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1962_27 | Following Scicluna's apostolic visitation, the Holy See announced on 20 March 2015 that Pope Francis had "accept[ed] the resignation of Cardinal Keith Patrick O'Brien from the rights and duties of a Cardinal". A statement for the Catholic Church in Scotland confirmed that O'Brien would continue to live outside Scotland until such time as his age and infirmity required that situation to be reviewed. He retained the title of Cardinal, but did not any longer carry out the functions of a cardinal and was only allowed to wear a cardinal's robes in private. According to the Holy See Press Office O'Brien would not take part in papal elections, act as papal adviser, or take part in Vatican congregations and councils, and would lose other roles of a cardinal. Journalist David Gibson wrote that "Those developments, [Scicluna's unpublished report, the home bought for O'Brien, that O'Brien was not officially punished] plus the fact that O'Brien can keep the title of cardinal ... may also keep |
1962_28 | the issue on the boil rather than cooling it off." The ecclesiastical historian Christopher Bellitto said, "What's odd, in this papacy especially, is that O'Brien loses the power, but not the pomp, ... a red hat is still a red hat, even if there is no punch behind it." |
1962_29 | The Survivors Network of those Abused by Priests is concerned that the transparency Pope Francis promised is absent and the cardinal's wrong or abusive actions have been kept secret. There is further concern that other clerics failed to disclose abuse by O'Brien which they reasonably should have known or suspected. Abusive bishops have resigned in the past, but action against complicit clerics and bishops who conceal abuse would be a helpful innovation because it would help prevent further abuse and concealment.
Consequences
O'Brien was the first misbehaving Catholic cardinal whose case was dealt with publicly. Richard Sipe, a US former priest working on church abuse, said at the time that O'Brien was not the only case: "We have someone here too. It will go public soon." He was referring to US cardinal Theodore McCarrick, who was ultimately, unlike O'Brien, stripped of his cardinalate. |
1962_30 | The O'Brien case forced accountability and discussion of such cases on the Catholic church, and Rome was forced to create a process. According to O'Brien's victim Keith Devlin, O'Brien's and McCarrick's cases are linked: "If we hadn't gone to the Observer back then, the church would have dealt with McCarrick quite differently. Without O'Brien, there would be no church process."
Health and death
O'Brien said, while criticising a parliamentary bill on embryology in 2008, that he carried an organ donor card. O'Brien suffered from heart problems and was fitted with a pacemaker after complaining of dizzy spells and fainting prior to Passion Sunday Mass in March 2008. Following the acceptance of his resignation in February 2013 he said "Approaching the age of 75 and at times in indifferent health, I tendered my resignation as Archbishop of St Andrews and Edinburgh to Pope Benedict XVI some months ago."
O'Brien died after a fall on 19 March 2018, two days after his 80th birthday. |
1962_31 | Views
O'Brien was often forthright in his political and spiritual views. In 1999, at the European Synod of Bishops, O'Brien declared who he saw fit to be the next Archbishop of Westminster, following the death of Basil Cardinal Hume. He named his candidate, Timothy Radcliffe, Master General of the Dominican order (Black Friars). At the synod, Radcliffe had made an appeal to O'Brien, saying that there was a crisis of authority in the church, but the answer could not be more emphasis on authority. In the presence of the Pope, Radcliffe went on: the church should not only speak about the poor, the divorced people, women who had had abortions, homosexuals, but should also take at heart their experiences, eat their bread, take what they had to offer. "They'll blame us being associated with the wrong people but we have a good precedent." |
1962_32 | Secularism
In 2011 he criticised "aggressive secularism", denouncing what he said was the way Christians had been prevented from acting in accordance with their beliefs. O'Brien said aggressive secularism threatened the Christian heritage and he wanted religion to remain in the public sphere. Specifically, legislation requiring Christians to tolerate homosexuality was a type of secularism O'Brien opposed, and he called on Christians of all denominations to unite in combating secularism.
Referring to equality legislation which prevents discrimination against homosexuals, he [O'Brien] said Christians faced being sidelined in British society because they were not willing to publicly endorse lifestyles that run contrary to their belief system.
His [O'Brien's Easter 2011] homily included instances where Christians had fallen foul of equality legislation, preventing discrimination against gay people, and swiftly drew fire from groups campaigning against religious privilege in public life. |
1962_33 | Evan Harris of the National Secular Society and the British Humanist Association called O'Brien's statements "paranoid and unjustified".
Homosexuality
Before becoming a cardinal, O'Brien had been regarded as "liberal" on the issue of homosexuality, saying that there were a significant number of homosexual priests ministering within the Catholic Church. However, in December 2004 he told members of the Scottish Parliament that homosexuals were "captives of sexual aberrations", comparing homosexuals to prisoners in Saughton Prison; and later referred to homosexuality as a "moral degradation". But in 2005 O'Brien did rebuke Bishop Joseph Devine, who had suggested that homosexuals should not be allowed to teach in Catholic schools, commenting, "I don't have a problem with the personal life of a person as long as they are not flaunting their sexuality." |
1962_34 | In January 2006 he criticised Westminster MPs over the introduction of civil partnerships in the UK, and Holyrood members over the liberalisation of divorce laws in Scotland. In July 2006 he opposed proposals to change the law which would require Catholic adoption agencies to place children with homosexuals in the same way as with heterosexuals, calling them totalitarian.
In December 2011, O'Brien reiterated the Catholic Church's continued opposition to civil partnerships and suggested that there should be no laws that "facilitate" same-sex relationships, saying that |
1962_35 | In 2012, O'Brien criticised in The Daily Telegraph government proposals to introduce same-sex marriage, saying it was "madness", and would "redefine society since the institution of marriage is one of the fundamental building blocks of society", and thus shame the United Kingdom. Conservative MP Margot James, who was considered one of the most influential gay women in 2009, called these comments "scaremongering" and said: "I think it is a completely unacceptable way for a prelate to talk. I think that the government is not trying to force Catholic churches to perform gay marriages at all. It is a purely civil matter." The Deputy Leader of the Labour Party, Harriet Harman, said: "We have had prejudice, discrimination and homophobia for hundreds of years. That doesn't make it right [...] I don't want anybody to feel that this is a licence for whipping up prejudice." Dan Hodges wrote: "I can't remember the last time I read a more morally and intellectually bankrupt rant from a senior |
1962_36 | member of the clergy." |
1962_37 | The LGBT rights campaigners Stonewall awarded O'Brien "Bigot of the Year" at their annual awards in 2012. The award was criticised by First Minister of Scotland, Alex Salmond, as being "clearly wrong" and "not conducive to a proper and dignified debate on the important issue of equality in Scotland".
