'S COPY | AUTORENEXEMPLAR 332 Helga Varden theless, I believe that this is a mistaken interpretation. It results from an incorrect reading of Kant's political writings, of which the "Doctrine of Right" in the Metaphysics of Morals is the most important. The mistake has been to read Kant's texts through what I will call 'voluntarist lenses'. When contemporary Kantians analyze Kant's political texts through voluntarist lenses they wrongly assume both that Kant's circumstances of justice are the same as those proposed by Hume and Locke, and that the ideal of political legitimacy must be either absolutist or voluntarist. There are several reasons to draw this conclusion. First, the majority of contemporary, historical interpretations of Kant mistakenly maintain that he considers the state merely prudentially necessary to overcome problems arising from immoral behaviour (humanity's 'warped wood') as well as from a general lack of resources. On this view, the state is not in principle necessary to enable justice3, but is simply a palliative or remedy for the inconveniences of the state of nature. Moreover, these historical interpretations presume that Kant accepted the dichotomy between voluntarism and absolutism. And since anyone with half a brain recognizes the irrationality of staying in the state of nature, they assume that Kant sided with Hobbes.4 In this way, they argue that considerations of prudence and simple assurance of property right lead Kant to the conclusion that our political obligations must be understood in non-consensual terms. And any sovereign that manages to subject the people to its rule is a legitimate political power, to which the people are politically obligated. Hence, they see Kant as affirming an absolutist conception of political legitimacy. Second, when contemporary Kantian theorists, such as Onora O'Neill5 and the early John Rawls6, develop their own Kantian positions they typically argue that Kant should have opted for a weak version of voluntarism.7 An absolutist conception of political legitimacy makes right into might and, therefore, is totally unacceptable. Instead, Kant should have argued that individuals' rights set the boundaries for rightful uses of state coercion, and these individual rights should have 3 I use 'justice' and 'right' interchangeably throughout this paper. 4 For prudential readings of Kant's and the Kantian argument, see Mary J. Gregor: Laws of Freedom. Oxford 1963; Jeffrie G. Murphy: Kant: The Philosophy of Right, Macon 1994, 34, 70, 75f., 104, 107; John Rawls: A Theory of Justice. Cambridge 1999, 110, though see also Political Liberalism. New York 1996, 66; Thomas Pogge: "Is Kant's Rechtslehre a 'Comprehensive Liberalism?'". In: Kant's Metaphysics of Morals, 147; Onora O'Neill: Bounds of Justice. Cambridge 2000, 139; Kenneth Westphal: "A Kantian Justification of Possession. In: Kant's Metaphysics of Morals", 108, but contrast with 91, 104, 109; and Howard L. Williams: Kant's Political Philosophy. 10f., 70, 73, 164, 169f., 185. 5 Onora O'Neill: Bounds of Justice; Constructions of Justice. Cambridge 1989; and Towards Justice and Virtue – A Constructive Account of Practical Reasoning. Cambridge 1996. 6 John Rawls: A Theory of Justice. 7 Some interpreters argue that Kant actually defends weak voluntarism. For example, see Alexander Kaufman: Welfare in the Kantian State. New York 1999; Paul Guyer: Kant on Freedom, Law, and Happiness. New York 2000, and Kant. New York 2006; and Patrick Riley: Will and Political Legitimacy. A Critical Exposition of Social Contract Theory in Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Kant, and Hegel. Cambridge 1999. AUTHOR'S COPY | AUTORENEXEMPLAR AUTHOR'S COPY | AUTORENEXEMPLAR Kant's Non-Absolutist Conception of Political Legitimacy 333 included a right to cover certain basic needs. Though these contemporary Kantians do not follow Locke in arguing for actual consent as a precondition on political obligations (strong voluntarism), they do argue for a weak version of voluntarism. Rightful coercion and legitimate political authority are understood in terms of hypothetical consent to principles of justice that are responsive to considerations of need. In this paper, I argue that Kant's non-voluntarist conception of political obligations is not complemented by an absolutist conception of political legitimacy. I argue that Kant outlines a third, republican alternative to absolutist and voluntarist conceptions of political legitimacy. According to this republican alternative, a state must meet certain institutional requirements before political obligations arise or before persons subject to its power are obligated to recognize its rightful authority over them. Kant argues that the state must represent the general, united will by representing the will of each person born within its jurisdiction. This is achieved by setting itself up as a public authority that posits and enforces laws in a way reconcilable with each subject's right to freedom, namely by ensuring that the totality of laws (public right) secures institutional conditions in which individuals can exercise their external freedom, or choice in space and time, rightfully. So, rather than understanding political legitimacy in terms of either absolutism or voluntarism, Kant argues that it is intimately linked to the existence of a certain, republican institutional framework. An important result of understanding Kant to be putting forward a third republican alternative to absolutism or voluntarism, and thus showing the dichotomy to be false, is not only that there are institutional restraints on a legitimate state's use of coercion, but also that the rights of the state are not seen as reducible to the rights of individuals. When Kant's texts are read through voluntarist lenses these aspects of Kant's theory do not become apparent, which is the reason why many contemporary Kantian theorists have been unable to capture these highly important features of Kant's theory of the legitimate state. And as will become clear, reading Kant through voluntarist lenses is the reason why Kant often is seen, albeit mistakenly, to have little to say about issues of economic justice. The voluntarist lenses make it impossible to see the way in which Kant links the state's legitimacy to the existence of public institutions that secure conditions of economic justice. 1. Kant's Non-Voluntarist Conception of Political Obligations In the private right sections of the "Doctrine of Right" Kant argues that justice is possible only within civil society, or within a liberal, legal framework. Civil society is an enforceable precondition of justice and not merely a remedy for the inconveniences characterizing the state of nature, understood as a condition without a public authority (MS, AA 06: 307–308, cf. TP, AA 08: 294–295, 313, ZeF, AA 08: 354). These conclusions are grounded in Kant's relational understanding of right, according to which individuals' interactions must be respectful of each AUTHOR'S COPY | AUTORENEXEMPLAR AUTHOR'S COPY | AUTORENEXEMPLAR 334 Helga Varden other's innate right to "freedom", understood as her right to "independence from being constrained by another's choice [...] insofar as it can coexist with the freedom of every other in accordance with a universal law."8 Interaction consistent with each person's innate right to freedom is deemed impossible in the state of nature. Right cannot be realized privately by each individual acting virtuously because it is impossible for private individuals to provide rightful assurance and to overcome certain problems of indeterminacy characterising the specification of the private right principles of private property, contract and status relations in the state of nature. So there are two insoluble problems in the state of nature: the problem of rightful assurance and the problem of indeterminacy regarding application. In short, private property, contract, and status relations9 among individuals cannot be both rightful, or respectful of each individual's innate right to freedom, and at the same time determined and assured by a private authority. And private authority is the only authority there is in the state of nature. Indeed, even mutual agreement cannot make relations among individuals rightful in the state of nature, since in this situation everyone's external freedom is still subject to one another's arbitrary choice. Due to the problems of assurance and indeterminacy, Kant maintains individuals can enjoy only provisional rights in this condition and that staying in the state of nature is to commit wrongdoing. It is to stay in a condition where we subject one another's external freedom to one another's arbitrary choices rather than to universal law, and so rightful external freedom is impossible in the state of nature. At best, the state of nature is "a state devoid of justice" [ein Zustand der Rechtlosigkeit (MS, AA 06: 312.24)], meaning that in the best case scenario it is a condition in which particular individuals do not wrong one another, but yet in choosing to remain in the state of nature they renounce any concept of right. Consequently, writes Kant, men "in general [...] do wrong in the highest degree by willing to be and to remain in a condition that is not rightful".10 That is, individuals choosing to stay in the state of nature do wrong in the highest degree even if the wrong they do is not done against particular individuals. In order to interact rightfully with others they must therefore establish a condition in which their interactions are subject to universal laws rather than to one another's arbitrary restrictions. And the only way to do this is by establishing a will that represents the will of each and yet the will of no one particular private individual. That is to say, 8 I have used Mary Gregor's translation of Kant's works in Immanuel Kant: Practical Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, 1996. MS, AA 06: 237.29–31: "Freiheit (Unabhängigkeit von eines Anderen nöthigender Willkür), sofern sie mit jedes Anderen Freiheit nach einem allgemeinen Gesetz zusammen bestehen kann". 9 Status relations include all relations, in which one person has legal standing with regard to another person's private life. I discuss these relations in more detail in "Kant's NonVoluntarist Conception of Political Obligations: Why Justice is Impossible in the State of Nature". In: Kantian Review 13: 2, 2008, 1–45, and in "A Kantian Conception of Rightful Sexual Relations: Sex, (Gay) Marriage and Prostitution". In: Social Philosophy Today 22, 2007, 199–218. 10 MS, AA 06: 307.31–32–308.01: [...] überhaupt tun sie im höchsten Grade daran unrecht, in einem Zustande sein und bleiben zu wollen, der kein rechtlicher ist." AUTHOR'S COPY | AUTORENEXEMPLAR AUTHOR'S COPY | AUTORENEXEMPLAR Kant's Non-Absolutist Conception of Political Legitimacy 335 rightful interaction requires the establishment of a will or authority that is impartial in its form or a public, general will or a public authority.11 To refuse to enter civil society is therefore to refuse the condition under which interaction respectful of each person's innate right to freedom is possible. This is why refusing to enter civil society is to commit wrongdoing in the highest degree, and individuals have a strict or enforceable duty to set up a public authority to provide assurance and to specify the rules for their interaction.12 Moreover, because consent cannot be a necessary condition for the establishment of a rightful state, Kant concludes that the liberal ideal of political obligations is non-voluntarist in nature.13 Let us now consider why this does not entail an absolutist conception of political legitimacy. To see this we must consider Kant's account of public right. 2. Kant's Non-Absolutist Conception of State Legitimacy "Public right", Kant argues, is the "sum of the laws which need to be promulgated generally in order to bring about a rightful condition".14 Elsewhere he explains, "the only constitution that accords with right" is a "pure republic". The pure republican constitution accords with right because it "makes freedom the principle and indeed the condition for any exercise of coercion".15 In yet another place, Kant explains that public right ultimately aims to enable a condition in which each citizen's freedom, equality and independence is secured.16 What does this mean? It can only be that constitutive of public right is the establishment of a public monopoly on coercion to overcome the problem of assurance and the public positing and application of those laws whose function it is to overcome the problem of indeterminacy regarding the specification of the private right principles (private property, contract and status relations). Thus, we need an account of how the sovereign sets itself up as a public authority to overcome the problems 11 See MS, AA 06: 345–346; AA 08: 344, 351–352. 12 See TP, AA 08: 371; MS, AA 06: 230, 232. 13 See my "Kant's Non-Voluntarist Conception of Political Obligations" for the full argument why justice is impossible in the state of nature. The paper at hand can be seen as a sequel of sorts to "Kant's Non-Voluntarist Conception of Political Obligations". It concerns national public right in the "Doctrine of Right", and hence takes off from the interpretation that Kant defends a non-voluntarist conception of political obligations in the private right section of the "Doctrine of Right". In: "Diversity and Unity. An Attempt at Drawing a Justifiable Line". In: Archiv für Rechtsund Sozialphilosophie/Archives for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy (ARSP) 94, 2008, Heft 1: 1–25, I discuss the other two forms of public right in the "Doctrine of Right", namely the right of nations and cosmopolitan right. 14 MS, AA 06: 311.06–08: Der Inbegriff der Gesetze, die einer allgemeinen Bekanntmachung bedürfen, um einen rechtlichen Zustand hervorzubringen, ist das öffentliche[.] Recht." 15 Die "einzig rechtmässige Verfassung" ist die "einer reinen Republik" (MS, AA: 06: 340.31–32). Sie allein "[macht] die Freiheit zum Princip, ja zur Bedingung alles Zwanges [...], der zu einer rechtlichen Verfassung im eigentlichen Sinne des Staats erforderlich ist [...]" (MS, AA 06: 340.35–37). 16 See MS, AA 06: 314; TP, AA 08: 290. AUTHOR'S COPY | AUTORENEXEMPLAR AUTHOR'S COPY | AUTORENEXEMPLAR 336 Helga Varden of assurance and indeterminacy in the right way. As we shall see, Kant ultimately argues that a tripartite authority that secures the rights of each citizen is required. But Kant, in contrast to Locke, does not limit public right to private right, or to laws that in principle are reducible to the provisional rights held by individuals in the state of nature. Instead, I suggest, Kant argues that public right must make 'freedom its principle' by addressing also the additional challenges resulting from the fact that the public authority must establish a monopoly on coercion. When the public authority establishes a monopoly on coercion, it creates what Kant in the essay "Perpetual Peace" calls a dependency relation between itself and its citizens that it must make rightful.17 The state must reconcile its sole right to use coercion with each individual's innate right to freedom by ensuring that the total system of law provides conditions under which each private person's freedom is subject to universal law. The state therefore does not merely posit laws regarding private right. It must also secure each citizen's 'freedom, equality and independence' through additional institutional provisions for its citizens – through public right. This is why, on Kant's view, the state has a right to do things that private individuals in the state of nature cannot be seen as having a provisional right to do, or why the rights of the state (the principles of public right) do not in principle reduce to the rights of individuals (the principles of private right). Moreover, what makes the public right argument an a priori argument is that it follows from requirements internal to rightful external freedom ('right') once the monopoly on coercion by the state is assumed.18 Finally, Kant argues that in order for the public institutional system to be legitimate, its actual establishment must be a 'pure republic', meaning that it must be representational in nature. It is because the legitimacy of the state is tied to the establishment of the public institutional framework that Kant's position is non-voluntarist, yet non-absolutist and republican in nature. For considerations of space, I will focus only on how the public authority must fulfill three institutional requirements regarding its structure (tripartite public authority, equal systemic freedom, and unconditional poverty relief) and must be representative in nature before there is civil society with its corresponding political obligations.19 First I consider why the public authority must be a tripar17 See ZeF, AA 08: 349–350; 349n; cf. MS, AA 06: 316. 18 See MS, AA 06: 313. 19 Kant argues that in addition to positing laws governing private property, contract and status relations, civil society must have the following institutional composition: 1.) a tripartite (legislative, executive and judiciary) public authority; 2.) public institutions governing land, the economy, finances and the police; 3.) public institutions that provide unconditional poverty relief; 4.) public offices to administer the state, and finally, 5.) a public system of punishment for both private and public crimes. In Kant's text, the last four of these institutions are given the sub-headings B, C, D and E under the overall heading: "General Remark On the Effects with Regard to Rights that Follow from the Nature of the Civil Union [Allgemeine Anmerkung von den rechtlichen Wirkungen aus der Natur des bürgerlichen Vereins]" (MS, AA 06: 318.15–17). The tripartite structure of the sovereign is discussed in § 47–49 immediately before section A, which discusses the right to revolution. I combine the discussion of the tripartite nature of the state and the right to revolution in section 2.1 below. Due to considerations of space, I do not deal with point 4 (D) and 5 (E) in this paper. AUTHOR'S COPY | AUTORENEXEMPLAR AUTHOR'S COPY | AUTORENEXEMPLAR Kant's Non-Absolutist Conception of Political Legitimacy 337 tite public authority in order to represent the general, united will and so to provide rightful solutions to the problems of assurance and indeterminacy regarding the specification of private right (section 2.1.). Subsequently, in sections 2.2 and 2.3, I address the requirements concerning equal systemic freedom and unconditional poverty relief, before in section 2.4 addressing the representative nature of the 'pure' republic. 2.1 The Tripartite Public Authority and Revolution Kant's theory of public right is constructed on the basis of his conception of rightful external freedom, which is grounded on each person's innate right to freedom. To have one's external freedom subject to universal law is to be restricted symmetrically and in a non-contingent manner. Kant's conception of rightful external freedom ('right') explains both why the public authority must establish a monopoly on uses of coercion and why although revolution is impermissible, one is obligated to respect the new sovereign after a successful revolution. The function of the civil authority is to subject and assure each subject's external freedom under universal law, or rightful external freedom. In the brief summary of Kant's conception of private right above, we saw both that any privately provided solutions to the problems of indeterminacy and assurance cannot enable such rightful external freedom. Therefore, the civil authority must assume a monopoly on coercion, since this is necessary to enable rightful external freedom. What is more, as Kant argues in public right section A, it follows from this that there can be no individual right to revolution or individual resistance to governmental authority, since such uses of coercion not only undermine the possibility of rightful assurance, but are also unilateral. After all, the reason why we have a strict duty to leave the state of nature is that we have an obligation to leave behind a condition in which our external freedom is constantly and necessarily subject to other person's arbitrary uses of coercion. To put the point differently, to have a right to revolution presupposes that rightful relations are possible in the state of nature, and yet Kant takes himself to have shown in the private right sections that this is impossible. Consequently, revolution and coercive resistance to the sovereign always amount to wrongdoing.20 For the same reason, however, if a successful revolution actually has taken place and a new sovereign with a just institutional framework has been established, then the people are politically obliged to obey the new sovereign.21 How, then, to conceive of the public authority, or a political authority with an impartial form? The first requirement is that the authority must represent the "general united will of the people.22 This is achieved by establishing the three ar20 See MS, AA 06: 318ff. 21 See MS, AA 06: 323. 22 MS, AA 06: 314: "der allgemein vereinigte Volkswille". AUTHOR'S COPY | AUTORENEXEMPLAR AUTHOR'S COPY | AUTORENEXEMPLAR 338 Helga Varden tificial public authorities, or 'thought entities'23, constitutive of a public will: a legislator, an executrix and a judge.24 Moreover, because the indeterminacy problem makes it impossible to be independent from others' arbitrary choices and subject to universal law in the state of nature, when instituting the public authority the challenge is to avoid reproducing this problem. In order to do this, the public authority must constitute itself as the rule of public law. First, this does not only mean that the political and legal authority must treat each of its subjects as equals under the law,25 but also that the legislator must be seen as having primacy with regard to the other two sovereign authorities. The legislative authority is prior to the others in that posited law must delineate the powers of the other two authorities. Only if posited law is constitutive of the executive and judiciary authorities can they enable interaction under universal law rather than subjection to arbitrary choices. This is why Kant says that in an important sense the legislator is the sovereign. The sovereign authority is primarily invested in the legislator by its authority to posit laws, whereas the executive authority enforces the law posited by the legislator, and the judicial authority adjudicates actual conflicts amongst the subjects by the relevant posited laws.26 Kant illustrates this by saying that the legislator can be seen as the major premise in a practical syllogism, the executive authority's resulting command is the minor premise and the judge's verdict is the conclusion.27 Nevertheless, despite the primacy of the legislator, the three constituents of the public authority complement each other and are simultaneously subordinated to each other without also usurping each other's functions. They must therefore be seen as comprising three different, yet complementary principles, which ensure the rule of universal law and so are established as authoritative rather than merely powerful.28 Second, the legislative, the executive and judiciary authorities cannot be the arbitrary choices of a private person, but must be non-contingent and symmetrical restrictions. How is this done? Consider the case in which the three artificial authorities constitutive of a public authority are represented by a monarch. The requirement of non-contingency is met by the monarch being a public person and not a private individual, namely by the monarch not having private property. This is why Kant says that the sovereign "possesses nothing (of his own) except himself; for if he had something of his own alongside others in the state, a dispute could arise between them and there would be no judge to settle it. But one can also say that he possesses everything, since he had the right to command over the people, to whom all external things belong [...] the right to assign to each what 23 MS, AA 06: 338. 24 See MS, AA 06: 313; cf. ZeF, AA 08: 352; cf. 350–351. 25 For example, when Jews no longer could own private property in Nazi-Germany, NaziGermany seized to be a legitimate state. – Cf. MS, AA 06: 314; TP, AA 294–295. 26 Matters of guilt or innocence, Kant argues are determined by the people (as members of a jury). In this way, if the jury is mistaken, then the people have wrongly judged themselves (MS, AA 06: 317–318). 27 See MS, AA 06: 313. 28 See MS, AA 06: 316–18. AUTHOR'S COPY | AUTORENEXEMPLAR AUTHOR'S COPY | AUTORENEXEMPLAR Kant's Non-Absolutist Conception of Political Legitimacy 339 is his".29 The monarch cannot own private property and the property over which it exerts any kind of authority belongs to the people (public property) and is governed by posited law. Instead, the monarch determines and secures its citizens' rights against one another. The first step to secure that the monarch is impartial in its form therefore yields the requirement that the monarch cannot have private property, since this would make it impossible for it to issue non-contingent restrictions. In turn, symmetry is secured by the same actions of all private persons being subjected to the same restrictions. With respect to its function as a legislator, this means that the monarch's law must be posited law. It cannot consist in daily decrees by the monarch. The main problem with having a system of daily decrees is not that it makes it almost impossible to know what the law is, but that the subjects would then be subject to the arbitrary choices of the monarch and would not be reciprocally restricted in their use of freedom vis-à-vis each other. Moreover, as mentioned above, posited law must constitute the two other offices of the monarch. Therefore the monarch, as judge, must not only adjudicate all disputes in accordance with its posited law, but his actions as judge are themselves specified by posited law. The monarch does not subject persons to symmetrical restrictions if its adjudications are simply his changing opinions rather than determinations in accordance with the rule of law. Finally, symmetry is enabled by how the office of the executrix is governed by posited law and by the executrix enforcing only the judgements of the judiciary against private individuals. In sum, the crux of the first condition set by public right is that each branch of the tripartite authority must institutionalize the non-contingency and symmetry that rightful external freedom demands. This is achieved through the requirement that the sovereign's exercise of its authority is detached from private interests and arbitrary choices, and instead is constituted by the rule of public law. By being so constructed, the sovereign is impartial in its form. Moreover, the two conditions of non-contingency and symmetry are conceptually connected. It is because the sovereign does not have private (contingent) interests that it can subject all the citizens (private persons) to symmetrical restrictions. And it is because the sovereign's tripartite authority is a thoroughgoing system of public law that it enables interaction under universal law rather than subjection to any particular person's arbitrary choice. 2.2 Equal Systemic Freedom The second and third condition on legitimate public authority, which I will call the conditions of 'equal systemic freedom' and 'unconditional poverty relief', each concern additional institutional systemic requirements constitutive of public 29 "Von einem Landesherrn kann man sagen: er besitzt nichts (zu eigen), ausser sich selbst; denn wenn er neben einem anderen im Staat etwas zu eigen hätte, so würde mit diesem ein Streit möglich sein, zu dessen Schlichtung kein Richter wäre. Aber man kann auch sagen: er besitzt alles; weil er das Befehlshaberrecht über das Volk hat (jedem das Seine zu Theil kommen zu lassen), dem alle äussere Sachen [...] zugehören."] (MS, AA 06: 324.14–20). AUTHOR'S COPY | AUTORENEXEMPLAR AUTHOR'S COPY | AUTORENEXEMPLAR 340 Helga Varden right. Each requirement stems from how the public authority must first assume a monopoly on coercion and then must ensure that this monopoly is reconcilable with each subject's innate right to freedom. The second condition on legitimate public authority requires the state to assume the role of guarantor of rightful relations with regard to land, the economy and finances. It does this by securing conditions of equal systemic freedom for its citizens. A condition of equal systemic freedom exists when the institutional framework, within which individuals use their rightful means to set and pursue ends, is itself constituted by universal (non-contingent, symmetrical) restrictions. If the institutional framework itself is subject to some private person's arbitrary choices, then it cannot provide a condition in which all persons' external freedom is non-contingently and symmetrically restricted, including when they set and pursue ends with their means. Hence, the state must ensure that property determining systems function according to universal laws. The state must provide institutional guarantees that the systems within which private persons' means have value and within which they set and pursue ends are not themselves subjected to the arbitrary choices of private individuals. Rather, there must be a public framework within which persons exercise external freedom independently and as equals. Only in this way can the state ensure that no one private person finds herself in a condition where the use of her external freedom is subjected to the arbitrary choice of other private persons rather than to universal law. With regard to land, Kant argues that providing a guarantee of equal systemic freedom involves implementing two kinds of institutional requirements. First, the state issues and repeals statutes governing 'artificial' landowners, such as corporations and clerical orders.30 For example, it is inconsistent with conditions of equal systemic freedom that artificial persons own land in perpetuity. The reason is that though persons as part of exercising their external freedom can establish such artificial persons, these artificial persons can continue to exist only insofar as there also exist persons who are exercising their private property rights through them. Because the state must make sure that the land belongs only to the people, corporations and clerical orders cannot have rights that exceed the rights of the individuals who exercise their rights through them at any time. Therefore, the state as guarantor of equal systemic freedom cannot recognise such artificial persons to exist in perpetuity, but rather must issue and repeal statutes restricting these artificial persons as appropriate. Second, Kant argues that the state generates conditions of equal systemic freedom by taxing private landowners insofar as necessary to secure rightful interaction on the land.31 External freedom is to use one's means to set and pursue ends in space and time, either alone or together with others subject to universal law. Since it is impossible for us, as embodied beings, to exist and do anything, that is, to be somewhere, to physically move, to acquire and trade things etc. without access to land, it follows that external freedom requires access to land. More30 See MS, AA 06: 324–325. 31 See MS, AA 06: 325. AUTHOR'S COPY | AUTORENEXEMPLAR AUTHOR'S COPY | AUTORENEXEMPLAR Kant's Non-Absolutist Conception of Political Legitimacy 341 over, since the sovereign is the means through which a particular person's exclusive possession of land can be made rightful, the rightfulness of any particular claim to land derives from the state's affirmation of it.32 How, then, does the sovereign go about evaluating whether the provisionally rightful claims to land should be affirmed as rightful ('concluded')? There seem to be two considerations here. First, if any access to land is determined by some particular (group of) private persons, such as private landowners, then others (the landless persons) find their external freedom subjected to these private persons' (the landowners') arbitrary choices. Second, since it is possible for the citizens to set ends together only if they can actually reach one another, the state must make it possible for each citizen legally to reach any other citizen via land.33 To reconcile the landowners' exclusive possession of land with everyone's innate right to freedom, the state as 'supreme proprietor' of the land must therefore provide institutional guarantees that everyone has sufficient access to land – a place physically to exist and a legal means of physically reaching one another. The main point is that if any particular citizen is without legal access to any land or can physically reach someone else only given a third person's consent, then the state has failed to ensure that the landowners have rightful possession of their land since their exclusive landownership is irreconcilable with each citizen's innate right to freedom. It is for these reasons that Kant maintains that the principle governing the system of law cannot simply be a principle of "aggregation" [Aggregation]34, understood as a principle according to which the determination of who owns what is simply an aggregate of individual provisionally rightful property claims in the state of nature. Instead, in order to reconcile its monopoly with each person's right to freedom the state must employ a principle of "division" [Einteilung]35 to regulate the private property institution. By this Kant means that the state must ensure that the totality of law is such that each citizen is secured equal systemic freedom under the law with regard to land. Thus, insofar as necessary the state must tax landowners and use the revenue to buy land as required to make the relation between landowners and non-landowners rightful, such as by building public roads and providing housing opportunities. In this way state taxation on land secures equal systemic freedom, namely by making it possible for people to exist and to use their means to set and pursue ends on the land without this possibility being under the control of someone else's arbitrary choice. If the state does not do this, then it fails to reconcile its monopoly on coercion with the rights of each of citizen. Although the state must have the right to tax landowners insofar as necessary to ensure that the system as a whole provides conditions of equal systemic freedom for all, it can neither be that each person is guaranteed a particular kind of physical transportation system nor the opportunity to buy a particular or equal amount 32 See MS, AA 06: 323. 33 For an excellent exposition of this point, see Arthur Ripstein's "Roads to Freedom". In: Force and Freedom. Harvard University Press 2009. 34 MS, AA 06: 323.35. 35 Ibid. AUTHOR'S COPY | AUTORENEXEMPLAR AUTHOR'S COPY | AUTORENEXEMPLAR 342 Helga Varden of land. Rather, persons are guaranteed that they have access to land and that they can access one another's land if they want to set ends together. Hence, the exact type, portion, etc. of land the state must purchase with tax revenues or the exact purposes towards which the land should be put in order to reconcile the relation between landowners and the landless and travellers cannot be determined in advance (a priori). For example, though all states must make it possible for everyone to move across land for purposes of interaction, their methods for doing so may be different. For some it might be necessary only to posit laws to regulate people's movement across each other's land; in other cases it might be necessary to purchase land to enable an effective infrastructure (roads and utilities). Similar reasoning applies to cases of buying up land to facilitate private housing. The point is that only the public authority is authorised to make these kinds of judgements, and their content depends upon which type of society (rural, technological, trade based etc.) exists. Although prior determinations of the use of tax revenues are impossible due to their context-dependency, it is clear that the state has a right and duty to tax landowners in order to provide conditions of equal systemic freedom with regard to land. So, if a particular political authority takes no reasonable steps to make landownership rightful by securing conditions of equal systemic freedom through land taxation, then it is not exercising its coercive powers legitimately, and political obligations do not exist. The reasoning is similar with regard to the regulation and administration of the economy, as Kant here also defends a public systemic solution to what he considers a systemic problem. The public authority as guarantor of the economy must act as 'supreme commander' of the economic system, which consists in relations of exchange between private persons. Regardless of what type of economic system the state permits, it must assume a special authoritative role with regard to the way in which means are exchanged by ensuring that it secures what we might call a 'public marketplace'. The state fulfils this role by positing and enforcing laws that secure each person's right to access and participate in the public marketplace on equal terms. In particular, it posits laws to regulate the ways in which people participate as buyers and sellers in the marketplace. Having the right to access the public marketplace to exchange one's means preserves the right to freedom in a marketbased system where people are dependent upon trade to set and pursue ends. Therefore, the state must ensure that the economic system does not in principle deny access to persons with relevant means or deny them access to trade on equal terms. Since the citizens' exercise of external choice is dependent on the economic system, the state must regulate actual economic practices to ensure equal systemic freedom. Distinctions between permissible and impermissible ways in which to engage in economic activity (trade) will be drawn precisely at the limits at which equal systemic freedom is threatened. For example, the state can prohibit the creation of monopolies on trade in a capitalist system. The power enjoyed by a monopoly enables it, in principle, to prohibit others from pursuing ends through the marketplace since the monopoly is in sole control of the supply. Moreover, a capitalist market system requires competition in order for markets to function, and there is no competition when monAUTHOR'S COPY | AUTORENEXEMPLAR AUTHOR'S COPY | AUTORENEXEMPLAR Kant's Non-Absolutist Conception of Political Legitimacy 343 opolies exist. Another example could be the public requirement upon businesses to provide access for physically impaired persons to enter their stores. If the public marketplace is inaccessible to those with physical impairments, and, as everyone else, the state has tied their exercise of external freedom to trade, then the state must institute regulations ensuring conditions of equal systemic freedom. Only by ensuring that a person's access is subject only to symmetrical and non-contingent restrictions through regulated participation, can the public authority provide the conditions of equal systemic freedom for all with regard to the economic system. In this way, public institutional regulations on trade preserve the individual's innate right to have her external freedom subject only to universal law and not to the arbitrary choices of others. The same assumption of special responsibility by the public authority must accompany its introduction of a financial system. For example, the state guarantees conditions of equal systemic freedom with respect to permitting the introduction of money by assuming responsibility for regulating the monetary (financial) system. External freedom is the ability to set and pursue ends subject to universal law and hence a person's means constitutes her external freedom. Once the value of a person's means is determined by a monetary system, there must be public systemic regulation of the value of money. The state must ensure that the value of a person's means is not arbitrarily determined by some other private person, but only by public law. Only in this way can it ensure that permitting a financial system is consistent with each individual's innate right to freedom. The complexity of the financial system will, of course, determine the complexity of regulations required to ensure that the system does its job. But the crucial test that the state provides its subjects with conditions under which they enjoy equal systemic freedom. Presumably, the following conditions must be met with regard to money: the state must determine what counts as legal tender; it must ensure that legal tender is recognized as having the same value by all participants in the public marketplace, and it must assume sole control over the supply of legal tender. If it does not do these things, then clearly it has not passed the test. A system of law that allows arbitrary determinations of what counts as legal tender, that allows private persons to determine whether legal tender is recognized and at what value it is given in the market place, or that allows private persons to print as much money as they wish clearly does not ensure that (the value of) one private person's means (as money) is protected from the arbitrary choices of other private persons. Since external freedom is to use one's means to set and pursue ends subject to universal law, if these systemic requirements are not met, one private person's external freedom becomes subjected to another private person's arbitrary choice rather than to universal law – and so is deprived of her innate right to freedom. If the state fails to regulate the financial system and yet makes its people dependent on it, then, as with the requirements concerning equal systemic freedom with regard to land and the economy, the citizens cannot be seen as under political obligations to obey its authority. AUTHOR'S COPY | AUTORENEXEMPLAR AUTHOR'S COPY | AUTORENEXEMPLAR 344 Helga Varden 2.3 Unconditional Poverty Relief Most Kantians find Kant's position deficient because of his alleged failure to deal with issues not only of economic justice in general, but of the problem of poverty in particular.36 Given this problem, contemporary Kantians, such as Onora O'Neill and John Rawls, find it necessary to move away from Kant's actual theory in order to develop more egalitarian Kantian theories of justice.37 In contrast to these interpretations, I propose that considerations of economic justice lie at the very heart of Kant's conception of justice, not only because of the requirements ensuring equal systemic freedom outlined above, but because unconditional poverty relief is identified as a minimal condition on the legitimacy of the state.38 Kant discusses the state's duties towards the poor in section C of public right.39 As in public right section B, which deals with conditions of equal systemic freedom, Kant here is also concerned with how the public authority reconciles its monopoly on coercion with each subject's right to freedom by arguing that a systemic solution is necessary to rectify a systemic problem. Only by an institutional guarantee of unconditional poverty relief can the state make rightful the dependency relation between itself and those who have no means. To reconcile its rightful monopoly on coercion with the rights of the poor, the state must ensure that no private person finds herself without any means whatsoever with which to set and pursue ends, since external freedom is impossible without means. Unconditional poverty relief, therefore, is necessary if the state is to fulfil its role of providing conditions under which persons can exercise their innate right to freedom. Without unconditional poverty relief the poor have no freedom, since they have nothing, and any access to means goes through some other private person's consent, such as to provide employment or charity. Without unconditional poverty relief, the possibility of poor persons exercising external freedom is subject to the arbitrary choices of those who have means. Consequently, as the state upholds its monopoly on coercion, it must also ensure institutionally that the poor do not find themselves so subject to the choices of others. Therefore, Kant maintains that the state has a right and a duty to tax the rich in order to provide unconditional relief for the poor, even though he also says that no individual private person has the corresponding right to coerce another to provide charity (beneficence). 36 For example, see Otfried Höffe: Immanuel Kant, 184f.; Mary Gregor: Laws of Freedom, 36f; Wolfgang Kersting: "Kant's Concept of the State", 153, 164 n.7, though contrast with his modified view on 356–357 in "Politics, freedom, and order: Kant's Political Philosophy"; Onora O'Neill: Bounds of Justice, 65; Allen Rosen: Kant's Theory of Justice, 197; and Howard L. Williams: Kant's Political Philosophy, 196–198. 37 For example, see Allen Rosen: Kant's Theory of Justice, 173–208; Onora O'Neill: Constructions of Justice, 219–234; Towards Justice and Virtue, 122–212; John Rawls: A Theory of Justice, 221–227; Paul Guyer: Kant on Freedom, Law, and Happiness, 262–286. 38 My view that economic justice lies at the very heart of Kant's conception of political legitimacy is in disagreement with almost all contemporary Kant interpretations. For example, see Guyer (2000), Höffe (1994), Kersting (1992), Murphy (1994), and Williams (1983). 39 See MS, AA 06: 325–328. AUTHOR'S COPY | AUTORENEXEMPLAR AUTHOR'S COPY | AUTORENEXEMPLAR Kant's Non-Absolutist Conception of Political Legitimacy 345 The reason why many read Kant's argument differently is due to claims like the following: since the wealthy owe their existence to the state and since state has an indirect right to preserve the people, the state will use taxation to provide for the poor people's "most necessary natural needs" [nothwendigsten Naturbedürfnissen]40. Given Kant's formulation, we might be tempted to conclude that Kant is just confused, since a claim that 'natural needs' can give rise to demands of justice would undermine much of Kant's account of justice. So even if Kant is here expressing a desire to incorporate into his theory of justice some notion of poverty relief, he clearly fails to do so. In my view, however, the stronger interpretation of Kant's position on poverty relief pays careful attention to how this argument is made within public right, and how public right is principally concerned with how the sovereign must set up its institutional framework to reconcile its rightful monopoly on coercion with the rights of each citizen. When Kant speaks of how the wealthy owe their existence to the state, my suggestion is that he is referring to the fact that the rightfulness of their property owners' is provided by the state.41 Moreover, the state's indirect right to preserve society refers to the fact that the primary aim of the public authority is to maintain and preserve its people as a rightful condition in perpetuity. And it does this by institutionally guaranteeing each person's innate right to freedom, namely by providing unconditional poverty relief. The reason is that it must ensure that no one of its subjects ends up in a situation in which she has done nothing wrong and yet is in a private dependency relation to other subjects, in that her external freedom is subject to their arbitrary choices.42 It is true that the fact of our embodiment entails that we have natural needs, which obviously makes even more pressing that without certain means we cannot physically survive. But this is not Kant's main point. Rather, the importance of being embodied is that we exercise external freedom (in space and time). Without poverty relief some people (the poor) find themselves in a situation where they have no external freedom at all, and they can only access means if other subjects (the rich) consent. But to be forced to stay in such a condition is to be deprived of one's innate right to freedom. Therefore, the sovereign must provide unconditional poverty relief in order to reconcile its monopoly on coercion with the innate right to freedom of each of its subjects. The radical claim in Kant's conception of poverty relief is that rightful external freedom does not exist in societies in which some persons have no means and any legal access to any means is dependent upon private charity or other private persons' decisions to provide employment. Here, the state is failing in its duty to establish conditions under which all persons are secured independence from having their freedom subject to the arbitrary choices of other private persons. The state cannot force its subjects into such dependency relations, and hence it cannot rightfully uphold its monopoly on coercion unless it also provides an uncondi40 MS, AA 06: 326.09: "nothwenigste[.] Naturbedürfnisse[.]". 41 See also V-MS/Vigil, AA 27: 540. 42 Naturally, those who prefer other textual interpretations can still the above as the stronger Kantian position. AUTHOR'S COPY | AUTORENEXEMPLAR AUTHOR'S COPY | AUTORENEXEMPLAR 346 Helga Varden tional guarantee of poverty relief. Therefore, without an institutional guarantee of unconditional poverty relief the state is not legitimate, and political obligations do not exist. It is important to note that the claim is not that the state, in order to be legitimate, must have an extensive welfare system. The claim is only that it must take institutional steps whereby it guarantees the availability of means to those who, for whatever reason, have none. Finally, it should be clear that these arguments concerning the state's role as guarantor of equal systemic freedom and unconditional poverty relief entail that the state's rights exceed the rights of individuals. More specifically, the state's right to ensure equal systemic freedom and unconditional poverty relief are rights that private individuals cannot have, for as private rights they are tantamount to the right to enslave others. Moreover, that the state must provide these institutional protections also explains why Kant's position is not absolutist. By requiring the state to provide systemic solutions to what he considers to be systemic problems, Kant argues that there are institutional requirements on the public authority that cannot be set aside without undermining its legitimacy. The focus above has been on only the very minimal conditions of equal systemic freedom that must be fulfilled in order to justify the state's legitimacy. Still, unless the state takes some measures to fulfil these conditions, it is not legitimate, and political obligations do not exist. 2.4 Pure and True Republics Kant's account above is an ideal normative account, meaning that it is an exposition of the public authority in theory. The next, final step in Kant's argument concerns how to institutionalize the public authority, in particular the public 'thought entities' (the legislative, executive, and judiciary powers) in the real world. This requires us to explain how some actual person or persons rightfully can hold sovereign authority. Answering this question comprises the final two paragraphs (§ 51–52) of Kant's public right section on the right of a state.43 Because it is tempting to read Kant as affirming absolutism in these paragraphs, I want to suggest why we need not read him that way. There are at least two ways to understand absolutism relevant to Kant's discussion here. First it could mean that the political leader can do whatever she wants and the people remain obligated. But nowhere in this discussion (nor anywhere else) does Kant maintain that particular institutionalizations of legitimate political power can involve setting aside the principles of private and public right. So clearly Kant cannot be an absolutist in this sense. Second, we could understand Kant's alleged absolutism as consisting in defending a non-representative conception of the sovereign. In the rest of this section I argue that Kant also rejects the legitimacy of non-representative sovereigns and that although he allows imperfections in states at early 43 See MS, AA 06: 338–342. AUTHOR'S COPY | AUTORENEXEMPLAR AUTHOR'S COPY | AUTORENEXEMPLAR Kant's Non-Absolutist Conception of Political Legitimacy 347 stages of actual institutionalization of the sovereign, we should not see this as an affirmation of absolutism.44 For Kant, there are three ways to conceive the relation between the people and the sovereign: autocracy (one person having command over all the others), aristocracy (a group of persons having command over the rest), and democracy (the people commanding themselves).45 Moreover, the issue of the legitimacy of the state is not seen as resting on the question of which form of state is institutionalized – autocracy, aristocracy, or democracy – but on the nature of the institutionalization itself. Unless these sovereign powers are taken to represent the sovereign, Kant argues, the particular state fails to be an establishment of civil society, meaning that it fails to yield conclusive right. When the sovereign powers do not represent the sovereign, Kant argues, "these forms of state are supposed to represent literally just so many different moral persons invested with supreme authority" and consequently "no absolutely rightful condition of civil society can be acknowledged, but only provisional right within it".46 Non-representative states enable only provisional right, or right as we find it in the state of nature, since the people with power consider themselves as the sovereign, rather than as representing the sovereign. Thus, non-representative states fail to represent the 44 One can (textually and philosophically) accept the above arguments regarding equal systemic justice and unconditional poverty relief and reject the argument concerning the representational nature of the state, or reject both. Seemingly strong textual support for absolutist interpretations in general and for rejecting the idea that the representational nature of the sovereign is a condition upon its legitimacy in particular, can be found, for example in "Toward Perpetual Peace" (ZeF, AA 08: 371–372), "On the Common Saying: That may be correct in theory, but it is of no use in practice" (TP, AA 08: 299–300), and in the "Doctrine of Right" (MS, AA 06: 371–372). Due to space restrictions, I have not included these passages, but let me briefly suggest why these passages need not be read as contrary to my view. Their common feature is that Kant's argument apparently leads him to the absurd conclusion that a subject is obligated to obey any particular or empirical, self-acclaimed public authority, regardless of how objectionable is its exercise of power. Though Kant's texts invite such an interpretation, I believe this conclusion is too hasty. Instead, I suggest that in each of these passages Kant argues that the content of the laws can be quite faulty as long as the sovereign has the proper institutional form. Therefore, if what is established is not at least public right in the minimal form ('pure republic'), then what is established is not a faulty version of the idea of public right – but no version of public right at all. Therefore, when Kant uses the locutions such as 'however faulty' or 'unconditional' in these passages he should not be understood as referring to the fundamental principles constitutive of the constitution (the norm constitutive of the legislative supreme authority), but to their actual specification (their content). Political obligations do not disappear simply because the content of the laws is imperfect or is perceived to be unfair so long as the normative principles constitutive of the fundamental institutional structure are correct. Since the proper, minimal institutional structure necessary for political freedom is in place, the only way to remove the unfairness without thereby creating injustice is to reform civil society through public reason from within. 45 See MS, AA 06: 338–339. 46 "[...] so lange jene Staatsformen dem Buchstaben nach eben so viel verschiedene mit der obersten Gewalt bekleidete moralische Personen vorstellen sollen, [kann] nur ein provisorisches inneres Recht und kein absolut-rechtlicher Zustand der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft zugestanden werden[...]." (MS, AA 06: 341.04–08) AUTHOR'S COPY | AUTORENEXEMPLAR AUTHOR'S COPY | AUTORENEXEMPLAR 348 Helga Varden united, general will of the people. In these states the political power does not conceive of itself as being governed by laws delineating its powers and all private disputes ultimately to be adjudicated by an application of these laws. Instead those in power are seen as ruling in accordance with their private judgement. Consequently, such states do not, Kant argues, "make freedom the principle and indeed the condition for any exercise of coercion47. And this is why these leaders fail to set up civil society, since in this case, the actual persons with power rule in accordance with their arbitrary choice rather than enable external freedom under universal law. Hence, the people still find themselves in the state of nature. In order to establish 'conclusive right' the political authority must be institutionalized as a 'pure republic' or as a representative system of right. In such a system those in public offices are taken to represent the sovereign by governing the public offices through public law. Such public organization captures the spirit of what Kant means by 'the original constitution for a free state', since it requires the institutional whole to be one "in which law itself rules and depends on no particular person [...]. It is the final end of all public right, the only condition in which each can be assigned conclusively what is his".48 If "law itself rules", then everyone invested with public power – whether the highest political sovereign powers or the lower public officers such as police, public bureaucrats, and publicly licensed professionals (physicians, accountants, lawyers) – has her job and function prescribed in posited laws, and they exercise their authority in accordance with those laws. For example, judges in the pure republic do not rule merely by applying their intelligence or private wisdom, but rather are versed in the law and continuously prove themselves capable of applying the law to particular cases. If some particular judge is no longer able to apply the law or grossly fails to do it in a particular case, her license is withdrawn by the state, and so on. This, I take it, is what Kant means when he says that in the pure republic, the institutional whole functions as a system of public law, namely "a system representing the people"49. In turn, Kant contrasts the 'pure' republic with the 'true' republic. The 'true' republic, for Kant, takes representation one step farther than the 'pure' republic by requiring also the existence of active citizenship, understood as active participation in the political power through delegates. Kant argues that in the true republic there is not only a "system representing the people, in order to protect its rights in its name", but in addition "all the citizens united and acting through their delegates (deputies)".50 The true republic is one, in which the system repre47 MS, AA 06: 340: "[...] die Freiheit zum Princip, ja zur Bedingung alles Zwanges [...]"; cf. Anth, AA 07: 330–331. 48 "[...] die einzige bleibende Staatsverfassung, wo das Gesetz selbstherrschend ist, und an keiner besonderen Person hängt; der letzte Zweck alles öffentlichen Rechts, der Zustand, in welchem allein jedem das Seine peremtorisch zugetheilt werden kann" (MS, AA 06: 341.01–04). 49 MS, AA 06: 341: "[...] ein repräsentatives System des Volks". 50 "Alle wahre Republik aber ist und kann nichts anders sein, als ein repräsentatives System des Volks, um im Namen desselben, durch alle Staatsbürger vereinigt, vermittelst ihrer Abgeordneten (Deputirten) ihre Rechte zu besorgen." (MS, AA 06: 341.09–12) AUTHOR'S COPY | AUTORENEXEMPLAR AUTHOR'S COPY | AUTORENEXEMPLAR Kant's Non-Absolutist Conception of Political Legitimacy 349 sents the people in the fullest sense, namely by the people ruling itself through its elected representatives. In true republics, the citizens are not merely 'passive' subjects to law; they are also active citizens who take part in the legislative process by voting for delegates to represent them.51 It is certainly possible to read these final sections of the Doctrine of Right as entailing that Kant defends absolutism. Nevertheless, in light of Kant's preceding argument that there are specific conditions on state legitimacy, we have good reasons to see these final sections of the rights of the state as Kant's understanding of how to go about actually establishing the legitimate state in the real world. In my view, nowhere in these last sections of the public right of a state (§ 51–52) does Kant indicate that he aims to undermine his preceding arguments concerning the nature of the institutional whole of public right, how the state must secure private right for all its citizens, how it must have a tripartite nature, or how it must secure equal systemic rights as well as unconditional poverty relief. Rather, the more sympathetic reading considers him as merely addressing the question of various possible actual institutionalizations of such a public authority. And I have suggested that in order for the state to be legitimate, it must rest on a representative, republican constitution ('pure republic'), even if imperfect at first. Moreover, the leaders of this republic must aim to transform it into a 'true' republic, in which the people actively governs itself through delegates. Therefore, that political legitimacy requires a certain institutional framework is never at stake. And Kant's conception of political legitimacy is non-absolutist exactly because it requires a tripartite public authority to posit, apply and enforce laws to regulate private property, contract and status relations for all and because the state must fulfill these additional institutional, systemic conditions to be legitimate. 3. The Irreconcilability of Kant's Public Right Account and Weak Voluntarist Conceptions of Legitimate States We can now see why, contrary to the claims of many neo-Kantian positions, Kant's position cannot be captured through the lenses of weak voluntarism. According to a weak voluntarist account, the rightful uses of state coercion are seen as determined by those rights an individual can be seen as having transferred to the state. On Kant's position, however, public right is not identical to the provisional rights of individuals in the state of nature (private right). The way in which the state reconciles its monopoly on coercive authority with the rights of each citizen entails that the rights of the state are not reducible to those of individuals. For example, the state has the right to tax citizens in order to provide unconditional poverty relief while individuals do not have the right to enforce charity in the state of nature. Although we cannot delineate a priori every way in which the 51 See MS, AA 06: 339. This reading seems supported by MS, AA 06: 328–329, where Kant emphasizes that over time states must reform its laws such that all public positions must be determined by merit rather than inheritance. AUTHOR'S COPY | AUTORENEXEMPLAR AUTHOR'S COPY | AUTORENEXEMPLAR 350 Helga Varden rights of the state will exceed those of individuals, we can say that public right is necessary to provide assurance and to make private right determinate and that the state must set itself up with a civil institutional structure including additional types of institutions in order to reconcile its monopoly on coercion with the rights of each. Consequently, the rights of the state and the rights of individuals are not identical, and weak voluntarism cannot be the perspective through which to read Kant's position. In fact, attributing weak voluntarism to Kant serves only to mask the way in which Kant's actual theory inextricably ties issues of economic justice to the issue of political legitimacy. I believe that because many contemporary Kantian theorists interpret the Kantian position as weak voluntarist, they encounter deep problems in trying to capture issues of economic justice. These interpretations make the mistake of assuming with the Lockeans that a Kantian solution must explain the rights of the state as corresponding to those of the individual and hence that the primary problem is how to make a liberal theory of freedom responsive to considerations of (natural) need. For example, the early John Rawls and Onora O'Neill are two prominent neo-Kantian philosophers who make this mistake. They both seek a way to make determinate individual economic rights such that the state can have a right to enforce them on an individual's behalf. Consequently, the puzzle they both see and try to solve is primarily concerned with how demands of freedom ('noumenal demands') can be made responsive to demands of our nature ('phenomenal demands'). In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls argues that the state can enforce a framework according to which each citizen has a right to be secured a list of basic goods, where this list of basic goods ties the choices within the original position to the natural or empirical conditions of human life.52 In contrast, Onora O'Neill in several of her articles makes the individuals' right to charity enforceable by the state, since the state can enforce beneficence.53 A problem facing the early Rawls, as A. John Simmons points out, is that he never explains why only the state (and not individuals) has the right coercively to redistribute resources in accordance with the two principles of justice as fairness. And yet if Rawls cannot explain this, then surely the door is open to challenge Rawls's weak voluntarism on strong voluntarist grounds.54 In O'Neill's case the problem is that Kant, for good reasons, explicitly denies that beneficence can be enforced. After all, if the reason you give money to pay your taxes (to be redistributed to the poor by the state) is that you are afraid you are getting into trouble otherwise, surely you are not performing an act of beneficence? Beneficence is an imperfect duty of virtue, which cannot be enforced.55 On the one hand, all virtue involves internal use of choice (act on a particular maxim) and it requires a moral moti52 For example, see Rawls's A Theory of Justice 226–227. 53 Onora O'Neill: Constructions of Justice, 219–234; Towards Justice and Virtue, 122–212; Bounds of Justice, 97–142. 54 See A. John Simmons: "Justification and Legitimacy". In: Justification and Legitimacy: Essays on Rights and Obligations. New York 2001. 55 See MS, AA 06: 390. AUTHOR'S COPY | AUTORENEXEMPLAR AUTHOR'S COPY | AUTORENEXEMPLAR Kant's Non-Absolutist Conception of Political Legitimacy 351 vation (that you act from duty), neither of which can be coerced.56 On the other hand, beneficence is not only an ethical duty, but it is a duty of virtue, and consequently involves making somebody else's happiness your end because it is your moral duty to do so.57 Hence, whatever the state does when it redistributes resources from the wealthy to the poor, it cannot be coercively enforcing beneficence. Finally, regardless of which voluntarist framework one chooses no solution faithful to Kant's basic commitments is possible, because any private redistribution and private coercion used in an attempt to secure conditions of equal systemic freedom and poverty relief will conflict with an individual's innate right to freedom. Yet explaining these rights is necessary to finding a convincing Kantian solution to the problem of how to protect the rights of the vulnerable and avoid systemic economic injustice in civil society. In contrast, on my interpretation there is no conflict, since through public right, namely a public institutional framework to secure equal systemic freedom and unconditional poverty relief, the state reconciles its rightful monopoly on coercion with each subject's innate right to freedom – and so is legitimate. Therefore, political legitimacy depends on securing conditions of economic justice. A reading of Kant as a weak voluntarist cannot deliver this conceptual link. 4. Conclusion Civil society is an enforceable precondition for justice. But this does not entail that just any powerful coercive structure qualifies as civil society. The just state is a representative, republican system of public right composed of a tripartite public authority with a monopoly on uses of coercion, which is reconciled with each subject's innate right to freedom through securing private right for all, the provision of conditions of equal systemic freedom regarding land, the economy and finances, and through the institutional guarantee of unconditional poverty relief. Since these institutional conditions must be met before political obligations exist, Kant's liberal non-voluntarist ideal of political obligations is not matched by an absolutist conception of political legitimacy. True, all changes regarding the content of particular laws and the particular ways in which the authority specifies and enforces laws must be sought through legal appeals and through public reason and reform. Still, if an actual state fails to establish the proper republican public institutional framework, then it is not a civil society, and the people living subject to its power are under an enforceable duty to establish civil society. Kant's conception of political legitimacy is therefore not a conception according to which any systematic and powerful use of might is seen as yielding political obligations (absolutism), since there are institutional requirements on the political authority. Because of this link between political obligations and the existence of a public institutional framework, Kant's liberal republican account of political legitimacy also shows why absolutism is not the only alternative to voluntarism. 56 See MS, AA 06: 219ff., 453–454, 376n. 57 See MS, AA 06: 388–389, cf. 379–384, 393–397. AUTHOR'S COPY | AUTORENEXEMPLAR AUTHOR'S COPY | AUTORENEXEMPLAR

June 2013 1 2013–043 Andrew J. Polsky, Elusive Victories: The American Presidency at War. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2012. Pp. vii, 445. ISBN 978–0–19–986093–7. Review by Edmund F. Byrne, Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis ([email protected]). Political scientist Andrew Polsky (Hunter College and CUNY Graduate Center) was moved to study US presidents at war by the George W. Bush administration's invasion of Iraq. "Bush demonstrated what my research identified as a fundamental characteristic of wartime presidential power: presidents begin conflicts with extraordinary freedom of action, only to see it dissipate quickly" (353). Polsky believes the "two presidency thesis" (that presidents address domestic and foreign policy separately) is false, because presidents do not have more leverage in foreign than in domestic affairs. The book has an avowed "distinctly conservative cast" (353); while liberals say presidents have too much power, Polsky's analysis "suggests ... that presidents have too little power, not too much" (352)-not due to lack of resources but lack of time and the need to rely on subordinates. To defend this "too little power" thesis, Polsky presents secondary-source case studies of men who occupied the White House during wars they started, continued, or tried to end. These studies show that no outcome of a war has fulfilled a wartime president's aspirations. So be it. But do they show that more power might have been the difference in solving or avoiding any president's problems? Political constraints aside, we must ask whether a president should have waged the war in question at all; whether achieving his goals justified war, given its costs; and whether failure to accomplish goals is regrettable only with respect to his legacy or his party's success at the polls, or viz-à-viz inherently worthy and important human values. Such queries remain on the periphery of Polsky's account. Unlike some professional political scientists, he does not limit his evaluation of presidential candidates to, say, electability, but he does generally avoid moral issues. For example, he says next to nothing about how a president's financial backers are "succeeding" during any given war, apart from the more political concerns of the White House occupant (see, however, 15–16, 161–62, 355–56, 392n66). This shortcoming aside, the book is valuable in other respects. The classification and discussion of the problems each president faced and solved (or not) are pedagogically helpful and make fascinating reading. Before laying out the problems, Polsky first articulates some pertinent "puzzles" in need of solution: why are there no political restraints on presidents' exercise of power at the outset of hostilities? why do they struggle so to achieve the national objectives they have set forth? why do they have difficulty with non-military challenges, especially at war's end? why are their domestic agendas routinely undermined? and why do they lack strategic options once a war is underway (6–11)? To deal with these puzzles, Polsky identifies six challenges each war president faced: first, to decide whether to go to war or accept it as inevitable; second, to lay the foundations for a successful war; third, to identify the nation's political objectives; fourth, to ensure that the military had a strategy to attain those objectives; fifth, to advance political goals diplomatically; and, sixth, to sustain domestic political support for the war (22–25). The presidents Polsky assesses are Abraham Lincoln (Civil War), Woodrow Wilson (World War I), Franklin Roosevelt (World War II), Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon (Vietnam), and George W. Bush and Barack Obama (Iraq and Afghanistan). Lincoln scores highest for his performance on the first five challenges. Bush scores lowest on all counts. In between, most of the others get passing marks for challenges 1– 5, subject to nuances for Johnson and Nixon and for Obama regarding the first. None dealt particularly well with the sixth. Polsky bases these evaluations on the judgments of historians or (regarding Bush and Obama) journalists and political insiders. With an asterisk after insider information, he seeks to be objective by political science standards. Yet he fails to mention the constraints that derive from obligations to Byrne 2 Michigan War Studies Review 2013–043 funding sources. Nor does he specify the sort of mental acumen, fund of knowledge, and moral character a commander in chief should possess. This silence is problematic, for four reasons. First, none of the evaluated presidents had any military training or experience (unless Bush gets points for his nominal Reserve service); nor did they all have qualified military advisers. Second, Lincoln and his successors had to adapt to the use of new, ever more destructive military technology of which they had no great understanding. (In this regard, Obama is almost a caricature, skeet shooting at Camp David while expanding his remote-controlled drone attacks.) Third, although some presidents had considerable military experience during the period Polsky covers-namely, Ulysses S. Grant, Theodore Roosevelt, Dwight Eisenhower, and, to a lesser extent, John Kennedy, the only one with military experience that Polsky considers is Jefferson Davis of the CSA (55–60). Some examination of these crossover individuals might have furnished a kind of control group to ensure some degree of scientific objectivity, 1 since (fourth), the target presidents all had political motives for seeking and holding on to the White House and hoped their war would further those objectives. So, as Polsky indicates, whatever they did or did not do regarding wars waged on their watch, they always took into account what they and their advisers felt to be politically, including electorally, advantageous. Polsky has clarified this prioritizing of the political over the military in comments since the publication of his book: "As a political leader ... a president needs to balance the wishes of his military subordinates against his larger political objectives. He has to weigh future casualties against the prospect that the losses would produce a better political outcome.... Barack Obama ... has demonstrated ... his grasp of one vital principle. Military strategy and operations must serve a political goal." 2 There is, in other words, "a recurring logic to presidential leadership ... grounded in the vitality of a dominant partisan political order and a president's relation to that order." 3 Political scientist Stephen Skowronek has analyzed this process in The Politics Presidents Make, 4 a book Polsky cites (370n20, 372n46) and says "has long shaped mine." 5 Besides Skowronek, however, Polsky relies mostly on historians and journalists. 6 Though he rarely addresses the question of source credibility, he does, however, note that scholars disagree about Johnson's comfort level in the area of foreign policy (402n18), and writes of the Iraq War that "Because few documents ... have been declassified to date, analysts have relied heavily on several fine works by journalists as well as a number of memoirs by former members of the Bush administration. Both should be regarded with caution. Many insiders who speak to reporters seek favorable treatment in their books, while memoirs often have a self-exculpatory purpose, especially when the authors have become the target of criticism" (413n1). 1. He toys with the idea of such a comparison in "A Conversation with Andrew Polsky, Author of Elusive Victories, Part II," Lawyers, Guns, and Money (18 Sep 2012) – www.miwsr.com/rd/1311.htm . 2. "Obama v. Romney on Afghanistan Strategy," OUPblog (23 May 2012) – www.miwsr.com/rd/1312.htm . 3. "A Conversation ..." (note 1 above), Part I (10 Aug 2012) – www.miwsr.com/rd/1313.htm . 4. Subtitle: Leadership from John Adams to Bill Clinton (Cambridge: Harvard U Pr, 1997). 5. Note 3 above . 6. These include, for Lincoln: James M. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom (NY: Oxford U Pr, 1988); also, for Jefferson Davis: William J. Cooper Jr., Jefferson Davis, American (NY: Knopf, 2000). For Wilson: Kendrick A. Clements, The Presidency of Woodrow Wilson (Lawrence: U Pr of Kansas, 1992), John Patrick Finnegan, Against the Specter of a Dragon (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1974), David F. Trask, "The American Presidency, National Security, and Intervention from McKinley to Wilson, 1789–1889," in Richard H. Kohn, ed., The United States Military under the Constitution of the United States, 1789–1989 (NY: NYU Pr, 1991) 290–316, and Margaret MacMillan, Paris 1919 (NY: Random House, 2002). For Roosevelt: Donald Cameron Watt, How War Came (NY: Pantheon, 1989), Jonathan C. Utley, Going to War with Japan, 1937– 1941 (1985; rpt. NY: Fordham U Pr, 2005), Warren F. Kimball, Forged in War (NY: Morrow, 1997), Eric Larrabee, Commander in Chief (1987; rpt. Annapolis: Naval Inst Pr, 2004), David M. Kennedy, Freedom from Fear (NY: Oxford U Pr, 1999), and Andrew Roberts, Masters and Commanders (NY: Harper, 2009). For Johnson and Nixon: Gary R. Hess, Presidential Decisions for War, 2nd ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins U Pr, 2009), Larry Berman, Lyndon Johnson's War (NY: Norton, 1989) and No Peace, No Honor (NY: Free Press, 2001), and James S. Robbins, This Time We Win (NY: Encounter Books, 2010). For Bush: Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, Cobra II (NY: Pantheon, 2006), Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco (NY: Penguin, 2006) and The Gamble (NY: Penguin, 2009), Gideon Rose, How Wars End (NY: Simon & Schuster, 2010), Bob Woodward, Bush at War (NY: Simon & Schuster, 2002), State of Denial (NY: Simon & Schuster, 2006), and The War Within (NY: Simon & Schuster, 2008). For Obama: Bob Woodward, Obama's Wars (NY: Simon & Schuster, 2010). Byrne 3 Michigan War Studies Review 2013–043 This cautionary note fades to naught when Polsky can bolster his points with documentary evidence. But information, especially when political in nature, obtained from a source with vested interests, however highly placed, does not necessarily merit unquestioning belief. This is less true, however, when the pertinent documents were not meant for public consumption (thank you, Freedom of Information Act), as shown by Polsky's account of how Roosevelt maneuvered the United States into World War II. He writes that FDR wanted to enter the war against Germany rather than Japan and, though Pearl Harbor required a focus on the latter, Hitler quickly resolved his need to prioritize the Pacific by declaring war against the United States (133–49). This may not be a fairy tale, but it is startlingly oblivious of documents showing that Roosevelt knew well in advance precisely what the Japanese were planning and in effect facilitated their "ignominy." 7 Without implying that everything else in the book is beyond controversy, I will now summarize some of Polsky's assessments of presidential abilities in time of war. Lincoln and Roosevelt came closest to meeting all the specified challenges (200). The others all fell short because of "the impossibility of the challenges" (340). Lincoln tolerated horrendous casualties, initiated expanded emergency powers and executive privilege, and planned inadequately for the postwar, post-emancipation nation. Wilson sought the unattainable, a world made "safe for democracy," while undermining civil liberties in its pursuit; he was thwarted by unpersuaded allies abroad and hostile politicians at home. But, on the credit side of the ledger, he did manage to stagger US participation in World War I to allow time to train the troops properly. Johnson, Nixon, and, to some extent, Obama made poor decisions regarding wars not primarily of their making. "Bush mismanaged nearly all of the tasks a wartime president faces" (323), for example, by delegating authority in occupied Iraq to the utterly unqualified Paul "Jerry" Bremer (298–303) and his incompetent "Coalitional Provisional Authority" staff. Lincoln and Roosevelt were the best at changing military leadership as circumstances dictated. For example, except for Robert E. Lee, few of Jefferson Davis's generals were reliable. Once he had chosen Gen. John J. Pershing, Wilson relied on him without hesitation, as did Nixon and Henry Kissinger (less reasonably) on Alexander Haag, and Bush (still less reasonably) on Donald Rumsfeld. (The book was published before scandals involving top military personnel in the Obama administration became public.) Roosevelt, convinced of the importance of warplanes and ships, including aircraft carriers, for military success, ramped up US production accordingly. Johnson stuck with Gen. William Westmoreland long after his insistence on "search-and-destroy" missions (as opposed to winning hearts and minds) had proved misguided. In military strategy, each president was an activist at least on occasion, some (Lincoln and now Obama with his drones) more than others. Davis failed to adopt and capitalize on the tactics of asymmetric warfare. Roosevelt was consistently involved in strategic planning (195) and adroitly reconciled the quest for unconditional German surrender with Stalin's desire for a second front in Europe and Churchill's fixation on regaining or preserving British colonial interests in the Mediterranean and elsewhere (172–76, 194). He also acquiesced in the rapacious land-grabbing by the Soviets and others, but laid the groundwork for permanent peace via the United Nations and new financial institutions (181–88). None of the target presidents consistently maintained popular support for war. Lincoln, Wilson, Roosevelt, and (reluctantly) Johnson implemented conscription; Bush and Obama did not. Bush accepted Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld's vacuous claim that large numbers of troops were unneeded for America's hypermodern, efficient war machine, then resorted to multiple redeployments to sustain personnel levels. All of Polsky's chosen presidents controlled the media to some degree, suppressing negative assessments of their war-making. Bush used "cooked" intelligence and the nation's desire to avenge 9/11 to make his case, while curtailing civil liberties through the USA Patriot Act and the newly established Department of Homeland Security. Intense political pressure undermined Roosevelt's New Deal during the war (160– 68). Johnson scaled back many of his policies in order to salvage his Great Society, but could not overcome antiwar protests and looming electoral challenges (235–47). Nixon tried expanded excursions and bombing 7. See Robert Stinnett, Day of Deceit: The Truth about FDR and Pearl Harbor (NY: Simon & Schuster, 2000); also Justin Raimondo, "Pearl Harbor: Roosevelt Knew," Antiwar.com (7 Dec 2012) – www.miwsr.com/rd/1314.htm . Byrne 4 Michigan War Studies Review 2013–043 missions to demonstrate US prowess to the North Vietnamese, who knew time was on their side and negotiated accordingly. Polsky has written an engaging and perceptive book. But is it good political science? This is a hard question to answer, given the extreme specialization of work in this academic discipline. A broader issue is the indifference of the social sciences as a whole to the study of war. 8 Since wars often reflect (explicit or implicit) political objectives, Polsky correctly warns us that future presidents pursuing non-military solutions to international problems will face a structural problem: "Wars are instruments of national policy with political objectives, and some of those goals can be achieved by other means ranging from diplomacy to economic sanctions.... [T]he cost-human, economic, and political-will likely be far less than war.... [But absent] more effective non-military tools to influence foreign policy outcomes ..., the disproportionate allocation of resources toward the military encourages presidents to opt for military solutions" (355–56). In other words, the critical policy priorities that American presidents should espouse are often frustrated by the institutional imperatives of their office. 8. For a seminal discussion of this subject, see Hans Jonas and Wolfgang Knöbl, War in Social Thought: Hobbes to the Present, trans. Alex Skinner (Princeton: Princeton U Pr, 2013 [German ed. 2008]). For a good economic, rather than political, approach to the study of war, see, e.g., Hugh Rockoff, America's Economic Way of War: War and the US Economy from the Spanish-American War to the Persian Gulf War (NY: Cambridge U Pr, 2012).

Urheilussakin elämme aikaa, joka juhlii supertähtiä, voittajayksilöitä yli kaiken. Suurinta urheilussa on tulla Tiger Woodsiksi, Roger Federeriksi, Kimi Räikköseksi, Cristiano Ronaldoksi tai Lionel Messiksi. Nämä globaalit urheilun supertähdet on nostettu suoranaiselle urheilunerouden jalustalle. Ennen kaikkea he ovat kuitenkin rahantekokoneita, jotka takovat pääomaa itselleen, varustefirmoilleen ja sponsoreilleen. He ovat ihailun kohteita ympäri maailmaa. Samalla maailman suosituimpia urheilulajeja ovat joukkuepallopelit – mitattiin asiaa sitten katsojatai harrastajamäärillä. Kaksi kauneinta yli muiden ovat jalkapallo ja koripallo. Varsinkin jalkapallo on kiistatta globaali laji. Sen ainut merkittävä sokea piste on Pohjois-Amerikka, mutta sielläkin se saanee yhä vahvemman jalansijan, kun väestö latinalaistuu erityisesti Yhdysvalloissa. Yksilöitä korostava urheilukulttuuri vaikuttaa siihen, kuinka suurimpienkin joukkuelajien luonne yleisesti ymmärretään. Voimakkaan individualistisesta näkökulmasta onkin luontevaa ajatella, että joukkuepeliäkin pelaavat lopulta yksilöt. Jalkapallossa ei ole perimmiltään kyse esimerkiksi Juventuksen ja Barcelonan taistosta vaan Andrea Pirlon ja Messin välisestä kamppailusta keskikentän hallinnasta. Jalkapallo on pelaajien, ei joukkueiden, saati valmentajien peli. Suomessakin usein toistettu hokema on, että peli pitää Jani Hakkarainen Voittiko Messi vai voittiko Barcelona? Jalkapallojoukkueiden olemisen tavasta 54 Jani Hakkarainen palauttaa pelaajille. Varsinkin jääkiekkotoimittajien kirjoituksista ja puheista olisi helppo löytyy lukuisia esimerkkejä hokemasta. On varmasti turvallista väittää, että tuskin kukaan toimittajista tai jalkapallon seuraajista ajattelee asiaa tämän pidemmälle. Siksi heihin voi tuskin liittää paremmin artikuloitua filosofista kantaa jalkapallon pelaamisen agentista eli tekijästä (perimmäisestä pelaajasta) tai joukkueiden mahdollisesta olemassaolosta. Tyypillistä toimittajaa tai jalkapallofania koko kysymys tuskin edes kiinnostaa, eikä siinä ole sinänsä mitään väärää. Heidän kiinnostuksen kohteensa ovat muualla. Fani esimerkiksi haluaa ihailla idoleitaan ja elää heidän kanssaan nousuissa ja laskuissa. Filosofi voi silti viedä asian tarkastelun pidemmälle. Yksilökeskeisestä ajattelusta on mahdollista kehittää filosofinen kanta, jolle luonteva termi on individualismi (jalkapallon suhteen). Se tulee yksilöä tarkoittavasta sivistyssanasta "indiviidi". Lyhyesti se voidaan muotoilla seuraavasti: jalkapalloa pelaavat yksittäiset pelaajat, eivät joukkueet tai niiden kentälliset. Joukkueita ja kentällisiä ei ole lainkaan olemassa. Tarkemmin sanottuna individualismi on siis eliminativistinen kanta, koska se ikään kuin poistaa joukkueet ja kentälliset olemassa olevien olioiden piiristä. Sen mukaan joukkueet ja kentälliset ovat filosofisesti sanottuna vain pelaajiensa moneuksia (pluraliteetteja): ei muuta kuin monta yksilöä (pelaajaa) yhdessä. Ne eivät muodosta laskettavia ykseyksiä, jotka ovat enemmän kuin pelaajiensa moneus (toisin kuin yksittäiset pelaajat, jotka voidaan laskea). Manchester Unitedin joukkue ei siis ole 36:s olio yli 35:n pelaajansa. Se on pelkästään näiden 35:n pelaajan moneus: nämä 35 pelaajaa yhdessä. Se ei ole mitään muuta. Itsessään Manchester Unitedin joukkue ei ole olio. Kun ManU pelaa, 11 pelaajaa näistä 35:stä pelaajasta pelaa kerrallaan. Jos joukkueita ja niiden kentällisiä on olemassa, ovat ne oletettavasti yhteisöllisiä eli sosiaalisia olioita. Jopa eliminativistinen individualisti myöntää, että joukkueet ja niiden kentälliset ovat ihmisten muodostamia ryhmiä, vaikka vain moneuksia. Eliminativistinen individualistikaan ei kiellä ihmisten ja ihmisryhmien olemassaoloa (kuten eliminativistinen fysikalisti voisi kieltää, koska 54 55 hän saattaa uskoa vain mikropartikkelien olemassaoloon). Puheena oleva individualismi on siis sosiaaliontologinen, sosiaalisten olioiden olemassaoloa ja olemisen tapaa koskeva näkemys. Koska se on muodostettu yleisestä arkiajattelun uskomuksesta, kyseessä ei ole helpoksi vastustajaksi filosofin keksimä olkinukke (tämän vuoksi en tarkastele individualismin muita mahdollisia, esimerkiksi reduktiivisia eli palauttavia muotoja). Eliminativistinen individualismi pohjaa suoraan todelliseen ajattelutapaan, joka vaikuttaa jalkapallon ymmärtämiseen ja toimintaan jalkapallon parissa (esimerkiksi tähtikultin pönkittämisenä). Filosofinen vastustajani tässä artikkelissa on eliminativistinen individualismi, jonka totuutta vastaan esitän perusteita. Käytän esimerkkinä jalkapalloa. En jätä tarkasteluani kuitenkaan vain kielteiselle tasolle, vaan puolustan myös myönteistä näkemystä asiaan. Esitän perusteita sen puolesta, että jalkapallojoukkueita ja niiden kentällisiä on olemassa ja niillä on kausaalisia voimia eli kykyä vaikuttaa syy–seuraus-suhteissa. Puolustan siis kollektivistista sosiaaliontologista kantaa jalkapallosta, koska näkemykseni mukaan jalkapallojoukkueita, kollektiiveja (yhteisöjä) on aidosti olemassa.1 Mielestäni kyseessä ei ole pelkkä filosofin akateeminen kysymys, jolla ei ole käytännön merkitystä. Uskon, että kollektivistisesta näkökulmasta opimme ymmärtämään jalkapalloa joukkuepallopelinä paremmin, millä voi olla myös käytännön merkitystä. Jos pelaaja, valmentaja tai tutkiva jalkapallojournalisti sisäistää kollektivismin, on sillä takuulla seurauksia hänen toimintansa suhteen. Ihannetapauksessa jalkapalloilija voi ymmärtää paremmin tekemisensä luonteen. Jalkapallo on ytimeltään joukkuepeli, jossa laji ja joukkue ovat pelaajaa jalkapalloilijana ensisijaisempia. Ilman niitä hän ei ole jalkapalloilijana mitään. Tämä saattaa rajoittaa pelaajan itsekkyyttä ja tehdä hänestä paremman joukkuepelaajan, mistä hän itsekin jalkapalloilijana hyötyy.2 Valmentaja puolestaan saa tukea toiminnalleen, koska valmentajan tehtävä on saada jalkapallojoukkue toimimaan, 1 Termistä "kollektivismi", ks. Elder-Vass 2010, 83. Sitä voitaisiin kutsua myös "sosietismiksi" (Schatzki 2003). 2 Yksi kaikkien aikojen menestyneimmistä koripallovalmentajista, Phil Jackson, korostaa voimakkaasti itsekkyydestä poisoppimista yhtenä avaimena voittamiseen koripallossa (Jackson ja Delehanty 2013, 11). 56 Jani Hakkarainen ei vain yksittäiset pelaajat pelaamaan hyvin. Tutkiva jalkapallojournalisti voi oppia näkemään tähtikultin vieläkin kriittisemmin kuin aiemmin. Artikkelin ensimmäisessä luvussa perustelen ja avaan ilmiön, joka tunnetaan yleisesti ilmauksella "joukkue on enemmän kuin pelaajiensa summa". Toisessa luvussa argumentoin tämän ilmiön perusteella eliminativistista individualismia vastaan ja kollektivismin puolesta. Tämä johtaa kolmannen luvun tarkasteluun kollektivismista pikemmin kokonaisuutta (holistisena) kuin sen osia korostavana (atomistisena) sosiaaliontologiana. Siinä pelaajia, ihmisiä, ei nähdä yhteisöllisinä atomeina vaan sosiaalisista olioista riippuvaisina. Neljännessä luvussa vastaan kysymykseen jalkapallon pelaamisen agentista eli tekijästä (pelaajasta) akselilla joukkue–kentällinen–pelaajat. Lopuksi tarkastelen muutamia ongelmia, joita kantaani sisältyy, sekä alustavia vastauksia niihin. Kreikka oli enemmän kuin pelaajiensa summa Kuten muissakin joukkuepallopeleissä myös jalkapallossa esiintyy ilmiötä, jossa joukkue on enemmän kuin pelaajiensa summa. Kreikan yllätysvoitto vuoden 2004 EM-kisoissa on varmasti yksi kaikkien aikojen parhaita esimerkkejä tästä ilmiöstä. On varsin selvää, että Kreikalla ei ollut läheskään kisojen paras joukkue, jos asiaa mitataan pelaajalistalla. Silti maa onnistui voittamaan kultaa ja vieläpä hieman vanhentuneella Otto Rehhagelin taktiikalla, joka perustui osittain miesvartiointiin ja vastahyökkäyksiin. Vastaavia tapauksia löytyy jalkapallosta useita. Pienempiä yllätyksiä sattuu jatkuvasti varsinkin cup-kilpailuissa, joissa yhden ottelun voitto ratkaisee. Mitä ilmiö "joukkueesta enemmän kuin pelaajiensa summana" tarkemmin ottaen tarkoittaa? Näkisin sen tarkoittavan, että joukkueen pelisuoritusta ei voida palauttaa sen pelaajien henkilökohtaisiin suorituksiin. Tarkemmin sanottuna kaikkia tosia lauseita joukkueen pelisuorituksesta ei voida ilmaista yksinomaan tosina lauseina sen pelaajien käyttäytymisestä: pelisuorituksista. Esimerkiksi Kreikasta vuoden 2004 EM-kisoissa pitää kiistatta paikkansa, että Kreikka 56 57 puolusti tiiviisti ja yhtenäisesti. Tätä lausetta ei voida palauttaa kreikkalaisten pelaajien pelaamista yksilöinä koskeviin tosiin lauseisiin: tosiin lauseisiin kreikkalaisten pelaajien liikkeistä, kaksinkamppailuista ja kontakteista puolustuspelissä. Tiiviisti ja yhtenäisesti puolustaminen sisältää muiden muassa muitakin yksittäisten pelaajien välisiä suhteita kuin avaruudellis-ajallisia relaatioita, joita heidän liikkeensä jatkuvasti muuttavat. Se sisältää esimerkiksi pelaajien välisiä monimutkaisia kommunikatiivisia ja tunnesuhteita. Ennen kaikkea palautumattomuus johtuu kuitenkin siitä, että Kreikalla oli joukkueena kausaalisia voimia yli yksittäisten pelaajien. Esimerkiksi juuri tiivis puolustuspeli antoi sille voiman peittää ja estää oman alueen keskusta tavalla, joka ei mitenkään palaudu joukkueen pelaajien kykyyn peittää aluetta. Pelaajien välissä on aina tilaa, mutta yhtenäisesti liikkuva joukkuepuolustus estää sen, että vastustaja voisi käyttää tämän tilan hyökkäyspelissään. Vastustaja ei kerta kaikkiaan onnistu pelaamaan palloa näihin väleihin. Tiiviisti puolustava kentällinen on kuin läpäisemätön betonilaatta kentän erään osa-alueen päällä. Jalkapallon historiasta tiedämme, että tietyissä vaiheissa Italia ja italialaiset seurajoukkueet ovat menestyneet nimenomaan perustamalla pelinsä joukkuepuolustamiseen ja vastahyökkäyksiin. Näin asia oli 60–70-luvuilla "catenaccion" eli lukkopuolustuksen kulta-aikoina. Parempi esimerkki on kuitenkin AC Milanin status maailman kenties parhaana seurajoukkueena Arrigo Sacchin valmennuskaudella ja välittömästi sen jälkeen 80ja 90-lukujen taitteessa. Sacchi harjoitutti joukkuettaan tunti toisensa jälkeen aktiiviseen aluepuolustukseen: liikkumaan yhtenäisenä muodostelmana kentällä ja prässäämään vastustajaa keskialueella armotta. Sacchin Milan oli parhaimmillaan kentällä yksikkö, joka ei tietyillä kentän alueilla antanut vastustajalle tilaa rakentaa peliään. Vastustajan ainut vaihtoehto oli rakentaa peliä tämän yksikön ulkopuolelta. Milanin kannalta tämä parhaimmillaan johti vastustajan hyökkäyspelin täydelliseen tyrehtymiseen ja helppoihin pitkiin palloihin, jotka topparit Franco Baresi ja Alessandro Costacurta poimivat helposti. Riistoista Milanin oli hyvä kääntää peli nopeasti järjestäytymätöntä vastustajaa vastaan.3 3 Wilson 2011, luvut 10 ja 16. 58 Jani Hakkarainen Esimerkkejä joukkueen voimasta yli yksilöidensä summan voidaan hakea myös hyökkäyspelistä. Viime vuosina Barcelona ja Espanjan maajoukkue ovat esittäneet kenties kautta aikain parasta hyökkäyspeliä. Sitä on toteutettu lyhytsyöttöpelinä, jossa pallo kiertää jatkuvasti pelaajalta toiselle helpoilla, lyhyillä syötöillä. Tästä seurauksena jossain vaiheessa vastustaja väsyy puolustuksessaan ja Barcelona tai Espanja pääsee iskemään pallon maaliin. Näin kävi vuoden 2014 EM-kisoissa jopa koko turnauksen näkökulmasta, kun Espanja murskasi väsyneen Italian finaalissa 4-0. Paljon on puhuttu Messin merkityksestä Barcelonalle. Hänen panoksensa on ollut tietenkin kiistaton. Silti Espanjan menestys osoittaa, että Messi on vain kirsikka kakun päällä Barcelonan kollektiivisessa lyhytsyöttöpelihyökkäyksessä. Espanjan rungon ovat muodostaneet Barcelonan pelaajat – ilman argentiinalaista Messiä. Espanja on voittanut kaksi Euroopan mestaruutta ja yhden maailmanmestaruuden. Vasta nyt saksalaiset ovat murtaneet espanjalaisten ylivallan seurajoukkuetasolla. Sekin on tapahtunut huippuluokan joukkuepelillä. Olen aiemmin argumentoinut, että lyhytsyöttöpelistä tehokkaan tavan hyökätä tekee sen mahdollistama hyvin korkea pelinopeus.4 Pelinopeudella ymmärrän tyhjän tilan luomisen, tyhjään tilaan pääsemisen ja sen hyödyntämisen yhteisnopeutta. Lyhytsyöttöpeli mahdollista siis tyhjän tilan luomisen, sinne pääsemisen ja sen hyödyntämisen nopeasti. Tästä esimerkkinä voidaan käyttää Barcelonan "valeysi"-taktiikkaa (engl. "false nine"). Siinä Messi pelaa juuri "valeysin", näennäisen keskushyökkääjän eli yhdeksikön paikkaa. Hän lähtee liikkeelle ylhäältä keskeltä, mutta pyrkii vetämään vastustajan keskuspuolustajan alemmas liikkumalla kohti kentän keskustaa. Pallo yritetään syöttää Messille, joka kääntyy ja lähtee haastamaan pallon kanssa vastustajan puolustuksen väliin. Puolustus joutuu tiivistämään keskelle kohti palloa. Tämä luo tyhjää tilaa laitoihin. Lisäksi Messin alkuperäinen pudotus on luonut tilaa vastustajan puolustuslinjan keskelle. Barcelona pyrkii hyödyntämään kummankin tilan. Laitahyökkääjät liikkuvat kohti keskustaa ja laitapuolustajat täyttävät laidan tyhjän tilan. Yksi Messin merkit4 Hakkarainen 2012b ja c. 58 59 tävimmistä vahvuuksista on taito syöttää pienestäkin välistä joko suoraan tai toisen pelaajan kautta keskelle tai laitaan lujaa liikkuvalle pelaajalle. Seurauksena Barcelona pääsee murtautumaan läpi joko vastustajan puolustuksen keskustasta tai laidasta. Barcelonan hyökkäyksen pelinopeus on korkea: se luo tyhjää tilaa nopeasti, pääsee sinne tehokkaasti ja hyödyntää tyhjän tilan vauhdilla. Tämän esimerkin avulla on helppo nähdä, että kyky tai voima tuottaa pelinopeutta on jalkapallojoukkueen kentällisen voimaa yli sen pelaajien kykyjen summan. Esimerkissä se ei ollut kenenkään yksittäisen pelaajan pelaamista eikä heidän pelaamisiensa summa. Kentällisen voima tuottaa korkeaa pelinopeutta syntyi pelaajien sujuvasta yhteispelistä. Se ei edellyttänyt vain pelaajien tiettyjä liikkeitä kentällä. Se edellytti heidän yhteistyötään, mikä ei ole mahdollista ilman toimivia kommunikaatiosuhteita ja yhteisymmärrystä pelaamisesta. Tämä yhteistyö on vaatinut vuosikausia kestänyttä pelitavan harjoittelua junioreista alkaen Barcelonan kuuluisassa akatemiassa La Masiassa. Korkea pelinopeus ei siis myöskään palautunut jäännöksettä Barcelonan yksittäisten pelaajien pelaamisen summaan. Korkean pelinopeuden syntymiseksi ei riittänyt yksittäisten pelaajien liikkeet ja pallon käsittely. Se oli niitä enemmän. Sanalla sanoen jalkapallo on joukkuepeli eikä yksilöurheilua tai yksilöurheilun summaa. Kollektivismi selittää, individualismi ei Mielestäni vahvin peruste individualismia vastaan on juuri tämä ilmiö: joukkueen pelaaminen voi olla enemmän kuin sen pelaajien pelaamisen summa. Sen jokainen joukkuepallopeliä pelannut tuntee. Kun yhteispeli sujuu, tuntuu kuin olisi "kolmannen asteen yhteys" muihin pelaajiin, mikä tekee itsestäkin paremman pelaajan hetkellisesti. Eliminativistinen individualismi ei tätä kykene selittämään. Eliminativistisessa individualismissa joukkueen pelaaminen pitäisi olla täysin eliminoitavissa eli poistettavissa. Se ei lopulta ole mitään muuta kuin joukkueen yksittäisten pelaajien pelaamista: heidän liikkeitään, kaksinkamppailujaan, kontaktejaan, sitä miten he käsit60 Jani Hakkarainen televät palloa. Erityisesti joukkueella ei voi olla mitään kausaalisia voimia. Sitä ei ole olemassa ja on varsin uskottava oletus, että olematon ei voi vaikuttaa syy–seuraus-suhteissa. Eliminativistisen individualismin ainut pelastautumistie olisi siis selittää pois ilmiö joukkueesta enemmän kuin pelaajiensa summana. Sen pitäisi pystyä osoittamaan, että tämä ilmiö ei ole tavalla tai toisella todellinen, mikä on vastoin pelaamisen kokemusta. Niin kauan kuin eliminativistinen individualismi ei tähän kykene – enkä usko sen koskaan kykenevän –, katson kyseisen ilmiön muodostavan vahvan perusteen sitä vastaan ja kollektivismin puolesta. On järkevää eli perusteltua ajatella, että jalkapallojoukkueita ja joukkueen kulloisiakin kentällisiä on olemassa sosiaalisina olioina. Se auttaa meitä ymmärtämään korkeatasoista jalkapalloa joukkuepelinä. Siinä on järkeä. Näyttää myös vahvasti siltä, että joukkueilla ja niiden kentällisillä on omia kausaalisia voimia. Jalkapallojoukkueella tai tarkemmin sanottuna sen kulloisellakin kentällisellä on esimerkiksi voimaa kollektiivina estää vastustajan hyökkäyspeliä tai tuottaa korkeaa pelinopeutta hyökkäyspelissä. Tätä voidaan lisäksi tukea kaikille joukkueessa pelanneille tutulla ilmiöllä, että joukkueen ryhmädynamiikka vaikuttaa pelaajiinsa. Jos joukkue toimii ryhmänä hyvin, sen pelaajat saavat itsestään helpommin kaiken irti kuin joukkueessa, jonka ryhmädynamiikka on retuperällä. Kausaaliset voimat ovat merkki joukkueiden ja niiden kentällisten olemassaolosta. Voimat eivät kuitenkin tee niistä olemassa olevia. Niiden olemassaolo kumpuaa jostakin muusta tekijästä. Näkisin, että se kumpuaa muodosta. Tietty muoto tekee joukkueesta tai kentällisestä olion. "Muodolla" en tarkoita geometrista muotoa. Tarkoitan sillä olemassaolon tapaa, joka on olion muodollinen piirre erotettuna sen materiaalisista ominaisuuksista. Ajatus voidaan esittää vetyatomin avulla. Vetyatomi koostuu protonista ja elektronista. Se ei kuitenkaan ole vain yhden protonin ja elektronin moneus. Yhden atomin, ykseyden, siitä tekee erään protonin ja elektronin yhdistyminen tietyllä tavalla. Tämä yhdistymisen tapa, joka tietenkin on myös materiaalinen fysikaalinen kysymys, on ontologisesta näkökulmasta vetyatomin muoto. Vetyatomin muoto tekee protonin ja 60 61 elektronin moneudesta olion ja ykseyden yli osiensa moneuden: se on esimerkiksi vaikeammin hajotettavissa kuin mielivaltainen protonin ja elektronin moneus. Vetyatomin muoto erottaakin tämän erään protonin ja elektronin moneuden mielivaltaisesta protonin ja elektronin moneudesta (esimerkiksi tämän protonin ja jonkin toisen elektronin periaatteellisesta moneudesta). Se antaa vedylle myös tiettyjä kausaalisia ominaisuuksia, joita fysiikka ja kemia tutkivat. Vastaavasti jalkapallojoukkueessa sen pelaajat yhdistyvät tietyllä, hyvin monimutkaisella tavalla, joka on tämän jalkapallojoukkueen olemisen tapa ja muoto. Se tekee joukkueesta olion ja ykseyden yli pelaajiensa moneuden. Ilmeisesti pelaajien yhdistymisen tapa koostuu ennen kaikkea hyvin monimutkaisista kanssakäymisrelaatioista. On sosiologian, sosiaalipsykologian ja psykologian tehtävä tutkia niitä. Yhtä kaikki juuri tämä pelaajien yhdistymisen tapa antaa joukkueelle myös sen kausaaliset voimat. Jos esimerkiksi pelaajien kanssakäyminen toimii hyvin eli joukkueen ryhmädynamiikka toimii, joukkue vaikuttaa pelaajien pelaamiseen myönteisesti. Joukkueen kulloisenkin kentällisen kohdalla merkitsevät kanssakäymisen lisäksi myös itse peliin liittyvät pelaajien väliset suhteet, kuten avaruudellis-ajalliset relaatiot pelaajien välillä kentällä. Ne yhdessä muodostavat kentällisen olemisen tavan ja muodon. Niiden vuoksi kentällisellä on voimaa esimerkiksi peittää tietty alue viheriöstä pelissä tehokkaasti. Silti nämä voimat eivät ole, kuten yllä argumentoin, palautettavissa yksittäisten pelaajien voimiin. Pelaajien väliset relaatiot ovat aiheuttaneet uuden olion ja ykseyden muodostumisen. Tätä voidaan tukea huomauttamalla, että voidaan ajatella osan joukkueen kentällisestä muodostavan moneuden vastustajan kentällisen kanssa. Tämä moneus ei ole kuitenkaan joukkue, ykseys, koska joukkueen muodostavat relaatiot puuttuvat (esimerkiksi jaettu yhteenkuuluvuuden tunne). Kollektivismia voidaan tukea myös havainnoilla. On nimittäin mahdollista havaita jalkapallojoukkueen kentällisen ykseys ja kollektiivinen voima. Tämä edellyttää vain huippuottelun näkemistä riittävän korkealta, lähes lintuperspektiivistä. Silloin havaitsee, että esimerkiksi puolustuspelissä kentällinen liikkuu viheriöllä parhaim62 Jani Hakkarainen millaan yksikkönä, yhtenä: ei vain kymmenen pelaajan moneutena vaan nimenomaan yhtenä oliona. Parhaimmillaan ykseys toimii kuin geometrinen kuvio, joka peittää tietyn alueen kentästä käytännössä täysin: sen väleihin ei vastustaja kykene pelaamaan. Vertasin sitä yllä betonilaattaan kentän päällä. Sama havainto on mahdollista tehdä hyökkäyspelissäkin. Esimerkiksi voidaan ottaa kuvaamani Barcelonan "valeysi"-taktiikka, joka on ollut hyvin menestyksekäs. Oikeasta näkökulmasta ja oikealla tavalla katsottuna Barcelonan kentällisen voidaan nähdä muodostavan yksikön, ykseyden, joka geometrisen muotonsa muutoksilla luo tyhjää tilaa ja täyttää sitä nopeasti. Tällä tavalla se murtautuu läpi vastustajan puolustuksen (mistä itse asiassa hyökkäämisessä on kysymys kaikissa joukkuepallopeleissä). Pikemmin holismia kuin atomismia Kollektivismini on pikemmin holistinen (kokonaisuutta korostava) kuin atomistinen (kokonaisuuden osia korostava) näkemys. Atomismilla en tässä tarkoita materiaalista atomismia, jonka mukaan materiaalinen todellisuus koostuu perimmiltään jakamattomista osista. Tarkoitan sosiaaliontologista tai yhteiskunnallista atomismia, jonka mukaan ihmisyksilöt ovat toisistaan ja muodostamistaan yhteisöllisistä olioista riippumattomia. Riippumattomuudella en tarkoita riippumattomuutta syy–seuraus-suhteista. Atomismi siis sallii kausaaliset vaikutukset ihmisyksilöiden välillä. Tarkoittamani riippumattomuus on pikemmin ontologista: olemista ja sen tapaa koskevaa. Yhteiskunnallisessa atomismissa ihmisyksilöt ovat identiteetiltään (yksilöllisyydeltään) toisistaan ja sosiaalisista olioista riippumattomia. Myöskään heidän olemassaolonsa ei riipu sosiaalisista olioista. Ihmisten identiteetti on, mitä se on, ihmiset ovat, mitä he ovat, riippumatta toisistaan ja sosiaalisista olioista. He ovat myös olemassa riippumatta siitä, mihin ryhmään he sattuvat kuulumaan. Minä olen minä riippumatta siitä, että satun olemaan Suomen kansalainen. Voisin myös olla olemassa, vaikka Suomen valtiota ei olisi koskaan perustettu. Sanalla sanoen ihmisyksilöt ovat yhteisöllisiä atomeja. 62 63 Kannattamani kollektivismi kieltää ainakin ihmisten identiteettiriippumattomuuden sosiaalisista olioista. Sikäli se ei ole atomistinen kanta. Sen mukaan ihmisten identiteetti riippuu ainakin yhdestä sosiaalisesta oliosta. Jalkapallon kohdalla tämä tarkoittaa, että kunkin jalkapalloilijan identiteetti riippuu osittain jalkapallosta pelinä. Esimerkiksi Andrea Pirlo ei olisi Andrea Pirlo, juuri se ihminen, jos jalkapalloa pelinä ei olisi koskaan keksitty. Silloin hän voisi olla vaikkapa koripalloilija Andrea Pirlo. Osa Andrea Pirlon identiteettiä on siis olla jalkapalloilija (kenties juuri tietynlainen jalkapalloilija, rakentava alempi keskikenttäpelaaja). Hän ei voisi olla jalkapalloilija, jos jalkapalloa ei olisi. Tästä itse asiassa seuraa, että jalkapallo on jalkapalloilijuuteen nähden ontologisesti ensisijaista. Kukaan ei voi olla jalkapalloilija, jos jalkapalloa lajina ei ole – kuten kukaan ei voi olla Suomen kansalainen, jos Suomea valtiona ei ole. Koska jalkapalloa joukkuepelinä ei voisi olla ilman jalkapallojoukkueita, kukaan ei voi olla identiteetiltään jalkapalloilija ilman jalkapallojoukkueita. Myös jalkapallojoukkueet ovat siis ontologisesti ensisijaisia jalkapalloilijana olemiseen nähden.5 Kollektivismini on siten holistista, koska ainakin yhdessä suhteessa sosiaaliset oliot ovat ihmisyksilöihin nähden ensisijaista. Kollektivismistani sen sijaan ei seuraa, että ihmisen identiteetti itsessään pitäisi olla olemassa jonakin oliona tai täysin muuttumattomana. On täysin mahdollista, että esimerkiksi Andrea Pirlon identiteetti on hänen piirteensä, mutta ei hänestä erillinen olio. Sikäli Andrea Pirlo voi olla identiteettiriippuvainen lajista nimeltä jalkapallo ja jalkapallojoukkueista. Tämä on myös täysin yhteensopivaa sen kanssa, että Andrea Pirlon identiteetti on osittain muuttuva. Lapsena Andrea Pirlo tuskin oli täysin sama Andrea Pirlo kuin mitä hän on nykyään aikuisena. Jalkapallon ja jalkapallojoukkueiden ontologisesta ensisijaisuudesta jalkapalloilijana olemiseen verrattuna on syytä esittää yksi tarken5 Kyseessä on kuitenkin geneerinen eli yleinen riippuvuus toisin kuin jalkapallon kohdalla. Yksittäinen jalkapalloilija, esimerkiksi Andrea Pirlo, ei ole riippuvainen jostakin tietystä jalkapallojoukkueesta kuten Juventuksesta, missä hän tällä hetkellä pelaa. Jalkapalloilijana hän on riippuvainen siitä, että jalkapallojoukkueita ylipäänsä on olemassa nimenomaan jalkapallojoukkueina. Sen sijaan Pirlon jalkapalloilijuus on riippuvainen nimenomaan yhdestä pelistä, jalkapallosta. 64 Jani Hakkarainen tava huomautus. Näin vältän räikeimmät mahdolliset vastaväitteet muna–kana-ongelmasta, jotka perustuvat väärinymmärrykseen. Ontologisesta ensisijaisuudesta ei seuraa ajallista edeltävyyttä. Teesini jalkapallopelin ja jalkapallojoukkueiden ontologisesta ensisijaisuudesta ei siis tarkoita sitoutumista väitteeseen, että jalkapallo pelinä ja jalkapallojoukkueet olivat ensin ja jalkapalloilijana olemisen mahdollisuus vasta sitten. Sinänsä tämä on varmasti täysin mahdollista. Olisi aivan hyvin voitu ensin kirjoittaa jalkapallon säännöt, valmistaa välineet, rakentaa kenttä, koota joukkueet ja alkaa vasta sitten pelata jalkapalloa. Historiallisesti asia lienee kuitenkin tapahtunut enemmän tai vähemmän spontaanisti niin, että jonain epämääräisenä ajanjaksona syntyivät samanaikaisesti jalkapallo pelinä, jalkapallojoukkueita ja jalkapalloilijana olemisen mahdollisuus. Kantani on täysin yhteensopiva tämän kanssa. Sen sijaan jalkapalloilijana olemisen ajallisen ensisijaisuuden joudun kieltämään. Se on kuitenkin mielestäni ainoastaan uskottava kanta, koska voiko joku olla jalkapalloilija, jos sellaista peliä ei ole kehitetty eikä jalkapallojoukkueita ole eli hän ei voi jalkapalloa periaatteessakaan pelata? Jalkapallo ja jalkapallojoukkueet näyttävät olevan jalkapalloilijana olemisen välttämätön ehto. Kuka pelaa? Kollektivismi herättää väistämättä kysymyksen, kuka lopulta pelaa jalkapalloa, jos kausaalisia voimia pelissä ei ole ainoastaan pelaajilla vaan myös joukkueilla ja niiden kentällisillä. Onko jalkapallossa lopulta niin, että peliä pelaavat joukkueet eivätkä pelaajat? Kuka tai mikä on jalkapallon pelaamisen agentti, tekijä eli pelaaja? Aiemmin olen puolustanut näkemystä, että ensisijaisesti joukkueet tai tarkemmin niiden kentälliset pelaavat. Myönsin kuitenkin, että pelaajat pelaavat toissijaisesti.6 Nykyään minusta kuitenkin näyttää siltä, että oikea vastaus kysymykseen on molempi parempi: molemmat pelaavat. Jalkapallo on joukkuepeli. Sitä pelaavat joukkueet tai tarkemmin joukkueiden kulloisetkin kentälliset. Mutta sitä pelaavat myös yksittäiset pelaajat. Asia riippuu pelitilanteesta. 6 Hakkarainen 2011a ja b. 64 65 Nähdäkseni tämä johtuu siitä, että yksittäinen jalkapallo-ottelu on prosessi. Se koostuu useista pelitapahtumista: syötöistä, laukauksista, harhautuksista, taklauksista, heittäytymisistä, kymmenellä pelaajalla puolustamisesta jne. Tärkeää on huomata, että pelitapahtumat eivät seuraa toisiaan peräkkäin ajassa kuin sotilaat jonossa. Ne ovat ainakin osittain ajallisesti päällekkäisiä. Samaan aikaan kentällä tapahtuu monia pelitapahtumia. Osa näistä pelitapahtumista on rajoittunut pienelle alueelle kenttää. Sikäli on pakko sanoa, että yksittäiset pelaajat pelaavat näiden tapahtumien suhteen. Jos esimerkiksi alin pelaaja antaa harhasyötön vastustajan kärkimiehelle, joka pääsee läpi ja tekee maalin, on oikein sanoa, että alin pelaaja teki virheen, ei koko joukkue. Osa pelitapahtumista on kuitenkin avaruudellisesti vähemmän rajoittuneita. Niiden suhteen pelaajina ovat pikemmin kentälliset kuin pelaajat. Voidaan tuskin sanoa, että Georgios Seitaridis peitti Kreikan oman alueen koko keskustan vuoden 2004 EM-finaalissa. Sen sijaan pitää sanoa, että Kreikan joukkue peitti oman alueensa keskustan niin hyvin, että Portugali ei päässyt maalipaikoille. Unohtaa ei pidä myöskään, että peliprosessin lopputulos on joukkueiden, ei pelaajien välinen. Toistaiseksi Messi ei ole voittanut yhtään ottelua Barcelonalle. Barcelona joukkueena on voittanut. Ongelmia Kaikilla filosofisilla kannoilla on omat ongelmansa. Puolustamani kollektivismi kohtaa muiden muassa kausaliteettiin eli syyn ja seurauksen suhteeseen liittyvän ongelman. Fysiikan mukaan näyttäisi siltä, että konkreettinen eli fysikaalinen maailma on kausaalisesti sulkeutunut. Konkreettiseen asiaan voi siis vaikuttaa vain toinen konkreettinen tapahtuma tai olio. Voiko siis sosiaalinen olio, joka oletettavasti ei ole konkreettinen olio, vaikuttaa fysikaalisen maailman tapahtumiin? Olenhan väittänyt, että joukkueet ja niiden kentälliset vaikuttavat konkreettisiin tapahtumiin jalkapallokentällä. En yritäkään tarjota pitkälle vietyä vastausta kausaalisen sulkeuman ongelmaan tässä artikkelissa. Huomautan vain, että en ole 66 Jani Hakkarainen itse asiassa välttämättä sitoutunut syy–seuraus-suhteeseen sosiaalisesta fysikaaliseen. Tarkkaan ottaen olen ensinnäkin vain väittänyt, että jalkapallojoukkueen kentällisillä on vaikutusta pelitapahtumiin. Kentällisistä on kuitenkin syytä huomata, että ne ovat sosiaalisia, konkreettisia olioita: niillä on sijainti aika-avaruudessa. Kentällinen sijaitsee jossakin kentällä jokaisella pelin hetkellä. Sijainti vain ei välttämättä ole yhtenäinen, se voi olla myös hajanainen. Sikäli kentällisen vaikutus pelitapahtumiin on fysikaalista kausaliteettia. Sen sijaan joukkueen kohdalla tilanne näyttää olevan ongelmallisempi. Jalkapallojoukkue nimittäin ei ole niin selvästi konkreettinen olio. Sillä ei näytä olevan mitään sijaintia aika-avaruudessa (ainakaan seuralla ei ole kuin korkeintaan ajallinen oleminen). Se vaikuttaa olevan jotakin muuta. Olen kuitenkin väittänyt ainoastaan, että jalkapallojoukkue vaikuttaa pelaajien tajuntaan. En ole sanonut, että se vaikuttaa suoraan pelitapahtumiin. Tällainen vaikuttaminen sosiaalisen ja mentaalisen välillä ei kärsi fysikaalisen todellisuuden kausaalisen sulkeuman ongelmasta. Toki siihen sisältyy ongelma, kuinka pelaajien tajunta voi vaikuttaa konkreettiseen pelaamiseen kentällä. Kausaalisen sulkeuman ongelma ikään kuin siirtyy toiseen paikkaan. Vastaus tähän ongelmaan riippuu syyn ja seurauksen suhteen luonteesta, mikä on avoin filosofinen kysymys, jota yksinomaan fysiikka ei voi ratkaista. Mielenfilosofisena ongelmana mentaalisen vaikutus fysikaaliseen onkin avoin filosofinen ongelma.7 Kausaliteetin ongelma liittyy toiseen, reifikaation eli olioksi tekemisen ongelmaan.8 Kollektivismia vastaan voidaan esittää, että se reifioi yhteisölliset ilmiöt ja muodostaa maailmaan sikäli sosiaalisten olioiden sfäärin ongelmattomien konkreettisten eli aika-avaruudellisten olioiden lisäksi. Tähänkään vaikeaan ongelmaan en kykene lyhyessä artikkelissa tarjoamaan kunnon vastausta. Voin vain huomauttaa, että kentällisten kohdalla en muodosta sosiaalisten olioiden sfääriä konkreettisten olioiden yli. Kuten yllä toin esille, ne ovat avaruudellis-ajallisia olioita. En siis sitoudu sellaiseen kantaan, jossa kentälliset sosiaalisina olioina ovat jotakin konkreettisesti erillistä, 7 Ks. Robb ja Heil 2013. 8 Ks. Elder-Vass 2010, 196 ja Schatzki 2003, 188. 66 67 hämärää lisää maailmaan. Joukkueiden kohdalla tämäkin ongelma tarvitsee lisäpohdintaa. Kollektivismia vastaan voidaan myös esittää, että se on käytännön seurauksiltaan moraalisesti vaarallinen kanta. Joukkuekollektiiviin uskominen johtaa mahdollisesti joukkueen yksilöiden sortamiseen ihmisenä. Itse asiassa tämä ei ole vain mahdollista vaan myös aktuaalista, jos tarkastellaan toisen joukkuepallopelin, jääkiekon historiaa. On varsin kiistatonta, että Neuvostoliiton jääkiekkomaajoukkueessa pelaajia ihmisinä sorrettiin: heidät pakotettiin 11:ksi kuukaudeksi vuodessa harjoitusleirille. Kollektivismia pitää siis kavahtaa, vaikka se olisi teoreettisesti oikea kanta. Se on moraalisesti kyseenalainen. Tähän mahdolliseen vastaväitteeseen on varsin helppo vastata. Neuvostoliiton jääkiekkomaajoukkueen kohdalla toimintatavoissa mentiin despotismin tai totalitarismin puolelle. Siinä unohdettiin – kenties tietoisesti –, että joukkueessa on kyseessä ihmisten muodostama ryhmä. Se koostuu elävistä ja tuntevista ihmisistä, joita ei voi kohdella kuin elottomia olioita. Joukkue ei ole kone, jonka elottomia osia pelaajat ovat. Tärkeää onkin nähdä, että kollektivismini ei tarkoita jalkapalloilijoiden ihmisarvon heikentämistä, vaikka heidän jalkapalloilijuutensa on toissijaista jalkapalloon ja jalkapallojoukkueisiin nähden. Kollektivismini tarjoaa itse asiassa kehittyneen, tasapainoisen näkemyksen joukkueen ja sen pelaajien välisestä suhteesta. Se kykenee välttämään sortumisen sekä eliminativistisen individualismin harhakuvaan että totalitarismin despotismiin. Se ei siis edusta helppoa, mustavalkoista joko–tai-ajattelua. 68 Jani Hakkarainen Kirjallisuus Elder-Vass, D. (2010). The Causal Power of Social Structures – Emergence, Structure and Agency. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hakkarainen, J. (2011). Sihvonen on sivupoluilla. Urheilulehti, 22, 46–8. Hakkarainen, J. (2011). Kuka pelaa? Urheilulehti, 19, 42–5. Hakkarainen, J. (2012). Joukkueurheilu ja yhteiskunnallisen atomismin myytti. Akateeminen urheilublogi, [http://avokatsomo.com/akateeminen/ 2012/02/ joukkueurheilu-ja-yhteiskunnallisen-atomismin-myytti/]. Hakkarainen, J. (2012). Miksi meidän peli? Akateeminen urheilublogi, [http:// avokatsomo.com/akateeminen/2012/05/miksi-meidan-peli/]. Hakkarainen, J. (2012). Miksi meidän peli – toisesta näkökulmasta? Akateeminen urheilublogi, [http://avokatsomo.com/akateeminen/2012/05/ miksi-meidan-peli-toisesta-nakokulmasta/]. Jackson, P. & Delehanty, H. (2013). Eleven Rings – The Soul of Success. New York: Penguin Press. Robb, D. & Heil, J. (2013). Mental Causation. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mental-causation/]. Luettu 12.6.2013. Schatzki, T. R. (2003). A New Societist Social Ontology. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 33, 174–202. Wilson, J. (2011). Pelien peli – jalkapallon taktiikan historia (Inverting the Pyramid – The History of Football Tactics, 2009; suom. T. Hannula). Helsinki: Helsingin Sanomat. 68

OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 07/18/2016, SPi 4 Reasons, Reflection, and Repugnance Doug McConnell and Jeanette Kennett 4.1 Introduction In a widely cited article, 'The Wisdom of Repugnance' (1997), moral conservative Leon Kass claims that, 'in crucial cases [. . .] repugnance is the emotional expression of deep wisdom, beyond reason's power fully to articulate it' (1997, p. 20). He argues that 'the burden of moral argument must fall entirely on those who want to declare the widespread repugnances of humankind to be mere timidity or superstition' (1997, p. 21). Kass focuses on repugnance at human cloning and IVF but presumably he would generalize his view to a range of enhancement technologies. He believes that we are too readily 'enchanted and enslaved by the glamour of technology' (Kass 1997, p. 18) and that technology can undermine valuable aspects of our humanity. In this chapter we draw comparisons between Kass' views on the normative authority of repugnance and social intuitionist accounts of moral judgement which are similarly sceptical about the role of reasoned reflection in moral judgement. We survey the empirical claims made in support of giving moral primacy to intuitions generated by emotions such as repugnance, as well as some common objections. We then examine accounts which integrate intuition and reflection, and argue that plausible accounts of wisdom are in tension with Kass' claim that our inarticulable emotional responses can be the expression of deep wisdom. We conclude that while repugnance and other emotions have a role to play in informing deliberation and judgement, we have reason to be cautious in giving them normative authority. Affective responses alone cannot discharge the burden of justification for moral judgement and are just one tool relied upon by those we consider wise. 4.2 Kass on Repugnance, Moral Judgement, and Wisdom Kass wrote his article against human cloning in the aftermath of the first successful cloning of a mammal, Dolly the sheep. Despite the public opposition to human cloning, OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 07/18/2016, SPi reasons, reflection, and repugnance 59 then as now, he thought that an attempt at human cloning was imminent given a cultural trend to enthusiastically adopt new technology.1 But even if that were the cultural trend, why should we be concerned about human cloning or any other technology? Kass complains that certain technologies undermine valuable aspects of our natural humanity. For example, 'cloning shows itself to be a major alteration, indeed, a major violation, of our given nature as embodied, gendered and engendered beings-and of the social relations built on this natural ground. . . . Asexual reproduction, which produces "single-parent" offspring, is a radical departure from the natural human way, confounding all normal understandings of father, mother, sibling, grandparent, etc., and all moral relations tied thereto' (Kass 1997, pp. 20–1). According to Kass, the 'natural human way' is, roughly, that children should be raised by their biological parents who are in a stable monogamous relationship. For Kass, then, there is a fundamental natural humanity which we are morally obligated to protect in the face of technologies that would alienate us from that humanity. Therefore we need to judge which aspects of our humanity need to be protected from which technologies. We do so by feeling repugnance, which generates moral intuitions about the threats to our natural humanity.2 Speaking of cloning, he says, 'we are repelled . . . not because of the strangeness or novelty of the undertaking, but because we intuit or feel, immediately and without argument, the violation of things that we rightfully hold dear' (Kass 1997, p. 20, emphasis added). It is worth noting that for moral repugnance to play this role, it presumably must have a different qualitative character to repugnance at the merely novel. A quantitative difference alone would be insufficient since even the extremely strange presumably falls short of moral wrongness; similarly something morally wrong may, unfortunately, become familiar. At this point, one might wonder about the direction of explanation here (Giubilini 2015). Must we rely on repugnance to let us know what to hold dear-that is, what counts as our fundamental humanity-or do we define what we hold dear first and then rely on repugnance to alert us if it is threatened? Kass is ambiguous on this point. For the most part he appears to favour the former, affect-driven view, claiming that 'repugnance is the emotional expression of deep wisdom, beyond reason's power fully to articulate it' (1997, p. 20, emphasis added). He also argues that the inability to find a justification for repugnance at incest, bestiality, cannibalism, rape, or murder in no way detracts from the normative authority of that repugnance, saying: 'Would anyone's failure to give full rational justification for his or her revulsion at these practices 1 More specifically, he worries that the growing acceptance of single parenting will make human cloning attractive because clones are 'the ultimate single-parent child'. He also thinks that the modern value that all children should be 'wanted', used to justify abortion and contraception, will be extended to justify cloning people that we 'want'. As it happens, opposition to human cloning has decreased, from about 90 per cent to 80 per cent in the last 15 years (Gallup 2015). 2 Kass is not completely clear on the relationship he envisages between repugnance and intuition. We interpret his view of repugnance as follows. Repugnance is an emotional response which gives rise to an intuitive, contentful judgement that the object of repugnance is morally wrong. The agent might try to justify the intuitions that stem from their repugnance with reflective thought but such justification is optional. OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 07/18/2016, SPi 60 reasons, reflection, and repugnance make that revulsion ethically suspect? Not at all' (Kass 1997, p. 20). In other words, we must rely on the normative authority of repugnance to generate intuitions about what we are morally obliged to resist and protect because we often cannot articulate why. Yet he also claims that, 'to pollution and perversion, the fitting response can only be horror and revulsion' (1997, p. 21). This appears to indicate that repugnance should 'fit' with a pre-established idea of what it is for natural humanity to be violated. In another context he mentions a case of repugnance being rightly overruled by reason: 'Surgery involves overcoming repugnance at violating wholeness and submitting to mutilation, overridden here only in order to defend the imperilled body against still greater threats to its integrity' (Kass 2002, p. 183). Kass might also be charitably interpreted as remaining somewhat open to consideration of counterargument when he states that 'the burden of moral argument must fall entirely on those who want to declare the widespread repugnances of humankind to be mere timidity or superstition' (1997, p. 21). There would be no point asking for argument from his opponents if his experience of repugnance was final.3 Perhaps Kass envisages a kind of mixed model where reason has some normative authority in certain cases (e.g. surgery) while in others repugnance has normative authority (e.g. human cloning). If this is his view he needs to explain how to distinguish the two kinds of case. How do we know when repugnance is wise? An analysis of wisdom might help us at this point. Strangely, given the article's title, Kass leaves the notion of 'wisdom' completely unanalysed. However, his account resembles Jonathan Haidt's Social Intuitionism, which also gives moral intuition normative authority and may therefore draw on the empirical underpinnings of Haidt's view. 4.3 Affect-Based Accounts of Moral Judgement: Social Intuitionism Haidt and colleagues (Haidt 2001, 2007, 2012; Haidt and Bjorkland 2008) have proposed that moral judgements are largely the result of moral intuition rather than moral reasoning. Moral intuitions are 'the sudden appearance in consciousness, of a moral judgment, including an affective valence (good–bad, like–dislike) without any conscious awareness of having gone through steps of search, weighing evidence, or inferring a conclusion' (Haidt 2001, p. 818). This account is supported by research that suggests that most, if not all, stimuli activate evaluative associations: an automatic attitude (positive or negative) that is immediate, unintentional, and preconscious (e.g. Fazio 2001). In some cases the evaluative tone of our automatic activations enters awareness in the form of a 'gut feeling'. For example, Haidt (2007, p. 998) notes that '[w]hen we think about sticking a pin into a child's hand . . . most of us have an automatic intuitive reaction that includes a flash of negative affect.' These automatic evaluative 3 Though perhaps this request is a mere rhetorical flourish. OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 07/18/2016, SPi reasons, reflection, and repugnance 61 intuitions ground or constitute moral judgements which we may then go on to defend or disseminate using more cognitively demanding, slower explicit reasoning. Notably, moral reasoning usually occurs after the automatic production of the moral intuition, and the social intuitionist argues that such reasoning is usually 'a post-hoc process in which we search for evidence to support our initial intuitive reaction' (Haidt 2007, p. 998). This primacy of moral intuition over moral reasoning is allegedly revealed in 'moral dumbfounding' studies in which subjects are presented with harmless but disgusting or taboo-violating scenarios (Haidt and Hersh 2001). Because the negative 'gut feeling' about the act remains-for example, repugnance at the thought of consensual sibling incest-even when the reasons they have cited for condemning it are shown not to apply in the case at hand, subjects continue to insist that the act is morally wrong while acknowledging their inability to explain why.4 Based on this kind of evidence, Haidt claims that moral intuitions, rather than reason, cause moral judgements. Haidt (2012) sees reason as a tool to convince people to share one's moral intuitions or form a consensus; consensus creates culturally relative moral truths.5 Kass, in contrast, believes that his repugnance is alerting him to important and presumably timeless, objective moral truths. Nevertheless they agree in their rejection of reason as a moral guide in key cases, and Haidt appears to share Kass' view that our affectively driven intuitions can be wise, arguing that we should look 'for the roots of human intelligence, rationality, and virtue in what the mind does best: perception, intuition, and other mental operations that are quick, effortless, and generally quite accurate' (Haidt 2001, pp. 821–2). Let us examine the case for intuition before turning to some problems of this approach. 4.4 Wise Intuitions and Unwise Reflection The folk readily acknowledge cases where acting in accordance with one's emotions is best despite those emotions running counter to deliberative judgement. Nomy Arpaly illustrates one kind of case with Emily, who has always believed that she should pursue a PhD in chemistry. However, she finds that her studies are causing her to feel 'restless, sad, and ill-motivated' (Arpaly 2000, p. 504). Emily sees her feelings as 'senseless and groundless', yet they drive her to leave the programme. At the time of the decision she feels lazy and irrational but also greatly relieved. Only later does she come to understand that her feelings were caused by the fact that the programme was ill-suited to her talents, preferences, and character. In hindsight she 'cites those feelings as the reasons for her quitting, and regards as irrationality not her quitting but that she held on to her conviction that the program was right for her for as long as she did' (Arpaly 2000, p. 504). In a similar case but with a moral flavour, Huckleberry Finn judges it morally 4 But see Kennett 2011, 2012 for an alternative interpretation of this finding. See also May 2014 for a sceptical view of the influence of disgust on moral judgement. 5 Haidt endorsed cultural relativism in an interview with Tamla Sommers (2005). OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 07/18/2016, SPi 62 reasons, reflection, and repugnance wrong to help the slave, Jim, but continues to do so, motivated by feelings of compassion for him (Bennett 1974). When deliberating he can only find reasons in favour of handing Jim in and none in favour of helping him. Yet he continues to give in to his compassion. As external observers we might see Huck's compassion as the expression of moral reasons that should outweigh those provided by his ideologically clouded judgement. In each of these cases, 'outlaw' emotions appear to function as correctives to internally coherent but false frameworks that structure judgement (Jagger 1996). How might we explain such cases? How does reflection go so wrong? Conscious, reflective thought is limited. Most obviously, it can be overwhelmed by multiple variables and/or time constraints (Lehrer 2009). Because of these limitations, in some circumstances, intuitive or unconscious cognitive processes can better guide decision-making. An experiment by Dijksterhuis and van Olden (2006), for example, showed that people who carefully reflected on a choice (between five artworks) were more likely to regret their decision than people who were distracted before making their decision. Unconscious thought processes were thought to be superior to conscious ones because, first, the unconscious has very high capacity, leading unconscious thought to take into account all information rather than just a subset. Second, unconscious thought . . . weights the relative importance of different attributes of objects in a relatively objective and "natural" way . . . Conversely, conscious thought often disturbs this natural weighing process . . . and can therefore lead to inferior decisions. (Dijksterhuis and van Olden 2006, p. 628) Similarly, in theories of expert action the focus is on the perceptual and recognitional elements of decision-making. Intuition is often both a faster and a more accurate way to make good decisions than relying on analysis and reflection (Hutton and Klein 1999; Dreyfus 2002; Bortolotti 2011).6 This range of evidence raises the possibility that intuitions generated by repugnance could guide wise choices even when they clash with deliberative frameworks that claim to ground good judgement. Repugnance might be the result of unconscious thought processes that integrate a wider range of information than the conscious thought processes of those who argue against that repugnance. Furthermore, attempts to justify repugnance (or a lack of it) may only result in causally irrelevant confabulations that unnecessarily and unhelpfully confound the real situation. However, the picture is more complicated than this evidence might suggest. We will first examine some objections to Kass that raise concerns about the reliability of intuitions, and then review the characteristics of expert decision-making that suggest the intuitions of the wise are not untrained intuitions. We will then turn to an important distinction made by Karen Jones between reason-tracking and reason-responding, before examining folk views of wisdom. 6 Conscious, reflective thought is still best for some tasks and expert activities-for example, when bookmakers set odds. OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 07/18/2016, SPi reasons, reflection, and repugnance 63 4.5 Problems for Kass: Unwise Intuitions Kass' view faces at least three problems. The first objection targets his particular form of moral realism. The second and third raise doubts as to whether a moral realist can rely on moral intuitions to track moral truth and, therefore, whether intuitions can have normative authority:7 1. Kass assumes that he knows what the fundamental aspects of human nature are and that we are morally obliged to protect them. For example, he claims that human cloning is wrong because asexual reproduction is a radical departure from the natural human way and confounds all normal understandings of familial relationships and their moral relations. This raises two problems. First, his view of what is natural for human beings is highly questionable.8 As Neil Levy points out in response to another moral conservative, Michael Sandel, '[H]omo sapiens is a niche constructing animal, an animal who shapes the environment that shapes it in turn. . . . We are deeply and essentially cultural animals . . . because it is not just our social organisation, but our intrinsic capacities and traits that are shaped by our culture' (Levy 2009, p. 73). Our niche construction has resulted in our domesticating animals, living in cities, relying on supermarkets, and socializing on the Internet. These cultural and technological changes haven't destroyed our humanity-rather, they are an expression and a development of it. Drawing the line at cloning and other innovations that happen to elicit repugnance in moral conservatives seems arbitrary. There is no reason to think that society is unable to adapt to novel familial relations as the increasing acceptance of same-sex parenting and the evidence that children of such families are as likely to thrive as any others suggests (Crouch et al. 2014). Second, even if Kass was correct about what is natural for humans, he assumes that natural traits are good and worth protecting just because they are natural. However, many things are natural that are not obviously worth protecting (e.g. cancer), so facts about human nature cannot ground normative standards in any straightforward way. 2. Although Kass recognizes that mere novelty may elicit strong negative feelings, he does not explain how the agent can distinguish those cases, where they should discount their initial intuition, from those where they should take repugnance as a veridical moral signal-the expression of deep wisdom. He seems to assume that veridical moral repugnance will have a distinct, unmistakable qualitative character. Such a qualitative character seems unlikely; indeed, evidence from social psychology presented by Haidt and others (e.g. Doris 2006; Prinz 2006) to support their claims that emotion, not reason, is fundamental to 7 If Haidt is committed to moral truth being relative to one's culture then he avoids these problems. 8 It's worth noting that this challenge to Kass' definition of moral truth holds whether he arrives at it by repugnance or reason. OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 07/18/2016, SPi 64 reasons, reflection, and repugnance moral judgement indicates that our affective responses, and so moral intuitions, can be influenced by morally irrelevant factors. For example, people make harsher moral judgements of people in vignettes if they read them at a filthy desk rather than at a clean desk (Schnall et al. 2008). In another case, participants who were hypnotized to feel disgust when they heard a morally neutral word would judge the behaviour of the protagonist more negatively when that neutral word appeared in the vignette (Wheatley and Haidt 2005). While the results of these experiments should be taken with caution (Jones 2006; Kennett and Fine 2009; Kennett 2012; May 2014) they should concern Kass. If disgust caused by morally irrelevant factors can pollute our moral judgement then its claim to be, or to ground, wisdom is undermined. Disgust does not reliably specify moral targets. 3. Kass seems to accept that some repugnance is misplaced (the merely novel or strange), some repugnance tracks the moral but can be dismissed with good reason (surgery), and some repugnance grounds morality in and of itself (human cloning). But different people make these distinctions in different places: that which elicits a fundamental moral repugnance for one person seems arguable, merely strange, or even familiar to other people.9 Furthermore, the things people find repugnant change over time. What was once strange becomes familiar. If there is no reason to favour one person's intuitions over those of another then we cannot know whose intuitions are right: repugnance lacks normative authority. Indeed, even moral conservative intuitions have changed over time. For example, conservatives found women who fought for suffrage repellent and unnatural, and their repugnance was widely shared. Viscount Helmsley, speaking in the House of Commons, said: It seems to me that this House should remember that if the vote is given to women those who will take the greatest part in politics will not be the quiet, retiring, constitutional women . . . but those very militant women who have brought so much disgrace and discredit upon their sex. . . . One feels that it is not cricket for women to use force. . . . It is little short of nauseating and disgusting to the whole sex. (Hansard Archive 1912) It is unlikely that latter-day conservatives would regard female suffrage as a departure from human nature or the suffragette's actions as nauseating, however much they might still disapprove of property damage. It is hard to resist the conclusion that much of what conservatives opposed and felt repugnance towards in the past was on account of its strangeness, or its challenge to conservative, white, male privilege, rather than its responsiveness to deep truths about our shared humanity. Perhaps we could settle on the targets that are genuinely repugnant by appealing to the repugnances of the majority, but majority intuitions have clearly been misplaced in the past (e.g. repugnance at 9 For example, on the basis of his disgust at it, Kass considers licking ice cream in public unacceptable (Kass 1994, p. 148). OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 07/18/2016, SPi reasons, reflection, and repugnance 65 interracial marriage). In any case, it is hard to imagine that Kass would be happy to correct his moral judgement on the grounds that the majority didn't share his repugnance. The case of same-sex marriage, for example, is one where conservatives such as Kass currently find themselves in a minority in many societies. Presumably he would see disagreement here as a sign that the majority have lost their moral compass. Therefore Kass needs an argument for why we should believe that his repugnances track moral truth; he cannot pass the burden of moral argument to his opponents as he hopes. If the moral judgements that stem from repugnance ultimately require justification, then we have abandoned Kass' view in favour of a more rationalist and deliberative view of moral judgement. Kass might hope to respond to these objections by appealing to the notion of expertise; repugnance per se does not have moral authority but perhaps the repugnance of moral experts does. The problem for Kass is that research on expert decision-making reveals an important role for slower reflective cognition in the acquisition and deployment of expertise. According to Hutton and Klein, the characteristics of expert decision-making are summarized as: (1) Expertise is domain-specific; (2) experts are better able to perceive patterns; (3) experts are relatively fast and virtually error-free; (4) experts have superior memory in their domain of expertise, (although this is often dependent on external cues); (5) experts have a deeper understanding of the problem to solve (e.g. they catch on the causal mechanisms), whereas novices are distracted by superficial features of the problem; (6) experts have a better understanding of their own limitations and an ability to catch themselves when they commit errors; (7) through years of experience, experts acquire the ability to perceive relevant features of the situation (distinguish typical features from exceptions, make fine discriminations, antecedents, and consequences). (Hutton and Klein 1999) While features (2)–(4) might be automatic, prereflective processes, it is apparent that they are reflectively trained processes rather than completely intuitive ones, and features (5)–(7) require developed reflective abilities, including the ability to conceive of consequences and imagine alternatives.10 In the moral domain, a deep understanding of a problem would seem to involve the capacity to articulate it and provide a justification for one's response. Consider again the case of Emily. She ultimately concludes that her feelings were a better indicator of what she should do than was her explicit reasoned judgement. It was only much later when Emily achieved a deeper understanding of her ill-suitedness to study-an understanding she could then articulate- that she approached wisdom. For, as the case of the shifting line of moral repugnance towards technological and social change suggests, our feelings, on their own, don't have normative authority. One can easily imagine an alternative ending to Emily's 10 With regard to (1), Kass could argue that repugnance-based moral expertise is a domain-specific skill or, unlike typical expertise, a relatively domain-general skill. There are issues with both characterizations but we won't pursue them here, given that all expertise involves reflective thought and so doesn't support Kass' view. OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 07/18/2016, SPi 66 reasons, reflection, and repugnance story (also amply demonstrated in everyday experience) where she later realizes that her restlessness and lack of motivation in her studies were caused by her internalization of unfortunate gender stereotypes that she now rejects, or by her unacknowledged fears that a successful scientific career would damage her relationship with her mother. She now regrets her earlier decision to quit. In both versions, however, the phenomenology of her coming to quit is exactly the same and it is hard to see why in one case but not the other we should regard the decision as rational or wise when it was made. Retrospective endorsement of a decision made on the basis of an intuition is not sufficient. Nevertheless, we should be cautious about discounting or overriding our intuitions, since, as Karen Jones (2003) argues, they can be reason-tracking. What is needed is a theoretical framework for understanding the relationship between intuitive and reflective cognition, and how both contribute to rational action. We turn now to Jones. 4.6 Reason-Tracking vs. Reason-Responding Jones begins with the relatively uncontroversial claim that, 'as practical agents, we are trying to latch onto those considerations that really are reason-giving for us in a situation' (Jones 2003, p. 184). The conflict between Kass and those of a more rationalist persuasion is over which mechanisms and methods are best suited to latch on to those reasons-affect and intuition or reflective thought. Based on the range of evidence already considered, it seems that both are essential and each is superior in certain situations. Presumably a wise person would be especially good at knowing when to rely on each. How might this be achieved? Jones begins to answer this question by making a distinction between reason-trackers and reason-responders. Reason-trackers are capable of 'behaving in accordance with [reasons], but . . . need possess neither the concept of a reason nor have a self-conception' (Jones 2003, p. 190). A variety of animals count as reason-trackers since innate capacities and learned associations are sufficient to track reasons most of the time. For example, a shark's instincts successfully key it in to what it has most reason to do most of the time, such as what to hunt and when to do it.11 It is apparent that reason-tracking on its own is not sufficient for wisdom. Sharks may be effective reason-trackers in their domain but they would not, for example, satisfy the conditions for expertise, even within that restricted domain. For that we must also be reason-responders. Reason-responders are sophisticated reason-trackers 'capable of tracking reasons in virtue of responding to them as reasons' (Jones 2003, p. 190). Responding to reasons as reasons requires complex reflective capacities in order to see certain reasons as justifying one action over alternative actions that may also have something to be said for them. To justify an action, a reason-responder has to be able to step back from their immediate affective responses and question whether they direct us to anything choice-worthy. 11 Is Jones' definition of 'reason' too broad? Perhaps only reason-responders really have reasons, and beings that are mere reason-trackers do not. This definitional change would not affect our argument. OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 07/18/2016, SPi reasons, reflection, and repugnance 67 The advantage of being a reason-responder is that one can track reasons more robustly. 'A creature who lacks critical reflective capacities will not be able to display the same kind of flexibility in its action and sensitivity to the implications of changes in its environment that a reason-responder can' (Jones 2003, p. 90). A shark, for example, will consistently take bait on hooks, unable to recalibrate its reason-tracking mechanisms to distinguish bait from real prey. Most adult humans are reason-responders, which allows them to track their reasons despite living in a highly dynamic sociopolitical world, where reason-tracking strategies need to be regularly revised or replaced. So, for example, one might avoid blood and viscera because one finds it disgusting. Disgust is reason-tracking because it evolved to help us avoid contaminants and disease (Oaten, Stevenson, and Case 2009; Curtis, De Barra, and Aunger 2011). Yet there are specific environments where humans need to overcome that disgust, which lies at the base of repugnance. Trainee surgeons, for example, have to use reflective thought to discount feelings of disgust in order to do what they have more reason to do-save lives and pursue careers. Reason-responders can adjust their behaviour in response to changing circumstances. Intuitive processes are not limited to tracking the reasons they evolved to track, however. They have the potential to reason-track in a range of novel environments but, to do so, they depend on monitoring and recalibration by reflective thought (Jones 2003, p. 196). So, at first, the trainee surgeon needs to try to discount their disgust at each surgical procedure but, over time, their disgust mechanisms adapt so that they are no longer disgusted by surgery. Despite our self-monitoring efforts we still occasionally find ourselves in situations like that of Emily, wrestling with whether to continue her PhD. Our intuitions conflict with our reflective cognition and we are unsure which is more likely to track our reasons for action. It is tough to know what our reasons are at the time of such conflicts because we have to make do with the self-knowledge our self-monitoring systems have afforded us to date. Such experiences provide opportunities to improve our self-monitoring techniques and self-knowledge so that the next time we face that kind of situation we may better interpret our affective states and question our reasoning more closely. From Jones' view, then, the rational agent will prefer intuition over reflection when reflective thought is expected to poorly track reasons and/or when intuitions have been trained and so are expected to track reasons accurately. Likewise the rational agent will tend to rely on reason in cases where intuitions aren't suited to the task or where intuitions haven't yet been well trained. The capacity to make such a judgement improves as one's self-knowledge increases, a self-knowledge that depends on the accumulated experience of self-monitoring both one's affective states and one's reflective reasoning. It's worth noting that there is a clear sense in which reflective thought has the ultimate normative authority. Whether one uses reflective thought or intuition at the time of decision, self-monitoring requires reflective thought to assess decisions in hindsight and implement changes for the future. It seems plausible to claim that wise people cannot just be reason-trackers; they must be reason-responders. This OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 07/18/2016, SPi 68 reasons, reflection, and repugnance allows them to track reasons despite changes in their environment, their bodies, and their cognitive architecture. Before considering the implications of Jones' account for Kass, we will say something more about the characteristics of those we consider wise that would allow us to better assess the claim that repugnance can be the expression of deep wisdom. Valerie Tiberius and Jason Swartwood (2011) use the method of wide reflective equilibrium to develop a theory of wisdom that makes no assumptions regarding the truth of any particular moral theory or theory of value. Of particular interest are their conclusions about the epistemic policies that characterize the wise. 4.7 Wisdom: a Closer Analysis Tiberius and Swartwood developed their view by examining a range of psychological research on folk intuitions about wisdom.12 The resulting folk theory was then calibrated against theoretical desiderata and research on human cognitive capacities with the goal of arriving at a rationally compelling and psychologically realistic theory of what wisdom consists of. To discover the folk conception of wisdom they conducted a literature review of personal experience and descriptor-rating studies in the psychology literature. In these studies, participants identify and describe wise people and wise acts, or they rate how related and central various characteristics are to wisdom and wise people. The analysis of this literature indicates that there are four key components to the folk concept of wisdom: deep understanding, reflective capacities, problemsolving capacities, and motivation to live well and help others live well. Wise people have a deep understanding of the practical challenges people face, the values that different people hold and how values can change, the ways values impact on practical concerns, and the emotional and intellectual challenges involved in practical success. This includes knowledge of oneself and others (motivations, emotions, habits, skills, limitations, and values), and general knowledge about the physically possible and what can count as a meaningful life. Wise people know 'what matters and can make appropriate distinctions and connections between the various things that matter in life' (Tiberius and Swartwood 2011, p. 282). Reflective capacities help the wise person develop deep understanding. Wise people assimilate information from diverse sources (personal experience, reflection, and advice from others) and can reorganize old information in new ways. They can apply abstract characterizations of problems to particular states of affairs. Reflective capacities help the wise person 'come to a comprehensive, thoughtful and accurate understanding of the nature of life's challenges and choices' (Tiberius & Swartwood 2011, p. 282). 12 We focus on the research outlined by Tiberius and Swartwood because we wish to provide an empirically based account of what is required for wisdom in response to Kass' claims-especially insofar as he bases these claims on allegedly shared responses. The theory that emerges from the examination of the empirical literature does chime with much philosophical discussion of wisdom. See, for example, Nozick 1989 and Ryan 1999. OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 07/18/2016, SPi reasons, reflection, and repugnance 69 Wise people have good problem-solving capacities where they bring their deep understanding to bear on practical problems while remaining mindful of the values at stake (their own and those of others). Practical success requires understanding and responding appropriately to both others' emotions and one's own. Finally, wise people are kind and helpful; they are motivated to choose well and to help others choose well. Importantly, the folk take both deep understanding and reflective capacities to be dynamic: A wise person is one who guides her actions by her values but also refines and reassesses her values as needed. . . . Most studies emphasise that wise people can take the long-term view of the relationship between their actions, values and priorities, can be self-critical and admit mistakes, and are open to new information that may lead them to change their values. (Tiberius and Swartwood 2011, p. 282) In other words, understanding can always be made deeper and reflective capacities can always be improved. This is because the world is constantly making new information available and our innate cognitive limitations can be mitigated. The folk therefore see wise people as good reason-responders; wise people self-monitor, train their reflective thought, and build self-understanding. Significantly, the folk also see wisdom as being inherently intersubjective. Wise people learn from others and they are motivated to help other people. Reflecting on the folk conception of wisdom, Tiberius and Swartwood argue that people need at least three policies to develop and maintain wisdom: policies of justification, epistemic humility and open-mindedness. These complementary policies can be seen as an elaboration of Jones' view. The wise person creates justificatory stories for how they have chosen to prioritize different values (from multiple perspectives) and distinguish genuine values from things that falsely appear valuable. Justifications can be challenged, developed and taught.13 By providing justificatory stories, then, the agent opens their decision-making process up to critical help from others. When providing advice, they also give the advisee some basis for discriminating good advice from bad. Epistemic humility is essential once we recognize our epistemic limitations and cognitive biases (biases that influence justificatory reasoning even in quiet moments). If our reasoning can be flawed without our realizing it then we should be prepared to revise our beliefs in the light of new information. Openmindedness is a good way to access new and potentially challenging information. The wise agent won't automatically revise their beliefs in the face of contrary views, of course, because others also suffer from cognitive limitations. Contrary views signal the need to revisit and compare justificatory stories to see which beliefs and decisions are justified. 13 Tiberius and Swartwood are alert to the fact that the agent cannot try to justify everything all the time. Rather, reflection can be undertaken in calm, cool moments and then form the basis for more automatic non-reflective decisions when required. OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 07/18/2016, SPi 70 reasons, reflection, and repugnance Tiberius and Swartwood claim the view of wisdom they offer is one that people have good reason to aspire to upon reflection, and that they can use to regulate and guide their attempts to develop wisdom and make wise choices (2011, p. 289). By grounding their theory in part in folk views of wisdom they claim to offer 'an ideal that is to some extent already ours' but one which has been refined to take account of our cognitive limitations. It is, they claim, both empirically informed and reflectively sound. 4.8 Wisdom and Repugnance Reconsidered The view of wisdom gleaned from Jones, and from Tiberius and Swartwood, has significant implications for Kass' claims about the normative authority of deep repugnance. First, Jones' analysis places clear restrictions on the role repugnance can play in latching on to considerations that count as reasons. To the extent that Kass isolates repugnance from being regulated by reflection or answerable to demands for justification, repugnance will fail to adjust to changes in the environment (or changes in the agent) that might throw it off. We may no longer have reason to avoid some things that innately elicit repugnance, and perhaps we should develop repugnance at things that don't innately elicit it. Repugnance might be reason-tracking in the moral domain, even when it conflicts with reflective thought, but only if it has been properly trained by reflective thought (and those reflective capacities themselves have been reflectively trained). Even then we should be cautious in deferring too readily to repugnance responses. The reason for this is that we should expect disgust to produce a lot of false positives-in evolutionary terms we are better safe than sorry when it comes to bad food and communicable disease. Indeed, the evolutionary history of disgust suggests that repugnance may be a particularly unreliable guide in social and moral contexts where the fear of contamination too readily attaches to designated out-groups (Kelly 2011). The data on implicit bias should worry us here. For most of us, culturally embedded unconscious associations between, for example, black skin and aggression, or homosexuality and contamination, produce negative affective responses of fear or disgust that drive judgements (particularly when we are tired or distracted) that we would, and should, reject upon reflection, even if we cannot entirely remove the affective responses themselves (Phelps et al. 2000; Dasgupta et al. 2009). On this story the appearance of repugnance should always prompt further reflection to determine whether it is reason-tracking or reason-distracting. The spotted history of moral repugnance does not support the view that even widespread repugnances are likely to be the expression of deep wisdom. Repugnance seems too unreliable to be a feature or expression of wisdom. Second, the policies of the wise identified by Tiberius and Swartwood seem to conflict with the claim that we should trust repugnance, or that the burden of argument must lie with those who do not share Kass' intuitions. A policy of epistemic OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 07/18/2016, SPi reasons, reflection, and repugnance 71 humility would encourage the agent to remain open to the possibility that their repugnance was unfounded.14 Open-mindedness encourages them to consider the views of others who do not share their feelings of repugnance. Finally, the policy of justification requires that any repugnance (or lack thereof) be justified; it cannot settle an argument on its own. Kass might argue that this conception of wisdom is mistaken. Unfortunately he does not offer an alternative account.15 Moreover, Kass cannot rely on widely shared repugnance to make his argument while rejecting the evidence for a widely shared view of wisdom that tends to undermine his claims about the wisdom of repugnance. There would need to be a good reason to convince the folk that they have a distorted view of wisdom, and that the attributes and policies of the wise should normatively defer to the deep repugnances of moral conservatives. 4.9 Conclusion Kass (1997) claims moral repugnance can alert us to threats against our fundamental human nature. However, his attempt to define and protect a static human nature is wrong-headed because the evidence supports the view that we are cultural animals whose intrinsic capacities and traits are continually shaped by our culture. Moreover, moral judgements generated by repugnance cannot be trusted to reliably track the moral truth because they are too readily influenced by morally irrelevant factors, and even the repugnances of moral conservatives have changed over time. This all suggests that moral repugnance elicited by new technologies is merely a response to the unfamiliar; at the very least, Kass owes us an argument for why it is not. Wisdom research suggests that the wise, like other experts, will rely on intuitions over reflective thought but only when those intuitions have been developed through reflection, training, and experience and are subject to reflective oversight. Therefore the normative authority of intuitions is parasitic on long-term reflective training. Repugnance is only one of many ways intuitions are generated and so, even when well trained, repugnance would only be expected to play a minor role in an account of wisdom. More central to wisdom are the policies of epistemic humility, open-mindedness, and a willingness to justify one's actions. These policies allow the wise agent to train both their affective responses and their reflective thinking to track their reasons more robustly. Such self-monitoring is essential because both the world and the agent are constantly changing so that prior training is always going out of date. 14 Epistemic humility may be consistent with challenging one's opponent to provide reasons why repugnance is not to be trusted, but it seems inconsistent with the claim that those who do not share one's repugnances bear the entire burden of proof. Humility would seem to require an acknowledgement that the request for reasons is also one that can legitimately be made of moral conservatives. 15 We do not deny that some such account might be available, but we do not see it as our task to supply him with an account. OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 07/18/2016, SPi 72 reasons, reflection, and repugnance This view of wisdom suggests that we should not rely on our starting intuitions to cast final judgements on novel technologies, including those that promise to enhance human capacities; the very novelty of those technologies entails that our intuitions will not be specifically trained to respond to them (Singer 2005). Wise decisions about how a new technology should be shaped and regulated requires reflective thought and intersubjective reasoning, and, like Emily, we often require more time and experience before we have sufficient knowledge to make our final judgement. In these cases, repugnance may alert us to the need to proceed with caution but it does not have the normative authority to end the conversation. References Arpaly, N. (2000). 'On Acting Rationally against One's Best Judgment', Ethics 110(3): 488–513. Bennett, J. (1974). 'The Conscience of Huckleberry Finn', Philosophy 49: 123–34. Bortolotti, L. (2011). 'Does Reflection Lead to Wise Choices?', Philosophical Explorations 14(3): 297–313. Crouch, S., Waters, E., McNair, R., Power, J., and Davis, E. (2014). 'Parent-Reported Measures of Child Health and Wellbeing in Same-Sex Parent Families: a Cross-Sectional Survey', BMC Public Health 14(1): 635, <http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=4082 299&tool=pmcentrez&rendertype=abstract>. Curtis, V., De Barra, M., and Aunger, R. (2011). 'Disgust as an Adaptive System for Disease Avoidance Behaviour', Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 366: 389–401. Dasgupta, N., Desteno, D., Williams, L., and Hunsinger, M. (2009). 'Fanning the Flames of Prejudice: the Influence of Specific Incidental Emotions on Implicit Prejudice', Emotion 9(4): 585–91. Dijksterhuis, A. and van Olden, Z. (2006). 'On the Benefits of Thinking Unconsciously: Unconscious Thought can Increase Post-choice Satisfaction', Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 42(5): 627–31. Doris, J. M. (2006). 'Skepticism about Persons', Philosophical Issues 19(1): 57–91. Dreyfus, H. L. (2002). 'Intelligence without Representation: Merleau-Ponty's Critique of Mental Representation: the Relevance of Phenomenology to Scientific Explanation', Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1(4): 367–83. Fazio, R. H. (2001). 'On the Automatic Activation of Associated Evaluations: an Overview', Cognition and Emotion 15: 115–41. Gallup (2015). 'Cloning', <http://www.gallup.com/poll/6028/cloning.aspx>, accessed 24 August 2015. Giubilini, A. (2015). 'What in the World is Moral Disgust?', Australasian Journal of Philosophy (September): 1–16, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00048402.2015.1070887>. Haidt, J. (2001). 'The Emotional Dog and its Rationalist Tail: a Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment', Psychological Review 108(4): 814–34. Haidt, J. (2007). 'The New Synthesis in Moral Psychology', Science 316: 998–1002. Haidt, J. (2012). The Righteous Mind: Why Good People are Divided by Politics and Religion. New York: Pantheon Books. OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 07/18/2016, SPi reasons, reflection, and repugnance 73 Haidt, J. and Bjorkland, F. (2008). 'Social Intuitionists Answer Six Questions about Moral Psychology', in W. Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.) Moral Psychology Vol. 2. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 181–218. Haidt, J. and Hersh, M. A. (2001). 'Sexual Morality: the Cultures and Emotions of Conservatives and Liberals', Journal of Applied Social Psychology 31: 191–221. Hansard, Archive (1912). 'Debate on the "Conciliation" Bill', Official Reports 5th Series Parliamentary Debates: Commons, cols 615–732, <http://www.hansard-archive.parliament. uk/Official_Report,_House_of_Commons_(5th_Series)_Vol_1_(Jan_1909)_to_Vol_1000_ (March_1981>, accessed 16 October 2015. Hutton, R. J. and Klein, G. (1999). 'Expert Decision Making', Systems Engineering 2(1): 32–45. Jagger, A. (1996). 'Love and Knowledge: Emotion in Feminist Epistemology', in A. Garry and M. Pearsall (eds), Women, Knowledge, and Reality. New York: Routledge, pp. 166–90. Jones, K. (2003). 'Emotion, Weakness of Will, and Normative Conception of Agency', Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 52: 181–200. Jones, K. (2006). 'Metaethics and Emotions Research: a Response to Prinz', Philosophical Explorations 9(1): 45–53. Kass, L. R. (1994). The Hungry Soul: Eating and the Perfecting of Our Nature. New York: Free Press. Kass, L. R. (1997). 'The Wisdom of Repugnance', The New Republic June: 17–26. Kass, L. R. (2002). Life, Liberty, and the Defense of Dignity. San Francisco: Encounter Books. Kelly, D. (2011). Yuck!: the Nature and Moral Significance of Disgust. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Kennett, J. (2011). 'Imagining Reasons', Southern Journal of Philosophy 49(Suppl. 1): 181–92. Kennett, J. (2012). 'Living with One's Choices: Moral Judgment in Vivo', in R. Langdon and C. Mackenzie (eds), Emotions, Imagination and Moral Reasoning. New York: Psychology Press, pp. 257–78. Kennett, J. and Fine, C. (2009). 'Will the Real Moral Judgment Please Stand Up ? The implications of social institutionist models of cognition for meta-ethics and moral psychology', Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12: 77–96. Lehrer, J. (2009). How We Decide. New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. Levy, N. (2009). 'Neuroethics: Ethics and the Sciences of the Mind', Philosophy Compass 4(1): 69–81. May, J. (2014). 'Does Disgust Influence Moral Judgment?', Australian Journal of Philosophy 92(1): 125–41. Nozick, R. (1989). 'What is Wisdom and Why Do Philosophers Love it So?', in R. Nozick (ed.), The Examined Life. New York: Simon and Schuster, pp. 167–278. Oaten, M., Stevenson, R., and Case, T. (2009). 'Disgust as a Disease-Avoidance Mechanism', Psychological Bulletin 135(2): 303. Phelps, E. A., O'Connor, K., Cunningham, W., Funayama, E., Gatenby, J., Gore, J., and Banaji, M. (2000). 'Performance on Indirect Measures of Race Evaluation Predicts Amygdala Activation', Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 12(5): 729–38. Prinz, J. (2006). 'The Emotional Basis of Moral Judgments', Philosophical Explorations 9: 29–43. Ryan, S. (1999). 'What is Wisdom?', Philosophical Studies 93(2): 119–39. Schnall, S., Haidt, J., Clore, G., and Jordan, A. (2008). 'Disgust as Embodied Moral Judgment', Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 34(8): 1096–109. Singer, P. (2005). 'Ethics and Intuitions', Journal of Ethics 9(3–4): 331–52. OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 07/18/2016, SPi 74 reasons, reflection, and repugnance Sommers, T. (2005). 'Jonathan Haidt Interviewed by Tamler Sommers', The Believer, <http:// www.believermag.com/issues/200508/?read=interview_haidt>, accessed 15 October 2015. Tiberius, V. and Swartwood, J. (2011). 'Wisdom Revisited: a Case Study in Normative Theorizing', Philosophical Explorations 14(3): 277–95. Wheatley, T. and Haidt, J. (2005). 'Hypnotically Induced Disgust Makes Moral Judgments More Severe', Psychological Science 16: 780–4.

FOR A NEW NATURALISM Arran Gare Swinburne University Wayne Hudson University of Tasmania Telos Press, Candor, NY, 2017. Table of Contents 1. Arran Gare and Wayne Hudson The Challenge of a New Naturalism 2. Arran Gare The Case for Speculative Naturalism 3. Wayne Hudson Speculative Naturalism, 'Theology' and 'Utopia' 4. David Macarthur Liberal Naturalism, Ordinary Things and Second-Personal Space 5 . Catherine Malabou Epigenesis of the Text: New Paths in Biology 6. Lenny Moss New Naturalism, Critical Theory and Hermeneutics 7. David Pan Intentionality and Interpretation in Biology and the Humanities 8. Maurita Harney Peirce and Phenomenological Naturalism 9. Freya Mathews Invoking the Real: from the Specular to the Ontopoetic 10. Wayne Hudson and Arran Gare Some Wider Implications of a New Naturalism 1. The Challenge of a New Naturalism Arran Gare and Wayne Hudson Contemporary naturalism is changing and scientific reductionism is under challenge from those who advocate a more comprehensive outlook, in effect, an expanded naturalism which is no longer the naturalism of the sixteenth century, a naturalism which much contemporary political and social thought still takes for granted. This volume, arising from the first Telos Australia Symposium held at Swinburne University in Melbourne, Australia, in 2014, introduces some of the key questions in the current debates. It also poses the question of whether more satisfactory political and social thought could be produced if scientific reductionism were replaced by a richer and more hermeneutical naturalism, one that takes more account of philosophical anthropology and philosophical biology, the co-involvements of human beings and their environments, and the potential of more naturalistically grounded approaches to culture. The contemporary naturalist challenge is to overcome the one sided and predominantly mechanistic naturalism coming from seventeenth century Europe. At one level, this is a philosophical issue about how best to interpret the natural sciences and the world to which they relate. At another level, it is about developing a rationalism capable of providing a basis for ethics, education and aesthetics. If our civilization continues to uncritically accept mechanistic and reductionist versions of naturalism, then it is unlikely to be able to solve the massive problems that confront it---from economic development to international security to climate change. On the other hand, if a richer and more inclusive naturalism can be developed without losing the explanatory purchase and progress characteristic of the modern natural sciences, then we may be able to overcome the agnosticism about goals and values that deforms the contemporary West. Aiming for a richer naturalism does not, of course, imply that civilized life can be made or sustained without cultural meanings that are creations rather than representations of a fixed or static natural order. Granted that cultural meanings play a crucial role, progress towards a richer naturalism can be made by recognizing the philosophical weaknesses of mechanistic and reductionist forms of naturalism, by understanding the interactions between the development of Western discourses and political and economic developments, and by taking sustained account of recent developments in the sciences which suggest that holistic perspectives that do not eliminate the human from the natural world can add explanatory power, not least in physics and biology. The approach we advocate implies that the standard separations between human experience and the natural world and between fact and value are unsound. These separations arose with the scientific revolution of the sixteenth century and became pervasive after the work of David Hume and the emergence of Kantian and neo-Kantian philosophy, with its separation of pure from practical reason. Subsequently neo-Kantians, Positivists and Logical Empiricists directed Western thought away from value-based engagement with the universe and this arguably had deleterious effects upon both human cultural development and on the environment, widely conceived to include both sentient and insentient nature. Following the rise of Kantianism and the marginalization of the natural law tradition of political, legal and ethical thought, it came to be widely accepted in liberal societies in the West that ethics and political philosophy should be founded on practical reason without recourse to claims about the natural order. The 'supernaturalism of reason' Kantians promoted was often presented as a liberation from dogmatic metaphysics, but it also encouraged a detachment from the results of the actual sciences since questions of practical reason were independent of them. Kantianism was not, of course, the only trend. At the end of the nineteenth century, for example, the British Idealists, especially T. H. Green (1836-1882), produced substantive political and social philosophy. The British Idealists lost their adherents however, in the early to mid twentieth century, partly because they failed successfully to confront Darwinian evolutionary theory and Social Darwinism. Partitional thinking also played a major role in analytical philosophy. Thus the British philosopher G.E. Moore (1873-1958) famously argued that drawing conclusions from descriptions of what is the case to conclusions about what is good involved what he called 'the naturalistic fallacy'. The Logical Positivists reformulated this opposition as the claim that there was an unbridgeable gulf between facts, the domain of objective knowledge, and values, the domain of subjective preferences. Such views were especially influential in the United States, where subliminal social Darwinism shaped political, social and economic policy after World War Two. A form of social Darwinism was also influential in the Communist world where, despite socialist rhetoric, economic formations, institutions and technology were evaluated by how successfully they facilitated the domination of nature and people. Rejecting this crude instrumentalism, most Western Marxists followed the Hungarian Marxist Györgi Lukács (18851871) and treated nature as a social category, even though a much richer approach had been advanced by the German Jewish Marxist philosopher Ernst Bloch (1885-1977). Once again there were negative consequences for social and economic thought. Many gave up criticizing economists and accepted the economists' portrayal of themselves as contributors to a positive science concerned with objective truth about what is required to regulate the economy efficiently. Subsequently Critical theory, as developed by the Frankfurt School, came to be dominated by cultural studies and later discourse ethics. Neither in the capitalist world of the West nor in the allegedly socialist East were there powerful discourses that integrated political, social and economic thought with the actual results of the sciences studying nature. There were, to be fair, contributions to natural law-based sociology and economics from Catholic philosophers, most obviously Heinrich Pesch (1854-1926), but they too were weak on the outcomes of the actual sciences, even though they sometimes invoked them at an expert level in the defense of theism and in bioethics. More recently, philosophy has continued to be relatively weak in its criticism of inadequate forms of naturalism and the sciences based on them. Some philosophical tendencies- phenomenology and hermeneutics, for example-have been critical of scientism, but until recently they have not engaged in depth with the results of the actual natural sciences. Process philosophers, to be fair, have done somewhat better, but they have been marginalized and/or ignored by most mainstream philosophers. In the late twentieth century most philosophers have carried on in social, political and ethical philosophy, and occasionally in aesthetics, as though the development of the sciences were of no relevance to their work, or have defended the cognitive claims of mainstream natural sciences and mathematics, relatively unconcerned with the implications of this way of understanding the world for humanity. Few philosophers have faced up to the demise of the humanities, their cognitive status and the values they strove to uphold. They have also offered little effective resistance to the collapse of the Humboldtian model of the university and the status it accorded the liberal arts and the humanities. Currently the ground seems to be shifting. More and more contemporary thinkers recognize the misguided nature of the Kantian turn towards representation and away from the actual natural world in which human beings are located. In addition, more and more considerations are brought to bear that arguably favor a more naturalist, but non-reductive, approach to the management of both human affairs and the environment. In this volume we seek to articulate this new naturalist challenge and to provoke discussion about its political, social and economic implications. If the natural sciences move beyond reductionism and mechanism, new perspectives open up, especially if philosophy can rise to the challenge of thinking a naturalism that does not delegitimate the agency of human beings or the importance of experiences of natural beings. Given such an enriched naturalism, it may also be possible to question the view that objective knowledge of the natural world can have no bearing on values. Rather Ernst Bloch was right to attempt to revive a radicalized version of the natural law tradition as an alternative to Western subjectivism about values and morality. Where most Western Marxists provided almost no political philosophy and only rudimentary conceptions of nature,1 Bloch called for a radicalized Aristotelianism, and revived interest in the work of Avicenna and what he called 'the Aristotelian Left'.2 He also reasserted the importance of the German philosopher Schelling (1775-1854) at a time when he was largely rejected as a mystical reactionary by Marxists. Building on these precedents, he defended a version of natural law that justified human dignity and offered hope for the future, partly because it took scientific knowledges about the nature of physical existence and human life seriously. Whether some form of natural law can be defended in contemporary terms remains to be seen, but it seems certain that only an approach that recognizes both human creativity and freedom and our location in nature will be adequate in the twenty first century. This volume contends for a new naturalism of this kind. It does not support scientific Romanticism,, but it does submit that considerations favoring a new naturalism need to be given greater prominence in contemporary critical thought, even though early formulations of such a naturalism may subsequently require reformulation or correction in various respects. 1 See Ernst Bloch, Natural Law and Human Dignity trs. Dennis J.Schmidt (Cambridge:MIT Press, 1987) and John Ely, 'Ernst Bloch, Natural Rights, and the Greens', Minding Nature: The Philosophers of Ecology, ed. David Macauley( New York: The Guilford Press, 1966), chap.6. 2Ernst Bloch, Avicenna und die Aristotelische Linke (1952) reprinted in Das Materialismus Problem Seine Geschichte und Substanz Gesamtausgabe vol 7 (Frankfurt a. M.:Suhrkamp, 1972) pp 479-546. The contributors to this volume write from a variety of political, philosophical and scientific standpoints. They all agree, however, that a civilization based on reductionist naturalism, with its impoverished understanding of both human life and the universe, is failing to generate the political and social thought we need. And they all support the need for a naturalism that is wider than the objectivating naturalism that emerged in sixteenth century Europe. The first four chapters address the contested status of naturalism in contemporary philosophy. They do not address every issue, and they do not go into the work of all of the major philosophers currently writing about this issue. They do, however, bring a range of difficult questions into view. begin, Arran Gare criticizes analytical philosophy as a form of neo-Kantianism that minimizes any role for synopsis and eliminates any role for synthesis in philosophical thinking and confuses naturalism with reductionist scientism. Drawing on the neglected work of the British philosopher C. D. Broad, he argues for a new form of speculative naturalism which gives a place to philosophers facing the challenge of developing new forms of non-reductionist science to overcome the incoherence and failures of reductionist science. Gare claims that such a richer naturalism of this sort can align science with the humanities and provide a basis for new approaches to politics, education, economics and the environment. In the third chapter Wayne Hudson raises the vexed problem of a preferentially ordered pluralism. He advocates an inclusive speculative naturalism that allows that a range of differential naturalisms may have some value. He also suggests, in a Maimonidean spirit, that this speculative naturalism can be tempered by 'theology', appropriately defined, and can contribute to a recovery of utopia on philosophical anthropological principles. In the fourth chapter David Macarthur develops an innovative liberal form of philosophical naturalism that does justice to natural non-scientific things, including people, action, art, reasons, and ordinary objects. His chapter attempts to solve the so-called 'placement problem' raised by scientific reductionism. The next chapters are concerned with theoretical developments in the sciences that arguably favor a post-reductionist naturalism, one that is not hostile to the humanities or to experience. In the fifth chapter Catherine Malabou challenges the assumption that comprehension of the constitution of cognition, organisms, or texts can only be achieved through the study of their genesis from foundations, pointing to a different form of comprehension from above their foundations, epigenesis, irreducible to genesis. Kant grappling with cognition, Waddington with embryology and Ricoeur with texts, all invoking the notion of epigenesis, are shown to have defended such comprehension, and through a comparison of their insights, what it involves is explicated. In the sixth chapter Lenny Moss provides a novel evolutionary form of philosophical anthropology, allowing for 'natural detachment', which goes some way to providing an account of the emergence of normativity within nature and so the ethical foundation that Critical theory is often alleged to lack. Then, in the seventh chapter David Pan makes erudite connections between Kant's views in the Critique of Judgement and the recent work of the cultural anthropologist Terence Deacon, work which argues, in opposition to Daniel Dennett, Richard Dawkins and Gregory Schremp, that intentionality, teleology and interpretation play a role in both biological and cultural processes. Pan defends Deacon's claims by invoking Kant's characterization of organisms. On this view, the distinctiveness of humans is their capacity to determine their own purposes, providing a basis for ethics and political philosophy. Then in the eighth chapter Maurita Harney finds resources for an alternative to reductionism in a phenomenological naturalism which takes as its point of departure Merleau-Ponty's later 'ontology of nature' and is further enriched by Peirce's semiotics. Harney advocates an ontology of nature which encompasses meaning. She draws on contemporary biosemiotics to propose a naturalist semiotic approach to mind which does not separate the human being from the natural world. Then, in the ninth Freya Matthews locates ecophilosophy, with its rejection of dualism and attempt to restore meaning, purpose, agency, will and intentionality to nature, within the speculative naturalist tradition. Matthews urges the need to move from the specular to the ontopoetic. A radical engagement with irreducible immanence is needed, she argues, one that recognizes that the problem of duality arises within discursive thinking itself. Finally, in a concluding chapter the editors summarize some of the wider implications of the volume. Clearly the ground covered is vast and the technical issues raised are many. This volume is an invitation to debate and controversy rather than the final word on matters of international importance. It signals, however, the challenge that an expanded naturalism poses to the fragmentation, pessimism and disillusion that pervades large parts of contemporary political and social thought. This thought is not well-grounded in current actual science and often explores neo-Kantian conceptions of rationality rather than the universe in which we find ourselves, whereas, in our view, political and social thought which engages with actual contemporary science offers a way beyond the vagaries of twentieth century critical theory, just as it contributes to major advances on contemporary neoliberalism. An expanded naturalism will have both philosophical and natural scientific dimensions, several of which are discussed in this volume. No one knows exactly what forms such an expanded naturalism will ultimately take. However, it is already possible to see beyond the limitations of an objectivating naturalism and this, in turn, challenges us to rethink both the scope and purport of contemporary critical thought.

ARTIFICIAL FREE WILL: THE RESPONSIBILITY STRATEGY AND ARTIFICIAL AGENTS Sven Delarivière 1. Introduction A traditional notion of free will is often pointed out to be inherently incompatible with determinism. Nonetheless, I will argue for an account of free will which is compatible with determinism. Objections have been made (e.g. Harris, 2013, 2014) that any interpretation of free will compatible with determinism would fail to capture what is attractive about it and that we should therefore simply throw the notion out our ontology. However, I will defend that a compatibilist account is "a variety of free will worth wanting" (Dennett, 2004, pp. 132). The account I will defend and the approach I take is my own, although it will be clear that Daniel Dennett's views have greatly influenced my thinking. To lay out my account of free will, I shall first perform some groundwork by defining freedom and relating that to ethics. With that groundwork, I can explicate how my account of free will fits with the two theses of free will: (i) that the agent could have done otherwise and (ii) that she is the proper source of her actions. With this account of free will, I will retrace my steps with an eye to Artificial Intelligence, hoping to show that my account of free will is not restricted to human agents. 2. Foundational Groundwork 2.1 Defining Freedom Before we plunge into any account of free will, I believe it is important to explicate the (or a) notion of freedom. Often, the notion of freedom is linked to the notion of control and I believe this link is a valuable one. However, we cannot ​equate freedom with control lest we run into infinite regress problems. If a pizza-addiction starts to get you in trouble with your health, you want to be able to control your interest in food. And if your interest in controlling your food is itself becoming unhealthy, you want to be able to control that too, but we can't (and indeed don't) require people to control their control their control and so forth ad infinitum. Freedom is a much more fruitful concept if we define it as attaining what is of value. Counterintuitively, this means that one can be free even if one can't do anything at all, as long as it is possible to attain or receive what is of value. This may seem strangely passive at first, but I believe the only worthwhile reason we consider an active component of control over passively getting what is of value is because control is generally more effective to that purpose. This same wisdom is captured in the famous idiom "If you give a man a fish, he will eat for a day, but if you teach him how to fish, he will eat for a lifetime." After all, the world is not static and certainly not designed to keep us safe and happy. Therefore, it would be beneficial to one's freedom to be designed to have capacities of keeping yourself safe and happy. However, it is important to mention that we only consider these active capacities to the extent that a certain valuable state is, or could be, in danger of faltering ​without any active involvement. For instance, as long as fish are expected to be plentiful (seemingly infinite in supply), no addition to the idiom will be made about teaching a man to breed or, more drastically, create fish. Attaining what is of value, then, is at its stablest and most effective via a capacity to achieve what is of value. This stops the infinite regress we got by defining freedom in terms of control. We can't have control ad infinitum, but we can have control ad bonum. What is undesirable about addiction is becoming insensitive to what is of value to us. It is only to the extent that our lack of sensitivity and control may make us less capable of achieving that which is of value that we consider it important to our freedom. Consequently, the requirement for freedom to be uninvolved with determinism ("free from determinism") has no place in our demands for a variety of free will worth wanting unless it stops us from attaining what is of value. In fact, without determinism, it is hard to see how one can have a reliable capacity to (re)act appropriately in any situation. 2.2 Ethics Since we have defined freedom as the ability to achieve what is of value, and considering morality is a mode of conduct concerned with that achievement, it should be of no surprise that morality and free will are deeply connected. If our choices bear no consequences of any actual (or perceived) value (to you or anyone else), it would be hard to call them free in any appropriate sense. We rightfully call a vote in a rigged election an illusion of choice despite our ability to vote with no one forcing us to choose one party over the other. If it doesn't effectuate any valuable (actual/perceived/possible) difference, then any difference it does effectuate we would only call freedom because of an abstract but entirely useless conception of the term. It is my contention that, for free will (and morality in general), all significant moral arguments are either directly or indirectly ​utilitarian in nature. What this means is that right and wrong are considerations of consequences, and that morality consists of the efficient (though complex) moral strategies we employ to shape consequences into those that are of value. (Singer, 2011; Franklin, 1968) What I called "moral strategies" are the (attempted) ways to increase what is of value in a community of subjects. Which strategy is to be employed depends on its cost-effectiveness, where cost stands for both the harm it does and the difficulty of deploying it. The efficacy of each strategy varies with the dispositions of its target. Some such strategies are: destruction, isolation, punishment or reward. To the extent that an agent's intentions determine her actions, she can be the proper target of the most cost-effective moral strategy: the responsibility strategy (coined here). Its use is justified by the efficacy of people's ability to respond to moral reactive attitudes (and their anticipation) and/or realizing the rationale for the strategy. In short, this means being able to respond positively to being held responsible, be it for emotional reasons or by seeing the moral utility in being held responsible. Consequently, simply sharing the rationale for acting (or refraining from acting) would, when possible, be the most cost-effective strategy. 3. Could Have Done Otherwise 3.1 Analysis of Can and Otherwise With the groundwork behind us, I believe we can tackle the two thesis of free will and their relation to determinism more adequately. The first thesis of free will requires the ability to could have done otherwise (henceforth CHDO). This does not seem to be allowed by determinism since a determined agent can only do what it is determined to do. However, the argument stands or falls with what is required of "can" in "could have done otherwise". Let me first point out that notions like "abilities", "otherwise" and "similarity" are all of a higher ontological category. We are not defining abilities (e.g. playing golf), circumstances (e.g. wind) or identities (e.g. Austin) as one specific configuration at the physical level. (Dennett, 2004) They are informal predicates. Although vague and subjective, they don't cause any unusual problems. (Dennett & Taylor, 2002) When we say something is possible or could have happened, Dennett (2004; Dennett & Taylor, 2002) says we are talking about a subset of possible worlds that are microscopically different from ours. When Austin, upon missing his putt in a round of golf, says "I could have holed the putt", we should interpret this statement as meaning there exists a subset of at least one similar world (very like our world, but not quite) in which Austin (the entity with the same identity predicate) does hole the putt. If the similarity of possible words is overly limited, we would only be considering identical worlds and thus identical outcomes. If the differences are too strong (say we take a different golf course or an Austin with some additional years of practicing), it would deviate from the initial meaning, but somewhere in between (say we drop the wind-rate by just a fraction or take an Austin who didn't just get distracted by a sinister thought) works just fine. (Dennett & Taylor, 2002) One of the important features of a relevant subset of CHDO is that its (relevant) informal predicates are obtainable in ​this world. What we need is a way to bridge the actual world into the possible worlds. A person chained to a desk could leave in possible worlds where he isn't (Fischer, 2005), so what is the relevant link to the actual world to be allowed to hold the person responsible for it? My answer to this lies in the efficacy of a moral strategy. We can also put this differently and say that a moral strategy is justified because it itself a condition for a desired otherwise. The thing counterfactuals point to are which dispositions can be reached and in what manner (by which strategy). Some people, like Jerry Coyne and (to some extent) Harris, object to counterfactual freedom and call it flimsy because it is scientifically untestable. (Harris, 2012) However, I don't believe that is an entirely fair assessment, as science deals with counterfactuals all the time. Without counterfactuals, we couldn't even say that a car can reach 50 km/h unless it is driving 50km/h at the moment we say it. (Dennett, 2014) ​Nonetheless, counterfactuals are admittedly abstract and difficult to chart. What we need is something that we can treat as evidence for counterfactual competence or excusing circumstances. I don't have any sure-proof suggestions, but I also don't believe it is entirely necessary, to lay out a demarcation-criteria before I am justified in saying we can distinguish, for instance, having missed a putt for a lack of trying and because someone has messed with the golf-clubs. 3.2 CHDO for Free Will With counterfactuals, we have a meaningful interpretation of CHDO, but further requirements must be satisfied before we consider a can as a freely willed can. Among the relevantly similar conditions for CHDO, there is only a limited set of conditions that justify a responsibility strategy and (hence) classifying the subject as freely willed. The relevant subset of counterfactual, but obtainable conditionals for free will is, I will argue, ​reasons-responsiveness​. Something most accounts of free will have in common is a role, be it central or peripheral, for human reason. An agent isn't freely willed or morally responsible if her actions weren't either directly or indirectly subject to deliberate(d) choices. A deliberate choice is a one which is preceded by a chain of reasoning, a process of deliberation or, quite simply, a ​reason​. Not just any kind of reason (a bird catches its prey for reasons of survival), but an "explicit" reason that requires a higher-level intentional stance. Deliberate choices and "explicit" reasons (though they may be based on desires, values or reasoning alone) are the features of a deliberator, a higher-intentional system, "capable of framing beliefs about its own beliefs, desires about its desires, beliefs about its fears about its thoughts about its hopes, and so on." (Dennett, 1997, p. 354) A higher-intentional system is "equipped to notice-and analyze, criticize, analyze, and manipulatethe fundamental parameters that determine its policies of heuristic search or evaluation" (Dennett, 1997, p. 354) in its quest to achieve what is of value. Based on the information about the world and the agent itself in it, it is possible to (though not perfectly) anticipate and assess the consequences of future courses of (in)actions. Essentially, the agent actively tries to act so as to secure a desired future through its own knowledge and evaluations. 1 Because a deliberator looks towards the future and assesses its courses of action, an appropriate moral strategy will address this capacity. The choices of humans are distinguishable from (most) animal choices by their remarkable sensitive to even minor revisions of societal norms. (Dennett, 2004) This, I believe, is what makes the responsibility strategy such an effective and distinct strategy peculiar to humans. Since there is, to some extent, a relation (or mesh) between an agent's reason and actions, deliberations are a stable way to estimate future actions (Harris, 2012) and thus the most effective (least harmful) focus of judgement. Furthermore, deliberations or reasons are shareable, which opens up the possibility of a responsibility strategy that can give responsibility (share an obligation) on the basis of its rationale (anticipated consequences of value) and/or the promise of blame and praise alone. Agents are excused if there is no violation of obligation and exempted if there is no general capacity to understand or comply with the obligations. (Coates & McKenna, 2015b) It would not be appropriate or justified (meaning, under my account, effective) to blame an agent that lacks the power to recognize and act on the moral reasons supporting the obligation. (Haji, 2002) Reason is effective as capacity for freedom (attaining what is of value). Unfortunately that relation is not so straightforward. If it were, a mesh between the perfect light of reason and behaviour would suffice. But reason is a tool. It matters very much how you use it and how you are able to use it rather than just whether you used it at all. ​Reasons-responsiveness​, a term by Fischer and Ravizza, is a form of control where a sensitivity to reasons aids in acquiring what is of value. (Russell, 2002) Fischer and Ravizza call an agent free if she is receptive to some range of rational considerations (arising from and subject to evaluation, adjustment and monitoring) and able to react or respond to those considerations in the control of her conduct. (Coates & McKenna, 2015a, 2015b) Thus an agent is responsible if the action comes from the reasons-responsiveness of her own mechanism. (Fischer & Ravizza, 2000) I shall elaborate on "own mechanism" later. Fischer and Ravizza (2000) also address the relation between reasons-responsiveness and responsibility. Too strong a responsiveness to reason would be too tight a fit for morality whereas too weak a reasons-responsiveness would be too loose. There must be an appropriate pattern and regularity in the reasons-responsive mechanism. (Fischer & Ravizza, 2000; Russell, 2002) An agent needn't respond to all good reasons to act otherwise (Matilda might not stop 1 This includes, incidentally, actions that improve the agent's anticipations and assessments. dancing for even €100), but does need to respond to a rich pattern of reasons in a coherent (Matilda shouldn't arbitrarily change her policy on when she'll stop dancing), rational (Matilda should only stop dancing for a certain amount of money or more) and sane (Matilda shouldn't only stop dancing for precisely €92,35) pattern. (Coates & McKenna, 2015b) An agent is moderately reasons-responsive if it is regularly, and with an understandable pattern, receptive to a range of reasons and (at least) weakly reactive to those reasons. These points bear some separation in my account. First of all, these are to be approached as considerations for moral strategies. What they point out is that there are ranges to which the responsibility strategy will be effective and/or costly depending on what reasons the agent will respond to. Secondly, it is important that the strategy does no more harm than it saves or than is appropriate. Being too demanding, for instance, might not be sufficiently more helpful and even counterproductive than being a little demanding. Thirdly, due to a lack of counterfactual evidence in every isolated case, it is only if the agent's range of (possible) responses constitutes a coherent, rational and sane pattern that can we justify a modest generalization of the agent's ability to be responsible to similar cases. Fischer and Ravizza (2000) also focus heavily on regularities of range of responsiveness in the actual sequence of history, whereas I think it is more important to emphasize counterfactuals and see regularities or patterns as evidence of those. I believe the counterfactual analysis highlights both the purpose of finding these regularities as well as incorporates the need for evidence of responsiveness that has or could not yet have manifested. For free will and the responsibility strategy specifically, the relevant subset of counterfactual, but obtainable conditionals is the capacity for more explicit, recursive anticipation and deliberation as the cause of conduct. But only to the extent that counterfactuals highlight that a responsibility strategy can make use of that capacity. 4. Source Origination We are now ready to move on to the second thesis of free will, which demands that the origin of a choice be with the agent and is relevantly theirs. 4.1 Ultimacy Under determinism, every action has a cause. If we want to dole out responsibility, the buck must stop somewhere along the chain of causes. The ​Source Incompatibilist Argument states that a person acts of her own free will only if she is the ultimate source of her actions, which, under determinism, is impossible since we can regress the causes (and thus the buck) back infinitely up till the beginning of the universe. (Coates & McKenna, 2015a) The argument relies on the notion of ​Ultimate Responsibility​, a term coined by Robert Kane, which asserts that an agent is ultimately responsible for what she did (when she could have done otherwise) if she is the sufficient cause of that action or choice. (Dennett & Taylor, 2002) What fuels the demand for ultimate responsibility is the promise of an ​essentialist​ regress-stopper. Nothing forces our hand to accept only essentialist regress-stoppers. We all need a little room for practice to be a self, to form it through continuous self-evaluation. Actions that, after immediate self-evaluation, are subject to systematic revision cannot relevantly be said to contain the agent's intentions. Gradually, less and less of an agent's actions will have passed through without self-evaluation. The agent's actions will become ​her actions because a mesh will unfold itself that enables a reliable assessment of the agent's actions with her intentions. So, the gradualist can also subscribe to a notion of self-forming acts , gradually making up a 2 person who is self-formed enough to not need to trace the cause of her actions beyond her. Even snap judgements won't necessarily be without deliberative force. They can be "remarkably sensitive to myriad features of [the agent's] world that have conspired over time to create [her] current dispositional state." (Dennett, 2004, p. 116) The more a self is formed, the less deliberation it'll require for its purposes and the more (and quicker) it can reveal a self whose decisions are her decisions, making her a proper target for a moral strategy. Causal inquiry is about causally necessary macroscopic conditions, not just the causes which have no further causes. Moral inquiry is interested in which of these causes is an effective target to employ a strategy on, not just the first cause. There is thus no need for one essential cause to stop an infinite regress. The responsibility bucks stop with the causes that are reasons-responsive, meaning the deliberate choice (or its avoidance) of an agent for which the relevant consequences can be predicted. Each and every one of the deliberate choices made that can reasonably anticipate consequences is subject to a responsibility strategy. An important point that might get lost in the imagery of buck-stopping is that responsibility bucks aren't singular, stopping at the first link in the chain or even shared across the responsible causes. Responsibility is attributed to all the causes that are effectively susceptible to the responsibility strategy. If Lee Harvey Oswald tells a friend of his plan to shoot the president and his friend aids him by giving him a gun to do it, then that friend is not sharing part of the responsibility, but getting his own separate responsibility. So several bucks might stop at several places and they're about as large a buck as their stopping someplace is effective as a moral strategy. Usually, that means they'll gradually die out in importance because anticipating long-term consequences are quite hard and agents need to be self-formed enough to have their deliberations be theirs. The responsibility strategy is used or distributed among the chain of causal necessity as far back as the responsibility strategy is useful. 4.2 Boundaries of an Agent There is one last concern I wish to deal with and that's how to demarcate the proper target of the responsibility strategy. If a little homunculus or neurological device infiltrated your brain and started to pull your muscles (or your reasons) in a certain way, it would be both physically and functionally inside your system and contribute to your dispositions. Yet we wouldn't call them yours. The reason why, I think, is because there's reason for dividing two mechanisms and assessing them separately. How we divide into mechanisms will be a pragmatic concern. If a neurological device cannot be detached from the rest of the brain, then there is no pragmatic reason to divide the two. Generally, we'll assess people's choices as the output of their one and only mechanism (the brain), though I think there are exceptions; the neurological device or tumours for instance. If a newly-grown tumour stands in the way of being reasons-responsive, it makes sense to divide the brain into two mechanisms and address the one that's causing problems. If there is no imaginable way to relevantly separate the two physically, we wouldn't say there was any asymmetrical moral considerations about responsibility because the reasons of the composited 2 Another term by Kane, but used by him to describe an undetermined choice amongst a determined agent's dilemma. ("Robert Hilary Kane", n.d.) mechanisms were inseparably "hers". If we can physically (and morally) separate the parts, we (at least hypothetically) do so, if we can't, we don't both in demarcating others as agents and ourself (or our self). Conversely, it is permissible to unify into mechanisms when it makes sense to. You might speak of several different mechanisms in your brain working together to produce your actions, but in most cases, there's absolutely no theoretical need or practical possibility to separate them. As far as we care then, they are a reliable part of the entity because they can't or won't be separated. If mechanisms work together to create a more reasons-responsive entity with a richer or better variety of alternate possibilities, then the division becomes unnecessary in theory and morally wrong in practice. They compose one larger mechanism, one agent. The point about ownership has to do with finding the proper target of a moral strategy. Once we have found the target(s), we can assess its dispositions and role in the causal chain to pick a moral strategy as a response. When we excuse people from responsibility because they were manipulated or mediated, it is only to the extent that their reasons-responsiveness was either inhibited by another mechanism, altogether absent or insufficiently formed to be reliably considered as their stamp on the world. However, as long as there is a reliable connection with other mechanisms, they may be combined (e.g. the brain). In that case it is the combination, as one agent that is reasons-responsive and the combination that is justifiably held responsible to the extent that the combination can now respond to the responsibility strategy. If, conversely, the part(s) are freer than their whole, we divide them so that a moral strategy can attempt to target its parts instead. 6. Artificial Source Origination I have now given a compatibilist reading of the both theses of free will that set up a free will worth wanting. In principle, there appear to me to be no worthwhile objections to an artificial agent satisfying these conditions, meaning that the same points about free will likewise apply to the appropriate AI. Allow me to, in broad terms, apply it. ​To begin, let's consider the second thesis of source origination in an artificial context. This requirement demanded that the origin of a choice or intention lies inside the agent. With Artificial Intelligence it seems reasonable to ask: who do the intentions belong to? When can we say something or someone has intentions? Dennett (2009) has given a clear answer to this question. Attributing a person or a system with an intention is part of taking an intentional stance​: utilizing a useful level of abstraction (with its own ontological categories) to explain certain kinds of behaviour. From this stance, we treat the designated entity as an agent with beliefs, intentions and enough rationality to do what it was designed to of those beliefs and desires. The concepts of this stance (beliefs, desires, rationality) make its behaviour both predictable and explanatory. (Dennett, 1997) A thermostat could be said to be an agent, since it is fruitful to speak of its actions in terms of a belief about the room temperature and a desire to achieve a different one. Admittedly, in the case of thermostats such a fanciful anthropomorphism is a bit unnecessary. However, with systems of sufficient complexity an intentional stance becomes indispensable (from our human perspective) for successful interaction. Taking an intentional stance towards our fellow creatures is what we do each time we attribute intentions, beliefs to what we consider to be (limitedly) rational agents. (Dennett, 2009) Dennett goes on to make the crucial argument that the difference between an intentional system and any other system is not a special metaphysical tag that distinguishes "real" intentions from imagined ones. "To seek a clean distinction between some metaphysically authentic intentional beings and simulacra like thermostats presupposes that there is more to any intentional system than adopting a stance toward it as an intentional system." (Coates & McKenna, 2015a) Deciding which stance to take depends and is justified solely by its practical efficacy. Lady Ada Lovelace wrote of computers that they "ha[ve] no pretension to originate anything. It can do whatever we know how to order it to perform" (cited in Turing, 1950/1985). Turing (1950/1985) reframed the objection to whether a machine can "take us by surprise" and this they most certainly can. Nonetheless, the critic insists that the surprise reflects no credit to the machine, but to the creativity of our own minds. Machines can't, in principle, surprise us because they can't do anything "really new". (Oppy & Dowe, 2011; Turing, 1950/1985) Bringsjord (2001) ​defends Lovelace on the same ground. Software doesn't always do what it is intended or what we expect it to, but only he insists because we're not smart enough. He says a computer program can only take it "upon itself to originate something" (p. 5) if it can reliable repeat an action (to rule out malfunctions) for which it was not programmed and which cannot be explained by even the designer by appeal to the program's "architecture, knowledge-base, and core functions" (p. 12). The reader will be reminded of the source origination objections to free will. Winograd & Flores (1990) likewise defend the notion that a computer cannot originate anything. They argue that any program is a mere intermediary medium to the commitment (intentions) and responsibility of the programmer. This objection is analogous to the infinite regress of causation that troubled us with our own intentions. Here it is assumed that humans stop the regress of commitment, but they never do clear up how humans originate any such commitments. Only if one starts from the premise that humans are not determined, does this argument hold any weight. Since I have built my account of free will on the basis of determinism, this argument simply doesn't apply. As I have argued before, the infinite regress can be stopped. Not through a single unpredictable act over which we have no meaningful control, but through the gradual acquirement of the, necessary causal, reasons that are internal and stable enough to warrant a reliable intentional stance towards the system. Both creator and creation play their own causal role in the events. Dennett (1997) clarifies where the originative credit is due by example of the computer chess-program ​Deep Blue​. Its behaviour is sufficiently complex and systematically purposeful to warrant an intentional stance. When Deep Blue beat world chess champion Garry Kasparov, it was "Deep Blue's sensitivity to those purposes and a cognitive capacity to recognize and exploit a subtle flaw in Kasparov's game that explain Deep Blue's success" (​Dennett, 1997, p. 352) and not the designer's. The designers do, of course, play a necessary causal and intentional role in Deep Blue's cognitive capacity. However, congratulating the designers is much like congratulating the educators or parents of (or the process of natural selection leading to) Kasparov, his human opponent. (Dennett, 1997) Though that is certainly justified, it doesn't take away Kasparov's credit as a world chess champion. The sequence of winning moves was found by Deep Blue. So it were Deep Blue's reasons and Deep Blue's intentions that are a (though not the only) proper target of using an intentional stance. If Deep Blue was capable of appreciating praise, we would justifiably deploy that strategy. Deep Blue's capacities are not wide enough to qualify as morally responsible, but they are strong enough to qualify as the originative winner of the match. For an action to be up to a system, the necessary cause needs to have been its internal programming (psychology), regardless of how it came to be that way. As soon as the intentional stance proves its effectiveness, a moral strategy will make use of it and regard the intentions as those of the system's rather than mediate it to another (though it might do that as well). With regard to the responsibility strategy, distinguishing responsibility from mediated responsibility requires nothing other than where the reasons-responsive buck stops (and doesn't). 7. Artificial CHDO A computer system can be the relevant causal source of an event, but that doesn't give it free will yet. The first thesis of free will required that the agent possessing free will has the ability to could have done otherwise, and for ​reasons​. I will argue that, provided a system has some capacity to learn, they have a range of otherwises at their disposal. 7.1 Artificial Otherwises To consider the importance of learning, I'd like to address another objection to AI: ​the Argument of Informality of Behaviour​. Turing (1980/1985) described the argument of informality of behaviour thusly: "It is not possible to produce a set of rules purporting to describe what a man should do in every conceivable set of circumstances." (p. 65) Any set of circumstances without the proper rules for responding would result in errors. To retort, Turing points to a confusion between "rules of conduct", stipulating precepts which can be followed consciously (e.g. stopping for a red light) and "laws of behaviour", which are laws that regulate our bodies (including our brains). It is the latter that are of importance to produce AI and, since we are at least near-determined, there is insufficient cause to say there are no such laws for human beings. (Turing, 1950/1985) I would personally like to add to Turing's remarks that the argument of informality of behaviour misconstrues how intelligence works. I could see how having a ready rule for every exact situation could allow for the most intelligent response in each. However, not only would that be a ludicrous demand, it doesn't solve how it was determined to be the most intelligent response. On top of that, it doesn't correspond to what we call intelligence. It is the mark of intelligence that it can operate even under circumstances for which there is no ready solution or stipulated rule of conduct. While it is true that some behaviour and even elements of representation can be wired-in, others must be learned. (Dennett, 1993) A certain amount of plasticity should be admitted to allow the system the room for trial and error, in actuality and deliberation (imagined anticipation), to deal with novel situations. However, by what system can intelligent responses be evaluated ​to​ learn? There is a prevalent evaluation system already in place in the world. Agents who lack self-persistence and whose interaction with the environment are less than ideal are ill favoured by natural selection. The (implicit) reward of receiving a non-negative evaluation by natural selection is to live and to reproduce. Perdijk (2014) calls this generational evaluation because the evaluation can only occur by terminating the agent or obstructing reproduction. Mutations that provide beneficial behaviour can be considered, in a broad sense of the word, to be learned across generations. It is not the agent, but the species that learns through natural selection. With regards to moral strategies, there seems little room beside isolation or destruction in this case. A degree of plasticity in the brain with an (even limited amount) of capacity to be punished or rewarded allows agents to learn traits in their own lifetime (we called this post-natal design fixing). For that we need an evaluative reward mechanism inside the agent. The active role of pain and pleasure, regardless of discussions regarding their subjective force, are obvious here. (Dennett, 1993) For now, we haven't yet strayed beyond an artificial reactive agent with some parameter-adjustment of set rules for behaviour that correspond to set rules of conduct. Better agents would be able to redesign themselves depending on the conditions they encounter. (Dennett, 1993) This is the case with state-determined agents, whose actions can also be driven by remembered (or, with sufficient complexity, expected) reward and punishment. (Perdijk, 2014) Natural selection is now at work at both the level of the species and at the level of the agent, the latter of which Perdijk (2014) calls lifetime evaluation. In this case, it can learn through non-fatal encounters that are still subject to actual or anticipated punishment or reward. With a sufficiently complex state-determined agent, anticipations of complex compositions of expectable situations it hasn't (yet) encountered can prepare an agent's responses. Once flexible state-determined systems are allowed, we may consider CHDO. Dennett (2004; Dennett & Taylor, 2002) uses the example of a chess program to illustrate it. Let's say the pivotal move in a game of the program, the necessary cause of its downfall, was a failure to castle. It would be meaningful to ask whether the program could have castled or not. Castling is a legal move, sure, but the question is whether it was within the program's dispositional repertoire to castle. Our chess program is determined, so looking at the conditions exactly as they were would be uninformative because its actual outcome in those precise circumstances will have always been the same. However, wiggling the events will show whether it was a remote, big or no possibility for the program. If we find that a relevant subset of similar conditions the chess program does castle, then there is a meaningful sense in which we say the program could have castled. (Dennett & Taylor, 2002) It is in that sense that we assess the program's capacity to play chess. 7.2 Artificial Reasons-Responsiveness Learning is not only necessary for intelligence, but for free will as well. An agent can only respond to a responsibility strategy if it can act, or learn to act, otherwise in accordance with a moral rationale (or moral attitude) that is transmissible. This is what I have earlier called the right kind of CHDO. Computers, as we currently know them, have their hardware designed to start out empty and accept universal software. So the interchangeability of software in current computer systems allows for horizontal learning. And indeed, if all that stands between an Android murdering and not murdering is a software-update, such a moral strategy would be effective. Nevertheless, such a strategy is not quite a responsibility strategy. Though there is a similarity between the mind's software and that of computers, our minds do not start out empty. Nor is our software as universal or efficiently shareable as that of computers. It is, however, much easier to work with in another sense. Computer-software has to be strenuously programmed before it can be shared. Programming languages make this a great deal easier and more intuitive, but not quite as effective as communication between two ordinary human adults. Communication (and instruction) between two human adults can be incredibly fast, flexible and pervasive in sharing its content because it is subject to a recursive (self-)control structure as well as a high amount of software-interconnectedness to maximize the effect. One meme can change someone's entire mind. A single piece of software has no such (functionally efficient) effect on other software. Part of the problem, I believe, is answered by having a recursive self-control structure. A single piece of information can be broadcasted (made famous) and looped around to great effect. However, to be able to do that, software needs to also be highly interconnected. If a piece of recursive reasoning can't affect anything beyond reasoning, it wouldn't do much good. The rationale must be captured by the whole (or relevant parts) of the system. To recognize a rationale (in most cases) requires a complex assessment of the world and one's own actions in it. A freely willed AI should not only be able to make decisions that it leaves to 3 natural selection to evaluate, but be able to evaluate those decisions itself through complex anticipation that is itself subject to evaluation. It should be able to take an intentional stance towards itself. It should treat itself as a moral agent, evaluate its own behaviour and its own selection of behaviour. A self-symbol, sometimes suggested as a requirement for self-consciousness, would not suffice to acquire a virtual captain, because the self needs to be sophisticated (a system rather than a single symbol) and functional enough to be utilized as such. (Hofstadter, 1999) In short, it needs to be a higher-intentional system. As a higher-intentional system, it can make predictions about the environment, its own behaviour and its own predictions. And most importantly, it can then evaluate each of those for accuracy and desirability, broaden its epistemic horizon and recognize the rationales (positive consequences) of complex actions. This is why moral strategies focus heavily on training and holding people responsible to stretch the epistemic horizon of their choices, to take responsibility. Whatever intentions (and consequences) cannot (reasonably) be captured by the self-narrative cannot be a target of a responsibility strategy since its scope only stretches the length of obtainable otherwises that are within the (reasonable) epistemic horizon of the system. Capturing a rationale, of the kind required for free will, requires not only its recognition, but that it can be moved or taught via the rational persuasion of either others or of itself. Essentially what we need is a recursive (self-)control structure. If a system can make reliable use of a rationale through its recursive self-control, then we are permitted to say it has captured it. Then its anticipations of its own actions and consequences can be used to better effectuate its own behaviour by having reasons (subject to revision) for its actions. Through this process, the higher-intentional system can form a better self. To the extent that it can do that, it can respond to the challenges of moral responsibility. At least, if there is a form of communication that can access the agent's self. Communication may be in whatever language. It may be visual, 3 There is an interesting elucidation of reasons‐responsiveness by linking it with leading theories of consciousness such as Baars' (2001) Global Workspace Theory, but the elucidation of this connection is beyond the need and scope of this paper. auditory, or whatever sense an agent has at its disposal as long as it does the trick of spreading the rationale. What is of crucial importance to a responsibility strategy is the ability to share the anticipations, evaluations and rationales that have an effect on how the system anticipates, evaluates and teaches itself. If it can do that, the system should be able to actually (or limitedly counterfactually) respond to instructions by being able to recognize and respond to a rationale behind an instruction, be reasons-responsive, and thus a fit subject to employ a responsibility strategy to. 8. Kludged Free Will If we want to assess an AI with free will, we do have to make sure that what we are seeing is evidence of the machine's sophisticated mechanism of recursive control, not the illusion of it offered by kludges. ​A kludge is computer jargon for a trick, a short-cut for computers to appear cleverer or more complex than they actually are. (Sharples et al, 1994) Examples of kludges are canned expressions of emotional responses that get attached at appropriate moments. However, as Dennett (1997) points out, "many of our own avowals of emotion are like that insincere moments of socially lubricating ceremony" (p. 361) Therefore, I believe kludge to be a useful term for humans, animals and computers alike. We are very susceptible to attributing complex inner lives whenever we see the opportunity for it. There is a now famous example of a vice president of a computer company stumbling upon a version of the kludge-program ELIZA and mistaking it for a Teletype connected to an employee's residence, whom he believed to be deliberately evasive to the crucial questions put to him. (Güzeldere & Franchi, 1995) It usually takes some extra effort to realize nobody's really home. Nonetheless, many of these kludges, exactly because they are limited to short-cuts, can be found out by their lack of sophistication or (reason-)responsiveness. I believe it is kludges most specifically that are of primary concern in the scepticism of artificial intelligence. The concern, I believe, is that all AI will be little more than a bag of kludges, sufficient to give the appearance of conscious intelligence, but insufficient in its devices to replicate the actual property. This certainly appears to be a justified scepticism with regards to current AI, but I don't believe this concern should be made inherent to its endeavours. Since we are more familiar with the evidence for real or kludged reason with humans, they are sometimes easier to find out than those of artificial intelligent systems which may be designed in numerous ways. However, a kludge will always betray itself in performance or it wouldn't be a kludge. Something is not a kludge just because it is "programmed that way", but because it appears to be (programmed for) doing something more complex than it is actually doing. Should the devices succeed in replicating sufficient complexity of consciousness, then it is the property, and not just the appearance, that it has replicated. ​A sophisticated recursive (self)control structure, capable of capturing, receiving and executing rationales would constitute reasons-responsiveness and thus allow the counterfactual assessment of abilities which we use to determine free will. 9. Conclusion I have argued that free will is a property attributed to an agent which can respond to a specific utilitarian moral strategy: the responsibility strategy. To employ a utilitarian moral strategy, we must begin by considering whether an agent is a proper cause for an action that could have been otherwise. Evidence for this benefits from a counterfactual analysis of the agent's dispositions, making for a meaningful interpretation of "could have done otherwise". If the difference causing the otherwise is reasons-responsiveness, then this points to the efficacy of the responsibility strategy and thus the agent's free will. The internal psychology or programming of an agent, regardless of how it acquired it, makes a system a reliable target to attribute the intentions subject to a moral strategy. A system capable of learning opens up a range of obtainable otherwises. Being able to learn behaviour via horizontally shared rationales, acquired by others or itself makes a responsibility strategy effective. At least, if there is enough interconnectedness of software for rationales to have a responding effect. Evidence of this counterfactual ability will be the right kind of "could have done otherwise" for responsibility. Reference List Baars, B . J. (2001). In The Theatre of Consciousness: The Workspace of the Mind​. New York: Oxford University Press. Bringsjord, S. (2001). ​Creativity, the Turing Test, and the (Better) Lovelace Test. ​Minds and Machines​, 11, 3-27. Retrieved from http://kryten.mm.rpi.edu/lovelace.pdf Coates, D. J., & McKenna, M. (2015a). ​Compatibilism. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), ​The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2015 ed.)​. Retrieved from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/​ (22/09/15) Coates, D. J., & McKenna, M. (2015b). Compatibilism: State of the Art. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), ​The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2015 ed.​). Retrieved from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/supplement.html​ (22/09/15) Dennett, D. C. (1997). ​When Hal Kills, Who's to Blame? Computer Ethics. In D. G. Stork (Ed.), Hal's Legacy: 2001's Computer as Dream and Reality (​pp. 351-365). Cambridge: MIT Press. Dennett, D. C. (2004). ​Freedom Evolves​. London: Penguin Books. Dennett, D. C. (2009).​ Intentional Systems Theory.​ (n.p.). Retrieved from http://www.lscp.net/persons/dupoux/teaching/QUINZAINE_RENTREE_CogMaster_2011-12/Bloc _philo/Dennet_2009_intentional_systems.pdf Dennett, D. C. (2014). ​Reflections on FREE WILL. ​[Review of the book Free Will, by S. Harris]. Retrieved from ​http://www.samharris.org/blog/item/reflections-on-free-will Dennett, D. C., & Taylor, C. (2002). Who's Afraid of Determinism? Rethinking Causes and Possibilities. In R. Kane (Ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will ​(pp. 257-277). New York: Oxford University Press. Fischer, J. M. (2005).​ Reply: The Free Will Revolution. ​Philosophical Explorations​, 8(2), 145-156. Fischer, J. M., & Ravizza, M. (2000). Précis of Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility. ​Philosophy and Phenomenological Research​, 61(2), 441-445. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/2653660 Franklin, R. L. (1968). ​Freewill and Determinism: a Study of Rival Conceptions of Man​. London: Routledge and Kegan. Güzeldere, G., & Franchi, S. (1995). Dialogues with Colorful "Personalities" of Early AI. Stanford Humanities Review​, 4(2), 161-169. Retrieved from http://www.stanford.edu/group/SHR/4-2/text/dialogues.html#note10 Haji, I. (2002). ​Compatibilist Views of Freedom and Responsibility. In R. Kane (Ed.), ​The Oxford Handbook of Free Will ​(pp. 202-228). New York: Oxford University Press. Harris, S. (2012).​ Free WIll​. New York: Free Press. Harris, S. (2014). ​The Marionette's Lament: A Response to Daniel Dennett [Blogpost]. Retrieved from ​http://www.samharris.org/blog/item/the-marionettes-lament Hofstadter, D. R. (1999).​ Gödel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid​. New York: Basic Books. Oppy, G., & Dowe, D. (2011). The Turing Test. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.) ​The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2011 ed.)​. Retrieved from ​http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/turing-test/ Perdijk, N. (2014). ​Artificial Reward and Punishment: Grounding Artificial Intelligence Through Motivated Learning Inspired by Biology and the Inherent Consequences for the Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence​. MA-Thesis, University of Utrecht. Russell, P. (2002). Pessimists, Pollyannas, and the New Compatibilism. In R. Kane (Ed.), ​The Oxford Handbook of Free Will​ (pp. 229-256). New York: Oxford University Press. Sharples, M. et al (1994)​. ​Computers and Thought: A Practical Introduction to Artificial Intelligence. ​Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Singer, P. (2011). ​The Expanding Circle: Ethics, Evolution, and Moral Progress. ​Princeton: Princeton University Press. Turing. A. (1985). ​Computing Machinery and Intelligence. In D. C. Dennett & D. R. Hofstadter (Eds.), ​The Mind's I: Fantasies and Reflections on Self and Soul ​(pp. 53-67). Middlesex, England: Penguin Books. (Original work published 1950). Winograd, T., & Flores, F. (1990). ​Understanding Computers and Cognition: A New Foundation for Design​. Norwood, NJ: Ablex Publishing Corporation.

JEMS 3 (2014), 2: 88–100 Defending the possible consent interpretation from actual attacks Samuel Kahn Indiana University-Purdue University, Indianapolis Abstract: In this paper, I defend the possible consent interpretation of Kant's formula of humanity from objections according to which it has counterintuitive implications. I do this in two ways. First, I argue that to a great extent, the supposed counterintuitive implications rest on a misunderstanding of the possible consent interpretation. Second, I argue that to the extent that these supposed counterintuitive implications do not rest on a misunderstanding of the possible consent interpretation, they are not counterintuitive at all. Keywords: Kant, Kant's practical philosophy, Kantian practical philosophy, Kant's ethics, Kantian ethics, Formula of Humanity, possible consent, possible consent interpretation In Pallikkathayil's "Deriving Morality from Politics: Rethinking the Formula of Humanity," she has a lot of interesting and insightful things to say about Kant's practical philosophy. Her paper has two main goals: (1) to discredit the so-called possible consent interpretation of Kant's Formula of Humanity (FH) and (2) to advance her own interpretation of FH. To accomplish her first goal, Pallikkathayil points out that according to the possible consent interpretation, FH rules out actions which depend on force, coercion or deception for their nature.1 She argues that this creates exegetical and philosophical problems. Exegetically, Kant thinks that sometimes such actions are permissible: Pallikkathayil points out that at various places in the Doctrine of Right Kant condones such actions.2 Philosophically, Pallikkathayil 1 Japa Pallikkathayil, "Deriving Morality from Politics: Rethinking the Formula of Humanity," Ethics 121.1 (2010), pp. 116-147, p. 118. 2 Ibid., pp. 119-124. Defending the possible consent interpretation from actual attacks 89 argues that any ethical theory that rules out all such actions would be making a big mistake.3 To accomplish her second goal, Pallikkathayil gives an overview of Kant's political philosophy and, in particular, of Kant's views about our rights and why it is necessary to exit the state of nature and enter into the civil condition.4 Pallikkathayil points out that our rights are indeterminate and unenforceable in the state of nature; they become determinate and enforceable only in the civil condition.5 Further, she argues that an agent (X) treats another agent (Y) as a mere means if but only if either (1) X violates Y's rights or (2) X expresses the denial of the claim that Y has equal practical standing in virtue of Y's humanity.6 Because rights become determinate only in the state and because violating someone's rights is treating that person as a mere means, it follows immediately that one can determine what counts as treating someone as a mere means only in the civil condition and only by appeal to the legal system in place. Now I would like to respond to the first part of Pallikkathayil's project. There are two main proponents of the possible consent interpretation of FH: O'Neill and Korsgaard. In what follows, I shall argue for the following two theses: (1) Pallikkathayil's attack on the possible consent interpretation does not work against O'Neill, for O'Neill's version of this interpretation is flexible enough to allow some kinds of deception, force and coercion and (2) Pallikkathayil's attack on the possible consent interpretation does not work against Korsgaard, for the attack simply does not address Korsgaard's response to the idea that it might be counterintuitive to say that all actions that rely on force, coercion and deception for their nature are impermissible. 1. O'Neill and possible consent As noted above, Pallikkathayil's attack on the possible consent interpretation begins with the claim that it rules out all actions that rely on force, coercion or deception for their nature. The idea is that force, coercion and deception in principle preclude consent. At an intuitive level, we can see this by means of an example. Suppose you plan to tell me a lying promise in order to get 20 dollars but I know better. I can consent to give you the money (perhaps without even letting you know that I am onto you). But I cannot consent to the deceit: if we try to arrange it so, it ceases to be deceit.7 3 Ibid., pp. 124-125. 4 Ibid., section II. 5 Ibid., section II.D. 6 Ibid., p. 141. 7 See, e.g., Onora O'Neill, "Between Consenting Adults," Philosophy and Public Affairs 14.3 (1985), pp. 252-277, p. 262: "It does not follow from this that nothing done in acting on a 90 Samuel Kahn Similar things, it is argued, can be said about force and coercion. Lurking in the background of such examples is a conceptual analysis of deceit, force and coercion that shows that to deceive, force or coerce someone into something just is to moot the issue of consent. This conceptual analysis is not provided, and that might be because it is difficult to pin down exactly why and how consent is precluded. Regardless, O'Neill seems to concede the starting point of Pallikkathayil's attack when she begins talking about the notion of possible consent: It is plausible to think that when we act in ways that would always preclude genuine consent or dissent, we will have used others. For example, if we coerce or deceive others, their dissent, and so their genuine consent, is in principle ruled out.8 However, O'Neill quickly backs down from any universal claims about possible consent and deception, coercion and force. She argues, on the one hand, that on her interpretation, the Formula of Humanity applies only to agents' fundamental maxims; it does not apply to every intentional aspect of an action.9 For my purposes here, what this means is that the possible consent interpretation does not rule out specific actions that seem to preclude consent unless those actions are based on fundamental maxims that themselves rule out the possibility of consent. O'Neill also argues, on the other hand, that understanding what makes genuine consent possible is a difficult thing and that we need to pay attention to the background conditions in which the supposed consent is (or is not) taking place. I want to focus on the second of these two considerations, but I shall say something briefly about the first. It is a common objection to Kant's and Kantian ethics that intuitively permissible actions are prohibited. These fall within the domain of false negatives: actions that seem innocuous but are nevertheless not allowed if we follow the strict guidelines laid out by the Categorical Imperative (CI). For example, surprise birthday parties would be impermissible because they involve deception, and deception, even for a good end, cannot be made consistent with the CI.10 The issue becomes more vexed if we interpret Kant's notorious murderer maxim of deception or coercion can be agreed to or shared by those deceived or coerced. On the contrary, deception standardly works by revealing subsidiary intentions or aspects of action, which misleadingly point to some underlying maxim to which consent can be given. Deception only works when the underlying intention or proposal is kept obscure. The deceiver's actual maxim therefore cannot be consented to. A maxim of coercion does not have to be obscure-it may be brutally plain-but clearly denies victims the choice between consent and dissent." 8 Ibid., p. 259. 9 This marks a change (of which she is very well aware) from O'Neill's position in her earlier work. See, e.g., Onora Nell [O'Neill], Acting on Principle, New York: Columbia University Press, 1975. 10 This example is taken from Barbara Herman, The Practice of Moral Judgment, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993, chapter 7, p. 141. Defending the possible consent interpretation from actual attacks 91 at the door case as saying that it is impermissible to lie even to a homicidal maniac (or neoNazi) when s/he shows up at the door looking for the person you just helped to hide in your basement.11 The task for Kantians becomes a sort of rescue attempt: how to rescue Kant from himself. Now some Kant scholars argue that this is a misinterpretation of the murderer at the door case. For example, Wood tells us that the murderer at the door case involves the permissibility of making a lying declaration (analogous to perjury) rather than a simple lie.12 If this is correct, then the murderer at the door case is not analogous to a case in which the Nazis knock on the door to ask whether you know the whereabouts of a Jew whom you happen to be hiding. Rather, the case is more like one in which you are asked to take the stand as a witness in a trial, and you know that if you tell the truth, there is a good chance that the defendant, whom you believe to be innocent, will be convicted and perhaps put to death-and the question is whether you should perjure yourself. For example, should Alexei Karamazov have given a lying testimony in The Brothers Karamazov? Unlike the Nazi case, the answer to this is not obviously "yes." Moreover, Kant's Lectures on Ethics suggest that Kant himself thought that lying is sometimes permissible, and Wood points out that there are even conditions in which a lying declaration might be permissible in Kantian ethics.13 I shall return to the murderer at the door case in the next section. The point is that O'Neill's suggestion about fundamental principles is meant to apply exactly to cases in which deception is intuitively permissible even though it seems to be ruled out by the possible consent interpretation. The idea is that the deception involved in throwing a surprise party might be permissible (even on the possible consent interpretation) if it is not part of the person's fundamental intentions-and the same could be said about lying to a Nazi.14 11 Pallikkathayil seems to interpret the murderer at the door case in just this way. She points out that in the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant claimed that as far as right is concerned, people may say what they like, true or false, provided that it does not bear directly on matters of right (e.g., a lie about the terms of a contract). She then argues that in the essay in which he discusses the murderer at the door, Kant "does an about face regarding duties of right not to lie" (Pallikkathayil, op. cit., p. 145). In other words, Pallikkathayil's idea is that in the Metaphysics of Morals, there is no direct duty of right not to lie but in the essay discussing the murderer at the door, there is always a (direct) duty of right not to lie. But this is incorrect. The murderer at the door case is not discussing a duty of right not to lie (simpliciter) but rather a duty of right not to lie under specific conditions, and therefore it does not obviously give evidence of an about face on Kant's part. I discuss this further in the text above. 12 Allen Wood, Kantian Ethics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, chapter 11. 13 Ibidem. 14 O'Neill, 1985, op. cit., p. 266: "In each case it is our fundamental proposals, principles, or basic intentions that must meet these conditions. We neither do nor can make it possible for others, even for others closely affected, to consent to or dissent from every aspect (or even every intentional aspect) of what we propose..." 92 Samuel Kahn This might strike some as somewhat sophistical: one winds up questioning when a deception really counts as a deception.15 But I think this is probably an important question to raise.16 However, I do not want to dwell on it here: I want to get to O'Neill's claims about understanding the background conditions for possible consent. As noted above, O'Neill's idea is that if we pay attention to the background conditions in which the supposed consent is (or is not) taking place, we shall see that the possible consent interpretation does not rule out some specific actions that seem to preclude consent. The basic idea here is that there is more to consent than simply giving someone the opportunity to say "yay" or "nay."17 If someone confronts you with 15 Ibid., p. 271: "Since it is only fundamental principles of actions (whether plans, proposals, policies, or intentions) that must meet these standards, superficial departure from them when acting on morally acceptable fundamental principles may be acceptable, or even required. The jokes and surprises in which friendship may be expressed do not count as deceptions; but if they were incident to action on other maxims might constitute fraud or serious disrespect or unacceptable paternalism" (my emphasis). 16 This is a question that Kant himself seems to raise: "[i]f our untruth is in keeping with our main intent, then it is bad; but if I can avert a truly great evil only by this means, then... etc. Here goodness of heart takes the place of sincerity... A white lie is often a contradictio in adjecto; like pretended tipsiness, it is untruth that breaches no obligation, and is thus properly no lie. Joking lies, if they are not taken to be true, are not immoral..." (27, 62). (Following standard convention, I use the Academy pagination in my citations from Kant; the first number (27) refers to the volume in the Academy edition and the second number (62) refers to the page of that volume on which the citation occurs. All translations are taken from the Cambridge Guyer/Wood blue series translations.) See also 27, 700-702. 17 Pallikkathayil distinguishes between the possible consent interpretation and the meaningful consent interpretation. She thinks that the possible consent interpretation requires one merely to give one's interlocutors the opportunity to signal consent or dissent (verbally or otherwise) regardless of whether one pays this signal any heed; the meaningful consent interpretation requires both that one give one's interlocutors the opportunity to signal consent or dissent and that one govern oneself in accordance with what one's interlocutors signal. An example will make this distinction clearer. If a murderer asks you whether s/he might shoot you and then does so despite your decided "no," then according to Pallikkathayil, the murderer has complied with the possible consent interpretation but not the meaningful consent interpretation (Pallikkathayil, op. cit., section I.C., especially p. 127). There are three problems with this, one rhetorical, one philosophical and one exegetical. The rhetorical problem with this is that Pallikkathayil introduces the meaningful consent interpretation only after dismissing the possible consent interpretation. But she dismisses the possible consent interpretation on the grounds that it is too strong (i.e., it rules out permissible actions-it has false negatives). Given that the meaningful consent interpretation is stronger than the possible consent interpretation (i.e., it rules out everything ruled out by the possible consent interpretation and more) it follows immediately (a fortiori) that the meaningful consent interpretation is too strong. So rhetorically, given Pallikkathayil's attack on the possible consent interpretation, no discussion of the meaningful consent interpretation should be needed beyond pointing out that it is stronger than the possible consent interpretation. Philosophically, separating the possible consent interpretation from the meaningful consent interpretation is problematic because it vitiates Pallikkathayil's attack on the possible Defending the possible consent interpretation from actual attacks 93 a gun in a back alley and says, "your money or your life," then the sense in which you "consent" to give that person your money when you hand it over is quite tenuous, indeed. The problem with the "consent" in this kind of case seems to lie in the background conditions (you have a gun to your head; the person "made you an offer you could not refuse"). This idea can be traced back to Marx, and it has been used also by Rawls, who combats Lockean historical accounts of justice with it, arguing that the basic structure of society must be regulated by the principles of justice as fairness to ensure the possibility of continued voluntary, just transactions.18 But regardless of where one stands on these issues in political philosophy, O'Neill thinks that they are relevant for determining possible consent. This can be seen in the following two quotations: ...we need to understand what makes genuine consent to the more fundamental aspects of action possible. But there is no guarantee that any one set of requirements makes genuine consent possible in all circumstances. There may be some necessary conditions, whose absence always makes genuine consent or dissent impossible, and other conditions which are needed to make consent possible only in some circumstances.19 ...coercion of less straightforward sorts may occur in some sexual relationships and transactions, including in relationships between prostitutes and their clients. Here the outward transaction may be an agreement between consenting adults. But when we remember the institutional context of much (at least contemporary, western) prostitution, including the practices of pimping, brothel keeping, and various forms of social ostracism and consequent dependence on a harsh subculture, we may come to think that not al l transactions between prostitutes and clients are uncoerced: but it may not be the client who coerces.20 consent interpretation. That is, once we see how weak the possible consent interpretation is on Pallikkathayil's account, it becomes unclear why it rules out all kinds of deception, force and coercion. The murderer described above seems to be engaged in a forceful action. But the murderer's action would not be ruled impermissible by Pallikkathayil's account of the possible consent interpretation. Exegetically, the problem is that it is unclear whether anybody subscribes to this weaker version of the possible consent interpretation. For example, O'Neill makes it clear that she subscribes to what Pallikkathayil calls the meaningful consent interpretation: "if those closely affected have the possibility of dissent, they will be able to require an initiator of action either to modify the action, or to desist or to override he dissent. But an initiator who presses on in the face of actively expressed dissent undercuts any genuine possibility of refusing the proposal and rather chooses to enforce it on others. Any "consent" the proposal then receives will be spurious, and will not show that others have not been used, let alone that they have been treated as persons" (O'Neill, 1985, op. cit., p. 259, my emphasis). 18 John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: a Restatement, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001, sections 14-16, p. 50ff, especially section 15. 19 O'Neill, 1985, op. cit., p. 259, my emphasis. 20 Ibid., pp. 268-269, my emphasis. 94 Samuel Kahn Both of these quotations reveal O'Neill's concern with background conditions. In the first quotation, O'Neill argues that there might be some background conditions that must be in place for consent to be possible in general, and there also might be some conditions that must be in place for consent to be possible in particular cases. In the second quotation, O'Neill gives an example of this. She argues that appreciation of the background conditions that lead some (perhaps many) to prostitution as a way of life might make us question whether the individual transactions in which they engage involve any real consent (despite their outward trappings). Perhaps consent was precluded long ago when, say, they were kidnapped and forced to sell their bodies. The issues here are complicated. Perhaps there is some sort of statute of limitations with regard to consent whereby past actions, if they are far back enough, do not infect the possibility of consent in future actions. It is far beyond the scope of this paper to discuss these issues much less to try to resolve them. So why bring this up? The point of bringing this up is simple. As noted above, Pallikkathayil attacks the possible consent interpretation on the grounds that it rules out all actions that rely on deception, force and coercion for their nature despite the fact that some such actions are intuitively permissible (and condoned as such by Kant: the problem is thus both philosophical and exegetical). Pallikkathayil's examples are (1) the use of force in self-defense; (2) the use of force in compelling others to leave the state of nature and enter the civil condition; (3) the use of force on the part of the state in enforcing laws; and (4) the use of force on the part of the state in punishing criminals. But now we can see how O'Neill might respond to all of these examples. With regard to the force used in self-defense, O'Neill might say that (1) the fundamental maxim of an agent acting in self-defense is not one of force and, therefore, not one that precludes consent and (2) maxims of self-defense plausibly are part of the background conditions that make consent possible. With regard to the force used in compelling others to leave the state of nature and enter the civil condition, O'Neill might point out again that (1) the fundamental maxim in this kind of case is not one of force and (2) it seems uncontroversial that the background conditions for consent are put in place by virtue of entering the civil condition (as noted above, for Rawls, part of the point of regulating the basic structure of society by the principles of justice as fairness is to ensure the continued possibility of meaningful consent). Finally, with regard to the use of force on the part of the state in enforcing laws and punishing criminals, again, O'Neill might point out that (1) the fundamental maxims of the agents in these cases are not maxims of force and (2) some sort of criminal justice system and executive branch of government form the background conditions required for consent to be possible. The basic problem is that Pallikkathayil's attack on the possible consent interpretation begins with the claim that the possible consent interpretation Defending the possible consent interpretation from actual attacks 95 rules out all kinds of deception, force and coercion. But this claim is not true (pace Pallikkathayil): on O'Neill's account, the possible consent interpretation rules out deception, force and coercion only if they are part of an agent's fundamental maxim-and, further, some kinds of deception, force and coercion might be necessary as background conditions to make consent possible in the first place. Making consent possible on O'Neill's account is a tricky thing, far more nuanced than (say) giving someone the opportunity to give a nod of the head. 2. Korsgaard and possible consent But Pallikkathayil tells us that she is more concerned with Korsgaard's version of the possible consent interpretation than with O'Neill's.21 So to be fair to Pallikkathayil, it is incumbent on us to examine also Korsgaard's view to see whether Pallikkathayil meets with more success there. Korsgaard, unlike O'Neill, would concede the first part of Pallikkathayil's attack on the possible consent interpretation: Korsgaard does think that the possible consent interpretation rules out all kinds of deception, force and coercion.22 Further, Korsgaard thinks that because the possible consent interpretation rules out all kinds of deception, force and coercion, it rules out some permissible actions. In particular, Korsgaard reconstructs Kant's murderer at the door case, interpreting it as one involving the permissibility of a simple lie to save the 21 Pallikkathayil claims, "[a]lthough O'Neill's and Korsgaard's views are very similar, I will focus on Korsgaard's view, since it is a bit more developed" (Pallikkathayil, op. cit., p. 118). However, Pallikkathayil's reasoning here seems a bit shaky. For one thing, it does not seem to be the case that Korsgaard's version of the possible consent is more developed than O'Neill's. O'Neill's account of the possible consent interpretation occurs in the context of an article devoted entirely to figuring out what kinds of duty the formula of humanity prescribes, with space devoted both to actual consent and hypothetical consent; Korsgaard's main account of the possible consent interpretation occurs in the context of an article on whether Kant's ethics (in general) is able to take account of background conditions, and she discusses both the universality formulations and the kingdom of ends formulation of the categorical imperative. This is not by any means an objection to Korsgaard or the project she undertakes. The point is simply that Pallikkathayil's claim that Korsgaard's version of the possible consent interpretation is more developed than O'Neill's is prima facie implausible. Even more problematic is Pallikkathayil's claim that O'Neill's and Korsgaard's views are very similar: as noted in the previous section of this paper, O'Neill does not think that the possible consent interpretation rules out all use of force, deception and coercion; but as noted (below) in the present section of this paper, Korsgaard does think that the possible consent interpretation rules out all use of force, deception and coercion. Given that this is the focal point of Pallikkathayil's attack, it seems to me that O'Neill and Korsgaard are very dissimilar, indeed. I am sure Pallikkathayil has reasons, and perhaps good ones, for focusing on Korsgaard's view rather than O'Neill's. But the ones she cites give a misleading picture of O'Neill. 22 Christine Korsgaard, Creating the Kingdom of Ends, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 106-132, 137-140 and especially 295-296. 96 Samuel Kahn life of someone you are hiding from a murderer, and she argues that although the possible consent precludes deceit in this case, deceit is, in fact, permissible.23 It seems like Pallikkathayil's two-pronged attack should apply: (1) this renders the possible consent interpretation exegetically implausible because it rules out actions that Kant thought were permissible and (2) this renders the possible consent interpretation philosophically implausible because it has false negatives. Korsgaard's answer to the first prong of the attack is, I take it, quite simple: she is not engaged primarily in exegesis. She is trying to construct a plausible Kantian theory, a theory that has recognizably Kantian roots even if she ultimately reaches conclusions that are different from Kant's. I take it that Korsgaard would say that if Kant really thinks that FH condones some kinds of deception, force and coercion, then that is so much the worse for Kant. So the first prong of Pallikkathayil's attack is easily handled by Korsgaard. What about the second prong? Korsgaard argues that although FH (by virtue of the possible consent interpretation) renders all deceit impermissible, which is counterintuitive, the so-called Formula of Universal Law (FUL) version of the CI does not. In particular, FUL gives the right answer to the murderer at the door case (as interpreted by Korsgaard): according to FUL, it is permissible to lie to a murderer at the door even though according to FH, it is not.24 But according to Korsgaard, this discrepancy between the formulations of the CI does not indicate that one of them is "better" than the other. Rather, it indicates that they have different functions. Whereas FH is for ideal theory, FUL is for nonideal theory. The basic idea is that FH is the moral standard that we would use if everyone with whom we interacted had a good will. Perhaps we even can use FH when our immediate interlocutors do have (at least approximately) good wills. But even if not, we have FUL. FUL is there for the messy, everyday world in which we often have to deal with agents who have turned away from the good, so to speak-with people who act with malice aforethought, with people who are selfish, with people who are thoughtless, with people who are callous. In a word, with people who are nonideal. So Korsgaard has answers to both prongs of Pallikkathayil's attack. However, Pallikkathayil does not stop there: she has two further attacks on Korsgaard's version of the possible consent interpretation. First, she tries to show that it does not work even for ideal theory.25 That is, as we have seen, Korsgaard is committed to two claims: (1) FH tells us how we would be 23 Ibid., pp. 132-135. 24 Ibid., pp. 132-140. Korsgaard summarizes her findings as follows: "[i]f the foregoing casuistical analyses are correct, then applying the Formula of Universal Law and the Formula of Humanity leads to different answers in the case of lying to the murderer at the door. The former seems to say that this lie is permissible, but the latter says that coercion and deception are the most fundamental forms of wrongdoing" (ibid., p. 143). 25 Pallikkathayil, op. cit., section I.C., especially p. 127. Defending the possible consent interpretation from actual attacks 97 supposed to behave if everyone with whom we interacted had a good will, and (2) FH rules out all actions that preclude consent (including all kinds of deception, force and conception). It follows immediately that Korsgaard is committed to (3) if everyone with whom we interacted had a good will, then all actions that preclude consent would be impermissible. But Pallikkathayil thinks this is false: Pallikkathayil argues that even in ideal theory, Korsgaard's version of the possible consent interpretation generates counterintuitive results. Pallikkathayil's second attack is against the bare idea of FH as a standard of ideal theory. Pallikkathayil claims that by consigning FH to ideal theory, Korsgaard "undermines the status of the Formula of Humanity as a principle of practical reason."26 In other words, Pallikkathayil seems to think that on Korsgaard's account, FH no longer can be considered as authoritative: it does not yield the right results to questions about what we may, may not or ought to do. So let us examine these attacks in more detail to see whether they really work. The first attack is illustrated by an example in which we are to imagine ourselves looking out into the street at the passersby to see whether it is cold enough to wear a coat. One of the passersby signals us to stop, and Pallikkathayil claims that (1) on Korsgaard's interpretation of FH, we ought to respect the person's wishes and stop looking outside and (2) this reveals that Korsgaard's version of FH generates results that are counterintuitive even for an ideal theory.27 Now the idea behind (1) is that if we continue to look out the window even after the passerby has signaled us to stop, then our maxim is one that precludes consent and, thus, is impermissible according to Korsgaard's version of the possible consent interpretation of FH. That is, if someone (P) clearly indicates that s/he does not consent to an action in which someone else (Q) is engaged, then for Q to continue on is for Q to pay no heed to the fact that P does not consent (actively) to Q's action. But if Q pays no heed to the fact that P does not consent (actively) to Q's action, then Q is acting on a maxim that makes consent impossible. It follows immediately that in the example just described, Korsgaard's version of the possible consent interpretation of FH generates the conclusion that we ought to stop looking outside if one of the passersby signals us to stop. The idea behind (2) is that "one may look out one's window at the activities on the street even if some particular person on the street objects."28 Here Pallikkathayil calls upon the public/private distinction, a distinction that, according to Pallikkathayil, commits us to the idea that we are not always required to be sensitive to others' wishes about how and when they are observed-a distinction that (according to Pallikkathayil) should be affirmed even in ideal theory (Korsgaard notwithstanding). 26 Ibid., p. 125, n. 27. 27 Ibid., p. 127ff. 28 Ibid., p. 127. 98 Samuel Kahn But there are problems with both (1) and (2). First, it seems unlikely that the possible consent interpretation really would require us to stop looking outside if one of the passersby signals us to stop. If X's neighbor asks Y to stop looking over the fence at a party in X's backyard, the possible consent interpretation might require Y to stop looking over the fence and into X's backyard. But it would not require Y to stop looking over the fence at the sun. And in Pallikkathayil's example, the person who signals us to stop is on public property, so it seems like the strongest proscription that the possible consent interpretation could generate would be against looking at that person. Moreover, it should be remembered that an ideal theory applies to ideal conditions; presumably an ideal agent in ideal conditions would not mind if someone were looking out a window to determine whether it is cold enough to wear a coat. At first blush, this second remark might seem somewhat fatuous, but it is not: if the possible consent interpretation is part of ideal theory, then any putative counterexample to it must be realizable in an ideal world. However, an even deeper problem with Pallikkathayil's example might arise with (2), with the claim that the example reveals that Korsgaard's version of FH generates results that are counterintuitive even for an ideal theory. That is, even if the possible consent interpretation generated the stronger proscription that Pallikkathayil attributes to it (it does not, but even if it did) it must be remembered that there is a distinction between having a right to X and the permissibility of X-ing. There are many things that are morally abhorrent but perfectly within our rights, and there are many things that are mildly distasteful but (again) well within our rights. Sometimes the rights that protect these activities are very important. But the point is that even if the possible consent interpretation generated the stronger proscription, this would be a result about the permissibility of looking out the window if one of the people being observed signals us to stop, not a result about whether looking out the window is within our rights if one of the people being observed signals us to stop-and this is not obviously counterintuitive for an ideal theory. Let me try to give a parallel case. Suppose you are at a coffee shop and someone with a horrible disfigurement walks in. Now I think that there is something almost magnetic about such people. Like Leontius, we want to stare. And sometimes we do. Many of us even have had temporary (and/or permanent) problems that rendered us like this, drawing eyes like a sideshow barker but with this crucial difference: the attention is unsolicited. And it is unwanted. Of course, I have a right to look at people like that. And that is a good thing: thank goodness I cannot be arrested for looking at someone slantwise. But looking away is not over and above what morality requires of me; it is simple respect, the barest recognition and sympathy for the feelings of another. So it seems to me that Pallikkathayil's first attack fails: she has not shown that Korsgaard's version of the possible consent interpretation generates counterintuitive results. Defending the possible consent interpretation from actual attacks 99 But what of Pallikkathayil's second attack? Recall that Pallikkathayil claims that by virtue of being consigned to ideal theory, FH loses its status as a principle of practical reason. Unfortunately, this attack is given only in a footnote, so Pallikkathayil does not explain exactly what she means. But if the idea is that a principle of practical reason is one that applies under all conditions (including nonideal conditions) then the objection is true but uninteresting. If the idea is that by virtue of being "relegated" to ideal theory, FH becomes useless or has no value-or even that other philosophers have not explored ideal theory-then the objection does not go through. Ideals play an important role in many areas of investigation, and an in depth discussion of them is beyond the scope of this paper. I note merely that one of the things that makes them useful is that the "calculations" are easier. 3. Conclusion Thus far I have defended the possible consent interpretation from Pallikkathayil. In particular, I have defended two very different versions of the possible consent interpretation from Pallikkathayil.29 Whereas on O'Neill's account, the notion of possible consent does not rule out all kinds of deception, force and coercion, on Korsgaard's account, it does, but it applies to the domain of the ideal, so these proscriptions are not obviously counterintuitive. But it should be remembered that the possible consent interpretation can tell us, at best, only what to do in order to avoid treating others as mere means. But that means that even at best, this interpretation of FH still has two serious exegetical problems: (1) FH tells us also never to treat ourselves as mere means, and duties to oneself (like the duty not to commit suicide from self-love) figure prominently in both the Groundwork for a Metaphysics of Morals and the Metaphysics of Morals. However, the notion of possible consent does not seem to apply to considerations of oneself: there does not seem to be any way to derive duties like the duty not to commit suicide from self-love from the possible consent interpretation. (2) In addition, FH tells us always to treat people as ends. The so-called "imperfect" duties that flow from this part of FH (like the duty to promote others' happiness) also figure prominently in both the Groundwork for a Metaphysics of Morals and the Metaphysics of Morals. However, acting on maxims to which it is possible for our interlocutors to consent seems a far cry from acting on maxims that involve treating these interlocutors positively as ends. Because the possible consent interpretation does not seem to be able to account either for duties to oneself or for imperfect duties, it can be at best only a piece of the larger puzzle of how Kant derives duties from FH. If one thinks that Kant is right to include such duties 29 See my remarks in note 21 above. 100 Samuel Kahn in his ethical system, then these exegetical problems become philosophical problems, too. However, proponents of the possible consent interpretation are aware of these two limitations, and they try to supplement the possible consent interpretation accordingly. Moreover, if the possible consent interpretation can account for all (even if only) our perfect duties to others, this is surely reason enough to take it quite seriously. Indeed, the notion of possible consent is not important only within the context of Kant's and Kantian ethics; the notion of possible consent is pervasive in law and ethics more generally and therefore independently interesting. As noted in section 1 of this article, possible consent is appealed to in core debates about distributive justice. It also shows up in discussions of criminal justice: many crimes, like rape, revolve around complicated questions about consent-whether it occurred (did that gesture really count as consent?), whether it was possible (was the victim drunk? How old was the victim?), etc-and similar questions come up in medical ethics when dealing with things like end of life issues, potential side-effects of a given course of treatment and the testing of new medicines, medical technologies and surgeries. A thorough discussion of any (let alone all) of these issues is far beyond the scope of the present article. My goal has not been to show even that the possible consent interpretation succeeds in carving out the sphere of perfect duties to others let alone to apply the possible consent interpretation to any of these (well trod) areas of inquiry. My goal has been simply to show that the idea behind this interpretation should be taken seriously: if it falls, I do not think it will be the result of some easy take-down-even the interesting objections raised by Pallikkathayil seem to miss the mark. Bibliography Barbara Herman, The Practice of Moral Judgment, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993. Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Ethics, ed. and trans. by Peter Heath, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. Christine Korsgaard, Creating the Kingdom of Ends, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Japa Pallikkathayil, "Deriving Morality from Politics: Rethinking the Formula of Humanity," Ethics 121.1 (2010), pp. 116-147. Onora Nell [O'Neill], Acting on Principle, New York: Columbia University Press, 1975. Onora O'Neill, "Between Consenting Adults," Philosophy and Public Affairs 14.3 (1985), pp. 252-277. John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: a Restatement, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001. Allen Wood, Kantian Ethics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

Natal, v.17, n.28, jul./dez. 2010, p. 05-36 Aristóteles como protofenomenólogo: la destrucción fenomenológica heideggeriana como apropiación originaria de la conceptualidad filosófica Jethro Masís* Resumen: Este artículo aborda la lectura heideggeriana de Aristóteles, a partir de la cual el Estagirita es retratado como un protofenomenólogo. En concordancia con ello, se dará cuenta de los escritos heideggerianos correspondientes al período de docencia (1919-1927) inmediatamente anterior a la publicación de Sein und Zeit en el cual Heidegger desarrolla la búsqueda de una terminología propia que viene marcada por el procedimiento fenomenológico de la 'destrucción' (Destruktion) de la tradición ontológica. Palabras Clave: Aristóteles; Fenomenología; Filosofía Contemporánea; Heidegger; Lutero Abstract: This paper revises Heidegger's interpretation of Aristotle, in which the greek philosopher is portrayed as a proto-phenomenologist. On this regard, an attempt is made in order to render an account of Heidegger's teaching phase (1919-1927) right before the publication of Sein und Zeit, in which Heidegger develops a search of his own philosophical terminology, resulting from the phenomenological procedure of the so-called 'destruction' (Destruktion) of the ontological tradition. Keywords: Aristotle; Contemporary Philosophy; Heidegger; Luther; Phenomenology [Aristóteles] se atuvo a los fenómenos y los tomó ampliamente como era posible, es decir, evitó una visión fundamentalmente fallida y con ello despejó el camino,pero ciertamente sólo para que luego fuera encubierto del modo más radical". (Martin Heidegger, GA 21: 164) Indicación de la Situación Hermenéutica El Natorp-Bericht (1922) o Informe Natorp es usualmente considerado el primer borrador de la temática que Heidegger habría de desarrollar a fondo en su gran obra, Sein und Zeit (1927), y venía precedido por el título * Profesor en las secciones de Metafísica e Historia del Pensamiento de la Escuela de Filosofía de la Universidad de Costa Rica. E-mail: [email protected] Artigo recebido em 31.10.2010, aprovado em 28.12.2010. Jethro Masís 6 Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles. Se trataba, en efecto, de la promesa programática de un trabajo mucho más extenso de investigaciones fenomenológicas sobre el Estagirita que, a la postre, no llegaría a concretarse en el sentido estricto de lo proyectado. En este respecto, Sein und Zeit es el recuento, la 'suma' – aunque, por así decirlo, sólo sea una parada en el trayecto heideggeriano del pensar o Denkweg –, de ese proyecto de la gran investigación fenomenológica de la filosofía aristotélica nunca llevado a cabo como tal, pero que ciertamente principia con la revisión destructiva de la tradición ontológica en la que, según Heidegger, se juega, ni más ni menos, el mismo sentido del ser. De ahí que la siguiente pregunta de Jesús Adrián Escudero deba ser contestada afirmativamente y deba tenerse por evidente de suyo: "¿[A]caso el plan de una hermenéutica de la experiencia humana que... culmina en la analítica existenciaria de Ser y Tiempo, delata algún tipo de apropiación de la filosofía práctica de Aristóteles?" (2001: 180). De la misma forma, Franco Volpi incluso ha equiparado el opus magmun de Heidegger con una 'traducción de la Ética Nicomáquea': "[L]a génesis de la terminología de Sein und Zeit puede explicarse si se pone atención a su celosa apropiación de la filosofía práctica de Aristóteles" (1994: 196). Por ello, le parece a Volpi claro e indiscutible que "la obra de Heidegger es la confrontación filosófica con Aristóteles más significativa del siglo" (1994: 195). En lo sucesivo, se dará cuenta detallada de la tesis del ensayo de Volpi, según la cual "la comprensión de la estructura práctica de la vida humana, que Heidegger reclama como la constitución originaria del Dasein, se origina de un tipo de sedimentación especulativa – en el punto de partida y, de hecho, en la terminología de Sein und Zeit – de la determinación de la vida ética y del ser del ser humano que se lleva a cabo en la Ética Nicomáquea" (1994: 204). El hecho mismo de que sea imposible separar 'la filosofía de Heidegger' de la lectura heideggeriana de autores esenciales de la tradición filosófica, debería incluso hacernos caer en la cuenta de que, en cierto sentido, no hay filosofía de Heidegger. Esto lo recuerda Heidegger mismo cada vez que tiene oportunidad, como cuando advierte en su respuesta al coloquio sobre el 'problema de un pensar y un hablar no objetivante en la teología actual' de 1964 en Estados Unidos que intentará, en su contribución, el "evitar la impresión de que se trata de una presentación de tesis dogmáticas extraídas de esa filosofía de Heidegger que no hay" (H: 69. Aristóteles como protofenomenólogo 7 Itálicas añadidas). Enfrascarse en una refutación de la 'filosofía heideggeriana' y de sus pretendidas 'tesis', es hacer trampa si uno toma un atajo y, por decirlo así, se salta la destrucción filosófica. El pensamiento de Heidegger no señala hacia sí mismo, sino hacia lo dicho, lo transmitido, lo filosofado. Uno va hacia Heidegger, y se encuentra con la retrorreferencia hacia los filósofos presocráticos, hacia Platón, hacia Agustín, hacia Lutero, hacia Descartes, hacia Hegel, hacia Schelling, hacia Dilthey y Nietzsche y Husserl, etcétera. Ha comenzado bien Figal, por tanto, su Martin Heidegger zur Einführung (1992) cuando afirma que, en Heidegger, se ha abierto toda una nueva visión de la historia de la filosofía en su totalidad: es, en efecto, a Heidegger a quien hay que agradecerle el que autores clásicos como Platón y Aristóteles, Kant o Hegel puedan leerse verdaderamente de nuevo, y que deban ser leídos de nuevo. Sin él se habrían quedado los fragmentos de Parménides y Heráclito apenas como objeto de la investigación especializada. Que ahora se tome a Nietzsche seriamente como filósofo, devuelve a las interpretaciones de Heidegger. Sin Heidegger seguramente habría sido mucho más difícil para Kierkegaard o Dilthey el ser admitidos en la corte de la filosofía académica (2003: 7-8). Pero, ¿qué es lo que ha sucedido aquí? ¿Cuál es la base de esa fascinación por la apertura de la historia de la filosofía que atrajo irresistiblemente a tantos estudiantes de los años veinte? Leo Strauss, quien tuvo oportunidad de asistir a las lecciones del joven fenomenólogo sobre Aristóteles, afirmaba sin dudar que "no sólo Werner Jaeger, quien era ciertamente un gran conocedor de Aristóteles, pero también Max Weber, con seguridad el temperamento científico más fuerte de las cátedras alemanas de la época, se veían como niños cándidos, párvulos [Weisenknaben], ante la potencia de Heidegger" (citado por Gadamer, 'Heideggers "theologische" Jugendschrift'. PIA: 83). Lo que ha sucedido aquí es que Heidegger no ha aportado más datos a la investigación histórica de Aristóteles, ni se ha engalanado con una brillante interpretación; no ha resuelto las aparentes contradicciones del 'sistema' aristotélico, como Jaeger – a cuyas obras (Studien zur Entstehungsgeschichte der Metaphysik des Aristoteles, 1912, y Aristoteles. Grundlegung einer Geschichte seiner Entwicklung, 1923) responde "la casi totalidad de la literatura aristotélica" (Aubenque, 1981: 8) –, ni se ha preocupado por la periodización de las etapas del pensamiento de Aristóteles. Si, como afirma Acevedo, "[e]s Jethro Masís 8 frecuente que los especialistas en los diversos autores de la historia de la filosofía hagan objeciones a las interpretaciones de Heidegger" asidos de la convicción cuestionable de que las pretensiones del filósofo han de circunscribirse a "hacer historia de la filosofía, exponiendo fielmente las doctrinas a las que alude" (2003: 5-6), entonces hay que decir que Heidegger es un infiel. Por el contrario, Heidegger "pretende entablar un diálogo con la tradición, el cual está sometido a otra legalidad que el quehacer historiográfico acerca de la filosofía y los filósofos" (Acevedo: 2003: 6). La potencia de Heidegger desde la cátedra resaltada por Leo Strauss con encomio ha hecho que los estudiantes asistentes a su cursos de juventud cayeran en la cuenta de que Aristóteles habla hoy, de que la propia conceptualidad actual está imbuida de jerga aristotélica, y que la filosofía, en general, habla desde la vida. Lo ha dicho Gadamer: "Aquí no se aborda a Aristóteles como un objeto de estudio importante, sino que se trata de las preguntas actuales de la filosofía, del concepto que se genera a partir de la presión del problema [Problemdruck]..." ('Heideggers "theologische" Jugendschrift'. PIA: 79). No se trata acá, pues, del pasado, sino, sobre todo y radicamente, del presente. Se trata de la presión del fenómeno, de la coacción ejercida y demandante del problema de la vida. De tal forma, la importancia de Aristóteles o, más bien, de este 'nuevo Aristóteles' descubierto después del desmantelamiento conceptual, de este Aristóteles que aún habla hoy y cuyo legado no está cerrado ni terminado de ninguna manera, no ha de ser desestimada para comprender a Heidegger, quien supone que esa actitud de quienes estiman que "desconocer los medios conceptuales empleados... equivale a poner entre paréntesis cualquier tipo de subjetividad" (PIA: 9/31) no es más que un yerro que se presta para oscuridades. Por ello, en primer lugar, Heidegger convoca a una "clarificación de la situación hermenéutica" (PIA: 9/31). Puede bien verse el Informe Natorp como la introducción al trabajo más extenso sobre el Estagirita que el joven asistente científico de Husserl había prometido a la comunidad fenomenológica, pero también, sobre todo, como una suerte de manifiesto programático de investigación fenomenológica: un programa, en efecto, destructivo-repetitivo. El tener bien en cuenta las dimensiones y alcances de este programa brindará, a quien se embarque en la lectura de los textos heideggerianos, la posibilidad de evitar Aristóteles como protofenomenólogo 9 polémicas innecesarias y los involucramientos no pretendidos de Heidegger con los filósofos destruidos y repetidos.1 Como ya se ha señalado, Heidegger planificaba "la publicación, en ese mismo año 1922, de un trabajo sobre Aristóteles en el volumen VII del Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung dirigido por Husserl" (Adrián Escudero, 2001: 184). El filósofo de la Selva Negra había compartido (en una comunicación epistolar dirigida a Gadamer que data de 1923) las intenciones que guardaba de convertir sus investigaciones fenomenológicas sobre Aristóteles en una obra más extensa y abarcadora,2 pero, según constata Gadamer, tal tarea "[n]o se llegó a realizar, porque al ocupar la cátedra en Marburgo se vio confrontado con tareas del todo nuevas. Aún así Aristóteles siguió siendo uno de los temas centrales de su actividad docente en Marburgo" ('Die religiöse Dimension', GW 3: 311312/155). Por razones comprensibles que atañen a la investigación histórica, el propio Gadamer sostuvo en 1989 que la aparición del perdido manuscrito del Informe Natorp debía estimarse como 'un verdadero suceso' (ein wahres Ereignis), tan importante como el que supuso el que se hallasen nuevamente los manuscritos de los escritos teológicos de juventud de Hegel publicados por Hermann Nohl en 1907 ('Heideggers "theologische" Jugendschrift'. PIA: 76), que realmente aclaran los supuestos teológicos de la filosofía hegeliana.3 Gadamer relata que el manuscrito que le había sido 1 Al respecto, es decir, en el sentido de los desvaríos que se pueden suscitar a partir de un malentendido de la 'repetición' (Wiederholung), puede consultarse la opinión, muy cuestionable, de Jacques Taminiaux de que lo que se encuentra en Sein und Zeit, por más que dé la impresión de radicalidad, es una reiteración del platonismo: el Dasein ha de volver de la fluctuación de la multiplicidad mundana de la caída, de la mera opinión y de una criteriología impropia derivada también de una actividad existencial inauténtica, a la unidad que le asegura el conocimiento filosófico en la 'idea' de la propiedad (Eigentlichkeit) del Dasein (cf. Taminiaux, 1989: 149-189). La duda en torno a esta opinión de Taminiaux también ha sido levantada por McNeill, cf. 1999: 18. 2 Asimismo, los editores de la lección dedicada a Aristóteles del semestre de invierno de 1921-1922 (cf. GA 61), Walter Bröcker y Käte Bröcker-Oltmanns, arguyen que el estilo del manuscrito de la lección permite suponer que Heidegger "pretendía hacer del manuscrito un libro" ('Nachwort der Herausgeber', GA 61: 201). 3 Heidegger refiere que la obra de Melanchton, Loci communes rerum theologicarum seu hypotheses theologicae (1521), constituye la obra protestante 'escolástica', direccionada decisivamente por la conceptualidad aristotélica, en la que el idealismo alemán halla su suelo neurálgico (Wurzelboden). "Cualquier investigación seria del idealismo alemán y, Jethro Masís 10 cedido por Natorp en Marburgo le causó una profunda impresión; la misma que lo convenció de cambiarse de universidad para poder estudiar con el joven 'rey escondido de la filosofía alemana' (según la caracterización de Hannah Arendt, cf. 1988: 232). El manuscrito extraviado por Gadamer durante la segunda guerra mundial, nunca se pudo recuperar; pero el ejemplar de Georg Misch fue nuevamente hallado en el legado de su discípulo Josef König y publicado finalmente por Hans-Ulrich Lessing en 1989 en el Dilthey-Jahrbuch für Philosophie und Geschichte der Geisteswissenschaften (cf. Vol. 6, 237-239). Harto se sabe que el texto fue redactado con premura por Heidegger para optar por una plaza de profesor de filosofía en la Universidad de Gotinga que no prosperó, pero que sí le dio la oportunidad de convertirse en profesor extraordinario de filosofía en Marburgo en 1923. Natorp y Hartmann hallaron en este escrito "una originalidad inusitada, profundidad y rigurosidad" (citado por Günther Neumann: "Nachwort des Herausgebers", PIA: 91).4 Ahora bien, más allá de lo estrictamente anecdótico y de las impresiones suscitadas por el documento en cuestión, su contenido es notablemente ambiguo, es decir, alusivo, incluso si se quiere, formalindicativo (formal-anzeigend). Es 'bizco', si uno se ve obligado a emplear la terminología menospreciativa de Bourdieu, pero solamente a causa del carácter de difícil aprehensión de 'lo histórico' (das Historische), pues es lo histórico lo que resiste la mirada; es la vida, que los filósofos quieren categorizar, la que se ve contrariada por las dilogías y el joven fenomenólogo se hace eco aquí, sin duda, de las protestas de Kierkegaard ante la propuesta de una logización absoluta de la vida humana. Heidegger eleva a principio metodológico aquel decir de Heráclito de que "el señor a quien pertenece el oráculo que está en Delfos no afirma ni oculta, sino que indica..." (DK 22 B 93. Itálicas añadidas). La ambigüedad (Zweideutigkeit) del estilo de Heidegger no ha de ser prejuzgada como una actitud cobarde para encubrir sobre todo, una concepción fundamental de la historia de su génesis [Entstehungsgeschichte] debe abrirse su acceso a partir de la situación teológica de aquel entonces. Fichte, Schelling y Hegel era teólogos, y Kant solamente es... comprensible teológicamente" (GA 61: 7). 4 Sobre la historia del texto, cf. 'Epílogo: Breve Historia de un Documento', que se adjunta en la versión española de Jesús Adrián Escudero. PIA: 105-109. Aristóteles como protofenomenólogo 11 su involucramiento con el Nazismo,5 sino que ha de verse esencialmente de consuno con el problema del ser indagado en su cuestionar filosófico que exige la incertidumbre de la multivocidad. En relación con este susurro indirecto, con este no decir diciendo tan característico de Heidegger y con lo que aquí inmediatamente nos ocupa, a nadie debe tomar por sorpresa el que Gadamer se refiera al Bericht como el 'escrito teológico de juventud de Heidegger': "Era un análisis de la 'situación hermenéutica' con miras a una interpretación de Aristóteles. ¿Y con qué comenzó? Con el joven Lutero, justamente aquel Lutero que exigía a todo aquel que quería ser realmente cristiano, que renunciara a Aristóteles, a ese 'gran mentiroso'" ('Die religiöse Dimension', GW 3: 313/256). Pero es una ligereza de principio el prejuzgar que aquí se va a arremeter contra Aristóteles mediante estrategias teologales. La destrucción que Heidegger ha aprendido del mismo reformador protestante va a ser ahora aplicada a la misma filosofía griega y dará como resultado un aprecio originario por la conceptualidad filosófica que explica esa inusitada originalidad del joven filósofo, tan alabada por Natorp y Hartmann, y que ya había hecho del joven docente de la Selva Negra un hombre famoso en ese difícil mundo académico alemán de entonces sin que siquiera tuviera una cátedra universitaria. Fue su fama la que lo sostuvo y la que le abriría las puertas de la cátedra marburguesa, pues en 1923 aún no había publicado Heidegger nada significativo y esa situación se mantendría hasta 1927, fecha en que por fin sale a la luz Sein und Zeit. Heidegger, en efecto, sigue al Lutero radical6 paso a paso como si él se concediera a sí mismo la tarea de 'reformar' la filosofía. John van Buren 5 Esto está dicho contra Ramón Rodríguez quien, por su parte, reproduce el criterio de que la 'filosofía de Heidegger' (signifique lo que fuere esta expresión que, de rigor, debe entrecomillarse) es neurálgicamente Nazi o de que guarda vínculos 'peligrosos' con el totalitarismo: "[...] Esta reflexión heideggeriana adolece de la misma ambigüedad que envuelve a su posición filosófica final" ('Estudio Preliminar: Heidegger y el Nacionalsocialismo: ¿Un Viaje a Siracusa?', AUA: XLII). 6 Este joven Lutero radical es el de las controversias teológicas apasionadas y el de los lúcidos, si bien forzados y hasta arbitrarios, comentarios bíblicos. También Lutero, en su tiempo, hizo caer en la cuenta de que los escritos bíblicos hablaban en la actualidad y que no eran esa boba repetición de letanías en latín que nadie entendía. Pero no se trata del Lutero más viejo, el cómodo protegido de los príncipes humanistas, que en 1925 despotricó contra las 'hordas ladronas y asesinas de los campesinos' y que no se dedicaba más a las diatribas teologales exaltadas sino – en una suerte de 'papismo de nuevo cuño' – a los meros Jethro Masís 12 ha evocado que Lutero, también – y esto, desde luego, no puede ser una mera casualidad –, se ocupó intensamente de la filosofía aristotélica: Lutero había estudiado detalladamente los escritos de Aristóteles y los había enseñado. 'Lo comprendo', mantenía Lutero, 'incluso mejor que a Tomás o que a Duns Escoto' (WA VI 458/XLIV 201). En 1517, estaba trabajando en un comentario al primer libro de la Física en que planeaba desenmascarar la inhabilidad de la filosofía de Aristóteles para expresar las realidades cristianas, pero nunca fue completado de esta forma (WA Briefwechsel I 88/XLVIII 38). [...] En concordancia con Lutero, 'no es que la filosofía sea maligna por sí misma', sino más bien su 'mal uso'. 'Hay que filosofar bien'" (1994b: 169). En sus Lecciones sobre la Epístola a los Romanos (1515), Lutero demuestra que la destructio no destruye, si con ello se da a entender una total eliminación de lo criticado. La 'Destruktion', como tantas veces insistió Gadamer, solamente es comprensible para quien tiene oído para la lengua alemana – esto lo dice contra Derrida – porque el término "no tiene nunca el sonido negativo de 'aniquilamiento' [Zerstörung] como sugiere el uso del vocablo en otras lenguas" ('Frühromantik, Hermeneutik, Dekonstruktivismus', GW 10: 132/66).7 Asimismo, el lado constructivo de la destructio se cumple ya en Lutero con una apropiación no escolástica de términos aristotélicos como fu,sij, du,namij, evne,rgeia, ste,rhsij y ki,nhsij. Por ello, con el fin de explicar lo que el apóstol Pablo llamó 'transformación mediante la renovación del entendimiento' (metamorfou/sqe th/| avnakainw,sei tou/ noo,j, cf. Ro 12:2. GNT: 552), Lutero recurre a Aristóteles y afirma, en sus lecciones sobre la mencionada epístola paulina, que "el camino hacia Dios, como la vida humana en general, es un constante movimiento (ki,nhsij) circular transformativo, ya que lo que es en acto (evne,rgeia) nunca se abstiene de la falta, de la privación (ste,rhsij), del tratadillos catequéticos dedicados a la reglamentación de la nueva iglesia. Para un repaso somero de la vida y obra de Lutero, cf. la 'Introducción' de Teófanes Egido a Lutero, O: 11-61. 7 Según la invectiva de Gadamer, el término Destruktion en cuanto desmantelamiento (Abbau) conceptual – es decir, no Zerstörung – fue introducido en este sentido por Heidegger "en la década de 1920, y supongo que Derrida no era plenamente consciente de ello, por lo cual elegió una palabra que, según mi sensibilidad lingüística, es extraña y redundante [se refiere, notablemente, a 'deconstrucción'], ya que parece que él percibía efectivamente sólo el sentido negativo en 'Destruktion'" ('Frühromantik, Hermeneutik, Dekonstruktivismus', GW 10: 132-133/66). Aristóteles como protofenomenólogo 13 todavía-no de la potencia (du,namij), en términos de la cual se repite la vida y se renueva" (citado por van Buren, 1994b: 169). La indicación de la situación hermenéutica (Anzeige der hermeneutischen Situation) apunta a que "[l]a situación de la interpretación, en cuanto apropiación comprensiva del pasado, es siempre la situación de un presente viviente [einer lebendigen Gegenwart]" (PIA: 8/30). Esto es notable a partir de las mismas condiciones de toda interpretabilidad; no se trata, por ello, de un 'genial invento' del filósofo Heidegger, pero sí de una apropiación actual del descubrimiento hermenéutico de Lutero. Hay, pues, en el reformador protestante una novedad sobresaliente: Lutero ha desteoretizado los términos físicos aristotélicos y los ha existencializado: fu,sij, du,namij, evne,rgeia, ste,rhsij y ki,nhsij son términos que ahora se aplican a la vida (en este caso, a la religiöses Leben), y Heidegger se ha dado cuenta de que esto no constituye ninguna arbitrariedad luterana, sino que, como se verá en el acápite siguiente, encuentra apoyo en Aristóteles mismo: a saber, en el Aristóteles no encubierto, sistematizado, por los comentadores. Esta conceptualidad física, es cierto, aparece ligada a una explicación de las condiciones de todas las cosas sujetadas al principio de movimiento (cf. Phys. II, 193b, 3-7), pero aunque se tratase en el Estagirita de una física cósmica, lo cuestionable fenomenológicamente es – para Heidegger tanto como para Husserl, vale recordar – el "origen en un acto productor" (Hua VI: 367) que pueda dar cuenta del sentido de esta conceptualidad teorética. Esto significa que si Husserl buscaba una historia decantada por propalar la tradición geométrica en su sedimentación de sentido – algo que se escapa enteramente a una historia de 'hechos' [Tatsachen] –, Heidegger, por su parte, ejerce de forma semejante un examen de toda la tradición filosófica que invita a recrearla. Pero esto implica ya una verdadera transformación de la fenomenología y, consecuentemente, una ruptura con Husserl. A esta recreación, Heidegger le ha dado un nombre: repetición (Wiederholung).8 De lo que se trata es de la tradición histórica y de lo preguntado e inquirido en esa tradición de interrogabilidad respecto de lo histórico que va de Hegel a Marx, de Vico a Herder, de Ranke a Gadamer y 8 Repetir, wieder-holen, no en el sentido del mero reiterar. Heidegger entiende el verbo holen supuesto en wiederholen en su sentido de reunir, tomar apropiadamente, recoger, ganar de nuevo y, en lo que atañe a la tradición del pensamiento, volver a apropiarse de lo transmitido. Jethro Masís 14 a Koselleck.9 El aporte heideggeriano a esta tradición de interrogabilidad es la ontologización del problema histórico y su redirección hermenéutica, pues una apropiación radical de la historia implica la difícil tarea de "comprender radicalmente lo que en cada momento una determinada investigación filosófica del pasado colocó en su situación y la inquietud de fondo que mostró por esta situación; comprender no significa aceptar sin más el conocimiento establecido, sino repetir [wiederholen]: repetir originariamente lo que es comprendido en términos de la situación más propia y desde el prisma de esa situación" (PIA: 11/33).10 En este sentido, no hay, no puede haber – si eso fuera lo que se busca – una rebeldía filosófica no tradicional, so pena de caer en ingenuidad. Quien quiera saltarse alegremente la tradición sin conocerla, sin apropiársela destructivamente, sin trabajar los prejuicios heredados, corre naturalmente el riesgo de reiterarla. Con la reiteración de lo dicho, periclita el que se aborden problemas filosóficos genuinos. De lo que se trata es, en un sentido radical, de que la tradición sea fiel a sí misma, y no hay refutación más originaria de lo tradicional que la que le pide a la tradición que sea transparente consigo misma. Así, pues, tenía razón Whitehead al enunciar en Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology (1929) que "la caracterización más segura de la tradición filosófica europea es que consiste en una serie de notas al pie de Platón [a series of footnotes to Plato]" (1979: 39), pero no por una suerte de mecanismo iterativo, ni por el mero truismo de que hay una tradición conceptual de la filosofía. El cuestionamiento de la conceptualidad filosófica no es una mera doxología de lo pensado o una historia de la mentalidad. El proyecto de la destrucción no debe limitarse "a ofrecer una multitud de hechos memorables" sino, más bien, consagrarse "de forma radical a cuestiones dignas de ser pensadas en su simplicidad" (PIA: 11/32). De tal 9 Koselleck mismo pretende, por ejemplo, "completar especialmente las determinaciones de finitud de la analítica del Dasein de Heidegger para dirigir la atención a la posibilidad de historias factuales [tatsächlicher]" ('Histórica y Hermenéutica', Koselleck & Gadamer, 2002: 73). 10 Se deja entender con facilidad la aseveración de Gadamer: "Cuando hoy vuelvo a leer esta primera parte de los estudios de Heidegger sobre Aristóteles, la indicación de la situación hermenéutica, es como si encontrara de nuevo el hilo conductor de mi propio trasfondo filosófico y como si debiera repetir nuevamente la elaboración final de la hermenéutica filosófica" ('Heideggers "theologische" Jugendschrift'. PIA: 78). Aristóteles como protofenomenólogo 15 forma, "lejos de desviar la atención del presente con el único fin de enriquecer el conocimiento, la historia de la filosofía fuerza al presente a replegarse sobre sí mismo con el propósito de aumentar su capacidad de interrogabilidad [Fraglichkeit]" (PIA: 11/32-33). Lo que se busca es, pues, el aumento de la interrogabilidad (Steigerung der Fraglichkeit) y no la tranquilización y la jactancia; y si el caso es que, precisamente, la teoría tranquiliza y huye de la vida, se tornan cuestionables, entonces, las razones por las cuales lo teorético ejerce esta huida y por qué acaece este ocultamiento de lo vital en las pretendidas aclaraciones teoréticas. Esto lo ha aprendido bien Heidegger del clima neokantiano de la época, que reproduce una tranquilización respecto de las preguntas más acuciantes. A lo que no puede explicar por carecer de forma, por no adaptarse a la lógica de las categorías que impone, simplemente se lo despacha y posterga.11 Si hay una insistencia metafísica en Occidente no es sino la reiteración obstinada del orden. El ideal de total aclarabilidad de la teoría inventa el marbete de la 'irracionalidad' para lo que prejuzga – cegado por la lógica del facto de la ciencia, aunque tenga pretensiones de 'suma lucidez' – como una mirífica búsqueda fenomenológica por la sedimentación de sentido y por la archievidencia. Sustentado en el principium rationis, que Leibniz imputaba últimamente a Dios en su Théodicée sur la bonté de Dieu, la liberté de l'homme et l'origine du mal (1710) como la causa final de todas las cosas, este ideal sigue intacto hasta nuestros días. Como, en este respecto, afirma Boechl, "[s]i un fenómeno no recibe la distinción de ser un hecho hasta que una razón ha sido descubierta para justificarlo, y si el descubrimiento de una razón inmediatamente asimila un hecho con la totalidad de los otros hechos, entonces lo que se revela como estando fuera o más allá de esa totalidad debe, precisamente, considerarse como algo que aún no es un hecho – como algo aún no conocido por una razón anterior que se espera encontrar conjuntada con las 11 Así Heidegger, en sus lecciones de lógica del semestre de invierno de 1925-1926, objeta a Lotze que su teoría de la validez (Geltung) de lo ideal termine por dejar indeterminado el mismo significado de la validez: "La opinión de Lotze de la supuesta inexplicabilidad de los así llamados conceptos fundamentales es de la tradición" (GA 21: 76). La designación lotzeana de 'validez' para dar cuenta de la 'idea' platónica es para Heidegger, no sólo una comodidad frente a Platón, sino una 'profanación del pasado' (cf. GA 21: 72) que se asienta en el hecho de que "toda la tradición se ha movido en una confusión fundamental respecto de la pregunta por el ser" (GA 21: 75). Jethro Masís 16 otras razones" (2003: 3). Empero, si continúa primando el afán interrogativo, es inexcusable que a Heidegger se le denomine 'irracionalista', sobre todo porque se acepta de entrada, sin que se lo aclare o siquiera discuta, este ideal del principio de razón suficiente. De lo que se trata, lo acuciante, es de la interrogabilidad; cuando se acaban las preguntas, cuando se lo sabe y se lo puede explicar todo, se ha acabado también la radicalidad de la crítica. En su lección de 1925-1926, Logik. Die Frage nach der Wahrheit y, precisamente, en el contexto de un desenterramiento de la conceptualidad aristotélica, Heidegger convoca a evitar que la investigación se mueva desde el principio "por este campo inaclarado con distinciones y conceptos aparentemente bellos de un sistema moderno, en lugar de custodiar la auténtica oscuridad productiva" (GA 21: 165). Con esta presunta claridad sistemático-conceptual lo que sucede es que ya "previamente se han matado los problemas" (GA 21: idem).12 En este sentido, la situación hermenéutica no indica el estado de la mera interpretabilidad textual. Tampoco se trata de ese instrumento metódico perseguido por la tradición que va de Schleiermacher a Dilthey para fundamentar las ciencias del espíritu, sino que, en concordancia con Grondin, "[l]a tarea de la hermenéutica elevada a filosofía no es la teoría de la interpretación, sino la interpretación misma, y concretamente en función de una transparencia para sí misma de la existencia que ésta misma debe conquistar, donde el trabajo filosófico de clarificación sólo lleva a término la interpretación que la existencia entendedora siempre está realizando" (1999: 12 El querer completar lo nunca completado, por lo menos en lo que atañe al Estagirita, no es meramente una 'tentación moderna' sino una tendencia que pertenece de suyo a la teoría: "No hay, de hecho, comentarista de Aristóteles que no lo sistematice a partir de una idea preconcebida: los comentaristas griegos a partir del neoplatonismo, los escolásticos a partir de cierta idea del Dios de la Biblia y su relación con el mundo. Cuanto más profundo es el silencio de Aristóteles, más prolija se hace la palabra del comentarista; no comenta el silencio: lo llena; no comenta el mal acabado: lo acaba; no comenta el apuro: lo resuelve, o cree resolverlo; y acaso lo resuelve de veras, pero en otra filosofía" (Aubenque, 1981: 12). El intérprete moderno cree, por su parte, que puede desentenderse de lo pensado por Aristóteles al reducir su filosofía a un número de tesis (como que el Estagirita acuñó la tesis de la verdad como copia) y, tal como recuerda Heidegger en el mismo espíritu de lo dicho por Aubenque, "cuando se lee esta definición de verdad como europeo del siglo XX, se piensa: es, sin embargo, muy trivial" (GA 21: 163), pero solamente porque lo pensado por Aristóteles ha sido ya reducido y caricaturizado. El problema ha sido ya previamente matado. Aristóteles como protofenomenólogo 17 146). Cuando se habla de interpretación, no se hace remisión a los textos, sino que el tema siempre es el Dasein que es cada vez sí mismo ('das jeweilige Dasein', cf. GA 63: 47). El Dasein, desde el punto de vista vital, ya es interpretativo-comprensivo de por sí; y el comprender, como quedó afirmado en Sein und Zeit, "es el ser existencial del propio poder ser del Dasein mismo, de tal manera que este ser abre en sí mismo lo que pasa consigo mismo" (SZ: § 31, 144). Lo digno de ser interrogado en este punto es, pues, lo que también preguntado por Kisiel: ¿Qué encontró Heidegger en Aristóteles? (cf. 1995: 227-275). Hasta este punto, a causa del estilo del joven Heidegger y de sus justificadas invectivas contra la no apropiación originaria de la conceptualidad tradicional, se sabe que lo hallado en Aristóteles es el signo de la oscuridad académica que, paradójicamente, se jacta de saber lo que no sabe. El tábano socrático bajo el que Heidegger se abandera sigue asiéndose de la manida pretensión de "examinar a los que creen ser sabios y no lo son" (Apol. Sóc. 33c), y el viejo Natorp, sin duda, ha dado una gran muestra de apertura y de madurez al apoyar la candidatura del joven asistente de Husserl, cuando precisamente éste se aprestaba a derrumbar el edificio neokantiano. El Informe Natorp demuestra inequívocamente el rechazo de Heidegger de la filosofía académica de la época en la que creció y se formó. La Interrogabilidad Aristotélica por el Movimiento de la Vida Durante su período de juventud, Heidegger se ocupó, intensa y sistemáticamente, de Aristóteles. Es de notar que este orden del trayecto no es producto de la casualidad, sino que una vez anunciado el proyecto anatréptico de la Destruktion fenomenológica y de la repetición, la remisión a Aristóteles es de rigor, puesto que su obra ha sido el lugar de la acuñación de una conceptualidad, aún vinculante y decisiva, cuya permanencia y difusión sería incluso inútil negar. En el tiempo de Heidegger, Aristóteles había sido ya trocado en todo un epistemólogo, pero el joven enseñante dirá que el conocimiento (Erkenntnis), en el sentido imperante de entonces, no es ningún problema para el Estagirita (cf. GA 61: 5); no es tampoco el filósofo griego alguien a quien pueda endilgársele la estampa de realista ('nicht zum Realisten stempeln', cf. GA 61: idem). Todas estas distinciones que se le imputan al filósofo de Estagira no son, para Heidegger, sino puras "debilidades [Schwachheiten] y comodidades [Bequemlichkeiten]" (GA 61: Jethro Masís 18 4). El 'Filósofo' es un invento de una tradición de comentadores de textos a veces disímiles, inconclusos y hasta contradictorios que, no obstante, han sido elevados al estatuto de sistema. Pero las cortapisas que se quieren solventar tanto en la actitud teorética de los medioevales, como en el afán sistematizador de los modernos, no ayudan a las pretensiones de Heidegger de demorarse en las oscuridades y no resolverlas. Quizá, por primera vez, haya de tenerse la no resolución como un rasgo positivo de la espesura de la problematicidad filosófica y deba elevarse la interrogabilidad al lugar incómodo y difícil que merece.13 En este sentido, la exposición en el Informe Natorp de los textos aristotélicos es bastante escueta, si bien sumamente insinuadora y formalindicativa, en el respecto más hondo de la expresión. La naturaleza del texto, es decir, las circunstancias que lo rodearon y, en especial, la premura 13 Lo hasta aquí dicho no tiene, por cierto, las pretensiones apologéticas del 'heideggeriano puro'. Esta designación es empleada por Javier Bengoa, quien acusa al autor de Sein und Zeit de incoherencia. Los heideggerianos puros serían quienes no admiten las incoherencias de Heidegger (cf. 1997: 76) y quienes se dejan envolver por lo que Bengoa mismo califica de "procedimiento retórico muy frecuentemente usado por Heidegger" (1997: 79, n. 101): Heidegger se inventa un enemigo imaginario a quien descalifica y desfigura y, posteriormente, se hace de los descubrimientos del pensador desfigurado (en el análisis de Bengoa se trata de Husserl), cuya conceptualidad simplemente trueca mediante una terminología rara y propia. La convicción de Heidegger de que lo esencial de un pensador es la ambigüedad de lo que dice (por ejemplo en SG: 123-124) es, según Bengoa, una clara prueba de debilidad interpretativa. También Bourdieu desacredita a los 'intérpretes inmanentes' de los textos heideggerianos, "los guardianes de las formas que consideran sacrílego o vulgar cualquier otro enfoque que no sea la meditación interna de la obra" (1991: 17). Está también, por último, la alarmante confesión de Derrida, en su famoso ensayo contra el pretendido humanismo heideggeriano: "Poco importa, para los fines que yo quería plantear, que este o aquel autor haya leído mal o no haya simplemente leído este o aquel texto, o que siga, en lo tocante a los pensamientos que cree haber sobrepasado o trastocado, manteniéndose en gran estado de ingenuidad" (2003: 156). Ahora, Bengoa concluye que la primacía del futuro en Sein und Zeit "es consecuencia de la distinción entre la temporalidad auténtica y la inauténtica y de la asignación del presente a esta última" (1997: 82). Pero, precisamente, la lectura sopesada de las lecciones de Heidegger demuestra lo contrario de la incoherencia que pretende probar Bengoa. La futuridad temporal no es una creación heideggeriana sacada de la manga por mor del argumento de Sein und Zeit. El tratamiento de la vida religiosa que aparece en Phänomenologie des religiösen Lebens (GA 60; texto, por cierto, no citado por Bengoa) manifiesta una seria reflexión sobre este asunto que Heidegger explota del tiempo en concepción kairológica. No aceptar las interpretaciones fáciles y ya decididas de antemano, no es lo mismo que ser un 'heideggeriano puro'. Aristóteles como protofenomenólogo 19 con la que fue redactado, pueden explicar esta circunstancia. Pero el sorprendente carácter alusivo –¡Aristóteles casi no es citado en el texto! – de las lecciones sobre Aristóteles del semestre de invierno 1921-1922 (cf. GA 61) no dejan lugar a dudas de que Heidegger no se presta para lecturas eruditas, por más que contradiga en varias ocasiones las opiniones de los expertos, como Bonitz, Jaeger y Ross. Heidegger anuncia el plan de la lección de la forma siguiente: Las investigaciones que siguen no tienen la intención de brindar una apología o salvación de las obras de Aristóteles, ni tienen como su meta una renovación de Aristóteles o la iniciación de un aristotelismo apegado a los resultados de las ciencias modernas (GA 61: 11). Con la anterior confesión, se clarifica el cometido de Heidegger: el rechazo de un plumazo de las posturas más comunes con que los filósofos se han hecho cargo de Aristóteles: o bien, en un neoaristotelismo apologéticodogmático que lo puede explicar todo a partir del pretendido 'realismo' fundado por Aristóteles, o ya bien mediante una postura justificativa del presente, es decir, moderna,14 que quiere ver en el Estagirita un hito antiguo en el camino del progreso de la ciencia. Si, como dice Capelle al reproducir un prejuicio tradicional, "[l]os tres milesios – Tales, Anaximandro y Anaxímenes – son los primeros precursores del camino de la ciencia", a causa de "su decisivo alejamiento del mundo del mito y su marcada orientación hacia la investigación y el pensar racional" (1992: 31), no es sino Aristóteles quien llevaría hasta sus consecuencias más radicales el pensamiento racional anclado en la inmutabilidad del avrch,. 14 "La modernidad surge de la experiencia de la distancia: de la convicción de que el presente se separa del pasado por una fisura [durch einen Riss]" (Figal, 1996: 112). Las implicaciones con el pasado, es decir, tradicionales al fin y al cabo, que siempre resalta Heidegger de la pretendida nueva conceptualidad filosófica moderna, son una negación directa de esta fisura (Riss), que no es más que un artilugio urdido en la llamada querelle des anciens et des modernes del diecisiete. ¿Es cierto que la modernidad trae consigo todo un nuevo aparataje conceptual que surge de la rebeldía respecto de la tradición? Heidegger lo niega: "[L]a metafísica de Descartes y las de Spinoza, Leibniz, Wolff, Kant y Hegel nacen a partir de las Disputationes Metaphysicae del jesuita y tomista español Suárez, merced a cuya mediación entraron en la modernidad la problemática y la conceptualidad ontológicas (él mismo, Tomás y por tanto Aristóteles)" (GA 21: 173). Jethro Masís 20 Con todo, la sucesión de las páginas y el consecuente avance de la lectura dará al lector la impresión de que, más bien, Aristóteles y su filosofía no es el tema de esta lección heideggeriana de juventud, sino un abordaje de la vida fáctica con miras al desvelamiento de lo que allí Heidegger llamó 'las categorías fundamentales de la vida' ('Grundkategorien des Lebens', cf. GA 61: 84 ss): esto es, un claro antecedente de los Existentialien de Sein und Zeit. En efecto, tenemos aquí, como se ha insistido, un tratamiento alusivo de la conceptualidad aristotélica que se rescata de los escombros de la destrucción, solamente para que Heidegger mismo discurra sobre 'la cosa misma' (die Sache selbst) que a Aristóteles le preocupaba y que también debería preocuparnos hoy. Esto es, pues, lo que significa investigar la inquietud de fondo y repetirla (cf. PIA: 11/33). Acto seguido, ofrecemos un trayecto por esta inquietud de fondo mediante el seguimiento del abordaje algo apresurado por parte de Heidegger de algunos textos aristotélicos, tanto en el Informe Natorp (cf. PIA: 45-75/60-85) como en su lección Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles (GA 61) y en su lección sobre lógica (cf. GA 21: 126-195): Metafísica, libro A, 1 y 2; y libro G 7 y E 4; De Interpretatione 1; Ética a Nicómaco, libro Z; De Anima, libro G; y Física, libros A y B, y libro G, 1-3. Estamos ante un docente de cursos filosóficos en la Universidad de Friburgo rayano en el primer lustro de sus treinta años de edad que aún tantea direcciones hacia las que lanzar su trayecto filosófico. Se puede incluso asentir sin problema alguno a la convicción de Bengoa, quien a su vez se apoya en análisis precedentes sobre Heidegger de Theunissen y Tugendhat, de que "Sein und Zeit es una amalgama de análisis que no han sido suficientemente integrados" (1997: 74, n. 88); pero solamente porque, para Heidegger, esa desintegración es solidaria de quien quiera atenerse a los fenómenos. Al haber puesto sus ojos sobre Aristóteles, Heidegger está haciendo lo que ya había llevado a cabo en cuanto a la vida religiosa: se encuentra en pos de la inquietud que yace en el fondo de lo dicho: "[S]i hacemos un esfuerzo histórico por saber lo que pensaba Aristóteles, cuál era su opinión sobre la verdad, no lo hacemos movidos por algún tipo de interés de anticuario, sino que la pregunta preguntada históricamente tiene que forzarnos hacia nosotros mismos, hacia nuestra historia" (GA 21: 124). Aristóteles como protofenomenólogo 21 Metafísica, libro A, 1 y 2; y libro G 7 y E 4; De Interpretatione 1 En carta a Natorp de enero de 1922, Husserl promocionaba a su joven asistente como una "personalidad sumamente original [eine ganz originelle Persönlichkeit]", cuya manera fenomenológica de ver (seine Weise phänomenologisch zu sehen) estaba marcada por una originariedad propia que lo hacía tener un efecto totalmente único ante los mismos discípulos del maestro. Y Husserl, en esto, no se equivocaba. La originalidad heideggeriana, sobre todo en lo que atañe a su lectura de los griegos, es pasmosa; particularmente, cuando la filosofía griega comienza a hablar de nuevo, como si la tradición le hubiese vedado el derecho de tener su propia voz; como si la filosofía europea moderna no tuviera ya nada más que aprender de los antiguos, a los que sólo se les achacan errores e ingenuidades. Por muy admirables y sugestivos que hayan sido los antiguos, terminan por concebirse – según una caracterización del tiempo histórico que se adjudican los modernos a sí mismos – como mero antecedente cuya culminación son ellos mismos. En el escrito de autobiografía intelectual, Mein Weg in die Phänomenologie (1963), Heidegger menciona la disertación de Brentano, Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden bei Aristoteles (1862), que le había sido obsequiada por Conrad Gröber en sus años de educación secundaria, como el texto que por primera vez, si bien de forma vacilante y confusa, le había despertado la inquietud hacia la pregunta por el sentido del ser. La cuestión directora del pensamiento de Heidegger ha sido, pues, avivada por el influjo de Aristóteles.15 Los textos consagrados a investigaciones aristotélicas que pertenecen al primer lustro de los años veinte, ya mucho más decididos y seguros, permiten ver cuán cercanos hallaba Heidegger su propia visión fenomenológica y la visión del Estagirita. En concordancia con Kisiel, Heidegger "encontró en primer lugar una afinidad notable entre sus propias investigaciones fenomenológicas originales y los textos de Aristóteles, tanto en el método como en el contenido. Al transponer sus interpretaciones tempranas de la facticidad dinámica de la vida sobre estos textos, encontró también en este filósofo de la vida griego [this Greek life-philosopher] con un sentido para la historia de 15 "De un modo bastante impreciso me movía la reflexión siguiente: Si el ente viene dicho con muchos significados, ¿cuál será entonces el significado fundamental y conductor? ¿Qué quiere decir ser?" (TS: 95). Jethro Masís 22 los problemas filosóficos ¡a un proto-fenomenólogo!" (1995: 228). Mas, ¿no es una osadía de parte de Heidegger el decir esto del antiguo maestro del Liceo? ¿No actúa de la misma manera que los neokantianos que querían a un Aristóteles epistemólogo? ¿Aristóteles, un filósofo de la vida? La respuesta a estas cuestiones solamente hallará una contestación satisfactoria si la evidencia proviene de los mismos textos aristotélicos y de una comprensión adecuada del pensamiento griego en general. Por lo pronto sabemos que lo legado, lo que se nos ha dicho del filósofo presuntamente sistemático y 'realista', Aristóteles, quien, por lo demás, contradecía a su maestro, 'idealista', Platón, dista mucho de un criterio tan inusitado como el heideggeriano. El descubrimiento de Heidegger de este Aristóteles desempolvado de los anaqueles de los libros que, por construir erudición de meros datos, no logra penetrar en la inquietud de fondo, se asemeja a la polémica en torno a Die Geburt der Tragödie (1872) de Nietzsche, desatada por las invectivas de Wilamowitz-Möllendorf con su panfleto: ¡Filología del futuro! Una Réplica a 'El Nacimiento de la Tragedia' (1872), que desprestigió a Nietzsche como filólogo.16 Los datos son mudos; no tienen nada que decirnos. Por más provechosos que resulten los trabajos eruditos sobre Aristóteles y por más necesarios que devengan los datos en cuanto ubicación contextual e historiográfica, el pensador no puede demorarse mucho en las teorías, sino que su lugar es lo pensado, el asunto mismo (die Sache selbst) que provoca la inquietud sin cierre de la verdadera interrogabilidad filosófica. Lo que cuenta es "en qué sentido tenemos algo que aprender de los griegos: no aceptar lo que hicieron, sino ¡comprenderlo genuinamente!" (GA 61: 121). La traducción que aparece en Sein und Zeit de las primeras palabras de la Metafísica aristotélica es ya ilustrativa de todo un trabajo de reflexión de fondo de esta especie meditativa de abordar la filosofía que Heidegger denomina 'repetición' (Wiederholung), pero que con el transcurrir de los años comenzará a llevar el nombre de 'pensar' (Denken). Con todo, si se desconoce el trasfondo investigativo del que esta traducción pulula y adquiere su lugar, es posible que no se la estime en toda su amplitud. La conocida sentencia del Estagirita es la siguiente: 16 Sobre esta polémica, cf. 'La Polémica en Torno a El Nacimiento de la Tragedia', Barrios, 2002: 105-115. Aristóteles como protofenomenólogo 23 Pa,ntej a;nqrwpoi tou/ eivde,nai ovre,gontai fu,sei (Met. A, 1, 980a 21). En este pasaje, según Heidegger, no se dice: "[T]odos los hombres desean por naturaleza saber" (según la versión de García Yebra, más apegada al latín de Moerbeke: Omnes homines natura scire desiderant), sino, más bien: "[E]n el ser del hombre yace esencialmente el cuidado por el ver [Im Sein des Menschen liegt wesenhaft die Sorge des Sehens]" (SZ: §36, 171). No es, de forma alguna, una arbitrariedad deliberada o un propósito de figurar el que lleva a Heidegger a este traslado que, en primera instancia, parece forzado y artificioso. Heidegger identifica, precisamente en este parágrafo § 36 que gira en torno a la curiosidad (Neugier), el eivde,nai con ei=doj y de ahí con el 'ver', en concordancia con Aristóteles quien, por su parte, se apresta a añadir que, de todos los sentidos, es la vista "el que nos hace conocer más" (Met. A, 1, 980a 26). Notables son, en esta sugestiva traducción heideggeriana, los vocablos eivde,nai y ovre,gontai, pues eivde,nai guarda relación con la tendencia intuitiva del pensamiento griego que consiste en un 'ver' de donde, a la postre, surge la tendencia hacia la qewri,a y, así, hacia la contemplación que confunde el ser con la presencia: la ouvsia en cuanto sujeto o ùpo,stasij es para Heidegger "sólo un giro tardogriego de la expresión que no acierta en absoluto con el significado del término" (GA 21: 71). La ouvsi,a no significa nunca una cosa, la substancia, o algo real en sentido moderno (por ejemplo, en Descartes como la cosa real por autosuficiente "que existe de tal manera que no necesita de ninguna otra cosa para existir", Principia Philosophiae: I, 51), sino "lo que comparece, o la comparecencia, lo siempre presente" (GA 21: idem). El otro vocablo destacable es ovre,gontai concebido desde una o;rexij que no es un mero desear, sino un cuidado (Sorge) constitutivo del ser humano, que apunta hacia la apertura de un mundo en el que el Dasein se despliega de forma ocupada y práxica. En referencia al conocido decir parmenídeo, to. ga.r avuto. noei/n evsti,n te kai. ei=nai, Heidegger refiere que "[e]l ser es lo que se muestra en un pura percepción intuitiva, y sólo este ver descubre el ser" (SZ: § 36, 171). Así, pues, no se trata de esa caracterización fácil de Parménides como 'idealista' porque aquí estaría identificando el 'ser' (ei=nai) con el 'pensar' (noei/n): 'idealismo' y 'realismo' son sólo caracterizaciones tardías que se hallan totalmente fuera del ámbito del pensamiento antiguo. Para Heidegger, una opinión tal constituiría errar en lo más básico, puesto que no sabemos aún qué sea la avlh,qeia si pensamos como modernos, es decir, en Jethro Masís 24 el juicio, en la proposición, en las relaciones que deban haber entre un sujeto y sus objetos, etcétera, etcétera. Pensar desde el dictum de Parménides significa reconocer que el avlhqeu,ein no significa el ser verdadero y yeu,desqai el ser falso, si todavía no se toma en cuenta la tendencia intuitiva de la concepción griega del conocimiento y de la práxis. El ser verdadero, el avlhqeu,ein en sentido griego, no significa una relación de entes con otros entes sino "descubrir en el sentido de desvelar, de retirar el ocultamiento de algo" (GA 21: 131). Consecuentemente, "el contraconcepto yeu,desqai tampoco significa ser falso; traducido de este modo, no se aprecia en absoluto el sentido de la frase; sino que significa confundir, por ejemplo confundir a otro, ponerle delante de aquello que él cree que se le da a ver, una cosa distinta que parece ser igual a..." (GA 21: 132). De tal forma, "[p]ara marcar también en una expresión lingüística el contraconcepto de 'descubrir' [avlhqeu,ein], traducimos yeu,desqai como 'ocultar'" (GA 21: idem). Lo antedicho aporta elementos interesantísimos para comprender la designación heideggeriana de Aristóteles como proto-fenomenólogo o como quien se atuvo estrictamente a los fenómenos, a las cosas mismas, si bien recae ulteriormente en los tentáculos de la qewri,a. Esto porque el eivde,nai que yace en la obertura de la Metafísica aristotélica ciertamente no es cualquier 'ver' como el ver nada más por mor del mero ver de la curiositas: diríase que no se trata de la concupiscentia oculorum denostada por Agustín en Confessiones. La apertura del mundo está sugerida en esta concepción de la verdad como des-ocultamiento (avlh,qeia, prestando atención a la negación de lh,qh, lo manifiesto) y se trata, por tanto, de un ver que ya se ha visto. Conocer en la verdad es des-ocultamiento, es decir, es desvelar lo que ya ha sido visto. Conocer es haber visto (Wissen heisst gesehen haben) y lo esencial en Aristóteles es precisamente to. ti, h=n ei=nai, lo que ya era con antelación de su plasmación actual. Aquí "[e]l ei=doj, como aspecto anticipado en la imaginación de lo que ha de ser formado, da la cosa con respecto a lo que esta cosa ya era y es antes de que fuera efectuada. Por ello, el aspecto anticipado, el ei=doj, se denomina también to. ti, h=n ei=nai, lo que un ente ya era" (GA 24: 150). Heidegger cree que ha hallado en la avlh,qeia en cuanto desocultamiento un anticipo de las reflexiones husserlianas sobre la intuición categorial y, más aún, las posibilidades de ensancharla y de explotar toda su Aristóteles como protofenomenólogo 25 hondura. Esto se sigue de la circunstancia de que al mismo tiempo que se dedicaba a sus lecciones sobre Aristóteles, impartía un seminario práctico introductorio en torno a las Logische Untersuchungen husserlianas (cf. 'Appendix B: Heideggers Lehrveranstaltungen, 1915-1930', Kisiel, 1995: 463). Según Heidegger, el carácter del conocimiento griego se decanta decididamente por la intuición, es decir, la verdad es verdad de lo que 'es visto' y, en tanto des-ocultamiento, de lo que ya ha sido visto. Esto dará pie también para que Heidegger rompa con Husserl y con toda la tradición aneja al ver contemplativo de la qewri,a. Pero tanto más provechosas resultan las descripciones aristotélicas cuando "Aristóteles se atiene a los testimonios fácticos [er hält sich an die faktischen Dafürnahmen]... a partir de los cuales la vida interpreta sus propios modos de tratar con el mundo" (PIA: 60/74). Lo que Heidegger en este punto pretende mostrar es que la sofi,a no es para Aristóteles, en principio, una mera contemplación intelectual o especulación en cuanto la acción de speculare: el tener un punto de mira privilegiado desde el que se pueda tener la totalidad de lo que es a partir de una evpisth,mh qewretikh,. Que Aristóteles refiera que la qewri,a es lo mejor, lo realmente superior (cf. Met. L, 1072b 23) o que funde la felicidad en la contemplación (cf. Eth. Nic. X, 8, 1178b 32), significa para la investigación de carácter fenomenológico que la sofi,a es como tal "constitutiva para el ser de la vida humana" (PIA: 59/73). Es decir, "que la estructura de la comprensión pura sólo resulta inteligible a partir de su enraizamiento ontológico en la vida fáctica [aus ihrer seinsmässigen Verwurzelung im faktischen Leben] y a partir de su génesis en ésta" (PIA: idem). Heidegger lee phaenomenologico sensu, y para ello se deshace de la reflexión husserliana como medio de acceso hacia las cosas mismas. En sentido contrario al maestro fenomenológico, Heidegger cree que, precisamente, "donde falta la reflexión, el fenómeno se muestra en su sentido más propio" (GA 17: 287). A los actos de reflexión caros a Husserl, el joven fenomenólogo de la vida fáctica le opondrá, en esta lección de 1923-1924 que se cita ahora, Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung, un procedimiento que llama 'retorsión' (Verdrehung): "Todo ser-aprehendido [Erfassendsein], todo conocer es, considerado desde el punto de vista de la retorsión, interpretación del Jethro Masís 26 Dasein mismo" (GA 17: 285).17 La elevación de la sofi,a a rango superior tiene mucho que decir respecto de la vida, puesto que debe notarse, sobre todo, que "Aristóteles retoma de la vida fáctica y de la forma coloquial de hablar la propia expresión sofw,teron: lo que uno comprende mejor que otro, saber más que otro" (PIA: 60/74). De tal forma, en la mayor capacidad de saber del sofo,n, en el ma/llon eivde,nai, "se hace visible el 'aspecto' del asunto que reclama la atención del trato, y ese asunto no se manifiesta como objeto de una determinación teorética, sino como asunto de una preocupación práctica" (PIA: idem). Posteriormente, a causa de la radicalización de los postulados exigidos por la visión contemplativa, "[e]l observar deviene una forma independiente del trato y, como tal, se convierte en el correlato de una preocupación particular" (PIA: 61/74). Lo teorético tiene en Aristóteles un arraigo en lo fáctico, y no viceversa. Y su filosofía de la pra/xij en absoluto viene exigida por una teoría de la vida práctica, sino por un enraizamiento genuino en la misma facticidad. El Estagirita "extrae el sentido de la 'filosofía' a través de la interpretación de una actividad fáctica del cuidado con arreglo a su tendencia última. Sin embargo, este trato puramente contemplativo se revela como un tipo de trato de cuyo horizonte queda excluido, precisamente, el fenómeno de la vida misma en que el trato está anclado" (PIA: 75). Ética a Nicómaco, libro Z; De Anima, libro G El enraizamiento fáctico del pensamiento aristotélico tiene, como ejemplo más expedito, el caso paradigmático del trato práxico que se halla en la fro,nhsij. A contrapelo de la común asunción de Aristóteles como pensador sistemático, Heidegger estatuye que no hay, en Aristóteles, una teoría abarcante, un sistema, del que, por división, se llegue al estrato más básico de la pra/xij. Por ello, el tratamiento de las virtudes dianoéticas que se encuentra en la Ética Nicómaco, es mucho más que ilustrativo. 17 Se adopta, de Berciano (cf. 2001: 180), 'retorsión' como traducción de 'Verdrehung'. El verbo 'verdrehen' significa literalmente 'retorcer', pero 'retorcimiento' no parece dar a entender bien lo que Heidegger tiene en mente con el término. La retorsión significa que no ha de despacharse lo que ha sido pensado en otras épocas como error, sino que la vida siempre habla en lo pensado. Por tanto, la retorsión involucra el procedimiento de volver lo pensado sobre la vida misma, con el fin de que la vida hable. Así, verbigracia, si se ha concebido la eternidad, entonces se la retuerce, de forma que confiese lo que quiere decir tal idea de la vida: en este caso, la huida de la finitud y de la muerte. Aristóteles como protofenomenólogo 27 En este respecto, podría cotejarse el abordaje de las virtudes por parte de Platón, para quien la templanza (swfrosu,nh), el valor (avndrei,a) y la sabiduría (sofi,a o fro,nhsij) corresponden de forma armónica con las partes del alma: respectivamente, apetitiva (evpiqumhtiko,n), activa (qumoeide,j) y racional (logistiko,n).18 Como ha argumentado Aubenque, "la teoría de las virtudes, partiendo de una totalidad a dividir en sus articulaciones naturales, apunta a la exhaustividad, al sistema" (1999: 47); pero ese, precisamente, no es el caso de Aristóteles para quien, más bien, el punto de partida "no es una esencia, cuyas determinaciones posibles se trataría de analizar, sino un nombre – fro,nimoj – que designa un cierto tipo de hombres que todos sabemos reconocer, que podemos distinguir de otros personajes emparentados y, sin embargo, diferentes, cuyos modelos nos son ofrecidos por la historia, la leyenda y la literatura" (Aubenque, 1999: 45). La fro,nhsij es, así, una virtud que realmente existe en algunos hombres que, por así decirlo, tienen "el ojo que proporciona la experiencia" (Eth. Nic. VI, 11, 1143b). Por ello, no basta con un sistema teórico del que, idealmente, derivaríase una virtud, un modo de ser, del trato práctico. Al contrario, según Aristóteles, "[a]cerca de la fro,nhsij podríamos alcanzar una idea de esta manera: considerando a quiénes solemos llamar prudentes" (Eth. Nic. VI, 5, 1140a), esto es, "la definición, cualquiera que sea, de la esencia de la prudencia presupone, no sólo de hecho (como es el caso de las virtudes éticas), sino de derecho, la existencia del hombre prudente y la descripción de esta existencia. Aquí, el recurso al retrato no es sucedáneo, sino una exigencia de la cosa misma" (Aubenque, 1999: 50). Esa remisión aristotélica hacia el conocimiento popular, hacia lo que todo el mundo ya sabe y puede reconocer sin dificultades en alguien en particular, constituye el rasgo fenomenológico que Heidegger encuentra en Aristóteles, y su convicción de que el Estagirita no se refugia en invenciones geniales ni en especulaciones de raigambre teorética, sino que se atiene a lo fenoménico. En efecto, "[l]a existencia del prudente, tal como está atestiguada por el lenguaje de los hombres, precede a la determinación de la esencia de la prudencia" (Aubenque, 1999: 45). De ello se sigue que estas virtudes aristotélicas no sean cualidades accidentales que se adhieren a las cosas. Las virtudes (te,cnh, evpisth,mh, fro,nhsij, sofi,a y nou/j) se refieren a 18 Al respecto, cf. Rep. IV, 439d ss y 427e; también Banq. 196b y Leyes I, 631b. Jethro Masís 28 las cualidades "con las que el alma alcanza la verdad" (Eth. Nic. VI, 3, 1139b 15-18), y esto devuelve a Heidegger al sentido del avlhqeu,ein. En traducción heideggeriana, no se trata de las cualidades con las que el alma alcanza la verdad – en ese lenguaje tradicional inaclarado – sino de aquellos modos "por los cuales la vida tiene y toma en custodia el ente en cuanto desvelado" (PIA: 46/61). En concordancia con Heidegger, "[l]a interpretación correcta del sentido de avlhqe,j-avlh,qeia resulta de una importancia capital: para la comprensión del análisis aristotélico de los fenómenos arriba mencionados; para la comprensión de su diversidad fenoménica y de las diferentes operaciones constitutivas que intervienen en la realización de la custodia del ser y, finalmente, para la comprensión del carácter de estos fenómenos en cuanto modos específicos de activar la vitalidad fundamental del inteligir como tal (nou/j, noei/n)" (PIA: 46/62). Propiamente hablando, las virtudes dianoéticas no son, entonces, la 'técnica', la 'ciencia', la 'prudencia', la 'sabiduría' y el 'intelecto', si con ellas se entienden las disposiciones establecidas dentro de una teoría de la práctica, sino el proceder técnico-productivo (te,cnh), la determinación que observa, discute y demuestra (evpisth,mh), la circunspección propia de la solicitud (fro,nhsij), la comprensión propiamente intuitiva (sofi,a), y el inteligir puro (nou/j) (cf. PIA: 46/61): es decir, son modos de ser del Dasein, modos ocupados de desempeñarse en el mundo. Si se pasa por alto que las virtudes son anunciadas como haciendo referencia a la verdad, como el modo mediante el cual el alma (yuch,) se refiere al des-ocultamiento, entonces es probable que se yerre en lo más fundamental, que no es sino la misma explicación de Aristóteltes de estos modos de existencia que "permiten llevar a cabo una auténtica custodia del ser en la verdad [Seinsverwahrung]" (PIA: 45/60-61). Hacer del Estagirita el promotor de una idea de la avlh,qeia como adaequatio entre el pensamiento y el objeto es lo que Heidegger denominaba el peligro de una profanación del pasado (cf. GA 21: 72). Por el contrario, "en Aristóteles no se encuentra la más mínima huella ni de este concepto de verdad como 'adecuación', ni de la concepción corriente de lo,goj como juicio válido, ni mucho menos de la 'teoría de la copia'" (PIA: 47/62). Aún más, "convertir a Aristóteles – en el contexto de una apologética dirigida contra un 'idealismo' mal comprendido – en el principal testigo de ese monstruo epistemológico llamado 'realismo crítico' significa interpretar de un modo completamente Aristóteles como protofenomenólogo 29 erróneo la situación fenoménica tal y como se presenta en sus fuentes" (PIA: idem); se trata, simplemente, de un prejuicio descaradamente impuesto al pensamiento aristotélico. Lo que se descubre en esta remisión aristotélica de la disposición de la vida hacia el des-ocultamiento en los modos en que custodia el ser es, contrariamente a lo pensado tradicionalmente, que "la verdad no se determina primariamente en relación con la proposición, sino con el conocimiento como intuición" (GA 21: 109-110). En De Anima, Aristóteles refiere que el carácter de lo falso (yeu/doj, yeude,j) solamente se da allí donde tiene lugar una 'síntesis': to. ga.r yeu/doj evn sunqe,sei avei, (De An. G, 6, 430b). Y en concordancia con Heidegger, esto es sumamente revelador: La falsedad presupone como condición de su posibilidad una estructura intencional diferente de la del mentar objetivo; implica acceder al ente desde la 'optica' [Hinsicht] de otro modo de ser-mentado. En los casos en lo que el ente no es considerado simplemente en sí mismo, sino como esto o aquello en función de su carácter de 'como-algo' [als-Charakter], la intelección adopta la forma del condensar [Zusammen-nehmen] y del com-prender [Mit-nehmen]. Si el inteligir, en cuanto sensible, se realiza en el le,gein – es decir, en la medida en que su objeto se nombra y se enuncia de tal o cual manera – puede darse el caso de que el objeto se dé como algo que realmente no es. Pero la tendencia a mentar un objeto desde la perspectiva del 'como' [Als] constituye en general el fundamento de la posibilidad del yeu/doj (PIA: 48/63). Aristóteles arguye, así, que si alguien yerra, lo hace sobre la base de algo, del algo en tanto algo (etwas als etwas): "En efecto, no se equivocará en si es blanco, pero sí puede equivocarse en si lo blanco es tal o cual cosa" (De An. G, 3, 428b 21-22. Itálicas añadidas). Esto le parece a Heidegger un testimonio inequívoco de que Aristóteles experimentó y trató de concebir el mundo circundante en su pensamiento, puesto que "[e]sta estructura del 'en tanto que' o, dicho más exactamente, el 'tener que ver con' en tanto llano tener y tomar que aquélla determina, determina nuestro ser hacia el mundo, y en una amplia medida también nuestro ser para con nosotros mismos" (GA 21: 149). Por ello, "[l]a fro,nhsij permite que quien actúa, comprenda la situación: porque fija el oue[neka, el motivo-por-el-cual actúa, pues hace accesible el para-qué que en ese momento determina la situación, porque aprehende el 'ahora' y porque prescribe el cómo" (PIA: 54/68). Jethro Masís 30 No sólo ha descubierto Aristóteles la facticidad del mundo circundante al estatuir la originariedad de la estructura del 'algo como algo' que presupone la anterioridad antepredicativa, el 'algo pre-teorético' (vortheoretisches etwas) que en Sein und Zeit se denominará Vorgriff (cf. SZ: § 32, 150) como la manera de entender previa que presupone de entrada la apertura mundanal y el primado del fenómeno del mundo: "[e]l mostrar del enunciado se lleva a cabo sobre la base de lo ya abierto en el comprender o de lo circunspectivamente descubierto" (SZ: § 33, 156). Esto último en el sentido de que "[l]o que las estructuras formales del 'enlazar' [su,nqesij] y el 'separar' [diai,resij], o más exactamente, con la unidad de ambos, debía ser fenoménicamente descubierto, es el fenómeno del 'algo en cuanto algo' [das Phänomen des 'etwas als etwas']" (SZ: § 33, 159). También, en añadidura a lo antedicho, Heidegger niega que el Estagirita haya brindado una tabla anodina de categorías. Para Heidegger, Aristóteles ha sido sumamente cuidadoso y no ha caracterizado el fenómeno que le sale al encuentro a manera de fijación inflexible; el fenómeno del mundo, de los modos de ser del Dasein en el mundo, "todavía no está caracterizado ontológicamente de manera positiva, sino que sólo lo está formalmente como aquello que también puede ser de otra manera, como aquello que no es siempre y necesariamente como es" (PIA: 57/71). De modo que la susodicha 'indicación formal' (formale Anzeige) la encuentra por primera vez el joven fenomenólogo en ciernes en el propio Aristóteles, con lo que se prueba la tesis de Volpi de que el proyecto heideggeriano ha de vérselo en concordancia, aunque lateral, con la metafísica aristotélica (cf. 1994: 204). La cuestión del ser en Aristóteles tiene, sin embargo, un sentido "completamente determinado" (PIA: 74/84): "[e]l ser de la casa consiste en el ser-construido (ouvsi,a ginome,nh, poihqei/sa)" (PIA: idem); esto quiere decir que Aristóteles "experimentó plenamente el fenómeno del mundo circundante y de que interpretó ontológicamente la accidentalidad, aunque tomando como hilo conductor un determinado y bien definido sentido del ser" (PIA: 74/85). Pero ello, si bien será motivo de las duras críticas heideggerianas, no resta nada a los méritos del pensador de Estagira quien se remitió a las cosas mismas y trató de dar cuenta de ellas mediante una óptica circunmundana (Umsicht) y con arraigo fenomenológico. Aristóteles como protofenomenólogo 31 Física, libros A y B, y libro G, 1-3 Heidegger ha aprendido bien las lecciones luteranas en que entra en consideración la comprensión vital del movimiento. Ahora lo que cuenta es llevar a cabo una interpretación que dé acceso al movimiento de la vida. Se persigue, entonces, dar con las estructuras fundamentales de la vida como movimientos (Bewegungen) y movilidades (Beweglichkeiten) (cf. GA 61: 114). El problema del movimiento, bien se sabe, forma parte del núcleo de la propia destrucción aristotélica del pensamiento legado. Las preguntas críticas que Aristóteles plantea a la tradición de antiguos físicos, las resume Heidegger de la siguiente forma: ¿[H]an incorporado los físicos antiguos el ente entendido como fu,sij en el proyecto de la investigación, de tal manera que su carácter fenoménico decisivo – aquel que la investigación anterior ya siempre presupone de alguna manera en sus diferentes modalidades de discurso: a saber, del movimiento – quede custodiado y explicitado originariamente? O, por el contrario: ¿acaso el modo como la investigación tradicional accede al ámbito del ser en cuestión no se mueve, de entrada, en 'teorías' y tesis fundamentales, que no sólo no se extraen del ámbito del ser, sino que directamente le cierran el paso? (PIA: 65/78). Las preguntas son retóricas y han de responderse negativamente. Para Aristóteles, en efecto, "resulta decisivo mostrar que, en principio, no es posible aprehender categorialmente el fenómeno del movimiento con las categorías proporcionadas hasta ese momento por la ontología tradicional: ser y no ser, alteridad, diferencia" (PIA: 71/82). La investigación aristotélica respecto de los primeros principios, es decir, la sabiduría buscada que "versa, en opinión de todos, sobre las primeras causas y los primeros principios [peri. ta. prw/ta ai;tia kai. ta.j avrca.j]" (Met. A, 1, 981b 28 ss) debe encargarse de la pesquisa por el "origen del movimiento [o[qen h` avrch. th/j kinh,sewj]" (Met. A, 3, 984a 25 ss). Pero Aristóteles no cuestiona desde lo teorético; no opone a los antiguos una teoría abarcante de la realidad que implique que, si el fenómeno investigado del kinou,menon de los fu,sei o;nta no corresponde con la realidad, ésta deba quedar a la espera o en rezago, sino que parte, precisamente, de que hay cosas que se mueven. Los cuestionamientos críticos que Aristóteles lanza a sus antecesores están basados en su convicción concreta de que toda investigación que busque efectividad "se mueve en un Jethro Masís 32 determinado nivel de interpretación de la vida dado con anterioridad y en unos modos de hablar sobre el mundo dados también con anterioridad" (PIA: 65/77). Esto, según Heidegger, quiere decir sin más que "[e]n la propia facticidad está presente y operativo el modo como ya los 'antiguos físicos' vieron, nombraron y abordaron la 'naturaleza' en clave discursiva" (PIA: 65/77-78). La estructura del etwas als etwas en que se enmarcan las investigaciones aristotélicas, será explotada por Heidegger en Sein und Zeit como el 'como hermenéutico' o, en la traducción de Rivera, como el 'en cuanto' hermenéutico-existencial (hermeneutisches Als) (cf. SZ: § 33, 158). Como sostiene Waldenfels, esta estructura del etwas als etwas – que el fenomenólogo de Bochum denomina 'diferencia significativa', cf. 1980: 86, 129 – "nos remonta a la determinación aristotélica del 'ente como ente'" (1995: 18). Este es, pues, un descubrimiento de Heidegger, a saber, que esa tan manida estructura fenomenológica es cara, no a Husserl, sino a Aristóteles. En sentido aristotélico, "[e]l ente siempre es categorialmente algo que se muestra como esto o aquello, lo que significa que el sentido del ser es por principio diverso (múltiple)" (PIA: 67/79). Es de esta forma como "el ente que se muestra bajo el aspecto fundamental del ser-movido – del 'estar-ocupado-en-algo'– es lo que se tiene de antemano [Vorhabe], la condición que permite descubrir la intencionalidad tal como se explicita en Aristóteles y que, por su parte, deja ver el carácter fundamental del lo,goj" (PIA: 72/83). Heidegger se irá desprendiendo, o ya lo ha hecho quizá desde un principio, de un apego literal a la conceptualidad aristotélica. Su independencia del Aristóteles que le fue enseñado no es la del crítico decepcionado, así como su entereza y propiedad frente a la tradición religiosa en que fue formado tampoco es la del apóstata airado. El libro de Aristóteles (es decir, GA 61) puede bien considerarse como un fracaso desde el punto de vista temático y objetivo. Quien crea que aquí hay un libro sobre Aristóteles, se decepcionará cuando caiga en la cuenta que de lo que se habla, si bien formal-indicativamente (formal-anzeigend), es de la vida y de sus categorías fundamentales. Esta es, justamente, la manera de leer de Heidegger: en entera alusividad a la vida fáctica y a sus categorias fundamentales. Es esta, pues, la llamada aclaración de la situación hermenéutica. Aristóteles como protofenomenólogo 33 Referencias ADRIÁN ESCUDERO, Jesús (2001) "El Joven Heidegger . Asimilación y Radicalización de la Filosofía Práctica de Aristóteles". Logos. Anales del Seminario de Metafísica. 3, p. 179-221. ACEVEDO, Jorge (2003) "En Torno a la Interpretación Heideggeriana del Principio de Razón Suficiente". Philosophica. 26, p. 5-26. ALAND, Barbara et. al. (eds.) (1994) The Greek New Testament. Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft. ARENDT, Hanna (1988) "Martin Heidegger ist achtzig Jahre alt". En: Günther Neske & Emil Kettering (eds.) Op. Cit., p. 232-246. ARISTÓTELES (Cat.) Categorías. En: Tratados de Lógica (Órganon). Vol. I: Categorías – Tópicos – Sobre las Refutaciones Sofísticas. Trad. M. Candel Sanmartín. Madrid: Gredos. 1994. _______ (De Interp.) Sobre la Interpretación. En: Tratados de Lógica (Órganon). Vol. II: Sobre la Interpretación – Analíticos Primeros – Analíticos Segundos. Trad. M. Candel San Martín. Madrid: Gredos. 1995. _______ (Phys.) Física. Trad. G. de Echandía. Madrid: Gredos. 1995. _______ (Met.) Metafísica. (Edición trilingüe). Trad. V. García Yebra. Madrid: Gredos. 1998. _______ (De An.) Acerca del Alma. Trad. T. Calvo Martínez. Madrid: Gredos. 1999. _______ (Eth. Nic.) Ética Nicomáquea. En: Ética Nicomáquea. Ética Eudemia. Trad. J. Pallí. Madrid: Gredos. 2000. También cf. Ética a Nicómaco. Trad. J. L. Calvo Martínez. Madrid: Alianza. 2001. AUBENQUE, Pierre (1981) El Problema del Ser en Aristóteles. Trad. V. Peña. Madrid: Taurus. _______ (1999) La Prudencia en Aristóteles (Con un Apéndice sobre la Prudencia en Kant). Trad. Ma José Torres. Barcelona: Crítica/Grijalbo Mondadori. BARRIOS, Manuel (2002) Voluntad de lo Trágico. El Concepto Nietzscheano de Voluntad a Partir de 'El Nacimiento de la Tragedia'. Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva. BENGOA, Javier (1997) De Heidegger a Habermas. Hermenéutica y Fundamentación Última en la Filosofía Contemporánea. Barcelona: Herder. BERCIANO, Modesto (2001) La Revolución Filosófica de Martin Heidegger. Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva. Jethro Masís 34 BOECHL, Jeffrey (ed.) (2006) Religious Experience and the End of Metaphysics. Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. CAPELLE, Wilhelm (1992) Historia de la Filosofía Griega. Trad. E. Lledó. Madrid: Gredos. DERRIDA, Jacques (2003) Márgenes de la Filosofía. Trad. C. González. Madrid: Cátedra. DIELS, Hermann & Walther Kranz (DK) Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker. Hildesheim: Weidmannsche. 2004. FIGAL, Günter (1996) Der Sinn des Verstehens. Beiträge zur hermeneutischen Philosophie. Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam. _______ (2003) Martin Heidegger zur Einführung. Hamburg: Junius. GADAMER, Hans-Georg (GW 3) Neuere Philosophie I: Hegel – Husserl – Heidegger. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). 1987. [Versiones Castellanas: La Dialéctica de Hegel. Cinco Ensayos Hermenéuticos. Trad. M. Garrido. Madrid: Cátedra. 1988. Los Caminos de Heidegger. Trad. A. Ackermann. Barcelona: Herder. 2002]. _______ (GW 10) Hermeneutik im Rückblick. Gesammelte Werke Bd. 10. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). [1985] 1999. [Versión Castellana: La Dialéctica de Hegel. Cinco Ensayos Hermenéuticos. Trad. M. Garrido. Madrid: Cátedra. Los Caminos de Heidegger. Trad. A. Ackermann. Barcelona: Herder. 2002]. GRONDIN, Jean (1999) Introducción a la Hermenéutica Filosófica. Trad. A. Ackermann. Barcelona: Herder. HEIDEGGER, Martin (GA 17) Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung. [WS 1923-1924]. Gesamtausgabe Bd. 17. Ed. F.-W. von Herrmann. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann. 1994. _______ (GA 21) Logik. Die Frage nach der Wahrheit. [WS 1925-1926]. Gesamtausgabe Bd. 21. Ed. W. Biemel. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann. 1976. [Versión castellana: Lógica. La Pregunta por la Verdad. Trad. J. A. Ciria. Madrid: Alianza. 2004]. _______ (GA 24) Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie. [SS 1927]. Gesamtausgabe Bd. 24. Ed. F.-W. von Herrmann. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann. 1975. [Versión castellana: Los Problemas Fundamentales de la Fenomenología. Trad. J. J. García. Madrid: Trotta. 2000]. Aristóteles como protofenomenólogo 35 _______ (GA 61) Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles. Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung. [WS 1921-1922]. Gesamtausgabe Bd. 61. Ed. W. Bröcker & K. Bröcker-Oltmanns. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann. [1985] 21994. _______. (GA 63) Ontologie. Hermeneutik der Faktizität. [SS 1923]. Gesamtausgabe Bd. 63. Ed. K. Bröcker-Oltmanns. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann. 1988. [Versión castellana: Ontología. Hermenéutica de la Facticidad. Trad. J. Aspiunza. Madrid: Alianza. 1999]. _______ (PIA) Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles. Ausarbeitung für die Marburger und die Göttinger Philosophische Fakultät (1922). Hrsg. Günther Neumann. Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam. [1989] 2002. [Versión castellana: Interpretaciones Fenomenológicas Sobre Aristóteles. Indicación de la Situación Hermenéutica. Trad. J. A. Escudero. Madrid: Trotta. 2002]. _______ (SZ) Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie. [SS 1927]. Gesamtausgabe Bd. 24. Ed. F.-W. von Herrmann. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann. 1975. [Versión castellana: Los Problemas Fundamentales de la Fenomenología. Trad. J. J. García. Madrid: Trotta. 2000]. _______ (H) Hitos. [1919-1958]. Trad. H. Cortés & A. Leyte. Madrid: Alianza. 2000. _______ (AUA) La Autoafirmación de la Universidad Alemana. El Rectorado, 1933-1934. Entrevista de Spiegel. Trad. R. Rodríguez. Madrid: Tecnos. 1996. _______ (SG) Der Satz vom Grund. [1957]. Pfullingen: Neske. _______ (TS) Tiempo y Ser. [1988]. Trad. M. Garrido, J. L. Molinuevo & F. Duque. Madrid: Tecnos. HUSSERL, Edmund (Hua VI) Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie. Eine Einleitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie. Husserliana Bd. VI. Ed. W. Biemel. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff. [1935-1939] 1954. [Versión castellana: La Crisis de las Ciencias Europeas y la Fenomenología Trascendental. Trad. J. Muñoz & S. Mas. Barcelona: Crítica. 1996]. KISIEL, Theodore (1995) The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time. California: University of California Press. Jethro Masís 36 KISIEL, Theodor & John van Buren (eds.) (1994) Reading Heidegger from the Start: Essays in his Earliest Thought. New York: State University of New York Press. KOSELLECK, Reinhardt & Hans-Georg Gadamer (2002) Historia y Hermenéutica. Trad. F. Oncina. Barcelona: Paidós. LUTERO, Martin (O) Obras. Trad. T. Egido. Salamanca: Sígueme. 2006. MCNEILL, William (1999) The Glance of the Eye. Heidegger, Aristotle and the Ends of Theory. New York: State University of New York Press. TAMINIAUX, Jacques (1989) Lectures d'Ontologie Fondamentale. Grenoble: Millon. VAN BUREN, John Van Buren, John (1994a) The Young Heidegger: Rumor of the Hidden King. Bloomington – Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. _______ (1994b) "Martin Heidegger, Martin Luther". En: Theodor Kisiel & John van Buren (eds.) Op. Cit., p. 159-174. VOLPI, Franco (1994) "Being and Time: A 'Translation' of the Nicomachean Ethics?". Trad. J. Protevi. En: Theodor Kisiel & John van Buren (eds.) Op. Cit., p. 195-211. WALDENFELS, Bernhard (1980) Der Spielraum des Verhaltens. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. _______ (1997) De Husserl a Derrida. Introducción a la Fenomenología. Trad. W. Wegscheider. Barcelona – Buenos Aires – México: Paidós. WHITEHEAD, Alfred North (1979) Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology. London: Simon & Schuster.

