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responsibility. It was not responsible for taking and implementing
|
decisions. This responsibility rested with the Central and State
|
Governments.
|
Composition
|
The following points can be noted in context of the composition
|
(membership) of the erstwhile Planning Commission:
|
1. The Prime Minister of India was the chairman of the
|
commission. He presided over the meetings of the commission.
|
2. The commission had a deputy chairman. He was the de facto
|
executive head (i.e., full-time functional head) of the
|
commission. He was responsible for the formulation and
|
submission of the draft of Five-Year Plan to the Central cabinet.
|
He was appointed by the Central cabinet for a fixed tenure and
|
enjoyed the rank of a Cabinet Minister. Though he was not a
|
member of cabinet, he was invited to attend all its meetings
|
(without a right to vote).
|
3. Some Central Ministers were appointed as part-time members
|
of the commission. In any case, the finance minister and
|
planning minister were the exofficio (by virtue of) members of
|
the commission.
|
4. The commission had four to seven fulltime expert members.
|
They enjoyed the rank of a minister of state.
|
5. The commission had a member-secretary. He was usually a
|
senior member of IAS. The state governments were not
|
represented in the commission in any way. Thus, the erstwhile
|
Planning Commission was wholly a Centre-constituted body.
|
Critical Evaluation
|
The erstwhile Planning Commission was originally established as a
|
staff agency with advisory role but in the course of time it had
|
emerged as a powerful and directive authority whereby its
|
Cabinet’, a ‘Parallel Cabinet’, the ‘Fifth Wheel of the Coach’ and so
|
on.
|
The following observations were made on the domineering role
|
played by the erstwhile Planning Commission.
|
1. Administrative Reforms Commission (ARC) of India: The ARC
|
observed: ‘Under the Constitution, the ministers, whether in the
|
Centre or the states, are in effect, the ultimate executive
|
authorities. Unfortunately, the Planning Commission has, in
|
some measures, earned the reputation of being a Parallel
|
Cabinet and sometimes, a Super Cabinet’.12
|
2. K. Santhanam This eminent constitutional expert stated that,
|
‘Planning has superseded the federation and our country is
|
functioning like a unitary system in many respects.13
|
3. P.V. Rajamannar Rajamannar, the Chairman of the Fourth
|
Finance Commission, highlighted the overlapping of functions
|
and responsibilities between the erstwhile Planning
|
Commission and Finance Commission in federal fiscal
|
transfers.14
|
NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL
|
On the 1st of January, 2016, it was reported15 that the Modi
|
government is also going to abolish the National Development
|
Council (NDC) and transfer its powers to the Governing Council of
|
the NITI Aayog. However, till now (October 2019), such a resolution
|
has not been passed.
|
It must also be noted here that the last meeting (57th) of the NDC
|
was held on the 27th of December, 2012 to approve the 12th Plan
|
(2012–2017).
|
The National Development Council (NDC) was established in
|
August 1952 by an executive resolution of the Government of India
|
on the recommendation of the First Five Year Plan (draft outline).
|
Like the erstwhile Planning Commission, it is neither a constitutional
|
body nor a statutory body.16
|
Composition
|
The NDC is composed of the following members.
|
1. The Prime Minister of India (as its chairman/head).
|
2. All Union Cabinet Ministers (since 1967).17
|
3. The Chief Ministers of all the states.
|
4. The Chief Ministers/administrators of all union territories.
|
5. Members of the Planning Commission (now NITI Aayog).
|
The secretary of the Planning Commission (now NITI Aayog) acts
|
as the secretary to the NDC. It (NDC) is also provided with
|
administrative and other assistance for its work by the Planning
|
Commission (now NITI Aayog).
|
Objectives
|
The NDC was established with the following objectives.
|
1. To secure cooperation of states in the execution of the Plan.
|
2. To strengthen and mobilise the efforts and resources of the
|
nation in support of the Plan.
|
3. To promote common economic policies in all vital spheres.
|
4. To ensure balanced and rapid development of all parts of the
|
country.
|
To realise the above objectives, the NDC is assigned with the
|
following functions:
|
1. To prescribe guidelines for preparation of the national Plan.
|
2. To consider the national Plan as prepared by the Planning
|
Commission (now NITI Aayog).
|
3. To make an assessment of the resources required for
|
implementing the Plan and to suggest measures for
|
augmenting them.
|
4. To consider important questions of social and economic policy
|
affecting national development.
|
5. To review the working of the national Plan from time to time.
|
6. To recommend measures for achievement of the aims and
|
targets set out in the national Plan.
|
The Draft Five-Year Plan prepared by the Planning Commission
|
(now NITI Aayog) is first submitted to the Union Cabinet. After its
|
approval, it is placed before the NDC, for its acceptance. Then, the
|
Plan is presented to the Parliament. With its approval, it emerges as
|
the official Plan and published in the official gazette.