Clerical celibacy
On 22 February 2013, in an interview with the BBC, O'Brien said he was open to the possibility of removing the requirement of celibacy in the priesthood.
Abortion and embryo research
In May 2007 O'Brien urged Roman Catholics to reject political candidates who support what he called the "social evil" of abortion, and said that such Catholic politicians should not expect to remain full members of the church. |
1962_38 | During March 2008, O'Brien highlighted the issue of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill being debated in Parliament, denouncing the government for a "monstrous attack on human rights" through its "evil" endorsement of "Frankenstein" experiments. Some scientists suggested that he intentionally used inflammatory language to stir up opposition to the bill; others argued he was sticking up for morals and forced the Government to allow MPs to vote freely on the issue. (Gordon Brown had originally imposed a three-line whip on Labour MPs, meaning they had to back the bill, regardless of personal convictions.) |
1962_39 | O'Brien himself narrated a five-minute video recording in which he stated the "many, many concerns" of the Catholic Church concerning the bill which was to be voted on in Parliament. It was posted on YouTube, and sent as a DVD to every member of Parliament. In the video O'Brien made clear he was not against medical research, and supported research with non-embryonic stem cells, but was opposed to using embryos which would later be destroyed. He expressed the church's concerns over "human-animal hybrids". |
1962_40 | British politics
In February 2010, the Secretary of State for Scotland, Jim Murphy, said in the House of Commons that faith was "at the very foundations of the Labour Party" and encouraged openness to religion in public life. O'Brien responded that he "welcomed the sentiment" but said that "a tangible example by the Government over the last decade that it acknowledged or endorsed religious values would also have been welcomed. Instead we have witnessed this Government undertake a systematic and unrelenting attack on family values." O'Brien said to the Leader of the Scottish Labour Party, Iain Gray, "I hope he [Pope Benedict XVI] gives you hell [during his September 2010 visit] for what has happened over the past 10 years." |
1962_41 | In March 2011, O'Brien called British foreign policy "anti-Christian" for greatly increasing aid to Pakistan without requiring any commitment from the Pakistani government to religious freedom for Christians and other religious minority groups. He made this statement in the wake of the assassination of Pakistani minister Shahbaz Bhatti, who had spoken out against the country's blasphemy law.
British monarchy
O'Brien called for a 310-year-old law banning Catholics from taking the throne to be repealed. He said the Act of Settlement of 1701 was hampering efforts to curb sectarianism. Former Prime Minister David Cameron said that "in principle" he supported reforming the law on royal succession to remove the ban on Catholics, and people married to Catholics, from ascending the throne. |
1962_42 | Scottish independence
In an interview with the University of St Andrews philosopher John Haldane, published in the Catholic Herald in October 2006, Cardinal O'Brien stated that he would be "happy" if Scots voted for independence and predicted that independence is coming "before too long". He drew parallels with the independence of the Roman Catholic Church in Scotland: "it is difficult to argue that ecclesiastical independence is acceptable but political independence is not".
Poverty
In 2011, Cardinal O'Brien preached a homily including the quote below.
See also
Homosexual clergy in the Catholic Church
References
External links |
1962_43 | 1938 births
2018 deaths
People from Ballycastle, County Antrim
People from West Dunbartonshire
Clergy from Edinburgh
People educated at Our Lady & St Patrick's High School
People educated at St Augustine's High School, Edinburgh
Alumni of the University of Edinburgh
20th-century Roman Catholic archbishops in the United Kingdom
21st-century British cardinals
Science teachers
Roman Catholic archbishops of St Andrews and Edinburgh
Cardinals created by Pope John Paul II
Mathematics educators
Members of the Pontifical Council for Social Communications
Knights of Malta
20th-century people from Northern Ireland
Knights of the Holy Sepulchre
Roman Catholic priests from Northern Ireland
Catholic Church sexual abuse scandals in the United Kingdom
21st-century Scottish clergy
Accidental deaths from falls
Accidental deaths in England |
1963_0 | Nuclear Power and the Environment, sometimes simply called the Flowers Report, was released in September 1976 and is the sixth report of the UK Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, chaired by Sir Brian Flowers. The report was dedicated to "the Queen's most excellent Majesty." "He was appointed "to advise on matters, both national and international, concerning the pollution of the environment; on the adequacy of research in this field; and the future possibilities of danger to the environment." One of the recommendations of the report was that:
"There should be no commitment to a large programme of nuclear fission power until it has been demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt that a method exists to ensure the safe containment of longlived, highly radioactive waste for the indefinite future." |
1963_1 | The "Flowers Report" was prompted by a proposal in 1975 to set up an international nuclear fuel reprocessing plant in Windscale. Windscale is a large nuclear facility on the coast of Cumbria in Northwest England that was built after World War II to produce plutonium for England's nuclear weapons program. The facility suffered a leak in 1973, which put it out of commission until the plans for the international nuclear fuel reprocessing plant were proposed. This proposal was met with strong resistance after it became known to the public and as a result, the plans to build the nuclear reprocessing plant were never acted upon. |
1963_2 | Radioactive waste management and disposal strategies have been enacted since the publishing of "The Flowers Report". This put the responsibility of disposing radioactive waste into the hands of those who are producing it. It was not until 1982 that the Department of the Environment, after their previous method proved to be not as effective as they had hoped, decided to enact stronger guidelines and rules regarding radioactive waste. The responsibility of disposal was then passed over to the government. This led to the Department of the Environment gaining a few new responsibilities: securing the disposal process at an establishment, making sure the method of disposal is safe and well researched, and lastly, keeping the waste secured and away from the public after it has been disposed of. |
1963_3 | In the United States, as of 2008, uranium ore reserves are primarily kept in Wyoming and New Mexico, totaling an estimated one billion, 227 million pounds. This uranium ore will be turned into fuel that will be used in the operation of nuclear power plants, creating low-levels of radioactive waste. "Spent" uranium fuel becomes radioactive waste as a result of the fission process. This "spent" fuel must be removed and replaced from nuclear power plants every 18 to 24 months; it is then shipped to specifically designed and licensed disposal sites. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the U.S. Department of Transportation carefully control and regulate the management, packing, transport, and disposal of waste. |
1963_4 | The Flower's Report
The Flower's report is composed of eleven chapters in a compilation of over 200 pages. The chapters cover a wide range of subjects and topics related to radioactive activity.
Chapter One: Introduction
The Flower's Report introduction chapter consists of six pages. The report introduces the topics of nuclear technology, future projections on commercial reactors, concerns for left over radioactive waste, other uses of nuclear technology (that will not be the focus of the report), and concerns with development of nuclear reactors.