Paul Formosa From Discipline to Autonomy 1 From Discipline to Autonomy: Kant's Theory of Moral Development Issues surrounding moral development and education form one of the major themes of Kant's philosophical output (see Herman 1998; Munzel 2003; Shell 2000; and Surprenant 2010). But Kant's keen interest in this area seems to raise a number of significant tensions in his work. These tensions arise because, depending on which strand of thought we focus on, education and development seem either essential or superfluous for morality. We shall examine two versions of this tension here, which I shall call the knowledge and revolution tensions. The knowledge tension arises because Kant makes strong claims about the ability of a boy of ten, but even as young as eight or nine (TP: 8:286), to correctly differentiate right from wrong in even complex cases (KpV: 5:155-57). But if we already know what we morally ought to do, if our moral knowledge is already complete and sound, then what role does this leave for moral development and education (see Moran 2009: 471)? The revolution tension arises because, Lewis White Beck (1978: 203-04) argues, Kant "expects and emphasizes the gradual progress toward the good through the historical process, including that of education" and also "teaches that there is a supernatural, superhistorical dimension to morality and the transition to it" in which "education" can "play only a preliminary role". But, Beck argues, these two elements, gradual moral progress through education and a sudden revolutionary transition to morality, were "never reconciled". In this paper I shall seek to resolve these two tensions by, in section one, briefly outlining the contemporary theories of moral development advanced by Lawrence Kohlberg and John Rawls. The aim of briefly illustrating these two theories is not to defend or criticise these views, since this has already been undertaken in an extensive literature, but rather to use these theories as models for extracting Kant's own distinct, but structurally similar, theory of moral development. This task is undertaken in section two in which I extract Kant's theory of Paul Formosa From Discipline to Autonomy 2 moral development from a number of texts. Finally, in section three, I draw on Kant's theory to resolve the knowledge and revolution tensions. 1. Kohlberg and Rawls on Moral Development Kohlberg develops a theory of moral development, or justice reasoning, which consists of six stages following an invariant sequence (see Crain 1985: 118-136; Gibbs 2003; Kohlberg et al. 1983). The six stages cover three levels of reasoning, preconventional, conventional and postconventional, with two stages per level. Stage one is "punishment and obedience" reasoning. At this stage prohibitions, which are given by some higher power (such as a parent), are seen as fixed and absolute, and the reason for obedience is typically to avoid punishment. Stage two is "individualism and exchange" which is a stage of self-interested reasoning combined with an "if you scratch my back I'll scratch yours" mentality. Stage three is that of "good interpersonal relationships" and at this stage motives, intentions and feelings, and not merely consequences, become more important. Children at this stage tend to make judgments in terms of role ideals and what counts as being a "good boy or girl". Stage four, "social order", involves seeing oneself not merely as involved in local affective ties, but also as a member of a society governed by laws and norms whose social order is worth maintaining. At stage five, "social contract and individual rights", people ask not merely what maintains social order but what constitutes a good social order, and they realise that morality and the legal order can come into conflict. Stage six is that of "universal principles" and at this stage persons come to understand the basis of principles of universal justice. Rawls develops a three stage account of moral development, with each stage having its own "psychological law", which approximately corresponds with the three levels of Kohlberg's account (Rawls 1999: 404). Rawls' account is based on the assumption that the child matures in a "well-ordered society realizing the principles of justice as fairness" (Rawls Paul Formosa From Discipline to Autonomy 3 1999: 404). The first stage is the "morality of authority". At this stage the child simply finds himself subject to injunctions set by his parents.1 He cannot question the legitimacy of these injunctions since he lacks, at this age, the very concept of justification. The operative psychological law here is that the child recognises the "evident love of him" that his parents have and as a result "comes to love them", and "if he loves and trusts his parents" then "he will tend to accept their injunctions" (Rawls 1999: 407, 429). The child will then tend to obey these injunctions out of fear of losing some of his parent's love and affection. The second stage is that of the "morality of association". This stage commences when the child begins to be aware that he occupies various social roles, such as being someone's son, friend, or classmate. At this stage morality is understood as consisting of standards of conduct for the particular roles and stations that one occupies. By living up to these standards one is a good son, friend, or classmate who realises certain ideals, such as being a "good sport" (Rawls 1999: 409). Eventually the emerging adolescent comes to see that his various roles and associations fit into a general system of cooperation which he recognises as just, as benefiting all members, and as maintained by the evident good will of others. The operative psychological law here is that persons living under a social arrangement that is "just and publicly known by all to be just" will develop "ties of friendly feeling and trust toward others" (Rawls 1999: 429). The third stage is that of the "morality of principles". While at the upper end of the morality of association a person "understands the principles of justice ... his motive for complying with" these principles "springs largely from his ties of friendship and fellow feeling for others, and his concern for the approbation of the wider society". On reaching the third stage of development one moves beyond this level of motivation by becoming "attached to these highest-order principles [of justice] themselves" (Rawls 1999: 414). The operative psychological law here is that by coming to understand that the basic institutions of one's Paul Formosa From Discipline to Autonomy 4 society are just and publically known to be so, a person acquires a "corresponding sense of justice as he recognises that he and those for whom he cares are the beneficiaries of these [just] arrangements" (Rawls 1999: 429-30). 2. Kant on Moral Development The human being is not born as, but must grow and develop into, an autonomous person. How does this development unfold? By keeping the theories of Kohlberg and Rawls in mind, it shall become clear that Kant also understands moral development as occurring by progression through three distinct, but overlapping, stages: firstly disciplining (including physical education), secondly cultivating and civilising, and thirdly moralising. While physical education and discipline should be applied almost as soon as the child is born, cultivating and civilising, as well as moralising, should be commenced only when the child becomes a youth "in approximately the tenth year, for by then he is already capable of reflection". When the youth enters manhood, which occurs when he is around sixteen, "education by discipline comes to an end" and the young man must be "appraised of his real duties, of the worth of humanity in his own person, and of respect for it in others" (VE: 27:469). We shall now investigate this process in detail. Stage 1: Disciplining and Physical Education – The Morality of Authority Initially the baby's guardians must choose everything for it on its behalf. They must choose what the baby is to eat and drink, where it is to sleep, and what it is to wear. Kant calls this initial stage that of "physical education", which is "actually only maintenance" or care (VP: 9:456). Toward this end Kant provides recommendations on the baby's diet, the temperature of its baths, and the hardness of its bed. He also warns against swaddling babies and the use of leading-strings and go-carts to teach children how to walk (VP: 9:456-66; see also Paul Formosa From Discipline to Autonomy 5 LaVaque-Manty 2006). At this "first stage" education "must be merely negative, i.e. one should ... merely leave nature undisturbed. The only art permitted in the educational process is that of hardening" (VP: 9:459). The aim of physical education is thus to maintain and nurture the child by providing for its needs without perverting its nature by making it overly accustomed to "ease" (VP: 9:464). Discipline must also "be applied very early" (VP: 9:442). Discipline takes different forms depending on the age of the child. The earliest forms that Kant mentions relate to the baby's crying. Parents should not run to the child "as soon as it cries", unless the baby is "being harmed" or suffering some ill, since this "only makes them cry more often" (VP: 9:479). Similarly, as children grow older parents should ignore them when "they want to get something by screaming" (VP: 9:464). This is important because otherwise children become "accustomed to having all their whims fulfilled" (VP: 9:460). But it is cruel to refuse a child something simply in order to exercise his patience. As such, parents should give children "that which they ask for in a friendly manner, provided it is useful to them" (VP: 9:464). Kant lists three principles that should guide disciplining. The first principle is to allow from "earliest childhood" the child to "be free in all matters (expect in those where it might injure himself, as, for example, when it grabs an open knife)" and except where the child gets "in the way of other's freedom, as for example, if it screams" too loudly. This principle should be applied from the earliest stages of childhood. The second principle, which applies when the child is a little older, is that the "child must be shown that it can only reach its goals by letting others also reach theirs" (VP: 9:454). In this way the child learns to do what its guardians expect of him and to treat the freedom of others as a constraint on his own freedom. The third principle, which applies when the child is still older, is that parents should "prove to it [the child] that restraint is put on it in order that it be led to the use of its own freedom ... this third point is the last to be grasped by the child" (VP: 9:454). Initally the child Paul Formosa From Discipline to Autonomy 6 is mechanically prevented from harming himself and others. Later he comes to accept a limitation on his freedom insofar as he interferes with the freedom of others, before finally he is led to understand why his freedom is constrained in this way. This final phase marks the transition from being a child to becoming a youth with capacities for reflection. The aim of disciplining is to get the child "to tolerate a constraint of his freedom" in order that in the future he may be led "to make good use of his freedom" (VP: 9:453). Children who lack discipline follow "every whim" and put "into practice actually and instantly each notion that strikes them". Kant therefore calls a lack of discipline "savagery" (Wildheit), that is, "independence from laws" (VP: 9:442). This is why Kant says that it is through "discipline or training" that "animal nature [changes] into human nature" (VP: 9:441) and "the culture of training (discipline) ... consists in the liberation of the will from the despotism of desires" (KU: 5:432). Through disciplining, the child learns to accept norms which restrict his freedom so that it is compatible with the freedom of others. As a result, the child learns to govern himself in accordance with these norms, and this requires that he learns how to control his whims and desires. In this way, through disciplining, his will is liberated from the "despotism of desires" and he thereby acquires "human choice" (MS: 6:213). At this stage of development the child's obedience of injunctions is based on the fear of punishment and an 'if you scratch my back I'll scratch yours' mentality. Kant explains: The obsequiousness of the pupil is either positive, when he must do what is prescribed to him, because he cannot himself judge, and the mere capacity of imitation still continues in him; or negative, when he must do what others want if he wants others to do some favour for him in return. With the first, he may come in for punishment; with the second, others may not do what he wants (VP: 9:453; see also KpV: 5:152). Initially the child is subject to rules which he learns by imitation and obeys from fear of punishment ("he may come in for punishment"). He cannot obey these rules for their own Paul Formosa From Discipline to Autonomy 7 sake since he is not yet able to understand their basis. This corresponds to stage one, punishment and obedience, in Kohlberg's account. The child also learns that if he does not do what others ask of him, then others will be reluctant to do what the child asks of them ("others may not do what he wants"). This corresponds to stage two, individualism and exchange, in Kohlberg's account. Together this stage also closely resembles Rawls' morality of authority, with its focus on the obedience of parental injunctions in order to avoid the punishment of withdrawn parental love. This leads Kant to argue that it is wrong "in the first stage of education" to admonish the child by saying "Shame on you! This is not proper!" since the "child does not yet have concepts of shame and propriety" (VP: 9:465). As such, to "talk to children about duty is futile labour. In the end they regard duty as something the transgression of which is followed by the rod" (VP: 9:484). This is why morality must initially be enforced by punishment. Kant divides punishment into physical, natural and moral punishment. "One punishes morally by harming the inclinations to be honoured and loved, which are aids to morality". This is done by, for example, temporarily treating the child "frostily and coldly" (VP: 9:482). Natural punishment occurs when the child brings bad consequences on himself as a result of his behaviour; for example, when he feels ill from eating too much. Kant considers moral and natural punishments to be best. Physical punishments "must be merely supplements to the insufficiency of the moral [and natural] punishment", and should never be "carried out with signs of rage" (VP: 9:483). Further, physical punishment must be used with great caution since it can lead to a servile and slavish disposition in the child which is directly counter to the aims of moral development (VP: 9:464, 482). Stage 2: Cultivating and Civilising – The Morality of Association Paul Formosa From Discipline to Autonomy 8 In the next stage of development the focus shifts from negative discipline to positive instruction and practical education through cultivating, civilising and moralising. The aim of practical education is to form the human into a "freely acting being" (VP: 9:455). However, I shall treat culture and civilisation as a single stage since both exhibit a similar developmental logic and treat moralisation as a distinct stage because of its differing developmental logic. Culture is acquired through the acquisition of skills and knowledge (VP: 9:449). This includes cultivating the child's lower and higher faculties of the mind, that is, his understanding, judgment and reason, as well as his wit, imagination and memory (VP: 9:472). Through cultivation the student obtains the skills and knowledge to achieve all sorts of ends. Certain skills are "good in all cases, for example reading and writing; others only for some purposes" (VP: 9:449-50). Culture also includes a component of physical education which involves "either the use of voluntary movement or the use of the organs of sense" (VP: 9:466). Sports and games are important tools for developing coordination and the ability to move one's body at will and make skilful use of one's senses. The aim of culture is to equip us with skills and knowledge to use as means to various ends, whereas the aim of civilisation is to equip us with the capacity to judge the worth of ends. In becoming civilised we learn not only which ends are worth pursuing but also what culture it is prudent to acquire. This leads Kant to closely link civilisation and prudence (VP: 9:455). Prudence also requires that we become "well suited for human society, popular and influential. This requires ... civilising. Its prerequisites are manners, good behaviour and ... [the ability] to use all human beings for one's own final purposes" (VP: 9:450). Civilising involves learning to govern oneself in accordance with the norms of politeness as defined by the taste of one's age, as well as acquiring the art of "dissimulation, that is, holding back one's faults" in order to maintain "propriety" and a favourable "external appearance" (VP: 9:486). Paul Formosa From Discipline to Autonomy 9 The "beautiful arts and sciences" also play a civilising role "by means of a universally communicable pleasure and an elegance and refinement [which] make[s] human beings, if not morally better, at least better mannered for society, [and which] very much reduce[s] the tyranny of sensible tendencies, and prepare[s] humans for a sovereignty in which reason alone shall have power" (KU: 5:433). By becoming civilised we learn to discipline ourselves in accordance with polite norms of social interaction. While this does not make us moral, it does prepare the way for morality by strengthening our capacity to control our sensible tendencies and to govern ourselves in accordance with ideals about how a person ought to act. However, at this stage the governing ideal is that of a conventionally successful, prudent, loved, and honourable member of society, and not the moral ideal set by our own reason. Even so, this is still a "higher step" on the path from discipline to autonomy (AP: 7:323-28). At this stage of development "the idea of morality still belongs to culture; but the use of this idea which comes down only to a resemblance of morals in love of honour and in external propriety constitutes only being civilised" (I: 8:26). This is why Kant says that the youth "can be disciplined by honour, whereas a child is disciplined only by obedience" (VE: 27:469) and why shame can be used in admonishing youths but not children since "shame can only occur when the concept of honour has already taken root" (VP: 9:483-84). At this stage the key motives for abiding by moral norms are love of honour and external propriety, prudence, a desire for social approbation, pleasure in social intercourse, and a desire to fit in with one's fellows. A person who acts from these motives will usually appear to act in conformity with morality. As such, acting from a sense of honour and external propriety resembles morality, even though acting in this way lacks moral worth. This stage of development, with its focus on living up to socially learnt role ideals and its concern for social approbation and the maintenance of social order through acting honourably and with Paul Formosa From Discipline to Autonomy 10 propriety, clearly resembles Rawls' morality of association and Kohlberg's stages three 'good interpersonal relationships' and four 'social order'. Stage 3: Moralising – The Morality of Principles Moralisation aims to bring the pupil to "acquire the disposition to choose nothing but good ends" (AP: 9:450), and this requires "not only [that] he does good, but that he does it because it is good" (AP: 9:475). This stage of "moral formation, in so far as it is based on principles which the human being should comprehend himself, comes last" (VP: 9:455). It requires not only the capacity to correctly judge moral particulars and to correctly understand the normative basis of such judgments in the requirements of practical reason, but also the acquisition of a disposition or character to always act in accordance with such judgments. As such, normative instruction and character formation are the two core components of moralisation. Punishment has no role whatsoever at this stage (VP: 9:481). Kant outlines three methods for forming character. Since character "consists in the aptitude for acting according to maxims" (VP: 9:481), the first method for acquiring character is to become accustomed to acting from maxims. In order to develop this aptitude students must learn to "follow exactly" their self-given maxims (VP: 9:481). This is because the "grounding of character ... consists in the firm resolution of willing to do something, and then also in the actual performance of it ... For a man who resolves to do something but who does not do it cannot trust himself any longer" (VP: 9:487). As such, if "someone resolves always to get up early in order to study ... [and] always from one day to the next puts off his resolution – then in the end he does not trust himself any more" (VP: 9:487-88). If you cannot trust yourself to do what you will to do then you cannot be autonomous. This is because you cannot, with any confidence, set plans for yourself about how you want your life to go, since you cannot trust yourself to put those plans into action. This not only means that others Paul Formosa From Discipline to Autonomy 11 cannot rely on you, but that you cannot even rely upon yourself. A "second principle feature in the grounding of character in children is truthfulness", which is "essential in a character" since a "human being who lies has no character at all" (VP: 9:484). A habitual liar is like a person who cannot follow his own maxims: you "cannot figure them out, and one can never really know what they are up to" (VP: 9:481). This aspect of character should be developed through the "withdrawal of respect" in response to acts of lying. A "third feature in the character of the child must be sociability" (VP: 9:484; see also Formosa 2010). This is developed by children forming friendships with other children through peer interaction. Kant also argues that in "order to ground a moral character in children ... One must teach them the duties [to themselves and to others] that they have to fulfil" (VP: 9:488). Children are to be taught these duties through a three step process: first by learning a moral catechism which states general principles, then by developing judgment through casuistry,2 and finally by understanding the normative basis of moral principles and judgments. Catechism is a method of instruction by questions and answers. Kant has both pedagogical and moral reasons for favouring this method. Pedagogically, Kant takes it to be a general principle that the "biggest aid to understanding something is to produce it" (VP: 9:477). Since few students are autodidacts, most students require the assistance of a teacher who acts as a guide by asking them the right questions. But the teacher should "proceed Socratically by attempting to be 'the midwife of his listeners' knowledge". As such, the teacher should not "carry rational knowledge into them" but rather attempt to "extract" it "from them" (VP: 9:477).3 In this way students both cultivate their reason and become confident in thinking for themselves and achieving this outcome is the moral reason for preferring the catechetical method. However, Kant notes that this method has two drawbacks. First, that it can be "slow" and second that it does not work well in large groups since "it is difficult to arrange things Paul Formosa From Discipline to Autonomy 12 such that when one extracts knowledge from one child the others also learn something in the process" (VP: 9:477). The teacher's questions should focus on the duties we have to ourselves and to others, the foundation of these duties in the "dignity of humanity", and the role that this dignity plays in limiting the worth of our own happiness (VP: 9:488-89; MS: 6:480-84). This means that students must learn to value themselves, not in comparison with other human beings, which only arouses envy, but according to the idea of the absolute worth of humanity (VP: 9:491; MS: 6:480). In presenting these duties it is important to focus on the moral worth that comes from acting from duty. Teachers should only make "casual mention" of any advantages or disadvantages that arise from acting from duty "merely as an instrument, for the taste of those who are weak by nature" (MS: 6:482-83). Kant takes this to be not only the morally correct method but also an effective one since he thinks that "morality must have more power over the human heart the more purely it is presented" (KpV: 5:156, 153; TP: 8:286). Kant argues that in "this catechistic moral instruction it would be most helpful to the pupil's moral development to raise some casuistical questions in their analysis of every duty" (MS: 6:483). However, in using concrete examples to illustrate specific duties Kant stresses that examples should be drawn from ordinary life and history (VP: 9:490; KpV: 5:154). Kant warns against the use of examples of "so-called noble (supermeritorious) actions, with which our sentimental writings so abound" because they inspire "empty wishing and longings for inaccessible perfection" which produces "mere heroes of romance who ... release themselves ... from observance of common and everyday obligation" since these seem "insignificant and petty" (KpV: 5:155). Kant's examples, in contrast, tend to focus on the sublimeness of observing common and everyday obligations, such as keeping promises, paying debts, giving to the poor, returning deposits, and so on. Paul Formosa From Discipline to Autonomy 13 As a result of this method, students will ideally develop an ennobling sense of their own worth and the worth of all other persons, an awareness of their moral obligations, and trust in their capacity to do what they will to do. This produces a solid basis for their future autonomy which is the aim of practical education. On achieving this aim and becoming a fully autonomous person the highest stage of moral development, moralisation, is reached. This highest stage resembles, although it is broader in scope, Rawls' morality of principles and Kohlberg's stage six 'universal principles', since it involves a commitment to universal moral principles themselves. At this stage of development a person not only knows what their duties are, but also understands why these duties are binding, and has acquired a trustworthy disposition to always act in accordance with these duties for their own sakes. However, this highest stage of moral development is, for three reasons, very rarely achieved. Firstly, because education is not organised along the lines which Kant advocates. Secondly, because the innate radical evil of human nature grounds a propensity to evil which works against moralisation (Formosa 2007; Formosa 2009). Thirdly, because this propensity to evil is exacerbated by the moral corruptness of a civilised society which encourages us to value ourselves in comparison with others and not in comparison with the moral law. In the rare cases where it is achieved, Kant thinks that it is unlikely to be "firmly established" before a person is "forty" years of age (AP: 7:295). 3. Resolving the Knowledge and Revolution Tensions The knowledge tension arises because Kant, on the one hand, outlines a developmental story which includes positive instruction in the moral duties that we are subject to and, on the other hand, makes strong claims about the moral knowledge of youths as young as nine or ten and adults with even the most common reason (KpV: 5:155-57; TP: 8:286). Development and Paul Formosa From Discipline to Autonomy 14 positive instruction seem either essential or superfluous for moral knowledge depending on which of these two claims we focus on. The key to resolving this tension is to appreciate the force of Kant's claim that there is a strong correlation between the historical progress of a society and the moral development of its members. This leads Kant (R: 6:93-95) to argue that only within moral communities under conditions of national, international and cosmopolitan justice can the moralisation of individuals occur (at least widely) and the radical evil of human nature be overcome. But we are still far from historically realising this state. Just as Rawls bases his developmental story on the assumption that the child of that story grows up in a well-ordered society, Kant bases his developmental story on the assumption that the child of that story grows up in a historical period identical to Kant's own. That is, "in a time" of "disciplinary training, culture and civilisation, but not by any means in a time of moralisation" (VP: 9:451; see also I: 8:26). As such, when Kant makes claims about the moral knowledge of a ten year old youth or a man with the most common reason, he makes these claims in the context of the historical assumption that the youth or man in question have already been (at least partly) socialised into a disciplined, cultured and civilised society. Discipline, cultivation and civilisation, unlike moralisation, come in degrees. Some people are highly disciplined, cultured, and cultivated and others, such as a youth and a man with the most common reason, are less so. But even in these latter cases the youth and man in question have already been socialised at least partly into a society which enforces its laws and cultural norms. They are therefore not lawless "savages", in Kant's sense, since they have been somewhat socialised to act in accordance with norms through the application of disciplining, cultivating and civilising techniques. As part of that socialisation process they will also have learnt what counts as morally right and wrong in their society and, as a result of this, they will be able to make correct Paul Formosa From Discipline to Autonomy 15 moral judgments (on the assumption that their socially learnt conception of right and wrong matches the requirements of morality which, in a civilised state, Kant thinks will generally be the case). This explains why someone who has not yet completed the process of moral development, or not yet even received formal instruction in moral duties, is able to make correct moral judgments. But it is one thing to be able to make correct moral judgments as a result of socialisation, and another thing to have a correct understanding of the normative basis of those judgments and to have a character defined by an aptitude to always act on the basis of that understanding. Without this proper understanding and firm character, which those who have yet to be moralised lack, one's moral judgments will tend to be based on social conventions which merely resemble morality, rather than on practical reason itself which grounds morality proper. But does this really defuse the knowledge tension? After all, Kant's preferred teaching methodology for ethics involves extracting judgments from the youth's own reason and not from his memory. Does this mean that Kant thinks we have the sort of innate rational knowledge which would make education and development superfluous? No. On Kant's view we have various predispositions and capacities, including rational ones. But these predispositions and capacities must be correctly cultivated and developed through education, practice, and communicative social interactions. As such, as Allen Wood (1999: 301) argues, on Kant's view we "can develop our reason only by communicating with others". Therefore we can extract correct moral judgments from a pupil's reason, rather than from his memory, only if his reason has already been (at least somewhat) cultivated and developed. There is thus no real tension between Kant's views about moral knowledge and moral development. This leads naturally to a consideration of the revolution tension. This tension seems to arise because, to paraphrase Beck, Kant emphasises both the necessity of education for moralising us and also the insufficiency of education for achieving this outcome. But is there Paul Formosa From Discipline to Autonomy 16 really a tension here between gradual developmental progress through education and the sudden moral revolution which completes that process? In some passages there does seem to be such a tension. For example, Kant writes: "that a human being should become not merely legally good, but morally good ... [and this] cannot be effected through gradual reform but must rather be effected through a revolution in the disposition of the human being" (R: 6:47). This dispositional revolution requires the repudiating of one's originally evil disposition, which takes the form of a conditional commitment to morality, by adopting a good disposition, which takes the form of a firm and unconditional commitment to moral principles (Formosa 2007). But "education, examples and teaching generally cannot bring about this firmness and persistence in principles gradually, but only ... by an explosion which happens one time" (AP: 7:295). A person's disposition is their highest-order maxim which defines the overall practical orientation of their character (Formosa 2007). However, all maxims, dispositional maxims included, are (directly or indirectly) self-given or subjective principles. Just as Kant holds that no one can force you to adopt a maxim, as opposed to force you to act in a certain way (MS: 6:218-221), equally no one can force you to adopt a disposition. For this reason education can only lead you to the view that you ought to adopt a good disposition, but it cannot actually give you a good disposition. This explains why the educational process of development, although necessary for moralising one's character (AP: 7:327) since without it one's rational predispositions remain uncultivated, is not sufficient for moralising one's character. It cannot be sufficient because what is required is a revolution in one's character, in one's way of thinking and reasoning, and this requires the adoption of a new disposition which is something one must do for oneself. As such, Kant's claim that education is necessary for bringing about the highest stage of moral development is not in tension with his Paul Formosa From Discipline to Autonomy 17 claim that education is not sufficient for bringing about this dispositional revolution. This insight resolves the revolution tension. 4. Conclusion Kant develops a detailed three stage theory of moral development which structurally resembles, although it differs in details from, the contemporary accounts defended by Kohlberg and Rawls. On Kant's theory this process begins with physical education, which takes the form of maintenance and care, and disciplining, which helps the child to overcome the despotism of desires by learning to accept a normative constraint on his freedom. This stage of development comprises a morality of authority in which the obedience of norms is based on a fear of punishment and an interest in maintaining exchange relationships. Next, the positive stage of practical education begins by cultivating and civilising. This equips the youth with a capacity to both reach various ends and to judge the worth of those ends. This comprises a morality of association in which the obedience of norms is based on a sense of honour and shame, a desire for social approbation, and prudence. The final and highest stage of development, moralisation or a morality of principles, is realised through the acquisition of both the rational knowledge of one's moral duties and a character practically orientated towards always obeying these duties for their own sake. However, Kant's account of moral development appears to be in tension with other elements of his moral philosophy. But these (specifically the knowledge and revolution) tensions have been shown here to be illusory. As such, a proper understanding of Kant's theory of moral development, far from exposing genuine tensions, helps rather to deepen our understanding of Kant's moral philosophy. Works Cited Beck, Lewis White (1978) Essays on Kant and Hume, New Haven: Yale University Press. Crain, W. C. (1985) Theories of Development, New York: Prentice Hall. Paul Formosa From Discipline to Autonomy 18 Formosa, Paul (2010) "Kant on the Highest Moral-Physical Good: The Social Aspect of Kant's Moral Philosophy," Kantian Review 15 (1): 1-36. --- (2009) "Kant on the Limits of Human Evil," Journal of Philosophical Research 34: 189-214. --- (2007) "Kant on the Radical Evil of Human Nature," The Philosophical Forum 38 (3): 221-245. Gibbs, John C. (2003) Moral Development and Reality, London: Sage. Herman, Barbara (1998) "Training to Autonomy," Philosophers on Education, ed. Amélie Rorty, London: Routledge. Kant, Immanuel (2006) Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, trans. Robert Louden, New York: Cambridge University Press. --- (1996) "Critique of Practical Reason," Practical Philosophy, trans. Mary Gregor, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. --- (2000) Critique of the Power of Judgment, trans. Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. --- (2007) "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim," Anthropology, History, and Education, trans. Allen Wood, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. --- (1997) Lectures on Ethics, trans. Peter Heath, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. --- (2007) "Lectures on Pedagogy," Anthropology, History, and Education, trans. Robert Louden, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. --- (1996) "The Metaphysics of Morals," Practical Philosophy, trans. Mary Gregor, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. --- (1996) "On the Common Saying: That May Be Correct in Theory, But It Is of No Use in Practice," Practical Philosophy, trans. Mary Gregor, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. --- (1996) "Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason," Religion and Rational Theology, trans. George Di Giovanni, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kohlberg, L., Levine, C., and Hewer, A. (1983) Moral Stages, Basel: Karger. LaVaque-Manty, Mika (2006) "Kant's Children," Social Theory and Practice 32 (3): 365388. Moran, Kate A. (2009) "Can Kant Have an Account of Moral Education?," Journal of Philosophy of Education 43 (4): 471-484. Munzel, G. Felicitas (2003) "Kant on Moral Education, or 'Enlightenment' and the Liberal Arts," The Review of Metaphysics 57 (1): 43-73. Rawls, John (1999) A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Shell, Susan Meld (2000) "Kant as Educator," Kant's Legacy, ed. Predrag Cicovacki, Rochester: University of Rochester Press. Surprenant, Chris W. (2010) "Kant's Contribution to Moral Education," Journal of Moral Education 39 (2): 165-174. Wood, Allen W. (1999) Kant's Ethical Thought, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Notes 1 Since both Rawls and Kant write exclusively in the masculine when they discuss moral development, I will do the same here in order that my discussion melds with the quotations that I use. However, I assume that Rawls thinks that the stages and means of development are the same for both sexes. Whether Kant also thinks this is less clear. Paul Formosa From Discipline to Autonomy 19 2 Kant stresses that examination of "practical questions" through concrete examples should follow "after first laying the foundation in a purely moral catechism" (KpV: 5:154). 3 Kant (MS: 6:411, 478-81) contrasts the "dogmatic" method, in which the teacher alone lectures, with the "erotetic" method, which is based on questions and answers. This latter method is divided into dialogue and catechism. Confusingly, Kant makes two different distinctions between dialogue and catechism. According to the first, in a dialogue the pupil asks the questions and the teacher answers or both question each other, whereas in a catechism only the teacher asks questions. According to the second, if the pupil is expected to draw his answer "merely from his memory, the method is called the catechistic method proper" but if it is "assumed" to be "already present naturally in the pupil's reason and needs only to be developed from it, then the method is called that of dialogue (Socratic method)". Kant's preferred method is therefore catechistical in the first sense, since he thinks (at least) initially that the teacher must do all the questioning because the student does not know what questions to ask, and dialogical (or Socratic) in the second sense, since he thinks that the student's answers should be drawn from his reason and not from his memory (as in the catechistic method proper).

This is the penultimate draft of an article that will be published in HOPOS 10:1 (Spring 2020) From Völkerpsychologie to Cultural Anthropology: Erich Rothacker's Philosophy of Culture Dr. Johannes Steizinger McMaster University [email protected] Acknowledgements: This work was supported by the European Research Council (ERC) under Grant 339382. For critical comments and helpful suggestions on earlier drafts of this paper, I want to thank Martin Kusch, Barry Allen, Sandra Lapointe, Martin Strauss, Matthias Schlossberger, Zach Murphy King, and four anonymous referees. I am also grateful to an audience at a workshop in Vienna (April 2018) and my students for discussing the topic of this paper. 2 Abstract Erich Rothacker (1888–1965) was a key figure in early-twentieth-century philosophy in Germany. In this paper, I examine the development of Rothacker's philosophy of culture from 1907 to 1945. Rothacker began his philosophical career with a völkerpsychological dissertation on history, outlining his early biologistic conception of culture (1907–1913). In his mid-career work, he then turned to Wilhelm Dilthey's (1833–1911) Lebensphilosophie (philosophy of life), advancing a hermeneutic approach to culture (1919–1928). In his later work (1929–1945), Rothacker developed a cultural anthropology. I shall argue that Rothacker's later theory of culture retained key motifs of his earlier works. In this way, I trace central aspects of Rothacker's reception of both Völkerpsychologie and Lebensphilosophie. The paper focuses on two aspects of Rothacker's philosophical development that deserve more attention than they have received to date: his reception of Völkerpsychologie and the political character of his theories of culture. Rothacker's theoretical work was closely connected to his political conservatism, which culminated in his engagement with National Socialism. The paper unearths problematic aspects of the legacy of Völkerpsychologie and Lebensphilosophie in early twentieth-century German thought. 1. Introduction Erich Rothacker (1888–1965) was a key figure in early-twentieth-century philosophy in Germany. In this paper, I examine the development of Rothacker's philosophy of culture from 1907 to 1945. Rothacker began his philosophical career with a völkerpsychological dissertation on history, outlining his early biologistic conception of culture (1907–1913). In his mid-career work, he then turned to Wilhelm Dilthey's (1833–1911) Lebensphilosophie (philosophy of life), advancing a hermeneutic approach to culture (1919–1928). In his later 3 work (1929–1945), Rothacker developed a cultural anthropology. I shall argue that Rothacker's later theory of culture retained key motifs of his earlier works. In this way, I trace central aspects of Rothacker's reception of both Völkerpsychologiei and Lebensphilosophie. I reconstruct the development of Rothacker's philosophy of culture in three steps: Section 2 outlines Rothacker's völkerpsychological beginnings (1907–1913). This section sketches the intellectual context of his dissertation, analyzes its biologistic concept of culture, and highlights the political implications of this view. Section 3 explores the middle Rothacker's turn to Lebensphilosophie (1919–1928). The section examines the hermeneutic concept of culture emerging from Rothacker's study of the Diltheyan theory of worldviews. Moreover, here I show the political motivations for Rothacker's theoretical engagement with the legacy of historicism, and show that Rothacker identified with the conservative and nationalist tendencies of the historicist movement. Finally, section 4 investigates the second fundamental revision of Rothacker's philosophical thought, outlining the methodological and political orientation of his later philosophy (1929–1945). Rothacker associated his new theory of culture with the rise of National Socialism (NS). This section analyzes the key motifs of Rothacker's cultural anthropology, and highlights the connections between this later work and his earlier approaches to culture. The paper focuses on two aspects of Rothacker's philosophical development that have not received the attention they deserve to date: (a) the significance of his reception of Völkerpsychologie, and (b) the political character of his theories of culture. a) Rothacker's Reception of Völkerpsychologie Most commentators do not focus on Rothacker's völkerpsychological beginnings (Koslowski 1997; Böhnigk 2002; Tremmel 2009, 2012; Plas 2011, 2013; Fischer 2008). Stöwer's (2012a) biography sketches the intellectual context of Rothacker's early work, yet 4 does not connect Rothacker's first concept of culture with his later approaches (see also Stöwer 2012b). Stöwer concentrates on the significance of Dilthey's hermeneutics for the development of Rothacker's philosophy of culture. This aspect of his work has been well researched (see Koslowski 1997; Fischer 2008; Plas 2011, 2013; Stöwer 2012a, 2012b; Tremmel 2009, 2012). The lack of scholarship on Rothacker's völkerpsychological beginnings is all the more surprising when we bear in mind the central themes of Rothacker's life-long work and their close connections with the general orientation of Völkerpsychologie. Rothacker sought to understand the nature of humanity throughout his philosophical career, believing that the special character of humanity was revealed in its historical development, where we see humanity consistently organized in particular groups with distinctive cultural achievements. This common starting point of Rothacker's philosophical projects is similar to the point of view found in Völkerpsychologie. Völkerpsychologie had emerged as a scholarly program in the work of German-Jewish scholars Moritz Lazarus (1824-1903) and Herman Steinthal (1823-1899) (on the development of Völkerpsychologie from 1850 to 1945 see Klautke 2013; Kusch 2019). Lazarus and Steinthal regarded the communal life of social groups as the key to understanding humanity. They emphasized that human communities, especially Völker, developed a common spiritual life (geistiges Leben) and that history was characterized by the development of these spirits of Völker (Volksgeister). Lazarus and Steinthal pursued a scientific approach to what they regarded as the "objective spirit" (objektiver Geist) of communities. They aimed to discover the causal-psychological laws that governed the development of humanity, taking "cultural forms" such as myths, religions, arts, and legal systems as their focus points. The Völkerpsychologie of Lazarus and Steinthal became an important model for understanding humanity through history and culture. This general orientation also guided the approach of Wilhelm Wundt (1832–1920), who was the most important proponent of the second generation of Völkerpsychologie, publishing the ten 5 volumes of his Völkerpsychologie between 1900 and 1920. Wundt restricted his approach to the early stages of communal life and defined language, myth, and customs as the central issues of Völkerpsychologie (Wundt 1886/1911). As Lazarus and Steinthal had, Wundt argued that the systematic study of collective psychological processes would yield a developmental history of humanity. b) The Political Character of Rothacker's Theories of Culture It is quite surprising that no in-depth examination of the close connection between Rothacker's theories of culture and his political orientation exists. Fischer (2008), Koslowski (1997), and Habermas (1958/1973) do not delve at all into the political aspect of Rothacker's philosophy. Plas (2011, 2013) examines the connection between Rothacker's historicist approaches to culture and his conservative leanings, but argues that the same theory could have lent itself to progressive policies. In my evaluation, here Plas underestimates the völkisch character of Rothacker's philosophy. The same holds for Tremmel's (2009, 2012) reading. Tremmel acknowledges that Rothacker's cultural anthropology could open the door for racist theories, but does not analyze the political aspect of its key motifs. Stöwer's (2012a) biography gives a detailed account of Rothacker's political activities during the Weimar Republic and the NS period, yet, by explaining Rothacker's political engagement through psychological motifs, Stöwer does not bring to bear the close connections between this political activity and Rothacker's philosophy. Böhnigk (2002) detects a commitment to biological racism in Rothacker's cultural anthropology, though, as I will show, Rothacker's later work did not center on biology. Weber (1989) only considers Rothacker's public engagement in support for nationalist cultural policies, without analyzing Rothacker's philosophical commitments. Rothacker is still seen as a key author in philosophical anthropology (Fischer 2008). Several commentators praise his culturalist approach to the historicity of humanity, 6 contrasting his emphasis on culture and history with the naturalized concept of 'humanity'. On this reading, naturalistic anthropologies are accused of relying on dogmatic concepts of humanity with problematic political consequences (Habermas 1958/1973; Fischer 2008; Tremmel 2009; Plas 2011). My paper challenges this popular argument. I show that Rothacker justified his political conservativism by biologistic, historicist, and culturalist arguments. Moreover, I argue that his different theories of culture were characterized by a general pattern of völkisch thinking about humanity. It was this pattern that undergirded Rothacker's problematic political views. 2. The Early Rothacker (1907–1913): Völkerpsychological Beginnings A preliminary look at Rothacker's educational background demonstrates that his main philosophical interests emerged in the context of Völkerpsychologie.ii The early Rothacker engaged intensively with Völkerpsychologie during his studies in Kiel, Strasburg, Munich, and Tübingen. In Kiel, Rothacker studied with Götz Martius (1853–1927), a student of Wundt. During that time, Rothacker (1909) published a review of recent debates around Völkerpsychologie in the renowned Zeitschrift für Angewandte Psychologie (Journal of Applied Psychology). He also began to engage with the social-psychological approach to cultural history in the work of Karl Lamprecht (1856–1915), a close ally of Wundt. Rothacker's engagement with Lamprecht was the beginning of his dissertation project. In 1912, Rothacker's dissertation was published in the important series Contributions to Cultural and Universal History, edited by Lamprecht himself. Rothacker's education was profoundly rooted in Völkerpsychologie and in Lamprecht's uses of this tradition. Lamprecht's German History (1891–1909) presented itself as a psychological history of the German nation and prompted the so-called "Lamprecht controversy" (see Schorn-Schütte 1984; Raphael 1990; Chickering 1993; Klautke 2013, 73, 7 77 f.). Against the mainstream of contemporary history, Lamprecht's "cultural history" prioritized economic and social history, and focused on collectives rather than individuals. Lamprecht believed that nations were the agents of history, and that they developed in clearly distinguishable psychological stages. He aimed to identify the causal, statistical laws governing this process. Other historians and philosophers of the time accused Lamprecht of "positivism" and "materialism," leaving him with few allies. It is surprising that, early on, Rothacker chose Lamprecht's genetic historiography as the starting point of his dissertation in philosophy, attempting to defend and improve Lamprecht's conception. In his dissertation, Rothacker held that history was the cultural development of human communities, and that its pattern could be explained biologically, thus agreeing with the general orientation of Lamprecht's "biology of nations." Yet Rothacker felt that Lamprecht had overlooked the physiological foundation of cultural achievements (Rothacker 1912, 118 f.). As Rothacker saw it, Lamprecht's social-psychological approach had to be modified into an examination of the physiological laws that governed the cultural development of human communities. Rothacker claimed that the same laws of organic development governed races, nations, animals, and plants (108). He defined his approach as völkerpsychological (33). In contrast to Wundt, but in line with Lazarus and Steinthal, Rothacker believed that the higher forms of cultural development-such as science or art- could be explained by völkerpsychological processes (45). Yet he rejected the reference to collective entities such as the Volksseele (soul of the people) as supposed agents of collective development, thus agreeing with the critique of Völkerpsychologie that Georg Simmel (1858– 1918) had put forward in his sociological works (48–50, 69 f.).iii Rothacker, however, disputed Simmel's (1908) conclusion that cultural forms always resulted from the interaction of individual minds. Rothacker believed in a collective foundation of cultural achievements, disagreeing with Simmel's distinction between the individual-psychological cause and the supraindividual result of the cultural process. The early Rothacker rejected sociological 8 explanations in general, skeptical of the suggestion that culture could be caused by the social interactions of individuals. For him, the social organization of a community was only an external framework that could modify cultural development superficially. Rothacker regarded "Völker", "nations," "tribes," "states," and "cities" as the most important social contexts in which cultural developments could manifest in concrete achievements (103–110). These social groups were defined as arbitrary associations of individuals. Rothacker believed that there were social groups without culture. They lacked the natural disposition for developing culture and remained only social organizations (158). One reason for this belief lies in Rothacker's advancement of a biologistic concept of culture which considers races to be the key agents of human life. Rothacker defined races as natural groups governed by the biological laws of organic growth, and envisaged them as flourishing or degenerating like trees (95, 106 f.). He regarded racial dispositions as the ultimate cause behind cultural development. On this account, races generated gifted individuals capable of developing culture, and concrete cultural achievements in turn depended upon individuals with exceptional intellectual capacities (106 f., 125). This explains how Rothacker could claim that his biologistic concept of culture constitutes something of a middle ground between collectivism and individualism (113 f.). If we follow Rothacker, cultural development was an expression of a community's natural development regarding its intellectual capacities. Rothacker defined these capacities as "formal" (formale Begabung; 79 f.). He compared their development with the organic development of an eye (54), emphasizing that the development of these intellectual capacities was first and foremost an organic process (113). This is not an analogy. Rothacker held that the physiological make-up of human brains was the key source of cultural development. This biologistic rendering of culture was clearly deterministic, and he believed that the intellectual capacities of an individual were completely genetically determined. In this context Rothacker also maintained that the brains of "primitives" were physiologically inferior, claiming that a 9 "primitive person's child" raised "among us" would never be capable of belonging to "our highest intellectual class" (80 f., 86 f.): "Nobody can go beyond his innate mind" (88). Of course, the early Rothacker did not think that all members of a community had the same formal capacities, and advocated a quite simple equation: The better your brain, the higher your social position, especially within a cultural domain (see, e.g. 51 f., 147–49). Rothacker believed that he had discovered the natural foundation of cultural differences, and that, from this point of view, he could rank human communities by their formal capacities. He was convinced that these formal capacities could be assessed by the vitality they exhibit (16, 38 f.). Thus, for example, he followed Lamprecht in assuming that the history of Germany since the tenth century was characterized by the development of selfconsciousness, and that this change was brought about by an increase of "mental energy" (seelische Energie; 40). He argued that the cultural achievements of communities revealed such changes, since they expressed the organic development of their formal capacities (54 f., 80). Rothacker's theory also shared the universal scope of Lamprecht's and Wundt's approaches to historical development. The early Rothacker envisaged cultural processes as continuous developments always following the same formal stages (53). He claimed that these empirical regularities could be found in all cultures, forming a clear hierarchy of cultural development. To illustrate his understanding of cultural development, Rothacker contrasted the primitive stage of knowledge with what he regarded as the highest stage. The inferior brain of "primitives," he argued, resulted in the weakness of their formal capacity for knowledge. "Primitives" necessarily perceived the world falsely, expressing a distorted cognition of reality in their mythological worldviews. Rothacker claimed that this form of knowledge was guided by the needs of primitive life, assuming that at the lowest stage, knowledge was entirely relative to practical interests (62–66). However, with the organic development of the brain, the formal capacity of knowing also improved (see, e.g., 101 f.). At the "highest" 10 cognitive stage, formal capacities enabled humans to gain objective knowledge about the world. At this point, knowledge was pursued for its own sake (53 f., 65 f.). Since the highest form of knowing was independent of external influences, Rothacker regarded it as absolute (109). He argued that the investigations of modern science were characterized by this "purely formal, objective, and critical spirit" (71). Early on, Rothacker extended this argument about knowledge to the consideration of values, maintaining that absolute values (such as pure beauty or pure benevolence) were the expression of highest physiological development of our "organ of feeling" (Organ des Fühlens; 115–125). This anti-relativistic tendency of Rothacker's early concepts of knowledge and values is significant in light of his later discussions of relativism, taken up below. At this point the political undercurrent of Rothacker's biologistic determinism should be obvious: He divided humanity into particular groups and ranked them in terms of an assumed "natural" hierarchy of capacities. This hierarchy naturalized cultural and social differences. Rothacker's theory was intended to justify existing power relations within and between social groups as natural. We can therefore justifiably say that the early Rothacker was a biological racist and a social Darwinist: He assumed that human communities developed analogues to organic life. From a methodological point of view, the early Rothacker conducted a study that corresponds to the so-called "weak program" of Völkerpsychologie (Kusch 2019): He searched for biological causal explanations of cultural development, and his biological determinism prioritized the community over the individual. He also blurred the lines between descriptive explanations and normative interests. He embraced a hierarchical understanding of cultural development and was neither an epistemic relativist nor a value relativist. Finally, Rothacker showed a hostility towards sociology that was typical of the völkerpsychological approaches around 1900 (see Klautke 2013, 75). 11 3. The Middle Rothacker (1919–1928): "Historicist 'Lebensphilosophie'" Rothacker's philosophical orientation changed dramatically after WWI. Following Dilthey, he developed a philosophy of the human sciences in the spirit of the Historical School. Rothacker published a new Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften (Introduction to the Human Sciences) in 1920 and aimed to complete Dilthey's project of a philosophical foundation of the human sciences in his Logik und Systematik der Geisteswissenschaften (Logic and System of the Human Sciences; 1926). Rothacker now favored a hermeneutical approach to cultures that emphasized their particularity, historicity, and creativity. He praised the historicist concept of the Volksgeist for having captured the very character of cultural productivity. The historicists aimed to reveal the "life-concern" (Lebensbezug) of cultural phenomena by relating them to the concrete fate of historical agents (Rothacker 1926, 129, 138, 157 f.). During this middle period, Rothacker characterized the "hidden philosophy of the Historical School" (130) as "historicist 'Lebensphilosophie'" (147). He retained his earlier dismissal of sociology, but now rejected all causal explanations of culture, including all kinds of naturalism (see, e.g., 143). The mid-career Rothacker was no aberration, and fits within one of the main lines of development in German philosophy after WWI. This historical context makes the major shift of his philosophical views plausible, but does not explain it sufficiently.iv German philosophers' war-time propaganda associated naturalism with the "Western" culture of Germany's French and British enemies. With Germany's defeat, critical theories of modernity were reinforced, and the scientific worldview, with its "shallow" causal explanations, became identified with the alleged intellectual crisis of the modern mind. Weimar culture thus was partly characterized by an anti-scientific mentality, in which Lebensphilosophie flourished as a "German" alternative to "Western" thought (see Kusch 1995, 224–252).v In his middle period, Rothacker emphasized the distinctively "German tradition" of the Historical School 12 (Rothacker 1920, 277, 1926, 114, 168). In the intellectual context of Weimar, Völkerpsychologie declined as an academic discipline searching for the universal laws of human development. Thus for example, Felix Krüger, Wundt's student and successor, rejected the term Völkerpsychologie and accused his teacher Wundt of having come too close to the "positivism" of "Western" thought (Klautke 2013, 86–88). Krüger even turned to Dilthey's descriptive psychology as a methodological alternative to experimental psychology (Kusch 1995, 266–68). In his mid-career, Rothacker extended Dilthey's theory of philosophical worldviews to the human sciences and culture in general. He argued that the methodological debates about scientific principles reflected fundamental "struggles of life" (1926, 112). The debates between naturalists, idealists, and historicists could thus be reduced to ideological differences between general worldviews. Like Dilthey, Rothacker distinguished between "naturalism," an "idealism of freedom," and "objective idealism" (36–67). Rothacker understood these worldviews as in conflict with each other, which was not Dilthey's understanding: Dilthey regarded the metaphysical worldviews as different perspectives rooted in distinct general attitudes to life, namely cognition, feeling, and volition (Dilthey 1962, 65 f.). To Dilthey, these represented different aspects of the world and, hence, were not necessarily in conflict with each other. Rothacker, on the other hand, saw these metaphysical worldviews as rooted in comprehensive decisions about life. They expressed practical demands and ethical postulates that could not be reconciled (137–139). For Rothacker, all knowledge was thus guided by normative interests (151). During this middle period, Rothacker was aware that his theory of worldviews would invite the charge of relativism. In his discussion of the relativistic consequences of his view, he distinguished between a "positive" and a "negative" relativism. Rothacker suggested that negative relativism was a form of skepticism; it had to be rejected because of its "corrosive" (zersetzend) effects (148). Yet, Rothacker embraced "positive relativism" in both 13 epistemology (a) and value theory (b). He employed a similar argument in both cases to show that his relativism had no unacceptable consequences. (a) Epistemology For Rothacker, the pursuit of knowledge was always motivated by practical interests anchored in worldviews, making truth interest-dependent. He held that the constitutive role of interests in knowing added a new dimension to epistemology, one which he tried to bring out by distinguishing between relevant and irrelevant truths. Still, Rothacker emphasized that this pragmatic criterion of knowledge did not affect the theoretical or empirical correctness of a claim: A certain claim may be irrelevant to us, but nevertheless true (144 f.). (b) Value Theory Rothacker admitted that his theory of worldviews followed historicism in acknowledging the plurality of values. The choice between different values was also guided by the particular interests of agents deciding between different possibilities of life. Rothacker maintained that adopting this perspective of life added a new dimension to the philosophical question about values: Values could be assessed by their "vitality" (Erlebtheit) and "genuineness" (Echtheit). This additional criteria made it possible to decide which values were "truly valuable" (wahrhaft wertvoll) in a specific context (147 f.). Rothacker's theory of worldviews was rooted in a specific concept of life, one that emphasizes life's historical and practical character. This he understood in an almost existential way, arguing that life put its agents in a concrete situation (Situation) that called for a definite action. This necessity to act called for decisions that ground human creativity. Rothacker assumed that creative agents could be either collective (the Volksgeist) or individual (155–157). This "scheme of productive life" (159, 171) granted creative agents more freedom than Rothacker's early biologistic concept of culture had. Now, in this middle 14 period of his work, Rothacker began to explicitly relativize the influence of hereditary factors in cultural production, with an emphasis on their ethical aspects. The sources of productivity, "character" and "substance," were not simply given, but had to be acquired through "selfcreation" and "self-affirmation" (159 f.). Yet he explicitly set his approach apart from an individualistic understanding of cultural history, rejecting the idea that cultural development rested on the creativity of individual genius only. Rothacker regarded this extreme individualism as rooted in strands of romanticism that he rejected (29). He emphasized that each individual participates in various "historical" and "spatial" communities. These communities are bearers of "historical substances" that shaped spiritual life. The "historical substances" could be assessed primarily by reference to their "fecundity" (Fruchtbarkeit). An individual could develop a productive attitude only within "historical substances", and always remained trapped within them (164 f., 170 f.). Therefore, while Rothacker in this middle period placed collective entities above individuals, he nevertheless rejected a causal interpretation of this relationship, maintaining that individual cultural creativity was circumscribed by the communal context. The last chapter of Rothacker's Systematics and Logic of the Human Sciences (Systematik und Logik der Geisteswissenschaften) shows the political aspect of his engagement with the Historical School (168–71; see also 117–119). Rothacker praises this movement's emphasis on the particularity of national cultures as a necessary response to the leveling character of the Enlightenment's universal aspirations. In embracing the value of concrete substances, and especially Völker, historicism revealed the productivity of cultural particularism. Rothacker closed his systematic treatise with an explicitly political statement, claiming that the discoveries of the Historical School entitled philosophers to patriotism (171). In a nutshell, the middle Rothacker emphasized the counter-Enlightenment character of historicism, and personally identified with its conservative and nationalist tendencies. He characterized the historicists as proponents of the "will of a great Volk" in search of its 15 national culture (148). Rothacker saw the deepening of historical consciousness as an opportunity to return to the national values of the "German tradition" (Rothacker 1920, 226– 28; see also Plas 2011, 474–476; Stöwer 2012a, 73–75). This political orientation is confirmed by Rothacker's political attitude during the Weimar Republic. Stöwer (2012a, 77–81) describes Rothacker's conduct in the highly politicized atmosphere of Heidelberg, where he worked from 1919 to 1929. Rothacker explicitly avoided the circle around Marianne and Alfred Weber where many of his liberal and socialist colleagues met regularly. He preferred the company of Friedrich Gundolf ,who introduced him to the circle gathered around the poet Stefan George (George-Kreis). Rothacker shared the elitist and anti-democratic conservativism of many of George's followers. In his autobiography he explained his rejection of the Weimar Republic with his strong belief that Germany had been humiliated after World War I (Rothacker 1963, 67). His anti-democratic attitude was thus closely connected with his nationalism. It is thus not surprising that he aligned himself with the politically conservative Deutsche Volkspartei (German People's Party), which combined a skeptical attitude towards the Weimar Republic with a nationalist, elitist, and anti-socialist agenda, and of which he was a member from 1919 to 1928. 4. The Later Rothacker (1929–1945): Cultural Anthropology Rothacker changed the bedrock of his philosophy for a second time when, around 1930, he followed the anthropological turn in German philosophy (Scheler, Plessner) and took a more serious interest in recent developments in biology (Uexküll) and Lebensphilosopie (Spengler, Klages). His later theory of culture was first developed in his treatise Geschichtsphilosophie (Philosophy of History) in 1934. In 1942, Rothacker published a second treatise on the same topic that continued his earlier work, coining the term "cultural anthropology" (Kulturanthropologie) for his approach. 16 The fundamental revision of his philosophical thought was accompanied by a political radicalization: Rothacker turned to National Socialism even before Hitler's seizure of power. He signed a petition calling for Hitler's election in July 1932, and became a member of the NS Lehrerbund (the Nazi organization for teachers) in November 1932 and of the NSDAP in May 1933.vi In the following section on Rothacker's later philosophy, I first sketch his methodological and political orientation (a), and then turn to the key motifs of his concept of culture (b). a) Methodological Demarcations and Political Affiliations Between his two treatises on the concept of culture, Rothacker (1938) published a psychological treatise on personality that positioned his cultural anthropology in relation to Völkerpsychologie, now taking a critical position. The chapter on Völkerpsychologie followed the contours of general psychology. Rothacker emphasizes that human behavior is always shaped by historically contingent cultural norms. He believed that the significance of culture and history confronts psychology with two problems. First, the focus on the individual mind is not sufficient to explain human characteristics. Second, the cultural level of human behavior cannot be adequately examined by experimental methods, which exposes the limited scope of causal explanation in psychology. Rothacker concluded that cultural studies had to complement Völkerpsychologie. He introduced his cultural anthropology as the theoretical and institutional framework that could bring together cultural and psychological studies to foster a comprehensive understanding of humanity (Rothacker 1938, 71–78). Rothacker's proposal for examining the cultural aspect of human behavior was hermeneutic in a broad sense: He emphasized that humans behaved in meaningful ways and that human phenomena should by examined by a descriptive analysis of the "plain experience of life" (schlichte Lebenserfahrung; 1934, 42). This hermeneutic approach demanded a 17 comparative study of the historical forms of human life. Rothacker's method was still visibly inspired by Dilthey. In this later period of his work, Rothacker rejected naturalism and often criticized causal explanations of human behavior. He dismissed biology, psychology, Völkerpsychologie, sociology, and existing forms of philosophical anthropology because of their naturalistic concept of humanity (Rothacker 1934, 19, f., 22, 41–43, 1942/1948, 61 f.). In contrast to the alleged one-sidedness of naturalism, Rothacker promised a "synthetic science of the human being" (synthetische Wissenschaft vom Menschen) that considered all aspects of human life: nature and spirit, origin and tradition, lawfulness and spontaneity, knowledge and deed (1942/1948, 61 f., 192, 197 f., 1934, 37, 144 f.). Rothacker criticized contemporary sociology from another angle as well. He now claimed that human communities had to be transformed into a unified Volk before they were capable of developing an advanced culture. The Volkswerdung (becoming a Volk) of a group was a political act and as such contingent (1942/1948, 93 f.). Rothacker wanted sociology to acknowledge the völkisch form of human life, calling for a National Sociology that would replace class with Volk (Rothacker 1933). With this nationalist focus, sociology could support the new supreme discipline of the humanities, namely Rothacker's "synthetic science of the human." The völkisch renewal of sociology was a key issue in Rothacker's public engagement in the 1930s: In newspaper articles and speeches he outlined how the human sciences could foster the rise of the German nation, envisioning Nazi Germany as a "self-conscious cultural state" (selbstbewusster Kulturstaat; Rothacker 1932a).vii The later Rothacker was not shy about the political character of his philosophy. He emphasized that one of his key thoughts-the significance of proving oneself in a certain situation (Bewährung in einer bestimmten Lage; 1942, 64)-was directly drawn from political experience. This concept was important in his philosophical reading of National Socialism (NS). Rothacker explicitly associated his cultural anthropology with the rise of NS. In the first 18 section of his Geschichtsphilosophie (1934), he claimed that his philosophical approach depended on the current historical developments, inasmuch as his philosophy revealed the anthropological foundation of the renewal of "folkish consciousness" (volkstümliche Bewusstsein; 1934, 3). In the last chapter, entitled "In the Third Reich", Rothacker argued that his philosophy belonged to this new political order, which he presented as a political revolution realizing a new image of humanity. He considered NS to be a kind of reality test for his cultural anthropology, advancing a reading of Nazi policies from the perspective of his theory of culture and justifying them philosophically. He argued that NS was the political response of a specific community to an ambivalent situation: On the one hand, an abundance of inner forces called for the shaping of the German Volk, yet on the other hand "hateful enemies and enviers" (149) threatened this project. NS understood the task that arose from the tension between the inner and outer situation: Germany had to assert itself against hostile foreign powers. Rothacker claimed that his concept of "proving oneself in a certain situation" explained the political primacy of foreign affairs typical of Nazi politics. His cultural anthropology aimed to show that the "protection of our sovereignty and borders" (149) had to be accompanied by the comprehensive mobilization of inner forces to establish a particular attitude (Haltung), which he characterized as being German. Rothacker held that being united in a stable attitude gave more strength to a community than any "constitutional crutches" (Verfassungskrücken) ever could (150). This conviction matched the self-understanding of NS as an ideological movement that shaped all aspects of life, so it is not surprising that Rothacker confidently concluded that the rise of this movement confirmed his philosophy of history. He also emphasized the philosophical significance of the guiding principles of the movement's ideology, arguing that the Nazi concepts of "state," "Volk," "race," and "Führer" contributed to the self-understanding of humanity and corresponded to his cultural anthropology (145–148). 19 Rothacker belonged among the many philosophers who welcomed National Socialism because of its promise to realize a new concept of the human (for a detailed account of the philosophical collaboration with NS see Sluga 1993; Wolters 1999; Sieg 2013). Philosophers such as Alfred Baeumler (1887–1968), Ernst Krieck (1882-1947), and Arnold Gehlen (1904– 1976) defined their own task as establishing a new conception of humanity in the realm of theory, corresponding to the new political reality. Anthropology thus became an important way to understand National Socialism philosophically. In this context, Rothacker's focus on culture made his approach stand out. b) The Key Motifs of Rothacker's Cultural Anthropology Völkisch particularism was at the core of Rothacker's cultural anthropology. Rothacker construed history as the struggle of particular communities for the realization of their life and their world (1934, 38). Human history was shaped by the cultural existence of those Völker who constituted the peak of human excellence. Only these communities possessed historical significance; all other "human societies" were justifiably forgotten (see, e.g., 1934, 53). Philosophy thus had to provide insight into the "life laws of Völker" (Lebensgesetze der Völker; 1934, 5), which Rothacker attempted to do by clarifying how human societies developed into advanced cultures (Hochkulturen). The later Rothacker defined Völker as the "bearers and creators" of all "moral, cultural, and spiritual life" (38). Völker were characterized both biologically and culturally: Rothacker held that Völker rested on biological groups (families, clans, tribes, and the like) which ensured continuity over time, while a shared a way of life provided common spiritual forms. A Volk established a specific attitude in its struggle with the natural and social environment. The principles of these struggles were: "digest and assimilate" and "eat and be eaten" (38). Rothacker's basic concept of communities was thus social Darwinist, with his 20 explicit assumption that the life of human communities was analogous to the life of organisms or a species (38). Rothacker developed an existentialist understanding of the collective life of humanity. He regarded communities as thrown into a certain "situation" (Lage) which called for an adequate "response" (Antwort): A community had to prove itself. Only a "good idea" (guter Einfall) triggered a course of action that lead to a successful response to the challenges of the world. The lived experience of collective agents was the horizon of both the idea and the response, both of which were entirely relative to the communal lived experience. Rothacker illustrated this fundamental structure of human life by describing the situation of a sail boat in a heavy sea. Strong winds and heavy swells called for certain responses. The sailors had to master the challenge by their coordinated activity. Rothacker used this same example to illustrate his thought that over time and with experience sailors formed habits that helped them to answer their maritime challenges effectively (44 f.). In a similar way, he thought that stable attitudes (Haltungen) formed the core of a people's specific "styles of life" (Lebenstile) and were thus the foundation of human cultures. Consequently, Rothacker understood the sailors' attitudes as the core of a maritime style of life. When this style of life shaped and unified all vital expressions of a sailing community, a veritable "sailors' culture" emerged (46). Rothacker held that cultures were rooted in a shared way of life. Cultures emerge when the specific attitude of a community finally is molded into a "characteristic form" (durchgeprägte Form), which shapes all areas of life. Rothacker defined the "characteristic form" of Kulturvölker (cultural people) as particular, collective, public, homogeneous, comprehensive, and productive. He claimed, for example, that there was a unique Roman style that characterized Roman heads, Roman architecture, each sentence of Roman historiography, each trait of Roman morality, and so on. This Roman identity was a basic disposition transmitted and modified from generation to generation and constituted the 21 essence of being Roman, in which all members of the Roman community participated (73–79, 1942/1948, 68 f.). For Rothacker, "reduction" was a historical method, inasmuch as he assumed that the manifold products of a culture could be reduced to a specific "mental form" (seelische Form). The general tendency of the Volksgeist was expressed in the particular world of shaped forms. Here the cultural form should be understood as an expression of the spiritual life of a Volk (1934, 120–132, 1942/1948, 147–150). Rothacker considered cultures to be separate and internally uniform entities, even though the unity of a style of life was never simply given. He viewed culture as the permanent task of shaping self and world. He emphasized that only permanent pressure and forceful coercion could facilitate the highest cultural achievements. A cultural style had to prove its productivity, preserve its unity, and succeed in the struggle with its environment. Social differences within a community could give rise to different versions of its specific style. For instance, Rothacker drew an analogy between how the style of the "leading classes" (Führungsschichten) and that of the "root classes" (Wurzelschichten) differ, and the difference between the spiritual and physiological expression of a culture. It was, however, essential that the unity of the cultural style be preserved, since the emergence of different class styles could endanger the unity of a culture (1942/1948, 178 ff.). Here Rothacker's social conservatism surfaced again: The imperative to stay in line suppresses the emancipatory struggle of social groups underrepresented in the cultural style of a given community. In his 1934 treatise, Rothacker used the concept of "substance" to signify the persisting character of collective attitudes and cultural styles (70, 113–117; see also 1942/1948, 67). Race was defined as one aspect of the "complex substance" of a culture. The later Rothacker understood race as a natural potential that had to be realized through "breeding" and "shaping." This led to an acknowledged methodological problem: Since races were only known in their historical form of Völker, only their phenotypes could be identified 22 (1934, 136 f.). From this Rothacker concluded the "issue of race" (Rassenfrage) did not necessarily require a biologistic approach that identified natural dispositions and used them as causal explanations (1934, 41, 136 f., 1942/1948, 193–195). He praised the work of Ludwig Ferdinand Clauss, who studied alleged racial types using a hermeneutic method (1934, 41; 1942/1948, 78). Clauss believed that the physiological and mental expressions of communities revealed the soul of their race (Rassenseele), claiming that the character of a race could only be understood by witnessing (Mitleben) its special way of life (Clauss 1926/1933).viii This understanding of race was compatible with anti-naturalism. The later Rothacker rejected the social determinism that he associated with sociology in particular (Rothacker 1934, 117–120, 1933, 1932b), yet he did not give up the belief in the priority of the community. In comparison to his middle period, Rothacker developed a more complex understanding of the relationship between the individual and its collective affiliations. In his later work, Rothacker thought the life of each human being took place in a culture whose collective substance determined the character of all individual acts, thus shaping a person's identity (1942/1948, 192). Yet, this cultural disposition could also transform into a situation (Lage) in which the individual had scope for decisions, and individual action could modify culture. Rothacker also mentioned the possibility of completely abandoning of one's cultural dispositions, though he warned against the use of absolute freedom and emphasized its futility. Individuals were creative only within their native culture. Rothacker emphasized that a culturally-shaped individual was "substantially enriched" but not "causally tied" (1934, 115 f.). He embraced the dominance of collective dispositions, but rejected causal interpretations of how the individual interacts with these (see also 1932b, 13–15). In his later work, Rothacker assumed that his particularistic understanding of cultures would invite the charge of relativism. He thus examines the problem of relativism again, but restricts his discussion to epistemology (1934, 86, 1942/1948, 177). He still believes that 23 practical interests played a constitutive role for knowing, though he also emphasizes the significance of desires and emotions for epistemic pursuits. The later Rothacker draws connections between his characterization of the human epistemic situation and the pragmatic criterion of truth encountered in his middle work. He distinguishes between relevant and irrelevant truths, claiming that this pragmatic dimension does not affect the correctness of epistemic claims (1934, 94–99, 1942/1948, 162–166). In contrast to his middle phase, the later Rothacker rejects the label of "relativism" for his view, emphasizing its realistic core. Divergent perspectives select between different aspects of the same reality, which he illustrates by way of a simple example: The same place can be spontaneously interpreted by a farmer as a wood, a forester as a forest, a hunter as a hunting ground, and a fugitive as a hiding place (1934, 85 f., 1942/1948, 161, 170 f.). Rothacker argues that the interpretations corresponding to each set of interests, desires, and emotions were objective knowledge about the world. He also claims that diverging worldviews do not contradict each other on an epistemic level (173). However, the different styles of life remain in practical conflict about which world and life was "truly worth" (wahrhaft würdig) living (1934, 99). Communities had to prove the value of their attitudes in a struggle with other communities, with the winner being credited with a better answer to the challenges of life and, hence, a superior style of life. The later Rothacker did not consider whether this position amounted to value relativism, since he restricted the problem of relativism to epistemology. In the 1930s and 40s, Rothacker developed a new theory of culture that included key motifs of his earlier works: He kept the hermeneutical orientation of his Diltheyan period and rejected naturalistic approaches to culture, while advancing revised versions of the existentialist concept of life and the cultural particularism that characterized his middle work. Rothacker's later philosophy thus is often read as an anthropological foundation for his theory of worldviews (Stöwer 2012a, 2012b; Tremmel 2012, 2009; Plas 2011; Fischer 2008). There are, however, also connections to key convictions of his early work, despite the explicit 24 critique of the biologistic concept of culture that the early work embraced. The later Rothacker was still a social Darwinist who worked with analogies between human and natural life-although he developed a different concept of life. He regarded cultures as expressions of the spiritual life of human communities, believed in the priority of community, and retained the old hostility towards sociology. But he distinguished his culturalism from all kinds of causal determinism and claimed that it left room for individual freedom. Rothacker's völkisch anthropology was guided by normative interests and was intended to justify both cultural and social hierarchies. It thus should not surprise us that Rothacker granted völkerpsychological examination a place in his "synthetic science of the human", nor that he should present his cultural anthropology as the long-overdue comprehensive answer to issues first raised by Völkerpsychologie. The later Rothacker's discussion of relativism is a special case: While he kept central thoughts from his middle work, he restricted his discussion to epistemology. He emphasized the realistic core of his perspectivism in order to distinguish his view from relativism. Rothacker's later work was characterized by an anti-relativistic tendency. 5. Conclusion The analysis above focuses on two aspects of Rothacker's philosophy of culture. First, the significance of Völkerpsychologie and Dilthey's Lebensphilosophie for the development of Rothacker's philosophical thought is emphasized. The paper begins by sketching Rothacker's völkerpsychological beginnings and analyzing his early biologist concept of culture. Then the analysis turns to Rothacker's Diltheyan philosophy of the human sciences, showing that, in the middle period of his work, Rothacker revised his understanding of human culture in line with ideas associated with historicism. He developed a theory of worldviews, embraced an existentialist concept of life, and deepened his particularism. The paper concludes by evaluating the second fundamental revision of Rothacker's philosophy, arguing that his cultural anthropology is best seen as a development of motifs of his earlier works. While the 25 straightforward link between his middle and later work is acknowledged by most commentators, I also pointed to the more subtle connection to his early work on culture. The later Rothacker rejected naturalism, but retained certain convictions that were now justified by the culturalist framework of his völkisch anthropology. Second, this paper emphasizes the political aspect of Rothacker's philosophy, showing that his different approaches to human culture shared a conservative tendency that corresponded to his political affiliation during the Weimar Republic and under NS. This political conservativism was deeply entrenched in Rothacker's theories of culture, which are presented here as different forms of völkisch thinking exhibiting a common pattern of assumptions about humanity-despite their important differences. Rothacker's philosophical approaches were always guided by normative interests. They carved the world up into unified entities whose members shared a particular identity. Rothacker emphasized the competition among these collective entities and ranked them according to their alleged achievements, assuming a deep distance between different forms of human life, and essentializing social differences by analyzing them in terms of natural or cultural characteristics. Finally, Rothacker always placed the community above the individual, thus attempting to justify nationalism philosophically. Since his philosophy was shaped by the reception of Völkerpsychologie and Lebensphilosophie, the political orientation of his thought demonstrates problematic aspects of their legacy. References Böhnigk, Volker. 2002. Kulturanthropologie als Rassenlehre: nationalsozialistische Kulturphilosophie aus der Sicht des Philosophen Erich Rothacker. Würzburg: Königshausen und Neumann. 26 Chickering, Roger. 1993. Karl Lamprecht: a German Academic Life (1856–1915). Atlantic Highlands/NJ: Humanities Press. Clauss, Ludwig F. 1926/1933. Rasse und Seele. 3rd ed. München: Lehmann. Dilthey, Wilhelm. 1962. The Essence of Philosophy. Trans. Stephen Emery and William Emery. Chapel Hill: The University of Carolina Press. Fischer, Joachim. 2008, Philosophische Anthropologie. Eine Denkrichtung des 20. Jahrhunderts, Freiburg: Alber. Habermas, Jürgen. 1958/1973. "Philosophische Anthropologie." In Kultur und Kritik: verstreute Aufsätze, 89–111. Repr. Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp. Klautke, Egbert. 2013. The Mind of the Nation: Völkerpsychologie in Germany, 1851-1955. New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books. Koonz, Claudia. 2003. The Nazi Conscience. Cambridge/Mass.: Harvard University Press. Koslowski, Peter. 1997. "A Philosophy of the Historical School: Erich Rothacker's Theory of the Geisteswissenschaften." In Methodology of the Social Sciences, Ethics, and Economics in the Newer Historical School, ed. Koslowski, 510–529. Berlin: Springer. Kroll, Frank-Lothar. 1998. Utopie als Ideologie. Geschichtsdenken und politisches Handeln im Dritten Reich, Paderborn: Schöningh. Kusch, Martin. 1995. Psychologism. London and New York: Routledge. ---. 2019. "From Völkerpsychologie to the Sociology of Knowledge." HOPOS, forthcoming. Plas, Guillame. 2011. "Philosophische Anthropologie als Anti-Soziologie. Erich Rothackers früher Entwurf einer Kulturanthropologie im theoretischen Feld der Weimarer Republik." In Konkurrenz der Paradigmata. Zum Entstehungskontext der philosophischen Anthropologie, ed. Plas and Gérad Raulet, 471–494. Nordhausen: Bautz. 27 ---. 2013. "Ernst Cassirers und Erich Rothackers Kulturmorphologien. Von der ideologischen Offenheit des Historismus." In Philosophische Anthropologie und Politik, ed. Plas, Raulet, and Manfred Gangl, 199–217. Nordhausen: Bautz. Raphael, Lutz. 1990. „Historikerkontroversen im Spannungsfeld zwischen Berufhabitus, Fächerkonkurrenz und sozialen Deutungsmustern." Historische Zeitschrift 252:325–363. Rothacker, Erich. 1909. "Über die Möglichkeit der Völkerpsychologie." Zeitschrift für angewandte Psychologie und Charakterkunde 2:382–392. ---. 1912. Über die Möglichkeit und den Ertrag einer genetischen Geschichtsschreibung im Sinne Karl Lamprechts. Leipzig: Voigtländer. ---. 1920. Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaft. Tübingen: Mohr. ---. 1926. Logik und Systematik der Geisteswissenschaften. München and Berlin: Oldenbourg. ---. 1932a. "Neue Wege des Hochschulwesens." In Hochschulfragen. Eine Sammlung von Vorträgen, ed. Westdeutscher Rundfunk, 48– 54. Köln: Bachem. ---. 1932b. "Überbau und Unterbau, Theorie und Praxis." Schmollers Jahrbuch 56:1–16 ---. 1933. "Nationale Soziologie." Westdeutsche Akademische Rundschau 3:1. ---. 1934. Geschichtsphilosophie. München and Berlin: Oldenbourg. ---. 1938. Die Schichten der Persönlichkeit. Leipzig: Barth. ---. 1942/1948. Probleme der Kulturanthropologie. Repr. Bonn: Bouvier. ---. 1963. Heitere Erinnerungen. Frankfurt/M.: Athenäum. Schorn-Schütte, Luise. 1984. Karl Lamprecht: Kulturgeschichtsschreibung zwischen Wissenschaft und Politik. Göttingen: V&R. Sieg, Ulrich. 2013. Geist und Gewalt. Deutsche Philosophen zwischen Kaiserreich und Nationalsozialismus. München: Hanser. Simmel, Georg. 1908. "Über das Wesen der Sozialpsychologie." Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik 26:285–291. 28 Sluga, Hans. 1993. Heidegger's Crisis: Philosophy and Politics in Nazi Germany. Cambridge/Mass.: Harvard University Press. Stöwer, Ralph. 2012a. Erich Rothacker: Sein Leben und seine Wissenschaft vom Menschen. Göttingen: V&R University Press. ---. 2012b. "Rothackers Kulturphilosophie in biographisch-zeitgeschichtlicher Perspektive." FIB 1:49–58. Tremmel, Frank. 2009. "Menschheitswissenschaft" als Erfahrung des Ortes. Erich Rothacker und die deutsche Kulturanthropologie. München: Utz. ---. 2012. "Leben in Begriffen. Erich Rothackers Kulturanthropologie als historische Semantik der 'existentiellen Reduktion.'" FIB 1:59–64. Weber, Thomas. 1989. "Arbeit am Imaginären des Deutschen. Erich Rothackers Ideen für eine NS-Kulturpolitik." In Deutsche Philosophen 1933, ed. Wolfgang F. Haug, 23–39. Reinbek/Hamburg: Argument. Wolters, Gereon. 1999. "Der 'Führer' und seine Denker. Zur Philosophie des 'Dritten Reichs." Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 47:223‒251. Wundt, Wilhelm. 1886/1911. "Ziele und Wege der Völkerpsychologie." In Probleme der Völkerpsychologie, 1-35. Leipzig: Wiegandt. i Since there is no established English translation of the term Völkerpsychologie, I use the German term in my paper. ii For a more detailed account see Stöwer 2012a, 31–52. iii For the significance of Simmel in the context of Völkerpsychologie see Kusch 2019. iv Examining the question why Rothacker changed his philosophical views after WWI would require a detailed analysis of Rothacker's work and life during the war that extends the scope of this paper (see Stöwer 2012a, 52–56). 29 v For the nationalist tendencies of German philosophy during and after WWI see Sieg 2013. vi For a detailed account of Rothacker's political involvement in NS see Stöwer 2012a, 113– 154. vii For the political aspect of Rothacker's critique of sociology see Plas 2013. viii For the significance of non-biologistic concepts of race for Nazi ideology see, e.g., Kroll 1998; Koonz 2003, 190−220.

Jennifer Nagel – September 28, 2011 Knowledge as a mental state Forthcoming in Oxford Studies in Epistemology ABSTRACT: In the philosophical literature on mental states, the paradigmatic examples of mental states are beliefs, desires, intentions, and phenomenal states such as being in pain. The corresponding list in the psychological literature on mental state attribution includes one further member: the state of knowledge. This article examines the reasons why developmental, comparative and social psychologists have classified knowledge as a mental state, while most recent philosophers--‐--‐with the notable exception of Timothy Williamson--‐--‐ have not. The disagreement is traced back to a difference in how each side understands the relationship between the concepts of knowledge and belief, concepts which are understood in both disciplines to be closely linked. Psychologists and philosophers other than Williamson have generally have disagreed about which of the pair is prior and which is derivative. The rival claims of priority are examined both in the light of philosophical arguments by Williamson and others, and in the light of empirical work on mental state attribution. One striking feature of research into mental state ascription or 'mindreading' is the extent to which it has involved cooperation between psychology and philosophy. Contemporary empirical work on mindreading is often traced back to a 1978 target article in comparative psychology, an article which raised the question of whether chimpanzees attribute mental states to themselves and others (Premack & Woodruff, 1978). Three of the most influential responses published with that article were written by philosophers, each of whom drew attention to the importance of probing the capacity to represent states of ignorance and false belief (Bennett, 1978; Dennett, 1978; Harman, 1978). In the decades that followed, philosophers made significant contributions to the theoretical frameworks guiding empirical research into mental state ascription (e.g. Goldman, 2006; Nichols & Stich, 2003), while psychologists made significant contributions to philosophical debates about the nature of our access to our own mental states and those of others (e.g. Gopnik & Wellman, 1992; Perner, 1991). Major progress has also been made in work co--‐authored by philosophers and psychologists (e. g. Apperly & Butterfill, 2009; Gallese & Goldman, 1998). In general, disciplinary boundaries between philosophers and psychologists working on mindreading do not seem to put these two groups in opposition to each other. However, there is one question on which most philosophers and psychologists appear to be divided, and it is arguably a significant question in the theory of mental state ascription. This is the question of whether knowledge is a mental state. On the psychology side of the line, the common answer to that question is positive. Developmental, social, cognitive, and comparative psychologists explicitly and without hesitation classify knowledge as a mental state, alongside states of belief, desire, intention, perception and feeling (Apperly, 2011; Baron--‐Cohen et al., 1994; Call & Tomasello, 2008; De Villiers, 2007; Epley & Waytz, 2009; Heyes, 1998; Keysar, 2007; Lin, Keysar, & Epley, 2010; Premack & Woodruff, 1978; 2 Saxe, 2005; Sodian, Thoermer, & Dietrich, 2006; Wellman & Liu, 2004). On the philosophy side of the line, the answer is almost unanimously negative. Knowledge is conspicuously absent from the lists of mental states presented by many prominent contemporary philosophers of mind (Davies & Stone, 2001; Goldman, 2006; Gordon, 1986; Stich & Ravenscroft, 1994). It is not simply by oversight that philosophers have failed to include knowledge in their lists; there are systematic reasons for the omission, to be discussed in what follows. In addition, philosophers have presented various explicit arguments aimed at establishing that knowledge is not a mental state (Fricker, 2009; Magnus & Cohen, 2003; Molyneux, 2007). Although the current climate in philosophy is largely hostile to the idea that knowledge is a mental state, there is no historical incompatibility between this idea and a philosophical mindset: philosophers as different as Plato and Locke classified knowledge this way. In present day philosophy, there are some philosophers of mind who continue to list knowledge among the mental states (e.g. Carruthers, 2009), and there is one sustained defense of the recognition of knowledge as a mental state, in the work of Timothy Williamson (1995; 2000; 2009). This position has met considerable resistance from other philosophers. In responding to Williamson's identification of knowledge as mental state, Anthony Brueckner is no doubt reporting the common sentiment among philosophers when he observes that 'to many this is a highly counterintuitive claim' (Brueckner, 2002, 197). When disciplines seem to disagree, it is natural to wonder whether the dispute is merely terminological. In this case one might suspect that the two sides currently mean something differ--‐ ent by 'mental state' or by 'knowledge'. Certainly there are a number of words whose standard technical meanings are quite different in philosophy and psychology, sometimes for theoretical reasons and sometimes just because a different sense of the word is more commonly in play in a given discipline (e.g. 'normative'; 'modal'). Section 1 of this paper argues that, notwithstanding certain relatively superficial differences in usage, the relevant branches of the two disciplines generally have shared targets in their sights both when they speak of mental states and when they speak of knowledge. If the debate is not merely verbal but substantive, at least one side is mistaken: this paper argues that the mainstream philosophers are the ones who have gone wrong. Section 2 discusses philosophical arguments on the matter and section 3 discusses empirical work. The difference between mainstream philosophers and psychologists is diagnosed as arising from a difference in the way the two sides see the relationship between the concepts of knowledge and belief. All parties to the dispute see these concepts as closely linked, and agree that 3 belief is a mental state. Where they disagree is on the question of whether knowledge or belief is a more basic concept: mainstream contemporary philosophers take the concept of belief as their starting point, and see the concept of knowledge as something more complex, generated by adding various non--‐mental conditions to the uncontroversially mental state of belief. Williamson joins the psychologists in taking the concept of knowledge to be more basic: like most psychologists of mental state ascription, he sees the concept of belief as something derived from the concept of knowledge, where knowledge is from the start seen as a mental state in its own right. A central motivation for the mainstream philosophical approach appears to be the thought that our understanding of action is fundamentally dependent on belief attribution; in this view, the belief component of knowledge is what really matters to our natural understanding of what others do, and it is uneconomical to admit knowledge--‐based explanations of action alongside belief--‐based ones. Advocates of the mainstream approach also appeal to a metaphysical intuition that mental states must be a function of strictly local conditions in the agent; observing that the truth of a known proposition is not typically something contained within the agent, they conclude that it would be metaphysically odd to characterize knowledge as a mental state. Against the first motiv--‐ ation for the mainstream view, it is not assumed in psychology that our understanding of other agents is ultimately belief--‐based; indeed the capacity to attribute mere belief to others seems to be considerably harder to master and deploy than the capacity to attribute knowledge. This paper examines a range of work in developmental and comparative psychology supporting the conclusion that an ability to track what others would know seems to be the precondition, rather than the product, of an ability to track what they would believe. Mature social cognition is also relevant. By the time they reach maturity, human beings are able to recognize both knowledge and belief intuitively, but it seems the availability of belief ascription does not make knowledge ascription redundant in our understanding of the actions of others. On the metaphysical point, there is reason to resist the intuitively alluring thought that mental states must be localized within the agent: this sense of localization is arguably a natural illusion, like the parallel illusion in 'naïve physics' which makes us feel that the motions of inani--‐ mate objects are determined by their own inner 'impetus' and local interactions with what they contact, even though our intuitive calculations of those motions themselves make use of inform--‐ ation about non--‐local factors such as gravitation. The intuitive sense that some human agent knows something is produced by intuitive mechanisms that make calculations about the target person and his relationship to the environment; for example, mechanisms that automatically track the target's 4 direction of gaze and note which objects lie in his visual field (Samson, Apperly, Braithwaite, Andrews, & Scott, 2010). Because these calculations are intuitive, we do not have explicit aware--‐ ness of how they are made, and can have the intuitive sense that the target's resulting mental state is 'internal' to him, like the intuitively felt 'internal impetus' of a falling object. Our actual use of the attributed mental state of knowledge in predicting and explaining the target's subsequent actions does not however depend on that illusory impression: just as our intelligent interactions with falling objects incorporate our real capacity to take gravitation into account, so also our intelligent interactions with other persons incorporate our real capacity to take their relationships with the environment into account. The fact that the state of knowing incorporates a relationship with the environment does not disqualify it from counting as a state which is fundamental to our intuitive understanding of other intelligent beings. Evidence from social, developmental and comparative psychology seems to support the view that knowledge is naturally seen as a mental state in its own right, and not as a composite of belief and non--‐mental factors. However, one might grant that knowledge is naturally seen this way and still wonder whether knowledge really is a mental state. The final section of the paper discusses the relationship between our evidence about the way we are naturally inclined to see knowledge and our conclusions about the kind of state knowledge really is. 1. What the two disciplines mean by 'mental states' and 'knowledge' One thing philosophy and psychology have in common is that neither discipline has produced a comprehensive and settled account of the nature of mental states or of knowledge. Ongoing contro--‐ versy over these topics within each discipline makes it difficult to establish conclusively that philo--‐ sophers and psychologists generally aim to speak of the same thing when they use the expression 'mental state' (or the word 'knowledge'). As each discipline produces and criticizes various succes--‐ sive 'mental state' theories, for example, it is a live question whether there is a single phenomenon that researchers on both sides of the disciplinary divide are trying to explain, or whether we and our colleagues across campus are stalking different prey. Because active controversies could mask subtle but genuine differences between the disciplines, this section will not hope to demonstrate that philosophers and psychologists all have precisely the same thing in mind for each of our key expressions, but will instead try to show extensive similarities in the way 'mental state' and 'know--‐ 5 ledge' are understood in the two disciplines, to shift the burden of proof onto those who claim that the general interdisciplinary disagreement over knowledge being a mental state is merely verbal. To give some rough indication of what they mean by 'mental state', both psychologists and philosophers often provide lists of examples. Setting aside the inclusion or omission of knowledge, these lists are strikingly similar across the disciplines. Psychologists and philosophers are widely agreed that the following are naturally classified as mental states: beliefs, desires, intentions, emotions, perceptions, and sensations such as pain and hunger. There is also wide agreement in both disciplines about the relationship between mental states and agency: we take1 a person's actions (as opposed to mere reflexes or automatic functions such as digestion) to be dependent on2 his or her epistemic and motivational mental states. There are well established systematic relationships between these mental states: for example, people generally intend to do what they believe will satisfy their desires. Given the universality of these relationships among mental states, a capacity to register the mental states of others-for example, what they believe, desire and intend-enables us to explain and predict what they will do. We do not simply expect old patterns of overt behavior to be repeated; because we can grasp the underlying causes of those patterns, we can anticipate how an agent will act and interact with us in novel circumstances. This social understanding may be imperfect in various ways, but it is strong enough to support successful communication, competition and cooperation across a wide range of social situations. Of course there are a great many theories about the nature of mental states both in psychology and in philosophy, and some of these theories may have discipline--‐specific or idiosyncratic aims, but in broad brushstrokes recent philosophical and psychological theories about mental states generally seem to aim at capturing similar phenomena. 1 According to some philosophers, our natural inclinations to see human actions as caused by mental states are fundamentally mistaken: eliminitavists like Churchland argue that the basic terms of folk psychology do not refer to anything with real causal powers (Churchland, 1981). As this is now very much a minority position within philosophy, and even Churchland himself has come to admit the reality of some mental states, eliminitavism will be set aside in what follows, and the reality of mental states such as belief and desire will be assumed as a starting point. A similar initial commitment to the reality of mental states is common in psychological work (see e.g. Apperly, 2011, p.2). One can of course admit the fallibility of folk psychology, and agree that the nature of those states cannot be read straight off our natural patterns of mental state ascription. Furthermore, even those who are still inclined towards an eliminitavist reading of much mental state discourse may still find some interest in the question of whether the (apparent) state of knowledge is a part of that domain, or whether knowledge ascription is a form of mental state ascription. 2 There are various views about the character of this dependence: many regard it as straightforwardly causal, but on some views (e.g. Dancy, 2000) mental states are characterized as necessary background conditions rather than causes of action. For ease of exposition I will describe the dependence as causal in what follows, but I believe that much of what I say could be reworded to fit views such as Dancy's. 6 The question of whether philosophers and psychologists mean the same thing by 'knowledge' is more difficult. One of the characteristics of knowledge to which philosophers are particularly attentive is the truth condition: it is almost universally accepted in philosophy that knowing, unlike mere believing, is an attitude that one can have only to truths. One strand of evidence for this is linguistic: 'know' is a factive verb, a verb that licenses an inference to its complement clause. From the truth of a proposition of the form 'S knows that p' it would follow that p is the case. Nonfactive verbs such as 'believes' do not license such inferences. If one follows philosophers such as Williamson in extending the terminology of linguistics over to epistemology, one can describe knowing itself as a factive propositional attitude, in contrast to nonfactive propositional attitudes such as thinking, hoping and conjecturing (Williamson, 2000). Unlike the identification of knowledge as a mental state, the identification of knowledge as a factive state is not considered particularly controversial in philosophy: even the rare philosopher who doubts the strength of the linguistic evidence for the factivity of the verb 'to know' does not see this as a reason to challenge the classification of knowledge itself as a factive state (Hazlett, 2010). Psychologists might at first seem not to take knowledge to be a factive state. For example, in the literature on calibration or the relationship between confidence and accuracy, some papers discuss the 'accuracy of knowledge' in various domains, by which the authors mean the percentage of true out of total answers volunteered (e.g. Perfect, Watson, & Wagstaff, 1993). Epistemologists might observe that the accuracy of knowledge, strictly speaking, would always have to be 100%; any false answer volunteered would be mere belief at best, and fail to count as knowledge in the first place. But the charitable reader can readily make sense of the calibration literature by penciling in scare quotes where appropriate, for example by reading various calibration studies as probing something more like the accuracy of what the research subjects "know" (or perhaps take themselves to know). When the line between knowledge and what is taken for knowledge is particularly important and there is a real risk of confusion, psychologists do take more care in marking the distinction. In calibration research as elsewhere it is understood, and sometimes even underscored, that strictly speaking what is known must be true (e.g. Koriat, 1995). In the branches of psychology most directly engaged with mental state attribution, there is greater self--‐consciousness about the relationship between truth and knowledge, both because those who are examining the linguistic expression of mental state attribution take the factivity of the mental state verb 'know' to be a core component of its meaning (e.g. Abbeduto & Rosenberg, 1985), and because much attention is paid to our competence for recognizing false beliefs, whether 7 this competence is expressed linguistically or in other forms of behavior. Indeed, the threat of an interdisciplinary difference sometimes appears to loom larger in the treatment of falsity than factivity: in articles about the relative difficulty of attributing knowledge and false belief, the terms 'belief' and 'false belief' occasionally seem to be used interchangeably (e.g. in Kaminski, Call, & Tomasello, 2008). But this pattern of usage is also better explained by its expediency than by any interdisciplinary disagreement about the possibility of true belief. In experimental studies of the capacity to discriminate knowledge from mere belief, the easiest way to generate a situation involving a belief falling short of knowledge is usually to devise a situation in which the observed agent's belief is false. Because some of the clearest tests of the capacity to represent belief (as contrasted to knowledge) are tests involving false belief, psychologists of mental state ascription sometimes gloss over the distinction between belief recognition and false belief recognition. This occasional elision in usage should not be taken to suggest any positive commitment to the thought that beliefs as such must be false, or to the thought that all true beliefs would have to count as knowledge. The relatively subtle capacity to distinguish knowledge from mere true belief (for example, belief generated by lucky guessing) emerges later than the capacity to distinguish knowledge from false belief: true belief that falls short of knowledge is surprisingly hard to ascribe. After they are capable of recognizing false belief, children pass through a stage in which they tend to describe a target as knowing if his action leads to successful performance-say selecting the box with the treat in it- even if the target had no evidential basis for his choice, for example because he was absent when the treat was placed in the box (Miscione, Marvin, O'Brien, & Greenberg, 1978). The capacity to recognize the difference between knowledge and accidentally true belief is often ignored in studies of young children and nonhuman primates who fail to make even the more rudi--‐ mentary distinction between knowledge and false belief.3 However, the more advanced capacity has 3 One might complain that it is still controversial for psychologists to describe the more rudimentary capacity as distinguishing between knowledge and false belief, as opposed to true belief and false belief; perhaps the cases of accidentally true beliefs have special peculiarities that make it harder to handle them appropriately. But it is not in general true that false beliefs are harder to attribute than true ones; for example, children who are capable of recognizing false belief pass through a stage in which they explicitly represent others who in fact simply lack knowledge as holding false, rather than true, beliefs about propositions known to the child (Ruffman, 1996). Furthermore, the prototypical cases of knowing that the child recognizes (in particular, seeing that something is the case), are the same as those we recognize as adults. Although the adult has a deeper understanding of knowledge, insofar as the child's early use of 'know' is typically a response to what we also recognize as knowledge, she should charitably be seen as referring to knowledge, just as the ancient Romans are appropriately seen as having referred to gold with their word "aurum", notwithstanding their failure to recognize it as the element with atomic number 79, and notwithstanding their relatively limited accuracy in sorting gold from its look--‐alikes. Thanks to Hagit Benbaji, Tamar Gendler and Michael Thompson for pressing me on this point. 8 also been studied heavily enough that there is no reason to think that psychologists of mental state ascription are generally oblivious to the distinction between knowledge and mere true belief (e.g. Johnson & Wellman, 1980; Moore, Bryant, & Furrow, 1989; Pillow, Hill, Boyce, & Stein, 2000; Sodian & Wimmer, 1987). A last reason to worry that psychologists may have something different in mind when they speak of 'knowledge' is that they sometimes offer what seem to be the sort of analyses of knowledge that would meet considerable resistance in philosophy departments. For example, Bartsch and Wellman offer the following observation: 'Adults use know to refer to a belief that is felt to be justified, assumed to be true, or that enjoys markedly higher conviction than one described by think' (1995, 40). Meanwhile, according to Miller, Hardin and Montgomery, 'Young children may appreciate some of the criteria for "know" (a true belief for which there is evidence) without fully understanding all of the criteria (a belief that is not only true but held with certainty)' (2003, 350). Some psychologists give even more explicit endorsement of theories of knowledge rejected in philosophy since Gettier (1963); for example, by claiming directly that 'knowledge means justified true belief' (Reber & Unkelbach, 2010, 570). Others amend the classical analysis, but not in a manner that contemporary philosophers are inclined to accept as fully satisfactory, for example by simply adding a causal condition to the conditions of truth, justification and belief (Dienes & Perner, 1999, 739; Perner, 1991, 304). Because the analysis--‐of--‐knowledge project commanded the attention of philosophers for decades after Gettier, counterexamples to all of these analyses will spring readily to mind for contemporary epistemologists. If there were evidence that psychologists wanted to insist on their analyses in the face of these counterexamples, one might worry about a real difference in what is meant by 'knowledge' in the two disciplines. But an examination of the psychologists' grounds for their general assertions about knowledge does not reveal any unorthodox responses to the currently standard epistemological counterexamples; rather, the relevant peculiar cases from the epistemology literature (cases involving deviant causal chains and the like) have not been the targets of theoretical attention in psychology, no doubt in part because such cases are ecologically rare. And, despite some perhaps overconfident phrasing-like the claim to have captured 'all of the criteria' for knowledge-the general claims in the last paragraph are not typically treated even by the psychologists who advance them as definitive. In practice psychologists do not for example insist that a mental state pass some test for 'markedly higher conviction' or a special feeling of certainty before they are willing to classify it as knowledge. Everyday cases of perceptual 9 observation, for example, are in standard practice taken to issue in knowledge without any prerequisite that they produce a particularly high level of confidence. So although the just--‐quoted general claims about knowledge may appear to philosophers as questionable analyses, they figure in their original contexts as rough empirical generalizations, typically aiming to deliver a quick outline of what it is that paradigmatic instances of knowing have in common. Reassuringly enough, lists of paradigm cases of knowledge are the same in the psychology of mental state ascription as they are in contemporary epistemology: perceptual observation in good conditions, sound inference, memory, and appropriate cases of testimony.4 If psychologists sometimes offer a questionable general recipe for what unites these cases, they are doing some--‐ thing that is often done in philosophy as well. When a philosopher advances what he describes as an analysis of knowledge, and this analysis is confronted with what we would ordinarily call an effective counterexample, it is more charitable to see the philosopher as having said something inaccurate about knowledge, than to see him as having attempted to introduce a new sense of the word 'knowledge'. The same charity should be extended to psychologists: except in cases where for example it is clear that they mean to speak of 'what is commonly taken to be knowledge' rather than knowledge itself, it is only fair to take their talk of knowledge at face value, as anchored in the same paradigmatic examples that drive philosophical work on knowledge, and as referring to a shared topic of pre--‐theoretical interest. If there are any underlying terminological differences between philosophy and psychology in their ordinary use of 'knowledge' and 'mental state', these possible differences do not seem to be large enough to explain the starkly opposing positions generally taken in the two disciplines on the question of whether knowledge is a mental state. The next two sections examine the substance of what seems to be a substantive disagreement. 2. Philosophical arguments about whether knowledge is a mental state. Most contemporary philosophers deny that knowledge is itself a mental state, but are happy to grant that knowledge 4 Philosophical skeptics have of course raised worries about whether knowledge is ever actually instantiated in any of these ways, but even they would not deny that these are the types of cases that people commonly take to be instances of knowing (Unger, 1971). Most contemporary epistemologists are not skeptics, and this paper will not address the challenge of skepticism. However, even skeptics who doubt the propriety of our ordinary ascriptions of knowledge may still have some interest in the question of whether what we ordinarily take to be knowledge is or is not naturally seen as a type of mental state. 10 incorporates a mental state, namely the state of belief.5 On the currently standard philosophical view, in order to know a proposition p, an agent must not only have the mental state of believing that p, but various further independent conditions must also be met: p must be true, the agent's belief in p must be justified or well--‐founded, and so forth. At least some of these further conditions-most importantly, the truth of p, where p is some proposition about the external world6-would clearly be non--‐mental conditions. States and events that are composites of the mental and non--‐mental are not naturally classified as mental: homicide, for example, is not a mental event. Although every homicide incorporates the mental condition of an intention to kill (indeed this mental condition, mens rea, is the part of the essence of homicide that distinguishes it from involuntary manslaughter), an event cannot be a homicide without also incorporating the non--‐mental condition of someone's actual death. The inclusion of this non--‐mental conjunct disqualifies the event considered as a whole from counting as purely mental. Similarly, on the currently orthodox philosophical view, because it is thought to include the non--‐mental component of the truth of propositions about external reality alongside the mental component of belief, the state of knowledge is considered composite rather than purely mental. Enormous effort has been directed towards developing an account of the composition of this composite state. Epistemologists since Gettier have struggled hard to produce a closed list of factors that would need to be added to true belief (or relationships in which truth and belief would need to figure) in order to constitute the state of knowledge, evidently without success (for surveys, see Plantinga, 1993; Shope, 1983; Steup, 2008). Increasingly complex analyses have been crafted to sidestep intuitive counterexamples to earlier analyses, but new counterexamples have steadily emerged to confront the new analyses (and perhaps not only steadily but inevitably, as argued in Zagzebski, 1994). Other, simpler efforts at the analysis of knowledge have collapsed into circularity, managing to analyze knowledge only by adding to true belief a condition which 5 Some philosophers add further mental conditions, maintaining that the mental state or psychological component of knowledge is not simply belief, but particularly confident belief, or perhaps justified belief, where 'justified' is understood in mental terms; these elaborations of the standard view will be discussed in due course. A few have argued that the state of knowledge positively excludes the state of belief; this type of position is now rarely held, and will not be discussed here (for criticism of such views, see Williamson, 2000, pp. 42--‐44). 6 Some of the propositions we might be said to know or believe are themselves about the domain of the mental; strictly for ease of exposition I am setting those cases aside in what follows. Of course the truth of a proposition about the mental is not itself a mental condition, but it is easier to see that the composite view of knowledge involves an element that is entirely independent of the mental realm if we focus on knowledge of propositions about the external world. 11 ultimately incorporates knowledge itself. Certain efforts to explain knowledge in terms of 'well--‐ foundedness', in particular, look problematic in this regard, as do appeals to conditions such as epistemic adroitness or competence (e.g. Sosa, 2007; Turri, 2011), insofar as it is hard to see how to understand the relevant concepts of adroitness or competence without appeal to the notion of knowing how to do something (cf. Stanley, 2011; Stanley & Williamson, 2001). Although there is no simple formula for the ascent from belief to knowledge, the intuitive recognition of knowledge is supposed to start with the recognition of belief. According to the view that is currently standard in philosophy, in attributing knowledge of a proposition to some target agent, we attribute the mental state of belief, while simultaneously judging the agent's situation to satisfy various non--‐mental conditions, in particular, the condition that the proposition believed be true, plus whatever further mental and non--‐mental features are necessary to distinguish knowledge from mere true belief. Attributions of knowledge, in this view, play no special or ineliminable role in our ability to explain and predict the actions of others.7 The purely mental factor of believing is what serves as the key input to our understanding of what the agent does, together with some representation of that agent's desires. The guiding principle of the current orthodoxy is that our ordinary understanding of action is supplied by belief--‐desire reasoning (Davidson, 1963; Dennett, 1971; Fodor, 1987). There are certain sets of cases which make it seem perfectly natural to maintain this exclusive focus on belief as the pivotal mental state. When we are explicitly considering the relative advantages of explaining actions in terms of what is believed as opposed to what is known, it is easy to think of pairs of parallel scenarios in which an agent both knows and believes a proposition p in the first scenario, but merely believes p in the second scenario, and can be predicted to perform exactly the same salient action in both. For example, in (1) Janet knows (and a fortiori believes) that her mobile phone is in her handbag, remembering having seen it there a few moments before; in (2) Janet believes that her mobile phone is in her handbag, again remembering having seen it there a few moments before, but does not know that her mobile phone is in her handbag, because an extremely skilled pickpocket has just removed it without her noticing. If we add a certain 7 The idea that attributions of knowledge play no special role in the success of our intuitive understanding of one another is not equivalent with the idea that knowledge plays no significant role in causal explanations. For example, Hilary Kornblith has argued at length for the causal and explanatory value of knowledge while expressing some skepticism about our natural intuitive capacity to register the presence or absence of knowledge, at least as this capacity is activated by thought experiments in philosophy (Kornblith, 2004). My own view is that our pre--‐theoretical intuitions about epistemological cases are the products of the same mindreading capacity that underpins ordinary mental state attribution (Nagel, forthcoming). 12 motivational state to these two scenarios-say, a sudden desire to make a phone call-we will expect to see just the same immediate action performed in each (reaching into the bag). Given that her immediate action in both cases would be the same, it can seem not to matter to the explanation of this action whether Janet knows or merely believes. On the currently orthodox philosophical view, the relevant proximal cause of her action in both scenarios is Janet's belief that her mobile phone is in her bag, which together with her desire to make a call and various background beliefs will determine what she does. On this view it would be inefficient to say that her action in the first scenario was produced by her knowledge of the key proposition while in the second it was produced by mere belief; for maximal generality we should posit the same set of mental causes in the two cases. At the first moment of reaching into the bag, the two scenarios may look very similar; however, when we extend the time frame and imagine the continuation of (1) and (2) we do expect differences to emerge. In (1) Janet will make her call; in (2) she will rummage in the handbag for a while and then come to the realization that something is amiss. But the advocate of the orthodox belief--‐desire view will not see this divergence as any reason to allow that knowledge has a special role in explaining action, or that the key mental states explaining action in (1) and (2) were perhaps different from the start. Rather, the difference in longer--‐range forecasts would be explained in terms of an interaction between the initial mental states (which on the orthodox belief--‐based view are the same in both scenarios) and environmental conditions (which differ between the scenarios on the point of whether the mobile phone is actually present), where these evolving conditions will come to produce different mental states in the parallel agents, further shaping what each will do. A considerable part of the value of mental state attribution is its capacity to generate predictions across variations in environmental conditions. Positing just a single initial mental state-belief- across both of our cases looks like an economical thing to do. However, it will be a false economy if the state of knowledge is generally associated with patterns of behavior that are interestingly different from those produced by the state of mere belief. One could concede both that knowing entails believing, and even that in this particular pair of cases the same immediate action would be generated by knowledge or belief, without granting the gener--‐ al point that attributions of knowledge play no special role in our understanding of intentional action. Arguing against the orthodox philosophical view and in favor of the admission of knowledge as a mental state, Williamson has developed some examples of cases in which our expectations 13 concerning an agent's extended pattern of conduct do seem to be sensitive to whether we see that agent as having knowledge or mere true belief on some point. A brief overview of his position, as presented in (Williamson, 2000), will facilitate discussion of these examples. Williamson stresses that his view is consistent with the orthodox view that knowledge in fact entails belief, so that any agent who knows that p could also be credited with a belief that p; what he denies is that knowledge is a composite of belief and other factors, or more generally, a hybrid state composed of mental and non--‐mental conditions. Knowledge, in his view, is a stronger mental state than belief, but it is nevertheless a purely mental state in its own right, so in attributing it to others we would not ordinarily have to pass through intermediate stages of attributing the weaker mental state of belief and also recognizing the believed proposition as true. To describe knowledge as a purely mental state is not to suggest that it is determined entirely by the internal physical or spiritual configuration of the agent, in a manner that is indepen--‐ dent of what is going on around her. In Williamson's view mental states like seeing or knowing that something is the case are not seen as, say, inner neurological states whose relationship to the environment is left entirely open, but rather as states in virtue of which an agent is related to an environment in certain ways (the thought that various neurological configurations can support our being in such states is undisputed). The relevant ways of being related to the environment mark another point of agreement with the orthodox view: Williamson agrees that knowledge is a factive state. Indeed, what distin--‐ guishes knowledge from other mental states is that knowledge is the most general factive mental state. Williamson allows that there are various different factive mental states-seeing that p, remembering that p, regretting that p, being acutely conscious that p and so on-but in his view all of these entail knowing. Factive mental states other than knowing are invariably just more specific ways of knowing. So, classifying knowledge as a state of mind does not mean giving up on the condition that what is known must be true as a matter of objective fact; the point is rather that states of mind can be constituted in terms of relationships between agents and the objective facts of their environment.8 The status of knowledge as our core factive mental state is what accounts for its special significance, according to Williamson: "factive mental states are important to us as states 8 It is important that these relations bind agents (or subjects-I use those terms interchangeably in this paper) directly to the environment. Orthodox analyses can also bind an agent to the environment, but only indirectly, through the mediation of the state of belief. For example, in Goldman's causal theory the state of knowing that p was thought to consist in having a belief that p, where this belief was appropriately caused by the fact that p (Goldman, 1967). 14 whose essence includes a matching between mind and world, and knowing is important to us as the most general factive stative attitude" (2000, 40). Knowledge on this view is a purely mental state rather than a composite of the mental state of belief plus non--‐mental factors. However, Williamson does not oppose the orthodox view about the entailment between knowing and believing: any agent who knows that p also believes that p. While the orthodox approach since Gettier has explained this entailment in terms of a composite theory of knowledge that takes belief as one of its basic building blocks, Williamson instead allows the entailment by characterizing belief as a potentially diluted version of knowing. In his view, 'believing p is, roughly, treating p as if one knew p' (2000, 47). Matching how things are is not part of the essence of belief, although beliefs do sometimes happen to match how things are: we can believe false propositions, and we can believe propositions whose truth is not essential to our believing them. The attribution of knowledge is not taken to start from an attribution of belief, on Williamson's view; rather, the capacity to recognize belief depends on some prior mastery of the concept of knowledge. Nevertheless, the weaker and derivative mental state of belief obtains wherever the stronger mental state of knowledge does.9 Williamson aims to support his view of knowledge as a distinctive and pure mental state by identifying some cases in which the simple attribution of knowledge yields a better explanation of action than the composite attribution of belief plus the truth of the proposition believed. One such case invites us to consider the difference between a burglar who knows that there is an especially valuable gemstone in a given house and a burglar who merely has a true belief to the same effect. Other things being equal, Williamson suggests, the first type of burglar would be expected to be more persistent in searching the house, if only because mere knowledge is in general more secure than mere true belief (2000, 62). Mere true belief has various vulnerabilities not shared by knowledge: for example, if a belief falls short of being knowledge because it is only accidentally true, it might be derived from a false premise. So, Williamson notes, the second sort of burglar could believe that the stone is in the house on the basis of a false report that it is hidden under the bed, and because of his reliance on false testimony fail to count as knowing that the stone is in the 9 This is not to say that an attribution of belief will always sound natural when an attribution of knowledge would be appropriate. Because we ordinarily aim to make our conversational contributions as relevantly informative as possible (Grice, 1975), by attributing the weaker condition of believing we would typically generate the conversational implicature that the stronger condition of knowing is not known to hold. So for example if I say "Justin thinks that I want him to come to my party," this carries the implication that I do not in fact want him there. But the implicature is cancellable and therefore merely pragmatic; I could say "Justin thinks that I want him to come to my party; indeed, he knows that I do." 15 house. After a thorough search under the bed, this burglar would be likely to desist where his counterpart who knows the stone is in the house would continue. Because it is essential to states of knowledge that they match how things are, knowledge is more robust than true belief as such. Discovering that a certain burglar engaged in an exceptionally tenacious search of a house-having spent hours on the property in peril of being discovered-we would better explain this behavior by saying that he knew the stone was in the house, rather than that he had the true belief that it was. This type of example has encountered resistance from defenders of the orthodox belief--‐ oriented line. If resolute behavior can be explained by appeal to knowledge, they contend it can be explained even more successfully by appeal to certain kinds of belief, perhaps particularly confident or inflexibly held belief (Magnus & Cohen, 2003; Molyneux, 2007).10 As Williamson himself stresses, knowledge may be lost when one encounters misleading evidence; mere belief, on the other hand, may be dogmatic enough to shield its holder from reconsidering a given proposition in any circumstances. If we just want to explain exceptional persistence in a dangerous course of action, an attribution of obstinacy may serve us better than an attribution of knowledge. The advocate of knowledge--‐based explanations of action can point out that in some circumstances we may have good reasons not to attribute sheer obstinacy to a resolute actor, but it is open to the advocate of the belief--‐based approach to suggest that in those cases there could be further conditions added to belief that would all together explain the situation as well as knowledge. To avoid granting the point about the special explanatory power of knowledge attributions, these further conditions could not themselves be tantamount to knowledge; well--‐ founded true belief will be off--‐limits, for example, if we are using the technical expression 'well--‐ founded' as some kind of abbreviation for 'amounting to knowledge'. Magnus and Cohen suggest that a certain kind of rational--‐belief--‐that--‐will--‐tend--‐to--‐survive--‐scrutiny would be a good belief--‐ 10 An anonymous referee suggests that there may be a sense of 'knowing that p' which means nothing other than 'being subjectively certain (or highly confident) that p', citing as evidence for this view comments such as 'I just knew the butler was the murderer, until it turned out, in the last chapter, that he wasn't.' On this view an attribution of 'knowledge' would be a better explanation of the burglar's persistence than an attribution of mere belief, but not in a way that would appeal to anyone committed to the essential factivity of 'knows'. However, it is not clear that we do have reason to admit a strictly confidence--‐driven and nonfactive sense of 'knows': there may be a better way of making sense of utterances like the remark about the butler. To begin, the special emphasis on 'knew' in that remark is plausibly a clue that 'knew' is not being used in a straightforward fashion. Richard Holton argues that such utterances gain their dramatic flair from 'protagonist projection', in which one puts oneself in the position of another (or in this case, one's past self), deliberately selecting words fitting that perspective rather than our current one (Holton, 1997). Note that one could say to similar effect, "Up until the last chapter, the butler was obviously the murderer, and then it turned out he wasn't." 16 based explanatory substitute for knowledge (2007, 49) but it is not clear we can make intuitive sense of such a concept except insofar as it is a rough characterization of knowledge itself. Magnus and Cohen do not elaborate on the nature of this tendency, but if they think that we intuitively explain action by appeal to such a concept, the burden of proof is arguably on them to establish that we have any intuitive notion of it. Furthermore, without an account of what grounds this special tendency, explanations that appeal to it would have limited explanatory value: it is not particularly informative to explain rationally tenacious action as being the kind of action that is based on beliefs that are, for some unexplained reason, rationally tenacious.11 If mere true belief can fall short of knowledge in an open--‐ended variety of ways, as the frustrations of the analysis--‐of--‐knowledge project would suggest, there is no quick formula to summarize the difference made by attributions of knowledge as opposed to true belief, and it is not immediately obvious which side has a better line on the explanation of action. Several points may still seem to favor belief--‐based over knowledge--‐based approaches to mental state attribution. There are costs associated with allowing the richer state of knowledge as an explainer: most notably, we are no longer in a position to give an exactly uniform explanation of what Janet initially does in our two mobile phone cases if her action is explained by knowledge in the first and mere belief in the second. The belief--‐based composite approach brings with it the main attraction of compositionality, its promise of greater fertility and generality. Molyneux suggests that knowledge--‐based explana--‐ tions are too finely tailored to their circumstances to have useful explanatory strength. Noting the similarity of a pair of cases like our Janet cases, he presses the concern that 'when an explanation type fails to preserve its force across extremely similar scenarios, it provides us with evidence that it does not bear up well through contingent variation of any sort' (Molyneux, 2007, 270). A somewhat related line of objection to Williamson would focus on the sorts of cases that he takes to illustrate the special value of knowledge--‐based explanation of action, and point out that these cases might be ecologically quite rare. If we take the usual non--‐skeptical stance that ordinary cases of perceptually, inferentially and testimonially grounded true belief are knowledge, then true belief that falls short of knowledge is arguably going to be uncommon, and situations in which it figures are likely to be greatly outnumbered by situations involving ordinary false belief. If we need to evaluate the truth of the key proposition anyway in order to make an attribution of knowledge, it may seem largely redundant to admit knowledge as an independent explainer of action alongside 11 This last point is owed to Tim Williamson, who notes 'a salient similarity to dormitive virtue explanations' here (Williamson, p.c.). 17 mere belief.12 Situations in which we encounter beliefs that are true overlap so heavily with situations in which we encounter knowledge that it is hard to see how we would be ill--‐served by an approach that promised to make uniform sense of true belief and false belief situations, even if it did not make perfect sense of those rare cases in which an agent has accidentally true belief. Even if Williamson is right that knowers conduct themselves in subtly different ways from mere believers of the truth, the cases he is able to find to illustrate this point are exotic enough that we might hope to leave them on the sidelines as a range of curious exceptions to our general account of mental state attribution: perhaps the differences between knowledge and mere true belief could be handled by some codicil to a belief--‐based account of intuitive mental state ascription. However, if natural social environments provide heavy overlap between observed true belief situations and observed knowledge situations, this is not necessarily bad news for a defender of the knowledge--‐based approach. If knowledge were a status only rarely attained by true belief, then the composite approach's capacity to generate a smooth compositional story about true belief and false belief would be more attractive than an approach giving a special primary role to the ecologically rare state of knowledge. If the most common prototypical examples of judgment that we witness are in fact moments of knowing, on the other hand, then it becomes more plausible to maintain that recognition of knowledge is prior to recognition of mere belief (whether true or false). Furthermore, it is not obvious that we must separately evaluate the truth of the proposition believed in the course of attributing knowledge. On some views of the testimonial transmission of knowledge, we can reasonably see another person as knowing a proposition without conducting any independent check of that proposition.13 A defender of the composite approach could of course resist such views of testimony, or object that what the composite approach really needs is not that the mental state ascriber should consult independent evidence on any proposition another is taken to know, but just that the mental state ascriber needs to go through the work of representing that proposition as being true, in addition to being believed by the target. However, the advocate of the knowledge--‐based account might observe here that in some cases of attributing knowledge to another, we do not even have to specify the proposition believed, let alone represent it as true: for example, we can see others as knowing whether q, where the truth 12 Or perhaps alongside highly confident mere belief, in the event that one's composite concept of knowledge incorporates the requirement of passing a certain threshold of confidence. Another version of this objection would press a worry that knowledge explanations will be redundant with highly confident true belief explanations. 13 Thanks to Tim Williamson for this point. 18 value of q is unknown to us. Not all knowledge attribution has the outward form "S knows that p". More broadly, attributions of knowledge can take a range of interrogative complements: the mental state ascriber can see another as knowing when the party is supposed to start, where the drinks are, or who is invited, without any particular answer to these embedded questions being endorsed by the ascriber.14 Indeed, our ability to see others as knowledgeable on questions whose answer is unknown to us is arguably a core feature of our intuitive social understanding of others. The advocate of the composite belief--‐based approach could of course develop a composite treatment of this aspect of our social intelligence: perhaps what we really recognize in others is their reliability, or something of that nature, and perhaps attributions of knowing--‐wh are rather different in kind from ordinary attributions of knowing that p. But if we take them at face value and attempt to treat them in a uniform manner, attributions of knowing--‐wh do seem to count against the original suggestion that knowledge attributions always require the composite representation of a known proposition as true and as believed. For many philosophers, the deepest problem with classifying knowledge as a mental state is quite different in character from the problems canvassed so far. It is a metaphysical problem about the localization of mental states. Because the essence of knowledge involves matching how things are in the world, a distal change in the environment can effect a change of mental state in a subject even if nothing in her internal consciousness or neurology changes at that moment. Early in April of 1865, an ordinary well--‐informed American citizen knows that Abraham Lincoln is President; at some point on the evening of the 15th her mental state switches from knowledge to mere belief.15 As soon as the President is assassinated and the proposition about his being President thereby becomes false, our citizen's mental state will have undergone this change, even if she has not heard what has happened in the faraway theatre, and even if she would say and do just the same things immediately following this change as before it. In the same vein, we can think of Janet's mental state before and after her mobile phone is stolen; when she first puts the phone in her bag she knows that it is there, and when it is stolen (or even just at very immanent risk of being stolen) she no longer has this knowledge of its location, but there need be no significant difference in either her internal neurological or conscious state between those two moments (assuming our pickpocket is stealthy enough to do nothing Janet consciously experiences). In short, the distal vulnerability of factive states may make them seem unfit to serve in causal explanations of behavior: critics of the 14 Thanks to Tim Williamson for this point, and to Jane Friedman for discussion of the issues here. 15 This example is again Williamson's (2000, 23). 19 knowledge--‐first approach have complained that positing knowledge as a mental state appears to violate strictures on action at a distance. Because nonfactive mental states like believing that Lincoln is President or believing the mobile phone is in the bag can persist through a change in the truth value of their contents, it can seem that they are better candidates for the causes of our actions. Pointing to intuitive theories according to which causal powers must always be in the same location as their effects, they object that 'attributions of causal efficacy to knowledge work, if at all, by piggybacking on the causal efficacy of belief' (Magnus & Cohen, 2003, 40). In response, Williamson claims that the best current accounts of the propositional attitude of belief do not localize it within the neurological or conscious states of the agent either; perhaps beliefs are also entangled with distal conditions in making reference to external particulars (2000, ch. 2).16 This paper will not attempt to evaluate the arguments of Williamson and others on the issue of whether we can find some way of making sense of belief as a local mental state; serious treatment of these arguments would require engagement with a large and unwieldy body of work on the nature of mental content and mental states (for some discussion, see Fricker, 2009; Jackson, 2007; McDowell, 1986; Putnam, 1975; Williamson, 2009). What will instead be pursued in the next two sections is a complementary strategy of challenging the claim that good explanations must be anchored in strictly local conditions.17 If we consider a discipline that gives uncontroversially good explanations of its target domain-the science of physics as applied to the interactions of mid--‐sized inanimate observable objects-we find reasons to resist the condition that all real explanation is local. Our intuitive understanding of these interactions may however feel more local than it really is. The 'naïve physics' which gives us an intuitive ability to predict the dynamic interactions among inanimate bodies is generated by a complex set of implicit computations involving the relationships among those bodies and so--‐called 'environmental invariants' such as gravity and friction (McCloskey & Kohl, 1983). Interestingly enough, we have a natural tendency to 'localize' the results of these computations, for example seeing the trajectory of an object as determined by its own private 16 On a related note, knowledge is sometimes thought to differ from belief in having 'normative' status: the person who is described as knowing is being positively evaluated, where the person who merely believes may be doing something wrong. Without disputing the claim that knowledge is normatively superior to mere belief, one might observe that belief itself has normative status: for example, as Plato observes in the Theaetetus, in order to have a belief about anything one must be appropriately acquainted with it, where it is at the very least far from obvious how one could cash out 'appropriately' in a non--‐normative fashion (Plato, 1990). 17 Williamson remarks congenially on the possibility of attempting this strategy, but does not develop it himself (2000, 61). 20 impetus or 'representational momentum', a strictly local power that is seen as vested in it as the result of its inner nature and contact with other things. However, this localization is a fiction, both because the principles of impetus physics are not entirely accurate, and because in computing it we draw essentially on the relationships between objects, relationships involving "action--‐at--‐a--‐ distance" factors such as gravitation (Hubbard, 1995). We can recognize on reflection that an inanimate object's motions do not depend strictly on local interactions between its inner condition and the objects it physically contacts, but this explicit recognition does not extinguish our natural intuitive tendency to see ordinary outer objects as driven in this way (Kozhevnikov & Hegarty, 2001). As a parallel,18 it is possible that we do in some sense intuitively represent the mental state of knowledge as localized within an agent, even if we actually intuitively compute the presence of knowledge on the basis of our grasp of relations between that agent and her environment, and even if we are able to recognize on reflection that this state must reflect how things are in the agent's environment. In intuitive judgment, we are aware of the final product or outcome of a process of computation, and not of the processing that gives rise to it (Sloman, 1996); while reflective and deliberate attributions of knowledge may make us conscious of the role played by distal factors in knowledge attributions, it is entirely possible for intuitive attributions of knowledge to incorporate distal factors without alerting us to this fact. If the epistemic state underpinning action is something that subjectively seems local, our intuitive representation of knowledge may well provide this subjective impression: we could at some level feel that an agent's knowledge is localized within her, just as we feel that an object's motion is sustained by something within it.19 As far as objective reality is concerned, the example from intuitive physics should give us second 18 It is plausible enough that there are parallels between naïve physics and mindreading, given the overall structural similarities in the function of these capacities. A psychological capacity for naïve physics underpins our ordinary experience of the motions of inanimate objects, enabling us to anticipate (and sometimes manipulate) their motions; mindreading underpins our ordinary experience of the actions of animate agents, enabling us to anticipate (and sometimes manipulate) what they do. Both capacities require very rapid assimilation of a broad range of complex information about our environment, much of it below the threshold of conscious or explicit reasoning. Psychologists do sometimes discuss the natural strengths and limitations of one domain in terms of an analogy with the other (e.g. Saxe, 2005). 19 Tamar Gendler observes (p.c.) that there may be a significant relationship between this tendency and the Fundamental Attribution Error, a bias which inclines us to assign unduly heavy weight to inner personality characteristics and insufficient weight to situational factors in our explanations of the actions of others (Jones & Harris, 1967; Ross, 1977). This is an intriguing suggestion, detailed exploration of which cannot be attempted here, if only because it would lead us into some very complex issues involving self/other asymmetries in the explanation of action, and into problems concerning the natural extent and character of misrepresentation in ordinary action explanations. 21 thoughts about the wisdom of a general principle ruling out appeal to non--‐local factors in our explanations of what is really going on, and even in our explanations of what is really going on in the generation of our intuitive assessments. There is something jarring about the reflective observation that a subject can switch from one mental state to another (e.g. from knowing to not knowing) through something that happens remotely. However, the attribution of quite different mental states to the agent before and after the change may be natural enough if there is a genuine change in how we intuitively represent them as agents, or if suitably distinct procedures naturally apply to representing knowledge and false belief. If we take belief to be a state that is derivative from the state of knowledge, then the more complex attribution of a false belief that p could nevertheless in some circumstances enable a prediction of the same immediate action that would be produced by knowledge that p. This observation could be applied to the explanation of the similar immediate behavior of our two Janets, one of whom knows that her phone is in her bag while the other falsely believes it. Williamson's view does not sever the link between knowledge and belief altogether: if believing that p is understood as a state that involves 'roughly, treating p as if one knew p', then the predicted outcome of immediate action given the false belief that p may be systematically similar to the predicted outcome of immediate action given the knowledge that p, although the former type of prediction may be expected to have some additional level of complexity. At this point it may be helpful to examine some independent evidence on the nature and relative complexity of our intuitive attributions of knowledge and belief, and on the question of whether the concept of knowledge is in some sense prior to the concept of belief, or whether it is composed from that concept and further conditions. In particular, it may be useful to examine developmental work on the emergence of the concepts of knowledge and belief: arguably, if intuitive representation of knowledge really is a composite involving intuitive representation of belief, the capacity to represent knowledge should not be available unless and until the capacity to represent belief is in place. The next section of this paper examines some recent empirical work which addresses this issue, and the closely related issue of the relative complexity of ordinary intuitive ascriptions of knowledge and belief. 22 Section 3: empirical work on the relationship between the concepts of knowledge and belief The standard view in psychology is that knowledge is a mental state; indeed, knowledge typically features prominently in lists of paradigmatic mental states (e.g. Apperly, 2011; Heyes, 1998; Premack & Woodruff, 1978; Sodian & Kristen, 2010; Wellman & Liu, 2004). Reading the empirical literature on mental state attribution, one sometimes finds an article which omits mention of knowledge as a mental state (e.g. Russell, 2005), but I do not know of any article in this body of literature in which it is explicitly argued or even claimed that knowledge is not a mental state. Marking a further point of difference from the mainstream philosophical view, psychologists of mental state attribution do not seem to assume that the concept of knowledge is an elaboration of the concept of belief; in fact, it is generally agreed that belief is the more sophisticated concept, and is harder to attribute than knowledge.20 In comparative psychology, there is nothing alarming about entitling an article, "Chimpanzees know what others know, but not what they believe" (Kaminski et al., 2008). In developmental psychology it is widely held that children acquire the concept of knowledge before the concept of belief.21 After a very brief review of psychological work on the relationship between the concepts of knowledge and belief, this section will discuss the reasoning behind the psychological classification of knowledge as a mental state. There is a wide range of evidence relevant to the question of whether the concept of knowledge is prior to the concept of belief. One might begin by looking at work on the acquisition of the mental state lexicon. Children use 'know' both earlier and more heavily than they use 'think' (Bartsch & Wellman, 1995; Shatz, Wellman, & Silber, 1983). Both the earlier age of initial use and the increased frequency of a word for knowing over a word for thinking appear cross--‐culturally, for example in languages such as Mandarin and Cantonese (Tardif & Wellman, 2000). Drawing on a database of over 200,000 spontaneous utterances by English--‐speaking children up to the age of six, Bartsch and Wellman found that the verb 'know' figured as the main verb in 70% of children's epistemic claims, with 'think' following at 26% (other epistemic mental state verbs, such as 'believe', 'wonder' and 'expect', were rarely used) (Bartsch & Wellman, 1995).22 Before the age of 20 This observation is of course compatible with the notion that knowledge entails belief. A creature must be a mammal in order to be the conspecific of a primate-being a conspecific of a primate entails being a mammal. Nevertheless many primates have the conceptual capacity to recognize their conspecifics while lacking the conceptual capacity to recognize mammals as such. 21 Williamson mentions the potential relevance of this fact to his 'knowledge first' approach, but does not elaborate (2000, 33). 22 The dominance of 'know' over 'think' continues in adult usage but is less pronounced. 'Know' and 'think' are respectively the 8th and 12th most common verbs in English, according to the Oxford English Corpus. In 23 about four, children have trouble with the word 'think', showing some tendency to take it as factive (Abbeduto & Rosenberg, 1985), although children early into their third year do use the word and are sometimes even able to produce the contrastive utterances taken to be the best evidence of an understanding of nonfactive verbs-e.g. "I thought there wasn't any socks, but when I looked, I saw them" (Bartsch & Wellman, 1995, ch.3). Explaining the initial acquisition of epistemic verbs is no easy matter. In the ordinary course of development, there is a cross--‐culturally robust and very significant lag between the emergence of action and activity verbs like 'go', 'eat' and 'push', and mental state verbs like 'think' and 'know' (Choi & Gopnik, 1995). Summarizing a few of the relevant difficulties, Papafragou and colleagues note that verbs like 'think', 'remember' and 'know' do not refer to perceptually transparent properties of the reference world; they are quite insalient as interpretations of the gist of scenes; they appear frequently in maternal speech to babies and yet occur in the child's own speech comparatively late; the concepts that they encode are evidently quite complex or abstract; and they are hard to identify from context even by adults who understand their meanings. (Papafragou, Cassidy, & Gleitman, 2007, 126) They go on to make the following observation about their approach to the problem: The idea here is that words that refer to mental states and events lack obvious and stable observational correlates: as a general rule, it is easier to observe that jumpers are jumping than that thinkers are thinking. Assuming that word learning – especially in its initial stages – relies heavily on establishing relations between what is said and what is (observably) happening in the extralinguistic environment, it follows that there will be barriers to acquiring mentalistic terms even where the concepts themselves fall within the learner's repertoire. (Papafragou et al., 2007, 128) To adults, mental state talk feels so natural that it takes some imaginative work to appreciate the mental state verb acquisition problem from the perspective of the child. Although children hear verbs like 'think' and 'know' heavily enough, it is not easy for them to forge the link between what is heard and what it refers to. Some aspects of the difficulty here can be reproduced even in adults the 425--‐million word Corpus of Contemporary American English these words occur at a ratio of 53:47. In the context of explicit action explanations there is some evidence that knowledge dominates. In COCA, for example, the ratio between instances of the strings 'because s/he knew' and 'because s/he thought' is 68:32. Including the next most common non--‐factive ('believe') alongside 'think' drops the ratio to 58:42. This is only superficial evidence of the importance of knowledge ascription in action explanation; a detailed study of this issue would have to examine corpus data for a wider range of factive and nonfactive verbs and constructions, and address questions about the relationship between our ordinary understanding of action and our verbal reports of this understanding. If we tend to remark on people's reasons for acting when their actions are out of line with our expectations, as Gricean norms might predict, then the method of counting occurrences of 'know' and 'think' would presumably underreport reliance on attributions of knowledge. 24 through an experimental protocol called the Human Simulation Paradigm (HSP). In one version of the HSP, adult subjects watch a series of brief silent videos of mother--‐infant interaction and try to guess the mystery word spoken by the mother at the moment of an electronic beep; for each mystery word subjects were told in advance whether it was a noun or a verb, and shown a series of six taped interactions in which the word was used. At the end of the series the subjects could reflect on all that they had seen and offer a seventh and final conjecture as to the identity of the target mystery word. None of the chosen words were particularly uncommon: Gillette and colleagues tracked the 24 nouns and the 24 verbs that occurred most frequently in their videotaped samples. Rates of correct identification were strikingly different for different classes of words: on average 44.9% of the nouns were correctly identified by the final try, versus only 15.3% of the verbs. Concrete nouns like 'piggy' (89.3% right), 'ball' (78.6%) and 'plane' (100%) did relatively well, as did some verbs: 'come' (75.0%), 'throw' (85.7%) and 'push' (42.9%). Mental state verbs did very badly: both 'think' and 'know' were identified by zero percent of subjects (Gillette, Gleitman, Gleitman, & Lederer, 1999). Given that adults already have mature mental state concepts, it should be easier for them than it is for infants to pick out adult uses of mental state words; the very poor performance of adults in recognizing mental state words in the HSP experiments suggests that the problem of finding 'observational correlates' of mental state verbs is a serious one. One reason why the task was difficult was that common mental state verbs are often used for reasons other than referring directly to a salient mental state; for example, in fixed expressions (such as the attention--‐getting 'know what?') and to perform social functions such as softening a request ('I think it's time to go'). These 'conversational' uses of mental state verbs are relatively frequent (Bartsch & Wellman, 1995) and are agreed to offer very little information to the language learner (Shatz et al., 1983). In their initial HSP experiments, Gillette and colleagues had made no special effort to find scenarios in which mental states would be particularly notable. Papafragou and colleagues experimented with various types of scenario to see whether some circumstances would improve performance on mental state verb recognition. They contrasted scenarios in which someone was fooled or mistaken (FB scenarios) with closely matched counterparts in which nothing went wrong (TB scenarios). In a typical FB scenario, a woman drinking tea while reading a newspaper did not observe her cup being moved by someone wiping the table and a teapot being set in its place; she reaches for the teapot and brings it close to her mouth before noticing her error. In the control TB scenario there is the same sequence of object displacements but the woman is not misled and picks up the cup. Children and adults then had to speculate about what would be said by a mother viewing the scene with her child. As in the earlier HSP experiments, most responses 25 focused on the concrete and observable aspects of the scenarios. Overall, looking at the TB and FB experiments together, both child and adult responses were skewed towards action verbs (43.9% and 31.6% respectively); among mental state verbs the verbs of desire were dominant (23.5% and 30.9% of child and adult responses referred to motivational mental states). Epistemic mental state verbs were used in 11.5% and 23.5% of the child and adult responses. But strikingly enough, the FB scenarios produced a much higher incidence of epistemic verb use: in comparison to the TB scenarios, the FB scenarios elicited more than triple the rate of epistemic verb use for children, and almost double for adults (Papafragou et al., 2007). These experiments do not show that we typically fail to register mental states in witnessing the successful actions of others. The discovery that epistemic mental states become particularly salient when actions do not unfold as expected might rather suggest that our background expectation is that agents will act knowledgeably, and we find it remarkable when they do not. The default expectation of knowledgeable behavior on the part of others is thought to be manifest in a well--‐known sequence of nonlinguistic mental state ascription tasks. The first of these, passed in some versions even by some nonhuman primates, measures the capacity to distinguish knowledge from ignorance; the second task measures the capacity to attribute false belief, and is passed only by humans, and only later than the knowledge--‐ignorance task. Some description of the tasks may help to clarify why psychologists of mental state ascription generally take the concept of knowledge to be prior to the concept of belief. In one version of these tasks, pairs of children were given a familiar container with familiar contents to examine (a domino box with picture dominos in it). One child from each pair was then sent out of the room, and in his absence the other witnessed the familiar contents being replaced with a novel item. The second child was then asked (in random order) two questions: (1) Does [name of absent child] know what is in the box now, or does he not know? (2) If we ask [name of absent child] what is in the box, what will he say? Among 3--‐year--‐olds, 39% answered question (1) correctly, and only 6% answered question (2) correctly; 4--‐year olds improved to 81% and 44%, and 5--‐year olds were right 88% and 76% of the time on the two questions (Hogrefe, Wimmer, & Perner, 1986).23 If we generally made judgments about the presence or absence of knowledge by attributing belief and then evaluating the truth or falsity of this belief, we would not expect to see such a lag between the capacity to recognize the absence of knowledge and the capacity to attribute 23 Difficulty with the second (false belief) type of question is still encountered if the child simply has to select between two pictures representing the two possible mental contents of the other person (Custer, 1996; Woolfe, Want, & Siegal, 2002). 26 a false belief.24 Young children are not random or indiscriminate in the way they fail the knowledge--‐ ignorance task: they have a general tendency to over--‐attribute knowledge to others. This tendency has been found across a great variety of different tasks; in general, the trend as children mature is towards the recognition of more and more of the restrictions on knowing that are imposed by the various limits of sensory modalities, perspective, perceptual access and experience (e.g. Apperly & Robinson, 2003; Mossler, Marvin, & Greenberg, 1976; Wimmer & Perner, 1983; Woolley & Bruell, 1996). But studies of immature and evolving mental concept use naturally raise questions about whether young children are really referring to knowledge as such when they come to succeed at tasks of the sort just given. In this context, it is useful to examine work in comparative psychology, where there has been a very active debate on the question of just what should count as genuine mental state recognition. Nonhuman primates can be very responsive to each others' behavior. For example, they track where their conspecifics are looking, following the direction of their gaze (Tomasello, Call, & Hare, 1998) in a way that is sensitive to the presence or absence of opaque barriers blocking the gazer's line of sight (Okamoto--‐Barth, Call, & Tomasello, 2007). The question of whether they are capable of mental state recognition is however difficult to assess. Early research on mental state reasoning in nonhuman primates seemed to show that they lacked the capacity to distinguish knowledge from ignorance. Chimpanzees will make visible begging gestures equally to human trainers who can see them and to those who have their vision obstructed by a blindfold or bucket, although they do discriminate between trainers who are and are not facing them (Povinelli & Eddy, 2000). In a food--‐ hiding game, chimpanzees also fail to discriminate between the helpful pointing gestures of a trainer they have seen hiding food (behind a barrier, in a location out of the chimpanzee's view) and a trainer who was absent at the time of hiding (Povinelli, Rulf, & Bierschwale, 1994). Negative results such as these seemed to support the view that nonhuman primates track surface behavioral regularities (like 'facing me – likelier to give food') but do not understand the relationship between seeing and knowing, and fail to attribute mental states such as knowledge or ignorance (Heyes, 1998; Povinelli & Vonk, 2003; Tomasello & Call, 1997). On this view, these primates' navigation of 24 This interpretation of the contrast is somewhat controversial, not least because there are various ways of understanding the difference between the knowledge--‐ignorance task and the false belief attribution task. Some psychologists have raised the concern that the knowledge--‐ignorance task is inherently easier for various irrelevant reasons, such as having a higher baseline of being answered correctly simply by chance (e.g. Perner, 1995). For a response to such concerns in the context of a large--‐scale meta--‐analysis of studies showing knowledge--‐ignorance to be easier than false belief attribution, see (Wellman & Liu, 2004). 27 social situations is guided strictly by learned or innate 'behavioral rules' linking certain observable situations or patterns of behavior and their typical behavioral consequences. This superficial grasp of behavior patterns would enable nonhuman primates to predict behavior in a fixed set of familiar situations; unlike mindreading abilities that discern the deeper mental causes of action, the 'behavior--‐rule' ability would not generate predictions flexibly, across novel circumstances. More recent work has reopened the question of whether nonhuman primates might have some grasp of the unobservable mental states underlying behavior. Artificial cooperative games with humans might not be the best setting to test a chimpanzee's mindreading abilities, and a number of primatologists wondered whether chimpanzees would perform better in a competitive setting involving their conspecifics. Exploiting the fact that subordinate chimpanzees will not challenge dominant chimpanzees for food, Hare and colleagues allowed subordinates to watch food being hidden outside their cages while a caged dominant either was or was not also watching within sight of the subordinate. Both chimpanzees were then released from their cages, with the subordinate getting a brief head start so he could not simply react to the dominant's behavior. Subordinates were able to distinguish between knowledgeable and ignorant competitors, preferring to go for the food when the dominant competitor was ignorant of its location (Hare, Call, & Tomasello, 2001). A series of control conditions ruled out various potential non--‐mental explanations of this behavior: for example, chimpanzees did not simply regard the food that had been seen as tainted or dangerous, but kept track of the relationship between the food and the specific individual who had seen it. If a different dominant animal was brought in rather than the one who had seen the food, the subordinate no longer avoided it. Surveying these and an array of other recent experiments, leading comparative psychologists who had earlier concluded that nonhuman primates do not grasp mental states (Tomasello & Call, 1997) came to revise their opinion, arguing that the total current body of evidence supports the conclusion that "chimpanzees, like humans, understand that others see, hear and know things" (Call & Tomasello, 2008, 190). It is possible to maintain a strict behavior rules interpretation of the recent experimental results, for example, by positing that what the subordinate animal really knows is not that the dominant knows where the food is, but that any dominant will go for food that has recently been in its line of sight (Povinelli & Vonk, 2003). However, this strategy may put us on a slippery slope: if we are allowed to formulate behavior rules ad hoc, then a behavior rules interpretation could be produced for any pattern of apparent mental state ascription, even one involving advanced social interactions among adult humans (Fletcher & Carruthers, 2012). The fact that a certain interpret--‐ ative strategy is in principle available-as behaviorism continues to be available, in principle, for 28 explaining even human social interaction-does not mean that it is advisable, or the that it is the strategy that would yield the best explanation of our data. Considerations of parsimony and fruit--‐ fulness also matter. It is not trivial to show that the mindreading interpretation is more parsimon--‐ ious than its behavioral rules counterpart as an explanation of the data involving nonhuman pri--‐ mates; in particular, the inherent complexity of the 'mindreading module' which links knowledge, goals and behavior must itself be taken into account, and cannot be treated as a 'black box' which the theorist gets for free (Perner, 2010). However, considerations of parsimony weigh more and more heavily in favor of a mindreading interpretation as creatures exhibit their competence in predicting the behavior of others across a broader range of situations. On the mindreading inter--‐ pretation, the chimpanzee can systematically combine attributions of knowing where something is with attributions of wanting that thing to generate predictions about behavior in novel circum--‐ stances, where there could be various different outward signals of knowing or wanting; meanwhile, the behavior rules interpretation has to posit a separate rule to connect each type of outward signal with each type of behavioral consequence (Fletcher & Carruthers, 2012). Interestingly, support for a mindreading interpretation of nonhuman primate abilities arises also from evidence about their limitations in social reasoning. There are some mental state attribution tests that nonhuman primates are apparently unable to pass, although as Fletcher and Carruthers point out in their (2012), it is possible to concoct relatively simple behavior rules that would dictate a successful pattern of reasoning for these tasks. The crucial feature that distinguish--‐ es these harder tasks from the ones that the chimpanzees succeed at is that they involve belief rather than knowledge. Nonhuman primates consistently fail false belief tests (Call & Tomasello, 1999; Hare et al., 2001), even in competitive situations and using apparatus that enables them to pass very closely matched knowledge--‐ignorance tests (Kaminski et al., 2008; Krachun, Carpenter, Call, & Tomasello, 2009). For example, when two chimpanzees or bonobo apes in view of each other have seen a reward placed in one container, and then the target animal is away while the reward is moved to another container, the subject animal does not seem to be able to anticipate that the returning target animal will seek the reward where it was originally placed, even when there would be a competitive advantage to this recognition. If apes were able to pass this test, we could easily write a behavior rule to underwrite their passing it: Fletcher and Carruthers suggest the rule, 'A potential competitor will approach the previous location of food if the competitor was absent when the food was moved to its present location'. This rule is not inherently any more complex than the behavior rule explaining successful performance on a matched knowledge--‐ ignorance task, so the advocate of the behavior rules approach faces an extra burden in explaining 29 why such a rule does not become part of the ape's repertoire. It is hard to see why only one of these patterns of action can be anticipated by apes without helping ourselves to the idea that the contrast in mental states makes a difference: knowledge attribution is easier than belief attribution.25 One way of appreciating the greater simplicity of knowledge attribution is to follow the earlier line according to which knowledge is a state that essentially involves matching how things are, where belief is essentially a state that may or may not match reality. The additional degree of freedom in belief attribution poses an additional computational burden, which matters because a very significant challenge in explaining mature human mindreading is explaining how it is comput--‐ ationally possible, given the open--‐ended character of the information that might be task--‐relevant. In contrast to our attributions of a state like jumping, our attributions of mental states are not nar--‐ rowly constrained by what is immediately observable. Ian Apperly has emphasized this difficulty in connection with the classic test of false belief. Sally sees an object in the round box, and leaves the scene. In her absence, Andrew moves it to the square box, and we are asked where Sally will expect to find it on her return. The 'right' answer-the answer that counts as a 'pass' on false belief tests- is: 'in the round box where she left it.' But Apperly points out that many other mental state attribu--‐ tions are logically consistent with the scenario as given: perhaps Sally will guess correctly that Andrew has moved the object; perhaps she will know that he has moved it, on the basis of what he has told her in the past; perhaps she believes that it has spontaneously teleported to the square box, or to some quite different location (2011, 118). Given the right supplementary evidence about this scenario, any one of those other attributions might be correct. The default understanding of the scenario makes sense, however, and will ordinarily serve us well: according to Apperly, we ordinarily construct simple and stereotyped models of situations involving other agents, drawing on our background knowledge of interactions like the ones we are 25 By observing that chimpanzees have some capacity to recognize the state of knowledge, one need not thereby credit chimpanzees with any very sophisticated understanding of the nature of knowledge, nor even with the capacity to recognize knowledge across a great range of situations. For example, they may be unable to pass tests requiring the attribution of knowledge gained through hearing rather than vision (Brauer, Call, & Tomasello, 2008). Ian Apperly has expressed concerned that a modality--‐restricted conception of knowledge would be seriously impoverished: commenting on chimpanzees' apparent failure to pass auditory tasks, he notes 'This would be significant because a core feature of the concept of "knowledge" is that it provides some unification over the results of a variety of perceptual and inferential processes. If chimpanzees' understanding of "knowledge" is modality--‐specific then it falls short of providing this conceptual unification' (2011, 53). Nonetheless, Apperly himself stresses the importance of rudimentary mental state concepts (or proto--‐concepts) in paving the way for our more sophisticated human capacities for explicit mindreading; he also grants the general priority of knowledge recognition over belief recognition. His overall assessment of the comparative literature is that 'there is good evidence that some non--‐human species "understand something about" seeing or knowing, but do not understand these mental states completely, and have no understanding of other mental states, such as believing' (2011, 109). 30 observing, in a process he compares to the situation modeling approach to discourse comprehen--‐ sion (e.g. Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998). The default state of knowledge plays an important role in this process of situation modeling. What makes it reasonable to grade 'Sally thinks the object is in the round box' as the right answer to the problem (or to attribute this mental state to Sally in a real--‐ world version of the problem) is that this agent would know that the object is in the round box if things had gone for her as they normally do in a person's momentary absence. If recently having seen something somewhere were not generally a reliable source of knowledge of its location, we would have no reason to attribute that particular belief to Sally.26 So a prior sense of how know--‐ ledge ordinarily arises helps to make belief attribution a tractable problem. The relative simplicity of factive attitudes also plays a role here. Apperly observes that 'making a mindreading inference consists of constructing a model of "what is in the head" of the target other person, but this model is both related to and part of our larger model of the situation in which that person figures' (2011, 131). Of the various different relationships that might hold between another person's mental state and the world, the factive ones are arguably the simplest: where the other person is seen as knowing, her mental state essentially reflects how things are around her. When we have reason to do so, we can posit restrictions on what others are taken to know, and see their mental states as deviating, or even just potentially deviating, from reality, but there are computational costs associated with broadening our horizons to include these more complex relationships.27 Given these costs, there is a genuine difference in how we intuitively evaluate an action performed by someone who knows some relevant proposition and an action performed by an agent in a parallel scenario who falsely believes a parallel proposition: predicting the second kind of action is a more complex task, requiring the construction of a situation model to represent the agent's belief, where this embedded model will be at odds with the larger model representing the agent's situation. It will even increase the complexity of our prediction to see someone as truly believing without knowing; in order to represent a belief that is only accidentally right, we need to model situations in which someone could have had a similar false belief. When we think about the relative advantages of explaining action strictly in terms of belief 26In a similar vein, Fletcher and Carruthers observe that 'the false--‐belief data make no sense in the absence of a capacity to attribute goals, perceptions, and knowledge to other agents, since the experiments are all designed around just such an assumption, and since no one has any idea how a set of behavior--‐rules could fit together with belief understanding to issue in the patterns of behavior we observe.' (2012, 11) 27 It may be more accurate to say that there are computational costs involved in admitting false belief when we reach the level of explicit mental state ascription: in Apperly's interpretation, recent work on implicit false belief recognition in infants (e.g. Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005) suggests that early implicit recognition of false belief may be fully automatic (cf. Apperly, Riggs, Simpson, Chiavarino, & Samson, 2006). 31 (whether true or false) as it interacts with other mental and environmental conditions, it can seem that such explanations have a cost--‐free advantage over knowledge--‐based explanations. Once we are imagining pairs of scenarios in which a key proposition is known in the first, but merely bel--‐ ieved in the second, we have already done the work of constructing the more elaborate set of models for the second scenario: for example, we have already imagined Janet as the unwitting victim of a theft, thinking her phone is in her bag when it is not. In this frame of mind, it may seem natural to explain Janet's action in terms of her belief across the pair of cases, but the contemplation of ways in which an agent might be mistaken is not a natural part of the ordinary ascription of knowledge, so our impression of the simpler scenario may already be distorted by our focus on the second. Apperly's talk of "what is in the head" may seem uncongenial to a treatment of knowledge as a factive mental state, but there is reason to think his scare quotes should be taken seriously here. He unpacks the metaphor elsewhere by saying that mental states themselves are not immediately visible but are known to us through their outward signs, claiming for example that 'we do not have direct access to what other people know, want, intend or believe, but must infer these mental states on the basis of what they do and say' (2011, 1). His more detailed discussion of the manner in which mental states are attributed makes it clear that these attributions draw not only on the target agent's local actions and utterances, but also on environmental conditions around the agent. In attributing knowledge of the external world to an agent, we see that agent as related in a certain way to that world. 4. Conclusion This paper might be faulted for attempting to answer the question of whether knowledge actually is a mental state by arguing that it is naturally perceived as one. Even if our natural mindreading systems parse agency with the help of the epistemic mental state concepts of knowledge and belief rather than belief alone, one might worry that mental reality could fail to correspond to our natural way of tracking it. Someone might be satisfied that we intuitively attribute knowledge to others as a state which explains their actions, without being satisfied that it really has the role it is intuitively seen to have. If we take mental states to be those states which actually do explain the actions of intelligent agents, we might wonder whether the intuitively recognized state of knowledge merely seems to explain what people do, while the real underlying explanation is substantially different, and perhaps more accurately expressed in terms of the weaker mental state concept of belief, plus 32 various further conditions. Indeed, once we are wondering about the relative merits of knowledge--‐ and belief--‐based explanations of action, we may start to wonder whether there is actually any such thing as being related directly to one's environment in a way that essentially involves getting it right. It may come to seem that when we are being our usual lazy selves, we assume that all is well with ourselves and other agents; the application of a little cognitive effort is all that it takes to recognize that what seems very much like knowledge could always fail to hit the mark. If I find myself intuitively attributing knowledge to someone-Janet just put her phone in her bag, so she knows where it is- it is open to me to rescind that generous ascription, on reflection, in favor of something more limited. Dwelling on counterfactual possibilities in which Janet might have been robbed without her knowing it, or more extreme counterfactual possibilities in which the phone spontaneously dissolves, I might start to feel inclined to attribute to Janet a state of mind that falls short of essentially matching how things are: perhaps she is just lucky that the world she inhabits is not one of the worlds I have just imagined, and in that case should be credited only with true belief. Insofar as the application of greater cognitive effort often accompanies an increase in the precision of our judgment, we may feel that we are being more accurate in taking this skeptical stance. However, a shift towards skepticism does not necessarily make us better at predicting and explaining how others will act: by adding extra possibilities to our models of their relationships with their environment, we may be weakening rather than strengthening our understanding of what they are doing. The skeptical stance generates an awkwardly large space of possibilities to be contemplated, and our capacity to reason accurately about all those possibilities is limited. If simplicity is generally a virtue in explanations, the greater simplicity of knowledge--‐based explanations of action should be counted as a point in their favor. Of course, thinking about possibilities of error sometimes really can increase the accuracy of our mental state ascriptions: the original philosophical critics of Premack and Woodruff were right to observe that the capacity to attribute false belief is a powerful weapon in the mindreader's arsenal. Other things being equal, creatures who are unable to imagine a conflict between belief and reality will not be as accurate in their predictions or explanations of action as creatures who are able to attribute false belief. But this is not to say that predictions and explanations of other agents generally become better the more we think about them, even when we have no positive grounds to suspect an agent is mistaken; serial contemplation of various possibilities of error threatens to leave us with suspension of judgment about the minds of others, where trust in our natural instincts about what they see, want and know would have been more helpful, and would 33 have enabled us to make better predictions. The fact that we are capable of applying extra caution and retreating from an ascription of knowledge down to an ascription of mere belief does not entail that ascribing mere belief (plus some environmental conditions about the truth of the proposition believed) is always the more accurate thing to do.28 Furthermore, the defender of knowledge--‐based mental state ascriptions can point out that under a more consistently applied skepticism, ascriptions of belief would themselves become problematic. The same forces that naturally generate doubts about whether Janet knows that her phone is in her bag can equally drive us to wonder whether she even believes as much: if we think about the range of possible attitudes she might have on this question, and especially if we do not allow ourselves to assume that her beliefs are a function of what a person in Janet's circumstances would ordinarily know, then the question of what she should be seen as believing becomes very hard to answer. There are many circumstances in which careful reflective re--‐thinking of our initial intuitive attitudes may well be warranted, but it is probably not a good idea, in our efforts to understand other agents, to aim for pure reflection without reliance on any intuitive input. This paper has argued that the identification of knowledge as a mental state is one of the central principles of our intuitive mindreading system. Taking a non--‐skeptical attitude towards that system means agreeing that when we are guided in our understanding of others by an intuitive sense of what they know, we gain significant insight into what they do. If the test of a theory is its capacity to generate good predictions and explanations, then anyone with a generally non--‐skeptical attitude towards intuitive mindreading should see the thesis that knowledge is a mental state as well confirmed. This is not to say that we have to accept at face value all of our intuitive impressions about the minds of others: like our perceptual systems, our mindreading capacities have certain natural limitations. These limitations-the bias towards egocentrism, for example- are subject to reflective correction, but such corrections can be better executed in light of a clear understanding of the core principles of the natural system that gives us access to other minds.29 28 For further discussion of this point, see (Nagel, 2011). 29 Thanks to Patrick Rysiew, Jonathan Weisberg, and members of the Van Leer Institute Epistemology group for discussion of the issues in this paper. Special thanks to Jane Friedman, Tamar Gendler, Sergio Tenenbaum, Tim Williamson, and an anonymous referee for this journal for helpful comments on an earlier draft. 34 References Abbeduto, L., & Rosenberg, S. (1985). Children's knowledge of the presuppositions of 'know' and other cognitive verbs. Journal of Child Language, 12(03), 621--‐641. Apperly, I. (2011). Mindreaders: The Cognitive Basis of "Theory of Mind". Hove and New York: Psychology Press. Apperly, I., & Butterfill, S. (2009). Do humans have two systems to track beliefs and belief--‐like states? Psychological Review, 116(4), 953--‐970. Apperly, I., Riggs, K., Simpson, A., Chiavarino, C., & Samson, D. (2006). Is belief reasoning automatic? Psychological Science, 17(10), 841. Apperly, I., & Robinson, E. (2003). When can children handle referential opacity? Evidence for systematic variation in 5--‐and 6--‐year--‐old children's reasoning about beliefs and belief reports. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 85(4), 297--‐311. Baron--‐Cohen, S., Ring, H., Moriarty, J., Schmitz, B., Costa, D., & Ell, P. (1994). Recognition of mental state terms. Clinical findings in children with autism and a functional neuroimaging study of normal adults. The British Journal of Psychiatry, 165(5), 640. Bartsch, K., & Wellman, H. (1995). Children talk about the mind. New York: Oxford University Press. Bennett, J. (1978). Some remarks about concepts. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1(04), 557--‐560. Brauer, J., Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (2008). Chimpanzees do not take into account what others can hear in a competitive situation. Animal Cognition, 11(1), 175--‐178. Brueckner, A. (2002). Williamson on the primeness of knowing. Analysis, 62(275), 197--‐202. Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (1999). A nonverbal false belief task: The performance of children and great apes. Child Development, 70(2), 381--‐395. Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (2008). Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind? 30 years later. Trends in cognitive sciences, 12(5), 187--‐192. Carruthers, P. (2009). How we know our own minds: the relationship between mindreading and metacognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 32(02), 121--‐138. Choi, S., & Gopnik, A. (1995). Early acquisition of verbs in Korean: A cross--‐linguistic study. Journal of child language, 22(03), 497--‐529. Churchland, P. M. (1981). Eliminative materialism and the propositional attitudes. The Journal of Philosophy, 78(2), 67--‐90. Custer, W. L. (1996). A comparison of young children's understanding of contradictory representations in pretense, memory, and belief. Child Development, 67(2), 678--‐688. Dancy, J. (2000). Practical reality: Oxford University Press, USA. Davidson, D. (1963). Actions, reasons, and causes. The Journal of Philosophy, 685--‐700. Davies, M., & Stone, T. (2001). Mental simulation, tacit theory, and the threat of collapse. Mental, 29(1&2), 127--‐173. De Villiers, J. (2007). The interface of language and Theory of Mind. Lingua, 117(11), 1858--‐1878. Dennett, D. C. (1971). Intentional systems. The Journal of Philosophy, 68(4), 87--‐106. Dennett, D. C. (1978). Beliefs about beliefs. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1, 568--‐570. Dienes, Z., & Perner, J. (1999). A theory of implicit and explicit knowledge. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 22(05), 735--‐808. Epley, N., & Waytz, A. (2009). Mind perception. In S. T. Fiske & D. T. Gilbert & G. Lindsay (Eds.), The Handbook of Social Psychology, 5th Edition (pp. 498 --‐ 541). New York: Wiley. Fletcher, L., & Carruthers, P. (2012). Behavior--‐Reading versus Mentalizing in Animals. In J. Metcalfe & H. Terrace (Eds.), Agency and Joint Attention. New York: Oxford. Fodor, J. A. (1987). Psychosemantics: The problem of meaning in the philosophy of mind: Oxford, England: British Psychological Society; Cambridge, MA, US: The MIT Press. Fricker, E. (2009). Is Knowing a State of Mind? The Case Against. In P. Greenough & D. Pritchard (Eds.), Williamson on Knowledge (pp. 31--‐60). New York: Oxford University Press. Gallese, V., & Goldman, A. (1998). Mirror neurons and the simulation theory of mind--‐reading. Trends in cognitive sciences, 2(12), 493--‐501. Gettier, E. L. (1963). Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? Analysis, 23, 121--‐123. Gillette, J., Gleitman, H., Gleitman, L., & Lederer, A. (1999). Human simulations of vocabulary learning. Cognition, 73, 135--‐176. 35 Goldman, A. (1967). A Causal Theory of Knowing. The Journal of Philosophy, 64(12), 357--‐372. Goldman, A. (2006). Simulating minds: The philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience of mindreading. New York: Oxford University Press. Gopnik, A., & Wellman, H. (1992). Why the child's theory of mind really is a theory. Mind & Language, 7(1 2), 145--‐171. Gordon, R. (1986). Folk psychology as simulation. Mind & Language, 1(2), 158--‐171. Grice, H. P. (1975). Logic and conversation. Syntax and Semantics, 3, 41--‐58. Hare, B., Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (2001). Do chimpanzees know what conspecifics know? Animal Behaviour, 61(1), 139--‐151. Harman, G. (1978). Studying the chimpanzee's theory of mind. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1(04), 576--‐577. Hazlett, A. (2010). The myth of factive verbs. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 80(3), 497--‐522. Heyes, C. M. (1998). Theory of mind in nonhuman primates. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 21(01), 101--‐114. Hogrefe, G. J., Wimmer, H., & Perner, J. (1986). Ignorance versus false belief: A developmental lag in attribution of epistemic states. Child Development, 567--‐582. Holton, R. (1997). Some telling examples: A reply to Tsohatzidis. Journal of pragmatics, 28(5), 625--‐628. Hubbard, T. L. (1995). Environmental invariants in the representation of motion: Implied dynamics and representational momentum, gravity, friction, and centripetal force. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 2(3), 322--‐338. Jackson, F. (2007). Is belief an internal state? Philosophical Studies, 132(3), 571--‐580. Johnson, C. N., & Wellman, H. M. (1980). Children's developing understanding of mental verbs: Remember, know, and guess. Child Development, 51(4), 1095--‐1102. Jones, E. E., & Harris, V. A. (1967). The attribution of attitudes. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 3(1), 1--‐24. Kaminski, J., Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (2008). Chimpanzees know what others know, but not what they believe. Cognition, 109(2), 224--‐234. Keysar, B. (2007). Communication and miscommunication: The role of egocentric processes. Intercultural Pragmatics, 4(1), 71--‐84. Koriat, A. (1995). Dissociating knowing and the feeling of knowing: Further evidence for the accessibility model. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 124(3), 311--‐333. Kornblith, H. (2004). Knowledge and its Place in Nature: Oxford University Press, USA. Kozhevnikov, M., & Hegarty, M. (2001). Impetus beliefs as default heuristics: Dissociation between explicit and implicit knowledge about motion. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 8(3), 439. Krachun, C., Carpenter, M., Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (2009). A competitive nonverbal false belief task for children and apes. Developmental Science, 12(4), 521--‐535. Lin, S., Keysar, B., & Epley, N. (2010). Reflexively mindblind: Using theory of mind to interpret behavior requires effortful attention. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 46(3), 551--‐556. Magnus, P., & Cohen, J. (2003). Williamson on knowledge and psychological explanation. Philosophical Studies, 116(1), 37--‐52. McCloskey, M., & Kohl, D. (1983). Naive physics: The curvilinear impetus principle and its role in interactions with moving objects. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 9(1), 146--‐ 156. McDowell, J. (1986). Singular thought and the extent of inner space. In J. McDowell & P. Pettit (Eds.), Subject, Thought and Context (pp. 137--‐168). Oxford: Clarendon Press. Miller, S., Hardin, C., & Montgomery, D. (2003). Young children's understanding of the conditions for knowledge acquisition. Journal of Cognition and Development, 4(3), 325--‐356. Miscione, J. L., Marvin, R. S., O'Brien, R. G., & Greenberg, M. T. (1978). A Developmental Study of Preschool Children's Understanding of the Words" Know" and" Guess". Child Development, 49(4), 1107--‐1113. Molyneux, B. (2007). Primeness, Internalism and Explanatory Generality. Philosophical Studies, 135(2), 255--‐ 277. Moore, C., Bryant, D., & Furrow, D. (1989). Mental terms and the development of certainty. Child Development, 60(1), 167--‐171. Mossler, D. G., Marvin, R. S., & Greenberg, M. T. (1976). Conceptual perspective taking in 2--‐to 6--‐year--‐old children. Developmental Psychology, 12(1), 85. Nagel, J. (2011). The psychological basis of the Harman--‐Vogel paradox. Philosophers' Imprint, 11(5), 1--‐28. 36 Nagel, J. (forthcoming). Intuitions and Experiments: A defense of the case method. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Nichols, S., & Stich, S. (2003). Mindreading: An integrated account of pretence, self--awareness, and understanding other minds: Oxford University Press, USA. Okamoto--‐Barth, S., Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (2007). Great apes' understanding of other individuals' line of sight. Psychological Science, 18(5), 462. Onishi, K. H., & Baillargeon, R. (2005). Do 15--‐month--‐old infants understand false beliefs? Science, 308(5719), 255. Papafragou, A., Cassidy, K., & Gleitman, L. (2007). When we think about thinking: The acquisition of belief verbs. Cognition, 105(1), 125--‐165. Perfect, T. J., Watson, E. L., & Wagstaff, G. F. (1993). Accuracy of confidence ratings associated with general knowledge and eyewitness memory. Journal of Applied Psychology, 78(1), 144. Perner, J. (1991). Understanding the Representational Mind: MIT Press Cambridge, MA. Perner, J. (1995). The many faces of belief: Reflections on Fodor's and the child's theory of mind. Cognition, 57(3), 241--‐269. Perner, J. (2010). Who took the cog out of cognitive science? Mentalism in an era of anti--‐cognitivism. In P. French & R. Schwarzer (Eds.), Cognition and neuropsychology: International perspectives on psychological science (Vol. 1, pp. 241--‐261). New York: Psychology Press. Pillow, B. H., Hill, V., Boyce, A., & Stein, C. (2000). Understanding inference as a source of knowledge: Children's ability to evaluate the certainty of deduction, perception, and guessing. Developmental Psychology, 36(2), 169. Plantinga, A. (1993). Warrant: The current debate. New York: Oxford University Press. Plato. (1990). The Theaetetus of Plato (M. J. Levett, Trans.). Indianapolis: Hackett. Povinelli, D. J., & Eddy, T. J. (2000). What young chimpanzees know about seeing. New York: Wiley--‐Blackwell. Povinelli, D. J., Rulf, A. B., & Bierschwale, D. T. (1994). Absence of knowledge attribution and self--‐recognition in young chimpanzees. Journal of Comparative Psychology, 108(1), 74. Povinelli, D. J., & Vonk, J. (2003). Chimpanzee minds: suspiciously human? Trends in cognitive sciences, 7(4), 157--‐160. Premack, D., & Woodruff, G. (1978). Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind? Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1(04), 515--‐526. Putnam, H. (1975). Mind, language and reality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Reber, R., & Unkelbach, C. (2010). The Epistemic Status of Processing Fluency as Source for Judgments of Truth. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 1--‐19. Ross, L. (1977). The intuitive psychologist and his shortcomings: Distortions in the attribution process. Advances in experimental social psychology, 10, 173--‐220. Ruffman. (1996). Do children understand the mind by means of simulation or a theory? Evidence from their understanding of inference, Mind language (Vol. 11, pp. 388). Oxford: B. Blackwell. Russell, J. (2005). Justifying all the fuss about false belief. Trends in cognitive sciences, 9(7), 307--‐308. Samson, D., Apperly, I., Braithwaite, J., Andrews, B., & Scott, S. (2010). Seeing it their way. Journal of Experimental Psychology--Human Perception and Performance, 36(5), 1255--‐1266. Saxe, R. (2005). Against simulation: the argument from error. Trends in cognitive sciences, 9(4), 174--‐179. Shatz, M., Wellman, H. M., & Silber, S. (1983). The acquisition of mental verbs: A systematic investigation of the first reference to mental state. Cognition, 14(3), 301--‐321. Shope, R. K. (1983). The analysis of knowing: A decade of research: Princeton University Press. Sloman, S. (1996). The empirical case for two systems of reasoning. Psychological Bulletin, 119(1), 3--‐22. Sodian, B., & Kristen, S. (2010). Theory of mind. In B. M. Glatzeder & V. Goel & A. von Muller (Eds.), Towards a Theory of Thinking (pp. 189--‐201). Berlin: Springer--‐Verlag. Sodian, B., Thoermer, C., & Dietrich, N. (2006). Two--‐to four--‐year--‐old children's differentiation of knowing and guessing in a non--‐verbal task. European Journal of Developmental Psychology, 3(3), 222--‐237. Sodian, B., & Wimmer, H. (1987). Children's understanding of inference as a source of knowledge. Child Development, 58(2), 424--‐433. Sosa, E. (2007). A virtue epistemology: Apt belief and reflective knowledge (Vol. 1): Oxford University Press, USA. Stanley, J. (2011). Know How. New York: Oxford University Press. Stanley, J., & Williamson, T. (2001). Knowing how. The Journal of Philosophy, 98(8), 411--‐444. 37 Steup, M. (2008). The analysis of knowledge. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge--analysis/. Stich, S., & Ravenscroft, I. (1994). What is folk psychology? Cognition, 50(1--‐3), 447--‐468. Tardif, T., & Wellman, H. M. (2000). Acquisition of mental state language in Mandarin--‐and Cantonese--‐ speaking children. Developmental Psychology, 36(1), 25. Tomasello, M., & Call, J. (1997). Primate cognition. New York: Oxford University Press. Tomasello, M., Call, J., & Hare, B. (1998). Five primate species follow the visual gaze of conspecifics. Animal Behaviour, 55(4), 1063--‐1069. Turri, J. (2011). Manifest failure: The Gettier problem solved. Philosophers' Imprint, 11(8), 1--‐11. Unger, P. (1971). A defense of skepticism. The Philosophical Review, 80(2), 198--‐219. Wellman, H. M., & Liu, D. (2004). Scaling of Theory of Mind Tasks. Child Development, 75(2), 523--‐541. Williamson, T. (1995). Is knowing a state of mind? Mind, 104(415), 533. Williamson, T. (2000). Knowledge and its Limits. New York: Oxford University Press. Williamson, T. (2009). Replies to Critics. In P. Greenough & D. Pritchard (Eds.), Williamson on Knowledge (pp. 279--‐284). New York: Oxford University Press. Wimmer, H., & Perner, J. (1983). Beliefs about beliefs: Representation and constraining function of wrong beliefs in young children's understanding of deception. Cognition, 13(1), 103--‐128. Woolfe, T., Want, S. C., & Siegal, M. (2002). Signposts to development: Theory of mind in deaf children. Child Development, 73(3), 768--‐778. Woolley, J., & Bruell, M. (1996). Young children's awareness of the origins of their mental representations. Developmental Psychology, 32(2), 335--‐346. Zagzebski, L. (1994). The inescapability of Gettier problems. The Philosophical Quarterly, 44(174), 65--‐73. Zwaan, R. A., & Radvansky, G. A. (1998). Situation models in language comprehension and memory. Psychological Bulletin, 123(2), 162.

DRAFT: La paternità dell'eros: il "Simposio" e Freud, in G. Ugolini (Hg. a cura di), Die Kraft der Vergangenheit – La forza del passato, Georg Olms Verlag, Hildesheim-Zürich-New York 2005, pp. 231-241. 1 DRAFT La paternità dell'eros. Il "Simposio" e Freud Marco Solinas Eros [...] non è nato né immortale né mortale, ma nello stesso giorno, ora fiorisce e vive, se vi riesce, ora muore, per poi risuscitar, di nuovo. Diotima a Socrate Sigmund Freud, nella creazione della psicoanalisi, dette un rilievo assolutamente centrale alla sessualità; per essere più esatti le pulsioni sessuali, o libido, poi eros, rappresentarono uno dei cardini portanti sui quali ruotò la metapsicologia freudiana, nonché la ricostruzione delle dinamiche intrapsichiche e relazionali nelle loro manifestazioni patologiche e non. Tutto questo è risaputo. È anche noto che al riguardo Freud si richiamò ripetutamente all'eros di Platone. L'obbiettivo di questo contributo è di sondare brevemente in quali forme e con quali significati egli si riallacciò alla concezione del filosofo greco, se i richiami risultano giustificati sul piano storico e filologico e infine se fu la lettura dei testi platonici a suggerire a Freud determinate valenze dell'eros; dunque se vi sia una paternità platonica della rinomata concezione della sessualità freudiana. Vi sono due indirizzi principali rispetto ai quali Freud si appoggiò a Platone, che segnano al contempo due delle più importanti vie della concettualizzazione della DRAFT: La paternità dell'eros: il "Simposio" e Freud, in G. Ugolini (Hg. a cura di), Die Kraft der Vergangenheit – La forza del passato, Georg Olms Verlag, Hildesheim-Zürich-New York 2005, pp. 231-241. 2 sessualità: l'una concerne la sua estensione sul piano delle dinamiche psichiche; l'altra la sua trasposizione sul piano biologico, a sua volta articolata in due filoni. Seguiamo la partizione freudiana. I. Lo scudo del divino Platone In Massenpsychologie und Ich-Analyse, scritto e pubblicato nel 1921, il concetto di libido, e con esso l'estensione della sessualità in esso presupposta, è direttamente ricondotto a tutto ciò che rientra nell'universo semantico della parola Liebe;1 ove Liebe va dal "Geschlechtsliebe mit dem Ziel der geschlechtlichen Vereinigung" fino all'amore per le "abstrakte Ideen".2 Difendendo tale operazione dallo "Sturm von Entrüstung" che sollevò, Freud si riallaccia direttamente a Platone: Und doch hat die Psychoanalyse mit dieser "erweiterten" Auffassung der Liebe nichts Originelles geschaffen. Der "Eros" des Philosophen Plato zeigt in seiner Herkunft, Leistung und Beziehung zur Geschlechtsliebe eine vollkommene Deckung mit der Liebeskraft, der Libido der Psychoanalyse, wie Nachmansohn und Pfister im Einzelnen dargelegt haben [...] Diese Liebestriebe werden nun in der Psychoanalyse a potiori und von ihrer Herkunft her Sexualtriebe geheissen [...].3 Il tono essenzialmente difensivo del richiamo a Platone emerge in modo ancor più esplicito nell'immediato proseguo: Wer die Sexualität für etwas die menschliche Natur Beschämendes und Erniedrigendes hält, 1 Freud, Massenpsychologie und Ich-Analyse, G.W., vol. XIII, pp. 98-9: "Libido ist eine Ausdruck aus der Affektivitätslehre. Wir heissen so die als quantitative Grösse betrachtete – wenn auch derzeit nicht messbare – Energie solcher Triebe, welche mit all dem zu tun haben, was man als Liebe zusammenfassen kann. [...] Wir meinen also, dass die Sprache mit dem Wort «Liebe» in seinen vielfältigen Anwendungen eine durchaus berechtigte Zusammenfassung geschaffen hat, und dass wir nichts Besseres tun können, als dieselbe auch unseren wissenschaftliche Erörterungen und Darstellungen zugrunde zu legen." 2 Ivi, 98. 3 Ivi, pp. 99-100, corsivi nostri; P. L. Assoun, Freud, la filosofia e i filosofi (1976), Roma 1990, p. 177 commenta: "L'Eros platonico è la forma originaria di quella sintesi che la stessa psicoanalisi promuove attraverso il suo concetto di libido". DRAFT: La paternità dell'eros: il "Simposio" e Freud, in G. Ugolini (Hg. a cura di), Die Kraft der Vergangenheit – La forza del passato, Georg Olms Verlag, Hildesheim-Zürich-New York 2005, pp. 231-241. 3 dem steht es ja frei, sich der vornehmeren Ausdrücke Eros und Erotik zu bedienen. [...] Ich kann nicht finden, dass irgend ein Verdienst daran ist, sich der Sexualität zu schämen; das griechische Wort Eros, das den Schimpf lindern soll, ist doch schliesslich nichts anderes als die Übersetzung unseres deutschen Wortes Liebe.4 Considerazioni analoghe, e con la stessa identica intenzione difensiva, aveva svolto del resto Freud l'anno prima, nella nuova prefazione ai tanto celebri quanto discussi Drei Abhandlugen zur Sexualtheorie, quando ricordava a tutti coloro che lo accusavano, indignati, di "Pansexualismus": "wie nahe die erweiterte Sexualität der Psychoanalyse mit dem Eros des göttlichen Platon zusammentrifft."5 Per individuare i dialoghi platonici cui si riferisce qua Freud vi sono due elementi principali: i suoi precedenti richiami al Simposio e il rimando ai saggi di Nachmansohn e Pfister. Quest'ultimo, nel suo brevissimo Plato als Vorläufer der Psychoanalyse, pubblicato nel '21, presentava una panoramica complessiva dell'eros nel Simposio delineandone la convergenza con libido e sublimazione.6 Nachmansohn nel suo Freuds Libidotheorie verglichen mit der Eroslehre Platos, pubblicato fin dal '15, aveva del resto già mostrato che nel Simposio, ma anche nel Fedro e nella Repubblica, era contenuta una concezione dell'eros equivalente a quella freudiana, sia quanto all'estensione semantica sia quanto al concetto di sublimazione.7 Le coordinate concettuali entro le quali si inscrivono i richiami freudiani sono dunque rappresentate da questi tre dialoghi. Quanto al Fedro, Freud stesso avrebbe di lì a poco adottato, tacitamente, la metafora del cavaliere quale emblema dell'utilizzo da parte dell'Io dell'energia erotica dell'Es,8 rielaborando così 4 Ibidem. 5 Freud, Vorwort zur vierten Auflage, Drei Abhandlugen zur Sexualtheorie, G.W., vol. V, p. 32, rimandando anche qui a Nachmansohn. 6 Cfr. O. Pfister, Plato als Vorläufer der Psychoanlyse, "Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse" (1921) VII/3, (pp. 264-9), pp. 267-8: nell'ascesa erotica descritta da Diotima si ritrova "ciò che Freud chiama sublimazione". 7 Cfr. M. Nachmansohn, Freuds Libidotheorie verglichen mit der Eroslehre Platos, "Internationale Zeitschrift für Ärztliche Psychoanalyse" (1915) III, (pp. 65-83), pp. 74 sgg.: Platone "anticipa" la concezione della libido e la "concezione della sublimazione di Freud": l'eros copre infatti tutte quelle manifestazioni che vanno dall'"istinto di conservazione" all'"amore per la scienza". 8 Cfr. Freud, Das Ich und das Es, G.W., vol. XIII, p. 253; Freud, Neue Folge der Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse, G.W., vol. XV, p. 83. Sulla paternità platonica dell'immagine cfr. tra gli altri A. Kenny, Mental health in Plato's Republic, in Id., The Anatomy of the Soul, DRAFT: La paternità dell'eros: il "Simposio" e Freud, in G. Ugolini (Hg. a cura di), Die Kraft der Vergangenheit – La forza del passato, Georg Olms Verlag, Hildesheim-Zürich-New York 2005, pp. 231-241. 4 l'immagine della biga alata richiamata da Nachmansohn.9 Quanto alla Repubblica, citata da Freud già nel '14 e nel '16 in riferimento al sogno,10 è stato scritto molto rispetto alle affinità con la concezione psicoanalitica (in parte intuite da Nachmansohn),11 a cominciare dalla idraulica dell'epithymia, alle modalità di gestione repressive e sublimanti del desiderio, all'analisi dell'emersione onirica;12 tale questione ci allontanerebbe però dal nostro tema perché più che di paternità sembrerebbe qui trattarsi di anticipazioni; veniamo dunque al Simposio e cerchiamo di capire se l'estensione freudiana vi trovi effettiva corrispondenza. Nel discorso di Socrate-Diotima – ove è contenuta la concezione che può esser considerata rappresentare quella di Platone –, l'eros si configura anzitutto quale forza sessuale in senso stretto, riproduttiva: è in vitù di "eros" che uomini e animali "sentono il desiderio di generare (genn©n TMpiqum»sV)" (207a). Il concetto viene quindi "esteso", sì da risultare il fondamento di ogni tipo di amore, come emerge nella celebre ascesa erotica: se il giovane all'inzio "deve amare (TMr©n) un determinato corpo", poi "bisogna far sì che divenga l'amante (TMrast»n) di tutti i corpi belli, e che allenti la veemente passione per uno solo», in modo da poter amare «la bellezza ch'è nelle psychai", esser "indotto a contemplare il bello che è nelle istituzioni e nelle leggi", nelle scienze, fino alla contemplazione della bellezza in sé (210a-c).13 Così, il giovane che "è stato educato nell'eros (prÕj t¦ TMrwtik¦ paidagwghqÍ) fino a questo punto" (210e) giungerà alla conoscenza; è perciò grazie alla forza dell'eros che si può giungere alla philo-sophia (210d). Platone si riallaccia così alla precedente definizione della philosophia quale desiderio Bristol and Oxford 1973, p. 12; W. Price, Mental Conflict, London and New York 1995, p. 188. 9 Nachmansohn, op. cit., pp. 77-8 si richiama alla "Vernunft" quale "Lenker der Seele" rimandando direttamente a Fedro 254a, 247d, ovvero ai passi del mito della biga. 10 Sui richiami a Repubblica, cfr. Freud, Die Traumdeutung, G.W., vol. II/III, pp. 70, 625, e Freud, Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse, vol. XI, p. 147. 11 Cfr. Nachmanoshn, op. cit., p. 82: "Die Sublimierungstheorie Freuds findet sich schon ausführlicher bei Plato und "der Staat" bringt noch eine noch auszubeutende pädagogische Lehre, um die Sublimierung des Eros in die Wege zu leiten." 12 Cfr. ad esempio Jaeger, Paideia, vol. III, Berlin 1947, pp. 74-8; Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies, London 19665, vol. 1, p. 313; Kahn, Plato's Theory od Desire, "Review of Metaphysics" XLI (1987), pp. 83-4; Kenny, op. cit., pp. 11 sgg.; Price, Plato and Freud, in C. Gill (a cura di), The Person and the Human Mind, Oxford 1990, pp. 261-3; Lear, Open Minded, Cambridge 1998, pp. 10-11, 108; M. Stella, Freud e la "Repubblica": l'anima, la società, la gerarchia, in M. Vegetti (a cura di), Platone, La Repubblica, Napoli 1998, vol. III, pp. 287-336. DRAFT: La paternità dell'eros: il "Simposio" e Freud, in G. Ugolini (Hg. a cura di), Die Kraft der Vergangenheit – La forza del passato, Georg Olms Verlag, Hildesheim-Zürich-New York 2005, pp. 231-241. 5 (epithymia) erotico per la sapienza di cui si è privi (200a-e). In sintesi, l'eros, volto originariamente alla procreazione sessuale, grazie alle corrette modalità pedagogiche adottate a livello extrapsichico, mostra di poter essere modellato, plasmato intrapsichicamente, "sublimato" utilizzando il linguaggio freudiano, sì da trasformarsi da forza sessuale in forza amorosa, in eros-philia o Liebestrieb come potremmo dire.14 Da questo punto di vista la vollkommene Deckung quanto a Herkunft, Leistung und Beziehung zur Geschlechtsliebe tra eros e libido individuata da Freud (come da Nachmansohn, Pfister e più tardi da molti altri commentatori)15 si rivela sostanzialmente corretta; sebbene la convergenza non debba essere spinta oltre i confini posti dallo statuto di Eros quale "demone mediatore" (cfr. 202c sgg.), e dal legame tra desiderio erotico e bellezza, originario in Platone, derivato in Freud.16 In conclusione, la paternità della concezione freudiana della libido quale estensione o ampliamento della sessualità spetta di diritto a Platone. Con paternità però in questo caso non si deve pensare ad una influenza diretta del pensiero platonico su Freud; la teoria della libido infatti, sia quanto all'adozione del termine (latino), che risale ai primissimi testi di Freud,17 sia quanto al modello di 13 Si seguirà la traduzione di Calogero, Platone, Il Simposio, Roma-Bari 1946. 14 Freud attribuirà paritariamente a Goethe e Platone una concezione affine a quella della sublimazione in Freud, Goethe-Preis 1930, G.W., vol. XIV, p. 549: "Den Eros hat Goethe immer hochgehalten, seine Macht nie zu verkleinen versucht, ist seinen primitiven oder selbst mutwilligen Äusserungen nicht minder achtungsvoll gefolgt wie seinen hochsublimierten und hat, wie mir scheint, seine Wesenseinheit durch alle seine Erscheinungsformen nicht weniger entschieden vertreten als vor Zeiten Plato." Già Taylor, Platone. L'uomo e l'opera (1926), trad. it., Firenze 1987-1990, pp. 327-8, 349-59, pur accostando l'eros all'amore cristiano ne ribadiva l'originaria forma "sessuale" ed "istintiva" di "desiderio bramoso". 15 Tra i tanti critici si veda ad esempio Dodds I Greci e l'Irrazionale (1951), Firenze 1997, pp. 264-5 che commentando il Simposio scrive: "Platone qui si avvicina molto al concetto freudiano di libido e sublimazione"; G. Tourney, Freud and the Greeks, "History of the Behavioral Sciences" I/1 (1965), soprattutto pp. 80-1; Marcuse, Eros e civiltà (19662), Torino 1996, pp. 226-7 per cui l'ascesa rappresenta una "sublimazione non repressiva"; Vegetti, L'etica degli antichi, Roma-Bari 1994, pp. 137-8 per cui nel Simposio si tratta di un "eros sublimato". 16 Cfr. ad esempio Freud, Das Unbehagen in der Kultur, G.W., vol. XIV, p. 441-2: "Einzig die Ableitung aus dem Gebiet des Sexualempfindens scheint gesichert; es wäre ein vorbildliches Beispiel einer zielgehemmten Regung. Die «Schönheit» und der «Reiz» sind ursprünglich Eigenschaften des Sexualobjekts". 17 Cfr. Laplanche e Pontalis, Enciclopedia della Psicoanalisi (1967), trad. it., Roma-Bari 19973, vol. I, pp. 320-1, per cui il termine "lo si incontra a più riprese nelle lettere e nelle minute indirizzate a Fliess e per la prima volta nella Minuta E (data probabile: giugno 1894)". DRAFT: La paternità dell'eros: il "Simposio" e Freud, in G. Ugolini (Hg. a cura di), Die Kraft der Vergangenheit – La forza del passato, Georg Olms Verlag, Hildesheim-Zürich-New York 2005, pp. 231-241. 6 funzionamento che ne permette la sublimazione, anch'esso di antica data,18 non sembra infatti esser stata suggerita dalla lettura dei testi platonici. Resta invece il fatto che Freud poteva legittimamente farsi scudo dell'autorità del "divino Platone", e questa era in verità la sua primaria intenzione, di fronte all'indignazione ed alle proteste sollevatesi da più parti contro la sua teoria che attribuiva all'eros sì grande rilievo pressoché a tutti i livelli della vita psichica, rinvenendo nell'antico filosofo greco un precursore. Platone levava ancora una volta alta la sua voce, questa volta a difender però la potenza 'positiva' di un'energia psichica, l'eros, per tanti secoli temuta quanto bistrattata, anche in suo nome. Il discorso sulla paternità dell'eros assume invece un'altra direzione quando si prende in considerazione l'estensione della libido o dell'eros al piano biologico; con ciò veniamo al secondo significato attribuito all'eros. II. I due suggerimenti del "Simposio" Jenseits des Lustprinzips, scritto e pubblicato nel '20, segna una tappa fondamentale per la psicoanalisi perché in esso Freud inaugura la nuova concezione dualistica delle pulsioni di vita e di morte (che qui tralasciamo), attribuisce ad entrambe carattere "regressivo" (1) e adotta una concezione per cui la pulsione sessuale, o libido, o meglio Eros, riportato sul piano cellulare viene identificato quale forza che "alles Lebende erhält", garantendone la potenziale immortalità (2). 1) Quanto al carattere regressivo o funzione di ripristino attribuito (anche) alle pulsioni sessuali, Freud richiama esplicitamente "die Theorie, die Plato im Symposion durch Aristophanes entwickeln lässt": l'ipotesi esposta nel mito, scrive, "leitet nämlich einen Trieb ab von dem Bedürfnis nach Wiederherstellung eines früheren Zustandes."19 Egli sintetizza il mito ricordando che anticamente v'erano i tre generi del maschio, della femmina e dell'androgino, in cui tutto era doppio finché Zeus non si decise a tagliarli in due, per citare infine: 18 Cfr. ivi, vol. II, pp. 618-21. DRAFT: La paternità dell'eros: il "Simposio" e Freud, in G. Ugolini (Hg. a cura di), Die Kraft der Vergangenheit – La forza del passato, Georg Olms Verlag, Hildesheim-Zürich-New York 2005, pp. 231-241. 7 Weil nun das ganze Wesen entzweigeschnitten war, trieb die Sehnsucht die beiden Hälften zusammen: sie umschlangen sich mit den Händen, verflochten sich ineinander im Verlangen, zusammenzuwachsen [...].20 Freud rinviene dunque nel mito aristofaneo, legittimamente, un modello che soddisfa proprio quella condizione che egli cerca di soddisfare, ovvero la funzione della pulsione sessuale di ripristinare uno stato precedente, di raggiungere una meta antica.21 Con ciò abbiamo una dichiarata ammissione di paternità storica dell'eros quanto al suo carattere regressivo. 2) Quanto all'eros che conserva, Freud, sempre discutendo il Simposio, non si richiama più direttamente ad Aristofane bensì al Dichterphilosoph;22 questo sembra un indizio della sua consapevolezza perlomeno del fatto che nel mito aristofaneo il discorso sulla separazione originaria concerne esclusivamente la natura umana (cfr. 189d; 193c), l'eros non ha la valenza biologico-universale attribuitagli da Freud (che ora vedremo), concezione che si ritrova invece pienamente nel discorso di SocrateDiotima. Egli sembrerebbe dunque coniugare parallelamente le sue due nuove concezioni attribuite all'eros e i due discorsi del Simposio: il ripristino grazie al mito di Aristofane, la funzione universale grazie al discorso socratico; operazione che, sebbene contravvenga in parte al dettato platonico, mostra che Freud sembra volersi riferire ad entrambi i discorsi, ed è ciò che qua conta.23 L'idea guida dell'eros quale forza che "alles Lebende erhält", assicurata dall'estensione delle pulsioni sessuali alle singole cellule, è l'assicurare una 19 Freud, Jenseits des Lustprinzips, G.W., vol. XIII, p. 62, corsivo di Freud. 20 Ibidem, cfr. Simposio 191a-b, traduzione Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, corsivo di Freud. 21 Ibidem, Freud scrive che non citerebbe l'ipotesi contenuta nel mito "wenn sie nicht gerade die eine Bedingung erfüllen würde, nach deren Erfüllung wir streben". Anche T. Gould, Platonic Love, London 1963, pp. 31-2 riporta l'interpretazione freudiana del mito esclusivamente alla questione del "carattere regressivo"; cfr. anche Assoun, op. cit., pp. 167-172. 22 Finita la citazione prosegue Freud, Jenseits des Lustprinzips, cit., p. 63: "Sollen wir, dem Wink des Dichterphilosophen folgend, die Annahme wagen, dass die lebende Substanz bei ihrer Belebung in kleine Partikel zerrissen wurde, die seither durch die Sexualtriebe ihre Wiedervereinigung anstreben?". 23 Ove la liceità agli occhi di Freud di una coniugazione dei due discorsi verrebbe confermata dall'osservazione per cui rispetto al mito, Platone "sich nicht zu eigen gemacht, geschweige denn ihr eine so bedeutsame Stellung angewiesen hätte, hätte sie ihm nicht selbst als wahrheitshältig eingeleuchtet", ivi, p. 63, nota 2 aggiunta nel 1921; intepretazione che come sappiamo si scontra irrimediamilmente con la negazione da parte di Socrate della concezione del "ripristino" dell'unità DRAFT: La paternità dell'eros: il "Simposio" e Freud, in G. Ugolini (Hg. a cura di), Die Kraft der Vergangenheit – La forza del passato, Georg Olms Verlag, Hildesheim-Zürich-New York 2005, pp. 231-241. 8 "potentielle Unsterblichkeith" alla materia vivente (se si vuole: mortale):24 das Wesentliche an den vom Sexualtrieb intendierten Vorgängen ist doch die Verschmelzung zweier Zelleiber. Erst durch diese wird bei den höheren Lebewesen die Unsterblichkeit der lebenden Substanz gesichert.25 Così, con tale "Ausdehnung des Libidobegriffes auf die einzelne Zelle wandelte sich uns der Sexualtrieb zum Eros, der die Teile der lebenden Substanz zueinanderzudrängen und zusammenzuhalten sucht";26 la sessualità converge quindi con "den alles erhaltenden Eros",27 "mit dem Eros der Dichter und Philosophen".28 Nel corso degli anni tale concezione verrà conservata e ribadita per sempre da Freud, di contro a quella del ripristino più tardi abbandonata,29 e ricondotta anche in seguito esplicitamente al Simposio: nel '24 ad esempio scriverà che "was die Psychoanalyse Sexualität nannte, [deckt sich ...] mit dem allumfassenden und alles erhaltenden Eros des Symposions Platos",30 nel '32 che le pulsioni sessuali vengon chiamate "erotische, ganz im Sinne des Eros im Symposion Platos."31 originaria di Aristofane cfr. Simposio 200e, 205d-e. 24 Ivi, p. 42. 25 Ivi, p. 60, corsivo nostro. 26 Ivi, p. 66 nota 1, corsivo nostro. 27 Ivi, p. 56. 28 Ivi, p. 54: "So würde also die Libido unserer Sexualtriebe mit dem Eros der Dichter und Philosophen zusammenfallen, der alles Lebende zusammenhält". 29 Tale concezione era esplicitamente compresa anche in Freud, Massenpsychologie und IchAnalyse (1921), cit., p. 100 ove "Eros alles in der Welt zusammenhält"; si veda anche Freud, Das Ich und das Es (1923), G.W., vol. XIII, p. 268; Freud, Hemmung, Symptom und Angst (1926), G.W., vol. XIV, p. 152; Freud, Das Unbehagen in der Kultur (1929), G.W., vol. XIV, pp. 596, 604-5; in Freud, Die endliche und die unendliche Analyse (1937), G.W., vol. XVI, pp. 91-2 egli accosterà direttamente il suo Eros alla "fil...a" di Empedocle con cui ha in comune la tendenza, "das Vorhandene zu immer grösseren Einheiten zusammenzuffassen"; molto simile la philia platonica in Gorgia, 508a; Infine nel 1938, in Abriss der Psychoanalyse, G.W., vol. XVII, pp. 70-1 Freud ribadisce: meta dell'Eros è "immer grosserere Einheiten herzustellen und so zu erhalten, also Bindung" (Empedocle è ivi ripreso nella nota 2); egli abbandona invece esplicitamene il carattere regressivo delle pulsioni erotiche: quanto alla formula "dass ein Trieb die Rückker zu einem früheren Zustand anstrebt", "Für den Eros (oder Liebestrieb) können wir eine solche Anwendung nicht durchführen". In nota chiarisce: "Dichter haben Ähnliches phantasiert, aus der Geschichte der lebendne Substanz ist uns nichts Entsprechendes bekannt.", è scontato il rimando al mito aristofaneo. 30 Freud, Die Widerstände gegen die Psychoanalyse, G.W., vol. XIV, p. 105: "was die Psychoanalyse Sexualität nannte, [deckt sich] keineswegs mit dem Drang nach Vereinigung der geschiedenen Geschlechter oder nach Erzeugung von Lustempfindung an den Genitalien, sondern weit eher mit dem allumfassenden und alles erhaltenden Eros des Symposions Platos." 31 Freud, Warum Krieg?, G.W., XVI, p. 20: "Wir nehmen an, dass die Triebe des Menschen nur DRAFT: La paternità dell'eros: il "Simposio" e Freud, in G. Ugolini (Hg. a cura di), Die Kraft der Vergangenheit – La forza del passato, Georg Olms Verlag, Hildesheim-Zürich-New York 2005, pp. 231-241. 9 Ora, l'attribuzione di Freud trova effettivamente riscontro nel discorso di Socrate-Diotima. Ad un primo livello eros si configura quale causa ultima che spinge gli uomini e "tutti gli animali della terra e del cielo [...] dapprima ad unirsi l'uno con l'altro (summigÁnai ¢ll»loij) e poi a curarsi dell'allevamento della prole" (207a-b).32 Platone amplia quindi ancor più il discorso: "la natura mortale cerca, per quanto può, di divenire eterna ed athanatos. E può riuscirvi solo per questa via, la via della generazione (tÍ genššsei), perché essa lascia sempre dietro di sé un altro essere nuovo in luogo del vecchio"33; ove "ogni singola creatura vivente [...] non conserva mai in sé le medesime cose, ma si rigenera di continuo, deperendo in altra parte, nei capelli, nella carne, nelle ossa, nel sangue e in tutto quanto il corpo"34 (207d-208a). Conclude Platone: in virtù di tale incessante generazione "si conserva (sózetai) tutto ciò che è mortale, non col restare sempre assolutamente identico, come il divino, ma in quanto ciò che invecchiando vien meno lascia al suo posto qualcosa di nuovo e simile a sé.35 Con questo espediente, o Socrate, il mortale, sia corpo sia ogni altra cosa (ka sîma ka t«lla p£nta), partecipa dell'immortalità" (208a-b).36 Eros viene dunque esteso a forza biologica universale che "unisce" e "conserva" "ogni cosa" mortale (se si vuole: vivente) garantendone la relativa e potenziale immortalità grazie ad una sorta di macro-duplicazione, la generazione della prole, e ad una micro-duplicazione, concernente ogni singolo elemento dell'organismo; Platone dischiude così la via che nel XX secolo sarebbe stata battuta dall'estensione von zweierlei Art sind, entweder solche, die erhalten und vereinigen wollen, wir heissen sie erotische, ganz im Sinne des Eros im Symposion Platos, oder sexuelle mit bewusster Überdehnung des populären Begriffs von Sexualität, und andere, die zerstören und töten wollen". 32 Esordisce Diotima: "Quale credi, o Socrate, che sia la causa di questo amore e di questo desiderio (a‡tion eŁnai toÚtou toà oerwtoj ka tÁj TMpiqum...aj)?", per proseguire: "Non ti accorgi del tremendo stato di tutti gli animali, della terra e del cielo, ogni volta che sentono il desiderio di generare, ammalandosi tutti e assecondando l'impulso erotico (TMrwtikîj diatiqššmena), che li spinge dapprima ad unirsi l'uno con l'altro e poi a curarsi dell'allevamento della prole?" (207a-b) 33 207d3: "Óti ¢e katale...pei ›teron nššon ¢nt toà palaioà". 34 208d7-e1: "¢ll¦ nššoj ¢e gignÒmenoj, t¦ dł ¢pollÚj, ka kat¦ t¦j tr...caj ka s£rka ka Ñst© ka aOEma ka sÚmpan tÕ sîma", sull'apparente manchevolezza del testo cfr. Pucci, Platone, Opere complete, Roma-Bari 19938, vol. 3, p. 187. 35 208b1-2: "¢ll¦ tù tÕ ¢piÕn ka palaioÚmenon ›teron nššon TMgkatale...pein oOEon aÙtÕ Ãn." 36 Sulla natura «inconscia» del desiderio cfr. Cornford, The Division of the Soul, "The Hibbert Journal", XXVIII (1929-30), p. 217; Price, Plato and Freud, cit., pp. 252-3; Gould, op. cit., p. 49. DRAFT: La paternità dell'eros: il "Simposio" e Freud, in G. Ugolini (Hg. a cura di), Die Kraft der Vergangenheit – La forza del passato, Georg Olms Verlag, Hildesheim-Zürich-New York 2005, pp. 231-241. 10 biologico-cellulare freudiana dell'eros (che si appoggiava anche sui risultati della giovane genetica ottocentesca di Weismann, Woodruff etc., dunque sui processi di "duplicazione" cellulare).37 Riepilogando, si deve attribuire al testo platonico, sia quanto al ripristino aristofaneo sia quanto all'eros che unisce e conserva, la paternità storica della concezione adottata da Freud. In questi due casi però, rispetto alla prima estensione del concetto di sessualità, si tratta di una paternità in senso stretto, nel senso che Freud sembra aver ripreso direttamente da Platone le due idee. Ad avvalorare tale ipotesi vi sono i seguenti elementi. Rispetto al mito di Aristofane, va riconosciuto che esso è attestato nel corpus fin dal lontano 1905, quando Freud vi accennava nei Drei Abhandlugen zur Sexualtheorie;38 si tratta dunque di una presenza di antica data che dopo circa quindici anni si sarebbe solidificata in una delle teorie biologicofilosofiche più ardite adottate da Freud. Quanto all'eros quale forza che conserva è degno di nota sottolineare che fin dal 1910, nel suo Leonardo, Freud aveva assunto quasi tacitamente una tal concezione, ove scriveva di sfuggita che "Eros", "alles Lebende erhält".39 Ora, fa pensare il fatto che circa tre mesi prima dall'inizio del Leonardo, iniziato all'incirca nell'ottobre del 1909 e finito nell'aprile del 1910, Freud citasse il Simposio nel saggio Sull'uomo dei topi (finito per l'appunto il 17 luglio del 1909); discutendo del rapporto tra il fattore negativo dell'amore e la componente sadica, in modo a dire il vero sorprendente Freud scriveva in nota: "ja oft habe ich den Wunsch, ihn nicht mehr unter den Lebenden zu sehen. Und doch wenn das je einträfe, ich weiss, ich würde noch viel unglücklicher sein, so wehrlos, so ganz wehrlos bin ich gegen ihn," sagt Alkibiades über den Sokrates im Symposion.40 37 Cfr. Freud, Jenseits des Lustprinzips, cit., pp. 46-61. 38 Freud, Drei Abhandlugen zur Sexualtheorie, G.W., vol. V, p. 34: "Der populären Theorie des Geschlechtstriebes entspricht am schönsten die poetische Fabel von der Teilung des Menschen in zwei Hälften – Mann und Weib –, die sich in der Liebe wieder zu vereinigen streben." 39 Freud, Eine Kindheitserinnerung des Leonardo da Vinci, G.W., vol. VIII, p. 136. Il termine "Eros" era stato utilizzato da Breuer fin dal 1895, cfr. Breuer e Freud, Studi sull'isteria, O.C., vol. 1, p. 389 (la parte di Breuer è assente nell'edizione degli Studien über Hysterie edita nelle Gesammelte Werke). 40 Freud, Bemerkungen über einen Fall von Zwangsneurose, G.W., vol. VII, p. 456, n. 1; cfr. Simposio 216c. DRAFT: La paternità dell'eros: il "Simposio" e Freud, in G. Ugolini (Hg. a cura di), Die Kraft der Vergangenheit – La forza del passato, Georg Olms Verlag, Hildesheim-Zürich-New York 2005, pp. 231-241. 11 Se da questa citazione, per l'appunto inaspettata ed estemporanea, è lecito presumere che Freud avesse riletto o perlomeno ripreso in mano il Simposio, è altrettanto lecito inferire che l'idea di Eros quale forza che alles Lebende erhält espressa appena tre mesi dopo gli venne suggerita proprio dalla recente rilettura del dialogo platonico. In questo caso si tratterebbe dunque di ben più di una sola eventuale "Kryptomensie" dovuta all'ampiezza delle sue lontane letture giovanili, come quella tirata in gioco laddove Freud – rinunciando garbatamente e felicemente all'originalità – riconosceva ad Empedocle la paternità storica della sua teoria dualistica. Sembra dunque che il Simposio, dalle sue timide comparse del 1905, del 1909 e presumibilmente del 1910, abbia poi più o meno silenziosamente, più o meno inconsciamente continuato a lavorare nella mente di Freud per riemergere infine con l'ampia revisione della concezione della sessualità di Jenseits des Lustprinzips del 1920. In questo caso però, sia quanto al carattere regressivo sia quanto alla funzione biologica, la paternità dell'eros non sarebbe più solo storica, né si tratterebbe più dell'utilizzo dell'autorità del "divino Platone" quale scudo contro le intemperie sollevate dal risalto dato alla sessualità: sembrerebbe invece trattarsi di una paternità in senso stretto, di un'influenza diretta del Simposio sviluppatasi e sedimentatasi col lento trascorrere degli anni. Possiamo allora concludere affermando che da una o verosimilmente più riletture del dialogo di Platone sia scaturita una decisiva rielaborazione di una delle concezioni della sessualità, dell'eros, se non tra le più "originali" in assoluto, di certo tra le più discusse e significative del XX secolo; si rivela così ancora una volta la fecondità di un passato antico, che, anche perché tanto amato, sembra morire solo per poi rinascere, di nuovo.

Kripke and the dogmatism paradox 7 September 2016 Abstract. I aim at dissolving Kripke's dogmatism paradox by arguing that, with respect to any particular proposition p which is known by a subject A, it is not irrational for A to ignore all evidence against p. Along the way, I offer a definition of A is dogmatic with respect to p, and make a distinction between an objective and a subjective sense of 'should' in the statement A should ignore all the evidence against p. For the most part, I deal with Kripke's original version of the paradox, wherein the subject wishes, above all else, to avoid losing her true belief or gaining a false one; in the final section I investigate the possibility of having a paradox for a subject who values knowledge above anything else. Kripke had discovered the dogmatism paradox by 1972. After four decades of commentaries and secondary literature, it is fortunate that the original presentation of the paradox is now available in print. Focusing on the relevant parts of Kripke's "On two paradoxes of knowledge"1, I aim at solving the paradox-and, perhaps unrealistically and immodestly, I aim at solving it without subscribing to any particular theory of knowledge. Section 1, basically a set of quotations from Kripke (2011) together with a few short comments, represents the paradox. Section 2 offers a definition of the very concept of being dogmatic with respect to a proposition, and § 3 makes a (familiar) distinction between two senses of 'should' in the statement A should resolve not to be influenced by any evidence against p, a distinction which may help us see that not all forms of recommending dogmatism have the same degree of weirdness. I offer my solution in § 4: a defense of the idea that it is all right for us to be dogmatic with respect to what we know, provided that, as Kripke assumes (see the quotation after (v) below), what we wish above all else is to avoid losing true beliefs or gaining false ones. Finally, in Section 5, I argue that the paradox cannot restructure itself by changing its focus from true belief to knowledge. Labelled sentences (i)-(vi) are directly quoted from Kripke (2011), with his own numbering. 1 Kripke (2011: 43 ff). Unannotated page numbers refer to this work. Kripke's paper is, for the most part, a transcript of a talk given in 1972; appendices and some of the footnotes seem to have been added in the late 2000s. For Kripke's comments on some commentaries see his Appendix 3. 1 1. The paradox. The starting point is a closure principle: (i) If A knows that p and A knows that p entails q, and, on the basis of such knowledge, A concludes that q, then A knows that q. Next we have something which contains no reference to knowledge: (ii) p entails the following hypothetical: any evidence against p is misleading (where misleading is to mean leads to a false conclusion). Let p be an arbitrary proposition,2 and suppose that A knows that p. It is certainly not implausible to assume that our subject recognizes the truth of (ii). So let us suppose (iii) The subject A knows that p, and A knows (ii). Assuming that A carries out the relevant deduction, it follows that (iv) A knows that any evidence against p is misleading. Kripke notes that this already looks rather strange; but let us continue. Here is an innocent, conceptual-truth-looking claim: (v) If A knows that taking an action of type T leads to consequence C, and A wishes above all else to avoid C (i.e., this is the only relevant issue), then A should resolve now not to take any action of type T. Note Kripke's parenthetical disambiguation of A wishes above all else to avoid C: avoiding C is not merely the strongest among A's desires-if that were the case, it would not necessarily follow that A should decide not to do anything of type T, for it could be the case that a cluster of A's other wishes collectively trump her wish to avoid C. Rather, Kripke is considering cases where "A knows, at a certain time, that if he does anything of a certain kind in the future, it will lead to some consequence that he thinks bad, there being no other relevant consequences which would override it" (44, emphasis added). However, it seems that an assumption weaker than Kripke's would do the job, viz., all things considered, A wishes to avoid C. With appropriate substitutions for C and T, (v) yields: (vi) A should resolve not to be influenced by any evidence against p. And what are the appropriate substitutions for C and T? Kripke's explanation is crucial to my understanding of the paradox; so let me quote it in full and not content myself with a reference in a footnote. Here is Kripke (44): 2 In Kripke's paper, 'p' is said to stand for a statement (30, 43). The differences between propositions and statements are negligible for my purposes here. 2 Let the action of type T be accepting evidence against p-that is, doubting or denying that p on the basis of some future evidence. The consequence C is gaining a false belief-or at least losing a true one, if we merely fall into doubt-and this is something that we do not want. Since (vi) is the very conclusion of the argument, we may assume that (vi) itself is supposed to be unacceptable. Unacceptable in what way? Kripke is slightly less than ideally explicit here; but it is fairly clear from the flavour of his discussion that what he has in mind is that it is irrational for A to do what (vi) says she should do. Textual evidence for such a reading comes from what he says just before presenting the (i)-(vi) argument: "[T]hat if I know something now, I should, as a rational agent, adopt a resolution not to allow any future evidence to overthrow it. But this does not seem to be our attitude toward statements that we know-nor does it seem to be a rational attitude" (43). Also in an appendix later added to the paper: "I should add [...] that sometimes the dogmatic strategy is a rational one." So I take this to be the real question concerning the dogmatism paradox: how could there be an apparently sound argument which prescribes dogmatism?3 2. Defining dogmatism. Kripke does not offer an explicit definition of dogmatism-in fact, he uses 'dogmatic' and its cognates only once in his original dicussion. Yet, already in the paper, (vi) gives us a hint that dogmatism, as Kripke understands the concept, has something to do with the subject's decision about what to do with the evidence against what she believes, should she encounter such evidence. Kripke elaborates on this when, in Appendix 3 to the paper, he comments on Harman's well-known solution to the paradox. We need not disagree with what Harman says about how disregarding evidence would affect the subject's knowledge, he says; but, "remember that I was talking about a resolution to be made in advance" (49).4 So I think it is fair to say that, for Kripke, a subject S is dogmatic with respect to a proposition p iff S believes that p, and, moreover, S has resolved not to be influenced by any evidence against p. Thus, in particular, if S believes that p and 3 In what is perhaps the oldest and best known of all commentaries on the paradox, Harman (1973: 148) presents an argument with the conclusion that I am in a position to disregard any future evidence that seems to tell against h, where h is a proposition the arguer knows. He then writes, "This is paradoxical, because I am never in a position simply to disregard any future evidence even though I know a great many different things." A majority of published works on the paradox quote this passage in full; it is thus safe to say that, according to many commentators, the unacceptable conclusion is that the arguer says of herself that she is in a position to disregard all the future counterevidence concerning a given proposition. And why is that unacceptable? We may imagine a number of related reasons or labels: (a) it is not all right, or it is absurd, to disregard all the future counterevidence (Nozick (1981: 237), Lewis (1996: 564)), (b) one can never know that one is in such a position, or (c) knowledge never breeds dogmatism (Hawthorne (2004: 73)). In what follows, I will directly deal with (a). 4 Also on page 48 (italics in the original): "one should remember that my point is about a resolution made in advance to ignore certain types of evidence." 3 she has resolved to ignore all evidence against p, then S is dogmatic with respect to p.5 Taking a hint from Lasonen-Aarino (2013: 3), one might cautiously add that the dogmatic subject is one who has resolved not to be influenced by any piece of evidence against p as it bears on p (not as it bears on other propositions). However, in the present enquiry we may sidestep this nicety by assuming that we are talking about the subject's attitude towards a single proposition.6 Also, in a more thorough investigation, it would be wise to define dogmatism with respect to a proposition relative to a mode of presentation, so that, for instance, the subject might be dogmatic with respect to the axiom of choice but not with respect to the principle of well-ordering. But I think the definition I just gave serves my purposes here. (A closely related concept is that of open-mindedness. Surely we would not say of a subject that she is open-minded with respect to p simply by virtue of her not believing that p (or worse: by virtue of not having entertained p at all); hence open-mindedness is not simply the complement of dogmatism as defined above. The essence of S's open-mindedness with respect to a proposition p is, I think, her readiness to consider all the (available) evidence for p, as well as all the evidence against it, if S has not yet come to believe either p or not-p and p is of some importance for S, and S's readiness to consider all the (available) evidence against p if she does believe that p.) Note that, insofar as the definition is concerned and in the absence of further argument, S's dogmatism with respect to p seems to be independent of her knowledge that p-though at the end of the day our preferred epistemology might tell us that dogmatism with respect to p may lead to the destruction of the subject's knowledge that p.7 The subject's dogmatism with respect to a proposition need not be a result of his psychological certainty of the believed proposition. Thus consider the case of Bill, who has to jump out of the 13th floor of a burning building to save his own life. He has somehow formed the not-so-firm belief that he has the nerve to jump off. As he also thinks that a necessary condition for his success is to sustain this belief, he tries not to lose it. In particular, he decides not to consider any evidence against the belief-not estimating the height of the building, not thinking of his acute acrophobia, etc. Bill is thus dogmatic with respect to a proposition, but he is not absolutely certain about it.8 5 Ignoring counterevidence is just one way of going for not being influenced by it. (For Kripke's brief discussion of different ways (or "strategies") of maintaining a dogmatic attitude see his 44 and 48n27). One might think of yet another way of not being influenced by a piece of evidence, not mentioned by Kripke: looking at the counterevidence with a firm prior intention to refute it. 6 This idealization makes my topic more manageable. For instance, while talking about the legitimacy of the subject's dogmatism with respect to a proposition known by her, we may forget about the effect of dogmatism with respect to p on the subject's epistemic relation to other propositions. 7 E.g., Lewis (1996) argues that some evidence against p are not properly ignorable, so that ignoring them would destroy the subject's knowledge that p. See Lewis (1996: 564 f) which is specifically about the dogmatism paradox. 8 Or consider Charles's attitude towards the proposition p that his wife is not unfaithful to him. For his own peace of mind, Charles tries not to think of p at all; if he cannot take his mind off it, he will then try to form the belief that p, and ignore all the counterevidence. Neither Bill nor Charles need be considered irrational-there are more to rationality than purely epistemic considerations. However, insofar as we deal with the paradox of dogmatism, we deal with 4 Regarding dogmatism with respect to a given proposition, it is essential that the subject has made a choice not to be influenced by any counterevidence: S is not dogmatic if it just happens that she ignores all the counterevidence. To make this point more emphatically, we may use the term de jure dogmatic for what I have simply called dogmatic, and call S de facto dogmatic with respect to p iff S believes that p and, whether or not it is a matter of a prior resolution, no evidence against p will ever influence S.9 Now it seems to me that it is only de jure dogmatism which might be considered as a sin against rationality, and it is only systematic de jure dogmatism (with respect to a significantly large class of propositions) which is, or may be, a vice in the realm of rationality. A de facto dogmatic agent might be careless or irresponsible; but she is not ipso facto guilty. To be considered as a crime, disregarding the evidence should be premeditated. 3. What the subject might not know. Note one thing the conclusion of the (i)-(vi) argument does not say: (vi) does not say that A knows that she should resolve to disregard all evidence against p-it just says that A should so resolve. It is as if someone located at an Archimedean point judges, after going through (i)-(vi), that A should be dogmatic with respect to p. Taken at face value, Kripke's paradoxical argument does not show that the subject herself knows that she should opt for a dogmatic attitude. To wit, it is only in an objective, not subjective, sense of 'should' that (vi) says that A should be dogmatic with respect to p. Although the terminology is transparent and the distinction intuitive enough, let me give two examples of different senses of 'should'.10 Suppose that Bernadette is gravely ill, that she knows this fact, and that she wishes above all else to be healed. Suppose that there is a cup of panacea in front of her. It seems obvious that there is a sense of 'should'-the objective sense-that Bernadette should take the cup. Equally obviously, however, there need not be a subjective sense in which she should take the cup: she might not have the slightest idea about the curative effect of taking it.11 To give an example of a different flavour, consider Danielle who is driving from work to home. She should keep her seat belt fastened, and this is a subjective 'should': for all she knows, there could be a collision or a sudden stop, and she knows that in a typical accident a fastened seat belt reduces the risk of injury. But now suppose that, as a matter of fact, there will be no accident this epistemic issues only. 9 The terminology, with its Latin qualifiers, is chosen with an eye to the preface of Kripke's classic, Naming and Necessity (1980: 21n21). 10 The distinction is of course standard in ethics and epistemology. Feldman (1988) argues that it works differently in the two disciplines. 11 For the obtaining of the situation Bernadette should take the cup in the subjective sense of 'should', it seems to suffice that Bernadette knows that she should take the cup in the objective sense (see Veber (2004: 560)). It is debatable whether this condition can be replaced by Bernadette's having a belief that she should take the cup, or is it necessary that she has "good reasons" for such a belief (see Feldman (1988: 407 ff) for corresponding issues in ethics and epistemology). Bernadette's case is indisputable, however, for we are considering a case where Bernadette does not even believe-let alone believe justifiedly-that drinking the contents will heal her. 5 evening. Then it is not the case that, objectively, Danielle should fasten her seat belt. (Allow me to set aside issues like Danielle's peace of mind when the belt is fastened, and the likelihood of her being fined by the police for not having her seat belt fastened; let us assume that "the only relevant issue" for Daniel is to avoid accident-caused injury.) Of course, it is safe to say that on a typical day a typical driver does not know that she will not have an accident-hence the practical uselessness of talking about the objective sense of 'should' in such cases. The upshot of both examples is the familiar point that for a given subject at a given time and for a given action X, the statements Shouldobjective (X) and notShouldsubjective (X) need not be incompatible. Back to the (i)-(vi) argument, suppose A knows that p-so that, in particular, p is true. It follows from (ii) that any evidence against p is misleading. Let us assume, like Kripke (44), that gaining a false belief or losing a true one is what A wishes above all else to avoid. It follows from (v) that, as a matter of fact, A should resolve not to be influenced by any evidence against p. For all we are told by (i)-(vi), this is like the case of Bernadette and panacea: objectively speaking, A should be dogmatic with respect to p. However, and again like Bernadette's case, A may not be aware of the obtaining of this objective 'should'-situation: A herself may not be able to reach the conclusion, "I should resolve now to disregard all the evidence against p". As presented by Kripke, the (i)-(vi) argument does not endorse a subjective dogmatism. Now here is a conjecture with empirical content: Mitigating the repugnancy of dogmatism. Encountered with a statement of the form A should be dogmatic with respect to p, most of us will find the statement less bizarre, or less disgusting, if we are told that only an objective sense of 'should' is meant. While reading a work of fiction containing the above-described situation involving Bernadette, we assent to the statement, made by the omniscient thirdperson narrator, that Bernadette shouldobjective take the cup which, unbeknownst to Bernadette herself, contains panacea; why balk at the idea that, as a matter of objective normative fact, of which the subject is probably unaware, A should resolve not to be influenced by any evidence against p? But this is not the end of the paradox. Although (vi) is not the statement of a subjective requirement of dogmatism, such a requirement, viz., (vi*) A knows that she should resolve not to be influenced by any evidence against p., would follow from a straightforward readjustment of (v): (v*) If A knows that taking an action of type T leads to consequence C, and A wishes above all else to avoid C, then A knows that she should resolve now not to take any action of type T., so that, with truly little ado, Kripke's argument could be transformed into an argument for the conclusion that A should be dogmatic with respect to p, in the subjective sense of 'should'. 6 Now a number of philosophers have argued that (iv), which is needed to derive (vi*) from (v*), does not follow from (iii) unless the KK principle holds, a principle according to which whenever a subject knows that p she also knows that she knows that p.12 However, important as the question of indispensability of KK to the the dogmatism paradox may be, we need not take a stand on it here. True, the KK principle is not warmly embraced by everyone;13 yet this does not solve the dogmatism paradox even if we think that KK is needed for the validity of the paradoxical argument, for, as noted by Sorensen (1988: 437), the critics of KK do not, or do not have to, unanimously deny that there are some cases where the subject has second-order knowledge, and we can run the asterisked version of the (i)-(vi) argument at least for such cases. Thus questioning the KK principle as the (alleged) hidden premise of the dogmatism paradox would not help us solving the paradox if we think dogmatism is never a rational attitude. Let me summarize this section. I mentioned a familiar distinction between two senses of 'should': an objective (or as-a-matter-of-fact) sense, and a subjective (or perspectival, or information-relative) one. I argued that it is only in the objective sense of 'should' that Kripke's original paradox (the (i)-(vi) argument) culminates in the conclusion that the subject should be dogmatic with respect to what she knows. If Y denotes A's resolution not to be influenced by any evidence against p, then the announcement of Shouldobjective (Y) sounds much less implausible than Shouldsubjective (Y). But this is cold comfort, for there is an obvious re-presentation of the argument (the (i)-(v*)-(vi*) argument), which seems to lead to a subjective requirement of dogmatism. Against this version of the paradox, one may still quibble: arguably, it needs the controversial KK principle. This objection however, sound as it may be, does not completely defuse the paradox, for it is hard to deny that there are some cases of propositions p and subjects A such that A knows that she knows that p, and with respect to any such p the new argument would say that A knows that she should be dogmatic. Now let me leave this trend of thought for a couple of pages and have a fresh look at the paradox. 4. Dogmatism: is it invariably irrational? In (i)-(vi) we seem to have a valid argument with reasonable premises whose conclusion says that the subject should be dogmatic with respect to what she knows. The literature on the paradox contains dozens of works which try to either question the truth of one of the premises, or else attack the validity of the argument.14 My strategy, however, is to bite the bullet and argue that there might 12 See, for instance, Sorell (1981: 558). Sorell then moves on to present a similar paradox not depending on KK. See also Baumann (2013: 6 f) for a brief discussion of why one might think that while first-order knowledge of a proposition does not licence dogmatism with respect to it, second-order knowledge may. 13 The most widely discussed recent case against KK is Williamson's anti-luminosity argument in Chapter 5 of his (2000). On the other hand, in his solution to the surprise examination paradox, Kripke, who is silent about the possible connections of the dogmatism paradox to KK, argues that the principle is "true enough for all practical purposes" (34). 14 The closure principle ((i), or its variants) is probably the most easily noticeable suspect among the premises; for a recent diagnosis along this line see Sharon and Spectre (2010). For an attack on the validity of the (i)-(vi) argument (or some variants thereof), see Nozick (1981: 236-239) and 7 be nothing wrong with a person's dogmatic attitude towards what she knows. And if the fact that p is known by you makes it the case that, objectively speaking, you should be dogmatic with respect to p, then if you know about your knowing that p, it is all right to say that you know that you should be dogmatic with respect to p. Let me explain. Is dogmatism an irrational attitude? Quite naturally, the answer depends on what the facts are, re rationality and epistemology. Arguably, if the highest epistemic duty of a rational agent is not to lose knowledge and if, moreover, one loses knowledge by not properly investigating all the available counterevidence, then one must avoid dogmatism. The more one's knowledge is sensitive to one's attitude towards evidence the more one should avoid dogmatism, given that one should aim at sustaining knowledge. However, independently of the real effect of dogmatism on knowledge, it seems to me that while talking about dogmatism and open-mindedness, it is first and foremost true belief, not knowledge, that we are worried about. At least so it seems to be the case when we look at what some old masters of the modern era have said about certain related issues. I will give just one quote-here is John Stuart Mill's number-one argument in defense of the freedom of thought and expression (1859: 60): First, if any opinion is compelled to silence, that opinion may, for aught we can certainly know, be true. To deny this is to assume our own infallibility. Of course Mill has much to say about cultivating individuality via practicing the freedom of thought and discussion; but here the main concern is truth-we should listen to what others say, lest it is very likely that we miss some true propositions. And open-mindedness begins at home: to minimize the risk of getting things wrong, in general I must not ignore the evidence available to myself against what I myself believe. Whatever the point of avoiding dogmatism might be in the views of Mill et al., we may recall that Kripke's subject wishes above all else to avoid "gaining a false belief-or at least losing a true one" (44), wherein there is no mention of knowledge. But if what we wish above all else is to avoid gaining a false belief or losing a true one, then of course one should be dogmatic if one's belief has already hit the target. If all evidence against p is in fact misleading (i.e., "leads to a false conclusion"), then, as a matter of fact, the subject should avoid them. This is what she should do, whether or not she knows it.15 While discussing the dogmatism paradox, philosophers typically take it for granted that dogmatism is irrational or outright absurd, and do not pause to explain why-the irrationality of dogmatism is perhaps something of a dogma Sorensen (1988). Alternatively, one may go sceptic and deny that anyone knows anything at all, hence denying (iii); according to Unger (1975), this is the way to go. That I am offering my own solution need not be construed as my disagreement with all of these authors-I think the paradoxicality of Kripke's (i)-(vi) fails on several grounds. Yet, while presenting my solution, I will talk as if the (i)-(vi) argument is sound. 15 In the next section, I will examine if there could be a version of the paradox wherein the subject wishes above all else to avoid losing not her true belief, but, more particularly, her knowledge. For the nonce, let us deal with true belief, like the original Kripke. 8 by itself.16 However, a misunderstanding is lurking here. If we are looking for a strategy to deal with our beliefs, then dogmatism is not always the wisest choice, for it ignores the fact that a good number of our beliefs are false. That much is obvious.17 But what about a particular true proposition p believed by the subject? Would it be rationally obligatory for the subject to stick to the strategy of openmindedness and go through all available evidence against p? If the rationale for examining all the (available) counterevidence is to avoid falsehood, then it is hard to see what would be the point of adhering to the strategy in a case where the goal is already achieved. In the setting of the dogmatism paradox, the subject is assumed to know that p, hence having a true belief that p; to insist that she should nonetheless keep an open mind with respect to p would be, to use Smart's felicitous expression in a different context (1956: 349), an instance of superstitious rule-worship. Here is an analogy (which might be isomorphic to the case of Danielle and her seat belt of the previous section). The goal of the security check in an airport, let us assume, is to prevent harm to the passengers, the crew, and the aircraft of each departing flight. A popular strategy to achieve this goal is to have the passengers screened by X-ray machines or some such devices. Now if, as a matter of fact, passenger B.J. Ortcutt carries no weapons or explosive material, then, as a matter of fact, it is all right not to subject him to the screening. Moreover, if the security guard knows that Ortcutt carries nothing harmful, then the guard knows that it is all right to waive the security check for him. Admittedly, it does not happen very often that the security guard knows that Ortcutt is clean without actually screening him; but this does not affect the moral of the story: (knowledge of) the proposition that Ortcutt carries nothing harmful, implies (knowledge of) the proposition that there is no need to screen Ortcutt. To deny this is either to say that there are important things other than the immunity of this particular flight to terrorist attacks, or to attach some intrinsic importance to adhering to a policy. Of course one may think of undesirable consequences of dogmatism, despite the truth of what one is dogmatic about: perhaps dogmatism makes us less amiable, less tolerant to others' tastes; perhaps it propels the society towards a less open one-and these may be considered bad for reasons other than missing the truth of the proposition with respect to which one is dogmatic.18 These might 16 Thus here is how Lewis concludes his description of the paradox (1996: 564): "Whenever we know [...] we should not heed any evidence tending to suggest that we are wrong. But this is absurd", period. The one exception I know is Unger (1975), for an evaluation of whose argument against dogmatism I refer to Section 2 of Douven and Olders (2008). Ideas similar to some of what I express in this paragraph are discussed by Douven and Olders, at pages 245-248, where they also discuss some possible advantages of being dogmatic with respect to what one knows. 17 Note, however, that the implausibility of dogmatism as an all-purpose strategy for reducing the number of false beliefs is not known a priori and is contingent upon our specific cognitive powers. Thus imagine a species whose cognitive powers work in a way that they always form a true belief about an issue when they look at it for the very first time. Then, at least insofar as their most important goal is to avoid losing true beliefs, it is not unwise for the members of this species to close their minds with respect to every issue immediately after forming a belief about it. Again, they themselves might be unaware of this fact. 18 One such reason is offered by Veber (2004: 567 f). Concerning a principle he formulates as "For any subject S: if a piece of evidence is known by S to be misleading then S is in a position to disregard it", which is basically the conclusion of Kripke's (i)-(vi), Veber's worry is that adopting it will put us at risk of misapplying it to the evidence we mistakenly think of as misleading. 9 give us good reasons for erring on the side of caution and avoid dogmatism in all cases. But, insofar as we are dealing with issues epistemological (and remember that the dogmatism paradox is an epistemic paradox), such worries are irrelevant. This, then, is my solution to-or, rather, dissolution of-the dogmatism paradox as originally presented by Kripke. Before proceeding to the final section where I deal with another version of the paradox, let me say a few words about the rôle played by knowledge in the paradox and in my analysis of it. In previous pages I argued that there is nothing wrong with the conclusion of Kripke's (i)-(vi) argument. Now it can hardly escape attention that my solution to the objective version of the paradox actually produces a stronger form of the (i)- (vi) argument, namely: If p is true and A believes that p, then A shouldobjective resolve not to be influenced by any evidence against p. Therefore, if what I have said so far is correct, one can equally soundly get the conclusion that A should be dogmatic with respect to p, in an objective sense of 'should', even if premise (iii) is weakened to 'p is true and A believes that p'. Moreover, premise (i) is idle. I think this result is welcome. For the objective version of the paradox, what we need is that the subject truly believes that p; it then follows that she should be dogmatic with respect to p. Knowledge steps in only when we look for the conclusion that the subject shouldsubjective be dogmatic with respect to p. Unlike the objective reading, for the subjective reading I am aware of no way of running the paradoxical argument without using the original forms of (i) and (iii). 5. Can the paradox make a "knowledgy" comeback? Suppose Zahra believes that Noam Chomsky is a linguist. This is a belief with true content. What would go wrong if Zahra decides not to be influenced by any counterevidence? Nothing, I have argued, if the only relevant issue for her is to avoid losing her true belief or gaining a false one. Next, suppose Zahra knows that Chomsky is a linguist. What would be wrong with Zahra's dogmatic attitude in this case? If we are not to appeal (rather dogmatically!) to the doctrine that dogmatism is irrational, we might offer the following reason for the inappropriateness of dogmatism: if Zahra encounters a piece of evidence against her belief that Chomsky is a linguist and ignores it, she may lose her knowledge that Chomsky is a linguist. But why should she care about that? Knowledge may or may not be more valuable than mere true belief, and a subject for whom the only relevant issue is to avoid losing her true belief may or may not be rationally less praiseworthy than she for whom the only relevant issue is to avoid losing her knowledge. In this paper, however, we need not decide the celebrated Meno question concerning the value of knowledge. In the (Veber's actual wording is more pessimistic: he says, at page 567, that adopting the principle "will result in our disregarding evidence which we merely think we know.") I admit that there risk Veber is worried about is a real one. However, note that in the case of the dogmatism paradox, it is assumed that any evidence against p is in fact misleading and that the subject in fact knows this. (Cf. Kripke, 48: "Moreover, one might distinguish between first and third person formulations of the problem, and in the latter case, whether it is a subject who really knows or merely thinks he or she knows. Here I am discussing a subject who genuinely knows that p".) Also remember that for the sake of simplicity, I have assumed that we are dealing with a single proposition (see my footnote 6 and the accompanying text). 10 original presentation of the paradox, Kripke-who is not evaluating what the subject wants-does not tell us about the subject's fear of losing knowledge; rather, the subject is assumed to wish, above all else, to avoid gaining a false belief or losing a true one (44). Nevertheless, perhaps Kripke could have instead formulated his argument for a subject who wishes, above all else, to avoid losing knowledge? In fact, in an appendix to the original paper, Kripke commentlessly switches from the true-belief talk to the knowledge talk (49n28, my italics): I am assuming that we are dealing with a subject who wishes to avoid losing knowledge. Sometimes there are people who "don't want to know" or do wish to lose knowledge that they have, sometimes for arguably good reasons. They are not in question here.19 Thus one might think that there is a modification of the (i)-(vi) argument for a subject who wishes, above all else, to avoid losing knowledge. (More on this below.) Now if we presume the following epistemological thesis: (!) If A is dogmatic with respect to p then A does not know that p.,20 it may appear that we get a genuine paradox: we seem to have a sound argument whose conclusion says that the subject should be dogmatic with respect to p in order not to lose her knowledge that p; but, according to our epistemological presumption, knowledge cannot coexist with dogmatism. My solution to the original paradox would not be applicable in this case, for the new argument has no recourse to the irrationality of dogmatism to make things look paradoxical. A closer look, however, will show that changing the focus from true belief to knowledge will lead to no unexplainable weirdness. In what follows, I will stay neutral with regard to (!); my goal is to show that even if we take the dogmatism-excludes-knowledge thesis for granted, no paradox will emerge. We might think of keeping the main body of the (i)-(vi) argument as in the original, with two changes. First, we include the epistemological thesis (!) as a premise. Second, instead of substituting C of (v) with our familiar gaining a false belief or losing a true one (call that old substitute c), we now take C to be losing knowledge (call this new substitute c+). In order to get the dogmatism-prescribing conclusion (vi), let us look at (ii) p entails the following hypothetical: any evidence against p is 19 Also on page 49, italics mine: "Just because the subject wishes to avoid a loss of knowledge such as Harman describes, so for that reason she or he makes the resolution." Kripke does not justify, or even flag, his shift from true belief to knowledge. 20 To a bona fide internalist ear, it may sound like a category mistake to say that dogmatism destroys (or cannot coexist with) knowledge: according to my definition (§ 2), for A to be dogmatic with respect to p is for her to have made a certain resolution; but it would be weird to say that a prior resolution kills knowledge. If one has such a worry about the wording of (!), one may read it as saying that she who is dogmatic with respect to p may lose her knowledge that p (given that she had such a knowledge in the first place) if she encounters a piece of evidence against p and, acting in accordance with her resolution, she does not properly examine the counterevidence. This seems to be close to what Lewis (1996) has in mind about the effect of dogmatism on knowledge. (For Kripke's brief comment on Lewis, see the very last footnote of his Appendix 3.) 11 misleading (where misleading is to mean leads to a false conclusion). Could leading to a false conclusion operate against A's wish to avoid c+? Yes, but only if it can deprive A of her knowledge that p. That could happen in the following manner: the misleadingness of a piece of evidence against p means that it leads to the specific false belief that not-p, and it is not implausible to assume that by the time A starts to believe that not-p, our reflective subject would have lost her belief that p and would have thereby lost her knowledge that p.21 So, concerning the action t1: accepting evidence against p (which is Kripke's substitute for T of (v); see his page 44), it follows from (v) that A should resolve not to take it. Hence (vi) A should resolve not to be influenced by any evidence against p. So far, so good (for the purpose of obtaining a paradox). Note that despite the fact that we now have a new C, in the new argument we get the dogmatic advice (vi) in the exact same way we got it in the original argument wherein A had no special concern about losing knowledge as such. This insensitivity to the change of C may cause a feeling of uneasiness; but let us move on and see if we can get anything paradoxical. Consider the following action: t2: resolving not to be influenced by any evidence against p., which is what the subject is now supposed to do. It follows from (!) that taking t2 leads to losing knowledge. Therefore, by (v), A should resolve not to take t2.22 So we have (vii) A should resolve not to resolve not to be influenced by any evidence against p. 21 Kripke explicitly names the false belief which results from misleading counterevidence: "If p is true [...] any evidence against it is misleading, that is, leads to the false conclusion that not-p" (43). The process of losing knowledge might be more complex than what is suggested in the text. Let p be the proposition that London in pretty. Suppose p is in fact true, and suppose A knows that p. What if A goes through something similar to what Pierre experiences in Kripke's puzzle about belief (1979)? In such a case, it is not crystal clear that A would necessarily lose her belief that p; losing her knowledge would then perhaps seem to require a loss of justification. But let us ignore such cases for the sake of simplicity. (The problem is more acute here than in the case of mere true belief in the original paradox, for there we have a disjunctive C: gaining a false belief or losing a true one; but, as there is no obvious disjunctive candidate for C in the knowledge case, we have to stick to losing knowledge.) 22 We may note that (v) requires the subject's knowledge that taking an action of type T leads to C, so that here the subject needs to know that the epistemological thesis holds. For the sake of discussion, we have taken (!) for granted; however, the epistemological thesis does not sound as a conceptual truth, like the way (ii) does. But let us not bother about this-we may assume that our subject is an epistemologist who knows (!). 12 Now it may appear that in (vi) and (vii) we have, in one and the same sense of 'should', a pair of the form Should (X) and Should (not-X), which is a truly undesirable pair to get, a pragmatic contradiction. However, we do not have that pair. What we have is this: A should X and A should resolve not to X. Odd and unusual as it may be to assert both A should X and A should resolve not to X, reaching at such a pair is not getting struck by a contradiction, not even by a pragmatic one. This is perhaps clearer in the case of the objective reading of 'should'-arguably, such a pair obtains in the biblical story of Akedah: Abraham should decide to kill Isaac, but he should not kill him. I think one can also imagine a situation wherein both components of the pair obtain with a subjective understanding of 'should', and this might be of some intrinsic philosophical interest. Yet, instead of arguing for that, perhaps it is more instructive to conclude with a comment on the very choice of c+ as the consequence the subject wishes above all else to avoid. It sounds unnatural, to a philosophically trained ear at least, to talk about the subject's fear of losing her knowledge simpliciter-one loses a particular piece of knowledge via losing either the belief itself or the justification for it.23 In the context of the dogmatism paradox, we may safely assume that the subject does not forget about p,24 so that what is really at issue is losing her justification for p. In fact, this is the way (!) works: to return to the case of Zahra, we may imagine that she is superdogmatic with respect to the proposition that Chomsky is a linguist, in the sense that she is dogmatic with respect to it and she keeps ritually telling herself that Chomsky is a linguist, so that she will not lose the belief. Hence if her knowledge is going to be destroyed because of her dogmatism, that would be by virtue of the effect of dogmatism on justification. So let us assume that A wishes, above all else, to avoid losing justification for her belief that p, so that we should now substitute C of (v) by losing the justification for p (call this substitute cj+). Premise (!) implies that the subject should avoid dogmatism, a conclusion which hardly surprises anyone. To get a paradox, we need something which tells us that the subject should be dogmatic with respect to p. However, now that we have replaced c+ by cj+, premise (ii) does not do anything, and we should look for something which is of some consequence to losing-knowledge-via-losing-justification. And it is hard to think of anything.25 I think it is not implausible to quine the possibility of a knowledge version of the paradoxical argument which is basically like the one given by Kripke. 23 Here I am setting aside probable consequences of a minority view concerning the conceptual or metaphysical priority of knowledge over belief and justification. It is fair to say that Kripke (or at least Kripke of the 1970s) does not subscribe to the theory of knowledge developed by Williamson (2000). 24 Cf. Kripke's discussion of the surprise exam paradox in the first part of the paper under consideration, where he assumes that A's memory is "good enough not to forget any significant detail" (35). 25 Note, by the way, that in the original presentation of the argument Kripke made it explicit that his (ii) makes no reference to knowledge (43). I think this confirms the conjecture that what he had in mind in 1972 was really c, despite his later (in Appendix 3) saying that it was c+. 13 References. Baumann, Peter (2013). "Knowledge and dogmatism", The Philosophical Quarterly, 63: 1-19 Douven, Igor, and Diederik Olders (2008). "Unger's argument for skepticism revisited", Theoria, 74: 239-250. Feldman, Richard (1988). "Subjective and objective justification in ethics and epistemology", The Monist, 71: 405-419. Harman, Gilbert (1973). Thought, Princeton University Press. Hawthorne, John (2004). Knowledge and Lotteries. Oxford University Press. Kripke, Saul A. (1979). "A puzzle about belief", reprinted in Kripke, Philosophical Troubles: Collected Papers, Volume I, Oxford University Press, 2011, pp. 125-161. Kripke, Saul A. (1980). Naming and Necessity, Harvard University Press. Kripke, Saul A. (2011). "On two paradoxes of knowledge", in Kripke, Philosophical Troubles: Collected Papers, Volume I, Oxford University Press, pp. 2751. Lasonen-Aarnio, Maria (2013). "The dogmatism puzzle", Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 92: 1-16. Lewis, David (1996). "Elusive knowledge", Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74: 549-567. Mill, John Stewart (1858). On Liberty. (Citation from Penn State's Electronic Classics Series, available at www2.hn.psu.edu/faculty/jmanis/jsmill/liberty.pdf.) Nozick, Robert (1981). Philosophical Explanations, Harvard University Press. Sharon, Assaf, and Levi Spectre (2010). "Dogmatism repuzzled", Philosophical Studies, 148: 307-321. Smart, J.J.C. (1956). "Extreme and restricted utilitarianism", The Philosophical Quarterly, 6: 344-354. Sorell, Tom (1981). "Harman's paradox", Mind 90: 557-575. Sorensen, Roy A. (1988). "Dogmatism, junk knowledge, and conditionals", The Philosophical Quarterly 38: 433-454. 14 Unger, Peter (1974). "An argument for skepticism", reprinted in Ernest Sosa and Jaegwon Kim, eds., Epistemology: An Anthology, Blackwell, 2000, pp. 42-52. Veber, Michael (2004). "What do you do with misleading evidence?", The Philosophical Quarterly, 54: 557-569. Williamson, Timothy (2000). Knowledge and its Limits. Oxford University Press.

JNS 48.1_04_Sinhababu.indd Page 54 04/01/17 3:27 PM JNS 48.1_04_Sinhababu.indd Page 55 04/01/17 3:27 PM JOURNAL OF NIETZSCHE STUDIES, Vol. 48, No. 1, 2017 Copyright © 2017 The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA Nietzschean Pragmatism Neil SiNhababu Abstract: Nietzschean pragmatism is the view that one should believe whatever best promotes life, even things that are untrue because they fail to correspond to reality. Nietzsche expresses this view in early sections of Beyond Good and Evil. While he rejects all objective value including that of truth, his view that passions can give their objects subjective value suggests valuing beliefs that promote life. The second essay of the Untimely Meditations applies Nietzschean pragmatism to the study of history. Keywords: pragmatism, truth, value, belief, objectivity, subjectivity, James Nietzsche holds that one should believe what best promotes life, and he also accepts the correspondence theory of truth. I'll call this conjunction of views Nietzschean pragmatism. This article provides textual evidence for attributing this pragmatist position to Nietzsche and explains how his broader metaethical views led him to it. The following section introduces Nietzschean pragmatism, discussing how Nietzsche expresses it in BGE, and distinguishing it from William James's pragmatism about truth. The second section explains how Nietzsche's skepticism about values that can't be grounded in individual passion attracted him to this kind of pragmatism. The third section explores an early application of Nietzschean pragmatism to history in the second essay of UM. I conclude by considering how Nietzsche developed his pragmatism. Nietzschean Pragmatism in Beyond Good and Evil Nietzschean pragmatism combines the view that one should believe what best promotes life with the correspondence theory of truth. BGE 1 and 4 are among Nietzsche's clearest expressions of such a view, and I'll discuss Nietzschean Pragmatism | 55 JNS 48.1_04_Sinhababu.indd Page 54 04/01/17 3:27 PM JNS 48.1_04_Sinhababu.indd Page 55 04/01/17 3:27 PM each of them at length here. I'll also contrast Nietzschean pragmatism with William James's pragmatism about truth, which doesn't raise the questions Nietzsche discusses in BGE 1 or allow for the striking claims Nietzsche makes in BGE 4. BGE 1 raises the question that Nietzschean pragmatism will answer. Nietzsche mentions the "will to truth" in the first sentence while inquiring about how this will figures in our psychology. Then Nietzsche describes how our "long halt at the question about the cause of this will" was followed by "a complete stop before a still more basic question. We asked about the value of this will. Suppose we want truth: why not rather untruth? and uncertainty? even ignorance?" This is how "the problem of the value of truth came before us."1 Nietzsche announces his answer and solution in BGE 4, which begins: "The falseness of a judgment is for us not necessarily an objection to a judgment; in this respect our new language may sound strangest. The question is to what extent it is life-promoting, life-preserving, species-preserving, perhaps even species-cultivating." Here the questions whether a judgment is true and whether it's useful with regard to promoting life and cultivating the species are sharply distinguished. Nietzsche emphasizes these practical goals over truth. In some situations, making true judgments might be the best way to achieve practical goals-in particular, when we're trying to figure out which course of action will best promote life or cultivate the species. When true judgments are important for realizing these practical values, the falseness of a judgment will give us reason to reject it. But as Nietzsche notes at the beginning, truth is not always aligned with practical value in such a way. He then provides examples of judgments that he takes to be valuable for life but false, writing that "we are fundamentally inclined to claim that the falsest judgments (which include the synthetic judgments a priori) are the most indispensable for us; that without accepting the fictions of logic, without measuring reality against the purely invented world of the unconditional and self-identical, without a constant falsification of the world by means of numbers, man could not live-that renouncing false judgments would mean renouncing life and a denial of life." Here he treats some of the most fundamental human judgments as life-promoting but false. While philosophers including Plato contemplate promoting their political goals by convincing people of "noble lies," these beliefs aren't as 56 | J o u r N a l o f N i e t z S c h e S t u d i e S JNS 48.1_04_Sinhababu.indd Page 56 04/01/17 3:27 PM JNS 48.1_04_Sinhababu.indd Page 57 04/01/17 3:27 PM fundamental to human thought as logic, identity, and number. In rejecting the truth of judgments invoking these concepts as well as the other judgments that Immanuel Kant lists as synthetic a priori (which include causal judgments), Nietzsche treats false belief as essential for human life. While one might say to Plato that the noble lies aren't actually needed, much of our activity in the simplest parts of everyday life would be impossible if everyone joined Nietzsche in rejecting logic, identity, and number. As judgments involving number, logic, and identity are necessary for achieving nearly any goal we might have, believing only the true would indeed mean renouncing life. Why these beliefs end up being so useful despite being false would be an interesting question to ask Nietzsche. Doesn't their utility result from how they support accurate predictions of observed phenomena? And then, why isn't this predictive accuracy evidence that they correspond to a reality that causes the observations we make? Such arguments are often made by scientific realists against their instrumentalist opponents.2 But as my focus is primarily interpretive, I'll set such issues aside here. Nietzsche ends the section by recognizing how radical his view is: "To recognize untruth as a condition of life-that certainly means resisting accustomed value feelings in a dangerous way; and a philosophy that risks this would by that token alone place itself beyond good and evil" (BGE 4). These passages from BGE express a distinctively pragmatic conception of epistemic value on which the best beliefs to hold will be false ones, if true beliefs don't help as much in achieving certain practical goals. But BGE 1 and 4 show that Nietzsche doesn't accept a pragmatist theory of truth like that of the American pragmatist William James, who writes: "'The true,' to put it very briefly, is only the expedient in the way of our thinking, just as 'the right' is only the expedient in the way of our behaving. Expedient in almost any fashion; and expedient in the long run and on the whole, of course."3 Nietzsche's pragmatism is about what one ought to believe, while James's pragmatism is about truth itself. If Nietzsche accepted James's pragmatist theory of truth, he wouldn't be able to tell us that false beliefs were useful for life. The usefulness of these beliefs would, on James's pragmatist theory of truth, make them true. Since Nietzsche is concerned to tell us that the most useful beliefs can be false ones, he cannot have this sort of pragmatist theory of truth. Maudemarie Clark also notes this point in arguing against Arthur Danto's pragmatic interpretation: "Nietzsche, in Nietzschean Pragmatism | 57 JNS 48.1_04_Sinhababu.indd Page 56 04/01/17 3:27 PM JNS 48.1_04_Sinhababu.indd Page 57 04/01/17 3:27 PM fact, insisted repeatedly that knowledge of the truth may conflict with the satisfaction of practical interests."4 To put the point another way, Nietzsche presents the question of why truth has value in BGE 1 as a serious and difficult one that brings us to a "complete stop." If he accepted a pragmatic theory of truth as James did, the question would be easy to answer. Since James identifies the true with the useful, truth would then acquire whatever value useful things have. Combining pragmatism about epistemic value with pragmatism about truth provides a straightforward defense of the value of truth. But Nietzsche doesn't offer such a straightforward defense, and he doesn't think the question of why truth has value is so easily answered. This shows that Nietzsche cannot be combining his pragmatism about epistemic value with pragmatism about truth. I follow Clark in attributing a correspondence theory of truth to Nietzsche. This is the traditional view of truth: true beliefs are those that correspond with reality. My purpose here is just to contrast the correspondence theory with the pragmatist theory of truth, so I won't explore the finer details of what variety of correspondence theory Nietzsche held. Nietzsche's view may also be indeterminate between the correspondence theory and deflationary views that retain many features of the correspondence theory. I won't draw these distinctions, as the contrast between correspondence-like views and pragmatism is the important one for our purposes. The chart below presents the results of combining correspondence and pragmatist theories of truth with truth-oriented and pragmatic theories of epistemic value: table. 1 | <caption to come> Truth as epistemic value Pragmatism about epistemic value Correspondence theory of truth Standard view: believe the true, whether or not it's useful Nietzschean pragmatism: believe the useful, whether or not it's true Pragmatist theory of truth James's pragmatism (1): believe the true, which is the useful James's pragmatism (2): believe the useful, which is the true 58 | J o u r N a l o f N i e t z S c h e S t u d i e S JNS 48.1_04_Sinhababu.indd Page 58 04/01/17 3:27 PM JNS 48.1_04_Sinhababu.indd Page 59 04/01/17 3:27 PM "Useful" here refers to any kind of practical value, not including the intrinsic value that truth is taken to have on standard nonpragmatist views. Nietzsche and James had very different theories of value, and I use "useful" broadly to span these differences. I use "epistemic" here and throughout this article to mean "regarding belief." I do not use it to imply any strong or direct connection to truth, as some users of the term do. So as I use the terms, being a pragmatist about epistemic value is consistent with rejecting the value of truth. As the chart indicates, the correspondence theory of truth and pragmatism about epistemic value are the only combination where we might be right to believe useful things that fail to be true. Nietzsche tells us to do this in BGE 4, giving us strong evidence that this is Nietzsche's view. On James's pragmatist theory of truth, the true and the useful merge, eliminating this possibility. Either we should believe the true, which James identifies with the useful; or we should believe the useful, which James identifies with the true. I don't know which of these very similar versions of pragmatism belong to James. They tell us to believe the same things in all possible situations, differing only hyperintensionally with regard to the content and explanatory structure of epistemic normativity. But since the questions of BGE 1 and the bold statement of BGE 4 make sense only if Nietzsche accepted both the correspondence theory of truth and pragmatism about epistemic value, this combination deserves to be called "Nietzschean pragmatism." Whether or not Nietzschean pragmatism is the right view about epistemic norms, it intuitively seems like a conceptually coherent position. There is no incoherence or implicit contradiction in claiming that we should believe the useful rather than the true. The conceptual coherence of Nietzschean pragmatism provides an objection to views of belief like those of Nishi Shah and David Velleman. They think it is part of the concept of belief that the norm of truth applies to it.5 Metaethical Motivations for Pragmatism about epistemic Value Nietzsche's metaethical concerns are part of what makes pragmatism about epistemic value so appealing to him. Since he doesn't believe in objective value, he can't regard truth as objectively valuable. But since he takes passions to give their objects subjective value, he values beliefs that have the right kinds of relations to passions and their objects. Nietzschean Pragmatism | 59 JNS 48.1_04_Sinhababu.indd Page 58 04/01/17 3:27 PM JNS 48.1_04_Sinhababu.indd Page 59 04/01/17 3:27 PM A great deal of textual evidence suggests interpreting Nietzsche as an error theorist about moral value, which is supposed to be objective. Clear statements of error theory appear as early as D, where he asserts that "it is errors which, as the basis of all moral judgment, impel men to their moral actions [. . .]. I deny morality as I deny alchemy: but I do not deny that there have been alchemists who believed in these premises and acted in accordance with them-I also deny immorality: not that countless people feel themselves to be immoral, but that there is any true reason so to feel" (D 103). He expresses a very similar view seven years later in TI, this time likening morality to religion instead of alchemy: "There are altogether no moral facts. Moral judgments agree with religious ones in believing in realities which are no realities" (TI "Improvers" 1). Many other passages state error theory about morality in similarly clear and forceful terms.6 Nietzsche thinks we lack evidence that objective moral facts exist, just as we lack evidence that God exists. The same epistemological and metaphysical principles that lead to atheism will also lead to error theory about morality. He writes, "When one gives up the Christian faith, one pulls the right to Christian morality out from under one's feet. This morality is by no means self-evident: this point has to be exhibited again and again, despite the English flatheads" (TI "Skirmishes" 5). Even fifteen years before G. E. Moore, he explains their error: "the English actually believe that they know 'intuitively' what is good and evil" (TI "Skirmishes" 5). Nietzsche thinks that objective moral facts would have to be additional facts over and above those that compose the natural world, and takes us to have no good evidence for facts of this kind. He rejects intuition as way of achieving this moral knowledge, just as he rejects revelation as a way of knowing that God exists. If we cannot rely on intuition or anything else for evidence of objective moral facts, it's hard to see how we could acquire evidence that truth has objective value. Even if we take truth to have a nonmoral kind of objective value, to avoid a direct contradiction with the rejection of objective moral value, we will be left with no good story about how we know that truth has this value. As Nietzsche sees it, the same principles that force us to atheism and to error theory about morality also force us to reject the objective value of truth. This is how the "problem of the value of truth" in BGE 1 comes before us. While Nietzsche rejects objective value, he accepts that our passions can give things value of a subjective and nonmoral kind.7 Values of taste are often understood this way. If Ariadne desires wine but not beer, wine 60 | J o u r N a l o f N i e t z S c h e S t u d i e S JNS 48.1_04_Sinhababu.indd Page 60 04/01/17 3:27 PM JNS 48.1_04_Sinhababu.indd Page 61 04/01/17 3:27 PM is good for Ariadne but beer is not. Subjective value is always indexed to some valuer whose passion makes its object valuable in this way. Moral value is not supposed to be valuable merely for a particular person but not for others, so this can't be a moral kind of value. Aesthetic value is plausibly regarded as subjective, however. If Mengxi has passions only for traditional Chinese music and Carrie has passions only for 1990s riot grrrl bands, the former will have value for Mengxi and the latter will have value for Carrie. But the favorite music of each won't have value for the other. The subjectivist view that having value just is being the object of passion avoids the epistemological and metaphysical problems with objective value. Since we know that passions and some of their objects exist, we know that some things have value. The passions and their objects are sufficient for constituting the existence of the value. And since there aren't deep metaphysical problems with the existence of passions or the existence of most of their objects, subjective value doesn't in general pose deep metaphysical problems. The things that constitute subjective value fit nicely into a naturalistic picture of reality. Clear textual evidence suggesting that Nietzsche's own values are subjective appears in Z. In "On the Spirit of Gravity," he writes, "He, however, has discovered himself who says, 'this is my good and evil'; with that he has reduced to silence the mole and dwarf who say, 'Good for all, evil for all.'" He concludes the section by saying, "'This is my way; where is yours?'-thus I answered those who asked me 'the way.' For the way-that does not exist." Here Zarathustra rejects objective value in favor of subjective value indexed to individuals as the subjectivist formula suggests. A particularly beautiful statement of subjectivism appears in "On Enjoying and Suffering the Passions," where Zarathustra tells us how to talk about what we love: If you must speak of her, then do not be ashamed to stammer of her. Then speak and stammer: "This is my good; this I love; it pleases me wholly; thus alone do I want the good. I do not want it as divine law; I do not want it as human statute and need: it shall not be a signpost for me to overearths and paradises. It is an earthly virtue that I love: there is little prudence in it, and least of all the reason of all men. But this bird built its nest within me, therefore I love and caress it; now it dwells with me, sitting on its golden eggs." Thus you shall stammer and praise your virtue. Nietzschean Pragmatism | 61 JNS 48.1_04_Sinhababu.indd Page 60 04/01/17 3:27 PM JNS 48.1_04_Sinhababu.indd Page 61 04/01/17 3:27 PM Here Zarathustra specifically rejects several metaethical conceptions of value as objective or grounded outside individual passion-for example, as "divine law" or issuing from "the reason of all men." He instead sees the good as grounded in "love." Lanier Anderson has asked why Zarathustra tells us to "stammer" about it; I think Nietzsche is acknowledging that speech about such value will not live up to the standards of discourse that states objective facts. So we will fall short of the standard requirements for good discourse, much as a stammerer does. But since all value is subjective, and since it is worth violating these requirements to talk about value, we shouldn't be ashamed. Zarathustra nicely describes how passion constructs subjective value in "On the Thousand and One Goals": "The fire of love glows in the names of all the virtues, and the fire of wrath. Zarathustra saw many lands and many peoples. No greater power did Zarathustra find on earth than the works of the lovers: 'good' and 'evil' are their names." This kind of good and evil, rooted in the transitory passions of human beings, is the only kind that Nietzsche believes in. As Zarathustra says concisely in "On SelfOvercoming": "good and evil that are not transitory, do not exist." This subjectivist picture makes it easy for beliefs to have instrumental value as means to achieving the objects of our passions. True beliefs are especially likely to have this value, as false beliefs often lead to failure in achieving the objects of passion. But if false belief in numbers or causal necessity is useful in delivering the objects of passion (as BGE 4 suggests), they may have instrumental value as well. If some beliefs play a role in our psychological economy that enables us to form and maintain particular passions, or to act in passionate ways that a fully developed Nietzschean evaluative theory might endorse, they might be instrumental in constituting value and not just in realizing it. Pragmatism about epistemic value provides an excellent account of how beliefs can be instrumentally valuable. In summarizing this kind of pragmatism above, I characterized it as telling us to "believe the useful." A belief that helps us achieve the objects of our passions is useful in a very obvious kind of way. If our evaluative theory tells us that having strong passions and acting on them is itself valuable, beliefs that help us cultivate our passions and act on them will be useful too. There may be even more ways in which truth attains instrumental value by allowing passions to operate in the best way they can. This is how Nietzsche's subjectivism naturally leads him to pragmatism about epistemic value. 62 | J o u r N a l o f N i e t z S c h e S t u d i e S JNS 48.1_04_Sinhababu.indd Page 62 04/01/17 3:27 PM JNS 48.1_04_Sinhababu.indd Page 63 04/01/17 3:27 PM For those who have sufficiently strong passions for truth, truth itself could have noninstrumental value. The value would still be subjective since it is grounded in individual passion, but it would be noninstrumental, as some of the value of pleasure and survival are. Since we have passions for pleasure and for survival themselves, regardless of what they might bring about, these things have value for us as ends and not merely as means. (They may also have value as means-survival certainly does.) A passion simply for knowing the truth would give truth similar value. Subjectivism also allows false beliefs to have noninstrumental value for those whose passions favor them. A passion for having a particular kind of belief whether or not it's true would give that belief value regardless of its truth. And a passion for false belief would give false belief the same kind of intrinsic subjective value that true belief has to lovers of truth. Since Nietzsche phrases his pragmatism in terms of the value of various beliefs for life, while subjectivism has our passions creating value, the relationship between life and passion should be clarified. In "Nietzsche on Life's Ends," John Richardson explores what it means for something to be valuable for life, interpreting him as holding that "values arise only by and in (biological) life's end-directedness and the valuing this involves. They are the intentional objects of the valuing life engages in."8 To be more precise about how this end-directedness is realized, Richardson writes that Nietzsche "thinks that an 'animal' kind of valuing operates in us all the time, in the 'part' of us that we call our body. I'll refer to this lower level of valuing in us as body values; these are the ends in us that we share with other living things. Nietzsche speaks of this valuing whenever he speaks of our drives."9 Passion seems to be the psychological location of the animal valuing that constitutes life's ends on Richardson's view. Passions are encoded in our neurobiological structures. Many passions are instinctual, difficult for cultural influences to eliminate, and shared with other living things. In ordinary folk-psychological discourse, we use "passion," "drive," and "desire" more or less interchangeably. These terms refer to mental states that constitute their objects as valuable on desire-satisfaction views of value, and which drive all human motivation on the Humean theory of motivation. Identifying passions with body values and the objects of passion with the valued things is the position that this leads to, and which I attribute to him. Here I will not be able to address the challenging interpretive question of which developments of passion Nietzsche sees as constituting the advancement and decline of life. While Nietzsche's remarks on this issue Nietzschean Pragmatism | 63 JNS 48.1_04_Sinhababu.indd Page 62 04/01/17 3:27 PM JNS 48.1_04_Sinhababu.indd Page 63 04/01/17 3:27 PM give us some clear examples of what he sees as advancement and decline (for example, that he regards the passionate creative activity of artists as an expression of advancing life), he doesn't present a clear general theory in any of his published works, and the question of what precise theory might most accurately fit the shape of his thoughts is too difficult for me to explore here.10 The fairly general claim that I'll assume for the rest of the article is that beliefs have their value because of their relation to passion, such that furthering the ability of artists to express their creative passions will give beliefs value. While true beliefs can have value in this way, false beliefs can as well. This thought is at the heart of Nietzschean pragmatism. the Second Untimely Meditation: Nietzschean Pragmatism applied to history Now I'll turn to an early expression of Nietzschean pragmatism applied to the study of history. As Nietzsche recognizes, a culture's understanding of history both consists in its beliefs about the past and affects its present character. So Nietzsche's discussion of historiography in UM provides a nice example of how he evaluates epistemic phenomena that have practical significance. True to Nietzschean pragmatism, he evaluates various methods of studying history by examining their effects to life, praising them insofar as they promote life, and faulting them insofar as they fail to do so. Nietzsche's discussion of historiography begins with a quotation from Goethe, who, as Brian Leiter notes,11 is the German whom he most admired: "In any case, I hate everything that merely instructs me without augmenting or directly invigorating my activity." Nietzsche's commentary on the quotation displays his pragmatic evaluative commitments: For its intention is to show why instruction without invigoration, why knowledge not attended by action, why history as a costly superfluity and luxury, must, to use Goethe's word, be seriously hated by us-hated because we still lack even the things we need and the superfluous is the enemy of the necessary. We need history, certainly, but we need it for reasons different from those for which the idler in the garden of knowledge needs it, even though he may look nobly down on our rough and charmless needs and 64 | J o u r N a l o f N i e t z S c h e S t u d i e S JNS 48.1_04_Sinhababu.indd Page 64 04/01/17 3:27 PM JNS 48.1_04_Sinhababu.indd Page 65 04/01/17 3:27 PM requirements. We need it, that is to say, for the sake of life and action, not so as to turn comfortably away from life and action, let alone for the purpose of extenuating the selfseeking life and the base and cowardly action. We want to serve history only to the extent that history serves life: for it is possible to value the study of history to such a degree that life becomes stunted and degenerate [. . .]. (HL Foreword) Nietzsche recognizes that broad historical understanding isn't intrinsically very important for the promotion of life. It might be instrumentally valuable for guiding life-promoting policy decisions or for providing a new perspective on one's personal life choices, but it also might not have such effects. Nietzsche describes how "a man's historical sense and knowledge can be very limited, his horizon as narrow as that of a dweller in the Alps, all his judgments may involve injustice and he may falsely suppose that all his experiences are original to him-yet in spite of this injustice and error he will nonetheless stand there in superlative health and vigor, a joy to all who see him; while close beside him a man far more just and instructed than he sickens and collapses because the lines of his horizon are always restlessly changing, because he can no longer extricate himself from the delicate net of his judiciousness and truth for a simple act of will and desire" (HL 1). Historical understanding doesn't necessarily serve life, and it can in fact be pursued and exhibited in a way that provides an impediment to life's further development. Sympathizing with Nietzsche's criticism of historical knowledge that doesn't serve life and action is easy when one considers his graduate education in classical philology. Learning many aspects of ancient history can give us a broader perspective on our own lives, and it helps us appreciate the sheer diversity of forms that human nature and society have taken. But it's hard for most of us to see similar value in learning the grammatical intricacies of ancient languages for their own sake as philologists do. While philologists' precise and detailed knowledge of ancient grammar may be instrumentally helpful when they try to draw insight from ancient texts, knowledge of these details is not, in itself, an object of most of our passions. Spending years in a postgraduate program built around pursuing knowledge of this kind without concern for its broader applicability to life may have impressed this fact on Nietzsche, and led him to a distinctively pragmatist view of the study of history. Nietzschean Pragmatism | 65 JNS 48.1_04_Sinhababu.indd Page 64 04/01/17 3:27 PM JNS 48.1_04_Sinhababu.indd Page 65 04/01/17 3:27 PM After making it clear to readers how history might fail to serve life, Nietzsche expresses the purpose of the second essay: "Let us at least learn better how to employ history for the purpose of life!" (HL 1). The monumental, antiquarian, and critical modes of history, which Nietzsche discusses at length in this essay, are introduced and evaluated as ways that history might be employed for the benefit of life. Nietzsche contrasts these modes of historiography with an approach that pursues knowledge for knowledge's sake: "These are the services history is capable of performing for life; every man and every nation requires, in accordance with its goals, energies and needs, a certain kind of knowledge of the past, now in the form of monumental, now of antiquarian, now of critical history: but it does not require it as a host of pure thinkers who only look on at life, of knowledge-thirsty individuals whom knowledge alone will satisfy and to whom the accumulation of knowledge is itself the goal, but always and only for the ends of life and thus also under the domination and supreme direction of these ends" (HL 4). As I'll describe, Nietzsche's evaluation of the various modes of history is fundamentally pragmatic, focusing on their utility for life rather than whether they help us grasp objective historical truth. The monumental mode of history presents us with examples of heroic people doing great deeds. Nietzsche sees it as advancing life by inspiring the person "who fights a great fight, who needs models, teachers, comforters and cannot find them among his contemporaries" (HL 2). He describes how such people might be energized by their predecessors' triumphs over obstacles. In light of how much his philosophy emphasizes great people doing great deeds, the significance of this role for monumentalist history wouldn't have been lost on him. But Nietzsche also recognizes that monumentalist history can be an impediment to doing great deeds in the present. He provides a vivid image of how "inartistic natures" might use monumentalist history against "strong artistic spirits" when "a half-understood monument to some great era of the past is erected as an idol and zealously danced around, as though to say: 'Behold, this is true art: pay no heed to those who are evolving and want something new!'" (HL 2). The antiquarian mode of history helps us better appreciate things in our lives by putting them in the context of a venerated past. Nietzsche writes that "this antiquarian sense of veneration of the past is of the greatest value when it spreads a simple feeling of pleasure and contentment over the modest; rude, even wretched conditions in which a man or a nation lives" (HL 3). But antiquarian history creates disadvantages for life when it traps one 66 | J o u r N a l o f N i e t z S c h e S t u d i e S JNS 48.1_04_Sinhababu.indd Page 66 04/01/17 3:27 PM JNS 48.1_04_Sinhababu.indd Page 67 04/01/17 3:27 PM within the past, making one satisfied with insignificant things only because they're the same things that satisfied one's ancestors. Under these circumstances, new artistic forms and creative developments to which the passions of the living drive them can be denigrated and rejected in comparison to venerated works of the past. Antiquarian history becomes harmful for life when it "paralyses the man of action who, as one who acts, will and must offend some piety or other" (HL 3). Critical history, which "judges and condemns" the past (HL 2), provides an especially illuminating development of Nietzschean pragmatism. Critical history dissolves and destroys historical ideas that no longer serve life, clearing away the excesses of monumentalist and antiquarian history when they obstruct the development of life. It does so by carefully examining and condemning the past. While Nietzsche doesn't go into great detail about how critical history could injure life, he does describe critical history as a "dangerous process, especially so for life itself " (HL 3). Presumably his thought is that monumental history provides inspiration and antiquarian history provides contentment, so critical history might by destroying them leave us unable to find inspiration or contentment in history. In Nietzsche's remarks about how critical history relates to a just appraisal of the past, we get a clear picture of how the judgments of life might tend toward historical truth. If he is to live, man must possess and from time to time employ the strength to break up and dissolve a part of the past: he does this by bringing it before the tribunal, scrupulously examining it and finally condemning it; every past, however, is worthy to be condemned-for that is the nature of human things: human violence and weakness have always played a mighty role in them. It is not justice which here sits in judgment; it is even less mercy which pronounces the verdict: it is life alone, that dark, driving power that insatiably thirsts for itself. Its sentence is always unmerciful, always unjust, because it has never proceeded out of a pure well of knowledge; but in most cases the sentence would be the same even if it were pronounced by justice itself. (HL 3) I take "justice" in this passage to be whatever would have the strength to resist powerful biases and provide an impartial view of history. Nietzsche tells us that critical history doesn't come from such a perspective. Instead, Nietzschean Pragmatism | 67 JNS 48.1_04_Sinhababu.indd Page 66 04/01/17 3:27 PM JNS 48.1_04_Sinhababu.indd Page 67 04/01/17 3:27 PM it comes from the perspective of life. The past is condemned not by forces impartially seeking objective truth, but from new living forces of the present oppressed by excessive veneration of the past. But this allows critical history to be a process that discovers the truth in a large proportion of actual cases. Despite the partiality of critical history, it often pronounces the same sentence as justice would, simply because human violence and weakness are ubiquitous. This passage suggests that there is a place for truth in Nietzschean pragmatist practice. While Nietzschean pragmatists won't value truth for its own sake, their judgments will in most cases coincide with the truth. In many ordinary cases, error is an impediment to achieving passion's ends. The judgments that serve life's purposes often happen to be true. Nietzsche's Path to his Pragmatism Readers may have noticed that I have discussed Nietzsche's works in the reverse of the order in which they were published. I began with the official statements of Nietzschean pragmatism in BGE, published in 1886. Discussing Zarathustra, published between 1883 and 1885, I presented the metaethical problem for objective value that led Nietzsche to this view. Finally, I came to the applications of this view in UM, published in the mid-1870s. Why? The process by which a theory reveals itself to proponents may differ from the process by which the theory is most clearly explained in a journal article. Here I've presented Nietzsche's view by clearly stating it, presenting the theoretical considerations that motivated it, and then demonstrating its application to a question of practical significance. This, I thought, would be the clearest presentation of Nietzsche's view of epistemic value. Nietzsche himself seems to have begun with pragmatist answers to the questions of practical significance, and then after considering metaethical problems with regarding truth as objectively valuable, arrived at a theory of epistemic value that reflected his views on practical questions. In passages like BGE 3, he often describes philosophers as arriving at their theoretical views by beginning from more immediately practical motivations. The way he developed his pragmatism bears out his own metaphilosophical theory. National University of Singapore [email protected] 68 | J o u r N a l o f N i e t z S c h e S t u d i e S JNS 48.1_04_Sinhababu.indd Page 68 04/01/17 3:27 PM JNS 48.1_04_Sinhababu.indd Page 68 04/01/17 3:27 PM Notes 1. Citations to Nietzsche's work refer to the following translations: Beyond Good and Evil, ed. and trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1966); Untimely Meditations, ed. Daniel Breazeale, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Daybreak, ed. Maudemarie Clark and Brian Leiter, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Twilight of the Idols, in the Portable Nietzsche, ed. and trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Penguin, 1954), 463–563. 2. Stathis Psillos, Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks Truth (London: Routledge, 1999). 3. William James, Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975), 106. Similarities between Nietzsche and James were noted by James Lindsay, "A Critical Estimate of Nietzsche's Philosophy," Bibliotheca Sacra 72 (1915): 67–82; and John Warbeke, "Friedrich Nietzsche, Antichrist, Superman, and Pragmatist," Harvard Theological Review 2.3 (1909): 366–85. For discussion, see Jennifer Ratner-Rosenhagen, American Nietzsche (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012). 4. Maudemarie Clark, Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 32. The reference is to Arthur Danto, Nietzsche as Philosopher (New York: Macmillan, 1965). 5. Nishi Shah, "How Truth Governs Belief," Philosophical Review 112.4 (2003): 447–82; Nishi Shah and David Velleman, "Doxastic Deliberation," Philosophical Review 114.4 (2005): 497–534. 6. See, e.g., D 3, 11, 32, and 100; Z III: "Old and New Tablets" 9; BGE 11, 108. 7. Neil Sinhababu, "Zarathustra's Metaethics," Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45.3 (2015): 278–99. 8. John Richardson, "Nietzsche on Life's Ends," in The Oxford Handbook of Nietzsche, ed. John Richardson and Ken Gemes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 756–84, 771. 9. Richardson, "Nietzsche on Life's Ends," 767. 10. See Thomas Hurka, "Nietzsche: Perfectionist," in Nietzsche and Morality, ed. Brian Leiter and Neil Sinhababu (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 9–31. 11. Brian Leiter, "Nietzsche and the Morality Critics," Ethics 107.2 (1997): 250–85.

