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70,148 | The logic goes like this: since both sides know, and they know that the other side also knows, the game theory conclusion for Russia to have any chance of something other than defeat is to massively attack with nuclear weapons the moment enough NATO countries demonstrate they are seriously committed to fighting and enough forces are assembled. Since it’s understood that the Russian armed forces can’t possibly win an exclusively conventional battle if NATO commits, as the industrial capacity of North America + Europe is so much greater. Although obviously the losses would be horrendous, with less than a fifth of the population, a 5 or 6 to 1 exchange in favour of Russia would cause vastly asymmetric damage. Thus giving a ‘relative victory’ to Russia, which may be perceived as better than a conventional loss. This then produces the paradox that the more committed the NATO countries are to fighting, the less safe they become. And the more resources spent on their military, the less safe they become, as the conventional gap grows wider. Whereas conversely the stronger and more confident Russia becomes conventionally, the lower the chance of them resorting to rapid nuclear escalation, thus making the world safer. (assuming nuclear forces remain constant on both sides) In economic terms, every extra dollar of wealth generated, and every extra bit of productivity by the NATO countries above and beyond what Russia can produce, actually makes everyone less safe as they decrease the confidence that Russia can resist a conventional loss. It sounds totally bizarre, is there a better interpretation? | Russia might also be convinced that NATO lacks the political coherence and will to fight, and that going nuclear would be a "Pearl Harbor moment" which turns it into a fight-to-the-finish. Russian tourists helping a separatists movement in the near abroad are one thing, nuclear weapons are something else. The term to read about is Hybrid Warfare . My personal estimate is that MAD still stands, even if Russia professes to be worried about growing American missile defenses. And the Russian investment in hypersonics suggests that Russia is serious, not just making propaganda noises. Which brings up the stability-instability paradox : as long as MAD stands, minor conflicts won't go major, so minor conflicts can be risked. Another interesting question is how long a conflict would last. An American think tank believes that Russia could overrun the Baltics in 60 hours. NATO has deployed tripwire forces in the Baltics, they can't stop Russia but they would make it a fight with a dozen NATO member states. Compare the Western reassurances for Ukraine, which are far less robust. Biden all but admitted that they won't send troops, only arms and sanctions. Those sanctions are going to be interesting -- if the US bans Russia from SWIFT , will that stop the Russian sale of gas to Europe? With the Nord Stream pipeline system, they could still deliver gas even if Ukraine stops transit (or of the infrastructure in Ukraine is damaged). Then-President Trump complained that Nord Stream 2 increases the European dependence on Russian gas. It doesn't. It decreases Russian and European dependence on Ukraine for the gas transport. | {
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70,184 | We know that the U.S. has a much stronger military than the Taliban, they could have deployed more troops in Afghanistan to beat Taliban, but they consciously didn't. This makes me wonder, does U.S. troops leaving Afghanistan mean that they lost the war against the Taliban? | Yes. Unquestionably. They left their enemy in control. Word games about military dominance in the field are besides the point in a guerrilla war. That kind of sophistry has been tried on Vietnam retroactively as well (which also "wasn't a war" ). The winner is the one who outlasts the other. Now, that is not the say US forces were ever defeated in the field. They were not. What never happened was enabling a stable Afghan, pro-Western, or at least not anti-Western government that could stand on its own, without needing military assistance from the West. Rather than putting blame on the brave men and women of the US and NATO military, it might well be laid at the feet of Western politicians who never quite grasped what they were dealing with. Along with the difficulty of putting in place a government of Afghans that was trusted by Afghans. "War is a continuation of politics by other means." Clausewitz. Clearly the overall political outcome has not necessarily developed to Western advantage. So, yes, they lost. p.s. In the larger scheme of things, leaving Afghanistan will allow NATO to refocus on its primary concerns, which mostly have to do with managing relations with China. Military gear and doctrine suitable in a counterinsurgency context has very little relevance in a peer-enemy conflict. And that's the bigger concern by far, much as Afghans risk suffering horribly under their new oppressors. p.p.s they could have deployed more troops in Afghanistan to beat Taliban, but they consciously didn't. I don't believe that to be a valid assumption. Extended deployments were running the US military ragged. Only a minority of troops could serve usefully (the Navy for example is of only limited utility there, carriers aside and so are heavy tank divisions). Recruitment and retention were both affected by this never-ending mission. It is one thing to fight for one's countries in a short sharp war like WW2 or Korea, it is another to be separated from your family during years of rotation, with insufficient training in between, in the ass-end of nowhere. Also, missions like these don't happen in a vacuum. To allow for them, other theaters get stripped of materiel and personnel, budgets are slashed elsewhere, overused gear wears down much before its expected lifetime. One of the eye openers I had upon reading The Rise and Fall of an American Army: U.S. Ground Forces in Vietnam, 1963-1973 by Shelby L. Stanton years ago was how barebones critical Cold War areas like the Fulda Gap were being left to feed the Vietnam quagmire (something that must have tickled Soviet generals pink). This is why "we coulda won, but our politicians chose not to" rings hollow, to me. And, to @Joshua's comment, past a certain point, you can't impose peace in guerrilla wars without great human cost - to soldiers, to civilians. Maybe there was a window where the peace could have been won, early on. Later on? Doubtful. | {
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70,196 | I have learned from this video that Switzerland does not have a single head-of-state - it is managed cooperatively by seven ministers with equal powers (the "president" serves only representational and ceremonial roles).
Are there other countries that are managed cooperatively by several "heads" with equal power? | San Marino has two heads of state - Captains Regent - which are elected every six months by the parliament, the Grand and General Council. The positions are mainly symbolic, but include powers such as enacting emergency decrees in consultation with the Congress of State, as well as guaranteeing the Constitution & dissolving Parliament. Both Captains Regent have a reciprocal veto, so any decision must be unanimous. Bosnia & Herzegovina has a three-member presidency which must constitutionally consist of one Bosniac & one Croat, elected from the territory of the federation, and one Serb elected from the Republika Srpska. The presidency must attempt to make decisions by unanimous consent, but may make decisions based on the consent of two members "when all efforts to reach consensus have failed". The powers of the presidency are defined in Article V, section 3 of the constitution , and include conducting the foreign policy of the country, negotiating treaties, proposing annual budgets, and appointing ambassadors. | {
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70,197 | With a population of over 200 million, the Indian state of Uttar Pradesh has a much larger population than most EU countries(eg: Switzerland has approx 9 mil population). Why is it that small places became countries in Europe when they big places become states in India? | History. India did consist of many more-or-less sovereign countries before the British came. When decolonization came around and the colonizers left, it split into India and Pakistan, and then Bangladesh. The Indian independence movement came at a time with the telegraph, printed newspapers, etc. Many of the European states came before that. You might compare Germany and Italy , which also consolidated many small polities at a later time. | {
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70,229 | For example, the wikipedia entry for Nazism/National Socialism states: It incorporates fervent antisemitism, anti-communism, scientific
racism, and the use of eugenics into its creed. Someone who displays racism would be called a racist.
Someone who showcases anti-semitic behaviour is called anti-semitic.
But can someone who is a racist and also an anti-semitic already be labeled a "(neo) nazi"? Or asked differently: what about someone who is not anti-semitic but showcases all of the other traits - would it be fair from a categorization point of view to label that person a "(neo) nazi"? | "X is a Nazi" is not a statement of fact, it's a personal opinion. Political labels are social constructs. Different people will have different standards how they apply a label. Not even the dictionaries can agree on one objective definition for most political labels ( Nazi in dictionary.com | Nazi in Merriam Webster | Nazi in wiktionary ). The only measure of validity of a label is consensus. Some people might be overzealous in applying a certain label: "Forcing me to own a vaccination card is a nazi method, so when you are pro-vaccination you are a nazi!" Others might gatekeep the ideology and apply a very stringent definition before they call someone a nazi: "You are not a real Nazi like us unless you can quote Mein Kampf from memory and have a swastika tattoo on your face!". Who is right and who is wrong? Personally I would say that both of these definitions of nazism would be wrong. But where exactly is the line? This is a matter of debate. And debating is not what Politics Stack Exchange is for. The same applies to any other ideology. Any label - self-applied or applied by others - will always be a matter of opinion. | {
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70,245 | I read this BBC article , but it's not totally clear for me why the recent voting rights laws passed in more than a dozen Republican-controlled state legislatures affect the Democratic base, but not their own constituents. Are Republicans better at standing in lines than Democrats? Are they more foolhardy with respect to Covid? They are, but there would be plenty of time to vote early or even cast mail-in/absentee ballots for Covid-conscious Democrats anyway (several weeks ahead of the voting day seems to be pretty enough still). How do the Republicans' laws make it harder for Democratic voters to vote (city population, especially people of color, young people)? I understand gerrymandering, but it looks like they are trying something else this time (even innocuous, one might say) | There's a bevy of tools being used but they boil down to a few basic categories: Close polling stations in key neighborhoods , forcing longer trips and longer lines at polling stations where voters are predominately People of Color (POC) & low socio-economic-standing (SES). This raises the marginal cost of voting (higher cost of transport) as well as the opportunity cost (hours lost from paying work). This is a powerful disincentive for these people to vote. A second version of this is the "make it illegal to give a bottle of water to people standing in line to vote" which also raises the misery induced by attempting to vote. Voter ID requirements place particularly painful economic burdens on low SES, disabled, and elderly voters. Getting a photo ID requires hours out of a day (lost work/wages), usually a fee you have to pay, and become one more damned thing someone has to keep track of when their plate is already full. Making voter support networks, and other election supports illegal , directly attacks the organic social supports that arise to help these populations overcome the already substantial obstacles to voting. Ballot collection is particularly useful to people who are mobility-impaired as it saves them having to physically navigate a polling station. Threatening election officials with felony charges has a chilling effect on them calling out abuses by raising the potential risks they face just from doing their jobs. Texas made it a felony to send a voter a ballot to which they are legally entitled, unless they first ask for it. This prevents people who don't know their rights as voters from being helped around that obstacle. And of course, outright disenfranchising populations that are already disproportionately POC & Low SES , such as ex-convicts who have finished their sentences is a nice, direct route to attack likely-Democratic voters. A more extensive list can be found here . | {
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70,252 | As mentioned here and here a commonly listed argument regarding voter ID's is the decreased ownership and/or difficulty in obtaining among the poor, people of color, and elderly. A similar question has gone without an accepted answer, with the more complete suggested answer downvoted, but doesn't answer my question. This claim is made repeatedly that for some reason poor, people of color, and elderly have difficulty in obtaining ID to vote. Where is there source material for this?
What evidence is there that it has any significant impact outside of the homeless community?
Are there any hard facts, statistics, studies, or other material that support this claim? Everything I've been able to find is that the only group of people that has problems with obtaining ID are the homeless. People of color, in general, seem to be able to ID themselves without much trouble. Please note, I am NOT asking about difficulty in voting. This question is specific towards obtaining sufficient ID for eligible voters. Anecdotally, I worked with programs involving unemployment, child support, TANF, SNAP, Medicaid, Medicare and a few others. At no point in 5 years working with those programs did I hear of ID being an issue. I know anecdotes are no substitute for data, but I haven't ever seen this claim supported with any real data.
I am not interested in contrived arguments regarding hypothetical situations. | Do poor people, people of color, and elderly have difficulty in obtaining ID? Yes. For example, here are some facts (citations to supporting authorities are found at this link ) (the omission of paragraphs from the source related to subjects not pertinent to the question are not expressly noted in the quoted material below). Anecdotally, I worked with programs involving unemployment, child
support, TANF, SNAP, Medicaid, Medicare and a few others. At no point
in 5 years working with those programs did I hear of ID being an
issue. I know anecdotes are no substitute for data, but I haven't ever
seen this claim supported with any real data. The real data quite overwhelmingly establishes that your anecdotal impressions are inaccurate. 11% of U.S. citizens – or more than 21 million Americans – do not have government-issued photo identification. Note that the source for this statistics clarifies that this is 11% of voting-age American citizens. A demographic breakdown of adult U.S. citizens with and without photo IDs can be found here . It shows that non-whites are much more likely to not have photo ID than whites (even for high income non-whites and non-whites who are not young adults), that not having a photo ID is strongly correlated with having a lower income (especially among whites), that young adults are particularly likely to not have photo ID (especially among whites). Another source has a convenient chart breaking down some key data points: Even if ID is offered for free, voters must incur numerous costs (such as paying for birth certificates) to apply for a
government-issued ID. Underlying documents required to obtain ID cost
money, a significant expense for lower-income Americans. The combined
cost of document fees, travel expenses and waiting time are estimated
to range from $75 to $175. The economic burden and delay make it difficult for poor people to obtain ID, and this issue empirically, is much bigger than most middle class people intuitively expect as illustrated by the large percentage of adult U.S. citizens who don't have IDs. Young married women whose names have changed are particularly heavily impacted by these costs, and even if one can obtain a suitable ID eventually, it may be challenging to do so in time to vote in the next election (particularly, for example, if you were born and/or married outside the state where you live). The travel required is often a major burden on people with disabilities, the elderly, or those in rural areas without access to a
car or public transportation. In Texas, some people in rural areas
must travel approximately 170 miles to reach the nearest ID office. These factors make it more difficult for elderly and disabled people to obtain IDs. For example, I have a wheelchair dependent client in a major urban area for whom I make house calls as a lawyer, because it takes him four hours roundtrip by bus, and about an hour and a half (at a much higher cost than an Uber or taxi trip) by a specialty wheel chair transportation vehicle that is often not on time for pickups, to travel from his suburban home to my central city office which is near government offices. Nationally, up to 25% of African-American citizens of voting age lack government-issued photo ID, compared to only 8% of whites. The difficulty in obtaining government-photo IDs for African-Americans is strongly suggested by this difference in percentages. Most of the difference is mediated by differences in affluence, including a much higher rate of not owning a motor vehicle, and thus not getting a driver's license (the most common form of photo ID). As evidence from a 2014 court case showed: In May 2014 federal Judge Lynn Adelman found Wisconsin's state photo
ID law unconstitutional given its adverse impact on many Wisconsin
citizens. In his 90-page decision . . . [he notes] that only 47% of
black adults and 43% of Hispanic adults compared to 73% of white
adults in Milwaukee County hold valid driver's licenses as do 85% of
white adults in the rest of Wisconsin compared to 53% of black adults
and 52% of Hispanic adults. Some of this is due to the common discriminatory practice of not locating government offices that provide these services in or near neighborhoods where most African-Americans level, or of understaffing those offices so that delays are longer. An NPR story explores some of the reasons for the differences: I think the first thing to look at is to look at who actually drives.
The most common form of government-issued ID are driver's licenses and
so the people who are most unlikely to drive, as it is, is elderly,
the poor, people who live in big cities, like African-Americans,
especially young people, too, especially if they attend college. They
may not have need for a car at the moment. And then people who are in rural areas. The other challenge for them
is they are not near the Department of Motor Vehicles offices, etc.,
etc. where you would get these IDs. . . . if you're someone trying to get a voter ID, you need that type of
documentation. In order to get an ID, you often need an ID, so it
becomes a Catch 22. MARTIN: And what about - are the states making any provision to help
voters like this who have not previously had IDs... DADE: Yeah. MARTIN: ...to get them? Or are interest groups doing that? DADE: Well, they are. The interest groups are trying to fill in the
void of information, where to get the IDs, what kind of documents you
need to get them when you show up so you're not caught unawares. As far as the states go, they are issuing non-driver voter IDs. Many
of them are for free, but the problem is, when you go to Department of
Motor Vehicle offices, the waits are very long, they're time
consuming. The governor of Tennessee, who's a Republican, by the way -
he has expressed concern about the average wait times there, which
extend well beyond an hour. And if you're talking about thousands of
elderly, in particular, they can't wait that long. A study of Texas voters who tried to vote without photo IDs found some of the following issues came up: Texans offered various reasons why they didn’t have a qualifying ID
for the 2016 general election. Nearly 30 percent said their IDs had
been lost or stolen. About 11.5 percent cited work obligations while
another 4 percent said family obligations prevented them from getting
one. Nearly 36 percent of individuals without IDs checked the “other” box,
many of whom indicated they had moved so their current address didn’t
match what was listed on their IDs. Of those who selected the “other” option, 1.4 percent — 82 people —
cited cost as the reason they didn’t have the appropriate ID. This isn't a representative sample and doesn't include the lion's share of voters without photo IDs who don't try to vote, but it is nonetheless hard data that provides some insight. A meta-analysis of 31 other studies on the topic found some key factors. The main reason people reported for not having identification was that it had been either lost or stolen. Other factors included lack of money for fees, lack of knowledge of application process, lack of competency with bureaucratic forms, the requirement of an address, and the requirements of an existing piece of identification in order to apply for additional identification. For people who are economically marginalized even seemingly minor fees constitute a financial hardship that makes the acquisition of PID prohibitive, and sometimes they are funneled though like of sophistication to commercial fee charging services that facilitate services that the government doesn't charge for or charges much less than the service does for. [F]ees are charged for replacement birth certificates, and if people
go through “third party” providers rather than state agencies to
obtain this form of ID, additional service fees are incurred. This
means that people who have little or no money and who are likely to
lose or have their PID stolen . . . are further burdened with higher
replacement fees. Ultimately, people regularly prioritize the
immediate needs of food, transportation, or rent rather than the costs
of replacing a lost or stolen document. Furthermore, additional costs
are required if individuals must take public transportation or live in
rural or remote locations and have to travel to service centers. Additional Burdens For Proof of Citizenship Also, notably, proof of citizenship is much more challenging to marshal (usually requiring a birth certificate that many people are not currently in possession of, marriage certificates to document change of name, naturalization certificates, and/or passports), then the proof of identity needed for a photo-ID without citizenship verification such as driver's licenses or state IDs that do not require proof of citizenship: A federal district court that heard a challenge to the Kansas law
noted that “the sheer number” of people blocked “evidences the
difficulty of complying with the law as it is currently enforced.” The
court found that more than 18,000 people who tried to register at the
state’s motor vehicle offices were prevented from registering between
2013 and 2016 “as a direct result” of the state’s documentary proof of
citizenship requirement. This is because getting a birth certificate and linking it to your identity, or having a passport, can be cumbersome taking time, money and even legal assistance. A story from the Washington Post puts flesh on the bones of the raw statistics and illustrates in personal and compelling examples, how these factors play out in the lives of individual people without photo IDs. One such story is this one from Texas: Many of the residents struggling to obtain a valid photo ID are
elderly and poor and were born in homes rather than hospitals. As a
result, birth certificates were often lost or names were misspelled in
official city records. Hargie Randall, 72, was born in his family’s home in Huntsville, Tex.,
and has lived in the state his entire life. Randall, now living in
Houston’s low-income Fifth Ward neighborhood, has several health
problems and such poor eyesight that he is legally blind. He can’t
drive and has to ask others for rides. After Texas implemented its new law, Randall went to the Department of
Public Safety (the Texas agency that handles driver’s licenses and
identification cards) three times to try to get a photo ID to vote.
Each time Randall was told he needed different items. First, he was
told he needed three forms of identification. He came back and brought
his Medicaid card, bills and a current voter registration card from
voting in past elections. “I thought that because I was on record for voting, I could vote
again,” Randall said. But he was told he still needed more documentation, such as a
certified copy of his birth certificate. Records of births before 1950, such as Randall’s, are not on a central
computer and are located only in the county clerk’s office where the
person was born. For Randall, that meant an hour-long drive to Huntsville, where his
lawyers found a copy of his birth certificate. But that wasn’t enough. With his birth certificate in hand, Randall
went to the DPS office in Houston with all the necessary documents.