This chapter also gives an arrangement of the entire report's information that acts as an outline for the information presented, including later chapters' topics and main points. |
1963_5 | Chapter Two: Radioactivity and Radiobiology |
1963_6 | The focus of the first half of the chapter is designed to provide basic information about atoms and radiation to aid in later chapters. The first half covers the basics on atoms such as: an atom consists of Neutrons, Protons, and Electrons; the atomic number of an atom determines the amount of protons in one atom; and that protons are roughly 2000 times heavier than electrons (see atom). The concept of radiation is introduced through ionization which is the process of adding one or more electrons to, or removing one or more electrons from, atoms or molecules, thereby creating ions. From there certain particles can cause ionization. The ionizing particles are alpha particles (a type of ionizing radiation ejected by the nuclei of some unstable atoms that are large subatomic fragments consisting of two protons and two neutrons), beta particles (subatomic particles ejected from the nucleus of some radioactive atoms that are equivalent to electrons), gamma particles (electromagnetic energy |
1963_7 | photon) and energetic neutron radiation (energy released from an atom in the form of neutral particles called neutrons). The second half focuses on knowledge of radiation introduced into the environment and humans. Flower's and his team concluded in 1976 that low levels over a long exposure time can prevent a cell from dividing or further damaging genetic information. |
1963_8 | Other topics covered are the effects of plutonium in the body. For instance, animals being susceptible to radiation causes birth defects among the litter. Chapter two concludes with a concern of radiation affecting an entire species of animals as opposed to a group. |
1963_9 | Chapter Three: Nuclear Power
Chapter Three focuses on nuclear power. This chapter main concentration is on nuclear reactors and the basic physical principals of which reactor operation is based. An understanding of the different types of reactors that are in use or plan to be used is given. It also accounts for the nuclear fuel cycle and the operations that are involved in the fabrication and treatment of nuclear fuel. It begins with the extraction of uranium from the mine to the fuel fabrication plant and then to reactors. Furthermore, it incorporates the removal of spent fuel and its treatment to extract material suitable for incorporation of fresh fuel along with the treatment and disposal of wastes. |
1963_10 | Chapter Four: Major Issues Raised by Nuclear Power |
1963_11 | Chapter Four emphasizes on major issues raised by nuclear power. The reason why chapter two and chapter three are so detailed in the effects of radioactivity and the principles of nuclear power along with the nuclear fuel cycle is so that there could be a better understanding on the problems that could cause environmental effects. Concerns about nuclear development, which is considered in detail in other chapters, centers on a few major issues. This chapter focuses on issues as a whole to ensure that they can be seen in the perspective that allows people to understand the underlying social and ethical questions that they raise. It begins with the world energy demand, the problem scale of nuclear development, and nuclear hazards that stem from other technological developments. The advantages must be weighed against the fears and risks attached to nuclear power, which can lead to many people disregarding nuclear power as an acceptable means of energy, also referred to as "the Faustian |
1963_12 | bargain." Certainly these fears must be taken seriously and can not be disregarded. This chapter concludes with the concerns of the future and the fact that the world is on the threshold of a huge commitment to fission power, which if fully entered into, it may be effectively impossible to reverse for a century or more. |
1963_13 | Chapter Five: International and National Control Arrangements |
1963_14 | Chapter Five focuses on the internal and national control arrangements. It begins by accepting that the hazards of ionizing radiation are well appreciated by anyone who works in the field and that there is, and has been, an elaborate system at the national and international level to minimize these risks. Although there are many questions to be answered, much has been learned and there has been a stricter management with respect to ionizing radiation and protecting the health of both radiation workers and the general public. It suggests that greater resources should be allocated to a critical group that is most exposed to a particular pollutant in order to determine a safe discharge criteria. This chapter also focuses on the organizational arrangements of responsibility, which may still be unclear. If a rapid expansion in the near future occurs, new problems are likely to rise; thus, creating new changes in the allocation of responsibilities. It focuses on the present arrangements, |
1963_15 | their efficacy, and recommendations that arise in order to sustain efficacy and effectiveness. It does not discuss discharges of radioactivity to the environment, but rather presents arrangements that are made in order to ensure protection to the general public and the environment. |
1963_16 | Chapter Six: Reactor Safety and Siting
Chapter Six stresses on reactor safety and compares the risks of reactor accidents with those arising from other activities or events. It clearly states that absolute safety cannot be ensured and that the advancing scale and complexity of technology tends to increase the possible consequences of serious accidents as well as the problems by which these accidents may be caused. Accordingly, all that can be expected is that the techniques and disciplines used to ensure safety are enough to reduce accidents to acceptable rates. The biggest concern in this chapter is the environmental effects of possible reactor accidents. The focus is on looking into the principles that are applied in seeking reactor safety. |
1963_17 | Chapter Seven: Security and the Safeguarding of Plutonium |
1963_18 | Chapter Seven focuses on security and the safeguarding of plutonium. Much of the concern that is presented with nuclear power is not strictly on the effects of normal operations, but to those that might be created by illicit activities directed towards nuclear installations or materials. The issues that arise within this chapter are the safeguarding of society, security arrangements, and the viewpoint of the ordinary citizen about the restrictions on their freedom that might result from security measures. One of the risks discussed is the sabotage of nuclear installation which could release harmful substances into the environment along with radioactivity. Another risk is the diversion of plutonium which could be made into a bomb or dispersed deliberately and will only increase along with the reliance of plutonium in fast conductors. Lastly, in regards to whether or not the measures necessary to protect society against these risks are going to interfere with civil liberties. |
1963_19 | Chapter Eight: Radioactive Waste Management
Chapter Eight focuses on radioactive waste management which is generated at various stages of the nuclear fuel cycle. This chapter focuses more strictly on radioactive waste, specifically on the waste that presents particularly difficult problems regarding its disposal and management. It also covers the harms that are present in the storage of nuclear waste along with the steps that are being taken to ensure that no harm is caused to the environment. Furthermore, this chapter considers the possibilities that exist for a safe disposal of these wastes and the organization needed to pursue the search and judge its results. |
1963_20 | Chapter Nine: Energy Strategy and the Environment
Chapter Nine focuses on energy storage and the environment along with the implications of a large nuclear power program. This chapters seeks and attempts to provide some understanding of those issues that bear on the question of whether great future dependence on nuclear fission power must be regarded as inevitable. It also helps understand if these implications should be accepted and what other alternate strategies might be available along with their economic, social, and environmental consequences. Some examples mentioned as acceptable means of energy are wave power and CHP systems. |
1963_21 | Chapter Ten: Nuclear Power and Public Policy
Chapter Ten reflects on nuclear power and public safety. This chapter draws the line on which policy should be adopted towards the development of nuclear power. Due to the popular belief that the spread of technology is responsible for the environment progressively deteriorating, nuclear power is highly opposed in some countries. This chapter mainly focuses on the United States and how the debate between the nuclear industry and the environmental movement has become increasingly controversial. One side of the spectrum sees technology as "blind to the dangers of the world", whereas the other side believes they "are making an essential contribution to the well-being of humanity." Also, this issue brings about the concerns of large scale nuclear power leading to a nuclear war on account of the connection of civil and military uses of nuclear power with the expansion of nuclear development. |
1963_22 | Chapter Eleven
Chapter Eleven is a summary of principal conclusions and recommendations.