UNIVERSITY OF READING MORAL RESPONSIBILITY AND SUBVERTING CAUSES A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy by Andy Taylor Department of Philosophy September 2010 Abstract I argue against two of the most influential contemporary theories of moral responsibility: those of Harry Frankfurt and John Martin Fischer. Both propose conditions which are supposed to be sufficient for direct moral responsibility for actions. (By the term ―direct‖ moral responsibility, I mean moral responsibility which is not traced from an earlier action.) Frankfurt proposes a condition of ―identification‖; Fischer, writing with Mark Ravizza, proposes conditions for ―guidance control‖. I argue, using counterexamples, that neither is sufficient for direct moral responsibility. My counterexample cases are based on recent research in psychology which reveals many surprising causes of our actions. Some of this research comes from the field of ―situationist‖ social psychology; some from experiments which reveal the influence of automatic processes in our actions. Broadly, I call such causes ―subverting‖ when the agent would not identify with her action, if she knew all the causes of the action. When an action has subverting causes, the agent is not directly morally responsible for it, even though she may meet the conditions specified by Frankfurt and Fischer. I also criticise the theories of Eddy Nahmias and John Doris, who have both engaged specifically with the threats posed to moral responsibility by situationist research. Against Doris and Nahmias, I argue that their conditions are neither necessary nor sufficient for direct moral responsibility. My final objective is to argue that there are many everyday actions for which we mistakenly hold agents morally responsible. I review evidence that there are many everyday actions which have subverting causes. Many of those are actions for which we currently hold agents morally responsible. But I argue that, in many of those same actions, the agents are not in fact morally responsible – they bear neither direct nor traced moral responsibility. Table of Contents 1. Introduction .............................................................................................................. 6 1.1. Scope and assumptions ..................................................................................... 7 1.1.1. Scope ........................................................................................................ 7 1.1.2. Actions ..................................................................................................... 8 1.1.3. Moral responsibility for actions ............................................................... 8 1.1.4. Determinism and compatibilism ............................................................ 10 1.2. Traced moral responsibility ............................................................................ 10 1.3. Overview of the arguments ............................................................................ 13 2. Frankfurt's identificationist theory ......................................................................... 15 2.1. Frankfurt's theory in detail ............................................................................. 15 2.1.1. Frankfurt's initial account ...................................................................... 16 2.1.2. Frankfurt's intermediate position ........................................................... 18 2.1.3. Frankfurt's final account ........................................................................ 20 2.1.4. Terminological simplifications .............................................................. 21 2.2. Identification and moral responsibility .......................................................... 22 2.3. Criticisms of Frankfurt's account of identification ........................................ 24 2.3.1. Normative competence ........................................................................... 25 2.3.2. The agent's history ................................................................................. 25 2.3.3. Desires which are not truly one's own ................................................... 26 2.3.4. Interim conclusions on Frankfurt's account ........................................... 27 3. Actions with subverting causes .............................................................................. 29 3.1. Definition ....................................................................................................... 29 3.2. Subverting causes – five key cases ................................................................ 30 3.2.1. Example 1: Situational factors and bystander intervention .................... 30 3.2.2. Example 2: Social influence and bystander intervention ....................... 31 3.2.3. Example 3: Influences on social judgements ......................................... 31 3.2.4. Example 4: Contextual priming ............................................................. 32 3.2.5. Example 5: Self-regulation and logical reasoning ................................. 32 3.3. Important features of subverting causes ......................................................... 33 3.3.1. Causes: necessary, proximate and relevant ............................................ 33 3.3.2. Knowledge about the cause .................................................................... 33 3.3.3. Actions, reasons and causes ................................................................... 34 3.4. My ―main argument‖ against Frankfurt ......................................................... 35 3.4.1. Subverting causes and F-acceptance ...................................................... 36 3.4.2. Subverting causes and being truly the agent's own action ..................... 37 3.4.3. Subverting causes and direct moral responsibility ................................. 37 3.5. My positive proposal: the CFA condition ...................................................... 38 3.6. The experimental evidence ............................................................................. 40 3.6.1. Situationist social psychology ................................................................ 41 3.6.2. Influences processed automatically ........................................................ 42 3.7. Objections to my claims about subverting causes .......................................... 44 3.7.1. The claims contradict common sense ..................................................... 44 3.7.2. The evidence is gathered in artificial conditions .................................... 45 3.7.3. The results must reflect character differences in subjects ...................... 46 3.8. Errors in our explanations of actions.............................................................. 47 3.8.1. Errors in explanation and prediction of actions ..................................... 48 3.8.2. Dissonance, confabulation, and rationalisation ...................................... 48 3.8.3. The hidden role of automatic processes ................................................. 50 3.8.4. Our experience of agency ....................................................................... 52 3.8.5. Errors in interpretation and assessment of situations ............................. 53 3.8.6. Conclusions from the experimental evidence ........................................ 55 3.9. Conclusions from this chapter ........................................................................ 56 4. Objections to my conclusions ................................................................................ 57 4.1. Non-subverting situationist causes ................................................................. 57 4.2. Regrettable actions without subverting causes ............................................... 60 4.3. Direct moral responsibility despite subverting causes ................................... 61 4.3.1. The agent is blameworthy for the action ................................................ 63 4.3.2. The agent allowed herself to perform the wrong action ......................... 64 4.3.3. The agent should have tried harder to resist the influence ..................... 65 4.3.4. The agent should have paused for further reflection .............................. 67 4.3.5. There is a flaw in the agent's character or dispositions ......................... 69 4.3.6. The agent would feel responsible despite subverting causes ................. 70 4.4. Conclusions .................................................................................................... 72 5. Doris and Nahmias ................................................................................................. 74 5.1. John Doris ...................................................................................................... 74 5.1.1. Criticisms of Doris's account ................................................................. 78 5.1.2. Doris's conclusions on situational factors and responsibility ................ 84 5.1.3. Summary of my conclusions on Doris's account ................................... 87 5.2. Eddy Nahmias ................................................................................................ 89 5.2.1. Criticisms of Nahmias's account ............................................................ 90 5.3. Conclusions .................................................................................................... 93 6. Fischer and Ravizza ............................................................................................... 94 6.1. Overview of the theory ................................................................................... 94 6.2. ―The Mechanism‖ .......................................................................................... 95 6.3. Ownership ...................................................................................................... 96 6.4. Reasons-responsiveness ................................................................................. 97 6.5. Tracing ........................................................................................................... 99 6.6. Criticisms of the Fischer-Ravizza account ................................................... 100 6.6.1. A problem with definitions .................................................................. 100 6.6.2. The theory relies on spurious intuitions about mechanisms ................ 102 6.6.3. The theory gives an implausible treatment of addictions ..................... 104 6.6.4. The theory gives an implausible treatment of compulsions ................. 106 6.6.5. The sufficient reason to do otherwise may be another compulsion ..... 107 6.6.6. Conclusions from these criticisms ........................................................ 108 6.7. Actions with subverting causes and guidance control ................................. 109 6.7.1. Guidance control in the five key cases ................................................. 110 6.7.2. Subverting causes and direct moral responsibility ............................... 111 6.8. Conclusions from this chapter ...................................................................... 115 7. The prevalence of moral responsibility ................................................................ 117 7.1. Moral responsibility for everyday actions .................................................... 117 7.1.1. There are many actions with subverting causes ................................... 118 7.1.2. There are many actions for which agents are not morally responsible 118 7.1.3. We mistakenly hold agents morally responsible for many actions ...... 120 7.2. Grounds for optimism about moral responsibility ....................................... 121 7.3. Implications of my conclusions.................................................................... 123 7.4. Conclusions .................................................................................................. 125 8. Summary of my arguments and conclusions ........................................................ 126 Bibliography ................................................................................................................. 129 Acknowledgements For financial sponsorship I thank and acknowledge the support of the Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC). I'm grateful to the staff and students of the University of Reading for my training in philosophy, and the opportunity to develop and discuss these ideas. I thank my family and friends for their patience and understanding while I've been working on this thesis. I am deeply grateful to my supervisors, Galen Strawson and Bart Streumer, for invaluable ideas, advice and generous giving of their time at every stage of my work. Finally, for her support in all of these areas and many more, I thank my wonderful wife Caroline. 6 1. INTRODUCTION Samantha is on her way to give a presentation about the parable of The Good Samaritan'. She walks past a man who is slumped in a doorway apparently in distress, without offering to help. A cause of her action is that, a few moments ago, Samantha was told that she was running late for the presentation. If she had not been told that she was running late, Samantha would have stopped to help the person slumped in the doorway. If Samantha learned that being told she was running late was a cause of her walking past the slumped man, she would be shocked, and she would strongly regret her action. She would not identify with, nor take responsibility for, her action. 1 Ingrid enters a room and interrupts a conversation which was already in progress between two other people. A cause of her action is that, a few minutes earlier, Ingrid was completing a word puzzle. Some of the words in the puzzle were connected with a theme of rudeness. If she had been completing a word puzzle with a neutral theme, Ingrid would not have interrupted the conversation. If Ingrid learned that completing the word puzzle was a cause of her interrupting the conversation, she would be shocked, and she would regret her action. She would not identify with, nor take responsibility for, her action. These are two examples of phenomena which I call ―subverting causes‖ of actions. Broadly, causes are ―subverting‖ when the agent would not identify with her action, if she knew all the causes of the action. 2 Recent and ongoing research in psychology is steadily uncovering more and more examples of similar causes of actions. It's my opinion that subverting causes are common as causes of everyday actions, and that philosophers have been slow to recognise the threat which they pose to moral responsibility. Using examples of actions with subverting causes, I will argue against two of the most influential contemporary theories of moral responsibility – those of Harry Frankfurt and John Martin Fischer. Both propose conditions which are supposed to be sufficient for direct moral responsibility for actions. (By the term ―direct‖ moral responsibility, I mean moral responsibility which is not traced from an earlier action. I'll discuss tracing of moral responsibility in section 1.2 below.) Frankfurt proposes a condition of ―identification‖; Fischer, writing with Mark Ravizza, proposes conditions for ―guidance control‖. I will argue that actions with subverting causes provide counterexamples to both theories: an agent may meet the conditions proposed by each theory and yet not be directly morally responsible for her action. I'll call this my ―main argument‖; it has the same basic structure when made against each of the two theories. My argument against Frankfurt's condition employs important elements of his own position. I'll argue that, after recognising that some actions do have subverting causes, followers of Frankfurt should accept that his identification condition is not sufficient for direct moral responsibility. Similarly, my argument against Fischer and Ravizza draws on important elements of their theory. I'll argue that, recognising the phenomena of subverting causes, followers of Fischer and Ravizza should agree that their conditions for guidance control are not sufficient for direct moral responsibility. I also have a number of secondary objectives. I'll make a positive proposal of a new condition which I think is necessary for direct moral responsibility. It incorporates the central elements of Frankfurt's theory, and I'll argue that his followers should accept my proposed condition. I'll also discuss two philosophers who have engaged specifically with the threats to responsibility posed by research in ―situationist‖ social psychology, which has revealed 1 I'll explain the italicised phrases in chapters 2 and 6 respectively. 2 I'll discuss subverting causes in much more detail in chapter 3. 7 subverting causes of actions like Samantha's above. 3 Eddy Nahmias and John Doris have both proposed conditions of direct moral responsibility which draw on identificationist theories like Frankfurt's, but include revisions to take account of actions with situationist causes. I will criticise and reject both Doris's and Nahmias's accounts. I'll argue against each theory that its conditions are neither necessary nor sufficient for direct moral responsibility. My final objective is to argue that there are many everyday actions for which we mistakenly hold agents morally responsible. In what I'll call my ―sceptical argument‖, I'll draw on evidence that there are many everyday actions which have subverting causes. Many of those are actions for which we currently hold agents morally responsible. But, in many of those same actions, the agents are not in fact morally responsible – they bear neither direct nor traced moral responsibility. Though they share a common theme, each of my arguments against a particular philosopher's position is independent of the others. For example if my argument against Fischer and Ravizza is shown to be unsuccessful, my argument against Frankfurt will be unaffected. My final ―sceptical argument‖ begins with the premise that agents are not directly morally responsible for actions which have subverting causes. It therefore requires that one of the previous arguments has been successful. However, if my sceptical argument fails, the previous arguments are unaffected. 1.1. SCOPE AND ASSUMPTIONS 1.1.1. Scope The scope of my enquiry is limited to an agent's moral responsibility for actions which he has performed. In this section I'll clarify that statement by pointing out some related areas of enquiry which fall outside my scope. Then, in the following two sections I'll examine the central concepts of moral responsibility and actions. I will exclude several interesting areas of enquiry from my scope. For the most part I do so merely to help simplify my arguments, and not because I think those arguments aren't applicable in other areas. My aim is to make my arguments as clear and precise as possible within a relatively narrow scope of enquiry. If those arguments are successful, I anticipate that they will also have a wider scope of application with only minor modifications. 4 I am concerned with actions performed by adult human agents. I won't be concerned with animals or inanimate agents, in any of the senses in which those may be agents. Nor will I be discussing actions performed by children. Unless stated otherwise, all the examples I'll discuss involve normal adults, by which I mean people who do not lack any normal physical or mental abilities. I will focus on moral responsibility for actions, and not on the related concepts of free action, autonomous action, control or free will. There are several ways to interpret the relations between these concepts and moral responsibility, so for simplicity I'm going to set aside those terms. 5 I will concentrate on moral responsibility for actions which are performed. I won't be addressing responsibility for omissions – actions which are not performed. Nor will I discuss 3 My definition of ―subverting causes‖, given in section 3.1, encompasses but is not restricted to ―situationist‖ causes. In chapter 3 I'll discuss a range of evidence from research in psychology, including but not restricted to situationist research, which suggests that subverting causes are common. 4 For example, I think my arguments could be adapted to cover moral responsibility for omissions as well as actions, but I will not argue for that here. 5 I will briefly discuss the relation between free will and moral responsibility in Frankfurt's theory, and the relation between control and moral responsibility in Fischer and Ravizza's theory. But I will focus on moral responsibility in my own arguments. 8 responsibility for any other kinds of events, or for states of affairs. For example, suppose Stan puts his dirty coffee mug down on the kitchen table. Stan's wife may hold him responsible for the table being stained (a consequence of his action), or for failing to clean up the stain (an omitted action). I won't discuss these kinds of responsibility. I will only address an agent's moral responsibility for actions which he performed. This excludes vicarious moral responsibility inherited by one person from another agent's action: for example, when a company director is vicariously morally responsible for an employee's action. 1.1.2. Actions In this section I'll briefly set out the working assumptions I'll make about actions. There are many difficult issues in the philosophy of action with which I cannot hope to engage in any detail. Again my objective is to argue as precisely as possible for conclusions which apply to a limited but very important set of actions. If I succeed then those conclusions will be significant; it may also be possible to extend my arguments, with minor modifications, to a wider set of actions. I will usually discuss examples of physical movements, and not ―mental actions‖ such as decisions or calculations performed by thought alone. But I do not claim that all actions must be physical movements. I am concerned only with intentional actions. There are several competing philosophical theories about how to define an intentional action, but for my purposes I need not commit myself to any particular view. Fischer and Ravizza have very little to say about the nature of intentional action, but they appear to advocate a broadly Davidsonian causal theory. 6 Frankfurt on the other hand criticises causal theories of action in his 1978 paper The Problem of Action'. Nevertheless this disagreement has no important implications for my arguments. The examples I'll discuss will involve actions which are regarded as intentional on all the mainstream views. Another contentious problem on which I will remain neutral concerns the individuation of actions. Neither Frankfurt nor Fischer has anything to say (as far as I'm aware) about how actions are to be individuated. I think the problem is orthogonal to the arguments I will be making: my arguments will be equally compelling on any of the mainstream theories of action individuation. 7 1.1.3. Moral responsibility for actions There is more than one view among philosophers about what it means to ascribe moral responsibility to agents. 8 In my two main arguments I criticise the theories of Frankfurt and Fischer and Ravizza. Ideally, when arguing against Frankfurt I would like to assume that his view of the concept is correct, and when arguing against Fischer and Ravizza that their concept of moral responsibility is correct. Unfortunately, I'm not aware that Frankfurt has explained his view of the concept of moral responsibility. Therefore I shall simply describe Fischer and Ravizza's account of the concept, and assume throughout that it is correct. I don't think my arguments against Frankfurt are greatly undermined by the lack of a statement from him on this point, for several reasons. It's likely that Frankfurt's view is quite similar to Fischer and Ravizza's, since they occupy broadly similar compatibilist positions in the wider 6 They say that non-intentional actions, such as seizures and tics, ―are not caused (in an appropriate way) by beliefs and desires‖ (1998:82). See also Davidson 1963. 7 I will ignore tricky cases on which different theories might give different verdicts about the number of actions involved. 8 For a summary of these views, see for example Eshleman 2009. 9 philosophical debates about free will and moral responsibility. 9 Furthermore, my arguments are about the conditions of moral responsibility; those arguments are not very much affected even if in fact Frankfurt has a different view about the meaning of the concept. Moreover, the same lack of a statement from Frankfurt on this point has not hampered many other criticisms of his account of the conditions for moral responsibility. Fischer and Ravizza's definition of the meaning of the concept is as follows: being morally responsible is being an appropriate candidate for the reactive attitudes. A morally responsible agent is ... a potential candidate for at least some of the reactive attitudes, but he need not be an actual recipient or target of any such attitude. 10 The ―reactive attitudes‖ are our natural responses to actions, including gratitude, indignation, respect, resentment, forgiveness and so on. These are reflected in practices such as punishing, blaming, condemning, and approving. These attitudes and practices are very closely connected with morally responsible agency, as Peter Strawson famously emphasised. 11 Fischer and Ravizza describe their view of the concept as a ―Strawsonian view‖. Nevertheless they claim that their view diverges in an important way from Strawson's: Strawson's theory may reasonably be said to give an account of what it is for agents to be held responsible, but there seems to be a difference between being held responsible and actually being responsible ... Strawson's theory risks blurring the difference between these two issues. 12 Fischer and Ravizza argue (correctly, in my view) against Strawson that a practice of responsibility attribution which is the norm in a certain society can be evaluated from a standpoint external to that society. 13 They also quote approvingly an example from Jay Wallace in which a very charming man cheats and lies to a colleague. The wronged colleague ―may have trouble working up any resentment or indignation‖, and yet it is clear that the liar is morally responsible: he is an appropriate candidate for the reactive attitudes in this case, despite not being an actual target of them. 14 On Fischer and Ravizza's view, being morally responsible does not entail being either blameworthy or praiseworthy. They give the example of a bank teller who hands over money to a robber at gunpoint. 15 The teller may well act calmly and be morally responsible for this action. 16 Yet complying with the threat is very reasonable: we do not blame the teller for doing so. The teller can be morally responsible for handing over the money without being blameworthy for doing so. Furthermore, in Fischer and Ravizza's view, agents can be morally responsible for actions which are ―morally neutral‖, and for which neither blame nor praise is appropriate. 17 However, in order to be blameworthy or praiseworthy for an action, an agent must be morally responsible for it. 9 More specifically, Frankfurt shares Fischer and Ravizza's view that an agent can be morally responsible without being blameworthy for his action (1975:55-56). 10 Fischer and Ravizza 1998:7. (Unless stated otherwise, italics in quoted passages are always taken from the original authors.) 11 Strawson 1962. 12 Fischer and Ravizza 1993:18. See also Fischer 1994:211-213. 13 Fischer and Ravizza 1993:18. 14 Wallace 1994:76-77; discussed in Fischer and Ravizza 1998:8. 15 Fischer and Ravizza 1998:36n7. 16 We might even say to the teller: ―You acted very responsibly, in the circumstances‖ (G. Strawson 1986b:312). 17 Fischer and Ravizza 1998:8n11 and 43. 10 A possible weakness in Fischer and Ravizza's position is that they do not explain what it is to be an appropriate candidate for the reactive attitudes. 18 However, I will simply assume that this view of the concept of moral responsibility is correct: my purpose is to argue that the conditions which they propose do not satisfy the requirements of the concept. 1.1.4. Determinism and compatibilism I'll now briefly explain my stance on an issue which is crucial in many debates about moral responsibility. There are several ways to express the thesis called ―determinism‖, but one of the simplest is this: the total set of facts about the past, together with the natural laws, entail all the facts about what happens in the present and future. 19 Many people hold the view that determinism is incompatible with moral responsibility, in the sense that if determinism is true then moral responsibility is always impossible. That view is denied by all of the philosophers whose theories I'll be addressing, who are compatibilists about moral responsibility and determinism. They aim to specify the conditions in which agents can be morally responsible even if determinism is true. My arguments do not presuppose any particular view about whether determinism is true, nor about whether it is compatible with moral responsibility. I will argue against certain compatibilist philosophers that they should accept my proposed revisions to their theories, without abandoning their compatibilist stance. I will mention determinism only fleetingly. 1.2. TRACED MORAL RESPONSIBILITY Many philosophers hold that moral responsibility for an action need not be anchored in facts about the action and the agent at the time of acting. According to what I'll call ―the tracing principle‖, an agent's moral responsibility can sometimes be ―traced back‖ to facts about an earlier action and about the agent at that earlier time. 20 I'll use the term ―traced moral responsibility‖ to refer to moral responsibility which is traced back to facts about an earlier time. In contrast, what I'll call ―direct moral responsibility‖ is not traced back in this way: it is anchored in facts about the action and the agent at the time of acting. An example will help to clarify the difference between these two types of responsibility. Suppose Trisha took a fix of a drug for the first time yesterday, knowing it to be extremely addictive. She now has a very strong craving for the drug, and takes another fix this morning. It may be that, on many theories of moral responsibility, Trisha does not meet the conditions for direct moral responsibility for her action of taking the drug this morning. She may be excused from direct moral responsibility on the grounds that she lacks the necessary control of her action; or that she could not have done otherwise, in some important sense; or that her desire to take the drug is not truly her own, because she wants not to have the craving to take the drug. And yet many people would hold Trisha morally responsible for her action this morning, on the grounds that she took the drug yesterday, and that her doing so again this morning was reasonably foreseeable by her yesterday. It's natural to say that, in certain cases, 18 It seems to me that an appeal to a related concept such as merit or desert is implicit but not acknowledged in this notion. Such an appeal seems to take their theory further away from Strawson's. Eshleman (2009) interprets Fischer and Ravizza's theory as a ―merit-based‖ form of compatibilism. 19 Fischer 2006:5. 20 The tracing principle is usually extended to cover moral responsibility for omissions and consequences as well as actions, but I will consider it only in so far as it concerns responsibility for actions (in line with the scope of my overall enquiry). 11 moral responsibility for an action can be anchored in facts about an earlier action (or omission) and about the agent at that earlier time. 21 My arguments in later chapters are about direct moral responsibility for actions. But it will often be important to retain a clear distinction between direct and traced moral responsibility. In particular, some of my replies to objections will draw on this distinction. In this section I'll introduce a generic and loosely defined version of the tracing principle, which should be acceptable to many of the philosophers whose theories I will discuss later. I'll then respond to an interesting criticism of the tracing principle made by Manuel Vargas, which raises a series of issues that will recur in later chapters. I propose the following generic statement of the tracing principle, as it relates to moral responsibility for actions: An agent bears traced moral responsibility for action A1 if: she bears direct moral responsibility for an earlier action (or omission) A0; the later action A1 results from A0; and the resultant occurrence of A1 was reasonably foreseeable by the agent, at the time of A0. 22 The agent's moral responsibility for action A1 can be ―traced back‖ to facts about her earlier action (or omission) A0, or about her at that time. In my terminology, it may well be the case that Trisha is not directly morally responsible for injecting the fix today. Her moral responsibility is not anchored in current facts about the action and about Trisha. But she does bear traced moral responsibility, because she did bear direct moral responsibility for her action of taking the drug yesterday, and the resultant occurrence of today's action was reasonably foreseeable by her when she did so. Vargas discusses a set of cases which, he thinks, highlight a problem with the epistemic requirement in the tracing principle, which is captured in the phrase ―reasonably foreseeable by the agent‖. 23 The most interesting of these cases involves Jeff, a manager who unreflectively makes an extremely insensitive comment to one of his employees just after he has made her redundant. 24 He is unreflective about his despicable treatment of this employee. Jeff is ―a jerk‖: he often treats people rudely and insensitively, and is unreflective about doing so. When other people react poorly to his behaviour, he always writes it off as a shortcoming on their part. Jeff made deliberate and ultimately successful efforts to become a jerk at age 15, after noticing that other boys who were jerks received the most attention from girls. Vargas makes three claims about the case. First, our intuitions tell us very clearly that Jeff is morally responsible for his insensitive comment. Second, Jeff does not bear direct moral responsibility for this action. Third, there is no suitable earlier action (or omission) to which his moral responsibility can be traced back, when the later action was reasonably foreseeable by Jeff. 21 It seems very plausible that moral responsibility for an action can be traced from an earlier omission, as well as from an earlier action. For example, Trisha might bear traced moral responsibility for injecting her current fix if she had earlier omitted to take a less harmful substitute drug prescribed to reduce her craving. 22 In this statement I draw on Vargas's phrasing (2005:269-274). In section 6.5 I'll discuss an alternative set of conditions for traced moral responsibility given by Fischer and Ravizza. 23 This problem will be relevant to my arguments in chapters 5 and 6. 24 Vargas 2005:271 and 275-276. I have changed the case very slightly; in my version there is a clearly identifiable single action for which Jeff may be held responsible. I have chosen to focus on this case among the four which Vargas raises because it poses the sternest challenge to the epistemic condition in the tracing principle. Fischer and Tognazzini (2009) also concentrate on this case, in their criticism of Vargas which I discuss below. 12 I agree with the first claim: we would hold Jeff morally responsible for making the insensitive comment. The second claim, on the other hand, looks somewhat implausible. Vargas seems to conclude that, because Jeff acts unreflectively from a long-standing character trait or habit, he is therefore not directly morally responsible for making his comment. 25 I don't think that follows. 26 However, I'll set aside this problem to examine the third claim. Assuming for the sake of argument that Jeff is not directly morally responsible for making the insensitive comment, can we trace his moral responsibility back to some earlier action? Vargas thinks not. At the time when Jeff freely decided, at age 15, to become a jerk – and he was directly morally responsible for doing so – he could not foresee that he would make an insensitive comment to an employee who had just been made redundant. Vargas concludes that either the tracing principle is flawed, or we must reject our strong intuition that an agent like Jeff is morally responsible for his comment. 27 I think there are two objections which refute Vargas's argument. The first is made by Fischer and Tognazzini. They point out that Jeff's action could indeed have been foreseen by his younger self, when aged 15, if it were specified more broadly. 28 The action certainly could not have been foreseen when specified as ―insulting that particular employee on that day after making her redundant as a result of becoming a jerk‖. Nor could it reasonably have been foreseen when specified as ―one day insulting an employee after making her redundant as a result of becoming a jerk‖. But it could certainly have been foreseen when specified as ―one day insulting someone as a result of becoming a jerk‖. The question now becomes: which of these must be reasonably foreseeable for Jeff to bear traced moral responsibility? The answer, according to Fischer and Tognazzini, is that the broadest is the most appropriate. Jeff bears traced moral responsibility for making his insensitive comment if ―one day insulting someone‖ was reasonably foreseeable by him when he decided to become a jerk. I think this is a plausible claim, which reflects our practice of responsibility attribution. The second objection I make to Vargas's argument is that there are more recent actions to which Jeff's moral responsibility for his comment can be traced. In making this point I continue (implausibly) to assume, for the sake of argument, that Jeff is not directly morally responsible for making his comment. Nevertheless it seems to me that even people who are jerks do occasionally reflect upon the impact of their habitual behaviour. Suppose for example that, a year ago, Jeff's last girlfriend accused him of habitual insensitivity before she left him, prompting Jeff to reflect over a brief period on whether his behaviour had indeed contributed to the failure of the relationship. At the end of that period he decided to do nothing to change his future behaviour. 29 I think it's plausible to say that his responsibility for the insensitive comment to his employee can be traced back to the moment a year earlier when he decided to do nothing to change his future behaviour. Vargas seems to think that Jeff's decision to become a jerk at the age of 15 is the only prior moment in his history to which his responsibility could be traced. 30 I can see two possible reasons why Vargas might think this; I'm not sure which reason he has in mind, but I think neither is persuasive. The first is perhaps that responsibility can only be traced to the point at which Jeff positively or explicitly decides to become a jerk. The second may be that 25 Vargas 2005:274-275. 26 On this point I agree with Fischer and Tognazzini, who interpret Vargas's claim in the same way, and find it implausible (2009:535-536). They too set aside this criticism after a brief discussion, in order to concentrate on Vargas's third claim. 27 Vargas 2005:271. 28 Fischer and Tognazzini (2009:537). 29 It doesn't matter whether we interpret this decision to do nothing as an action or as an omission, since responsibility for a later action can be traced back to an earlier action or omission. Equally, if Jeff simply decided nothing and did nothing after his brief period of reflection, this too is an omission to which his later responsibility can be traced. 30 Vargas 2005:277. 13 Jeff is not directly morally responsible for any decisions or omissions affecting his insensitive behaviour at any point after he decided to become a jerk. The first reason would seem to contradict the tracing principle as I stated it above (in which I follow Vargas's own very loose definition). Moral responsibility can be traced to any action or omission from which the later action results. To defend the second possible reason, Vargas would presumably claim that there has been no point at which Jeff was sufficiently reflective about his behaviour that he was directly morally responsible for a decision or omission concerning his future behaviour. I think that is extremely implausible. It's overwhelmingly likely that Jeff has reflected on his insensitive behaviour at some point since he was 15 years old. Such moments of reflection may not occur as often in the life of a jerk as they do in the lives of more considerate people, but I think it's implausible to suggest that they never occur. 31 I conclude that Vargas's attack on the tracing principle is unsuccessful. There are, no doubt, other potential challenges to the tracing principle as I have outlined it. 32 I will not pursue them because my arguments do not depend on the viability of tracing. I think the tracing principle is extremely plausible, and it can feature in many philosophical theories – whether compatibilist, libertarian or sceptical about moral responsibility. 33 But I will distinguish traced moral responsibility from direct moral responsibility without assuming that the tracing principle is correct. My arguments concern the conditions for direct moral responsibility. For philosophers who reject the tracing principle, all moral responsibility is direct moral responsibility. When discussing particular cases, I will often consider the possibility that agents bear traced moral responsibility for their actions. But I won't need to assume the validity of the tracing principle. To avoid cumbersome phrasing, I'll often use the abbreviation TMR' to stand for traced moral responsibility, and DMR' to mean direct moral responsibility. I'll also use those abbreviations as adjectives, so that for example ―Trisha is TMR for her action‖ means that Trisha bears traced moral responsibility for her action. 1.3. OVERVIEW OF THE ARGUMENTS I'll begin, in chapter 2, by addressing Frankfurt's identificationist theory of moral responsibility. After sketching the development of his account, I'll discuss some of the most important criticisms that it faces, in section 2.3. These criticisms support the conclusion that, contra Frankfurt, his identification condition is not sufficient for moral responsibility for action. I'll set aside those criticisms in chapter 3, in order to build an independent argument against Frankfurt's position, which I call my ―main argument‖. In the first three sections of the chapter, I'll define ―subverting causes‖ and introduce five examples of actions with subverting causes, together with the experimental evidence which supports those examples. (I'll dub these examples ―the five key cases‖, since I will refer to them often.) Then in section 3.4 I'll set out my argument that Frankfurt's identification condition is not sufficient for direct moral responsibility. In the five key cases of actions with subverting causes, the agents meet Frankfurt's identification condition, and yet are not directly morally responsible. 31 If we found that Jeff never did reflect on his behaviour and its effects, I think we might doubt his normative competence, in the sense I'll discuss in section 2.3.1. We would doubt whether his ethical sensitivity is sufficiently well developed for him to be held morally responsible for any actions at all. 32 One interesting question, rarely discussed as far as I know, is whether responsibility for a current action can be traced back to more than one earlier action or omission. 33 Vargas comments: ―One of the nice features about tracing is that it is one of the few things to which nearly all parties in the debate about free will appeal with equal enthusiasm‖ (2005:270). 14 I'll make a ―positive proposal‖ of an alternative necessary condition of direct moral responsibility in section 3.5, and argue that it should be acceptable to Frankfurt and his followers. In the remainder of chapter 3, I'll discuss experimental evidence which suggests that there are many everyday actions with subverting causes. I'll also review evidence which helps to explain why we often fail to notice when actions have subverting causes, and so we are unaware of how common such causes are. In chapter 4 I'll discuss and reject some objections to my main argument against Frankfurt and to my positive proposal. In chapter 5 I'll discuss two philosophers who have engaged with very similar subject matter. Both Nahmias and Doris have proposed identificationist conditions of direct moral responsibility which take account of research in situationist social psychology. 34 I'll argue that their conditions are neither necessary nor sufficient for direct moral responsibility. I'll move on in chapter 6 to consider Fischer and Ravizza's theory of moral responsibility. I'll explain their conditions for ―guidance control‖ over actions, and then (in section 6.6) discuss some criticisms which have been made of their account. My own argument against their position begins in section 6.7, using actions with subverting causes as counterexamples to show that the guidance control conditions are not sufficient for direct moral responsibility. In the five key cases, the agents meet the guidance control conditions and yet are not directly morally responsible for their actions. In chapter 7 I make a ―sceptical argument‖: I'll argue that there are many everyday actions for which we mistakenly hold agents morally responsible. Drawing on evidence from chapter 3, I'll argue that there are many everyday actions which have subverting causes. Many of those are actions for which we currently hold agents morally responsible. But, in many of those same actions, the agents are not in fact morally responsible – they bear neither direct nor traced moral responsibility. Finally, in chapter 8, I'll summarise my arguments and conclusions. 34 Situationist causes can be subverting causes; but there are also other kinds of subverting cause which have been revealed by research in other fields of psychology. 15 2. FRANKFURT'S IDENTIFICATIONIST THEORY One way to characterise Frankfurt's enormous contribution to the problems of freedom and moral responsibility is as a revolutionary departure from the prevailing compatibilist view, often labelled ―classical compatibilism‖. Frankfurt challenged classical compatibilism with two new theoretical proposals, both of which have been extremely influential. 1 The first of these proposals, which challenges incompatibilists as well as classical compatibilists, is that alternate possibilities are not necessary for moral responsibility. Frankfurt argues that an agent can be morally responsible for his action even if he could not have done otherwise. 2 I won't discuss this argument here. In fact, I will remain neutral on the question whether alternate possibilities are required for moral responsibility: none of my arguments depend on the answer to that question. I will focus on the second of Frankfurt's theoretical proposals, in which he gives a positive account of free will and moral responsibility. In classical compatibilism, freedom and moral responsibility require an absence of impediments or constraints upon action. In the absence of constraints, the agent is held to be free to act as he wants. In early compatibilist theories, the most commonly cited constraints preventing free action were physical constraints such as paralysed legs or locked doors. As understanding grew of psychological conditions such as compulsions and addictions, these were added to the list of constraints which could prevent a free action. 3 A criticism often made of the classical tradition is that this list of constraints is merely ad hoc: the constraints which appear on the list are those which we generally take as preventing free action, but we are not provided with an independent explanation of why certain constraints prevent free action, while others do not. 4 Frankfurt's theory provides a principled account of why certain psychological conditions can prevent freedom and responsibility. 5 Frankfurt distinguishes between internal and external desires. The agent ―identifies himself‖ or ―is identified‖ with desires which are internal – which are ―truly his own‖. In contrast, an external desire constrains the agent and prevents moral responsibility. 6 A drug addict, for example, may feel that ―the force [i.e. the desire] moving him to take the drug is a force other than his own‖ – and so is external to him in this sense. 7 As I'll explain in section 2.1, Frankfurt has made more than one attempt to define exactly what identification consists in. I'll examine the relationship between identification and moral responsibility, in Frankfurt's theory, in section 2.2. Then in section 2.3 I'll examine three important criticisms of his account. The criticism which forms my main argument will be the subject of chapter 3. 2.1. FRANKFURT'S THEORY IN DETAIL In Frankfurt's own words, the notion of identification is ―admittedly a bit mystifying‖. 8 He has developed his account of identification over a period of three decades, with a series of 1 I am of course greatly oversimplifying Frankfurt's contribution in this summary. 2 Frankfurt 1969. 3 For example Ayer views kleptomania as a constraint on the agent's ―process of deciding‖ which action to perform (1954:20-22). 4 This is not, of course, the only criticism of classical compatibilism; for overviews of other important issues, see for example Berofsky 2002 and McKenna 2004a. 5 It's often said that Frankfurt provides an account of free will, while classical compatibilism merely gives an account of free action. 6 Frankfurt sometimes describes an external desire as ―alien‖ or ―an outlaw‖. 7 Frankfurt 1971:18 (my italics). 8 Frankfurt 1975:54. 16 articles in which he has gradually changed his position. 9 Unfortunately he has not given a definitive statement of his final position on all the elements of the theory. In particular, while Frankfurt introduced the notion of identification primarily as a condition of freedom and moral responsibility, in later work he has focused increasingly on its role as a condition of psychological well-being. 10 I'm not certain whether Frankfurt endorses the ―tracing principle‖, by which an agent's moral responsibility for an action can sometimes be traced back to facts about an earlier action. 11 Frankfurt's identificationist theory is a theory of direct moral responsibility (DMR). If Frankfurt rejects the tracing principle, then he will view all moral responsibility as direct moral responsibility. If he accepts the tracing principle, then Frankfurt will allow an agent can be morally responsible for an action when the identification conditions are not met, because the agent bears traced moral responsibility (TMR). I won't make any assumption about Frankfurt's stance on tracing. The tracing principle will not be relevant in this chapter; in later chapters I will point out some implications of accepting or rejecting it. With these caveats in mind, the position I set out in this section is the one which I take Frankfurt to hold. It's a testament to the importance of Frankfurt's proposal that the theory has remained, in its changing forms, at the forefront of critical discussion over such a long period. I'll present Frankfurt's theory as it has developed through three key stages, which I'll call his initial, intermediate and final accounts. It may well be that there have been more than three such stages in the theory's development, but I think the three I describe are the most important. I'll begin by setting out the main elements of Frankfurt's initial account of identification. 2.1.1. Frankfurt's initial account I'll begin by defining the key terms in Frankfurt's initial account, and then give some examples which will help to explain those terms. 12 A ―first-order desire‖ is a desire to perform an action. An effective first-order desire is one which ―moves‖ the agent ―all the way to action‖. 13 Many first-order desires are not effective – usually because they conflict with other first-order desires. A ―second-order‖ desire has as its object a first-order desire. There may be third-order desires which have second-order desires as their objects, and so on. The phrase ―higher-order desire‖ refers to any desire above the first order in this hierarchy. A higherorder volition is a desire that a certain first-order desire will be effective. The agent is (directly) morally responsible for an action when there is an alignment or ―mesh‖ between his higher-order volition and his effective first-order desire. 14 In Frankfurt's phrasing, the agent ―identifies himself‖ with that first-order desire, by having the higher-order volition. These definitions are best explained with some examples. Dennis is in a restaurant studying the dessert menu. He has a first-order desire G to order chocolate gateau. He also has another first-order desire D to decline the dessert and 9 Perhaps a more charitable interpretation would be that, over the course of the three decades, Frankfurt has merely clarified his initial position, which has remained unchanged. But most commentators portray him as changing his position over a series of papers. 10 Scanlon makes this point (2002:167). 11 I discussed the tracing principle in section 1.2. I'm not aware of any passages in which Frankfurt discusses tracing. Fischer and Ravizza seem to interpret Frankfurt as rejecting the tracing principle (1998:194-201). On the other hand, Watson makes it clear that identificationist theories can incorporate tracing (2001:304-305). 12 Frankfurt's initial account is found in his paper Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person' (1971). To avoid possible confusion, I have deliberately avoided using the term ―will‖, and the phrases ―free will‖ and ―freedom of the will‖, because Frankfurt employs them in a quite specific way which differs from many other philosophers' usage. 13 Frankfurt 1971:14. 14 The useful term ―mesh‖ was introduced by Fischer (1987:79). 17 head home instead. He is on a diet, and has a second-order volition that desire D be effective. Desire D moves him to action, and he declines the dessert. His second-order volition meshes with the effective first-order desire: he is morally responsible for the action. Ulf is an ―unwilling addict‖ about to inject his usual drug. 15 He has a first-order desire T to throw away the needle, and at the same moment a first-order desire F to inject his next fix. His second-order volition is that desire T be effective. Instead, desire F is effective – he injects the fix. There is no mesh between second-order volition and effective first-order desire: Ulf is not morally responsible for this action. William is a willing addict. He has the same first-order desires T and F as Ulf. William's second-order volition is that desire F be effective, and it is – he injects the fix. The mesh obtains: William is morally responsible for his action. 16 Being capable of second-order volitions is essential to being a person. Very young children and animals have no second-order volitions, and so are termed ―wantons‖. Adults too may act wantonly in response to first-order desires about which they have no second-order volitions. A ―wanton addict‖ has a first-order desire to inject a fix; he may also have a firstorder desire to refrain from taking it. But he has no higher-order volition which favours either one of these first-order desires. Whichever first-order desire is effective here, ―he has no stake in the conflict‖, 17 and so he does not act as a morally responsible person. There is ―no theoretical limit‖ to the number of levels in Frankfurt's hierarchy of desires. Sometimes, for example, an agent may have a third-order desire about one of his second-order desires. Frankfurt recognised the threat of a damaging regress. Why does a mesh between an agent's first-order desire and his second-order volition sometimes suffice for identification? Why isn't a mesh with third-order volitions always necessary? And if third-order desires are sometimes necessary, why not even higher orders of desire ... and so on? Frankfurt initially claimed that the regress could be terminated without arbitrariness: When a person identifies himself decisively with one of his first-order desires, this commitment ―resounds‖ throughout the potentially endless array of higher orders ... there is no room for questions concerning the pertinence of desires or volitions of higher orders. 18 But, at least in Frankfurt's initial presentation of his theory, it is unclear how a resounding ―commitment‖ would prevent the damaging regress. Suppose that William the willing addict wants (second-order desire) his first-order desire F to inject a fix to be effective. On Frankfurt's account, such an arrangement can constitute a decisive identification. But now consider Wanda, who also has a second-order desire that her firstorder desire F to inject a fix will be effective. Wanda's second-order desire is itself brought on by her addiction, and she has no third-order desire about this second-order desire. It would seem quite plausible to say that Wanda's second-order desire is wantonly held. And if the second-order desire is wantonly held, then there is no decisive identification. Why does William's case involve genuine identification, while Wanda's does not? Why is the lack of a third-order desire significant in Wanda's case, but not in William's? Frankfurt's initial account lacks the resources to answer this question. As Gary Watson argued: 15 The ―unwilling addict‖ is a key example in Frankfurt's 1971 argument. 16 See Frankfurt 1971:25. 17 Frankfurt 1971:19. 18 Frankfurt 1971:21. 18 It is unhelpful to answer that one makes a ―decisive commitment,‖ where this just means that an interminable ascent to higher orders is not going to be permitted. This is arbitrary. 19 It seems that Frankfurt later accepted this point, 20 and made amendments over a series of papers to take up what I will call his intermediate position. 21 2.1.2. Frankfurt's intermediate position By 1987, Frankfurt's answer to the regress problem involved decisions about desires: it is characteristically by a decision ... that a sequence of desires or preferences of increasingly higher orders is terminated. 22 Once the agent has taken a decision in favour of some higher-order desire, there is no longer an open question about whether that desire would be endorsed by a desire of a still higher level. What is a decision about a desire? Frankfurt describes a commitment made ―without reservation‖, such that the person who makes it does so in the belief that no further accurate enquiry would require him to change his mind. It is therefore pointless to pursue the enquiry any further. 23 By making such a decisive commitment to a higher-order desire, the agent identifies with the first-order desire at the bottom rung of that hierarchy. The decision determines what the person really wants by making the desire on which he decides fully his own. 24 Frankfurt claims that a decision in favour of a desire would eliminate the threat of an infinite regress of desires, which was a problem for his first account. 25 The basis for this claim is not entirely clear to me. There seem to be two possibilities. First, Frankfurt may be claiming that a decision in favour of a desire is not itself capable of being the object of a desire. There would then be no possibility of regress beyond the decision, since there could be no higher order of desires above the decision. But it seems false to say that decisions (even decisions about desires) cannot be the objects of desires. It's surely possible – indeed common – for us to have desires about what decisions to make. If this is correct, then a decision which is made in the absence of desires about the decision appears to be wanton. And wantonness precludes identification. The second possibility is that Frankfurt believes that a decision in favour of a desire must be internal to the agent, and cannot be external. 26 If that is correct, identification would be entailed in the moment of deciding. However, it seems that decisions about desires can be 19 Watson 1975:29. In the same article Watson proposed his own alternative account of identification. Very roughly, on this account an agent identifies with an effective desire to perform an action if and only if that action is what she most values performing. However, Watson's account succumbed to the problem that an agent can identify with an action even when it is not what she values performing, as he later acknowledged (1987b). 20 See Frankfurt 1977:65-66. 21 The most important developments between the initial account and the intermediate position are described in Frankfurt's 1975, 1977, and 1987a papers. 22 Frankfurt 1987a:170. 23 Frankfurt 1987a:168-169. 24 Frankfurt 1987a:170. 25 Frankfurt denies that Watson's charge of arbitrariness applies to decisions about desires (1987a:167). 26 Frankfurt had earlier claimed that ―Decisions, unlike desires or attitudes, do not seem to be susceptible both to internality and to externality‖ (1977:68n3). 19 external to the agent. Frankfurt cannot rule out, as far as I can see, that a decision about a desire might be made as a result of an agent's compulsion, and so not truly her own. Furthermore, a decision in favour of a first-order desire might be ―unwitting‖, and so not truly the agent's own. David Velleman describes an example in which he meets an old friend, aiming to resolve a minor disagreement. He finds himself annoyed by the friend's attitude and begins to raise his voice, and the two men part in anger. On later reflection he realises that ―accumulated grievances had crystallized ... into a resolution to sever our friendship over the matter at hand‖. 27 There is nothing abnormal or compulsive about the desires in this case. Yet Velleman believes that the resolution is not truly his own: ―it was my resentment speaking, not I‖. 28 Velleman concludes: the example of my unwitting decision to break off a friendship shows that even decisions and commitments can be foreign to the person in whom they arise. 29 Thus, if Velleman is right, identification is not entailed even by a (non-compulsive) decision which meshes with an effective desire. In response to this problem case, it might seem open to Frankfurt to define the crucial notion of a ―decisive commitment‖ as one which the agent necessarily regards as internal to him. But this response would be circular: identification would require a kind of decision which itself requires identification. 30 A second possible response for Frankfurt would be to claim that the effective first-order desire in Velleman's example is not in fact supported by a decision. Instead, he might claim, the resolution results from some mental event which is something less than a decision – perhaps we might call it an ―opting‖ event. 31 This response would require that there is some distinction between decision and opting which is independent of the notion of identification (in order to avoid the circularity in the first response). In this vein one might claim that ―decisions‖ about desires must involve careful conscious deliberation, of a kind which will ensure that any effective desires endorsed by decisions are internal. That may be a plausible definition of ―decisions‖. But this line of thinking seems to lead toward scepticism about the prevalence of moral responsibility. For there are surely many actions which we perform without such careful conscious deliberation about our desires; compatibilists will reject a definition of identification which suggests that agents are not identified with their desires in a lot of everyday actions. It may be that Frankfurt was influenced by Velleman's paper. 32 At any rate, he later accepted that no particular ―deliberate psychic element‖ can be essential to identification. 33 Any such deliberate psychic element – including a decision – would be one about which the agent could have a conflicting higher order desire or attitude. And so a problematic regress threatens once more. In response, Frankfurt moved to what I'll call his final account of identification. 27 Velleman 1992:192. 28 Velleman 1992:192. 29 Velleman 1992:200. The word ―unwitting‖ may perhaps mislead here. The point is not that the agent lacked awareness of the decision or the desire; but rather that the effective desire was not truly his own, in spite of the decision in its favour. 30 Velleman makes this point (1992:200n27). 31 I've avoided the term ―choice‖ here, which is used by Frankfurt in a particular technical sense (1987a:172). 32 Bratman (1996:193) draws a link between Velleman's paper and Frankfurt's abandonment of the intermediate position. 33 See Frankfurt 1992:104. ―Psychic elements‖ include beliefs, desires, attitudes, judgements and decisions. 20 2.1.3. Frankfurt's final account The final account is by far the most complex and subtle. 34 Frankfurt introduces two new elements into the theory of identification – ―acceptance‖ and ―satisfaction‖. In the initial account, identification with an effective desire consisted simply in having a higher-order desire which meshes with the effective desire. But that account succumbed to the threat of an endless regress of higher orders of desires. Frankfurt now builds on that initial account by adding an extra condition, which introduces the element of satisfaction. The endorsing higher-order desire must be, in addition, a desire with which the person is satisfied. 35 Being satisfied with one's desires is ―a matter of simply having no interest in making changes‖. 36 How is the regress avoided, on this account? There is no requirement that the agent have any psychic element which meshes with the endorsing higher-order desire. Identification in fact depends on the absence of any psychic element which conflicts with that desire. Thus, being satisfied with a certain desire does not entail an endless proliferation of higher order desires. Identification is constituted neatly by an endorsing higher-order desire with which the person is satisfied. 37 Now it may be that there is some specific judgement (or other psychic element) which meshes with the endorsing higher-order desire. But even the presence of such a judgement does not ensure that the agent is satisfied. For example, judging it best not to try to change one's desires is not the same as being genuinely satisfied with them. 38 At the same time, it's possible to be satisfied with one's desires (even first-order desires) ―without in any way considering whether to endorse them‖. 39 But the absence of interest in making a change must be ―reflective‖ – it ―must derive from [the agent's] understanding and evaluation of how things are with him‖. 40 A deliberately contrived or wanton lack of interest in making changes does not constitute genuine satisfaction. Frankfurt's use of the term ―endorse‖ is somewhat misleading, as he later acknowledges. 41 He does not mean that the endorsed desire must be positively evaluated, or approved of. The sense of endorsement he has in mind requires ―nothing more than that the agent accepts it as his own‖. 42 Such acceptance is an ―altogether neutral attitude‖: A person may be led to accept something about himself in resignation, as well as in approval or in recognition of its merit. The fact that he accepts it entails nothing, in other words, concerning what he thinks of it. 43 This is an important change to the theory. In the initial and intermediate accounts, the agent's top-level desire or decision included a normative assessment of the lower level desires. But 34 The exegetical problems are especially severe in the final account, which was first introduced in Frankfurt's 1992 paper. In a collection of essays on Frankfurt's work, it's clear that two extremely eminent commentators – Bratman (2002a) and Watson (2002) – misinterpreted important elements of his (final) theory of identification. See Frankfurt 2002b and 2002c for his clarifications. I have drawn heavily from these papers, as well as Bratman 1996, Velleman 2002 and Taylor 2005, for my summary here. 35 Frankfurt 1992:105. 36 Frankfurt 1992:105. 37 Frankfurt 1992:105. 38 Frankfurt 1992:104. 39 Frankfurt 1992:105. 40 Frankfurt 1992:105. 41 See Frankfurt 2002b:87 and 2002c:160. 42 Frankfurt 2002b:87. 43 Frankfurt 2002c:160. 21 the ―neutral attitude‖ of acceptance simply marks the agent's descriptive assessment about whether the lower-order desires are his own. 44 To summarise, an agent identifies with an effective desire to act if he accepts the desire as his own, and if he is satisfied with that attitude of acceptance. It is possible for an agent to exhibit acceptance without satisfaction. This can happen in a condition which Frankfurt calls ―ambivalence‖. Here two desires or volitions are inherently opposed, in the sense that they cannot both be fulfilled; yet both are accepted as the agent's own. For example, someone may want to commit to a certain career, but also want to refrain from doing so. 45 According to Frankfurt, this person cannot be satisfied with his ―psychic condition‖. In contrast to ambivalence, ―wholeheartedness‖ consists in being satisfied that certain desires and volitions should be effective, while others are not. 46 Wholeheartedness is compatible with conflict among one's desires. For example, an unwilling addict may be wholehearted if he is satisfied in accepting one set of desires and volitions as his own, while rejecting conflicting desires to take drugs as external. 47 But a wholehearted agent does not accept two or more conflicting desires as his own. For simplicity moving forward, I'll introduce a technical term ―F-accepts‖, whose meaning is as follows. An agent ―F-accepts‖ his effective desire if he accepts it as his own, and is satisfied with that acceptance, where being satisfied is a matter of having no interest in making changes. According to Frankfurt's final account, an agent identifies with his effective desire if and only if he F-accepts it. 48 One might object that Frankfurt has failed to avert the vicious regress which overwhelmed his earlier accounts. It's not obvious that ―reflective‖ satisfaction can be distinguished clearly from a merely wanton lack of interest in making changes. The agent must have reached an ―understanding and evaluation of how things are with him‖. But he must not have formed a desire not to change his desires, nor a judgement that change is not appropriate: the presence of either of these would open up the possibility of regress. What kind of reflective process can the agent undergo which would produce this outcome? Perhaps Frankfurt has in mind a kind of process which might produce a higher-order psychic element, but in fact does not do so. It's not obvious that such a fine balance is possible, let alone common enough to enable agents to be identified with most of their actions. However, I'll set aside this objection and assume, for the sake of my later arguments, that Frankfurt succeeds in avoiding regress in his final theory. 2.1.4. Terminological simplifications Strictly, on Frankfurt's final account, the object of the agent's F-acceptance is the effective desire to act. This is also what the agent is identified with. Now, the first-order desire which is effective has as its object the action performed. 49 There is a one-to-one relationship between the effective desire to act and the action performed. Therefore, the phrase ―William F-accepts the effective desire which moves him to act‖ is equivalent, for practical purposes, to the phrase ―William F-accepts his action‖. For reasons 44 Taylor makes this point (2005:9). 45 The example is Frankfurt's (1992:99). 46 Frankfurt 1992:103. 47 Frankfurt 1992:100. 48 Frankfurt says that identification ―consists in‖ having an ―endorsing‖ (by which he means ―accepting‖, as he later clarifies) higher order desire with which the agent is satisfied (1992:105). 49 The desire is effective when it moves the agent to perform the action desired. 22 of simplicity and style, I'll often use the shorter phrasing in place of the longer version. Similarly, I will often use the phrase ―William identifies with his action‖ rather than the more precise but more cumbersome phrase ―William identifies with the effective desire which moves him to act‖. I'll also sometimes say that ―William's action is truly his own‖, rather than ―the effective desire which moves William to act is truly his own‖. I don't think I risk any misunderstanding of my argument by making these simplifications. 2.2. IDENTIFICATION AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY My exegetical caveats extend to Frankfurt's (final) view of the relationship between identification and moral responsibility. There are four pieces to this puzzle, and not all the logical relations between them are explicitly described by Frankfurt, it seems to me. In their positive forms, I'm interested in the following four states of affairs: (A) The agent F-accepts his effective desire. 50 (I) The agent is identified with his effective desire. (O) The agent's effective desire is truly his own. 51 (R) The agent is directly morally responsible for the action to which he is moved by his effective desire. I'll assemble a set of six statements which I'm confident that Frankfurt holds, and which jointly define Frankfurt's view of the logical relationships between these states of affairs. 52 I'll list the full set of statements at the end of this section. In Frankfurt's final position, (A) is necessary and sufficient for (I): an agent is identified with his effective desire if and only if he F-accepts it. I'll label this statement (1) in the set which defines Frankfurt's position. I'm rather less confident of Frankfurt's full view of the relations between (I) and (O), and between (I) and (R). 53 Fortunately, he does make two clear declarations which establish at least part of the picture. Both come in replies to critics of his position, in which he also clarifies some important elements of the final theory, so it seems reasonable to take them as definitive. Frankfurt says: A desire with which an agent identifies is legitimately attributable to him as his own; it is not external to him or, in other words, an outlaw. 54 From this I conclude that (I) is sufficient for (O): if the agent is identified with his effective desire, then that desire is truly his own. This is statement (2) in my set. Frankfurt also states that: Someone who is wholeheartedly behind the desires that move him when he acts is morally responsible for what he does. 55 50 An agent F-accepts his effective desire if he accepts it as his own, and is satisfied with that acceptance. Being satisfied is a matter of having no interest in making changes. See section 2.1.3. 51 When a desire is ―truly his own‖ it is internal to the agent, rather than external or ―alien‖. 52 Occasionally I will use a logical notation to condense a brief argument. In that notation, the symbol ―→‖ means ―entails that‖, or ―is sufficient for‖; ―↔‖ means ―if and only if‖ or ―is necessary and sufficient for‖; and ―¬‖ means ―it is not true that‖. 53 As I'll discuss below, I am not certain whether Frankfurt regards (I) as necessary for either (O) or (R). 54 Frankfurt 2002b:88. 55 Frankfurt 2002d:28. 23 From this I conclude that (I) is sufficient for (R): if the agent is identified with his effective desire, then he is directly morally responsible for the action to which he is moved by that effective desire. This is statement (3) in my set. It is not clear to me whether (I) is necessary for either (O) or (R), in Frankfurt's final position. As Teresa Chandler points out, Frankfurt's view of the relationship between (I) and (O) appears to have changed over time. 56 In Chandler's phrasing, Frankfurt moves from an ―invention account‖ to a ―discovery account‖ of identification. In the early ―invention account‖, identifying with the desire is what makes the desire truly one's own. This is especially clear in what I called Frankfurt's intermediate position, in which identification involves a decision which ―determines what the person really wants‖. 57 Here it seems that (I) is necessary for (O): the desire is truly the agent's own only if he is identified with it. However, in the later ―discovery account‖ (which corresponds with what I've called Frankfurt's final position), it seems that an agent can have desires which are truly her own, but are not yet F-accepted by her. She may struggle against them, not realising that they are truly her own or refusing to accept them as such, before finally recognising them, and Faccepting them. Frankfurt describes a mother who thinks it best to give up her child to adoption, and decides to do so, but when the moment arrives she finds that she cannot go through with it. 58 The mother discovers something about herself, and specifically about the structure of her own higher-order desires. She may finally F-accept the desire to keep the child. It seems that the desire to keep the child was truly her own, even when the mother was struggling against it and did not F-accept it. It seems that (A) is not necessary for (O), and hence that (I) is not necessary for (O). 59 Similarly, it may be that identification is not necessary for responsibility – i.e. (I) is not necessary for (R) – on Frankfurt's final view. I'm not aware of any statement or denial by Frankfurt on this point. Therefore I will not assume that (I) is necessary for either (O) or (R), on Frankfurt's view. Many commentators interpret Frankfurt as holding that (O) is both necessary and sufficient for (R). For example Sarah Buss and Lee Overton, introducing a collection of essays about Frankfurt's work, say: According to Frankfurt, we are responsible for what we do if and only if our motives for doing it are truly our own. 60 But I have not found a clear statement to that effect in Frankfurt's own writing. In particular, it may be that (O) is not sufficient for (R) in Frankfurt's final account. (If Frankfurt held that (I) is necessary for (O), as he seemed to on the ―invention‖ account of identification, then it would follow that (O) is sufficient for (R). 61 But I am not convinced that this is the case in Frankfurt's final account, where identification is more a matter of discovery than invention.) I will not assume that Frankfurt holds that (O) is sufficient for (R). Instead, I will simply take it that he regards (O) as necessary for (R): in other words, that an agent is directly 56 Chandler 2004:38-43 57 See section 2.1.2. 58 The example is originally mentioned in Frankfurt 1993:111, but is developed further by Watson (2002:147) and in Frankfurt's reply (2002c:161-164). 59 If ¬(O→A) and (I↔A), then ¬(O→I). 60 Buss and Overton 2002:xii. 61 We know, from statement (3), that (I→R). If also (O→I), then it would follow that (O→R). 24 morally responsible for her action only if her effective desire is truly her own. 62 This is statement (4). Since (A) is sufficient for (I), and (I) is sufficient for both (O) and (R), it follows that (A) is sufficient for both (O) and (R). So if the agent F-accepts his effective desire, then that that desire is truly his own. This is statement (5) in my set. Furthermore, if the agent F-accepts his effective desire, then he is directly morally responsible for the action to which he is moved by that effective desire. This is statement (6). To summarise, the six statements which I'm confident that Frankfurt holds are: 63 (1) F-acceptance is necessary and sufficient for identification (A↔I). (2) Identification with an effective desire is sufficient for its being truly the agent's own (I→O). (3) Identification is sufficient for direct moral responsibility (I→R) (4) For direct moral responsibility for an action, the effective desire must be truly the agent's own (R→O). (5) F-acceptance of an effective desire is sufficient for its being truly the agent's own (A→O). (6) F-acceptance of the effective desire is sufficient for direct moral responsibility for the action (A→R). 2.3. CRITICISMS OF FRANKFURT'S ACCOUNT OF IDENTIFICATION My main objectives, in arguing against Frankfurt, are to show that statements (5) and (6) above are false. In my ―main argument‖, which I'll make in chapter 3, I'll aim to show first that statement (5) is false. From that, it follows that (6) is false, if (4) is true. 64 I will only reject three of the six statements that Frankfurt holds: (5), (6), and also (1) – which is Frankfurt's definition of identification. I won't deny (2) or (4), which are both key axioms of identificationist accounts of moral responsibility. For the sake of my main argument, I won't deny (3) either (although I think it is false). Meanwhile, in the rest of this current chapter, I'll briefly discuss three criticisms which also suggest, in different ways, that (5) and (6) are false. The first two criticisms – in sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 – aim to show that (3) is false. From that, it follows that (6) is false, given Frankfurt's own definition of identification (1). 65 The third criticism – in section 2.3.3 – denies statement (5). I won't do much more than give an overview of these criticisms, since my main argument does not rely on their conclusions. By including them I hope to achieve two things. First, I'll show that the conclusions of my main argument can be reached in other ways, which gives independent grounds to think that they are, at least, plausible conclusions. Second, discussion of these criticisms introduces some issues which will be relevant in later chapters. 62 It's clear from Frankfurt's discussion of unwilling addicts, for example, that he regards (O) as necessary for (R). An unwilling addict is not morally responsible for her action of injecting a fix because the effective desire is not truly her own. 63 I've abbreviated these statements to avoid cumbersome phrasing, and to incorporate the simplifications I discussed in section 2.1.4. The full version of statement (1), for example, is ―the agent's F-acceptance of the effective desire is necessary and sufficient for his identification with the effective desire‖. I don't think any confusion will arise from my abbreviations. 64 If ¬(A→O) while (R→O), then it follows that ¬(A→R). 65 If (A↔I), but ¬(I→R), then it follows that ¬(A→R). 25 2.3.1. Normative competence In a very influential paper, Susan Wolf criticised identificationist accounts of responsibility, including Frankfurt's. 66 One of her examples involves JoJo, the son of an evil and sadistic dictator. As a child, JoJo witnesses his father's appalling actions every day. Later, as an adult, he behaves in similar ways. For example, he sends a person to be tortured on a whim. JoJo is not constrained or coerced in this action. Moreover, the effective desire which moves him to the action is one with which he wholly identifies, for he has been raised by his father to develop higher-order desires which endorse such actions. 67 Wolf concludes that JoJo is not morally responsible for his action, despite being identified with the effective desire. She notes the legal principle, known as the ―M'Naughten Rule‖, that a person is sane only if he knows what he is doing and whether it is right or wrong. 68 JoJo fails to meet the condition of ―sanity‖: the minimally sufficient ability cognitively and normatively to recognize and appreciate the world as it is. 69 In her later book, Wolf substitutes the phrase ―normative competence‖ – with a very similar definition – for this ability. 70 I think this simple argument is convincing: normative competence is indeed necessary for direct moral responsibility. 2.3.2. The agent's history Perhaps the most common criticism of Frankfurt's theory is that his identification condition does not take the agent's history into consideration. Consider the following example. Brian was abducted several years ago by some members of a cult and prevented from leaving their remote community. Since that time, the cult leader has used various psychological manipulation techniques (sometimes called ―brainwashing‖) to influence Brian's desires. Brian no longer wants to leave the cult. In fact, Brian writes a new will in which he leaves his estate to the cult leader, rather than to his own relations. Brian is identified with his effective first-order desire, on any of Frankfurt's accounts of identification. And yet a strong intuition tells us that Brian is not morally responsible for this action, because of his past conditioning. The higher-order desire which meshes with the effective first-order desire seems not to be genuinely Brian's own desire, in a very important sense. This is an issue which divides compatibilists. 71 Some, often called ―soft compatibilists‖, believe that a condition about the agent's history is necessary for moral responsibility. 72 The following are examples of histories which many soft compatibilists (and many incompatibilists) believe can prevent moral responsibility for action: psychological manipulation by a cult leader; 73 behavioural conditioning; 74 an extremely deprived 66 Wolf 1987. 67 Wolf addresses her criticism to Frankfurt's initial account of identification, but it could be updated to make the same points against his final account. 68 Wolf 1987:381. 69 Wolf 1987:381. Wolf notes that this definition of sanity is specifically intended to address questions about responsibility, and may not be applicable for use in other contexts. 70 Wolf 1990:129. 71 Watson presents the issue in the form of a dilemma for compatibilists: advocates of both positions face difficult problems (1999:209-215). 72 The terms ―hard‖ and ―soft‖ compatibilists were introduced by Kane (1996:67-68). 73 Kane argues that agents who have undergone this kind of ―covert nonconstraining control‖ lack autonomy (1996:64-65). 26 upbringing; 75 hypnosis designed to induce a certain desire or belief. 76 I'll use the generic term ―conditioning‖ to refer to these various kinds of insidious influences. The challenge faced by soft compatibilists is to explain how conditioning in the agent's past might prevent moral responsibility, while the presence of causal determinism throughout the agent's past does not. 77 Frankfurt, on the other hand, belongs in the ―hard compatibilist‖ camp. Hard compatibilists propose that it is sufficient for moral responsibility that certain conditions are fulfilled at the time of acting. They face the problem that we feel a very strong intuition that some events in an agent's history – such as Brian's conditioning in the cult – can excuse him from moral responsibility. Frankfurt is of course well aware of this difficulty for his theory, and his response is staunchly hard compatibilist. 78 A manipulator may succeed, through his interventions, in providing a person not merely with particular feelings and thoughts but with a new character. That person is then morally responsible for the choices and the conduct to which having this character leads. We are inevitably fashioned and sustained, after all, by circumstances over which we have no control. The causes to which we are subject may also change us radically, without thereby bringing it about that we are not morally responsible agents. It is irrelevant whether those causes are operating by virtue of the natural forces that shape our environment or whether they operate through the deliberate manipulative designs of other human agents. 79 While I admire Frankfurt for taking a principled stance on this point, he seems to be simply ignoring strongly held contrary intuitions. A more persuasive way to deal with intuitions which conflict with one's theory is to acknowledge their validity, while explaining why they are not applicable in the situations covered by the theory. Frankfurt's own extremely influential argument that alternate possibilities are not required for moral responsibility works in just this way. 80 In contrast, Frankfurt's defence of hard compatibilism amounts to an unconvincing flat denial or rejection of our intuitions. I think these arguments reveal that some condition concerning the agent's history is necessary for direct moral responsibility. 2.3.3. Desires which are not truly one's own Another problem for Frankfurt's final account is that there seems to be scope for an agent to F-accept a desire which is not truly her own. 74 The fictional inhabitants of Walden Two have undergone extreme behavioural conditioning (Skinner 1948/1976). 75 A persuasive real-life example is the harrowing account of the childhood and later crimes of Robert Alton Harris given in Watson 1987a. A fictional example is that of JoJo, the son of a sadistic dictator, discussed above (Wolf 1987:379-380). 76 A fictional situation involving hypnosis is discussed by Slote (1980:149). 77 Pereboom presents a particularly stark version of the problem for soft compatibilists in his ―Four Case Argument‖ (2001:110-120). 78 He has taken the same principled line since proposing his initial theory – see Frankfurt 1975:52-54. 79 Frankfurt 2002d:28. 80 Frankfurt (1969) argues that our intuitions lead us to a mistaken belief in the Principle of Alternate Possibilities'. In many cases of constrained action, we assume that the agent is not morally responsible because he is unable to do otherwise. But usually, in these cases, the agent cannot act otherwise and does not identify with the action. In certain highly unusual ―Frankfurt-style‖ cases, agents who do identify with their actions can be morally responsible (according to Frankfurt) despite having no alternate possibilities. In this argument Frankfurt does not deny or ignore an important intuition about constrained actions; he aims to reveal that we apply it mistakenly. 27 Suppose that Christine is extremely self-critical. She strongly believes in taking the blame for one's own faults. She is a drug addict, and she dislikes her own habit of taking drugs. But she has come to accept that the effective desires and volitions in favour of taking drugs are her own. She is satisfied with that acceptance. And yet it seems that she might be mistaken here: she might F-accept the desires in error. Suppose that she discusses her situation with an addiction therapist, and then comes to the opposite opinion that the desires are not her own. We might plausibly conclude, I think, that her new opinion is correct and her initial F-acceptance was mistaken. Her desires and her normative judgements about those desires need not have changed at all, but her descriptive assessment now seems to be more accurate. The same issue arises when agents simply form different descriptive assessments at different times. For example, Derek is depressed and accepts as his own the desire to quit his profession, even though he doesn't think that quitting is the best thing to do. 81 He thinks to himself ―I might as well accept it. I'm just a quitter‖. He is satisfied with this acceptance, and quits his profession. But after his depression has lifted, he takes a very different view, and thinks ―I was not myself when I decided to do that‖. Frankfurt must hold that, since Derek Faccepted the effective desire at the time of acting, it was truly his own. And yet Derek himself now rejects that conclusion, and people who know him well might take the same view. It seems possible that agents could form different descriptive assessments of their own desires even at quite short intervals. Someone in a particularly ecstatic or fearful mood might F-accept a desire, only to form a different assessment an hour later. Someone who is drunk or under the influence of drugs might F-accept a desire but later renounce that acceptance. In these cases, too, the later assessment seems to reflect the agent's more ―normal‖ state, in the sense that seems most relevant for judging whether the desire was truly her own. It might seem that Frankfurt can reply that agents in such situations are not ―wholehearted‖ when they accept their effective desires at the time of acting. But since ―wholeheartedness‖ consists in being satisfied that certain desires and volitions should be effective, I don't think this reply would help: in F-accepting a desire, the agent is already satisfied with it. At issue here, as Laura Ekstrom points out, is how to interpret Frankfurt's notion of satisfaction. 82 If satisfaction is ―a kind of feeling‖ (or perhaps the absence of a kind of feeling), then it seems that Christine and Derek are indeed satisfied with their effective desires. Satisfaction might instead be interpreted as ―a structural requirement‖ of ―cohesion‖ among the agent's volitions. 83 But it seems to me that satisfaction is portrayed as a feeling on the most natural reading of Frankfurt's 1992 paper The Faintest Passion'. At any rate, it's not obvious how Frankfurt could incorporate cohesion into the notion of satisfaction, since he allows that satisfaction and wholeheartedness are compatible with conflict among one's desires. 84 I conclude that, in these cases, F-acceptance of a desire does not ensure that the desire is truly the agent's own, in the deep sense which Frankfurt aims to analyse. 2.3.4. Interim conclusions on Frankfurt's account In section 2.2 I assembled the following set of statements to summarise Frankfurt's (final) position on identification and responsibility: 81 This case is adapted from Ekstrom 2005:148. Bratman makes the very similar point that an agent may simply F-accept a desire through exhaustion, while the desire is not truly his own (1996:194-195). Frankfurt appears to hold that F-acceptance ―in exhaustion‖ is identification (2002b:90n2). 82 Ekstrom 2005:143-144. 83 Such an interpretation would bring Frankfurt's theory closer to Ekstrom's. 84 I discussed an example above: an unwilling addict may be wholehearted if he is satisfied in accepting one set of desires and volitions as his own, while rejecting conflicting desires to take drugs as external. 28 (1) F-acceptance is necessary and sufficient for identification (A↔I). (2) Identification with an effective desire is sufficient for its being truly the agent's own (I→O). (3) Identification is sufficient for direct moral responsibility (I→R). (4) For direct moral responsibility for an action, the effective desire must be truly the agent's own (R→O). (5) F-acceptance of an effective desire is sufficient for its being truly the agent's own (A→O). (6) F-acceptance of the effective desire is sufficient for direct moral responsibility (A→R). I've discussed three criticisms of Frankfurt's theory of identification. The first two show that identification is not sufficient for direct moral responsibility: conditions concerning the agent's history and normative competence are also necessary. I conclude from this that Frankfurt's claim (3) is false. If statement (3) is false, then on Frankfurt's own definition of identification (1), it follows that (6) is false: F-acceptance is not sufficient for direct moral responsibility. 85 The third criticism suggests that F-acceptance of an action is not in fact sufficient for the action's being truly one's own. Actions can be F-accepted even though they are not truly one's own. I conclude from this that claim (5) is false. These criticisms, then, give support to my main conclusion that both (5) and (6) are false. However, I haven't argued thoroughly for these conclusions in this chapter, so I will not rely on them as I move forward. Instead, in the next chapter I'll give an independent argument that Frankfurt's claims (5) and (6) are false. None of the examples I'll use to build that argument will involve agents who have a responsibility-undermining history or lack normative competence, nor agents who are depressed, exhausted or unusually self-critical. Instead, I'll argue that when an action has subverting causes, that action is not truly the agent's own, and so she is not directly morally responsible for it – even when she F-accepts it. 85 If ¬(I→R), while (A↔I), then ¬(A→R). 29 3. ACTIONS WITH SUBVERTING CAUSES In the previous chapter I summarised Frankfurt's theory of direct moral responsibility for actions. 1 An agent is identified with his effective desire, on Frankfurt's account, if and only if he accepts it as his own, and is satisfied with that acceptance, where being satisfied is a matter of having no interest in making changes. I introduced the term ―F-acceptance‖ to stand for this combination of acceptance and satisfaction. According to Frankfurt, F-acceptance of an effective desire is sufficient for direct moral responsibility for the resulting action. 2 I'll argue that this is false. In some actions with what I call ―subverting causes‖, the agent may F-accept her effective desire, and yet not be DMR for the action. I'll begin by describing five examples of actions with subverting causes (section 3.2). Since I'll refer to those examples many times, I'll dub them ―the five key cases‖. I'll discuss some of the most important features of subverting causes in section 3.3. I make my main argument against Frankfurt's identification condition in section 3.4. Then, in section 3.5, I make a positive proposal of an alternative condition which I believe to be necessary for direct moral responsibility. The five key cases provide only a small sample of the evidence that actions do have subverting causes. I'll discuss the larger body of evidence discovered through psychology research in section 3.6, followed by objections to my claims about this evidence in 3.7. Then in section 3.8 I'll review evidence which explains why we often fail to notice that some of our actions have subverting causes. I'll finish by summarising the chapter's most important conclusions in section 3.9. 3.1. DEFINITION As a simplified working definition, an action has subverting causes when it is true that: if the agent knew all the causes of her action, she would not identify with the action. Since I am arguing against Frankfurt's (final) position, I'll substitute his identification condition into this working definition. An action has subverting causes when it is true that: if the agent knew all the causes of her action, she would not F-accept the action. The definition incorporates what I'll call a ―counterfactual test‖: the verdict hinges on what would be the case if the agent knew all the causes of her action. It's possible that, although in fact the agent does F-accept her action, she would no longer do so if she knew all of its causes. The full definition is as follows. An action has subverting causes when it is true that: if, at the time of acting, the agent had known all the causes of her action (except in so far as any additional knowledge gained would have given her new information about means to satisfy her desires), she would not have Faccepted the effective desire which moved her to act. Compared with the working definition, the full definition includes three additional clauses. The first specifies that the relevant counterfactual test is made at the time of acting. The second clause (in parentheses) constrains the type of knowledge that the agent gains in the counterfactual scenario. Briefly, this second clause excludes knowledge which would make 1 Direct moral responsibility (DMR) is anchored in facts about the action and the agent at the time of acting. In contrast, traced moral responsibility (TMR) can be ―traced back‖ to facts about an earlier action (or omission) and about the agent at that earlier time. See section 1.2. 2 This is statement (6) from section 2.2. 30 the agent regret her action, yet still regard it as truly her own. 3 I'll discuss this clause in detail in section 4.2. Finally, on the more strictly precise definition, the object of the agent's counterfactual F-acceptance is ―the effective desire which moved her to act‖, rather than ―the action‖ itself. 4 I'll usually avoid this longer and precise but clumsy phrasing, in favour of the simpler but slightly less precise working definition above. I include among the ―causes‖ of the action any proximate, relevant event without which the action would not have occurred. I'll discuss the notions of proximity and relevance, as well as some other important features of subverting causes in section 3.3 below. For simplicity, I'll often use the word ―causes‖ as a shorthand for ―proximate and relevant causes‖. Strictly speaking, if the causes of an action are subverting, they are subverting as a set. However, it's often possible to identify a certain individual cause without which the set of causes would not be subverting. When that is the case, for simplicity of style, I'll call that individual cause ―the subverting cause‖. 3.2. SUBVERTING CAUSES – FIVE KEY CASES I'll now present five key cases of actions with subverting causes, which will feature in my main argument and much of the subsequent discussion. As I'll point out, each case closely matches an actual research experiment. The first three cases are taken from the field of social psychology known as ―situationism‖. 3.2.1. Example 1: Situational factors and bystander intervention Samantha is on her way to give a short presentation about the parable of The Good Samaritan'. 5 She heads down an alley and walks past a man who is slumped in a doorway apparently in distress. A cause of her action is: (a) A few moments ago Samantha was told that she was running late for the presentation. If she had not been told that she was running late, Samantha would have stopped to help the person slumped in the doorway. This example matches a study by psychologists Darley and Batson (1973), whose subjects were students at a theological seminary. Some were told that they were a little early for their presentation: 63% of this group stopped to offer help to the slumped man (who was a confederate or stooge' of the experimenters). Of those subjects told that they were running late, only 10% stopped. Some of the subjects who walked past the slumped man appeared anxious about their decision, while others appeared to assess him as not in need of assistance. 6 Telling the subjects that they were early or late was a ―situational‖ factor which varied. The experimenters also varied another situational factor – whether the subjects were to give the presentation about the parable of the Good Samaritan', or whether they were to speak instead about job prospects for seminarians. The experimenters also tested the subjects on a personality measure, via a questionnaire. Only the first factor – the early or late condition – 3 For example, if the agent discovered that she had merely misunderstood some feature of the actual situation, she might regret her action but still regard it as truly her own. 4 For practical purposes these phrases are equivalent, as I explained in section 2.1.4. 5 I'll often refer to this case as the Good Samaritan case'. 6 Darley and Batson 1973:107-108. Each of these reactions by subjects are common in situationist experiments. I'll discuss some of the possible explanations and implications in later sections. 31 was significantly correlated with intervention behaviour (stopping to offer help, or walking past). 7 If Samantha learned that (a) was a cause of her action, she would not F-accept the action. 8 Therefore (a) is a subverting cause of her action. 3.2.2. Example 2: Social influence and bystander intervention Martha has volunteered to take part in a market research survey. 9 The researcher hands Martha a questionnaire to fill out, and then goes into the next room where she falls heavily. Despite a loud crash, and the researcher's cries of ―Oh my God ... my foot ... I ... I ... can't move it. Oh ... my ankle‖, Martha continues to fill out her questionnaire. A cause of this action is: (b) Another person has volunteered for the survey at the same time, and is sitting next to Martha completing a questionnaire. If this second volunteer had not been present, Martha would have offered to help the researcher. This example matches an experiment by Latané and Rodin (1969). When subjects were alone filling out the questionnaire, almost 70% offered to help the researcher. When subjects completed the questionnaire alongside a stooge instructed to act passively, only 7% offered help. 10 If Martha learned that (b) was a cause of her action, she would not F-accept the action. 3.2.3. Example 3: Influences on social judgements Judy is assessing the qualities of a candidate for a job vacancy. Judy makes a judgement that the candidate possesses a high degree of flexibility in solving problems. A cause of her action is: (c) Judy has been told that she will meet the candidate later. If event (c) had not occurred, Judy would have judged that the candidate had only an average degree of flexibility in problem-solving. This case matches a study by Nisbett and Bellows (1977). 11 Subjects were asked to read a file about the candidate and to make four judgements: to what degree the candidate was likeable, intelligent, sympathetic to others' feelings, and flexible in problem-solving. Five characteristics about the candidate were varied among different groups of subjects. For example half of the subjects were told that the candidate was physically attractive, while the other half were told nothing about the candidate's appearance. The other varied characteristics were: whether the candidate had an excellent academic record; whether she had spilled a cup of coffee during her interview; whether she had been in a serious car accident which still caused her pain; and whether the subject would later meet the candidate. 7 Darley and Batson 1973:105. 8 An agent F-accepts her action if she accepts it as her own, and is satisfied with that acceptance. Being satisfied is a matter of having no interest in making changes. See sections 2.1.3 and 2.1.4. 9 I'll often refer to this case as the market research case'. 10 For a discussion of these and other similar findings, see for example Doris 2002:32-33, Ross and Nisbett 1991:41-44, or Latané and Darley 1970. In section 3.8.5 I'll discuss the experimenters' attempts to explain the subjects' actions in studies like this one and the Good Samaritan' case above. 11 See Nahmias 2001:210-214 for more discussion of this experiment. This study also investigated the accuracy of the subjects' explanations of their own assessments – I'll discuss those findings in section 3.8.1. 32 Subjects who were told that they would meet the candidate judged her flexibility in problem-solving to be significantly higher than those who did not. 12 This is an example of a well-established tendency: people tend to give more favorable ratings on a number of dimensions to people whom they believe they are about to meet than to people whom they do not expect to meet. 13 If Judy learned that (c) was a cause of her action, she would not F-accept the action. Therefore (c) is a subverting cause of her action. 3.2.4. Example 4: Contextual priming Ingrid enters a room and interrupts a conversation which was already in progress between two other people. A cause of this action is: (d) A few minutes earlier, Ingrid was completing a word puzzle. Some of the words in the puzzle were connected with a theme of rudeness. If she had been completing a different word puzzle, Ingrid would not have interrupted the conversation. An experiment by Bargh, Chen and Burrows (1996) demonstrates this ―priming‖ effect. Subjects were asked to complete a short test in which they had form sentences from sets of scrambled words. After completing that test, they went into a different room to find the researcher, who was engaged in a conversation with a confederate. Of subjects whose puzzle included words connected with rudeness – such as brazen and obnoxious – more than 60% interrupted the conversation within ten minutes. Fewer than 20% of those whose puzzle contained words connected with politeness made an interruption. 14 If Ingrid learned that (d) was a cause of her action, she would not F-accept the action. 3.2.5. Example 5: Self-regulation and logical reasoning Gina gives up trying to solve a difficult problem she has been working on. A cause of her action is: (e) A few minutes earlier Gina resisted the temptation to eat the chocolate chip cookies which were on the table in front of her. If Gina had eaten the cookies, she would not have given up working on the problem. This example matches an experiment run by Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven and Tice (1998). Subjects required to refrain from eating chocolate cookies gave up much more quickly on a complex puzzle task than subjects who ate cookies, or subjects in a control group. Further related experiments appear to demonstrate that logical reasoning and ―selfregulation‖ (which includes resisting temptations) deplete the same inner resource. 15 For example if Gina had completed the complex puzzle first, she might now fail to resist the 12 Judgements about the candidate's intelligence were strongly correlated with the ―academic record‖ characteristic, as one would expect. However, the subjects' judgements about whether the candidate was likeable were most influenced by whether she had spilled her coffee during the interview. 13 Nisbett and Wilson 1977:222. 14 A third group of subjects completed a puzzle with only neutral words, none of which related to rudeness or politeness. Fewer than 40% of these subjects interrupted the conversation. For a discussion of similar effects, see for example Bargh 2008. 15 These effects are discussed in Baumeister 2008:69-74. 33 cookies. Alternatively, having earlier resisted the cookies successfully, she might now fail to resist eating a doughnut. Cause (e) is a subverting cause: if Gina learned that (e) was a cause of her action, she would not F-accept the action. 3.3. IMPORTANT FEATURES OF SUBVERTING CAUSES I've introduced five examples of actions with subverting causes. It will be useful discuss some of their most important features, since I will draw on these key cases extensively in my arguments. To recap, an action has subverting causes when it is true that: if the agent knew all the causes of her action, she would not F-accept the action. I stipulated that the five agents I described would not F-accept their effective desires, if they learned of the causes of their actions. I think this would be the natural reaction of many people in the same situation, but I do not claim that this must be true of everyone in the same situation. Some people performing the same action in the same situation would F-accept their effective desires if they learned of the causes; for these people the causes are not subverting. 16 3.3.1. Causes: necessary, proximate and relevant The causes of an action include any proximate, relevant event without which the action would not have occurred. The notion of causal proximity I'm employing here is the one which leads us to exclude events such as Columbus's discovery of a new continent in 1492, or events on the other side of the galaxy, from the set of causes of an action in Britain in 2010. The notion of causal relevance which I'm relying on is the one which leads us to discount as causes those events which are strictly necessary for an effect to occur, but are merely ―in the background‖. Such events are simply not relevant to the issue under investigation. For example, when the effect is an action and the issue is moral responsibility for it, the beating of the agent's heart and the arrival of photons on her retina are not relevant events. I won't try to define these notions of proximity and relevance more precisely; but I take it that we already employ these same notions in the everyday judgments we make about causes and effects when attributing moral responsibility. A cause can include an event within the agent's body, such as a brain haemorrhage or the growth of a brain tumour. Such events, if they are causes of actions, can be proximate, relevant and not in the background. To avoid cumbersome phrasing I won't always include the phrase ―proximate and relevant‖ when I speak of an action's causes, but I will always mean to pick out only those causes which are proximate and relevant. 3.3.2. Knowledge about the cause The definition of subverting causes invokes a counterfactual scenario in which the agent ―knew all the causes of her action‖. In this counterfactual the agent knows, of each cause, that the event occurred and also that the event was a cause of her action. I'll use the phrase ―to know all the causes of an action‖ to imply both of these kinds of knowledge about the cause. However, in the actual situation, the agent may or may not have either kind of knowledge. In all five of my key cases, the agent knows of the occurrence of the subverting 16 I'll discuss an interesting example of this kind in section 4.1. 34 cause. But a cause can still be subverting if the agent does not know of its occurrence. For example, a subliminal stimulus might be a subverting cause of an action. 17 In none of my key cases does the agent know that the cause was a cause of her action. But it is not essential to a cause's being subverting that the agent does not know it was a cause. For example, suppose an agent knows that she was experiencing a phobia when she acted, and that this was a cause of her action. Here, the known cause is a subverting cause if she does not identify with the action – i.e. if she does not F-accept the action as her own. In the counterfactual scenario, her knowledge of the cause is the same as it is in the actual situation. She still would not F-accept the action in that counterfactual scenario, and so the cause is a subverting cause. 3.3.3. Actions, reasons and causes There are two important and controversial issues about motivating reasons, on which I want to remain neutral. 18 The first is the question Are reasons causes of actions?'. The second is What is the metaphysical nature of reasons?'. Some philosophers hold that reasons are mental events or states, and that they are causes of actions. Others hold that reasons are not mental but external events or states, and that these are causes of actions. Still others hold that reasons are not causes of actions at all. I think my arguments and the definition of subverting causes can be theory-neutral', in the sense that they can be accepted no matter what one's position on these two issues about reasons. The claim about causes which I need for my arguments is that events which are not mental events or states can be causes of actions. For example, I claim that snowfall overnight can be a cause of Bob's putting on his boots this morning. This statement is compatible with the view that snowfall overnight is a reason for Bob's action. It is also compatible with the view that a reason for Bob's action is that he wants to stay warm and believes that putting on his boots will enable him to stay warm. And, furthermore, it is compatible with the view that Bob's desire to stay warm and his belief that the action will satisfy it are causes (or, jointly, a cause) of his action. 19 All that I require, for my claim about causes, is that the snowfall is a proximate and relevant event without which Bob would not have performed the action. In what follows I will usually avoid speaking of reasons for actions, focusing instead on causes of actions. An action which has a subverting cause may nevertheless be an intentional action, either in the sense that it is an action performed for a reason, or in the sense that the action has a reason as a cause. 20 For example, a cause of Ingrid's interrupting a conversation is that she completed a word puzzle shortly beforehand – a subverting cause. 21 This does not imply that the action is non-intentional; the action may well be performed for a reason, or have a reason as a cause. Furthermore, the reason may be a normatively good reason – either prudentially or morally good, or both. The presence of a subverting cause does not imply that the action is irrational. On one view of reasons and actions, the reason may be Ingrid's desire to go to meet someone, combined with a belief about how to satisfy that desire. On another view, the reason may be the fact that Ingrid has promised to meet someone. On either view, 17 A subliminal stimulus is one which cannot reach conscious awareness in the perceiver (in this definition I follow Dijksterhuis, Aarts, and Smith 2005). Nevertheless, subliminal stimuli can be perceived unconsciously. In a study by Karremans, Stroebe and Claus (2006), presenting subliminal images of the brand name of a drink influenced subjects to choose that brand if they were already thirsty. 18 By ―motivating reasons‖ I mean, broadly, reasons which actually motivate agents to act. These are often distinguished from ―normative reasons‖ which are (broadly) reasons in favour of acting, or which justify acting. 19 On a Davidsonian account, the desire and belief pair make up the primary reason, which is a cause of the action (Davidson 1963). 20 The latter is Davidson's definition of an intentional action. 21 See section 3.2.4. 35 the presence of the reason is compatible with the presence of a subverting cause. Ingrid's moral responsibility is subverted if she would not F-accept the action as truly her own, if she knew all of its causes. 3.4. MY ―MAIN ARGUMENT‖ AGAINST FRANKFURT My argument against Frankfurt involves three of the statements which I used to define his position in section 2.2, namely: (4) For direct moral responsibility for an action, the effective desire must be truly the agent's own (R→O). (5) F-acceptance of an effective desire is sufficient for its being truly the agent's own (A→O). 22 (6) F-acceptance of the effective desire is sufficient for direct moral responsibility (A→R). I will argue that (5) is false. From that, it follows that (6) is false if (4) – which is an identificationist axiom – is true. 23 If F-acceptance is not sufficient for an action being truly the agent's own, then F-acceptance is not sufficient for DMR for the action either (given that being truly the agent's own is necessary for DMR). My argument to show that (5) is false proceeds as follows. Using the five key cases discussed above, I aim to demonstrate that the agent's F-acceptance of an action (Frankfurt's identification condition) is not sufficient for the action's being truly her own. In each of the five cases, I claim that the agent does F-accept her action, but that the action is not truly her own because the action has a subverting cause. I'll defend each part of my argument separately. In the next section (3.4.1), I'll argue that the agent does F-accept her action, in each of the five key cases. Then in section 3.4.2 I'll argue that the action is not truly the agent's own, in each of the five cases. From this it follows, given (4), that the agents are not directly morally responsible for these actions. In section 3.4.3 I'll consider some objections to the conclusion that the agents in the five cases are not DMR for their actions. It's important to note that the conclusion is true if the premises are true for any action. To refute the argument, an objector would need to show, for all five key cases, that one of the premises is false. A single counterexample will be enough to establish my argument. I'll also defend my claim that the events (a) to (e), which I picked out in my descriptions of the five key cases, can indeed be causes of actions. Support for this claim in each case comes from the study which matches the action. However, five examples may not be enough to convince a doubter that such phenomena are genuine. Therefore, in section 3.6, I'll discuss a much wider range of experimental evidence for similarly subverting causes of actions. In sections 3.7 and 3.8 I'll defend my conclusions from that evidence against objections. This should establish my claims about the causes of the five cases as convincing. Furthermore, even if there are never in fact any subverting causes of actions, my argument nevertheless reveals something important about the conditions for direct moral responsibility. Simply considering the potential threat posed by subverting causes reveals that Frankfurt's identification condition (F-acceptance) is not sufficient for the action being truly the agent's own, and so not sufficient for direct moral responsibility, even if subverting causes do not in fact occur. The F-acceptance condition might in practice be perfectly correlated with 22 An agent F-accepts her action if she accepts it as her own, and is satisfied with that acceptance. Being satisfied is a matter of having no interest in making changes. 23 If ¬(A→O) while (R→O), then it follows that ¬(A→R). 36 DMR (setting aside conditions about history and normative competence), but it would not be logically sufficient for direct moral responsibility. But I aim to go further, and show that there are actual cases in which agents F-accept their actions but are not DMR for them, because the actions are not truly the agents' own. 3.4.1. Subverting causes and F-acceptance I'll begin by defending this claim: in each of the five key cases, the agent F-accepts her action, and hence Frankfurt's identification condition is met. In effect I have stipulated this as a fact about the agents in the five cases. But for my argument to be convincing it must also be plausible that, in five real-life cases matching the ones I've described, the agent F-accepts her effective desire to act, and so F-accepts her action. 24 This is plausible, because the cases are representative of actions that all of us perform every day. Agents who perform actions like these usually accept them as their own, and are satisfied with that acceptance, in the Frankfurtian sense of those phrases. None of the actions would seem remarkable, were it not for our knowing about the influence of the subverting cause. It may seem that, in some of the cases at least, the agent's lack of reflection upon her own effective desire might prevent her F-acceptance of it. But on Frankfurt's final account, Facceptance requires only that the agent be satisfied with the effective desire, in the sense that she has ―no interest in making changes‖. It's not necessary that the agent knows in advance of the action that she has that desire. 25 Nor is it necessary that the agent reflects on the desire after the action. For example, if Phoebe crosses the road to avoid some workmen on the pavement, all the while talking on her mobile phone, she may not at any time reflect on her effective desire to cross the road. Nevertheless, according to Frankfurt, she may F-accept that desire and be DMR for the action. Thus, F-acceptance is not precluded either by lack of awareness of, or by lack of reflection upon, one's effective desire. It might be claimed that the agents, in some of the examples, must feel uneasy or conflicted in some way about their actions – and that this prevents their satisfaction and F-acceptance. The thrust of the objection would be that feeling uneasy or conflicted about one's action indicates a lack of satisfaction with the effective desire. In reply I make two points. The first is that some of the agents in the examples might not feel at all uneasy. For example I think it's very plausible that Judy does not feel uneasy about her judgement of the job candidate's flexibility; the consequences of her action are not very grave. In the situations described in the other examples, it's easier to imagine agents who do feel conflicted about their actions. But, at the same time, I think it's still very plausible that some agents in those situations do not feel conflicted at all. Even if they reflected further on their actions, without of course learning about the subverting causes, they still would not feel conflicted. In section 3.8.2 below I'll discuss the phenomena of dissonance and confabulation, which may help to explain why some agents do not feel conflicted, even after an action with a subverting cause. But even without dissonance and confabulation effects, some agents may not feel conflicted if they simply do not reflect very carefully on their actions. For my argument, I need only a single instance of an agent who F-accepts an action with subverting causes. The second point I can make in reply to this objection is that feeling uneasy or conflicted about an action does not prevent identification with the effective desire. 26 We face many difficult decisions in everyday life, and we often feel conflicted about what to do, and 24 F-acceptance of the effective desire is equivalent to F-acceptance of the action – see section 2.1.4. 25 In fact Frankfurt holds that it is possible to be satisfied with, and so identified with, an unconscious desire (1992:99 and 1971:13). 26 I have in mind Frankfurt's theory here of course, but this is likely to be true on any plausible account of identification. 37 uneasy about whether we made the right choice. But that does not entail that we do not identify with the course of action we take, even if it follows a lot of anxious deliberation. After all, identification with one desire rather than another is one of the hallmarks of a successful conflict resolution. It is not always followed by a thoroughgoing inner peace. 3.4.2. Subverting causes and being truly the agent's own action I'll now defend my claim that, in each of the five examples, the action is not truly the agent's own. I make two points here. The first point is about knowledge. There are two scenarios in which the agent may or may not F-accept her action. The first of these is the actual situation, in which she does Faccept her action – as I discussed in the previous section. The second is the counterfactual scenario in which the agent learns of the subverting cause of the action, and does not F-accept it. The key question is: in which of these scenarios does her F-acceptance, or lack of it, best indicate whether the action is truly her own? The answer is: the counterfactual scenario. All of the events preceding the action are common to both the counterfactual scenario and the actual situation. But in the counterfactual scenario the agent has more knowledge, and that knowledge is relevant to her F-acceptance. If asked, the agent would prefer to have more knowledge (ceteris paribus). With more knowledge, her F-acceptance reflects more reliably whether the action is truly her own. If she does not F-accept it in that counterfactual scenario, then the action is not truly her own. I think followers of Frankfurt should accept this argument, since it employs the central elements from his own theory in a way which is consistent with the theory's objectives. My second point is that, in every example, knowing the role of the subverting cause, I would not judge that the action is truly the agent's own. Nor would most of the people with whom I've discussed the issue. Nor would I feel that the action was truly my own, if I were an agent in the same circumstances and I learned that the subverting cause was a cause of my action. In each case, without the presence of the subverting cause, the agent would have performed a different action. 27 In each case, had she learned that the subverting cause was a cause of her action, she would not have F-accepted the effective desire as her own. This shows that the effective desire, and so too the action, are not truly her own. I stipulated as a fact about the agents in the five key cases that they would not F-accept their actions, if they knew all the causes. I did not claim this would be true of everyone in the same situation. A single example in which it's true is enough to support my argument against Frankfurt. 3.4.3. Subverting causes and direct moral responsibility I have argued that statement (5) of Frankfurt's position is false: F-acceptance of an action is not sufficient for its being truly the agent's own. I combine this finding with the identificationist axiom (4) that, for direct moral responsibility for an action, the action must be truly the agent's own. From these two statements it follows that, contra Frankfurt, Facceptance is not sufficient for direct moral responsibility. 28 An obvious objection is that it seems wrong to excuse the agents in these five cases from DMR. It may well be, of course, that all of the agents did in fact feel themselves directly morally responsible for their action, since they did not know that the unendorsed cause was a 27 This follows from the definition of a cause in section 3.1: any proximate, relevant event without which the action would not have occurred. 28 If ¬(A→O) while (R→O), then it follows that ¬(A→R). Therefore statement (6) is false. 38 cause. But that is not enough for DMR, on the identificationist view that the action must be truly the agent's own. It's also true that we could hold the agents indirectly morally responsible for their action – via the tracing principle. For example, suppose we hold Gina indirectly morally responsible (TMR) for giving up working on the problem after resisting the cookies. 29 We might think that some earlier action, for which she is DMR, led to her giving up. Perhaps yesterday she noticed that she got distracted easily from her work, after sitting at a table where there were chocolate cookies in front of her. She resolved to put the cookies out of sight in future. But today, she chose again to work at the same table with the cookies in plain view, and resisted them once more. It might then be reasonable to hold Gina TMR for giving up today. 30 But even if we can hold Gina TMR for her action, this would not provide an objection to my conclusion, which is about direct moral responsibility. Moreover, the fact that Gina might be TMR for her action, because of some earlier action, helps to explain some of our intuitive reluctance to excuse her from moral responsibility. When we feel intuitively that someone is morally responsible for an action, we don't usually distinguish DMR from TMR. The feeling generally comes before we begin the process of working out why the agent is morally responsible – if indeed that process occurs at all. When an everyday action has a subverting cause, we may instinctively feel that the agent is morally responsible. But I suggest that feeling arises because we are so confident of our judgements about moral responsibility for similar everyday actions, in which we ignore subverting causes. After thinking carefully about whether actions with subverting causes are truly the agents' own, I believe the most common reaction will match mine. More importantly, I think followers of Frankfurt should accept my conclusion, for the reasons I gave above. Once again, a single counterexample is enough to establish my argument. Some other objections spring easily to mind. It's possible that – in some of the examples at least – the agent would feel herself to be directly morally responsible, even if she were told of the role of the subverting cause. A further objection employs the claim that the agent, in each of the five cases, is DMR because she is blameworthy for performing the action. These objections are not open to followers of Frankfurt, if they accept the identificationist axiom (4). 31 Nevertheless I will respond to these objections. I'll delay doing so until chapter 4, because my replies will draw on experimental evidence about subverting causes which I have not yet discussed. 3.5. MY POSITIVE PROPOSAL: THE CFA CONDITION In the last section I argued, against Frankfurt, that F-acceptance of the effective desire is not sufficient for direct moral responsibility for the agent's action. 32 I now offer a positive proposal. 33 I suggest that the following condition is necessary for direct moral responsibility: CFA The agent would F-accept the effective desire, at the time of acting, if he knew, at the time of acting, all the proximate and relevant causes of 29 See section 3.2.5. 30 Note that, on the tracing conditions discussed in section 1.2, Gina would bear traced moral responsibility only if the resultant occurrence of her later uncontrolled action was reasonably foreseeable by her at the time of an earlier action for which she was DMR. I'll say more about whether this is plausible in section 7.1.2. 31 Axiom (4): for direct moral responsibility for an action, the effective desire must be truly the agent's own. 32 An agent F-accepts his effective desire if he accepts it as his own, and is satisfied with that acceptance, where being satisfied is a matter of having no interest in making changes. See section 2.1.3. 33 My CFA condition is partly inspired by Nozick's notion of ―acts in equilibrium‖ (1981:348-352), though Nozick himself does not use it as part of a condition of freedom or moral responsibility. 39 that desire's being effective (except in so far as any additional knowledge gained gives him new information about means to satisfy his desires). After making three simplifications, a working version of this definition is: The agent would F-accept his action, if he knew all the proximate and relevant causes of the action. The first simplification is to substitute the action for the effective desire as the object of F-acceptance; these are equivalent for practical purposes. 34 The second simplification is to remove the clause in parentheses. This clause is designed to exclude knowledge which would make the agent regret his action, yet still feel that the action is truly his own; I'll discuss it in section 4.2. The third simplification merely removes the two clauses which specify that the agent's counterfactual knowing and F-acceptance would occur at the time of acting. In what follows I'll usually avoid the precise but clumsy phrasing in favour of the simpler definition. The definition of CFA is based on Frankfurt's identification condition, since his is the identificationist account I am disputing in my main argument. The important change I'm adding is that the F-acceptance required of the agent is now counterfactual. It seems likely to me that any identificationist theory of moral responsibility will need to incorporate a similar counterfactual condition, though I won't argue for that claim here. The phrase ―if he knew all the proximate and relevant causes‖ stands in need of clarification. The knowledge the agent has in the counterfactual scenario is more than simply knowledge of the existence of the causes of his action. He knows also that they are causes of his action. However, he need not understand how it is that these events are causes of his action: he need not understand all the causal connections and intermediary processes, nor be able to predict other scenarios in which the causes would be effective. Henceforth I'll use the phrase ―to know the causes‖ in this way. To recap, I'm focusing on three statements defining Frankfurt's position: (4) For direct moral responsibility for an action, the effective desire must be truly the agent's own (R→O). (5) F-acceptance of an effective desire is sufficient for its being truly the agent's own (A→O). (6) F-acceptance of the effective desire is sufficient for direct moral responsibility (A→R). In section 3.4 I argued that (5) is false, from which it follows that (6) is false if (4) is true. I now propose that the following statement is true: (7) The effective desire is truly the agent's own only if the CFA condition is met (O→CFA). From (7) and (4) it follows that: 35 (8) The agent is directly morally responsible for an action only if the CFA condition is met (R→CFA). Now, the following is also true: (9) It is not the case that F-acceptance of an effective desire is sufficient for the CFA condition to be met (¬(A→CFA)). 36 34 See section 2.1.4. 35 If (O→CFA), while (R→O), then (R→CFA). 40 From (9) and (8) we can also derive that (6) is false, which was my main conclusion in section 3.4. 37 I don't claim that the CFA condition is sufficient for DMR, or for the effective desire's being truly one's own. Nor do I claim that the CFA condition, in conjunction with Frankfurt's identification condition, are jointly sufficient for DMR (or being truly one's own). In fact, I think that conditions concerning the agent's history and normative competence are also necessary for an action's being one's own, and for DMR. 38 I argue only that CFA is necessary for direct moral responsibility, and that followers of Frankfurt should agree with me about this. 3.6. THE EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE I've already mentioned some experimental evidence that the CFA condition is sometimes not met, in the discussion of the five examples of subverting causes in section 3.2. This limited evidence will not be convincing without an appreciation of the wider pattern of research into which these experiments fit. In the remainder of this chapter I'll give an overview of that research. I have two specific objectives in doing so. First, I want to support the key premise of my main argument in section 3.4, by establishing that: (A) There are actions with subverting causes. Second, I want to establish a stronger claim that I'll use in my later ―sceptical argument‖ in chapter 7: (B) There are many everyday actions with subverting causes. I don't aim to mount a conclusive defence of either claim. I aim only to show that each one is extremely plausible. To support claim (A), I will demonstrate that: (A1) The five examples of subverting causes in section 3.2 are not isolated incidents which occur because of dubious experimental methods. Rather, they are representative of a large body of credible experimental evidence in mainstream fields of psychology. To establish that (B) is plausible, I will defend these subsidiary claims: (B1) There are good grounds to believe, on the basis of existing experimental evidence, that many everyday actions have subverting causes. (B2) There are good grounds to believe that there are many more subverting causes of everyday actions as yet undiscovered by experimenters. Claims (B1) and (B2) are interrelated. Both are matters of degree. The more plausible is claim (B1), the less support is required from claim (B2), in order to establish (B). The more plausible is claim (B2), the less support is required from claim (B1). Over the next several sections I'll present evidence which establishes claims (A1) and (B1) as extremely plausible. Finally, in section 3.8.6, I'll review that evidence and give a brief inductive argument in favour of claim (B2). 36 Some agents who do F-accept their effective desires, would not F-accept them if they knew all the causes – I argued for this in section 3.4.1. 37 From (R→CFA) and ¬(A→CFA) it follows that ¬(A→R), i.e. that (6) is false. From (7) and (9) we can also derive that Frankfurt's (5) is false: if (O→CFA) and ¬(A→CFA), it follows that ¬(A→O). 38 See sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2. 41 I'll begin by discussing situationist' psychology, the field in which three of the effects in my five key cases were discovered. 39 3.6.1. Situationist social psychology Researchers in the situationist' field of social psychology have, over the last sixty years, been amassing evidence that we make a ―fundamental attribution error‖ when explaining human actions. We often operate with [an] inflated belief in the importance of personality and character traits, together with [a] failure to recognize the importance of situational factors in affecting behavior. 40 The research offers support to the idea that we do, in practice, weigh an agent's personality and character traits very heavily when explaining and predicting her behaviour. At the same time, though, the research reveals that such explanations and predictions are often inaccurate. The examples I discuss are only a tiny sample of that research. 41 Philosophers have perhaps been a little slow to address the implications of situationist research. 42 Most of the (limited) philosophical engagement with situationism has focused primarily on the implications for virtue ethics, and the influence of the agent's character on his ethical behaviour. Few philosophers have addressed the implications of situationist research for free will and moral responsibility. The most notable exceptions are Nahmias, Doris and Nelkin. 43 Nahmias and Doris propose positive theories which take account of the findings from situationist research. I address their theories in sections 5.1 and 5.2. It's important to stress at the outset of my discussion that I am not claiming that character traits do not exist. Nor am I claiming that character traits never help to explain or predict agents' actions. Few (if any) situationist psychologists would make such strong claims. Nor do I need to claim that personality or character traits are only rarely causes of actions; nor that they are causes less often than situational factors. 44 In fact my argument has little to do with personality and character traits at all. I'll briefly describe two important situationist studies, in order to give an impression of the scope of the effects which have been discovered. One of the most striking situationist experiments was first performed by Stanley Milgram in 1960. The experiment has been repeated many times, by Milgram and by other researchers, sometimes with small variations from the original. A representative description is 39 To recap these examples very briefly: Samantha walks past a slumped man after being told that she is running late for her presentation; Martha ignores the cries of a researcher because someone is sitting passively next to her; and Judy judges that a job candidate possesses a high degree of flexibility after being told that she will meet the candidate later. See sections 3.2.1 to 3.2.3. 40 Ross and Nisbett 1991:4. 41 My discussion draws heavily on Ross and Nisbett's classic 1991 textbook' of situationism, and also on the lengthy reviews of situationist research in Nahmias 2001 and Doris 2002. My aim here is merely to reflect the key themes and issues, which I will cover in much less depth than these authors. 42 Doris comments that ―moral philosophers have not typically engaged [with] empirical psychology in anything remotely approaching the depth required to see exactly where and how it might matter for ethics‖ (2002:4). Even Milgram's extraordinary findings (discussed below), which have obvious ethical significance, have been little discussed by philosophers – see Doris 2002:39. 43 Nahmias (2001) discusses the problems for free will posed by situationist research. Doris (2002 ch.7) discusses the problems posed for responsibility. Nelkin (2005) discusses both free will and responsibility, but does not propose a positive theory of either. 44 Whether these claims are true is likely to depend on the breadth of the notion of personality and character traits being employed. Situationism ―denies that people typically have highly general personality traits that effect behavior manifesting a high degree of cross-situational consistency‖ (Doris 2002:38-39, my italics). 42 as follows. 45 A stooge confederate of the research team plays the role of a volunteer who is trying to learn a series of word associations (the ―learner‖). Under the guidance of an ―experimenter‖ (often wearing a lab coat), the subject is instructed to administer an electric shock to the learner every time the latter gives an incorrect answer to a question. 46 The intensity of the shocks increases as the task continues, so that eventually the subject dispenses shocks labelled on the equipment as ―375 volts‖ and ―Danger: severe shock‖. The stooge learner does not actually receive the shocks, but nevertheless acts convincingly by appealing more and more urgently for the shocks to stop, pleading that he should be excused because of a heart condition, and finally falling silent as the voltage reaches the most dangerous levels. A typical result of the experiment is that about two-thirds of subjects will continue to administer shocks all the way to the very highest levels. 47 The conclusion drawn by situationists is that the subjects are influenced to a remarkable degree by certain factors in the situation, rather than that they are displaying a remarkable degree of callousness in their characters. Some of these factors, when varied, correlate strongly with the number of compliant subjects. For example in one study, when the ―experimenter‖ was in a different room and gave instructions by telephone, only 21% of subjects administered the shocks to the end. 48 Another totem of situationist literature is the Stanford Prison Experiment' run by Philip Zimbardo in 1971. 49 Twenty-one volunteers were divided randomly into two groups at the start of the experiment – ―prisoners‖ and ―guards‖. The intention was to run a simulation of a prison for two weeks, using rooms in an empty part of Stanford University's psychology department as the ―cells‖. The simulation was terminated after six days, following what can be fairly described as ―a precipitous descent into barbarism‖. 50 The guards behaved sadistically. The prisoners rebelled, and one staged a hunger strike. Five prisoners had to be released early from the experiment because they were acutely distressed. Even a former convict playing only a minor role in the simulation, as a ―parole board chairman‖, found himself sickened by his own actions. 51 These extreme effects are all the more startling when we consider that all the participants knew they were taking part in a time-limited simulation, from which they could withdraw at any time, and which was not especially realistic in many ways – there was no physical punishment of prisoners, the ―cells‖ were ordinary rooms, and there were no high walls around the university. It is difficult to draw precise conclusions from the Stanford Prison Experiment, because – unlike the other experiments I've described – there were many situational factors at work simultaneously, and no control conditions against which their influence could be compared. Nevertheless it seems reasonable to conclude that, when many situational factors work together, the effects can be very significant. 3.6.2. Influences processed automatically Meanwhile psychological research is revealing that our actions can be influenced in very surprising ways by influences which are processed automatically or unconsciously. Many disparate effects have been discovered, which are not easily summarised by a single 45 For much more detailed discussions of Milgram's experiment, see Ross and Nisbett 1991:52-58 or Doris 2002:39-51. 46 No coercive pressure is applied; although subjects are given insistent instructions by the ―experimenter‖ in the lab coat, they are free to desist at any point without threat of sanctions. 47 Doris 2002:45. 48 Doris 2002:46. 49 Discussed in Doris 2002:51-53. For the fullest (astonishing and unforgettable) account of the experiment, see Zimbardo 2007 chapters 2 to 11. 50 Doris 2002:53. 51 Zimbardo 2009. 43 description or label. Moreover, it is too early to expect comprehensive theories to explain these effects, since many of them have only recently been researched (in the last decade). In section 3.2.4 I discussed one example of contextual priming, in which Ingrid interrupts the experimenter after completing the rudeness-themed word puzzle. This particular effect seems to work because Ingrid's mood is influenced by the content of the priming event (the words in the puzzle). Other studies have shown that agents' goals can be primed too, sometimes even subliminally (so that the subjects are not consciously aware of the existence of the priming event). For example, a 2001 study found that subliminal priming of the goal of co-operation causes participants playing the role of a fishing company to voluntarily put more fish back into a lake in order to replenish the fish population, compared to a control condition. 52 It may be that these effects confer a benefit to us as individuals by helping to ensure that our moods, goals and actions are well matched with those of our social group, which we pick up through a host of subtle cues which need not be processed consciously. Such explanations are somewhat speculative, though, since this area of research is still relatively young. In one of my key cases, Gina gives up on a problem after resisting an opportunity to eat chocolate cookies (an act of self-control or self-regulation). 53 A series of similar experiments reveal that logical reasoning in the service of making deliberate, conscious choices appears to deplete the same resource used for self-regulation. 54 A speculative explanation for this state of affairs is that a powerful but energy-intensive neurological system evolved to enable one of these functions in humans (perhaps it was selfregulation – the ability to override automatic behavioural impulses). This same system was later adapted to perform a second function (perhaps logical reasoning and decision-making evolved later than self-regulation). A more famous experiment shows how automatic arousal processes can influence our actions in unexpected ways. 55 The subjects were single men in a park who had been given a spurious explanation of the purpose of the study. The attractive female researcher offered to explain the study in more detail when she had more time, and gave them her phone number. One group of subjects met the woman on a footbridge over a deep gorge which swayed in the wind; a control group met her beside a park bench. Of the men on the bridge, 57% called to speak to the researcher again; only 30% of the control group did so. The apparent explanation is that the men on the swaying bridge were physiologically aroused by fear or exhilaration, and found the researcher more attractive as a result: By failing to recognize why they were aroused, people were more attracted to someone than they would otherwise have been. 56 Needless to say, the subjects did not suspect that the location of the meeting might have influenced their action. 52 Bargh 2008:143. 53 See section 3.2.5. 54 Baumeister 2008:73. 55 Dutton and Aron (1974). For a discussion of this study, see for example Wilson 2002:100-102. 56 Wilson 2002:102. 44 Meanwhile studies of automatic attitudes show that our preferences and choices can be influenced by some very surprising factors. It seems that automatic processes provide evaluations of stimuli in our environment, and that these evaluations can influence our actions in ways which we do not recognise. For example a 2005 study found significant correlations between voter ratings of the competence of political candidates and the facial appearance of those candidates. 57 Other recent studies have found that compared to what you'd expect by chance alone, there are more people named Ken who moved to live in Kentucky, Florences who moved to Florida, and more named Louis who moved to St. Louis; there are more Dennises and Denises who become dentists and Lauras and Lawrences who become lawyers, compared to people with names that do not share letters with these occupations. 58 In a 2006 study, student subjects read a fictitious newspaper article about another student who had won a prestigious award in mathematics. Some subjects read that they shared their birthday with the fictitious award winner. At the end of the semester, those subjects gained higher average grades in mathematics than students in the control group – presumably because their studying activities were influenced by reading the article. These different kinds of study have in common the finding that actions can be influenced by unexpected factors because of the mediating role of automatic processes. Such an influence is a cause of an action if the agent would not have performed the action in the absence of that influence. It's clear that the influences in these studies are causes in that sense, at least for many of the subjects in each experiment. It seems to me very likely that many of the agents in these studies would regard the causes of their actions as subverting: if they knew of these causes, they would not F-accept their actions. 3.7. OBJECTIONS TO MY CLAIMS ABOUT SUBVERTING CAUSES I'll now discuss some objections to the claims I introduced at the start of section 3.6, which were: (A) There are actions with subverting causes. (B) There are many everyday actions with subverting causes. Those claims are supported by the experimental evidence which I've reviewed in the previous two sections. My discussion of the objections and responses will be similarly brief. 59 My aim is to establish that the claims above are very plausible, not to provide a conclusive defence of them. 3.7.1. The claims contradict common sense The first and most obvious objection is that these claims, and often indeed even the very results of the experiments, contradict common sense. In other words they contradict the way we habitually think about, and what we think we know about, human actions. That it contradicts common sense is not a very convincing objection to an experimental discovery. All of the sciences, including psychology, have revealed truths which contradicted previous common sense. It's particularly difficult, though, for us to accept challenges to our 57 The studies in this paragraph are discussed in more detail in Bargh 2008:136-140. 58 Bargh 2008:139. 59 Many of these issues are covered in greater detail by Doris (2002 chapters 1 to 3) and Nahmias (2001 chapter 3). 45 commonsense view of action. Action is a phenomenon with which we feel intimately acquainted. At least in familiar everyday actions, we believe that we know the causes and that they are not subverting. We need more than experimental results to convince us that such important beliefs are mistaken. What we need, as well, are explanations of how and why we form these mistaken beliefs. As I'll discuss below (section 3.8), psychologists are beginning to provide these explanations. Meanwhile, it's important to stress that the experiments I have discussed provide only a tiny sample of the research findings in each relevant field of psychology. I selected, for the examples in section 3.2 on which I built my argument, experiments which demonstrate striking effects which can clearly be attributed to a single variable. But any one of the experiments I have quoted could later be discredited without undermining my confidence in the claims I made above, if the research in the broader field remains sound. In case my claims may seem too strong, it's worth contrasting them with some claims that I'm not making. Take the example of Samantha who walks past the slumped man on her way to give a talk on the Good Samaritan. 60 I'm not claiming that everyone in the same situation as Samantha would walk past the slumped man after being told of their lateness for a talk. Nor am I claiming that most people would walk past the slumped man. 61 Nor am I claiming that being told of their lateness is the variable which correlates most strongly with that action. 62 All I need for my claim (A) is that the subverting cause can be a cause of the action, for at least one person. I think it would be implausible to deny that claim. To support claim (B), I need only that there are many actions with similarly subverting causes. 3.7.2. The evidence is gathered in artificial conditions A second objection is that since the experimental results occur in artificial conditions, my claims are applicable only to actions in such conditions, and not to everyday actions. I think this is implausible. It's true that the experiments which match my examples in section 3.2 were conducted by academic researchers, with subjects who know they have volunteered for some kind of research (though they often do not understand the real purpose of the experiment until after the results have been captured). However, there are many experiments with similar results in which the subjects are not volunteers, and are unaware that their actions are being studied. 63 Meanwhile in many studies there is also evidence that, even though they know that they are taking part in a research experiment, the subjects treat their decisions and actions seriously. For example, in Milgram's experiments described above, the subjects often displayed signs of great and genuine distress (yet most continued to obey the experimenter). 64 For less dramatic actions than administering electric shocks, such as giving up on problems, interrupting people in conversations, and expressing judgements about interview candidates, I think it's even more plausible that the same subverting causes can operate in their everyday equivalents. The best reason to think otherwise is simply that we do not expect these actions to be influenced by subverting causes. But that very fact also helps to explain why we do not notice their influence. We don't notice that actions like these correlate with factors like the availability of cookies or the content of a word puzzle. We don't notice the correlations precisely because these factors seem to be inconsequential. 60 See section 3.2.1. 61 Of course, in the experiment conducted by Darley and Batson, most subjects in Samantha's situation did walk past the slumped man. 62 In fact, Darley and Batson also tested for correlations with a personality measure (tested by questionnaire), and with the topic of the talk (which was varied for some subjects). The only factor which correlated significantly with the subjects' actions was being told whether they were late. See Darley and Batson 1973:104-106. 63 A famous situationist example is the dime in a phone booth' experiment described in section 4.1 below. 64 Ross and Nisbett 1991:55. 46 3.7.3. The results must reflect character differences in subjects A third objection is that the experimental results must reflect personality or character differences in the subjects, rather than (or perhaps as well as) the situational factors, priming events and so forth which the experimenters identify as causes. 65 It's important to acknowledge that, in the fields I've discussed, most experiments test a single optional action (e.g. the subject administers the shock, or refuses to do so) against a series of potentially correlated factors (e.g. the subject meets or does not meet the person being shocked; the experimenter wears a white lab coat or casual attire; the experiment is held in a university psychology lab or a dingy basement). This kind of experiment cannot test whether the subject's action in the experiment correlates with any of her other actions. For example, we cannot say whether subjects who administer the full set of shocks in a Milgram-style experiment also walk past people slumped in doorways more often than subjects who refuse to administer all the shocks. To compensate for this practical limitation, experimenters often test for correlations between subjects' actions and their age, sex, socio-economic background, and reported personality measures – all of which I'll call ―dispositional‖ factors. One of the most important general lessons to be drawn from situationist research is that dispositional factors correlate much less strongly with observed behaviour than the subjects themselves would expect. 66 Sometimes the experimenters find no significant correlations with dispositional factors. 67 Furthermore, there is a very large number of experiments in which dispositional factors correlate much less strongly with subjects' actions than do situational factors. 68 This, of course, is more than we need in order to say with confidence that the situational factor is a cause of the action for some of the subjects. Any significant correlation between situational factor and observed action would provide us with confidence that the situational factor is sometimes a cause of the action. We expect – naively, according to situationists – that dispositional factors correlate much more strongly with actions than situational factors. If that were true, we should expect to find agents performing similar actions in widely differing situations. In fact there have been relatively few studies which test consistency of subjects' behaviour in several different situations. 69 One classic study tested a group of school children in a range of situations in which they could choose whether to act honestly. 70 For example they had the opportunity to steal money from an empty classroom, to lie to help a fellow pupil, and to cheat in various different ways in tests. Relying on common sense, one would predict a high degree of crosssituational consistency, reflecting the character trait of honesty. In fact, subjects behaved very consistently across situations which were very similar indeed. They were much less consistent then expected across situations which were only somewhat similar. For example: A particular form of cheating, such as copying from an answer key, might correlate strongly (.70) with copying from a key on a similar test at a later 65 Doris discusses this objection in some detail in relation to the Milgram experiments (2002:47-49). 66 I'll discuss some of the evidence for this point in section 3.8.1 below. See also Ross and Nisbett 1991 chapters 1 and 5. 67 See for example Latané and Darley 1970 chapter 12. 68 See Ross and Nisbett 1991 chapter 1 for an insightful discussion of correlations and ―effect sizes‖. 69 Such studies are complex, expensive and time-consuming – see Ross and Nisbett 1991:98. 70 For a more detailed discussion of this 1928 study of honesty by Hartshorne and May, see Doris 2002:24 and 62-64, and Nahmias 2001:197-198. For studies of the consistency of other dispositional traits, see Ross and Nisbett 1991:96-100. 47 date, but not correlate strongly (.29) with another form of cheating, such as continuing to work on a speed test after time is called. 71 Meanwhile experiments which compare actual behaviour with self-reports, or peer assessments of personality traits, typically find much lower correlations than would be expected using common sense. 72 However, it is important to repeat that I do not need to claim, and indeed I do not claim, that dispositional factors never correlate strongly with actions. Nor do I claim that situational factors usually correlate more strongly with actions than do dispositional factors. My claims (A) and (B) are about the existence and prevalence of subverting causes. In the example cases in section 3.2, and in experimental scenarios like those in the Milgram and Zimbardo studies, what matters to my argument is not the presence or absence of correlations between actions and dispositional factors. What I claim is that the agents of some of these actions would not Faccept their effective desires, if they knew all the causes of the actions. It may well be that there is some correlation between the agent's propensity to perform the action and a dispositional factor. But that relationship is not relevant to the truth of my claims. I do think it is plausible to conclude, from situationist research, that situational factors sometimes correlate more strongly with actions than dispositional factors. But in fact I do not need even that conclusion in order to support my claims (A) and (B) – which are strictly claims about the prevalence of subverting causes. 73 Hence, while I think the assertion made in this objection is implausible, it does not in fact threaten my argument. 3.8. ERRORS IN OUR EXPLANATIONS OF ACTIONS I have defended the following claims: (A) There are actions with subverting causes. (B) There are many everyday actions with subverting causes. I've discussed some of the positive evidence which supports (A) and (B), and dealt with some objections to drawing them as conclusions from the evidence. The claims are difficult to believe, and the positive evidence for them is so surprising, because we think we know why we act. We think we know the reasons for our actions, and we think we know the causes of our actions. There is a conflict between those strongly-held intuitions and the evidence I've discussed above. In such conflicts, we are usually inclined to doubt the evidence more readily than to doubt our intuitions. To come to believe that the fault lies in our intuitions, we need something more: an explanation of how our intuitions often come to be mistaken. In this section I'll discuss several parts of that explanation, together with an overview of the evidence supporting them. Some of that evidence has been discovered relatively recently, and I suspect the explanation will become more and more plausible with further advances in research. I won't discuss the evidence in great detail: my objective is simply to give an overview of the research in each field, and to show why it helps to make plausible my claims (A) and (B). I'll begin with evidence from situationist experiments that we do make mistakes when we predict and explain actions. 71 Doris 2002:64. 72 See Ross and Nisbett 1991:98-9, or Doris 2002:63. 73 By way of comparison, Doris makes much stronger claims than my (A) and (B). For example: ―In very many situations it looks as though personality is less than robustly determinative of behavior. To put things crudely, people typically lack character‖ (2002:2). 48 3.8.1. Errors in explanation and prediction of actions In a study by Nisbett and Bellows (1977), college students were asked to assess someone (a fictional candidate called Jill') for suitability for a job. 74 The assessments were based on a file of written reports about her application and a prior interview. Jill was rated on four criteria: intelligence, flexibility, sympathy and likeability. Five factors in Jill's file were manipulated: her academic credentials, whether she was described as attractive, whether she spilled her coffee during the interview, whether she had recently been involved in an accident, and whether the subject would later meet Jill. One group of subjects (the ―actors‖) read the file, gave ratings of Jill, and also reported on which factors had influenced those ratings. A second group (―observers‖) did not view the file on Jill, but merely estimated which factors would influence them if they were making such ratings. The ―actors‖ reported that Jill's academic credentials were the factor which most influenced their rating of Jill's intelligence, and indeed there was a strong correlation between those credentials and ratings of intelligence. However, their reports were much less reliable predictors of the other three ratings. For example, ―actors‖ reported that academic credentials also had most influence on their rating of her flexibility; in fact by far the most important factor in that rating was whether they were told that they would later meet Jill. Perhaps the most interesting result was that ―observer‖ subjects' predictions of how they would rate the various factors were statistically identical to the actors' reported ratings. Hence, observers' ratings were also inaccurate (except for the effect of academic credentials), but no less accurate than those of the actors who actually experienced the various factors in judging Jill. Nisbett and Bellows interpret these results as evidence that the actors did not actually use the reasons they reported when they judged the candidates. Rather, they were unaware of how various factors influenced most of their judgments, and they retrospectively theorized about these influences in the same way the observers theorized about what factors would influence them. And in both cases, the theories were generally mistaken. 75 Findings like these suggest that discrepancies can arise between the factors which we think are causes of our actions, and the factors which really are causes. Over the next four sections, I'll discuss some explanations of that fact. 3.8.2. Dissonance, confabulation, and rationalisation Cognitive dissonance arises when there is some conflict between our actions and our attitudes, beliefs or desires. Research experiments show that we tend to revise our attitudes, beliefs and desires in order to resolve this conflict. 76 The effect is often so strong that we forget what our original attitudes, desires and beliefs were: we imagine instead that the attitudes we form after the action are the ones we had beforehand. For example, people asked to make a speech or write an essay defending a view they do not hold will often subsequently take up that view, and then (mistakenly) believe that it is the view they held before beginning the task. The phenomenon of dissonance helps to explain why we fail to notice errors in our predictions about our own future actions. It also helps to explain why we may sometimes F- 74 One of my five key cases is based on this experiment – see section 3.2.3. For a more detailed discussion of this experiment, see Nahmias 2001:210-214. 75 Nahmias 2001:212. 76 For more details of research on cognitive dissonance and confabulation, see for example Wegner 2002:171186. 49 accept an action which we did not expect to perform. Consider Samantha in the Good Samaritan' example. 77 If we had asked, beforehand, about her attitude to someone walking past a slumped man when running late to give a talk, it's likely that she would have regarded the action as ethically wrong. However, if we ask her attitude after she herself has performed that action, she may well regard it as acceptable in the circumstances – because of a dissonance effect. But at the same time, dissonance seems to pose a threat to my proposed CFA condition. CFA The agent would F-accept his action, if he knew all the proximate and relevant causes of the action. 78 After her action, Samantha may F-accept it, even though she would not have done so beforehand. This seems to present an obstacle to determining whether the action is truly her own. This problem can be overcome, I think, by stressing that the test of F-acceptance in the counterfactual scenario applies at the time of acting. We are interested in whether the agent would F-accept her action if she learned of its causes at the same time as she performs it. (Of course, this test cannot be carried out in practice; but since it is a counterfactual test, that does not matter.) A possible experiment to simulate the counterfactual scenario might be hampered by dissonance. A delay between performing the action and learning of its causes might also allow a dissonance effect to occur in the agent. Therefore, it's often useful to compare agents' reports with the attitudes of people who have not performed the action themselves. We can examine our own reactions to each of the five key cases I've discussed. Imagining ourselves in those situations, most of us would expect not to F-accept our actions. Another interesting psychological effect, apparently related to dissonance, is confabulation of explanations for acting. 79 An agent who lacks a plausible explanation for her own action will often confabulate one when asked – in other words, she will simply invent a suitable explanation. Furthermore, since confabulations are not deliberate, she will usually not realise that the confabulated explanation is invented. In many cases the confabulated explanation is also spurious (false). Thus Samantha, if asked why she did not stop to help the slumped man, might give as a reason that he looked threatening; she might believe this explanation, despite it being entirely false. Working with people who had undergone commissurotomy (so-called split-brain' patients), Michael Gazzaniga suggested that confabulation is a function performed in the left hemisphere of the brain. 80 That it can occur in normal people in everyday situations has been shown in various experiments. A classic example is Nisbett and Wilson's work on the ―position effect‖. 81 In one experiment, people in a shopping mall were asked to select their preferred pair of nylon stockings from four options on a table. The subjects were not told that the pairs were in fact all identical. The distribution of subjects' choices was heavily skewed toward the pair farthest to the right (this is the position effect). Asked to explain their choice, none of the subjects reported the position of the stockings as a factor. When position was suggested to them as a possible factor, almost all denied that it could have been. They pointed instead to superior colour, texture, quality of workmanship and so forth – all spurious reasons, since the stockings were identical. These are the sorts of explanations which we believe are 77 See section 3.2.1. 78 This is the simplified version of the condition – see section 3.5. 79 It seems that we often confabulate intentions to act, as well as explanations for acting. 80 For accounts of Gazzaniga's work and other research on commissurotomy patients, see for example Wegner 2001:181-184, Feinberg 2001:90-105 and Mackay 1987. 81 For an account of these and other similar findings, see Nisbett and Wilson 1977, or Nahmias 2001:175-177 and 208-214. 50 important in our decision-making, and so – naturally enough – they are the sorts of explanations we give when asked to provide one. Experiments of this kind demonstrate that introspection is not always a reliable guide to our own reasons for acting. Why do we not notice that we confabulate so readily? Part of the answer is that we confabulate only when we need to give some explanation for an action – if we are asked to give a reason, for example, or if we question ourselves about it. Many of our actions are simply not explained to anyone, and so there is no need for a spurious explanation, nor any opportunity to doubt it. Samantha might well not confabulate a reason if she is not questioned about her action. Meanwhile the usefulness of action-explanations does not depend only on their accuracy. One purpose of action-explanation is to influence the reactions of other people. Confabulation facilitates effective ―interpersonal influence‖, and it may be that this gain outweighs the potential benefits from more accurate explanations of our actions. 82 A similar and more familiar effect occurs before acting. Suppose Jon is offered a promotion to a new job based on the other side of the country. He decides to decline the offer, citing the reason that he does not want to move from his current home. However, his best friend suspects that the real reason why Jon declined the promotion was that he did not want to accept the extra responsibility and stress which that role would have entailed. A fortnight later, Jon accepts an offer of a similar but less demanding job – despite the fact that this job also requires that he move home. It seems that Jon's explanation for declining the first job was false. What may have happened, before Jon declined the first offer, is that he reached a plausible and acceptable – but false – explanation for his action. He rationalised an acceptable reason. Sometimes agents rationalise deliberately in order to mislead others about their real reasons for acting. Sometimes agents rationalise unintentionally in order to avoid thinking about uncomfortable reasons for acting, to justify an action which they feel uncertain about, or to justify an action which they want to perform despite a lack of acceptable reasons. 83 Rationalisation, confabulation and dissonance are three parts of the explanation for our lack of awareness that our actions sometimes have subverting causes. The next part of the explanation is even less transparent to us when we act. 3.8.3. The hidden role of automatic processes In section 3.6.2 I reviewed some specific examples of the influence on actions of unconscious automatic processes. I'll now discuss some of the broader implications of this research, specifically in so far as it suggests that our explanations of actions are inaccurate or incomplete. In the early twentieth century, Freud proposed that unconscious motives, which the agent cannot report on, often generate actions. This central idea has remained influential, while many of Freud's suggestions about how and why the unconscious mind influences thoughts and actions have fallen out of favour. Freud famously compared the human mind to an iceberg: we are aware only of a small conscious part which lies above the surface, as it were, while a vast unconscious part lies hidden beneath. In last few decades many important advances have been made in the study of ―automatic‖ processes of which we are not consciously aware. Psychologist Timothy Wilson, who carried out some of the most influential studies in the field, summarises the modern view colourfully: 82 See Baumeister 2008:76-78 for discussion of the relationship between action-explanations and social interaction. 83 Haidt discusses the phenomenon of ―motivated reasoning‖ in more detail (2006:63-66). 51 When [Freud] said ... that consciousness is the tip of the mental iceberg, he was short of the mark by quite a bit – it may be more the size of a snowball on top of that iceberg. The mind operates most efficiently by relegating a good deal of high-level, sophisticated thinking to the unconscious ... The adaptive unconscious does an excellent job of sizing up the world, warning people of danger, setting goals, and initiating action in a sophisticated and efficient manner. 84 John Bargh, another pioneer in this field, concludes that conscious thoughts are not causes of some actions: conscious acts of will are not necessary determinants of social judgment and behavior; neither are conscious processes necessary for the selection of complex goals to pursue, or for the guidance of those goals to completion. Goals and motivations can be triggered by the environment, without conscious choice or intention, then operate and run to completion entirely nonconsciously, guiding complex behavior in interaction with a changing and unpredictable environment, and producing outcomes identical to those that occur when the person is aware of having that goal. 85 Some researchers have gone even further, and suggested that conscious thoughts may be entirely epiphenomenal – that they are never causes of actions. Psychologist Daniel Wegner recently created controversy by appearing to entertain that view. 86 Neuroscientist Benjamin Libet has also stirred a great deal of debate with an ingenious experiment from which he concludes that conscious intentions ―to act now‖ occur late in the sequence of processes which lead to action – too late for them to be causally effective. 87 No part of my argument requires the claim that conscious thoughts are always epiphenomenal. 88 My claims are that subverting causes are sometimes (or often) among the causes of actions. 89 These claims are compatible with the possibility that conscious thoughts are always among the causes of actions. It may be that both a conscious thought and a subverting cause are causes of an action – in the sense that both are necessary for the action. Or it may be that in some cases a conscious thought is a sufficient cause of an action, but the subverting cause is a cause of that conscious thought. 90 All of these possibilities are compatible with my claim that actions sometimes (or often) have subverting causes. It seems to me that automatic processes themselves are often causes of actions. However, I don't need this claim, so I don't rely on it. 91 In section 3.3 I defined causes of actions as proximate, relevant events without which the action would not have occurred. An objector may take the view that automatic processes are part of the background' conditions, and that the relevance condition is not met, so that automatic processes cannot be causes of 84 Wilson 2002:6-7 (my italics). The ―adaptive unconscious‖ is Wilson's collective term for the huge number of unconscious processes which facilitate conscious thoughts and actions. 85 Bargh 2005:52. 86 See Wegner's response (2004b) to criticisms by Jack and Robbins (2004) and Kihlstrom (2004), among others. Mele (2009) carefully unpacks some of Wegner's statements which suggest that conscious thoughts may be epiphenomenal, before criticising them. 87 See for example Libet 2002. For criticisms of Libet's philosophical conclusions, see for example Dennett 2003a chapter 8, or Mele 2009 chapter 4. 88 In fact I think that claim is extremely unlikely to be correct. 89 These are my claims (A) and (B) from section 3.6. 90 In such a case the subverting cause is a cause of the action, if it is proximate to the action in the sense discussed in section 3.3. 91 I think that some of those processes are subverting causes of actions, but I don't rely on that claim either. For a review of the research on automatic processes which has implications for responsibility and freedom, see for example Bargh 2005 and 2008, or Suhler and Churchland 2009. 52 actions. Even if that is conceded to the objector, though, there are three further points which I think are undeniable. First, automatic processes play an essential role in the causation of many actions. Even if we don't acknowledge them as causes in their own right, it is clear that automatic processes mitigate and facilitate the causation of actions by factors which we do consider to be causes. Second, agents are not aware of the operation of automatic processes. Third, agents do not understand the function of many automatic processes. Bearing these points in mind, it is plausible that agents would sometimes be surprised to learn about the causes of their actions, even if we exclude automatic processes from consideration as causes. Since the operation of automatic processes is opaque to us, we cannot introspect the entire process by which any action is caused. Sometimes we know of a possible cause, and the action, and we incorrectly infer causation. Further insight into this inference is provided by the work of psychologist Daniel Wegner, which I'll discuss next. 3.8.4. Our experience of agency According to Wegner, our experience of having acted – which I call the ―experience of agency‖ – does not arise from introspective access to causal processes. 92 Instead, on Wegner's ―theory of apparent mental causation‖, an agent's experience of agency is inferred from a correlation between his prior conscious thoughts about the action and his awareness of the action taking place. 93 There are three key factors in the interpretation. The first is priority: a relevant conscious thought, such as an intention, occurs before the action. The second factor is consistency between the prior thought and the action. The third is exclusivity: the action is not accompanied by other potential causes. I can't do justice to the evidence for Wegner's theory here, let alone defend it properly. But, broadly speaking, there are three sources of evidence for the theory. One is experiments in the psychology lab, where the priority, consistency and exclusivity factors can be carefully adjusted, and the subject's experience of agency is altered as a result. Another source of evidence is instances outside the laboratory where the experience of agency doesn't reflect actual causation of action. For example, Doug uses dowsing rods to locate underground water. He walks around holding two metal rods, and when the rods move he thinks that movement is caused by water under the ground. In fact Doug moves the rods himself by tilting them very slightly, but he has no experience of agency. On the other hand, Doug sometimes experiences agency when he is not causally effective – for example when he clutches his lucky charm to help his football team to score a goal. The third source of evidence comes from the physical structure and evolution of the human brain. It seems likely that the ability to experience agency – which enables us to pick out our own actions and accept responsibility for them – is a relatively recent addition. The experience is most useful in animals which live in complex social groups, and can communicate the experience or its impact. Wegner suggests that most of our mammal ancestors had no use for such an experience. On the other hand, it's likely that we share with these ancestors much of the neural infrastructure which actually controls bodily movements. If a new cognitive faculty evolved to provide an experience of agency, the most likely way for it to work is by interpreting correlations between experiences which already exist – in this case the experience of considering a possible action, and the experience of witnessing its 92 See Wegner 2001 chapter 3. Wegner calls this ―the experience of conscious will‖ – which he describes as ―experienced when we perform an action ... [a] feeling of voluntariness or doing a thing ―on purpose‖‖ (Wegner 2001:3). 93 Here I am ignoring the controversy about whether conscious thoughts are ever causes of actions (and about whether Wegner believes that they are). See Mele 2009 for a thorough discussion of that issue. I am focusing here on Wegner's claims about the source of our experience of agency. 53 performance. This is much more likely to have evolved than the alternative: a new faculty which is physically connected to the older' parts of the brain's architecture – the parts which trigger and control bodily movements – in order to monitor their activity directly. If Wegner is right, agents do not know from introspection that their own actions are caused by conscious mental states or events. Instead, they infer that causation. It follows that an agent does not know from introspection that any particular conscious mental state or event was a cause of a particular action. The agent does not know from introspection that any particular conscious thought – whether an intention, decision, desire or belief – was a cause of his action. 94 When the agent concludes that one of these was a cause of the action, he does so by an inference based on the priority, consistency and exclusivity factors. This inference is fallible, as Wegner demonstrates experimentally. I think this theory, if correct, helps to explain why we may sometimes be surprised to learn of the causes of our actions. Take the case of Ingrid, who interrupted a conversation after completing the rudeness-themed puzzle (see section 3.2.4). Suppose that, just before acting, Ingrid has a conscious thought that she needs to leave soon to meet someone. This thought is prior to and consistent with her action of interrupting the conversation (she can say what she wants to say and then leave for the meeting). As far as she is aware, the thought is also an exclusive explanation: she does not realise that the content of the word puzzle might be another possible explanation. She concludes that her thought about the meeting is a cause of her interruption. According to Wegner's theory, she cannot know from introspection that this is true. The thought about the meeting might be entirely coincidental, and not a cause of her action. Instead, and unbeknownst to her, working on the priming puzzle is a cause of her action. 3.8.5. Errors in interpretation and assessment of situations Situational factors can have surprising effects on actions, as I discussed in section 3.6.1. Perhaps equally surprising is that they sometimes operate by distorting the agent's assessment of the situation in which she acts. The Good Samaritan' and market research' experiments are among the most disturbing in the situationist literature. In one, 90% of subjects walked past a slumped man after being told they were running late to give a presentation. 95 In the other, 93% of subjects continued to fill out a market research questionnaire despite the researcher's cries of distress from the next room, if someone was sitting passively next to them. 96 The most natural explanation of these findings is very alarming: it seems as though the great majority of subjects callously failed to help someone in obvious need of assistance, and knowingly disregarded a clear and important moral demand. However, the psychologists leading the studies found that this natural explanation is too simplistic. Instead, Latané and Darley devised a model of ―the intervention process‖, which includes the steps through which ―bystanders‖ (such as the subjects in the experiments above) may pass when they do intervene to help someone in need. 97 The three steps are these: the bystander ―must notice that something is happening, interpret that event as an emergency, and decide that he has personal responsibility for coping with it‖. 98 All three of these steps may be influenced by the situational factor, with the result that the subject does not help. 94 Wegner himself does not draw this conclusion explicitly; his objectives are different from mine. But these points seem to me to follow from Wegner's stated conclusions. 95 Darley and Batson 1973. See section 3.2.1. 96 Latané and Rodin 1969. See section 3.2.2. 97 Latané and Darley 1970, chapters 4, 10 and 13. The model is based on a series of experiments on the theme of ―bystander intervention‖, like the two experiments I mentioned above. 98 Latané and Darley 1970:121. 54 Take for example the market research' experiment. At the first step, the situational factor (the presence of another person filling out a questionnaire) might lead subjects not to notice the cries of the researcher, or to notice them more slowly. But this effect was found not to be very pronounced. 99 The influence of the situational factor at the second step, however, was much more pronounced and very interesting. Many subjects appear not to have interpreted the situation as an emergency: They did not act because they thought there was no emergency, or that the emergency was not serious, or that it would be inappropriate to act ... We think they were correct when they stated that if their interpretations had been different, they would have intervened. 100 This suggests that, in many cases, the situational factor influenced the subject's action by influencing his interpretation of the situation which he faced. At the third step, too, the influence of the situational factor can be significant. In particular, when there are more than one witness to an event, the ―onus of responsibility is diffused‖, and each individual bystander is less likely to intervene. 101 This may help to explain why many subjects did not respond to the market researcher's cries: they perceived a lesser moral onus to help, compared to subjects in the control experiment, because there was a second witness present. The full version of Latané and Darley's model is more complex still. Subjects do not necessarily move sequentially through the three stages before helping or not helping. Instead three further phenomena, which they call cycling, blocking, and commitment, may hinder helping. 102 When ―cycling‖ occurs, the bystander's interpretation of the event is influenced by the onus of responsibility which he feels. For example, a subject hearing the market researcher's cries might initially interpret the situation as an emergency, but then feel only a small onus of responsibility to help because of the presence of the second witness. This in turn may lead him to reinterpret the situation as much less serious. When ―blocking‖ occurs, a subject does not come to any decision about what to do. Rather than deciding not to help, for example, confusion and conflict leads him simply not to reach a decision about whether to help. The third phenomenon, commitment, can follow blocking. A lack of a decision to help effectively commits the subject to the alternative path of not helping, as it were by default. We should not assume that subjects are consciously aware of the influence of the situational factor on these interpretations and decision-making processes. 103 Over a series of experiments where the situational factor was the presence of a bystander, the researchers found the following. We asked this question every way we knew how: subtly, directly, tactfully, bluntly. Always we got the same answer. Subjects persistently claimed that their behavior was not influenced by the other people present. This denial occurred in the face of results showing that the presence of others did inhibit helping ... People seem quite sincerely and genuinely unaware of the various ways in which they are influenced in their definitions of physical and social realities by the behavior of other people. 104 99 Latané and Darley 1970:87. 100 Latané and Darley 1970:89. 101 Latané and Darley 1970:90. 102 Latané and Darley 1970 chapter 13. 103 It may well be that many important parts of these processes occur unconsciously – see section 3.8.3 above. 104 Latané and Darley 1970:124. Of course, it may be that the presence of bystanders was not a cause of action for some of the subjects. But the fact that almost all the subjects denied that it was a cause shows that many of them were mistaken. 55 If Latané and Darley's model is at all accurate, then it seems that the ―natural explanation‖ of the experimental findings is deeply flawed. Subjects did not, in the main, callously fail to help people in obvious need of assistance, and knowingly disregard clear and important moral demands. Instead, the situational factor often influences subjects' interpretations of the situation and their assessments of the moral onus upon them to act. The experiments covered by Latané and Darley's model are some of the most shocking in the situationist literature. It seems likely that similar phenomena occur when other kinds of situational factors are causes of actions. 3.8.6. Conclusions from the experimental evidence The experimental evidence I have reviewed over the past several sections establishes, I think, that the following two claims are extremely plausible: (A1) The five examples of subverting causes in section 3.2 are not isolated incidents which occur because of dubious experimental methods. Rather, they are representative of a large body of credible experimental evidence in mainstream fields of psychology. (B1) There are good grounds to believe, on the basis of existing experimental evidence, that many everyday actions have subverting causes. I've given overviews of the research fields in which the effects in my five key cases were discovered. The actions in those five key cases are just like many everyday actions. Many other studies have revealed similar effects. Many of these have studied real-life everyday actions, or actions that are just like everyday actions. I also rejected some objections to these claims. Nevertheless, it is difficult to believe that everyday actions can have subverting causes. I discussed evidence which suggests explanations for our failing to notice that everyday actions have subverting causes. I will now present a brief inductive argument in support of my third claim: (B2) There are good grounds to believe that there are many more subverting causes of everyday actions as yet undiscovered by experimenters. Most of the evidence which supports claims (A1) and (B1) has only recently been discovered. Almost all of the evidence dates from the last fifty years, and much of the most interesting evidence has come in the last decade. A lot of the evidence has been extremely surprising: we did not expect to discover that our actions can be influenced by the factors which have been pinpointed. Some of the research fields from which the evidence has come are still in their infancy, and the experimental methods used are steadily becoming more and more sophisticated. Therefore it is very likely that many more subverting causes and effects will be discovered by experimenters in the coming years. This supports my claim (B2). Claim (A1) above supports the following claim: (A) There are actions with subverting causes. This in turn supports a key premise in my ―main argument‖ against Frankfurt in section 3.4: the actions in the five key cases have subverting causes. Claims (B1) and (B2) support the following claim, which will be a premise in my ―sceptical argument‖ in chapter 7: (B) There are many everyday actions with subverting causes. 56 The term ―many‖ in my claim (B) is deliberately loose, and indicates a range of possibilities. Someone who finds it plausible that there are very many actions with subverting causes will find that my argument in chapter 7 leads to a very sceptical conclusion. 3.9. CONCLUSIONS FROM THIS CHAPTER I'll now recap my conclusions from the chapter as a whole. I've argued that: (A) There are actions with subverting causes. 105 I've given examples of such actions, discussed evidence for the claim that there are such actions, dealt with some important objections to that claim, and explained why it is difficult to accept. In my ―main argument‖, I argued that F-acceptance of an effective desire is not sufficient for its being truly the agent's own. In some actions with subverting causes, Frankfurt's identification condition (F-acceptance) is met, and yet the effective desire is not truly the agent's own. From this, it follows that F-acceptance of an effective desire is not sufficient for direct moral responsibility for the action performed. 106 I discussed five key cases of actions with subverting causes, for which this argument can be run. A single counterexample is enough to show that F-acceptance is not sufficient for direct moral responsibility. I also made a positive proposal: that my CFA condition is necessary for direct moral responsibility. An agent's effective desire is truly her own only if the agent would F-accept it, if she knew the causes of the action. I argued that followers of Frankfurt should accept these conclusions, since my arguments employ the central elements from his own theory in ways which are consistent with the theory's objectives. Finally, I argued for the following claim: (B) There are many everyday actions with subverting causes. I will draw on claim (B) in my ―sceptical argument‖ in chapter 7 below. 105 An action has subverting causes when it's true that: if the agent knew all the causes of her action, she would not F-accept the action as her own. 106 This conclusion follows if we accept (as Frankfurt does) the following identificationist axiom: For direct moral responsibility for an action, the effective desire must be truly the agent's own. This is statement (4) in section 2.2. 57 4. OBJECTIONS TO MY CONCLUSIONS In chapter 3 I set out my main argument against Frankfurt's theory of moral responsibility. I concluded that Frankfurt's condition of identification, which I labelled ―F-acceptance‖ of the effective desire, is not sufficient for direct moral responsibility. 1 I argued that when an action has subverting causes, the effective desire which moves the agent to act is not truly her own. 2 On an axiom of identification which Frankfurt himself holds, an agent cannot be directly morally responsible for an action if the effective desire is not truly her own. 3 I also made a positive proposal – namely that the following condition is necessary for direct moral responsibility: CFA The agent would F-accept the effective desire, at the time of acting, if he knew, at the time of acting, all the proximate and relevant causes of that desire's being effective. 4 In this chapter I'll discuss some objections to my main argument and to my positive proposal. The first two of these objections involve cases which seem to create problems for my proposed CFA condition. In section 4.1 I'll discuss actions with situationist causes which do not subvert moral responsibility, on my account. These actions seem in many respects very similar to the five key cases which I employed in my main argument: it could be objected that the threat to moral responsibility is even greater than the one I've portrayed. I'll argue that compatibilists can give plausible replies to this objection. In section 4.2 I'll examine cases of regrettable actions, in which it is obvious that the agent is DMR, and yet it appears that my CFA condition is not met. These would be counterexamples to my claim that the CFA condition is necessary for DMR. However, I'll show that the CFA condition is indeed met in these cases, and so the objection dissolves. Then, in section 4.3, I'll discuss several objections which have a common structure. Agents in the five key cases of actions with subverting causes, who do not meet the CFA condition, might nevertheless seem to be directly morally responsible for their actions. This would undermine both of my arguments from chapter 3. This objection can be presented in several forms. Against each form, I'll defend my view that the agents are not DMR for these actions. Some of these objections would not be raised by followers of Frankfurt. By considering such objections, I am perhaps going beyond what I need to do to defend my arguments against Frankfurt's position. However, I think it's still useful to consider all of the objections I'll discuss, because (if I can answer them successfully) they help to strengthen the conclusions I reach. 4.1. NON-SUBVERTING SITUATIONIST CAUSES One important source of evidence about subverting causes has been research in situationist psychology, as I discussed in section 3.6.1. However, the surprising effects discovered by situationist research are not always subverting. I've already noted that certain agents in the same situations as my five key cases might F-accept their actions after learning of their causes. Those causes, although unknown, would not be subverting. Furthermore, in some experiments it seems likely that the surprising situationist cause is not subverting for the majority of subjects. 1 An agent F-accepts his effective desire if he accepts it as his own, and is satisfied with that acceptance. Being satisfied is a matter of having no interest in making changes. See section 2.1.3. 2 An action has subverting causes when it is true that: if the agent knew all the causes of her action, she would not F-accept the action. (This is a simplified definition; for the full version see section 3.1). 3 This axiom is statement (4) in the set which define Frankfurt's position in section 2.2. 4 This again is a simplified version of the condition; for the full definition see section 3.5. 58 For example, in a famous situationist experiment, people exiting a phone booth in a busy shopping centre (who were the unsuspecting subjects) encountered a researcher who dropped a folder of papers in their paths. 5 Some 88% of subjects who had just found a dime in the coin return slot of the telephone (placed there by the experimenters) stopped to help pick up the scattered papers. But of those subjects who found no dime, only 4% stopped to help. The experimenters speculated that subjects are much more likely to help after finding the dime because they are in a better mood. Further research suggests that apparently small stimuli which influence moods can produce significant behavioural effects. 6 It's possible that the ―mood effect‖ in cases like this one operates (at least for some subjects) by heightening the person's awareness that they are confronted with a moral demand. That is, without the mood effect provided by finding the dime, perhaps some people do not notice the moral demand upon them to help the researcher to pick up her papers. 7 It's clear that finding a dime in the return slot was a cause of the helping action in very many cases. It seems likely that the majority of these subjects, if told of the causes, would Faccept the helping action they performed. Meanwhile, of those subjects who did not find a dime, it seems very likely that the large majority did F-accept their action when walking past the researcher and her scattered papers, and that they would still do so if they knew all of their action's causes. These subjects already do know as much about the causes of their action as the experimenters know: I'm assuming that we wouldn't include the absence of a dime in the slot as a cause of their action. There is something paradoxical about this kind of case, which I think can give rise to four objections to my proposal. All four objections lead to a more sceptical conclusion than mine about the prevalence of moral responsibility. Since my position is already sceptical, I'm not troubled by such objections. Nevertheless in each case I think these objections can plausibly be rejected by compatibilists. In the first objection, consider an agent – I'll call him Walter – who does not find a dime, and does not help pick up the scattered papers but walks away instead. Suppose that Walter Faccepts his action, and that the following counterfactual (X) is true of him: if he knew all the causes of his action, he would still F-accept it. 8 Walter meets the CFA condition which (I proposed) is necessary for DMR for his action. However, suppose the following counterfactual (Y) is also true of Walter: if he had found a dime in the slot, he would have helped to pick up the researcher's papers. Suppose further that counterfactual (Z) is true as well: if Walter learned that counterfactual (Y) is true, he would not F-accept the action as his own. The objector claims that this action is not truly Walter's own. It follows that Walter is not directly morally responsible for it – if being truly one's own is necessary for DMR for an action. 9 In the objector's view, what subverts Walter's moral responsibility here is not a cause of his action, but rather what we might call an enabling condition of his action. 10 In this case, the enabling condition is that there was no dime in the slot in the phone booth. 11 5 Isen and Levin (1972). For more discussion of the experiment, see Doris 2002:30 or Nelkin 2005:185. 6 See Doris 2002:30. 7 See Doris 2002:180n5. 8 The absence of a dime in the slot is not a cause of his action. 9 This identificationist axiom is number (4) in the list of statements defining Frankfurt's position, in section 2.2. 10 Albeit that this is an enabling condition of a rather strange sort – a negative enabling condition. 11 Note that an enabling condition which would have led the agent to act otherwise than he did is not necessarily subverting, on the objector's view. For example, suppose this counterfactual (R) is true: if Walter had won the lottery yesterday, he would not have driven to the shopping centre today. This does not entail that the enabling condition that Walter did not win the lottery subverts his moral responsibility for his action of driving to the shopping centre. If Walter learned that counterfactual (R) is true, he would nevertheless still F-accept his actual action. So the enabling condition that Walter did not win the lottery is not subverting here. 59 Is it true that subverting enabling conditions prevent (direct) moral responsibility? I find myself in two minds on this question. On the one hand, it seems implausible to say that Walter's moral responsibility for an action can be influenced by the absence of something which would have been a cause of his performing a different action. We are accustomed to excusing agents from moral responsibility because of the presence of a cause of their action – for example an addiction or a compulsion. But we are not accustomed to excusing agents because of the absence of a cause of an alternative action. On the other hand, I am also drawn to agree with the objector, on the grounds that there is no obvious principled reason why a cause can excuse but an enabling condition cannot. This objection leads to a more sceptical view than mine about the frequency of direct moral responsibility for actions. If enabling conditions can be subverting, then there are fewer actions for which agents are directly morally responsible. I assume that most compatibilists will resist this conclusion. My arguments are mainly directed toward compatibilists. Therefore I will assume that the objection fails, thereby coming down on the compatibilist side of the fence - since this gives no support to my sceptical argument in chapter 7. There I will argue that the prevalence of subverting causes means that there are many everyday actions for which we mistakenly hold agents morally responsible. That is already a strongly sceptical conclusion. Its impact is more powerful if it goes through without the support of the point made by the current objector. The three remaining objections concern an agent (I'll call him Henry) who helps the researcher immediately after finding a dime in the return slot, and when the finding was a cause of the helping action. That a situational factor like this can be a cause of this action is certainly surprising. But suppose that Henry would F-accept his action, if he knew all of its causes. On my account, this cause is not subverting. The remaining objections make a case, in differing ways, that Henry is not directly morally responsible for his action. If that is correct, then an extra necessary condition is required for DMR, in addition to counterfactual Facceptance. 12 Again this is a more sceptical conclusion than mine, since it leaves fewer actions for which agents can be DMR. But I think that compatibilists can resist these objections. The second objector holds that Henry must know the most important causes of his action, in order to be directly morally responsible for it. The relevant sense of ―important‖ will be difficult to define, but I'll set that point aside for the sake of argument. 13 To this objector I reply that her position is implausibly restrictive. It's not plausible to require that an agent must know all the most important causes of his action, in order to be DMR for it. I'm not aware of any philosopher who holds this objector's view. The third objection might be made by an identificationist: she might argue that Henry's action is not truly his own in the way required for direct moral responsibility. Some condition of identification must be set out, which is not met in Henry's action. But I cannot think of an existing identificationist account on which Henry's action would be held to be not truly his own. Instead, a fourth objection might be made. This objector claims that Henry's authorship of the action is undermined by the situational cause – that the action is not really Henry's, in the appropriate sense for direct moral responsibility. The objector must provide a definition of ―authorship‖. And if this objection is separate from the third objection above, the required 12 If it were true that Henry meets my CFA condition while not being DMR for his action, that would not refute any of my claims about CFA. In chapter 3 I argued that Frankfurt's identification condition is not sufficient for DMR, and that my CFA condition is necessary (though not sufficient) for DMR. 13 A more stringent version of this objection would require that the agent must know all the (proximate and relevant) causes of his action. This would lead to an even more sceptical conclusion about the possibility of moral responsibility. As a result I think it is even less plausible than the objection I discuss here. 60 definition of authorship will not involve identification. Again I find myself in two minds about this objection. There does seem to be a sense in which Henry's authorship is impaired by the situational cause. But at the same time, it may be that the ―mood boost‖ helps focus Henry's attention on the moral demand to help the researcher, so that he is, as it were, more actively engaged in his action of helping the researcher than he might have been if he had walked past her without the presence of the dime. This is unclear. Once again I'll take the line which gives least help to my sceptical argument in chapter 7. A restrictive definition of authorship would lead to a more sceptical conclusion about the prevalence of direct moral responsibility. I think it's unlikely that compatibilists would press this objection, so I'll assume for the sake of argument that it fails. I conclude from this section that my main argument (in chapter 3) can be defended against various objections which draw on non-subverting situationist causes. These objections lead to conclusions about the prevalence of moral responsibility which are more sceptical than mine. I am not troubled by the prospect that my position could be outflanked in this way. At the same time, I think these objections can plausibly be rejected by compatibilists. 4.2. REGRETTABLE ACTIONS WITHOUT SUBVERTING CAUSES Another type of problem case for my argument involves regrettable actions which do not have subverting causes. In some such actions, it may seem that my CFA condition is not met, and yet the agent is DMR. This would refute my conclusion, in chapter 3, that the CFA condition is necessary for DMR, and for the action being truly one's own. Consider Philip, who hears a fire alarm in his hotel room and sets off down the main stairs. Unbeknownst to him, there is a fire on the main staircase, which is what triggered the smoke detectors and caused the fire alarm to sound. When he sees the smoke, Philip has to retrace his steps and take the external fire escape instead to reach safety. If, at the time of setting off, Philip learned all the causes of this action, he might learn that the fire which is a cause of his action is in the main staircase. Now if he gained that knowledge, Philip would not F-accept his action, because he would immediately reverse it and take the external fire escape instead. It may seem that Philip's action is not truly his own on my account, and that he cannot be DMR for walking down the main stairs. 14 That would be an extremely implausible conclusion; but in fact it does not follow from the full version of my CFA condition, given in my original presentation in section 3.5: CFA The agent would F-accept the effective desire, at the time of acting, if he knew, at the time of acting, all the proximate and relevant causes of that desire's being effective (except in so far as any additional knowledge gained gives him new information about means to satisfy his desires). Among Philip's desires, in the actual situation, are the following: a desire to go down the main staircase (the effective desire to act), a desire to escape from a possible fire, and a desire to survive the night and continue living. If he learned that there was a fire, and that the fire was in the main staircase, Philip would have new information about the means to satisfy his desires. This information is not available to him in the counterfactual scenario which is relevant for determining whether his actual action is truly his own. In that relevant counterfactual scenario, he would learn that a fire was a cause of his action. He would not learn that the fire is in the main staircase. Hence he would continue to F-accept his effective 14 The conclusion about DMR follows if being truly one's own is necessary for DMR – this is axiom (4) in the set defining Frankfurt's view (see section 2.2). 61 desire and the action which results from it. The CFA condition is therefore met, and Philip can be DMR for his action. Consider a similar example involving a misunderstanding. Simon is swimming in the sea and sees a flag flying above the lifeguard station. He swims back to shore, thinking that the flag indicates danger. But in fact the flag signifies that conditions are safe for swimming. A cause of Simon's action is the senior lifeguard assessing the situation as safe and hoisting the flag. Simon's desires include the desire to swim back to shore (the effective desire to act), a desire to avoid swimming in dangerous waters, and a desire to survive his swim and continue living. If he learned that the lifeguard had raised the flag, and that the flag signifies that conditions are safe, Simon would have new information about the means to satisfy his desires. This information is not available to him in the counterfactual scenario which is relevant for determining whether his actual action is truly his own. In that relevant counterfactual scenario, he would learn only that the raised flag was a cause of his action. Hence he would continue to F-accept his effective desire and the action which results from it. The CFA condition is met, and Simon can be DMR for his action. Someone might object that the final italicised clause in the definition of the CFA condition represents an unprincipled and wholly ad hoc reaction to a potential problem with my proposal. This problem is posed by regrettable actions in which some key information about the causes of his actions is unavailable to the agent. In response to this objection I appeal to a clear difference between the cases of Philip and Simon on the one hand, and those of Samantha and Martha on the other. 15 Samantha walks past a slumped man because she is running late. Martha continues to complete a questionnaire despite a researcher's cries in the next room. Knowing of the causes of their actions, and understanding the nature of situationist causes, it is easy to judge that these agents' decision-making processes are subverted, so that the effective desires are not truly their own, in the sense which Frankfurt aims to capture. The same is not true of Philip and Simon. We might say that their decision-making processes are constrained by a lack of information, but that lack is not subverting. Their effective desires are truly their own, in the Frankfurtian sense. I conclude that ―regrettable‖ actions such as these do not undermine my conclusions. 4.3. DIRECT MORAL RESPONSIBILITY DESPITE SUBVERTING CAUSES In this section I'll address several forms of an objection in which the following claim is made: the agents in my five key cases are DMR for their actions, despite those actions having subverting causes. This claim, if true, would affect two of my arguments, which I'll discuss in turn. First, the objector's claim would affect my main argument against Frankfurt, in section 3.4. In that argument I made use of the following statements which partly define Frankfurt's position: 16 (4) For direct moral responsibility for an action, the effective desire must be truly the agent's own (R→O). (5) F-acceptance of an effective desire is sufficient for its being truly the agent's own (A→O). 17 (6) F-acceptance of the effective desire is sufficient for direct moral responsibility (A→R). 15 Samantha and Martha's cases appear in sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2. 16 See section 2.2 for a discussion of these statements. 17 An agent F-accepts her action if she accepts it as her own, and is satisfied with that acceptance. Being satisfied is a matter of having no interest in making changes. 62 I argued that statement (5) is false, since agents in the five key cases do F-accept their effective desires, and yet those effective desires are not truly their own. If that is correct, then (6) is false if (4) is true. 18 It also follows that the agents in the five key cases are not directly morally responsible for their actions, since their effective desires are not truly their own, and – according to (4) – the desires' being truly their own is necessary for DMR. Now, if it turns out (as will be claimed in the objections in this section) that the agents in the five key cases are directly morally responsible for their actions, then one of two conclusions must follow. It could be, on the one hand, that axiom (4) is false. Then it would be possible that the agents' effective desires are not truly their own (as I argued) and yet they are DMR for their actions (as the objector argues). Or, on the other hand, it could be that axiom (4) is true and so it must follow that my claim is false: the agents' effective desires are truly their own. Thus the objections I'll consider in this section do not necessarily establish that my claim about the five key cases (that that the agents' effective desires are not truly their own) is false. It could be, instead, that axiom (4) is false. But having noted that point I will set it aside. My main objective is to show that Frankfurt's statement (6) is false, even if (4) is true, so I will continue to assume for the sake of that argument that (4) is true. It's also important to remember that, for my main argument, I need only one example of an action in which the agent's effective desire is not truly her own (and hence she is not DMR for her action). In order to refute this argument, the objector would need to show that none of the agents in the five key cases are DMR for their actions. Meanwhile, the objector's claim, if true, would also affect my positive proposal that the CFA condition is necessary for an agent's effective desire being truly her own. 19 From that it follows – if axiom (4) is true – that the CFA condition is necessary for the agent's direct moral responsibility for the action. In the five key cases, the agents do not meet the CFA condition: they would not Faccept their effective desires if they knew all the causes of their actions. If the objections in this section succeed, and the agents are DMR for their actions in the five key cases, then one of two conclusions must follow. It could be that axiom (4) is false. But, as above, I will set aside that possibility. The other conclusion is that the CFA condition is not necessary for DMR. In order to refute my positive proposal, the objector needs only to show that there is a single case in which the agent is DMR but does not meet the CFA condition. I won't consider the objector's claim for every one of the five key cases. But it is my aim to defend my positive proposal, so I hope to show how the objection can be refuted for all five of the key cases. Meanwhile, refuting the objection for at least one of the key cases will suffice to defend my main argument above. I'll discuss the following forms of the objection. In section 4.3.6 I'll consider the claim that agents of actions with subverting causes can be DMR for performing them on the grounds that they feel morally responsible for doing so. But I'll begin by addressing the important claim that agents in the five key cases are DMR for their actions because they are blameworthy for performing them, despite the actions having subverting causes. I'll introduce this objection in section 4.3.1, and then, over the four subsequent sections, discuss four forms in which it can be advanced. 18 If ¬(A→O) while (R→O), then it follows that ¬(A→R). 19 See section 3.5. 63 4.3.1. The agent is blameworthy for the action The reasoning shared across this family of objections is as follows. The objector claims that, in at least one of my five key cases, the agent is blameworthy for performing the action. If she is blameworthy, she must be morally responsible for the action – since moral responsibility is necessary for blameworthiness. 20 (It's conspicuous that this reasoning employs morally bad actions, for which the agent is considered blameworthy. A parallel form of reasoning could be advanced for agents who are praiseworthy for actions which have subverting causes: they must be morally responsible for those actions. However, I've never encountered this form of the objection. 21 Perhaps we are more strongly motivated to insist that agents are blameworthy for bad actions than that agents are praiseworthy for good actions. 22 ) The point I make initially, in reply to the objection, is that blameworthiness does not imply direct moral responsibility. An agent may be blameworthy for an action because she is TMR for it. In fact, I think that some of the intuitive pull toward blaming agents in the cases I discuss is attributable to the possibility that they are TMR, even if not DMR. Our intuitions do not distinguish very clearly between TMR and DMR. In order to keep the distinction clear I'll use the phrase ―directly blameworthy‖ to mean ―blameworthy in virtue of the agent's being DMR – as opposed to TMR – for her action‖. I have two further replies to the objection. The first is simply that this objection would probably not be made by an identificationist like Frankfurt. 23 It's an identificationist axiom that direct moral responsibility is possible only if the action is truly the agent's own. 24 I've argued that, when an action has subverting causes, it is not truly the agent's own. 25 If my argument there is persuasive (as I argued that it should be to followers of Frankfurt), then the present objection is not open to anyone who holds that identificationist axiom. 26 However, I won't rely only on this first reply. My second reply is to deny the objector's claim that the agent is directly blameworthy in one of my five example cases. The objector can make this claim in several ways, which I'll discuss over the next few sections (4.3.2 to 4.3.5). I won't consider all five key cases of actions with subverting causes in each form of the objection. For simplicity I'll focus on one of those cases – Martha's completing her questionnaire despite the researcher's cries. 27 I've picked this case because it's the most difficult for me: it seems that Martha faces a substantial moral demand to help, in a situation of very obvious need, and several ways in which an objector might plausibly claim that she is directly blameworthy for her action. By defending my conclusion that Martha is not DMR for her action, I will go a long way toward establishing how the conclusion can be defended in the other cases. 20 I assumed that this principle is correct in section 1.1.3. 21 Doris and Nahmias, too, when discussing the implications of situationist research, focus almost entirely on the possible implication that agents should be exculpated for morally bad actions, rather than the possibility that agents are not praiseworthy for good actions. (See chapter 5.) 22 This may be one explanation for some intriguing recent discoveries in the new field of ―experimental philosophy‖ – see for example Knobe 2006:138-139. 23 In section 6.7.2 I'll argue that this objection would not be made by Fischer and Ravizza either. 24 This was statement (4) in my summary of Frankfurt's position in section 2.2. 25 See section 3.4.2. 26 If the action is not truly the agent's own, then she cannot be DMR for it, and so she cannot be directly blameworthy for it. 27 See section 3.2.2. 64 4.3.2. The agent allowed herself to perform the wrong action In this first form of the objection, the claim I must refute is that Martha is blameworthy for her action because she allowed herself to complete her questionnaire rather than help the researcher. This objector's explanation for Martha's action is something like this. Martha must have realised that the researcher was in need of help. She also realised there was some disadvantage in going to offer help, such as the risk of embarrassing herself in front of the other bystander who continued to fill out his questionnaire. She must have assessed the moral demand to help as greater than the moral demand to complete the questionnaire, but she allowed the disadvantage to weigh more heavily in her deliberation. She is directly blameworthy and DMR because she allowed herself to perform the morally worse action. My reply is that Martha's case need not fit this description. As I discussed in section 3.8.5, situational factors can influence an action by influencing the agent's interpretation of the situation. Consequently, the objector's explanation for the action is not the only one. There are three possible explanations, which I'll discuss in turn. The first explanation is as follows. Martha is not aware of the situationist research which reveals that the presence of a bystander can have a significant influence on an agent's interpretation of a situation. As a result of that influence, Martha misconstrues the situation as one in which the researcher's need is less morally pressing than her duty to complete the questionnaire. 28 Martha does not recognise that the greater moral onus on her is to help the researcher, and instead she continues to complete the questionnaire. In this first case, I think it is unreasonable to hold Martha directly blameworthy for her action, or for failing to recognise that the greater moral onus on her is to help. She misconstrues the situation, but she does not culpably misconstrue it. Hence we cannot conclude that she is DMR on the grounds that she is directly blameworthy. 29 The second possible explanation for Martha's action is this. Martha has read about situationist research which reveals that bystander presence can have a significant influence on an agent's interpretation of a situation. However, when she hears the researcher's cries she does not think about the information she has read. Perhaps she has forgotten about it, or perhaps it simply does not come to mind at the crucial time. And because of the bystander's presence, she does not recognise that the greater moral onus on her is to help the researcher; instead she continues to complete the questionnaire. In this second case, depending on the circumstances, I think it might be reasonable to say that Martha culpably misconstrues the situation. We might say that, after reading about situationist influences on actions, Martha should have taken some steps to ensure that she recognised future situations in which those influences might be present. She might be blameworthy for omitting to take those steps. Whether she is in fact blameworthy will depend on such factors as whether there were any steps which she could have taken to prevent the later action, and whether she could reasonably have known what those steps were. 30 But even assuming that Martha is blameworthy for not taking those steps, this establishes only that she bears traced moral responsibility for her action. Her moral responsibility for her current action is anchored in facts about her earlier omission, rather than in facts about the current action. She is moved to her current action by an effective desire 28 In fact, it may be that Martha does not assess the researcher as being in need of help at all. (See section 3.8.5.) 29 In this first case I think we should conclude that Martha is not TMR for her action either. But I do not need this point for my argument here. 30 I think it's far from obvious that there was any culpable omission on Martha's part here. Most of us, upon learning of situationist research, can do little more to modify our future behaviour than to ―try to pay attention to and overcome group effects when confronted with an emergency‖ (Nahmias 2001:189). However, I don't need this point for my argument. 65 which she would not F-accept, if she knew all the causes of her action. As I argued in section 3.4.2, this action is not truly her own, and so she is not directly morally responsible for it. The objector might press the view that Martha is directly blameworthy for her action, on the grounds that she should have made use of the information about situationism that she had read – even if she did not recall that information at the time of acting. I think this is unreasonable. If Martha genuinely would not F-accept her effective desire on learning of the action's causes, then the action is not truly her own in the sense emphasised by Frankfurt as necessary for DMR. At any rate, I don't think that followers of Frankfurt would press this point, and it is to them that my main argument is addressed. The third possible explanation for Martha's action is as follows. Martha does recognise the greater moral onus on her to help the researcher, but allows her desire not to look foolish in front of the bystander to prevail. In this case, the presence of the bystander is not a subverting cause. Martha knows that it is a cause of her action. 31 She has weighed the options, and decided to complete the questionnaire. She F-accepts this action, and would F-accept it if she knew all of its causes. 32 On my account, she is directly morally responsible for her action. In summary, the objector's claim that Martha is directly blameworthy for her action is plausible if we assume that the third explanation for her action is correct. But on my argument, Martha is DMR for her action if the third explanation is correct. So this case does not present an objection to my argument. But the third explanation is not the only possible explanation. On the other two explanations I've considered, Martha is not directly blameworthy for her action. Hence the objection fails in cases like these. I think it's extremely implausible to think that the third explanation applies to every subject in the market research' study. That is, it's extremely implausible to think that everyone who completed the questionnaire rather than help did so in spite of recognising the moral onus to help as the greater of the two. 33 It's much more plausible that the first explanation applied to many subjects in the study. 34 Many agents in the same position as Martha would continue to complete their questionnaires, and not be DMR for their actions. This supports the conclusions I drew in chapter 3 about the five key cases including Martha's. 35 So this objection fails to establish that Martha is blameworthy for her action because she allowed herself to complete her questionnaire rather than help the researcher. 4.3.3. The agent should have tried harder to resist the influence Another way for the objector to claim that agents can be directly blameworthy for actions with subverting causes is as follows. 36 The objector claims that the agent should have resisted, or should have tried harder to resist, the influence of the subverting cause. I'll make two replies to this claim. 31 In this third case, is doesn't matter whether Martha is aware of the relevant situationist research. 32 In the counterfactual in which she knew all the causes of the action, she would learn nothing that would affect her F-acceptance. She already knows that the presence of the bystander is a cause. 33 In the actual study, 93% of subjects offered no help to the researcher (see section 3.2.2). 34 In the first explanation, the agent had not read about situationist research and she would not F-accept her action on learning of its causes. 35 In section 5.1.2 I'll discuss a line of argument which is very similar to this objection, using another of the five key cases – that of Samantha who walks past a slumped man on her way to give a presentation. 36 The full objection runs like this. If the agent is directly blameworthy, then she is DMR. If she also does not meet the CFA condition, then my conclusion that the CFA condition is necessary for DMR is refuted. 66 My first reply is that the notion of resisting an influence, though it features prominently in everyday action-explanation, is somewhat murky and difficult to elucidate. The assumption implicit in the objection is that resisting an influence is a process which is independent of the operation of the influence. But there are good grounds to doubt that. If resisting an influence is analogous to resisting a desire, then the very process of resisting may itself be influenced by a subverting cause. This is one of the lessons to be learned from research pioneered by Roy Baumeister. An agent's ability to resist a desire can be influenced by earlier incidents which have depleted the inner resource used for both ―self-regulation‖ and logical reasoning. 37 For example if Gina had earlier completed a complex puzzle, she might now be unable to resist a desire to eat a cookie. 38 If she does not know of that effect, and would not F-accept the desire if she did, then the earlier puzzle completion is a subverting cause of her now eating a cookie – and also of her failing to resist her desire to do so. Furthermore, resisting an influence is not something which can happen independently of the agent's desires. An influence can be resisted only if the agent desires sufficiently strongly to resist it. But a desire to resist something can itself be influenced by a subverting cause. Suppose that Martha desires to help the fallen researcher, but also desires to stay seated completing her questionnaire. Let's assume, for the sake of argument, that she can somehow try to resist the subverting influence of the person sitting next to her, despite not knowing of its influence. The success of her attempt to resist the influence will depend on the strength of her desire to resist it, relative to her desire to perform the action. But it's very likely that the strengths of both of those desires are influenced by the subverting cause. Therefore it is naïve to appeal to an effort of resistance in the face of a subverting cause, and unreasonable to blame someone for failing to succeed with that effort. I'll now set aside that first reply to make a second, independent, reply. I think it's difficult to assess the claim that an agent should have tried harder to resist a subverting cause. We know so little about subverting causes, and their effects are so far removed from popular understanding, that we have no established and reliable intuitions about whether agents are blameworthy for not resisting them. For guidance I think we should compare them with other influences which agents are sometimes blameworthy for failing to resist, and about which we do have well established intuitions. Suppose Paula is a police officer who is building a case against a man accused of assault. Paula is approached by the accused and threatened: Paula's beloved sports car will be smashed up unless she drops the case. She does drop the case. The objector will argue here that Paula is directly morally responsible for her action despite the coercive influence of the threat, because she should have done otherwise and is blameworthy. I think that is very plausible, and I don't dispute the argument in this case. Nevertheless, I think that actions with subverting causes are not analogous with Paula's action. I'll distinguish three types of influences over actions. Paula faces what I'll call a type-1 influence: a known influence to do the wrong thing. In type-1 cases, there is a clear moral onus on the agent to resist the influence, and a clear means by which she should resist it – in this case, by steeling herself to accept the possible consequence that her car may be smashed up. Type-2 influences are more subtle. The agent knows or suspects that she is being influenced, but does not understand how the influence operates. For example, Rhona is discussing a possible repair to her roof with a tradesman. She knows that tradesmen sometimes employ influencing techniques, so she is on her guard against making a hasty decision which she might later regret. In fact the tradesman's techniques lead her to paying for a very expensive and unnecessary repair to her roof, and subsequently Rhona has to stop her donations to charity in order to pay for it. She has been influenced, but the objector 37 See section 3.6.2. 38 See section 3.2.5. 67 nevertheless will hold Rhona DMR for agreeing to the repair. According to the objector, there is a moral onus on Rhona to resist the influence, and some ready means by which she should be able to do so. I am not convinced that there is always a means open to agents to resist type-2 influences. Furthermore, I think it's likely that the responsibility Rhona bears here is traced, not direct; in order to resist the influence she must take some earlier action, such as reading about how to resist persuasive tradesmen, or ―getting herself into an extremely sceptical frame of mind‖. But I'll set aside those replies for the sake of argument, in order to meet the objector's case in its strongest possible form. Even if we allow that Rhona bears DMR for her action with a type-2 influence, I think we must deny that agents can be DMR when the influence is of type-3. When an action has a type-3 influence, the agent does not know or suspect that there is any such influence. For example, Suzanne might be influenced to buy a certain brand of drink by a series of images in a TV advert deliberately intended to be processed subliminally. 39 As a result she does not buy the alternative drink which is ethically sourced. She is unaware of the images, and unaware that there might be any subliminal influence on her action. The objector will claim that Suzanne is directly blameworthy for her action: she should have resisted the influence to perform the morally worse action. This claim is mistaken: it is implausible to say that Suzanne should have resisted this influence. There can be no moral onus on Suzanne to resist an influence of which she is not aware and which she does not suspect. 40 I think that type-3 influence is the appropriate analogy for unknown and unsuspected subverting causes. For example, when Martha completes her questionnaire despite the researcher's cries from the next room, she does not know or suspect that the presence of the bystander is a cause of her action. Similarly Samantha does not know or suspect that being told she was late was a cause of her walking past the slumped man. Nor does Ingrid suspect that the content of the word puzzle was a cause of her interrupting a conversation. And nor does Gina suspect that resisting eating cookies was a cause of her giving up on a problem. In all of these cases, it is false to say that the agent should have resisted the influence of the subverting cause. Of course, not all subverting causes are unknown and unsuspected. When an arachnophobic agent runs out of the room, the presence of a large spider is a cause which is well known – and its subverting effect is also well known to her. 41 The objector may claim that an agent should resist known subverting causes, when there is a substantial moral imperative. My second reply does not cover known subverting causes; for those causes I point only to my first reply above. 4.3.4. The agent should have paused for further reflection In this form of the objection, the claim is that an agent should pause for reflection in the presence of a potentially subverting cause. For example, when she hears the researcher's cries, rather than continuing to fill out her questionnaire, perhaps Martha should pause to reflect on what is the best course of action. Because she does not do so, the objector claims, she is directly blameworthy for the action and so DMR for it. 42 39 In a study by Karremans, Stroebe and Claus (2006), subliminal priming of the brand name of a drink influenced subjects to choose that brand if they were already thirsty. 40 What if there were an earlier onus on her to suspect a possible influence in the present? As well as being implausible in Suzanne's case, this suggestion introduces the tracing principle. It's not relevant here, because I am concerned with direct moral responsibility. 41 This cause is subverting because she does not F-accept her effective desire; knowledge of all the causes of her action would not change that. 42 Since Martha does not meet the CFA condition in her action, this would refute my conclusion that the CFA condition is necessary for DMR. 68 My first response is that it's not obvious that failure to pause and reflect before an action is good grounds for holding an agent blameworthy for that action. But I won't rely on this line of response, and I'll set it aside. My second response is that there may be a subverting cause of an agent's not pausing and reflecting about a certain action. An example might be that of Ingrid, who interrupts a conversation after completing a rudeness-themed word puzzle. 43 The words in the puzzle may be a subverting cause of Ingrid's failing to pause and reflect before interrupting. 44 Should we hold Ingrid blameworthy for failing to pause, on the grounds that she should have paused to reflect about pausing to reflect before acting? A vicious regress threatens. My third response is to point out that pausing itself may be ethically wrong, in some situations. For example, if Penny is running late for a presentation she has promised to give, it may be ethically wrong for her to pause for reflection several times on her way. If she is travelling through a city on foot at rush hour, for example, there may be dozens of situations in which some subverting cause might be a cause of her failing to notice a moral demand. But if she pauses for reflection dozens of times on her journey, to assess whether there might be a moral demand that she should act on, she may well be late for the presentation. It's not clear that pausing for reflection is the morally best thing for her to do. I think it would be false to say Penny is blameworthy for any particular action of continuing on to give her presentation, on the grounds that she does not pause to reflect. So it seems that there cannot be a general principle that people should pause to reflect before acting, even in situations where there might be unnoticed moral demands. This links to my fourth response: the injunction to pause and reflect at any occasion in which there is a possible subverting cause is simply impractical, if my claim that subverting causes are commonplace is correct. It's not plausible to think that we are repeatedly blameworthy for failing to pause on every such occasion. This point in turn links to my fifth response. In order to be blameworthy for an action in virtue of failing to pause and reflect, the agent must have some reason to think that she should pause and reflect. She must consider that her initial assessment of the situation may be flawed, and that further reflection might be warranted. For example, when Martha is filling out her questionnaire, she assesses the researcher's cries as not indicating that help is needed. For what reason would she now pause to reflect before continuing to complete the forms? She would only do so if she suspected that her initial assessment may be distorted. But she would only suspect that if she also suspected that some element in the situation might be a cause of a distorted assessment (in this case, the presence of a bystander). And of course, she does not suspect that, since she has not read the relevant research literature. So Martha has no reason to think that she should pause before acting. Hence she is not blameworthy in virtue of not pausing. It may be objected, to that line of argument, that Martha has reason to pause even though she does not know about situationist research. It makes sense, the objector may say, that something like ―peer pressure‖ or social influence might affect her action, and hence she is indeed blameworthy for not considering that possibility and pausing to reflect. To this objection I reply that, though we as everyday agents may have some knowledge that social influence can affect decision-making, we do not expect it to affect our assessments of moral demands. If we are aware of social influence as a phenomenon at all, we tend to think that it operates by making us consciously too embarrassed or inhibited to perform certain actions. 45 43 See section 3.2.4. 44 In the absence of the cause, she would have paused to reflect. But if she knew of the cause, she would not Faccept her failure to pause. 45 In this respect the objection mirrors our limited everyday understanding of these phenomena. We are inclined to object that Martha should have paused to reflect because she must have felt embarrassed or inhibited. But it need not be the case that she felt those emotions. (See also section 3.8.5.) 69 Furthermore, even if we have some understanding that social influence might affect even our assessments of moral demands, we certainly do not expect it to have as profound an effect as it does: we do not imagine that sitting next to a passive bystander would lead Martha to not to react to the researcher's cries, when 70% of people sitting alone do offer help. 46 I don't think it's plausible to blame Martha for not pausing to reflect, in this situation. Furthermore, Latané and Darley – who ran a series of studies into factors inhibiting bystander intervention – discovered that pausing to reflect in situations like Martha's actually made it less likely that the agent would intervene to help. Subjects in our experiments responded early or not at all. Over 90 percent of all subjects who responded responded within the first half of the relatively short time available to them ... By their initial inaction, [many other] subjects inadvertently committed themselves to continued inaction. 47 Meanwhile, suppose that someone in Martha's position (I'll call him Malcolm) also assessed the researcher as not in need of help when she cried out. Unlike Martha, Malcolm did wonder whether his assessment was influenced by the bystander's presence. Could Malcolm be blameworthy for his action in virtue of failing to pause and reflect before performing it? Given his set of circumstances, I think that is plausible. But Martha's case need not be like Malcolm's. A final response is that, in many actions which have subverting causes, there is even less reason for the agent to suspect that a pause for reflection might be beneficial. For example, when rating the qualities of job applicants, we do not expect that our ratings will be affected by whether we will later meet the applicants. 48 There is no apparent reason for someone making the ratings to pause and reflect, and no grounds to hold her blameworthy in virtue of not pausing. It's therefore even less plausible to blame Judy for not pausing to reflect about her rating, since the cause is even more unexpected than the cause in Martha's case. 49 4.3.5. There is a flaw in the agent's character or dispositions The final objection in this series is the claim that the agent is directly blameworthy for her action (and hence DMR for it) because some aspect of her character or dispositional nature is weak or flawed. For example, the objector might say of Martha that she is more readily influenced than most by the behaviour of other people. This flaw, he claims, is what explains why Martha failed to help the market researcher, while 7% of people in the same situation did help. Before replying to this objection, I'll point out again that it would not be made by an identificationist like Frankfurt. For Frankfurt, it is necessary for responsibility that the action and effective desire were truly the agent's own. If they were not then the agent is not morally responsible, no matter what can be said about her character and dispositions. Setting that point aside, I'll make two points in reply to the objection. My first is that there is no evidence that the agents who failed to help in Martha's position do indeed lack or possess any particular character or dispositional trait. As I discussed in section 3.7.3, studies of this kind often test for such correlations and fail to find them. It may be that there is no trait which correlates significantly with performance of the action, counterintuitive though this seems. By a ―trait‖ here I mean some feature which is exhibited across many situations. But 46 See section 3.2.2. 47 Latané and Darley 1970:122. See also section 3.8.5. 48 See sections 3.2.3 and 3.8.1. 49 Similar points can be made for Samantha, Ruby and Gina – the other agents in the five key cases. 70 situationism ―denies that people typically have highly general personality traits that effect behavior manifesting a high degree of cross-situational consistency‖. 50 My second point is about the structure of the objector's claim here. How can an agent be directly blameworthy for an action in virtue of the fact that her character or dispositional nature is flawed? It seems to me that two conditions must be fulfilled. The agent must know or suspect that the flaw is present; and it must be reasonably foreseeable to her that performing the bad action would result from that flaw. 51 There is no good reason to think that the first condition is fulfilled in Martha's case. This would require that there is some broad character trait (such as being more readily influenced than most by the behaviour of others) which correlates significantly with performing the morally bad action in this particular situation – for which there is both no evidence and also some grounds for doubt. It would also require that Martha is aware that she lacks that trait, which might well not be the case. More importantly, the second condition is almost certainly not fulfilled in Martha's case: it is not reasonably foreseeable to her that being more readily influenced than most by the behaviour of others would lead her to fail to respond to a researcher's cries in the very next room. If the contrary were the case, we would not be as shocked as we are to learn that only 7% of people in her situation did respond. Suppose that the psychologists had described the situation to a control group of subjects, who were not actually placed in that situation. I think that the great majority – far more than 7% – would predict that they would offer help to the researcher. It is surely not reasonably foreseeable to these would-be subjects that they would perform the bad action as a result of possessing a certain dispositional trait, if they are untrained in social psychology. After all, in such experiments even expert social psychologists often fail to uncover any dispositional traits which correlate with performance of actions. And yet the trait (or traits) would surely have to be extremely common, to explain the result that 93% of people will fail to help. I conclude that it's unreasonable to hold Martha directly blameworthy and DMR for her action in virtue of possessing a certain trait, because she cannot reasonably foresee that possession of the trait would lead her to perform that action (if indeed there is a trait which correlates with performing that action). Therefore the objection does not refute my proposal that the CFA condition is necessary for DMR. I'll now turn away from the series of objections which seek to establish that the agent in one of my five example cases is directly blameworthy, and thereby DMR for her action. The final objection aims to establish that the agent is DMR by different means. 4.3.6. The agent would feel responsible despite subverting causes Sometimes, even after she has learned of the subverting cause of her action, an agent may feel herself to be morally responsible for that action. For instance, Martha might feel morally responsible for continuing to fill out her questionnaire when the researcher cried out, despite learning that the passive behaviour of the person sitting next to her was a cause of her action (see section 3.2.2). Suppose that Martha is told of her action's causes, and feels ashamed and angry at herself. These are emotions suggestive of someone who feels responsible for her actions. Even if she were told of various situationist studies which reveal the surprising influence of passive bystanders, she might remain ashamed or angry. This indicates that Martha would not 50 Doris 2002:38-39. 51 Arguably, there is a third necessary condition: the agent must have been able at some earlier time to change her nature to remove the flaw. But I'll set this condition aside since it is more controversial than the other two. 71 F-accept her action at the time of acting, if she knew its causes. 52 Yet Martha feels morally responsible for performing the action. This is evidence, the objector claims, that she is directly morally responsible for her action – despite the fact that she would not F-accept it. I'll make three points in response to this objection. The first point is that feeling morally responsible is not the same thing as being responsible. I'm working on the assumption that an agent's moral responsibility is a matter of her being an appropriate candidate for reactive attitudes in relation to the action, independently of any facts about whether the action in fact stimulates any reactive attitudes. 53 One of my aims is to show that we are often mistaken when we feel ourselves and others to be morally responsible for actions. 54 Thus I regard Martha's feeling morally responsible for her action as prima facie evidence of her actual moral responsibility, but not decisive evidence. Nevertheless it's surely true that most people in Martha's position would feel similar reactive attitudes toward their own action. And in fact most onlookers would hold her morally responsible for her action, if they were not familiar with situationist research. This adds up to quite a strong prima facie case for Martha's moral responsibility. My second point is that Martha's own feeling that she is morally responsible could be overturned. It may seem paradoxical that a philosopher or a psychologist looking at the case is less likely to hold the agent morally responsible, in that situation, than the agent herself. But the paradox dissolves, I think, when we pinpoint the difference between the people making these judgements. If the difference were that the philosopher (or psychologist) had very different fundamental intuitions about moral responsibility from the agent's, then that would be problematic, and we might suspect the philosopher of having lost touch with something important about the concept. But that is not the case here. Instead, the difference is simply a matter of information, as we can see if we consider a series of steps in which the agent receives more and more information. Martha does not know all the causes of her action, so it is natural that she feels morally responsible for it. If she were told of the subverting cause, she might feel slightly inclined toward excusing herself, but not convincingly so. If she were told that only 7% of subjects in her situation helped the researcher, she would probably feel more inclined to excuse herself. If she then studied situationist psychology, and learned that the same pattern has been found in many similar experiments, she would realise that agents can be very powerfully influenced by situational factors, and be more inclined again to excuse herself. If she then considered the philosophical implications, as discussed here and by Doris and Nahmias (see chapter 5), it's more likely still that she would no longer consider herself to be morally responsible for her action. 55 None of this extra information would change Martha's intuitions about the concept of moral responsibility. Rather, it would change her view about which actions fall within the scope of the concept. My third and more minor point is that Martha's feeling that she is morally responsible for her action need not indicate that she feels directly morally responsible for it. She might instead feel that she bears traced moral responsibility for it. She might continue to feel this, even after learning of the subverting cause of her action. For in our feelings about whether someone bears moral responsibility we do not usually distinguish between direct and traced moral responsibility. The feeling is the same in either case. Martha would be TMR if the resultant occurrence of her action was reasonably foreseeable by her at the time of some 52 If Martha would F-accept her action, then she would be directly morally responsible for it on my account – and so the objection would not be applicable. 53 This is Fischer and Ravizza's definition of moral responsibility, which I adopted as a working assumption in section 1.1.3. 54 This will be the subject of chapter 7. 55 Of course, I can't claim that everyone would come to this conclusion, but I think it's likely that many would do so. Furthermore, this conclusion would not seem completely implausible, even to people who did not in the end agree with it. 72 earlier action or omission. In her particular case, it's very unlikely that there is any such earlier time, since she does not have specialist knowledge of psychology. But judgements about traced moral responsibility are sometimes complex and difficult to make. We are used to feeling morally responsible even for actions with which we do not identify, in part because we accept the tracing principle and think that it often operates in everyday actions. We are often reluctant to excuse agents from responsibility when there is uncertainty, especially when their action was bad, or the consequences of their action were bad. 56 For Martha, the possibility that she might bear TMR may explain her feeling morally responsible for her action. Thus Martha's feeling that she is morally responsible does not necessarily indicate that she feels directly morally responsible for it. I conclude that the objection fails. That an agent would feel herself to be morally responsible for an action with subverting causes, even if she were told of the role of the subverting cause, does not show that she is DMR for it. In fact, this consideration is outweighed by the arguments which point to her lacking DMR for it. 4.4. CONCLUSIONS I've considered three kinds of objection to my arguments against Frankfurt. In section 4.1 I discussed situationist causes which do not subvert moral responsibility on my account, because agents would continue to F-accept their actions on learning of those causes. For example, finding a dime in a phone booth may be a non-subverting cause of a helping action. I considered a series of objections which suggest stronger necessary conditions of DMR than my CFA condition. All of these conditions imply more sceptical conclusions than mine about the prevalence of moral responsibility for actions. Although these conclusions are not threatening to my position, I argued that all of them can plausibly be rejected by compatibilists. In section 4.2 I considered cases of regrettable actions for which it is obvious that the agent is DMR, and yet it appears that my CFA condition is not met. These would be counterexamples to my claim that the CFA condition is necessary for DMR. However, I showed that the CFA condition is indeed met in these cases, and so the objection dissolves. In section 4.3 I discussed a series of objections with a common structure: an agent who does not meet the CFA condition might seem to be DMR for her action, in various different ways. If one of these objections succeeded, it would show that the CFA condition is not necessary for DMR. The objectors' points are most persuasively applied to Martha's action in the market research' case, so I focused on that case. I argued that none of the objections establishes that Martha is DMR for her action. I think the same points would be equally effective in the other five cases I rely on in my main argument. 57 Meanwhile I need only one case in which an agent is not DMR for her action, while she does F-accept her effective desire, in order to establish my main argument against Frankfurt. 58 In this chapter I've defended my two arguments against Frankfurt's position (my main argument, and my positive proposal). Very similar objections could be made to the arguments I'll make in the next two chapters, against other theories of moral responsibility. My replies, too, would be very similar to those I've given here. 56 Empirical research by philosophers seems to show that people blame agents for the bad consequences of their actions more readily than they praise agents for good consequences – see for example Knobe 2006. 57 In fact, I think my points would be even more plausible when applied to the other four cases, though I have not argued for that. 58 The conclusion of my main argument is that F-acceptance is not sufficient for DMR. I discussed this point in more detail at the start of section 4.3 above. 73 I'll turn next to discuss two philosophers who have specifically addressed the threat to moral responsibility posed by situationist social psychology: John Doris and Eddy Nahmias. 74 5. DORIS AND NAHMIAS In chapter 3 I set out my main argument against Frankfurt's theory of moral responsibility. I concluded that Frankfurt's condition of identification is not sufficient for direct moral responsibility. 1 I argued that when an action has subverting causes, the effective desire which moves the agent to act is not truly her own. 2 On an axiom of identification which Frankfurt himself holds, an agent cannot be directly morally responsible for an action if the effective desire is not truly her own. 3 I also made a positive proposal of an alternative condition which I believe is necessary for direct moral responsibility. John Doris and Eddy Nahmias are two philosophers who have engaged in detail with situationist research and its implications of for moral responsibility. They both propose identificationist theories, which I will discuss and criticise in this chapter. My five key cases of subverting causes included three situationist factors –Samantha's being told that she is running late for a presentation (section 3.2.1), a bystander sitting next to Martha as she filled out a questionnaire (3.2.2), and Judy's being told that she will meet the candidate whose qualities she is assessing (section 3.2.3). Doris and Nahmias do not discuss the other kinds of subverting cause which I included in section 3.2. I'll begin by addressing Doris's account. 5.1. JOHN DORIS Doris's book Lack of Character is focused primarily on the relationship between character and ethical behaviour, but it includes one chapter about responsibility. 4 In this section I will summarise Doris's arguments for his proposed condition of responsibility. 5 In section 5.1.1 I'll criticise Doris's arguments and explain why I think my condition is preferable. In section 5.1.2 I'll summarise and then criticise Doris's conclusions about responsibility. Finally, in section 5.1.3, I'll summarise my conclusions about Doris's theory. Doris aims to develop an identificationist theory which can resist the threats to our attributions of responsibility posed by situationist research. He does not examine or criticise any previous identificationist account. 6 Instead, he begins by outlining a very generic condition for what I'll call ―G-identification‖: To identify with one's determinative motive is to embrace it or regard it as ―fully one's own‖. 7 Doris speaks of agents being identified with ―determinative motives‖, whereas Frankfurt-style identification is with ―effective desires‖. 8 Doris's ―determinative motives‖ 1 Direct moral responsibility (DMR) is anchored in facts about the action and the agent at the time of acting. In contrast, traced moral responsibility (TMR) can be ―traced back‖ to facts about an earlier action (or omission) and about the agent at that earlier time. See section 1.2. 2 An action has subverting causes when it is true that: if the agent knew all the causes of her action, she would not F-accept the action. (This is a simplified definition; for the full version see section 3.1). 3 This axiom is statement (4) in the set which define Frankfurt's position in section 2.2. 4 The following caveat applies. Chapter 7 of Lack of Character covers a lot of ground, and Doris admits engagingly that he has not filled out all of the details for some of the positions he considers and adopts. It's therefore possible that I've misunderstood his views on some points. 5 Doris speaks of ―responsibility‖, but by that he seems to mean what most other philosophers mean by ―moral responsibility‖. At any rate, I don't think it makes a significant difference to my arguments if the two concepts do not have exactly the same extensions. 6 Doris notes ―I favor the ―identificationist‖ approach to moral responsibility associated with Frankfurt‖; but he does not describe Frankfurt's account in detail (2002:140). 7 Doris 2002:140. 8 Sometimes Doris speaks only of identification with a ―motive‖ for action; I assume that he uses this term as shorthand for ―determinative motive‖. 75 include desires which would be classed as ―endorsing higher-order desires‖ on Frankfurt's account. 9 For example, on Doris's account, an agent can be identified with a determinative motive to please her father. The same agent on Frankfurt's account could be identified with an effective first-order desire to perform a specific action, but the desire to please her father would be among the higher-order desires which endorse that first-order desire. Despite this difference, I think the two theories are readily comparable. To assess moral responsibility for a particular action, we are interested in whether the agent identifies either with the effective desire (Frankfurt) or with a determinative motive which endorses the effective desire (Doris). For consistency with previous arguments I will sometimes express my points in terms of ―effective desires‖ rather than ―motives‖. In doing so I don't think I risk any misunderstanding of my arguments. Ignoring situationist experiments to begin with, Doris argues that G-identification is neither necessary nor sufficient for moral responsibility. That G-identification is not necessary for moral responsibility is shown, according to Doris, by the example of an agent who is ashamed of her akratic action when betraying her spouse. 10 This is an action in which the agent is not G-identified; and yet the lack of G-identification does not absolve her from moral responsibility. 11 Meanwhile, to see that G-identification is not sufficient for moral responsibility, we need only consider cases where the agent suffers a deprived upbringing or a mental illness, or has been brainwashed. 12 Necessary for moral responsibility, Doris believes, is ―normative competence‖, which is a complex capacity enabling the possessor to appreciate normative considerations, ascertain knowledge relevant to particular normative judgments, and engage in effective deliberation. 13 Via ―effective deliberation‖ the agent can make decisions which conform with her evaluative commitments. Doris aims to specify a form of identification which is necessary and sufficient for responsibility. Doris considers two issues which threaten responsibility when actions have situationist causes. The first issue he considers is that agents whose actions have situationist causes do not exercise their capacity for effective deliberation. The second issue is that agents whose actions have situationist causes have not consciously recognised their own motives for acting. 14 Doris argues that neither of these issues prevent an agent's moral responsibility for her action. He employs the same example to deal with both issues. When we act out of habit and without reflection, we sometimes do not exercise our capacity for effective deliberation, and yet we are often morally responsible. And when we act out of habit and without reflection, we sometimes have not consciously recognised our own motives, and yet we are morally responsible. Thus neither the exercise of effective deliberation nor conscious recognition of motives are necessary for moral responsibility. Hence Doris also concludes that 9 Motives may also include beliefs about which first-order desires will best achieve the higher-order desire. 10 Doris 2002:140. 11 For comparison, it's not clear to me whether Frankfurt (in his final account) regards identification as necessary for moral responsibility, and I did not assume that he does. See section 2.2. 12 Doris 2002:216n37. 13 Doris 2002:136. Doris credits Susan Wolf for inspiring this part of his account. I discussed Wolf's criticism of Frankfurt on this point in section 2.3.1. 14 Doris uses the expression ―consciously identified motives‖ (2002:141) in place of ―consciously recognised motives‖, but I think that phrasing is apt to confuse in the context of a discussion about identifying with motives. 76 neither of these is necessary for identification, since identification is necessary for moral responsibility. 15 Instead Doris briefly contemplates the following identification condition involving counterfactual scrutiny: Identification may be said to obtain if a person would have [G-] identified with the determinative motive of her [action] at the time of performance had she subjected it to reflective scrutiny. 16 Reflective scrutiny here involves both the exercise of effective deliberation and conscious recognition of one's own motives. 17 But Doris rejects this condition with the following argument. Suppose an agent (I'll call her Fatima) has an unconscious desire to please her father, which influences her action. If she reflected on her action, she would not recognise that this unconscious desire played any role in it. If she were made aware of this desire, at the time of acting, she would recoil from it, saying ―Well, if that's why I'm doing it, I'm damn sure going to do something else‖. 18 According to Doris, this lack of counterfactual identification need not excuse Fatima from moral responsibility. If Fatima's unconscious desire for paternal approval has influenced many of her actions, including several which are harmful to her colleagues for example, those colleagues may indeed hold her morally responsible for her latest action. Therefore the counterfactual scrutiny condition is not necessary for moral responsibility (and so it is not the correct condition of identification). Doris's response to this problem employs what he calls ―narrative integration‖. A motive admits of narrative integration if it can be ―integrated into a narrative that manifests identification‖. 19 A narrative can reveal identification even when the agent (the subject of the narrative) disavows that motive; it can reveal that the motive does in fact express the agent's ―operative priorities‖ or ―evaluative orientation‖. The agent's judgement about whether she is identified with a motive is not definitive: Narrative development is a way of subjecting claims of identification (or its lack) to the sort of interpersonal scrutiny required for responsibility assessment; this may sound too impressionistic for good philosophy, but I think it is a fair characterization of something central to our practice, and it is far from clear that there is a better way to proceed. 20 I summarise Doris's argument in a condition of identification: NI An agent identifies with a determinative motive to perform an action if and only if that motive admits of narrative integration. On condition NI, Fatima may well be identified with her unconscious desire to please her father – if a narrative reveals that it does express her operative priorities or evaluative orientation. 15 For Doris, moral responsibility requires identification. If it were the case that identification requires effective deliberation, for example, then we could conclude that moral responsibility requires effective deliberation. But moral responsibility does not require effective deliberation. Therefore identification does not require effective deliberation. 16 This phrase is a quotation from Doris 2002:141. 17 At least, this is my interpretation of Doris's remarks on the subject (2002:141). 18 Doris 2002:141. Doris does not give an example of the kind of action he has in mind; I suggest one in the discussion below. 19 Doris 2002:142. 20 Doris 2002:142. 77 I take it that Doris regards NI as necessary and sufficient for moral responsibility. 21 What verdict does the NI condition give about actions with situationist causes? Consider for example the case of Samantha, who walks past a slumped man after being told that she is running late to give a presentation. 22 Doris acknowledges that there are some important differences between unconscious motives and ―the kind of motives adduced by situationism‖. Fatima's unconscious desire to please her father is a very personal motive; whereas Samantha's desire to be on time for her presentation seems rather generic. Fatima's desire is representative of a long history of similar actions, and fits into a temporally extended narrative. It's not so easy to fit Samantha's desire into a narrative; actions like hers ―look like psychological tics or glitches‖. 23 Doris now appeals to the notion of ―policies‖ – which ―reflect ongoing commitments that order and structure behavior‖. 24 Take the example of a ―hard-charging stockbroker‖ (I'll call him Steve) who walks past someone in distress without helping, where a cause of Steve's action is that he has been told that he is late for a presentation. 25 Steve might meet Doris's identification condition NI, for even where a person fails to identify with the callousness that resulted from haste, he might yet embrace having the sort of packed schedule that induces haste. The driven stockbroker might reject his many hasty omissions, but wholeheartedly endorse the way of life that leads to them. The hardcharging broker embraces a life-plan that eventuates in the unfortunate omissions; the identification requisite for responsibility obtains, although it is not directly proximate to the omission. 26 Doris discusses an interesting and difficult problem case in which an agent (I'll call him Alf) performs an akratic act of sexual infidelity under intense situational pressures brought to bear by ―a committed and skilled seducer‖. 27 The sexual infidelity represented no policy of Alf's; in fact it happened despite his policy to the contrary. However, as Doris notes, ―the proximate motive is not the only motive of ethical interest‖. 28 If Alf's akratic infidelity follows his wholehearted flirting during a candlelit dinner, then in this ―there is a legitimate target for the reactive attitudes, though it comes rather earlier in the process than we might have expected‖. 29 Doris goes on to suggest that Alf is responsible for the flirtation, but not for the infidelity – despite the likelihood that his wife will feel much angrier about the latter than the former. Similarly he suggests that someone may be responsible for drinking too much alcohol, but not for his subsequent behaviour. 30 Doris recommends taking this view as an improvement on our ―familiar reactive habits‖. 21 Doris holds that effective deliberation is necessary for normative competence, normative competence is necessary for identification, and identification is necessary for moral responsibility (2002:136 and 140). Like me, Nelkin interprets Doris as holding that the condition is sufficient for moral responsibility: ―One is responsible for an action [according to Doris] if one acts on motives that admit of narrative integration‖ (2005:197). 22 See section 3.2.1. Doris doesn't discuss individual actions, but speaks only in general terms about ―situationally induced behaviors‖. 23 Doris 2002:143. 24 Doris 2002:144. Doris also uses the word ―plan‖ as a synonym for ―policy‖. I find this confusing, so I've used only the term ―policy‖. 25 Doris does not say explicitly that the example of the hard-charging broker is supposed to shed light on actions with situationist causes, but that seems to be implied by the position of these remarks in his argument. 26 Doris 2002:144. The sense in which the person ―fails to identify‖ in the first sentence of this quote is presumably the generic sense I labelled ―G-identification‖. 27 Doris 2002:144. (The example is embellished at various points during the chapter.) 28 Doris 2002:144. 29 Doris 2002:144. 30 Doris 2002:145. 78 Doris concludes that, far from undermining responsibility, situationist findings can increase responsibility, by enabling more effective deliberation. 31 Those who know about situational stimuli are more responsible than they were before gaining that knowledge. He also holds that agents are often morally responsible even when their actions result from situationist effects of which they are not aware. I'll discuss those conclusions in more detail in section 5.1.2, but first I will criticise Doris's responsibility condition, and explain why I think my proposal is preferable. 5.1.1. Criticisms of Doris's account I'll begin by amending my proposed necessary condition for DMR, to incorporate the generic notion of identification with which Doris compares his account. I labelled that notion ―Gidentification‖: To identify with one's determinative motive is to embrace it or regard it as ―fully one's own‖. 32 The condition which I argued for in section 3.5 was this: CFA The agent would F-accept her effective desire, if she knew all the proximate and relevant causes of the action. 33 An equivalent condition, incorporating generic G-identification in place of Frankfurt's Facceptance, would be this: CFG The agent would embrace her determinative motive or regard it as fully her own, if she knew all the proximate and relevant causes of the action. I'll argue, against Doris, that this CFG condition is necessary for direct moral responsibility. There are several important points on which I agree with Doris. First, I agree that Gidentification is not sufficient for moral responsibility: normative competence, including the agent's ability to deliberate effectively, is also necessary. Second, I agree that the agent's conscious recognition of her motives is not necessary for moral responsibility (whether DMR or TMR). The key question, in my view, is whether the agent would embrace her determinative motive, or regard it as fully her own, if she knew all the causes of the action. 34 Third, I agree that the exercise of effective deliberation is not necessary for moral responsibility, nor for direct moral responsibility. An agent's motive can be fully her own when it is unconscious, and also when she acts out of habit without reflecting on the motive. On my account, a motive can be fully the agent's own when effective deliberation does not occur because the action has a situationist cause, provided that she would embrace it if she knew of the situationist cause. 35 I also agree with Doris that we can use knowledge about situational effects (and indeed other types of subverting cause which he does not discuss) to make better choices (both 31 Doris 2002:129 and 153. 32 Doris 2002:140. 33 This is a simplified version of the condition; see section 3.5 for the fully precise version. 34 The weaknesses of the phrases ―embrace‖ and ―regard as fully her own‖ are evident, but I've used them because they are part of Doris's rough and generic characterisation of identification. It strains normal usage to say that an agent can ―embrace‖ a motive that she does not consciously recognise, or ―regard it as fully her own‖. A more nuanced notion is needed instead – such as Frankfurt's F-acceptance. 35 In this kind of case the situationist cause is not subverting. I discussed one such case in more detail in section 4.1. 79 ethically and prudentially better). 36 However, I think Doris is mistaken in his assessment of agents' responsibility when their actions have situationist causes which are subverting. Standing back from his theory, one might view it as moulded with the end in mind: Doris wants his theory to give the verdict that agents are usually morally responsible for actions with situationist causes. 37 Although it achieves that end, the theory fails to deal effectively with actions whose causes are already familiar to us. In the important case of Alf's akratic act of sexual infidelity, Doris claims that Alf bears moral responsibility only for his earlier flirting over dinner. 38 I think it's much more plausible to say that Alf bears moral responsibility for his act of infidelity (as well as for his flirting). Doris acknowledges that adopting his proposal would require a change to our reactive practices. 39 I see no need for this change, given that an obvious mechanism is available by which we can hold Alf responsible for the act of infidelity – namely tracing. Alf bears traced moral responsibility for the act of infidelity because the earlier flirtation is fully his own, and because the subsequent infidelity is reasonably foreseeable by Alf at the time of the flirtation. Doris makes a comparison between this case and that of a man who drinks too much alcohol and later behaves badly. Again it seems to me that we hold the drunken man responsible for his actions while drunk, and not merely for drinking too much. He bears TMR for his actions while drunk. Doris's proposal, that we excuse Alf and the drunk for responsibility for their lustful and drunken actions, goes against our reactive attitudes and intuitions. I think my proposal is much less radical: we should accept that Alf and the drunk are not directly morally responsible for the lustful and drunken actions, because these actions are not fully their own. But the agents are morally responsible for them nonetheless, via tracing. An advantage of Doris's account of responsibility – compared with Frankfurt's – is that the relevance of the agent's history is recognised. The means by which it is recognised in Doris's account is ―narrative integration‖. Doris acknowledges that using narrative integration as the basis for judgements of responsibility will be difficult in many cases. Often our judgements will involve ―more art than science‖. 40 I don't regard this as a weakness of his account. Judgements of moral responsibility are often difficult to make. A more serious problem is the threat of circularity in his account. It's far from clear that our judgements about whether an agent's desire to act admits of narrative integration are independent of our judgements about whether the agent is morally responsible for an action. According to Doris, in obsessive-compulsive disorders there may be desires which are very typical for the agent which nevertheless do not meet the narrative integration requirement. 41 Suppose that Oscar washes his hands repeatedly after eating and cannot bring himself to help with cleaning the dishes. We do not hold Oscar morally responsible for his obsessive handwashing action because, according to Doris, we cannot readily integrate the desire for this action into a narrative. But to see a problem with this view, I think we need only think back to a time when obsessive-compulsive disorders were not understood. Without an understanding of the disorder, people might well have held Oscar morally responsible for his hand-washing action. The associated narrative might have described Oscar as overly and selfishly worried about his own cleanliness, or habitually lazy and unwilling to help with household chores. 36 See Doris 2002:153. 37 This impression is reinforced by Doris's insistence that exculpation for those who are unaware of situational effects is a result ―to be resisted‖ (2002:153). I'll discuss this point further in section 5.1.2. 38 At least, this is how I interpret Doris's remarks when he says that ―there is a legitimate target for the reactive attitudes, though it comes rather earlier in the process than we might have expected‖ (2002:144). Doris makes no use of tracing, despite discussing several cases in which it seems natural to do so. 39 Doris 2002:145. 40 Doris 2002:145. 41 Doris 2002:142. Doris does not support his point with any examples; the example of the hand-washing obsessive is mine. 80 With greater modern understanding of the condition, we realise that those narratives were flawed. But it cannot be that Oscar is excused from moral responsibility today because our narratives are accurate, whereas a medieval man in the same situation was morally responsible because his contemporaries' narratives were flawed. An agent's metaphysical status as morally responsible must not vary according to the narratives of the day. 42 (In contrast, my condition is not threatened by this circularity. In the counterfactual scenario in which the agent must embrace his effective desire, he knows the true causes of his action. If does not embrace it or regard it as fully his own, he is not DMR on my account.) Perhaps Doris might respond to this objection by appealing again to the notion of policies. 43 He might claim that Oscar has no policy to wash his hands repeatedly after eating, and hence that the desire to do so is not suitable for narrative integration. But I don't think this move would solve the problem facing Doris. For Oscar might indeed have a deliberate policy to wash his hands repeatedly after eating, as a means of managing his disorder. Setting such a policy might enable him to wash his hands much less often during the rest of the day. So it may be that Oscar's having a policy in favour of his action makes no difference to whether he is identified with the desire (for Doris will surely still hold that Oscar is not identified with it here). If Doris now responds that the relevant sense of a policy' covers only actions which are embraced by the agent as fully his own, then the notion of a policy itself appears not be independent of the notion of identification. Furthermore, in times before our modern understanding, people might well have regarded Oscar's hand-washing actions as reflecting a policy (e.g. a policy of avoiding chores, rather than a policy of managing his condition). Those people would have been licensed by Doris's account to hold Oscar morally responsible – contra Doris's own verdict on this kind of case. A different way to put the point against Doris is that the notion of ―admitting of narrative integration‖ is vague. It's not clear why some obsessive-compulsive desires do not admit of narrative integration, if they are often effective and lead to action. Similarly if there are two kinds of policies, some of which reveal identification while others are merely compulsive, it's not clear what makes the relevant difference. That a certain verdict matches our practices of responsibility attribution does not provide it with properly independent support. I think there is another problem with Doris's narrative integration condition, which he does not address. Suppose Karen is habitually extremely health-conscious and well disciplined, and has a policy not to eat unhealthy desserts in restaurants. In fact, she has never done so before. On this particular evening at the restaurant she has perused the dessert menu, and knows that it would be best, all things considered, to order a fruit salad. However, on this particular evening she has a strong desire to eat chocolate cake. She orders some chocolate cake. This action is akratic, but she does G-identify with her motive – she embraces it as fully her own. It seems that the verdict of Doris's account, though, must be that Karen is not identified with her motive, and so not morally responsible for her action. Her determinative motive is not readily integrated into a narrative, since she has never before ordered cake (nor any other unhealthy dessert) in such a situation. Furthermore, her action contradicts her explicit policy. But the verdict that Karen is not morally responsible for ordering the cake makes Doris's condition much less plausible than the generic condition of G-identification in this case. 44 42 On the view of moral responsibility which I adopted in section 1.1.3, a morally responsible agent is an appropriate candidate for the reactive attitudes. There is a fact of the matter about this, whose truth is not merely relative to the norms of a particular society. 43 Doris does not mention policies in connection with this kind of case. 44 On Frankfurt's account, too, Karen would be held DMR if she F-accepts the action as her own. 81 Doris might respond by claiming that Karen's action is readily integrated into a narrative: namely, the narrative I gave in the previous paragraph. But in order to assess whether the description in previous paragraph establishes Karen's identification with her motive, in the way that Doris needs, we must strip out the stated fact that Karen does embrace it as her own. 45 Without that fact, I cannot see any basis on which we might integrate Karen's strong desire to eat chocolate into a narrative. She has never before ordered an unhealthy dessert in a restaurant, and has a policy against doing so. And yet it may be that she does embrace the motive as her own. On that basis Karen is G-identified with her motive. 46 Instead, perhaps Doris might respond that we must consider the type of action in this case. We might for example count Karen's action as of the type ―indulging herself‖, and it might be that she has performed actions of this type before, though perhaps only rarely. 47 The problem with such a reply is that the threat of circularity lurks nearby. How are we to determine the types of actions which are relevant for narrative integration? How many times must an agent have performed an action of that type in order for her current motive to admit of narrative integration? Our answers to these questions cannot be guided by our intuitions about responsibility attribution, without circularity. Furthermore, it's not clear from Doris's discussion what verdict we should give if an agent's narrative contradicts his policy. Suppose that Sidney, a smoker for the last 30 years, decides to stop smoking. I think it's reasonable to say that he now has a policy not to smoke, reflecting his ongoing commitment. Two days later, at a moment of extreme stress, he succumbs to his craving to smoke another cigarette. Should we say that Sidney is identified with his effective desire, on the grounds that it meshes well with his narrative? Or should we conclude that he is not identified, because the action contradicts his policy? At best there seems to be a lacuna in Doris's account here. At worst there may be an irresolvable tension. Meanwhile, the narrative integration test does not always pick out desires with which the agent is identified, or which are fully her own. If an agent would disavow a motive if she subjected it to reflective scrutiny, I think the most plausible conclusion is that identification does not obtain. 48 I am not persuaded by Doris's key example of the agent with an unconscious desire (whom I called Fatima), which is supposed to show the contrary. Fatima has an unconscious desire to please her father, which is a determinative motive in her action. Suppose that the action is indiscreetly revealing a secret about one of her colleagues, which in turn enhances Fatima's own prospects of promotion at her colleague's expense. 49 If she were made aware of the unconscious desire, at the time of acting, she would disavow it. 50 Doris believes that Fatima is identified with her desire if it can be integrated into a suitable narrative. I think this is an implausible view. I'll argue that, if Fatima would disavow the desire, then she is not identified with it. Yet, at the same time, that lack of 45 If our judgement about narrative integration required knowledge of whether Karen accepts her motive as her own, then it would not be independent of the ―generic‖ notion of ―G-identification‖. 46 Of course, I have argued that G-identification is not sufficient to establish that the motive is truly Karen's own. For example, suppose a cause of her action of ordering chocolate cake is that she earlier worked on a complex logical problem. If Karen knew that this was a cause, she might not G-identify with her motive. In this case, the motive is not truly her own, in my view. 47 She might never before have ―indulged herself‖ by ordering an unhealthy dessert. 48 In this discussion of Fatima's case I am ignoring the possibility that she might embrace the motive if she knew the action's causes. 49 I take it that this is the sort of action that Doris has in mind in his discussion of identification with an unconscious desire to please one's father, though he does not give an example of such an action (2002:141-142). 50 In my terms this desire (or more strictly, the onset of this desire) is a subverting cause of Fatima's action. I didn't include an example of this kind among my five key cases because I'm not aware of research which demonstrates this kind of effect. (If such effects do indeed occur, then they lend support to my claim that there are many everyday actions with subverting causes, and so too to my sceptical argument in chapter 7). 82 identification need not excuse her from moral responsibility for the action which issues from that desire, because she may bear TMR for it. Fatima's unconscious desire has influenced many of her previous actions, including several which are harmful to her colleagues. I'll consider two possible versions of this history. In the first version, she is aware that several of her previous similar actions have been detrimental to her colleagues. She had the opportunity to reflect on the effects of her actions, and whether she regretted or was satisfied with those effects. After reflecting, she was satisfied with those effects, and she decided not to take steps to change her future behaviour. This decision was fully her own, and she was directly morally responsible for it. To this decision we can trace Fatima's moral responsibility for her current action – indiscreetly revealing a secret about her colleague. Fatima bears TMR for revealing the secret, because she was directly morally responsible for an earlier action (the decision to do nothing to change her future behaviour), and the later action was reasonably foreseeable by her at that time. 51 There is an obvious parallel with Vargas's example case of Jeff the jerk (discussed in section 1.2). I think the same arguments apply, and Fatima's responsibility can be traced to her earlier decision. 52 In this first version of Fatima's history, we have no need for Doris's notion of narrative integration: the established principle of tracing gives the conclusion which reflects our intuitions and reactive practices. In the second version of Fatima's history, she reflected on the effects of her previous actions and was not satisfied with them. She embarked on a course of therapy with the intention of changing some of her future behaviour. However, she has so far been unable to make significant changes to that behaviour. She also remains unaware of the unconscious motive and would continue to disavow it if made aware of it. Here I think the only plausible verdict is that Fatima is not identified with her unconscious motive. She might still be morally responsible for revealing the secret, if responsibility can be traced to some earlier point in her history. But, contrary to Doris's NI condition, she is not identified with the motive despite the fact that it admits of narrative integration. Thus on the first version of Fatima's history narrative integration is superfluous; on the second it yields an implausible verdict. Tracing captures the way in which Fatima can be morally responsible for her action, in a more plausible manner than the claim that she is identified with a motive which she would genuinely disavow, if she knew of its existence. Problems also arise, I think, from Doris's discussion of the hard-charging stockbroker (whom I called Steve). Doris suggests that Steve can be held morally responsible for walking past a person in distress, because he ―embrace[s] having the sort of packed schedule that induces haste‖. 53 This is despite the fact that Steve ―fails to identify with the callousness that resulted from haste‖. Steve ―reject[s] his many hasty omissions, but wholeheartedly endorse[s] the way of life that leads to them‖. Doris seems to think that Steve is not G-identified with his determinative motive, and that this is a weakness in the generic account of identification, which can be rectified by using the narrative integration condition instead. I'm not convinced that this analysis is correct. It's not clear that Steve fails to embrace (or regard as fully his own) the determinative motive which leads him to walk past a person in distress, which is presumably a motive which concerns meeting other commitments. If indeed Steve ―wholeheartedly endorses the way of life‖ with which that motive is surely consistent, then it 51 An incompatibilist might want to add the condition that it must have been possible for Fatima to change her future behaviour. I am sympathetic to this claim, but I set it aside so that my arguments will apply to compatibilists who would reject it. 52 Here we may treat the earlier decision as an action, or as an omission (since it's a decision to do nothing). I think the point succeeds either way. 53 All the quotes in this paragraph are from Doris 2002:144. 83 seems more plausible to say that Steve does embrace that motive. 54 In that case, he is Gidentified with the motive, and narrative integration is once again superfluous. I'll set aside that point, though, for the sake of argument. I'll assume that Steve does not G-identify with his effective desire to walk past the person in distress – he does not embrace it or regard it as his own. But Steve does meet the narrative integration (NI) condition. I think the case is now analogous to the first version of Fatima's history I envisioned above: Steve is not DMR for his action, but he is very likely to be TMR for it. It's very likely that he has had the opportunity to reflect on the effects of his habitually hasty behaviour, and to decide whether to take steps to change his future behaviour. Again, we have no need for narrative integration to reach this result. Now suppose instead that when Steve walks past someone in distress his action has a situationist cause: suppose that he is in the same position as Samantha and the participants in the Good Samaritan' experiment (section 3.2.1). He walks past because he was told that he is running late, but would have stopped to help in the absence of that event. I take it that Doris views Steve as identified with his effective desire and morally responsible for his action, because the action reflects his operative priorities or evaluative orientation, as revealed in a suitable narrative. 55 I think there is a serious problem with this view. It seems to be at odds with Doris's own (persuasive) arguments about the powerful influence of situationist causes. The disturbing feature of situationist causes is that agents' subsequent actions are not predictable on the basis of their character or past habitual behaviour. The research reveals that features of the situation have a surprisingly marked effect on agents' actions. They are surprising precisely because they do not fit easily into agents' narrative histories. So in the presence of situationist causes, a person's narrative history is not a suitable guide to whether he is identified with an effective desire. Two kinds of error could occur, if we use narrative history as the condition of identification. First, when there is a mesh between the action and the agent's narrative history, the mesh might be merely coincidental. When Steve walks past the person in distress after being told that he is late for his presentation, this action meshes with his narrative history. But in the original experiment, 90% of subjects (who were seminarians rather than hard-charging brokers) did the same thing. Given these facts, we cannot conclude that Steve's action reflects his operative priorities or evaluative orientation; it may instead simply reflect the power of that situational factor. If in fact the situational factor was a cause of his action, and Steve would not embrace his motive upon learning of the action's causes – in other words, if my CFG condition is not met – then I submit that the motive is not fully his own. In the second kind of error, we might excuse from responsibility someone who is not habitually ―hard-charging‖, on the basis that her action does not mesh with her narrative. But on this particular occasion she might be identified in the sense that my CFG condition captures. That is, she might embrace her effective desire to walk past the person in distress, even if she were informed that being told she was late was a cause. In my view, it's much more plausible in that case to say that the desire is fully her own, and to hold her responsible for the action. Thus I think narrative integration is flawed as a guide to moral responsibility when there are situationist causes of actions. The same is true, for the same reasons, for other types of subverting cause. The counterexamples in the last two paragraphs show that Doris' NI 54 Doris's phrasing is peculiar when he says that Steve ―fails to identify with the callousness that resulted from haste‖ (my italics), rather than failing to identify with a motive. This may be a sign that the case cannot support the weight placed upon it. 55 Doris's remarks in this part of his discussion (2002:144) suggest that this would be his conclusion, though, unfortunately, he does not mention any specific examples in which the ―hard-charging broker‖ would bear responsibility despite ―situationally induced motives‖. 84 condition is neither necessary nor sufficient for a desire being fully one's own, and hence neither necessary nor sufficient for direct moral responsibility. 5.1.2. Doris's conclusions on situational factors and responsibility Doris reaches several conclusions about responsibility in the light of his discussion of situational influences on actions. I confess that I find the conclusions confusing; it seems to me that some conclusions conflict with others, and I don't see how the conflicts are to be resolved. In the following discussion I'll highlight some of the difficulties. It's not clear to me whether Doris thinks that situational effects could ever excuse an agent from moral responsibility for his action. Though Doris's account of responsibility is clearly intended as a response to the threat of situationism, his discussion of narrative integration includes only one (very brief) example of agents performing actions unknowingly influenced by situational pressures: of the subjects in the Milgram experiments who decide to administer strong electric shocks as instructed, Doris thinks we can easily take either view – that they are responsible, or that they are not. He comments ―I suspect that ... ambivalence is the appropriate judgment – or abstention from judgment‖. 56 In his Conclusion' section to the chapter on responsibility, Doris considers this question: Is it the case that those unfamiliar with the tradition of experimental social psychology suffer exculpating ignorance, insofar as they lack our keen awareness of situational danger? This result is to be resisted, lest thinking on responsibility become implausibly tender-minded. It is quite true that some situational factors, such as group size effects, are unknown to those lacking familiarity with a specialized literature, and here there may be surprising instances of exculpating ignorance. But ignorance of a bit of psychological theory does not excuse ignorance of an independent and ethically relevant fact. 57 To support this last point Doris draws on a highly-charged real-life example of a woman who was stabbed repeatedly, but some 38 bystanders apparently did not help or even call the police until it was too late. 58 It seems likely that situational factors – such as the behaviour of the other bystanders as a group – were causes of some bystanders' actions. Of these people Doris says: the Genovese bystanders were painfully aware of a person in desperate need of help, even if they were unaware of situational factors implicated in their failure to provide it. Excusable ignorance in one area does not necessarily excuse negligence in another. 59 On the other hand, Doris suggests that ―encountering situationism facilitates increased personal responsibility‖. 60 Once aware of such factors we can – and we should – avoid situations in which those factors are likely to influence our actions. 61 For example Alf, once aware that his flirting over dinner might lead to a later act of akratic infidelity, should avoid flirting. This pushes the ―locus of responsibility‖ to an earlier point in the process – in this case, to the time of the flirting rather than the time of the infidelity. Indeed, Doris even 56 Doris 2002:145. See section 3.6.1 for a description of the Milgram experiments. 57 Doris 2002:153. 58 The victim was Catherine (―Kitty‖) Genovese, murdered at night in Chicago in 1963. Earlier (2002:28-29), Doris describes key details of the incident, citing a book written by a newspaper editor. 59 Doris 2002:153. 60 Doris 2002:129. 61 Doris 2002:147. 85 suggests that we have a ―cognitive duty‖ to attend to possible situational factors, once we are aware of them. 62 Doris worries that: To some, my recommendations may seem more a recipe for treating oneself as a pet than for deliberating as a responsible person. 63 But he concludes that: Better understanding the determinants of behavior facilitates a process of self-manipulation that allows people to take a more active and responsible role in our own lives. 64 There seem to be two main conclusions here. Knowledge of situational factors facilitates increased responsibility. But a lack of such knowledge is not exculpating. It seems to me that there is a tension between Doris's two conclusions. If knowledge of situational factors facilitates increased responsibility, then the corollary surely follows that people who lack that knowledge must bear less responsibility. But Doris's phrasing in these passages is rather open-ended. He speaks of taking a ―more responsible role in our lives‖, but he gives no examples of agents who either do or do not bear responsibility for specific actions which have situationist causes. In the long quote above he urges us to resist ―exculpating ignorance‖ – but it's not clear whether he means that the bystanders to the woman's stabbing should be held responsible or blameworthy. 65 He doesn't discuss exactly what actions or omissions he takes them to be responsible or blameworthy for; nor does he give a detailed argument for his conclusion in that particular case. Nor does he attribute responsibility (or blameworthiness) in any other specific cases of actions which have situational factors as causes. I'll consider two such actions, and argue that Doris's conclusions on each one are misguided. Doris argues (plausibly) that Alf bears responsibility when he flirts over dinner and subsequently commits an act of infidelity. No specialised knowledge of social psychology research is required in this case: the situational pressures are all too predictable. Doris proposes (implausibly) that Alf is responsible for the flirting over dinner, but not for the akratic infidelity. (As I argued in the previous section, Doris's proposal would involve an unnecessary change to our reactive practices. We intuitively hold Alf responsible for the act of infidelity, and we do so by employing the tracing principle.) But it's not clear to me how Alf's knowledge about the situational pressures is supposed to contribute positively to his bearing responsibility for his actions. 66 Suppose Albert is in the same situation as Alf, but is extremely naïve. Albert spent his formative years in a monastery and got married very soon after leaving; the person with whom he flirts over dinner is only the second woman he has got to know at all well. Albert does not realise that his flirting might lead to a later akratic infidelity. For which action is Albert responsible? Doris presumably holds Albert responsible for his flirting, and not for the akratic infidelity which follows. But this is the same verdict as Doris gives about Alf, who did know about the situational effects he might be subjecting himself to when he flirted. I don't see how Alf's extra knowledge leads to ―increased‖ responsibility, on Doris's account. (On a standard view, in contrast, Alf bears more responsibility than Albert – in one important sense at least. Both are directly 62 Doris 2002:148. 63 Doris 2002:149. 64 Doris 2002:153. 65 According to many philosophers, one can be morally responsible without being blameworthy, (see also section 1.1.3). Doris doesn't state his view on this, as far as I'm aware. 66 I take it that if knowledge about situationist effects ―facilitates increased personal responsibility‖, then it must in some way contribute positively to bearing responsibility for specific actions. 86 morally responsible for their flirting, but only Alf bears traced moral responsibility for the later infidelity.) Meanwhile, what will Doris say about Samantha's responsibility for her action of walking past the slumped man, if she is not aware of situationist research? 67 On the most natural reading of the long quotation above, I take it that Doris would hold Samantha responsible for her action, on the grounds that ―ignorance of a bit of psychological theory does not excuse ignorance of an independent and ethically relevant fact‖. But Doris's phrasing in this important point is curious, and he does not spell out exactly what he means by it. There are at least three kinds of ignorance which Samantha might exhibit here. First, she is ignorant of the relevant situationist psychological theory. Second, she might be ignorant of the relevant moral principle. In this case we might say that the relevant principle is that people have a moral obligation to help others who may be in distress. Third, she might be ignorant of empirical facts in this particular situation. For example, she might not recognise that the slumped man is showing signs of distress, or that the audience for her presentation wouldn't be inconvenienced by her late arrival. I'll suggest two ways to interpret Doris's point. The first is that he is appealing to an axiom about responsibility: ignorance of a moral principle does not excuse someone from responsibility if she flouts that principle. If Samantha were ignorant of the moral principle that people have a moral obligation to help others who may be in distress, this would not excuse her for failing to help someone showing signs of distress. But there's no reason to think that Samantha is ignorant of that principle. Rather, as I'll discuss in more detail below, it may be that Samantha is ignorant of certain empirical facts which obtain in this situation. On the second interpretation, Doris is making the point that agents cannot be exempted from responsibility if they deliberately ignore an empirical fact which has moral significance. 68 At first glance this seems an unlikely interpretation, since Doris's phrasing suggests that he is talking about a passive ignorance rather than an active deliberate ignoring. But it does lead to a more intuitively plausible line of argument, which is worth discussing. Because the situational effect in the Good Samaritan' case is so extreme and so surprising, it seems natural to assume that all the agents who fail to help the slumped man must have deliberately ignored his signs of distress. But it turns out that this is another instance in which our everyday model of action explanation is too simplistic. As I discussed in section 3.8.5, situational factors sometimes distort an agent's assessment of her circumstances. In their discussion of the Good Samaritan' study, experimenters Darley and Batson noted: According to the reflections of some of the subjects, it would be inaccurate to say that they realized the victim's possible distress, then chose to ignore it; instead, because of the time pressures, they did not perceive the scene in the alley as an occasion for an ethical decision. 69 Suppose that Samantha simply does not recognise the slumped man's possible distress. We cannot then hold her morally responsible on the grounds that she ignored ―an ethically relevant fact‖. She did not ignore the man's possible distress; she simply did not recognise it. Now, some subjects in the Good Samaritan' study did seem to notice and assess the man's plight before walking past without helping. Of these, some showed signs of being conflicted about that action, but it appears that they did not assess the man's possible need for 67 Samantha walks past a slumped man on her way to give a presentation about the parable of the Good Samaritan' (see section 3.2.1). 68 I addressed a similar point in the form of an objection to my proposal, in section 4.3.2. 69 Darley and Batson 1973:108. 87 help as being greater than the obligation to give their presentations on time. 70 It's surely implausible to think that the vast majority of subjects recognised that the greater moral obligation was to help the man, but pressed on regardless. 71 If that is correct, then it would be false to say of many subjects that they ignored ―an ethically relevant fact‖, in the sense that they were aware that the moral obligation to help the man was greater than the moral obligation to give their presentations on time, and yet they decided not to act on it. On either interpretation, then, I think Doris's point fails to hit home. Meanwhile Doris himself seems to overlook a very important feature of cases like Samantha's. It seems very likely indeed that many of the subjects in the Good Samaritan' experiment assessed the slumped man's plight differently than they would have done without being told of a time pressure. In my view, Samantha is excused from direct moral responsibility because the motive on which she acts is not fully her own: she would not regard it as fully her own, if she knew all of the causes of her action. Samantha's assessment of the situation is distorted by the situational factor – in this case, being told that she is late – so that she does not recognise the greater moral obligation before her. What excuses Samantha from traced moral responsibility is that she is ignorant of the effect that the situational factor may have on her future assessment. It is not reasonably foreseeable by her that she might act without recognising the greater moral obligation, and she takes no precautions against doing so. What of the specific case in which Doris does attribute responsibility – the 38 witnesses to murder who ―were painfully aware of a person in desperate need of help‖, as Doris describes them? It's difficult and potentially misleading to draw conclusions about social psychology from journalists' accounts of a single event. A recent investigation into the circumstances throws considerable doubt on the key features that Doris appeals to: ―there is no evidence for the presence of 38 witnesses, or that witnesses observed the murder, or that witnesses remained inactive‖. 72 So it's far from clear that there were 38 people on that night who deliberately ignored ―an ethically relevant fact‖, and who should be held morally responsible on those grounds. Furthermore, even if there were, it would not follow that Samantha is morally responsible for her action on the same grounds. Experimental research on the subject of bystander intervention reveals that the most natural explanation of Samantha's action is too simplistic. 5.1.3. Summary of my conclusions on Doris's account Doris's account of responsibility for actions, unlike Frankfurt's, recognises the relevance of events which occurred before the current action. The notion of narrative integration is a potential substitute for the tracing principle, since it takes account of the agent's personal history including his previous actions. At the same time it addresses the challenge posed by subverting causes. But I argued that there are two respects in which tracing is simply more plausible than narrative integration. It's much more plausible to say that Alf bears moral responsibility for his akratic act of adultery, than merely for his earlier flirting from which the adultery resulted. Secondly, Fatima's unconscious desire to please her father does not reveal her true 70 Darley and Batson 1973:108. 71 In the experiment, only 10% of subjects told they were running late offered to help, compared with 63% of those told they were early (see section 3.2.1). 72 Manning, Levine and Collins (2007:555). In Doris's defence, the Kitty Genovese case has been included in psychology textbooks for several decades as an example of the power of social group effects, though it now seems to be a very dubious example. 88 self, if she would disavow it upon learning about it. Tracing is a more plausible means by which she can still be held morally responsible for actions which issue from it. But even if we set aside these arguments that narrative integration is much less plausible than tracing, there remain other serious problems with Doris's account. It seems that there is circularity in Doris's use of narrative integration as a condition of moral responsibility: it's far from clear that our judgements about whether an agent's desire to act admits of narrative integration are independent of our judgements about whether the agent is morally responsible for an action. Doris's appeal to policies does not help him to evade the circularity, and at the same time introduces further problems. Karen's akratic ordering of chocolate cake contradicts both her policy and an established narrative which expresses her priorities, and yet we will still hold her morally responsible for it. When Sidney breaks a new policy to stop smoking after many years, and that policy itself contradicts an established narrative, it is not clear what verdict will be reached on Doris's account. Meanwhile Doris's treatment of actions with subverting situationist causes is problematic. He claims that knowledge of situational factors facilitates increased responsibility, but a lack of such knowledge is not exculpating. These claims seem to be in tension with one another. Doris would hold the hurried broker Steve morally responsible for walking past a slumped man after being told that he is running late for a presentation, on the grounds that such an action meshes well with an established narrative. But this seems to undermine Doris's earlier arguments that situationist causes often issue in actions which contradict the agent's history and habitual behaviour. I think implementing Doris's view would risk holding Steve morally responsible when the action is not fully his own – if he would not regard it as fully his own, upon learning of its causes. Equally, Doris's line would excuse someone in the same situation whose walking past the bystander was fully his own, but did not mesh with a narrative. Therefore I think Doris' NI condition is neither necessary nor sufficient for direct moral responsibility. Also troubling is Doris's insistence that exculpation of agents who lack knowledge of situationist causes ―is to be resisted‖. He attempts to judge responsibility in only one case of a well-researched action with a situationist cause: when Milgram subjects follow instructions to administer shocks, he suggests that abstention from judgement is appropriate. The sole example in which he does clearly judge responsibility is not a researched case at all, and serious doubts have been raised about the facts that are most relevant to his judgement. Doris's analysis doesn't make adequate allowance for the distorting effect of situational factors on agents' assessments of the situations they face. In the case of Alf, whose flirting leads on to an akratic infidelity, Doris proposes a change to our reactive attitudes, so that we hold Alf responsible for the flirting but not the infidelity. I think this is both unnecessary and unlikely to happen. I think instead that there may be a different kind of change, as we come to understand subverting causes more thoroughly, and as knowledge about them spreads through the general population. Rather than shifting the object of our reactive attitudes from one action to another, we may come to see that our reactive attitudes are misplaced for many actions. I'll have more to say about this in chapter 7. 89 5.2. EDDY NAHMIAS Another philosopher who has engaged deeply with situationist research is Eddy Nahmias. 73 Nahmias aims to give an analysis of free will which ―refines‖ Frankfurt's by adding requirements concerning the agent's knowledge about her own desires. 74 Nahmias is primarily focused on analysing free will, rather than moral responsibility. He distinguishes between possession and exercise of free will, both of which, in his view, admit of degrees. Possession of free will is necessary for its exercise. Exercise of free will in a particular action is necessary for moral responsibility for that action, which also admits of degrees. 75 Nahmias proposes a ―Knowledge Condition‖, necessary for possession of free will, which involves three cognitive abilities. First, we must have introspective access to at least some of our most important desires; we must recognize what desires we have, how they conflict, and how they might motivate us to act. Second, we must be able to care about how we act and how we are motivated to act; we must be able to identify ourselves with some of our desires and not others. We must know what we really want. Third, we must be able to become motivated by those desires we identify with; this will involve a form of control over our desires that often requires knowledge of their influence on us. 76 The kind of access to our own desires that we require does not involve continuous introspection. It would be unrealistic for a theory of free will to require that we selfconsciously consider our desires every time we make a choice ... Nonetheless, awareness and reflection are not irrelevant; identification does require that the agent has the ability to introspect on her motivations and reflect on her attitudes towards them. 77 Nahmias sees the Knowledge condition as necessary both for possession of free will and for identification; while identification is necessary for the exercise of free will and hence for moral responsibility for a particular action. For identification itself, it is not necessary that we are in fact aware of what moves us to act – only that we would identify with our motivations if we became aware of them. 78 I'll call this the ―Counterfactual Awareness‖ condition: a determinative motive is truly the agent's own only if she would identify with it if she became aware of it. 79 73 Nahmias's Ph.D. dissertation (2001) covers the situationist literature in much more detail than I have done. He does not discuss other types of subverting cause. 74 Nahmias makes many criticisms of Frankfurt's theory, some of which are unrelated to situationist research findings. 75 Nahmias 2001:76. Nahmias does not think that the exercise of free will is sufficient for moral responsibility, since normative competence of the agent is also necessary (2001:148ff). In my discussion, I will ignore the complication that these concepts may admit of degrees, since I don't think it makes any significant difference to my arguments. 76 Nahmias 2001:4. 77 Nahmias 2001:108-109. 78 Nahmias 2001:184. Nahmias makes some very interesting observations about the kind of agential history required for identification, which I won't discuss here. 79 This condition can be made independent of any particular account of identification. It can be applied, for example, using the generic definition outlined by Doris: to identify with one's motive is to embrace it or regard it as fully one's own. (I called this ―G-identification‖ in section 5.1). I assume that the counterfactual identification would occur at the time of acting. 90 Nahmias therefore concludes that situationist findings do threaten the exercise of free will (and hence moral responsibility for actions). So, subjects in the [situationist] experiments are usually not acting of their own free will. Even if they became aware of their motivations or the process by which they acquired them, they would usually not identify with them. They would feel constrained by them and try to overcome their influence. 80 Nahmias concludes his discussion of the threat to free will posed by situationist experiments with a call for further research. He seems to have an open-minded view of what that further research will bring. While such investigations may indicate limits on our freedom, they also have the potential to increase our knowledge of ourselves in ways that augment our free will. 81 5.2.1. Criticisms of Nahmias's account I'll focus my critical discussion on Nahmias's Knowledge condition and the Counterfactual Awareness condition. I'll argue that these conditions are not jointly sufficient for moral responsibility. I'll then argue that neither is necessary for moral responsibility. I'll begin by considering whether the Knowledge condition and the Counterfactual Awareness condition are jointly sufficient for moral responsibility. For this purpose I will set aside the other conditions which Nahmias holds to be necessary, principally those concerning normative competence and the exercise of free will; I will assume that those conditions are met. I'll take the Good Samaritan' case as my example. When Samantha walks past the slumped man to deliver her presentation, her determinative motive is wanting to reach the room where she will be speaking. Other relevant desires may include the desire to please or help the person who asked her to give the presentation, the desire to appear competent or reliable, the desire to give a successful talk, and so on. She may or may not have a desire to help the slumped man. 82 If she does have that desire, it is less strongly motivating than the combination of the other desires. I see no need to assume that Samantha is not consciously aware of any of these desires. Much less plausible still is the notion that Samantha cannot introspect on them, and reflect on her attitudes towards them. So it seems that Nahmias's Knowledge condition is met for this action. Meanwhile, I see no reason to think that the Counterfactual Awareness condition is not met. That condition requires that Samantha would have identified with her determinative motive, had she become aware of it. As I've explained, it's very plausible to think that Samantha was aware of all the desires which moved her to act. Furthermore, it seems very likely that Samantha did identify with her determinative motive. She did not know, of course, about the influence of the subverting cause. So it's very plausible to think that both the Knowledge and the Counterfactual Awareness conditions are met, in Samantha's action. And yet, even if that is the case, I think Nahmias is right to conclude that the effective desire is not truly Samantha's own. The problem is not that Samantha lacks knowledge of her desires as they are. The problem is that she lacks knowledge of how her desires have been influenced by the subverting cause, and hence how her action has been affected. The subverting cause is that she was told that she was running late. If she became aware that she 80 Nahmias 2001:185. 81 Nahmias 2001:239. 82 As discussed in section 5.1.2, it may be that she does not assess him as requiring any assistance. 91 would have acted otherwise without this cause, she would not regard her effective desire and her action as truly her own. That is, she would not meet my CFG condition of direct moral responsibility. 83 With knowledge of how such causes can sometimes operate, gleaned perhaps from studying situationist psychology research, Samantha might instead have stopped to help the slumped man. That action would have been truly her own, and she would have been directly morally responsible for it. 84 But having the ability to introspect on her desires would not have made any difference here. What would have helped, instead, is knowledge of how subverting causes can operate. 85 Knowledge of how subverting causes operate might also allow agents to bear traced moral responsibility for their actions. For example, if Gina had known that giving up on a problem might result from resisting cookies (section 3.2.5), she might be TMR for doing so. By eating the cookies (or perhaps by not leaving them in full view), she could have avoided giving up on the problem. But again what prevents her from bearing responsibility in the actual situation is not lack of knowledge of her desires, or lack of an ability to know them. Gina is all too aware that she desires to eat cookies, and that she also desires not to eat cookies (i.e. she wants to resist eating them). She may have related desires about losing weight or saving the cookies for someone else. Later, she desires to complete the problem, and also has a conflicting desire to give up on it. It is not because of a lack of introspective access to these desires that the action of giving up on the problem is not truly her own. The important knowledge she lacks is about the subverting effect of the resisted cookies. I conclude from this discussion that the Knowledge condition and the Counterfactual Awareness condition are not jointly sufficient for moral responsibility. An agent may have introspective access to all the relevant desires at the time of acting. It may be true that she was aware of, and did identify with the effective desire at the time of acting. And yet, it may also be true that the desire is not truly her own, because she would not identify with it if she knew all the causes of her action. If the effective desire is not truly her own, then she is not directly morally responsible for the action. 86 I'll now argue that the Knowledge condition is not necessary for moral responsibility. I take it that one of the central claims made in some schools of psychotherapy is that we simply cannot gain introspective access to certain deep-seated' unconscious desires. Take for example Doris's case of Fatima, who has an unconscious desire to please her father (see section 5.1 above). Suppose further that Fatima cannot gain introspective access to that desire. I think it's plausible to say that Fatima can be morally responsible for an action which issues from that desire, such as revealing a secret about a colleague, despite her being quite unaware of the desire's existence. It might be that she would meet my CFG condition: it might be that she would embrace her effective desire or regard it as fully her own if she knew all of the action's causes. In that case she would be DMR for her action. Meanwhile if Fatima is aware that her previous similar actions have caused problems for her colleagues, and she has decided to do nothing to change her behaviour, she can bear traced moral responsibility for this latest action. 87 In either case, I think holding Fatima morally responsible is much more plausible than excusing her, as Nahmias apparently would do, because the Knowledge condition is not met. 83 I discussed the CFG condition in section 5.1.1 above. It requires that: the agent would embrace her determinative motive or regard it as fully her own, if she knew all the proximate and relevant causes of the action. 84 In that scenario, being told that she was late would not have been a subverting cause. 85 It may be that knowledge of how subverting causes can operate is necessary for possession of free will. That is not a conclusion I am arguing for, so I won't follow up this line of thought. 86 This is an identificationist axiom, equivalent to statement (4) with which I defined Frankfurt's position in section 2.2. 87 I argued for this conclusion in section 5.1.1 above. 92 An objector might deny that my presentation of Fatima's case here is realistic; he would deny that there are important unconscious desires to which agents cannot gain introspective access. This is indeed a controversial issue in psychology. But even if the case is only hypothetical, I think the conclusion is clear enough: an agent could bear moral responsibility for an action even if it issued from an unconscious desire to which she could not gain introspective access. My arguments here may not be convincing. But it doesn't matter to my overall position if Nahmias is correct on this point. If the Knowledge condition is indeed necessary for moral responsibility, the result is fewer actions for which it is possible for an agent to be morally responsible. Since my conclusions are in the end sceptical about the prevalence of moral responsibility, I am not troubled by this possibility. Doris claims that an agent can be identified with a motive which she would disavow after learning of it. His example is that of an agent with an unconscious desire which she would disavow. I argued that, in such a case, it is more plausible to say that the agent's desire is not fully her own if she would disavow it. And yet I do not think Nahmias's Counterfactual Awareness condition is necessary for direct moral responsibility. Instead, I think my proposed CFG condition is necessary for DMR, and does not need to be supplemented by the Counterfactual Awareness condition. The Counterfactual Awareness condition gives a different verdict from a standard or ―generic‖ condition of identification when there are determinative motives of which the agent is unaware. 88 In those situations, I think my CFG condition will give the same verdict as the Counterfactual Awareness condition. For example, take the case of Fatima, whose unconscious desire to please her father endorses her effective desire to reveal a secret about a colleague. 89 It's likely that, if she knew of the unconscious desire, she would disavow it. She would not meet the Counterfactual Awareness condition. I think that, if instead she knew all the causes of her action, she would again disavow the effective desire. These causes would be subverting, and she would not meet my CFG condition. In other words, the results would be equivalent in these two counterfactual scenarios, and we would conclude, using either condition, that Fatima is not directly morally responsible for her action. What causes might Fatima become aware of, which would lead her to disavow the effective desire? I think there are two potential kinds. The first kind would include incidents from Fatima's past, such as occasions on which her father perhaps scolded her for her lack of competitiveness, or rewarded her for breaking a confidence. Fatima does not realise that these incidents are causes of her current action; if she became aware of that fact, she would disavow the desires which led her to act. The second kind of cause I have in mind includes events much more proximate to the action, such as Fatima's looking at a photograph of her father immediately before acting, or her boss behaving in a way that reminds her (perhaps even unconsciously) of her father. If Fatima were made aware that these events were causes of her action – and that she would have acted otherwise without their presence – she would disavow her effective desire. I conclude that, given that the CFG condition is necessary for direct moral responsibility, the Counterfactual Awareness condition is not also necessary. Of course, by giving these limited examples I have not made a very strong case that for that conclusion. But I'm content to say no more, since my main objective is to show that the CFG condition is necessary. Furthermore, if there are everyday actions for which the Counterfactual Awareness condition indicates a more sceptical verdict about the prevalence of moral responsibility than 88 The ―generic‖ identification condition discussed by Doris was: to identify with one's determinative motive is to embrace it or regard it as ―fully one's own‖. 89 My proposed CFG condition was: The agent would embrace her determinative motive or regard it as fully her own, if she knew all the proximate and relevant causes of the action. See section 5.1.1. 93 the CFG condition, my secondary objective in chapter 7 below will actually be helped. For there I will argue that there are many everyday actions for which we mistakenly hold agents morally responsible. 5.3. CONCLUSIONS In chapter 3 I argued that Frankfurt's identification condition is not sufficient for direct moral responsibility. An action with subverting causes is not truly the agent's own, and hence the agent cannot be directly morally responsible for it. In some actions with subverting causes, though, Frankfurt's identification condition is met. I proposed an alternative identification condition which I believe is both necessary for direct moral responsibility and acceptable to followers of Frankfurt. In this chapter I've considered two identificationist accounts developed specifically in response to the threat to moral responsibility posed by actions with situationist causes – those of Doris and Nahmias. I argued that Doris' narrative integration NI condition is neither necessary nor sufficient for DMR. I proposed that the following condition, which incorporates a very generic notion of identification, is necessary instead for direct moral responsibility: CFG The agent would embrace her determinative motive or regard it as fully her own, if she knew all the proximate and relevant causes of the action. Against Nahmias, I argued that his Knowledge condition and Counterfactual Awareness condition are not jointly sufficient for direct moral responsibility. I also argued that neither is necessary for DMR. In the next chapter I'll address a different kind of compatibilist theory, which is not primarily identificationist – that of Fischer and Ravizza. 94 6. FISCHER AND RAVIZZA John Martin Fischer's theory of moral responsibility has developed gradually over several years. I will concentrate on the position discussed in his book written with Mark Ravizza, Responsibility and Control, and subsequent papers. 1 Most of the time I'll refer to it as ―the Fischer-Ravizza account‖, but it will be clear from references when I'm discussing a contribution made by Fischer alone. A central element of the Fischer-Ravizza theory is that an ability to respond to reasons is necessary for moral responsibility. To that they add that the agent must ―take ownership‖ of his actions. By combining these elements in the right way, Fischer and Ravizza believe they can give an analysis of the appropriate form of control required for moral responsibility. Fischer and Ravizza's complex theory contains many insightful innovations, and has already become extremely influential: it has recently been described as ―the gold standard for cutting edge defenses of compatibilism‖. 2 I'll begin (section 6.1) with an overview of the theory, followed in sections 6.2 to 6.5 by a description of its key components. In section 6.6 I'll discuss some important criticisms raised by other philosophers, and I'll conclude from those that the Fischer-Ravizza theory contains several flaws. I'll set aside those criticisms to build my main argument against the theory, in section 6.7. By examining actions with subverting causes, I'll argue that the conditions set out by Fischer and Ravizza are not sufficient for direct moral responsibility. 3 6.1. OVERVIEW OF THE THEORY Fischer and Ravizza endorse Harry Frankfurt's attack on the Principle of Alternate Possibilities' (PAP). According to PAP: ―a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise‖. 4 Frankfurt denies PAP because he thinks that agents in certain kinds of case (now widely called Frankfurt-style' cases) are morally responsible despite lacking alternate possibilities. Here's one Frankfurt-style case. 5 Jones is about to cast a vote in an election. He does not know that Black, a well-meaning liberal neurosurgeon, has placed a microchip in his brain. Using the microchip, Black can monitor Jones's brain and cause him to act as she chooses. In fact, Jones votes Democrat in the election, and Black does not intervene. But if Jones had been about to vote Republican, Black would have activated the chip and ensured that Jones voted Democrat instead. Frankfurt holds – and Fischer and Ravizza agree – that Jones is morally responsible for his action, despite the fact that he had no access to alternate possibilities (i.e. despite the fact that he could not have voted Republican). 6 It seems plausible to say that Jones exercises some kind of control over his actual action when there is no intervention by Black. Fischer and Ravizza aim to specify the kind of control which is necessary for moral responsibility. They distinguish two kinds of control: regulative control, and guidance control. For regulative control of an action, the agent must have alternate possibilities. Jones lacks regulative control of his voting action, because he has no 1 The book covers moral responsibility for actions, omissions and the consequences of actions and omissions. The scope of my enquiry is limited to moral responsibility for actions, and I'll restrict my discussion to that. 2 McKenna 2004. 3 Direct moral responsibility (DMR) is anchored in facts about the action and the agent at the time of acting. In contrast, traced moral responsibility (TMR) can be ―traced back‖ to facts about an earlier action (or omission) and about the agent at that earlier time. See section 1.2. 4 Frankfurt 1969:1. 5 This case is adapted from Fischer 2007:58. 6 There are many objections to Frankfurt's argument, but they are not relevant to my discussion here. I will assume for the sake of argument that Fischer and Ravizza are correct to accept Frankfurt's conclusion. For an overview of the large and complex debate surrounding Frankfurt's argument, see for example Fischer 2002b. 95 alternate possibilities. Therefore, Fischer and Ravizza conclude that regulative control is not necessary for moral responsibility. 7 Jones is morally responsible for his voting action, according to Fischer and Ravizza, because he has guidance control of the action: ―guidance control is the freedom-relevant condition necessary and sufficient for moral responsibility‖. 8 There are three key components in the Fischer-Ravizza account of guidance control: a mechanism which ―issues in‖ an action; the agent's ownership of that mechanism; and the mechanism's being appropriately reasons-responsive. When an action issues from the agent's own appropriately reasons-responsive mechanism, the agent is said to have guidance control over the action. I'll describe these three components in the next three sections. 6.2. ―THE MECHANISM‖ The notion of ―the mechanism issuing in an action‖ plays a crucial role in the Fischer-Ravizza account, but it is not precisely defined. No examples of individual mechanisms are given. The authors give perhaps their clearest indication of what a mechanism actually is when they explain that it is not ―like a mechanical object‖: although we employ the term ―mechanism‖ we do not mean to point to anything over and above the process that leads to the relevant upshot; instead of talking about the mechanism ... we could instead talk about the process that leads to the action, or the ―way the action comes about‖. 9 The authors claim that mechanisms can be grouped into ―kinds of mechanism‖. They cite as kinds of mechanism ―practical reasoning, non-reflective habits, and so forth‖. 10 Many paradigmatic actions issue from ―practical reasoning‖. An example of an action issuing from ―non-reflective habits‖ is turning off the freeway at the exit that one uses every day, without conscious deliberation. 11 The notion of a kind of mechanism is at its clearest and most plausible when we consider Frankfurt-style examples. When Jones votes for the Democrat without intervention by Black, his action issues from ―the normal faculty of practical reasoning‖, 12 which is appropriately reasons-responsive. But in the alternative scenario, in which Black does intervene, Jones's vote does not issue from his own faculty of reasoning. Fischer and Ravizza claim that Jones's vote issues from two different kinds of mechanism in the two scenarios. 13 In less exotic cases, which don't involve Frankfurt-style neurosurgery, it's much less clear how we are to decide whether two mechanisms are the same, or of the same kind. We must confess that we do not have any general way of specifying when two kinds of mechanism are the same. This is a potential problem for our 7 According to the family of arguments usually known as the Consequence Argument', agents never have alternate possibilities if determinism obtains. If that is correct, then regulative control is incompatible with determinism. 8 Fischer and Ravizza 1998:241n2. I take it that this statement is oversimplified: it ignores traced moral responsibility, as I'll discuss in section 6.5. Guidance control is compatible with determinism. 9 Fischer and Ravizza 1998:38. This phrasing is slightly open-ended, perhaps because Fischer and Ravizza intend their theory to be compatible with both physicalism and mind-body dualism. I will generally speak of mechanisms as though they are physical processes in the agent's brain. But I will not assume that physicalism is true, in any of the points I'll rely on in my arguments. 10 Fischer and Ravizza 1998:241-2. To my knowledge no other examples of kinds of mechanism are given. 11 Fischer and Ravizza 1998:86. 12 Fischer and Ravizza 1998:38. It's not very clear from the text whether this phrase picks out a mechanism or a kind of mechanism; I assume it is the latter. 13 In my view, Jones's vote in the counterfactual scenario is not Jones's action at all, since it is controlled by Black. However, I'll ignore that point here. 96 approach; ... rather than attempting to say much by way of giving an account of mechanism-individuation, we shall simply rely on the fact that people have intuitions about fairly clear cases of ―same kind of mechanism‖ and ―different kind of mechanism‖. 14 The mechanism is central in the Fischer-Ravizza theory, because it figures in both of the requirements for guidance control. When the agent has guidance control over an action, the mechanism which actually operates to produce the action must be reasons-responsive, and the mechanism must be the agent's own. 6.3. OWNERSHIP Guidance control requires ―ownership of the mechanism that actually issues in the relevant behavior‖. 15 Ownership of an individual mechanism is attained via ownership of the relevant kind of mechanism. In turn, individuals make certain kinds of mechanism their own by taking responsibility for them. (When we speak of taking responsibility for a kind of mechanism, we understand this as ―shorthand‖ for taking responsibility for behavior that issues from that kind of mechanism). 16 For a person to take responsibility for a mechanism he must meet three further conditions. First, he ―must see himself as the source of his behavior ... [he] must see himself as an agent; he must see that his choices and actions are efficacious in the world‖. 17 Second, he ―must accept that he is a fair target of the reactive attitudes as a result of how he exercises this agency‖. 18 Third, his ―view of himself as an agent and sometimes appropriately subject to the reactive attitudes [must] be grounded in his evidence for those beliefs‖. 19 Taking responsibility for mechanisms is part of the process of moral education and development which begins in childhood. Once achieved, guidance control can be exercised over actions which issue from the same kind of mechanism without ownership being constantly reviewed. 20 When one takes responsibility, at a certain point in one's life, for a certain kind of mechanism, this functions as a kind of ―standing policy‖ with respect to that kind of mechanism. So, for example, if one has in the past taken responsibility for the mechanism of ―ordinary practical reasoning‖ 21 (and in the absence of reconsideration of this mechanism), it follows that one takes responsibility for the currently operating mechanism of ordinary practical reasoning: taking responsibility is, as it were, transferred via the medium of ―sameness of kind of mechanism‖. 22 14 Fischer and Ravizza 1998:40. 15 Fischer and Ravizza 1998:241. 16 Fischer and Ravizza 1998:241. I take it that the phrase ―taking responsibility‖ is shorthand for ―taking moral responsibility‖ – see Fischer and Ravizza 1998:184-201. 17 Fischer and Ravizza 1998:210. 18 Fischer and Ravizza 1998:211. Eshleman (2001) argues that this second condition is not appropriate, because (very roughly) an agent's beliefs about whether he is a fair target of reactive attitudes may be mistaken. I won't pursue this interesting issue, since it is somewhat tangential to the points I want to make. 19 Fischer and Ravizza 1998:213. 20 It is apparently possible for an agent to renounce ownership of a kind of mechanism, but (as far as I'm aware) no examples of this are given. 21 This seems to be loose phrasing: ―ordinary practical reasoning‖ here must be a kind of mechanism, rather than a mechanism. 22 Fischer and Ravizza 1998:242. 97 The conditions of ownership are designed to help us distinguish causally determined actions from actions under manipulation. 23 In the Frankfurt-style examples involving Jones, the mechanism which would have issued in the action, if the neurosurgeon Black had intervened to manipulate him, is not a mechanism which Jones owns. 24 Therefore if Black were later to cause Jones to act in a certain way, using that mechanism, Jones cannot be morally responsible for that action. Determinism, however, does not prevent ownership of mechanisms. All of the conditions of ownership discussed above are compatible with determinism. The ownership conditions also represent an attempt to give proper consideration to the agent's history, when assessing moral responsibility. This is an important advantage of the Fischer-Ravizza theory compared with Frankfurt's, which I criticised on this issue in section 2.3.2. 25 6.4. REASONS-RESPONSIVENESS Reasons-responsiveness is a dispositional property. Something is reasons-responsive in the actual situation if it would respond to reasons in counterfactual scenarios. 26 In a Frankfurt-style case, the agent is not reasons-responsive in the Fischer-Ravizza sense. No matter what reasons he might have considered, Jones would still have voted for the Democrat candidate (because Black would have intervened to ensure this outcome). Jones could not have done otherwise. 27 According to Fischer and Ravizza, this shows that reasonsresponsiveness of the agent himself is not necessary for moral responsibility (since they hold that agents in Frankfurt-style cases are morally responsible for their actions). Instead, the agent has guidance control over his action if the mechanism which issues in the action is appropriately reasons-responsive (and he owns the mechanism). Fischer and Ravizza characterise three forms of reasons-responsiveness: strong, weak and moderate. The ―moderate‖ form is the one they regard as necessary and sufficient for (direct) moral responsibility. This is best explained by first describing the other two forms. They define the strong form as follows: Suppose that a certain kind K of mechanism actually issues in an action. Strong reasons-responsiveness obtains under the following conditions: if K were to operate and there were sufficient reason 28 to do otherwise, the agent would recognize the sufficient reason to do otherwise and thus choose to do otherwise and do otherwise. 29 When testing for strong reasons-responsiveness, we must ―ask what would happen if there were a sufficient reason to do otherwise‖. 30 Given the actual kind of mechanism used, the nonactual possible worlds that are germane to strong reasonsresponsiveness are those in which the agent has a sufficient reason to do 23 Stump (2002) objects that an agent could be manipulated but still meet the ownership conditions; see also Fischer and Ravizza's reply (2004:226-230). This issue does not affect my main argument. 24 Fischer and Ravizza 1998:227-8. 25 See also Fischer and Ravizza 1998:194-201. 26 Fischer and Ravizza use ―actual situation‖ interchangeably with ―actual world‖, and ―counterfactual scenario‖ interchangeably with ―nonactual possible world‖. I take it that these terms are indeed equivalent; I will usually refer to situations and scenarios rather than ―worlds‖. 27 Fischer and Ravizza 1998:39. 28 Fischer and Ravizza say that for the term ―sufficient reason‖ we should read ―justificatorily sufficient reason‖, and not ―motivationally sufficient reason‖ (1998:41n13). 29 Fischer and Ravizza 1998:41. They take no stand on debates about the ontological nature of reasons (1998:68n11). 30 Fischer and Ravizza 1998:44 (my italics). 98 otherwise ... which are most similar to the actual world. (Perhaps there is just one such world, or perhaps there is a sphere of many such worlds.) 31 Strong reasons-responsiveness is not necessary for moral responsibility. Suppose Jennifer decides to go to a basketball game tonight, and goes. 32 But if there had been a sufficient reason to stay at home instead – such as a deadline for a piece of work – she would have been ―weak-willed‖, and she would still have gone to the game. Her actual-sequence mechanism is not strongly reasons-responsive, and yet we would hold her morally responsible for her action in the actual situation. 33 For weak reasons-responsiveness, we (again) hold fixed the actual kind of mechanism, and we then simply require that there exist some possible scenario (or possible world) in which there is a sufficient reason to do otherwise, the agent recognizes this reason, and the agent does otherwise. 34 Once again the relevant possible worlds are those in which an action issues from the same kind of mechanism as the actual-sequence mechanism. It's important to note that: ―This possible world need not be the one (or ones) in which the agent has a sufficient reason to do otherwise ... which is (or are) most similar to the actual world‖. 35 Suppose Jennifer would not decide to go to the basketball game if the ticket were priced at $1000. Her actual-sequence mechanism is revealed to be at least weakly reasons-responsive by the fact that ―there exists some scenario in which the actual mechanism operates, she has sufficient reason not to go to the game, and she doesn't go‖. 36 Weak reasons-responsiveness (in the agent's actual-sequence mechanism) is necessary for (direct) moral responsibility. But it is too weak, by itself, to be sufficient: Fischer and Ravizza consider three respects in which it needs to be strengthened. First, in the possible scenarios being considered, the agent must do otherwise because there is sufficient reason to do otherwise (and not merely coincidentally with the existence of such a sufficient reason). Second, the agent must not merely respond in bizarre or incomprehensible ways to reasons in counterfactual scenarios; his mechanism must display an understandable ―pattern‖ of reasonsresponsiveness. (I'll discuss, below, an example which fails this requirement.) Third, the agent must respond to moral reasons and not merely to prudential reasons (this is one difference between adults and young children). Thus a moderate form of reasonsresponsiveness is required, which incorporates these elements and lies somewhere between the strong and weak forms. To specify what the moderate form requires, Fischer and Ravizza distinguish two constitutive elements of reasons-responsiveness: ―receptivity to reasons‖ and ―reactivity to reasons‖. Receptivity is a matter of recognising reasons. Reactivity requires translating reasons into both choices and behaviour. Moral responsibility, they argue, requires ―only a very weak sort of reactivity" but ―a stronger sort of receptivity‖ to reasons. 37 31 Fischer and Ravizza 1998:44n16. 32 The example is from Fischer and Ravizza 1998:42-3. 33 The ―actual-sequence mechanism‖ is the one which issues in the action actually performed; ―alternativesequence‖ mechanisms would issue in actions in counterfactual scenarios. 34 Fischer and Ravizza 1998:44. 35 Fischer and Ravizza 1998:44n17 (my italics). 36 Fischer and Ravizza 1998:45. I think there is a mistake in this quote: the phrase ―the actual mechanism operates‖ should instead read ―the same kind of mechanism operates‖. This same switch between talking about mechanisms and kinds of mechanism occurs several times in Fischer and Ravizza's discussion. 37 Fischer and Ravizza 1998:69. 99 They use an example to explain and support this ―asymmetry‖. 38 Brown takes a drug called Plezu', which causes euphoria but also lethargy and the likelihood of eventual loss of his job, family and self-respect: there is a sufficient reason to stop taking it. Suppose first that Plezu is ―nonaddictive‖: users do not face irresistible urges to take it. 39 But the only scenario in which Brown would stop taking Plezu is that in which he is told that doing so would cause his death. Here his mechanism is weakly reactive to reasons: there is at least one scenario in which he would refrain from taking the drug. Therefore he can be held morally responsible for taking the drug. Now suppose that Brown faces an irresistible urge to take Plezu: there is no scenario in which he would refrain from taking it. Here, Brown's mechanism is not even weakly reactive, and so he cannot be morally responsible for taking the drug. Finally, suppose that Brown would refrain from taking Plezu if his next fix cost $1000 (the urge to take it is not irresistible). But he would not refrain from taking the drug if the next fix cost $2000. Here his mechanism is not receptive to reasons in an understandable or appropriate ―pattern‖, and therefore he cannot be held morally responsible for taking the drug. The mechanism must be ―regularly receptive‖. This requires that, in counterfactual scenarios in which the same kind of mechanism operates, the agent would recognize reasons (some of which are moral) in such a way as to give rise to an understandable pattern (from the viewpoint of a third party who understands the agent's values and beliefs). 40 In summary: a mechanism must exhibit both ―weak reactivity‖ and ―regular receptivity‖ in order to be moderately reasons-responsive. On the Fischer-Ravizza theory, ownership of a moderately reasons-responsive mechanism is necessary and sufficient for guidance control, and hence direct moral responsibility. From now on, following Fischer and Ravizza, I'll use the term ―reasons-responsive‖ as a shorthand for ―moderately reasons-responsive‖. 6.5. TRACING Fischer and Ravizza do not use the term ―direct‖ moral responsibility, nor any equivalent term. In fact they claim explicitly that guidance control is necessary and sufficient for moral responsibility for action. 41 But I think what they have in mind is revealed when they make a ―refinement‖ to their account to incorporate ―a tracing approach‖. 42 According to Fischer and Ravizza, moral responsibility is traced from an earlier action at time T1 to a later action at time T2 when the following conditions are met: 43 (a) ―an agent's act at a time T1 issues from a reasons-responsive sequence, and this act causes his act at T2 to issue from a mechanism that is not reasons-responsive‖, and (b) the agent ―can reasonably be expected to have known‖ that the action at T1 would (or might) ―lead to‖ the action at T2 issuing from a mechanism that is not reasons-responsive. These conditions are very similar to the rough and open-ended condition I proposed in section 1.2. 44 I gave the example of Trisha who took a fix of a drug for the first time yesterday, 38 Fischer and Ravizza 1998:69-70. 39 As I'll discuss below in section 6.6.3, this is a very unusual definition of ―nonaddictive‖. 40 Fischer and Ravizza 1998:243-4. (This statement in the concluding chapter of the book is rather more precise than the ―still quite vague‖ account discussed on pages 70-73.) 41 I think this must be a misleading oversimplification – see footnote 8 above. They must mean that guidance control is necessary and sufficient for direct moral responsibility. 42 See Fischer and Ravizza 1998:49-51. 43 Fischer and Ravizza 1998:50. 100 knowing it to be extremely addictive. She now has a very strong craving the drug, and takes another fix this morning. Suppose that the mechanism which issues in this action is not reasons-responsive, and so Trisha does not exercise guidance control over this action. She is not directly morally responsible for it. But Trisha did exercise guidance control over her fixtaking action yesterday, and could reasonably be expected to have known that it might lead to her fix-taking today. Despite her lack of guidance control today, Trisha is morally responsible for injecting the fix today – via the tracing principle. I take it from this discussion of tracing that, on the Fischer-Ravizza theory: 1. Guidance control of action A is necessary and sufficient for direct moral responsibility for action A. 2. If the agent does not have guidance control of action A, then, for (traced) moral responsibility for action A, it is necessary and sufficient that the agent had guidance control over some previous action from which that moral responsibility for action A can be traced. I make no criticisms of Fischer and Ravizza's account of tracing. 45 The tracing principle seems to me extremely plausible. But, as I noted in section 1.2, I don't need to assume that it is true. I'll continue to distinguish direct from traced moral responsibility. In quotations from Fischer and Ravizza, I'll generally take it that ―moral responsibility‖ means direct moral responsibility. 6.6. CRITICISMS OF THE FISCHER-RAVIZZA ACCOUNT In section 6.7 I'll argue that actions with subverting causes are counterexamples to FischerRavizza theory, and so guidance control is not sufficient for direct moral responsibility. Before then, I'll discuss a series of different criticisms which support that same conclusion. I'll argue that we do not have the intuitions which would support Fischer and Ravizza's claims about mechanism individuation (section 6.6.2). I'll then argue that the Fischer-Ravizza theory gives implausible treatments of both addictions (section 6.6.3) and compulsions (section 6.6.4). Finally I'll argue that their theory's definition of weak reactivity is simply too weak, since reactivity to certain reasons does not indicate moral responsibility (section 6.6.5). But I'll begin by discussing a problem with their definition of weak reactivity which, as far as I'm aware, has not been pointed out by other commentators. 6.6.1. A problem with definitions I think there's a flaw in the definition of moderate reasons-responsiveness, which is supposed to be necessary for guidance control. For weak reactivity: 46 [we] hold fixed the actual kind of mechanism, and we then simply require that there exist some possible scenario (or possible world) in which there is a sufficient reason to do otherwise, the agent recognizes this reason, and the agent does otherwise. 47 44 The condition I proposed was: ―An agent bears traced moral responsibility for action A1 if: she bears direct moral responsibility for an earlier action (or omission) A0; action A1 results from A0; and the resultant occurrence of A1 was reasonably foreseeable by the agent, at the time of A0.‖ 45 They acknowledge that their account of tracing is ―a sketchy and incomplete treatment of difficult issues‖ (1998:50). 46 This condition of ―weak reactivity‖, strengthened with the conditions for ―regular receptivity‖, entails ―moderate reasons-responsiveness‖. See section 6.4. 47 Fischer and Ravizza 1998:44. (I quoted the same passage in section 6.4.) 101 Fischer and Ravizza specify only four elements which must obtain in the requisite possible scenario: a sufficient reason to act otherwise, recognition of that reason by the agent, the agent's acting otherwise (because of that reason), and the same kind of mechanism issuing in the action. I think there is a fifth requirement, which is not stated: the counterfactual scenario must contain the most important reasons for which the agent performs her action in the actual situation. Here is an example which demonstrates the problem I have in mind. Ray is a man who is often angry, and today he is in a particularly angry mood. It seems as though everything has gone wrong since he got up this morning, and he's just had a blazing row on his mobile phone with his girlfriend. Just then a passing stranger, Nick, says to him: ―Cheer up mate – it might never happen!‖. Ray punches Nick. Suppose that there is no scenario in which Nick says these mocking words and Ray does not punch him. Ray's anger is such that he would respond in this way in every counterfactual scenario, even if someone quickly offered him £10 million in the moment before he punched Nick. Ray's mechanism is not moderately reasonsresponsive in the way required for guidance control. Now consider a counterfactual scenario in which Nick says ―good morning‖ to Ray as he walks past. Ray scowls at Nick but does not punch him. This is a possible scenario in which the four Fischer-Ravizza conditions are satisfied: a sufficient reason to act otherwise (Nick's pleasant greeting), recognition of that reason by the agent, the agent's acting otherwise (in response to that reason), and the same kind of mechanism issuing in the action. But this does not show that Ray's mechanism is moderately reasons-responsive in the actual situation. For, given that Nick speaks with the actual words, there is no counterfactual scenario in which Ray would act otherwise than punching Nick. My proposed fifth condition is required, I think, for moderate reasons-responsiveness. Why don't Fischer and Ravizza include this fifth requirement? Perhaps they think it can be taken for granted, and doesn't need to be stated. For normal actions (where the agent has guidance control) there will always be some scenario in which the most important reasons for the actual action remain, and some additional reason prompts a change in response. In Fischer and Ravizza's example, Jennifer goes to the basketball game (presumably because she enjoys basketball and wants to see this particular game). Her decision would have been the same (although ―weak-willed‖) if she had been given a deadline for a piece of work. But there will always be some counterfactual scenario in which she decides not to go to the game – in this case the price of a ticket rising to $1000 would suffice. I assume this is the reason why Fischer and Ravizza don't specify anything else about the counterfactual scenarios which are relevant. I can see two objections to my argument. First, it might be objected that the mechanism in the counterfactual scenario is not of the same kind as in the actual situation. My reply is that I cannot see any reason to think that these mechanisms are of different kinds. In both scenarios Ray is in an angry mood before Nick appears, and he reacts accordingly. The second objection might be that my example is unrealistic. One might think that there is bound to be some counterfactual scenario in which Ray would respond differently and not punch Nick – perhaps if he were distracted by a bolt of lightning, for example. 48 The problem with this second objection is this: if such counterfactual events as distraction by lightning are to be counted as establishing moderate reasons-responsiveness, it becomes very hard to see how any mechanism could ever be less than moderately reasons-responsive. This same theme recurs in the next two sections. A problem with my suggested fifth condition is that it is rather imprecise – how should we define ―the most important reasons for which the agent performs her action‖? I don't 48 Presumably a counterfactual scenario in which Ray were hit by the bolt of lightning and prevented from punching Nick would not be a relevant scenario, because the same kind of mechanism could not operate. 102 know how to solve this problem, but of course my main concern is simply to point out that it needs to be addressed – and isn't addressed by Fischer and Ravizza. 6.6.2. The theory relies on spurious intuitions about mechanisms Michael McKenna criticises Fischer and Ravizza for providing ―no principled basis for individuating mechanisms‖. 49 Instead, (as I discussed in section 6.2) they offer only an appeal to people's intuitions about whether mechanisms belong to the same kind. Two of his objections in particular indicate why McKenna finds this appeal unsatisfactory. The first objection is that Fischer and Ravizza's intuitions about sameness of mechanisms simply reflect their own compatibilist convictions. There are many possible notions of sameness of mechanism across counterfactual scenarios. One of these would require that ―the entire complex of proximal antecedent events and states‖ in the world before the action be held constant. Using this ―stringent‖ notion of sameness, if determinism is true then the agent would perform the same action in every counterfactual scenario where the same mechanism issues in action. 50 Fischer and Ravizza had attempted to head off this challenge, by claiming that the stringent view of sameness would only be appealing to someone with a ―prior commitment to the view that causal determinism is incompatible with moral responsibility‖. 51 They seem to be implying that it is question-begging to take the stringent view. McKenna's charge is that it's equally question-begging for compatibilists to reject the stringent view. McKenna's second objection is that our judgements about the sameness of mechanisms are likely to vary according to our explanatory perspective. A neurospychologist may be interested in physical states and processes in the agent's brain, when making her judgement; whereas in everyday discourse we don't refer to such states and processes, and we rarely consider their role at all. Fischer replies to McKenna's concerns by conceding that his defence of mechanism individuation is ―incomplete‖, and that ―it is obvious that the notion of mechanism leading to action' is quite vague in itself‖. 52 But, for Fischer, a simple appeal to everyday intuitions – rather than general principles – need not be a weakness in a philosophical theory. His objective is to provide a theory which correctly reflects our intuitions about moral responsibility – the ones which we employ in everyday discourse. A principled account of mechanism individuation would be desirable; but Fischer's objective could be achieved without one. I think this is adequate as a defence against McKenna: Fischer's position here is structurally sound. However, Fischer's position relies instead on two crucial appeals to our intuitions. First, it must be that the claims he makes about mechanism individuation do indeed match our intuitions. Second, the theory as a whole, incorporating its mechanism individuation component, must give verdicts about moral responsibility which match our intuitions. In fact I think there are fatal problems in both areas. Although it succeeds in giving verdicts on moral responsibility which match our intuitions about most actions, there are nevertheless important counterexamples to the Fischer-Ravizza theory which I'll consider in the next two sections. Furthermore, the intuitions about mechanism individuation which are required to support the theory are largely spurious. Most importantly, I think the following claim made by Fischer and Ravizza is false: 49 McKenna 2001:96. 50 McKenna 2001:96-97. 51 Fischer and Ravizza 1998:52n22. 52 Fischer 2004:240. 103 people have intuitions about fairly clear cases of same kind of mechanism' and different kind of mechanism'. 53 Evidence in support of my view comes from Fischer's exchange with Eleonore Stump over the conditions for ownership of mechanisms. Stump objects that the ownership conditions in the Fischer-Ravizza theory are inadequate – it could be that they are satisfied while the agent is manipulated and so not morally responsible for his action. 54 I'm not concerned here with the details of this objection. More relevant for my argument is that Fischer, in his reply to Stump, says that she ―employs an overly broad notion of mechanism individuation‖ in her critique. 55 Further, he thinks it should be evident that, in order to render the Fischer-Ravizza account of manipulation cases even minimally plausible, we are not thinking of the relevant mechanisms as individuated so broadly [as Stump does]. 56 He seems genuinely surprised that Stump could have misinterpreted the theory on ―this very basic point‖. My point is this. Whatever the merits of their respective arguments about ownership, it's clear that Stump and Fischer have formed very different views about mechanism individuation. And this is despite the detailed study of the Fischer-Ravizza account which Stump clearly must have made before proposing her critique. This already is evidence that we do not have reliable intuitions about how to compare kinds of mechanism. Nor can we set aside Stump's apparent misunderstanding as an aberration, since Harry Frankfurt endorsed her critique of Fischer. 57 Speaking for myself, I don't think I ever have any intuitions about whether two actions issue from the same or different kinds of mechanism. This is so whether the actions are mine or someone else's. In fact, I don't think I have any intuitions at all about mechanisms, nor about ―kinds‖ of mechanism – even while reading the Fischer-Ravizza example cases which are supposed to draw out such intuitions. The role of the very term ―mechanism‖ is curious here. If a mechanism is nothing over and above a process, why does the theory not draw on our intuitions about ―process individuation‖? I think the answer must be that it's even less plausible to suppose that we have intuitions about how to compare processes and kinds of process. A Frankfurt-style case is the only one in which I feel an intuition that two different kinds of process are being compared. Here I do have an intuition that a process involving a microchip is a different kind of process from one involving only organic circuitry in the agent's brain. But this intuition alone falls far short of validating the claims about mechanism individuation in the Fischer-Ravizza theory. A further problem concerns this claim made by Fischer and Ravizza: Imagine that the agent somehow gets considerably more energy or focus if he is presented with a strong reason to do otherwise, and it is only in virtue of these factors that he successfully reacts to the reason. There certainly can be cases like this, but it is natural to say that, when the agent acquires significantly more ―energy or focus,‖ this gives rise to a different mechanism from the actual mechanism. 58 53 Fischer and Ravizza 1998:40. (I used the same quote in section 6.2.) 54 Stump 2002:46-56. 55 Fischer 2004:230. 56 Fischer 2004:229. 57 Frankfurt 2002a:61. (This was published before Fischer's response to Stump.) 58 Fischer and Ravizza 1998:74. 104 From the context it's clear that they think a different kind of mechanism would arise, not merely ―a different mechanism‖. 59 I think this claim is false. It does not seem natural to me to say that an agent's mechanism is of a different kind when he gains significantly more focus. Insofar as I can gain any intuitive grasp on the notion of kinds of mechanism, it seems to me that the same kind of mechanism is involved in both cases. McKenna wonders why it isn't the mechanism, rather than the agent, which can gain more energy or focus when there is a strong reason to do otherwise. 60 This may seem an odd way to speak; but speaking of mechanisms at all is already very odd. My intuitions don't favour either way of speaking over the other. Insofar as I can grasp the notion of mechanisms at all, I would say that an agent could gain more energy or focus, and yet still act from the same kind of mechanism. In summary, the notions of mechanisms and kinds of mechanisms are nebulous and unclear; we do not have the intuitions which would support Fischer and Ravizza's claims about mechanism individuation. The authors don't provide any principles or other means to individuate mechanisms, and so their claims about sameness of kinds of mechanism are effectively unsupported. Since those claims are central to the definition of guidance control, this is a significant flaw in their theory. 6.6.3. The theory gives an implausible treatment of addictions Meanwhile, the theory deals poorly with actions performed by addicts. In section 6.4 I described the example of Brown, who takes a drug called Plezu' which is likely to lead to the loss of his job and family. Fischer and Ravizza describe Plezu as ―nonaddictive‖, because Brown's urge to take it is not irresistible. In fact, the only scenario in which Brown would stop taking Plezu is that in which he is told that doing so would cause his death. I take it that the Fischer-Ravizza usage of the term ―nonaddictive‖, and hence too of the term ―addictive‖, is highly unusual. It must be doubtful that addiction ever exists, on this definition. 61 As far as I'm aware, Fischer and Ravizza offer no evidence that any addictions or compulsions are irresistible in the sense that even the weak reactivity condition cannot be met. 62 Fischer and Ravizza claim that Brown is morally responsible for his action. Suppose Brown objects as follows: ―whereas I would have responded to a very different incentive for doing otherwise, the mechanism on which I acted did not – and could not – have responded to the actual incentive to do otherwise. Given this, it is unfair to hold me morally responsible.‖ 63 Fischer and Ravizza respond to Brown's objection by claiming that ―reactivity is all of a piece‖. If a mechanism of the same kind would react differently to some incentive to do otherwise, this shows (they think) that the actual-sequence mechanism ―can react to any incentive to do otherwise‖. 64 Specifically they say: 59 The authors often use the term ―mechanism‖ where they must mean ―kind of mechanism‖. It may be that they do so intentionally as a form of shorthand (though to my knowledge they do not explain such a move). A potential danger is that an appeal might be made to the wrong set of intuitions. For example, intuitions about mechanisms (if indeed we have any) may not support conclusions about kinds of mechanism. 60 McKenna 2001:99. 61 Watson (2001) makes this point. 62 Brown's mechanism is weakly reactive because there is at least one counterfactual scenario in which he would refrain from taking the drug (via the same kind of mechanism). 63 Fischer and Ravizza 1998:73 – these words are spoken by the fictional Brown. 64 Fischer and Ravizza 1998:73. 105 it is plausible to reply to Brown that his mechanism of practical reasoning (the mechanism that actually produced his behavior) could in fact have reacted to his actual reason not to take Plezu. 65 I think there are two convincing objections to this claim. The first is simply a denial of the quotation just given: it is not plausible to conclude, from the fact that a mechanism of the same kind would react differently to a different reason in a counterfactual scenario, that the actual mechanism can react differently. This is a complex issue, and somewhat tangential to my main argument, so I mention it only briefly and won't rely on this objection. 66 The second objection fits well with my main argument: the ―weak reactivity‖ requirement which forms part of the guidance control condition is much too weak. That there is a single counterfactual scenario in which an agent would act otherwise (via the same kind of mechanism) is not enough to establish that he is morally responsible for his action. Consider an even more extreme example of addiction. Harry is a long-term heroin user. He takes heroin this morning, and he would take it even in a counterfactual scenario in which doing so would cause his own death. 67 The only counterfactual scenario in which he would not take the drug, is one in which a kidnapper would torture and then murder all of his children. Harry is clearly very strongly addicted to heroin, in any normal sense of the term ―addicted‖. It's not plausible to hold Harry directly morally responsible for taking the drug, even though his mechanism meets the weak reactivity condition. One might object to that claim by pointing to a contrary intuition: that heroin addicts do bear moral responsibility for their actions. I recognise this intuition and feel its pull to some extent. Much of its strength, though, is attributable to the tracing principle. Perhaps Harry was DMR when he tried the drug for the first time, and the resultant occurrence of his addicted actions was reasonably foreseeable by him. It's very plausible, then, to hold Harry morally responsible for his taking the drug this morning, via tracing. But what is not plausible, I think, is to say that Harry is directly morally responsible for this action. 68 A separate problem is that it's far from clear that the mechanism which issues in Brown's action is, as Fischer and Ravizza claim in the quotation above, ―his mechanism of practical reasoning‖. Setting aside the point that ―practical reasoning‖ is surely a kind of mechanism rather than a particular mechanism, this conflicts with my intuitions about actions under severe addiction. If Brown (or Harry) craves his drug so strongly that there is only one reason which would prevent him taking a fix, then it seems much more plausible that the operative mechanism is of a very different kind from those which issue in their other everyday actions. In fact, I find it plausible to imagine that Brown (or Harry) might well not meet the ownership conditions for the kind of mechanism which operates when he takes a fix to relieve a craving. That is, he may well not have ―taken responsibility‖, in the appropriate way, for previous actions issuing from the same kind of mechanism. There is thus a plausible means, available to Fischer and Ravizza, by which to judge that Brown and Harry are not morally responsible for their actions. I find it strange that they do not do so, and that instead they reach a counterintuitive verdict. This reinforces my conviction that their claims about sameness of mechanisms are not supported by our intuitions. To conclude, it's not plausible to hold Harry or Brown directly morally responsible for taking their drugs. Since both apparently meet the conditions of guidance control, I conclude that 65 Fischer and Ravizza 1998:74 (my italics). 66 For more details see Watson 2001:299-300, and Fischer and Ravizza 2004:242-244. 67 He recognises that this as a sufficient reason not to take the drug (he does not want to die). 68 This is one of many instances, I think, in which our intuitions do not distinguish very clearly between traced moral responsibility and direct moral responsibility. We must take care when judging which one is applicable. 106 guidance control is not sufficient for direct moral responsibility. 69 In particular, the reactivity part of the reasons-responsiveness requirement is too weak. That a mechanism could react differently in a single counterfactual scenario does not establish that the agent is morally responsible, even if all the other conditions of guidance control are met. 6.6.4. The theory gives an implausible treatment of compulsions A similar argument can be made about the theory's treatment of agents with compulsions. Al Mele raises the example of Fred, who is agoraphobic and hasn't left his house in ten years. 70 He stays at home rather than attend his beloved daughter's wedding in the church next door. But if Fred's house had caught fire on that afternoon, he would have been even more terrified of the flames, and would have left the house and gone to the church. Fred's mechanism, which issues in his actual action of watching TV at home during the wedding, is weakly reasons-reactive. 71 Thus (provided that it is regularly reasons-receptive and owned by Fred) the mechanism is moderately reasons-responsive; and Fred is morally responsible for his actual action on the Fischer-Ravizza account. But this verdict is profoundly counter-intuitive, as Mele notes. If Fred's agoraphobia is so extremely debilitating that it would take a raging fire to move him to leave the house, then it's much more plausible to excuse him from moral responsibility. Fischer and Ravizza address this point directly in a paper published in the same symposium as Mele's. 72 One might have expected them to claim that Fred's mechanism in the fiery counterfactual scenario is of a different kind than the actual-sequence mechanism. In section 6.6.2 I discussed their claim that, if an agent would gain more ―energy or focus‖ when presented with a ―strong‖ reason to do otherwise, then a different kind of mechanism would operate. I rejected that claim as unsupported by intuitions. Nevertheless I find it surprising that they don't take that line in the case of Fred, which seems closely analogous. In fact, this adds to my conviction that their intuitions about sameness of mechanism are spurious. Instead, Fischer and Ravizza take the following line. Fred is exempted from moral responsibility only if his phobia ―issues in genuinely irresistible urges‖ – which in this case it does not. 73 The phobia is not ―genuinely irresistible‖, on the Fischer-Ravizza account, if Fred's mechanism is weakly reasons-reactive. Fred can thus be held morally responsible; but it does not follow from this that he is blameworthy for his action. Indeed, Fischer and Ravizza themselves would not be inclined to hold him blameworthy, given Mele's description of the case. On what grounds do Fischer and Ravizza defend their claim that Fred is morally responsible? They see Fred as ―an apt target for the reactive attitudes on the basis of [his action]‖. 74 They draw a distinction between Fred on the one hand and, on the other, an agent who has irresistible urges or an agent who is ―being significantly manipulated‖. I don't think that being an apt target for the reactive attitudes captures the distinction between Fred and those agents. The example with which Fischer and Ravizza first introduced the notion of 69 Brown does meet the guidance control conditions, according to Fischer and Ravizza themselves; I'm assuming that they would make the same judgement on Harry. 70 Mele 2000:450. I've adapted the example very slightly to make it a case about responsibility for an action rather than for an omission. 71 The mechanism is weakly reasons-reactive if there is a single counterfactual scenario in which the same kind of mechanism issues in a different action in response to a sufficient reason. 72 Fischer and Ravizza 2000b:470-472. 73 Fischer and Ravizza 2000b:471. It's interesting that they describe the phobia as issuing in urges, rather than its issuing in actions. It's not clear to me whether they consider that a phobia is a mechanism (or a kind of mechanism), or whether they have some other relation in mind between phobias and mechanisms. Once again, I find I have no intuitions on the subject. 74 Fischer and Ravizza 2000b:471. 107 being an apt candidate for reactive attitudes was taken from Wallace: a charming colleague who has cheated and lied can be an apt target of reactive attitudes, even though one may not actually feel resentment about his actions. 75 Here it is very clear that the colleague is an apt target of reactive attitudes; an acquaintance who has not yet been charmed is very likely to experience indignation or resentment about his actions. But that is not true in Fred's case. No amount of distance from Fred's case would make me regard Fred as an apt target of reactive attitudes. In fact, Fred's situation looks rather like the inverse of Wallace's case. I think it's possible that Fred's daughter might feel some indignation or other reactive attitudes toward him, while at the same time knowing that these emotions are misplaced – i.e. she might feel the attitudes while knowing that Fred is not an apt target for them. I don't find it plausible to say that Fred is an apt target of reactive attitudes, and so morally responsible for his action. To conclude, I think it's flatly implausible to hold Fred morally responsible in this case. Since Fred does meet the conditions of guidance control, according to Fischer and Ravizza themselves, guidance control is not sufficient for (direct) moral responsibility. In particular, the reactivity part of the reasons-responsiveness requirement is too weak. That a mechanism could react differently in a single counterfactual scenario does not establish that the agent is morally responsible, even if all the other conditions of guidance control are met. Furthermore, just as in the cases of the addicts Brown and Harry, it's far from clear that Fred acts from a mechanism of which he has taken ownership. Fischer and Ravizza seem to believe that Fred's action issues from ―the mechanism of practical reasoning‖. 76 It seems more plausible to think that Fred's current action issues from a mechanism (or kind of mechanism) which has in the past issued in agoraphobic actions. But if that is the case, then it seems very unlikely that Fred would have ―made this mechanism his own‖, in FischerRavizza terminology, by ―taking responsibility‖ for those past actions. 6.6.5. The sufficient reason to do otherwise may be another compulsion Watson raises a related issue. 77 Suppose there is only one counterfactual scenario in which a heroin addict (I'll call him Adrian) would not perform his actual action of taking a fix of the drug. That counterfactual scenario is one in which Adrian's supply of heroin is put into a cage full of rats, of which he is profoundly phobic. Adrian's actual-sequence mechanism is moderately reasons-responsive, and so on the Fischer-Ravizza account (provided that that he owns the mechanism) Adrian has guidance control and is morally responsible for his action. But here, as Watson points out, susceptibility to counterincentives is not evidence of control or moral responsibility. Rather, Adrian is ―in the grip of competing compulsions‖. This kind of case is a counterexample to the Fischer-Ravizza guidance control conditions. The theory's definition of weak reactivity is simply too weak – it can be met when an agent clearly is not morally responsible for his action. One objection to this argument, open to Fischer and Ravizza, is to claim that the mechanism in the ―rat cage‖ counterfactual scenario is of a different kind from his actualsequence mechanism, because Adrian would gain some ―extra focus or energy‖ if faced by his phobia. In section 6.6.2 I argued that this claim is not supported by our intuitions. A similar objection would be to claim that the two mechanisms are of different kinds because one involves an addiction and one involves a phobia. That claim seems to me very plausible. But making this objection would open another line of attack against the theory's 75 See section 1.1.3. 76 They do not say this explicitly in their reply to Mele, but this line would be consistent with what they say about Brown the Plezu addict – see section 6.6.3. 77 Watson 2001:295. 108 use of ―kinds of mechanism‖. 78 For Fischer and Ravizza have claimed, in several crucial cases which don't seem markedly different from Adrian's, that the same kind of mechanism does operate in relevant counterfactual scenarios. For example, let's compare Adrian's case with two others. First, Fischer and Ravizza claim that Fred (the agoraphobic) has guidance control if he would react to a raging house fire. On what grounds can we confidently say that Fred's agoraphobic mechanism is of the same kind as his counterfactual fire-fearing mechanism? I can't see that the difference in kinds of mechanism between actual and counterfactual scenario is less significant in Fred's case than in Adrian's. A similar question arises over Brown's ability to stop taking Plezu in the counterfactual scenario in which he is told that he will otherwise die. Why believe that his Plezu-devoted mechanism is of the same kind as his death-fearing mechanism? I see no good grounds to believe that Brown's and Fred's mechanisms are of the same kind, while at the same time denying that Adrian's mechanisms are of the same kind. So this objection cannot help against my conclusion that Adrian's case is a counterexample to the Fischer-Ravizza guidance control conditions. 6.6.6. Conclusions from these criticisms I draw three key conclusions from the criticisms I've discussed. First, the notions of ―mechanisms‖ and ―kinds of mechanism‖ are unclear, and crucial claims made about them by Fischer and Ravizza are not supported by intuitions. Second, the ―weak reactivity‖ requirement, which forms part of moderate reasons-responsiveness, is simply too weak. 79 Third, there is a flaw in the Fischer-Ravizza notion of ―ownership‖ of a kind of mechanism. These conclusions are independent, in the sense that each one is well supported even if the others are wrong. For example, even if there are no flaws in the Fischer-Ravizza accounts of mechanisms and ownership, it remains the case that the weak reactivity requirement is too weak; and so on. All three of the problems are evident in most of the cases I've discussed, so it's difficult to disentangle them. I'll summarise my case on each problem in turn, beginning with mechanisms. 80 In section 6.6.2 I discussed some of the claims about sameness of mechanisms which are most important for the Fischer-Ravizza theory, and argued that – contrary to the authors' assertions – they are not supported by our intuitions. Then in the next two sections (6.6.3 and 6.6.4) I showed that those claims don't help Fischer and Ravizza to deal with actions arising from addictions and compulsions. My case against the Fischer-Ravizza reactivity condition is as follows. 81 To demonstrate weak reactivity, a mechanism need only react differently to any sufficient reason, in at least one counterfactual scenario. That reason may be very extreme, such as the threat of torture and murder of the agent's children. It could be even more extreme, such as the threat of the end of the world: for weak reactivity, there is no constraint on the kind of reason or counterfactual scenario to be contemplated. It simply is not plausible to say that this degree of reactivity is appropriate for judging moral responsibility. If some form of reasons- 78 Watson makes this point (2001:297). 79 A mechanism is weakly reasons-reactive if there is a single counterfactual scenario in which the same kind of mechanism issues in a different action in response to a sufficient reason. I have nothing to say about the ―regular receptivity‖ element of moderate reasons-responsiveness, which is relatively uncontroversial. 80 The central role played by mechanisms in their theory enables Fischer and Ravizza to give accounts of moral responsibility in Frankfurt-style examples, and in cases of manipulation of agents. I think both of those issues can be addressed without appeals to mechanisms, but I haven't pursued that point. 81 Here I'm ignoring the definitional problem discussed in section 6.6.1. 109 responsiveness is indeed required for moral responsibility, the reactivity condition must be revised. 82 Finally, there are problems with mechanism ownership. One problem, of course, is that if the notion of mechanisms is fatally unclear then so must be the notion of owning a mechanism. But there remains another problem, even if we assume that the notion of mechanisms can be made clear. I discussed examples of actions arising from addictions and compulsions, in which Fischer and Ravizza claim that the operative mechanism is owned (and the other conditions for guidance control are also met). I argued that the agents in these actions are not morally responsible, so that the actions are straightforwardly counterexamples to the claim that guidance control is sufficient for direct moral responsibility. However, there is another way to interpret these cases, and defend a Fischer-Ravizzastyle account of mechanism ownership, which I think is more plausible. We might instead say, contra Fischer and Ravizza's application of their own theory, that the agents in these actions do not own the operative mechanism. This could be the case if the mechanism issuing in those actions is not of the kind ―ordinary practical reasoning‖. Then it may well be that the agent has not ―taken responsibility‖ for the mechanism, because he has not taken responsibility for actions which have issued from mechanisms of the same kind in the past. To take this view seems more charitable to the Fischer-Ravizza theory than are the authors themselves – at least on this particular issue. On this view, the account of ownership of mechanisms is not undermined by cases of addiction and compulsion. In the next section, though, I'll discuss another kind of case which definitely does undermine the Fischer-Ravizza account of mechanism ownership: actions with subverting causes. For these actions there is no doubt that the mechanism is owned, and the other conditions of guidance control are met, and yet the agent is not directly morally responsible. 6.7. ACTIONS WITH SUBVERTING CAUSES AND GUIDANCE CONTROL For the remainder of the chapter I'll set aside the various criticisms I've already made of the Fischer-Ravizza theory of moral responsibility. I'll build an independent argument, based on actions with subverting causes, to show that the guidance control conditions are not sufficient for direct moral responsibility. As a brief reminder, the five key cases of actions with subverting causes on which I build my main arguments were the following. 83 Samantha walks past a man slumped in doorway after being told that she is running late for her appointment to give a presentation. Martha, like the person sitting next to her, continues to fill out a market research questionnaire despite loud cries from the researcher in the next room. Judy judges that a candidate possesses a high degree of flexibility in solving problems, after being told that she will meet the candidate later. Ingrid interrupts a conversation shortly after completing a puzzle in which some of the words were connected with a theme of rudeness. Gina gives up trying to solve a difficult problem, after earlier resisting the temptation to eat some chocolate cookies. Using these five examples of actions with subverting causes, I aim to demonstrate that the Fischer-Ravizza guidance control conditions are not sufficient for direct moral responsibility. In each of the five cases, I claim that the agent does exercise guidance control, but that she is not directly morally responsible for her action. In the next section, I'll defend 82 I think it's very difficult to specify this reactivity condition. I have tried to formulate one, and rejected several candidates. I've come to suspect that no specification can be given which is genuinely independent of judgements about moral responsibility for actions. But that's not a claim I can defend here, so I remain uncommitted about whether some condition of reasons-responsiveness is indeed necessary for direct moral responsibility. 83 See section 3.2 for more details. 110 my claim that the guidance control conditions are met in each of the five key cases. Then, in section 6.7.2, I'll set out my argument that the agents are not directly morally responsible for their actions. It's important to note that the conclusion is true if the premises are true for any action. To refute the argument, an objector would need to show, for all five key cases, that one of the premises is false. A single counterexample will be enough to establish my argument. My claim that subverting causes do occur is supported by the evidence I gave in section 3.2, introducing the five key cases. I also discussed a much wider range of experimental evidence for similarly subverting causes of actions (in section 3.6), and objections to my claim that there are actions with subverting causes (section 3.7). Furthermore, even if there are never in fact any subverting causes of actions, my argument nevertheless reveals something important about the conditions for direct moral responsibility. Simply considering the potential threat posed by subverting causes reveals that guidance control is not sufficient for direct moral responsibility. Guidance control might in practice be perfectly correlated with direct moral responsibility, but not logically sufficient for DMR. 6.7.1. Guidance control in the five key cases A premise of my argument is that the agents in the five key cases do meet the Fischer-Ravizza guidance control conditions. There are several ways to object that they do not. Each objection would deny that an element of the guidance control conditions is present in one or more of the five actions. I'll consider each element in turn. Someone might object that the agent's mechanism in the example actions is not moderately reasons-responsive. To be moderately reasons-responsive, a mechanism must display ―weak reactivity‖ and ―regular receptivity‖ to reasons. 84 In order to be weakly reactive, it must be the case that the same kind of mechanism would issue in a different action in at least one counterfactual scenario in which there is a different reason to act. There are two ways in which that might be false. First, it might be that there is no counterfactual scenario whatsoever – irrespective of the kinds of mechanism involved – in which a different action would occur. That is clearly not the case for any of the example actions. The second way in which weak reactivity might be lacking is that different actions would only occur in counterfactual scenarios which involve different kinds of mechanism from the mechanism which issues in the actual action (Fischer and Ravizza call this ―the actual-sequence mechanism‖). It's clear that, in each of the example actions, there is a counterfactual scenario in which a different action issues from a mechanism that fits the Fischer-Ravizza description ―ordinary practical reasoning‖. 85 The key question, then, is whether the actual-sequence mechanism is of that same kind. As far as I can see, there's no reason to believe that it's not. Only the fact that we happen to know of the influence of the subverting causes, in these particular cases, could make us think otherwise. If we did not know of the influence of the subverting causes – as the agents do not – then we would happily describe the actions as issuing from ordinary practical reasoning. In all likelihood, as I argued in chapter 3, there are many everyday actions which are influenced in similar ways; we would describe those actions as issuing from ordinary practical reasoning, too. So I think that the actual-sequence mechanism is weakly reactive to reasons, in all five example actions. The ―regular receptivity‖ condition requires that the agent's mechanism must display an understandable ―pattern‖ of reasonsresponsiveness. It's not enough for the agent to respond to reasons in bizarre or incomprehensible ways. The objector might claim that that the agents in my five examples are responding to reasons in bizarre ways. I deny this claim. I think that 84 See section 6.4. 85 For example, there are counterfactual scenarios in which the slumped man would call out to ask for help, and Samantha would offer him help via a mechanism of the kind described as ―ordinary practical reasoning‖. 111 it's quite easy to understand, in all five cases, how the agents are responding to the reasons they encounter. The problem is not that their responses are bizarre; in fact they are all too understandable. The problem is rather that their actual responses are not the responses they would wish to make, if they learned of the influence of the subverting causes. Furthermore, the agents are all normal adults, whose mechanisms of ordinary practical reasoning respond in normal and unremarkable ways to everyday reasons. I see no grounds for doubting that the agents in my examples meet the Fischer-Ravizza receptivity requirements. I conclude that the agents' mechanisms in the example actions are indeed moderately reasons-responsive. The other element of guidance control which might be missing, according to an objector, is ownership of the actual-sequence mechanism. Ownership of a mechanism is achieved by taking responsibility for actions which issue from a mechanism of the same kind. 86 This in turn involves a further condition: the agent must accept that she is a fair target of the reactive attitudes when she acts from that kind of mechanism. 87 How might the objector deny that the agents in the five example actions own their mechanisms? He might begin by denying that the agents have taken responsibility for previous actions issuing from the same kind of mechanism. This is implausible, for the same reasons I discussed above: the operative mechanisms in every case fit the description ―ordinary practical reasoning‖, and the agents are all normal adults who have taken responsibility for previous actions issuing from that kind of mechanism. Instead, the objector might move on to deny that the agents would take responsibility for the five particular actions which I'm using in my argument – the actions which have subverting causes. I have two replies to this objection. The first is simply that responsibility for a mechanism is supposed (on the Fischer-Ravizza account) to be taken gradually over a period spanning many historical actions issuing from that kind of mechanism, and is not something which the agent takes or renounces for individual actions. By the time of their example actions the five agents are adults who have long ago taken responsibility for mechanisms of the kind ―ordinary practical reasoning‖. The second reply is that the agents of the five example actions do see themselves as morally responsible – and hence fair targets of reactive attitudes – for those actions. They do not know that their actions have subverting causes. The actions are just like many of our everyday actions, for which we all feel ourselves morally responsible. Without specialist knowledge, the agents do not even suspect that there may have been subverting causes. Thus I think both forms of this objection fail, and it's not plausible to claim that the agents do not own their actual-sequence mechanisms. 6.7.2. Subverting causes and direct moral responsibility I've argued that the agents in the five key cases do meet the Fischer-Ravizza guidance control conditions. I'll now defend my claim that these agents are not directly morally responsible for their actions with subverting causes. In section 3.4.2 I argued for the same claim by drawing on key elements of Harry Frankfurt's position. There, I made the case that the effective desire in each of the five actions is not truly the agent's own, because she would not F-accept it if she knew all the causes of the action. If the effective desire is not truly the agent's own then she is not DMR for it, according to this identificationist axiom which Frankfurt holds: (4) For direct moral responsibility for an action, the effective desire must be truly the agent's own (R→O). 86 See section 6.3. 87 Strictly, there are two further conditions of ownership, but these are true of all normal adult agents: she must see herself as an agent, and this belief must be appropriately grounded in evidence. 112 I concluded that followers of Frankfurt should accept that the agents in the five cases are not DMR for their actions. Fischer and Ravizza, though, do not hold (4). So followers of Fischer and Ravizza will not be convinced by the argument that I made in section 3.4.2. Instead, I'll argue against the Fischer-Ravizza position directly, in a way which I think should persuade its advocates that the agents in the five cases are not DMR for their actions. My argument focuses on the relationship between moral responsibility and ownership of a kind of mechanism in Fischer and Ravizza's theory. This relationship is best summarised in a pair of quotations: 88 individuals make certain kinds of mechanism their own by taking responsibility for them. (When we speak of taking responsibility for a kind of mechanism, we understand this as ―shorthand‖ for taking responsibility for behavior that issues from that kind of mechanism). 89 Since guidance control is sufficient for moral responsibility, to take responsibility for a kind of mechanism is to take responsibility for all the actions which issue from mechanisms of that kind when the other guidance control conditions are met. When one takes responsibility, at a certain point in one's life, for a certain kind of mechanism, this functions as a kind of ―standing policy‖ with respect to that kind of mechanism. So, for example, if one has in the past taken responsibility for the mechanism of ―ordinary practical reasoning‖ (and in the absence of reconsideration of this mechanism), it follows that one takes responsibility for the currently operating mechanism of ordinary practical reasoning: taking responsibility is, as it were, transferred via the medium of ―sameness of kind of mechanism‖. 90 (Strictly, what one takes responsibility for and sometimes later reconsiders is not a mechanism but a kind of mechanism. 91 To keep this point clear without unduly cumbersome phrasing, I'll refer to a kind of mechanism as ―a mechanism-kind‖.) The authors do not clarify what ―reconsideration‖ of a mechanism-kind involves or implies. But I assume they mean that an agent can reject responsibility for a mechanism-kind for which she has previously taken responsibility. In doing so (I take it) the agent would reject ownership of the mechanism-kind which she had previously made her own by taking responsibility for it. Against Fischer and Ravizza, I've argued that we don't take responsibility for mechanisms or mechanism-kinds: we simply don't have intuitions about how to individuate these notions, which we would need in order to take responsibility for them. 92 I also argued that the use of mechanisms in the Fischer-Ravizza theory generates implausible verdicts about moral responsibility for actions involving compulsions and addictions. 93 Nevertheless, the idea that agents take responsibility for certain actions does seem to reflect an important element of our practice of responsibility attribution. I'm inclined to think 88 I used these same quotations in section 6.3 above. 89 Fischer and Ravizza 1998:241. By ―behavior‖ they mean to include both actions and omissions; I am focusing mainly on actions. 90 Fischer and Ravizza 1998:242. 91 The phrasing in the Fischer-Ravizza quote above is loose: ―ordinary practical reasoning‖ is a kind of mechanism, rather than a mechanism. (I made the same point in footnote 21 above.) 92 See section 6.6.2. 93 See sections 6.6.3, 6.6.4, and 6.6.5. 113 that a more accurate account of taking responsibility would not feature mechanisms at all. 94 Instead it seems to me more accurate to say that we take responsibility for certain kinds of action; we do not do so indirectly, via taking responsibility for mechanism-kinds. But mechanisms are crucial to the Fischer-Ravizza theory, in two ways. In certain cases of manipulation of the agent, the theory states that an unowned mechanism issues in the action. 95 And it is reasons-responsiveness of the mechanism, rather than the agent, which enables moral responsibility for actions in Frankfurt-style cases. So I'll assume that the FischerRavizza theory is correct, including its claims about mechanisms. Even though, as I've argued, the notion of mechanisms has little support from our intuitions, the role they supposedly play in most everyday actions (which don't involve manipulation, addiction, compulsion and so forth) is relatively innocuous. The idea that we take responsibility for the mechanism-kind ―ordinary practical reasoning‖ doesn't clash violently with our intuitions, because the kinds of actions we might expect to issue from such a roughly delineated mechanism-kind are also roughly the kinds of action for which we expect to be held responsible. So I'll assume, for the sake of argument, that the agents in my five key cases have indeed taken responsibility for their mechanism-kind ―ordinary practical reasoning‖, and hence for all the actions which issue from ―ordinary practical reasoning‖. 96 But now let's consider what would happen if those agents knew all the causes of their actions in the five key cases. I think each agent would reject responsibility for her action. She would not accept that she is a fair target of reactive attitudes in relation to the action, if she learned of its subverting causes. On Fischer and Ravizza's view, an agent's rejecting responsibility for actions which issue from a mechanism-kind presumably entails her rejecting responsibility for, and ownership of, that mechanism-kind. (This mirrors their position on taking responsibility and ownership of mechanism-kinds. But as far as I can tell they don't discuss the implications of rejecting responsibility for actions and mechanism-kinds.) In turn, rejecting ownership of a mechanism-kind must entail rejecting responsibility for all the actions which issue from that mechanism-kind, since ownership of the actual-sequence mechanism is required for guidance control and DMR. It would be foolish to claim that the agents in the five key cases would reject responsibility for all the actions which issue from their ordinary practical reasoning, just because they learned about the subverting causes of some of their actions. I do not claim that. Instead, what this discussion shows is that taking or rejecting ownership of a mechanism-kind is much too inflexible as a means of determining responsibility for individual actions. Ownership of a mechanism-kind is much too far removed from the causes of a particular action to be a condition of moral responsibility for that action. What's required instead is something much closer to Frankfurt's identificationist axiom: (4) For direct moral responsibility for an action, the effective desire must be truly the agent's own (R→O). The attempt to use mechanisms as an extra layer between the action and the agent, mediating her responsibility, fails in several respects. Even if we set aside the criticisms I made in section 6.6, mechanisms cannot – at least in the way they are used by Fischer and Ravizza – establish the relevant ownership relationship between the agent and her action. 94 I'm not going to try to give such an account. Indeed in the end I'm sceptical that any principled account of taking responsibility could be given: I suspect that an accurate account of taking responsibility would involve an arbitrary list of those kinds of actions for which we do in fact attribute responsibility. 95 Such cases can involve for example brainwashing, indoctrination, hypnosis or direct stimulation of the brain. 96 As Fischer and Ravizza explain in the first quotation above, taking responsibility for a kind of mechanism is ―shorthand‖ for taking responsibility for the actions which issue from it. 114 An agent's counterfactual rejection of responsibility for an action, if she knew all the action's causes, should lead us to excuse her from DMR for that action. It should certainly weigh more heavily than the fact that she has taken responsibility for – and ownership of – the mechanism-kind which issued in the action. In the counterfactual scenario she has more information, which is very relevant to the issue in question; and that is the only difference between the counterfactual scenario and the actual situation. I conclude that the Fischer-Ravizza guidance control conditions are not sufficient for direct moral responsibility. Though the guidance control conditions are met in the five key cases, each agent would reject responsibility for her action, if she knew all of its causes. Therefore we should not hold those agents directly morally responsible for their actions. I'll expand on this argument by considering some objections to it. An important objection would make the intuitively appealing claim that agents cannot be excused responsibility for some of their actions on a piecemeal basis. Having taken responsibility for a mechanism-kind, the objector argues, an agent should not be excused responsibility for a certain action simply because she would prefer to reject that responsibility. Taking responsibility for – and ownership of – a mechanism-kind is a very important matter, and we must accept the consequent responsibilities which follow. There is an intuitive merit in this way of thinking, but I think the problem of subverting causes reveals its limitations. It might be reasonable to expect agents to accept moral responsibility for all the actions which issue from a mechanism-kind, if those agents were aware of all the kinds of actions which might issue from it, when they took responsibility for the mechanism-kind. But that's exactly what we are not aware of. Assuming for the sake of argument that we do take responsibility for mechanism-kinds, there is a very significant flaw in the everyday model of action explanation which we use when we do so. 97 If we realised that actions with subverting causes might issue from those mechanism-kinds, we would not take responsibility for them, and all the actions which issue from them. It is therefore unreasonable to hold us morally responsible for all the actions which issue from a mechanism-kind. When we took responsibility for that mechanism-kind, we did so on the basis of a very significant misunderstanding of its operation. 98 An obvious objection to this line of argument is that many agents would take responsibility for their mechanism-kind ―ordinary practical reasoning‖, and hence the actions that issue from it, even if they knew that some of the actions which would issue from it would have subverting causes. In response I accept that many people would do so, if they were simply told about a few example cases of subverting causes and asked for a prompt reaction to their new knowledge. But I think that, if they spent some time reflecting carefully on the implications of the wideranging research I discussed in sections 3.6, 3.7 and 3.8, most people would take the opposite view. Our intuitions about moral responsibility are closely linked to our everyday model of action explanation. Only after careful consideration of the evidence is someone likely to countenance a change to her model, to include serious consideration that some actions have subverting causes. Only after further reflection on the implications of this change will she then change her views about responsibility attribution. The fact that many people would initially retain their current views about responsibility, faced with some evidence about actions with subverting causes, does not show that they would retain those views after further reflection. 97 By ―the everyday model of action explanation‖, I mean the methods and tendencies used by non-experts to explain actions. Although there is of course no single uniform model, I take it that almost everyone ignores subverting causes when explaining almost every action. In sections 3.6, 3.7 and 3.8, I discussed evidence that this is a flaw in our everyday model of action explanation. 98 Of course, I deny that we ever do take responsibility for mechanism-kinds; I am setting that point aside here. 115 A separate objection would be that agents can be DMR for actions with subverting causes in virtue of being (directly) blameworthy for performing them. I discussed several forms of this objection in section 4.3. As well as responding directly to the objection, I argued that Frankfurt would not raise it, because he holds axiom (4) above: an agent is DMR for an action only if it is truly the agent's own. Since Fischer and Ravizza do not hold this axiom, might they raise this objection? I think they would not, because they do believe there must be an ownership relation between the agent and the action for which she is DMR. This relation is an important part of their strategy for dealing with cases of manipulation, brainwashing, and so forth, as well as Frankfurt-style cases. Fischer and Ravizza would not, I take it, argue that an agent can be directly blameworthy for an action if the ownership relation does not obtain. In their case, the ownership relation involves taking responsibility for actions and mechanism-kinds. I've argued that their account of the relation is flawed, and specifically that it breaks down in cases of actions with subverting causes. If they accepted those criticisms, Fischer and Ravizza would not press the present objection. I need not rely only on this reply, though, since I did answer the objection directly (in several forms) in section 4.3. It's possible that the problem I've highlighted for the Fischer-Ravizza theory could be solved by a minor revision. Rather than using ―ordinary practical reasoning‖ as their primary example of a kind of mechanism, the authors might claim that there is a distinction to be drawn among kinds of mechanism. The suggestion would be that actions with subverting causes issue from a certain kind (or kinds) of mechanism, while other actions (including those we think of as paradigmatic examples of morally responsible action) issue from another kind (or kinds) of mechanism. On this view, agents take responsibility for the latter kind(s) of mechanism, and would endorse that judgement even if they learned about potential subverting causes of actions. However, it seems very unlikely to me that this suggestion would find empirical support in either neuroscience or psychology. Instead, the processes which precede actions with subverting causes seem likely to be very similar to those which precede paradigmatically rational actions. For example, all of our actions involve a great many automatic processes of which we are not consciously aware. There seems no reason to think that the processes differ when actions have subverting rather than non-subverting causes. There's no obvious basis, then, for claiming that the mechanism-kinds differ when there are, or are not, subverting causes of actions. 6.8. CONCLUSIONS FROM THIS CHAPTER In this chapter I've argued that there are flaws in all three elements of Fischer and Ravizza's theory. Fischer and Ravizza's notion of ―the mechanism issuing in action‖ is flawed. They make appeals to intuitions to support their claims about mechanisms, and also to support some of their claims about responsibility for actions performed by addicts and compulsives. Several of the most important appeals fail. The Fischer-Ravizza conditions for ―moderate reasons-responsiveness‖ include a requirement of ―weak reactivity‖. This is simply too weak. If there is a reactivity condition for 116 moral responsibility, it must require more than that a mechanism would respond differently to a very extreme reason such as the threat of murder of the agent's children. 99 Finally, the Fischer-Ravizza account of mechanism ownership is flawed. This is bound to be the case since the notions of mechanisms and kinds of mechanism are themselves flawed. But even setting aside those issues, the ownership requirements fail to ensure that the agent is morally responsible for every action which issues from a kind of mechanism which is owned. There are two kinds of counterexample. The first involves agents acting in the grip of compulsions or addictions. Here it seems plausible to say that the mechanism issuing in action is not owned by the agent, since he has not taken responsibility for it. 100 But Fischer and Ravizza maintain, implausibly, that the mechanism is owned and the agent is morally responsible for his action. The second kind of counterexample involves my five key cases of actions with subverting causes. In these it is plausible to agree with Fischer and Ravizza that the operative mechanism is owned, on their account of mechanism ownership. But this does not entail that the agents are morally responsible for their actions, even if the other conditions of guidance control are met. For if those agents knew all the causes of those actions, they would reject responsibility for the actions. This should lead us to conclude that those agents are not directly morally responsible for their actions. Therefore, ownership of a moderately reasons-responsive mechanism which issues in an action – guidance control – is not sufficient for direct moral responsibility for that action. 99 I think this problem is independent of the problems I've identified with the notion of the mechanism. A requirement of weak reactivity of the agent, rather than weak reactivity of the mechanism, would still be too weak. A plausible reactivity condition would require more than that an agent would react differently to a very extreme reason. (I haven't developed this point, as it isn't central to my argument.) 100 On this way of applying the Fischer-Ravizza theory, the agent would not meet the guidance control conditions, and so would not be held directly morally responsible for the action – which is the plausible verdict. 117 7. THE PREVALENCE OF MORAL RESPONSIBILITY In this chapter I'll make the following ―sceptical argument‖. There are many everyday actions which have subverting causes. Many of those are actions for which we currently hold agents morally responsible. But, in many of those same actions, the agents are not in fact morally responsible – they bear neither direct nor traced moral responsibility. 1 I conclude that there are many everyday actions for which we mistakenly hold agents morally responsible. This argument might be resisted by any of the compatibilists whose accounts I have discussed in previous chapters. For simplicity, I'll express my sceptical argument using the central elements of Frankfurt's theory of moral responsibility. Alternative versions could also be expressed using elements of the theories of Doris, Nahmias or Fischer and Ravizza: these alternative versions would have the same structure, and their conclusions would be the same. The following is a very brief recap of my arguments against Frankfurt. On Frankfurt's final account, an agent identifies with his effective desire if and only if he accepts it as his own, and is satisfied with that acceptance, where being satisfied is a matter of having no interest in making changes. 2 I used the label ―F-acceptance‖ to stand for this kind of acceptance. Frankfurt regards F-acceptance of an effective desire as sufficient for the desire's being truly one's own, and hence for direct moral responsibility for the action. 3 I argued against both of these points, using example cases of actions with subverting causes. 4 In these cases the agents do F-accept their effective desires, and yet the desires are not truly their own. I also made a positive proposal, that my CFA condition is necessary for direct moral responsibility: CFA The agent would F-accept his action, if he knew all the proximate and relevant causes of the action. 5 I'll make use of these definitions in this chapter. I'll make the case for my sceptical conclusion in section 7.1. Then, in section 7.2, I'll discuss whether research into subverting causes of actions also gives some grounds for optimism about moral responsibility. In section 7.3 I'll discuss some of the implications of my conclusions. My focus in this chapter is on actions with subverting causes, where those subverting causes are unknown both to the agents and to onlookers who may attribute moral responsibility. Therefore most of my examples will be of this kind of action. 7.1. MORAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR EVERYDAY ACTIONS There are three parts to my sceptical argument. In section 7.1.1 I'll review support for the claim that there are many everyday actions with subverting causes. Then in section 7.1.2 I'll argue that agents are not morally responsible in many everyday actions with subverting causes. Finally in section 7.1.3 I'll argue that we do in fact hold people morally responsible for many of those actions. It follows that we mistakenly hold people morally responsible for many everyday actions. 1 Direct moral responsibility (DMR) is anchored in facts about the action and the agent at the time of acting. Traced moral responsibility (TMR) can be ―traced back‖ to facts about an earlier action (or omission) and about the agent at that earlier time. See section 1.2. 2 See section 2.1.3. 3 These are statements (5) and (6) in the set defining Frankfurt's position in section 2.2. 4 See section 3.4. 5 This is a simplified version of the condition; see section 3.5. 118 7.1.1. There are many actions with subverting causes In chapter 3 I made these claims: (A) There are actions with subverting causes. (B) There are many everyday actions with subverting causes. Claim (A) supports a key premise in my ―main arguments‖ against Frankfurt and Fischer. 6 For my ―sceptical argument‖, in this current chapter, I'll focus on claim (B). To establish that (B) is plausible, I defended these subsidiary claims: (B1) There are good grounds to believe, on the basis of existing experimental evidence, that many everyday actions have subverting causes. (B2) There are good grounds to believe that there are many more subverting causes of everyday actions as yet undiscovered by experimenters. The term ―many‖ in these claims is deliberately loose, and indicates a range of possibilities. Someone who finds it plausible that there are very many actions with subverting causes will find that my argument leads to a very sceptical conclusion. To support claim (B1), I reviewed experimental evidence from several fields of psychology. There have been many studies of real-life everyday actions, or actions that are just like everyday actions, which have surprising causes. 7 It's very likely that many of those causes were subverting: the agents would not F-accept their actions, if they knew all the causes. 8 I also rejected some objections to these points. 9 Nevertheless, it is difficult to believe that everyday actions can have subverting causes. I discussed evidence which suggests explanations for our failing to notice that everyday actions have subverting causes. 10 To support claim (B2), I gave the following inductive argument. Most of the evidence which supports claim (B1) has only recently been discovered. Almost all of the evidence dates from the last fifty years, and much of the most interesting evidence has come in the last decade. A lot of the evidence has been extremely surprising: we did not expect to discover that our actions can be influenced by the factors which have been pinpointed. Some of the research fields from which the evidence has come are still in their infancy, and the experimental methods used are steadily becoming more and more sophisticated. Therefore it is very likely that many more subverting causes and effects will be discovered by experimenters in the coming years. Claims (B1) and (B2) are interrelated. Both are matters of degree. The more plausible is claim (B1), the less support is required from claim (B2), in order to establish (B). The more plausible is claim (B2), the less support is required from claim (B1). 7.1.2. There are many actions for which agents are not morally responsible When an action has a subverting cause, the agent would not F-accept her action upon learning of its causes. I argued in chapter 3 that such an action is not truly the agent's own, and so she is not directly morally responsible for it. If there are many everyday actions which have subverting causes, then it follows that there are many everyday actions for which the agent is not directly morally responsible. 6 See sections 3.4 and 6.7. 7 One could argue that some studies of extremely unusual actions also provide evidence that similar effects operate in everyday actions. For example, some of the influencing effects of authority figures revealed in Milgram-style experiments may also occur in workplace meetings (Doris 2002:148). However, I don't need to rely on this point. 8 See section 3.6. 9 See section 3.7. 10 I reviewed this evidence in section 3.8. I'll summarise it again in section 7.1.3 below. 119 I'll now argue, further, that there are many everyday actions with subverting causes for which the agent does not bear traced moral responsibility either. In order to bear TMR for an action with a subverting cause (which I'll call action A1), it must be the case that there was some earlier action or omission (A0) from which A1 results, and that the resultant occurrence of A1 was reasonably foreseeable by the agent at the time of A0. 11 Now it seems clear that the effects of many subverting causes are not reasonably foreseeable by an agent who is not familiar with the relevant psychology research. Many of the effects discussed in chapter 3 were surprising even to psychologists when they were first discovered. They are surprising – even shocking – to all of us when we first learn about them. This is evidence enough that the effects are not foreseeable by a person who is unfamiliar with the psychology research. To say that the effect of a subverting cause is not foreseeable by an agent is not quite the same as saying that the resultant occurrence of an action with a subverting cause was not reasonably foreseeable. But in fact we can see that the latter point does follow by considering a couple of examples. Suppose that Michael is a subject in a Milgram-style study. 12 He agrees to take part in what he is told is a study of learning, and begins to follow the first few instructions given by the ―experimenter‖ in the white coat. We might hope to trace moral responsibility for his later action to one of these earlier actions. Since Michael knows nothing about situationism, he cannot reasonably foresee that one or more situational factors will later be causes of his agreeing to administer a lethal dose of electricity to the ―learner‖. It is not plausible to say that the resultant occurrence of that action is reasonably foreseeable by him at the time of the earlier actions. But perhaps that example is too far removed from everyday life to establish the point. The action of administering a lethal electric shock is extremely unusual, and it's difficult for anyone to foresee himself performing it. A more commonplace example may help. Ingrid interrupts a conversation which was already in progress between two other people. 13 A cause of her action was that, a few minutes earlier, she completed a puzzle in which some of the words were connected with a theme of rudeness. It might be true that, at the time of completing the puzzle, Ingrid could have foreseen her later action of interrupting a conversation. But we need more than that to establish traced moral responsibility. Is it plausible to say that the resultant occurrence of her interrupting a conversation was reasonably foreseeable by her, at the time of completing the puzzle? It is not, because she does not know about the relevant psychology research which reveals this kind of effect. Therefore we cannot trace moral responsibility for the interrupting to the earlier action. A separate point is that, in some cases, tracing of responsibility from an earlier action will be impossible because that earlier action itself had a subverting cause – and so the agent was not directly morally responsible for that earlier action. It's also worth noting that if the tracing principle is false, then (if my proposed CFA condition is necessary for DMR) moral responsibility is impossible for actions with subverting causes. I conclude that there are many everyday actions with subverting causes for which the agent bears neither direct nor traced moral responsibility. 11 I discussed this definition of TMR in section 1.2. It seems plausible that the same argument would succeed on other definitions of TMR, too. 12 See section 3.6.1. 13 See section 3.2.4. 120 7.1.3. We mistakenly hold agents morally responsible for many actions Most of the examples of subverting causes I've described are readily applicable to everyday actions. They involve people running late to give presentations, filling out paperwork, assessing job applicants, completing word puzzles, interrupting conversations, resisting temptations, and so on. Without knowledge of any subverting causes in these situations, we would readily hold the agents morally responsible for their actions. We would not even pause to doubt their moral responsibility. We simply do not expect that everyday actions like these might have subverting causes, and we do not allow for that possibility in our judgements about moral responsibility. I have reviewed evidence which helps to explain why these examples of subverting causes are so surprising and conflict with common sense. 14 Situationist research reveals that our commonsense explanations of actions are much less reliable than we think. The phenomena of dissonance, confabulation and rationalisation all contribute to our failure to recognise mistakes in our explanations of our own actions. We lack awareness of the automatic processes involved in our actions: we are not consciously aware that they are occurring; nor do we realise how important their roles are. We have an experience of agency; but do not realise that it is interpreted automatically from factors such as the exclusivity and priority of our conscious thoughts about the action, and does not arise from introspective access to the processes which trigger and control actions. Furthermore, subverting causes can operate by distorting our assessments of situations in which we act: for example, we sometimes do not notice that we have failed to respond to a moral obligation. The possibility of unknown subverting causes is not currently accounted for in everyday action explanation, except perhaps for such possible causes as subliminal perceptions or unconscious memories, which are present at the fringes of popular understanding. 15 A problem we face as agents is that we don't know when our everyday actions have subverting causes. Suppose Delia is deliberating before choosing between action A and action B. In favour of A, she recognises reasons R1 and R2. In favour of B are reasons R3 and R4. She decides to perform action A. But before she does so, she changes her mind and instead performs action B. Now asked why she changed her mind, Delia says that she re-evaluated reason R3 as more important than she had previously thought. Unfortunately, Delia cannot know whether her action had a subverting cause. It may be that a subverting cause led to her change of mind, and she confabulated the re-evaluation of reason R3 (which did not happen). Alternatively, it may be that a subverting cause led her to re-evaluate R3: in this case, the explanation is correct but the action is not truly her own. 16 Delia knows that there were reasons in favour of action B, but does not know that there were no subverting causes. This epistemic limitation is problematic in itself, independently of the implications for moral responsibility for our own actions. It means that we cannot be confident in our judgements about other agents' actions, even when they give sincere explanations. 17 It's impossible to calculate the proportion of everyday actions in which there are subverting causes, for several reasons. The fields of research into situational factors, and other factors processed automatically in unexpected ways, are still very young. We simply don't know how many surprising effects of these kinds still lie undiscovered. Furthermore, a potentially subverting factor will sometimes not subvert an action, either because it is not a cause of the action, or because the agent would F-accept the action if he knew of its effect. 14 This paragraph summarises evidence discussed in section 3.8. 15 I did not include examples of subliminal perception or unconscious memory among my five key cases, because I'm not aware of specific evidence which demonstrates that they are causes in everyday actions. It may well be, however, that such evidence exists or will soon be discovered. 16 That is, if she learned of the (subverting) cause of her action, she would not F-accept it as her own. 17 There are also implications for our view of ourselves as autonomous agents, which I won't pursue here. 121 Before moving on, I'll briefly summarise my sceptical argument. I think it's plausible that there are many actions with subverting causes for which the agent does not bear traced moral responsibility. This can be the case when the agent cannot reasonably foresee the operation of the subverting cause. It can also be the case when the prior action, from which responsibility might be traced, itself had a subverting cause. Meanwhile an agent cannot be directly morally responsible for an action with a subverting cause, because it is not truly his own. There are many everyday actions with subverting causes. Therefore there are many everyday actions for which agents are not morally responsible. Many of these are actions for which we currently do hold agents morally responsible, in practice, because we are not aware that they may have subverting causes. It follows that there are many everyday actions for which we mistakenly hold agents morally responsible. 7.2. GROUNDS FOR OPTIMISM ABOUT MORAL RESPONSIBILITY An optimistic response to the challenges posed by research on subverting causes is to hope that increasing knowledge of the effects will help us in future to perform more actions which are truly our own. Both Nahmias and Doris emphasise the possible increases in freedom and responsibility to be gained by greater knowledge of situationist effects. There are three ways in which increased knowledge of subverting causes might help someone. First, she may be able to recognise potential subverting causes before they operate, so that they do not become causes of her actions. Second, the person may reduce her reliance on character traits – both as explanations of other people's actions, and more importantly as predictors of her own future actions. She may stop relying complacently on predictions of what she will do in some future situation which are based predominantly on character traits. Third, she may learn how to manipulate her environment so as to reduce either the prevalence or the influence of potential subverting causes. I'll briefly assess each of these possibilities in this section. Unfortunately there has been little relevant research to establish whether the first source of optimism presents good grounds for hope. 18 We must be careful to avoid moving complacently from an unrealistic view of how our actions are caused to an unrealistic vision of what we can achieve in the future. It seems intuitively plausible, for example, that teaching someone about the Good Samaritan' experiment, or the effect of bystanders' behaviour on helping people in need, would have a significant on her future actions in any similar circumstances. But the (limited) experimental evidence suggests that any such effect is weak. 19 Doris speculates that better results could be gained by ―integrating the lessons learned from situationism into our culture of moral education‖. 20 That seems to me much more likely to be effective than individuals learning fragments of knowledge about situationism and attempting to modify their actions. It would be worthwhile to include non-situationist subverting causes in this education too – such as factors processed automatically in unexpected ways. The second optimistic hope is that agents may learn to reduce their reliance on character traits, both when predicting their own future actions and when explaining others' actions. I'm not aware of any experimental evidence to support this hope. It may be that attributing character traits and using them in these ways is instinctive. There may be some evolutionary 18 Doris 2002:148. 19 In one study, students who had attended a lecture or film about group effects and helping behaviour were more likely than control subjects to intervene two weeks later to help someone, when part of a group of bystanders. However, ―the effect, although significant, is not extremely marked‖ (Doris 2002:148). 20 Doris 2002:148. 122 advantage to our doing so. 21 To some extent this second optimistic hope is linked to the first: the difficulty of success in one is probably reflected in the other. In my view the third optimistic hope is the one most likely to bring results in the short term. We can change our behaviour to avoid situations in which subverting causes may be prevalent. For example, with more understanding of situational pressures, Alf may choose to decline the invitation to a candlelit dinner which might lead him to a later akratic act of infidelity. 22 Manipulating our environment can enable us to reduce the prevalence or the influence of potential subverting causes. We may also be able to introduce factors which subtly incline us toward behaviour that we want to encourage, making use of research on situationism and on factors processed automatically in unexpected ways. 23 A problem for this line of optimism is that we may need to take such steps very often in future: trying to avoid the influence of many potentially subverting factors may require a lot more effort than trying to recognise individual factors. There are practical problems with all three of these optimistic responses. One problem is that it will be difficult for psychologists to uncover every type of subverting cause. Until they do – or if they do not succeed – we should avoid overconfidence in our efforts to overcome such causes. We will continue to face the prospect that there may be more unknown factors that will subvert our actions. Perhaps even more problematic is the possibility that there are simply too many potentially subverting factors. Even if they were all studied and documented by scientists, it might not be practical to use all the relevant available knowledge in an everyday action. Just trying to take into account the few kinds of effect I have discussed here would be taxing, and perhaps impractically difficult. For example, if Charlotte decides to offer a job to a candidate, she might need to ponder whether this action could have been subverted by: running late; other people's behaviour; recently having processed any words which might affect her mood; recently resisting some temptation; recently engaging in a logical thinking activity; whether the candidate spilled coffee at her interview; and so on. This list already seems too long to be manageable, even if Charlotte made a conscious effort to consider all these possibilities. If she did not make the effort, she might well fail to notice factors which have the potential to subvert her action. And since there are many more known factors which I haven't discussed or listed here, the practical problem seems unmanageable. And that problem will only be made worse by a growing number of discoveries from future research. This practical problem also has implications for moral responsibility. The sheer number of possible subverting effects is so large that it seems implausible to hold someone morally responsible if she failed to avoid all of them – even if she did know about all of them. If a certain factor was a subverting cause of a person's action, then the action was not truly her own, and so she is not directly morally responsible for it. And even if she had knowledge about that particular type of subverting effect and had an opportunity to avert it by some earlier action or omission, it seems implausible to say that her subverted action's resulting from that earlier action was reasonably foreseeable, if there were so many potentially subverting factors that she simply could not consider them all. Therefore it may be impossible to attribute TMR to the agent even if she did know about the subverting effect which was a cause of her action. 21 It may be that action explanation in terms of character traits facilitates clear-cut and widely accepted judgements of responsibility. This in turn may strengthen the effect of those judgements in deterring antisocial actions. 22 See section 5.1. 23 See Thaler and Sunstein 2008 for many interesting examples of how we may be ―nudged‖ towards preferable behaviour by manipulated environmental factors – whether manipulated by ourselves or by others. 123 Setting aside all of those problems, the main limitation of all three optimistic responses to subverting causes is that they do not constitute objections to my argument. By the three means suggested we may be able, in future, to perform more everyday actions which are truly our own. But that does not challenge my conclusion that there are currently many everyday actions which are not truly our own, and for which we are not directly morally responsible. Nor do they establish a means by which we can happily accept traced moral responsibility for actions with subverting causes. In fact, we don't want to bear TMR for actions which have subverting causes, since those actions are not truly our own. 24 My conclusion remains, notwithstanding the possible grounds for future optimism, that today there are many everyday actions for which agents are mistakenly held morally responsible. 7.3. IMPLICATIONS OF MY CONCLUSIONS I have argued against two of the most influential contemporary compatibilist theories of moral responsibility. They are also the leading representatives of two of the most important kinds of compatibilist theory: Frankfurt's is the most influential identificationist theory of responsibility, while the Fischer-Ravizza account is the most widely-discussed and detailed attempt to analyse responsibility in terms of responsiveness to reasons. I have also considered and rejected two attempts (by Doris and Nahmias) to build identificationist theories which take account of the threats to moral responsibility posed by research in situationist social psychology. 25 I've argued that none of these theories provides conditions which are sufficient for moral responsibility. My arguments employ the central elements from Frankfurt's and Fischer's own positions, so I believe that they should be accepted by adherents of those positions. In this chapter I've also argued for a very sceptical conclusion: there are many everyday actions for which agents are not morally responsible. Determinism plays no role in any of my arguments. The truth or falsity of determinism is irrelevant to the truth or falsity of my conclusions. Both Frankfurt and Fischer reject the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP), according to which ―a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise‖. 26 By this means they defend their theories from the most common arguments for the incompatibility of determinism and moral responsibility. Very broadly, these arguments run as follows: if PAP is true, and if determinism is incompatible with alternate possibilities, then determinism is incompatible with moral responsibility. 27 Questions about determinism and its implications are so important and far-reaching that they continue to dominate discussion of free will and moral responsibility. For example, Fischer declares: I am motivated in much of my work by the idea that our basic status as distinctively free and morally responsible agents should not depend on the arcane ruminations – and deliverances – of the theoretical physicists and 24 It may sometimes seem otherwise. But if, for example, Alf accepts the invitation to a candlelit dinner despite knowing that it may lead him to an akratic act of infidelity, then that later act probably is truly his own (see section 5.1). 25 To my knowledge these are the only theories of moral responsibility which address the threats posed by subverting causes. 26 Frankfurt 1969:1. 27 That determinism is incompatible with alternate possibilities is the conclusion of the family of arguments known as ―the Consequence Argument‖ (of which the most influential versions are found in van Inwagen 1983). Some compatibilists accept PAP but deny that determinism is incompatible with alternate possibilities. 124 cosmologists. That is, I do not think our status as morally responsible persons should depend on whether or not causal determinism is true. 28 The arguments I've presented here pose a threat to the theories of Frankfurt and Fischer from a very different direction. I've argued that their proposed conditions are not sufficient for direct moral responsibility, even if PAP is false, and whether or not determinism is true and incompatible with PAP. The source of the threat is not theoretical physics but empirical psychology. And yet the sceptical conclusion I've defended is extremely significant: we mistakenly hold agents morally responsible for many everyday actions. 29 If all of my conclusions are correct, then followers of Frankfurt and Fischer face the following options. First, they could accept that there are many everyday actions for which agents are not morally responsible. This is an unpalatable consequence, which compatibilists will surely resist. Second, they could adopt a different compatibilist account of the same kind. Followers of Frankfurt might adopt an alternative form of identificationism; followers of Fischer might support or develop another theory in which moral responsibility is analysed in terms of responsiveness to reasons. I've discussed two identificationist theories which do take account of situationist research. I argued that neither Doris's nor Nahmias's conditions of identification are sufficient for direct moral responsibility. I think it's likely that other identificationist accounts will face similar difficulties – though I have not argued for this conclusion. I find it hard to imagine a plausible condition of identification on which the agent's effective desire, in the five key cases of actions with subverting causes, would be truly her own (in the sense which is necessary for DMR). 30 Nor can I imagine a plausible set of conditions involving reasons-responsiveness which would be sufficient for DMR, and also satisfied in the five key cases. The problem, when an action has a subverting cause, is not that the agent (or mechanism) is not responding to reasons. Nor is the problem that the agent (or mechanism) is not responsive to reasons. The problem is something closer to this: the agent is not responding to reasons in the way that she would wish to respond, if she knew all the causes of her action. I have not shown, of course, that no suitable account of moral responsibility can be given which would be appealing to followers of Frankfurt or Fischer. My objective here is simply to indicate that the task may be difficult. A third option facing followers of Frankfurt and Fischer, if my conclusions are correct, is to adopt a different kind of compatibilist theory of moral responsibility – to move away from theories centred on identification and reasons-responsiveness. I haven't examined any such theories, but again I think it's likely that many compatibilist accounts of responsibility will come under attack as the phenomena of actions with subverting causes become more widely discussed. Few philosophers have addressed the threats posed to moral responsibility by situationist research. 31 Recent research in other fields of psychology reveals that there are many more types of subverting cause, of which word puzzles and resisted cookies are examples. 32 But in any case, followers of Frankfurt will not want to abandon identificationism 28 Fischer 2006:5. 29 My arguments give no support to incompatibilist libertarians, either – except in so much as they highlight problems for these influential compatibilist theories. The problems posed by actions with subverting causes may threaten libertarian attempts to define the sufficient conditions for direct moral responsibility in similar ways. 30 I argued that my CFA condition, which is based on Frankfurt's identification condition, is necessary for DMR. But the CFA condition is not met in actions with subverting causes. (See section 3.5.) 31 To my knowledge the only philosophers who have done so are Doris, Nahmias and Nelkin (2005). 32 For more examples see section 3.6.2. 125 altogether; nor will followers of Fischer want to endorse theories which do not analyse moral responsibility in terms of reasons-responsiveness. I can see no readily available option which would be palatable to followers of Frankfurt or Fischer, if they accept my criticisms. It's likely that they would want to refute my arguments, rather than pursue one of these options. This shows that my conclusions are significant, if correct. 7.4. CONCLUSIONS For my ―sceptical argument‖ in this chapter, I drew on my earlier arguments (given in chapter 3) that there are many everyday actions which have subverting causes, and that agents are not directly morally responsible for actions which have subverting causes. I showed that many of those are actions for which we currently hold agents morally responsible. I also argued that the agents of many of those actions do not bear traced moral responsibility for them. Therefore I conclude that we mistakenly hold agents morally responsible for many everyday actions. Although this conclusion is troubling, and may seem unduly sceptical, it's worth noting that I rejected some compelling objections which would have even more sceptical implications. My line on non-subverting situationist causes – such as finding a dime in a phone booth before acting to help a stranger – faced several objections which led toward more sceptical conclusions. 33 I also rejected Nahmias's conclusion that two conditions are necessary for direct moral responsibility: his Knowledge condition and Counterfactual Awareness condition. 34 In my view, either of these – if necessary for DMR – would entail a smaller number of actions for which agents do bear direct moral responsibility. None of these alternative and more sceptical views is completely implausible; I was hesitant to reject each of them. Although the conclusion I reach is seemingly extreme, there are more extreme alternatives. My sceptical conclusion, if correct, is obviously significant. The prospect that there are many everyday actions for which agents are not morally responsible is unpalatable to compatibilists. Followers of Frankfurt and Fischer will surely object to my arguments, rather than accept this conclusion. 33 See section 4.1. 34 See section 5.2.1. 126 8. SUMMARY OF MY ARGUMENTS AND CONCLUSIONS In this final chapter I will summarise my arguments and conclusions. I will focus on the arguments which contribute most to my main objectives; many points and arguments from earlier chapters won't be included in this summary. I began in chapter 2 by describing the development of Frankfurt's identificationist theory of moral responsibility. On Frankfurt's final account, an agent identifies with an effective desire to act if he accepts the desire as his own, and if he is satisfied with that attitude of acceptance, where being satisfied is a matter of having no interest in making changes. I introduced the term ―F-acceptance‖ to stand for this kind of acceptance. I summarised Frankfurt's final position in a set of statements defining the relationships between four states of affairs: (A) The agent F-accepts his effective desire. (I) The agent is identified with his effective desire. (O) The agent's effective desire is truly his own. (R) The agent is directly morally responsible for the action to which he is moved by his effective desire. 1 The six statements are: (1) F-acceptance is necessary and sufficient for identification (A↔I). (2) Identification with an effective desire is sufficient for its being truly the agent's own (I→O). (3) Identification is sufficient for direct moral responsibility (I→R) (4) For direct moral responsibility for an action, the effective desire must be truly the agent's own (R→O). (5) F-acceptance of an effective desire is sufficient for its being truly the agent's own (A→O). (6) F-acceptance of the effective desire is sufficient for direct moral responsibility for the action (A→R). In my ―main argument‖ against Frankfurt, in chapter 3, I argued that statement (5) is false: F-acceptance of an effective desire is not sufficient for its being truly the agent's own. I drew on five ―key cases‖ of actions with subverting causes. 2 An action has subverting causes when it is true that: if the agent knew all the proximate and relevant causes of her action, she would not F-accept the effective desire. I argued that, in each of the five key cases, the agent does F-accept her effective desire, and yet that effective desire is not truly her own. In each case, the agent would not F-accept her action, if she knew all of its causes. In this counterfactual scenario, the agent has more knowledge than she has in the actual situation, and that knowledge is relevant to her Facceptance. Her counterfactual lack of F-acceptance indicates that the effective desire is not truly her own. Thus statement (5) is false: F-acceptance of an effective desire is not sufficient for its being truly the agent's own. 1 By direct moral responsibility I mean moral responsibility which is not traced back to facts about an earlier action or omission. See section 1.2. 2 As a brief reminder, the five key cases of actions with subverting causes on which I built my main arguments were the following. Samantha walks past a man slumped in doorway after being told that she is running late for her appointment to give a presentation. Martha, like the person sitting next to her, continues to fill out a market research questionnaire despite loud cries from the researcher in the next room. Judy judges that a candidate possesses a high degree of flexibility in solving problems, after being told that she will meet the candidate later. Ingrid interrupts a conversation shortly after completing a puzzle in which some of the words were connected with a theme of rudeness. Gina gives up trying to solve a difficult problem, after earlier resisting the temptation to eat some chocolate cookies. (See section 3.2 for full details.) 127 If statement (5) is false, it follows that (6) is false if the identificationist axiom (4) is true. Frankfurt's condition of identification, the agent's F-acceptance of his effective desire, is not sufficient for direct moral responsibility for the action. I also made a positive proposal, that the following condition is necessary for direct moral responsibility: CFA The agent would F-accept the effective desire if she knew all the proximate and relevant causes of the action. 3 I think followers of Frankfurt should accept my argument, since it employs the central elements from his own theory in a way which is consistent with the theory's objectives. In the second half of chapter 3 I reviewed experimental evidence which shows that the five key cases of actions with subverting causes are not isolated incidents. Rather, the cases are representative of a large body of credible research in mainstream fields of psychology. I also reviewed evidence which explains why it is difficult for us to believe that there are actions with subverting causes. I addressed objections to my arguments against Frankfurt in chapter 4. 4 In chapter 5 I discussed two philosophers – John Doris and Eddy Nahmias – who have developed identificationist theories of moral responsibility specifically in response to the threats posed by situationist subverting causes. 5 I argued that Doris' ―Narrative Integration‖ condition would entail implausible revisions to our practices of responsibility attribution. Furthermore, it's not clear that judgements about narrative integration are genuinely independent of judgements about moral responsibility. Meanwhile Doris's treatment of actions with subverting situationist causes is problematic. He claims that knowledge of situational factors facilitates increased responsibility, but a lack of such knowledge is not exculpating. These claims seem to be in tension with one another. I also argued, using counterexamples, that Doris' narrative integration condition is neither necessary nor sufficient for direct moral responsibility. Nahmias proposes a ―Knowledge condition‖ and what I called a ―Counterfactual Awareness condition‖, both of which he takes to be necessary for direct moral responsibility. I argued that the Knowledge condition is too stringent: it's not plausible to believe that it is necessary for DMR. Meanwhile a modified version of my CFA condition, which incorporates a generic definition of identification, is preferable to Nahmias's Counterfactual Awareness condition as a necessary condition of direct moral responsibility: CFG The agent would embrace her determinative motive or regard it as fully her own, if she knew all the proximate and relevant causes of the action. Using an example action with a situationist subverting cause, I also argued that Nahmias's Knowledge and Counterfactual Awareness conditions are not jointly sufficient for direct moral responsibility. John Martin Fischer, working with Mark Ravizza, has developed the most influential example of a very different kind of theory of moral responsibility. On their account, moral responsibility is to be analysed in terms of reasons-responsiveness. I argued that there are problems with all three of the central elements of the Fischer-Ravizza theory: the notion of mechanisms, ownership of mechanisms, and the requirement of ―moderate reasons- 3 This is a simplified version of the condition; for the full version see section 3.5. 4 Very similar objections could be made to my arguments in later chapters, and my replies, too, would be very similar. 5 The first three of my five key cases are examples of situationist subverting causes of actions. 128 responsiveness‖. 6 These problems are exposed in the theory's treatment of agents suffering addictions and compulsions; but I set those cases aside for the sake of my main argument, which concerns actions with subverting causes. The Fischer-Ravizza guidance control conditions are met in the five key cases of actions with subverting causes. In each case, the mechanisms are moderately reasons-responsive. The mechanisms are of the kind ―ordinary practical reasoning‖, for which the agents have taken responsibility – and ownership – in virtue of having taken responsibility for past actions issuing from ―ordinary practical reasoning‖. I argued that, if each agent knew all the causes of her action, she would reject responsibility for her action. She would not accept that she is a fair target of reactive attitudes in relation to the action, if she learned of its subverting causes. This should lead us to excuse the agent from direct moral responsibility for the action. Thus Fischer and Ravizza's guidance control conditions are not sufficient for direct moral responsibility. Ownership of a kind of mechanism is too inflexible to be a condition of moral responsibility for actions: it is too far removed from the causes of individual actions. This problem is already evident in cases involving addictions and compulsions, but is revealed even more starkly by the phenomena of subverting causes of actions. Finally in chapter 7 I presented a ―sceptical argument‖. There are good grounds to believe, on the basis of existing experimental evidence, that many everyday actions have subverting causes. There are also good grounds to believe that there are many more subverting causes of everyday actions as yet undiscovered by experimenters. So there are good grounds to believe that many everyday actions have subverting causes. Many of those are actions for which we currently hold agents morally responsible. But, as I argued in earlier chapters, agents are not directly morally responsible for actions which have subverting causes. Furthermore, there are many everyday actions with subverting causes for which the agent does not bear traced moral responsibility either, because the resultant occurrence of the subverted action is not reasonably foreseeable to her at the time of any earlier action or omission. Therefore, there are many everyday actions for which we mistakenly hold agents morally responsible. Meanwhile, there are some grounds for optimism that increasing knowledge of the effects will help us to perform more actions which are truly our own. We may in future be able to recognise potential subverting causes before they operate, improve our predictions and explanations of actions, and learn how to manipulate our environments so as to reduce either the prevalence or the influence of potential subverting causes. Unfortunately, there is little experimental evidence so far to establish whether these are good grounds for optimism. And, in any case, the sheer quantity of potentially subverting factors in our environments imposes severe practical difficulties: it's not clear that an individual can learn about a large number of such effects, nor that she can take the steps required to mitigate their influence. At the same time, these possible grounds for future optimism do not challenge my sceptical conclusion: there are currently many everyday actions for which agents are not morally responsible. 6 The problem lies in the ―weak reactivity‖ condition, which forms part of the requirement of ―moderate reasonsresponsiveness‖. 129 BIBLIOGRAPHY Anscombe, Elizabeth (1957/1963). Intention, second edition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Ayer, Alfred (1954). Freedom and Necessity' in Free Will, first edition, edited by Gary Watson. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Bargh, John (1994). The Four Horsemen of Automaticity: Awareness, Intention, Efficiency and Control in Social Cognition' in Handbook of Social Cognition Volume 1: Basic Processes, second edition, edited by Robert Wyer and Thomas Srull. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Bargh, John (2005). Bypassing the Will: Toward Demystifying the Nonconscious Control of Social Behavior' in The New Unconscious (Oxford Series in Social Cognition and Social Neuroscience), edited by Ran Hassin (et al.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Bargh, John (2008). Free Will is Un-natural' in Are We Free?: Psychology and Free Will, edited by John Baer (et al.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Bargh, John; Chen, Mark and Burrows, Lara (1996). Automaticity of Social Behavior: Direct Effects of Trait Construct and Stereotype Activation on Action' in The Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 71/2:230-244. Baumeister, Roy (2005). The Cultural Animal: Human Nature, Meaning, and Social Life. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Baumeister, Roy (2008). Free Will, Consciousness and Cultural Animals' in Are We Free?: Psychology and Free Will, edited by John Baer (et al.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Baumeister, Roy; Blatslavsky, Ellen; Muraven, Mark and Tice, Dianne (1998). Ego Depletion: Is the Active Self a Limited Resource?' in The Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 74/5:1252-1265. Berofsky, Bernard (2002). Ifs, Cans and Free Will: The Issues' in The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, edited by Robert Kane. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Bratman, Michael (1996). Identification, Decision, and Treating as a Reason' in Faces of Intention: Selected Essays on Intention and Agency. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bratman, Michael (2000). Fischer and Ravizza on Moral Responsibility and History' in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61/2:453-458. Bratman, Michael (2002a). Hierarchy, Circularity, and Double Reduction' in Contours of Agency: Essays on Themes from Harry Frankfurt, edited by Sarah Buss and Lee Overton. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Bratman, Michael (2002b). Nozick on Free Will' in Structures of Agency: Essays. New York: Oxford University Press. Bratman, Michael (2006). A Thoughtful and Reasonable Stability' in Taking Ourselves Seriously and Getting It Right: The Tanner Lectures in Moral Philosophy by Harry Frankfurt, edited by Debra Satz. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Buss, Sarah and Overton, Lee (2002). Introduction' in Contours of Agency: Essays on Themes from Harry Frankfurt. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Chandler, Teresa (2004). Identification and Autonomy: A Meditation on the Philosophy of Harry Frankfurt. Doctoral dissertation, University of Maryland. Chisholm, Roderick (1964). Human Freedom and the Self' in Free Will, second edition, edited by Gary Watson. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Clark, Andy (2007). Soft Selves and Ecological Control' in Distributed Cognition and the Will: Individual Volition and Social Context, edited by Don Ross (et al.). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Dan-Cohen, Meir (2006). Socializing Harry' in Taking Ourselves Seriously and Getting It Right: The Tanner Lectures in Moral Philosophy by Harry Frankfurt, edited by Debra Satz. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 130 Darley, John and Batson, Daniel (1973). From Jerusalem to Jericho: A Study of Situational and Dispositional Variables in Helping Behavior' in The Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 27/1:100-108. Davidson, Donald (1963). Actions, Reasons, and Causes' in Essays on Actions and Events, second edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Davidson, Donald (1969). How is Weakness of the Will Possible?' in Essays on Actions and Events, second edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Davidson, Donald (1971). Agency' in Essays on Actions and Events, second edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Davidson, Donald (1973). Freedom to Act' in Essays on Actions and Events, second edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Dennett, Daniel (1973). Mechanism and Responsibility' in Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology. Brighton: Harvester Press. Dennett, Daniel (1984). Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Dennett, Daniel (1991). Consciousness Explained. London: Penguin Books. Dennett, Daniel (1992). The Self as a Center of Narrative Gravity'. URL= <http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/selfctr.htm>. Accessed 14 th October 2005. Dennett, Daniel (2003a). Freedom Evolves. London: Penguin Books. Dennett, Daniel (2003b). Making Ourselves At Home in Our Machines (Review of Daniel Wegner's The Illusion of Conscious Will)' URL= <http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/wagnerreview.htm>. Accessed 14 th October 2005. Dennett, Daniel (2004). Calling In the Cartesian Loans' in Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27/5:661-661. Dennett, Daniel (2005). Natural Freedom' in Metaphilosophy 36/4:449-459. Dennett, Daniel (2007). My Body Has a Mind of Its Own' in Distributed Cognition and the Will: Individual Volition and Social Context, edited by Don Ross (et al.). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Dennett, Daniel (2008). Some Observations on the Psychology of Thinking About Free Will' in Are We Free?: Psychology and Free Will, edited by John Baer (et al.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Dijksterhuis, Ap; Aarts, Henk and Smith, Pamela (2005). The Power of the Subliminal: On Subliminal Persuasion and Other Potential Applications' in The New Unconscious (Oxford Series in Social Cognition and Social Neuroscience), edited by Ran Hassin (et al.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Dijksterhuis, Ap; Smith, Pamela; van Baaren, Rick and Wigboldus, Daniël (2005). The Unconscious Consumer: Effects of Environment on Consumer Behavior' in The Journal of Consumer Psychology 15/3:193-202. Dixon, Norman (1981). Preconscious Processing. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons. Doris, John (2002). Lack of Character: Personality and Moral Behavior. New York: Cambridge University Press. Doris, John (2005). Evidence and Sensibility (Symposium Replies)' in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71/3:656-677. Dutton, Donald and Aron, Arthur (1974). Some Evidence for Heightened Sexual Attraction Under Conditions of Anxiety' in The Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 30/4:510-517. Ekstrom, Laura (2005). Autonomy and Personal Integration' in Personal Autonomy: New Essays on Personal Autonomy and Its Role in Contemporary Moral Philosophy, edited by James Taylor. New York: Cambridge University Press. Eshleman, Andrew (2001). Being is not Believing: Fischer and Ravizza on Taking Responsibility' in The Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79:479-90. 131 Eshleman, Andrew (2009). Moral Responsibility' in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward Zalta. URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2009/entries/moral-responsibility/>. Accessed 28 th May 2010. Feinberg, Todd (2001). Altered Egos: How the Brain Creates the Self. New York: Oxford University Press. Fischer, John (1987). Responsiveness and Moral Responsibility' in My Way: Essays on Moral Responsibility. New York: Oxford University Press. Fischer, John (1994). The Metaphysics of Free Will: An Essay on Control. Oxford: Blackwell. Fischer, John (2002a). Frankfurt-Style Compatibilism' in My Way: Essays on Moral Responsibility. New York: Oxford University Press. Fischer, John (2002b). Frankfurt-type Examples and Semi-Compatibilism' in The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, edited by Robert Kane. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Fischer, John (2003). Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities' in My Way: Essays on Moral Responsibility. New York: Oxford University Press. Fischer, John (2004). Responsibility and Manipulation' in My Way: Essays on Moral Responsibility. New York: Oxford University Press. Fischer, John (2006). A Framework for Moral Responsibility' in My Way: Essays on Moral Responsibility. New York: Oxford University Press. Fischer, John (2007). Compatibilism' in Four Views on Free Will, John Fischer (et al.). Oxford: Blackwell. Fischer, John and Ravizza, Mark (1993). Introduction' in Perspectives on Moral Responsibility. New York: Cornell University Press. Fischer, John and Ravizza, Mark (1998). Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Fischer, John and Ravizza, Mark (2000a). Précis of Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility' in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61/2:441-445. Fischer, John and Ravizza, Mark (2000b). Replies' in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61/2:467-480. Fischer, John and Tognazzini, Neal (2009). The Truth About Tracing' in Noûs 43/3:531-556. Flanagan, Owen (2002). The Problem of the Soul: Two Visions of Mind and How to Reconcile Them. New York: Perseus Books. Frankfurt, Harry (1969). Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility' in The Importance of What We Care About: Philosophical Essays. New York: Cambridge University Press. Frankfurt, Harry (1971). Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person' in The Importance of What We Care About: Philosophical Essays. New York: Cambridge University Press. Frankfurt, Harry (1975). Three Concepts of Free Action' in The Importance of What We Care About: Philosophical Essays. New York: Cambridge University Press. Frankfurt, Harry (1976). Identification and Externality' in The Importance of What We Care About: Philosophical Essays. New York: Cambridge University Press. Frankfurt, Harry (1978). The Problem of Action' in The Importance of What We Care About: Philosophical Essays. New York: Cambridge University Press. Frankfurt, Harry (1987a). Identification and Wholeheartedness' in The Importance of What We Care About: Philosophical Essays. New York: Cambridge University Press. Frankfurt, Harry (1987b). Rationality and the Unthinkable' in The Importance of What We Care About: Philosophical Essays. New York: Cambridge University Press. Frankfurt, Harry (1988). Preface' in The Importance of What We Care About: Philosophical Essays. New York: Cambridge University Press. Frankfurt, Harry (1992). The Faintest Passion' in Necessity, Volition, and Love. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 132 Frankfurt, Harry (1993). On the Necessity of Ideals' in Necessity, Volition, and Love. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Frankfurt, Harry (1994). Autonomy, Necessity and Love' in Necessity, Volition, and Love. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Frankfurt, Harry (2002a). Reply to Eleonore Stump' in Contours of Agency: Essays on Themes from Harry Frankfurt, edited by Sarah Buss and Lee Overton. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Frankfurt, Harry (2002b). Reply to Michael E. Bratman' in Contours of Agency: Essays on Themes from Harry Frankfurt, edited by Sarah Buss and Lee Overton. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Frankfurt, Harry (2002c). Reply to Gary Watson' in Contours of Agency: Essays on Themes from Harry Frankfurt, edited by Sarah Buss and Lee Overton. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Frankfurt, Harry (2002d). Reply to John Martin Fischer' in Contours of Agency: Essays on Themes from Harry Frankfurt, edited by Sarah Buss and Lee Overton. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Frankfurt, Harry (2002e). Reply to J. David Velleman' in Contours of Agency: Essays on Themes from Harry Frankfurt, edited by Sarah Buss and Lee Overton. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Frankfurt, Harry (2006a). Taking Ourselves Seriously' in Taking Ourselves Seriously and Getting It Right: The Tanner Lectures in Moral Philosophy, edited by Debra Satz. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Frankfurt, Harry (2006b). Getting It Right' in Taking Ourselves Seriously and Getting It Right: The Tanner Lectures in Moral Philosophy, edited by Debra Satz. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Ginet, Carl (1990). On Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Haidt, Jonathan (2006). The Happiness Hypothesis: Putting Ancient Wisdom to the Test of Modern Science. London: William Heinemann. Haji, Ishtiyaque (1998). Moral Appraisability: Puzzles, Proposals, and Perplexities. New York: Oxford University Press. Haji, Ishtiyaque (2002). Compatibilist Views of Freedom and Responsibility' in The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, edited by Robert Kane. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Honderich, Ted (1988). A Theory of Determinism, Volume 2: The Consequences of Determinism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hornsby, Jennifer (1980). Agency and Causal Explanation' in The Philosophy of Action, edited by Alfred Mele. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hume, David (1740/1978). A Treatise of Human Nature, edited by L. A. Selby-Bigge, second edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hume, David (1777/1975). Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and the Principles of Morals, edited by L. A. Selby-Bigge, third edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Isen, Alice and Levin, Paula (1972). Effect of Feeling Good on Helping: Cookies and Kindness' in The Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 21/3:384-388. Jack, Anthony and Robbins, Philip (2004). The Illusory Triumph of Machine Over Mind: Wegner's Eliminativism and the Real Promise of Psychology' in Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27/5:665-666. Kane, Robert (1996). The Significance of Free Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kane, Robert (2002a). The Contours of Contemporary Free Will Debates' in The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kane, Robert (2002b). Some Neglected Pathways in the Free Will Labyrinth' in The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 133 Kane, Robert (2005). A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Karremans, Johan; Stroebe, Wolfgang and Claus, Jasper (2006). Beyond Vicary's Fantasies: The Impact of Subliminal Priming and Brand Choice' in The Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 42:792-798. Kihlstrom, John (2004). An Unwarrantable Impertinence' in Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27/5:666-667. Knobe, Joshua (2006). The Concept of Intentional Action: A Case Study in the Use of Folk Psychology' in Experimental Philosophy, edited by Joshua Knobe and Shaun Nichols. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Latané, Bibb and Darley, John (1970). The Unresponsive Bystander: Why Doesn't He Help? New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts. Latané, Bibb and Rodin, Judith (1969). A Lady in Distress: Inhibiting Effects of Friends and Strangers on Bystander Intervention' in The Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 5:189-202. Libet, Benjamin (2002). Do We Have Free Will?' in The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, edited by Robert Kane. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Mackay, Donald (1987). Divided Brains – Divided Minds?' in Mindwaves, edited by Colin Blakemore and Susan Greenfield. London: Basil Blackwell. Manning, Rachel; Levine, Mark and Collins, Alan (2007). The Kitty Genovese Murder and the Social Psychology of Helping: The parable of the 38 Witnesses' in American Psychologist 62/6:555-562. McKenna, Michael (2001). Review of Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility' in The Journal of Philosophy 98/2:93-100. McKenna, Michael (2004a). Compatibilism' in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward Zalta. URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2004/entries/compatibilism/>. Accessed 4 th August 2008. McKenna, Michael (2004b). Compatibilism: State of the Art' in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward Zalta. URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2004/entries/compatibilism/supplement.html>. Accessed 10 th November 2008. Mele, Alfred. (1987). Irrationality. New York: Oxford University Press. Mele, Alfred (2000). Reactive Attitudes, Reactivity, and Omissions' in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61/2:447-452. Mele, Alfred (2008). Psychology and Free Will: A Commentary' in Are We Free?: Psychology and Free Will, edited by John Baer (et al.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Mele, Alfred (2009). Effective Intentions: The Power of Conscious Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Nadelhoffer, Thomas (2006). Bad Acts, Blameworthy Agents, and Intentional Actions: Some Problems for Juror Impartiality' in Philosophical Explorations 9/2:203-219. Nagel, Thomas (1986). The View From Nowhere. New York: Oxford University Press. Nahmias, Eddy (2001). Free Will and the Knowledge Condition. Doctoral dissertation, Duke University. Nahmias, Eddy (2005). Agency, Authorship and Illusion' in Consciousness and Cognition 14:771-785. Nahmias, Eddy (2007). Autonomous Agency and Social Psychology' in Cartographies of the Mind: Philosophy and Psychology in Intersection, edited by Massimo Marraffa (et al.). Dordrecht: Springer. Nelkin, Dana (2005). Freedom, Responsibility and the Challenge of Situationism' in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29/1:181-206. 134 Nelkin, Dana (2008). Responsibility and Rational Abilities: Defending an Asymmetrical View' in Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89/4:497-515. Nichols, Shaun (2008). How Can Psychology Contribute to the Free Will Debate?' in Are We Free?: Psychology and Free Will, edited by John Baer (et al.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Nisbett, Richard and Bellows, Nancy (1977). Verbal Reports About Causal Influences on Social Judgments: Private Access Versus Public Theories' in The Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 35/9:613-624. Nisbett, Richard and Wilson, Timothy (1977). Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes' in Social Cognition: Key Readings, edited by David Hamilton. New York: Psychology Press. Nørretranders, Tor (1991). The User Illusion: Cutting Consciousness Down To Size. London: Penguin Books. Nozick, Robert (1981). Philosophical Explanations. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Pereboom, Derk (2001). Living Without Free Will. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pettit, Philip (2007). Neuroscience and Agent-Control' in Distributed Cognition and the Will: Individual Volition and Social Context, edited by Don Ross (et al.). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Ross, Don (2007a). Science Catches the Will' in Distributed Cognition and the Will: Individual Volition and Social Context, edited by Don Ross (et al.). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Ross, Don (2007b). The Economic and Evolutionary Basis of Selves' in Distributed Cognition and the Will: Individual Volition and Social Context, edited by Don Ross (et al.). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Ross, Lee and Nisbett, Richard (1991). The Person and the Situation: Perspectives of Social Psychology. New York: McGraw-Hill. Russell, Paul (2002). Pessimists, Polyannas, and the New Compatibilism' in The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, edited by Robert Kane. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Scanlon, T.M. (2002). Reasons and Passions' in Contours of Agency: Essays on Themes from Harry Frankfurt, edited by Sarah Buss and Lee Overton. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Skinner, Burrhus (1948/1976). Walden Two. Indianapolis: Hackett. Slote, Michael (1980). Understanding Free Will' in The Journal of Philosophy, 77/3:136151. Smilansky, Saul. (2000). Free Will and Illusion. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Sommers, Tamler (2007a). The Objective Attitude' in The Philosophical Quarterly 57/228:321-341. Sommers, Tamler (2007b). The Illusion of Freedom Evolves' in Distributed Cognition and the Will: Individual Volition and Social Context, edited by Don Ross (et al.). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Stout, Rowland (2005). Action. Chesham: Acumen. Strawson, Galen (1986a). Freedom and Belief. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Strawson, Galen (1986b). On the Inevitability of Freedom from the Compatibilist Point of View' in Real Materialism and Other Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Strawson, Galen (1989). Consciousness, Free Will, and the Unimportance of Determinism' in Real Materialism and Other Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Strawson, Galen (1994). The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility' in Free Will, second edition, edited by Gary Watson. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Strawson, Galen (2000). The Unhelpfulness of Determinism' in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60/1:149-155. 135 Strawson, Galen (2002). The Bounds of Freedom' in The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, edited by Robert Kane. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Strawson, Galen (2003). Mental Ballistics: The Involuntariness of Spontaneity' in Real Materialism and Other Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Strawson, Galen (2004). Free Agents' in Real Materialism and Other Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Strawson, Peter (1959). Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London: Methuen. Strawson, Peter (1962). Freedom and Resentment' in Free Will, second edition, edited by Gary Watson. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Stump, Eleonore (2002). Control and Causal Determinism' in Contours of Agency: Essays on Themes from Harry Frankfurt, edited by Sarah Buss and Lee Overton. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Suhler, Christopher and Churchland, Patricia (2009). Control: Conscious and Otherwise' in Trends in Cognitive Sciences 13/8:341-347. Taylor, James (2005). Introduction' in Personal Autonomy: New Essays on Personal Autonomy and Its Role in Contemporary Moral Philosophy. New York: Cambridge University Press. Thaler, Richard and Sunstein, Cass (2008). Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth and Happiness. London: Penguin Books. van Inwagen, Peter (1983). An Essay on Free Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press. van Inwagen, Peter (2002). Free Will Remains a Mystery' in The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, edited by Robert Kane. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Vargas, Manuel (2005). The Trouble With Tracing' in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29/1:269-291. Velleman, J. David (1992). What Happens When Someone Acts?' in Perspectives on Moral Responsibility, edited by John Fischer and Mark Ravizza. New York: Cornell University Press. Velleman, J. David (2002). Identification and Identity' in Contours of Agency: Essays on Themes from Harry Frankfurt, edited by Sarah Buss and Lee Overton. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Wallace, R. Jay. (1994). Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Waller, Bruce (1990). Freedom Without Responsibility. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Watson, Gary (1975). Free Agency' in Agency and Answerability: Selected Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Watson, Gary (1987a). Responsibility and the Limits of Evil: Variations on a Strawsonian Theme' in Agency and Answerability: Selected Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Watson, Gary (1987b). Free Action and Free Will' in Agency and Answerability: Selected Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Watson, Gary (1996). Two Faces of Responsibility' in Agency and Answerability: Selected Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Watson, Gary (1999). Soft Libertarianism and Hard Compatibilism' in Agency and Answerability: Selected Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Watson, Gary (2001). Reasons and Responsibility' in Agency and Answerability: Selected Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Watson, Gary (2002). Volitional Necessities' in Contours of Agency: Essays on Themes from Harry Frankfurt, edited by Sarah Buss and Lee Overton. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Wegner, Daniel (2002). The Illusion of Conscious Will. London: Bradford Books. Wegner, Daniel (2003). The Mind's Best Trick: How We Experience Conscious Will' in Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7/2:65-69. 136 Wegner, Daniel (2004a). Précis of The Illusion of Conscious Will' in Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27/5:649-659. Wegner, Daniel (2004b). Frequently Asked Questions About Conscious Will' in Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27/5:679-692. Wilkes, Kathleen (1988). Real People: Personal Identity Without Thought Experiments. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Wilson, Timothy (2002). Strangers To Ourselves: Discovering the Adaptive Unconscious. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Wolf, Susan (1980). Asymmetrical Freedom' in Moral Responsibility, edited by John Fischer. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Wolf, Susan (1987). Sanity and the Metaphysics of Responsibility' in Free Will, second edition, edited by Gary Watson. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Wolf, Susan (1990). Freedom Within Reason. New York: Oxford University Press. Zimbardo, Philip (2007). The Lucifer Effect: How Good People Turn Evil. London: Rider. Zimbardo, Philip (2009). Interview with Tamler Sommers in The Believer 67. URL: <http://www.believermag.com/issues/200909/?read=interview_zimbardo>. Accessed 17 th December 2009.

Climate change and human moral enhancement Tvrtko Jolić 2 Introduction: Education for change Contemporary science is providing more and more evidence that climate is indeed changing and that at least part of the cause lies in factors related to human activity. Strong emphasis is placed on raising public awareness about the need to conserve the environment in order to remove, or at least alleviate, the worst consequences of climate change. However, research has shown that only a small share of, for example Croatian, population considers environmental concerns to be the most important social issue (cf. Domazet, Dolenec and Ančić 2012, 31). Also, very few people are willing to change their behaviour in aid of environmental protection and sustainable development if it means sacrificing their own economic interests (Domazet, Dolenec and Ančić 2012, 43). There are many reasons why people are not willing to modify their behaviour. I will name just a few. Firstly, not everyone is convinced that climate change is indeed happening under human influence. A possible reason for this is that, upon considering different scientific theories, they might think that the arguments in support of the thesis that climate change is the result of human activity are just not strong enough. A second possible reason is that the scientific theories which explain processes that lead to climate change are too complex to understand, even when presented in simplified form.1 Failing to understand a certain theory is often accompanied with reluctance to accept the theory. 01 Environmental psychologists claim that for most people it is difficult to understand even some basic concepts associated with climate change, e.g. difference between a deterministic weather prediction and a statistical climate projection. "[T]he explanation is complex to the journalist, the policy maker, and the general public, despite every effort to use simple language" (Newell and Pitman 2010, 1004). I Theoretical considerations80 In addition, even those who believe that climate change is the result of human activity, and who have the knowledge of how they should alter their behaviour, often lack the motivation to do so. Some of them know that a significant part of their actions will only have a long-term impact, affecting generations that will come after them. Others are not motivated to change because their actions affect population in remote parts of the world. In both cases, spatial or temporal distance leads to weaker interest and concern among individuals for those who are affected by the negative repercussions of their actions. In addition to the individual level, this problem is encountered on the group level as well, especially in the activity of businesses and countries that refuse to change and choose the politics of waiting instead. How can individuals be moved to change their behaviour towards environmental protection and sustainable development? Having analysed relevant data, the authors of the study We Need to Change conclude that "citizens with higher level of educational attainment more often perceive environmental issues as important, they less frequently see economic growth as damaging for the environment and they are more willing to accept a reduction in living standards for the benefit of the environment" (Domazet, Dolenec and Ančić 2012, 47). Why is it that education, especially higher levels of education, lead to greater degrees of sensibility towards issues of environmental protection and sustainable development? Answers to this question seem to lie in the very structure of education processes and their intended goals. According to the understanding prevalent in contemporary Western liberal democracies, education comprises at least two significant components. The most prominent component, which is often considered to be the fundamental goal of education, is the transfer of knowledge and development of different skills and competences. This knowledge and these skills can have a wide variety of possible applications, such as reading and writing, or they could be limited to more narrow areas, like knitting lessons or constructing bridges (Bailey 1984, 14). The second, equally important, component of the standard Western process of education is related to upbringing, socialisation and internalisation of civic virtues. In terms of environmental protection and sustainable development, education can offer individuals information about the challenges that we face due to climate change, to provide them with the knowledge and capabilities to cope with these challenges, and to acquaint them with the principles and values which they must uphold in their actions. Without these three constituents of education, humanity is highly unlikely to sustain itself and progress.2 02 There is no room here to enter into elaboration of general strengths of education for sustainability, which can be found elsewhere in this volume (Domazet and Ančić, THIS VOLUME). 2. Climate change and human moral enhancement 81 To what extent is it possible to achieve these educational goals through traditional modes of education? As can be expected, education would be the best way to fulfil the goal of informing people about climate change, about harming the environment and harming-related hazards. We can approach this goal by placing emphasis on making tertiary education more accessible, as, according to statistics, people with tertiary education attainment express the greatest concern for environmental issues (Domazet, Dolenec and Ančić 2012, 32). The capabilities of the current education model to transfer the knowledge and abilities necessary to tackle climate change-induced issues depend on the capabilities of science to generate this knowledge. Given the complexity of processes that affect climate change, many doubt that science is capable of achieving this to the degree necessary to deter impending environmental disaster (cf. Huesemann 2000; 2006). However, even those who are more optimistic believe that science can only help resolve these issues if it is accompanied by a shift in awareness and values that guide our actions. At the same time, it is highly unlikely that the education system will be able to carry out a quick and radical enough change in our understanding of what we are morally obliged to do in order to prevent climate change that could have a disastrous impact on human survival. This primarily involves our tendency to put our short-term interests before long-term ones, and to ignore the negative repercussions that our actions have on other people who are most often removed from us in terms of space and/or time. Although research has shown that people are willing to modify their behaviour in order to contribute to the protection of their living environment, their readiness for change drops if they are expected to sacrifice their lifestyle (Kempton, Boster and Hartley 1995; Domazet, Dolenec and Ančić 2012, 46). Educational and other institutional measures (taxation, incentives, and the like) can to a certain extent encourage people to alter their behaviour. However, as some authors state, traditional measures of moral education were able to achieve only "modest success" during the last few millennia (Persson and Savulescu 2012, 9). The limiting factor in the internalisation of principles and values crucial to the preservation of humankind in the light of global climate change (as well as tremendous distributive inequalities, threats of terrorism and possible nuclear war) is our moral psychology, which has not altered significantly since the emergence of humankind (Persson and Savulescu 2012, 1). Namely, our moral psychology is better suited for living in small communities that operate with simple technologies than for today's way of living in multi-million population countries that use advanced technologies. The shortcomings of our moral psychology are evident in the lack of altruism towards people with whom we do not interact closely, a consequence of which is our reluctance to alter I Theoretical considerations82 our actions that cause climate change. Actions that we take today will only reach their full effect in several decades, impacting generations that will come after us. Also, the present consequences of our actions are seriously affecting the population of remote countries and parts of the world. The limitations of our moral psychology, which motivates us to have concern for those who are near and dear to us, prevent us from changing harmful patterns in our behaviour. In order to avoid the worst consequences of climate change caused by human activity, it will be necessary to reach a sustainable level of consumption of natural resources on the global scale. According to some estimates, however, a sustainable level of consumption presupposes that the material welfare level enjoyed by citizens of Western democracies would have to decrease significantly (Persson and Savulescu 2012, 76). Namely, even the current level of consumption necessary to sustain the lifestyle of one billion population of the rich West is considered to require an overall unsustainable level of consumption. Things get even more complicated when we take into account the aspirations of the rest of humanity to reach a higher level of welfare. In addition, moderate projections by United Nations experts estimate that the population growth might exceed ten billion people by the end of the twenty-first century (UN 2013, 2). These data support the thesis that human behaviour and approach to the environment must change as soon as possible. Biomedical moral enhancement Apart from the technologies we use to exploit natural resources, there are other contemporary technologies (specifically, nuclear and biological weapons) that enable humankind to inflict immense damage upon humanity itself as well as the world it lives in. Given this greatly increased possibility of humans causing damage or even complete destruction, Savulescu and Persson believe that humans should be morally enhanced so that they could apply these technologies responsibly. Starting with the assumption that our moral behaviour is based in biology and is a product of the process of evolution, Persson and Savulescu's solution proposes the research and, if possible, application of biomedical modes of moral enhancement (Persson and Savulescu 2012, 106; 2013, 124). These authors consider it to be one of the ways we must test in order to reduce the risks we face from reckless and malevolent use of power enabled by contemporary technology. According to one of the originators of the idea of moral enhancement by biomedical means, "a person morally enhances herself if she alters herself in a way that may reasonably be expected to result in her having morally better future motives, taken in sum, than she would otherwise have had" 2. Climate change and human moral enhancement 83 (Douglas 2008, 229). What could therefore be done to improve people's motives for action, thereby changing their behaviour and starting to make sustainability-oriented decisions? Whereas traditional methods of education did this indirectly, informing people about available options and the effects of particular choices, the idea of biomedical enhancement considers the option of directly influencing the biological and psychological basis of human motivation. There are three basic ways to do this – with the help of drugs, genetic engineering, and using technical devices connected to the brain. All these methods are in very early stages of testing and are very far from being applied on human beings (Douglas 2008, 233). Those who are optimistic about biomedical moral enhancement of humans rest their hopes on two research projects that are exhibiting somewhat promising signs of progress in this area. The first project is tied to the research into the activity of the hormone and neurotransmitter oxytocin. It was found to enhance certain morally relevant characteristics and was popularly dubbed "the cuddle hormone." Apart from the oxytocin released by the posterior lobe of the pituitary gland, the hormone can also be introduced into the body via pills or nasal spray. Research has shown that persons who are administered with a dose of oxytocin exhibit a higher level of trust and readiness to cooperate than those left untreated (Kosfeld et al. 2005; Zak, Kurzban and Matzner 2005). Also, oxytocin was found to be helpful in fostering fidelity in monogamous couples (Scheele et al. 2012). However, other studies have found that the application of oxytocin does not really corroborate the arguments of those in favour of biomedical moral enhancement. Namely, quite contrary to the idea that oxytocin might help extend altruism, trust and cooperation to include persons beyond our immediate social group, these studies have shown that oxytocin primarily enhances prosocial behaviour within the group, and can even encourage sacrificing outsiders if it could benefit members of the group (de Dreu 2010; 2011; 2012). The other method that is often seen as a potential way of influencing our moral behaviour is the application of selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs), which are used to treat depression, anxiety and personality disorder. Similar to oxytocin, SSRIs stimulate cooperation, but they also seem to affect our sense of fairness. Experiments have shown that SSRI-treated individuals are more willing to offer fairer conditions of cooperation than the control group which was left untreated (Tse and Bond 2002; Wood 2006). As with oxytocin, the current state of research has at best provided a mere hint that the application of SSRIs might have a positive effect on human behaviour. Further research in this area indicates that technological advancement might lead to these methods becoming more precise and having a stronger effect on human behaviour. I Theoretical considerations84 These and other lines of research into ways of biomedical enhancement of human morality are seen by some authors as a promising solution for shortcomings of the human nature that lead to the resources depletion, climate change, and global inequality. The main argument behind this view is the following: if drugs and medical treatments could be used to me make people care for the wellbeing of other human beings that are temporally and spatially distant, these bioenhanced people will be more willing to adopt sustainable ways of behaviour. Persson and Savulescu believe that "[i]f safe moral enhancements are ever developed, there are strong reasons to believe that their use should be obligatory, like education or fluoride in the water, since those who should take them are least likely to be inclined to use them. That is, safe, effective moral enhancement would be compulsory" (Persson and Savulescu 2008, 174). However, even if biomedical methods are sufficiently improved to be used safely and effectively on humans, the question remains of how justified it would be to try and influence human moral behaviour in this way. Arguments against the biomedical moral enhancement project According to an influential school of ethical thought, the only way to morally improve humans is connected to the enhancement of our cognitive abilities. The more we know, the less we err. Those sceptical of biomedical intervention in the basis of human moral motivation refer to the philosophical understanding that goes back to Socrates, according to which the root of immorality is false belief, which is best eliminated by cognitive improvement and education. For instance, John Harris thus claims that "[t]he most obvious countermeasure to false beliefs and prejudices is a combination of rationality and education, possibly assisted by various other forms of cognitive enhancement, in addition to courses or sources of education and logic" (Harris 2011, 105). The most prominent representative of this branch of ethics is most definitely Immanuel Kant, for whom morality is based in rationality. He, as well as his subsequent proponents, would find the very idea of affecting morality by altering our emotional psychological inclinations such as altruism completely misguided. Namely, moral actions are those that result from duty which is based in rational thinking, not in inclination (Kant 2011, 24). Acting upon our inclinations, whether natural or acquired, cannot be free according to Kant. When we act upon our inclinations, we are slaves to our own emotions or customs. The only free actions are those which result from our ability to think rationally. Therefore, in order to achieve moral improvement, we must improve our rationality, not the emotional aspect of our character. Attempts at improvement that are 2. Climate change and human moral enhancement 85 carried out through direct enhancement of emotions, such as suggested by Douglas, Persson and Savulescu, cannot therefore be moral improvements (Harris 2013). Also, opponents of biomedical moral enhancement might object that mandatory subjection to moral enhancement would narrow the subjects' freedom, namely in two respects. Firstly, no one asked them whether they wanted to undergo moral enhancement. From a liberal standpoint, this is a serious encroachment upon human freedom in a particularly sensitive area like private moral beliefs. One of the basic tenets of liberal political philosophy, built into the foundations of more or less all Western democracies, is the principle of state neutrality, according to which the state must not favour any one moral belief or understanding of human good (cf. Dworkin 1978, 127; Rawls 1993, 179). For instance, communitarians might therefore object that state-imposed "moral enhancement," which would motivate us towards greater concern for the needs of outsiders, is detrimental to the interests of our own community, which is, according to the communitarian moral outlook, a fundamental moral value. Without assessing the rectitude of this moral view, it is evident that the idea of mandatory subjection to biomedical procedures of moral enhancement is at least prima facie, for lack of better justification, contrary to the tenets of liberal political philosophy. The second objection is not so much concerned with political restrictions of freedom as with our understanding of what it is that makes a certain action morally good. With posthumans, which is the common name for humans who have undergone some sort of biomedical enhancement, their improved nature causes them to have different motivation in certain situations than they would have had without the moral enhancement. Neither the motivation that they would have had without the moral enhancement, nor the motivation caused by moral enhancement is the result of these individuals' independent choice; in that respect, posthumans are no less free than common people. However, sceptics might argue that moral enhancement deprives posthumans of the ability to demonstrate strength of character in certain situations, resisting the supposedly poorer motivation that they would have had without the moral enhancement. They are thwarted from demonstrating their moral excellence, which derives its specific moral value from overcoming their biological predispositions. Certainly, there will be differences in moral excellence among posthumans as well, since even morally enhanced individuals will exhibit different degrees of being able to turn the good motivation laid down by biomedical engineering into morally good action. However, the excellence of an individual who has had their psychological process biomedically altered is not ascribed solely to their moral character, but also, at least in part, to the biomedical treatment to which they were I Theoretical considerations86 subjected. The virtue of marital fidelity displayed so beautifully by Penelope as she waited for Odysseus to return from his voyages will no longer be ascribable solely to the character of the spouse, but a well-administered cocktail of medication and genetic intervention as well.3 This line of thinking led John Harris to state the following: "Without the freedom to fall, good cannot be a choice; and freedom disappears and along with it virtue. There is no virtue in doing what you must" (Harris 2011, 104). Changes that are brought about by enhancing psychological characteristics of humans are changes in behaviour alone, and not in the human understanding of morality. If biomedical enhancement can someday make people choose to act in such a way that is more responsible to the interests and needs of temporally and spatially remote strangers, to the natural environment and threats posed by weapons of mass destruction, this will on the one hand be morally good, useful, and commendable. However, the problem from the standpoint of morality is that these actions will not have been deliberate choices of moral actors, thereby having no intrinsic moral value. Biomedical enhancement of our emotional psychological characteristics is thus revealed not only as being no moral enhancement at all, but sacrificing a major aspect of the moral character of humans as well. Biomedical enhancement and liberal democracy What are the potential counterarguments that advocates of biomedical enhancement could provide in response to the abovementioned objections? In response to the objection that mandatory moral enhancement curtails human freedom, it could be said that freedom is not the only value humans care about. Although exceptionally important, freedom can be restricted in certain circumstances, especially in situations of threats to human safety or the very survival of humankind. There are many who believe that humanity will face such a challenge, if not today, then in the near future. Climate change, environmental devastation and threats of terrorism, combined with the possible use of weapons of mass destruction, will seriously endanger the chances of human survival. A possible way to deter this threat is the moral enhancement of humans. 03 As regards proposals to stimulate marital fidelity through biomedical enhancement, please see Wudarczyk et al. 2013. Earp, Sandberg, and Savulescu 2012 believe that this form of enhancement should be mandatory for couples who are parents. 2. Climate change and human moral enhancement 87 However, it seems that this enhancement would have to be applied on a wider scale if it is to be effective. This would require something that could be described as a "biological contract," which would oblige all people to undergo biomedical enhancement procedures in order to secure the survival of humankind and make Earth a safer place to live. In other words, people would relinquish part of their sovereignty over their biological characteristics to the state. In this respect the "biologically contract" is similar to the social contract in which people relinquish part of their sovereignty over their freedom to state, which then take it upon itself to secure peace and safety for its citizens. Is this justification of mandatory moral enhancement plausible? It could be, if certain conditions are met. Just like in the natural state in social contract theory, what needs to be shown is that humans are in a situation, or that their way of life will necessarily lead to it, where normal functioning of society is threatened. That humanity is indeed in such a situation is what Persson and Savulescu are claiming. They believe "that the development of science and technology turned for the worse, all things considered, at the point at which it put in the hands of humankind the powers of doing ultimate harm" (Persson and Savulescu 2011, 441). According to them, "something could be ultimately harmful by forever extinguishing sentient life, or by damaging its conditions so drastically that, in general, life will not henceforth be worth living" (ibid.). A major difference between the biological contract and the social contract is that the social contract stems from the fact that the war of all against all, which occurs in the natural state, is unbearable. According to Hobbes' famed description of the disadvantages of the natural state, human life in it is "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short" (Hobbes 1998, 84). But is not human life, at least that of most citizens of Western democracies, everything but that? Savulescu and Persson acknowledge that most people are not aware of the risk we are faced with, and they partially ascribe this to our innate cognitive bias to objects and events that we find familiar and available: "we are fixated on the possible occurrence of events of which we have readily available images, largely as a result of recently having experienced events of these kinds. Our emotions are geared to how vividly we imagine possible events rather than simply to how we abstractly estimate their value and probability" (Persson and Savulescu 2011, 442). But is humanity truly headed for destruction? And could biomedical enhancement save us from it? These questions are, as admitted by Savulescu and Persson as well, "so complex that it is difficult to be confident of not going astray somewhere" (Persson and Savulescu 2011, 444).They become especially difficult to anI Theoretical considerations88 swer when it is not possible to attribute an exact, or at least approximate, degree of probability to different outcomes.4 Some reckon that even in these circumstances it is possible to apply the Catastrophic Harm Precautionary Principle, which requires regular citizens, as well as the government, to take extra precautions when assessing potentially catastrophic situations (Sunstein 2007, 122). But even if we agree that climate change and other threats that accompany the development of contemporary technologies represent a potentially catastrophic danger, which requires precautionary measures that involve various forms of action to deter this danger, it obviously does not mean that any and all precautions are justified. For instance, although I am in danger of contracting a virus in contact with other people, it does not mean I have to accept avoiding all direct social contact as precaution. I can just get inoculated against the most dangerous diseases for which there is reasonable probability of getting infected. It is therefore not only in our interests to identify challenges in connection to the threat we are facing, but also the challenges that accompany potential solutions. Apart from the potential dangers of climate change and weapons of mass destruction, we should assess the dangers that come with biomedical enhancement as one possible solution to these issues. Earlier in this text, I claimed that biomedical intervention aimed towards improving human behaviour that is considered moral improvement by its advocates is, in fact, no moral improvement at all, and that it also restricts moral and political freedom. If this reasoning is correct, the project of biomedical improvement could be justified solely if it was the only way to save humanity from destruction. However, not even advocates of biomedical enhancement believe that; they see this method as an accompanying measure that could contribute to resolving the problem (Persson and Savulescu 2012, 121). They consider it necessary because they are convinced that liberal democracy as the political order of the developed West is not capable of making changes that would deter the threat of catastrophic predicament and secure sustainable development. The democratic process makes change impossible as long as the majority of citizens put their short-term interests before long-term interests. Politicians likewise avoid proposing and carrying 04 Reports by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change provide rough estimates of the probability of climate change impact on human life. The reports confirm, with a high degree of reliability, that economic losses due to weatherand climate-related setbacks are on the rise and that developing countries are particularly affected. However, the reports are highly reserved when it comes to estimates of the magnitude of losses and damages that climate change will cause in the future (IPCC 2012, 234 and IPCC 2013). 2. Climate change and human moral enhancement 89 out unpopular measures whose impact would only be felt in the distant future, for fear of losing elections. Another solution would be to accept a form of benevolent authoritarian government which would be successful in putting unpopular decisions into action. But the authoritarian form of government cannot be a serious solution because it has so far invariably failed in the area of freedom and human rights.5 Were Persson and Savulescu perhaps too quick to write off liberal democracy? Although their analysis of liberal democracy reveals that it is faced with serious problems, the practice of liberal democracy per se has in the course of history displayed an amazing capability of self-correction. The development of Western democracy in the past two hundred years has shown that democracy was able to find it in itself to respond to some of its own shortcomings, such as the tyranny of the majority and the abuse of power. Since democracy is never a finished project, these responses must always be examined and improved anew. The development of democracy primarily depends on developing awareness among its citizens of the need for its continuous improvement. For instance, the development of civic awareness of gender equality led to enfranchisement of women. Raising awareness of the gross injustice of subjugating religious, racial and ethnic minorities led to effective legislation which guaranteed equal rights for all citizens. In these cases, the enfranchised ruling majority was able to put aside its own short-term interests and support a politics that would benefit the long-term interests of society on the whole. 05 Not all threats of potential catastrophic damage originate from the shortcomings of liberal democracy. Among the potential dangers that ought to incite our moral improvement is the misuse of nuclear weapons. However, history has come to show that, after the sobering effect of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, nuclear weapons were never used again. Perhaps we owe the fact that a nuclear event did not occur during the Cold War to the so-called "balance of power," but almost a quarter of a century after its end, no country seems to be ready to use nuclear weapons either. Persson and Savulescu are more concerned with the level of technological development, which they consider to have made available the knowledge and necessary materials to produce a nuclear bomb to smaller groups or even individuals; they are also apprehensive that terrorists might acquire nuclear weapons through stealing (Persson and Savulescu 2012, 47). Without a doubt, there are terrorist organisations that would gladly get their hands on nuclear weapons, either by producing or by stealing them. But neither option is that simple. Despite the fact that knowledge on producing nuclear weapons is fairly easily available, we bear witness to the fact that not even those countries that possess far greater resources than terrorist organisations are capable of it. Still, the threat of nuclear weapons theft is far smaller today than in the 1990s, when the nuclear weapons storage facilities of the former Soviet Union were virtually unguarded. I Theoretical considerations90 Although problems related to climate change, excessive use of natural resources, and the misuse of weapons of mass destruction open up a great number of queries, uncertainties and fears from today's perspective, the hope remains that humans are capable of seeing the steps that need to be taken in order to deter at least the worst repercussions of these threats. Past experience has shown that humans were able to overcome their misconceptions and limitations without biomedical enhancement to establish a more equitable and long-term sustainable society. To be able to do this in the future, additional efforts are required to develop awareness of the problems we are facing. The research data we provided at the beginning of this article indicate that a higher level of problem awareness and higher level of educational attainment lead to a greater willingness to sacrifice one's own interests and embrace necessary changes. Year after year, science gains more knowledge about human impact on climate change; this new knowledge strengthens public conviction that it is necessary to change how we relate to the world we live in. There is also growing awareness that economic growth and protection of the living environment are not mutually exclusive. Countries are becoming more serious about focusing on sustainable forms of development and ecological sources of energy. It might not be enough, but it still leaves hope that the road to change can be reached without biomedical enhancement that would require us to sacrifice part of our freedom. Conclusion In this chapter I have discussed a recent proposal according to which human beings are in need of moral enhancement by novel biomedical means in order to reduce the risk of catastrophes that could threaten the very possibility of continued human existence on this planet. According to the proponents of this position, our moral psychology – evolved for a life in small societies with primitive technology – is no longer able to cope with the challenges of modern technologically developed and globalized world. Since these authors believe that the traditional means of moral enhancement such as education had only a modest effect in the effort to adjust our moral behaviour to the challenges of modern world, they propose that it is necessary to examine and (if proven safe and effective) adopt alternative ways of moral enhancement by biomedical means. Their hope is that once human beings become morally enhanced by traditional and biomedical means, they will be able to overcome the affectionate limitations of our psychology. These limitations are most obvious in our inclination to take care primarily only of those that are near and dear to us, whereas this "near" should be understood in its spatial and temporal meaning. One of the main 2. Climate change and human moral enhancement 91 tasks of moral enhancement is to strengthen our altruistic feelings toward strangers. Once we are morally and psychologically equipped to take care of the needs and interest of those with whom we do not share spatial and temporal proximity, we will be more willing to change our behaviour in accordance to the more sustainable modes of development. In my discussion I raised two objections to this proposal. The first objection claims that the idea that human beings could be morally enhanced by altering our emotional psychological inclinations, such as altruism, is misguided. In the line with Kantian understanding of morality I argue that our morality is based on rationality and not on inclinations. If we take this view of morality it becomes clear that the proposed enhancement by biomedical means cannot be moral enhancement. What is enhanced is emotional aspect of our character, not our morality. People enhanced in this way would not act on the basis of their deliberate choices but on basis of preprogramed psychological inclination. This would in turn undermine our basic moral concept of freedom and, thereby, of moral responsibility. The second objection to the proposal show how the idea that moral enhancement by biomedical means should be mandatory violates political freedom of citizens. Faced with the objection that moral enhancement by biomedical means could be necessary in order to prevent catastrophic destruction of environment, in the final part of this chapter I try to point to education and liberal democracy as the alternative and morally acceptable ways of changing our behaviour. 