But, DPS officials still would not issue him a photo ID because of a
clerical mistake on his birth certificate. One letter was off in his
last name — “Randell” instead of “Randall” — so his last name was
spelled slightly different than on all his other documents. Kamin, the lawyer, asked the DPS official if they could pull up
Randall’s prior driver’s-license information, as he once had a
state-issued ID. The official told her that the state doesn’t keep
records of prior identification after five years, and there was
nothing they could do to pull up that information. Kamin was finally able to prove to a DPS supervisor that there was a
clerical error and was able to verify Randall’s identity by showing
other documents. Is Lack Of A Photo ID Indicative Of Being Ineligible To Vote? It also bears noting, while slightly off the narrow scope of the question, that the likelihood that an African-American who speaks English with an American accent (a group that makes up the vast majority, probably 98% or more of African-Americans who do not have IDs in all but a handful of counties in the United States) not being a U.S. citizen is vanishingly small. Put another way, virtually all of the 25% of African-Americans adults without IDs in the United States are U.S. citizens who are eligible to vote (absent felony disqualification which is present mostly in states that also impose other barriers to voting like voter ID laws and also have a long history of racial discrimination). The share of African, Afro-Caribbean, and black Latin American legal immigration to the U.S. is modest , many of those immigrants are naturalized citizens, and those immigrants overwhelmingly have passports. About 6-7% of undocumented immigrants in the United States are black (see here and here ) and those undocumented immigrants are overwhelming recent immigrants. Voters not infrequently have some form of ID but not one of the forms of ID required by Voter ID laws. The types of IDs allowed are tailored to political demographics: States exclude forms of ID in a discriminatory manner. Texas allows concealed weapons permits for voting, but does not accept student ID
cards. Until its voter ID law was struck down, North Carolina
prohibited public assistance IDs and state employee ID cards, which
are disproportionately held by Black voters. And until recently,
Wisconsin permitted active duty military ID cards, but prohibited
Veterans Affairs ID cards for voting. One particularly notorious case involves South Dakota's unwillingness to accept Indian tribe IDs , an especially big factor for people who live on Indian reservations that are remote from non-tribal government offices, who are often poor, and are a group of people that almost by definition is made up 100% of U.S. citizens. Selected Sources The sources for the fact cited above include the Brennan Center Brennan Center for Justice, Citizens without Proof: A Survey of Americans’ Possession of Documentary Proof of Citizenship and Photo Identification (New York: Brennan Center for Justice, 2006), a report from the federal government's General Accountability Office (GAO), a published academic journal article with three University of California at San Diego professors as authors, and a Harvard law professor's published academic article, Richard Sobel, The High Cost of ‘Free’ Photo Voter Identification Cards (Cambridge: Charles Hamilton Houston Institute for Race and Justice at Harvard Law School, 2014). | {
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70,279 | Upon reading that Quebec may impose a health tax on unvaccinated Canadians , I wondered the following: Prior to COVID-19, had any country fiscally targeted unvaccinated individuals? | Yes, in Jacobson v. Massachusetts (1905) the United States Supreme Court upheld the right of the state to fiscally target unvaccinated individuals. Massachusetts had enacted the following law in relation to the smallpox vaccine: The board of health of a city or town if, in its opinion, it is
necessary for the public health or safety shall require and enforce
the vaccination and revaccination of all the inhabitants thereof and
shall provide them with the means of free vaccination. Whoever, being
over twenty-one years of age and not under guardianship, refuses or
neglects to comply with such requirement shall forfeit five dollars . More recently, in April 2019, the New York City Commissioner of Health issued an emergency order compelling people living within certain zip codes to get the MMR vaccine in response to an outbreak of measles. Non-compliance with this order would be a breach of §3.05 of the New York City Health Code , which is punishable with a minimum fine of $1,000 under §3.11(b). ABC News reported that three people were issued with civil summons for contravening the order. While not really exactly what your question asks for, I think it's also worth mentioning that there are plenty of examples of parents having tax benefits withheld or being fined if they refuse to get their children vaccinated, e.g. Australia's No Jab, No Pay law, a similar policy in Israel , and even - returning to smallpox - the UK's Vaccination Extension Act 1853 which imposed an initial fine of £1 up to a maximum of £5 on parents who refused to get their children the vaccine. | {
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70,315 | USA, for example, having a total foreign debt of over 23 trillion dollars (according to the statistics provided in 2019), is still on the frontline of those countries which are considered to be successful first world states, making remarkable achievements and development day in and day out, in the field of technology, businesses, public services, trade, etc. Alongside USA, there are other powerful countries with booming economy such as UK, Russia, France, Germany, China etc, which are essentially perceived as kinda the rulers of the new world. These countries are also drowned in significant and serious international debt, on a scale of trillions of dollars. On the other hand, South American countries like Argentina and Chile, African countries like Egypt and Uganda, and Asian countries like Pakistan and Thailand, don't have foreign debts anywhere near the levels of the countries mentioned in my previous paragraph. But still, these countries are considered as third world countries and basically, poorer states. So my question basically becomes what is the relation and connection between a state being a first world or a third world, with the amount of foreign debt they are immersed in? Doesn't the first world countries (which essentially proclaims to be the rulers of the new world) which are under trillions of dollars of foreign debt feel pressurized that they have to return the loan they have taken? How can they still thrive and prosper after being such huge debtors? List of countries by external debt | Because a debt to GDP ratio is usually the wrong metric. The terms "first world" and "third world" are imprecise and not unproblematic for other reason, but they typically correspond to "wealthy" and "not wealthy." As such, the question seems to be asking why many countries are considered wealthy despite their high debt. For instance, consider the United States of America. It is widely considered to have a high debt to GDP ratio of over 100%—not the highest in the world, but it is quite high. If absolute foreign debt or a debt-to-GDP ratio captured what we meant by a wealthy country, the USA would be considered quite poor. However, consider a hypothetical wealthy CEO who has billions of dollars. Let's say that in their current job, they "only" make as much money as Lisa Su, a trifling 50 or 60 million dollars per year, but they own an enormous mansion that they have taken out a mortgage on, so they owe the bank 70 million. Are they poorer than I (not a billionaire) am, if I do not have any debt at the moment? Why am I not living a mansion, then? No, of course they are not. We have made the mistake of considering the ratio of their debt to their income without considering their tremendous wealth . We have also forgotten that what matters for their ability to use their wealth is the absolute difference between their wealth and mine, not so much the ratio of their debt relative to their wealth. Let's consider the total debt to total household wealth ratio of the United States instead. According to this article, it is about 12% . Much of that is internal (owed by Americans to Americans) but even if it were all external, the difference between debt and wealth would still be around USD 124 trillion. That means that as a country, the US has about USD 123 trillion more than Kuwait, for instance , even though Kuwait has quite a low debt to GDP ratio. For another definition of wealth vs debt (the average economic standard of living as measured by debt minus wealth per capita) we see that the average American has USD 376,000 or so after subtracting debts, whereas the average Kuwaiti has USD 119,000 at most. Obviously, this has its own problems: it does not take into account income inequality or purchasing power parity. However, it still conveys the general idea: one country can have both a higher absolute debt and a higher relative debt than another, and its residents can (both individually and collectively) have much more money to spend after subtracting their debts . Going back to the example of the CEO, why do they have so much more debt than I do, both in absolute and relative terms? It is because their enormous wealth and substantial income make banks view them as more trustworthy. If I tried to take out such a large loan, the bank would laugh me out of their exclusive boardroom (which I actually would not be invited to in the first place). They would know that I could never pay off such a debt over my entire lifetime. However, they know that the CEO will be able to do so. As such, wealthier people (if they want to expand their ability to consume still more) get more debt in absolute and sometimes relative terms because they can . The same applies to countries, to an extent, with a major exception: a low-income person might take on student loans or housing mortgages that exceed their real or expected wealth (in other words, low in absolute terms but high in relative terms), which the companies will give them because they anticipate that the interest payments will make it worthwhile. A country, however, has much more power to default, and it can be difficult for politicians to convince their constituents to take on large relative debts if they know that they will not be able to pay them off under any circumstances. This means that low-wealth countries rarely take on more relative debt than the average wealthy country. | {
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70,354 | Since the 1970 Census the US Census has tracked Hispanic population under a separate question titled "Hispanic origin", saying "Hispanics may be of any race". This doesn't make much sense to me given that polls say that the majority say it is also a "race" , and this is reflected in many people declaring themselves "other race". I understand why the census says that Hispanic isn't a race -- Hispanic people have different appearances and genetic origin but usually claim some common language and culture. If they consider "Asian" a race which has a similar but even broader geographic meaning to it, then why not? | The "Hispanic/non-Hispanic" is orthogonal to the White-Black-Asian-Native Amerian racial categorisation that the US census uses. A Hispanic person is a person of Cuban, Mexican, Puerto Rican, South or Central American, or other Spanish/Portuguese culture (except perhaps Spain and Portugal). You only have to look at these regions to see that there are people who can and do identify as Black, white, Asian, and Native American who are "Hispanic". So Alberto Fujimori, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, Evo Morales, Joaquim Barbosa would all be "Hispanic" in the US census categorisation. By contrast, "Asian" doesn't mean "from Asia" in the census definition. So Ebrahim Raisi would be considered "White", as would Rudyard Kipling, though both are/were native Asians, in the literal meaning of "native" and "Asia". Similarly "White" and "Black" don't actually refer to colours. Barack Obama could claim to be both "White" and "Black", even though he was born in Hawaii, and so is a native Pacific islander, in the literal sense of the words "native" "Pacific" and "islander". | {
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70,381 | Does NATO have any obligation to defend Ukraine against Russia? Why is it not sending NATO troops on the Ukraine border to defend against Russia? I thought the point of NATO is to defend against tyrannical leaders in Europe attacking other European sovereign states. Germany did this in the 1930s attacking smaller countries such as Poland first. What is the purpose of the organization at this time? | No. Obligations are listed under Article 5 of NATO. Article 5 The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force , to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. Ukraine is not currently a member, as the UK defense minister has pointed out: In an interview with the Spectator, Mr Wallace said Ukraine was "not a member of Nato, so it is highly unlikely that anyone is going to send troops into Ukraine to challenge Russia". NATO is a mutual defense pact between its members , who have perhaps not coincidentally, demurred in granting Ukraine NATO membership to date. The idea of eventual Ukrainian membership has been floating around since 2008, pushed by then POTUS Bush . Perhaps related to Russia's invasion of Georgia in August 2008 . Now, going on, past direct obligations to wider considerations about ethics, maintaining peace and being firm to deter future wars, there could be different viewpoints depending on your opinions : Possible effects of making Ukraine a formal NATO member: (this is addressing to defend against tyrannical leaders ) Actual Ukrainian membership of NATO might cause it to be a flashpoint triggering a direct confrontation, of the type that the USSR and NATO avoided from 1960 to 1990. See also the fully-aligned defense blocs of 1914 and how a minor terrorist incident launched WW1. Actual Ukrainian membership of NATO may fully dissuade Russia from meddling in its affairs. This would avoid the type of phenomena where France and the UK threw Czechoslovakia under the bus in 1938 to appease Hitler, thus enabling WW2 in 1939. The possibility of Ukraine's membership is what's driving up tension in that area, as Russia has legitimate security concerns in increasingly being bordered by NATO countries. That's certainly Russia's official position. With regard to how justified Russia is in being concerned, one could always look at the USA's "tolerance" of Cuba during the Cold War (and beyond). Possible NATO responses to an invasion: Ukraine could become too unpleasant a bone to swallow for Russia if NATO provided sufficient arms to Ukraine to sustain a prolonged guerrilla war, after an initial overrun. That does not require membership. See also: Afghanistan 1980-1989, Afghanistan 2001-2021. Ukraine may not receive military assistance directly, but the West could fully embargo Russian gas, at considerable inconvenience to itself, but even greater damage to Russia. That also does not require membership, nor does it require an UN resolution (which Russia could veto). It could also restrict sales of high tech goods to Russia, like microchips. And banking systems, like SWIFT, could be denied to Russia. Gas aside, Russia is a relatively negligible vendor and customer to the West, but the reverse is not true. The West could decide to cut Ukraine loose and risk neither military confrontation nor economic damage from embargoes. Against that are NATO members who intensely fear and dislike Russia, such as the Baltic countries and Poland. And such a lack of resolve would not go unnoticed by China. Threats that Western troops would be directly engaged, as per this question. This doesn't strike me as very credible or dissuasive: no European leader would be the first to send their boys's boots on the ground to defend Ukraine. I am sure I missed some. But a firm enough signal to Russia that actual attacks would be heavily penalized, somehow , may very well suffice to deter Putin from a real invasion of Ukrainian-held territory (that's my guess at this point). Complicating this is no one really knowing what Putin wants or what he would need to call off his threats: he has a domestic political audience to play tough guy to and it may very well be that a successful and prosperous neighboring Ukraine, run on Western principles, would be an unacceptable indictment of his domestic failures, whether or not Ukraine was threatening Russia militarily (note: this last is predicated on a explicitly neutral military role for Ukraine, like Finland in the 70-90s, not on a partial NATO association). Last his demands on withdrawal of NATO presence in existing NATO members are so off-the-top maximalist that it is hard to see them as genuine negotiation points: they don't allow for any partial concessions that would allow both parties to meet halfway. | {
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70,416 | According to CoinDesk , the vice-chair of the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) suggested that cryptocurrency mining based on proof-of-work should be banned: Proof-of-work crypto mining should be banned in the European Union (EU), according to the vice chair of the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA). The main reason for doing so is the relatively high energy consumption this protocol involves while the less energy-intensive proof-of-stake could be used instead. I am wondering why banning is suggested instead of heavily taxation (e.g. have a very high tax for energy consumption above a certain threshold except for designated industries). | Taxation is already complicated enough, and complicated legal codes create unintentional consequences and loopholes. "Have a very high tax for energy consumption above a certain threshold except for designated industries" raises the question of what industries are those "designated industries". When there is a new kind of industry which is actually really beneficial for the political goals of the EU but isn't on the exemption list yet, then it might not be economically feasible until the EU updates that list. This could become a blocker for technological innovation. And how exactly do you define those industries? A definition which is too broad might enable cryptocurrency miners to find loopholes which allow them to masquerade as another industry. "We use the heat from our 100 server racks to pre-warm this tiny smelting furnace, so we are actually a steel mill which just does some cryptocurrency mining on the side". And then there is the question if taxation really stops cryptocurrency mining. One theory about crypto-economics is that cryptocurrency is valuable because it is expensive to mine. When someone wants cryptocurrency, then they can choose between buying it or mining it themselves. A rational person will do whatever is less expensive. But when everyone decides to buy, then demand increases, which means the price increases. Until it reaches the mining price, and mining becomes again the preferred form of acquiring cryptocurrency. Which means that the prices for cryptocurrency will regress to the cost it takes to mine new cryptocurrency. So making mining more expensive means that the prices for cryptocurrency will just increase accordingly making mining profitable again. | {
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70,420 | I have seen many claims that Dubai has no income tax. Yet, since the Government of Dubai clearly does spend lots of money, how does money flow to the Government of Dubai? | The other answers discuss taxation in the UAE but omit the elephant in the room. The UAE is a collection of monarchies (that's what "United Arab Emirates" literally means). The monarchs collectively own the natural resources of the UAE, including its mineral rights and most of its land, personally (and the proceeds of past oil and gas wealth invested in sovereign wealth funds owned by them ), as their own property, and use this personal wealth to fund the government. Most of this wealth comes from oil and gas mineral rights that the monarchs own, and that is not taxed by anyone else, and the proceeds of that wealth that they have invested, in a geographically tiny federation with a quite small population relative to the magnitude of this wealth. In addition to "normal" investments, Dubai has excess oil reserves, estimated to be $649 billion (U.S.), that its sovereign wealth fund manages (in a country with a population as of 2020 of 3.38 million of whom 71% are expatriate workers whom sovereign wealth is not intended to benefit, leaving about 980,000 citizens). Its oil reserves are worth about $662,000 (U.S.) per citizen, and that doesn't include very substantial other investments that the monarch, though the sovereign wealth fund, manages. Taxes are a tiny, second order consideration by comparison. Like most monarchies without democratic government in a constitutional monarchy regime, the norm is no taxation with no representation (subject to minor exceptions), because the ruling monarchies don't need taxes since they already own the vast majority of the nation's wealth. | {
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70,441 | https://finance.yahoo.com/news/africa-decision-not-boycott-beijing-093000132.html African countries have ignored Washington's call for a diplomatic
boycott of the Beijing Winter Olympics, instead expressing support for
China's hosting of the Games and warning that the event should not be
a platform for politics. What's the purpose of sending diplomats to the Olympic games? I am trying to understand if it's simply a gesture of good will, so that the countries hosting the games also respond in kindness or if there's some other purpose of doing this that I am not aware of. | The Olympics is and always has been — even back to the ancient Greeks — a political event, meant to pit the prowess of one nation against another in something other than warfare. Hosting the Olympics is a serious matter: it positions the hosting regime as a central player in international politics, and gives them a chance to show off their artistic, cultural, and economic wealth above and beyond their successes in the contests. staging a diplomatic boycott is an effective snub to the hosting nation, suggesting that (for one reason or another) the hosting nation is not qualified to stand among the world's leading nations. Honestly, it's a bit like hosting a large, fancy, old-fashioned dinner party. Hosts invite the 'very best' guests, because guests with high social standing confer high social standing on the host. If a guest with high social standing rejects the invitation, it can humiliate the host, because it can appear that the host has been dismissed as inferior. It's all a bit juvenile — any eighth-grader would understand the game intuitively — but it is effective nonetheless. | {
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70,475 | The media is reporting that Justice Stephen Breyer plans to retire at the end of this year's court term. Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer issued the following statement regarding the confirmation process . President Biden’s Supreme Court nominee will receive a prompt hearing in the Senate Judiciary Committee and be considered and confirmed by the full United States Senate with all deliberate speed. So, since Justice Breyer has not officially retired from the court, can the Senate confirm a President's nominee at this point of time? Can the Senate confirm any federal judges or Cabinet positions when the incumbent has not vacated the position, for that matter? If so, what's stopping the Senate from erroneously confirming judiciary nominees for seats that aren't vacant? | Yes - in 1994 the 103rd Congress voted to confirm President Bill Clinton's nomination of Stephen G. Breyer to replace Harry A. Blackmun. The nomination was received in the Senate on May 17th, and the 87-9 confirmation vote was held on July 29th. However, Blackmun didn't leave the bench until August 3rd. In answer to your questions regarding whether the Senate can confirm other federal judges/Cabinet positions without a vacancy, it's perhaps helpful to examine the text of the nomination: Stephen G. Breyer, of Massachusetts, to be an Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court of the United States, vice Harry A. Blackmun. The form of the confirmation is such that it will only come into force once the specified vacancy exists - this is also the case for other federal judges & other positions requiring Senate confirmations. As to what is stopping the Senate from erroneously confirming judiciary nominees for seats that aren't vacant - the final steps in the process are set out in the CRS report Supreme Court Appointment Process: Senate Debate and Confirmation Vote : If the Senate votes to confirm the nomination, the Secretary of the
Senate then attests to a resolution of confirmation and transmits it
to the White House. In turn, the President signs a document, called
a commission, officially appointing the individual to the Court. Next,
the signed commission “is returned to the Justice Department for
engraving the date of appointment (determined by the actual day the
president signs the commission) and for the signature of the attorney
general and the placing of the Justice Department seal.” The
department then arranges for expedited delivery of the commission
document to the new appointee. Once the President has signed the
commission, the incoming Justice may be sworn into office. This commission may not be signed and the individual appointed to the Court before the vacancy exists, avoiding the possibility of replacement nominees being lined up for non-existent vacancies such that they cannot be withdrawn by an incoming President; the next President would simply refuse to sign the commission. | {
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70,490 | With speculation of Kamala Harris getting pushed into the Supreme Court , I'm wondering when if ever something like this has happened before. Has anyone ever been appointed to the Supreme Court without prior experience as a judge? And if so, when was the last time this has happened? | Quite a lot of them have been, in fact . There have been 115 Justices in the court's entire history, and the linked page indicates that 41 of them, more than a third of all Justices in the court's history, had no prior judicial experience before their appointment. The most recent, as indicated in another answer, was Elena Kagan in 2010. We even have a Q&A about her confirmation sans judicial experience . Indeed, of the 17 different Chief Justices, nine of them, more than half, had no prior judicial experience before appointment to the court ! Three of those were already an Associate Justice when they were nominated to be Chief Justice, at least. See the link for full details, but here's a few of the more notable Chief Justices that had no prior experience. John Marshall (1801-1835, the longest serving Chief Justice ever, and thought to be one of the most influential Justices ever; decided the case Marbury vs. Madison , which entrenched judicial review and let courts decide constitutionality of laws) Salmon Chase (1864-1873; was the Chief Justice presiding over the first Presidential Impeachment trial) Earl Warren (1953-1969; his court and the subsequent Burger court are considered some of the most liberal in history; also the last such ones) William Rehnquist (1986-2005; the Chief Justice immediately preceding the current Chief Justice Roberts ) | {
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70,555 | I'm a big proponent of Umberto Eco's definition of Fascism that he gives in his essay Ur-Fascism ; I find it really helps break down the very nebulous and poorly defined - but unmistakeable - concept of "fascistness". Most of the points are pretty self-explanatory and self-evident (cult of tradition, machismo, action for action's sake etc). However, I'm stuck on his final feature of fascism: Ur-Fascism speaks Newspeak. Newspeak was invented by Orwell, in 1984, as the official language of Ingsoc, English Socialism. But elements of Ur-Fascism are common to different forms of dictatorship. All the Nazi or Fascist schoolbooks made use of an impoverished vocabulary, and an elementary syntax, in order to limit the instruments for complex and critical reasoning. But we must be ready to identify other kinds of Newspeak, even if they take the apparently innocent form of a popular talk show. This is very unclear to me - what could this refer to? I find it very difficult to link it to any fascist movements, old and new - language reform isn't exactly top of the fascist agenda. And the last sentence seems to imply an almost Mcluhan-ist ("the medium is the message") interpretation, which doesn't relate to the rest of the point. To take it literally, reducing the ability of oppressed groups to express and understand their oppression by physically reducing their vocabulary would be a very effective tactic, but - he says it himself - that's only plausible in fiction like 1984. Even the strictest, most prescriptivist language academy doesn't have that much control. Finally, there's my final idea that it's talking about new vocabulary - i.e "Fuhrer", "Duce", "Lebensraum", "Fuhrerprinzip" - but that's common to all new movements, requiring new language to communicate new concepts. Does anyone have any examples or alternative interpretations? | Chomsky tackled one angle on this by adumbrating what one might call corporate fascism (fascism was after all historically supported by big business against working class movements) but which he called 'The Manufacture of Consent' (this is also the title of the book where he and a coauthor presented this theory). The main idea here is simply gatekeepers to the mass-media purposefully allow only a very restricted and "impoverished" debate on the key issues of today. Thus the population at large hardly is able to debate these key issues or to think them through. That is their "instruments for complex and critical thinking" is severely limited. Hannah Arendt observed in her book, The Human Condition that this was part of a movement from a public world to a mass world. A mass world where mass media preys on the population. More recently, algorithms have been charged with causing political polarisation, echo-chambers and an attention deficit. Moreover, Hannah Arendt in her book, The Origins of Totalitarianism stated that one of the key techniques that fascism operated with is to loosen the relation that language has to reality and to truth and even to invert or subvert it. This is why in 1984, Big Brother demands that citizen Winston Smith hold up all four fingers on one hand and count five. The idea here is to crush the spirit by crushing any sense that language has a relation to truth: O'Brien held up his left hand, its back towards Winston, with the thumb hidden and the four fingers extended. "How many fingers am I holding up Winston?" "Four" "And if the Party says it is not four but five -then how many?" "four" The word ended in a gasp of pain. The needle of the dial had shot up to fifty-five. The sweat had sprung up all over Winston's body. The air tore into his lungs and issued again in deep groans which even by clenching his teeth he could not stop. O'Brien watched him, the four fingers still extended. He drew back the lever. We see this today with a tidal wave of misinformation and fake news. Take for instance climate change denialism (recently the CEO's of major fossil fuel companies in the US have been subpoened to appear before congress to answer questions about their role in funding climate denialism and misinformation) and the anti-vaxxer movement. Thinking is reduced to slogans and sloganeering. This was also anticipated by Orwell: Big Brother's voice: [harsh and grating...] Comrades repeat after me ... War is Peace! ... Freedom is Slavery! ... Ignorance is Strength ... And today, in the most powerful nation the world had yet seen: The Election was a fraud! Lock her up! Alternative Facts! There is no climate change! That's fake news! And fake science! And the sneering term "woke" as though being awake to what's going on is a thought crime. Whereas earlier despicable regimes disciplined and punished bodies, fascism policed thought itself - hence the thought police (and this is one reason why I was uneasily uncomfortable when I came across the phrase 'thought leaders' - in a corporate context of course). Hannah Arendt goes on to say: ... Intellectual, spiritual and artistic initiative is as dangerous to totalitarianism as the gangster initiative of the mob, and both are more dangerous than mere political opposition. The consistent persecution of every higher form of intellectual activity by new mass leaders springs from more than their natural resentment against everything that they cannot understand. Total domination does not allow for any free initiative in any field of life, for any activity that is not entirely predictable. Totalitarianism in power invariably replaced every first-rate talents, regardless of their sympathies, with those crackpots and fools whose lack of intelligence and creativity is still the best guarantee of their loyalty ... She also writes about how alienation, loneliness and social isolation is a precursor to totalitarianism as their lack of reality, solidarity, trust and meaningful connection makes them easy prey to the propaganda machine of totalitarian movements: The revolt of the masses against "realism," common sense, and "the plausibilities of the world" (Burke) was the result of their atomization,
of their loss of social status along with which they lost the whole sector of communal relationships in whose framework common sense makes sense. In
their situation of spiritual and social homelessness, a measured insight into the interdependence of the arbitrary and the planned, the accidental and the necessary, could no longer operate. Totalitarian propaganda can outrageously insult common sense only where common sense has lost its validity. and Before they seize power and establish a world according to their doctrines, totalitarian movements conjure up a lying world of consistency which
is more adequate to the needs of the human mind than reality itself; in
which, through sheer imagination, uprooted masses can feel at home and
are spared the never-ending shocks which real life and real experiences deal
to human beings and their expectations pointing out: The forms of totalitarian organization, as distinguished from their ideological content and propaganda slogans, are completely new. They are
designed to translate the propaganda lies of the movement, woven around
a central fiction-the conspiracy of the Jews, or the Trotskyites, or 300
families, etc.-into a functioning reality, to build up, even under nontotalitarian circumstances, a society. and finally: What prepares men for totalitarian domination in the non-totalitarian