See also
List of books about nuclear issues
Nuclear or Not?
Environmental impact of nuclear power
Acute Radiation Syndrome
References
Books about nuclear issues
British non-fiction books
Environmental impact in the United Kingdom
Environmental non-fiction books
Environmental reports
Reports of the United Kingdom government
Nuclear power in the United Kingdom
1976 non-fiction books
1976 in the environment |
1964_0 | The People's Volunteer Army (PVA) was the armed forces deployed by the People's Republic of China during the Korean War. Although all units in the PVA were actually transferred from the People's Liberation Army under the orders of Mao Zedong, the PVA was separately constituted in order to prevent an official war with the United States. The PVA entered Korea on 19 October 1950, and completely withdrew by October 1958. The nominal commander and political commissar of the PVA was Peng Dehuai before the ceasefire agreement in 1953, although both Chen Geng and Deng Hua served as the acting commander and commissar after April 1952 due to Peng's illness. The initial (25 October – 5 November 1950) units in the PVA included 38th, 39th, 40th, 42nd, 50th, 66th Corps totalling 250,000 men, and eventually about 3 million Chinese civilian and military personnel served in Korea by July 1953.
Background |
1964_1 | Although the United Nations Command (UN) forces were under United States command, this army was officially a UN "police" force. In order to avoid an open war with the US and other UN members, the People's Republic of China deployed the People's Liberation Army (PLA) under the name "volunteer army". |
1964_2 | About the name, there were various opinions. According to some scholars during the mid 1990s, after the PRC made the strategic decision to send soldiers to Korea, the very first name of this army was "support army." But Huang Yanpei, the vice premier of the Government Administration Council of the Central People's Government at that time, suggested that the name "support army" might cause the international community to assume that China was sending soldiers as an act of direct aggression against the United States. Therefore, the army's name was modified to "volunteer army" while different unit designations and footings were used instead, to give the impression that China did not intend to declare war against the US, but rather that Chinese soldiers were only present on Korean battlefields as individual volunteers. On the other hand, some recent studies show that the change was not only due to Huang's advice. Because much earlier on July 7, 1950, the name had already been changed to |
1964_3 | "volunteer army" by Zhou Enlai on his manuscript about the decision of the army's clothing and flags. |
1964_4 | Despite arguments on the changing from "People's Support Army" to "People's Volunteer Army", the name was also a homage to the Korean Volunteer Army that had helped the Chinese communists during the Second Sino-Japanese War and the Chinese Civil War. It also managed to deceive the US intelligence and the UN about the size and nature of the Chinese forces that entered Korea. They later realized that the PVA was the PLA's North East Frontier Force (NEFF), with other PLA formations transferred under NEFF's command as the Korean War dragged on. But the result was that they still admitted the name, "People's Volunteer Army", in order to minimize the war within the Korean Peninsula and prevent escalation of the war.
Strengths and weaknesses
Clothing |
1964_5 | The PVA soldier was reasonably well clothed, in keeping with the PLA's guerrilla origin and egalitarian attitudes. All ranks wore a cotton or woolen green or khaki shirt and trousers combination with leaders' uniforms being different in cut.
Equipment |
1964_6 | The nominal strength of a PLA division was 9,500 men, with a regiment comprising 3,000 and a battalion consisting of 850. However, many divisions sent to Korea were below-strength while the divisions stationed opposite Taiwan were above-strength. There was also variation in organization and equipment as well as in the quantity and quality of the military equipment. Some of the PLA's equipment was from the Imperial Japanese Army or were captured from the Kuomintang (Nationalist Chinese) military forces. Some Czechoslovak-made weapons were also purchased on the open market by the PRC. During the PVA's first offensive (the so-called First Phase Campaign) in the Korean War between October and November 1950, large quantities of captured US weapons were widely used due to the availability of the required ammunition and the increasing difficulty of constant re-supplying across the Yalu River due to numerous UN-conducted air interdiction operations. In addition, there was also a local copy of |
1964_7 | the US Thompson submachine gun being produced by the PRC, based on the type of which had already been exported to and used in China since the 1930s and by UN troops during the Korean War as well. Later on, after the first year of the Korean War, the Soviet Union began to send more weapons and ammunition to the PRC, which started to produce licensed copies of some types of Soviet weapons , such as the PPSh-41 submachine gun, which was designated as the Type 50. In addition to surplus WWII Soviet arms, the Soviet Union also provided some WWII German small arms to the Chinese like the Karabiner 98k rifle. Surplus Mauser ammunition were also supplied by the Soviet Union or were available from stocks left behind by the KMT forces who also used German ammunition. |
1964_8 | Actions during the Korean War
First Phase Campaign (October 25 – November 5, 1950) |
1964_9 | The collapse of the North Korean Korean People's Army (KPA) in September/October 1950 following the Battle of Inchon, the Pusan Perimeter Offensive and the UN September 1950 counteroffensive alarmed the PRC Government. The PRC had issued warnings that they would intervene if any non-South Korean forces crossed the 38th Parallel, citing national security interests. US President Harry Truman regarded the warnings as "a bold attempt to blackmail the UN". On October 8, 1950, the day after UN troops crossed the 38th Parallel and began their offensive into North Korea, Chairman Mao issued the order for the NEFF to be moved to the Yalu River, ready to cross. Mao sought Soviet aid and saw intervention as essentially defensive: "If we allow the U.S. to occupy all of Korea... we must be prepared for the US to declare... war with China", he told Joseph Stalin. Zhou Enlai was sent to Moscow to add force to Mao's cabled arguments. Mao delayed his forces while waiting for Soviet help, and the |
1964_10 | planned attack was thus postponed from 13 October to 19 October. Soviet assistance was limited to providing air support no closer than from the battlefront. The MiG-15s in PRC colours would be an unpleasant surprise to the UN pilots; they would hold local air superiority against the F-80 Shooting Stars until newer F-86 Sabres were deployed. The Soviet role was known to the US but they kept quiet to avoid any international and potential nuclear incidents. It has been alleged by the Chinese that the Soviets had agreed to full scale air support, which never occurred south of Pyongyang, and helped accelerate the Sino-Soviet Split. |
1964_11 | On October 15, 1950, Truman went to Wake Island to discuss with UN commander General Douglas MacArthur the possibility of Chinese intervention and his desire to limit the scope of the Korean War. MacArthur reassured Truman that "if the Chinese tried to get down to Pyongyang there would be the greatest slaughter."