Introduction If we are convinced of the reliability of our model – the Standard model of Particle physics – the search for quantum gravity is restricted to the creation of an extension of the current model. However, gravity – as a phenomenon – is only observable in relation to other phenomena, like objects and celestial bodies. Therefore it is really strange that we cannot understand gravity while our model of all the other phenomena is thought to be a very reliable model. Besides that, what do we expect from a new hypothesis about quantum gravity? It is for granted that the hypothesis must show the direct relations between gravity and the other known quantum fields and quantum objects. Like the electromagnetic field, mass and rest mass. The hypothesis must also clarify free fall at the quantum level and explain the equivalence between gravitational mass and inertial mass. And last but not least, the new hypothesis must clarify the concept of General relativity, Newtonian gravity and maybe even the mechanism behind Dark matter. Actually, this is not an extension of the current model. This is like a re-orientation of the Standard model. The origin of matter Without objects – rest mass – there is no Newtonian gravity in the universe. That's why we can conclude that Newtonian gravity isn't a basis quantum field.[1] Because basic quantum fields exist everywhere in the universe – without exception – during the evolution of the universe. If gravity just emerge at the moment rest mass is created, it is not reasonable to suppose that gravity itself is a basic quantum field too. Matter is mass with an extension that is called rest mass. In quantum field theory the creation of rest mass is the result of the local supply of energy from one or more decreased scalars of the flat Higgs field to the electromagnetic field. An energy transfer that is called the Higgs mechanism. However, the hypothesis isn't without problems because of the quark model and the existence of the Higgs boson. figure 1 Albert Einstein's theory about the equivalence of mass – inclusive rest mass – and energy shows that matter is a concentration of energy: E = m c2.[2] The images in figure 1 show the progression of a local concentration of quanta and the result is the creation of a particle with a certain amount of mass and rest mass if the required amount of energy – the number of concentrated quanta – is available. A quantum is a fixed amount of the energy of Planck's constant if there exist a minimal length scale in the universe. The concept of the existence of a minimal length scale means that the volume of space itself is quantized. Because a quantum is an amount of observable change and the existence of quantized change relates page 1 of 6 On quantum gravity Sydney Ernest Grimm* Experiments have showed that gravity can be manipulated by light. Light – electromagnetic waves – is a pure quantum phenomenon so we can conclude that quantum gravity isn't just a fantasy. Nearly half a century ago it was thought that gravity must be related to the conceptual framework of quantum electrodynamics. Gravity as a quantum field that interacts with the help of bosons, named gravitons. Unfortunately the problem about the origin of gravity still exists in spite of new proposed solutions like MOND, loop quantum gravity, etc. That is why the problem is more fundamental: "What is the nature of the force we call gravity?" Conceptual FrameWorks Research papers the existence of a quantum to the spatial properties of the units of quantized space. Figure 2 shows a schematic representation of quantized space with the help of easy to draw cubes. The notation λ is the proposed standard length.[3] figure 2 The energy of Planck's constant (h) is an amount of change in one direction during 1 second and with the velocity of the speed of light. In other words, if I reduce the length of the change in one direction till the trajectory is equal to the minimal length scale I get the ratio of the amount of energy of every quantum. Because a quantum is the exchange of a fixed amount of energy between adjacent units of quantized space. So I can state that the energy of a quantum (h) is a fixed small amount of the energy of Planck's constant. If I substitute the energy in E = m c2 by the amount of energy of the quantum (h), the result is: n h = m c2 [n = integer] The addition c2 at the right side of the equation represents the "action" that is required to transform the energy of the mass m into an amount of quanta in vacuum space. However, c2 doesn't affect the amount of energy of the mass. So we can conclude that the energy of the mass and rest mass is equal to the amount of energy at the left side of the equation (n h). If we want to concentrate "change" within the composed cube in figure 2, we have to transfer an amount of a property of every cube to the centre of the big cube. The volume of every cube is invariant so we have to transfer an amount of surface area. Because invariant volumes can deform their shape if they deform synchronously. That means that every unit of quantized space is a topological object that represents a homeomorphism. So what to think about c2? The square of the speed of light represents about 300.000.000 m2 but if I transform everything into quanta related to the minimal length scale c2 becomes λ2. Therefore: n h = m λ2. However, the energy of the mass is a number of quanta in vacuum space (n h). In other words, the mass represents the same number of quanta although the quanta are concentrated so the involved units – the schematic small cubes of figure 2 – represent together a topological deformation that is equal to the number of quanta. The Higgs mechanism Figure 3 shows a unit of quantized space in a schematic way. Inside the unit is the scalar – the inscribed sphere – and the deformed part of the unit encloses the scalar. If I make all the small cubes in figure 2 transparent, every cube shows a scalar and all the scalars together are like an atomic lattice: the flat Higgs field (see figure 4). figure 3 The scalar inside the unit is a sphere because the sphere is the only true geometrical scalar. The volume around the scalar (light grey) must be the deformed part of the same spherical shape forming mechanism[3]. Because the decrease of a scalar – the inscribed sphere – means that the lost volume of the outer shell of the sphere has become part of the deformed volume (light grey). In other words, the scalar and the deformed part don't represent parts of 2 solitary fields, both are part of the same "internal" mechanism of every unit. The Higgs mechanism – the transfer of volume from the outer shell of a decreased scalar to the deformed volume within the boundary of one unit – is related to the creation of rest mass: "ordinary matter". page 2 of 6 figure 4 The creation of matter by the structure of the basic quantum fields changes the mutual relations between the inscribed spheres – the scalars – of the flat Higgs field around the created matter. In other words, the creation of matter induces at the same moment a disturbance of the symmetry within the flat Higgs field. A phenomenon we call the force of gravity. Figure 5 shows the scalar vectors of 4 identical scalars within the flat Higgs field (every scalar has the same magnitude). The scalar vectors exist because of the internal mechanism of every unit of quantized space: the spherical shape forming mechanism (scalar mechanism). Every scalar within the flat Higgs field has 12 points of contact with the 12 scalars of the adjacent units around. That means that the magnitude of the undistorted part of the scalar mechanism of every unit is determined by the repulsive force of the 12 adjacent scalars by means of the 12 points of contact. figure 5 Newtonian gravity Figure 6 – cross section – shows the vectorized flat Higgs field with in the centre a decreased scalar. I have drawn the resultant vectors (blue) because it is to difficult to draw the pointers of the small scalar vectors – like figure 5 – in a clear way. The broken symmetry of all the vectors of the flat Higgs field around the decreased scalar will result in a "push force" in the direction of the decreased scalar. The push force from all the scalars around within the flat Higgs field – the force of Newtonian gravity – influences the direction of the changes of the deformed part of every unit. In other words, it influences also the direction of the movement of the involved rest mass in the centre of figure 6. The mechanism behind the influence of the direction of movement of an object by the push force of Newtonian gravity can be illustrated with the help of the schematic representation of the unit, like figure 3. figure 6 The schematic representation – figure 7 – shows a unit and its scalar. The influence of the adjacent units – the topological deformation of the shape of the unit – is simulated with the help of the green arrows. The influence of the unit itself on the other units around are the red arrows. The net result is zero because of the invariance of the volume of every unit. All the units together tessellate space thus the motion of an object – the propagation of an amount of topological deformation in space – is determined by vectorized vacuum space, the scalar vectors. Every unit has the same internal scalar mechanism – actually, the unit is the scalar mechanism – and the direction of the next deformation of its shape is determined by the distinct magnitudes of all the scalar vectors within the scalar of the unit in vacuum space (the flat Higgs field). figure 7 page 3 of 6 The deformed part of every unit is the electric field and the synchronous change of the magnitude(s) of the scalar vectors of the scalar of the unit represent the magnetic field. That's why the increase of the topological deformation of the electric field generates a similar increase of the (scalar) vector of the magnetic field (and vice versa). Together both proportional coupled fields are the well known electromagnetic field.[1] The scalar vectors of the Newtonian gravity – figure 6 – change the magnitudes of the scalar vectors of the electromagnetic field. The consequence is the resulting direction of the motion of objects in vacuum space, the force of Newtonian gravity. Gravitational mass and inertial mass Matter is gravitational mass because of the Higgs mechanism, the creation of rest mass that induces the existence of Newtonian gravity. Inertial mass is the amount of energy that is required to accelerate matter. Every unit of the electric field – the deformed part of every unit – transfers 1 quantum at the same moment that all the other units in the universe transfer one quantum (h) too. That means that quanta transfer in space is conserved and synchronized (the conservation of change is the synchronisation of change).[3] So there is only one question: "How many quanta are involved by the transfer of matter in a certain direction?" The direction of the transfer of a number of local quanta that represent a concentration of quanta within a non-local universe is set by the scalar vectors of the whole universe. But the method to create a certain direction doesn't change the amount of topological deformation that represents the mass. Free fall Figure 8 shows a celestial body without atmosphere (e.g. the moon) and I have drawn in a schematic way the units of the structure of the basic quantum fields (cubes). A hammer (H) and a feather (F) are dropped high above the surface of the celestial body. Both objects represent rest mass – matter – and the nuclei of the atoms contain decreased scalars: holes within the flat Higgs field that interrupt scalar vectors (figure 6). In other words, both objects cut off the entire scalar vectors of Newtonian gravity, created by the rest mass of the moon. All the units of the underlying structure of the basic quantum fields transfer synchronously 1 quantum at the same moment because all the units tessellate space and their volume is invariant. In other words, the feather and the hammer move with the same velocity in the direction of the surface of the moon by the interrupted scalar vectors: free fall. figure 8 Effect of light on gravitation Experiments have proved that light – electromagnetic waves – can influence the force of Newtonian gravity. The publication of the experiments by Louis Rancourt and Philip Tattersall describes the influence of a shield of light on the force of gravitation. Moreover, the experiments prove that the force of gravitation must be a push force.[4][5] If the description of quantum gravity is correct, the model must clarify how light can influence the induced scalar vectors by the creation of matter. figure 9 The image above shows a schematic unit. Every adjacent unit can transfer 1 quantum to the unit but the gravitational scalar vector G is dominant. In other words, only the 2 blue faces are involved in the transfer of a quantum (h input = h output). page 4 of 6 figure 10 But if I manipulate the free fall of the hammer and the feather with a shield of light – see figure 10 – I disrupt the scalar vectors of Newtonian gravity too. Not with the help of an interruption by reducing the magnitude of scalars but with the help of a stream of quanta within the electromagnetic field. Figure 11 shows the principle. figure 11 The stream of quanta from the right side – created by the laser – influences the magnitudes of the scalar vectors within the involved scalars. In other words, from time to time the gravitational scalar vector G is not the dominant vector thus the topological transformation of the unit is caused by a quantum of the electromagnetic wave (n h). The result is an interruption of the gravitational acceleration if the unit is – at that moment – involved in the propagation of an amount of deformation we call matter. Actually the hammer or the feather. Dark matter Newtonian gravity isn't the only mechanism that acts like a push force. The electric field itself is responsible for the concentration of quanta. The mechanism is a bit awkward because it is caused by the distribution of deformation in space by the scalar mechanism of every unit. Every unit "tries" to change its shape in such a way that the unit becomes a true scalar, a sphere. But obviously, this is impossible. The distribution of deformation between units in vacuum space is related to the concept of probability. However, our universe is non-local. First because all the units tessellate space and second because of the existence of scalar vectors within vacuum space. Scalar vectors that influence the direction of the next transformation of the units. The scalar vectors act instantaneous thus nearly all the units in the universe are instantaneous "coupled" to the changes of the other units that are part of vacuum space at exactly the same moment. Figure 1 shows the concentration of deformation by the transfer of quanta. But every unit transfers 1 quantum (h) to 1 or more units around. A unit that has a higher amount of deformation needs more "cycles" of quanta transfer to get the average amount of local deformation. But if a region in vacuum space cannot concentrate its deformation into rest mass carrying particles – for example because there is too much disturbance by particles and radiation – the result is a local accumulation of deformation that is mass. The centre of an accumulation of matter by Newtonian gravity is a centre of deformation. Local concentrated deformation – Dark matter – is pushed in the same direction because all the units in the universe try to minimize their surface area. We cannot detect local topological deformations of the electric field because these local deformations don't emit radiation. Moreover, our sun de-concentrates the clouds of Dark matter because of the continuous emission of high-energy particles and radiation. In other words, if our sun is less active the Dark matter at the edge of our solar system will become more concentrated and it will influence the balance between the internal and external conditions in our solar system. References 1. S.E. Grimm (2019), "On the concept of (quantum) fields" DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.3585790 https://zenodo.org/record/3585790 2. A. Einstein: "Does the Inertia of a Body Depend upon its Energy Content?" Annalen der Physik (ser. 4), 18, 639–641, http://myweb.rz.uni-augsburg.de/~eckern/adp/history/e instein-papers/1905_18_639-641.pdf page 5 of 6 3. S.E. Grimm (2019): "Quanta transfer in space is conserved". DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.3572846 https://zenodo.org/record/3572846 4. Louis Rancourt and Philip J. Tattersall (2015), "Further Experiments Demonstrating the Effect of Light on Gravitation".Applied Physics Research; Vol. 7, No. 4; 2015 http://dx.doi.org/10.5539/apr.v7n4p4 5. Chungpin Hovering Liao (2019), "Microwave-caused influence on gravitational constant G in Newton's gravitational law". DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.15509.37600 * City of Amersfoort, the Netherlands mail: [email protected] orcid: 0000-0002-2882-420X page 6 of

Received: 25 February 2019 Revised: 11 November 2019 Accepted: 11 December 2019 DOI: 10.1111/nous.12324 A R T I C L E Mental structures Kevin J. Lande1,2 1Department of Philosophy, York University, Ontario, Canada 2Centre for Vision Research, York University, Ontario, Canada Correspondence Kevin J. Lande, Department of Philosophy, York University, Ontario, Canada. Email: [email protected] Abstract An ongoing philosophical discussion concerns how various types of mental states fall within broad representational genera-for example, whether perceptual states are "iconic" or "sentential," "analog" or "digital," and so on. Here, I examine the grounds for making much more specific claims about how mental states are structured from constituent parts. For example, the state I am in when I perceive the shape of a mountain ridge may have as constituent parts my representations of the shapes of each peak and saddle of the ridge. More specific structural claims of this sort are a guide to how mental states fall within broader representational kinds. Moreover, these claims have significant implications of their own about semantic, functional, and epistemic features of our mental lives. But what are the conditions on a mental state's having one type of constituent structure rather than another? Drawing on explanatory strategies in vision science, I argue that, other things being equal, the constituent structure of a mental state determines what I call its distributional properties-namely, how mental states of that type can, cannot, or must co-occur with other mental states in a given system. Distributional properties depend critically on and are informative about the underlying structures of mental states, they abstract in important ways from aspects of how mental states are processed, and they can yield significant insights into the variegation of psychological capacities. This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs License, which permits use and distribution in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, the use is non-commercial and no modifications or adaptations are made. © 2020 The Authors. Noûs published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc. NOÛS. 2020;1–29. wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/nous 1 2 LANDE We apprehend the world as structured in certain ways. Take vision. Though a human retina has over 100 million photoreceptors, we do not merely perceive 100 million or so discrete points. I see the maple leaf lying on the ground in front of me as having a unified surface, which I differentiate from the surrounding ground and other nearby figures in the scene, and which I see as having a specific color and shape. Many hold that in addition to apprehending the world as structured in certain ways, our mental states themselves are structured. In particular, some mental states have constituent parts, which stand in structural relations to each other.1 The visual state I am in when I look at the leaf in front of me may have as constituent parts my state of seeing that leaf as having a specific color and my state of seeing it as having a specific shape, which may in turn have constituent parts such as my states of seeing the different segments of the leaf as having certain shapes. Claims about how mental states are structured have an important place in understanding the mental lives of humans and other creatures. In the paradigm cases, constituent structure is attributed to representational mental states-mental states that function to be about individuals in the world and their features (such as the shape of the leaf) and that can be veridical or non-veridical depending on how the world is (whether the leaf has the shape I see it as having). On most conceptions, the functional, semantic, and epistemic features of mental representations depend partly on how those representations are structured. In the first place, mental states are thought to be causally related to each other partly in virtue of how they are structured. For example, we most easily attend to and remember those things that receive integrated representations-the whole leaf rather than one corner of the leaf together with half of the door handle in the background. Further, how a mental state represents the world is standardly thought to depend on how its constituent parts represent the world and how those constituents are related. The shape I perceive the leaf as having depends on the shapes I perceive the segments of the leaf as having. Finally, since a mental state's structure constrains its functional and semantic relationships to other mental states, that structure also constrains how a mental state can epistemically support, or be supported by, other mental states. Accordingly, in order to better delineate the functional, semantic, and epistemic architectures of human and animal minds, recent debates in philosophy of mind have focused on identifying fundamental structural similarities and differences between the mental states involved in capacities such as perception, thought, spatial cognition, the representation of analogue magnitudes, social cognition, and intentional action.2 In philosophy, the predominant approach to characterizing the structures of mental states has been top-down, focusing on whether certain mental states are structured at all and how they fit within a taxonomy of broad representational kinds, genera, or formats-"sentential," "iconic," "analog," "digital," "conceptual," "non-conceptual," and so on. Here, I focus on a complementary bottom-up approach that makes much more specific claims about the ways that certain types of mental states (for example, perceptual representations of the outline shapes of things) are structured from certain types of constituents (for example, perceptual representations of curved segments of contours), while deferring the question of how these structures fit within a broader taxonomy. Specific structural claims can guide our understanding of broader representational genera while yielding important functional, semantic, and epistemic insights in their own right. What does it mean to say that a mental state is structured in a certain way from specific constituents? In particular, what are the conditions on mental state's having one constituent structure rather than another? I argue that a mental state has a specific constituent structure only if, other things being equal, that state exemplifies the appropriate distributional properties. What I call the "distributional properties" of a mental state characterize how states of that type can, cannot, or must co-occur in a particular system with mental states of other types. Can one, for example, enter into a type of perceptual state that represents the specific shape of this leaf, as distinct from a different shape? And, if so, how can (or must) this representation of the shape of the leaf co-occur with representations of the shapes LANDE 3 of different edges, lobes, and clefts on the leaf, or with representations of the leaf's surface color? The answers to these questions depend critically on and are informative about the underlying structures of the mental states in question. Constituency relations organize the space of possible mental states. I show in Section 1 that a standard form of explanation in vision science purports to explain the distributional properties of mental states as a function of how those states are structurally related. This form of explanation presupposes that a mental state's constituent structure determines the distributional properties of that state, other things being equal. The significance of this presupposition depends on when "other things" count as "equal." In Section 2, I examine this proviso, arguing that proper violations are restricted in kind and that structural claims are generally critical to explaining the distributional properties of mental states. In Section 3, I distinguish distributional considerations from considerations about how the mental states in question are processed. While both distributional and processing considerations provide grounds for evaluating structural claims, few have distinguished these types of considerations or examined their relationship. As a result, there is a widespread view that structural claims must be supplemented by specific processing models in order to be empirically meaningful. Against this view, I argue that claims about how mental states are structured are relatively autonomous from specific models of how those states are processed, insofar as distributional considerations often are sufficient to rule between serious alternatives. I close, in Section 4, by discussing the implications of distributional and structural considerations for understanding the variegation of psychological capacities. 1 THE DISTRIBUTION OF PERCEPTUAL STATES Here is the core story of this section. Structural claims purport to explain modal nomological facts about the psychological possibility (or impossibility) of various co-occurrences of mental states by reference to a narrower notion of structural possibility. For example, suppose that it is psychologically impossible to be in a type of visual perceptual state that represents the shape of a mountain ridge without also being in distinct types of visual states that represent the shapes of each peak on the ridge. It is outside the scope of this paper to say how observational data can support these kinds of nomological claims in psychology. More to the point is what it is about a mental state's structure that can explain those nomological claims. A mental state's constituent structure is a function both of what its constituent parts are and of the way those parts are structurally related-their mode of combination. Each mode of combination is characterized by principles constraining what types of mental states can enter into combinations of that sort and how those states must be related. So, for a mental state to be structured in a certain way from particular constituents, those constituents must satisfy corresponding structural requirements.3 One explanation for why you cannot be in a state that represents the ridgeline without being in states that represent the peaks is that the latter states are constituent parts of the former, and that mental states having the relevant kind of structure cannot be tokened without tokening their constituents. Structural claims of this sort purport to explain the distributional properties of mental states as a function of what the constituents of those states are and what structural requirements those constituents must satisfy. This type of explanation presupposes that normally a mental state's constituent structure determines that state's distributional properties: were a mental state to have such-and-such structure (were representations of ridge-lines to have as constituents representations of peaks), then that state would have to satisfy certain structural requirements and so, other things equal, it would have corresponding distributional properties (representations of ridge-lines would necessarily co-occur with representations of peaks). One can (and psychologists standardly do) infer that a state does not have 4 LANDE F I G U R E 1 According to one family of theories, representations of scenes have as constituents representations of the shapes of object contours. These decompose into representations that attribute types of curvature to contour segments located relative to the center of the object. Curvatures may be represented in terms of their width (the distance between the end-points on the base of the curve) and height (the distance between the curve's highest point and its base), relative to the object's size [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com] a given type of structure if it does not exemplify the appropriate distributional properties and other things are relevantly equal. As an illustration, consider psychological accounts of the human visual capacity to represent the shapes of contours and outlines-for example, the shapes of mountain ridges and leaves (setting to the side the perception of complex, volumetric shapes of animal bodies, trees, furniture, and so on). According to one family of theories, the human visual system represents contours and shapes in a piecewise manner. In other words, it segments contours and shapes into simpler 'parts' and organizes shape representations using these parts and their spatial relationships. Far from being arbitrary subsets, these perceptual parts are highly systematic, and segmented using predictable geometric 'rules' (Singh, 2015, p. 242-3). This family of theories has an established history in vision science.4 Though these theories vary in important details, I will focus on the following common claims (see Figure 1 ). First, visual perceptual representations of scenes include among their constituents representations of contour shapes. These contour representations are structurally complex. Second, the constituents of these contour representations are distinct representations of how segments of the contour at various positions relative to the center of the outline are curved. A representation of a maple leaf's shape will have as constituents representations of the different lobes and peaks of the leaf, which may themselves decompose into distinct representations of the width and height of the contour segment relative to the size of the whole leaf. Third, these theories broadly agree on the structural principles or rules requiring that the constituents of a contour representation have certain properties or relationships. I will discuss how these commitments function to explain patterns in how visual perceptual representations of the shapes of contours and contour segments can, cannot, or must co-occur. LANDE 5 Importantly, nothing in what follows rests on whether the particular claims I discuss turn out ultimately to be true. What I do take for granted is that these claims exemplify explanatory strategies that are standard in empirical psychology and that these strategies are cogent in the sense that they can in principle yield successful explanations.5 1.1 Complexity Why think in the first place that perceptual representations of contour shapes are complex-that they have other perceptual states as constituent parts? Two general, widely discussed reasons for taking mental states to be complex stem from the productivity and systematicity of the capacities that those mental states exemplify (Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988; McLaughlin, 2009). To a first approximation, a mental capacity is productive if it can generate arbitrarily many distinct types of mental states. Our visual capacities to perceive and discriminate between contour shapes are productive in this sense. As Field, Hayes, and Hess (1993, p. 187) note, it is unlikely that there is a distinct type of primitive representation for each discriminable contour shape. It is more plausible that the shapes of whole contours are represented by combinations of representations of more frequently repeatable or geometrically informative shape features (see also Attneave, 1954; Hoffman & Richards, 1984; Zhu & Mumford, 2006). Moreover, contour perception appears to be systematic in the sense that one's being able to perceive a contour as having one shape (a mountain ridge with alternating tall and short peaks; the outline of a human standing with arms akimbo) nomologically implies that one is also able to perceive contours as having certain other shapes (a ridge with a pair of tall peaks followed by a pair of short peaks; the outline of a human standing in "tree pose"; Hoffman & Richards, 1984). One natural explanation is that the representation of a whole contour shape is really a combination of representations of more basic shape features and that if these constituent representations can be combined in one way to represent one shape, then they normally can also be combined in other ways so as to represent different shapes. A good deal of attention has been paid to explicating the concepts of productivity and systematicity and assessing whether they support the claim that some mental states have constituent structure. But, in practice, structural explanations in psychology rarely linger on general considerations of productivity and systematicity. Even if the fact that a mental capacity is productive and systematic were to show that states produced by that capacity have constituent structure (or even, say, that they have some generic structural characteristic such as recursive combinability), this result would leave open how exactly those mental states are structured-from what constituents and by what modes of combination (see Fodor, 1975, p. 99). Structural explanations in psychology tend to focus on identifying and explaining determinate co-occurrence properties by reference to how specifically the mental states in question are structured from their particular constituents. I focus on these types of explanations in what follows. The success of these more targeted explanations plays a significant role in vindicating the basic claim that the mental states in question are complex. 1.2 Constituency A standard basis for positing that mental states of one type have mental states of another type as constituents is the discovery that the former cannot occur without the latter. The hypothesis that mental states of type B are constituents of mental states of type A, together with the assumption that a mental state of the relevant structural kind cannot be tokened without tokening its constituents, explains why it would be a distinctive feature of states of type A that they could not psychologically occur without states of type B also occurring.6 Accordingly, a central motivation for structural claims about contour representations is a variety of data suggesting that in order to perceptually represent the specific, 6 LANDE F I G U R E 2 It can be significantly more difficult to discriminate an outline's shape when it is sandwiched between two mask shapes with aligned curves (left). When the curves on the target shape do not align with those of the masks (right), the target shape is as easily discriminated as when it is viewed in isolation (see Habak et al., 2004)8 global shape of a contour, one must also perceptually represent the ways that segments of that contour are curved.7 Habak, Wilkinson, Zakher, and Wilson (2004) employed a lateral masking paradigm to study how abilities to perceptually represent contour shapes depend on abilities to represent the curvature features of those contours (see also Poirier & Wilson, 2007; Slugocki, Sekuler, & Bennett, 2019). A typical lateral masking effect occurs when it is more difficult to detect and discriminate a feature of a stimulus because it is nearby a perceptually similar stimulus. By selectively masking various features of a stimulus, researchers can investigate the relationships between individuals' abilities to represent those stimulus features. Habak et al. showed subjects a target outline nested in between smaller and larger "mask" outlines (see Figure 2 ). The subject's task was to indicate whether the target contour differed in shape from a perfect circle. Certain masks critically disrupted subjects' abilities to discriminate the test shape. By varying the features of the masks across different conditions, Habak et al. determined that the masking effect depends on whether the areas of greatest curvature (the bumps and dents) on the masks and test shapes were aligned and on how pronounced those curves were. The masking effect persisted across variations in low-level features of the masks, such the brightnesses and orientations of minute fragments of the contour, as long as the higher-order curvature of the mask contours were preserved and aligned with the target's curvature. The masking effect disappeared whenever the curves on the test and masks did not align. Habak et al. concluded that perceptually representing the test shape requires representing the curvatures and relative locations of segments of the test contour, which is more difficult in the presence of aligned masks. Similar results have been obtained from a number of paradigms. Deleting or perturbing curvature information on a contour while preserving other kinds of information, such as the luminance or local orientations of edges of the outline, can significantly impede discrimination of that contour's shape. Conversely, if curvature features remain constant while other features vary or are removed, the discrimination of a given shape is largely unaffected (see also Biederman & Cooper, 1991; Kurki, Saarinen, & Hyvärinen, 2014; Lamote & Wagemans, 1999; Loffler, Wilson, & Wilkinson, 2003; Poirier & Wilson, 2007; Panis, Winter, Vandekerckhove, & Wagemans, 2008). Moreover, continuous exposure to a contour shape can produce shape adaptation, significantly altering the representation of another test contour just so long as the bumps and dents are arranged in the same ways on their respective contours (Anderson, Habak, Wilkinson, & Wilson, 2007; Bell & Kingdom, 2009; Gheorghiu & Kingdom, 2007). Adapting to a shape with pronounced curves makes a shape with gentler curves in the same relative positions look circular (see Figure 3 ). The majority of these studies suggest that this adaptation effect persists when the curves on the adapting and test stimuli have the same relative positions, even if they differ in other features such as brightness, contrast, and retinal size and (to some extent) position.9 LANDE 7 F I G U R E 3 Stare at the left fixation cross for at least 30 seconds. Then shift your gaze to the right fixation cross. After adaptation, the outline on the upper right should look different in shape from the outline on the lower right, even though they are in fact identical (see Anderson et al., 2007; Bell & Kingdom, 2009) These studies suggest that one cannot perceptually represent contour shapes without representing curvature at specific positions along the contour. The explanation given by Habak et al. (2004) and many others for this type of distributional pattern is that at some stage in visual processing, the perceptual states dedicated to representing shapes of contours are complex and have as their constituents representations of the curvatures of contour segments at different positions on the contour. To interfere with representations of the curvatures of contour segments, by masking or adaptation for example, is to interfere with the constituent parts of a shape representation and so to interfere with the whole shape representation. Neither metaphysical claims about the nature of shapes nor semantic claims about the accuracy conditions of shape representations explain the distributional pattern in question. The point is not just that the actual shape properties of contours are constituted by their curvature properties, so that in representing a contour's shape one thereby also represents that contour's curvature (read this as a de re ascription). Rather the point is that representations of specific curvature properties are psychologically real and must be tokened if a representation of a specific contour shape is to be tokened. Moreover, the finding is not just that a shape representation is accurate only if the represented shape has certain curvature properties. The relevant type of shape representation cannot occur, accurately or inaccurately, without the tokening of certain curvature representations. Why interpret these distributional patterns as evidence that curvature representations are constituents of shape representations rather than mere causes or cues for those representations? The distributional pattern in question is qualitatively different from what one finds when one type of representation is merely a sufficient cause of or cue for another type of representation. There is rarely only one causal route to the formation of a given type of mental state. The same type of mental state can arise from a variety of different cues, any of which are sufficient for generating that type of mental state, but no one of which is singly necessary. Habak et al. showed, for example, that the shapemasking effect was invariant across different sets of local shape cues. In one control condition, Habak et al. designed masks that were composed of tiny line segments that were oriented perpendicularly to the target contour, so that the mask, unlike the target, appeared to have horizontal stripes along its contour. These striped masks produced the same pattern of masking effects as the linear masks, with greater or lesser masking depending on the curvature features of the masks and their alignment with the target. This shows that representations of substantially different local features can serve as 8 LANDE sufficient, though not individually necessary, cues for representing a contour shape. By contrast, the representations of specific curvatures seems distinctively to be necessary for representing a given shape in each condition. In no condition could one represent the target contour's shape unless one could also represent the curvature features of that shape. Curvature representations have been shown to be similarly critical for representing shapes on the basis of patterns of dots (Wilson, Wilkinson, & Asaad, 1997; see also Baker & Kellman, 2018; Sáry, Vogels, & Orban, 1993) and on the basis of motion (Rainville & Wilson, 2004). One cannot plausibly explain these pattern on the hypothesis that curvature representations are mere cues to shape representations. The question is why it should be necessary to token curvature representations in order to token the relevant shape representations. To account for the cue-invariant role of curvature in shape representations, it is common to posit that, across cues, shape representations are composed from representations of contour curvature. If the shape-in-terms-of-curvature account is true, it is only contingently true. Other possible structures would give rise to different distributional properties. Suppose a contour's shape were represented merely in terms of the positions and orientations of edge segments along the contour, rather than in terms of the curvature properties that emerge from those collections of edge segments. In that case, representing a specific shape would require representing a particular configuration of locally oriented edges but not the relative curvature of that configuration. But it has been repeatedly shown that no particular set of locally oriented edge types must be represented in order to represent the overall shape of a contour. One can mask local edge features without masking shape and one can mask shape without masking local features. Habak et al. (2004) and many others take these sorts of results to disconfirm the shape-in-terms-of-mere-edges hypothesis. By contrast, in line with the shape-in-terms-of-curvature hypothesis, representations of specific contour shapes require representations of specific curvature features-features that may be realized by various sets of local edges or points.10 The evaluation of these competing structural hypotheses rests on the principle that constituency relations normally determine and explain distributional properties. Claims about the nature of what is perceived, the accuracy conditions of perceptual states, or the causal cues to these perceptual states are not suited to explaining distributional patterns. Constituency relations, by contrast, are just the sort of thing to explain such patterns. 1.3 Distinguishing constituents The hypothesis that shape representations are structured from curvature representations explains why the former cannot occur without the latter (masking the latter results in masking the former). But what exactly are the constituent curvature representations? Does a contour shape representation consist of an elementary (that is, non-complex) representation of the contour's curvature, or do different curvature features receive distinct constituents? To determine whether certain features receive structurally distinct representations, psychologists look at how representations of those sorts of features can or cannot cooccur with each other. Consider the speeded classification paradigm, pioneered by the psychologist Wendell Garner. Subjects are asked to quickly classify or discriminate stimuli according to one type of feature while a separate type of feature that is irrelevant to succeeding in the task varies randomly. For example, one might be asked to discriminate between rectangles on the basis of their aspect ratios while their colors also vary randomly (Cant, Large, McCall, & Goodale, 2008). The critical question is how the discrimination of the target feature (aspect-ratio) in this filtering condition compares to discrimination in a baseline condition in which the irrelevant feature (color) is held constant. When variations to the irrelevant feature lead to worse (slower, less accurate, less precise) discrimination of the target feature than in baseline conditions, the effect is called "Garner interference" (see LANDE 9 F I G U R E 4 A consists of the combination of the curvature of B and the curvature of C (see Bell, Wilkinson, Wilson, Loffler, & Badcock, 2009) Ashby & Townsend, 1986; Arguin & Saumier, 2000; Algom & Fitousi, 2016; Garner, 1974; Posner, 1964). The absence of Garner interference is often used as evidence that the representations of the target features and of the irrelevant features are structurally distinct. Random variation of features on some dimension introduces noise and uncertainty into one's representations of those features. One tends to be slower, less accurate, and less precise in discriminating the colors of stimuli when those colors vary randomly across trials than when the colors are predictable. If noise in one's representation of the color of a figure does not entail equivalent noise in one's representation of the shape of that figure, this strongly suggests that shape and color receive distinct representations (see also Brady et al., 2011; Fougnie & Alvarez, 2011; Green & Quilty-Dunn, 2017). The basic presumption is that if these features were to receive the very same elementary representation rather than structurally distinct representations-if these features received the same representational variable rather than distinct representational variables, so to speak-then greater variation and noise in the representation of one feature would ipso facto entail greater variation or noise in the representation of the other feature. Same representation, same noise (same variable, same variance). So if there are contexts in which the representation of the one feature can vary separately from the representation of the other-for example, if they can have separate levels of noise-the only plausible explanation is that those features receive distinct representations. More generally, if variation in aspects of B-states does not nomologically entail co-variation in aspects of C-states, then these must be distinct types of states. Following this basic form of reasoning, a number of researchers have inferred that contour representations have distinct constituents dedicated to attributing different types of curvatures to segments of the whole contour. For example, Bell et al. (2009) had subjects adapt to closed contours of particular uniform curvatures (for example, B or C in Figure 4 ), and then had them discriminate between contours in which these curvatures were combined (for example, A in Figure 4). They found that adapting to contours with one regular curvature feature (for example, the widely separated curves of C) did not inhibit subjects' ability to discriminate between test shapes on the basis of contours containing other kinds of curvature features (the more frequently repeating curves of B, for example). The inability to represent one type of curvature does not imply an inability to represent other types. This suggests that the representation of the compound shape A, in Figure 4, has constituents that represent the type of curvature features in B and distinct constituents that represent the type of curvature features in C. In general, representations of whole contours have distinct constituents for representing different kinds of curvature features. Moreover, evidence suggests contour segments that are separated by points of sharp concavity (that is, sharp indentations) receive distinct representations, even when those different segments have the same curvatures. Masking or adapting to one curved segment of a contour does not entail masking of or adaptation to other segments of the same curvature at different positions on the contour (Habak et al., 2004; Gheorghiu & Kingdom, 2007). Barenholtz and Feldman (2003) argue for a related conclusion, 10 LANDE F I G U R E 5 Discriminating probes is faster and more accurate when the probes are located on the same part than when they are located on different parts. (The difference between probes is exaggerated here for clarity; see Barenholtz and Feldman (2003) for original stimuli.) that saliently distinct "parts" of objects, such as the lobes of the "peanut" patterns in Figure 5 , receive distinct representations even when the parts have the same outline curvature (see also Green, 2017; Hoffman & Richards, 1984; Singh, 2015). Barenholtz and Feldman tasked subjects with determining whether two marks or probes on such a figure-small, textured line-segments like those illustrated in Figure 5-were identical or not. These marks were located at a constant distance from each other either on the same lobe or on different lobes. Subjects were systematically faster and more accurate at comparing marks on the same lobe than they were at comparing the same, equidistant pair of marks when located on different lobes. It is unclear how to explain this if all contours of the same curvature receive a common elementary representation. But if each convex segment of the outline (each lobe) receives a numerically distinct representation with separate levels of noise, this would explain why discrimination would be worse for a pair of features lying on different segments than for the same pair lying on a single segment. Where discrimination depends on a greater number of distinct, unintegrated representations, there will be a greater number of distinct sources of noise (see also Baylis & Driver, 1993; Brady et al., 2011; Kempgens et al., 2013; Naber, Carlson, Verstraten, & Einhäuser, 2011; Palmer, 1977; Vecera, Behrmann, & Filapek, 2001). Finally, there is reason to think that in some cases the representation of the curvature of a contour segment is structured from a representation of that segment's width (more precisely, its chord, or the distance between end-points at the segment's base) relative to the size of the contour and a distinct representation of that segment's height or amplitude (its sagitta, or distance between the segment's highest point and its base) relative to the size of the contour. Using sine-wave-shaped contours, Gheorghiu and Kingdom (2007) replicated many of the findings discussed above. They also found that the effect that adaptation to curvature width has on discriminating contour shapes is separate from the effect of adaptation to curvature height. They had subjects discriminate a given target contour after adapting to curves that had different widths but the same height. In this condition, subjects' perception of the target contour's width varied depending on the adapting contour's width, while its perceived height remained constant. Conversely, variation in the adapting curve's height but not width led to variations in the target contour's perceived height but not in its perceived width. Gheorghiu and Kingdom concluded that curvature is not represented in terms of a single elementary representation of the aspect-ratio of a curve's width and height. If it were, then (other things equal) greater variability in perceived curve width would have entailed greater variability in perceived curve height (see also Anderson et al., 2007; Bell & Kingdom, 2009).11 1.4 Structural constraints I have discussed how psychologists purport to explain the distributional properties of perceptual states-the ways that they can, cannot, or must co-occur-by taking some states to be distinct LANDE 11 F I G U R E 6 Shape coherence thresholds are determined by having subjects discriminate sampled contours (the right of either pair) when embedded in a field of randomly oriented and positioned contour segments (the left of either pair; see Field et al., 1993; Schmidtmann, Gordon, Bennett, & Loffler, 2013). Stimuli generated with GERT v1.30, as detailed by Demeyer and Machilsen (2012) constituents of others. A mental state's constituent structure is a function of both its constituents and their mode of combination. The mode of combination that characterizes a type of structure corresponds to constraints that constituents of such structures must satisfy. The constituents of a representation cannot be studied independently of their mode of combination. The previous hypotheses about constituency assume, for example, that the constituents in question are combined in such a way that the whole cannot occur without the constituents, and that one constituent can vary somewhat independently of distinct co-constituents. Additional distributional properties help to further specify the nature of these structural constraints. Take the study of "shape coherence thresholds," which specify the necessary conditions on perceiving coherent contours and outlines (Loffler, 2015). The problem of identifying the conditions under which coherent contours can be perceptually represented is especially salient in cases in contours are viewed in crowded scenes-when one perceives a mountain through trees as having a continuous ridgeline, a leaf in foliage as having a coherent outline, or the boundary of a rock as distinct from its surface texture and the texture of the background. But the problem is a general one insofar as different segments of continuous, wholly visible contours receive different representations. Indeed, continuous contours are, at the earliest stages of visual processing, sampled by neurons with different localized receptive fields. In one standard experimental paradigm, stimuli consist of sampled contours (that is, continuous contours are replaced with a subset of disconnected segments of those contours) that are presented either in different, larger configurations or in an array of other randomly oriented and positioned segments (Figure 6 ; see Field et al., 1993; Hess, May, & Dumoulin, 2015; Loffler, 2015). The subject's task is to detect whether or not the display contains an elongated contour. A number of studies suggest that subjects can detect coherent contour shapes in noise only if the perceived locations of the elements making them up are sufficiently close to each other in three-dimensional space (Hess et al., 1997) and the perceived orientations of those elements are relatively aligned (collinear or co-circular; Field et al., 1993; Geisler & Super, 2000; Loffler et al., 2003; Schmidtmann, Gordon, Bennett, & Loffler, 2013). Subjects are unable to detect coherent contours in random background noise when the perceived locations of the sampled segments are too far apart or when their perceived orientations are not sufficiently aligned. Shape coherence thresholds do not just correspond to semantic constraints, for example that the positions and orientations attributed to the contour segments must be sufficiently nearby and aligned if those segments are to be represented accurately as parts of a common contour. Coherence thresholds are distributional. Proximity and alignment constraints must be satisfied if a coherent contour is to be represented at all. On one influential explanation, this distributional pattern is the result of a structural 12 LANDE F I G U R E 7 The "association field" depicts specific rules for when representations of sampled contour fragments can combine (solid lines) or not (dashed lines): the difference in the perceived orientations of fragments must not be greater than ±60◦; the perceived distance between the fragments must not be greater than around 7 times the size of the fragments themselves; and the perceived positions and orientations of the fragments must be aligned approximately along a smooth, non-inflected curve. Figure reprinted from Field et al. (1993) with kind permission from Elsevier constraint on so-called "contour integration": representations of contour segments can be constituents of a representation of a common contour only if those representations attribute sufficiently nearby positions and aligned orientations to those segments. Field et al. (1993)'s "association field" model, depicted in Figure 7 , encapsulates a simplified version of this rule (see also Hess et al., 2015; Kellman & Shipley, 1991). The general form of inference here is that if states of type A (representations of elongated contours) can only have constituents that are related in a certain way (for example, they represent contour segments as having positions and orientations that are relatively close together and aligned), one explanation is that standing in such relations is necessary for satisfying the structural constraint, fA, for being constituents of A-type states. On the other hand, an explanation for why perceptual states of type A∗ (representations of elongated contours, the parts of which are perceived as randomly scattered) cannot psychologically occur is that those hypothetical states do not correspond to any structurally possible combination of constituents, given the set of structural constraints. These explanations account for the psychological possibility or impossibility of types of mental states in terms of constraints on which combinations of constituents are structurally possible or not. Structural constraints can be understood as imposing dependencies between constituents of the same complex perceptual state. For example, representations of distantly separated contour segments can be constituents of a representation of a common contour only if they have co-constituents that represent intermediate contour segments linking those distantly separated ones (see Geisler & Super, 2000). Structural dependencies between distinct constituents are common in representational systems. In the language of classical first-order predicate logic, for instance, individual constants cannot occur except under the scope of a predicate and an individual constant can occur within the scope of an n-ary predicate only if also combines with n − 1 other individual constants or variables. Structural dependencies can be more or less generic. At the generic end, a number of studies suggest that the constituents of outline shape representations could not occur except as constituents of a representation of a whole outline. Representations of outline shapes appear to require representations of the positions and curvatures of contour segments relative to each other or to the whole outline. The majority of studies find that masking and adaptation effects do not depend on the retinal positions of contours or their absolute curvature, but rather on the object-relative positions of those contours and their curvature scaled to the size of the whole object (Bell, Dickinson, & Badcock, 2008; Dickinson, Bell, & Badcock, 2013; Habak et al., 2004; Loffler, 2008; Poirier & Wilson, 2006; Schmidtmann, Jennings, & Kingdom, 2015; Wilkinson et al., 1998; see also Green, Dickinson, & Badcock, 2018; Kempgens et al., 2013). But one cannot represent object-relative position and curvature except in the context of LANDE 13 F I G U R E 8 While any given triangle can be seen as pointing in any of three directions, if the triangles are perceived as a group they must all be seen as pointing in parallel directions (see Attneave, 1968; Palmer, 1980) representing the complement contours of the object-that is, unless this representation of the contour segment functions as a constituent alongside others of the representation of a whole contour (see the models given in Kempgens et al., 2013; Poirier & Wilson, 2006). Constituents of global, outline shape representations cannot occur on their own; they must be tokened as constituents.12 More specific structural dependencies give rise to a "co-determination" of perceptual states (Gilchrist, 2006; Schwartz & Sanchez Giraldo, 2017). Consider the group of triangles in Figure 8 . As Attneave (1968) pointed out, an equilateral triangle can be seen as oriented or pointed along any of its three tips. However, when triangles are embedded in a group of identical triangles, there is a robust consistency constraint: so long as one sees the triangles as part of a cohesive group, one must see those triangles as all pointed in parallel directions. Palmer (1980) argued, in effect, that the perceived orientations of the triangles cannot always be fully explained by positing only a single global representation of the orientation of the whole array. In some cases, the perceived orientations of the triangles are not well-explained in terms of the perceived orientation of the whole group, and so there must be distinct representations of the orientation of the group and of the orientations of individual triangles. One explanation for why the perceived orientations of the different triangles are co-determined is that representations of the individual triangles in Figure 8 can only serve as constituents of a representation of a cohesive group of triangles if the represented orientations of those triangles are parallel to each other. Representations of the orientations of individual triangles are co-determined insofar as they have to satisfy the constraints for being constituents of a representation of a cohesive group. While the only plausible explanation for the independent variation in representations of features (as evidenced, for example, by independent adaptation effects) is that those features receive structurally distinct representations, interdependencies in the representations of features do not necessarily mean that those features receive a common elementary representation. Interesting dependency relations can arise when distinct constituents must jointly satisfy structural constraints. *** These examples illustrate how psychologists purport to explain distributional properties of perceptual states in terms of how those states are structured from constituent perceptual states, or how they figure as constituents in other perceptual states.13 These explanations draw on analyses of how perceptual states can, cannot, or must co-occur in order to form and evaluate specific hypotheses about how those states are structured. By integrating structural explanations and developing increasingly articulated hypotheses about how a given type of perceptual state is structured, one can explain clusters of distributional properties.These structural explanations are representative of standard explanatory strategies in psychology and, I take it, they can yield successful explanations. Structural claims predict and explain distributional properties on the assumption that a mental state's constituent structure normally determines that state's distributional properties. The psychological possibility of certain cooccurrences of mental states normally depends on the structural relationships and constraints those mental states and their constituents must satisfy. Were a mental state to be structured in a certain way 14 LANDE F I G U R E 9 The outline of a geometrically impossible object from some set of constituents, then that state and its constituents would have to satisfy corresponding structural requirements. Other things equal, these states would have to co-occur (or not) in the ways demanded by those structural requirements. So, a necessary condition on a mental state's being structured in one way rather than another is that the state exemplifies the distributional properties corresponding to the one structural type and not the other-other things being equal. 2 THE EQUALITY OF WHAT? I have argued that a standard form of explanation in perceptual psychology assumes that a mental state's constituent structure determines its distributional properties, other things equal.14 One consequence of this proviso is that a structural claim that falsely predicts a distributional regularity can be maintained only if there is independent evidence for some extenuating factor. How widely structural claims figure into explanations of distributional properties depends on the conditions in which this proviso is violated. If extenuating factors could be cited arbitrarily and frequently, then structural claims would have little real application in explaining the distributional properties of mental states. As a matter of fact, the relevant sorts of extenuating factors are relatively constrained. Two paradigmatic types of extenuating factors are (a) brute physical or physiological facts about sensory acuity, and (b) constraints on processing resources such as attention, memory, and time. As an example of the first, humans cannot perceptually represent colors in the ultraviolet range or visually discriminate the sizes of molecules because of physiological facts about the sensitivity, size, and packing of our retinal photoreceptors together with physical facts about the scattering of light. Because there is independent reason to think that these perceptual incapacities arise from basic physical and physiological facts about light and the structures of our sensory transducers, there is no need to explain them in terms of constraints on representational structure. The second prominent type of extenuating factor comprises constraints on general processing resources such as attention, memory, and time. As an illustration, consider the perception of geometrically impossible objects such as the one depicted in Figure 9 . Schacter, Cooper, Delaney, Peterson, and Tharan (1991) conducted a perceptual priming experiment in which subjects were exposed to an outline drawing of either a geometrically possible or impossible three-dimensional object. After exposure to a series of distinct outline shapes, subjects saw the same outline again and were asked whether it belonged to a geometrically possible three-dimensional shape. If subjects maintain a representation of a particular shape in perceptual priming memory, then one would expect them to be faster and more accurate in responding to that shape than they are in responding to stimuli that they have not seen before. Schacter et al. found that while initial exposure to the outlines of geometrically possible shapes primed responses to later exposures, no such priming was found for the outlines of geometrically impossible shapes. They inferred that representations of geometrically impossible shapes could not be formed in the first place and therefore could not be stored in perceptual memory. Schacter et al. argued, in effect, that representations of whole impossible shapes cannot be formed because the representations are structurally impossible: the perceptual systems in question can LANDE 15 represent the parts of the shape and can represent a scene as containing those parts, but the representations of those parts are not combinable into an integrated representation as of a whole, intact shape.15 By their lights, a theory in which perceptual representations as of whole impossible shapes are structurally possible over-generates, predicting priming where there is none. An adequate theory, they assumed, would not count these representations as structurally possible. Crucially, Schacter et al. argued that the geometrically impossible shapes they used as stimuli did not require more time to encode and were not more difficult to store in perceptual priming memory than the geometrically possible shapes. However, Carrasco and Seamon (1996) challenged Schacter et al.'s conclusions, arguing that they did not control systematically enough for the complexity of their stimuli (see also Seamon & Carrasco, 1999). When the complexity of the stimuli was controlled for-according to both objective measures of complexity such as the number of visible corners in the shape and according to subjective measures such as subjects' reports about how complex the shapes looked-outlines of geometrically impossible three-dimensional shapes supported priming to the same extent as outlines of possible shapes. Carrasco and Seamon suggested that representations of impossible figures are structurally possible in general, though processing constraints preclude the formation of structurally possible representations of overly complex shapes. The relevant perceptual system may be capable of computing global structural descriptions of both possible and impossible objects, providing those objects are not structurally highly complex .... For structurally complex objects, such as the extreme impossible objects of the present study, lack of priming may be due to insufficient time and resources available for encoding (Carrasco & Seamon, 1996, p. 350). Most of the studies described in the previous section take pains to show that the co-occurrence patterns they are explaining are not merely the results of limitations on acuity, attention, memory, or time. A mental state's structure is taken to determine that state's distributional properties when such factors are presumed to be equal. The presumption can be supported by broadly controlling for stimulus complexity, processing time, attentional demands, and taking into account brute physiological constraints. The presumption can be overridden if there is evidence that extenuating factors of these sorts are partly responsible for the distributional properties in question. Structural claims can play an important role in determining a mental state's distributional properties even in the context of extenuating factors (cf. Pietroski & Rey, 1995, p. 94–97). Carrasco and Seamon noted that it was the "subjective" complexity of a shape-how subjects rated the shape when asked how complex it looked-that was critical to whether an impossible shape would support priming or not. A number of theorists have proposed that the apparent complexity of a stimulus corresponds to the structural complexity of the perceptual state that represents that stimulus (Feldman, 1999; van der Helm, 2000; Oliva, Mack, Shrestha, & Peeper, 2004; Palmer, 1977). On this view, it takes more time and energy to form a representation of a shape that looks complex because the representation is itself more complex. The more complex a representation is, the more constituents and structural relations must be tokened for that representation to be tokened. Inordinately complex perceptual states cannot be formed, given the bounded resources of the visual system. But the complexity of a type of mental state is only well-defined if that type of mental state is structurally possible-if that state has a decomposition into constituents that satisfy certain structural constraints. So, the claim that a type of perceptual state is too structurally complex to be formed given limited resources is ultimately committed to giving an account of how states of this type are structurally possible. Structural claims, then, play a wide and robust role in explaining distributional properties even when extenuating factors are also involved.16 16 LANDE 3 THE AUTONOMY OF STRUCTURAL CLAIMS I have argued that structural claims are critical to psychological explanations of the distribution of perceptual states. Little attention has been paid in the literature to how distributional considerations, which concern what co-occurrences of mental states are possible, differ from processing considerations, which concern the particular causal and temporal organization of mental states. In fact, it is frequently assumed that structural claims are only explanatory and evaluable in the context of specific models of psychological processes (see, for example, Anderson, 1978; Barsalou, 1990; Dickinson, 2012; Goldstone & Kersten, 2003; Johnson, 2015; Machery, 2009; Palmer, 1978; Schwartz & Sanchez Giraldo, 2017).17 I suggest, in contrast, that hypotheses about how mental states are structured can explain and predict the distributional properties of those mental states without committing to specific processing models. As a result, structural claims have a relative autonomy from models of how states of that type are generated and operated on and can "abstract away from processing and concentrate on what there is to be processed" (Jackendoff, 1987, p. 38). A central goal of psychological theory is to specify the processes by which mental states are formed and operated on. These psychological processes consist of functional causal dependencies defined over types of mental states, input stimuli, and behaviors. Structural claims play a central role in understanding these processes. Information-processing theories in psychology commonly characterize mental capacities in terms of structure-sensitive processes that build up, break down, query, compare, or otherwise manipulate the structures of mental states. Many agree that information-processing theories of how mental states are structured and processed can be explanatory and predictive independently of claims about the mechanisms that realize these mental states and causal dependencies at a lower level of explanation. But it is a further question whether claims about the structures of mental states can be explanatory and predictive unless one offers a processing model, at the same level of explanation that these structures are described, which specifies the operations that produce and manipulate those structures. To what extent can we empirically disentangle claims about representational structure from claims about algorithms? I hold that structural claims are relatively autonomous from processing models in that they can explain and predict distributional properties with remarkably minimal assumptions about how the mental states in question are formed and operated on. First, structural claims can explain the distributional properties of mental states independently of any substantive model of how those mental states are processed. A mental state's structure determines the mental state's distributional properties, other things being equal. But substantially different types of processes could be defined over mental states with the same type of structure and, accordingly, the same distributional properties. Consider Gheorghiu and Kingdom (2007)'s finding that the representation of curve width can vary separately from the representation of curve height. Neither the pattern of distinct variability in the discrimination of curve width and height nor the structural explanation of this pattern entails a specific model of the functional processes that produce and operate on representations of curve width and height. Other things equal, the hypothesis that curve width and height only ever receive the same elementary representation cannot explain the pattern of independent variation on any processing model under serious consideration. Only the hypothesis that curve width and height at some point receive structurally distinct perceptual representations can explain the separate variability in the perception of those features. But this hypothesis leaves open how exactly these distinct representations are generated and employed. To be sure, this structural explanation does make some basic assumptions about processing. One assumption is that adaptation to a perceptually represented feature modulates one's ability to form the same type of representation of that feature at a later time. Given this assumption, if curve width LANDE 17 and curve height received a numerically identical elementary representation, then one could not adapt to the one without thereby adapting to the other-it would be the very same representation that was modulated. But this assumption does not specify the steps or processes by which adaptation takes place and influences curvature perception. In fact, Gheorghiu and Kingdom are explicitly agnostic about how curvature adaptation works (Gheorghiu & Kingdom, 2007, p. 835). Rather than presupposing a specific processing model, structural hypotheses often serve to independently constrain the space of plausible processing models. Structural explanations are of course committed to there being some processes that produce and operate on representations with the posited structure. Since not all operations are defined for a given structure, structural claims constrain processing models and vice versa. Some types of processes would yield unitary, elementary representations of the aspect-ratio of a curve. Gheorghiu and Kingdom's structural hypothesis rules out that such processes are what directly yield the representations affected by curvature adaptation. But one does not have to select from among the possible models that yield structurally distinct representations of curve width and curve height in order to provide a structural account of how there can be independent variability in the representations of these features. Another assumption of the structural explanation is that things are relevantly equal. The structural distinction between representations of curve height and width is presumed not to be accompanied by, say, some brute physiological condition or attentional constraint ensuring that one can only represent either tall, narrow curves or short, wide ones. Far from introducing a specific processing model, the proviso that structural claims explain distributional properties other things equal generalizes over possible extenuating factors. The proviso holds that the relevant distributional properties do not result from any extenuating factors. Structural claims are autonomous from processing models in a second way: they can be confirmed (or disconfirmed) with minimal processing commitments. Gheorghiu and Kingdom (2007)'s experimental procedures, for example, consisted of having subjects stare at an adapting stimulus, which varied along different dimensions, and then perform a discrimination task with a target stimulus. These experimental procedures, and their interpretation, did not rely on any model of how curvature and shape representations are produced or operated on or how they causally interact. Likewise, specific processing models need not be (though they sometimes can be) invoked either in confirming or disconfirming the presumption that things are relevantly equal. As in the Schacter et al. and Carrasco and Seamon studies, control conditions are often constructed on the assumption that there are bounds on processing time, attention, and memory, without committing to any specific model of the operations that produce and manipulate the representations in question or how exactly they rely on the bounded processing resources. By contrast, it is common for theorists to insist that structural claims are "impossible to evaluate unless one specifies the processes that will operate on [the] representation (Anderson, 1978, p. 250)." For example: If we restrict ourselves to behavioral data, we cannot directly observe the internal processes nor the internal representations. All we observe is that at various times, the stimuli Si, Sj , and Sk arrive and that sometime later response R is emitted. The question of interest is whether behavioral data (i.e., observation of the contingencies between such events and the time of these events) are adequate to constrain a theory of internal representation. Such a theory of representation will be part of a model, M, that also specifies the processes that operate on the representation .... [M]odels with very different theories of representation can perfectly mimic the behavioral predictions of M. These alternative models will 18 LANDE compensate for differences in the representation by different assumptions about the processes (Anderson, 1978, p. 263). This line of thought assumes an impoverished view of the range of data and explanatory questions available to psychologists. It focuses on the project of explaining which from a range of responses a subject will select for a given stimulus and how long that response will take. A response to a stimulus is a causal product of (at least) two things: one's mental state and the processes that operate on that state. Correlations between stimulus and response (including the time it takes to respond to a stimulus) are not enough to isolate a mental state's structure independent of the processes that relate that state to the response. Different ways of processing a type of structure could yield different stimulus-response pairings and time-courses, while different structures could, given appropriate processes, produce the same stimulus-response pairings and time-courses. In some cases, these different structure-process combinations are entertained as serious empirical alternatives (for example Kosslyn, 1980; Pylyshyn, 2002). But, as a number of theorists have pointed out (for example, Pylyshyn, 1979; Camp, 2007), this line of thought neglects other explanatory projects-including, the project of explaining distributional patterns. Distributional properties stem from a mental state's structure (other things equal), generalizing across different ways in which that structure might be processed. Evidence for distributional patterns does not come from a total pattern of stimulus-response relationships so much as it comes from the relationships between different dimensions of those responses-for example, the correspondence between performance in filtering conditions and baseline conditions, or across different adaptation and masking conditions. It is not in general the case that the alternative structural hypotheses that psychologists seriously entertain could, given appropriate processing models, yield equivalent predictions about modal distributional patterns and the relationships that these patterns engender between various observable response dimensions. 4 THE VARIETY OF MENTAL STRUCTURES I have argued that structural claims in perceptual psychology standardly purport to explain the distributional properties of mental states-why some mental states can, cannot, or must co-occur in certain ways. These explanations assume that a mental state's distributional properties normally depend on its constituent structure: were a state to have a specific structure, it would thereby have certain corresponding distributional properties, absent relatively constrained sorts of extenuating factors such as limitations on acuity, attention, memory, and time. So, other things being equal, a mental state has a specific type of structure only if it exemplifies the appropriate distributional properties. Distributional considerations provide critical information about the underlying structures of mental states. These distributional considerations are importantly different in kind from, and more abstract than, the considerations that motivate specific models of the operations by which the mental structures in question are formed and manipulated. Constituency relations do not just constrain how mental states enter into particular types of causal sequences. Brute physiological and resource constraints aside, constituency relations govern what perceptual states are possible at all. I want to conclude by discussing how structural and distributional considerations bear on understanding the relations between different mental capacities. As I noted at the start, many hold that the ways a creature's mental states are structured from their constituents have significant functional, semantic, and epistemic implications about that creature's mental life. One might doubt, in the first place, that structural claims even describe a creature's mental states. Maybe structural claims only describe states of a creature's sub-systems (see Dennett, 1978; McDowell, 1994). The cases discussed here do LANDE 19 not, on the face of it, provide positive evidence for this view. The masking and adaptation experiments described in Section 1 relied on asking subjects to indicate what shapes they consciously saw. These studies investigated how things appeared to the subject. The structural claims discussed here purport to explain how the individual's perceptual states-states that are produced by the visual system and some of which can at least sometimes be conscious and accessible for intentional action guidance and verbal report-can, cannot, or must co-occur. The explanations seem to attribute constituent structure to those very perceptual states. In order to better understand how individuals represent and come to know about the world, much of the philosophical literature has taken a top-down approach to characterizing representational systems, concentrating on how to classify those systems into broad "genera" or "formats." Different representational systems seem, intuitively to cluster into increasingly broad kinds. Sentences of Sanskrit, Hebrew, and first-order logic exemplify one cluster of "sentential" representations. Mercator maps of the Earth and maps of celebrity homes exemplify a cluster of maps, which together with photographs and realist paintings exemplify a broad cluster of "iconic" representations. The angles of the arms on a clock and the representation of numbers by electrical resistances exemplify a cluster of "analog" representations. There has been a substantial effort to specify the unifying characteristics of these clusters, their points of overlap and differentiation, and to locate specific public and mental representational systems within one or another cluster.18 A virtue of this top-down classificatory project is that interesting features of a representational system, including the types of constituents and structural principles available in that system, can be highlighted and understood through analogies to other systems with which it might form a cluster and through an account of the unifying features of that cluster. A risk is that false analogies or inadequate accounts of these representational clusters will obscure the nature of the representational system of interest. The psychological explanations surveyed here, by contrast, take a complementary bottom-up approach to locating mental states within a wide and varied range of structural kinds. These explanations appeal to the distributional properties of mental states in order to characterize their constituent structures, without relying on analogical considerations or committing to a more general taxonomy of these structures. Distributional considerations can have significant functional, semantic, and epistemic implications. Distributional patterns suggest, for example, that if I perceive a set of contour segments as scattered and misaligned, it is structurally impossible for me to form a complex representation as of a cohesive contour to which those segments belong. Still, I can entertain the thought that the line segments belong to a common contour. I might quickly dismiss the thought, or I might come to believe it on the word of a trusted source or if I am confused about the nature of contours. The point is that the thought, unlike the percept, can be entertained, even if untrue or disbelieved. If this is right, then thoughts about contours are subject to different structural constraints than perceptual representations of contours. The space of possible thoughts takes a fundamentally different shape than the space of possible percepts. If perceptual representations of contours and thoughts about contours are subject to different structural restrictions, then these representations will differ in how they can be generated and employed, in the sorts of contours they can represent, and in what implicit commitments they make and transmit about those contours (cf. Camp, 2007; Cummins, 2010; Heck, 2007). Systems can differ dramatically in ways other than how representations are structured from constituents. Representations can differ in the semantic principles governing how their content relates to their structure. For example, adjoining a name to a syntactic tree will have a different effect on the meaning of that tree than will adjoining a name to an isomorphic tree that represents a social hierarchy (Camp, 2009). Moreover, beyond internal constituent structure, representations can have semantically significant extrinsic, inter-representational structure. Suppose I have an optical device 20 LANDE that, when pointed at some surface, outputs a tone the intensity of which corresponds to the surface's distance from the device-louder tones for closer surfaces. There is no reason to suppose that a loud tone, representing a small distance, has as constituents quieter tones that represent greater distances. But while the representations that the device outputs lack internal constituent structure, they have a different kind of external, or inter-representational structure. The intensities of the device's potential output tones fall under a natural ordering, from quietest to loudest. Moreover, this ordering has semantic import: the ordering of sound intensities functions to correspond to a natural ordering of distances, from greater to lesser. A number of people have argued that such semantically significant structures over representations are characteristic of analog representations (Beck, 2019; Clarke, 2019; Kulvicki, 2015; Maley, 2010; Shepard & Chipman, 1970) and iconic representations (Barwise & Etchemendy, 1996; Burge, 2018; Giardino & Greenberg, 2015; Shimojima, 2001). An important question is how, for a given system or class of systems, intra-representational constituent structure interacts with inter-representational structure and how these together relate to the contents of representations. For example, consider the structural constraint that representations of contour shapes can only have as constituents representations of contour segments that are aligned and close together. Psychologists often characterize perceptual representations of contour segments as located in geometrically structured psychological spaces with dimensions corresponding to represented position or orientation. Distance on either psychological dimension functions to represent how similar in position or orientation the contour segments are represented as being. The intra-representational constraint on constituency, then, appears to select for constituents according to their inter-representational relations. Moreover, the complex representation of the whole contour itself presumably stands in interrepresentational relations along these dimensions as a function of the positions of its constituents. There is a complex interface between a perceptual representation's constituent structure, its extrinsic structure, its content, and its causal role. The interface differs in important ways across representational systems. In organizing the space of possible representations, constituency relations are a central scaffold for this interface.19 ENDNOTES 1 See, for example, Fodor (1975), Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988), Davies (1992), Bermúdez (2003), Camp (2007), Burge (2010a), Neander (2017), Shea (2018), Lande (2018), Quilty-Dunn (2019). 2 For some discussions of the structural differences between perception and thought, see Heck (2007), Fodor (2008), Carey (2009), Burge (2010a), Toribio (2011), Kulvicki (2015), Quilty-Dunn (2019), and Block (forthcoming). For discussions of structural features of cognitive maps, see Camp (2007) and Rescorla (2009). For discussions of analogue magnitude representation, see Peacocke (1986), Carey (2009), Beck (2012), and Clarke (2019). For discussions of the structural features of implicit attitudes, see Mandelbaum (2014) and Toribio (2018). For discussions of structural features of motor intentions, see Mylopoulos and Pacherie (2017) and Pavese (2019). For some structural comparisons between human and animal thought, see Cheney and Seyfarth (2007), Camp (2009), Carruthers (2009), Burge (2010b), Beck (2018), and Aguilera (2018). 3 For simplicity, I adopt the idealization that structural requirements are absolute and so there is a sharp distinction between structural possibility and impossibility. The discussion here can easily be extended to incorporate soft structural constraints and degrees of structural permissibility (see Zhu & Mumford, 2006). 4 For some historical examples, see Attneave (1954), Sutherland (1968), Leeuwenberg (1971), Fu (1974), Marr (1982), Witkin and Tenenbaum (1983), Hoffman and Richards (1984), Richards and Hoffman (1985), and Leyton (1988). 5 Phrases such as "constituent structure" do not always appear explicitly in such explanations. I take it that constituent structure is normally being attributed when mental states are characterized as "organized data structures" of one kind or another (Gallistel & King, 2010; Palmer, 1977); as "structural" representations (Biederman, 1987; Barenholtz & Tarr, 2006; Marr, 1982); as "compositional" representations that are "comprised of" (Kellman, Garrigan, & Erlikhman, LANDE 21 2013) or "consist of" (McCloskey, Valtonen, & Cohen Sherman, 2006) other mental representations; as representing one type of feature "in terms" of others (Hummel, 2013; Leek, Reppa, & Arguin, 2005); as having a "code" made up of certain "primitive" representations (Kempgens, Loffler, & Orbach, 2013; Kellman et al., 2013; Leeuwenberg, 1971; Poirier & Wilson, 2006; Richards & Hoffman, 1985); as being "bound" or "integrated," on at least some usages of those terms (Geisler & Super, 2000; Roelfsema, 2006; Treisman, 1988; Wolfe & Cave, 1999); as having separable "constituent" or "component" dimensions (Arguin & Saumier, 2000; Garner, 1974; Lockhead, 1972; Kemler Nelson, 1993); or as having a certain "format" (Brady, Konkle, & Alvarez, 2011; Kosslyn, 1980; Lowet, Firestone, & Scholl, 2018), though "format" can pertain to features, which I discuss in the final section, other than constituent structure. Besides terminological cues, I have relied on close readings of psychological models along with their broader context of inquiry as a guide to which explanations posit constituent structure. Note that in the psychological literature on object recognition, the labels "structured representation" and "structural representation" (often, "structural description") are commonly reserved for representations that have recursive hierarchical constituent structure, or that attribute spatial relationships to distinct parts of the scene, or that attribute spatial relationships to three-dimensional volumetric parts of the scene (Barenholtz & Tarr, 2006; Hummel, 2013; Palmer, 1978). Mental states need not have any of these properties to be structured from constituent representations. For example, multidimensional feature representations, or "holistic templates," arguably have constituent structure, though they frequently are contrasted with "structural representations" (in the psychologist's sense of the term). Multidimensional feature representations are characterized by vectors of values on various psychological dimensions, where these values are representations of features on corresponding world dimensions (see also Gauker, 2012; Quilty-Dunn, 2017). Color representations, for example, are specified in terms of values of hue, saturation, and brightness. Shape representations, on many accounts, have the form of vectors in a high-dimensional space (Loffler, 2008), with different proposals on what the basic dimensions are. Though I will not explore the point here, I take it that theories that posit multidimensional feature representations are committed to attributing constituents to those representations if those representations are characterized as decomposing into values along one privileged, psychologically real set of representational dimensions rather than alternative, orthogonal sets of dimensions (see Arguin & Saumier, 2000; Kemler Nelson, 1993; Lockhead, 1972). 6 This pattern of necessitation should be distinctive to A-states. For example, if one blocks all the inputs to visual shape processing-by inhibiting activity in a prior level of the visual hierarchy or by putting on a blindfold-this will preclude not just the representation of one shape, but also the representations of other shapes (not to mention other visual features). What is relevant for motivating claims about the constituents of shape representations, for example, is that for each shape representation there corresponds a particular, distinctive subset of other representations that must be tokened in order for that shape representation to be tokened. 7 Fodor and McLaughlin (1990) take the assumption that complex mental states cannot be tokened without tokening their constituents to be definitive of "classical constituent structure." I prefer manifest constituent structure as a less loaded label (van Gelder (1990) calls structures of this kind "concatenative"). A more liberal type of constituent structure is one such that a mental state cannot be tokened without thereby making its constituents available for tokening (other things equal). Call constituents of this sort latent constituents. The difference between manifest and latent constituent structure can be construed as a general difference in modes of combination or structural constraints governing how representations can figure as constituents of the complex representation. Van Gelder (1990) argues that some connectionist models posit merely latent constituent structure (see also Aydede, 1997; Smolensky, 1988). The explanations I will discuss posit manifest constituent structure. I will not address here how these explanations relate to neural network architectures (for a discussion that touches on some related issues, see Vaziri, Pasupathy, Brincat, & Connor, 2009). The notion of merely latent constituents is relevant to psychological explanation even outside the context of neural network architectures. Consider the perception of "hierarchical configurations" such as a large triangular pattern consisting of discriminable circular elements (Hochstein & Ahissar, 2002; Kimchi, 2015; Navon, 1977; Navon, 2003; Pomerantz & Pristach, 1989), "chunks" such as meaningful arrangements of chess or go pieces (Chase & Simon, 1973; Goldstone, 2000; Gobet et al., 2001), or coarse representations of the "gists" of scenes (Oliva, 2015; Potter, 2012). Much of the existing psychological literature is equivocal about whether perceptual representations of the component elements of these patterns (for example, the circles that make up the triangular pattern) are manifest constituents of the configural representations, whether they are merely latent constituents, or whether they are not constituents at all (cf. Brady & Alvarez, 2011; Baker & Kellman, 2018; Palmer, 1977; Tsotsos, Rodríguez-Sánchez, Rothenstein, & Simine, 2008). 22 LANDE 8 The "radial frequency" patterns (Wilkinson, Wilson, & Habak, 1998) displayed in Figures 2, 3, and 4 were generated with code that was kindly provided by Robert J. Green. 9 I assume here that the perceptual states underlying the discrimination of contour shapes function to be about distal contours and outlines in the world and are not mere sensory registrations of features of the retinal image (see Burge, 2010a). As with many states involved in mid-level perception, which mediates between sensory encoding of features of the retinal image and representations of three-dimensional shapes and object identities and categories, this is not a settled matter. Still, many of the studies cited here demonstrate capacities for attributing the same shapes to contours despite differences in the registered retinal sizes, positions, local orientations, and luminance profiles that the contours project to the eye. Further, it is plausible that the perceptual states in question are the products of processes such as shape segmentation, contour integration, and completion (Hoffman & Richards, 1984; Kellman et al., 2013; Singh, 2015), which are known to be sensitive to the locations and orientations of contours in three-dimensional space (Hess, Hayes, & Kingdom, 1997; Kellman, Garrigan, & Shipley, 2005) and to produce contour representations according to principles that reflect objective regularities in how contours are organized in the environment (Geisler, Perry, Super, & Gallogly, 2001; Hoffman & Richards, 1984). These characteristics suggest that the perceptual states in question function to represent the shapes of objective, distal contours rather than features of proximal stimuli. In any case, I allow that mere sensory states can also have a kind of constituent structure. An interesting open question is what, if anything, fundamentally distinguishes the ways representational perceptual states are structured from the ways mere sensory states are structured (cf. Dretske, 1981, Ch. 6). 10 The shape-in-terms-of-curvature hypothesis is consistent in principle with the possibility that representations of local features are also constituents of representations of objects and their shapes. The crucial claim is just that shape representations at least require specific types of curvature representations. A more restrictive theory is that shape is represented merely in terms of curvature-that shape representations are "derived from, but do not consist of" mere edges or points (Baker & Kellman, 2018, p. 10). 11 While the data described here are behavioral, there is compelling neurophysiological evidence that in fact mid-level shape representations are implemented by populations of neurons in visual areas V4 and IT that are tuned to contour segments with specific types of curvature, at specific positions relative to a contour's center. Differences in the combined activity of such populations predicts differences in perceived contour shapes (Pasupathy & Connor, 2002; Pasupathy, El-Shamayleh, & Popovkina, 2018; Yau, Pasupathy, Brincat, & Connor, 2013). The general relationship between structural claims in psychology and claims about how such structures are neurally encoded requires a separate discussion. 12 Similarly, there is good reason to distinguish object or body representations from representations of shape, color, size, and position (Naber et al., 2011). The very same token representation as of an object or body can co-occur with different representations of that object's shape, color, size, and position (Carey, 2009; Green & Quilty-Dunn, 2017; Kahneman, Treisman, & Gibbs, 1992; Pylyshyn, 2003). This suggests that these representations of shapes, colors, sizes, and positions are not constituent parts of object representation, but are combined with object representations to form complex representations of objects with various features. But, while the same token object representation is structurally distinct from and can be combined with any of a variety of feature representations, arguably an object representation must always be tokened in combination with some feature representation (Burge, 2009, 2010a). 13 For a review of other relevant examples, see Schwartz and Sanchez Giraldo (2017). 14 I do not mean that structural claims themselves are ceteris paribus claims. It may be that claims about how mental states are structured are not qualified by any hedges. The proviso qualifies the structural claim's capacity to explain and predict distributional properties. A (maybe unqualified) structural claim only purports to explain and predict particular distributional properties under the assumption that certain kinds of extenuating factors are not responsible for those distributional properties (cf. Earman & Roberts, 1999; Hempel, 1988). 15 See also Donnelly, Found, & Müller (1999), Soldan, Hilton, and Stern (2009), Freud, Hadad, Avidan, and Ganel (2015). 16 Likewise, many neuropsychological explanations of the distribution of mental states in non-neurotypical subjects depend on specifying how non-neurotypical physiological factors and processing constraints interact with ways the mental states in question are structured (for example, Behrmann, Peterson, Moscovitch, & Suzuki, 2006; McCloskey et al., 2006). 17 At the same time, some psychological work is explicitly predicated on the possibility of evaluating structural claims independently of processing models (for example, Brady et al., 2011; Clowes, 1971; Feldman, 1999; van der Helm & Leeuwenberg, 1996). LANDE 23 18 See, for example, Goodman (1968), Barwise and Etchemendy (1996), Haugeland (1998), Shimojima (2001), Camp (2007), Maley (2010), Kulvicki (2015), Giardino and Greenberg (2015), Burge (2018), and Beck (2019). See Johnson (2015) for a criticism of this undertaking. 19 Special thanks to Tyler Burge, Sam Cumming, Gabriel Greenberg, Philip Kellman, Bence Nanay, and an anonymous reviewer. This paper also benefited from the feedback of Jake Beck, Denis Buehler, Sam Clarke, and Gerardo Viera, from conversations with James Elder, Mazyar Fallah, E.J. Green, Robert J. Green, Gabrielle Johnson, Jake QuiltyDunn, and Hugh Wilson, as well as from discussions at the UCLA Mind and Language Workshop, the Centre for Philosophical Psychology at the University of Antwerp, my mini-seminar at the Institute of Philosophical Research (IIFs) at Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, and the Centre for Vision Research seminar series at York University. This work was supported by funding from the European Research Council through Bence Nanay's ERC Consolidator grant 726251 and from the Canada First Research Excellence Fund through the Vision: Science to Applications program. REFERENCES Aguilera, M. (2018). Why the content of animal thought cannot be propositional. Analisis Filosofico, 118(2), 183–207. Algom, D., & Fitousi, D. (2016). Half a century of research on Garner interference and the separability-integrality distinction. Psychological Bulletin, 142(12), 1352–1383. https://doi.org/10.1037/bul0000072 Anderson, J. R. (1978). Arguments concerning representations for mental imagery. Psychological Review, 85(4), 249– 277. https://doi.org/10.1037//0033-295x.85.4.249 Anderson, N. D., Habak, C., Wilkinson, F., & Wilson, H. R. (2007). Evaluating shape after-effects with radial frequency patterns. Vision Research, 47(3), 298–308. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.visres.2006.02.013 Arguin, M., & Saumier, D. (2000). Conjunction and linear non-separability effects in visual shape encoding. Vision Research, 40(22), 3099–3115. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0042-6989(00)00155-3 Ashby, F. G., & Townsend, J. T. (1986). Varieties of perceptual independence. Psychological Review, 93(2), 154–179. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295x.93.2.154 Attneave, F. (1954). Some informational aspects of visual perception. Psychological Review, 61(3), 183–193. https:// doi.org/10.1037/h0054663 Attneave, F. (1968). Triangles as ambiguous figures. The American Journal of Psychology, 81(3), 447–453. https:// doi.org/10.2307/1420645 Aydede, M. (1997). Language of thought: The connectionist contribution. Minds and Machines, 7(1), 57–101. https:// doi.org/10.1023/a:1008203301671 Baker, N., & Kellman, P. J. (2018). Abstract shape representation in human visual perception. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 147(9), 1295–1308. https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0000409 Barenholtz, E., & Feldman, J. (2003). Visual comparisons within and between object parts: evidence for a single-part superiority effect. Vision Research, 43(15), 1655–1666. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0042-6989(03)00166-4 Barenholtz, E., & Tarr, M. J. (2006). Reconsidering the role of structure in vision. Psychology of Learning and Motivation, 47, 157–180. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0079-7421(06)47005-5 Barsalou, L. W. (1990). On the indistinguishability of exemplar memory and abstraction in category representation. In T. K. Srull, J. Robert, & S. Wyer (Eds.), Advances in social cognition: Content and process specificity in the effects of prior experiences, volume III (pp. 61–88). Lawrence Elbaum. Barwise, J., & Etchemendy, J. (1996). Heterogeneous logic. In G. Allwein & J. Barwise (Eds.), Logical reasoning with diagrams (pp. 179–200). New York: Oxford University Press. Baylis, G. C., & Driver, J. (1993). Visual attention and objects: Evidence for hierarchical coding of location. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 19(3), 451–470. https://doi.org/10.1037/ 0096-1523.19.3.451 Beck, J. (2012). The generality constraint and the structure of thought. Mind, 121(483), 563–600. https://doi.org/ 10.1093/mind/fzs077 Beck, J. (2018). Do nonhuman animals have a language of thought? In K. Andrews & J. Beck (Eds.), The Routledge handbook of the computational mind (pp. 46–55). New York: Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315742250-5 Beck, J. (2019). Perception is analog: The argument from Weber's law. The Journal of Philosophy, 116(6), 319–249. https://doi.org/10.5840/jphil2019116621 24 LANDE Behrmann, M., Peterson, M. A., Moscovitch, M., & Suzuki, S. (2006). Independent representations of parts and the relations between them: Evidence from integrative agnosia. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 32(5), 1169–1184. https://doi.org/10.1037/0096-1523.32.5.1169 Bell, J., Dickinson, J. E., & Badcock, D. R. (2008). Radial frequency adaptation suggests polar-based coding of local shape cues. Vision Research, 48(21), 2293–2301. doi.org/10.1016/j.visres.2008.07.003 Bell, J., & Kingdom, F. A. (2009). Global contour shapes are coded differently from their local components. Vision Research, 49(13), 1702–1710. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.visres.2009.04.012 Bell, J., Wilkinson, F., Wilson, H. R., Loffler, G., & Badcock, D. R. (2009). Radial frequency adaptation reveals interacting contour shape channels. Vision Research, 49(18), 2306–2317. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.visres.2009.06.022 Bermúdez, J. L. (2003). Thinking without words. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/ acprof:oso/9780195159691.001.0001 Biederman, I. (1987). Recognition-by-components: A theory of human image understanding. Psychological Review, 94(2), 115–147. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295x.94.2.115 Biederman, I., & Cooper, E. E. (1991). Priming contour-deleted images: Evidence for intermediate representations in visual object recognition. Cognitive Psychology, 23(3), 393–419. https://doi.org/10.1016/0010-0285(91)90014-f Block, N. (Forthcoming). The border between seeing and thinking. The MIT Press. Brady, T. F., & Alvarez, G. A. (2011). Hierarchical encoding in visual working memory: Ensemble statistics bias memory for individual items. Psychological Science, 22(3). https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797610397956 Brady, T. F., Konkle, T., & Alvarez, G. A. (2011). A review of visual memory capacity: Beyond individual items and toward structured representations. Journal of Vision, 11(5), 1–34. https://doi.org/10.1167/11.5.4 Burge, T. (2009). Five theses on de re states and attitudes. In J. Almog & P. Leonardi (Eds.), The philosophy of David Kaplan (pp. 233–316). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195367881. 003.0015 Burge, T. (2010a). Origins of objectivity. New York: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/ 9780199581405.001.0001 Burge, T. (2010b). Steps toward origins of propositional thought. Dusputatio, 9(29), 39–67. https://doi.org/10.2478/ disp-2010-0010 Burge, T. (2018). Iconic representation: Maps, pictures, and perception. In S. Wuppuluri & F. Doria (Eds.), The map and the territory (pp. 79–100). Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-72478-2_5 Camp, E. (2007). Thinking with maps. Philosophical Perspectives, 21(1), 145–182. https://doi.org/10.1111/ j.1520-8583.2007.00124.x Camp, E. (2009). A language of baboon thought? In R. W. Lurz (Ed.), The philosophy of animal minds (pp. 108–127). Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511819001.007 Cant, J. S., Large, M.-E., McCall, L., & Goodale, M. A. (2008). Independent processing of form, colour, and texture in object perception. Perception, 37(1), 57–78. https://doi.org/10.1167/6.6.612 Carey, S. (2009). The origin of concepts. New York: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/ 9780195367638.001.0001 Carrasco, M., & Seamon, J. G. (1996). Priming impossible figures in the object decision test: The critical importance of perceived stimulus complexity. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 3(3), 344–351. https://doi.org/10.3758/bf03210758 Carruthers, P. (2009). Invertebrate concepts confront the generality constraint (and win). In R. W. Lurz (Ed.), The philosophy of animal minds (pp. 89–107). Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511819001.006 Chase, W. G., & Simon, H. A. (1973). Perception in chess. Cognitive Psychology, 4(1), 55–81. https://doi. org/10.1016/0010-0285(73)90004-2 Cheney, D. L., & Seyfarth, R. M. (2007). Baboon metaphysics: The evolution of a social mind. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. https://doi.org/10.7208/chicago/9780226102429.001.0001 Clarke, S. (2019). Beyond the icon: Core cognition and the bounds of perception. Mind and Language. Clowes, M. (1971). On seeing things. Artificial Intelligence, 2(1), 79–116. https://doi.org/10.1016/0004-3702(71)90005-1 Cummins, R. (2010). Representational specialization: The synthetic a priori revisited. In The world in the head (pp. 194–209). New York: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199548033.003.0012 Davies, M. (1992). Aunty's own argument for the language of thought. In J. Ezquerro & J. M. Larrazabal (Eds.), Cognition, semantics, and philosophy (pp. 235–271). Kluwer Academic Publishers. https://doi.org/10.1007/97894-011-2610-6_9 LANDE 25 Demeyer, M., & Machilsen, B. (2012). The construction of perceptual grouping displays using gert. Behavior Research Methods, 44(2), 439–446. https://doi.org/10.3758/s13428-011-0167-8 Dennett, D. C. (1978). Toward a cognitive theory of consciousness. In Brainstorms: Philosophical essays on mind and psychology, chapter 9 (pp. 149–173). Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/ 1664.003.0014 Dickinson, A. (2012). Associative learning and animal cognition. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B, 367, 2733–2742. https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2012.0220 Dickinson, J. E., Bell, J., & Badcock, D. R. (2013). Near their thresholds for detection, shapes are discriminated by the angular separation of their corners. PLoS ONE, 8(5), e66015. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0066015 Donnelly, N., Found, A., & Müller, H. J. (1999). Searching for impossible objects: Processing form and attributes in early vision. Perception & Psychophysics, 61(4), 675–690. https://doi.org/10.3758/bf03205538 Dretske, F. I. (1981). Knowledge & the flow of information. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. https://doi.org/ 10.1086/289062 Earman, J., & Roberts, J. (1999). Ceteris paribus, there is no problem of provisos. Synthese, 118(3), 439–478. https:// doi.org/10.1023/a:1005106917477 Feldman, J. (1999). The role of objects in perceptual grouping. Acta Psychologica, 102(2–3), 137–163. https:// doi.org/10.1016/s0001-6918(98)00054-7 Field, D. J., Hayes, A., & Hess, R. F. (1993). Contour integration by the human visual system: Evidence for a local "association field". Vision Research, 33(2), 173–193. https://doi.org/10.1016/0042-6989(93)90156-q Fodor, J., (1975). The language of thought. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Fodor, J., (2008). LOT 2: The language of thought revisited. New York: Oxford University Press. Fodor, J., & McLaughlin, B. P. (1990). Connectionism and the problem of systematicity: Why Smolensky's solution doesn't work. Cognition, 35(2), 183–204. https://doi.org/10.1016/0010-0277(90)90014-B Fodor, J., & Pylyshyn, Z. (1988). Connectionism and cognitive architecture: A critical analysis. Cognition, 28(1–2), 3–71. https://doi.org/10.1016/0010-0277(88)90031-5 Fougnie, D., & Alvarez, G. A. (2011). Object features fail independently in visual working memory: evidence for a probabilistic feature-store model. Journal of Vision, 11(3), 1–12. https://doi.org/10.1167/11.12.3 Freud, E., Hadad, B.-S., Avidan, G., & Ganel, T. (2015). Evidence for similar early but not late representation of possible and impossible objections. Frontiers in Psychology, 6(94), 1–8. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00094 Fu, K. S. (1974). Syntactic methods in pattern recognition. New York: Academic Press. https://doi.org/10.1016/ s0076-5392(09)x6026-1 Gallistel, C., & King, A. P. (2010). Memory and the computational brain: Why cognitive science will transform neuroscience. Wiley Blackwell. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781444310498 Garner, W. R. (1974). The processing of information and structure. New York: Lawrence Elbaum Associates. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315802862 Gauker, C. (2012). Perception without propositions. Philosophical Perspectives, 26(1), 19–50. https://doi.org/10.1111/ phpe.12000 Geisler, W. S., Perry, J., Super, B., & Gallogly, D. (2001). Edge co-occurrence in natural images predicts contour grouping performance. Vision Research, 41(6), 711–724. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0042-6989(00)00277-7 Geisler, W. S., & Super, B. J. (2000). Perceptual organization of two-dimensional patterns. Psychological Review, 107(4), 677–708. https://doi.org/10.1037//0033-295x.107.4.677 Gheorghiu, E., & Kingdom, F. A. (2007). The spatial feature underlying the shape-frequency and shape-amplitude aftereffects. Vision Research, 47(6), 834–844. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.visres.2006.11.023 Giardino, V., & Greenberg, G. (2015). Introduction: Varieties of iconicity. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 6(1), 1–25. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-014-0210-7 Gilchrist, A., (2006). Seeing black and white. New York: Oxford University Press. Gobet, F., Lane, P. C., Croker, S., Cheng, P. C.-H., Jones, G., Oliver, I., & Pine, J. M. (2001). Chunking mechanisms in human learning. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 5(6), 236–243. https://doi.org/10.1016/s1364-6613(00)01662-4 Goldstone, R. L. (2000). Unitization during category learning. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 26(1), 86–112. https://doi.org/10.1037//0096-1523.26.1.86 Goldstone, R. L., & Kersten, A. (2003). Concepts and categorization. In A. F. Healy & R. W. Proctor (Eds.), Handbook of psychology, volume 4: Experimental Psychology (pp. 599–622). Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. https://doi.org/10.1002/0471264385.wei0422 26 LANDE Goodman, N., (1968). Languages of art: An approach to a theory of symbols. The Bobbs-Merril Company, Inc. Green, E. (2017). On the perception of structure. Nous, 53(3), 564–592. https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12207 Green, E., & Quilty-Dunn, J. (2017). What is an object file? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, axx055. https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axx055 Green, R. J., Dickinson, J. E., & Badcock, D. R. (2018). Integration of shape information occurs around closed contours but not across them. Journal of Vision, 18(5), 1–13. https://doi.org/10.1167/18.5.6 Habak, C., Wilkinson, F., Zakher, B., & Wilson, H. R. (2004). Curvature population coding for complex shapes in human vision. Vision Research, 44(24), 2815–2823. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.visres.2004.06.019 Haugeland, J. (1998). Representational genera. In Having Thought: essays in the metaphysics of mind (pp. 171–206). Heck, R. K. (2007). Are there different kinds of content? In B. P. McLaughlin & J. D. Cohen (Eds.), Contemporary debates in philosophy of mind (pp. 117–138). Blackwell. Hempel, C. G. (1988). Provisoes: A problem concerning the inferential function of scientific theories. Erkenntnis, 28(2), 147–164. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00166441 Hess, R. F., Hayes, A., & Kingdom, F. A. (1997). Integrating contours within and through depth. Vision Research, 37(6), 691–696. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0042-6989(96)00215-5 Hess, R. F., May, K. A., & Dumoulin, S. O. (2015). Contour integration: Psychophysical, neurophysiological, and computational perspectives. In J. Wagemans (Ed.), The oxford handbook of perceptual organization, chapter 10 (pp. 189–206). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199686858.013.013 Hochstein, S., & Ahissar, M. (2002). View from the top: Hierarchies and reverse hierarchies in the visual system. Neuron, 36(5), 791–804. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0896-6273(02)01091-7 Hoffman, D. D., & Richards, W. A. (1984). Parts of recognition. Cognition, 18(1), 65–96. https://doi.org/10.1016/ 0010-0277(84)90022-2 Hummel, J. E. (2013). Object recognition. In D. Reisberg (Ed.), The oxford handbook of cognitive psychology (pp. 32– 45). New York: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195376746.013.0003 Jackendoff, R., (1987). Consciousness and the computational mind. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. Johnson, K. (2015). Maps, languages, and manguages: Rival cognitive architectures? Philosophical Psychology, 28(6), 815–836. https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2014.893814 Kahneman, D., Treisman, A., & Gibbs, B. J. (1992). The reviewing of object files: Object-specific integration of information. Cognitive Psychology, 24(2), 175–219. https://doi.org/10.1016/0010-0285(92)90007-o Kellman, P. J., Garrigan, P., & Erlikhman, G. (2013). Challenges in understanding visual shape perception and representation: Bridging subsymbolic and symbolic coding. In S. Dickinson & Z. Pizlo (Eds.), Shape perception in human and computer vision: An interdisciplinary perspective (pp. 249–274). London: Springer-Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-5195-1_18 Kellman, P. J., Garrigan, P., & Shipley, T. F. (2005). Object interpolation in three dimensions. Psychological Review, 112(3), 586–609. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295x.112.3.586 Kellman, P. J., & Shipley, T. F. (1991). A theory of visual interpolation in object perception. Cognitive Psychology, 23(2), 141–221. https://doi.org/10.1016/0010-0285(91)90009-d Kemler Nelson, D. G. (1993). Processing integral dimensions: The whole view. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 19(5), 1105–1113. https://doi.org/10.1037/0096-1523.19.5.1105 Kempgens, C., Loffler, G., & Orbach, H. S. (2013). Set-size effects for sampled shapes: Experiments and model. Frontiers in Computational Neuroscience, 7(67), 1–18. https://doi.org/10.3389/fncom.2013.00067 Kimchi, R. (2015). The perception of hierarchical structure. In The oxford handbook of perceptual organization, chapter 7 (pp. 129–149). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199686858.013.025 Kosslyn, S. M. (1980). Image and mind. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. https://doi.org/10.2307/1772225 Kulvicki, J. V. (2015). Analog representation and the parts principle. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 6(1), 165– 180. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-014-0218-z Kurki, I., Saarinen, J., & Hyvärinen, A. (2014). Investigating shape perception by classification images. Journal of Vision, 14(12), 1–19. https://doi.org/10.1167/14.12.24 Lamote, C., & Wagemans, J. (1999). Rapid integration of contour fragments: From simple filling-in to parts-based shape description. Visual Cognition, 6(3–4), 345–361. https://doi.org/10.1080/135062899395019 Lande, K. J. (2018). The perspectival character of perception. The Journal of Philosophy, 115(4), 187–214. https://doi.org/10.5840/jphil2018115413 LANDE 27 Leek, E., Reppa, I., & Arguin, M. (2005). The structure of three-dimensional object representations in human vision: Evidence from whole-part matching. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 31(4), 668–684. https://doi.org/10.1167/6.6.610 Leeuwenberg, E. (1971). A perceptual coding language for visual and auditory patterns. The American Journal of Psychology, 84(3), 307–349. https://doi.org/10.2307/1420464 Leyton, M. (1988). A process-grammar for shape. Artificial Intelligence, 34(2), 213–247. https://doi.org/ 10.1016/0004-3702(88)90039-2 Lockhead, G. (1972). Processing dimensional stimuli: A note. Psychological Review, 79(5), 410–419. https://doi. org/10.1037/h0033129 Loffler, G. (2008). Perception of contours and shapes: Low and intermediate stage mechanisms. Vision Research, 48(20), 2106–2127. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.visres.2008.03.006 Loffler, G. (2015). Probing intermediate stages of shape processing. Journal of Vision, 15(7), 1–19. https://doi. org/10.1167/14.10.1458 Loffler, G., Wilson, H. R., & Wilkinson, F. (2003). Local and global contributions to shape discrimination. Vision Research, 43(5), 519–530. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0042-6989(02)00686-7 Lowet, A. S., Firestone, C., & Scholl, B. J. (2018). Seeing structure: Shape skeletons modulate perceived similarity. Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics, 80(5), 1278–1289. https://doi.org/10.3758/s13414-017-1457-8 Machery, E. (2009). Doing without concepts. New York: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/ acprof:oso/9780195306880.001.0001 Maley, C. J. (2010). Analog and digital, continuous and discrete. Philosophical Studies, 155(1), 117–131. https:// doi.org/10.1007/s11098-010-9562-8 Mandelbaum, E. (2014). Attitude, inference, association: On the propositional structure of implicit bias. Nous, 50(3), 629–658. https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12089 Marr, D. (1982). Vision: A computational investigation into the human representation and processing of visual information. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9780262514620.001.0001 McCloskey, M., Valtonen, J., & Cohen Sherman, J. (2006). Representing orientation: A coordinate-system hypothesis and evidence from developmental deficits. Cognitive Neuropsychology, 23(5), 680–713. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 02643290500538356 McDowell, J. (1994). The content of perceptual experience. The Philosophical Quarterly, 44(175), 190–205. https://doi.org/10.2307/2219740 McLaughlin, B. P. (2009). Systematicity redux. Synthese, 170(2), 251–274. Mylopoulos, M., & Pacherie, E. (2017). Intentions and motor representations: The interface challenge. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 8(2), 317–336. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-016-0311-6 Naber, M., Carlson, T. A., Verstraten, F. A., & Einhäuser, W. (2011). Perceptual benefits of objecthood. Journal of Vision, 11(4), 1–9. https://doi.org/10.1167/11.4.8 Navon, D. (1977). Forest before trees: The precedence of global features in visual perception. Cognitive Psychology, 9(3), 353–383. https://doi.org/10.1016/0010-0285(77)90012-3 Navon, D. (2003). What does a compound letter tell the psychologist's mind? Acta Psychologica, 114, 273–309. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.actpsy.2003.06.002 Neander, K., (2017). A mark of the mental: In defense of informational teleosemantics. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. Oliva, A. (2005). Gist of the scene. In L. Itti, G. Rees, & J. K. Tsotsos (Eds.), Neurobiology of attention (pp. 251–256). Academic press. https://doi.org/10.1016/b978-012375731-9/50045-8 Oliva, A., Mack, M. L., Shrestha, M., & Peeper, A. (2004). Identifying the perceptual dimensions of visual complexity of scenes. Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society, 26, 1041–1046. Palmer, S. E. (1977). Hierarchical structure in perceptual representation. Cognitive Psychology, 9(4), 441–474. https://doi.org/10.1016/0010-0285(77)90016-0 Palmer, S. E. (1978). Fundamental aspects of cognitive representation. In E. Roach & B. B. Lloyd (Eds.), Cognition and categorization (pp. 259–303). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Elbaum Associates. Palmer, S. E. (1980). What makes triangles point: Local and global effects in configurations of ambiguous triangles. Cognitive Psychology, 12(3), 285–305. https://doi.org/10.1016/0010-0285(80)90012-2 Panis, S., Winter, J. D., Vandekerckhove, J., & Wagemans, J. (2008). Identification of everyday objects on the basis of fragmented outline versions. Perception, 37(2), 271–289. https://doi.org/10.1068/p5516 28 LANDE Pasupathy, A., & Connor, C. E. (2002). Population coding of shape in area V4. Nature Neuroscience, 5(12), 1332–1338. https://doi.org/10.1038/nn972 Pasupathy, A., El-Shamayleh, Y., & Popovkina, D. V. (2018). Visual shape and object perception. In Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Neuroscience. http://neuroscience.oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190264086. 001.0001/acrefore-9780190264086-e-75. https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190264086.013.75 Pavese, C. (2019). The psychological reality of practical representation. Philosophical Psychology, 32(5), 785–822. https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2019.1612214 Peacocke, C. (1986). Analogue content. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 60(1), 1–18. https://doi.org/ 10.1093/aristoteliansupp/60.1.1 Pietroski, P., & Rey, G. (1995). When other things aren't equal: Saving ceteris paribus laws from vacuity. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 46(1), 81–110. https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/46.1.81 Poirier, F. J., & Wilson, H. R. (2006). A biologically plausible model of human radial frequency perception. Vision Research, 46(15), 2443–2455. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.visres.2006.01.026 Poirier, F. J., & Wilson, H. R. (2007). Object perception and masking: Contributions of sides and convexities. Vision Research, 47(23), 3001–3011. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.visres.2007.08.003 Pomerantz, J. R., & Pristach, E. A. (1989). Emergent features, attention, and perceptual glue in visual form perception. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 15(4), 635–649. https://doi.org/10.1037//0096-1523.15.4.635 Posner, M. I. (1964). Information reduction in the analysis of sequential tasks. Psychological Review, 71(6), 491–504. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0041120 Potter, M. C. (2012). Recognition and memory for briefly presented scenes. Frontiers in Psychology, 3, 1–9. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00032 Pylyshyn, Z. (1979). Validating computational models: A critique of Anderson's indeterminacy of representation claim. Psychological Review, 86(4), 383–394. https://doi.org/10.1037//0033-295x.86.4.383 Pylyshyn, Z. (2002). Mental imagery: In search of a theory. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 25(2), 157–182. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x02000043 Pylyshyn, Z. (2003). Seeing and visualizing: It's not what you think. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. https:// doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/6137.001.0001 Quilty-Dunn, J., (2017). Syntax and semantics of perceptual representation. PhD thesis, The Graduate Center, City University of New York. Quilty-Dunn, J. (2019). Perceptual pluralism. Nous, Advanced online publication. https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12285 Rainville, S. J., & Wilson, H. R. (2004). The influence of motion-defined form on the perception of spatially-defined form. Vision Research, 44(11), 1065–1077. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.visres.2004.01.003 Rescorla, M. (2009). Cognitive maps and the language of thought. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 60(2), 377–407. https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axp012 Richards, W., & Hoffman, D. D. (1985). Codon constraints on closed 2d shapes. Computer Vision, Graphics, and Image Processing, 31(3), 265–281. https://doi.org/10.1016/0734-189X(85)90031-3 Roelfsema, P. R. (2006). Cortical algorithms for perceptual grouping. Annual Review of Neuroscience, 29, 203–227. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.neuro.29.051605.112939 Sáry, G., Vogels, R., & Orban, G. A. (1993). Cue-invariant shape selectivity of Macaque inferior temporal neurons. Science, 260(5110), 995–997. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.8493538 Schacter, D. L., Cooper, L. A., Delaney, S. M., Peterson, M. A., & Tharan, M. (1991). Implicit memory for possible and impossible objects: Constraints on the construction of structural descriptions. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 17(1), 3–19. https://doi.org/10.1037/0278-7393.17.1.3 Schmidtmann, G., Gordon, G. E., Bennett, D. M., & Loffler, G. (2013). Detecting shapes in noise: Tuning characteristics of global shape mechanisms. Frontiers in Computational Neuroscience, 7(37), 1–14. https://doi. org/10.3389/fncom.2013.00037 Schmidtmann, G., Jennings, B. J., & Kingdom, F. A. (2015). Shape recognition: Convexities, concavities and things in between. Scientific Reports, 5, 17142. https://doi.org/10.1038/srep17142 Schwartz, O., & Sanchez Giraldo, L. G. (2017). Behavioral and neural constraints on hierarchical representations. Journal of Vision, 17(3). https://doi.org/10.1167/17.3.13 Seamon, J. G., & Carrasco, M. (1999). The effect of study time on priming possible and impossible figures in the object decision test. Psicothema, 11(4), 801–813. LANDE 29 Shea, N. (2018). Representation in cognitive science. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/ oso/9780198812883.001.0001 Shepard, R. N., & Chipman, S. (1970). Second-order isomorphism of internal representations: Shapes of states. Cognitive Psychology, 1(1), 1–17. https://doi.org/10.1016/0010-0285(70)90002-2 Shimojima, A. (2001). The graphic-linguistic distinction. Artificial Intelligence Review, 15, 5–27. Singh, M. (2015). Visual representation of contour and shape. In J. Wagemans (Ed.), The oxford handbook of perceptual organization, chapter 12 (pp. 236–256). Academic Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199686858.013.061 Slugocki, M., Sekuler, A. B., & Bennett, P. J. (2019). Phase-selective masking with radial frequency contours. Vision Research, 154, 1–13. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.visres.2018.10.013 Smolensky, P. (1988). The constituent structure of connectionist mental states: A reply to Fodor and Pylyshyn. The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 26(S1), 137–161. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2041-6962.1988.tb00470.x Soldan, A., Hilton, H. J., & Stern, Y. (2009). Bias effects in the possible/impossible object decision test with matching objects. Memory & Cognition, 37(2), 235–247. https://doi.org/10.3758/MC.37.2.235 Sutherland, N. S. (1968). Outlines of a theory of visual pattern recognition in animals and man. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B. Biological Sciences, 171(1024), 297–317. https://doi.org/10.1098/rspb.1968.0072 Toribio, J. (2011). Compositionality, iconicity, and perceptual nonconceptualism. Philosophical Psychology, 24(2), 177– 193. https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2011.558836 Toribio, J. (2018). Implicit bias: From social structure to representational format. Theoria, 33(1), 41–60. https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.17751 Treisman, A. (1988). Features and objects: The fourteenth Bartlett memorial lecture. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology Section A, 40(2), 201–237. https://doi.org/10.1080/02724988843000104 Tsotsos, J. K., Rodríguez-Sánchez, A. J., Rothenstein, A. L., & Simine, E. (2008). The different stages of visual recognition need different attentional binding strategies. Brain Research, 1225(119–132). https://doi.org/10.1016/ j.brainres.2008.05.038 van derHelm, P. A. (2000). Simplicity versus likelihood in visual perception: From surprisals to precisals. Psychological Bulletin, 126(5), 770–800. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.126.5.770 van derHelm, P. A., & Leeuwenberg, E. L. (1996). Goodness of visual regularities: A nontransformational approach. Psychological Review, 103(3), 429–456. vanGelder, T. (1990). Compositionality: A connectionist variation on a classical theme. Topics in Cognitive Science, 14(3), 355–384. https://doi.org/10.1207/s15516709cog1403_2 Vaziri, S., Pasupathy, A., Brincat, S. L., & Connor, C. E. (2009). Structural representation of object shape in the brain. In S. J. Dickinson, A. Leonardis, B. Schiele, & M. J. Tarr (Eds.), Object categorization: Computer and human vision perspectives (pp. 182–195). Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511635465.011 Vecera, S. P., Behrmann, M., & Filapek, J. C. (2001). Attending to the parts of a single object: Part-based selection limitations. Perception & Psychophysics, 63(2), 308–321. https://doi.org/10.1037/e501882009-226 Wilkinson, F., Wilson, H. R., & Habak, C. (1998). Detection and recognition of radial frequency patterns. Vision Research, 38(22), 3555–3568. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0042-6989(98)00039-X Wilson, H. R., Wilkinson, F., & Asaad, W. (1997). Concentric orientation summation in human form vision. Vision Research, 37(17), 2325–2330. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0042-6989(97)00104-1 Witkin, A., & Tenenbaum, J. (1983). On the role of structure in vision. In J. Beck, B. Hope, & A. Rosenfeld (Eds.), Human and machine vision (pp. 481–543). Academic Press. https://doi.org/10.1016/b978-0-12-084320-6.50022-0 Wolfe, J. M., & Cave, K. R. (1999). The psychophysical evidence for a binding problem in human vision. Neuron, 24(1), 11–17. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0896-6273(00)80818-1 Yau, J. M., Pasupathy, A., Brincat, S. L., & Connor, C. E. (2013). Curvature processing dynamics in macaque area v4. Cerebral Cortex, 23(1), 198–209. https://doi.org/10.1093/cercor/bhs004 Zhu, S. C., & Mumford, D. (2006). A stochastic grammar of images. Foundations and Trends in Computer Graphics and Vision, 2(4), 259–362. https://doi.org/10.1561/0600000018 How to cite this article: Lande KJ. Mental structures. Noûs. 2020;1–29. https://doi.org/10.1111/ nous.

Universal Journal of Physics and Application 10(4): 128-140, 2016 DOI: 10.13189/ujpa.2016.100404 http://www.hrpub.org General Classical Electrodynamics Koen J. van Vlaenderen Ethergy B.V, Research, Hobbemalaan 10, 1816GD Alkmaar, North Holland, The Netherlands Institute for Basic Research, P.O. Box 1577, Palm Harbor, FL 34684 U.S.A. Copyright c©2016 by authors, all rights reserved. Authors agree that this article remains permanently open access under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License 4.0 International License Abstract Maxwell's Classical Electrodynamics (MCED) suffers several inconsistencies: (1) the Lorentz force law of MCED violates Newton's Third Law of Motion (N3LM) in case of stationary and divergent or convergent current distributions; (2) the general Jefimenko electric field solution of MCED shows two longitudinal far fields that are not waves; (3) the ratio of the electrodynamic energy-momentum of a charged sphere in uniform motion has an incorrect factor of 43 . A consistent General Classical Electrodynamics (GCED) is presented that is based on Whittaker's reciprocal force law that satisfies N3LM. The Whittaker force is expressed as a scalar magnetic field force, added to the Lorentz force. GCED is consistent only if it is assumed that the electric potential velocity in vacuum, 'a', is much greater than 'c' (a c); GCED reduces to MCED, in case we assume a = c. Longitudinal electromagnetic waves and superluminal longitudinal electric potential waves are predicted. This theory has been verified by seemingly unrelated experiments, such as the detection of superluminal Coulomb fields and longitudinal Ampère forces, and has a wide range of electrical engineering applications. Keywords Classical Electrodynamics, Longitudinal Ampère Force, Scalar Fields, Longitudinal Electric Waves, Superluminal Velocity, Energy Conversion 1 Introduction An alternative to Maxwell's [1, 2] Classical Electrodynamics (MCED) theory is presented, called General Classical Electrodynamics (GCED), that is free of inconsistencies. For the development of this theory we make use of the fundamental theorem of vector algebra. The proof of this fundamental theorem is based on the three dimensional delta function δ(x) and the sifting property of this function, see (1.1 – 1.2): δ(x) = −1 4π ∆ ( 1 |x| ) (1.1) F(x) = ∫ V ′ F(x′) δ(x− x′) d3x′ (1.2) The fundamental theorem of vector algebra is as follows: a vector function F(x) can be decomposed into two unique vector functions Fl(x) and Ft(x), such that F(x) = Fl(x) + Ft(x) (1.3) Fl(x) = − 1 4π ∇ ∫ V ′ ∇′ * F(x′) |x− x′| d 3x′ (1.4) Ft(x) = 1 4π ∇× ∫ V ′ ∇′ × F(x′) |x− x′| d 3x′ (1.5) The lowercase subindexes 'l' and 't' will have the meaning of longitudinal and transverse in this paper. The longitudinal vector function Fl is curl free (∇×Fl = 0), and the transverse vector function Ft is divergence free (∇*Ft = 0). We assume that F is well behaved (F is zero if |x| is infinite). Let us further introduce the following notations and definitions. ρ Net electric charge density, in C/m3 J = Jl + Jt Net electric current density, in A/m2 Φ Net electric charge (scalar) potential, in V A = Al + At Net electric current (vector) potential, in V*s/m EΦ = −∇Φ Electric field, in V/m EL = −∂tAl Field induced divergent electric field ET = −∂tAt Field induced rotational electric field BΦ = −∂tΦ Field induced scalar field, in V/s BL = −∇*Al Scalar magnetic field, in T = V*s/m2 BT = ∇×At Vector magnetic field, in T = V*s/m2 φ0 ε20μ0 Polarizability of vacuum, in F*s2/m3 μ0 Permeability of vacuum: 4π10−7 H/m ε0 Permittivity of vacuum: 8.854−12 F/m Universal Journal of Physics and Application 10(4): 128-140, 2016 129 (x, t) = (x, y, z, t) Place and time coordinates ∂t = ∂ ∂t Partial time differential ∇= ( ∂ ∂x , ∂ ∂y , ∂ ∂z ) Del operator ∆ = ∇ * ∇ Laplace operator ∆Φ = ∇*∇Φ, ∆A = ∇∇*A−∇×∇×A The permittivity, permeability and polarizability of vacuum are constants. The chargeand current density distributions, the potentials and the fields, are functions of place and not always functions of time. Time independent functions are called stationary or static functions. Basically there are three types of charge-current density distributions: A. Current free charge J = 0 B. Stationary currents ∂tJ = 0 1. closed circuit ∂tJ = 0 ∧ ∇*J = 0 2. open circuit ∂tJ = 0 ∧ ∇*J 6= 0 C. Time dependent currents ∂tJ 6= 0 The charge conservation law (also called 'charge continuity') is true for all types of charge-current density distributions: ∂ρ ∂t +∇*J = 0 (1.6) The physics of current free charge density distributions is called Electrostatics (ES): ∂tρ = −∇*0 = 0. The physics of stationary current density distributions (∂tJ = 0) is called General Magnetostatics (GMS). A special case of GMS are divergence free current distributions (∇*J = 0), and this is widely called Magnetostatics (MS) in the scientific educational literature. In case of Magnetostatics, the charge density distribution has to be static as well: ∂tρ = −∇*J = 0, such that the electric field and the magnetic field are both static. The Maxwell-Lorentz force law satisfies Newton's third law of motion (N3LM) in case of Electrostatics and Magnetostatics, however, this force law violates N3LM in case of General Magnetostatics. A violation of N3LM means that momentum is not conserved by GMS systems, for which there is no experimental evidence! This remarkable inconsistency in classical physics is rarely mentioned in the scientific educational literature. This is not the only problematic aspects of MCED. Jefimenko's electric field expression that is derived from MCED theory, shows two longitudinal electric field terms that do not interact by induction with other fields, therefore these electric fields cannot be field waves and nevertheless these electric fields fall off in magnitude by distance, as far fields, which is inconsistent. A third inconsistency is the problematic 43 factor in the ratio of the electric energy and the electromagnetic momentum of a charged sphere. In the next sections we describe these related inconsistencies of MCED theory in more detail, and how to resolve them. 2 General Magnetostatics Let J(x) be a stationary current distribution. The vector potential A(x) at place vector x is given by: A(x) = μ0 4π ∫ V ′ J(x′) r d3x′ (2.1) r = x− x′ r = |x− x′| Since ∂tA = 0 for stationary currents, the electric field equals E = EΦ = −∇Φ, such that the Gauss law for General Magnetostatics is given by ∇*EΦ(x, t) = 1 ε0 ρ(x, t) (2.2) The magnetostatic vector field BT (x) is defined by BiotSavart's law as follows: BT (x) = ∇×At(x) = ∇×A(x) = − μ0 4π ∫ V ′ J(x′)×∇ ( 1 r ) d3x′ = μ0 4π ∫ V ′ 1 r3 [ J(x′)× r ] d3x′ (2.3) The magnetic field is indeed static, since the current density is stationary. From the continuity of charge (1.6), and (2.2), it follows that Jl = −ε0∂t(EΦ), hence the Ampère law for General Magnetostatics is as follows: ∇×BT − ε0μ0 ∂EΦ ∂t = μ0J (2.4) 2.1 The Lorentz force The magnetic force density, fT (x), that acts transversely on current density J(x) at place x, is given by: fT (x) = J(x)×BT (x) = μ0 4π ∫ V ′ 1 r3 J(x)× [ J(x′)× r ] d3x′ = μ0 4π ∫ V ′ 1 r3 [[ J(x) * r ] J(x′) − [ J(x′) * J(x) ] r ] d3x′ = μ0 4π ∫ V ′ fT (x,x ′) d3x′ (2.5) This is the Lorentz force density law for Magnetostatics; it is assumed that the electric force densities are negligible. Notice that the integrand is non-reciprocal: fT (x,x′) 6= −fT (x′,x), and that r changes into −r by swapping x and x′. This means that the Lorentz force law agrees with N3LM, but only if one calculates the total force on closed on-itself current circuits (magnetostatics is usually defined for divergence free currents only), which is proven as follows. Consider two non-intersecting and closed current circuits C and C ′, that carry the stationary electric currents I and I ′, see figure 1. The currents I and I ′ are equal to the surface integral of the current density over a circuit line cross section of respectively circuits C and C ′. The total force acting on circuit C is a double volume integral of the Lorentz force density. We assume that the currents in C and C ′ are constant for each circuit line cross section, therefore we replace the double volume integral by a double line integral over the circuits C and C ′, in order to determine the force, FC , acting on C: 130 General Classical Electrodynamics I I ′ dl dl′ r x x′ O Figure 1. Closed stationary current circuits FC = − μ0II ′ 4π ∮ C ∮ C′ dl× (dl′ ×∇ [ 1 r ] ) = −μ0II ′ 4π ∮ C′ ∮ C [ (dl * ∇ [ 1 r ] )dl′ − (dl * dl′)∇ [ 1 r ] ] = μ0II ′ 4π ∮ C ∮ C′ (dl * dl′)∇ [ 1 r ] (2.6) This is Grassmann's [3] force law for closed current circuits. Since the curl of a gradient is zero, the first integral disappears, see (2.6) after the first derivation. The final integral after derivation step 2 has a reciprocal integrand, such that the force acting on circuitC ′ is the exact opposite of the force acting on circuitC (FC = −FC′ ), in agreement with N3LM. Fubini's theorem is applicable in derivation step 1 (switching the integration order in the first integral), since it is assumed the circuits C and C ′ do not intersect. The standard literature on Classical Electrodynamics usually defines Magnetostatics as the physics of stationary and divergence free (closed circuits) electric currents. For example, the Feynman lectures [4, Vol II, §13.4] describe that Magnetostatics is based on equation∇×BT = μJ, such that Magnetostatic current is divergence free, such that the electric field is also static, and such that charge density is constant in time: ∇*J = 0 = ∂tρ. R. Feynman further suggests that a Magnetostatic circuit may contain batteries or generators that keep the charges flowing, however, an electric battery delivers an electrical current only if the battery's charge density changes in time. A generator of stationary current is for example Faraday's homopolar disk generator, which can be included in a stationary closed current loop. One has to measure the force FC on the entire closed circuit that includes the generator as well, while the generator is externally driven with constant speed. Such a magnetostatic force experiment has yet to be done. J. D. Jackson's [5] third edition of Classical Electrodynamics postulates without proof that ∇*J = 0 = ∂tρ (charge density is time-independent anywhere in space, see after equation 5.3) before Jackson treats the laws of magnetostatics. D. J. Griffiths' [6] treatment of magnetostatics is likewise: "stationary electric currents are such that the density of charge is constant anywhere", which means that stationary currents that are divergence free. A. Altland [7] defined 'statics' as 'static electric fields and static magnetic fields', and again this implies that∇*J = 0 = ∂tρ. Etc ... It is not at all straightforward to find practical examples of a measured force exerted on a stationary and perfectly closedon-itself current circuit. The Meisner effect might be such an example: a free falling permanent magnet approaches a superconductor, which induces a closed-circuit current in the superconductor. The magnet falls until the induced currents and magnetic field of the superconductor perfectly opposes the field of the magnet, which causes the magnet to levitate, and from that moment on the superconductor current is stationary and divergence free. However, we cannot measure the "electric current" of the floating permanent magnet, in order to derive a magnetostatics force law. An electrically charged rotating object may represent a closed-circuit stationary current, however, it seems impractical to measure forces on such objects while keeping the rotation speed constant during the measurements. Ampère force experiments with two coils that conduct stationary currents have been performed frequently in history. A coil with several windings gives the impression of a perfectly closed current loop, however, this is only true approximately. Many stationary current experiments have been conducted to measure the Ampère force on a circuit that is not closedon-itself, see figure 2. ∂tρ < 0 ∂tρ > 0 ∂tρ > 0 ∂tρ < 0 O I I I ′ I ′ dl dl′ x x′ r Figure 2. Open stationary current circuits One can perform such experiments by applying two sliding contacts in order to enable a rotationor translation motion of a circuit part that is non-closed, such that a force can be measured on just this movable circuit part. Faraday's homopolar disk motor is an example of this principle. Stefan Marinov's [8] Siberian Coliu motor is another example of a two sliding contacts motor, driven by a stationary current. Another type of non-closed current circuits make use of light weight movable batteries, such that sliding contacts can be avoided. This shows that the condition∇*J = 0 = ∂tρ, as well as the conditions∇×B = μJ and ∂tE = 0, are artificial and superfluous for force experiments on stationary electric currents. A possible reason for reducing General Magnetostatics to Magnetostatics by means of the false assumption that stationary currents are divergence free in general, is to obscure mathematically the violation of N3LM by the Grassmann force law [9], and also by the more general Lorentz force law. General Magnetostatics may be consistent with Classical Mechanics, if the Lorentz force law is replaced by another force law that satisfies N3LM. 2.2 The Whittaker force J.C. Maxwell [2, Part IV, Chapter II, p.174] actually preferred Ampère's original force law to Grassmann's force law, because of Newton's third law of motion. An analysis of Universal Journal of Physics and Application 10(4): 128-140, 2016 131 Ampère's force law by E. T. Whittaker [10, p.91], resulted in the following Whittaker force law, FC = μ0II ′ 4π ∫ C ∫ C′ 1 r3 [ (dl′ *r)dl+(dl *r)dl′−(dl *dl′)r) ] (2.7) that is equal to Grassmann's force law (2.6), except for the additional term (dl′ * r)dl. Both force laws predict the same force acting on closed on-itself circuits, since the line integral of the additional term over a closed circuit disappears as well. However, Whittaker's force law is reciprocal (FC = −FC′ ), also for non-closed circuits, and satisfies N3LM for General Magnetostatics. By means of the following functions, defined as follows, BL(x) = −∇*Al(x) = −∇*A(x) = −μ0 4π ∫ V ′ J(x′) * ∇ ( 1 r ) d3x′ = μ0 4π ∫ V ′ 1 r3 [ J(x′) * r ] d3x′ (2.8) fL(x) = J(x)BL(x) (2.9) we generalize Whittaker's force law as a double volume integral of field force densities, see [11, equation 13], and [12]: ∫ V [ fL(x) + fT (x) ] d3x = ∫ V [ J(x)BL(x) + J(x)×BT (x) ] d3x = μ0 4π ∫ V ∫ V ′ 1 r3 [[ J(x′) * r ] J(x) + [ J(x) * r ] J(x′) − [ J(x′) * J(x) ] r ] d3x′ d3x (2.10) This double volume integral of force densities satisfies N3LM for stationary current densities in general, since the integrand is reciprocal. The additional force density, fL, is called the longitudinal Ampère force density, which balances the transverse Ampère force density, fT , such that the total Ampère force density f(x) = fL(x) + fT (x) satisfies f(x) = −f(x′), see figure 3. O J(x) J(x′) x x′ f(x) fL(x) fT (x) fL(x ′) f(x′) fT (x ′) Figure 3. Total Ampère force density It is obvious that the scalar function BL is a physical field that mediates an observable Ampère force, just like the vector magnetic field BT , and therefore it is called the scalar magnetic field [13]. 2.3 The Lorenz condition By means of (1.1), (1.2) and (2.3), (2.8), we derive the following equations: ∇BL(x) +∇×BT (x) = −∆A(x) = μ0J(x) (2.11) ∇BL(x) = −∇∇*Al(x) = μ0Jl(x) (2.12) ∇×BT (x) = ∇×∇×At(x) = μ0Jt(x) (2.13) The following GMS condition follows from (2.4), (2.11) and (3.1), and is known as the Lorenz condition [14]: ∇( BL + ε0μ0BΦ ) = 0 (2.14) This GMS condition is not a free to choose "gauge" condition. If the scalar function BL has the meaning of a physical field, then Lorenz's condition shows that the scalar function BΦ also has the meaning of a physical field. So far we have shown a consistent GMS theory in agreement with classical mechanics. 3 General CED We continue to develop the theory of General CED that describes the physics of time dependent currents, taking into account the physical scalar fields BL, BΦ and (2.2), (2.12) and (2.13). 3.1 General field induction The field equations that describe the induction of secondary fields by primary time dependent fields, follow directly from the field definitions and the fact that the operators ∇,∇* and ∇× commute with ∂t: ∇BΦ − ∂EΦ ∂t = −∇∂Φ ∂t + ∂(∇Φ) ∂t = 0 (3.1) ∇*EL − ∂BL ∂t = −∇* ∂Al ∂t + ∂(∇*Al) ∂t = 0 (3.2) ∇×ET + ∂BT ∂t = −∇× ∂At ∂t + ∂(∇×At) ∂t = 0 (3.3) This is the generalization of Faraday's [15] law of induction, see (3.3). A curl-free electric field EL is induced by a time varying scalar magnetic field BL, see (3.2), which is similar to the Faraday induction of a divergence-free electric field ET . Equation (3.2) will be called Nikolaev's [13] law of electromagnetic induction, after G.V. Nikolaev. Electric fields are sourced by static charges and induced by time varying vectorand scalar magnetic fields. According to the superposition principle, a superimposed electric field is defined as E = EΦ + EL + ET = −∇Φ − ∂tA. Notice that El = EΦ + EL and that Et = ET . 3.2 The essence of Maxwell's CED Maxwell's famous treatise on electricity and magnetism does not include the definitions of the fields BL and BΦ, and does not include Nikolaev's induction law. However, Maxwell defined the superimposed electric field as E = EΦ +EL +ET , without explaining the induction of the secondary field EL by a time varying primary field BL. We cannot just assume the existence of field EL without experimental proof, therefore the superimposed electric field may 132 General Classical Electrodynamics be defined as E = EΦ + ET , according to Ockham's razor. This simple definition reduces MCED to its experimental essence, and fixes the indeterminacy (gauge freedom) of the chargeand current potentials: the electric field EΦ +ET is not invariant with respect to the "gauge" potential transformation. The following field equations describe the essence of Maxwell's CED: EΦ + ET = E (3.4) ∇*E = ∇*EΦ = 1 ε0 ρ (3.5) ∇×E = ∇×ET = − ∂BT ∂t (3.6) ∇×BT − ε0μ0 ∂(EΦ + ET ) ∂t = μ0J (3.7) Completed with the Lorentz force law, this theory is called Special Classical Electrodynamics (SCED). From the charge continuity law follows the next 'displacement current' equation: −ε0 ∂EΦ ∂t = Jl (3.8) Substraction of (3.8) from (3.7) gives the following equation. ∇×BT − ε0μ0 ∂ET ∂t = μ0Jt (3.9) The presence of Maxwell's displacement current term ε0 ∂tET in the Maxwell-Ampère law (3.7) and in (3.9) does not follow directly from charge continuity, since this term is divergence free. The addition of this term by Maxwell was an unfounded conjecture, which led to the derivation of the transverse electromagnetic (TEM) wave equations. Maxwell's conjecture was eventually proven and verified by Hertz's [16] electromagnetic wave detection experiments. Rewriting (3.5) and (3.9) in terms of the potentials gives: −∆Φ = 1 ε0 ρ (3.10) ε0μ0 ∂2At ∂t2 +∇×∇×At = μ0Jt (3.11) The derivation of these 'decoupled' differential equations for the potentials is independent of gauge conditions and gauge transformations. The indeterminacy (gauge freedom) of the potentials is a direct consequence of Maxwell's unfounded addition of the field EL to the superimposed electric field, within the context of MCED. These equations have the following solutions. Φ(x, t) = 1 4πε0 ∫ V ′ ρ(x′, t) r d3x′ (3.12) At(x, t) = μ0 4π ∫ V ′ Jt(x ′, tc) r d3x′ (3.13) r = |x− x′| c = 1√ ε0μ0 tc = t− r c (3.14) The net charge potential Φ is instantaneous at a distance. The net current potential At is retarded with time interval r/c, relative to current potential sources at a distance r. We derive general field solutions, similar to the Jefimenko's fields, from the potential functions 3.12 and 3.13, and definition 3.4: BT (x, t) = μ0 4π ∫ V ′ [ Jt(x ′, tc)× r r3 + Jt(x ′, tc)× r cr2 ] d3x′ (3.15) E(x, t) = 1 4πε0 ∫ V ′ [ ρ(x′, t)r r3 − Jt(x ′, tc) c2r ] d3x′ (3.16) Jefimenko's general fields are derived from MCED, and are the following expressions: BT (x, t) = μ0 4π ∫ V ′ [ Jt(x ′, tc)× r r3 + Jt(x ′, tc)× r cr2 ] d3x′ (3.17) E(x, t) = 1 4πε0 ∫ V ′ [ ρ(x′, tc)r r3 + ρ(x′, tc)r cr2 − Jl(x ′, tc) c2r − Jt(x ′, tc) c2r ] d3x′ (3.18) Jackson [17] proved that Jefimenko's field expressions do not depend on the choice for gauge condition. Notice that Jefimenko's magnetic field is expressed in terms of the divergence free current density, Jt. The second term and third term of the integrand of (3.18) are longitudinal electric far fields that fall off in magnitude by r. Since far fields are field waves that can only exist as two fields that induce each other in turn, these two far field terms represent an inconsistency, since MCED does not define the two other fields that mutually induce the two longitudinal electric far fields that occur in Jefimenko's electric field expression. The two missing fields prove to be BΦ and BL, see §3.3. We call this the far field inconsistency of MCED. SCED theory is manifestly far field consistent, since (3.15) and (3.16) only show the two far fields of the transverse electromagnetic wave. SCED is a consistent theory as special case of GCED with the condition Jl = 0. If we assume Jl = 0, then the second and third term in the integrand of (3.18) disappear, and in that case MCED and SCED are equal, except that the first integrand term of (3.18) is retarded, where the first integrand term of (3.16) is instantaneous. SCED and MCED describe the same physical effects in essence, if we ignore for a moment those experiments that determine the velocity of the near electric field. 3.3 General displacement terms and general field waves We combine GMS with SCED in order to derive a consistent GCED. This theory should treat Jl and ρ as the sources of fields BL, BΦ and EL, and should define the superimposed electric field as E = EΦ +EL +ET . We already generalized Faraday's field induction law in §3.1, and now we generalize Maxwell's conjectural term ε0 ∂tET , by adding a displacement charge term φ0 ∂tBΦ to(3.5) and a second displacement current term λ0 ∂tEL to (2.12): ∇*EΦ − φ0 ε0 ∂BΦ ∂t = φ0 ε0 ∂2Φ ∂t2 −∇*∇Φ = 1 ε0 ρ (3.19) ∇BL − λ0μ0 ∂EL ∂t = λ0μ0 ∂2Al ∂t2 −∇∇*Al = μ0Jl (3.20) ∇×BT − ε0μ0 ∂ET ∂t = ε0μ0 ∂2At ∂t2 +∇×∇×At = μ0Jt (3.21) Universal Journal of Physics and Application 10(4): 128-140, 2016 133 The constant, φ0, is called the electric polarizability of vacuum, and its unit is Fs2m−3. In case of a stationary current potential (∂tA = 0), the GCED equations (3.20–3.21) reduce to the GMS equations (2.12–2.13), such that GCED will obey N3LM for open circuit stationary current distributions, by deducing the correct force theorem later on. The following inhomogeneous field wave equations can be derived from (3.1–3.3) and (3.19–3.21). φ0 ε0 ∂2EΦ ∂t2 −∇∇*EΦ = − 1 ε0 ∇ρ (3.22) φ0 ε0 ∂2BΦ ∂t2 −∇*∇BΦ = − 1 ε0 ∂ρ ∂t (3.23) λ0μ0 ∂2EL ∂t2 −∇∇*EL = −μ0 ∂Jl ∂t (3.24) λ0μ0 ∂2BL ∂t2 −∇*∇BL = −μ0∇*Jl (3.25) ε0μ0 ∂2ET ∂t2 +∇×∇×ET = −μ0 ∂Jt ∂t (3.26) ε0μ0 ∂2BT ∂t2 +∇×∇×BT = μ0∇×Jt (3.27) These wave equations describe the Transverse Electromagnetic (TEM) wave and two types of longitudinal electric waves. One type of longitudinal electric wave is expressed only in terms of the electric charge potential Φ, so it is not induced by electric currents, see (3.22–3.23). It will be called a Φ-wave. The second type of longitudinal electric wave is associated with the curl free electric current potential, see (3.24–3.25), and it will be called a Longitudinal Electromagnetic (LEM) wave. The following notations for the phase velocities of these wave types is used. a = √ ε0 φ0 , b = √ 1 λ0μ0 , c = √ 1 ε0μ0 (3.28) Initially we assume that the values of these phase velocities are independent constants, and that is why we introduced the new constants λ0 and φ0. The additional theoretical prediction of the LEM wave and the Φ-wave are testable, as before Maxwell's TEM wave prediction was tested by Hertz. 3.4 General powerand force theorems Three powerand force laws can be derived that are associated with the Φ-wave, the LEM wave and the TEM wave. The powerand force law for the Φ-wave fields BΦ and EΦ are derived from (3.1) and (3.19): −ρBΦ = φ0 2 ∂B2Φ ∂t + ε0 2 ∂E2Φ ∂t − ε0∇*(BΦEΦ) (3.29) ρEΦ = φ0(∇BΦ)BΦ + ε0(∇*EΦ)EΦ − φ0 ∂(BΦEΦ) ∂t (3.30) The powerand force law for the LEM wave fields BL and EL are derived from (3.2) and (3.20l): −EL * Jl = 1 2μ0 ∂B2L ∂t + λ0 2 ∂E2L ∂t − 1 μ0 ∇*(BLEL) (3.31) BLJl = 1 μ0 (∇BL)BL + λ0(∇*EL)EL − λ0 ∂(BLEL) ∂t (3.32) The powerand force law for the TEM wave fields BT and ET are derived from (3.3) and (3.21): −ET * Jt = 1 2μ0 ∂B2T ∂t + ε0 2 ∂E2T ∂t − 1 μ0 ∇*(BT ×ET ) (3.33) BT × Jt = 1 μ0 BT ×∇×BT + ε0ET ×∇×ET − ε0 ∂(BT ×ET ) ∂t (3.34) Similar energy flux vectors as Poynting's vector for the TEM wave, −BT × ET , can be defined for the Φ-wave: BΦEΦ (see the last term in (3.29) and in (3.30), and for the LEM wave: BLEL (see the last term in (3.31) and in (3.32). For very small values of φ0, the Φ-wave contribution to momentum change becomes very small as well, and yet the Φ-wave contribution to power flux might be substantial! Notice that the fields in these powerand force theorems are not superimposed fields. The most general powerand force theorems should be expressed in terms of superimposed fields, and these are defined as follows: E = EΦ + EL + ET (3.35) E∗ = 1 c2 EΦ + 1 b2 EL + 1 c2 ET (3.36) B = 1 c2 BΦ + BL (3.37) B∗ = 1 a2 BΦ + BL (3.38) The field equations (3.19–3.21) are rewritten in terms of these fields. ∇*E − ∂B ∗ ∂t = 1 ε0 ρ (3.39) ∇B +∇×BT − ∂E∗ ∂t = μ0J (3.40) General powerand force theorems follow from (3.39) and (3.40): −E * J− c2Bρ = 1 μ0 [E * ∂E ∗ ∂t + BT * ∂BT ∂t +B ∂B∗ ∂t ] − 1 μ0 ∇*(BT ×E +BE) (3.41) ρE + J×BT + ( ε0 λ0 Jl + Jt)B ∗ = ε0(∇*E)E + 1 μ0 (∇×E)×E∗ + 1 μ0 (∇B +∇×BT )×BT + (ε0∇BΦ + ε0 λ0μ0 ∇BL + 1 μ0 ∇×BT )B∗ − ε0 ∂(EB∗) ∂t − 1 μ0 ∂(E∗ ×BT ) ∂t (3.42) 134 General Classical Electrodynamics In (3.42) the expression ( ε0λ0Jl + Jt) has to equal J in order to deduce the force law of (2.10) that satisfies N3LM. Therefore, the following condition is generally true: λ0 = ε0 (b = c). Applying this condition, the general powerand force theorems become (if b = c then E∗ = 1c2E): −E * J− c2Bρ = ε0 2 ∂E2 ∂t + 1 2μ0 ∂BT 2 ∂t + B μ0 ∂B∗ ∂t − 1 μ0 ∇*(BT ×E +BE) (3.43) ρE + J×BT + JB∗ = ε0((∇*E)E + (∇×E)×E) + 1 μ0 (∇B +∇×BT )×BT + 1 μ0 (∇B +∇×BT )B∗ − ε0 ∂(EB∗ + E×BT ) ∂t (3.44) From the law of charge continuity and the two scalar field wave equations (see (3.23) and (3.25), and also apply λ0 = ε0), the following scalar field condition is derived for GCED: 1 c2 ∂2B∗ ∂t2 −∇*∇B = 0 (3.45) In case of general magnetostatics, the scalar fields are independent of time, and (3.45) is reduced to ∇ *∇B = 0, which is fulfilled by Lorenz's condition (B = 0), see also (2.14). If B = 0 then BΦ = −c2BL, and B∗ is expressed as B∗ = (1 − c2/a2)BL. In case of general magnetostatics, we also have E = EΦ, so the power theorem and the force theorem for General Magnetostatics are the following two equations: −EΦ * J = ε0 2 ∂E2Φ ∂t + 1 μ0 ∇*(EΦ ×BT ) (3.46) ρEΦ + J×BT + (1− c2 a2 )JBL = ε0(∇*EΦ)EΦ + 1 μ0 ((∇×BT )×BT + (1− c2 a2 )(∇×BT )BL) − ε0 ( (1− c 2 a2 ) ∂EΦ ∂t BL + ∂EΦ ∂t ×BT ) (3.47) This shows that the energy flow carried by stationary currents (for example, from a battery to an energy dissipating resistor [18]) just depend on the 'static' electric field, EΦ, and the vector magnetic field, BT , where stationary currents forces depend also on the scalar magnetic field, BL. 3.5 The Whittaker premise versus the Lorentz premise In case of general magnetostatic currents, the density of the scalar magnetic field force must equal fL = JBL, according to Whittaker's force law that satisfies N3LM. Hence, the factor (1 − c2/a2) in the GCED force theorem for general magnetostatics (3.47) must be approximately equal to 1 in order to fulfill N3LM. We conclude that a c must be generally true, and this is the crux of GCED theory. We will call the assumption, a c, the Whittaker premise, after E.T. Whittaker. This premise should not be confused with the Coulomb "gauge" condition, BL = 0. GCED in the Whittaker premise is called GCED-WP. The assumption a = c (B∗ = B) will be called the Lorentz premise, after H.A. Lorentz. This premise should not be confused with the Lorenz "gauge" condition: B = 0. GCED in the Lorentz premise (GCED-LP) is equivalent with the inconsistent MCED theory, and for this reason the Lorentz premise must be false in general. This is proven as follows: with a = c (B∗ = B), (3.45) becomes: 1 c2 ∂2(B) ∂t2 −∇*∇(B) = 0 (3.48) This equation implies that the superimposed scalar field exists as a free field wave that isn't sourced by any charge current density distribution. If B isn't sourced by anything, it simply does not exist, then we can set B = 0. It is easy to verify that GCED-LP reduces to MCED, by setting B = B∗ = 0. The scalar fields equation (3.45) is a physical condition for physical potentials and physical scalar fields, since the Whittaker premise is true. We have shown that MCED, and in particular the confusing indeterminacy of the potentials in the context of MCED can be avoided, by replacing the Lorentz premise for the Whittaker premise. In §4.1 we refer to the experiments that verify the Whittaker premise and falsify the Lorentz premise. 3.6 Retarded potentials and retarded fields The potentials of GCED-WP are determinate and physical, such that a unique solution of charge-current potentials describes the physics of a particular chargeand current distribution. With a c, and b = c, the scalarand vector potentials are solutions of the following decoupled inhomogeneous wave equations: 1 a2 ∂2Φ ∂t2 −∆Φ = 1 ε0 ρ (3.49) 1 c2 ∂2A ∂t2 −∆A = μ0J (3.50) The solutions of these wave equations are the following retarded potentials: Φ(x, t) = 1 4πε0 ∫ V ′ ρ(x′, ta) r d3x′ (3.51) A(x, t) = μ0 4π ∫ V ′ J(x′, tc) r d3x′ (3.52) r = |x− x′| ta = t− r a tc = t− r c The four retarded fields, derived from these potentials, are: Universal Journal of Physics and Application 10(4): 128-140, 2016 135 BΦ(x, t) = 1 4πε0 ∫ V ′ −ρ(x′, ta) r d3x′ (3.53) BL(x, t) = μ0 4π ∫ V ′ [ Jl(x ′, tc) * r r3 + Jl(x ′, tc) * r cr2 ] d3x′ (3.54) BT (x, t) = μ0 4π ∫ V ′ [ Jt(x ′, tc)× r r3 + Jt(x ′, tc)× r cr2 ] d3x′ (3.55) E(x, t) = 1 4πε0 ∫ V ′ [ ρ(x′, ta)r r3 + ρ(x′, ta)r ar2 − Jl(x ′, tc) c2r − Jt(x ′, tc) c2r ] d3x′ (3.56) We identify three near field terms, that fall off in magnitude by r2, and six far field terms of the Φ, LEM and TEM waves, that fall off in magnitude by r, so GCED-WP is far field consistent. Beside Electrostatics and General Magnetostatics, we define two other types of restricted behavior. A charge-current distributions is Quasi Dynamic (QD) if it is assumed that a → ∞ . A charge-current distribution is Quasi Static (QS) if it is assumed that a → ∞ ∧ c → ∞ . For QD distributions, the retardation of the Coulomb field EΦ, and the scalar potential Φ , is unnoticed (ta = t). The length of the circuit is much smaller than the wavelength of the far Φ-wave, such that detection of a far Φ potential gradient is impossible: the second term in (3.56) becomes zero. The induction law (3.1) is still needed, since the secondary field BΦ does not disappear for quasi dynamics. QD is often referred to as 'instantaneous action at a distance' [19]. In case of QS, also the second term in (3.54) and (3.55) become zero. The induction laws for the secondary fields EL and ET are still required for quasi statics, since the third and fourth term in (3.56) do not disappear. 3.7 The 4 3 problem of MCED The electrostatic energy, Ee, and the electromagnetic momentum, pe, of an electron with charge qe (that is distributed on the surface of a sphere with classical electron radius, re) which has a constant speed v, are the following expressions, derived from Maxwell's CED: Ee = 1 2 1 4πε0 q2e re = mec 2 (3.57) pe = 2 3 μ0 4π q2e re v = m′ev (3.58) Notice the following inconsistency: m′e = 4 3me, which is known as the 43 problem in the context of MCED. David E. Rutherford offered a solution to the this problem. His expressions for the electrostatic energy and the electromagnetic momentum are as follows: Ee = 1 4πε0 q2e re = mec 2 (3.59) pe = μ0 4π q2e re v = m′ev (3.60) Firstly, Rutherford [20] proves that the electrostatic energy of the electron is twice that of (3.57), since the work rate, in order to charge the electron sphere with radius re with a charge qe, is equal to ∂t(qeΦe) = ∂t(qe)Φe + qe∂t(Φe), and not just equal to ∂t(qe)Φe. If we consider only the net charge potential, Φ, the GCED power density is equal to ∇Φ * J + ∂t(Φ)ρ. The volume integral of ∇Φ * J equals Φe∂t(qe). The volume integral of ∂t(Φ)ρ equals ∂t(Φe)qe, and therefore the energy flow of charging the electron sphere equals ∂t(qeΦe), such that (3.59) also follows from GCED. This shows that the 43 problem is in fact a 2 3 problem: an electromagnetic momentum of 13mev is missing. Secondly, Rutherford [21] derives the electromagnetic momentum (3.60) by means of the electromagnetic momentum density expression ε0(EBL+E×BT ); the volume integral of the electromagnetic momentum density ε0(EBL) is equal to the missing 13mev momentum. The time derivative of this momentum density expression is exactly the last term of (3.44) in case we apply the Whittaker premise (B∗ = BL), thus (3.60) follows also from GCED-WP. Now we have me = m′e without factor 4 3 , and this means that the famous equation E = mc2 can be derived from the non-relativistic GCED-WP theory by evaluating the static energy and the electromagnetic momentum of a charged sphere in uniform motion. The consistent GCED-WP theory does not suffer the 43 problem either. 4 Review of CED experiments The development of GCED-WP was motivated by Nikola Tesla's [22, 23] remarkable achievements in electrical engineering. Tesla described his long distance electric energy transport system as transmission of longitudinal electric waves, conducted by a single wire or the natural media, including the aether. Mainstream physics predicts that longitudinal electric waves exist as sound waves conducted by material media only. GCED-WP predicts luminal longitudinal electromagnetic waves, and super luminal electric Φ-waves in vacuum as well, hence, for the first time in history Tesla's observation of a longitudinal aether sound wave is supported by an exact theory. The characteristic 'quarter wave length' distribution, across the unwound wire length of the secondary coil of Tesla's transformer device, is hard to explain by conventional electrodynamics theory, where GCEDWP explains this wave type naturally as a LEM wave. A most general review is required for a wide range of CED experiments that may verify or falsify the new aspects of GCEDWP theory. 4.1 The superluminal Coulomb field SCED and GCED-WP predict that the Coulomb field is superluminal. Superluminal evanescent 'tunneling' of fields has been reported [24]. Usually such effects are explained as quantum effects, however, GCED-WP (a c) explains such effects as a Coulomb near field with superluminal speed, see also [25]. The authors of [26] experimentally proved that the Coulomb near field of a uniformly moving electron beam is rigidly carried by the beam itself, which is further described as follows: the Coulomb near field travels with velocity much greater than c. It is impossible to explain these results by means of MCED, since Jefimenko's electric field expression predicts a field retardation time interval of r/c for the electric near field and the electric far field. 136 General Classical Electrodynamics 4.2 General Magnetostatic force experiments The historic Magnetostatic force experiments carried out by Ampère, Gauss, Weber and other famous scientist, are examples of open circuit currents. It is certain that batteries or very large capacitor banks were used as electric current sources and current sinks that typically showed time varying charge densities and divergent currents at the current source/sink interface, however, delivered a steady voltage and a stationary current. Specific General Magnetostatic experiments such as Ampère's historic hairpin experiment, demonstrate the existence of the longitudinal Ampère force [27] [28] [9]. In particular, Stefan Marinov [8] and Genady Nikolaev [13] published on the results of several GMS force experiments that prove the existence of longitudinal Ampère forces. Nikolaev suggested a classical explanation for the Aharonov Bohm effect: it is a longitudinal Ampère force, acting on the free electrons that pass through a double slit and pass a shielded solenoid on both sides of the solenoid. Such a force does not deflect the free electrons, and it slightly decelerate (delay) or accelerate (advance) the electrons, depending on which side the electrons pass the solenoid, which explains classically the observed phase shift in the interference pattern. An excellent example of General Magnetostatics is Marinov's stationary current motor that works as claimed, as observed by Phipps [29] and others. The Marinov motor configuration is very similar to the Aharonov Bohm experiment: two stationary electric currents, conducted by a metallic rotor ring, pass a solenoid at both sides, such that only a longitudinal Ampère force can explain the ring rotation. Marinov referred to Whittaker's force law and Newton's third law of motion, in order to explain the ring rotation. Wesley's theory of the Marinov motor is incorrect, because equation i = vq has been applied incorrectly for the movement of net electric charge, q, in the conducting ring and the net electric current, i, in the conducting ring. 4.3 Nikolaev induction Experiments have yet to be done to verify or falsify Nikolaev's induction law, see eq. 3.2. According to this law, primary sinusoidal divergent currents induce a secondary sinusoidal divergent electric field EL and similar secondary currents (depending on the resistance in the secondary 'circuits'), such that the secondary current is 90 degrees (or more) out of phase with the primary currents. 4.4 LEM waves Wesley and Monstein published a paper on the transmission of a Φ-wave, by means of a pulsating surface charge on a centrally fed ball antenna [30]. They assumed divergent currents are not present in such an antenna (∇*J = 0), however, this suggests a violation of charge conservation (∇*J = 0 and ∂tρ 6= 0). We suggest that a centrally fed ball antenna conducts curl free divergent currents that induce mainly LEM waves (the fieldBΦ] is negligible), and that Wesley and Monstein actually observed LEM waves in stead of Φ-waves. They tested and confirmed the longitudinal polarity of the received electric field. Ignatiev and Leus used a similar ball shaped antenna to send wireless longitudinal electric waves with a wavelength of 2.5 km [31]. They measured a phase difference between the wireless signal and an optical glass fiber control signal (the two signals are synchronous at the sender location) at a 0.5 km distance from the sender location. They concluded from the measured phase shift that the wireless signal is faster than the optical glass fiber signal, and that the wireless signal has a phase velocity of 1.12 c. However, we assume that the 0.12 c discrepancy is due to an incorrect interpretation of the data, for instance, the optical glass fiber control signal has a phase velocity slower than c (in most cases it is 200,000 km/sec, depending on the refractive index of the glass fiber). Combining the results from the experiments by Wesley, Monstein, Ignatiev and Leus, we conclude that the results verify the existence of the LEM wave that has luminal speed c in air. A very efficient 'quasi-superconducting' Single Wire Electric Power System (SWEP) has been tested [32], that meets the same power requirements for standard 50/60Hz threephase AC power lines. The SWEP system transmits a high frequency high voltage signal that is send and received by tuned and synchronized Tesla transformers. 'Floating' SWEP applications are described that do not require grounding of the SWEP system, therefore it is reasonable to assume the SWEP system is based on the LEM wave concept. Single wire transmission systems that transport TEM wave energy are 'ground return' systems that always require ground connections, such that the electric field is perpendicular to the wire and ground. 4.5 The BΦ field and Φ-waves The field BΦ only exists as far field, so observable effects of this type of field are not similar to near field force interaction, but through the emission and reception of Φ-wave energy. In order to induce observable BΦ fields, one needs to induce high electric charge potentials with very high frequencies. High BΦ fields may be induced by means of collective tunneling of many electrons through a potential energy barrier, since the tunneling of electrons is practically instantaneous. The Φ-wave energy flux vector ε0BφEΦ also depends on the magnitude of electric fields, which can be optimized as well. Negative Resistance Oscillators (NROs) and Negative Conductance Oscillators (NCOs) may be suitable senders and receivers of continuous Φ waves; such oscillators induce the highest electric potential frequencies, and are either based on avalanche ionization effects or collective quantum tunneling effects (or both). Podketnov's "impulse gravity" generator emits a far field signal pulse with velocity of at least 64c [33], over a distance of 1211 meter. The wireless pulse is generated by means of a high voltage discharge (maximum of 2 million volt) from a superconducting flat surface electrode to another nonsuperconducting electrode. The emitted pulse travels into the direction longitudinal (parallel) to the electronic discharge direction. TEM wave radiation, transverse to the direction of discharge, was not detected. Podkletnov concluded that the 'longitudinal direction' signal isn't a TEM wave, nor a beam of mass particles. We assume that Podkletnov's impulse 'gravity' device generates Φ-waves; the measured signal speed of at least 64c agrees with the GCED-WP prediction of a superluminal Φ-wave phase velocity (a c). Secondly, Podkletnov expects that the superluminal signal frequency matches the tunneling frequency of the discharged electrons [34]; during the discharge pulse, many electrons Universal Journal of Physics and Application 10(4): 128-140, 2016 137 tunnel collectively through many superconducting layers before leaving the superconductor. This implies that a high BΦ scalar field is induced, since electron tunneling is an almost instantaneous electronic effect. The electrodynamic nature of the impulse gravity force has not yet been fully investigated by Podkletnov and Modanese. This recently discovered force could also be a novel 'impulse dia-electric' force, that is repulsive for a wide range of materials, similar to the repulsive diamagnetic force in a strong magnetic field. The reception of Φ-waves is most likely the reverse process of the transmission of Φ-waves, and requires the fastest movement of electrons, such as quantum tunneling through an energy barrier. The hypothesis that Φ-waves may stimulate quantum tunneling of electrons will be called the Φ-wave electric effect, similar to the photo-electric effect of electron emissions by a metal surface that is exposed to TEM waves. 4.6 Evidence for natural longitudinal electric waves as energy source The most important GCED-WP application may be the conversion of natural existing longitudinal electric far fields into useful electricity. Nikola Tesla was convinced that such an energy conversion is possible [22, 23]. In particular, the conversion of natural superluminal Φ-waves can be of great importance, since a high frequency energetic Φ-wave penetrates much deeper into the earth and earth atmosphere than electromagnetic waves, because of its relative long wavelength. We assume that a few "free energy" device that were invented in the electronic age, might actually function as claimed and make use of the Φ-electric effect. Dr. T. Henry Moray's radiant energy device converted the energy flow of natural 'cosmic aether' waves into 50 KWatt of useful electricity, day and night [35]. Moray's device did not include batteries or large capacitor banks to store energy. Moray tuned his radiant energy device into a natural high frequency signal, that we assume is a Φ-wave of natural origin. Dr. Harvey Fletcher, who was the co-discoverer of the elementary charge of the electron as the assistant of Nobel price winner Dr. Millikan, signed an affidavit [36] describing that Moray's radiant energy receiver functioned as claimed. The most proprietary component of Moray's device was a high voltage cold cathode tube that contained a Germanium electrode doped with impurities, called 'the detector tube' by Moray. The high voltage high frequency electric potential at the first energy receiving stage appeared to be at over 200,000 volts. Electron tunneling and avalanche ionization effects explain the observed high frequency signal generated by Moray's valve tube, as well as the reported negative slope in a part of the conduction characteristic of the Moray tube. Moray's suggestion that transverse electromagnetic gamma rays are the energy source of his device is unlikely, since the cosmic gamma ray intensity at the earth surface is too weak to explain 50 KWatt of continuous output power generated by such a small device. The conversion of mass energy into electricity as alternative explanation for Moray's device power output was rejected by Moray himself, therefore Φ-wave energy conversion remains one of the few explanations. Dr. P.N. Correa's [37] energy conversion system is also based on a cold cathode plasma tube, which shows an excess electric power output. Correa described an anomalous and longitudinal cathode reaction force during self-pulsed abnormal glow discharges in a cold cathode plasma tube. Correa observed the abnormal glow discharge in a negative slope current-voltage regime. The same 'pre-discharge' glow has been observed by Podkletnov, just before the pulse discharge of his 'gravity' impulse device. A similar excess energy result was achieved by Dr. Chernetsky [38] by means of a selfpulsed high voltage discharge tube filled with hydrogen gas. Chernetsky's hydrogen gas tube generated longitudinal electronic waves in the electrical circuits attached to the tube, powering several hundred watt lamps. These self-oscillating electronic plasma tube systems are without doubt negative resistance/conductance oscillators (NRO/NCO), optimized for Fowler-Nordheim quantum tunneling from a cold cathode to vacuum, and optimized for avalanche effects. The self-oscillation criteria for NROs and NCOs are not fully understood even today. We suggest that this type of device can function as a powerful Φ-wave energy receiver, which explains its excess energy output. 5 Conclusions N3LM describes the motion of bodies that have mass; this law does not take into account the momentum of massless electromagnetic radiation. N3LM can be replaced by the more general principle of conservation of the sum of massand massless momentum. It is sometimes concluded that MCED satisfies the more general principle of momentum conservation, however, MCED violates this principle as well: circuits of stationary currents do not send or receive electromagnetic radiation with massless momentum, and it was already shown that Grassmann force law violate N3LM, in case of General Magnetostatics. One might take into account infrared radiation caused by friction, emitted by magnetostatic current circuits. However, infrared radiation does compensate for the non-reciprocal Lorentz force, since the magnitude of momentum changes due to infrared radiation usually is much smaller than the occurring Ampère forces exerted on conductors, and secondly, this radiation is usually emitted in all directions such that the contribution of momentum change due to infrared radiation emission nullifies. The fundamental theorem of vector algebra, that holds for time dependent vector functions [39] as well, is essential for a comprehensive treatise and derivation of a consistent classical electrodynamics. We showed that GCED-LP (a = c) reduces to the inconsistent MCED, that shows indeterminate potentials. Therefore, we conclude that the Lorentz premise is false, and that the Whittaker premise (a c) is fundamentally true. GCED-WP is a consistent electrodynamics theory, naturally based on the law of charge continuity (and not on divergence free currents), that solves the 43 problem as well. Experimental results exist that verify GCEDWP and falsify MCED. GCED-WP and the extra condition ∇*J = ∂tρ = 0 reduces to SCED, which is a consistent theory and the essence of MCED. Classical electrodynamics is closely tied to modern physics theories, such as relativity theory and quantum mechanics. The false Lorentz premise (a = c) is key to understand the second postulate of Special Relativity (SR) theory, a proposition in the following circular arguments: MCED does not predict longitudinal wave modes in vacuum, therefore vacuum can not be a physical medium (a physical medium allows for longitudinal waves), therefore a relative motion of an observer with respect to vacuum is not possible, such that 138 General Classical Electrodynamics the speed of light has an absolute constant value c regardless of the relative motion of light source and observer (the second SR postulate), such that the Lorentz transform has preference over the Galilei transform, which further forbids velocities higher than constant c, such that a = c, and this reduces GCED to MCED, etc ... These circular arguments of SR theory began with the false Lorentz premise (a = c), which is the most fundamental assumption of SR, and which reduces GCED to the inconsistent MCED. One-way TEM wave experiments prove the anisotropy of the TEM wave velocity in vacuum [40], and the recent "gravity impulse" speed measurements by E. Podkletnov [33] is strong evidence for a superluminal wave speed of 64c. These experiments falsify both the Lorentz-Poincaré SR theory and Hilbert's general relativity theory. To formulate a relativistic and consistent GCED-WP theory, a relativity principle other than Lorentz invariance should be applied anyway. Heinrich Hertz and Thomas E. Phipps [41] showed how to cast MCED into a Galilei invariant form by simply replacing the partial time differential operator by the total time differential operator. In this way GCED-WP can be cast into a relativistic Galilei invariant GCED-WP. The unfounded conjecture from Quantum Mechanics theory: "the linearly dependent 'scalar' photon and 'longitudinal' photon do not contribute to field observables", is obviously based on the false Lorentz premise, and is expressed classically as follows: B = B∗ = 0. The indeterminacy of the quantum wave function, ψ, is tied to the indeterminacy of the MCED potentials, Φ and A. A gauge transform of the relativistic quantum wave equation is a transformation of the MCED potentials and the quantum wave function in Φ′, A′ and ψ′, such that the phase of the transformed function ψ′ differs a constant with the phase of the function ψ, and such that the relativistic quantum wave equation is "gauge invariant" [42]. This means the function ψ is 'unphysical' and indeterminate as well. The indeterminacy of ψ is explained as "probabilistic behavior" of elementary particles (the Born rule): the particle velocity is the ψ wave group velocity, and is not associated with ψ wave phase velocity. Gauge invariance is also known as gauge symmetry, and is supposed to be the guiding principle of modern particle physics, however, this "gauge freedom" is merely the consequence of a false Lorentz premise (a = c), that reduces determinate GCED potentials to indeterminate MCED potentials. Recent scanning tunneling microscope experiments [43] falsify Heisenberg's uncertainty relations by close two orders of magnitude, which is proof for the deterministic physical nature of the quantum wave function. The determinate potentials of GCED-WP are agreeable with a determinate quantum wave function, where the phase of ψ has physical meaning. The De Broglie-Bohm pilot wave theory comes into mind, in order to reinterpret quantum entanglement behavior as interferences of physical pilot waves. The unknown nature of Bohm's pilot wave has been an objection against pilot wave theory, ever since Bohm and de Broglie offered his interpretation Schrödinger's equation solutions. Caroline H. Thompson [44] published a paper on the universal ψ function as the Φ-wave aether. Indeed, super luminal Φ-wave fields, acting as particle pilot waves, is a natural suggestion, such that the pilot wave nature is no longer "ghost like" and unknown. Quantum nonlocality and non-causal entanglement may be confused with causal and local quasi dynamics. GCED-WP offers a classical foundation for the elementary particle-wave duality. The electromagnetic momentum and the near Φ-potential energy describes the particle mass energy and mass momentum, and the pilot Φ-wave particle interference describes the particle wave nature. Although a consistent physics foundation based on determinate functions is the final destiny of modern physics, it is of greater importance that GCED-WP inspires scientists and engineers to review past classical electrodynamics experiments, which may birth a new era of science and technology with respect to telecommunication and energy conversion. Acknowledgements We are grateful to Samer Al Duleimi and Ernst van Den Bergh for valuable discussions. REFERENCES [1] James Clerk Maxwell. A treatise on electricity and magnetism, volume One. Dover Publications, Inc. New York, 1954. https://ia902302.us.archive.org/25/items/ ATreatiseOnElectricityMagnetism-Volume1/ Maxwell-ATreatiseOnElectricityMagnetismVolume1. pdf. [2] James Clerk Maxwell. A treatise on electricity and magnetism, volume Two. Dover Publications, Inc. New York, 1954. https://ia902302.us.archive.org/25/items/ ATreatiseOnElectricityMagnetism-Volume2/ Maxwell-ATreatiseOnElectricityMagnetismVolume2. pdf. [3] Olivier Darrigol. Electrodynamics from Ampère to Einstein, page 210. Oxford University Press, 2003. [4] Richard P. Feynman. The feynman lectures online. http://www.feynmanlectures.caltech.edu/II_13. html. [5] John David Jackson. Classical Electrodynamics Third Edition. Wiley, 1998. http://www.amazon.com/ Classical-Electrodynamics-Third-Edition\ \-Jackson/dp/047130932X. [6] David J. Griffiths. Introduction to Electrodynamics. Pearson Education Limited, 2013. http://www.amazon.com/ Introduction-Electrodynamics-Edition-\ \David-Griffiths/dp/0321856562. [7] Alexander Altland. Classical electrodynamics. http://www.thp.uni-koeln.de/alexal/pdf/ electrodynamics.pdf. [8] Stefan Marinov. DIVINE ELECTROMAGNETISM. EAST WEST International Publishers, 1993. http://zaryad.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/ Stefan-Marinov.pdf. [9] Jorge Guala-Valverde & Ricardo Achilles. A manifest failure of Grassmann's force. http://redshift.vif.com/JournalFiles/ V15NO2PDF/V15N2VAL.pdf. Universal Journal of Physics and Application 10(4): 128-140, 2016 139 [10] E.T. Whittaker. THEORIES OF AETHER AND ELECTRICITY. Trinity College Dublin:printed at the University Press, by Ponsonby and Gibbs, 1910. [11] A.K. Tomilin. The Fundamentals of Generalized Electrodynamics. D. Serikbaev East-Kazakhstan State Technical University, 2008. http://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/0807/0807. 2172.pdf. [12] David E. Rutherford. Action-reaction paradox resolution, 2006. http://www.softcom.net/users/der555/actreact. pdf. [13] Gennady V. Nikolaev. Electrodynamics Physical Vacuum. Tomsk Polytechnical University, 2004. http://electricaleather.com/ d/358095/d/nikolayevg.v. elektrodinamikafizicheskogovakuuma.pdf. [14] Ludvig Valentin Lorenz. On the identity of the vibrations of light with electrical currents. Philosophical Magazine, 34:287–301, 1867. [15] Michael Faraday. Experiments resulting in the discovery of the principles of electromagnetic induction. In Faraday's Diary, Volume 1, pages 367–92. http://faradaysdiary.com/ws3/faraday.pdf, 1831. [16] H.R Hertz. Ueber sehr schnelle electrische Schwingungen. Annalen der Physik, vol. 267, no. 7, p. 421-448, 1887. [17] J.D. Jackson. From Lorenz to Coulomb and other explicit gauge transformations. Department of Physics and Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, LBNL-50079, 2002. http://arxiv.org/ftp/physics/papers/0204/ 0204034.pdf. [18] Igal Galili and Elisabetta Goihbarg. Energy transfer in electrical circuits: A qualitative account. http://sites.huji.ac.il/science/stc/staff_h/ Igal/Research%20Articles/Pointing-AJP.pdf. [19] Andrew E. Chubykalo and Roman Smirnov-Rueda. Instantaneous Action at a Distance in Modern Physics: "Pro" and "Contra" (Contemporary Fundamental Physics). Nova Science Publishers, Inc., 1999. [20] David E. Rutherford. Energy density correction, 2003. http://www.softcom.net/users/der555/enerdens. pdf. [21] David E. Rutherford. 4/3 problem resolution, 2002. http://www.softcom.net/users/der555/elecmass. pdf. [22] Andre Waser. Nikola Tesla's Radiations and the Cosmic Rays. http://www.andre-waser.ch/Publications/ NikolaTeslasRadiationsAndCosmicRays.pdf, 2000. [23] Andre Waser. Nikola Tesla's Wireless Systems. http://www.andre-waser.ch/Publications/ NikolaTeslasWirelessSystems.pdf, 2000. [24] G. Nimtz and A.A. Stahlhofen. Macroscopic violation of special relativity. http://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/0708/0708. 0681.pdf. [25] Shuangjin Shi Qi Qiu Zhi-Yong Wang, Jun Gou. Evanescent Fields inside a Cut-off Waveguide as Near Fields. Optics and Photonics Journal, 2013, 3, 192-196, 1993. [26] P. Patteri M. Piccolo G. Pizzella R. de Sangro, G. Finocchiaro. Measuring propagation speed of coulomb fields. http://arxiv.org/pdf/1211.2913v2.pdf. [27] Lars Johansson. Longitudinal electrodynamic forces and their possible technological applications. Department of Electromagnetic Theory, Lund Institute of Technology, 1996. http://www.df.lth.se/~snorkelf/ LongitudinalMSc.pdf. [28] Rémi Saumont. Mechanical effects of an electrical current in conductive media. 1. Experimental investigation of the longitudinal Ampère force. Physics Letters A, Volume 165, Issue 4, Pages 307-313, 25 May 1992, 1992. [29] Thomas E. Phipps Jr. Observations of the Marinov motor. http://redshift.vif.com/JournalFiles/Pre2001/ V05NO3PDF/v05n3phi.pdf. [30] C. Monstein and J.P. Wesley. Observation of scalar longitudinal electrodynamic waves. Europhysics Letters, 2002. [31] V.A. Leus G.F. Ignatiev. On a superluminal transmission at the phase velocities. Instantaneous action at a distance in modern physics: "pro" and "contra", 1999. [32] Stanislav V. Avramenko, Aleksei I. Nekrasov, Dmitry, S. Strebkov. SWEP SYSTEM FOR RENEWABLE-BASED ELECTRIC GRID. The All-Russian Research Institute for Electrification of Agriculture, Moscow, Russia, 2002. http://ptp.irb.hr/upload/mape/kuca/07_Dmitry_ S_Strebkov_SINGLE-WIRE_ELECTRIC_POWER_SYSTEM_ FOR_RE.pdf. [33] Evgeny Podkletnov and Giovanni Modanese. Study of light interaction with gravity impulses and measurements of the speed of gravity impulses. In Gravity-Superconductors Interactions: Theory and Experiment, chapter 14, pages 169–182. Bentham Science Publishers, 2015. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/ 281440634_Study_of_Light_Interaction_with_ Gravity_Impulses_and_Measurements_of_the_ Speed_of_Gravity_Impulses. [34] Evgeny Podkletnov and Giovanni Modanese. Investigation of high voltage discharges in low pressure gases through large ceramic superconducting electrodes. http://xxx.lanl.gov/pdf/physics/0209051.pdf, 2003. [35] Dr. T. Henry Moray. For Beyond the Light Rays Lies the Secret of the Universe. http://free-energy.ws/pdf/radiant_energy_1926. pdf, 1926. [36] Harvey Fletcher. Affidavit, signed by dr. harvey fletcher. Affidavit, signed by Harvey Fletcher and Public Notary, confirming T.H. Moray's Radiant Energy Device functioned as claimed. http://thmoray.org/images/affidavit.pdf, 1979. [37] Paulo N. Correa and Alexandra N. Correa. Excess energy (XS NRGTM ) conversion system utilizing autogenous pulsed abnormal glow discharge (PAGD). Labofex Scientific Report Series, 1996. [38] A.V. Chernetsky. Processes in plasma systems with electric charge division. G.Plekhanov Institute, Moscow, 1989. [39] Andrew Chubykalo, Augusto Espinoza, Rolando Alvarado Flores. Helmholtz theorems, gauge transformations, general covariance and the empirical meaning of gauge conditions. Journal of Modern Physics, 7:1021–1044, 2016. 140 General Classical Electrodynamics [40] Reginald T. Cahill. One-Way Speed of Light Measurements Without Clock Synchronisation. http://www.ptep-online.com/index_files/2012/ PP-30-08.PDF, 2012. [41] Thomas E. Phipps Jr. On hertz's invariant form of maxwell's equations. http://www.angelfire.com/sc3/elmag/files/ phipps/phipps01.pdf. [42] J. D. Jackson. Historical roots of gauge invariance. Department of Physics and Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, LBNL-47066, 2001. http://arxiv.org/pdf/hep-ph/0012061v5.pdf. [43] Werner A. Hofer. Heisenberg, uncertainty, and the scanning tunneling microscope. http://xxx.lanl.gov/pdf/1105.3914v3.pdf. [44] Caroline H. Thompson. The phi-wave aether. In Has the Last Word Been Said on Classical Electrodynamics? –New Horizons, chapter 22, pages 350–370. Rinton Press, Inc, 2004.

Ontological Minimalism about Phenomenology susanna schellenberg The Australian National University I develop a view of the common factor between subjectively indistinguishable perceptions and hallucinations that avoids analyzing experiences as involving awareness relations to abstract entities, sense-data, or any other peculiar entities. The main thesis is that hallucinating subjects employ concepts (or analogous nonconceptual structures), namely the very same concepts that in a subjectively indistinguishable perception are employed as a consequence of being related to external, mind-independent objects or property-instances. These concepts and nonconceptual structures are identified with modes of presentation types. Since a hallucinating subject is not related to any such objects or property-instances, the concepts she employs remain empty. I argue that the phenomenology of hallucinations and perceptions can be identified with employing concepts and analogous nonconceptual structures. By doing so, I defend an ontologically minimalist view of the phenomenology of experience that (1) vindicates Aristotelianism about types and (2) amounts to a naturalized view of the phenomenology of experience. Galileo: Vision is perfect. People have very good eyes. Apicius: Whose weak eyes, then, need the help of your lenses? Galileo: They are the eyes of the philosophers. Fontenelle, Dialogues des morts, 1683 When a subject sees an object instantiating certain properties, it is natural to say that it seems to her that she is seeing an object instantiating those properties because she is perceptually related to that very object and those very property-instances. So when she sees a white cup, it seems to her that there is a white cup precisely because she is perceptually related to a white cup. By definition, ONTOLOGICAL MINIMALISM ABOUT PHENOMENOLOGY 1 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Vol. LXXXIII No. 1, July 2011  2010 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LLC Philosophy and Phenomenological Research when a subject is hallucinating, she is not perceptually related to the external, mind-independent object that her experience is seemingly of. If she is suffering a non-veridical hallucination, it seems to her that there is a particular object, such as a white cup, where in fact there is none. Since she is not perceptually related to a white cup, the fact that it seems to her that there is a white cup present cannot be explained in virtue of a perceptual relation to an external, mind-independent object and the properties it instantiates. So how should we explain the phenomenology of hallucinations? Let's call this the hallucination question. Many differences between philosophical views of perceptual experience can be traced back to how this question is answered. There are two standard ways of answering the hallucination question. One common response is to argue that a hallucinating subject stands in an awareness relation to a peculiar entity. This peculiar entity has been understood to be an abstract entity, such as a property-cluster, an (uninstantiated) universal, an intentional object, or a proposition. It has also been understood to be a strange particular, such as a sensedatum, a quale, or a Meinongian object.1 As Dretske formulates the idea: ''hallucinations are experiences in which one is aware of properties. ... Can we really be aware of (uninstantiated) universals? Yes, we can, and, yes, we sometimes are'' (2000, p. 162–3). Similarly, Tye writes: ''[i]n attending to the color of the ball, you are directly aware of 1 For views according to which hallucinating subjects stand in awareness or acquaintance relations to property-clusters, see Johnston 2004; for intentional objects, see Harman 1990, Lycan 1996; for propositions, see Russell 1913; for sense-data, see Robinson 1994; for qualia, see Block 2003; for Meinongian objects, see Parsons 1980. It is important to note that one could argue that hallucinating subjects represent intentional objects without arguing that the subjects stand in awareness or acquaintance relations to such objects. For a defense of such a view, see Crane 1998. Similarly, one can argue that the phenomenology of hallucinations is constituted by qualia without arguing that hallucinating subjects stand in awareness or acquaintance relations to these qualia. For a defense of such a view, see Chalmers 1996, McLaughlin 2007, and Shoemaker 2007. Finally, one can argue that the content of a hallucination is a Russellian proposition without arguing that hallucinating subjects stand in awareness or acquaintance relations to these propositions or their constituents. Byrne (2001) and Pautz (2007) defend versions of such a view. Arguably, any view that aims to explain phenomenology in virtue of properties or objects that constitute the content of experience is committed to positing that the experiencing subject stands in an awareness or acquaintance relation to these properties or objects. For a defense of this thesis, see Crane 2006, p. 128ff. It would lead too far afield to discuss here to what extent such views are peculiar entity views. I will reserve this for another occasion. For the purposes of this paper, any view that denies that subjects stand in awareness or acquaintance relations to peculiar entities is not my target. I will address such views only to the extent that they face the same problems as peculiar entity views. 2 SUSANNA SCHELLENBERG a certain quality, Q, as covering that surface. ... If the ball does not exist [you are hallucinating], still you are directly aware of Q. ... the phenomenal character involves the surface qualities of which the subject of the visual experience is directly aware'' (2002, p. 141). With 'peculiar entity' I mean any object that is not an external, mind-independent object, such as a cat, cup, or a carrot; and any property that cannot be analyzed in terms of external, mind-independent propertyinstances, such as the whiteness or shape of the cup on my desk, or relations to such property-instances. Let's call a view according to which a hallucinating subject stands in an awareness relation to an entity that is not a material, mind-independent object or propertyinstance, a peculiar entity view. Peculiar entity views have it that since hallucinating subjects are aware of something, they must stand in an awareness relation to something that accounts for this phenomenology. So such views operate with a particular understanding of what it means to be aware of something. By distinguishing between extensional and intensional awareness, I will argue that one can acknowledge that hallucinating subjects are aware of something without analyzing ''awareness of'' in terms of an awareness relation to an object, property, or any other entity. A second way of responding to the hallucination question is to stipulate that a hallucination could be subjectively indistinguishable from a perception, but to leave unexplained how this could be possible (e.g. Snowdon 1981, Campbell 2002).2 Let's call such a view negativism about hallucinations. Negativist views avoid introducing peculiar entities of which hallucinating subjects are aware, but at the cost of leaving unexplained just what accounts for the phenomenology of hallucinations and how a hallucination could be subjectively indistinguishable from a perception. There are many ways of understanding the claim that two experiences are subjectively indistinguishable. Williamson (1990) uses the expression to pick out an epistemic notion. In short, the idea is that two experiences e1 and e2 are subjectively indistinguishable for a subject if and only if she is not able to know by introspection alone that e1 and e2 are not the same. I will follow this use. I will not argue here that the possible subjective indistinguishability of a hallucination and a perception needs to be explained. In the context of this paper, I will 2 Of course, it need not be a positive part of the view that the possible subjective indistinguishability of a hallucination and a perception is not something that requires explanation. What characterizes negativism is the fact that the view does not explain possible subjective indistinguishability. Negativist views could fail to explain this due to neglect or since the defender of the view holds that possible subjective indistinguishability is something that does not require explanation. ONTOLOGICAL MINIMALISM ABOUT PHENOMENOLOGY 3 take this for granted. Indeed, I will posit that any account of experience should explain the possibility that a perception and a hallucination can (seemingly) have the same phenomenology and thus be subjectively indistinguishable.3 Call this the indistinguishability desideratum. The distinction between the way the peculiar entity view and negativism answer the hallucination question is orthogonal to the distinction between two fundamentally different ways of thinking about the relation between hallucinations and accurate perceptions. Disjunctivists and naıve realists characterize hallucinations in terms of a deficiency of an accurate perception and argue that perceptions and hallucinations do not share a common element.4 By contrast, common factor views have it that perceptions and subjectively indistinguishable hallucinations share a common element that accounts for the phenomenology of the experiences. Although the two distinctions are orthogonal, most peculiar entity views are common factor views and most negativist views are versions of disjunctivism. The fault line between disjunctivism and common factor views does not however coincide with the fault line between negativism and peculiar entity views. There are for instance views on which hallucinations-but not perceptions-are a matter of being related to a peculiar entity (e.g. Johnston 2004). So there are peculiar entity views on which hallucinations and perceptions do not share a common element. However, with the aim of giving a common account of both perception and hallucination, most peculiar entities views posit that a perceiving subject is related to the very same (or the very same kind of) peculiar entity that she would be related to, were she hallucinating. My aim is to present a positive view of hallucinations that satisfies the indistinguishability desideratum without endorsing the thesis that perceptions or hallucinations are a matter of standing in an awareness relation to a peculiar entity. I will pursue this aim by arguing that perceptions and subjectively indistinguishable hallucinations share a common element that accounts for the subjective indistinguishability of the 3 It should be noted that Campbell (2002) denies that a hallucination has the same phenomenology as a perception in the metaphysical sense. However, even he concedes that a hallucination could be subjectively indistinguishable from a perception in the epistemic sense, given that the experiencing subject may not be able to tell that there is a metaphysical difference between her experiences. 4 Naıve realism is a new-fangled version of disjunctivism. By contrast to most traditional disjunctivists, naıve realists deny not only that hallucinations have content, but are moreover skeptical that perceptions have content. Campbell (2002), Travis (2004), and Brewer (2006) argue explicitly that perceptions do not have content. For ease of presentation, I will speak only of disjunctivism, but everything I say about disjunctivism generalizes to naıve realism. 4 SUSANNA SCHELLENBERG experiences, while acknowledging that hallucinations exhibit a deficiency that can only be explained with reference to accurate perceptions. So I will defend a common factor view that does not amount to a peculiar entity view and that recognizes the disjunctivist insight that hallucinations are deficient. The main thesis is that hallucinating subjects employ concepts (or analogous nonconceptual structures), namely the very same concepts that in a subjectively indistinguishable perception are employed as a consequence of the perceiving subject being related to external, mind-independent objects and property-instances. Since a subject who suffers a non-veridical hallucination is not perceptually related to the external, mind-independent objects or propertyinstances that it seems to her are present, the concepts she employs remain empty. As a consequence, hallucinations are deficient. Insofar as the concepts employed in hallucinations are grounded in perceptions and can only be analyzed with regard to their role in perceptions, hallucinations are derivative of perceptions. In §1, I will critically discuss disjunctivism and those versions of the common factor view on which experiential states are awareness relations to peculiar entities. In §2, I will develop a view of the phenomenology of experience that circumvents the need to think of experiences in terms of awareness relations to peculiar entities. I will call it ontological minimalism about phenomenology. In §3, I will discuss the notion of content that this view implies. In §4, I will respond to five objections to the view. First, it is necessary to make a few terminological remarks. When I speak of an experience without qualification, I mean an experience that is a perception, a hallucination, or an illusion. When I speak of objects without further qualifications, I mean material, mind-independent objects, such as cats, cups, or carrots. 1. Disjunctivism and the Common Factor View Disjunctivists take as their starting point the perceptual relation between subject and object in the case of an accurate perception and argue that perception is fundamentally a perceptual relation to an object. When a subject s perceives an object o, she stands in a perceptual relation R to that very object o. So perception has the form Rso. Since a hallucinating subject is not perceptually related to an object, or at least not the one that it seems to her she is related to, a hallucination could not possibly share the Rso-form of perception. So disjunctivists conceive of the structure of perception in a way that a hallucination could not possibly share. As a result they argue that there is no common element between hallucinations and perceptions. ONTOLOGICAL MINIMALISM ABOUT PHENOMENOLOGY 5 There are at least two problems with such a view that are of immediate relevance for present purposes. A first problem is that if phenomenology is explained in terms of perceptual relations to the very objects that the experiencing subject sees and the properties that this object instantiates, then it is unclear what accounts for the phenomenology of hallucinations. A hallucinating subject is not perceptually related to the object that it seems to her is present. So the phenomenology of her experience cannot be explained simply in terms of perceptual relations to objects and the properties they instantiate. A second problem is that, if the fundamental structure of perception is one that a hallucination could not possible share, then it is unclear how the indistinguishability desideratum could be satisfied.5 Obviously, there is much more to be said about these problems. I cannot here do justice to the subtleties of disjunctivism.6 Rather than further pursue a discussion of disjunctivism, I will assume that these two problems are problems and focus on developing a view that avoids them without positing that hallucinating subjects are aware of peculiar entities. In contrast to disjunctivism, common factor views argue that there is a common element between perceptions and subjectively indistinguishable hallucinations. There are many different versions of this view. Indeed there are at least as many different versions as there are different ways of conceiving of the common element, multiplied by the different possible ways of understanding the additional element that distinguishes hallucinations from perceptions. Adverbialism has it that being appeared to F-ly is the common element between perceiving and hallucinating an F (Chisholm 1957). Adverbialism is a view according to which hallucinations and perceptions share a common element, without that common element constituting a peculiar entity. On sensedatum theory, the common element is a sense-datum, that is, a concrete particular that has just the properties of which the experiencing subject is aware (Price 1950, Moore 1953, Jackson 1977, Robinson 1994). Qualia theory argues that the common element is a quale (e.g. Block 1990, Chalmers 1996). All three views have been criticized widely (e.g. 5 Martin (2002) argues that a hallucination that is subjectively indistinguishable from a perception instantiates an indistinguishability property in virtue of which it is subjectively indistinguishable from the perception. More specifically, he argues that our epistemic situation with regard to our experience is the same regardless of whether we are perceiving or hallucinating. Arguably, this does not constitute an explanation of what accounts for the hallucination being subjectively indistinguishable and so such an account does not satisfy what we have called the indistinguishability desideratum. For a discussion of Martin's indistinguishability properties, see Siegel 2004. 6 For detailed discussions, see Haddock and Macpherson 2008, Siegel 2008, and my forthcoming-a. 6 SUSANNA SCHELLENBERG Strawson 1979, Smith 2002, Johnston 2004, Crane 2006) and I have nothing substantial to add to their criticisms. I will focus on those versions of the peculiar entity view on which the experiencing subject stands in an awareness relation to an abstract entity. In particular, I will concentrate on property-cluster views. According to the property-cluster view an experiencing subject is related to a property-cluster regardless of whether she is perceiving or hallucinating. There are at least three versions of this view. On what I will call a pure property-cluster view, experience does not have content. It is simply a matter of being related to a propertycluster. On what I will call a content property-cluster view, experience is a matter of being related to a Russellian proposition that is constituted by a property-cluster and possibly one or more objects. There are two versions of the content property-cluster view. On the standard view, perceptions and subjectively indistinguishable hallucinations are analyzed in terms of relations to the very same (or the very same kind of) Russellian proposition. On a gappy version of the view, the content of a hallucination is gappy in the object-place because an object is missing, while the gap is filled by an object in the case of a perception.7 Not all of these views rely on awareness relations to abstract objects. However, as I will argue shortly, any property-cluster view requires that the property-cluster is potentially constituted by uninstantiated universals to avoid facing obvious counterexamples. In the rest of this section, I will present an argument against those versions of the common factor view according to which hallucinating subjects stand in an awareness relation to an abstract entity. I will focus first on the pure property-cluster view and will then discuss the extent to which the problems facing this view arise for content property-cluster views. Since the property-cluster view is most famously associated with Johnston, it will be helpful to make a few clarifying remarks about his account to begin. Johnston's view is summed up in the following passage: When we see we are aware of instantiations of sensible profiles. When we hallucinate we are aware merely of the structured qualitative parts of such sensible profiles. Any case of 7 The pure property-cluster view is defended by Johnston (2004); for the content property-cluster view, see Tye 2000, Byrne 2001, and Pautz 2007 among others; for the gappy content property-cluster view, see Bach 2007 and Tye 2007. I defend a gappy content view (see my 2006), but one that is not a version of the propertycluster view. ONTOLOGICAL MINIMALISM ABOUT PHENOMENOLOGY 7 hallucination is thus a case of ''direct'' visual awareness of less than one would be ''directly'' aware of in the corresponding case of seeing. (2004, p. 137) As Johnston argues, when we hallucinate, we are aware of an uninstantiated property-cluster, that is, a structured qualitative part of a sensible profile. When we perceive, we are aware of a property-cluster instantiated by an external, mind-independent object, that is, an instantiated sensible profile. Instantiations of sensible profiles and structured qualitative parts of sensible profiles are not the same things. Given that they are not the same things, there is no reason to think that they amount to a common factor. If they do not amount to a common factor, then Johnston's view is a version of disjunctivism.8 For the sake of clarity, I will work with an idealized version of a property-cluster view on which a hallucinating subject is related to the very same propertycluster regardless of whether she is hallucinating or perceiving. Everything I will say about the idealized version generalizes to versions of the property-cluster view on which there are differences between what the subject is related to when she is hallucinating and what she is related to when she is perceiving. So everything I will say about the idealized version generalizes to Johnston's property-cluster view. Consider a subject s who has a non-veridical hallucination as of a material, mind-independent object o that seems to be instantiating property P at location L. Since there is no object o at location L, there is no object that could be instantiating P. Therefore, what the subject is aware of can neither be the material, mind-independent object o, nor the properties instantiated by such a material, mind-independent object. The property-cluster view has it that hallucinating subjects stand in an awareness relation to properties that are not instantiated where the subject experiences them to be instantiated. Since these properties are not instantiated where they are experienced to be, they are conceived of as universals. This view is phenomenologically controversial since universals are abstract entities. Abstract entities are not spatially extended and it is not clear what it would be to be sensorily aware of something that is not spatially extended.9 At least phenomenally, it is more plausible to say that when one experiences a white cup, one is aware of an instance of whiteness, not an abstract entity.10 8 For a critical discussion of Johnston's view along these lines, see also Pautz 2007. 9 A second way that one may question the possibility of sensory awareness of abstract entities is by arguing that such awareness requires causation and universals do not cause. For an excellent discussion of the problem of sensory awareness of abstract entities and possible solutions to it, see Pautz 2007. 10 For a classical defense of this thesis, see Williams 1953. 8 SUSANNA SCHELLENBERG There are several possible ways for the property-cluster theorist to respond to the criticism that the view is phenomenologically controversial. She might distinguish between being sensorily and cognitively aware of something. This would allow her to argue that hallucinating subjects are cognitively aware of abstract entities, while perceiving subjects are sensorily aware of the objects and property-instances to which they are perceptually related. Even if we would grant, for the sake of argument, that one could be cognitively aware of abstract entities, this response to the phenomenological worry raised above faces a second phenomenological problem. Arguably, being cognitively aware of something is phenomenally distinct from being sensorily aware of something. If this is right, then it is not clear how such an approach would satisfy the indistinguishability desideratum. The property-cluster view could circumvent this second phenomenological problem by arguing that subjects are cognitively aware of abstract entities regardless of whether they are perceiving or hallucinating. This way of dealing with the problem faces several worries. One worry is that perceptual experience is assimilated too strongly to thought. A second worry is that while non-rational animals can perceive, it is not clear that they can be cognitively aware of abstract entities. A third worry is how such a view can account for the particular sensory character of experiences. There are several options for the property-cluster theorist to proceed from this point. But any option will involve positing that hallucinating subjects are either cognitively or sensorily aware of abstract entities. Arguably, this is reason enough to be at the very least wary of the view. The property-cluster view is not only phenomenologically controversial, it is moreover metaphysically controversial. To show why, let's assume for a moment an Aristotelian view of types, that is, a view that is committed to the principle that the existence of a type depends on its tokens, where the tokens depend in turn on concrete entities of the physical world insofar as the tokens are for instance instantiated by concrete physical entities. We can call this the Aristotelian principle. This principle implies that any type must be tokened somewhere and that it must be possible to analyze any token in terms of concrete entities of the physical world. Applied to properties, the Aristotelian principle implies that any property must be instantiated somewhere. A property-cluster theorist who accepts the Aristotelian principle will have to constrain possible hallucinations to hallucinations of properties that are instantiated somewhere in the actual world. But by doing so her view faces a whole range of counterexamples. It is ONTOLOGICAL MINIMALISM ABOUT PHENOMENOLOGY 9 easy to conceive of hallucinations of uninstantiated properties, that is, properties that are not instantiated anywhere. Examples are hallucinations of Hume's missing shade of blue and hallucinations of supersaturated red. Not only are such hallucinations conceivable, they are easy to produce.11 The property-cluster theorist could account for hallucinations of uninstantiated properties by rejecting the Aristotelian principle and by arguing that hallucinating subjects are at least sometimes related to uninstantiated universals.12 However by doing so, she commits herself to a controversial metaphysical view of types. The view is metaphysically controversial since accepting the existence of uninstantiated universals requires some kind of Platonic 'two realms'-view on which there is more to reality than what can be analyzed in terms of what exists in the concrete physical world. There are universals that cannot be analyzed in terms of their instances in the concrete physical world or in terms of any other concrete physical entities. The rival Aristotelian view that requires universals to be analyzable in terms of concrete physical entities can do without such a Platonic heaven. By understanding abstract entities such as universals in terms of their instances, the Aristotelian view can accept the existence of abstract entities, while denying that subjects are ever aware of anything other than the instances of these abstract entities.13 11 See Ffytche and Howard (1999) and Ffytche (2008). 12 When I speak of an uninstantiated universal, I mean-following common use-a universal that is not instantiated anywhere. It is important to distinguish an uninstantiated universals from a universal that is instantiated somewhere, but not instantiated where a subject who suffers an illusion or hallucination experiences it to be instantiated. 13 For a critical discussion of uninstantiated universals, see Armstrong 1989. Armstrong restricts the Aristotelian principle to so-called sparse properties. By contrast, I aim to vindicate the Aristotelian principle for all perceivable properties. One might object that the metaphysical problem articulated over-generalizes in that it would work just as well against Russellian accounts of the content of false beliefs. The metaphysical problem articulated is specific to accounts of perceptual experience that analyze experience in terms of awareness relations to (uninstantiated) abstract entities. If experience is analyzed in terms of awareness relations to (uninstantiated) abstract entities, then these (uninstantiated) abstract entities must exist such that we could stand in an awareness relation to them. The same is not true of beliefs of abstract entities, since there is no reason why a belief as of o must be analyzed in terms of an awareness relation to o. If however beliefs are analyzed in terms of awareness relations to (uninstantiated) abstract entities, then the phenomenological and metaphysical problems articulated would indeed arise for such an account of beliefs. Thanks to Nico Silins for pressing me on this point. As I will show in the next section, any view that analyzes the phenomenology of perceptual experience in terms of an awareness relation to (uninstantiated) abstract entities should and can be avoided. 10 SUSANNA SCHELLENBERG To what extent does the content property-cluster view inherit the problems of the pure property-cluster view? Any view on which the content of experience is constituted by naked properties and objects inherits the metaphysical problem of the pure property-cluster view. For the gappy content property-cluster view, this problem manifests itself in the following way. Let's assume again for a moment the Aristotelian principle. Given this assumption, the defender of this view faces an unfortunate choice point. (i) He can deny that hallucinations of uninstantiated properties are possible. This first strategy faces the counterexamples of hallucinations of uninstantiated properties such as supersaturated red. (ii) Alternatively, he can accept that hallucinations of such properties are possible and argue that they have the content <__, __>. The content is gappy in both the object and property-place since the subject neither stands in an awareness relation to any mindindependent object nor any properties. This second strategy implies that any hallucination of uninstantiated properties will have the very same content. So a hallucination of supersaturated red will have the very same content as a hallucination of Hume's missing shade of blue. If the content of experience is supposed to ground the phenomenology of the relevant experience, then such a view of content will predict that a hallucination of supersaturated red will have the very same phenomenology as a hallucination of Hume's missing shade of blue. So the gappy content property-cluster view must reject the Aristotelian principle to avoid either (i) denying that hallucinations of uninstantiated properties are impossible or (ii) positing experiential contents that do not have sufficient structure to account for phenomenal differences between hallucinations of uninstantiated properties. More generally, any content property-cluster view is committed to accepting the existence of uninstantiated universals to avoid restricting possible hallucinations to hallucinations of properties that are instantiated somewhere. So since such a view is committed to rejecting the Aristotelian principle and accepting a Platonic 'two realms'-view, it inherits the metaphysical problem of the pure property-cluster view. For the reasons given above, I take this problem to be sufficient to reject any such view in favor of a view that can accommodate with the Aristotelian principle. Does the content property-cluster view inherit the phenomenological problems of the pure property-cluster view as well? The answer to this question depends on how one understands the relation between the experiencing subject and the content of her experience. Russell argued that subjects stand in acquaintance relations to the objects and properties that constitute propositions. He used the terms ''acquaintance'' and ''awareness'' synonymously (1913, p. 35), and indeed the standard ONTOLOGICAL MINIMALISM ABOUT PHENOMENOLOGY 11 reading of Russell has it that his acquaintance relations are a particular kind of awareness relations.14 If we stand in awareness relations to the properties and objects that constitute the content of our experience, then the Russellian view inherits all the phenomenological problems of pure property-cluster views. Such a view is committed to the phenomenologically controversial thesis that hallucinating subjects are either sensorily or cognitively aware of abstract entities.15 Byrne (2001) and Pautz (2007) argue that the content of experience is a Russellian proposition, but deny that experiencing subjects stand in acquaintance or awareness relations to this proposition or its constituents. If this approach works, then such a view inherits only the metaphysical problem of the pure property-cluster view and not its phenomenological problems. 2. Ontological Minimalism about Phenomenology So far I have articulated the problems of disjunctivism and any view according to which perceptions or hallucinations are a matter of standing in an awareness relation to abstract entities. In the rest of this paper, I will present an account of phenomenology that avoids positing that subjects are aware of abstract entities or any other peculiar entities. The problems of peculiar entity views are avoided, if hallucinating subjects are understood not as related to abstract entities, but rather as employing concepts (or analogous nonconceptual structures), where concepts take objects, property-instances, or other external, mind-independent entities as inputs and yield contents as outputs.16 As I will 14 For a recent interpretation of Russell's acquaintance relations along these lines, see Campbell 2009. 15 For views that are committed to the thesis that subjects are either sensorily or cognitively aware of abstract entities, such as (uninstantiated) universals, propositions or their constituents, see McGinn 1982, Harman 1990, Davies 1992, Lycan 1996, Dretske 2000, and Tye 2002. It is important to note that such views are not committed to the thesis that we are aware of abstract entities or any other peculiar entities as such. 16 The idea that concepts take objects, property-instances, or other external, mindindependent entities as inputs and yield contents as outputs can be interpreted functionally. In formal discussion, functions are understood as necessarily requiring an input to have an output. As I am understanding concepts, one can employ a concept and thereby be in a mental state with content, despite the fact that one is not perceptually related to anything. So one can employ a concept and yield a content as output even if there is no input. So if the idea that concepts take objects or property-instances as inputs and yield contents as outputs is interpreted functionally, then it is important to note that the notion of function in play is distinct from the one in formal discussion. Alternatively, the view presented here could be reformulated by arguing that in the case of a hallucination, the input is the empty set. This would allow being in tune with the use of ''functions'' in formal discussions, but would require accepting the existence of the empty set. 12 SUSANNA SCHELLENBERG show in the next section, these concepts correspond to mode of presentation types. The notion of property-instances in play is best illustrated with an example: when one sees two qualitatively identical white cups, the cups instantiate the same property, but the instances are distinct. When one suffers a hallucination as of a white cup, it seems to one that there is a white cup present, but since one is not perceptually related to the object that it seems to one is present, one is not perceptually related to any instance of whiteness. As I will argue, possessing a concept grounds the ability to refer to external, mind-independent objects or property-instances. For the sake of definiteness, I will focus on the case in which experience is a matter of employing concepts, but everything I say can be reformulated in terms of nonconceptual structures rather than concepts. Given the notion of concepts in use, it is unproblematic to attribute basic concepts to non-rational animals. However, even if this notion of concepts is compatible with attributing basic concepts to non-rational animals, it is plausible that perceptual content is constituted at least in part nonconceptually. On the view I am suggesting, the content of experience is not constituted by naked objects and properties as on the property-cluster view and most other peculiar entity views. Rather the content of experience is constituted by modes of presentations of objects and properties. More specifically, the content ensues from employing concepts that pick out objects and property-instances. When a subject hallucinates, the concepts that she employs are empty. When a subject perceives, objects or property-instances are subsumed under the concepts employed: the objects to which she is perceptually related are subsumed under the employed object-concepts; the property-instances to which she is perceptually related are subsumed under the employed propertyconcepts. The common element between hallucinations and perceptions is constituted by the concepts that the subject employs in a sensory mode regardless of whether she is hallucinating or perceiving. The relevant sensory modes are modes such as seeing, hearing, touching, smelling, or tasting. How can such a view explain the phenomenology of hallucinations? I will argue that employing concepts and analogous nonconceptual structures in a sensory mode grounds the phenomenology of experience. So any experience in which the same concepts are employed in the same mode will have the same phenomenology. Given this constraint there are two ways of understanding the relation between the phenomenology and the employed concepts. One could identify the phenomenology of experience with employing concepts and analogous nonconceptual structures in a sensory mode. Alternatively, the phenomenology can be argued to supervene on employing concepts and ONTOLOGICAL MINIMALISM ABOUT PHENOMENOLOGY 13 analogous nonconceptual structures in a sensory mode. I will argue for the identity thesis, but my argument needs to be modified only slightly to be compatible with the weaker supervenience thesis. On both versions of the view, whether or not a concept is empty will not affect the phenomenology of the experience. Only if this is the case, can the view satisfy the indistinguishability desideratum. For only if it is not revealed in phenomenology whether a concept is empty or not can a perception and a hallucination be subjectively indistinguishable. Let's call such a view ontological minimalism about phenomenology, or minimalism for short. The view is ontologically minimalist since it accounts for the phenomenology of perceptual experience without having to appeal to awareness of peculiar entities and since it vindicates the Aristotelian principle in ways that I will explain in the rest of this section. By rejecting the Russellian thesis that content is constituted by naked objects and properties in favor of the thesis that content ensues from employing concepts that pick out objects and property-instances, minimalism about phenomenology entails a Fregean view of content. While minimalism appeals to concepts employed in experience and thus appeals to abstract entities, I will argue that experiencing subjects do not stand in an awareness relation to these abstract entities. On the notion of concepts in play, concepts are understood in terms of their tokens, which in turn are analyzed in terms of the very mind-independent objects and property-instances that we are perceptually related to when we perceive. The suggested way of thinking about experience makes it possible to acknowledge that a hallucinating subject does not stand in an awareness relation to anything despite enjoying a phenomenology that purports to be of mind-independent objects and property-instances. To defend the conjunction of these two theses it will be helpful to uncover an ambiguity in the notion of ''awareness of''. On one understanding, for a subject to be aware of something means that the subject stands in an awareness relation to that very object or property. This notion of ''awareness of'' implies that a subject cannot be aware of something without standing in an awareness relation to that very thing. Call this extensional awareness. Peculiar entity views take ''awareness of'' to imply extensional awareness. If ''awareness of'' were necessarily extensional awareness, then a hallucinating subject must be standing in an awareness relation to some object or property. Since she is by definition not related to an external, mind-independent object and the properties this object instantiates, such as a white cup, the object in question must be a peculiar entity. If we recognize that there is a second way of understanding ''awareness of'' this conclusion can be avoided. On a second understanding, 14 SUSANNA SCHELLENBERG for a subject to be aware of something means only that the subject is in a mental state that purports to be of something. This understanding of ''awareness of'' allows that a subject can be aware of something without standing in an awareness relation to any relevant thing. So on this understanding, being aware of something does not entail the existence of what she is aware of. Call this intensional awareness. In this intensional sense, one can be aware of ghosts. Another way to bring the distinction between the two notions of ''awareness of'' into focus is to center on the grammatical structure of experiential reports. Denying that hallucinating subjects stand in awareness relations to an object is not to deny the linguistic fact that the expression ''I hallucinate'' takes a grammatical object. The important thing to recognize is that this grammatical object does not correspond to an ontological existent to which the hallucinating subject stands in an awareness relation. It merely marks what the hallucinating subjects takes to be present and what she would be perceptually related to, were she perceiving an external, mind-independent object. The distinction between extensional and intensional awareness is analogous to the distinction between relational and phenomenological particularity.17 A mental state instantiates relational particularity if and only if the experiencing subject is perceptually related to the particular object perceived. A mental state instantiates phenomenological particularity only if it (perceptually) seems to the subject as if there is a particular object present. More generally, a mental state instantiates phenomenological particularity only if the particularity is in the scope of how things seem to the subject. Every experience exhibits phenomenological particularity. Indeed it is unclear what it would be to have an experience that seems to be of an external, mind-independent object without it seeming to the subject that there is a particular object present. If a subject has an experience that is intentionally directed at a particular object it will seem to her as if she is experiencing a particular object-regardless of whether there is in fact an object present. If this is right, then any view on which experience is object-directed is committed to saying that perceptual experience exhibits phenomenological particularity. When one hallucinates it seems to one as if one is perceiving a particular object-at least if the hallucination is phenomenally indistinguishable from a perception. So hallucinations instantiate phenomenological particularity. Since hallucinating subjects are not related to a mind-independent object, hallucinations do not instantiate relational particularity. 17 For a defense of the distinction between relational and phenomenological particularity, see my 2010. ONTOLOGICAL MINIMALISM ABOUT PHENOMENOLOGY 15 While the distinction between extensional and intensional awareness is analogous to the distinction between relational and phenomenological particularity, it is however important to note that they pertain to different sets of issues. Extensional and intensional awareness both concern the phenomenology of experience. By contrast, whether a mental state instantiates relational particularity is, I argue, not revealed in the phenomenology of the experience. Recognizing the distinction between extensional and intensional awareness makes it possible to accept the Aristotelian principle without forfeiting a positive account of hallucinations. So it makes it possible to understand properties in terms of their instances, but nonetheless give a positive account of the phenomenology of hallucinations. The entities that a subject stands in an awareness relation to are always either material, mind-independent objects such as cats and chairs, the properties that these objects instantiate, or a combination of propertyinstances and objects. So according to minimalism, subjects are only ever extensionally aware of mind-independent, external objects, property-instances, or other concrete mind-independent entities. Now, one may wonder how such an account can secure the identity of hallucinated objects across hallucinations. It cannot, but this is a desirable consequence of the view. A hallucinating subject may form false judgments on the basis of her hallucinations and believe that the unicorn it seemed to her she was seeing yesterday is the very same unicorn as the one that it seems to her she is seeing today. But the identity postulated here is within the scope of how things seem to the subject and thus based on mere phenomenological particularity. There is nothing in the world that corresponds to how things seem to the subject. So there is nothing in the world that corresponds to this phenomenological particularity. In other words, the phenomenological particularity of her experience is not matched with any relational particularity. Since the subject is not standing in an awareness relation to any unicorns, no identity of the hallucinated objects can be secured. So far I have specified concepts roughly as taking objects, propertyinstances, or other external, mind-independent entities as inputs and yielding contents as outputs. If concepts are understood in terms of what they refer to or what they pick out, then the question arises of how minimalism can account for experiences of uninstantiated properties. In order to address this question, it is necessary to get a clearer understanding of the notion of concepts. On the notion in play, concepts cannot be analyzed independently of analyzing what it means to possess a concept. Possessing a concept grounds the ability to refer to the external, mind-independent objects or property-instances that the 16 SUSANNA SCHELLENBERG concept is of.18 This ability involves among other things being able to discriminate between the things that fall under the concept and those that do not.19 So a subject who possesses the concept of redness must be able to use it to refer to red things, which involves discriminating red things from things that are not red. The ability to refer to objects and property-instances may be analyzed as constituting a kind of know-how, but one that should not be understood as over-intellectualizing the requirement for concept-possession. Following Ryle (1949), I am using 'know-how' to refer to a practical, non-intellectual conception that non-rational beings could have.20 To avoid terminological confusion, the notion of concepts in play must be distinguished from any notion on which concepts are mental representations (Fodor 1975, 1998, Jackendoff 1987, Lawrence and Margolis 1999, Carruthers 2000, Prinz 2002) or prototypes (Rosch 1978, Smith and Medin 1981), as well as any view according to which concepts are properties. The thesis that concepts cannot be analyzed independently of their possession conditions does not entail that concepts are behaviorally reduced. The thesis does not even entail that one needs to successfully apply a concept to count as possessing the concept. The thesis is rather that one needs to have the ability to successfully apply a concept to count as possessing the concept. One may possess a concept, but not be in an environment that contains the objects and property-instances that fall under the concept and therefore not be able to successfully apply the concept. Moreover, as I will argue, one may never have been in an environment that contains the objects and property-instances that fall under the concept and nonetheless possess the concept that grounds the ability to refer to such objects and property-instances. So concepts ground the ability to refer to mind-independent objects and property-instances irrespective of whether these objects and property-instances are in fact present in the environment of the experiencing subject. If one employs a concept, in an environment in which no relevant objects and property-instances are 18 For a detailed discussion of concepts as analyzed in terms of their possession conditions, which in turn are analyzed in terms of abilities, see Peacocke 1992 and Sosa 1993. 19 It would lead too far afield to discuss here just what the conditions are for counting as being able to discriminate. For discussion of the capacity to discriminate, see McLaughlin 1996. 20 Ryle's conception of know-how has been famously criticized by Carr (1979) and more recently by Stanley and Williamson (2001). In short, the criticism is that 'know-how' expresses the same relation as 'know-that'. Addressing this criticism would only affect the wording of my argument. For a critical discussion of Stanley and Williamson's argument and a defense of a concept of know-how, see Hornsby 2004. ONTOLOGICAL MINIMALISM ABOUT PHENOMENOLOGY 17 present, then one fails to refer to what the concept purports to pick out. If one fails to refer, then the concept employed remains empty. This way of thinking about concepts is closely related to two prominent views, so it will be helpful to contrast it with those views. It is closely related to Frege's understanding of concepts (Begriffe), but while Frege argues that concepts are functions from objects to truth-values, I am understanding concepts as taking objects, property-instances, or other external, mind-independent entities as inputs and yielding contents as outputs. The idea in play is particularly closely related to Peacocke's (1992) influential view of concepts.21 But while Peacocke argues that concepts are Fregean senses, I am thinking of the output of concepts as Fregean senses. On the way I am understanding the term, concepts themselves are not content tokens.22 Following both Frege and Peacocke, I am understanding concepts as abstract entities, rather than as psychological entities. Although concepts are abstract entities, I will argue that any given concept is necessarily employed at some point. Insofar as employing a concept tokens the concept and these tokens can in turn be analyzed in terms of the very objects and property-instances that the concept is of, accepting the suggested notion of concepts is compatible with accepting the Aristotelian principle that the existence of a type depends on its tokens, which depend in turn on concrete entities of the physical world. Thus any commitment to a Platonic 'two realms'-view can be avoided. There are several possible ways of analyzing concepts, given the articulated constraints. On the understanding of concepts in play, conncepts could be analyzed in terms of conceptual roles as long as these conceptual roles are 'long-armed' (Block 1986, p. 636), that is, as long as they include relations to the world.23 By building on causal approaches (Kripke 1972 ⁄1980, Putnam 1975, Burge 1979, Devitt 1981), they could alternatively be analyzed in terms of mere relations to the world without any appeal to relations to other concepts. For the purposes of this paper, we can remain neutral on this issue. The important point is that possessing a concept grounds the ability to refer to objects or property-instances in the world. I should not leave the impression that the content of experience is conceptually structured. As stated earlier, my argument does not 21 See also Sosa 1993. 22 Depending on how one understands contents, this may be a mere terminological difference. Peacocke could be read as equating concepts with mode of presentation types. This is just the understanding of concepts that I will argue for in §3. While concepts are mode of presentation types, the output of a concept is a mode of presentation token. 23 For different versions of such a view, see Sellars 1963, Harman 1987, Dummett 1993, and Brandom 1994. 18 SUSANNA SCHELLENBERG depend on experiential content being exclusively conceptually structured. There are powerful reasons to think that the content of experience is at least in part nonconceptually structured. Moreover, even if content is conceptually structured, this is compatible with understanding the state of experience as nonconceptual in that the experiencing subject does not have the cognitive tools to articulate the conceptually structured content of her experience.24 Now, how should we understand the relation between the content of perception and the content of hallucination on the suggested view? More specifically, how should we understand the relation between being perceptually related to external physical entities, such as white cups, and employing concepts that purport to be of such entities? In order to address this question, it will be necessary first to distinguish two possible versions of minimalism. On one version, perceptions of property-instances are necessary to acquire the concept that grounds the ability to have hallucinations that are intensionally of such property-instances. Similarly, perceptions of objects are necessary to acquire the concept that grounds the ability to have hallucinations as of objects of the same type. Let's call this view grounded minimalism. This version of minimalism posits that the content of hallucination is derivative of the content of perception either insofar as it ensues from reemploying and possibly recombining the concepts acquired in past perceptions or insofar as the concepts employed in hallucinations are extrapolations of concepts acquired in past perceptions. On a second version of minimalism, hallucinations of properties or objects are possible even if one has not had past perceptions of instances of the same property or the same type of object. So this version of the view does not require that the concepts employed in hallucinations be acquired through perceptions. It allows that one can possess concepts without having been perceptually related to the objects or property-instances that the concept picks out. Let's call this view ungrounded minimalism. This version of minimalism allows that a subject could have a hallucination as of, say, an object unlike anything she has seen before. On a radical version of ungrounded minimalism, having a hallucination is sufficient to acquire the ability to refer to external, mind-independent objects and property-instances.25 The radical 24 For a defense of the distinction between content and state (non)conceptualism, see Heck 2000. 25 Pautz (forthcoming) argues that through hallucinations subjects can acquire the capacity to have beliefs that involve properties. As he understands it, the capacity to have beliefs that involve properties does not imply that subjects have the capacity to refer or pick out these properties and so does not amount to a version of what I am calling radical ungrounded minimalism. ONTOLOGICAL MINIMALISM ABOUT PHENOMENOLOGY 19 version is only plausible on the assumption that hallucinations of objects and property-instances (to which one has never been perceptually related) do not involve at least imagining such objects or propertyinstances, where imagination involves more high-level mental capacities than mere hallucination. On a modest version, the concepts employed in hallucinations are acquired through testimony or imagination. If perceptual concepts are understood to be grounded in accurate perceptions, then only the modest version can be plausible. For only if some bridge exists between my hallucination of a property that I have never seen and someone else's perception of an instance of this property, can the concept I employ in hallucination be plausibly understood to be grounded in accurate perceptions. We can remain neutral here on whether or not ungrounded minimalism is best understood in its radical or modest version. The important point for the discussion is that on both versions of ungrounded minimalism, a subject need not have had perceptions of objects and property-instances to have hallucinations as of such objects and property-instances. So ungrounded minimalism posits that a brain in a vat could have hallucinations as of white cups.26 On both the grounded and the ungrounded versions of minimalism, hallucinations are externally directed without involving awareness relations to abstract entities, sense-data, or any other peculiar entities. The grounded and the ungrounded versions of minimalism both face problems if they are taken independently. Taken independently, grounded minimalism faces the problem that one can only have hallucinations of objects and property-instances if one has had perceptions of objects and property-instances that are sufficiently similar that one could successfully extrapolate from these experiences. Taken independently, ungrounded minimalism faces the problem that accounting for hallucinations as of objects or property-instances that are not sufficiently similar to one that the relevant subject has perceived requires rejecting the Aristotelian principle. Both problems are avoided if it is recognized that an analysis of what grounds our abilities to refer to objects and property-instances requires combining the two views. I will argue that grounded minimalism holds globally, but that ungrounded minimalism holds locally. 26 More specifically, radical ungrounded minimalism has it that an isolated brain in a vat could have such hallucinations, while modest ungrounded minimalism has it that a brain in a vat could only have hallucinations as of objects and propertyinstances, if the brain has acquired the relevant concepts from subjects who have perceived sufficiently similar objects and property-instances. If it is not possible for brains in vats to acquire concepts in such a way, then modest ungrounded minimalism posits that brains in vats cannot have hallucinations as of white cups. 20 SUSANNA SCHELLENBERG Let's follow the common understanding of perceptual concepts as concepts that are of perceivable objects or property-instances. And let's assume for the sake of argument that any given perceptual concept is grounded in perception insofar as the existence of a perceptual concept depends on perceptions of the objects or property-instances that the concept is of.27 If this is right, then it follows that grounded minimalism holds globally: there cannot exist a perceptual concept that is not grounded in perception. It does not, however, follow from this that an individual subject must have had perceptions of the objects or property-instances that the concept is of to possess the relevant concept. So it does not follow that grounded minimalism holds locally. It follows only that there cannot exist perceptual concepts of objects or propertyinstances that have not been perceived by someone, somewhere. A subject can acquire a concept through testimony and thus possess a perceptual concept without having perceived any objects or propertyinstances that the concept picks out. If this is right, then any given individual perceiver can have hallucinations as of objects and propertyinstances that she has not perceived. It follows from this that ungrounded minimalism can hold locally, even if grounded minimalism holds globally. Moreover, it follows that there cannot be a world in which there are only brains in a vat that could have hallucinations as of white cups. In light of these clarifications about the notion of concept, we can address the question of how minimalism can account for the possibility of hallucinations of uninstantiated properties while recognizing the Aristotelian principle. A hallucination of supersaturated red could be analyzed as a result of combining the concepts of red and saturatedness, thereby inducing an experience of a particularly saturated red. Alternatively, such a hallucination could be analyzed as a result of extrapolating from experiences of red with regular levels of saturatedness.28 By accepting that grounded minimalism holds globally, the defended view satisfies the Aristotelian principle. By accepting that ungrounded minimalism holds locally, the defended view allows that a subject can have hallucinations as of objects and property-instances unlike any she has seen. Finally, by accepting that the content of hallucination is derivative of the content of perception either insofar as it recombines the concepts acquired in past perceptions or insofar as the concepts 27 For a defense of this thesis, see Peacocke 1992 and Prinz 2002. This thesis is famously challenged by Fodor (1998). 28 It would lead too far afield to discuss the details of what it takes to extrapolate a concept here. For an excellent discussion, see Browne 2002. ONTOLOGICAL MINIMALISM ABOUT PHENOMENOLOGY 21 employed in hallucinations are extrapolations of concepts acquired in past perceptions, the defended view can allow for hallucinations of uninstantiated properties while satisfying the Aristotelian principle.29 I have argued that hallucinating subjects employ concepts that account for the intentional directedness to a seeming particular object and the properties that this object instantiates. But there is no need to think that employing such concepts entails the existence of the objects and property-instances that the concepts purport to pick out. Employing concepts necessitates only intensional awareness of the objects and property-instances that the concepts purport to pick out. It does not necessitate extensional awareness. A subject can employ a concept while failing to refer to the object or property-instance that the concepts purports to be of. If a hallucinating subject is not related to anything, then the concepts she employs remain empty. As I have argued, possessing a concept grounds the ability to pick out the objects or property-instances that the concept is of. Therefore, the phenomenology that ensues from employing concepts is inherently related to the objects and property-instances that they pick out. So while minimalism analyzes phenomenology with appeal to concepts and thus abstract entities, these concepts are in turn analyzed in terms of perceptual relations to external, mind-independent objects and property-instances. By doing so, minimalism takes on board the naıve realist insight that being in a mental state with a certain phenomenology can be analyzed in terms of perceptual relations to external, mind-independent objects and properties. This insight demystifies what it means to be in a phenomenal state. Indeed, it paves the way for a naturalized view of the phenomenology of perceptual experience.30 However, by arguing that all there is to being in a mental state with a certain phenomenology is to be perceptually related to mind-independent objects or property-instances, naıve realists leave mysterious how one could be 29 Can Jackson's Mary have hallucinations of red? Mary is a color scientist who knows everything about colors but who lives in a black and white world and so has never seen any colors. So she could not have acquired the concept of red through perceptions of instances of red. If radical ungrounded minimalism holds locally, then Mary could have hallucinations of red. However, if one rejects the radical ungrounded view in favor of the modest ungrounded view, then it is plausible that perceptions of colors are necessary for a person to imagine what it would be like to experience red. So one might argue that some perceptions of colors other than red are necessary to have hallucinations of red. If this is right, then Mary could not have hallucinations of red, but her sister Anna could. Anna is a color scientist who knows everything about colors but who lives in a world with all the colors except red. So while she has seen all other colors, she has never seen red. For an excellent discussion of experiences of novel colors, see Macpherson 2003. 30 See in particular Fish 2009 for an account that brings out the naturalistic advantages of naıve realism. 22 SUSANNA SCHELLENBERG in a phenomenal state if one is not related to the very mind-independent objects or property-instances that one's phenomenal state purports to be of.31 By introducing concepts that ground our ability to refer to these external, mind-independent objects and properties, minimalism rejects the radical naıve realist thesis that all there is to being in a mental state with a certain phenomenology is to be related to mind-independent objects or property-instances. By rejecting the radical naıve realist thesis, the presented view constitutes a positive account of hallucinations on which subjectively indistinguishable hallucinations and perceptions share a common factor that grounds the phenomenology of the experiences. So against disjunctivists, I have argued that perceptions and hallucinations share a common element that grounds the phenomenology of the experiences. However with disjunctivists, I have argued that hallucinations exhibit a deficiency that can only be explained with reference to accurate perceptions. Hallucinations are derivative of perceptions insofar as the concept employed in hallucinations can only be specified with reference to their possible roles in perceptions. I have argued that possessing concept grounds the ability to pick out its referent. Since concepts are analyzed in terms of perceptual relations to external, mind-independent objects and property-instances, minimalism not only satisfies the Aristotelian principle, it moreover amounts to a naturalized view of the phenomenology of experience. In the next sections, I will elaborate on the notion of content that minimalism implies and will defend the view against possible objections. But first, it will be helpful to clarify how the suggested view can account for the difference between the phenomenology of experience and thought. This difference can be accounted for in a number of ways within the framework provided. I have assumed that there is a specific sensory mode in which concepts are employed when experiencing.32 One way to account for the difference between the phenomenology of experiencing a white cup and thinking about a white cup is with regard to differences in the mode in which the relevant concepts are employed. A second way of accounting for the difference is to argue that in contrast to thought, the content of experience is necessarily constituted at least in part by nonconceptual structures (e.g. Peacocke 1992, Tye 2000, Chalmers 2004). It is plausible that experiences differ from thoughts in both ways. If my argument holds at all, it holds regardless 31 For a defense of this radical naıve realist thesis, see Campbell 2002, Brewer 2006, and Fish 2009. Martin (2004) argues for a more moderate version of naıve realism. 32 Among others, Crane (2003) and Chalmers (2004) argue that experience and thought differ with regard to modes or manners. ONTOLOGICAL MINIMALISM ABOUT PHENOMENOLOGY 23 of what stance one takes on these possible ways of accounting for the difference between the phenomenology of thought and experience. The difference between the phenomenology of perception and thought has been accounted for in many other ways. A particularly influential one is to argue that there are qualia, sensations, or phenomenal properties present in experience but not in thought. Peacocke (1983, 2008) and Block (2003) among others argue that there are aspects of the phenomenology of experience-for instance blurriness and afterimages-that are not grounded in content. Accepting this idea would require modifying minimalism by arguing that only part of phenomenology is identified with employing concepts and anologous nonconceptual structures, namely only that part that purports to be of external, mind-independent objects and property-instances. Given this modification, accepting the existence of non-representational qualia, sensations, or phenomenal properties is compatible with minimalism-as long as the experiencing subject is not understood as standing in awareness relations to these sensations or phenomenal properties. But although compatible, I will show that the view presented undermines the need to appeal to such entities. It is possible to account for phenomena such as blurriness and afterimages within an unrestricted representational framework (for defense, see Tye 2000 and Byrne 2001). This strategy is more in tune with the tenor of the argument presented here. Within the minimalist framework, a blurry experience of a white cup can be analyzed as being a matter of employing the concept of blurriness (among other concepts). The concept blurriness is grounded in perceptions of instances of blurriness. To give an example of a perception of an instance of blurriness: when I look out of the window on a rainy day, the tree in front of my window is presented blurrily to me because of the raindrops on the window.33 As I have argued, the subject who hallucinates blurriness need not herself have perceived instances of blurriness in the world. The concept could be acquired through testimony. So to ground the concept of blurriness in perception it is only necessary that someone has had perceptions of blurriness. Now, seeing something as blurry is of course distinct from seeing something blurrily, but the very same concept of blurriness can be understood to be employed in both experiences. The difference between seeing something as blurry and seeing something blurrily can be accounted for in virtue of what blurriness is attributed to. If one experiences an object as blurry, blurriness is attributed to that object. If one experiences blurrily, blurriness is attributed 33 For a detailed discussion of how such properties can be analyzed as mind-independent, external properties, see my 2008. 24 SUSANNA SCHELLENBERG to one's experience. In this way, minimalism undermines the need to appeal to qualia, sensations, or phenomenal properties to account for the phenomenology of perceptions and hallucinations.34 3. The Relational Content of Perceptual Experience I have argued that hallucinating subjects employ the same concepts and nonconceptual structures that they employ to refer to objects and property-instances when perceiving. Since a hallucinating subject does not stand in an awareness relation to objects or property-instances, the concepts she employs remain empty. How should one think about the content that ensues from employing concepts and nonconceptual structures? In this section, I will specify the implications of ontological minimalism on the content of experience. The thesis that content ensues from employing concepts that pick out objects and property-instances implies that the content of experience is both inherently relational and Fregean.35 What does it mean for content to be inherently relational? If the content of experience ensues from employing concepts and possessing a concept is a matter of being able to pick out its referent, then relations to objects and propertyinstances are implicated in the very nature of experiential content. Moreover, if the fact that concepts pick out objects and propertyinstances in some situations and not in others has any semantic significance, then the content ensuing from employing these concepts will depend at least in part on the situation in which they are employed. Another way of expressing the same idea is to say that the accuracy condition of experiential content depends for the particular objects and property-instances to which the subject is related and not just on the way in which the subject experiences the objects and properties. A content is inherently relational if and only if it depends at least in part on the mind-independent objects and property-instances that the content is 34 There are ways of understanding qualia on which they are simply identified with the phenomenology of experience, such that any phenomenological state necessarily instantiates qualia. This understanding of qualia implies that experiences trivially instantiate qualia. But if that is all that is meant with qualia, then introducing qualia just amounts to a reformulation of the fact that experiences are phenomenological states. For a discussion of this set of issues, see Stoljar 2004. It should be noted that it has been argued that if inverted spectrum scenarios are empirically possible, then introducing qualia is necessary, where qualia are understood as more substantive than simply what can be identified with the phenomenology of experience (Shoemaker 1982). However, as Egan (2006) has argued convincingly, it can be ruled out on conceptual grounds that inverted spectrum scenarios are empirically possible. 35 For a detailed development of this way of understanding the content of perception, see my 2010. ONTOLOGICAL MINIMALISM ABOUT PHENOMENOLOGY 25 of. We can call a content that is inherently relational in the sense articulated a relational content. Relational contents differ depending on what object or propertyinstance (if any) the subject is related to. So the token content covaries with the environment of the experiencing subject. In the case of an accurate perception, the token content determines a referent. Insofar as the token relational content is individuated in part by the object or property-instance, which it determines, it is at least in part dependent on the environment of the experiencing subject. Another way of expressing the same idea is to say that relational contents are mental indexicals. A content determines the contextual relation that something must bear to a mental state to be the referent of that mental state. How should we understand the Fregean nature of these relational contents? If perceptual content is inherently relational as argued, then it must be understood as constituted by de re modes of presentations rather than de dicto modes of presentations. Were perceptual content constituted by de dicto modes of presentations, then a two-stage view of determining reference would be implied. On such a two-stage view, we first represent a non-relational content, and in a second step we refer to external object and properties on the basis of this content.36 The mental act of representing a de dicto mode of presentation is independent of the second step in which an external particular may be determined. Such a two-stage view faces the problem of how the content grounds the ability to refer to external particulars. This problem is avoided, if perceptual content is understood to be constituted by de re rather than de dicto modes of presentation. The introduction of de re modes of presentation is motivated by recognizing that modes of presentation play a dual role: they have a specific cognitive significance and they pick out or refer to objects and property-instances. If the role of modes of presentation as picking out objects and property-instances is taken seriously, then the mental state of a subject who successfully picks out the object or property-instance at which she is intentionally directed will arguably not be the same as the mental state of a subject who fails to refer to the object or property-instance at which she is intentionally directed.37 But a descriptive, de dicto mode of presentation is not affected if there is no referent. By contrast to de dicto modes of presentation, de re modes of presentation are inherently relational in 36 For an argument against such a two-stage view of determining the reference, see Johnston 2004, p. 150f. Johnston does not distinguish between de dicto and de re modes of presentation, and as a consequence sees the problem articulated in the main text as a problem for any Fregean view tout court. As I will show it is only a problem for a view on which Fregean senses are de dicto rather than de re. 37 For a defense of this thesis, see my forthcoming-b. 26 SUSANNA SCHELLENBERG that what object or property-instance (if any) the subject is related to makes a constitutive difference to the nature of the content. So de re modes of presentation constitutively depend on the objects or propertyinstances that they pick out. There are at least two ways of understanding relational contents and consequently two ways of understanding de re modes of presentation. On one view, a subject can only have an experience with content if she is related to the very object that her experience purports to be of. Such a view is motivated by a particular understanding of what it means to represent an object: only if a subject is related to an object, can an object be presented to her such that she could be representing the object. On the basis of this way of understanding what it means to represent an object, the conclusion is drawn that a hallucinating subject is not in a mental state with content, it only seems to her that she is representing. There is only an illusion of content.38 So this view has it that perceptual content is radically object-dependent. The problem with this way of understanding perceptual content is that it downplays the cognitive significance of modes of presentation. When a subject hallucinates, the way things seem to her plays a certain cognitive role. If it seems to her that she is perceptually related to a white cup, she may for example reach out and try to pick up the cup. By denying that hallucinating subjects are in representational states, this state of affairs is not explained. It is not clear how the illusion of content could motivate the subject to act. Moreover, a view on which perceptual content is radically object-dependent amounts to a disjunctivist view of experience and faces the problems of such a view. These problems are avoided, if relational contents are understood not as radically object-dependent, but rather as partly object-dependent or, more generally, as partly dependent on the environment of the experiencing subject.39 I will call these contents potentially gappy Fregean contents. Given that a hallucinating subject employs the very same concepts as she would be employing were she successfully perceptually related to objects and property-instances, there is no reason to think that she is not in a mental state with content. Indeed, we can understand the content of any two subjectively indistinguishable experiences e1 and e2 in which a subject s is perceptually related to the same object 38 For a defense of such a view, see Evans 1982 and McDowell 1984. 39 Perry (1977), Peacocke (1981), Bach (1987 ⁄ 1994), and Recanati (1993) develop different ways of understanding de re modes of presentation that are not fully objectdependent. The understanding of experiential content developed here turns out to partly parallel their work as well as the work of so-called latitudinarians, according to which de re attitudes (or contents) are a special case of de dicto attitudes (or contents); see in particular Sosa 1970, 1995 and Jeshion 2002. ONTOLOGICAL MINIMALISM ABOUT PHENOMENOLOGY 27 o in the same way as including MOPr(o), where MOPr(o) is the output of a concept that takes objects as inputs. A hallucination that is subjectively indistinguishable from e1 is a matter of employing the same concept, but since there is no object present the concept remains empty: MOPr(__), where MOPr(__) is an empty concept. Modes of presentation of property-instances can be specified in an analogous way. So if I perceive a white cup o, the content of my perception will be <MOPr(o), MOPr(P)> where MOPr(o) is a de re mode of presentation of the cup o and MOPr(P) is a mode of presentation of the property that this object instantiates. If I hallucinate a white cup and thus am not related to any white cup, the content of my hallucination will be <MOP1r(__), MOP 2 r(__)> where MOP1r(__) in the object-place is an empty object-concept and MOP2r(__) in the property place is an empty property-concept. 40 The empty concept in the object-place specifies the kind of object that has to be present for the experience to be accurate. It accounts for the intentional directedness of the experience to a (seeming) particular object. The empty concept in the property-place specifies the properties that this object would instantiate, if the experience were accurate. Since the hallucinating subject is not related to the object or propertyinstances that the concepts employed purport to pick out, the modes of presentation are gappy. The gap marks that there is a reference failure. Although token modes of presentation covary with the situation in which the subject experiences, the mode of presentation types remain the same across subjectively indistinguishable experiences. The content of a hallucination is a token of the same type of de re mode of presentation as the token content of a subjectively indistinguishable perception. The modes of presentation types just are the concepts employed. Insofar as an experiencing subject can employ a concept even if she is not in an environment that contains the object or property-instance that the concept purports to pick out, employing concepts is independent of objects and property-instances. As a consequence, subjectively indistinguishable experiences share a content element (namely mode of presentation types) that is independent of objects and propertyinstances. As I have shown, environment-dependence is not an essential 40 This way of thinking about the content of perception and hallucination builds on my 2006. 28 SUSANNA SCHELLENBERG feature of potentially gappy Fregean contents. Although a part of the content of an experience of a white cup is dependent on the environment in the case of a perception, the very same type of de re mode of presentation can be tokened if no white cup is present. The token content of a hallucination of a white cup is naturally not dependent on their being a white cup in the environment of the hallucinating subject. 4. The Metaphysics of Experience-Objections and Replies I have developed a view of the common factor between subjectively indistinguishable perceptions and hallucinations that avoids analyzing experiences as involving awareness relations to abstract entities, sensedata, or any other peculiar entities. Objection 1. One could object that concepts are abstract entities: the thesis that experiencing subjects employ concepts implies that they are related to these concepts. Response. My aim was not to avoid all reference to abstract entities, nor was my aim to argue against all versions of the thesis that subjects are related to abstract entities. My aim was rather to argue against the thesis that experiencing subjects stand in awareness relations to abstract entities or any other peculiar entities. Moreover, my aim was to vindicate the Aristotelian principle and thus understand abstract entities or any other types in terms of their instances. As I will show, the suggested view does not entail that experiencing subjects stand in awareness relations to concepts and it vindicates the Aristotelian principle. One can quantify over concepts, therefore they must exist. Although they exist, they are not extended and do not have a spatiotemporal location. Moreover, they do not enter into causal interactions without being employed in mental states. Since they do not have spatiotemporal locations and do not enter into causal interactions, they must be abstract. While concepts are abstract entities, minimalism does not imply that experiencing subjects stand in awareness or acquaintance relations to concepts. More specifically, minimalism does not explain phenomenology in terms awareness or acquaintance relations to concepts or any other abstract entities. I have argued rather that the phenomenology of experience can be identified with employing concepts and nonconceptual structures in a sensory mode. There is no reason to think that this employment relation amounts to an awareness relation. ONTOLOGICAL MINIMALISM ABOUT PHENOMENOLOGY 29 Moreover on the view developed, concepts are analyzed in terms of perceptual relations to the very external mind-independent objects or property-instances that the concepts are of and that we are aware of when we accurately perceive. As a consequence, the Aristotelian principle is vindicated. When we accurately perceive a white cup, we employ concepts that pick out the very object and property-instances to which we are perceptually related. When we hallucinate, we employ the very same concepts that are grounded in such accurate perceptions. Objection 2. One could object that a content is an abstract entity: the thesis that perceptual experiences have content implies that experiencing subjects stand in an awareness relation to that content. Response. In order to respond to this objection, it will be helpful to distinguish between three ways in which one might say that experiences have content. On one view, the thesis that experience has content is analyzed in terms of the thesis that the experiencing subject stands in an awareness relation to the content or its constituents, such that this awareness relation grounds the phenomenology of the experience. Call this the content awareness view. This view goes back to Russell (1913), who argued that an experiencing subject stands in acquaintance relations to the constituents of the proposition that characterizes her experience. In the tradition of Russell, some views according to which experience is a propositional attitude to a content are formulated in a way that implies a content awareness view. However as noted earlier, many who hold that the content of experience is a Russellian proposition analyze experience in terms of a propositional attitude to a content without that propositional attitude constituting an awareness relation to that content or its constituents (e.g. Byrne 2001, Pautz 2007). A very different way of understanding what it means to say that experiences have content is to say that every experience can be associated with a content that describes what the subject is aware of, without that content being a proper part of the experience. Call this the associated content view. This view entails only that every mental event can be described by articulating a sentence that has a certain content. Articulating what contents can be associated with an experience is informative, but the view that such contents can be articulated does not entail that the experiences have content in any substantive sense of ''have''. In between these two poles is a view according to which experience has content without the subject standing in an awareness relation to 30 SUSANNA SCHELLENBERG that content. The idea is that in virtue of being perceptually related to an object or a property-instance, one represents that very object or property-instance by employing concepts that pick out the relevant object or property-instance. The content of the experience ensues from employing concepts. So far there is no need to say that one stands in an awareness relation to the content. What happens in the case of a hallucination? One employs the very same concepts employed in perception without being perceptually related to objects or propertyinstances. As in the perceptual case, there is no need to say that one stands in an awareness relation to the content. Rather one employs concepts in virtue of which one is intentionally directed at what seems to one to be an object or a property-instance. In this sense, the thesis that experience has content does not entail that one stands in an awareness relation to that content. Objection 3. It could be argued that the property-cluster theorist can analyze hallucinations of properties such as supersaturated red in a way analogous to the suggested view, thereby avoiding the metaphysical problems that I have argued a property-cluster theorist faces. According to minimalism, a hallucination of supersaturated red could be analyzed as a result of jointly employing the concepts of red and saturatedness, thereby inducing an experience of a particularly saturated red. Alternatively, a hallucination of supersaturated red could be analyzed as a result of extrapolating from experiences of red with regular levels of saturatedness. The property-cluster theorist could argue that supersaturated red is a complex property and posit that while supersaturated red is uninstantiated, the properties that the cluster consists of are instantiated. So hallucinations of supersaturated red can be analyzed in terms of (awareness) relations to instantiated properties.41 Response. While hallucinating a unicorn may be analyzable in terms of standing in an awareness relation to an uninstantiated property-cluster that consists of the instantiated properties of being white, having a single horn, and being horse-shaped etc., it is more contentious that hallucinating supersaturated red can be in analyzed in terms of standing in an awareness relation to the uninstantiated complex property that consists of the instantiated properties of redness and saturatedness. It is plausible that all color properties are phenomenologically basic and that therefore 41 This objection is due to Adam Pautz. ONTOLOGICAL MINIMALISM ABOUT PHENOMENOLOGY 31 they cannot be analyzed in terms of more basic color properties. However, if uninstantiated color properties can be analyzed as composites of instantiated color properties, then the metaphysical problem would indeed be avoided. Nonetheless, the phenomenological problem remains. A subject who suffers a non-veridical hallucination as of a cat by definition does not stand in an awareness relation to a material, mind-independent cat or any properties it instantiates. Since the properties that hallucinating subjects are said to be aware of are not instantiated where they seem to be instantiated, the revised version of the property-cluster view analyzes the phenomenology of hallucinations in terms of awareness relations to universals. Given that universals are not spatially extended it is unclear how one can be sensorily aware of universals. As I showed in my response to the previous two objections, minimalism does not require any commitment to the thesis that hallucinating subject stand in an awareness relations to abstract entities. Moreover, in contrast to the property-cluster view, minimalism is not commited to positing the existence of uninstantiated universals. Finally, in contrast to the revised property-cluster view, minimalism is not committed to the contentious thesis that uninstantiated color properties can be analyzed as composites of instantiated color properties. Objection 4. One could argue that if a property-cluster theorist accepts the distinction between intensional and extensional awareness, then she could hold that hallucinating subjects are intensionally aware of properties. Since intensional awareness relations do not require the existence of the properties which one is aware of, such a view avoids the metaphysical problems that I have argued a property-cluster theorist faces.42 Response. Let's assume for the sake of argument that this strategy would indeed avoid the metaphysical problem. The problem with such a modified property-cluster view is that it is unclear how it would amount to an explanation of the phenomenology of experience. The property-cluster view answers the hallucination question by arguing that hallucinating subjects stand in awareness relations to (uninstantiated) property-clusters. If these property-clusters are now considered to be not only potentially uninstantiated but moreover non-existing it is unclear how 42 Thanks to Fred Dretske for pressing me on this point. 32 SUSANNA SCHELLENBERG appealing to them could explain the phenomenological nature of hallucinations and more generally perceptual experiences. Objection 5. A third way in which the property-cluster theorist could aim to circumvent the metaphysical problem is to argue that supersaturated red is instantiated, namely by the mental state of a subject who suffers a hallucination of supersaturated red.43 Response. While such an analysis would avoid the metaphysical problem of having to accept the existence of uninstantiated universals, it would amount to one of the following two undesirable views. On one view, the phenomenology of hallucination is identified with the properties (e.g. phenomenal properties) that the mental state is stipulated to be constituted of. Arguably, such an approach would fail to give a noncircular explanation of what accounts for the phenomenology of the hallucination, since the phenomenology is now explained in terms of properties of the mental state, the nature of which is the explanandum.44 In this sense, such an approach simply reformulates the fact that experiences are phenomenological states. On a second view, phenomenology is explained in terms of awareness or acquaintance relations to concrete, mind-dependent entities, such as phenomenal properties, sense-data, qualia, or Meinongian objects. This approach is just a version of the peculiar entity view. The peculiar entities in question are not abstract entities, but rather concrete, mind-dependent entities.45 The aim of the paper was to explain phenomenology without having to appeal to awareness relations to any entities other than the very mind-independent objects and property-instances that the experiencing subject is aware of. On the view I have suggested, phenomenology is identified with employing concepts or analogous nonconceptual structures in a sensory mode. Concepts are in turn understood in terms of perceptual relations to the very mind-independent objects or propertyinstances that the concepts are of. While concepts are analyzed in terms of such perceptual relations, they can be employed in environments where the relevant objects or property-instances are not in fact present. 43 Thanks to Adam Pautz for a helpful email exchange on this set of issues. 44 It could be stipulated that these properties are in fact very different than the explanandum, but such a stipulation would be at best ad hoc. 45 See Strawson 1979, for a classical, critical discussion of such views. ONTOLOGICAL MINIMALISM ABOUT PHENOMENOLOGY 33 I take such an account to give an adequate, naturalized explanation of phenomenology. 5. Conclusion I have developed a way of analyzing the phenomenology of experience that does not require positing that hallucinating subjects stand in awareness relations to abstract entities or any other peculiar entities. I have argued that a hallucinating subject does not stand in an awareness relation to anything despite enjoying a phenomenology that purports to be of material mind-independent objects and property-instances. Defending the conjunction of these two theses required distinguishing between extensional and intensional awareness. As I argued, hallucinating subjects are not extensionally aware, but rather intensionally aware. Recognizing this distinction cleared the path for a view on which hallucinations have content, where this content has the same logical form as the content of a subjectively indistinguishable perception. The concepts and nonconceptual structures employed in hallucinations are the very same as the ones that pick out objects and property-instances in perceptions. So in contrast to disjunctivism, minimalism posits that perceptions and hallucinations share a common element. The concepts and nonconceptual structures that a hallucinating subject employs account for the intentional directedness to seeming objects and propertyinstances. Since the subject fails to refer to any objects or propertyinstances, the concepts remain empty. Since the concepts remain empty, the content of a hallucination is defective. As I argued, a hallucinating subject only possesses concepts because she has the ability to refer to the objects and property-instances that the concept is of. Since the concepts employed in hallucinations can only be specified with reference to their possible roles in perceptions, hallucinations exhibit a deficiency that can only be explained with reference to accurate perceptions. So minimalism reconciles the following four theses. First, there is a proper common element between subjectively indistinguishable perceptions and hallucinations that grounds the phenomenology of the experiences, thereby satisfying the indistinguishability desideratum. In this respect, the view is an improvement over disjunctivism and naıve realism, that is, views according to which perceptions and hallucinations do not share a common element. Second, the view does not require positing that hallucinating or perceiving subjects stand in an awareness relation to peculiar entities. In this respect, the view is ontologically more minimalist than any view that must appeal to such entities. While concepts are abstract entities, we do not stand in awareness relations to concepts when we employ concepts. Moreover, on the notion of 34 SUSANNA SCHELLENBERG concepts in play, there cannot be a perceptual concept that has not been employed to refer to the very mind-independent objects or property-instances that the concept is of. Third, the view satisfies the Aristotelian principle according to which the existence of any type depends on its tokens that in turn depend on concrete entities of the physical world. In this respect, the view is at an advantage over any view that must assume a Platonic 'two realms'-view. Finally, the view accounts for the phenomenology of perceptions and hallucinations in terms of relations to external, mind-independent objects and property-instances. Thereby, it amounts to a naturalized view of the phenomenology of experience.46 References Armstrong, D. 1989. Universals: An Opinionated Introduction. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Bach, K.1987 ⁄1994. Thought and Reference. Oxford: Oxford University Press (revised with postscript 1994). -- 2007. ''Searle Against the World: How Can Experiences find their Objects?'' John Searle's Philosophy of Language, ed. S. L. Tsohatzidis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Block, N. 1986. ''Advertisement for a Semantics for Psychology.'' Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10: 615–78. -- 1990. ''Inverted Earth.'' Philosophical Perspectives 4, ed. J. Tomberlin. Northridge: Ridgeview Publishing Company. -- 2003. ''Mental Paint.'' Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge, ed. M. Hahn and B. Ramberg. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Brandom, R. 1994. Making It Explicit. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Brewer, B. 2006. ''Perception and Content.'' The European Journal of Philosophy 14: 165–81. Browne, A. 2002. Representation and Extrapolation in Multilayer Perceptions. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Burge, T. 1979. ''Individualism and the Mental.'' Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4: 73–121. 46 I am grateful to David Chalmers, Fred Dretske, Ole Koksvik, Fiona Macpherson, Jonathan Schaffer, Laura Schroeter, Nico Silins, and particularly Adam Pautz for detailed written comments on a draft of this paper. Thanks also to Kent Bach, Bill Fish, Frank Jackson, Susanna Siegel, Declan Smithies, Daniel Stoljar, and Brad Thompson for comments and discussions as well as to the audiences at the Hallucination on Crete conference, the Australasian Assocation for Philosophy 2008 meeting, and the Themes from Crispin Wright workshop. ONTOLOGICAL MINIMALISM ABOUT PHENOMENOLOGY 35 Byrne, A. 2001. ''Intentionalism Defended.'' The Philosophical Review 110: 199–240. Campbell, J. 2002. Reference and Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press. -- 2009. ''Consciousness and Reference.'' Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind, ed. B. McLaughlin and A. Beckermann. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Carr, D. 1979. ''The Logic of Knowing How and Ability.'' Mind 88: 394–409. Carruthers, P. 2000. Phenomenal Consciousness: A Naturalistic Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chalmers, D. 1996. The Conscious Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. -- 2004. ''The Representational Character of Experience.'' The Future for Philosophy, ed. B. Leiter. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chisholm R. 1957. Perceiving: A Philosophical Study. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Crane, T. 1998. ''Intentionality as the Mark of the Mental.'' Contemporary Issues in the Philosophy of Mind, ed. A. O'Hear. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. -- 2003. ''The Intentional Structure of Consciousness.'' Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives, ed. A. Jokic and Q. Smith. Oxford: Oxford University Press. -- 2006. ''Is there a Perceptual Relation?'' Perceptual Experience, ed. T. Gendler and J. Hawthorne. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Davies, M. 1992. ''Perceptual Content and Local Supervenience.'' Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 92: 21–45. Devitt, M. 1981. Designation. New York: Columbia University Press. Dretske, F. 2000. ''The Mind's Awareness of Itself.'' Perception, Knowledge, and Belief. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Dummett, M. 1993. ''What is a Theory of Meaning?'' The Seas of Language. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Egan, A. 2006. ''Appearance Properties?'' Noûs 40: 495–521. Evans, G. 1982. The Varieties of Reference, ed. J. McDowell. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Fish, W. 2009. Perception, Hallucination, and Illusion. New York: Oxford University Press. Fodor, J. 1975. The Language of Thought. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. -- 1998. Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong. New York: Oxford University Press. 36 SUSANNA SCHELLENBERG Ffytche, D. H. 2008. ''The Hodology of Hallucinations.'' Cortex 44: 1067–1083. Ffytche, D. H. and Howard, R. J. 1999. ''The Perceptual Consequences of Visual Loss: 'Postive' pathologies of Vision.'' Brain 122: 1247–60. Frege, G. 1879. Begriffsschrift: eine der arithmetischen nachgebildete Formelsprache des reinen Denkens. Halle: L. Nebert. Haddock, A. and Macpherson, F. 2008. ''Introduction: Varieties of Disjunctivism.'' in their Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Harman, G. 1987. ''(Non-solipsistic) Conceptual Role Semantics.'' New Directions in Semantics, ed. E. Lepore. London: Academic Press. -- 1990. ''The Intrinsic Quality of Experience.'' Philosophical Perspectives 4, ed. J. Tomberlin. Northridge: Ridgeview Publishing Company. Heck, R. 2000. ''Nonconceptual Content and the 'Space of Reasons'.'' The Philosophical Review 109: 483–523. Hornsby, J. 2004. ''Semantic Knowledge and Practical Knowledge.'' Supplement to the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 79: 107– 30. Hinton, J. M. 1973. Experiences. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Jackendoff, R. 1987. Computation and Cognition. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Jackson, F. 1977. Perception: A Representative Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Jeshion, R. 2002. ''Acquaintanceless De Re Belief.'' Meaning and Truth, ed. J Campbell, M. O'Rourke and D. Shier. New York: Seven Bridges Press. Johnston, M. 2004. ''The Obscure Object of Hallucination.'' Philosophical Studies 120: 113–83. Kripke, S.1972 ⁄1980. Naming and Necessity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Laurence, S. and Margolis, E. 1999. ''Concepts and Cognitive Science.'' Concepts: Core Readings, ed. E. Margolis and S. Laurence. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Lycan, W. G. 1996. Consciousness and Experience. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. MacPherson, F. 2003. ''Novel Colors and the Content of Experience.'' Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84: 43–66. Martin, M. G. F. 2002. 'The Transparency of Experience'. Mind and Language 17: 376–425. -- 2004. ''The Limits of Self-Awareness.'' Philosophical Studies 103: 37–89. ONTOLOGICAL MINIMALISM ABOUT PHENOMENOLOGY 37 McDowell, J. 1984. ''De Re Senses.'' The Philosophical Quarterly 34: 283–94. McGinn, C. 1982. The Character of Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. McLaughlin, B. 1996. ''Lewis on What Distinguishes Perception From Hallucination.'' Problems in Perception, ed. K. Akins. Oxford: Oxford University Press. -- 2007. ''Type Materialism for Phenomenal Consciousness.'' Blackwell Companion to Consciousness, ed. M. Velmans and S. Schneider. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. Moore, G. E. 1953. Some Main Problems of Philosophy. London: George, Allen and Unwin. Parsons, T. 1980. Nonexistent Objects. New Haven: Yale University Press. Pautz, A. 2007. ''Intentionalism and Perceptual Presence.'' Philosophical Perspectives 21, ed. J. Hawthorne. Northridge: Ridgeview Publishing Company. -- forthcoming. ''The Intentional Structure of Visual Experience.'' Perceiving the World, ed. B. Nanay. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Peacocke, C. 1981. ''Demonstrative Thought and Psychological Explanation.'' Synthese 49: 187–217. -- 1983. Sense and Content: Experience, Thought, and Their Relations. Oxford: Oxford University Press. -- 1992. A Study of Concepts. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. -- 2008. ''Sensational Properties: Theses to Accept and Theses to Reject.'' Revue Internationale de Philosophie 62: 7–24. Perry, J. 1977. ''Frege on Demonstratives.'' The Philosophical Review 86: 474–97. Price, H. H. 1950. Perception. London: Methuen. Prinz, J. 2002. Furnishing the Mind: Concepts and their Perceptual Basis. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Putnam, H. 1975. ''The Meaning of Meaning.'' Reprinted in his Philosophical Papers vol. 2: Mind, Language, and Reality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Recanati, F. 1993. Direct Reference: From Language to Thought. London: Blackwell. Robinson, H. 1994. Perception. London: Routledge. Rosch, E. 1978. ''Principles of Categorization.'' Cognition and Categorization, ed. E. Rosch and B. Lloyd. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Russell, B. 1913. Theory of Knowledge: London: Routledge 1992. 38 SUSANNA SCHELLENBERG Ryle, G. 1949. The Concept of Mind. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Schellenberg, S. 2006: Perception in Perspective. Doctoral Dissertation. University of Pittsburgh. -- 2008. ''The Situation-Dependency of Perception.'' The Journal of Philosophy 105: 55–84. -- 2010. ''The Particularity and Phenomenology of Perceptual Experience.'' Philosophical Studies. -- forthcoming-a. ''Perceptual Content Defended.'' Noûs. -- forthcoming-b. ''Externalism and the Gappy Content of Hallucination.'' Hallucination, ed. F. E. Macpherson and D. Platchais, MIT Press. Sellars, W. 1963. Science, Perception and Reality. Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing Company. Shoemaker, S. 1982. ''The Inverted Spectrum.'' The Journal of Philosophy 79: 357–381. -- 2007. ''A Case for Qualia.'' Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind, ed. B. McLaughlin and J. Cohen. London: Blackwell. Siegel, S. 2004. ''Indiscriminability and the Phenomenal.'' Philosophical Studies 120: 91–112. -- 2008 ''The Epistemic Conception of Hallucination.'' Disjunctivism: Perception, Action and Knowledge, ed. F. Macpherson. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Smith, A. D. 2002. The Problem of Perception. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Smith, E. and Medin, D. 1981. Categories and Concepts. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Snowdon, P. 1981. ''Perception, Vision and Causation.'' Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 81: 175–92. Sosa, E. 1970. ''Propositional attitudes de dicto and de re.'' The Journal of Philosophy 67: 883–96. -- 1993. ''Abilities, Concepts, and Externalism.'' Mental Causation, ed. J. Heil and A. Mele. Oxford: Oxford University Press. -- 1995. ''Fregean Reference Defended'' and ''More on Fregean Reference.'' Philosophical Issues 6: 91–99; 113-22. Stanley, J. and Williamson, T. 2001. ''Knowing How.'' The Journal of Philosophy 98: 411–44. Stoljar, D. 2004. ''The Argument from Diaphanousness.'' New Essays in the Philosophy of Language and Mind. Supplemental volume of The Canadian Journal of Philosophy, ed. M. Ezcurdia, R. Stainton and C. Viger. Calgary: University of Calgary Press. Strawson, P.F. 1979. ''Perception and its Objects.'' Perception and Identity, ed. G. F. MacDonald. London: Macmillian. ONTOLOGICAL MINIMALISM ABOUT PHENOMENOLOGY 39 Travis, C. 2004. ''Silence of the Senses.'' Mind 113: 57–94. Tye, M. 2000. Consciousness, Color and Content. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. -- 2002. ''Representationalism and the Transparency of Experience.'' Noûs 36: 137–51. -- 2007. ''Intentionalism and the Argument from no Common Content.'' Philosophical Perspectives 21, ed. J. Hawthorne. Northridge: Ridgeview Publishing Company. Williams, D. C. 1953. ''The Elements of Being.'' Review of Metaphysics 7: 3–18; 171-92. Williamson, T. 1990. Identity and Discrimination. Oxford: Blackwell. 40 SUSANNA SCHELLENBERG

/7/2020 EUSKADIASIA https://web.archive.org/web/20120324000052/http://www.euskadiasia.com:80/ESTUDIOS_ORIENTALES/DOCUMENTOS/_repensar_homogenei... 1/4 EUSKADIASIA EL HEMISFERIO ORIENTAL DE LA FILOSOFÍA: REPENSAR LA HOMOGENEIDAD FILOSÓFICA Montserrat Crespín y Virginia Solá El texto que EuskadiAsia presenta, elaborado por Montserrat Crespín Perales y Virginia Solá Díaz a propósito de la celebración del XXII World Congress of Philosophy en Corea del Sur, representa, a todas luces, una piedra de toque para hacernos reflexionar sobre el alcance de la labor filosófica lejos de las costas occidentales. Con este evento, la academia bienpensante, esto es, políticamente correcta, bien pudiera atemperar las dudas de aquellos que le recriminan su ensimismamiento solipsista, que perdura ya algún milenio, e incluso hacer suyos, desde la supremacía moral de saberse fundadores y únicos herederos del acto de inteligencia humana por antonomasia, ciertos reclamos del huero discurso multiculturalista. Más nos hubiera gustado a otros que esta reunión hubiera servido para dejar que una ráfaga de viento fresco disipara el rancio hedor teológico, la viciada atmósfera de superchería que atesta infinidad de departamentos universitarios, en Europa y en Norteamérica, en torno a las primigenios y exclusivos orígenes occidentales del quehacer filosófico. ¿Habrá que recordar todavía que, cuando Diógenes de Enoanda declina y emerge el calvario judeocristiano, en la universidad budista de Nālandā diez mil monjes estudian las doctrinas budistas, lógica, matemáticas, medicina, botánica y otras ciencias? Es preciso, pues, ir más allá y arrumbar los ejes nucleares de meta-historia de la filosofía occidental para convencerse que esta clase de reuniones aspiran a ser algo más que u mera pose de edulcorado esteticismo o un inquietante impu expansivo de la empresa cultural dominante con el objeto convertir estos territorios "periféricos" en otras tan franquicias del ideal occidental. De hecho, la significativa coincidencia en el tiempo entre elección de Corea del Sur como sede del Congreso y fulgurante emergencia geoestratégica de esta región del mun nos debe llamar al más sombrío escepticismo y recordar, u vez más, lo dicho por F. Nietzsche acerca de los soterrad instintos de dominación que mueven a la moderna empr filosófica de corifeos y pseudoilustrados. Sirva, sin embargo, el texto de Montserrat Crespín y Sil Solá como contrapunto esperanzado a las objeciones expues o, si se quiere, síntoma de que algo se mueve, paciente inasequible al desaliento, en pos del definitivo quebranto de homogeneidad filosófica. REPENSAR LA HOMOGENEIDAD FILOSÓFICA El XXII Congreso Mundial de Filosofía se ha celebrado por primera vez en una sede asiática, en Seúl Corea del Sur, de modo casi simultáneo a los Juegos Olímpicos de Pekín. Tanto la ubicación geográfic como los contenidos que allí se trataron durante esas siete jornadas invitan a repensar si puede sostener que la filosofía es un conocimiento homogéneamente occidental. 1. Una sede asiática por primera vez Han hecho falta veintidós ediciones para que el Congreso Mundial de Filosofía atendiera a la necesidad de Los intelectuales africanos analizaron durante los d del congreso, uno de los aspectos que queda fuera de beneficios de la sociedad global. Entre los puntos que merecen una atención más urgente no podía faltar la cuest Go MAR MAR APR 24 2010 2012 2013 2 captures http://www.euskadiasia.com/ESTUDIOS_ORIENTALES/DOCUMENTOS/_repensar_homogeneida_crespin_sola.ht 👤 ⍰❎ f 🐦 11 Mar 2010 24 Mar 2012 ▾ About this capture 30/7/2020 EUSKADIASIA https://web.archive.org/web/20120324000052/http://www.euskadiasia.com:80/ESTUDIOS_ORIENTALES/DOCUMENTOS/_repensar_homogenei... 2/4 hacer honor a su nombre. De la mano de la Federación Internacional de Sociedades Filosóficas (FISP) en colaboración con la Korean Philosophical Association, la antaño olímpica Seúl iniciaba a finales de Julio la mayor maratón internacional del complejo mundo de las eternas preguntas. Pese a que en congresos anteriores la presencia de miles de pensadores de todo el mundo proporcionaba voz a otras tantas formas de pensamiento, esta vez el marco ha roto una lanza en favor de la pluralidad. Tal y como decía el Presidente del Comité Organizador Coreano, Dr. Myung-Hyun Lee durante su discurso inaugural: "Los congresos mundiales han sido hasta ahora festivales filosóficos basados en concepciones occidentales. Esta vez, el Congreso tiene lugar por primera vez en el hemisferio oriental desde su establecimiento hace 108 años, lo cual proporciona una oportunidad para dar a conocer concepciones orientales haciendo que el Congreso Mundial sea de verdadero sentido (1) ." Lejos de convertirse en otro evento conceptual y contablemente occidental, el Dr. Lee nos convidaba, con las palabras antes citadas, a dar un paso del centro imaginario del poder filosófico (europeo o norteamericano) a la también imaginaria periferia de la griega filosofía (no-occidental). Sin duda la nueva ubicación del encuentro ofreció una oportunidad para dar a conocer al otro y a su vez para poder reconocer al otro por sí mismo y por nosotros mismos. La reflexión a la que Lee nos empuja es automática: las Sociedades Filosóficas decidieron organizarse y reunirse hace más de un siglo y llamaron a tal banquete de ponencias y ponentes "Mundial", sin llegar a cuestionarse qué significaba unir "filosofía" y "mundial". De hecho, esa reflexión sigue sin hacerse o se responde ante el interrogante con una evasiva que trata a los pensadores asiáticos, africanos o sudamericanos y a sus discursos como enjuagaduras exóticas. Frente a la universalidad indiscutible de otros ámbitos de conocimiento, la filosofía parece encarnar el eterno anti-logos, lo eterno nocomún a todos, por cuanto esos asignados márgenes del pensamiento, o se silencian o, en el mejor de los casos, se utilizan para reafirmar la hegemonía occidental en cuestiones culturales, políticas o epistemológicas. En nuestros días, un verdadero diálogo ya no puede sostenerse sobre la base del mero reconocimiento o la rehabilitación de otros discursos. Es totalmente necesario reconsiderar qué significa dialogar y qué comunicarse. No es aceptable obviar que la verdadera interlocución se constituye con la aceptación de la heterogeneidad que debe ir de la mano del reconocimiento de lo común en todo pensador más allá de su continente, nación o lengua. Lamentablemente, estamos lejos de aspirar a redefinir o repensar la filosofía y más lejos aún de llegar a entender su mensaje. Si algún día se llegara a considerar con todas sus consecuencias el carácter universal de la filosofía, ésta saldría de la caverna occidentalocéntrica y aquellos que ahora quedan relegados al exotismo o la marginalidad dejarían de tener que pagar el alquiler de la justificación ante los auto-coronados "propietarios" de la razón. De discursos como el del politólogo Larry Arnhart que asevera que "La tradición europea que comenzó con la antigua Grecia es superior a cualquier otra tradición de pensamiento" (2) , se sigue que hay tradiciones que podemos minusvalorar. La valoración a la baja de otras historias intelectuales es un tipo de juicio que, llevado a su extremo, puede desembocar en afirmaciones que sostengan que hay hombres y mujeres inferiores, aunque los interrogantes de éstos sean los mismos que los nuestros. Entre otras cosas porque compartimos con ellos eso que cae bajo un verbo y un adjetivo: ser-humano. sanitaria así como el reto de la "simple" supervivencia a la q se enfrentan diariamente. En el mundo occidental, los sistem de seguridad social y la estabilidad económica han cambia progresivamente la percepción de una enfermedad como SIDA: ha pasado de ser una enfermedad que sentenciaba muerte a aquellos que la padecían, a considerarse un proble de salud crónico. En África, tal y como se desprende de impresiones de sus propios pensadores, la batalla contra e extendida epidemia es doblemente complicada. Por un lado, sabemos que los intereses capitalistas las multinacionales farmacéuticas impiden la distribución los medicamentos en los países del continente más atacad por la enfermedad. Por otro, como bien señaló el profe etíope Workineh Kelbessa Golga, en la sociedad africana h una necesidad urgente de acabar con los prejuicios cultura que avivan la pandemia. Kelbessa sostuvo que es urgente educación sexual de la población africana, educación q solamente podrá referirse a aspectos sexuales si primero protege y apoya a la educación en sí misma, como derec innegociable y necesario para el desarrollo de la sociedad. educación eliminaría mitos culturales como los que afirm que los hombres de raza negra son hiper-sexuales o inmoral y erradicaría falsas supersticiones que creen en la sanación la enfermedad al mantenerse relaciones sexuales con niña mediante violaciones. Alejándose de las abstracciones en que vuela la reflexión filosófica de la academia occidental, e tipo de planteamientos han constituido, sin duda, u invitación a reevaluar el objeto y sentido de la reflex filosófica ante los problemas de su contemporaneidad. Para no llevar a engaño, hay que dejar constancia que la representación africana asistente al congreso esta compuesta de pensadores que han tenido que emigrar p poder realizar sus investigaciones. Ni que decir tiene que testimonio es el de aquellos afortunados que, buscando lugar donde desarrollar sus estudios, tuvieron que emigra universidades norteamericanas o europeas. Desde reivindican la identidad de su tradición y su valía. Much otros como ellos no han tenido la misma suerte y siguen sien desconocidos entre nosotros. Es más que una utopía pensa estos últimos asumiendo el pago, no ya del viaje o la estanc sino simplemente del coste del registro al evento. De tod modos, estos intelectuales migrantes, aunque sea desde distancia, elevan la voz de su crítica social pero también de orgullo. Paralelamente, análisis similares aunque con ot intenciones surgieron entre los pensadores nacidos Sudamérica. Los intelectuales sudamericanos están critican detenidamente la transformación geopolítica de sus país Reivindican el compromiso con las luchas de resistencia reclaman, como hiciera el Dr. Héctor Samour de El Salvad una nueva dirección hacia la praxis concreta de los individu y las colectividades. El objetivo de esa nueva direcc pretende la consecución de una liberación filosófica alternat al capitalismo. Al margen de sus interesantes análisis y sus novedo aportaciones, cabe reclamarles una contraposición a su v crítica de esas estructuras alternativas que proponen. C frecuencia, las alternativas políticas o económicas aparec dibujadas en los discursos pero no se definen de un mo concreto. Quizá en la volatilidad y, por tanto, en imposibilidad de una opción real que huya de ser un retor sonoro con ecos de populismo que corroe la idealización an capitalista, radica la flaqueza de estos discursos herederos las teorías de la liberación. Para esos académic sudamericanos cabría plantear un nuevo reto: salir de audiencias convencidas y enfrentarse a oyentes más áspe que les espolearan preguntándoles de qué forma y modo posible otro sistema económico. Quedar reducidos al an capitalismo sin ofrecer opción de análisis económico real Go MAR MAR APR 24 2010 2012 2013 2 captures http://www.euskadiasia.com/ESTUDIOS_ORIENTALES/DOCUMENTOS/_repensar_homogeneida_crespin_sola.ht 👤 ⍰❎ f 🐦 11 Mar 2010 24 Mar 2012 ▾ About this capture 30/7/2020 EUSKADIASIA https://web.archive.org/web/20120324000052/http://www.euskadiasia.com:80/ESTUDIOS_ORIENTALES/DOCUMENTOS/_repensar_homogenei... 3/4 Siguiendo con la denominación del Dr. Lee, el festival filosófico que tuvo lugar en Seúl, aún con sus limitaciones, dejó a las claras la ridiculez de aquellos académicos que en más de una ocasión se escuchan en reuniones patrias y que se siguen refiriendo a tradiciones, como pueda ser la japonesa, con chanzas. Dejan a la vista que su ignorancia no es de raíz socrática. Como mucho dicen conocer los restaurantes japoneses de la ciudad en la que viven. ¿Cómo habrían enfrentado ellos las sesiones sobre las obras de Platón conducidas por profesores japoneses o coreanos? ¿Cómo habrían colaborado con esos "otros" filósofos a los que desmerecen infravalorando de entrada su calidad por el mero hecho de proceder de una cultura distinta? Habría sido interesante contemplar su incomodidad en la mesa, pero sea por cobardía o desconocimiento de la existencia del Congreso, no estuvieron allí. 2. La "universalidad" de los derechos humanos entre paréntesis Merced precisamente a la pluralidad de opiniones, entre las cientos de ponencias, lecturas, diálogos o mesas redondas, una idea se repitió como reflejo de una preocupación latente en todos los continentes: ¿dónde reside la vigencia y efectividad de los derechos humanos? ¿Qué papel real juega la universalidad de la Declaración proclamada por las Naciones Unidas hace 60 años? Si antes nos referíamos a la jerarquía construida e impuesta al conocimiento filosófico, algo similar sucede cuando se escucha a filósofos africanos o asiáticos hablar de los derechos adjetivados como "universales". El profesor Nkolo Fo, de Camerún, habló en la Sesión Plenaria "Repensando la Filosofía Moral, Social y Política: Democracia, Justicia y Responsabilidad Global", de los sofistas del siglo veintiuno. Para Fo, esos "nuevos bárbaros" se amparan en sociedades cada día más acríticas y en el relativismo que se rearma frenando el universalismo de derechos y garantías individuales y sociales. Los filósofos del mundo árabe comparten esta crítica al enmascaradamente viejo y nuevo sofismo. Éstos apuntalan la vacuidad que se esconde tras lemas políticamente correctos como los que se camuflan en el posibilismo de los "retos del nuevo milenio". Para ellos tales discursos parecen quedarse en meros documentos escritos sin valor real en la práctica jurídica y política. Esto es así porque no se piensan los aspectos económicos en toda su complejidad. Difícilmente pueden cumplirse los decálogos de buenas intenciones y las banderas multicolor de la igualdad y la justicia si no se reconsideran los aspectos monetarios que subyacen. La economía siega toda condición de posibilidad y amparo en estos derechos que, siendo inalienables, se negocian en el libre mercado político y gubernamental. 3. Paradójica globalización El fenómeno de la globalización también fue objeto de controversia. Este concepto manoseado que llena las estanterías de las librerías con su insignia nominal por título, tampoco parece haberse pensado en serio, teniéndose en cuenta los múltiples rostros que lo componen. Para el Doctor africano Zekeh Gbotokuma, el fenómeno de la globalización es una nueva forma de recolonización que mantiene el status quo de las desigualdades. Sus palabras recuerdan a las del cantautor Terry Callier quien hace unos años cantaba que la recolonización travestida con el maquillaje de la globalización no era más que otra ventana para que escape la esperanza en África. Entretenidos con la escritura de páginas y páginas de líderes políticos e intelectuales que nos hablan de la globalización y sus efectos, se nos olvida con frecuencia que hay tareas irrealizadas en el continente africano. seguir en el carril del que se intenta huir finalme descarrilando. 4. Responsabilidad y ética en el mundo tecnológico "A su pregunta contestaré dentro de tres años. Es pensando en ello." Algo tan simple como la aceptación de propia ignorancia fue quizá la mejor lección de tan do congreso. Con la respuesta sin respuesta, sabedora de imposibilidad de dar contestaciones cerradas a aspec incontestables, el filósofo japonés Tomonobu Imamichi convirtió desde el primer día en sensei (profesor) de toda congregación filosófica. Lejos de la santificada filosofía púlpito universitario, hay pensadores que, como él, aún mueven caminando y conversando y dando la posibilidad caminar junto a él y conversar con él. Todos tenemos cie imagen mental de la figura de Sócrates. El Dr. Imamic reivindicando la amistad y la eutrapelia (la alegría vital fre al nihilismo), podría encarnar una de esas imágenes filósofo griego. A sus ochenta y cinco años, y compartiendo su extre lucidez, contribuyó activamente desde el estrado o desde platea. Otra enseñanza sin palabras: el maestro nunca deja aprender. De entre todas las ideas sobre las que reflexionó voz alta, destacamos sin duda su noción de "eco-ética". E concepto, derivado de la palabra griega oikos (casa) en ta que lugar en el que habitamos y nos relacionamos, se distan de lo que a primera vista parecería una idea encuadrada den de los estudios medioambientales o ecológicos. El proyecto de Imamichi busca nuevos bríos para comportamiento ético. En su opinión, éste debería sostene en la reivindicación de toda una estructura de valores q hayan limado sus aristas ante el nuevo mundo cohabitado c la tecnología. En vez de caminar hacia un horizonte alienación tecnológica, su propuesta reconoce que ya podemos concebir nuestra vida diaria sin las máquin convertidas en instrumentos necesarios de nues cotidianeidad. Su tesis se aleja de otras concepciones q añoran utopías de paraísos artificialmente naturales sustentadas en una idea edulcorada del medio ambien ineficaz ante el irrefrenable mundo industrial. El aún p desarrollar proyecto alrededor de la "eco-ética" e empezando a dar sus frutos en las obras de filósofos co Peter McCormick y en los ámbitos universitarios de Franci Dinamarca. Cualquier neologismo conceptual es aparatoso y e noción no es una excepción. Sin embargo, vale la pena valo la advertencia que el Dr. Imamichi hizo frente al peligro q corremos olvidando los gestos más básicos de nues humanidad dentro de un mundo urbano tecnológicame cohesionado. Para Imamichi corremos el riesgo deshumanizarnos metidos en nuestro mundo, en nues movimiento incesante sin expresión. Su reconsideración de ética parece intentar evitar que el ser humano aca metamorfoseándose en un insecto que nunca sonríe. Tanto éstas como otras cuestiones surgidas durante XXII Congreso Mundial de Filosofía fueron ejemplo de la heterogeneidad mencionada al principio y lo son también de común que subyace en todos los hombres. No hay reflexió que no nazca de los interrogantes propios de cada uno de nosotros y no hay enigma, por remoto que nos parezca, que nos incumba. Al respecto, es importante un apunte más allá las sesiones y discusiones propias de la organización del congreso. Al visitar el centro de Seúl impresiona visitar la Pla de la Independencia y la antigua prisión ahora convertida museo y dedicada a mantener viva la memoria de los horro cometidos durante los treinta y cinco años de ocupac japonesa de la península coreana (1910-1945). Go MAR MAR APR 24 2010 2012 2013 2 captures http://www.euskadiasia.com/ESTUDIOS_ORIENTALES/DOCUMENTOS/_repensar_homogeneida_crespin_sola.ht 👤 ⍰❎ f 🐦 11 Mar 2010 24 Mar 2012 ▾ About this capture 30/7/2020 EUSKADIASIA https://web.archive.org/web/20120324000052/http://www.euskadiasia.com:80/ESTUDIOS_ORIENTALES/DOCUMENTOS/_repensar_homogenei... 4/4 Aún no se ha erradicado la pobreza y por tanto la globalización debería confrontarse, en primer lugar, con la distribución de las grandes oportunidades que parece contener. --- (1) Programa del XXII Congreso Mundial de Filosofía, p. 4. (2) Citado en ANASTAPLO, George, But not Philosophy: Seven Introduction to Non-Western Thought; Lanham, Boulder, New York and Oxford: Lexington Books, 2002, pp. Xvi-xvii. El horror y el límite al diálogo siguen inscritos en paredes de los edificios que conformaron el campo concentración, sus celdas de castigo y su cadalso. La sensac que queda, más allá de mirar hacia el pasado, es la de conscientes de que eso que se visita guiadamente como trayecto turístico por el mal del que son capaces los hombr no es cosa de una narración histórica, sino que sigue en pie sí) como discurso universal. Paradójicamente, la tortura y la aniquilación nos ponen a tod de acuerdo y en condición de igualdad. Tod independientemente de la nacionalidad, la lengua o la cultu hemos sido alguna vez o víctimas o verdugos. Go MAR MAR APR 24 2010 2012 2013 2 captures http://www.euskadiasia.com/ESTUDIOS_ORIENTALES/DOCUMENTOS/_repensar_homogeneida_crespin_sola.ht 👤 ⍰❎ f 🐦 11 Mar 2010 24 Mar 2012 ▾ About this capture

The motion of the subject – a metaphor? Reply to Pollok About this paper This paper is a reply to the criticism of my Kant-interpretation in Konstantin Pollok's "Kant's Critical Concepts of Motion" in the Journal of the History of Philosophy 44 (2006): 559-575. I submitted my reply on January 8th 2008, but in spite of an anonymous referee report recommending "uniqueivocally that the paper be accepted for publication as is by the journal," it was not accepted. Realizing that the paper will never appear in the journals, I have decided to make it available on the internet "as is." I also received another referee report, which was negative in the extreme. The editor informed me in a letter of April 16th 2008 that they had "also received a third report to the effect that this work neither introduces a novel line of interpretation nor exposes a deep ambiguity in Pollok's position, and we concurred with this judgment." However, this third report was not sent to me. In reply to my e-mail inquiry of yesterday, the Journal of the History of Philosophy states that it is "fine with us" that I post the two referee reports (attached at the end here). Oslo, November 7st 2013 Jens Saugstad The motion of the subject – a metaphor? Reply to Pollok Abstract In Critique of Pure Reason Kant speaks about motion, as action of the subject in connection with the actions by which we describe a space, such as drawing a line or constructing a circle. In a 1992-paper in Kant-Studien I argued that this is one important piece of textual evidence for the so-called externalist interpretation, according to which the transcendental conditions of experience and indeed all the a priori elements in Kant's system are public, depending upon overt action. Konstantin Pollok has criticized my reading, arguing that the relevant use of the term "motion" here is just metaphorical, and considering some central Kantian doctrines that he thinks refutes the externalist interpretation. The present paper defends the externalist interpretation against Pollok's charges. The motion of the subject – a metaphor? Reply to Pollok Jens Saugstad I have become aware of an article in Journal of the History of Philosophy in which Konstantin Pollok has attempted to reject my proposal for a radical re-interpretation Kant's philosophy.1 I need to ask the Editor for space to defend my so-called externalist interpretation.2 I. Brief presentation of the externalist interpretation3 At the end of the Anthropology, Kant makes a thought-experiment in order to shed light upon the moral character of the human species: It could well be that some other planet is inhabited by rational beings who could only think aloud – who, whether awake or dreaming, in company with others or alone, can have no thoughts they do not at the same time utter (Anthro: B 331/332). If Kant allows, in principle, that there could be rational beings who can only think aloud, then it seems that he must hold that rationality per se does not necessarily comprise the capacity for inner thought. Consequently, in order to capture Kant's analysis of reason, we must construe it in such a way that it applies also to such extraterrestrial rational beings. This leads to the externalist interpretation: If we can imagine extraterrestrial rational beings whose whole mental life (short of sensations) is public, we should, for the purpose of a Kantian analysis of the mind, entirely disregard the human capacity for inner, mental acts, for inner speech, and for entertaining mental images before the "inner eye." Rather, rationality should be construed as depending upon a fixed set of interconnected overt actions, or behavioral techniques, to put it in Wittgensteinean terms.4 More specifically, syntheses or the actions of the understanding are not mental acts inside some "private box" called the understanding, but the behavioral techniques that enable us to know the sensible world via language (Ent: BA 16n/193-4n). 1 Konstantin Pollok, "Kant's Critical Concepts of Motion," Journal of the History of Philosophy 44 (2006): 55975, esp. pp. 562-4. I refer to this work by page numbers only. 2 Jens Saugstad, "Kant on Action and Knowledge," Kant-Studien 83 (1992): 381-98. I also refer to this work by page numbers only. In addition, I refer to two follow-up papers of mine which Pollok does not consider: "Sensibility, Space, and Public Display," in Øfsti, A., Ulrich P., and Wyller T. (eds.), Indexicality and Idealism. The self in Philosophical Perspective (Paderborn: mentis 2000), and "'I think ....' Kant on Self-Consciousness," in Øfsti, A., Ulrich P., and Wyller T. (eds.), Indexicality and Idealism II. The self in Philosophical Perspective (Paderborn: mentis 2002). 3 All references to Kritik der reinen Vernunft are placed in brackets in the main text, e.g. A 23 or B 38 (A and B referring to the first and second edition of that work, respectively). References to other works by Kant are to the Weischedel-edition (before the slash), and the Akademie-edition (after the slash). For quotation, I have consulted both Critique of Pure Reason, edited and translated by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), and Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, translated by Norman Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 1933/1990). For other works I rely upon Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, translated by Mary J. Gregor (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974), and Critique of Practical Reason, translated by Lewis White Beck (New York: Macmillan, 1956), or else draw upon translations given by Pollok and other commentators where such have been available. Abbreviations: Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht = Anthro; Die Metaphysik der Sitten – Rechtslehre = MdS-R; Kritik der praktischen Vernunft = KpV; Kritik der Urteilskraft = KU; Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft = MAN; Über eine Entdeckung, nach der alle neue Kritik der reinen Vernunft durch eine ältere entbehrlich gemacht werden soll = Ent, to which I refer in the main text as the Streitschrift. 4 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations / Philosophische Untersuchungen (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958, originally 1953), # 199. 2 Productive imagination through figurative synthesis (B 151-2), of which geometrical construction (or ostensive construction, B 745) is an important specimen, is a capacity for producing pictures overtly, for instance by depicting a geometrical figure in the air (cf. B 741), or, according to the same rules, upon paper, or like Archimedes, "with his stick in the sand" (Ent: BA 13n/191n). Even the form of sensibility, albeit it strictly speaking "does not lie in reason itself" (KpV: A 116/65-6), depends upon overt action: The pure, original intuitions of space and time are the public displays of locations, directions and the modes of time through ostensive actions (B 38, B 40, B 46).5 By implication, sensible intuitions are paradigmatic, public displays by means of material things, as is evident in Kant's reminders about the foundation of arithmetic: In the famous example, he explicitly says that the fingers of my hand or points on paper – later he adds strokes and the beads of the abacus – are called in aid as intuition when I add 7 and 5 to get 12 (B 15, B 299).6 On my proposal, then, the transcendental conditions of experience – and all the other a priori elements in Kant's system – are public.7 I have called it the externalist interpretation simply because it construes the a priori in terms of actions that are performed overtly, in the external world, by embodied subjects, and I oppose it to internalist interpretations, which reduce the a priori to something private – either of the familiar kind: inner, mental images and acts, or of a more dubious kind: inner structures and inner operations that allegedly are neither overt nor mental (in the above, narrow sense).8 The motive behind my proposal, apart from doing Kant justice, is to rescue his philosophical system from the later Wittgenstein's devastating criticism of internalism.9 Notice that the externalist interpretation does not, of course, deny that inner acts and images are integral to our mental life, or that they are recognized by Kant. But Pollok's example of the figurative synthesis of a tree (564 and n), echoing Kant's example of the apprehension of a house (B 162), suggests that he construes my proposal as being at odds with the possibility of a synthesis without the motion of the human body. Therefore, let me stress that the externalist interpretation does not deny that a synthesis can be exercised mentally; it claims that its overt exercise is logically prior. II. Motion as subject and motion of the object The immediate object of disagreement between Pollok and me is a distinction that Kant draws in the transcendental deduction of the categories. In the main text Kant writes: 5 Notice that this reading of space and time honors the distinction between sensibility and the understanding in terms of passive receptivity and active spontaneity (B 33, B 75). Sensations are passively received, but this does not entail that the forms of sensibility must themselves be something passive. I also believe that the original, pure intuitions of space and time depend upon ostensive actions that do not, by themselves, function as syntheses. 6 It seems plausible that the interpretation of intuitions as paradigms also comprises the intellectual intuitions of a non-sensuous understanding "which is itself intuitive", such as the divine understanding (B 145, cf. B 159). Recall that Plato characterized the ideas as paradeigmata – the intellectual "vision" of Platonic ideas, or, perhaps, these paradigms or archetypes themselves as they exist in the divine mind is, presumably, a prominent historical example of that which Kant takes to be intellectual intuitions (see B 370, B 596, B 881-2). 7 Actually, this requirement applies also to the intelligible; I believe Kant's definition of the intelligible (B 566) entails that it is just as manifest as the sensible, though it does not have the status of appearance. 8 The terms "externalism" and "internalism" are already in use in contemporary philosophy for a wide variety of positions. However, I am not committed to any connection with other positions called externalism. 9 For criticism of mentalism, see Philosophical Investigations, ## 152, 199, 202, and 242ff; for criticism related to the second kind of internalism, see # 36. 3 We cannot think of a line without drawing it in thought, we cannot think of a circle without describing it, we cannot represent the three dimensions of space at all without placing three lines perpendicular to each other at the same point, and we cannot even represent time save in so far as we attend, in the drawing of a straight line (which is to be the external figurative representation of time), merely to the action of the synthesis of the manifold through which we successively determine the inner sense, and thereby attending to the succession of this determination in inner sense. Motion, as action of the subject (not as determination of an object),* and therefore the synthesis of the manifold in space, first produces even the concept of succession – if we abstract from this manifold and attend solely to the action through which we determine the inner sense according to its form (B 154-5).10 In the footnote Kant further illuminates the distinction between motion, as action of the subject, on the one hand, and motion, as determination of an object, on the other: * Motion of an object in space does not belong in a pure science, thus also not in geometry; for that something is movable cannot be known a priori, but only through experience. But motion, as description of a space, is a pure act of the successive synthesis of the manifold in outer intuition in general through productive imagination, and belongs not only to geometry, but even to transcendental philosophy (B 155n). In "Kant on Action and Knowledge" I argued that Kant's claim that motion as subject11 is a pure act that belongs to both geometry and transcendental philosophy offers hard textual evidence for the externalist thesis that Kant intended "the transcendental action of the imagination" (the figurative synthesis) to pick out a subclass of overt actions – familiar actions essentially involving the movement of the human body, such as drawing a line on a piece of paper (pp. 384-6). The following passage about inner sense is clearly related to the two above passages: [F]or in order subsequently to make even inner alterations thinkable, we must be able to grasp time, as the form of inner sense, figuratively through a line, and grasp the inner alteration through the drawing of this line (motion), and thus grasp the successive existence of ourselves in different states through outer intuition; ... (B 292). Literally taken, the reference to motion here too entails that even an inner intuition cannot be an inner state or the introspection of an inner state. According to the externalist interpretation, an inner intuition is the public display of a psychological concept of an inner state, formally by means of overt line-drawing, and materially by means of changes in spatial objects (B 156) – in particular, the human body. I have argued more fully for such a novel reading in my "'I think ....' Kant on Self-Consciousness."12 While I believe that the reference to motion in these central doctrines generalizes to Kant's transcendental philosophy as a whole, with further externalist implications for the entire critical system, Pollok believes that: 10 Pollok has only quoted the last sentence of this passage; unfortunately, he has here twice translated "Handlung" as "act", which tends to bias the translation in an internalist direction due to the frequent use of "act" as shorthand for "mental act" in contemporary Anglo-American philosophy. 11 For simplicity, I shall often speak of motion as subject instead of motion, as action of the subject (and motion as description of a space), and motion of the object instead of motion, as determination of an object (and motion of an object). 12 See esp. Section 5. 4 Apart from a merely metaphorical use on Kant's part, there is no textual evidence for proposing a close connection between the concepts of geometrical (ii-a) and transcendental motion (ii-b) and, consequently, between those and motion in the objective sense (i). As a result, Saugstad's view must be rejected (p. 564).13 Pollok here assumes that Kant makes a division between different concepts of motion, which I think is essential to Pollok's argument. He repeatedly makes a shift of reference from motion to concept of motion (and he often confounds them, see e.g., claims on p. 563 and p. 564). Thus, having quoted the passages from the transcendental deduction, he comments upon them (treating them as one) thus: In this passage Kant simply refers to the concept of motion, and the immediate context in which this reference occurs reveals little about what he means by it. In the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, however, motion plays a more significant role, and, concomitantly, it is in his writings on natural science that Kant most fully expresses his thoughts on the subject (p. 559). The claim that Kant simply refers to the concept of motion is questionable for more than one reason; I first only want to make the somewhat pedantic point that Kant does not simply refer to anything; he draws a distinction. And the claim that the Metaphysical Foundations most fully expresses Kant's thoughts on the subject is misleading, at best. That work is surely not required for understanding the distinction between motion as subject and motion of the object. Nor is Pollok's connected argument sound that the externalist interpretation raises the expectation that Kant would have needed to add a fifth chapter addressing motion as subject (p. 564); being ordinary, objective motion, it ought to be fully covered by that work. But Pollok's most controversial claim is that Kant refers to concepts. This shift of reference is also conspicuous in the following passage from the subsequent page: The first passage from the first Critique (quoted above) reveals both that the concept of motion plays a central role in Kant's epistemology and that he distinguishes clearly between motion of the object, on the one hand, and action of the subject, on the other. The two concepts of motion are quite different – the former belonging to transcendental philosophy and geometry (to 'pure science' in the Kantian sense), the latter to the metaphysical and empirical investigation of nature (p. 560). Though in some ways more adequate than the former passage, it has some minor puzzling features – apart from the major one. First, Pollok must have meant that motion, as action of the subject belongs to transcendental philosophy and geometry, and motion of the object to the metaphysical and empirical investigation of nature, but he actually says the opposite due to a mix-up of "the latter" and "the former." Second, his rendering here of the distinction at issue as one between motion of the object and action of the subject – having eliminated from "motion, as action of the subject" the very term "motion" that is the immediate topic of our disagreement – serves to bias the reading in favor of his interpretation. But his most contentious claim is, again, that Kant's distinction is one between concepts of motion – two concepts that, as we have seen, soon multiply into three. I dwell on this point, because Pollok's thesis that Kant uses "motion" metaphorically in his two phrases for motion as subject seems to rely upon it. Thus, he says: 13 I take it that Pollok here means to say that Kant uses the term "motion" in a metaphorical way in the two phrases "motion, as action of the subject" and "motion, as description of a space." 5 I suggest that motion is not an unambiguous and homogeneous concept: the empirical concept of motion should be differentiated from the transcendental concept of synthesis and the geometrical concept of drawing a line or tracking the movement of a point. Collapsing these distinctions into a single concept actually distorts Kant's position (p. 561). Pollok's underlying reasoning presumably is something like this: If Kant operates with (three) different concepts of motion, then he must also acknowledge (three) different kinds of motion, and it is possible, indeed highly plausible, that only one of these concepts – the empirical one – refers to the kind which is commonly meant by the word "motion": change of place (B 489). But there is no explicit reference to three different concepts in the two passages from the first Critique. I believe the simple explanation is that Kant here does not distinguish between different concepts of motion at all. And while Kant makes a threefold division of sciences, he makes only a twofold division with regard to motion. There is no reason to doubt that the concept of motion is the same in both cases – designating change of place; rather, the distinction pertains to the two roles that motion itself can have, or two respects in which it can be taken. As a determination of an object, motion is the object of experience, while as subject, the very same kind of thing, viz., change of place, is involved in the actions of the understanding that make experience of objects possible. We should also ask what the metaphorical sense of "motion" might be. What does Pollok understand by geometrical "motion"? And by transcendental "motion"? His diagram on pp. 567-8, where he situates "motion" (in inverted commas) on a middle level between synthesis and motion, makes me no wiser, and his use of the inverted commas does nothing to explain what these "motions" are. His discussion of the figurative synthesis of a tree (p. 564) suggests that he construes geometrical "motion" mentalistically, but I have not been able to find any clues as to what he might mean by transcendental "motion". His assumption that the thinking subject for Kant is disembodied (see Section IV, below) has the implication that he must be taking transcendental "motions" to be the "spiritual acts" (whatever that might be) performed by an immaterial self, but this does not appear to me as a charitable reading of Kant. Pollok also speaks of "[t]he transcendental aspect of drawing a line," but I can make no sense of the phrase. He is right, of course, that the drawing of a line for Kant "goes beyond geometry" (p. 565) because it "holds also for every determination of inner sense" (p. 566), but this doctrine is, as I have suggested, compatible with the literal interpretation of the term "motion." III. Nativism and original acquisition I now turn to what I take to be Pollok's main arguments against the externalist interpretation. The first of them pertains to my appeal to Kant's claim that all the pure conditions of experience are acquired. This is clearly stated in a passage in the Streitschrift: The Critique completely rules out any divinely implanted or innate representations; all of them in their entirety, no matter if they belong to intuition or to the concepts of the understanding, it assumes to be acquired (Ent: BA 68/221).14 14 In his translation, Pollok has illegitimately restricted Kant's completely general claim about representations (Vorstellungen) as if it pertained only to concepts (p. 563). 6 My appeal to the doctrine alluded to in this passage in "Kant on Action and Knowledge" (pp. 382, n. 4 and 388-9) served two purposes: First, to nip in the bud the natural objection that the transcendental conditions of experience could not be formed through the learning of a set of behavioral techniques, and would instead have to be presuppositions of such learning. Second, to argue that Kant's rejection of innate representations favors the externalist interpretation, because internalist interpretations seem committed to nativism. However, by presenting the passage as if it were my main evidence, Pollok distorts my reasoning. In addition, Pollok's criticism of the first argument above seems to me unsound. Says he: "The objection fails," he [Saugstad] concludes, because "Kant says explicitly that absolutely all representations, including the form of things in space and time and the transcendental concepts of the understanding, are acquired". The textual evidence for this latter claim is rather thin, however (p. 563). Pollok's claim here about the textual evidence is bewildering, for syntactically "the latter claim" must be my claim that "Kant says explicitly that absolutely all representations, including the form of things in space and time and the transcendental concepts of the understanding, are acquired." But the doctrine of acquisition in the Streitschrift does not seem to be "rather thin" textual basis for this claim – to the contrary! Pollok himself cites the following passage (most of which I also quoted (p. 389, n. 15): But there is also an original acquisition (as the teachers of natural law say); thus, also of that which did not have any prior existence, and therefore did not belong to any thing before this action. The Critique claims that the following (representations) belong to this category: first, the form of things in space and time, and second, the synthetic unity of the manifold in concepts; for neither of them is derived by our faculty from the objects as they are given in themselves, but is brought forth a priori by the faculty of cognition (Ent: BA 68/221). As to Pollok's first charge, the only explanation I can think of is that he has once more lost track of the reference of "the latter"; what he tried to say, apparently, was that the passage is rather thin textual basis for the externalist interpretation, for he goes on to say that "Kant himself goes on to qualify this claim in such a way as to rule out the kind of externalism for which Saugstad argues" (p. 563). But, then, how is the doctrine of original acquisition of the forms of experience supposed to rule it out? Here is what Pollok says: This "acquisition" means nothing but the fact that we do not possess any form of intuition or any pure concept before we encounter an object of possible experience; if Kant had meant more than this, then talk of apriori elements would no longer make sense (p. 563). This is far from clear; but Pollok's claim appears to be that the meaning of "a priori" for Kant entails that that which is a priori must already exist in the subject before the act of original acquisition, and that original acquisition only means that it comes in our possession through that act, viz., that we become conscious of innate representations through original acquisition. If so, it is his interpretation which is ruled out by Kant's explicit claim that the original acquisition of the formal conditions of experience is "of that which did not have any prior existence." This verdict is further supported by a close comparison between the two doctrines of original acquisition: The original acquisition of property comprises also the movable things that belong to (inhere in) the land prior to the act of original acquisition, whereas the original acquisition of the pure conditions of experience, by contrast, pertains to what "did not belong to any thing before this action" (MdS-R: AB 82/262; AB 94-5/268-9). 7 IV. The embodied self There is now a turn to a new topic in Pollok's criticism, although he introduces it as if it were a mere continuation of his argument from acquisition: In fact, Saugstad's distinction between the Kantian "motion of an object" and "motion of the subject" finally amounts to the difference between any body and the human body: "Kant is of course right that there is a fundamental difference between the motion of a physical object in space and the bodily motion involved in the description of a space: while both motions are observable, only the latter is part of an action performed by a human agent."[....] Yet for the Critical Kant the human body is nothing but one possible object of experience, and in no sense is it a transcendental concept. Thus Saugstad's identification of "action of the subject" and "description of space" with bodily motions directly contradicts Kant's own argument and the hierarchical structure he gives it (p. 563). I first need to take exception to some of Pollok's less central claims here. I do not identify action of the subject with bodily motions. This sounds rather reductionistic, and I must repeat what I did stress in my paper: The externalist interpretation does not reduce Kant to a behaviorist (pp. 382-3; cf. Section V, below). Nor do I hold that the human body is a transcendental concept, or more charitably interpreted, that the concept of the human body is transcendental. Like the concept of any kind of body, it is empirical. However, although I do not speak of a "difference between any body and the human body" in the quotation that Pollok offers, I concede that the distinction between motion as subject and motion of the object entails that the human body "as subject" is integral to the transcendental conditions of experience: that the transcendental subject is corporeal (p. 563), whereas "as object" the human body is just a body among physical bodies. Pollok does not have much of an argument against this interpretation, but first just asserts his view on the issue that we are disagreeing upon as if it were an established truth. But perhaps he felt entitled to such a question-begging and seemingly dogmatic assertion in light of his subsequent claim: "at one point Kant states the very opposite to Saugstad's view" (p. 563), quoting a well-known sentence in the Paralogisms: I distinguish my own existence, as a thinking being, from other things outside me (to which my body also belongs) – this is equally an analytical proposition; for other things are such as I think to be distinguished from me (B 409).15 Pollok must be assuming that Kant here says that I distinguish my own existence as a thinking being from my own body. But as I have argued in "'I think ....' Kant on Self-Consciousness" (pp. 110-11), this is not a plausible interpretation; actually, the claim supports the externalist interpretation of the transcendental subject on closer scrutiny. The latter part of the quotation shows that the intended analytic claim is that I distinguish my own existence as a thinking being from other things outside me; this clearly does not entail that I distinguish my existence as a thinking being from my own body. What might seem to suggest that my body is not a part of me is Kant's characterization of my body as a thing 15 Once again Pollok's translation tends to bias the interpretation by singling out and emphasizing the bracketed clause about my body. 8 outside me. To appreciate that this is not so, we need to recall what Kant means by the term "outside me" (and its first person plural counterpart, "outside us"). Let us begin with the definition of outer sense: By means of outer sense (a property of our mind) we represent to us things as outside us, and these altogether in space (B 37). According to the externalist interpretation, this "property of our mind" is the capacity to distinguish things from ourselves by the use of our own body as a reference point in ostensive actions. The first space-argument is highly suggestive of the externalist position here: For in order for certain sensations to be related to something outside me (i.e., to something in another place in space from that in which I find myself), thus in order for me to represent them as outside one another, thus not merely as different but as in different places, the representation of space must already be their ground (B 38). Philosophically, it seems plausible that the acquired ability to accompany locutions such "Look over there!" with pointing gestures enables us to fix a position in space for what we perceive,16 and that this way of relating our sensations to something outside us supplies the meaning of the term "outside me." Exegetically, this also seems to me the most plausible reading of what Kant here says. Relating-sensations-to-something-outside-me, accordingly, is part of a "language-game" in which spatial discourse is intertwined with ostensive actions in which we literally point out space from our subjective standpoint (B 42).17 I believe, furthermore, that this reading adequately captures the a priori status of the representation of space: If the original intuition of space is brought forth by the learning of ostensive actions like the above, it is indeed a priori according to Kant's doctrine of original acquisition. Thus, the phrase "things outside me," which is here synonymous with "things that are to be encountered in space" (A 373), expresses the way in which we refer to objects in space by means of familiar ostensive gestures. Now the solution to the riddle that Kant calls even my own body a thing outside me is as follows: When I determine positions in space by means of ostensive actions, I relate to my body "as subject." But I also relate to my body "as object" on par with other physical bodies, and when I relate to it as an object in space I must relate to my own body (quasi in the third person), by means of, in principle, ostensive gestures involving the very same body of mine as subject.18 That is, I must apply to my own body the concept of a thing outside me that is based upon the acquired ability to relate sensations through ostensive actions to "something in another place in space than were I find myself." For this transcendental reason19 Kant correctly characterizes my body is a thing outside me – even though, nay, because I am embodied as subject.20 16 Not to be confused with ostensive definitions of terms, the role of which is duly restricted by Wittgenstein; see Philosophical Investigations, ## 28ff. 17 There is a long, unbroken line from Kant's pre-critical works to his later works stressing the embodied subject as, so to speak, a "living co-ordinate system," see "Kant on Action and Knowledge," p. 395, n. 26. 18 Charles Parsons's criticism that "'Outside us' cannot have as its primary meaning just outside our bodies," is, in my view, based on the confusion between my body "as subject" and "as object" in space-discourse. Parsons, "The Transcendental Aesthetic," in Guyer, P. (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Kant (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 67. 19 Kant's term "transcendental" refers to the a priori way in which representations relate to objects (B 25, B 81). 20 The dual perspective on the corporeal human subject fits nicely with a passage in the A-Paralogisms in which Kant concludes that transcendental idealism would make obsolete the talk of souls as thinking substances (A 359-60/226). More work is required, of course, to determine whether the embodiment of the subject is consistent 9 V. Motion and action Having (groundlessly) concluded that "Saugstad's view must be rejected," Pollok returns to the Metaphysical Foundations, claiming that it "provides an alternative way of understanding Kant's position." I confess that it is not clear to me what this alternative is supposed to be, or what the argument for it is. Presumably, Pollok's alternative position is that "the concept of synthesis does not refer necessarily to motion understood as change in the outer relations of a thing to a given space" (p. 564). But if this just means that one can carry out a synthesis without moving the body, this is, as I have already said, no objection to the externalist interpretation. It certainly allows that a person who has already acquired the behavioral technique involved in a synthesis can, in certain circumstances, carry it out mentally (just as a person who has learnt to calculate overtly can typically calculate just "in the head"). There is an internal connection between apprehending shapes mentally and actually drawing them, say, by tracing them with the index-finger. Philosophically, the latter is plausibly the more fundamental ability: The reason why we can carry out a figurative synthesis, indeed any kind of synthesis, mentally (in circumstances when that suffices) is that we have already acquired the ability (the know-how) to perform it overtly. Exegetically, I believe there is ample evidence that this was also Kant's own position (e.g., B 745, B 299; KU: B 240-1/342-3), and I have discussed some of the textual evidence in my articles. But perhaps Pollok's main argument for his alternative is to be found in the subsequent part of the paragraph, in which he draws the distinction between the objective concept of motion and the concept of a synthesis in terms of the passive/active-distinction: In contrast to the (objective) concept of motion, the concept of synthesis is an active concept; motion of an object is caused by something outside the subject. A synthesis, however, can only come about spontaneously: .... (p. 564). This is hardly an objection to the externalist position; in fact, it is a point I made use of in one of three additional arguments for the externalist reading of the distinction between motion as subject and motion of the object (pp. 385-6). If I perform an overt action – say, trace the outline of a tree with my index-finger – then this action comes about spontaneously (indeed, Kant says, at least sometimes, that the action itself is the absolutely spontaneous, first cause, not that it has such a cause (see B 474 and B 476)). Surely, this action involves a motion (my index-finger changes place), and such bodily motions have causes just like the motions of the leaves that are blowing in the wind. But that does not reduce a synthesis to a mere event (or to "colorless movements"). On the externalist interpretation, the causal schema is the deliberate manipulation of physical objects according to rules (B 183, cf. B 248-9). While the motions involved are natural events on par with the accelerated motion of any other physical object, their involvement as subject in the conditions of the experience of events leaves open the possibility that actions are not "completely caught in the nets of causality," to borrow von Wright's phrase21: This kind of intervenistic analysis of causation seems to me the key also to Kant's solution to the third antinomy. with Kant's doctrine of the regulative use of the idea of the soul as a "simple self-sufficient intelligence" (B 710), and with the postulate of the immortal soul. But see B 712 and Der Streit der Fakultäten, A 52/40. 21 Georg Henrik von Wright, Explanation and Understanding (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1971), p. 81. See also Wittgenstein, Philosophical Occasions 1912-1951 (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1993), pp. 397-399, and 410. 10 VI. Mistaking subjects for objects Pollok seems right, finally, that Kant's emphasis of the distinction between motion as subject and motion of the object was a response to a review in the Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung (p. 561), probably by the editor, Christian Gottfried Schütz, of Johann Schulze's Elucidiations of the first Critique (with a view to the first Critique itself and the Prolegomena). But ironically, the review provides additional support for the externalist reading. Schütz's scruple was that Kant's appeal to the drawing of a line jeopardizes the a priori status of mathematical construction by making the latter depend upon empirical assistance.22 The problem disappears by distinguishing between motion as the determination of an object, and motion as part of the a priori conditions of experience. For although our concept of motion is empirical, and we can only determine (know) the motion of objects through experience (B 155n), it seems like putting the cart before the horse to assume that we must first have the concept and experience (empirical knowledge) of motion in order to learn the relevant behavioral techniques. By emphasizing the distinction, Kant reminds his readers – now as then – that the involvement of motion in the a priori conditions of experience does not transform these very conditions into empirical presuppositions. I conclude that Pollok's criticism of the externalist interpretation stems from the same failure as Schütz's scruple – and that both evaporate once Kant's distinction is correctly understood.23 22 The review is reprinted in Albert Landau (ed.), Rezensionen zur Kantischen Philosophie 1781-87 (Bebra: Albert Landau Verlag, 1991), see esp. p. 153. For the conjecture that Schütz is the author of the anonymous review, see ibid, pp. 776-7. 23 I would like to thank Professor Truls Wyller for kindly commenting upon a longer version of the paper.