world is the fact that loneliness, once a borderline experience usually suffered in certain marginal social conditions like old age, has become an everyday experience of the evergrowing masses of our century. Recall here that the Kaiser Family Foundation have conducted a survey that says around 60 million adults in the US are often or are completely socially isolated. The merciless process into which totalitarianism drives and organizes the masses looks like a suicidal escape from this reality. The "ice-cold reasoning" and the "mighty tentacle" of dialectics which "seizes you as in a vise" appears like a last support in a world where nobody is reliable and nothing can be relied upon. She is saying totalitarian 'logic' destroys common sense, the foundation for all critical thinking and reasoning. It is the inner coercion whose only content is the strict avoidance of contradictions that seems to confirm a man's identity outside all relationships with others. It fits him into the iron band of terror even when he is alone, and totalitarian domination tries never to leave him alone except in the extreme situation of solitary confinement. By destroying all space between men and pressing men against each other ... This is a condition that the the mass apparatus of social media is facilitating to a a degree greater than hithertoo known. even the productive potentialities of isolation are annihilated; by teaching and glorifying the logical reasoning of loneliness where man knows that he will be utterly lost if ever he lets go of the first premise from which the whole process is being started, even the slim chances that loneliness may be transformed into solitude and logic into thought are obliterated. ie when you cannot think, when thoughts become unthought, then you can become indoctrinated. | {
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70,579 | Germany has banned RT , apparently because it is considered to be not independent of the Russian government ( Die Medienkommission sieht die Staatsferne nicht gewährleistet ), which funds it directly. In response, Deutsche Welle was banned in Russia . Meanwhile, France24 and Voice of America, which are also state-funded, are allowed in Germany (among others, probably). Why is RT prohibited, while other state-funded foreign broadcasters such as France24 and Voice of America are permitted? Is the ban based on the contents of the RT broadcasts, or is there another critical difference as far as German law is concerned? | First a little clarification: It's not the original English-language RT which is banned in Germany. The English version of RT is actually available via satellite and in some regions of Germany via cable for quite a while. The fuss is about RT Deutschland (RT DE), the new German subsidy of RT operating from their offices in Berlin and producing a German program in Germany aimed specifically at the German audience. Here is the official German press release by the regulatory body which banned RT DE ( Kommission für Zulassung und Aufsicht der Medienanstalten , ZAK - commission for permission and monitoring of media institutions). They justify their decision based on a technicality. TV stations in Germany require a license in order to operate. They first have to request a license, and that license needs to be granted. The ZAK did not grant such a license to RT DE because so far RT DE did not request a license with them. So RT DE is not allowed to broadcast in Germany. RT DE did try to obtain a license to operate in Luxembourg. This failed ( German article ), because the government of Luxembourg considered themselves not responsible for licensing a TV station aiming primarily at the German market. They then applied for a license in Serbia (which succeeded) and claimed that this license would allow them to operate in all of Europe (Serbia is not an EU member, but a member of the European Convention on Transfrontier Television). The German regulatory body, however, did not accept that license and insisted on being asked for one themselves. Why doesn't RT DE try to get a license in Germany through the official channels? Likely because they assume that they would not receive one. But an official statement of why exactly would require that they try. Until then, it would just be speculation. I did not check, but I would assume that VOA or France24 either did request and receive the required license, or don't need them because they don't broadcast via the channels monitored by the ZAK. | {
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70,633 | In the comedic New York Times video Jonathan Pie: 'Boris Johnson Is a Liar' | NYT Opinion at about 00:45 the character (speaking to a fictional New York Times interviewer) says: Actually I can't say liar, can I? Really? (surprised) Oh in the UK you can't call them liars, you have to say like "Oh, he inadvertently misled parliament." Seriously? I can just come out and say it - call him a liar? Ah, god bless America. From Wikipedia : Jonathan Pie is a fictional character created and portrayed by English actor and comedian Tom Walker. A political correspondent, Pie appears in a series of comedic online videos in which he rants angrily about British, American, and Australian politics, with the videos being presented as though he were a real reporter giving his personal opinions before or after filming a regular news segment. In this case the Pie character is supposed to be explaining to the US audience of the New York Times about the news of Boris Johnson's apparently not telling the truth about parties which appeared to violate government restrictions due to the pandemic. Question: Are there restrictions in the UK against calling politicians liars? | Yes, Members of Parliament may not normally accuse other MPs of lying while they are speaking in Parliament - paragraph 21.24 of Erskine May states the following: The general requirements of moderation in parliamentary language,
reflected above, are viewed as particularly important when Members are
speaking of other Members, not because other Members require specific
protection, but in order to preserve the character of parliamentary
debate. Words which may be tolerated by the Chair in other
circumstances may therefore be discouraged or required to be withdrawn
as unparliamentary when used in connection with other Members;
though, as already indicated, what is unparliamentary is subject to
the context in which a word or phrase is used. Expressions that are
unparliamentary when applied to individuals are not always so
considered when applied to a whole party. Expressions when used in respect of other Members which are regarded
with particular seriousness, generally leading to prompt intervention
from the Chair and often a requirement on the Member to withdraw the
words, include the imputation of false or unavowed motives; the
misrepresentation of the language of another and the accusation of
misrepresentation; and charges of uttering a deliberate falsehood. Accusations of this kind must be made by tabling a substantive motion on the allegation, under which these accusations can be freely made and met by "a distinct decision of the House" (see Erskine May 20.21 ). The devolved legislatures have similar rules - by convention if not explicitly codified. For example, in September 2020, MSP Oliver Mundell was asked to leave a sitting of the Scottish Parliament by the Presiding Officer for a breach of Rule 7.3 of the standing orders after raising a point of order accusing the First Minister of lying. Rule 7.3 does not explicitly list accusations of misrepresentation as disorderly, but uses the fairly broad instruction that members should "conduct themselves in a courteous and respectful manner". In addition to tabling a substantive motion, there are other ways to skirt the rule - Churchill famously used the phrase 'terminological inexactitude' to avoid censure from the Chair, while written evidence from the Clerk of the House of Commons recalls an exchange between Tam Dalyell and Margaret Thatcher in 1984: Mr. Dalyell: Is it the submarine commander or the Prime Minister who
is lying? Mr. Speaker: Order. The hon. Member must not use that word. I am sure
that he will rephrase that final comment. Mr. Dalyell: Is it the submarine commander or the Prime Minister who
is telling the truth? Outside of Parliament, there are few to no restrictions on accusations of misrepresentations - beyond the risk of being sued for slander/libel. This risk provides another reason why the rule exists; while in Parliament, MPs enjoy parliamentary privilege, meaning they could freely accuse one another of anything while being protected from the jurisdiction of the courts. This, of course, would probably not lead to an effective and orderly debate. | {
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70,639 | Based on this article , this article and this article , global warming could benefit some countries in the world. The first article ( withdrawn later as pointed out by LShaver) says the warming of temperatures across the world could generate an economic boost to some 70 countries in the coming decades. One of the examples given in the first article is: For the mildest pathway, the Czech economy could stand to gain nearly 0.3% in GDP per capita by 2050 when compared to current emission levels and temperatures, with similar gains spread across the rest of the century as well. Interestingly, the higher the emissions, the higher the benefit for Czech Republic. This article could be questionable, but it is not hard to understand that countries with low-temperature climate could benefit from the global warming. Not even to mention that the economy of many countries will be harmed if we use carbon-free fuels instead of fossil fuels. Given this, why is it becoming constructive (or more emotionally, "politically correct") for nations in the world to form a joint force to fight global warming? Why should any country be blamed/discriminated for not being part of it? Update: I personally do not deny the fact that human beings as a whole will benefit from stopping global warming in the next hundreds of years. My questions is more about why the majority of the world has the right to use the "political correctness" to force (using media or political influence whatever) the countries (no matter there are 70 of them or 7 of them) that will benefit from it in the next few decades. As a comparison, we can question the whether the majority can force the religious minority to abandon their gods and believe in science. In a nutshell, my question is more about politics than science. If you believe it is constructive, one possible way to answer is to argue (better with theories from political science, game theory etc.) that the small number of countries will inevitably suffer more in other ways (from sanctions, wars, kicked out of important organizations by the pro-clean-energy big powers) even if their economy could boost from global warming forever (thanks to the comments by Jeff Lambert). Answers from other perspectives are also welcome and appreciated! | This quite a good question, considering that it is one often asked by detractors of climate change concerns. Frame shift: Benefits? What benefits? From the POV of Canada, a cold country which is explicitly cited as an example in the consultancy.eu report , this whole notion of climate change economic benefits seems highly dubious. Now, if it doesn't even work here, where would it? In a large, aggregate, country-level, sense? Let's take a strictly utilitarian viewpoint of the likely impacts of climate change to Canada, and for the purposes of this answer, even completely ignore any extinction threats to wildlife. This is what the study claims: So the Czech Republic is poised to benefit from any increase in emissions, no matter how intense. The country is not alone in this position. In fact, the analysis suggests that around 70 countries in total stand to benefit from higher temperatures. Fellow cold climate countries Russia, Canada , Mongolia, Finland, Kyrgystan, Norway, Tajikistan, Sweden, Iceland and North Korea are all in the same boat. Some of what has actually happened/will probably happen to Canada follows: Mountain beetles impact on logging, in BC The British Columbia interior forestry for pine collapsed from 2000-2005 due to a massive infestation of mountain pine beetles. Usually the beetles are kept in check by sufficiently cold winter spells (-35C kills them) but that didn't happen anymore and the beetles ran amok. Logging for the affected tree species has largely been stopped and mills that supported smaller towns shuttered. Costs? This study estimates the future provincial economic impacts of the MPB infestation in a dynamic computable general equilibrium (CGE) model, by examining the effects of the reduction in timber supply from BC forests over the 2009–2054 period. Results suggest that there will be a cumulative present value loss of $57.37 billion (or 1.34 per cent) in GDP and a $90 billion decline in welfare (compensating variation) from 2009 to 2054 in BC. Forest fires, BC and Alberta From 2003 BC has had 4-5 seasons of extreme forest fires where the provincial government runs up bills of $500M+ in one season fighting fires. That's leaving aside insurance industry impact. Lytton got gutted in 2021 after a heat wave, but Fort McMurray in 2016 was a much higher impact fire, at $9B . Drought impact to farmers , Prairies. The severe, ongoing agricultural drought across the Prairie provinces is a concerning glimpse into the region’s future climate. Alberta alone is expected to pay out $1 billion in crop insurance as a result of the drought, while Saskatchewan has announced additional measures to support farmers struggling with dry conditions. In Manitoba, drought conditions are currently classified as “extreme” or “exceptional” by the Canadian Drought Monitor –where extreme and exceptional are defined as events that happen once every 20 years or 50 years, respectively. There are different ways of defining drought, so it is important to establish common ground. Drought events across the Prairie provinces are anticipated to grow in frequency, duration, and severity over the coming decades as a result of climate change. Such a future could be devastating for the region’s economy: the Prairie provinces account for more than 80% of Canada’s agricultural land and more than half of all income generated by farming is earned on the Prairies. Ice roads are becoming unreliable, High North Canadian communities in the high North often rely on ice roads. Basically, given the huge distances and low population it is not feasible to build and maintain normal roads year round so instead trucks wait till everything ices up and drive on the hardened ground. Without those? Air freight, baby. The season for those roads is already getting shorter. Coastal flooding I live in Vancouver, BC, which has some very, very expensive real estate. But a significant proportion of it would be at risk with a 90-150cm sea level increase by 2100, which is well within the range of median model predictions. Since we are on an estuary, protection isn't as simple as just recessing constructions a bit from the shoreline, parts of the greater metro area, such as Richmond are just low . The map below, generated from Climate Central, shows the results of a 1.5C warming with the parts in turquoise under water at high tide (by 2100?) without mitigation. Our airport is also built on a low lying island in the estuary and will need dikes to protect it. Highway 99, linking to the US, would be underwater, as well as the ferry terminal to Vancouver Island. Ditto Richmond, both the city and a lot of farmland around it. Storms, projected to become more violent, worsen this problem. And this not just a left coast issue, Halifax has potentially $1.9B of real estate at risk . Housing/construction code will need to be adapted. Last summer, Vancouver's general area suffered a massive heat wave. BC's coroner reported 559 heat deaths over 5 weeks, with the bulk, 445, during 1 week . One problem is that most residences do not have air conditioning and may not have appropriate ventilation. I have some personal insight, having recently moved from one highrise to another. My summer '21 apartment faced northeast and really did not heat up all that much. It also had windows that opened up somewhat. The one I am now renting is facing southwest and has much smaller window openings. Both have large glass windows which will absorb heat very well. As a renter, I can just leave it, it is merely inconvenient. If I owned it however, I would have to face retrofitting air conditioning which might not be cheap at all. If heat waves become a recurring pattern, this will likely impact resale value of this type of real estate. Bear in mind too, Canadian coasts are moderated by the oceans. Inland Canada can get extremely hot in summer, even when it is very cold in winter. Neither are "useful", economically. Canada looks like it will need a lot more AC. Doesn't come free. Erratic weather is costly. Vancouver suffered extreme flooding in November 2021 and was temporarily cut off from most of the roads leading inland. Some of the most productive farming land in Canada, in the Fraser Valley was extensively flooded and then hit by severe frost a few weeks later. Costs? $450M . Government just pledged $228M just for the farmers, though I there may be some overlap between those 2 sums. Farmers are very concerned about the impacts to their plants, most notably blueberries. JonathanReez cautions about attributing climate change to the Nov 2021 floods, citing experts who are not convinced about current increased precipitation in the Pacific Northwest. That's a valid point: one event does not a pattern make. Climate change attribution is a probabilistic method: great podcast covering the methods used, 2+ hrs :-( . However, even in the PNW, extreme rainfall is expected to increase in the future. And the Atlantic coast has seen increasing storms and storm surges in the last decade: we know warmer air soaks up more water. Insurance premiums Insurance premiums for flooding and forest fires are definitely on the rise. This is money straight out of consumer/business pockets. Fisheries are a mixed bag . There are possibilities of extra productivity in some cases, but West Coast salmon are in decline due to shallow, overheated, streams and oyster farms report significant die-offs, apparently linked to the effect of acidification on shell formation. Trade Though the question, as I see it, is solely looking at the economic effects to Canada , we are also a trading nation. If our trading partners can't afford our products due to their problems, we will ultimately suffer as well, economically . And if their production costs are driven up by climate change impacts to their infrastructure, our purchases will also be more expensive. Imagine if our local hipsters were deprived of their avocado toasts. The horror! Conclusion A number of these impacts have already happened, in 2022, while the climate models generally predict that it is going to get progressively worse. Against that we might get a longer growing season, supposedly benefiting farmers but see the caveats above, and will get reduced heating bills. Plus, possibly, some economic benefits, to Canada(?), from opening up the NorthWest Passage. What has already happened has already cost us billions of dollars and is likely to get much worse. While lowering our emissions will also cost us vastly greater sums of money they will also create new industries and new jobs. Rebuilding after insurance payouts for say forest fires does as well, to an extent. On the other hand some of the costs incurred, like firefighting or drought relief, are straight out losses - they don't generate new jobs or industries in any meaningful sense. Ditto for high-priced properties on waterfronts that need abandoning or hefty view-blocking dikes. I don't think the math adds up, for Canada. We won't benefit. To be clear there are 3 types of monetary amounts here. Benefits, to Canada itself, of climate change. Losses, to Canada, due to climate change. Costs to Canada, to fight or mitigate climate change. My answer here is that 2), the losses, trump 1), the gains. By a large amount. This answer isn't really preoccupied with quantifying 3), the costs of measures to address climate change, because that is not needed to dispute a claim of net gain to Canada . p.s. Switching to renewables and electricity rather than fossil fuels, while it comes at a high upfront cost, can save money in the long term. Of course what type of renewables and what type of electricity generating capacity is being used may be tricky to optimize, economically, but that's a different question. p.p.s. Quick blurb about Russia , the other big Northern country. (I don't pretend to know much, but it also does not look unequivocally rosy either from this) In June of this year, regional officials in Stravopol, one of Russia’s major wheat regions, projected a remarkable 40 percent decline in wheat crop in 2020 as a result of droughts. ... An increase in droughts, floods, wildfires, permafrost damage, and disease could lower GDP by 3 percent annually in the next decade, according to Russia’s Audit Chamber. Climate damage to buildings and infrastructure alone could cost Russia up to 9 trillion rubles ($99 billion) by 2050, according to Deputy Minister for the Development of the Russian Far East and Arctic Alexander Krutikov. p.p.p.s At some point there was an ongoing comment thread about lethality risks of heat waves vs other natural hazards, including cold. Well, The Economist covered this on Sept 1st, 2022 - Heatwaves kill more Americans than hurricanes, tornadoes and floods . A picture is worth 1000 words though: | {
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70,667 | In order to be a candidate in a French presidential election, a person must obtain at least 500 "présentations" or "parrainages" from among tens of thousands of elected representatives, the majority of whom are mayors. The other two requirements are that these présentations must come from at least 30 areas of the country (departments or overseas collectivities), and that no more than 10% of them may come from the same area. Let's say that at the time of the last announcement before the final one, a person has présentations as follows: 50 from 1 area 10 from each of 45 areas So if no further présentations are received, he will have met all three criteria. Whatever happens, he has clearly met the first two criteria. My question is what happens in respect of the third criterion if he receives one more présentation before the deadline, and it is from the area of the country in which he has already received 50. In this case, his score would look like this: 51 from 1 area 10 from each of 45 areas His total is now 501, and 51 exceeds 10% of 501. Does he meet or fail to meet the third criterion? You can check the exact wording of the law here: Loi n° 62-1292 du 6 novembre 1962 relative à l'élection du Président de la République au suffrage universel (Version en vigueur au 08 février 2022) . | No - this scenario is discussed on the constitutional council’s website (from the 2017 Presidential election). The process is that a maximum of fifty parrainages from one département will be considered, and that any others will be discarded. Les contrôles du nombre de parrainages Les parrainages doivent émaner d’au moins 500 élus, répartis dans au
moins 30 départements ou collectivités d’outre-mer différents, sans
que dans un département ou une collectivité on ne dépasse le seuil de
50 signatures (un dixième). Par exemple : si 80 élus d’un même département parrainent un même
candidat de façon parfaitement valide, le Conseil constitutionnel les
publiera, mais ne tiendra compte que de 50 d’entre elles, en dépit de
la validité des 30 autres, pour parvenir au seuil des 500 signatures
requises. My translation: Controls on the number of nominations Nominations must come from at least 500 elected officials, spread over at least 30 different departments or overseas communities, without a department or community exceeding the threshold of 50 signatures (one tenth). For example: if 80 elected officials from the same department nominate the same candidate in a perfectly valid way, the Constitutional Council will publish them, but will only take into account 50 of them, despite the validity of the 30 others, to arrive at the threshold of 500 nominations required. In your example, then, only fifty of the nominations from the department with fifty-one nominations would be taken into account, and the candidate would be validly nominated. For further proof - according to the list of validated nominations published by the constitutional council - in 2017, Jean Lassalle received a total of 708 nominations. Despite 73 of these coming from the Pyrénées-Atlantiques department, Lassalle was confirmed to be a valid candidate and appeared on the ballot. | {
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70,678 | My understanding is that due to its overall economic conditions today, Russia, a country much weaker than Soviet Union, does not have enough military power to defeat NATO in a hot war without invoking nuclear weapons (e.g., the military budget of Russian is ~$70 billion, compared with ~$700 billion military budget for U.S), although they might have the motivation to start one . See here for NATO's military budget. I believe there are many ways for NATO to confront Russia. For example, if there are cyber-attacks from Russia, simply fight back with cyber techniques. Sanctions are also good tools to use. However, the enlargement of NATO in the recent years seemed to raise the risk of hot war with Russia. For example, NATO tried to build missile defense complex in Poland and even trying to include Ukraine, neighbor of Russia into their organization. What is their motivation of doing so? Why can't NATO simply let the Eastern Europe stay (at least militarily) neutral between NATO and Russia? What is the motivation of their expansion in Eastern Europe, irritating Russian, and at the cost of a potential Russia-Ukraine war which could involve NATO themselves? | However, what NATO was doing in the recent years seemed to raise the risk of hot war with Russia. For example, NATO tried to build missile bases in Eastern Europe and even trying to include Ukraine, neighbor of Russia into their organization. What is their motivation of doing so? The way that paragraph is phrased makes it seem as if NATO is an entity that does things. NATO expands and NATO increases military activity closer to Russia. That's one way of looking at it. Another way of looking at it is through the scope of those individual nations which make up NATO. That way, NATO countries don't expand further east, but countries which are further east decide for themselves that they want to be part of NATO. That's actually an important principle: self determination. Non-NATO members Sweden and Finland used this reasoning, according to dw.com : Recently, the leaders of Sweden and Finland, non-member states aligned with NATO, signaled they see their decision to join NATO as their own right of self-determination in the wake of Russia's troop movements near the Ukraine border. This isn't new though, from the NATO website : NATO’s door has been open to new members since it was founded in 1949 – and that has never changed. This “Open Door Policy” is enshrined in Article 10 of NATO’s founding treaty, which says “any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic” can apply for membership. Decisions on membership are taken by consensus among all Allies. No treaty signed by the United States, Europe and Russia included provisions on NATO membership. And more recently NATO's Secretary General said : On membership and the NATO's open door all Allies are united on the core principle that each and every nation has the right to choose his own path. This is enshrined in a lot of fundamental documents, many different documents, which are the foundation for European security. And, therefore, also Allies totally agree that it is only Ukraine and 30 Allies that can decide when Ukraine is ready to become a NATO member. No one else has anything to say and of course Russia doesn't have a veto on whether Ukraine can become a NATO member. Allies are ready to support Ukraine on this path towards membership, helping to implement reforms, modernise the armed forces to meet NATO standards. And then, at the end of the day, it has to be NATO Allies and Ukraine that decides on membership. In other words, NATO isn't the entity that decides to expand. A third country requests to join and that decision then needs to be agreed by the existing members. Once a country is a member of its own will, it coordinates with other NATO allies on how to defend its territory. It's not like NATO forces a country to take certain military activity it does not want. Why can't NATO simply let the Eastern Europe stay (at least militarily) neutral between NATO and Russia? What is the motivation of their expansion in Eastern Europe, irritating Russian, and at the cost of a potential Russia-Ukraine war which could involve NATO themselves? Because that goes against the principle of self determination upon which NATO is founded. If countries in Eastern Europe want to join NATO, then why should NATO say no? That is directly contrary to NATO's open door policy. Continuing your line of thought, one might argue that it is in NATO's interest to leave Eastern European countries out. That way they come across as less threatening to Russia. That goes against another principle upon which NATO countries or the West more broadly is built: the liberal international order . All NATO members and candidate members are sovereign nations. That means these countries can decide for themselves and whether joining NATO upsets some third country (Russia) isn't a factor in the decision. My understanding is that due to its overall economic conditions today, Russia, a country much weaker than Soviet Union, does not have enough military power to defeat NATO in a hot war without invoking nuclear weapons (e.g., the military budget of Russian is ~$70 billion, compared with ~$700 billion military budget for U.S), although they might have the motivation to start one. See here for NATO's military budget. Why would Russia have motivation to start a war with NATO? Without using nuclear weapons they would lose and they risk NATO escalating to nuclear weapons. If Russia started a nuclear war against NATO then they guarantee themselves a nuclear response. So in the first case Russia loses, in the second both sides lose by the principle of mutual assured destruction . As for your comparison of military budget, it's not really a fair comparison. Most countries in the West have paid military membership while Russia relies in large part on conscription. Though the US military is stronger than the Russian military, it's not ten times stronger. | {
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70,825 | There must be some motive here that I can't understand. For one I can easily think of reasons why the US wouldn't want to make public the things that they know, if not for any other reason than to risk revealing how they know what they know. Other than that sometimes it's better to not let the "adversary" (for lack of a better term) know that you know the cards they are holding. On the other hand I can think of reasons why you wouldn't want to keep making these kinds of announcements, like freaking out people in Ukraine. Wouldn't it be better to just tell the Ukrainian government what you know and let them decide how to handle the public relations in the matter? It just seems very surreal, if you watch the mainstream news or listen to the President or other officials making statements they claim to know these very specific details but I can't figure out why we are hearing it from the US and no other source, or why we are hearing it from the US at all. This seems like a multi-faceted question but really it comes down to why is the US specifically pumping out all these statements and claims about Russia/Ukraine in the first place? What could the possible motive be for the US? | This is fairly common political technique called 'poisoning the well'. The US is laying out all of the actions and steps that Russia has been taking — and some that they expect Russia will take if there is an invasion — thus making it extremely difficult for Russia to claim after the fact that an invasion was necessary as a response or reaction to something that occurred within Ukraine. Putin has been carefully trying to craft a narrative that Russian-speaking peoples in eastern Ukraine are under some sort of existential threat, but knows that staging a bald-faced invasion would violate a number of international treaties and norms. It would be best for him politically if there were an international incident that would justify sending troops across the border (much as 9/11 became a justification for the US invasion of Afghanistan, albeit under shady logic). By carefully spelling out all of Russia's preparations and troop mobilizations, the US is undercutting Putin's 'justified response' narrative, effectively saying: "Why would Russia prepare so extensively for an as-yet-to-occur international incident?". Note that in the US invasion of Afghanistan, all of the preparations and mobilizations began after the trigger incident, and the US was quite public about its intentions, seeking international agreement and support. Russia, by contrast, has played its cards close to its chest: massing its forces without much comment, creating public misdirections about non-existent troop withdrawals, ginning up the potential of a genocide where no overt evidence of genocide exists. Russia wants uncertainty and confusion over the nature of its actions, so that it can spin out ex post facto rationales and maintain some semblance of its international reputation. The US is doing its best to remove any uncertainty or confusion, so that any actual invasion will merely look like naked aggression on Russia's part. | {
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70,884 | The current Russian troop buildup close to Ukraine and the exercise in Belarus are partially justified by Russian security interests which, in particular, mean that Russia very much opposes NATO membership of Ukraine. It seems clear that NATO would not admit Ukraine in the foreseeable future. But assuming Ukraine joins at some point: How would that affect (harm) Russian security? Having NATO troops in Ukraine would of course facilitate a ground attack. Does anybody in Russia or NATO seriously consider that remotely plausible, even in the future? (I'd have thought that that was exceedingly unlikely given nuclear deterrence and the lack of any interest in starting a direct war with Russia.) Would Ukraine offer a particular advantage for stationing ballistic missiles or anti-ballistic defense (or something similar) that current NATO territory does not? In that sense, is the situation similar to the Cuban Missile Crisis? (Here, my understanding is that at the time, missiles in Cuba (and Turkey, for the US missiles) posed a serious threat in addition to the existing delivery systems.) Is there some other aspect? Edit: Another question ( Why would Russia care about NATO troops on its borders if it has nuclear weapons? ) asked about similar aspects, but is not quite the same because it does not consider any non-invasion harm to Russia's security. | One key question is the plausibility of a preemptive, conventional or nuclear counterforce strike against the Russian nuclear force. For much of the Cold War, there was a commonly held belief that both sides possessed a survivable second strike capability, like nuclear missile submarines, mobile missiles, and hardened silos, and that even after a preemptive strike there would be more than enough Soviet missiles left to inflict unacceptable damage on the United States. Now the US is working on both ballistic missile defenses and conventional strike capabilities. Back during the Cold War, it was agreed that missile defense was destabilizing, hence the ABM Treaty . As of now , US missile defense plans are on a much smaller scale than pre-ABM-Treaty. I would say that on paper, Russian concerns are unfounded for now and for years to come. Russia might have different ideas than I have about the American understanding of acceptable damage in a war against Russia, the numbers and readiness of Russian SSBNs, the resilience of the Russian early-warning and command-and-control systems. If those points are worse than I believe, then Russia would be threatened by small numbers of US interceptors and missiles near their border. Russia might also be looking two or three decades ahead, and worrying that it cannot afford an arms race against the West. A simplistic interpretation of the end of the Cold War might be that President Reagan threatened to develop and deploy SDI (aka Star Wars) and that Gorbachev knew that the Soviet economy would be unable to keep up. You might note that Russia is not just demanding political control over Ukraine, but also a rollback of the NATO enlargement of recent decades. NATO forces in the Baltics or Romania are as bad as potential NATO forces in Ukraine in this regard. A different perspective might be that the Putin regime (as opposed to Russia itself) is threatened by a Western-style democracy in a society that is culturally close to Russia -- the Russian people might demand the same. Russia claims that the string of Color Revolutions were Western-engineered regime change , not the will of the people. | {