|
Therefore, the NDC is the highest body, below the Parliament,
|
responsible for policy matters with regard to planning for social and
|
economic development. However, it is listed as an advisory body to
|
the Planning Commission (now NITI Aayog) and its
|
recommendations are not binding. It makes its recommendations to
|
the Central and state governments and should meet at least twice
|
every year.
|
Critical Evaluation The first and foremost function of NDC is to act
|
as a bridge and link between the Central Government, the State
|
Governments and the Planning Commission (now NITI Aayog)
|
especially in the field of planning, to bring about coordination of
|
policies and programmes of plans. It has been, to a large extent
|
successful in this regard. Besides, it has also served as a forum for
|
Centre-State deliberations on matters of national importance, and
|
also as a device for sharing responsibility between them in the
|
federal political system.
|
However, two diametrically opposite views have been expressed
|
on its working. On one hand, it has been described as a ‘Super
|
Cabinet’ due to its wide and powerful composition, though its
|
recommendations are only advisory and not binding, and can hardly
|
be ignored as they are backed by a national mandate. On the other
|
decisions already taken by the Union government. This is mainly due
|
to the Congress Party rule both at the Centre and states for a long
|
period. However, due to the emergence of regional parties in various
|
states, the NDC is steadily acquiring its federal character and thus
|
providing a greater say to the states in the preparation of national
|
plans.
|
NOTES AND REFERENCES
|
1. Resolution of the Cabinet Secretariat vide No.
|
511/2/1/2015-Cab., dated the 1st of January, 2015,
|
published in the Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part I,
|
Section 1, dated the 7th of January, 2015.
|
2. Government of India document on NITI Aayog entitled as
|
“From Planning to NITI–Transforming India’s Development
|
Agenda”, dated February 8, 2015.
|
3. Ibid.
|
4. “We will use every provision in the Constitution to push
|
reforms”, OPEN Magazine, January 9, 2015.
|
5. See Reference 2 above.
|
6. Press Information Bureau release on NITI Aayog, dated
|
January 1, 2015.
|
7. Ibid.
|
8. See Reference 2 above.
|
8a. Annual Report 2017–2018, NITI Aayog, Government of
|
India, p.14.
|
8b. Ibid.
|
8c. Ibid.
|
8d. Ibid.
|
9. “Opposition attacks government over plan panel new
|
avatar”, The Asian Age, page No.2, dated January 2,
|
2015.
|
10. “Renaming of Plan Panel due to ‘anti-Nehruvianism’:
|
Congress”, The Indian Express, page No.9, dated January
|
2, 2015.
|
11. “Left parties slam Centre for renaming plan panel”, The
|
Statesman, dated January 2, 2015.
|
12. Interim Report on the Machinery for Planning, 1967, Para
|
13. K. Santhanam, Union-State Relations in India, Asia
|
Publishing House, 1960, p. 70.
|
14. Report of the Fourth Finance Commission, New Delhi,
|
Government of India, 1965, pp. 88–90.
|
15. “NDC to be scrapped, NITI Aayog council likely to get its
|
powers”, The Hindu, dated January 1, 2016.
|
16. The Sarkaria Commission on Centre-State Relations
|
(1983–1987) recommended that the NDC should be given
|
a constitutional status under Article 263 of the Constitution
|
and should be renamed as National Economic and
|
Development Council.
|
17. Before 1967, only selected cabinet ministers like Home,
|
55 National Human Rights Commission
|
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE COMMISSION
|
The National Human Rights Commission is a statutory (and not a
|
constitutional) body. It was established in 1993 under a legislation
|
enacted by the Parliament, namely, the Protection of Human
|
Rights Act, 19931 .
|
The commission is the watchdog of human rights in the country,
|
that is, the rights relating to life, liberty, equality and dignity of the
|
individual guaranteed by the Constitution or embodied in the
|
international covenants2 and enforceable by courts in India.
|
The specific objectives of the establishment of the commission
|
are3 :
|
(a) To strengthen the institutional arrangements through which
|
human rights issues could be addressed in their entirety in a
|
more focussed manner;
|
(b) To look into allegations of excesses, independently of the
|
government, in a manner that would underline the
|
government’s commitment to protect human rights; and
|
COMPOSITION OF THE COMMISSION
|
The commission is a multi-member body consisting of a
|
chairperson and five members. The chairperson should be a
|
retired chief justice of India or a judge of the Supreme Court and
|
members should be a serving or retired judge of the Supreme
|
Court, a serving or retired chief justice of a high court and three
|
persons (out of which atleast one should be a woman) having
|
knowledge or practical experience with respect to human rights. In
|
addition to these full-time members, the commission also has
|
seven ex-officio members–the chairpersons of the National
|
Commission for Minorities, the National Commission for SCs, the
|
National Commission for STs, the National Commission for
|
Women, the National Commission for BCs and the National
|
Commission for Protection of Child Rights and the Chief
|
Commissioner for Persons with Disabilities.