Delirios Utópicos Suicidas en el Siglo 21 La filosofía, la naturaleza humana y el colapso de la civilización Artículos y reseñas 2006-2019 4TH Edición Michael Starks El día más triste de la historia de Estados Unidos. El presidente Johnson, con dos Kennedys y el ex Presidente Hoover, da América a México--3 oct 1965 Reality Press Las Vegas Copyright © 2019 por Michael Starks Todos los derechos reservados. Ninguna parte de esta publicación puede ser reproducida, distribuida o transmitida sin el consentimiento expreso del autor. Impreso y encuadernado en los Estados Unidos de América. 4TH Edición 2019 ISBN: 9781096554202 "¿En qué punto se espera el enfoque de peligro? Yo respondo, si alguna vez nos llega debe brotarnos entre nosotros; no puede venir del extranjero. Si la destrucción es nuestro lote, debemos ser su autor y acabador. Como nación de hombres libres debemos vivir todo el tiempo o morir por suicidio. " Abraham Lincoln (1838) "No digo que la democracia haya sido más perniciosa en el todo, y a largo plazo, que la monarquía o la aristocracia. La democracia nunca ha sido y nunca puede ser tan duradera como la aristocracia o la monarquía; pero mientras dure, es más sangriento que cualquiera. ... Recuerden, la democracia nunca dura mucho. Pronto desperdicia, agota y se asesina. Nunca hubo una democracia que no se suicidara. Es en vano decir que la democracia es menos vana, menos orgullosa, menos egoísta, menos ambiciosa, o menos avariciosa que la aristocracia o la monarquía. No es cierto, de hecho, y en ninguna parte aparece en la historia. Esas pasiones son las mismas en todos los hombres, bajo todas las formas de gobierno simple, y cuando no se controlan, producen los mismos efectos del fraude, la violencia y la crueldad. Cuando se abren perspectivas claras antes de la vanidad, el orgullo, la avaricia o la ambición, por su fácil gratificación, es difícil para los filósofos más considerados y los moralistas más concisos resistir la tentación. Los individuos se han conquistado. Naciones y grandes cuerpos de hombres, nunca. " John Adams (1814) Las cartas de John y Abigail Adams TABLA DE CONTENIDOS Prefacio .................................................................................. I LA DESCRIPCIÓN DEL COMPORTAMIENTO SIN DELIRIO 1. La estructura lógica de la filosofía, la psicología, la mente y el lenguaje revelada en los escritos de Ludwig Wittgenstein y John Searle 2 2. Reseña de hacer el mundo social por John Searle (2010)---102 3. Reseña de ' filosofía en un nuevo siglo ' por John Searle (2008)--125 4. Reseña de Wittgenstein's Metaphilosophy de Paul Horwich 248p (2013)--145 5. Reseña de las cosas del pensamiento por Steven Pinker (2008)----168 6. Reseña de "¿Estamos cableados? por Clark & Grunstein Oxford (2000)- --181 EL DELIRIO DIGITAL--LAS COMPUTADORAS SON PERSONAS Y EL LENGUAJE ES MATEMÁTICA Y HI-TECH NOS SALVARÁ 7. ¿JK Rowling es más malvado que yo? ............................184 8. Reseña de Freedom evoluciona por Daniel Dennett (2003)---189 9. Reseña de I am a Strange loop de Douglas Hofstadter (2007)---205 10. Otro retrato de caricatura de la mente de la metafísicos reduccionista-una revisión de la opacidad de la mente de Peter Carruthers (2011) ..............................................................................................222 11. ¿Los hominoides o androides destruirán la tierra? - Una revisión de cómo crear una mente por Ray Kurzweil (2012) ...........250 12. ¿Qué significa paraconsistente, indescifrable, aleatorio, computable e incompleto? Una revisión de la manera de Godel: explota en un mundo indecible por Gregory Chaitin, Francisco A Doria, Newton C.A. da Costa 160P (2012) .................................................263 13. Wolpert, Chaitin y Wittgenstein sobre la imposibilidad, la incompletitud, la paradoja mentirosa, el teísmo, los límites de la computación, un principio de incertidumbre mecánica no cuántica y el universo como computadora, el teorema definitivo en la teoría de la máquina de Turing ............................................................278 14. Reseña de ' los límites exteriores de la razón ' por noson Yanofsky 403p (2013)--283 EL DELIRIO RELIGIOSO – UN UNIVERSO BENÉVOLO NOS SALVARÁ 15. Reseña de la religión explicada--los orígenes evolutivos del pensamiento religioso por Pascal Boyer (2002) .............300 16. Reseña de sexo, ecología, espiritualidad por Ken Wilber 2nd Ed 851p (2001)-314 17. ¿La autobiografía espiritual más profunda de todos los tiempos? -una reseña de "la rodilla de la escucha" de ADI da (Franklin Jones) (1995) ..............................................................................................330 18. ¿Nuestros comportamientos inconscientes automatizados revelan nuestros verdaderos seres y verdades ocultas sobre el universo? --Una revisión del poder contra la fuerza de David Hawkins--los determinantes ocultos del comportamiento humano – edición oficial autorizada del autor ' 412p (2012) (edición original 1995).334 UN GRAN DELIRIO FAMILIAR--LA DEMOCRACIA, LA DIVERSIDAD Y LA IGUALDAD NOS SALVARÁN 19. La supresión transitoria de los peores demonios de nuestra naturalezauna revisión de ' los mejores ángeles de nuestra naturaleza de Steven Pinker: ¿por qué la violencia ha disminuido ' (2012) ....339 20. Las manos muertas de selección de grupo y fenomenología--una revisión de la individualidad y el entrelazamiento por Herbert Gintis 357p (2017) ..........................................................................344 21. El altruismo, Jesús y el fin del mundo: cómo la Fundación Templeton compró una Cátedra de Harvard y atacó la evolución, la racionalidad y la civilización. Una revisión de E.O. Wilson ' la conquista social de la tierra ' (2012) y Nowak y Highfield ' Supercooperadores ' (2012)---357 22. Una revisión del asesino al lado por David Buss (2005)--371 23. Suicidio por la democracia-un obituario para América y el mundo(2019)---382 I Prefacio Esta colección de artículos fue escrita en los últimos 10 años y revisado para ponerlos al día (2019). Es una traducción automática del libro original Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century (2019) en inglés al español. Todos los artículos son sobre el comportamiento humano (al igual que todos los artículos de cualquier persona sobre cualquier cosa), y así sobre las limitaciones de tener una ascendencia de mono reciente (8 millones años o mucho menos dependiendo del punto de vista) y palabras y hechos manifiestos en el marco de nuestro Psicología innata tal como se presenta en la tabla de intencionalidad. Como dice el famoso evolucionista Richard Leakey, es fundamental tener en cuenta que no evolucionamos de los simios, sino que de todas las maneras importantes, somos simios. Si a todos se les dio una comprensión real de esto (es decir, de la ecología humana y la psicología para realmente darles un poco de control sobre sí mismos), tal vez la civilización tendría una oportunidad. Como las cosas son, sin embargo, los líderes de la sociedad no tienen más comprensión de las cosas que sus electores y por lo tanto el colapso en la anarquía es inevitable. El primer grupo de artículos intenta dar una idea de cómo nos comportamos que está razonablemente libre de delirios teóricos. En los próximos tres grupos, Me comentar tres de los principales delirios que impiden sociedad - tecnología, religión y política (grupos cooperativos). Gente creen que la sociedad pueda ser salvada por ellos, así que proporciono algunas sugerencias en el resto del libro sobre por qué esto es improbable a través de artículos cortos y reseñas de libros recientes de escritores bien conocidos. Es fundamental entender por qué nos comportamos como lo hacemos y por lo que la primera sección presenta artículos que tratan de describir (no explicar como Wittgenstein insistió) comportamiento. Empiezo con una breve reseña de la estructura lógica de la racionalidad, que proporciona algunas heurísticas para la descripción del lenguaje (mente, racionalidad, personalidad) y da algunas sugerencias sobre cómo esto se relaciona con la evolución del comportamiento social. Esto se centra en los dos escritores que he encontrado los más importantes a este respecto, Ludwig Wittgenstein y John Searle, cuyas ideas combino y extendemos dentro del marco del sistema dual (dos sistemas de pensamiento) que ha demostrado ser tan útil en el pensamiento reciente y investigación de razonamiento. Como señalo, hay en mi opinión una superposición esencialmente completa entre la filosofía, en el sentido estricto de las preguntas duraderas que conciernen a la disciplina académica, y la psicología descriptiva del pensamiento de orden superior (comportamiento). Una vez que uno ha entendido la idea de Wittgenstein de que sólo hay la cuestión de cómo se va a jugar el juego de idiomas, uno determina las condiciones de satisfacción (lo que hace que una declaración sea verdadera o satisfecha, etc.) y ese es el final de la discusión. No hay Neurofisiología, ni metafísica, ni posmodernismo, ni teología. II Dado que los problemas filosóficos son el resultado de nuestra psicología innata, o como lo puso Wittgenstein, debido a la falta de sombra del lenguaje, corren a través del discurso y el comportamiento humanos, por lo que hay una necesidad interminable de análisis filosófico, no sólo en el ' humano Ciencias de la filosofía, la sociología, la antropología, la ciencia política, la psicología, la historia, la literatura, la religión, etc., pero en las "ciencias duras" de la física, las matemáticas y la biología. Es universal mezclar las preguntas del juego de idiomas con las científicas reales en cuanto a lo que son los hechos empíricos. El civismo está siempre presente y el maestro lo ha puesto ante nosotros hace mucho tiempo, es decir, Wittgenstein (en adelante W) comenzando con los libros azul y marrón a principios de los años 1930. "Los filósofos ven constantemente el método de la ciencia ante sus ojos y son irresistiblemente tentados a preguntar y responder preguntas en la forma en que la ciencia lo hace. Esta tendencia es la verdadera fuente de la metafísica y lleva al filósofo a una completa oscuridad. " (BBB P18) La clave de todo sobre nosotros es la biología, y es la obliviosidad que lleva a millones de personas instruidas inteligentes como Obama, Chomsky, Clinton y el Papa para abrazar ideales utópicos suicidas que inexorablemente conducen directamente al infierno en la tierra. Como señaló W, es lo que siempre está ante nuestros ojos lo más difícil de ver. Vivimos en el mundo del sistema lingüístico deliberativo consciente 2, pero es inconsciente, sistema reflexivo automático 1 que gobierna. Esta es la fuente de la ceguera universal descrita por la ilusión fenomenológica (TPI) de Searle, la pizarra en blanco de Pinker y el modelo de ciencias sociales estándar de Tooby y Cosmides. La astuta puede preguntarse por qué no podemos ver el sistema 1 en el trabajo, pero es claramente contraproducente que un animal esté pensando o adivinando cada acción, y en cualquier caso, no hay tiempo para que el lento y masivamente integrado sistema 2 participe en el flujo constante de "decisiones" de segunda división que debemos tomar. Como señaló W, nuestros ' pensamientos ' (T1 o los ' pensamientos ' del sistema 1) deben conducir directamente a las acciones. Mi afirmación es que la tabla de intencionalidad (racionalidad, mente, pensamiento, lenguaje, personalidad, etc.) que se presenta aquí describe de forma prominente más o menos precisa, o al menos sirve como una heurística para, cómo pensamos y comportamos, y por lo que abarca no meramente filosofía y psicología, pero todo lo demás (historia, literatura, matemáticas, política, etc.). Tenga en cuenta especialmente que la intencionalidad y la racionalidad como yo (junto con Searle, Wittgenstein y otros) lo ve, incluye tanto el sistema deliberativo consciente 2 como el inconsciente acciones o reflejos automatizados del sistema 1. Así, todos los artículos, como todo comportamiento, están íntimamente conectados si III uno sabe cómo verlos. Como señalo, la ilusión fenomenológica (olvido de nuestro sistema automatizado 1) es universal y se extiende no sólo a través de la filosofía, sino a lo largo de la vida. Estoy seguro de que Chomsky, Obama, Zuckerberg y el Papa serían incrédulos si se les dijera que sufren del mismo problema que Hegel, Husserl y Heidegger, (o que difieren sólo en grado de drogas y adictos sexuales en ser motivados por la estimulación de sus las corteces frontales por la entrega de dopamina (y más de 100 otros productos químicos) a través del tegmentum ventral y el Núcleo accumbens), pero es claramente cierto. Mientras que los fenomenólogos sólo desperdiciaron un montón de tiempo de la gente, están desperdiciando la tierra y el futuro de su descendientes. La siguiente sección describe los delirios digitales, que confunden los juegos de idiomas del sistema 2 con los automatismos del sistema uno, y por lo tanto no pueden distinguir las máquinas biológicas (es decir, personas) de otros tipos de máquinas (es decir, computadoras). La afirmación ' reduccionista ' es que se puede ' explicar ' el comportamiento en un nivel ' inferior ', pero lo que realmente sucede es que uno no explica el comportamiento humano, sino un ' stand in ' para él. De ahí el título de la revisión clásica de Searle del libro de Dennett ("la conciencia explicada") - "la conciencia explicó lejos". En la mayoría de los contextos ' reducción ' de mayor nivel de comportamiento emergente a las funciones cerebrales, bioquímica, o la física es incoherente. Incluso para la "reducción" de la química o la física, el camino está bloqueado por el caos y la incertidumbre. Cualquier cosa puede ser ' representada ' por ecuaciones, pero cuando ' representan ' un comportamiento de orden superior, no está claro (y no se puede aclarar) lo que significan los ' resultados '. La metafísica reduccionista es una broma, pero la mayoría de los científicos y filósofos carecen del sentido del humor apropiado. Otros delirios digitales son que nos salvaremos del mal puro (egoísmo) del sistema 1 por computadoras/AI/robótica/nanotecnología/ingeniería genética creada por el sistema 2. El director del almuerzo sin libre nos dice que habrá consecuencias serias y posiblemente fatales. Los aventureros pueden considerar este principio como una expresión emergente de orden superior de la segunda ley de la termodinámica. Los entusiastas de la alta tecnología subestiman enormemente los problemas resultantes de la maternidad desenfrenada y disgenics, y por supuesto no es ni rentable ni políticamente correcto (y ahora con el supremacismo del tercer mundo dominante, ni siquiera posible) ser honesto al respecto. También se dan cuenta del hecho de que la IA está alcanzando el punto en el que nos será imposible entender cómo funciona o controlarlo o arreglarlo y prevenir fallas catastróficas en comunicaciones, energía, policía, militares, agrícolas, médicas y financieras Sistemas. La última sección describe la ilusión de la gran familia feliz, es decir, que somos seleccionados para la cooperación con todos, y que los ideales euiónicos de democracia, diversidad e igualdad nos llevarán a la utopía, si simplemente gestionamos las cosas correctamente (la posibilidad de la política). Una vez más, el principio de no libre almuerzo debe advertirnos que no puede ser verdad, y vemos a IV lo largo de la historia y en todo el mundo contemporáneo, que sin controles estrictos, el egoísmo y la estupidez ganan la ventaja y pronto destruyen cualquier nación que abraza Estos delirios. Además, la mente del mono descuentos abruptamente el futuro, y por lo que cooperamos en la venta de la herencia de nuestro descendiente para las comodidades temporales, exacerbando en gran medida los problemas. El único cambio importante en esta 3a edición es la adición en el último artículo de una breve discusión de China, una amenaza para la paz y la libertad tan grande como la sobrepoblación y el cambio climático y una a la que incluso la mayoría de los académicos y políticos profesionales son ajenos, así que reg lo suficientemente importante como para justificar una nueva edición. Describo las versiones de este delirio (es decir, que somos Basicamente "amistoso" si se le acaba de dar una oportunidad) como aparece en algunos libros recientes sobre sociología/biología/economía. Incluso Sapolsky de otra manera excelente "comportarse" (2017) abraza la política de izquierdistas y la selección de grupos y da espacio a una discusión de si los seres humanos son innatamente violentos. Termino con un ensayo sobre la gran tragedia que se juega en Estados Unidos y el mundo, que puede ser visto como un resultado directo de nuestra psicología evolucionada manifestada como las maquinaciones inexorables del sistema 1. Nuestra psicología, eminentemente adaptable y Eugénica en las llanuras de África desde hace 6 millones años, cuando nos separamos de los chimpancés, a CA. 50.000 años atrás, cuando muchos de nuestros antepasados dejaron África (es decir, en el EEE o entorno de adaptación evolutiva), ahora es maladaptativa y disgénica y la fuente de nuestros delirios utópicos suicidas. Así, como todas las discusiones de comportamiento (filosofía, psicología, sociología, biología, Antropología, política, derecho, literatura, historia, economía, estrategias de fútbol, reuniones de negocios, etc.), este libro trata sobre estrategias evolutivas, genes egoístas y Fitness inclusivo (selección de parientes, selección natural). Una cosa raramente mencionadas por los seleccionadores de grupo es el hecho de que, incluso si fuera posible "selección de grupo", el egoísmo es al menos tan probable (probablemente mucho más probable en la mayoría de los contextos) que se seleccione un grupo para el altruismo. Sólo trate de encontrar ejemplos de verdadero altruismo en la naturaleza-el hecho de que no podemos (que sabemos que no es posible si entendemos la evolución) nos dice que su presencia aparente en los seres humanos es un artefacto de la vida moderna, ocultando los hechos, y que no se puede seleccionar más para que la tendencia al suicidio (que en realidad es). Uno también podría beneficiarse de considerar un fenómeno nunca (en mi experiencia) mencionado por groupies--Cancer. Ningún grupo tiene tanto en común como las células genéticamente idénticas (originalmente) en nuestros propios cuerpos-un 5clon de 0 billones de células--pero todos nacemos con miles y quizás millones de celdas que ya han dado el primer paso en el camino hacia el cáncer, y generar millones a miles de millones de células cancerosas en nuestra vida. Si no morimos primero de otras cosas, nosotros (y tal vez todos los organismos multicelulares) moriremos de cáncer. Sólo un mecanismo masivo y enormemente complejo integrado en nuestro genoma que V reencarna o deshace billones de genes en billones de células, y mata y crea billones de células por segundo, mantiene a la mayoría de nosotros vivos el tiempo suficiente para reproducirse. Uno podría tomar esto para implicar que una sociedad justa, democrática y duradera para cualquier tipo de entidad en cualquier planeta en cualquier universo es sólo un sueño, y que ningún ser o poder podría hacerlo de otra manera. No es sólo "las leyes" de la física que son universales e ineludibles, o tal vez deberíamos decir que la aptitud inclusiva es una ley de la física. La gran mística Osho dijo que la separación de Dios y el cielo de la tierra y la humanidad era la idea más malvada que jamás entró en la mente humana. En el siglo 20 surgió una noción aún más malvada, o al menos se hizo popular entre los izquierdistas- que los seres humanos nacen con derechos, en lugar de tener que ganar privilegios. La idea de los derechos humanos es una fantasía malvada creada por los izquierdistas para alejar la atención de la despiadada destrucción de la tierra descontrolada por 3Rd maternidad mundial. Así, cada día la población aumenta en 200.000, a quienes se les debe aportar recursos para crecer y espacio para vivir, y que pronto producen otros 200.000, etc. Y uno casi nunca escucha que se nota que lo que reciben debe ser tomado de los que ya están vivos, y sus descendientes. Sus vidas disminuyen las que ya están aquí, tanto en las grandes obvias como en las innumerables formas sutiles. Cada nuevo bebé destruye la tierra desde el momento de la concepción. En un mundo horriblemente superpoblado con recursos que se desvanecen, tAquí no pueden ser derechos humanos sin destruyendo la tierra y nuestros futuros descendientes. Se cno ser más obvio, pero raramente se menciona de manera clara y directa, y uno nunca verá las calles llenas de manifestantes contra la maternidad. Los hechos más básicos, casi nunca mencionados, son que no hay suficientes recursos en Estados Unidos o en el mundo para elevar un porcentaje significativo de los pobres de la pobreza y mantenerlos allí. El intento de hacerlo ya está quebrando a Estados Unidos y destruyendo el mundo. La capacidad de la tierra para producir alimentos disminuye diariamente, al igual que nuestra calidad genética. Y ahora, como siempre, el mayor enemigo de los pobres es, por mucho, otros pobres y no los ricos. Estados Unidos y el mundo están en proceso de colapso de un crecimiento excesivo de la población, la mayor parte del mismo durante el siglo pasado, y ahora todo, debido a la 3a gente del mundo. El consumo de recursos y la adición de 4 mil millones más CA. 2100 colapsarán la civilización industrial y traerán hambre, enfermedad, violencia y guerra a una escala asombrosa. La tierra pierde al menos el 1% de su tierra vegetal cada año, por lo que se acerca a 2100, la mayor parte de su capacidad de cultivo de alimentos desaparecerá. Miles de millones morirán y la guerra nuclear es todo menos seguro. En Estados Unidos, Esto se está acelerando enormemente por la masiva reproducción migratoria e inmigrante, combinada con los abusos que la democracia ha hecho posible. La depravada naturaleza humana convierte inexorablemente el sueño de la democracia y la diversidad en una pesadilla de crimen y pobreza. China continuará abrumar a Estados Unidos y al mundo, siempre y cuando mantenga la dictadura que limita el egoísmo y permite la planificación a largo plazo. VI La causa raíz del colapso es la incapacidad de nuestra psicología innata para adaptarse al mundo moderno, lo que lleva a las personas a tratar a personas no relacionadas como si tuvieran intereses comunes (que sugiero que puede ser considerado como un no reconocido-pero el más común y más serio-problema psicológico-trastorno de fitness inclusivo). Esto, más la ignorancia de la biología básica y la psicología, conduce a las delirios de ingeniería social de los parcialmente educados que controlan las sociedades democráticas. Pocos entienden que si usted ayuda a una persona a lastimar a alguien más - no hay almuerzo gratis y cada artículo que alguien consume destruye la tierra más allá de la reparación. Por consiguiente, las políticas sociales en todas partes son insostenibles y una por una todas las sociedades sin estrictos controles sobre el egoísmo se derrumbarán en la anarquía o la dictadura. Sin cambios dramáticos e inmediatos, no hay esperanza para prevenir el colapso de Estados Unidos, o cualquier país que siga un sistema democrático, especialmente ahora que los supremacistas del tercer mundo Noemarxist están tomando el control de los Estados Unidos y otras democracias occidentales, y ayudando a los siete sociópatas que llevan a China a tener éxito en su plan para eliminar la paz y la libertad en todo el mundo. De ahí mi ensayo final "suicidio por la democracia". Tenía la esperanza de soldar mis comentarios en un todo unificado, pero llegué a darme cuenta, como lo hicieron los investigadores de Wittgenstein y AI, que la mente (más o menos la misma que el lenguaje que nos mostró Wittgenstein) es un variopinto de piezas dispares evolucionados para muchos contextos, y no existe tal o r teoría excepto la aptitud inclusiva, es decir, evolución por selección natural. Finalmente, como con mi Otro escritos 3DTV y 3D Movie Technology-Seleccioned artículos 1996-2017 2Nd Edición (2018), Drogas psicoactivas-cuatro Classic Textos (1976-1982) (2016), Monos parlantes 2a ed (2019), la estructura lógica de la filosofía, la psicología, la mente y el lenguaje en Ludwig Wittgenstein y John Searle 2Nd Ed (2019), suicidio por democracia 3Rd Ed (2019) y delirios utópicos suicidas en el 21St Century 4TH Ed (2019), y en todas mis cartas y correos electrónicos y conversaciones por más de 50 años, siempre he usado ' ellos ' o ' ellos ' en lugar de "su/ella", "ella/él", o el sexismo inverso idiota de ' ella ' o ' ella ', siendo tal vez el único en esta parte de la galaxia para hacerlo. El uso servil de estos vocablos atroces universalmente aplicados está íntimamente ligado a los defectos de nuestra psicología que generan filosofía académica, democracia y colapso de la civilización industrial, y dejo la descripción de Estas conexiones como un ejercicio para el lector. Soy consciente de muchas imperfecciones y limitaciones de mi trabajo y la reviso continuamente, pero tomé la filosofía 12 hace años a las 65, por lo que es milagroso, y un testimonio elocuente del poder de los automatismos del sistema 1, que he sido capaz de hacer cualquier cosa en absoluto. Fueron diez años de lucha incesante y espero que los lectores lo encuentren de algún uso. vyupzzz@gmail. com VII LA DESCRIPCIÓN DEL COMPORTAMIENTO SIN DELIRIO 2 La estructura lógica de la filosofía, la psicología, la mente y el lenguaje revelada en los escritos de Ludwig Wittgenstein y John Searle (revisado en 2019) Michael Starks Abstracto Proporciono un estudio crítico de algunos de los principales hallazgos de Wittgenstein y Searle sobre la estructura lógica de la intencionalidad (mente, lenguaje, comportamiento), tomando como punto de partida el descubrimiento fundamental de Wittgenstein, que todos los problemas verdaderamente ' filosóficos ' son los mismos - confusiones sobre cómo usar el lenguaje en un contexto particular, y por lo que todas las soluciones son las mismas - observando cómo se puede utilizar el lenguaje en el contexto en cuestión para que sus condiciones de verdad (condiciones de satisfacción o COS) sean claras. El problema básico es que uno puede decir cualquier cosa menos que uno no puede significar (el estado claro COS para) cualquier enunciado arbitrario y significado es solamente posible en un contexto muy específico. Empiezo con ' On Certaint ' ('En Certeza') y continúo el análisis de los escritos recientes por y sobre ellos desde la perspectiva de los dos sistemas de pensamiento, empleando un nuevo cuadro de intencionalidad y nueva nomenclatura de sistemas duales. Aquellos que deseen un marco completo hasta la fecha para el comportamiento humano de la moderna dos systems view puede consultar mi libro 'La estructura lógica de la filosofía, la psicología, la mind y Language En Ludwig Wittgenstein y John Searle ' 2nd ED (2019). Los interesados en más de mis escritos pueden ver 'Monos parlantes--filosofía, psicología, ciencia, religión y política en un planeta condenado-artículos y reseñas 2006-2019 3rd ED (2019) y delirios utópicos suicidas en el 21St Century 4TH Ed (2019). "El que entiende a babuón haría más hacia la metafísica que Locke" Charles Darwin 1838 Notebook M "Si quisiera dudar de si esta era mi mano, ¿cómo podría evitar dudar si la palabra ' mano ' tiene algún significado? Así que eso es algo que parece saber, después de todo. " Wittgenstein ' on certidumbre ' P48 "¿Qué tipo de progreso es este-el fascinante misterio ha sido eliminado-pero no se han picado profundidades en la consolación; nada ha sido explicado, descubierto o reconcebido. Cuán dócil y poco inspirador podría pensar. Pero tal vez, como sugiere Wittgenstein, las virtudes de la claridad, la desmitificación y la verdad deben encontrarse lo suficientemente satisfactoria "--Horwich ' ' Metafilosofía de Wittgenstein '. 3 En primer lugar, recordemos el descubrimiento fundamental de Wittgenstein (W): que todos los problemas verdaderamente "filosóficos" (es decir, aquellos que no se resuelven por experimentos o recopilación de datos) son los mismos: confusiones sobre cómo usar el lenguaje en un contexto particular, y por lo tanto todos soluciones son las mismas: ver cómo se puede utilizar el lenguaje en el contexto en cuestión para que sus condiciones de verdad (condiciones de Satisfacción o COS) son claros. El problema básico es que uno puede decir cualquier cosa menos que uno no puede significar (el estado claro COS para) cualquier enunciado arbitrario y significado es solamente posible en un contexto muy específico. Así, W en su última obra maestra ' on certidumbre ' (OC) examina ejemplos perspicuos de los diversos usos de las palabras "know", "Doubt" y "Certain", a menudo a partir de sus 3 perspectivas típicas de narrador, interlocutor y comentarista, dejando al lector decidir el mejor uso ( COS más claros) de las oraciones en cada contexto. Uno sólo puede describir los usos de las oraciones relacionadas y eso es el final de la misma - sin profundidades ocultas, sin perspectivas metafísicas. No hay ' problemas ' de ' conciencia ', ' voluntad ', ' espacio ', ' tiempo ', etc., sino sólo la necesidad de mantener el uso (COS) de estas palabras claras. Es realmente triste que la mayoría de los filósofos sigan desperdiciando su tiempo en las confusiones lingüísticas peculiares de la filosofía académica en lugar de prestar atención a las de las otras disciplinas conductuales y a la física, la biología y las matemáticas, donde es necesita desesperadamente. ¿Qué ha logrado realmente W? Aquí es cómo un erudito líder de Wittgenstein resumió su trabajo: "Wittgenstein resolvió muchos de los profundos problemas que han molestado a nuestro sujeto durante siglos, a veces de hecho durante más de dos milenios, problemas sobre la naturaleza de la representación lingüística, Acerca de la relación entre el pensamiento y el lenguaje, sobre el solipsismo y el idealismo, el autoconocimiento y el conocimiento de otras mentes, y sobre la naturaleza de la verdad necesaria y de las proposiciones matemáticas. Aró el suelo de la filosofía europea de la lógica y el lenguaje. Nos dio una novela e inmensamente fructífera variedad de ideas sobre la filosofía de la psicología. Intentó revoque siglos de reflexión sobre la naturaleza de las matemáticas y la verdad matemática. Socavó la epistemología de los foundacionalistas. Y nos legó una visión de la filosofía como una contribución no al conocimiento humano, sino a la comprensión humana – comprensión de las formas de nuestro pensamiento y de las confusiones conceptuales en las que estamos obligados a caer. " - Peter hacker--' la interpretación tardía de Gordon Baker de Wittgenstein ' A esto añadiría que W fue el primero en describir clara y extensamente los dos sistemas de pensamiento: S1 prelingüístico automático rápido y el sistema de reflexión lingüística lenta S2. Explicó cómo el comportamiento sólo es posible con un vasto fondo heredado que es la base axiomática para juzgar y no se puede dudar o juzgar, por lo que voluntad (elección), la conciencia, el yo, el tiempo y el espacio son innatas verdaderos axiomas. Señaló en miles de páginas y cientos de ejemplos cómo nuestras experiencias mentales internas no son descripbles en el lenguaje, esto es posible sólo para el comportamiento con un lenguaje público (la imposibilidad de lenguaje 4 privado). Él predijo la utilidad de la lógica paraconsistente que sólo surgió mucho más tarde. Por cierto, patentó diseños de helicópteros que anticiparon por tres décadas el uso de chorros de punta de cuchilla para conducir los rotores, y que tenían las semillas del motor de turbina de gas de flujo centrífugo, diseñaron un monitor de ritmo cardíaco, diseñaron y supervisaron la construcción de una casa modernista, y esbozó una prueba del teorema de Euler, posteriormente completada por otros. Él estableció los fundamentos psicológicos de las matemáticas, la lógica, la incompletitud y el infinito. Y Paul Horwich da un hermoso Resumen de donde un entendimiento de Wittgenstein nos deja. "No debe haber ningún intento de explicar nuestra actividad lingüística/conceptual (PI 126) como en la reducción de la aritmética a la lógica de Frege; ningún intento de darle fundamentos epistemológicos (PI 124) como en cuentas basadas en el significado de conocimiento a priori; ningún intento de caracterizar las formas idealizadas de la misma (PI 130) como en lógica lógica; ningún intento de reformarlo (PI 124.132) como en la teoría de errores de Mackie o el intuicionismo de Dummett; ningún intento de racionalizarlo (PI 133) como en el relato de la existencia de Quine; ningún intento de hacerla más consistente (PI 132) como en la respuesta de Tarski a las paradoñas de los mentiroso; y ningún intento de hacerla más completa (PI 133) como en el asentamiento de preguntas de identidad personal para escenarios de "teletransportación" extravagantes e hipotéticos. " Él puede ser visto como el primer psicólogo evolutivo, ya que constantemente explicó la necesidad de los antecedentes innatos y demostró cómo genera comportamiento. Aunque nadie parece consciente de ello, describió la psicología detrás de lo que más tarde se convertiría en la prueba de Wason, una medida fundamental utilizada en la psicología evolutiva (EP) décadas después. Señaló el carácter indeterminado o subdeterminado del lenguaje y la naturaleza del juego de la interacción social. Describió y refutó las nociones de la mente como máquina y la teoría computacional de la mente, mucho antes de las computadoras prácticas o los famosos escritos de Searle. Inventó las tablas de la verdad para su uso en la lógica y la filosofía. Se sentó de manera decisiva para descansar el escepticismo y la metafísica. Demostró que, lejos de ser inescrutable, las actividades de la mente yacen abiertas antes que nosotros, una lección que pocos han aprendido desde entonces. Al pensar en Wittgenstein, a menudo recuerdo el comentario atribuido al profesor de filosofía de Cambridge, C.D. Broad (que no entendía ni le gustaba). "¡ no ofrecer la Cátedra de filosofía a Wittgenstein sería como no ofrecer la silla de la física a Einstein!" Pienso en él como el Einstein de la psicología intuitiva. Aunque nació diez años más tarde, también estaba tramando ideas sobre la naturaleza de la realidad casi al mismo tiempo y en la misma parte del mundo, y, al igual que Einstein, casi muere en WW1. Ahora Supongamos que Einstein era un suicida homosexual recluso con una personalidad difícil que publicó una sola versión temprana de sus ideas que se confundieron y a menudo se equivocaron, pero se volvieron mundialmente famosas; 5 cambiado por completo sus ideas, pero durante los próximos 30 años publicó nada más, y el conocimiento de su nueva obra, en forma mayormente confusa, se difundo lentamente de conferencias ocasionales y notas de los estudiantes; que murió en 1951 dejando atrás más de 20.000 páginas de garabatos en su mayoría escritos a mano en alemán, compuesto de oraciones o párrafos breves con, a menudo, sin relación clara con las oraciones antes o después; que estos fueron cortados y pegados de otros cuadernos escritos años antes con notas en los márgenes, subrayados y palabras tachadas, por lo que muchas oraciones tienen múltiples variantes; que sus ejecutivos literarios cortan esta masa indigerible en pedazos, dejando fuera lo que deseaban y luchando con la monstruosa tarea de captar el significado correcto de las oraciones que transmiten opiniones totalmente novedosas sobre cómo funciona el universo y que luego publicó este material con lentitud agonizante (no terminado después de medio siglo) con prefacios que no contenían ninguna explicación real de lo que se trataba; que se hizo tan notorio como famoso debido a muchas afirmaciones de que toda la física anterior era un error e incluso tonterías, y que virtualmente nadie entendía su trabajo, a pesar de cientos de libros y decenas de miles de artículos que lo discutían; que muchos físicos sabían sólo sus primeros trabajos en los que había hecho una suma definitiva de la física newtoniana declaró en forma extremadamente abstracta y condensada que era difícil decidir lo que se decía; que fue virtualmente olvidado y que la mayoría de los libros y artículos sobre la naturaleza del mundo y los diversos temas de la física moderna sólo habían pasado y por lo general las referencias erróneas a él, y que muchos lo omitieron por completo; que hasta el día de hoy, más de medio siglo después de su muerte, sólo había un puñado de personas que realmente captó las consecuencias monumentales de lo que había hecho. Esto, supongo, es precisamente la situación con Wittgenstein. Si W viviera en sus 80, habría sido capaz de influir directamente en Searle (otro genio moderno de la psicología descriptiva), Pinker, Tooby y Cosmides, Symons, y muchos otros estudiantes de conducta. Si su brillante amigo Frank Ramsey no hubiera muerto en su juventud, una colaboración muy fructífera casi sin duda habría surgido. Si su estudiante y colega Alan Turing se había convertido en su amante, una de las colaboraciones más sorprendentes de todos los tiempos probablemente habría evolucionado. En cualquier caso, el paisaje intelectual del siglo 20 habría sido diferente y si los 3 hubieran ocurrido, casi con certeza habrían sido muy diferentes. En cambio, vivió en un relativo aislamiento intelectual, pocos lo conocían bien o tenían una idea de sus ideas mientras vivía, y sólo un puñado tiene una comprensión real de su trabajo incluso hoy en día. Podía haber brillado como un ingeniero, un matemático, un psicólogo, un fisiólogo (que hizo la investigación en tiempo de guerra en él), un músico (tocaba instrumentos y tenía un talento de renombre para silbar), un arquitecto (la casa que diseñó y construyó para su hermana todavía), o un empresario (heredó una de las mayores fortunas del mundo, pero lo entregó todo). Es un milagro que sobrevivió a las trincheras y a los campos de prisioneros y repetidamente voluntario para el deber más peligroso (mientras escribía el Tractatus) en WW1, muchos años de depresiones suicidas (3 hermanos sucumbió a ellos), evitó ser atrapado en Austria y ejecutado por los nazis (él era en parte judío y probablemente sólo el deseo del nazi de poner las manos sobre su dinero salvó a la 6 familia), y que no fue perseguido por su homosexualidad y conducido a suicidio como su amigo Turing. Se dio cuenta de que nadie entendía lo que estaba haciendo y nunca (no es de extrañar como él era medio siglo-o un siglo entero dependiendo de su punto de vista-por delante de la psicología y la filosofía, que sólo recientemente han comenzado a aceptar que nuestro cerebro es un órgano evolucionado como nuestro corazón.) En primer lugar, voy a ofrecer algunos comentarios sobre la filosofía y su relación con la investigación psicológica contemporánea como ejemplificado en las obras de Searle (S), Wittgenstein (W), hacker (H) et al. Le ayudará a ver mis comentarios de TLP, Bbb PI, OC por W, y PNC (filosofía en un nuevo siglo), Hacer que el mundo social (MSW), ver las cosas como son (STATA), la filosofía de Searle y la filosofía China (SPCP), John R Searle – pensar en el mundo real (TARW), y otros libros por y acerca de estos genios, que proporcionan una descripción clara de orden superior comportamiento, que no se encuentra en los libros de psicología, que me referiremos como el marco de WS. Empiezo con algunas citas penetrantes de W y S. "La confusión y el esterilidad de la psicología no debe explicarse llamándola" ciencia joven "; su estado no es comparable con el de la física, por ejemplo, en sus inicios. (Más bien con el de ciertas ramas de las matemáticas. Establecer teoría.) En Psicología hay métodos experimentales y confusión conceptual. (Como en el otro caso, confusión conceptual y métodos de prueba). La existencia del método experimental nos hace pensar que tenemos los medios para resolver los problemas que nos molesten; Aunque el problema y el método pasan entre sí por. " Wittgenstein (PI p. 232) "Los filósofos ven constantemente el método de la ciencia ante sus ojos y son irresistiblemente tentados a preguntar y responder preguntas en la forma en que la ciencia lo hace. Esta tendencia es la verdadera fuente de la metafísica y lleva al filósofo a una completa oscuridad. " (BBB P18). "Pero no he tenido mi imagen del mundo satisfaciendo su corrección: ni la tengo porque estoy satisfecho de su corrección. No: es el trasfondo heredado en el que distingo entre verdadero y falso. " Wittgenstein OC 94 "El objetivo de la filosofía es levantar una pared en el punto donde el lenguaje se detiene de todos modos." Ocasiones filosóficas de Wittgenstein p187 "El límite del lenguaje se demuestra por su imposibilidad de describir un hecho que corresponde a (es la traducción de) una frase sin simplemente repetir la frase..." Wittgenstein CV P10 "Muchas palabras entonces en este sentido, entonces no tienen un significado estricto. Pero esto no es un defecto. Pensar que es sería como decir que la luz de mi lámpara de lectura no es realmente luz en absoluto porque no tiene un límite agudo. " BBB P27 7 "Cada signo es capaz de interpretar, pero el significado no debe ser capaz de interpretar. Es la última interpretación "BBB P34 "Hay una especie de enfermedad general de pensamiento que siempre busca (y encuentra) lo que se llamará un estado mental del cual todos nuestros actos brotan, como de un embalse." BBB p143 "Y el error que aquí y en mil casos similares están inclinados a hacer está etiquetado por la palabra" hacer "como lo hemos usado en la frase" no es un acto de perspicacia que nos hace usar la regla como lo hacemos " , porque hay una idea de que "algo debe hacernos" hacer lo que hacemos. Y esto de nuevo se une a la confusión entre la causa y la razón. No necesitamos tener ninguna razón para seguir la regla como nosotros. La cadena de razones tiene un fin. " BBB p143 "Si tenemos en cuenta la posibilidad de una imagen que, aunque correcta, no tiene similitud con su objeto, la interpolación de una sombra entre la oración y la realidad pierde todo punto. Por ahora, la frase en sí puede servir como una sombra. La frase es sólo una imagen, que no tiene la menor similitud con lo que representa. " BBBp37 "Así, podemos decir de algunos matemáticos filosofar que obviamente no son conscientes de los muchos usos diferentes de la palabra "prueba"; y que no son claros acerca de las diferencias entre los usos de la palabra "Kind", cuando hablan de tipos de números, tipos de pruebas, como si la palabra "tipo" aquí significaba lo mismo que en el contexto "tipos de manzanas." O, podemos decir, no son conscientes de los diferentes significados de la palabra "descubrimiento" cuando en un caso hablamos del descubrimiento de la construcción del Pentágono y en el otro caso del descubrimiento del Polo Sur. " BBB P29 "Algunas de las características lógicas más importantes de la intencionalidad están más allá del alcance de la fenomenología porque no tienen una realidad fenomenológica inmediata... Porque la creación del significado de la falta de sentido no se experimenta conscientemente... no existe... Esto es... la ilusión fenomenológica. " Searle PNC P115117 "... la relación intencional básica entre la mente y el mundo tiene que ver con las condiciones de satisfacción. Y una proposición es cualquier cosa que pueda estar en una relación intencional con el mundo, y ya que esas relaciones intencionales siempre determinan las condiciones de satisfacción, y una proposición se define como cualquier cosa suficiente para determinar las condiciones de satisfacción, resulta que toda intencionalidad es una cuestión de proposiciones. " Searle PNC p193 "El estado intencional representa sus condiciones de satisfacción... personas suponen erróneamente que cada representación mental debe ser conscientemente pensada... pero la noción de una representación como la estoy usando es una noción funcional y no ontológica. Cualquier cosa que tenga condiciones de satisfacción, que pueda 8 triunfar o fracasar de una manera que sea característica de la intencionalidad, es por definición una representación de sus condiciones de satisfacción... podemos analizar la estructura de la intencionalidad de los fenómenos sociales analizando sus condiciones de satisfacción. " Searle MSW p28-32 "La superstición no es más que creencia en el nexo causal." TLP 5,1361 "Ahora bien, si no son las conexiones causales que nos preocupan, entonces las actividades de la mente están abiertas ante nosotros." BBB P6 "Sentimos que incluso cuando todas las preguntas científicas posibles han sido contestadas, los problemas de la vida permanecen completamente intactos. Por supuesto, entonces no quedan preguntas, y esta es la respuesta. " TLP 6,52 "Tonterías, tonterías, porque estás haciendo suposiciones en lugar de simplemente describir. Si su cabeza está embrujada por explicaciones aquí, usted está descuidando para recordar los hechos más importantes. " Z 220 "La filosofía simplemente pone todo ante nosotros y no explica ni deduce nada... Uno podría dar el nombre ' filosofía ' a lo que es posible antes de todos los nuevos descubrimientos e invenciones. " PI 126 "Cuanto más estrechamente examinamos el lenguaje real, más agudo se convierte en el conflicto entre él y nuestro requisito. (Por supuesto, para la pureza cristalina de la lógica no fue un resultado de la investigación: era un requisito.) " PI 107 "La concepción equivocada que quiero objetar en este Connexion es la siguiente, que podemos descubrir algo totalmente nuevo. Eso es un error. La verdad del asunto es que ya lo tenemos todo, y que lo tenemos realmente presente; no necesitamos esperar nada. Hacemos nuestros movimientos en el ámbito de la gramática de nuestro lenguaje ordinario, y esta gramática ya está allí. Por lo tanto, ya tenemos todo y no necesitamos esperar el futuro. " (dijo en 1930) Waismann "Ludwig Wittgenstein y el círculo de Viena (1979) p183 "Aquí nos encontramos ante un fenómeno notable y característico en la investigación filosófica: la dificultad---podría decir---no es la de encontrar la solución sino más bien la de reconocer como la solución algo que parezca Si fuera sólo un preliminar. Ya lo hemos dicho todo. ---No hay nada que se desprende de esto, ¡ no es la solución! .... Esto está conectado, creo, con nuestra espera errónea de una explicación, mientras que la solución de la dificultad es una descripción, si le damos el lugar correcto en nuestras consideraciones. Si lo moramos, y no tratamos de ir más allá de él. " Zettel p312 llamar-314 "Nuestro método es puramente descriptivo, las descripciones que damos no son pistas 9 de explicaciones." BBB P125 Estas citas no se eligen al azar, pero (junto con las otras en mis reseñas) son un esquema de comportamiento (naturaleza humana) de dos de nuestros más grandes psicólogos descriptivos. Al considerar estos asuntos debemos tener en cuenta que la filosofía (en el sentido estricto que considero aquí) es la psicología descriptiva del pensamiento de orden superior (HOT), que es otro de los hechos obvios que son totalmente ignorados-es decir, nunca lo he visto claramente se indica en cualquier lugar. Además de no aclarar que lo que están haciendo es psicología descriptiva, los filósofos raramente especifican exactamente qué es lo que esperan contribuir a este tema que otros estudiantes de comportamiento (es decir, los científicos) no lo hacen, así que después de anotar el comentario de W sobre la envidia de la ciencia, voy a citar de nuevo de hacker que da un buen comienzo en él. "Los epistemologistas tradicionales quieren saber si el conocimiento es una creencia verdadera y otra condición... o si el conocimiento ni siquiera implica la creencia... Queremos saber cuándo lo hace el conocimiento y cuándo no requiere justificación. Tenemos que ser claros lo que se atribuye a una persona cuando se dice que él sabe algo. ¿Es un estado mental distintivo, un logro, una actuación, una disposición o una habilidad? ¿Podría saber o creer que p ser idéntico con un estado del cerebro? ¿Por qué uno puede decir ' él cree que p, pero yono es el caso que p ', mientras que uno no puede decir ' creo que p, pero no es el caso que p '? ¿Por qué hay maneras, métodos y medios de lograr, alcanzar o recibir conocimiento, pero no creencia (en contraposición a la fe)? ¿Por qué uno puede saber, pero no creer quién, qué, qué, Cuándo, si y cómo? ¿Por qué uno puede creer, pero no saber, de todo corazón, con pasión, vacilante, tontamente, sin pensar, de manera irregular, dogmáticamente o razonablemente? ¿Por qué uno puede saber, pero no creer, algo perfectamente bien, a fondo o en detalle? Y así sucesivamente-a través de muchos cientos de preguntas similares concernientes no sólo al conocimiento y la creencia, sino también a la duda, la certeza, recordar, olvidar, observar, notar, reconocer, asistir, ser consciente de, ser consciente de, sin mencionar los numerosos verbos de percepción y sus cognados. Lo que hay que aclarar si estas preguntas han de ser contestadas es la Web de nuestros conceptos epistemicos, las formas en que los diversos conceptos cuelgan juntos, las diversas formas de sus compatibilidades e incompatibilidades, su punto y propósito, su presuposiciones y diferent formas de dependencia de contexto. Para Este ejercicio venerable en el análisis conectivo, el conocimiento científico, la psicología, la neurociencia y la ciencia cognitiva autoproclamados no pueden aportar nada en absoluto. " (Pasando por el giro naturalista: en el cul-de-SAC-P15 de Quine (2005). A su muerte en 1951 W dejó atrás una colección dispersa de unas 20.000 páginas. Aparte del Tractatus, fueron inéditos y en gran parte desconocidos, aunque algunos fueron ampliamente circulados y leídos (como las notas tomadas en sus clases), dando lugar a influencias extensas pero en gran parte no reconocidas. Algunas obras se sabe que se han perdido y muchos otros W habían destruido. La mayor parte de 10 este Nachlass fue microfilmado en 1968 por la Universidad de Cornell y las copias fueron compradas por muy pocas bibliotecas. La filosofía de la psicología de BuddWittgenstein (1989)-como la mayoría de los comentaristas de la época, no hace referencia al microfilm. Aunque gran parte de la Nachlass es repetitiva y aparece de alguna forma en sus obras publicadas posteriormente (que son referenciadas por Budd), muchos textos variantes son de gran interés y hay material sustancial que nunca ha sido traducido del alemán original ni publicado en forma de libro. Las notas de la Conferencia de Yorick Smithies aparecieron en 2018 e incluso ahora esperamos lo que parece ser una versión del libro marrón, dejó con su amante Francis Skinner-' Wittgenstein, dictando la filosofía de Francis Skinner ' (Springer, 2019). En 1998, apareció el CD de Bergen del Nachlass completo--Nachlass de Wittgenstein: versión de texto y facsímile: la edición electrónica de Bergen $2500 ISBN 10:0192686917. Está disponible a través de préstamo interbibliotecario y gratis en la red también. Al igual que los otros CDs de trabajo de W, está disponible desde Intelex (www.NLX.com). Se indexa y se pueden buscar y el primer recurso W. Sin embargo, mis extensas lecturas de la literatura W muestran que muy pocas personas se han molestado en consultarla y por lo tanto sus obras carecen de un elemento crítico. Uno puede ver los documentos de Victor Rodych sobre las observaciones de W sobre Godel para una excepción notable. Un trabajo importante que data del período medio de W (1933) que se publicó como un libro en 2000 es el famoso Big Typescript. La filosofía de Psicología de Budd ' Wittgenstein (1991) es uno de los mejores tratamientos de W (ver mi reseña) pero desde que terminó este libro en 1989, ni el Big Typescript ni el CD de Bergen estaban disponibles para él y descuidó el microfilm de Cornell. Sin embargo, con mucho, los trabajos más importantes datan del 3er período de W (CA. 1935 a 1951) y estos fueron utilizados por Budd. Wuttgenstein ideas totalmente novedosas y únicas triálogos Super-Socráticos y la escritura telegráfica, junto con su estilo de vida a menudo solitario y casi solipsista, y la muerte prematura en 1951, resultaron en la imposibilidad de publicar nada de su pensamiento posterior durante su vida y sólo lentamente tiene su enorme nachlass de unas 20.000 páginas han sido publicadas-un proyecto que continúa hasta el día de hoy. La única edición completa de la gran mayoría alemana nachlass fue emitido por primera vez por Oxford en 2000 con Intelex ahora publicándolo, así como todos los 14 libros de Inglés de Blackwell en un CD de búsqueda. El CD de Blackwell cuesta CA. $100 pero el CD de Oxford es más de $1000 o más de $2000 para el conjunto incluyendo las imágenes de los manuscritos originales. Sin embargo, pueden obtenerse a través de un préstamo interbibliotecario y también, como la mayoría de los libros y los artículos ahora están disponibles gratuitamente en la red (libgen.IO, b-OK.org Y En P2P. el 11 CDROM con búsqueda de suyos Libros ingleses Como Bien Como la de toda la nachlass está ahora en varios sitios en la red y el CD de Bergen se debe a una nueva edición CA 2021-http://wab.uib.no/alois/Pichler%2020170112%20Geneva.pdf). Y, por supuesto, la mayoría de los artículos académicos y libros ahora son gratuitos en línea en b-ok.org y libgen.io. Además, hay grandes problemas con la traducción de su principios del siglo 20 vieneses alemán en inglés moderno. Uno debe ser un maestro de inglés, alemán, y W con el fin de hacer esto y muy pocos están a la par. Todas sus obras sufren de errores de traducción claros y hay preguntas más sutiles donde uno tiene que entender todo el empuje de su filosofía posterior con el fin de traducir. Puesto que, en mi opinión, nadie excepto Daniele Moyal-Sharrock (DMS) ha comprendido la plena importación de sus obras posteriores (pero por supuesto que ha publicado recientemente ampliamente y muchos son ahora conscientes de sus puntos de vista), uno puede ver por qué W todavía tiene que ser plenamente apreciado. Incluso el más o menos bien-diferencia crítica conocida entre la comprensión de ' Satz ' como ' frase ' (es decir, una expresión S1) frente a ' proposición ' (es decir, una expresión S2) en varios contextos suele haber escapado al aviso. Pocos avisos (Budd P29-32, Stern y DMS en un artículo reciente son raras excepciones) que W proféticamente (décadas antes de que surgió la ciencia del caos y la complejidad) sugirió que algunos fenómenos mentales pueden originarse en procesos caóticos en el cerebro-que por ejemplo, hay no es nada que corresponda a un rastreo de memoria. También sugirió varias veces que la cadena causal tiene un fin, y esto podría significar tanto que simplemente no es posible (independientemente del estado de la ciencia) rastrearlo y que el concepto de "causa" deja de ser aplicable más allá de un cierto punto (p34). Posteriormente, muchos han hecho sugerencias similares sin ninguna idea de que W Anticlos ha ipated por décadas (de hecho más de un siglo ahora en unos pocos casos). Con DMS tengo en cuenta el último libro de W ' on certidumbre ' (OC) como la piedra fundacional de la filosofía y la psicología. No es realmente un libro, pero notas que hizo durante los dos últimos años de su vida mientras moría de cáncer de próstata y apenas podía trabajar. Parece haber sido motivado principalmente por la comprensión de que los simples esfuerzos de G.E. Moore habían centrado la atención en el núcleo mismo de toda la filosofía--cómo es posible significar, creer, saber algo en absoluto, y no ser capaz de dudar de ello. Todo el mundo puede hacer es examinar minuciosamente el funcionamiento de los juegos de idiomas de ' saber ' y ' seguro ' y ' duda ', ya que se utilizan para describir el primitivo sistema prelingüístico automatizado una (S1) funciones de nuestro cerebro (mi K1, C1 y D1) y el sistema lingüístico deliberativo avanzado dos (S2) funciones (mi K2, C2 y D2). Claro, W no utiliza la terminología de los dos sistemas, que solamente llegó a la proa en Psicología un medio siglo después de su muerte, y todavía tiene que penetrar la filosofía, pero claramente comprendió el marco de dos sistemas (la ' gramática ') en todo su trabajo a principios de los años 30, y uno puede ver presagialas claras en sus primeros escritos. 12 Mucho se ha escrito sobre Moore y W y on certidumbre (OC) recientemente, después de medio siglo en el olvido relativo. Véase, por ejemplo, "Moore y Wittgenstein" de Annalisa Coliva (2010), "racionalidad extendida" (2015), las variedades de autoconocimiento (2016), la ' exploración de la certeza ' de Brice (2014) y la guía de la filosofía Routledge de Andy Hamilton a Wittgenstein y on certidumbre ', y los muchos libros y documentos de Daniele Moyal-Sharrock (DMS) y Peter hacker (PH), incluyendo los últimos 3 volúmenes de hacker en Human Nature. DMS y PH han sido los principales eruditos de la W posterior, cada uno escribiendo o editando media docena de libros (muchos revisados por mí) y muchos artículos en la última década. Sin embargo, las dificultades de llegar a los fundamentos de nuestra psicología de orden superior, es decir, de cómo el lenguaje (aproximadamente el mismo que la mente, como nos mostró W) obras son evidenciado por Coliva, uno de los filósofos contemporáneos más brillantes y prolíficos, que hicieron Comentarios en un artículo muy reciente que demuestran que después de años de trabajo intensivo en la W posterior, ella parece no haber comprendido que resolvió los problemas más básicos de la descripción del comportamiento humano. Como DMS aclara, uno no puede ni siquiera afirmar coherentemente las dudas sobre las operaciones de nuestra psicología básica (W ' bisagras ' que equipara con S1) sin caer en la incoherencia. DMS ha notado las limitaciones de ambos trabajadores (limitaciones compartidas por todos los estudiantes de comportamiento) en sus artículos recientes, que (como los de Coliva y Hacker) están disponibles libremente en la red. Como DMS lo pone: "... las notas que conforman la certeza revolucionan el concepto de creencias básicas y disuelven el escepticismo, haciéndolos correctivos, no sólo a Moore sino también a Descartes, Hume y toda epistemología. On certidumbre muestra a Wittgenstein que ha resuelto el problema que se había fijado para resolver: el problema que ocupaba a Moore y plagado la epistemología: el de la Fundación del conocimiento. La visión revolucionaria de Wittgenstein en on certidumbre es que lo que los filósofos tradicionalmente han llamado "creencias básicas" – esas creencias en las que todo conocimiento debe basarse en última instancia – no pueden, en el dolor de regresion infinitas, basarse en más creencias proposicionales. Él viene a ver que las creencias básicas son realmente animales o formas no reflexivas de actuar que, una vez formuladas (por ejemplo, por los filósofos), parecen proposiciones (empíricas). Es esta apariencia engañosa que lleva a los filósofos a creer que en la base del pensamiento es aún más pensamiento. Sin embargo, aunque a menudo pueden parecer conclusiones empíricas, nuestras certezas básicas constituyen la base no fundamentada y no proposicional del conocimiento, no su objeto. Al situar así la base del conocimiento en certezas no reflectantes que se manifiestan como formas de actuar, Wittgenstein ha encontrado el lugar donde la justificación llega a su fin, y resolvió el problema regresivo de las creencias básicas – y, de paso, mostró la imposibilidad lógica del escepticismo hiperbólico. Creo que esto es un logro pionero para la filosofía – digno de llamar a la certeza de la ' tercera obra maestra ' de Wittgenstein. " 13 Llegué a las mismas conclusiones generales hace algunos años y lo declaré en mis reseñas de libros. Ella continúa: " ... Esto es precisamente cómo Wittgenstein describe las certezas de bisagra tipo Moore en on certidumbre: ' tienen la forma de proposiciones empíricas ', pero no son proposiciones empíricas. Por supuesto, estas certezas no son proposiciones metafísicas putativas que parecen describir las características necesarias del mundo, pero son proposiciones empíricas putativas que parecen describir las características contingentes del mundo. Y ahí radica parte de la novedad de on certidumbre. On certidumbre es continua con todos los escritos anteriores de Wittgenstein – incluyendo el Tractatus – en que llega al final de un largo e inquebrantable intento de elucidar la gramática de nuestros juegos de idiomas, para demarcar la gramática del lenguaje en uso. Baker y hacker han elucidado magníficamente la segunda desenmascaración de Wittgenstein de la naturaleza gramatical de las proposiciones metafísicas o superempíricas; lo que establece on certidumbre aparte es su otra distinción perspicuo entre algunas proposiciones ' empíricas ' y otras (' nuestras ' proposiciones empíricas ' no forman una masa homogénea ' (OC 213)): Algunas proposiciones aparentemente empíricas y contingentes son de hecho nada más que expresiones de reglas gramaticales. La importancia de esta realización es que conduce a una visión sin precedentes de que las creencias básicas – aunque parecen proposiciones empíricas y contingentes-son, de hecho, formas de actuar que, cuando se elucidan conceptualmente, se puede ver que funcionan como reglas de gramática: subyacen a todo pensamiento (OC 401). De modo que la certeza de la bisagra ' la tierra ha existido por muchos años ' sustenta todo pensamiento y acción, pero no como una proposición que nos golpea inmediatamente como verdadera; más bien como una forma de actuar que sustenta lo que hacemos (por ejemplo, investigamos la edad de la tierra) y lo que decimos (por ejemplo, hablamos de la tierra en el tiempo pasado): "sin embargo, dar motivos para justificar las pruebas, llega a su fin; – pero el final no es ciertas proposiciones que nos golpean inmediatamente como verdaderos, es decir, no es una especie de ver por nuestra parte; es nuestra actuación, que se encuentra en la parte inferior del juego de idiomas. ' (OC 204) " "La naturaleza no proposicional de las creencias básicas pone fin a los regresos que han plagado la epistemología: ya no tenemos que plantear proposiciones injustificables de autojustificación en base al conocimiento. Al tomar las bisagras para ser verdaderas proposiciones empíricas, Peter hacker no reconoce la visión innovadora de que nuestras certezas básicas son formas de actuar, y no ' ciertas proposiciones que nos golpean... como verdadero» (OC 204). Si todo lo que Wittgenstein hacía en OC era afirmar que nuestras creencias básicas son verdaderas proposiciones empíricas, ¿por qué molestarse? Él sería simplemente repitiendo lo que los filósofos antes de él han estado diciendo durante siglos, todo el tiempo deplorando una regresión infinita irresoluble. ¿Por qué no apreciar que Wittgenstein ha detenido la regresión? " ("Más allá del Wittgenstein de hacker" -(2013)). " 14 Es asombroso (y un signo de lo profundo que se mantiene la brecha entre la filosofía y la psicología) que (como he señalado muchas veces) en una década de lectura intensiva, no he visto a una persona hacer la conexión obvia entre la ' gramática ' de W y la reflexiva automática funciones de nuestro cerebro que constituyen el sistema 1, y sus extensiones en las funciones lingüísticas del sistema 2. Para cualquier persona familiarizada con el marco de dos sistemas para entender el comportamiento que ha dominado diversas áreas de la psicología, como la teoría de la decisión de las últimas décadas, debe ser manifiestamente obvio que las "creencias básicas" (o como las llamo B1) son la heredado de la estructura true-solamente de S1 y que su extensión con experiencia en oraciones verdaderas o falsas (o como yo los llamo B2) son lo que los no filósofos llaman ' creencias '. Esto puede golpear a algunos como un mero poco terminológico, pero he utilizado la vista de dos sistemas y su tabulación a continuación como la estructura lógica de la racionalidad durante una década y considerarla una destacado avanzar en la comprensión de un comportamiento de orden superior, y por lo tanto de W o cualquier escritura filosófica o conductual. En mi opinión, el fracaso para captar la importancia fundamental de la automaticidad de nuestro comportamiento debido a S1 y la consecuente atribución de toda interacción social (por ejemplo, política) a las superficialidades del S2 puede considerarse responsable del colapso inexorable de civilización industrial. El olvido casi universal de la biología básica y la psicología conduce a interminables intentos infructurados de solucionar los problemas del mundo a través de la política, pero sólo una drástica reestructuración de la sociedad con la comprensión del papel fundamental de la aptitud inclusiva como se manifiesta a través las automaticidades de S1 tiene la posibilidad de salvar el mundo. El olvido de S1 ha sido llamado por Searle ' la ilusión fenomenológica ', por Pinker ' la pizarra en blanco ' y por Tooby y Cosmides ' el modelo de ciencias sociales estándar '. OC muestra el único triálogo Super-socrático de W (narrador, interlocutor, comentarista) en plena floración y mejor que en cualquier otro lugar en sus obras. Se dio cuenta a finales de los años 20 de que la única manera de hacer cualquier progreso era mirar cómo funciona el lenguaje-de lo contrario uno se pierde en el laberinto del lenguaje de las primeras frases y no hay la menor esperanza de encontrar una salida. Todo el libro examina varios usos de la palabra ' saber ' que se separan a sí mismos en ' saber ' como una certeza intuitiva ' perceptual ' que puedeno se cuestionen de manera significativa (mi K1 o el intransitivo de W) y "saber" como disposición para actuar (mi K2 o W de Transitive), que funciona igual que pensar, esperar, juzgar, entender, imaginar, recordar, creer y muchas otras palabras disposicionales. Como he sugerido en mis diversas reseñas de W y S, Estos dos usos corresponden a los dos sistemas modernos de marco de pensamiento que es tan poderoso en la comprensión del comportamiento (mente, lenguaje), y esto (y su otro trabajo) es el primer esfuerzo significativo para mostrar cómo nuestros rápidos, "Estados mentales" automáticos prelingüísticos son la incuestionable base axiomática ("bisagras") para nuestra posterior evolución, lenta, lingüística, deliberativa psicología disposicional. Como he señalado muchas veces, ni W, ni nadie más a mi conocimiento, nunca ha dicho esto claramente. Sin duda, la mayoría de los que leen OC desaparecen sin una idea clara de lo que ha hecho, que es el resultado normal de leer cualquiera de sus trabajos. 15 En Certeza (OC) no se publicó hasta 1969, 18 años después de la muerte de Wittgenstein y recientemente ha comenzado a llamar seriamente la atención. Hay pocas referencias a ella en Searle (junto con hacker, el heredero de W aparente y uno de el filósofo viviente más famosos) y uno ve libros enteros en W con apenas una mención. Hay sin embargo razonablemente buenos libros sobre él por paseo, Svensson, Coliva, McGinn y otros y partes de muchos otros libros y artículos, pero lo mejor es el de Daniele Moyal-Sharrock (DMS) cuyo volumen 2004 "entendiendo la certeza de Wittgenstein" es obligatorio para cada persona educada, y tal vez el mejor punto de partida para la comprensión de Wittgenstein (W), la psicología, la filosofía y la vida. Sin embargo (en mi opinión) todo análisis de W se queda corto de captar plenamente sus avances únicos y revolucionarios al no haber puesto el comportamiento en su amplio contexto científico evolutivo y contemporáneo, que voy a intentar aquí. No voy a dar una explicación página por página ya que (como con cualquier otro libro que trata de la conducta-i. e., filosofía, psicología, Antropología, sociología, historia, derecho, política, religión, literatura, etc.) no podríamos pasar las primeras páginas, ya que todas las cuestiones discutidos aquí surgen inmediatamente en cualquier discusión de comportamiento. La siguiente tabla que resume la estructura lógica de la racionalidad (psicología descriptiva del pensamiento de orden superior) proporciona un marco para esta y toda la discusión del comportamiento. En el transcurso de muchos años leyendo extensamente en W, otros filósofos, y la psicología, ha quedado claro que lo que él estableció en su período final (y a lo largo de su trabajo anterior de una manera menos clara) son los cimientos de lo que ahora se conoce como evolucionario Psicología (EP), o si lo prefieres, psicología cognitiva, lingüística cognitiva, intencionalidad, pensamiento de orden superior o simplemente comportamiento o incluso un orden superior comportamiento animal. Lamentablemente, pocos se dan cuenta de que sus obras son un vasto y único libro de psicología descriptiva que es tan relevante ahora como el día en que fue escrito. Él es casi universalmente ignorados por Psicología y otras ciencias del comportamiento y las Humanidades, e incluso aquellos pocos que lo han entendido no han comprendido el alcance de su expectativa de la última obra sobre el EP y las ilusiones cognitivas (por ejemplo, los dos yo de rápido y lento pensamiento - véase más adelante). John Searle (S), se refiere a él con poca frecuencia, pero su obra puede ser vista como una extensión directa de W, aunque no parece ver esto. Los analistas de W como Baker y hacker (B&H), Read, Harre, Horwich, Stern, Hutto y Moyal-Sharrock hacen maravillosamente, pero sobre todo dejan de ponerlo en el centro de la psicología actual, donde ciertamente pertenece. También debe ser claro que en la medida en que son coherentes y correctos, todas las cuentas de un comportamiento de orden superior están describiendo los mismos fenómenos y deben traducirse fácilmente entre sí. Así, los temas recientemente de moda de "mente encarnada" y "Enactivismo radical" deben fluir directamente desde y hacia el trabajo de W (y lo hacen). El fracaso de la mayoría para captar plenamente el significado de W se debe en parte 16 a la limitada atención en certeza (0C) y sus otros 3Rd obras del período han recibido hasta hace poco, pero aún más a la incapacidad de muchos filósofos y otros para entender cuán profundamente nuestra visión de la conducta se altera una vez que adoptamos el marco evolutivo. Llamo al marco de la psicología descriptiva del pensamiento de orden superior-DPHOT-o más precisamente el estudio del lenguaje utilizado en DPHOT-que Searle llama la estructura lógica de racionalidad-LSR), que se encuentra en la antropología, la sociología, la política, la ley, la moral, la ética, la religión, la estética, la literatura y la historia. La "teoría" de la evolución dejó de ser una teoría para cualquier persona normal, racional e inteligente antes del final del siglo 19 y para Darwin al menos medio siglo antes. Uno no puede evitar incorporar T. Rex y todo lo que es relevante para él en nuestro verdadero fondo axiomático a través del funcionamiento inexorable de EP. Una vez que se obtiene la necesidad lógica (psicológica) de esto, es realmente una verdadera perplelogía que incluso los más brillantes y los mejores parecen no captar este hecho más básico de la vida humana (con una punta del sombrero a Kant, Searle y algunos otros) que fue establecido con gran detalle en "En certeza". Por cierto, la ecuación de la lógica y nuestra psicología axiomática es esencial para entender la W y la naturaleza humana (como Daniele Moyal-Sharrock (DMS), pero no AFAIK a nadie más, señala). Por lo tanto, la mayor parte de nuestra experiencia pública compartida (cultura) se convierte en una verdadera extensión de nuestro EP axiomático y no se puede encontrar confundido sin amenazar nuestra cordura. El fútbol o Britney Spears no pueden simplemente desaparecer de mi memoria y vocabulario, ya que estos conceptos, ideas, eventos, se desarrollan y están ligados a innumerables otros en la verdadera red que comienza con el nacimiento y se extiende en todas las direcciones para abarcar gran parte de nuestro conciencia y la memoria. Un corolario, muy bien explicado por DMS y esclarecido en su propia manera única por Searle, es que la visión escéptica del mundo y otras mentes (y una montaña de otras tonterías, incluyendo la pizarra en blanco) realmente no puede tener un punto de apoyo, como "realidad" es el resultado de axiomas involuntarios de pensamiento rápido y no comprobables proposiciones verdaderas o falsas. La mano muerta de la vista de pizarra en blanco del comportamiento todavía descansa fuertemente y es el defecto del ' segundo yo ' del sistema consciente de pensamiento lento 2, que (sin educación) es ajeno al hecho de que las bases para todo comportamiento radica en el inconsciente, rápido pensamiento estructura axiomática del sistema 1 (' ilusión fenomenológica ' de Searle). Searle resumió esto en un artículo reciente muy perspicaz señalando que muchas características lógicas de la intencionalidad están fuera del alcance de la fenomenología porque la creación de significado (es decir, la COS de S2) de la insignificancia (es decir, los reflejos de S1) no es experimentada conscientemente. Ver filosofía en un nuevo siglo (PNC) P115-117 y mi revisión de la misma. Es esencial captar el W/S (Wittgenstein/Searle) framework por lo que primero voy a 17 ofrecer algunos comentarios sobre filosofía y su relación con la investigación psicológica contemporánea como ejemplificada en las obras de Searle (S), Wittgenstein (W), Baker y hacker (B&H), Read, Hutto, Daniele Moyal-Sharrock (DMS) et. al. Para captar mi sencilla terminología y perspectiva de dos sistemas, ayudará a ver mis reseñas de W/S y otros libros sobre estos genios, que proporcionan una descripción clara del comportamiento de orden superior que no se encuentra en los libros de psicología. Decir que Searle ha extendido el trabajo de W no necesariamente implica que es un resultado directo del estudio W (y claramente no es un Wittgensteinian), sino más bien que porque sólo hay una psicología humana (por la misma razón sólo hay una Cardiología humana) , que cualquier persona que describa con precisión el comportamiento debe enunciar alguna variante o extensión de lo que dijo W. Sin embargo, S rara vez menciona W e incluso entonces, a menudo de una manera crítica, pero en mi opinión sus críticas (como las de todos) casi siempre se pierden la marca y hace muchas afirmaciones dudosas por las que a menudo se le critica. En el contexto actual, Encuentro las recientes críticas de DMS, Coliva y hacker más relevante. Sin embargo, él es el candidato principal para los mejores desde W y recomiendo descargar el más de 100 Video conferencias que tiene en la red. A diferencia de casi todas las demás conferencias de filosofía son bastante entretenido e informativo y he oído todos al menos dos veces. Un tema importante en todas las discusiones sobre el comportamiento humano es la necesidad de separar los automatismos genéticamente programados de S1 (que equipara con las "bisagras" de W) del comportamiento de la disposicional lingüística menos mecánico de S2. Para reformular: todo el estudio de un comportamiento de orden superior es un esfuerzo para desordenar el sistema rápido 1 (S1) y ralentizar el sistema 2 (S2) pensando-por ejemplo, percepciones y otros automatismos frente a disposiciones. El trabajo de Searle proporciona una descripción impresionante del comportamiento social S2 de orden superior, incluyendo "nuestra intencionalidad", mientras que la W posterior muestra Cómo S2 se basa en axiomas inconscientes sólo verdaderos de S1, que en la evolución y en cada una de nuestras historias personales se desarrolló en el pensamiento de proposicional disposicional consciente (actuando) de S2. Wittgenstein destacó que la confusión y la franqueza de la psicología no debe explicarse llamándola una ciencia joven y que los filósofos están irresistiblemente tentados a preguntar y responder preguntas de la manera en que la ciencia lo hace. Señaló que esta tendencia es la verdadera fuente de la metafísica y lleva al filósofo a una completa oscuridad. Vea BBB P18. Otro comentario notable fue que si no nos preocupan las "causas" que las actividades de la mente están abiertas ante nosotros – véase BB P6 (1933). de la misma manera, las 20.000 páginas de su nachlass demostraron su famoso dictum que el problema no es encontrar la solución sino reconocer como la solución lo que parece ser sólo un preliminar. Ver su Zettel p312 llamar-314. Y de nuevo, señaló hace 80 años que debemos darnos cuenta de que sólo podemos dar descripciones de comportamiento y que estos no son indicios de 18 explicaciones (BBB P125). Consulte las cotizaciones completas en otros lugares de este artículo. Las ideas comunes (por ejemplo, el subtítulo de uno de los libros de Pinker "las cosas del pensamiento: el lenguaje como una ventana a la naturaleza humana") que el lenguaje (mente, discurso) es una ventana en o algún tipo de traducción de nuestro pensamiento o incluso (LOT de Fodor, ISA de Carruthers, etc.) que debe ser otro "lenguaje del pensamiento" del que es una traducción, fueron rechazados por W, que trataron de mostrar, con cientos de ejemplos perspicuos continuamente reanalizados de lenguaje en acción, que el lenguaje no es una imagen de, pero está pensando o la mente, y todo su corpus puede ser considerado como el desarrollo de esta idea. Muchos han deconstruido la idea de un ' lenguaje de pensamiento ', pero en mi opinión ninguno mejor que W en BBB P37 - "si tenemos en cuenta la posibilidad de una imagen que, aunque correcta, no tiene similitud con su objeto, la interpolación de una sombra entre la oración y la realidad pierde todo punto. Por ahora, la frase en sí puede servir como una sombra. La frase es sólo una imagen, que no tiene la menor similitud con lo que representa. " así que, problemas lingüísticos directamente desde el cerebro y lo que podría contar como evidencia para un intermediario? W rechazó la idea de que los enfoques Bottom up de la fisiología, la psicología y la computación podrían revelar lo que hizo su análisis Top Down de los juegos de idiomas (LG). Las dificultades que observó son comprender lo que está siempre delante de nuestros ojos y capturar la vaguedad – es decir, "la mayor dificultad en estas investigaciones es encontrar una manera de representar la vaguedad" (LWPP1, 347). Y así, el habla (es decir, las contracciones musculares orales, la forma principal en que interactuamos) no es una ventana a la mente, sino que es la propia mente, que se expresa por la acústica explosiones sobre el pasado, actos presentes y futuros (es decir, nuestro discurso usando los juegos de idiomas más evolucionados (LG) de la SECOND Self--las disposiciones como imaginar, saber, decir, creer, pretender, etc.). Algunos de los temas favoritos de W en su segundo momento y su los terceros períodos son los mecanismos interdigitantes de pensamiento rápido y lento (sistema 1 y 2), la irrelevancia de nuestra "vida mental" subjetiva para el funcionamiento del lenguaje, y la imposibilidad del lenguaje privado. La piedra angular de nuestro comportamiento es nuestro involuntario, sistema 1, pensamiento rápido, verdaderosólo, Estados mentales-nuestras percepciones y recuerdos y actos involuntarios, mientras que la evolutivamente más tarde LG son voluntarios, sistema 2, pensamiento lento, comprobables verdadero o falso disposicional (y a menudo contrafáctico) imaginando, suponiendo, pretendiendo, pensando, conociendo, creyendo, etc. Reconoció que ' Nothing is Hidden' - es decir, toda nuestra psicología y todas las respuestas a todas las preguntas filosóficas están aquí en nuestra lengua (nuestra vida) y que la dificultad no es encontrar las respuestas sino reconocerlas como siempre aquí delante de nosotros - sólo tenemos que dejar de tratar de mirar más profundo (por ejemplo, en LWPP1 "el mayor peligro aquí es querer observarnos a uno mismo"). W no está legislando los límites de la ciencia, pero señalando el hecho de que nuestro 19 comportamiento (en su mayoría el habla) es la imagen más clara posible de nuestra psicología. FMRI, PET, TCMS, iRNA, análogos computacionales, AI y todo el resto son formas fascinantes y poderosas para describir y extender nuestra psicología axiomática innata, pero todo lo que pueden hacer es proporcionar la base física para nuestro comportamiento, multiplicar nuestros juegos de idiomas, y extender S2. Los verdaderos axiomas de ' ' on certidumbre ' ' son de W (y más tarde Searle) "lecho" o "fondo", que ahora llamamos Psicología evolutiva (Evolutionary Psychology, EP), y que es rastreable a las reacciones automatizadas verdaderas de las bacterias, que evolucionaron y operan por el mecanismo de aptitud inclusiva ( inclusive Fitness, IF), es decir, por selección natural. Vea las recientes obras de Trivers para una introducción popular a IF o Bourke de los magníficos "principios de evolución social" para una introducción profesional. La reciente farsa del pensamiento evolutivo de Nowak y Wilson de ninguna manera afecta el hecho de que si es el mecanismo principal de la evolución por la selección natural (ver mi reseña de ' la conquista social de la tierra ' (2012)). Como W se desarrolla en OC, la mayor parte de nuestra experiencia pública compartida (cultura) se convierte en una extensión real (es decir, S2 bisagras o S2H) de nuestro EP axiomático (es decir, bisagras S1 o S1H) y no se puede encontrar ' confundido ' sin amenazar nuestra cordura-como señaló, un ' error ' en S1 (sin prueba) tiene consecuencias profundamente diferentes de una en S2 (comprobable, testable). Un corolario, bien explicado por DMS y esclarecido en su propia manera única por Searle, es que la visión escéptica del mundo y otras mentes (y una montaña de otras tonterías) no puede tener un punto de apoyo, como "realidad" es el resultado de axiomas involuntarios ' de pensamiento rápido ' y no comprobables proposiciones (como Yo lo pondría). Está claro para mí que los axiomas innatos verdaderos-sólo W está ocupado a lo largo de su trabajo, y especialmente en OC, son equivalentes al pensamiento rápido o sistema 1 que está en el centro de la investigación actual (por ejemplo, ver Kahneman- "pensando rápido y lento", pero ni él , ni nadie AFAIK, tiene idea de W estableció el marco hace más de 50 años), que es involuntario y automático y que corresponde a los Estados mentales de percepción, emoción y memoria, como W notas una y otra vez. Uno podría llamar a estos "reflejos intracerebrales" (tal vez 99% de toda nuestra cerebración si se mide por el uso de energía en el cerebro). Nuestro lento o reflexivo, más o menos "consciente" (cuidado con otra red de juegos de idiomas!) segundo-la actividad del cerebro propio corresponde a lo que W caracterizó como "dispositiones "o" inclinaciones ", que referirse a las habilidades o posibles acciones, no son Estados mentales, son conscientes, deliberados y proposicionales (verdadero o falso), y no tienen ningún tiempo definido de ocurrencia. Como señala W, las palabras de disposición tienen al menos dos usos básicos. Uno es un uso peculiar sobre todo filosófico (pero graduándose en los usos cotidianos) que se refiere a las oraciones verdaderas sólo resultantes de la percepción directa y la memoria, es decir, nuestra psicología axiomática S1 innata (' sé que estas son mis 20 manos '), originalmente llamado causally Autorreferencial (CSR) por Searle (pero ahora causally auto-reflexiva) o reflexivo o intransigente en los libros azules y marrones de W (BBB), y el uso de S2, que es su uso normal como disposiciones, que puede ser actuado hacia fuera, y que puede llegar a ser verdadero o falso (' yo sé mi camino a casa ')- -es decir, tienen condiciones de satisfacción (COS) en el sentido estricto, y no son CSR (llamado transitivo en BBB). La ecuación de estos términos de la psicología moderna con los usados por W y S (y mucho más aquí) es mi idea, así que no esperes encontrarla en la literatura (excepto mi Libros Artículos y reseñas on viXra.org, philpapers.org, ResearchGate.net, Academia.edu, Amazon, libgen.io, b-ok.org etc.). Aunque rara vez son tocados por los filósofos, la investigación del pensamiento rápido involuntario ha revolucionado la psicología, la economía (por ejemplo, el Premio Nobel de Kahneman) y otras disciplinas bajo nombres como "ilusiones cognitivas", "cebado", "cognición implícita", "framing", "heurística" y "sesgos". Por supuesto, estos también son juegos de idiomas, por lo que habrá más y menos útiles maneras de utilizar estas palabras, y los estudios y discusiones variarán de "puro" sistema 1 a combinaciones de 1 y 2 (la norma como W dejó claro, pero por supuesto que no utiliza esta terminología) , pero presumiblemente no siempre de un pensamiento de disposicional S2 lento, ya que cualquier pensamiento (acción intencional) no puede ocurrir sin involucrar gran parte de la intrincada red S1 de los "módulos cognitivos", "motores de inferencia", "reflejos intracerebrales", "automatismos", " Cognitivo axiomas "," fondo "o" lecho de roca "(como W y Searle llaman a nuestro EP) que también debe utilizar S1 para mover los músculos (acción). Se deduce tanto del trabajo del 3er período de W y de la psicología contemporánea, que "voluntad", "self" y "conciencia" (que como notas Searle se presupuesta por toda la discusión de la intencionalidad) son elementos axiomáticos verdaderos-sólo de S1, compuesto de percepciones, recuerdos y reflejos., y no hay posibilidad (inteligibilidad) de demostrar (de dar sentido a) su falsedad. Como W dejó claras en numerosas ocasiones, son la base para el juicio y por lo tanto no pueden ser juzgados. Los verdaderos axiomas de nuestra psicología no son probatorios. Como él mismo dijo en OC p94 - "pero no he hecho mi foto del mundo satisfaciendo su corrección: ni la tengo porque estoy satisfecha de su corrección. -no: es el trasfondo heredado en el que distingo entre verdadero y falso. " Una frase expresa un pensamiento (tiene un significado), cuando tiene claras las condiciones de satisfacción (COS), es decir, las condiciones de la verdad pública. De ahí el comentario de W: "cuando pienso en el lenguaje, no hay ' significados ' pasando por mi mente, además de las expresiones verbales: el lenguaje es en sí mismo el vehículo del pensamiento." Y, si pienso con o sin palabras, el pensamiento es lo que yo (honestamente) diga que es, ya que no hay otro criterio posible (COS). Así los aforismos de W (p132 en el hermoso libro de Budd sobre W) – "Es en el lenguaje que el deseo y la realización se reúnen y como todo lo metafísico, la armonía entre el pensamiento y la realidad se encuentra en la gramática de la lengua." Y uno podría notar aquí que la "gramática" en W puede ser usualser traducido como EP o LSR (DPHOT - ver tabla) y que, a pesar de sus frecuentes advertencias contra la teoría y la generalización (por lo 21 que a menudo es erróneamente criticado por Searle), esto es tan amplia una caracterización de la psicología descriptiva de orden superior (filosofía) como se puede encontrar (como DMS también señala). W es correcto que no hay ningún estado mental que constituya un significado, y Searle señala que hay una manera general de caracterizar el ACt de significado "significado de altavoz... es la imposición de condiciones de satisfacción en las condiciones de satisfacción " -que significa hablar o escribir un bien-frase formada expresando COS en un contexto que puede ser verdadero o falso, y esto es un acto y no un estado mental. es decir, como Searle señala en filosofía en un nuevo siglo p193 - "la relación intencional básica entre la mente y el mundo tiene que ver con las condiciones de satisfacción. Y una proposición es cualquier cosa que pueda estar en una relación intencional con el mundo, y ya que esas relaciones intencionales siempre determinan las condiciones de satisfacción, y una proposición se define como cualquier cosa suficiente para determinar las condiciones de satisfacción, resulta que toda intencionalidad es una cuestión de proposiciones. "--las proposiciones son eventos públicos que pueden ser verdaderos o falsos – contra el uso perverso de la palabra para el verdadero axiomas de S1 por Searle, Coliva y otros. Por lo tanto, el famoso comentario de W de PI P217 - "Si Dios hubiera mirado en nuestras mentes, no habría podido ver de quién estábamos hablando", y sus comentarios de que todo el problema de la representación está contenido en "eso es él" y "lo que da a la imagen su interpretación es el camino sobre el que yace ", o como S dice su COS. por lo tanto, la suma de W (P140 Budd) –" lo que siempre llega al final es que sin ningún otro significado, él llama lo que sucedió el deseo de que eso suceda-y-la pregunta de si sé lo que deseo antes de que se cumpla mi deseo no puede surgir en todo. Y el hecho de que algún evento pare mis deseos no significa que lo cumpla. Tal vez no debería haberme satisfecho si mi deseo hubiera sido satisfecho. Supongamos que se le preguntó-¿sé por cuánto tiempo antes de conseguirlo? Si he aprendido a hablar, entonces lo sé. " Uno de los temas recurrentes de W ahora se llama teoría de la mente, o como yo prefiero, la comprensión de la agencia (UA). Ian Apperly, que está analizando cuidadosamente UA1 y los UA2 (es decir, UA de S1 y S2) en experimentos, se ha dado cuenta del trabajo de Daniel Hutto, que ha caracterizado a UA1 como una fantasía (es decir, ninguna ' teoría ' ni representación puede estar involucrada en UA1--que está reservada para los UA2-ver mi revisión de su Primero libro con Myin). Sin embargo, al igual que otros psicólogos, Apperly no tiene idea de que W sentó las bases para esto hace 80 años. Es una visión fácilmente defendible que el núcleo de la literatura floreciente sobre las ilusiones cognitivas, cognición implícita, Automatismos y el pensamiento de mayor orden es compatible con y directamente discutible de W. A pesar del hecho de que la mayor parte de lo anterior ha sido conocido por muchos durante décadas (e incluso 3/4 de un siglo en el caso de algunas de las enseñanzas de W), raramente he visto algo acercándose a una discusión adecuada en filosofía u otros behavivitextos de Ciencias orales, y comúnmente hay apenas una mención. Después de medio siglo en el olvido, la naturaleza de la conciencia es ahora el tema 22 más caliente en las Ciencias del comportamiento y la filosofía. Comenzando con el trabajo pionero de Ludwig Wittgenstein en la década de 1930 (los libros azul y marrón) a 1951, y desde los años 50 hasta el presente por sus sucesores Searle, MoyalSharrock, Read, hacker, Stern, Horwich, Winch, Finkelstein, etc., he creado el siguiente tabla como heurística para avanzar en este estudio. Las filas muestran diversos aspectos o formas de estudiar y las columnas muestran los procesos involuntarios y comportamientos voluntarios que comprenden los dos sistemas (procesos duales) de la estructura lógica de la conciencia (LSC), que también pueden considerarse como la estructura lógica de la racionalidad (LSR-Searle), de la conducta (LSB), de la personalidad (LSP), de la mente (LSM), del lenguaje (LSL), de la realidad (LSOR), de la intencionalidad (LSI)-el término filosófico clásico, la psicología descriptiva de la conciencia (DPC), el descriptivo Psicología del pensamiento (DPT) – o mejor, el lenguaje de la psicología descriptiva del pensamiento (LDPT), términos introducidos aquí y en mis otros escritos recientes. Las ideas para esta tabla se originaron en Wittgenstein, Y una mesa mucho más simple por Searle, y se correlaciona con extensas tablas y gráficos en los tres libros recientes sobre la naturaleza humana por el p. m. S hacker. Las últimas 9 filas provienen de la investigación de decisionesPrincipalmente por Johnathan St. B.T. Evans y colegas revisados por mí mismo. El sistema 1 es involuntario, reflexivo o automatizado "reglas" R1 mientras pensar (cognición) no tiene lagunas y es voluntario o deliberativo "reglas" R2 y Willing (Volition) tiene 3 huecos (consulte Searle). Sugiero que podamos describir el comportamiento más claramente cambiando "imponer condiciones de satisfacción en las condiciones de satisfacción" de Searle a "relacionar los Estados mentales con el mundo moviendo los músculos" - es decir, hablar, escribir y hacer, y su "mente al mundo Dirección de ajuste"y" la dirección del mundo a la mente de ajuste "por" causa se origina en la mente "y" causa se origina en el mundo "S1 es sólo de forma ascendente causal (mundo a la mente) y sin contenido (falta de representaciones o información) mientras que S2 tiene contenidos y es descendente causal (mente al mundo ). He adoptado mi terminología en esta tabla. 23 DESDE EL ANALISIS DE LOS JUEGOS DE IDIOMAS Disposición Emoción Memoria Percepción Deseo PI * * IA * * * Acción/ Palabra Causa origina de * * * * Mundo Mundo Mundo Mundo Mente Mente Mente Mente Provoca cambios en * * * * * Ninguno Mente Mente Mente Ninguno Mundo Mundo Mundo Causalmente Auto Reflexivo * * * * * * No Sí Sí Sí No Sí Sí Sí Verdadero o falso (Comprobable) Sí T sólo T sólo T sólo Sí Sí Sí Sí Condiciones públicas de satisfacción Sí Sí/No Sí/No No Sí/No Sí No Sí Describir Un estado mental No Sí Sí Sí No No Sí/No Sí Prioridad evolutiva 5 4 2, 3 1 5 3 2 2 Contenido voluntario Sí No No No No Sí Sí Sí Iniciación voluntaria Sí/No No Sí No Sí/No Sí Sí Sí Sistema cognitivo ******* 2 1 2/1 1 2/1 2 1 2 Cambiar intensidad No Sí Sí Sí Sí No No No Duración precisa No Sí Sí Sí No No Sí Sí Aquí y Ahora o Allá y Luego (H + N, T + T) ******** TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN Calidad especial No Sí No Sí No No No No Localizado en Cuerpo No No No Sí No No No Sí Las expresiones corporales Sí Sí No No Sí Sí Sí Sí Autocontradiccion es No Sí No No Sí No No No Necesita un yo Sí Sí/No No No Sí No No No Necesita lenguaje Sí No No No No No No Sí/No 24 DE LA INVESTIGACIÓN DE DECISIONES Disposición Emoción Memoria Percepción Deseo PI * * IA * * * Acción/ Palabra Efectos subliminales No Sí/No Sí Sí No No No Sí/No Asociativa Basada en reglas RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB Dependiente del contexto/ Abstracto A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/A CD/A Serie/Paralelo S S/P P P S/P S S S Heurístico Analítica A H/A H H H/A A A A Necesita trabajar Memoria Sí No No No No Sí Sí Sí Dependiente general de la inteligencia Sí No No No Sí/No Sí Sí Sí La carga cognitiva Inhibe Sí Sí/No No No Sí Sí Sí Sí Excitación facilita o inhibe I F/I F F I I I I Condiciones públicas de satisfacción de S2 son a menudo referidos por Searle y otros como COS, representaciones, creadores de la verdad o significados (o COS2 por mí mismo), mientras que los resultados automáticos de S1 son designados como presentaciones por otros (o COS1 por mí mismo). * Aka Inclinaciones, Capacidades, Preferencias, Representaciones, Posibles Acciones, etc. ** Intenciones anteriores de Searle *** La intención de Searle en acción. **** Dirección de ajuste de Searle ***** Dirección de causalidad de Searle ****** (Las instancias del estado mental Causas o se cumple a sí mismo). Searle anteriormente llamó a esto causalmente auto-referencial. ******* Tversky / Kahneman / Frederick / Evans / Stanovich definieron los sistemas cognitivos. ******** Aquí y ahora o allí y luego Es de interés para comparar esto con las diversas tablas y gráficos en los últimos 3 volúmenes de Peter hacker en la naturaleza humana. Uno siempre debe tener en cuenta El descubrimiento de Wittgenstein de que después de haber descrito los 25 posibles usos (significados, creadores de la verdad, condiciones de satisfaccion) del lenguaje en un determinado contexto, hemos agotado su interés, y los intentos de explicación (es decir, filosofía) sólo nos alejan de la verdad. Nos mostró que sólo hay un problema filosófico: el uso de oraciones (juegos de idiomas) en un contexto inapropiado y, por lo tanto, sólo una solución, mostrando el contexto correcto. EXPLICACIÓN DE LA TABLA Sistema 1 (es decir, emociones, memoria, percepciones, reflejos) que partes del cerebro presentan a la conciencia, se automatizan y generalmente ocurren en menos de 500msec, mientras que el sistema 2 es habilidades para realizar acciones deliberativas lentas que están representadas en conciencia deliberación (S2D-mi terminología) que requiere más de 500msec, pero con frecuencia se repiten acciones S2 también puede ser automatizado (S2A-mi terminología). Hay una gradación de la conciencia desde el coma a través de las etapas del sueño hasta la conciencia plena. La memoria incluye memoria a corto plazo (memoria de trabajo) del sistema 2 y larga memoria de término del sistema 1. Por voliciones uno normalmente diría que son exitosos o no, en lugar de verdadero o falso. S1 es causalmente auto-reflexivo desde la descripción de nuestra experiencia perceptual-la presentación de nuestros sentidos a la conciencia, sólo se puede describir en las mismas palabras (como el mismo COSSearle) como describimos el mundo, que prefiero llamar a la perceptos o COS1 para distinguirlo de la representación o COS2 pública de S2. Claro, las distintas filas y columnas están lógicamente y psicológicamente conectadas. Por ejemplo, emoción, memoria y percepción en la fila verdadero o falso será trueOnly, describirán un estado mental, pertenecen al sistema cognitivo 1, generalmente no se iniciará voluntariamente, son causalmente autorreflexivo, causa se origina en el mundo y provoca cambios en la mente, tienen una duración precisa, cambio en la intensidad, ocurren aquí y ahora, comúnmente tienen una calidad especial, no necesitan lenguaje, son independientes de la inteligencia general y la memoria de trabajo, no están inhibidas por la carga cognitiva, no tendrá contenido voluntario, y no tendrá condiciones públicas de satisfacción, etc. Siempre habrá ambigüedades porque las palabras (conceptos, juegos de lenguaje) no pueden igualar con precisión las funciones complejas reales del cerebro (comportamiento), es decir, hay una explosión combinatoria de contextos (en oraciones y en el mundo), y en el infinito variaciones de ' Estados del cerebro ' (' estados mentales o el patrón de activaciones de miles de millones de neuronas que pueden corresponder a ' ver una manzana roja ') y esta es una de las razones por las que no es posible ' reducir ' el comportamiento de orden superior a un ' sistema de leyes ' que tendría que indicar todos los contextos posibles – de ahí las advertencias de Wittgenstein contra las teorías. Y lo que cuenta como reducir y como una «ley» y un «sistema» (véase, por ejemplo, Nancy Cartwright). Este es un caso especial de la irreductibilidad de las descripciones de nivel superior a los de nivel inferior que se ha explicado muchas veces por Searle, DMS, hacker, W y otros. 26 Hace aproximadamente un millón de años, los primates desarrollaron la capacidad de usar los músculos de la garganta para hacer complejas series de ruidos (es decir, discursos primitivos) para describir eventos presentes (percepciones, memoria, acciones reflexivas) con algunos juegos de idiomas primarios o primitivos (PLG). El sistema 1 se compone de rápido, automatizado, subcortical, no representacional, causalmente autorreflexivo, intransitivo, sin informacion, verdadero-sólo "Estados mentales" con un tiempo y ubicación precisos, y con el tiempo evolucionó en centros corticales más altos S2 con la capacidad adicional de describir los desplazamientos en el espacio y el tiempo de los acontecimientos (el pasado y el futuro y a menudo hipotéticos, contrafactual, condicionales o ficticios preferencias, inclinaciones o disposiciones los juegos de lenguaje secundario o sofisticado (SLG) del sistema 2 que son lentos, corticales, conscientes, información que contiene, transitivo (tener condiciones públicas de satisfacción-término de Searle para los creadores de la verdad o significado que divido en COS1 y COS2 para privado S1 y S2 público), representacional (que nuevamente divido en R1 para las representaciones S1 y R2 para S2), el pensamiento proposicional verdadero o falso, con todas las funciones S2 que no tienen tiempo preciso y ser habilidades y no estados mentales. Las preferencias son intuiciones, tendencias, reglas ontológicas automáticas, comportamientos, habilidades, módulos cognitivos, rasgos de personalidad, plantillas, motores de inferencia, inclinaciones, Disposiciones Emociones (descritas por Searle como deseos agitados), actitudes proposicionales (correcto sólo si se utiliza para referirse a eventos en el mundo y no a proposiciones), valoraciones, capacidades, hipótesis. Algunas emociones se están desarrollando lentamente y cambiando los resultados de las disposiciones S2 (W - ' Comentarios sobre la filosofía de la psicología ' V2 p148) mientras que otros son típicos S1-automático y rápido de aparecer y desaparecer. "Yo creo", "él ama", "piensan" son descripciones de posibles actos públicos típicamente discolocado en el espacio-tiempo. Mi primer declaraciones de persona sobre mí son verdaderas-sólo (excluyendo mentir) – es decir, S1, mientras que las declaraciones en tercera persona sobre otros son verdaderas o falsas – es decir, S2 (ver mis comentarios de Johnston ' Wittgenstein: Repensando el Interior ' y de Budd ' la filosofía de la psicología de Wittgenstein '). Las "preferencias" como clase de Estados intencionales--opuestos a percepciones, actos reflexivos y memorias--fueron descritas por primera vez claramente por Wittgenstein (W) en la década de 1930 y denominadas "inclinaciones" o "disposiciones". Se han denominado comúnmente "actitudes proposicionales" desde Russell, pero a menudo se ha observado que esta es una frase incorrecta o engañosa since creyendo, con la intención, sabiendo, recordando, etc., a menudo no son proposicionales ni actitudes, como se ha demostrado, por ejemplo, por W y por Searle (por ejemplo, cf Conciencia e Idioma P118). Las preferencias son las representaciones públicas intrínsecas y observadoras independientes (a diferencia de las presentaciones o representaciones del sistema 1 al sistema 2 – Searle-Consciencia e idioma p53). Son posibles actos desplazados en el tiempo o en el espacio, mientras que los recuerdos evolutivamente más primitivos de las percepciones S1 y las acciones reflexivas están siempre aquí y ahora. Esta es una manera de caracterizar el sistema 2-el segundo gran 27 avance en la psicología de los vertebrados después del sistema 1-la capacidad de representar (estado público de COS para) eventos y pensar en ellos como ocurriendo en otro lugar o tiempo (tercera Facultad de Searle de contrafactual imaginación que complementa la cognición y la volición). S1 ' pensamientos ' (mi T1-i. e., el uso de "pensar" para referirse a los procesos cerebrales automáticos del sistema uno) son Estados mentales potenciales o inconscientes de S1--Searle--Phil Issues 1:45-66 (1991). Las percepciones, los recuerdos y las acciones reflexivas (automáticas) pueden ser descritos por los principales LG (PLG-por ejemplo, veo el perro) y hay, en el caso normal, NO hay pruebas posibles para que puedan ser verdaderos-sólo-es decir, axiomáticos como yo prefiero o reflejos animales como W y DMS describen. Las disposiciones pueden sere descrita como secundaria de LG (SLG-por ejemplo, creo que veo el perro) y también debe ser actuado, incluso para mí en mi propio caso (es decir, ¿cómo puedo saber lo que creo, pensar, sentir hasta que actúo algún evento ocurrever mis comentarios de los libros bien conocidos en W por Johnston y Budd. Tenga en cuenta que las disposiciones se convierten en acciones cuando se habla o se escriben, así como se actúa de otras maneras, y estas ideas son todas debidas a Wittgenstein (mediados de 1930) y no son Behaviorismo (Hintikka & Hintikka 1981, Searle, hacker, Hutto, etc.,). Wittgenstein puede ser considerado como el fundador de la psicología evolutiva y su trabajo una investigación única del funcionamiento de nuestra psicología axiomática System 1 y su interacción con el sistema 2. Después de que Wittgenstein sentó las bases para la psicología descriptiva del pensamiento de orden superior en los libros azul y marrón a principios de los años 30, fue ampliado por John Searle, quien hizo una versión más simple de mi mesa aquí en su libro clásico racionalidad en acción (2001). Esta tabla se expande en El estudio de W de la estructura axiomática de la psicología evolutiva se desarrolló a partir de sus primeros comentarios en 1911 y tan bellamente establecidos en su última obra ' sobre la certeza ' (OC) (escrita en 1950-51). OC es la piedra fundacional de la conducta o epistemología y ontología (posiblemente la misma que la semántica y la pragmática), la lingüística cognitiva o el pensamiento de orden superior, y en mi opinión (compartido, por ejemplo, por DMS) el trabajo más importante en filosofía (descriptivo Psicología) y por lo tanto en el estudio de la conducta. La percepción, la memoria, las acciones reflexivas y la emoción son primitivos Estados mentales involuntarios parcialmente subcorticales, en los que la mente encaja automáticamente (presenta) el mundo (es causalmente auto reflexivo--Searle) -la incuestionable, verdadera-sólo, base axiomática de la racionalidad sobre la cual ningún control es posible. Preferencias, deseos e intenciones son descripciones de habilidades voluntarias conscientes de pensamiento lento - que se pueden describir en las SLG-en las que la mente intenta encajar (representar) el mundo. El Behaviorismo y todas las demás confusiones de nuestro Psicología descriptiva por defecto (filosofía) surge porque no podemos ver S1 trabajando y describir todas las acciones como las acciones deliberadas conscientes de S2 (La ilusión fenomenológica - TPI - Searle). W entendió esto y lo describió con una claridad inigualable con cientos de ejemplos de lenguaje (la mente) en acción a lo largo de sus obras. La razón tiene acceso a la memoria y por lo 28 que utilizamos conscientemente aparente pero a menudo incorrectas razones para explicar el comportamiento (los dos sí mismos o sistemas o procesos de investigación actual). Las creencias y otras disposiciones pueden describirse como pensamientos que intentan igualar los hechos del mundo (mente a la dirección mundial de ajuste), mientras que Volitions son intenciones de actuar (intenciones previas - PI, o intenciones en acción – IA Searle) más actos que intentan igualar al mundo a los pensamientos - de la dirección del mundo a la mente de ajuste - CF. Searle, por ejemplo, consciencia y lenguaje P145, 190). A veces hay lagunas en el razonamiento para llegar a la creencia y otras disposiciones. Las palabras de disposición se pueden usar como sustantivos que parecen describir los Estados mentales (' mi pensamiento es..."), o como verbos o adjetivos para describir habilidades (agentes que actúan o pueden actuar-' creo que...') y a menudo se denominan incorrectamente "actitudes proposicionales". Las percepciones se convierten en memorias y nuestros programas innatos (módulos cognitivos, plantillas, motores de inferencia de S1) los utilizan para producir disposiciones - (creer, conocer, entender, pensar, etc., -actos públicos reales o potenciales como el lenguaje (pensamiento, mente) también llamados inclinaciones, preferencias, capacidades, representaciones de S2) y Volition, Y no hay lenguaje (concepto, Pensé que De "Estados mentales privados" para pensar o desear (es decir, sin lenguaje privado, pensamiento o mente). Los animales más altos pueden pensar y actuarán y en esa medida tienen una psicología pública. PERCEPTIONS: (X es true): escuchar, ver, oler, dolor, tacto, temperatura MEMORIES: Recordando (X era verdad) PREFFERENCES, INCLINATIONS,DISPOSITIONS: (X podría convertirse en true): CLASE 1: PROPOSICIONAL (Verdadero o falso) ACTOS PÚBLICOS de creer, juzgar, pensar, representar, entender, elegir, decidir, preferir, interpretar, conocer (incluyendo habilidades y habilidades), asistir (aprender), experimentar, significado, recordar, yontender, considerando, deseando, esperando, deseando, queriendo, esperando (una clase especial), ver como (aspectos). CLASE 2: modo DESACOPLADO-(como si, condicional, hipotético, ficticio)-soñando, imaginando, mintiendo, prediciendo, dudado. CLASE 3: emociones: amar, odiar, temer, pesar, alegría, celos, depresión. Su función es modular las preferencias para aumentar la aptitud inclusiva (la utilidad máxima esperada) facilitando el procesamiento de la información de las percepciones y memorias para una acción rápida. Hay cierta separación entre las emociones S1 como la rabia y el miedo y S2 como el amor, el odio, el asco y la ira. Podemos pensar en ellos como deseos fuertemente sentida o actuado. 29 DESEOS: (quiero que X sea verdad - quiero Change el mundo para adaptarse a mis pensamientos): Anhelo, esperando, esperando, esperando, necesitando, requiriendo, obligado a hacer. INTENCIONES: (voy a hacer X true) con la intención. ACCIONES: (estoy haciendo X true): actuando, hablando, leyendo, escribiendo, calculando, persuadiendo, mostrando, demostrando, convincente, haciendo intento, tratando, riendo, jugando, comiendo, bebiendo, llorando, afirmando (describiendo, enseñando, predicando, Reportando), prometiendo, haciendo o usando mapas, libros, dibujos, programas de computadora – estos son públicos y voluntarios y transfieren información a otros para que dominen los reflejos inconscientes, involuntarios e sin informacion S1 en explicaciones de comportamiento ((La ilusión fenomenológica (TPI), la pizarra en blanco (BS) o el modelo de ciencias sociales estándar (SSSM)). Las palabras expresan acciones que tienen varias funciones en nuestra vida y no son los nombres de los objetos, ni de un solo tipo de evento. Las interacciones sociales de los seres humanos se rigen por módulos cognitivos - aproximadamente equivalentes a los guiones o esquemas de la psicología social (grupos de neuronas organizadas en motores de inferencia), que, con percepciones y recuerdos, conducen a la formación de preferencias que conducen a las intenciones y luego a las acciones. La intencionalidad o la psicología intencional pueden ser tomadas para ser todos estos procesos o sólo las preferencias que conducen a acciones y en el sentido más amplio es el tema de la psicología cognitiva o Neurociencias cognitivas cuando se incluye la neurofisiología, neuroquímica y Neurogenética. La psicología evolutiva puede ser considerada como el estudio de todas las funciones precedentes o del funcionamiento de los módulos que producen comportamiento, y es entonces coextenso en evolución, desarrollo y acción individual con preferencias, intenciones y acciones. Dado que los axiomas (algoritmos o módulos cognitivos) de nuestra psicología están en nuestros genes, podemos ampliar nuestra comprensión y aumentar nuestro poder dando Claro descripciones de cómo funcionan y pueden extenderla (cultura) a través de la biología, la psicología, la filosofía (psicología descriptiva), las matemáticas, la lógica, la física y los programas de computación, haciéndolos así más rápidos y eficientes. Hajek (2003) da un análisis de las disposiciones como probabilidades condicionales WHICH son algatizados por Rott (1999), Spohn, etc. La intencionalidad (psicología cognitiva o evolutiva) consiste en diversos aspectos de la conducta que se programan innatamente en módulos cognitivos que crean y requieren conciencia, voluntad y auto, y en adultos humanos normales casi todos excepto las percepciones y algunos recuerdos son contrarios, requieren actos públicos (por ejemplo, lenguaje), y nos comprometen a las relaciones con el fin de aumentar nuestra aptitud inclusiva (máxima utilidad esperada o maximización de la utilidad bayesiana). Sin embargo, el bayesianismo es altamente cuestionable debido a la grave subdeterminación es decir, puede ' explicar ' cualquier cosa y, por tanto, nada. Esto ocurre a través de la dominación y el altruismo recíproco, a menudo resultando en el deseo de razones independientes de acción (Searle)-que divido en DIRA1 y DIRA2 para 30 S1 y S2) e impone condiciones de satisfacción en condiciones de satisfacción (Searle) - (es decir, relaciona pensamientos con el mundo a través de actos públicos (movimientos musculares), produciendo matemáticas, lenguaje, arte, música, sexo, deportes, etc. Los fundamentos de esto fueron deducido por nuestro mayor psicólogo natural Ludwig Wittgenstein de la década de 1930 a 1951 pero con prefiguraciones claras de vuelta a 1911, y con refinamientos por muchos, pero sobre todo por John Searle a partir de la década de 1960. "El árbol General de los fenómenos psicológicos. No me esfuerzo por la exactitud, sino por una visión del todo. " RPP Vol 1 p895, CF. Z p464. Gran parte de la intencionalidad (por ejemplo, nuestros juegos de idiomas) admite títulos. Como observó W, las inclinaciones son a veces conscientes y deliberativos. Todas nuestras plantillas (funciones, conceptos, juegos de idiomas) tienen bordes difusos en algunos contextos, como deben ser útiles. Hay al menos dos tipos de pensamiento (es decir, dos juegos de idiomas o formas de usar la verbo disposicional ' pensar ') - no racional sin conciencia y racional con conciencia parcial (W), ahora descrito como el pensamiento rápido y lento de S1 y S2. Es útil considerarla como juegos de idiomas y no como meros fenómenos (W RPP Vol2 P129). Fenómenos mentales (nuestras "experiencias" subjetivas o internas) son epifenomenales, carecen de criterios, por lo tanto carecen de información incluso para uno mismo y por lo tanto no pueden desempeñar ningún papel en la comunicación, el pensamiento o la mente. Pensar como todas las disposiciones carece de cualquier prueba, no es un estado mental (a diferencia de las percepciones de S1), y no contiene ninguna información hasta que se convierta en un acto público o evento como en el habla, la escritura u otras contracciones musculares. Nuestras percepciones y memorias pueden tener información (es decir, un COS público) sólo cuando se manifiestan en acciones públicas, ya que sólo entonces piensan, sienten, etc. tienen algún significado (consecuencias) incluso para nosotros mismos. Memoria y percepción están integrados por los módulos en las disposiciones que se vuelven psicológicamente eficaces cuando se actúan sobre - i. e., S1 genera S2. El desarrollo del lenguaje significa manifestar la capacidad innata de los humanos avanzados para sustituir palabras (contracciones finas de los músculos orales o manuales) para (contracciones gruesas de los músculos de los brazos y las piernas). TOM (teoría de la mente) es mucho mejor llamado UA-comprensión de la agencia (mi término) y UA1 y los UA2 para tales funciones en S1 y S2-y también puede ser llamado Psicología evolutiva o intencionalidad-la producción innata programada genéticamente de la conciencia, sí mismo, y pensamiento que conduce a las intenciones y luego a las acciones mediante la contratación de los músculos-es., la comprensión es una disposición como el pensamiento y el conocimiento. Por lo tanto, "actitud proposicional" es un término incorrecto para la normal de S2D Deliberante (es decir, el funcionamiento deliberativo lento del sistema 2) o S2A automatizado (es decir, la conversión de las funciones del sistema 2 que se practican con frecuencia de voz y acción en automático funciones rápidas). Vemos que los esfuerzos de la ciencia cognitiva para entender el pensamiento, las emociones, etc. mediante el estudio de la neurofisiología no nos va a decir nada más sobre cómo funciona la mente (pensamiento, lenguaje) (en contraposición a cómo funciona el cerebro) de lo que ya 31 sabemos, porque "mente" (pensamiento, el lenguaje) ya está en plena vista pública (W). Cualquier ' fenómeno ' que esté oculto in Neurofisiología, bioquímica, la genética, la mecánica cuántica, o la teoría de cuerdas, son tan irrelevantes para nuestra vida social como el hecho de que una tabla está compuesta de átomos que "obedecen" (puede ser descrito por) las leyes de la física y la química es almorzar en ella. Como dijo W tan famoso "nada está oculto". Todo el interés sobre la mente (pensamiento, lenguaje) está abierto a ver si sólo examinamos cuidadosamente el funcionamiento del lenguaje. El lenguaje (mente, discurso público conectado a las acciones potenciales) fue evolucionado para facilitar la interacción social y por lo tanto la recolección de recursos, la supervivencia y la reproducción. Su gramática (es decir, la psicología evolutiva, la intencionalidad) funciona automáticamente y es extremadamente confusa cuando tratamos de analizarla. Esto ha sido explicado con frecuencia por hacker, DMS y muchos otros. Como W observó con innumerables ejemplos cuidadosamente declarados, las palabras y oraciones tienen múltiples usos dependiendo del contexto. Yo creo y como tengo papeles profundamente diferentes como creo y creo o creo y él cree. El uso en primera persona presente de los verbos inclinacionales como "creo" normalmente describe mi capacidad para predecir mis probables actos basados en el conocimiento (es decir, S2) pero también puede parecer (en contextos filosóficos) ser descriptivo de mi estado mental y por lo tanto no basado en conocimiento o información (W y ver mi reseña del libro de Hutto y Myin). En el antiguo sentido S1, no describe una verdad, sino que se hace realidad en el acto de decirlo--es decir, "Creo que está lloviendo" se hace realidad. Es decir, los verbos de disposición utilizados en la primera persona presente en el tiempo pueden ser causalmente auto-reflexivo-instancian a sí mismos, pero entonces no son testables (es decir, no T o F, no S2). Sin embargo tiempo pasado o futuro o uso en tercera persona--"Yo creía" o "él cree" o "él va a creer" contienen o pueden ser resolvada por la información que es verdadera o falsa, ya que describen los actos públicos que son o pueden volverse verificables. Del mismo modo, "Creo que está lloviendo" no tiene información aparte de acciones posteriores, incluso para mí, pero "Creo que lloverá" o "pensará que está lloviendo" son actos públicos potencialmente verificables desplazados en el espacio-tiempo que pretenden transmitir información (o información errónea). Palabras no reflectantes o no racionales (automáticas) habladas sin intención previa (que yo llamo S2A - i. e., S2D automatizado por la práctica) han sido llamados palabras como "Deeds" por W y luego por Daniele Moyal-Sharrock en su papel en Psicología filosófica en 2000). Muchos de los llamados Inclinaciones/disposiciones/preferencias/Tendencias/capacidades/habilidades son actitudes no proposicionales (no reflectantes) (mucho más útiles para llamarlas funciones o habilidades) del sistema 1 (Tversky Kahneman). Las intenciones previas son indicadas por Searle para ser Estados mentales y por lo tanto S1, pero una vez más creo que uno debe separar PI1 y PI2 ya que en nuestro lenguaje normal, nuestras intenciones anteriores son las deliberaciones conscientes de S2. Percepciones, 32 memorias, tipo 2 disposiciones (por ejemplo, algunas emociones) y muchos tipo 1 las disposiciones son mejor llamadas reflejos de S1 y son automático, no reflectante, no proposicional y no-attitudinal funcionamiento de las bisagras (axiomas, algoritmos) de nuestra Psicología evolutiva (Moyal-Sharrock después de Wittgenstein). Algunos de los principales exponentes de las ideas de W, a quienes considero una lectura esencial para una comprensión de la psicología descriptiva del pensamiento de orden superior son Coliva, Hutto, DMS, Stern, Horwich, Finkelstein y Read, quienes, como muchos eruditos ahora, han publicado la mayor parte de su trabajo (a menudo en forma de preimpresión) gratis en línea en Academia.edu, philpapers.org, ResearchGate.net, y otros sitios, y, por supuesto, los diligentes pueden encontrar Casi todo gratis en línea a través de torrents, P2P, libgen.IO, b-OK.org etc. Baker & hacker se encuentran en sus muchas obras conjuntas y en Hacker Página personal. El difunto Baker se fue por la borda con una extraña interpretación psicoanalítica y más bien nihilística que fue refutada por hacker, cuya "interpretación tardía de Wittgenstein" de Gordon Baker es una lectura obligada para cualquier estudiante de conducta. Uno puede encontrar infinitas vistas de dibujos animados metafísicos reduccionistas de la vida debido al intento de explicar el pensamiento de orden superior de S2 en términos del marco causal de S1, que Carruthers (C), Dennett, las tierras de las Churchlands (3 de los actuales líderes de civismo, computacionalismo o reduccionismo materialista-en adelante los CDC-mis siglas para los centros para el control de enfermedades filosóficas) y muchos otros persiguen. El Scientismo ha sido desdeñado con frecuencia comenzando con W en el BBB en los años 30 cuando observó que – "los filósofos ven constantemente el método de la ciencia ante sus ojos y son irresistiblemente tentados a preguntar y responder preguntas en la forma en que la ciencia lo hace. Esta tendencia es la verdadera fuente de metafísica y lleva al filósofo a una completa oscuridad "-y por Searle, Read, Hutto, hacker y muchos otros desde entonces. El intento de ' explicar ' (realmente sólo para describir como W dejó claro) S2 en términos causales es incoherente e incluso para S1 es extremadamente complejo y no está claro que los juegos de idiomas muy diversos de "causalidad" puede ser hecho para aplicar (como se ha señalado muchas veces) incluso su aplicación en la física y la química es variable y a menudo oscura (era la gravedad o la capa de abscisión o las hormonas o el viento o todos los que hicieron que la manzana cayera, ¿y cuándo se inician y terminan las causas)? Pero como dijo W - "ahora bien, si no son las conexiones causales que nos preocupan, entonces las actividades de la mente están abiertas ante nosotros". Sin embargo, Sugiero que es un gran error ver a W como tomar cualquier lado, como generalmente dijo, ya que sus puntos de vista son mucho más sutil, más a menudo que no dejar sus triálogos sin resolver. A uno le puede resultar útil para empezar con mis reseñas de W, S etc., y luego estudiar tanto de lectura, Hutto, Horwich, Coliva, hacker, Glock, DMS, Stern, etc. como sea factible antes de profundizar en la literatura de la causalidad y la filosofía de la ciencia, y si uno encuentra poco interesante para hacerlo entonces W ha golpeado la marca. 33 A pesar de los esfuerzos de W y otros, me parece que la mayoría de los filósofos tienen poca comprensión de la sutileza de los juegos de idiomas (por ejemplo, los usos drásticamente diferentes de ' yo sé lo que quiero decir ' y ' sé qué hora es '), o de la naturaleza de las disposiciones , y muchos (por ejemplo, los CDC) todavía basan sus ideas en nociones tales como el lenguaje privado, la introspección del "habla interna" y el computacionalismo, que W puso a descansar 3/4 de un siglo atrás. Antes de leer un libro, Voy al índice y a la bibliografía para ver a quién citan. A menudo el logro más notable de los autores es la omisión completa o casi completa de todos los autores que cito aquí. W es fácilmente el filósofo moderno más ampliamente discutido con acerca de un nuevo libro y docenas de artículos en gran parte o un dedicado a él cada mes. Tiene su propio diario "Investigaciones filosóficas" y espero que su bibliografía supere la de los próximos 4 o 5 filósofos combinados. Searle es quizás el siguiente entre los modernos (y el único con muchas conferencias en YouTube, Vimeo, sitios de la Universidad, etc.) más de 100, que, a diferencia de casi todas las otras conferencias de filosofía, son una delicia para escuchar) y Hutto, Coliva, DMS, hacker, Leer, etc., son muy prominentes con docenas de libros y cientos de artículos, charlas y reseñas. Pero los CDC y otros metafísicos los ignoran y los miles que consideran su trabajo como de importancia crítica. En consecuencia, el potente marco W/S (así como por grandes Como la de la investigación moderna en el pensamiento) está totalmente ausente y todas las confusiones que tiene despejados son abundantes. Si lees mis comentarios y las obras ellos mismos, Espero su visión de la mayoría de los escritos en esta arena puede ser muy diferente de los suyos. Pero como insistió W, uno tiene que trabajar los ejemplos a través de uno mismo. Como se observó a menudo, sus triálogos Super-Socráticos tenían una intención terapéutica. Los argumentos definitivos de W contra la introspección y el lenguaje privado se observan en mis otras reseñas y son muy conocidos. Básicamente, son tan simples como el pastel, debemos tener una prueba para diferenciar entre A y B y las pruebas solo pueden ser externas y públicas. El famoso ilustró esto con el escarabajo en la caja. Si todos tenemos una caja que no se puede abrir ni rayos x, etc. y llamar a lo que está dentro de un ' escarabajo ', entonces ' escarabajo ' no puede tener ningún papel en el lenguaje, para cada caja podría contener una cosa diferente o incluso estar vacío. Por lo tanto, no hay un lenguaje privado que sólo yo pueda saber y ninguna introspección de ' discurso interno '. Si X no es públicamente demostrable no puede ser una palabra en nuestro idioma. Esto dispara la teoría de la ISA de Carruther, así como todas las otras teorías de "sentido interno" que él hace referencia. He explicado el desmantelamiento de W de la noción de introspección y el funcionamiento del lenguaje disposicional ("actitudes proposicionales") por encima y en mis reseñas de Budd, Johnston y varios de los libros de Searle. Véase la de Stern "Wittgenstein Investigaciones filosóficas de" (2004) para una buena explicación del idioma privado und todo por Read et al para llegar a las raíces de estos problemas como pocos lo hacen. 34 Los CDC evitan el uso de "yo", ya que asume la existencia de un "yo superior". Pero, el mismo acto de escribir, leer y todo el lenguaje y los conceptos (juegos de idiomas) presuponen el yo, la conciencia y la voluntad, por lo que tales relatos son caricaturas autocontradictorias de la vida sin ningún tipo de valor (y cero impacto en la vida cotidiana de cualquier persona). W/S y otros han señalado desde hace mucho tiempo que el punto de vista de primera persona no es inteligiblemente eliminable o reducible a una 3a persona, pero la ausencia de coherencia no es un problema para las vistas de dibujos animados de la vida. de la misma manera, con la descripción de la función cerebral o el comportamiento como ' computacional ', ' procesamiento de la información ', etc., -bien desacreditado innumerables veces por W/S, Hutto, Read, hacker y muchos otros. Escribir que intenta combinar la ciencia con la filosofía, con el significado de muchos términos clave que varían casi al azar sin conciencia, es esquizoide y desesperanzador, pero hay miles de libros de ciencia y filosofía como este. Hay la descripción (no la explicación como W dejó claro) de nuestro comportamiento y luego los experimentos de la psicología cognitiva. Muchos de estos que tratan con el comportamiento humano combinan el pensamiento consciente de S2 con los automatismos inconscientes de S1 (absorber la psicología en fisiología). A menudo se nos dice que el yo, la voluntad y la conciencia son ilusiones, ya que piensan que nos están mostrando el significado ' real ' de estos términos, y que el uso de dibujos animados es el válido. ese es, S2 es ' irreal ' y debe ser subsumido por las descripciones causales científicas de S1. por lo tanto a razón para el cambio de la filosofía del lenguaje a la filosofía de la mente. Véase, por ejemplo, mi reseña de la reciente ' la opacidad de la mente ' de Carruthers. Incluso Searle es un delincuente frecuente aquí como se señala por hacker, Bennet y hacker, DMS, Coliva etc. Si alguien dice que no puedo elegir qué comer para almorzar él está claramente equivocado, o si por elección quiere decir otra cosa como esa ' elección ' puede describirse como tener una ' causa ' o que no está claro cómo reducir ' elección ' a ' causa ' por lo que debemos considerarla como ilusoria , entonces eso es trivialmente cierto (o incoherente), pero irrelevante para la forma en que utilizamos el lenguaje y cómo vivimos, que debe considerarse como el punto desde el que comenzar y poner fin a tales discusiones. Tal vez uno podría considerar relevante que era W, junto con Kant y Nietzsche (grandes intelectos, pero ninguno de ellos haciendo mucho para disolver los problemas de la filosofía), que fueron votados el mejor de todos los tiempos por los filósofos-no Quine, Dummett, Putnam, Kripke o CDC. Uno puede ver la similitud en todas las preguntas filosóficas (en el sentido estricto que considero aquí, teniendo en cuenta el comentario de W que no todo con la aparición de una pregunta es uno). Queremos entender cómo el cerebro (o el universo) lo hace, pero S2 no es hasta él. Es todo (o mayormente) en las maquinaciones inconscientes de S1 a través del ADN. Nosotros no ' sabemos ', pero nuestro ADN lo hace, cortesía de la muerte de incontables billones de organismos en unos 3 mil millones años. Podemos 35 describir el mundo fácilmente pero a menudo no podemos estar de acuerdo sobre cómo debería ser una ' explicación '. así que, luchamos con la ciencia y describimos cada vez tan lentamente los mecanismos de la mente. Aunque debamosen el conocimiento "completo" de el cerebro, todavía tendríamos una descripción de qué patrón neuronals corresponden a ver rojo, pero no está claro lo que significaría (COS) tener una "explicación" de por qué es rojo (es decir, por qué Qualia existe). Como dijo W, las explicaciones llegan a su fin en alguna parte. Para aquellos que entienden lo anterior, las partes filosóficas de la "opacidad de la mente" de Carruthers (una importante obra reciente de la escuela de los CDC) están compuestas en gran parte de las confusiones estándar que resultan de ignorar el trabajo de W, S y cientos de otros. Puede llamarse civismo o reduccionismo y niega la "realidad" de nuestro pensamiento de orden superior, voluntad, sí mismo y conciencia, excepto porque se les da un uso bastante diferente y totalmente incompatible en la ciencia. Tenemos, por ejemplo, no hay razones para la acción, sólo un cerebro que causa acción, etc. Crean problemas imaginarios al tratar de responder a preguntas que no tienen un sentido claro. Debería darnos la razón de que estas opiniones no tienen absolutamente ningún impacto en la vida cotidiana de quienes pasan la mayor parte de su vida adulta promoviéndolos. Esta situación está muy bien resumida por Rupert Read en su artículo ' el difícil problema de la conciencia ' - "el problema hardcore se vuelve más y más remoto, cuanto más deshumanizamos aspectos de la mente, como la información y la percepción y la intencionalidad. El problema sólo se afrontará realmente si nos enfrentamos a él como un "problema" que tiene que ver con seres humanos enteros, encarnados en un contexto (inextricablemente natural y social) en un momento dado, etc. entonces puede volverse perspicuo a uno que no hay ningún problema. Sólo cuando uno comienza, digamos, a "teorizar" la información a través de los dominios humanos y no humanos (supuestamente utilizando el no-humano-el animal {por lo general se piensa en como mecánico} o la máquina-como paradigma de uno, y por lo tanto conseguir las cosas de nuevo al frente), ¿empieza a verse como Si hay un problema... que todos los ' ismos ' (Cognitivismo, reduccionismo (al cerebro), Behaviorismo y así sucesivamente)... empujar más y más lejos de nuestro alcance... la conceptualización del problema es la misma cosa que asegura que el ' problema duro ' sigue siendo insoluble... nunca se nos ha dado una buena razón para pensar que debe haber una ciencia de algo que se considere real. No hay una buena razón para pensar que debe haber una ciencia de la conciencia, o de la mente o de la sociedad, más de lo que necesita ser una ciencia de los números, o de los universos o de las capitales o de los juegos o de las constelaciones o de los objetos cuyos nombres comienzan con la letra ' b '.... Tenemos que empezar con la idea de nosotros mismos como personas encarnadas actuando en un mundo, no con la idea de nosotros mismos como cerebros con mentes ' localizadas ' en ellos o ' apegados ' a ellos... No hay forma de que la ciencia pueda ayudarnos a arrancar en una cuenta ' externa '/' objetiva ' de lo que realmente es la conciencia y cuando está realmente presente. Porque no nos puede ayudar cuando hay un conflicto de criterios, cuando nuestras máquinas entran en conflicto con nosotros mismos, en conflicto con nosotras. Para nuestras máquinas sólo son 36 calibrados por nuestros informes en primer lugar. No puede haber tal cosa como conseguir un punto de vista externo... eso no es porque... el difícil problema es insoluble,... Más bien, no tenemos que admitir que un problema se ha definido incluso... ' naturalismo trascendental '... Garantiza... mantener vivo indefinidamente el problema. Ofrece la extraordinaria satisfacción psicológica de una declaración "científica" humilde (pero privilegiada) de límites a la comprensión y, el conocimiento de parte de una élite privilegiada, que al declarar esos límites, puede ver más allá de ellos. No ve lo que Wittgenstein dejó claro en el prefacio del Tractatus. El límite puede... sólo se dibuja en el idioma y lo que está en el otro lado del límite será simplemente absurdo. " Muchos de los comentarios de W vienen a la mente. Señaló que 88 hace años que los ' misterios ' satisfacen el anhelo de lo trascendente, y porque pensamos que podemos ver los ' límites de la comprensión humana ', pensamos que también podemos ver más allá de ellos, y que debemos insistir en el hecho de que vemos los límites del lenguaje (mente) en el hecho de que CA no describir los hechos que corresponden a una frase excepto por repitiendo la frase (ver P10, etc. en su cultura y valor, escrito en 1931). También me resulta útil repetir con frecuencia su comentario de que "la superstición no es más que creencia en el nexo causal" --escrito hace un siglo en TLP 5,1361. Además, a propósito es su famoso comentario (PI p308) sobre el origen de los problemas filosóficos sobre los procesos mentales (y todos los problemas filosóficos). "¿Cómo surge el problema filosófico sobre los procesos mentales y los Estados y sobre el Behaviorismo? El primer paso es el que se escapa por completo del aviso. Hablamos de procesos y Estados y dejamos su naturaleza indeciso. En algún momento tal vez sabremos más sobre ellos-pensamos. Pero eso es justo lo que nos compromete a una forma particular de ver el asunto. Porque tenemos un concepto definido de lo que significa aprender a conocer mejor un proceso. (El movimiento decisivo en el truco de conjurar se ha hecho, y fue el mismo que pensamos bastante inocente.) --Y ahora la analogía que nos hizo entender nuestros pensamientos cae en pedazos. Por lo tanto, tenemos que negar el proceso aún sin comprender en el medio aún inexplorado. Y ahora parece como si hubiéramos negado los procesos mentales. Y naturalmente no queremos negarlos. " Otro comentario aparentemente trivial de W (PI P271) nos pidió que imaginemos a una persona que olvidó lo que significaba la palabra "dolor", pero la usó correctamente, es decir, la usó como lo hacemos nosotros! También es relevante el comentario de W (TLP 6,52) que cuando todas las preguntas científicas han sido contestadas, nada queda por cuestionar, y esa es la respuesta. Y central para entender los fracasos científicos (es decir, debido al civismo, no a la ciencia) de los CDC et al es su observación de que es un error muy común pensar que algo tiene que hacernos hacer lo que hacemos, lo que conduce a la confusión entre la causa y la razón. "Y el error que aquí y en mil casos similares están inclinados a hacer está etiquetado por la palabra" hacer "como lo hemos usado en la frase" no es un acto de perspicacia que nos hace usar la regla como lo hacemos ", porque hay una idea de que "algo debe hacernos" hacer lo que hacemos. Y esto de nuevo se une a la confusión entre la causa 37 y la razón. No necesitamos tener ninguna razón para seguir la regla como nosotros. La cadena de razones tiene un fin. " BBB p143 También ha comentado que la cadena de causas tiene un fin y que no hay ninguna razón en el caso general para que sea significativa para especificar una causa. W vio en sus propias décadas de lucha la necesidad de aclarar ' gramática ' a sí mismo mediante el trabajo de ' ejemplos perspicuo ' y la futilidad para muchos de ser contadas las respuestas. De ahí sus famosos comentarios sobre la filosofía como terapia y ' trabajando en uno mismo '. Otra cosa llamativa de tantos libros de filosofía (y la filosofía disfrazada a través de las Ciencias del comportamiento, la física y las matemáticas) es que a menudo no hay indicios de que haya otros puntos de vista, que muchos de los filósofos más destacados consideran que la visión científica es incoherente. También hay thecho (raramente mencionado) que, por supuesto que ignoramos su incoherencia, la reducción no se detiene en el nivel de la neurofisiología, pero puede extenderse fácilmente (y a menudo ha sido) al nivel de la química, la física, la mecánica cuántica, las ' matemáticas ' o simplemente ' ideas '. ¿Qué debe hacer exactamente la neurofisiología privilegiada? Los antiguos griegos generaron la idea de que nada existe, pero las ideas y Leibniz famoso describieron el universo como una máquina gigante. Más recientemente, Stephan Wolfram se convirtió en una leyenda en la historia de la pseudociencia para su descripción del universo como un autómata informático en ' un nuevo tipo de ciencia '. El materialismo, el mecanismo, el idealismo, el reduccionismo, el Behaviorismo y el dualismo en sus muchas formas son apenas noticias y, para un Wittgensteinian, caballos bastante muertos desde que W dictó los libros azul y marrón en los años 30, o al menos desde la publicación posterior y extenso comentario sobre su nachlass. Pero convencer a alguien es una tarea desesperada. W se dio cuenta de que uno tiene que trabajar en uno mismo - la autoterapia a través de largo trabajo duro a través de ' ejemplos perspicuos ' del lenguaje (mente) en acción. Una expresión (sin saber) de cómo las reglas de la psicología axiomática, y lo fácil que es cambiar el uso de una palabra sin saberlo, fue dada por el físico Sir James jeans hace mucho tiempo: "el universo comienza a lucir más como un gran pensamiento que como una gran máquina." Pero ' pensamiento ', ' máquina ', ' tiempo ', ' espacio ', ' causa ', ' evento ', ' suceder ', ' ocurren ', ' continúan ', etc. no tienen los mismos significados (usos) en ciencia o filosofía que en la vida cotidiana, o más bien tienen los viejos usos mezclados al azar con muchos nuevos, por lo que existe la apariencia de sentido sin sentido. Gran parte de la discusión académica sobre el comportamiento, la vida y el universo es una alta comedia (a diferencia de la baja comedia de la mayoría de la política, la religión y los medios de comunicación): es decir, "la comedia trata con la sociedad educada, caracterizada por un diálogo sofisticado y ingenioso y una trama intrincada"- (Dictionary.com). pero la filosofía no es una pérdida de tiempo--hecha con razón, es la mejor manera de pasar el tiempo. ¿De qué otra manera podemos disipar el caos en las Ciencias del comportamiento o describir nuestra vida mental y el pensamiento de orden superior del sistema 2-la cosa más intrincada, maravillosa y misteriosa que hay? 38 Teniendo en cuenta este marco, debe ser fácil entender OC, seguir los ejemplos de W describiendo cómo nuestra psicología innata utiliza la prueba de realidad del sistema 2 para construir sobre las certezas del sistema 1, de modo que nosotros como individuos y como sociedades adquirimos una visión mundial de experiencias de entrelazamiento irrefutables que construyen sobre la base de nuestra percepción reflexiva axiomática genéticamente programada y la acción para el increíble edificio de la ciencia y la cultura. La teoría de la evolución y la teoría de la relatividad pasaron hace mucho tiempo de algo que podría ser desafiado a certezas que sólo pueden ser modificados, y en el otro final del espectro, no hay posibilidad de descubrir que no hay cosas como París o brontosaurios. La opinión escéptica es incoherente. Podemos decir cualquier cosa, pero no podemos significar nada. Por lo tanto, con DMS, veo OC como una descripción de la piedra fundacional de la comprensión humana y el documento más básico sobre nuestra psicología. Aunque escrito cuando en sus años 60, mentalmente y físicamente devastado por el cáncer, es tan brillante como su otro trabajo y transforma nuestra comprensión de la filosofía (la psicología descriptiva del pensamiento de orden superior), trayendo al final a la luz, después de tres mil años en la cueva. La metafísica ha sido arrastrada lejos de la filosofía y de la física. "¿Qué tipo de progreso es este-el fascinante misterio ha sido removido-sin embargo, no hay profundidades se han caído en la consolación; nada ha sido explicado, descubierto o reconcebido. Cuán dócil y poco inspirador podría pensar. Pero tal vez, como sugiere Wittgenstein, las virtudes de la claridad, la desmitificación y la verdad deben encontrarse lo suficientemente satisfactoria "--Horwich ' ' Metafilosofía de Wittgenstein '. Permítanme sugerir que con la perspectiva que he animado aquí, W está en el centro de la filosofía y la psicología contemporánea y no es oscura, difícil o irrelevante, pero centelleante, profunda y cristalina y que para extrañarlo es perderse uno de los mayores Aventuras intelectuales posibles. Un excelente trabajo reciente que muestra muchas de las confusiones filosóficas en un libro putativamente sobre la ciencia y las matemáticas es ' los límites exteriores de la razón de Yanofsky: lo que la ciencia, las matemáticas y la lógica no nos puede decir ' (2013) (ver mi opinión). W señaló que cuando llegamos al final de los comentarios científicos, el problema se convierte en una filosofía filosófica es decir, uno de cómo el lenguaje se puede utilizar de forma inteligible. Yanofsky, como virtualmente todos los científicos y la mayoría de los filósofos, no consigue que haya dos tipos distintos de "preguntas" o "afirmaciones" (es decir, juegos de idiomas o de LG) aquí. Hay aquellos que son asuntos de hecho acerca de cómo es el mundo, es decir, son públicamente observables proposicionales (verdadero o falso) Estados de asuntos que tienen significados claros (condiciones de satisfacción-COS en la terminología de Searle)- es decir, declaraciones científicas, y 39 luego están las que son cuestiones acerca de cómo el lenguaje se puede utilizar coherentemente para describir estos Estados de asuntos, y estos pueden ser contestadas por cualquier persona sana, inteligente, alfabetizada con poco o ningún recurso a los hechos de la ciencia. Otro hecho poco entendido pero crítico es que, aunque el pensamiento, representando, infiriendo, comprendiendo, intuando, etc. (es decir, la psicología disposicional) de un verdadero o falso declaración es una función de la cognición de orden superior de nuestro sistema lento y consciente 2 (S2), la decisión de si las "partículas" están entrelazadas, la estrella muestra un cambio rojo, un teorema ha sido probado (es decir, la parte que implica ver que los símbolos se utilizan correctamente en cada línea de la prueba), se hace siempre por el sistema rápido, automático, inconsciente 1 (S1) vía ver, oír, tocar etc. en el cual no hay procesamiento de la información, ninguna representación (es decir, ningún COS) y ninguna decisión en el sentido en el cual éstos ocurren en S2 (que recibe sus entradas de S1). Este enfoque de dos sistemas es ahora la forma estándar de ver el razonamiento o la racionalidad y es una heurística crucial en la descripción del comportamiento, de la que la ciencia, las matemáticas y la filosofía son casos especiales. Hay una literatura enorme y en rápido crecimiento sobre el razonamiento que es indispensable para el estudio de la conducta o la ciencia. Un libro reciente que se inserta en los detalles de cómo realmente razonar (es decir, utilizar el lenguaje para llevar a cabo acciones-ver W, DMS, hacker, S etc.) es ' razonamiento humano y ciencia cognitiva ' por Stenning y van Lambalgen (2008), que, a pesar de sus limitaciones (por ejemplo, limitado comprensión de la W/S y la estructura amplia de la psicología intencional), es (a partir de 2019) la mejor fuente única que conozco. W escribió mucho sobre la filosofía de las matemáticas, ya que ilustró claramente muchos de los tipos de confusiones generadas por los juegos de idiomas "científicos", y ha habido innumerables comentarios, muchos bastante pobres. Voy a comentar sobre algunos de los mejores trabajos recientes, ya que es criado por Yanofsky. Francisco Berto ha hecho algunos comentarios penetrantes recientemente. Señala que W negó la coherencia de la metamatemática es decir, el uso por parte de Godel de un metateorema para probar su teorema, probablemente que representa su interpretación "notoria" del teorema de Godel como una paradoja, y si aceptamos su argumento, creo que nos vemos obligados a negar la inteligibilidad de los metalangulos, metateorías y meta Algo más. ¿Cómo puede ser que tales conceptos (palabras, juegos de idiomas) como metamatemático e incomplecortesía, aceptada por millones (e incluso reclamados por no menos de Penrose, Hawking, Dyson et al para revelar verdades fundamentales sobre nuestra mente o el universo) son simples malentendidos acerca de cómo funciona el lenguaje? ¿No es la prueba en este pudin que, como tantas nociones filosóficas "reveladoras" (por ejemplo, la mente y la voluntad como ilusiones-Dennett, Carruthers, las Churchlands etc.), no tienen ningún impacto práctico en absoluto? Berto lo resume muy bien: "dentro de este marco, no es posible que la misma frase... resulta ser expresable, pero indescifrable, en un sistema formal... y demostrablemente cierto (bajo la hipótesis de coherencia antes mencionada) en un sistema diferente (el 40 meta-sistema). Si, como mantuvo Wittgenstein, la prueba establece el significado mismo de la sentencia probada, entonces no es posible que la misma frase (es decir, una frase con el mismo significado) sea indescifrable en un sistema formal, sino que se decida en un sistema diferente (el meta-sistema) ... Wittgenstein tuvo que rechazar tanto la idea de que un sistema formal puede estar incompleto sintácticamente, como la consecuencia platónica de que ningún sistema formal que demuestre sólo verdades aritméticas puede probar todas las verdades aritméticas. Si las pruebas establecen el significado de las oraciones aritméticas, entonces no puede haber sistemas incompletos, así como no puede haber significados incompletos. " Y además "aritméticos incoherentes, es decir, aritméticos no clásicos basados en una lógica paraconsistente, son hoy en día una realidad. Lo que es más importante, las características teóricas de tales teorías coinciden con precisión con algunas de las mencionadas Intuiciones de Wittgensteinian... Su incongruencia les permite también escapar del primer teorema de Godel, y del resultado de la indecisión de la iglesia: son, es decir, demostrablemente completos y decisibles. Por lo tanto, cumplen precisamente la solicitud de Wittgenstein, según la cual no puede haber problemas matemáticos que puedan formularse de manera significativa en el sistema, pero que las normas del sistema no pueden decidir. Por lo tanto, la decifrabilidad de la aritmética paraconsistente TICs armoniza con una opinión que Wittgenstein mantuvo en su carrera filosófica. " W también demostró el error fatal en relación con las matemáticas o el lenguaje o nuestro comportamiento en general como un sistema lógico coherente unitario, en lugar de como un variopinto de piezas ensambladas por los procesos aleatorios de selección natural. "Godel nos muestra un poco de claridad en el concepto de ' matemáticas ', que se indica por el hecho de que las matemáticas se toman como un sistema" y podemos decir (contra casi todo el mundo) que es todo lo que Godel y Gregory Chaitin muestran. W comentó muchas veces que la ' verdad ' en matemáticas significa axiomas o teoremas derivados de axiomas, y ' falso ' significa que uno cometió un error en el uso de las definiciones, y esto es completamente diferente frOM asuntos empíricos donde uno aplica una prueba. W a menudo señaló que para ser aceptable como matemáticas en el sentido habitual, debe ser utilizable en otras pruebas y debe tener aplicaciones del mundo real, pero tampoco es el caso con la incompletitud de Godel. Puesto que no se puede probar en un sistema consistente (aquí la aritmética de Peano pero una arena mucho más amplia para Chaitin), no se puede utilizar en pruebas y, a diferencia de todo el ' resto ' de PA, no se puede utilizar en el mundo real cualquiera de los dos. Como señala Victor Rodych "... Wittgenstein sostiene que un cálculo formal es sólo un cálculo matemático (es decir, un juego de lenguaje matemático) si tiene una aplicación extra-sistémica en un sistema de proposiciones contingentes (por ejemplo, en el conteo ordinario y la medición o en la física) ..." Otra manera de decir esto es que uno necesita una orden para aplicar nuestro uso normal de palabras como ' prueba ', ' proposición ', ' verdadero ', ' incompleto ', ' número ', y ' matemáticas ' a un resultado en la maraña de juegos creados con ' números ' y ' más ' y ' menos ' signos, etc., y con ' Incompletitud ' esta orden carece. Rodych lo resume admirablemente. "En la cuenta de Wittgenstein, no existe tal cosa como un cálculo matemático incompleto porque ' en matemáticas, todo es algoritmo [y sintaxis] y nada 41 es significado [semántica]... " W tiene mucho lo mismo que decir de la Diagonalización de cantor y la teoría del conjunto. "La consideración del procedimiento diagonal le hace pensar que el concepto de ' número real ' tiene mucho menos analogía con el concepto ' número cardinal ' que nosotros, siendo engañados por ciertas analogías, que se inclinan a creer" y muchos otros comentarios (véase Rodych y Floyd). Una de las principales omisiones de todos estos libros es el increíble trabajo del físico polimatemático y teórico de la decisión David Wolpert, que demostró algunos teoremas sorprendentes de imposibilidad o incompletos (1992 a 2008 Ver arXiv.org) en los límites de la inferencia (cálculo) que son tan generales que son independientes del dispositivo de hacer el cálculo, e incluso independiente de las leyes de la física, por lo que se aplican a través de los ordenadores, la física y el comportamiento humano, que resumió por lo tanto : "Uno no puede construir un ordenador físico que pueda estar seguro de procesar correctamente la información más rápido que el universo. Los resultados también significan que no puede existir un aparato de observación infalible y de propósito general, y que no puede haber un aparato de control infalible y de propósito general. Estos resultados no se basan en sistemas que son infinitos, y/o no clásicos, y/o obedecen dinámicas caóticas. También se encuentran incluso si uno utiliza una computadora infinitamente rápida e infinitamente densa, con potencias computacionales mayores que las de una máquina de Turing. " También publicó lo que parece ser el primer trabajo serio sobre el equipo o la inteligencia colectiva (COIN) que dice que pone este tema en una sólida base científica. Aunque ha publicado varias versiones de Estas más de dos décadas en algunos de las revistas de física revisadas por pares más prestigiosas (por ejemplo, Physica D 237:257-81 (2008)), así como en revistas de la NASA, y ha recibido noticias en revistas científicas importantes, pocas parecen haber notado y he mirado en docenas de libros recientes sobre física, matemáticas, teoría de decisiones y computación sin encontrar una referencia. Es muy lamentable que Yanofsky y otros no tengan conciencia de Wolpert, ya que su trabajo es la última extensión de la computación, el pensamiento, la inferencia, la incompletitud y la indecisión, que logra (como muchas pruebas en la teoría de la máquina de Turing) por extendiendo la paradoja mentirosa y la Diagonalización de cantor para incluir todos los universos posibles y todos los seres o mecanismos y por lo tanto puede ser visto como la última palabra no sólo en la computación, sino en la cosmología o incluso deidades. Él logra esta generalidad extrema mediante la partición del universo inferir utilizando las líneas del mundo (es decir, en términos de lo que hace y no cómo lo hace) para que sus pruebas matemáticas son independientes de cualquier ley física particular o estructuras computacionales en estableciendo los límites físicos de la inferencia para el pasado, presente y futuro y todos los cálculos posibles, la observación y control. Señala que incluso en un universo clásico Laplace estaba equivocado sobre ser capaz de predecir perfectamente el futuro (o incluso perfectamente representar el pasado o el presente) y que sus resultados de imposibilidad pueden ser vistos como un "principio de incertidumbre mecánica no cuántica" (es decir, no puede haber un dispositivo de observación o control infalible). 42 Cualquier dispositivo físico universal debe ser infinito, sólo puede ser en un momento en el tiempo, y ninguna realidad puede tener más de uno (el "Teorema del monoteísmo"). Dado que el espacio y el tiempo no aparecen en la definición, el dispositivo puede incluso ser todo el universo a través de todos los tiempos. Se puede ver como un análogo físico de incompleto con dos dispositivos de inferencia en lugar de un dispositivo autorreferencial. Como él dice, "o bien el hamiltoniano de nuestro universo proscribe un cierto tipo de cálculo, o la complejidad de la predicción es única (a diferencia de la complejidad de la información algorítmica) en que hay una y sólo una versión de la misma que puede ser aplicable a lo largo de nuestro universo. " Otra manera de decir esto es que uno no puede tener dos dispositivos de inferencia física (computadoras) tanto capaces de hacerse preguntas arbitrarias sobre la salida de la otra, o que el universo no puede contener una computadora a la que se puede plantear cualquier cálculo arbitrario tarea, o que para cualquier par de motores de inferencia física, siempre hay preguntas de valor binario sobre el estado del universo que ni siquiera puede ser planteada a al menos uno de ellos. No se puede crear un equipo que pueda predecir una condición futura arbitraria de un sistema físico antes de que ocurra, incluso si la condición es de un conjunto restringido de tareas que pueden ser planteadas a él, es decir, no puede procesar información (aunque esta es una frase molesta como S y re anuncio y otros la nota) más rápido que el universo. El ordenador y el sistema físico arbitrario que se está calculando no tienen que estar físicamente acoplados y se mantiene independientemente de las leyes de la física, el caos, la mecánica cuántica, la causalidad o conos de luz e incluso para una velocidad infinita de la luz. El dispositivo de inferencia no tiene que estar localizado espacialmente, pero puede ser procesos dinámicos no locales que ocurren en todo el universo. Él es muy consciente de que esto pone las especulaciones de Wolfram, Landauer, Fredkin, Lloyd etc., concerniente a tél universo como computadora o el límites de "procesamiento de la información", en una nueva luz (aunque los índices de sus escritos no hacen referencia a él y otra omisión notable es que ninguno de los anteriores son mencionados por Yanofsky tampoco). Wolpert dice que muestra que el universo no puede contener un dispositivo de inferencia que pueda procesar la información tan rápido como pueda, y puesto que muestra que no puede tener una memoria perfecta ni un control perfecto, su estado pasado, presente o futuro nunca puede ser perfectamente o completamente representado, caracterizado, conocido o copiado. También demostró que ninguna combinación de computadoras con códigos de corrección de errores puede superar estas limitaciones. Wolpert también señala la importancia crítica del observador ("el mentiroso") y esto nos conecta a los enigmas familiares de la física, Matemáticas y el lenguaje que conciernen a Yanofsky. De nuevo CF. Floyd en W: "Él está articulando en otras palabras una forma generalizada de la diagonalización. Por lo tanto, el argumento es generalmente aplicable, no sólo a las expansiones decimales, sino a cualquier supuesta enumeración o expresión gobernada por la regla de ellos; no depende de ningún dispositivo notacional en particular ni de las disposiciones espaciales preferidas de los signos. En ese sentido, el argumento de Wittgenstein no apela a ninguna imagen y no es esencialmente esquemático o representacional, 43 aunque puede ser diagramada y en la medida en que es un argumento lógico, su lógica puede ser representada formalmente). Al igual que los argumentos de Turing, está libre de un vínculo directo con cualquier formalismo en particular. [Los paralelos a Wolpert son obvios.] A diferencia de los argumentos de Turing, invoca explícitamente la noción de un juego de idiomas y se aplica a (y presupone) una concepción cotidiana de las nociones de las reglas y de los humanos que las siguen. Cada línea en la presentación diagonal anterior se concibe como una instrucción o un comando, análogo a una orden dada a un ser humano... " Debe ser obvio cómo el trabajo de Wolpert es una ilustración perfecta de las ideas de W de los temas separados de la ciencia o las matemáticas y los de la filosofía (juegos de idiomas). Yanofsky tampoco aclara la superposición principal que ahora existe (y se expande rápidamente) entre los teóricos del juego, los físicos, los economistas, los matemáticos, los filósofos, los teóricos de las decisiones y otros, todos los cuales han estado publicando durante décadas estrechamente pruebas conexas de indecisión, imposibilidad, ininformatibilidad e incompletitud. Una de las más extrañas es la reciente prueba de Armando Assis de que en la formulación relativa del estado de Quantum mecánicos uno puede configurar un cero-juego de suma entre el universo y un observador usando el equilibrio de Nash, del cual siguen la regla del Born y el colapso de la función de onda. Godel fue el primero en demostrar un resultado imposible, y (hasta los extraordinarios papeles de David Wolpert - ver Aquí y mi artículo de revisión) es el más largo alcance (o simplemente TRIVIAL/incoherente), pero hay sido una avalancha de otros. Uno de los primeros en la teoría de la decisión fue el famoso teorema de imposibilidad general (GIT) descubierto por Kenneth Arrow en 1951 (por lo que obtuvo el Premio Nobel de economía en 1972-y cinco de sus estudiantes son ahora premios Nobel por lo que esto no es ciencia marginal). Afirma que no existe un sistema de votación razonablemente consistente y equitativo (es decir, ningún método para agregar las preferencias de las personas a las preferencias del grupo) puede dar resultados sensatos. El grupo está dominado por una persona, por lo que a menudo GIT es llamado el "teorema dictador", o hay preferencias intransigtivas. El papel original de Arrow se tituló "una dificultad en el concepto de bienestar social" y se puede señalar así: "yot es imposible formular un social preorden de referencia que satisface todas las condiciones siguientes: no dictadura; Soberanía individual; Unanimidad Libertad de alternativas irrelevantes; Singularidad del rango de grupo. " Aquellos familiarizados con la teoría de la decisión moderna aceptan esto y el muchos teoremas de restricción relacionados como sus puntos de partida. Aquellos que no lo pueden encontrar (y todos estos teorems) increíble y en ese caso, necesitan encontrar una trayectoria profesional que no tenga nada que ver con uny de las disciplinas anteriores. Ver "El teorema de la imposibilidad de la flecha" (2014) o "toma de decisiones e imperfección" (2013) entre legiones de publicaciones. Yanofsky menciona el famoso resultado imposible de Brandenburger y Keisler (2006) para juegos de dos personas (pero por supuesto no limitado a "juegos" y como todos estos resultados de imposibilidad se aplica ampliamente a las decisiones de cualquier tipo) que muestra que cualquier modelo de creencias de un cierto tipo conduce a contradicciones. Una interpretación del resultado es que si las herramientas del 44 analista de decisiones (básicamente, sólo la lógica) están disponibles para el Players en un juego, entonces hay declaraciones o creencias que los jugadores pueden anotar o "pensar", pero que en realidad no pueden sostener (es decir, no tienen claro COS). "Ann cree que Bob asume que Ann cree que la suposición de Bob es errónea" parece irreprochable y "recursividad" (otro LG) se ha asumido en la argumentación, la lingüística, la filosofía, etc., por lo menos durante un siglo, pero demostraron que es imposible para Ann y Bob para asumir estas creencias. Y hay un cuerpo de rápido crecimiento de tales resultados de imposibilidad para 1 o multijugador situaciones de decisión (por ejemplo, se gradía en Arrow, Wolpert, Koppel y Rosser etc). Para un buen papel técnico de entre la avalancha en la paradoja de B&K, obtener el papel de Abramsky y Zvesper de arXiv.org, que nos lleva de vuelta a la paradoja del mentiroso y el infinito de cantor (como su título señala que se trata de "formas interactivas de diagonalización y auto-referencia ") y por lo tanto a Floyd, Rodych, Berto, W y Godel. Muchos de estos documentos citan el artículo de Yanofksy "un enfoque universal para las paradocitas autorreferenciales y los puntos fijos. Boletín de la lógica simbólica, 9 (3): 362 – 386, 2003. Abramsky (un polímata que es entre otras cosas un pionero en la computación cuántica) es un amigo, por lo que Yanofsky aporta un papel al reciente Festschrift para él ' computación, lógica, juegos y fundamentos cuánticos ' (2013). Para tal vez la mejor reciente (2013) Comentarios sobre el BK y paradojes relacionados ver la Conferencia de PowerPoint 165p libre en la red por Wes Holliday y Eric Pacuit ' diez puzzles y Paradojes sobre el conocimiento y la creencia '. Para una buena encuesta de varios autores, véase ' toma de decisiones colectivas (2010). Desde Los famosos teoremas de Godel son corolarios del teorema de Chaitin mostrando ' aleatoriedad ' algorítmica (' incompleta ') a través de las matemáticas (que es sólo otro de nuestros sistemas simbólicos), parece ineludible que pensar (comportamiento, lenguaje, mente) está lleno de declaraciones y situaciones imposibles, aleatorias o incompletas. Ya que podemos ver cada uno de estos dominios como sistemas simbólicos evolucionados por la oportunidad de hacer que nuestro trabajo de psicología, tal vez debería ser considerado como no sorprendente que no son "completos". Para las matemáticas, Chaitin dice tsu ' aleatoriedad ' (de nuevo un grupo de LG) muestra que hay teoremas ilimitados que son verdaderas, pero no puede comprobar, es decir, verdaderas sin ninguna razón. Entonces uno debería poder decir que hay declaraciones ilimitadas que hacen un perfecto sentido "gramatical" que no describen situaciones reales alcanzables en ese dominio. Sugiero que estos puzzles desaparecen si uno considera las opiniones de W. Escribió muchas notas sobre el tema de los teoremas de Godel, y la totalidad de su trabajo se refiere a la plasticidad, la "incompleta" y la sensibilidad extrema del contexto del lenguaje, las matemáticas y la lógica. Los documentos recientes de Rodych, Floyd y Berto son la mejor introducción que conozco a los comentarios de W sobre los fundamentos de las matemáticas y así a la filosofía. Como se ha señalado, David Wolpert ha derivado algunos teoremas sorprendentes en la teoría de la máquina de Turing y los límites de la computación que son muy a propósito aquí. Han sido casi universalmente ignorados pero no por los conocidos econometricios Koppl y Rosser, que, en su famoso papel de 2002 "todo lo que tengo 45 que decir ya ha cruzado tu mente", dar tres teoremas en los límites a la racionalidad, predicción y control en Economía. La primera utiliza el teorema de Wolpert sobre los límites de la computabilidad para mostrar algunos límites lógicos para predecir el futuro. Wolpert señala que puede ser visto como el análogo físico del teorema incompleto de Godel y K y R dicen que su variante se puede ver como su análogo de las ciencias sociales, aunque Wolpert es muy consciente de las implicaciones sociales. El segundo Teorema de K y R muestra una posible no convergencia para la previsión bayesiana (probabilística) en un espacio de dimensiones infinitas. El tercero muestra la imposibilidad de una computadora que pronostique perfectamente una economía con agentes que sepan su programa de previsión. El astuto se dará cuenta de que estos teoremas pueden ser vistos como versiones de la paradoja del mentiroso y el hecho de que estamos atrapados en imposibilidades cuando tratamos de calcular un sistema que incluye a nosotros mismos ha sido observado por Wolpert, Koppl, Rosser y otros en estos contextos y una vez más hemos vuelto a los puzzles de la física cuando el observador está involucrado. K&R concluir "así, el orden económico es en parte el producto de algo distinto de la racionalidad calculadora". La racionalidad delimitada es ahora un campo importante en sí mismo, el tema de miles de papeles y cientos de libros. El razonamiento es otra palabra para pensar, que es una disposición como saber, entender, juzgar, etc. Como Wittgenstein fue el primero en explicar, estos verbos disposicionales describen proposiciones (oraciones que pueden ser verdaderas o falsas) y por lo tanto tienen lo que Searle llama condiciones de satisfacción (COS). Es decir, hay Estados públicos de asuntos que reconocemos como mostrando su verdad o falsedad. "Más allá de la razón" significaría una frase cuyas condiciones de la verdad no son claras y la razón sería que no tiene un contexto claro. Es una cuestión de hecho si tenemos claro COS (i.e., significado) pero simplemente no podemos hacer la observación-esto no está más allá de la razón, pero más allá de nuestra capacidad de lograr, pero es una materia filosófica (lingüística) si no conocemos el COS. "son la mente y las computadoras del universo? "parece que necesita ciencia o matemática investigación, pero sólo es necesario aclarar el contexto en el que se utilizará este lenguaje, ya que son términos ordinarios y no problemáticos y es sólo su contexto lo que es desconcertante. Como siempre, lo primero a tener en cuenta es el dictum de W que no hay nuevos descubrimientos que se hagan en la filosofía ni explicaciones que se darán, pero sólo descripciones claras de la conducta (lenguaje). Una vez que uno entiende que todos los problemas son confusiones acerca de cómo funciona el lenguaje, estamos en paz y la filosofía en su sentido ha logrado su propósito. Como han señalado W/S, sólo hay una realidad, por lo que no hay varias versiones de la mente o la vida o el mundo que pueden ser significativamente dado, y sólo podemos comunicarnos en nuestro único idioma público. No puede haber un idioma privado y cualquier pensamiento "privado interno" no puede ser comunicado y no puede tener ningún papel en nuestra vida social. También debería ser muy sencillo resolver los problemas filosóficos en este sentido. "Ahora bien, si no son las conexiones causales que nos preocupan, entonces las actividades de la mente están abiertas ante nosotros." Wittgenstein "el libro azul" 46 P6 (1933) Tenemos sólo un conjunto de genes y por lo tanto un idioma (mente), un comportamiento (la naturaleza humana o la psicología evolutiva), que W y S se refieren como la roca o el fondo y reflexionando sobre esto generamos filosofía que S llama la estructura lógica de la racionalidad y llamo a la psicología descriptiva del pensamiento de orden superior (HOT) o, tomando la CUE de W, el estudio del lenguaje que describe HOT. El único interés en leer los comentarios de cualquiera sobre los aspectos filosóficos del comportamiento humano (HOT) es ver si su traducción al marco W/S da algunas descripciones claras que iluminan el uso del lenguaje. Si no, entonces mostrar cómo han sido embrujados por el lenguaje disipa la confusión. Repito lo que Horwich ha señalado en la última página de su magnífica "Metahilosofía de Wittgenstein" (ver mi reseña): "¿Qué tipo de progreso es este - se ha quitado el fascinante misterio-pero no hay profundidades que se hayan picado en consuelo; nada ha sido explicado, descubierto o reconcebido. Cuán dócil y poco inspirador podría pensar. Pero tal vez, como sugiere Wittgenstein, las virtudes de la claridad, la desmitificación y la verdad deben ser encontradas suficientemente satisfactorias. " Sin embargo, W/S hacen mucho explicar (o como W sugirió que deberíamos decir "describiendo") y S afirma que la estructura lógica de la racionalidad constituye varias teorías, y no hay ningún daño en ella, siempre que uno se da cuenta de que se componen de una serie de ejemplos que vamos a hacernos una idea general de cómo funciona el lenguaje (la mente), y que como sus "teorías" se explicaban a través de ejemplos se vuelven más como descripciones perspicuas de W. "Una rosa con cualquier otro nombre..." Cuando hay una pregunta, uno tiene que volver a los ejemplos o considerar nuevas los. Como señaló W, el lenguaje (la vida) es ilimitablemente complejo y sensible al contexto (W es el padre no reconocido del contextualismo), por lo que es totalmente diferente a la física donde a menudo se puede derivar una fórmula y prescindir de la necesidad de más ejemplos. El cientismo (el uso del lenguaje científico y el marco causal) nos lleva por mal camino en la descripción de HOT. Una vez más: "los filósofos ven constantemente el método de la ciencia ante sus ojos y son irresistiblemente tentados a preguntar y responder preguntas en la forma en que la ciencia lo hace. Esta tendencia es la verdadera fuente de la metafísica y lleva al filósofo a una completa oscuridad. " (BBB P18). A diferencia de muchos otros, S ha evitado en gran medida y a menudo demolido el civismo, pero hay un residuo que se Evince a sí mismo cuando insiste en el uso de términos S2 disposicionales que describen el comportamiento público (pensar, saber creer, etc.) para describir los ' procesos ' S1 en el cerebro, que por ejemplo, podemos entender la conciencia mediante el estudio del cerebro, y que está dispuesto a renunciar a la causalidad, la voluntad o la mente. W dejó muy claro que tales palabras son las bisagras o juegos de lenguaje básico y darles o incluso cambiarlos no es un concepto coherente. Como se mencionó en mis otras reseñas, creo que el residuo de civismo resulta de la tragedia mayor de la vida filosófica de S (y casi todos los demás 47 filosofos)--su fracaso para tomar la W más tarde lo suficientemente en serio (W murió unos años antes de que S fuera a Inglaterra para estudiar) y haciendo el error fatal común de pensar que es más inteligente que W. "Aquí nos encontramos con un fenómeno notable y característico en la investigación filosófica: la dificultad--Podría decir---no es la de encontrar la solución, sino más bien la de reconocer como elresolución algo que se ve como Si fuera sólo un preliminar. Ya lo hemos dicho todo. --No hay nada que se desprende de esto, ¡ no es la solución! .... Esto está conectado, creo, con nuestra espera errónea de una explicación, mientras que la solución de la dificultad es una descripción, si le damos el lugar correcto en nuestras consideraciones. Si lo moramos, y no tratamos de ir más allá de él. " Zettel p312 llamar-314 "Nuestro método es puramente descriptivo, las descripciones que damos no son pistas de explicaciones." BBB P125 Se deduce tanto del trabajo de la 3a etapa de W y la psicología contemporánea, que ' voluntad ', ' Self ' y ' conciencia ' son elementos axiomáticos verdaderos-sólo de la reptil subcorticales System One (S1) compuesto de percepciones, recuerdos y reflejos, y no hay posibilidad (inteligibilidad) de demostrar (de dar sentido a) su falsedad. Como W lo hizo tan maravillosamente claro, son la base para juicio y por lo tanto no puede ser juzgado. Los verdaderos axiomas de nuestra psicología no son probatorios. Los filósofos rara vez son claros sobre exactamente lo que esperan aportar que otros estudiantes de comportamiento (es decir, los científicos) no lo hacen, por lo que, observando el comentario anterior de W sobre la envidia de la ciencia, voy a citar de p. m. s. Hacker (el experto líder en W durante muchos años) que da un buen comienzo y una contraexplosión al civismo. "Los epistemologistas tradicionales quieren saber si el conocimiento es una creencia verdadera y otra condición... o si el conocimiento ni siquiera implica la creencia... Lo que hay que aclarar si estas preguntas han de ser contestadas es la Web de nuestros conceptos epistemicos, las formas en que los diversos conceptos cuelgan juntos, las diversas formas de sus compatibilidades e incompatibilidades, su punto y propósito, su presuposiciones y diferentes formas de dependencia del contexto. Para este venerable ejercicio en el análisis conectivo, el conocimiento científico, la psicología, la neurociencia y la ciencia cognitiva autoproclamados no pueden aportar nada en absoluto. " ((Pasando por el giro naturalista: en el cul-de-SAC-P15 de Quine (2005)) Las estructuras deonóticas o ' pegamento social ' son las acciones rápidas automáticas de S1 produciendo las disposiciones lentas de S2, que se expanden inexorablemente durante el desarrollo personal en una amplia gama de relaciones deonóticas culturales universales automáticas tan bien descritas por Searle. Espero que esto abstrae bastante bien la estructura básica del comportamiento social. Varios comentarios se repiten. Por lo tanto, reconociendo que S1 sólo es causal 48 ascendente (mundo a la mente) y sin contenido (falta de representaciones o información) mientras que el S2 tiene contenidos (es decir, es representacional) y es una causal descendente (mente a mundo) (por ejemplo, ver mi reseña de Hutto y de Myin ' radical Enactivismo '), traduzco los párrafos de S MSW P39 comenzando "en suma" y terminando en PG 40 con "condiciones de satisfacción" como sigue. En Resumen, la percepción, la memoria y las intenciones y acciones reflexivas previas ("voluntad") son causadas por el funcionamiento automático de nuestro EP axiomático de solo true, modificado por S2 ("libre voluntad"). Tratamos de igualar cómo deseamos que las cosas sean con cómo pensamos que son. Deberíamos ver que la creencia, el deseo y la imaginación--desea que el tiempo se desplazó y se desacopló de la intención-y otras disposiciones de proposicionalidad S2 de nuestro pensamiento lento evolucionado más adelante segundo yo, son totalmente dependientes sobre (tienen sus condiciones de satisfacción (COS) originando en) el autoreflexivo causalmente (CSR) rápido automático primitivo real-sólo reflexivo S1. En el lenguaje y la neurofisiología hay casos intermedios o combinados tales como pretendiendo (intenciones previas) o recordando, donde la conexión causal de la COS con S1 es el tiempo desplazado, ya que representan el pasado o el futuro, a diferencia de S1 que siempre está en el presente. S1 y S2 se alimentan entre sí y a menudo se orquestan sin problemas por las relaciones culturales deóntica aprendidas, por lo que nuestra experiencia normal es que conscientemente controlamos todo lo que hacemos. Esta vasta arena de ilusiones cognitivas que dominan nuestra vida Searle ha descrito como ' la ilusión fenomenológica ' (TPI). "Algunas de las características lógicas más importantes de la intencionalidad están más allá del alcance de la fenomenología porque no tienen una realidad fenomenológica inmediata... Porque la creación del significado de la falta de sentido no se experimenta conscientemente... no existe... Esto es... la ilusión fenomenológica. " Searle PNC P115117 Las palabras de disposición (preferencias--ver la tabla anterior) tienen al menos dos usos básicos. Uno se refiere a las oraciones verdaderas sólo que describen nuestras percepciones directas, reflejos (incluyendo el habla básica) y la memoria, es decir, nuestra psicología axiomática S1 innata que son causalmente autoreflexivo (CSR)- (llamado reflexivo o intransitivo en la BBB de W), y el uso de S2 como palabras de disposición (pensamiento, comprensión, conocimiento, etc.) que pueden ser actuada, y que puede llegar a ser verdadero o falso (' yo sé mi camino a casa ')-es decir, tienen condiciones de satisfacción (COS) y no son CSR (llamado transitivo en BBB). "¿Cómo surge el problema filosófico sobre los procesos mentales y los Estados y sobre el Behaviorismo? – El primer paso es el que se escapa por completo del aviso. Hablamos de procesos y Estados y dejamos su naturaleza indeciso. En algún momento tal vez sabremos más sobre ellos, pensamos. Pero eso es justo lo que nos compromete a una forma particular de ver el asunto. Porque tenemos un concepto definido de lo que significa aprender a conocer mejor un proceso. (El movimiento decisivo en el truco de conjurar se ha hecho, y fue el mismo que pensamos bastante inocente). - Y ahora 49 la analogía que nos hizo entender nuestros pensamientos cae en pedazos. así que, tenemos que negar el proceso aún sin comprender en el medio aún inexplorado. Y ahora parece como si hubiéramos negado los procesos mentales. Y naturalmente no queremos negarlos. W PI p308 "... la relación intencional básica entre la mente y el mundo tiene que ver con las condiciones de satisfacción. Y una proposición es cualquier cosa que pueda estar en una relación intencional con el mundo, y ya que esas relaciones intencionales siempre determinan las condiciones de satisfacción, y una proposición se define como cualquier cosa suficiente para determinar las condiciones de satisfacción, resulta que toda intencionalidad es una cuestión de proposiciones. " Searle PNCp193 "El estado intencional representa sus condiciones de satisfacción... personas suponen erróneamente que cada representación mental debe ser conscientemente pensada... pero la noción de una representación como la estoy usando es una noción funcional y no ontológica. Cualquier cosa que tenga condiciones de satisfacción, que pueda triunfar o fracasar de una manera que sea característica de la intencionalidad, es por definición una representación de sus condiciones de satisfacción... podemos analizar la estructura de la intencionalidad de los fenómenos sociales analizando sus condiciones de satisfacción. " Searle MSW p28-32 Al igual que Carruthers, Coliva, S y otros en algún momento estado (por ejemplo, p6667 MSW) que S1 (es decir, recuerdos, percepciones, actos reflejos) tiene una estructura proposicional (es decir, verdadero-falso). Como he señalado anteriormente, y muchas veces en mis comentarios, parece cristalino que W es correcto, y es básico para entender el comportamiento, que sólo S2 es proposicional y S1 es axiomático y verdadero-sólo. Sin embargo, desde lo que S y varios autores aquí llaman el fondo (S1) da lugar a S2 y es a su vez parcialmente controlado por S2, tiene que haber un sentido en el que S1 es capaz de convertirse en proposicional y ellos y Searle nota que las actividades inconsciente o consciente pero automatizado de S1 debe ser capaz de convertirse en el consciente o deliberativo de S2. Ambos tienen COS y direcciones de ajuste (DOF) porque la intencionalidad genética, axiomática de S1 genera la de S2, pero si S1 fuera proposicional en el mismo sentido significaría que el escepticismo es inteligible, el caos que era la filosofía antes de W volvería, y, de hecho, si es cierto, la vida no sería posible. Por ejemplo, significaría que la verdad y la falsedad y los hechos del mundo podrían decidirse sin conciencia. Como W declaró a menudo y mostró tan brillantemente en su último libro ' sobre la certeza ', la vida debe basarse en la certezalas reacciones rápidas inconscientes automatizadas. Los organismos que siempre tienen una duda y una pausa para reflexionar morirán, sin evolución, sin gente, sin filosofía. Otra vez, Voy a repetir algunas nociones cruciales. Otra idea clarificada por S es el deseo de razones independientes de acción (DIRA). Traduzco el Resumen de S de la razón práctica en p127 de MSW de la siguiente manera: "cedemos a nuestros deseos (necesidad de alterar la química del cerebro), que típicamente incluyen el deseorazones independientes de acción (DIRA-es decir, los deseos desplazados en el espacio 50 y el tiempo), que producen disposiciones para el comportamiento que comúnmente resultan tarde o temprano en los movimientos musculares que sirven a nuestra aptitud inclusiva (aumento de la supervivencia de los genes en nosotros mismos y aquellos estrechamente relacionados). " Y me gustaría reafirmar su descripción en P129 de cómo llevamos a cabo DIRA2 como "la resolución de la paradoja es que el DIRA1 inconsciente que sirve la aptitud inclusiva a largo plazo generan el DIRA2 consciente que a menudo anula los deseos inmediatos personales a corto plazo." Los agentes de hecho crean conscientemente las razones próximas de DIRA2, pero estas son extensiones muy restringidas de DIRA1 inconsciente (la causa última). Obama y el Papa desean ayudar a los pobres porque es "correcto", pero la causa última es un cambio en su química cerebral que aumentó la aptitud inclusiva de sus antepasados lejanos. La evolución por la aptitud inclusiva ha programado las acciones causales reflexivas rápidas inconsciente de S1 que a menudo dan lugar al pensamiento lento consciente de S2, que produce razones de acción que a menudo resultan en la activación de los músculos del cuerpo y/o del habla por S1 causando acciones. El mecanismo general es a través de la neurotransmisión y por los cambios en los neuromoduladores en las áreas específicas del cerebro. La ilusión cognitiva general (llamada por S ' la ilusión fenomenológica ', por Pinker ' la pizarra en blanco ' y por Tooby y Cosmides ' el modelo de ciencias sociales estándar ') es que S2 ha generado la acción conscientemente por razones de las cuales somos plenamente conscientes y en control de, pero cualquier persona familiarizada con la biología moderna y la psicología puede ver que esta visión no es creíble. Una frase expresa un pensamiento (tiene un significado), cuando tiene claro COS, es decir, las condiciones de la verdad pública. De ahí el comentario de W: "cuando pienso en el lenguaje, no hay ' significados ' pasando por mi mente, además de las expresiones verbales: el lenguaje es en sí mismo el vehículo del pensamiento." Y, si pienso con o sin palabras, el pensamiento es lo que yo (honestamente) diga que es como no hay otro criterio posible (COS). Así, Los aforismos preciosos de W (p132 Budd-la filosofía de la psicología de Wittgenstein) "es en el lenguaje que el deseo y la realización se reúnen" y "como todo lo metafísico, la armonía entre el pensamiento y la realidad se encuentra en la gramática de la lengua." Y uno podría notar aquí que la "gramática" en W generalmente se puede traducir como psicología evolutiva (EP) y que a pesar de sus frecuentes advertencias contra la teoría y la generalización, esto es tan amplio como una caracterización de la psicología descriptiva de orden superior (filosofía) como se puede encontrar, más allá de las ' teorías ' de Searle (que a menudo critica a W por su famosa postura anti-teórica). "Cada signo es capaz de interpretar, pero el significado no debe ser capaz de interpretar. Es la última interpretación "W BBB P34 "La filosofía de Searle y la filosofía China" (SPCP) (2008) es un libro magnífico y único, pero tan totalmente ignorado que mi 2015 revisión era en ese momento el único! Debe ser obvio que las cuestiones filosóficas son siempre acerca de los errores en el lenguaje utilizado para describir nuestra psicología innata universal y no hay ningún sentido útil 51 en el que puede haber un chino, Francés, cristiano, feminista, etc. vista de ellos. Tales puntos de vista pueden existir de la filosofía en el sentido amplio, pero eso no es lo que la filosofía de la mente (o a W, S o me lo que cualquier filosofía interesante y sustantiva) se trata. Podría tomar un libro entero para discutir esto y S hace un trabajo excelente, así que sólo comentaré aquí que respecto a P35 en SPCP, las proposiciones son S2 y no estados mentales, que son S1 como W hizo bastante claro sobre 3/4 de un siglo atrás, y que tanto Quine como Davidson estaban igualmente confundidos sobre los temas básicos involucrados (tanto Searle como hacker han hecho excelentes demoliciones de Quine). Tan a menudo, la discusión de S está empinada por su fracaso para llevar a cabo su comprensión de los "antecedentes" de W a su conclusión lógica y por lo que sugiere (como él tiene con frecuencia) que podría tener que renunciar al concepto de libre voluntad-una noción que encuentro (con W) incoherente. ¿Qué es el COS (el evento de la verdad, la prueba o prueba) que podría mostrar la verdad frente a la falsedad de que no tenemos la opción de levantar nuestro brazo? Del mismo modo (P62) nadie puede dar argumentos para el fondo (es decir, nuestro EP axiomático) como nuestro ser capaz de hablar en absoluto lo presupone (como W observó con frecuencia). También es cierto que "reducción" junto con "monismo", "realidad", etc. son juegos de idiomas complejos y que no llevan el significado a lo largo de pequeñas mochilas! Uno debe diseccionar un uso en detalle para aclarar y luego ver cómo otro uso (contexto) difiere. Los filósofos (y los filósofos) crean problemas imaginarios al tratar de responder a preguntas que no tienen un sentido claro. Esta situación está muy bien analizada por Finkelstein en ' holism y mentes animales ' y altan admirablemente resumido por leer en ' el difícil problema de la conciencia ' citado arriba. ' ' Cultura y valor ' ' de Wittgenstein (publicado en 1980, pero escrito décadas antes), aunque es tal vez su libro menos interesante, tiene mucho que es pertinente a esta discusión, y por supuesto a una gran parte de la vida intelectual moderna. ' ' No existe una denominación religiosa en la que el uso indebido de expresiones metafísicas haya sido responsable de tanto pecado como tiene en matemáticas. ' ' "La gente dice una y otra vez que la filosofía no progresa realmente, que todavía estamos ocupados con los mismos problemas filosóficos que los griegos. Pero la gente que dice esto no entiende por qué tiene que ser así. Es porque nuestro lenguaje ha permanecido igual y nos sigue seduciendo para que hagan las mismas preguntas. Mientras siga habiendo un verbo "ser" que parezca como si funciona de la misma manera que "comer" y "beber", siempre y cuando todavía tengamos los adjetivos "idénticos", "verdaderos", "falsos", "posibles", siempre y cuando sigamos hablando de un río de tiempo , de una extensión de espacio, etc., etc., la gente seguirá tropezando con las mismas dificultades desconcertante y se encontrará mirando a algo que ninguna explicación parece capaz de aclarar. Y lo que es más, esto satisface un anhelo de lo trascendente, porque, en la medida en que la gente cree que puede ver "los límites del entendimiento humano", creen, por supuesto, que pueden ver más allá 52 Estos. ' ' Igualmente tratemos de destilar la esencia de dos de las obras recientes de Searle. "¿Puede haber razones para actuar que son vinculantes para un agente racional sólo en virtud de la naturaleza del hecho reportado en la declaración de razón, e independientemente de los deseos, valores, actitudes y evaluaciones del agente? ... La verdadera paradoja de la discusión tradicional es que trata de plantear la guillotina de Hume, el hecho rígido distinción de valor, en un vocabulario, cuyo uso ya presupone la falsedad de la distinción. " Searle PNC p165-171 "... todas las funciones de estado y por lo tanto toda la realidad institucional, con la excepción del lenguaje, son creadas por actos de voz que tienen la forma lógica de las declaraciones... las formas de la función de status en cuestión son casi invariablemente cuestiones de poderes deóntica... reconocer algo como un derecho, un deber, una obligación, un requisito, etcétera, es reconocer un motivo de acción... Estas estructuras deonóticas hacen posible el deseo-razones independientes de la acción... El punto general es muy claro: la creación del campo general de los motivos de acción basados en el deseo presuponía la aceptación de un sistema de razones de acción independientes del deseo. " Searle PNC P34-49 Es decir, el funcionamiento de nuestro sistema lingüístico 2 presupone el de nuestro sistema prelingüístico 1. También no es posible para nosotros aceptar o rechazar DIRA, más bien como parte de S1 son innatos y rechazar cualquiera de S1 es incoherente. "Algunas de las características lógicas más importantes de la intencionalidad están más allá del alcance de la fenomenología porque no tienen una realidad fenomenológica inmediata... Porque la creación del significado de la falta de sentido no se experimenta conscientemente... no existe... Esto es... la ilusión fenomenológica. " Searle PNC P115117 Es decir, nuestro funcionamiento mental suele estar tan preocupado con el sistema 2 como para ser ajeno al sistema 1. "... la relación intencional básica entre la mente y el mundo tiene que ver con las condiciones de satisfacción. Y una proposición es cualquier cosa que pueda estar en una relación intencional con el mundo, y ya que esas relaciones intencionales siempre determinan las condiciones de satisfacción, y una proposición se define como cualquier cosa suficiente para determinar las condiciones de satisfacción, resulta que toda intencionalidad es una cuestión de proposiciones. " Searle PNCp193 "Así que, funciones de estado son el pegamento que une a la sociedad. Son creados por intencionalidad colectiva y funcionan mediante el transporte de poderes deóntica... Con la importante excepción del lenguaje en sí, toda la realidad institucional y por ello en cierto sentido toda la civilización humana es creada por los 53 actos del habla que tienen la forma lógica de las declaraciones... toda la realidad institucional humana se crea y se mantiene en existencia por (representaciones que tienen la misma forma lógica que) declaraciones de función de estado, incluyendo los casos que no son actos de habla en la forma explícita de declaraciones. " Searle MSW p11-13 "Las creencias, como las declaraciones, tienen el descenso o la mente (o la palabra) – Para Dirección mundial de ajuste. Y los deseos y las intenciones, como las órdenes y las promesas, tienen la dirección ascendente o mundial (o palabra) de ajuste. Se supone que las creencias o percepciones, como las declaraciones, representan cómo son las cosas en el mundo, y en ese sentido, se supone que encajan en el mundo; tienen la dirección de ajuste de la mente al mundo. Los Estados conative-volicionales como los deseos, las intenciones previas y las intenciones en acción, como las órdenes y las promesas, tienen la dirección de ajuste del mundo a la mente. No se supone que representen cómo son las cosas sino cómo nos gustaría que fueran o cómo pretendemos hacerlas ser... Además de estas dos facultades, hay una tercera, la imaginación, en la que el contenido de proposicional no se supone que encaja la realidad en la forma en que el contenido de proposicional de la cognición y la volición se supone que encajan... se abandona el compromiso referente al mundo y tenemos un contenido proposicional sin ningún compromiso que represente con cualquier dirección de ajuste. " Searle MSW P15 "El estado intencional representa sus condiciones de satisfacción... personas suponen erróneamente que cada representación mental debe ser conscientemente pensada... pero la noción de una representación como la estoy usando es una noción funcional y no ontológica. Cualquier cosa que tenga condiciones de satisfacción, que pueda triunfar o fracasar de una manera que sea característica de la intencionalidad, es por definición una representación de sus condiciones de satisfacción... podemos analizar la estructura de la intencionalidad de los fenómenos sociales analizando sus condiciones de satisfacción. " Searle MSW p28-32 "Pero no hay un análogo prelingüístico para las declaraciones. Los Estados Prelingüísticos intencionales no pueden crear hechos en el mundo al representar esos hechos como ya existen. Esta notable hazaña requiere un lenguaje "MSW p69 "... una vez que usted tiene el lenguaje, es inevitable que usted tendrá deontología porque no hay manera que usted puede hacer actos explícitos de la voz realizados de acuerdo con las convenciones de un idioma sin crear compromisos. Esto es cierto no sólo para las declaraciones, sino para todos los actos de habla "MSW P82 Una noción crítica introducida por S hace muchos años es condiciones de satisfacción (COS) en nuestros pensamientos (proposiciones de S2) que W llamó inclinaciones o disposiciones para actuar--todavía llamado por el término inapropiado ' actitudes proposicionales ' por muchos. COS se explican por S en muchos lugares, como en p169 de PNC: "así decir algo y significado que implica dos condiciones de satisfacción. En primer lugar, la condición de satisfacción de que se produzca la expresión, y segundo, 54 que la propia expresión tendrá condiciones de satisfacción. " Como S lo dice en PNC, "una proposición es cualquier cosa en absoluto que puede determinar una condición de satisfacción... y una condición de satisfacción... es que tal y tal es el caso. " O, uno necesita agregar, que podría ser o podría haber sido o podría ser imaginado para ser el caso, como lo deja claro en MSW. En cuanto a las intenciones, "para que se cumpla, la intención misma debe funcionar causalmente en la producción de la acción." (MSWp34). "Orador significa... es la imposición de condiciones de satisfacción en condiciones de satisfacción. La capacidad de hacer esto es un elemento crucial de las capacidades cognitivas humanas. Se requiere la capacidad de pensar en dos niveles a la vez, de una manera que es esencial para el uso del lenguaje. En un nivel, el orador produce intencionalmente una expresión física, pero en otro nivel la expresión representa algo. Y la misma dualidad infecta el símbolo en sí. En un nivel, es un objeto físico como cualquier otro. En otro nivel, tiene un significado: representa un tipo de estado de asuntos "MSW P74 Una forma de hablar de esto es que el sistema automático inconsciente 1 activa la mayor personalidad de conciencia cortical del sistema 2, trayendo consigo contracciones musculares de la garganta que informan a otros que ve el mundo de ciertas maneras, que lo comprometen a potencial Acciones. Un gran avance sobre las interacciones prelingüísticas o protolingüísticas en las que los movimientos musculares brutos pudieron transmitir información muy limitada sobre las intenciones. La mayoría de las personas se beneficiarán en gran medida de la lectura de W "on certidumbre" o "RPP1 y 2" o dos libros de DMS en OC (ver mis comentarios), ya que hacen claro la diferencia entre verdaderas frases que describen S1 y proposiciones verdaderas o falsas que describen S2. Esto me parece un acercamiento muy superior a Searle tomando las percepciones de S1 como proposicionales (al menos en algunos lugares en su trabajo) ya que sólo pueden convertirse en T o F (aspectual como S los llama en MSW) después de que uno comienza a pensar en ellos en S2. Searle a menudo describe la necesidad crítica de anotar los diferentes niveles de descripción de un evento para la intención en acción (IA) "tenemos diferentes niveles de Descripción donde un nivel está constituido por el comportamiento en el nivel inferior... Además de la constitutiva a modo de relación, también tenemos la causal por medio de relación. " (P37 MSW). "La prueba crucial de que necesitamos una distinción entre las intenciones previas y las intenciones en acción es que las condiciones de satisfacción en los dos casos son sorprendentemente diferentes." (P35 MSW). La COS de PI necesita una acción completa, mientras que la de IA sólo es parcial. Él deja claro (por ejemplo, p34) que las intenciones previas (PI) son Estados mentales (es decir, S1 inconsciente) mientras que dan lugar a intenciones en acción (IA) que son actos conscientes (es decir, S2) pero ambos son causalmente autorreflexivo (CSR). El argumento crítico de que ambos son 55 CSR es que (a diferencia de las creencias y los deseos) es esencial que se imaginan en la crianza de su COS. Estas descripciones de la cognición y la volición se resumen en la tabla 2,1 (p38 MSW), que Searle ha utilizado durante muchos años y es la base para el muy extendido que presento aquí y en mis muchos artículos. En mi opinión, ayuda enormemente a relacionar esto con la investigación psicológica moderna mediante el uso de mi S1, terminología S2 y de W verdadero-sólo vs proposicional (disposicional) Descripción. Así, CSR hace referencia a la percepción de true-Only S1, la memoria y la intención, mientras que el S2 se refiere a disposiciones tales como creencia y deseo. Se sigue de una manera muy directa e inexorable, tanto del trabajo del 3er período de W y de las observaciones de la psicología contemporánea, que "voluntad", "self" y "conciencia" son elementos axiomáticos verdaderos-sólo del sistema 1 al igual que ver, oír, etc., y no hay posibilidad (inteligibilidad) de demostrar (de dar sentido a) su falsedad. Como W hizo tan maravillosamente claro en numerosas ocasiones, que son la base para el juicio y por lo tanto no puede ser juzgado. Los verdaderos axiomas de nuestra psicología no son probatorios. Es fundamental entender la noción de "función" que es relevante aquí. "Una función es una causa que sirve a un propósito... En este sentido las funciones son de intencionalidad-relativas y por lo tanto dependientes de la mente... funciones de estado... Requieren... imposición colectiva y el reconocimiento de un estatuto "(P59 MSW). Me Sugerir, la traducción de "la intencionalidad del lenguaje es creada por la intencionalidad intrínseca o independiente de la mente de los seres humanos" (p66 MSW) como "la disposicionalidad lingüística y consciente del S2 es generada por las funciones reflexivas axiomáticas inconscientes de S 1 ". Es decir, uno debe tener en cuenta que el comportamiento está programado por la biología. Una vez más, Searle afirma (por ejemplo, p66-67 MSW) que S1 (es decir, memorias, percepciones, actos reflejos) tiene una estructura proposicional (es decir, verdaderofalso). Como he señalado anteriormente, y muchas veces en otros comentarios, parece cristalino que W es correcto, y es básico para entender el comportamiento, que sólo S2 es proposicional y S1 es axiomáticos y verdaderos. Ambos tienen COS y direcciones de ajuste (DOF) porque la intencionalidad genética, axiomática de S1 genera la de S2 pero si S1 fuera proposicional en el mismo sentido significaría que el escepticismo es inteligible, el caos que era la filosofía antes de que W regresaría, y de hecho, si es cierto, la vida no sería posible. Como W mostró innumerables veces y la biología muestra tan claramente, la vida debe basarse en la certeza-las reacciones rápidas inconscientes automatizadas. Los organismos que siempre tienen una duda y una pausa para reflexionar morirán, sin evolución, sin gente, sin filosofía. El lenguaje y la escritura son especiales porque la longitud de onda corta de las vibraciones de los músculos vocales permite una transferencia de información de ancho de banda mucho mayor que las contracciones de otros músculos y estos en 56 promedio varias órdenes de magnitud superior para la información visual. S1 y S2 son partes críticas del EP humano y son los resultados, respectivamente de miles de millones y cientos de millones de años de selección natural por aptitud inclusiva. Facilitaron la supervivencia y la reproducción en el EEE (medio ambiente de adaptación evolutiva). Todo sobre nosotros física y mentalmente en el fondo de la genética. Toda la vaga charla en el MSW de S (por ejemplo, P114) sobre "convenciones extralingüísticas" y "semántica extra semántica" se refiere de hecho a EP y especialmente a los automatismos inconscientes de S1 que son la base para todo comportamiento. Como dijo W muchas veces, el más familiar es por esa razón invisible. Aquí de nuevo está mi resumen (siguiente S en MSW) de cómo funciona la razón práctica: cedemos a nuestros deseos (necesidad de alterar la química del cerebro), que típicamente incluyen el deseo-razones independientes de la acción (DIRA-es decir, los deseos desplazados en el espacio y el tiempo, a menudo para altruismo recíproco-RA), que producen disposiciones para el comportamiento que comúnmente resultan tarde o temprano en movimientos musculares que sirven a nuestra aptitud inclusiva-IF (aumento de la supervivencia de los genes en nosotros mismos y aquellos estrechamente relacionados). Creo que si se define adecuadamente, DIRA son universales en los animales más altos y no en absoluto único a los seres humanos (pensar madre gallina defendiendo su cría de un zorro) si incluimos los reflejos prelingüísticos automatizados de S1 (es decir, DIRA1), pero sin duda el orden superior DIRA de S2 (DIRA2) que requieren lenguaje son exclusivamente humanos. La paradoja de cómo podemos llevar a cabo voluntariamente DIRA2 (es decir, los actos S2 y sus extensiones culturales que son deseo independiente) es que el DIRA1 inconsciente, sirviendo a largo plazo de aptitud inclusiva, generar el DIRA2 consciente que a menudo prevalecen el corto plazo deseos inmediatos personales. Los agentes de hecho crean conscientemente las razones próximas de DIRA2, pero estas son extensiones muy restringidas de inconsciente o simplemente automatizado DIRA1 (la causa última). Siguiendo a W, está bastante claro que la elección es parte de nuestro axiomático S1 sólo verdaderas acciones reflexivas y no puede ser cuestionada sin contradicción como S1 es la base para el interrogatorio. Usted no puede dudar de que está leyendo esta página como su conciencia de que es la base para dudar. Inevitablemente, las famosas manifestaciones de W de la inutilidad de la introspección y la imposibilidad de un idioma verdaderamente privado aparecen repetidamente ("... introspección nunca puede conducir a una definición... " P8). Los fundamentos de este argumento son extremadamente simples: ninguna prueba, ningún lenguaje y una prueba solo pueden ser públicas. Si crecí sola en una isla desierta sin libros y un día decido llamar a las cosas redondas en los árboles ' Coco ' y luego al día siguiente veo uno y digo ' Coco ' parece que he comenzado en un idioma. Pero supongamos que lo que digo (ya que no hay ninguna persona o Diccionario para corregirme) es ' Coca ' o 57 incluso ' manzana ' y al día siguiente algo más? La memoria es notoriamente falible y tenemos grandes problemas para mantener las cosas claras incluso con la corrección constante de los demás y con la entrada incesante de los medios. Esto puede parecer un punto trivial, pero es fundamental para todo el asunto del interior y el exterior - es, nuestras declaraciones no comprobable (testable) verdaderas de nuestra experiencia frente a las declaraciones comprobable verdaderas o falsas con respecto a todo en el mundo, incluyendo nuestro propio comportamiento. Aunque W explicó esto con muchos ejemplos a partir de 3/4 de un siglo atrás, raramente se ha entendido y es imposible ir muy lejos con cualquier discusión de comportamiento a menos que uno lo haga. Como W, S, Hutto, Budd, hacker, DMS, Johnston y otros han explicado, cualquiera que piense que W tiene una afinidad con Skinner, Quine, Dennett, funcionalismo, o cualquier otra excreciones conductista que niegan nuestra vida interior, necesita volver al principio. La filosofía de Psicología de Budd de ' Wittgenstein ' (1991) es una de las mejores obras para obtener información, así que lo discuto en detalle (ver mi opinión para más). En p21 comienza a discutir disposiciones (es decir, habilidades S2 como pensar, saber, creer) que parecen referirse a los Estados mentales (es decir, a los automatismos S1), otra gran confusión que W fue la primera en establecer recta. Así, en p28 ' lectura ' debe entenderse como otra capacidad disposicional que no es un estado mental y no tiene una duración definida como pensar, entender, creer, etc. Pocos avisos (Budd P29-32, Stern, Johnston y Moyal-Sharrock son excepciones) que W proféticamente (décadas antes de que la ciencia del caos y la complejidad llegara a ser) sugirió que algunos fenómenos mentales pueden originarse en procesos caóticos en el cerebro-que por ejemplo, hay no es nada que corresponda a un rastreo de memoria. También sugirió varias veces que la cadena causal tiene un fin, y esto podría significar que no es posible (independientemente del estado de la ciencia) rastrearlo o que el concepto de "causa" deja de ser aplicable más allá de un cierto punto (p34). Posteriormente, muchos han hecho sugerencias similares sin ninguna idea de que W los anticipó por décadas (de hecho, más de un siglo ahora en unos pocos casos). En p32 las "condiciones contrafactuales" se refieren de nuevo a disposiciones tales como "pueden pensar que está lloviendo", que son posibles estados de asuntos (o acciones potenciales - las condiciones de satisfacción de Searle) que pueden surgir en el caos. Puede ser útil vincular esto a las 3 lagunas de intencionalidad de Searle, que él encuentra necesario críticamente. Budd notas famoso comentario de W en P33-"el error es decir que hay algo que significa que algo consiste en." Aunque W es correcto que no hay un estado mental que constituya un significado, S notas (como se ha citado anteriormente) que hay una manera general de caracterizar el acto de significado-"orador significado... es la imposición de condiciones de satisfacción en las condiciones de satisfacción "que es un acto y no un estado mental. Como señala Budd en P35 esto puede ser visto como otra declaración de su argumento contra el idioma privado (interpretaciones personales vs públicamente comprobables). de la misma manera, con la siguiente 58 regla e interpretación en p36-41 - sólo pueden ser actos públicamente verificables-no hay reglas privadas o interpretaciones privadas tampoco. Y hay que tener en cuenta que muchos (el más famoso Kripke) pierden el barco aquí, siendo engañados por las frecuentes referencias de W a la práctica comunitaria en el pensamiento de que es sólo la práctica pública arbitraria que subyacen a las convenciones sociales y del lenguaje. W aclara muchas veces que tales convenciones sólo son posibles dada una psicología compartida innata que a menudo llama el trasfondo. Budd rechaza correctamente esta mala interpretación varias veces (p. ej., P58). En el siguiente capítulo de Budd se ocupa de las sensaciones que en mis términos (y en la psicología moderna) es S1 y en los términos de W el verdadero y único fondo indiscutible y no comprabable. Su comentario (P47) ..." que nuestras creencias sobre nuestras sensaciones actuales descansan sobre una base absolutamente segura-el ' mito de lo dado ' es uno de los principales objetos del ataque de Wittgenstein... " se pueden malinterpretar fácilmente. En primer lugar, comete el error Universal de llamar a estas ' creencias ', pero es mejor reservar esta palabra para S2 disposiciones verdaderas o falsas. Como W hizo muy claro, las sensaciones, los recuerdos y los actos reflexivos de S1 son axiomáticos y no están sujetos a la creencia en el sentido usual, pero son mejor llamados entendimientos (mi U1). A diferencia de nuestras creencias S2 (incluyendo las de otras personas' s S1 experiencias), no hay ningún mecanismo de duda. Budd explica esto bien, como en p52 donde observa que no hay ninguna justificación posible para decir que uno está sufriendo. Es decir, justificar significa probar y eso es posible con el pensamiento consciente lento disposicional S2, no el procesamiento inconsciente rápido de S1 reflexivo. Su discusión sobre esto en p52-56 es excelente, pero en mi opinión, como todos los que discute W en las reglas, el lenguaje privado y el interior, todo lo que tiene que hacer es decir que en S1 no hay prueba posible y este es el significado de la famosa W ' ' proceso interno ' se encuentra en necesidad de criterios externos '. Es decir, la introspección es vacuo. La Nota 21 de Budd confunde las experiencias causales verdaderas de S1 y las disposiciones razonadas de S2. El punto de las próximas páginas en los nombres de ' objetos internos ' (dolores, creencias, pensamientos, etc.) es de nuevo que tienen su uso (significado) y es la designación de disposiciones para actuar, o en términos de Searle, la especificación de condiciones de satisfacción, que hacer que la expresión sea verdadera. Una vez más, la discusión de Budd sobre "sensaciones y causation" es errónea al afirmar que nos ' autoatribuirse ' o ' creemos ' en nuestras sensaciones o ' tomamos una postura ' (Dennett) que tenemos un dolor o vemos un caballo, pero más bien no tenemos elección: S1 es verdadero-sólo y un error es un poco raro y ocurrencia extraña y de un tipo totalmente diferente a un error en S2. Y S1 es causal en contraposición a S2, que se refiere a razones, y es por eso que ver el caballo o sentir el dolor o saltar del camino de un coche que acelera no está sujeto a juicios o errores. Pero vuelve hacerle derecha de nuevo - "Así que la infalibilidad de las autoascripciones no inferenciales del dolor es compatible con la tesis de que una verdadera auto-ascripción de dolor 59 debe ser causada por un acontecimiento físico en el cuerpo del sujeto, que es idéntico al dolor que experimenta (P67)." No acepto su siguiente declaración de que W no aceptaría esto basándose en uno o dos comentarios en todo su corpus, ya que en su obra posterior (en particular OC) pasa cientos de páginas describiendo la naturaleza causal automatizada de S1 y cómo se alimenta en (causas) S2 que luego se alimenta de vuelta a S1 para causar movimientos musculares (incluyendo el habla). Los animales sobreviven sólo porque su vida está totalmente dirigida por los fenómenos que los rodean, que son altamente predecibles (los perros pueden saltar pero nunca vuelan). El siguiente capítulo sobre ver aspectos describe los extensos comentarios de W sobre cómo interactúan S1 y S2 y dónde nuestro lenguaje es ambiguo en lo que podemos significar por ' ver '. En general, está claro que "ver como" o aspectual ver es parte de las acciones lentas del cerebro S2, mientras que sólo ver es los verdaderos automatismos S1, pero están tan bien integrados que a menudo es posible describir una situación de múltiples maneras que explica el comentario de W en p97. Él señala que W está exclusivamente interesado en lo que tengo en otro lugar llamado ' Seeing2 ' o ' Concepts2'-I. e., aspectual o S2 procesamiento de orden superior de las imágenes. Aquí, como a lo largo de este libro y de hecho en cualquier discusión de W o de comportamiento, es de gran valor para referirse a ' Wittgenstein de Johnston: repensar el interior ' (1993) y especialmente a sus discusiones sobre la naturaleza indeterminada del lenguaje. En el capítulo 5 de Budd, nuevamente tratamos con una gran preocupación de la obra posterior de W: las relaciones entre S1 y S2. Como he señalado en mis otras críticas, pocos han comprendido completamente la W posterior y, carente de la S1, marco S2 no es sorprendente. Así, La discusión de Budd sobre ver (S1 automático) vs visualizando (S2 consciente que está sujeta a la voluntad) se ve gravemente obstaculizada. Así, uno puede entender por qué uno no puede imaginar un objeto mientras lo ve como el dominio de S2 por S1 (P110). Y en P115 es el tema familiar de no haber ninguna prueba para mis experiencias internas, así que todo lo que digo viene a la mente cuando imagino que la cara de Jack cuenta como la imagen de Jack. Semejantemente, con la lectura y el cálculo que puede referirse a S1, S2 o una combinación y existe la tentación constante de aplicar términos S2 a los procesos S1 donde esa falta de cualquier prueba los hace inaplicables. Ver Bennet y hacker ' neurofilosofía ', DMS, etc. para las discusiones. En P120 y siguientes, Budd menciona dos de los famosos ejemplos de W utilizados para combatir esta tentación - jugar al tenis sin una pelota (1 de tenis), y una tribu que sólo tenía el cálculo del S2, así que ' calculando en tél cabeza (' 1 cálculo ') fue no es posible. "Jugando" y "calculando" describen los actos reales o potenciales - es decir, son palabras de disposición pero con usos plausibles de S1 reflexivo por lo que he dicho antes uno realmente debe mantenerlos directamente escribiendo ' playing1 ' y ' playing2 ', etc. Pero no se nos enseña a hacer esto, así que queremos descartar ' calculating1 ' como una fantasía, o pensamos que podemos dejar su naturaleza indeciso hasta más tarde. Por lo tanto, el famoso comentario de W (P120) - "el movimiento decisivo en el truco de conjuros se ha hecho, y fue el mismo que pensamos bastante inocente." 60 Capítulo 6 explica otro tema frecuente de W-que cuando hablamos, el discurso en sí es nuestro pensamiento y no hay otro proceso mental previo y esto puede ser visto como otra versión del argumento del idioma privado-no hay cosas tales como ' criterios internos ' que nos permiten decir lo que pensamos antes de actuar (hablar). El punto de los comentarios de W (P125) acerca de otras maneras imaginables de utilizar el verbo ' intención ' es que no serían los mismos que nuestro ' intentar ' i. e., el nombre de un evento potencial (PE) y, de hecho, no está claro lo que significaría. "Tengo la intención de comer" tiene la COS de comer, pero si significaba (COS es) comiendo entonces no describiría una intención sino una acción y si significaba decir las palabras (COS es el habla) entonces no tendría más COS y cómo podría funcionar en cualquiera de los casos? A la pregunta sobre p127 en cuanto a cuando una frase expresa un pensamiento (tiene un significado), podemos decir ' cuando tiene COS claros ' y este medio tiene condiciones de verdad públicas. De ahí la cita de W: "Cuando pienso en el lenguaje, no hay "significados" que pasan por mi mente además de las expresiones verbales: el lenguaje es en sí mismo el vehículo del pensamiento. " Y, si pienso con o sin palabras, el pensamiento es lo que yo (honestamente) diga que es como no hay otro criterio posible (COS). Así, Los aforismos preciosos de W (p132) "es en lenguaje que el deseo y la realización se reúnen" y "como todo lo metafísico, la armonía entre el pensamiento y la realidad se encuentra en la gramática de la lengua." Y uno podría notar aquí que la "gramática" en W generalmente puede traducirse como "EP" y que a pesar de sus frecuentes advertencias contra la teoría y la generalización, esto es una caracterización tan amplia de la filosofía y la psicología descriptiva de orden superior como se puede encontrar . Otra vez, Esto reduce la frecuente crítica de Searle a W como anti-teórico, todo depende de la naturaleza de la generalización. Ayuda grandemente en esta sección de Budd sobre la armonía del pensamiento con la realidad (es decir, de cómo las disposiciones como esperar, pensar, imaginar el trabajo-lo que significa pronunciarlos) para que los indique en términos de COS S que son el PE (posibles eventos) que los hacen verdaderos. Si digo que espero que Jack venga entonces el COS (PE) que hace que sea cierto es que Jack llega y mis estados mentales o comportamiento físico (ritmo de la habitación, imaginando Jack) son irrelevantes. La armonía del pensamiento y la realidad es que Jack llega sin importar mi comportamiento anterior o posterior o cualquier estado mental que pueda tener y Budd está confundido o al menos confuso cuando afirma (p132 fondo) que debe haber una descripción interna de un estado mental que CA n de acuerdo con la realidad y que este es el contenido de un pensamiento, ya que estos términos deben limitarse a los automatismos de S1 sólo y nunca se utiliza para las funciones conscientes de S2. El contenido (significado) de la idea de que Jack vendrá es el evento externo (público) que viene y no cualquier evento mental interno o estado, que el argumento del lenguaje privado muestra es imposible conectarse a los eventos externos. Tenemos una verificación muy clara para el evento exterior, pero ninguno en absoluto para ' 61 eventos internos '. Y como W y S han demostrado maravillosamente muchas veces, el acto de pronunciar la frase "Espero que Jack venga" es sólo el pensamiento frase que Jack vendrá y el COS es el mismo, que Jack sí viene. Y así la respuesta a las dos preguntas en P133 y la importación de comentarios de W en p 135 ahora debe ser cristalina - "En virtud de lo que es cierto que mi expectativa tiene ese contenido?" y "¿qué se ha convertido ahora en el espacio hueco y el sólido correspondiente?", así como "... la interpolación de una sombra entre la frase y la realidad pierde todo punto. Por ahora, la frase en sí puede servir como una sombra. " Y así, también debe ser bastante claro lo que Budd se refiere a lo que hace que sea "posible que haya la armonía requerida (o la falta de armonía) con la realidad." de la misma manera, con la pregunta en la siguiente sección--¿Qué hace que sea verdad que mi imagen de Jack es una imagen de él? Imaginar es otra disposición y el COS es que la imagen que tengo en mi cabeza es Jack y es por eso que voy a decir ' sí ' si se muestra su imagen y ' NO ' si se muestra uno de otra persona. La prueba aquí no es que la foto coincida con la imagen vaga que tenía, pero que pretendía que (tenía la COS que) para ser una imagen de él. De ahí la famosa cita de W: "si Dios hubiera mirado en nuestras mentes, no habría podido ver allí de quien estábamos hablando (PI P217)" y sus comentarios de que todo el problema de la representación está contenido en "eso es él" y "... lo que da a la imagen su interpretación es el camino en el que se encuentra. " Por lo tanto, la suma de W (P140) que "lo que siempre llega al final es que sin ningún significado más, él llama lo que sucedió el deseo de que eso suceda" ... la cuestión de si sé lo que deseo antes de que se cumpla mi deseo no puede surgir en absoluto. Y el hecho de que algún evento pare mis deseos no significa que lo cumpla. Tal vez no debería haberme satisfecho si mi deseo hubiera sido satisfecho " ... Supongamos que se le preguntó ' ¿sé por cuánto tiempo antes de conseguirlo? Si he aprendido a hablar, entonces lo sé. " Palabras de disposición se refieren a PE que acepto como el cumplimiento de la COS y mis estados mentales, emociones, cambio de interés, etc. no tienen ninguna relación con la forma en que funcionan las disposiciones. Como señala acertadamente Budd, tengo la esperanza de desear, esperar, pensar, pretender, desear, etc. dependiendo del estado en el que me tomo para estar--en el COS que expreso. Pensamiento y la intención son disposiciones S2 que sólo se pueden expresar por contracciones del músculo S1 reflexivo, especialmente los de habla. W nunca dedicó tanto tiempo a las emociones como lo hizo a las disposiciones por lo que hay menos sustancia en el capítulo 7. Señala que típicamente el objeto y la causa son los mismos - es decir, son causalmente autorreferenciales (o Causal autorreflexivo como Searle ahora prefiere) - un concepto desarrollado más por S. Si uno mira mi mesa, las emociones claras tienen mucho más en común con los automatismos rápidos y verdaderos de S1 que con el pensamiento lento, verdadero o falso de S2, pero por supuesto S1 alimenta S2 y a su vez Los automatismos S1 son a menudo modificados Por S2 y S2 "pensamientos" pueden ser automatizados (S2A). El Resumen de Budd es un final apropiado para el libro (p165). "El rechazo del modelo 62 de ' objeto y designación ' para las palabras psicológicas cotidianas-la negación de que la imagen del proceso interno proporciona una correcta representación de la gramática de tales palabras, no es la única razón de la hostilidad de Wittgenstein para el uso de introspección en la filosofía de la psicología. Pero es su fundamento definitivo. " Ahora tomemos otra dosis de Searle. "Pero no se puede explicar un sistema físico como una máquina de escribir o un cerebro mediante la identificación de un patrón que comparte con su simulación computacional, porque la existencia del patrón no explica cómo el sistema funciona realmente como un sistema físico. ... En Resumen, el hecho de que la atribución de sintaxis no identifique otras potencias causales es fatal para la afirmación de que los programas proporcionan explicaciones causales de la cognición ... Sólo hay un mecanismo físico, el cerebro, con sus diversos niveles causales físicos y físicos/mentales de la descripción. " Filosofía Searle en un nuevo siglo (PNC) P101-103 "En Resumen, el sentido de" procesamiento de la información "que se utiliza en la ciencia cognitiva es un nivel demasiado alto de abstracción para captar la realidad biológica concreta de la intencionalidad intrínseca... Estamos cegados a esta diferencia por el hecho de que la misma frase ' veo un coche viniendo hacia mí ', se puede utilizar para registrar tanto la intencionalidad visual como la salida del modelo computacional de la visión... en el sentido de ' información ' utilizada en la ciencia cognitiva, es simplemente falso decir que el cerebro es un dispositivo de procesamiento de información. " Searle PNC P104-105 "El estado intencional representa sus condiciones de satisfacción... personas suponen erróneamente que cada representación mental debe ser conscientemente pensada... pero la noción de una representación como la estoy usando es una noción funcional y no ontológica. Cualquier cosa que tenga condiciones de satisfacción, que pueda triunfar o fracasar de una manera que sea característica de la intencionalidad, es por definición una representación de sus condiciones de satisfacción... podemos analizar la estructura de la intencionalidad de los fenómenos sociales analizando sus condiciones de satisfacción. " Searle MSW p28-32 Y otra toma de Wittgenstein. "La filosofía simplemente pone todo ante nosotros y no explica ni deduce nada... Uno podría dar el nombre "filosofía" a lo que es posible antes de todos los nuevos descubrimientos e invenciones. " PI 126 "Cuanto más estrechamente examinamos el lenguaje real, más agudo se convierte en el conflicto entre él y nuestro requisito. (Por supuesto, para la pureza cristalina de la lógica no fue un resultado de la investigación: era un requisito.) " PI 107 63 "Aquí nos encontramos ante un fenómeno notable y característico en la investigación filosófica: la dificultad---podría decir---no es la de encontrar la solución sino más bien la de reconocer como el resolución algo que se ve como Si fuera sólo un preliminar. Ya lo hemos dicho todo. ---No cualquier cosa que se desprende de esto, ¡no es la solución! .... Esto está conectado, creo, con nuestra espera errónea de una explicación, mientras que la solución de la dificultad es una descripción, si le damos el lugar correcto en nuestras consideraciones. Si lo moramos, y no tratamos de ir más allá de él. " Zettel p312 llamar-314 Un tema importante en todas las discusiones sobre el comportamiento humano es la necesidad de separar los automatismos genéticamente programados de los efectos de la cultura. Todo estudio de comportamiento de orden superior es un esfuerzo para burlarse no sólo rápido S1 y lento pensamiento S2 (por ejemplo, percepciones y otros automatismos vs. disposiciones), pero las extensiones lógicas de S2 en la cultura. El trabajo de Searle en su conjunto proporciona una descripción impresionante del comportamiento social S2 de orden superior debido al reciente evolución de los genes para la psicología disposicional, mientras que la W posterior muestra cómo se basa en axiomas inconscientes sólo verdaderos de S1 que evolucionaron en el pensamiento de proposicional disposicional consciente de S2. Una cosa a tener en cuenta es que la filosofía no tiene ningún impacto práctico, excepto para aclarar las confusiones acerca de cómo se utiliza el lenguaje en casos particulares. Al igual que varias "teorías físicas", pero a diferencia de otras vistas de dibujos animados de la vida (religiosa, política, psicológica, sociológica, antropológica), es demasiado cerebral y esotérico para ser agarrado por más de un pequeño flequillo y es tan poco realista que incluso sus adherentes ignorarlo totalmente en su vida cotidiana. de la misma manera, con otras "teorías de la vida" académicas, como el modelo de ciencias sociales estándar ampliamente compartido por la sociología, la antropología, la psicología del pop, la historia y la literatura. Sin embargo, las religiones grandes y pequeñas, los movimientos políticos, y a veces la economía a menudo generan o abrazan caricaturas ya existentes que ignoran la física y la biología (naturaleza humana), las fuerzas postulan terrestres o cósmicas que refuerzan nuestras supersticiones (los valores por defecto EP ), y ayudar a poner los desechos en la tierra (el verdadero propósito de casi todas las prácticas y instituciones sociales, que están ahí para facilitar la replicación de los genes y el consumo de recursos). El punto es darse cuenta de que estos están en un continuo con caricaturas filosóficas y tienen la misma fuente (nuestra psicología evolucionada). Todos nosotros podríamos decir para generar/absorber varias vistas de dibujos animados de la vida cuando joven y sólo unos pocos nunca crecen fuera de ellos. También tenga en cuenta que, como W comentó hace mucho tiempo, el prefijo "meta" es innecesario y confuso en la mayoría (tal vez todos) contextos, por lo que para ' metacognición ' en cualquier lugar sustituto ' cognición ' o ' pensamiento ', ya que pensar en lo que nosotros u otros creen o sabemos es pensar como cualquier otro y 64 no tiene que ser visto como ' mindreading ' (comprensión de la agencia o UA en mi terminología) tampoco. En S términos, el COS son la prueba de lo que se está pensado y son idénticos para ' está lloviendo ', creo que está lloviendo ', ' creo que creo que está lloviendo ' y ' él cree que está lloviendo ' (también para ' sabe ', deseos, jueces, entiende, etc.), es decir, que es Lloviendo. Este es el dato crítico a tener en cuenta con respecto a la ' metacognición ' y la ' mentalidad ' de las disposiciones (' actitudes proposicionales '). Ahora, algunos extractos de mi reseña de Carruthers ' (C) ' la opacidad de la mente ' (2013) que está repleta de las confusiones clásicas disfrazados de ciencia. Fue el tema de un Precis en Ciencias del cerebro y del comportamiento (BBS) que no se debe perder. Una de las respuestas en BBS fue por Dennett (que comparte la mayoría de las ilusiones de C), que parece encontrar estas ideas bastante bueno, excepto que C debe eliminar el uso de ' I ' ya que asume la existencia de un yo superior (el objetivo es la reducción dura de S2 a S1). Claro, el mismo acto de escribir, leer y todo el lenguaje y los conceptos de cualquier cosa que presuponen el yo, la conciencia y la voluntad (como S a menudo notas), por lo que tal relato sería sólo una caricatura de la vida sin ningún valor, que se podría decir de la mayoría filosóficas y muchas Disquisiciones "científicas" sobre el comportamiento. El marco W/S ha señalado desde hace tiempo que el punto de vista de primera persona no es eliminable o reducible a una 3a persona, pero esto no es un problema para la vista de dibujos animados de la vida. de la misma manera, con la descripción de la función cerebral o el comportamiento como ' computacional ', ' procesamiento de la información ', etc., -todos bien desacreditado innumerables veces por W/S, Hutto, Read, hacker y muchos otros. Lo peor de todo es la "representación" crucial pero totalmente poco clara, para lo cual creo que el uso de S como condición de satisfacción (COS) es de lejos el mejor. Es decir, la ' representación ' de ' creo que está lloviendo ' es la COS que está lloviendo. Más triste de todo es que C (como Dennett y Searle) piensa que es un experto en W, después de haberlo estudiado a principios de su carrera y decidió que el argumento del idioma privado debe ser rechazado como ' Behaviorismo '! W ha rechazado el Behaviorismo y gran parte de su trabajo se dedica a describir por qué no puede servir como una descripción del comportamiento. "¿No eres realmente un conductista disfrazado? ¿No estás realmente diciendo que todo excepto el comportamiento humano es una ficción? Si hablo de una ficción, entonces es de una ficción gramatical. " (PI P307) Y también se puede apuntar al Behaviorismo real en C en su forma moderna ' computacionalista '. W/S insisten en la indivisibilidad del punto de vista de la primera persona, mientras que C se disculpa con D en el artículo de BBS para usar "yo" o "self". HUTTO ha mostrado el vasto abismo entre W y Dennett (D) que servirá para caracterizar C, así, ya que tomo D y C (junto con los Churchland y muchos otros) para estar en la misma página. S es uno de los muchos que han deconstruido D en varios escritos y estos pueden ser leídos en oposición a C. Y recordemos que W se adhiere a ejemplos de lenguaje en acción, y una vez que uno consigue el punto que es en su 65 mayoría muy fácil de seguir, mientras que C es cautivado por la ' teoría ' (es decir, encadenar numerosas oraciones sin COS claros) y rara vez se molesta con juegos de idiomas específicos , prefiriendo experimentos y observaciones que son bastante difíciles de interpretar de cualquier manera definitiva (ver las respuestas BBS), y que en cualquier caso no tienen relevancia para las descripciones de mayor nivel de comportamiento (por ejemplo, exactamente cómo encajan en la intencionalidad Tabla). Un libro que elote como definitivo (memoria y el cerebro computacional) presenta el cerebro como un procesador de información computacional-una visión de segundo año aniquilada a fondo y repetidamente por S y otros, incluyendo W en la década de 1930. En la última década, He leído miles de páginas por y sobre W y es bastante claro que C no tiene una pista. En esto se une a una larga línea de distinguidos filósofos cuya lectura de W fue infructuoso - Russell, Quine, Dummett, Kripke, Dennett, Putnam, Chomsky, etc. (aunque Putnam comenzó a ver la luz más tarde). Simplemente no pueden captar el mensaje de que la mayoría de la filosofía es chistes gramaticales y viñetas imposibles, una visión de dibujos animados de la vida. Libros como ' la opacidad de la mente ' que intentan cerrar dos ciencias o dos niveles de descripción son realmente dos libros y no uno. Existe la descripción (no explicación, como W dejó claro) de nuestro lenguaje y comportamiento no verbal y luego los experimentos de psicología cognitiva. "La existencia del método experimental nos hace pensar que tenemos los medios para resolver los problemas que nos molesten; Aunque el problema y método se pasan entre sí. " (W PI p232), CET al están cautivados por la ciencia y simplemente asumen que es un gran avance para mimos-nivel de psicología descriptiva a la neurociencia y la psicología experimental, pero W/S y muchos otros han demostrado que esto es un error. Lejos de hacer la descripción de la conducta científica y clara, lo hace incoherente. Y debe haber sido por la gracia de Dios que Locke, Kant, Nietzsche, Hume, Wittgenstein, Searle et al fueron capaces de dar tales relatos memorables de comportamiento sin ninguna ciencia experimental en absoluto. Claro, como los políticos, los filósofos raramente admiten errores o se callan, así que esto seguirá adelante por razones que W diagnosticaron perfectamente. La línea de fondo tiene que ser lo que es útil y lo que tiene sentido en nuestra vida cotidiana. Sugiero que las opiniones filosóficas de los CDC (Carruthers, Dennett, Churchland), en contraposición a las de W/S, no sean útiles y sus conclusiones definitivas que harán, el yo y la conciencia son ilusiones no tienen sentido en absoluto - es decir, carecen de sentido, sin tener claro porque. Queda por determinar si los comentarios de los CDC sobre la ciencia cognitiva tienen algún valor heurístico. Este libro (como un gran cuerpo de otra escritura) trata de descontar el HOT de otros animales y reducir el comportamiento a las funciones cerebrales (para absorber la psicología en Fisiología). La filosofía es un desastre pero, siempre que uno lee primero las muchas críticas en el BBS, el comentario sobre la psicología reciente y la fisiología puede ser de interés. Al igual que Dennett, Churchland y muchos otros lo hacen a menudo, C no revela sus verdaderas gemas hasta el final, cuando se nos dice que el yo, la voluntad, la conciencia son ilusiones (supuestamente en los sentidos normales de estas palabras). Dennett tuvo que ser desenmascarado por S, Hutto et al por explicar estas ' supersticiones ' (es decir, haciendo el movimiento filosófico usual de 66 no explicar en absoluto y de hecho ni siquiera describir) pero sorprendentemente C lo admite al principio, aunque por supuesto él cree que está mostrando nosotros estas palabras no significan lo que pensamos y que su uso de dibujos animados es el válido. También hay que ver las críticas de Bennett y hacker de la ciencia cognitiva en ' fundamentos filosóficos de la neurociencia ' (2003) y su debate con S y Dennett en ' Neurociencia y filosofía ' (2009-y no se pierda el ensayo final de Daniel Robinson). También está bien explorado en tres libros recientes de hacker sobre "la naturaleza humana". Durante mucho tiempo se han realizado libros sobre física química y química física, pero no hay ninguna señal de que los dos se fusionen (ni es una idea coherente) ni que la química absorba la bioquímica ni a su vez absorberá la fisiología o la genética, ni que la biología desaparezca ni que eliminará la psicología, la sociología, etc. Esto no se debe a la "juventud" de estas disciplinas, sino al hecho de que son diferentes niveles de descripción con conceptos totalmente diferentes, datos y mecanismos explicativos. Pero la envidia de la física es poderoso y simplemente no podemos resistir la "precisión" de la física, las matemáticas, la información y el cómputo frente a la vaguedad de los niveles superiores. "Debe" ser posible. El reduccionismo prospera a pesar de la incomprensibilidad de la mecánica cuántica, la incertidumbre, las olas/partículas, los gatos vivos/muertos, el entrelazamiento cuántico y la incompletitud y la aleatoriedad de las matemáticas (Godel/Chaitin) ver mi revisión completa de Yanofsky ' el exterior Límites de la razón ' y los extractos aquí) y su atracción irresistible nos dice que es debido a los valores por defecto EP. Otra vez, un soplo de aire fresco mal necesitado de W: "para la pureza cristalina de la lógica era, por supuesto, no el resultado de la investigación: era un requisito." PI P107. Es difícil resistirse a tirar la mayoría de los libros sobre el comportamiento y releer a W y S. Simplemente salte de cualquier cosa que intente ' explicar ' un comportamiento de orden más alto para, por ejemplo, estas cotizaciones de PI http://topologicalmedialab.net/xinwei/classes/readings/Wittgenstein/pi_94138_239-309.html. Me parece claro después de leer 10000 páginas de filosofía en la última década que el intento de hacer psicología descriptiva de alto nivel de este tipo, donde el lenguaje ordinario se transforma en usos especiales tanto deliberadamente como inadvertidamente, es esencialmente imposible (es decir, la situación normal en la filosofía y otras disciplinas conductuales). El uso de palabras especiales de jerga (por ejemplo, la intensionalidad, el realismo, etc.) no funciona ya que no hay ninguna policía de filosofía para imponer una definición estrecha y los argumentos sobre lo que significan son interminables. Hacker es bueno, pero su escritura tan preciosa y densa que a menudo es dolorosa. Searle es muy bueno, pero requiere un poco de esfuerzo para abrazar su terminología y hace algunos errores atroces, mientras que W es manos abajo el más claro y más perspicaz, una vez que comprenda lo que está haciendo, y nadie nunca ha sido capaz de emular a él. Su TLP sigue siendo la última declaración de la visión reduccionista mecánica de la vida, pero más tarde vio su error y diagnosticó y curó la ' enfermedad de los dibujos animados ', pero pocos consiguen el punto y más 67 simplemente lo ignoran y la biología también, y por lo que hay decenas de miles de libros y millones de artículos y la mayoría de las organizaciones religiosas y políticas (y hasta hace poco la mayor parte de la economía) y casi todas las personas con vistas de dibujos animados de la vida. Pero el mundo no es una caricatura, por lo que una gran tragedia se está reproduciendo como las vistas de dibujos animados de la vida (por ejemplo, socialismo, democracia, multiculturalismo) colisionan con la realidad y la ceguera y el egoísmo universales traen consigo el colapso de la civilización. Me parece bastante obvio (ya que era a W) que la visión mecánica de la mente existe por la misma razón que todo el comportamiento básico-es la operación por defecto de nuestro EP que busca explicaciones en términos de lo que podemos pensar deliberadamente a través de lentamente , en lugar de en el S1 automatizado, del que en su mayoría permanecemos ajenos. Sin embargo, es cierto que la mayor parte del comportamiento es mecánico y que la ilusión fenomenológica es de alcance mucho mayor que la que Searle describe. Es más llamativo para mí cuando se conduce un coche en la autopista y de repente de vuelta a la conciencia S2 sorprendido de darse cuenta de que acabo de conducir durante varios minutos sin conciencia consciente de conducir En absoluto. En la reflexión, este automatismo se puede ver para tener en cuenta casi todo nuestro comportamiento, con una supervisión y un conocimiento mínimos del S2. Estoy escribiendo esta página y tengo que "Pensar" (es decir, dejar pasar algún tiempo) sobre qué decir, pero luego simplemente fluye hacia fuera en mis manos que lo tipo y en general es una sorpresa para mí, excepto cuando pienso en cambiar una oración específica. Y lo lees dando comandos a tu cuerpo para que se sientan quietos y Miren esta parte de la página, pero las palabras sólo fluyen en ti y algún tipo de comprensión y la memoria suceden, pero a menos que te concentres en una frase sólo hay una vaga sensación de hacer algo. Un jugador de fútbol corre por el campo y patea la pelota y miles de impulsos nerviosos y contracciones musculares hábilmente coordinado con movimientos oculares, y retroalimentación de órganos propioceptivos y de equilibrio han ocurrido, pero sólo hay una vaga sensación de control y conocimiento de alto nivel de los resultados. S2 es el jefe de policía que se sienta en su oficina, mientras que S1 tiene miles de oficiales haciendo el trabajo real de acuerdo con las leyes que él en su mayoría ni siquiera sabe. Leer, escribir o fútbol son actos voluntarios a2 vistos desde arriba, pero compuesto por miles de hechos automáticos a1 vistos desde abajo. Gran parte de la ciencia conductual contemporánea se refiere a estos automatismos. Es una buena idea leer al menos el capítulo 6 de la PNC de Searle, "la ilusión fenomenológica" (TPI). Es claro como el cristal que TPI es debido a la obliviosidad a los automatismos de S1 y a tomar el pensamiento consciente lento del S2 como no sólo primario sino como todo lo que hay. Este es el clásico ceguera de pizarra en blanco. También está claro que W demostró esto unos 60 años antes y dio la razón de ello en la primacía de la red axiomática automática inconsciente sólo verdadero de nuestro sistema innato 1 que es la fuente del interior. Muy aproximadamente, con respecto a las características "independientes del observador" del mundo como S1 o el interior, y las características de "dependiente del observador" como S2 o el exterior deben ser 68 muy reveladoras. Como señala Searle, los fenomenólogos tienen la ontología exactamente al revés, pero por supuesto lo hace casi todo el mundo debido a los valores predeterminados de su EP. Otro excelente trabajo en W que merece un estudio cercano es ' Wittgenstein de Johnston: repensar el interior ' (1993). Señala que algunos objetarán que si nuestros informes y memorias son realmente no comprobable no tendrían ningún valor, pero "esta objeción pierde todo el punto del argumento de W, ya que asume que lo que realmente sucedió, y lo que el individuo dice que sucedió, son dos Cosas. Como hemos visto, sin embargo, la gramática de las declaraciones psicológicas significa que este último constituye el criterio para el primero. Si vemos a alguien con una expresión concentrada en su rostro y queremos saber ' lo que está sucediendo dentro de ella ', entonces su sinceremente diciéndonos que ella está intentando para solucionar la respuesta a una suma complicada nos dice exactamente lo que queremos saber. La cuestión de si, a pesar de su sinceridad, su afirmación podría ser una descripción inexacta de lo que ella es (o estaba) haciendo no surge. La fuente de confusión aquí es la incapacidad de reconocer que los conceptos psicológicos tienen una gramática diferente de la de los conceptos utilizados para describir los eventos externos. Lo que hace que el interior parezca tan misterioso es el intento equivocado de entender un concepto en términos de otro. De hecho, nuestro concepto de interior, a lo que nos referimos cuando hablamos de "lo que estaba sucediendo dentro de ella" está ligado no a misteriosos procesos internos, sino a la cuenta que el individuo ofrece de su experiencia... Como procesos o eventos, lo que sucede dentro del individuo no es de interés, o más bien es de un interés puramente médico o científico "(p13-14). "El ataque de W a la noción de procesos internos no implica que sólo los asuntos exteriores, por el contrario; al sacar a la realidad la verdadera naturaleza de las expresiones, subraya el hecho de que no sólo nos interesa el comportamiento. No sólo queremos saber que el cuerpo de la persona estaba en tal y tal posición y que sus características dispuestas en tal y tal manera. Más bien nos interesa su cuenta de lo que estaba detrás de este comportamiento... " (p16-17) Al establecer el razonamiento de W sobre la imposibilidad de normas privadas o de un idioma privado, señala que "el verdadero problema, sin embargo, no es simplemente que no haya establecido reglas, sino que, en principio, no podría hacerlo... El punto es que sin procedimientos públicamente verificables, ella no podía distinguir entre seguir la regla y simplemente pensar que ella está siguiendo la regla. " En P55 Johnston hace el punto con respecto a la visión (que ha sido hecho muchas veces por W y S en este y otros contextos) que la discusión de la exterior es totalmente dependiente de su muy inteligibilidad en la naturaleza indiscutible de nuestra primera persona directa experiencia del interior. El sistema 2 dudas escépticas en cuanto a la mente, voluntad, sentidos, mundo, no puede tener un punto de apoyo sin las certezas verdaderas del sistema 1 y la certeza de que usted está leyendo estas palabras ahora es la base para el juicio, no una cosa que sí mismo puede ser juzgado. Este error es uno de los más básicos y comunes en toda filosofía. 69 En P81 señala que la imposibilidad, en el caso normal, de comprobar sus afirmaciones concernientes a sus disposiciones (a menudo, pero confusamente llamadas "actitudes proposicionales") como lo que pensó o se siente, lejos de ser un defecto de nuestra psicología , es exactamente lo que le da interés a estas afirmaciones. "Estoy cansado" nos dice cómo te sientes en lugar de darnos otro pedacito de datos sobre el exterior como tus movimientos lentos o las sombras debajo de tus ojos. Johnston entonces hace un excelente trabajo de explicar la desacreditación de W de la idea de que el significado o la comprensión (y todas las disposiciones) son experiencias que acompañan el habla. Como indicó W, sólo tienes que considerar el caso donde crees que entiendes, y luego descubrir que no, para ver la irrelevancia de cualquier experiencia interior a significado, comprensión, pensar, creer, saber, etc. La experiencia que cuenta es la conciencia del juego de lenguaje público en el que participamos. Consideraciones similares disuelven el problema de la "velocidad del rayo del pensamiento". "La clave es reconocer que el pensamiento no es un proceso o una sucesión de experiencias, sino un aspecto de la vida de los seres conscientes. Lo que corresponde a la velocidad del rayo del pensamiento es la capacidad del individuo para explicar en cualquier momento lo que está haciendo o diciendo. " (P86). Y como dice W "o, si uno llama al principio y al final de la oración el principio y el fin del pensamiento, entonces no está claro si uno debe decir de la experiencia de pensar que es uniforme durante este tiempo o si es un proceso como hablar la oración sí mismo "(RPP2p237). Una vez más: "los individuos tienen en cuenta lo que ella pensó que tiene la misma gramática que su relato de lo que ella pretendía y de lo que significaba. Lo que nos interesa es el relato del pasado que se inclina a dar y la suposición de que ella será capaz de dar una cuenta es parte de lo que está involucrado en verla como consciente "(p 91). Es decir, todos estos verbos de disposición son parte de nuestro consciente, voluntario S2 psicología. En "la complejidad del interior", señala que es irónico que nuestra mejor manera de comunicar el interior es referirse al exterior pero yo diría que es natural e inevitable. Ya que no hay lenguaje privado y no hay telepatía, sólo podemos contraer los músculos y, con mucho, la comunicación más eficiente y profunda es mediante la contratación de los músculos orales (habla). Como comentó W en varios contextos, está en obras (o ahora en televisión y películas) que vemos el lenguaje (pensamiento) en su forma más pura. Las disposiciones como la intención continúan siempre y cuando no las cambiemos o las olvidemos y así carecemos de una duración precisa, así como niveles de intensidad y el contenido es una decisión y por lo tanto no es un estado mental preciso, por lo que en todos estos aspectos son muy diferentes de S1 mi, recuerdos y respuestas reflexivas como las emociones S1. La diferencia entre S1 y S2 (como lo puse-esto no era una terminología disponible para 70 J o W) también se ve en la asimetría de los verbos de disposición, con el uso en primera persona de ' yo creo ', etc., siendo (en el caso normal de la expresión sincera) oraciones verdaderas solamente contra la TH persona IRD utiliza "él cree", etc., siendo verdaderas o falsas proposiciones basadas en evidencias. Uno no puede decir "Creo que está lloviendo y no lo es", pero otros tiempos como "yo creía que estaba lloviendo y no era" o la tercera persona "él cree que está lloviendo y no lo es" están bien. Como dice J: "el problema general en el corazón del problema aquí es si el individuo puede observar sus propias disposiciones... La clave para aclarar esta paradoja es señalar que la descripción de los individuos de su propio estado de ánimo es también indirectamente la descripción de un estado de cosas... En otras palabras, alguien que dice que cree que P se compromete a afirmar P misma... La razón por la que el individuo no puede observar su creencia es que al adoptar una postura neutral o evaluatoria hacia ella, ella la socava. Alguien que dijo "Creo que está lloviendo pero no lo es" socavaría así su propia afirmación. Como señala W, no puede haber una primera persona equivalente del uso de la tercera persona del verbo por la misma razón que un verbo que significa creer falsamente falta una primera persona presente indicativo... las dos proposiciones no son independientes, porque ' la afirmación de que esto está sucediendo dentro de mí afirma: esto está sucediendo fuera de mí ' (RPP1 p490) "(P154-56). Aunque no comentado por W o J, el hecho de que los niños nunca cometen tales errores como "quiero el caramelo pero no creo que lo quiero", etc., muestra que tales construcciones están construidas en nuestra gramática (en nuestros genes) y no addiciones culturales. A continuación, mira esto desde otro punto de vista citando W "¿Cuál sería el punto de mis conclusiones de dibujo de mis propias palabras a mi comportamiento, cuando en cualquier caso sé lo que creo? ¿Y cuál es la manifestación de mi saber lo que creo? ¿No se manifiesta precisamente en esto-que no infiere mi comportamiento de mis palabras? Ese es el hecho. " (RPP1 p744). Otra manera de decir esto es que S1 es la base axiomática verdaderasólo para la cognición, y como el sustrato no proposicional para determinar la verdad y la falsedad, no se puede juzgar inteligible. Termina el capítulo con comentarios importantes sobre la variabilidad dentro de los LG (dentro de nuestra psicología) y sugiero que se lea con cuidado. Johnston continúa la discusión en "la imagen interior/exterior" gran parte de la cual se resume en su cita de W. "el interior está oculto a nosotros significa que está oculto de nosotros en un sentido que no está oculto de él. Y no se esconde del dueño en el sentido de que él le da expresión, y nosotros, bajo ciertas condiciones, creemos que su expresión y allí, error no tiene lugar. Y esta asimetría en el juego se expresa en la frase que el interior está oculto a otras personas. " (LWPP2 p36). J continúa: "el problema no es que el interior está oculto, sino que el juego de idiomas que implica es muy diferente de aquellos donde normalmente hablamos de conocimiento." Y luego entra en uno de los temas principales de W a lo largo de su vida, la diferencia entre el hombre y la máquina. "Pero con un ser humano la suposición es que es imposible 71 obtener una visión del mecanismo. Así, indeterminacia es postulada... Creo que la imprevisibilidad debe ser una característica esencial del interior. Como también es la infinita diversidad de expresiones. " (RPP2 p645 y LWPP2 p65). Otra vez, W sonda la diferencia entre los animales y las computadoras. J señala que las incertidumbres en nuestros LG no son defectos sino críticos para nuestra humanidad. Una vez más W: "[lo que importa es] no que la evidencia hace que el sentimiento (y así el interior) meramente probable, sino que tratamos esto como evidencia de algo importante, que basamos un juicio sobre este tipo de pruebas implicadas, y para que esa evidencia tiene un especial importancia en nuestras vidas y se hace prominente por un concepto. " (Z p554). J ve tres aspectos de esta incertidumbre como la falta de criterios fijos o matices finos de significado, la ausencia de una determinación rígida de las consecuencias de los Estados internos y la falta de relaciones fijas entre nuestros conceptos y experiencia. W: "Uno no puede decir cuáles son las consecuencias observables esenciales de un estado interno Son. Cuando, por ejemplo, realmente se complace, ¿qué es lo que se espera de él, y qué no? Por supuesto, existen tales consecuencias características, pero no se pueden describir de la misma manera que las reacciones que caracterizan el estado de un objeto físico. " (LWPP2 P90). J "aquí su estado interior no es algo que no podemos saber porque no podemos penetrar en el velo del exterior. Más bien no hay nada determinado para saber. " (P195). En su último capítulo, señala que nuestros LG no son propensos a cambiar independientemente del progreso científico. "Aunque es concebible que el estudio de la actividad cerebral podría resultar ser un predictor más fiable del comportamiento humano, el tipo de comprensión de la acción humana que dio no sería el mismo que el involucrado en el juego de idiomas en las intenciones. Cualquiera que sea el valor del científico'descubrimiento, no se podría decir que ha revelado qué intenciones son realmente. " (p213). Esta indeterminación conduce a la noción de que la correlación de los Estados cerebrales con las disposiciones parece improbable. "La dificultad aquí es que la noción de un pensamiento es un concepto altamente artificial. ¿Cuántos pensamientos hay en el Tractatus? Y cuando la idea básica para que golpeó W, fue que un pensamiento o un sarpullido de ellos? La noción de intenciones crea problemas similares... Estas declaraciones subsiguientes pueden ser vistas como amplificaciones o explicaciones del pensamiento original, pero ¿cómo vamos a suponer que esto se relaciona con el estado del cerebro? ¿Vamos a imaginar que también contendrá la respuesta a todas las preguntas posibles sobre el pensamiento?.. tendríamos que permitir que dos pensamientos significativamente diferentes se correlacionan con el mismo estado cerebral... palabras pueden en un sentido ser intercambiables y en otro sentido no. Esto crea problemas para el intento de correlacionar Estados y pensamientos cerebrales... dos pensamientos pueden ser los mismos en un sentido y diferentes en otro... Por lo tanto, la noción de un pensamiento es frágil y artificial y por esa razón es difícil ver qué sentido podría hacer para hablar de una correlación de uno a uno con 72 los Estados cerebrales. " (P218-219). Es decir, el mismo pensamiento (COS) "está lloviendo" expresa un número infinito de Estados cerebrales en una o muchas personas. de la misma manera, el ' mismo ' estado cerebral podría expresar pensamientos diferentes (COS) en diferentes contextos. Del mismo modo, W niega que la memoria consiste en rastros en el sistema nervioso. "Aquí la traza postulada es como el reloj interno, porque ya no inferimos lo que pasó de un rastro de lo que consultamos un reloj interno para adivinar el tiempo." A continuación, toma nota de un ejemplo de W (RPP1 p908) de un hombre que anota las marcas mientras lee y que no puede repetir el texto sin las marcas, pero no se relacionan con el texto por las reglas ... "El texto no se almacenaría en los anotaciones. ¿Y por qué debe almacenarse en nuestro sistema nervioso? "y también "... nada me parece más plausible que que la gente algún día llegará a la opinión definitiva de que hay no hay copia en el sistema fisiológico o nervioso que corresponde a un pensamiento particular o una idea particular de la memoria "(LWPP1 P504). Esto implica que puede haber regularidades psicológicas a las que no corresponden regularidades fisiológicas; y como W añade provocativamente ' si esto altera nuestros conceptos de causalidad, entonces es hora de que se molesten. ' " (RPP1 p905) ... «¿Por qué no deben conectarse los Estados iniciales y los terminales de un sistema mediante una ley natural que no cubra el estado intermediario? (RPP1 p909) ... [Es muy probable que] no hay ningún proceso en el cerebro correlacionado con la asociación o con el pensamiento, por lo que sería imposible leer los procesos de pensamiento de los procesos cerebrales... ¿Por qué esta orden, por así decirlo, no procede del caos? ... como era, sin causa; y no hay ninguna razón por la que esto no debe sostener realmente para nuestros pensamientos, y por lo tanto para nuestra charla y escritura. ' (RPP1 P903)... ¿Pero debe haber una explicación fisiológica aquí? ¿Por qué no dejamos de explicarnos solos? -¡ pero nunca hablaras así si estuvieras examinando el comportamiento de una máquina! – Bueno, ¿quién dice que una criatura viviente, un cuerpo animal, es una máquina en este sentido? ' " (RPPI p918) (p 220-21). Claro, uno puede tomar estos comentarios diversamente, pero una manera es que W anticipa el ascenso de la teoría del caos, la mente encarnada y la autoorganización en la biología. Ya que la incertidumbre, el caos y la imprevisibilidad son la doctrina estándar ahora, desde la escala subatómica a la molecular, y en la dinámica planetaria (clima, etc.,) y la cosmología, ¿por qué el cerebro debe ser una excepción? Los únicos comentarios detallados sobre estas observaciones que he visto están en un artículo reciente de Daniele Moyal-Sharrock (DMS). Es bastante llamativo que aunque las observaciones de W son fundamentales para todos los estudios de comportamiento: lingüística, filosofía, psicología, historia, Antropología, política, sociología y arte, ni siquiera se menciona en la mayoría de los libros y artículos, incluso con las excepciones tener poco que decir, y la mayoría de eso distorsionada o plana mal. Hay una ráfaga de interés reciente, al menos en filosofía, y posiblemente esta situación absurda cambiará, pero probablemente no mucho. La discusión de la diferencia lógica (psicológica) entre las causas del S1 y las razones 73 del S2 en el capítulo 7 del reciente libro de hacker ' Human Nature ' (2011), especialmente la P226-32, es fundamental para cualquier estudiante de conducta. Es una ilusión casi universal que "causa" es un término exacto lógicamente exacta, mientras que la "razón" no es pero W expuso esto muchas veces. Claro, el mismo problema surge con todo el concepto científico y matemáticos. y por supuesto, uno debe mantener constantemente en mente que la ' Acción ', ' condición ', ' satisfacción ', ' intención ', e incluso ' y ', ' o ', ' prior ', ' verdadero ', etc. son todos los juegos de lenguaje complejos capaces de tropezar con W tan bellamente descrito en BBB a principios de los años 30. Searle hace muchos comentarios interesantes en uno de sus libros más recientes ' pensar sobre el mundo real ' (TARW) (2013), y parece que he escrito la única revisión, así que voy a discutirlo en detalle aquí. En el p21 de TARW, de nuevo nos encontramos con lo que yo consideré como el defecto más evidente en el trabajo de S y uno que debería haber sido obviado hace mucho tiempo si hubiera leído más adelante W y sus comentaristas más cuidadosamente. Se refiere al libre voluntad como una "suposición" que puede que tengamos que renunciar! Es cristalina de W que voluntad, auto, mundo, y todos los fenómenos de nuestras vidas son la base para juzgar-el fundamento axiomático de nuestro comportamiento y no hay posibilidad de juzgarlos. ¿Podemos "suponer" que tenemos dos manos o vivimos en la superficie de la tierra o que Madonna es cantante, etc.? Tal vez este gran error está conectado con su mezcla de verdadero sólo S1 y proposicional S2 que he notado. Increíble que él puede conseguir casi todo lo demás derecho y tropezar en esto! En p22 y en otros lugares utiliza la noción de intencionalidad inconsciente, que discutió por primera vez en su artículo de 1991 en Phil. cuestiones, señalando que estos son el tipo de cosas que podrían llegar a ser conscientes (por ejemplo, sueños). W era yo creo que el primero en comentar esto señalando que si usted no puede hablar de pensamientos inconscientes que no se puede hablar de los conscientes o bien (BBB). Aquí y a lo largo de su trabajo es desgraciado que no utiliza el S1/Los conceptos S2, ya que hace que sea mucho más fácil de mantener las cosas rectas y que todavía encuentra necesario para disfrutar de la jerga muy de un-Wittgensteinian. Por ejemplo, "una vez que tienes elementos sintácticos manipulables, puedes separar la intencionalidad de sus causas inmediatas en forma de percepciones y recuerdos, de una manera que no es posible hacer destacamentos de elementos representacionales estructurados unsintácticamente." (P31) sólo dice que con el lenguaje llegó la intencionalidad disposicional de S2, donde el pensamiento consciente y la razón (es decir, posibles acciones públicas expresables en el lenguaje) se hizo posible. En cuanto a razones y deseos (P39) ver en otro lugar aquí y mis evaluaciones de sus otras obras. La continua referencia de S a las disposiciones como Estados mentales, y su referencia a los Estados mentales como Representaciones (en realidad ' presentaciones ' aquí) 74 con COS, es (en mi opinión) contraproducente. En P25 por ejemplo, parece que quiere decir que la manzana que vemos es la COS de la CSR – (causalmente auto reflexivo -es decir, causa está incorporada en) la percepción de la manzana y el reflejo inconsciente reflexivo de una picazón tiene el mismo estado (es decir, un cos) como el movimiento deliberado planeado del brazo. Así, los Estados mentales de S1 se incluirán con las acciones de S2 como COS. Aunque acepto la mayoría de la ontología y Epistemología de S no veo la ventaja de esto, pero tengo el mayor respeto por él, así que voy a trabajar en ello. Me han notado su tendencia (normal para otros pero un defecto en Searle) para mezclar S1 y S2 que hace en p29 donde parece que se refiere a las creencias como Estados mentales. Me parece bastante básico y claro desde la BBB de W en los años 30 que S2 no son Estados mentales en algo como el sentido de S1. Necesitamos siempre mantener clara la diferencia entre los juegos de idiomas de S1 y S2 y así que si él insiste en utilizar el juego de la creencia en referencia a S1 entonces es mucho más claro si nos referimos a B1 y B2 donde B2 es la palabra "creencia" como se utiliza en referencia a la actos lingüísticos públicos del sistema 2. El párrafo que comienza "porque" en P25 está discutiendo los verdaderos perceptos inconscientes, los recuerdos y los actos reflexivos de S1 - i. e., nuestro axiomático funciones automáticas de nuestra psicología evolucionada (EP). Como se ha señalado, uno puede leer el libro de Hutto y Myin ' radicalizando el Enactivismo: mentes básicas sin contenido ' (2012) y su secuela para una cuenta reciente muy diferente de la naturaleza no representacional o enactiva de S1. La tabla de intencionalidad sobre el P26 actualiza una que ha utilizado durante décadas y que he utilizado como base para mi tabla extendida de arriba. Hace casi medio siglo S escribió "cómo derivar debe de es" que fue un avance revolucionario en nuestra comprensión de la conducta (aunque menos si uno entendió W). Él ha continuado desarrollando la descripción naturalista del comportamiento y en P39 muestra cómo la ética se origina en nuestra conducta social innata y el lenguaje. Un concepto básico es el deseo de razones independientes de acción (DIRA), que se explica en sus diversos libros. Para un esquema ver mis comentarios de su MSW y otras obras. Tiende a utilizar las razones próximas de S2 (es decir, la psicología disposicional y la cultura) para enmarcar su análisis, pero como con todo comportamiento lo veo como superficial a menos que incluya las causas finales en S1 y así rompo su DIRA en DIRA1 y DIRA2. Esto permite la descripción en términos de los mecanismos inconscientes del altruismo recíproco y la aptitud inclusiva. Así, Me gustaría reafirmar la última frase en P39 "... se pide a las personas que anulen sus inclinaciones naturales haciendo que prevalezcan las consideraciones éticas "como"... las personas se ven obligadas a anular sus beneficios personales inmediatos para asegurar beneficios genéticos a largo plazo a través del altruismo recíproco y la aptitud inclusiva. " La obliviosidad de S (que comparte con la mayoría de los filósofos) al marco moderno de dos sistemas, y a las implicaciones de la epistemología "radical" de W, como se ha expresado con mayor espectacularmente en su última obra ' en certeza ', es muy lamentable (como he señalado en muchos comentarios). Fue W quien hizo el primer y 75 mejor trabajo de describir los dos sistemas (aunque nadie más lo ha notado) y OC representa un evento importante en la historia intelectual. No sólo S es consciente del hecho de que su marco es una continuación directa de W, pero todos los demás es también, lo que explica la falta de cualquier referencia significativa a W en este libro. Como de costumbre, también se observa que no se ha conocido con EP, lo que puede iluminar todas las discusiones de comportamiento proporcionando las verdaderas explicaciones evolucionarias y biológicas en lugar de las superficiales culturales cercanas. Así, La discusión de S de las dos maneras de describir las sensaciones (' experiencias ') en P202 es en mi opinión mucho más clara si uno se da cuenta de que ver el dolor rojo o sentir es un verdadero S1 automático, pero tan pronto como lo atendemos conscientemente (aprox. 500 ms o más) se convierte en ' ver como ' y un proposicional (verdadero o falso) función S2 que se puede expresar públicamente en el lenguaje (y otras contracciones musculares corporales, así). Así, la ' experiencia ' S1 que es idéntica con el rojo o el dolor vs la ' experiencia ' S2 de rojo o dolor, una vez que comenzamos a reflexionar sobre él, normalmente se mezclan juntos en una ' experiencia '. Para mí, de lejos, el mejor lugar para obtener una comprensión de estos problemas es todavia en los escritos de W comenzando con el BBB y terminando con OC. nadie más ha descrito las sutilezas de los juegos de idiomas con tanta claridad. Uno debe tener siempre en cuenta la vaguedad y los significados múltiples de ' error ', ' verdadero ', ' experiencia ', ' entender ', ' saber ', ' ver ', ' mismo ', etc., pero sólo W pudo hacerlo, incluso S tropieza con frecuencia. Y no es un problema trivial, a menos que uno pueda reafirmar claramente todo P202 separando el S1 no juzgable verdadero de la proposicional S2, entonces nada sobre el comportamiento se puede decir sin confusión. Y por supuesto, muy a menudo (es decir, normalmente) las palabras se utilizan sin un significado claro-uno tiene que especificar cómo "verdadero" o "sigue" o "ver" se debe utilizar en este contexto y W es el único que conozco que consistentemente consigue este derecho. Otra vez en el P203 Row-206, la discusión de los causales automáticos intrínsecamente intencional disposicionalidad sólo tiene sentido para Yo porque lo miro como otra manera de describir los Estados S1, que proporcionan la materia prima para la predisposición deliberada de la disposicionalidad S2 que, desde un punto de vista biológico evolutivo (y lo que otro puede haber?) tiene que ser el caso. Por lo tanto, su comentario sobre P212 está justo en el dinero-la explicación final (o como W insiste en la descripción) sólo puede ser una naturalizada que describe cómo la mente, voluntad, sí mismo y la intención de trabajo y no puede eliminarlos de manera significativa como fenómenos ' reales '. Recordemos la famosa reseña de S de la ' conciencia explicada ' de Dennett titulada "la conciencia explicada". Y esto hace que sea más bizarro que S debe afirmar repetidamente que no sabemos con certeza si tenemos libre voluntad y que tenemos que ' postularse ' un yo (P218-219). Además, Una vez más pienso que S está en el camino equivocado (p214) cuando sugiere que las confusiones se deben a errores históricos en filosofía como el dualismo, el idealismo, el materialismo, el epifenomenalismo, etc., más que en la susceptibilidad 76 universal a los incumplimientos de nuestra Psicología - ' La fenomenológica Illusion ' (TPI) como él lo ha llamado, y embrujado por el lenguaje como bellamente descrito por W. Como señala, "los procesos neurobiológicos y los fenómenos mentales son el mismo acontecimiento, descritos a diferentes niveles" y "¿Cómo pueden las intenciones conscientes causar movimiento corporal? ... ¿Cómo puede el martillo mover el clavo en virtud de ser sólido? ... Si analizamos qué solidez es causalmente... Si usted analiza qué intención-en-acción es causalmente, usted ve análogamente no hay ningún problema filosófico dejado. " Traduzco su comentario (P220) "un orador puede utilizar una expresión para referirse sólo si en la expresión de las expresiones de referencia el orador introduce una condición que el objeto referido satisface; y referencia se logra en virtud de la satisfacción de esta condición. "como" el significado se logra declarando una condición de satisfacción públicamente verificable (condición de la verdad). " "Creo que está lloviendo" es cierto si está lloviendo y falso de lo contrario. Además, Me gustaría decir "el corazón de mi argumento es que nuestras prácticas lingüísticas, como se entiende comúnmente, presuponen una realidad que existe independientemente de nuestras representaciones." (p223) como "nuestra vida muestra un mundo que no depende de nuestra existencia y no puede ser cuestionado inteligible." Tiempo para algunas citas más y una discusión de su reciente libro de reimpresiones ' filosofía en un nuevo siglo ' (2008) y como en otros lugares voy a repetir algunos comentarios para colocarlos en un contexto diferente. "¿Podría un proceso de máquina causar un proceso de pensamiento? La respuesta es: sí. en efecto, sólo un proceso de máquina puede causar un proceso de pensamiento, y ' cálculo ' no nombra un proceso de máquina; se nombra un proceso que puede ser, y por lo general se, implementado en una máquina. " Searle PNC p73 "... la caracterización de un proceso como computacional es una caracterización de un sistema físico desde fuera; y la identificación del proceso como computacional no identifica una característica intrínseca de la física, es esencialmente una caracterización relativa del observador. " Searle PNC P95 "El argumento de la sala China demostró que la semántica no es intrínseca a la sintaxis. Ahora estoy haciendo el punto separado y diferente que la sintaxis no es intrínseca a la física. " Searle PNC p94 "El intento de eliminar la falacia de homúnculo a través de la descomposición recursiva falla, porque la única manera de obtener la sintaxis intrínseca a la física es poner un homúnculo en la física." Searle PNC p97 "Pero no se puede explicar un sistema físico como una máquina de escribir o un 77 cerebro mediante la identificación de un patrón que comparte con su simulación computacional, porque la existencia del patrón no explica cómo el sistema funciona realmente como un sistema físico. ... En Resumen, el hecho de que la atribución de sintaxis no identifique otras potencias causales es fatal para la afirmación de que los programas proporcionan explicaciones causales de la cognición... Sólo hay un mecanismo físico, el cerebro, con sus diversos niveles causales físicos y físicos/mentales de la descripción. " Searle PNC P101-103 "En Resumen, el sentido de" procesamiento de la información "que se utiliza en la ciencia cognitiva es un nivel demasiado alto de abstracción para captar la realidad biológica concreta de la intencionalidad intrínseca... Estamos cegados a esta diferencia por el hecho de que la misma frase ' veo un coche viniendo hacia mí ', se puede utilizar para registrar tanto la intencionalidad visual como la salida del modelo computacional de la visión... en el sentido de ' información ' utilizada en la ciencia cognitiva, es simplemente falso decir que el cerebro es un dispositivo de procesamiento de información. " Searle PNC P104-105 "¿Puede haber razones para la acción que son vinculantes para un agente racional sólo en virtud de la naturaleza del hecho reportado en la declaración de razón, e independientemente de los deseos del agente, los valores, las actitudes y ¿Evaluaciones? ... La verdadera paradoja de la discusión tradicional es que intenta plantear la guillotina de Hume, la rígida distinción de valor de hecho, en un vocabulario, cuyo uso ya presupone la falsedad de la distinción. " Searle PNC p165171 "... todas las funciones de estado y por lo tanto toda la realidad institucional, con la excepción del lenguaje, son creadas por actos de voz que tienen la forma lógica de las declaraciones... las formas de la función de status en cuestión son casi invariablemente cuestiones de poderes deóntica... reconocer algo como un derecho, un deber, una obligación, un requisito, etcétera, es reconocer un motivo de acción... Estas estructuras deonticas hacen posible el deseo-razones independientes de la acción... El punto general es muy claro: la creación del campo general de los motivos de acción basados en el deseo presuponía la aceptación de un sistema de razones de acción independientes del deseo. " Searle PNC P34-49 "Algunas de las características lógicas más importantes de la intencionalidad están más allá del alcance de la fenomenología porque no tienen una realidad fenomenológica inmediata... Porque la creación del significado de la falta de sentido no se experimenta conscientemente... no existe... Esto es... la ilusión fenomenológica. " Searle PNC P115117 "La conciencia es causalmente reducible a los procesos cerebrales... y la conciencia no tiene poderes causales propios, además de los poderes causales de la Neurobiología... Pero la reducibilidad causal no conduce a la reducibilidad ontológica... conciencia sólo existe como experimentada... y por lo tanto no puede reducirse a algo que tiene una ontología en tercera persona, algo que existe independientemente de las experiencias. 78 " Searle PNC 155-6 "... la relación intencional básica entre la mente y el mundo tiene que ver con las condiciones de satisfacción. Y una proposición es cualquier cosa que pueda estar en una relación intencional con el mundo, y ya que esas relaciones intencionales siempre determinan las condiciones de satisfacción, y una proposición se define como cualquier cosa suficiente para determinar las condiciones de satisfacción, resulta que toda intencionalidad es una cuestión de proposiciones. " Searle PNC p193 Aunque S no dice y parece ser en gran parte inconsciente, la mayor parte de su trabajo sigue directamente de la de W, a pesar de que a menudo lo critica. Decir que Searle ha llevado a cabo el trabajo de W no es decir que es un resultado directo del estudio W, sino más bien que porque sólo hay una psicología humana (por la misma razón sólo hay una Cardiología humana), que cualquier persona que describa con precisión la conducta debe estar expresando SOM e variante o extensión de lo que W dijo (como deben si ambos están dando descripciones correctas de comportamiento). Encuentro la mayoría de S prefigurado en W, incluyendo versiones del famoso argumento de la sala China contra Strong AI y temas relacionados que son los temas de CHAPS 3-5. Por cierto, si la habitación China le interesa entonces usted debe leer el excelente, pero virtualmente desconocido suplemento de Victor Rodych en el CR-"Searle liberado de cada defecto". Rodych también ha escrito una serie de artículos magníficos sobre la filosofía de W de matemáticas--es decir, el EP (psicología evolutiva) de la capacidad axiomática System 1 de contar hasta 3, como se extendió en el sistema infinito 2 SLG (juegos de lenguaje secundario) de matemáticas. Las ideas de W sobre la psicología de las matemáticas proporcionan una excelente entrada en la intencionalidad. También señalaré que nadie que promueva la IA fuerte, las versiones múltiples del Behaviorismo, el funcionalismo informático, el CTM (teoría computacional de la mente) y la teoría de los sistemas dinámicos (DST), parece ser consciente de que el Tractatus de W puede ser visto como el más llamativo y poderosa declaración de su punto de vista (es decir, comportamiento (pensamiento) como el procesamiento lógico de los hechos--es decir, procesamiento de la información). Claro, más tarde (pero antes de que el ordenador digital fuera un destello en el ojo de Turing) W describió con gran detalle por qué estas eran descripciones incoherentes de la mente (pensamiento, comportamiento) que debe ser reemplazado por la psicología (o se puede decir que esto es todo lo que hizo por el resto de su vida). S sin embargo hace poca referencia a la declaración de la mente presciente de W como mecanismo, y su destrucción de ella en su trabajo posterior. Desde W, S se ha convertido en el principal deconstructor de estas vistas mecánicas de comportamiento, y quizás el más importante psicólogo descriptivo (filósofo), pero no se da cuenta de cuán completamente W lo anticipó ni, en general, hacer otros (pero ver los muchos papeles y libros de Proudfoot y Copeland en W, Turing y AI). El trabajo de S es mucho más fácil de seguir que W, y aunque hay cierta jerga, es sobre todo espectacularmente claro si te acercas desde la dirección correcta. Vea mis artículos para más detalles. 79 Al igual que W, Searle es considerado como el mejor filósofo "standup" de su tiempo y su obra escrita es sólida como una roca y pionera en todo. Sin embargo, su fracaso para tomar la W más tarde lo suficientemente seriamente conduce a algunos errores y confusiones. En P7 de PNC, dos veces señala que nuestra certeza sobre los hechos básicos se debe al peso abrumador de la razón apoyando nuestras afirmaciones, pero como Coliva, DMS et al han señalado, W demostró definitivamente en ' sobre certeza ' que no hay posibilidad de dudar de la verdadera-sólo estructura axiomática de nuestras percepciones, memorias y pensamientos del sistema 1, ya que es la base del juicio y no puede ser juzgada. En la primera frase del P8 nos dice que la certeza es revisable, pero este tipo de ' certeza ', que podríamos llamar Certainty2, es el resultado de extender nuestra certeza axiomática y no revisable (Certainty1) a través de la experiencia y es completamente diferente, ya que es proposicional (verdadero o falso). Este es, por supuesto, un ejemplo clásico de la "batalla contra la hechizamiento de nuestra inteligencia por el lenguaje" que W demostró una y otra vez. Una palabra: dos (o muchos) usos distintos. En P10 él reprende a W por su antipatía a la teorízacion, pero como he señalado anteriormente, ' teorizacion ' es otro juego de idiomas (LG) y hay un vasto abismo entre una descripción general del comportamiento con pocos ejemplos bien elaborados y uno que emerge de un gran número de tal que me s no están sujetos a muchos contraejemplos. La evolución en sus primeros días fue una teoría con pocos ejemplos claros, pero pronto se convirtió en un resumen de un vasto cuerpo de ejemplos y una teoría en un sentido bastante diferente. de la misma manera, con una teoría que uno podría hacer como un resumen de mil páginas de ejemplos de W y una resultante de diez páginas. Otra vez en P12, ' consciencia ' es el resultado del funcionamiento automatizado del sistema 1 que es ' subjetivo ' en varios sentidos muy diferentes, y no, en el caso normal, una cuestión de evidencia, sino una comprensión verdadera en nuestro propio caso y una percepción real en el caso de Otros. Al leer P13 pensé: "¿puedo sentir un dolor insoportable y seguir como si nada estuviera mal?" ¡No! - Esto no sería «dolor» en el mismo sentido. "La experiencia interna está en necesidad de criterios externos" (W) y Searle parece perderse esto. Véase W o Johnston. Al leer las próximas páginas sentí que W tiene una comprensión mucho mejor de la conexión mente/idioma, ya que los considera como sinónimo en muchos contextos, y su trabajo es una brillante exposición de la mente como ejemplificado en numerosos ejemplos perspicuos de uso del lenguaje. Como se ha citado anteriormente, "ahora bien, si no son las conexiones causales que nos preocupan, entonces las actividades de la mente están abiertas ante nosotros." Y, como se explicó anteriormente, Siento que las preguntas con las que S termina la sección 3 se responden en gran medida al considerar el OC de W desde el punto de vista de los dos sistemas. de la misma manera, para la sección 6 sobre la filosofía de la ciencia. Rodych ha hecho un artículo sobre 80 Popper vs W que me pareció excelente en el momento, pero tendré que releer para asegurarme. Por último, en P25, uno puede negar que cualquier revisión de nuestros conceptos (juegos de idiomas) de causalidad o libre voluntad son necesarias o incluso posibles. Usted puede leer casi cualquier página de W y gran parte de DMS, Coliva, hacker, etc. por las razones. Una cosa es decir cosas extrañas sobre el mundo usando ejemplos de la mecánica cuántica, la incertidumbre, etc., pero es otro decir algo relevante para nuestro uso normal de las palabras. En P31, 36 etc., nos encontramos de nuevo con los problemas incesantes (en la filosofía y la vida) de palabras idénticas que passando por alto sobre las enormes diferencias en LG de ' creencia ', ' ver ', etc., como se aplica a S1, que se compone de Estados mentales en el presente solamente, y S2 que no es. El resto del capítulo resume su trabajo sobre ' pegamento social ' que, desde un EP, perspectiva de Wittgensteinian, es las acciones rápidas automáticas de S1 produciendo las disposiciones lentas de S2 que se expanden inexorablemente y universalmente durante el desarrollo personal en una amplia gama de automáticos relaciones deontico inconscientes con los demás, y arbitrariamente en las variaciones culturales en ellos. Los capítulos 3 a 5 contienen sus argumentos bien conocidos en contra de la visión mecánica de la mente que me parece definitiva. He leído libros enteros de respuestas a ellos y estoy de acuerdo con S que todos se pierden los muy simples puntos lógicos (psicológicos) que hace (y que, en general, W hizo medio siglo antes de que hubiera computadoras). Para ponerlo en mis términos, S1 se compone de inconsciente, rápido, físico, causal, automático, no proposicional, verdaderos Estados mentales, mientras que el S2 lento sólo puede describirse coherentemente en términos de las acciones que son más o menos disposiciones conscientes para comportamiento (acciones potenciales) que son o pueden llegar a ser proposicionales (T o F). Las computadoras y el resto de la naturaleza sólo tienen intencionalidad derivada (atribuada) que depende de nuestra perspectiva, mientras que los animales superiores tienen intencionalidad primaria que es independiente de la perspectiva. Como S y W aprecian, la gran ironía es que estas reducciones materialistas o mecánicas de la psicología se disfrazan como ciencia de vanguardia, pero de hecho, son totalmente anticientíficas. La filosofía (psicología descriptiva) y la psicología cognitiva (liberada de la superstición) se están convirtiendo en un guante de la mano y es Hofstadter, Dennett, Carruthers, Kurzweil, etc., que se quedan fuera en el frío. La página 62 resume muy bien uno de sus argumentos, pero P63 muestra que todavía no ha dejado de hablar de la pizarra en blanco, ya que trata de explicar las tendencias en la sociedad en términos de las extensiones culturales de S2. Como lo hace en muchos otros lugares en sus escritos, él da razones culturales, históricas para el conductismo, pero me parece bastante obvio (ya que era a W) que la visión mecánica de la mente existe por la misma razón que casi todos los comportamientos-es la operación por defecto de nuestro EP que busca explicaciones en términos de lo que se 81 puede pensar deliberadamente a través de lentamente, en lugar de en el S1 automatizado, del que en su mayoría permanecemos inconsciente. Como se mencionó anteriormente, Searle ha descrito esto como TPI. Otra vez, en p65 encuentro la descripción de W de nuestra psicología heredada axiomática y sus extensiones en su OC y otras obras que son más profundas que S (o de cualquiera), y por lo tanto no estamos "seguros" de que los perros son conscientes, sino más bien no está abierto a la duda. Vea la sección anterior de este artículo que trata de OC y DMS. El capítulo 5 destruye muy bien el CTM, el LOT, etc., señalando que ' calculo ', ' información ', "sintaxis", "algoritmo", "lógica", "programa", etc., son términos relativos a los observadores (es decir, psicológicos) y no tienen ningún significado físico o matemático (COS) en este sentido psicológico, pero por supuesto hay otros sentidos que se han dado recientemente como la ciencia se ha desarrollado. Una vez más, la gente está embrujada por el uso de la misma palabra para ignorar esa gran diferencia en su uso (significado). Estos comentarios son todas las extensiones del clásico Wittgenstein y en este sentido, Recomiendo los papeles de Hutto y Read también. El capítulo 6 "la ilusión fenomenológica" (TPI) es, con mucho, mi favorito, y, al mismo tiempo que demoliendo ese campo, muestra tanto sus habilidades lógicas supremas como su fracaso para captar todo el poder de la W posterior, y el gran valor heurístico de la reciente psicología psicológica investigación sobre los dos. Es claro como el cristal que TPI es debido a la obliviosidad a los automatismos de S1 y a tomar el pensamiento consciente lento del S2 como no sólo primario sino como todo lo que hay. Este es el clásico ceguera de pizarra en blanco. Está claro que W demostró esto unos 60 años antes y también dio la razón de ello en la primacía de la verdadera red axiomática automática inconsciente de nuestro sistema innato 1. Como muchos otros, Searle baila a su alrededor, pero nunca llega. Muy aproximadamente, con respecto a las características "independientes de los observadores" del mundo como las características S1 y "dependientes de los observadores" como S2 deberían ser muy reveladoras. Como S notas, Heidegger y los demás tienen la ontología exactamente al revés, pero por supuesto lo hace casi todo el mundo debido a los valores predeterminados de su EP. Pero lo realmente importante es que S no da el siguiente paso para darse cuenta de que TPI no es sólo una falla de unos pocos filósofos, sino una ceguera universal a nuestro EP que está incorporada en EP. En realidad, lo declara en casi estas palabras en un punto, pero si realmente lo consiguió, ¿cómo podría dejar de señalar sus inmensas implicaciones para el mundo. Con raras excepciones (por ejemplo, los Jaina Tirthankaras que se remonta a más de 5000 años a los inicios de la civilización Indus y más recientemente y notablemente Osho, Buda, Jesús, Bodhidharma, da Free John etc.), todos somos títeres de carne tropezando a través de la vida en nuestro Misión genéticamente programada para destruir la tierra. Nuestra casi total preocupación con el uso de la segunda personalidad auto S2 para complacer las gratificaciones infantiles de S1 está creando el infierno en la tierra. Al igual que con todos los organismos, sólo se trata de la reproducción y la acumulación de recursos para ello. Sí, mucho ruido sobre el calentamiento global y el inminente colapso de la civilización industrial en el 82 próximo siglo, pero nada es probable que lo detenga. S1 escribe la reproducción y S2 lo actúa. Dick y Jane sólo quieren jugar a la casa-esta es mamá y este es papá y esto y esto y esto es el bebé. Tal vez uno podría decir que TPI es que somos humanos y no sólo otro primate. El capítulo 7 sobre la naturaleza del yo es bueno, pero nada realmente me pareció nuevo. El capítulo 8 sobre el dualismo de la propiedad es mucho más interesante, aunque sobre todo un refrito de su trabajo anterior. La última de sus citas de apertura arriba resume esto, y por supuesto la insistencia en la naturaleza crítica de la ontología en primera persona es totalmente Wittgensteinian. El único gran error que veo es su pizarra en blanco o tipo (cultural) de explicación en p 158 para los errores de dualismo, cuando en mi Vista, es claramente otro caso de TPI - un error que él (y casi todos los demás) ha hecho muchas veces, y se repite en p177 etc., en el capítulo 9, de lo contrario, magnífico. Los genes programa S1 que (en su mayoría) tira de las cuerdas (contrae los músculos) de los títeres de carne a través de S2. Fin de la historia. Otra vez, necesita leer mis comentarios o los de DMS en el OC de W por lo que cambia la "buena razón para creer" en la parte inferior de p171 y la parte superior de P172 a "sabe" (en el sentido verdadero). Se vuelve a hacer un punto crítico en p169. "Así, decir algo y significa que implica dos condiciones de satisfacción. En primer lugar, la condición de satisfacción de que se produzca la expresión, y segundo, que la propia expresión tendrá condiciones de satisfacción. " Una forma de hablar de esto es que el sistema automático inconsciente 1 activa la mayor personalidad de conciencia cortical del sistema 2, trayendo consigo contracciones musculares de la garganta que informan a otros que ve el mundo de ciertas maneras, que lo comprometen a potencial Acciones. Un gran avance sobre las interacciones prelingüísticas o protolingüísticas en las que sólo los movimientos musculares brutos fueron capaces de transmitir información muy limitada sobre las intenciones y S hace un punto similar en Chapter10. Los genes programa S1 que (en su mayoría) tira de las cuerdas (contrae los músculos) de los títeres de carne a través de S2. Fin de la historia. Otra vez, necesita leer mis comentarios y los de DMS, Coliva, Andy Hamilton, etc., en el OC de W por lo que cambia la "buena razón para creer" en la parte inferior de p171 y la parte superior de P172 a "sabe" (en el sentido verdadero). Su último capítulo "la unidad de la Proposición" (anteriormente inédito) también se beneficiaría en gran medida de la lectura de W "sobre la certeza" o de los diversos libros y documentos de DMS, ya que aclaran la diferencia entre verdaderas frases que describen S1 y verdadero o falso proposiciones que describen S2. Esto me parece un enfoque muy superior a S tomando percepciones S1 como proposicional ya que sólo se convierten en T o F después de que uno comienza a pensar en ellos en S2. Sin embargo, su punto de que las proposiciones permiten declaraciones de la verdad y la falsedad real o potencial, del pasado y del futuro y de la fantasía, y por lo tanto proporcionar un gran avance sobre la sociedad pre o protolingüística, es convincente. Como dice, "una proposición es cualquier cosa que pueda determinar una condición de satisfacción... y una condición de satisfacción... es que tal y tal es el caso. " O, uno necesita agregar, que podría ser o podría haber sido o podría ser imaginado para ser 83 el caso. En general, PNC es un buen Resumen de los muchos avances sustanciales sobre Wittgenstein resultantes del medio siglo de trabajo de S, pero en mi opinión, W todavía es inigualable una vez que se comprende lo que está diciendo. Idealmente, deben leerse juntos: Searle para la clara prosa y generalizaciones coherentes, ilustradas con los ejemplos perspicaces de W y aforismos brillantes. Si yo fuera mucho más joven escribiría un libro haciendo exactamente eso. "Así que, funciones de estado son el pegamento que une a la sociedad. Son creados por la intencionalidad colectiva y funcionan mediante el transporte de poderes deóntica... Con la importante excepción del lenguaje en sí, toda la realidad institucional y por ello en cierto sentido toda la civilización humana es creada por los actos del habla que tienen la forma lógica de las declaraciones... toda la realidad institucional humana se crea y se mantiene en existencia por (representaciones que tienen la misma forma lógica que) declaraciones de función de estado, incluyendo los casos que no son actos de habla en la forma explícita de declaraciones. " Searle MSWp11-13 "Las creencias, como las declaraciones, tienen la dirección de ajuste hacia abajo o la mente (o la palabra) al mundo. Y los deseos y las intenciones, como las órdenes y las promesas, tienen la dirección ascendente o mundial (o palabra) de ajuste. Se supone que las creencias o percepciones, como las declaraciones, representan cómo son las cosas en el mundo, y en ese sentido, se supone que encajan en el mundo; tienen la dirección de ajuste de la mente al mundo. Los Estados conativo-volicionales como los deseos, las intenciones previas y las intenciones en acción, como las órdenes y las promesas, tienen la dirección de ajuste del mundo a la mente. No se supone que representen cómo son las cosas sino cómo gustaría que fueran o cómo pretendemos hacerlos ser... Además de estas dos facultades, hay una tercera, la imaginación, en la que el contenido de proposicional no se supone que encaja la realidad en la forma en que el contenido de proposicional de la cognición y la volición se supone que encajan... se abandona el compromiso referente al mundo y tenemos un contenido proposicional sin ningún compromiso que represente con cualquier dirección de ajuste. " Searle MSWp15 "Al igual que en los Estados intencionales, podemos distinguir entre el tipo de estado... y el contenido del estado... así que en la teoría del lenguaje podemos hacer una distinción entre el tipo de acto de habla que es... y el contenido proposicional... tenemos el mismo contenido proposicional con diferente modo psicológico en el caso de los Estados intencionales, y la fuerza o tipo de illocucionaria diferente en el caso de los actos del habla. Además, así como mis creencias pueden ser verdaderas o falsas y por lo tanto tienen la dirección de la mente al mundo de ajuste, por lo que mis declaraciones pueden ser verdaderas o falsas y así tener la dirección de la palabra a mundo de ajuste. Y así como mis deseos o intenciones no pueden ser verdaderos o falsos, pero pueden estar de diversas maneras satisfechos o insatisfechos, por lo que mis órdenes y promesas no pueden ser verdaderas o falsas, pero pueden estar 84 satisfechas o insatisfechas de varias maneras - podemos pensar en todos los Estados intencionales que tienen un todo e contenido proposicional y una dirección de ajuste como representaciones de sus condiciones de satisfacción. Una creencia representa sus condiciones de verdad, un deseo representa sus condiciones de cumplimiento, una intención lo representa's llevando a cabo condiciones... El estado intencional representa sus condiciones de satisfacción... personas suponen erróneamente que cada representación mental debe ser conscientemente pensada... pero la noción de una representación como la estoy usando es una noción funcional y no ontológica. Cualquier cosa que tenga condiciones de satisfacción, que pueda triunfar o fracasar de una manera que sea característica de la intencionalidad, es por definición una representación de sus condiciones de satisfacción... podemos analizar la estructura de la intencionalidad de los fenómenos sociales analizando sus condiciones de satisfacción. " Searle MSW p28-32 "Los primeros cuatro tipos de actos del habla tienen análogos exactos en los Estados intencionales: correspondiendo a los asertivos son creencias, correspondiendo a las directivas son deseos, correspondiendo a las Commissives son intenciones y correspondientes a expresivos es toda la gama de emociones y otros Estados intencionales donde el presup Fit es dado por sentado. Pero no hay un análogo prelingüístico para las declaraciones. Los Estados Prelingüísticos intencionales no pueden crear hechos en el mundo al representar esos hechos como ya existen. Esta notable hazaña requiere un lenguaje "MSW p69 "Orador significa... es la imposición de condiciones de satisfacción en condiciones de satisfacción. La capacidad de hacer esto es un elemento crucial de las capacidades cognitivas humanas. Se requiere la capacidad de pensar en dos niveles a la vez, en un manera que es esencial para el uso del lenguaje. En un nivel, el orador produce intencionalmente una expresión física, pero en otro nivel la expresión representa algo. Y la misma dualidad infecta el símbolo en sí. En un nivel, es un objeto físico como cualquier otro. En otro nivel, tiene un significado: representa un tipo de estado de asuntos "MSW P74 "... una vez que usted tiene el lenguaje, es inevitable que usted tendrá deontología porque no hay manera que usted puede hacer que los actos de habla explícita realizados de acuerdo con la convenciones de un idioma sin crear compromisos. Esto es cierto no sólo para las declaraciones, sino para todos los actos de habla "MSW P82 Esto trae otro punto que es prominente en W pero negado por S, que todo lo que podemos hacer es dar descripciones y no una teoría. S insiste en que está proporcionando teorías, pero por supuesto "teoría" y "Descripción" son juegos de idiomas también y me parece que la teoría de S es generalmente la descripción de Wuna rosa con cualquier otro nombre.... El punto de W fue que al apegarse a ejemplos perspicaces que todos sabemos que son verdaderos relatos de nuestro comportamiento, evitamos las arenas movedizas de las teorías que intentan tener en cuenta el comportamiento de todos (todos los juegos de idiomas), mientras que S quiere generalizar e inevitablemente se extravía (él da varios ejemplos de sus propios 85 errores en la PNC). Mientras S y otros modifican sin cesar sus teorías para tener en cuenta los juegos multifácidos del lenguaje, se acercan más y más a describir el comportamiento a través de numerosos ejemplos como lo hizo W. Los juegos de idiomas primarios (PLG) son las expresiones automatizadas simples por nuestro involuntario, sistema 1, pensamiento rápido, neurona espejo, verdadero solo, no proposicional, Estados mentales-nuestras percepciones y recuerdos y actos reflexivos (' voluntad ') incluyendo el sistema 1 verdades y UA1--comprensión de la Agencia 1--y Emotions1-como la alegría, el amor, la ira, que pueden describirse causalmente, mientras que los juegos de idiomas secundarios evolutivamente posteriores (SLG) son expresiones o descripciones de voluntariado, sistema 2, pensamiento lento, mentalización neuronas, comprobable verdadero o falso, proposicional, Truth2 y los UA2 y Emotions2-alegría, amorosa, odiando, la disposicional (y a menudo contrafactual) imaginando, suponiendo, pretendiendo, pensando, conociendo, creyendo, etc., que sólo puede describirse en términos de razones (es decir, es un hecho que los intentos de describir el sistema 2 en términos de Neuroquímica, física atómica, matemáticas, simplemente no tienen sentido-ver W para muchos ejemplos y Searle para las buenas disquisiciones sobre esto). No es posible describir los automatismos del sistema 1 en términos de razones (por ejemplo, ' veo que como una manzana porque... ') a menos que desee dar una razón en términos de EP, genética, fisiología, y como W ha demostrado repetidamente que carece de sentido dar "explicaciones" con la condición de que tendrán sentido en el futuro-' nada está oculto '-que tienen sentido ahora o nunca. Una heurística poderosa es separar el comportamiento y la experiencia en la intencionalidad 1 y la intencionalidad 2 (por ejemplo, pensamiento 1 y pensamiento 2, emociones 1 y emociones 2, etc.) e incluso en las verdades 1 (T solamente axiomas) y las verdades 2 (extensiones empíricas o "teoremas" que resultado de la extensión lógica de las verdades 1). W reconoció que ' nada está oculto '-es decir, toda nuestra psicología y todas las respuestas a todas las preguntas filosóficas están aquí en nuestro idioma (nuestra vida) y que la dificultad no es encontrar las respuestas, sino reconocerlas como siempre aquí delante de nosotros-sólo tenemos que dejar de tratar de mirar más profundo. Las ideas aquí ya están publicadas y nada vendrá como una sorpresa para aquellos que han mantenido el trabajo de Searle. Siento que W tiene una mejor comprensión de la conexión mente/idioma, ya que los considera como Sinónimo en muchos contextos, y su obra es una brillante exposición de la mente como ejemplificada en numerosas perspicaces ejemplos de uso del lenguaje. Como se ha citado anteriormente, "ahora bien, si no son las conexiones causales que nos preocupan, entonces las actividades de la mente están abiertas ante nosotros." Uno puede negar que cualquier revisión de nuestros conceptos (juegos de idiomas) de causalidad o libre voluntad son necesarias o incluso posibles. Puede leer cualquier página de W por las razones. Una cosa es decir cosas extrañas sobre el 86 mundo usando ejemplos de la mecánica cuántica, la incertidumbre, etc., pero es otro decir algo relevante para nuestro uso normal de las palabras. Las estructuras deonticas o ' pegamento social ' son las acciones rápidas automáticas de S1 produciendo las disposiciones lentas de S2 que se expanden inexorablemente durante el desarrollo personal en una amplia gama de relaciones deonticas culturales universales inconsciente automáticas con otros (S3). Aunque este es mi resumen de comportamiento que espero que bastante describe el trabajo de S. Me parece bastante obvio (ya que era a W) que la visión mecánica de la mente existe por la misma razón que casi todo comportamiento-es la operación por defecto de nuestro EP que busca explicaciones en términos de lo que podemos pensar deliberadamente a través de lentamente, en lugar de en el S1 automatizado, de la que en su mayoría permanecen ajenos (TPI). Encuentro la descripción de W de nuestra psicología heredada axiomática y sus extensiones en su OC y otro 3er período trabaja para ser más profundo que S (o cualquiera), y por lo que no estamos "seguros" de que los perros son conscientes, pero más bien no está abierto a (no es posible) duda. Ahora revisemos el brillante Resumen de Searle de sus muchos años de trabajo sobre la estructura lógica del ' pegamento social ' que mantiene unida a la sociedad como se expone es su ' hacer el mundo social ' (2010). Una noción crítica introducida por S hace muchos años es condiciones de satisfacción (COS) en nuestros pensamientos (proposiciones de S2) que W llamó inclinaciones o disposiciones para actuar--todavía llamado por el término inapropiado ' actitudes proposicionales ' por muchos. COS se explican por S en muchos lugares, como en p169 de PNC: "así decir algo y significado que implica dos condiciones de satisfacción. En primer lugar, la condición de satisfacción de que se produzca la expresión, y segundo, que la propia expresión tendrá condiciones de satisfacción. " Como S lo dice en PNC, "una proposición es cualquier cosa en absoluto que puede determinar una condición de satisfacción... y una condición de satisfacción... es que tal y tal es el caso. " O, uno necesita agregar, que podría ser o podría haber sido o podría ser imaginado para ser el caso, como lo deja claro en MSW. En cuanto a las intenciones, "para que se cumpla, la intención misma debe funcionar causalmente en la producción de la acción." (MSWp34). La mayoría se beneficiará en gran medida de la lectura de W "on certidumbre" o "RPP1 y 2" o dos libros de DMS en OC (ver mis comentarios), ya que hacen claro la diferencia entre verdaderas oraciones que describen S1 y proposiciones verdaderas o falsas que describen S2. Esto me parece un enfoque muy superior a S tomando percepciones S1 como proposicional (al menos en algunos lugares en su trabajo) ya que sólo pueden convertirse en T o F (aspectual como S los llama aquí) después de que uno comienza a pensar en ellos en S2. Sin embargo, su punto en la PNC que proposiciones permiten declaraciones de verdad o potencial real y la falsedad, del pasado y del futuro y de la fantasía, y por lo tanto proporcionar un gran avance sobre la sociedad pre o protolingüística, es convincente. 87 S a menudo describe la necesidad crítica de tener en cuenta los distintos niveles de descripción de un evento, por lo tanto para IA (intención en acción) "tenemos diferentes niveles de Descripción donde un nivel está constituido por el comportamiento en el nivel inferior... Además de la constitutiva a modo de relación, también tenemos la causal por medio de la relación. " (P37). Por lo tanto, reconocer el S1 sólo es causal ascendente y sin contenido (falta "Representaciones" O "Información") mientras que S2 tiene "Contenido" y es una causal descendente (por ejemplo, ver el ' Enactivismo radical ' de Hutto y Myin) yo cambiaría los párrafos de P39 comenzando "en suma" y terminando en PG 40 con "condiciones de satisfacción" como sigue. En Resumen, la percepción, la memoria y las intenciones y acciones reflexivas ("voluntad") son causadas por el funcionamiento automático de nuestro EP axiomático de solo verdadero de S1. A través de intenciones previas e intenciones en acción, tratamos de igualar cómo deseamos que las cosas sean con cómo pensamos que son. Debemos ver esa creencia, deseo (y imaginación - deseos de tiempo desplazado y tan desacoplado de la intención) y otras disposiciones de proposicionalidad S2 de nuestro pensamiento lento evolucionado más adelante segundo yo, son totalmente dependientes sobre (tienen su COS en) la CSR (causalmente autorreflexivo) rápida automática primitiva verdadera solo S1 reflexiva. En el lenguaje y tal vez en la neurofisiología hay casos intermedios o combinados tales como la intención (anteriores intenciones) o recordar, donde la conexión causal con COS (es decir, con S1) se desplaza el tiempo, ya que representan el pasado o el futuro, a diferencia de S1 que es siempre en el presente. Los dos sistemas se alimentan entre sí y a menudo son orquestadas por las relaciones culturales deonóticas aprendidas sin problemas, para que nuestro normal experiencia es que conscientemente controlamos todo lo que hacemos. Esta vasta arena de ilusiones cognitivas que dominan nuestra vida S ha descrito como ' la ilusión fenomenológica. ' Termina este asombroso capítulo repitiendo por tal vez la 10a vez en sus escritos, lo que yo considero como un error muy básico que comparte con casi todo el mundo - la noción de que la experiencia de ' libre voluntad ' puede ser ' ilusoria '. Se sigue de una manera muy directa e inexorable, tanto del trabajo del 3er período de W y de las observaciones de la psicología contemporánea, que "voluntad", "self" y "conciencia" son elementos axiomáticos verdaderos-sólo del sistema 1 al igual que ver, oír, etc., y no hay posibilidad (inteligibilidad) de demostrar (de dar sentido a) su falsedad. Como W hizo tan maravillosamente claro en numerosas ocasiones, que son la base para el juicio y por lo tanto no puede ser juzgado. S entiende y utiliza básicamente este mismo argumento en otros contextos (por ejemplo, el escepticismo, el solipsismo) muchas veces, por lo que es bastante sorprendente que no pueda ver esta analogía. Él comete este error con frecuencia cuando dice cosas como que tenemos "buena evidencia" de que nuestro perro es Consciente Etc. Los verdaderos axiomas de nuestra psicología no son probatorios. Aquí tienes uno de el mejor psicólogo descriptivos desde W, así que esto no es un error estúpido. 88 Su Resumen de deontics en P50 necesita traducción. Así, "hay que tener una forma prelingüística de intencionalidad colectiva, en la que se construyen las formas lingüísticas, y hay que tener la intencionalidad colectiva de la conversación para hacer el compromiso" es mucho más claro si se complementa con "el axiomáticas prelingüísticas de S1 subyacen a las disposiciones lingüísticas de S2 (es decir, nuestro EP) que evolucionan durante nuestra maduración en sus manifestaciones culturales. " Puesto que las declaraciones de función de status desempeñan un papel central en los deontics, es fundamental entenderlas y, por lo tanto, explica la noción de "función" que es relevante aquí. "Una función es una causa que sirve a un propósito... En este sentido las funciones son de intencionalidad-relativas y por lo tanto dependientes de la mente... funciones de estado... Requieren... imposición colectiva y el reconocimiento de un estatuto " (P59). Otra vez, Sugiero la traducción de "la intencionalidad del lenguaje es creada por la intencionalidad intrínseca, o independiente de la mente de los seres humanos" (p66) como "la disposicionalidad lingüística y consciente del S2 es generada por el reflexivo axiomático inconsciente funciones de S1 "(P68). Es decir, uno debe tener en cuenta que el comportamiento está programado por la biología. Sin embargo, me oponerse firmemente a sus declaraciones sobre p66-67 y en otros lugares de sus escritos que S1 (es decir, recuerdos, percepciones, actos reflejos) tiene una estructura proposicional (es decir, verdadero-falso). Como he señalado anteriormente, y muchas veces en otros comentarios, parece cristalino que W es correcto, y es básico para entender el comportamiento, que sólo S2 es proposicional y S1 es axiomático y verdadero-sólo. Ambos tienen COS y direcciones de ajuste (DOF) porque la intencionalidad genética, axiomática de S1 genera la de S2, pero si S1 fuera proposicional en el mismo sentido significaría que el escepticismo es inteligible, el caos que era la filosofía antes que W regresaría, y de hecho Social Vida (y tal vez toda la vida animal dependiendo de lo que uno considera como "proposiciones") no sería posible. Como W mostró innumerables veces y la biología muestra tan claramente, la vida debe basarse en la certeza - las reacciones rápidas inconscientes automatizadas. Los organismos que siempre tienen una duda y una pausa para reflexionar morirán (no puede evolucionar). Contrariamente a sus comentarios (P70) no puedo imaginar un lenguaje que carece de palabras para objetos materiales más de lo que puedo imaginar un sistema visual que no puede verlos, porque es la primera y más básica tarea de la visión para segmentar el mundo en objetos y por lo que el lenguaje para describirlos. de la misma manera, No puedo ver ningún problema con objetos que son sobresalientes en el campo consciente ni con oraciones segmentadas en palabras. ¿Cómo podría ser de otra manera para los seres con nuestra historia evolutiva? En P72 y en otros lugares, le ayudará a recordar que las expresiones son las primitivas PLG reflexivas de S1 mientras que las representaciones son las SLG disposicionales de 89 S2. Se necesita otra traducción de la filosofía al inglés para el segundo párrafo de P79, comenzando ' hasta ahora ' y terminando ' escuchado antes '. "Transmitimos significado al hablar un lenguaje público compuesto de palabras en frases con una sintaxis." A sus preguntas 4 y 5 en p105 en cuanto a la naturaleza especial del lenguaje y la escritura, yo respondería: ' son especiales porque la longitud de onda corta de las vibraciones de los músculos vocales permite mucho mayor transferencia de información de ancho de banda que las contracciones de otros músculos y esto es en promedio varios órdenes de magnitud superior para la información visual. ' En P106, una respuesta general a la pregunta 2 (¿cómo se sale con la suya?, por qué funciona) es EP y S1 y su declaración de que "mi principal estrategia de exposición en este libro es tratar de hacer que la familiar parecen extraños y sorprendentes " es, por supuesto, el clásico Wittgenstein. Su afirmación en la siguiente página de que no hay una respuesta general a por qué la gente acepta instituciones es claramente errónea. Los aceptan por la misma razón que lo hacen todo: su EP es el resultado de una aptitud inclusiva. Facilitó la supervivencia y la reproducción en el EEE (medio ambiente de adaptación evolutiva). Todo sobre nosotros física y mentalmente en el fondo de la genética. Toda la vaga charla aquí (por ejemplo, P114) sobre "convenciones extralingüísticas" y "semántica extra semántica" se refiere de hecho a EP y especialmente a los automatismos inconscientes de S1 que son la base para todo comportamiento. Sí, como dijo W muchas veces, el más familiar es por esa razón invisible. La sugerencia de S (P115) de que el lenguaje es esencial para los juegos es sin duda equivocado. Los sordomudos totalmente analfabetos podían jugar a las cartas, al fútbol e incluso al ajedrez, pero, por supuesto, sería necesario contar con una capacidad de conteo mínima. Estoy de acuerdo (P121) en que la capacidad de fingir e imaginar (por ejemplo, las nociones contrafactual o como-si involucradas en el tiempo y el cambio de espacio) son, en forma completa, capacidades humanas únicas y críticas para el pensamiento de orden superior. Pero incluso aquí hay muchos precursores de animales (como debe haber), tales como la postura de los combates rituales y bailes de apareamiento, la decoración de los sitios de apareamiento por los pájaros Bower, el ala rota pretensión de las aves madre, falsas llamadas de alarma de los monos, peces ' limpiadores ' que toman un mordedura de su presa y la simulación de las estrategias de halcón y Paloma (tramposos) en muchos animales. Se necesita más traducción para su análisis de la racionalidad (p126 et seq.). Decir que el pensamiento es proposicional y se ocupa de verdaderas o falsas ' entidades factitivas ' significa que es una disposición típica S2 que se puede probar, a diferencia de las funciones cognitivas automáticas sólo verdaderas de S1. En ' libre voluntad, racionalidad y hechos institucionales ', actualiza partes de su libro 90 clásico ' racionalidad en acción ' y crea una nueva terminología para describir el aparato formal de razones prácticas que no encuentro feliz. Las "entidades Factitivas" no parecen diferentes de las disposiciones y ' motivador ' (deseo u obligación), ' efector ' (músculos corporales), ' constitutor ' (músculos del habla) y ' razón total ' (todas las disposiciones relevantes) no lo hacen, al menos aquí parecen añadir a la claridad (p126-132 ). Deberíamos hacer algo aquí que rara vez sucede en las discusiones sobre el comportamiento humano y recordarnos a nosotros mismos de su biología. Evolucion por inclusive fitness tiene programado las acciones causales reflexivas rápidas inconsciente de S1 que a menudo dan lugar al pensamiento lento consciente de S2 (a menudo modificada por las extensiones culturales de S3), que produce razones de acción que a menudo resultan en la activación del cuerpo y/o el habla músculos por S1 causando acciones. El mecanismo general es a través de la neurotransmisión y por cambios en varios neuromoduladores en áreas específicas del cerebro. Esto puede parecer también poco feliz, pero tiene la virtud de que se basa en hechos, y dada la complejidad de nuestro pensamiento de orden superior, no creo que una descripción general va a ser mucho más simple. La ilusión cognitiva general (llamada por S ' la ilusión fenomenológica ') es que S2 ha generado la acción conscientemente por razones de las cuales somos plenamente conscientes y en control de, pero cualquier persona familiarizada con la biología moderna y la psicología sabe que esta vista no es Creíble. Otra vez, Voy a repetir algunas nociones cruciales. Otra idea clarificada por S es el deseo de razones independientes de acción (DIRA). Traduzco el Resumen de S de la razón práctica en p127 de MSW de la siguiente manera: "cedemos a nuestros deseos (genéticamente programados necesidad de alterar la química del cerebro), que típicamente incluyen razones de deseo-independientes de la acción (DIRA-es decir, Deseos desplazados en el espacio y el tiempo), que producen disposiciones para el comportamiento que comúnmente resultan tarde o temprano en los movimientos musculares que sirven a nuestra aptitud inclusiva (aumento de la supervivencia de los genes en nosotros mismos y aquellos estrechamente relacionados). " Y me gustaría reafirmar su descripción en P129 de cómo llevamos a cabo DIRA2 (es decir, el juego de idiomas de DIRA en el sistema 2) como "la resolución de la paradoja es que el DIRA1 inconsciente que sirve la aptitud inclusiva a largo plazo genera el DIRA2 consciente que a menudo anula los deseos inmediatos personales a corto plazo." Los agentes de hecho crean conscientemente las razones próximas de DIRA2, pero estas son extensiones muy restringidas de DIRA1 inconsciente (la causa última). Obama y el Papa desean ayudar a los pobres porque es "correcto", pero la causa última es un cambio en su química cerebral que aumentó la aptitud inclusiva de sus antepasados lejanos (y también por ejemplo, el neomarxista supremacismo del tercer mundo destruyendo América y el mundo). La evolución por aptitud inclusiva ha programado las acciones causales reflexivas rápidas e inconscientes de S1, que a menudo dan lugar al pensamiento lento consciente de S2, que produce razones de acción que a menudo resultan en la 91 activación de los músculos del cuerpo y/o del habla por S1 causando acciones. El mecanismo general es a través de la neurotransmisión y por los cambios en los neuromoduladores en las áreas específicas del cerebro. La ilusión cognitiva general (llamada por S ' la ilusión fenomenológica ', por Pinker ' la pizarra en blanco ' y por Tooby y Cosmides ' el modelo de ciencias sociales estándar ') es que S2 ha generado la acción conscientemente por razones de las cuales somos plenamente conscientes y en control de, pero cualquiera que esté familiarizado con la biología moderna y la psicología puede ver que esta visión es no es creíble. Así, traduzco su resumen de la razón práctica en p127 de la siguiente manera: "cedemos a nuestros deseos (necesidad de alterar la química del cerebro), que típicamente incluyen el deseo – razones independientes de acción (DIRA - es decir, los deseos desplazados en el espacio y el tiempo, más a menudo para la reciprocidad altruismo), que producen disposiciones para el comportamiento que comúnmente resultan tarde o temprano en los movimientos musculares que sirven a nuestra aptitud inclusiva (aumento de la supervivencia de los genes en nosotros mismos y aquellos estrechamente relacionados). " Contrariamente al comentario de S sobre P128 creo que si se define adecuadamente, la DIRA es universal en animales superiores y no es en absoluto única para los seres humanos (piense madre gallina defendiendo su cría de un zorro) si incluimos los reflejos prelingüísticos automatizados de S1 (es decir, DIRA1), pero sin duda la DIRA de orden superior de S2 o DIRA2 que requieren lenguaje son singularmente humanos. Esto me parece una descripción alternativa y más clara de su "explicación" (como W sugirió que estas son mucho mejor denominadas ' Descripción ') en el fondo de P129 de la paradoja de cómo podemos llevar a cabo voluntariamente DIRA2 (es decir, los deseos S2 y sus extensiones culturales). Es decir, "la resolución de la paradoja es que el reconocimiento de las razones independientes del deseo puede hacer que el deseo y así causar el deseo, a pesar de que no es lógicamente inevitable que lo hacen y no empíricamente universal que hacen" se puede traducir como "el resolución de la paradoja es que el DIRA1 inconsciente que sirve la aptitud inclusiva a largo plazo genera el DIRA2 consciente que a menudo anula los deseos inmediatos personales a corto plazo. " de la misma manera, para su discusión sobre este tema en P130-31-es EP, RA, IF, S1 (psicología evolutiva, Altruismo recíproco, aptitud inclusiva, sistema 1) que entierra las disposiciones y acciones subsiguientes ofS2. En P140 pregunta por qué no podemos obtener deontics de la biología, pero por supuesto debemos obtener de la biología, ya que no hay otra opción y la descripción anterior muestra cómo sucede esto. Contrariamente a su afirmación, las inclinaciones más fuertes siempre prevalecen (por definición, de lo contrario no es el más fuerte), pero deontics funciona porque la programación innata de RA y si anula los deseos inmediatos a corto plazo personal. Su confusión de naturaleza y crianza, de S1 y S2, se extiende a las conclusiones 2 y 3 en p143. Los agentes de hecho crean las razones próximas de DIRA2, pero estos no son sólo cualquier cosa sino, con pocos si hay excepciones, extensiones muy restringidas de DIRA1 (la causa final). Si realmente 92 quiere atribuir a nuestras decisiones conscientes a solas, entonces es presa de ' la ilusión fenomenológica ' (TPI) que tan bellamente demolió en su papel clásico de ese nombre (ver mi reseña de PNC). Como he señalado anteriormente, hay un enorme cuerpo de investigación reciente en la cognición implícita Exponer el Cognitivo ilusiones que componen nuestra personalidad. El TPI no es meramente un error filosófico inofensivo, sino una obliviosidad universal a nuestra biología que produce la ilusión de que controlamos nuestra vida y nuestra sociedad y el mundo, y las consecuencias son casi cierto colapso de la civilización industrial durante los próximos 150 años. Señala acertadamente que la racionalidad humana no tiene sentido sin la "brecha" (en realidad, 3 lagunas que ha discutido muchas veces). Es decir, sin voluntad libre (o sea, elección) en un sentido no trivial, todo sería inútil, y ha señalado acertadamente que es inconcebible que la evolución pueda crear y mantener una farsa innecesaria, genética y energéticamente costosa. Pero, como casi todos los demás, él no puede ver su salida y por lo que una vez más sugiere (P133) que la elección puede ser una ilusión. Por el contrario, siguiendo a W, está bastante claro que la elección es parte de nuestras acciones reflexivas axiomáticas S1 verdaderas y no puede ser cuestionada sin contradicción, ya que S1 es la base para el interrogatorio. No puede en el caso normal duda de que está leyendo esta página como su conciencia de que es la base para dudar. Ahora nos permite repasar brevemente el libro más reciente de Searle, "ver las cosas tal como son" (STATA-2015). Vea la revisión completa para más comentarios. Como se espera de cualquier filosofía, estamos en graves problemas de inmediato, ya que en la página 4 tenemos los términos ' percepción ' y ' objeto ' como si fueran utilizados in algún sentido normal, pero estamos haciendo filosofía, así que vamos a estar ondulados de ida y vuelta entre los juegos de idiomas Con no hay posibilidad de mantener nuestros juegos de día a día distintos de los diversos filosóficos. Otra vez, Usted puede leer algunos de Bennett y hacker ' Neurociencia y filosofía ' o ' fundamentos filosóficos de la neurociencia ' para tener una sensación de esto. Tristemente, como casi todos los filósofos, Searle (S) todavía no ha adoptado el marco de dos sistemas, así que es mucho más difícil mantener las cosas rectas de lo que debe ser. En P6, creer y afirmar son parte del sistema 2, que es lingüístico, deliberativo, lento, sin tiempo preciso de ocurrencia, y ' está lloviendo ' es su condición pública de satisfacción (COS2) (transitiva de Wittgenstein) – es decir, es proposicional y representacional y no un estado mental y sólo podemos describirlo inteligiblamente en términos de razones, mientras que la experiencia visual (VisExp) es el sistema 1 y por lo tanto requiere (para la inteligibilidad, para la cordura) que esté lloviendo (es COS1) y tiene un tiempo determinado de ocurrencia, es rápido (típicamente bajo 500msec), no Testable (comprobable i.e., true-only o solo cierto de Wittgenstein o intransitivas), y no pública, automática y no lingüística, es decir, no proposicional y presentacional y sólo descriptible en términos de causas de un estado mental. A pesar de esto en P7 después de aplastar el término horroroso (pero todavía muy popular) ' 93 actitud proposicional ', dice que la percepción tiene contenido proposicional, pero estoy de acuerdo con W que S1 es verdadero-sólo y por lo tanto no puede ser proposicional en algo como el sentido de S2 donde las proposiciones son declaraciones publicas (COS) que son verdaderos o Falso. En P12 tenga en cuenta que está describiendo la automaticidad del sistema 1 (S1), y luego señala que para describir el mundo sólo podemos repetir la descripción, que W señaló que muestra los límites del lenguaje. La última frase al final del párrafo medio de P13 necesita traducir (como la mayoría de la filosofía!) por lo que "la experiencia subjetiva tiene un contenido, que los filósofos llaman un contenido intencional y la especificación del contenido intencional es la misma que la descripción de la situación que el contenido intencional le presenta, etc. " Yo diría que ' percepciones son Estados mentales del sistema 1 que sólo se pueden describir en el idioma público del sistema 2. " Y cuando termina señalando de nuevo la equivalencia de una descripción de la creencia con la de una descripción de nuestra percepción, él está repitiendo lo que W señaló hace mucho tiempo, y que se debe al hecho de que S1 es no lingüístico y que describir, creer, saber, esperar, etc. son diferentes modos psicológicos o intencionales o juegos de idiomas jugados con las mismas palabras. En P23 se refiere a las "experiencias" privadas, pero las palabras son S2 y describen eventos públicos, por lo que lo que justifica nuestro uso de la palabra para "experiencias privadas" (es decir, S1) sólo puede ser sus manifestaciones públicas (S2), es decir, el lenguaje que todos usamos para describir los actos públicos, incluso para mí no puedo tener ninguna manera de adjuntar el lenguaje a algo interno. Este es, por supuesto, el argumento de W contra la posibilidad de un idioma privado. También menciona varias veces que las alucinaciones de X son lo mismo que ver a X, pero, ¿cuál puede ser la prueba para esto, excepto que nos inclinamos a utilizar las mismas palabras? En este caso, son los mismos por definición, por lo que este argumento suena hueco. En P35 Top ataca de nuevo correctamente el uso de la "actitud proposicional" que no es una actitud a una sentencia sino una actitud (disposición) a su COS público, es decir, al hecho o la verdad. Luego dice: "por ejemplo, si veo a un hombre frente a mí, el contenido es que hay un hombre delante de mí. El objeto es el hombre mismo. Si estoy teniendo una alucinación correspondiente, la experiencia perceptual tiene un contenido, pero ningún objeto. El contenido puede ser exactamente el mismo en los dos casos, pero la presencia de un contenido no implica la presencia de un objeto. " La forma en que veo esto es que el ' objeto ' es normalmente en el mundo y crea el estado mental (S1) y si ponemos esto en palabras se convierte en S2 con COS2 (es decir, un creador de la verdad pública) y esto implica el objeto público, pero para una alucinación (o estimulación cerebral directa et c.) el ' objeto ' es sólo el estado mental similar resultante de la activación del cerebro. Como nos mostró W, el gran error no se trata de entender la percepción, sino de entender el lenguaje - todos los problemas de la filosofía propiamente dichos son exactamente los mismos - no mirar cuidadosamente cómo funciona el lenguaje en 94 un contexto particular para producir COS claros. Medio de P61 vemos las confusiones que surgen aquí y en todas partes cuando no mantenemos S1 y S2 separados. O no debemos referirnos a las representaciones en S1 o al menos debemos llamarlas R1 y darnos cuenta de que no tienen COS públicos - i. e., no COS2. En P63 no detachability (no desmontable) sólo significa que es una función automática causada de S1 y no una función razonada, voluntaria de S2. Esta discusión continúa en la siguiente página, pero por supuesto es relevante para todo el libro y para toda la filosofía, y es tan desafortunado que Searle, y casi todos en las Ciencias del comportamiento, no pueden entrar en el siglo 21 y utilizar la terminología de los dos sistemas que representa muchos problemas opacos muy claro. Del mismo modo, con el fracaso de entender que siempre es sólo una cuestión de si se trata de un científico tema o filosófico y si filosófico entonces qué juego de idioma va a ser jugado y lo que el COS están en el contexto en cuestión. En P64 dice que la ' experiencia ' está en su cabeza, pero que es sólo el problema-como W hizo tan claro que no hay lenguaje privado y como Bennett y hacker toman toda la comunidad de la neurociencia a la tarea para, en el uso normal ' experiencia ' sólo puede ser un fenómeno público para el que compartimos criterios e, pero ¿cuál es la prueba para que tenga una experiencia en mi cabeza? Al menos, hay una ambigüedad aquí que conducirá a otros. Muchos creen que esto no importa, muchos piensan que lo hacen. Algo sucede en el cerebro, pero eso es un problema científico neurofisiológico y sin duda por ' experiencia ' o por ' vi un conejo ' uno nunca significa la neurofisiología. Es evidente que esto no es un asunto para Científica investigación, pero una de las palabras de uso inteligible. En p65 indexical (indexada), no desmontable, y presentacional son sólo más jerga filosófica utilizada en lugar del sistema 1 por personas que no han adoptado el marco de dos sistemas para describir el comportamiento (es decir, casi todo el mundo). de la misma manera, para las siguientes páginas si nos damos cuenta de que "objetos y Estados de asuntos", "experiencias visuales", "totalmente determinado", etc., son sólo juegos de idiomas donde tenemos que decidir qué son los COS y que si sólo tenemos en cuenta las propiedades de S1 y S2 todo esto se convierte en salir e Clear y Searle y todos los demás podrían dejar de ' luchando para expresarlo '. Por lo tanto (p69) ' la realidad es determinada ' sólo significa que las percepciones son S1 y así Estados mentales, aquí y ahora, automático, causal, nontestable (verdadero-sólo, es decir, no hay pruebas públicas) etc. mientras que las creencias, como todas las disposiciones son S2 y por lo tanto no estados mentales, no tienen un tiempo definido, tienen razones y no causa, son comprobables con cos etc. En P70 señala que las intenciones en acción de la percepción (IA1 en mis términos) son parte de los actos reflexivos de S1 (a1 en mis términos) que pueden originarse en los actos S2 que se han convertido en reflexivo (S2A en mi terminología). 95 En la parte inferior de P74 en p75, 500 ms se toma a menudo como la línea divisoria aproximada entre ver (S1) y ver como (S2), lo que significa que S1 pasa el percepto a centros corticales superiores de S2 donde pueden ser deliberados y expresados en lenguaje. En P100-101 el ' campo visual subjetivo ' es S2 y ' campo visual objetivo ' es S1 y ' no se ve nada ' en S2 significa que no jugamos el juego de la lengua de ver en el mismo sentido que para S1 y de hecho la filosofía y un buen trozo de ciencia (por ejemplo. , física) sería diferente si la gente se diera cuenta de que estaban jugando juegos de idiomas y no haciendo ciencia. En P107 ' percepción es transparente ' porque el lenguaje es S2 y S1 no tiene ningún idioma, ya que es automático y reflexivo, así que al decir lo que vi, o para describir lo que vi, Sólo puedo decir "vi un gato". Una vez más W señaló esto hace mucho tiempo como mostrando los límites del lenguaje. P110 medio necesita ser traducido de SearleSpeak en TwoSystemsSpeak para que "porque la intencionalidad visual presentacional es una subespecie de representación, y porque toda la representación está en los aspectos, las presentaciones visuales siempre presentarán sus condiciones de satisfacción en algunos aspectos y no en otros. "se convierte en" porque los perceptos de S1 presentan sus datos a S2, que tiene COS públicos, podemos hablar de S1 como si también tiene COS públicos ". En P111 la ' condición ' se refiere al COS público de S2, es decir, los eventos que hacen que la declaración sea verdadera o falsa y "orden inferior" y "orden superior" se refieren a S1 y S2. En p112 la acción básica y la percepción básica son isomórficas porque S1 alimenta sus datos a S2, que sólo puede generar acciones alimentándose de vuelta a S1 para contraer los músculos, y la percepción de nivel inferior P1 y una percepción de mayor nivel P2 sólo puede describirse en los mismos términos debido a que sólo hay un idioma para describir S1 y S2. En P117 fondo sería mucho menos misterioso si adoptase el marco de dos sistemas, para que en lugar de "conexión interna" con las condiciones de satisfacción (mi COS1), una percepción simplemente se notaría como la automaticidad de S1 que causa un estado mental. En P120 el punto es que las "cadenas causales" no tienen poder explicativo porque la Juegos de idiomas de ' causa ' sólo tener sentido en S1 u otros fenómenos no psicológicos de la naturaleza, mientras que la semántica es S2 y sólo podemos hablar inteligiblemente de razones para orden superiorcomportamiento humano. Una forma en que este manifiestos es ' significado no está en la cabeza ' que nos enmalla en otros juegos de idiomas. En P121 decir que es esencial para una percepción (S1) que tiene COS1 ("la experiencia") simplemente describe las condiciones del juego de la lengua de la percepción - es un estado mental causal automático (P1) cuando estamos hablando del sistema 1. 96 En la p 122 creo que "en primer lugar, para que algo sea rojo en el mundo ontológicamente objetivo es que sea capaz de causar experiencias visuales ontológicamente subjetiva como esta." no es coherente ya que no hay nada a lo que podamos referirnos "esto" debe ser indicado como "En primer lugar, para que algo sea rojo es sólo para que me incline a llamarlo ' rojo ' "- como de costumbre, la jerga no ayuda en absoluto y el resto del párrafo es innecesario también. En P123 la ' disposición de fondo ' es el estado automático, causal, mental de S1, y como yo, de acuerdo con W, DMS y otros han dicho muchas veces, Estos no se pueden llamar inteligentemente ' presuposiciones ', ya que se activan inconscientemente ' bisagras ' que son la base de las presuposiciones. La sección VII y VIII (o todo el libro o la mayoría de los comportamientos de orden superior o la mayor parte de la filosofía en el sentido estricto) podrían titularse "los juegos de idiomas que describen la interacción de los Estados mentales transitorios, automáticos, no lingüísticos, de S1 con los razonadas, pensamiento lingüístico consciente y persistente de S2 "y el fondo no es suposicional ni se puede tomar por sentado, pero es nuestra psicología axiomática true-only (las "bisagras" o "formas de actuar" de W " 'On Certainty' (' En Certeza ')) que subyacen a todas las suposiciones. Como se desprende de mis comentarios, creo que toda la sección, carente del marco de dos sistemas y de las ideas de W en OC se confunde al suponer que presenta una "explicación" de la percepción en la que puede, en el mejor de los detalles, describir cómo funciona el lenguaje de la percepción en varios Contextos. Sólo podemos describir cómo se utiliza la palabra "rojo" y que es el final de la misma y para la última frase de esta sección podríamos decir que para que algo sea una "manzana roja" es sólo para que normalmente resulta en las mismas palabras que todos usan. Hablando de bisagras, es triste y un poco extraño que Searle no ha incorporado lo que muchos ((p. ej., DMS (Danielle Moyal-Sharrock) un eminente filósofo contemporáneo y líder experto en W)) como el mayor descubrimiento en la filosofía moderna: W está revolucionando la epistemología en su ' On Certainty ', ya que nadie puede hacer filosofía o psicología de la vieja manera sin buscando anticuados y estar confundido. Y aunque Searle casi en su totalidad ignoró ' On Certainty' toda su carrera, en 2009 (es decir, 6 años antes de la publicación de este libro) habló en un simposio sobre él celebrado por la sociedad británica Wittgenstein y alojado por DMS, por lo que es ciertamente consciente de la visión que ha realizado los temas que es discutiendo aquí. No creo que esta reunión haya sido publicada, pero su Conferencia puede ser descargada de Vimeo. Parece ser un caso de un perro viejo que no puede aprender nuevos trucos. A pesar de que probablemente ha sido pionero en más territorio nuevo en la psicología descriptiva del comportamiento de orden superior que nadie desde Wittgenstein (excepto tal vez Peter hacker cuyos escritos son bastante densos), una vez que ha aprendido un camino que tiende a permanecer en él, como todos lo hacemos. Como todo el mundo, utiliza la palabra francesa repertorio cuando ahí esta un más fácil de pronunciar y deletrear la palabra 97 inglesa ' repertorio ' y el incómodo ' él/ella ' o revertir sexista ' ella ' cuando uno siempre puede utilizar ' ellos ' o ' ellos '. A pesar de su mayor inteligencia y educación, los académicos también son ovejas, especialmente ahora que los fascistas supremacistas del tercer mundo neo marxistas controlan las universidades y los medios de comunicación y pronto todo el gobierno. La sección IX al final del capítulo muestra de nuevo los juegos de idiomas muy opacos e incómodos a los que uno se ve obligado a tratar de describir (no explicar como W dejó claro) las propiedades de S1 (es decir, para jugar los juegos de idiomas utilizados para describir "cualidades primarias") y cómo estos alimentan datos en S2 (es decir, cualidades secundarias '), que luego tiene que volver a alimentar a S1 para generar acciones. También muestra los errores que uno comete al no captar la visión única de Wittgenstein de ' epistemología de bisagra ' presentada en "sobre certeza". Para mostrar lo más claro que esto es con la terminología del sistema dual, tendría que reescribir todo el capítulo (y gran parte del libro). Ya que he reescrito secciones aquí varias veces, y a menudo en mis comentarios de otros libros de Searle, sólo voy a dar un par de breves ejemplos. La frase sobre P129 "la realidad no depende de la experiencia, sino de la inversa. El concepto de la realidad en cuestión ya implica la capacidad causal de producir cierto tipo de experiencias. así que, la razón de que estas experiencias presenten objetos rojos es que el hecho mismo de ser un objeto rojo implica una capacidad para producir este tipo de experiencia. Ser una línea recta implica la capacidad de producir este otro tipo de experiencia. El hecho es que los organismos no pueden tener estas experiencias sin que les parezca que están viendo un objeto rojo o una línea recta, y que "pareciendo a ellos" marca la intencionalidad intrínseca de la experiencia perceptual. " Puede representarse como "S1 proporciona la entrada para S2 y la forma en que usamos la palabra ' rojo ' ordena que es COS en cada contexto, por lo que el uso de estas palabras de una manera particular es lo que significa ver rojo. En el caso normal, no nos "parece" que vemos rojo, sólo vemos rojo y usamos "parecen" para describir los casos en los que estamos en duda. " En P130 "nuestra pregunta ahora es: ¿existe una conexión esencial entre el carácter de las cosas en el mundo y el carácter de nuestra experiencia?" se puede traducir como "¿nuestros juegos de lenguaje público (S2) son útiles (consistentes) en la descripción de la percepción (S1)?" El primer párrafo de la sección X ' el camino hacia atrás ' es quizás el más importante en el libro, ya que es crítico para toda la filosofía para entender que no puede haber una conexión precisa 1:1 entre o reducción de S2 a S1 debido a las muchas maneras de describir en lenguage un evento determinado (estado mental, es decir, Percept, memoria, etc.). De ahí la aparente imposibilidad de capturar comportamientos (lenguaje, pensamiento) perfectamente en algoritmos (la desesperanza de la "IA fuerte") o de extrapolación de un determinado patrón neuronal en el cerebro a los actos multitudinosos (juegos de idiomas -es decir, palabras en contextos ilimitados) 98 que utilizamos para describirlo. El ' camino hacia atrás ' es el idioma (COS) de S2 utilizado para describir S1. Otra vez, Creo que su fracaso en usar el marco de dos sistemas hace que esto sea bastante confuso si no opaco. Claro, comparte este fracaso con casi todos. Searle ha comentado esto antes y así tienen otros (por ejemplo, hacker, W en varios contextos) pero parece haber escapado a la mayoría de los filósofos y casi todos los científicos. Otra vez, Searle pierde el punto en la secta XI y X12-no podemos ' parecen ver ' rojo o ' parecen ' tener un recuerdo o ' asumir ' una relación entre la experiencia y la palabra, sino como con todas las percepciones y recuerdos que constituyen el estado mental de verdadero único axiomático s del sistema 1, sólo tenemos la experiencia y "se" sólo se convierte en ' rojo ', etc., cuando se describe en lenguaje público con esta palabra en este contexto por el sistema 2. Sabemos que es de color rojo, ya que se trata de una bisagra, un axioma de nuestra psicología que es nuestra acción automática y es la base para suposiciones o juicios o presuposiciones y no puede ser inteligible juzgada, probada o alterada. Como W señaló tantas veces, un error en S1 es de un tipo completamente diferente que uno en S2. No hay explicaciones posibles - sólo podemos describir cómo funciona y por lo que no hay posibilidad de obtener una "explicación" no trivial de nuestro orden superior Psicología. Como siempre lo ha sido, Searle comete el error común y fatal de pensar que entiende el comportamiento (lenguaje) mejor que Wittgenstein. Después de una década leyendo W, S y muchos otros, encuentro que los ' ejemplos perspicuos ' de W, los aforismos y los triálogos suelen proporcionar una mayor iluminación que las preocupantes Disquisiciones de cualquier otra persona. "No podemos avanzar ningún tipo de teoría, no debe ser nada hipotético en nuestras consideraciones. Debemos desaparecer con toda explicación, y solo la descripción debe tomar su lugar. " (PI 109). En P135, una forma de describir la percepción es que el evento u objeto provoca un patrón de activación neuronal (estado mental) cuya COS1 autorreflexiva es que vemos una rosa roja frente a nosotros, y en contextos apropiados para una persona normal que habla inglés, esto nos lleva a activar las contracciones musculares que produce las palabras "veo una rosa roja" cuyo COS2 es que hay una rosa roja allí. O simplemente, S1 produce S2 en contextos apropiados. así que, en P136 podemos decir S1 conduce a S2 que expresamos en este contexto por la palabra ' smooth ' que describe (pero nunca ' explica ') Cómo funciona el juego de idiomas de 'smooth ' en este contexto y podemos traducir "para acciones básicas y percepciones básicas el contenido intencional es relacionado internamente con las condiciones de satisfacción, a pesar de que se caracteriza no intencionalmente, porque ser la característica F percibida consiste en la capacidad de causar experiencias de ese tipo. Y en el caso de acción, experiencias de ese tipo constan en su capacidad para causar ese tipo de movimiento corporal. "como" las percepciones básicas (S1) pueden conducir automáticamente (internamente) a las acciones de reflejo básicas (a1) (es decir, quemar un dedo conduce a retirar el brazo) que sólo entonces entra en la conciencia para que pueda reflejarse sobre y se describe en el lenguaje (S2). 99 En P150, el punto es que deducir, como saber, juzgar, pensar, es una disposición S2 expresada en lenguaje con COS públicos que son informativos (verdadero o falso) mientras que los perceptos son no informativos (ver mi reseña de Hutto y Myin Primero libro) respuestas automatizadas de S1 y no hay una manera significativa de jugar un juego de idiomas de inferir en S1. Árboles y todo lo que vemos es S1 para unos cientos de milisegundos o así y luego normalmente entrar S2 donde consiguen el idioma adjunto (forma aspectual o ver como). En cuanto a P151 et seq., es triste que Searle, como parte de su falta de atención a la posterior W, nunca parece referirse a lo que es probablemente el análisis más penetrante de las palabras en color en W 'Comentarios sobre el color ", que falta en casi todas las discusiones sobre el tema que he visto. El único problema es cómo jugar el juego con palabras en color y con ' mismo ', ' diferente ', ' experiencia ', etc. en este contexto lingüístico público (declaraciones verdaderas o falsas - COS2) porque no hay lenguaje ni significado en uno privado (S1). así que, no importa (excepto a los neurocientíficos) lo que sucede en los Estados mentales de S1, pero sólo lo que decimos acerca de ellos cuando entran S2. Está claro como el día 7.8 mil millones en la tierra tienen un patrón ligeramente diferente de activación neuronal cada vez que ven rojo y que no hay ninguna posibilidad de una correlación perfecta entre S1 y S2. Como he señalado anteriormente es absolutamente crítico para todo filósofo y científico para aclarar esto. En cuanto al cerebro en una Cuba (p157), en la medida en que interrumpamos o eliminamos las relaciones normales de S1 y S2, perdemos los juegos lingüísticos de intencionalidad. Lo mismo se aplica a las máquinas inteligentes y W describió definitivamente esta situación hace más de 80 años. "Sólo de un ser viviente y lo que se asemeja (se comporta como) un ser humano viviente puede uno decir: tiene sensaciones; que ve; es ciega; oye es sordo; es consciente o inconsciente. " (PI 281) Capítulo 6: sí el disjunctivismo (como casi todas las tesis filosóficas) es incoherente y el hecho de que este y otros absurdidades florezcan en su propio departamento e incluso entre algunos de sus antiguos estudiantes que consiguió las mejores calificaciones en sus clases de filosofía de la mente muestra tal vez que, como la mayoría, se detuvo demasiado pronto en sus estudios de Wittgenstein. En p188, sí, veridical ver y ' saber ' (es decir, K1) son los mismos ya que S1 es verdaderosólo-es decir, es el ayuno, axiomáticos, causalmente auto-reflexivo, Estados mentales automáticos que sólo se pueden describir con los juegos de lenguaje público lentos, deliberativos de S2. En P204-5, representación siempre está bajo un aspecto ya que, como pensar, saber, etc., es una disposición de S2 con COS públicos, que es infinitamente variable. 100 Otra vez, Creo que el uso del marco de dos sistemas simplifica en gran medida el debate. Si uno insiste en usar ' representación ' para ' presentaciones ' de S1 entonces uno debe decir que R1 tiene COS1 que son Estados mentales neurofisiológicos transitorios, y tan totalmente diferente de R2, que tienen COS2 (formas aspectuales) que son públicas, lingüísticamente Estados expresables de los asuntos, y la noción de Estados mentales inconscientes es ilegítima ya que estos juegos de idiomas carecen de sentido claro. Lamentablemente, en P211 Searle, para tal vez la décima vez en sus escritos (y sin cesar en sus conferencias), dice que ' libre voluntad ' puede ser ilusoria, pero como W de los años 30 en señalado, uno no puede negar coherentemente o juzgar las ' bisagras ' como nuestra elección, ni que vemos, escuchamos, dormimos, tenemos manos, etc., ya que estas palabras expresan los verdaderos axiomas de nuestra psicología , nuestros comportamientos automáticos son la base para la acción. En P219 parte inferior y 222 superior - fue W en su trabajo, culminando con «on certidumbre» que señaló que el comportamiento no puede tener una base probatoria y que su fundamento es nuestra certeza animal o forma de comportarse que es la base de la duda y la certeza y no se puede dudar (t él depende de S1). También señaló muchas veces que un ' error ' en nuestras percepciones básicas (S1) que no tiene COS públicos y no puede ser probado (a diferencia de los de S2), si es mayor o persiste, conduce no a más pruebas, pero a la locura. Fenomenalismo p227 Top: vea mis extensos comentarios sobre el excelente ensayo de Searle ' la ilusión fenomenológica ' en mi reseña de ' filosofía en un nuevo siglo '. Ni siquiera hay una orden para referirse a las experiencias privadas como "fenómenos", "ver" o cualquier otra cosa. Como nos mostró la famosa W, el lenguaje solo puede ser una actividad de prueba pública (sin idioma privado). Y en p230 el problema no es que la "teoría" parezca ser inadecuada, sino que (como la mayoría de las teorías filosóficas) es incoherente. Utiliza un lenguaje que no tiene COS claros. Como W insistió todo lo que podemos hacer es describir: son los científicos los que pueden hacer teorías. La conclusión es que esto es Searle clásico-excelente y probablemente al menos tan bueno como cualquier otra persona puede producir, pero carente de comprensión de las ideas fundamentales de la posterior Wittgenstein, y sin comprensión de los dos sistemas de marco de pensamiento, que podría haber lo hizo brillante. Finalmente, permítanme señalar de nuevo que W planteó una interesante resolución a algunos de estos ' rompecabezas ' sugiriendo que algunos ' fenómenos mentales ' (es decir, palabras para disposiciones que conducen a actos públicos) pueden originarse en procesos caóticos en el cerebro y que no hay cualquier cosa que corresponda a un rastro de memoria, ni a un solo proceso cerebral identificable como una sola intención o acción--que la cadena causal termine sin dejar rastro, y que "causa", "evento" y "tiempo" dejen de ser aplicables (útil - teniendo un COS claro). Posteriormente, muchos han hecho sugerencias similares basadas en la física y las Ciencias de la 101 complejidad y el caos. Sin embargo, uno debe recordar que "caótico" en el sentido moderno significa que está determinado por las leyes, pero no es predecible, y que la ciencia del caos no existía hasta mucho después de su muerte. 102 Reseña de hacer el mundo social (Making the Social World) por John Searle (2010) (revisión revisada 2019) Michael Starks Abstracto Antes de comentar detalladamente sobre Haciendo lo Mundo Social (MSW) primero voy a ofrecer algunos comentarios sobre la filosofía (psicología descriptiva) y su relación con la investigación psicológica contemporánea como ejemplificado en las obras de Searle (S) y Wittgenstein (W), ya que siento que esta es la mejor manera de lugar Searle o cualquier comentarista sobre el comportamiento, en la perspectiva adecuada. Será de gran ayuda para ver mis comentarios de PNC, TLP, PI, OC, TARW y otros libros de estos dos genios de la psicología descriptiva. S no hace ninguna referencia a la declaración de la mente presciente de W como mecanismo en TLP, y su destrucción de ella en su trabajo posterior. Desde W, S se ha convertido en el principal deconstructor de estas vistas mecánicas de la conducta, y el psicólogo descriptivo más importante (filósofo), pero no se da cuenta de cómo completamente W lo anticipó ni, en general, hacer otros (pero ver los muchos papeles y libros de Proudfoot y Copeland en W, Turing y AI). El trabajo de S es mucho más fácil de seguir que W, y aunque hay cierta jerga, es sobre todo espectacularmente claro si te acercas desde la dirección correcta. Vea mis reseñas de W S y otros libros para más detalles. En general, MSW es un buen Resumen de los muchos avances sustanciales sobre Wittgenstein resultantes del medio siglo de trabajo de S, pero en mi opinión, W todavía es inigualable para la psicología básica una vez que entiendes lo que está diciendo (ver mis comentarios). Idealmente, deben leerse juntos: Searle para la clara prosa coherente y generalizaciones sobre la operación de S2/S3, ilustrada con los ejemplos perspicaces de W de la operación de S1/S2, y sus brillantes aforismos. Si yo fuera mucho más joven escribiría un libro haciendo exactamente eso. Aquellos que deseen un marco completo hasta la fecha para el comportamiento humano de la moderna dos sistemas punto de vista puede consultar mi libro 'La Estructura Lógica de la Filosofía, la Psicología, la Mente y Lenguaje en Ludwig Wittgenstein y John Searle ' 2nd Ed (2019). Los interesados en más de mis escritos pueden ver 'Monos parlantes--filosofía, psicología, ciencia, religión y política en un planeta condenado--artículos y reseñas 2006-2019 3rd Ed (2019) y delirios utópicos suicidas en el 21St Century 4TH Ed (2019) "Pero no he tenido mi foto del mundo satisfaciendo su corrección: ni la tengo porque estoy satisfecho de su corrección. No: es el trasfondo heredado en el que distingo entre verdadero y falso. " Wittgenstein OC 94 103 "Ahora bien, si no son las conexiones causales que nos preocupan, entonces las actividades de la mente están abiertas ante nosotros." Wittgenstein "el libro azul" P6 (1933) "Tonterías, tonterías, porque estás haciendo suposiciones en lugar de simplemente describir. Si su cabeza está embrujada por explicaciones aquí, usted está descuidando para recordar los hechos más importantes. " Wittgenstein Z 220 "La filosofía simplemente pone todo ante nosotros y no explica ni deduce nada... Uno podría dar el nombre ' filosofía ' a lo que es posible antes de todos los nuevos descubrimientos e invenciones. " Wittgenstein PI 126 "Lo que estamos suministrando son realmente comentarios sobre la historia natural del hombre, no Curiosidades; sin embargo, sino más bien observaciones sobre hechos que nadie ha dudado y que no han sido comentados porque siempre están ante nuestros ojos. " Wittgenstein RFM I p142 "El objetivo de la filosofía es levantar una pared en el punto donde el lenguaje se detiene de todos modos." Ocasiones filosóficas de Wittgenstein p187 "El mayor peligro aquí es querer observarnos a uno mismo." LWPP1, 459 "El límite del lenguaje se demuestra por su imposibilidad de describir un hecho que corresponde a (es la traducción de) una frase sin simplemente repetir la frase (esto tiene que ver con la solución kantiana al problema de la filosofía)." Wittgenstein CV P10 (1931) "Pero no se puede explicar un sistema físico como una máquina de escribir o un cerebro mediante la identificación de un patrón que comparte con su simulación computacional, porque la existencia del patrón no explica cómo el sistema funciona realmente como un sistema físico. ... En Resumen, el hecho de que la atribución de sintaxis no identifique otras potencias causales es fatal para la afirmación de que los programas proporcionan explicaciones causales de la cognición... Sólo hay un mecanismo físico, el cerebro, con sus diversos niveles causales físicos y físicos/mentales de la descripción. " La filosofía Searle en un nuevo siglo (PNC) P101103 "¿Puede haber razones para la acción que son vinculantes para un agente racional sólo en virtud de la naturaleza del hecho reportado en la declaración de razón, e independientemente de los deseos, valores, actitudes y evaluaciones del agente? ... La verdadera paradoja de la discusión tradicional es que intenta plantear la guillotina de Hume, la rígida distinción de valor de hecho, en un vocabulario, cuyo uso ya presupone la falsedad de la distinción. " Searle PNC p165-171 "... todas las funciones de estado y por lo tanto toda la realidad institucional, con la excepción del lenguaje, son creadas por actos de voz que tienen la forma lógica de las 104 declaraciones... las formas de la función de estatus en cuestión son casi invariablemente cuestiones de poderes deóntica... reconocer algo como un derecho, un deber, una obligación, un requisito, etcétera, es reconocer un motivo de acción... Estas estructuras deonticas hacen posible el deseo-razones independientes de la acción... El punto general es muy claro: la creación del campo general de los motivos de acción basados en el deseo presuponía la aceptación de un sistema de razones de acción independientes del deseo. " Searle PNC P34-49 "Algunas de las características lógicas más importantes de la intencionalidad están más allá del alcance de la fenomenología porque no tienen una realidad fenomenológica inmediata... Porque la creación del significado de la falta de sentido no se experimenta conscientemente... no existe... Esto es... la ilusión fenomenológica. " Searle PNC P115117 "La conciencia es causalmente reducible a los procesos cerebrales... y la conciencia no tiene poderes causales propios, además de los poderes causales de la neurobiología subyacente... Pero la reducibilidad causal no conduce a la reducibilidad ontológica... conciencia sólo existe como experimentada... y por lo tanto no puede reducirse a algo que tiene una ontología en tercera persona, algo que existe independientemente de las experiencias. " Searle PNC 155-6 "... la relación intencional básica entre la mente y el mundo tiene que ver con las condiciones de satisfacción. Y una proposición es cualquier cosa que pueda estar en una relación intencional con el mundo, y ya que esas relaciones intencionales siempre determinan las condiciones de satisfacción, y una proposición se define como cualquier cosa suficiente para determinar las condiciones de satisfacciones, resulta que toda intencionalidad es una cuestión de proposiciones. " Searle PNC p193 "Así que, funciones de estado son el pegamento que une a la sociedad. Son creados por la intencionalidad colectiva y funcionan mediante el transporte de poderes deóntica... Con la importante excepción del lenguaje en sí, toda la realidad institucional y por ello en cierto sentido toda la civilización humana es creada por los actos del habla que tienen la forma lógica de las declaraciones... toda la realidad institucional humana se crea y mantenidos en existencia por (representaciones que tienen la misma forma lógica que) declaraciones de función de estado, incluyendo los casos que no son actos de voz en la forma explícita de declaraciones. " Searle MSW p11-13 "Las creencias, como las declaraciones, tienen la dirección de ajuste hacia abajo o la mente (o la palabra) al mundo. Y los deseos y las intenciones, como las órdenes y las promesas, tienen la dirección ascendente o mundial (o palabra) de ajuste. Se supone que las creencias o percepciones, como las declaraciones, representan cómo son las cosas en el mundo, y en ese sentido, se supone que encajan en el mundo; tienen la dirección de ajuste de la mente al mundo. Los Estados conativo-volicionales como los deseos, las intenciones previas y las intenciones en acción, como las órdenes y las 105 promesas, tienen la dirección de ajuste del mundo a la mente. No se supone que representen cómo son las cosas sino cómo nos gustaría que fueran o cómo pretendemos hacerlas ser... Además de estas dos facultades, hay una tercera, la imaginación, en la que el contenido de proposicional no se supone que encaja la realidad en la forma en que el contenido de proposicional de la cognición y la volición se supone que encajan... se abandona el compromiso referente al mundo y tenemos un contenido proposicional sin ningún compromiso que represente con cualquier dirección de ajuste. " Searle MSW P15 "Al igual que en los Estados intencionales, podemos distinguir entre el tipo de estado... y el contenido del estado... así que en la teoría del lenguaje podemos hacer una distinción entre el tipo de acto de habla que es... y el contenido proposicional... tenemos el mismo contenido proposicional con diferente modo psicológico en el caso de los Estados intencionales, y la fuerza o tipo de illocucionaria diferente en el caso de los actos del habla. Además, así como mis creencias pueden ser verdaderas o falsas y por lo tanto tienen la dirección de la mente al mundo de ajuste, por lo que mis declaraciones pueden ser verdaderas o falsas y así tener la dirección de la palabra a mundo de ajuste. Y así como mis deseos o intenciones no pueden ser verdaderos o falsos, pero pueden estar de diversas maneras satisfechos o insatisfechos, por lo que mis órdenes y promesas no pueden ser verdaderas o falsas, pero pueden estar satisfechas o insatisfechas de varias maneras - podemos pensar en todos los Estados intencionales que tienen un todo e contenido proposicional y una dirección de ajuste como representaciones de sus condiciones de satisfacción. Una creencia representa sus condiciones de verdad, un deseo representa sus condiciones de cumplimiento, una intención representa sus condiciones de realización... El estado intencional representa sus condiciones de satisfacción... personas suponen erróneamente que cada representación mental debe ser conscientemente pensada... pero la noción de una representación como la estoy usando es una noción funcional y no ontológica. Cualquier cosa que tenga condiciones de satisfacción, que pueda triunfar o fracasar de una manera que sea característica de la intencionalidad, es por definición una representación de sus condiciones de satisfacción... podemos analizar la estructura de la intencionalidad del fenómenos sociales mediante el análisis de sus condiciones de satisfacción. " Searle MSW p28-32 "Los primeros cuatro tipos de actos del habla tienen análogos exactos en los Estados intencionales: correspondiendo a los asertivos son creencias, correspondiendo a las directivas son deseos, correspondiendo a las comisarias {commissives} son intenciones y correspondientes a expresivos es toda la gama de emociones y otros Estados intencionales donde el presup fit {presupuesto ajustado} es dado por sentado. Pero no hay un análogo prelingüístico para las declaraciones. Los Estados Prelingüísticos intencionales no pueden crear hechos en el mundo al representar esos hechos como ya existen. Esta notable hazaña requiere un lenguaje "MSW p69 "Orador significa... es la imposición de condiciones de satisfacción en condiciones de satisfacción. La capacidad de hacer esto es un elemento crucial de las capacidades 106 cognitivas humanas. Se requiere la capacidad de pensar en dos niveles a la vez, de una manera que es esencial para el uso del lenguaje. En un nivel, el orador produce intencionalmente una expresión física, pero en otro nivel la expresión representa algo. Y la misma dualidad infecta el símbolo en sí. En un nivel, es un objeto físico como cualquier otro. En otro nivel, tiene un significado: representa un tipo de estado de asuntos "MSW P74 "... una vez que usted tiene el lenguaje, es inevitable que usted tendrá deontología porque no hay manera que usted puede hacer actos explícitos de la voz realizados de acuerdo con las convenciones de un idioma sin crear compromisos. Esto es cierto no sólo para las declaraciones, sino para todos discurso actúa "MSW P82 Estas citas no se eligen al azar, pero (junto con las otras en mis reseñas de libros por estos dos genios) son un précis de comportamiento de nuestros dos mejores psicólogos descriptivos. Antes de comentar en detalle en hacer el mundo social (MSW) primero voy a ofrecer algunos comentarios sobre la filosofía (psicología descriptiva) y su relación con la investigación psicológica contemporánea como ejemplificado en las obras de Searle (S) y Wittgenstein (W), ya que sentir que esta es la mejor manera de colocar Searle o cualquier comentarista sobre el comportamiento, en la perspectiva adecuada. Ayudará en gran medida a ver mis reseñas de PNC, TLP, PI, OC, TARW y otros libros por estos dos genios de la psicología descriptiva, decir que Searle ha llevado a cabo el trabajo de W no es decir que es un resultado directo del estudio W , pero más bien que porque sólo hay una psicología humana (por la misma razón sólo hay una Cardiología humana), que cualquiera que describa con precisión el comportamiento debe estar expresando alguna variante o extensión de lo que W dijo (como deben si ambos están dando correcta descripciones de comportamiento). Encuentro la mayoría de S prefigurado en W, incluyendo versiones del famoso argumento de la sala China contra Strong AI y temas relacionados que son los temas de CHAPS 3-5. Por cierto, si la habitación China le interesa entonces usted debe leer excellente de Victor Rodych, pero virtualmente desconocida, suplemento en el CR-"Searle liberado de cada defecto." S no hace ninguna referencia a la declaración de la mente presciente de W como mecanismo en TLP, y su destrucción de ella en su trabajo posterior. Desde W, S se ha convertido en el principal deconstructor de estas vistas mecánicas de la conducta, y el psicólogo descriptivo más importante (filósofo), pero no se da cuenta de cómo completamente W lo anticipó ni, en general, hacer otros (pero ver los muchos papeles y libros de Proudfoot y Copeland en W, Turing y AI). El trabajo de S es mucho más fácil de seguir que W, y aunque hay cierta jerga, es sobre todo espectacularmente claro si te acercas desde la dirección correcta. Vea mis reseñas de W S y otros libros para más detalles. Wittgenstein es para mí fácilmente el pensador más brillante en el comportamiento 107 humano. Su trabajo como un todo muestra que todo el comportamiento es una extensión de los axiomas innatos verdaderos y que nuestra raciocinación consciente (sistema 2) (S2) emerge de maquinaciones inconscientes (sistema 1) (S1) y se amplía lógicamente en la referencia cultural (sistema 3 (S3). Ver "sobre certeza" (OC) para su tratamiento final extendido de esta idea-y mi revisión de la misma para su preparación. Su corpus puede ser visto como la base para toda la descripción del comportamiento animal, revelando cómo funciona la mente y de hecho debe funcionar. El "must" (debe) está implicado en el hecho de que todos los cerebros comparten una ascendencia común y genes comunes y por lo que sólo hay una forma básica de trabajar, que esto necesariamente tiene una estructura axiomática, que todos los animales superiores comparten la misma psicología evolucionada basada en aptitud, y que en los seres humanos esto se extiende en una personalidad (una ilusión cognitiva o fenomenológica) basado en las contracciones musculares de la garganta (lenguaje) que evolucionó para manipular a otros (con variaciones que pueden ser considerados como trivial). Podría decirse que todo el trabajo de W y S es un desarrollo o una variación de estas ideas. Otro tema importante aquí, y por supuesto en todas las discusiones sobre el comportamiento humano, es la necesidad de separar los automatismos genéticamente programados, que subyacen a todo comportamiento, de los efectos de la cultura. Aunque pocos filósofos, psicólogos, antropólogos, sociólogos, etc., discuten explícitamente esto de una manera integral, puede ser visto como el principal problema con el que están lidiando. Sugiero que probará el mayor valor para considerar todos los estudios de comportamiento de orden superior como un esfuerzo para burlarse no sólo el pensamiento rápido y lento (por ejemplo, percepciones y otros automatismos vs. disposiciones-S1 y S2-ver más abajo), pero las extensiones lógicas de S2 en la referencia cultural (S3). Lo que W estableció en su período final (y a lo largo de su trabajo anterior en un menor manera clara) son los fundamentos de la psicología evolutiva (EP), o si lo prefieres, la psicología, la lingüística cognitiva, la intencionalidad, el pensamiento de orden superior o simplemente el comportamiento animal. Lamentablemente, casi nadie parece darse cuenta de que sus obras son un libro de texto único de la psicología descriptiva que es tan relevante ahora como el día en que se escribió. Es casi universalmente ignorado por la psicología y otras ciencias del comportamiento y las Humanidades, e incluso aquellos pocos que lo han entendido más o menos, no han comprendido el alcance de su anticipación de la última obra sobre EP y las ilusiones cognitivas (teoría de la mente, encuadre, los dos seres de pensamiento rápido y lento, etc., --ver abajo). El trabajo de Searle proporciona una descripción impresionante del comportamiento social de orden superior que es posible debido a la reciente evolución de los genes para la psicología disposicional, mientras que la W posterior muestra cómo se basa en verdaderos axiomas inconscientes de S1 que evolucionaron en el pensamiento de proposicional disposicional consciente de S2. Mucho antes de Searle, W rechazó la idea de que los enfoques bottom up (de abajo hacia arriba) de la fisiología, la psicología experimental y la computación (por ejemplo, 108 el Behaviorismo, el funcionalismo, la IA fuerte, la teoría de sistemas dinámicos, la teoría computacional de la mente, etc.) podrían revelar lo que su top down (de arriba hacia abajo)deconstrucciones de juegos de idiomas (LG) lo hizo. Las principales dificultades que observó son entender lo que está siempre delante de nuestros ojos (ahora podemos ver esto como la obliviosidad al sistema 1 (aproximadamente lo que S llama ' la ilusión fenomenológica ') y para capturar la vaguedad ("la mayor dificultad en estos investigaciones es encontrar una manera de representar la vaguedad "LWPP1, 347). Al igual que con sus otros aforismos, sugiero que uno debe tomar seriamente el comentario de W que incluso si Dios pudiera mirar en nuestra mente que no podía ver lo que estamos pensando-este debe ser el lema de la mente encarnada y, como S deja claro, de la psicología cognitiva. Pero Dios podía ver lo que estamos percibiendo y recordando y nuestro pensamiento reflexivo, ya que estas funciones S1 son siempre Estados mentales causales mientras que las disposiciones S2 son sólo potencialmente CMS. Esto no es una teoría sino un hecho sobre nuestra gramática y nuestra fisiología. El lodo de S las aguas aquí porque se refiere a las disposiciones como Estados mentales, así, pero como W hizo hace mucho tiempo, muestra que el lenguaje de causalidad simplemente no se aplica a las descripciones de S2 de orden superior emergente-de nuevo no es una teoría sino una descripción de cómo el lenguaje (pensamiento) funciona. Esto trae otro punto que es prominente en W pero negado por S, que todo lo que podemos hacer es dar descripciones y no una teoría. S insiste en que está proporcionando teorías, pero por supuesto "teoría" y "Descripción" son juegos de idiomas también y me parece que la teoría de S es generalmente la descripción de Wuna rosa con cualquier otro nombre.... El punto de W fue que al apegarse a ejemplos perspicaces que todos sabemos que son verdaderos relatos de nuestro comportamiento, evitamos las arenas movedizas de las teorías que intentan tener en cuenta para todos los comportamientos (todos los juegos de lenguaje), mientras S quiere generalizar e inevitablemente se extravía (él da varios ejemplos de sus propios errores en PNC). Como S y otros modifican sin cesar sus teorías para tener en cuenta los juegos de idiomas múltiples que se acercan y más cerca de describir el comportamiento a través de numerosos ejemplos como lo hizo W. Algunos de los temas favoritos de W en su segundo y sus terceros periodos son los diferentes (pero interdigitantes) de LG de pensamiento rápido y lento (sistema 1 y 2 o más o menos juegos de idiomas primarios (PLG) y juegos de lenguaje secundario (SLG) del interior y el exterior-ver por ejemplo, Johnston- ' Wittgenstein: repensar el interior ' sobre cómo confundir a los dos es una industria importante en la filosofía y la psicología), la imposibilidad de lenguaje privado y la estructura axiomática de todo comportamiento. Verbos como ' pensar ', ' ver ' primero describieron las funciones S1, pero como S2 evolucionaron, llegaron a aplicarse también, lo que condujo a la mitología entera del interior resultante de, por ejemplo, tratando de referirse a la imaginación como si estuviera viendo imágenes dentro del cerebro. Los PLG son las declaraciones automatizadas simples por nuestro involuntario, sistema 1, 109 pensamiento rápido, neurona de espejo, verdadero sólo, no proposicional, Estados mentales-nuestras percepciones y recuerdos y actos reflexivos (' voluntad ') incluyendo el sistema 1 verdades y UOA1-comprensión de Agencia 1--y Emotions1como la alegría, el amor, la ira) que se pueden describir causalmente, mientras que los SLG evolutivamente más tarde son expresiones o descripciones de voluntario, sistema 2, pensamiento lento, mentalización de las neuronas, comprobables verdadero o falso, proposicional, Truth2 y UOA2 y Emotions2-alegría, amar, odiar, la disposicional (y a menudo contrafáctual) imaginar, suponiendo, pretendiendo, pensando, sabiendo, creyendo, etc. que sólo se puede describir en términos de razones (es decir, es sólo un hecho que intenta describir el sistema 2 en términos de Neuroquímica, física atómica, matemáticas, simplemente no tienen sentido-ver W para muchos ejemplos y Searle para las buenas disquisiciones sobre esto). No es posible describir los automatismos del sistema 1 en términos de razones (por ejemplo, ' veo que como una manzana porque... ') a menos que desee dar una razón en términos de EP, genética, fisiología, y como W ha demostrado repetidamente que carece de sentido dar "explicaciones" con la condición de que tendrán sentido en el futuro-' nada está oculto '-que tienen sentido ahora o nunca. Una heurística poderosa es separar el comportamiento y la experiencia en la intencionalidad 1 y la intencionalidad 2 (por ejemplo, pensamiento 1 y pensamiento 2, emociones 1 y emociones 2, etc.) e incluso en las verdades 1 (T solamente axiomas) y las verdades 2 (extensiones empíricas o "teoremas" que resultado de la extensión lógica de las verdades 1). W reconoció que ' nada está oculto '-es decir, toda nuestra psicología y todas las respuestas a todas las preguntas filosóficas están aquí en nuestro idioma (nuestra vida) y que la dificultad no es encontrar las respuestas sino reconocerlas como siempre aquí en frente de nosotros-sólo tenemos que dejar de tratar de mirar más profundo. FMRI, PET, TCMS, iRNA, análogos computacionales, AI y todo el resto son formas fascinantes y poderosas de extender nuestra psicología axiomática innata, para proporcionar la base física de nuestro comportamiento y facilitar nuestro análisis de los juegos de idiomas que sin embargo permanecen inexplicable--EP simplemente es de esta manera-y sin cambios. Los axiomas verdaderos, explorados más a fondo en ' on certidumbre ', son W (y más tarde Searle) "lecho" o "fondo", es decir, la psicología evolutiva, que son trazables a las reacciones automáticas verdaderas de las bacterias y sus descendientes (por ejemplo, los seres humanos), que evolucionaron y operan por el mecanismo de la aptitud inclusiva (si)--ver los magníficos "principios de la evolución social" de Bourke. W insistió en que deberíamos considerar nuestro análisis de la conducta como descripciones en lugar de explicaciones, pero por supuesto estos también son complejos juegos de idiomas y la descripción de una persona es la explicación de otro. Comenzando con sus respuestas innatas, sólo verdaderas, no empíricas (automatizadas y no cambiables) al mundo, los animales extienden su comprensión axiomática a través de deducciones en más verdaderos sólo entendimientos 110 ("teoremas" como podríamos llamarlos, pero esto es un complejo juego de idiomas, incluso en el contexto de las matemáticas). Los tiranosaurios y los mesones se vuelven tan indisputable como la existencia de nuestras dos manos o nuestra respiración. Esto cambia drásticamente una'vista de la naturaleza humana. Teoría de la mente (TOM) no es una teoría en absoluto, sino un grupo de entendimientos verdaderos de la agencia (UA un término que diseñé hace 10 años) que los animales recién nacidos (incluyendo moscas y gusanos si UA está adecuadamente definido) tienen y posteriormente se extienden grandemente (en eucariotas más altas). Sin embargo, como señalo aquí, W dejó muy claro que para gran parte de la intencionalidad existen las versiones Sistema 1 y Sistema 2 (juegos de idiomas)-el UA1 inconsciente rápido y el UA2 consciente lento y, por supuesto, estos son heurísticos para fenómenos multifacéticos. Aunque la materia prima para S2 es S1, S2 también se alimenta de nuevo en S1 - mayor retroalimentación cortical a los niveles más bajos de percepción, memoria, pensamiento reflexivo que es un fundamental de la psicología. Muchos de los ejemplos de W exploran esta calle de dos vías (por ejemplo, ver las discusiones del pato/conejo y "ver como" en Johnston). Creo que está claro que los axiomas innatos verdaderos-sólo W está ocupado a lo largo de su trabajo, y casi exclusivamente en OC (su última obra ' sobre la certeza '), son equivalentes al pensamiento rápido o sistema 1 que está en el centro de la investigación actual (por ejemplo, ver Kahneman-" Pensar rápido y lento ", pero no tiene idea de W estableció el marco hace unos 75 años), que es involuntario e inconsciente y que corresponde a los Estados mentales de la percepción (incluyendo UA1) y la memoria y actos involuntarios, como W notas una y otra vez en un sinfín de ejemplos. Uno podría llamar a estos "reflejos intracerebrales" (tal vez 99% de toda nuestra cerebración si se mide por el uso de energía en el cerebro). Nuestro lento o reflexivo, más o menos "consciente" (¡ cuidado con otra red de juegos de idiomas!) la actividad de segundo cerebro propio se corresponde con lo que W caracterizó como "disposiciones" o "inclinaciones", que se refieren a habilidades o posibles acciones, no son Estados mentales ( o no en el mismo sentido), y no tienen ningún tiempo definido de ocurrencia y/o duración. Pero las palabras de disposición como "saber", "entender", "pensar", "creer", que W discutió extensamente, tienen al menos dos usos básicos. Uno es un uso filosófico peculiar (pero graduándose en los usos cotidianos) ejemplificado por Moore (cuyos papeles inspiraron a W a escribir OC), que se refiere a las oraciones verdaderas sólo resultantes de las percepciones directas y la memoria, es decir, nuestra psicología axiomática S1 innata (' i saben que estas son mis manos '), y el S2, que es su uso normal como disposiciones, que pueden ser actuada, y que puede llegar a ser verdadero o falso (' yo sé mi camino a casa '). La investigación del pensamiento rápido involuntario ha revolucionado la psicología, la economía (por ejemplo, el Premio Nobel de Kahneman) y otras disciplinas bajo nombres como "ilusiones cognitivas", "cebado", "enmarcado", "heurística" y "sesgos". Por supuesto, estos también son juegos de idiomas por lo que habrá más y menos útiles maneras de utilizar estas palabras, y los estudios y discusiones variarán de "puro" 111 sistema 1 a combinaciones de 1 y 2 (la norma como W dejó claro), pero presumiblemente no siempre de lento sistema 2 disposicional delgado rey sólo, ya que cualquier sistema 2 pensamiento o acción intencional no puede ocurrir sin involucrar gran parte de la intrincada red de "módulos cognitivos", "motores de inferencia", "reflejos intracerebrales", "automatismos", "axiomas cognitivos", "fondo" o "lecho de roca" (como W y más tarde Searle llamar a nuestro EP). Aunque W advirtió con frecuencia contra la teoría y produjo más y mejores ejemplos de lenguaje en acción que nadie, uno podría decir que sus aforismos agregados ilustrados por ejemplos constituyen la "teoría" más completa de la conducta ("realidad") jamás Escrito. Por último, permítanme sugerir que con esta perspectiva, la W no es oscura, difícil o irrelevante, sino centelleante, profunda y cristalina, que escribe de forma aforística y telegráfica porque pensamos y nos comportamos de esa manera, y que extrañarlo es perderse uno de las mayores aventuras intelectuales posibles. Ahora que tenemos un comienzo razonable en la estructura lógica de la racionalidad (la Psicología descriptiva del pensamiento de orden superior) se puede ver la tabla de intencionalidad que resulta de esta obra, que he construido en los últimos años. Se basa en una mucho más simple de Searle, que a su vez le debe mucho a Wittgenstein. También he incorporado en las tablas de forma modificada que son utilizados por los investigadores actuales en la psicología de los procesos de pensamiento que se evidencian en las últimas 9 filas. Debería resultar interesante compararlo con los 3 volúmenes recientes de Peter hacker en Human Nature. Ofrezco esta tabla como una heurística para describir el comportamiento que encuentro más completo y útil que cualquier otro marco que he visto y no como un análisis final o completo, que tendría que ser tridimensional con cientos (al menos) de flechas que van en muchos direcciones con muchas (tal vez todas) vías entre S1 y S2 siendo bidireccional. Además, la distinción entre S1 y S2, cognición y voluntad, percepción y memoria, entre sentimiento, saber, creer y esperar, etc. son arbitrarias--es decir, como demostró W, todas las palabras son contextualmente sensibles y la mayoría tienen varios diferentes usos (significados o COS). Muchos gráficos complejos han sido publicados por los científicos, pero los encuentro de utilidad mínima cuando se piensa en el comportamiento (en contraposición a pensar en la función cerebral). Cada nivel de descripción puede ser útil en ciertos contextos, pero me parece que ser más grueso o más fino limita la utilidad. La estructura lógica de la racionalidad (LSR), o la estructura lógica de la mente (LSM), la estructura lógica del comportamiento (LSB), la estructura lógica del pensamiento (LST), la estructura lógica de la conciencia (LSC), la estructura lógica de la personalidad (LSP), el Psicología descriptiva de la conciencia (DSC), la psicología descriptiva del pensamiento de orden superior (DPHOT), la intencionalidad-el término filosófico clásico. 112 El sistema 1 es involuntario, reflexivo o automatizado "reglas" R1 mientras pensar (cognición) no tiene lagunas y es voluntario o deliberativo "reglas" R2 y hazlo (willing) or voluntad (Volition) tiene 3 lagunas (ver Searle). Sugiero que podamos describir el comportamiento más claramente cambiando "imponer condiciones de satisfacción en las condiciones de satisfacción" de Searle a "relacionar los estados mentales con el mundo moviendo los músculos" - es decir, hablar, escribir y hacer, y su "mente al mundo dirección de ajuste "y" la dirección del mundo a la mente de ajuste "por" causa se origina en la mente "y" causa se origina en el mundo "S1 es sólo de forma ascendente causal (mundo a la mente) y sin contenido (falta de representaciones o información) mientras que S2 tiene contenidos y es descendente causal (mente al mundo ). He adoptado mi terminología en esta tabla. 113 DESDE EL ANALISIS DE LOS JUEGOS DE IDIOMAS Disposición Emoción Memoria Percepción Deseo PI * * IA * * * AcciónPalabra Causa origina de * * * * Mundo Mundo Mundo Mundo Mente Mente Mente Mente Provoca cambios en * * * * * Ninguno Mente Mente Mente Ninguno Mundo Mundo Mundo Causalmente Auto Reflexivo * * * * * * No Sí Sí Sí No Sí Sí Sí Verdadero o falso (Comprobable) Sí T sólo T sólo T sólo Sí Sí Sí Sí Condiciones públicas de satisfacción Sí Sí/No Sí/No No Sí/No Sí No Sí Describir Un estado mental No Sí Sí Sí No No Sí/No Sí Prioridad evolutiva 5 4 2, 3 1 5 3 2 2 Contenido voluntario Sí No No No No Sí Sí Sí Iniciación voluntaria Sí/No No Sí No Sí/No Sí Sí Sí Sistema cognitivo ******* 2 1 2/1 1 2/1 2 1 2 Cambiar intensidad No Sí Sí Sí Sí No No No Duración precisa No Sí Sí Sí No No Sí Sí Aquí y Ahora o Allá y Luego (H + N, T + T) ******** TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN Calidad especial No Sí No Sí No No No No Localizado en Cuerpo No No No Sí No No No Sí Las expresiones corporales Sí Sí No No Sí Sí Sí Sí Autocontradiccion es No Sí No No Sí No No No Necesita un yo Sí Sí/No No No Sí No No No Necesita lenguaje Sí No No No No No No Sí/No 114 DE LA INVESTIGACIÓN DE DECISIONES Disposición Emoción Memoria Percepción Deseo PI * * IA * * * Acción/ Palabra Efectos subliminales No Sí/No Sí Sí No No No Sí/No Asociativa Basada en reglas RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB Dependiente del contexto/ Abstracto A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/A CD/A Serie/Paralelo S S/P P P S/P S S S Heurístico Analítica A H/A H H H/A A A A Necesita trabajar Memoria Sí No No No No Sí Sí Sí Dependiente general de la inteligencia Sí No No No Sí/No Sí Sí Sí La carga cognitiva Inhibe Sí Sí/No No No Sí Sí Sí Sí Excitación facilita o inhibe I F/I F F I I I I Condiciones públicas de satisfacción de S2 son a menudo referidos por Searle y otros como COS, representaciones, creadores de la verdad o significados (o COS2 por mí mismo), mientras que los resultados automáticos de S1 son designados como presentaciones por otros (o COS1 por mí mismo). * Aka Inclinaciones, Capacidades, Preferencias, Representaciones, Posibles Acciones, etc. ** Intenciones anteriores de Searle *** La intención de Searle en acción. **** Dirección de ajuste de Searle ***** Dirección de causalidad de Searle ****** (Las instancias del estado mental Causas o se cumple a sí mismo). Searle anteriormente llamó a esto causalmente auto-referencial. ******* Tversky / Kahneman / Frederick / Evans / Stanovich definieron los sistemas cognitivos. ******** Aquí y ahora o allí y luego Tengo una explicación detallada de esta tabla en mis otros escritos. Uno siempre debe tener en cuenta el descubrimiento de Wittgenstein de que después de haber descrito los posibles usos (significados, los creadores de la verdad, condiciones de satisfacción) del lenguaje en un contexto particular, hemos agotado su 115 interés, y los intentos de explicación (es decir, filosofía) sólo nos alejan de la verdad. Es fundamental tener en cuenta que esta tabla es sólo una heurística libre de contexto muy simplificada y cada uso de una palabra debe examinarse en su contexto. El mejor examen de la variación de contexto está en los últimos 3 volúmenes de Peter hacker en la naturaleza humana, que proporcionan numerosas tablas y gráficos que se deben comparar con este. Aquellos que deseen una cuenta completa hasta la fecha de Wittgenstein, Searle y su análisis de comportamiento de la vista moderna de dos sistemas pueden consultar mi artículo la estructura lógica de la filosofía, la psicología, la mente y el lenguaje como se reveló en Wittgenstein y Searle (2016). Ahora, para algunos comentarios sobre el MSW de Searle. Voy a hacer algunas referencias a otra de sus obras recientes que he revisado-filosofía en un nuevo siglo (PNC). Las ideas aquí ya están publicadas y nada vendrá como una sorpresa para aquellos que han mantenido su trabajo. Al igual que W, es considerado como el mejor filósofo de su tiempo y su obra escrita es sólida como una roca y pionera en todo. Sin embargo, su fracaso para tomar la W más tarde lo suficientemente seriamente conduce a algunos errores y confusiones. En varios lugares de su trabajo (p. ej., P7 de PNC) señala dos veces que nuestra certeza sobre los hechos básicos se debe al peso abrumador de la razón que respalda nuestras afirmaciones, pero W demostró definitivamente en On Certainty (Sobre Certeza) que no hay posibilidad de dudar del verdadero estructura axiomática de nuestras percepciones, memorias y pensamientos del sistema 1, ya que es en sí misma la base para el juicio (razón) y no puede ser juzgada por sí misma. En la primera frase sobre P8 de PNC nos dice que la certeza es revisable, pero este tipo de ' certeza ', que podríamos llamar Certainty2, es el resultado de extender nuestra certeza axiomática y no revisable (Certainty1 de S1) a través de la experiencia y es completamente diferente como es proposicional (verdadero o falso). Este es, por supuesto, un ejemplo clásico de la "batalla contra la hechizamiento de nuestra inteligencia por el lenguaje" que W demostró una y otra vez. Una palabra-dos (o muchos) usos distintos. En P12 de PNC, ' consciencia ' se describe como el resultado del funcionamiento automatizado del sistema 1 que es ' subjetivo ' en varios sentidos muy diferentes, y no, en el caso normal, una cuestión de evidencia sino una comprensión verdadera en nuestro propio caso y una percepción verdadera en el caso de otros. Siento que W tiene una mejor comprensión de la conexión mente/idioma, ya que considera ellos como sinónimos en muchos contextos, y su trabajo es una brillante exposición de la mente como ejemplificado en numerosos ejemplos perspicaces de uso del lenguaje. Como se ha citado anteriormente, "ahora bien, si no son las conexiones causales que nos preocupan, entonces las actividades de la mente están abiertas ante nosotros." Uno puede negar que cualquier revisión de nuestros conceptos (juegos de idiomas) de causalidad o libre voluntad son necesarias o incluso posibles. Puede leer cualquier página de W por las razones. Una cosa es decir cosas 116 extrañas sobre el mundo usando ejemplos de la mecánica cuántica, la incertidumbre, etc., pero es otro decir algo relevante para nuestro uso normal de las palabras. Las estructuras deonticas o ' pegamento social ' son las acciones rápidas automáticas de S1 produciendo las disposiciones lentas de S2 que se expanden inexorablemente durante el desarrollo personal en una amplia gama de relaciones deonticas culturales universales inconsciente automáticas con otros (S3). Aunque este es mi précis de comportamiento que espero que bastante describe el trabajo de S. Aquellos que deseen familiarizarse con los argumentos bien conocidos de S contra la visión mecánica de la mente, que me parece definitivo, pueden consultar a CHAPS 3-5 de su PNC. He leído libros enteros de respuestas a ellos y estoy de acuerdo con S que todos se pierden los muy simples puntos lógicos (psicológicos) que hace (y que, en general, W hizo medio a century antes). Para ponerlo en mis términos, S1 se compone de inconsciente, rápido, físico, causal, automático, no proposicional, verdaderos sólo Estados mentales, mientras que el S2 lento sólo puede describirse coherentemente en términos de las acciones que son más o menos disposiciones conscientes para comportamiento (acciones potenciales) que son o pueden llegar a ser proposicionales (T o F). Las computadoras y el resto de la naturaleza sólo tienen intencionalidad derivada que depende de nuestra perspectiva, mientras que los animales superiores tienen intencionalidad primaria que es independiente de la perspectiva. Como S y W aprecian, la gran ironía es que estas reducciones materialistas o mecánicas de la psicología se disfrazan como ciencia de vanguardia, pero en realidad son totalmente anti-científicas. La filosofía (psicología descriptiva) y la psicología cognitiva (liberada de la superstición) se están convirtiendo en un guante de la mano y es Hofstadter, Dennett, Kurzweil, etc., que se quedan fuera en el frío. Me parece bastante obvio (ya que era a W) que la visión mecánica de la mente existe por la misma razón que casi todos los comportamientos-es la operación por defecto de nuestro EP que busca explicaciones en términos de lo que podemos pensar deliberadamente a través de lentamente , en lugar de en el S1 automatizado, del que en su mayoría permanecemos ajenos (TPI). Encuentro la descripción de W de nuestra psicología heredada axiomática y sus extensiones en su OC y otro 3er período trabaja para ser más profundo que S (o cualquiera), y por lo que no estamos "seguros" de que los perros son conscientes, pero más bien no está abierto a (no es posible) duda. Capítulo 5 de Searle's PNC muy bien demolida teoría computacional de la mente, lenguaje del pensamiento, etc., señalando que ' computación ', ' información ', "sintaxis", "algoritmo", "lógica", "programa", etc., son términos relativos a los observadores (es decir, psicológicos) y no tienen un significado físico o matemático en este sentido psicológico, pero por supuesto hay otros sentidos que se han dado recientemente ya que la ciencia ha Desarrollado. Una vez más, la gente está embrujada por el uso de la misma palabra para ignorar la gran diferencia en su uso (significado). Y por supuesto, todo esto es una extensión del clásico Wittgenstein. Toda persona pensante debe leer el capítulo 6 de la PNC de S "la ilusión 117 fenomenológica" (TPI), ya que muestra sus capacidades lógicas supremas y su fracaso para apreciar todo el poder de la W posterior, y el gran valor heurístico de la reciente investigación psicológica sobre los dos Yo. Es claro como el cristal que TPI es debido a la obliviosidad a los automatismos de S1 y a tomar el pensamiento consciente lento del S2 como no sólo primario sino como todo lo que hay. Este es el clásico ceguera de pizarra en blanco. También está claro que W demostró esto unos 60 años antes y también dio la razón de ello en la primacía de la verdadera red axiomática automática inconsciente de nuestro sistema innato 1 (aunque por supuesto no utiliza estos términos). Pero lo realmente importante es que el TPI no es sólo un fracaso de algunos filósofos, sino una ceguera universal a nuestra Psicología evolutiva (EP) que está incorporada en el EP y que tiene implicaciones inmensas (y mortales) para el mundo. Todos somos títeres de carne tropezando con la vida en nuestra misión genéticamente programada para destruir la tierra. Nuestra casi total preocupación con el uso de la segunda personalidad auto S2 para complacer las gratificaciones infantiles de S1 está creando el infierno en la tierra. Al igual que con todos los organismos, sólo se trata de la reproducción y la acumulación de recursos para ello. S1 escribe la reproducción y S2 lo actúa. Dick y Jane sólo quieren jugar a la casa-esta es mamá y este es papá y esto y esto y esto es el bebé. Tal vez uno podría decir que TPI es que somos humanos y no sólo otro primate-una ilusión cognitiva fatal. Los genes programa S1 que (en su mayoría) tira de las cuerdas (contrae los músculos) de los títeres de carne a través de S2. Fin de la historia. Otra vez, necesita leer mis comentarios en el OC de W por lo que cambia la "buena razón para creer" en la parte inferior de p171 y la parte superior de P172 a "sabe" (en el sentido verdadero). Una noción crítica introducida por S hace muchos años es condiciones de satisfacción (COS) en nuestros pensamientos (proposiciones de S2) que W llamó inclinaciones o disposiciones para actuar--todavía llamado por el término inapropiado ' proposicional actitudes ' por muchos. COS se explican por S en muchos lugares, como en p169 de PNC: "así decir algo y significado que implica dos condiciones de satisfacción. En primer lugar, la condición de satisfacción de que se produzca la expresión, y segundo, que la propia expresión tendrá condiciones de satisfacción. " Como S lo dice en PNC, "una proposición es cualquier cosa en absoluto que puede determinar una condición de satisfacción... y una condición de satisfacción... es que tal y tal es el caso. " O, uno necesita agregar, que podría ser o podría haber sido o podría ser imaginado para ser el caso, como lo deja claro en MSW. En cuanto a las intenciones, "para que se cumpla, la intención misma debe funcionar causalmente en la producción de la acción." (MSWp34). Una forma de hablar de esto es que el sistema automático inconsciente 1 activa la mayor personalidad de conciencia cortical del sistema 2, trayendo consigo contracciones musculares de la garganta que informan a otros que ve el mundo de ciertas maneras, que lo comprometen a potencial Acciones. Un gran avance sobre las 118 interacciones prelingüísticas o protolingüísticas en las que sólo los movimientos musculares brutos fueron capaces de transmitir información muy limitada sobre las intenciones. La mayoría se beneficiará en gran medida de la lectura de W "on certidumbre" o "RPP1 y 2" o dos libros de DMS en OC (ver mis comentarios), ya que hacen claro la diferencia entre verdaderas oraciones que describen S1 y proposiciones verdaderas o falsas que describen S2. Esto me parece un enfoque muy superior a S tomando percepciones S1 como proposicional (al menos en algunos lugares en su trabajo) ya que sólo pueden convertirse en T o F (aspectual como S los llama aquí) después de que uno comienza a pensar en ellos en S2. Sin embargo, su punto en la PNC que proposiciones permiten declaraciones de verdad o potencial real y la falsedad, del pasado y del futuro y de la fantasía, y por lo tanto proporcionar un gran avance sobre la sociedad pre o protolingüística, es convincente. S a menudo describe la necesidad crítica de tener en cuenta los diversos niveles de descripción de un evento por lo que para IAA "tenemos diferentes niveles de Descripción donde un nivel está constituido por el comportamiento en el nivel inferior... Además de la constitutiva a modo de relación, también tenemos la causal por medio de la relación. " (P37). "La prueba crucial de que necesitamos una distinción entre las intenciones previas y las intenciones en acción es que las condiciones de satisfacción en los dos casos son sorprendentemente diferentes." (P35). El COS de PI necesita una acción completa, mientras que los de IAA sólo uno parcial. Él aclara (por ejemplo, p34) que las intenciones previas (PI) son Estados mentales (es decir, S1 inconsciente) mientras que dan lugar a intenciones en acción (IAA) que son actos conscientes (es decir, S2) pero ambos son causalmente autorreferenciales (CSR). El argumento crítico de que ambos son CSR es que (a diferencia de las creencias y los deseos) es esencial que se imaginan en la crianza de su COS. Estos descripciones de la cognición y la volición se resumen en la tabla 2,1, que Searle ha utilizado durante muchos años y es la base para una extendida que he creado. En mi opinión, ayuda enormemente a relacionar esto con la investigación psicológica moderna mediante el uso de mi S1, S2, terminología S3 y W verdadero-sólo vs proposicional (disposicional) Descripción. Así, CSR hace referencia a la percepción de true-only (solo cierto) S1, la memoria y la intención, mientras que el S2 se refiere a disposiciones tales como creencia y deseo. Por lo tanto, reconocer el S1 sólo es causal ascendente y sin contenido (falta de representaciones o información) mientras que el S2 tiene contenidos y es una causa descendente (por ejemplo, ver el ' Enactivismo radical ' de Hutto y Myin) cambiaría los párrafos de P39 comenzando "en suma" y terminando en PG 40 con "condiciones de satisfacción" de la siguiente manera. En Resumen, la percepción, la memoria y las intenciones y acciones reflexivas ("voluntad") son causadas por el funcionamiento automático de nuestro EP axiomático de solo verdadero de S1. A través de intenciones previas e intenciones en acción, 119 tratamos de igualar cómo deseamos que las cosas sean con cómo pensamos que son. Debemos ver que la creencia, el deseo (y la imaginación, los deseos de tiempo desplazado y tan desacoplados de la intención) y otras disposiciones de proposicionalidad S2 de nuestro pensamiento lento evolucionado más adelante segundo yo, son totalmente dependientes sobre (tienen su COS en) la CSR automático rápido primitivo verdadero solo S1 reflexivo. En el lenguaje y tal vez en la neurofisiología hay casos intermedios o combinados tales como la intención (anteriores intenciones) o recordar, donde la conexión causal con COS (es decir, con S1) se desplaza el tiempo, ya que representan el pasado o el futuro, a diferencia de S1 que es siempre en el presente. Los dos sistemas se alimentan entre sí y a menudo son orquestos por las relaciones culturales deóntica aprendidas de S3 sin problemas, de modo que nuestra experiencia normal es que conscientemente controlamos todo lo que hacemos. Esta vasta arena de ilusiones cognitivas que dominan nuestra vida S ha descrito como ' la ilusión fenomenológica. ' Termina este asombroso capítulo repitiendo por tal vez la 10a vez en sus escritos, lo que yo considero como un error muy básico que comparte con casi todo el mundo - la noción de que la experiencia de ' libre voluntad ' puede ser ' ilusoria '. Se sigue de una manera muy directa e inexorable, tanto del trabajo del 3er período de W y de las observaciones de la psicología contemporánea, que "voluntad", "self" (yo) y "conciencia" son elementos axiomáticos verdaderos-sólo del sistema 1 al igual que ver, oír, etc., y no hay posibilidad (inteligibilidad) de demostrar (de dar sentido a) su falsedad. Como W hizo tan maravillosamente claro en numerosas ocasiones, que son la base para el juicio y por lo tanto no puede ser juzgado. S entiende y utiliza básicamente este mismo argumento en otros contextos (por ejemplo, el escepticismo, el solipsismo) muchas veces, por lo que es bastante sorprendente que no pueda ver esta analogía. Él comete este error con frecuencia cuando dice cosas como que tenemos "buena evidencia "de que nuestro perro es Consciente Etc. Los verdaderos axiomas de nuestra psicología no son probatorios. Aquí tienes el mejor psicólogo descriptivo desde W, así que esto no es un error estúpido. Su Resumen de deontics en P50 necesita traducción. Así, "hay que tener una forma prelingüística de intencionalidad colectiva, en la que se construyen las formas lingüísticas, y hay que tener la intencionalidad colectiva de la conversación para hacer el compromiso" es mucho más claro si se complementa con "el axiomáticas prelingüísticas de S1 subyacen a las disposiciones lingüísticas de S2 (es decir, nuestro EP) que evolucionan durante nuestra maduración en sus manifestaciones culturales en S3. " Puesto que las declaraciones de función de status desempeñan un papel central en los deontics, es fundamental entenderlas y, por lo tanto, explica la noción de "función" que es relevante aquí. "Una función es una causa que sirve a un propósito... En este sentido las funciones son de intencionalidad-relativas y por lo tanto dependientes de la mente... funciones de estado... Requieren... imposición colectiva y el reconocimiento de un estatuto " (P59). 120 Otra vez, Sugiero la traducción de "la intencionalidad del lenguaje es creada por la intencionalidad intrínseca, o independiente de la mente de los seres humanos" (p66) como "la disposicionalidad lingüística y consciente del S2 es generada por el reflexivo axiomático inconsciente funciones de S1 "(P68). Es decir, uno debe tener en cuenta que el comportamiento está programado por la biología. Sin embargo, Me oponto firmemente a sus declaraciones sobre p66-67 y en otros lugares de sus escritos que S1 (es decir, recuerdos, percepciones, actos reflejos) tiene una estructura proposicional (es decir, verdadero-falso). Como he señalado anteriormente, y muchas veces en otros comentarios, parece cristalino que W es correcto, y es básico para entender el comportamiento, que sólo S2 es proposicional y S1 es axiomático y verdadero-sólo. Ambos tienen COS y direcciones de ajuste (DOF) porque la intencionalidad genética, axiomática de S1 genera la de S2, pero si S1 fuera proposicional en el mismo sentido significaría que el escepticismo es inteligible, el caos que era la filosofía antes de W volvería y de hecho la vida no sería posible (no esto no es una broma). Como W mostró innumerables veces y la biología muestra tan claramente, la vida debe basarse en la certeza - las reacciones rápidas inconscientes automatizadas. Los organismos que siempre tienen una duda y una pausa para reflexionar morirán. Contrariamente a sus comentarios (P70) no puedo imaginar un lenguaje que carece de palabras para objetos materiales más de lo que puedo imaginar un sistema visual que no puede verlos, porque es la primera y más básica tarea de la visión para segmentar el mundo en objetos y por lo que el lenguaje para describirlos. de la misma manera, No puedo ver ningún problema con objetos que son sobresalientes en el campo consciente ni con oraciones segmentado en palabras. ¿Cómo podría ser de otra manera para los seres con nuestra historia evolutiva? En P72 y en otros lugares, le ayudará a recordar que las expresiones son las primitivas PLG reflexivas de S1 mientras que las representaciones son las SLG disposicionales de S2. Se necesita otra traducción de la filosofía al inglés para el segundo párrafo de P79, comenzando ' hasta ahora ' y terminando ' escuchado antes '. "Transmitimos significado al hablar un lenguaje público compuesto de palabras en frases con una sintaxis." A sus preguntas 4 y 5 en p105 en cuanto a la naturaleza especial del lenguaje y la escritura, yo respondería: ' son especiales porque la longitud de onda corta de las vibraciones de los músculos vocales permiten la transferencia de información de ancho de banda mucho mayor que las contracciones de otros músculos y Esto es en promedio varios órdenes de magnitud superior para la información visual. ' En P106, una respuesta general a la pregunta 2 (¿cómo se sale con la suya, es decir, por qué funciona) es EP y S1 y su declaración de que "mi principal estrategia de exposición en este libro es tratar de hacer que el familiar parezca extraño y llamativo" 121 es, por supuesto, el clásico Wittgenstein. Su afirmación en la siguiente página de que no hay una respuesta general a por qué las personas aceptan instituciones es claramente errónea. Los aceptan por la misma razón que lo hacen todo: su EP es el resultado de una aptitud inclusiva. Facilitó la supervivencia y la reproducción en el EEE (medio ambiente de adaptación evolutiva). Todo sobre nosotros física y mentalmente en el fondo de la genética. Toda la vaga charla aquí (por ejemplo, P114) sobre "convenciones extralingüísticas" y "semántica extra semántica" se refiere de hecho a EP y especialmente a los automatismos inconscientes de S1 que son la base para todo comportamiento. Sí, como dijo W muchas veces, el más familiar es por esa razón invisible. La sugerencia de S (P115) de que el lenguaje es esencial para los juegos es sin duda equivocado. Los sordomutes totalmente analfabetos podían jugar a las cartas, al fútbol e incluso al ajedrez, pero, por supuesto, sería necesario contar con una capacidad de conteo mínima. Estoy de acuerdo (P121) en que la capacidad de fingir e imaginar (por ejemplo, las nociones contrafactual o como-si involucradas en el tiempo y el cambio de espacio) son, en forma completa, capacidades humanas únicas y críticas para el pensamiento de orden superior. Pero incluso aquí hay muchos precursores de animales (como debe haber), tales como la postura de los combates rituales y bailes de apareamiento, la decoración de los sitios de apareamiento por los pájaros Bower, el ala rota pretensión de las aves madre, falsas llamadas de alarma de los monos, peces ' más limpios ' que toman un mordedura de su presa y la simulación de las estrategias de halcón y Paloma (tramposos) en muchos Animales. Se necesita más traducción para su análisis de la racionalidad (p126 et seq). Decir que el pensamiento es proposicional y se ocupa de verdaderas o falsas ' entidades factitivas ' significa que es una disposición típica S2 que se puede probar, a diferencia de las funciones cognitivas automáticas sólo verdaderas de S1. En ' libre voluntad, racionalidad y hechos institucionales ', actualiza partes de su libro clásico ' racionalidad en acción ' y crea una nueva terminología para describir el aparato formal de razones prácticas que no encuentro feliz. Las "entidades Factitivas" no parecen diferentes de las disposiciones y ' motivador ' (deseo u obligación), ' efector ' (músculos corporales), ' constitutor ' (músculos del habla) y ' razón total ' (todas las disposiciones relevantes) no lo hacen, al menos aquí parecen añadir a la claridad (p126-132). Deberíamos hacer algo aquí que rara vez sucede en las discusiones sobre el comportamiento humano y recordarnos a nosotros mismos de su biología. La evolución por la aptitud inclusiva ha programado las acciones causales reflexivas rápidas e inconscientes de S1 que a menudo dan lugar al pensamiento lento consciente de S2 (a menudo modificada por las extensiones culturales de S3), que produce razones de acción que a menudo resultan en activación de los músculos del cuerpo y/o del habla por S1 causando acciones. El mecanismo general es a través de la neurotransmisión y por cambios en varios neuromoduladores en áreas específicas del cerebro. Esto puede parecer también poco feliz, pero tiene la virtud de que se basa en 122 hechos, y dada la complejidad de nuestro pensamiento de orden superior, no creo que una descripción general va a ser mucho más simple. La ilusión cognitiva general (llamada por S ' la ilusión fenomenológica ') es que S2/S3 ha generado la acción conscientemente por razones de las cuales somos plenamente conscientes y en control de, pero cualquier persona familiarizada con la biología moderna y la psicología sabe que esta vista no es Creíble. Así, Traduzco su Resumen de la razón práctica en p127 de la siguiente manera: "cedemos a nuestros deseos (necesidad de alterar la química del cerebro), que típicamente incluyen el deseo – razones independientes para la acción (DIRA - i. e., deseos desplazados en el espacio y el tiempo, más a menudo para recíprocamente altruismo), que producen disposiciones para el comportamiento que comúnmente resultan tarde o temprano en los movimientos musculares que sirven a nuestra aptitud inclusiva (aumento de la supervivencia de los genes en nosotros mismos y aquellos estrechamente relacionados). " Contrariamente al comentario de S sobre P128 creo que si se define adecuadamente, la DIRA es universal en animales superiores y no es en absoluto única para los seres humanos (piense madre gallina defendiendo su cría de un zorro) si incluimos los reflejos prelingüísticos automatizados de S1 (es decir, DIRA1), pero sin duda la DIRA de orden superior de S2/3 o DIRA2 que requieran idioma son exclusivamente humanos. Esto me parece una descripción alternativa y más clara de su "explicación" (como W sugirió que estas son mucho mejor denominadas ' Descripción ') en el fondo de P129 de la paradoja de cómo podemos llevar a cabo voluntariamente DIRA2/3 (es decir, los deseos S2 y su S3 cultural extensiones). Es decir, "la resolución de la paradoja es que el reconocimiento de las razones independientes del deseo puede hacer que el deseo y así causar el deseo, a pesar de que no es lógicamente inevitable que lo hacen y no empíricamente universal que hacen" se puede traducir como "el resolución de la paradoja es que el DIRA1 inconsciente que sirve la aptitud inclusiva a largo plazo genera el DIRA2 consciente que a menudo anula los deseos inmediatos personales a corto plazo. " de la misma manera, para su discusión sobre este tema en P130-31-es EP, RA, IF, S1 que se basa en las disposiciones y acciones subsiguientes de S2/3. En P140 pregunta por qué no podemos obtener deontics de la biología, pero por supuesto debemos obtener de la biología, ya que no hay otra opción y la descripción anterior muestra cómo sucede esto. Contrariamente a su afirmación, las inclinaciones más fuertes siempre prevalecen (por definición, de lo contrario no es el más fuerte), pero deontics funciona porque la programación innata de RA y si anula los deseos inmediatos a corto plazo personal. Su confusión de naturaleza y crianza, de S1 y S2, se extiende a las conclusiones 2 y 3 en p143. Los agentes de hecho crean las razones próximas de DIRA2/3, pero estos no son sólo cualquier cosa sino, con pocos si hay excepciones, extensiones muy restringidas de DIRA1 (la causa final). Si realmente quiere atribuir a nuestras decisiones conscientes a solas, entonces es presa de ' la ilusión fenomenológica ' (TPI) que tan bellamente demolió en su papel clásico de ese nombre (ver mi reseña de PNC). Como he señalado anteriormente, hay un gran cuerpo de investigación reciente exponer ilusiones cognitivas que componen nuestra 123 personalidad. El TPI no es meramente un error filosófico inofensivo, sino una obliviosidad universal a nuestra biología que produce la ilusión de que controlamos nuestra vida y nuestra sociedad y el mundo y las consecuencias son casi cierto colapso de la civilización durante los próximos 150 años. Señala acertadamente que la racionalidad humana no tiene sentido sin la "brecha" (en realidad, 3 lagunas que ha discutido muchas veces). Es decir, sin voluntad libre (o sea, elección) en un sentido no trivial, todo sería inútil, y ha señalado acertadamente que es inconcebible que la evolución pueda crear y mantener una farsa innecesaria, genética y energéticamente costosa. Pero, como casi todos los demás, él no puede ver su salida y por lo que una vez más sugiere (P133) que la elección puede ser una ilusión. Por el contrario, siguiendo a W, está bastante claro que la elección es parte de nuestras acciones reflexivas axiomáticas S1 verdaderas y no puede ser cuestionada sin contradicción, ya que S1 es la base para el interrogatorio. Usted no puede dudar de que está leyendo esta página como su conciencia de que es la base para dudar. Pocos avisos (Budd en su magnífico libro sobre W es una excepción) que W planteó una interesante resolución a esto sugiriendo que algunos fenómenos mentales pueden originarse en procesos caóticos en el cerebro-que por ejemplo, no hay nada que corresponda a un rastro de memoria. También sugirió varias veces que la cadena causal tiene un fin y esto podría significar tanto que simplemente no es posible (independientemente del estado de la ciencia) rastrearlo y que el concepto de "causa" deja de ser aplicable más allá de cierto punto. Posteriormente, muchos han hecho sugerencias similares basadas en la física y las Ciencias de la complejidad y el caos. En P155 uno debe tener en cuenta que el fondo/red es nuestro EP y sus extensiones culturales de S1, S2, S3. Dado lo anterior, no siento que sea necesario comentar sobre su discusión sobre el poder y la política, pero diré unas palabras sobre los derechos humanos. Estoy totalmente de acuerdo con su comentario sobre P185 de que la declaración de derechos humanos de las Naciones Unidas es un documento irresponsable. El rápido y probablemente inexorable colapso de la sociedad se debe a que las personas tienen demasiados derechos y muy pocas responsabilidades. El único pequeño rayo de esperanza para el mundo es que de alguna manera la gente puede ser forzada (pocos lo harán voluntariamente) para colocar la tierra primero y a sí mismos en segundo lugar. El consumo de recursos y la producción de niños deben ser regulados como privilegios o la tragedia de los comunes pronto terminará el juego. En general, MSW es un buen Resumen de los muchos avances sustanciales sobre Wittgenstein resultantes del medio siglo de trabajo de S, pero en mi opinión, W todavía es inigualable para la psicología básica una vez que entiendes lo que está diciendo (ver mis comentarios). Idealmente, deben leerse juntos: Searle para la clara prosa coherente y generalizaciones sobre la operación de S2/S3, ilustrada con los ejemplos perspicaces de W de la operación de S1/S2, y sus brillantes aforismos. Si yo fuera mucho más joven escribiría un libro haciendo exactamente eso. 124 125 Reseña de ' Filosofía en un Nuevo Siglo ' (Philosophy in a New Century)por John Searle (2008) (revisión revisada 2019) Michael Starks Abstracto Antes de comentar sobre el libro, ofrezco comentarios sobre Wittgenstein y Searle y la estructura lógica de la racionalidad. Los ensayos aquí son en su mayoría ya publicados durante la última década (aunque algunos han sido actualizados), junto con un artículo inédito, y nada aquí vendrá como una sorpresa para aquellos que han mantenido su trabajo. Al igual que W, es considerado como el mejor filósofo de su tiempo y su obra escrita es sólida como una roca y pionera en todo. Sin embargo, su fracaso para tomar la W más tarde lo suficientemente seriamente conduce a algunos errores y confusiones. Sólo algunos ejemplos: en P7, dos veces señala que nuestra certeza sobre los hechos básicos se debe al peso abrumador de la razón que respalda nuestras afirmaciones, pero W demostró definitivamente en ' on certidumbre ' que no hay posibilidad de dudar de la verdadera estructura axiomática de nuestro sistema 1 percepciones, memorias y pensamientos, ya que es en sí la base para el juicio y no puede ser juzgado. En la primera frase del P8 nos dice que la certeza es revisable, pero este tipo de ' certeza ', que podríamos llamar Certainty2, es el resultado de extender nuestra certeza axiomática y no revisable (Certainty1) a través de la experiencia y es completamente diferente, ya que es proposicional (verdadero o falso). Este es, por supuesto, un ejemplo clásico de la "batalla contra la hechizamiento de nuestra inteligencia por el lenguaje" que W demostró una y otra vez. Una palabra-dos (o muchos) usos distintos. Su último capítulo "la unidad de la Proposición" (anteriormente inédito) también se beneficiaría en gran medida de la lectura de W "en la certeza" o de los dos libros de DMS sobre OC (ver mis comentarios), ya que hacen claro la diferencia entre verdaderas sólo frases que describen S1 y verdadero o falso proposiciones que describen S2. Esto me parece un enfoque muy superior a S tomando percepciones S1 como proposicional ya que sólo se convierten en T o F después de que uno comienza a pensar en ellos en S2. Sin embargo, su punto de que las proposiciones permiten declaraciones de la verdad y la falsedad real o potencial, del pasado y del futuro y de la fantasía, y por lo tanto proporcionar un gran avance sobre la sociedad pre o protolingüística, es convincente. Como dice, "una proposición es cualquier cosa que pueda determinar una condición de satisfacción... y una condición de satisfacción... es que tal y tal es el caso. " O, uno necesita agregar, que podría ser o podría haber sido o podría ser imaginado para ser el caso. En general, PNC es un buen Resumen de los muchos avances sustanciales sobre Wittgenstein resultantes del medio siglo de trabajo de S, pero en mi opinión, W todavía es inigualable una vez que se comprende lo que está diciendo. Idealmente, deben leerse juntos: Searle para la clara prosa y generalizaciones coherentes, ilustradas con los ejemplos perspicaces de W y aforismos brillantes. Si yo fuera mucho más joven 126 escribiría un libro haciendo exactamente eso. Aquellos que deseen un marco completo hasta la fecha para el comportamiento humano de la moderna dos sistemas punto de vista puede consultar mi libro 'La Estructura Lógica de la Filosofía, la Psicología, la Mente y Lenguaje en Ludwig Wittgenstein y John Searle ' 2nd Ed (2019). Los interesados en más de mis escritos pueden ver 'Monos parlantes--filosofía, psicología, ciencia, religión y política en un planeta condenado--artículos y reseñas 2006-2019 3rd Ed (2019) y delirios utópicos suicidas en el 21St Century 4TH Ed (2019) "Pero no he tenido mi imagen del mundo satisfaciendo su corrección: ni la tengo porque estoy satisfecho de su corrección. No: es el trasfondo heredado en el que distingo entre verdadero y falso. " Wittgenstein OC 94 "Ahora bien, si no son las conexiones causales que nos preocupan, entonces las actividades de la mente están abiertas ante nosotros." Wittgenstein "el libro azul" P6 (1933) "Tonterías, tonterías, porque estás haciendo suposiciones en lugar de simplemente describir. Si su cabeza está embrujada por explicaciones aquí, usted está descuidando para recordar los hechos más importantes. " Wittgenstein Z 220 "La filosofía simplemente pone todo ante nosotros y no explica ni deduce nada... Uno podría dar el nombre ' filosofía ' a lo que es posible antes de todos los nuevos descubrimientos e invenciones. " Wittgenstein PI 126 "Lo que estamos suministrando son realmente comentarios sobre la historia natural del hombre, no Curiosidades; sin embargo, sino más bien observaciones sobre hechos que nadie ha dudado y que no han sido comentados porque siempre están ante nuestros ojos. " Wittgenstein RFM I p142 "El objetivo de la filosofía es levantar una pared en el punto donde el lenguaje se detiene de todos modos." Ocasiones filosóficas de Wittgenstein p187 "El límite del lenguaje se demuestra por su imposibilidad de describir un hecho que corresponde a (es la traducción de) una frase sin simplemente repetir el frase (esto tiene que ver con la solución kantiana al problema de la filosofía). " Wittgenstein CV P10 (1931) "El mayor peligro aquí es querer observarnos a uno mismo." LWPP1, 459 "¿Podría un proceso de máquina causar un procedimiento de pensamiento ? La respuesta es: sí. en efecto sólo un proceso de máquina puede causar un proceso de pensamiento, y ' cálculo ' no nombra un proceso de máquina; se nombra un proceso que puede ser, y por lo general se, implementado en una máquina. " Searle PNC p73 127 "... la caracterización de un proceso como computacional es una caracterización de un sistema físico desde fuera; y la identificación del proceso como computacional no identifica una característica intrínseca de la física, es esencialmente una caracterización relativa del observador. " Searle PNC P95 "El argumento de la sala China demostró que la semántica no es intrínseca a la sintaxis. Ahora estoy haciendo el punto separado y diferente que la sintaxis no es intrínseca a la física. " Searle PNC p94 "El intento de eliminar la falacia de homúnculo a través de la descomposición recursiva falla, porque la única manera de obtener la sintaxis intrínseca a la física es poner un homúnculo en la física." Searle PNC p97 "Pero no se puede explicar un sistema físico como una máquina de escribir o un cerebro mediante la identificación de un patrón que comparte con su simulación computacional, porque la existencia del patrón no explica cómo el sistema funciona realmente como un sistema físico. ... En Resumen, el hecho de que la atribución de sintaxis no identifique otras potencias causales es fatal para la afirmación de que los programas proporcionan explicaciones causales de la cognición... Sólo hay un mecanismo físico, el cerebro, con sus diversos niveles causales físicos y físicos/mentales de la descripción. " Searle PNC P101-103 "En Resumen, el sentido de" procesamiento de la información "que se utiliza en la ciencia cognitiva es un nivel demasiado alto de abstracción para captar la realidad biológica concreta de la intencionalidad intrínseca... Estamos cegados a esta diferencia por el hecho de que la misma frase ' veo un coche viniendo hacia mí ', se puede utilizar para registrar tanto la intencionalidad visual como la salida del modelo computacional de la visión... en el sentido de ' información ' utilizada en la ciencia cognitiva, es simplemente falso decir que el cerebro es un dispositivo de procesamiento de información. " Searle PNC P104-105 "¿Puede haber razones para actuar que son vinculantes para un agente racional sólo en virtud de la naturaleza del hecho reportado en la declaración de razón, y independientemente de los deseos del agente, los valores, las actitudes y ¿Evaluaciones? ... La verdadera paradoja de la discusión tradicional es que intenta plantear la guillotina de Hume, la rígida distinción de valor de hecho, en un vocabulario, cuyo uso ya presupone la falsedad de la distinción. " Searle PNC p165-171 "... todas las funciones de estado y por lo tanto toda la realidad institucional, con la excepción del lenguaje, son creadas por actos de voz que tienen la forma lógica de las declaraciones... las formas de la función de status en cuestión son casi invariablemente cuestiones de poderes deóntica... reconocer algo como un derecho, un deber, una obligación, un requisito, etcétera, es reconocer un motivo de acción... Estas estructuras deonticas hacen posible el deseo-razones independientes de la acción... El punto general es muy claro: la creación del campo general de los motivos de acción 128 basados en el deseo presuponía la aceptación de un sistema de razones de acción independientes del deseo. " Searle PNC P34-49 "Algunas de las características lógicas más importantes de la intencionalidad están más allá del alcance de la fenomenología porque no tienen una realidad fenomenológica inmediata... Porque la creación del significado de la falta de sentido no se experimenta conscientemente... no existe... Esto es... la ilusión fenomenológica. " Searle PNC P115117 "La conciencia es causalmente reducible a los procesos cerebrales... y la conciencia no tiene poderes causales propios, además de los poderes causales de la neurobiología subyacente... Pero la reducibilidad causal no conduce a la reducibilidad ontológica... conciencia sólo existe como experimentada... y por lo tanto no puede reducirse a algo que tiene una ontología en tercera persona, algo que existe independientemente de las experiencias. " Searle PNC 155-6 "... la relación intencional básica entre la mente y el mundo tiene que ver con las condiciones de satisfacción. Y una proposición es cualquier cosa que pueda estar en una relación intencional con el mundo, y ya que esas relaciones intencionales siempre determinan las condiciones de satisfacción, y una proposición se define como cualquier cosa suficiente para determinar las condiciones de satisfacciones, resulta que toda intencionalidad es una cuestión de proposiciones. " Searle PNC p193 Antes de comentar en detalle sobre la filosofía en un nuevo siglo (PNC) primero voy a ofrecer algunos comentarios sobre la filosofía (psicología descriptiva) y su relación con la investigación psicológica contemporánea como ejemplificado en las obras de Searle (S) y Wittgenstein (W), ya que siento que esta es la mejor manera de colocar Searle o cualquier comentarista sobre el comportamiento, en la perspectiva adecuada. Aunque S no dice y parece ser en gran parte inconsciente, la mayor parte de su trabajo sigue directamente de la de W, a pesar de que a menudo lo critica. Decir que Searle ha llevado a cabo el trabajo de W no es decir que es un resultado directo del estudio W, sino más bien que porque sólo hay una psicología humana (por la misma razón sólo hay una Cardiología humana), que cualquier persona que describa con precisión la conducta debe estar expresando SOM e variante o extensión de lo que W dijo (como deben si ambos están dando descripciones correctas de comportamiento). Encuentro la mayoría de S prefigurado en W, incluyendo versiones del famoso argumento de la sala China contra Strong AI y temas relacionados que son los temas de CHAPS 3-5. Por cierto, si la sala China te interesa entonces deberías leer el excellente de Victor Rodych, pero virtualmente desconocida, suplemento en el CR-"Searle liberado de cada defecto". Rodych también ha escrito una serie de artículos magníficos sobre la filosofía de W de matemáticas--es decir, el EP (psicología evolutiva) de la capacidad axiomática Sistema 1 de contar hasta 3, como se extendió en el sistema infinito 2 SLG (juegos de lenguaje secundario) de matemáticas. Las ideas de W sobre la psicología de las matemáticas proporcionan una excelente entrada en la intencionalidad. También señalaré que nadie que promueva la IA fuerte, las versiones múltiples del 129 Behaviorismo, el funcionalismo informático, el CTM (teoría computacional de la mente) y la teoría de los sistemas dinámicos (DST), parece ser consciente de que el Tractatus de W puede ser visto como el más llamativo y poderosa declaración de su punto de vista (es decir, comportamiento (pensamiento) como el procesamiento lógico de los hechos--es decir, procesamiento de la información). Claro, más tarde (pero antes de que el ordenador digital fuera un destello en el ojo de Turing) W describió con gran detalle por qué estas son descripciones incoherentes de la mente que deben ser reemplazadas por la psicología (o puedes decir que esto es todo lo que hizo por el resto de su vida). S sin embargo hace poca referencia a la declaración de la mente presciente de W como mecanismo, y su destrucción de ella en su trabajo posterior. Desde W, S se ha convertido en el principal deconstructor de estas vistas mecánicas de la conducta, y el psicólogo descriptivo más importante (filósofo), pero no se da cuenta de cómo completamente W lo anticipó ni, en general, hacer otros (pero ver los muchos papeles y libros de Proudfoot y Copeland en W, Turing y AI). El trabajo de S es mucho más fácil de seguir que W, y aunque hay cierta jerga, es sobre todo espectacularmente claro si te acercas desde la dirección correcta. Vea mis reseñas de W y otros libros para más detalles. Wittgenstein es para mí fácilmente el pensador más brillante en el comportamiento humano. Su trabajo como un todo muestra que todo el comportamiento es una extensión de los axiomas innatos verdaderos y que nuestra ratiocinación consciente (sistema 2) (S2) emerge de maquinaciones inconscientes (sistema 1) (S1). Ver "sobre certeza" (OC) para su tratamiento final extendido de esta idea-y mi revisión de la misma para su preparación. Su corpus puede ser visto como la base para toda la descripción del comportamiento animal, revelando cómo funciona la mente y de hecho debe funcionar. El "must" está implicado en el hecho de que todos los cerebros comparten una ascendencia común y genes comunes y por lo que sólo hay una forma básica de trabajar, que esto necesariamente tiene una estructura axiomática, que todos los animales superiores comparten la misma psicología evolucionada basada en aptitud, y que en los seres humanos esto se extiende en una personalidad (una ilusión cognitiva o fenomenológica) basado en las contracciones musculares de la garganta (lenguaje) que evolucionó para manipular a otros (con variaciones que pueden ser considerados como trivial). Podría decirse que todo el trabajo de W y S es un desarrollo o una variación de estas ideas. Otro tema importante aquí, y por supuesto en todas las discusiones sobre el comportamiento humano, es la necesidad de separar los automatismos genéticamente programados, que subyacen a todo comportamiento, de los efectos de la cultura. Aunque pocos filósofos, psicólogos, antropólogos, sociólogos, etc., discuten explícitamente esto de una manera integral, puede ser visto como el principal problema con el que están lidiando. Sugiero que probará el mayor valor para considerar todos los estudios de un comportamiento de orden superior como un esfuerzo para separar no sólo el pensamiento rápido y lento (por ejemplo, percepciones y otros automatismos vs. disposiciones-S1 y S2-ver más abajo), pero la naturaleza y la crianza. 130 Lo que W estableció en su período final (y a lo largo de su trabajo anterior de una manera menos clara) son los fundamentos de la psicología evolutiva (EP), o si lo prefieres, la psicología, la lingüística cognitiva, la intencionalidad, el pensamiento de orden superior o simplemente el comportamiento animal. Lamentablemente, casi nadie parece darse cuenta de que sus obras son un libro de texto único de la psicología descriptiva que es tan relevante ahora como el día en que se escribió. Es casi universalmente ignorado por la psicología y otras ciencias del comportamiento y las Humanidades, e incluso aquellos pocos que lo han entendido más o menos, no han comprendido el alcance de su expectativa de la última obra en EP y ilusiones cognitivas (teoría de la mente, enmarcado, los dos yo de pensamiento rápido y lento, etc., -Ver más abajo). El trabajo de Searle proporciona una descripción impresionante del comportamiento social de orden superior que es posible debido a la reciente evolución de los genes para la psicología disposicional, mientras que la W posterior muestra cómo se basa en verdaderos axiomas inconscientes de S1 que evolucionaron en el pensamiento de proposicional disposicional consciente de S2. Sugiero que la clave de W es considerar su corpus como el esfuerzo pionero en descifrar nuestro EP, viendo que estaba describiendo los dos yos de S1 y S2 y los juegos de lenguaje múltiple de pensamiento rápido y lento, y a partir de su 3er período de obras y leyendo al revés al proto-Tractatus. También debe ser claro que en la medida en que son coherentes y correctos, todos los relatos de conducta están describiendo los mismos fenómenos y deben traducirse fácilmente entre sí. Así, los temas recientemente de moda de "mente encarnada" y El "Enactivismo radical" debe fluir directamente desde y hacia el trabajo de W (y lo hacen). Sin embargo, casi nadie es capaz de seguir su ejemplo de evitar la jerga y apegarse a ejemplos perspicuos, por lo que incluso el temible Searle tiene que ser filtrado y traducido para ver que esto es cierto, e incluso él no consigue lo completamente que W ha anticipado la última trabajan de manera rápida y lenta, con un pensamiento encarnado (escribiendo, hablando y actuando). W también puede ser considerado como un pionero en la lingüística cognitiva evolutiva, que puede ser considerado como el análisis de arriba abajo de la mente y su evolución a través del análisis cuidadoso de ejemplos de uso del lenguaje en contexto. Expone las muchas variedades de juegos de idiomas y las relaciones entre los juegos primarios de la verdadera-sólo inconsciente, pre o protolingüismo axiomático pensamiento rápido de la percepción, la memoria y el pensamiento reflexivo, las emociones y los actos (a menudo descritos como el cerebro de reptil cortical subcorticales y primitivo, funciones de neurona de espejo), y las más posteriores evolucionaron las capacidades de consciencia lingüística más altas de creencia, conocimiento, pensamiento, etc. que constituyen el verdadero o falso proposicional Juegos de lenguaje secundario de pensamiento lento que son la red de ilusiones cognitivas que constituyen la segunda personalidad de la que estamos tan enamorados. W disecciona cientos de juegos de idiomas que muestran cómo las percepciones verdaderas, memorias y acciones reflexivas de grado S1 en el pensamiento, recordando, y comprensión de las disposiciones S2, y muchos de sus 131 ejemplos también abordan el tema de la naturaleza/nutrición Explícitamente. Con esta perspectiva evolutiva, sus obras posteriores son una revelación impresionante de la naturaleza humana que es totalmente actual y nunca ha sido igualada. Muchas perspectivas tienen un valor heurístico, pero me parece que esta perspectiva evolutiva de dos sistemas ilumina todo el comportamiento más alto. Dobzhansky comentó: "nada en la biología tiene sentido excepto a la luz de la evolución." Y nada en la filosofía tiene sentido excepto a la luz de la psicología evolutiva. Las ideas comunes (por ejemplo, el subtítulo de uno de los libros de Pinker "las cosas del pensamiento: el lenguaje como una ventana a la naturaleza humana") que el lenguaje es una ventana o algún tipo de traducción de nuestro pensamiento o incluso (Fodor) que debe haber algún otro "lenguaje del pensamiento" de que h es una traducción, fueron rechazados por W (y también por S), que trataron de mostrar, con cientos de ejemplos perspicaces continuamente reanalizados de lenguaje en acción, que el lenguaje es la mejor imagen que podemos llegar a pensar, la mente y la naturaleza humana, y todo W Corpus puede ser considerado como el desarrollo de esta idea. Mucho antes de Searle, rechazó la idea de que los enfoques Bottom Up (de abajo hacia arriba) de fisiología, psicología experimental y computación (por ejemplo, Behaviorismo, funcionalismo, fuerte IA, Teoría de Sistemas Dinamicos, Teoría Computacional de la Mente, etc.) podría revelar lo que sus deconstrucciones Top Down (de arriba hacia abajo)de los juegos de idiomas (LG) lo hizo. las principales dificultades que observó son entender lo que está siempre delante de nuestros ojos (ahora podemos ver esto como la obliviosidad al sistema 1 (aproximadamente lo que S llama ' la ilusión fenomenológica') y para capturar la vaguedad ("la mayor dificultad en estas investigaciones es encontrar una manera de representar la vaguedad" LPP1, 347). Y así, el habla (es decir, las contracciones musculares orales, la forma principal en que interactuamos) no es una ventana en la mente, sino que es la propia mente, que se expresa por explosiones acústicas sobre los actos pasados, presentes y futuros (es decir, nuestro discurso usando el lenguaje secundario evolucionado más adelante Juegos (SLG) del segundo yo-las disposiciones-imaginar, saber, significado, creer, pretender, etc.). Al igual que con sus otros aforismos, sugiero que uno debe tomar seriamente el comentario de W que incluso si Dios pudiera mirar en nuestra mente que no podía ver lo que estamos pensando-este debe ser el lema de la mente encarnada y, como S deja claro, de la psicología cognitiva. Pero Dios podía ver lo que estamos percibiendo y recordando y nuestro pensamiento reflexivo, ya que estas funciones S1 son siempre Estados mentales causales mientras que las disposiciones S2 son sólo potencialmente CMS. Esto no es una teoría sino un hecho sobre nuestra gramática y nuestra fisiología. El lodo de S las aguas aquí porque se refiere a las disposiciones como Estados mentales, así, pero como W hizo hace mucho tiempo, muestra que el lenguaje de causalidad simplemente no se aplica a las descripciones de S2 de orden superior emergente-de nuevo no es una teoría sino una descripción de cómo el lenguaje (pensamiento) funciona. Esto trae otro punto que es prominente en W pero negado por S, que todo lo que podemos hacer es dar descripciones y no una teoría. S insiste en que está proporcionando teorías, pero por supuesto "teoría" y "Descripción" son juegos de 132 idiomas también y me parece que la teoría de S es generalmente la descripción de Wuna rosa con cualquier otro nombre.... El punto de W fue que al apegarse a ejemplos perspicaces que todos sabemos que son verdaderos relatos de nuestro comportamiento, evitamos las arenas movedizas de las teorías que intentan tener en cuenta el comportamiento de todos (todos los juegos de idiomas), mientras que S quiere generalizar e inevitablemente se extravía (él da varios ejemplos de sus propios errores en la PNC). Como S y otros modifican sin cesar sus teorías para tener en cuenta los juegos de idiomas múltiples que se acercan y más cerca de describir el comportamiento a través de numerosos ejemplos como lo hizo W. Algunos de los temas favoritos de W en su segundo y sus terceros periodos son los diferentes (pero interdigitantes) de LG de pensamiento rápido y lento (sistema 1 y 2 o más o menos juegos de idiomas primarios (PLG) y juegos de lenguaje secundario (SLG) del interior y el exterior-ver por ejemplo, Johnston-' Wittgenstein: repensar el interior ' sobre cómo confundir los dos es una industria importante en la filosofía y la psicología), la imposibilidad del lenguaje privado y la estructura axiomática de todo comportamiento. Verbos como ' pensar ', ' ver ' primero describieron las funciones S1, pero como S2 evolucionaron, llegaron a aplicarse a ella también, dando lugar a toda la mitología del interior resultante de, por ejemplo, tratando de referirse a la imaginación como si estuviera viendo imágenes dentro del cerebro. Los PLG son declaraciones y descripciones de nuestro involuntario, sistema 1, pensamiento rápido, neurona espejo, verdadero sólo, no proposicional, Estados mentales-nuestras percepciones y recuerdos y actos involuntarios (incluyendo el sistema 1 verdades y UA1 (comprensión de la Agencia 1) y Emotions1-como la alegría, el amor, la ira) que se pueden describir causalmente, mientras que los SLG evolutivamente más tarde son expresiones o descripciones de voluntario, sistema 2, pensamiento lento, mentalización de las neuronas, comprobables verdadero o falso, proposicional, Truth2 y los UA2 y Emotions2-alegría, amorosa, odiando, la disposicional (y a menudo contrafáctual) imaginando, suponiendo, pretendiendo, pensando, conociendo, creyendo, etc. que sólo se puede describir en términos de razones (es decir, es sólo un hecho que intenta describir el sistema 2 en términos de Neuroquímica, física atómica, matemáticas, simplemente no tienen sentido-ver W para muchos ejemplos y Searle para las buenas disquisiciones sobre esto). No es posible describir los automatismos del sistema 1 en términos de razones (por ejemplo, ' veo que como una manzana porque... ') a menos que desee dar una razón en términos de EP, genética, fisiología, y como W ha demostrado repetidamente que carece de sentido dar "explicaciones" con la condición de que tendrán sentido en el futuro-' nada está oculto '-que tienen sentido ahora o nunca-(por ejemplo, "el mayor peligro aquí es querer observar a uno mismo." LWPP1, 459). Una heurística poderosa es separar el comportamiento y la experiencia en la intencionalidad 1 y la intencionalidad 2 (por ejemplo, pensamiento 1 y pensamiento 2, emociones 1 y emociones 2, etc.) e incluso en las verdades 1 (T solamente axiomas) y las verdades 2 (extensiones empíricas o "teoremas" que resultado de la extensión lógica de las verdades 1). W reconoció que ' nada está oculto '-es decir, toda nuestra 133 psicología y todas las respuestas a todas las preguntas filosóficas están aquí en nuestro idioma (nuestra vida) y que la dificultad no es encontrar las respuestas, sino reconocerlas como siempre aquí delante de nosotros-sólo tenemos que dejar de tratar de mirar más profundo. Una vez que entendemos a W, nos damos cuenta de lo absurdo de la "filosofía del lenguaje" como un estudio separado aparte de otras áreas de comportamiento, ya que el lenguaje es sólo otro nombre para la mente. Y, cuando W dice que la comprensión del comportamiento no depende en absoluto del progreso de la psicología (por ejemplo, su afirmación frecuentemente citada: "la confusión y la franqueza de la psicología no debe explicarse llamándola una" ciencia joven "--sino CF. otro comentario que tengo nunca visto citado-"¿el progreso científico es útil para la filosofía? Ciertamente. Las realidades que se descubren aclaran la tarea de los filósofos. Imaginando posibilidades. " (LWPP1, 807). Por lo tanto, no está legislando los límites de la ciencia, pero señalando que nuestro comportamiento (en su mayoría el habla) es la imagen más clara posible de nuestra psicología y que todas las discusiones de un comportamiento de orden superior están plagadas de confusiones conceptuales. FMRI, PET, TCMS, iRNA, análogos computacionales, AI y todo el resto son formas fascinantes y poderosas de extender nuestra psicología axiomática innata, para proporcionar la base física de nuestro comportamiento y facilitar nuestro análisis de los juegos de idiomas que sin embargo permanecen inexplicable--EP simplemente es de esta manera-y sin cambios. Los axiomas verdaderos, explorados más a fondo en ' on certidumbre ', son W (y más tarde Searle) "lecho" o "fondo", es decir, la psicología evolutiva, que son trazables a las reacciones automáticas verdaderas de las bacterias y sus descendientes (por ejemplo, los seres humanos), que evolucionaron y operan por el mecanismo de la aptitud inclusiva (si)--ver los magníficos "principios de la evolución social" de Bourke. W insistió en que deberíamos considerar nuestro análisis de la conducta como descripciones en lugar de explicaciones, pero por supuesto estos también son complejos juegos de idiomas y la descripción de una persona es la explicación de otro. Comenzando con sus respuestas innatas, sólo verdaderas, no empíricas (automatizadas y no cambiables) al mundo, los animales extienden su comprensión axiomática a través de deducciones en más verdaderos sólo entendimientos ("teoremas" como podríamos llamarlos, pero esto es un complejo juego de idiomas, incluso en el contexto de las matemáticas). Los tiranosaurios y los mesones se vuelven tan indisputable como la existencia de nuestras dos manos o nuestra respiración. Esto cambia drásticamente una'vista de la naturaleza humana. Teoría de la mente (TOM) no es una teoría en absoluto, sino un grupo de entendimientos verdaderos de la agencia (UA un término que diseñé hace 10 años) que los animales recién nacidos (incluyendo moscas y gusanos si UA está adecuadamente definido) han, Y Que posteriormente evolucrado en gran medida (en eukaryotes más altos). Sin embargo, como señalo aquí, W dejó muy claro que para 134 gran parte de la intencionalidad existen las versiones Sistema 1 y Sistema 2 (juegos de idiomas)-el UA1 inconsciente rápido y el los UA2 consciente lento y, por supuesto, estos son heurísticos para fenómenos multifacéticos. Aunque la materia prima para S2 es S1, S2 también se alimenta de nuevo en S1 - mayor retroalimentación cortical a los niveles más bajos de percepción, memoria, pensamiento reflexivo que es un fundamental de la psicología. Muchos de los ejemplos de W exploran esta calle de dos vías (por ejemplo, ver las discusiones del pato/conejo y "ver como" en Johnston). La "teoría" de la evolución dejó de ser una teoría para cualquier persona normal, racional e inteligente antes del final del siglo 19 y para Darwin al menos medio siglo antes. Una No ayuda, pero incorporan Tyrannosaurus Rex y todo lo que es relevante para él en nuestro verdadero único fondo a través del funcionamiento inexorable de EP. Una vez que se obtiene la necesidad lógica (psicológica) de este, es realmente estupeficante que incluso los más brillantes y los mejores parecen no captar este hecho más básico de la vida humana (con una punta del sombrero a Kant, Searle y algunos otros) que fue establecido con gran detalle en "sobre certeza". Por cierto, la ecuación de la lógica y nuestra psicología axiomática es esencial para entender la W y la naturaleza humana (como Daniele Moyal-Sharrock (DMS), pero no AFAIK a nadie más, señala). Por lo tanto, la mayor parte de nuestra experiencia pública compartida (cultura) se convierte en una verdadera extensión de nuestro EP axiomático y no se puede encontrar confundido sin amenazar nuestra cordura. El fútbol o Britney Spears no pueden simplemente desaparecer de mi memoria y vocabulario, ya que estos conceptos, ideas, eventos, se desarrollan y están ligados a innumerables otros en la verdadera única red que comienza con el nacimiento y se extiende en todas las direcciones para abarcar gran parte de nuestro conciencia y la memoria. Un corolario, muy bien explicado por DMS y esclarecido en su propia manera única por Searle, es que la visión escéptica del mundo y otras mentes (y una montaña de otras tonterías, incluyendo la pizarra en blanco) realmente no puede tener un punto de apoyo, como "realidad" es el resultado de axiomas involuntarios de pensamiento rápido y no comprobables proposiciones verdaderas o falsas. Creo que está claro que los axiomas de verdad innatos W se ocupan a lo largo de su trabajo, y casi exclusivamente en OC (su última obra "en certeza"), son equivalentes al pensamiento rápido o sistema 1 que está en el centro de la investigación actual (por ejemplo, ver Kahneman-" Pensando rápido y lento ", pero no tiene idea de W estableció el marco hace unos 75 años), que es involuntario e inconsciente y que corresponde a los Estados mentales de la percepción (incluyendo UOA1) y la memoria y actos involuntarios, como W notas una y otra vez en interminables Ejemplos. Uno podría llamar a estos "reflejos intracerebrales" (tal vez 99% de toda nuestra cerebración si se mide por el uso de energía en el cerebro). Nuestro lento o reflexivo, más o menos "consciente" (¡ cuidado con otra red de juegos de idiomas!) la actividad de segundo cerebro propio se corresponde con lo que W caracterizó como "disposiciones" o "inclinaciones", que se refieren a habilidades o 135 posibles acciones, no son Estados mentales ( o no en el mismo sentido), y no tienen ningún tiempo definido de ocurrencia y/o duración. Pero las palabras de disposición como "saber", "entender", "pensar", "creer", que W discutió extensamente, tienen al menos dos usos básicos. Uno es un uso filosófico peculiar (pero graduándose en los usos cotidianos) ejemplificado por Moore (cuyos papeles inspiraron a W a escribir OC), que se refiere a las oraciones verdaderas sólo resultantes de las percepciones directas y la memoria, es decir, nuestra psicología axiomática S1 innata (' i saben que estas son mis manos '), y el S2, que es su uso normal como disposiciones, que pueden ser actuada, y que puede llegar a ser verdadero o falso (' yo sé mi camino a casa '). La investigación del pensamiento rápido involuntario ha revolucionado la psicología, la economía (por ejemplo, el Premio Nobel de Kahneman) y otras disciplinas bajo nombres como "ilusiones cognitivas", "cebado", "framing" (enmarcado), "heurística" y "sesgos". Por supuesto, estos también son juegos de idiomas por lo que habrá más y menos útiles maneras de utilizar estas palabras, y los estudios y discusiones variarán de "puro" sistema 1 a combinaciones de 1 y 2 (la norma como W dejó claro), pero presumiblemente no siempre de lento sistema 2 disposicional delgado rey sólo, ya que cualquier sistema 2 pensamiento o acción intencional no puede ocurrir sin involucrar gran parte de la intrincada red de "módulos cognitivos", "motores de inferencia", "reflejos intracerebrales", "automatismos", "axiomas cognitivos", "fondo" o "lecho de roca" (como W y más tarde Searle llamar a nuestro EP). Uno de los temas recurrentes de W fue lo que ahora se llama teoría de la mente (TOM), o como prefiero la comprensión de la agencia (UA), pero por supuesto que no utilizó estos términos, que es el tema de los principales esfuerzos de investigación ahora. Recomiendo consultar el trabajo de Ian Apperly, que está Diseccionando cuidadosamente UA1 y 2 y que recientemente se ha dado cuenta de uno de los principales filósofos Wittgensteinian Daniel Hutto, ya que Hutto ha caracterizado a UA1 como una fantasía (o más bien insiste en que hay no hay ' teoría ' ni representación involucrada en UA1--que está reservada para los UA2). Sin embargo, al igual que otros psicólogos, Apperly no tiene idea de que W sentó las bases para esto entre 60 y 80 años atrás. Otro punto hecho innumerables veces por W fue que nuestra vida mental consciente es epifenomenal en el sentido de que no describe con precisión ni determinar cómo actuamos, ahora un pilar de las Ciencias del comportamiento. Ver ' la ilusión fenomenológica ' en PNC para un gran ejemplo de la filosofía. Es un corolario obvio de la psicología descriptiva de W y S que son los automatismos inconscientes del sistema 1 los que dominan y describen el comportamiento y que los posteriores evolucionaron las disposiciones conscientes (pensar, recordar, amar, desear, lamentar, etc.) son la mera guinda del pastel. Esto es más llamativo por la última psicología experimental, algunos de los cuales está muy bien resumido por Kahneman en el libro citado (véase, por ejemplo, el capítulo "dos yos", pero por supuesto hay un gran volumen de trabajo reciente que no cita y un flujo interminable de pop un d publicación de libros Pro). Es una visión fácilmente defendible que la mayor parte de la literatura floreciente sobre las ilusiones cognitivas, los automatismos y el pensamiento de orden superior es 136 totalmente compatible con y directamente discutible de W. Con respecto a mi visión de W como el principal pionero en EP, parece que nadie se ha dado cuenta de que muy claramente explicó varias veces específicamente y muchas veces de paso, la psicología detrás de lo que más tarde se conoció como la prueba de Wason-por mucho tiemp un pilar de la investigación EP. Por último, permítanme sugerir que con esta perspectiva, W no es oscuro, difícil o irrelevante, sino centelleante, profundo y cristalino, que escribe aforísticamente y telegráficamente porque pensamos y nos comportamos de esa manera, y que echarlo de menos es perderse una de las mayores aventuras intelectuales posibles. Ahora que tenemos un comienzo razonable en la estructura lógica de la racionalidad (la psicología descriptiva del pensamiento de orden superior), podemos ver la tabla de intencionalidad que resulta de esta obra, que he construido en los últimos años. Se basa en una mucho más simple de Searle, que a su vez le debe mucho a Wittgenstein. También he incorporado en las tablas de forma modificada que son utilizados por los investigadores actuales en la psicología de los procesos de pensamiento que se evidencian en las últimas 9 filas. Debería resultar interesante compararlo con los 3 volúmenes recientes de Peter hacker en Human Nature. Ofrezco esta tabla como una heurística para describir el comportamiento que encuentro más completo y útil que cualquier otro marco que he visto y no como un análisis final o completo, que tendría que ser tridimensional con cientos (al menos) de flechas que van en muchos direcciones con muchas (tal vez todas) vías entre S1 y S2 siendo bidireccional. Además, la distinción entre S1 y S2, cognición y voluntad, percepción y memoria, entre sentimiento, saber, creer y esperar, etc. son arbitrarias--es decir, como demostró W, todas las palabras son contextualmente sensibles y la mayoría tienen varios diferentes usos (significados o COS). Muchos gráficos complejos han sido publicados por los científicos, pero los encuentro de utilidad mínima cuando se piensa en el comportamiento (en contraposición a pensar en la función cerebral). Cada nivel de descripción puede ser útil en ciertos contextos, pero me parece que ser más grueso o más fino limita la utilidad. La estructura lógica de la racionalidad (LSR), o la estructura lógica de la mente (LSM), la estructura lógica del comportamiento (LSB), la estructura lógica del pensamiento (LST), la estructura lógica de la conciencia (LSC), la estructura lógica de la personalidad (LSP), el Psicología descriptiva de la conciencia (DSC), la psicología descriptiva del pensamiento de orden superior (DPHOT), la intencionalidad-el término filosófico clásico. El sistema 1 es involuntario, reflexivo o automatizado "reglas" R1 mientras pensar (cognición) no tiene lagunas y es voluntario o deliberativo "reglas" R2 y (Willing) (Volition) (voluntad) tiene 3 lagunas (ver Searle) Sugiero que podamos describir el comportamiento más claramente cambiando 137 "imponer condiciones de satisfacción en las condiciones de satisfacción" de Searle a "relacionar los Estados mentales con el mundo moviendo los músculos" - es decir, hablar, escribir y hacer, y su "mente al mundo Dirección de ajuste "y" la dirección del mundo a la mente de ajuste "por" causa se origina en la mente "y" la causa se origina en el mundo "S1 sólo es causal ascendente (mundo a la mente) y sin contenido (falta de representaciones o información) mientras que S2 tiene contenido y es causal descendente (mente a mundo). He adoptado mi terminología en esta tabla. He hecho una explicación detallada de esta tabla en mis otros escritos. 