On October 19, 1950, Pyongyang, North Korea's capital, was captured by UN forces. On the same day, the PVA formally crossed the Yalu River under strict secrecy. |
1964_12 | The initial PVA assault began on October 25, 1950, under the command of Peng Dehuai with 270,000 PVA troops (it was assumed at the time that Lin Biao was in charge, but this notion had been disproved). The PVA assault caught the UN troops by surprise, and employing great skill and remarkable camouflage ability, concealed their numerical and divisional strength after the first engagement with the UN. After these initial engagements, the Chinese withdrew into the mountains. UN forces interpreted this withdrawal as a show of weakness; they thought that this initial attack was all that the Chinese forces were capable of undertaking.
Second Phase Campaign (November 25 – December 24, 1950) |
1964_13 | On November 25, 1950, in the Second Phase Offensive (or campaign) the PVA struck again along the entire Korean front. In the west, at the Battle of the Ch'ongch'on River, the PVA overran several UN divisions and landed an extremely heavy blow into the flank of the remaining UN forces, decimating the U.S. 2nd Infantry Division in the process. In December 1950, Chinese forces captured Pyongyang. The city saw a massive evacuation of refugees alongside UN forces heading south in order to avoid the advancing PVA. The resulting UN retreat from North Korea was the longest retreat of an American unit in history. In the east, at the Battle of Chosin Reservoir, Task Force Faith - a 3,000 man unit from the 7th Infantry Division - was surrounded by the PVA 80th and the 81st Divisions. Task Force Faith managed to inflict heavy casualties onto the PVA divisions, but in the end it was destroyed with 2,000 men killed or captured, and losing all vehicles and most other equipment. The destruction of |
1964_14 | Task Force Faith was considered by the PVA to be their biggest success of the entire Korean War. The 1st Marine Division fared better; though surrounded and forced to retreat, they inflicted heavy casualties on the PVA, who committed six divisions trying to destroy the Marines. Although the PVA were able to recapture much of North Korea during the Second Phase Campaign, 40 percent of the PVA was rendered combat ineffective—a loss which they could not recover from until the start of Chinese Spring Offensive. |
1964_15 | UN forces in northeast Korea withdrew to form a defensive perimeter around the port city of Hŭngnam, where an evacuation was carried out in late December 1950. Approximately 100,000 military personnel and material and another 100,000 North Korean civilians were loaded onto a variety of merchant and military transport ships. Eighth Army commander General Walton Walker was killed in an accident on December 23, 1950. He was replaced by Lieutenant General Matthew Ridgway, who led airborne troops in the Second World War.
Third Phase Campaign (December 31, 1950 – January 8, 1951) |
1964_16 | Hoping to pressure the UN into abandoning South Korea, Mao ordered the PVA to attack the UN forces along the 38th Parallel. On the last day of 1950, PVA/KPA forces attacked several ROK divisions along the parallel, breaching the UN defenses in the process. To avoid another encirclement, UN forces evacuated Seoul on January 3, and PVA/KPA forces recaptured the city on January 4. Both the US Eighth Army and the US X Corps retreated another , but the overextended PVA were completely exhausted after months of nonstop fighting. Ridgway took immediate steps to raise the morale and fighting spirit of the battered Eighth Army, which had fallen to low levels during its retreat from North Korea. |
1964_17 | Fourth Phase Campaign (January 30 – April 21, 1951) |
1964_18 | The overextended PVA were forced to disengage and to recuperate for an extensive period of time, but the UN forces soon returned to the offensive. On January 23, 1951, the US Eighth Army launched Operation Thunderbolt, attacking the unprepared PVA/KPA forces south of the Han River. This was followed up with Operation Roundup by US X Corps in central Korea. Hoping to regain the initiative, the PVA counterattacked at the Battle of Hoengsong on February 11, stopping US X Corps' advance in the process. But without proper rest and recuperation, the new offensive soon fizzled out at the Battle of Chipyong-ni on February 15. With the entire PVA incapable of any further offensive operations, the US Eighth Army launched Operation Killer on February 21, followed by Operation Ripper on March 6. A revitalized Eighth Army, restored by Ridgway to fighting trim, expelled the PVA/KPA troops from Seoul on 16 March, destroying much of the city with aerial and artillery bombardments in the process. |
1964_19 | MacArthur was removed from command by President Truman on April 11, 1951, due to a disagreement over policy. MacArthur was succeeded by Ridgway, who led the UN forces for additional offensives across the 38th Parallel. A series of attacks managed to slowly drive back the opposing forces, inflicting heavy casualties on PVA/KPA units as UN forces advanced some miles north of the 38th parallel to Line Kansas.