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70,918 | A quote from a Reuters article on Feb 21, 2022 : Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered the deployment of troops to
two breakaway regions in eastern Ukraine after recognizing them as
independent on Monday, accelerating a crisis the West fears could
unleash a major war. It seems implied that Russia sending troops into Ukraine is not considered an invasion. Why is this? The article seems to continue to hope for peace. | If the breakaway 'republics' are sovereign, which Russia now accepts but which the international community does not accept, Russia would be defending two allies at the invitation of those allies. Not an invasion. If the independence declarations are invalid, which most of the international community believes, Russia is invading a sovereign nation. | {
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70,920 | In this question, I do not raise questions about the conflicts themselves. The question is different - how is the fact that the United States recognizes these problems as its own justified from a legal point of view? Quote from today's executive order : <...> the Russian Federation’s purported recognition of the so-called Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) or Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) regions of Ukraine contradicts Russia’s commitments under the Minsk agreements and further threatens the peace, stability, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Ukraine, and thereby constitutes an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States . Why can't some South Africa just as well recognize the conflict between China and Taiwan as its own? | The 1994 Memorandum on security assurances in connection with Ukraine’s accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is an agreement between Ukraine, the Russian Federation, the UK, and the US that requires each country to treat Ukraine as an independent nation, to respect the borders of Ukraine, to refrain from economic coercion on Ukraine, and to provide assistance to Ukraine should any party threaten Ukraine. In exchange, Ukraine surrendered its stockpile of nuclear weapons to Russia. Ukraine was the third largest nuclear power at the time of the agreement. (Russia however had all the launch codes.) | {
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70,922 | With the Russian invasion of Ukraine now officially around the corner (or even underway), I am surprised how minimalistic and non-committal the proposed sanctions are. Even the US " mother of all sanctions " consists of mainly targeted surgical measures like cutting Russia off SWIFT and banning the export of semiconductors and the like. I understand that US doesn't have to show much of an effort since it's a long way from Ukraine to Washington, but I would expect much more resolve from the EU with a war on its doorstep. EU sanctions against Russia have been ongoing since 2014. However, given their limited nature, Russia doesn't seem to have responded much to them (apart from learning to buy Russian apples instead of Polish ones). Given that the EU-Russia trade comprises just 5% of all international trade of the EU but almost 40% of all Russian trade, I would naively expect that a total ban on trade and financial transactions would hurt the EU a little but bring Russia swiftly to its knees and Putin to the negotiating table. Of course, losing a third of the gas supply would mean everyone in Europe would have to put on an extra sweater or two and China would also likely step in and pick up part of the slack, but I cannot imagine Russia being able to retarget half of its foreign trade overnight. (To illustrate my line of thought, consider how we treat bacterial infections with antibiotics. You don't slowly ramp up the dose because that would let the bacteria develop resistance, you hit them with a big hammer right away so they don't get a chance.) I assume that if the above made a lot of sense economically, politicians would figure out a way to sell it to the general public (after all, they managed to sell things that didn't make any economical sense at all). Is there a serious economic analysis showing that targeted sanctions are more efficient than a total trade ban? | I think there are at least two obvious reasons, The EU profits from trade with Russia. Russia buys a lot of stuff, sells a lot of stuff the EU needs, and also uses the European market for its transactions with other parties, increasing its size and importance. A lot of European companies operate extensive local branches in Russia, such as banks, retailers, consumer goods makers, etc - whose bottom line will not be happy. EU countries can't afford to fire all of their weapons and come empty-handed. Let's assume the EU introduces a full ban on trade with Russia. Let's assume Russia takes over Belarus and Ukraine the next morning and imposes a blockade on the Baltic states. The EU then can't do anything short of a military intervention since it has exhausted its "soft" options. There are subtle reasons, such as, some EU countries may not be happy about US and/or EU policies, so they would give the necessary lip service and then block the harsh measures because they feel that Russia balances out these parties. Update: Losing half of Russia's international trade is not a deterrent to stop Putin from trying to rebuild the Russian sphere of influence. The threats of loss of half of the international trade are the deterrent. Once you actually trigger it, the damage is done but it's not a deterrent anymore since there's no downside for Putin to invade whoever he pleases after already suffering the "pre-consequences". | {
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70,929 | In the context of the recognition of the Donetsk People's Republic and the Luhansk People's Republic by Russia, I cannot seem to find whether the territories of said republics correspond only to what they currently control (22/02/2022) or include the original territories of Donetsk and Luhansk. In the Wikipedia article for Donetsk it says it includes all the original territory (Donetsk Oblast, I think). However, it does not say if Russia recognizes all of it. Same for Luhansk. It would follow that if Russia recognizes the whole Oblasts, Ukraine is currently occupying those territories. Which would be a clear casus belli for Russia. Obviously, I understand that the situation is more complex than this, but this point could be important to understand the next actions by Russia (mainly). | Updated answer: President Putin addressed this issue in a press conference around 16:45 UTC on February 22nd: As for the borders, within what borders will we recognize these
republics. We recognized them, which means we recognized their
constitutions. And the constitutions spelled out the borders within
the Donetsk and Luhansk regions - at the time when they were part of
Ukraine. This means that, according to Putin, Russia recognises the territory of the LPR & DPR to include all of the yellow-shaded territory in the map below, courtesy of the New York Times . This represents the entirety of the Luhansk and Donetsk Oblasts, including territory currently controlled by Ukraine. Original answer follows: It's not currently clear - the decrees signed by President Putin, " On the recognition of the Donetsk People's Republic " and " On the recognition of the Luhansk People's Republic " don't refer to territorial claims, and there have been several contradicting answers from Russian officials. Article 7 of both treaties as ratified by the State Duma ( Luhansk , Donetsk ) state: The Contracting Parties confirm and respect the territorial integrity
and inviolability of the existing borders of the Russian Federation
and the [Luhansk People's Republic / Donetsk People's Republic]. The Parties shall conclude a
separate agreement on the State border between the Russian Federation
and the [Luhansk People's Republic / Donetsk People's Republic]. The protection of the State border
of the [Luhansk People's Republic / Donetsk People's Republic] shall be carried out jointly by the
Contracting Parties in the interests of their own security and peace
and stability. The Contracting Parties will conclude a separate
agreement on this matter. This lines up with the statement to Rossiyskaya Gazeta by the spokeswoman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Maria Zakharova, who said that "the issue of the borders of the LPR and the DPR would be resolved after the ratification of the friendship treaty". The Deputy Foreign Minister, Andrei Rudenko, however, responded to a question from Interfax , stating that the recognised borders are "the borders within which the DPR and LPR leaderships operate and have jurisdiction". On the other hand, in a press briefing held by Putin's press secretary, Dmitry Peskov, he initially defined the extent of territorial recognition as being "within the borders that they have proclaimed themselves", but didn't not expand on this when questioned. Meduza.io carries the transcript of the conference : CNN: Regarding the recognition of the sovereignty of the DNR and LNR,
tell me, are we talking about recognizing them in their current, de
facto borders or within the borders of the entire Luhansk and Donetsk
regions? As we understand it, these are a bit different. Dmitry Peskov: Within the borders that they have proclaimed
themselves. CNN: Proclaimed at what point? Dmitry Peskov: Well, when these two republics were proclaimed. Bloomberg: Can you elaborate on this issue? Dmitry Peskov: No, I have nothing to add. Ekho Moskvy: Do these borders include Mariupol, for example? Dmitry Peskov: I have nothing to add to this. Within the borders in
which they exist and have been proclaimed. Ekho Moskvy: In which they exist or were proclaimed? Dmitry Peskov: Well, in which they were proclaimed and exist. Ekho Moskvy: Meaning, within the current borders? Dmitry Peskov: I have nothing to add to this. BBC News: Can you clarify? I don’t quite understand: Will the
recognition of the people’s republics mean the borders that exist now
or those that they’ve proclaimed themselves? Dmitry Peskov: Within the borders in which these republics were
proclaimed. BBC News: In 2014? Meaning, the entire Donetsk and Luhansk regions? Dmitry Peskov: In this case, I’ve said everything I can on this
subject. | {
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70,940 | The conflict in Ukraine is escalating and new sanctions are being announced . Some of the news are arguing about the EU's significant dependence on Russian gas. The following graphic indicates that the EU did not manage to significantly reduce the dependence on Russian gas ( source , page 13): The graphic does not indicate recent values, but this article indicates that Russia continues to supply around 40% of EU gas consumption. Despite the fact that Russia became more and more aggressive (clearly visible in 2014, when it annexed Crimea). Why did EU fail to reduce the Russian natural gas dependence? | There have been attempts. For example, consider the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline , constructed from 2016 and completed in 2020 to transport natural gas from Azerbaijani fields into Europe without touching Russia. These attempts have not even been new, as is exemplified by the Nabucco Pipeline , the agreement to which was signed in 2009, well ahead of the current timeline of Ukraine-Russia skirmishes. (Nabucco was ultimately ditched in favour of the TAP.) There are a few problems though: The only sustainable way to reduce dependency of one gas supplier is to find a different one. That's precisely the idea behind Nabucco/TAP, but given geography and physics there are only a small handful of options to acquire gas. The real, sustainable long-term solution is to replace gas with SomethingElse. However, given the concerns about climate change SomethingElse should not be fossil (gas is the fossil energy source that gives the most bang per carbon dioxide), given the difference in use cases nuclear is not always an option (a lot of gas is used directly for heating which nuclear power cannot directly provide) and although renewable energies are the stated goal their proliferation have been meagre, at best. If you take a look at the blue bars, gas demand as a whole has stabilised since about 2005 and is tipping downwards, so it looks like the long-term strategy is slowly starting to bear blossoms that might become fruit one day. But this isn't a switch that can be done in a day and the share Russia supplies is simply too large for quick action. | {
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71,041 | President Biden has announced new sanctions on Russia after Russia invaded Ukraine unprovoked. From CNN : President Joe Biden on Thursday unveiled harsh new sanctions on Russia meant to punish the country for its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, calling out Russian President Vladimir Putin for his aggression even as he acknowledged it would take time for the new measures to alter Putin's behavior. "Putin is the aggressor. Putin chose this war. And now he and his country will bear the consequences," Biden said, laying out a set of measures that will "impose a severe cost on the Russian economy, both immediately and over time."
The new sanctions include export blocks on technology, a centerpiece of Biden's approach that he said would severely limit Russia's ability to advance its military and aerospace sector. He also applied sanctions on Russian banks and "corrupt billionaires" and their families who are close to the Kremlin. Biden insisted his threat to directly sanction Putin remains "on the table" and is "not a bluff," but he didn't answer when asked why he hasn't directly sanctioned the Russian president yet.
Asked by CNN's Kaitlan Collins what could stop Putin if sanctions can't, Biden responded, "I didn't say sanctions couldn't stop him." "The threat of the sanctions ... imposing the sanctions and seeing the effect of the sanctions are two different things," Biden said. "He's going to begin to see the effect of the sanctions."
The new sanctions targets are not limited to Russia. The US also went after individuals in Belarus, including the country's defense minister, for that country's role in facilitating the Russian attack. These sanctions are just ones that affect only a certain thing, or maybe a small group of things. Why doesn't the US just ban Russia—specifically the elite oligarchs—from trade entirely? | Whenever you ask the question "Why?" in politics, it is necessary to "round up the usual suspects." There is horse trading. The political situation inside various countries, and between various countries, requires the leaders to push only so hard. In most countries it is not possible for the leadership to make changes of this nature with the simplicity of flipping a light switch. There are various overlapping concerns of favors owed and punishments in potential that must be considered. Cutting off trade of certain items means they become more expensive, angering the people who buy them. And in turn, angering the leadership of the places those people live. Pulling support away from the leadership in other goals that are in play. So, you cut off exports of grain to Russia. The farmers, and the senators and congressional reps from the farming areas, begin to shout very loudly. And that causes difficulty with other legislation. You cut off imports of fossil fuel from Russia, and many countries get very angry with you because of the price their people must pay for winter heating. There is general “cussedness.” Some people just hate the current leadership. Some are happy to see the current leadership failing because they think it elevates them. So, they will take various delaying and interfering steps that slow down the process. Calls for investigations and hearings. Criticisms in the press. Feeding the rumor mill. Various other delaying and obfuscating tactics, right up to calls for impeachment because of the “obvious” mishandling of the crisis. Some parts of the press will feed on this because they hate the current leadership. Some will feed on it because they are “war hawks” and want to move straight to a huge war with Russia. Some (hopefully not very large) part will feed on it because they agree with Putin’s actions. There is practicality of implementation. When you officially cut off trade in some product, the price goes up. Particularly, the price Russia will pay for this product goes up. Especially if it is a war related item. So, you cut off Russia's supply of truck tires. Russia needs truck tires to pursue their activity. And here comes Country-X (that I won't specify but you can guess) willing to sell truck tires at, say, double the price that Country-X can buy them at. It may even be that Country-X has on-hand a good supply of tires from the same suppliers Russia would have used. They may have practiced this plan for multiple products in various previous sanction situations with various other countries. There is concern of who Russia will turn to should the pressure become too large. If Russia needs fuel, food, medicine, replacement parts, etc., then they will start to look around for some other place to get them. And China is not that far away. And China would not be against the idea of making various western nations look bad. Especially if it means that Russia will go along with various ambitions that China has. And that gets various other countries angry, and not a small amount fearful. In the other direction, sanctions are to some extent "kabuki theatre." As very large parts of politics are. Putin will have included sanctions in his plans. It is quite unlikely that sanctions will cause Russian forces to be withdrawn, particularly if they are not backed up by a serious blockade. Putting sanctions on Russia is not meant to stop his actions. Sanctions are meant to provide the leadership with something to say when they are asked why they don't do something about the invasion. | {
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71,087 | There have been several claims since the Russian Federation attacked Ukraine the 24th of Feb that it violated international laws, and such claims have been made several times since the Crimea got annexed. Did the Russian Federation violate any international law since 2014 in Ukraine? And if so, how? EDIT: Here are some claims : "Putin violates all international law principles" -- E. Macron, president of French Republic "Russian President Vladimir Putin's decision to recognize the independence of self-proclaimed entities "LPR/DPR" is in breach of international law and a flagrant violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine" -- B. Johnson, prime minister of UK "This is a grave breach of international law & a serious threat to Euro-Atlantic security," -- NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg | The EU Council has accused Russia of multiple breaches of international laws and agreements, and has helpfully enumerated them in its condemnation of its actions: On 22 February 2022, the High Representative issued a declaration on
behalf of the Union condemning the decision of the President of the
Russian Federation to recognise the non-government controlled areas of
Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts of Ukraine as independent entities and the
ensuing decision to send Russian troops into those areas. That illegal
act further undermines Ukraine’s sovereignty and independence and is a
severe breach of international law and international agreements,
including the UN Charter, Helsinki Final Act, Paris Charter and
Budapest Memorandum, as well as of the Minsk Agreements and UN
Security Council Resolution 2202 (2015). Taking these in turn:- The UN Charter Paragraph 4 of Article 2 of the UN Charter states the following: All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations. The Helsinki Final Act 1975 You can more or less take your pick here - from Article I: Sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty , Article II: Refraining from the threat or use of force , Article III: Inviolability of frontiers , Article IV: Territorial integrity of States , Article V: Peaceful settlement of disputes , and Article VI: Non-intervention in internal affairs , there seem to be good arguments that Russia has not abided by its commitments under this Act. The Paris Charter 1990 The Paris Charter contains, amongst other relevant statements, the following declaration: In accordance with our obligations under the Charter of the United Nations and commitments under the Helsinki Final Act, we renew our pledge to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or from acting in any other manner inconsistent with the principles or purposes of those documents. We recall that non-compliance with obligations under the Charter of the United Nations constitutes a violation of international law. We reaffirm our commitment to settle disputes by peaceful means. We decide to develop mechanisms for the prevention and resolution of conflicts among the participating States. Budapest Memorandum 1994 The first two articles of this agreement, signed in exchange for Ukraine giving up its nuclear weapons, state: The United States of America, the Russian Federation, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, reaffirm their commitment to Ukraine, in accordance with the principles of the CSCE Final Act, to respect the Independence and Sovereignty and the existing borders of Ukraine. The United States of America, the Russian Federation, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, reaffirm their obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine, and that none of their weapons will ever be used against Ukraine except in self-defense or otherwise in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. Minsk Agreements/Security Council Resolution 2202 As I discussed further in my answer here , recognition of the two separatist republics, DPR & LPR constituted a breach of point 9 of Minsk II. In the Security Council Resolution, President Putin reaffirmed his “full respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine”. | {
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71,099 | Why has India abstained on the UN Security Council resolution condemning the Russian invasion of Ukraine? EDIT:
The Finantial Times published India sticks with Russia after Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine on the India stance, some details mentioned there: India depends on Russia for crucial commodities such as energy and fertiliser Russia’s support is seen as vital to managing India’s unresolved confrontation with China on its northern Himalayan border the Soviet Union is credited as having helped India win its 1971 war with Pakistan over Bangladesh India might not want to push Putin to further strengthen his alliance with China some 65 per cent of arms transferred to India between 1950 and 2020 were from the Soviet Union or Russia | Historically, India was a leading member of the Non-Aligned movement and one of the non-Marxist-Leninist states closest to the Soviet Union. Those relations laid the foundation for good India-Russia relations. India's military also uses a lot of Russian equipment; they recently concluded a bevy of trade and arms deals late
last year. However, India has also maintained a nice relationship with the US, strengthened especially by the relations between the nationalist and populist leaders, Modi and Trump. Furthermore, India and the US are becoming closer partners against the China-Pakistan bloc. So in sum, India's still in that neutral Cold War zone, balancing between Russia and the US. Abstaining from this vote reflects the fact that they're trying to be non-committal and not anger either of their partners. | {
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71,130 | The ruling Polish PiS party's single biggest sensationalized issue seems to be immigration and the anti-immigrant euro-skepticism. But Polish people now are very receptive of Ukrainian people. Is it because they can relate to the threat from Russia? | First of all Poland as most of countries does not have 100% uniform political opinion. It is entirely possible that if Poland had more liberal government they would take more of Syrian refugees. However the current government is very conservative, so it is easy to see why they would refuse to do it. Even liberal by the Polish standard, British conservatives are in some part anti-immigration. Secondly, Polish people do not have much experience with other nationalities living in Poland and all Ukrainian expats who arrived after 2014, are relatively recent phenomenon and some people are still uneasy about it (stealing jobs and other xenophobic opinions), but Ukrainians are still somewhat familiar and there is a fear of unknown. Thirdly, there is a concern about terrorist attacks from Muslims, although it is probably unfounded, it is difficult to argue with people. Even if there is less than 0.1% chance of terrorist attack, why would a country take the risk? Especially seeing the terror attacks from Western countries with relatively large Muslim population. To be clear, I personally do not endorse this opinion and I think there is more risk to Polish public from nationalists, anti-vaxxers etc. than from Muslim extremists. Next, perhaps the most important point in the current situation is that this is an exceptional war on the Polish doorstep, which is inflicted by one of the historical enemies to Poland and the biggest perceived threat. I know it sounds strong, but it is how many people in Poland perceive Russia. Not one serious politician would endorse or ally with Russia in Poland. Also if you cannot send the troops, you can at least help the refugees. The war in Syria is unfamiliar to Polish people who know very little about it and is hard to relate. I hope that lack of references are counterbalanced by the fact I'm a Polish person, which would give some valuable insight. | {
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71,151 | Putin proposes talks in Minsk. Zelenskyy is ready for talks with Russia in Baku, Warsaw, Budapest and Istanbul. I see only capitals here and wonder - does it have to be a capital of some country? Time seems to be of the essence, the faster the negotiations the fewer casualties the war will have. Why don’t they just take the closest big city, which is easiest to reach? Or not even a city, just a place in an open field - I believe this is how negotiations were done 10 centuries ago, why is it different now? Another, even more modern and faster option (thanks to @Trilarion) would be a video call. | It doesn't. Notable locations for summit meetings and treaty negotiations include Yalta, New York, Geneva, and San Francisco, none of which is a national capital (Geneva is the capital city of the Canton of Geneva). Capital cities can typically provide good security for visiting dignitaries, however, since they're used to protecting their own government officials, as well as the necessary infrastructure. | {
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71,153 | A great variety of sanctions have been discussed and implemented with more to follow. One sanction I have never heard being discussed, and that is cutting off Russia from the internet. Now I am aware that there is no a single organization that controls the internet. But when it comes the management of the top-level domains there are not many options available, and some of this is definitely controlled from the US. I appears to me that cutting of Russia from the internet would make the lives of Putin and his government harder and it would also help create an atmosphere of discontent inside Russia towards Putin. In addition it would also have an economic impact on Russia's economy. Can it be done and would it support Putin or hurt him ? | It appears to be somewhat possible... at least from the inside. This capability been on Putin's to-do list for a while. He has last cut off Russia from the internet as a test half a year ago. This "internet switch" has been unpopular in Russia and led to protests against it . Since then, the switch to render the Russian segment autonomous has gone operational. The specific method is to switch off the major transnational connection points and replace all ISP DNS. Some connectivity would remain, but it would be insufficient to carry the full volume of the civilian traffic. The military and the wealthy that can afford satellite connections would generally only experience a reduction in bandwidth. The IP protocol can be rerouted, so the technically savvy and the large businesses could still reach the outside world via proxies and radio/satellite bridges. Note that internet connectivity in the EU would also be affected, as the major cables between the EU and China/Korea/Japan pass through Russia. However, there are enough submarine cables that lower bandwidth communication can be maintained through third countries. Doing it from the outside is harder. If done across the borders with Europe, the US and Japan, Russian traffic would be routed through China and Kazakhstan . Kazakhstan has already successfully tried cutting off their internet through similar means, however it would side with Russia. This would technically permit most traffic to be filtered by the Great Firewall, which is more mature and effective than Russia's fragmented filters implemented individually by various ISPs. China would then be able to affect the flow of data to and from Russia. In summary: it's possible to significantly reduce Russia's internet connectivity. However, it would disproportionately affect the common population and their access to Western media. As such, internet restrictions are more likely to support Putin rather than hurt him. Some of the population wouldn't notice, some would have to switch to local media and services, the technically inclined would find a way around. Mar 4 update: It has started. | {
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71,164 | As can be read in various sources, for example The Guardian , Russia has put its ‘nuclear deterrence forces’ on high alert. What does that even mean? Isn’t the point of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) that these forces are always ready to go? The article states that it probably doesn’t mean that the bombers are actually being loaded. But I don’t imagine that matters anyway. If MAD wouldn’t work because bombers aren’t ready then it is pointless anyway. What am I missing here? | Very hard to say what the actual changes are without looking at the specifics of Russian nuclear protocols (which nuclear countries do not generally share much, preferring to remain ambiguous). Russia's forces, like US ones, are capable of reacting to a first strike and thus are capable of operation without being "warmed up". This is true for ICBMs and SLBMS (sub-launched). However, at the political level, it is very clear what message is intended: "Russia is a nuclear state and don't you forget it". Nuclear alert levels were a ritualized signaling mechanism during the Cold War. Like a dog growling and raising its hackles it is meant to signal that it might bite. Not that it will bite, but that it wants you to know it is ready to (this is akin to moving the US's DEFCON levels, as Fluidcode points out ) Nuclear war is so dangerous that it is critically important to have a variety of signals to indicate intents and especially the level of threat you perceive from others or want to signal to others. Alert levels are part of that. What it's not is an indication that Russian forces are prepping for launching a strike. Those wouldn't be broadcast in advance. Most nuclear forces have been "off-alert", for whatever actual meaning that has, since the end of the Cold War. This is a spike back up. If you go back earlier in time in the Cold War, nuclear readiness was more gradual and had actual meanings, with aircraft needing to be loaded and possibly being put on station near the enemy territory. Earlier Soviet ICBMs were liquid-fuelled and needed considerable prep before being ready for launch. This is not the case anymore however. You do probably have things like bases being locked down and personnel being pulled back from leave. Putin already reminded us that Russia is a nuclear state in his original speeches on the 23rd. At one level, this is, usefully, reminding the more gung-ho of Western politicians that "boots on the ground" or engaging NATO air forces directly over Ukraine is a non-starter. What got us out of the Cold War in one piece is never to risk direct NATO-Russia combat. This something Biden, correctly, identified back when he advised US citizens to leave . Biden made the remarks in an interview with NBC News' Lester Holt, who asked him what kind of scenarios would prompt a U.S. rescue mission, if Russia invaded. "There's not [one]," Biden said. "That's a world war — when Americans and Russians start shooting at one another, we're in a very different world than we've ever been in." At another level, Putin would no doubt be thrilled if the West stopped supporting Ukraine altogether because the more timid amongst our politicians lost their resolve. However, this risks being another miscalculation - whatever Russia can do to NATO, NATO can do to Russia and Putin is losing world sympathy by the day with his antics. China, for one, would be horribly impacted if Putin managed to trigger a full on war. MAD is just as suicidal to all parties now as it was 30 years ago. To give an example of nuclear alertness level influencing a crisis, Israel loaded their nukes during the early days of the Yom Kippur War , when they were not doing well. And the US, which before had dragged its feet on helping them, immediately flooded them with military aid. Or during the Cuban Missile Crisis : US alert level raised Adlai Stevenson shows aerial photos of Cuban missiles to the United Nations, October 25, 1962.