138 DESDE EL ANALISIS DE LOS JUEGOS DE IDIOMAS Disposición Emoción Memoria Percepción Deseo PI * * IA * * * Acción/ Palabra Causa origina de * * * * Mundo Mundo Mundo Mundo Mente Mente Mente Mente Provoca cambios en * * * * * Ninguno Mente Mente Mente Ninguno Mundo Mundo Mundo Causalmente Auto Reflexivo * * * * * * No Sí Sí Sí No Sí Sí Sí Verdadero o falso (Comprobable) Sí T sólo T sólo T sólo Sí Sí Sí Sí Condiciones públicas de satisfacción Sí Sí/No Sí/No No Sí/No Sí No Sí Describir Un estado mental No Sí Sí Sí No No Sí/No Sí Prioridad evolutiva 5 4 2, 3 1 5 3 2 2 Contenido voluntario Sí No No No No Sí Sí Sí Iniciación voluntaria Sí/No No Sí No Sí/No Sí Sí Sí Sistema cognitivo ******* 2 1 2/1 1 2/1 2 1 2 Cambiar intensidad No Sí Sí Sí Sí No No No Duración precisa No Sí Sí Sí No No Sí Sí Aquí y Ahora o Allá y Luego (H + N, T + T) ******** TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN Calidad especial No Sí No Sí No No No No Localizado en Cuerpo No No No Sí No No No Sí Las expresiones corporales Sí Sí No No Sí Sí Sí Sí Autocontradiccion es No Sí No No Sí No No No Necesita un yo Sí Sí/No No No Sí No No No Necesita lenguaje Sí No No No No No No Sí/no 139 DE LA INVESTIGACIÓN DE DECISIONES Disposición Emoción Memoria Percepción Deseo PI * * IA * * * Acción/ Palabra Efectos subliminales No Sí/No Sí Sí No No No Sí/No Asociativa Basada en reglas RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB Dependiente del contexto/ Abstracto A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/A CD/A Serie/Paralelo S S/P P P S/P S S S Heurístico Analítica A H/A H H H/A A A A Necesita trabajar Memoria Sí No No No No Sí Sí Sí Dependiente general de la inteligencia Sí No No No Sí/No Sí Sí Sí La carga cognitiva Inhibe Sí Sí/No No No Sí Sí Sí Sí Excitación facilita o inhibe I F/I F F I I I I Condiciones públicas de satisfacción de S2 son a menudo referidos por Searle y otros como COS, representaciones, creadores de la verdad o significados (o COS2 por mí mismo), mientras que los resultados automáticos de S1 son designados como presentaciones por otros (o COS1 por mí mismo). * Aka inclinaciones, capacidades, preferencias, representaciones, posibles acciones, etc. ** Las intenciones previas de Searle *** La intención de Searle en acción **** Dirección de ajuste de Searle Dirección de Causalidad de Searle (Crea instancias de estado mental: causa o cumple). Searle anteriormente llamó a esta causalmente autorreferencial. Tversky/Kahneman/Frederick/Evans/Stanovich definió los sistemas cognitivos. Aquí y ahora o allí y luego Uno siempre debe tener en cuenta el descubrimiento de Wittgenstein que después de haber descrito los posibles usos (significados, los creadores de la verdad, condiciones de satisfaccion de lenguaje en un determinado contexto, hemos agotado su interés, y los intentos de explicación (es decir, filosofía) sólo nos alejan de la verdad. Es fundamental tener en cuenta que esta tabla es sólo una heurística libre de contexto 140 muy simplificada y cada uso de una palabra debe examinarse en su contexto. El mejor examen de la variación de contexto está en los últimos 3 volúmenes de Peter hacker en la naturaleza humana, que proporcionan numerosas tablas y gráficos que se deben comparar con este. Aquellos que deseen una cuenta completa hasta la fecha de Wittgenstein, Searle y su análisis del comportamiento de la moderna vista de dos sistemas pueden consultar a mi Libro La estructura lógica de la filosofía, la psicología, la mente y el lenguaje revelada en Wittgenstein y Searle 2Nd Ed (2019). Ahora, para algunos comentarios sobre el PNC de Searle. Los ensayos en PNC en su mayoría ya están publicados durante la última década (aunque algunos han sido actualizados), junto con un artículo inédito, y nada aquí vendrá como una sorpresa para aquellos que han mantenido su trabajo. Al igual que W, se le considera por muchos como el mejor filósofo leventate de su tiempo y su obra escrita es sólida como una roca y pionera en todo. Sin embargo, su fracaso para tomar la W más tarde lo suficientemente seriamente conduce a algunos errores y confusiones. En P7 señala dos veces que nuestra certeza sobre los hechos básicos se debe al abrumador peso de la razón que respalda nuestras afirmaciones, pero W demostró definitivamente en ' On Certainty '(Sobre Certeza) que no hay posibilidad de dudar de la verdadera estructura axiomática de nuestro sistema 1 percepciones, recuerdos y pensamientos, ya que es en sí la base para el juicio y no puede ser juzgado. En la primera frase del P8 nos dice que la certeza es revisable, pero este tipo de ' certeza ', que podríamos llamar Certainty2, es el resultado de extender nuestra certeza axiomática y no revisable (Certainty1) a través de la experiencia y es completamente diferente, ya que es proposicional (verdadero o falso). Este es, por supuesto, un ejemplo clásico de la "batalla contra la hechizamiento de nuestra inteligencia por el lenguaje" que W demostró una y otra vez. Una palabra-dos (o muchos) usos distintos. En P10 él reprende a W por su antipatía a la teoría, pero como he señalado anteriormente, ' teorizar ' es otro juego de idiomas (LG) y hay un vasto abismo entre una descripción general del comportamiento con pocos ejemplos bien elaborados y uno que emerge de un gran número de tal que me s no están sujetos a muchos contraejemplos. La evolución en sus primeros días fue una teoría con pocos ejemplos claros, pero pronto se convirtió en un resumen de un vasto cuerpo de ejemplos y una teoría en un sentido bastante diferente. de la misma manera, con una teoría que uno podría hacer como un resumen de mil páginas de ejemplos de W y una resultante de diez páginas. Otra vez, en P12, ' consciencia ' es el resultado del funcionamiento automatizado del sistema 1 que es ' subjetivo ' en varios sentidos muy diferentes, y no, en el caso normal, una cuestión de evidencia, sino una comprensión verdadera en nuestro propio caso y una percepción real en el caso de Otros. Al leer P13 pensé: "¿puedo sentir un dolor insoportable y seguir como si nada estuviera 141 mal?" ¡No! - Esto no sería «dolor» en el mismo sentido. "La experiencia interna está en necesidad de criterios externos" W, y Searle parece perderse esto. Véase W o Johnston. Al leer las próximas páginas, Sentí que W tiene una comprensión mucho mejor de la conexión mente/idioma, ya que los considera como sinónimo en muchos contextos, y su trabajo es una brillante exposición de la mente como ejemplificado en numerosos ejemplos perspicaces de uso del lenguaje. Como se ha citado anteriormente, "ahora bien, si no son las conexiones causales que nos preocupan, entonces las actividades de la mente están abiertas ante nosotros." Y como se explicó anteriormente, siento que las preguntas con las que S termina la sección 3 se responden en gran medida al considerar el OC de W desde el punto de vista de los dos sistemas. de la misma manera, para la sección 6 sobre la filosofía de la ciencia. Rodych ha hecho un artículo sobre Popper vs W que me pareció excelente en el momento, pero tendré que releer para asegurarme. Por último, en P25, uno puede negar que cualquier revisión de nuestros conceptos (juegos de idiomas) de causalidad o libre voluntad son necesarias o incluso posibles. Puede leer cualquier página de W por las razones. Una cosa es decir cosas extrañas sobre el mundo usando ejemplos de la mecánica cuántica, la incertidumbre, etc., pero es otro decir algo relevante para nuestro uso normal de las palabras. En P31, 36 etc., nos encontramos de nuevo con los problemas incesantes (en la filosofía y la vida) de palabras idénticas que pasando pro alto sobre las enormes diferencias en LG de ' creencia ', ' ver ', etc., como se aplica a S1 que se compone de Estados mentales en el presente sólo, y S2 que no es. El resto del capítulo resume su trabajo sobre ' pegamento social ' que, desde un EP, perspectiva de Wittgensteinian, es las acciones rápidas automáticas de S1 produciendo las disposiciones lentas de S2 que se expanden inexorablemente y universalmente durante el desarrollo personal en un amplia gama de relaciones deonticas inconscientes automáticas con otros, y arbitrariamente en las variaciones culturales en ellos. Los capítulos 3 a 5 contienen sus argumentos bien conocidos en contra de la visión mecánica de la mente que me parece definitiva. He leído libros enteros de respuestas a ellos y estoy de acuerdo con S que todos se pierden los muy simples puntos lógicos (psicológicos) que hace (y que, en general, W hizo medio siglo antes de que hubiera computadoras). Para ponerlo en mis términos, S1 se compone de inconsciente, rápidos, físicos, causales, automáticos, no proposicionales, verdaderos sólo Estados mentales, mientras que el S2 lento sólo puede describirse coherentemente en términos de razones de acciones que son más o menos disposiciones conscientes del comportamiento (acciones potenciales) que son o pueden llegar a ser proposicional (T o F). Las computadoras y el resto de la naturaleza sólo tienen intencionalidad derivada que depende de nuestra perspectiva, mientras que los animales superiores tienen intencionalidad primaria que es independiente de la perspectiva. Como S y W aprecian, la gran ironía es que estas reducciones materialistas o mecánicas de la psicología se disfrazan como ciencia de vanguardia, pero en realidad son totalmente anti-científicas. La filosofía (psicología descriptiva) y la psicología cognitiva (liberada de la superstición) se están convirtiendo en un guante de la mano y es Hofstadter, Dennett, Kurzweil, etc., 142 que se quedan fuera en el frío. La página 62 resume muy bien uno de sus argumentos, pero P63 muestra que todavía no ha dejado de hablar de la pizarra en blanco, ya que trata de explicar las tendencias en la sociedad en términos de las extensiones culturales de S2. Como lo hace en muchos otros lugares en sus escritos, él da razones culturales, históricas para el conductismo, pero me parece bastante obvio (ya que era a W) que la visión mecánica de la mente existe por la misma razón que casi todos los comportamientos-es la operación por defecto de nuestro EP que busca explicaciones en términos de lo que podemos pensar deliberadamente a través de lentamente, en lugar de en el S1 automatizado, del que en su mayoría permanecemos ajenos (es decir, una instancia de lo que Searle tiene el nombre "la ilusión fenomenológica). Otra vez, en p65 encuentro la descripción de W de nuestra psicología heredada axiomática y sus extensiones en su OC y otras obras que son más profundas que S (o de cualquiera), por lo que no somos seguro que los perros son conscientes, pero más bien no está claro qué duda significa (¿qué COS hay allí que pueda hacerlo falso?). Capítulo 5 muy bien demolida CTM, LOT etc., señalando que ' computación ', ' información ', "sintaxis", "algoritmo", "lógica", "programa", etc., son términos relativos a los observadores (es decir, psicológicos) y no tienen un significado físico o matemático en este sentido psicológico, pero por supuesto hay otros sentidos que se han dado recientemente ya que la ciencia ha Desarrollado. Una vez más, la gente está embrujada por el uso de la misma palabra para ignorar esa gran diferencia en su uso (significado). Todas las extensiones del clásico Wittgenstein, y recomiendo los papeles de Hutto también. El capítulo 6 "la ilusión fenomenológica" (TPI) es, con mucho, mi favorito y, a la vez que demoler Fenomenología, muestra tanto sus habilidades lógicas supremas como su fracaso para captar todo el poder de la W más tarde, y el gran valor heurístico de la reciente investigación psicológica sobre los dos mismos. Es claro como el cristal que TPI es debido a la obliviosidad a los automatismos de S1 y a tomar el pensamiento consciente lento del S2 como no sólo primario sino como todo lo que hay. Este es el clásico ceguera de pizarra en blanco. También está claro que W mostró esto unos 60 años antes y también dio la razón de ello en la primacía de la verdadera-sólo inconsciente red axiomática automática de nuestro sistema innato 1. Como muchos otros, Searle baila a su alrededor, pero nunca llega. Muy aproximadamente, con respecto a las características "independientes de los observadores" del mundo como las características S1 y "dependientes de los observadores" como S2 deberían ser muy reveladoras. Como S notas, Heidegger y los demás tienen la ontología exactamente al revés, pero por supuesto lo hace casi todo el mundo debido a los valores predeterminados de su EP. Pero lo realmente importante es que S no da el siguiente paso para darse cuenta de que TPI no es sólo una falla de unos pocos filósofos, sino una ceguera universal a nuestro EP que está incorporada en EP. En realidad, lo declara en casi estas palabras en un punto, pero si realmente lo consiguió, ¿cómo podría dejar de señalar sus 143 inmensas implicaciones para el mundo. Con raras excepciones (por ejemplo, las Jaina Tirthankaras que se remonta a más de 5000 años a los inicios de la civilización Indus y más recientemente y notablemente Osho, Buda, Jesús, Bodhidharma, da Free John etc., todos somos títeres de carne tropezando a través de la vida en nuestro Misión genéticamente programada para destruir la tierra. Nuestra casi total preocupación con el uso de la segunda personalidad auto S2 para complacer las gratificaciones infantiles de S1 está creando el infierno en la tierra. Al igual que con todos los organismos, sólo se trata de la reproducción y la acumulación de recursos para ello. Sí, mucho ruido sobre el calentamiento global y el inminente colapso de la civilización industrial en el próximo siglo, pero nada es probable que lo detenga. S1 escribe la reproducción y S2 lo actúa. Dick y Jane sólo quieren jugar a la casa-esta es mamá y este es papá y esto y esto y esto es el bebé. Tal vez uno podría decir que TPI es que somos humanos y no sólo otro primate. El capítulo 7 sobre la naturaleza del yo es bueno, pero nada realmente me pareció nuevo. El capítulo 8 sobre el dualismo de la propiedad es mucho más interesante, aunque sobre todo un refrito de su trabajo anterior. La última de sus citas de apertura arriba resume esto, y por supuesto la insistencia en la naturaleza crítica de la ontología en primera persona es totalmente Wittgensteinian. El único gran error que veo es su pizarra en blanco o tipo (cultural) de explicación en p 158 para los errores de dualismo, cuando en mi opinión, es claramente otro caso de TPI - un error que él (y casi todos los demás) ha hecho muchas veces, y se repite en p177 etc., en el capítulo 9, de lo contrario, magnífico. Los genes programa S1 que (en su mayoría) tira de las cuerdas (contrae los músculos) de los títeres de carne a través de S2. Fin de la historia. Otra vez, necesita leer mis comentarios en el OC de W por lo que cambia la "buena razón para creer" en la parte inferior de p171 y la parte superior de P172 a "sabe" (en el sentido verdadero es decir, K1). Se vuelve a hacer un punto crítico en p169. "Así, decir algo y significa que implica dos condiciones de satisfacción. En primer lugar, la condición de satisfacción de que se produzca la expresión, y segundo, que la propia expresión tendrá condiciones de satisfacción. " Una forma de hablar de esto es que el sistema automático inconsciente 1 activa la mayor personalidad de conciencia cortical del sistema 2, trayendo consigo contracciones musculares de la garganta que informan a otros que ve el mundo de ciertas maneras, que lo comprometen a potencial Acciones. Un gran avance sobre las interacciones prelingüísticas o protolingüísticas en las que sólo los movimientos musculares brutos pudieron transmitir información muy limitada sobre las intenciones y S hace un punto similar en el capítulo 10. Su último capítulo "la unidad de la Proposición" (anteriormente inédito) también se beneficiaría en gran medida de la lectura de W "en la certeza" o de los dos libros de DMS sobre OC (ver mis comentarios), ya que hacen claro la diferencia entre verdaderas sólo frases que describen S1 y verdadero o falso proposiciones que describen S2. Esto me parece un enfoque muy superior a S tomando percepciones S1 como proposicional 144 ya que sólo se convierten en T o F después de que uno comienza a pensar en ellos en S2. Sin embargo, su punto de que las proposiciones permiten declaraciones de la verdad y la falsedad real o potencial, del pasado y del futuro y de la fantasía, y por lo tanto proporcionar un gran avance sobre la sociedad pre o protolingüística, es convincente. Como dice, "una proposición es cualquier cosa que pueda determinar una condición de satisfacción... y una condición de satisfacción... es que tal y tal es el caso. " O, uno necesita agregar, que podría ser o podría haber sido o podría ser imaginado para ser el caso. En general, PNC es un buen Resumen de los muchos avances sustanciales sobre Wittgenstein resultantes del medio siglo de trabajo de S, pero en mi opinión, W todavía es inigualable una vez que se comprende lo que está diciendo. Idealmente, deben leerse juntos: Searle para la clara prosa y generalizaciones coherentes, ilustradas con los ejemplos perspicaces de W y aforismos brillantes. Si yo fuera mucho más joven escribiría un libro haciendo exactamente eso. 145 Reseña de La Metafilosofia de Wittgenstein (Wittgenstein's Metaphilosophy) de Paul Horwich 248p (2013) (revisión revisada 2019) Michael Starks Abstracto Horwich da un buen análisis de Wittgenstein (W) y es un erudito líder de W, pero en mi opinión, todos se quedan cortos de una apreciación completa, como explico extensamente en esta revisión y muchos otros. Si uno no entiende W (y preferiblemente Searle también) entonces no veo cómo uno podría tener más que una comprensión superficial de la filosofía y del pensamiento de orden superior y por lo tanto de todo el comportamiento complejo (psicología, sociología, Antropología, historia, literatura, sociedad). En pocas palabras, W demostró que cuando se ha demostrado cómo se utiliza una frase en el contexto de interés, no hay nada más que decir. Comenzaré con algunas citas notables y luego daré lo que creo que son las consideraciones mínimas necesarias para entender Wittgenstein, la filosofía y el comportamiento humano. En primer lugar se puede notar que poner "meta" delante de cualquier palabra debe ser sospechoso. W comentó, por ejemplo, que la metamatemática es matemática como cualquier otra. La noción de que podemos salir de la filosofía (es decir, la psicología descriptiva del pensamiento de mayor orden) es en sí misma una profunda confusión. Otra irritación aquí (y a lo largo de la escritura académica durante las últimas 4 décadas) es el sexismo lingüístico inverso constante de "ella" y "ella" y "ella" o "él/ella" etc., donde "ellos" y "ellos" y "ellos" harían bien. de la misma manera, la utilización de la palabra francesa «repertorio», en la que el repertorio inglés «repertorios» será bastante bueno. La deficiencia principal es el fracaso completo (aunque muy común) para emplear lo que veo como la vista de dos sistemas enormemente potente e intuitiva de HOT y el marco de Searle que he descrito anteriormente. Esto es especialmente conmovedor en el capítulo sobre el significado de P111 et seq. (especialmente en las notas al pie de página 2-7), donde nadamos en agua muy fangosa sin el marco de automatizado verdadero sólo S1, proposicional disposicional S2, COS etc. Uno también puede obtener una mejor vista de lo interno y lo externo mediante la lectura, por ejemplo, Johnston o Budd (ver mis comentarios). Horwich sin embargo hace muchos comentarios incisivos. Me gustó especialmente su Resumen de la importación de la postura anti-teórica de W en p65. Él necesita dar más énfasis a ' on certidumbre ', recientemente el tema de mucho esfuerzo por Daniele Moyal-Sharrock, Coliva y otros y resumidos en mis recientes artículos. Horwich es de primera, y su trabajo vale la pena el esfuerzo. Uno espera que él (y todo 146 el mundo) estudiarán Searle y algunos psicología moderna, así como Hutto, Read, Hutchinson, Stern, Moyal-Sharrock, paseo, hacker y Baker, etc. para lograr una visión amplia y moderna del comportamiento. La mayoría de sus documentos están en academia.edu y philpapers.org, pero para PMS hacker ver http://info.sjc.ox.ac.uk/scr/hacker/DownloadPapers.html. Él da uno de los más bellos resúmenes de donde un entendimiento de Wittgenstein nos deja que he visto nunca. "No debe haber ningún intento de explicar nuestra actividad lingüística/conceptual (PI 126) como en la reducción de la aritmética a la lógica de Frege; ningún intento de darle fundamentos epistemológicos (PI 124) como en cuentas basadas en el significado de conocimiento a priori; ningún intento de caracterizar las formas idealizadas de la misma (PI 130) como en lógica lógica; ningún intento de reformarlo (PI 124, 132) como en la teoría de errores de Mackie o el intuicionismo de Dummett; ningún intento de racionalizarlo (PI 133) como en el relato de la existencia de Quine; ningún intento de hacerla más consistente (PI 132) como en la respuesta de Tarski a las paradojas de los mentiroso; y ningún intento de hacerla más completa (PI 133) como en el asentamiento de preguntas de identidad personal para escenarios de "teletransportación" extravagantes e hipotéticos. " Por último, permítanme sugerir que con la perspectiva que he animado aquí, W está en el centro de la filosofía y la psicología contemporánea y no es oscura, difícil o irrelevante, pero centelleante, profunda y cristalina y que perderse es perderse uno de los mayores aventuras intelectuales posibles. Aquellos que deseen un marco completo hasta la fecha para el comportamiento humano de la moderna dos sistemas punto de vista puede consultar mi libro 'La Estructura Lógica de la Filosofía, la Psicología, la Mente y Lenguaje en Ludwig Wittgenstein y John Searle ' 2nd Ed (2019). Los interesados en más de mis escritos pueden ver 'Monos parlantes--filosofía, psicología, ciencia, religión y política en un planeta condenado--artículos y reseñas 2006-2019 3rd Ed (2019) y delirios utópicos suicidas en el 21St Century 4TH Ed (2019) Horwich da un buen análisis de Wittgenstein (W) y es un erudito líder de W, pero en mi opinión, todos se quedan cortos de una apreciación completa, como explico extensamente en esta revisión y muchos otros. Si uno no entiende W (y preferiblemente Searle también) entonces no veo cómo uno podría tener más que una comprensión superficial de la filosofía y del pensamiento de orden superior y por lo tanto de todo comportamiento complejo (psicología, sociología, Antropología, historia, literatura, sociedad). En pocas palabras, W demostró que cuando se ha demostrado cómo se utiliza una frase en el contexto de interés, no hay nada más que decir. Comenzaré con algunas citas notables y luego daré lo que creo que son las consideraciones mínimas necesarias para entender Wittgenstein, la filosofía y el 147 comportamiento humano. "La confusión y el esterilidad de la psicología no debe explicarse llamándola" ciencia joven "; su estado no es comparable con el de la física, por ejemplo, en sus inicios. (Más bien con el de ciertas ramas de las matemáticas. Establecer teoría.) En Psicología hay métodos experimentales y confusión conceptual. (Como en el otro caso, confusión conceptual y métodos de prueba). La existencia del método experimental nos hace pensar que tenemos los medios para resolver los problemas que nos molesten; Aunque el problema y el método pasan entre sí por. " Wittgenstein (PI p. 232) "Los filósofos ven constantemente el método de la ciencia ante sus ojos y son irresistiblemente tentados a preguntar y responder preguntas en la forma en que la ciencia lo hace. Esta tendencia es la verdadera fuente de la metafísica y lleva al filósofo a una completa oscuridad. " (BBB P18). "Pero no he tenido mi imagen del mundo satisfaciendo su corrección: ni la tengo porque estoy satisfecho de su corrección. No: es el trasfondo heredado en el que distingo entre verdadero y falso. " Wittgenstein OC 94 "El objetivo de la filosofía es levantar una pared en el punto donde el lenguaje se detiene de todos modos." Ocasiones filosóficas de Wittgenstein p187 "El límite del lenguaje se demuestra por su imposibilidad de describir un hecho que corresponde a (es la traducción de) una frase sin simplemente repetir la frase..." Wittgenstein CV P10 "Si tenemos en cuenta la posibilidad de una imagen que, aunque correcta, no tiene similitud con su objeto, la interpolación de una sombra entre la oración y la realidad pierde todo punto. Por ahora, la frase en sí puede servir como una sombra. La frase es sólo una imagen, que no tiene la menor similitud con lo que representa. " BBB P37 "Así, podemos decir de algunos matemáticos filosofar que obviamente no son conscientes de los muchos usos diferentes de la palabra "prueba; y que no son claros acerca de las diferencias entre los usos de la palabra "kind" {tipo}, cuando hablan de tipos de números, tipos de pruebas, como si la palabra "tipo" aquí significaba lo mismo que en el contexto "tipos de manzanas." O, podemos decir, que no son conscientes de los diferentes significados de la palabra "descubrimiento" cuando en un caso hablamos del descubrimiento de la construcción del Pentágono y en el otro caso del descubrimiento del Polo Sur. " BBB P29 Estas citas no se eligen al azar, pero (junto con las otras en mis reseñas) son un esquema de comportamiento (naturaleza humana) de nuestros dos mejores psicólogos descriptivas. Al considerar estos asuntos debemos tener en cuenta que la filosofía es la psicología descriptiva del pensamiento de orden superior (HOT), que es otro de los hechos obvios que son totalmente ignorados – es decir, nunca lo he visto claramente declarado en cualquier lugar. 148 Aquí es cómo el erudito principal de Wittgenstein resumió su trabajo: "Wittgenstein resolvió muchos de los profundos problemas que han molestado a nuestro sujeto durante siglos, a veces de hecho durante más de dos milenios, problemas sobre la naturaleza de la representación lingüística, Acerca de la relación entre el pensamiento y el lenguaje, sobre el solipsismo y el idealismo, el autoconocimiento y el conocimiento de otras mentes, y sobre la naturaleza de la verdad necesaria y de las proposiciones matemáticas. Aró el suelo de la filosofía europea de la lógica y el lenguaje. Nos dio una novela e inmensamente fructífera variedad de ideas sobre la filosofía de la psicología. Intentó revoque siglos de reflexión sobre la naturaleza de las matemáticas y la verdad matemática. Socavó la epistemología de los foundacionalistas. Y nos legó una visión de la filosofía como una contribución no al conocimiento humano, sino a la comprensión humana – comprensión de las formas de nuestro pensamiento y de las confusiones conceptuales en las que estamos obligados a caer. " - Peter hacker--' la interpretación tardía de Gordon Baker de Wittgenstein ' Añadiría que W fue el primero (por 40 años) para describir clara y extensamente los dos sistemas de pensamiento--rápido automático prelingüístico S1 y la disposicional lenta reflexional del aparato. Explicó cómo el comportamiento sólo es posible con un vasto fondo heredado que es la base axiomática para juzgar y no se puede dudar o juzgar, por lo que voluntad (elección), la conciencia, el yo, el tiempo y el espacio son innatas verdaderos axiomas. Discutió muchas veces lo que ahora se conoce como teoría de la mente, framing (enmarcado) y las ilusiones cognitivas. Frecuentemente explicaba la necesidad de los antecedentes innatos y demostraba cómo generaba comportamiento. Describió la psicología detrás de lo que más tarde se convertiría en la prueba de Wason, una medida fundamental utilizada en la investigación EP décadas después. Señaló la naturaleza indeterminada del lenguaje y la naturaleza del juego de la interacción social. Examinó en miles de páginas y cientos de ejemplos cómo nuestras experiencias mentales internas no son describible en el lenguaje, esto es posible sólo para el comportamiento público con un lenguaje público (la imposibilidad del idioma privado). Por lo tanto, puede ser visto como el primer psicólogo evolutivo. Al pensar en Wittgenstein, a menudo recuerdo el comentario atribuido al profesor de filosofía de Cambridge, C.D. Broad (que no entendía ni le gustaba). "no ofrecer la Cátedra de filosofía a Wittgenstein sería como no ofrecer la silla de la física a Einstein!" Pienso en él como el Einstein de la psicología intuitiva. Aunque nació diez años más tarde, también estaba tramando ideas sobre la naturaleza de la realidad casi al mismo tiempo y en la misma parte del mundo y como Einstein casi muere en WW1. Ahora Supongamos que Einstein era un suicida homosexual recluso con una personalidad difícil que publicó una sola versión temprana de sus ideas que se confundieron y a menudo se equivocaron, pero se volvieron mundialmente famosas; cambiado por completo sus ideas, pero durante los próximos 30 años publicó nada más, y el conocimiento de su nueva obra, en forma mayormente confusa, se difundo lentamente de conferencias ocasionales y notas de los estudiantes; que murió en 1951 dejando atrás más de 20.000 páginas de garabatos en su mayoría escritos a mano en alemán, compuesto de oraciones o párrafos breves con, a menudo, sin relación clara 149 con las oraciones antes o después; que escribió en un estilo socrático con 3 personas distintas en el diálogo (en realidad sus escritos deben llamarse trialogues, aunque parezco ser el único en usar este término)- el narrador, el interlocutor y el comentarista (por lo general la opinión de W) cuyos comentarios fueron mezclados por la mayoría de los lectores, por lo tanto vitando completamente todo el empuje elucidatorio y terapéutico, que estos fueron cortados y pegados de otros cuadernos escritos años anteriormente con notas en los márgenes, bajo forros y palabras tachadas, de modo que muchas oraciones tienen múltiples variantes; que sus ejecutivos literarios cortan esta masa indigerible en pedazos, dejando fuera lo que deseaban y luchando con la monstruosa tarea de captar el significado correcto de las oraciones que transmiten opiniones totalmente novedosas sobre cómo funciona el universo y que luego publicó este material con lentitud agonizante (no terminado después de medio siglo) con prefacios que no contenían ninguna explicación real de lo que se trataba; que se hizo tan notorio como famoso debido a muchas afirmaciones de que toda la física anterior era un error e incluso tonterías, y que virtualmente nadie entendía su trabajo, a pesar de cientos de libros y decenas de miles de artículos que lo discutían; que muchos físicos sabían sólo sus primeros trabajos en los que había hecho una suma definitiva de la física newtoniana declaró en forma extremadamente abstracta y condensada que era difícil decidir lo que se decía; que fue virtualmente olvidado y que la mayoría de los libros y artículos sobre la naturaleza del mundo y los diversos temas de la física moderna sólo habían pasado y por lo general las referencias erróneas a él, y que muchos lo omitieron por completo; que hasta el día de hoy, más de medio siglo después de su muerte, sólo había un puñado de personas que realmente captó las consecuencias monumentales de lo que había hecho. Esto, supongo, es precisamente la situación con Wittgenstein. Antes de remarcar en este libro, primero voy a ofrecer algunos comentarios sobre la filosofía y su relación con la investigación psicológica contemporánea como ejemplificada en las obras de Searle (S), Wittgenstein (W), hacker (H) et al. Ayudará a ver mis reseñas de PNC (filosofía en un nuevo siglo), TLP, PI, OC, haciendo el mundo social (MSW) y otros libros por y acerca de estos genios, que proporcionan una descripción clara del comportamiento de orden superior no encontrado en los libros de psicología, que me referiremos como el WS Marco de referencia. Un tema importante en todas las discusiones sobre el comportamiento humano es la necesidad de separar los automatismos genéticamente programados de los efectos de la cultura. Todo estudio de comportamiento de orden superior es un esfuerzo para burlarse no sólo rápido S1 y lento pensamiento S2-por ejemplo, percepciones y otros automatismos frente a disposiciones, pero las extensiones de S2 en la cultura (S3). El trabajo de Searle en su conjunto proporciona una descripción impresionante del comportamiento social S2/S3 de orden superior, mientras que el W posterior muestra cómo se basa en axiomas inconscientes sólo verdaderos de S1 que evolucionaron en el pensamiento de proposicional disposicional consciente de S2. S1 es las funciones automatizadas simples de nuestro involuntario, sistema 1, pensamiento rápido, neurona espejo, verdadero-sólo, no proposicional, Estados mentales prelingüísticos-nuestras percepciones y recuerdos y actos reflexivos incluyendo Sistema 1 verdades y UA1--comprensión de Agencia 1--y Emotions1-como 150 la alegría, el amor, la ira) que pueden describirse causalmente, mientras que las funciones lingüísticas evolutivamente posteriores son expresiones o descripciones de voluntariado, sistema 2, pensamiento lento, mentalización de las neuronas. Es decir, de comprobables verdadero o falso, proposicional, Truth2 y los UA2 y Emotions2 (alegría, amor, odio) -el disposicional (y a menudo contrafáctual) imaginando, suponiendo, pretendiendo, pensando, conociendo, creyendo, etc. que sólo se puede describir en términos de razones (es decir, es sólo un hecho que intenta describir el sistema 2 en términos de Neuroquímica, atómica física, matemáticas, no tienen sentido-ver W, S, hacker, etc.). "Muchas palabras entonces en este sentido, entonces no tienen un significado estricto. Pero esto no es un defecto. Pensar que es sería como decir que la luz de mi lámpara de lectura no es realmente luz en absoluto porque no tiene un límite agudo. " BBB P27 "El origen y la forma primitiva del juego de la lengua es una reacción; sólo de esto pueden desarrollarse formas más complicadas. El lenguaje--quiero decir--es un refinamiento. "Al principio estaba la escritura." CV P31 "Imagina a una persona cuya memoria no podía retener lo que significaba la palabra" dolor "-para que constantemente llamaba a cosas diferentes con ese nombre-pero sin embargo usó la palabra de una manera que encaja con los síntomas usuales y las presuposiciones de la palabra" pain" {dolor)-en pocas palabras lo usó como que todos hacemos. " PI P271 "Cada signo es capaz de interpretar, pero el significado no debe ser capaz de interpretar. Es es la última interpretación "BBB P34 "Hay una especie de enfermedad general de pensamiento que siempre busca (y encuentra) lo que se llamará un estado mental del cual todos nuestros actos brotan, como de un embalse." BBB p143 "Y el error que aquí y en mil casos similares están inclinados a hacer está etiquetado por la palabra" hacer "como lo hemos usado en la frase" no es un acto de perspicacia que nos hace usar la regla como lo hacemos ", porque hay una idea de que "algo debe hacernos" hacer lo que hacemos. Y esto de nuevo se une a la confusión entre la causa y la razón. No necesitamos tener ninguna razón para seguir la regla como nosotros. La cadena de razones tiene un fin. " BBB p143 Las palabras de disposición tienen al menos dos usos básicos. Uno es un uso filosófico peculiar (pero se gradúa en los usos cotidianos) que se refiere a las oraciones verdaderas sólo resultantes de la percepción directa y la memoria, es decir, nuestra psicología axiomática S1 innata (' sé que estas son mis manos ')-es decir, son Causalmente Auto Referencial (CSR)-llamado reflexivo o intransigente en BBB), y el uso de S2, que es su uso normal como disposiciones, que puede ser actuado hacia fuera, y 151 que puede llegar a ser verdadero o falso (' yo sé mi camino a casa ')-es decir, tienen condiciones de satisfacción (COS) y no son CSR (llamado transitivo en BBB). Se deduce tanto del trabajo del 3er período de W y de la psicología contemporánea, que ' voluntad ', ' Self ' (Yo) y ' consciencia ' son elementos axiomáticos verdaderossólo de S1 compuesto de percepciones y reflejos., y no hay posibilidad (inteligibilidad) de demostrar (de dar sentido a) su falsedad. Como W hizo tan maravillosamente claro en numerosas ocasiones, que son la base para el juicio y por lo tanto no puede ser juzgado. Los verdaderos axiomas de nuestra psicología no son probatorios. La evolución por la aptitud inclusiva ha programado las acciones causales reflexivas rápidas e inconscientes de S1 que a menudo dan lugar al pensamiento lento consciente de S2 (a menudo modificado en las extensiones culturales de S3), que produce razones de acción que a menudo resultan en activación de los músculos del cuerpo y/o del habla por S1 causando acciones. El mecanismo general es a través de la neurotransmisión y por los cambios en los neuromoduladores en las áreas específicas del cerebro. La ilusión cognitiva general (llamada por S ' la ilusión fenomenológica ', por Pinker ' la pizarra en blanco ' y por Tooby y Cosmides ' el modelo de ciencias sociales estándar ') es que S2/S3 ha generado la acción conscientemente por razones de las cuales somos plenamente conscientes y en control de, pero cualquier persona familiarizada con la biología moderna y la psicología puede ver que esta visión no es creíble. Una frase expresa un pensamiento (tiene un significado), cuando tiene claro COS, es decir, las condiciones de la verdad pública. De ahí el comentario de W: "cuando pienso en el lenguaje, no hay ' significados ' pasando por mi mente, además de las expresiones verbales: el lenguaje es en sí mismo el vehículo del pensamiento." Y, si pienso con o sin palabras, el pensamiento es lo que yo (honestamente) diga que es como no hay otro criterio posible (COS). Así, Los aforismos preciosos de W (p132 Budd) "es en el lenguaje que el deseo y la realización se reúnen" y "como todo lo metafísico, la armonía entre el pensamiento y la realidad se encuentra en la gramática de la lengua." Y uno podría notar aquí que la "gramática" en W generalmente se puede traducir como EP y que a pesar de sus frecuentes advertencias contra la teoría y la generalización, esto es tan amplia una caracterización de la psicología descriptiva de orden superior (filosofía) como uno puede encontrar. Aunque W es correcto que no hay un estado mental que constituya significado, S señala que hay una manera general de caracterizar el acto de significado-"significado de orador... es la imposición de condiciones de satisfacción en las condiciones de satisfacción "que significa hablar o escribir un bien-frase formada expresando COS en un contexto que puede ser verdadero o falso y esto es un acto y no un estado mental. De ahí la famosa cita de W: "si Dios hubiera mirado en nuestras mentes, no habría podido ver allí de quien estábamos hablando (PI P217)" y sus comentarios de que todo el problema de la representación está contenido en "eso es él" y "... lo que da a la imagen su interpretación es el camino en el que se encuentra, "o como S dice su COS. 152 por lo tanto, la suma de W (P140 Budd) que" lo que siempre llega al final es que sin ningún significado más, él llama lo que sucedió el deseo de que eso suceda "..." la cuestión de si sé lo que deseo antes de que se cumpla mi deseo no puede surgir en absoluto. Y el hecho de que algún evento pare mis deseos no significa que lo cumpla. Tal vez no debería haberme satisfecho si mi deseo había sido satisfecho "... Supongamos que se le preguntó ' ¿sé por cuánto tiempo antes de conseguirlo? Si he aprendido a hablar, entonces lo sé. " Wittgenstein (W) es para mí fácilmente el pensador más brillante en el comportamiento humano. Él muestra que el comportamiento es una extensión de los axiomas innatos verdaderos (ver "sobre certeza" para su tratamiento final extendido de esta idea) y que nuestra ratiocinación consciente emerge de maquinaciones inconscientes. Su corpus puede ser visto como la base para toda la descripción del comportamiento animal, revelando cómo funciona la mente y de hecho debe funcionar. El "must" (debe) está implicado en el hecho de que todos los cerebros comparten una ascendencia común y genes comunes y por lo que sólo hay una forma básica de trabajar, que esto necesariamente tiene una estructura axiomática, que todos los animales superiores comparten la misma psicología evolucionada basada en aptitud, y que en los seres humanos esto se extiende en una personalidad basada en el músculo de la garganta contracciones (lenguaje) que evolucionaron para manipular a otros. Sugiero que probará el mayor valor para considerar el trabajo de W y la mayoría de sus ejemplos como un esfuerzo para desaprovechar no sólo el pensamiento rápido y lento (por ejemplo, percepciones vs disposiciones-Ver más abajo), pero la naturaleza y la crianza. "La filosofía simplemente pone todo ante nosotros y no explica ni deduce nada... Uno podría dar el nombre ' filosofía ' a lo que es posible antes de todos los nuevos descubrimientos e invenciones. " PI 126 "Cuanto más estrechamente examinamos el lenguaje real, más agudo se convierte en el conflicto entre él y nuestro requisito. (Por supuesto, para la pureza cristalina de la lógica no fue un resultado de la investigación: era un requisito.) " PI 107 "La concepción equivocada que quiero objetar en este conexion es la siguiente, que podemos descubrir algo totalmente nuevo. Eso es un error. La verdad del importa es que ya hemos consiguió todo, y que lo tenemos realmente presente; no necesitamos esperar nada. Hacemos nuestros movimientos en el ámbito de la gramática de nuestro lenguaje ordinario, y esta gramática ya está allí. Por lo tanto, ya tenemos todo y no necesitamos esperar el futuro. " (dijo en 1930) Waismann "Ludwig Wittgenstein y el círculo de Viena (1979) p183 "Aquí nos encontramos con un fenómeno notable y característico en la investigación filosófica: la dificultad---podría decir---no es la de encontrar la solución sino más bien la de reconocer como la solución algo que parece ser sólo un preliminares a ella. Ya lo hemos dicho todo. ---No hay nada que se desprende de esto, ¡ no es la solución! ... Esto está conectado, creo, con nuestra espera errónea una explicación, mientras que 153 la solución de la dificultad es una descripción, si le damos el lugar correcto en nuestras consideraciones. Si lo moramos, y no tratamos de ir más allá de él. " Zettel p312 llamar-314 "Nuestro método es puramente descriptivo, las descripciones que damos no son pistas de explicaciones." BBB P125 "La claridad a la que aspiramos es, de hecho, una claridad completa. Pero esto simplemente significa que los problemas filosóficos deben desaparecer por completo. " PI P133 W también puede ser considerado como un pionero en la lingüística cognitiva evolutiva-el análisis de arriba abajo de la mente y su evolución a través del análisis cuidadoso de ejemplos de uso del lenguaje en contexto, exponiendo las muchas variedades de juegos de idiomas y las relaciones entre los juegos primarios de trueonly (solo cierto) inconsciente, el pensamiento rápido axiomático de la percepción, la memoria y las emociones y los actos reflexivos (a menudo se describe como el cerebro de reptil cortical subcorticales y primitivo las funciones primero-yo (self)), y el más adelante evolucionado mayor consciente de la disposicional cortical habilidades de creer, saber, pensar, etc. que constituyen los verdaderos o falsos juegos de lenguaje secundario proposicional de pensamiento lento que incluyen la red de ilusiones cognitivas que constituyen la base de nuestra segunda personalidad. Disecciona cientos de juegos de idiomas que muestran cómo las percepciones verdaderas, los recuerdos y las acciones reflexivas del sistema de una (S1) grado en el pensamiento, recordando, y la comprensión de las disposiciones del sistema dos (S2), y muchos de sus ejemplos también abordan el tema de la naturaleza/nutrición explícitamente. Con esta perspectiva evolutiva, sus obras posteriores son una revelación impresionante de la naturaleza humana que es totalmente actual y nunca ha sido igualada. Muchas perspectivas tienen un valor heurístico, pero me parece que esta visión evolutiva de dos sistemas es la mejor. Parafraseando el famoso comentario de Dobzhansky: "nada en filosofía tiene sentido excepto a la luz de la psicología evolutiva." Las ideas comunes (por ejemplo, el subtítulo de uno de los libros de Pinker "las cosas del pensamiento: el lenguaje como una ventana a la naturaleza humana") que el lenguaje es una ventana o algún tipo de traducción de nuestro pensamiento o incluso (Fodor) que debe haber algún otro "lenguaje del pensamiento" de que h es una traducción, fueron rechazados por W, que trataron de mostrar, con cientos de ejemplos perspicaces continuamente reanalizados de lenguaje en acción, que el lenguaje no es sólo la mejor imagen que podemos llegar a pensar, la mente y la naturaleza humana, pero el habla es la mente , y todo su corpus puede ser considerado como el desarrollo de esta idea. Rechazó la idea de que los enfoques Bottom Up (de abajo hacia arriba) de la fisiología, psicología experimental y computación (teoría computacional de la mente, fuerte IA, teoría de sistemas dinámicos, funcionalismo, etc.) podría revelar lo que hicieron sus análisis de los juegos de idiomas (LG). Las dificultades que observó son entender lo que siempre está delante de nuestros ojos y capturar la vaguedad ("la mayor dificultad en estas investigaciones es encontrar una 154 manera de representar la vaguedad" LWPP1, 347). Reconoció que ' nothing is hidden' (nada esta oculto) - es decir, toda nuestra psicología y todas las respuestas a todas las preguntas filosóficas están aquí en nuestra lengua (nuestra vida) y que la dificultad no es encontrar las respuestas sino reconocerlas como siempre aquí delante de nosotros - sólo tenemos que dejar de tratar de mirar más profundo y abandonar el mito del acceso introspectivo a nuestra "vida interior" (por ejemplo, "el mayor peligro aquí es querer observarse a uno mismo." LWPP1, 459). Por cierto, la ecuación de la lógica o la gramática y nuestra psicología axiomática es esencial para entender la W y la naturaleza humana (como DMS, pero AFAIK nadie más, señala). "Algunas de las características lógicas más importantes de la intencionalidad están más allá del alcance de la fenomenología porque no tienen una realidad fenomenológica inmediata... Porque la creación del significado de la falta de sentido no se experimenta conscientemente... no existe... Esto es... la ilusión fenomenológica. " Searle PNC P115117 "... la relación intencional básica entre la mente y el mundo tiene que ver con las condiciones de satisfacción. Y una proposición es cualquier cosa que pueda estar en una relación intencional con el mundo, y ya que esas relaciones intencionales siempre determinan las condiciones de satisfacción, y una proposición se define como cualquier cosa suficiente para determinar las condiciones de satisfacción, resulta que toda intencionalidad es una cuestión de proposiciones. " Searle PNC p193 "El estado intencional representa sus condiciones de satisfacción... personas suponen erróneamente que cada representación mental debe ser conscientemente pensada... pero la noción de una representación como la estoy usando es una noción funcional y no ontológica. Cualquier cosa que tenga condiciones de satisfacción, que pueda triunfar o fracasar de una manera que sea característica de la intencionalidad, es por definición una representación de sus condiciones de satisfacción... podemos analizar la estructura de la intencionalidad de los fenómenos sociales analizando sus condiciones de satisfacción. " Searle MSW p28-32 "La superstición no es más que creencia en el nexo causal." TLP 5,1361 "Ahora bien, si no son las conexiones causales que nos preocupan, entonces las actividades de la mente están abiertas ante nosotros." BBB P6 "Sentimos que incluso cuando todas las preguntas científicas posibles han sido contestadas, los problemas de la vida permanecen completamente intactos. Por supuesto, entonces no quedan preguntas, y esta es la respuesta. " TLP 6,52 "Tonterías, tonterías, porque estás haciendo suposiciones en lugar de simplemente 155 describir. Si su cabeza está embrujada por explicaciones aquí, usted está descuidando para recordar los hechos más importantes. " Z 220 Nuestra experiencia pública compartida se convierte en una verdadera extensión de nuestro EP axiomático y no se puede encontrar equivocada sin amenazar nuestra cordura. Es decir, las consecuencias de un "error" S1 son muy diferentes de un error S2. Un corolario, muy bien explicado por DMS y esclarecido en su propia manera única por Searle, es que la visión escéptica del mundo y otras mentes (y un montaña de otras tonterías, incluyendo la pizarra en blanco) realmente no puede tener un punto de apoyo, como "realidad" es el resultado de axiomas involuntarios y no comprobables proposiciones verdaderas o falsas. La investigación del pensamiento rápido involuntario ha revolucionado la psicología, la economía (por ejemplo, el Premio Nobel de Kahneman) y otras disciplinas bajo nombres como "ilusiones cognitivas", "cebado", "enmarcado", "heurística" y "sesgos". Por supuesto, estos también son juegos de idiomas, por lo que habrá más y menos útiles maneras de utilizar estas palabras, y los estudios y discusiones variarán de "puro" sistema 1 a combinaciones de 1 y 2 (la norma como W dejó claro), pero presumiblemente no siempre de sistema lento 2 disposicional Thi sólo nking, ya que cualquier sistema 2 pensamiento o acción intencional no puede ocurrir sin involucrar gran parte de la intrincada red de "módulos cognitivos", "motores de inferencia", "reflejos intracerebrales", "automatismos", "axiomas cognitivos", "fondo" o "Bedrock" (como W y más tarde Searle llamar a nuestro EP). Uno de los temas recurrentes de W fue TOM, o como yo prefiero UA (comprensión de la Agencia). Ian Apperly, que está analizando cuidadosamente UA1 y los UA2 en experimentos, recientemente se ha dado cuenta de Hutto, que ha caracterizado a UA1 como una fantasía (es decir, sin ' teoría ' ni representación involucrada en UA1--que está reservada para los UA2-ver mi reseña de su libro con Myin). Sin embargo, al igual que otros psicólogos, Apperly no tiene idea de que W sentó las bases para esto hace 80 años. Es una visión fácilmente defendible que el núcleo de la literatura floreciente sobre las ilusiones cognitivas, los automatismos y el pensamiento de orden superior es compatible con y directamente discutible de W. A pesar del hecho de que la mayor parte de lo anterior ha sido conocido por muchos durante décadas (e incluso 3/4 de un siglo en el caso de algunas de las enseñanzas de W), nunca he visto nada acercándose a una discusión adecuada en textos de Ciencias del comportamiento y comúnmente no hay una mención. Ahora que tenemos un comienzo razonable en la estructura lógica de la racionalidad (la psicología descriptiva del pensamiento de orden superior), podemos ver la tabla de intencionalidad que resulta de esta obra, que he construido en los últimos años. Se basa en una mucho más simple de Searle, que a su vez le debe mucho a Wittgenstein. También he incorporado en las tablas de forma modificada que son utilizados por los investigadores actuales en la psicología de los procesos de pensamiento que se evidencian en las últimas 9 filas. Debería resultar interesante compararlo con los 3 volúmenes recientes de Peter hacker en Human Nature. Ofrezco esta tabla como una heurística para describir el comportamiento que encuentro más completo y útil que cualquier otro marco que he visto y no como un análisis final o completo, que tendría 156 que ser tridimensional con cientos (al menos) de flechas que van en muchos direcciones con muchas (tal vez todas) vías entre S1 y S2 siendo bidireccional. También, la distinción entre S1 y S2, cognición y voluntad, percepción y memoria, entre sentimiento, conocimiento, creer y esperar, etc. son arbitrarios--es decir, como demostró W, todas las palabras son contextualmente sensibles y la mayoría tienen varios usos totalmente diferentes (significados o COS). Muchos gráficos complejos han sido publicados por los científicos, pero los encuentro de utilidad mínima cuando se piensa en el comportamiento (en contraposición a pensar en la función cerebral). Cada nivel de descripción puede ser útil en ciertos contextos, pero me parece que ser más grueso o más fino limita la utilidad. La estructura lógica de la racionalidad (LSR), o la estructura lógica de la mente (LSM), la estructura lógica del comportamiento (LSB), la estructura lógica del pensamiento (LST), la estructura lógica de la conciencia (LSC), la estructura lógica de la personalidad (LSP), el Psicología descriptiva de la conciencia (DSC), la psicología descriptiva del pensamiento de orden superior (DPHOT), la intencionalidad-el término filosófico clásico. El sistema 1 es involuntario, reflexivo o automatizado "reglas" R1 mientras pensar (cognición) no tiene lagunas y es voluntario o deliberativo "reglas" R2 y Willing (Volition)(voluntad) tiene 3 lagunas (ver Searle). Sugiero que podamos describir el comportamiento más claramente cambiando "imponer condiciones de satisfacción en las condiciones de satisfacción" de Searle a "relacionar los Estados mentales con el mundo moviendo los músculos" - es decir, hablar, escribir y hacer, y su "mente al mundo Dirección de ajuste"y" la dirección del mundo a la mente de ajuste "por" causa se origina en la mente "y" causa se origina en el mundo "S1 es sólo de forma ascendente causal (mundo a la mente) y sin contenido (falta de representaciones o información) mientras que S2 tiene contenidos y es descendente causal (mente al mundo ). He adoptado mi terminología en esta tabla. 157 DESDE EL ANALISIS DE LOS JUEGOS DE IDIOMAS Disposición Emoción Memoria Percepción Deseo PI * * IA * * * AcciónPalabra Causa origina de * * * * Mundo Mundo Mundo Mundo Mente Mente Mente Mente Provoca cambios en * * * * * Ninguno Mente Mente Mente Ninguno Mundo Mundo Mundo Causalmente Auto Reflexivo * * * * * * No Sí Sí Sí No Sí Sí Sí Verdadero o falso (Comprobable) Sí T sólo T sólo T sólo Sí Sí Sí Sí Condiciones públicas de satisfacción Sí Sí/No Sí/No No Sí/No Sí No Sí Describir Un estado mental No Sí Sí Sí No No Sí/No Sí Prioridad evolutiva 5 4 2, 3 1 5 3 2 2 Contenido voluntario Sí No No No No Sí Sí Sí Iniciación voluntaria Sí/No No Sí No Sí/No Sí Sí Sí Sistema cognitivo ******* 2 1 2/1 1 2/1 2 1 2 Cambiar intensidad No Sí Sí Sí Sí No No No Duración precisa No Sí Sí Sí No No Sí Sí Aquí y Ahora o Allá y Luego (H + N, T + T) ******** TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN Calidad especial No Sí No Sí No No No No Localizado en Cuerpo No No No Sí No No No Sí Las expresiones corporales Sí Sí No No Sí Sí Sí Sí Autocontradiccion es No Sí No No Sí No No No Necesita un yo Sí Sí/No No No Sí No No No Necesita lenguaje Sí No No No No No No Sí/No 158 DE LA INVESTIGACIÓN DE DECISIONES Disposición Emoción Memoria Percepción Deseo PI * * IA * * * Acción/ Palabra Efectos subliminales No Sí/No Sí Sí No No No Sí/No Asociativa Basada en reglas RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB Dependiente del contexto/ Abstracto A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/A CD/A Serie/Paralelo S S/P P P S/P S S S Heurístico Analítica A H/A H H H/A A A A Necesita trabajar Memoria Sí No No No No Sí Sí Sí Dependiente general de la inteligencia Sí No No No Sí/No Sí Sí Sí La carga cognitiva Inhibe Sí Sí/No No No Sí Sí Sí Sí Excitación facilita o inhibe I F/I F F I I I I Condiciones públicas de satisfacción de S2 son a menudo referidos por Searle y otros como COS, representaciones, creadores de la verdad o significados (o COS2 por mí mismo), mientras que los resultados automáticos de S1 son designados como presentaciones por otros (o COS1 por mí mismo). * Aka Inclinaciones, Capacidades, Preferencias, Representaciones, Posibles Acciones, etc. ** Intenciones anteriores de Searle *** La intención de Searle en acción. **** Dirección de ajuste de Searle ***** Dirección de causalidad de Searle ****** (Las instancias del estado mental Causas o se cumple a sí mismo). Searle anteriormente llamó a esto causalmente auto-referencial. ******* Tversky / Kahneman / Frederick / Evans / Stanovich definieron los sistemas cognitivos. ******** Aquí y ahora o allí y luego Uno siempre debe tener en cuenta el descubrimiento de Wittgenstein que después de haber describió los posibles usos (significados, verdades, condiciones de satisfacción) del lenguaje en un contexto particular, hemos agotado su interés, y los intentos de explicación (es decir, filosofía) sólo nos alejan de la verdad. Es fundamental tener en 159 cuenta que esta tabla es sólo una heurística libre de contexto muy simplificada y cada uso de una palabra debe examinarse en su contexto. El mejor examen de la variación de contexto está en los últimos 3 volúmenes de Peter hacker en la naturaleza humana, que proporcionan numerosas tablas y gráficos que se deben comparar con este. Aquellos que deseen una cuenta completa hasta la fecha de Wittgenstein, Searle y su análisis del comportamiento de la moderna vista de dos sistemas pueden consultar a mi Libro La estructura lógica de la filosofía, la psicología, la mente y el lenguaje revelada en Wittgenstein y Searle 2Nd Ed (2019). EXPLICACIÓN de la tabla sistema 1 (es decir, emociones, memoria, percepciones, reflejos) que partes del cerebro presente a la conciencia, se automatizan y ocurren generalmente en menos de 500msec, mientras que el sistema 2 son habilidades para realizar acciones deliberativas lentas que están representados en la conciencia (S2Dmi terminología) que requieren más de 500msec, pero las acciones S2 repetidas veces también pueden ser automatizadas (la terminología de S2A-My). Hay una gradación de la conciencia desde el coma a través de las etapas del sueño hasta la conciencia plena. La memoria incluye memoria a corto plazo (memoria de trabajo) del sistema 2 y memoria a largo plazo del sistema 1. Por voliciones uno normalmente diría que son exitosos o no, en lugar de T o F. Claro, las distintas filas y columnas están lógicamente y psicológicamente conectadas. Por ej., emoción, memoria y percepción en la fila verdadero o falso será verdadero sólo, describirán un estado mental, pertenecen al sistema cognitivo 1, generalmente no se iniciará voluntariamente, son causalmente auto reflexivo, causa se origina en el mundo y provoca cambios en la mente, tienen una duración precisa, cambio en la intensidad, ocurren aquí y ahora, comúnmente tienen una calidad especial, no necesitan lenguaje, son independientes de la inteligencia general y la memoria de trabajo, no están inhibidas por la carga cognitiva, no tendrá contenido voluntario, y no tendrá condiciones públicas de satisfacción, etc. Siempre habrá ambigüedades porque las palabras no pueden igualar con precisión las funciones complejas reales del cerebro (comportamiento), es decir, hay una explosión combinatoria de contextos (en oraciones y en el mundo), y es por eso que no es posible reducir mayor comportamiento de la orden a un sistema de leyes que tendrían que indicar todos los contextos posibles – de ahí las advertencias de Wittgenstein contra las teorías. Hace aproximadamente un millón de años, los primates evolucionaron la capacidad de usar los músculos de la garganta para hacer series complejas de ruidos (es decir, discursos primitivos) para describir eventos presentes (percepciones, memoria, acciones reflexivas y algunas primarias o Juegos de lenguaje primitivo (PLG). El sistema 1 se compone de Estados mentales rápidos, automatizados, subcorticales, no representacionales, causalmente autorreferenciales, intransitivos, sin información menos, verdaderos, con un tiempo y ubicación precisos, y con el tiempo evolucionaron en mayor S2 cortical con el capacidad de describir los desplazamientos en el espacio y el tiempo (condicionales, hipotéticos o ficcionales) de posibles eventos (el pasado y el 160 futuro y, a menudo, las preferencias condicionales o ficticias, las inclinaciones o las disposiciones, las secundarias o Sofisticados juegos de lenguaje (SLG) del sistema 2 lento, cortical, consciente, información que contiene, transitiva (tener condiciones públicas de satisfacción-término de Searle para los creadores de la verdad o significado que divido en COS1 y COS2 para el privado S1 y S2 público), representacional - que de nuevo divido en R1 para las representaciones S1 y R2 para S2), el pensamiento de actitud de proposicional verdadero o falso, con todas las funciones S2 sin tiempo preciso y siendo habilidades y no estados mentales. Las preferencias son intuiciones, tendencias, reglas ontológicas automáticas, comportamientos, habilidades, módulos cognitivos, rasgos de personalidad, plantillas, motores de inferencia, inclinaciones, emociones, actitudes proposicionales, valoraciones, capacidades, hipótesis. Algunas emociones están desarrollando lentamente y cambiando los resultados de las disposiciones S2 (W RPP2 148) mientras que otros son típicos S1, rápido y automático para aparecer y desaparecer. "Yo creo", "él ama", "piensan" son descripciones de posibles actos públicos típicamente discolocado en el espacio-tiempo. Mi primero declaraciones de persona sobre mí son verdaderas-sólo (excluyendo mentir) – es decir, S1, mientras que las declaraciones en tercera persona sobre otros son verdaderas o falsas – es decir, S2 (ver mis comentarios de Johnston ' Wittgenstein: repensando entrada del interior ' y de Budd ' Filosofía de la psicología de Wittgenstein '). Las "preferencias" como clase de Estados intencionales--opuestos a percepciones, actos reflexivos y memorias--fueron descritas por primera vez claramente por Wittgenstein (W) en la década de 1930 y denominadas "inclinaciones" o "disposiciones". Comúnmente se denominan "actitudes proposicionales" desde que Russell pero esta es una frase engañosa ya que creyendo, con la intención, sabiendo, recordando, etc., a menudo no son proposiciones ni actitudes, como se ha demostrado, por ejemplo, por W y por Searle (p. ej., cf. C + L --Consciousness and Language --P118). Son representaciones públicas intrínsecas y observadoras independientes (en contraposición a la presentaciones o representaciones de Sistema 1 al Sistema 2 – Searle-C + L p53). Son posibles actos desplazados en el tiempo o en el espacio, mientras que los recuerdos evolutivamente más primitivos de las percepciones S1 y las acciones reflexivas están siempre aquí y ahora. Esta es una manera de caracterizar el sistema 2-el segundo gran avance en la psicología de los vertebrados después del sistema 1-la capacidad de representar eventos y pensar en ellos como ocurriendo en otro lugar o tiempo (la tercera Facultad de Searle de imaginación contrafactual que complementa cognición y volición). Los ' pensamientos ' S1 son estados mentales potenciales o inconscientes de S1--Searle--problemas de Phil 1:45-66 (1991). Las percepciones, memorias y acciones reflexivas (automáticas) pueden ser descrito como como S1 o primario de LG (PLG-por ejemplo, veo el perro) y hay, en el caso normal, NO hay pruebas posibles para que puedan ser true only (verdadero solo). Las disposiciones pueden ser descripto como secundario de LG (SLG-por ejemplo, creo que veo al perro) y también debe ser actuado, incluso para mí en mi propio caso (es decir, ¿cómo puedo saber lo que creo, pensar, sentir hasta que actúo algún evento 161 ocurre-ver mis comentarios de Johnston ' Wittgenstein: repensar el interior ' y Budd ' filosofía de Wittgenstein o f psicología»). Tenga en cuenta que las disposiciones también se convierten en acciones cuando se habla o se escriben, así como se actúa de otras maneras, y estas ideas son todas debidas a Wittgenstein (mediados de 1930) y no son Behaviorismo (Hintikka & Hintikka 1981, Searle, hacker, Hutto, etc.,). Wittgenstein puede ser considerado como el fundador de la psicología evolutiva y su trabajo una investigación única del funcionamiento de nuestra psicología axiomática sistema 1 y su interacción con el sistema 2. Después de que Wittgenstein sentó las bases para la psicología descriptiva del pensamiento de orden superior en los libros azul y marrón a principios de los años 30, fue ampliado por John Searle, quien hizo una versión más simple de esta tabla en su libro clásico racionalidad en acción (2001). Se expande en la encuesta de W de la estructura axiomática de la psicología evolutiva desarrollada a partir de sus primeros comentarios en 1911 y tan bellamente establecido en su última obra sobre certeza (OC) (escrita en 1950-51). OC es la piedra fundacional de comportamiento o epistemología y ontología (posiblemente la misma), lingüística cognitiva o pensamiento de orden superior, y en mi opinión el trabajo más importante en filosofía (psicología descriptiva) y por lo tanto en el estudio de la conducta. La percepción, la memoria, las acciones reflexivas y la emoción son primitivos Estados mentales involuntarios parcialmente subcorticales, que pueden describirse en PLG, en los que la mente se ajusta automáticamente al mundo (es causalmente auto referencial--Searle) --la incuestionable, verdadera única, base axiomática de racionalidad sobre la que no hay control posible). Preferencias, deseos e intenciones son descripciones de habilidades voluntarias conscientes de pensamiento lento - que se pueden describir en las SLG-en las que la mente intenta encajar al mundo. El Behaviorismo y todas las demás confusiones de nuestra psicología descriptiva por defecto (filosofía) surgen porque no podemos ver S1 trabajando y describir todas las acciones como SLG (el Fenomenológica Ilusión - TPI - Searle). W entendió esto y lo describió con una claridad inigualable con cientos de ejemplos de lenguaje (la mente) en acción a lo largo de sus obras. La razón tiene acceso a la memoria y por lo que utilizamos conscientemente aparente pero a menudo incorrectas razones para explicar el comportamiento (los dos sí mismos o sistemas o procesos de investigación actual). Las creencias y otras disposiciones pueden describirse como pensamientos que intentan igualar los hechos del mundo (mente a la dirección mundial de ajuste), mientras que voliciones son intenciones de actuar (intenciones previas - PI, o intenciones en acción-IA-Searle) más actos que intentan igualar al mundo con los pensamientos - dirección del mundo a la mente de la forma de ajuste - CF. Searle e.g., C + L P145, 190). A veces hay lagunas en el razonamiento para llegar a la creencia y otras disposiciones. Las palabras de disposición se pueden usar como sustantivos que parecen describir los Estados mentales (' mi pensamiento es... ') o como verbos o adjetivos para describir las habilidades (agentes que actúan o pueden actuar- "Creo que...) y a menudo se denominan incorrectamente "actitudes proposicionales". Las percepciones se convierten en memorias y nuestros programas innatos (módulos cognitivos, plantillas, motores de inferencia de S1) los utilizan para producir disposiciones - (creer, conocer, entender, pensar, etc., -ACTOS públicos reales o potenciales (lenguaje, pensamiento, 162 mente) también llamados inclinaciones, preferencias, capacidades, representaciones de S2) y volition (voluntad) y no hay lenguaje (concepto, pensamiento) de los estados mentales privados para pensar o estar dispuestos (es decir, sin idioma, pensamiento o mente). Los animales más altos pueden pensar y actuarán y en esa medida tienen una psicología pública. PERCEPTIONS: ("X" es true): escuchar, ver, oler, dolor, tacto, temperatura Recuerdos: ¿Recordando, soñando? PREFERENCIAS, INCLINACIONES, DISPOSITIONS (X podría convertirse en true): CLASE 1: PROPOSICIONAL (verdadero o falso) Público Actos de creer, juzgar, pensar, representar, entender, elegir, decidir, preferir, interpretar, conocer (incluyendo habilidades y habilidades), asistir (aprender), experimentar, significado, recordar, intentando, considerando, deseando, esperando, deseando, queriendo, esperando (una clase especial), viendo como (aspectos), CLASE 2: MODO DESACOPLADO-(como si, condicional, hipotético, ficticio)-soñando, imaginando, mintiendo, prediciendo, dudado CLASE 3: emociones: amar, odiar, temer, pesar, alegría, celos, depresión. Su función es modular las preferencias para aumentar la aptitud inclusiva (la utilidad máxima esperada) facilitando el procesamiento de la información de las percepciones y memorias para una acción rápida. Hay cierta separación entre las emociones S1 como la rabia y el miedo y S2 como el amor, el odio, el asco y la ira. DESEOS: (quiero que "X" sea verdad - quiero Change el mundo para adaptarse a mis pensamientos): Anhelo, esperanza, Esperando, esperando, necesitando, requiriendo, obligado a hacer intenciones: (voy a hacer "X" verdadero) con la intención ACTIONS (estoy haciendo "X" true): actuando, hablando, leyendo, escribiendo, Cálculo, persuasión, mostrando, demostrando, convincente, haciendo intento, tratando, riendo, jugando, comiendo, bebiendo, llorando, afirmando (describiendo, enseñando, predicando, informando), prometiendo, haciendo o usando mapas, libros, dibujos, computadora Programas – estos son públicos y voluntarios y transfieren información a otros para que dominen los reflejos de S1 inconsciente, involuntario e informacional menos en las explicaciones de comportamiento. PALABRAS EXPRESAR ACCIONES POTENCIALES QUE TIENEN VARIAS FUNCIONES EN NUESTRA VIDA Y NO SON LOS NOMBRES DE LOS OBJETOS NI DE UN SOLO TIPO DE EVENTO. Las interacciones sociales de los seres humanos se rigen por módulos cognitivos - aproximadamente equivalentes a los guiones o esquemas de la psicología social (grupos de neuronas organizadas en motores de inferencia), que, con percepciones y recuerdos, conducen a la formación de preferencias que conducen a las intenciones y luego a las acciones. La intencionalidad o la psicología intencional se pueden tomar 163 para ser todos estos procesos o sólo las preferencias que conducen a acciones y en el sentido más amplio es el tema de la psicología cognitiva o Neurociencias cognitivas cuando se incluye Neurofisiología, neuroquímica y neurogenética. La psicología evolutiva puede ser considerada como el estudio de todas las funciones precedentes o del funcionamiento de los módulos que producen comportamiento, y es entonces coextenso en evolución, desarrollo y acción individual con preferencias, intenciones y acciones. Dado que los axiomas (algoritmos o módulos cognitivos) de nuestra psicología están en nuestros genes, podemos ampliar nuestra comprensión al dar descripciones claras de cómo funcionan y pueden extenderla (cultura) a través de la biología, la psicología, la filosofía (psicología descriptiva), las matemáticas, la lógica, la física y los programas de computación, haciéndolos más rápidos y eficientes. Hajek (2003) da un análisis de las disposiciones como probabilidades condicionales que son hecho en algoritmos por Rott (1999), Spohn etc. La intencionalidad (psicología cognitiva o evolutiva) consiste en diversos aspectos de la conducta que se programan innatamente en módulos cognitivos que crean y requieren conciencia, voluntad y auto y en adultos humanos normales casi todos excepto las percepciones y algunos recuerdos son deliberado, requieren actos públicos (por ejemplo, lenguaje), y nos comprometen a las relaciones con el fin de aumentar nuestra aptitud inclusiva (máxima utilidad esperada-la maximización de la utilidad bayesiana pero el bayesianismo es altamente cuestionable) a través de la dominación y altruismo recíproco (razones independientes del deseo de acción-Searle-que divido en DIRA1 y DIRA2 para S1 y S2) e imponer condiciones de satisfacción en condiciones de satisfacción-Searle-(es decir, relacionar pensamientos con el mundo a través de actos públicos (músculo movimientos – es decir, matemáticas, lenguaje, arte, música, sexo, deportes, etc.]. Los fundamentos de esto fueron deducido por nuestro mayor psicólogo natural Ludwig Wittgenstein de la década de 1930 a 1951, pero con prefiguralas claras de vuelta a 1911, y con refinamientos por muchos, pero sobre todo por John Searle a partir de la década de 1960. "El árbol General de los fenómenos psicológicos. No me esfuerzo por la exactitud, sino por una visión del todo. " RPP Vol 1 p895 CF Z p464. Gran parte de la intencionalidad (es decir, de nuestros juegos de idiomas) admite títulos. Como observó W, las inclinaciones son a veces conscientes y deliberativos. Todas nuestras plantillas (funciones, conceptos, juegos de idiomas) tienen bordes difusos en algunos contextos, ya que deben ser útiles. Hay al menos dos tipos de pensamiento (es decir, dos juegos de idiomas o formas de usar el verbo disposicional "pensar") - no racional sin conciencia y racional con conciencia parcial (W), ahora descrito como el pensamiento rápido y lento de S1 y S2. Es útil considerarla como juegos de idiomas y no como meros fenómenos (W RPP Vol2 P129). Fenómenos mentales (nuestras "experiencias" subjetivas o internas) son epifenomenales, carecen de criterios, por lo tanto carecen de información incluso para uno mismo y por lo tanto no pueden desempeñar ningún papel en la comunicación, el pensamiento o la mente. Pensar como todas las disposiciones (inclinaciones, actitudes proposicionales) carece de cualquier prueba, no es un estado mental (a diferencia de las percepciones de S1), y no contiene información hasta que se convierte en un acto público en el habla, la escritura u otras contracciones musculares. Nuestras percepciones y memorias pueden tener información (es decir, un COS público) sólo cuando se manifiestan en acciones públicas, porque sólo entonces piensan, sintiendo etc. tienen cualquier 164 sentido (consecuencias) incluso para Nosotros mismos. (Memoria y percepción están integrados por los módulos en las disposiciones que se vuelven psicológicamente eficaces cuando se actúa sobre). Desarrollar el lenguaje significa manifestar la capacidad innata de sustituir la palabras para los actos. TOM (teoría de la mente) es mucho mejor llamado UA-comprensión de la Agencia – mi término-y UA1 y los UA2 para tales funciones en S1 y S2)-y también puede llamarse Psicología evolutiva o intencionalidad--la producción innata programada de conciencia, el yo y el pensamiento que conduce a las intenciones y luego a las acciones mediante la contratación de los músculos. Por lo tanto, "actitud proposicional" es un término confuso para la normal de S2D racional intuitiva o no racional automática de la voz y la acción de los S2A. Vemos que los esfuerzos de la ciencia cognitiva para entender el pensamiento, las emociones, etc. mediante el estudio de la neurofisiología no nos va a decir nada más sobre cómo el Mente (pensamiento, lenguaje) funciona (en contraposición a cómo funciona el cerebro) de lo que ya sabemos, porque "mente" (pensamiento, lenguaje) ya está en plena vista pública (W). Cualquier fenómeno que esté oculto in Neurofisiología, bioquímica, la genética, la mecánica cuántica o la teoría de cuerdas, son tan irrelevantes para nuestra vida social como el hecho de que una tabla se compone de átomos que "obedecer" (se puede describir por) las leyes de la física y la química es almorzar en ella. Como dijo W tan famoso "nada está oculto". Todo el interés sobre la mente (pensamiento, lenguaje) está abierto a ver si sólo examinamos cuidadosamente el funcionamiento del lenguaje. El lenguaje (mente, discurso público conectado a las acciones potenciales) fue evolucionado para facilitar la interacción social y por lo tanto la recolección de recursos, la supervivencia y la reproducción. eso's gramática (es decir, la psicología evolutiva, la intencionalidad) funciona automáticamente y es extremadamente confusa cuando tratamos de analizarla. Las palabras y oraciones tienen múltiples usos dependiendo del contexto. Yo creo y como tengo papeles profundamente diferentes como creo y creo o creo y él cree. El uso expresivo presente en primera persona de los verbos inclinacionales como "creo" describe mi capacidad para predecir mis probables actos y no es descriptivo de mi estado mental ni basado en el conocimiento o la información en el sentido usual de esas palabras (W). No describe una verdad, sino que se hace realidad en el acto de decirlo--es decir, "Creo que está lloviendo" se hace realidad. Es decir, los verbos de disposición utilizados en primera persona en el tiempo presente son causalmente autorreferenciales-se instancian a sí mismos, pero como descripciones de los posibles estados no son comprobables (es decir, no T o F). Sin embargo pasado o futuro tenso o tercera persona uso-"yo creía" o "él cree" o "él va a creer" contienen información que es verdadera o falsa, ya que describen los actos públicos que son o pueden llegar a ser verificables. Del mismo modo, "Creo que está lloviendo" no tiene información aparte de las acciones subsiguientes, incluso para mí, pero "Creo que lloverá" o "pensará que está lloviendo" son actos públicos potencialmente verificables desplazados en el espacio-tiempo que pretenden transmitir información (o desinformación). Palabras no reflectantes o no racionales (automáticas) habladas sin intención previa (que yo llamo S2A - i. e., S2D automatizado por la práctica) han sido llamados palabras como hechos por W & then por Daniel Moyal-Sharrock en su papel en filosófico 165 Psicología en 2000) muchas de las llamadas inclinaciones/disposiciones/preferencias/tendencias/capacidades/ABpasivos no son proposicionales (No-Reflexivo) actitudes (mucho más útiles para llamarlas funciones o habilidades) del sistema 1 (Tversky y Kahnemann). Las intenciones previas son indicadas por Searle para ser Estados mentales y por lo tanto S1 pero una vez más creo que uno debe separar PI1 y PI2, ya que en nuestro lenguaje normal nuestras intenciones previas son las deliberaciones conscientes de S2. Percepciones, memorias, tipo 2 disposiciones (por ejemplo, algunas emociones) y muchas disposiciones tipo 1 son mejor llamados reflejos de S1 y son automáticos, no reflectantes, no proposicional y no-actitudinal funcionamiento de las bisagras (axiomas, algoritmos) de nuestro El evolucionario Psychología (Moyal-Sharrock después de Wittgenstein). Ahora, para algunos comentarios sobre "la Metafilosofía de Wittgenstein" de Horwich. Después de lo anterior y mis muchas reseñas de libros por y sobre W, S, Hacker, DMS, etc., debe estar claro lo que W está haciendo y lo que una cuenta contemporánea de comportamiento debe incluir, así que voy a hacer sólo unos pocos Comentarios. El primero podría notar que poner "meta" delante de cualquier palabra debe ser sospechoso. W comentó, por ejemplo, que la metamatemática es matemática como cualquier otra. La noción de que podemos salir de la filosofía (es decir, la psicología descriptiva de pensamiento de orden superior) es en sí una profunda confusión. Otra irritación aquí (y a lo largo de la escritura académica durante las últimas 4 décadas) es el sexismo lingüístico inverso constante de "ella" y "ella" y "ella", etc., donde "ellos" y "ellos" y "ellos" harían bien. La deficiencia principal es el fracaso completo (aunque casi universal excepto por mi trabajo) para emplear lo que veo como la vista de dos sistemas muy potente e intuitiva de HOT y el marco de Searle que he esbozado anteriormente. Esto es especialmente conmovedor en el capítulo sobre el significado de P111 et seq. (especialmente en las notas al pie de página 2-7), donde nadamos en agua muy fangosa sin el marco de automatizado verdadero sólo S1, proposicional disposicional S2, COS etc. Uno también puede obtener una mejor vista de lo interno y lo externo mediante la lectura, por ejemplo, Johnston o Budd (ver mis comentarios). Horwich sin embargo hace muchos comentarios incisivos. Me gustó especialmente su Resumen de la importación de la postura antiteórica de W en p65. "No debe haber ningún intento de explicar nuestra actividad lingüística/conceptual (PI 126) como en la reducción de la aritmética a la lógica de Frege; ningún intento de darle fundamentos epistemológicos (PI 124) como en cuentas basadas en el significado de conocimiento a priori; ningún intento de caracterizar las formas idealizadas de la misma (PI 130) como en lógicas de sentido; ningún intento de reformarlo (PI 124, 132) como en la teoría de errores de Mackie o el intuicionismo de Dummett; ningún intento de racionalizarlo (PI 133) como en el relato de la existencia de Quine; ningún intento de hacerla más consistente (PI 132) como en la respuesta de Tarski a las paradojas de los mentiroso; y ningún intento de hacerla más completa (PI 133) como en el asentamiento de preguntas de identidad personal para escenarios de "teletransportación" extravagantes e hipotéticos. " 166 Para mí, los puntos altos de todos los escritos en W son casi siempre las citas del maestro mismo y esto es de nuevo cierto aquí. Su cita (P101) de TLP muestra la comprensión temprana de W de EP, que más tarde denominó "fondo" o "lecho de roca". "El pensamiento está rodeado por un halo. Su esencia, la lógica, presenta un orden, de hecho el orden a priori del mundo: ese es el orden de las posibilidades, que debe ser común tanto al mundo como al pensamiento. Pero esta orden, parece, debe ser completamente simple. Es antes de toda experiencia, debe correr a través de toda la experiencia; no se puede afectar a la turbidez empírica ni a la incertidumbre. Debe ser del cristal más puro. Pero este cristal no aparece como una abstracción; pero como algo concreto, de hecho, como el más concreto, como era, lo más difícil que hay. (TLP # 5, 5563, PI 97). " Hay muchos puntos buenos en el capítulo de Kripke, pero algunas confusiones también. La discusión de la refutación de W de lenguaje privado en p165-6 parece un poco confusa bUt en la p 196-7 lo declara de nuevo, y esta noción no sólo es fundamental para W pero a toda comprensión de HOT. Stern tiene tal vez la mejor discusión de lo que he visto en su "Investigaciones filosóficas de Wittgenstein". Kripke, a pesar de todo el ruido que hizo, ahora se entiende generalmente que ha malinterpretado totalmente a W, simplemente repitiendo los clásicos errores metafísicos escépticos. Aquellos que quieran cavar en ' Kripkenstein ', o filosofía en general, deben leer "Truco de Magico de Kripke" por Read y Sharrock-una soberbia deconstrucción del escepticismo que, como la mayoría de los libros y documentos académicos son ahora libremente disponible en la red en libgen.IO, b-OK.org, philpapers.org, Academia.edu, arXiv.org y ResearchGate.net. Encuentro el capítulo sobre la conciencia muy bueno, especialmente p190 et. Seq. en el lenguaje privado, qualia, espectros invertidos y la enésima refutación de la idea de que W es un conductista. Vale la pena repetir su comentario final. "¿Qué tipo de progreso es este-el fascinante misterio ha sido removido-sin embargo, no hay profundidades se han caído en la consolación; nada ha sido explicado, descubierto o reconcebido. Cuán dócil y poco inspirador podría pensar. Pero tal vez, como sugiere Wittgenstein, las virtudes de la claridad, la desmitificación y la verdad deben ser encontradas suficientemente satisfactorias. " Horwich es de primera, y su trabajo vale la pena el esfuerzo. Uno espera que él (y todo el mundo) estudiarán Searle y algunos psicología moderna, así como Hutto, Read, Hutchinson, Stern, Moyal-Sharrock, paseo, hacker y Baker, etc. para lograr una visión amplia y moderna del comportamiento. La mayoría de sus papeles están en academia.edu o researchgate.net o philpapers.org or ssrn.org pero para PMS hacker 167 ver http://info.sjc.ox.ac.uk/scr/hacker/DownloadPapers.html. Por último, permítanme sugerir que con la perspectiva que he animado aquí, W está en el centro de la filosofía y la psicología contemporánea y no es oscura, difícil o irrelevante, pero centelleante, profunda y cristalina y que perderse es perderse uno de los mayores aventuras intelectuales posibles. 168 Reseña de las cosas del pensamiento (The Stuff of Thought) por Steven Pinker (2008) (revisión revisada 2019) Michael Starks Abstracto Empiezo con algunos comentarios famosos del filósofo (psicólogo) Ludwig Wittgenstein porque Pinker comparte con la mayoría de la gente (debido a la configuración predeterminada de nuestra psicología innata evolucionada) ciertos prejuicios sobre el funcionamiento de la mente, y porque Wittgenstein ofrece una visión única y profunda del funcionamiento del lenguaje, el pensamiento y la realidad (que él consideraba más o menos coextenso) que no se encontraba en ningún otro lugar. Ahí esta sólo referencia a Wittgenstein en este volumen, lo que es más desafortunado teniendo en cuenta que él era el analista más brillante y original del lenguaje. En el último capítulo, usando la famosa metáfora de la cueva de Platón, resume bellamente el libro con una visión general de cómo la mente (lenguaje, pensamiento, psicología intencional)-un producto de egoísmo ciego, moderado sólo ligeramente por el altruismo automatizado para cerca parientes que llevan copias de nuestros genes (Fitness inclusivo)--funciona automáticamente, pero trata de terminar en una nota optimista al darnos la esperanza de que, sin embargo, podemos emplear sus vastas capacidades para cooperar y hacer del mundo un lugar digno para vivir. Pinker es ciertamente consciente de, pero dice poco sobre el hecho de que mucho más sobre nuestra psicología se deja fuera de lo incluido. Entre las ventanas a la naturaleza humana que se dejan fuera o se presta una atención mínima son las matemáticas y la geometría, la música y los sonidos, las imágenes, los eventos y la causalidad, la ontología (clases de cosas o lo que sabemos), la mayor parte de la epistemología (cómo sabemos), disposiciones (creer, pensar, juzgar, pretender, etc.) y el resto de la psicología intencional de la acción, neurotransmisores y entheogens, Estados espirituales (por ejemplo, Satori e iluminación, estimulación y grabación del cerebro, daño cerebral y comportamiento déficits y trastornos, juegos y deportes, teoría de la decisión (incluyendo la teoría del juego y la economía conductual), comportamiento animal (muy poco lenguaje pero mil millones de años de genética compartida). Se han escrito muchos libros sobre cada una de estas áreas de la psicología intencional. Los datos de este libro son descripciones, no explicaciones que muestran por qué nuestro cerebro lo hace de esta manera o cómo se hace. ¿Cómo sabemos usar las oraciones de manera diversa (es decir, conocer todos sus significados)? Esta es la psicología evolutiva que opera a un nivel más básico: el nivel en el que Wittgenstein es más activo. Y hay escasa atención a el Contexto en el que se utilizan palabras = una arena que Wittgenstein fue pionera. 169 Sin embargo, Este es un trabajo clásico y con estas precauciones todavía vale la pena leer. Aquellos que deseen un marco completo hasta la fecha para el comportamiento humano de la moderna dos sistemas punto de vista puede consultar mi libro 'La Estructura Lógica de la Filosofía, la Psicología, la Mente y Lenguaje en Ludwig Wittgenstein y John Searle ' 2nd Ed (2019). Los interesados en más de mis escritos pueden ver 'Monos parlantes--filosofía, psicología, ciencia, religión y política en un planeta condenado--artículos y reseñas 2006-2019 3rd Ed (2019) y delirios utópicos suicidas en el 21St Century 4TH Ed (2019) "Si Dios nos miró a la mente, no sería capaz de ver en quién estábamos pensando." Wittgenstein PI P217 "¿Debe evitarse la palabra" infinito "en las matemáticas? Sí: donde parece conferir un significado sobre el cálculo; en lugar de conseguir uno de él. " Edición revisada de la RFM (1978) P141 "Una y otra vez el intento de usar el lenguaje para limitar el mundo y establecerlo en relieve, pero no se puede hacer. La auto-evidencia del mundo se manifiesta en el mismo hecho de que el lenguaje puede y sólo se refiere a él. Porque el lenguaje sólo deriva la forma en que significa, su significado, del mundo, no hay lenguaje concebible que no represente a este mundo. " Observaciones filosóficas de Wittgenstein S47 "Los límites de mi idioma significan los límites de mi mundo" TLP Empiezo con estos famosos comentarios del filósofo (psicólogo) Ludwig Wittgenstein (W) porque Pinker comparte con la mayoría de las personas (debido a la configuración predeterminada de nuestra psicología innata evolucionada) ciertos prejuicios sobre el funcionamiento de la mente y porque Wittgenstein ofrece una visión única y profunda del funcionamiento del lenguaje, el pensamiento y la realidad (que consideraba más o menos coextenso) que no se encontraba en ningún otro lugar. La última cita es la única referencia que Pinker hace a Wittgenstein en este volumen, que es muy desafortunado teniendo en cuenta que él era el más brillante y original de los analistas de lenguaje. Otro famoso dictum de Wittgensteinian es "nada está oculto." Si uno se pone en su trabajo lo suficiente, creo que deja muy claro lo que esto significa: que nuestra Psicología está delante de nosotros todo el tiempo si sólo abrimos los ojos para verlo y que ninguna cantidad de trabajo científico va a hacerlo más claro (de hecho, sólo se vuelve más y más oscura). Esto no es antiracional o anticientífico, pero sólo dice lo que ve como los hechos - un juego de fútbol está fuera en el campo-no en nuestra cabezay entendemos perfectamente bien las motivaciones, ansiedades, tensiones y decepciones de los jugadores y qué esfuerzo es necesario para jugar y cómo se mueve la pelota cuando pateó. Se han realizado inmensos avances en fisiología deportiva, Anatomía, bioenergética, física matemática y química. Libros enteros llenos de 170 ecuaciones se han escrito sobre cómo las bolas se mueven a través del aire y los músculos aplican fuerza para mover los huesos; sobre cómo los movimientos musculares se originan en parte de la corteza, se reflejan en el cerebro de otros; montañas de la literatura sobre la motivación, la personalidad, la función cerebral y el modelado. ¿Esto nos ha dado más información sobre un partido de fútbol o ha cambiado nuestra estrategia o nuestra Experiencia de jugar o ver? La intencionalidad (racionalidad) se ha desarrollado gradualmente a partir de cualquier herramienta (genes) que los animales tuvieron que trabajar y por lo tanto está llena de paradojas e ilusiones. De la misma manera que vemos espejisimos en el desierto o leemos palabras en oraciones que no están allí, y vemos burbujas animadas en una pantalla "causando" que otros se muevan y "ayudan" o "obstaculizan", miramos para pensar y creer en la cabeza y confundir nuestros axiomas psicológicos innatos con hechos empíricos (por ejemplo, con respecto a las matemáticas y la geometría como cosas que "descubrimos" en el mundo, en lugar de inventar). Para que el concepto y la palabra "realidad" se apliquen a los resultados obtenidos del uso de ecuaciones diferenciales, escáneres de RMN y colisionadores de partículas en mayor grado que o en lugar de manzanas, rocas y tormentas eléctricas, sería necesario para estos recientes descubrimientos que han tenido el mismo papel en la selección natural durante cientos de millones de años. Es sólo la ventaja de supervivencia sobre eones que seleccionó los genes que permiten a nuestros antepasados distantes (invertebrados) para comenzar a reaccionar de manera útil a las vistas y los sonidos del mundo y tan lentamente para producir cerebros que podrían formar conceptos (pensamientos) que eventualmente fueron verbalizados. La ciencia y la cultura no pueden reemplazar o tomar preferencia sobre nuestra antigua psicología intencional, sino que simplemente se extiende o complementa ligeramente. Pero cuando filosofar (o haciendo lingüísticas!) nos engañamos fácilmente a medida que falta el contexto y nuestra psicología disecciona automáticamente cada situación por las causas y el nivel definitivo o más bajo de explicación y sustituimos eso por los niveles brutos más altos porque no hay nada en nuestras reglas de lenguaje para evitarlo. Siempre es tan natural decir que no pensamos: nuestro cerebro lo hace y las tablas no son sólidas porque la física nos dice que están hechas de moléculas. Pero W nos recordó que nuestros conceptos, y las palabras para, pensar, creer y otras disposiciones son acciones públicas, no procesos en el cerebro, y en qué sentido son moléculas sólidas? Por lo tanto, la cita anterior, que se repite, ya que la veo como una de las ideas más fundamentales que tenemos que aclarar antes de que podamos hacer cualquier progreso en el estudio de la conducta. "Una y otra vez el intento de usar el lenguaje para limitar el mundo y estableclo en relieve, pero no se puede hacer. La autoevidencia del mundo se manifiesta en el mismo hecho de que el lenguaje puede y sólo se refiere a él. Porque el lenguaje sólo deriva la forma en que significa, su significado, del mundo, no hay lenguaje concebible que no represente a este mundo. " Gran parte dela escritura de Wittgenstein's es un ejemplo de la conocimiento del 171 sentido comun que es esencial para el éxito de todo comportamiento animal y en general no sólo la ciencia del comportamiento, pero incluso la IA, que no puede tener éxito sin ella, ha sido incapaz de comprenderlo y aplicarlo. Incluso uno de los padres de la IA, Marvin Minsky dijo (en un 2003 de un Univ. De Boston discourso) que "IA ha estado muerta de cerebro desde los años 70" y carecía de razonamiento de sentido común. Pero su reciente libro "la máquina de la emoción" todavía no muestra ninguna conciencia del trabajo que W hizo hace 75 años, y esto significa que no hay conciencia del contexto, intencional, punto de vista sin el cual no se puede esperar para entender cómo funciona la mente (idioma). Cuando se habla de comportamiento (es decir, pensamiento o lenguaje o acción) es un error casi universal considerar el significado de una palabra o frase que se le atribuye, ignorando las sutilezas infinitas del contexto, y así nos desviamos. Por supuesto, no podemos incluir todo sobre el contexto, ya que eso dificultaría la discusión, incluso imposible, pero hay una gran diferencia entre el significado de algo que puede ser dado completamente por una entrada de diccionario y un significado como taquigrafía para una familia de usos complejos. Incluso el libro clásico de Klein ' tiempo en el lenguaje ' (no citado por Pinker) considera ' tiempo ' como una familia de usos vagamente conectados, aunque por supuesto él también no tiene conciencia de W, Searle o intencionalidad. El punto de mencionar esto es que Pinker comparte los sesgos reduccionistas de la mayoría de los científicos modernos y que esto colorea su acercamiento al comportamiento de maneras que no serán evidentes para la mayoría de los lectores. Tan fascinante como sus datos son y tan magistral como su escritura es, nos lleva sutilmente a lo que creo que es una imagen equivocada de nuestra Psicología-una visión que se debe a los sesgos innatos de nuestra psicología evolucionada y por lo tanto es un fracaso universal. Pinker es el Richard Dawkins de la psicología, uno de los principales popularizadores de la ciencia en los tiempos modernos. Posiblemente sólo la tarde y más sin lamentarse (era un auto-sirviendo a un egomaníaco que engañaba a millones con su razonamiento especioso de nosotros, el Neomarxismo y el pizeísmo en blanco) Stephan Gould vendió más volúmenes de pop-SCI. Fue la magistral refutación de Pinker de la ilusión universal de que la naturaleza humana se genera culturalmente (uno de los muchos delirios de Gould) que hizo su libro anterior ' La Pizarra en Blanco ' un clásico y una opción superior para los libros más importantes del siglo 21. Por cierto, hay muchas configuraciones de Gould, incluyendo algunas de Pinker y Dawkins ("él ha hecho inclinación en los molinos de viento en su propia forma de arte personal"-como lo recuerdo de una revisión de Dawkins de un tomo de Gould de la revista ' Evolution ' hace una década o tan), pero creo que lo mejor es el de Tooby y Cosmides en una carta al NY Times (buscar en su página o el Times). Todas estas obras están íntimamente conectadas por el tema del comportamiento animal, la psicología evolutiva, y por supuesto ' las cosas del pensamiento '. Después de la Convención, Pinker discute la famosa, pero mal defectuoso, 172 experimento de pensamiento de la tierra gemela (extraño pensamiento experimentos. en filosofía fueron esencialmente inventados por Wittgenstein), que pretende demostrar que el significado no está en la cabeza, pero era W en los años 30-es decir, 40 año antes-que demostró con decisión que todos los las disposiciones o inclinaciones (como él las llamaba, aunque los filósofos, que carecen de conocimiento de su trabajo comúnmente los llaman por el nombre incorrecto de las actitudes proposicionales) incluyendo el significado, la intención, el pensamiento, la creencia, el juzgar etc. funcionan como descripciones de nuestras acciones y no como términos para los fenómenos mentales. No pueden estar en la cabeza por la misma razón que un partido de fútbol no puede estar en la cabeza. Más tarde en la vida, Putnam comenzó a tomar en serio a Wittgenstein y cambió su melodía en consecuencia. No hace casi ninguna referencia a la literatura grande y fascinante sobre el automatismos de comportamiento (es decir, la mayor parte de nuestro comportamiento! -ver por ejemplo, "experimentos con personas" (2004) o la ' psicología social y el inconsciente ' de Bargh (2007) para la obra más antigua, y "Dos teorías del proceso de la mente social" de Sherman et al (2014) y el literatura vasta y en rápida expansión sobre la cognición implícita), lo que demuestra que cuanto más mires, más claro se vuelve que las acciones que nosotros consideremos como resultados de nuestra elección consciente no lo son. La gente muestra fotos o leer historias de ancianos tienden a salir del edificio más lento que cuando se les da la gente joven, etc. etc. El conocido efecto placebo es una variante en la que la información se introduce conscientemente - e. g., en un estudio 2008 85 por ciento de los voluntarios que pensaron que estaban recibiendo una pastilla de azúcar $2,50 dijo que sentían menos dolor después de tomarlo, en comparación con un grupo de control de 61 por ciento. Estos efectos pueden ser inducidos subliminalmente si la información del precio es ingresarse a través de imágenes, texto o sonido. Presumiblemente lo mismo sucede con la mayoría de nuestras elecciones. Esto nos lleva a una de mis principales quejas sobre este libro: es la obsesión monomaniaca con el "significado" de las palabras en lugar de su uso-una distinción hecha famosa por W en sus conferencias y unos 20 libros a partir de la década de 1930. Como la insistencia de W de que no explicamos el comportamiento (o el resto de la naturaleza) pero sólo lo describen, esto puede parecer una sutileza inútil, pero, como de costumbre, he encontrado como reflexioné sobre estos asuntos a lo largo de los años que W estaba justo en la marca. Dijo que una fórmula que funcionará la mayor parte del tiempo es que la significado de una palabra (mucho mejor decir una frase) es su uso en el lenguaje - y esto significa que su uso público en un contexto específico para comunicar información de una persona a otra (y a veces a otro mamífero superior - los perros comparten una porción importante de nuestra psicología intencional). Menciono esto en parte porque en un libro anterior que Pinker acusó W de negar que los animales tienen conciencia (una visión extraordinaria que en realidad es defendida por algunos) porque señaló que un perro no puede pensar "tal vez lloverá mañana", pero el punto de W fue el poco excepcional que hay muchos pensamientos que no podemos tener sin lenguaje y que no tenemos ninguna prueba para interpretar el comportamiento de un perro como mostrando que esperaba algo mañana. Incluso si 173 usó un paraguas e invariablemente lo consiguió fuera del armario el día antes de una lluvia, no hay manera de conectar esto a su estado mental, lo mismo para un mudo sordo que no podía leer o escribir o utilizar el lenguaje de señas. Esto se conecta a sus famosas manifestaciones de la imposibilidad de un idioma privado y al hecho de que las disposiciones no están en la cabeza. W demostró cómo la ausencia de cualquier prueba pública significa que incluso el perro y el mudo no pueden saber lo que están pensando, ni podemos, porque la disposicións son actos públicos y el acto es el criterio de lo que pensamos, incluso para nosotros mismos. Este es el punto de la cita de arriba - ni Dios ni los neurofisiólogos pueden ver pensamientos, creencias, imágenes, esperanzas en nuestro cerebro, porque estos son términos para los actos y ni los epifenómenos vagos y fugaces que experimentamos, ni los correlatos detectables por estudios cerebrales, función en nuestra vida de la misma manera que el uso contextual de las oraciones que describen estos actos. Y, en cuanto a la conciencia animal, W observó que la psicología intencional se pone de pie incluso en una mosca, un punto maravillosamente y cada vez más apoyado por la genética moderna, que muestra que muchos genes y procesos fundamentales para el comportamiento de primates tuvieron su inicio al menos tan pronto como los nematodos (es decir, C. elegans) hace unos miles de millones de años. La psicología intencional o la intencionalidad (muy aproximadamente nuestra personalidad o racionalidad o pensamiento de orden superior (HOT) es un concepto filosófico muy antiguo que (desconocido para la mayoría) recibió su formulación moderna de Wittgenstein, quien, en las 20.000 páginas de su nachlass, ahora mayormente traducido y publicado en unos 20 libros y varios CDROM, sentó las bases para el estudio moderno del comportamiento humano. Tristemente, fue en su mayoría un recluso que no publicó durante los últimos 30 años de su vida, nunca terminó de escribir nada de su trabajo posterior y escribió sus comentarios brillantes y altamente originales sobre el comportamiento en un estilo de diversamente denominado epigrammático, telegráfico, oracular, socrático, oscuro etc. y todo publicado póstumamente durante un período de más de 50 años (las famosas Investigaciones filosóficas (PI) en 1953 y el más reciente-pero no el último! - el Gran Mecanografiado en 2005) y por lo tanto, aunque recientemente fue votado como uno de los 5 mejores filósofos de todos los tiempos, y las investigaciones filosóficas el libro de filosofía más importante del siglo 20, que es ignorado o mal entendido por casi todo el mundo. La sensación que consigo a menudo es que nuestra Psicología es un arrecife de coral con la mayoría de las personas que bucean en la superficie admirando los baches, mientras que Wittgenstein está a 20 metros por debajo del sondeo de las grietas con el equipo de buceo y la linterna. Los ejecutores literarios de Wittgenstein eran académicos desaliñado y sus libros se emitieron principalmente de Blackwell con títulos académicos de hospedamos y no hay explicación alguna de que puedan ser vistos como una base importante para el estudio moderno de la psicología evolutiva, la personalidad, racionalidad, lenguaje, conciencia, política, teología, literatura, Antropología, sociología, derecho, etc., – de hecho todo lo que decimos, pensamos y hacemos ya que, como él demostró, todo depende de los axiomas innatos de nuestra psicología evolucionada que compartimos 174 con un gran medida con perros, y hasta cierto punto incluso con moscas y C. elegans. Si sus obras han sido presentadas con portadas llamativas por las prensas populares con títulos como el trabajo de la mente, el instinto del lenguaje, y las cosas del pensamiento, gran parte del paisaje intelectual del siglo 20 podría haber sido diferente. Tal como es, a pesar de que es el tema principal de al menos 200 libros y 10.000 artículos y discutidos en innumerables miles más (incluyendo Pinker cómo la mente funciona), basado en los cientos de artículos y docenas de libros que he leído en los últimos años , Yo diría que hay menos de una docena de personas que realmente entienden la importancia de su trabajo, como lo presento en este y mis otros comentarios. Sin embargo, las publicaciones recientes de Coliva, DMS y otros, y tal vez la mía, deberían cambiar esto. Aquellos que deseen una cuenta completa hasta la fecha de Wittgenstein, Searle y su análisis de comportamiento de la vista moderna de dos sistemas pueden consultar mi artículo la estructura lógica de la filosofía, la psicología, la mente y el lenguaje como se reveló en Wittgenstein y Searle 2Nd Ed (2019). Un resultado de todo esto (lo que un filósofo ha llamado "la amnesia colectiva con respecto a Wittgenstein") es que los estudiantes de la lengua incluyendo Pinker toman las nociones de Grice como la implicación (que parece sólo una palabra de lujo para implicar) y, más recientemente, Teoría de la relevancia, como un marco para "la relación entre palabras y significado" (por supuesto W se entregaría en su tumba en esta frase, ya que ¿cómo pueden ser separables de su uso si uno sigue su significado es la fórmula de uso?), pero me parecen débiles sustitutos de la intencionalidad según lo descrito por W y revisado y ampliado por Searle y otros. En cualquier caso, Grice es el académico soporífico normal, Sperber (un líder en la teoría de la relevancia) tolerable, Pinker atractiva y a menudo elegante e incluso conmovedor, Searle (ver ESP. ' racionalidad en acción ') es clara, rigurosa, y bastante original (aunque debido, creo yo, un deuda muy grande con W,) pero demasiado académico para las listas de major vendido, mientras que Wittgenstein, una vez que comprenda que es un maestro natural psicólogo que describe cómo funciona la mente, es muy exigente, pero brillantemente original y a menudo impresionante. Pinker escribe una prosa magistral mientras que Wittgenstein escribe telegramas, aunque a menudo se mueven y son poéticos y en pocas ocasiones, escribió hermosos ensayos. Pinker puede ser extraído para un poco de oro, un montón de hierro y un poco de escoria, mientras que W es en su mayoría de oro, un poco de hierro y apenas una mota de escoria. Pinker está principalmente resumiendo el trabajo de otros (aunque en estilo impecable) mientras que W es tan original y tan bizarro que está muy por encima de la cabeza de la mayoría de la gente. Sugiero leer Pinker, Searle y Wittgenstein alternativamente o simultáneamente con un toque de Sperber, Grice y algunos cientos de otros de vez en cuando. W dijo que el problema no es encontrar la respuesta, sino reconocer lo que siempre está ante nosotros como la respuesta. Es decir, nuestro lenguaje es (en general) nuestro pensamiento, que se trata de eventos reales o potenciales (incluyendo acciones de agentes como ladridos, hablar y escribir), y ese significado, contra Pinker 175 y un elenco de miles, es uso, y no hay nada oculto (es decir, el lenguaje es Principalmentepensamiento). La ignorancia en muchos campos es tan completa que incluso un por lo demás maravilloso reciente libro de 358 páginas de Wiese sobre un tema virtualmente creado por Wittgenstein (Numeros, el Lenguaje y la Mente Humana que veo es citado por Pinker) no hay una sola referencia a él! W enfatiza principalmente los diferentes usos de las "mismas" palabras "(es decir, un divisor) que originalmente querían usar la cita" ¡ te enseñaré las diferencias! "como el lema de su libro Investigaciones Filosóficas. Es decir, describiendo los diferentes usos de las oraciones (los juegos de idiomas), y modificando los juegos en experimentos de pensamiento, nos recordamos los diferentes roles que juegan estos juegos en la vida y vemos los límites de nuestra psicología. Pero Pinker, de nuevo siguiendo los seductores valores predeterminados de nuestros módulos evolucionados y los ejemplos atroces de miles de otros, es un cargador que a menudo difumina estas diferencias. Por ej., habla repetidamente de "realidad" como si fuera una sola cosa (en lugar de toda una familia de usos). También habla de la realidad como algo separado de nuestra experiencia (es decir, la clásica confusión idealista/realista). Pero, ¿qué prueba hay para la realidad? Él se desliza (como todos nosotros) tan fácilmente en la sustitución reduccionista de los niveles más bajos para los más altos por lo que todos estamos inclinados a descartar el pensamiento que podemos ver (es decir, acciones) para los procesos en el cerebro, que nuestro lenguaje (pensamiento) no puede describir posiblemente, ya que evolucionó mucho antes de que alguien tuviera alguna idea de las funciones cerebrales. Si Pinker imagina que eres realmente no está leyendo esta página (por ejemplo, la retina se golpea con fotones que rebotan en las moléculas de tinta, etc.) entonces respetuosamente sugiero que necesita reflexionar más sobre el tema del lenguaje, el pensamiento y la realidad y no conozco mejor antídoto para este Meme tóxico que la inmersión en Wittgenstein. Reflexionar sobre Wittgenstein trae a la mente un comentario atribuido al profesor de filosofía de Cambridge, C.D. Broad (que no entendía ni le gustaba), que corrió algo como ' no ofrecer la cátedra de filosofía a Wittgenstein sería como no ofrecer la silla de la física a Einstein! " Pienso en Wittgenstein como el Einstein de la psicología intuitiva. Aunque nació diez años más tarde, también estaba tramando ideas sobre la naturaleza de la realidad casi al mismo tiempo y en la misma parte del mundo y como Einstein casi muere en WW1. Ahora Supongamos que Einstein era un suicida homosexual recluso con una personalidad difícil que publicó una sola versión temprana de sus ideas que se confundieron y a menudo se equivocaron, pero se volvieron mundialmente famosas; cambiado por completo sus ideas, pero durante los próximos 30 años no publicó nada más, y el conocimiento de su nueva obra en forma mayormente confusa difundiera lentamente de conferencias ocasionales y notas de los estudiantes; que murió en 1951 dejando atrás más de 20.000 páginas de garabatos en su mayoría escritos a mano en alemán, compuesto de oraciones o párrafos breves con, a menudo, sin relación clara con las oraciones antes o después; que estos fueron 176 cortados y pegados de otros cuadernos escritos años antes con notas en los márgenes, aubrayados y palabras tachadas para que muchas oraciones tienen múltiples variantes; que sus ejecutivos literarios cortan esta masa indigerible en pedazos, dejando fuera lo que deseaban y luchando con la monstruosa tarea de captar el significado correcto de las oraciones que transmiten opiniones totalmente novedosas sobre cómo funciona el universo y que luego publicó este material con lentitud agonizante (no terminado después de medio siglo) con prefacios que no contenían ninguna explicación real de lo que se trataba; que se hizo tan notorio como famoso debido a muchas afirmaciones de que toda la física anterior era un error e incluso tonterías y que virtualmente nadie entendía su trabajo, a pesar de cientos de libros y decenas de miles de artículos que lo discutían; que muchos físicos sabían sólo sus primeros trabajos en los que había hecho una suma definitiva de la física newtoniana declaró en forma extremadamente abstracta y condensada que era imposible decidir lo que se decía; que fue virtualmente olvidado y que la mayoría de los libros y artículos sobre la naturaleza del mundo y los diversos temas de la física moderna sólo habían pasado y generalmente las referencias erróneas a él y que muchos lo omitieron por completo; que hasta el día de hoy, medio siglo después de su muerte, sólo había un puñado de personas que realmente captó las consecuencias monumentales de lo que había hecho. Esto, supongo, es precisamente la situación con Wittgenstein. Parece tremendamente obvio que nuestra psicología evolucionada ha sido seleccionada para que coincida con el mundo hasta la máxima extensión compatible con nuestros recursos genéticos y energéticos y eso es todo lo que podemos decir sobre la realidad, y todos nosotros entender esto (lo vivimos) pero cuando nos detenemos a pensarlo, los valores predeterminados de nuestra psicología universal toman el control y comenzamos a usar las palabras (conceptos) de "realidad", "aspectos", "tiempo", "espacio", "posible", etc. fuera de los contextos intencionales en los que Evolucionado. La siguiente joya proviene de los biólogos (lo tomo del magnífico libro de Shettleworth cognición, evolución y comportamiento). "El papel de la psicología entonces es describir las características innatas de las mentes de los diferentes organismos que han evolucionado para coincidir con ciertos aspectos de ese universo físico externo, y la forma en que el universo físico interactúa con la mente para producir el mundo fenomenal. " O'Keefe y Nadel "el hipocampo como un mapa cognitivo" Piense en ello de esta manera: puede buscar una palabra en el Diccionario, pero no se puede buscar un uso allí, a menos que haya un video que mostró antes y después del evento y todos los hechos relevantes sobre él. El diccionario es como una morgue llena de cadáveres pero queremos estudiar fisiología. Aquí yace "Rose" y aquí "Run" y aquí "in" y aquí "es" y lo que falta es vida. Añadir una foto y es un poco mejor: Añadir un vídeo y mucho mejor: Añadir un largo color 3D contrata vídeo con el sonido y el olfato y'está llegando. Parte de la descripción de Wittgenstein de nuestra psicología pública incluyó muchos ejemplos detallados de cómo las sensaciones y las imágenes en mi mente no llevan 177 ningún peso epistémica incluso para mí. ¿Cómo sé que estoy comiendo una manzana? ¿Mi gusto y mi visión podrían estar equivocados y cómo decidir? Pero si hablo escribirlo y decir "que es una manzana de aspecto sabroso", etc. Tengo una prueba objetiva. El bien y el mal tienen un punto de apoyo aquí. W iba a utilizar una cita de Goethe como el lema de PI-"en el principio era la escritura." Es decir, evolutivamente eran percepciones y acciones y luego recuerdos de ellos y luego pensamientos sobre ellos y luego palabras expresando los pensamientos. Por lo tanto, el evento es lo que Australopithecus pensó sobre, y selección natural para poder hacer explosiones acústicas, que los sustituyeron, era lo suficientemente fuerte como para modificar nuestro aparato vocal y el circuito de control adecuado a un ritmo fantástico, por lo que a principios de Neanderthal estaban hablando una raya azul y no han cerrado la mente o la boca durante más de unos pocos minutos desde entonces. W entendió, como pocos tienen, la primacía de las acciones y la irrelevancia de nuestros pensamientos, sentimientos, etc. como los fundamentos de la comunicación, por lo que a menudo se le llama un conductista (es decir, Dennett, Hofstadter, B.F. Skinner al estilo de la negación de la realidad de nuestro vida, mente, conciencia, etc.) pero esto es manifiestamente absurdo. Me recuerda a la famosa descripción Por Platón de las sombras en la pared de la cueva vs girar alrededor para ver a la gente en realidad usando el lenguaje-una analogía que nunca pensé en relación con W y que me sorprendió ver unas horas más tarde en el último capítulo de Pinker. En cualquier caso, si se considera cuidadosamente cualquier caso de uso del lenguaje, vemos que gran parte de nuestra psicología intencional es llamada a jugar. Uno puede ver la ignorancia de Wittgenstein en los artículos de EEL2 (la enciclopedia de Elsevier de la lengua y la lingüística-2a ed. (2005) 12, 353p-sí eso es 12000 PAGES en 14 vols y un mero $6000,) que es de lejos el más grande, y uno espera la más autorizada, referencia en estudios de idiomas. Curiosamente, Pinker no tiene una sola referencia a ella, pero se puede encontrar, junto con casi todo Pinker, Searle, Wittgenstein y miles de otros libres en la red. Para obtener una comprensión de las necesidades básicas de la IA, podría, por ejemplo, encontrar mucho más interesante leer el RFM de W que la "máquina de la emoción" de Minsky. Pinker ha referido a la famosa lista de Brown de cientos de universales de comportamiento humano, pero estos son casi todos los comportamientos brutos de nivel más alto, tales como la posesión de la religión, altruismos recíprocos, etc. Y grande omite cientos de otros universales que subyacen a estos. Wittgenstein fue el primero, y en algunos casos quizás el único hasta la fecha, para señalar muchos de los más fundamentales. Sin embargo, él no le dijo lo que estaba haciendo y nadie más tiene ya sea por lo que tendrá que rompecabezas por sí mismo. La mayoría de las personas leen primero (y a menudo nada más) sus investigaciones filosóficas, pero prefiero los ejemplos más estrictamente matemáticos en sus comentarios sobre los fundamentos de las matemáticas o sus conferencias 178 sobre los fundamentos de las matemáticas. Si lees con la comprensión de que él está describiendo los axiomas universales de nuestra Psicología evolutiva que, subyacen a todo nuestro razonamiento, entonces su trabajo tiene un sentido perfecto y es impresionante en su ingenio. Pinker ilustra cómo funciona la mente con el ejemplo de salsa barbacoa. Por supuesto, hay un número ilimitado de otros que ilustran nuestra probabilidad subjetiva (a menudo llamado razonamiento bayesiano, aunque él no menciona esto). Mis favoritos son Doomsday (véase, por ejemplo, el libro o página web de Bostrum), la bella durmiente y el problema de Newcomb. A diferencia de la barbacoa, que tiene una solución clara, muchos otros tienen (dependiendo de su punto de vista) uno, ninguno o muchos. Podemos considerar estos como interesantes, ya que muestran lagunas en o límites a nuestra racionalidad (un tema importante en Wittgenstein) o (lo que hemos sabido al menos desde el trabajo de Finetti en los años 20) que toda probabilidad es subjetiva, o como la famosa paradoja mentirosa o Godel teoremas (ver mi reseñas de Hofstadter ' I am a Strange Loop Y Yanofsky ' más allá de los límites del pensamiento '), como demostraciones triviales de los límites de nuestra mente de primates, aunque Pinker no se expande sobre este tema ni da más que unos pocos consejos sobre la vasta literatura sobre la teoría de la decisión, la teoría del juego, la economía conductual, el Bayesianismo, etc. EEL2 tiene un artículo corto pasable en W que evita hacer demasiados errores evidentes, pero se pierde totalmente casi todo de importancia, que, si realmente se entiende, haría el artículo con mucho el más largo en el libro. Casi todo el asunto se desperdicia en el Tractatus, que todo el mundo sabe que rechazó totalmente más tarde y que es extremadamente confuso y confuso también. Casi nada en su filosofía posterior y ni una palabra sobre los dos CDROM que se pueden buscar que ahora son el punto de partida para todos los eruditos de W (y cualquier persona interesada en el comportamiento humano) que ahora se están difundiendo ampliamente libremente a través de la red. Tampoco hay nada aquí ni en los artículos sobre Chomsky, ideas innatas, evolución de la sintaxis, evolución de la semántica, evolución de la pragmática (prácticamente cada una de sus 20.000 páginas tiene que ver con ideas novedosas y ejemplos sobre estos dos), teoría de esquemas, etc., ni sobre cómo anticipó a Chomsky en el estudio de la "gramática profunda", describió el problema de la subdeterminación o la explosión combinatoria, ni una palabra acerca de su descubrimiento (repetidamente y en detalle - e. g., RPP Vol. 2 P20) unos 20 años antes de Wason de las razones de "fallas" en "si p entonces q" tipos de construcciones ahora analizadas por las pruebas de selección Wason (una de las herramientas estándar de investigación EP) , ni sobre cómo se puede ver su obra anticipando muchas ideas en Psicología evolutiva, sobre su fundación del estudio moderno de la intencionalidad, de las disposiciones como acciones, de la epifenomenalidad de nuestra vida mental y de la unidad del lenguaje, las matemáticas, la geometría, música, arte y juegos, ni siquiera una explicación de lo que quiso decir con los juegos de idiomas y la gramática, dos de sus términos más utilizados. W hizo el cambio de tratar de entender la mente como una estructura lógica, general de dominio a un dominio idiosincrásico psicológico específico a finales de los años 20, pero Kahneman consiguió 179 el Nobel en 2002, por numerosas razones, no la menor de las cuales es que hicieron laboratorio WOR k y análisis estadístico (aunque W era un excelente experimentalista y bastante bueno en matemáticas). Claro, uno no puede criticar el EEL2 demasiado, ya que simplemente sigue las omisiones similares y la falta de comprensión a través de las Ciencias del comportamiento. Y, no voy a poner esto en la forma en que uno podría quejarse de la ausencia de información sobre los antiguos cohetes de guerra chinos en un libro sobre motores de cohetes, sino porque su trabajo es todavía una mina virtualmente sin explotar de diamantes de la ciencia conductual, y, por mi dinero, algunos de los más emocionantes y la prosa de la abertura del ojo que he leído nunca. Casi todo lo que ha escrito podría ser utilizado como un manual de texto o de laboratorio complementario en cualquier clase de filosofía o psicología y en gran parte de la ley, matemáticas, literatura, economía conductual, historia, política, Antropología, sociología y por supuesto la lingüística. Lo que nos lleva de vuelta a Pinker. En el último capítulo, usando la famosa metáfora de la cueva de Platón, resume bellamente el libro con una visión general de cómo la mente (lenguaje, pensamiento, psicología intencional)-un producto de egoísmo ciego, moderado sólo ligeramente por el altruismo automatizado para cerca parientes que llevan copias de nuestros genes (Fitness inclusivo)--funciona automáticamente, pero trata de terminar en una nota optimista al darnos la esperanza de que, sin embargo, podemos emplear sus vastas capacidades para cooperar y hacer del mundo un lugar digno para vivir. Dudo mucho de esto (ver mi reseña de sus ' los mejores ángeles de nuestra naturaleza). Pinker es sin duda consciente de, pero dice poco sobre el hecho de que mucho más sobre nuestra psicología se deja fuera de lo incluido. Entre las ventanas a la naturaleza humana que se dejan fuera o se da la mínima atención son las matemáticas y la geometría, la música y los sonidos, las imágenes, los eventos y la causalidad, la ontología (clases de cosas), las disposiciones (creer, pensar, juzgar, la intención, etc.) y el resto de Psicología intencional de la acción, neurotransmisores y entheogens, Estados espirituales (por ejemplo, Satori e iluminación, estimulación y grabación del cerebro, daño cerebral y déficits y trastornos del comportamiento, juegos y deportes, teoría de la decisión (incluyendo el juego teoría y la economía conductual), comportamiento animal (muy poco lenguaje pero mil millones de años de genética compartida). Se han escrito muchos libros sobre cada una de estas áreas de la psicología intencional. Los datos de este libro son descripciones, no explicaciones que muestran por qué nuestro cerebro lo hace de esta manera o cómo se hace. ¿Cómo sabemos usar las oraciones de varias maneras (es decir, conocer todos sus significados)? Esta es la psicología evolutiva que opera a un nivel más básico: el nivel en el que Wittgenstein es más activo. Y hay escasa atención al contexto que es fundamental para entender el lenguaje y en el que Wittgenstein fue el principal pionero. Entre los innumerables libros que no se mencionan aquí se encuentra el excelente tomo de Guerino Mazzola investigando la similitud de las matemáticas y la música ' El Topos de la Música ', el increíble trabajo de Shulgin sonando la mente con los 180 psicoquímicos ' Phikal ' y ' Tikal '. Muchos Otros tratar de representar funciones mentales con medios geométricos o matemáticos como la revisión de creencias de Rott ', Gardenfors varios libros, y por supuesto los esfuerzos masivos que van En en la lógica (por ejemplo, el 20 o tan Vol manual de la lógica filosófica), así como muchos otros editados o escritos por el asombroso Dov Gabbay (por ejemplo, ' lógica temporal '). Respecto a lenguaje espacial-de los numerosos volúmenes sobre la psicología, el lenguaje o la filosofía del espacio, el reciente ' manual de lógica espacial ' (especialmente divertido es CHAP 11 en el espacio-tiempo y el último Cap. por Varzi) se destaca. El punto es que estas obras lógicas, geométricas y matemáticas son extensiones de nuestra psicología axiomática innata, y por lo que muestran en sus ecuaciones y gráficos algo sobre la ' forma ' o ' forma ' o ' función ' de nuestros pensamientos (módulos, plantillas, motores de inferencia), y así también la forma de los animales e incluso quizás de las computadoras (aunque uno tiene que pensar en qué prueba sería relevante aquí!). Y por supuesto. todas las obras de Wittgenstein, manteniendo En mente que a veces está hablando de los niveles más básicos de pensamiento y percepción prelingüísticos o incluso premamífero. Claro, muchos libros sobre IA, la navegación robótica y el procesamiento de imágenes son relevantes ya que deben imitar nuestra psicología. El reconocimiento facial es una de nuestras habilidades más sorprendentes (aunque incluso los crustáceos pueden hacerlo) y el mejor trabajo reciente que conozco es ' manual de reconocimiento facial '. De los numerosos libros sobre el espacio/tiempo uno puede comenzar con el ' idioma y tiempo ' de Klein o la ' filosofía del tiempo ' de McLure. La ' lengua y el tiempo ' de Smith, la ' cómo las cosas persisten ' de Hawley y el ' cuatro dimensionalismo ' de Sider, ' semántica, tensa y tiempo ' de Ludlow, ' tiempo y espacio ' de Dainton. y ' unidad de conciencia ', Diek ' la ontología de tiempo espacial ' y Sattig ' el idioma y Realidad del tiempo ". Pero como uno esperaría, y como se detalla por Rupert Read, los juegos de idiomas aquí están todos enredado y la mayoría De las discusiones del tiempo son irremediablemente incoherentes. Y también un libro bueno pero ahora anticuado que cubre mucha relevancia con los artículos de Searle y otros es ' lógica, pensamiento y acción ' de Vanderveken. 181 Reseña de "¿Estamos Cableados?(Are We Hardwired?) por Clark & Grunstein Oxford (2000) Michael Starks Abstracto Esta es una excelente revisión de las interacciones gen/ambiente en el comportamiento y, a pesar de ser un poco anticuado, es una lectura fácil y valiosa. Empiezan con estudios gemelos que muestran el impacto abrumador de la genética en el comportamiento. Señalan los estudios cada vez más conocidos de Judith Harris, que amplían y resumen los hechos de que el ambiente doméstico compartido casi no tiene efecto sobre el comportamiento y que los niños adoptados crecen para ser tan diferentes de sus hermanastros y hermanas como las personas elegidas al azar. Un punto básico que ellos (y casi todos los que discuten sobre la genética conductual) no se dan cuenta es que los cientos (miles dependiendo de su punto de vista) de los universales de comportamiento humano, incluyendo todos los fundamentos de nuestras personalidades, son 100% determinado por nuestros genes, con no hay variación en las normales. Todo el mundo ve un árbol como un árbol y no una piedra, busca y come comida, se enfada y celosa, etc. Por lo tanto, lo que están hablando sobre todo aquí es cuánto ambiente (cultura) puede afectar al grado en que se muestran varios rasgos, en lugar de su apariencia. Por último, discuten la eugenesia en la costumbre políticamente correcta, al no notar que nosotros y todos los organismos somos los productos de la eugenesia de la naturaleza y que los intentos de derrotar la selección natural con la medicina, la agricultura y la civilización en su conjunto, son desastroso para cualquier sociedad que persiste en hacer esto. Tanto como el 50% de todas las concepciones, o unos 100 millones/año, terminan en abortos espontáneos tempranos, casi todos sin que la madre sea consciente. Este sacrificio natural de genes defectuosos impulsa la evolución, nos mantiene relativamente genéticamente sólidas y hace posible la sociedad. La disgenesia es suficiente para destruir la civilización pero sobrepoblación se do primero. Aquellos que deseen un marco completo hasta la fecha para el comportamiento humano de la moderna dos sistemas punto de vista puede consultar mi libro 'La Estructura Lógica de la Filosofía, la Psicología, la Mente y Lenguaje en Ludwig Wittgenstein y John Searle ' 2nd Ed (2019). Los interesados en más de mis escritos pueden ver 'Monos parlantes--filosofía, psicología, ciencia, religión y política en un planeta condenado--artículos y reseñas 2006-2019 3rd Ed (2019) y delirios utópicos suicidas en el 21St Century 4TH Ed (2019) 182 Esta es una excelente revisión de las interacciones gen/ambiente en el comportamiento y, a pesar de ser un poco anticuado, es una lectura fácil y valiosa. Empiezan con estudios gemelos, que muestran el impacto abrumador de la genética sobre el comportamiento. Señalan los estudios cada vez más conocidos de Judith Harris, que amplían y resumen los hechos de que el ambiente doméstico compartido casi no tiene efecto sobre el comportamiento y que los niños adoptados crecen para ser tan diferentes de sus hermanastros y hermanas como las personas elegidas al azar. Hay un montón de impacto en la personalidad (CA 50% de variación) desde el entorno temprano, presumiblemente interacción entre pares, TV, etc., pero realmente no lo sabemos. Resumen la genética del comportamiento en los primeros animales verdaderos, los protozoos, y señalan que muchos de los genes y mecanismos subyacentes a nuestro comportamiento ya están presentes. Existe una fuerte ventaja selectiva para identificar los genes de los compañeros potenciales e incluso los protozoos tienen tales mecanismos. Hay datos que muestran que las personas tienden a elegir relaciones de posición con diferentes tipos de HLA, pero el mecanismo es oscuro. Presentan varias líneas de evidencia que nos comunican inconscientemente con feromonas a través de los órganos vomeronasal y Esto es no mediada por las neuronas del olfato. Un capítulo revisa la biología del nematuro C. elegans, señalando el hecho de que comparte muchos mecanismos y genes con protozoos y con nosotros debido al conservadurismo extremo de la evolución. Algunos genes humanos se han insertado en él con la aparente preservación de su función en nosotros. Por otra parte, muestran lo que parecen ser mecanismos de memoria a largo plazo y a corto plazo controlados por genes de una manera similar a la de los organismos superiores. Señalan la similitud general del criptochome no visual mediada regulación de los ritmos circadianos en levaduras y moscas de la fruta a los de los animales más altos e incluso a los de las plantas. Se ha demostrado que ambos genes de cryptocromo Cry1 y Cry-2 están presentes en moscas de la fruta, ratones y seres humanos y que el sistema fotorreceptor está activo en muchas células del cuerpo que no sean la retina, y los investigadores incluso han sido capaces de desencadenar los ritmos circadianos de la luz brilló en nuestra pierna! Después de una breve encuesta de trabajo sobre la famosa APLYSIA y los sistemas cAMP y calmodulin, revisan los datos sobre los neurotransmisores humanos. El capítulo sobre la agresión señala la agresión impulsiva de ratones de baja serotonina y los efectos sobre el comportamiento agresivo de las mutaciones/fármacos que afecta la química de óxido nítrico - recientemente, al asombro de todos, identificado como un neurotransmisor importante o el neuromodulador. 183 En un capítulo sobre el consumo, cuentan la historia ahora bien conocida de la leptina y su papel en la regulación De ingesta de alimentos. Luego un resumen de la genética de la conducta sexual. Un punto básico que ellos (y casi todos los que discuten sobre la genética conductual) no se dan cuenta es que los cientos (miles dependiendo de su punto de vista) de los universales de comportamiento humano, incluyendo todos los fundamentos de nuestras personalidades, son 100% determinado por nuestros genes, con no hay variación en las normales. Todo el mundo ve un árbol como un árbol y no una piedra, busca y come comida, se enfada y celosa, etc. Por lo tanto, lo que están hablando sobre todo aquí es cuánto ambiente (cultura) puede afectar al grado en que se muestran varios rasgos, en lugar de su apariencia. También hay campos altamente activos que estudian el comportamiento humano que apenas mencionan: la psicología evolutiva, la psicología cognitiva, partes de la sociología, la antropología y la economía conductual, que están lanzando luces brillantes sobre el comportamiento y mostrando que es en gran medida automática e inconsciente con poca conciencia o control voluntario. Los autores se inclinan hacia la biología es un gran defecto. Por último, discuten la eugenesia en la costumbre políticamente correcta, al no notar que nosotros y todos los organismos somos los productos de la eugenesia de la naturaleza y que los intentos de derrotar la selección natural con la medicina, la agricultura y la civilización en su conjunto, son desastroso para cualquier sociedad que persiste en ella. Tanto como el 50% de todas las concepciones, o unos 100 millones/año, terminan en abortos espontáneos tempranos, casi todos sin que la madre sea consciente. Este sacrificio natural de genes defectuosos impulsa la evolución, nos mantiene relativamente genéticamente sólidas y hace posible la sociedad. Sin embargo, ahora está claro que la sobrepoblación destruirá el mundo antes de que la disgenesia tenga una oportunidad. 184 ¿Es JK Rowling más malvado que Me? (revisado en 2019) Michael Starks Abstracto ¿Qué tal una toma diferente de los ricos y famosos? Primero lo obvio - las novelas de Harry Potter son supersticiones primitivas que animan a los niños a creer en la fantasía en lugar de asumir la responsabilidad del mundo-la norma por supuesto. JKR es tan despistada sobre sí misma y el mundo como la mayoría de las personas, pero unas 200 veces más destructivas que el estadounidense promedio y unas 800 veces más que el chino promedio. Ella ha sido responsable de la destrucción de tal vez 30.000 hectáreas de bosque para producir estas novelas de basura y toda la erosión subsiguiente (no trivial como es al menos 6 y tal vez 12 toneladas/año de tierra en el océano para todos en la tierra o tal vez 100 toneladas por American, y así alrededor de 5000 toneladas/año para los libros y películas de Rowling y su 3 niños). La tierra pierde al menos el 1% de su tierra vegetal cada año, por lo que se acerca a 2100, la mayor parte de su capacidad de cultivo de alimentos desaparecerá. Luego está la enorme cantidad de combustible quemado y los desechos hechos para hacer y distribuir los libros y películas, muñecas de plástico, etc. Ella muestra su falta de responsabilidad social produciendo niños en lugar de usar sus millones para alentar la planificación familiar o comprar la selva tropical, y promoviendo la estupidez liberal convencional de la 3a supremacía mundial que está destruyendo Gran Bretaña, Estados Unidos, el mundo y el futuro de su descendiente. Por supuesto, ella no es tan diferente de las otras 7.8 mil millones de sólo más ruidosas y destructivas. Es el no libre problema de almuerzo escrito grande. La multitud simplemente no puede ver que no hay tal cosa como ayudar a una persona sin dañar a los demás. Los derechos o privilegios dados a los nuevos participantes en un mundo superpoblado sólo pueden disminuir los de los demás. A pesar de los desastres ecológicos masivos que ocurren delante de ellos en todas partes todos los días, no pueden anclar a la maternidad desenfrenada de "lo diverso", que representa la mayor parte del aumento de la población del siglo pasado y todo eso en este. Carecen de una combinación de inteligencia, educación, experiencia y cordura necesaria para extrapolar los asaltos diarios a los recursos y el funcionamiento de la sociedad para el eventual colapso de la civilización industrial. Cada comida, cada viaje en coche o autobús, cada par de zapatos es otro clavo en el ataúd de la tierra. Probablemente nunca ha cruzado su mente que un asiento en un avión de Londres a San Francisco produce alrededor de una tonelada de carbono que derrite unos 3 metros cuadrados de hielo marino y como uno de los privilegiados que probablemente ha volado cientos de tales vuelos. No sólo los ricos y famosos, pero casi cualquier figura pública en absoluto, incluyendo prácticamente todos los profesores, se ven presionados a ser políticamente correcto, que en el las democracias occidentales, ahora significa socialdemócrata (Neomarxista - i. e., comunista diluido), supremacistas del tercer mundo que trabajan por la 185 destrucción de sus propias sociedades y sus propios descendientes. Entonces, aquellos cuya falta of educación, experiencia, inteligencia (y el sentido común básico), que debería prohibirles hacer declaraciones públicas en absoluto, dominar totalmente a todos los medios de comunicación, creando la impresión de que los inteligentes y civilizados deben favorecer la democracia, la diversidad y la igualdad, mientras que la verdad es que estos son los problemas y no las soluciones, y que ellos mismos son los principales enemigos de la civilización. Ver mi suicidio por la democracia 2Nd Ed (2019). ¿Qué tal una toma diferente de los ricos y famosos? Primero lo obvio - las novelas de Harry Potter son supersticiones primitivas que animan a los niños a creer en la fantasía en lugar de asumir la responsabilidad del mundo-la norma por supuesto. JKR es tan despistada sobre sí misma y el mundo como la mayoría de las personas, pero unas 200 veces más destructivas que el estadounidense promedio y unas 800 veces más que el chino promedio. Ella ha sido responsable de la destrucción de tal vez 30.000 hectáreas de bosque para producir estas novelas de basura y toda la erosión subsiguiente (no trivial como es al menos 6 y tal vez 12 toneladas/año de tierra en el océano para todos en la tierra o tal vez 100 toneladas por American, y así alrededor de 5000 toneladas/año para los libros y películas de Rowling y su 3 niños). La tierra pierde al menos el 1% de su tierra vegetal cada año, por lo que se acerca a 2100, la mayor parte de su capacidad de cultivo de alimentos desaparecerá. Luego está la enorme cantidad de combustible quemado y los desechos hechos para hacer y distribuir los libros y películas, muñecas de plástico, etc. Ella muestra su falta de responsabilidad social produciendo niños en lugar de usar sus millones para alentar la planificación familiar o comprar la selva tropical, y promoviendo la estupidez liberal convencional de la 3a supremacía mundial que está destruyendo Gran Bretaña, Estados Unidos, el mundo y el futuro de su descendiente. Por supuesto, ella no es tan diferente de las otras 7.8 mil millones de sólo más ruidosas y destructivas. Como todos los ricos, ella es capaz de multiplicar su destrucción causando que otros destruyan en su nombre. Cada niño que produjo resultados en alrededor de 50 toneladas de tierra vegetal en el océano, 300 libras de productos químicos tóxicos producidos, 1 acre de bosque/humedal/desaparecido para siempre, cada año. Como todas las personas, su familia roba a todas las personas de la tierra y de sus propios descendientes (no hay derechos humanos sin males humanos), y, al igual que la gran mayoría, ella es pobremente educada, egomaniíaca y carente de autoconsciencia, por lo que estas cuestiones nunca se cruzan. Además de la destrucción material para hacer y distribuir sus libros y películas, existe la gran cantidad de tiempo desperdiciado en la lectura y visualización de ellos. Además, la extrema inmadurez mostrada por los personajes en ellos y sus preocupación por las fantasías supersticiosas infantiles sólo puede hacer daño a las mentes impresionables. El mundo sería un lugar mejor si nunca hubiera nacido, pero uno puede decirlo de casi todo el mundo. Durante mucho tiempo ha sido la comprensión de la gente espiritualmente consciente que todos menos un pequeño número de nosotros pasamos toda su vida durmiendo, 186 y esta visión es poderosamente apoyada por la investigación psicológica moderna, que muestra que casi todas nuestras acciones se realizan mecánicamente, por razones por las que no somos conscientes y sobre las cuales no tenemos control. Nuestra personalidad es una ilusión producida por la evolución para asegurar la reproducción. Sólo somos un paquete para los genes egoístas que llevan a cabo sus programas ciegos y, al igual que todos los organismos, vivimos para replicar nuestros genes y para acumular y consumir recursos para ese fin. En nuestro caso eso significa que vivimos para destruir la tierra y nuestros propios descendientes. Es esencial para este juego que seguimos siendo conscientes de ello, ya que, en la medida en que nos damos cuenta y vivimos nuestras vidas como seres conscientes, disminuimos nuestra reproducción y los genes que producen este comportamiento son seleccionados en contra. Rowling es un ejemplo típico de una persona consciente aparentemente inteligente que caminará a través de su vida entera dormida - al igual que casi todos los otros 11 mil millones (extrapolar a 2100) - y como ellos, vive sólo para destruir la tierra y dejar su descendencia tóxica atrás para continuar la destrucción. Como muchos, ella, con Obama y el Papa, comparte la ilusión común de que los pobres son más nobles y merecedores, pero los ricos difieren sólo en tener la oportunidad de ser más destructivos. Los pobres son los ricos en la espera. así que, 800 chino o indios hacer tanto daño como JKR y su familia. Ricos o pobres lo hacen las únicas cosas que los monos pueden hacer consumen recursos y replican sus genes hasta el colapso de la civilización industrial a mediados del próximo siglo. En un abrir y cerrar de ojos, siglos y milenios pasarán y, en el infernal mundo del hambre, la enfermedad, la guerra y la violencia que sus antepasados crearon, nadie sabrá ni cuidará de que ninguno de ellos exista. Ella no es más inherentemente malvada que otros, pero tampoco es mejor y, debido a los accidentes de la historia, ella es alta en la lista de enemigos de la vida en la tierra. Es el no libre problema de almuerzo escrito grande. La mafia simplemente no puede ver que no hay tal cosa como ayudar a una persona sin dañar a los demás. Los derechos o privilegios dados a los nuevos participantes en un mundo superpoblado sólo pueden disminuir los de otros. A pesar de los desastres ecológicos masivos que ocurren delante de ellos en todas partes todos los días, no pueden anclar a la maternidad desenfrenada de "lo diverso", que representa la mayor parte del aumento de la población del siglo pasado y todo eso en este. Carecen de una combinación de inteligencia, educación, experiencia y cordura necesaria para extrapolar los asaltos diarios a los recursos y el funcionamiento de la sociedad ahora al colapso eventual de civilización industrial, así como el coraje de decirlo, incluso si se dan cuenta. Cada comida, cada viaje en coche o autobús, cada par de zapatos es otro clavo en el ataúd de la tierra. Probablemente nunca ha cruzado su mente que un asiento en un avión de Londres a San Francisco produce alrededor de una tonelada de carbono que derrite unos 3 metros cuadrados de hielo marino y como uno de los privilegiados que probablemente ha volado cientos de tales vuelos. Nunca cruza de la mayoría de la gente mentes que el promedio Americano familia de 187 clase inferior de 4 tomar en bienes, servicios, y los costos de infraestructura tal vez $50.000 más cada año de lo que contribuyen, y en 100 años (cuando se habrá ampliado a tal vez 10 personas) habrá costado el país sobre $15 millones, y inconmensurablemente más en costos ecológicos y sociales a largo plazo (¿Cuál es el valor para el colapso de la civilización?). No sólo los ricos y famosos, sino casi cualquier figura pública en absoluto, incluyendo prácticamente todos los maestros, se ven presionados a ser políticamente correctos, que en las democracias occidentales, ahora significa socialdemócrata (diluido comunista) tercer mundo supremacistas que trabajan para el destrucción de sus propias sociedades y de sus propios descendientes. Así, aquellos cuya falta de libertad de expresión (y sentido común básico), que debería prohibirles hacer declaraciones públicas en absoluto, dominan totalmente todos los medios de comunicación, creando la impresión de que los inteligentes y civilizados deben favorecer la democracia, la diversidad y igualdad, mientras que la verdad es que estos son los problemas y no las soluciones, y que ellos mismos son los principales enemigos de la civilización. Estados Unidos y el mundo están en el proceso de colapso de un crecimiento excesivo de la población, la mayor parte de ella durante el siglo pasado y ahora todo ello debido a la 3a gente del mundo. El consumo de recursos y la adición de 4 mil millones más CA. 2100 colapsarán la civilización industrial y traerán hambre, enfermedad, violencia y guerra a una escala asombrosa. Miles de millones morirán y la guerra nuclear es todo menos seguro. En Estados Unidos, Esto se está acelerando enormemente por la masiva reproducción migratoria e inmigrante, combinada con los abusos que la democracia ha hecho posible. La depravada naturaleza humana convierte inexorablemente el sueño de la democracia y la diversidad en una pesadilla de crimen y pobreza. China continuará abrumar a Estados Unidos y al mundo, siempre y cuando mantenga la dictadura que limita el egoísmo. La causa raíz del colapso es la incapacidad de nuestra psicología innata para adaptarse al mundo moderno, lo que lleva a las personas a tratar a personas no relacionadas como si tuvieran intereses comunes. He denominado esto el delirio fitness inclusivo. Esto, más la ignorancia de la biología básica y la psicología, conduce a las delirios de ingeniería social de los parcialmente educados que controlan las sociedades democráticas. Pocos entienden que si usted ayuda a una persona a lastimar a alguien más - no hay almuerzo gratis y cada artículo que alguien consume destruye la tierra más allá de la reparación. Por consiguiente, las políticas sociales en todas partes son insostenibles y una por una todas las sociedades sin estrictos controles sobre el egoísmo se derrumbarán en la anarquía o la dictadura. Sin cambios dramáticos e inmediatos, no hay esperanza para prevenir el colapso de Estados Unidos, o cualquier país que siga un sistema democrático. Aquellos que quieran un marco más amplio pueden ver mi Libro ' Suicidio por la Democracia ' 2Nd Ed. (2019). 188 EL DELIRIO DIGITAL--LAS COMPUTADORAS SON PERSONAS Y EL LENGUAJE ES MATEMÁTICA Y HITECH NOS SALVARÁ 189 Scientismo sobre los esteroides: un review de Freedom Evoluciona (Freedom Evolves) por Daniel Dennett (2003) (revisión revisada 2019) Michael Starks Abstracto "La gente dice una y otra vez que la filosofía no progresa realmente, que todavía estamos ocupados con los mismos problemas filosóficos que los griegos. Pero la gente que dice esto no entiende por qué tiene que ser así. Es porque nuestro lenguaje ha permanecido igual y nos sigue seduciendo para que hagan las mismas preguntas. Mientras siga habiendo un verbo "ser" que parezca como si funciona de la misma manera que "comer y beber", siempre y cuando todavía tengamos los adjetivos "idénticos", "verdaderos", "falsos", "posibles", siempre y cuando sigamos hablando de un río de tiempo, , de una extensión de espacio, etc., etc., la gente seguirá tropezando con las mismas dificultades desconcertante y se encontrará mirando a algo que ninguna explicación parece capaz de aclarar. Y lo que es más, esto satisface un anhelo de lo trascendente, porque, en la medida en que la gente cree que puede ver el 'límites de la comprensión humana , creen, por supuesto, que pueden ver más allá de estos. ' ' Esta cita es de Ludwig Wittgenstein que redefinió la filosofía hace unos 70 años (pero la mayoría de la gente todavía tiene que averiguarlo). Dennett, aunque ha sido un filósofo desde hace unos 40 años, es uno de ellos. También es curioso que tanto él como su antagonista principal, John Searle, estudiaron bajo los famosos Wittgensteinianos (Searle con John Austin, Dennett con Gilbert Ryle) pero Searle Más o menos consiguió el punto y Dennett no, (aunque se está estirando cosas para llamar Searle o Ryle Wittgensteinianos). Dennett es un determinista duro (aunque intenta escabullirse de la realidad en la puerta trasera), y tal vez esto se deba a Ryle, cuyo famoso libro el concepto de la mente (1949) continúa siendo reimpreso. Ese libro hizo un gran trabajo de exorcizar al fantasma, pero dejó la máquina. A Dennett le gusta cometer los errores que Wittgenstein, Ryle (y muchos otros desde entonces) han expuesto en detalle. Nuestro uso de las palabras consciencia, elección, libertad, intención, partícula, pensamiento, determina, oleada, causa, ocurrió, evento (y así sucesivamente) raramente son una fuente de confusión, pero tan pronto como dejamos la vida normal y entramos en la filosofía (y cualquier discusión separada del entorno en el que el lenguaje evolucionó- es decir, el contexto exacto en el que las palabras tenían sentido) reina el caos. Como la mayoría, Dennett carece de un marco coherente que Searle ha llamado la estructura lógica de la racionalidad. Me he expandido en este considerablemente desde que escribí esta reseña y mis artículos recientes muestran en detalle lo que está mal con el enfoque de Dennett a la filosofía, que uno podría llamar scientismo en esteroides. Permítanme terminar con otra cita de 190 Wittgenstein--la ambición es la muerte del pensamiento . Aquellos que deseen un marco completo hasta la fecha para el comportamiento humano de la moderna dos sistemas punto de vista puede consultar mi libro 'La Estructura Lógica de la Filosofía, la Psicología, la Mente y Lenguaje en Ludwig Wittgenstein y John Searle ' 2nd Ed (2019). Los interesados en más de mis escritos pueden ver 'Monos parlantes--filosofía, psicología, ciencia, religión y política en un planeta condenado--artículos y reseñas 2006-2019 3rd Ed (2019) y delirios utópicos suicidas en el 21St Century 4TH Ed (2019) "La gente dice una y otra vez que la filosofía no progresa realmente, que todavía estamos ocupados con los mismos problemas filosóficos que los griegos. Pero la gente que dice esto no entiende por qué tiene que ser así. Es porque nuestro lenguaje ha permanecido igual y nos sigue seduciendo para que hagan las mismas preguntas. Mientras siga habiendo un verbo "ser" que parezca como si funciona de la misma manera que "comer" y "beber", siempre y cuando todavía tengamos los adjetivos "idénticos", "verdaderos", "falsos", "posibles", siempre y cuando sigamos hablando de un río de tiempo , de una extensión de espacio, etc., etc., la gente seguirá tropezando con las mismas dificultades desconcertante y se encontrará mirando a algo que ninguna explicación parece capaz de aclarar. Y lo que es más, esto satisface un anhelo de lo trascendente, porque, en la medida en que la gente cree que puede ver "los límites del entendimiento humano", creen, por supuesto, que pueden ver más allá de estos. ' ' "La filosofía es una batalla contra el embrujo de nuestra inteligencia por medio del lenguaje". "La ambición es la muerte del pensamiento" "Los filósofos ven constantemente el método de la ciencia ante sus ojos y son irresistiblemente tentados a preguntar y responder preguntas en la forma en que la ciencia lo hace. Esta tendencia es la verdadera fuente de la metafísica y lleva al filósofo a una completa oscuridad. " (BBB P18). "¿Cómo surge el problema filosófico sobre los procesos mentales y los Estados y sobre el Behaviorismo? – El primer paso es el que se escapa por completo del aviso. Hablamos de procesos y Estados y dejamos su naturaleza indeciso. En algún momento tal vez sabremos más sobre ellos, pensamos. Pero eso es sólo lo que nos compromete a una forma particular de ver el asunto. Porque tenemos un concepto definido de lo que significa aprender a conocer mejor un proceso. (El movimiento decisivo en el truco de conjurar se ha hecho, y fue el mismo que pensamos bastante inocente). - Y ahora la analogía que nos hizo entender nuestros pensamientos cae en pedazos. así que, tenemos que negar el proceso aún sin comprender en el medio aún inexplorado. Y ahora parece como si hubiéramos negado los procesos mentales. Y naturalmente no queremos negarlos. W PI p308 191 Estas citas son de Ludwig Wittgenstein, que redefinió la filosofía hace unos 70 años (pero la mayoría de la gente todavía tiene que averiguarlo). Dennett, aunque ha sido un filósofo por unos 40 años, es uno de ellos. También es curioso que tanto él como su antagonista principal, John Searle, estudiaron bajo los famosos Wittgensteinianos (Searle con John Austin, Dennett con Gilbert Ryle) pero Searle al menos parcialmente consiguió el punto y Dennett no. Dennett es un determinista duro (aunque intenta escabullirse de la realidad en la puerta trasera), y tal vez esto se deba a Ryle, cuyo famoso libro el concepto de la mente (1949) continúa siendo reimpreso. Ese libro hizo un gran trabajo de exorcizar al fantasma pero dejó la máquina. A Dennett le gusta cometer los errores que Wittgenstein, Ryle (y muchos otros desde entonces) han expuesto en detalle. Por casualidad, justo antes de este libro, había leído las mentes I , que Dennett coescribió con Douglas Hofstadter en 1981. Hicieron algunos errores malos (ver mi opinión), y más triste de todos, reimprimieron dos artículos famosos que señalaron la manera de salir del lío---Nagel s ' ¿Qué es como ser un murciélago? ' y una versión temprana del argumento de John Searle de la sala China explicando por qué las computadoras no piensan. Nagel señaló que ni siquiera sabemos cómo reconocer como sería un concepto de la mente de un murciélago. Searle explicó de manera similar cómo nos falta una manera de conceptualizar el pensamiento y cómo difiere de lo que hace un ordenador (por ejemplo, puede traducir Chino sin entenderlo). Del mismo modo, nos falta una prueba clara para reconocer lo que cuenta como bueno contra malo-o simplemente inteligible-para muchos conceptos filosóficos y científicos. Nuestro uso de las palabras consciencia, elección, libertad, intención, partícula, pensamiento, determina, oleada, causa, ocurrió, evento (y así sucesivamente) rara vez son una fuente de confusión, pero tan pronto como dejamos la vida normal y entramos en la filosofía (y cualquier discusión separada del entorno en el que el lenguaje evolucionó- es decir, el contexto exacto en el que las palabras tenían sentido) Reina el caos. Wittgenstein fue el primero en entender por qué y para señalar cómo evitar esto. Desafortunadamente, murió en su apogeo, sus obras están compuestas casi enteramente de una serie de ejemplos de cómo funciona la mente (lenguaje), y él nunca escribió libros populares, así que entender de su trabajo está restringido a muy pocos. Searle es uno de los principales filósofos del mundo y ha escrito muchos extremadamente artículos y libros claros y muy apreciados, algunos de los cuales han señalado los numerosos defectos en Dennett. Su reseña ' ' Consciousness Explained Away de Dennett 1991 libro ' Consciencia Explicado y su libro El Misterio de Consciencia son muy conocidos, y muestran, de una manera que es sorprendentemente claro para la escritura filosófica, por qué ni Dennett (ni ninguno de los cientos de filósofos y científicos que han escrito sobre este tema) se han acercada a explicar el difícil problema - es... Cómo conceptualiza la conciencia. Por supuesto, en mi opinión (y de Wittgenstein) no hay un ' problema duro ' sólo confusión sobre el uso del lenguaje. Muchos sospechan que nunca podremos ' conceptualizar ' ninguna de las cosas realmente importantes (aunque creo que W dejó claro que están mezclando el problema científico muy duro con el simple tema de cómo usar la 192 palabra), pero está claro que no estamos cerca de él ahora como una cuestión científica. Mi opinión es que la cuestión científica es sencilla, ya que podemos ver que la ' conciencia ' se pone juntos unos neurones a la vez por la evolución y por Desarrollo. Y el ' concepto ' es un juego de idiomas como cualquier otro y uno sólo tiene que ser claro (especificar COS claros) sobre cómo vamos a utilizar la palabra. Dennett ha ignorado principalmente a sus críticos, pero ha favorecido a Searle con ataques personales vituperativos. Searle ha sido acusado por Dennett y otros de estar fuera para destruir la psicología cognitiva que es bastante divertido, como la filosofía moderna es en el sentido académico estrecho una rama de la psicología cognitiva (la psicología descriptiva del pensamiento de orden superior), y Searle ha hecho muy claro durante 30 años que somos un buen ejemplo de una máquina biológica que es consciente, piensa, etc. Sólo señala que no tenemos ni idea de cómo sucede esto. Searle caracteriza como patología intelectual , las opiniones de Dennett y de todos aquellos que niegan la existencia de los mismos fenómenos que se han puesto a explicar. Dennett repite sus errores aquí y deja su respuesta a sus críticos a la penúltima página del libro, donde se nos dice que todos están equivocados y es una pérdida de espacio para mostrar cómo! Como era de esperar, no hay una referencia a Wittgenstein o Searle en todo el libro. Sin embargo, hay muchas referencias a otros filósofos de la vieja escuela que están tan confundidos como él. Es un científico de gran tamaño, el error casi universal de mezclar el verdadero problema empírico de la ciencia con las cuestiones de cómo se va a utilizar el lenguaje (juegos de idiomas) de la filosofía. Como la mayoría de la gente, no cruza su mente que los motores de inferencia con el que piensa lo están obligando a llegar a ciertas conclusiones y que estos a menudo estar bastante desconectada o equivocada sobre la forma en que las cosas están en el mundo. Son un revoltijo de curiosidades evolutivas que hacen diversas tareas en la organización de comportamientos que fueron útiles para la supervivencia hace cientos de miles de años. Wittgenstein fue un pionero en hacer experimentos de pensamiento en psicología cognitiva y comenzó a dilucidar la naturaleza de estos motores y las sutilezas del lenguaje en los años 30, y así hizo el tipo de comentarios que esta revisión comienza con. Dennett dice (p98) que su visión es compatibilismo, es decir, que la libre voluntad (que espero, para la coherencia, podemos igualar con la elección) es compatible con el determinismo (es decir, que hay en cualquier instante exactamente un futuro físicamente posible --P25). Quiere demostrar que el determinismo no es lo mismo que la inevitabilidad. Sin embargo, todo el libro es humo y espejos por medio de los cuales la elección, en el sentido que normalmente entendemos, desaparece y nos dejan con ' ' elección ' ', que es algo que no podemos elegir. Naturalmente, esto hace eco del destino de la conciencia en su libro anterior ' ' la conciencia explicada ' '. 193 Es notable que, en un momento en el que apenas estamos empezando a llegar al punto en el que podríamos ser capaces de entender los fundamentos de cómo una sola neurona funciona (o cómo funciona un átomo para el caso), que cualquiera debe pensar que puede dar el salto a la comprensión de todo el cerebro y para explicar sus fenómenos más complejos. Por favor, recuerden la última frase de Wittgenstein de la cita de apertura: y lo que es más, esto satisface un anhelo de lo trascendente, porque, en la medida en que las personas creen que pueden ver "los límites del entendimiento humano", creen, por supuesto, que pueden ver más allá de estos. ' ' el lenguaje juegos son muy variados y exquisitamente sensibles al contexto así que todos se pierden. Si Estamos muy, muy cuidadoso, podemos diseñar los juegos de idiomas (por ejemplo, especificar las condiciones de satisfacción de varias declaraciones utilizando las palabras conciencia, elección, realidad, Mente Etc.) y la claridad se hace posible, pero Dennett arroja PRECAUCIÓN a los vientos y somos arrastrados a las arenas movedizas. Hay al menos 3 temas diferentes aquí (evolución de nuestro cerebro, elección y moralidad) y Dennett intenta en vano soldar juntos en un relato coherente de cómo la libertad evoluciona a partir del choque determinista de los átomos. Sin embargo, no hay ninguna razón convincente para aceptar que los átomos que rebotan (o su ejemplo favorito, el juego de la vida que se ejecuta en un ordenador) son isomorfos con la realidad. Nunca se le ocurre que a menos que especifique exactamente un contexto y por lo tanto el COS (condiciones de satisfacción - i. e., lo que hace que las declaraciones sean verdaderas o falsas), sus afirmaciones carecen de significado. Él sabe que la indeterminacia cuántica (o el principio de incertidumbre) es un gran obstáculo para el determinismo, sin embargo definido (y ha sido tomado por muchos como un escape a la libertad), pero lo descarta debido al hecho de que tales eventos son demasiado raros para molestarse. Por extensión, es improbable que cualquier evento de este tipo ocurra ahora o incluso en toda nuestra vida en nuestro cerebro, así que parece que estamos atrapados con un cerebro determinado (lo que sea que puede ser, es decir, nunca especifica el COS). Sin embargo, el universo es un lugar grande y ha estado alrededor de mucho tiempo (tal vez ' para siempre ') y si incluso uno de esos efectos cuánticos ocurre, parecería arrojar todo el universo a un estado indeterminado. La noción hay en cualquier instante exactamente un futuro físicamente posible no puede ser verdad si en cualquier instante, puede ocurrir una indeterminacia cuántica--en este caso parecería haber infinitamente muchos futuros posibles. Pero de nuevo, ¿qué es exactamente la COS de esta afirmación? Esto recuerda uno de los escapes de las contradicciones de la física: cada instante nuestro universo se ramifica en infinitamente muchos universos. Él rechaza correctamente la idea de que la indeterminacia cuántica nos da la respuesta a cómo podemos tener elección. Esta idea obvia ha sido sugerida por muchos, pero el problema es que nadie tiene idea de cómo especificar una secuencia exacta de pasos que comienza con las ecuaciones de la física y termina con los fenómenos de la conciencia (o cualquier otro fenómeno emergente). Si es así, definitivamente ganarán al menos un premio Nobel, ya que no sólo tendrán ' explicado ' la conciencia, tendrán ' explicado ' (o mucho mejor ' descrito ' como Wittgenstein insistió) el fenómeno universal de emergencia (¿cómo las propiedades de orden superior emergen de los 194 inferiores). Por lo tanto, tendrían que resolver el problema "fácil" (para determinar el estado exacto del cerebro que corresponde a algún estado mental y preferiblemente especificar la posición exacta de todos los átomos en el cerebro con el tiempoignorando la incertidumbre) y el ' duro ' uno (¿qué exactamente se correlaciona con o produce conciencia o elección, etc.?). Y mientras están en ello, ¿qué tal también hacer lo imposible-una solución exacta y completa a las ecuaciones de campo cuántico para un cerebro. Es muy sabido que estas ecuaciones son incomputables, incluso para un átomo o un vacío, ya que requeriría una cantidad infinita de tiempo de computadora. Pero infinito hará por un átomo así que tal vez un cerebro ya no tomará más. Nunca cruza su mente (ni nadie que he visto) que nadie puede aclarar cómo un átomo ' emerge ' de electrones, neutrones y protones o una molécula emerge de átomos ni de células de moléculas, etc. Sí, Hay algunas ecuaciones, pero si miras atentamente verás un montón de agitaciones de manos y hechos que simplemente se aceptan como "la forma en que están las cosas" y creo que claramente es lo mismo con la conciencia, el color, la elección, el dolor que surge de los racimos de las células. Por supuesto, después de Wittgenstein nos damos cuenta de que mezclado con las preguntas científicas son los filosóficos-es decir, los diferentes usos (significados, COS) de las palabras no se mantienen claras y por lo que las discusiones son en su mayoría incoherentes. Él comienza en la primera página apelando a las leyes de la física para la protección contra las nociones fantásticas como las almas inmaterial, pero la física está hecha de nociones tan fantásticas (incertidumbre, entrelazamiento, onda/partícula dualidad, Gato muerto/vivo de Schrodinger, etc.) y como dijo Feynmann muchas veces ' ' nadie entiende la física! muchos piensan que nadie jamás lo hará y yo soy uno de los muchos que dicen que no hay nada que ' entender ', sino que hay un montón de ' cosas ' junto con la existencia, el espacio, el tiempo, la materia, etc. para aceptar. Hay un límite en lo que nuestro cerebro pequeño puede hacer y tal vez estamos en ese límite ahora. Incluso si creamos una computadora masiva que podría entender (en cierto sentido) mucho mejor que nosotros, no está claro que pueda explicarnos. Entender una idea requiere un cierto nivel de inteligencia o poder (por ejemplo, sosteniendo un cierto número de cosas en mente y realizando un cierto número de cálculos/segundo). La mayoría de la gente nunca agarrará las matemáticas abstrusas de la teoría de cuerdas, sin importar cuánto tiempo tengan que hacerlo. Y no está claro que la teoría de cuerdas (o cualquier otra) tenga sentido como una representación matemática (es decir, real) de nuestro mundo. Esto requiere claro COS que creo que la teoría de cuerdas, la teoría cuántica de la mente etc. carecen. así que, hay una buena razón para suponer que nuestro ordenador muy intelligente, incluso si le enseñamos cómo pensar en el ' mismo' sentido que hacemos, nunca será capaz de explicar cosas realmente complejas para nosotros. Pero como siempre tenemos que especificar el contexto exacto para poder ver los significados (COS) de las palabras y la mayoría de la ciencia de este tipo no tiene conciencia del problema. En la primera página es una de sus citas favoritas, que compara el cerebro con un 195 montón de pequeños robots, y en PG2 dice que estamos hechos de robots sin sentido. Pero, ¿qué es el COS para una entidad que tiene una mente? La forma en que el cerebro (y cualquier célula) funciona no es nada como la forma en que funcionan los robots y ni siquiera sabemos cómo conceptualizar la diferencia (es decir, sabemos cómo funcionan los robots, pero no cómo funcionan los cerebros - p. ej., cómo hacen elecciones, entienden imágenes y motivos, etc.). Como he señalado anteriormente, esto fue señalado por Searle hace 30 años, pero Dennett (y muchos otros) simplemente no consigue eso. También se nos dice en la primera página que la ciencia nos permitirá entender nuestra libertad y darnos Un mejor fundamento para nuestra moralidad. Hasta donde puedo ver, ni la ciencia ni la filosofía, ni la religión, tienen ningún efecto en nuestra comprensión de nuestra libertad o moralidad. A pesar de que discute la biología del altruismo y la elección racional por largo tiempo, nunca menciona la abundante evidencia de la psicología cognitiva que nuestras intuiciones morales son innato y demostrable en 4 año los niños mayores. En cambio, pasa mucho tiempo tratando de mostrar cómo la elección y la moralidad provienen de los recuerdos de los acontecimientos y de nuestra interacción con los demás. En PG2 dice que nuestros valores tienen poco que ver con el 'Metas' de nuestras células y en PG2 a 3 que nuestras diferencias de personalidad se deban a la forma en que nuestros equipos robóticos están juntos, durante toda una vida de crecimiento y experiencia. ' ' este es un despido Calvo de la naturaleza humana, de la abundante evidencia de que nuestras diferencias están en gran medida programadas en nuestros genes y fija en la primera infancia, y es típico de su constante confundido vagando de ida y vuelta ruta entre el determinismo y el ambientalismo (es decir, su opinión de que desarrollamos la moralidad a través del tiempo por experiencia y pensando en cuestiones morales). Pero de nuevo él mezcla los problemas científicos con los filosóficos, es decir, ¿exactamente qué juego estamos jugando con "robot", "mente", "determinado", "libre", etc.? Muchas otras secciones del libro muestran la misma confusión. Aquellos que no conocen el Científica evidencia puede desear leer Pinker ' ' la pizarra en blanco , Boyer ' la religión explicada y cualquiera de los cien textos recientes, y decenas de miles de artículos y páginas web sobre el desarrollo de la personalidad, y la psicología evolutiva y cognitiva. En PG4 dice que los bisontes no saben que son bisontes y que hemos sabido que somos mamíferos por sólo unos pocos cientos de años. Ambos muestran una falta fundamental de comprensión de la psicología cognitiva. Las plantillas cognitivas para las categorías ontológicas se desarrollaron, en sus formas originales, hace cientos de millones de años y los animales tienen la capacidad innato de reconocer a otros de su especie y de otras especies y clases de animales y plantas y los objetos sin ningún tipo de aprendizaje suficiente para establecer categorías. Bison sabe que son como otros bisontes y nuestros antepasados sabían que eran como otros mamíferos y que los reptiles eran diferentes pero similares entre sí, etc. Los estudios cognitivos han demostrado estos tipos de habilidades en niños muy pequeños. Una vez más, ¿estamos utilizando "know" en su sentido prelingüístico del sistema 1 o en su sistema lingüístico 2? Ver mis otros escritos para la utilidad de los dos sistemas de punto de 196 vista del pensamiento. Claro, es cierto que las palabras Bison y ' mamifero son recientes, pero no tienen nada que ver con cómo funcionan nuestros cerebros. En la página 5 atribuye la hostilidad del posmodernismo a la ciencia como un producto de ' temeroso pensamiento pero no especula por qué es eso. A pesar de su conocimiento de la psicología cognitiva no ve que esto es probablemente debido al hecho de que muchos resultados de la ciencia chocan con los sentimientos producidos normalmente por la operación de los motores de inferencia para la psicología intuitiva, la coalición, la mente social, intercambio social, etc. como discuto en otro lugar. En la página 9 señala que el libre voluntad es un problema y nuestras actitudes hacia ella hacen una diferencia, pero ¿para quién? Nadie más que filósofos. Hacemos elecciones. ¿Cuál es el problema? Uno tiene que salir de la vida para experimentar un problema y luego todo se convierte en un problema. ¿Qué son la consciencia, el dolor, el amarillo, la intención, la materia, los quarks, la gravedad, etc.? Dudo que cualquier persona normal haya experimentado alguna vez un cambio fundamental en su interaccións con la gente o su decisión-hacer procesos debido a su pensamiento sobre la elección. Esto demuestra que hay algo extraño en esas preguntas. Wittgenstein muestra que los juegos de idiomas son diferentes. Hay juegos para el lenguaje conectado con el plantillas cognitivas para decisiones, o ver colores, etc., y pensar filosóficamente es típicamente usando las palabras en el contexto incorrecto o sin ningún contexto claro (uno puede llamar esto desacoplado), así que sin el COS claro (significado). Los modos desacoplados permiten pensar en el pasado, planear para el futuro, adivinar los Estados mentales de los demás, etc., pero si uno toma los resultados de la manera equivocada y comienza a pensar ' John intentará robar mi billetera , en lugar de imaginar que John podría hacerlo, entra la confusión y aquellos que no pueden apagar el modo desacoplado o distinguirlo del modo acoplado, entran en el ámbito de la patología. Algunos aspectos de la esquizofrenia y otras enfermedades mentales pueden ser vistos de esta manera--pierden el control del modo en que se encuentran, por ejemplo, no pudiendo ver la diferencia entre los motivos gente tiene y los motivos que podría haber, entre un juego de idiomas y otro. Uno puede entonces ver gran parte de las filosofías que la gente hace como operando en estos Desemparejado hipotético Modos, pero fallando para poder mantener delante de ellos las diferencias de la normal Modo. El modo normal - e. g., ¿qué está haciendo ese león-fue indudadblemente el primero evolucionó y los modos desacoplados--qué hizo ese León la última vez o qué pretende hacer a continuaciónevolucionó más tarde. Esto probablemente nunca fue un problema para los animalescualquier animal que pasaba demasiado tiempo preocupándose por lo que podría suceder no sería muy exitoso contribuyendo al grupo genético. Es interesante especular que sólo cuando los humanos desarrollaron la cultura y 197 empezaron a degenerar genéticamente, un gran número de personas sobrevivió con genes que los llevaron a pasar mucho tiempo en modos desacoplados. Por lo tanto, tenemos la filosofía y este libro, que se trata principalmente de ejecutar las plantillas de decisión en modo desacoplado donde no hay consecuencias reales, excepto ganar regalías por poner los resultados en un libro para que otras personas utilicen para ejecutar sus motores en modo desacoplado. Vamos a alterar la cita de Wittgenstein para que lea: ' ' mientras siga habiendo un verbo "decidir" que parece que funciona de la misma manera que "comer" y "beber", siempre y cuando sigamos hablando de la libertad de acción, de decir que desearía haber hecho otra cosa, etc., etc., la gente seguirá tropezando con las mismas dificultades desconcertante y se encontrará mirando algo que no explicación parece capaz de aclarar. Al igual que con la mayoría de los libros de filosofía, casi cada página, a menudo cada párrafo, cambia de un tipo de juego de idioma a otro, sin darse cuenta de que ahora uno tendría que estar bromeando o soñando o actuando en una obra o recitando una historia, etc., y en realidad no pretendiendo nada, ni describir una situación real en el mundo. En la página 10 dice que contamos con libre voluntad para todo el way de pensar en nuestras vidas, como nosotros contamos en alimentos y agua, pero quien fuera filosofía, de pie frente al mostrador de almuerzo lleno de comida, alguna vez piensa lo bien que es que tienen libre voluntad para que puedan recoger Coca-Cola en lugar de agua mineral? Incluso si quiero ser un compatibilista seria y tratar de pensar esto en el modo desacoplado, tengo que salir y entrar en el modo no desacoplado para hacer la elección real. Sólo entonces puedo volver al modo desacoplado para preguntarme qué podría haber sucedido si no hubiera tenido la capacidad de hacer una elección real. Wittgenstein notó que los juegos de fingir son parásitos en los reales (esto no es una observación trivial!). La capacidad de participar en escenarios desacoplados muy complejos ya es evidente en niños de 4 años de edad. así que, Yo diría que normalmente, nadie cuenta con la elección, sino más bien sólo elegimos. Como Wittgenstein dejó en claro que es la acción basada en la certeza que es el fundamento de nuestra vida. Vea los escritos recientes de Daniele Moyal-Sharrock y mis otros escritos. Estar de acuerdo, muestra de nuevo que no capta los fundamentos cognitivos. Él dice que aprendemos a llevar nuestra vida en la atmósfera conceptual de elección, y que ' parece ser una construcción estable y ahistórica, tan eterna e inmutable como la aritmética, pero no lo es. y en la página 13-- es una creación evolucionada de la actividad humana y creencias . Ttodo el empuje de psicología cognitiva (y Wittgenstein) es que nosotros no (y no podemos) aprendemos los fundamentos de planificación, decisión, promesa, resentimiento, etc., pero que estas son funciones incorporadas de los motores de inferencia que funcionan de forma automática e inconsciente y empiezan a correr en la primera infancia. En la PG 14 sugiere que es probable que nuestra voluntad libre depende de nuestra creencia de que lo tenemos! ¿Creemos que vemos una manzana, sentimos dolor, 198 estamos contentos? El juego de la lengua de la creencia es muy diferente de la de saber en las palabras son incoherentes (no claros COS) en la forma en que Dennett a menudo los utiliza. Podemos creer que tenemos un dólar en el bolsillo, pero si lo tomamos y lo miramos, no podemos decir de manera significativa que todavía lo creemos (excepto como una broma, etc.). El motor de inferencia puede ejecutarse en modo desacoplado (creencia) para que podamos imaginar tener opciones o hacerlos, pero en la vida sólo los hacemos, y es sólo en situaciones muy extrañas podemos decir que creemos que hicimos una elección. Pero Dennett dice que este es el caso universal. Si hacer una elección tenía alguna dependencia de la creencia que lo haría todo lo demás-la conciencia, ver, pensar, etc. Si tomamos esto en serio (y él dice los serios problemas de libre voluntad ) entonces nos estamos metiendo en problemas y si realmente tratamos de aplicarlo a la vida, entonces la locura está a minutos de distancia. Él, como todos los filósofos hasta hace poco, no tenía idea de que Wittgenstein nos mostro la manera de salir de esta necesidad de sentar nuestras acciones en las creencias mediante la descripción de la base real de saber que son las "bisagras" sin fundamento o automatismos del sistema 1 pensamiento en su última obra ' sobre la certeza '. Daniele Moyal-Sharrock ha explicado esto durante la última década y he resumió su trabajo y lo incorporó en mis reseñas y artículos. En la página 65 y siguientes, analiza la causalidad, la intención y los "predicados informales" que utilizamos para describir los átomos, etc., pero la investigación cognitiva ha demostrado que describimos todos los ' objetos ' con un número limitado de categorías ontológicas, que analizamos con nuestros módulos de física intuitivos, y que cuando los agentes (es decir, animales o personas o cosas como ellos - i. e., fantasmas o dioses) están involucrados, Utilizamos nuestros conceptos (motores) para la agencia, la psicología intuitiva, las mentes sociales, etc. para decidir cómo comportarse. Casi con certeza no hay módulo de causalidad, sino que implicará todos estos y otros motores de inferencia, dependiendo de la situación precisa. Discutir la posibilidad y la necesidad es mucho EasiER si uno habla en términos de la salida de nuestros módulos para la física intuitiva, agencia, categorías ontológicas, etc. Claro, no hay ninguna mención aquí de los muchos comentarios incisivos de Wittgenstein sobre los juegos de idiomas de causalidad, intención, decisión, ni de las obras clásicas de Searle sobre la intención y la realidad social. Pasa mucho tiempo en el libro de Ainslie "desglose de la voluntad", en el que se discute las facultades de descuento hiperbólico (es decir, motores de inferencia) por el cual evaluamos los resultados probables. Él hace gran parte del excelente trabajo de Robert Frank sobre el altruismo, la emoción y la economía, pero el libro que cita tenía 15 años cuando se publicó este libro. Fue idea de Bingham, amplificada por Frank y por Boyd y Richardson (1992) que la cooperación fue muy estimulada por la evolución de los medios para castigar a los tramposos. Los sugiere como ejemplos de enfoques darwinianos que son obligatorios y prometedores. en efecto, son, y de hecho son partes estándar de la teoría económica, evolutiva y cognitiva, pero desafortunadamente, hace poca referencia a la otra obra en estos campos. Todo ese trabajo tiende a mostrar que la gente no elige, 199 pero sus cerebros eligen para ellos (Sistema 1 "opciones" automáticas rápidas frente al sistema 2 "opciones" deliberativas lentas). No establece ninguna conexión convincente entre esta obra y el problema general de elección y como casi todos los filósofos no tiene comprensión de los dos poderosos sistemas de marco de pensamiento. Los filósofos de todas las rayas han sido hipnotizados por su capacidad de desacoplar los motores de inferencia para jugar ' lo que si ' juegos, amar a poner etiquetas contra intuitivas en las categorías ontológicas (es decir, si Sócrates era inmortal, etc.). En este sentido, comparten algunos elementos con la religión primitiva (véase Boyer). Esto no es una broma, ni un insulto, pero simplemente señala que una vez que uno tiene una comprensión de los conceptos cognitivos modernos, uno ve que se aplican a todo el espectro de la actividad humana (y sería extraño si no lo hacían). Pero como Wittgenstein explicó tan bellamente, los juegos de idiomas y los motores de inferencia de S2 tienen su límites--las explicaciones llegan a su fin--golpeamos el lecho de roca (S1). Pero el filósofo cree que puede ver más allá y sale al agua, o como lo puso Wittgenstein, en absoluta oscuridad. En la PG 216 dice que el hacerse a sí mismo para que uno no podría haber hecho otra cosa es una innovación clave en la ascensión evolutiva a la libre voluntad, y que sólo podemos ser libres si aprendemos cómo nos hacemos insensibles a las oportunidades. Una vez más, uno puede decir cualquier cosa menos que uno no puede significar (COS claro del estado) para cualquier cosa, y Dennett ni siquiera comienza a aclarar el COS. ¿Y cómo estos función ' habilidades ' (es decir, los juegos de ' voluntad ', ' auto ', ' elección ', ' causa ', etc.) Es nunca dejó claro. Dennett tiene la inclinación de esconder sus ideas en una cantidad masiva de texto bastante irrelevante (es decir, el es un verdadero filósofo!). Una vez más, se pone las cosas al revés, ya que hay un vasto cuerpo de evidencia muy buena de la biología y la psicología que tenemos los sentimientos que debemos comportarse de alguna manera de nuestros motores de inferencia, y estos no son proporcionados por alguna parte de nuestro yo consciente, sino por el funcionamiento automático e inconsciente de los motores. Como él señala, cientos de experimentos con el dilema del prisionero y protocolos relacionados han demostrado lo fácil que es manipular las decisiones de las personas y que sus cálculos no son conscientes y deliberados en absoluto y, de hecho, gran parte de los modernos psicológicos, sociológicos y neurola investigación de la economía se dedica a distinguir los automatismos de S1 del pensamiento deliberativo de S2 y mostrar cómo las reglas S1. Cuando la situación es manipulada para conciencia a la gente, son mucho más lentas y menos fiables (S2). Por lo tanto, ha habido una presión constante de selección natural para hacer los motores rápidos y automáticos e inaccesibles para el pensamiento deliberado. Dennett dice ' nos hacemos ' para que no pudiéramos hacer otra cosa y que esta es la base de la moralidad y la elección. La evidencia Es exactamente lo contrario. Nuestros 200 motores de inferencia nos dan intuiciones morales básicas y generalmente actuamos de acuerdo con los resultados. Si nosotros u otros no, sentimos culpa, indignación, resentimiento, etc., y luego los genes tramposo invadirán la población y esta es una de las principales teorías sobre cómo evolucionó una buena parte de la moralidad. Nuestros genes nos hacen para que no podamos (sobre todo) hacer lo contrario, no nuestra voluntad o lo que Dennett piense que puede hacerlo. A menudo podemos optar por hacer lo contrario, pero nuestras propias intuiciones y el conocimiento de la desaprobación social generalmente sirven para limitar nuestras elecciones. Estas intuiciones evolucionaron en pequeños grupos entre 50.000 y algunos millones de años atrás. En el mundo moderno, las intuiciones a menudo no son para nuestra ventaja a largo plazo y los controles sociales son débiles. Esta es una razón principal por el inexorable progreso hacia el caos en el mundo. En PG 225 finalmente se cuela en una definición de libre voluntad como un gruñido complicado de causas mecanisticas que parecen tomar decisiones (desde ciertos ángulos)". Él afirma que esto desempeña todos los papeles valiosos de libre voluntad, pero carece de algunas propiedades (no especificadas) poseídas por la voluntad tradicional libre. El humo es grueso, pero estoy bastante seguro de que una de esas propiedades no especificadas es lo que entendemos como opción. Él insiste (arriba de PG 226) que su relato naturalista de la toma de decisiones deja mucho espacio para la responsabilidad moral, pero el hecho de que no pudiéramos hacerlo de otra manera no describe la forma en que realmente funcionamos, ni deja ningún espacio para la moralidad, ya que eso consistiría precisamente en ser capaz de hacer lo contrario. No propone ninguna prueba para decidir si una elección es voluntaria o forzada y dudo que pueda hacerlo. Normalmente, si alguien nos pide que movamos nuestra mano, sabemos lo que cuenta como tener una opción, pero, típico de los filósofos, espero que, independientemente de si se mueve o no, contará como evidencia para su posición y, por supuesto, si todo cuenta, entonces nada cuenta como Wittgenstein tan aducían comentó muchas veces. En este punto también comienza su discusión sobre el trabajo bien conocido de Libet sobre la atención consciente, que es la única parte del libro que sentí que valía mi tiempo. Sin embargo, La afirmación de Libet de que hacemos decisiones sin conciencia ha sido desdeñada muchas veces, tanto por psicólogos como por filósofos (por ejemplo, Searle y Kihlstrom). En la página 253 y siguientes, él se cuela en su definición de voluntad consciente: la "ilusión de usuario de cerebros de sí misma que tiene como uno de sus principales papeles proporcionándome los medios para interactuar conmigo mismo en otras épocas ' '. Y ' ' ilusorio o no, la voluntad consciente es la guía de las personas a su propia responsabilidad moral para la acción. ' ' Dice el truco que necesitamos es ver que ' ' yo ' ' controlar lo que está sucediendo dentro de la ' ' barrera de simplificación ... donde ocurre la toma de decisiones . ' ' Eventos mentales ' se vuelven conscientes al ' entrar en la memoria . El proceso de auto descripción... es lo que somos . Lo crucial es que la elección es posible porque el yo se distribuye en el espacio (el cerebro) y el tiempo 201 (memorias). Se da cuenta de que esto va a dejar muchos incrédulos (todos los que pueden seguir esto y realmente entiende los juegos de idiomas extraños!). Sé que a muchas personas les resulta difícil captar esta idea o tomarlas en serio. Les parece que son un truco con espejos, algún tipo de mano verbal que susurra la conciencia, y el verdadero yo, fuera de la imagen justo cuando estaba a punto de ser introducido. muchos dirán que sacó las palabras de su boca, pero yo diría que es incoherente y que todo lo que sabemos sobre la conciencia y el universo entero (haciendo que las extensiones obvias de tales reclamaciones) se ha ido largo antes de que llegamos tan lejos en su tomo. Y una mirada cuidadosa a los juegos de idiomas muestra su falta de coherencia (es decir, no hay condiciones claras de satisfacción como señalo en mis artículos). Como la mayoría de los filosofos y casi todos los científicos que se enceran filosóficos, comete errores fatales en sus primeras oraciones – no usar el lenguaje en formas claras (es decir, significativas) y todo lo que sigue es una casa de naipes. Wittgenstein declaró el problema con su brillo aforístico habitual, así que lo repito de nuevo. "¿Cómo surge el problema filosófico sobre los procesos mentales y los Estados y sobre el Behaviorismo? – El primer paso es el que se escapa por completo del aviso. Hablamos de procesos y Estados y dejamos su naturaleza indeciso. En algún momento tal vez sabremos más sobre ellos, pensamos. Pero eso es justo lo que nos compromete a una forma particular de ver el asunto. Porque tenemos un concepto definido de lo que significa aprender a conocer mejor un proceso. (El movimiento decisivo en el truco de conjurar se ha hecho, y fue el mismo que pensamos bastante inocente). - Y ahora la analogía que nos hizo entender nuestros pensamientos cae en pedazos. así que, tenemos que negar el proceso aún sin comprender en el medio aún inexplorado. Y ahora parece como si hubiéramos negado los procesos mentales. Y naturalmente no queremos negarlos. W PI p308 En PG 259 dice que la cultura nos ha hecho animales racionales! Esta es una impresionante negación de la naturaleza humana (y animal) (es decir, la genética y la evolución) procedente de la persona que escribió Darwin ' la idea peligrosa ! Presumiblemente está hablando de su idea de que son los recuerdos repartidos por el espacio (el cerebro y otras personas) y el tiempo (al igual que los memes de Dawkins) que nos dan opciones y la moral y la conciencia (línea 6 de abajo). Él dice que la conciencia es una interfaz de usuario, pero nunca se aclara quién o Dónde está el usuario y cómo interactúa con el cerebro (usted tendrá que sufrir a través de la "conciencia explicada" para encontrar que no hay respuesta allí tampoco). A pesar de que hace muchas referencias a la psicología evolutiva y cognitiva, rara vez utiliza cualquiera de la terminología que ha sido actual durante décadas (mente social, psicología intuitiva, intuiciones coalicionales, etc.) y claramente no está familiarizado con la mayoría de los conceptos. Si quiere decir que tenemos los detalles finos de la moralidad de la cultura, está bien, pero esta es la guinda del S2 en el pastel y el pastel 202 S1 fue horneado por los genes. Aquí también se nos dice que R&D (por el que significa evolución aquí, pero otros cosas en otro lugar) nos ha dado el yo y ese lenguaje crea un nuevo tipo de conciencia y moralidad. Estoy seguro de que obtendrá poco acuerdo sobre esto. Parece bastante claro que la conciencia y los fundamentos de la moralidad evolucionaron en primates (y antes) mucho antes del lenguaje hablado (aunque es muy contencioso en cuanto a cómo el lenguaje evolucionó a partir de capacidades existentes en el cerebro). Él continúa ' ' los memes Morales surgieron por accidente algunas decenas de miles de años atrás ' ' que estaría bien si se refería a la guinda del pastel, pero claramente significa el pastel! Y luego dice que el punto de la moralidad no es la supervivencia de nuestros genes, que es una cosa increíble (y totalmente incorrecta) decir, incluso si sólo se refería a to Memes. En PG 260 afirma que debido a que no comprenden nuestras "disposiciones sosas para cooperar , no significan nada para nosotros, pero es la operación de nuestras plantillas (es decir, altruismo recíproco promoviendo la aptitud inclusiva) eso es todo para nosotros y a todas las acciones de todos los animales. Como Dawkins recientemente señaló en sus comentarios sobre el desastroso trabajo reciente de E. O Wilson apoyando el fantasma de ' selección de grupo ', la selección natural es la aptitud inclusiva (ver mi revisión de Wilson ' la conquista social de la tierra '). Hay una amplia evidencia de que si una de nuestras muchas "plantillas" está dañada, una persona no puede funcionar correctamente como un ser social (por ejemplo, autismo, sociopatía, sczhizophrenia). Yo diría que es la operación de las plantillas para la psicología intuitiva, etc., que conducen personas cuando filosofar a las opiniones contraintuitivo que no tenemos conciencia y elección. También dice aquí que fue una de las mayores transiciones evolutivas cuando pudimos cambiar nuestras opiniones y reflexionar sobre las razones de ellas. Esto refleja de nuevo su falta de comprensión de la psicología evolutiva. No sé de ninguna evidencia que las intuiciones morales básicas, como todas las plantillas, sean accesibles a la conciencia, pero hay un gran cuerpo de trabajo mostrando lo opuesto. Podemos decidir que nuestro engaño fue justificable, o perdonar la trampa de alguien más, pero todavía sabemos que era trampa (es decir, no podemos cambiar el motor). Sospecho que mis antepasados hace un millón de años tenían los mismos sentimientos en la misma situación, pero lo que ha sucedido es que ahora hay muchas otras cosas que se pueden tomar como relevantes, y que a veces Esto me llevará a actuar en contra de mis sentimientos. Otra cuestión es que a medida que la cultura se desarrollaba, uno tenía que tomar muchas decisiones importantes o "de tipo moral" para las cuales los motores no evolucionaron para dar una respuesta clara. En PG 267 dice que ahora reemplazamos nuestros "fundamentos flotantes libres" (probablemente correspondiendo a lo que los psicólogos cognitivos llaman nuestras plantillas o motores de inferencia) con reflexión y persuasión mutua. Y en la PG 286 dice que es una crianza de un niño--exigiendo y dando razones-que afecta la moral Razonamiento. Una vez más, simplemente no tiene conocimiento de lo que ha 203 sucedido en los últimos 30 años de investigación-las plantillas son automatismos S1 innatos y no pueden cambiar con la reflexión o la crianza. Entonces se nos dice de nuevo que la conciencia hace que las cuestiones morales estén disponibles con el tiempo para el yo, que asume la responsabilidad. No es más coherente o creíble con la repetición. En la PG 289 tiene un resumen del capítulo que repite las nociones erróneas de que es la cultura lo que hace posible reflexionar y esa elección depende de la educación (memoria) y el compartir. Está claro que no es la cultura sino las estructuras cognitivas heredadas las que hacen posible reflexionar y elegir y esa cultura determina las acciones aceptables y sus recompensas o castigos. En la pág. 303 discute la clásica barrera filosófica entre ought and is (debería y es), sin saber que nuestras plantillas resolvieron ese problema hace mucho tiempo - es decir, nos dicen cómo sentir acerca de las situaciones con respecto a otras personas. También parece no ser consciente de que hay cientos de universales "culturales" implantados en nuestros genes (por ejemplo, ver la pizarra en blanco de Pinker) y también del papel clásico de Searle "cómo derivar lo que se debe de es". A menudo comienza en lo que parece que va a ser una buena discusión de algunos temas en la psicología evolutiva, pero invariablemente se deambula en Arcana filosófico y termina con más confusión. Esto sucede en la pág. 261 donde afirma que conceptos como "elogiables" fueron formados a lo largo de milenios por la cultura, mientras que la mayoría diría que la base de tales conceptos es en los genes y cada cultura sólo determina los detalles de las reacciones aceptables a las intuiciones su los miembros obtienen de sus mecanismos innatos. En PG 262 trata de explicar cómo una ESS (estrategia evolucionariamente estable) puede producir moralidad. Su idea aquí es que la genética ' R&D ' (es decir, evolución) produce un entendimiento tenue de la moral y luego la cultura (memética) produce variaciones y aclaraciones. Yo diría que todos sabemos, y mucha investigación ha hecho claro, que comúnmente tenemos resultados muy claros de nuestros motores de inferencia y sólo vagamente entender en casos especiales. La cultura simplemente decide qué podemos hacer con nuestros sentimientos. La última parte del libro se refiere principalmente a la culpabilidad moral. Se refiere al clásico legal de Hart y Honore, que empecé a leer hace 30 años, desde que sus autores fueron profundamente influenciados por Wittgenstein. Dennett nos dice que tenemos control sobre nuestra propia moralidad y que pensar en la moralidad nos va a mejorar. Pero, parece que no hay justificación alguna para esta opinión en este libro. No hay nada aquí para ayudar a nadie a escapar de los dictados de la mente del mono y estoy muy seguro de que cuando la civilización industrial colapse en el siglo 22 la gente actuará como sus antepasados hicieron hace 200.000 años. Es un punto de vista defendible que aquellos que logran escapar lo hacen por viajando por un sendero espiritual que no tiene ninguna conexión con la filosofía -y no hay un indicio de espiritualidad en todo este libro-otro punto revelador teniendo en cuenta que muchos místicos tienen cosas fascinantes que decir sobre el funcionamiento de la mente. Encuentro más sabiduría sobre cómo ser libre y moral en cualquiera de los 200 libros 204 y cintas de Osho que en cualquier parte de la filosofía. Como era de esperar, rara vez se encuentra espiritualmente y moralmente avanzada personas enseñando en las universidades. No hay señal aquí, ni en nada que ha hecho, que Dennett es moralmente superior. Después de 40 años de pensamiento sobre la moralidad, lanza ataques personales a sus críticos o los rechaza arrogantemente. Parece claro que, como todos nosotros, está atrapado en los límites de sus motores de inferencia. Entonces, ¿cuánta oportunidad hay para mejorar nuestra moralidad? Parece claro (por ejemplo, ver ' la pizarra en blanco ' de Pinker) que la mayor parte de nuestro comportamiento es genético y el resto debido a factores desconocidos en nuestro entorno, a pesar del esfuerzo vigorosos de padres y religiones y partidos políticos. En promedio, tal vez el 5% de la variación en el comportamiento moral (las variaciones son lo único que podemos estudiar) se debe a nuestros propios esfuerzos (cultura). Las decisiones morales que más importan hoy son las que afectan el destino del mundo. Pero nuestras plantillas no evolucionaron para lidiar con la sobrepoblación (excepto por asesinato) y el cambio climático (excepto por mudarse a otro lugar y matar a cualquier oposición). Qué notable sería si sólo uno de los cientos de millones de personas educadas en el mundo lograron averiguar qué conciencia o elección o cualquier fenómeno mental realmente es (es decir, cómo describir sus correlatos neurofisiológicos). Y si uno lo hiciera, esperaríamos que fueran un científico a la vanguardia de la investigación utilizando algunos equipos exóticos de fMRI y la última computadora lógica difusa en red neuronal de procesamiento en paralelo, etc. Y eso sólo significaría que especifican los circuitos neuronales y bioquímica/genética. así que, no pueden contestar el preguntas de la filosofía (los juegos de lenguaje de la psicología descriptiva del pensamiento de orden superior). Pero no necesita respuesta, como la existencia del espacio, el tiempo, la materia, es sólo la forma en que las cosas son y el trabajo del filósofo es aclarar los juegos de idiomas que podemos jugar con estas palabras. Pero, un filósofo o físicost sentado pensando en venir con un científico solución al mayor rompecabezas científico que hay! Y luego escribir un libro entero sobre ello sin consultar primero con los escépticos. Para volver a la cita al principio--ambición es la muerte del pensamiento . De hecho-aunque claramente Wittgenstein estaba pensando en el pensamiento profundo! 205 Reseña de Soy un Bucle Extraño ( I am a Strange Loop) de Douglas Hofstadter (2007) (revisión revisada 2019) Michael Starks Abstracto Último sermón de la iglesia del naturalismo fundamentalista por el pastor Hofstadter. Al igual que su mucho más famoso (o infame por sus incesantemente errores filosóficos) trabajo Godel, Escher, Bach, tiene una plausibilidad superficial, pero si se entiende que se trata de un científico rampante que mezcla problemas científicos reales con los filosóficos (es decir, el sólo los problemas reales son los juegos de idiomas que debemos jugar) entonces casi todo su interés desaparece. Proporciono un marco para el análisis basado en la psicología evolutiva y el trabajo de Wittgenstein (ya actualizado en mis escritos más recientes). Aquellos que deseen un marco completo hasta la fecha para el comportamiento humano de la moderna dos sistemas punto de vista puede consultar mi libro 'La Estructura Lógica de la Filosofía, la Psicología, la Mente y Lenguaje en Ludwig Wittgenstein y John Searle ' 2nd Ed (2019). Los interesados en más de mis escritos pueden ver 'Monos parlantes--filosofía, psicología, ciencia, religión y política en un planeta condenado--artículos y reseñas 2006-2019 3rd Ed (2019) y delirios utópicos suicidas en el 21St Century 4TH Ed (2019) Ii am a strange loop "Podría ser justamente preguntado qué importancia tiene la prueba de Gödel para nuestro trabajo. Para un pedazo de matemáticas no puede resolver problemas del tipo que nos molesten. --La respuesta es que la situación, en la que tal prueba nos trae, es de interés para nosotros. ' ¿Qué vamos a decir ahora? ' --Ese es nuestro tema. Sin embargo, extraña que suene, mi tarea en lo que concierne a la prueba de Gödel parece meramente consistir en aclarar lo que tal proposición como: "Supongamos que esto se puede demostrar" significa en matemáticas. " Wittgenstein "Comentarios sobre los fundamentos de las matemáticas" p337 (1956) (escrito en 1937). "Mis teoremas sólo muestran que la mecanización de las matemáticas, es decir, la eliminación de la mente y de las entidades abstractas, es imposible, si uno quiere tener una base satisfactoria y un sistema de matemáticas. No he probado que haya preguntas matemáticas que sean indescifrables para la mente humana, pero sólo que no hay máquina (o formalismo ciego) que pueda decidir todas las preguntas de la teoría numérica, (incluso de un tipo muy especial) .... No es la estructura misma de los sistemas deductivos que está siendo amenazado con un descompostura, sino sólo una cierta interpretación de la misma, es decir, su interpretación como un formalismo ciego. " Gödel "obras recogidas" VOL 5, p 176-177. (2003) 206 "Toda inferencia tiene lugar a priori. Los acontecimientos del futuro no pueden deducirse de los del presente. La superstición es la creencia en el nexo causal. La libertad de la voluntad consiste en el hecho de que las acciones futuras no se pueden conocer ahora. Sólo podíamos conocerlas si la causalidad fuera una necesidad interna, como la de la deducción lógica. --La conexión del conocimiento y lo que se conoce es la necesidad lógica. ("A sabe que p es el caso" no tiene sentido si p es una tautología.) Si por el hecho de que una proposición es obvia para nosotros, no sigue que es verdad, entonces la evidencia no es ninguna justificación para creer en su verdad. " TLP 5,133- -5,1363 "Ahora bien, si no son las conexiones causales que nos preocupan, entonces las actividades de la mente están abiertas ante nosotros." Wittgenstein "el libro azul" P6 (1933) "Sentimos que incluso cuando todas las preguntas científicas posibles han sido contestadas, los problemas de la vida permanecen completamente intactos. Por supuesto, entonces no quedan preguntas, y esto en sí mismo es la respuesta. " Wittgenstein TLP 6,52 (1922) He leído algunos 50 Comentarios de estos libros (que por el físico cuántico David Deutsch era quizás el mejor) y ninguno de ellos proporciona un marco satisfactorio, por lo que intentaré dar comentarios novedosos que serán útiles, no sólo para este libro, sino para cualquier libro en las Ciencias del comportamiento (que puede incluir cualquier libro, si uno agarra las ramificaciones). Como su clásico Gödel, Escher, Bach: el Eterna trenza dorada, y muchos de sus otros escritos, este libro de Hofstadter (H) trata de encontrar correlaciones o conexiones o analogías que arrojan luz sobre la conciencia y toda la experiencia humana. Como en GEB, pasa una gran cantidad de tiempo explicando y dibujando analogías con los famosos teoremas "incompletos" de Gödel, el arte "recursivo" de Escher y las "paradojas" del lenguaje (aunque, como con la mayoría de la gente, no ve la necesidad para poner estos términos en Comillas, y este es el núcleo del problema). La idea es que sus aparentemente extrañas consecuencias se deben a "bucles extraños" y que tales bucles son de alguna manera operativos en nuestro cerebro. En particular, pueden "dar lugar" a nuestro yo, que parece más o menos equipara con la conciencia y el pensamiento. Al igual que con todos, cuando empieza a hablar de cómo funciona su mente, se va seriamente descarriado. Sugiero que es para encontrar las razones de esto que el interés en este libro, y el comentario más general sobre el comportamiento se encuentra. Voy a contrastar las ideas de ISL con las del filósofo (psicólogo descriptivo del pensamiento de orden superior) Ludwig Wittgenstein (W), cuyos comentarios sobre la psicología, escritos de 1912 a 1951, nunca han sido superados por su profundidad y claridad. Es un pionero sin reconocimiento en la psicología evolutiva (EP) y desarrollador del concepto moderno de intencionalidad. Señaló que el problema fundamental en la filosofía es que no vemos nuestros procesos mentales innatos 207 automáticos y cómo estos generan nuestros juegos de idiomas. Él dio muchas ilustraciones (uno puede considerar las 20.000 páginas enteras de su nachlass como una ilustración), algunos de ellos para palabras como "es" y "esto", y observó que todos los problemas realmente básicos generalmente se deslizan sin comentarios. Un punto importante que desarrolló fue que casi toda nuestra intencionalidad (más o menos, nuestra psicología evolutiva (EP), racionalidad o personalidad) es invisible para nosotros y tales partes como entrar en nuestra conciencia son en gran parte epifenomenales (es decir, irrelevante para nuestro comportamiento). El hecho de que nadie pueda describir sus procesos mentales de manera satisfactoria, que esto es universal, que estos procesos son rápidos y automáticos y muy complejos, nos dice que son parte de los módulos cognitivos "ocultos" (plantillas o motores de inferencia) que se han fijado gradualmente en el ADN animal durante más de 500 millones años. Por favor, vea mis otros escritos para más detalles. Como en prácticamente todos los escritos que tratan de explicar el comportamiento (filosofía, psicología, sociología, antropología, historia, política, teología, e incluso, como con H, matemáticas y física), soy un bucle estrano (I am a strange loop -ISL) comete este tipo de error (olvido de nuestra automaticidad) continuamente y esto produce los rompecabezas que luego intenta resolver. El título de ISL comprende palabras que todos conocemos, pero como indicó W, los usos de palabras se pueden ver como familias de juegos de idiomas (gramática) que tienen muchos sentidos (usos o significados), cada uno con sus propios contextos. Sabemos lo que estos son en la práctica, pero si tratamos de describirlos o filosofar (teorizando) acerca de ellos, casi siempre nos desviamos y decimos cosas que pueden parecer tener sentido pero carecen del contexto para darles sentido. Nunca cruza la mente de Hofstadter que tanto "extraño" como "loop" están fuera de contexto y carecen de un sentido claro (para no decir nada sobre "yo" y "soy"!). Si vas a Wikipedia, encuentras muchos usos (juegos como W decía a menudo) para estas palabras y si miras a tu alrededor en ISL, los encontrarás referidos como si fueran todos uno. de la misma manera, para "consciencia", "realidad", "paradoja", "recursiva", "autorreferencial", etc. Por lo tanto, estamos irremediablemente a la deriva de la primera página, como esperaba del título. Un lazo en una cuerda puede tener un sentido muy claro y también un diagrama de un ciclo de retroalimentación del gobernador del motor de vapor, pero ¿qué pasa con los bucles en las matemáticas y la mente? H no ve el "lazo más extraño" de todos-que utilizamos nuestra conciencia, el yo y la voluntad de negarse a sí mismos! En cuanto a los famosos teoremas de Gödel's, ¿en qué sentido pueden ser bucles? Lo que se supone casi universalmente que muestran es que ciertos tipos básicos de sistemas matemáticos son incompletos en el sentido de que hay teoremas "verdaderos" del sistema cuya "verdad" (la desafortunada palabra matemàticos comúnmente sustituyen a la validez) o " falsedad (invalidez) no puede probarse en el sistema. Aunque H no le dice, estos teoremas son lógicamente equivalentes a la solución "incompleta" de Turing del famoso problema de detención para los equipos que realizan un cálculo arbitrario. Él pasa mucho tiempo explicando la prueba original 208 de Gödel's, pero no menciona que otros posteriormente encontraron pruebas mucho más cortas y más simples de "incompleta" en matemáticas y demostraron muchos conceptos relacionados. El que menciona brevemente es el del matemático contemporáneo Gregory Chaitin, un originador con Kolmogorov y otros de la teoría de la información algorítmica, que ha demostrado que tal "incompleto" o "aleatoriedad" (término de Chaitin--aunque este es otro juego), es mucho más extenso que el pensamiento prolongado, pero no te dice que los resultados de Gödel's y Turing son corolarios del teorema de Chaitin y una instancia de "aleatoriedad algorítmica". Usted debe referirse a Chaitin más escritos recientes como "el número Omega (2005) ", como la única referencia de Hofstadter a Chaitin es de 20 años de edad (aunque Chaitin no tiene más comprensión de los problemas más grandes aquí-es decir, la intencionalidad innata como la fuente de los juegos de idiomas en matemáticas-que H y comparte la fantasía del ' universo es una computadora ' también). Hofstadter toma este "incompleto" (otra palabra (conceptual) juego fuera de contexto) para significar que el sistema es auto referencial o "loop" y "extraño". No está claro por qué tener teoremas que parecen ser (o son) verdaderos (es decir, válido) en el sistema, pero no es demostrable en él, lo convierte en un bucle ni por qué esto califica como extraño ni por qué esto tiene alguna relación con cualquier otra cosa. Fue mostrado bastante convincente por Wittgenstein en la década de 1930 (es decir, poco después de la prueba de Gödel's) que la mejor manera de mirar esta situación es como un juego de lenguaje típico (aunque uno nuevo para las matemáticas en ese momento) - es decir, los teoremas "verdaderos pero no puede comprobar" son "verdaderos" en un sentido diferente (ya que requieren nuevos axiomas para probarlos). Pertenecen a un sistema diferente, o como deberíamos decir ahora, a un contexto intencional diferente. Sin incompletitud, sin bucles, sin auto referencia y definitivamente no es extraño! W: "la proposición de Gödel, que afirma algo sobre sí misma, no se menciona a sí misma" y "podría decirse: Gödel dice que uno también debe ser capaz de confiar en una prueba matemática cuando uno quiere concebirlo prácticamente, como la prueba de que el patrón proposicional puede construirse de acuerdo con las reglas de la prueba? O: una proposición matemática debe ser capaz de ser concebido como una proposición de una geometría que es realmente aplicable a sí mismo. Y si se hace esto surge que en ciertos casos no es posible confiar en una prueba. " (RFM p336). Estas observaciones apenas dan una pista a la profundidad de la visión de W en la intencionalidad matemática, que comenzó con sus primeros escritos en 1912 pero fue más evidente en sus escritos en los años 30 y 40. W es considerado como un escritor difícil y opaco debido a su estilo aforístico, telegráfico y constante saltando con rara vez un aviso que ha cambiado de tema, ni de hecho lo que el tópico es, pero si uno comienza con su único trabajo de estilo de libro de texto-los libros azul y marrón-y entiende que él está explicando cómo funciona nuestro pensamiento de orden superior evolucionado, todo se hará claro para los persistentes. W dio conferencias sobre estos temas en la década de 1930 y esto ha sido documentado en varios de sus libros. Hay otros comentarios en alemán en su nachlass (algunos de ellos anteriormente disponibles sólo en un $1000 CDROM pero ahora, 209 como casi todas sus obras, en P2P Torrents, libgen.io y b-ok.org. El filósofo canadiense Victor Rodych ha escrito recientemente dos artículos sobre W y Gödel en la revista Erkenntnis y otros 4 en W y matemáticas, que creo que constituyen un resumen definitivo de W y los fundamentos de las matemáticas. Se pone a descansar la noción anteriormente popular de que W no entendía incompleta (y mucho más concerniente a la psicología de las matemáticas). De hecho, por lo que puedo ver W es uno de muy pocos hasta el día de hoy que hace (y no incluyendo a Gödel! - aunque vea su penetrante comentario citado arriba). Las formas relacionadas de "paradoja" que ejercen H (e innumerables otras) fueron ampliamente discutidas por W con ejemplos en matemáticas y lenguaje y me parece una consecuencia natural de la evolución fragmentaria de nuestras habilidades simbólicas que se extiende también a la música, el arte, juegos, etc. Aquellos que deseen opiniones contrarias los encontrarán en todas partes y con respecto a W y matemáticas, pueden consultar a Chihara en la revisión filosófica V86, p365-81 (1977). Me tienen mucho respeto por Chihara (soy uno de pocos que han leído su portada de "una cuenta estructural de matemáticas" para cubrir) pero él fracasa en muchos temas básicos como las explicaciones de W de paradojas como inevitables y casi siempre inofensivas facetas de nuestro EP. Años después de que hice esta revisión original escribí uno en Yanofsky ' más allá de los límites del pensamiento ' y en los siguientes párrafos repito aquí los comentarios sobre la incompleta que hice allí. De hecho, toda la revisión es relevante, especialmente las observaciones sobre Wolpert. En cuanto a Godel y "incompleta", ya que nuestra psicología expresada en sistemas simbólicos como las matemáticas y el lenguaje es "aleatoria" o "incompleto" y está llena de tareas o situaciones ("problemas") que han sido demostradas imposibles (es decir, no tienen solución-ver abajo) o cuya naturaleza no está clara, parece inevitable que todo lo derivado de ella - e. g. física y matemática) también sea "incompleto". AFAIK el primero de ellos en lo que ahora se llama teoría de la elección social o teoría de la decisión (que son continuos con el estudio de la lógica y el razonamiento y la filosofía) fue el famoso teorema de Kenneth Arrow más de 60 años atrás, y ha habido muchos desde entonces. Y señala una imposibilidad reciente o prueba incompleta en dosTeoría de juegos de persona. En estos casos, una prueba muestra que lo que parece una simple opción indicada en inglés simple no tiene solución. Aunque uno no puede escribir un libro sobre todo, me hubiera gustado Yanofsky al menos mencionar esas famosas "paradotas" como la bella durmiente (disuelta por Rupert Read), el problema de Newcomb (disuelto por Wolpert) y Doomsday, donde lo que parece ser un problema muy simple, o bien no tiene una respuesta clara, o resulta excepcionalmente difícil de encontrar uno. Existe una montaña de literatura sobre los dos teoremas "incompletos" de Godel y el trabajo más reciente de Chaitin, pero creo que los escritos de W en los años 30 y 40 son definitivos. Aunque Shanker, Mancosu, Floyd, Marion, Rodych, Gefwert, Wright y otros han hecho un trabajo perspicaz, es sólo recientemente que el análisis de la penetración única de W de los juegos de idiomas que se juegan en matemáticas han sido clarificados por Floyd (por ejemplo, ' El argumento diagonal de Wittgenstein-una variación en Cantor y Turing '), Berto (por 210 ejemplo, ' la paradoja de Godel y las razones de Wittgenstein, y ' Wittgenstein en la incompleta hace que el sentido paraconsistente ' y el libro ' hay algo sobre Godel ', y Rodych (por ejemplo, Wittgenstein y Godel: los comentarios recién publicados ', ' malentendido Gödel: nuevos argumentos sobre Wittgenstein ', ' nuevos comentarios de Wittgenstein ' y su artículo en la enciclopedia en línea de Stanford de filosofía ' filosofía de las matemáticas de Wittgenstein '). Berto es uno de los mejores filósofos recientes, y aquellos con el tiempo podrían desear consultar sus muchos otros artículos y libros, incluyendo el volumen que co-editó en paraconsistencia (2013). El trabajo de Rodych es indispensable, pero sólo dos de una docena de documentos son gratuitos en línea con la búsqueda habitual, pero por supuesto todo es gratis en línea si uno sabe dónde buscar (p. ej., libgen.io y b-ok.org). Berto señala que W también negó la coherencia de metamatemática--es decir, el uso por parte de Godel de un metateorema para probar su teorema, probablemente la contabilización de su interpretación "notoria" del teorema de Godel como una paradoja, y si aceptamos su argumento, creo que nos vemos obligados a negar la inteligibilidad de metalenguajes, metateorías y meta cualquier otra cosa. ¿Cómo puede ser que tales conceptos (palabras) como metamatemático e incompletitud, aceptada por millones (e incluso reclamados por no menos de Penrose, Hawking, Dyson et al para revelar verdades fundamentales sobre nuestro mente o el universo) son simples malentendidos acerca de cómo funciona el lenguaje? ¿No es la prueba en este pudin que, como tantas nociones filosóficas "reveladoras" (por ejemplo, la mente y la voluntad como ilusiones-Dennett, Carruthers, las Churchlands etc.), no tienen ningún impacto práctico en absoluto? Berto lo resume muy bien: "dentro de este marco, no es posible que la misma frase... resulta ser expresable, pero indescifrable, en un sistema formal... y demostrablemente cierto (bajo la hipótesis de coherencia antes mencionada) en un sistema diferente (el meta-sistema). Si, como sostiene Wittgenstein, la prueba establece el significado mismo de la sentencia probada, entonces no es posible que la misma frase (es decir, una frase con el mismo significado) sea indescifrable en un sistema formal, sino que se decida en un sistema diferente (el meta-sistema) ... Wittgenstein tuvo que rechazar tanto la idea de que un sistema formal puede estar incompleto sintácticamente, como la consecuencia platónica de que ningún sistema formal que demuestre sólo verdades aritméticas puede probar todas las verdades aritméticas. Si las pruebas establecen el significado de las oraciones aritméticas, entonces no puede haber sistemas incompletos, así como no puede haber significados incompletos. " Y además "aritméticos incoherentes, es decir, aritméticos no clásicos basados en una lógica paraconsistente, son hoy en día una realidad. Lo que es más importante, las características teóricas de tales teorías coinciden precisamente con algunas de las intuiciones de Wittgensteinian antes mencionadas... Su inconsistencia les permite también escapar del primer teorema de Godel, y del resultado de la indecisión de la Church: eles son, eso es decir, demostrablemente completas y decidible. Por lo tanto, cumplen precisamente la solicitud de Wittgenstein, según la cual no puede haber problemas matemáticos que puedan formularse de manera significativa en el sistema, pero que las normas del sistema no pueden decidir. Por lo tanto, la decibilidad de la aritmética paraconsistente armoniza con una opinión que Wittgenstein mantuvo durante su carrera filosófica. " 211 W también demostró el error fatal en relación con las matemáticas o el lenguaje o nuestro comportamiento en general como un sistema lógico coherente unitario, en lugar de como un variopinto de piezas ensambladas por los procesos aleatorios de selección natural. "Godel nos muestra un poco de claridad en el concepto de ' matemáticas ', que se indica por el hecho de que las matemáticas se toman como un sistema" y podemos decir (contra casi todo el mundo) que es todo lo que Godel y Chaitin muestran. W comentó muchas veces que la ' verdad ' en matemáticas significa axiomas o teoremas derivados de axiomas, y ' falso ' significa que uno cometió un error en el uso de las definiciones, y esto es completamente diferente de los asuntos empíricos donde uno aplica una prueba. W a menudo señaló que para ser aceptable como matemáticas en el sentido habitual, debe ser utilizable en otras pruebas y debe tener aplicaciones del mundo real, pero tampoco es el caso con la incompletitud de Godel. Puesto que no se puede probar en un sistema consistente (aquí la aritmética de Peano pero una arena mucho más amplia para Chaitin), no se puede utilizar en pruebas y, a diferencia de todo el ' resto ' de PA, tampoco se puede utilizar en el mundo real. Como Rodych notas "... Wittgenstein sostiene que un cálculo formal es sólo un cálculo matemático (es decir, un juego de lenguaje matemático) si tiene una aplicación extra-sistémica en un sistema de proposiciones contingentes (por ejemplo, en el conteo ordinario y la medición o en la física) ..." Otra manera de decir esto es que uno necesita una orden para aplicar nuestro uso normal de palabras como ' prueba ', ' proposición ', ' verdadero ', ' incompleto ', ' número ', y ' matemáticas ' a un resultado en la maraña de juegos creados con ' números ' y ' más ' y ' menos ' signos, etc., y con ' Incompletitud ' esta orden carece. Rodych lo resume admirablemente. "En la cuenta de Wittgenstein, no hay tal cosa como un cálculo matemático incompleto porque ' en matemáticas, todo es algoritmo [y la sintaxis] y nada significa [semántica]... " W tiene mucho lo mismo que decir de la Diagonalización de cantor y la teoría del conjunto. "La consideración del procedimiento diagonal le hace pensar que el concepto de ' número real ' tiene mucho menos analogía con el concepto ' número cardinal ' que nosotros, siendo engañados por ciertas analogías, que se inclinan a creer" y muchos otros comentarios (véase Rodych y Floyd). En cualquier caso, parecería que el hecho de que el resultado de Gödel ha tenido cero impacto en las matemáticas (excepto para evitar que la gente intente probar la integridad!) debería haber alertado a H de su trivialidad y de la "extrañeza" de intentar que sea una base para cualquier cosa. Sugiero que sea considerado como otro juego conceptual que nos muestra los límites de nuestra psicología. Por supuesto, todas las matemáticas, la física y el comportamiento humano pueden ser aprovechamente tomadas de esta manera. Mientras que en el tema de W, debemos tener en cuenta que otra obra en la que H pasa mucho tiempo es Whitehead y el clásico de Russell de lógica matemática "Principia Mathematica", principalmente porque fue al menos en parte responsable del trabajo de Gödel que condujo a sus teoremas. W había pasado del estudiante de lógica inicial de Russell a su maestro en aproximadamente un año, y Russell lo había 212 escogido para reescribir los Principia. Pero W tuvo grandes dudas sobre todo el proyecto (y toda la filosofía que resultó) y, cuando regresó a la filosofía en los años 30, demostró que la idea de fundar matemáticas (o racionalidad) en la lógica era un error profundo. W es uno de los filósofos más famosos del mundo e hizo extensos comentarios sobre Gödel y los fundamentos de las matemáticas y la mente; es pionera en EP (aunque nadie parece darse cuenta de esto); el descubridor del esquema básico y el funcionamiento del pensamiento de mayor orden y mucho más, y es asombroso que Dennett & H, después de medio siglo de estudio, son completamente ajenos a los pensamientos de la mayor Intuitiva psicólogo de todos los tiempos (aunque tienen casi 8 mil millones para la compañía). Hay, como algunos han comentado, una amnesia colectiva con respecto a W no sólo en Psicología (para la cual sus obras deberían estar en servicio universal como textos y manuales de laboratorio) sino en todas las ciencias conductuales incluyendo, sorprendentemente, la filosofía. La Asociación de H con Daniel Dennett (D), otro famoso escritor confundido en la mente, ciertamente no ha hecho nada para ayudarle a aprender nuevas perspectivas en los casi 30 años desde GEB. A pesar del hecho de que D ha escrito un libro sobre intencionalidad (un campo que, en su versión moderna, fue creado esencialmente por W), H parece no tener conocimiento de ello en absoluto. Las percepciones que conducen a recuerdos, alimentándose en disposiciones (inclinaciones) (Los términos de W, también utilizados por Searle, pero llamados "actitudes proposicionales por otros) como creer y suponer, que no son Estados mentales y no tienen una duración precisa, etc., son avances trascendentes en la comprensión de cómo funciona nuestra mente, que W descubrió en los años 20, pero con hilos volviendo a sus escritos antes de la primera guerra mundial. La trenza dorada eterna no se realiza por H para ser nuestra Psicología evolutiva innata, ahora, 150 años tarder (es decir, desde Darwin), convirtiéndose en un campo floreciente que está fusionando la psicología, la ciencia cognitiva, la economía, la sociología, la antropología, la ciencia política, la religión, la música (por ejemplo, G. Mazzola de "el topos de la música" - topos son sustitutos de los sets, uno de los grandes libros de ciencia (psicología) del siglo 21, aunque no tiene idea sobre W y la mayoría de los puntos en esta revisión), arte, matemáticas, física y literatura. H ha ignorado o rechazado a muchas personas que uno podría considerar como nuestros mejores maestros en el Reino de la mente - W, Buda, John Lilly, John Searle, Osho, ADI da (ver su "la rodilla de la escucha"), Alexander Shulgin y muchos otros. La gran mayoría de los conocimientos de la filosofía, así como los de la física cuántica, la probabilidad, la meditación, el EP, la psicología cognitiva y los psicodélicos no puntuan ni siquiera una referencia pasajera aquí (ni en la mayoría de los escritos filosóficos de los científicos). Aunque hay algunos buenos libros en su bibliografía, hay muchos que consideraría referencias estándar y cientos de obras importantes en ciencias cognitivas, EP, matemáticas y probabilidad, y filosofía de la mente y la ciencia que no están allí (ni en sus otros escritos). Su francotiradores en Searle es mezquino y sin sentido: la frustración de alguien que no tiene comprensión de los problemas reales. En mi 213 opinión, ni H ni nadie más ha proporcionado una razón convincente para rechazar la Argumento de la habitación China (el artículo más famoso en este campo) que las computadoras no piensan (no es que nunca pueden hacer algo que podríamos querer llamar pensar-que Searle admite es posible). Y Searle (en mi opinión) organizó y extendió el trabajo de W en libros como "la construcción de la realidad social" y "racionalidad en acción"--brillantes sumas de la organización de HOT (pensamiento de orden superior - i. e., intencionalidad) - libros de filosofía raros que incluso puede tener un sentido perfecto de una vez que traduzcas una pequeña jerga al inglés! H, D y muchos otros en la ciencia cognitiva y la IA están indignados con Searle porque tenía la temeridad de desafiar (destruir-yo diría) su filosofía básica-la teoría computacional de la mente (CTM) hace casi 30 años y continúa señalarlo (aunque uno puede decir que W lo destruyó antes de que existiera). Claro, ellos (casi) todos rechazan la sala China o simplemente lo ignoran, pero el argumento es, a juicio de muchos, incontestable. El reciente artículo de Shani (mentes y máquinas V15, P207-228 (2005)) es un bonito Resumen de la situación con referencias al excelente trabajo de Bickhard sobre este tema. Bickhard también ha desarrollado una teoría de la mente más realista que utiliza la termodinámica de no equilibrio, en lugar de los conceptos de Hofstadter de la psicología intencional utilizado fuera de los contextos necesarios para darles sentido. Pocos se dan cuenta de que W de nuevo anticipó a todos en estos temas con numerosos comentarios sobre lo que ahora llamamos CTM, AI o inteligencia de la máquina, e incluso hizo experimentos con personas haciendo "traducciones" al chino. Me había dado cuenta de esto (e innumerables otros paralelos estrechos con el trabajo de Searle) cuando llegué sobre el papel de Diane Proudfoot en W y la habitación China en el libro "vistas a la habitación China" (2005). También se pueden encontrar muchas gemas relacionadas con estos temas en la edición de Cora Diamond de las notas tomadas en las primeras conferencias de W sobre matemáticas "conferencias de Wittgenstein sobre los fundamentos de las matemáticas, Cambridge 1934 (1976). Los propios "Comentarios sobre los fundamentos de las matemáticas" de W cubren un terreno similar. Uno de los pocos que ha examinado las opiniones de W sobre esto en detalle es Christopher Gefwert, cuyo excelente libro pionero "Wittgenstein en mentes, máquinas y matemáticas" (1995), es Casi ignorados universalmente. A pesar de que estaba escribiendo antes de que hubiera un pensamiento serio sobre los ordenadores electrónicos o robots, W se dio cuenta de que el problema básico aquí es muy simple- --las computadoras carecen de una psicología (e incluso 70 años después tenemos apenas una pista de cómo darles una), y es sólo en el contexto de un ser con una intencionalidad totalmente desarrollada que los términos de la disposicional como pensar, creer, etc. tienen sentido (tienen un significado o claro COS), y como de costumbre lo resumió todo en su forma aforística única "Pero una máquina sin duda no puede pensar! --¿Es una declaración empírica? No. Sólo decimos de un ser humano y lo que es como uno que piensa. También lo decimos de muñecas y sin duda de espíritus también. Mira la palabra "pensar" como una herramienta. " (Investigaciones filosóficas P113). Fuera de contexto, muchos de los comentarios de W pueden parecer insípidos o simplemente equivocados, pero los perspicaces encontrarán que usualmente pagan una reflexión prolongada - él no era el tonto de nadie. 214 Hofstadter, en todos sus escritos, sigue la tendencia común y hace gran parte de "paradojas", que considera como auto referencias, recursiones o bucles, pero hay muchas "inconsistencias" en la psicología intencional (matemáticas, lenguaje, percepción, arte, etc.) y tienen ningún efecto, ya que nuestra psicología evolucionó para ignorarlos. Así, "paradojas" como "esta frase es falsa" sólo nos dicen que "esto" no se refiere a sí mismo o si prefieres que este es uno de infinitamente muchos arreglos de palabras que carecen de un sentido claro. Cualquier sistema simbólico que tengamos (es decir, idioma, matemáticas, arte, música, juegos, etc.) siempre tendrán áreas de conflicto, problemas insolubles o contraintuitivos o Confuso Definiciones. Por lo tanto, tenemos los teoremas de Gödel's, el mentiroso's paradoja, inconsistencias en la teoría del conjunto, dilemas del prisionero, gato muerto/vivo de Schrodinger, problema de Newcomb, principios anthropico, Estadísticas bayesianas, notas que no puedes sonar juntas o colores que no puedes mezclar y reglas que no se pueden usar en el mismo juego. Un conjunto de subindustrias dentro de la teoría de la decisión, la economía conductual, la teoría del juego, la filosofía, la psicología y la sociología, la ley, la ciencia política, etc. e incluso los fundamentos de la física y las matemáticas (donde comúnmente se disfraza como filosofía de la ciencia) ha surgido que trata de variaciones infinitas en "real" (p. ej., mecánica cuántica) o artificio ((por ejemplo, el problema de Newcomb - ver análisis V64, p187-89 (2004)) situaciones donde nuestra psicología – evolucionó sólo para obtener alimentos, encontrar compañeros y evitar convertirse en el almuerzo – da resultados ambivalentes, o simplemente se rompe. Prácticamente ninguno de los que escriben los cientos de artículos e innumerables libros sobre estos temas que aparecen anualmente parecen conscientes de que están estudiando los límites de nuestra psicología innata y que Wittgenstein usualmente los anticipó por más de medio siglo. Típicamente, tomó el tema de la paradoja al límite, señalando la ocurrencia común de la paradoja en nuestro pensamiento, e insistió en que incluso las inconsistencias no eran un problema (aunque Turing, asistiendo a sus clases, discrepó), y predijo la aparición de sistemas lógicos inconsistentes. Décadas más tarde, se inventaron lógicas dialeticas y sacerdote en su reciente libro sobre ellos ha llamado a las opiniones de W prescient. Si usted quiere una buena revisión reciente de algunos de los muchos tipos de paradojas del lenguaje (aunque sin la conciencia de que W fue pionero en la década de 1930 y en gran parte inocente de cualquier comprensión del contexto intencional) ver Rosenkranz y Sarkohi "Platitudes Against Paradox" en Erkenntnis V65, p319-41 (2006). La aparición de muchos artículos relacionados con W en esta revista es más apropiada ya que fue fundada en los años 30 por positivistas lógicos cuya Biblia era Tractus Logico Philosophicus de W. Por supuesto, también hay un diario dedicado a W y el nombre de su obra más famosa- "Investigaciones filosóficas". H, en línea con la práctica casi universal, se refiere a menudo a nuestras "creencias" para "explicaciones" de comportamiento, pero nuestra psicología compartida no descansa en la creencia, sólo tenemos conciencia y dolores y sabemos desde la infancia que los animales son agentes conscientes, autopropulsados que son diferentes de los árboles y las rocas. Nuestra madre no nos enseña que más de lo que la madre de un 215 perro hace y no puede enseñarnos! Y, si esto es algo que aprendemos, entonces podríamos enseñarle a un niño (o un perro) que un pájaro y una roca son realmente el mismo tipo de cosa (es decir, ignorar la psicología intencional innata). W señaló clara y repetidamente la indeterminación de todos nuestros conceptos (por ejemplo, ver sus comentarios sobre la adición y la finalización de la serie en comentarios sobre los fundamentos de las matemáticas), que ordenó su innato (es decir, la evolución tuvo que resolver este problema por sacrificar innumerables cuadrillones de criaturas cuyos genes no han hecho las elecciones correctas). Hoy en día esto es comúnmente llamado el problema de la explosión combinatoria y a menudo señalado por los psicólogos evolutivos como evidencia convincente de la innatismo, sin saber que W los anticipó por más de 50 años. Nuestra psicología innata no descansa en "creencias" cuando claramente no está sujeto a prueba o duda o revisión (por ejemplo, tratar de dar un sentido a "Creo que estoy leyendo esta revisión" y la media (es decir, encontrar un uso real en nuestra vida normal para) algo diferente de "estoy leyendo este revision"). Sí, siempre hay usos derivados de cualquier frase incluyendo este, pero estos son parásitos en el uso normal. Antes de cualquier "explicación" (simplemente descripciones claras, como se señaló W) son posibles, tiene que ser claro que los orígenes de nuestro comportamiento se encuentran en los axiomas de nuestra psicología innata, que son la base para todo entendimiento, y que la filosofía, las matemáticas, la literatura, la ciencia y la sociedad son sus extensiones culturales. Dennett (y cualquiera que se sienta tentado a seguirlo - i. e., todo el mundo) se ve obligado a reclamar aún más bizarras por su escepticismo (porque yo reclamo que es un secreto ligeramente velado de todos los reduccionistas que son escépticos en el corazón - i. e., deben negar la "realidad" de todo). En su libro "la postura intencional" y otros escritos trata de eliminar esta molesta psicología que pone a los animales en una clase diferente de las computadoras y el ' física Universo' al incluir nuestra intencionalidad innata evolucionada con la intencionalidad derivada de nuestras creaciones culturales (es decir, termómetros, PC y aviones) señalando que son nuestros genes, y en última instancia la naturaleza (es decir, el universo), y no nosotros que "realmente" ha intencionalidad, por lo que todo es "derivado". Claramente algo está gravemente mal aquí! Uno piensa inmediatamente que también debe ser cierto que ya que la naturaleza y los genes producen nuestra fisiología, no debe haber ninguna diferencia sustantiva entre nuestro corazón y uno artificial que fabricamos con plástico. Para la comedia reduccionista más grandiosa de los últimos años, vea "un nuevo tipo de ciencia" de Wolfram que nos muestra cómo el universo y todos sus procesos y objetos son realmente sólo "Computadoras" y "computación" (que no se da cuenta son conceptos intencionales que no tienen significado aparte de nuestra psicología y que no tiene ninguna prueba para distinguir un cálculo de un no-cálculo-i. e., elimina la Psicología por definición). Uno ve que Dennett no entiende los temas básicos de la intencionalidad por el título 216 de su libro. Nuestra psicología no es una postura o atribución o postulan sobre nosotros mismos, u otro seres mentales, más de lo que es una "postura" que poseen cuerpos. Un niño pequeño o un perro no adivina ni supones y no puede aprender que las personas y los animales son agentes con mentes y deseos y que son fundamentalmente diferentes de árboles y rocas y lagos. Ellos conocen (en vivo) estos conceptos (psicología compartida) desde el nacimiento y si se debilitan, la muerte o la locura supervene. Esto nos lleva de nuevo a W, que vio que los intentos reduccionistas de basar la comprensión en la lógica o las matemáticas o la física eran incoherentes. Sólo podemos ver desde el punto de vista de nuestra psicología innata, de la que son todas extensiones. Nuestra Psicología es arbitraria sólo en el sentido de que uno puede imaginar formas en las que podría ser diferente, y este es el punto de W inventando ejemplos extraños de juegos de idiomas (es decir, conceptos alternativos (gramáticas) o formas de vida). Al hacerlo, vemos los límites de nuestra psicología. La mejor discusión que he visto en escenarios imaginarios de W es la de Andrew Peach en PI 24 p299-327 (2004). Me parece que W fue el primero en entender en detalle (con el debido respeto a Kant) que nuestra vida se basa en nuestra psicología evolucionada, que no puede ser desafiada sin perder sentido. Si uno niega los axiomas de las matemáticas, uno no puede jugar el juego. Uno puede colocar un signo de interrogación después de cada axioma y cada teorema derivado de ellos, pero ¿cuál es el punto? Filósofos, teólogos y la persona común pueden jugar en este juego, siempre y cuando no lo tomen en serio. Las lesiones, la muerte, la cárcel o la locura vendrán rápidamente a quienes lo hagan. Trate de negar que está leyendo esta página o que estas son sus dos manos o hay un mundo fuera de su ventana. El intento de entrar en un juego conceptual en el que estas cosas se pueden dudar presupone el juego de conocerlos - y no puede haber una prueba para los axiomas de nuestra psicología - más que para las matemáticas (derivadas, como demostró W, de nuestros conceptos intuitivos) --sólo son lo que son. Para poder saltar debe haber algún lugar para pararse. Este es el hecho más básico de la existencia, y sin embargo, es una notable consecuencia de nuestra psicología ser automatizado que es lo más difícil para nosotros ver. Es una visión divertida ver a la gente (no sólo a los filósofos) tratando de usar su psicología intuitiva (la única herramienta que tenemos) para salir de los límites de nuestra psicología intuitiva. ¿Cómo va a ser posible esto? ¿Cómo encontraremos algún punto de vista que nos permita ver nuestra mente en el trabajo y por qué prueba sabremos que la tenemos? Pensamos que si simplemente pensamos lo suficiente o adquirimos suficientes hechos, podemos obtener una visión de la "realidad" que otros no tienen. Pero hay buenas razones para pensar que tales intentos son incoherentes y sólo nos alejan más de la claridad y la cordura. W dijo muchas veces de muchas maneras que debemos sobrevienen este antojo de "claridad", la idea del pensamiento subyacente por la "lógica cristalina", cuyo descubrimiento "explicará" nuestro comportamiento y nuestro mundo y cambiará nuestra visión de lo que es ser humano. 217 "Cuanto más estrechamente examinamos el lenguaje real, más agudo se convierte en el conflicto entre él y nuestro requisito. (Por supuesto, para la pureza cristalina de la lógica no fue un resultado de la investigación: era un requisito.) " PI 107 A su regreso a la filosofía en 1930 dijo: "La concepción equivocada que quiero objetar en este connexion es la siguiente, que podemos descubrir algo totalmente nuevo. Eso es un error. La verdad del asunto es que ya lo tenemos todo, y que lo tenemos realmente presente; no necesitamos esperar nada. Hacemos nuestros movimientos en el ámbito de la gramática de nuestro lenguaje ordinario, y esta gramática ya está allí. Por lo tanto, ya tenemos todo y no necesitamos esperar el futuro. " (Waismann "Ludwig Wittgenstein y el círculo de Viena (1979) p183 y en su Zettel P 312-314 "Aquí nos encontramos con un fenómeno notable y característico en la investigación filosófica: la dificultad---podría decir---no es la de encontrar la solución sino más bien la de reconocer como la solución algo que parece ser sólo un preliminares a ella. "Ya hemos dicho todo. ---No hay nada que se desprende de esto, no esto en si es el solución! " "Esto está conectado, creo, con nuestra espera errónea una explicación, mientras que la solución de la dificultad es una descripción, si le damos el lugar correcto en nuestras consideraciones. Si lo moramos, y no tratamos de ir más allá de él. " A algunos también les resulta útil leer "por qué no hay una lógica deductiva de la razón práctica" en la magnífica "racionalidad en acción" de Searle (2001). Sólo tiene que sustituir sus frases infeliz "imponer condiciones de satisfacción en las condiciones de satisfacción" por "relacionar los Estados mentales con el mundo moviendo los músculos" - es decir, hablar, escribir y hacer, y su "mente a mundo" y "direcciones del mundo a la mente de ajuste" por " causa se origina en el mundo "y" causa se origina en la mente ". Otro defecto básico en H (y a través del discurso científico, que incluye la filosofía, ya que es psicología del sillón) se refiere a las nociones de explicaciones o causas. Tenemos pocos problemas para entender cómo estos conceptos trabajar en sus contextos normales, pero la filosofía no es un contexto normal. Son sólo otras familias de conceptos (a menudo llamados gramática o juegos de idiomas por W y aproximadamente equivalentes a módulos cognitivos, motores de inferencia, plantillas o algoritmos) que componen nuestro EP (aproximadamente, nuestra intencionalidad) pero, fuera de contexto, nos sentimos obligados a proyectarlos en el mundo y ver "causa" como una ley universal de la naturaleza que determina los acontecimientos. Como dijo W, necesitamos reconocer descripciones claras como respuestas que terminan la búsqueda de "explicaciones" definitivas. Esto nos lleva de nuevo a mi comentario sobre por qué la gente se extravía cuando tratan de "explicar" las cosas. Una vez más, esto conecta íntimamente con juicios, la 218 teoría de la decisión, la probabilidad subjetiva, la lógica, la mecánica cuántica, la incertidumbre, la teoría de la información, el razonamiento bayesiano, la prueba de Wason, el principio Anthropic ((Bostrum "The Anthropic Principle" (2002)) y la economía conductual, por nombrar algunos. No hay espacio aquí para entrar en este nido de ratas de aspectos estrechamente ligados de nuestra psicología innata, pero uno podría recordar que incluso en sus escritos previos a Tractatus, Wittgenstein comentó que la idea de la necesidad causal no es a superstición, pero el Fuente de la superstición. Sugiero que este comentario aparentemente trivial es uno de sus más profundos-W no fue dado a la trivialidad ni a la falta de cuidado. ¿Cuál es la "causa" del Big Bang o de un electrón en un "lugar" particular o de "aleatoriedad" o caos o la "ley" de la gravitación? Pero hay descripciones que pueden servir como respuestas. Así, H siente que todas las acciones deben ser causadas y "materiales" y así, con su amigo D y la alegre banda de materialistas reduccionistas, niega la voluntad, el yo y la conciencia. D niega que los niega, pero los hechos hablan por sí mismos. Su libro "la conciencia explicada" es comúnmente referido como "conciencia denegada" y fue revisado por Searle como "la conciencia explicada". Esto es especialmente extraño en el caso de H, ya que comenzó un físico y su padre ganó el Premio Nobel de física, por lo que uno podría pensar que sería consciente de los famosos papeles de Einstein, Podolsky y Rosen y de von Neumann en los años 20 y 30, en el que explicaron cómo la mecánica cuántica no tenía sentido sin la conciencia humana (y una abstracción digital no lo hará en absoluto). En este mismo período, otros incluyendo Jeffreys y de Finetti mostraron que la probabilidad sólo tenía sentido como un método subjetivo (es decir, psicológico) y los amigos cercanos de Wittgenstein, John Maynard Keynes y Frank Ramsey, primero claramente equipararon la lógica con la racionalidad, y Popper y otros señalaron la equivalencia de la lógica y la probabilidad y sus raíces comunes en la racionalidad. Hay una vasta literatura sobre las interrelaciones de estas disciplinas y el crecimiento gradual de la comprensión de que son todas facetas de nuestra psicología innata. Los interesados pueden comenzar con el artículo de Ton Sales en el Manual de Lógica Filosófica 2o Ed. vol 9 (2002) ya que también ellos introducirá a esta excelente fuente, que ahora se extiende a unos 20 volúmenes (todos en P2P, libgen.io y b-ok.org). Ramsey fue uno de los pocos de su tiempo que fue capaz de entender las ideas de W y en sus documentos seminales de 1925-26 no sólo desarrolló las ideas pioneras de Keynes sobre la probabilidad subjetiva, sino que también extendió las ideas de W del Tractatus y las conversaciones y cartas en la primera declaración formal de lo que más tarde se conoció como semántica sustitutiva o la interpretación sustitutiva de los cuantificadores lógicos. (Véase el artículo de LeBlanc en Manual de Lógica Filosófica 2o Ed. V2, p53-131 (2002)). La muerte prematura de Ramsey, como la de W, von Neumann y Turing, fueron grandes tragedias, ya que cada uno de ellos solo y ciertamente juntos habrían alterado el clima intelectual del siglo 20 a un grado aún mayor. Si hubieran vivido, bien podrían haber colaborado, pero como era, sólo W se dio cuenta de que estaba descubriendo facetas de nuestra psicología innata. W y Turing fueron profesores de Cambridge enseñando clases sobre los fundamentos de las matemáticas, aunque W desde la posición que descansaba en axiomas no 219 declarados de nuestra psicología innata y Turing desde la visión convencional de que era una cuestión de lógica que se mantuvo por sí misma. Si estos dos genios homosexuales se involucraban íntimamente, podrían haber surgido cosas asombrosas. Creo que todo el mundo tiene estas tendencias reduccionistas "deflacionarias", por lo que sugiero que esto se debe a los valores predeterminados de los módulos de psicología intuitivos que están sesgados a la asignación de causas en términos de propiedades de los objetos, y los fenómenos culturales que podemos ver y a nuestra necesidad de Generalidad. Nuestros motores de inferencia clasifican y buscan de forma compulsiva la fuente de todos los fenómenos. Cuando nos fijamos en busca de causas o explicaciones, nos inclinamos a mirar hacia el exterior y tomamos el punto de vista de la tercera persona, para lo cual tenemos pruebas empíricas o criterios, ignorando el funcionamiento invisible automático de nuestra propia mente, para lo cual no tenemos tales pruebas (otra arena iniciada por W hace unos 75 años). Como se ha señalado aquí, una de las tomas de W en este problema "filosófico" universal fue que nos falta la capacidad de reconocer nuestras explicaciones intuitivas normales como los límites de nuestra comprensión, confundiendo los axiomas INCOMPROBABLES e indisputables de nuestros Sistema 1 Psicología con hechos del mundo que podemos investigar, diseccionar y explicar a través del sistema 2. Esto no niega la ciencia, sólo la noción de que proporcionará el significado "verdadero" y "real" de la "realidad". Hay una vasta literatura sobre las causas y las explicaciones, por lo que sólo me referiremos al excelente artículo de Jeffrey Hershfield "Cognitivismo y la relatividad explicativa" en el canadiense J. de filosofía V28 P505-26 (1998) y al libro de Garfinkel "formas de explicación" (1981). esta literatura se está fusionó rápidamente con los de la epistemología, la probabilidad, la lógica, la teoría del juego, la economía conductual y la filosofía de la ciencia, que parecen casi completamente desconocidas para H. de los cientos de libros recientes y miles de artículos, uno puede empezar con los libros de Nancy Cartwright, que proporcionan un antídoto parcial a la ilusión de "la regla de la física y la matemática del universo". O, uno puede simplemente seguir los vínculos entre la racionalidad, la causalidad, la probabilidad, la información, las leyes de la naturaleza, la mecánica cuántica, determinismo, etc. en Wikipedia y la enciclopedia de filosofía de Stanford en línea, durante décadas (o, con los comentarios de W en mente, tal vez solo días) antes de que uno se dé cuenta de que lo hizo bien y que no nos aclaramos nuestra "realidad" psicológica estudiando la naturaleza. Una forma de mirar a ISL es que sus fallas nos recuerdan que las leyes y explicaciones científicas son extensiones frágiles y ambiguas de nuestra psicología innata y no, como lo haría H, al revés. Es un hecho curioso y raramente notado que los reduccionistas severos primero niegan la psicología, pero, con el fin de tener en cuenta (ya que hay claramente algo que genera nuestra vida mental y social), se ven obligados a acampar con los grupos de pizarra en blanco (todos nosotros antes de que educarse), que atribuyen psicología a la cultura o a aspectos muy generales de nuestra inteligencia (es decir, nuestra intencionalidad es aprendida) en contraposición a un conjunto innato de funciones. H 220 y D dicen que el yo, la conciencia, la voluntad, etc. son ilusiones - meramente "patrones abstractos" (el "espíritu" o "alma" de la iglesia del naturalismo fundamentalista). Ellos creen que nuestro "programa" puede ser digitalizado y puesto en computadoras, que por lo tanto adquieren psicología, y que "creer" en "fenómenos mentales" es como creer en la magia (pero nuestra psicología no está compuesta de creencias-que son sólo sus extensiones-y la naturaleza es mágica). Sugiero que es fundamental ver por qué nunca consideran que los "patrones" (otro juego de lenguaje encantador!) en las computadoras son mágicos o ilusorios. Y, incluso si permitimos que el programa reduccionista es realmente coherente y no circular (por ejemplo, somos demasiado educados para señalar-al igual que W y Searle y muchos otros-que no tiene ninguna prueba para sus afirmaciones más críticas y requiere el funcionamiento NORMAL de voluntad, auto, realidad, conciencia, etc., para ser entendido), no podemos razonablemente decir "bien Doug y dan, una rosa por cualquier otro nombre huele como dulce!" No creo que los reduccionistas vean que incluso si fuera cierto que podríamos poner nuestra vida mental en algoritmos que se ejecutan en silicio (o--en el famoso ejemplo de Searle - en una pila de latas de cerveza), todavía tenemos el mismo "problema duro de la conciencia": ¿Cómo surgen los fenómenos mentales de la materia bruta? Casi siempre se pasa por alto que uno podría considerar la existencia de todo como un "problema duro". Esto añadiría otro misterio sin una forma obvia de reconocer una respuesta - ¿qué significa (¿por qué es posible) codificar "propiedades emergentes" como "algoritmos"? Si podemos tener sentido de la idea de que la mente o el universo es una computadora (es decir, puede decir claramente lo que cuenta para y en contra de la idea), ¿qué seguirá si es o no lo es? "Computacional" es una de las palabras de moda más importantes de la ciencia moderna, pero pocas se detienen a pensar lo que realmente significa. Es un clásico juego de lenguaje Wittgensteinian o una familia de conceptos (usos) que tienen poco o nada en común. Hay computadoras analógicas y digitales, algunas hechas de bloques o engranajes mecánicos solamente (Babbage, etc.), calculamos a mano (como es bien sabido, los primeros comentarios de Turing sobre esto se refieren a los seres humanos que computan y sólo más tarde se piensa en las máquinas que simulan esto), y los físicos hablan de las hojas de la computación "su" trayectoria a medida que caen del árbol, etc. etc. Cada juego tiene su propio uso (significado) pero estamos hipnotizados por la palabra en ignorar estos. W ha analizado los juegos de palabras (módulos psicológicos) con una profundidad y claridad insuperables (ver ESP. la larga discusión de saber cómo continuar un cálculo en el libro marrón), comprensión de los cuales debe poner fin al asombro supersticioso que generalmente rodea esta palabra y todas las palabras, pensamientos, sentimientos, intuiciones, etc. Está chorreando con ironía de que D escribiera un libro en el EP de la religión, pero no puede ver su propio materialismo como una religión (ie., también se debe a sesgos conceptuales innatos). Timothy O'Connor ha escrito (Metaphilosophy V36, p436-448 (2005)) un magnífico artículo sobre el naturalismo fundamentalista de D (aunque en realidad no consigue todo el camino hasta el punto de vista del EP que tomo aquí), señalando que simplemente aceptar el surgimiento de la intencionalidad es la visión más razonable a tomar. Pero Pastores D y H leen de los libros de Churchland y las otras 221 Biblias de la CTM (teoría computacional de la mente) y exhortan a uno y a todos a reconocer sus hornos de PC y tostador como seres sensibles (o al menos pronto lo serán). El pastor Kurzweil hace lo mismo, pero pocos asisten a sus sermones ya que ha llenado las bancos con el reconocimiento de voz de la PC y sistemas de habla y su coro de voces sintéticas idénticas gritan "Bendito sea Turing" después de cada oración. Vea mi reseña de su libro "¿Los hominoides o androides destruirán la tierra? - Una revisión de cómo crear una mente" por Ray Kurzweil (2012) en la siguiente sección. La aparición de "propiedades de orden superior" de "materia inerte" (más juegos de idiomas!) es de hecho desconcertante, pero se aplica a todo en el universo, y no sólo a la psicología. Nuestros cerebros no tenían ninguna razón (es decir, no hay fuerzas selectivas operativas) para evolucionar un nivel avanzado de entendimiento de sí mismos o del universo, y sería demasiado costoso para hacerlo. ¿Qué ventaja selectiva podría haber tenido al ver nuestros propios procesos de pensamiento? El cerebro, como el corazón, fue seleccionado para funcionar rápida y automáticamente y sólo una parte de sus operaciones está disponible para la conciencia y sujeto al control consciente. Muchos piensan que no hay posibilidad de un "entendimiento final" y W nos dice que esta idea es una tontería (y si no, entonces qué prueba nos dirá que lo hemos alcanzado)? Tal vez la última palabra pertenece a Wittgenstein. Aunque sus ideas cambiaron mucho, hay muchos indicios de que comprendió lo esencial de su filosofía madura en sus primeras reflexiones y el Tractatus puede ser considerado como la declaración más poderosa de metafísica reduccionista jamás escrita (aunque pocos se dan cuenta es la última declaración de computacionalismo). También es una tesis defendible que la estructura y los límites de nuestra psicología intencional estaban detrás de su positivismo y atomismo tempranos. Por lo tanto, vamos a terminar con la famosa primera y última frase de su Tractatus, visto como resumir su opinión de que los límites de nuestra psicología innata son los límites de nuestro entendimiento. "El mundo es todo lo que es el caso." "En cuanto a aquello de lo que no podemos hablar, debemos permanecer en silencio." 222 Otro retrato de caricatura de la mente de la metafísicos reduccionistas-un revision de Peter Carruthers 'la opacidad de la mente ' (The Opacity of the Mind) (2011) (revisión revisada 2019) Michael Starks Abstracto El materialismo, el reduccionismo, el Behaviorismo, el funcionalismo, la teoría de los sistemas dinámicos y el computacionalismo son puntos de vista populares, pero Wittgenstein demostró que no era coherente. El estudio del comportamiento abarca toda la vida humana, pero el comportamiento es en gran medida automático e inconsciente e incluso la parte consciente, expresada principalmente en lenguaje (que Wittgenstein equipara con la mente), no es perspicuo, por lo que es fundamental tener un marco que Searle llame a la estructura lógica de la racionalidad (LSR) y llamo a la psicología descriptiva del pensamiento de orden superior (DPHOT). Después de resumir el marco elaborado por Wittgenstein y Searle, ampliado por la investigación de razonamiento moderno, muestro las insuficiencias en las opiniones de Carruthers, que impregnan la mayoría de las discusiones sobre el comportamiento, incluyendo las Ciencias del comportamiento contemporáneas. Mantengo que su libro es una amalgama de dos libros, uno un resumen de la psicología cognitiva y el otro un resumen de las confusiones filosóficas estándar en la mente con una nueva jerga añadida. Sugiero que este último debe ser considerado como incoherente o como una vista de dibujos animados de la vida y que tomando Wittgenstein en su palabra, podemos practicar la autoterapia exitosa con respecto a la cuestión de la mente/cuerpo como un tema de idioma/cuerpo. Aquellos que deseen un marco completo hasta la fecha para el comportamiento humano de la moderna dos sistemas punto de vista puede consultar mi libro 'La Estructura Lógica de la Filosofía, la Psicología, la Mente y Lenguaje en Ludwig Wittgenstein y John Searle ' 2nd Ed (2019). Los interesados en más de mis escritos pueden ver 'Monos parlantes--filosofía, psicología, ciencia, religión y política en un planeta condenado--artículos y reseñas 2006-2019 3rd Ed (2019) y delirios utópicos suicidas en el 21St Century 4TH Ed (2019) En primer lugar, voy a ofrecer algunos comentarios sobre la filosofía y su relación con la investigación psicológica contemporánea como ejemplificado en las obras de John Searle (S) y Ludwig Wittgenstein (W) (WS conjuntamente) ya que considero S el sucesor de W y uno debe estudiar su trabajo juntos. Ayudará a ver mis reseñas de PNC (filosofía en un nuevo siglo), TLP, PI, OC, haciendo que el mundo social (MSW) y otros libros por y sobre estos dos genios, que proporcionan una descripción clara del comportamiento que me referiremos como el marco de WS. Dado este marco, que Searle llama la estructura lógica de la racionalidad (LSR) y yo llamo a la psicología 223 descriptiva del pensamiento de orden superior (DPHOT), it es posible tener descripciones claras del comportamiento, pero está completamente ausente de casi todos los tal discusiones. Incluso en las obras de la WS no se establece claramente y en prácticamente todos los demás sólo se insinuó, con las habituales consecuencias desastrosas. Comenzaré con algunas citas de W y S. Estas cotizaciones no se eligen al azar, sino que resultan de una década de estudio y juntos son un esquema de comportamiento (la naturaleza humana) de nuestros dos mejores psicólogos descriptivos. Si uno los entiende, penetran tan profundamente como es posible entrar en la mente (en gran parte coextensiva con el lenguaje que W dejó claro) y proporcionar tanta orientación como uno necesita-es entonces sólo una cuestión de mirar cómo funciona el lenguaje en cada caso y de lejos el mejor PL ACE para encontrar ejemplos de lenguaje analizados con detalladamente se encuentra en las 20.000 páginas de la nachlass de Wittgenstein. "La confusión y el esterilidad de la psicología no debe explicarse llamándola" ciencia joven "; su estado no es comparable con el de la física, por ejemplo, en sus inicios. (Más bien con el de ciertas ramas de las matemáticas. Establecer teoría.) En Psicología hay métodos experimentales y confusión conceptual. (Como en el otro caso, confusión conceptual y métodos de prueba.) La existencia del método experimental nos hace pensar que tenemos los medios para resolver los problemas que nos molesten; Aunque el problema y el método pasan entre sí por. " Wittgenstein (PI p. 232) "Los filósofos ven constantemente el método de la ciencia ante sus ojos, y son irresistiblemente tentados a preguntar y responder en la forma en que la ciencia lo hace. Esta tendencia es la verdadera fuente de la metafísica, y lleva al filósofo a una completa oscuridad. " El libro azul de Wittgenstein "Aquí nos encontramos con un fenómeno notable y característico en la investigación filosófica: la dificultad---podría decir---no es la de encontrar la solución sino más bien la de reconocer como la solución algo que parece ser sólo un preliminares a ella. Ya lo hemos dicho todo. ---No hay nada que se desprende de esto, no esto en si es el solución! .... Esto está conectado, creo, con nuestra espera errónea de una explicación, mientras que la solución de la dificultad es una descripción, si le damos el lugar correcto en nuestras consideraciones. Si lo moramos, y no tratamos de ir más allá de él. " Zettel p312 llamar-314 "El movimiento decisivo en el truco de conjuros se ha hecho, y fue el mismo que pensamos bastante inocente." Wittgenstein, PI para. 308 "Pero no he tenido mi imagen del mundo satisfaciendo su corrección: ni la tengo porque estoy satisfecho de su corrección. No: es el trasfondo heredado en el que distingo entre verdadero y falso. " Wittgenstein OC 94 "Ahora bien, si no son las conexiones causales que nos preocupan, entonces las actividades de la mente están abiertas ante nosotros." Wittgenstein "el libro azul" P6 224 (1933) "Tonterías, tonterías, porque estás haciendo suposiciones en lugar de simplemente describir. Si su cabeza está embrujada por explicaciones aquí, usted está descuidando para recordar los hechos más importantes. " Wittgenstein Z 220 "La filosofía simplemente pone todo ante nosotros y no explica ni deduce nada... Uno podría dar el nombre ' filosofía ' a lo que es posible antes de todos los nuevos descubrimientos e invenciones. " Wittgenstein PI 126 "Lo que estamos suministrando son realmente comentarios sobre la historia natural del hombre, no Curiosidades; sin embargo, sino más bien observaciones sobre hechos que nadie ha dudado y que no han sido comentados porque siempre están ante nuestros ojos. " Wittgenstein RFM I p142 "El objetivo de la filosofía es levantar una pared en el punto donde el lenguaje se detiene de todos modos." Ocasiones filosóficas de Wittgenstein p187 "El límite del lenguaje se demuestra por su imposibilidad de describir un hecho que corresponde a (es la traducción de) una frase sin simplemente repetir la frase (esto tiene que ver con la solución Kantiana al problema de la filosofía)." Wittgenstein CV P10 (1931) "¿Puede haber razones para actuar que son vinculantes para un agente racional sólo en virtud de la naturaleza del hecho reportado en la declaración de razón, e independientemente de los deseos, valores, actitudes y evaluaciones del agente? ... La verdadera paradoja de la discusión tradicional es que intenta plantear la guillotina de Hume, la rígida distinción de valor de hecho, en un vocabulario, cuyo uso ya presupone la falsedad de la distinción. " Searle PNC p165-171 "... todas las funciones de estado y por lo tanto toda la realidad institucional, con la excepción del lenguaje, son creadas por actos de habla que tienen la forma lógica de Declaraciones... las formas de la función de status en cuestión son casi invariablemente cuestiones de poderes deóntica... reconocer algo como un derecho, un deber, una obligación, un requisito, etcétera, es reconocer un motivo de acción... Estas estructuras deonticos hacen posible el deseo-razones independientes de la acción... El punto general es muy claro: la creación del campo general de los motivos de acción basados en el deseo presuponía la aceptación de un sistema de razones de acción independientes del deseo. " Searle PNC P34-49 "Algunas de las características lógicas más importantes de la intencionalidad están más allá del alcance de la fenomenología porque no tienen una realidad fenomenológica inmediata... Porque la creación del significado de la falta de sentido no se experimenta conscientemente... no existe... Esto es... la ilusión fenomenológica. " Searle PNC P115117 225 "... la relación intencional básica entre la mente y el mundo tiene que ver con las condiciones de satisfacción. Y una proposición es cualquier cosa que pueda estar en una relación intencional con el mundo, y ya que esas relaciones intencionales siempre determinan las condiciones de satisfacción, y una proposición se define como cualquier cosa suficiente para determinar las condiciones de satisfacción, resulta que toda intencionalidad es una cuestión de proposiciones. " Searle PNC p193 "Así que, funciones de estado son el pegamento que une a la sociedad. Son creados por la intencionalidad colectiva y funcionan mediante el transporte de poderes deóntica... Con la importante excepción del lenguaje en sí, toda la realidad institucional y por ello en cierto sentido toda la civilización humana es creada por los actos del habla que tienen la forma lógica de las declaraciones... toda la realidad institucional humana se crea y se mantiene en existencia por (representaciones que tienen la misma forma lógica que) declaraciones de función de estado, incluyendo los casos que no son actos de habla en la forma explícita de declaraciones. " Searle MSW p11-13 "Pero no se puede explicar un sistema físico como una máquina de escribir o un cerebro mediante la identificación de un patrón que comparte con su simulación computacional, porque la existencia del patrón no explica cómo el sistema funciona realmente como un sistema físico. ... En Resumen, el hecho de que la atribución de sintaxis no identifique otras potencias causales es fatal para la afirmación de que los programas proporcionan explicaciones causales de la cognición... Sólo hay un mecanismo físico, el cerebro, con sus diversos niveles causales físicos y físicos/mentales de la descripción. " La filosofía Searle en un nuevo siglo (PNC) P101103 "En Resumen, el sentido de" procesamiento de la información "que se utiliza en la ciencia cognitiva es un nivel demasiado alto de abstracción para captar la realidad biológica concreta de la intencionalidad intrínseca... Estamos cegados a esta diferencia por el hecho que la misma frase ' veo un coche viniendo hacia mí ', se puede utilizar para registrar tanto la intencionalidad visual como la salida del modelo computacional de la visión... en el sentido de ' información ' utilizada en la ciencia cognitiva, es simplemente falso decir que el cerebro es un dispositivo de procesamiento de información. " Searle PNC P104-105 "El estado intencional representa sus condiciones de satisfacción... personas suponen erróneamente que cada representación mental debe ser conscientemente pensada... pero la noción de una representación como la estoy usando es una noción funcional y no ontológica. Cualquier cosa que tenga condiciones de satisfacción, que pueda triunfar o fracasar de una manera que sea característica de la intencionalidad, es por definición una representación de sus condiciones de satisfacción... podemos analizar la estructura de la intencionalidad de los fenómenos sociales analizando sus condiciones de satisfacción. " Searle MSW p28-32 "Orador significa... es la imposición de condiciones de satisfacción en condiciones de 226 satisfacción. La capacidad de hacer esto es un elemento crucial de las capacidades cognitivas humanas. Se requiere la capacidad de pensar en dos niveles a la vez, de una manera que es esencial para el uso del lenguaje. En un nivel, el orador produce intencionalmente una expresión física, pero en otro nivel la expresión representa algo. Y la misma dualidad infecta el símbolo en sí. En un nivel, es un objeto físico como cualquier otro. En otro nivel, tiene un significado: representa un tipo de estado de asuntos "MSW P74" ... una vez que usted tiene el lenguaje, es inevitable que usted tendrá deontología porque no hay manera que usted puede hacer actos explícitos de la voz realizados de acuerdo con las convenciones de un idioma sin crear compromisos. Esto es cierto no sólo para las declaraciones, sino para todos los actos de habla "MSW P82 "Cuanto más estrechamente examinamos el lenguaje real, más agudo se convierte en el conflicto entre él y nuestro requisito. (Por supuesto, para la pureza cristalina de la lógica no fue un resultado de la investigación: era un requisito.) " PI 107 Un tema importante en todas las discusiones sobre el comportamiento humano es la necesidad de separar los automatismos genéticamente programados de los efectos de la cultura. Todo estudio de comportamiento de orden superior es un esfuerzo para desordenar no sólo rápido S1 y lento pensamiento S2 (por ejemplo, percepciones y otros automatismos vs. disposiciones), pero las extensiones lógicas de S2 en la cultura (S3). El trabajo de Searle (S) en su conjunto proporciona una descripción impresionante del comportamiento social S2/S3 de orden superior, que se debe a la reciente evolución de los genes para la psicología disposicional, mientras que el posterior Wittgenstein (W) muestra cómo se basa en axiomas inconscientes de solo verdadero de S1 que evolucionó hasta convertirse en conscientes pensamiento de proposicional disposicional de S2. S1 es las funciones automatizadas simples de nuestro involuntario, sistema 1, pensamiento rápido, neurona espejo, verdadero-sólo, no proposicional, Estados mentales-nuestras percepciones y recuerdos y actos reflexivos incluyendo Sistema 1 verdades y UA1--comprensión de la Agencia 1-y emociones 1-como la alegría, el amor, la ira) que pueden describirse causalmente, mientras que las funciones lingüísticas evolutivamente posteriores son expresiones o descripciones de voluntariado, sistema 2, pensamiento lento, mentalización de las neuronas, comprobables verdadero o falso, proposicional, Truth2 y los UA2 y Emotions2-alegría, amorosa, odiando-el disposicional (y a menudo contrafáctual) imaginar, suponiendo, pretendiendo, pensando, sabiendo, creyendo, etc. que sólo puede describirse en términos de razones (es decir, es sólo un hecho que intenta describir Sistema 2 en términos de Neuroquímica, física atómica, matemáticas, no tiene sentido-ver W para muchos ejemplos y Searle y hacker ( 3 volúmenes en Naturaleza humana) para las disquisiciones). 227 Uno debe tomar seriamente el comentario de W que incluso si Dios pudiera mirar en nuestra mente que no podía ver lo que estamos pensando-este debe ser el lema de la psicología cognitiva. Sí, un psicólogo cognitivo del futuro puede ser capaz de ver lo que estamos percibiendo y recordando y nuestro pensamiento reflexivo y la actuación, ya que estas funciones S1 son siempre Estados mentales causales (CMS) pero las disposiciones S2 son sólo potencialmente CMS y por lo tanto no se realiza o visible. Esto no es una teoría sino una descripción de nuestro lenguaje, mente, vida, gramática (W). S, Carruthers (C) y otros fangoso las aguas aquí porque a veces se refieren a disposiciones como Estados mentales, así, pero como W hizo hace mucho tiempo, S, hacker y otros muestran que el lenguaje de causalidad simplemente no se aplica a las descripciones de S2 de orden superior emergente-otra vez no una teoría, sino una descripción de cómo nuestros Estados de disposicional (lenguaje, pensamiento) trabajan. S1 se compone de inconsciente, rápido, físico, causal, automático, no proposicional, verdaderos sólo Estados mentales, mientras que el S2 lento sólo puede ser descrito coherentemente en términos de las acciones que son más o menos disposiciones conscientes para el comportamiento (potencial acciones) que son o pueden convertirse en proposicionales (T o F). Me parece bastante obvio (ya que era a W) que la visión mecánica de la mente existe por la misma razón que casi todos los comportamientos-es la operación por defecto de nuestra psicología evolucionada (EP) que busca explicaciones en términos de lo que podemos deliberadamente pensar a través de lentamente ( S2), en lugar de en el S1 automatizado, del que en su mayoría permanecemos inconsciente--llamado por S en la PNC ' la ilusión fenomenológica ' (TPI). El TPI no es un error filosófico inofensivo, sino una obliviosidad universal a nuestra biología que produce la ilusión de que controlamos nuestra vida y entre las consecuencias se encuentra el colapso inexorable de lo que pasa por la civilización. Nuestro lento o reflexivo, más o menos "consciente" (tener cuidado con otra red de juegos de idiomas!) la actividad de segundo cerebro propio se corresponde con lo que W caracterizó como "disposiciones" o "inclinaciones", que se refieren a habilidades o posibles acciones, no son Estados mentales (o no en el mismo sentido que los Estados S1), y no tienen ningún tiempo definido de ocurrencia y/o duración. Pero las palabras de disposición como "saber", "entender", "pensar", "creer", que W discutió extensamente, tienen al menos dos usos básicos. Uno es un uso filosófico peculiar (pero se gradúa en los usos cotidianos) que se refiere a las oraciones verdaderas sólo resultantes de la percepción directa y la memoria, es decir, nuestra psicología axiomática S1 innata (' sé que estas son mis manos ')-es decir, son causalmente Self Referential –autoreferencial (CSR) - es decir, ver a un gato lo hace verdadero y en el caso normal no hay prueba posible, y el uso de S2, que es su uso normal como disposiciones, que puede ser actuado fuera, y que puede llegar a ser verdadero o falso (' yo sé mi camino a casa ')-es decir, , tienen condiciones de satisfacción (COS) externas, públicas, comprobables y no son CSR. La investigación del pensamiento rápido involuntario del sistema 1 ha revolucionado la psicología, la economía y otras disciplinas bajo nombres como "ilusiones cognitivas", 228 "cebado", "enmarcado", "heurística" y "sesgos". Por supuesto, estos también son juegos de idiomas por lo que habrá más y menos útiles maneras de utilizar estas palabras, y los estudios y discusiones variarán de "puro" sistema 1 a combinaciones de 1 y 2 (la norma como W dejó claro), pero presumiblemente no siempre de lento sistema 2 disposicional delgado rey sólo, ya que cualquier sistema 2 pensamiento o acción intencional no puede ocurrir sin involucrar gran parte de la intrincada red de "módulos cognitivos", "motores de inferencia", "reflejos intracerebrales", "automatismos", "axiomas cognitivos", "fondo" o "lecho de roca"-como W y más tarde Searle llama a nuestra Psicología evolutiva (EP). Una forma de hablar de esto es que el sistema automático inconsciente 1 activa la mayor personalidad de conciencia cortical del sistema 2, trayendo consigo contracciones musculares de la garganta que informan a otros que ve el mundo de ciertas maneras, que lo comprometen a potencial Acciones. Un gran avance sobre las interacciones prelingüísticas o protolingüísticas en las que sólo los movimientos musculares brutos fueron capaces de transmitir información muy limitada sobre las intenciones. Las estructuras deonticas o ' pegamento social ' son las acciones rápidas automáticas de S1 produciendo las disposiciones lentas de S2 que se expanden inexorablemente durante el desarrollo personal en una amplia gama de relaciones deonticas culturales universales automáticas (S3). Espero que esto describa bastante bien la estructura básica del comportamiento. Estas descripciones de la cognición y la volición se resumen en la tabla 2,1 de MSW, que Searle ha utilizado durante muchos años y es la base para una extendida que he creado. En mi opinión, ayuda enormemente a relacionar esto con la investigación psicológica moderna mediante el uso de mi S1, S2, terminología S3 y W verdadero-sólo vs proposicional (disposicional) Descripción. Así, CSR hace referencia a la percepción de true-only S1, la memoria y la intención anterior (causa se origina en el mundo), mientras que S2 se refiere a proposicional (verdadero o falso i.e., comprobable o Testable) disposiciones como la creencia y el deseo (causa se origina en la mente). Por lo tanto, reconociendo que S1 es sólo una causa causal (mundo a la mente) y sin contenido (falta de representaciones o información) mientras que S2 tiene contenidos y es una causa descendente (mente a mundo) (por ejemplo, ver mi reseña de Hutto y el ' Enactivismo radical ' de Myin), cambiaría el párrafos de MSW P39 comenzando "en suma" y terminando en PG 40 con "condiciones de satisfacción" de la siguiente manera. En Resumen, la percepción, la memoria y las intenciones y acciones reflexivas previas ("voluntad") son causadas por el funcionamiento automático de nuestro EP axiomático de solo verdadero de S1. A través de intenciones previas e intenciones en acción, tratamos de igualar cómo deseamos que las cosas sean con cómo pensamos que son. Debemos ver que la creencia, el deseo (y la imaginación-desea que el tiempo desplazado y desacoplado de la intención) y otras disposiciones de la 229 proposicionalidad S2 de nuestro pensamiento lento evolucionado más adelante segundo yo, son totalmente dependientes sobre (tienen su COS originando en) la CSR rápida automático primitivo true-only (verdadero solo) reflexiva S1. En el lenguaje y la neurofisiología hay casos intermedios o combinados tales como la intención (anteriores intenciones) o recordar, donde la conexión causal con COS (es decir, con S1) se desplaza el tiempo, ya que representan el pasado o el futuro, a diferencia de S1 que siempre está en el presente. S1 y S2 se alimentan entre sí y a menudo son orquestos a la perfección por las relaciones culturales deónticas aprendidas de S3, de modo que nuestra experiencia normal es que conscientemente controlamos todo lo que hacemos. Esta vasta arena de ilusiones cognitivas que dominan nuestra vida Searle ha descrito como ' la ilusión fenomenológica. ' Se sigue de una manera muy directa e inexorable, tanto del trabajo del 3er período de W y de las observaciones de la psicología contemporánea, que "voluntad", "self" (yo) y "conciencia" son elementos axiomáticos verdaderos-sólo del sistema 1 al igual que ver, oír, etc., y no hay posibilidad (inteligibilidad) de demostrar (de dar sentido a) su falsedad. Como W hizo tan maravillosamente claro en numerosas ocasiones, que son la base para el juicio y por lo tanto no puede ser juzgado. Los verdaderos axiomas de nuestra psicología no son probatorios. Al igual que Carruthers y otros, Searle a veces los estados (por ejemplo, p66-67 MSW) que S1 (es decir, memorias, percepciones, actos reflejos) tiene una estructura proposicional (es decir, verdadero-falso). Como he señalado anteriormente, y muchas veces en otras reseñas, parece cristalino que W es correcto, y es básico para entender el comportamiento, que sólo S2 es proposicional y S1 es axiomático y verdaderosolamente. Ambos tienen COS y direcciones de ajuste (DOF) porque la intencionalidad genética, axiomática de S1 genera la de S2 pero si S1 fuera proposicional en el mismo sentido significaría que el escepticismo es inteligible, el caos que era la filosofía antes de que W regresaría, y de hecho, si es cierto, la vida no sería posible. Como W mostró innumerables veces y la biología demuestra, la vida debe basarse en la certeza-las reacciones rápidas inconscientes automatizadas. Los organismos que siempre tienen una duda y una pausa para reflexionar morirán, sin evolución, sin gente, sin filosofía. El lenguaje y la escritura son especiales porque la longitud de onda corta de las vibraciones de los músculos vocales permite una transferencia de información de ancho de banda mucho mayor que las contracciones de otros músculos y esto es en promedio varios órdenes de magnitud superiores para la información visual. El pensamiento es proposicional y por lo tanto se ocupa de las declaraciones verdaderas o falsas, lo que significa que es una disposición típica S2 que se puede probar, a diferencia de las funciones cognitivas automáticas sólo verdaderas de S1. O se puede decir que las declaraciones espontáneas y acciones son los reflejos primitivos o juegos de lenguaje primario (PLG) de S1, mientras que las representaciones conscientes son los juegos de lenguaje secundario (SLG) de la disposicional de S2. Suena trivial y de hecho lo es, pero esta es la declaración más básica de cómo funciona el comportamiento y casi nadie lo ha entendido nunca. 230 Traduzco el Resumen de S de la razón práctica en p127 de MSW de la siguiente manera: "cedemos a nuestros deseos (necesidad de alterar la química del cerebro), que típicamente incluyen el deseo-razones independientes de acción (DIRA-es decir, los deseos desplazados en el espacio y el tiempo, más a menudo para altruismo recíproco), que producen disposiciones para el comportamiento que comúnmente resultan tarde o temprano en los movimientos musculares que sirven a nuestra aptitud inclusiva (aumento de la supervivencia de los genes en nosotros mismos y aquellos estrechamente relacionados). " Y me gustaría reafirmar su descripción en P129 de cómo llevamos a cabo DIRA2/3 como "la resolución de la paradoja es que el DIRA1 inconsciente que sirve la aptitud inclusiva a largo plazo generan el DIRA2 consciente que a menudo anula los deseos inmediatos personales a corto plazo." Los agentes de hecho crean conscientemente las razones próximas de DIRA2/3, pero estas son extensiones muy restringidas de DIRA1 inconsciente (la causa última). La evolución por la aptitud inclusiva ha programado las acciones causales reflexivas rápidas e inconscientes de S1 que a menudo dan lugar al pensamiento lento consciente de S2 (a menudo modificado en las extensiones culturales de S3), que produce razones de acción que a menudo resultan en activación de los músculos del cuerpo y/o del habla por S1 causando acciones. El mecanismo general es a través de la neurotransmisión y por los cambios en los neuromoduladores en las áreas específicas del cerebro. La ilusión cognitiva general (llamada por S ' la ilusión fenomenológica ', por Pinker ' la pizarra en blanco ' y por Tooby y Cosmides ' el modelo de ciencias sociales estándar ') es que S2/S3 ha generado la acción conscientemente por razones de las cuales somos plenamente conscientes y en control de, pero cualquier persona familiarizada con la biología moderna y la psicología puede ver que esta visión no es creíble. Aunque W es correcto que no hay un estado mental que constituya un significado, S notas (como se ha citado anteriormente) que hay una manera general de caracterizar el acto de significado-"orador significado... es la imposición de condiciones de satisfacción en las condiciones de satisfacción "que es un acto y no un estado mental. Esto se puede ver como otra declaración del argumento de W contra el idioma privado (interpretaciones personales frente a los comprobables públicamente). de la misma manera, con la siguiente y la interpretación de la regla--sólo pueden ser actos públicamente verificables--no hay reglas privadas o interpretaciones privadas tampoco. Y hay que tener en cuenta que muchos (el más famoso Kripke) pierden el barco aquí, siendo engañados por las frecuentes referencias de W a la práctica comunitaria en el pensamiento de que es sólo la práctica pública arbitraria que subyacen a las convenciones sociales y del lenguaje. W deja claro muchas veces que tales convenciones sólo son posibles dada una psicología compartida innata que a menudo llama el trasfondo, y esto que subyace a todo comportamiento y que está esquematizado en la mesa. Como he señalado en mis otros comentarios, pocos si alguno han comprendido 231 completamente la W posterior y, carente de la S1, marco S2 no es sorprendente. Así, uno puede entender por qué uno no puede imaginar un objeto mientras lo ve como el dominio de S2 por S1. No hay pruebas para mis experiencias internas, así que lo que me venga a la mente cuando me imagino la cara de Jack es la imagen de Jack. Semejantemente, con la lectura y el cálculo que puede referirse a S1, S2 o una combinación, y existe la constante tentación de aplicar términos S2 a los procesos S1 donde la falta de cualquier prueba los hace inaplicables. Dos de los famosos ejemplos de W utilizados para combatir esta tentación son jugar al tenis sin una pelota (' 1 tenis '), y una tribu que sólo tenía cálculo S2 por lo que ' calculando en la cabeza (' ' 1 calculando ') no era posible. "Jugar" y "calcular" describen los actos reales o potenciales--es decir, son palabras de disposición, pero con los usos de S1 reflexivos plausibles por lo que he dicho antes uno realmente debe mantenerlos directamente escribiendo ' playing1 ' y ' playing2 ', etc. Pero no se nos enseña a hacer esto, así que queremos descartar ' calculating1 ' como una fantasía, o pensamos que podemos dejar su naturaleza indeciso hasta más tarde. Por lo tanto, otro de los famosos comentarios de W-"el movimiento decisivo en el truco de conjurar se ha hecho, y fue el único que pensamos muy inocente." ese es, las primeras frases o a menudo el título de cometer uno a una manera de ver las cosas (un juego de idiomas) que impide el uso claro del lenguaje en el contexto actual. Una frase expresa un pensamiento (tiene un significado), cuando tiene un COS claro, y esto significa que tiene condiciones de verdad públicas. De ahí el comentario de W: "cuando pienso en el lenguaje, no hay ' significados ' pasando por mi mente, además de las expresiones verbales: el lenguaje es en sí mismo el vehículo del pensamiento." Y, si pienso con o sin palabras, el pensamiento es lo que yo (honestamente) diga que es como no hay otro criterio posible (COS). Así, Los aforismos preciosos de W (p132 Budd) "es en el lenguaje que el deseo y la realización se reúnen" y "como todo lo metafísico, la armonía entre el pensamiento y la realidad se encuentra en la gramática de la lengua." Y uno podría notar aquí que la "gramática" en W generalmente se puede interpretar como la estructura lógica del lenguaje, y que a pesar de sus frecuentes advertencias contra la teoría y la generalización, esto es tan amplio como una caracterización de la filosofía y el orden superior Psicología descriptiva como uno puede encontrar. de la misma manera, con la pregunta "¿Qué hace que sea verdad que mi imagen de Jack es una imagen de él?" Imaginar es otra disposición y el COS es que la imagen que tengo en mi cabeza es Jack y es por eso que voy a decir ' sí ' si se muestra su imagen y ' NO ' si se muestra uno de otra persona. La prueba aquí no es que la foto coincida con la imagen vaga que tenía, pero que pretendía que (tenía la COS que) para ser una imagen de él. De ahí la famosa cita de W: "si Dios hubiera mirado en nuestras mentes, no habría podido ver allí de quien estábamos hablando (PI P217)" y sus comentarios de que todo el problema de la representación está contenido en "eso es él" y "... lo que da a la imagen su interpretación es el camino en el que se encuentra, "o como S dice su COS. por lo tanto, la suma de W (P140 Budd) que" lo que siempre llega al final es que sin ningún significado más, él llama lo que sucedió el deseo de que eso suceda 232 "..." la cuestión de si sé lo que deseo antes de que se cumpla mi deseo no puede surgir en absoluto. Y el hecho de que algún evento pare mis deseos no significa que lo cumpla. Tal vez no debería haberme satisfecho si mi deseo había sido satisfecho "... Supongamos que se le preguntó ' ¿sé por cuánto tiempo antes de conseguirlo? Si he aprendido a hablar, entonces lo sé. " Palabras de disposición se refieren a eventos potenciales (PE) que acepto como el cumplimiento de la COS y mis estados mentales, emociones, cambio de interés, etc. no tienen ninguna influencia en la función de las disposiciones de la manera. Espero, deseando, esperando, pensando, con intención, deseando, etc. dependiendo del estado que me tomo a estar en-en el COS que expreso. Pensamiento y la intención son disposiciones S2 que sólo se pueden expresar por contracciones del músculo S1 reflexivo, especialmente los de habla. Ahora que tenemos un comienzo razonable en la estructura lógica de la racionalidad (la psicología descriptiva del pensamiento de orden superior), podemos ver la tabla de intencionalidad que resulta de esta obra, que he construido en los últimos años. Se basa en una mucho más simple de Searle, que a su vez le debe mucho a Wittgenstein. También he incorporado en las tablas de forma modificada que son utilizados por los investigadores actuales en la psicología de los procesos de pensamiento que se evidencian en las últimas 9 filas. Debería resultar interesante compararlo con los 3 volúmenes recientes de Peter hacker en Human Nature. Ofrezco esta tabla como una heurística para describir el comportamiento que encuentro más completo y útil que cualquier otro marco que he visto y no como un análisis final o completo, que tendría que ser tridimensional con cientos (al menos) de flechas que van en muchos direcciones con muchas (tal vez todas) vías entre S1 y S2 siendo bidireccional. Además, la distinción entre S1 y S2, cognición y voluntad, percepción y memoria, entre sentimiento, saber, creer y esperar, etc. son arbitrarias--es decir, como demostró W, todas las palabras son contextualmente sensibles y la mayoría tienen varios diferentes usos (significados o COS). Muchos gráficos complejos han sido publicados por los científicos, pero los encuentro de utilidad mínima cuando se piensa en el comportamiento (en contraposición a pensar en la función cerebral). Cada nivel de descripción puede ser útil en ciertos contextos, pero me parece que ser más grueso o más fino limita la utilidad. La estructura lógica de la racionalidad (LSR), o la estructura lógica de la mente (LSM), la estructura lógica del comportamiento (LSB), la estructura lógica del pensamiento (LST), la estructura lógica de la conciencia (LSC), la estructura lógica de la personalidad (LSP), el Psicología descriptiva de la conciencia (DSC), la psicología descriptiva del pensamiento de orden superior (DPHOT), la intencionalidad-el término filosófico clásico. El sistema 1 es involuntario, reflexivo o automatizado "reglas" R1 mientras pensar (cognición) no tiene lagunas y es voluntario o deliberativo "reglas" R2 y willing 233 (volition, voluntad o(volicion) tiene 3 lagunas (ver Searle) Sugiero que podamos describir el comportamiento más claramente cambiando "imponer condiciones de satisfacción en las condiciones de satisfacción" de Searle a "relacionar los Estados mentales con el mundo moviendo los músculos" - es decir, hablar, escribir y hacer, y su "mente al mundo Dirección de ajuste"y" la dirección del mundo a la mente de ajuste "por" causa se origina en la mente "y" causa origina en el mundo "S1 es sólo causal (mundo a la mente) y sin contenido (falta de representaciones o información) mientras que S2 tiene contenidos y es una causal descendente (mente a mundo). He adoptado mi terminología en esta tabla. 234 DESDE EL ANALISIS DE LOS JUEGOS DE IDIOMAS Disposición Emoción Memoria Percepción Deseo PI * * IA * * * AcciónPalabra Causa origina de * * * * Mundo Mundo Mundo Mundo Mente Mente Mente Mente Provoca cambios en * * * * * Ninguno Mente Mente Mente Ninguno Mundo Mundo Mundo Causalmente Auto Reflexivo * * * * * * No Sí Sí Sí No Sí Sí Sí Verdadero o falso (Comprobable) Sí T sólo T sólo T sólo Sí Sí Sí Sí Condiciones públicas de satisfacción Sí Sí/No Sí/No No Sí/No Sí No Sí Describir Un estado mental No Sí Sí Sí No No Sí/No Sí Prioridad evolutiva 5 4 2, 3 1 5 3 2 2 Contenido voluntario Sí No No No No Sí Sí Sí Iniciación voluntaria Sí/No No Sí No Sí/No Sí Sí Sí Sistema cognitivo ******* 2 1 2/1 1 2/1 2 1 2 Cambiar intensidad No Sí Sí Sí Sí No No No Duración precisa No Sí Sí Sí No No Sí Sí Aquí y Ahora o Allá y Luego (H + N, T + T) ******** TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN Calidad especial No Sí No Sí No No No No Localizado en Cuerpo No No No Sí No No No Sí Las expresiones corporales Sí Sí No No Sí Sí Sí Sí Autocontradiccion es No Sí No No Sí No No No Necesita un yo Sí Sí/No No No Sí No No No Necesita lenguaje Sí No No No No No No Sí/No 235 DE LA INVESTIGACIÓN DE DECISIONES Disposición Emoción Memoria Percepción Deseo PI * * IA * * * Acción/ Palabra Efectos subliminales No Sí/No Sí Sí No No No Sí/No Asociativa Basada en reglas RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB Dependiente del contexto/ Abstracto A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/A CD/A Serie/Paralelo S S/P P P S/P S S S Heurístico Analítica A H/A H H H/A A A A Necesita trabajar Memoria Sí No No No No Sí Sí Sí Dependiente general de la inteligencia Sí No No No Sí/No Sí Sí Sí La carga cognitiva Inhibe Sí Sí/No No No Sí Sí Sí Sí Excitación facilita o inhibe I F/I F F I I I I Condiciones públicas de satisfacción de S2 son a menudo referidos por Searle y otros como COS, representaciones, creadores de la verdad o significados (o COS2 por mí mismo), mientras que los resultados automáticos de S1 son designados como presentaciones por otros (o COS1 por mí mismo). * Aka Inclinaciones, Capacidades, Preferencias, Representaciones, Posibles Acciones, etc. ** Intenciones anteriores de Searle *** La intención de Searle en acción. **** Dirección de ajuste de Searle ***** Dirección de causalidad de Searle ****** (Las instancias del estado mental Causas o se cumple a sí mismo). Searle anteriormente llamó a esto causalmente auto-referencial. ******* Tversky / Kahneman / Frederick / Evans / Stanovich definieron los sistemas cognitivos. ******** Aquí y ahora o allí y luego Uno siempre debe tener en cuenta el descubrimiento de Wittgenstein que después de haber describió los posibles usos (significados, verdades, condiciones de satisfacción) del lenguaje en un contexto particular, hemos agotado su interés, y los intentos de explicación (es decir, filosofía) sólo nos alejan de la verdad. Es fundamental tener en 236 cuenta que esta tabla es sólo una heurística libre de contexto muy simplificada y cada uso de una palabra debe examinarse en su contexto. El mejor examen de la variación de contexto está en los últimos 3 volúmenes de Peter hacker en la naturaleza humana, que proporcionan numerosas tablas y gráficos que se deben comparar con este. Aquellos que deseen una cuenta completa hasta la fecha de Wittgenstein, Searle y su análisis de comportamiento de la vista moderna de dos sistemas pueden consultar mi artículo la estructura lógica de la filosofía, la psicología, la mente y el lenguaje como se reveló en Ludwig Wittgenstein y John Searle 2Nd Ed (2019). 237 EXPLICACIÓN DE LA TABLA Hace aproximadamente un millón de años, los primates evolucionaron la capacidad de usar los músculos de la garganta para hacer series complejas de ruidos (es decir, discursos primitivos) para describir eventos presentes (percepciones, memoria, acciones reflexivas que pueden describirse como lenguaje primario o primitivo Juegos (PLG)-es decir, una clase de reflejos de la rápida asociativa inconsciente sistema automatizado 1, subcortical, no representacional, causalmente autorreferencial, intransigente, sin informacion, verdadero sólo estadismo mental con un tiempo y ubicación precisos) y gradualmente desarrollaron la capacidad de abarcar los desplazamientos en el espacio y el tiempo para describir memorias, actitudes y eventos potenciales (el pasado y el futuro y, a menudo, las preferencias contrafactual, condicionales o ficticias, inclinaciones o disposiciones-el Juegos de lenguaje secundario o sofisticado (SLG) del sistema 2 lento, cortical, consciente, información que contiene, transitivo (tener COS públicos), representacional, verdadero o falso pensamiento de actitud de proposicional, que no tiene tiempo preciso y son habilidades y no estados mentales). Las preferencias son intuiciones, tendencias, reglas ontológicas automáticas, comportamientos, habilidades, módulos cognitivos, rasgos de personalidad, plantillas, motores de inferencia, inclinaciones, emociones, actitudes proposicionales, valoraciones, capacidades, hipótesis. Algunas emociones son preferencias de tipo 2 (W RPP2 148). "Yo creo", "él ama", "piensan" son descripciones de posibles actos públicos típicamente discolocado en el espaciotiempo. Mi primer declaraciones de persona sobre mí son verdaderas-sólo (excluyendo mentir) mientras que las declaraciones en tercera persona sobre otros son verdaderas o falsas (ver mi reseña de Johnston ' Wittgenstein: Rethinking The Inner '). Las "preferencias" como clase de Estados intencionales--opuestos a percepciones, actos reflexivos y memorias--fueron descritas por primera vez claramente por Wittgenstein (W) en la década de 1930 y denominadas "inclinaciones" o "disposiciones". Se han denominado comúnmente "actitudes proposicionales" desde Russell, pero esta es una frase engañosa desde creyendo, pretendiendo, sabiendo, recordando, etc., a menudo no son proposiciones ni actitudes, como se ha demostrado, por ejemplo, por W y por Searle (por ejemplo, CF conciencia y lenguaje P118). Son representaciones mentales intrínsecas y observadoras independientes (a diferencia de las presentaciones o representaciones del sistema 1 al sistema 2 – SearleC + L p53). Son posibles actos desplazados en el tiempo o en el espacio, mientras que los recuerdos evolutivamente más primitivos de las percepciones S1 y las acciones reflexivas están siempre aquí y ahora. Esta es una manera de caracterizar el sistema 2 – el mayor avance en la psicología de los vertebrados después del sistema 1 – la capacidad de representar eventos y pensar en ellos como ocurriendo en otro lugar o tiempo (la tercera Facultad de Searle de imaginación contrafactual que complementa cognición y volición). Las disposiciones S2 son habilidades para actuar (los músculos del contrato producen movimientos del habla o del cuerpo a través de S1 en el que 238 tiempo se convierten en estados causales y mentales). As veces las disposiciones pueden ser consideradas como inconscientes ya que pueden volverse conscientes más tarde-Searle -Phil Issues 1:45-66 (1991). Las percepciones, memorias y acciones reflexivas (automáticas) pueden describirse como S1 o juegos de idiomas primarios (PLG-por ejemplo, veo el perro) y hay, en el caso normal, NO hay pruebas posibles para que puedan ser true only (verdadero solo) Las disposiciones pueden sere descrita como secundaria de LG (SLG-por ejemplo, creo que veo al perro) y también debe ser actuado, incluso para mí en mi propio caso (es decir, ¿cómo puedo saber lo que creo, pensar, sentir hasta que actúe, ver los cotizaciones anteriores de W). Las disposiciones también se convierten en acciones cuando se habla o se escriben, así como se actúan de otras maneras, y estas ideas son todas debidas a Wittgenstein (mediados de 1930) y no son Behaviorismo (Hintikka & Hintikka 1981, Searle, Hutto etc.,). Wittgenstein puede ser considerado como el fundador de la psicología evolutiva y su trabajo una investigación única del funcionamiento de nuestra psicología axiomática Sistema 1 y su interacción con el sistema 2. Aunque pocos lo han entendido bien (y posiblemente nadie completamente hasta el día de hoy) fue desarrollado por unos pocos--sobre todo por John Searle, que hizo una versión más simple de esta tabla en su libro clásico racionalidad en acción (2001). Se expande en la encuesta de W de la estructura axiomática de la psicología evolutiva desarrollada a partir de sus primeros comentarios en 1911 y tan bellamente establecido en su última obra sobre certeza (OC) (escrita en 1950-51). OC es la piedra fundacional de la conducta o epistemología y ontología (posiblemente la misma), lingüística cognitiva o DPHOT, y en mi opinión el trabajo más importante en filosofía (psicología descriptiva) y por lo tanto en el estudio de la conducta. Percepción, memoria, acciones reflexivas y emociones básicas son primitivos Estados mentales involuntarios subcorticales, que pueden describirse en PLG, en los que la mente se ajusta automáticamente al mundo El S1 es sólo una causal ascendente (mundo a la mente Dirección de ajuste) y sin contenido (carente de representaciones o información) (es causalmente autorreferencial-Searle --la incuestionable, verdadera única, base axiomática de racionalidad sobre la que no hay control posible). Preferencias, deseos e intenciones son descripciones de habilidades voluntarias conscientes de pensamiento lento - que se pueden describir en las SLG-en las que la mente intenta encajar el mundo S2 tiene contenido y es una causal descendente (mente a mundo Dirección de ajuste). El Behaviorismo y todas las demás confusiones de nuestra psicología descriptiva predeterminada (filosofía) surgen porque no podemos ver S1 trabajando y describir todas las acciones con juegos de lenguaje secundario (SLG) que S llama la ilusión fenomenológica (TPI). W entendió esto y lo describió con una claridad inigualable con cientos de ejemplos de lenguaje (la mente) en acción a lo largo de sus obras. Razón tiene acceso a la memoria de trabajo y por lo que utilizamos conscientemente aparente pero razones típicamente incorrectas para explicar el comportamiento (los dos seres de la investigación actual). Las creencias y otras disposiciones pueden describirse como pensamientos que intentan igualar los hechos del mundo (mente a 239 la dirección mundial de ajuste), mientras que voliciones son intenciones de actuar (Prior Intentions-intenciones anterior - PI, y Intentions In Action-intenciones en accion IA-Searle) más actos que intentan igualar el mundo a los pensamientos - mundo a mente dirección de ajuste - CF. Searle e.g., C + L P145, 190). A veces hay lagunas en el razonamiento para llegar a la creencia y otras disposiciones. Las palabras de inclinación se pueden utilizar como sustantivos que parecen describir los Estados mentales (por ejemplo, creencias), o como verbos que describen habilidades (agentes que actúan o pueden actuar) (por ejemplo, creer) y a menudo se denominan incorrectamente "actitudes proposicionales". Las percepciones se convierten en memorias y nuestros programas innatos (módulos cognitivos, plantillas, motores de inferencia de S1) los utilizan para producir disposiciones - (actos públicos reales o potenciales también llamados inclinaciones, preferencias, capacidades, representaciones de S2) y volicion -y no hay lenguaje (concepto, pensamiento) de los Estados mentales privados para el pensamiento o la voluntad (es decir, ningún idioma privado). Los animales más altos pueden pensar y actuarán y en esa medida tienen una psicología pública. PERCEPTIONS: ("X" es true): escuchar, ver, oler, dolor, tacto, temperatura MEMORIES: Recordando, soñando S1 PRFERENCES, INCLINATIONS, DISPOSICIONES (X podría convertirse en true) (S2) CLASE 1: creyendo, juzgando, pensando, representando, entendiendo, eligiendo, decidiendo, prefiriendo, interpretando, conociendo (incluyendo habilidades y habilidades), asistiendo (aprendiendo), experimentando, significado, recordando, pretendiendo, Considerando, deseando, esperando, deseando, queriendo, esperando (una clase especial), viendo como (aspectos), CLASE 2: modo DESACOPLADO--soñar, imaginar, mentir, predecir, dudar CLASE 3: EMOCIONES: amar, odiar, temer, pesar, alegría, celos, depresión. Su función es modular las preferencias para aumentar la aptitud inclusiva (la utilidad máxima esperada) facilitando el procesamiento de la información de las percepciones y memorias para una acción rápida. Hay cierta separación entre las emociones S1 como la rabia y el miedo y S2 como el amor, el odio, el asco y la ira. DESEOS: (Quiero que la "X" sea verdadera, quiero que Change el mundo para adaptarse a mis pensamientos): Anhelo, esperando, esperando, esperando, necesitando, requiriendo, obligados a hacer 240 INTENCIONES: (voy a hacer "X" verdadero) con la intención ACTIONS (estoy haciendo "X" true): actuando, hablando, leyendo, escribiendo, calculando, persuadiendo, mostrando, demostrando, convincente, haciendo intento, tratando, riendo, jugando, comiendo, bebiendo, llorando, afirmando (describiendo, enseñando, predicando, Reportando), prometiendo, haciendo o usando mapas, libros, dibujos, programas de computadora – estos son públicos y voluntarios y transfieren información a otros para que dominen los reflejos inconscientes, involuntarios e sin informacion S1 en explicaciones de comportamiento. TODAS LAS PALABRAS SON PARTES DE COMPLEJOS JUEGOS DE IDIOMAS (PENSAMIENTOS QUE CONDUCEN A ACCIONES) TENER VARIAS FUNCIONES EN NUESTRA VIDA Y NO SON LOS NOMBRES DE LOS OBJETOS NI DE UN SOLO TIPO DE EVENTO. Conducimos un coche, pero también lo tenemos, lo vemos, vemos su foto, soñamos con él, lo imagino, lo esperamos, lo recordamos. Las interacciones sociales de los seres humanos se rigen por módulos cognitivos - aproximadamente equivalentes a los guiones o esquemas de la psicología social (grupos de neuronas organizadas en motores de inferencia), que, con percepciones y recuerdos, conducen a la formación de preferencias que conducen a las intenciones y luego a las acciones. La intencionalidad o la psicología intencional se pueden tomar para ser todos estos procesos o sólo las preferencias que conducen a acciones y en el sentido más amplio es el tema de la psicología cognitiva o Neurociencias cognitivas cuando se incluye Neurofisiología, neuroquímica y neurogenética. La psicología evolutiva puede ser considerada como el estudio de todas las funciones precedentes o del funcionamiento de los módulos que producen comportamiento, y es entonces coextenso en evolución, desarrollo y acción individual con preferencias, intenciones y acciones. Dado que los axiomas (algoritmos o módulos cognitivos) de nuestra psicología están en nuestros genes, podemos ampliar nuestro entendimiento dando descripciones claras de cómo funcionan y pueden extenderlo (cultura) a través de la biología, la psicología, la filosofía (psicología descriptiva), las matemáticas, lógica, física y programas de computación, haciéndolos más rápidos y eficientes. Hajek (2003) da un análisis de las disposiciones como probabilidades condicionales y son algoritmatizados por Spohn etc. La intencionalidad (psicología cognitiva o evolutiva) consiste en diversos aspectos de la conducta que se programan innatamente en módulos cognitivos (sin embargo definido) que crean y requieren conciencia, voluntad y el yo y en los adultos humanos normales todas las disposiciones son de significado, requieren actos públicos (por ejemplo, el lenguaje), y nos comprometen a las relaciones (llamados razones independientes del deseo para la acción-DIRA por Searle) con el fin de aumentar nuestra aptitud inclusiva (la máxima utilidad esperada, a veces llamada-la maximización de la utilidad-polémica-bayesiana) a través del dominio y el altruismo recíproco e imponer condiciones de satisfacción en las condiciones de satisfacciónSearle -(es decir, relacionar los pensamientos con el mundo a través de actos públicos movimientos musculares – es decir, matemáticas, lenguaje, arte, música, sexo, deportes, etc.). Los fundamentos de esto fueron deducido por nuestro mayor 241 psicólogo natural Ludwig Wittgenstein de la década de 1930 a 1951 pero con prefiguralas claras de vuelta a 1911 ("el árbol General de los fenómenos psicológicos. No me esfuerzo por la exactitud, sino por una visión del todo. " RPP Vol 1 P895 CF Z P464), y con refinamientos por muchos, pero sobre todo por John Searle comenzando en la década de 1960. Gran parte de nuestra intencionalidad S2 admite grados o tipos (principalmente juegos de idiomas). Como observó W, las inclinaciones (por ejemplo, el pensamiento) son a veces conscientes y deliberativos. Todas nuestras plantillas (funciones, conceptos, juegos de idiomas) tienen bordes difusos en algunos contextos, ya que deben ser útiles. Hay al menos dos tipos de pensamiento (es decir, dos juegos de idiomas o formas de usar el verbo disposicional 'Pensando') - no racional sin conciencia y racional con conciencia parcial (W), ahora descrito como el pensamiento rápido y lento de S1 y S2. Es útil considerarla como juegos de idiomas y no como meros fenómenos (W RPP2 129). Fenómenos mentales (nuestras "experiencias" subjetivas o internas) son epifenomenales, carecen de criterios, por lo tanto carecen de información incluso para uno mismo y por lo tanto no pueden desempeñar ningún papel en la comunicación, el pensamiento o la mente. Pensar como todas las disposiciones (inclinaciones, actitudes proposicionales) no es un estado mental, y no contiene ninguna información hasta que se convierte en un acto público (se da cuenta de una COS) en el habla, la escritura u otras contracciones musculares. Nuestras percepciones y memorias pueden tener información (significando-COS) cuando se manifiestan en acciones públicas a través de S2, porque sólo entonces tienen cualquier significado (consecuencias) incluso para nosotros mismos. La memoria y la percepción están integradas por los módulos en disposiciones que se vuelven psicológicamente efectivas cuando se actúan sobre ellas. El desarrollo del lenguaje significa manifestar la capacidad innata de sustituir palabras por actos. El término común TOM (teoría de la mente) es mucho mejor llamado (UA-comprensión de agencia). La intencionalidad es la innata producción genéticamente programada de conciencia, de sí mismo y de pensamiento que conduce a las intenciones y luego a las acciones mediante la contratación de los músculos. Por lo tanto, la "actitud proposicional" es un término confuso para el hablo racional intuitivo normal o no racional y la acción, pero lo doy como un sinónimo de disposiciones, ya que todavía es ampliamente utilizado por aquellos que no están familiarizados con W y S. Los esfuerzos de la ciencia cognitiva para entender el pensamiento, las emociones, etc. mediante el estudio de la neurofisiología no va a decirnos nada más acerca de cómo la mente (pensamiento, lenguaje) funciona (en contraposición a cómo funciona el cerebro) de lo que ya sabemos, porque "mente" (pensamiento, idioma) ya está en la vista pública completa (W). Cualquier fenómeno que esté oculto in Neurofisiología, bioquímica, la genética, la mecánica cuántica, o la teoría de cuerdas, son tan irrelevantes para nuestra vida social como el hecho de que una tabla está compuesta de átomos que "obedecen" (puede ser descrito por) las leyes de la física y la química es almorzar en ella. Como dijo W tan famoso "nada está oculto". Todo el interés sobre la mente (pensamiento, lenguaje) está abierto a ver si sólo examinamos cuidadosamente el funcionamiento del lenguaje. 242 El lenguaje se desarrolló para facilitar la interacción social y, por lo tanto, la recolección de recursos, supervivencia y reproducción. Su gramática funciona automáticamente y es extremadamente confusa cuando tratamos de analizarla. Las palabras y oraciones tienen múltiples usos dependiendo del contexto. Yo creo y como tengo papeles profundamente diferentes como creo y creo o creo y él cree. El presente en primera persona el uso expresivo de los verbos inclinacionales como 'Creo que' describir mi capacidad para predecir mis actos probables y no son descriptivos de mi estado mental ni basados en el conocimiento o la información en el sentido usual de esas palabras (W). "Creo que llueve", "creí que llovía", "él cree que llueve", "él va a creer que llueve,"," Creo que lloverá "o" pensará que llueve "son actos públicos potencialmente verificables desplazados en el espacio-tiempo que pretenden transmitir información (o información errónea) y así tienen COS que son sus creadores de la verdad (o falsedad). Las palabras no reflectantes o no racionales (automáticas) habladas sin intención previa han sido llamadas palabras como Deeds (actos) por W y luego por DMS en su papel en Psicología filosófica en 2000) son típicas de gran parte de nuestro comportamiento ya que puente S1 y S2 que interactúan en ambos direcciones la mayor parte de nuestra vida consciente. Las percepciones, memorias, algunas emociones y muchas "disposiciones tipo 1" son mejor llamadas reflejos de S1 y son automáticas, no reflectantes, no proposicionales y no-actitudinal funcionamiento de las bisagras (axiomas, algoritmos) de nuestra Psicología evolutiva (Moyal-Sharrock después de Wittgenstein). Ahora para algunos comentarios sobre "la opacidad de la mente" (OM). En el momento en que terminé la primera página del prefacio, me di cuenta de que este libro era simplemente otro lío desesperado (la norma en filosofía). Él dejó en claro que no tenía ninguna comprensión de la sutileza de los juegos de idiomas (por ejemplo, los usos drásticamente diferentes de ' sé que estoy despierto ', ' sé lo que quiero decir ' y ' sé qué hora es ') ni la naturaleza de las disposiciones (que él llama por el término engañoso y obsoleto ' actitudes proposicionales ') y estaba basando sus ideas sobre el comportamiento en nociones tales como el lenguaje privado , la introspección del "discurso interno" y la descripción computacional de la mente, que fueron puestos a descansar por W 3/4 de hace un siglo y por S y muchos otros desde entonces. Pero sabía que la mayoría de los libros sobre el comportamiento humano están tan confundidos y que iba a dar un resumen del trabajo científico reciente sobre las funciones cerebrales correspondientes a un pensamiento de orden superior (HOT), así que seguí. Antes de leer cualquier libro en filosofía o ciencia cognitiva, voy al índice y la bibliografía para ver a quién citan y luego tratar de encontrar algunas reseñas y especialmente un artículo en BBS ya que tiene retroalimentación de pares, que generalmente es altamente informativo. Como se mencionó anteriormente, W y S son 243 dos de los nombres más famosos en este campo, pero en el índice y la bibliografía encontré sólo 3 menciones triviales de W y no uno para S o hacker-sin duda el logro más notable de este volumen. Como era de esperar, varios comentarios de las revistas filosóficas eran inútiles y las respuestas BBS a sus précis de este libro parecen devastadoras-aunque, característicamente (con la excepción de una mención de W)que también son despistados acerca de WS. Más notable, aunque incluye muchas referencias tan recientes como 2012, la 2009 artículo BBS no está entre ellos y, por lo que puedo recordar, no proporciona respuestas sustantivas a sus críticas en este libro. En consecuencia, el potente marco LSR inspirado en WS está totalmente ausente y todas las confusiones que ha borrado son abundantes en casi todas las páginas. Si usted lee lo anterior y mis otras reseñas y luego el artículo BBS (fácilmente disponible en la red) su vista de este libro (y la mayoría de la escritura en esta arena) probablemente será muy diferente. Claro, el defecto principal de BBS es aparente--los comentadores obtienen sólo una Comentario de página y sin respuesta, mientras que los autores obtienen un artículo largo y una respuesta larga, por lo que siempre parece que prevalecen. Sin embargo, está claro que la teoría de la ISA de C, como la mayoría (todas?) las teorías filosóficas es un metamorfo que se altera para "explicar" cada objeción. Así, la línea entre una teoría significativa (en realidad una descripción) ligada a los hechos, y una vaga noción de que "no explica" nada, Desenfoca. Claro, C a menudo dice que su teoría "predice" tal y tal observación, pero esto parece ocurrir después del hecho y, por supuesto, las teorías opuestas también cambian de forma. Una poderosa teoría predice cosas que nadie esperaba e incluso lo opuesto A lo que esperaban. También recordamos los mandamientos constantes de W para seguir describiendo los hechos y evitar las "explicaciones" de la otiosa. Los argumentos definitivos de W contra la introspección y el lenguaje privado se observan en mis otras reseñas y son muy conocidos. Básicamente, son tan claros como el día, debemos tener una prueba para diferenciar entre A y B y las pruebas solo pueden ser externa y pública. El famoso ilustró esto con el escarabajo en la caja. Si todos tenemos una caja que no se puede abrir ni rayos x, etc. y llamar a lo que está dentro de un ' escarabajo ' entonces ' escarabajo ' no puede tener ningún papel en el lenguaje, para cada caja podría contener una cosa diferente o incluso podría estar vacío. Por lo tanto, no hay un lenguaje privado que sólo yo pueda saber y ninguna introspección de ' discurso interno '. Si X no es públicamente demostrable no puede ser una palabra en nuestro idioma. Esto dispara la teoría de la mente de la ISA de Carruthers' (C), así como todas las otras teorías de "sentido interno" que él hace referencia y un gran número de otros libros y artículos. He explicado el desmantelamiento de W de la noción de introspección y el funcionamiento del lenguaje disposicional ("actitudes proposicionales") por encima y en mis reseñas de Budd, Johnston y varios de los libros de S. Básicamente, demostró que la relación causal y el modelo de palabra y objeto que funciona para S1 no se aplica a S2. En cuanto a ISA, muchos han deconstruido la idea de un ' lenguaje de pensamiento ', pero en mi opinión ninguno mejor que W en BBB P37 -, "si tenemos en cuenta la posibilidad de una imagen que, aunque correcta, no tiene similitud con su objeto, la interpolación de una sombra entre la oración y la realidad pierde todo punto. Por 244 ahora, la frase en sí puede servir como una sombra. La frase es sólo una imagen, que no tiene la menor similitud con lo que representa. " Una cosa a tener en cuenta es que las teorías filosóficas no tienen ningún impacto práctico en absoluto-el papel real de la filosofía es para aclarar las confusiones acerca de cómo se utiliza el lenguaje en casos particulares (W). Al igual que varias "teorías físicas", pero a diferencia de otras vistas de dibujos animados de la vida (es decir, las opiniones religiosas, políticas, psicológicas, sociológicas, biológicas, médicas, económicas, antropológicas e históricas de la mayoría de las personas), es demasiado cerebral y esotérico para ser captado por más de una franja diminuta y es tan poco realista que incluso sus adherentes lo ignoran totalmente en su vida cotidiana. de la misma manera, con otras "teorías de la vida" académicas como el modelo de ciencias sociales estándar o pizarra en blanco ampliamente compartida por la sociología, la antropología, la psicología del pop, la historia y la literatura. Sin embargo, las religiones grandes y pequeñas, los movimientos políticos y a veces la economía a menudo generan o abrazan caricaturas ya existentes que ignoran la física y la biología (la naturaleza humana), las fuerzas terrestres o cósmicas que refuerzan nuestras supersticiones (nuestra innatamente inspirados incumplimientos psicológicos), y ayudan a poner los desechos en la tierra (el verdadero propósito de casi todas las prácticas sociales y la institución que están allí para facilitar la replicación de los genes y el consumo de recursos). El punto es darse cuenta de que estos están en un continuo con caricaturas filosóficas y tienen la misma fuente. Todos nosotros podríamos decir que tienen varias vistas de la vida de dibujos animados cuando son jóvenes y sólo unos pocos crecen de ellos. También tenga en cuenta que, como W comentó hace mucho tiempo, el prefijo "meta" es innecesario y confuso en la mayoría (tal vez todos) contextos, por lo que para ' metacognición ' en este libro, sustituir ' cognición ' o ' pensamiento ', ya que pensar en lo que nosotros u otros creen o conocemos es pensar como cualquier otro y no tiene que ser visto como ' mindreading ' o lectura de la mente (UA o Comprension de la Agencia en mi terminología). En términos de S, el COS son la prueba de lo que se piensa y son idénticos para ' está lloviendo ', creo que está lloviendo ', ' creo que usted cree que está lloviendo ' y ' él cree que está lloviendo ' (del mismo modo para ' sabe ', deseos, jueces, entiende, etc.), es decir, que Está lloviendo. Este es el dato crítico a tener en cuenta con respecto a la ' metacognición ' y la ' mentalidad ' de las disposiciones (' actitudes proposicionales ') que promueve C. Una de las respuestas en BBS fue por Dennett (que comparte la mayoría de las ilusiones de C), que parece encontrar estas ideas bastante bueno, excepto que C debe eliminar el uso de ' I ' ya que asume la existencia de un yo superior (el objetivo es la reducción dura de S2 a S1). Claro, el mismo acto de escribir, leer y todo el lenguaje y los conceptos de cualquier cosa que presuponen el yo, la conciencia y la voluntad (como S a menudo notas), por lo que tal relato sería sólo una caricatura de la vida sin ningún valor, que uno podría decir probablemente de la mayoría relatos filosóficos de conducta. El marco de trabajo de WS ha señalado desde hace tiempo que el punto de vista de primera persona no es eliminable o reducible a una 3a persona, pero esto no 245 es un problema para la vista de dibujos animados de la vida. de la misma manera, con la descripción de la función cerebral o el comportamiento como ' computacional ', ' procesamiento de la información ', etc., todos bien desdeñados innumerables veces por WS, Hutto, Read, hacker y muchos otros. Lo peor de todo es la "representación" crucial pero totalmente poco clara, para lo cual creo que el uso de S como condición de satisfacción (COS) de representar (es decir, la misma forma que para todos los sustantivos y sus verbos) es de lejos el mejor. Es decir, la ' representación ' de ' creo que está lloviendo ' es la COS que está lloviendo. Más triste de todo es que C (como Dennett) piensa que es un experto en W, después de haberlo estudiado a principios de su carrera y decidió que el argumento del idioma privado debe ser rechazado como ' Behaviorismo '! W ha rechazado el behaviorismo y gran parte de su trabajo se dedica a describir por qué no puede servir como una descripción del comportamiento. "¿No eres realmente un conductista disfrazado? ¿No estás realmente diciendo que todo excepto el comportamiento humano es una ficción? Si hablo de una ficción, entonces es de una ficción gramatical. " (PI P307) Y también se puede apuntar al Behaviorismo real en C en su forma moderna ' computacionalista '. WS insiste en el carácter indispensable del punto de vista en primera persona, mientras que C se disculpa con D en el artículo BBS para usar "yo" o "self". Esto es en mi opinión la diferencia entre una descripción exacta del uso del lenguaje y el uso que uno puede imaginar en un dibujo animado. HUTTO ha mostrado el vasto abismo entre W y Dennett (D) que servirá para caracterizar a C también, ya que tomo D y C (junto con los Churchlands y muchos otros) para estar en la misma página. S es uno de los muchos que han deconstruido D en varios escritos, y todos estos pueden leerse en oposición a C. Y recordemos que W se adhiere a ejemplos de lenguaje en acción, y una vez que uno consigue el punto que es en su mayoría muy fácil de seguir, mientras que C es cautivado por 'teoría ' (es decir, encadenar numerosas oraciones sin COS claros) y rara vez se molesta con juegos de idiomas específicos , prefiriendo experimentos y observaciones que son bastante difíciles de interpretar de cualquier manera definitiva (ver las respuestas BBS), y que en cualquier caso no tienen relevancia para las descripciones de mayor nivel de comportamiento (por ejemplo, exactamente cómo encajan en la intencionalidad Tabla). Un libro C elogia como definitivo (memoria y el cerebro computacional) presenta el cerebro como un procesador de información computacional, una visión de segundo año aniquilada a fondo y repetidamente por S y otros. En la última década, He leído miles de páginas por y sobre W y es bastante claro que C no tiene una pista. En esto se une a una larga línea de distinguidos filósofos y científicos cuya lectura de W fue infructorada: Russell, Quine, Godel, Kreisel, Chomsky, Dummett, Kripke, Dennett, Putnam, etc. (aunque Putnam comenzó a ver la luz más tarde). Simplemente no pueden ver que la mayoría filosofía son chistes gramaticales y viñetas imposibles, una vista de dibujos animados de la vida. Libros como este que intentan cerrar dos niveles de descripción son realmente dos libros y no uno. Existe la descripción (no explicación, como W dejó claro) de nuestro lenguaje y comportamiento no verbal y luego los experimentos de psicología cognitiva. 246 "La existencia del método experimental nos hace pensar que tenemos los medios para resolver los problemas que nos molesten; Aunque el problema y el método pasan entre sí por. " (W PI p232), C et al están cautivados por la ciencia y simplemente suponen que es un gran avance para casarse Metafísica a la neurociencia y la psicología experimental, pero el WS y muchos otros han demostrado que esto es un error. Lejos de hacer la descripción de la conducta científica y clara, lo hace incoherente. Y debe haber sido por la gracia de Dios que Locke, Kant, Hume Nietzsche, Sartre, Wittgenstein, Searle et al fueron capaces de dar tales relatos memorables de comportamiento sin ningún sciencia experimental en absoluto. De Curso, como los políticos, los filósofos raramente admiten errores o se callan para que esto se encienda y se encienda por razones que W diagnosticaron a la perfección. La línea de fondo tiene que ser lo que es útil y lo que tiene sentido en nuestra vida cotidiana. Sugiero que las opiniones filosóficas de los CDC (Carruthers, Dennett, Churchland), a diferencia de las de la WS, no sean útiles y sus conclusiones definitivas que harán, el yo y la conciencia son ilusiones no tienen sentido en absoluto - es decir, no tienen sentido que no tengan un COS claro. Queda por determinar si los comentarios de los CDC sobre la ciencia cognitiva tienen algún valor heurístico. Este libro (como un gran cuerpo de otra escritura) trata de descontar el HOT de otros animales y reducir el comportamiento a las funciones cerebrales (para absorber la psicología en la fisiología). La filosofía es un desastre pero, siempre que uno lee primero los muchos críticas en el BBS, el comentario sobre la psicología reciente y la fisiología puede ser de interés. Como Dennett, Churchland y muchos otros lo hacen a menudo, C no revela sus verdaderas gemas hasta el final, cuando se nos dice que el yo, la voluntad, la conciencia (en los sentidos en que estas palabras normalmente funcionan) son ilusiones (supuestamente en el sentido normal de esta palabra). Dennett tuvo que ser desenmascarado por S, Hutto et al por explicar estas ' supersticiones ' (es decir, no explicar en absoluto y de hecho ni siquiera describir), Pero sorprendentemente C también lo admite al principio, aunque por supuesto él piensa que nos está mostrando estas palabras no significan lo que pensamos y que su uso de dibujos animados es el válido. Uno también debería ver las críticas de hacker de la ciencia de la cremallera con las respuestas de S y Dennett en "Neurociencia y filosofía" y bien exploradas en los libros de hackers "Human Nature" (3 volúmenes) y "fundamentos filosóficos de la neurociencia" (ver mis comentarios de HN v1). Es notable que prácticamente nadie en todas las disciplinas conductuales (en la que incluyo literatura, historia, política, religión, derecho, arte, etc. así como los obvios) alguna vez declara su marco lógico o lo que está tratando de lograr y qué papel desempeña el análisis del lenguaje y la ciencia, por lo que todos aquellos interesados en el comportamiento podrían considerar la memorización del encantador Resumen de hacker de qué filosofía (DPHOT) tiene como objetivo hacer y cómo esto se relaciona con las actividades científicas. "Los epistemologistas tradicionales quieren saber si el conocimiento es una creencia verdadera y otra condición... o si el conocimiento ni siquiera implica la creencia... 247 Queremos saber cuándo lo hace el conocimiento y cuándo no requiere justificación. Tenemos que ser claros lo que se atribuye a una persona cuando se dice que él sabe algo. ¿Es un estado mental distintivo, un logro, una actuación, una disposición o una habilidad? ¿Podría saber o creer que p ser idéntico con un estado del cerebro? ¿Por qué uno puede decir ' él cree que p, pero no es el caso de p ', mientras que uno no puede decir ' creo que p, pero no es el caso de p '? ¿Por qué hay maneras, métodos y medios de lograr, alcanzar o recibir conocimiento, pero no creencia (en contraposición a la fe)? ¿Por qué uno puede saber, pero no creer quién, qué, qué, Cuándo, si y cómo? ¿Por qué uno puede creer, pero no saber, de todo corazón, con pasión, vacilante, tontamente, sin pensar, de manera irregular, dogmáticamente o razonablemente? ¿Por qué uno puede saber, pero no creer, algo perfectamente bien, a fondo o en detalle? Y así sucesivamente-a través de muchos cientos de preguntas similares concernientes no sólo al conocimiento y la creencia, sino también a la duda, la certeza, recordar, olvidar, observar, notar, reconocer, asistir, ser consciente de, ser consciente de, sin mencionar los numerosos verbos de percepción y sus cognados. Lo que hay que aclarar si estas preguntas han de ser contestadas es la Web de nuestros conceptos epistémicos, las formas en que los diversos conceptos cuelgan juntos, las diversas formas de sus compatibilidades e incompatibilidades, su punto y propósito, sus presuposiciones y diferentes formas de dependencia del contexto. Para este venerable ejercicio en el análisis conectivo, el conocimiento científico, la psicología, la neurociencia y la ciencia cognitiva autoproclamados no pueden aportar nada en absoluto. " (Pasando por el giro naturalista: en la calle cul-de-SAC-P15-2005 de Quine). Claro, Añadiría que es el estudio de nuestra psicología evolucionada, de DPHOT, Y la sensibilidad contextual del lenguaje (juegos de idiomas de W). No es trivial para afirmar estos hechos, ya que es bastante raro encontrar a alguien que agarre el cuadro grande e incluso mi héroe como Searle, sacerdote, Pinker, leer, etc. caen vergonzosamente cortas cuando intentan definir sus profesiones. Ha habido libros durante mucho tiempo en Atómica física y la química física, pero no hay ninguna señal de que los dos se fusionarán (ni es una idea coherente), ni que la química absorberá la bioquímica ni ese a su vez absorberá la fisiología o la genética, ni que la biología desaparezca ni que eliminará la psicología, la sociología, etc. Esto no se debe a la "juventud" de estas disciplinas, sino al hecho de que son diferentes niveles de descripción con conceptos totalmente diferentes, datos y mecanismos explicativos. Pero la envidia de la física es poderosa, y simplemente no podemos resistir la "precisión" de la física, las matemáticas, la información y el cómputo frente a la 'Vaguedad' de niveles superiores. "Debe" ser posible. El reduccionismo prospera a pesar de la incomprensibilidad (falta de aplicación a nuestra escala normal de espacio, tiempo y vida) de la mecánica cuántica, la incertidumbre, las olas/partículas, los gatos vivos/muertos, el entrelazamiento cuántico y la aleatoriedad de las matemáticas (Godel/Chaitin) incompleta y algorítmica (ver mi reseña de ' los límites externos de la razón ' de Yanofsky) y su irresistible fureza nos dice que se debe a los valores predeterminados de EP. Otra vez, un soplo de aire fresco mal necesitado de W: "para la pureza cristalina de la lógica era, por supuesto, no el resultado de la investigación: era un requisito." PI P107. Y una vez más W del 248 libro azul- "Los filósofos ven constantemente el método de la ciencia ante sus ojos, y son irresistiblemente tentados a preguntar y responder en la forma en que la ciencia lo hace. Esta tendencia es la verdadera fuente de la metafísica, y lleva al filósofo a una completa oscuridad. " Es difícil resistirse a tirar la mayoría de los libros sobre el comportamiento y releer a W y S. Simplemente salta de cualquier cosa para, por ejemplo, estas cotizaciones de su Pi http://topologicalmedialab.net/xinwei/classes/readings/Wittgenstein/pi_94- 138_239-309. html. Sugiero ver la cuestión de la mente como esencialmente la misma que todas las preguntas filosóficas "profundas". Queremos entender la ' realidad ' percibida por S1, pero S2 no es programado para eso. Es todo (o mayormente) en las maquinaciones inconscientes de S1 a través del ADN. No lo sabemos, pero nuestro ADN es cortesía de la muerte de billones de organismos en unos 3 mil millones años. así que, luchamos con la ciencia y siempre tan lentamente describir los mecanismos de la mente (es decir, del cerebro), sabiendo que incluso debemos llegar al conocimiento "completo" del cerebro, sólo tendríamos una descripción de lo que modelo exacto neuronal corresponde a ver rojo o hacer una elección y una "explicación" de por qué eso no es posible (no inteligible). Es obvio para mí después de leer decenas de miles de páginas de la filosofía que el intento de hacer más alto nivel de psicología descriptiva de este tipo, donde el lenguaje ordinario se transforma en usos especiales, tanto deliberada como inadvertidamente, es esencialmente imposible (es decir, la situación normal en la filosofía y otras disciplinas conductuales). El uso de palabras especiales de jerga (por ejemplo, la intensionalidad, el realismo, etc.) no funciona ya que no hay ninguna policía de filosofía para imponer una definición estrecha y los argumentos sobre lo que significan son interminables. Hacker es bueno, pero su escritura tan preciosa y densa que a menudo es dolorosa. Searle es muy bueno, pero requiere un poco de esfuerzo para abrazar su terminología y creo que comete algunos errores importantes, mientras que W es manos abajo el más claro y más perspicaz, una vez que comprenda lo que está haciendo, y nadie nunca ha sido capaz de emular a él. Su TLP sigue siendo la última declaración de la visión reduccionista mecánica de la vida, pero más tarde vio su error y diagnosticó y curó la ' enfermedad de los dibujos animados ', pero pocos consiguen el punto y más simplemente lo ignoran y la biología también, y por lo que hay decenas de miles de libros y millones de artículos y la mayoría de las organizaciones religiosas y políticas (y hasta hace poco la mayor parte de la economía) y casi todas las personas con vistas de dibujos animados de la vida. Pero el mundo no es una caricatura, por lo que una gran tragedia se está reproduciendo como las vistas de dibujos animados de la vida colisionan con la realidad y la ceguera universal y el egoísmo traen consigo el colapso de la civilización en los próximos dos Siglos (o menos). Dudo en recomendar los escritos de C a cualquier persona, ya que los experimentados deben tener sobre la misma perspectiva que yo, y los ingenuos estarán perdiendo su tiempo. Ya sea leer la filosofía o la ciencia cognitiva y evitar las amalgamas. 249 Entre los interminables libros y artículos disponibles, felicito a los 3 volúmenes de Human Nature editados por Carruthers (sí, el mismo), el 3 en la naturaleza humana escrito por hacker, el manual de la psicología evolutiva 2Nd Ed, y mis comentarios de W/S, Hutto, DMS, Hacker et al. y sus libros originales. Finalmente, sugiero que si aceptamos la ecuación del lenguaje y la mente de W y consideremos el "problema de la mente/cuerpo" como el "problema del lenguaje/cuerpo" puede ayudar a lograr su objetivo terapéutico. 250 ¿Los hominoides o androides destruirán la tierra? - Una revisión de Cómo Crear una Mente (How to Creaate a Mind) por Ray Kurzweil (2012) (revisión revisada 2019) Michael Starks Abstracto Hace algunos años, Llegué al punto en el que normalmente puedo decir del título de un libro, o al menos de los títulos de los capítulos, qué tipos de errores filosóficos se harán y con qué frecuencia. En el caso de trabajos nominalmente científicos, estos pueden estar en gran parte restringidos a ciertos capítulos que enceran filosóficos o tratan de sacar conclusiones generales sobre el significado o significado a largo plazo de la obra. Normalmente, sin embargo, las cuestiones científicas de hecho se entrelazan generosamente con la algarabia filosóficas en cuanto a lo que estos hechos significan. Las claras distinciones que Wittgenstein describió hace unos 80 años entre los asuntos científicos y sus descripciones por varios juegos de idiomas rara vez se toman en consideración, y por lo tanto uno es cautivado alternativamente por la ciencia y consternado por su incoherente Análisis. Así es con este volumen. Si uno es crear una mente más o menos como la nuestra, uno necesita tener una estructura lógica para la racionalidad y una comprensión de los dos sistemas de pensamiento (teoría del proceso dual). Si se trata de filosofar sobre esto, se necesita entender la distinción entre cuestiones científicas de hecho y la cuestión filosófica de cómo funciona el lenguaje en el contexto en cuestión, y de cómo evitar las trampas del reduccionismo y el cientismo, pero Kurzweil, como más estudiantes de conducta, no tiene ni idea. Él está encantado con los modelos, teorías y conceptos, y el impulso de explicar, mientras que Wittgenstein nos mostró que sólo necesitamos describir, y que las teorías, conceptos, etc., son sólo formas de usar el lenguaje (juegos de idiomas) que tienen valor sólo en la medida en que tienen un claro prueba (claro que los creadores de la verdad, o como John Searle (el crítico más famoso de AI) le gusta decir, claras condiciones de satisfacción (COS)). He intentado proporcionar un comienzo en este en mis escritos recientes. Aquellos que deseen un marco completo hasta la fecha para el comportamiento humano de la moderna dos sistemas punto de vista puede consultar mi libro 'La Estructura Lógica de la Filosofía, la Psicología, la Mente y Lenguaje en Ludwig Wittgenstein y John Searle ' 2nd Ed (2019). Los interesados en más de mis escritos pueden ver 'Monos parlantes--filosofía, psicología, ciencia, religión y política en un planeta condenado--artículos y reseñas 2006-2019 3rd Ed (2019) y delirios utópicos suicidas en el 21St Century 4TH Ed (2019) 251 También, como es habitual en las cuentas "fácticas" de la IA/robótica, no da tiempo a las amenazas muy reales a nuestra privacidad, seguridad e incluso la supervivencia de la creciente ' androidización ' de la sociedad que es prominente en otros autores (Bostrum, Hawking, etc.) y frecuentes en SciFi y películas, así que hago algunos comentarios sobre las delirios utópicos muy posiblemente suicidas de androides ' agradables ', humanoides, inteligencia artificial (IA), la democracia, la diversidad y la ingeniería genética. Me da por sentado que los avances técnicos en electrónica, robótica e IA ocurrirán, resultando en profundos cambios en la sociedad. Sin embargo, creo que los cambios provenientes de la ingeniería genética son al menos tan grandes y potencialmente mucho mayores, ya que nos permitirán cambiar totalmente Quiénes somos. Y será factible hacer servidores SuperSmart/súper fuertes modificando nuestros genes o los de otros monos. Al igual que con otras tecnologías, cualquier país que resista se quedará atrás. Pero, ¿será socialmente y económicamente factible implementar BioBots o superhumanos a gran escala? E incluso si es así, no parece Probable, económica o socialmente, para evitar que el Destrucción de la civilización industrial por la sobrepoblación, el agotamiento de los recursos, el cambio climático y probablemente también la regla tiránica de los siete sociópatas que gobiernan China. Por lo tanto, ignorando los errores filosóficos en este volumen como irrelevantes, y dirigiendo nuestra atención sólo a la ciencia, lo que tenemos aquí es otra ilusión utópica suicida enraizada en el fracaso de captar la biología básica, la psicología y la ecología humana, las mismas ilusiones que están destruyendo Estados Unidos y el mundo. Veo una remota posibilidad de que el mundo se pueda salvar, pero no por Ia/robótica, CRISPR, ni por Neomarxismo, diversidad y la igualdad. Hace algunos años, Llegué al punto en el que normalmente puedo decir del título de un libro, o al menos de los títulos de los capítulos, qué tipos de errores filosóficos se harán y con qué frecuencia. En el caso de trabajos nominalmente científicos, estos pueden estar en gran parte restringidos a ciertos capítulos que enceran filosóficos o tratan de sacar conclusiones generales sobre el significado o significado a largo plazo de la obra. Normalmente, sin embargo, las cuestiones científicas de hecho se entrelazan generosamente con la algarabia filosóficas en cuanto a lo que estos hechos significan. Las claras distinciones que Wittgenstein describió hace unos 80 años entre los asuntos científicos y sus descripciones por varios juegos de idiomas rara vez se toman en consideración, y por lo tanto uno es cautivado alternativamente por la ciencia y consternado por su incoherente Análisis. así que, es con este volumen. Si uno es crear una mente más o menos como la nuestra, uno necesita tener una estructura lógica para la racionalidad y una comprensión de los dos sistemas de pensamiento (teoría del proceso dual). Si se trata de filosofar sobre esto, se necesita entender la distinción entre cuestiones científicas de hecho y la cuestión filosófica de cómo funciona el lenguaje en el contexto en cuestión, y de cómo evitar las trampas del 252 reduccionismo y el cientismo, pero Kurzweil, como Más estudiantes de conducta, no tiene ni idea. Él, está encantado por los modelos, teorías y conceptos, y el impulso de explicar, mientras que Wittgenstein nos mostró que sólo tenemos que describir, y que las teorías, conceptos, etc., son sólo formas de usar el lenguaje (juegos de idiomas) que tienen valor sólo en la medida en que tienen un claro prueba (claro que los creadores de la verdad, o como John Searle (el crítico más famoso de AI) le gusta decir, claras condiciones de satisfacción (COS)). Aquellos que deseen un marco completo hasta la fecha para el comportamiento humano de la moderna dos sistemas punto de vista puede consultar mi libro 'La estructura lógica de la filosofía, la psicología, la mente y lenguaje en Ludwig Wittgenstein y John Searle ' 2nd ED (2019). Los interesados en más de mis escritos pueden ver 'Monos parlantes--filosofía, psicología, ciencia, religión y política en un planeta condenado--artículos y reseñas 2006-2019 2a Ed (2019) y delirios utópicos suicidas en el 21St Century 4TH Ed (2019) Realmente 'reducción' es un juego de lenguaje complejo o un grupo de juegos (usos de palabras con varios significados o COS) por lo que su uso varía mucho dependiendo del contexto y a menudo no está claro lo que significa. de la misma manera, Con 'modelado' o 'simulando' o 'equivalente a ' o ' el mismo que ' etc. de la misma manera con las afirmaciones aquí y en todas partes que 'cómputo' de procesos biológicos o mentales no se realiza, ya que llevaría demasiado tiempo, pero no 'computable o 'calculable' significa muchas cosas, o nada en absoluto dependiendo del contexto, y esto es por lo general simplemente ignorado totalmente. El capítulo 9 es la típica pesadilla que uno espera. La primera cita de Minsky "milos NDS son simplemente lo que hacen los cerebros " es un truismo en el que en algunos juegos uno puede, por ejemplo, decir ' mi cerebro está cansado ', etc. pero como la mayoría no tiene ninguna comprensión en toda la línea entre las preguntas científicas y aquellos acerca de cómo se juegan los juegos de idiomas (cómo podemos utilizar el lenguaje inteligible). Las descripciones del comportamiento no son las mismas que las descripciones de los procesos cerebrales. Este ' reduccionismo ' es una visión irremediablemente en bancarrota de la vida, -simplemente no funciona, es decir, no es coherente, y esto se ha explicado extensamente, primero por Wittgenstein y posteriormente por Searle, Hacker y muchos otros. Para una cosa, hay varios niveles de Descripción (física, química, bioquímica, genética, neurofisiología, cerebro, pensamiento/comportamiento) y los conceptos (juegos de lenguaje) útiles e inteligible (tener significado claro o COS) en un nivel de trabajo diferente en otro. Además, un "estado mental", "disposición" o "pensamiento" o "acción", pueden describirse en primera persona o en tercera persona por muchas declaraciones y viceversa, Y una declaración puede describir muchos diferentes "estados mentales", "disposiciones", "pensamientos" o "acciones", dependiendo intrincadamente en el contexto, por lo que la coincidencia entre el comportamiento y el lenguaje está enormemente indeterminado incluso para actos o oraciones "simples". y como estos se vuelven más complejos hay una explosión combinatoria. Hacker y otros han explicado esto muchas veces. 253 No hay un significado claro para describir mi deseo de ver la puesta de sol en los niveles más bajos, y nunca lo serán. Son diferentes niveles de descripción, diferentes conceptos (diferentes juegos de idiomas) y uno no puede incluso tener sentido de reducir uno a otro, de la conducta en la neurofisiología en la bioquímica en la genética a la química en la física en matemáticas o Computación y como la mayoría de los científicos de Kurzweil saludando y afirma que no se hace porque su inconveniente o poco práctico no puede ver que el verdadero problema es que la ' reducción ' no tiene un significado claro (COS), o más bien muchos significados dependiendo de forma aguda en contexto, y en ningún caso podemos dar una cuenta coherente que elimina cualquier nivel. Sin embargo, el cadáver podrido del reduccionismo flota a la superficie con frecuencia (por ejemplo, P37 y la cita de Minsky en p199) y se nos dice que la química "se reduce" a la física y que la termodinámica es una ciencia separada porque las ecuaciones se convierten en "difíciles de manejar", pero otra manera de decir esto es que la reducción es incoherente, los juegos de idiomas (conceptos) de un nivel simplemente no se aplican (tener sentido) en niveles más altos y más bajos de la descripción, y no es que nuestra ciencia o nuestro lenguaje es inadecuado. He discutido esto en mis otros artículos y es bien sabido en la filosofía de la ciencia, pero es probable que nunca va a penetrar en la "ciencia dura". La psicología del pensamiento de orden superior no es descriptible por causas, sino por razones, y uno no puede hacer que la psicología desaparezca en fisiología ni fisiología en Bioquímica ni en física, etc. Son sólo diferentes e indispensables niveles de descripción. Wittgenstein lo describió con fama hace 80 años en el libro azul. "Nuestro anhelo de generalidad tiene [como una] fuente... nuestra preocupación por el método de la ciencia. Me refiero al método de reducir la explicación de los fenómenos naturales al menor número posible de leyes naturales primitivas; y, en matemáticas, de unificar el tratamiento de diferentes temas mediante el uso de una generalización. Los filósofos ven constantemente el método de la ciencia ante sus ojos, y son irresistiblemente tentados a preguntar y responder en la forma en que la ciencia lo hace. Esta tendencia es la verdadera fuente de la metafísica, y lleva al filósofo a completa oscuridad. Quiero decir aquí que nunca puede ser nuestro trabajo para reducir cualquier cosa, o para explicar cualquier cosa. La filosofía es realmente "puramente descriptiva." Como casi todos los científicos "duros" e incluso tristemente "blandos" también, no tiene ninguna comprensión de cómo funciona el lenguaje, por ejemplo, de cómo "pensar" y otros verbos psicológicos funcionan, por lo que los hace un mal uso constantemente a lo largo de sus escritos (por ejemplo, ver sus comentarios en Searle en P170). No voy a entrar en una explicación aquí, ya que he escrito extensamente sobre esto (Delirios utópicos suicidas en los 21St Siglo 4a Ed (2019)). Así que, como la mayoría de los científicos, e incluso la mayoría de los filósofos, juega un juego de idiomas (utiliza las palabras con un significado o condición de satisfacción), pero lo 254 mezcla con otros significados bastante diferentes, al mismo tiempo insistiendo en que su juego es el único que se puede jugar (tiene algún sentido "real"). Como la mayoría, tampoco está claro en la distinción entre cuestiones científicas de hecho y los temas de cómo el lenguaje se puede utilizar de manera inteligible. Además, no tiene una comprensión clara de la distinción entre los dos sistemas de pensamiento, las automaticidades del sistema no lingüístico S1 y las deliberaciones conscientes del sistema lingüístico S2, pero he descrito esto extensamente en mis escritos y no lo voy a hacer aquí. Otra cosa que Kurzweil nunca menciona es el hecho obvio de que habrá conflictos graves y probablemente mortales con nuestros robots. Sólo piense en los continuos problemas diarios que tenemos con otros seres humanos, sobre el número de asaltos, abusos y asesinatos todos los días. ¿Por qué estos deben ser menos con los androidesy luego quién toma la culpa? No parecería haber ninguna razón en absoluto por qué los androides/AI deben estar menos en conflicto entre sí, y con nosotros, que otros humanos ya están. Y todos los dispositivos/funciones/armas están siendo voltean a la IA a un ritmo rápido. Pronto todos los sistemas de armamento, comunicaciones, redes eléctricas, actividades financieras, sistemas médicos, vehículos, dispositivos electrónicos serán controlados por la IA. Cientos de miles de millones de dispositivos ' inteligentes ' conectados al internet de las cosas y sólo un puñado de programadores incluso posiblemente capaces de entenderlos o controlarlos. Millones de misiles inteligentes, naves, submarinos, tanques, cañones, satélites, drones en todo el mundo, programados para eliminar automáticamente ' enemigos ' y cada vez más dominado por un masivo Ejército chino internacional dirigido por los siete sociópatas. Un hacker (o una IA picaro) podría paralizar o activar cualquiera de ellos en cualquier momento, y una vez que comiencen los fuegos artificiales, ¿quién podría detenerlo? La ley de robótica de Asimov-no daña a los seres humanos, es una fantasía que es inalcanzable en la práctica para los androides/AI tal como lo es para nosotros. Admito (como Searle tiene muchas veces) que somos ' androides ' también, aunque diseñado por la selección natural, no tener ' inteligencia ' desde un punto de vista, pero habiendo Casi "inteligencia" ilimitada de otra. ¿Qué es detener Ai tener todas las dolencias mentales que tenemos: neurosis, psicosis, sociopatías, egomanía, codicia, deseo egoísta de producir copias interminables del propio ' genoma ' (electrome, digitome, silicome?), racismo (programismo?), algo equivalente a la drogadicción, tendencias homicidas y suicidas o deberíamos simplemente término estos ' bichos biocidas '? Claro, los humanos intentarán excluir el mal comportamiento de los programas, pero esto tendrá que ser después del hecho, es decir, cuando ya está disperso a través de la red a millones o miles de millones de dispositivos, y como serán la autoprogramación y actualización, cualquier maldad que le otorgue una ventaja de supervivencia Debe extenderse casi instantáneamente. Esto es, por supuesto, sólo el Ai equivalente de la evolución humana por selección natural (fitness inclusivo). 255 John Searle mató la idea de la IA fuerte con la habitación China y otras descripciones de la incoherencia de varios juegos de idiomas (como Wittgenstein había hecho magníficamente mucho antes de que hubiera computadoras, aunque pocos se han dado cuenta). Él es considerado por algunos como el némesis de la IA, pero de hecho sólo tiene lo describió con precisión, y no tiene antipatía en absoluto. Searle ha dicho repetidamente que, por supuesto, las máquinas pueden pensar y sentir, porque somos tales máquinas! Hecho de proteínas, etc., y no de metal, pero las máquinas en un sentido muy fundamental, sin embargo. Y las máquinas que tomaron alrededor de 4 mil millones años de experimentación en un laboratorio del tamaño de la tierra con trillones of trillones de máquinas que se crean y sólo un pequeño número de los supervivientes más exitosos. Los esfuerzos de la IA parecen o al menos robótica, hasta ahora parecen triviales en comparación. Y como él señala es posible que gran parte o la totalidad de nuestra psicología puede ser única para los seres carnosos, al igual que gran parte de la IA puede ser para silicon. ¿Cuánto podría ser 'Verdad' superposición y cuánta simulación vaga es imposible de decir. La selección Darwiniana o la supervivencia del más apto, ya que se aplica a Ai es un tema importante que nunca es abordado por Kurzweil, ni la mayoría de los otros, pero es el tema de un libro entero del filósofo-científico Nik Bostrum y de repetidas advertencias por el físico del agujero negro y el más largo sobreviviente del mundo de ALS, Stephen Hawking. La selección natural es mayormente equivalente a la aptitud inclusiva o favoritismo hacia parientes cercanos (selección de parientes). Y "selección de grupo compensatorio" para ' amabilidad' es ilusorio (vea mi reseña de la red social de conquista de la tierra de Wilson (2012)). sí, no tenemos ADN y genes en robots (todavía), pero en lo que es tal vez el filósofo Daniel Dennett más (sólo?) contribución sustantiva a la filosofía, es útil considerar la aptitud inclusiva como el ' ácido universal ' que come a través de todas las fantasías sobre la evolución, naturaleza y la sociedad. Por lo tanto, cualquier androide auto-replicante o programa que tiene incluso la más mínima ventaja sobre otros Puede eliminarlos automáticamente y los seres humanos y todas las demás formas de vida, proteínas o metales, que son competidores de recursos, o simplemente para ' diversión ', como humanos con otros animales. ¿Exactamente qué evitará que los programas evolucionen del egoísmo y sustituyan a todas las demás máquinas/programas o formas biológicas de la competencia? Si uno toma la "singularidad" en serio, entonces ¿por qué no tomar esto sólo un serio? Comenté esto hace mucho tiempo y, por supuesto, es un elemento básico de la ciencia ficción. así que, AI es sólo la siguiente etapa de la selección natural con los seres humanos acelerando en ciertas direcciones hasta que son reemplazados por sus creaciones, al igual que las ventajas en nuestro ' programa ' resultó en la extinción de todas las otras subespecies hominoides y está exterminando rápidamente todas las otras formas de vida grandes (excepto por supuesto los que comemos y algunas mascotas degeneradas, la mayoría de las cuales se comen como los diferenciales de hambre). Como es habitual en las cuentas "fácticas" de la IA/robótica, Kurzweil no da tiempo a 256 las amenazas reales a nuestra privacidad, seguridad e incluso a la supervivencia de la creciente ' androidización ' de la sociedad, que son prominentes en otros autores de no ficción (Bostrum, Hawking etc.) y frecuentes en SciFi y películas. Se requiere poca imaginación para ver este libro como simplemente otra ilusión de utopía suicida que se concentra en los aspectos ' agradables ' de los androides, humanoides, democracia, computadoras, tecnología, diversidad étnica e ingeniería genética. Sin embargo, es gracias a estos que los últimos vestigios de nuestra estabilidad/privacidad/seguridad/prosperidad/tranquilidad/cordura están desapareciendo rápidamente. Además, los drones y los vehículos autónomos están aumentando rápidamente en capacidades y bajando de costo, por lo que no será mucho antes de que se utilicen versiones de Ia mejoradas para el crimen, la vigilancia y el espionaje por todos los niveles de gobierno, terroristas, ladrones, acosadores, secuestradores y asesinos. Dada su foto, huellas dactilares, nombre, lugar de trabajo, dirección, teléfono móvil #, correos electrónicos y chats, todos cada vez más fácil de conseguir, drones alimentados por energía solar o auto-carga, microbots, y los vehículos serán capaces de llevar a cabo casi cualquier tipo de crimen. Los virus inteligentes continuarán invadido su teléfono, PC, tableta, refrigerador, coche, TV, reproductor de música, monitores de salud, androides y sistemas de seguridad para robar sus datos, monitorear sus actividades, seguirle, y si lo desea, extorsionar, secuestrar o matar. Su cristal claro que si los aspectos positivos sucedan entonces los negativos también. Es un lanzamiento que va a hacer el más malvado-los yihadistas, los siete sociópatas, los hackers o nuestros propios programas, o tal vez todos ellos en concierto. Este lado oscuro de AI/Robotics/El Internet de Cosas a no se mencionan en este libro, y esta es la norma. Aunque la idea de que los robots se apoderen ha estado en SciFi durante muchos años, empecé a pensar seriamente en ello cuando leí sobre los nanobots en los motores de creación de Drexler en 1993. Y muchos se han preocupado por la ' goo Gris ' problema - i. e., de los nanobots replicando hasta que sofoque todo lo demás. Otra singularidad que Kurzweil y la mayoría en la IA no mencionan es la posibilidad de que la ingeniería genética pronto conducirá al ADN desplazando el silicio como el medio para la inteligencia avanzada. CRISPR y otras técnicas nos permitirá cambiar los genes a voluntad, añadiendo nuevos genes/cromosomas enteros en meses o incluso horas, con el desarrollo superrápido de organismos o cerebros en tinas sin cuerpos molestos para gravarlos. Incluso ahora, sin la ingeniería genética, hay genios precoces dominando la mecánica cuántica en sus primeros años de adolescencia o tomando el cubo de un número de 10 dígitos en su cabeza. Y la programación de los genes puede ser hecha por los mismos ordenadores y programas que se utilizan para la IA. Cualquiera que tome IA en serio también podría encontrar interés en mi artículo sobre el trabajo de David Wolpert sobre la Ley Suprema en la teoría de la máquina de Turing que sugiere algunas facetas notables y límites a la computación y la ' inteligencia '. Lo escribí porque su trabajo ha escapado de alguna manera a la atención de toda la comunidad científica. Es fácilmente disponible en la red y en mi Artículo "Wolpert, Godel, Chaitin y Wittgenstein sobre la imposibilidad, la incompletitud, la paradoja 257 mentirosa, el teísmo, los límites de la computación, un principio de incertidumbre mecánica no cuántica y el universo como computadora, el teorema definitivo en la teoría de la máquina de Turing' (2015). Para su crédito, Kurzweil hace un esfuerzo para entender a Wittgenstein (P220 etc.), pero (como 50 millones otros académicos) sólo tiene una comprensión superficial de lo que hizo. Antes de que existiesen ordenadores, Wittgenstein discutió en profundidad los temas básicos de lo que era el cálculo y lo que hace que los seres humanos sean distintos de las máquinas, pero sus escritos sobre esto son desconocidos para la mayoría. Gefwert es uno de los pocos que los analizan en detalle, pero su trabajo ha sido ignorado en gran medida. En p222 Kurzweil comenta que es ' tonto ' negar el ' mundo físico ' (un juego de lenguaje intrincado), pero es más bien que uno no puede dar ningún sentido a tal negación, ya que presupone la inteligibilidad (realidad) de lo que niega. Esta es la siempre presente cuestión de cómo damos sentido a (estamos seguros de) cualquier cosa, lo que nos lleva de nuevo a la famosa obra de Wittgenstein ' sobre la certeza ' (ver mi reseña) y la noción de la "verdadera única" Proposición. Al igual que todas las discusiones de comportamiento, Kurzweil necesita una estructura lógica para la racionalidad (intencionalidad) y (lo que es equivalente) una comprensión profunda de cómo funciona el lenguaje, pero está casi totalmente ausente. Como gran parte de mi Trabajo trata de estos problemas que no voy a entrar en ellos aquí, excepto para proporcionar el cuadro resumido de la intencionalidad. Después de medio siglo en el olvido, la naturaleza de la conciencia es ahora el tema más caliente en las Ciencias del comportamiento y la filosofía. Comenzando con el pionero obra de Ludwig Wittgenstein en la década de 1930 (los libros azul y marrón) a 1951, y desde los años 50 hasta el presente por sus sucesores Searle, Moyal-Sharrock, Read, hacker, Stern, Horwich, Winch, Finkelstein, etc., he creado la siguiente tabla como una heurística para avanzar en este estudio. Las filas muestran diversos aspectos o formas de estudiar y las columnas muestran los procesos involuntarios y comportamientos voluntarios que comprenden los dos sistemas (procesos duales) de la estructura lógica de la conciencia (LSC), que también pueden considerarse como la estructura lógica de la racionalidad (LSR-Searle), de la conducta (LSB), de la personalidad (LSP), de la mente (LSM), del lenguaje (LSL), de la realidad (LSOR), de la intencionalidad (LSI)-el término filosófico clásico, la psicología descriptiva de la conciencia (DPC), el descriptivo Psicología del pensamiento (DPT) – o mejor, el lenguaje de la psicología descriptiva del pensamiento (LDPT), términos introducidos aquí y en mis otros escritos muy recientes. Las ideas para esta tabla se originaron en el trabajo de Wittgenstein, una mesa mucho más simple de Searle, y se correlaciona con extensas tablas y gráficos en los tres recientes libros sobre la naturaleza humana por P. m. S hacker. Las últimas 9 filas provienen principalmente de la investigación de la decisión de Johnathan St. B.T. Evans y colegas como revisado por mí mismo. 258 El sistema 1 es involuntario, reflexivo o automatizado "reglas" R1 mientras pensar (cognición) no tiene lagunas y es voluntario o deliberativo "reglas" R2 y Willing (Volition) tiene 3 lagunas (ver Searle). Sugiero que podamos describir el comportamiento más claramente cambiando "imponer condiciones de satisfacción en las condiciones de satisfacción" de Searle a "relacionar los Estados mentales con el mundo moviendo los músculos" - es decir, hablar, escribir y hacer, y su "mente al mundo Dirección de ajuste"y" la dirección del mundo a la mente de ajuste "por" causa se origina en la mente "y" causa se origina en el mundo "S1 es sólo de forma ascendente causal (mundo a la mente) y sin contenido (falta de representaciones o información) mientras que S2 tiene contenidos y es descendente causal (mente al mundo ). He adoptado mi terminología en esta tabla. 259 DESDE EL ANALISIS DE LOS JUEGOS DE IDIOMAS Disposición Emoción Memoria Percepción Deseo PI * * IA * * * AcciónPalabra Causa origina de * * * * Mundo Mundo Mundo Mundo Mente Mente Mente Mente Provoca cambios en * * * * * Ninguno Mente Mente Mente Ninguno Mundo Mundo Mundo Causalmente Auto Reflexivo * * * * * * No Sí Sí Sí No Sí Sí Sí Verdadero o falso (Comprobable) Sí T sólo T sólo T sólo Sí Sí Sí Sí Condiciones públicas de satisfacción Sí Sí/No Sí/No No Sí/No Sí No Sí Describir Un estado mental No Sí Sí Sí No No Sí/No Sí Prioridad evolutiva 5 4 2, 3 1 5 3 2 2 Contenido voluntario Sí No No No No Sí Sí Sí Iniciación voluntaria Sí/No No Sí No Sí/No Sí Sí Sí Sistema cognitivo ******* 2 1 2/1 1 2/1 2 1 2 Cambiar intensidad No Sí Sí Sí Sí No No No Duración precisa No Sí Sí Sí No No Sí Sí Aquí y Ahora o Allá y Luego (H + N, T + T) ******** TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN Calidad especial No Sí No Sí No No No No Localizado en Cuerpo No No No Sí No No No Sí Las expresiones corporales Sí Sí No No Sí Sí Sí Sí Autocontradiccion es No Sí No No Sí No No No Necesita un yo Sí Sí/No No No Sí No No No Necesita lenguaje Sí No No No No No No Sí/No 260 DE LA INVESTIGACIÓN DE DECISIONES Disposición Emoción Memoria Percepción Deseo PI * * IA * * * Acción/ Palabra Efectos subliminales No Sí/No Sí Sí No No No Sí/No Asociativa Basada en reglas RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB Dependiente del contexto/ Abstracto A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/A CD/A Serie/Paralelo S S/P P P S/P S S S Heurístico Analítica A H/A H H H/A A A A Necesita trabajar Memoria Sí No No No No Sí Sí Sí Dependiente general de la inteligencia Sí No No No Sí/No Sí Sí Sí La carga cognitiva Inhibe Sí Sí/No No No Sí Sí Sí Sí Excitación facilita o inhibe I F/I F F I I I I Condiciones públicas de satisfacción de S2 son a menudo referidos por Searle y otros como COS, representaciones, creadores de la verdad o significados (o COS2 por mí mismo), mientras que los resultados automáticos de S1 son designados como presentaciones por otros (o COS1 por mí mismo). * Aka Inclinaciones, Capacidades, Preferencias, Representaciones, Posibles Acciones, etc. ** Intenciones anteriores de Searle *** La intención de Searle en acción. **** Dirección de ajuste de Searle ***** Dirección de causalidad de Searle ****** (Las instancias del estado mental Causas o se cumple a sí mismo). Searle anteriormente llamó a esto causalmente auto-referencial. ******* Tversky / Kahneman / Frederick / Evans / Stanovich definieron los sistemas cognitivos. ******** Aquí y ahora o allí y luego Uno siempre debe tener en cuenta el descubrimiento de Wittgenstein que después de haber describió los posibles usos (significados, creadores de la verdad, condiciones de satisfacción) de idioma en un determinado contexto, hemos agotado su interés, y los intentos de explicación (es decir, filosofía) sólo nos alejan de la verdad. Nos mostró 261 que sólo hay un problema filosófico: el uso de oraciones (juegos de idiomas) en un contexto inapropiado y, por lo tanto, sólo una solución, mostrando el contexto correcto. En p 278 comenta sobre nuestra mejora de la vida y referencias ' abundancia ' por su colega Diaminidis-otra fantasía utópica, y menciona la reciente obra de Pinker "los mejores ángeles de nuestra naturaleza: ¿por qué la violencia ha disminuido", pero no se da cuenta de que estas mejoras son sólo temporal, y se compran a costa de destruir el futuro de nuestro descendiente. Como he revisado el libro de Pinker y comentado en detalle sobre el próximo colapso de Estados Unidos y el mundo en mi libro ' Suicidio por la Democracia ' 2Nd Ed (2019) no voy a repetirlo aquí. Cada día perdemos unt menos 100 millones de toneladas de tierra vegetal en el mar (ca. 6kg/persona/día) y unas 20.000 hectáreas de tierra agrícola se vuelven salinificadas e inútiles. El agua dulce está desapareciendo en muchas áreas y el calentamiento global reducirán drásticamente la producción de alimentos en muchos 3Rd países del mundo. Cada día las madres del 3er mundo (el 1er mundo ahora disminuyendo diariamente) nos ' bendicen ' con otros 300.000 bebés o así, lo que conduce a un aumento neto de alrededor de 200000, otro de las Vegas cada 10 días, otro de los Angeles cada mes. Alrededor de 4 mil millones más en 2100, la mayoría en África, la mayoría del resto en Asia. Los musulmanes, famosamente tolerantes, probablemente aumentarán de aproximadamente 1/5 a alrededor de 1/3 de la tierra y controlarán numerosas bombas de H y drones controlados por la IA. Gracias a los delirios sociales de los pocos cientos de políticos que lo controlan, el romance de Estados Unidos con la "diversidad" y la "democracia" garantizará su transformación en un 3er infierno mundial y el famosamente benevolente Siete sociópatas que corren China ahora están Tomando etapa central (buscar la iniciativa cinturón y carretera, la diplomacia trampa de la deuda y agacharse tigre en la red o YouTube). Se proyecta que el nivel del mar se elevará de uno a tres metros por 2100 y algunas proyecciones son diez veces mayores. No hay ninguna duda de que eventualmente se elevará mucho más alto y cubrirá gran parte de las zonas principales del mundo de tierras de cultivo y más densamente pobladas. También está claro que el petróleo y el gas natural y la buena calidad fácil de conseguir el carbón se habrá ido, gran parte de la tierra despojado de suelo, todos los bosques se han ido, y la pesca se redujo drásticamente. Me gustaría ver un relato plausible de cómo la IA arreglará esto. Incluso si es teóricamente posible, ¿a qué costo en dinero y contaminación y sufrimiento social para crearlos y mantenerlos? La segunda ley de la termodinámica y el resto de la física, química y economía trabaja para los androides, así como los hominoides. ¿Y quién va a obligar al mundo a cooperar cuando su vida obvia es un cero-juego de suma en el que su ganancia es mi pérdida? Ciertamente no los yihadistas o los siete sociópatas. No hay almuerzo gratis. Incluso si los robots pudieran hacer todas las tareas humanas Pronto no salvaría al mundo de los constantes conflictos internacionales, el hambre, la enfermedad, el crimen, la violencia y la guerra. Cuando ellos no se puede hacer para cooperar en este tiempo limitado de abundancia (comprado por violar la tierra) es desesperadamente ingenuo suponer que lo harán cuando la anarquía está arrasando el planeta. 262 Me da por sentado que los avances técnicos en electrónica, robótica e IA ocurrirán, resultando en profundos cambios en la sociedad. Sin embargo, creo que los cambios provenientes de la ingeniería genética son al menos tan grandes y potencialmente mucho mayores, ya que nos permitirán cambiar totalmente Quiénes somos. Y será factible hacer servidores SuperSmart/súper fuertes modificando nuestros genes o los de otros monos. Al igual que con otras tecnologías, cualquier país que resista se quedará atrás. Pero, ¿será socialmente y económicamente factible implementar BioBots o superhumanos a gran escala? E incluso si es así, no parece remotamente posible, económica o socialmente para evitar el colapso de la civilización industrial. Por lo tanto, ignorando los errores filosóficos en este volumen como irrelevantes, y dirigiendo nuestra atención sólo a la ciencia, lo que tenemos aquí es otra ilusión utópica suicida enraizada en el fracaso de captar la biología básica, la psicología y la ecología humana, las mismas ilusiones que están destruyendo Estados Unidos y el mundo. Veo una remota posibilidad de que el mundo se pueda salvar, pero no por Ia/robótica, CRISPR, ni por la democracia, diversidad y la igualdad. 263 ¿Qué significa paraconsistente, indescifrable, aleatorio, computable e incompleto? Una revisión de la Manera de Godel: explota en un mundo indecible (Godel's Way: exploits into an undecidable world) por Gregory Chaitin, Francisco A Doria, Newton C.A. da Costa 160P (2012) (revisión revisada 2019) Michael Starks Abstracto En ' Godel's Way ', tres eminentes científicos discuten temas como la indecisión, la incompleta, la aleatoriedad, la computabilidad y la paraconsistencia. Me acerco a estas cuestiones desde el punto de vista de Wittgensteinian de que hay dos cuestiones básicas que tienen soluciones completamente diferentes. Existen las cuestiones científicas o empíricas, que son hechos sobre el mundo que necesitan ser investigados observacionalmente y cuestiones filosóficas en cuanto a cómo el lenguaje se puede utilizar inteligiblemente (que incluyen ciertas preguntas en matemáticas y lógica), que necesitan decidirse por unt cómo realmente usar palabras en contextos concretos. Cuando tenemos claro sobre qué juego de idiomas estamos jugando, estos temas son vistos como preguntas científicas y matemáticas ordinarias como cualquier otra. Las percepciones de Wittgenstein rara vez se han igualado y nunca superado y son tan pertinentes hoy como lo fueron hace 80 años cuando dictó los libros azul y marrón. A pesar de sus fallas - realmente una serie de notas en lugar de un libro terminado -, esta es una fuente única de la obra de estos tres eruditos famosos que han estado trabajando en los bordes sangrantes de la física, las matemáticas y la filosofía durante más de medio siglo. Da Costa y Doria son citados por Wolpert (ver abajo o mis artículos sobre Wolpert y mi reseña de ' los límites de la razón ' de Yanofsky) desde que escribieron en el cómputo universal, y entre sus muchos logros, da Costa es pionera en paraconsistencia. Aquellos que deseen un marco completo hasta la fecha para el comportamiento humano de la moderna dos sistemas punto de vista puede consultar mi libro 'La Estructura Lógica de la Filosofía, la Psicología, la Mente y Lenguaje en Ludwig Wittgenstein y John Searle ' 2nd Ed (2019). Los interesados en más de mis escritos pueden ver 'Monos parlantes--filosofía, psicología, ciencia, religión y política en un planeta condenado--artículos y reseñas 2006-2019 3rd Ed (2019) y delirios utópicos suicidas en el 21St Century 4TH Ed (2019) 264 A pesar de sus fallas - realmente una serie de notas en lugar de un libro terminado -, esta es una fuente única de la obra de estos tres eruditos famosos que han estado trabajando en los bordes sangrantes de la física, las matemáticas y la filosofía durante más de medio siglo. Da Costa y Doria son citados por Wolpert (ver abajo o mis artículos sobre Wolpert y mi reseña de ' los límites de la razón ' de Yanofsky) desde que escribieron en el cómputo universal, y entre sus muchos logros, da Costa es pionera en paraconsistencia. La prueba de Chaitin de la aleatoriedad algorítmica de las matemáticas (de la que los resultados de Godel son un corolario) y el número Omega son algunos de los resultados matemáticos más famosos en los últimos 50 años y los ha documentado en muchos libros y artículos. Sus coautores de Brasil son menos conocidos, a pesar de sus muchas contribuciones importantes. Para todos los temas aquí, la mejor manera de obtener artículos gratuitos y libros en la vanguardia es visitar ArXiv.org, viXra.org, academia.edu, citeseerx.ist.psu.edu, philpapers.org, libgen.IO o b-OK.org, donde hay millones de preimpresos/articulos/libros en cada tema (se advierte que esto puede utilizar todo su tiempo libre para el resto de su vida!). Como los lectores de mis otros artículos son conscientes, en mi opinión hay dos temas básicos que se ejecutan a lo largo de la filosofía y la ciencia que tienen soluciones completamente diferentes. Existen las cuestiones científicas o empíricas, que son hechos sobre el mundo que necesitan ser investigados observacionalmente, y cuestiones filosóficas sobre cómo el lenguaje puede ser utilizado de manera inteligible, que necesitan ser decididos mirando cómo realmente usamos ciertas palabras en contextos particulares y cómo se extienden a nuevos usos en contextos nuevos. Desafortunadamente, no hay casi ninguna conciencia de que estas son dos tareas diferentes y por lo que este trabajo, al igual que toda la escritura científica que tiene un aspecto ' filosófico ', mezcla los dos con resultados desafortunados. Y luego está el cientismo, que aquí podemos tomar como el intento de tratar todas las cuestiones como los científicos y el reduccionismo que trata de tratarlos como física y/o matemática. Desde que he notado en mis reseñas de libros de Wittgenstein (W), Searle y otros, cómo una comprensión del lenguaje utilizado en lo que Searle llama la estructura lógica de la realidad (LSR) y yo llamo a la psicología descriptiva del pensamiento de orden superior (DPHOT), junto con el proceso dual marcos de referencia (los dos sistemas del pensamiento) ayuda a aclarar los problemas filosóficos, no voy a repetir las razones de esa opinión aquí. Dado que los teoremas de Godel son corollarios del teorema de Chaitin mostrando aleatoriedad algorítmica (incompleta) a lo largo de las matemáticas (que es sólo otro de nuestros sistemas simbólicos que pueden dar lugar a acciones comprobables públicas-i. e., si es significativo que tiene COS), parece ineludible que el pensamiento (disposicional comportamiento que tiene COS) está lleno de declaraciones y situaciones imposibles, aleatorias o incompletas. Ya que podemos ver cada uno de estos dominios como sistemas simbólicos evolucionados por la oportunidad de hacer 265 que nuestro trabajo de psicología, tal vez debería ser considerado como no sorprendente que no son "completos". Para las matemáticas, Chaitin dice que esta ' aleatoriedad ' (otro grupo de juegos de idiomas) muestra que hay teoremas ilimitados que son ' verdaderos ' pero no puede comprobar-es decir, ' verdadero ' sin ' razón '. Entonces uno debería poder decir que hay declaraciones ilimitadas que hacen un perfecto sentido "gramatical" que no describen situaciones reales alcanzables en ese dominio. Sugiero que estos rompecabezas desaparecen si uno considera las opiniones de W. Escribió muchas notas sobre el tema de los teoremas de Godel, y la totalidad de su trabajo se refiere a la plasticidad, "incompleta" y la sensibilidad de contexto extrema del lenguaje, las matemáticas y la lógica, y los recientes documentos de Rodych, Floyd y Berto son la mejor introducción que conozco para Los comentarios de W sobre los fundamentos de las matemáticas y así a la filosofía. En cuanto a Godel y "incompleta", ya que nuestra psicología expresada en sistemas simbólicos como las matemáticas y el lenguaje es "aleatoria" o "incompleto" y está llena de tareas o situaciones ("problemas") que han sido demostradas imposibles (es decir, no tienen solución-ver abajo) o cuya naturaleza no está clara, parece inevitable que todo lo derivado de ella mediante el uso de pensamiento de orden superior (sistema 2 o S2) para extender nuestra psicología axiomática innata (Sistema 1 o S1) en interacciones sociales complejas como juegos, economía, física y matemáticas, también serán "incompletas". El primero de ellos en lo que ahora se llama teoría de la elección social o teoría de la decisión (que son continuos con el estudio de la lógica y el razonamiento y la filosofía) fue el famoso teorema de Kenneth Arrow hace 63 años, y ha habido muchos desde como el reciente imposibilidad o prueba incompleta de Brandenburger y Kreisel (2006) en dos-Teoría de juegos de persona. En estos casos, una prueba muestra que lo que parece una simple elección que se indica en inglés simple no tiene solución. También hay muchas famosas "paradojas" como la bella durmiente (disuelta por Rupert Read), el problema de Newcomb (disuelto por Wolpert) y Doomsday, donde lo que parece ser un problema muy simple o bien no tiene una respuesta clara, o resulta excepcionalmente difícil de encontrar. Existe una montaña de literatura sobre los dos teoremas "incompletos" de Godel y el trabajo más reciente de Chaitin, pero creo que los escritos de W en los años 30 y 40 son definitivos. Aunque Shanker, Mancosu, Floyd, Marion, Rodych, Gefwert, Wright y otros han hecho un trabajo perspicaz en la explicación de W, es sólo recientemente que el análisis único penetrante de W de los juegos de idiomas que se juegan en matemáticas y lógica han sido aclarados por Floyd (por ejemplo, ' el argumento diagonal de Wittgenstein-una variación en cantor y Turing '), Berto (por ejemplo, ' la paradoja de Godel y las razones de Wittgenstein ', y ' Wittgenstein en incompletitud hace que Sentido paraconsistente ', y Rodych (por ejemplo, ' Wittgenstein y Godel: los comentarios recién publicados ' y ' malentendido Gödel: nuevos argumentos sobre Wittgenstein y nuevos comentarios de Wittgenstein '). Berto es uno de los mejores filósofos recientes, y aquellos con el tiempo podrían desear consultar sus muchos otros artículos y libros, incluyendo el volumen que co- 266 editó en paraconsistencia. El trabajo de Rodych es indispensable, pero sólo dos de una docena de documentos son gratuitos en línea (pero ver b-OK.org y también su en línea artículos de la enciclopedia de filosofía de Stanford). Berto señala que W también negó la coherencia de metamatematica-i. e., el uso por parte de Godel de un metateorema para probar su teorema, probablemente que representa la interpretación "notoria" de W del teorema de Godel como una paradoja, y si aceptamos el argumento de W, creo que nos vemos obligados a negar la inteligibilidad de metalengujes, metateorías y meta cualquier otra cosa. ¿Cómo puede ser que tales conceptos (palabras) como metamatemático, indecibilidad e incompletitud, aceptada por millones (e incluso reclamados por no menos de Penrose, Hawking, Dyson et al para revelar verdades fundamentales sobre nuestra mente o el universo) son simples malentendidos acerca de cómo funciona el lenguaje? ¿No es la prueba en este pudin que, como tantas nociones filosóficas "reveladoras" (por ejemplo, mente y voluntad como ilusiones a la Dennett, Carruthers, etc.), no tienen ningún impacto práctico en absoluto? Berto lo resume muy bien: "dentro de este marco, no es posible que la misma frase... resulta ser expresable, pero indescifrable, en un sistema formal... y demostrablemente cierto (bajo la hipótesis de coherencia antes mencionada) en un sistema diferente (el meta-sistema). Si, como sostiene Wittgenstein, la prueba establece el significado mismo de la sentencia probada, entonces no es posible que la misma frase (es decir, una frase con el mismo significado) sea indescifrable en un sistema formal, sino que se decida en un sistema diferente (el meta-sistema) ... Wittgenstein tuvo que rechazar tanto la idea de que un sistema formal puede estar incompleto sintácticamente, como la consecuencia platónica de que ningún sistema formal que demuestre sólo verdades aritméticas puede probar todas las verdades aritméticas. Si las pruebas establecen el significado de las oraciones aritméticas, entonces no puede haber sistemas incompletos, así como no puede haber significados incompletos. " Y además "aritméticos incoherentes, es decir, aritméticos no clásicos basados en una lógica paraconsistente, son hoy en día una realidad. Lo que es más importante, las características teóricas de tales teorías coinciden precisamente con algunas de las intuiciones de Wittgensteinian antes mencionadas... Su incongruencia les permite también escapar del primer teorema de Godel, y del resultado de la indecisión de la iglesia: son, es decir, demostrablemente completos y decisibles. Por lo tanto, cumplen precisamente la solicitud de Wittgenstein, según la cual no puede haber problemas matemáticos que puedan formularse de manera significativa en el sistema, pero que las normas del sistema no pueden decidir. Por lo tanto, la decidabilidad de los aritméticos paraconsistentes armoniza con una opinión que Wittgenstein mantuvo en su carrera filosófica. " W también demostró el error fatal en relación con las matemáticas o el lenguaje o nuestro comportamiento en general como un sistema lógico coherente unitario, en lugar de como un variopinto de piezas ensambladas por los procesos aleatorios de selección natural. "Godel nos muestra un poco de claridad en el concepto de ' matemáticas ', que se indica por el hecho de que las matemáticas se toman como un sistema" y podemos decir (contra casi todo el mundo) que es todo lo que Godel y Chaitin muestran. W comentó muchas veces que la ' verdad ' en matemáticas significa 267 axiomas o teoremas derivados de axiomas, y "falso" significa que uno cometió un error en el uso de las definiciones (de los cuales los resultados siguen necesariamente y algorítmicamente), y esto es totalmente diferente de los asuntos empíricos donde uno aplica una prueba (los resultados de los cuales son impredecibles y discutible). W a menudo señaló que para ser aceptable como matemáticas en el sentido habitual, debe ser utilizable en otras pruebas y debe tener aplicaciones del mundo real, pero tampoco es el caso con la incompletitud de Godel. Puesto que no se puede probar en un sistema consistente (aquí la aritmética de Peano pero una arena mucho más amplia para Chaitin), no se puede utilizar en pruebas y, a diferencia de todo el ' resto ' de la aritmética de Peano, tampoco se puede utilizar en el mundo real. Como Rodych notas "... Wittgenstein sostiene que un cálculo formal es sólo un cálculo matemático (es decir, un juego de lenguaje matemático) si tiene una aplicación extra-sistémica en un sistema de proposiciones contingentes (por ejemplo, en el conteo ordinario y la medición o en la física) ..." Otra manera de decir esto es que uno necesita una orden para aplicar nuestro uso normal de palabras como ' prueba ', ' proposición ', ' verdadero ', ' incompleto ', ' número ', y ' matemáticas ' a un resultado en la maraña de juegos creados con ' números ' y ' más ' y ' menos ' signos, etc., y con ' Incompletitud ' esta orden carece. Rodych lo resume admirablemente. "En la cuenta de Wittgenstein, no existe tal cosa como un cálculo matemático incompleto porque ' en matemáticas, todo es algoritmo [y sintaxis] y nada es significado [semántica]..." W tiene mucho lo mismo que decir de la Diagonalización de cantor y la teoría del conjunto. "La consideración del procedimiento diagonal le da la idea de que el concepto de ' número real ' tiene mucho menos analogía con el concepto ' número cardinal ' que nosotros, siendo engañados por ciertas analogías, que se inclinan a creer" y hace muchos otros comentarios penetrantes (véase Rodych y Floyd). Claro, las mismas observaciones se aplican a todas las formas de lógica y cualquier otro sistema simbólico. Como Rodych, Berto y Priest (otro pionero en la paraconsistencia) han señalado, W fue el primero (por varias décadas) en insistir en la inevitable capacidad y utilidad de la incoherencia (y debatió este tema con Turing durante sus clases sobre los fundamentos de las matemáticas). Ahora vemos que los comentarios despectivos sobre las observaciones de W sobre las matemáticas hechas por Godel, Kreisel, Dummett y muchos otros fueron mal concebidos. Como siempre, es una mala idea apostar contra W. Algunos pueden sentimos que nos hemos desviado del camino aquí - después de todo en ' Godel Way ' sólo queremos entender ' ciencia ' y ' matemáticas ' (entre comillas porque parte del problema les concierne como ' sistemas ') y por qué surgen estas ' paradojas ' e ' inconsistencias ' y cómo deshacerse de Ellos. Pero yo reclamo que es exactamente lo que he hecho señalando el trabajo de W. Nuestros sistemas simbólicos (lenguaje, matemáticas, lógica, computación) tienen un uso claro en los estrechos confines de la vida cotidiana, en lo que podemos llamar vagamente al Reino mesoscópico-el espacio y el tiempo de los eventos normales que podemos observar sin ayuda y con certeza (el base axiomático innato o el "background" como W y posterior Searle lo llaman). Pero dejamos atrás la coherencia cuando entramos en los reinos de la física de partículas o el cosmos, la relatividad, las matemáticas más allá 268 de la simple suma y resta con números enteros, y el lenguaje utilizado fuera del contexto inmediato de los acontecimientos cotidianos. Las palabras o frases enteras pueden ser iguales, pero el significado se pierde (es decir, para usar el término preferido de Searle, sus condiciones de satisfacción (COS) se cambian u opacos). A mí me parece la mejor manera de entender la filosofía Quizás para entrar en él a través de Berto, Rodych y el trabajo de Floyd en W, con el fin de entender las sutilezas del lenguaje, ya que se utiliza en matemáticas y después "metafísicos" temas de todo tipo pueden ser disueltos. Como señala Floyd "en cierto sentido, Wittgenstein está literalizando el modelo de Turing, llevándolo de vuelta al diario y dibujando el aspecto de comando antropomórfico de las metáforas de Turing." W señaló cómo en matemáticas, estamos atrapados en más de LG (juegos de idiomas) donde no está claro lo que "verdadero", "complete" , "sigue desde", "demostrable", " número ","infinito", etc. significan (es decir, cuáles son sus COS o los creadores de la verdad en este contexto), y por lo tanto qué significado adjuntar a ' incompleto ' y también para la "aleatoriedad algorítmica" de Chaitin. Como W señaló con frecuencia, hacer el "inconsistencias "de las matemáticas o los resultados contradictorio de la metafísica causan problemas reales en las matemáticas, la física o la vida? Los casos aparentemente más serios de declaraciones contradictorias-por ejemplo, en la teoría de los---se han sabido durante mucho tiempo, pero las matemáticas van de todos modos. Del mismo modo para los innumerables mentiroso (auto referenciar) paradojas en el lenguaje y en el incompletitud y "inconsistencia" (grupos de LG complejos) de matemáticas también. Es una lucha constante para tener en cuenta que diferentes contextos significan diferentes LG (significados, COS) para "tiempo", "espacio", "partícula" "objeto", "dentro", "fuera", "siguiente", "simultáneo", "ocurrir", "suceder", "evento", "pregunta", "respuesta", "infinito", "pasado" , "futuro", "problema", "lógica", "ontología", "epistemología", "solución", "paradoja", "prueba", "extraña", "normal", "experimento", "completo", "incontable", "decidible", "dimensión", "completa", "fórmula", "proceso", "algoritmo", "axioma", " matemáticas "," número "," física "," causa "," lugar "," mismo "," en movimiento "," límite "," razón "," todavía "," suposición real "," creencia "," saber "," evento "," recursivo "," meta-", "autorreferencial" "continuar", "partícula", "onda", "frase" e incluso (en algunos contextos) "y", "o", "también", "añadir", "dividir", "si... luego "," sigue ", etc. Como señaló W, la mayoría de lo que la gente (incluyendo muchos filósofos y la mayoría de los científicos) han decir cuando la filosofar no es filosofía sino su materia prima. Chaitin, Doria, y da Costa se unen a Yanofsky (Y), Hume, Quine, Dummett, Kripke, Dennett, Churchland, Carruthers, Wheeler, etc. en la repetición de los errores de los griegos con elegante jerga filosófica mezclada con la ciencia. Sugiero antídotos rápidos a través de mis críticas y algunos Rupert Read tales como sus libros ' una manera Wittgensteinian con paradojas ' y ' Wittgenstein entre las ciencias ', o ir a academia.edu y obtener sus artículos, especialmente ' Kripke's Truco de Magia ' y ' contra el tiempo rebanadas ' y luego tanto de Searle como sea factible, pero al menos su más reciente como ' filosofía en un nuevo siglo ', ' la filosofía de Searle y la filosofía 269 China ', ' haciendo el mundo social ' y ' pensando en el mundo real ' (o al menos mis reseñas) y su Reciente volumen de percepción. Hay ademas sobre 100 YouTubes de Searle, que confirman su reputación como el mejor filósofo de hablante espontaneo desde Wittgenstein. Una superposición importante que ahora existe (y se está expandiendo rápidamente) entre teóricos del juego, físicos, economistas, matemáticos, filósofos, teóricos de la decisión y otros, todos los cuales han estado publicando para decadas pruebas estrechamente relacionadas de indecision, imposibilidad, no computabilidad e incompletitud. Una de las más extrañas es la reciente prueba de Armando Assis de que en la formulación relativa del estado de Quantum mecánicos uno puede configurar un cero-juego de suma entre el universo y un observador usando el equilibrio de Nash, del cual siguen la regla del Born y el colapso de la función de onda. Godel fue el primero en demostrar un resultado imposible y (hasta Chaitin y sobre todo Wolpert-ver mi artículo sobre su trabajo) es el más de largo alcance (o simplemente trivial/incoherente), pero ha habido una avalancha de otros. Como se señaló, uno de los primeros en la teoría de la decisión fue el famoso teorema de imposibilidad general (GIT) descubierto por Kenneth Arrow en 1951 (por lo que obtuvo el Premio Nobel de economía en 1972-y cinco de sus estudiantes son ahora premios Nobel por lo que esto no es ciencia marginal). Afirma que no existe un sistema de votación razonablemente consistente y equitativo (es decir, ningún método para agregar las preferencias de las personas a las preferencias del grupo) puede dar resultados sensatos. El grupo está dominado por una persona y por lo tanto GIT es a menudo llamado el "teorema dictador", o hay preferencias intransitivo. El papel original de Arrow se tituló "una dificultad en el concepto de bienestar social" y se puede decir así: "es imposible formular una orden de preferencia social que satisfaga todas las condiciones siguientes: no dictadura; Soberanía individual; Unanimidad Libertad de alternativas irrelevantes; Singularidad del rango de grupo. " Aquellos familiarizados con la teoría de la decisión moderna aceptan esto y los muchos relacionados restringiendo los teoremas como puntos de partida. Aquellos que no lo pueden encontrar (y todos estos teoremas) increíble y en ese caso, necesitan encontrar una trayectoria profesional que no tenga nada que ver con ninguna de las disciplinas anteriores. Ver "El teorema de la imposibilidad de la flecha" (2014) o "toma de decisiones e imperfección" (2013) entre legiones de publicaciones. Otro resultado de imposibilidad reciente es el de Brandenburger y Keisler (2006) para juegos de dos personas (pero por supuesto no limitado a "juegos" y como todos estos resultados de imposibilidad se aplica ampliamente a las decisiones de cualquier tipo), lo que demuestra que cualquier modelo de creencias de cierto tipo conduce a contradicciones. Una interpretación del resultado es que si las herramientas del analista de decisiones (básicamente, sólo la lógica) están disponibles para los jugadores en un juego, entonces hay declaraciones o creencias que los jugadores pueden anotar o "pensar", pero en realidad no pueden sostener. Pero nota la caracterización de W de "pensar" como una acción potencial con COS, que dice que realmente no tienen un significado (uso), como la infinidad de Chaitin de fórmulas aparentemente bien formadas que en realidad no pertenecen a nuestro sistema de 270 matemáticas. "Ann cree que Bob asume que Ann cree que la suposición de Bob es errónea" parece irreprochable y múltiples capas de ' recursividad ' (otro LG) se han asumido en la argumentación, la lingüística, la filosofía, etc., por lo menos durante un siglo, pero B&K demostró que es imposible que Ann y Bob asuman estas creencias. Y hay un cuerpo de rápido crecimiento de tales resultados de imposibilidad para una persona o multijugador situaciones de decisión (por ejemplo, que la calificación en Arrow, Wolpert, Koppel y Rosser etc.). Para un buen papel técnico de entre la avalancha en la paradoja de B&K, obtener el papel de Abramsky y Zvesper de arXiv que nos lleva de vuelta a la paradoja del mentiroso y el infinito de cantor (como su título señala que se trata de "formas interactivas de diagonalización y auto-referencia") y por lo tanto a Floyd, Rodych, Berto, W y Godel. Muchos de estos documentos citan el papel de Yanofsky (Y) "un enfoque universal para las paradojas autorreferenciales y los puntos fijos. Boletín de la lógica simbólica, 9 (3): 362 – 386, 2003. Abramsky (un polímatematico que es entre otras cosas un pionero en la computación cuántica) es un amigo de y y así y contribuye un papel a la reciente Festschrift a él ' computación, Logic, Games y Quantum Foundations ' (2013). Para tal vez la mejor reciente (2013) Comentarios sobre el BK y paradojes relacionados ver la Conferencia de PowerPoint 165p libre en la red por Wes Holliday y Eric Pacuit ' diez rompecabezas y paradojas sobre el conocimiento y la creencia '. Para una buena encuesta de varios autores, véase ' toma de decisiones colectivas (2010). Una de las principales omisiones de todos estos libros es el increíble trabajo del físico polimatemático y teórico de la decisión David Wolpert, que demostró algunos teoremas sorprendentes de imposibilidad o incompletos (1992 a 2008-ver arxiv.org) en los límites de la inferencia (computación) que son tan generales que son independiente del dispositivo que realiza el cálculo, e incluso independiente de las leyes de la física, por lo que se aplican a través de los ordenadores, la física y el comportamiento humano, que resumió de manera: "no se puede construir un equipo físico que pueda estar seguro de procesar correctamente información más rápida que el universo. Los resultados también significan que no puede existir un aparato de observación infalible y de propósito general, y que no puede haber un aparato de control infalible y de propósito general. Estos resultados no se basan en sistemas que son infinitos, y/o no clásicos, y/o obedecen dinámicas caóticas. También se encuentran incluso si uno utiliza una computadora infinitamente rápida e infinitamente densa, con potencias computacionales mayores que las de una máquina de Turing. " También publicó lo que parece ser el primer trabajo serio sobre el equipo o la inteligencia colectiva (COIN) que dice que pone este tema en una sólida base científica. Aunque ha publicado varias versiones de estas pruebas durante dos décadas en algunas de las revistas de física revisadas por pares más prestigiosas (por ejemplo, Physica D 237:25781 (2008)), así como en revistas de la NASA y ha recibido noticias en revistas científicas importantes, pocas parecen han notado, y he mirado en docenas de libros recientes sobre física, matemáticas, teoría de decisiones y computación sin encontrar una referencia. La comprensión presciente de W de estos temas, incluyendo su abrazo de finitismo 271 estricto y paraconsistencia, finalmente se está extendiendo a través de las matemáticas, la lógica y la informática (aunque raramente con cualquier reconocimiento). Bremer ha sugerido recientemente la necesidad de un teorema de Lowenheim-Skolem paraconsistente. "Cualquier teoría matemática presentada en la lógica del primer orden tiene un modelo paraconsistente finito." Berto continúa: "por supuesto, el finitismo estricto y la insistencia en la decidibilidad de cualquier pregunta matemática significativa van de la mano. Como Rodych ha señalado, la visión intermedia de Wittgenstein está dominada por su ' finitismo y su visión [...] del significado matemático como decidibilidad algorítmica ' según la cual ' [sólo] sumas y productos lógicos finitos (que contienen sólo predicados aritméticos) son significativos porque son algorítmicamente decidible. ". En términos modernos esto significa que tienen condiciones públicas de satisfacción (COS)-es decir, pueden ser indicadas como una proposición que es verdadera o falsa. Y esto nos lleva a la visión de W de que en última instancia todo en matemáticas y lógica descansa en nuestra innata (aunque por supuesto extensible) capacidad de reconocer una prueba válida. Berto de nuevo: "Wittgenstein creía que la noción ingenua (es decir, del matemático de trabajo) tenía que ser decidible, porque la falta de decidibilidad significaba para él simplemente falta de significado matemático: Wittgenstein creía que todo tenía que ser decidible en Matemáticas... Por supuesto, uno puede hablar en contra de la decisión de la ingenua noción de la verdad sobre la base de los propios resultados de Godel. Pero uno puede argumentar que, en el contexto, esto suplicaría la pregunta contra los paraconsistentistas-y contra Wittgenstein también. Tanto Wittgenstein como los paraconsistentistas de un lado, y los seguidores de la vista estándar por el otro, coinciden en la siguiente tesis: la decidibilidad de la noción de prueba y su incompatibilidad son incompatibles. Pero inferir de esto que la ingenua noción de la prueba no es decidible invoca la indecidibilidad de la coherencia, que es exactamente lo que Wittgenstein y el argumento paraconsistente cuestionan... ya que Victor Rodych ha argumentado enérgicamente, la coherencia del sistema pertinente es precisamente lo que se cuestiona por el razonamiento de Wittgenstein. " Y así: "por lo tanto, la aritmética inconsistente evita el primer teorema incompleto de Godel. También evita el segundo teorema en el sentido de que su no trivialidad puede establecerse dentro de la teoría: y el teorema de Tarski también, incluyendo su propio predicado no es un problema para una teoría inconsistente "[como Graham Priest señaló hace más de 20 años]. Esto trae a la mente famoso comentario de W. "Lo que estamos ' tentados a decir ' en tal caso es, por supuesto, no la filosofía, pero es su materia prima. Así, por ejemplo, lo que un matemático se inclina a decir acerca de la objetividad y la realidad de los hechos matemáticos, no es una filosofía de las matemáticas, pero algo para el tratamiento filosófico. " PI 234 Y de nuevo, la ' decidibilidad ' se refiere a la capacidad de reconocer una prueba válida, que descansa sobre nuestra psicología axiomática innata, que las matemáticas y la lógica tienen en común con el lenguaje. Y esto no es sólo un asunto histórico remoto, pero es totalmente actual. He leído mucho de Chaitin y nunca he visto una pista de 272 que él ha considerado estos asuntos. El trabajo de Douglas Hofstadter también viene a la mente. Su Godel, Escher, Bach ganó un premio Pulitzer y un Premio Nacional al Libro de Ciencias, vendió millones de copias y sigue teniendo buenas críticas (por ejemplo, casi 400 comentarios sobre la mayoría de 5 estrellas en Amazon hasta la fecha), pero no tiene idea sobre los problemas reales y repite los errores filosóficos clásicos en casi todas las páginas. Sus posteriores escritos filosóficos no han mejorado (ha elegido a Dennett como su musa), pero, como estas opiniones son vacuas y desconectadas con la vida real, sigue haciendo una excelente ciencia. Una vez más, tenga en cuenta que "infinito", "cómputo", "información", etc., sólo tienen significado en contextos humanos específicos, es decir, como Searle ha enfatizado, son todos los observadores relativos o atribuido vs intrínsecamente intencionados. El universo aparte de nuestra psicología no es ni finito ni infinito y no puede computar ni procesar nada. Sólo en nuestros juegos de idiomas hacer nuestro ordenador portátil o el universo de cómputo. W señaló que cuando llegamos al final de los comentarios científicos, el problema se convierte en una filosofía filosófica, es decir, uno de cómo el lenguaje se puede utilizar de forma inteligible. Prácticamente todos los científicos y la mayoría de los filósofos, no tienen que hay dos tipos distintos de "preguntas" o "afirmaciones" (ambas familias de lenguaje Juegos). Hay aquellos que son asuntos de hecho acerca de cómo el mundo es, es decir, que son públicamente observables proposicionales (verdadero o falso) Estados de asuntos que tienen significados claros (COS)-i.e., declaraciones científicas, y luego hay aquellos que son temas acerca de cómo el lenguaje puede ser utilizado coherentemente para describir estos Estados de cosas, y estos pueden ser respondidos por cualquier persona sana, inteligente, alfabetizada con poco o ningún recurso a los hechos de la ciencia, aunque por supuesto hay casos límite donde tenemos que decidir. Otro hecho poco entendido pero crítico es que, aunque el pensamiento, representando, inferir, entender, intuir, etc. (es decir, la psicología disposicional) de una declaración verdadera o falsa es una función de la cognición de orden superior de nuestra lentitud, Sistema consciente 2 (S2), la decisión sobre si las "partículas" están entrelazadas, la estrella muestra un cambio rojo, un teorema ha sido probado (es decir, la parte que implica ver que los símbolos se utilizan correctamente en cada línea de la prueba), siempre se hace por el ayuno , automático, inconsciente sistema 1 (S1) a través de ver, oír, tocar, etc. en el que no hay procesamiento de información, no hay representación (es decir, no hay COS) y no hay decisiones en el sentido en que estos ocurren en S2 (que recibe sus entradas de S1). Este enfoque de dos sistemas es ahora una forma estándar de ver el razonamiento o la racionalidad y es una heurística crucial en la descripción del comportamiento, de la cual la ciencia y las matemáticas son casos especiales. Hay una literatura enorme y en rápido crecimiento sobre el razonamiento que es indispensable para el estudio de la conducta o la ciencia. Un libro reciente que profundila en los detalles de cómo realmente razonamos (es decir, utilizar el lenguaje para llevar a cabo acciones - ver W y S) es ' razonamiento humano y ciencia cognitiva ' por Stenning y van Lambalgen (2008), que, a pesar de sus limitaciones (por ejemplo, la comprensión limitada de W 273 /S y la amplia estructura de la psicología intencional), es (a partir de principios de 2015) la mejor fuente única que conozco. Hay interminables libros y documentos sobre razonamiento, teoría de la decisión, teoría de juegos, etc. y muchas variantes de y algunas alternativas al marco de dos sistemas, pero yo soy uno de un número que aumenta rápidamente que encontrar el marco simple S1/S2 el mejor para la mayoría de las situaciones. El mejor libro reciente sobre la razón del enfoque de sistemas duales es las teorías de doble proceso de la mente social (2014) editado por Sherman et al. y Manktelow et al ' la ciencia de la razón ' (2011) también es indispensable. Lo que ahora está llegando a la palestra, después de milenios de discusión de razonamiento en filosofía, psicología, lógica, matemáticas, economía, sociología, etc., es el estudio de la manera real en la que usamos palabras como y,' pero, o, quiere decir, significa, implica, no', y sobre todo "si" (el condicional es el tema de más de 50 documentos y un libro (' si ') de Evans, uno de los principales investigadores en este ámbito. Claro, Wittgenstein entendió los problemas básicos aquí, probablemente mejor que nadie hasta el día de hoy, y estableció los hechos que empiezan más claramente con el Blue y Brown Books a partir de los años 30 y terminando con la soberbia ' sobre certeza ' (que puede ser vista como una tesis sobre lo que ahora se llama los dos sistemas de pensamiento), pero lamentablemente la mayoría de los estudiantes de conducta no tienen ni idea de su trabajo. El libro de Yanofsky (los límites externos de la razón) es un tratamiento extendido de estos temas, pero con poca perspicacia filosófica. Dice que las matemáticas están libres de contradicciones, sin embargo, como se ha señalado, ha sido bien sabido durante más de medio siglo que la lógica y las matemáticas están llenas de ellos-sólo Google incongruencia en matemáticas o buscarlo en Amazon o ver las obras de Priest, Berto o el artículo de Weber en la enciclopedia de Internet de la filosofía. W fue el primero en predecir inconsistencia o paraconsistencia, y si seguimos a Berto podemos interpretarlo como la sugerencia de W para evitar ser incompleta. En cualquier caso, la paraconsistencia es ahora una característica común y un importante programa de investigación en geometría, teoría de conjunto, aritmética, análisis, lógica y Ciencias de la computación. Y en P346 dice que la razón debe estar libre de contradicciones, pero está claro que "libre de" tiene diferentes usos y surgen con frecuencia en la vida cotidiana, pero tenemos mecanismos innatos para contenerlos. Esto es cierto porque fue el caso en nuestra vida cotidiana mucho antes de las matemáticas y la ciencia. Hasta hace muy poco sólo W vio que era inevitable que nuestra vida y todos nuestros sistemas simbólicos son paraconsistentes y que nos llevamos bien, ya que tenemos mecanismos para encapsular o evitarlo. W trató de explicar esto a Turing en sus conferencias sobre los fundamentos de las matemáticas, dado en Cambridge al mismo tiempo que el curso de Turing sobre el mismo tema. Ahora voy a hacer algunos comentarios sobre los elementos específicos en el libro. Como se señaló en P13, el teorema de Rice muestra la imposibilidad de un antivirus universal para computadoras (y quizás también para organismos vivos) y así es, como el teorema de la detención de Turing, otra declaración alternativa de los teoremas de Godel, pero a diferencia de Turing, rara vez se Mencionado. 274 En P33 la discusión de la relación de compresibilidad, estructura, aleatoriedad, etc. está mucho mejor indicada en muchos otros libros y papeles de Chaitin. También de importancia fundamental es el comentario de Weyl sobre el hecho de que uno puede ' probar ' o ' derivar ' cualquier cosa de cualquier otra cosa si se permite arbitrariamente ' complejas ' ' ecuaciones ' (con "constantes" arbitrarias) pero hay poca conciencia de esto entre los científicos o Filósofos. Como dijo W, necesitamos mirar el papel que cualquier afirmación, ecuación, prueba lógica o matemática juega en nuestra vida para discernir su significado ya que no hay límite en lo que podemos escribir, decir o "probar", pero sólo un pequeño subconjunto de estos tiene un uso. ' Caos ', ' complejidad ', ' ley ', ' estructura ', ' teorema ', ' ecuación ', ' prueba ', ' resultado ', ' aleatoriedad ', ' compresibilidad ', etc. son todas las familias de juegos de idiomas con significados (COS) que varían mucho, y uno debe mirar su papel preciso en el contexto dado. Esto rara vez se hace de manera sistemática deliberada, con resultados desastrosos. Como señala Searle repetidamente, estas palabras tienen intencionalidad intrínseca sólo relevante para la acción humana y significados bastante diferentes (atribuados) de otra manera. Sólo se atribuye la intencionalidad derivada de nuestra psicología cuando decimos que un termómetro ' dice ' la temperatura o una computadora es ' computación ' o una ecuación es una ' prueba '. Como es típico en la discusión científica de estos temas, los comentarios sobre p36 (sobre Omega y matemáticas cuasi-empíricas) y en gran parte del libro cruzan la línea entre la ciencia y la filosofía. Aunque hay una gran literatura sobre la filosofía de las matemáticas, hasta ahora, asI lo sabemos, todavía no hay mejor análisis que el de W, no sólo en sus comentarios publicados como ' comentarios sobre los fundamentos de las matemáticas ' y ' conferencias sobre las fundaciones de Matemáticas ', pero a lo largo de las 20.000 páginas de su nachlass (a la espera de una nueva edición en CDROM de OUP CA. 2020 pero mucho en línea ahora ver por ejemplo, Pichler http://wab.uib.no/alois/Pichler%2020170112%20Geneva.pdf). Las matemáticas, como la lógica, el lenguaje, el arte, los artefactos y la música, solo tienen un significado (uso o COS en un contexto) cuando se conectan a la vida mediante palabras o prácticas. de la misma manera, en P54 et seq. fue W quien nos ha dado el primer y mejor razonamiento para la paraconsistencia, mucho antes de que alguien realmente funcionara una lógica paraconsistente. Otra vez, como W señaló muchas veces, es fundamental tener en cuenta que no todo es un ' problema ', ' pregunta ', ' respuesta ', ' prueba ' o una ' solución ' en el mismo sentido y aceptar algo como uno u otro se compromete a un punto de vista a menudo confuso. En la discusión de la física en P108-9 debemos recordar que "punto", "energía", "espacio", "tiempo", "infinito", "principio", "fin", "partícula", "onda", "Quantum", etc. son todos los juegos de lenguaje típicos que nos seducen en vistas incoherentes de cómo son las cosas por aplicar significados (COS) de un juego a uno bastante diferente. así que, Este libro es un diamante defectuoso con mucho valor, y espero que los autores sean capaces de revisarla y ampliarla. Hace que el error casi universal y fatal 275 de la ciencia, especialmente las matemáticas, la lógica y la física, como si fueran sistemas-es., dominios donde "número", "espacio", "tiempo", "prueba", "evento", "punto", "se produce", "fuerza", "fórmula", etc. se pueden utilizar a lo largo de sus "procesos" y "Estados" sin cambios en el significado - es decir, sin alterar las condiciones de satisfacción, que son pruebas públicamente observables de verdad o falsedad. Y cuando es un problema casi insuperable para personas tan inteligentes y experimentadas como los autores, ¿qué probabilidades tiene el resto de nosotros? Recordemos el comentario de W sobre este fatal error. "El primer paso es el que se escapa por completo del aviso. Hablamos de procesos y estados y dejamos su naturaleza indeciso. En algún momento quizás sepamos más sobre ellos, pensamos. Pero eso es justo lo que nos compromete a una forma particular de ver el asunto. Porque tenemos un concepto definido de lo que significa aprender a conocer mejor un proceso. (El movimiento decisivo en el truco de conjurar se ha hecho, y fue el mismo que pensamos bastante inocente.) " PI p308 Mientras escribía este artículo, llegué a la infame ' condenación con alabanza débil ' de Dennett, un resumen de la importancia de W, que se le pidió que escribiera cuando la revista Time, con una perspicacia asombrosa, eligiera a Wittgenstein como una de las 100 personas más importantes del siglo 20. Al igual que con sus otros escritos, muestra su fracaso total para captar la naturaleza del trabajo de W (es decir, de la filosofía) y me recuerda a otro famoso comentario W que es pertinente aquí. "Aquí nos encontramos ante un fenómeno notable y característico en la investigación filosófica: la dificultad---podría decir--no es la de encontrar la solución sino más bien la de reconocer como solución algo que parece ser sólo un preliminar. Ya lo hemos dicho todo. ---No hay nada que se desprende de esto, no es la solución! .... Esto está conectado, creo, con nuestra espera erróneamente una explicación, mientras que la solución de la dificultad es una descripción, si le damos el lugar correcto en nuestras consideraciones. Si lo moramos, y no tratamos de ir más allá de él. " Zettel p312 llamar314 Chaitin es un estadounidense y sus muchos libros y artículos son bien conocidos y fáciles de encontrar, pero da Costa (que tiene 89) y Doria (79) son brasileños y la mayor parte de la obra de da Costa es sólo en Portugués, pero Doria tiene muchos artículos en inglés. Puede encontrar una bibliografía parcial para Doria aquí http://www.math.buffalo.edu/mad/PEEPS2/doria_franciscoA.html y, por supuesto, ver sus wikis. Las mejores colecciones de su trabajo están en el caos, las computadoras, los juegos y el tiempo: un cuarto de siglo de trabajo conjunto con Newton da Costa por F. Doria 132p (2011), Sobre los fundamentos de la ciencia por da Costa y Doria 294p (2008), y Metamatemático de la Ciencia por da Costa y Doria 216p (1997), pero fueron publicados en Brasil y casi imposible de encontrar. Es probable que tenga que conseguirlos a través de préstamo interbibliotecario o como archivos digitales de los autores, pero como siempre intente libgen.io y b-ok.org. 276 Hay un buen Festschrift en honor a Newton C.A. da Costa con motivo de su septuagésimo Birthday editado por Décio Krause, Steven French, Francisco Antonio Doria. (2000) que es un tema de Synthese (Dordrecht). Vol. 125, no. 1-2 (2000), también publicado como un libro, pero el libro está en sólo 5 bibliotecas en todo el mundo y no en Amazon. Vea también Doria (Ed.), "los límites del modelado matemático en las ciencias sociales: la importancia del fenómeno de la incompletitud de Godel" (2017) y Wuppuluri y Doria (eds.), "el mapa y el territorio: explorando los fundamentos de la ciencia, el pensamiento y la realidad" (2018) . Otro elemento relevante es Nuevas tendencias en los fundamentos de la ciencia: artículos dedicados al 80 o cumpleaños de Patrick Suppes, presentado en Florianópolis, Brasil, abril 22-23, 2002 por Jean-Yves Beziau; Décio Krause; Otávio Bueno; Newton C da Costa; Francisco Antonio Doria; Patrick Suppes; (2007), que es Vol. 154 # 3 de Synthese, pero de nuevo el libro está en sólo 2 bibliotecas y no en Amazon. Estudios brasileños en filosofía y la historia de la ciencia: una cuenta de las obras recientes por Decio Krause; Antônio Augusto Passos Videira; tiene un artículo por cada uno de ellos y es un libro caro pero barato en Kindle. A pesar de que es una década de edad, algunos pueden estar interesados en "son los fundamentos de la informática lógica dependiente?" por Carnielli y Doria, que dice que la teoría de la máquina de Turing (TMT) puede ser visto como ' aritmética disfrazada ', en particular como la teoría de diophantine ecuaciones en las que se formalizan, y concluyen que ' la ciencia de la computación axiomatizada es dependiente de la lógica '. Claro, como wittgensteinianos, queremos mirar con mucho cuidado los juegos de idiomas (o juegos de matemáticas), es decir, las condiciones precisas de satisfacción (los creadores de la verdad) resultantes del uso de cada una de estas palabras (es decir, ' axiomatized ', ' informática ', y ' dependiente de la lógica '). Carnielli y Agudello también formalizan TMT en términos de lógica paraconsistente, creando un modelo para las máquinas de Turing paraconsistentes (PTM) que tiene similitudes con la computación cuántica y por lo tanto con una interpretación cuantitativa de la misma crean una máquina de Turing cuántica modelo con el que resuelven los problemas Deutsch y Deutsch-Jozsa. Esto permite que se ejecuten y almacenen simultáneamente instrucciones contradictorias y cada célula de cinta, cuando y si se detiene, puede tener múltiples símbolos, cada uno de los cuales representa una salida, permitiendo así el control de las condiciones de unicidad versus multiplicidad, que simulan algoritmos cuánticos, preservando la eficiencia. Doria y da Costa también demostraron (1991) que Teoría del caos es indescifrable, y cuando está correctamente axiomatizado dentro de la teoría de conjunto clásico, es incompleto en Gödel's sentido. Los artículos, y especialmente la discusión grupal con Chaitin, Fredkin, Wolfram et al 277 al final de Zenil H. (Ed.) ' aleatoriedad a través de la computación ' (2011) es una continuación estimulante de muchos de los temas aquí, pero de nuevo carece de conciencia de la filosofía filosófica problemas, y tan a menudo perder el punto. Chaitin también contribuye a la "causalidad, complejidad significativa y cognición encarnada" (2010), repleta de artículos que tienen la mezcla usual de perspicacia científica y de incoherencia filosófica, y como de costumbre nadie es consciente de que Ludwig Wittgenstein (W) proporcionó una visión profunda e insuperable de los problemas hace más de medio siglo, incluyendo la cognición encarnada (Enactivismo). Finalmente, Me gustaría mencionar la obra del físico/filósofo Nancy Cartwright cuyos escritos sobre el significado de las "leyes" naturales y la "causalidad" son indispensables para cualquier persona interesada en estos temas. 278 Wolpert, Chaitin y Wittgenstein sobre la imposibilidad, la incompletitud, la paradoja mentirosa, el teísmo, los límites de la computación, un principio de incertidumbre mecánica no cuántica y el universo como computadora, el teorema definitivo en la teoría de la máquina de Turing (revisado en 2019) Michael Starks Abstracto He leído muchas discusiones recientes sobre los límites de la computación y el universo como computadora, con la esperanza de encontrar algunos comentarios sobre el increíble trabajo del físico polimatemático y teórico de la decisión David Wolpert pero no han encontrado una sola citación y así que presento esta muy breve Resumen. Wolpert demostró algunos teoremas sorprendentes de imposibilidad o incompletos (1992 a 2008-ver arxiv.org) en los límites de la inferencia (computación) que son tan generales que son independientes del dispositivo que hace el cómputo, e incluso independiente de las leyes de la física, por lo que se aplican a través de computadoras, física y comportamiento humano. Hacen uso de la Diagonalización de cantor, la paradoja mentirosa y las líneas del mundo para proporcionar lo que puede ser el teorema definitivo en la teoría de la máquina de Turing, y aparentemente proporcionan información sobre la imposibilidad, la incompleta, los límites de la computación, y el universo como computadora, en todos los universos posibles y todos los seres o mecanismos, generando, entre otras cosas, un principio de incertidumbre mecánica no cuántica y una prueba de monoteísmo. Hay conexiones obvias al trabajo clásico de Chaitin, Solomonoff, Komolgarov y Wittgenstein y a la noción de que ningún programa (y por lo tanto ningún dispositivo) puede generar una secuencia (o dispositivo) con mayor complejidad de la que posee. Uno podría decir que este cuerpo de trabajo implica el ateísmo, ya que no puede haber ninguna entidad más compleja que el universo físico y desde el punto de vista de Wittgensteinian, ' más complejo ' carece de sentido (no tiene condiciones de satisfacción, es decir, creador de la verdad o prueba). Incluso un ' Dios ' (es decir, un 'dispositivo' con tiempo/espacio ilimitado y energía) no puede determinar si un ' número ' dado es ' aleatorio ', ni encontrar una cierta manera de demostrar que una determinada "fórmula", "teorema" o "frase" o "dispositivo" (todos estos son juegos de lenguaje complejos) es parte de un "sistema" en particular. Aquellos que deseen un marco completo hasta la fecha para el comportamiento humano de la moderna dos sistemas punto de vista puede consultar mi libro 'La Estructura Lógica de la Filosofía, la Psicología, la Mente y Lenguaje en Ludwig Wittgenstein y John Searle ' 2nd Ed (2019). Los interesados en más de mis escritos pueden ver 'Monos parlantes--filosofía, psicología, ciencia, religión y política en un 279 planeta condenado--artículos y reseñas 2006-2019 3rd Ed (2019) y delirios utópicos suicidas en el 21St Century 4TH Ed (2019) He leído muchas discusiones recientes sobre los límites de la computación y el universo como computadora, con la esperanza de encontrar algunos comentarios sobre el increíble trabajo del físico polimatemático y teórico de la decisión David Wolpert pero no han encontrado una sola citación y así que presento esta muy breve artículo. Wolpert demostró alguna imposibilidad impresionante o incompleta teoremas (1992 a 2008-ver arXiv.org) en los límites de la inferencia (computación) que son tan generales que son independientes del dispositivo que hace el cómputo, e incluso independiente de las leyes de la física, por lo que se aplican a través de los ordenadores, la física y el comportamiento humano, que resumió porlo tanto: "Uno no puede construir un ordenador físico que pueda estar seguro de procesar correctamente la información más rápido que el universo. Los resultados también significan que no puede existir un aparato de observación infalible y de propósito general, y que no puede haber un aparato de control infalible y de propósito general. Estos resultados no se basan en sistemas que son infinitos, y/o no clásicos, y/o obedecen dinámicas caóticas. También se encuentran incluso si uno utiliza una computadora infinitamente rápida e infinitamente densa, con potencias computacionales mayores que las de una máquina de Turing. " También publicó lo que parece ser el primer trabajo serio sobre el equipo o la inteligencia colectiva (COIN) que dice que pone este tema en una sólida base científica. Aunque ha publicado varias versiones de estos durante más de dos décadas en algunas de las revistas de física revisadas por pares más prestigiosas (por ejemplo, Physica D 237:257-81 (2008)), así como en revistas de la NASA y ha recibido noticias en revistas científicas importantes, pocas parecen tener notado y he mirado en docenas de libros recientes sobre física, matemáticas, Teoría de decisiones y computación sin encontrar un Referencia. Es muy lamentable que casi nadie sea consciente de Wolpert, ya que su trabajo puede ser visto como la última extensión de la computación, el pensamiento, la inferencia, la incompletitud, y la indecisión, que logra (como muchas pruebas en la teoría de la máquina de Turing) extendiendo el paradoja mentirosa y la Diagonalización de los cantores para incluir todos los universos posibles y todos los seres o mecanismos y por lo tanto puede ser visto como la última palabra no sólo en la computación, sino en la cosmología o incluso deidades. Él logra esta generalidad extrema mediante la partición del universo inferir utilizando las líneas del mundo (es decir, en términos de lo que hace y no cómo lo hace) para que sus pruebas matemáticas son independientes de cualquier ley física particular o estructuras computacionales en establecer los límites físicos de la inferencia para el pasado, presente y futuro y todos los cálculos posibles, la observación y el control. Él señala que incluso en un universo clásico Laplace estaba equivocado sobre ser capaz de predecir perfectamente el futuro (o incluso perfectamente representar el pasado o el presente) y que sus resultados de imposibilidad pueden ser vistos como un "no cuántico principio de incertidumbre mecánica " (es decir, no puede haber un dispositivo de observación o control infalible). Cualquier dispositivo físico universal debe ser infinito, sólo puede ser en un momento 280 en el tiempo, y ninguna realidad puede tener más de uno (el "Teorema del monoteísmo"). Dado que el espacio y el tiempo no aparecen en la definición, el dispositivo puede incluso ser todo el universo a través de todos los tiempos. Se puede ver como un análogo físico de incompleto con dos dispositivos de inferencia en lugar de un dispositivo autorreferencial. Como él dice, "o bien el hamiltoniano de nuestro universo proscribe un cierto tipo de cálculo, o la complejidad de la predicción es única (a diferencia de la complejidad de la información algorítmica) en que hay una y sólo una versión de la misma que puede ser aplicable a lo largo de nuestro universo. " Otra manera de decir esto es que uno no puede tener dos dispositivos de inferencia física (computadoras) tanto capaces de hacerse preguntas arbitrarias sobre la salida de la otra, o que el universo no puede contener una computadora a la que se puede plantear cualquier cálculo arbitrario tarea, o que para cualquier par de motores de inferencia física, siempre hay preguntas de valor binario sobre el estado del universo que ni siquiera puede ser planteada a al menos uno de ellos. No se puede crear un equipo que pueda predecir una condición futura arbitraria de un sistema físico antes de que ocurra, incluso si la condición es de un conjunto restringido de tareas que pueden ser planteadas a él, es decir, no puede procesar la información (aunque se trata de una frase molesta, como muchos incluyendo John Searle y Rupert leer Nota) más rápido que el universo. El ordenador y el sistema físico arbitrario que se está calculando no tienen que estar físicamente acoplados y se mantiene independientemente de las leyes de la física, el caos, la mecánica cuántica, la causalidad o conos de luz e incluso para una velocidad infinita de la luz. El dispositivo de inferencia no tiene que estar localizado espacialmente, pero puede ser procesos dinámicos no locales que ocurren en todo el universo. Él es muy consciente de que esto pone las especulaciones de Wolfram, Landauer, Fredkin, Lloyd, etc., sobre el universo como computadora o los límites de "procesamiento de la información", en una nueva luz (aunque los índices de sus escritos no hacen referencia a él y otra omisión notable es que ninguno de los anteriores son mencionados por Yanofsky en su reciente libro completo ' los límites externos de la razón ' (ver mi opinión). Wolpert dice que muestra que ' el universo ' no puede contener un dispositivo de inferencia que pueda ' procesar información ' tan rápido como pueda, y puesto que muestra que no puede tener una memoria perfecta ni un control perfecto, su estado pasado, presente o futuro nunca puede ser perfectamente o completamente representado, caracterizado, conocido o copiado. También demostró que ninguna combinación de computadoras con códigos de corrección de errores puede superar estas limitaciones. Wolpert también señala la importancia crítica del observador ("el mentiroso") y esto nos conecta a los enigmas familiares de la física, las matemáticas y el lenguaje. Como se ha señalado en mis otros artículos, creo que los comentarios definitivos sobre muchos temas relevantes aquí (integridad, certeza, la naturaleza de la computación, etc.) fueron hechos hace mucho por Ludwig Wittgenstein y aquí hay un comentario relevante of Juliet Floyd en Wittgenstein: "Él está articulando en otras palabras una forma generalizada de la diagonalización. Por lo tanto, el argumento es generalmente aplicable, no sólo a las expansiones 281 decimales, sino a cualquier supuesta enumeración o expresión gobernada por la regla de ellos; no depende de ningún dispositivo notacional en particular ni de las disposiciones espaciales preferidas de los signos. En ese sentido, el argumento de Wittgenstein no atrae a ninguna imagen y no es esencialmente esquemático o representacional, aunque puede ser diagramada e en la medida en es un argumento lógico, su lógica puede ser representada formalmente). Al igual que los argumentos de Turing, está libre de un vínculo directo con cualquier formalismo en particular. A diferencia de los argumentos de Turing, invoca explícitamente la noción de un juego de idiomas y se aplica a (y presupone) una concepción cotidiana de las nociones de las reglas y de los humanos que las siguen. Cada línea en la presentación diagonal anterior se concibe como una instrucción o un comando, análogo a una orden dada a un ser humano... " Los paralelismos con Wolpert son evidentes. Sin embargo, una vez más, tenga en cuenta que "infinito", "computación", "información", etc., sólo tienen significado (es decir, son transitivos (Wittgenstein) o tienen COS-condiciones de satisfacción (Searle)) en contextos humanos específicos, es decir, como Searle ha enfatizado, son todos los observadores relativos o atribuido vs intrínsecamente intencionados. El universo aparte de nuestra psicología no es ni finito ni infinito y no puede computar ni procesar nada. Sólo en nuestros juegos de idiomas hacer nuestro ordenador portátil o el universo de cómputo. Sin embargo no todos son ajenos a Wolpert. Conocidos econometristas Koppl y Rosser en su famoso papel 2002 "todo lo que tengo que decir ya ha cruzado su mente" dar tres teoremas en los límites a la racionalidad, la predicción y el control en la economía. La primera utiliza el teorema de Wolpert sobre los límites de la computabilidad para mostrar algunos límites lógicos para predecir el futuro. Wolpert señala que puede ser visto como el análogo físico del teorema incompleto de Godel y K y R dicen que su variante se puede ver como su análogo de las ciencias sociales, aunque Wolpert es muy consciente de las implicaciones sociales. Dado que los teoremas de Godel son corollarios del teorema de Chaitin mostrando aleatoriedad algorítmica (incompleta) a través de las matemáticas (que es sólo otro de nuestros sistemas simbólicos), parece ineludible que pensar (comportamiento) esté lleno de imposibles, aleatorios o declaraciones y situaciones incompletas. Ya que podemos ver cada uno de estos dominios como sistemas simbólicos evolucionados por la oportunidad de hacer que nuestro trabajo de psicología, tal vez debería ser considerado como no sorprendente que no son "completos". Para las matemáticas, Chaitin dice que esta ' aleatoriedad ' (de nuevo un grupo de juegos de idiomas en términos de Wittgenstein) muestra que hay teoremas ilimitados que son verdaderos pero no puede comprobar, es decir, verdaderos sin razón. Entonces uno debería poder decir que hay declaraciones ilimitadas que hacen un perfecto sentido "gramatical" que no describen situaciones reales alcanzables en ese dominio. Sugiero que estos rompecabecezas desaparecen si uno considera las opiniones de W. Escribió muchas notas sobre el tema de los teoremas de Godel, y la totalidad de su trabajo se refiere a la plasticidad, "incompleta" y la sensibilidad de contexto extrema del lenguaje, las matemáticas y la lógica, y los recientes documentos de Rodych, Floyd y Berto son la mejor introducción que conozco para Las observaciones de W sobre los fundamentos de las matemáticas y Quizás a la 282 filosofía. K y Rel segundo Teorema de la misma muestra una posible no convergencia para la previsión bayesiana (probabilística) en un espacio de dimensiones infinitas. El tercero muestra la imposibilidad de una computadora que pronostique perfectamente una economía con agentes que sepan su programa de previsión. El astuto se dará cuenta de que estos teoremas pueden ser vistos como versiones de la paradoja del mentiroso, y el hecho de que estamos atrapados en imposibilidades cuando tratamos de calcular un sistema que incluye a nosotros mismos ha sido observado por Wolpert, Koppl, Rosser y otros en estos contextos y una vez más hemos vuelto a los rompecabecezas de la física cuando el observador está involucrado. K&R concluir "así, el orden económico es en parte el producto de algo distinto de la racionalidad calculadora". La racionalidad delimitada es ahora un campo importante en sí mismo, el tema de miles de papeles y cientos de libros. Y este trabajo aparentemente abstruso de Wolpert puede tener implicaciones para toda racionalidad. Claro, uno debe tener en cuenta que (como señaló Wittgenstein) las matemáticas y la lógica son toda sintaxis y ninguna semántica y no tienen nada que decirnos hasta que estemos conectados a nuestra vida por el lenguaje (es decir, por la psicología) y por lo que es fácil hacerlo de manera útil (significativa o tener COS) o no son (COS claros). Finalmente, uno podría decir que muchos de los comentarios de Wolpert son reajustes de la idea de que ningún programa (y por lo tanto ningún dispositivo) puede generar una secuencia (o dispositivo) con mayor complejidad de lo que posee. Hay conexiones obvias al trabajo clásico de Chaitin, Solomonoff, Komolgarov y Wittgenstein y a la noción de que ningún programa (y por lo tanto ningún dispositivo) puede generar una secuencia (o dispositivo) con mayor complejidad de la que posee. Uno podría decir que este cuerpo de trabajo implica el ateísmo, ya que no puede haber ninguna entidad más compleja que el universo físico y desde el punto de vista de Wittgensteinian, ' más complejo ' carece de sentido (no tiene condiciones de satisfacción, es decir, creador de la verdad o prueba). Incluso un ' Dios ' (es decir, un ' dispositivo ' con tiempo/espacio y energía ilimitados) no puede determinar si un ' número ' dado es ' aleatorio ' ni puede encontrar una cierta manera de demostrar que una ' fórmula ', ' teorema ' o ' frase ' o ' dispositivo ' (todos estos son juegos de lenguaje complejos) es parte de un "sistema" en particular. 