Fifth Phase Campaign (April 22 – May 22, 1951) |
1964_20 | The PVA counterattacked on 22 April 1951 with the Fifth Phase Campaign (also known as the "Chinese Spring Offensive") and with three field armies (approximately 700,000 men). The offensive's first thrust fell upon US I Corps and IX Corps which fiercely resisted, blunting the impetus of the offensive, which was halted at the No-Name Line north of Seoul. On May 15, 1951, the PVA commenced the second impulse of the Spring Offensive and attacked the ROK and the US X Corps in the east, and initially were successful, yet were halted by May 22. On 20 May the US Eighth Army counterattacked the exhausted PVA/KPA forces in the UN May-June 1951 counteroffensive, inflicting heavy losses. The destruction of the PVA 180th Division of the 60th Army during the counterattack has been considered to be the worst Chinese defeat during the entire Korean War. Roughly 3,000 men managed to escape (including the division commander and other high-ranking officers), but the majority of the division were killed |
1964_21 | or captured. During the final days of the Fifth Phase Campaign, the main body of the 180th Division was encircled during a UN counterattack, and after days of hard fighting, the division was fragmented, and the regiments fled in all directions. Soldiers either deserted or were abandoned by their officers during failed attempts to wage guerrilla warfare without support from the local people. Finally, out of ammunition and food, some 5,000 soldiers were captured. The division commander and other officers who escaped were subsequently investigated and demoted on return to China. The UN counterattack halted at Line Kansas where they were met with fresh troops from the counterattacking PVA 42nd and 47th Corps on 27 May, and subsequent offensive action stand-down began the stalemate that lasted until the armistice of 1953. |
1964_22 | Stalemate (June 10, 1951 – July 27, 1953)
The UN counterattack in the aftermath of the Chinese Spring Offensive stabilized the front roughly along the 38th Parallel. The rest of the war involved little territory change, large-scale bombing of the population in the north, and lengthy peace negotiations, which started in Kaesong on July 10, 1951. Even during the peace negotiations, combat continued. For the UN forces, the goal was to recapture all of what had been South Korea before an agreement was reached in order to avoid loss of any territory and the PVA attempted similar operations. A major issue of the negotiations was repatriation of POWs. The Chinese and North Koreans insisted on forcible repatriation, while the UN insisted on voluntary repatriation. The war continued until the Chinese and North Koreans eventually dropped this issue. |
1964_23 | On November 29, 1952, U.S. President-elect Dwight D. Eisenhower fulfilled a campaign promise by going to Korea to find out what could be done to end the war. With the UN's and PVA's acceptance of India's proposal for an armistice, fighting ended July 27, 1953, by which time the front line was back around the proximity of the 38th Parallel. A demilitarized zone (DMZ) was established along the Military Demarcation Line, which is patrolled to this day by North Korean troops on one side and South Korean and American troops on the other. |
1964_24 | Tactics
PVA forces used rapid attacks on the flanks and rear and infiltration behind UN lines to give the appearance of vast hordes. This, of course, was augmented by the PVA tactic of maximizing their forces for the attack, ensuring a large local numerical superiority over their opponent. The initial PVA victories were a great morale booster for the PVA. However, by late 1951, overextended supply lines and superior UN firepower had forced a stalemate. The KPA that invaded in 1950 had been much better supplied and armed by the Soviets than the PVA had been. The main arms of the PVA were captured Japanese and Nationalist arms.
Historian and Korean War veteran Bevin Alexander had this to say about Chinese tactics in his book How Wars Are Won: |
1964_25 | The Chinese had no air power and were armed only with rifles, machineguns, hand grenades, and mortars. Against the much more heavily armed Americans, they adapted a technique they had used against the Nationalists in the Chinese civil war of 1946–49. The Chinese generally attacked at night and tried to close in on a small troop position—generally a platoon—and then attacked it with local superiority in numbers. The usual method was to infiltrate small units, from a platoon of fifty men to a company of 200, split into separate detachments. While one team cut off the escape route of the Americans, the others struck both the front and the flanks in concerted assaults. The attacks continued on all sides until the defenders were destroyed or forced to withdraw. The Chinese then crept forward to the open flank of the next platoon position, and repeated the tactics. |
1964_26 | Roy Appleman further clarified the initial Chinese tactics as: |
1964_27 | In the First Phase Offensive, highly skilled enemy light infantry troops had carried out the Chinese attacks, generally unaided by any weapons larger than mortars. Their attacks had demonstrated that the Chinese were well-trained disciplined fire fighters, and particularly adept at night fighting. They were masters of the art of camouflage. Their patrols were remarkably successful in locating the positions of the U.N. forces. They planned their attacks to get in the rear of these forces, cut them off from their escape and supply roads, and then send in frontal and flanking attacks to precipitate the battle. They also employed a tactic which they termed Hachi Shiki, which was a V-formation into which they allowed enemy forces to move; the sides of the V then closed around their enemy while another force moved below the mouth of the V to engage any forces attempting to relieve the trapped unit. Such were the tactics the Chinese used with great success at Onjong, Unsan, and Ch'osan, but |
1964_28 | with only partial success at Pakch'on and the Ch'ongch'on bridgehead. |
1964_29 | Discipline and political control
The discipline of the PVA was strict by western standards, a notable improvement when compared to the Nationalist and warlord armies that ruled the country from 1912 until 1949. Discipline was applied universally within the army, with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) members expected to be punished more than non-Party soldiers for the same infraction. Beatings and abuses were also forbidden by regulations. Although capital punishments were enforced for disobeying certain orders, it was rarely used in accordance with the Chinese traditions. Normally, public shamings and political indoctrination camps were preferred methods in dealing with serious infractions such as desertion, and the punished are expected to return to frontline duty with his original unit. |
1964_30 | Like the Soviet Army, political and military officers formed a dual chain of command within the PVA, and this arrangement could be found as low as the company level. Political officers were in charge of the control and the morale of the troops, and they were often expected to act like role models in combat. Unlike other Communist armies of the same period, although the political officers had authority over military officers on combat decisions, the military officers could issue orders without political officers' approval. Similarly, the line between military and political officers were often blurred in PVA, since the political officers often had extensive military experiences while most military officers were senior Party members within a unit. |
1964_31 | Besides the political officers, Party members and Party candidates also enforced political controls within the ranks. Squads were often divided into three-man fireteams, with each fireteam led by a Party member or a Party candidate. Group meetings were frequently used to maintain unit cohesion, and within the meetings public shamings and criticisms were conducted to raise morale and to indoctrinate soldiers. |
1964_32 | The by-product of the tight political control within the PVA is that it relied on the presence of the Party members within its ranks to be combat effective. A PVA unit could disintegrate once the Party members were either killed or wounded in action. Also, the tight political control had created a general dissatisfaction amongst the Chinese ranks, and it required constant political indoctrination and high peer pressure to maintain high morale for each soldier.
According to the Korean War written by Matthew Bunker Ridgway, the commander-in-chief of the United Nations forces, the positive evaluation of the Chinese Army's good treatment of prisoners is completely different from the Korean People's Army's policy of abusing prisoners. He positively praised the Chinese army as a disciplined army and a respectable enemy.。During the Korean War, the US front-line combat forces also spoke highly of the fighting will of the Chinese people's Volunteer Army。 |
1964_33 | Prisoners-of-war (POWs)
Prisoners-of-war (POWs) played a major role in the continuation of the war past 1951. The US accused China of implementing mind control, coined "brainwashing", on US prisoners, while China refused to allow the US to repatriate POWs to Taiwan.