The US requested an emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council on October 25. US Ambassador to the United Nations Adlai Stevenson confronted Soviet Ambassador Valerian Zorin in an emergency meeting of the Security Council, challenging him to admit the existence of the missiles. Ambassador Zorin refused to answer. The next day at 10:00 pm EDT, the US raised the readiness level of SAC forces to DEFCON 2. For the only confirmed time in US history, B-52 bombers went on continuous airborne alert, and B-47 medium bombers were dispersed to various military and civilian airfields and made ready to take off, fully equipped, on 15 minutes' notice. Further readings: Alert Status of Nuclear Weapons - Federation of American Scientists Despite concern about realerting effect, both US and Russian escalation strategies rely on significant realerting to signal and boost nuclear postures in a crisis. Alert status of nuclear weapons - AIP Conference Proceedings Since end of the Cold War, nuclear alert rates have been reduced in several ways:
• Strategic bombers were taken off alert in 1991.
• ICBM warhead loading reduced (United States); New START treaty included ICBM MIRV ban but was
abandoned in favor of ballistic missile defenses against rogue states.
• SLBM warhead loading reduced (United States).
• De-targeting initiatives: ICBMs/SLBMs targeted at open ocean areas during peacetime (note: de-targeting is
not dealerting).
• Non-strategic forces taken off alert. Most warheads destroyed but remaining placed in central storage. Some
still deployed on bases near launchers (US bombs in Europe; French cruise missiles). Note that the AIP publication also uses the term to indicate weapon readiness , where they say that Russia and the US both have about 20% of their nukes ready to fire on short notice. That's likely not what this is about, short term. This is about personnel, not gear : Putin has ordered the defence minister and the chief of the military to put nuclear deterrent forces in a ‘special regime of combat duty’. Finally, in a some-dude-on-Twitter-said vein, I found this when I tried to compare US Defcon levels to what Russia is up to: Like US DEFCON levels, Russia has a number of readiness levels: CONSTANT ELEVATED MILITARY DANGER FULL Putin ordered nuclear forces to ELEVATED level today. Concerning but not cause for panic yet (Where 1. would be lowest, as opposed to the US's DEFCON 1 being the worst and DEFCON 5 being "no worries"?) DW has picked these levels up as well, but is not sure where Putin's "special level" sits. "The expression he used to indicate some heightened state of alert does not exist in Russian military manuals," Eggert, DW's Russia affairs analyst said. There are four levels of alert in the Russian military, he explained. Those four levels are: regular, heightened, the threat of war and full or complete. "Nuclear forces are pretty much always on heightened alert," Eggert noted. | {
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71,199 | As the title asks, isn't sending weapons to Ukraine an escalation in the war? Perhaps, due to this not being a 'declared war' or an 'invasion' (from the Russian pov), so sending weapons to Ukraine isn't breaking 'international law' (I know it's irrelevant, but can be used as an argument from the Russian side), and Russia can't use that to object? Suppose an arms shipment is being delivered by country X, and just crosses the border of country X and Ukraine's border. If the Russian destroyed the shipment, and there were casualties, would that be an act of war against country X then? | First, weapons can be delivered through Poland : Reznikov ( Ukrainian Defense Minister ), in his video, tried to provide an answer. “You may deliver it to Poland,” he told potential donors. “From there, we will transport them across the land.” Delivery via Poland leaves Putin with 2 possibilities: attack Polish soil. And therefore NATO. Or extend his invasion to cover the Polish border areas, which is a lot more than most analyst expect him to have targeted at the beginning because it forces Russia to occupy all of Ukraine, more or less indefinitely. Second, yes, it's an escalation. No doubt. But an escalation in what? With regards to Ukraine, Putin has already invaded. He's not going to "double-plus invade" because of those weapons. They are also, very deliberately , defensive weapons in nature. Anti-tank missiles, surface to air missiles, etc... The kind of gear that allows infantry to engages armored vehicles and ground support aircraft. A country can't invade another with what's being delivered to Ukraine. There's chance those weapons, and the courageous self-defense they are used for by Ukraine, will prod the Russian army to abandon its relative restraint in attacking cities and civilian areas. There's already a sign of that happening in Kharkiv today . That's on Russia though, just on Russia. They decided to invade, they decide if they want to be even more ruthless. They'll probably win, in the short term, with the numbers and gear they have. But every extra bit of violence makes it less likely that they will ever be accepted by Ukrainians. It would be irresponsible and immoral for the West to use Ukrainians as "proxies" to weaken Russia. But it really, really, doesn't seem to be case here. Ukrainians genuinely do not want to be part of Russia's "near abroad" again and are only asking for weapons to defend themselves. In 2014, the West decided to cool things down and let Putin have his way in Crimea and Donbass. It seemed like a reasonable, if weak and timidly convenient, calculation at the time. It hasn't turned out that way, strictly due to Putin. Even now, analysts struggle to articulate an actual Russian-positive endgame to this, even if they win . No one really understands why Putin gave the invasion order on the 24th. With regards to risking Russia-NATO conflict? Yes, there is a real risk there. On the other hand, there is a real risk that not pushing back on Putin's Russia will embolden it to perform some other stupidity in the not too distant future. And, as others have remarked, the Cold War did see numerous events which involved supplying nations or groups fighting against one of the big powers. And, to be honest, the more contentious pressure point seems more throttling Russia's central bank access to its foreign currency holding. Then, again, when even Switzerland doesn't like you , you know you're not the most popular guy around. If Putin's dream is really to go back to the golden days of the Soviet Union, why the Warsaw Pact era map looks mighty uncomfortable doesn't it? Are these countries all part of the fellow Slav brotherhood so dear to Putin? Also, looking beyond Russia, which, for all its bluster and ruthlessness, is pretty much a has-been Great Power, except for its nukes, the West is also playing to the audience of China, a potential future adversary with considerably more potential. Not taking risks in supporting Ukraine now will make it difficult to negotiate any kind of equitable agreement with China say 20 years down the line. They will expect weakness from us and will act accordingly. At some point China will become stronger than the US. If Western countries do not want to be controlled by the likes of people who run concentration camps for Uyghurs, but instead want to have a stable world where countries have real independence, might be worth to show some spine now. | {
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71,204 | According to this BBC article , Russia anticipated that their invasion of Ukraine would lead to sanctions and one of their ways to sanction proof their economy was to build a large foreign currency reserve to prop it up. However, according to this Washington Post article , it seems a lot of those reserves are held in western banks and are now being frozen. Doesn't having the money overseas defeat the purpose of having built up the foreign reserves at all? Why didn't they store the money in their own banks? | You cannot really "store" lots of money in the physical sense. Money is an entitlement to benefits in the future and mostly is just numbers in some computers and typically there is always a counterpart to every transaction. This here is a case of vanishing counterparts. Think about money in terms of goods changing ownership. Russia sold lots of natural resources and by this converted them into overseas assets. They earned the right to buy goods from their trading partners in the future. They could have done that already and brought these assets already home by increasing imports (buy gold, apples, paper clips) or by storing huge amounts of dollar bills at home. But probably both wasn't practical and anyway, nobody can live from gold or dollar bills alone. They didn't do it, otherwise the trade surplus would have reversed . So they stayed as overseas assets. And that's where they provide liquidity. They tried to diversify their foreign currency reserves away from dollar and euro also towards yen (doesn't help them now) and yuan, but only 13% of them are in yuan, and gold. The majority of their foreign assets are still in euro, dollar, sterling and yen and they are all inaccessible now. If there is an ordinary economical crisis, having a financial cushion is great, you can support your economy by temporary deficit spending. If however there are economic sanctions, this will not help. Trade is disrupted and your assets are temporarily (or permanently) inaccessible. Think of it as parts of the World not wanting to honor payment agreements with Russia under the present circumstances. That makes these assets pretty useless. The gold they have is also difficult to use because nowadays it's actually hard to do large-scale business with physical money like dollar bills or gold bars. Maybe China might help out. They could increase their exports to Russia with or without compensation. Otherwise Russia's economy is basically on its own and on its own it may be worth much less than before. It may also have an unfavorable composition, not producing the stuff that Russians actually need. Conclusion: This question stumbles over a fundamental misconception of what money is. Large amounts of money are not stored physically. They are represented by contracts with two sides to the contract, therefore they are not localized at a single position in the world but have at least two end points (one in Russia and one overseas). Now Russia was unable to move all the overseas endpoints to China where it would have been still usable. Instead a large chunk of their foreign assets had counter-parties in Europe, the US or Japan. These counter-parties have refused to honor the agreements now and this means that a huge part of the assets of Russia effectively vanished into thin air for the moment. Russia may have underestimated the unity of almost all their trading partners in this matter and the sanctions are indeed exceptional, but in the end it just means that foreign currency reserves are never completely safe. The argument about the large amount of foreign reserves of Russia and the protection it would give them was always seriously flawed. Epilogue: The same but even one order of magnitude larger could happen to China, should for example China attack Taiwan and the rest of the world decides to conveniently ignore the $3 trillion foreign exchange reserves of China. It could make such a potential attack the most expensive attack ever. | {
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71,207 | President Zelensky of Ukraine urged the European Union today to grant his country immediate accession to the EU bloc. Would joining the EU bloc rapidly allow the European Union members to help more efficiently Ukraine during wartime? or thwart Russia's plans in any way? edit -- excerpts from the NYT Zelensky: "We appeal to the European Union for Ukraine’s immediate accession under a new special procedure. Our goal is to stand alongside all Europeans and, most importantly, to stand on their level" The European Union wants Ukraine to join the bloc “over time,” Ms. von der Leyen said in an interview with Euronews on Saturday, although she gave no indication of timing. Ukraine took a first step to joining the European Union in early 2014, but progress toward accession has been slow. Kyiv’s turn toward the European Union and the West has angered President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia and has helped fuel a conflict involving Russia-backed separatists in eastern Ukraine | The simple fact is that it is not feasible. Even if everybody agreed in principle, the EU was ready to waive some of the requirements and ignore all other political considerations, it would still take years of technical work to actually integrate with the EU. Without that, Ukraine would not effectively function as part of the EU. Consequently, the entire point of the speech is symbolic: expressing an aspiration, forcing a discussion, getting the EU to take a stance and promise a speedy process, messaging to the people of Ukraine or to Russia, having something to give up in future negotiations, etc. What membership entails or what could actually happen after it's done isn't the main point right now. | {
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71,233 | Why doesn't Russia object to Norway's NATO membership like it does to that of Finland, Ukraine, and Georgia? Is it because the border with Norway is much shorter and basically in the middle of nowhere high up north? | Norway has been in NATO from day one . Norway and NATO
As a founding member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Norway has been an active participant in NATO since the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington on the 4th of April 1949. Russia's communicated grievance about NATO's actual and potential expansion concerns states admitted since the collapse of the Soviet Union . Also, Norway's membership, with its geography, small population and total lack of cultural affinity with Russia is much less of risk and snub to Russian security and self-view than "losing" Georgia or Ukraine. As to Finland, it had been pushed into an effective neutrality , one that it did not always appreciate much, during the Cold War. But while the circumstances of that neutrality were not always pleasant to the Finns, neutrality itself seemed broadly popular . For them to consider joining NATO is a strong indication of the lack of trust that Russia in its current state engenders in its neighbors. Finland, while small, is also much closer to the major city of St. Petersburg. | {
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71,251 | In Europe, there are not many countries that have not sanctioned Russia for attacking Ukraine. Serbia is one of the few that has not so far done so. What reasons have the country's leadership given for this decision? | "They (Russia) were the only country not to have imposed sanctions against us in the 1990s," Vucic said after a National Security Council meeting. "They also supported our territorial integrity in the United Nations. We must not forget that," Vucic said, referring to Russia's stance on Serbia's former province of Kosovo whose independence Moscow refuses to recognise. In full: "As for the sanctions, just tell me how can we simply impose sanctions against Russia overnight just to please someone? Against the only country that did not impose sanctions against us in the 1990s , against the country that has not imposed sanctions against the Republic of Srpska , against the country that saved us in the UN Security Council in 2015? Do you think you have the right to forget such things in state affairs? Let alone that it is dishonest in respect of people who have never done anything wrong against our country ," The Serbian president stressed that Russia is a major guarantor of Serbia’s sovereignty in the UN Security Council and UNSC Resolution 1244 . Serbia has put its gas and oil sectors in Russia's hand s. In 2008 the Balkan country sold a majority stake of its oil company to Gazprom Neft Gazprom is the majority stakeholder in the country's sole gas storage facility . In return, Russia has been blocking membership of Serbia's former province Kosovo in the United Nations. (In 2019, Vladimir Putin presented Aleksandar Vucic with the Order of Alexander Nevsky “for his great personal contribution to the development of multilateral cooperation with Russia.”) However , Vucic said the National Security Council concluded the Republic of Serbia considers "very wrong the violation of territorial integrity of a number of countries including Ukraine." “Serbia respects the norms of international law, but understands its needs well and, despite the wishes of others, has its own national interests, respects traditional friendship,” Vučić said. He added that Serbia is temporarily halting military exercises with all states. After Russia recognized the independence of the LNR and the DNR, Vucic said that this decision “completely changes the world order.” Also: Georgia also refused to impose sanctions against Russia. Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili said that this “will only harm the country and the population.” He added that Georgia expresses “full solidarity and support” to Ukraine, but will “be guided only by national interests.” https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/serbia-will-not-impose-sanctions-against-moscow-president-says-2022-02-25/ https://hindustannewshub.com/russia-ukraine-news/serbia-refused-to-impose-sanctions-against-russia-so-did-georgia-the-moscow-times-in-russian/ https://tass.com/world/1411539 | {
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71,257 | I would like to state beforehand that the war Ukraine is tragic and I hope the conflict will end soon (preferably resolved via negotiations). However it is hard to ignore that it receives a lot more attention and attracts a lot more passion than other similar conflicts in recent history.^1 Post-WW2 conflicts in Europe As it has been already discussed in this forum, the conflict might become the most significant European war since World War 2, but it remains a rather tall mark: (a) Yugoslav wars with 130,000-140,000 casualties are still well ahead; (b) the number of troops involved is notably less than those involved either in Yugoslavia or during the Warsaw pact invasion of Czechoslovakia (E.g., this article claims that only half of the amassed 150,000 Russian troops have been committed so far, whereas the initial commitment for Czechoslovakia was 250,000). Post-WW2 conflicts elsewhere Korean war (1950-53) - about 3 million civilian deaths, and more than 2 million military deaths; committed forces up to 2 million on both sides Vietnam war (1955-75, including French and American action) - between 1,3 to 3,5 millions of deaths (note the uncertainty!), about 2 millions of fighters committed by both sides Algerian war (1954-62) - from 350,000 to 1.5 million deaths, depending on which side made the estimate; about 800,000 fighters committed; about 2 million refugees. Soviet-Afghan war (1979-89) - between half a million and 2 millions killed American invasion of Afghanistan (2001-2021) - about 200,000 killed American invasion of Iraq (2003-2011) - from 100,000 to 1 million killed Syrian civil war (from 2011) - about 600,000 killed Arab-Israeli conflict (from 1948) - about 120,000 killed Iran-Iraq war (1980-88) - about 400,000-800,000 total deaths Question What makes the Ukrainian war special? More specifically: does it touch essential economic, political or other interests of either side? ^1 : The conflict receives a lot more attention and attracts a lot more passion than other similar conflicts in recent history, e.g., in terms of the level/harshness of the actual and proposed sanctions against Russia ( excluding a permanent member from the UNSC? - has it ever been tried before?) in terms of the public outcry (including the remarks on this site) in terms of the media attention (both conventional and social media) | There are a few reasons: A major factor is that Ukraine is right next to NATO member countries , and that Putin has explicitly made the conflict at least partly about his dislike of NATO. This is obviously relevant insofar as provincialism plays a role: leaders of countries in NATO, not to mention ordinary citizens, are unsurprisingly more worried about a war that might directly affect them. Particularly for people in Europe, a war a few countries over represents a more immediate threat. However, this is worrying even for many people who do not live in NATO countries, because they believe that an open confrontation could ensue between NATO and Russia, both of which have nuclear weapons, leading to a nuclear conflict and even an extremely destructive Third World War. That is the view expressed here ; the US president Joe Biden has even said that any clash between US and Russian troops would be a world war. Putin has also put Russia's nuclear forces on alert. Even though this may largely be posturing, this is the major concern about the conflict throughout most of the world : for instance, one can easily find questions on forums asking if "X country would be bombed in the nuclear war between Russia and the United States." Newspapers from India , South Africa and many other countries have been speculating about the possibility of an open nuclear conflict. In part, many of the wars mentioned in the question seem more obscure or less controversial than they were because of the effects of time. The US-Iraq war was heavily covered at the time, and attracted negative press in a number of countries outside the United States (and in the United States itself, some time later). But with time, people forget about the news coverage those wars received, and new stories about them become less common even when ongoing. The Vietnam War was huge , but it also occurred half a century ago. It must be mentioned that for some people—certainly not everyone—open or covert bigotry also plays a role in their assessment of the conflict. Al Jazeera compiled an article listing an assortment of reporters at national news outlets (including one of their own reporters!) and other figures of note who basically said that the war in Ukraine is more serious because the victims are European (if not directly White). This is clearly not the only reason that someone would view the war in Ukraine as serious or presenting a greater worldwide threat than many of the wars mentioned in the question, but it does appear to have a greater influence than one might hope. | {
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71,290 | One of the major reasons why Russia is stated to be so much in the need of controlling the Crimean peninsula, is that their economy is restricted due to having too few options for sea trade, having very limited access to the sea. The north is frozen for a big part of the year, and Vladivostok is too remote, therefore they need another sea trading option. However, even if Crimea stayed in Ukrainian hands and they blockaded the Kerch Strait and cut off Mariupol and Rostov, Russia still has over 400 km of coastline on the NE part of the Black Sea. Is that coastline so unsuited for building a sea port (or expanding existing ones, like Sochi)? Why is control over Sevastopol (in terms of sea trade) so important for the Russians, so they risk a potentially very costly war over it? | Military importance There are several reasons of the importance of Crimea to Russia, the primary of which is the Sevastopol naval base , which is the largest Russian naval base on the Black sea: It is a comfortable harbor with extensive military and naval infrustructure, built over decades (or even centuries). It is simply difficult to replace at a reasonable cost and in a short amount of time. It allows Russia to control the black sea coast of its immediate neighbors, notably Ukraine and Georgia, but also other countries, and potentially teh Balkans. (See below for the map). The Black sea provides the shortest and the surest access to the Mediterranean sea, and by extension to the Indian Ocean and Southern Atlantic (what in US parlance is called projecting military power to the Mediterranean ). Economical importance The OP suggest that Sevastopol is not indispensable for trade - this is correct, given that Russia still has a rather long Black sea coast line. Also, traditionally the trade in the Black sea was passing not through Sevastopol, but through Odessa (a Russian equivalent of Marseille), which is not in Crimea and still under Ukrainian control. However, any trade is largely dependent on presence of a military force, guaranteeing its protection, although this is arguably not the principal mission of the Russian Black Sea fleet. Historical and cultural significance Crimea was conquered by Russia from the Ottoman empire by Prince Potemkin (during the reign of Catherine II), in realizing the Peter I vision of Russian access to the warm Black sea. Crimean war Several wars were fought in Crimea against Turkey and its allies, most notably the Crimean war , in which Britain and France militarily supported Turkey. This war is sometimes cited as the first mediatized war , as the war correspondents were present in place, and the photos were published in newspapers, and people were shocked by the explicit brutality of the war. Sevastopol is still a name of many landmarks, e.g., in France, in the memory of this war. Sevastopol sketches is a famous series of stories by Leo Tolstoy (the author of the War and Peace ) about the war. In less formal culture Sevastopol is well-known as a hot sea resort during the Soviet period (a kind of Russian Côte d'Azur), as well as for the wine making tradition - see Crimean wines . Some additional reading Crimea's strategic value to Russia What is Russia doing in the Black sea? What makes the Black sea so strategically important? | {