283 Reseña de ' Los Limites Exteriores de la Razón' (The Outer Limits of Reason) por Noson Yanofsky 403p (2013) (revision revisada 2019) Michael Starks Abstracto Doy una revisión detallada de ' los límites externos de la razón ' por Noson Yanofsky desde una perspectiva unificada de Wittgenstein y la psicología evolutiva. Yo indiqué que la dificultad con cuestiones como la paradoja en el lenguaje y las matemáticas, la incompletitud, la indeterminación, la computabilidad, el cerebro y el universo como ordenadores, etc., surgen de la falta de mirada cuidadosa a nuestro uso del lenguaje en el adecuado contexto y, por tanto, el Error al separar los problemas de hecho científico de las cuestiones de cómo funciona el lenguaje. Discuto las opiniones de Wittgenstein sobre la incompletitud, la paracoherencia y la indecisión y el trabajo de Wolpert en los límites de la computación. Resumiendo: el universo según Brooklyn--buena ciencia, no tan buena filosofía. Aquellos que deseen un marco completo hasta la fecha para el comportamiento humano de la moderna dos sistemas punto de vista puede consultar mi libro 'La Estructura Lógica de la Filosofía, la Psicología, la Mente y Lenguaje en Ludwig Wittgenstein y John Searle ' 2nd Ed (2019). Los interesados en más de mis escritos pueden ver 'Monos parlantes--filosofía, psicología, ciencia, religión y política en un planeta condenado--artículos y reseñas 2006-2019 3rd Ed (2019) y delirios utópicos suicidas en el 21St Century 4TH Ed (2019) La mamá de Alvy responde a su depresión porque el universo se expande - "¿Qué tiene que ver el universo con eso? ¡ Estás aquí en Brooklyn! ¡ Brooklyn no está expandiéndose! " Esta famosa broma de Woody Allen hace un punto profundo sobre la sensibilidad del contexto del lenguaje que se aplica a través de la filosofía y la ciencia. Es gracioso porque es obvio que el significado de "expandir" en los dos casos es bastante diferente. Brooklyn podría expandirse si la población aumenta o la ciudad anexa tierras periféricas, pero se dice que el universo se expande debido a los telescopios cósmicos que muestran un cambio rojo que indica que las estrellas están retrocediendo entre sí o a mediciones de la densidad de la materia, etc. Diferentes significados (juegos de idiomas) (De LG) fueron caracterizados por el austríaco-Frances filósofo Ludwig Wittgenstein (W) como el problema central de la filosofía y demostró ser un defecto universal de nuestra psicología. A pesar de que hizo esto comenzando con los libros 284 azules y marrones (BBB) a principios de los años 30, dejó una 20.000 página nachlass, y es el filósofo más ampliamente discutido de los tiempos modernos, pocos lo entienden. Para el crédito de Yanofsky (Y), que ha prestado mucha atención a la filosofía e incluso citas W un par de veces, pero sin ninguna comprensión real de los temas. Es la norma entre los científicos y filósofos para mezclar las cuestiones científicas de hecho con las cuestiones filosóficas de cómo se utiliza el lenguaje y, como señaló W, - "El problema y la respuesta se pasan unos a otros". Yanofsky (un residente de Brooklyn como muchos de sus amigos y profesores) ha leído ampliamente y hace un buen trabajo de topografía de los bordes sangrantes de la física, las matemáticas y la informática en un claro y autorizada manera, pero cuando llegamos a los límites de la explicación científica y no está claro qué decir, nos vamos a la filosofía. La filosofía puede ser vista como la psicología descriptiva del pensamiento de orden superior o como el estudio de las variaciones contextuales del lenguaje utilizado para describir la cognición o la intencionalidad (mis caracterizaciones), o el estudio de la estructura lógica de la racionalidad LSR (Searle). En cuanto a LSR, el filósofo de Berkeley John Searle (S) es uno de los mejores ya que W y su trabajo pueden ser vistos como una extensión de W. He revisado muchos libros por ellos y otros y juntos estos comentarios constituyen un contorno esquelético de pensamiento o intencionalidad de orden superior, y por lo tanto de los fundamentos de la ciencia. Es común que los libros y papeles traicionar sus limitaciones en sus títulos y ese es el caso aquí. "Reason" y "Limits" son complejos de juegos de idiomas. así que, Debería parar aquí y pasar toda la revisión mostrando cómo el título de Y revela el profundo malentendido de cuáles son los verdaderos problemas. Sabía que estábamos en un momento difícil por P5 donde se nos dice que nuestras concepciones normales de tiempo, espacio, etc., se equivocan y esto se conocía incluso a los griegos. Esto trae a la mente W: "la gente dice una y otra vez que la filosofía no progresa realmente, que todavía estamos ocupados con los mismos problemas filosóficos que los griegos... en algo que ninguna explicación parece capaz de aclarar... Y lo que es más, esto satisface un anhelo de lo trascendente, porque en la medida en que las personas piensan que pueden ver los "límites del entendimiento humano", creen, por supuesto, que pueden ver más allá de estos. -CV (1931) "y también" el límite del lenguaje se demuestra por su imposibilidad de describir un hecho que corresponde a (es la traducción de) una frase sin simplemente repetir la frase... " así que, Yo diría que sólo tenemos que analizar los diferentes tipos de juegos de idiomas. Mirar más profundo es esencial, pero renunciar a nuestro uso anterior es incoherente. Piense en lo que implica "los límites externos de la razón". "exterior", "limites" und "razón" todos tienen usos comunes, pero con frecuencia son utilizados por Y de diferentes maneras, y van a parecer "bastante inocentes", pero esto sólo puede ser discutido en un contexto específico. Estamos utilizando la palabra "pregunta" (o "afirmación", "declaración", etc.) con 285 sentidos totalmente diferentes si preguntamos "¿se produce 777 en la expansión decimal de PI?" que si preguntamos "¿se produce 777 en los primeros 1000 dígitos de la expansión decimal de PI?" utilizar uno de los ejemplos de W. En este último caso está claro lo que cuenta como una respuesta verdadera o falsa, pero en el primero sólo tiene la forma de una pregunta. En P10 encontramos un grupo de "afirmaciones" que tienen significados muy diferentes. Los tres primeros son definiciones y uno podría entenderlos sin conocer ningún hecho sobre su uso, por lo tanto, X no puede ser y y no y. Y recomienda el documental "Into the Infinite", pero en realidad no se puede ver a menos que estés en el Reino Unido. Me pareció libre en la red poco después de que salió y estaba muy decepcionado. Entre otras cosas, sugiere que Godel y Cantor se volvieron locos debido a trabajar en problemas de infinito - para los cuales no hay una pizca de evidencia - y pasa mucho tiempo con Chaitin, quien, aunque es un excelente matemático, sólo tiene una noción nebulosa sobre los diversos filosóficos cuestiones discutidas aquí. Si quieres un hermoso documental de "ciencia profunda" de torbellino, sugiero "¿Somos reales?" en YouTube, aunque comete algunos de los mismos errores. W señaló que cuando llegamos al final de los comentarios científicos, el problema se convierte en un filosófico-i. e., uno de cómo el lenguaje se puede utilizar de forma inteligible. Yanofsky, como virtualmente todos los científicos y la mayoría de los filósofos, no consigue que haya dos tipos distintos de "preguntas" o "afirmaciones" (es decir, juegos de idiomas o de LG) aquí. Hay aquellos que son asuntos de hecho acerca de cómo es el mundo, es decir, que son públicamente observables proposicionales (verdadero o falso) Estados de asuntos que tienen significados claros (condiciones de satisfacción-COS) en la terminología de Searle-i. e., declaraciones científicas, y luego están los que son temas sobre cómo el lenguaje puede ser utilizado coherentemente para describir estos Estados de asuntos, y estos pueden ser contestadas por cualquier persona sana, inteligente, alfabetizada con poco o ningún recurso a los hechos de la ciencia. Otro hecho poco entendido pero crítico es que, aunque el pensamiento, representando, inferir, entender, intuir, etc. (es decir, la psicología disposicional) de una declaración verdadera o falsa es una función de la cognición de orden superior de nuestra lentitud, Sistema consciente 2 (S2), la decisión sobre si las "partículas" están entrelazadas, la estrella muestra un cambio rojo, un teorema ha sido probado (es decir, la parte que implica ver que los símbolos se utilizan correctamente en cada línea de la prueba), siempre se hace por el sistema rápido, automático e inconsciente 1 (S1) a través de ver, oír, tocar, etc. en el que no hay procesamiento de información, no hay representación (es decir, no hay COS) y no hay decisiones en el sentido en que estos ocurren en S2 (que recibe sus entradas de S1). Este enfoque de dos sistemas es ahora la forma estándar de ver el razonamiento o la racionalidad y es una heurística crucial en la descripción del comportamiento, de la que la ciencia, las matemáticas y la filosofía son casos especiales. Hay una literatura enorme y en rápido crecimiento sobre el razonamiento que es indispensable para el estudio de la conducta o la ciencia. Un libro reciente que profundiza en los detalles de cómo realmente razonamos (es decir, usamos el lenguaje para llevar a cabo acciones) véase Wittgenstein y Searle) es ' 286 razonamiento humano y ciencia cognitiva ' por Stenning y van Lambalgen (2008), que, a pesar de sus limitaciones (por ejemplo, la comprensión limitada de W/S y la amplia estructura de la psicología intencional), es (a mediados de 2016) la mejor fuente única que conozco. En cuanto a "incompletitud" o "aleatoriedad" en matemáticas, el fracaso de Y de mencionar el trabajo de Gregory Chaitin es realmente asombroso, ya que debe saber de su trabajo, y la prueba de Chaitin de la aleatoriedad algorítmica de las matemáticas (de la cual Los resultados de Godel son un corolario) y el número Omega son algunos de los resultados matemáticos más famosos en los últimos 50 años. de la misma manera, no se ve nada sobre la computación no convencional, como aquellas con membranas, ADN, etc., que no tienen puertas lógicas y siguen los patrones biológicos de "procesamiento de la información". La mejor manera de obtener artículos gratuitos y libros en la vanguardia es visitar ArXiv.org, viXra.org, academia.edu, citeseerx.ist.psu.edu, researchgate.net o philpapers.org, libgen.IO y bOK.org donde hay Millones de preimpresiones gratuitas, documentos y libros en cada tema (se advierte que esto puede utilizar todo su tiempo libre para el resto de su vida!). En cuanto a Godel y "incompleta", ya que nuestra psicología expresada en sistemas simbólicos como las matemáticas y el lenguaje es "aleatoria" o "incompleto" y está llena de tareas o situaciones ("problemas") que han sido demostradas imposibles (es decir, no tienen solución-ver abajo) o cuya naturaleza no está clara, parece inevitable que todo lo derivado de ella - e. g. física y matemática) también sea "incompleto". AFAIK el primero de ellos en lo que ahora se llama teoría de la elección social o teoría de la decisión (que son continuos con el estudio de la lógica y el razonamiento y la filosofía) fue el famoso teorema de Kenneth Arrow 65 años atrás, y ha habido muchos desde entonces. Y señala una imposibilidad reciente o prueba de incompletitud en la teoría de juegos de dos personas. En estos casos, una prueba muestra que lo que parece una simple opción indicada en inglés simple no tiene solución. Aunque uno no puede escribir un libro sobre todo, me hubiera gustado Y al menos mencionar esas famosas "paradojas" como la bella durmiente (disuelta por Read), el problema de Newcomb (disuelto por Wolpert) y Doomsday, donde lo que parece ser un problema muy simple, o bien no tiene una respuesta clara, o resulta excepcionalmente difícil de encontrar uno. Existe una montaña de literatura sobre los dos teoremas "incompletos" de Godel y el trabajo más reciente de Chaitin, pero creo que los escritos de W en los años 30 y 40 son definitivos. Aunque Shanker, Mancosu, Floyd, Marion, Rodych, Gefwert, Wright y otros han hecho un trabajo perspicaz, es sólo recientemente que el análisis de la penetración única de W de los juegos de idiomas que se juegan en matemáticas han sido clarificados por Floyd (por ejemplo, ' El argumento diagonal de Wittgenstein-una variación en cantor y Turing '), Berto (por ejemplo, ' la paradoja de Godel y las razones de Wittgenstein, y ' Wittgenstein en la incompleta hace que el sentido paraconsistente ' y el libro ' hay algo sobre Godel ', y Rodych (por ejemplo, Wittgenstein y Godel: los comentarios recién publicados ', ' malentendido Gödel: nuevos argumentos sobre Wittgenstein ', ' nuevos comentarios 287 de Wittgenstein ' y su artículo en la enciclopedia en línea de Stanford de filosofía ' filosofía de las matemáticas de Wittgenstein '). Berto es uno de los mejores filósofos recientes, y aquellos con el tiempo podrían desear consultar sus muchos otros artículos y libros, incluyendo el volumen que co-editó en paraconsistencia (2013). El trabajo de Rodych es indispensable, pero sólo dos de una docena de documentos son gratuitos en línea con la búsqueda habitual, pero es Probablemente todo gratis en línea si uno sabe dónde buscar. Berto señala que W también negó la coherencia de metamatemática--es decir, el uso por parte de Godel de un metateorema para probar su teorema, probablemente la contabilización de su interpretación "notoria" del teorema de Godel como una paradoja, y si aceptamos su argumento, creo que nos vemos obligados a negar la inteligibilidad de metalenguajes, metateorías y meta cualquier otra cosa. ¿Cómo puede ser que tales conceptos (palabras) como metamatemático e incompletitud, aceptada por millones (e incluso reclamados por no menos de Penrose, Hawking, Dyson et al para revelar verdades fundamentales sobre nuestro mente o el universo) son simples malentendidos acerca de cómo funciona el lenguaje? ¿No es la prueba en este pudin que, como tantas nociones filosóficas "reveladoras" (por ejemplo, la mente y la voluntad como ilusiones-Dennett, Carruthers, las Churchlands etc.), no tienen ningún impacto práctico en absoluto? Berto lo resume muy bien: "dentro de este marco, no es posible que la misma frase... resulta ser expresable, pero indescifrable, en un sistema formal... y demostrablemente cierto (bajo la hipótesis de coherencia antes mencionada) en un sistema diferente (el meta-sistema). Si, como sostiene Wittgenstein, la prueba establece el significado mismo de la sentencia probada, entonces no es posible que la misma frase (es decir, una frase con el mismo significado) sea indescifrable en un sistema formal, sino que se decida en un sistema diferente (el meta-sistema) ... Wittgenstein tuvo que rechazar tanto la idea de que un sistema formal puede estar incompleto sintácticamente, como la consecuencia platónica de que ningún sistema formal que demuestre sólo verdades aritméticas puede demostrar todo verdades aritméticas. Si las pruebas establecen el significado de las oraciones aritméticas, entonces no puede haber sistemas incompletos, así como no puede haber significados incompletos. " Y además "aritméticos incoherentes, es decir, aritméticos no clásicos basados en una lógica paraconsistente, son hoy en día una realidad. Lo que es más importante, las características teóricas de tales teorías coinciden precisamente con algunas de las intuiciones de Wittgensteinian antes mencionadas... Su incongruencia les permite también escapar del primer teorema de Godel, y del resultado de la indecisión de la iglesia: hay, es decir, demostrablemente completo y decidible. Por lo tanto, cumplen precisamente la solicitud de Wittgenstein, según la cual no puede haber problemas matemáticos que puedan formularse de manera significativa en el sistema, pero que las normas del sistema no pueden decidir. Por lo tanto, la decibilidad de la aritmética paraconsistente armoniza con una opinión que Wittgenstein mantuvo durante su carrera filosófica. " W también demostró el error fatal en relación con las matemáticas o el lenguaje o nuestro comportamiento en general como un sistema lógico coherente unitario, en lugar de como un variopinto de piezas ensambladas por los procesos aleatorios de 288 selección natural. "Godel nos muestra un poco de claridad en el concepto de ' matemáticas ', que se indica por el hecho de que las matemáticas se toman como un sistema" y podemos decir (contra casi todo el mundo) que es todo lo que Godel y Chaitin muestran. W comentó muchas veces que la ' verdad ' en matemáticas significa axiomas o teoremas derivados de axiomas, y ' falso ' significa que uno cometió un error en el uso de las definiciones, y esto es completamente diferente de los asuntos empíricos donde uno aplica una prueba. W a menudo señaló que para ser aceptable como matemáticas en el sentido habitual, debe ser utilizable en otras pruebas y debe tener aplicaciones del mundo real, pero tampoco es el caso con la incompletitud de Godel. Puesto que no se puede probar en un sistema consistente (aquí la aritmética de Peano pero una arena mucho más amplia para Chaitin), no se puede utilizar en pruebas y, a diferencia de todo el ' resto ' de PA, tampoco se puede utilizar en el mundo real. Como Rodych notas "... Wittgenstein sostiene que un cálculo formal es sólo un cálculo matemático (es decir, un juego de lenguaje matemático) si tiene una aplicación extra-sistémica en un sistema de proposiciones contingentes (por ejemplo, en el conteo ordinario y la medición o en la física) ..." Otra manera de decir esto es que uno necesita una orden para aplicar nuestro uso normal de palabras como ' prueba ', ' proposición ', ' verdadero ', ' incompleto ', ' número ', y ' matemáticas ' a un resultado en la maraña de juegos creados con ' números ' y ' más ' y ' menos ' signos, etc., y con ' Incompletitud ' esta orden carece. Rodych lo resume admirablemente. "En la cuenta de Wittgenstein, no hay tal cosa como un cálculo matemático incompleto porque ' en matemáticas, todo es algoritmo [y la sintaxis] y nada significa [semántica]... " W tiene mucho lo mismo que decir de la Diagonalización de cantor y la teoría del conjunto. "La consideración del procedimiento diagonal le enfunda que el concepto de ' real número ' tiene mucho menos analogía con el concepto ' número cardinal ' que nosotros, siendo engañados por ciertas analogías, estamos inclinados a creer "y muchos otros comentarios (véase Rodych y Floyd). Como Rodych, Berto y Priest (otro pionero en la paraconsistencia) han señalado, W fue el primero (por varias décadas) en insistir en la inevitable capacidad y utilidad de la incoherencia (y debatió este tema con Turing durante sus clases sobre los fundamentos de las matemáticas). Ahora vemos que los comentarios despectivos sobre las observaciones de W sobre las matemáticas hechas por Godel, Kreisel, Dummett y muchos otros fueron mal concebidos. Como siempre, es una mala idea apostar contra W. Algunos pueden sentir que nos hemos desviado del camino aquí, después de todo en "los límites de la razón" sólo queremos entender la ciencia y las matemáticas y por qué surgen estas paradojas e inconsistencias y cómo deshacerse de ellas. Pero yo afirme que eso es exactamente lo que he hecho señalando la obra de W y sus herederos intelectuales. Nuestros sistemas simbólicos (lenguaje, matemáticas, lógica, computación) tienen un uso claro en los estrechos confines de la vida cotidiana, de lo que podemos llamar vagamente al Reino mesoscópico-el espacio y el tiempo de los eventos normales que podemos observar sin ayuda y con certeza (la innata piedra angular o fondo axiomático). Pero dejamos atrás la coherencia cuando entramos en los reinos de la física de partículas o el cosmos, la relatividad, las matemáticas más allá de la simple suma y resta con números enteros, y el lenguaje utilizado fuera del 289 contexto inmediato de los acontecimientos cotidianos. Las palabras o frases enteras pueden ser iguales, pero el significado se pierde. Me parece que la mejor manera de entender la filosofía es introducirme a través de Berto, Rodych y el trabajo de Floyd en W, con el fin de entender las sutilezas del lenguaje, ya que se utiliza en matemáticas y después los problemas "metafísicos" de todo tipo pueden ser disueltos. Como señala Floyd "en cierto sentido, Wittgenstein está literalizando el modelo de Turing, llevándolo de vuelta al diario y dibujando el aspecto de comando antropomórfico de las metáforas de Turing." W señaló cómo en matemáticas, estamos atrapados en más de LG (juegos de idiomas) donde no está claro lo que "verdadero", "completo", "sigue a partir de", "demostrable", "número", "infinito", etc. significan (es decir, cuáles son sus COS o los creadores de la verdad en este contexto), y por lo tanto qué significado adjuntar a ' incompleto ' y también para la "aleatoriedad algorítmica" de Chaitin. Como W observó con frecuencia, hacer el "inconsistencias "de las matemáticas o los resultados contradictorio de la metafísica causan problemas reales en las matemáticas, la física o la vida? Los casos aparentemente más serios de declaraciones contradictorias-por ejemplo, en la teoría de los---se han sabido durante mucho tiempo, pero las matemáticas van de todos modos. Del mismo modo, para el sinnúmero de mentiras (autoreferenciación) paradoas en el lenguaje que Y discute, pero él no entiende realmente su base, y no deja claro que la autorreferenciación está involucrada in el "incompleta" e "inconsistencia" (grupos de LG complejas) de matemáticas también. Otro trabajo interesante es " Godel's Way (el camino de Godel)" (2012) por Chaitin, da Costa y Doria (ver mi revision). A pesar de sus muchos fracasos - realmente una serie de notas en lugar de un libro terminado - es una fuente única de la obra de estos tres famosos eruditos que han estado trabajando en los bordes sangrantes de la física, las matemáticas y la filosofía durante más de medio siglo. Da Costa y Doria son citados por Wolpert (ver más abajo) ya que escribieron sobre computación universal y entre sus muchos logros, da Costa es un pionero en paraconsistencia. Chaitin también contribuye a la "causalidad, complejidad significativa y cognición encarnada" (2010), repleta de artículos que tienen la mezcla habitual de perspicacia e incoherencia y como de costumbre, nadie es consciente de que W puede ser considerado como el originador de la posición actual como Cognición o Enactivismo encarnado. Muchos encontrarán los artículos y especialmente la discusión grupal con Chaitin, Fredkin, Wolfram et al al final de Zenil H. (Ed.) ' aleatoriedad a través de la computación ' (2011) una continuación estimulante de muchos de los temas aquí, pero carente de conciencia de la cuestiones filosóficas y así mezclar ciencia (hallazgo de hechos) con la filosofía (juegos de idiomas). Véase también Doria (Ed.), "los límites del modelado matemático en las ciencias sociales: la importancia del fenómeno de la incompletitud de Godel" (2017) y Wuppuluri y Doria (eds.), "el mapa 290 y el territorio: explorando los fundamentos de la ciencia, el pensamiento y la realidad "(2018). Es una lucha constante para tener en cuenta que diferentes contextos significan diferentes LG (significados, COS) para "tiempo"," espacio "," partícula "," objeto ", "dentro", "fuera", "siguiente", "simultáneo", "ocurrir", "suceder", "evento" , "pregunta", "respuesta", "infinito", "pasado", "futuro", "problema", "lógica", "ontología", "epistemología", "solución", "paradoja", "probar", "extraño", "normal", "experimento", "completo", "incontable", "decidible", "dimensión", "completo", "fórmula", " proceso "," algoritmo "," axioma "," matemáticas "," física "," causa "," lugar "," mismo "," en movimiento "," límite "," razón "," todavía "," real "" suposición "," creencia "," saber "," evento "," recursivo "," meta-"," autorreferencial "" continuar "," partícula "," onda "," frase "e incluso (en algunos contextos)" y "," o "," también "," añadir "," dividir "," si... luego "," sigue ", etc. Parafraseando a W, la mayoría de lo que la gente (incluyendo muchos filósofos y la mayoría de los científicos) tienen que decir cuando la filosofar no es filosofía sino su materia prima. Yanofsky se une a Hume, Quine, Dummett, Kripke, Dennett, Churchland, Carruthers, Wheeler, etc. en la repetición de los errores de los griegos con la jerga filosófica elegante mezclado con la ciencia. Como antídotos, sugiero mis reseñas y algunos Rupert Read, tales como sus libros ' un camino Wittgensteinian con paradojas ' y ' Wittgenstein entre las ciencias ', o ir a academia.edu y obtener sus artículos, especialmente ' ' Kripke Conjuring trick ' y ' contra rebanadas de tiempo ' y luego tanto de S como sea factible, pero al menos su más reciente como ' filosofía en un nuevo siglo ', ' filosofía de Searle y filosofía China ', ' haciendo el mundo social ' y ' pensando en el mundo real ' (o mis reseñas si el tiempo es corto) y su Reciente volumen de percepción. También hay más de 100 YouTubes de Searle que confirman su reputación como el mejor filósofo de "standup" (pensando en sus pies) desde Wittgenstein. Y no aclara la superposición principal que ahora existe (y se expande rápidamente) entre los teóricos del juego, los físicos, los economistas, los matemáticos, los filósofos, los teóricos de las decisiones y otros, todos los cuales han estado publicando durante décadas las pruebas estrechamente relacionadas de indecidibilidad, imposibilidad, nocomputabilidad e incompletitud. Uno de los más "extraños" (es decir, no es así si aclaramos los juegos de idiomas) es la reciente prueba de Armando Assis que en la formulación relativa del estado del mecanica cuantica, uno puede configurar un cerojuego de suma entre el universo y un observador usando el equilibrio de Nash, del cual siguen la regla del Born y el colapso de la función de onda. Godel fue el primero en demostrar un resultado imposible y (hasta que Wolpert) es el más lejano (o simplemente trivial/incoherente) pero ha habido una avalancha de otros. Como se señaló, uno de los primeros en la teoría de la decisión fue el famoso teorema de imposibilidad general (GIT) descubierto por Kenneth Arrow en 1951 (por lo que obtuvo el Premio Nobel de economía en 1972-y cinco de sus estudiantes son ahora premios Nobel por lo que esto no es ciencia marginal). Afirma que no existe un sistema de votación razonablemente consistente y equitativo (es decir, ningún método para 291 agregar las preferencias de las personas a las preferencias del grupo) puede dar resultados sensatos. El grupo está dominado por una persona y por lo tanto GIT es a menudo llamado el "teorema dictador", o hay preferencias intransitivas. El papel original de Arrow se tituló "una dificultad en el concepto de bienestar social" y se puede decir así: "es imposible formular una orden de preferencia social que satisfaga todas las condiciones siguientes: no dictadura; Soberanía individual; Unanimidad Libertad De alternativas irrelevantes; Singularidad del rango de grupo. " Aquellos familiarizados con la teoría de la decisión moderna aceptan esto y los muchos teoremas de restricción relacionados como sus puntos de partida. Aquellos que no lo pueden encontrar (y todos estos teoremas) increíble y en ese caso, necesitan encontrar una trayectoria profesional que no tenga nada que ver con ninguna de las disciplinas anteriores. Ver "El teorema de la imposibilidad de la flecha" (2014) o "toma de decisiones e imperfección" (2013) entre legiones de publicaciones. Y menciona el famoso resultado imposible de Brandenburger y Keisler (2006) para los juegos de dos personas (pero por supuesto no se limitan a los "juegos" y como todos estos resultados de imposibilidad se aplica ampliamente a las decisiones de cualquier tipo) que muestra que cualquier modelo de creencias de un cierto tipo conduce a contradicciones. Una interpretación del resultado es que si las herramientas del analista de decisiones (básicamente, sólo la lógica) están disponibles para los jugadores en un juego, entonces hay declaraciones o creencias que los jugadores pueden anotar o "pensar", pero en realidad no pueden sostener. "Ann cree que Bob asume que Ann cree que la suposición de Bob es errónea" parece irreprochable y "recursividad" (otro LG) se ha asumido en la argumentación, la lingüística, la filosofía, etc., por lo menos durante un siglo, pero demostraron que es imposible para Ann y Bob para asumir estas creencias. Y hay un cuerpo de rápido crecimiento de tales resultados de imposibilidad para 1 o multijugador situaciones de decisión (por ejemplo, se gradía en Arrow, Wolpert, Koppel y Rosser etc). Para un buen papel técnico de entre la avalancha en la paradoja de B&K, obtener el papel de Abramsky y Zvesper de arXiv que nos lleva de vuelta a la paradoja del mentiroso y el infinito de cantor (como su título señala que se trata de "formas interactivas de diagonalización y autoreferencia") y por lo tanto a Floyd, Rodych, Berto, W y Godel. Muchos de estos documentos citan el documento de Y "un enfoque universal para las paradocitas autorreferenciales y los puntos fijos. Boletín de la lógica simbólica, 9 (3): 362 – 386, 2003. Abramsky (un polímata que es entre otras cosas un pionero en la computación cuántica) es un amigo de y y así y contribuye un papel a la reciente Festschrift a él ' computación, lógica, juegos y fundamentos cuánticos ' (2013). Para tal vez el mejor reciente (2013) Comentario sobre el BK y paradojas relacionados ver la Conferencia de PowerPoint 165p libre en la red por Wes Holliday y Eric Pacuit ' diez rompecabezas y paradojas sobre el conocimiento y la creencia '. Para una buena encuesta de varios autores, véase ' toma de decisiones colectivas (2010). Una de las principales omisiones de todos estos libros es el increíble trabajo del físico polimatemático y teórico de la decisión David Wolpert, que demostró algunos teoremas sorprendentes de imposibilidad o incompletos (1992 a 2008-ver arxiv.org) en los límites de la inferencia (computación) que son tan generales que son 292 independientes del dispositivo que hace el cálculo, e incluso independiente de las leyes de la física, por lo que se aplican a través de los ordenadores, la física y el comportamiento humano, que resumió de este modo: "uno no puede construir un equipo físico que se puede asegurado de procesar correctamente la información más rápido que el universo. Los resultados también significan que no puede existir un aparato de observación infalible, de propósito general, y que no puede haber un infalible, de propósito general Control Aparato. Estos resultados no se basan en sistemas que son infinitos, y/o no clásicos, y/o obedecen dinámicas caóticas. También se encuentran incluso si uno utiliza una computadora infinitamente rápida e infinitamente densa, con potencias computacionales mayores que las de una máquina de Turing. " También publicó lo que parece ser el primer trabajo serio sobre el equipo o la inteligencia colectiva (COIN) que dice que pone este tema en una sólida base científica. Aunque ha publicado varias versiones de estos durante más de dos décadas en algunas de las revistas de física revisadas por pares más prestigiosas (por ejemplo, Physica D 237:257-81 (2008)), así como en revistas de la NASA y ha recibido noticias en revistas científicas importantes, pocas parecen tener notado y he mirado en docenas de libros recientes sobre física, matemáticas, teoría de decisiones y computación sin encontrar una referencia. Es muy lamentable que Yanofsky y otros no tengan conciencia de Wolpert, ya que su trabajo es la última extensión de la computación, el pensamiento, la inferencia, la incompletitud y la indecisión, que logra (como muchas pruebas en la teoría de la máquina de Turing) por extendiendo la paradoja mentirosa y la Diagonalización de los cantores para incluir todos los universos posibles y todos los seres o mecanismos y por lo tanto puede ser visto como la última palabra no sólo en la computación, sino en la cosmología o incluso deidades. Él logra esta generalidad extrema mediante la partición del universo inferir utilizando las líneas del mundo (es decir, en términos de lo que hace y no cómo lo hace) para que sus pruebas matemáticas son independientes de cualquier ley física particular o estructuras computacionales en establecer los límites físicos de la inferencia para el pasado, presente y futuro y todos los cálculos posibles, la observación y el control. Señala que incluso en un universo clásico Laplace estaba equivocado sobre ser capaz de predecir perfectamente el futuro (o incluso perfectamente representar el pasado o el presente) y que sus resultados de imposibilidad pueden ser vistos como un "principio de incertidumbre mecánica no cuántica" (es decir, no puede haber un dispositivo de observación o control infalible). Cualquier dispositivo físico universal debe ser infinito, sólo puede ser en un momento en el tiempo, y ninguna realidad puede tener más de uno (el "Teorema del monoteísmo"). Dado que el espacio y el tiempo no aparecen en la definición, el dispositivo puede incluso ser todo el universo a través de todos los tiempos. Se puede ver como un análogo físico de incompleto con dos dispositivos de inferencia en lugar de un dispositivo autorreferencial. Como él dice, "o bien el hamiltoniano de nuestro universo proscribe un cierto tipo de cálculo, o la complejidad de la predicción es único (a 293 diferencia de algorítmico complejidad de la información) en que hay una y sólo una versión de la misma que puede ser aplicable en todo nuestro universo. " Otra manera de decir esto es que uno no puede tener dos dispositivos de inferencia física (computadoras) tanto capaces de hacerse preguntas arbitrarias sobre la salida de la otra, o que el universo no puede contener una computadora a la que se puede plantear cualquier cálculo arbitrario tarea, o que para cualquier par de motores de inferencia física, siempre hay preguntas de valor binario sobre el estado del universo que ni siquiera puede ser planteada a al menos uno de ellos. Uno no puede crear un equipo que pueda predecir una condición futura arbitraria de un sistema físico antes de que ocurra, incluso si la condición es de un conjunto restringido de tareas que pueden ser planteadas a él-es decir, no puede procesar la información (aunque esta es una frase molesta como S y leer y otros señalan) más rápido que el universo. El ordenador y el sistema físico arbitrario que se está calculando no tienen que estar físicamente acoplados y se mantiene independientemente de las leyes de la física, el caos, la mecánica cuántica, la causalidad o conos de luz e incluso para una velocidad infinita de la luz. El dispositivo de inferencia no tiene que estar localizado espacialmente, pero puede ser procesos dinámicos no locales que ocurren en todo el universo. Él es muy consciente de que esto pone las especulaciones de Wolfram, Landauer, Fredkin, Lloyd, etc., en relación con el universo como el ordenador o los límites de "procesamiento de la información", en una nueva luz (aunque los índices de sus escritos no hacen referencia a él y otra omisión notable es que ninguno de los anteriores son mencionados por Yanofsky tampoco). Wolpert dice que muestra que el universo no puede contener un dispositivo de inferencia que pueda procesar la información tan rápido como pueda, y puesto que muestra que no puede tener una memoria perfecta ni un control perfecto, su estado pasado, presente o futuro nunca puede ser perfectamente o completamente representado, caracterizado, conocido o copiado. También demostró que ninguna combinación de computadoras con códigos de corrección de errores puede superar estas limitaciones. Wolpert también señala la importancia crítica del observador ("el mentiroso") y esto nos conecta a los enigmas familiares de la física, las matemáticas y el lenguaje que se refieren a y. De nuevo CF. Floyd en W: "Él está articulando en otras palabras una forma generalizada de la diagonalización. Por lo tanto, el argumento es generalmente aplicable, no sólo a las expansiones decimales, sino a cualquier supuesta enumeración o expresión gobernada por la regla de ellos; no depende de ningún dispositivo notacional en particular ni de las disposiciones espaciales preferidas de los signos. En ese sentido, el argumento de Wittgenstein no apela a ninguna imagen y no es esencialmente esquemático o representacional, aunque puede ser diagramada y en la medida en que es un argumento lógico, su lógica puede ser representada formalmente). Al igual que los argumentos de Turing, está libre de un vínculo directo con cualquier formalismo en particular. [los paralelos a Wolpert son obvios.] A diferencia de los argumentos de Turing, invoca explícitamente la noción de un juego de idiomas y se aplica a (y presupone) una concepción cotidiana de las nociones de las reglas y de los humanos que las siguen. Cada línea en la presentación diagonal anterior se concibe como una instrucción o un comando, análogo a una orden dada a un ser humano... " 294 W es prescient mirador de estas cuestiones, incluyendo su abrazo de finitismo estricto y paraconsistencia, Finalmente se está extendiendo a través de matemáticas, lógica y Ciencias de la computación (aunque raramente con cualquier reconocimiento). Bremer ha sugerido recientemente la necesidad de un teorema de Lowenheim-Skolem paraconsistente. "Cualquier teoría matemática presentada en la lógica del primer orden tiene un modelo paraconsistente finito." Berto continúa: "por supuesto, el finitismo estricto y la insistencia en la decidibilidad de cualquier pregunta matemática significativa van de la mano. Como Rodych ha comentado que la visión intermedia de Wittgenstein está dominada por su ' finitismo y su visión [...] de la significado matemática como la decidibilidad algorítmica ' según la cual ' [sólo] sumas y productos lógicos finitos (que contienen sólo predicados aritméticos) son significativos porque son algorítmicamente decidibles. " En términos modernos esto significa que tienen condiciones públicas de satisfacción-es decir, se puede afirmar como una proposición que es verdadera o falsa. Y esto nos lleva a la visión de W de que en última instancia todo en matemáticas y lógica descansa en nuestra innata (aunque por supuesto extensible) capacidad de reconocer una prueba válida. Berto de nuevo: "Wittgenstein creía que la noción ingenua (es decir, los matemáticos en funcionamiento) de la prueba tenía que ser decidible, porque la falta de decidilidad significaba para él simplemente falta de significado matemático: Wittgenstein creía que todo tenía que ser decidible en Matemáticas... Por supuesto, uno puede hablar en contra de la decisión de la ingenua noción de la verdad sobre la base de los propios resultados de Godel. Pero uno puede argumentar que, en el contexto, esto suplicaría la pregunta contra los paraconsistentistas-y contra Wittgenstein también. Tanto Wittgenstein como los paraconsistentistas de un lado, y los seguidores de la opinión estándar por el otro, coinciden en la siguiente tesis: la decisión de la noción de prueba y su incompatibilidad son incompatibles. Pero inferir de esto que la ingenua noción de la prueba no es decidible invoca la indispensabilidad de la consistencia, que es exactamente lo que Wittgenstein y el argumento paraconsistente cuestionan... ya que Victor Rodych ha argumentado enérgicamente, la coherencia del sistema pertinente es precisamente lo que se cuestiona por el razonamiento de Wittgenstein. " Y así: "por lo tanto, la aritmética inconsistente evita el primer teorema incompleto de Godel. También evita el segundo teorema en el sentido de que su no trivialidad puede establecerse dentro de la teoría: y el teorema de Tarski también, incluyendo su propio predicado, no es un problema para una teoría inconsistente "[como señaló el sacerdote hace más de 20 años]. El Prof. Rodych piensa que mis comentarios representan razonablemente sus puntos de vista, pero señala que los problemas son bastante complejos y hay muchas diferencias entre él, Berto y Floyd. Y de nuevo, la ' decidibilidad ' se refiere a la capacidad de reconocer una prueba válida, que descansa sobre nuestra psicología axiomática innata, que las matemáticas y la lógica tienen en común con el lenguaje. Y esto no es sólo un asunto histórico remoto, pero es totalmente actual. He leído mucho de Chaitin y nunca he visto una pista de que él ha considerado estos asuntos. El trabajo de Douglas Hofstadter también viene a la mente. Su Godel, Escher, Bach ganó un premio Pulitzer y un Premio Nacional de Libro de Science, vendió millones de copias y sigue teniendo buenas críticas (por 295 ejemplo, casi 400 comentarios sobre la mayoría de 5 estrellas en Amazon hasta la fecha), pero no tiene idea sobre los problemas reales y repite los errores filosóficos clásicos en casi todas las páginas. Sus posteriores escritos filosóficos no han mejorado (ha elegido a Dennett como su musa), pero, como estas opiniones son vacuas y desconectadas con la vida real, sigue haciendo una excelente ciencia. Sin embargo, una vez más, tenga en cuenta que "infinito", "computación", "información", etc., sólo tienen significado en contextos humanos específicos, es decir, como Searle ha enfatizado, son todos los observadores relativos o atribuido vs intrínsecamente intencionados. El universo aparte de nuestra psicología no es ni finito ni infinito y no puede computar ni procesar nada. Sólo en nuestros juegos de idiomas hacer nuestro ordenador portátil o el universo de cómputo. Sin embargo no todos son ajenos a WolpeRt. Los econometristas bien conocidos Koppl y Rosser en su famoso papel de 2002 "todo lo que tengo que decir ya ha cruzado su mente" dan tres teoremas sobre los límites de la racionalidad, la predicción y el control en la economía. La primera utiliza el teorema de Wolpert sobre los límites de la computabilidad para mostrar algunos límites lógicos para predecir el futuro. Wolpert señala que puede ser visto como el análogo físico del teorema incompleto de Godel y K y R dicen que su variante se puede ver como su análogo de las ciencias sociales, aunque Wolpert es muy consciente de las implicaciones sociales. Desde Godel son corollarios del teorema de Chaitin mostrando aleatoriedad algorítmica (incompleta) a través de las matemáticas (que es sólo otro de nuestros sistemas simbólicos), parece ineludible que el pensamiento (comportamiento) está lleno de imposible, aleatorio o incompleto declaraciones y situaciones. Ya que podemos ver cada uno de estos dominios como sistemas simbólicos evolucionados por la oportunidad de hacer que nuestro trabajo de psicología, tal vez debería ser considerado como no sorprendente que no son "completos". Para las matemáticas, Chaitin dice que esto ' aleatoriedad ' (de nuevo un grupo de LG) muestra que hay teoremas ilimitados que son verdaderos pero no puede comprobar, es decir, verdadero sin razón. Entonces uno debería poder decir que hay declaraciones ilimitadas que hacen un perfecto sentido "gramatical" que no describen situaciones reales alcanzables en ese dominio. Sugiero que estos rompecabezas desaparecen si uno considera las opiniones de W. Escribió muchas notas sobre el tema de los teoremas de Godel, y la totalidad de su trabajo se refiere a la plasticidad, "incompleta" y la sensibilidad de contexto extrema del lenguaje, las matemáticas y la lógica, y los recientes documentos de Rodych, Floyd y Berto son la mejor introducción que conozco para Los comentarios de W sobre los fundamentos de las matemáticas y así a la filosofía. El segundo Teorema de K y R muestra una posible no convergencia para la previsión bayesiana (probabilística) en un espacio de dimensiones infinitas. El tercero muestra la imposibilidad de una computadora que pronostique perfectamente una economía con agentes que sepan su programa de previsión. El astuto se dará cuenta de que estos teoremas pueden ser vistos como versiones de la paradoja del mentiroso y el hecho de que estamos atrapados en imposibilidades cuando tratamos de calcular un sistema que incluye a nosotros mismos ha sido observado por Wolpert, Koppl, Rosser y otros 296 en estos contextos y una vez más hemos vuelto a los puzzles de la física cuando el observador está involucrado. K&R concluir "por lo tanto, el orden económico es en parte el producto de otra cosa de racionalidad calculadora ". La racionalidad delimitada es ahora un campo importante en sí mismo, el tema de miles de papeles y cientos de libros. En el P19 Yanofsky dice que las matemáticas están libres de contradicciones, sin embargo, como se ha señalado, ha sido bien sabido durante más de medio siglo que la lógica y las matemáticas (y física) están llenos de ellos-sólo Google inconsistencia en matemáticas o buscarlo en Amazon o ver las obras de Priest, Berto o el artículo de Weber en la enciclopedia de Internet de la filosofía. W fue el primero en predecir inconsistencia o paraconsistencia, y si seguimos a Berto podemos interpretarlo como la sugerencia de W para evitar ser incompleta. En cualquier caso, la paraconsistencia es ahora una característica común y un importante programa de investigación en geometría, teoría de conjunto, aritmética, análisis, lógica y Ciencias de la computación. Y vuelve a este problema otros lugares como en P346 donde dice que la razón debe estar libre de contradicciones, pero está claro que "libre de" tiene diferentes usos y surgen con frecuencia en la vida cotidiana, pero tenemos mecanismos innatos para contenerlos. Esto es cierto porque fue el caso en nuestra vida cotidiana mucho antes de las matemáticas y la ciencia En cuanto a los viajes en el tiempo (P49), sugiero a Rupert Read "contra rebanadas de tiempo" en sus papeles en línea gratuitos o "viaje en el tiempo-la idea misma" en su libro "un camino Wittgensteinian con paradojas." Con respecto a la discusión del famoso filósofo de la ciencia Thomas Kuhn en p248, los interesados pueden ver el trabajo de Rupert Read y sus colegas, más recientemente en su libro "Wittgenstein entre las Ciencias" y mientras que allí, usted puede hacer un comienzo en la eliminación de la dura problema de la conciencia al leer "disolviendo el difícil problema de la conciencia de nuevo en la vida ordinaria" (o su ensayo anterior sobre esto que es libre en la red). Es en el último capítulo "más allá de la razón" que las fallas filosóficas son más agudas a medida que volvemos a los errores sugeridos por mis comentarios sobre el título. El razonamiento es otra palabra para pensar, que es una disposición como saber, entender, juzgar, etc. Como Wittgenstein fue el primero en explicar, estos verbos disposicionales describen proposiciones (oraciones que pueden ser verdaderas o falsas) y por lo tanto tienen lo que Searle llama condiciones de satisfacción (COS). Es decir, hay Estados públicos de asuntos que reconocemos como mostrando su verdad o falsedad. "Más allá de la razón" significaría una frase cuyas condiciones de verdad no son claras, y la razón sería que no tiene un contexto claro. Es una cuestión de hecho si tenemos claro COS (i.e., significado) pero simplemente no podemos hacer la observación-esto no está más allá de la razón, pero más allá de nuestra capacidad de lograr, pero es una materia filosófica (lingüística) si no conocemos el COS. "son la mente y las computadoras del universo? "parece que necesita una investigación científica o matemática, pero sólo es necesario aclarar el contexto en el que este 297 idioma se utilizará ya que estos son ordinarios y términos no problemáticos y es sólo su (falta de un claro) contexto que es desconcertante. E.g, las paradojas "autorreferenciales" en p344 surgen porque el contexto y por lo tanto el COS no están claros. En P140 podríamos notar que 1936 no era realmente "largo" antes de las computadoras desde Zeus en Alemania y Berry y Atanasoff en Iowa ambos hicieron máquinas primitivas en los años 30, aunque estos pioneros son muy desconocidos para muchos en el campo. Vi algunos de Zeus en el Deutsches Museum de Múnich, mientras que la máquina B & A fue reconstruida a partir de su diseño recientemente en la Universidad Estatal de Iowa, dónde ellos trabajado. Wittgenstein discutió los aspectos filosóficos de las computadoras algunos años antes de que existiesen (véase Gefwert, Proudfoot, etc.). En p347, lo que descubrimos acerca de los números irracionales que les dieron un significado es que se les puede dar un uso o un COS claro en ciertos contextos y en la parte inferior de la página de nuestras "intuiciones"sobre objetos, lugares, tiempos, longitud no se confunden-más bien comenzamos a utilizar estas palabras en nuevos contextos donde el COS de oraciones en el que se utilizan eran totalmente diferentes. Esto puede parecer un punto pequeño para algunos, pero sugiero que sea todo el asunto. Alguna "partícula" que puede "estar en dos lugares" a la vez no es un objeto y/o no es "estar en lugares" en el mismo sentido que una pelota de fútbol, es decir, como tantos términos, sus juegos de idiomas tienen COS claros en nuestro reino mesoscópico pero carecen de ellos (o tienen diferentes y comúnmente no declarados) en los reinos macro o micro. En cuanto a su referencia en p366 a los famosos experimentos de Libet, que se han tomado para mostrar que los actos ocurren antes de nuestra conciencia de ellos y por lo tanto negar voluntad, esto ha sido cuidadosamente desdeñada por muchos incluyendo Searle y Kihlstrom. Es de destacar que en la última página del libro comenta sobre el hecho de que muchas de las palabras básicas que utiliza no tienen definiciones claras, pero no dice que esto es porque requiere gran parte de nuestra psicología innata para proporcionar significado, y aquí de nuevo es el error fundamental de la filosofía. "Límite" o "existe" tiene muchos usos, pero el punto importante es--cuál es su uso en este contexto. "El límite de la razón" o "el mundo existe" no tienen (sin contexto) un significado claro (COS), pero "el límite de velocidad en US 15" y "una póliza de seguro de vida existe para él" son perfectamente claros. En cuanto al solipsismo en p369, esta y otras ' posiciones ' filosóficas clásicas fueron mostradas por W para ser incoherentes. Y finalmente, por qué es exactamente que el entrelazamiento cuántico es más paradójico que hacer un cerebro de proteínas y otros pegotes y tener que sentir y ver 298 y recordar y predecir el futuro? ¿No es sólo que el primero es nuevo y no está directamente presente a nuestros sentidos (es decir, necesitamos instrumentos sutiles para detectarlo) mientras que los sistemas nerviosos de los animales han evolucionado para hacer los últimos cientos de millones de años atrás y lo encontramos natural desde el nacimiento? No veo el difícil problema de la conciencia para ser un problema en absoluto, o si uno insiste entonces OK, pero está en cuatro patas con un sinfín de otros – por qué hay (o qué es exactamente) el espacio, el tiempo, el rojo, las manzanas, el dolor, el universo, las causas, los efectos, o cualquier cosa en absoluto. En general, un excelente libro siempre que se lea con esta revisión en mente. EL DELIRIO RELIGIOSO – UN UNIVERSO BENÉVOLO NOS SALVARÁ 300 Reseña de la Religión Explicada--los orígenes evolutivos del pensamiento religioso (Religion Explained: the evolutionary origins of religious thought) por Pascal Boyer (2002) (revisión revisada 2019) Michael Starks Abstracto Puede obtener un resumen rápido de este libro en p 135 o 326. Si no estás a la velocidad de la psicología evolutiva, primero debe leer uno de los numerosos textos recientes con este término en el título. Uno de los mejores es "el manual de la psicología evolutiva" 2Nd Ed por Buss. Hasta hace unos 15 años, las explicaciones del comportamiento no han sido realmente explicaciones de los procesos mentales, sino descripciones vagas y en gran medida inútiles de lo que la gente hizo y lo que dijeron, sin ninguna idea de por qué. Podríamos decir que la gente se reúne para conmemorar un acontecimiento, alabar a Dios, recibir sus (o sus) bendiciones, etc., pero nada de esto describe los procesos mentales relevantes, por lo que podríamos decir que son explicaciones de la misma manera que explica por qué una manzana cae al suelo si decimos que es porque la lanzamos, y es pesada-no hay ningún mecanismo y ninguna potencia explicativa o predictiva. Este libro continúa la elucidación de la base genética del comportamiento humano que ha sido casi universalmente ignorado y negado por el mundo académico, la religión, la política y el público (véase el excelente libro de Pinker ' ' The Blank Slatè '). Su declaración (P3) de que no tiene sentido preguntar si la religión es genética se confunde como el porcentaje de variación de cualquier comportamiento debido a los genes y el medio ambiente se pueden estudiar, tal como lo son para todos los demás comportamientos (ver por ejemplo, Pinker). El título debe ser "intentos preliminares para explicar algunos aspectos de la religión primitiva", ya que él no trata la conciencia superior en absoluto (por ejemplo, Satori, iluminación, etc.) que son, con mucho, los fenómenos más interesantes y la única parte de la religión de interés personal a las personas inteligentes, educados en el siglo 21. Leyendo todo este libro, nunca adivinaría que esas cosas existirían. de la misma manera, para el inmenso campo de las drogas y la religión. Carece de un marco para la racionalidad y no menciona los sistemas duales de visión del pensamiento que ahora es tan productivo. Para este sugiero mis documentos recientes. Sin embargo, el libro tiene mucho interés, y a pesar de estar fechada todavía vale la pena leer. Aquellos que deseen un marco completo hasta la fecha para el comportamiento humano de la moderna dos sistemas punto de vista puede consultar mi libro 'La Estructura Lógica de la Filosofía, la Psicología, la Mente y Lenguaje en Ludwig Wittgenstein y John Searle ' 2nd Ed (2019). Los interesados en más de mis escritos pueden ver 'Monos parlantes--filosofía, psicología, ciencia, religión y política en un 301 planeta condenado--artículos y reseñas 2006-2019 3rd Ed (2019) y delirios utópicos suicidas en el 21St Century 4TH Ed (2019) "Dios está muerto y el hombre es libre" Nietzsche "Este mismo cuerpo el Buda, este tierra el paraíso del loto " Osho "bien puedo imaginar una religión en la que no hay doctrinas, por lo que no se habla nada. Claramente, entonces, la esencia de la religión no puede tener nada que ver con lo que se dice "Wittgenstein Cuando este libro apareció, fue un esfuerzo pionero, pero ahora hay interminables discusiones sobre este tema, por lo que voy a dar un resumen suficientemente detallado y preciso que sólo los especialistas necesitarán leerlo. Puede obtener un resumen rápido de este libro en p 135 o 326. Si no está al tanto de la psicología evolutiva, primero debe leer uno de los numerosos textos recientes con esta término en el título. Los mejores son "El manual de Psicología evolutiva" 2Nd Ed (2015) y el 5TH Ed. de Psicología evolutiva por Buss, fácilmente disponible en la red. Hasta unos 15 años atrás, "explicaciones" de comportamiento no han sido realmente explicaciones de los procesos mentales en absoluto, pero relativamente vagas y en gran parte inútiles de lo que personas lo hicieron y lo que dijeron, sin ninguna idea de por qué. Podríamos decir que la gente se reúne para conmemorar un evento, pelevar a Dios, recibir su bendiciones, etc., pero nada de esto describe los procesos mentales relevantes, por lo que podríamos decir que son explicaciones de la misma manera que explica por qué una manzana cae al suelo si decimos que's porque lo liberamos y es pesado-no hay ningún mecanismo y ninguna potencia explicativa o predictiva. Este libro continúa la elucidación de la base genética del comportamiento humano que ha sido casi universalmente ignorado y negado por el mundo académico, la religión, la política y el público (ver el excelente libro de Pinker ' ' la pizarra en blanco ' '). Su declaración (P3) de que no tiene sentido preguntar si la religión es genética se confunde como el porcentaje de variación en cualquier comportamiento debido a los genes y el medio ambiente se pueden estudiar, tal como lo son para todos los demás comportamientos (ver por ejemplo, Pinker). El título debe ser "intentos preliminares para explicar algunos aspectos de la religión primitiva", ya que no trata la conciencia superior en absoluto (por ejemplo, Satori, iluminación, etc.) que son, con mucho, los fenómenos más interesantes y la única parte de la religión de interés personal para personas inteligentes y educadas en el siglo 21. Leyendo todo este libro, nunca adivinaría que esas cosas existirían. de la misma manera, para el inmenso campo de las drogas y la religión. ¿Cómo y por qué los 302 enteógenos activan los motores de inferencia y qué papel han desempeñado en la religión y la vida durante los últimos millones de años? Hay una enorme mina de información sobre drogas y plantillas de comportamiento, pero no encontrarás ni una pista aquí. Puedes comenzar con los libros recientes ' Entheogens y el futuro de la religión ' y ' ' Budismo y Psicodélicos o puedes leer la asombrosa probación de mi amigo Alexander Shulgin de las "plantillas cognitivas en PHIKAL y TIKAL, disponible, ya que casi todo ahora, gratis en la red. Uno de los más inusuales de las sondas de drogas es la ketamina, descrita por muchos, más notablemente en "viajes al mundo brillante" por Altounian y Moore, Jansen en "ketamina" y en probablemente el relato más detallado de una sola droga enteógena por un solo usuario en los dos últimos capitulos de "el científico" de John Lilly. Lilly, casi sola, el fundador de la investigación de delfines, fue una generación o más por delante de casi todo el mundo en muchos temas y también sonró su propia mente con LSD, ketamina (recientemente introducida para el tratamiento de la depresion) y tanques de aislamiento. Ver sus ' simulaciones de Dios ' (1975 y mi revisión de la misma) por sus especulaciones sobre la mente, Dios y el cerebro y más aspectos de lo espiritual y mental no tocado por Boyer. También para la reciente autoterapia heroica con enteógenos ver Xenolinguistics' por Slattery y 'DMT & Mi Mente Oculta', de Khan. No hay prácticamente nada aquí sobre la relación entre los Estados físicos y mentales. La práctica de las muchas formas de yoga fue muy avanzada hace miles de años. Su objetivo principal era desencadenar estados espirituales con energía corporal y al revés. Hay una inmensa literatura y cientos de millones lo han practicado. La mejor cuenta personal que conozco por un místico detallando la interacción de la física y mental a través de yoga se encuentra en ' La rodilla de la escucha ' de ADI da (ver mi opinión). Entrelazados con el relato fascinante de su progreso espiritual son los detalles de su trabajo con la energía Shakti del yoga (por ejemplo, P95-9, 214-21, 249281-3, 439-40 de la 1995 edición--preferible a los posteriores). Estas pocas páginas valen más que un estante entero de libros de yoga si quieres llegar al corazón de la relación mente/cuerpo en la espiritualidad. Zen y otras prácticas sondean las plantillas del cerebro con meditación y trucos. Boyer no entiende que las principales religiones (e innumerables menores) fueron iniciadas por personas que rompieron el molde - i. e., de alguna manera bloqueado o evadió algunas plantillas para destruir gran parte del ego y para descubrir aspectos de su mente normalmente escondidos. No es difícil ver por qué la iluminación completa es rara, ya que aquellos que lo tienen dejan de comportarse como monos (es decir, luchando, engañando, reproduciendo acumulando) y esto sería fuertemente seleccionado en contra. Una podría decir que los que lo lograron son los únicos que se volvieron completamente humanos (es decir, Jesús, Adi Da, Mohammed, Buddha, Mahavira, Rumi, Osho y 1000 o así otros que conocemos). Parece que Boyer no tiene experiencia personal con la meditación, los enteógenos y la conciencia superior (por ejemplo, ver las páginas 317, 320-324) por lo que claramente no trata a toda la religión. Esto es nuevamente evidente (p32) cuando dice que la religión no tiene origen ni explicación clara que es curioso, ya que proporciona exactamente este. Claro, Esto es cierto en cierto sentido de las religiones primitivas que discute, pero el budismo, el 303 cristianismo, el Islam, etc., tienen orígenes y explicaciones muy claros en la iluminación de Jesús, Buda, Mahoma, etc. Él se equivoca (p308) en su creencia de que la religión oriental se trata principalmente de rituales, en lugar de experiencia personal y Estados internos y que consiguió tales ideas de la filosofía occidental (hace 3000 años!). Sorprendentemente, rechaza la noción de William James de que la religión es el resultado de las experiencias de individuos excepcionales que posteriormente son degradados por las masas (P310 llamar). James está claramente en lo cierto y Boyer está de nuevo, sólo pensando en la religión primitiva. Tal vez el mejor relato personal de los diversos Estados de samadhi, la iluminación, etc. es el libro de ADI da--' la rodilla de la escucha ', pero con mucho la mejor fuente para las cuentas personales por un maestro iluminado son los numerosos libros, audios y videos de Osho, todos gratuitos en el Red. Presenciar los pensamientos de uno es una de las técnicas más comunes de los meditadores de principio en muchas tradiciones diferentes. El progreso posterior fusiona el perceptor y percibe (todo es uno). Uno se pregunta cómo esto se relaciona con las plantillas - ¿entran en la conciencia, el cambio espiritual abre nuevas conexiones neuronales o cierra algunas? La psicología cognitiva apenas ha comenzado en este, pero sería interesante ver PET o fMRI en una persona iluminada o una en un estado Samadhi con buenos controles y se ha hecho. Aunque tiene razón de que muchas experiencias son de algún agente, los Estados avanzados han sido descritos en una vasta literatura que muestra que típicamente no tienen pensamientos, ni mente, ni persona, ni Dios. Esto parecería ser lo último en desacoplamiento Sistema 2 plantillas en una persona funcional. Para que los tipos sobrenaturales de conceptos religiosos evolucionen y sobrevivan, deben pertenecer a una de las categorías o plantillas ontológicas básicas (planta, herramienta, objeto natural, animal, persona, etc.) que el cerebro utiliza para organizar la percepción y el pensamiento. Estas son comúnmente dadas propiedades contraintuitivo tales como prescience, Telepatía, inmortalidad, abilidad a escuchar una's palabras o leer uno's pensamientos, capacidad de sanar o conferir gran poder, etc. Los buenos conceptos sobrenaturales usualmente permiten que todas las inferencias no estén específicamente prohibidas por la violación de la intuición - i. e., un Dios tendrá todas las propiedades humanas, pero no envejece ni muere. La gran cantidad de conceptos religiosos está contenida en esta breve lista de Plantillas. Es la naturaleza contraintuitivo de los conceptos lo que los hace fáciles de recordar y para transmitir a los demás y esto parece por una razón por la que los conceptos sobrenaturales son una parte central de casi todas las religiones. Los conceptos sobrenaturales interactúan con otros tipos de plantillas como la psicología intuitiva, la física intuitiva, la función de estructura y la detección de objetivo. Si activa la física, la detección de objetivo, la psicología intuitiva y el uso intencional, entonces será un ser humano con propiedades sobrehumanas. Esta es la psicología cognitiva estándar y las partes contraintuitivas se añaden para el uso religioso. Hay abundantes evidencias de que las áreas cerebrales que se activan cuando hacemos algo también se activan cuando vemos a otra persona haciendo una cosa similar (neuronas espejo). Es factible 304 que esto se correlacione con la necesidad de unirse y la satisfacción de participar en los rituales integrales a la sociedad (deportes, política, música, etc.) y la religión. También hay evidencias de que ver las emociones de otras personas activa las mismas áreas que las nuestras. Nuestra teoría de la mente (es decir, de la vida mental de otras personas--la psicología intuitiva que prefiero llamar a Understanding of Agency-UA) (comprension de la agencia) parece no ser un motor de inferencia, pero la suma de muchos y, a medida que se realiza más investigación, se descubrieran más módulos. Otra característica crítica de motores de inferencia es que a menudo se ejecutan en desacoplados (contrafáctual o imaginario) modo mientras consideramos el pasado o el futuro. Esto comienza muy temprano como se muestra en la presencia común de los compañeros de juego imaginarios en los niños, su capacidad para captar historias y televisión, y señala que la investigación parece mostrar que los niños que crean compañeros de juego parecen ser mejores en captar los Estados mentales de otras personas y Emociones. El punto en este contexto es que parece bastante natural atribuir características humanísticas a espíritus, fantasmas, dioses, etc. no hay ninguna evidencia en absoluto para su real Presencia. Los motores de inferencia innata son automáticos, ya que tienen que ser rápidos y no distraernos (es decir, son el sistema 1, pero lamentablemente no utiliza el marco de dos sistemas aquí - ver mis papeles para esto). La mente no fue evolucionado como una máquina de explicación y antes del reciente ascenso de la ciencia, nadie trató nunca de explicar por qué nuestro pie se mueve cuando caminamos, una manzana cae al suelo, tenemos hambre o enojo o por qué experimentamos o hacemos algo. Sólo ocurrencias extrañas o cósmicas como el rayo o el amanecer necesitaban una causa. Nuestra psicología intuitiva y plantillas de agencia también nos impulsó a atribuir buena y mala suerte a algún agente. Gran parte de esto puede sonar especulativo, pero ahora que el EP (psicología evolutiva) es un paradigma importante, la evidencia de tal S1 funciones en la primera infancia y la infancia se está montando rápidamente. Los agentes sobrenaturales (incluyendo antepasados fallecidos) son tratados por la psicología intuitiva como agentes intencionales, por el sistema de intercambio social (una parte de o variante de los sistemas de costo/beneficio) por el sistema moral como testigos de las acciones Morales, y por el sistema de la persona-archivo como individuos. Puesto que todos estos sistemas pueden funcionar en el modo desacoplado, no hay necesidad de considerar si estos agentes realmente existen. Están impulsados por la relevancia, por la riqueza de las inferencias que resultan y por la facilidad con que pueden ser recordadas y comunicadas. Las plantillas están muy afinadas para reunir información, obtener cooperación y calcular beneficios de una manera muy rápida, subconsciente y normalmente libre de errores, mientras que la razón consciente es lenta y falible. En los tiempos modernos, el ego tiene tiempo para perder en el debate, la explicación y la interpretación en interminables intentos de engañar y manipular a otros para obtener beneficios personales. Con grandes poblaciones móviles y una rápida comunicación los resultados de nuestro intercambio social, la evaluación de la confianza, la detección de tramposa y otras plantillas son a menudo inútiles y autodestructivos. La información estratégica (que pasa los filtros de 305 relevancia) activa los motores relacionados con la interacción social y nuestro conocimiento de la información que otros tienen es una parte crítica de la mente social. Los agentes sobrenaturales suelen tener un conocimiento perfecto. Aunque no parece mencionarlo, la gente poderosa a menudo viene a tener algunas de las características de los agentes sobrenaturales y por lo que la gente comenzará a responder a ellos como a los dioses. Alienígenas, ovnis, misticismo de la nueva era, astrología, fantasía y ciencia ficción atraen gran atención debido a la activación, y a menudo poseen agentes con información estratégica. Sin embargo, cientos de millones han seguido a líderes carismáticos con información estratégica falsa (es decir, agentes cuasi-sobrenaturales) a sus muertes (la rama Davidians de Waco, comunismo, nazismo, Vietnam, Jonestown, George Bush, cometa Kahoutek etc.). Las interacciones sociales requieren una mente social - es decir, sistemas mentales que los organizan. Como la mayoría de los comportamientos, sólo recientemente se dio cuenta de que necesitábamos mecanismos incorporados para hacerlo. La información estratégica es lo que activa la mente social. Nuestra teoría de la mente UA nos indica qué agentes también está disponible esta información. Es común atribuir a los agentes sobrenaturales la capacidad de acceder completamente a la información que normalmente estaría parcial o totalmente inaccesible para otros. Todos los motores deben tener algún tipo de filtro de relevancia para que no se activen constantemente por Trivia. Tenemos taxonomías que nos dicen cómo agrupar las cosas de manera relevante a su comportamiento o propiedades en el mundo ahora llamado sistema 1 (S1), y luego utilizamos nuestro sistema lingüístico deliberado lento más recientemente evolucionado 2 (S2) cuando hay tiempo. Esperamos grandes cosas felina con grandes dientes y garras para ser depredadores y no herbívoros. Los espíritus se adaptan a la taxonomía humana y automáticamente tienen necesidades y deseos, gustos y aversiones y, por lo tanto, darán recompensas y castigos y toda la cultura tiene que hacer es especificar lo que son. Esos conceptos que dan las inferencias más ricas con el menor esfuerzo se han seleccionado en S1. Un punto de vista común viene dado por la teoría de la relevancia, que trata de determinar cómo y por qué algunos 'Conceptos' (es decir, los juegos de idiomas del sistema 2) se transmiten más fácilmente. Presumiblemente, los conceptos que desencadenan motores ("Conceptos S1") más intensamente o con frecuencia, o más motores diferentes, será superior. Por lo tanto, es posible que tengamos muchos Juegos de idiomas que son más fáciles de recordar y aplicar, en lugar de porque tienen sentido o son Más útil de alguna manera que otros. Esto puede ayudar a explicar la existencia de muchos conceptos o prácticas que parecen arbitrarios o estúpidos, o que hacen la vida más difícil y se aplica a toda la cultura, no sólo a la religión. Casi todas las religiones tienen agentes de acceso completo - es... saben todo o casi todo sobre nosotros y Boyer distingue 3 clases--brutos divinos con poco o ningún acceso pero que sin embargo tienen poder, agentes de Aquinas que lo saben todo y agentes estratégicos completos que tener acceso a toda la información estratégica o importante. Él dice que esto puede tener en cuenta nuestro interés en conocer a otra 306 personas ideas religiosas o en convirtiéndolos a los nuestros. solamente de esta manera podemos entender cómo pueden comportarse e interactuar. Los agentes que son conscientes y capaces de afectar a nuestro interacción social son más ricas en las inferencias, y por lo tanto son más fáciles de representar y recordar mentalmente y así disfrutar de una gran ventaja en la transmisión cultural. Así, Ahora podemos decir que la religión no crea ni siquiera apoya la moralidad, sino que nuestra construcción en intuiciones morales (es decir, los reflejos mentales rápidos prelingüísticos automáticos de S1) hacer que la religión sea plausible y útil. Del mismo modo, nuestros mecanismos para explicar la buena y la mala suerte hacen que su conexión con agentes sobrenaturales sea simple. Y ya que compartimos nuestro sistema moral y nuestra información con ellos, es natural esperar que harán cumplir nuestras actitudes. Altruismo recipcroco y el engaño son partes centrales del comportamiento humano. Mostrar sentimientos apasionados y honestidad que son genuinos (difíciles de falsificar) es de gran valor social (y genético). Esto puede ser reforzado por la religión como uno elegiría cooperar con esas personas en lugar de con calculadoras racionales que pueden cambiar de opinión o engañar cada vez que sus motores de inferencia calculan que es en su mejor interés. Este sistema también requiere que los tramposos sean castigados, incluso cuando el engaño tiene un costo social mínimo. Un grupo común de conceptos religiosos son aquellos que hacen trampa inmoral. El mecanismo es sentimientos (p. ej., los rápidos reflejos S1 de enojo, celos, resentimiento, confusión) en lugar de el lento reflexión racional de S2. Esto puede sonar extraño, pero se ha demostrado no sólo en los monos, sino en los animales inferiores. Sí hay un sinfín de elaboraciones de engaño en la sociedad moderna, pero como todo nuestro comportamiento se construye sobre la genética y S1..sentimos que está mal que alguien robe el dinero de otro en lugar de tener que sentarse y pensar-bueno, si él toma ese dinero, entonces tal vez él tomará el mío o tendrá alguna ventaja futura sobre mí, etc. Tal vez aquí hay un lugar donde la culpa entra para hacer la práctica socialmente (genéticamente) destructiva de hacer trampa menos atractiva. Esto nos lleva a la enorme literatura sobre los tramposos y cooperadores, halcones y palomas y pretendientes y dentro altruismo recíproco y al juego teoría. Ten en cuenta que el "altruismo verdadero" o la selección de grupos es claramente una fantasía como he detallado en mi reseña de la "Conquista Social de la Tierra" de Wilson. Así, como todo comportamiento, la religión evolucionó porque tenía valor de supervivencia para las personas. Muchos tipos de artilugios de compromiso han evolucionado que tienden a asegurar la cooperación--mantener un seguimiento de la reputación, los enlaces legales o cuasilegales (contratos), las fuertes pasiones, la honestidad compulsiva, el resentimiento y la necesidad de castigar a los tramposos. Los artilugios de cooperación se construyen también--intuiciones morales, culpabilidad, orgullo, gratitud, hostilidad. En contraste con la idea casi universal de que el realismo moral (ese comportamiento en sí mismo tiene un valor moral específico que no depende del punto de vista de uno) sólo es desarrollado por los adultos o es dado por la religión, ahora está claro que esto aparece 307 en los niños de 3 y 4 años y los cambios Provenza e con la edad. Los métodos ahora se han desarrollado para estudiar a los bebés y a finales de 2007 un estudio apareció en la naturaleza que demostró que pueden distinguir ayudante de objetos no auxiliares y ha habido mucho trabajo en humanos y otros animales desde. Claro moralidad intuitiva a menudo dará los resultados equivocados para los adultos en el mundo moderno, al igual que todos nuestros reflejos S1 en muchos contextos. La mayoría de los fundamentos de lo que antes se consideraba cultura, ahora se sabe o se sospecha que es heredado. Pinker enumera cientos de diferentes aspectos de las sociedades humanas que son universales y por lo tanto buenos candidatos. Uno puede compilar una lista muy larga de conceptos religiosos que no necesitamos que nos enseñen---espíritus entender los pensamientos humanos, las emociones y las intenciones y diferenciar entre los deseos o las imágenes y la realidad, etc. Parece que la única característica de los seres humanos que siempre se proyecta sobre dioses, espíritus, fantasmas, etc., es una mente muy semejante a la nuestra. La psicología intuitiva se aplica a los agentes intencionales en general (es decir, personas, animales y cualquier cosa que parezca moverse en busqueda de sus propios objetivos). La física intuitiva probablemente también se compone de muchos subsegmentos y debe estar conectado con el módulo de intencionalidad – por ejemplo, cuando un León está persiguiendo a un antílope, sabemos que si cambia de rumbo, el León probablemente lo hará. Uno esperaría que la detección de tales agentes era una prioridad evolutiva muy antigua e incluso hace 500 millones años una Trilobite que carecía de tales genes pronto sería el almuerzo. Como más comportamiento genes se asignan están encontrando el mismo o similares en las moscas frutales, al igual que tenemos para otros genes como los que controlan la segmentación del cuerpo y Inmunidad, y se han hecho grandes progresos en esta dirección desde que apareció este libro. Sólo busca el comportamiento de Drosophila. Al igual que nuestros otros conceptos, los religiosos son a menudo vagos y su uso idiosincrásico debido al hecho de que resultan del funcionamiento inconsciente de los motores de inferencia (S1) según lo elaborado por los caprichos de la cultura. No podemos decir con precisión incluso qué palabras simples significan, pero sabemos cómo usarlas. Así como Chomsky descubrió la gramática de profundidad, uno podría decir que Wittgenstein descubrió la semántica de profundidad. Wittgenstein fue el primero (y aún uno de los pocos) que entendió que la filosofía- que termino con la psicología descriptiva del pensamiento de orden superior- (y todos los intentos de entender el comportamiento) estaba luchando con fue ante todo Estos incorporados S1 funciones que son inaccesibles para el pensamiento consciente. Aunque nunca lo he visto declarado, parece razonable considerarlo como un pionero en la psicología cognitiva y evolutiva. Boyer también tiene una nueva visión de la muerte. Los cadáveres tienen propiedades que hacen que los conceptos sobrenaturales sean relevantes aparte de nuestra necesidad de consuelo y esta parte de la religión puede ser menos sobre la muerte que 308 sobre los cadáveres. Producen una disociación entre la animacion, la psicología intuitiva y la persona 'sistemas de archivos'. Vemos tal disociación en autismo y Estados neurológicos extraños como el síndrome de Capgras. Él ve esto como otra manera que la cultura hace uso de gadgets sobresalientes (eventos, objetos, etc.) que son muy relevantes y captar la atención de los motores de inferencia. Y desde que apareció este libro, la evidencia continúa acumulando que los genes crean cultura en una medida mucho mayor que la mayoría de las personas (incluyendo a los eruditos) jamás imaginadas. Tiene su propio campo - cognición implícita. Nunca nadie piensa en preguntar sobre los motivos si una roca que cae y nos golpea, pero siempre lo hacemos si viene de la mano de una persona. Incluso un niño muy pequeño lo sabe, debido a su psicología intuitiva, agencia, animismo y otros motores. Estos motores (genes, comportamientos reflexivos) debe ser, en sus formas orginales, cientos de millones de años de antigüedad. Un carbonífero era libélula diferenciaba entre objetos animados e inanimados y calculaba la trayectoria de su presa. La religión trabajaba originalmente en un ambiente de miedo perpetuo. Los motores de inferencia evolucionaron para encontrar compañeros y alimento y refugio y evitar la muerte, de ahí el acercamiento a los dioses como un suplicante impotente y el uso de rituales y ofrendas de apaciguamiento (como lo haría con una persona). Nuestra evasión de peligros es altamente imperfecta en el mundo moderno debido a las armas, las drogas y el transporte rápido (coches, esquís). En todas partes del mundo se puede ver a la gente caminando o bicicletas de equitación en las calles a un paso de los vehículos de exceso de velocidad, a pesar de que al menos un millón al año se han bajado. Él dice (P40) que los memes (Dawkins famoso análogo cultural del gen) no son un muy buen concepto para la transmisión cultural ya que las ideas son cambiadas por cada persona, mientras que los genes siguen siendo los mismos. Sin embargo, ¿qué pasa con los medios de comunicación-es., cine, TV, impresión, correo electrónico? Ellos enlatar replicar más precisamente que los genes. Estos son ahora los primer medio para transmitir y comprobar la validez de los memes, no sólo lo que alguien dice. En cualquier caso, los genes tampoco son perfectos. Así como hay un fenotipo que corresponde al genotipo, hay un phene correspondiente al meme. ¿Por qué invocamos a agentes sobrenaturales para la buena y la mala suerte? Activan nuestros sistemas de intercambio social y ya que los vemos como teniendo información estratégica pueden controlar lo que sucede. Se me ocurre que tal vez exista una gran oposición a las explicaciones genéticas para el comportamiento porque la gente siente que cualquiera que acepte esto rechazará automáticamente el intercambio social y otras plantillas y siempre hará trampa. O tal vez temen que la psicología intuitiva ya no funcionará. Y llama su atención a la ilusión fenomenológica (el sentimiento ilusorio que tenemos de que nuestro comportamiento 309 se debe a decisiones conscientes-ver mis otros escritos). Los rituales sociales son ejemplos de lo que los psicólogos han denominado reglas cautelares y estos comúnmente incluyen preocupaciones sobre la contaminación, rituales de purificación (activación del sistema de contagio), evasión de contacto, tipos especiales de tocar, atención especial a límites y umbrales, violaciones de reglas, uso de cierto número de colores brillantes, matrices simétricas y patrones precisos, sonidos especiales o música, danza especial y otros movimientos, etc. Todos estos activan ciertos grupos de plantillas, crean sentimientos satisfactorios, y son comúnmente acoplados a conceptos religiosos, y a la política, el deporte, la caza y la agricultura, el matrimonio, la crianza de los hijos, la música, el arte, el folclore, la literatura, etc. La agencia que detecta los sistemas (por ejemplo, la detección de depredadores y presas) está sesgada para la sobredetección - es., no necesitan ver a un León o a una persona para activarse, sino sólo una huella o un sonido del tipo correcto. Basados en muy poca información, estos sistemas luego producen sentimientos y expectativas sobre los agentes ' naturaleza e intenciones. En el caso de las agencias sobrenaturales nuestras plantillas de psicología intuitivas también se activan y generalmente producen una entidad como persona más las características contraintuitivo, pero sus características precisas generalmente se dejan vagas. La fijación de una etiqueta contraintuitivo (por ejemplo, levantarse de los muertos) a un agente (por ejemplo, Jesús) u otra categoría ontológica hace que sea fácil de recordar y un buen candidato para la religión. Todos estos módulos son heredados, pero por supuesto un bebé no los tiene completamente desarrollados y sólo con el tiempo y un ambiente ' normal ' surgirán. Leí esto poco antes de leer "sexo, ecología y espiritualidad" de Ken Wilber y pude ver en casi todas las páginas cuán anticuadas y vacías están la mayoría de las obras que Wilber está discutiendo. Una gran parte del libro de Wilbur y de los cientos que analiza sobre la religión, la psicología y la filosofía son ahora arcaicos. Sin embargo, Wilbur ha escrito muchos libros de gran interés en la espiritualidad y es triste que Boyer ni siquiera le haga referencia--pero tampoco hace referencia a las drogas, Wittgenstein, meditación, yoga, Satori o iluminación en su índice! Uno podría Decir que el Premio Nobel de la paz se concede a quienes son los mejores alentándonos a extender coaliciones a la inclusión de otros marginales o incluso de otros países o del mundo entero. O, uno podría decir que obtienen el premio por los esfuerzos para apagar el ' detector tramposo ' o plantillas de intercambio social que requieren que sólo los que se reciproco están incluidos en un grupo y se les dio acceso a recursos (que la mayoría de los pobres del mundo claramente no puede hacer). Él da un breve resumen de algunas de las inferencias autoengañosas que juegan un papel en la religión como en toda la vida-consenso, falso consenso, efecto de la 310 generación, ilusiones de memoria, defectos de monitoreo de la fuente, sesgo de confirmación y disonancia cognitiva. Al igual que las otras plantillas, estos dieron muy buenos resultados hace 100.000 años, pero con la vida en el carril rápido, ahora pueden resultar fatales para los individuos y para el mundo. Las intuiciones y conceptos de esencia coalicionales se delinan como partes críticas del comportamiento humano. Los seres humanos forman automáticamente grupos y muestran hostilidad a las personas que no están en el grupo y la amistad totalmente no merecida a los del grupo (intuiciones coalicionales), incluso cuando el grupo está compuesto por desconocidos totales. Esto se relaciona con los motores de operación tales como costo/beneficio y el cálculo de la confiabilidad mencionada antes. Las esencias son los conceptos que utilizamos para describir nuestros sentimientos (intuiciones) sobre coaliciones y otras categorías sociales (por ejemplo, jerarquías y dominio). Aunque estos mecanismos evolucionaron en pequeños grupos, hoy en día estos son comúnmente operando con personas a quienes no estamos estrechamente relacionados, por lo que a menudo dan resultados falsos. El estereotipado, el racismo y sus acompañamientos (es decir, distinciones arbitrarias (o no tan arbitrarias) son probablemente los resultados de la operación de intuiciones coalicionales incorporadas en nuestros cerebros, en lugar de estereotipar siendo un S2 función psicológica y las coaliciones con su exclusión, dominio y antipatía son los resultados. Estos motores bien pueden explicar la "magia social" que forma y guía a las sociedades. Sugiere que uno podría explicar el fundamentalismo como una reacción natural a la violación común del pensamiento coalicional en las sociedades modernas. La libertad de actuar como uno elige y en oposición directa a los demás en la misma comunidad crea sentimientos fuertes y a menudo violentos en aquellos sin la educación o la experiencia para lidiar con la diversidad y el cambio. A menudo quieren castigos públicos y espectaculares para calmar sus sentimientos. El fundamentalismo puede explicarse mejor como intentos de preservar las jerarquías basadas en coaliciones, cuando éstas se ven amenazadas por la deserción o la falta de atención. Estas están funcionando en todas las personas todo el tiempo, pero llegan a la superficie principalmente cuando hay una situación que crea algunos especiales amenaza (es decir, la vida moderna). De Curso, como siempre, tenemos que tener en cuenta que la fuente definitiva y el beneficio para todos los comportamientos están en los genes. Aunque dice poco al respecto, las nociones de ontológica S1 categorías y etiquetas contraintuitivo que 'stick a ellos también van muy lejos para explicar la magia, lo paranormal, el folclore, la mitología, la medicina popular, la astrología, la teología, los trabajadores milagrosos, posesión demoníaca y angelical, las artes, y antes incluso gran parte de la ciencia. Los rituales actúan como trampas para el pensamiento. Nuestras plantillas de contagio son potentes activadores de comportamiento y es natural incluir muchos rituales de purificación en la religión. También hacen uso de nuestros sistemas de planificación, que podemos ver en forma extrema en el trastorno obsesivo compulsivo. Hay una preocupación con los colores, los espacios, los límites, los movimientos y el contacto. Se incorporan artilugios salientes. Tenemos una poderosa necesidad de imitar a los demás. 311 Los rituales activan nuestros sistemas de peligro no detectados. Las ofrendas de sacrificio a los agentes invisibles hacen uso de nuestros sistemas de intercambio social. Nuestras intuiciones coalicionales se satisfacen con los ritos grupales y el matrimonio. La "sociología ingenua" del hombre común se extiende en gran parte de la filosofía, la sociología, la teología, la antropología, la psicología, la economía, la política y es el resultado de nuestros intentos de dar sentido a nuestro propio comportamiento, pero esto es el resultado de la diversión automática e inconsciente marcha de nuestras plantillas. Así gran parte de la cultura parece mágica-de ahí el término ' magia social '. Inevitablemente, la sociología ingenua es débil, por lo que los sistemas de rituales y creencias enfatizan los beneficios de la cooperación y los costos de engaño o defección. Los rituales y artilugios estimulan la memoria y satisfacen el sistema de contagio. La participación en las señales de cooperación y los dioses y espíritus son opcionales. Por lo tanto, las plantillas conducen a la religión que conduce a las doctrinas y no al revés. Creo que se extravía seriamente al hablar de ciencia vs religión (P320). Dice que es un error hablar de la religión como un objeto real en el mundo (lo que sea que eso podría ser), pero por supuesto los fenómenos externos e internos (mentales) pueden ser estudiados así como cualquier otro, y muestra en este libro que la religión es una rama de la psicología cognitiva. Él dice que no hay ciencia como tal, y sabemos que él significa que es complejo, pero entonces no hay religión, ley, deportes, carreras de autos o cualquier cosa en absoluto, como tal. Se opone a la "teología pop", que dice que la religión hace que el mundo sea más bello o significativo, o que aborda las cuestiones definitivas, pero toda la religión aborda las preguntas definitivas y trata de hacer que el mundo sea significativo y menos feo. Además, lo que yo llamo "religión avanzada"--es decir, la forma en que se inicia en las no-mentes de Jesús, Buda, Osho, etc.-tiene una toma muy diferente del mundo que la religión primitiva que discute en este libro (por ejemplo, ver los 200 libros y DVD de Osho en Oshoworld.com o en P2P Etc., o ver Wilber, ADI da, etc.). Una vez más, en p 327 él piensa que no hay un centro religioso en el cerebro y aunque esto es probablemente cierto para la religión primitiva, parece más probable que haya centros (redes de conexiones) para las experiencias de Satori e iluminación y tal vez para los enteógenos También. También piensa (P321) que la ciencia es menos natural y más difícil que la religión, pero en vista del gran número de científicos y los hechos que casi todo el mundo es capaz de absorber la ciencia en la escuela primaria, y que probablemente ha habido menos de 1000 iluminado personas en toda la historia humana, parece claro que el situación es bastante al revés para la espiritualidad avanzada. Es mucho menos difícil convertirse en un botánico o un químico que disolver el ego de uno! La selección natural eliminará claramente los genes de mayor conciencia, pero el cálculo racional de la ciencia es bastante consistente con la recolección de recursos y niños productores. De curso, el problema es que está de nuevo obsesionado con la religión primitiva. Lo resume diciendo (p 135) que actividades religiosas se activan sistemas de inferencia que ' gobiernan nuestras emociones más intensas, moldean nuestra interacción con otras personas, nos dan una sensación moral y organizar grupos sociales`. Claro, no tienen nada que ver con Satori o iluminación! Señala que las ideas religiosas son 312 parasitarias sobre nuestra ontología intuitiva (es decir, que son relevantes). Se transmiten con éxito debido a las capacidades mentales que la evolución ya ha creado. Al igual que con otros comportamientos, la religión es el resultado de la relevancia agregada, es decir, la suma de la operación de todos los motores de inferencia. Así, conceptos y comportamientos religiosos están presentes no porque sean necesarios o incluso útiles, sino porque activan fácilmente nuestras plantillas, son fáciles de recordar y transmiten, y sobreviven con el tiempo. Él da un resumen final (p326) de ' ' la historia completa de toda religión (siempre) ' ' de la siguiente manera (por supuesto que deja fuera ' religión avanzada (espiritualidad, misticismo)`). Entre los millones de cosas que la gente discutió fueron algunas que violaron nuestras intuiciones y esto los hizo más fáciles de recordar y transmitir. Los que se trataba de agentes eran especialmente sobresalientes, ya que activaban dominios ricos de posibles inferencias como las de los depredadores y la psicología intuitiva. Agentes con propiedades contraintuitivo, especialmente la capacidad de entender y afectar el comportamiento humano o el mundo fueron fuertemente transmitidos. Se conectaron con otros eventos extraños y algo contraintuitivo, como la muerte y los sentimientos sobre la presencia continuada de los muertos. De alguna manera los rituales surgen y se asocian con los poderosos agentes sobrenaturales. Algunas personas serán más expertas en llevar a cabo tales rituales y guiar las interacciones con los espíritus. Inevitablemente crearán versiones más abstractas y comenzarán a adquirir poder y riqueza. Sin embargo, la gente seguirá teniendo sus propias inferencias sobre la religión. Señala que la religión debe mucho a la aparición probablemente reciente (en la evolución hominoide) de la capacidad de desacoplamiento y se me ocurre que uno podría considerar experiencias de drogas enteógena, Satori y la iluminación como la última en la disociación-ningún pasado, ningún futuro, y ni siquiera un regalo-no aquí, no hay, no yo, no tú y todo es una cosa e ilusoria. La otra transición clave en la evolución está postulada para ser la capacidad de aceptar la violación de las expectativas intuitivas en el nivel de los dominios ontológicos (es decir, las clases de cosas-plantas, personas, mover cosas, etc.). Considera que estas capacidades conducen a la invención de la religión (y por supuesto mucho más), pero está claro que Buda, Jesús y Osho fue un poco más lejos. Rechaza la idea de que los pensamientos religiosos hacen que las mentes sean más flexibles y abiertas (más bien se volvieron susceptibles a ciertos conceptos que activaron las inferencias de agencia, depredación, moralidad, intercambio social, muerte, etc.), pero algo nos hizo susceptibles también a los enteógenos, Satori e iluminación y esto es tan flexible y abierto como la gente puede ser y permanecer cuerdo. Por lo tanto, está claro que queda mucho por descubrir sobre la espiritualidad y la religión y el progreso en la comprensión del comportamiento traerá esto. 313 314 Reseña de Sexo, Ecología, Espiritualidad (Sex, Ecology, Spirituality) por Ken Wilber 2nd Ed 851p (2001) (revisión revisada 2019) Michael Starks Abstracto Es increíble y apropiado que esta enorme, cargada de jerga (este libro realmente necesita un glosario!), el trabajo muy académico se ha convertido en un major vendido en el mundo de los educados. Uno tiene que ser dedicado a aprender la jerga y luego arado a través de 551 páginas de texto y 238 páginas de notas. Mientras tanto, se nos dice tiempo y otra vez que esto es sólo un bosquejo de lo que está por venir! A pesar de que critica severamente los excesos de los tres movimientos, esto es un deconstructivo y NEW edad mística y posmoderna interpretación de la religión, la filosofía y la Ciencias del comportamiento de un muy liberal, punto de vista espiritual - i. e., sin lo peor de Decon, la jerga de PM y NAM, el igualitarismo rabioso y antiintelectualismo anti-científico. Analiza en algunos detallar las diversas opiniones del mundo de la filosofía, la psicología, la sociología y la religión, exponiendo sus fallas reduccionistas fatales con (principalmente) cuidado y brilliantez, pero la mayoría de las fuentes que analiza no son casi ninguna relevancia hoy en día. Utilizan terminología y conceptos que ya estaban obsoletos cuando estaba investigando y escribiendo hace 20 años. Uno tiene que marcha despacio a través de interminables páginas de jerga-la discusión cargada de Habermas, Kant, Emerson, Jung et.al. para llegar a las perlas. Tienes una excelente muestreo de mala escritura, ideas confusas y anticuadas y jerga obsoleta. Si uno tiene una buena educación actual, es doblemente doloroso leer este libro (y la mayoría escribiendo sobre el comportamiento humano). Doloroso porque es tan torturado y confuso, y luego de nuevo cuando te das cuenta lo sencillo que es con la psicología moderna y la filosofía. La terminología y las ideas son horriblemente confusas y anticuadas (pero menos en el propio análisis de Wilber que en sus fuentes). Este libro y la mayoría de sus fuentes son textos de psicología, aunque la mayoría de los autores no se dan cuenta. Se trata de la conducta humana y el razonamiento-acerca de por qué pensamos y actuamos de la manera que hacemos y cómo podríamos cambiar en el futuro. Pero (como toda esa discusión Hasta recientemente) ninguna de las explicaciones son realmente explicaciones, y por lo que no dan ninguna idea del comportamiento humano. Nadie discute los mecanismos mentales involucrados. Es como describir cómo funciona un coche por discutiendo el volante y metal y pintura 315 sin ningún conocimiento del motor, combustible o tren de impulsión. De hecho, como la mayoría "explicaciones" más antiguas del comportamiento, los textos citado aquí y el comentarios por Wilber son a menudo más interesantes para qué tipo de las cosas que aceptan (y omitir!) como explicaciones, y el tipo de razonamiento ellos uso, que para el contenido real. Si uno está en la filosofía y la psicología cognitiva y evolutiva, la mayor parte de esto es arcaico. Como casi todo el mundo (académicos y públicos por igual-e.g., ver mi reseña de la libertad evoluciona de Dennett y otros libros), él no entiende que los fundamentos de la religión y la ética--de hecho, toda la conducta humana, se programan en nuestros genes. Una revolución en la comprensión nosotros mismos estábamos tomando lugar mientras escribía sus muchos libros y lo pasaba por allí. Aquellos que deseen un marco completo hasta la fecha para el comportamiento humano de la moderna dos sistemas punto de vista puede consultar mi libro 'La Estructura Lógica de la Filosofía, la Psicología, la Mente y Lenguaje en Ludwig Wittgenstein y John Searle ' 2nd Ed (2019). Los interesados en más de mis escritos pueden ver 'Monos parlantes--filosofía, psicología, ciencia, religión y política en un planeta condenado--artículos y reseñas 2006-2019 3rd Ed (2019) y delirios utópicos suicidas en el 21St Century 4TH Ed (2019) 'Cualquier cosa que se pueda decir puede decirse claramente ' Ludwig Wittgenstein "Cielo y la tierra es inhumana-que ver a las innumerables criaturas como perros de paja ' Tao Te Ching Es increíble y apropiado que esta enorme, cargada de jerga (este libro realmente necesita un glosario!), el trabajo muy académico se ha convertido en un mejor vendido en el mundo de los educados. Uno tiene que ser dedicado a aprender la jerga y luego arado a través de 551 páginas de texto y 238 páginas de notas. Mientras tanto, se nos dice una y otra vez que esto es sólo un bosquejo de lo que está por venir! Este libro y la mayoría de sus fuentes son textos de psicología, aunque la mayoría de los autores no se dan cuenta. Se trata de la conducta humana y el razonamientoacerca de por qué pensamos y actuamos de la manera que hacemos y cómo podríamos cambio en el futuro. Pero (como toda esa discusión hasta hace poco) ninguna de las explicaciones son realmente explicaciones y por lo tanto no dieron ninguna idea sobre el comportamiento humano. Nadie discute los mecanismos mentales involucrados. Es como describir cómo funciona un coche discutiendo el volante y el metal y la pintura y las ruedas sin ningún conocimiento del motor o tren de impulsión. De hecho, como la mayoría de las "explicaciones" de la conducta, los textos citados aquí y los comentarios de Wilber son a menudo más interesantes para qué tipo de cosas aceptan (y omiten!) como explicaciones, y el tipo de razonamiento que uso, que para el contenido real. 316 Al igual que con todo el razonamiento y explicando uno ahora quiere saber cuál de los motores de inferencia de cerebros se activan para producir los resultados y cómo el pensamiento rápido automatizado sistema prelingüístico 1 (S1) y el sistema lingüístico deliberativo de pensamiento lento 2 (S2) están involucrados y lo que es la estructura lógica de la racionalidad que explica (o más bien describe como Wittgenstein insistió) comportamiento. Son los filtros de relevancia (los procesos reflexivos) de S1 que determinan qué tipo de cosas que se pueden introducir como datos apropiados para cada motor y su operación e interacción automática e inconsciente que determina qué nuestro cerebro pasará a S2 para una expresión de orden superior en el lenguaje. La psicología cognitiva y evolutiva aún no ha evolucionado lo suficiente como para proporcionar explicaciones completas descripciones pero se ha hecho un comienzo interesante. La ' religión explicada ' de Boyer es un buen lugar para ver lo que una explicación científica moderna del comportamiento humano se parece a partir de 2002 (aunque se pierda por completo la iluminación!). Pinker ' Cómo funciona la mente ' es una buena encuesta general y su ' la pizarra en blanco ' (ver mis comentarios) con mucho la mejor discusión sobre el problema de la herencia-ambiente en el comportamiento humano. Ellos no 'Explicar' toda la inteligencia o el pensamiento, pero resuma lo que se conoce. Véanse varios de los textos recientes (i.e., 2004 en adelante) con la psicología evolutiva en el título (sobre todo "El manual de Psicología evolutiva" 2Nd Ed por Buss) o la web para obtener más información. Ahora reconocemos que las bases para el arte, la música, las matemáticas, la filosofía, la psicología, la sociología, el idioma y la religión se encuentran en el funcionamiento automático de las plantillas o motores de inferencia de S1. Es por eso que nos enlatar Esperar similitudes y rompecabezas inconsistencias o incompletitud y a menudo, callejones sin salida como sin un sondeo cuidadoso por experimentos o análisis filosófico (lingüístico) es invisible para nosotros (' la ilusión fenomenológica ' de Searle). El cerebro no tiene inteligencia general, pero numerosos módulos especializados, cada uno de los cuales trabaja en ciertos aspectos de algún problema y los resultados se añaden, lo que resulta en los sentimientos que conducen a la conducta. Wilber, como todo el mundo, sólo puede generar o reconocer explicaciones que son consistente con las operaciones de sus propios motores de inferencia, que fueron evolucionados para lidiar con cosas tales como la acumulación de recursos, coaliciones en pequeños grupos, intercambios sociales y la evaluación de las intenciones de otras personas. Es asombroso que puedan producir filosofía y ciencia, y no sorprender que averiguar cómo trabajan juntos para producir conciencia o elección o la espiritualidad es mucho más allá Alcanzar. Wilber es un raton de biblioteca y ha pasado décadas analizando textos clásicos y modernos. Él es extremadamente brillante, ha tenido claramente su propio despertar, y también conoce las minucias de la religión oriental, así como de cualquiera. Dudo que haya más de un puñado en el mundo que podría escribir este libro. Sin embargo Este es un caso clásico de ser demasiado inteligente para su propio bien y su fascinación por la historia intelectual y su capacidad para leer, analizar y escribir sobre 317 cientos de difíciles libros lo ha empantanado en el pasado muerto. A pesar de que critica severamente los excesos de los tres movimientos, esto es un deconstructivo y nuevo edad mística y posmoderna interpretación de la religión, la filosofía y la Ciencias del comportamiento de un muy liberal, punto de vista espiritual - i. e., sin lo peor de Decon, PM y jerga NAM, anti-científico anti-Intelectualismo, y el opresivo rabioso Neomarxista tercer mundo partidario egalitarismo que está destruyendo Estados Unidos y el mundo entregando poder a la chusma de clase baja en Occidente y a los yihadistas y a los siete sociópatas que ejecutan China. Boyer señala (P20), cuando el miedo y la pobreza dan paso a la seguridad y la riqueza, los resultados de la inferencia motores cambian y encuentras la religión cambiando de los rituales de apaciguamiento para los poderosos dioses en un universo hostil a autoempoderamiento y control en una benevolente (es decir, el misticismo de la nueva era Etc.). Analiza con algún detalle el diferentes mundo vistas de filosofía, psicología, sociología y religión, exponiendo sus defectos fatales mortales con (principalmente) cuidado y brillantez, pero la mayoría de las fuentes que analiza son de dudosa relevancia hoy en día. Utilizan terminología y conceptos que ya estaban obsoletos cuando estaba investigando y escribiendo hace 20 años. Uno tiene que marcha a través de interminables páginas de jerga-la discusión cargada de Habermas, Kant, Emerson, Jung et.al. para llegar a las perlas. Él se sumerge en Freud y la interpretación psicoanalítica de los sueños (por ejemplo P92), aunque la mayoría ahora consideras como artefactos meramente pintorescos de la historia intelectual. Si uno está arriba hasta la fecha sobre filosofía y psicología cognitiva y evolutiva, la mayor parte de esto es arcaico. Como casi todo el mundo (académicos y público por igual-por ejemplo, ver mi revisión de la libertad evoluciona Dennett y otros libros), él no entiende que los fundamentos de la religión y la ética-de hecho, toda la conducta humana, se programan en nuestros genes. Una revolución en la comprensión de nosotros mismos estaba teniendo lugar mientras escribía sus muchos libros y lo pasó en gran medida, aunque no he leído sus últimas obras. Si uno tiene una buena educación actual, es doblemente doloroso leer este libro (y la mayoría escribiendo sobre el comportamiento humano). Doloroso porque es tan torturado y confuso y luego de nuevo cuando te diste cuenta de lo simple que es con la psicología moderna y la filosofía. La terminología y las ideas son horriblemente confusas y anticuadas (pero menos en el propio análisis de Wilber que en sus fuentes). Ahora pensamos en términos de plantillas cognitivas que evolucionaron hace unos 100.000 años (en la mayoría de los casos varios cientos de millones de años antes en sus formas originales). Operan automáticamente, no son accesibles a la conciencia y hay abundantes evidencias de que limitan severamente las opciones de comportamiento para los individuos y para la sociedad. Su nuevo prefacio señala un estudio de este tipo, pero el libro necesita una reescritura total. 318 Hay una enorme resistencia en nosotros a aceptarnos como parte de la naturaleza, y en particular, cualquier explicación basada en genes de la conducta, a pesar del hecho de que todo nuestro comportamiento, como toda nuestra fisiología, se basa en el gen de sus raíces. Como todos nuestros pensamientos, estos sentimientos se deben al funcionamiento de las plantillas cognitivas, por lo que tal vez es el conflicto entre las explicaciones biológicas y nuestra psicología intuitiva automática o sistemas de la mente social que es responsable (la evidencia de nuestras convenciones y cultura lingüística y la opacidad de nuestros automatismos que Searle ha llamado ' la ilusión fenomenológica '). Estos sistemas genéticos han funcionado durante cientos de miles o millones de años y los nuevos datos de la ciencia nos están contando los resultados de sus operaciones (nuestros sentimientos sobre qué hacer) Son frecuentemente Incorrecto en nuestro complejo mundo moderno. Hay un gran programa de investigación en comportamiento social, económico y político desde este nuevo punto de vista. Una jerga que necesitarás está en la PG X del nuevo prefacio donde encuentras que la visión-lógica usada constantemente es cognición postformal o de red-lógica o integralaperspectival (todos los puntos de vista son iguales y deben ser considerados). También declara el manifiesto postmoderno aquí: todas las vistas iguales, dependientes de contextos ilimitados y meramente interpretaciones. Como él nota con gran detalle, esto pone uno en la pendiente resbaladizo que conduce a mucha irracionalidad e incoherencia y hay defectos muy básicos en ella. Sin embargo, prácticamente se apoderó de las universidades de Estados Unidos y Europa durante varias décadas y está lejos de estar muerto, habiéndose transformado en el Neomarxista supremacista egalitarianismo. tú también necesitarán su definición de eros de p528. Obtienes una excelente muestra de mala escritura, ideas confusas y anticuadas y jerga obsoleta. En p52 hay una cita de Jakobson que pueden sustituirse por ' los motores de inferencia para la psicología y el lenguaje se desarrollan a medida que maduramos ; y párrafos de Jantsch (P58) que dicen que la evolución es la evolución y las células son células y (P71) el ambiente cambia a medida que los organismos evolucionan. Hay una cita de Foucault para abrir el libro dos (p327) que, traducido de deconstructese, dice ' el conocimiento ayuda a entender el mundo '. Hay una cita larga (P60-61) de Rupert Sheldrake que, cuando es inteligible, dice cosas que se traducen como "las proteínas son proteínas" y "las células son células". Hay numerosos desastres lingüísticos de Habermas (por ejemplo, si usted tiene tiempo para perder, tratar de averiguar las cotizaciones en P77 o 150), pero algunos son realmente traducibles, como los de P153-4, que dicen que la gente tiene la moral, por lo que la sociedad tiene leyes y lenguaje evolucionado para que la sociedad evolucionada. Y mucho de esto de Wilber mismo, como en P109 donde pasa la mayor parte de la página para decir que la mayoría de las mutaciones y recombinaciones fallan y los sobrevivientes son compatibles con sus evirones. A pesar de su conocido con el trabajo de Searle, a menudo es cofusionados sobre la conciencia. él dice (P1178) que podemos considerar lo que queramos como consciente, pero claramente, una 319 vez que dejamos el Reino de los animales que tienen ojos y un cerebro y caminan, se convierte en una broma. de la misma manera, él está en hielo muy delgado cuando se habla de nuestro interior y la necesidad de interpretar las mentes de los demás. Esto está muy lejos de la marca si uno conoce algunos Searle, Wittgenstein y cognitivo psicología (ver mis otros escritos). Igualmente con el "explicaciones" de Wolf en p742 que son erróneas por las mismas razones que las "explicaciones" de la conciencia están equivocadas. Debe ser cierto que la mente y el espíritu se basan en la física (al menos no hay una alternativa inteligible), pero no sabemos cómo conceptualizar esto o incluso cómo reconocer tal concepto (es decir, los juegos de idiomas o condiciones de satisfacción no están claros). Muchos sospechan que nunca entenderemos esto pero más bien es sólo una cuestión de aceptar cómo son las cosas y también con los fundamentos del universo (por ejemplo, ver mi reseña de Kaku ' Hyperspace ' y Dennett). Sus notas (P129) que los estudios culturales han hecho un pequeño paso, pero ni él ni sus fuentes entienden que no tenían ningún marco para hacerlo y Típicamente porque abrazaron la idea estéril de la pizarra en blanco. Quieren ser fácticos, incluso científicos, pero constantemente se deshacen de la fantasía. Delinúa la integración del arte, la ciencia y la moralidad como la gran tarea del posmodernismo, y él y otros se esfuerzan muchísimo para hacer conexiones y organizarlo todo en un plan coherente para pensar y vivir. Sin embargo No puedo ver ningún sentido realmente útil en el que esto es posible. La vida no es un juego de ajedrez. Incluso en el limitado Reino del arte o la moralidad no es en absoluto claro que hay algo más que eso son partes de la experiencia humana que los dibuja juntos, es decir, los genes hacen cerebro y las reglas automáticas del sistema 1 inconsciente. Se pueden poner pinturas y esculturas y ropa y edificios y figuras de palo en un libro de arte, pero esto realmente nos está consiguiendo en cualquier lugar? Por favor, vea mi opinións para obtener detalles sobre cómo describir el comportamiento utilizando los dos modernos sistemas de pensamiento y una estructura lógica para la racionalidad. Boyer (ver mi opinión) muestra en detalle cómo la religión se debe a un complejo de sistemas cerebrales que sirven a muchas funciones diferentes que evolucionaron mucho antes de que hubiera algo como la religión. El cerebro tiene numerosas plantillas que toman los datos, lo organizan y lo relacionan en tiempo real con odatos, pero cada uno de ellos sirve un determinado propósito y los plas experimentales no son arte, moralidad, religion y ciencia. La psicología cognitiva muestra que tenemos muchos módulos trabajando simultáneamente para producir cualquier comportamiento y que nos relacionamos con personas en muchos maneras por muchas razones. Una función básica es la intuición coalicional. Esto nos da sentimientos que guían nuestra entrada en grupos y nuestras interacciones con otros grupos. Automáticamente y de inmediato sobrestimamos las cualidades de los de nuestro grupo, incluso si se compone de desconocidos totales elegidos al azar que conocimos cinco minutos antes. Asimismo, subestimamos inmediatamente las buenas cualidades de los de otros grupos, y siempre estamos fuertemente a favor de aquellos que estrechamente relacionados 320 genéticamente (selección de parientes o fitness inclusivo que son otros nombres para la selección natural). Esto y muchos otra guía de automatismos y normalmente regla comportamiento individual, grupos, naciones y el mundo, pero casi nadie tuvo una comprensión real de esto hasta hace muy poco. Por lo tanto, no es de extrañar que casi todas sus fuentes de Platón a Kant a Habermas han estado vagando por ahí en la oscuridad y que Wilber está huyendo frenéticamente de uno a otro con una linterna tratando de ayudarles a encontrar su manera de salir del bosque. Señala (p199) que el único movimiento social global serio hasta la fecha fue el marxismo, pero piensa que su defecto fatal fue el reduccionismo. Parece ser mucho más convincente tener en cuenta que, como prácticamente toda la sociedad moderna (y la mayoría de sus fuentes y en gran medida este libro), negó (o ignoró o no entendía) la naturaleza humana y la biología básica. Nadie parece notar que la mayoría de las instituciones sociales y los ideales, (incluyendo la igualdad y la democracia) tienen este mismo defecto. El debate sobre la naturaleza humana, el medio ambiente y el futuro es interminable, pero la realidad es un ácido que comerá a través de toda fantasía. Parafraseando a Lincoln, puedes engañar a algunas personas todo el tiempo y a toda la gente del tiempo, pero no puedes engañar a la madre naturaleza en cualquier momento. La mafia está programada para acumular recursos y replicar sus genes, y esto significa el colapso de la civilización. El Neomarxismo, la diversidad, la democracia, el Islam, el hinduismo, el budismo, el cristianismo, la justicia social y los derechos humanos son los medios para este fin y nada puede resistir. Detalla la historia intelectual (filosofía, psicología, religión, ecología, feminismo, sociología, etc.) y muestra dónde casi todo el mundo fue demasiado lejos en la dirección de Ascenso (sólo para el espíritu o la vida religiosa) o descenso (a la ciencia, materialismo, reduccionismo o Flatland). Él intentos para mostrar cómo curar las grietas mediante la combinación de sentido y el alma (vida espiritual y material, Ciencia y religión, interna y externa, individual y social). Todo está relacionado con todo lo demás (holones en las hoquías-es decir, las cosas en las jerarquías anidadas- Ver P26, 135 por su definición). La era de la ilustración negó el espíritu, el individuo y la vida interior, pero desarrolló el arte, la moral y la ciencia y condujo a la democracia, el feminismo, la igualdad y la ecología. Este reduccionismo comprimió el intelecto y el espíritu en la tierra plana de la ciencia, la racionalidad y el materialismo. Él ve la pérdida del punto de vista espiritual con la edad de la ilustración como el factor principal responsable para el malestar de la moderna Times, pero ' verdadera espiritualidad ' o ' religión avanzada 'mi términos--(i.e., la búsqueda de la iluminación), en contraposición a la ' religión primitiva ' (todo lo demás-ver Boyer) siempre fui raro. Es la religión avanzada que ve como la panacea, pero es la religión primitiva que las masas entienden, y también tiene sólo objetivos materialistas (dinero, poder y todo lo demás servir para replicar genes). Él entiende que Jesús era un místico en el mismo sentido que Buda y muchos otros, y 321 que lo que se convertiría en la iglesia católica en gran parte destroyó su mística Aspectos y la búsqueda personal para la iluminación-p. ej., gnosticismo, a favor de la religión primitiva, sacerdotes, diezmos y una estructura que parezca modelada en el ejército romano (p363 lavar). Pero, para la iglesia cristiana primitiva, como para la mayoría de la religión, las plantillas cognitivas eran sirvientes de los genes y la iluminación no estaba en el menú. Jesús no era Cristiano, no tenía Biblia, y no creía en un Dios más que en Buda. Tenemos el cristianismo sin la verdadera inteligencia de Jesús y esto, como explica en detalle, es una causa de la prolongada estancia de Occidente en tierra plana. No soy cristiano, ni siquiera teísta, pero es una de las cosas más tristes de la historia que el maestro iluminado que iba a servir como modelo de espiritualidad para Occidente tuvo su visión de iluminación personal destruida y distorsionada por sus propios seguidores (pero por supuesto ellos no son realmente SUS seguidores). Vea los manuscritos Gnostics y Nag Hammadi y, sobre todo, los discursos de Osho sobre el Evangelio de Tomás de estos. Como todo el mundo hasta hace poco, los muchos autores que discute carecían de ninguna explicación real para el comportamiento humano. Raramente se les ocurrió preguntar por qué tenemos tales ideas y comportamientos y los pocos que no tenían una solución coherente. Aunque ha leído algunos de los magníficos Filosofía y tiene pasando referencias a la investigación en psicología cognitiva, es increíble que él podría hacer 20 años de investigación en filosofía sin estudiar Wittgenstein, la religión sin leer Osho y ver sus videos, y psicología sin Buss, Tooby, Cosmides et al. Gran parte de la evolución cognitiva y evolutiva Psicología sólo se publicó en revistas en el momento en que escribía y Wilber casi no tiene referencias a revistas. Pero Wittgenstein es el filósofo más famoso de los tiempos modernos, y Osho, el maestro espiritual más famoso. Es notable que a pesar de que pasa mucho tiempo en sus libros discutiendo el aspectos intelectuales de la terapia (Freud, Beck, Maslow, etc.) y entiende claramente que el camino espiritual es la terapia definitiva, ignora totalmente Osho, que había la comunidad terapéutica más avanzada en funcionamiento de la historia en todo el mundo durante los últimos 30 años. Osho nunca escribió un libro grueso que contenía una teoría del comportamiento humano, aunque sus 200 libros y muchos Videos, todo gratis en línea, explicarlo tan maravillosamente y claramente como se ha hecho nunca. Aunque se esfuerza por sanar al mundo, Wilber pasa mucho tiempo en los amplios reinos del debate intelectual. Como un postmodernista, y un holista mística de la nueva era, él quiere unir el arte, la moralidad y la ciencia, pero la ciencia obtiene el corto paja. Al igual que en algunos de sus otros libros (p. ej., Una Breve Historia de Todo-ver mi opinión), de lejos los peores errores que hace (junto con casi todas sus fuentes y la mayor parte del planeta) son ignorando y malentendidos básicos Biología. Esto es aparente en el libro. Comienza el capítulo 7 con una cita de Aurobindo, que tuvo el mismo fracaso. No tienen ninguna comprensión del hecho de que los efectos eugénicos de la evolución son impulsados por la selección natural y cuando la sociedad se estableció firmemente, esto cesó y ha sido totalmente disgénico desde entonces. Los ingenieros genéticos han estado en el trabajo y han liberado en un mundo 322 indefenso el mutante más horriblemente destructivo imaginable. La sociedad es el ingeniero y nosotros somos ese mutante. Si uno obtiene el panorama general, la preocupación por los posibles efectos destructivos de los OMG (organismos modificados genéticamente) --Aparte de nosotros mismos-es simplemente estúpido y es quizás el resultado de la operación de las plantillas de contagio discutidas por Boyer. Es decir, es poco probable que el posible efecto destructivo de todos los OMG que vamos a hacer sea acercarse a lo que los humanos ya han hecho ellos mismos. Él dice (p 508, p519) que Darwin no explica la evolución, supuestamente bien conocida ante él, y lo acusa de ' obscurantismo masivo ' (¡ debería decir esto sobre la mayoría de sus fuentes!). La verdad es que nada en el comportamiento humano o el mundo o el universo tiene sentido, excepto en la luz de la evolución y ninguna persona hizo más para aclarar esto que Darwin. El trabajo ante él era poco más que especulación ociosa y ni siquiera se aproximaba a un tratamiento científico serio. Esta es la razón por la que NO tuvo efecto sobre la ciencia o la sociedad, a diferencia de la transformación completa de Darwin. Claro, Darwin no conocía la genética ni la tectónica de placas, y el neodarwinismo moderno añaden muchos refinamientos, pero muestra un malentendido total de la ciencia y la historia para decir que esto invalida o disminuye sus contribuciones. Wilber está claramente deslizándose lateralmente hacia el campamento creacionista y sólo se puede especular sobre cuál de sus motores de inferencia produce esto. Él muestra en muchos lugares que tiene una mala comprensión de la genética y la evolución. E. g., en p561--como Dawkins ha explicado pacientemente, la unidad de evolución es tél gene, y ninguno de los otros cosas que Wilber menciona funcionan como una unidad genética. A pesar de que enumera ' el gen egoísta ' en su bibliografía, está claro que no lo ha entendido, y es más de 40 años de edad. Dawkins ha escrito media docena de obras magníficas desde entonces y hay cientos de otros. Wilber parece tener una alergia a los buenos libros de biología--la mayoría de los que cita son muy viejos y otros son clásicos de la confusión. Desperdicia una página (p51) sobre la idea (principalmente debido a el pseudocientífico Neomarxista Gould y su coautor Eldredge) de evolucion puntuada, que es de muy poco interés. Gould amaba para hacer un gran alboroto sobre sus ' descubrimientos ' y su energía le consiguió mucho tiempo de recarga, pero cuando todo estaba dicho y hecho, no tenía nada nuevo que decir y arrastró a millones en sus propias confusiones (como Dawkins, Conway Morris y muchos otros han señalado). Sí, la evolución es a veces más rápida pero ¿Y qué? A veces llueve un poco, a veces mucho. Si amplía, en el tiempo o en el espacio, siempre Ver más detalles, y si se aleja se empieza a lucir igual. Gould también fue responsable de los ' Spandrels de San Marcos ' debacle y, con sus colegas Neomarxistas Lewontin y Rose, por interminables ataques insípidos a la "Biología Determinista", incluyendo los escandalosos asaltos verbales y físicos a E. O Wilson (que, a diferencia de ellos mismos, hicieron numerosas contribuciones importantes a la biología, aunque recientemente deshonrado él mismo - ver mi reseña de su ' la Conquista Social de la Tierra '). La investigación moderna (por ejemplo, ver Pinker y Boyer) deja claro que Wilson tenía razón en el dinero con respecto a la evolución, 323 excepto por su desafortunado abrazo reciente de ' selección de grupo '. Es bastante descuidado decir (p775) que no hay un solo mundo predado. Quizás sólo signifique que deberíamos ser multiculturales, igualitario, etc., pero si realmente no había ninguno, entonces, ¿cómo podemos vivir y comunicarnos? Esta es la fealdad del posmodernismo que se arrastra. Una gran dosis de Wittgenstein y la psicología cognitiva es una cura apropiada. Ni Wilber ni Derrida ni Foucault (ni la mayoría personas entender que DEBE haber un punto de vista único o la vida sería imposible. Este sencillo punto de vista, residente en nuestro genes, es parte integral de cómo pensamos y nos comportamos y en gran medida dicta los caprichos de la filosofía, la política y la religión. Las plantillas cognitivas de S1 que subyacen en el lenguaje, el pensamiento y nuestra percepción de la realidad lógicamente deben ser los mismos y la evidencia de esto es abrumadora. Incluso los cambios más pequeños, incluso una gen salió mal, y tienes autismo, imbecilidad o esquizofrenia. El hecho bruto que Wilber (y la mayoría del mundo) ignora en gran medida, es que son 7.8 mil millones (11 mil millones o así por 2100) conjuntos de genes egoístas que llevan a cabo sus programas para destruir la tierra. Son un ácido que comerá a través de cualquier conclusión intelectual, fanatasias igualitarias y renacimientos espirituales. El egoísmo, la deshonestidad, el tribalismo y miopía no se deben a accidentes de historia intelectual o espiritual. Él dice que la falta de espíritu está destruyendo la tierra, y aunque hay este aspecto en las cosas, es mucho más al punto de decir que son los genes egoístas los que son responsables. Del mismo modo, dice ' la biología ya no es destino ', pero es un punto de vista fácilmente defendible que el revés es mucho más probable. El intento de entender la historia en términos de ideas ignora la biología y niega la naturaleza humana. Los genes egoístas siempre viven en Flatland y menos de 1000 personas en toda la historia humana han escapado la tiranía de la mente del mono en la iluminación. La mayor parte del capítulo 6 sobre el mito y la magia es anticuado, confuso o simplemente erróneo. Para dar sólo unos pocos ejemplos, ahora entendemos que la mayor parte del desarrollo psicológico y social de un niño está construido y no tiene que ser aprendido (por ejemplo, PG 233-4). El niño no tiene que deconstruir nada--los motores de inferencias lo hacen todo (P260). Joseph Campbell es citado extensamente y él tampoco tenía idea de cómo desarrollamos y cómo explicar las diferencias y similitudes en las culturas (P245-50). Por ejemplo, Campbell dice que la mitología sólo puede reclamar a la niñez, pero una mirada alrededor del mundo muestra lo falso que es esto y una lectura de Boyer' la religión explicada ' (ver mi reseña) dice por qué. Su discusión de pensar sobre lo no fáctico en PG 279 a 80 es ahora frecuentemente denomina ejecutar los motores de inferencia en desacoplados o contrafáctual modo. A sus retorcido comentarios en el medio de PG 560 (y finalmente....) Quiero decir ' explicación termina con las plantillas! P580-4 y 591-3 están tan llenos de dudosa y afirmaciones equivocadas que ni siquiera quiero comenzar, sino sugeriren Wilber y el lector comienza con Searle ' el misterio de Conciencia o mejor con casi cualquiera de mis reseñas de Searle o Wittgenstein. Una y otra vez, está claro que comparte la falta de un punto de vista científico con la mayoría de sus fuentes. ¿Qué información o 324 procedimientos pueden resolver las preguntas de la conciencia o de cualquier ciencia social y teorías filosóficas? ¿Cómo reconoces una respuesta cuando la ves? Él y ellos van a las páginas y libros enteros sin tener ninguna idea (por ejemplo, ver mi reseña de Dennett s Freedom Evolves). En p702-bottom-habla de la fulcro forzando desarrollo pero si uno entiende las plantillas, la estructura lógica de la racionalidad y los dos sistemas de pensamiento (y me refiero aquí y en otros lugares de todo el corpus de la psicología cognitiva y evolutiva) entonces uno o bien necesita para reescribir esto o eliminarlo. Igualmente para la mayoría de PGS 770-77. La prosa torturada en PG 771-2 sólo dice que las plantillas (reflejos S1) son investigados por drogas u otras entradas pero no cambió y que nadie sabe (de una manera que puede transmitir claramente) lo que estos son. El fondo o el espacio intersubjetivo son las plantillas y se desarrollan muy temprano en los niños y luego permanecen fijos de por vida. La destrucción deliberada del misticismo de Jesús ha creado un poderoso sesgo contra la conciencia superior en Occidente. Aunque no entiende ni discute la iluminación, Boyer da la base para entender cómo y por qué sucedió esto. Wilber adopta un utilitarismo simple (el más grande para el mayor número) - es decir, la mayor profundidad para el mayor alcance (p334). Este Basic principio de mucha filosofía, religión y economía tiene serios problemas y es probablemente inviable. ¿Qué personas debemos hacer felices y cuán felices y cuándo (i.e., ahora o en el futuro)? ¿Sobre qué base distribuimos recursos ahora y ¿cuánto ahorramos para la futura población, y quién decide y cómo hacer cumplir esto? Él llama a nuestra intuición moral básica (es decir, la operación de nuestra templates (plantiillas), como ahora sabemos), pero nuestro BMI no es realmente para ayudar a los demás, sino para ayudarnos a nosotros mismos y nuestros parientes cercanos (aptitud inclusiva), y los pocos miles (o vamos a ser muy optomista y decir pocos millones) que son espiritualmente avanzada no corren el mundo y nunca lo harán. El IMC--por ejemplo, el intercambio social, las intuiciones coalicionales, la psicología intuitiva, etc., evolucionaron para servir a nuestros propios intereses (no a los de la Grupo--si, como Wilber, piensas así por favor leer algunos de los libros de Dawkin o mi reciente reseña de ' la Conquista Social de la Tierra ' de Wilson) y en cualquier caso está irremediablemente en el mar en el mundo moderno con su avanzada educaciones, comunicaciones instantáneas, armas de fuego, estado de ánimo alterando drogas, ropa y cosméticos, una población enorme y móvil y recursos de desaparición. En lugar del enfoque intelectual o espiritual que Wilber lleva a la historia, otros toman enfoques ecológicos, genéticos o tecnólogas (e.g,, Diamond's "Guns Germs and Steel" o Pinker's "The Blank Slate"). En el largo plazo, parece que sólo la biología realmente importa y vemos diariamente cómo la sobrepoblación es abrumadora todos los intentos de civilizar a las masas. La democracia y la igualdad que los valores de Wilber son tan alta son los medios creados por los genes egoístas para facilitar su destrucción del planeta. A pesar de la esperanza de que una nueva era esté amaneciendo y veremos la evolución biológica y psíquica de un nuevo ser humano, el hecho es que somos la especie más degenerada que haya existido y el planeta se aproxima al 325 colapso. Los miles de millones de años de eugenesia (selección natural) que empujan la vida de la limo y nos dio la increíble capacidad de escribir y leer libros como este es ahora. Ya no hay selección para los más sanos y más inteligentes y de hecho producen un porcentaje menor de los ninos cada año. La naturaleza no tolerar las aberraciones físicas y mentales, pero la sociedad las alienta. Nuestra fisical y pico mental era probablemente Cromagnon hombre o tal vez incluso neandertales (que tenían cerebros más grandes (Sí, Sé que parecen no haber aportado más de un par de por ciento de nuestro ADN) hace unos 100.000 años. Parece plausible que sólo la ingeniería genética y una oligarquía iluminada nos puedan salvar. Vea mi ensayo suicidio por la democracia. Él piensa (por ejemplo P12, etc.) que es nuestra vista del mundo fracturada (i.e., la negación del espíritu) que es responsable de nuestras catástrofes ecológicas y la preocupación por los bienes materiales, pero este es otro ejemplo de la negación de la naturaleza humana. Nadie ve las afecciones cardíacas o la enfermedad de Alzheimer debido a una visión del mundo fracturada, pero pocos parecen tener ningún problema pensando que puede cambiar los fundamentos de la conducta sólo por la educación o la manipulación psicológica. La ciencia moderna refuta esta visión de manera concluyente (ver Pinker, Boyer, etc.). Las plantillas de psicología intuitivas nos dicen que podemos manipular el comportamiento de los demás, pero estas plantillas se desarrollaron cientos de miles a millones de hace años, y a menudo no pueden dar resultados correctos en contextos modernos. Casi todos los padres piensan que pueden influyen profundamente en el carácter adulto (paciencia, honestidad, irritabilidad, depresión, persistencia, compulsividad, etc.) de sus hijos, a pesar de las claras pruebas en contrario (p. ej., Pinker). Cree que los derechos de los animales son ilógicos y excesivos cuando valoran a los animales sobre los seres humanos y también con aquellos que valoran el medio ambiente sobre las necesidades de las personas. Esto puede ser lógico en su sistema, pero por supuesto los seres humanos son típicamente (y a menudo razonablemente) ilógicos. En cualquier caso, si siempre ponemos las necesidades humanas en primer lugar, entonces es seguramente el fin de la paz, la tranquilidad, belleza y cordura. Wilber defiende a Piaget, pero al igual que él muestra muchos lugares que no entiende que el niño no tiene que aprender las cosas importantes-que están construidas en y sólo tiene que crecer. No parece haber ninguna evidencia de que cualquiera de nuestras plantillas, es decir, S1 cambiar con el tiempo uno que maduramos. Las cosas que aprendemos son en su mayoría triviales en comparación (i.e., incluso una computadora puede aprenderlo!). Sus fuentes se pierden en su mayoría en la confusión y la jerga, pero él es brillante y si uno se molesta en leer sus explicaciones y traduce "Wilberspeak" al inglés, por lo general hace que sentido. En PG 545-7 explica la ecología holonica. Aquí hay una traducción. Todos los organismos tienen valor en sí mismos y están relacionados con todos los demás en el ecosistema y debemos despertar espiritualmente. Hay una red de vida (es decir, Gaia o ecosistema) y todos tienen valor intrínseco, pero los 326 organismos superiores tienen más valor, lo que requiere un punto de vista espiritual. Ninguno lo espiritual o científico enfoque funciona solo (i.e., el dualismo es malo). Traducido, pierde la mayor parte de su atractivo, pero no es justo negar la poesía y majestad de su visión. Pero, esto no lo excusa de escribir claramente. La opacidad es casi característica universal de los libros que trata aquí. Sin embargo, cuando Katz escribió un libro denigrando el misticismo Wilber se tomó el tiempo para hacer un análisis de ' Searleian ' para mostrar cómo la incoherencia ha pasado para el beca (p629-31). Desafortunadamente, él no continúa esto a lo largo del libro y utiliza la incoherencia de la jerga de Habermas y otros para explicar otros y los textos de ague o incoherentes (e. g., utilizando Habermas en lugar de Searle o Wittgenstein o psicología cognitiva para explicar Emerson p633). En los EE.UU., unos 120 millones (alrededor de 250 millones por 2100) los refugiados del tercer mundo de la maternidad desenfrenada son ahora la fuerza única más poderosa para la destrucción, habiendo desplazado fácilmente a los fundamentalistas europeos Cristianos. Pero todos los bajos personas de clase están Unidas en el estar en contra (o al menos no dispuestos/incapaces de practicar) el control de la población y la devastación ambiental con el fin de maximizar el número de y el uso de recursos por sus genes (aunque carece de cualquier conocimiento de esto, por supuesto). Esta fue una estrategia de supervivencia racional cuando se fijó en los genes hace millones de años, pero ahora es suicida. El renacimiento espiritual del que habla no es el de las clases "diversas" o las más bajas en ningún lugar. Su opinión es que son los pobres e ignorantes los que son el principal problema medioambiental y que esto se debe de alguna manera a nuestro enfoque de tierra plana, así que si nos despertamos, nos ponemos en forma y les ayudamos a resolverlo. Sin embargo, los ricos destruyen tanto como 20 veces más que los pobres per cápita y el tercer mundo pasará el primero en la producción de C02 sobre 2025. Pero no hay nada noble en los pobres, sólo son los ricos en la espera. Todo el mundo es parte del problema y si uno hace las matemáticas (los recursos que se desvanecen dividido por el aumento de la población) es claro que el colapso mundial de la sociedad industrial y una drástica reducción de la población ocurrirá y su única cuestión de cómo y cuándo (2150 es una buena suposición). Como tantos, sugiere vivir a la ligera en la tierra, pero vivir (y sobre todo, reproducirse), es hacer daño y si la reproducción sigue siendo un derecho entonces es difícil ver cualquier esperanza para el futuro. Como es políticamente correcto, enfatiza los derechos y dice poco sobre las responsabilidades. Es razonable ver que si la sociedad acepta a alguien como humano, debe asumir la responsabilidad del mundo y esto debe prevalerse sobre sus necesidades personales. Es improbable que cualquier gobierno implemente Esto, e igualmente improbable que el mundo se seguir siendo un lugar en el que cualquier persona civilizada deseará vivir (o ser capaz de hacerlo). Les presento aquí una tabla de racionalidad que he trabajado en los últimos 10 años. Las filas muestran diversos aspectos o formas de estudiar y las columnas muestran los 327 procesos involuntarios y comportamientos voluntarios que comprenden los dos sistemas (procesos duales) de la estructura lógica de la conciencia (LSC), que también pueden considerarse como la estructura lógica de la racionalidad (LSR-Searle), de la conducta (LSB), de la personalidad (LSP), de la mente (LSM), del lenguaje (LSL), de la realidad (LSOR), de la intencionalidad (LSI)-el término filosófico clásico, la psicología descriptiva de la conciencia (DPC), el descriptivo Psicología del pensamiento (DPT) – o mejor, el lenguaje de la psicología descriptiva del pensamiento (LDPT), términos introducidos aquí y en mis otros escritos muy recientes. Las ideas para esta tabla se originaron en el trabajo de Wittgenstein, una mesa mucho más simple de Searle, y se correlaciona con extensas tablas y gráficos en los tres libros recientes sobre la naturaleza humana por p. m. s. Hacker. Las últimas 9 filas provienen principalmente de la investigación de la decisión de Johnathan St. B.T. Evans y colegas como revisado por mí mismo. El sistema 1 es involuntario, reflexivo o automatizado "reglas" R1 mientras pensar (cognición) no tiene lagunas y es voluntario o deliberativo "reglas" R2 y Willing (Volition)(voluntud) tiene 3 lagunas (ver Searle). Sugiero que podamos describir el comportamiento más claramente cambiando "imponer condiciones de satisfacción en las condiciones de satisfacción" de Searle a "relacionar los Estados mentales con el mundo moviendo los músculos" - es decir, hablar, escribir y hacer, y su "mente al mundo Dirección de ajuste"y" la dirección del mundo a la mente de ajuste "por" causa se origina en la mente "y" causa se origina en el mundo "S1 es sólo de forma ascendente causal (mundo a la mente) y sin contenido (falta de representaciones o información) mientras que S2 tiene contenidos y es descendente causal (mente al mundo ). He adoptado mi terminología en esta tabla. He hecho explicaciones detalladas de esta tabla en mis otros escritos. 328 DESDE EL ANALISIS DE LOS JUEGOS DE IDIOMAS Disposición Emoción Memoria Percepción Deseo PI * * IA * * * AcciónPalabra Causa origina de * * * * Mundo Mundo Mundo Mundo Mente Mente Mente Mente Provoca cambios en * * * * * Ninguno Mente Mente Mente Ninguno Mundo Mundo Mundo Causalmente Auto Reflexivo * * * * * * No Sí Sí Sí No Sí Sí Sí Verdadero o falso (Comprobable) Sí T sólo T sólo T sólo Sí Sí Sí Sí Condiciones públicas de satisfacción Sí Sí/No Sí/No No Sí/No Sí No Sí Describir Un estado mental No Sí Sí Sí No No Sí/No Sí Prioridad evolutiva 5 4 2, 3 1 5 3 2 2 Contenido voluntario Sí No No No No Sí Sí Sí Iniciación voluntaria Sí/No No Sí No Sí/No Sí Sí Sí Sistema cognitivo ******* 2 1 2/1 1 2/1 2 1 2 Cambiar intensidad No Sí Sí Sí Sí No No No Duración precisa No Sí Sí Sí No No Sí Sí Aquí y Ahora o Allá y Luego (H + N, T + T) ******** TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN Calidad especial No Sí No Sí No No No No Localizado en Cuerpo No No No Sí No No No Sí Las expresiones corporales Sí Sí No No Sí Sí Sí Sí Autocontradiccion es No Sí No No Sí No No No Necesita un yo Sí Sí/No No No Sí No No No Necesita lenguaje Sí No No No No No No Sí/No 329 DE LA INVESTIGACIÓN DE DECISIONES Disposición Emoción Memoria Percepción Deseo PI * * IA * * * Acción/ Palabra Efectos subliminales No Sí/No Sí Sí No No No Sí/No Asociativa Basada en reglas RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB Dependiente del contexto/ Abstracto A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/A CD/A Serie/Paralelo S S/P P P S/P S S S Heurístico Analítica A H/A H H H/A A A A Necesita trabajar Memoria Sí No No No No Sí Sí Sí Dependiente general de la inteligencia Sí No No No Sí/No Sí Sí Sí La carga cognitiva Inhibe Sí Sí/No No No Sí Sí Sí Sí Excitación facilita o inhibe I F/I F F I I I I Condiciones públicas de satisfacción de S2 son a menudo referidos por Searle y otros como COS, representaciones, creadores de la verdad o significados (o COS2 por mí mismo), mientras que los resultados automáticos de S1 son designados como presentaciones por otros (o COS1 por mí mismo). * Aka Inclinaciones, Capacidades, Preferencias, Representaciones, Posibles Acciones, etc. ** Intenciones anteriores de Searle *** La intención de Searle en acción. **** Dirección de ajuste de Searle ***** Dirección de causalidad de Searle ****** (Las instancias del estado mental Causas o se cumple a sí mismo). Searle anteriormente llamó a esto causalmente auto-referencial. ******* Tversky / Kahneman / Frederick / Evans / Stanovich definieron los sistemas cognitivos. ******** Aquí y ahora o allí y luego 330 ¿La autobiografía espiritual más profunda de todos los tiempos? -una reseña de "la Rodilla de la Escucha" de ADI da (Franklin Jones) (1995) (revisión revisada 2019) Michael Starks Abstracto Una breve reseña de la vida y la autobiografía espiritual de la única mística estadounidense ADI da (Franklin Jones). La pegatina en la portada de algunas ediciones dice "la más profunda autobiografía espiritual de todos los tiempos" y esto bien podría ser cierto. Estoy en mis 70 s y he leído muchos libros de maestros espirituales y de espiritualidad, y este es uno de los más grandes. Ciertamente, es por lejos la más completa y clara relato del proceso de iluminación que he visto en mi vida. Incluso si usted no tiene ningún interés en absoluto en el más fascinante de todos los procesos psicológicos humanos, es un documento increíble que revela una gran cantidad de religión, yoga, y la psicología humana y las sondas de las profundidades y límites de las posibilidades humanas. Lo describo con cierto detalle y comparo su enseñanza con la del contemporáneo mística Indio Osho. Aquellos que deseen un marco completo hasta la fecha para el comportamiento humano de la moderna dos sistemas punto de vista puede consultar mi libro 'La Estructura Lógica de la Filosofía, la Psicología, la Mente y Lenguaje en Ludwig Wittgenstein y John Searle ' 2nd Ed (2019). Los interesados en más de mis escritos pueden ver 'Monos parlantes--filosofía, psicología, ciencia, religión y política en un planeta condenado--artículos y reseñas 2006-2019 3rd Ed (2019) y delirios utópicos suicidas en el 21St Century 4TH Ed (2019) Hay muchas ediciones de la autobiografía espiritual de la única mística estadounidense ADI da (Franklin Jones). La primera edición fue de 1972 y nuevas ediciones con más material y mucha publicidad sobre el grupo continúan apareciendo. El último que he visto (2004) es aproximadamente 3 veces el tamaño y el peso de la 1995 edicion que prefiero, ya que los cientos de páginas de nuevo material son prosa opaca y la publicidad. Por lo tanto, recomiendo una de las ediciones anteriores de paperpack, como la 1995 1 a la que se refieren mis citas de página. Una breve reseña de la vida y la autobiografía espiritual de la única mística estadounidense ADI da (Franklin Jones). La pegatina en la portada de algunas ediciones dice "la más profunda autobiografía espiritual de todos los tiempos" y esto bien podría ser cierto. Estoy en mis 70 s y he leído muchos libros de maestros espirituales y en 331 espiritualidad, y esta es una de las más grandes. Ciertamente, es, con mucho, el relato más pleno y claro del proceso de iluminación que he visto en mi vida. Incluso si usted no tiene ningún interés en absoluto en el más fascinante de todos los procesos psicológicos humanos, es un documento increíble que revela una gran cantidad de religión, yoga, y la psicología humana y las sondas de las profundidades y límites de las posibilidades humanas. Como he leído y experimentado mucho en varias tradiciones religiosas, naturalmente comparo sus escritos con los de otros, particularmente con el gran místico indio Osho. A pesar de que claramente coinciden en los puntos principales de cómo proceder en el camino, dejando ir el apego a la búsqueda espiritual, etc, sus estilos son muy diferentes. Tanto el era muy inteligente y bien leido (Osho podría acelerar la lectura y leer un gran número de libros) y estaban en casa en la literatura espiritual de las principales tradiciones religiosas. Sin embargo, al igual que gran parte de la literatura espiritual, la mayor parte de Da s libros son esencialmente inlegibles, ya que lucha por expresar en lenguaje los reinos inefables de la a mente iluminada. Incluso en esto, con mucho su más libro legible, a menudo se desvía en páginas de opacidad mientras trata de explicar lo inexplicable. Una gran lástima que parece que nunca ha leído Wittgenstein-el mayor psicólogo natural de todos los tiempos-que demostró que debemos abandonar los intentos de explicación y aceptar descripciones de nuestras funciones psicológicas innatas en el lenguaje, que es la mente. Osho por contraste es el expositor libre más claro y más jargón de la vida espiritual que jamás ha existido. Escribió muy poco y casi todos sus más de 200 libros son transcripciones de charlas espontáneas que dio, sin notas ni preparación. Sin embargo, son obras maestras no exceladas de la literatura espiritual. Su asombrosa àutobiografía ' (realmente compilado después de su muerte) ha sido publicado por St. Martins y la versión completa, así como todos sus libros (muchos también disponibles en DVD), están disponibles en línea muchos lugares. Desafortunadamente, he tiene muy poco que decir acerca de la exacta detalles de su progreso espiritual. Como da vivió la mayor parte de su vida posterior en reclusión en una isla en Fiji, no era fácil escucharlo, pero la prensa del caballo del amanecer vende algunos videos en su página web. Da no es una muy atractiva o un altavoz fácil, a diferencia de Osho, que por turnos es divertido, devastador e hipnótico. Pero, como ambos de ellos entienden, es lo que el maestro es y no dice que es importante. Ambos eran totalmente honestos e intransigentes en su vida y enseñanzas y da omite nada de relevancia, incluyendo sus aventuras juveniles con sexo y drogas, así como su exposición al LSD, psilocibina y mescalina como voluntario en experimentos del gobierno. Sin embargo, al igual que con muchos o tal vez todos los destinados a ser iluminados, él era diferente del nacimiento y experimentó la energía Shakti (que él llama el Bright) desde la niñez. Y cuando entró Universidad, dijo que su principal interés era descubrir lo que vive seres son y lo que es consciencia viva. Claramente no su novato típico. 332 Un problema importante en la descripción de los Estados espirituales avanzados es que no hay criterios o lenguaje para ellos existe en el discurso común por lo que los místicos tienen que tratar de doblar el lenguaje en la mayoría de los intentos vanidosos para capturar sus experiencias. Es mucho peor que tratar de describir ver a una persona ciega congénito, ya que en menos tienen las estructuras cognitivas y la experiencia del mundo. Pero los místicos son bastante raros y la mayoría de ellos han dejado poco or no hay descripción de su Estados mentales. A diferencia de Osho, que rechazó milagros, fenómenos paranormales y todas las otras tonterías que comúnmente acompañan a la religión, da parece carecer de cualquier antecedente científico y abraza la precognición (P120), la reencarnación (p555), ' meditando ' a otras personas, viviendo en aire (p287), etc., y se refiere a los fenómenos que yo diría que están sucediendo en su cerebro como "allá afuera". De los comentarios incluidos en las nuevas ediciones está claro que muchos de sus discípulos creen que puede realizar milagros como detener un incendio forestal furioso en su retiro de California. Sin embargo, la mayoría de las veces está increíblemente nivelado, pasando por más de una década de estrés y terrores psíquicos que conducirían más desde el sendero espiritual. Millones de años de evolución han solidificado el ego y no se va pacíficamente. Entretejido con la cuenta de fascinante de su progreso espiritual son los detalles de la interacción de la mente con el cuerpo, descrita en el este en términos de diversas formas de yoga (e.g., P95-9, 214-21, 249281-3, 439-40 en la edición 1995 que recomiendo). Estas pocas páginas valen más que un estante entero de libros de yoga que quieres llegar al corazón de la relación mente/cuerpo en la espiritualidad. A diferencia de la mayoría de los que se han iluminado, tuvo una profunda base en la práctica cristiana e hizo un gran esfuerzo para convertirse en un protestante, y luego ministro griego ortodoxo. Incluso años más tarde, después de que él estaba lejos a lo largo del camino con Muktananda, tuvo una increíble y totalmente inesperada serie de visitas de María y Jesús que continuó durante semanas (p 301-3 et seq.). En cuanto a las drogas, como es casi universal entre los maestros espirituales, él señala que aunque pueden eliminar ciertas barreras a veces, no proporcionan un atajo a la comprensión. Sin embargo, casi todo el mundo es ahora consciente de que han puesto a muchos en el camino hacia una mayor conciencia a través de los historia humana, especialmente en los últimos décadas. Él describe en detalle las muchas etapas en su ego muerte o autorrealización (por ejemplo P72-4, 198-200, 219, 20, 238-9, 245, 249, 258-9, 281, 355-65, 368-72, 406). A lo largo del camino, se dio cuenta de la máxima disutilidad de todas las prácticas y todas las tradiciones (337-9) incluyendo el yoga (281-3), que están todos Unidos a la búsqueda y los objetivos, en última instancia, acabando en el presente. él descubierto, como tienen muchos otras que la búsqueda y la meditación se convirtieron en obstáculos y los entregó por devoción a su gurú Muktananda (P420-22). Sus relatos detallados de sus interacciones con el famoso Swami Muktananda y su realización final de su límites son de rara percepcion y honestidad. Constantemente se encuentra con 333 su apego a su ego (Narciso-por ejemplo, P108-110) y le pide el mismo-' ¿evitar la relación? ` por lo que parece significar evitar la muerte divina o el ego por la preocupación por la búsqueda espiritual. Después de la iluminación, él enseña el sólo por me revelado y dado camino del corazón ', encontrar todos los otros caminos para ser "correctivos" y "egoícos" y simplemente perseguir a Dios o a la realidad (p359 +), pero después de una lectura cuidadosa de este y varios otros libros nunca tuve idea de lo que se compone de esa manera. Sin duda, ser en su presencia ayuda mucho, pero en otros lugares que ha se quejó del hecho de que sus discípulos simplemente no deja que suceda y uno se pregunta si incluso uno ha sido capaz de seguirlo. Claro, la misma consideraciones se aplican a todas las tradiciones y maestros y aunque algunos de los amigos de Osho (él desautorizó la relación maestro/discípulo) han reivindicado la iluminación, nadie de su estatus ha surgido. Parece que tienes que tener los genes correctos y el ambiente adecuado y un gurú muy avanzado y preferiblemente iluminado para estimularte. Sospecho que ha pasado el tiempo cuando un iluminado podría iniciar un movimiento que transforma gran parte del mundo. El mundo necesita desesperadamente una conciencia más alta y espero que alguien tiene una manera más fácil muy pronto, pero creo que es bastante improbable. 334 ¿Nuestros comportamientos inconscientes automatizados revelan nuestros verdaderos seres y verdades ocultas sobre el universo? --Una revisión del Poder Contra la Fuerza (Power vs Force: the hidden determinants of human behavior) de David Hawkins- -los determinantes ocultos del comportamiento humano – la edición oficial autorizada del autor ' 412p (2012) (edición original 1995)(revisión revisada 2019) Michael Starks Abstracto Estoy muy acostumbrado a libros extraños y gente especial, pero Hawkins se destaca debido a su uso de una técnica simple para probar la tensión muscular como una clave para la "verdad" de cualquier tipo de afirmación-es., no sólo para si la persona que está siendo probada lo cree, sino si es realmente cierto! Lo que es bien sabido es que las personas mostrarán respuestas fisiológicas y psicológicas automáticas e inconscientes a cualquier cosa a la que estén expuestos: imágenes, sonidos, toques, olores, ideas, personas. así que, lectura muscular para descubrir sus verdaderos sentimientos no es radical en absoluto, a diferencia de usarlo como un palo doble (más lectura muscular) para hacer "ciencia Paranormal". Hawkins describe el uso de la tensión decreciente en los músculos de un brazo en respuesta a aumentos en la carga cognitiva causando así que el brazo caiga en respuesta a la presión constante de los dedos de alguien. No parece consciente de que existe un largo y vasto esfuerzo de investigación en psicología social que se hace referencia por frases como ' cognición implícita ', ' automaticidad ', etc., y que su uso de la ' Kinesiología ' es una sección diminuta. Además del tono muscular (utilizado con poca frecuencia) los psicólogos sociales miden el EEG, la respuesta galvánica de la piel y las respuestas verbales más frecuentes a las palabras, oraciones, imágenes o situaciones en momentos que varían de segundos a meses después del estímulo. Muchos, como Bargh y Wegner, toman los resultados para significar que somos autómatas que aprenden y actúan en gran medida sin conciencia a través de S1 (sistema automatizado 1) y muchos otros como Kihlstrom y Shanks dicen que estos estudios son defectuosos y somos criaturas de S2 (sistema deliberativo 2). Aunque Hawkins parece no tener idea, como en otras áreas de la psicología descriptiva del pensamiento de mayor orden, la situación con respecto a "automaticidad" sigue siendo tan caótica como lo fue cuando Wittgenstein describió las razones de la esterilidad y la barrendez de la psicología en los años 30. Sin embargo, este libro es una lectura fácil y algunos terapeutas y maestros espirituales pueden encontrarlo de 335 uso. Aquellos que deseen un marco completo hasta la fecha para el comportamiento humano del moderno de la dos sistemas punto de vista puede consultar mi libro 'La Estructura Lógica de la Filosofía, la Psicología, la Mente y Lenguaje en Ludwig Wittgenstein y John Searle ' 2nd Ed (2019). Los interesados en más de mis escritos pueden ver 'Monos Parlantes--filosofía, psicología, ciencia, religión y política en un planeta condenado--artículos y reseñas 2006-2019 3rd Ed (2019) y delirios utópicos suicidas en el 21St Century 4TH Ed (2019) Estoy muy acostumbrado a libros extraños y gente especial, pero Hawkins se destaca debido a su uso de una técnica simple para probar la tensión muscular como una clave para la "verdad" de cualquier tipo de afirmación-es., no sólo para si la persona que está siendo probada lo cree pero, si es realmente cierto! ¿Cómo puede alguien cuerdo creerlo? Como persona con más de 50 años experiencia adulta con la ciencia, la psicología, la filosofía, la religión y la vida no creo que sea creíble que sea incluso altamente confiable sobre las creencias de la persona y no hay ninguna posibilidad de llegar a conocer la realidad de esta manera. Lo que es bien sabido es que las personas mostrarán respuestas fisiológicas y psicológicas automáticas e inconscientes a cualquier cosa a la que estén expuestos: imágenes, sonidos, toques, olores, ideas, personas. así que, lectura muscular para descubrir sus verdaderos sentimientos no es radical en absoluto, a diferencia de usarlo como un palo doble (más lectura muscular) para hacer "ciencia Paranormal". La kinesiología, también conocida como cinética humana, es el estudio de la Movimiento. Los estudios de Kinesiología fisiológicos, mecánicos (tono muscular), y los mecanismos psicológicos como índices del estado mental y físico de las personas y a menudo utiliza ejercicios de movimiento como terapia. Sin embargo, Hawkins (sin decir eso) está utilizando el término para referirse a una aplicación muy estrecha de la kinesiología-el uso de la tensión decreciente en los músculos de un brazo en respuesta a aumentos en la carga cognitiva (es decir, mención de alguna persona, evento u objeto), que causa el sujeto a distraerse por problemas intelectuales o emocionales, disminuyendo así la tensión muscular y causando que el brazo caiga en respuesta a la presión constante de los dedos de alguien. Hawkins no parece consciente de que existe un largo y vasto esfuerzo de investigación en psicología social que se hace referencia por frases como ' cognición implícita ', ' automaticidad ', etc., y que su uso de la ' Kinesiología ' es una sección diminuta. Además del tono muscular (que en realidad se utiliza con poca frecuencia) los psicólogos sociales miden el EEG, la respuesta galvánica de la piel y las respuestas verbales más frecuentes a palabras, oraciones, imágenes o situaciones a veces que varían de segundos a meses después del estímulo. Fue sólo por casualidad que leí el libro de Hawkins después de leer varios libros y docenas de documentos recientes sobre la cognición implícita y estaba muy sorprendido de que lo utiliza como una clave para el universo-es decir, la ' naturaleza 336 última de la realidad ' y estoy seguro de que los cientos de activos investigatores estarían igualmente asombrados. Relaciono su práctica espiritual con el trabajo contemporáneo sobre la cognición implícita. Una cuestión importante en la mayoría de las investigaciones contemporáneas sobre la cognición social implícita es el grado en que es automático (' inconsciente ') y lo que constituye ' evidencia ' para esto. Cientos de papeles y docenas de libros han aparecido en los últimos años con confusión masiva y debates a menudo acrimoniosos. Muchos, como Bargh y Wegner, toman los resultados para significar que somos autómatas que aprenden y actúan en gran medida sin conciencia a través de S1 y muchos otros como Kihlstrom y Shanks dicen que estos estudios son defectuosos y somos criaturas de S2. Aunque Hawkins parece no tener idea, como en otras áreas de la psicología descriptiva del pensamiento de orden superior, la situación con respecto a "automaticidad" sigue siendo tan caótica como lo fue cuando Wittgenstein describió las razones de la esterilidad y la barrendez de la psicología en los años 30. A menudo la cuestión es declarada por los investigadores y filósofos en términos de sistema 1 y sistema 2 funcionamiento-una división muy útil, incluso indispensable de la conducta (intencionalidad) en nuestro primitivo reptil automatizado, S1 no reflexivo y nuestro superior cortical primates funciones deliberativas conscientes de S2. Como se mencionó en mis otras reseñas, esta división fue iniciada por el filósofo Ludwig Wittgenstein en la década de 1930, aunque nadie se ha dado cuenta. Estoy bastante familiarizado con la mediación y los fenómenos de la iluminación (ver mi reseña de la autobiografía de Adi Da's ' la Rodilla de la Escucha ') y estoy dispuesto a aceptar la afirmación de Hawkins de estar en este grupo rareficado (a menudo se dice que sabemos de menos de 1000 iluminado personas en toda la historia humana). También puedo aceptar que puede haber sido un "terapeuta" muy eficaz que ayudó a muchas personas y claramente, es muy inteligente. Esto no me hace aceptar sus muchas afirmaciones cuestionables o claramente falsas sobre los hechos del mundo. También estoy (sobre la base de una vida de estudio de la ciencia y la filosofía) muy escéptico sobre la relevancia del caos, atractores, teoría de la complejidad, computación, etc. para el estudio del comportamiento humano (ver mi reseñas y libros en academia.edu, philpapers.org, researchgate.net, vixra.org, libgen.io, b-ok.org, Amazonas, etc.), afirmaciones que a menudo son hechas por los científicos también. La investigación de la cognición implícita implica lo habitual mezcla horrorosa habitual de cuestiones científicas verdaderas o falsas sobre las funciones cerebrales causales (la mente S1), con aquellas sobre cómo funciona el lenguaje (es decir, la mente, que como Wittgenstein nos mostró 3/4 de un siglo atrás, es el comportamiento público-la mente S2)-otros temas que he cubierto extensamente en mis comentarios. Así que, Hawkins hace gran parte de su lectura muscular y estoy seguro de que a menudo funciona bien, pero hay un error lógico importante aquí. Independientemente de lo que diga sobre las creencias de la persona que está siendo probada, claramente no dice nada sobre el mundo mismo. así que, Respeto a Hawkins y su trabajo 337 terapéutico, pero, con la vasta gama de enfoques para la curación espiritual y emocional, Hay muchas opciones. Y una cosa es ser tratada por un maestro iluminadocuya misma presencia (o incluso el pensamiento de ellos) puede ser galvanizante, y bastante otro ser tratado por una persona ordinaria. Con mucho, la mejor fuente de libros, audios y videos de un maestro iluminado en el trabajo son los de Osho (Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh) que están disponibles para comprar o liberar en la red en varios sitios. Él therapizó miles a la vez en ocasiones y creó la comunidad terapéutica más notable de todos los tiempos a su alrededor. A pesar de que se ha ido, sus terapeutas todavía practican en todo el mundo, y sus obras pueden ser transformadoras. Hawkins tiene otros libros que tienen muchas críticas favorables por lo que aquellos profundamente interesados pueden consultarlos. UN GRAN DELIRIO FAMILIAR--LA DEMOCRACIA, LA DIVERSIDAD Y LA IGUALDAD NOS SALVARÁN 339 La supresión transitoria de los peores demonios de nuestra naturaleza-una revisión de Steven Pinker's ' Los Mejores Angeles de Nuestro Naturaleza: por qué la violencia ha disminuido' (The Better Angels of Our Nature: why violence has declined) (2012)(revisión revisada 2019) Michael Starks Abstracto Este no es un libro perfecto, pero es único, y si usted lee rapido las primeras 400 o así páginas, el último 300 (de unos 700) son un buen intento de aplicar lo que se sabe sobre el comportamiento a los cambios sociales en la violencia y las costumbres con el tiempo. El tema básico es: ¿Cómo controla y limita el cambio social nuestra genética? Sorprendentemente, no puede describir la naturaleza de la selección de parientes (aptitud inclusiva) que explica gran parte de la vida social humana y animal. Él también (como casi todo el mundo) carece de un marco claro para describir la estructura lógica de la racionalidad (LSR-el término preferido de John Searle) que prefiero llamar la psicología descriptiva del pensamiento de orden superior (DPHOT). Debería haber dicho algo sobre las muchas otras formas de abusar y explotar a la gente y el planeta, ya que ahora son mucho más severos que hacer otras formas de violencia Casi Irrelevante. Ampliar el concepto de violencia para incluir el largo-consecuencias a término de la replicación de los genes de alguien, y tener una comprensión de la naturaleza de cómo funciona la evolución (es decir, la selección de parientes) proporcionará una perspectiva muy diferente sobre la historia, los acontecimientos actuales y cómo es probable que las cosas vayan en los próximos cientos de años. Uno podría comenzar señalando que la disminución de la violencia física sobre la historia se ha igualado (y hecho posible) por la violación despiadada en constante aumento del planeta (es decir, por la destrucción de las personas de su propio descendiente's futuro). Pinker (como la mayoría de las personas la mayoría del tiempo) a menudo se distrae por las superficialidades de la cultura cuando es la biología lo que importa. Vea mis reseñas recientes de ' la conquista social de la tierra ' de Wilson y de los ' SuperCooperators ' de Nowak y Highfield aquí y en la red para obtener un breve resumen de la vacuidad de ' true Altruismo' (selección de grupo), y el funcionamiento de la selección de parientes y la inutilidad y la superficialidad de describir el comportamiento en términos culturales. Esta es la naturaleza clásica/tema de la crianza y la naturaleza triunfa-infinitamente. Lo que realmente importa es la violencia que se ha hecho a la tierra por el incesante aumento de la población y la destrucción de los recursos (debido a la medicina y la tecnología y la supresión de conflictos por la policía y los militares). Acerca de 200.000 más personas al día (otra las Vegas cada 10 días, otro los Angeles cada mes), el 6 340 Toneladas o así de la tierra que va al mar/persona/año – alrededor del 1% del total del mundo desapareciendo anualmente, etc. significan que a menos que ocurra algún milagro, la Biosfera y la civilización colapsarán en gran medida Durante próximos dos siglos, y habrá hambre, miseria y violencia de todo tipo en una escala asombrosa. Los modales, las opiniones y las tendencias de las personas para cometer actos violentos no son pertinentes a menos que puedan hacer algo para evitar esta catástrofe, y no veo cómo va a suceder. No hay espacio para los argumentos, y ningún punto o bien (sí soy un fatalista), así que voy a hacer algunos comentarios como si fueran hechos. No Imagine que tengo una participación personal en la promoción de un grupo a expensas de otros. Tengo 78, no tienen descendientes ni parientes cercanos y no se identifican con ningún grupo político, nacional o religioso y consideran que los que pertenezco por defecto son tan repulsivos como todos los demás. Los padres son los peores enemigos de la vida en la tierra y, tomando la visión amplia de las cosas, las mujeres son tan violentas como los hombres cuando uno considera el hecho de que la violencia de las mujeres (como la mayoría de los que hacen los hombres) se hace en gran medida en cámara lenta, a una distancia en el tiempo y el espacio y en su mayoría realizado por proxy -por sus descendientes y por los hombres. Cada vez más, las mujeres tienen hijos sin importar si tienen una pareja y el efecto de detener a una mujer de la cría es en promedio mucho mayor que detener a un hombre, ya que son el cuello de botella reproductivo. Uno puede tomar la opinión de que las personas y sus crías merecen abundantemente cualquier miseria que se le presente y (con raras excepciones) los ricos y famosos son los peores delincuentes. Meryl Streep o Bill Gates o J. K Rowling y cada uno de sus hijos puede destruir 50 toneladas de tierra vegetal cada año por generaciones en el futuro, mientras que un granjero indio y su puede destruir 1 tonelada. Si alguien lo niega está bien, y a sus descendientes le digo "Bienvenido al infierno en la tierra" (WTHOEWelcome To Hell On Earth). El énfasis hoy en día siempre está en los derechos humanos, pero está claro que si la civilización tiene una oportunidad, las responsabilidades humanas deben reemplazar a los derechos humanos. Nadie obtiene derechos sin ser un ciudadano responsable y lo primero que esto significa es midestrucción medioambiental nimal. La responsabilidad más básica no son los niños a menos que su sociedad le pida que los produzca. Una sociedad o un mundo que permite a las personas reproducirse al azar siempre será explotada por los genes egoístas hasta que colapse (o llegue a un punto donde la vida es tan horrorosa que no vale la pena vivir). Si la sociedad continúa manteniendo los derechos humanos como principal, para sus descendientes uno puede decir con confianza "WTHOE". Aquellos que deseen un marco completo hasta la fecha para el comportamiento humano de la moderna dos sistemas punto de vista puede consultar mi libro 'La Estructura Lógica de la Filosofía, la Psicología, la Mente y Lenguaje en Ludwig Wittgenstein y John Searle ' 2nd Ed (2019). Los interesados en más de mis escritos pueden ver 'Monos parlantes--filosofía, psicología, ciencia, religión y política en un planeta condenado--artículos y reseñas 2006-2019 3rd Ed (2019) y delirios utópicos suicidas en el 21St Century 4TH Ed (2019) 341 Este no es un libro perfecto, pero es único, y si usted hojean las primeras 400 o así páginas, el último 300 (de unos 700) son un buen intento de aplicar lo que se sabe sobre el comportamiento a los cambios sociales en la violencia y las costumbres con el tiempo. El tema básico es: ¿Cómo controla y limita el cambio social nuestra genética? Sorprendentemente, no puede describir la naturaleza de la selección de parientes (aptitud inclusiva) que explica gran parte de la vida social humana y animal. Él también (como casi todo el mundo) carece de un marco claro para describir la estructura lógica de la racionalidad (LSR-el término preferido de John Searle) que prefiero llamar la psicología descriptiva del pensamiento de orden superior (DPHOT). La mayoría de las críticas dadas por otros son intrascendentes y irrelevantes y, como ha dicho Pinker, no podía escribir un libro coherente sobre "cosas malas", ni podía dar todas las referencias y puntos de vista posibles, pero debería haber dicho al menos algo sobre los muchos otras formas de abusar y explotar a las personas y al planeta, ya que ahora son mucho más severas como para hacer que otras formas de violencia sean irrelevantes. Ampliar el concepto de violencia para incluir el largo-consecuencias a término de la replicación de los genes de alguien, y tener una comprensión de la naturaleza de cómo funciona la evolución (es decir, la selección de parientes) proporcionará una perspectiva muy diferente sobre la historia, los acontecimientos actuales y cómo es probable que las cosas vayan en los próximos cientos de años. Uno podría comenzar señalando que la disminución de la violencia física sobre la historia se ha igualado (y hecho posible) por la violación despiadada en constante aumento del planeta (es decir, por la destrucción de las personas de su propio descendiente's futuro). Pinker (como la mayoría de las personas la mayoría del tiempo) a menudo se distrae por las superficialidades de la cultura cuando es la biología lo que importa. Vea mis reseñas recientes sobre ' la conquista social de la tierra ' de Wilson y los ' SuperCooperators ' de Nowak y Highfield para un breve resumen de la vacuidad del altruismo y el funcionamiento de la selección de parientes y la inutilidad y la superficialidad de describir el comportamiento en la cultura Términos. Esta es la naturaleza clásica/tema de la crianza y la naturaleza triunfa-infinitamente. Lo que realmente importa es la violencia que se ha hecho a la tierra por el incesante aumento de la población y la destrucción de los recursos (debido a la medicina y la tecnología y la supresión de conflictos por la policía y los militares). Acerca de 200.000 más personas al día (otra las Vegas cada 10 días, otro los Angeles cada mes), el 6 toneladas o así de suelo que va al mar/persona/año, etc. significan que a menos que algunos milagro ocurre la Biosfera y la civilización se derrumbará en gran medida en los próximos dos siglos y habrá hambre, miseria y violencia de todo tipo a una escala asombrosa. Los modales, las opiniones y las tendencias de las personas para cometer actos violentos no son pertinentes a menos que puedan hacer algo para evitar esta 342 catástrofe, y no veo cómo va a suceder. No hay espacio para los argumentos, y ningún punto tampoco (sí, Soy un fatalista, así que voy a hacer algunos comentarios como si fueran hechos. No Imagine que tengo una participación personal en la promoción de un grupo a expensas de otros. Soy 77, no tengo descendientes ni parientes cercanos y no me identifico con ningún grupo político, nacional o religioso y considero a los que pertenezco por defecto tan repulsivos como todos los demás. Los padres son los peores enemigos de la vida en la tierra y, tomando la visión amplia de las cosas, las mujeres son tan violentas como los hombres cuando uno considera el hecho de que la violencia de las mujeres (como la mayoría de los que hacen los hombres) se hace en gran medida en cámara lenta, a una distancia en el tiempo y el espacio y en su mayoría realizado por proxy por sus descendientes y por los hombres. Cada vez más las mujeres tienen hijos, independientemente de si tienen un compañero y el efecto de detener a una mujer de la cría es en promedio mucho mayor que detener a un hombre, ya que son el cuello de botella reproductivo. Uno puede tomar la opinión de que las personas y sus crías merecen abundantemente cualquier miseria que se le presente y (con raras excepciones) los ricos y famosos son los peores delincuentes. Meryl Streep o Bill Gates o j. k. Rowling y cada uno de sus hijos puede destruir 50 toneladas de tierra vegetal cada año por generaciones en el futuro, mientras que un granjero indio y su puede destruir 1 tonelada. Si alguien lo niega está bien, y a sus descendientes le digo "Bienvenido al infierno en la tierra" (WTHOE). El énfasis hoy en día siempre está en los derechos humanos, pero está claro que si la civilización tiene una oportunidad, las responsabilidades humanas deben reemplazar a los derechos humanos. Nadie tiene derechos (es decir, privilegios) sin ser un ciudadano responsable y lo primero que esto significa es una mínima destrucción medioambiental. La responsabilidad más básica no son los niños a menos que su sociedad le pida que los produzca. Una sociedad o un mundo que permite a las personas reproducirse al azar siempre será explotada por los genes egoístas hasta que colapse (o llegue a un punto donde la vida es tan horrorosa que no vale la pena vivir). Si la sociedad sigue manteniendo los derechos humanos como primaria, eso está bien y a sus descendientes se puede decir con confianza "WTHOE". "Ayudar" tiene que ser visto desde una larga-perspectiva de término. Casi toda la "ayuda" que dan los individuos, las organizaciones o los países perjudica a los demás y al mundo a largo plazo y sólo debe ser dado después de una consideración muy cuidadosa. Si quieres entregar dinero, comida, medicinas, etc., tienes que preguntar qué Largo-consecuencias medioambientales. Si quieres complacer a todos todo el tiempo, de nuevo a tus descendientes digo "WTHOE". Disgenicos: billones interminables de criaturas que empiezan con formas semejantes a bacterias hace más de 3 mil millones años han muerto para crearnos y toda la vida actual y esto se llama eugenesia, evolución por selección natural o selección de parientes (fitness inclusivo). Todos tenemos "genes malos", pero algunos son peores que otros. Se estima que hasta el 50% de todas las concepciones humanas terminan en aborto espontáneo debido a "genes malos". La civilización es disgénico. Este 343 problema es actualmente trivial comparado con la sobrepoblación, pero empeorando por el día. La medicina, el bienestar, la democracia, la igualdad, la justicia, los derechos humanos y la "ayuda" de todo tipo tienen un largo plazo global medioambientales y consecuencias disgénicos que colapsarán la sociedad aunque el crecimiento de la población se detenga. Otra vez, Si el mundo se niega a creerlo o no quiere lidiar con eso, está bien y a sus descendientes (y a todos) podemos decir "WTHOE". Tenga cuidado con los escenarios utópicos que sugieren Doomsday (dia del juicio final) puede evitarse mediante la aplicación juidiosa de las tecnologías. Como dicen, puedes engañar a algunas personas todo el tiempo y a toda la gente del tiempo, pero no puedes engañar a la madre naturaleza en cualquier momento. Te dejo con un solo ejemplo. El famoso científico Raymond Kurzweil (ver mi reseña de ' cómo crear una mente ') los nanobots propuestos como salvadores de la humanidad. Ellos harían todo lo que necesitábamos y limpiar cada desorden. Incluso harían mejores versiones de sí mismos. Nos mantendrían como mascotas. Pero piense en cuántas personas tratan a sus mascotas, y las mascotas están sobrepoblando y destruyendo y volviéndose disgénico casi tan rápido como los humanos (por ejemplo, domésticos y gatos salvajes solo matan quizás 100 mil millones animales salvajes al año). Los animales domésticos sólo existen porque destruimos la tierra para alimentarlos y tenemos clínicas de castrar y neutralizador y eutanasia a los enfermos y los no deseados. Practicamos un riguroso control de la población y eugenesia sobre ellos deliberadamente y por omisión, y ninguna forma de vida puede evolucionar o existir sin estos dos controles, ni siquiera los bots. ¿Y qué va a impedir que los nanobots evolucionen? Cualquier cambio que facilitara la reproducción se seleccionaría automáticamente y cualquier comportamiento que desperdicie tiempo o energía (es decir, cuidar de los seres humanos) sería fuertemente seleccionado en contra. ¿Qué detendrá el AI controlado Programa de bots de mutando en forma homicida y explotando todos los recursos de la tierra causando el colapso global? No hay almuerzo gratis para los bots ya sea y a ellos también podemos decir con confianza "WTHOE". Aquí es donde cualquier pensamiento sobre el mundo y el comportamiento humano debe guiar a una persona educada, pero Pinker no dice nada al respecto. así que, las primeras 400 páginas de este libro se pueden omitir y la última 300 leer como un buen Resumen de EP (psicología evolutiva) a partir de 2011. Sin embargo, como en sus otros libros y casi universalmente en las Ciencias del comportamiento, no existe un marco general claro para la intencionalidad, como fue iniciado por Wittgenstein, Searle y muchos otros. He presentado un marco de este tipo en mis muchas revisiones de las obras por y sobre estos dos genios psicológicos naturales y no lo repetirá aquí. 344 Las manos muertas de selección de grupo y fenomenología--una revisión de Individuality and Entanglement (La Individualidad y el Entrelazamiento) por Herbert Gintis 357p (2017)(revisión revisada 2019) Michael Starks Abstracto Como Gintis es economista senior y he leído algunos de sus libros anteriores con interés, esperaba más información sobre el comportamiento. Tristemente, hace las manos muertas de selección de grupos y fenomenología en los centros de sus teorías de comportamiento, y esto invalida en gran medida la obra. Peor aún, ya que muestra tan mal juicio aquí, cuestiona todo su trabajo anterior. El intento de resucitar la selección grupal por sus amigos en Harvard, Nowak y Wilson, hace unos años fue uno de los mayores escándalos en biología en la última década, y he contado la triste historia en mi artículo ' altruismo, Jesús y el fin del mundo-cómo el Templeton Foundation compró una Cátedra de Harvard y atacó la evolución, la racionalidad y la civilización--una revisión de E.O. Wilson ' la conquista social de la tierra ' (2012) y Nowak y Highfield ' SuperCooperators ' (2012). ' A diferencia de Nowak, Gintis no parece estar motivada por el fanatismo religioso, sino por el fuerte deseo de generar una alternativa a las realidades sombrías de la naturaleza humana, fácil por la falta de comprensión (casi universal) de la biología humana básica y el pizeísmo en blanco (blank slate) de científicos del comportamiento, otros académicos y el público en general. Gintis ataca con razón (como ha tenido muchas veces antes) a economistas, sociólogos y otros científicos del comportamiento por no tener un marco coherente para describir el comportamiento. Claro, el marco necesario para comprender el comportamiento es un uno evolutivo. Desafortunadamente él no proporciona uno mismo (de acuerdo con sus muchos críticos y Yo coincido), y el intento de injertar el cadáver podrido de selección de grupo en cualquier teoría económica y psicológica que ha generado en sus décadas de trabajo, simplemente invalida todo su proyecto. Aunque Gintis hace un valiente esfuerzo para entender y explicar la genética, como Wilson y Nowak, él está lejos de ser un experto, y como ellos, las matemáticas sólo lo ciega a las imposibilidades biológicas y, por supuesto, esta es la norma en la ciencia. Como señaló Wittgenstein en la primera página de la cultura y el valor "no hay denominación religiosa en la que el mal uso de las expresiones metafísicas ha sido responsable de tanto pecado como lo ha sido en matemáticas." Siempre ha sido cristalino que un gen que causa comportamiento que disminuye su 345 propia frecuencia no puede persistir, pero este es el núcleo de la noción de selección de grupo. Además, ha sido bien sabido y a menudo demostró que la selección de grupos sólo se reduce a la aptitud inclusiva (selección de los parientes), que, como Dawkins ha señalado, es sólo otro nombre para la evolución por la selección natural. Al igual que Wilson, Gintis ha trabajado en esta arena durante unos 50 años y todavía no lo ha entendido, pero después de que el escándalo se rompió, me tomó sólo 3 días para encontrar, leer y entender el trabajo profesional más relevante, como se detalla en mi artículo. Es alucinante darse cuenta de que Gintis y Wilson fueron incapaces de lograr esto en casi medio siglo. Discuto los errores de selección de grupo y fenomenología que son la norma en el mundo académico como casos especiales de la falta casi universal de entender la naturaleza humana que están destruyendo América y el mundo. Aquellos que deseen un marco completo hasta la fecha para el comportamiento humano de la moderna dos sistemas punto de vista puede consultar mi libro 'La Estructura Lógica de la Filosofía, la Psicología, la Mente y Lenguaje en Ludwig Wittgenstein y John Searle ' 2nd Ed (2019). Los interesados en más de mis escritos pueden ver 'Monos parlantes--filosofía, psicología, ciencia, religión y política en un planeta condenado--artículos y reseñas 2006-2019 3rd Ed (2019) y delirios utópicos suicidas en el 21St Century 4TH Ed (2019) Como Gintis es economista senior y he leído algunos de sus libros anteriores con interés, esperaba más información sobre el comportamiento. Tristemente, hace las manos muertas de selección de grupos y fenomenología en los centros de sus teorías de comportamiento, y esto invalida en gran medida la obra. Peor aún, ya que muestra tan mal juicio aquí, cuestiona todo su trabajo anterior. El intento de resucitar la selección grupal por sus amigos en Harvard, Nowak y Wilson, hace unos años fue uno de los mayores escándalos en biología en la última década, y he contado la triste historia en mi artículo ' altruismo, Jesús y el fin del mundo-cómo el Templeton Foundation compró una Cátedra de Harvard y atacó la evolución, la racionalidad y la civilización--una revisión de E.O. Wilson ' la conquista social de la tierra ' (2012) y Nowak y Highfield ' SuperCooperators ' (2012). ' A diferencia de Nowak, Gintis no parece estar motivada por el fanatismo religioso, sino por el fuerte deseo de generar una alternativa a las realidades sombrías de la naturaleza humana, fácil por la falta de comprensión (casi universal) de la biología humana básica y en blanco el pizeísmo (blank slate) de los científicos del comportamiento, otros académicos, y el público en general. Gintis ataca con razón (como ha tenido muchas veces antes) a economistas, sociólogos y otros científicos del comportamiento por no tener un marco coherente para describir el comportamiento. Claro, el marco necesario para entender el comportamiento es una evolución. Desafortunadamente, él no proporciona uno mismo (de acuerdo con 346 sus muchos críticos y Yo coincido), y el intento de injertar el cadáver podrido de selección de grupo en cualquier teoría económica y psicológica que ha generado en sus décadas de trabajo, simplemente invalida todo su proyecto . Aunque Gintis hace un valiente esfuerzo para entender y explicar la genética, como Wilson y Nowak, él está lejos de ser un experto, y como ellos, las matemáticas sólo lo ciega a las imposibilidades biológicas y, por supuesto, esta es la norma en la ciencia. Como señaló Wittgenstein en la primera página de la cultura y el valor "no hay denominación religiosa en la que el mal uso de las expresiones metafísicas ha sido responsable de tanto pecado como lo ha sido en matemáticas." Siempre ha sido cristalino que un gen que causa comportamiento que disminuye su propia frecuencia no puede persistir, pero este es el núcleo de la noción de selección de grupo. Además, ha sido bien sabido y a menudo demostró que la selección de grupos sólo se reduce a la aptitud inclusiva (selección de los parientes), que, como Dawkins ha señalado, es sólo otro nombre para la evolución por la selección natural. Al igual que Wilson, Gintis ha trabajado en esta arena durante unos 50 años y todavía no lo ha entendido, pero después de la Wilson escándalo se rompió, me tomó sólo 3 días para encontrar, leer y entender el trabajo profesional más relevante, como se detalla en mi artículo. Es alucinante darse cuenta de que Gintis y Wilson fueron incapaces de lograr esto en casi medio siglo. En los años después de que el Nowak, Wilson, papel Tarnita fue publicado en la naturaleza, varios genetistas de la población contaron capítulo y verso sobre el tema, de nuevo demostrando conclusivamente que es toda una tormenta en una taza de té. Es muy lamentable que Gintis, al igual que sus amigos, no le pregunten a un biólogo competente acerca de esto y considera como desorientado a los 140 algunos biólogos bien conocidos que firmaron una carta protestando por la publicación de esta tontería en la naturaleza. Me refiero a los que quieren los detalles sangrientos a mi papel, ya que es la mejor cuenta de la melee que soy consciente de. Para obtener un resumen de la detalles de la tecnico ver el artículo de Dawkins 'El descenso de Edward Wilson' http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/Magazine/Edward-Wilson-social-conquistatierra-evolucionaria-errores-origen-especie. Como Dawkins escribió ' para Wilson no reconocer que habla por sí mismo contra la gran mayoría de sus colegas profesionales es-me duele decir esto de un héroe de toda la vida-un acto de arrogancia sin sentido '. Tristemente, Gintis se ha asimilado a una compañía tan ignominioso. También hay algunas agradables Dawkins YouTubes como https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lBweDk4ZzZ4. Gintis tampoco ha podido proporcionar el marco conductual que carece de todas las ciencias sociales. Uno necesita tener una estructura lógica para la racionalidad, entendimiento de los dos sistemas de pensamiento (teoría de procesos duales), de la división entre cuestiones científicas de hecho y cuestiones filosóficas de cómo funciona el lenguaje en el contexto en cuestión, y de cómo evitar el reduccionismo y el cientismo, pero él, como casi todos los estudiantes de comportamiento, es en gran parte Despistado. Él, como ellos, está encantado con los modelos, teorías y conceptos, 347 y el impulso de explicar, mientras que Wittgenstein nos mostró que sólo necesitamos describir, y que las teorías, conceptos, etc., son sólo formas de usar el lenguaje (juegos de lenguaje) que tienen valor sólo en la medida en que tienen una prueba clara (los creadores de la verdad claros, o como el eminente filósofo John Searle le gusta decir, condiciones de satisfacción claras (COS)). Aquellos que deseen un marco completo hasta la fecha para el comportamiento humano de la moderna dos sistemas punto de vista puede consultar mi libro 'La Estructura Lógica de la Filosofía, la Psicología, la Mente y Lenguaje en Ludwig Wittgenstein y John Searle ' 2nd Ed (2019). Los interesados en más de mis escritos pueden ver 'Monos parlantes--filosofía, psicología, ciencia, religión y política en un planeta condenado--artículos y reseñas 2006-2019 3rd Ed (2019) y delirios utópicos suicidas en el 21St Century 4TH Ed (2019) Después de medio siglo en el olvido, la naturaleza de la conciencia (intencionalidad, comportamiento) es ahora el tema más caliente en las Ciencias del comportamiento y la filosofía. Comenzando con el trabajo pionero de Ludwig Wittgenstein de la década de 1930 (los libros azul y marrón) a 1951, y desde los años 50 hasta el presente por sus sucesores Searle, Moyal-Sharrock, Read, hacker, Stern, Horwich, Winch, Finkelstein, etc., he creado el tabla siguiente como heurística para avanzar en este estudio. Las filas muestran diversos aspectos o formas de estudiar y las columnas muestran los procesos involuntarios y comportamientos voluntarios que comprenden los dos sistemas (procesos duales) de la estructura lógica de la conciencia (LSC), que también pueden considerarse como la estructura lógica de la racionalidad (LSR-Searle), de la conducta (LSB), de la personalidad (LSP), de la mente (LSM), del lenguaje (LSL), de la realidad (LSOR), de la intencionalidad (LSI)-el término filosófico clásico, la psicología descriptiva de la conciencia (DPC), el descriptivo Psicología del pensamiento (DPT) – o mejor, el lenguaje de la psicología descriptiva del pensamiento (LDPT), términos introducidos aquí y en mis otros escritos muy recientes. Las ideas para esta tabla se originaron en el trabajo de Wittgenstein, una mesa mucho más simple de Searle, y se correlaciona con extensas tablas y graficas en los tres libros recientes en Human Nature, de P.M.S Hacker. Las últimas 9 filas provienen principalmente de la investigación de la decisión de Johnathan St. B.T. Evans y colegas revisado por mí mismo. El sistema 1 es involuntario, reflexivo o automatizado "reglas" R1 mientras pensar (cognición) no tiene lagunas y es voluntario o deliberativo "reglas" R2 y Willing (Volition)((voluntad) tiene 3 lagunas (ver Searle). Sugiero que podamos describir el comportamiento más claramente cambiando "imponer condiciones de satisfacción en las condiciones de satisfacción" de Searle a "relacionar los Estados mentales con el mundo moviendo los músculos" - es decir, hablar, escribir y hacer, y su "mente al mundo Dirección de ajuste"y" la dirección del 348 mundo a la mente de ajuste "por" causa se origina en la mente "y" causa se origina en el mundo "S1 es sólo de forma ascendente causal (mundo a la mente) y sin contenido (falta de representaciones o información) mientras que S2 tiene contenidos y es descendente causal (mente al mundo ). He adoptado mi terminología en esta tabla. He hecho explicaciones detalladas de esta tabla en mis otros escritos. 349 DESDE EL ANALISIS DE LOS JUEGOS DE IDIOMAS Disposición Emoción Memoria Percepción Deseo PI * * IA * * * AcciónPalabra Causa origina de * * * * Mundo Mundo Mundo Mundo Mente Mente Mente Mente Provoca cambios en * * * * * Ninguno Mente Mente Mente Ninguno Mundo Mundo Mundo Causalmente Auto Reflexivo * * * * * * No Sí Sí Sí No Sí Sí Sí Verdadero o falso (Comprobable) Sí T sólo T sólo T sólo Sí Sí Sí Sí Condiciones públicas de satisfacción Sí Sí/No Sí/No No Sí/No Sí No Sí Describir Un estado mental No Sí Sí Sí No No Sí/No Sí Prioridad evolutiva 5 4 2, 3 1 5 3 2 2 Contenido voluntario Sí No No No No Sí Sí Sí Iniciación voluntaria Sí/No No Sí No Sí/No Sí Sí Sí Sistema cognitivo ******* 2 1 2/1 1 2/1 2 1 2 Cambiar intensidad No Sí Sí Sí Sí No No No Duración precisa No Sí Sí Sí No No Sí Sí Aquí y Ahora o Allá y Luego (H + N, T + T) ******** TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN Calidad especial No Sí No Sí No No No No Localizado en Cuerpo No No No Sí No No No Sí Las expresiones corporales Sí Sí No No Sí Sí Sí Sí Autocontradiccion es No Sí No No Sí No No No Necesita un yo Sí Sí/No No No Sí No No No Necesita lenguaje Sí No No No No No No Sí/No 350 DE LA INVESTIGACIÓN DE DECISIONES Disposición Emoción Memoria Percepción Deseo PI * * IA * * * Acción/ Palabra Efectos subliminales No Sí/No Sí Sí No No No Sí/No Asociativa Basada en reglas RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB Dependiente del contexto/ Abstracto A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/A CD/A Serie/Paralelo S S/P P P S/P S S S Heurístico Analítica A H/A H H H/A A A A Necesita trabajar Memoria Sí No No No No Sí Sí Sí Dependiente general de la inteligencia Sí No No No Sí/No Sí Sí Sí La carga cognitiva Inhibe Sí Sí/No No No Sí Sí Sí Sí Excitación facilita o inhibe I F/I F F I I I I Condiciones públicas de satisfacción de S2 son a menudo referidos por Searle y otros como COS, representaciones, creadores de la verdad o significados (o COS2 por mí mismo), mientras que los resultados automáticos de S1 son designados como presentaciones por otros (o COS1 por mí mismo). * Aka Inclinaciones, Capacidades, Preferencias, Representaciones, Posibles Acciones, etc. ** Intenciones anteriores de Searle *** La intención de Searle en acción. **** Dirección de ajuste de Searle ***** Dirección de causalidad de Searle ****** (Las instancias del estado mental Causas o se cumple a sí mismo). Searle anteriormente llamó a esto causalmente auto-referencial. ******* Tversky / Kahneman / Frederick / Evans / Stanovich definieron los sistemas cognitivos. ******** Aquí y ahora o allí y luego Es de interés para comparar esto con las diversas tablas y gráficos en Peter Los últimos 3 volúmenes de hacker sobre la naturaleza humana. Uno siempre debe tener en cuenta el descubrimiento de Wittgenstein de que después de haber descrito los posibles usos (significados, los creadores de la verdad, condiciones de satisfacción) del 351 lenguaje en un contexto particular, hemos agotado su interés, y los intentos de explicación (es decir, filosofía) sólo nos alejan de la verdad. Nos mostró que sólo hay un problema filosófico: el uso de oraciones (juegos de idiomas) en un contexto inapropiado, y, por tanto, solo una solución, mostrando el contexto correcto. Gintis comienza a hacer afirmaciones dudosas, vagas o francamente extrañas al principio del libro. Comienza en la primera página de la visión general con citas sin sentido de Einstein y Ryle. En el pxii el párrafo que comienza ' tercer tema ' sobre mentes enredadas necesita reescribir para especificar que los juegos de idiomas son funciones del sistema 2 y así es como pensar, creer etc. trabajar (lo que son), mientras que el cuarto tema que trata de explicar el comportamiento como debido a lo que la gente "cree conscientemente" es correcto. Es decir, con ' no consecuencialismo ' está tratando de ' explicar ' el comportamiento como selección de grupo ' altruista ' mediada por el sistema lingüístico consciente 2. Pero si tomamos una visión evolutiva a largo plazo, es claramente debido al altruismo recíproco, tratando de servir la aptitud inclusiva, que está mediada por la operación inconsciente del sistema 1. de la misma manera, para el quinto tema y el resto de la visión general. Él favorece a Rational Choice, pero no tiene idea de que se trata de un juego de idiomas para el que se debe especificar el contexto exacto, ni que tanto el sistema 1 como el sistema 2 sean "racionales", sino de maneras muy diferentes. Este es el error clásico de la mayoría de las descripciones de comportamiento, que Searle ha llamado la ilusión fenomenológica, Pinker la pizarra en blanco y Tooby y Cosmides ' el modelo de ciencias sociales estándar ' y lo he discutido extensamente en mis otras reseñas y artículos. Mientras uno no comprenda que la mayor parte de nuestro comportamiento está automatizado por el sistema no lingüístico 1, y que nuestro sistema lingüístico consciente 2 es principalmente para la racionalización de nuestras opciones compulsivas e inconscientes, no es posible tener más que una visión muy superficial del comportamiento, i. e., el que está casi universal no sólo entre académicos pero políticos, dueños multimillonarios de compañías de alta tecnología, estrellas de cine y el público en general. En consecuencia, las consecuencias van mucho más allá de la academia, produciendo políticas sociales delirante que traen consigo apocolapso inxorable del sector industrial civilización. Vea mi ' Suicidio por la Democracia-un obituario para Estados Unidos y el mundo '. Es impresionante ver a los Estados Unidos y las democracias europeas ayudando a los ciudadanos del tercer mundo a destruir el futuro de todos. En el pxiii uno puede describir el ' no consecuencialista ' (es decir, aparentemente ' verdadero ' comportamiento altruista o autodestructivo) como realmente realizar el altruismo recíproco, sirviendo la aptitud inclusiva debido a los genes evolucionados en el EEE (Entorno de adaptación evolutiva - es decir, el de nuestros antepasados muy distantes), que estimula los circuitos dopaminérgicos en el tegmentum ventral y el Núcleo accumbens, con la liberación resultante de la dopamina que nos hace sentir bien - el mismo mecanismo que parece estar involucrado en todos los comportamientos adictivos del abuso de drogas a las madres de fútbol. Y más balde incoherente como "en el contexto de tales ambientes, hay un beneficio 352 de aptitud para la ' transmisión epigenética ' de dicha ' información ' relativa al ' estado actual ' del ' medio ambiente ', es decir, la transmisión a través de "canales" genéticos. Esto se llama "transmisión cultural". Además, esa ' cultura ' está ' directamente codificada ' en el cerebro (P7), que dice que es el principio principal de la coevolución de la cultura génica, y que las instituciones democráticas y las votaciones son altruistas y no pueden explicarse en términos de interés propio (P17-18). La razón principal de estas vistas peculiares no sale realmente hasta p186 cuando finalmente deja claro que es un seleccionador de grupo. Puesto que no hay tal cosa como selección de grupo aparte de la aptitud inclusiva, no es de extrañar que esto es sólo otro relato incoherente de la conducta-es decir, más o menos lo que Tooby y Cosmides famoso llamado el modelo de ciencias sociales estándar o Pinker ' la pizarra en blanco '. Lo que él llama ' genes altruistas ' en p188 debe llamarse ' genes de aptitud inclusiveo o genes de parientes selección». Gintis también está muy impresionado con la idea de la cultura génica coevolución, que sólo significa que la cultura puede ser un agente de la selección natural, pero no logra entender que esto sólo puede suceder dentro del contexto de la selección natural (fitness inclusivo). Como casi todos los científicos sociales (y científicos, filósofos, etc.), nunca cruza su mente que ' cultura ', "coevolución", "simbólico", "epigenético", "información", "representación", etc., son todas las familias de complejos juegos de idiomas, cuya COS (condiciones de satisfacción, pruebas de la verdad) son exquisitamente sensibles a la contexto. Sin un contexto específico, no significan nada. así que, en este libro, como en la mayoría de la literatura sobre el comportamiento, hay mucha charla que tiene la apariencia de sentido sin sentido (significa o claro COS). Su afirmación sobre el pxv, que la mayoría de nuestros genes son el resultado de la cultura, es claramente absurda como, por ejemplo, es bien sabido que somos aproximadamente 98% chimpancé. solamente Si se refiere a las relativas a idioma podemos aceptar la posibilidad de que algunos de nuestros genes hayan sido objeto de selección cultural e incluso estos meramente modificados que ya existían - es decir, unos pocos pares de base se cambiaron de cientos de miles o millones en cada gen. Está muy ocupado con el modelo de comportamiento económico del "actor racional". pero de nuevo, no es consciente de que las automaticidades de S1 subyacen a todo comportamiento ' racional ' y las deliberaciones lingüísticas conscientes de S2 no pueden tener lugar sin ellos. Como muchos, tal vez la gran mayoría de los estudiantes jóvenes actuales de comportamiento, veo todas las actividades humanas como resultados fácilmente comprensibles del trabajo de la genética egoísta en un contexto contemporáneo en el que la vigilancia policial y una abundancia temporal de recursos, conseguido por violar la tierra y robar nuestra propios descendientes, conduce a la tranquilidad temporal relativa. En este sentido, Sugiero mi reseña del libro reciente de Pinker - la supresión transitoria de los peores demonios de nuestra naturaleza - una revisión de los mejores ángeles de nuestra naturaleza. Muchos comportamientos se parecen al verdadero altruismo, y algunos son (es decir, 353 disminuirán la frecuencia de los genes que los traen, es decir, conducen a la extinción de sus propios descendientes), pero el punto que Gintis falla es que estos se deben a una psicología que evolucionó hace mucho tiempo en pequeños grupos en las llanuras africanas en el EEE y tenía sentido entonces (es decir, era una aptitud inclusiva, cuando todos en nuestro grupo de unas pocas docenas a unos pocos cientos eran nuestros parientes cercanos), y por lo que a menudo continuamos con estos comportamientos a pesar de que ya no hacen sentido (es decir, que sirven a los intereses de personas no relacionadas o de relación distante que disminuye nuestra aptitud genética disminuyendo la frecuencia de los genes que lo hicieron posible). Esto explica su promoción de la noción de que muchos comportamientos son ' verdaderamente altruistas ', en lugar de egoísmos de origen (como en la secta. 3,2). Incluso señala esto y lo llama "efectividad distribuida" (P60-63) en la que las personas se comportan en grandes elecciones como si fueran pequeñas, pero no puede ver que esto no se deba a ningún gen para el "altruismo verdadero" sino a los genes para el altruismo recíproco (aptitud inclusiva), que es, por supuesto, egoísta. Así, personas se comportan como si sus acciones (por ejemplo, sus votos) fueron consecuentes, a pesar de que está claro que no lo son. Por ejemplo, uno puede encontrar en la red que las probabilidades de que un voto de una persona decida el resultado de una elección presidencial estadounidense está en el rango de millones a decenas de millones a uno. Y por supuesto, lo mismo es cierto de nuestras posibilidades de ganar una lotería, sin embargo, nuestra psicología mal funcionamiento del EEE hace loterías y votar actividades enormemente populares. También parece inconsciente de la terminología estándar y formas de describir el comportamiento utilizado en la psicología evolutiva (EP). Por ejemplo, en la pág. 75 de la descripcion de Arrow sobre normas de comportamiento social se describen en términos económicos en lugar de como EP del EEE que intentan operar en los entornos actuales, y en la parte inferior de la página, las personas actúan no como castigos "altruistas" (es decir, como "seleccionadores de grupo") sino como castigos de fitness inclusivos. En la p 78, para decir que sujetos actúan ' moralmente ' o de acuerdo con una norma ' por su propio bien ', es otra vez para abrazar la ilusión de grupo seleccionista/fenomenológico, y claramente es grupos de genes que están tratando de aumentar su aptitud inclusiva a través de mecanismos EP bien conocidos como la detección tramposa y Castigo. Otra vez, en P88, lo que él describe como otro-con respecto a las acciones desinteresadas puede describirse tan fácilmente como autosobre los intentos de altruismo recíproco que se extravían en una gran sociedad. Naturalmente, a menudo utiliza jerga de la economía estándar como ' el Prior subjetivo debe interpretarse como una probabilidad condicional ', que sólo significa una creencia en la probabilidad de un resultado en particular (P90-91), y 'common subjective priors' (antecedentes comunes subjetivos o creencias compartidas) P122. Gran parte del libro y de la conducta se refiere a lo que a menudo se llama "la intencionalidad" o la construcción de la realidad social, pero el teórico más eminente en esta arena, John Searle, no se discute, su terminología ahora estándar como COS y DIRA (deseo independiente razones de acción) no aparece, no está en el índice, y sólo una de sus muchas obras, y que más de 20 años de edad, se encuentra en la 354 bibliografía. En p97 comenta favorablemente la actualización bayesiana sin mencionando que es notorio por carecer de cualquier prueba significativa para el éxito (es decir, claro COS), y comúnmente no hace ninguna predicción clara, de modo que no importa lo que la gente hace, puede hacerse para Descuna su comportamiento después de la Hecho. Sin embargo, el principal problema con el capítulo 5 es que "racional" y otros términos son juegos de lenguaje complejos que no tienen ningún significado aparte de contextos muy específicos, que por lo general faltan aquí. Por supuesto, como nos mostró Wittgenstein, este es el problema central de toda discusión sobre el comportamiento y Gintis tiene la mayor parte de la comunidad de Ciencias del comportamiento (o al menos la mayoría de las personas de más de 40) como coconspiradores. de la misma manera, a lo largo del libro, como Capítulo 6, donde discute ' teoría de la complejidad ', ' propiedades emergentes ', ' macro y micro niveles ', y ' sistemas dinámicos no lineales ' y la generación de ' modelos ' (que puede significar casi cualquier cosa y ' describir ' casi cualquier cosa), pero es sólo la predicción que cuenta (es decir, claro COS). A pesar de su ilusión fenomenológica (es decir, la suposición casi universal de que nuestras deliberaciones conscientes describen y controlan el comportamiento - en desacuerdo con prácticamente toda la investigación en psicología social durante los últimos 40 años), también comparte el reduccionista delirio, preguntándose por qué las ciencias sociales no han conseguido una teoría analítica central y no se han unido. Esto, por supuesto, es un tema frecuente en las ciencias sociales y la filosofía y la razón es que la psicología del pensamiento de orden superior no es descriptible por causas, sino por razones, y uno no puede hacer que la psicología desaparezca en la fisiología ni la fisiología en Bioquímica ni en física, etc. Son sólo diferentes e indispensables niveles de descripción. Searle escribe sobre él a menudo y Wittgenstein lo describió con fama hace 80 años en el libro azul. "Nuestro anhelo de generalidad tiene [como una] fuente... nuestra preocupación por el método de la ciencia. Me refiero al método de reducir la explicación de la natural fenómenos al menor número posible de leyes naturales primitivas; y, en matemáticas, de unificar el tratamiento de diferentes temas mediante el uso de una generalización. Los filósofos ven constantemente el método de la ciencia ante sus ojos, y son irresistiblemente tentados a preguntar y responder en la forma en que la ciencia lo hace. Esta tendencia es la verdadera fuente de la metafísica, y lleva al filósofo a una completa oscuridad. Quiero decir aquí que nunca puede ser nuestro trabajo para reducir cualquier cosa, o para explicar cualquier cosa. La filosofía es realmente "puramente descriptiva." También está bastante fuera de contacto con el mundo contemporáneo, pensando que la gente va a ser agradable porque han interiorizado el altruismo (es decir, la selección de grupos), y con las realidades demográficas, cuando se opone a que el crecimiento de la población está bajo control, cuando de hecho predicciones son para 355 otro 4 mil millones por 2100 (P133), la violencia está aumentando y la perspectiva es sombría. Él ve la necesidad de "tallar un nicho académico para la sociología" (p148), pero toda la discusión es típica galimatías (no claro COS), y todo lo que realmente necesita (o puede dar) es un claro descripcion de los juegos de idiomas (la mente en el trabajo) jugamos en social situaciones, y cómo muestran cómo nuestros intentos de hacer una actividad física inclusiva o desviarnos en contextos contemporáneos. Una y otra vez empuja su fantasía de que "comportamiento inherentemente ético" (es decir, el altruismo del seleccionador de grupo) explica nuestro comportamiento social, ignorando los hechos obvios de que se debe a la abundancia temporal de recursos, la policía y la vigilancia, y que siempre cuando se los quita, salvajismo emerge rápidamente (p. ej., P151). Es fácil mantener tales delirios cuando uno vive en el mundo de la torre de marfil de teorías abstrusas, desatentos a los millones de estafas, robos, violaciones, asaltos, robos y asesinatos que tienen lugar todos los días. Otra vez, y de nuevo, (por ejemplo, Top P170) ignora las explicaciones obvias para nuestra "racionalidad", que es la selección natural-es decir, la aptitud inclusiva en el EEE que conduce a ESS (estrategias evolucionariamente estables), o por lo menos eran más o menos estables en grupos pequeños 100.000 a 3 millones de años atrás. El capítulo 9 de la sociología del genoma está inevitablemente lleno de errores e incoherencia - por supuesto, no hay "genes altruistas" especiales, más bien, todos los genes sirven aptitud inclusiva o desaparecen (p188). El problema es que la única manera de realmente conseguir la genética egoísta y la aptitud inclusiva a través de es tener Gintis en una habitación para un día con Dawkins, Franks, Coyne etc., explicando por qué está mal. Pero como siempre, uno tiene que tener un cierto nivel de educación, inteligencia, racionalidad y honestidad para que esto funcione, y si uno es sólo un poco corto en varias categorías, no tendrá éxito. Lo mismo por supuesto es cierto para gran parte de la comprensión humana, y por lo que la gran mayoría nunca obtendrá nada que sea en absoluto Sutil. Al igual que con el Nowak, Wilson, Tarnita articulo, estoy seguro de que Dawkins, Franks y otros habrían estado dispuestos a ir sobre este capítulo y explicar donde se extravía.. El principal problema es que la gente simplemente no entienden el concepto de selección natural por la aptitud inclusiva, ni de motivaciones subconscientes, y que muchos tienen motivaciones ' religiosas ' para rechazarlas. Esto incluye no sólo el público en general y académicos no científicos, pero un gran porcentaje de biólogos y cientificos de comportamiento. Recientemente me topé con una revisión encantadora por Dawkins de una discusión de la idea genética egoísta por biólogos profesionales de alto nivel, en el que tenía que repasar su trabajo línea por línea para explicar que simplemente no entienden cómo funciona todo. Pero sólo un pequeño número de personas como él podría hacer esto, y el mar de confusión es vasto, y por lo que estos delirios sobre la naturaleza humana que destruyen este libro, y están destruyendo Estados Unidos y el mundo, como la reina le dijo a Alice en un contexto ligeramente diferente, seguir hasta que llegan al final y luego se detienen. 356 357 El altruismo, Jesús y el fin del mundo: cómo la Fundación Templeton compró una Cátedra de Harvard y atacó la evolución, la racionalidad y la civilización. Una revisión de E.O. Wilson ' la Conquista Social de la Tierra ' *The Social Conquest of Earth) (2012) y Nowak y Highfield ' Supercooperadores ' (Supercooperators) (2012)(revisión revisada 2019) Michael Starks Abstracto El famoso hombre hormiga E.O. Wilson siempre ha sido uno de mis héroes-no sólo un biólogo sobresaliente, sino una de las pequeñas y desvanecida minoría de intelectuales que al menos se atreve a insinuar la verdad sobre nuestra naturaleza que otros no logran captar, o en la medida en que do comprender, evitar de manera estudiosa la conveniencia política. Tristemente, está terminando su larga carrera en una moda más sóla como parte de un ataque ignorante y arrogante a la ciencia motivado al menos en parte por el fervor religioso de sus colegas de Harvard. Muestra las consecuencias viles cuando las universidades aceptan dinero de grupos religiosos, las revistas científicas están tan asombradas por los grandes nombres que evitan la revisión de pares adecuada, y cuando los egos se les permite salir de control. Nos lleva a la naturaleza de la evolución, los fundamentos de la metodología científica, cómo las matemáticas se relacionan con la ciencia, lo que constituye una teoría, e incluso qué actitudes a la religión y la generosidad son apropiadas cuando nos acercamos inexorablemente al colapso de la industria Civilización. Aquellos que deseen un marco completo hasta la fecha para el comportamiento humano de la moderna dos sistemas punto de vista puede consultar mi libro 'La Estructura Lógica de la Filosofía, la Psicología, la Mente y Lenguaje en Ludwig Wittgenstein y John Searle ' 2nd Ed (2019). Los interesados en más de mis escritos pueden ver 'Monos parlantes--filosofía, psicología, ciencia, religión y política en un planeta condenado--artículos y reseñas 2006-2019 3rd Ed (2019) y delirios utópicos suicidas en el 21St Century 4TH Ed (2019) El famoso hombre hormiga E.O. Wilson siempre ha sido uno de mis héroes-no sólo un biólogo sobresaliente, sino una de las pequeñas y desvanecimientos minoría de 358 intelectuales que al menos se atreve a insinuar la verdad sobre nuestra naturaleza que otros no logran captar, o en la medida en que ellos entienden, evitamos de manera estudiosa la conveniencia política. Tristemente está terminando su larga carrera en una moda más sóla como parte de un ataque ignorante y arrogante a la ciencia motivado al menos en parte por el fervor religioso de sus colegas de Harvard. Muestra las consecuencias viles cuando las universidades aceptan dinero de grupos religiosos, las revistas científicas están tan asombradas por los grandes nombres que evitan la revisión de pares adecuada, y cuando los egos se les permite salir de control. Nos lleva a la naturaleza de la evolución, los fundamentos de la metodología científica, cómo las matemáticas se relacionan con la ciencia, lo que constituye una teoría, e incluso qué actitudes a la religión y la generosidad son apropiadas cuando nos acercamos inexorablemente al colapso de la industria Civilización. Encontré secciones en ' Conquest ' con el habitual comentario incisivo (aunque nada realmente nuevo o interesante si has leído sus otras obras y estás en biología en general) a menudo-prosa forzada que es su sello distintivo, pero estaba bastante sorprendido de que el núcleo del libro es su rechazo de la aptitud inclusiva (que ha sido un pilar de la biología evolutiva por más de 50 años) en favor de la selección de grupo. Uno asume que viniendo de él y con el articulos hace referencia a los publicados por él mismo y el colega de matemáticas de Harvard Nowak en las principales revistas revisadas por pares como Nature, debe ser un avance sustancial, a pesar del hecho de que sabía que la selección de grupos era casi universalmente rechazada por tener un papel importante en la evolución. He leído numerosos comentarios en la red y muchos tienen buenos comentarios, pero el que más quería ver era que por el renombrado escritor de ciencia y biólogo evolutivo Richard Dawkins. A diferencia de la mayoría de los profesionales, que están en los diarios sólo disponibles para aquellos con acceso a una Universidad, que está disponible en la red, aunque al parecer, decidió no publicarlo en un diario, ya que es adecuadamente mordaz. Tristemente uno encuentra un rechazo devastador del libro y el comentario más mordaz de un colega científico que he visto desde Dawkins--superando cualquier cosa en sus muchos intercambios con demagogo tardío y no lamentado y pseudocientífico Stephan Jay Gould. Aunque Gould fue infame por sus ataques personales a su colega de Harvard Wilson, Dawkins señala que gran parte de ' Conquest ' recuerda una incómodamente de los frecuentes lapsos de Gould en "ecumenicalismo insípido y sin focalización". Lo mismo es más o menos cierto de todos los escritos populares de Wilson, incluyendo su libro más reciente "el significado de la existenciade la existencia humana", otra desvergonzada auto-promoción de sus inacreditadas ideas sobre la aptitud inclusiva (si). Dawkins señala que el notorio 2010 papel de Nowak, Tarnita y Wilson en la naturaleza fue rechazado casi universalmente por más de 140 biólogos que firmó un carta y que no hay ni una palabra sobre esto en el libro de Wilson. Ni han corregido esto en los siguientes 4 años de artículos, conferencias y varios libros. No hay otra opción que 359 estar de acuerdo con el comentario de mordaces de Dawkins "para Wilson no reconocer que habla por sí mismo contra la gran mayoría de sus colegas profesionales es-me duele decir esto de un héroe de toda la vida-un acto de arrogancia sin sentido." En vista del comportamiento subsiguiente de Nowak, uno debe incluirlo también. Me siento como una de las personas aturdidas que uno ve en la televisión siendo entrevistada después de que el simpático hombre de al lado, que ha estado cuidando a los niños de todos durante 30 años, está expuesto como un asesino serial. Dawkins también señala (como él y otros han hecho durante muchos años) que la aptitud inclusiva está implicado por (es decir, lógicamente se desprende de) neodarwinismo y no puede ser rechazado sin rechazar la evolución misma. Wilson nos recuerda de nuevo a Gould, quien denunció a los creacionistas de un lado de su boca mientras les daba consuelo al arrojar un sinfín de galimatías ultraliberales con tintes marxistas sobre los spandrels, el equilibrio puntuado y la psicología evolutiva del otro. La vaguedad y la opacidad matemática (a la mayoría de nosotros) de las matemáticas de la selección de grupo o multinivel es justo lo que los de mentalidad blanda quieren permitirles escapar del pensamiento racional en sus interminables rantas anticientíficas, y (en la academia) posmodernista ensaladas de palabras. Peor aún, la ' conquista ' de Wilson es una mala idea y un desorden escrito y desordenado lleno de no sequiturs, divagaciones vagas, confusiones e incoherencia. Una buena crítica que detalla algunos de estos es que por el estudiante graduado Gerry Carter que se puede encontrar en la red. Wilson también está fuera de contacto con nuestra comprensión actual de la psicología evolutiva (EP) (véase, por ejemplo, las últimas 300 páginas de ' los mejores ángeles de nuestra naturaleza ' de Pinker). Si quieres una seria cuenta de la evolución social y algún EP relevante de un experto ve 'Los principios de la evolución social' por Andrew F.G. Bourke, o una cuenta no tan seria y ciertamente defectuosa y divagante, pero una debe leer sin embargo por Robert Trivers-'La locura de los tontos: la lógica del engaño y el autoengaño en la vida humana' y las obras más viejas pero aún actuales y penetrantes como 'La evolución de la cooperación': Edición revisada de Robert Axelrod y 'La biología de los sistemas morales' por Richard Alexander. Después de leer este libro y sus reseñas, profundicé en algunos de los artículos científicos que respondieron a Nowak y Wilson y a las críticas de van Veelen de la ecuación de Price sobre la cual dependían fuertemente. Los comentarios señalaron que siempre ha sido claro que las matemáticas de la selección de grupo o multinivel se reduce a la de la aptitud inclusiva (selección de parientes) y que no es lógicamente posible seleccionar para el comportamiento que no beneficia a los genes que son únicos para el actor y sus parientes inmediatos. Para ponerlo sin rodeos, el comportamiento ' altruista ' siempre es egoísta al final en el sentido de que aumenta la supervivencia de los genes en el altruista. Esto para mí es obvio de la vida cotidiana y los científicos que afirman que de otra manera han perdido claramente su camino. Sí, sucede en la rareza de la vida moderna (es decir, así que a diferencia de la sociedad de la edad de piedra en la que evolucionamos) que uno a veces ve a una persona dar su vida para proteger a una persona no relacionada, pero claramente, no lo harán de 360 nuevo y (siempre que se haga antes de replicar) cualquier tendencia a hacerlo tampoco será heredado. Incluso si ya se han replicado, en promedio dejarán atrás a menos descendientes que si se retrasan. Esto garantiza que cualquier tendencia genética para el "altruismo verdadero"-es decir, el comportamiento que disminuye un gene en la población-serán seleccionados en contra y no más de esta lógica muy básica es necesaria para captar la evolución por la selección natural, la selección de parientes y la aptitud inclusiva-todas las bromas matemáticas que sirven sólo para cuantificar las cosas y para aclarar extrañas arreglos de vida en algunos de nuestros parientes (por ejemplo, hormigas, termitas y ratas topo). El principal foco del ataque del seleccionador de grupo ("groupies") fue la famosa ecuación de precio extendido que se ha utilizado para modelar la aptitud inclusiva, publicada por Price hace unos 40 años. El mejor papels desdeñando estos ataques que he encontrado son los de Frank y Bourke y comenzaré con unas cuantas citas de Frank ' natural Selección. IV. la ecuación de precio ' J. EVOL. BIOL. 25 (2012) 1002 – 1019. "Los críticos confunden las distintas funciones de la teoría abstracta general y los modelos dinámicos de hormigón para casos particulares. El poder duradero de la ecuación de precio surge del descubrimiento de invariancias esenciales en la selección natural. Por ejemplo, la teoría de la selección de parientes expresa problemas biológicos en términos de coeficientes de parentesco. El parentesco mide la asociación entre los interlocutores sociales. La medida adecuada de parentesco identifica escenarios biológicos distintos con el mismo resultado evolutivo (invariante). Las relaciones de invarianza proporcionan el conocimiento más profundo del pensamiento científico... Esencialmente, todas las discusiones modernas de selección multinivel y selección de grupo derivan de Price (1972a), según lo desarrollado por Hamilton (1975). Price y Hamilton señalaron que la ecuación de Price se puede expandir de forma recursiva para representar niveles anidados de análisis, por ejemplo, individuos que viven en grupos... Todos los conocimientos conceptuales modernos sobre la selección de grupo derivan de la expansión recursiva de Price de su expresión abstracta de selección... Una crítica de estas aplicaciones de la ecuación de precio es una crítica al enfoque central de la genética cuantitativa evolutiva. Estas críticas pueden ser válidas para ciertas aplicaciones, pero deben evaluarse en el contexto más amplio de la teoría de la genética cuantitativa... [y en una cita de Price... «El cambio de frecuencia génica es el acontecimiento básico en la evolución biológica. La siguiente ecuación... que da cambio de frecuencia en la selección de una generación a la siguiente para un solo gen o para cualquier función lineal de cualquier número de genes en cualquier número de loci, sostiene para cualquier tipo de dominancia o epistasis, para reproducción sexual o asexual, para acoplamiento aleatorio o no aleatorio, para especies diploides, haploides o poliploides, e incluso para especies imaginarias con más de dos sexos...] ... El análisis de camino (contextual) sigue como una extensión natural de la ecuación de Price, en la que uno hace modelos específicos de aptitud expresados por regresión. No tiene sentido discutir la ecuación del precio y el análisis de la ruta como alternativas... Las críticas de la ecuación de precio rara vez distinguen los costos y beneficios de suposiciones particulares en relación con objetivos particulares. Utilizo la reciente serie de papeles de van Veelen como un proxy para 361 esas críticas. Esa serie repite algunos de los malentendidos comunes y añade algunos nuevos. Nowak repitió recientemente la crítica de van Veelen como base para su comentario sobre la ecuación de Price (van Veelen, 2005; Nowak et al., 2010; van Veelen et al., 2010; Nowak & Highfield, 2011; van Veelen, 2011; van Veelen et al., 2012... Esta cita de van Veelen et al. (2012) demuestra un enfoque interesante para la beca. Primero citan a Frank como diciendo que la insuficiencia dinámica es un inconveniente de la ecuación de Price. Entonces discrepan con ese punto de vista y presentan como su propia interpretación un argumento que es casi idéntico en concepto y fraseo a mi propia declaración en el mismo documento que citan como fundamento para su desacuerdo... La forma recursiva de la ecuación de precio completo proporciona la base para todos los estudios modernos de selección de grupo y análisis multinivel. La ecuación de Price ayudó a descubrir esas diversas conexiones, aunque hay muchas otras formas de derivar las mismas relaciones... La teoría de la selección de parientes (kin selection) deriva gran parte de su poder al identificar una cantidad informativa invariable suficiente para unificar una amplia variedad de procesos aparentemente dispares (Frank, 1998, capítulo 6). La interpretación de la selección de parientes como una invarianza informativa no ha sido completamente desarrollada y sigue siendo un problema abierto. Las Invariancias proporcionan la base de la comprensión científica: "sólo está exagerando ligeramente el caso de decir que la física es el estudio de la simetría ' (Anderson, 1972). La invarianza y la simetría significan lo mismo (Weyl, 1983). Feynman (1967) enfatizó que la invarianza es el carácter de la ley física. Los patrones de probabilidad observados comúnmente pueden ser unificados por el estudio de la invarianza y su asociación con la medición (Frank & Smith, 2010, 2011). Ha habido poco esfuerzo en biología para perseguir una comprensión similar de la invarianza y la medición (Frank, 2011; Houle et al., 2011)." Espero que esté quedando claro por qué elegí el título que hice para este artículo. Atacar la ecuación de precio y la aptitud inclusiva es atacar no sólo la genética cuantitativa y la evolución por selección natural, pero los conceptos universalmente utilizados de la covarianza, la invarianza y la simetría, que son fundamentales para la ciencia y para la racionalidad. Además, la motivación religiosa claramente expresada por Nowak nos invita a considerar en qué medida las virtudes cristianas como el altruismo verdadero (permanentemente geneticamente auto-disminuyendo) y la Hermandad del hombre (mujer, niño, perro, etc.) pueden formar parte de un programa racional para la supervivencia en un futuro próximo. Mi opinión es que el verdadero altruismo es un lujo para aquellos que no les importa ser evolutivos callejones sin salida y que incluso en su ' hacer creer ' versión de fitness inclusiva, uno será difícil de encontrar cuando el lobo está en la puerta (es decir, el escenario universal probable para el 11 mil millones en el próximo siglo). Hay mucho más en esta joya, que entra en exquisitos detalles lógicos y matemáticos (y también sus muchos otros papeles-usted puede conseguir todos los 7 en esta serie en un PDF) pero esto dará el sabor. Otro divertido episodio se refiere a la tautología en matemáticas. Frank de nuevo: ' Nowak & Highfield (2011) y van Veelen et al. (2012) 362 creen que sus argumentos demuestran que la ecuación de Price es verdadera en el mismo sentido trivial, y llaman a ese tipo trivial de verdad una tautología matemática. Curiosamente, revistas, artículos en línea y la literatura científica han estado utilizando durante varios años la frase tautología matemática para la ecuación de precio, aunque Nowak & Highfield (2011) y van Veelen et al. (2012) no proporcionan citas a anteriores Literatura. Por lo que sé, la primera descripción de la ecuación de precio como una tautología matemática fue en el estudio de Frank (1995). ' A diferencia de Frank, Lamm y otros, los "groupies"(seguidores) no han demostrado ninguna comprensión de la filosofía de la ciencia (la psicología descriptiva del pensamiento de orden superior, como me gusta llamarlo) en estos libros y artículos recientes, ni en ninguno de los numerosos libros y artículos populares de Wilson en el último medio siglo, por lo que no esperaría que hayan estudiado a Wittgenstein (el filósofo más penetrante de las matemáticas) que famosamente comentó que en matemáticas ' todo es sintaxis, nada es semántica '. Wittgenstein expone una confusión casi universal sobre el papel de las matemáticas en la ciencia. Todas las matemáticas (y la lógica) es una tautología que no tiene significado ni uso hasta que está conectada a nuestra vida con palabras. Cada ecuación es una tautología hasta que se emplean números y palabras y el sistema de convenciones que llamamos Psicología evolutiva. Sorprendentemente Lamm en su reciente excelente artículo ' una introducción suave a la ecuación de precio ' ( A gentle introduction to the Price equation)(2011) señala esto: "La ecuación de precio se ocupa de cualquier proceso de selección. De hecho, podemos definir la selección utilizarla. No dice nada en particular sobre la evolución biológica o genética, y no está ligada a ningún escenario biológico en particular. Esto le da un inmenso poder, pero también significa que es muy posible aplicarlo incorrectamente al mundo real. Esto nos lleva a la segunda y última observación. La ecuación de precio es analítica [true por definición o tautologo]. No es una proposición sintética [una cuestión empírica en cuanto a su verdad o falsedad]. Lo derivamos basado en definiciones directas y principios matemáticos universales. La ecuación simplemente proporciona una forma útil de interpretar el significado de las definiciones directas desde las que empezamos. Sin embargo, este no es el caso una vez que pones la ecuación en palabras, interpretando así las relaciones matemáticas. Si simplemente dices: _ defino ' selección ' para ser la covarianza Blah Blah Blah, podrías estar a salvo. Si usted dice: _ The covariance bla bla bla es selección, Usted está haciendo una reclamación con contenido empírico. Más fundamentalmente, la creencia de que las reglas de la teoría de la probabilidad y las estadísticas, o cualquier otra manipulación matemática, describen el mundo real es sintética." En este sentido, también se recomienda Helantera y Uller ' la ecuación de precio y la herencia extendida ' Philos Theor Biol (2010) 2: E101. "Aquí usamos la ecuación de precios como punto de partida para una discusión de las diferencias entre cuatro categorías propuestas recientemente de sistemas de herencia; genética, epigenética, conductual y simbólica. Concretamente, abordamos 363 cómo los componentes de la ecuación de precios abarcan diferentes sistemas no genéticos de herencia en un intento de aclarar cómo los diferentes sistemas están conceptualmente relacionados. Concluimos que las cuatro clases de sistemas de sucesiones no forman agrupaciones diferenciadas con respecto a su efecto sobre la tasa y la dirección del cambio fenotípico de una generación a la siguiente en ausencia o presencia de selección. En cambio, nuestros análisis sugieren que los diferentes sistemas de herencia pueden compartir características que son conceptualmente muy similares, pero que sus implicaciones para la evolución adaptativa difieren sustancialmente como resultado de las diferencias en su capacidad para acoplar selección y herencia." Así que, debe estar claro que no hay tal cosa como eludir la ecuación de precio y que como cualquier ecuación, tiene aplicaciones ilimitadas si sólo se conecta al mundo con palabras adecuadas. Como Andy Gardner lo puso en su artículo sobre Price (biología actual 18 # 5 R198) (también vea su ' adaptación y fitness inclusivo ' biología actual 23, R577 – R584, 8 de julio de 2013) "Estas ideas fueron bastante confusas hasta que Price, y más tarde Hamilton, mostraron que la ecuación de Price puede ampliarse para abarcar múltiples niveles de selección actuando simultáneamente (recuadro 2). Esto permite que la selección en los distintos niveles se defina y separe de forma explícita, y proporciona la base formal de la teoría de selección de grupos. Es importante destacar que permite la cuantificación de estas fuerzas separadas y produce predicciones precisas para cuando se favorezca el comportamiento beneficioso para el grupo. Resulta que estas predicciones son siempre coherentes con la regla de Hamilton, RB – c > 0. Además, debido a que la selección de los parientes y la teoría de selección de grupo se basan en la misma ecuación de precio, es fácil demostrar que los dos enfoques son matemáticamente equivalentes exactamente, y son simplemente formas alternativas de tallar la selección total operando sobre el carácter social. Independientemente del enfoque adoptado, se espera que los organismos individuales maximicen su aptitud inclusiva, aunque este resultado sigue más fácilmente de un análisis de selección de parientes, ya que hace que el elemento clave de parentesco sea más explícito." Por lo tanto, para que los ' groupies ' atacando el Price ecuación es bizarro. Y aquí está el reciente resumen de Bourke de aptitud inclusiva vs ' groupism ': (haplodiploide y eusociales se refieren a los insectos sociales que proporcionan algunas de las mejores pruebas). "Recientes críticas han cuestionado la validez de la teoría principal para explicar la evolución social y la eusocialidad, a saber, la teoría de la aptitud inclusiva (selección de parientes). Repaso la literatura reciente y pasada para argumentar que estas críticas no tienen éxito. La teoría de la aptitud inclusiva ha añadido conocimientos fundamentales a la teoría de la selección natural. Estas son la comprensión de que la 364 selección de un gen para el comportamiento social depende de sus efectos en los coportadores, la explicación de los comportamientos sociales como el altruismo y el egoísmo utilizando los mismos parámetros subyacentes, y la explicación del interior del grupo conflicto en términos de optima aptitud inclusiva no coincidente. Una teoría alternativa propuesta para la evolución eusociales asume erróneamente que los intereses de los trabajadores están subordinados a la reina, no contiene nuevos elementos y no hace predicciones novedosas. La hipótesis haplodiploide aún no ha sido rigurosamente probada y la relación positiva dentro de las sociedades eusociales diploides apoya la teoría de la aptitud inclusiva. La teoría ha hecho predicciones únicas y falsificables que han sido confirmadas, y su base de evidencias es extensa y robusta. Por lo tanto, la teoría de la aptitud inclusiva merece mantener su posición como la principal teoría de la evolución social." Sin embargo la aptitud inclusiva (especialmente a través de la ecuación de precio extendido) explica mucho más que la sociedad de hormigas, explica cómo los organismos multicelulares entraron en vigor. "La tercera visión de la teoría de la aptitud inclusiva es la demostración de que el conflicto entre los miembros de una sociedad está potencialmente presente si están inequitativamente relacionados con la descendencia grupal, ya que la relación diferencial conduce a usted neQual inclusive fitness optima. A partir de esto ha surgido una comprensión de una inmensa gama de conflictos seleccionados por los parientes, incluidos los conflictos dentro de las familias y las sociedades eusociales y los conflictos intragenómicos que siguen la misma lógica subyacente. El corolario de esta perspicacia es que las sociedades son estables en la medida en que el inclusivo Fitness optima de sus miembros coinciden. Esto a su vez proporciona la justificación para toda la visión de la evolución de las "grandes transiciones", mediante la cual el origen de nuevos tipos de grupos en la historia de la vida (por ejemplo, genomas dentro de las células, organismos multicelulares y sociedades eusociales) puede explicarse como resultado de sus unidades constituyentes previamente independientes logrando una coincidencia de inclusivos Fitness optima mediante la agrupación. Desde este punto de vista, un organismo multicelular es una sociedad eusociales de células en las que los miembros de la sociedad se encuentran físicamente pegados; el pegamento más fundamental, sin embargo, es la relación clonal que (mutaciones en las BARRING) da a cada célula somática dentro del organismo un interés común en la promoción de la producción de gametos... Nowak et al. argumentaron que su perspectiva asume un ' enfoque centrado en el gen ' que ' hace innecesaria la teoría de la aptitud inclusiva '. Esto es desconcertante, porque carece totalmente de su perspectiva la idea, que sustenta cada una de las ideas de la teoría de la aptitud inclusiva, del gen como un estratega autopromotora cuyos intereses evolutivos están condicionados a la clase de parientes en la que reside ... En su modelo de la evolución de la eusocialidad, Nowak et al. dedució que el problema del altruismo es ilusorio. Escribieron que ' no hay altruismo paradójico que deba explicarse ' porque suponían que los trabajadores potenciales (hijas de una mujer o reina fundadora de una colonia) son ' no agentes independientes ', sino más bien pueden ser vistos ' como ' robots ' que son construidos por la Reina ' o la ' proyección extrasomática del genoma personal [de la reina] '. Si 365 esta afirmación fuera correcta, sólo tendrían que abordarse los intereses de la reina y se podría concluir que el altruismo de los trabajadores es más aparente que real. Pero es incorrecto, por dos razones. Una es que, como se ha argumentado repetidamente en respuesta a la anterior ' manipulación parental ' teorias el origen de la eusocialidad, el supervivencia inclusiva intereses de los trabajadores y el reina madre no coinciden, porque las dos partes son diferentialiado con las crías de grupo. La segunda es que los comportamientos de los trabajadores, como comer los huevos de la reina, la puesta de huevos en respuesta a las caídas percibidas en la fecundez de la reina, la manipulación de la relación sexual por la destrucción de la descendencia de la reina y la agresión letal hacia la reina demuestran que los trabajadores pueden actuar en sus propios intereses y en contra de los de la reina. A la luz de esta probada falta de pasividad del trabajador, el autosacrificio reproductivo de los trabajadores es paradójico a primera vista y este es el verdadero problema del altruismo que la teoría de la aptitud inclusiva ha resuelto. (c) teoría alternativa de la evolución eusociales Nowak et al. [38] presentó una «teoría alternativa de la evolución eusociales» (como se alude en el § 2B), respaldada por un «modelo matemático para el origen de la eusocialidad». Sin embargo, estos no representan verdaderas teorías alternativas, ya sea solo o en combinación, porque no hacen ningún punto o predicción que no se han hecho dentro de la teoría de la aptitud inclusiva" Hablando de varios pasos en un esquema sugerido por Nowak et al, Bourke dice: "Estos pasos constituyen un escenario razonable para el origen y la elaboración de la eusocialidad de los insectos, pero ni la secuencia de pasos ni los elementos individuales difieren sustancialmente de los que se han propuesto que ocurran dentro de la aptitud inclusiva Marco de referencia... La teoría alternativa de la evolución eusociales de Nowak et al. también exhibe dos debilidades importantes. Para empezar, al permitir que los grupos se formen de múltiples maneras en el paso (i) (por ejemplo, a través de asociaciones subsocialmente a través de padres y descendientes, pero también por cualquier otro medio, incluyendo "aleatoriamente por atracción local mutua"), su escenario ignora dos puntos críticos que son incompatible con ella, pero consistente con la teoría de la aptitud inclusiva. En primer lugar, la evidencia es que, en casi todos los linajes eusociales, la eusocialidad se ha originado en grupos sociales que eran ancestralmente subsociales y por lo tanto caracterizados por una alta relación dentro del grupo. En segundo lugar, la evidencia es que el origen de una eusocialidad obligada o compleja, definida como la participación de los trabajadores adultos irreversiblemente comprometidos con un fenotipo trabajador, se asocia con la monogamia parental de por vida ancestral y, por lo tanto, de nuevo, con un previsiblemente alto parentesco dentro del grupo... En Resumen, Nowak et al. hacer un caso para considerar el efecto de la población-contexto dinámico en el que se produce la evolución eusociales. Pero su teoría alternativa y su modelo asociado no añaden elementos fundamentalmente nuevos sobre los identificados dentro del marco de aptitud inclusiva y, en relación con este marco, exhiben deficiencias sustanciales... Más fundamentalmente, como se ha reconocido durante mucho tiempo y repetidamente estresado, la hipótesis haplodiploidía no es un componente esencial de la teoría de la aptitud inclusiva, ya que la regla de Hamilton para el altruismo puede 366 contener sin las asimetrías de parentesco causadas por haplodiploidía está presente. Destacando el estado de la hipótesis haplodiploidía para criticar la teoría de la aptitud inclusiva, por lo tanto, pierde el objetivo. También se da cuenta del hecho de que todas las sociedades eusociales diploides identificadas desde que se propuso la hipótesis haplodiploidía han resultado ser grupos clonales o familiares y, por lo tanto, según lo previsto por la teoría de la aptitud inclusiva, exhiben una relación positiva. Esto es cierto con el escarabajo ambrosía, los pulgones sociales, las avispas poliembrionarias, los camarones sociales y las ratas topo. Incluso es cierto de un nuevo descubrió el gusano eusociales. En Resumen, las sociedades diploides eusociales, lejos de debilitar la teoría de la aptitud inclusiva, sirven para fortalecerla... En términos más generales, la teoría predice de forma única la ausencia de altruismo (que implica costos de vida para la aptitud directa) entre los no parientes, y de hecho no se han encontrado casos de este tipo excepto en los sistemas claramente derivados de las sociedades ancestrales de parientes. Por último, la teoría de la aptitud inclusiva es única en la gama de fenómenos sociales que ha elucidado con éxito, incluyendo fenómenos tan superficialmente diferentes como el origen de la multicelularidad y el origen de la eusocialidad, o conflictos intragenómicos y conflictos dentro de las sociedades eusociales. En general, ninguna otra teoría se acerca a emparejar la teoría de la aptitud inclusiva de la explicación exitosa y la predicción a través de una gama de tales fenómenos dentro del campo de la social Evolución. El desafío a cualquier enfoque que pretenda reemplazar la teoría de la aptitud inclusiva es explicar los mismos fenómenos sin usar las ideas o conceptos de la teoría... Las críticas recientes de la teoría de la aptitud inclusiva han demostrado ser ineficaces en múltiples frentes. No demuestran dificultades fatales o no reconocidas con la teoría de la aptitud inclusiva. No proporcionan una teoría de reemplazo distinta u ofrecen un enfoque de unificación similar. No explican datos previamente inexplicables o demuestran que las explicaciones de la teoría de la aptitud inclusiva no son válidas. Y no hacen predicciones nuevas y únicas. La crítica más reciente y más completa de la teoría de la aptitud inclusiva, aunque amplia en el alcance de su crítica, sufre de las mismas fallas. Ciertamente, la relación no explica toda variación en los rasgos sociales. Además, el mensaje de larga data de la teoría de la aptitud inclusiva es que se requieren combinaciones particulares de factores no genéticos (por ejemplo, ecológicos) y genéticos para el origen de la eusocialidad. Sin embargo, la relación conserva un estatus único en el análisis de la evolución eusociales porque ninguna cantidad de beneficio ecológico puede traer consigo el altruismo si la relación es cero." Andrew f. g. Bourke 'La validez y el valor de la teoría de la aptitud inclusiva' Proc. R. soc. B 2011 278, doi: 10.1098/rspb. 2011.1465 14 de septiembre (2011) Una cosa rara vez mencionada por los groupies es el hecho de que, incluso si fuera posible "selección de grupo", el egoísmo es al menos tan probable (probablemente mucho más probable en la mayoría de los contextos) que se seleccione un grupo para el altruismo. Sólo trate de encontrar ejemplos de verdadero altruismo en la naturaleza-el hecho de que no podemos (que sabemos que no es posible si entendemos la evolución) nos dice que su presencia aparente en los seres humanos es un artefacto de la vida moderna, ocultando los hechos, y que no se puede seleccionar 367 más que la tendencia al suicidio (que en realidad es). Uno también podría beneficiarse de considerar un fenómeno nunca (en mi experiencia) mencionado por groupies-Cancer. Ningún grupo tiene tanto en común como las células genéticamente idénticas (originalmente) en nuestros propios cuerpos-un clon de células 100 billones-, pero todos nacemos con miles y quizás millones de células que ya han dado el primer paso en el camino hacia el cáncer y generan millones para miles de millones de células cancerosas en nuestra vida. Si no morimos primero de otras cosas, nosotros (y tal vez todos los organismos multicelulares) moriremos de cáncer. Sólo un mecanismo masivo y enormemente complejo integrado en nuestro genoma que reencarna o desautoriza billones de genes en billones de células, y mata y crea milles de millones de células por segundo, mantiene a la mayoría de nosotros vivos el tiempo suficiente para reproducirse. Uno podría tomar esto para implicar que una sociedad justa, democrática y duradera para cualquier tipo de entidad en cualquier planeta en cualquier universo es sólo un sueño, y que ningún ser o poder podría hacerlo de otra manera. No es sólo "las leyes" de la física que son universales e ineludibles, o tal vez deberíamos decir que la aptitud inclusiva es una ley de la física. En un giro bizarro, fue aparentemente tal pensamiento que condujo a Price (creador de la ecuación de Price y un cristiano devoto) al suicidio. En cuanto a la noción de ' teoría ', es un clásico juego de lengua Wittgensteinian, un grupo de usos vagamente vinculados pero con diferencias críticas. Cuando se propuso por primera vez, evolución por selección natural era de hecho altamente teórica, pero con el tiempo pasó a estar inextricablemente ligada a tantas observaciones y experimentos que sus ideas básicas ya no eran más teóricas que las vitaminas desempeñan un papel crítico en la nutrición humana. Para la ' teoría de la Deidad ', sin embargo, no está claro lo que se contará como una prueba definitiva. Tal vez lo mismo se aplica a la teoría de cuerdas. Muchos al lados las groupies señalan la naturaleza agradable de mucha interacción humana y ven un futuro rosado por delante, pero son ciegos. Es aplastantemente obvio que la cortesía es una fase transitoria debido a los abundantes recursos producidos por la despiadada violación del planeta, y como se agotan en los próximos dos siglos más o menos, habrá miseria y salvajismo en todo el mundo como el (probablemente) permanente Condición. No solo estrellas de cine, políticos y religiosos son ajenos a esto, sino incluso académicos muy brillantes que deberían saberlo mejor. En su reciente libro ' los mejores ángeles de nuestra naturaleza ' uno de mis eruditos más admirados Steven Pinker pasa la mitad del libro mostrando cómo nos hemos vuelto más y más civilizados, pero no parece nunca mencionar las razones obvias por las cuales--la abundancia temporal de recursos junto con la masiva presencia policial y militar facilitada por las tecnologías de vigilancia y comunicación. A medida que la civilización industrial colapsa, es inevitable que los peores demonios de nuestra naturaleza reaparezcan. Uno lo ve en el caos actual en el Medio Oriente, Latinoamérica y África, e incluso las guerras mundiales eran picnics del domingo en comparación con lo que viene. Tal vez la mitad de los 11 mil millones entonces vivos morirán de hambre, enfermedades y violencia, y podría ser muchos más. Vea mi ' 368 suicidio por la democracia ' para un breve resumen de Doomsday ( dia del juicio final). Otro dato desagradable sobre el altruismo, la generosidad y la ayuda, virtualmente nunca mencionado, es que si se toma un largo global-término, en un mundo superpoblado con recursos que se desvanecen, ayudando a una persona a lastimar a todos los demás de una manera pequeña. Cada comida, cada par de zapatos crean contaminación y erosión y usan recursos, y cuando añades 7.8 mil millones de ellos juntos (pronto será de 11) está claro que la ganancia de una persona es la pérdida de todos los demás. Cada dólar ganado o gastado daña al mundo y si los países se preocupan por el futuro, reducirían su PIB (producto destructivo bruto) cada año. Incluso eran groupism (grupo selectivo partidismo) verdad esto no cambiaría. Los hechos que Wilson, Nowak et al tienen, durante cuatro años, persistió en la publicación y hacer afirmaciones extravagantes sobre un trabajo manifiestamente inadecuado no es lo peor de este escándalo. Resulta que la Cátedra de Nowak en Harvard fue comprada por la Fundación Templeton, bien conocida por elloes el patrocinio generalizado de lectures, conferencias y publicaciones que intentan conciliar la religión y la ciencia. Nowak es un católico devoto y parece que un gran regalo para Harvard estaba supeditado a la cita de Nowak. Esto le hizo colega de Wilson y el resto es historia. Sin embargo, Wilson sólo estaba demasiado dispuesto, ya que había demostrado durante mucho tiempo una falta de comprensión de la teoría evolutiva - por supuesto, en cuanto a la selección de parientes como una división de selección de grupos en lugar de al revés. Me di cuenta hace años que él co-publicó con David Wilson, un partidario de la selección de grupo, y había escrito otros documentos que demuestran su falta de comprensión. Cualquiera de los groupies podría haber ido a los expertos para aprender el error de sus maneras (o simplemente leer sus papeles). Los grandes ancianos de selección de parientes como Hamilton, Williams y Trivers, y los jóvenes de sangre como Frank, Bourke y muchos otros, habrían estado encantados de enseñarles. Pero Nowak ha recibido algo así como $14 millones en las becas de Templeton en pocos años (para las matemáticas!) y quién quiere renunciar a eso? Él es bastante Franco en su intención de demostrar que la dulzura y la bondad de Jesús se construye en nosotros y en todo el universo. Jesús está convenientemente ausente, pero uno puede adivinar de las cualidades de otros iluminados y de la historia de la iglesia que la historia real del cristianismo temprano vendría como un shock. Recordemos que la Biblia fue expurgada de cualquier cosa que no cumplió con la línea del partido (por ejemplo, Gnosticismo mira los manuscritos de Nag-Hammadi). Y en cualquier caso, ¿Quién grabaría las duras realidades de la vida cotidiana? Casi con certeza, el Nowak, Tarnita, El papel de Wilson nunca habría sido publicado (al menos no por Nature) si hubiera sido presentado por dos biólogos promedio, pero viniendo de dos famosos profesores de Harvard claramente no logró la revisión por pares que debería tener. En cuanto al libro de Nowak y Highland ' SuperCooperators ' voy a dejar Dawkins hacer 369 los honores: He leído el libro de Nowak y Highfield. Partes de ella son bastante buenas, pero la calidad abruptamente, y vergonzosamente, se desploma en el capítulo sobre la selección de parientes, posiblemente bajo la influencia de E O Wilson (que ha sido consistentemente mal entendido selección de parientes desde la sociobiología, erróneamente con respecto a como un subconjunto de selección de grupo). Nowak pierde el punto de la teoría de la selección de parientes, que es que no es algo adicional, no algo más allá de la teoría de la "selección individual clásica". La selección de parientes no es algo EXTRA, no es algo que se recurera sólo si la teoría de la "selección individual clásica" falla. Más bien, es una consecuencia inevitable del neodarwinismo, que se desprende de ella de forma deductiva. Para hablar de la selección Darwiniana la selección de parientes menos es como hablar de la geometría euclidiana menos el teorema de Pitágoras. Es sólo que esta consecuencia lógica del neodarwinismo fue pasado por alto históricamente, lo que dio a la gente una falsa impresión de que era algo adicional y extra. De lo contrario, el buen libro de Nowak está trágicamente empurado por este error elemental. Como matemático, realmente debería haberlo sabido mejor. Parece dudoso que haya leído los papeles clásicos de Hamilton sobre la aptitud inclusiva, o que no pudo haber entendido la idea de manera tan exhaustiva. El capítulo sobre selección de parientes desacreditará el libro y dejará de ser tomado en serio por aquellos calificados para juzgarlo, lo cual es una lástima. http://whyevolutionistrue.wordpress.com/2011/03/16/New-Book-shows-thatHumans-are-genetically-Nice-Ergo-Jesus/ Una crítica de ' SuperCooperators ' también apareció de eminente teórico del juego/economista/científico político (y alumno de Harvard) Herbert Gintis (quien relata el escándalo de Templeton en el mismo), lo que es bastante sorprendente teniendo en cuenta su propia relación amorosa con selección de grupo - ver la revisión de su libro con Bowles por Price www.epjournal.net – 2012. 10 (1): 45-49 y mi revisión de su volumen más reciente ' individualidad y entrelazamiento ' (2017). En cuanto a los libros subsiguientes de Wilson, ' el significado de la existencia humana ' es soso y también confuso y deshonesto, repitiendo varias veces la línea del partido groupies cuatro años después de su completa desacreditar y ' una ventana en la eternidad '-es una escasa revista de viajes sobre el establecimiento de un parque nacional en Mozambique. Él evita cuidadosamente mencionar que África agregará 3 mil millones en UN futuro próximo (la proyección oficial de la ONU), eliminando toda la naturaleza, junto con la paz, la belleza, la decencia, la cordura y la esperanza. Al final, está claro que todo este triste asunto será sólo el más pequeño golpe en el camino y, como todas las cosas que ejercen nuestra atención ahora, pronto será olvidado como los horrores de la maternidad desenfrenada y la subyugación del mundo por los siete sociópatas que gobiernan a China hacer que la sociedad se derrumbe. Pero uno puede estar seguro de que incluso cuando el calentamiento global ha puesto a Harvard bajo el mar y el hambre, la enfermedad y la violencia son la norma diaria, habrá quienes insisten en que no se debe a las actividades humanas (la opinión 370 de la mitad del público estadounidense actualmente) y que sobre población no es un problema (la vista del 40%), habrá miles de millones rezando a su Deidad elegida por una lluvia de grandes Macs desde el cielo, y que (suponiendo que la empresa de la ciencia no se ha derrumbado, que está asumiendo mucho) alguien en algún lugar estará escribiendo un papel abrazando selección de grupo. 371 Una revisión del Asesino al Lado (The Murderer Next Door) por David Buss (2005)(revisión revisada 2019) Michael Starks Abstracto Aunque este volumen es un poco anticuado, hay pocos libros populares recientes que tratan específicamente con la psicología del asesinato y es una visión general rápida disponible por unos pocos dólares, por lo que aún así vale la pena el esfuerzo. No hace ningún intento de ser exhaustiva y es algo superficial en los lugares, con el lector se espera que llene los espacios en blanco de sus muchos otros libros y la vasta literatura sobre la violencia. Para una actualización, véase, por ejemplo, Buss, el Manual de Psicología Evolutiva 2nd Ed. v1 (2016) p 265, 266, 270 – 282, 388 – 389, 545 – 546, 547, 566 y Buss, Psicología Evolutiva 5o Ed. (2015) p 26, 96 – 97223, 293-4, 300, 309 – 312, 410 y Shackelford y Hansen , La evolución de la violencia (2014). Ha estado entre los mejores psicólogos evolutivos durante varias décadas y cubre una amplia gama de comportamientos en sus obras, pero aquí se concentra casi enteramente en los mecanismos psicológicos que causan que las personas individuales asesinen y sus posibles función evolutiva en el EEA (medio ambiente de adaptación evolutiva - i. e., las llanuras de África durante los últimos millones de años). Buss comienzan señalando que como con otros comportamientos, las explicaciones ' alternativas ' como la psicopatología, los celos, el entorno social, las presiones grupales, las drogas y el alcohol, etc. no explican realmente, ya que la pregunta sigue siendo en cuanto a por qué estos producen impulsos homicidas, es decir, son las causas próximas y no las últimas evolutivas (genéticas). Como siempre, inevitablemente se reduce a la aptitud inclusiva (selección de parientes), y por lo tanto a la lucha por el acceso a los compañeros y recursos, que es la máxima explicación para todos los comportamientos en todos los organismos. Los datos sociológicos (y el sentido común) aclaran que los machos más pobres son los más propensos a matar. Él presenta sus propios y otros datos de homicidios de las naciones industrializadas, y las culturas tribales, la matanza conespecífica en animales, la arqueología, los datos del FBI y su propia investigación sobre las fantasías homicidas de las personas normales. Mucha evidencia arqueológica continúa acumulando asesinatos, incluyendo el de grupos enteros, o de grupos menos mujeres jóvenes, en tiempos prehistóricos. Después de examinar los comentarios de Buss, presento un breve resumen de la psicología intencional (la estructura lógica de la racionalidad), que se cubre extensamente en mis muchos otros artículos y libros. Aquellos con mucho tiempo que quieran una historia detallada de violencia homicida desde una perspectiva evolutiva pueden consultar a Steven Pinker ' los mejores ángeles de nuestra naturaleza por qué la violencia ha disminuido ' (2012), y mi revisión de ella, fácilmente disponible en la red y en dos de mis libros recientes. Brevemente, 372 Pinker señala que el asesinato ha disminuido de manera constante y dramática por un factor de alrededor de 30 desde nuestros días como forrajeras. Por lo tanto, a pesar de que las armas ahora hacen que sea extremadamente fácil matar a alguien, el homicidio es mucho menos común. Pinker piensa que esto se debe a varios mecanismos sociales que traen a cabo nuestros "mejores ángeles", pero creo que se debe principalmente a la abundancia temporal de recursos de la violación despiadada de nuestro planeta, junto con una mayor presencia policial, con la comunicación y sistemas de vigilancia y jurídicos que hacen que sea mucho más probable que sea castigado. Esto se hace claro cada vez que hay incluso una ausencia breve y local de la policía. Aquellos que deseen un marco completo hasta la fecha para el comportamiento humano de la moderna dos sistemas punto de vista puede consultar mi libro 'La Estructura Lógica de la Filosofía, la Psicología, la Mente y Lenguaje en Ludwig Wittgenstein y John Searle ' 2nd Ed (2019). Los interesados en más de mis escritos pueden ver 'Monos parlantes--filosofía, psicología, ciencia, religión y política en un planeta condenado--artículos y reseñas 2006-2019 3rd Ed (2019) y delirios utópicos suicidas en el 21St Century 4TH Ed (2019) Buss comienzan señalando que como con otros comportamientos, las explicaciones ' alternativas ' como la psicopatología, los celos, el entorno social, las presiones grupales, las drogas y el alcohol, etc. no explican realmente, ya que la pregunta sigue siendo en cuanto a por qué estos producen impulsos homicidas, es decir, son las causas próximas y no las últimas evolutivas (genéticas). Como siempre, inevitablemente se reduce a la aptitud inclusiva (selección de parientes), y por lo tanto a la lucha por el acceso a los compañeros y recursos, que es la máxima explicación para todos los comportamientos en todos los organismos. Los datos sociológicos (y el sentido común) aclaran que los machos más pobres son los más propensos a matar. Él presenta sus propios y otros datos de homicidios de las naciones industrializadas, y las culturas tribales, la matanza conespecífica en animales, la arqueología, los datos del FBI y su propia investigación sobre las fantasías homicidas de las personas normales. Mucha evidencia arqueológica continúa acumulando asesinatos, incluyendo el de grupos enteros, o de grupos menos mujeres jóvenes, en tiempos prehistóricos. En el p 12 señala que la guerra entre cada individuo y el mundo sobre los recursos comienza en la concepción, cuando comienza a crecer robando a su madre de alimentos y estresando su cuerpo, y cuando su sistema se enfrenta a consecuencias fatales con frecuencia para el conceptus. No nos dice que las estimaciones del aborto espontáneo están en el rango de hasta alrededor del 30% de todas las concepciones, por lo que hasta 80 millones al año mueren, la mayoría de las primeras que la madre ni siquiera sabe que está embarazada, y tal vez su período es un poco tarde. Esto es parte de la eugenesia de la naturaleza que no hemos logrado derrotar, aunque el efecto disgénico general de la civilización continúa y cada día los aprox. 300.000 que 373 nacen son en promedio un poco menos mentalmente un ajuste físico que el aprox. 100.000 que mueren, con un aumento neto de la población mundial de ca. 200.000 y una población "no apta" cada vez más grande para destruir la tierra (mientras que son en parte o un apoyado por sus vecinos "ajuste"). En P13 dice que no sabemos con certeza que el O.J. Simpson era culpable, pero yo diría que independientemente del juicio que sabemos que era, ya que es la única interpretación razonable de los hechos del caso, que incluyen su comportamiento bizarro. También, en el posterior juicio civil, donde sus abogados de defensa multimillonaria no estaban presentes para subvertir la justicia, fue rápidamente condenado, lo que condujo a la vinculación de sus activos, que condujo a su condena por robo armado y encarcelamiento. Señala en P20 que había alrededor de 100 millones asesinatos conocidos en todo el mundo en los últimos 100 años, con tal vez tantos como 300 millones si todos los no reportados fueron incluidos. No creo que cuente el aprox. 40 millones por el partido comunista chino (que no cuenta los aprox. 60 millones que murieron de hambre), ni los diez de millones de Stalin. También hay que tener en cuenta que la tasa de asesinatos de Estados Unidos se reduce en un 75% debido al sistema médico de clase mundial que salva a la mayoría de las víctimas de los intentos. Añadiremos que México tiene aproximadamente 5X la tasa de asesinatos de EEUU y Honduras alrededor de 20X, y sus descendientes ciertamente pueden mirar adelante a nuestra tasa moviéndose en esa dirección debido al fatal abrazo de la diversidad de Estados Unidos. Ann Coulter en ' Adios America ' (2015) señala que los hispanos han cometido alrededor de 23.000 asesinatos aquí en las últimas décadas. Por ahora, nada se hará, y el crimen aquí llegará a los niveles en México mientras la frontera continúa disolvió y el colapso ambiental y acercándose a la bancarrota disuelven la economía. Dentro de México en 2014 solo, 100 ciudadanos estadounidenses fueron asesinados y más de 130 secuestrados y otros acaban de desaparecer, y si agregas a otros extranjeros y mexicanos se encuentra con miles. Ver mi ' suicidio por la democracia ' 2Nd Ed (2019) para más detalles. Incluso un país pequeño y ligeramente transitado como Honduras gestiona unos 10 asesinatos y 2 secuestros al año de ciudadanos estadounidenses. Y estos son los mejores momentos - se está poniendo cada vez peor como la maternidad desenfrenada y el agotamiento de los recursos acercar cada vez más el colapso. Además de los continuos aumentos en el crimen de todo tipo, veremos que el porcentaje de crímenes resueltos cae a los niveles extremadamente bajos del tercer mundo. Más recursos se dedican a la solución de asesinatos que cualquier otro delito y alrededor de 65% se resuelven en los EE.UU., pero en México menos de 2% se resuelven y a medida que se obtiene más de la ciudad de México la tasa desciende a casi cero. También tenga en cuenta que la tasa aquí solía ser alrededor de 80%, pero ha caído en paralelo con el aumento de la diversa. También 65% es el promedio, pero si usted podría obtener estadísticas estoy seguro de que se elevaría con el porcentaje de euro en una ciudad y caer como el porcentaje de diversos aumentos. En Detroit (83% negro) sólo 30% se resuelven. Si se lleva un registro de quién roba, viola y asesina, 374 es obvio que las vidas negras importan mucho más a los euros (los de ascendencia europea) que a otros negros. Estas son mis observaciones. A lo largo de la historia, las mujeres han estado en una desventaja importante cuando se trataba de asesinar, pero con la disponibilidad lista de armas, esperaríamos que esto cambiara, pero en P22 encontramos que alrededor del 87% de los asesinos de Estados Unidos son hombres y para el mismo sexo matando esto asciende a 95% y se trata de TH e mismo en todo el mundo. Claramente algo en la psique masculina fomenta la violencia como una ruta a la aptitud que es en gran parte ausente en las mujeres. También es relevante que los asesinatos de conocidos sean más comunes que los de extraños. En P37 señala que con alta probabilidad de convicción (y yo diría que la mayor probabilidad de que la víctima o los demás estarán armados), el asesinato es ahora une costosa estrategia que antiguamente, pero creo que esto depende enteramente de quién eres. En una ciudad en gran parte euro USA, o entre personas de clase media y alta, más del 95% de los asesinatos podrían resolverse, pero en clase baja Áreas tal vez el 20% podría ser, y para las áreas dominadas por pandillas incluso menos que eso. Y en los países del 3er mundo las probabilidades de justicia son incluso más bajas, especialmente cuando son cometidas por miembros de pandillas, por lo que es una estrategia altamente viable, especialmente si se planea con anticipación. próximo, se ocupa de la violencia y el asesinato como parte de las estrategias de apareamiento, que han estado claramente a lo largo de nuestra evolución, y permanecen tan especialmente entre las clases bajas y en los países del tercer mundo. Él toma nota del frecuente asesinato de esposas o amantes por los hombres durante o después de las rupturas. Comenta al pasar la selección de pareja y la infidelidad, pero hay una discusión mínima ya que estos temas son tratados con gran detalle en sus otros escritos y volúmenes editados. Ahora es bien sabido que las mujeres tienden a tener relaciones con hombres sexys que no seleccionarían como un compañero permanente (la teoría del hijo sexy) y para aparearse con ellos en sus días más fértiles. Todos estos fenómenos se ven desde una perspectiva evolutiva (es decir, lo que sería la ventaja de fitness han sido antes). Hay una selección muy fuerte para los comportamientos que impiden que un hombre criar hijos engendrados por otra persona por las mismas razones que ' selección de grupo ' es fuertemente seleccionado contra (vea mi ensayo sobre el grupo Selección ' altruismo, Jesús y el fin del mundo... '). Sin embargo la vida moderna ofrece amplias oportunidades para los asuntos, y los estudios genéticos han demostrado que un alto porcentaje de los niños son engendrados por otros que el putativeo socio de su madre, con un porcentaje que aumenta de un poco a un 30%, ya que uno desciende de las clases superiores a las inferiores en varios países occidentales modernos en varios períodos y, sin duda, mayor que en muchos 3Rd países del mundo. En su libro "guerras de esperma: la ciencia del sexo" (2006) Robin Baker resume: ' las cifras reales oscilan entre el 1% en áreas de alto estatus de los Estados Unidos y Suiza, hasta el 5% y el 6% para varones de estatus moderado en los Estados Unidos y Gran Bretaña, de 10 a 30 375 por ciento para los varones de estatus inferior en los Estados Unidos, Gran Bretaña y Francia. Uno podría suponer que en las sociedades donde tanto hombres como mujeres están muy concentrados en las ciudades y tienen teléfonos móviles, este porcentaje está aumentando, especialmente en el tercer mundo donde el uso del control de la natalidad y el aborto es errático. Descubre que la mayoría de los hombres y mujeres que asesinan a sus compañeros son jóvenes y cuanto más jóvenes son sus compañeros, más probabilidades habrá de que sean asesinadas. Como todo comportamiento, esto es difícil de explicar sin una perspectiva evolutiva. Un estudio encontró que los hombres de sus 40 años constituían el 23% de los asesinos de pareja, pero los hombres en sus 50 sólo 7,7%, y el 79% de los asesinos femeninos de mate estaban entre 16 y 39. Tiene sentido que los más jóvenes que son, cuanto mayor sea la pérdida de aptitud potencial para el macho (disminución de la reproducción) y así más intensa la respuesta emocional. Como dice Buss: "de Australia a Zimbabwe, cuanto más joven es la mujer, más alta es la probabilidad de que sea asesinada como resultado de una infidelidad sexual o dejar una relación romántica. Las mujeres en el soporte de 15 a 24 años de edad están en el mayor riesgo. " Un alto porcentaje es asesinado dentro de dos meses de separación y la mayoría en el primer año. Un estudio encontró que el 88% de ellos había sido acechado antes de ser asesinado. En algunos capítulos hay citas de personas que dan sus sentimientos acerca de sus compañeros infieles y estos típicamente incluyen fantasías homicidas, que fueron más intensas y pasaron por períodos más largos para los hombres que para las mujeres. Dedica algún tiempo al mayor riesgo de abuso y asesinato de tener un padrastro con, por ejemplo, el riesgo para una niña de violación que aumenta alrededor de 10X si su padre es un padrastro. Ahora es muy sabido que en una amplia gama de mamíferos, un macho nuevo que se encuentre con una hembra con crías intentará matarlos. Un estudio de EE.UU. encontró que si uno o ambos padres son sustitutos, esto eleva la posibilidad del niño de ser asesinado en el hogar entre 40 y 100X (P174). Un canadiense estudio encontró que la tasa de muertes venciendo aumentó 27X si uno de los padres en un matrimonio registrado era un padrastro mientras se levantaba más de 200X si el sustituto era un novio vivo. Las tasas de abuso infantil en Canadá aumentaron 40X cuando había un padrastro. En los seres humanos, el estar sin recursos es un fuerte estímulo para que las mujeres eliminen a sus hijos existentes con el fin de atraer a un nuevo compañero. Un estudio canadiense descubrió que a pesar de que las mujeres solteras solo eran el 12% de todas las madres, cometieron más del 50% de los infanticidas (p169). Dado que las mujeres más jóvenes pierden menos aptitud de una muerte infantil que las más viejas, no sorprende que un Cross-estudio cultural encontró que los adolescentes mataron a sus bebés a tasas de alrededor de 30 veces la de las mujeres en sus veinte años (P170). A continuación, discute brevemente los asesinos seriales y los violadores seriales, el más exitoso de todos los tiempos son los mongoles de Gengis Khan, cuyos cromosomas Y están representados en alrededor del 8% de todos los hombres en los territorios que 376 controlaban, o unos 20 millones hombres (y un número igual de mujeres) o alrededor de medio por ciento de todas las personas en la tierra, lo que los hace fácilmente el más genéticamente aptos de todas las personas que han vivido en tiempos históricos. Aunque este volumen es un poco anticuado, hay pocos libros populares recientes que tratan específicamente con la psicología del asesinato y es una visión general rápida disponible por unos pocos dólares, por lo que aún así vale la pena el esfuerzo. No hace ningún intento de ser exhaustiva y es algo superficial en los lugares, con el lector se espera que llene los espacios en blanco de sus muchos otros libros y la vasta literatura sobre la violencia. Para una actualización, véase, por ejemplo, Buss, el manual de Psicología evolutiva 2nd Ed. v1 (2016) p 265, 266, 270 – 282, 388 – 389, 545 – 546, 547, 566 y Buss, Psicología evolutiva 5o Ed. (2015) p 26, 96 – 97223, 293-4, 300, 309 – 312, 410 y Shackelford y Hansen , La evolución de la violencia (2014) ha estado entre los mejores psicólogos evolutivos durante varias décadas y cubre una amplia gama de comportamientos en sus obras, pero aquí se concentra casi enteramente en los mecanismos psicológicos que hacen que las personas individuales asesinato y su posible función evolutiva en el EEE (medio ambiente de adaptación evolutiva - i. e., las llanuras de África durante los últimos millones de años). Aquellos con mucho tiempo que quieran una historia detallada de violencia homicida desde una perspectiva evolutiva pueden consultar a Steven Pinker ' los mejores ángeles de nuestra naturaleza-por qué la violencia ha disminuido ' (2012) y mi revisión de ella fácilmente disponible en la red y en dos de mis libros recientes. Brevemente, Pinker señala que el asesinato ha disminuido de manera constante y dramática por un factor de alrededor de 30 desde nuestros días como forrajeras. Por lo tanto, a pesar de que las armas ahora hacen que sea extremadamente fácil matar a alguien, el homicidio es mucho menos común. Pinker cree que esto se debe a varios mecanismos sociales que traen a cabo nuestros "mejores ángeles", pero creo que se debe principalmente a la abundancia temporal de recursos de la violación despiadada de nuestro planeta, junto con una mayor presencia policial, con la comunicación y la vigilancia y los sistemas jurídicos que hacen que sea mucho más probable que sea castigado. Esto se hace claro cada vez que hay incluso una ausencia breve y local de la policía. Otros también toman la opinión de que tenemos un "lado agradable" que es genéticamente innato y apoya el trato favorable de incluso aquellos que no están estrechamente relacionados con nosotros (' selección de grupo '). Esto se confunde irremediablemente y he hecho mi pequeña parte para que descanse en ' altruismo, Jesús y el fin del mundo-cómo la Fundación Templeton compró una Cátedra de Harvard y atacó la evolución, la racionalidad y la civilización. Una reseña de E.O. Wilson ' The social Conquista de la tierra ' (2012) y Nowak y Highfield ' SuperCooperators ' (2012) '. Aquellos que deseen un marco completo hasta la fecha para el comportamiento humano de la moderna dos sistemas punto de vista puede consultar mi libro 'La Estructura Lógica de la Filosofía, la Psicología, la Mente y Lenguaje en Ludwig 377 Wittgenstein y John Searle ' 2nd Ed (2019). Los interesados en más de mis escritos pueden ver 'Monos parlantes--filosofía, psicología, ciencia, religión y política en un planeta condenado--artículos y reseñas 2006-2019 3rd Ed (2019) y delirios utópicos suicidas en el 21St Century 4TH Ed (2019) Ahora presento un breve resumen de la psicología intencional (la estructura lógica de la racionalidad) que se cubre extensamente en mis muchos otros artículos y libros. La violencia impulsiva implicará las funciones subcorticales automatizadas del sistema 1, pero a veces se deliberan con anticipación a través del sistema cortical 2. Hace aproximadamente un millón de años los primates evolucionaron la capacidad de usar sus músculos de la garganta para hacer series complejas de ruidos (es decir, el habla) que hace unos 100.000 años habían evolucionado para describir los eventos presentes (percepciones, memoria, acciones reflexivas con expresiones básicas que se pueden describir como juegos de idiomas primarios (PLG) que describen el sistema 1, es decir, el sistema automatizado rápido e inconsciente, los Estados mentales solo verdaderos con un tiempo y ubicación precisos). Gradualmente desarrollamos la capacidad adicional para abarcar los desplazamientos en el espacio y el tiempo para describir recuerdos, actitudes y eventos potenciales (el pasado y el futuro y, a menudo, preferencias, inclinaciones o disposiciones condicionales o ficticias) con los juegos de lenguaje secundario (SLG) del sistema dos-lento consciente de la actitud de proposicional, que no tiene un tiempo preciso y son habilidades y no estados mentales. Las preferencias son intuiciones, tendencias, reglas ontológicas automáticas, comportamientos, habilidades, módulos cognitivos, rasgos de personalidad, plantillas, Motores de inferencia, inclinaciones, emociones, actitudes proposicionales, valoraciones, capacidades, hipótesis. Las emociones son tipo 2 preferencias (Wittgenstein RPP2 p148). "Yo creo", "él ama", "piensan" son descripciones de posibles actos públicos típicamente desplazados en el espacio-tiempo. Mi primer declaraciones de persona sobre mí son verdaderas-sólo (excluyendo mentir), mientras que las declaraciones en tercera persona sobre otros son verdaderas o falsas (ver mi reseña de Johnston-' Wittgenstein: Rethinking the Inner '). Ahora que tenemos un comienzo razonable en la estructura lógica de la racionalidad (la psicología descriptiva del pensamiento de orden superior) establecido, podemos ver la tabla de intencionalidad que resulta de este trabajo, que he construido en los últimos años. Se basa en una mucho más simple de Searle, que a su vez le debe mucho a Wittgenstein. También he incorporado en las tablas de forma modificada que son utilizados por los investigadores actuales en la psicología de los procesos de pensamiento que se evidencian en las últimas 9 filas. Debería resultar interesante compararlo con los 3 volúmenes recientes de Peter hacker en Human Nature. Ofrezco esta tabla como una heurística para describir el comportamiento que encuentro más completo y útil que cualquier otro marco que he visto y no como un análisis final o completo, que tendría que ser tridimensional con cientos (al menos) de flechas que van en muchos direcciones con muchas (tal vez todas) vías entre S1 y S2 siendo 378 bidireccional. Además, la distinción entre S1 y S2, cognición y voluntad, percepción y memoria, entre sentimiento, saber, creer y esperar, etc. son arbitrarias--es decir, como demostró W, todas las palabras son contextualmente sensibles y la mayoría tienen varios diferentes usos (significados o COS). La INTENCIONALIDAD se puede ver como la personalidad o como la construcción de la realidad social (el título del libro bien conocido de Searle) y de muchos otros puntos de vista también. Comenzando con el trabajo pionero de Ludwig Wittgenstein en la década de 1930 (los libros azul y marrón) y de los años 50 al presente por sus sucesores Searle, MoyalSharrock, Read, Baker, hacker, Stern, Horwich, Winch, Finkelstein, Coliva etc., he creado el tabla siguiente como heurística para avanzar en este estudio. Las filas muestran diversos aspectos o formas de estudiar y las columnas muestran los procesos involuntarios y comportamientos voluntarios que comprenden los dos sistemas (procesos duales) de la estructura lógica de la conciencia (LSC), que también pueden considerarse como la estructura lógica de la racionalidad (LSR), de la conducta (LSB), de la personalidad (LSP), de la mente (LSM), del lenguaje (LSL), de la realidad (LSOR), de la intencionalidad (LSI)-el término filosófico clásico, la psicología descriptiva de la conciencia (DPC), la psicología descriptiva de Pensé (DPT) – o mejor dicho, el lenguaje de la psicología descriptiva del pensamiento (LDPT), términos introducidos aquí y en mis otros escritos muy recientes. Sugiero que podamos describir el comportamiento más claramente cambiando "imponer condiciones de satisfacción en las condiciones de satisfacción" de Searle a "relacionar los Estados mentales con el mundo moviendo los músculos" - es decir, hablar, escribir y hacer, y su "mente al mundo Dirección de ajuste"y" la dirección del mundo a la mente de ajuste "por" causa se origina en la mente "y" causa se origina en el mundo "S1 es sólo de forma ascendente causal (mundo a la mente) y sin contenido (falta de representaciones o información) mientras que S2 tiene contenidos y es descendente causal (mente al mundo ). He adoptado mi terminología en esta tabla. He hecho explicaciones detalladas de esta tabla en mis otros escritos. 379 DESDE EL ANALISIS DE LOS JUEGOS DE IDIOMAS Disposición Emoción Memoria Percepción Deseo PI * * IA * * * AcciónPalabra Causa origina de * * * * Mundo Mundo Mundo Mundo Mente Mente Mente Mente Provoca cambios en * * * * * Ninguno Mente Mente Mente Ninguno Mundo Mundo Mundo Causalmente Auto Reflexivo * * * * * * No Sí Sí Sí No Sí Sí Sí Verdadero o falso (Comprobable) Sí T sólo T sólo T sólo Sí Sí Sí Sí Condiciones públicas de satisfacción Sí Sí/No Sí/No No Sí/No Sí No Sí Describir Un estado mental No Sí Sí Sí No No Sí/No Sí Prioridad evolutiva 5 4 2, 3 1 5 3 2 2 Contenido voluntario Sí No No No No Sí Sí Sí Iniciación voluntaria Sí/No No Sí No Sí/No Sí Sí Sí Sistema cognitivo ******* 2 1 2/1 1 2/1 2 1 2 Cambiar intensidad No Sí Sí Sí Sí No No No Duración precisa No Sí Sí Sí No No Sí Sí Aquí y Ahora o Allá y Luego (H + N, T + T) ******** TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN Calidad especial No Sí No Sí No No No No Localizado en Cuerpo No No No Sí No No No Sí Las expresiones corporales Sí Sí No No Sí Sí Sí Sí Autocontradiccion es No Sí No No Sí No No No Necesita un yo Sí Sí/No No No Sí No No No Necesita lenguaje Sí No No No No No No Sí/No 380 DE LA INVESTIGACIÓN DE DECISIONES Disposición Emoción Memoria Percepción Deseo PI * * IA * * * Acción/ Palabra Efectos subliminales No Sí/No Sí Sí No No No Sí/No Asociativa Basada en reglas RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB Dependiente del contexto/ Abstracto A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/A CD/A Serie/Paralelo S S/P P P S/P S S S Heurístico Analítica A H/A H H H/A A A A Necesita trabajar Memoria Sí No No No No Sí Sí Sí Dependiente general de la inteligencia Sí No No No Sí/No Sí Sí Sí La carga cognitiva Inhibe Sí Sí/No No No Sí Sí Sí Sí Excitación facilita o inhibe I F/I F F I I I I Condiciones públicas de satisfacción de S2 son a menudo referidos por Searle y otros como COS, representaciones, creadores de la verdad o significados (o COS2 por mí mismo), mientras que los resultados automáticos de S1 son designados como presentaciones por otros (o COS1 por mí mismo). * Aka Inclinaciones, Capacidades, Preferencias, Representaciones, Posibles Acciones, etc. ** Intenciones anteriores de Searle *** La intención de Searle en acción. **** Dirección de ajuste de Searle ***** Dirección de causalidad de Searle ****** (Las instancias del estado mental Causas o se cumple a sí mismo). Searle anteriormente llamó a esto causalmente auto-referencial. ******* Tversky / Kahneman / Frederick / Evans / Stanovich definieron los sistemas cognitivos. ******** Aquí y ahora o allí y luego Una explicación detallada de esta tabla se da en mis otros escritos. Uno siempre debe tener en cuenta el descubrimiento de Wittgenstein de que después 381 de haber descrito los posibles usos (significados, creadores de la verdad, condiciones de satisfacción) del lenguaje en un contexto particular, hemos agotado su interés, y los intentos en la explicación (es decir, la filosofía) sólo nos alejan más de la verdad. Es fundamental tener en cuenta que esta tabla es sólo una heurística libre de contexto muy simplificada y cada uso de una palabra debe examinarse en su contexto. El mejor examen de la variación de contexto está en los últimos 3 volúmenes de Peter hacker en la naturaleza humana, que proporcionan numerosas tablas y gráficos que se deben comparar con este. 382 Suicidio por la democracia-un obituario para América y el mundo (revisado (2019) Michael Starks Abstracto Estados Unidos y el mundo están en proceso de colapso de un crecimiento excesivo de la población, la mayor parte del mismo durante el siglo pasado, y ahora todo, debido a la 3a gente del mundo. El consumo de recursos y la adición de 4 mil millones más CA. 2100 colapsarán la civilización industrial y traerán hambre, enfermedad, violencia y guerra a una escala asombrosa. La tierra pierde al menos el 1% de su tierra vegetal cada año, y el cambio climático disminuirá en gran medida la producción de alimentos en gran parte del mundo, por lo que se acerca a 2100, la mayor parte de su capacidad de cultivo de alimentos desaparecerá. Miles de millones morirán y la guerra nuclear es todo menos seguro. En Estados Unidos, Esto se está acelerando enormemente por la masiva reproducción migratoria e inmigrante, combinada con los abusos que la democracia ha hecho posible. La depravada naturaleza humana convierte inexorablemente el sueño de la democracia y la diversidad en una pesadilla de crimen y pobreza. China continuará abrumar a Estados Unidos y al mundo, destruyendo la paz, la prosperidad y la libertad, mientras mantenga la dictadura que limite el egoísmo y permite la planificación unida a largo plazo. La causa raíz del colapso es la incapacidad de nuestra psicología innata para adaptarse al mundo moderno, lo que lleva a las personas a tratar a personas no relacionadas como si tuvieran intereses comunes. La idea de los derechos humanos es una fantasía malvada promovida por los izquierdistas para alejar la atención de la despiadada destrucción de la tierra descontrolada por 3Rd maternidad mundial. Esto, más la ignorancia de la biología básica y la psicología, conduce a las delirios de ingeniería social de los parcialmente educados que controlan las sociedades democráticas. Pocos entienden que si usted ayuda a una persona a lastimar a alguien más - no hay almuerzo gratis y cada artículo que alguien consume destruye la tierra más allá de la reparación. Por consiguiente, las políticas sociales en todas partes son insostenibles y una por una todas las sociedades sin estrictos controles sobre el egoísmo se derrumbarán en la anarquía o la dictadura. Los hechos más básicos, casi nunca mencionados, son que no hay suficientes recursos en Estados Unidos o en el mundo para elevar un porcentaje significativo de los pobres de la pobreza y mantenerlos allí. El intento de hacerlo está arruinando a Estados Unidos y destruyendo el mundo. La capacidad de la tierra para producir alimentos disminuye diariamente, al igual que nuestra calidad genética. Y ahora, como siempre, el mayor enemigo de los pobres es, por mucho, otros pobres y no los ricos. Sin cambios dramáticos e inmediatos, no hay esperanza para impidiendo el colapso de Estados Unidos, o cualquier país que siga un sistema democrático. 383 TEL DÍA MÁS TRISTE EN LA HISTORIA DE ESTADOS UNIDOS. El presidente Johnson, con 2 Kennedy y el ex Presidente Hoover, da a Estados Unidos a México, el 3 de OctubreRd, 1965. lobos en ropa de oveja, como la mayoría de los demócratas de ese día en adelante. 384 Prefacio "¿En qué punto se espera el enfoque de peligro? Yo respondo, si alguna vez nos llega debe brotarnos entre nosotros; no puede venir del extranjero. Si la destrucción es nuestro lote, debemos ser su autor y acabador. Como nación de hombres libres debemos vivir todo el tiempo o morir por suicidio. " Abraham Lincoln (1838) Entre los millones de páginas impresas y páginas web y el incesante chat y charla en televisión y blogs y discursos, hay una notable ausencia de un breve resumen claro, honesto, sensato, inteligente de la catástrofe que está destruyendo a Estados Unidos y el mundo. Esto se debe en parte a la falta de entendimiento y en parte a la supresión de la libertad de expresión por parte de la coalición supremacista izquierdista/liberal/progresista/democrática/socialista/multicultural/diversa/socialde mócrata/comunista/tercer mundo. Intento llenar ese hueco aquí. Una parte integral de la democracia moderna es la gran ilusión de la familia feliz, es decir, que somos seleccionados para la cooperación con todos, y que los ideales eufónicos de democracia, diversidad e igualdad nos llevarán a la utopía, si simplemente gestionamos las cosas correctamente (la posibilidad de política). El principio de no libre almuerzo debe advertirnos que no puede ser verdad, y vemos a lo largo de la historia y en todo el mundo contemporáneo, que sin controles estrictos, el egoísmo y la estupidez ganan la ventaja y pronto destruyen cualquier nación que abraza estos delirios. Además, la mente del mono descuentos abruptamente el futuro, y por lo que cooperamos en la venta de la herencia de nuestro descendiente para las comodidades temporales, exacerbando en gran medida los problemas. Describo la gran tragedia que se está haciendo en Estados Unidos y el mundo, que puede ser visto como un resultado directo de nuestra psicología evolucionada, que, aunque eminentemente adaptable y eugénica en las llanuras de África hace 6 millones años, cuando nos separamos de los chimpancés, a CA. 50.000 a hace 150.000 años, cuando muchos de nuestros antepasados dejaron África (es decir, en el EEE o entorno de adaptación evolutiva), ahora es maladaptativo y disgénico y la fuente de nuestros delirios utópicos suicidas. Por lo tanto, como todas las discusiones de comportamiento (filosofía, psicología, sociología, biología, Antropología, política, derecho, literatura, historia, economía, estrategias de fútbol, reuniones de negocios, etc.), este libro es en última instancia sobre estrategias evolutivas, egoístas genes y la aptitud inclusiva (selección de parientes, es decir, selección natural). Uno podría tomar esto para implicar que una sociedad justa, democrática y duradera para cualquier tipo de entidad en cualquier planeta en cualquier universo es sólo un sueño, y que ningún ser o poder podría hacerlo de otra manera. No es sólo "las leyes" de la física que son universales e ineludibles, o tal vez deberíamos decir que la aptitud inclusiva es una ley de la física. 385 La gran mística Osho dijo que la separación de Dios y el cielo de la tierra y la humanidad era la idea más malvada que jamás entró en la mente humana. En los últimos tiempos surgió una noción aún más malvada, que los humanos nacen con derechos, en lugar de tener que ganar privilegios. La idea de los derechos humanos, como ahora se promulga comúnmente, es una fantasía malvada creada por los izquierdistas para alejar la atención de la despiadada destrucción de la tierra descontrolada por 3Rd maternidad mundial. Por lo tanto, cada día la población aumenta en 200.000, que debe ser provisto de recursos para crecer y espacio para vivir, y que pronto producir otro 200.000 etc. Y uno casi nunca escucha que se nota que lo que reciben debe ser tomado de los que ya están vivos, y sus descendientes. Sus vidas disminuyen las que ya están aquí, tanto en las grandes obvias como en las innumerables formas sutiles. Cada nuevo bebé destruye la tierra desde el momento de la concepción. En un mundo horriblemente abarrotado de recursos que se desvanecen, no puede haber derechos humanos sin destruir la tierra y el futuro de nuestros descendientes. No podría ser más obvio, pero rara vez se menciona de una manera clara y directa, y uno nunca verá las calles llenas de manifestantes contra la maternidad. El hecho más básico, casi nunca mencionado, es que no hay suficientes recursos en Estados Unidos o en el mundo para elevar un porcentaje significativo de los pobres de la pobreza y mantenerlos allí. El intento de hacerlo está arruinando a Estados Unidos y destruyendo el mundo. La capacidad de la tierra para producir alimentos disminuye diariamente, al igual que nuestra calidad genética. Y ahora, como siempre, el mayor enemigo de los pobres es, por mucho, otros pobres y no los ricos. Estados Unidos y el mundo están en el proceso de colapso de un crecimiento excesivo de la población, la mayoría de ella para el siglo pasado, y ahora todo ello, debido a la 3a gente del mundo. El consumo de recursos, y la adición de unos 3 mil millones más CA. 2100, colapsarán la civilización industrial y traerán hambre, enfermedad, violencia y guerra a una escala asombrosa. La tierra pierde al menos el 1% de su tierra vegetal cada año, por lo que se acerca a 2100, la mayor parte de su capacidad de cultivo de alimentos desaparecerá. Miles de millones morirán y la guerra nuclear es todo menos seguro. En Estados Unidos, esto se está acelerando enormemente por la masiva reproducción migratoria e inmigrante, combinada con los abusos que la democracia ha hecho posible. La depravada naturaleza humana convierte inexorablemente el sueño de la democracia y la diversidad en una pesadilla de crimen y pobreza. China continuará abrumar a Estados Unidos y al mundo, siempre y cuando mantenga la dictadura que limita el egoísmo y permite a largo plazo Planificación. La causa principal del colapso es la incapacidad de nuestra psicología innata para adaptarse al mundo moderno, lo que lleva a las personas a tratar a personas no relacionadas como si tuvieran intereses comunes (lo que sugiero puede ser considerado como un no reconocido-pero el más común y más grave--problema psicológico--trastorno de fitness inclusivo). Esto, más la ignorancia de la biología básica y la psicología, conduce a las delirios de ingeniería social de los parcialmente educados que controlan las sociedades democráticas. Pocos entienden que si usted ayuda a una 386 persona a lastimar a alguien más - no hay almuerzo gratis y cada artículo que alguien consume destruye la tierra más allá de la reparación. En consecuencia, las políticas sociales en todas partes son insostenibles y una por una todas las sociedades sin estrictos controles sobre el egoísmo se derrumbarán en la anarquía o la dictadura. Sin cambios dramáticos e inmediatos, no hay esperanza para prevenir el colapso de Estados Unidos, o cualquier país que siga un sistema democrático. Esto sucede incluso sin el cambio climático o los malvados designios de siete sociópatas seniles que gobiernan China, pero hacen que suceda mucho más rápido. El único cambio importante de la primera edición de este ensayo es la adición de una breve discusión de China, que, después de la sobrepoblación, representa con mucho la mayor amenaza para la paz y la libertad en todo el mundo. La política de apaciguar a ellos, que todos los países y la mayoría de las empresas persiguen, es el peor de los delirios utópicos suicidas. Aquellos que deseen un marco completo hasta la fecha para el comportamiento humano de la moderna dos sistemas punto de vista puede consultar mi libro 'La Estructura Lógica de la Filosofía, la Psicología, la Mente y Lenguaje en Ludwig Wittgenstein y John Searle ' 2nd Ed (2019). Los interesados en más de mis escritos pueden ver 'Monos parlantes--filosofía, psicología, ciencia, religión y política en un planeta condenado--artículos y reseñas 2006-2019 3rd Ed (2019) y delirios utópicos suicidas en el 21St Century 4TH Ed (2019) 387 El porcentaje de estadounidenses nacidos en el extranjero--el resultado de la ley de inmigración "sin impacto demográfico significativo" de 1965-los non europeos (los diversos) fueron una participación del 16%, son ahora (2019) sobre 38% y será de aproximadamente 60% por 2100, ya que ahora son el 100% del aumento de la población de alrededor de 2,4 millones cada año. Suicidio por democracia. Parte del costo de la diversidad y del envejecimiento, siendo el mundo Impago policía, etc., (sin contar pasivos futuros que son de 5 a 10 veces como mucho, salvo grandes cambios sociales). Definiciones útiles para entender política Americana DIVERSIDAD: 1. programa gubernamental de Estados Unidos para entregar el control a México. 2. programa gubernamental de Estados Unidos para proporcionar gratuitamente o fuertemente subvencionados bienes y servicios a los de otros países. 3. un medio para convertir a Estados Unidos en un 3er mundo aguajuero del infierno. 4. multiculturalismo, multietismo, multipartidismo, inclusividad, la supremacía del tercer mundo. RACISTA: 1. persona opuesta a la diversidad en el sentido anterior. 2. persona de diferentes etnias que discrepan de mí en cualquier asunto. 3. persona de cualquier etnia que discrepa conmigo en cualquier cosa. Además, llamado ' Bigot ' hater o ' nativist '. SUPREMACIST Blanco: cualquiera que se oponga a la diversidad en el sentido anterior, es decir, cualquiera que intente evitar el colapso de América y de civilización industrial mundial. 388 SUPREMACISTA del Tercer Mundo: cualquier persona a favor de la diversidad en los sentidos superiores. Cualquiera que trabaje para destruir su descendiente's futuro. Tambien conocido como demócratas, socialistas, Neomarxistas, socialistas demócratas, marxistas, izquierdistas, liberales, progresivos, comunistas, maternalistas, fascistas izquierdistas, multiculturalistas, inclusivistas, derechistas humanos. ODIO: 1. Cualquier oposición a la diversidad en el sentido anterior. 2. expresión de un deseo de impedir el colapso de Estados Unidos y del mundo. EURO: blanco o caucásico o europeo: uno cuyos antepasados dejaron África hace más de 50.000 años. NEGRO: Africano o Afroamericano: uno cuyos antepasados se quedaron en África o se fueron en los últimos cien años (por lo que no ha habido tiempo para la evolución de cualquier diferencia significativa de euros). Diversos: Cualquier persona que no sea EURO (Europeo, blanco, Caucásico). DERECHOS humanos: una fantasía malvada creada por los izquierdistas para alejar la atención de la despiadada destrucción de la tierra descontrolada 3Rd reproducción mundial. Por lo tanto, las anomalías temporales, como la democracia, la igualdad, los sindicatos, los derechos de las mujeres, los derechos del niño, los derechos de los animales, etc. se deben a altos niveles de vida creados por la violación del planeta y desaparecerán a medida que la civilización colapse y China gobierna el mundo. En primer lugar, debo señalar que no tengo ninguna inversión en el resultado de ningún movimiento social o político. Soy viejo, sin hijos o parientes cercanos, y en un abrir y cerrar de ojos voy a estar fuera (por supuesto, lo más importante a recordar es que muy pronto todos vamos a estar fuera y nuestros descendientes se enfrentarán las terribles consecuencias de nuestra estupidez y egoísmo). Ofrezco estos comentarios con la esperanza de que darán perspectiva, ya que Concisa los análisis racionales y competentes de la peligrosa situación en Estados Unidos y el mundo son casi inexistentes. Tengo Cerca amigos de varias etnias, varias veces dado mis únicos activos a una persona pobre del tercer mundo (no yo no heredé nada significativo, no tenía parientes ricos, un fondo fiduciario o un trabajo cómodo), han tenido amigos del tercer mundo, colegas, novias, esposas y socios comerciales, y ayudó a cualquier persona en cualquier forma que pudiera sin importar la raza, edad, credo, preferencias sexuales o de origen nacional o posición en el espectro del autismo, y sigo haciéndolo. No he votado en ningún tipo de elección, pertenecía a ninguna Religiosa grupo social o político, escuchó un discurso político o leyó un libro sobre política en más de 50 años, como lo consideré inútil y degradante que mis puntos de vista tengan el mismo peso que los de idiotas, lunáticos, criminales y simplemente sin educación (es decir, alrededor del 95% de la población). Encuentro que casi todos los diálogos políticos son superficiales, equivocados e inútiles. Este es mi primer y último comentario social/político. Los millones de artículos diarios, discursos Tweets y newsbites edición rara vez lo mencionan, pero lo que está sucediendo en Estados Unidos y en todo el mundo no son algunos eventos transitorios y no conectados, sino la historia infinitamente triste del colapso inexorable de la civilización industrial debido a la sobrepoblación y de la libertad debida a ella y a las dictaduras malignas que son el PCC (partido comunista chino) y el Islam. Aunque estas son la única cuestión importantes, Ellos Rara vez se indica claramente en los interminables debates y las convulsiones sociales diarias, y Pocos las cosas en este artículo se discuten alguna vez en cualquier claras y manera inteligente, en gran parte porque los diversos (es decir, los que no son de ascendencia europea) tienen una retención de estrangulación en Americano y más occidental medios de comunicación que lo hacen imposible. Política en los países democráticos se dedica casi enteramente a proporcionar la oportunidad para cada grupo de interés especial para obtener un mayor parte de los rapidimente disminuyendo recursos. El problema es que casi todas las personas son cortasavistado, egoísta, mal educado, carente de experiencia y estúpida y esto crea un problema insoluble cuando hay 10 mil millones (por fin de siglo), o cuando constituyen la mayoría de cualquier electorado en un sistema democrático. Una cosa es cometer errores cuando hay tiempo y recursos para corregirlos, pero bastante otro cuando es imposible. Estados Unidos es el peor de los casos, ya que parece tener vastos recursos y una economía resiliente, y lo que yo y la mayoría de las personas crecimos con respecto a las maravillosas tradiciones de la justicia, la democracia y la igualdad, pero ahora veo que estas son invitaciones a la explotación por cada especial grupo de interés (especialmente Hispanos, el PCC y el Islam) y que dar privilegios para todos los nacidos, sin imponer deberes, tienen consecuencias fatales. Además, un sistema que opera de esta manera no puede competir con los que no lo hacen-Asia y sobre todo China está comiendo el almuerzo de los Estados Unidos (y el de todos los países no asiáticos), y nada es probable que detenerlo, pero por supuesto la sobrepoblación ensombrece a todos (la minoría que sobrevivirá después de los grandes 22Nd/23Rd Siglo muerto) a una vida infernal. Un mundo donde todos son libres de replicar sus genes y consumir recursos como deseen pronto tendrán un aterrizaje duro. El hecho es que la democracia se ha convertido en 389 un licencia para robar-del gobierno-i. e., de la minoría que se encoge que paga impuestos significativos, de la tierra, de todos en todas partes, Y de los propios descendientes, y esa diversidad (multiculturalismo, multipartidismo etc.) en un mundo superpoblado conduce a Insoluble conflicto y colapso. La historia en Estados Unidos es bastante clara. En lo que ahora se puede ver como el primer gran desastre derivado de la idea cristiana lunática de los derechos humanos innatos el políticos de los Estados del Norte decidieron que era inapropiado que el sur tuviera esclavos. La esclavitud era sin duda una idea desmocada y malvada y estaba desapareciendo en todo el mundo, y habría sido eliminada con presiones económicas y políticas después de la emancipación a través de la 13TH Enmienda. Pero entonces, como ahora, los delirios utópicos prevalecieron, y so atacaron el sur, matando y paralizando a millones y Crear la pobreza y disgenicas Caos (la muerte y la debilidad de un gran porcentaje de hombres euro capaces) cuyos efectos están todavía con nosotros. Los africanos replicando sus genes en a tasa más alta, resultando en heredero que viene a comprender un porcentaje creciente del país. Nadie se dio cuenta en el momento y la mayoría todavía no, pero este fue el comienzo del colapso de Estados Unidos y los defectos en la psicología que llevaron al norte a perseguir al sur fueron una continuación de los fanatismos cristianos que produjeron el asesinato y la tortura de millones durante la edad media, la Inquisición, el genocidio de los nuevos indios del mundo por los europeos, las cruzadas y los jihads de los musulmanes durante los últimos 1200 años. EIIL, al-queda, los cruzados y el ejército del norte tienen mucho en común. Sin preguntar a los votantes, unos pocos miles de estadistas y congresionistas y el Presidente Lincoln hizo ex-esclavos ciudadanos esclavos y les dio el derecho de votar a través de las enmiendas 14 y 15. Gradualmente llegaron a ser vastas guetos compuestos por ex esclavos, donde florecieron el crimen y la pobreza, y donde las drogas (importadas mayoritariamente por hispanos) generaron un vasto imperio criminal, cuyos usuarios cometieron cientos de millones de crímenes cada año. Luego vino el Demócratas liderados por el Kennedys, quien, criado en privilegio y desconectado del mundo real, y teniendo como casi todos los políticos ninguna pista sobre la biología, la psicología, la ecología humana o la historia, decidió en 1965 que era sólo democrático y justo que el país debería cambiar las leyes de inmigración para disminuir la afluencia de europeos en favor de la 3a gente del mundo (la diversa). Aprobaron la ley y en 1965 el Presidente Lyndon Johnson la firmó (véase cubrir foto). Hubo dudas de algunos trimestres de que esto destruiría a Estados Unidos, ¡ pero se les aseguró que no habría "ningún impacto demográfico significativo"! El público estadounidense nunca (hasta el día de hoy en 2019) tuvo la oportunidad de expresar sus opiniones (es decir, votar), a menos que cuente la elección de Trump como esa oportunidad, y el Congreso y varios presidentes cambiaron nuestra democracia en una "democracia socialista", es decir, en un Neomarxista, el estado fascista supremacista del tercer mundo. Los chinos están encantados ya que no tienen que luchar contra los EE.UU. y otras democracias para el dominio, pero sólo para esperar Ellos colapsar. Hace algunas décadas, William Brennen, jefe de Justicia de la Corte Suprema, sugirió que una ley aprobada un siglo antes, para garantizar la ciudadanía a los antiguos esclavos (el primer fatal Legislativa Error, el segundo les da el voto), debe aplicarse a cualquier persona que haya nacido en América. Posteriormente, otras sentencias del Tribunal (no las personas, que nunca se han preguntado) decidieron todos los nacidos en los Estados Unidos, independientemente del estado parental (por ejemplo, incluso si eran extranjeros de otro sistema solar) tenían derecho a la ciudadanía estadounidense (bebés ancla) y fueron Posteriormente permitido hacer ciudadanos de todos sus parientes – (él tercero y cuarto errores fatales). Una vez más, nunca cruzó las mentes del Congreso o de los tribunales que la Constitución no dio ninguno de esos derechos, ni que se le permitiera al público estadounidense votar sobre esto. Además de los millones de personas 3rd mundo aquí ' ' legalmente "(es decir, con el permiso de unos pocos cientos en el Congreso, pero no la gente) millones empezaron a entrar ilegalmente y todos los niños producidos en aproximadamente 3 veces la tasa de los estadounidenses existentes y generados siempre problemas sociales crecientes. La mayoría de los diversos poco o ningún impuesto, y por lo que viven parcial o totalmente en los folletos del gobierno (es decir, impuestos pagados por el minoría cada vez más decreciente de los estadounidenses que pagan cualquier, así como el dinero prestado de las futuras generaciones a la melodía de $2,5 mil millones al día, añadido a la $18 billones en la deuda y el $90 billones o más de obligaciones futuras no financiadas-Medicare, seguridad social, etc.), mientras que el sistema agrícola, vivienda, calles y autopistas, alcantarillas, sistemas de agua y electricidad, parques, escuelas, hospitales, tribunales, transporte público, gobierno, policía, bomberos, servicios de emergencia y los enormes gastos de defensa necesarios para garantizar la continuidad de la existencia de Nuestro País y la mayoría de los demás, se crearon, Administrado y en gran parte pagados por euros (es decir, los de ascendencia europea). El hecho de que los diversos deben su bienestar (en relación con el diverso todavía en el 3er mundo) y su propia existencia (medicina, tecnología, agricultura, represión de la guerra y esclavitud) a euros nunca es mencionado por nadie (ver más abajo). Naturalmente, los euros (y una minoría de impuestos que pagan diversa) están indignados a tener que gastar cada vez más de su vida laboral para apoyar a las legiones de recién llegadas Diversa, para ser inseguro en su propias casas y calles y ver sus pueblos, escuelas, hospitales, parques, etc. siendo tomados y destruidos. Intentan protestar, pero los medios de comunicación 390 ahora están controlados por los diversos (con la ayuda de euros engañados que se dedican a destruir a sus propios descendientes), y ahora es casi imposible de afirmar cualquier oposición a el colapso de Estados Unidos y el mundo sin ser atacado como "racista", "supremacista blanco" o "un hater", y a menudo perdiendo su trabajo por ejercer la libertad de expresión. Las palabras que se refieren a los diversos están casi prohibidas, a menos que sea para alabarlas y ayudar a su racismo genuino (es decir, vivir a expensas de y explotar y abusar en todos los sentidos del euro, y sus diversos vecinos que pagan impuestos), por lo que uno no puede mencionar negros, inmigrantes, hispanos, musulmanes, etc. en la misma discusión con las palabras violadores, terroristas, ladrones, asesinos, abusadores de niños, convictos, criminales, sociales, etc., sin ser acusados de "odio" o "racismo" o "supremacía blanca". Por supuesto, son ajenos a su propio racismo y a la supremacía del tercer mundo. Tenga en cuenta que no hay y casi con certeza nunca habrá ninguna evidencia de una diferencia genética significativa entre euros y diversa en psicología, o IQ, y que su tendencia a la reproducción excesiva y otras deficiencias se debe enteramente a la cultura. Gradualmente, cada tipo de grupo de interés especial ha logrado eliminar cualquier referencia negativa a ellos de cualquier manera fácilmente identificable, por lo que casi ha desaparecido del discurso público no sólo las palabras que se refieren a la diversa, sino a la corta, alta, gorda, delgada, enfermos mentales, discapacitados, genéticamente defectuosos, desfavorecidos, anormales, esquizofrénicos, deprimidos, estúpidos, deshonestos, locos, perezosos, cobardes, egoístas, aburridos, etc. hasta que nada más que agradables trivialidades son escuchadas y una queda perpleja en cuanto a quién llena las cárceles , hospitales y barrios mentales para desbordar, camadas por las calles con basura, destruye los parques, playas y tierras públicas, robos, disturbios, asaltos, violaciones y asesinatos, y utiliza todo el dinero de impuestos, además de un extra 2,5 mil millones dólares al día, añadido a la 18 billones deuda nacional (o más de 90 billones si amplía los pasivos reales en un futuro próximo). Claro, no se debe todo a la diversa, pero cada día que pasa un porcentaje mayor es como sus números se hinchan y los de los euros disminuyen. Ahora es sobre 50 años después de aprobar la nueva ley de inmigración y aproximadamente 16% de la población es hispana (en vez de menos del 1% anterior), que He estado reproduciendo aproximadamente 3X la tasa de euros , por lo que aproximadamente la mitad de los niños menores de 6 años son ahora hispanos, mientras que alrededor del 13% del país son negros, siendo rápidamente desplazados y marginados por los hispanos (aunque pocos negros se dan cuenta, por lo que continúan apoyando a los políticos favoreciendo una mayor inmigración y folletos y prometedoras ganancias a corto plazo). Prácticamente nadie capta el eventual colapso de Estados Unidos y el mundo entero, a pesar de que se puede ver en frente de tus ojos por todas partes. En América y en todo el mundo, los euros (y todos los "ricos" en general) están produciendo menos de dos niños por pareja, por lo que sus poblaciones se están encogiendo, y en Estados Unidos en 2014, por primera vez desde que los euros llegaron aquí en los 16TH siglo, más de murieron que nacieron, por lo que su marginación es cierta. Y, mostrando el "éxito" de la Neomarxista, supremacista del tercer mundo Inmigración y bienestar políticas, la población de hispanos en California aprobó 50%, así que en una década, el 6o economía más grande del mundo será parte de México. La diversa voluntad, en, este Siglo, eliminar todos los Estados Unidos "racismo "(es decir, cualquier oposición o obstáculo legal a la adquisición de todo el poder político, y la apropiación de la mayor parte de su vecino's dinero y propiedad, ya que pueden gestionar,) excepto su propia Racismo (por ejemplo, el impuesto sobre la renta graduado que obliga al euro a apoyarlos). Pronto eliminarán en gran medida las diferencias legales entre los ciudadanos de México y California y luego Texas, que entonces tendrán plenos "derechos" (privilegios) en cualquier lugar de los EE.UU., para que la ciudadanía se vuelva cada vez mas sin sentido (y siempre menor porcentaje de los diversos pagará cualquier impuesto significativo o servirá en el ejército, y un porcentaje mucho más alto continuará recibiendo bienestar y cometiendo crímenes, y para obtener libre o fuertemente subvencionados Escolaridad, atención médica Etc.). Uno no puede mencionar en los medios de comunicación que el racismo predominante en los Estados Unidos es la extorsión por los diversos de cualquier persona con dinero (principalmente Euros pero también cualquier diversa que tenga dinero), la eliminación de la libertad de expresión (excepto la suya), el sesgo de todas las leyes para favorecer esta extorsión, y su rápida adquisición de todas las políticas y financieras poder, es decir, la discriminación total contra euros y cualquier persona perteneciente a las "clases superiores", es decir, cualquier persona que pague impuestos significativos. Gradualmente la pobreza, las drogas, las pandillas, la destrucción del medio ambiente y la corrupción de la policía, el ejército y el gobierno endémicos en México y la mayoría de los otros 3rd países del mundo se está extendiendo por todo Estados Unidos, por lo que podremos cruzar la frontera cada vez más porosa con México sin darse cuenta de que estamos en un país diferente – probablemente dentro de unas pocas décadas, pero ciertamente a finales del siglo. La población sigue aumentando, y aquí como en todas partes del mundo, el aumento es ahora 100% diverso y, al entrar en el próximo siglo (mucho antes en algunos países), los recursos disminuirán y el hambre, la enfermedad, el crimen y la guerra se descontrolarán. Los ricos y las corporaciones en su mayoría seguirán siendo ricos (como siempre, como las cosas empeoran van a tomar su dinero y salir), los pobres serán más 391 pobres y más numerosos, y la vida en todas partes, con la posible excepción de unos pocos países o partes de países donde se previene el crecimiento de la población, será insoportable y no podrá sobrevivir. La cooperación entre los diversos para el control de la sociedad a partir de euros se desmoronará a medida que la sociedad se desintegre y se dividirán en negros, hispanos, musulmanes, chinos, filipinos, gays, ancianos, discapacitados, y más allá donde sea posible en subgrupos interminables. Los ricos contratarán cada vez más guardaespaldas, llevarán armas, conducirán coches a prueba de balas y usarán a la policía privada para protegerlos en sus comunidades y oficinas cerradas, como ya es habitual en los países del 3er mundo. Con mucha menor calidad de vida y alto crimen, algunos pensarán en regresar a sus países de origen, pero también la sobrepoblación agotará los recursos y producirá colapso aún más severo que en Estados Unidos y Europa, y el racismo en el 3er mundo, suprimida temporalmente por una abundancia relativa de recursos y la policía y la presencia militar, se convertirá en alguna vez peor, por lo que la vida será infernal en casi todas partes. La población de los 22Nd siglo se encogerá como miles de millones mueren de hambre, enfermedades, drogas, suicidio, y la guerra civil e internacional. Como Tercero países nucleares del mundo colapsarán (Pakistán, India y tal vez Irán para entonces, gracias a Obama) y son tomados por los radicales, los conflictos nucleares Eventualmente Ocurrir. Aun así, tal vez nadie se atreva a sugerir públicamente que el Primer causa del caos era la maternidad sin restricciones. Claro, gran parte de esta historia ya se ha jugado en América, el Reino Unido y otros lugares, y el resto es inevitable, incluso sin el cambio climático y los apetitos vorosos de China, lo que hace que suceda más rápido. Es sólo una cuestión de cuán malo va a llegar dónde y cuándo. Cualquiera que dude de esto está fuera de contacto con la realidad, pero no puedes engañar a tu madre naturaleza, y sus descendientes ya no lo debatirán ya que se verán obligados a vivirla. Los pobres, y al parecer, Obama, Krugman, Zuckerberg y la mayoría de los demócratas (Neomarxistas), no entiendes el principio de funcionamiento más básico de la civilización, no hay almuerzo gratis. Sólo se puede dar a uno por tomar de otro, ahora o en el futuro. No hay tal cosa como ayudar sin lastimar. Cada dólar y cada elemento tiene valor porque en alguna parte, alguien destruyó la tierra. Y Izquierdistas tienen la ilusión de que pueden resolver todos los problemas robando a los ricos. Para tener una idea de lo absurdo de esto, todos los contribuyentes estadounidenses que ganan más de un millón Dólares tienen un total después de beneficios tributarios de alrededor de 800 mil millones, mientras que el déficit anual es de aproximadamente 1,5 billones, e incluso tomar todo no hace nada para pagar la deuda existente de 18 billones o el aprox. 90 mil billones en pasivos no financiados a corto plazo (por ejemplo, Medicare y social seguridad). Claro, usted no puede aumentar su impuesto o impuestos corporativos mucho más o va a depresionar en gran medida la economía y producir una recesión, pérdidas de empleo y el vuelo de capital, y ya pagan los impuestos más altos, en relación con lo que ganan como un% de los ingresos de la nación , de cualquier país industrializado. Y una vez más, el 1% superior de los asalariados paga alrededor del 50% del impuesto federal sobre la renta total, mientras que el 47% (en su mayoría diversa) no pagan nada. Así que el hecho es que sólo tenemos una especie de democracia, ya que casi hemos nada que decir acerca de lo que el govt. hace, y una especie de fascismo, como el siempre en expansión goberno espías en cada movimiento, controla cada vez más minuciosamente cada acción, y nos obliga a punta de pistola para hacer lo que decidan, y una especie de comunismo que roban lo que quieran de quien quieran y utilizarlo para apoyar a cualquiera que les guste, aquí y en todo el mundo, la mayoría de los cuales no tienen ningún interés en la democracia, la justicia o la igualdad, excepto como medios para aprovechar nuestro sistema fatalmente defectuoso para obtener tanto dinero y servicios como puedan conseguir para apoyar la replicación de sus genes y la destrucción de la tierra. Hablando de Obama, Trump dice que es el peor presidente de la historia, y por supuesto Obama, totalmente arrogante, deshonesto y carente de toda comprensión real de la situación (o no dispuesto a ser honesto) sólo se ríe, y baladas trivialidades, pero como yo reflejo un poco es claramente cierto. Como Roosevelt,o nos dio el primer paso gigante en el fascismo y el despilfarro y la opresión con un impuesto ilegal e inconstitucional (seguridad social), Obamacare dejó el goberno tragar 1/6 de la economía y creó su propio impuesto ilegal (llamado "sanciones" de Obamacare, donde FDR los llamó ' beneficios ' y ' contribuciones '). Intentó obligar a los Estados Unidos a aceptar otros 8 a 10 millones ilegales (nadie parece estar muy seguro) que ' derecho de nacimiento ' a alrededor de 50 millones por 2100. En los primeros 3 años de su oficina (2009 a 2012) el funcionamiento federal déficit aumentó alrededor de 44% de 10 a 15 billones, el mayor aumento porcentual desde WW2, mientras que a mediados de 2015 había aumentado a más de 71% del presupuesto de operación fiscal--más de $18 billones o alrededor de $57.000 para cada persona en los Estados Unidos, incluyendo niños. Su aplazamiento de la deportación de millones de ilegales, todos los cuales ahora reciben seguridad social, créditos tributarios, Medicare, etc., se estima que tiene un costo de por vida para el gobierno. (es decir, a la minoría de nosotros que pagamos cualquier importante impuestos) de CA. $1,3 billones. De Curso, Esto no incluye la escuela gratuita, el uso del sistema judicial, las cárceles y la policía, la atención gratuita de "emergencia" (es decir, simplemente ir a emergencias por cualquier problema), la degradación de todas las instalaciones públicas, etc. así que es probable que al menos el doble. Y hemos visto 8 años de manejo incompetente de las guerras de Irak, Afganistán y Siria y el crecimiento canceroso del PCC y el Islam, el probablemente dio la capacidad de hacer armas nucleares a 392 Irán, lo que es muy probable que conduzca a una guerra nuclear por 2100 o mucho antes. Fue claramente elegido para Clasista razones racistas, supremacistas del tercer mundo-porque tenía genes africanos visibles, mientras que los euros, habiendo salido de África unos 50.000 años antes tienen los invisibles. Él, y la mayoría de las personas que nombró, tenía poca competencia o experiencia en el funcionamiento de un país y fueron recogidos, como él mismo, sobre la base de diversos genes y Neomarxista, supremacista del tercer mundo Simpatías. Si él no es un traidor (dando ayuda y consuelo al enemigo) entonces quién es? Está claro como el día que, como casi todo el mundo, opera totalmente en la psicología primitiva automática, con sus simpas coalicionales sesgos Favoreciendo aquellos que se ven y actúan más como él. Él (como la mayoría de los diversos) está haciendo su mejor esfuerzo para destruir el país y del sistema que hizo posible su vida exaltada. En una entrevista cerca del final de su mandato, dijo que la razón principal para el atraso del tercer mundo era el colonialismo. Al igual que con todos los supremacistas izquierdistas del tercer mundo, nunca ha cruzado su mente que alrededor del 95% de todas las personas del tercer mundo deben su existencia y su relativamente alto nivel de vida a euros y el colonialismo (es decir, medicina, agricultura, tecnología, ciencia, el comercio, la educación, la policía y el sistema judicial, las comunicaciones, la eliminación de la guerra y el crimen, etc.), ni que los verdaderos enemigos de los pobres son otros pobres, que son tan repulsivos como los ricos, a quienes es su mayor deseo de emular. Estoy de acuerdo en que, con la posible excepción de Lincoln, él es el peor (es decir, más destructivo para la calidad de vida estadounidense y la supervivencia como nación) por su falta de honestidad, arrogancia y asalto a la libertad y la supervivencia a largo plazo, un logro impresionante cuando su competencia incluye a Nixon, Johnson los Bushes y los Clintons, y lo que hace que incluso Reagan se vea bien. Al considerar a los presidentes malos, debería comenzar con Abraham Lincoln, que es venerado como un Santo, pero él (con la ayuda del Congreso) destruyó gran parte del país y la vida de millones de gente luchando contra la guerra civil totalmente innecesaria, y en muchos sentidos, el país nunca se recuperará como condujo al movimiento de derechos civiles, la ley de inmigración 1965 y el 1982 Tribunal Supremo de la corte ancla gobernante. La esclavitud habría llegado a su fin pronto sin la guerra, como lo hizo en todas partes y, por supuesto, fueron los euros los que proporcionaron el impulso principal para llevarlo a un fin aquí y en todas partes. Después de la guerra, los esclavos pudieron haber sido repatriados a África, o simplemente dada la residencia, en lugar de hacerlos ciudadanos (14TH enmienda) y luego darles la votación (15TH enmienda). Él y sus colaboradores, como tantos liberales de clase alta en euros entonces y ahora, quedaron cegados por las ilusiones sociales utópicas incorporadas en el cristianismo y la democracia, que resultan de la psicología inclusiva de la aptitud de las intuiciones coalicionales y el altruismo recíproco, que era eugénico y adaptativo en el EEA (medio ambiente de adaptación evolutiva-i. e., de CA. 50.000 a varios millones de años atrás) pero es fatalmente disgénico y maladaptativo en los tiempos modernos. Tenga en cuenta la gran ironía de la cita de él que comienza este libro, lo que demuestra que incluso el más brillantes son víctimas de sus propios límites, y no tienen ninguna comprensión de la biología humana, la psicología o la ecología. Nunca se le cruzó la mente que el mundo se convertiría horriblemente superpoblado y que los africanos crecerán hasta convertirse en un problema social gigante, en casa y por sí mismos y el mundo a medida que África se expande a más de 4 mil millones. de la misma manera a pesar de la ahora clara catástrofe, parece no cruzar de Obama que el diverso en casa y en el extranjero destruirá a los Estados Unidos y al mundo, aunque los diez años brillantes viejo puede verlo. El presidente Truman pudo haber dejado a McArthur usar la bomba atómica para acabar con el Guerra de Corea, destruye el comunismo y evitar el horror continuo de China dirigido por 25 sociópatas (el Politburó) o realmente sólo siete sociópatas (el Comité permanente del Politburó) o tal vez en realidad sólo un sociópata (Xi Jinping). Johnson podría haber hecho lo mismo en Vietnam, Bush en Irak y Obama en Afganistán, Siria y Libia. China y probablmente muchos países del mundo 3 tendrían usó armas nucleares si las situaciones se invirtieron. Una vez que un país musulmán radical consigue la bomba un ataque preventivo por ellos o en ellos se probablemente seguira, y esto es probable por 2100 y cerca seguro por 2200. Si Gadafi hubiera tenido éxito en sus esfuerzos por conseguir la bomba, sería muy probable han sucedido. Estados Unidos podría haber forzado a Japón, China y Corea, Irak y Libia y a todos los países de Europa (y el mundo entero para el caso) para pagar los costos de nuestros esfuerzos militares en todas las guerras recientes, y entre guerras, En lugar de asumir la mayor parte del costo y luego ayudándoles a asumir la mayor parte de la fabricación de Estados Unidos. Por supuesto, estas decisiones, críticas para la supervivencia del país, fueron hechas por un puñado de políticos sin consultar a los votantes. Los Kennedy fueron una parte importante de cambiar las leyes de inmigración a mediados de los 60, por lo que tienen que contar como traidores y grandes enemigos de Estados Unidos a la par con Obama, G. w. Bush y los Clintons. Podríamos haber seguido las peticiones universales de la industria estadounidense y nos negamos a firmar el GATT, que dio acceso libre a todas nuestras patentes años antes de que se concedieran, aunque por supuesto los chinos ahora piratean y roban todo con impunidad de todos modos. Eisenhower pudo haber dejado que el Reino Unido mantener la posesión del Suez canal, en lugar de chantajear a salir de Egipto, y en y en. Algunos pueden estar interesados en unas cuantas estadísticas para dar una idea de dónde estamos actualmente en el camino al infierno. Vea las tablas al principio. En los EE.UU., la población de hispanos se hinchan de alrededor de 55 millones en 2016 (o 393 tanto como 80 millones si usted acepta algunas estimaciones de 25 millones ilegales-es una marca de lo lejos que el gobeirno ha dejado que las cosas van que realmente no sabemos) a tal vez 140 millones medio siglo y 200 millones al entrar en el 22Nd siglo, momento en que la población de Estados Unidos se elevará más allá de 500 millones, y la población mundial será de aproximadamente 11 mil millones, 3 mil millones de los que han sido añadidos de ahora en más en África y 1 mil millones en Asia (las estimaciones oficiales de las Naciones Unidas en este momento). Los hispanos se reproducen tan rápido que euros, ahora una mayoría 63%, será una minoría a mediados del siglo y alrededor de 40% por 2100. La mayor parte del aumento en los EE.UU. de ahora en adelante será hispánica, con los demás negros, asiáticos y musulmanes, y todo el aumento aquí y en el mundo será 100% diversa. Alrededor de 500.000 personas son naturalizadas anualmente y ya que son principalmente de la 3a mundo y producir niños en aproximadamente el doble de la tasa de euros, que añadirá tal vez 2 millones mediados del siglo y 5 millones por 2100 por cada año que continúa. Para mostrar lo rápido que las cosas se quedaron sin control después de "ningún impacto demográfico" TKO (técnico knockear o Ted Kennedy indignación, aunque podríamos llamarlo también la indignación del LBJ, el Neomarxista Indignación, la indignación liberal etc.) ley de inmigración de 1965, ahora hay más hispanos en California que personas en 46 otros Estados. En 1970 justo después del TKO, había alrededor de 4 millones hispanos y ahora hay más de 55 millones "legals" (es decir, no se hacen legales por los votantes, sino por un puñado de políticos y la corte supremamente estúpida) y tal vez 80 millones contando ilegales. Nunca cruza las mentes de los pobres demócratas en la votación de los bloques democráticos que los que sufrirán por mucho más la "diversificación" de los Estados Unidos son ellos mismos. Estados Unidos ha pasado de 84 por ciento blanco, 11 por ciento negro, 4 por ciento hispano y 1 por ciento asiático en 1965, a 62 por ciento blanco, 11 por ciento negro, 18 por ciento hispano y 6 por ciento asiático ahora, según un informe reciente de Pew. Por 2055, no se espera que un grupo tenga una mayoría--un escenario perfecto para el caos, pero se pueden ver innumerables idiotas de la academia (ahora un paraíso para el tsupremacistas Neomarxistas del tercero mundo financiado por el estado) elogiando el multipartidismo. Se prevé que los asiáticos aumenten más rápido que cualquier otro grupo, duplicando su porcentaje en las próximas décadas, pero al menos habrá pasado por un procedimiento mínimo de inmigración, excepto por supuesto para las familias de bebés ancladas (produciendo que ahora es una industria importante como Los asiáticos vuelan aquí para dar a luz, aunque son muy superada por los hispanos que sólo tienen que cruzar la frontera por la noche). Por supuesto, los asiáticos son en gran medida una bendición para los Estados Unidos, ya que son más productivos y menos problemas que cualquier grupo, incluyendo euros. El gobierno de Estados Unidos (solo de los principales países) empuja la "diversidad", pero en países de todo el mundo y a lo largo de la historia, los intentos de soldar diferentes razas y culturas en uno han sido un desastre total. Muchos grupos han vivido entre o junto a otros durante miles de años sin que se hayan asimilando notablemente. Los chinos, los coreanos y los japoneses en Asia, los judíos y los gentiles en miles de lugares, turcos, kurdos y armenios, etc., han vivido juntos durante milenios sin asimilarlos y se van por la garganta del otro a la menor provocación. Después de más de 300 años de mezcla racial, Estados Unidos sigue siendo alrededor de 97% monoracial (es decir, blanco, hispano, negro, etc.) con sólo alrededor de 3% describiéndose a sí mismos como raza mixta (y la mayoría de ellos fueron mezclados cuando vinieron aquí). Los nativos americanos (a quienes todo el nuevo mundo realmente pertenece si uno va a rectificar las injusticias pasadas contra los diversos, un hecho que nunca es mencionado por los supremacistas del tercer mundo) son en su mayoría todavía vivos aislado y (antes de los casinos) empobrecido, al igual que los negros que, 150 años después de la emancipación, en gran parte todavía viven en el crimen montado, guetos empobrecidos. Y estos han sido los mejores tiempos, con un montón de tierra barata y recursos naturales, grandes bienestar y programas de acción afirmativa (en gran parte único de los Estados Unidos "racistas"), una economía en su mayoría sana y un gobierno que extorsiona a más del 30% de su dinero (es decir, el 30% de sus vidas laborales, contando el impuesto sobre la renta, el impuesto sobre las ventas, el impuesto inmobiliario etc.), obtenida por el impuesto que paga parte de la clase media y alta, para dar a los pobres folletos masivos-no sólo cupones de alimentos y otro bienestar, pero la policía y Emergencia servicios, calles y parques, el gobierno, el sistema de justicia, los hospitales, la defensa nacional, las escuelas, las carreteras, los puentes, la red eléctrica, etc., y los costos de la degradación ambiental, y los costos financieros y emocionales del crimen y su amenaza, etc., la mayoría de Estos nunca contaron por nadie (y nunca mencionado por los supremacistas Neomarxistas del tercer mundo) al considerar los "costos del bienestar" o la enorme desventaja de la diversidad. En cualquier caso, el delirio liberal y democrático es que esa generosidad y las políticas sociales soldarán nuestra "diversa" (es decir, fatalmente fragmentada) sociedad en una familia feliz. Pero los folletos del gobierno necesitan aumentar continuamente (para la seguridad social, las guerras, la atención médica, las escuelas, el bienestar, la infraestructura, etc.) mientras que la base tributaria relativa se encoge, y nuestra deuda y "derechos" (realmente privilegios)sin fondos crecen por trillones un año, por lo que la economía está en proceso de colapso. La familia promedio tiene menos ganancias netas reales y ahorros ahora que hace dos décadas y podría sobrevivir alrededor de 3 meses sin ingresos, alrededor del 40% de los estadounidenses retirados tienen menos de $25.000 ahorros, etc. Y de nuevo, estos son los mejores tiempos con muchos recursos ' libres ' (es decir, robados de otros y de nuestros descendientes) en todo el mundo y alrededor de 4 mil millones menos personas que habrá para el próximo 394 siglo. A medida que las economías fracasan y la hambruna, las enfermedades, el crimen y la guerra se propagan, las personas dividirán las líneas raciales y religiosas como siempre, y en los Estados Unidos los hispanos y los negros seguirán dominando el fondo. Rara vez se produce a aquellos que quieren continuar (y aumentar) el número de y la subvención de los diversos que el dinero para esto es finalmente robado de sus propios descendientes, en el que cae la carga de más de $90 billones de deuda Si uno cuenta los derechos actuales (o hasta $220 billones si los pasivos continuaban sin reducción de folletos y sin aumento de impuestos), y una sociedad y un mundo colapsaban en la anarquía. Como se ha señalado, uno de los muchos efectos secundarios malignos de la diversidad (por ejemplo, aumentos masivos en el crimen, degradación ambiental, estancamiento del tráfico, disminución de la calidad de las escuelas, la quiebra de los gobiernos locales, estatales y federales, la corrupción de la policía y la frontera funcionarios, el aumento de los precios de todo, la sobrecarga del sistema médico, etc.) es que nuestro derecho a la libertad de expresión ha desaparecido en cualquier cuestión de posible relevancia política y, por supuesto, eso significa cualquier cuestión. Incluso en privado, si cualquier comentario negativo sobre la "diversidad" es registrado o presenciado por alguien creíble, el racista, el tercer mundo supremacista diverso y sus servidores euro tratará de quitar su trabajo y dañar su negocio o a su persona. Esto es cierto cuando involucra a figuras públicas y asuntos raciales o de inmigración, pero nada está fuera de los límites. Docenas de libros en las últimas dos décadas abordan el tema, incluyendo ' la nueva policía de pensamiento: dentro de la izquierda Asalto a la libertad de expresión y a las mentes libres ', ' fin de la discusión: cómo la industria de la indignación de la izquierda apaga el debate, manipula a los votantes y hace que Estados Unidos sea menos libre (y divertido) ' y ' el silenciamiento: cómo la izquierda está matando la libertad de expresión ', pero nada disuadirá al los socialistas demócratas (es decir, los comunistas de armario) y a los liberales de la franja lunática. Como se ha señalado, escribo este libro porque nadie en la Academia, ni ninguna figura pública, se atreve a hacerlo. Otro "efecto secundario" es la pérdida de gran parte de nuestra libertad y privacidad a medida que el gobierno continúa expandiendo su guerra contra el terror. Nunca hubo una razón convincente para admitir cualquier número serio de musulmanes (o cualquier otro más diverso para el caso). En cualquier caso, parece una obviedad no admitir y expulsar a los musulmanes solteros masculinos de 15 a 50, pero incluso esos simples movimientos obvios están más allá de las capacidades de los retrasados que controlan el Congreso y, por supuesto, de nuestros amados presidentes, todos los cuales, con los miembros del Congreso, que votó por los cambios de la ley de inmigración a partir de 1965, podría ser responsabilizarse personalmente por 9/11, el bombardeo de maratón de Boston, etc. Claro, Trump está tratando de cambiar esto, pero es muy poco, demasiado tarde y salvo su declaración de ley marcial, dirigiendo el país con el ejército, y deportar o poner en cuarentena a 100 millones de los residentes menos útiles, América'fecha con el destino es cierto. Un ejemplo encantador de cómo la supresión de la libertad de expresión conduce a una locura cada vez mayor es el caso del mayor Hasan (cortesía de Mark Steyn "después de América"). Un psiquiatra del ejército en Fort Hood que tenía SoA (Soldier of Allah) en su tarjeta de visita, él fue reprendido con frecuencia cuando un estudiante interna del ejército por tratar de convertir a los pacientes al Islam, y muchas quejas fueron presentadas por sus constantes comentarios anti-estadounidenses -un día dio una conferencia de Power Point a una sala llena de doctores del ejército justificando su radicalismo. La libertad de expresión y el sentido común no están más disponibles en el ejército que la vida civil, luego fue ascendido a mayor y enviado a Fort Hood, donde comentó a su oficial superior sobre un reciente asesinato de dos soldados en Little Rock: "Esto es lo que los musulmanes deben hacer, stand hasta los agresores "y" la gente debe amarrarse bombas sobre sí mismos y ir a Times Square ", pero el ejército no hizo nada por temor a ser acusado de sesgo. Un día salió de su oficina con un rifle de asalto y asesinó a 13 soldados. Resultó que dos fuerzas de tarea antiterroristas diferentes eran conscientes de que había estado en contacto frecuente con los terroristas islamistas radicales. El jefe del estado mayor general del ejército, George Casey, comentó: "lo que sucedió en Fort Hood fue una tragedia, pero creo que sería una tragedia aún mayor si nuestra diversidad se convierte en una víctima aquí"!! ¿Está perdiendo el 70 millones en el bienestar o el 1,7 millones en la cárcel o el 3 millones drogadictos que es más trágico? La invasión del suroeste por los hispanos da el sabor de lo que viene y Coulter en su libro "Adios América" habla de los parques destrozado, escuelas que cayeron de la a a la D grado, billones de ' gratis ' (es decir, pagados por la clase media alta y alta y negocios) atención médica y otros servicios en los Ángeles solo, etc. Cualquier persona que vive allí que recuerda lo que Texas o California fueron como hace 30 años no tiene dudas sobre las consecuencias catastróficas de la diversidad como lo ven todos los días. En California, que conozco personalmente, las áreas urbanas (e incluso la mayoría de los parques y playas) que solía disfrutar ahora están llenas de hispanos y a menudo llenas de basura y spray pintado con carteles de pandillas, mientras que las autopistas están terriblemente abarrotadas y las ciudades y pueblos invadido por las drogas y el crimen, por lo que la mayor parte es ahora inhabitable y la 6a economía más grande del mundo se dirige a la bancarrota, ya que trata de trasladar a 20 millones hispanos en su mayoría de clase inferior a la clase media alta mediante el uso de dinero de impuestos de los euros. Uno de último locuras era tratar de poner a todos los ilegales en Obamacare. Algunas personas que conozco han tenido su cobertura médica anual aumento 395 de menos de $1000 antes de Obamacare a alrededor de $4000 (2017 estimación) y el extra $3000 es lo que los demócratas están robando de cualquier persona que puedan para cubrir los costos de la atención gratuita o muy bajo costo para aquellos que PA y poco o ningún impuesto, y que ya están en bancarrota hospitales obligados a darles libre "Emergencia" Cuidado. Claro, los republicanos intentan matarlo pero como todo el gobierno, ya está en una espiral de muerte que sólo un enorme aumento en las tasas puede arreglar. Uno de los más flagrantes violaciones de la ley de los Estados Unidos a la izquierda-lunáticos de ala que apoyan la inmigración es la creación de "ciudades Santuario". Las ciudades no permiten fondos municipales o recursos que se utilizarán para hacer cumplir las leyes federales de inmigración, por lo general por no permitir que los empleados de la policía o municipales para preguntar sobre el estado migratorio de un individuo. Esto comenzó con los Angeles en 1979 (convirtiéndose así en la primera gran ciudad donada a México) y ahora incluye al menos 31 grandes ciudades American. Presumiblemente, el presidente podría ordenar al ejército o al FBI para arrestar a los funcionarios de la ciudad que aprobaron estas regulaciones para la obstrucción de la justicia, etc., pero es un área legal turbia como (en otra indicación de la ineptitud total del Congreso y los tribunales y la desesperanza del sistema democrático como se practica actualmente) las violaciones de inmigración son delitos civiles y no delitos federales o estatales que claramente deberían. Después de escribir esto, los tribunales (predeciblemente) bloquearon el intento de Trump de cortar fondos para ciudades Santuario, olvidando que su propósito es proteger a los ciudadanos de Estados Unidos, y no a los de otros países aquí ilegalmente. Y recientemente California se declaró un estado Santuario, es decir, ahora es parte de México. A Gobierno competente (tal vez podríamos importar uno de Suecia, China o incluso Cuba) podría aprobar dicha legislación en unas pocas semanas. Además, podría forzar el cumplimiento cortando la mayoría o todos los fondos federales a cualquier ciudad o estado que no cumpliera con las leyes federales de inmigración, y al menos una de esas facturas ha sido introdujo recientemente en el Congreso, pero los demócratas impidieron su paso, y por supuesto Obama o Clinton Sería han vetado cualquier intento de devolver a American a los norteamericanos. Trump, por supuesto, tiene una visión diferente, aunque no puede salvar a Estados Unidos por medios democráticos. Mientras los demócratas (que pronto regresen al poder y, se rumorea, cambien su nombre a el Neomarxista supremacista del tercer mundo partido de América Latina, Asia, África y Oriente Medio) están en el poder, nada se hará, y más ciudades y Estados dejarán de ser parte de Estados Unidos hasta que los hispanos se apoderen por completo en algún momento de la segunda mitad del siglo. Sólo un golpe militar puede salvar a Estados Unidos ahora y es muy improbable que los generales tengan el coraje. Para esta evaluación, Leí algunos libros y artículos orientados políticamente en la impresión y en la web del tipo que he evitado por más de 50 años, y en ellos y los comentarios sobre ellos vieron repetidas acusaciones de ' racist"contra las personas que sólo estaban afirmando su deseo de que los Estados Unidos sigan siendo un país próspero y seguro. Esta afirmación es ahora casi siempre falsa en el sentido normal, pero por supuesto verdadera en el nuevo significado - i. e., uno opuesto a dejar que México y África Anexo América. así que, Escribí una respuesta a esta calumnia, ya que nunca he visto una buena. Realmente, no es ' racismo ' sino defensa propia-los diversos en América son los racistas, como en el promedio, su vida aquí es en gran medida una explotación de otras razas, especialmente los europeos y asiáticos que en realidad pagan impuestos. Para un racismo genuino, mira cómo los diferentes grupos nativos de tu propio país (o inmigrantes) se tratan allí. La gran mayoría de los inmigrantes en los Estados Unidos ni siquiera se les permitiría entrar en sus países, mucho menos permitido la ciudadanía, el privilegio de votar, vivienda gratuita o de bajo costo, comida, gratis o subsidiado atención médica, escuela gratuita, programas de acción afirmativa, Igualmente Privilegios como nativos, etc. Y en los EE.UU., es la diversa que han quitado la tranquilidad, la belleza, la seguridad y la libertad de expresión que existía aquí antes de un puñado de estupido políticos y jueces de la supremo corte le permiten entrar. Nunca hemos votado para que entres o te conviertes en ciudadanos--fue forzado a nosotros por medio ingenio en nuestro gobierno, comenzando con Lincoln y sus socios en el crimen. Si tuviéramos la oportunidad de votar, pocos extranjeros, excepto los expertos médicos, científicos y tecnológicos y algunos profesores habrían sido admitidos y tal vez el 75% de los diversos seria deportados. En muchos casos, usted tiene una religión alienígena (algunos de los cuales exigen el asesinato de alguien a quien le gusta) y la cultura (asesinatos de honor de sus hijas, etc.), no pagan una parte justa de los impuestos (generalmente ninguno) y cometen mucho más crímenes per cápita (por ejemplo, 2.5 x para Hispanos , 4.5 x para negros). Además, la clase media americana paga alrededor del 30% de sus ingresos a la gobierno. Esto es alrededor de 66 días/año de su vida laboral y tal vez 20 días de que va a apoyar a los pobres, ahora en su mayoría diversa. Y todas las cosas ' libres ' como el bienestar, cupones de alimentos, atención médica y hospitales, escuelas, parques, calles, saneamiento, policía, bomberos, red eléctrica, sistema postal, carreteras y aeropuertos, defensa nacional, etc. existen en gran parte porque el centro superior "racista" y clase alta creada, mantener y pagar por ellos. Tal vez otros 4 días laborables va a apoyar a la policía, FBI, sistema de 396 justicia, DHS, patrulla fronteriza y otros gobierno agencias que tienen que lidiar con los extranjeros. Agregue otros 10 días o más para apoyar al ejército, que es en su mayoría necesario para lidiar con los resultados del 3er mundo sobrepoblación (la verdadera causa principal de la guerra de Corea, la guerra de Vietnam, Irak, Afganistán, Siria, Libia, Yemen y la causa principal de la mayoría de las guerras, disturbios sociales y conflictos pasados, presentes y futuros), y este costo, sumado al bienestar, Medicare, seguridad social y la degradación del medio ambiente (un porcentaje cada vez mayor para los inmigrantes y sus descendientes) está arruinando el país, con la única solución posible de disminuir los beneficios y aumentar los impuestos, cuya carga caerá sobre todos los Descendientes. Usted aprovecha la libertad de expresión que creamos para contar mentiras maliciosas sobre nosotros y evitar la discusión racional! La mayoría de ustedes, si hacen esto en su país de origen, terminarían en prisión o muertos! Mentirosos desvergonzados! ¿Cuál es tu problema? --educación deficiente, sin gratitud, maliciosa, estúpida, sin experiencia con la sociedad civilizada? (recoger cinco). Y cualquiera que dude de esto simplemente no sabe cómo usar su cerebro o la red, ya que está todo allí. Estos comentarios son sólo los hechos que cualquiera puede ver, junto con simples extrapolaciones en el futuro. También, por favor permítanme preguntar a los diversos--¿las personas en su país de origen trabajan 30 días al año para apoyar decenas de millones de alienígenas que cometen crímenes en varias ocasiones la tasa de nativos, abarrotan sus escuelas, autopistas, ciudades y cárceles, destroza sus parques y playas, rocía grafitis de pintura en los edificios e importa y vende drogas a adictos que cometen más de cien millones de crímenes un año (añadido al 100 millones o así se comprometen)? ¿Y has tenido un 9/11 y muchos atentados y asesinatos en casa? ¿Los inmigrantes controlan los medios de comunicación para que ni siquiera puedan discutir estos temas que están destruyendo su país y el mundo? ¿Su país estará totalmente en su control en unas cuantas generaciones y será otro empobrecido, crimen montado, hambriento, corrupto tercer mundo aguajero del infierno? Claro, para la mayoría de ustedes ya lo es, y vinieron a Estados Unidos para escapar de ella. Pero sus descendientes no tendrán que estar nostálgica por el infierno, ya que lo volverán a crear aquí. Los diversos aquí (y sus funcionarios del euro) nunca se cansan de quejarse en todos los medios de comunicación todos los días sobre cómo no se tratan de manera justa y no se les da suficiente (es decir, los euros y los relativamente ricos diversos no trabajan lo suficientemente duro para apoyarlos), y nunca cruza su mentes que si no fuera por impuestos pagados sobre todo por euros ahora y por más de un siglo anterior, sería poca o ninguna policía o incendio o servicios médicos o escolares o parques o transporte público o calles o alcantarillas en sus comunidades, y por supuesto no habría ni siquiera un país aquí, ya que es principalmente euros quienes crearon, y lo apoyan y que prestan servicio en el ejército en todas las guerras. Y fue principalmente euros y sus descendientes quienes crearon la red y el PC que se usó para crear este y los medios electrónicos o impresos Estás leyendo esto, la tecnología que produce los alimentos que comes y el medicamento que te mantiene con vida. Si no es por la tecnología y la seguridad de los euros, al menos el 90% de los diversos en el mundo no existirían. Todos condenan el colonialismo, pero fue la manera en que los diversos fueron llevados de las edades oscuras a los tiempos modernos a través de las comunicaciones, la medicina, la agricultura y la observancia del gobierno democrático. De lo contrario, todas sus poblaciones habrían permanecido muy pequeñas, al revés, hambrientas, con enfermedades, empobrecidas, aisladas y viviendo en la edad oscura (incluyendo la esclavitud y sus equivalentes) hasta el día de hoy. Para resumir, la antipatía del euro hacia la diversidad ("racismo") se debe al deseo de que sus hijos tengan un país y un mundo digno de vivir. Otra vez, Esto es para beneficio de todos, no sólo euros o los ricos. Del mismo modo, toda mi vida he estado escuchando pueblo del tercer mundo diciendo que sus problemas desproporcionados con las drogas, el crimen y el bienestar se deben al racismo, y ciertamente hay algo de verdad en ello, pero me pregunto por qué los asiáticos, que deben estar sujetos al racismo también (en la medida en que exista - y en relación con la mayoría de los condados diversos, es bastante mínimo aquí), y la mayoría de los cuales vinieron aquí mucho más recientemente, hablaban poco o nada de inglés, no tenían parientes aquí y pocas habilidades, tienen una fracción del crimen, las drogas y el bienestar (todos menos de euros y de manera menos que los negros o hispanos) y promedio de alrededor de $10.000 más INCO mí por familia que por euros. Además, los negros nunca consideran que no existirían si sus antepasados no fueran llevados al nuevo mundo y nunca hubieran nacido o sobrevivido en África, que los que los capturaron y los vendieron eran generalmente africanos, que hasta el día de hoy los africanos en África casi tratar universalmente a los de las diferentes tribus como subhumanas (Idi Amin, Ruanda, Gadafi, etc. y mucho peor pronto llegará a medida que la población de África se hincha por 3 mil millones por 2100), y que si quieren ver el racismo real y la explotación económica y el maltrato policial , deben ir en vivo en casi cualquier lugar en África o el 3er mundo. Volver a África o México, etc. siempre ha sido una opción, pero a excepción de los criminales que escapan de la justicia, nadie regresa. Y fueron los euros los que pusieron fin a la esclavitud en todo el mundo y, en la medida de lo posible, a la servidumbre, la enfermedad, el hambre, el crimen y la guerra en todo el 3er mundo. Si no fuera por el colonialismo y los inventos de euros habría tal vez 1/10 como muchos diversos vivos y que en su mayoría todavía estarían viviendo como lo hicieron 400 años atrás. de la misma manera, nunca se mencionó que si no fuera por el euro, que eran aproximadamente 95% responsable de pagar y luchar y morir en WW2, los alemanes y japoneses y/o los comunistas ahora controlaría el mundo y sólo los euros pueden impedir que el PCC y/o los musulmanes lo hagan en el futuro. Además, en su mayoría euros que lucharon, están luchando y estarán luchando contra los comunistas en Corea y Vietnam, y los fanáticos musulmanes en Irak, Siria, Libia y Afganistán y los 397 muchos otros que pronto vendrán. En la medida en que cualquier venganza en los euros es necesaria para su esclavitud (pero la esclavitud por otros negros en varias formas siempre ha existido), los negros ya lo han tenido abundantemente. Primero, han sido ampliamente apoyados y protegidos por los euros durante siglos. En segundo lugar, los parásitos que trajeron consigo han infectado y destruido la vida de decenas de millones de euros. Malaria, esquistosomas, filariasis ascariasis, fiebre amarilla, viruela etc., pero sobre todo la anquilosis, que era tan común y tan debilitante hasta las primeras décadas de este siglo que era responsable de la visión generalizada de los sureños como estúpidos y perezosos. Todo esto es aplastantemente obvio, pero apuesto a que no hay un texto primario o universitario en el mundo que menciona cualquiera de ellos, ya que'es claramente "racista" para sugerir que el diverso debe nada a euros o para señalar que otras diversas en sus países de origen siempre tienen y siempre se tratarlos mucho peor que el euro hacer. Y son incapaces de captar el verdadero horror que viene o todos serían uno en oponerse a cualquier aumento de la población por cualquier grupo en cualquier lugar y cualquier inmigración en Estados Unidos. Bueno antes 2100 los hispanos controlarán América, y el resto del mundo será dominada por Chino y el resto por Los musulmanes, que aumentarán de alrededor del 1/5o del mundo ahora a aproximadamente 1/3rd por 2100 y superan a los cristianos, y ninguno de los grupos se destaca por abrazar el multiculturalismo, los derechos de las mujeres, los derechos del niño, los derechos de los animales, los derechos gays o cualquier derecho. así que, el hecho obvio es que en general los euros han tratado a los diversos mucho mejor de lo que se han tratado mutuamente. Y ahora tenemos el mejor de los tiempos, mientras que por 2100 (dar o tomar una generación o dos) colapso económico y el caos reinará permanentemente, excepto tal vez algunos lugares que excluyen a la fuerza diversa. Una vez más, tenga en cuenta que en mi opinión no hay, y casi con certeza nunca será, ninguna evidencia de una diferencia genética significativa entre euros y diversos en la psicología, o IQ, y que su tendencia a la reproducción excesiva y otras limitaciones culturales son accidentes de la historia. Del mismo modo, nunca cruza Diversa, izquierdista, supremacista del tercer mundo, Neomarxista mentes que cada año tal vez 500 mil millones dólares se gastan en los EE.UU. por el gobierno federal, estatal y municipal. sobre educación, medicina, transporte (autopistas, calles, ferrocarril, autobuses y sistemas de aerolíneas), la policía, el fuego y la atención de emergencia, numerosos programas de bienestar, el gobierno y los sistemas judiciales--la gran mayoría de la misma ha creado, mantenido y pagado por los euros, asistido por los impuestos de la pequeña minoría de bienestar diverso. También está el FBI, la NSA, la CIA, y la Armada fuerzas de los EE.UU. (otro 500 mil millones al año) y otros países del euro, sin los cuales no habría Estados Unidos y poca o ninguna paz, seguridad o prosperidad en cualquier parte del mundo, y también han sido creados, corren y atendidos en gran parte por los euros, que constituyen la mayor parte de t muerto y herido en cada guerra (menos un problema para los hispanos que sirven en el ejército a la mitad de la tasa de euros) y en todas las fuerzas policiales desde 1776 hasta ahora. Sin medicamentos y medidas de salud pública, la mayoría de sus antepasados (y el tercer mundo entero) habrían sufrido y a menudo murieron de lepra, malaria, gusanos, bacterias, gripe, tuberculosis, viruela, sífilis, VIH, hepatitis, fiebre amarilla, encefalitis y la tecnología para el colesterol alto y la presión arterial, el corazón, el cáncer y la cirugía hepática, Trasplantes MRI, XRAY, ultrasonido etc., etc., casi todos han sido inventados, administrados y pagados abrumadoramente por los "racistas" y los "supremacistas blancos" del euro. ¿Crees que el colonialismo fue malo? Piense en lo que sería el 3er mundo sin él, o lo que sería como vivir bajo los nazis, comunistas o japoneses (y será como vivir bajo los chinos o musulmanes una vez que los diversos destruyen América). Esto no excusa nada, pero sólo señala los hechos de la historia. Pero bien, vamos a deshacer la "injusticia" y pasar una ley de regreso a África (y América Latina y Asia, etc.) que proporciona fondos para repatriar a todos. Podrían vender sus bienes aquí y la mayoría podría vivir como reyes allí, pero por supuesto habría muy pocos participantes. Y para el próximo siglo habrá 3 mil millones más africanos (la estimación oficial) y todo el continente será una alcantarilla, y 1 mil millones más asiáticos, e incluso la India y China (que agregará cien millones de o así cada uno) se verá como el paraíso en comparación con África, al menos hasta que los recursos se hayan acabado (petróleo, gas, carbón, tierra vegetal, agua dulce, pescado, minerales, bosques). Si nos fijamos en la red se encuentra la diversa incesantemente lloriqueo sobre su opresión, incluso cuando ocurrió hace décadas o siglos, pero no veo cómo nada de lo que hacen otros, incluso hoy en día, es mi responsabilidad, y mucho menos en el pasado. Si quieren que todos los euros sean responsables de lo que la inmensa mayoría ahora viva son completamente inocentes, entonces queremos responsabilizarles de todos los crímenes cometidos por cualquiera de ellos aquí o sus parientes en sus países de origen durante los últimos 400 años, y por su participación en todas las decenas de billones des gastado para construir y defender los Estados Unidos y mantenerlos seguros, sanos y bien alimentados. Sí, la mayoría de los negros e hispanos son pobres debido a factores históricos más allá de su control, al igual que los euros son a menudo más ricos debido a factores históricos más allá de los suyos, pero los puntos importantes son que ahora vivos no causamos esto, y que aquí, como casi en todas partes que el Diversos son un porcentaje significativo, cometen la mayor parte del crimen, recogen la mayor parte del bienestar, pagan 398 los menos impuestos y continúan la cría excesiva y arrastrando sus países y el mundo al abismo. Consideremos también que los males del colonialismo sólo son prominentes porque eran recientes. Si miramos con atención, encontramos que casi todos los grupos de cada país tienen una historia interminable de asesinatos, violaciones, saqueo y explotación de sus vecinos que continúan hoy en día. No está lejos de la marca sugerir que lo mejor que podría suceder era ser conquistado por los euros. Una vez más, tenga en cuenta que no hay y casi con certeza nunca habrá ninguna evidencia de una diferencia genética significativa entre euros y diversos y que sus limitaciones son casi sin duda debido a la cultura. El problema no es el diverso ni el euro, pero que las personas son egoístas, estúpidos, deshonestos, perezosos, locos y cobardes y sólo se comportarán decentemente, honestamente, y justamente si se ven obligados a hacerlo. Dar derechos a las personas en lugar de tener privilegios que deben ganar es un error fatal que destruirá cualquier sociedad y cualquier mundo. En los grupos diminutos en los que evolucionamos, donde todo el mundo era nuestro pariente, el altruismo recíproco funcionaba, pero en un mundo que pronto se hincha a 11 mil millones, este impulso de ayudar a los demás es suicida. El mundo está totalmente preocupado por los terroristas, pero sus efectos son realmente triviales comparados, por ejemplo, a accidentes de tráfico, asesinatos, drogadicción, enfermedades, erosión del suelo, etc., y cada día los 7,7 mil millones hacen mucho más daño al mundo sólo por vivir. Las madres del tercer mundo aumentan la población alrededor de 200.000 cada día, y así lo hacen enormemente más daño cada hora que todos los terroristas en todo el mundo harán en la todo e Siglo 21 (hasta que consiguen sus manos en la bomba). Sólo los diversos en los EE.UU. en un año va a hacer mucho más daño a los Estados Unidos y el mundo mediante la destrucción de recursos, erosionando tierra vegetal y la creación de CO2 y otra contaminación que todo el terrorismo en todo el mundo en toda la historia. ¿Hay incluso un político o animador o persona de negocios que tenga una pista? Y si lo hicieran, dirían o harían algo - ciertamente no - que quiere ser atacado por "racismo". La gente en todas partes es perezosa, estúpida y deshonesta y la democracia, la justicia y la igualdad en un gran estado de bienestar diverso son una invitación abierta a la explotación ilimitada de sus vecinos y pocos se resistirán. En 1979 7% de los estadounidenses consiguió medios-probado gobierno beneficios mientras que en 2009 fue más de 30% y, por supuesto, el aumento es principalmente el diverso. Los cupones de alimentos aumentaron de 17 millones personas en 2000 a aproximadamente 43 millones ahora. En los primeros años de Obama más de 3 millones inscritos para obtener cheques de "discapacidad" y sobre el 20% de la población adulta es ahora en "discapacidad" que, según la oficina del censo, incluye categorías como "tuvo dificultades para buscando un trabajo o empleado restante "y"tenía dificultades con el trabajo escolar ". Ahora hay casi 60 millones edad de trabajo (16 a 65) adultos que no están empleados o alrededor del 40% de la fuerza laboral. Las familias ilegales obtienen alrededor de $2,50 en beneficios directos por cada dólar que pagan en impuestos y otros $2,50 beneficios indirectos (y sin contar su daño a la Biosfera) por lo que son un drenaje enorme y cada vez mayor a pesar de Frecuente "historias de noticias" falsas en la red sobre su gran valor. Se proyecta que los pagos de intereses de nuestra deuda nacional ascenderá al 85% de nuestro total de ingresos federales en 2050. Aproximadamente la mitad de nuestra deuda es propiedad de los gobiernos extranjeros., alrededor de una cuarta parte de China, y si China sigue comprando nuestra deuda a tasas actuales, muy pronto nuestros pagos de intereses a ellos cubrirán su presupuesto militar anual total (CA. 80 mil millones vs EE.UU. de CA $600 mil millones) y (dependen sobre las tasas de interés) en pocos años podrían triplicar o cuadruplicar sus gastos militares y todos serían pagados por los contribuyentes estadounidenses. Realmente, No lo he visto notar, pero sus costos más bajos significan que en realidad están gastando tal vez 300 mil millones. Y rara vez se menciona por qué el presupuesto militar de Estados Unidos es tan enorme, y cómo se ata en el estilo de vida alta y enormes subsidios en Europa y en todo el mundo para el caso. Estados Unidos es el mundo Gratis policía, proporcionando tecnología, dinero y tropas para mantener la paz y las guerras de lucha en todo el mundo y es demasiado Estúpido pedir a los demás países que paguen su parte--hasta los comentarios recientes de Trump. En gran medida, la capacidad de los europeos y de los países de todo el mundo de tener un alto nivel de vida se debe a los contribuyentes norteamericanos (sin por supuesto que se les pide) que paguen por su defensa durante los últimos 75 años. La CEI informa que la inmigración total alcanzará alrededor de 51 millones por 2023, aproximadamente el 85% del aumento total de la población (todo el resto debido a los diversos ya aquí) y pronto comprenderán alrededor del 15% de la población total, con mucho el mayor porcentaje en cualquier país grande en historia reciente. Se informó que el Dept. de Seguridad Nacional nuevos estadounidenses Taskforce fue dirigido a procesar las solicitudes de ciudadanía de los 9 millones titulares de tarjetas verdes ASAP para tratar de influir en las 2016 elecciones. El gobierno federal. es un cáncer que ahora toma alrededor de 40% de todos los ingresos de la minoría que pagan impuestos significativos y gobierno federal. los empleados civiles son muy sobrepagados, promediando $ $81.000 salario y $42.000 399 beneficios mientras que los empleados privados obtener alrededor de $51.000 salario y $11.000 beneficios. Alrededor del 25% de todos los bienes y servicios producidos en los Estados Unidos son consumidos por el gobierno y alrededor del 75% del total de ingresos se otorga como subsidios de negocios y granjas y bienestar. Si todos los impuestos federales aumentaban en un 30% y el gasto no aumentaba, el presupuesto podría equilibrar en 25 años. Claro, el gasto aumentaría inmediatamente si hubiera más dinero disponible, y también la economía tendría un gran éxito ya que habría menos incentivos para ganar o permanecer en los Estados Unidos y la inversión comercial y las ganancias podrían caer. Se estima que el cumplimiento del sector privado con las regulaciones gobierno cuesta alrededor de 1,8 billones al año o alrededor del 12% de nuestro PIB total, y por supuesto está creciendo constantemente, por lo que gastar más en papeleo cada año que el PIB de la mayoría de los países. El impulso principal para la confiscación cada vez mayor de nuestro dinero (años de nuestra vida laboral) por la gobierno es el comunismo/socialismo/fascismo forzado a nosotros por el rápido aumento de diversa, pero ser la fuerza policial del mundo de forma gratuita nos ha costado billones, que también se traduce en años de nuestra vida laboral como se detalla en otro lugar aquí. Los pobres son casi siempre hablados como si fueran de alguna manera superiores a los ricos y es implícito que debemos hacer sacrificios por ellos, pero son sólo los ricos en la espera y cuando se hacen ricos son inevitablemente exactamente tan repugnante y explotante. Esto se debe a nuestra psicología innata, que en los pequeños grupos en los que evolucionamos tuvo sentido, ya que todo el mundo era nuestro pariente, pero en un mundo que está colapsando rápidamente debido a la expansión de lo diverso no tiene sentido. Los pobres no se preocupan más por los demás que por los ricos. Es maravilloso que incluso Obama y el Papa hablen sobre los horrores venideros del cambio climático, pero por supuesto ni una palabra sobre el irresponsable paternidad que es su causa. Lo más que se obtiene de cualquier gobierno oficial, académico o documental de televisión es una sugerencia mansa que el cambio climático necesita ser tratado, pero rara vez un indicio de que la sobrepoblación es la fuente de la misma y que la mayor parte de ella para el siglo pasado y todo de ahora en adelante es de la 3a Mundo. China ahora crea el doble de C02 de los EE.UU. y esto aumentará, ya que se espera que el doble del tamaño de nuestro PIB en 2030 o así, y USA Diverse crean alrededor del 20% de la contaminación de EE.UU., que aumentará a alrededor de 50% para el próximo siglo. Ann Coulter en "Adios America" describe la escandalosa historia de lo que parece ser la única ocasión en la que los estadounidenses realmente tuvieron que votar sobre el tema de la inmigración, lo que algunos llaman "la gran proposicion 187 democracia robo". En 1994 californianos, indignados de ver a cada vez más hispanos amontonamiento en el estado y utilizando el dinero de impuestos, poner en la proposición de votación 187 que prohibía a los ilegales de recibir dinero del estado. A pesar de la oposición esperada y las indignas mentiras de todos los que se sirven a sí mismos, lamiendo botas Los supremacistas Neomarxistas del tercer mundo, pasó abrumadoramente ganando 2/3 de blanco, 56% de negro, 57% de asiáticos e incluso 1/3 de votos hispanos (sí, muchos hispanos de clase media y alta se dan cuenta de que ser asumido por México será un desastre). Tenga en cuenta que todas estas personas son ' racistas ' o ' supremacistas blancos ' (o en columnas ligeramente más corteses del Carlos Slim Helu controlado NY Times etc. ' fanáticos ' o ' nativists') según el uso actual de esta palabra por un gran porcentaje de liberales, muchos hispanos, el Sierra Club, el ACLU e incluso el economista ganador del Premio Nobel Paul Krugman (que recientemente llamó a Trump un "racista" por atreverse a decir la verdad mientras defendía a los Estados Unidos de la anexión de México). Incluso llevó al candidato republicano desesperado al gobernador, a Peter Wilson a una victoria de deslizamiento de tierra, con 1/3 de sus votantes afirmando que su apoyo a la Prop 187 era su razón para votar por él. Sin embargo, el "ACLU y otros grupos antiestadounidenses" (Coulter) trajo el traje y pronto fue derribado por un juez del Tribunal de distrito designado Demócrata (es decir, "mexicano honorario") por ser inconstitucional (es decir, proteger a los estadounidenses en lugar de extranjeros). Al igual que con las decisiones de la Corte Suprema 1898 y 1982 que dan la ciudadanía a cualquiera que haya nacido aquí, fue otra interpretación alucinatoria de nuestras leyes y una clara demostración de la desesperanza del sistema judicial, o cualquier rama del gobierno (al menos un Demócrata dominado uno) en la protección de los estadounidenses de una tercera toma del mundo. Se ha sugerido que la ACLU cambie su nombre a la Unión de libertades civiles alienígenas y que, junto con las muchas otras organizaciones e individuos que trabajan para destruir los Estados Unidos, se vean obligados a registrarse como agentes de un gobierno extranjero o preferiblemente, ser clasificados como los terroristas y todos sus empleados y donantes deportados o en cuarentena. A pesar de esto, ni el estado ni el gobierno federal ha hecho nada para evitar la toma de posesión, y Coulter señala que cuando G.W. Bush se postuló para Presidente, hizo campaña en Estados Unidos con el corrupto presidente mexicano Gortari (ver comentarios sobre Carlos Slim a continuación) , si el hermano Jeb ' inmigración ilegal es un acto de amor ' Bush hablar en español 400 en el Convención Nacional del Republicano, y después de ganar, dio direcciones de radio semanales en español, añadió una página en español a la página web de la casa blanca, celebró un gran partido cinco de mayo en la casa blanca, y dio un discurso al flagrantemente racista Consejo Nacional de la Raza, en el que, entre otros indignos , prometió $100 millones en dinero federal (es decir, nuestro dinero) para acelerar las aplicaciones de inmigración! Claramente con los partidos republicanos y demócratas que buscan la anexión de México, no hay esperanza para el proceso democrático en Estados Unidos a menos que se cambie drásticamente y claramente esto nunca sucederá usando el proceso democrático. California es el 6TH más grande en economía del mundo, por delante de Francia, Brasil, Italia, Corea del sur, Australia, España, India, Rusia y Canadá, y más del doble que la de México, y en unos 10 años, cuando sus 10 millones niños crecen y la población hispana total de Calif es de aproximadamente 22 millones (contando sólo legals), serán los propios del estado y serán anexadas por México. En los últimos años, California. el gobernador Brown firmó la legislación que concede a los conductores licencias a ilegales, y el pago de la atención médica gratuita para sus hijos (es decir, por supuesto que los contribuyentes pagan). Accedió a permitir que los no ciudadanos supervisen las encuestas para las elecciones, y han sido nombrados para otros cargos del gobierno como Ayuntamientos sin la aprobación del estado. También obligó a todos los funcionarios estatales a cometer obstrucción de la justicia mediante la firma de una ley conocida como la ley de fideicomiso (es decir, la confianza de que no robarán, violar, asesinar, vender drogas, etc.), que especifica que a menos que los inmigrantes han cometido ciertos delitos graves, no pueden ser detenidos (para su entrega a los federales por deportación) pasados cuando de otro modo serían elegibles para ser liberaron. El lote de nuevas leyes de "vamos a formar parte de México" también incluyó una que permitiría a los inmigrantes sin estatus legal ser admitidos a la ley de abogados y prácticas estatales en California. Pero él veculebrera la ley que permite alienígenas a servir en los jurados. así que, lo único que impidió el paso final de entregar el California tribunales a México fue la decisión arbitraria de un hombre! Sin embargo, no será más que unos pocos años antes de que un hispano sea gobernador y luego esta y otras infinitas atrocidades van a venir, incluyendo presumiblemente dando a los ilegales el derecho a votar tal vez pasando otra ley estatal que viole u obstruya a la Federal. En cualquier caso, pronto habrá poca distinción en California entre ser ciudadano de los EE.UU. y ciudadano de cualquier otro país que pueda colarse a través de la frontera. Tenga en cuenta que, como de costumbre, a los ciudadanos de California nunca se les permitió votar sobre ninguna de estas cuestiones, que fueron aprobadas por la legislatura estatal controlada por los demócratas. ¿Por qué no solo son honestos y cambian el nombre a Neomarxista ¿Fiesta de México? Al menos deberían ser obligados a registrarse como agente de un gobierno extranjero. Es cierto que California (y a finales del siglo EE.UU.) se pierde por la civilización (es decir, será como México, que por supuesto será mucho peor para entonces ya que la mayoría de los recursos del mundo se han ido y otras 3 mil millones personas la demandarán) a menos que el gobierno envíe tropas federales a California (y otros Estados con ciudades Santuario) deportar a los ilegales y arrestar a todos aquellos (incluidos numerosos funcionarios electos) que violan la ley federal. Incluso esto sólo va a ralentizar la cataestrofa a menos que se pase una ley los bebés que terminan de anclar (es decir, los que están obteniendo la ciudadanía porque nacen aquí), preferiblemente retroactivamente a 1982 o mejor a 1898, y rescindir la ciudadanía para ellos y todos aquellos que lo obtuvieron de ellos- es decir, todos sus descendientes y parientes. También, por supuesto, la ley de inmigración 1965 debe ser declarada inconstitucional y todos aquellos (y parientes y descendientes) que emigraron desde entonces tienen su estatus revisado con los contribuyentes significativos restantes y los no o bajos pagadores repatriados. Difícil de obtener estadísticas precisas, como su "racista" para incluso pensar en ello, pero en Stockton, California y Dallas, Texas, alrededor de 70% de todos los nacimientos son ilegales y tal vez 90% del total contando todos los hispanos, y por supuesto las facturas son casi todos pagados por euros y "rico" di verso por imposición forzada, que por supuesto nunca consiguen votar. Para terminar con el derecho de nacimiento, una nueva ley tiene que ser aprobada y no una antigua derogada, ya que no existe tal ley-esta fue una opinión totalmente arbitraria de Justice Willie, "bebé ancla" Brennan y sólo un puñado de jueces han votado por esta interpretación alucinatoria de la ley. Aquellos que quieren ver cómo la Corte Suprema destruyó nuestro país erosionando la frontera entre ser un ciudadano estadounidense y una persona que estaba de paso (y la falta de principios básicos comunes sentido en la ley y la desesperanza del sistema legal estadounidense-y las opiniones contrarias de los expertos legales) pueden consultar a los ' hombres en negro ' de Levin o ver Estados Unidos v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898) (sí, fue un chino que comenzó el asalto a Estados Unidos hace más de un siglo) donde 6 Abogados (es decir, jueces de la corte) concedieron la ciudadanía a los hijos de extranjeros residentes y Plyler v. Doe, 457 Estados unidos. 202 (1982) donde 5 Abogados (con 4 de desacuerdo) concedieron la ciudadanía a los hijos de extranjeros ilegales y cualquier persona que da a luz durante su visita. Si sólo uno de los 5 idiotas que votaron por esto había cambiado de opinión, tendríamos tal vez 10 millones menos en los rollos de bienestar ahora y tal vez 50 millones menos por 2100. Claro, ninguno de los otros 450 millones o así los adultos vivos entre entonces y ahora se les ha permitido votar sobre esta o cualquiera de las cuestiones básicas que conducen inexorablemente a 401 colapsar. Como vemos ahora en los medios de comunicación todos los días, en una democracia "representativa" lo que está representado no son los intereses de Estados Unidos, sino la egomanía, la codicia, la estupidez y el supremacismo del tercer mundo. ¿Cuántas personas se han hecho para entregar América a México? Para el desastre de inmigración de TKO en 1965 había 320 representantes y 76 senadores, y para los bebés anclados las dos decisiones de la Corte Suprema suman 11 abogados, la mayoría de estos "ciudadanos sobresalientes" ahora muertos, así que de los aprox. 245 millones estadounidenses adultos ciudadanos vivos ahora, alrededor de 120 ciudadanos muy ancianos votaron en realidad por la entrega. Como una demostración clara de la desesperanza de la democracia representativa (como se practica aquí) como uno podría desear. Evidentemente, si Estados Unidos va a seguir siendo un lugar digno para vivir para cualquiera, el acto 1965, y todos los subsiguientes, deben ser derogados por una ley que impone una moratoria a toda la inmigración y Naturalización, y de preferencia rescinde o al menos reseñas ciudadanía para todo el mundo naturalizada desde 1965 (o preferiblemente desde la primera regla absurda de derecho de nacimiento en 1898), junto con todos sus parientes y descendientes. Todos sus casos podrían ser revisados y la ciudadanía conferida a personas selectas que anotó lo suficientemente alto en una escala de puntos, con el bienestar Destinatarios, los desempleados crónicamente, los delincuentes y sus descendientes no elegibles, aquellos con títulos universitarios o médicos, maestros, ingenieros, dueños de negocios, etc., obteniendo puntos hacia la elegibilidad, es decir, sólo el sentido común básico si Estados Unidos va a sobrevivir. Siguiendo a Ann Coulter (' Adios America '), observamos que el impuesto corporativo en los Estados Unidos es Una el más alto del mundo de los principales países en 39% y como el govt. continúa recaudando impuestos para apoyar a la mitad del país que está en algún tipo de bienestar (si se incluye la seguridad social, el desempleo, cupones de alimentos, subsidios de vivienda, bienestar y beneficios para veteranos), inevitablemente capital y puestos de trabajo se van, y entrar en el próximo Siglo con recursos que se desvanecen, y dado que todo el aumento anual de la población de 2,4 millones ahora es diverso, eso significa que alrededor de 200 millones más de ellos (para un total de alrededor de 350 millones de aproximadamente 500 millones) por 2100, una población fragmentada luchando por los recursos, y un nivel de vida reducido drásticamente Con eventual colapso es inevitable, incluso sin los males predatorios de los siete sociópatas seniles (es decir, el PCC).. En cuanto a la situación fiscal, en 2013, aquellos con ingresos brutos por encima de $250.000 (casi todos ellos euros) pagaron casi la mitad (48,9%) de todos los impuestos de ingresos individuales, Aunque sólo representaban 2,4% de todas las devoluciones presentadas y su tasa de impuestos promedio fue de 25,6%. El 50% inferior de los contribuyentes (los que hacen bajo $34.000tal vez medio diverso y medio euros) pagaron un promedio de 1,2% impuesto federal sobre la renta para la participación total del 2,4% mientras que el próximo 35% de los contribuyentes (esos Hacer $34k a $69k) promedió un índice impositivo del 21% por una participación total del 10,5% del impuesto federal sobre la renta total recaudado. así que, es obvio que Contrariamente a la opinión común de los demócratas/supremacistas/Neomarxistas del tercer mundo, la clase media alta y superior están dando a los pobres un paseo en gran medida libre, y que ya tenemos un pie en el comunismo. Sin embargo, no debemos olvidar el $2,5 mil millones al día en que Estados Unidos está entrando en deuda y el total $80 billones o más pasivos no financiados (p. ej., seguridad social y medicare), que eventualmente tendrán que ser pagados por algún Combo de aumento de impustos y disminución de beneficios para sus descendientes. Considere esto: "cuando combinamos las poblaciones de no contribuyentes y no contribuyentes y miramos a ver qué porcentaje general de cada grupo no está pagando impuestos, nos encontramos con que: 50,7 por ciento de los hogares afroamericanos no pagan impuestos sobre la renta, 35,5 por ciento de asiático americano los hogares no, el 37,6 por ciento de los hogares de los blancos americanos no, y el 52 por ciento de los hispanos (legales) no pagan impuestos sobre la renta. " Hay alrededor de 5X tantos euros (blancos) como negros y 4X como muchos Euros como hispanos en los Estados Unidos, y hay aproximadamente el mismo% de blancos y negros en el bienestar (39%) y alrededor del 50% de los hispanos, por lo que el porcentaje sabio significa que los negros son aproximadamente 5X y los hispanos sobre 8X como propensos a estar en el bienestar como Euros. Incluyendo impuestos a la propiedad, impuestos sobre las ventas, etc., trae el impuesto promedio de clase media ($ 34k a $69k) hasta alrededor del 30%, así que 4 meses/año o alrededor de 15 años de trabajo en una vida de 50 año va al gobierno, un gran porcentaje para apoyar a los inmigrantes que están destruyendo Estados Unidos y el mundo, y otro gran porcentaje para el ejército, que es una fuerza policial libre para el resto del mundo. Contando todo el apoyo como se enumeró anteriormente (es decir, no sólo estampillas de comida, etc., sino la parte justa de los pobres de todos los demás gastos) la familia media de clase media trabaja aproximadamente 5 semanas/año o 5 años de su vida laboral para apoyar a los pobres. Ni la inmigración masiva, ni la esclavitud, ni los bebés anclados, ni la cría excesiva, ni el desempleo, ni los crímenes y las drogas son su culpa, pero la clase media y alta pagan por los pobres, y sus hijos pagarán más 402 (probablemente por lo menos 10 años de su vida laboral de 50 año bien antes de las 2100) hasta que el nivel de vida y la calidad del vivir es aproximadamente el mismo que el de los países diversos, y ambos van a caer continuamente cada año hasta el colapso, incluso si la pandilla de los siete sociópatas es destruida. Claro, cada estadístico tiene una estadística de contador y los supremacistas Neomarxistas del tercer mundo y el "50 Cent Army" del PCC están ocupados difundiendo la desinformación y trolling todas las redes sociales, pero como guía aproximada encontramos un estudio reciente que descubrió que el 37% de los hogares hispanos inmigrantes obtuvo la mayor parte de sus ingresos de bienestar, mientras que el 17% de los negros lo hizo (los blancos no fueron reportados, pero yo adivinaría sobre 10%). Del presupuesto $3,5 billones, alrededor de 595 mil millones es déficit y alrededor de 486 mil millones va al bienestar, por lo que eliminar el bienestar casi lo equilibraría y eliminaría todos los costos asociados con las personas y sus descendientes naturalizados desde 1965 pondría a Estados Unidos sólidamente en el negro y probablemente permitiría pagar la deuda nacional de $18 billones antes de finales de siglo, mientras que la implementación de una ley de repatriación de ciudadanos naturalizados probablemente permitiría que esto más cerca de mediados de siglo. Al escribir esto, veo un "artículo de noticias" (es decir, una de las interminables andanadas de mentiras pagadas que se plantan allí todos los días por los diversos y el 50 Cent Army) en Yahoo que me dice que los ilegales nos están haciendo un gran favor como la mayoría está trabajando y pagar alrededor de $1000 cada impuesto por año. Pero no nos dicen que cuestan el país tal vez $25.000 cada uno en costos directos trazables y si se agrega su parte de todos los otros costos (para mantener el gobirno la policía, los tribunales, el ejército, las calles, etc., etc.) es probable que el doble que. Como Coulter le dice en P47 de Adios America, una persona educada en la Universidad paga un promedio de $29k impuestos más por año que volver en servicios del gobierno. Los inmigrantes legales sin embargo recuperar un promedio $4344 más de lo que pagan, mientras que aquellos sin un título de escuela secundaria volver alrededor de $37k más de lo que pagan. Dice que alrededor del 71% de las familias ilegales obtienen bienestar. Alrededor del 20% de las familias estadounidenses obtienen el 75% de sus ingresos del gobierno (es decir, extorcionado a los contribuyentes y tomado prestado de los bancos a 2,5 billones/día) y otro 20% obtener 40%. En el Reino Unido, que está a la par con los Estados Unidos en su diversa/Neomarxista camino a la ruina, alrededor de 5 millones personas o el 10% de los adultos capaces viven totalmente en el bienestar y no han trabajado un día desde que el laborismo. asumió en 1997, y otro 30% recibe apoyo parcial. Grecia, famosa por su gran rescate reciente, es un caso típico de cómo las masas siempre arrastran un país dentro caos si se permite. Gente normalmente se retiran en pleno pensiones del gobierno en sus 50 's y tan pronto como 45, y cuando la jubilación en 50 fue permitida para un par de trabajos peligrosos como la eliminación de bombas, pronto se amplió para cubrir más de 500 ocupaciones incluyendo peluqueros (productos químicos peligrosos como champú) y locutores de radio y televisión (bacterias en los micrófonos)- no, no estoy bromeando. La gente a menudo elogia a los países europeos por su generoso bienestar, pero de hecho es principalmente posible porque casi toda su defensa desde los años 50 (para no decir nada sobre las dos guerras mundiales, las guerras coreanas y vietnamitas, Afganistán, Irak, Siria, Somalia, Serbia, etc., etc.), es decir, acerca de $10 billones en costes directos y tal vez otro $10 billones indirecto) ha sido pagada por los EE.UU. (y por vidas y lesiones americanas), es decir, por el 20% de los contribuyentes estadounidenses que pagan cualquier impuesto significativo, además de gran parte del $18 billones deuda. De hecho, como todo el mundo, ni siquiera serían países independientes si no fuera por los Estados Unidos que derrotaron a los alemanes en dos guerras Y el Japoneses y mantuvieron a los comunistas y ahora los musulmanes bajo control durante medio siglo. Por lo tanto, no sólo los Estados Unidos se secan por los pobres y diversos aquí, pero pagamos por todos el mundo, así como ayudar a los ricos allí se enriquecen. Típico de toda Europa, en Francia, donde los musulmanes se han convertido en un gran problema, incluso cuando no masacrando a la gente, la mayoría de ellos están en el bienestar, pagados en parte por los Estados Unidos. Durante aproximadamente una década, el mayor bloque de votación en la U. N es la organización de cooperación islámica que controla, por ejemplo, el Consejo de derechos humanos, donde sólo permiten los derechos permitidos por la ley islámica, y así olvidan los derechos de las mujeres, los derechos de los niños, los derechos de los homosexuales, libertad de religión, libertad de expresión, etc. y, de hecho, libertades de cualquier tipo. A medida que los musulmanes cría sin restricciones aumenta su porcentaje de la población mundial de 1/5 a 1/3 por 2100 o así y la civilización colapsa, esto va a empeorar mucho. El Islam se defiende con tal ferocidad porque en los países pobres del 3er mundo ha sido la única defensa contra el egoísmo y proporciona a los hombres pobres una garantía de reproducción y supervivencia. Lo mismo solía ser el caso del cristianismo. También está claro que a medida que el siglo 22 se aproxima y Estados Unidos se derrumba, China lo reemplazará como el ' gran Satanás ', ya que será dominante en todo el mundo, protegiendo siempre creciendo inversiones y ciudadanos Chinos, y eventualmente haciendo lo que quiera, como ' diversificación ' da como resultado el control de América por mexicanos y africanos y pierde superioridad militar y la dinero y voluntad de pelear. Y de Curso, los chinos no seguirán el camino de los Estados 403 Unidos y estarán "diversificados" en el colapso, a menos que a través de una gran desgracia se conviertan en democráticos/Neomarxista (por supuesto ahora sólo es comunista en nombre). Un poco fuera de la marca, pero demasiado agradable para dejar pasar es un hermoso ejemplo de devolución (disgenics) que es segundo sólo a la sobrepoblación en el colapso de la civilización industrial (aunque la corrección política prohíbe la discusión en cualquier lugar). Los pakistaní del Reino Unido, que a menudo importan a sus primos para casarse y por lo tanto están en crianza con hasta 5 niños una familia, a veces con múltiples esposas, producen el 30% de las enfermedades raras en el Reino Unido, aunque son el 2% de la población. Claro, la mayoría están en el bienestar y los defectivos resultan en enormes gastos para la atención de enfermería a tiempo completo y educación especial (para aquellos que no son sordos y ciegos). Y el Tribunal Superior Europeo, al igual que la Corte Suprema de Estados Unidos, ha olvidado su verdadera razón de existir y embelesado por delirios utópicos suicidas, ha gobernadó el gobierno debe pague todos los beneficios conyugales a todas las esposas y no puede trazar la línea a las dos. Una buena parte del libro de Coulter se gasta en el crimen, y debemos primero tnega un cuenta que (Coulter no parece, aunque me esperar que ella sepa) que rara vez es consideró que está enormemente subreportada, especialmente entre los pobres y los diversos. Así, el BJS dice que alrededor de 3,4 millones crímenes violentos por año no se reportan y las cifras de los no violentos (robo, asalto, hurto, vandalismo, narcotráfico, etc.) deben estar en los cientos de millones, desproporcionadamente cometidos por (y sufridos por) el Diversos. Uno encuentra que el porcentaje de varones adultos encarcelados por blancos es de 0,7, para los hispanos 1,5 y para los negros 4,7. Parece imposible encontrar cifras nacionales precisas para el costo de la encarcelación, pero $35K/año parece un mínimo, y tal vez $50K para el sistema legal, y tal vez otro $50k en costos médicos y psicológicos, programas de rehabilitación, pérdida de trabajo por sus víctimas, etc. De acuerdo con los negros no hispanos de BJS representaron el 39,4% de la población de la prisión y la cárcel en 2009, mientras que los blancos no hispanos eran 34,2%, y los hispanos (de cualquier raza) 20,6%. Según un informe 2009 del Centro Hispano de Pew, en 2007 latinos "representaron el 40% de todos los delincuentes federales condenados-más del triple de su participación (13%) de la población adulta total de Estados Unidos ". Una vez más, tenga en cuenta que no hay y casi con certeza nunca habrá ninguna evidencia de una diferencia genética significativa entre euros y diversa en psicología, o IQ, y que su mayor incidencia de problemas debe ser enteramente debido a su cultura. Si uno solo contaba ilegales, el crimen y la tasa de encarcelamiento probablemente sería el doble que se reportaría para los hispanos legales. Como señala Coulter (P101-2) es imposible obtener las cifras reales para el crimen inmigrante, ya que es, por supuesto, ' racista ' incluso sugerir que deben ser recogidos (y como se señaló, todo el crimen entre diverso está muy subreportado y muchos hispanos están mal clasificados como blancos), pero definitivamente está por encima de lo declarado, por lo que su tasa real podría estar cerca de la de los negros. Un conjunto de datos mostró alrededor de 1/3 de la 2,2 millones estado y los presos locales son extranjeros nacidos y tal vez otro 5% son hispanos nacidos americanos y otro 30% negro, dejando alrededor de 32% blanco. Los nacidos en el extranjero tenían un 70% más de probabilidades de cometer un crimen violento y dos veces más probable que una clase a Delito. Como señala Coulter, prácticamente todos los grupos de inmigrantes tienen una tasa de criminalidad más alta que los nativos. A medida que la invasión continúa, el soborno y la extorsión verán enormes aumentos a medida que suben al tercer estándar mundial. Sobornos (la forma más leve de extorsión) en efectivo o equivalente es la interacción normal entre las personas en el tercer mundo y la policía, los funcionarios militares, de aduanas y de inmigración, los inspectores de salud y bomberos, los maestros, los funcionarios de admisiones escolares e incluso los médicos, cirujanos y enfermeras. No estoy adivinando aquí ya que pasé una década de mi vida en el tercer mundo y experimenté y oí innumerables historias sobre todo lo anterior. A medida que pasa el tiempo, podemos esperar que esto se convierta en una rutina aquí también (primero por supuesto en California y el otro estados del oeste) y la norma nacional a partir de entonces. Además de los continuos aumentos en el crimen de todo tipo, veremos que el porcentaje de crímenes resueltos cae a los niveles extremadamente bajos del tercer mundo. Más recursos se dedican a la solución de asesinatos que cualquier otro delito y alrededor de 65% se resuelven en los E.E.U.U., pero en México menos del 2% se resuelven y como usted consigue Fuera Ciudad de México la tasa desciende a casi cero. También tenga en cuenta que la tasa aquí solía ser alrededor de 80%, pero ha caído en paralelo con el aumento en diverso. También 65% es el promedio, pero si usted podría obtener estadísticas estoy seguro de que se elevaría con el porcentaje de euro en una ciudad y caer como el porcentaje de diversos aumentos. En Detroit sólo el 30% se resuelven. Si sigues la pista de quién roba, viola y asesina, es obvio que las vidas negras importan mucho más a los euros que a otros negros. El español puede convertirse en el idioma oficial y obligatorio y el catolicismo romano la religión oficial, y por supuesto los cárteles mexicanos serán las organizaciones criminales dominantes, al menos para los Estados del suroeste a mediados del siglo y probablemente todo el país por 2100. Por supuesto, como señala Coulter,'es muy difícil obtener estadísticas sobre la raza y el crimen o cada vez más en la raza y 404 cualquier cosa, ya que's considerado ' racismo ' incluso para preguntar y el gobierno se niega a recogerla. Encontrar la verdad se hace mucho más difícil ya que los grupos hispanos de interés especial (es decir, supremacistas del tercer mundo), institados por los liberales del euro, que han perdido o vendido cualquier sentido común o decencia que puedan haber tenido, están trabajando arduamente difundiendo la desinformación con cientos de miles de elementos falsos o engañosos en la red y las redes sociales cada semana. Ella no parece mencionar el engaño masivo facilitado por Yahoo, Bing, Facebook y otros, que presentan entre sus artículos de noticias, desinformación pagada que presenta ' Noticias ' que es deliberadamente falsa o enormemente engañosa, como el artículo mencionado anteriormente (repetido muchas veces al día en algún lugar de la red) que dice que los ilegales son una buena cosa, ya que pagan impuestos. A pesar de haber recibido un viaje en gran parte libre, los diversos lo dan por sentado (especialmente porque es "racista", "odio" y "supremacista blanco" para señalar su libre, por lo que no lo encontrará en los principales medios de comunicación) y no tiene ningún problema demandando a la policía, los hospitales y todas las ramas del gobierno por cualquier infracción imaginada. ¡ Los euros deben tener una pista y demandarlos de vuelta! Ellos y el gobierno de los Estados Unidos, ahora que Trump es presidente, podrían presentar millones de trajes o casos criminales contra personas que se alborotan en las calles, piquetes y protestas que interrumpen el tráfico, rompiendo ventanas y causando pérdidas de negocio, trauma psicológico, etc. Demandar y/o arrestar a todos los criminales y sus familias por los daños a la propiedad, la policía, la pérdida de ingresos del negocio y el trabajo, etc. También demandar a la policía y a todas las ramas del gobierno por no protegerlos cada vez que se comete un crimen, especialmente por los diversos ilegales. Como escribe esto los padres de una joven mujer de San Francisco asesinada por un criminal alienígena ilegal, que había sido deportado en numerosas ocasiones, y luego protegido de la deportación por la policía de San Francisco (obstrucción de la justicia), los está demandando a ellos y a los federales (y deben demandar al Junta de supervisores y el gobernador Brown y la legislatura estatal que votó por las reglas del Santuario y la ley de confianza también). Predeciblemente fue encontrado inocente y en la ciudad santuario de San Francisco (y ahora el estado Santuario de California) es capaz de vivir su vida de crimen, mientras que siendo apoyado a expensas públicas. Cientos de miles son robados, asaltados, violados o asesinados por diversos, y tal vez 100 millones victimizados de manera menor cada año, y las partes perjudicadas (muy a menudo diversas) deben demandar cada vez. Para facilitar esto, los euros podrían establecer un fondo y varias organizaciones para eliminar los ilegales y los delitos contra euros. Y por supuesto, todos los países de los que provienen los delincuentes nacidos en el extranjero deben verse obligados a pagar el costo de la vigilancia y el enjuiciamiento de los mismos y de mantenerlos aquí: bienestar, atención médica, escolarización y su parte de todos los bienes y servicios mencionados anteriormente, incluidos los nacionales Defensa. México debe pagar todos los costos de la vigilancia de la frontera y de todos los crímenes y por todo el mantenimiento de los ilegales aquí desde el primer día, es decir, volver a afirmar 1965. Y ellos y Colombia Etc. debe pagar por el costo de la aplicación de drogas, el tratamiento adicto y el encarcelamiento, y decir una multa de $20 millones cada vez que alguien es violado, discapacitado o asesinado por un drogadicto o por un ciudadano ilegal o naturalizado o descendiente de una persona originaria de su país. Si no lo hacen, podríamos expulsar a todos los nacidos allí y cortar todo el comercio y las visas, o simplemente confiscar su producción de petróleo, minerales y alimentos. Al igual que muchas de las ideas aquí suena extraño porque la cobardía y la estupidez de ' nuestros ' líderes (es decir, en realidad no nuestro como nunca se nos pide) nos ha hecho tan acostumbrados a ser abusados. Somos el último país que debe abusar de los abusos, pero los políticos y la izquierdista idiotas nos han hecho la marca más fácil del planeta. Sí 9/11 es el abuso más llamativo, pero de hecho sufrimos tantas muertes y lesiones de los diversos cada año (por ejemplo, sólo de las drogas y los adictos o simplemente de las guerras), y mucho más daño todos los días, si extrapolar las consecuencias de su presencia aquí en el futuro. Se generó mucha controversia cuando Trump mencionó que estábamos dejando a los violadores en el país, pero él sólo estaba declarando los hechos. La mayoria de los crímenes en diversas comunidades nunca se informan, a menudo porque son cometidos por las pandillas hispanas que los controlan. Coulter relata unos pocos (el editor cortó el libro por la mitad y ella dice que puede producir fácilmente 50 casos por cada uno citado) de los crímenes de violación de inmigrantes más escandalosos cometidos aquí, señalando un estudio en el que las mujeres latinas reportaron abuso sexual en la niñez a aproximadamente 80X la tasa de otras mujeres estadounidenses, y ya que parece probable que muchos no querían hablar de ello, podría ser más alto. Ella señala que en gran parte de América Latina violar a los adolescentes no se considera un delito (por ejemplo, la edad de consentimiento en México es 12) y en cualquier caso, es raro que se haga algo al respecto, ya que a menudo está conectado a miembros de pandillas o a sus familias y si usted protesta por morir. Coulter señala que los ilegales han hecho grandes áreas de tierras públicas del suroeste de Estados Unidos y parques inseguros y algunos han sido cerrados. La mitad de unos 60 incendios forestales en tierras federales o tribales entre 2006 y 2010 fueron 405 iniciados por ilegales, muchos de ellos fijados deliberadamente para evitar la captura. El costo de luchar contra estos 30 por sí solo podría pagar un buen comienzo en un valla fronteriza segura. Asumo que todos conocen las masivas operaciones de cultivo de marihuana llevadas a cabo por los cárteles mexicanos en nuestros bosques nacionales. Además de la erosión y la contaminación, es la norma para los cultivadores matar a numerosos animales y amenazar a los excursionistas. Lo más deprimente de todo es la venta de la Sierra Club (que de repente cambió su melodía después de obtener una contribución de $100 millones del multimillonario David Gelbaum con la condición de que apoyan la inmigración-claramente confundido como su mano derecha protege la naturaleza mientras la izquierda lo destruye), que ahora se dedican a la inmigración masiva, denunciando a cualquiera que se oponga como "racistas blancos" incluso cuando son diversos. así que, son otro grupo que se debe hacer para registrarse como un agente de un gobierno extranjero y sus ejecutivos y los principales contribuyentes hechos para unirse a los otros criminales en cuarentena en una isla (el Aleutians sería perfecto, pero incluso Cuba lo haría) donde no pueden hacer más daño. Teniendo en cuenta el flagrante destrozando de California por los hispanos, y el claro como el fin del día de la naturaleza en América como los inmigrantes sobre el doble de la población durante el próximo siglo, esto es realmente asombroso desde un punto de vista, pero la cobardía y la estupidez son sólo para ser Esperado. Un asesinato en los EE.UU. se dice que total alrededor de $9 millones costos de por vida y si consiguen la muerte es varios millones más. En aproximadamente 15000/año que sería sobre $150 mil millones/año sólo para homicidios-más por diversa. México tiene alrededor de 5X el tasa de asesinatos de los EE.UU. y Honduras sobre 20X y sus descendientes sin duda pueden mirar adelante a nuestra tasa de movimiento en esa dirección. Coulter señala que los hispanos han cometido unos 23.000 asesinatos aquí en las últimas décadas. Mientras escribo, este artículo apareció en la red. "En una foto de archivo sin fecha, Jose Manuel Martínez llega al edificio judicial del Condado de Lawrence en Moulton, Ala., antes de declararse culpable de dispararle a Jose Ruiz en el Condado de Lawrence, Ala., en marzo de 2013. Martínez ha admitido haber matado a decenas de personas en los Estados Unidos como ejecutora de carteles de drogas en México. " Por supuesto, no es raro, sólo uno de los pocos que hacen los titulares recientemente. Pensando en 2,2 millones prisioneros (más del 1% de la población adulta) y un costo para ponerlos en la cárcel desde el inicio de su carrera criminal de tal vez $50.000 cada uno o alrededor de $100 mil millones y el costo de mantenerlos allí de alrededor de $35.000 cada uno o aproximadamente $75 mil millones significa un mínimo de $150 mil millones al año, sin incluir otros costos gubernamentales y sociales. No veo ninguna estimación realmente clara en la red para el costo total de la delincuencia en los Estados Unidos, pero en 2013 se estimó que el crimen violento solo costó al Reino Unido (donde las armas son mucho menos frecuentes y las mafias mexicanas y colombianas no operan significativamente) CA. $150 mil millones o alrededor de $6000/hogar, o alrededor del 8% del PIB, pero Estados Unidos tiene un porcentaje mucho más alto de inmigrantes, armas y drogas, incluyendo todos los crímenes no violentos y calculando sólo el 5% del PIB, que sería alrededor de 900 mil millones por año. Calculando alrededor del 60% del crimen debido a el Diverso, o tal vez 80% si usted cuenta que de los euros adictos a las drogas importadas por diversa, pagamos algo como 700 mil millones al año para apoyar el crimen diverso. Claro, todos los culpables de delitos, independientemente del origen nacional, la historia o el estado podrían tener su ciudadanía rescindido y ser deportado o cuarentenad en una isla, donde su costo de mantenimiento podría ser de $0 a $1,000/año en lugar de $35.000 y it podría ser hecho un viaje de ida para evitar la reincidencia. Sí, su ciencia ficción ahora, pero a medida que el siglo 22 se aproxima y la civilización se derrumba, la tolerancia del crimen Disminuir de necesidad. Por ahora, nada se hará, y el crimen aquí llegará a los niveles en México mientras la frontera continúa disolvió y el colapso ambiental y acercándose a la bancarrota disuelven la economía. Dentro de México en 2014 solo, 100 ciudadanos estadounidenses fueron asesinados y más de 130 secuestrados y otros acaban de desaparecer, y si agregas a otros extranjeros y mexicanos se encuentra con miles. Incluso un país pequeño y ligeramente transitado como Honduras gestiona unos 10 asesinatos y 2 secuestros al año de ciudadanos estadounidenses. Y por supuesto, Estos son los mejores tiempos, se está poniendo cada vez peor como sin restricciones Cría y el agotamiento de recursos traen el colapso cada vez más cerca. En otro índice de cuán fuera de control está México, los cárteles criminales, que se cree que generan más de $21 mil millones cada año a partir de las drogas, la minería ilegal, la pesca y la tala, el robo, la prostitución, la extorsión, el secuestro y la malversación de fondos, son una amenaza creciente a Pemex, el monopolio petrolero mexicano. Entre 2009 y 2016, los ladrones tocados las tuberías aproximadamente cada 1,4 kms a lo largo de la red de ductos de Pemex aproximadamente 14.000 km, consiguiendo más de $1 mil millones en ingresos anuales del gas que venden en el mercado negro. Son capaces de hacer esto aterrorizando a Pemex a los empleados obtener información sobre sus operaciones, ofreciéndoles lo mismo que a todos en México - plata o plomo, es decir, tomen los sobornos o mueran usted y su familia. 406 Euros escuchar constantemente acerca de lo malo que son no quieren dar la diversa aún más. OK bien, vamos a aceptar para hacerlo siempre que el país del tercer mundo que son de permite en los inmigrantes hasta que comprenden alrededor del 30% de su población ahora y 60% por 2100, impone legislación que da a todos los extranjeros en su país, legalmente o no, la ciudadanía para sus bebés, el bienestar, la comida gratis, la atención médica gratuita, la educación gratuita, la inmunidad a la deportación, Gratis atención de emergencia, licencias de conducir, licencia para ejercer la abogacía, derecho a servir en los jurados, derecho a traer a todos sus parientes (que también obtienen todos estos Privilegios), derecho a establecer organizaciones que les ayuden a mentir sobre los formularios de inmigración, a evadir la deportación, a suprimir la libertad de expresión y a subvertir el proceso político para que puedan tomar el control del país. Realmente, Hagamos que sea fácil y lo hagamos si incluso uno de sus países implementa incluso algunos de estos. Claro, nunca sucederá. Naturalmente, aquellos con todo tipo de deficiencia mental o física no están satisfechos con su nivel de bienestar y se están organizando también. Aquellos con autismo, en realidad un espectro de deficiencias genéticas debido a tantos como 1000 genes, ahora están haciendo campaña para ser considerados como no deficientes, pero "neurodiversos" y "neurotipográficos" deberían considerarlos como compañeros o incluso sus superiores. No hay problema para mí si alguien quiere tener un ' amigo ' o cónyuge que no puede experimentar amor o amistad y que siente lo mismo cuando mueren como lo hacen cuando su peces de colores (excepto estar más molesto por los mayores inconvenientes). Y aquellos con casos más que leves nunca tendrán un trabajo y serán una carga para sus parientes y la sociedad (es decir, la minoría que paga impuestos) toda su vida, y tienen una fuerte tendencia a pasar el problema a cualquier descendencia que tengan, por lo que probablemente aumentará continuamente, lo mismo que cientos de otros problemas genéticos con una heredabilidad significativa. Como el diagnóstico ha mejorado, también lo tiene la incidencia de autismo, que ahora excede el 1%, al igual que para la esquizofrenia, trastornos esquizotypales, ADHD, adicción a las drogas, alcoholismo, alexitimia, bajo coeficiente intelectual, depresión, trastorno bipolar, etc., etc., por lo que tal vez el combinado incidencia de trastornos mentales incapacitantes excede el 10% y aquellos con problemas físicos que necesitan apoyo parcial o completo de por vida es probablemente similares, y ambos están subiendo en número y porcentaje, el resultado inevitables de ' civilización ', "democracia" y "derechos humanos". Claramente, a medida que la economía colapsa, los costos de el cuidado de la salud se alza y un mayor porcentaje son ancianos no laborables y mentalmente o físicamente discapacitados, este sistema lunático colapsará-i. e., Estados Unidos se eventualmente tienen sobre las mismas limosnas para todos como países del tercer mundo por la temprano Siglo 22 - ninguno. Coulter comenta sobre el ciudadano mexicano Carlos Slim Helu (el mundo tercero persona más rica mientras escribo este) en el contexto de la mentira casi universal y la evasión de las cuestiones de inmigración por el New York Times y otros medios de comunicación. Él dio un gran préstamo para el Times hace unos años, para salvarlo de la bancarrota, y esto probablemente explica su posterior fracaso para cubrir los problemas de inmigración de una manera significativa. Slim es el monopolista de estreno mundial y sus empresas controlan el 90% del mercado telefónico mexicano y muchas de sus principales industrias (las mexicanas se refieren a su país como Slimlandia). Su riqueza equivale a aproximadamente el 5% del PIB de México. Para agregar perspectiva, ya que Estados Unidos tiene alrededor de 15 veces el PIB de México, para ser comparable, Bill Gates o Warren Buffet tendrían que valer alrededor de un billón de dólares cada uno o aproximadamente 12X su valor a partir de 2019. California es el mayor dinero que hace el estado de Estados Unidos para Slim, cuya toma de bienes y servicios mexicanos es de unos $140 millones/día. Para obtener el sabor de cómo eran las cosas cuando Slim logró adquirir la compañía telefónica Mexicana (y lo que se puede esperar aquí pronto), Gortari (elegido por G.W. Bush para hacer campaña con él) fue Presidente del vicioso monopolio político mexicano PRI, y en los años subsiguientes el hermano de Gortari fue hallado asesinado, sus parientes fueron detenidos por la policía Suiza cuando intentaron retirar $84 millones de la cuenta bancaria de su hermano, y huyó de México a Irlanda, donde permanece. Estas son algunas de las razones por las que Coulter llama a Slim un barón ladrón y una influencia funesto en México y Estados Unidos. Ella señala que alrededor de $20 mil millones de los ingresos anuales de Slim de su monopolio telefónico provienen de los mexicanos que viven aquí. Es libanés en ambos bandos, por lo que México ha experimentado su propia toma de posesión extranjera. Los corazones sangrantes insisten en que los estadounidenses muestren cada vez más "humanidad" y garanticen nuestro propio colapso para ayudar a la mafia, pero ¿qué humanidad hace el programa diverso? Se reproducen como conejos y consumen sin moderación, condenando así a todos, incluyendo a sus propios descendientes, al infierno en la tierra. No hay nada noble en los pobres, son sólo los ricos en la espera. Mostrando el olvido típico del establecimiento, nuestro secretario de estado Kerry alabado China por "levantar a 200 millones personas de la pobreza", pero no nota esto colocó un enorme drenaje en los recursos del mundo, y se hace robando del futuro, incluyendo a sus propios descendientes, y que esto es insostenible. Diez o 11 mil millones (por 2100) todos los que intentan mantenerse fuera de la pobreza garantizan el colapso del mundo. La China mayor QOL, como el nuestro, es sólo temporal, obtenido a costa de sus propios descendientes y del futuro de los mundos. La deficiencia principal de la primera edición de este ensayo fue la falta de cualquier discusión sobre China. Lo primero que 407 debemos tener en cuenta es que al decir que China dice esto o China hace eso, no solemos hablar del pueblo chino, sino de los sociópatas del PCC (partido comunista chino, es decir, los siete asesinos seriales seniles sociopáticos (SSS) de la Comité permanente del PCC que gobierna China. Hay 25 miembros del Politburó pero sólo 7 miembros de su Comité Permanente, uno de ellos usualmente elegido como Premier. Actualmente y probablemente hasta que se convierte en senil o muere esto es Xi Jinping. Recientemente he visto algunos programas de noticias falsas izquierdistas típicos (es decir, prácticamente el único tipo que se puede encontrar en los medios de comunicación, es decir, casi todo ahora-es decir, Yahoo, CNN, el New York Times, etc.) en YouTube, uno por VICE que mencionó que 1000 economistas (y 15 Nobel Ganadores del premio) enviaron una carta a Trump diciéndole que la guerra comercial fue un error, y otra que entrevistó a un economista académico que dijo que el movimiento de Trump fue una provocación para iniciar la segunda guerra mundial. Tienen razón sobre la perturbación del comercio mundial, pero no entienden el panorama general, que es que los siete sociópatas tienen una dominación mundial total, con la eliminación de la libertad en todas partes, como su objetivo. y que sólo hay dos maneras de detenerlos: un embargo comercial total que devasta la economía China y lidera a sus militares para forzar al PCC y celebrar elecciones, o WW3. Claro como el día, pero todos estos académicos "brillantes" no pueden verlo. Si los sociópatas no se retiran ahora, en tan sólo 15 años será demasiado tarde y sus descendientes lenta pero inexorablemente estarán sujetos a la misma suerte que los chinos: secuestro, tortura y asesinato de cualquier disidente. Por supuesto, el PCC comenzó WW3 hace mucho tiempo (se podía ver su invasión de Corea como el principio) y lo está persiguiendo en todas las maneras posibles, a excepción de las balas y las bombas, y vendrán pronto. El PCC luchó contra los Estados Unidos en Corea, invadió y masacró el Tíbet, y luchó contra las escaramuzas fronterizas con Rusia y la India. Lleva a cabo operaciones masivas de piratería contra todas las bases de datos industriales y militares en todo el mundo y ha robado los datos clasificados en prácticamente todos los sistemas militares y espaciales actuales de Estados Unidos y Europa, analizó sus debilidades y desplegados versiones mejoradas dentro unos años. Decenas de miles, y tal vez cientos de miles, de empleados del PCC han estado hackeando en las bases de datos militares, industriales, financieros y de medios sociales en todo el mundo desde los primeros días de la red y hay cientos de hacks recientes conocidos en los EE.UU. solo. Como las principales instituciones y militares han endurecido sus firewalls, el SSS se ha trasladado a las instituciones menores y a los subcontratistas de defensa y a nuestros aliados, que son objetivos más fáciles. Si bien ignora la aplastante pobreza de cientos de millones y la existencia marginal de la mayoría de sus habitantes, ha creado un masiva presencia militar y espacial, que crece cada año, y cuya única razón de existencia está librando la guerra para eliminar la libertad en todas partes. Además de despojar a los 3Rd mundo de los recursos, una de las principales iniciativas de la iniciativa cinturón y carretera de varios billones de dólares es la construcción de bases militares en todo el mundo. Están obligando al mundo libre a una carrera armamentística masiva de alta tecnología que hace que la guerra fría con la Unión Soviética parezca un picnic. Los rusos no son estúpidos, y a pesar de fingir amistad con los sociópatas, seguramente entienden que el PCC va a comerlos vivos, que su única esperanza es aliarse con Occidente, y Trump tiene razón en el dinero en hacerse amigo de Putin. Por supuesto, los supremacistas Neomarxistas del tercer mundo probablemente tomaran el control total de los EE.UU. en 2020 y nada podría ser más a gusto del PCC. Snowden (otro no despistado veinte algo) ayudaron al SSS más que cualquier otro individuo, con la posible excepción de todos los presidentes estadounidenses desde WW2, que han perseguido la política suicida de apaciguamiento. Estados Unidos no tiene más remedio que monitorear todas las comunicaciones y compilar un dossier sobre todos, ya que es esencial no sólo para controlar a los criminales y terroristas, sino para contrarrestar al SSS, que están haciendo rápidamente lo mismo, con la intención de eliminar completamente la libertad. Aunque el SSS, y el resto de los militares del mundo, están gastando grandes sumas en hardware avanzado, es muy probable que WW3 (o los compromisos más pequeños que conducen a él) será dominado por software. No está fuera de la cuestión que el SSS, con probablemente más hackers (codificadores) trabajando para ellos, entonces todo el resto del mundo combinado, ganará guerras futuras con un mínimo conflicto físico, sólo por paralizar su electrónica enemiga a través de la red. Sin satélites, sin teléfonos, sin comunicaciones, sin transacciones financieras, sin red eléctrica, sin Internet, sin armas avanzadas, sin vehículos, trenes, naves o aviones. Algunos pueden cuestionar que el PCC (y por supuesto los niveles superiores de la policía, el ejército y la oficina 610) son realmente aberrantes mentales, así que aquí están algunas de las características comunes de los sociópatas (antes llamados psicópatas) que se pueden encontrar en la red. Por supuesto, algunos de estos son compartidos por muchos autistas y alexitimics, y los sociópatas difieren de las personas "normales" sólo en grado. Encanto superficial, manipulante y astuto, gran sentido de sí mismo, falta de remordimiento, vergüenza o culpabilidad, 408 emociones superficiales, incapacidad para el amor, insensibilidad/falta de empatía, controles conductuales pobres/naturaleza impulsiva, cree que son todopoderosos, omnisciente , con derecho a todos los deseos, ningún sentido de los límites personales, ninguna preocupación por su impacto en los demás. Problemas para hacer y mantener amigos. Comportamientos aberrantes como la crueldad a personas o animales, el robo, la promiscuidad, la versatilidad criminal o empresarial, cambiar su imagen según sea necesario, no percibas que nada está mal con ellos, autoritario, reservado, paranoico, buscar situaciones donde su comportamiento tiránico será tolerado, condonado o admirado (p. ej., CCP, policía, militar, capitalismo predatorio), apariencia convencional, objetivo de esclavización de sus víctimas, procurar ejercer control des despotico sobre todos los aspectos de la vida de otros, Tener una necesidad emocional para justificar sus acciones y por lo tanto necesitan la afirmación de su víctima (respeto, gratitud), objetivo último es la creación de una víctima dispuesta, Incapaz de apego humano real a otro, incapaz de sentir remordimiento o culpabilidad, narcisismo extremo y grandiosidad, su objetivo es gobernar el mundo. Mentirosos patológicos. Esta última es una de las características más sorprendentes del PCC. Prácticamente todo lo que dicen es una mentira obvia, o distorsión, en su mayoría tan absurdo que cualquier bien educado de diez años se reirá de ellos. Sin embargo, persisten en saturar todos los medios de comunicación todos los días (un presupuesto anual de $10 mil millones sólo para la propaganda extranjera) con declaraciones absurda. El hecho de que estén tan fuera de contacto con la realidad que piensan que se tomarán en serio muestra claramente lo que cualquier persona racional va a considerar como una enfermedad mental (sociopatía). Sólo hay dos caminos para eliminar el PCC, liberando 1,4 mil millones prisioneros del SSS, y terminando la marcha lunática a WW3. El Pacífico es lanzar una guerra comercial para devastar la economía China hasta que el ejército se alimente y arranque el PCC. Los Estados Unidos necesitan, por cualquier medio que sea necesario, unir a todos sus aliados para reducir el comercio con China a casi cero, sin importar ningún producto de China ni de ninguna entidad con más de un 10% de propiedad China en cualquier parte del mundo, incluido cualquier producto con cualquier componente de dicho Origen. Ninguna exportación de nada a China ni a ninguna entidad que reexporte a China o que tenga más del 10 por ciento de propiedad China, con consecuencias severas e inmediatas para los violadores. Sí, costaría temporalmente millones de empleos y una gran recesión mundial, y sí sé que una gran parte de sus exportaciones provienen de empresas conjuntas con compañías americanas, pero la alternativa es que cada país se convierta en el perro de los siete sociópatas (y como todos los animales que mantienen a los perros en pequeñas jaulas mientras los engordan para la matanza) y/o experimentan los horrores de WW3. Otros posibles pasos son enviar a casa a todos los estudiantes y trabajadores chinos en ciencia y tecnología, congelar todos los activos de cualquier entidad de más del 10% de propiedad China, prohibir los viajes extranjeros a cualquier ciudadano chino, para prohibir cualquier chino o cualquier entidad más de 10% propiedad de China de la compra de cualquier empresa, tierra, producto o tecnología de los EE.UU. o cualquiera de sus aliados. Todas estas medidas se introducirían gradualmente según proceda. Debemos tener en cuenta que el monstruo chino se debe en gran parte a las delirios utópicos suicidas de nuestros políticos. El Presidente Carter les dio el derecho de enviar estudiantes a los EE.UU. (actualmente hay alrededor de 300.000), utilizar nuestra propiedad intelectual sin pagar regalías, les dio el estatus de comercio nación más favorecida, y por Decreto cancelado nuestro reconocimiento de Taiwán y nuestro acuerdo de defensa mutua (es decir, sin el voto de nadie) debe ser un miembro honorario del PCC, junto con los arbustos, los Obamas, los Clintons, Edward Snowden, etc.). Estos fueron los primeros en una larga serie de gestos conciliatorios con la dictadura más cruel del mundo que hizo posible que prosperen, y estableció el escenario para su próxima invasión de Taiwán, las islas del mar del sur y otros países como lo deseen. Estas medidas, junto con nuestra incapacidad de invadir en los años 40 para evitar su adquisición de China, nuestro fracaso para Nuke su ejército y por lo tanto el PCC fuera de existencia durante la guerra de Corea, nuestro fracaso para evitar su masacre del Tíbet, nuestro fracaso para hacer nada cuando ellos explotoron sus primeras armas nucleares, nuestra incapacidad para llevarlos a cabo en 1966 cuando lanzaron su primer ICBM con capacidad nuclear, nuestro (o más bien de Bush) fracaso para hacer algo sobre la masacre de Tiananmen, nuestro fracaso para cerrar los institutos de Confucio presentes en muchos universidades de todo el mundo, que son frentes para el PCC, nuestra incapacidad de prohibir la compra de empresas, propiedad, derechos mineros, etc. en todo el mundo, que es otra manera de adquirir bienes de alta tecnología y otros activos vitales, nuestro fracaso para hacer nada durante los últimos 20 años sobre su innumerables actos de espionaje y piratería en nuestras bases de datos robando casi todo nuestro armamento avanzado, nuestro fracaso para impedir que sus aliados de Corea del norte y Pakistán desarrollen armas nucleares e ICBM y reciban equipos de China (por ejemplo, su misil móvil lanzadores, que afirman que eran para transportar troncos y era pura coincidencia que 409 encajaban exactamente con los misiles coreanos), nuestra incapacidad para detenerlos de violar nuestro embargo sobre el petróleo de Irán (compran gran parte de él, registrando sus naves en Irán), y su programa nuclear ( equipo y técnicos van de ida y vuelta a Corea del norte a través de China), nuestra incapacidad para evitar que provean tecnología militar y armas en todo el mundo (por ejemplo, Corea del sur, Irán, Pakistán, los cárteles en México, y más de otros 30 países), nuestra incapacidad para detener el flujo de drogas peligrosas y sus precursores directa o indirectamente (por ejemplo, casi todos los Fentanyl y Carfentanyl enviados en todo el mundo, y los precursores de metanfetaminas para los cárteles mexicanos provienen de China), y nuestro fracaso para hacer algo acerca de su edificio "puertos" (es decir, bases militares) en todo el mundo, que está en curso. Una alternativa al cierre de la economía de China es una huelga selectiva, digamos 50 drones termobáricos en el 20TH Congreso del PCC, Cuando todos los miembros principales están en un solo lugar, pero eso no tendrá lugar hasta las 2022 para que uno pueda llegar a la reunión plenaria anual. Los chinos serían informados, como ocurrió el ataque, que deben dejar sus armas y prepararse para celebrar una elección democrática o ser empujados a la edad de piedra. La otra alternativa es un ataque nuclear. La confrontación militar es inevitable dado el curso actual del PCC. Es probable que ocurra sobre las islas en el mar del sur de China o Taiwán dentro de unas pocas décadas, pero a medida que establecen bases militares en todo el mundo podría suceder en cualquier lugar (ver tigre agachado, etc.). Los conflictos futuros tendrán aspectos hardkill y softkill con los objetivos declarados del PCC para enfatizar la ciberguerra pirateando y paralizante sistemas de control de todas las comunicaciones militares e industriales, equipos, plantas de energía, satélites, Internet, bancos, y cualquier dispositivo o vehículo conectado a la red. Los sociópatas están lanzando lentamente una matriz mundial de superficie tripulada y autónoma y submarinos submarinos o drones capaces de lanzar armas convencionales o nucleares que pueden estar inactivos a la espera de una señal de China o incluso en busca de la firma de los buques estadounidenses o Aviones. Mientras destruimos nuestros satélites, eliminando así la comunicación entre Estados Unidos y nuestras fuerzas en todo el mundo, usarán la suya, junto con drones para atacar y destruir a nuestras fuerzas navales actualmente superiores. Por supuesto, todo esto se hace cada vez más automáticamente por la IA. Todo esto es totalmente obvio para cualquier persona que pasa un poco de tiempo en la red y puede entender inglés. Dos de las mejores fuentes para empezar son el libro Crouching Tiger (y los cinco videos de YouTube con el mismo nombre), y la larga serie de piezas satíricas cortas en el canal China Uncensored en YouTube o su nuevo www.chinauncensored.tv. Los planes del PCC para WW3 y la dominación total se presentan con bastante claridad en las publicaciones y discursos de la gobierno de China. Gastan unos 10 mil millones dólares anuales para difundir su propaganda en todo el mundo. Ellos o sus títeres poseen o controlan periódicos, revistas, canales de televisión y radio y colocan noticias falsas en la mayoría de los medios de comunicación en todas partes todos los días. Además, tienen un ejército (tal vez millones de personas) que trol todos los medios de comunicación colocando más propaganda y ahogando comentarios legítimos. La regla de los siete sociópatas seniles es una tragicomedia surrealista como Blancanieves y los siete enanos, pero sin Blancanieves, personalidades entrañables o un final feliz. Son los guardianes de la prisión más grande del mundo, pero son de lejos los peores criminales, cometiendo por apoderado cada año millones de asaltos, violaciones, robos, sobornos, secuestros, torturas y asesinatos, la mayoría de ellos presumiblemente por su propia policía secreta de la 610 Oficina creada el 10 de junio de 1999 por Jiang Zemin para perseguir a los meditadores Qigong de Falun Gong, y cualquier otra persona consideró una amenaza, ahora incluyendo todos los religiosos y grupos políticos que no están bajo su dominio directo. Con mucho, el mayor aliado de los siete enanos es el partido demócrata de los Estados Unidos, que, en un momento en que los Estados Unidos necesitan más que nunca ser fuertes y Unidos, está haciendo todo lo posible para dividir a los Estados Unidos en facciones beligerantes con cada vez más recursos que van a sostener las legiones florecientes de las clases bajas y la conducen a la bancarrota. El PCC es, con mucho, el grupo más malvado en la historia del mundo, robando, violando, secuestrando, encarcelado, torturándose, muriendo de hambre y matando a más personas que todos los otros dictadores de la historia (un estimado 100 millones), y en pocos años tendrá un total Estado de vigilancia registrando cada acción de todos en China, que ya se está expandiendo en todo el mundo. Aunque el SSS nos trata como a un enemigo, de hecho, Estados Unidos es el mejor amigo del pueblo chino y el PCC su mayor enemigo. Desde otra perspectiva, otros chinos son su mayor enemigo, ya que demoler todos los recursos del mundo. Por supuesto, algunos dicen que China colapsará por su propia voluntad, y es posible, pero el precio de equivocarse es el fin de la libertad y la WW3 o una larga serie de conflictos que los siete sociópatas seguramente ganarán. Uno debe tener en cuenta que tienen controles sobre su población y armas que Stalin, Hitler, Gadafi e Idi Amin nunca soñaron. Cámaras de CCTV (actualmente tal vez 300 millones y aumentando rápidamente) en redes de alta velocidad con análisis de imagen de IA, software de rastreo en cada teléfono que la gente está obligada a usar, y rastreadores GPS en todos los vehículos, todas las transacciones pagaderas sólo por teléfono ya dominante allí y universal y obligatoria pronto, el monitoreo automático total de todas las comunicaciones por IA y un estimado de 2 millones censores en línea, además de millones de policías y cuadros del ejército, hay 410 tantos como 10 millones policías secretos de la policía de 610 Oficina creada por Jiang Zemin, con prisiones negras (es decir, no oficial y sin marcar), actualización instantánea del expediente digital en todos los 1,4 mil millones chinos y pronto en todo el mundo en la tierra que utiliza la red o los teléfonos. A menudo se llama el sistema de crédito social y permite a los sociópatas para cerrar las comunicaciones, capacidad de compra, viajes, cuentas bancarias, etc. de cualquier persona. Esto no es fantasía, pero ya en gran medida implementado para los musulmanes de Xinjiang y difundir rápidamente-ver YouTube. ¿Cuánta calidad de vida (QOL-una medida general incluyendo la riqueza, la tasa de criminalidad, el estrés, el tráfico, los problemas de drogas, la felicidad, etc.) podrían los estadounidenses ganar con varias medidas? La prohibición de los bebés ancla podría subir QOL 5% para mediados de siglo y 10% para el final, relativa a no hacer nada. Hacer la prohibición retroactiva a 1982, o preferiblemente a 1898, y así deportar a la mayoría de los naturalizados por estar relacionado con los bebés anclados, podría elevar QOL otro 5% inmediatamente. Prohibir la inmigración podría elevarlo otro 10% a finales de siglo, mientras que hacer la prohibición retroactiva a 1965 y deportar a la mayoría de los inmigrantes junto con sus descendientes y parientes naturalizados podría dar a los estadounidenses (diversos y euros) otro 20% más QOL inmediatamente. Y podría haber una ley de devolución a África o restitución de la esclavitud que enviara a todos los negros, o al menos a los de bienestar, desempleados o encarcelados, de vuelta a sus tierras natales para que nunca más tuviéramos que escuchar sus quejas inanes sobre ser secuestrados (como se señaló , nunca consideran que si no fuera por la esclavitud no existirían y si no fuera por el colonialismo y la tecnología euro tal vez el 90% de las personas en el tercer mundo no existirían), por no mencionar si no es por el euro que ahora estarían viviendo (o DYING) bajo los nazis o los japoneses o los comunistas. Claro, uno podría hacer esto caso por caso, manteniendo a todos los expertos (por ejemplo, personal médico y de Hitech). En lugar de o antes del proceso de deportación lenta, uno podría cancelar la ciudadanía o al menos la votación Privilegios de todos los ciudadanos naturalizados y sus descendientes desde 1965. Los 42 millones afroamericanos (alrededor de 74 millones por 2100) que representan 4.5 x tantos prisioneros per cápita como euros, obtienen un viaje en gran medida libre para todos los servicios esenciales y bienestar, toman y hacen que las grandes áreas inhabitables de las ciudades, aumentan la aglomeración y tráfico en alrededor de 13%, etc., por lo que pueden disminuir el QOL de todos los estadounidenses sobre 20% en promedio, pero a no habitable para aquellos que están en barrios pobres. Las Hispanos son de aproximadamente 18% (o alrededor del 25% incluyendo ilegales) y representan un mínimo de 2.5 X tantos prisioneros como euros y tienen todas las otras cuestiones, causando así una caída de QOL de alrededor de 30% o de nuevo a inhabitable en áreas que dominan, que pronto incluirá todo el suroeste de Estados Unidos. Así que en general, es una suposición justa que deportar más diversa haría sobre el doble de la QOL (o decir de Sólo soportable a maravilloso) en este momento para la persona promedio, pero por supuesto mucho más aumento para los más pobres y menos para los más ricos. Si uno compara el QOL probable en 2119 (es decir, un siglo a partir de ahora), si se adoptaron todas las posibles medidas antidiversidad, en relación con lo que será si poco o nada está hecho, espero que QOL ser aproximadamente 3X más alto o de nuevo de intolerable a fantástico. Después de documentar la incompetencia del INS y el gobierno, y los incontables traidores y abiertamente anti-blanco racista (en el sentido original y significativo de racismo) organizaciones (por ejemplo, el Consejo Nacional de la raza) ayudándonos a citarnos con inmigrantes (lista parcial en p247 of Adios America) Coulter dice: "lo único que se interpone entre Estados Unidos y el olvido es una moratoria total de la inmigración" y "los mil millones de dólares industria de la inmigración ha convertido cada aspecto de la ley de inmigración en un motor de fraude. Las reunificaciones familiares son fraudes, los "trabajadores agrícolas" son fraudes, las visas de alta tecnología son fraudes y los casos de asilo y refugiados son fraudes monumentales. " Su libro es fuertemente documentados (y la mayoría de los datos se dejaron fuera debido a las restricciones de tamaño) y, por supuesto, casi todos los datos se pueden encontrar en la red. Como señala Coulter, una encuesta de 2015 muestra que más estadounidenses tenían una opinión favorable de Corea del norte (11%) que querían aumentar la inmigración (7%,) pero la mayoría de los demócratas, los Clintons, los Bush, Obama el magnate del Casino Sheldon Adelson, el multimillonario de Hedge Fund David Gelbaum, Carlos Slim, el economista ganador del Premio Nobel Paul Krugman y el fundador de Facebook de megabillionaire, Mark Zuckerberg, no quieren que los estadounidenses lo voten nunca. También menciona que el gobernador de Florida Jeb Bush (con una esposa mexicana) empujó a un proyecto de ley para dar licencias de conducir a los extranjeros ilegales (copia de California) sólo 3 años después de 13 de los 9/11 terroristas habían utilizado licencias de conductores de la Florida para abordar los aviones. Sí, el mismo Jeb Bush que recientemente llamó a la inmigración ilegal "un acto de amor" (por supuesto que significa amor por México y odio por los EE.UU., o por lo menos sus euros). El inexorable colapso de los Estados Unidos (y otros países del primer mundo en Europa están apenas un paso o dos atrás, ya 411 que han dejado que en los diversos que están produciendo niños en aproximadamente 3 veces las tasas de euro) se muestran las fallas fatales en la democracia representativa. Si van a sobrevivir y no a convertirse en los aguajeros del infierno del tercer mundo, deben establecer una meritocracia. Cambiar la edad de votación a 35 mínimo y 65 máximo, con un mínimo de IQ 110, prueba de estabilidad mental, falta de dependencia de drogas o alcohol, no hay condenas por delitos graves, y una puntuación mínima en la prueba SAT que podría conseguir uno en una buena Universidad. Pero el lamentable estado de lo que pasa para la civilización se muestra en una reciente encuesta de Gallup que descubrió que alrededor del 50% de los estadounidenses creían que el diablo influye en los eventos diarios, y que los ovnis son reales, mientras que el 36% cree en la telepatía y alrededor del 25% en fantasmas. Un sí en cualquiera de estos parecería ser una buena razón para la exclusión de por vida de la votación y preferiblemente la pérdida de la ciudadanía, como debería ser un sí o "posiblemente" o "probablemente" respuesta a "¿crees que O.J. Simpson es inocente". Tal vez disminuya el dolor ligeramente para darse cuenta de que no es sólo el gobierno Estadounidense que es morónico y traidor, como versiones de su suicidio están sucediendo en otras democracias. En Gran Bretaña, la Oficina Nacional de la infancia ha instado a los maestros de la guardería a que informen de cualquier expresión "racista" de niños de hasta tres años de edad. Alrededor del 40% de los Britons reciben alguna forma de bienestar. Londres tiene más crimen violento que Estambul o Nueva York y se dice que tiene casi 1/3 de las cámaras de CCTV del mundo, que registran el ciudadano promedio alrededor de 300 veces al día. Por supuesto, como de costumbre, no hay estadísticas confiables para China, donde algunas de las compañías de electrónica más exitosas están en el negocio de CCTV y donde el software de reconocimiento facial a menudo puede identificar a cualquier persona aleatoria en minutos. El Reino Unido tiene la tasa más alta en Europa de las ETS, las madres no casados, la drogadicción y el aborto. Una quinta de todos los niños no tienen un adulto que trabaja en su casa, casi un millón de personas han estado en licencia por enfermedad durante más de una década, los tribunales forzaron al Gobierno a dar a un hombre con discapacidad dinero para volar a Ámsterdam para tener sexo con una prostituta porque negar que sería una "violación de sus derechos humanos". El número de delitos imputables por 1000 aumentó de aproximadamente 10 en la década de 1950 a alrededor de 110 en los años 1990 en paralelo con el aumento en diverso. Gracias a "después de América" de Mark Steyn, que se requiere la lectura de todos los estadounidenses brillantes y civilizados que quieren que su país para sobrevivir, aunque salvo un golpe militar, no hay ninguna posibilidad. Coulter señala lo absurdo de los políticos que adulan a los votantes hispanos (Hispandering). Si candidato presidencial Mitt Romney había ganado el 71% del voto hispano en lugar del 27% que todavía habría perdido, pero si hubiera ganado sólo un 4% más del voto blanco que habría ganado. En realidad, el 72% de los votantes son blancos no hispanos, por lo que incluso si alguien obtuvo todos los votos no blancos, un candidato presidencial todavía podría ganar por un deslizamiento de tierra, como vimos en las elecciones de Trump. El problema es que un porcentaje considerable de votantes blancos son idiotas y lunáticos que no pueden actuar en su propio interés. Lo absurdo de permitir que los ciudadanos promedio votaran fue mostrado cuando muchos estaban considerando seriamente a Ben Carson para Presidente en 2016--una Biblia Adventista del séptimo día en el creacionista Detroit ghetto chico de tan obvia inmadurez y estupidez que ningún país cuerdo le permitiría ocupar cualquier cargo público cualquiera (por supuesto, uno podría decir lo mismo de la mayoría de las personas y la mayoría de los políticos). Sin embargo, tiene la enorme ventaja de que sus defectos le dan mucho en común con el estadounidense promedio. Me parece que sus limitaciones incluyen el autismo-la razón de su famoso "efecto plano". No se deje engañar por sus ocasionales simulaciones de risas--los autistas aprenden a imitar las emociones a una edad temprana y algunos incluso tienen carreras exitosas como comediantes. El famoso comediante Dan Aykroyd tenía esto que decir acerca de su Asperger-"uno de mis síntomas incluyó mi obsesión con los fantasmas y la aplicación de la ley-llevo consigo una insignia policial conmigo, por ejemplo. Me obsesioné con Hans Holzer, el cazador de fantasmas más grande de la historia. Fue entonces cuando nació la idea de mi película Ghostbusters. " "Gentil Ben" Carson quiere prohibir el aborto, incluso en casos de violación e incesto, piensa que debemos abandonar Medicare, y se adhiere a muchas teorías de conspiración extrañas, como las pirámides que no están construidas por los faraones como tumbas, sino por el José bíblico para el almacenamiento de ¡Grano! Se propone convertir el Departamento de educación en un supervisor fascista de la moral adecuada, con estudiantes que informan a los profesores que muestran sesgo político (es decir, cualquier persona) al gobierno para que la financiación de las universidades podría ser cortada. "Personalmente creo que esta teoría que Darwin surgió fue algo que fue alentado por el adversario." El adversario es un apodo para el diablo; es la traducción real de la palabra "Satanás." También despidió al Big Bang, llamándolo un "cuento de hadas." Como todos los creacionistas, eso significa que rechaza la mayor parte de la ciencia moderna--es decir, todo lo que nos permite tener sentido de la biología, la geología, la física y el universo y los pone en cuatro patas con personas que vivieron hace 100.000 años-es decir, neandertales. Claro, a los sanos, inteligentes y educados, los "cuentos de hadas" son sobre el cielo, el infierno, los Ángeles y los demonios, pero estos son exactamente el nivel correcto para la clase media baja estadounidense, diversa o euro. Es difícil creer que pudiéramos hacer cosas peores que el Clinton, Nixon, Reagan, Obama y G.W. Bush, pero va a suceder, y sus descendientes verán una línea 412 interminable de políticos que sólo son calificaciones reales son avaricia, deshonestidad, estupidez, sociopatía, piel oscuro o un apellido español. En cualquier caso, es inevitable en una mobocracia de que los idiotas, los lunáticos y los meramente despistados se apoderen y corran el espectáculo hasta que colapse, lo cual es inevitable a menos que la democracia como actualmente se practica cambia radicalmente y la diversidad disminuye. Ahora que tenemos un razonablemente cuerdo, inteligente patriótico persona como Presidente (aunque ver esto a través de la desinformación masiva y la calumnia producida por los supremacistas Neomarxistas del tercer mundo puede ser difícil) y suficientes republicanos en el Congreso (los demócratas que han vendido su país hace mucho tiempo) que en teoría deportar a los ilegales, pero a menos que rescindimos la inmigración y deportemos retroactivamente a la mayoría de los naturalizados desde 1965, sólo retrasará el desastre y no lo detendrá. Sin embargo, casi todo lo que Trump intenta hacer está bloqueado por los jueces Neomarxistas y los demócratas que hace mucho tiempo dejaron de representar los intereses de Estados Unidos. Hillary Clinton era preferible a Obama, que fue entrenado como abogado constitucional, por lo que conocía nuestros sistemas debilidades fatales, y cuánto más podría ir en la creación de un estado comunista Impuesta por el fascismo, como su gran admirado modelo Cuba. Puedo perdonar fácilmente a Hillary por Benghazi y sus correos electrónicos y Bill por Monica, pero no por su totalmente cínico indulto de clientes del hermano de Hillary, Hugh, el tramposo de impuestos Marc Rich y cuatro Hasids condenados en 1999 de engañar al gobierno federal de más de $30 millones en subsidios federales de vivienda, préstamos para pequeñas empresas y becas estudiantiles, con el fin de ganarse el favor de los judíos de N.Y. Esto es muy conocido y, de hecho, Casi todo lo que digo Aquí es fácilmente fácil de encontrar en la red. Incluso Aunque nuestra mobocracia es un lento-pesadilla de movimiento, si tuviéramos una democracia directa (como podíamos fácilmente en la era de la computación) y la gente realmente se sondeó en cuestiones importantes, tal vez la mayoría de nuestros principales problemas se desecharían rápidamente. Supongamos que mañana hubo un voto de cada votante registrado con una dirección de correo electrónico o un teléfono inteligente en preguntas como esta: ¿Todos los extranjeros ilegales deben ser deportados dentro Una ¿año? ¿Debería cortarse el bienestar en mitad dentro de 1 año? Si todos los delincuentes condenados nacidos en otro país o uno de cuyos padres fueran, se cancelara su ciudadanía y se deportaran en un plazo de 90 ¿Días? ¿Se debe terminar toda inmigración excepto las visas de trabajo temporales para aquellos con habilidades especiales? ¿Se debe cancelar y deportar a todos los abusadores de niños, violistas, asesinos y drogadictos, o si un ciudadano nativo está en cuarentena en una isla? Tanto mejor si la votación estaba restringida a aquellos cuyos padres y/o los cuatro abuelos son nativos nacidos, que no son delincuentes, que han pagado más del 5% de sus ingresos en impuestos los últimos 3 años y aprobado la salud mental, eventos actuales y pruebas de IQ. Una vez más, los mayores benefactores serían los diversos que permanecieron aquí, pero por supuesto la mayoría resistirá cualquier cambio que requiera inteligencia o educación para captar. No estoy en contra de una sociedad diversa, sino para salvar a Estados Unidos de sus hijos (recuerda que no tengo descendientes ni parientes cercanos), debería tener un límite de 20% y eso significaría que alrededor del 40% de los diversos aquí ahora serían repatriados. En realidad, no me oponía a mantener el% diverso que tenemos ahora (alrededor de 37%) proporcionó la mitad de los que aquí fueron reemplazados por asiáticos cuidadosamente seleccionados o por personas de cualquier lugar, siempre que sean cuidadosamente examinados (es decir, sin criminales, defectuosos mentales o físicos, sin nueces religiosas, sin drogadictos, bien educados con una probada utilidad profesión), y que acuerdan no tener más de dos hijos, con deportación inmediata si producen un tercio, cometen un delito mayor, o permanecen en el bienestar por más de un año. Y no se permite la entrada de parientes. En realidad, sería un gran paso adelante para reemplazar a todos los criminales del euro, drogadictos, casos mentales, usuarios de bienestar, y crónicamente desempleados, etc. con diverso adecuado. Claro, ahora es imposible, pero a medida que la civilización colapsa y los siete sociópatas del PCC toman el control, sucedan muchas cosas asombrosas, todas ellas extremadamente desagradables para miles de millones de personas, con los diversos teniendo más sufrimiento y muriendo. Coulter sugiere en broma invitar a Israel a ocupar la frontera con México, ya que han demostrado cómo vigilar uno. Sin embargo, Yo sugeriría realmente hacerlo, ya sea dándoles la porción sur de cada estado fronterizo o tal vez simplemente ocupando la sección fronteriza de México (que podríamos hacer en unos pocos días). Israel debería estar encantado de tener un segundo país, ya que su posición en Israel se convertirá en insostenible ya que Estados Unidos, Francia, etc. pierden la capacidad de ser policías del mundo, y los países del tercer mundo con capacidad nuclear colapsan. Sin embargo, debemos exigir a los israelíes que dejen el estricto ortodoxo en casa donde los musulmanes pronto los recibirán, ya que tenemos bastantes lunáticos religiosos de cría de conejos. Hablando del colapso de los países del tercer mundo capaces de tener capacidad nuclear, debería ser obvio que, como esto 413 sucede, probablemente antes del final de este siglo, pero ciertamente en el siguiente, con bombas H en posesión de fanáticos, es sólo una cuestión de tiempo antes de que comiencen a vaporizar ciudades americanas y europeas. La única defensa definitiva será la "nucleación" preventiva de cualquier país que colapse, o donde los radicales musulmanes tomen el control. Debe ser obvio para Israel que no tendrán otra opción que un ataque preventivo contra Pakistán, Irán y tal vez otros. Otro regalo encantador de el Diverso. En una encuesta a finales de 2015 por You.Gov, el 29 por ciento de los encuestados dijo que pueden imaginar una situación en la que apoyarían a los militares que toman el control del gobierno federal, lo que se traduce en más de 70 millones adultos estadounidenses. Y estos son los mejores tiempos. En este momento en el próximo siglo, dar o tomar unas cuantas décadas, (mucho antes en muchos países del tercer mundo), con la civilización industrial colapsando, el hambre, el crimen, la enfermedad y la guerra en todo el mundo, los golpes militares estarán sucediendo en todas partes. Es casi seguro que es la única cura para los problemas de Estados Unidos, pero por supuesto nadie podrá votar sobre ella. En Resumen, este es el capítulo americano de la triste historia de la destrucción inexorable del mundo por maternidad desenfrenada. 54 años atrás, 396 políticos estadounidenses votaron para abrazar la destrucción de Estados Unidos por el tercer mundo, a través de la ley de inmigración "sin impacto demográfico significativo". Sin los cambios que hicieron y la Corte Suprema de idiotas (Junto con la incapacidad de hacer cumplir nuestro leyes de inmigración), tendríamos alrededor de 80 millones menos gente e ahora y al menos 150 millones menos en 2100, junto con decenas de billones de dólares en ahorros. Tendríamos la oportunidad de lidiar con los inmensos problemas que los Estados Unidos y el mundo enfrentan. Pero, agobiados por una población fatalmente fragmentada (es decir, diversa), aproximadamente el doble del tamaño que podríamos haber tenido, la mitad de las cuales no contribuirían a la solución, sino que constituirían el problema, es imposible. Lo que vemos es que la democracia que se practica aquí y ahora garantiza un gobierno fatalmente inepto. La paz y la prosperidad en todo el mundo desaparecerán y la hambruna, la enfermedad, el crimen, los golpes militares, el terrorismo y los señores de la guerra serán rutinarios, probablemente en este siglo, ciertamente durante el próximo. Para mí está claro que nada va a frenar la maternidad y que no hay esperanza para Estados Unidos o el mundo, independientemente de lo que suceda en la tecnología, la vida verde o la política en cualquier lugar. Todo tranquilo, puro, salvaje, cuerdo, seguro y decente está condenado. No hay problema en entender la estupidez, la pereza, la deshonestidad, el autoengaño, la cobardía, la arrogancia, la codicia y la locura de los monos sin pelo, pero debe parecer un poco extraño que tantas personas razonablemente sanas y más o menos educadas puedan acoger en su país (o al menos permitir la entrada y tolerar la presencia de) un gran número de inmigrantes que proceden a tomar el control y destruirlo. La psicología del mono (compartida por todos los seres humanos) sólo es capaz de considerar seriamente a uno mismo y parientes inmediatos por un corto tiempo en el futuro (altruismo recíproco o aptitud inclusiva), tal vez décadas como máximo, por lo que no hay restricción interna. La democracia es el caldo de cultivo ideal para la catástrofe. La mayoría de las personas no son ni inteligentes ni bien educados, pero uno puede ver el colapso sucediendo frente a nosotros, y sobre todo en las grandes áreas urbanas y en el suroeste, especialmente California y Texas. La pereza pura, la ignorancia y la falta de comprensión de la ecología y la naturaleza del crecimiento demográfico son parte de ella, pero creo que la innata altruismo recíproco compartimos con todos los animales debe tener un papel importante. Cuando evolucionamos en África vivíamos en pequeños grupos, probablemente raramente más de unos pocos cientos y a menudo menos de 20, y así todos los que nos rodeaban eran nuestros parientes cercanos, y nuestro comportamiento fue seleccionado para tratarlos razonablemente bien, ya que compartían nuestros genes (aptitud inclusiva) y correspondería a las buenas obras (altruismo recíproco). Dejamos de evolucionar y comenzamos a devolviendo, reemplazando la evolución por selección natural con devolución (degeneración genética) por una selección antinatural hace unos 100.000 años, cuando la cultura evolucionó hasta el punto donde el lenguaje, el fuego y las herramientas nos dieron una gran ventaja sobre otros animales, y ya no había mayor fuerza selectiva para cambiar el comportamiento o aumentar o mantener la salud y la inteligencia. Así que, hasta el día de hoy, todavía tenemos la tendencia, cuando no nos sentimos en peligro físico inmediato, de actuar de una manera más o menos amistosa con los que nos rodean. el paz temporal, provocado por comunicaciones avanzadas y armamento y la despiadada violación de los recursos de los planetas, ha ampliado esta ilusión de "una gran familia". Aunque las personas más inteligentes y reflexivas (que por supuesto incluye muchos diversos) pueden ver el peligro para sus descendientes, aquellos que son pobremente educados, aburridos, o emocionalmente inestables, sociópatas, autistas o enfermos mentales (es decir, la vasta mayoría) no lo verá o no actuará en él. Pero, ¿qué hay de Adelson, Zuckerberg, Gelbaum, Biden, Clinton, Obama, Krugman y una larga lista de ricos y famosos? Tienen al menos algo de educación e inteligencia, ¿cómo pueden querer destruir su país y el futuro de sus propios hijos? En realidad, no están más bien educados, perceptivos y orientados hacia el futuro que el graduado promedio universitario (es decir, no muy), y también, ellos y sus parientes viven en comunidades cerradas y a menudo tienen guardaespaldas, por lo que no estarán seriamente preocupados o incluso conscientes de los vecindarios, playas y parques, conducir por disparos, invasiones en el hogar, 414 violaciones y asesinatos, ni sobre el pago de impuestos o hacer fin a la final. Ellos no están pensando en el destino de sus grandes nietos, ni de nadie, o si se cruza su mente, como el vasto mayoría, no tienen ni idea de la ecología humana, ni de la disgenesia, y no puede ver el camino inexorable para colapsar. En la medida en que lo hacen, no arriesgarían las molestias personales al decir o hacer algo al respecto (el egoísmo y la cobardía). Un lector sugirió que hablaba de ' limpieza étnica ' de diversa por euros, pero lo que está sucediendo en todo el mundo es exactamente al revés. En realidad no había pensado en la destrucción de los Estados Unidos y la civilización industrial por diverso como genocidio, pero desde el número de euros de todos los tipos (y muchos grupos de diversos como el japonés y los coreanos) será perío constantemente y sus países son tomados por diverso, tiene ese aspecto, aunque es la falta de euros para producir suficientes niños que es responsable de sus números en declive. Algunos fanáticos (pero no tan pocos en el futuro como los musulmanes aumentarán de alrededor de 1/5 del mundo a alrededor de 1/3 por 2100, estimulando el Condiciones que reproducen fanatismo) como al Queda y ISIS quieren eliminar todo el euro 's (y judíos y sunitas, feministas, cristianos, etc.) y los árabes sin duda demoler Israel por y por, pero de lo contrario hay poca motivación para deshacerse de los que le están dando un almuerzo gratis (aunque por supuesto pocos diversos comprenden lo grande que es realmente el almuerzo hasta que se detiene y la civilización se derrumba). Sin embargo, a medida que pasa el tiempo y la competition por el espacio y los recursos se vuelve cada vez más desesperado, genocidio de todos los euros grupos pueden convertirse en un objetivo explícito, Aunque en su mayoría estará muy eclipsado por los ataques de diversos grupos diversos en otros, que siempre ha sido el situacion y siempre lo hará. En cualquier caso, todo el euro y muchos grupos diversos están ciertamente condenados--estamos hablando aproximadamente 2100 y más allá, cuando Estados Unidos (entonces una parte de México) y Europa ya no tendrá el dinero ni la voluntad de suprimir la anarquía en todas partes, ya que se ser uncapaz de controlarlo en casa. Chocante como es para mí llegar a estas realizaciones (nunca pensé realmente en estos temas de una manera seria hasta recientemente), No veo ninguna esperanza para America o las otras ' democracias ' (Estados Unidos ya tiene un pie en el fascismo y el otro en el comunismo) sin un cambio drástico en la forma en que funciona la "democracia", o en su abandono totalmente. Claro va a ser más o menos el mismo en otros lugares y tanto Euros y Diversos deben rezar los Chinos adoptan la democracia pronto (por lo que colapsan también) o están condenados desde fuera y por dentro. Que la democracia es un sistema fatalmente defectuoso no es noticia para nadie con una comprensión de la historia o de la naturaleza humana. Nuestro segundo presidente John Adams tuvo esto que decir en 1814: "No digo que la democracia haya sido más perniciosa en el todo, y a largo plazo, que la monarquía o la aristocracia. La democracia nunca ha sido y nunca puede ser tan duradera como la aristocracia o la monarquía; pero mientras dure, es más sangriento que cualquiera. ... recuerden, la democracia nunca dura mucho. Pronto desperdicia, agota y se asesina. Nunca hubo una democracia que no se suicidara. Es en vano decir que la democracia es menos vana, menos orgullosa, menos egoísta, menos ambiciosa, o menos avariciosa que la aristocracia o la monarquía. No es cierto, de hecho, y en ninguna parte aparece en la historia. Esas pasiones son las mismas en todos los hombres, bajo todas las formas de gobierno simple, y cuando se descontrolan, producen los mismos efectos del fraude, la violencia y la crueldad. Cuando se abren perspectivas claras antes de la vanidad, el orgullo, la avaricia o la ambición, por su fácil gratificación, es difícil para los filósofos más considerados y los moralistas más concisos resistir la tentación. Los individuos se han conquistado. Naciones y grandes cuerpos de hombres, nunca. " John Adams, Las cartas de John y Abigail Adams Los hechos más básicos, casi nunca mencionados, son que no hay suficientes recursos en Estados Unidos o en el mundo para elevar un porcentaje significativo de los pobres de la pobreza y mantenerlos allí. El intento de hacerlo está arruinando a Estados Unidos y destruyendo el mundo. La capacidad de la tierra para producir alimentos disminuye diariamente, al igual que nuestra calidad genética. Y ahora, como siempre, el mayor enemigo de los pobres es, por mucho, otros pobres y no los ricos. Sin cambios dramáticos e inmediatos, no hay esperanza para prevenir el colapso de Estados Unidos, o cualquier país que siga un sistema democrático. así que, está claro que Ann Coulter tiene razón y a menos que algunos cambios realmente milagrosos ocurran muy pronto, es adiós América y hola agujero del infierno del tercer mundo. La única consuelo son que la gente mayor puede consolarnos sabiendo que no será terminada durante nuestra vida, que aquellos como yo que no tienen hijos no tendrán descendencia para sufrir las consecuencias, y, desde los descendientes de los que dejan que esto suceda (es decir, casi todo el mundo) será tan repugnante como sus antepasados, se merecen abundantemente el infierno en la tierra.