United Nations POWs
In contrast with their KPA counterparts, executions committed by the PVA were rather few in number. According to author Kevin Mahoney in his study of the PVA, executions of POWs did occur during the heat of the battle. Most of the executions appeared to have been committed by the lower commands without the upper echelons' knowledge, and it is often carried out to prevent the future escapes or rescues of the POWs. |
1964_34 | Because the PVA rarely executed prisoners, the Chinese considered themselves to be more lenient and humane than the KPA. However, the Chinese were unprepared for the large influx of POWs after their entry into the war and a large number of prisoners were crowded into temporary camps for processing. Mass starvation and diseases soon swept through those camps during the winter of 1950–51, while numerous death marches were conducted by the PVA to move the prisoners into permanent locations. Although the situation started to improve after permanent camps were established by January 1951, death by starvation still continued until April 1951. About 43 percent of all US POWs died from November 1950 to April 1951. In comparison, only 34 percent of all US prisoners died under Japanese captivity during World War II. The Chinese have defended their actions by stating that all PVA soldiers during this period were also suffering mass starvation and diseases due to the lack of a competent logistics |
1964_35 | system. The UN POWs, however, pointed out that a lot of the Chinese camps were located near the Sino-Korean border, and claimed that the starvation was used to force the prisoners to accept the communism indoctrinations programs. The starvation and the POW deaths finally stopped by the summer of 1951 after the armistice talks started. |
1964_36 | Allegations of mind control
During the Korean War, Edward Hunter, who worked at the time both as a journalist and as a U.S. intelligence agent, wrote a series of books and articles on the allegations of Chinese mind control, which he coined as "brainwashing". |
1964_37 | The Chinese term 洗腦 (xǐ năo, literally "wash brain") was originally used to describe methodologies of coercive persuasion used under the Maoist regime in China, which aimed to transform individuals with a reactionary imperialist mindset into "right-thinking" members of the new Chinese social system. To that end the regime developed techniques that would break down the psyche integrity of the individual with regard to information processing, information retained in the mind and individual values. Chosen techniques included dehumanizing of individuals by keeping them in filth, sleep deprivation, partial sensory deprivation, psychological harassment, inculcation of guilt and group social pressure. The term punned on the Taoist custom of "cleansing/washing the heart" (洗心, xǐ xīn) prior to conducting certain ceremonies or entering certain holy places. |
1964_38 | Hunter and those who picked up the Chinese term used it to explain why, unlike in earlier wars, a relatively high percentage of American GIs defected to the enemy side after becoming prisoners-of-war. It was believed that the Chinese in North Korea used such techniques to disrupt the ability of captured troops to effectively organize and resist their imprisonment. British radio operator Robert W. Ford and British army Colonel James Carne also claimed that the Chinese subjected them to brainwashing techniques during their war-era imprisonment. |
1964_39 | After the war, two studies of the repatriation of American prisoners of war by Robert Lifton and by Edgar Schein concluded that brainwashing (called "thought reform" by Lifton and "coercive persuasion" by Schein) had a transient effect. Both researchers found that the Chinese mainly used coercive persuasion to disrupt the ability of the prisoners to organize and maintain morale and hence to escape. By placing the prisoners under conditions of physical and social deprivation and disruption, and then by offering them more comfortable situations such as better sleeping quarters, better food, warmer clothes or blankets, the Chinese did succeed in getting some of the prisoners to make anti-American statements. Nevertheless, the majority of prisoners did not actually adopt Communist beliefs, instead behaving as though they did in order to avoid the plausible threat of extreme physical abuse. Both researchers also concluded that such coercive persuasion succeeded only on a minority of POWs, |
1964_40 | and that the end-result of such coercion remained very unstable, as most of the individuals reverted to their previous condition soon after they left the coercive environment. In 1961 they both published books expanding on these findings. Schein published Coercive Persuasion and Lifton published Thought Reform and the Psychology of Totalism. More recent writers including Mikhail Heller have suggested that Lifton's model of brainwashing may throw light on the use of mass propaganda in other communist states such as the former Soviet Union. |
1964_41 | In a summary published in 1963, Edgar Schein gave a background history of the precursor origins of the brainwashing phenomenon:
Thought reform contains elements which are evident in Chinese culture (emphasis on interpersonal sensitivity, learning by rote and self-cultivation); in methods of extracting confessions well known in the Papal Inquisition (13th century) and elaborated through the centuries, especially by the Russian secret police; in methods of organizing corrective prisons, mental hospitals and other institutions for producing value change; in methods used by religious sects, fraternal orders, political elites or primitive societies for converting or initiating new members. Thought reform techniques are consistent with psychological principles but were not explicitly derived from such principles. |
1964_42 | Mind-control theories from the Korean War era came under criticism in subsequent years. According to forensic psychologist Dick Anthony, the CIA invented the concept of "brainwashing" as a propaganda strategy to undercut communist claims that American POWs in Korean communist camps had voluntarily expressed sympathy for communism. Anthony stated that definitive research demonstrated that fear and duress, not brainwashing, caused western POWs to collaborate. He argued that the books of Hunter (whom he identified as a secret CIA "psychological warfare specialist" passing as a journalist) pushed the CIA brainwashing theory onto the general public. |
1964_43 | In addition, Herbert Brownell Jr., the Attorney General of the United States, once said publicly that "if American prisoners of war cooperate with the Communist Party during their imprisonment in North Korea, they will face charges of treason that may carry out the death penalty. Moreover, the United States official wrote a statement saying: "Those who cooperate with Communists and sign false confessions should be quickly removed from the army, not honored." in addition to the threats and pressure made by the U.S. government and military, prisoners of war also bear great psychological pressure that shames their families. This is considered to be that many American prisoners of war accuse "China of abusing prisoners of war" Or the reason for overturning his previous statement in favor of the people's Republic of China after returning home.
Chinese POWs |
1964_44 | Anti-Communist POWs in Communist service |
1964_45 | During the Panmunjom Truce negotiations, the chief stumbling block to the arrangement of a final armistice during the winter of 1951–1952 revolved around the exchange of prisoners. At first glance, there appeared to be nothing to argue about, since the Geneva Conventions of 1949, by which both sides had pledged to abide, called for the immediate and complete exchange of all prisoners upon the conclusion of hostilities. This seemingly straightforward principle, however, disturbed many Americans. To begin with, UN prisoner-of-war camps held over 40,000 South Koreans, many of whom had been impressed into Communist service and who had no desire to be sent north upon the conclusion of the war. Moreover, a considerable number of North Korean and Chinese prisoners had also expressed a desire not to return to their homelands. This was particularly true of the Chinese POWs, some of whom were anti-Communists whom the Communists had forcibly inducted during the Chinese Civil War into the PLA |
1964_46 | unit that was later transferred into Korea. |
1964_47 | Aftermath of the Korean War
In 2011, some former members of the PVA revisited North Korea. After the visit, they commented that they were "very sad" and dissatisfied with the post-war development of North Korea. "[We] liberated them, but they're still struggling for freedom" said Qu Yingkui.
To mark the 70th year of entry into the Korean War by the volunteers' army, Kim Jong-un visited the cemetery in 2020. The Pyongyang Times described the soldiers as having 'unparalleled bravery, mass spirit and international heroism,' and describing the other help that the volunteer army provided.