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71,318 | Apologies for the controversial question, but this is something I'm curious about. Historically, and particularly in recent history, invasions of one country into another are generally justified as "it will be better for the residents of country B if they are ruled by country A instead of their current rulers". This was the case with both Iraq and Afghanistan, and, as it's played out by history, has actually somehow more or less turned out to be true in those 2 examples. Now, the situation in Ukraine is confusing, because news media are alternately claiming Ukraine to be a Western-style democracy but also a corrupt oligarchy (not that those two things are entirely incompatible with one another, but I digress), so it's difficult to determine to an outside observer. It seems to be the case that it is commonly agreed upon that this is not true of the current Russia-Ukraine conflict, that there is no possible way that Ukraine will be "better off" under Russian control than under its own control. However, I am unfamiliar with the specifics of that argument, only that it is so stated and agreed. So my question is, as someone who knows very little about the internal workings of Russia or of Ukraine: If Putin were to make a similar claim to the above, that the lives of Ukranians would be better under Russian rule as opposed to their own rule, what evidence to we have to falsify that statement? Obviously general considerations of one country being taken over by another include the right to self-governance, which is certainly one issue, but I'm wondering more specifically regarding the particular parties of engagement in this conflict rather than general considerations. What, specifically, is it believed that Russia would do negatively to Ukraine, if it was to take over? I'm specifically looking for examples of things that Putin and/or other Russian or Soviet regimes have said or done with regards to Ukraine in the past as indications of what they might do again. Of course anything is hypothetically possible, but I'm interested in likely outcomes, not simply possible or hypothetical ones. | I think Belarus makes a fair example of why a country would not want to be dictated by Russia. Its people endured massive dangers to get rid of Lukashenko in protests and were beaten up accordingly. Or Russia itself for that matter. This is a resource-rich country, with talented people and look what they've achieved in 20 years. A GDP less than Canada's. This a whole generation in both countries that have had a better future stolen from them, with no end in sight. That's plenty to think about when you decide whether to go along with his threats or resist, at risk to your life. Out of people that challenged Putin in elections one was poisoned and is in prison now. The other one was assassinated. Ukraine has competitive elections, and a fair bit of corruption which might have evolved for the better had they been on track to join the EU. Russia hasn't had competitive elections since Putin got in and its corruption is entrenched. For that matter, Ukrainians have direct experience with being ruled by Putin's allies. And being victimized by Putin-sponsored separatists in Crimea and Donbas. Last, his speech stating they were not historically a nation inspires no confidence whatsoever in a better life under him, not least because his gold standard, the Soviet Union, treated Ukraine horribly at times. Would living under Russia have been better than being put under horrors they are being subjected to right now? Possibly, but people have had to make choices between submission and resistance ever since history started. Once Russia started killing people, the choice wasn't really there anymore however - Russia wasn't going to be accepted as a desirable alternative though it might yet impose its rule by oppression. I'm the first person to be surprised, and awed, by Ukrainian resistance. But it's not like they had any good reasons to trust Putin's word. | {
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71,340 | It's pretty clear that NATO does not want to get militarily involved in the war between Russia and Ukraine. However a NATO country like Poland or Romania could still decide to send in troops to defend Ukraine on their own accord. Let's say something like that were to happen and Russia starts bombing Poland or Romania in retaliation, would Article 5 still be invoked in such a case? The troops would only be sent in to help bolster the defense of Ukrainian cities. They would not engage Russian troops unless they were being attacked by Russian troops. Nor would these troops attack any targets in Russia or Belarus. So if Russia decides to attack Poland/Romania for merely helping to defend the territory of Ukraine, would Article 5 still be invoked? | The comparison with Turkey's forces being attacked in Syria, even by Russia, (which did happen ), isn't 100% relevant because Art.5 starts with "The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all [...]" Syria is not Europe or North America. Ukraine is in Europe. The part o.m. quoted is relevant still in the sense that NATO may decide it was an attack, but do nothing much about it. There's plenty of precedent for discounting isolated incidents/attacks, like NATO planes shot down by the Soviets during the cold war over Germany, over the Baltic etc. So some stray Russian shell killing a bunch of Polish or Romanian troops near the border will probably not result in WW3. It would take a more concerted attack than that. | {
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71,356 | I am referring to Indian Prime Minister Modi second phone call to Putin during Russo-Ukraine conflicts, to get help to evacuate stranded Indian Students in Ukraine. So Putin halted his war for 6 hours . Is it first time in history that ongoing war was halted for few hours to evacuate people? | According to more serious (but still Indian) sources relating on the matter (of this 2nd phone call), like The Hindu reporting of today , no such cessation was agreed. At best: Moscow is considering a humanitarian corridor for foreign nationals stuck in Kharkiv So it looks like pipanews.com = fake news. On the other hand, the Indian foreign ministry has confirmed the death of one Indian student in the shelling on Kharkiv. | {
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71,376 | So, my newsfeed had an item about "H&M" stopping selling things to Russa, as well as a score of other random retailers (Nike? etc...). I can sort of see the possible argument about efficacy of a (self) ban on Google or Apple's side, given their scale and impact in daily life of people. But a random clothing retailer and such? Leaving aside pure posturing to generate good will with their Western customers, is there any meaningful purpose in stopping selling consumer goods to Russia? It seems counter-productive actually - if they sell to Russia, they hopefully syphon more hard currency out of Russia's financial ecosystem. | Both selling goods, consumer or otherwise, as well as buying Russian products, is an excellent way to make Russian citizens realize that a war is going on. You see, there is no independent media in Russia, none whatsoever. Over half of the population gets all the news from the state-controlled TV, which produces not news but propaganda. I was born and raised in Ukraine and got my BS in Russia, and therefore have friends and relatives in both countries. As a child I lived in USSR, so I'm very familiar with how total propaganda works. Smarter people see the inconsistencies in the state propaganda, but too many people just believe whatever they were told. This has been done many times, both by Nazi Germany and by Soviet Union to justify their wars in the eyes of its population. It's never "let's occupy Czechoslovakia and Poland", it's "let's protect our German brothers living there." It's never "let's occupy Eastern Europe", it's "let's help workers free themselves from capitalists." Or, as IMHO is likely to happen this or next year, "let's help Taiwan citizens in their unspoken desire to unify with China." If you completely control the media you control the perspective, no matter how made up it is. And today many Russians don't believe that there is a war waged by Russia against Ukraine. They were told completely untrue propaganda stories of civil unrest in Ukraine that Russia allegedly has nothing to do with, and that Ukrainian Nazis are committing genocide of ethnic Russians, and that Russia has no option to protect its brethren other than a limited friendly peacekeeping action. All of it is completely 100% false, but many citizens of Russia has no access to media to contradict this bullshit, and so they believe it. Ukrainians published a screen capture of text messages from a fallen Russian soldier's cellphone. A drafted soldier texting his mother that he's so scared that he wants to commit suicide; his mother reassures him that military exercises are not too dangerous and offers to send him a parcel from home; he replies that he's no longer in training, that there's a real war, that he is forced to shoot at both Ukrainian soldiers and peaceful citizens. As pointed out in comments, this story needs a reference, so here it is (as reported without the translation by vice.com ): One way to get through propaganda is to his the shelves. No matter what TV says, if most goods have disappeared from the supermarkets you ought to know that something's amiss. If suddenly you cannot buy quality consumer products and have to settle for domestic (which is terrible in Russia most of the time) you take a notice. If, furthermore, you cannot buy even domestic because you business went belly up, you pay even more attention. The latter one is the reason why many American businesses halted imports from Russia. Russians who have access to info are already fleeing Russia. Somebody traced paths of planes belonging to Russia's oligarchs. Most of them fled Russia within days of invasion, but not after loosing like half of their investments. Economic pressure is effective; halting business in both direction makes people reconsider their options. Per comment, here's the source about oligarchs fleeing Russia; these are tracks of oligarch's planes flight paths (from townandcountrymag.com ): ADDED: it looks like the sanctions against average people started to work a little. Here's an interview with Baronova , a former head of a Russian state controlled news organization who just quit over this war. This is what she says, among other things: “People were in favor on [the] first day of invasion. Now they are
less convinced and much more skeptical because they understand now
that they are going to lose their jobs, they are going to lose their
cars, their iPhones, their everything,” she said. “So, let’s see what
that are going to say in a month … The whole world is in a bad
position.” | {
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71,384 | If the USA (or another western country) wants to help Ukraine without sending troops, one thing it can do is to convince Russian soldiers in Ukraine to desert the Russian army, for example, by promising a green card to any soldier who abandons his post. As many Russian soldiers are poor, and do not entirely support Putin, this deal might be attractive to them. Clearly, only few soldiers will be able to get out, but even if one or two soldiers escapes, this might affect the morale of remaining soldiers. Instead of thinking how to beat the Ukrainians, they might think how to escape. Question: does it break any international law or treaty, to pay soldiers of another country to abandon their duty? Are there any other repercussions to this idea? BTW, It is interesting to note that, in the present war in Ukraine, both sides have directly called on soldiers of the other side to defect: Putin calls Ukrainian soldiers to defect: in his address from 24/2 : "I would also like to address the military personnel of the Ukrainian Armed Forces... I urge you to immediately lay down arms and go home. I will explain what this means: the military personnel of the Ukrainian army who do this will be able to freely leave the zone of hostilities and return to their families." Ukraine calls Russian pilots to defect: taken from this answer : "RUSSIAN PILOT, SURRENDER TO THE UKRAINIAN MILITARY! the only way to save your life and honor! According to the decision of the General Director Yuri Gusev, the State Concern "Ukroboronprom" is ready to pay bonuses for stolen combat aircraft of the occupiers! $ 1,000,000 for a stolen or trophy combat-ready aircraft. 500,000 US dollars - for a captured military helicopter in working order." | It has been done all the time: e.g., via dropping propaganda leaflets behind the enemy lines , as was done during both world wars. In modern days (e.g., in Israel confrontation with Palestinians) it is done not only via leaflets, but also by making telephone calls, media broadcasting and publisizing the good deeds of defectors, such as the Son of Hamas . Althoigh in this case we are not dealing with soldiers of another state , strictly speaking. | {
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71,401 | Some 25 nations were on the call and all said they would continue to contribute aid, some saying for the first time their support will include lethal assistance. NATO was also represented. In addition, two other countries that could not make the conference said separately that they would donate support, Sky News understands. https://news.sky.com/story/ukraine-28-nations-agree-to-give-more-weapons-and-military-aid-to-country-after-russian-invasion-sky-news-understands-12551824 Earlier I used to believe that no countries would interfere as that could cause WW3.But after reading this news I have a question that instead of giving fighter jets,guns,bulletproof vests why doesn't any country share the nuclear arsenal/umbrella(as some countries do share nuclear umbrella) or the codes,which in turn may result in the end of the war? | This 'suggestion' is grasping at straws which do not exist. If the West wants to defend Ukraine and thereby risk WWIII, they can do it by directly fighting for Ukraine. If they don't want to risk WWIII, they must observe limits to their support for Ukraine. It would be against the Non-Proliferation Treaty . Russia would interpret that as a nuclear weapon used by the Western powers. Compare the Cuban Missile Crisis . The same applies to suggestions for immediate NATO membership, or immediate EU membership, or a no-fly zone. One can debate going to war over Ukraine, but please do it with open eyes. | {
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71,443 | Zelensky has recently requested NATO to set up a no-fly zone over Ukraine hoping to reduce the bombing and NATO rejected this request . The main reason provided for this was not dragging the alliance in this conflict. I am wondering about how could setting up such a no-fly zone actually be implemented in the current context. The announcement would be the easy part, but it is not clear how could NATO actually enforce it since it explicitly stated to not send any NATO troops to Ukraine . | Enforcing a no-fly zone would mean several things: telling Russia that it can not fly its military aircraft over all, or portions, of Ukraine, a country that is not in NATO. flying NATO aircraft over that airspace and using those NATO aircraft to shoot down Russian aircraft violating the no-fly order. most likely it would also mean engaging with, and destroying, Russia surface to air missile systems (SAMs) that actively threaten NATO aircraft flying those interdiction patrols. (the fact that the no-fly zone over Ukraine would be imposed at Ukraine's request, as an unjustly aggressed nation, changes zilch/nada/nothing to the above statements) Further reading: THE DANGEROUS ALLURE OF THE NO-FLY ZONE I am going to speculate here, but I suspect Zelinsky is well aware of the extreme nuclear escalation risks associated with this and only half-expects this to happen. However, he is also extremely media savvy and clearly understands that Western public opinion is distressed at "not doing enough" about Russia's aggression, especially as the war is progressing to a Grozny/Aleppo style of brutally leveling cities. The fact that our leaders have no choice but to "meekly refuse to help" could be very helpful leverage to pressure Western countries to get more sanctions going against Russia as well as more lethal help. Certainly while the unexpectedly dismal effectiveness of the Russian army is entirely due to Ukrainians' willingness to fight against overwhelming odds, the volume and severity of sanctions, boycotts and lethal aid against Russia - including from habitual foot-draggers like Germany - already far outweigh what anyone could have expected a month ago and may very well tip the balance in the long term. Maintaining the pressure on the West to keep up, and expand those sanctions is likely a key concern to Zelensky. p.s. Previous no-fly zones, in Iraq and Yugoslavia, involved active shooting from NATO aircraft. There is no way around it unless the targeted nation submits from the onset. p.p.s. No-fly zones aren't going to be enforced only by NATO surface to air missiles not located in Ukraine either. Even if that was technically possible, which I highly, highly, doubt (especially in a context where Russian planes being interdicted are flying low-level ground attack runs), that would just be inviting disaster like shooting down Russian medevac helicopters or the like. Additionally, it would only invite Russian to retaliate against units on NATO territory, not Ukraine, making this an even more daft policy. Last, Kiyv, the closest main fighting area is about 350km from Romania, the closest NATO country, while Odessa's area, closer to South Eastern Romania is still a considerable distance away (150k?) and sees no current fighting . Those are not within easy SAM ranges. p.p.p.s As @llama points out, suppressing threatening Russian SAM batteries would be especially fraught for those based on Russian territory rather than in Ukraine itself. | {
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71,548 | Inspired by the question, Who is the Russian military commander in charge of the war on Ukraine? ; this made me wonder why the United States makes it known who its generals are and what operations they will be leading? Considering that this would make them potential targets for assassination, although unlikely that it would be successful, the risk is still there. I don't see why the public, much less the rest of the world (with the exception of the friendly forces we are working with), needs to know that information in general. | The U.S. feels secure from assassinations (and honestly, when was the last time you recall a U.S. general being assassinated, so the sense of security is not delusional), and values having visible heroes/leaders to personify military actions. Also, it is virtually impossible to keep this information secret from even the most feeble foreign intelligence agency, since tens of thousands of people have a need-to-know reason to know the name of a military general. | {
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71,550 | It is clear at the moment that no Western countries will send troops to Ukraine or set up a non-fly zone in Ukraine because they worry that will lead to a WWIII. But Putin already said Western sanctions are akin to declaration of war . If Western countries keep adding harsh economic sanctions on Russia, which will destroy the economy of Russia (and Putin's administration hopefully) eventually, there is a possibility that they push Russia to a corner for no choice but fighting back with something and that something could be nuclear weapons. What is the basis for the Western leaders to believe that emphasizing on harsh sanctions will not lead to a nuclear war with Russia eventually? | That's not necessarily the belief. When trying to make arrangements for future outcomes, anything can go wrong. The best that people can do is try to maximize probabilities of good outcomes and minimize probabilities of bad outcomes. If it is estimated that the chain of possible escalations which would result from imposing sanctions is less likely to cause an all-out war than the chain of possible outcomes which would result from not imposing sanctions, then it is a better bet to impose sanctions. Given that looking the other way has resulted in Putin escalating every time, and given that historically aggressors have not curtailed their own trajectory of escalations until they have been stopped by others, imposing a cost on an escalation seems to be a less risky medium-term strategy. Sanctions impose a cost without themself starting an all-out war. If the escalation continues, sanctions and other means will be used to impose further cost until the trajectory of escalations is stopped, and probably until it is reversed. | {
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71,555 | One of the core demands that Russia is making on Ukraine is that Ukraine enshrine neutrality, thereby permanently refraining from joining NATO. In other words, one of the reasons Russia went to war is to stop Ukraine from joining NATO. Given that all member states in NATO must agree to a new state joining , why can't Russia prevent Ukraine from joining the alliance by getting Turkey or Hungary (or any other willing state that's already in NATO) to agree to veto any attempt by Ukraine to join the alliance? This sounds like a considerably simpler method to achieve the goal than going to war. I remember reading that Western leaders refuse to rule out admitting Ukraine in the future because they believe in Ukraine's right to self-determination, but this arrangement also sidesteps that objection, since Ukraine would still be free to apply, they just won't be able to join. If this is possible: has it been suggested? If this is not possible (or not acceptable to Russia): why not? Related: What, if any, reasons prevented Ukraine from joining NATO? which indicates that Hungary has already been blocking Ukraine from joining NATO, so if Hungary can be persuaded (or compelled via treaty) to keep blocking Ukraine from joining NATO, then there is no need for Russia to go to war. | From the linked question , Hungary had serious objections to Ukraine joining NATO already, and they took concrete steps like blocking talks etc. Enshrining that in a treaty, e.g. between Hungary and Russia, would put the country doing this at an even more serious diplomatic standoff with the rest of NATO. To the point where they might be de-facto ejected. While NATO, unlike the EU, has no provision to suspend a country's membership, the treaty is also fairly flexible in what member countries must do. According to some analysts, the real power of NATO is the integrated command and control and the presence of tripwire forces. The treaty is more like a paper appendage to these. There's nothing preventing the rest of the countries, sufficiently pissed off, from creating NATO 2.0, minus the country that has openly declared would sabotage the alliance in some fundamental way. Something like that more or less happened at the WTO, where the objecting country was the much more powerful US. | {
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71,601 | There are these two symbols ( Z & V) which are considered as Russian prowar symbols which are appearing on Russian Army vehicles and being worn by Russians supporting the war. There is some speculation that they could mean Zapad and Vostok . Does it have anything to do with the Zapad 2017 War Game ? What is the meaning of these symbols? | The most common explanation, usually from those with military experience, is that it is a form of IFF - identification, friend or foe. When Ukraine was part of the USSR, it had substantial manufacturing capacity, not least in terms of military vehicles and equipment.
After the breakup, Ukraine found itself with both factories and a large amount of now ex-Soviet inventory. Since then it has manufactured its own military equipment but their ancestry is usually quite obvious. To that end, with both Russia and Ukraine meeting on the battleground, they would be using equipment, that to the layman's eye, or to civilians, to those untrained, and to those without time to confirm identity, looked identical to each other. In some ways the only other way to identify would have been camouflage painted on but in fog of war that might not always work as well. This is further complicated by the fact that some Russian units were seen with very similar camouflage. So to that end, Russian vehicles were daubed with Z on them to identify them as friendly to their own forces.
Note that it was done last minute (some reports 21 Feb), just before rolling in, so that the OPFOR would not be aware of them or find out their meaning well before. Example: Both countries use variants of the bronyetransportyor, armored transporter: https://www.dialog.ua/ukr/war/246774_1645441351 Since they were first written about the markings and their meaning has had lots of variations seen, and the most copy pasted meaning version is this: https://twitter.com/RuslanLeviev/status/1497216201616936964?s=20&t=6u1E6Xwood4CvzVuJXZRlw Z - ZVO (ZVO), V - VVO (VVO), △ - SVO, / - most likely CVO.