|
The chairperson and members are appointed by the president
|
on the recommendations of a six-member committee consisting of
|
the prime minister as its head, the Speaker of the Lok Sabha, the
|
Deputy Chairman of the Rajya Sabha, leaders of the Opposition in
|
both the Houses of Parliament and the Central home minister.
|
Further, a sitting judge of the Supreme Court or a sitting chief
|
justice of a high court can be appointed only after consultation
|
with the chief justice of India.
|
The chairperson and members hold office for a term of three
|
years or until they attain the age of 70 years, whichever is earlier.
|
They are elligible for re-appointment. After their tenure, the
|
chairperson and members are not eligible for further employment
|
under the Central or a state government.
|
The president can remove the chairperson or any member from
|
the office under the following circumstances:
|
(a) If he is adjudged an insolvent; or
|
(b) If he engages, during his term of office, in any paid
|
employment outside the duties of his office; or
|
(d) If he is of unsound mind and stand so declared by a
|
competent court; or
|
(e) If he is convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for an
|
offence.
|
In addition to these, the president can also remove the
|
chairperson or any member on the ground of proved misbehaviour
|
or incapacity. However, in these cases, the president has to refer
|
the matter to the Supreme Court for an inquiry. If the Supreme
|
Court, after the inquiry, upholds the cause of removal and advises
|
so, then the president can remove the chairperson or a member.
|
The salaries, allowances and other conditions of service of the
|
chairperson or a member are determined by the Central
|
government. But, they cannot be varied to his disadvantage after
|
his appointment.
|
All the above provisions are aimed at securing autonomy,
|
FUNCTIONS OF THE COMMISSION
|
The functions of the Commission are:
|
(a) To inquire into any violation of human rights or negligence in
|
the prevention of such violation by a public servant, either
|
suo motu or on a petition presented to it or on an order of a
|
court.
|
(b) To intervene in any proceeding involving allegation of
|
violation of human rights pending before a court.
|
(c) To visit jails and detention places to study the living
|
conditions of inmates and make recommendation thereon.
|
(d) To review the constitutional and other legal safeguards for
|
the protection of human rights and recommend measures for
|
their effective implementation.
|
(e) To review the factors including acts of terrorism that inhibit
|
the enjoyment of human rights and recommend remedial
|
measures.
|
(f) To study treaties and other international instruments on
|
human rights and make recommendations for their effective
|
implementation.
|
(g) To undertake and promote research in the field of human
|
rights.
|
(h) To spread human rights literacy among the people and
|
promote awareness of the safeguards available for the
|
protection of these rights.
|
(i) To encourage the efforts of nongovernmental organisations
|
(NGOs) working in the field of human rights.
|
(j) To undertake such other functions as it may consider
|
WORKING OF THE COMMISSION
|
The commission’s headquarters is at Delhi and it can also
|
establish offices at other places in India. It is vested with the
|
power to regulate its own procedure. It has all the powers of a civil
|
court and its proceedings have a judicial character. It may call for
|
information or report from the Central and state governments or
|
any other authority subordinate thereto.
|
The commission has its own nucleus of investigating staff for
|
investigation into complaints of human rights violations. Besides, it
|
is empowered to utilise the services of any officer or investigation
|
agency of the Central government or any state government for the
|
purpose. It has also established effective cooperation with the
|
NGOs with first-hand information about human rights violations.
|
The commission is not empowered to inquire into any matter
|
after the expiry of one year from the date on which the act
|
constituting violation of human rights is alleged to have been
|
committed. In other words, it can look into a matter within one
|
year of its occurrence4 .
|
The commission may take any of the following steps during or
|
upon the completion of an inquiry:
|
(a) it may recommend to the concerned government or authority
|
to make payment of compensation or damages to the victim;
|
(b) it may recommend to the concerned government or authority
|
the initiation of proceedings for prosecution or any other
|
action against the guilty public servant;
|
(c) it may recommend to the concerned government or authority
|
for the grant of immediate interim relief to the victim;
|
ROLE OF THE COMMISSION
|
From the above, it is clear that the functions of the commission
|
are mainly recommendatory in nature. It has no power to punish
|
the violators of human rights, nor to award any relief including
|
monetary relief to the victim. Notably, its recommendations are not
|
binding on the concerned government or authority. But, it should
|
be informed about the action taken on its recommendations within
|
one month. In this context, a former member of the Commission
|
observed5 : ‘The government cannot wash away the
|
recommendations made by the Commission. The commission’s
|
role may be recommendatory, advisory, yet the Government
|
considers the cases forwarded by it. It is, therefore, improper to
|
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