Early Chinese involvement |
1964_48 | The stated historical importance of the PVA entering the war was that it marked the beginning of Chinese government involvement. However, this is rather from political propaganda needs and there is debate of the time of the beginning of Chinese involvement. Some scholars in the west had argued that the Chinese involvement was much earlier, and in the North Korean invasion on June 25, 1950, out of the 135,000 KPA invasion force, more than 38,000 were former ethnic Korean soldiers of the Chinese Communist Fourth Field Army. An equal number of former ethnic Korean soldiers of Fourth Field Army who did not participate in the invasion also served in the KPA in other regions of North Korea. The KPA invasion force consisted of two corps, the I Corps and II Corps. Jin Xiong (金雄, Kim Woong), the commander-in-chief of the invasion force and the commander of KPA I Corps, was a veteran of Eighth Route Army, and a former member of the CCP. Jin Wuting (金武亭, Kim Mu Jong), also known as Wu Ting (武亭, |
1964_49 | Mu Jong) the commander of KPA II Corps, even had more seniority than Jin Xiong (金雄), in that he participated in Guangzhou Uprising and the Long March. All of these facts are agreed by the Chinese government. |
1964_50 | The former units of the Fourth Field Army transferred to North Korean with all of their weapons were: |
1964_51 | 5th Division (North Korea): former 164th Division. The commander, Li Deshan (李德山), a veteran of Eighth Route Army and former member of the CCP, was also the political commissar. When the division reached to North Korea on July 20, 1949, its number totaled 10,821. Weaponry brought with them included 5,279 rifles, 588 handguns, 321 light machine guns, 104 heavy machine guns, 206 submachine guns, 8 anti-tank rifles, 32 grenade launchers, 67 50-mm mortars, 87 60-mm mortars, 26 mortars with calibre of 81-mm or greater, 12 anti-tank guns, 1 infantry support gun, 3 other artillery pieces and 734 horses. |
1964_52 | 6th Division (North Korea): former 166th Division. The commander, Fang Hushan (方虎山, Bang Ho San), a veteran of Eighth Route Army and former member of the CCP, was also the political commissar. When the division reached to North Korea on July 20, 1949, its number totaled 10,320. Weaponry brought with them included: 6,046 rifles, 722 handguns, 281 light machine guns, 91 heavy machine guns, 878 submachine guns, 69 grenade launchers, 31 50-mm mortars, 91 60-mm mortars, 33 mortars with calibre of 81-mm or greater, 10 anti-tank guns, 3 mountain guns, 3 other artillery pieces and 945 horses. |
1964_53 | 7th Division (North Korea) (later renamed as the 12th): former 156th Division, with additional ethnic Korean soldiers from the 139th, 140th and 141st Divisions of the IV Field Army. The commander, Cui Ren (崔仁, Chu Yol), a veteran of Eighth Route Army and former member of the CCP, was also the political commissar. When the division reached North Korea on April 18, 1950, its number totaled more than 14,000. The weaponry brought into North Korea was greater than that of the other two divisions due to its larger size. |
1964_54 | With the exception of the KPA 2nd and 3rd Divisions, which mostly consisted of former-Soviet trained North Korean troops, all other KPA divisions had at least a former regiment of the IV Field Army, and in addition to the three former Chinese divisions, most of commanders were former commanders of the IV Field army, such as:
Commander of the 2nd Division Ch'oe Hyon (崔贤) and chief-of-staff Xu Bo (许波)
Commander of the 3rd Division Lee Yong Ho (李英镝) and chief-of-staff Zhang Pingshan (张平山)
Commander of the 4th Division Lee Kwon Mu (李权武) |
1964_55 | Though the Chinese government acknowledged these facts, this early Chinese involvement was kept a secret for more than four decades in China and it was only until the late 1990s when such information was finally allowed to be revealed on large scale. The Chinese government, however, argued that these troops were already transferred to North Korea and thus should be strictly considered as the internal affairs of Korea, and thus still asserts the Chinese involvement in the Korean War began when the PVA joined the fight.
Legacy
Democratic People's Republic of Korea
The legacy of the PVA is commemorated in the DPRK with the Cemetery of the Fallen Soldiers of the Chinese People’s Volunteers Army, located in Hoechang County. Wreaths and floral baskets are sent to commemorate their contributions to the war. |
1964_56 | People's Republic of China
For many Chinese, the Korean War is generally regarded as an honorable struggle in Chinese history. The PVA was the first Chinese army in a century that was able to withstand a Western army in a major conflict. They had earned a name "the most beloved people (最可爱的人)", which is from the essay written by Wei Wei in 1951, "Who are the Most Beloved People?". More and more stories of heroism by members of the PVA continue to be promoted by the PRC government even to this day, and appear in school textbooks. The willingness of China to assist North Korea against the United States, and the show of force they engaged in, heralded that China was once again becoming a major world power. |
1964_57 | From official Chinese sources, PVA casualties during the Korean War were 390,000. This breaks down as follows: 110,400 KIA; 21,600 died of wounds; 13,000 died of sickness; 25,600 MIA/POW; and 260,000 more wounded. However, western and other sources estimate that about 400,000 Chinese soldiers were either killed in action or died of disease, starvation, exposure, and accidents with around 486,000 wounded, out of around 3 million military personnel deployed in the war by China. Mao Zedong's oldest and only healthy son, Mao Anying (毛岸英), was a PVA officer during the war, and was killed by a UN air strike.
The war also contributed to the decline of Sino-Soviet relations. Although Chinese had their own reasons to enter the war (i.e. a strategic buffer zone in the Korean peninsula), the view that the Soviets had used them as proxies was shared in the Western bloc. China had to use Soviet loans originally intended to rebuild their shattered economy to pay for Soviet arms. |
1964_58 | Republic of China
After the war was over, of the PVA POWs held by UNC forces, 14,235 were transported to Taiwan. The began arriving in Taiwan on January 23, 1954 and were referred to as "Anti-Communist Martyrs" (反共義士). In Taiwan January 23 became World Freedom Day (自由日) in their honor. |
1964_59 | The Korean War also led to other long-lasting effects. Until the war, the US had largely abandoned the government of Chiang Kai-shek, which had retreated to Taiwan, and had no plans to intervene in the Chinese Civil War. The start of the Korean War rendered untenable any policy that would have caused Taiwan to fall under PRC control. Truman's decision to send American forces to the Taiwan Strait further deterred the PRC from making any cross-strait invasion of Taiwan. The anti-communist atmosphere in the West in response to the Korean War and Cold War contributed to the unwillingness to diplomatically recognize the People's Republic of China by the United States until 1979. Today, diplomacy between the Republic of China and mainland China remains strained, and mainland China continues to claim the sovereignty of Taiwan.
Media |
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