Zorro is no longer Zorro. or https://zaxid.net/ukrayinski_viyskovi_pokazali_yak_vorog_markuye_svoyu_tehniku_n1537191 "Z" is the symbol for the Russian armed forces in the east, who are involved in operations in the Donetsk region,the "Z" in a square or circle identifies Russian vehicles coming from Crimea, the circle or "O" identifies vehicles from Belarus - some interpretations suggest that these are Belarusian vehicles, but this is not confirmed, the "V" is a symbol for Marines - other interpretations indicate armed forces from the Brest region of Belarus,the symbol "X" is used by the Chechens, "A" is the symbol of special operations forces (SPETSNAZ). (When the markings were first spotted before the invasion, some observers thought it representative of pre-invasion markings, meaning: 'preparations completed'} Other common theories: https://www.marca.com/en/lifestyle/world-news/2022/03/01/621e58eee2704e3e4f8b45f7.html "Often these symbols will be location-based - they will communicate where the unit is going," Michael Clarke, former director of defence of the think tank RUSI, told Sky. "They are probably signals that tell which units are heading to the northeast or northwest of a district, for example." https://www.hitc.com/en-gb/2022/03/07/what-does-the-z-on-russian-tanks-mean/ Without official confirmation, there is only speculation behind what "Z" could mean. Kamil Galeev, a former Galina Starovoitova Fellow at policy think tank The Wilson Center, tweeted that some interpreted the "Z" as short for "za pobedy" — the Russian term for "victory." Others have guessed the "Z" is short for "zapad" (or west) and is meant to signify west-bound infantry. https://fortune.com/2022/03/07/russia-z-tank-marking-how-letter-became-symbol-pro-ukraine-war-invasion/ How Z came to be Experts suggest the symbol was first used as a unit identification marking to avoid friendly fire between Russians. Usage of the letter Z was first reported on Feb. 28 by U.S. armed forces defense journal Task & Purpose, which argued it was a way of distinguishing Russians from Ukrainians, as both sides use similar military equipment. The journal notes that in the fog of war, “a Russian T-72 main battle tank may look a lot like a Ukrainian T-80 through long-range sights.” The Russian Defense Ministry issued a statement on March 3, noting that Z stood for Za pobedu, or “For victory,” while V stood for Sila v pravde, or “Our strength is in truth.” But the usage of more than one letter has left some believing the letter signifies the end location or mission of the vehicle. Former Marine Capt. Rob Lee, who spent a year with a defense-focused think tank in Moscow and is now a Ph.D. candidate at the Department of War Studies at King’s College London, notes the Z symbol is “different from what you normally see on Russian vehicles.” “They’re obviously something new. And the most likely reason they would have put these kinds of symbols on is to indicate a different task force, a different echelon,” (Note: See later on for Russian/Soviet era formation markings, which could be related) Since its introduction as a military fixture, the letter Z can now be found anywhere, from T-shirts to car stickers. Online usernames have capitalized the letter to show support, and even children in hospice were reportedly lined up to form a Z shape. https://taskandpurpose.com/analysis/russian-military-equipment-white-markings/ Here’s what those mysterious white ‘Z’ markings on Russian military equipment may mean (FEB 24, 2022) “Bottom line is the ‘Z’ markings (and others like it) are a deconfliction measure to help prevent fratricide, or friendly fire incidents,” said Air Force Lt. Col. Tyson Wetzel, senior Air Force fellow with The Atlantic Council think tank in Washington, D.C. Because Russian warplanes, such as SU-25 Frogfoots and SU-34 Fullbacks, fly too quickly for their pilots to recognize the “Z” markings, these symbols are more likely meant to deter fratricide from Russian attack helicopters, artillery, rocket launchers, and mortars, Wetzel said. https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/44413/mysterious-symbols-are-appearing-on-russian-military-vehicles-near-ukraine Mysterious Symbols Are Appearing On Russian Military Vehicles Near Ukraine (FEBRUARY 22, 2022) So far, photos and videos that have appeared on social media show a range of different symbols, the implication presumably being that these will be used for rapid identification on and around the battlefield. This is especially important when large numbers of vehicles are headed in different directions and require marshalling by troops or other security forces on the ground who may not be immediately familiar with their units and objectives. https://jauns.lv/raksts/arzemes/488981-z-apli-un-citas-figuras-kas-ir-noslepumainie-simboli-kuri-rota-krievu-militaro-tehniku-pie-ukrainas There are a great many other speculative meanings posited (WWZ, Zelensky, victory, point of no return, ready for invasion, etc) and most start with Z and do not count for the other letters seen. Similar speculation: Meanwhile, there are several communication groups on social networks, especially the Telegram, which bring together representatives and supporters of the separatist "republics" in Donbass, who are passionate about spreading the "Z" symbol as such a mysterious sign ..and there are occasional reports indicating that such markings were seen in Crimea in 2014 and in Syria . I have not seen any such photos so unable to say, but it does remind me of this: Russia's Use of Unmarked Troops in Crimea Beginning in late February 2014, unmarked military personnel
suddenly appeared in Crimea and, alongside Crimean "self-defense"
forces, subsequently took control over key strategic and military
facilities in the peninsula. The unexpected appearance of these unmarked soldiers-referred to by some commentators as the "little green men scenario" -left both the Ukrainian authorities and western states puzzled about the affiliation of these troops. https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1213&context=vjtl (Illegally Evading Attribution? Russia's Use of Unmarked Troops in Crimea and International Humanitarian Law) Identifying the actors on the Ukrainian battlefields and outlining their legal responsibilities and obligations is not simply an academic exercise. Further, crystallizing the battlefield status of the actors eliminates any later claims of ignorance, while simultaneously increasing the likelihood of accountability. https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1321&context=ils (The Combatant Status of the “Little Green Men” and Other Participants in the Ukraine Conflict) ..and so, if it is true such markings were also used in Crimea, it may have also been for IFF from their own side since the Russians in particular were lacking the standard identification features. Maybe related: Back in 2017, this was posted when looking at tactical markings of de-mothballed equipment turning up in the region: https://informnapalm.org/en/valuyki-boguchar-common-markings-military-equipment-operated-russian-army-lpr/ And, harking back to Soviet vehicle markings: At regimental level, formation identification markings, which seemed to be temporary but often left were spotted alongside vehicle numbers as well as formation symbols. Consisting of simple shapes usually a circle, square or rectangle. The addition of smaller markers inside increased the availability of symbol variation. http://army.armor.kiev.ua/hist/opoznav.shtml Each division was assigned one specific geometric figure. Letters, numbers, dots, lines, sectors were applied inside the divisional sign, which denoted the regiment, a separate battalion of the division. In the regiments, it was common practice to give numbers not in a row, but to encrypt them. There were several more such encryption systems. Here everything depended on the imagination of the regiment's deputy commander (the regiment commander usually did not interfere in this himself). As a rule, nothing else was required, and there were no other identification marks or numbers on the armored vehicles. Which might itself give rise to the scarcity of confirmation about the actual meaning whilst the operation is continuing... ........... As the other answer mentions, as time goes on the apparent meaning has evolved in its representation: Recently it seems that these symbols, usually the Z, are being used for propaganda purposes: for our people for the victory our strength is that we represent the truth the objective will be completed https://strana.today/news/379919-chto-oznachajut-bukva-z-i-v-na-voennoj-tekhnike-armii-rossii.html Edit: With regards to Zapad 2017: Zapad's were large scale military exercises carried out by the former Soviet Union, roughly every four years, and most recently by Russia. But like Vostok, Tsentr, and Kavkaz, these are named for the region of the country in which they are held. As such each exercise has had focus on different aspects of military action (2009 was an attack against Poland), and both Zapad 2017 and Zapad 2021 for example was fought in an 'active' defense role, the latter being much larger. https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/the-political-logic-of-the-zapad-exercises/ https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2021/09/23/zapad-2021-what-we-learned-from-russias-massive-military-drills-a75127 | {
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71,622 | If a group of soldiers is outpowered in combat, they can wave a white flag to signal that they surrender, and by this attempt to save their lives. It is an agreed symbol that, as far as I know, is enshrined in the Geneva pact. What if a group of jet fighters is outpowered by enemy jet fighters - is there an agreed symbol that allows them to signal that they wish to surrender? | White flag is well-known but not an obligatory symbol of surrender: A white flag or handkerchief is often taken or intended as a signal of a desire to surrender, but in international law, it simply represents a desire for a parley that may or may not result in a formal surrender. Normally, a surrender will involve the handing over of weapons; the commanding officer of a surrendering force symbolically offers his sword to the victorious commander. Individual combatants can indicate a surrender by discarding weapons and raising their hands empty and open above their heads; a surrendering tank commander should point the tank's turret away from opposing combatants. Flags and ensigns are hauled down or furled, and ships' colors are struck. (Emphasis is mine) In other words, one has to demonstrate that they are harmless. In case of a fighter plane this may mean flying low, at slow speed, opening landing gear and having discarded visible ammunition, taking off the helmet . Bailing out, suggested in the other answer, is a possible option, but not always available - either due to the risks involved (due to weather, complex ground or water below) or when one wants to use a plane to bargain for better surrender conditions (e.g., in case of pilot defectors ). Note also that there are visual signals (hand gestures etc.) that pilots use to communicate with each other when radio fails - as, e.g., when ordering a forced landing or signaling. | {
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71,640 | Among other things, Putin has called the Ukrainian leadership a “band of drug addicts” (source) shortly before invading Ukraine in 2022. This seems like a strange accusation. He could have simply accused them of corruption, extremism, or any other broad claim that’s hard to prove. But he chose drug addiction. For one, drug addiction is not malicious. It is often a result of emotional struggles and drug addicts should be helped. I do not understand the logic of how this claim is supposed to help justify the invasion. Also, it is a specific claim and I suppose that he needs to present evidence of individuals in the Ukrainian government who are drug addicts in order to have credibility. Is there any cultural context which I am missing? Or any known cases of drug addicts in the Ukrainian government? | There is an article in the Russian press way before the conflict began, explaining why people suspect Zelensky to be a cocaine user. It seems to imply that scandalous Domestic Affairs official Gogilashvili was Zelensky's dealer. Poroshenko, the previous Ukrainian president, tried to use a drugs card against Zelensky in the presidential race. | {
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71,675 | In his announcement (at 20:02) of the special military operations, Vladimir Putin invoked article 51 of the UN charter, justifying these operations as self-defence. However, since Russia was never attacked by Ukrainian shelling, which was being carried out in Donbas and the proclamation of independence of Donetsk and Lugansk People's Republic didn't make them part of Russia, how did Russia invoke article 51? Can other states invoke article 51 for states they are allied with? | Russia's justification of its invocation of article 51 is based on its recognition of the DPR & LPR as independent states, combined with articles 3 and 4 of the treaties "of friendship and cooperation and mutual assistance" ( Luhansk , Donetsk ) ratified by the State Duma on February 22nd, which enshrines a commitment to mutual defence. The UN Charter explicitly recognises the right of collective self-defence in Article 51: Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security. Article 3 and 4 of the above-mentioned treaties set out the basis for the mutual defence agreement, and article 4 even references the right to collective self-defence recognised by the UN Charter. Article 3 The Contracting Parties will closely cooperate
with each other in the defense of sovereignty, territorial
integrity and security of the Russian Federation and the [Donetsk/Luhansk] People's Republic. They will consult without delay each time when, in the opinion of one of the Contracting Parties, there is a threat of attack against it, in order to ensure joint defence, maintenance of peace and mutual security. During these consultations, the need, types and amounts of assistance that one Contracting Party will provide to the other Contracting Party in order to help eliminate the threat that has arisen will be determined. Article 4 The Contracting Parties shall jointly accept all
measures available to them to eliminate a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace, as well as to counteract acts of aggression against them by any state or group of states and to provide each other with the necessary assistance, including military, in the exercise of the right to individual or collective self-defence in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter. Of course, neither the DPR or LPR are members of the United Nations, so by my reading of the charter, article 51 would not apply in this case. | {
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71,689 | From this video which appears genuine: I'm miffed at why the Russian soldiers are flying the flag of the USSR. And why would the Russian Ministry of Defense advertise this? A little more search finds additional images, from other sources Also, commentary like: A Soviet flag was even spotted on an armoured vehicle in a video from the Russian Ministry of Defence and broadcast on their television channel Zvezda, identified by the red star logo in the top right of the video. | I see it as antagonistic by local vehicle crews, particularly those who look up to the myth of the old Soviet Empire. Bit like you might see in other countries where they might fly the old flags of past era (Confederate flag comes to mind, but only because I can't think of others off the top of my head). As other might say it is a morale booster. Nothing more than that and given Russia's official voice (Russian Embassy on Twitter until very recently for example) I would think that they see it as not a negative to promote it. The red flag on the tank was seen on February 25 in the push towards Kherson, and has been repeated many times. And the other vehicles (APCs and trucks) flying it are from around 3-4 days ago. Considering how hard the propaganda machine at home on Russian soil is working, a flying Soviet flag is like flipping the bird at the rest of the (sanction-flinging) world. Also, ever since the Soviet Union collapse I see the old Soviet flag on a fairly frequent basis, usually with old timers who have good memories (or old Soviet patriots) and with new young Russians too.
It reminds me of the campaign to bring back the old Soviet anthem, and the old flag was never far behind... So, tbh, its nothing new and I was expecting it.. (See other tank formations flying Orthodox flags, and of course the Novorossiya/New Russia confederation battle flags too) Additional side note, related to the above: Following Putin's statement in an interview in 2014 that the territories of Kharkiv, Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson, Mykolaiv and Odessa were part of what was called Novorossiya (New Russia), self-proclaimed DPR and LPR proclaimed the confederation of Novorossiya and their desire to enlarge this across southern Ukraine. The above image appeared in 2015 during DPR and LPR exercises. Maybe there needs to be more context given to the source of the Russian Defense video. What if they are not Russian troops but rather DPR/LPR troops instead. many would lump them together but I think the differences are important. Additional: Given that it seems (without confirming) that much of the footage is of only a few vehicles and seems to be all from the south of Ukraine (for example the tank at Kherson dominates a lot of the reports) it is likely that the footage is of DPR / LPR forces or at least Russian sympathizers / supporters of them ( more likely ) - the Soviet flag has been seen most often in these parts: Donbass and Donetsk: Not sure if this is a great source but should show the romanticism for past Soviet days in these southern regions: https://www.thedailybeast.com/pro-russian-protestors-in-ukraine-dream-of-soviet-glory-days For many of the people here the Berlin Wall never came down, or at least it shouldn’t have done. .. At pro-Russian demonstrations ... in different cities the modern day Russian flag , while popular, always takes a clear second place to the flags of the USSR and of the Russian Empire before it. The yearning for a vague idea of “glory” that will come with being part of a greater Russian “whole” runs through everything. https://www.ft.com/content/1425647c-297f-11e6-8ba3-cdd781d02d89 Brandishing a chest pin of Joseph Stalin, Eduard Basurin, deputy defence minister for the local pro-Russian militants, defends the former Soviet leader for raising the “ USSR to a level when it was respected in the entire world ” | {
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71,718 | Russian separatists in Ukraine have had an important role in "inviting" Russia to invade Ukraine. In order to predict future steps that may be taken by Russia, it may be useful to know: are there substantial groups in other East European countries (particularly those bordering Russia or Ukraine), that support accession to Russia? If so, what are they? | Moldova (which borders Ukraine to the West) definitely has them. They have a self-declared republic there too , Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic (PMR), better known as Transnistria in the West. It's more debatable if the Russian minority in the Baltic countries (~20-25% of the population in two of those) could count as such, but relations with the majority there have been tense at times and ... Latvia and Estonia designated Soviet-era migrants as non-citizens. and e.g. Contact between Russians and Estonians is rare. and (2018) A New Law In Latvia Aims To Preserve National Language By Limiting Russian In Schools This by Western mainstream media accounts. You can only imagine how the Russian media portrays these matters. | {
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71,719 | Some examples of claims from Russia which Western politicians recently had to respond to: Ukraine was making nuclear weapons in Chernobyl Ukraine had biolabs working on new biological weapons Ukraine's government is "fascist" and "full of nazis" But why even bother providing a substantial response to claims like these? Why not simply say "everything Putin says is propaganda, there's no point in taking it seriously" any time someone brings up Russia's official talking points? It seems like completely denouncing Russia's words as illegitimate would be much more powerful than trying to take them seriously. | The point of propaganda is to manipulate perception. It's not to communicate alternative interpretations or to arrive at consensus. It is to make people see something very different from what is actually happening. Putin's particular method of propaganda has been designed specifically for the information age . It's designed to function successfully even when most people have access to better quality information . Putin's propaganda's main component is making numerous claims in rapid succession . The claims must be generally in different categories so they cannot be analyzed in tandem. This Rand Corporation Article calls it a "Firehose of Falsehood." I am going to allow myself a different analogy to explain this propaganda method's effect on perception. It functions like sprinkles on a donut. Attempting to argue that the color of a sprinkled donut's top is not that of any one particular sprinkle can be "debunked" by pointing to the sprinkles of that color, which are present. But the sprinkles' main goal is hardly the taste . They add little (but not nothing) to the taste. Their main job is to distract from what the actual glazing of the donut is. There are various techniques which are being tried out to counter this sprinkles-on-a-donut propaganda . What you propose would be the equivalent of always coming back to pointing out that sprinkles don't add to the taste . But they do a little. Which risks making the "debunking" of your claim just another added sprinkle on the donut. The other technique, which is also unsuccessful, is to pick the sprinkles off one by one . Which means debunking the claims one by one as they arrive. This (as you have observed) is also not very successful. The spreading of the sprinkles is cheap and the claims can be just repeated at a later time or in a different venue. As long as more eyes are exposed to them, they gain traction. A more successful technique for countering this propaganda method appears to be to periodically remind everyone that despite the sprinkles, it's still a "chocolate donut." Acknowledging the sprinkles preempts further arguing about whether they are there. And it short-circuits the argument to being able to say what the overarching reality happens to be. In the example of this war, the "sprinkle" that Ukraine tried to weaponize Chernobyl can be acknowledged by saying that "Ukraine gets 25% of its electricity from nuclear power and it's always been nuclear-capable." But it has to be followed up with a reminder of the actual "glazing" of this donut "This has nothing to do with Russia's unprovoked war of aggression on Ukraine." | {
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71,750 | It seems like quite a lot of people think that the current war in Ukraine is entirely down to Putin, and if Putin dies / is assassinated / is replaced in a coup etc, then the war will end. Examples: WASHINGTON -- South Carolina Sen. Lindsey Graham is facing intense pushback from all corners of Washington after calling for the Russian people to end the Ukraine war by assassinating President Vladimir Putin. Source The only way out of this crisis is to make Putin’s failure in Ukraine so disastrous for Russia and its genuine interests that his own elite will have no choice but to remove him. Source Some protests say " Stop Putin " instead of "Stop Russia". The implication is that 1) the current war is entirely because of Putin, and Putin only; and 2) if Putin loses power somehow then the war will cease because his successor will not continue the war. How do we know that Russian foreign policy will change (and by how much) should Putin lose power? Related: Why do news articles often refer to the leader as opposed to the country? However, the current anti-Putin (but not anti-Russia) news seems more precisely targeted on Putin than the answer to that question would indicate. | I think this question answers itself. Opposition to the war in Ukraine — and the sanctions placed on
prominent players and the nation as a whole — is the main reason
anyone in Russia would want to risk an assassination or coup
attempt. Putin has been in power a long time (and secured power for
the foreseeable future) without any such efforts; the only thing
that's changed is the war. Anyone who successfully wrests power from Putin is going to face
internal struggles and the need to consolidate his new position
of power. In that kind of transition a foreign war would work
against interest. The new leader would want to stabilize the
international situation quickly in order to focus on internal
problems. It's extremely unlikely (and I suspect impossible) that any new leader would be more hawkish and expansionist than Putin. Can you imagine a group staging a coup because they think Putin is not warlike enough? | {
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71,759 | The NATO website has an article about Collective defence - Article 5 which reads The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security. For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack: on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France 2, on the territory of Turkey
or on the Islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in
the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer; According to Laws Regarding to Extraterritoriality (cited by Wikipedia) There is a common misconception that Embassies and Consulates have extraterritoriality. However this is qualified by For the most part, this is not the case as extraterritoriality is not conferred upon an Embassy or Consulate, but in some situations extraterritoriality may be created by Treaty. Are there any areas of Ukraine which are NATO member states extraterritorial areas? Would an attack that impacts an extraterritorial area be considered the same as any attack with the same damages on the country's main territory and might trigger article 5? | The NATO charter is not a smart contract that executes automatically. Article 5 doesn't just "trigger" and automatically launch jets and missiles. The first point of the article is giving legitimacy, in the eyes of every NATO member, to military action by any other member, performed under these conditions. The UN also considers such mutual defense treaties a suitable justification for war. Finally, it helps justify actions for the internal population. The decisive factor is still the individual government's desire to take action. A formal justification is not necessary for war, and almost no wars since WWII were even declared.