Mary Shepherd's Refutation of Idealism By Jennifer McRobert Introduction Lady Mary Shepherd (1777-1847) was the second daughter of Neil Primrose, the third Earl of Rosebery, and the author of several philosophical treatises. During her lifetime, Shepherd wrote and published two major philosophical works: An Essay upon the Relation of Cause and Effect (1824) and Essays on the Perception of an External Universe and Other Subjects Connected (1827). 1 There are indications that Shepherd may also have written a third philosophical treatise, a teaser suggested in both the Dictionary of National Biography and a curious typewritten insert left in the Cambridge University copy of her 1827 publication. 2 Apart from this, very little is known about Shepherd's life and work, a fact that is surprising in light of her talent for clear thinking and the high calibre of her written work. 3 According to her daughter's memoirs, Whewell is reputed to have used one of Shepherd's books as a text at Cambridge, and Sir Charles Lyell said of her that she was an 'unanswerable logician, in whose argument it was impossible to find loophole or flaw.' 4 It is easy to explain our oversight of Shepherd's philosophy as part of a more general failure to document the contributions of women philosophers. However, in this instance, perpetuating the collective oversight would amount to the unwarranted omission of a significant scholarly contribution to the philosophical discussion and debate surrounding the work of Hume and Berkeley. What makes the loss of Shepherd's contribution especially poignant is not just that her work has scholarly merit, but that the obstacles to her writing and publishing her treatises would have been considerable. Standing in favour of her receiving some form of education would have been her aristocratic heritage and access to an already enviable collection of books in the family library at Barnbougle Castle. 5 However, in Shepherd's day, few Scottish girls received any education to speak of. Daughters of Scottish aristocrats would have been encouraged to restrict themselves to estate management and to acquire only the most basic of literacy skills. 6 Whatever the influences leading to Shepherd's development as a scholar, it seems reasonable to suppose that the late eighteenth century intellectual flourishing of Edinburgh society played an important role among them. In the latter half of the eighteenth century, numerous literary and intellectual societies sprang into existence in Edinburgh, including, among others, the Select Society, the Edinburgh Society, and the Pantheon Society. 7 With the leadership of local intellectuals such as Hume, Carlyle, Ferguson, Smith and others, these societies were much in demand. As Hume wrote to Alan Ramsey, founder of the Select Society, '...Young and old, noble and ignoble, witty and dull, all the world are ambitious of a place amongst us...' 8 That said, even a cursory look at Shepherd's writing is enough to establish that she was a rare breed indeed. Exceptionally well read and analytically clear, her style shows a marked preference for logic and a strong inclination to show up so called 'experts' by pointing to fallacies in their arguments. 9 It is in locating such fallacies and exposing them that Shepherd is led to elaborate her own philosophical views, which are, it turns out, quite unique and interesting. Since Shepherd's positive contributions are best understood in light of her critical responses to Hume and Berkeley, I shall reserve a fuller treatment of her epistemology and metaphysics for a later date, and restrict myself here to an analysis of Shepherd's critical responses to Hume and Berkeley. 10 The opening sections of the paper summarise first, Shepherd's logical analysis of Berkeley's arguments for sceptical idealism, and second, Shepherd's criticisms of Hume's account of causality. The third section begins by remarking upon Shepherd's failure to notice Berkeley's equivocation on 'causality', and notes that Shepherd herself invokes both a priori and a posteriori senses of causality in her arguments against Hume and Berkeley. The paper concludes with an assessment of Shepherd's responses to Hume and Berkeley in light of the role played by the a priori sense of causality in her arguments. Shepherd's Criticisms of Berkeley's Reasoning Shepherd often announces that it is her intention to critically assess Hume's account of causality, although much of what she writes aims directly against Berkeley's sceptical idealism. Her interest in the two philosophers converges on the problem of our knowledge of the external world. Evidently, Shepherd felt that an effective response to sceptical doubts about external existence would require an account of causality, since '...the question concerning the nature and reality of external existence can only receive a satisfactory answer, derived from a knowledge of the relation of Cause and Effect.' 11 Hence, in addition to her interest in causality, Shepherd sought to expose flaws in arguments for external world scepticism, and Berkeley's syllogisms were the subject of her careful examination. Indeed, logic and analysis were central preoccupations for Shepherd, who makes frequent references to Whateley's Logic and recommends that 'analytical philosophy' seek the 'scrutiny of the most rigid analysis.' 12 Consider Shepherd's criticisms of Berkeley's arguments leading to sceptical idealism, all of which involve the discovery of logical errors in his reasoning against our knowledge of an external world. Recall first that Berkeley argues for the principle 'esse es percipi', a principle which he thinks entails that no sensible object could have an existence distinct from its being perceived by the understanding. 13 Berkeley brings these ideas together to form his 'master argument', which can be reconstructed as follows: Sensible objects are things we perceive by the senses. Things perceived by the senses are nothing but our own ideas or sensations. Sensible objects are nothing but our own ideas or sensations. Sensible objects are nothing but our own ideas or sensations. Ideas and sensations could not exist unperceived. No sensible object could have an existence distinct from its being perceived by the understanding. Berkeley then invokes the likeness principle, which asserts that 'nothing can be like an idea except another idea'. Berkeley uses this principle to argue that any representation of a sensible thing, including that of an object, could only be like another idea: 14 Ideas and sensations are the only things we perceive. Objects are the things we perceive by the sense. Objects are only ideas and sensations. Thus far, Berkeley has attacked the representational account of nature. However, he has not yet taken the crucial step in defence of his own idealist position. He does this by offering a proof that spirits must be the cause of our ideas. Berkeley's main claim is that the causes of our ideas are spirits and that spirits are known by reasoning back from particular ideas to their causes. 15 He reasons that: Ideas are effects. All effects have causes. Ideas have causes. Ideas have causes. Causes are spirits. Ideas are caused by spirits. Mary Shepherd's strategy against Berkeley involves turning an etymological analysis of terms against his syllogisms. Berkeley's first argument, she points out, commits the fallacy of equivocation. Shepherd shows that Berkeley's master argument rests on an equivocal use of the term 'sensation'. When Berkeley says that ideas are imprinted on the senses he talks both in terms of our perceiving ideas through the senses and in terms of our having 'our own ideas and sensations'. These are, in fact, two different ways of talking about sensations. On the one hand, sensations are taken to be the cause of ideas namely, things that are independent of the mind; on the other hand sensations are taken to be nothing but ideas, namely, things that are dependent on the mind. 16 In using the term 'sensation' in the former sense, Berkeley suggests that ideas of sense cannot be imprinted until affected by outward objects. But this is to rely on a conception of the world that he explicitly rejects to describe his own view. Hence Berkeley's description of ideas being 'imprinted on the senses ... contains the very doctrine he is controverting.' 17 The second argument suffers from a similar flaw. Shepherd argues that there are four terms in this argument because Berkeley equivocates on the term 'perception'. Specifically, perception is taken to be mental consciousness of ideas arising through the action of organs of sense and mental consciousness of ideas of arising independently of the action of sense organs. The charge is that Berkeley cannot pretend that the 'objects of sense' are one and the same if they are conceived as existing both with and without the action of sense organs. 18 Shepherd's logical analyses of the first two of Berkeley's arguments are flawless. In fact, Berkeley's ambiguous usage of terms such as 'sensation', idea', and 'perception' are now standard criticisms. Shepherd's final criticism of Berkeley is that his third argument uses a term that he cannot, by his own light, claim to know. Berkeley's argument involves claims that all that exists are 'spirits' and 'ideas', and that spirits are the causes of ideas. In this case, Berkeley's analysis is problematic because he can have no idea of 'cause' at all; Indeed, Berkeley has already argued that 'ideas are not causes' and that he 'knows nothing but ideas'. So what sort of idea of cause could Berkeley possibly have? 19 While Berkeley is not charged with equivocation, he has erred in using a term that can have no exact meaning on his own theory of ideas. Shepherd's Critique of Hume on Causality In both of her treatises, Shepherd objects to the doctrine of causation in Hume, a doctrine whose arguments she regards as 'illogical' and whose conclusions she takes to be 'untrue'. 20 In her 1824 treatise, Shepherd summarises the claims to be demonstrated against Hume as follows: 1. That reason, not fancy and custom, leads us to the knowledge 'That everything which begins to exist must have a cause.' 2. That reason forces the mind to perceive that similar causes must necessarily produce similar effects. 3. I shall thence establish a more philosophical definition of the relation of Cause and Effect. 4. Show, in what respects Mr. Hume's definition is faulty. 5. Proceed to prove that Nature cannot be supposed to alter her Course without a contradiction in terms, and finally, show that Custom and Habit alone are not our guides; but chiefly reason, for the regulation of our expectations in ordinary life. 21 It is apparent from this list that the theme of Shepherd's earlier treatise is the nature of the causal relation, rather than the existence of an external world. The first proposition that Shepherd takes up in earnest is the claim 'That a being cannot begin its existence of itself'. This principle, she says, is demonstrable a priori, since it is impossible to conceive of causes and effects existing apart in nature without becoming involved in a contradiction. 22 The point rests on Shepherd's claims that 'Effects are no more than the new qualities of newly formed objects', and that these new qualities must necessarily be in the effects themselves 'in the very moment of their formation'. 23 Since new qualities are presumably brought about by causes, it follows analytically that 'it is impossible for causes and effects to exist apart in nature without becoming involved in a contradiction.' 24 This causal principle, she argues, counts against Hume's sceptical doubts about causality: If then (as I hope to have shown) all objects whatever, which begin to exist, must owe their existence to some cause, those we usually consider as effects cannot be held in suspense; suddenly alter their nature; be 'non-existent this minute, and existent the next;' and, though always introduced as qualities of other objects, be easily separated from the ideas of their causes, and require no 'productive principle'. 25 In addition, insofar as the principle counts against these sceptical doubts about causal regularity, the principle also leads to Shepherd's second proposition 'That reason forces the mind to perceive that similar causes must necessarily produce similar effects'. As Shepherd writes, 'the relation of cause and effect is the chief proposition immediately associated with and applicable to certain exhibited sensations. It can be used to infer that similar effects have similar causes, and that differences of effect are proportional to differences in causes.' 26 The first two of Shepherd's arguments appear to invoke an a priori causal principle. However, in proposing her more 'philosophical' definition of causality, Shepherd introduces a posteriori, non-logical elements in her account of causality and external existence: ...when the mind perceives by what passes within itself, that no quality, idea, or being whatever, can begin its own existence, it not only perceives the general necessity of a cause for every effect, but also deduces, that there must necessarily be a continually existing cause, for that constantly recurring effect, our perception of extension; or in other words, the existence of that which though unperceived and independent, merits the appellation of 'body.' 27 In the above passage, Shepherd maintains that causal necessity is discovered 'when the mind perceives what passes within itself'. Such an introspection of the mind's contents leads not only to the perception of 'the general necessity of a cause for every effect', but also to the perception of 'constantly recurring effects', which lead us to infer the existence of unknown, but continually existing causes. Perception of the mind's contents can lead to two kinds of inferences to necessary connection, Shepherd elaborates: First, there is the inference to the unperceived causes of particular sensible effects. Secondly, there is the inference to the necessary connection of invariable 'antecedency' and 'subsequency', which is associated with causal laws of nature. 28 Shepherd argues that Hume's doctrine is based on a faulty analysis of causation in terms of temporal 'antecendency' and 'subsequency' and on a mistaken analysis of causal objects. Shepherd claims that temporal contiguity is insufficient for causation, and that Hume is wrong to say that we form causal judgements merely by noticing the temporal order of sensible qualities. Shepherd's analysis turns on her claim that there is an important distinction to be drawn between the 'exterior object' that is the unperceived cause of sensible effects and the 'compound object' that results from a mental union of ideas. 29 While qualities of compound objects are perceived through the senses and mixed with ideas in the mind, the existence of unperceived, exterior objects is known by inference alone. Strictly speaking then, our ideas of causes are not perceived sensible qualities that precede our ideas of effects. Rather, we infer that unperceived exterior objects are causes of perceived qualities 'from the necessity there is, that there should be invariable sequences of effects, when one common cause (or exterior object) mixes successively with different organs of sense, or various parts of the human frame &c'. 30 Contra Hume then, sensible qualities give rise to ideas of invariable sequences of 'compound objects', which leads us to infer the existence of external causal objects: This impossibility of sensible qualities, being the productive principle of sensible qualities, lies at the root of all Mr. Hume's controversy concerning the manner of causation; for he, observing that such ideas could only follow one another, resolved causation into the observations of the customary antecedency and subsequency of sensible qualities. But objects, when spoken of and considered as causes, should always be considered as those masses of unknown qualities in nature, exterior to the organs of the sense, whose determination of sensible qualities to the sense forms one class of their effects; whereas philosophers, (with the exception of Berkeley) and mankind in general, look upon the masses of sensible qualities after determination to the senses as the causes, the antecedents, the productive principles of other masses of sensible qualities, which are their effects or subsequents; a notion naturally arising from the powerful style of the associations in the mind, and which our Maker has ordained for practical purposes; --but monstrous when held as an abstract truth in analytical science. 31 Thus, Shepherd has proven her last three propositions against Hume's view. She has established her more 'philosophical' notion of cause and effect, exposed flaws in Hume's reasoning, and argued that reason, rather than 'mere custom', is our chief guide in matters relating to cause and effect. In responding to Hume, Shepherd has also elaborated features of her own view of the causal relation. For example, it is clear from her arguments that Shepherd relies on both a priori and a posteriori senses of causality. On the one hand, Shepherd says that it is an axiom 'That no quality can begin its own existence,' 32 since the truth of this proposition is discovered by reason. On the other hand, although the proposition 'That every effect must have a cause' is demonstrable a priori, 33 Shepherd notes that we do not know what particular effect may arise as the result of a given cause. Hence, she also holds that perception leads us to the knowledge that the necessary connection of cause and effect '...arises from the obligation that like qualities should arise from the junction, separation, admixture, &c. of like aggregates of external qualities.' 34 In this second case, our knowledge of causality depends on an a posteriori sense of reasoning from effects to causes. Shepherd's Refutation of Idealism Thus far, I have shown how Shepherd employs the method of logical analysis available to her against Berkeley, and described Shepherd's response to Hume's reasoning on causality. Given her interest in both logical analysis and causation, it seems somewhat surprising that Shepherd fails to notice that in his third argument, the argument leading directly to sceptical idealism, Berkeley equivocates on the term 'cause'. Interestingly, the two senses of 'cause' invoked by Berkeley correspond to the a posteriori and a priori senses that we have just seen in Shepherd's response to Hume. It is hard to imagine that Shepherd missed Berkeley's latter equivocation, given that her first two attacks on Berkeley amount to charges of equivocation. Moreover, Shepherd was evidently well aware of these two distinct senses of causality, and also held that an analysis of causality would be central in defeating arguments for external world scepticism. So it is surprising, and even strange, that Shepherd does not apply these insights against Berkeley's third argument. Here is what such an analysis might look like: Berkeley's argument equivocates on the term 'causality', relying on both the a priori and a posteriori senses of reasoning from effects to causes in the same proof. In the first sense of reasoning from an effect to its cause Berkeley asks us to infer that our ideas have causes on the basis of the a priori causal principle that all effects must have causes. In the second sense, reasoning from an effect to its cause is based on an empirical sense of causal reasoning. That is, Berkeley asks us to reason from particular effects (our ideas) to their causes (spirits). In this instance, we are reasoning inductively from empirical phenomena (our ideas) to empirical causes (spirits). In the end, Shepherd's oversight is of little consequence for her critique of Berkeley. Shepherd has all along been aiming at the development of an even more substantive critique -one that rests on her considered view of causality. She announces at the start of her 1827 treatise that it is her intention to critically evaluate Hume's doctrine, and to apply the results of this investigation to the doctrine of Berkeley. 35 The former investigation yields the true 'philosophical' account of the nature of causality, which is required for proof of external existence. So, one explanation of why Shepherd overlooks the equivocation on causality in Berkeley's reasoning is that she has in mind an even more substantive critique of Berkeley involving causality. One of the first things that is clear in reading Shepherd's critique of Berkeley is that there is considerable common ground between them. They both subscribe, for example, to Locke's empiricist theory of ideas. As Berkeley writes in the Principles, '...the objects of human knowledge ... are either ideas actually imprinted on the senses, or else are such as are perceived by attending to the passions and operations of the mind, or lastly, ideas forged by help of memory and imagination.' 36 Shepherd offers a similar sensationist definition of the term 'idea'. I use the word idea, as signifying a distinct class of sensations, being the result of that reasoning or observation which shows that under certain conditions, there must needs be an existence when we cannot perceive it. In such is included the evidence for memory of the past; of such is compounded expectation of the future. Thus we have an idea of continual, unperceived, independent existence; -but only have a consciousness or sensation of dependant, interrupted, and perceived existence; whenever I have used it in any other sense, it is in a popular manner signifying notion or object of thought, &c. 37 Moreover, Shepherd also agrees with Berkeley's 'likeness principle', and his view that 'outward objects' cannot be ideas and sensations. The ideas of colours cannot be imprinted on the eye; nor those of sound on the ear; not those of extension on the touch; there are no such ideas, until after the eye, as an instrument, has been affected by some sorts of outward objects, fitted to convey to the sentient principle, a sensation of colour, and so of the rest. Therefore, the objects perceived by the organs of sense cannot be our ideas, and sensations. 38 However, Shepherd maintains that Berkeley's indiscriminate use of the term 'idea' to mean sensible qualities 'which arise from the organs of sense, in relation to external beings' and 'conclusions of the understanding' 39 betrays a confusion regarding the nature of objects. An object is not a mere counterpart to an idea or sensation, but a compound thing, which is the product of both sensations and reasoning. Shepherd writes that it is the union of three things that leads to 'the creation and production of all sensible complex qualities called objects': The union of the three following things are required to form the proximate cause for that great effect, the formation and combination of those aggregates of sensible qualities usually called objects; namely, first, the unkown, unnamed circumstances in nature, which are unperceived by the senses; secondly, the organs of the sense, whose qualities mix with these; and thirdly, the living, conscious powers necessary to sensation in general. 40 Most importantly, sensible objects are complexes that combine raw sense data and the causal principle itself: ...in every object of sense which the mind perceives, the knowledge of its genus, as a general effect arising from a general cause independent of mind, is mixed with the sensations or ideas resulting from its special qualities affecting the same. 41 So although Shepherd's account of knowledge is sensationist, her emphasis on the role of reasoning and inference in our knowledge of the external world takes her epistemology well beyond either naive empiricism or sceptical idealism. In the following passage, Shepherd emphasises that belief in the existence of external objects requires that 'quick suggestions of the understanding' be combined with sensible qualities: But then he [Berkeley] has omitted the consideration of that circumstance, which is necessary to our belief in the existence of objects independent of ourselves; and that is the quick suggestions of the understanding; the reasoning, that as sensation does not itself form the essence of those existences which cause particular kinds of sensations; therefore there must be existences without it; that sensation not causing the variety of its own perceptions, therefore there must be variety without it; that various existences must be ready in order to be perceived, and that these must lie under various positions in relation to each other, as well as to the mind; that sensation is but a thin gauze, through which things are seen in their native proportions, although it imparts to them a similarity of colouring. 42 Shepherd's response to Berkeley culminates in a refutation of idealism in which she appeals to something akin to Kant's phenomena/noumena and appearance/reality distinctions. With respect to the former metaphysical distinction, Shepherd writes that the 'assurance of other existences besides ourselves' follows from the inference that 'in order to support the phenomena, there must needs be other continuous existences than ourselves.' 43 Like Kant, Shepherd holds that perceived things must be supported by the existence of unperceived things. Shepherd's epistemology also invokes the epistemological appearance/ reality distinction. In this case, Shepherd claims that inferred marks of objectivity, such as our noticing 'the regular reply of the organs of the senses to the irregular calls made upon them' lead us to infer the existence of 'essences different from the mind': ...for the mind perceiving, upon each irregular application to some sorts of beings, or qualities, or ideas, which it may call the organs of sense if it please, that they regularly reply to that application, justly concludes them to exist when unnoticed, in order to be capable of this readiness to reply. Those objects, also, which do thus reply, yield to the sense of motion from point to point, an idea of resistance and extension in particular; and so are regarded as body; that is, as essences different from the mind, or the powers of sensation in general; but continually existing objects, or qualities, which yield ideas of extension, are not ideas, but continued existences called bodies. 44 Hence Shepherd's epistemology attempts a more sophisticated defense of knowledge of external things than representational realism. Shepherd's suggestion is that the senses lead us to discover objective features of external existence such as resistance and extension. Shepherd's view is that only the 'proportional varieties of external objects may be known', but that the 'real essences of mind and matter are unknown to us'. 45 In another passage, Shepherd indicates that qualities such as 'variety', 'independency' and 'existence' 46 are inferred 'exterior qualities' that we know resemble 'inward qualities': Variety (we know that like causes have like effects and also that differences in qualities have proportionally different causes), independency (we perceive that the general sensation of consciousness is independent of a given particular one) and existence (the existence of sensation is perceived in the very exhibition and conscious feeling of that quality) are the set of exterior qualities which we may know of as resembling such as are inward. 47 Thus, Shepherd would agree with Berkeley's assessment that the representational realist's appeal to psychological inclination is alone insufficient to establish existence or knowledge of external objects. It is through reasoning that the subject discovers sequences in phenomena, forms ideas of relations and external objects, distinguishes causality from the perception of mere succession, and ultimately, realises that she bears a relation to an external world: In short, the sensible qualities form the sensible objects; but it is a reasoning arising out of a perception of the relation of these qualities; -of the different positions of colours in relation to motion; -of the knowledge of the place where we are &c. by which external continuous existences are proved... 48 Unlike Berkeley then, Shepherd emphasises that inferential steps and epistemological criteria can lead us to postulate the existence of exterior objects and objectively real qualities, both of which derive from a world independent of the subject. Hence, the fact that our various sense perceptions converge on a single coherent account of the world is ultimately explained with reference to the marks of objectivity in knowledge. 49 It is interesting to note that Shepherd's reply to Berkeley is Kantian in several respects. First, it makes a Kantian appeal to a noumena/phenoma distinction. Secondly, it relies on an appearance/reality distinction. Thirdly, it suggests that epistemic criteria can be used to distinguish purely subjective states from objective reality. What Shepherd maintains is that the processes of abstracting from our selfconscious awareness of things leads us to infer that something external to ourselves exists. Shepherd concludes that 'The independence of objects of the sense from the general capacity for sensation (consciousness) is proved by the changes of qualities visited upon and appearing before the mind without our conscious awareness.' 50 In the end, Shepherd offers a more sophisticated response to Berkeley than most of her predecessors, and this is due, in part, to her recognition that an analysis of causality should figure in a reply to Berkeley. 51 Indeed, the early reception of Berkeley's philosophy could well be summed up by Ronald Knox's caricature of Berkeley's position in the famous limerick: There was a young man who said, 'God Must think it exceedingly odd If he finds that this tree Continues to be When there's no one about in the Quad.' REPLY Dear Sir: Your astonishment's odd; I am always about in the Quad, And that's why the tree Will continue to be, Since observed by Yours faithfully, God. 52 As Harry Bracken remarks, most of Berkeley's early critics merely sought to ridicule him, so that by the mid-eighteenth century 'Berkeley already has a reputation – he has already been called a sceptic, atheist, idealist, egomist and fool.' As a result, Bracken notes, we 'no longer need to suppose that the limerick Berkeley was the simple product of a straightforward reading of the Principles, -it was also the product of a bias engendered by the early critics.' 53 Not only was the ridiculing of Berkeley's position unattractive in its own right, but the early critics relied on fairly crude arguments to show that his philosophy led to absurdity. An early review in the Journal Litéraire, Perry and Baxter all charge that Berkeley begs the question against materialism. 54 Baxter also charges that in rejecting materialism Berkeley rejects the very possibility of science. 55 Samuel Johnson made the notorious remark 'I refute Berkeley thus' and then kicked a rock. Although there is much more substance than this to the early reception of Berkeley, Bracken makes a convincing case to show that Berkeley's early critics typically failed to address the crux of the issue. Where Berkeley's sceptical idealism is concerned, as Shepherd correctly perceived, it is the underlying account of causality and its connection to sensible objects that must be probed. Thomas Reid, for example, felt that Hume's critique of Berkeley on abstract ideas had already 'wantonly sapped the foundation' of Berkeley's view by undermining his case for immaterialism. 56 Although Shepherd is undoubtedly deeply influenced by the Scottish reception of Berkeley, 57 she rejects Reid's direct realism and, in particular, his view that it is possible to have immediate sensible knowledge of primary qualities, so she would have been satisfied with neither Hume nor Reid's assessment of Berkeley. However, it would appear that she takes quite seriously the sort of remark made by the French Encyclopedist Turgot, who urged that an adequate account of causality would be necessary to rebut Berkeley. 58 It is Shepherd's intent to provide just such an account. In sum, Shepherd offers a much more convincing argument than did her predecessors when she shows that the marks of objectivity in our knowledge lead us to infer knowledge causality and knowledge of 'exterior objects'. Indeed her rejection of Berkeley turns on a Kantian analysis that many other critics of empiricist scepticism were missing in their responses to Berkeley and Hume, but that Shepherd was clever enough to see would do the job. Causality in Shepherd's Refutation of Idealism Shepherd's refutation of idealism appears to turn on the 'philosophical' or a posteriori sense of causality that she develops as part of her critique of Hume. Indeed, Shepherd builds an argument for external existence around this a posteriori sense of causality in such a manner as to give us compelling reasons to reject Berkeley's idealism, and none of those arguments seem to depend on the a priori sense of causality. It is somewhat surprising then, when she claims at one point that her argument for the independence of external things itself depends on the axiom 'that no idea, or quality, can begin its own existence: The foundation for the whole argument relating to the independency of the sense organs is in the axiom 'that no idea, or quality, can begin its own existence. For we perceive that the sensation as of the use of any organ of sense, does not alter the mind always in the same way; therefore, the mind and the organs of sense being the same upon any occasion as on a former one, when no other object than themselves were present, a third object is required to occasion the interruption of its present state, which object is to be seen, or heard, or felt &c. 59 In addition to this remark, we have already seen that Shepherd's argument against Hume clearly invokes the same a priori axiom. As Hume (and later Kant) showed, the principle that 'All effects have causes' cannot be used to justify the inference that 'All events have causes'. 60 However, this is the very inference that Shepherd appears to make when she claims that to deny her causal axiom would lead to contradiction and 'That reason, not fancy and custom, leads us to the knowledge 'That everything which begins to exist must have a cause.' 61 The question is raised then: To what extent are Shepherd's responses to first Hume, and then Berkeley, compromised by her dependence upon this a priori sense of causality? The answer, I think, rests on the success of a unique strategy Shepherd employs to evade Hume's critique. The strategy involves linking her a posteriori and a priori senses of causality, so that ultimately, Shepherd's critical responses depend on the cogency of her linking argument. Consider first that Hume arrives at his constant-conjunction theory of causality by ruling out two alternative accounts: One account is that our idea of a necessary connection between causes and their effects arises from a logical sense of causal connection. The other account is that our idea of a necessary connection between causes and their effects arises from a nonlogical sense of a necessary connection between the same. The first alternative Hume denies, for reasons similar to those just given above. Specifically, Hume reasons that effects cannot be deduced from causes prior to experience such that we can know that one kind of cause is invariably linked with one kind of effect. But Hume also denied the plausibility of the second alternative, concluding instead that it is a subjective fiction of the mind that leads humans to ascribe causal necessity to nature. Hume's argument against the second alternative amounts to the claim that when he inspects his mental experiences, he finds that neither perception nor acts of will contain any element of necessity. 62 The claim that neither perception nor acts of will contain any element of necessity is, of course, the very claim that Kant denied when he maintained that the faculty of understanding supplies an a priori rule for our causal judgements. Kant's argument is based on the claim that we can distinguish between cases where we perceive the mere temporal succession in appearances and cases where we perceive an objective order in the succession of appearances. The very fact that we are able to make the sort of determination that leads to a causal judgement, Kant argues, should lead us to infer the existence of an a priori causal principle at work in understanding. Shepherd's argument resembles Kant's own rejection of Hume insofar as she argues that '...when the mind perceives by what passes within itself, that no quality, idea, or being whatever, can begin its own existence, it...perceives the general necessity of a cause for every effect.' 63 That is, Shepherd maintains that upon inspecting the contents of our perceptions, we do discover an element of necessity leading to an objective account of causal knowledge. First, she notes, there is the inherent orderliness in sense perception. Thus in a 'waking and sane state of mind', 'the harmony of ideas' and 'their relations and conclusions' is a sign that marks the difference between the order due to sense perceptions and 'dreams and frenzies'. 64 In addition to this, the mind takes notice of 'like qualities' arising from the junction, separation, and admixture of 'like aggregates of external qualities' and also of 'invariable sequences of effects'. In such cases, it is the invariability of the sequences that leads us to infer the existence of a necessary connection. 65 For this reason, Shepherd reproaches Hume on the grounds that 'Hume denied that 'reason could prove, by the relation of our ideas, the knowledge of continued existences, and resolved all into 'custom and imagination.'' 66 So Shepherd's case against Hume's constant-conjunction theory resembles Kant in at least this respect: Shepherd claims that in an empirical, non-logical, perceptual act of introspection, the mind encounters an element of necessity -the necessity of the a priori principle of causality. Like Kant, Shepherd's response to Hume involves rejecting the original form of Hume's dilemma between logical and non-logical necessity by maintaining that a non-logical element containing necessity is discovered in perception. If Shepherd is right, then the a priori sense of causal necessity is known to be true by demonstration, but its existence is also known through a non-logical act of perception. Clearly, the force of Shepherd's response to Hume lies here, in the additional non-logical evidence that the a posteriori argument supplies for the existence of the priori causal principle. It is apparent from what has been said above that Shepherd's response to Hume rests on her linking of a posteriori and a priori senses of causal necessity. But it is equally apparent that Shepherd assumes this same linkage in her refutation of idealism. Indeed, postulating such an assumption helps to explain why Shepherd's mention of the axiom 'that no idea, or quality, can begin its own existence' in connection with the 'independency' argument leads her directly to a justification that brings to bear the evidence of our perception. For what follows directly after Shepherd's mention of the axiom is her a posteriori account of the discovery of causes among the contents of our perceptions. Shepherd explains that 'we perceive that the sensation as of the use of any organ of sense, does not alter the mind always in the same way' and this leads us to infer the existence of some third thing, in addition to the mind and the organs of sense. This is hardly the sort of support one would expect for a principle whose sole justification was logical. The assumption that Shepherd intends to provide additional a posteriori evidence in support for the existence of the a priori causal principle also helps us to see the consistency between claims that she makes. For example, she asserts that the causal axiom is the foundation for her 'independency', but also that we know of the existence of external things when we 'perceive certain motions, changes, combinations of ideas'. 67 It is only on the assumption that Shepherd's argument for causality resembles the Kantian argument that we can make sense of her views. Finally, I think that it is because Shepherd a priori sense of causality is linked to the a posteriori sense of causality that her arguments provide substantive responses to Hume's subjectivism and Berkeley's idealism. Given that Shepherd does adopt a Kantian line of reasoning in her response to Hume, one is led to wonder why she does not follow his argument more closely in her refutation of Berkeley. Kant rests his own argument against Berkeley on the demonstration that objects of experience must be given to us in space and time, so that the foundation for his refutation of idealism lies in the arguments for space and time in the Transcendental Aesthetic. Although Shepherd does discuss the nature of space and time in her treatises, she virtually ignores them in her response to Berkeley. The reason for this is very likely that she rejects Kant's views of space and time. Shepherd writes that 'Kant imagines time and space to be only modes of the mind, which is mistaking the cause which determine a mode of the mind with the effect, viz. the mode of the mind.' 68 What Shepherd maintains that 'the notion of time is an idea the result of reasoning; but time itself is a capacity in nature fitted to the continuance of existence.' 69 Hence, although Shepherd may draw inspiration from Kant in her responses to Hume and Berkeley, it is also apparent that she develops a unique and original metaphysics and epistemology. Conclusion In conclusion, Lady Mary Shepherd's work offers a critical and original response to Hume and Berkeley that deserves the careful consideration of contemporary historians and philosophers. She is, in my estimation, the clearest and the most critically acute of the women philosophers of the modern period, with a distinctive, analytical style of criticism. She focuses her attention on careful definition and on the identification of fallacies in the arguments of her predecessors, and lays out compelling arguments against her opponents. In addition to identifying the conceptual and logical limitations of other philosophical arguments, she seeks to develop an original and plausible account of objective knowledge of the external world. This account might best be characterized as sensationist empiricism, since it emphasizes the role of the sense organs and sensation in knowledge acquisition. However, much of Shepherd's efforts are directed against scepticism, and one of her central concerns is to show that sensation leads to objective knowledge rather than to sceptical forms of subjectivism and idealism. Hence it is through reflection on the actions of sense organs that we come to infer the existence of bodies and real characteristics of bodies such as resistance and extension. Although sensation and sense organs play an important role in our coming to have beliefs about external things, our belief in an external world of unperceived things, such as causal objects, is in large part a product of reasoning. Shepherd's aim then, is to show that a modified form of empiricism, a view that differs from both Berkeley and Hume insofar as it defends the objectivity of our knowledge of external world, conforms to 'our common everyday experience,' refutes idealism and avoids scepticism. Thus, Shepherd's responses to Hume, Berkeley, and others lead to a subtle and complex account of our knowledge of the external world. 1 Mary Shepherd. An Essay upon the Relation of Cause and Effect Controverting the Doctrine of Mr. Hume Concerning The Nature of that Relation; with Observations upon the Opinions of Dr. Brown and Mr. Lawrence, Connected with the Same Subject. London: Printed for T. Hookham, 1824, and Essays on the Perception of an External Universe and Other Subjects Connected. London: John Hatchard and Son,1827. Hereafter cited as Shepherd (1824) and Shepherd (1827), respectively. 2 The Cambridge insert indicates that Shepherd's third treatise was published in 1819 under the title Enquiry Respecting the Relation of Cause and Effect. Whether or not such a treatise does in fact exist, the title itself suggests that the work might well have been quite similar to the treatise on causality published in 1824. 3 One other article has been written on Mary Shepherd. Margaret Atherton. 'Lady Mary Shepherd's Case Against George Berkeley' in the British Journal for the History of Philosophy 4 (2) 347-366 S 96. 4 Mary Shepherd's daughter's memoirs are unpublished and held in a private collection by her relatives. 5 Several catalogues describing library holdings at Barnbougle Castle and other family residences have been published. Built in the thirteenth century on her family's Dalmeny property in Queensferry, and set on the edge of Scotland's Firth of Forth, Barnbougle Castle was one of Shepherd's principal residences during childhood. 6 Marjorie Plant. The Domestic Life of Scotland in the Eighteenth Century. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1952, pp.13-18. Plant paints a vivid but rather bleak picture of the eighteenth century domestic life of Scottish girls. Few girls received any education to speak of, and a typical day might be split between activities such as sewing shirts, reading scriptures, writing letters, taking walks, and the occasionally game or amusement. Only the most fortunate of Scottish girls of aristocratic heritage would have had access to their brother's tutors. 7 Jane Rendall. The Origins of Scottish Enlightenment. New York: St. Martin's Press, 206-236. Hereafter cited as Rendall. 8 David Hume to Allan Ramsey, April or May 1755, Letters of David Hume. Edited by J.Y.T. Greig. Oxford: Clarendon Press, Vol. I, 1969, pp. 219-221. The pursuit of philosophy was evidently very much au courant by the time the young Mary Primrose was old enough to take an interest, so much so that both the medical and the arts students at the University of Edinburgh complained of the bias in the curriculum in favor metaphysics. See Rendall, pp. 230-231. 9 The following excerpt from p. 46 of Shepherd's 1827 treatise is both telling of her critical approach to the great thinkers of the early modern period and indicative of the breadth of her knowledge: Thus some philosophers make God create all the images at the moment they appear in every mind. [Malebranche] Others conceive there is a pre-established harmony between the qualities of the external object, and our inward perception of it? [Leibniz] One considers the sensations arising from some of the senses to exist outwardly, but not those of others, arising from the rest of the senses. [Reid] Another gives up all outward existence whatever of objects and qualities. [Berkeley] And some suppose that if there be such things, that unless they be like our sensations, they are not worth talking about. [Hume]. 10 Mary Shepherd also published two articles in response to the philosophy of John Fearn: 'Observations on Mr. Fearn's Lines of the Human Mind', in Parriana: or Notices of the Rev. Samuel Parr, L.L.D.. Edited by E.H. Barker. London: Henry Colburn, 1828, 624-627, and 'Lady Mary Shepherd's Metaphysics' in Fraser's Magazine for Town and Country, Vol. V, No. XXX (July 1832) pp. 697-708. 11 Shepherd (1827) p. xii. 12 Shepherd (1827) p.114. 13 George Berkeley, The Principles of Human Knowledge. Edited by A.A. Luce and T.E. Jessop. London: Nelson, 1967, p. 42. Hereafter cited as Berkeley. 14 Berkeley, pp. 43-44. 15 Berkeley, p. 52-53. 16 Shepherd (1827) p.199. 17 Shepherd (1827) p.199. 18 Shepherd (1827) pp. 200-201. 19 Shepherd (1827) p. 216. 20 The following quote from pp. 5-6 of her 1824 treatise shows that Mary Shepherd was well aware of past controversies surrounding the philosophy of David Hume in Edinburgh society: It is not many years since Mr. Hume's notions were the occasion of much dispute, on the very ground on which I have undertaken it; a dispute which nearly lost the mathematical chair in one of our universities to the present possessor of it, on account of his favouring this doctrine. His opinion, however, as far as it related to any countenance it might afford to the principles of atheism, was defended by a learned treatise, from the then Professor of Moral Philosophy, in the same University. This treatise, whilst it controverts Mr. Hume's opinions in some respects, denies that atheistical inferences may be deduced from them; but I shall endeavour to show, that, in this respect, the author wanted observation and acuteness; neither perceiving the corollaries that go along with the doctrine, nor detecting the sly and powerful sophistry of the reasoning by which they are supported. 21 Shepherd (1824) pp. 27-28. 22 Shepherd (1824) p. 30. 23 Shepherd (1824) p. 49-50. 24 Shepherd (1824) p. 30. 25 Shepherd (1824) p. 38. 26 Shepherd (1827) p. 169. 27 Shepherd (1827) p. xv. 28 Shepherd (1827) 131. 29 Shepherd (1827) p. 125 30 Shepherd (1827) p. 131. 31 Shepherd (1827) pp. 126-127. 32 Shepherd (1827) p. 232 and p. 138. 33 Shepherd (1827) p. 325. 34 Shepherd (1827) p. 131. 35 Shepherd (1827) p. xvi. 36 Berkeley, p. 41. 37 Shepherd (1827) pp. 133-134. 38 Shepherd (1827) pp. 199-200. 39 Shepherd (1827) pp. 134-135. 40 Shepherd (1827) pp. 71-72. 41 Shepherd (1827) pp. 197-198. 42 Shepherd (1827) pp. 72-73. 43 Shepherd (1827) pp. 33-34. 44 Shepherd (1827) pp. 231-232. 45 Shepherd (1827) pp. 243-244. 46 Shepherd's full list of qualities is actually longer than this. On p. 168, Shepherd's list reads ''variety', 'independency', 'existence', continued existence', identity and so on'. 47 Shepherd (1827) p. 182 48 Shepherd (1827) p. 94. 49 Shepherd (1827) pp. 80-81. Shepherd writes that We gain the notion of the independancy of objects, from the observation of one object affecting many minds in a manner which renders it impossible there should be as many objects as minds. If five men see a pond, and can only walk round one pond, then there is one pond seen five times over, not five ponds; so the pond whatever it may be when unperceived, must at least in its unperceived state, be independant of, and I may add external to all the minds ; for if the pond were only in the mind, there would be five ponds, and every person who perceived a pond would create another pond, and yet this multitude of ponds in perception, would in many respects but merit the definition due to one pond. Thus there would be such a contradiction between "ideas and sensation," that the mind must come to the belief of only one pond, seen by five persons; that is, in other words, an independent cause for particular sensations. This objection to his doctrine Berkeley answers, in a very unsatisfactory, hesitating manner in his dialogues. 50 Shepherd (1827) p. 121. 51 The interpretation and assessment of Shepherd's reply to Berkeley in this paper differs from that of Margaret Atherton. Atherton passes a largely negative judgment on Shepherd's arguments. My positive judgment is based on the view that Shepherd's analysis of causation plays a central role in her response to Berkeley. See Margaret Atherton. 'Lady Mary Shepherd's Case Against George Berkeley' in the British Journal for the History of Philosophy 4 (2) 347-366 S 96. 52 See Bertrand Russel, A History of Western Philosophy. New York: Simon and Schuster,1945, Ch. XVI. 53 Harry Bracken. The Early Reception of Berkeley's Immaterialism: 1710-1733. Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1959, p.89. Hereafter cited as Bracken. 54 Bracken, p. 37 55 Bracken, p. 37. 56 Bracken, p. 87. 57 On p. 32, Bracken cites Luce's remark in 'The Berkelian Idea of Sense' Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, XXVII (1953), p. 7: But for Scotland Berkeley might have died the second death. During his lifetime and for the greater part of the first century after his death Scottish philosophers took charge of him, and placed and kept him on the map. 58 Three quarters of a century earlier, in his article entitled 'Existence' in D'Alembert's Encyclopedia, AnneRobert Jacques Turgot advised that an analysis of causation must be central to any adequate reply top Berkeley. 59 Shepherd (1827) pp. 232-233 60 David Hume. A Treatise of Human Nature. Edited by L.A. Selby-Biggs. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980, p. 157, and An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding in The Philosophy of David Hume. Edited by V. Chappell. New York: Random House, 1963, p. 327-330. Immanuel Kant. The Critique of Pure Reason. Edited by N. Kemp-Smith. London: Macmillan, 1929, (B 289). 61 Shepherd (1824) p. 27 62 Hume's subjectivist conclusion is that the necessary connection implicit in our ideas of cause is a subjective fiction ascribed by the mind when it perceives a constant conjunction of certain sensible qualities. 63 Shepherd (1827) p. xv. 64 Shepherd (1827) pp.107-108. 65 Shepherd (1827) p.131. 66 Shepherd (1827) p.70. 67 Shepherd (1827) p. 207. 68 Shepherd (1827) p. 59. 69 Shepherd (1827) pp. 138-139. Shepherd expresses the view that our ideas of extension and empty space must be linked to perception. She holds that motion enables us in the first instance to detect the 'outwardness' of objects, and that extension is not conceivable when unperceived either by the senses or the imagination. (164) 'Motion considered in relation to empty space is also perceived to be in relation to a mode of existence' and 'we prove empty space by the same reasoning, to be continually existing.' (175)