The act will be interpreted by each country in the way that best supports the course of action it chooses. There are no enclaves of any other country within Ukraine. Embassies have inviolability privileges for legal purposes. That can be considered related to extraterritoriality, but even that's only the ability of a government to exercise authority beyond its normal boundaries . Actually transferring the territory to the diplomatic mission would be a significantly greater concession on the host's part. A military action that harms a foreign diplomat in collateral damage may be used or not used as a justification for military or non-military action, at the sole discretion of the state taking that action. Going by the word of the law, it is not an attack on the state. There is no duty for any state to take any specific action, or clear global rules of engagement. But the more significant the attack, and the more treaties cover the scenario, the easier it is to justify a military response. This is by design. Earlier mutual defense treaties had stronger language, which may have contributed to escalations . Leaving the interpretation to each government is more realistic. Short summary: Embassies are territory of the host, not the guest. They are only special in that the host may not enter without permission. An attack by A on B that hits an embassy of X is the same as any attack where a citizen of X is harmed abroad, outside of X territory. | {
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71,778 | Czech, Polish, Slovenian PMs visiting Kyiv to meet Zelenskiy How do the Czech/Polish/Slovenian PMs know their transport isn't going to be attacked? They are after all going through a war zone. Only thing I can see is that they are going to liaise with the Russians first, but given that they're going to Ukraine to offer support, it seems unusual that Russia will agree. | For a start, they're taking a train - Michał Dworczyk, the Head of the Polish Prime Minister's Office, held a press conference on the morning of the 15th in which he informed reporters that the train carrying the PMs had just crossed the Polish-Ukranian border. This information was also released on Twitter by the Chancellery of the Prime Minister. According to the BBC's Katya Adler , this decision was taken "because flying by Polish military jet could have been viewed by Russia as dangerously provocative". The news organisation PAP reported on the press conference held by Dworczyk, which included a question on how the leaders' security would be ensured (my translation): Dworczyk was asked how the security of politicians going to Kiev would be ensured. "Today, hundreds, thousands of civilians in Ukraine, children, women, not to mention soldiers, are dying under Russian fire, but it is known that civilians are most affected in any war. And today everything must be done to stop the Russian aggressor. This is a risk that must be taken. In such situations, danger is inevitable " - said Dworczyk. At the same time, he stressed that "of course, you always weigh the related risks." "Here, after an analysis not only at the Polish level, because, as you can see, this delegation is international, it was decided that such a trip must be carried out. We cannot allow the Russians to continue these criminal activities in Ukraine," he stressed. The Mayor of Kyiv, Vitali Klitschko, announced that Ukraine's military command has imposed a curfew in the city from 8pm on the 15th until 7am on the 17th, although it's not clear that this is specifically related to this visit. Finally, Petr Fiala's announcement of the visit on Twitter notes that international organisations including the UN have been informed of the visit - Dworczyk mentioned that the international organisations informed also included NATO and OSCE. Russia is a member of OSCE and, of course, the UN and we can probably conclude that forces around Kyiv will have been made aware of the visit, as an attack, accidental or otherwise, on three NATO heads of government on a well-publicised visit would probably be seen as escalatory. | {
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71,783 | I associate tight money with Thatcher, and after Thatcher, Reagan (who I also associate with Thatcher). Therefore, it came as a surprise to learn that it was Jimmy Carter who appointed Volcker - who I also associate with tight money - as Fed Chair. I understand that Jimmy Carter had to appoint somebody in a hurry, since his emergency inflation reshuffle - that I've learnt from my research - but why the choice of Volcker? | For a start, they're taking a train - Michał Dworczyk, the Head of the Polish Prime Minister's Office, held a press conference on the morning of the 15th in which he informed reporters that the train carrying the PMs had just crossed the Polish-Ukranian border. This information was also released on Twitter by the Chancellery of the Prime Minister. According to the BBC's Katya Adler , this decision was taken "because flying by Polish military jet could have been viewed by Russia as dangerously provocative". The news organisation PAP reported on the press conference held by Dworczyk, which included a question on how the leaders' security would be ensured (my translation): Dworczyk was asked how the security of politicians going to Kiev would be ensured. "Today, hundreds, thousands of civilians in Ukraine, children, women, not to mention soldiers, are dying under Russian fire, but it is known that civilians are most affected in any war. And today everything must be done to stop the Russian aggressor. This is a risk that must be taken. In such situations, danger is inevitable " - said Dworczyk. At the same time, he stressed that "of course, you always weigh the related risks." "Here, after an analysis not only at the Polish level, because, as you can see, this delegation is international, it was decided that such a trip must be carried out. We cannot allow the Russians to continue these criminal activities in Ukraine," he stressed. The Mayor of Kyiv, Vitali Klitschko, announced that Ukraine's military command has imposed a curfew in the city from 8pm on the 15th until 7am on the 17th, although it's not clear that this is specifically related to this visit. Finally, Petr Fiala's announcement of the visit on Twitter notes that international organisations including the UN have been informed of the visit - Dworczyk mentioned that the international organisations informed also included NATO and OSCE. Russia is a member of OSCE and, of course, the UN and we can probably conclude that forces around Kyiv will have been made aware of the visit, as an attack, accidental or otherwise, on three NATO heads of government on a well-publicised visit would probably be seen as escalatory. | {
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71,799 | India claims that on March 9, 2022, it accidentally launched a missile at its neighbor and frequent adversary Pakistan. The two countries: have fought three wars and have engaged in numerous military clashes,
most recently in 2019 which saw the air forces of the two engage in
combat. Both nations have nuclear weapons. Conventional wisdom holds that a country launching a missile at your country, especially, when both countries have nuclear missiles, is the kind of thing that is viewed as an act of war that calls for an immediate response in kind with little time for deliberation. How did India and Pakistan avoid going to war in this incident? | At present I cannot find any quotes that definitively nail down what the rationale of Pakistani leadership was for this particular event. There are some details and government responses that at least provide a chance to draw inferences, though. Here's a NY Times article with quotes and information from various ministries and personages on both sides. Evidently India did not communicate with Pakistan about the incident any earlier than it did the rest of the world (two days later). So the muted response is definitely quite surprising. One major factor to note is that the missile did not hit any military structures, aircraft, or population centers, and tensions between the countries were not at a particularly elevated level at the time. The missile also did not have a nuclear warhead. These would all help to contribute to interpreting the event as not an actual act of war. Initial news reports in Pakistan thought the damage resulted from a crashed airplane, which likely also damped any initial popular outrage or concern. According to Moeed Yusuf, national security advisor for Pakistan, the missile traveled close to paths of international and commercial airline flights. This certainly elevated the potential risks of the launch, but may have also helped create the initial reports of a plane crash. This Indian Express article provides further details on exactly how this event unfolded that may help explain Pakistan's level-headed response. It notes that originally the missile was launched about 104km south of the Pakistan border and initially traveled some 70-80km southwest further into India. It then took a turn and traveled northwest, eventually heading into Pakistan. This is not an expected flight pattern for any such missile, according to Retired Air Marshal Anil Chopra. It ends with the following: The Pakistani military said on Thursday that the “high-speed flying object” was picked up inside Indian flying territory by the Air Defence Operations Centre of the Pakistan Air Force. They knew it had taken off from Sirsa, and after its initial course it suddenly manoeuvred towards Pakistani territory and violated Pakistan’s airspace ultimately falling near Mian Channu. It stated that the Pakistani Air Force initiated requisite tactical actions in accordance with the Standard Operating Procedures, and continuously kept monitoring it and as soon as it turned towards Pakistani territory. But during this time it did not intercept the incoming missile, which was unarmed. So the Pakistani Air Force was evidently well aware of the launch and moreover its unusual flight path. While one might imagine attempting to "sneak attack" with a deceptive and sudden change in trajectory, it's also possible that the unusual behavior, which would only give Pakistan more time to notice and respond, was taken as indicative of some sort of error or other bizarre circumstance. | {
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71,886 | It doesn't seem in dispute that Russia has breached the Budapest Memorandum , which among others said that Russia will "Respect Belarusian, Kazakh and Ukrainian independence and sovereignty in the existing borders". If the memorandum was not breached in the 2014 annexation of Crimea, then surely it was breached in the current invasion of Ukraine. Given that, has Russia explained why Ukraine should trust them in the ongoing peace negotiations? I imagine Ukrainian negotiators must have asked this question at the peace talks. I am only interested in what Russia has said about their trustworthiness. Edit : If Russia has not explained why they can be trusted, I would also accept an answer Ukraine's explanation of why they are apparently trusting Russia, since they have requested legal guarantees for their own security. | Whatever Russia says it cannot be trusted at all. Treaties with Russia that rely on Russia keeping them mean nothing because Russia constantly breaks them. The Budapest Memorandum is not the 1st and not even 10th treaty that Russia broke, and usually with impunity. The guarantee is not in what Russia promises; it's in what other nations promise. One has to understand that the Russian government treats their own words from short-term utilitarian viewpoint: the worth of a promise or a testimony is in the immediate benefit the word would produce; the truth or the morals are irrelevant. Amazingly, it's also irrelevant that the deception is going to be discovered soon. An example: during Crimea invasion Putin was saying that Russia does not have Russian soldiers invading the peninsula, even though they were there on his orders, albeit without insignia. When Megyn Kelly was interviewing him about the Russians in Crimea he ridiculed her for that. What Russians troops in Crimea? These are merely volunteers taking vacation from the service in Russian Army (all 20,000 of them, fully armed). Where do you get that nonsense about our government involvement? Where is your proof? It didn't matter that everybody knew about the ongoing invasion and that within weeks Russia admitted its involvement. Being caught in a lie is not shameful; you just shrug it off and proceed with another lie. Another example: when a passenger jet was shot down by Russians over Ukraine the 1st claim from Russia was that it was shot down by a Ukrainian fighter jet, and a satellite image of that was produced. That image proved to be a terribly executed photoshop, with the fighter measuring a kilometer long as compared to the terrain. The 2nd claim from Russia was "never mind; the Boeing was shot down by a missile which was not Russian-made; here's the proof". That was quickly debunked, so the 3rd claim was "never mind; the missile was Russian-made, but it belonged to the Ukrainians; here is its trace", which was also quickly debunked. Notice the pattern here: being proved a liar is not shameful, it's just a part of the process of producing a more believable fraud. Russian government does not believe that it could be held to whatever it claimed or promised before, even just days ago. Ukraine understands all that. Whatever Russia says about its trustworthiness would be just another worthless breeze. Russia cannot be trusted; fool me once - shame on you; fool me like 20 times - shame on me. The guarantee of a treaty with Russia cannot possibly come from Russia; it must come from other parties. When you sign a very important contract and you don't trust the other party too much you want to include witnesses and a notary public in the process. In case of a dispute it wouldn't be your word agains the other party; it would also be the testimony of the witnesses and the notary. Moreover, sometimes you want to purchase a 3rd party insurance to protect you against the other party's breach. Similar here: it doesn't matter what Russia says about keeping the treaty; it only matters what kind of support Ukraine could marshal from other countries if/when Russia would breach. Ukraine knew that in 1994: the Budapest Memorandum also included US and UK as the guarantors witnesses against breaches, although "it does not impose a legal obligation of military assistance on its parties". Unfortunately, both US and UK didn't act when the treaty was breached in 2014, which they could do, but were not legally obligated to do. IMHO this encouraged Putin: he assumed that US and UK wouldn't act in 2022 either. And, if Ukrainians wouldn't put such a stiff resistance, US and UK would probably shrug it off again. So the answer to your question is "nothing". The guarantee that Russia would respect the new treaty cannot come from Russia; it must come from the other nations that are witnessing the treaty. | {
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71,909 | Reuters is very often used and quoted in parliamentary hearings, google updates and different news outlets.
Many people say that this is because of the "independent " nature of reporting of Reuters. But how is this so? What makes Reuters different from the other news channels? | The Reuters organization a news agency , not a news media organization. That means their primary function is to collect news from across the globe and deliver it to newspapers, magazines, news shows, and other media sources, who then present it to the public. As such, they have an incentive to be impartial, because impartiality maximizes their client base: even biased news organizations want unbiased raw material. News media sources can get away with a slant on the news because they try to appeal to specific demographics in the general population; news agencies cannot afford that. Further, Reuters has an established policy of value-neutral reporting, and a very long track-record (they were founded in 1851) of sticking to it. Those things build trust. They've had a few scandals over time — see their Wikipedia page for details — but nothing that shakes their otherwise solid reputation. | {
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71,922 | At least on paper, the Russian Federation is a constitutional democracy with the legal possibility of impeaching the President. There were three attempts to remove Yeltsin from office and Wikipedia states that President Putin is now also facing possible impeachment https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Impeachment_in_Russia ( current revisions ) Apart from this statement I have neither read anything about the chances of such a procedure to be initiated nor its predicted success. Could the reason be that in today's Russia anyone who publicly pursues an impeachment procedure would face serious threats? Or would there simply never be a majority to make it succeed? | Russian Parliament is fully controlled by Putin's United Russia party, so I can imagine it happening only if it becomes someone else's party. Even then he would probably declare martial law due to military conflict. So this does not seem plausible at this point. | {
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71,937 | Putin is considered a strong president. Probably, many Duma members who voted for war-related laws did so because Putin wanted them to. But even strong people may be influenced by others. Are there "strongmen" (or strongwomen) in Russia, such as: politicians, oligarchs, military officers, etc., who have an interest in the war in Ukraine, and who - Pushed Putin towards invading Ukraine? Push Putin now towards continuing the war? | It's going to be incredibly difficult to disentangle exactly what went into this piece of decision-making. You have basically have 3 different models to look at: "Yes men", with the top leader having pliant underlings who meekly go along. Putin making decisions solo and imposing them onto others. The oft-reported episode of his spy chief getting told to "speak plainly" plays into that view. Note however that by its nature, a position like Putin's, or any singular leader (as opposed to explicit group leadership), slots neatly into that role: a leader is expected to lead. "Eminence grise", or the "ones really pulling the strings" where there is the power behind the throne who "influence"/"convince"/"make the decisions". That's one possible way to take this question. "Group think", where a small group of like-minded people exhaustively dissect the options, all the while ignoring the input of people holding different opinions. That's the other role for strongpeople ... with who have an interest in the war in this question. Now, let's take the US's invasion of Iraq in 2003. All 3 are candidates, having been cited by different people at different times: Bush goes to war because Saddam went after daddy. Everyone else goes along. Cheney was the one who was the biggest, most forceful, hawk and imposed the decisions on the rest. The Bush team, while not intellectually lightweight, was incredibly cohesive in their worldview, from Condoleezza Rice to Rumsfeld to Cheney... The only one with a diverging outlook was Colin Powell and he got sidelined. Twenty years after the war, it is still hard, with the degree of transparency found in POTUS archives and the publication of numerous books, to disentangle how the decision to invade was arrived at. It's probably not Bush imposing on others, at least outside the bounds expected of POTUS leading, and it's probably more group think than Cheney pulling the strings, but... Attempts to do this in real time in 2022 with Putin, from openly available sources are just going to reflect the biases and hypothesis of whoever writes up the analysis. That said, we can look at some things we do know: This playbook has been in play since 2008, when Russia backed separatists in Georgia, so whatever is influencing Putin is not new. So it can't be solely due to new guys. The Russians in country X are getting mistreated and therefore justify our interfering in that country is old, old, old. In fact, as old as Estonia in 2007. A number of his close cronies are from his St. Petersburg days. These are people who were pulled up by him. They are more likely to be "yes men" or participants in a "group think" phenomenon than pulling the strings. One of them was Naryshkin, Mr. Public-Dress-Down. The armed forces can't be too influential or else they would have told Putin not to invade with troops that had only been told to prep for an invasion the day before. That's basic military 101 : Mr Putin's initial military plan looked like something devised by a KGB officer, one Western intelligence official explains. It had been created, they say, by a tight "conspiratorial cabal" with an emphasis on secrecy. But the result was chaos. Russian military commanders were not ready and some soldiers went over the border without knowing what they were doing. So I would hazard to say that it's Putin's decision and mostly just his, reached in a context where only people liked by Putin are asked for their opinion. Sure, some of the people listed are going to be hawkish, but their presence is because they are agreeable to Putin, not because they are directing his decision making process. Putin also has a history promoting ex-body bodyguards and the like, hardly people who will direct him. And he seems to fancy himself a historian, which points to independent thinking to convince others, not the other way around. For people to have had any direct influence on this particular decision, now , requires them to be part of the inner circle of decision makers who planned this. As opposed to merely people whose worldview agree with and have shaped Putin's own worldview. That's a limited circle, which does not necessarily include people who hold influential, but peripheral, positions. But... if we don't really know all that much about Bush-Iraq 2003, how are we going to know Putin-Ukraine 2022, now? Sources: DW and BBC . Guardian A 2017 version by CNN . | {
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71,967 | During the Vietnam War, the Soviets sent hundreds of MiGs to North Vietnam. Now, Americans say they cannot send airplanes to Ukraine lest it lead to escalation. Why wasn't the Soviet assistance to North Vietnam during the Vietnam War a form of escalation? Why didn't it start the 3rd World War, say, via an American attack on the USSR as revenge for the latter's direct involvement in the Vietnam War? | As with many things about international relations, the issue is not so much if they can do it but if it is the convenient (for oneself, not for Ukraine) thing to do. To top your analogy, the USA did send planes, ships, weapons and half a million men to the Vietnam War without seeming to be particularly worried about nuclear retaliation from the Soviet Union. But the Vietnam War always was a proxy war: both sides wanted to win it, of course, but neither would have felt particularly threatened by losing it. Whoever would lose it, would still be safe relying on its nuclear arsenal, its other military and political assets, and the distance from Vietnam to their core interests. In Ukraine, Russia has repeatedly asserted that it views it as an existential threat if they do not achieve its objectives or if the West intervenes militarily. That means believing that if they lose the war, they will lose not only Ukrania but Russia itself (or perhaps more properly, its government) would be at risk of being destroyed. This could be a bluff: Putin playing the madman to scare the West. Or it could be his actual assessment, and in this case the risk of losing the war could outweigh the risk of using nuclear weapons. It is difficult to be sure which is the case, but in any case it has made the West way more cautious than they have been in other situations (e.g. support to Syrian or Libyan rebels). | {
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72,000 | These days, there have been media reports claiming that parts of the Russian elite have plans to assassinate Putin, citing Ukrainian intelligence as sources. However, I am not aware of details on how this information was obtained and became public. There might have been a leak in the system and this information was not meant to be disclosed in the foreseeable future, but still got out somehow. Or it might be entirely fabricated, without any facts (not even classified) to back it up. Or it might be genuine, officially declassified information. As detailed in Why do people think that if Putin ceases to be Russian president, the Russo-Ukraine war will cease? , Ukraine would tend to benefit from an actual assassination. That would make them likely to at least silently support such an operation. Disclosing intelligence information would then, however, likely tip off Putin that his life might be under greater threat than anticipated until now, and thus decrease the odds of such an operation succeeding. So how come the media are now in a position to discuss such information, from intelligence sources that would have good reasons to keep it secret? | An important part of remaining in power as a dictator is the general impression that it is inevitable that the dictator will remain in power (at least for the medium term) — because then challenging the dictator carries a high risk with little reward for it. If a dictator starts to appear vulnerable, the calculus for whether to oppose him changes — if there is a chance to topple him or to seize power for yourself, there starts to be a benefit to maybe outweigh the risk of going against him. If for whatever reason the Ukrainian Intelligence knew of a concrete plan (eg "Tomorrow Sergey's guy Boris is going to switch Putin's vodka for drain cleaner."), they'd quite certainly keep quiet about it. If, however, they have info along the lines of "Two high-ranking Kremlin officials were talking about how convenient it would be if Putin fell out of a window and Shoigu would take over.", sharing the gist of this can make sense. These two guys might never act on it, but if others know that such attitudes exist, they might dare trying a coup. Since the actual existence of these two guys isn’t really relevant, it is of course a plausible assumption that they never existed in the first place, and that the entire thing is just made-up as a psy-ops. If such reports cause Putin to become even more paranoid and purge his surroundings, this will weaken Russian command structures — and might cause someone to putch against Putin to prevent being purged for potentially planning to do so. | {
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72,038 | Yesterday, Vladimir Putin announced that " unfriendly" countries would need to pay for Russian gas in Rubles in the near future. The news came with speculation that this is a move to prop up the falling value of the Ruble, that affected countries would have a hard time coming up with a source of Rubles, and that this might constitute breach of contract (as gas contracts specify, among other things, means of payment and cannot be changed unilaterally on short notice). But even if he gets his way, how does that actually benefit Russia? Major Russian banks (Sberbank, Gazprombank) that deal with gas payments were famously not banned from Swift and thus can still deal with foreign currency, so now: Major Russian banks receive foreign currency and can do whatever they want with it (like propping up the Ruble) then: Major gas customers would have to buy Rubles (best source would be Russia's central bank, but this one is sanctioned), propping up the Ruble's value, then send the Rubles to major (non-sanctioned) Russian banks. Seems like a wash to me?! Is this about proving a point like "oh, you want Rubles from our central bank? How are those sanctions working out for you?" Is it about price increases through the back door by setting a price in Rubles? (But then the headlines should be about price increases, not Rubles itself, and besides that would only seem to work if one expects the value of the Ruble to rise.) | It benefits Russia by forcing gas customers to purchase rubles at unfavourable rates, rather than Russian gas suppliers. At the moment, since President Putin enacted a decree obligating exporters to sell 80% of foreign currency received from foreign trade contracts, Russian exporters are effectively propping up the exchange rate of the ruble. Putin's announcement is very clear that the only part of the contracts that Russia is seeking to change is the currency, not the gas price. However, once this change is enacted, the only sufficient source of rubles is likely to be the Russian central bank - currently sanctioned. Customers could try to buy rubles on the open market, but the sums are such that this may prove infeasible. If sanctions on the central bank are lifted in order for customers to obtain sufficient supplies of rubles, this is a win in itself; however, the central bank could then subsequently introduce fixed exchange rates, forcing gas importers to pay over the odds for rubles - increasing the price of the contracts by the back door, putting pressure on the 'unfriendly' countries and propping up the ruble further. It seems like Germany is calling the demand a 'breach of contract' , while the Italian Prime Minister's economic adviser has said that the country intends to 'keep paying in euros', so we'll have to see if this change actually materialises. | {
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72,123 | US President Biden concluded his March 27, 2022 speech in Poland with the words For God’s sake, this man cannot remain in power. (e.g. CBS News's video Biden says Putin "cannot remain in power" at 26:37) Question: How often has a post WWII US president said publicly that the leader of another country must go? I'm not asking about actions (covert or otherwise), I'm asking about highly visible public statements in a speech or via a definitive statement by an official White House spokesperson that the leader of a country must no longer be its leader in no uncertain terms. | This seems to be a post Cold War phenomenon, and it’s even more a post 9/11 phenomenon as Bush was the first US president to make such a statement in public. Here are some examples: US President Country Leader Source G. W. Bush Iraq Hussein President Says Saddam Hussein Must Leave Iraq Within 48 Hours; Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation Obama Libya Gaddafi U.S. says Libya has spoken, Gaddafi must leave now Obama Syria Assad Obama tells UN: Syria's Assad must go Trump Venezuela Maduro U.S. says Venezuela’s Maduro should go, recognizes Guaido as new leader Biden Belarus Lukashenko Biden vows to back Belarus opposition in removing Lukashenko | {
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72,140 | Tucker in this video said that sanctions against Russia aren't hurting Putin and its side-effects are just hurting US people by raising gas price. Do US sanctions against Russia really not have any notable impact on Russia's economy to stop it from invading Ukraine? I think it's obvious that banning oil import hurts Russia's economy, but how much? Is it really remarkable? And will the effects be felt in the short term? | Tucker Carlson would appear to be wrong about this. He has been talking a remarkably pro-Putin line since the Russo-Ukrainian war heated up, and this doesn't seem to have much contact with reality. For example, here's a story about the re-opening of the Russian stock market . It re-opened on Thursday March 24th, and rose slightly, so things are good with the Russian economy, no? No. Foreign investors, who hold about 80% of the total shares in the Russian market, were not permitted to sell shares, at all. No short-selling is allowed, by anyone. Only a restricted list of companies, 33 blue-chip stocks by Russian standards, could be traded. This does not give any kind of truthful indication of business confidence in Russia. The Biden Administration's description of it as a "charade" seems accurate. If the sanctions weren't having an effect, these restrictions would not be needed. Tucker Carlson has supported Putin's actions with such consistency and vehemence that a Republican political strategist suggested that he should be investigated by the Department of Justice as a "foreign asset" who is "shilling for Putin." It's not clear why he's doing this, but he is not a reliable source on this subject. Quantifying the impact on the Russian economy of the oil and gas sanctions is difficult, because it's a moving target, with complex effects. Oil and gas exports are Russia's main source of foreign exchange, which means that their ability to import goods will be severely limited. The fall in the value of the rouble has been significant, in spite of Russian attempts to prop it up . Update, March 31st: The rouble is now trading at levels seen before the war escalated, but this is fairly artificial : Base interest rates in Russia are at 20%. Exporters are being required to convert 80% of their foreign currency holdings into roubles. Foreigners cannot sell Russian securities. Russian residents cannot transfer money out of Russia. All of these things create an artificial demand for roubles, and thus push up its exchange rate. They also mean that nobody would want to buy Russian securities, or convert money into roubles unless they really needed to. If these restrictions remain in place, Russia would be cut off from much of the world economy even if the sanctions ended. However, if the restrictions are removed, the rouble will fall, probably quite seriously. When the stock market was allowed to trade all Russian stocks, but with the other restrictions described above, it unsurprisingly fell. Russia has also threatened to require payment for its natural gas exports in roubles, but has not actually done that yet. S&P Global Market Intelligence reckons that the Russian economy is going into its deepest recession since the 1990s, with an expected 20% fall in GDP during 2022. Since oil and gas were Russia's main exports, the loss of sales due to sanctions will be the largest cause of this. | {
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72,162 | In terms of protecting their borders the USA have one to the south with Mexico and one to the north (or east if you're Alaska) with Canada, neither of which seem like likely invaders. Contrast this to other large powers and you'll see they've fairly large borders to protect where invasions seem more likely. Despite this the USA has one of the highest military budgets as a percentage of GDP in the world. Is this simply to back up a "bigger stick" diplomacy or are there invasion threats I haven't taken into account? Edit: To be clear to those questioning why the comparison is initially around defending USA soil - it isn't that this is all an army is for, but it is definitely part of it. The assumption is that, all else being equal, if a country is in a safer, more defensible position, it wouldn't need to spend as much on defending against invasion. This would mean that its total military budget could be lower. It is just a metric to measure by. | A lot of this has to do with the geopolitical state of the world. World War II changed a lot for the US. The US had been reluctant to enter World War I . President Wilson was reluctant to enter World War I. When the War began, Wilson declared U.S. neutrality and demanded that the belligerents respect American rights as a neutral party. He hesitated to embroil the United States in the conflict, with good reason. Americans were deeply divided about the European war, and involvement in the conflict would certainly disrupt Progressive reforms. In 1914, he had warned that entry into the conflict would bring an end to Progressive reform. "Every reform we have won will be lost if we go into this war," he said. A popular song in 1915 was "I Didn't Raise My Boy to Be a Soldier." World War II, however, saw the US directly involved after the Japanese attack on Pearl harbor . That galvanized the American public towards war (approval hit 97% for entering the war as a result). After the war ended, the US was in a unique position. The US had the largest military force in the world and it had largely escaped the ravages of war that left Europe having to rebuild for years afterward. In the meantime, the Soviet Union began its political encroachment in Europe, which led to the Cold War , which encompassed the nuclear arms race . It also brought several proxy wars like Korea and Vietnam . During this time, many people of the World War II generation still openly supported having military power to project worldwide ( Vietnam was still popular through mid-1967 , when mounting losses of drafted men helped changed views). The recent Russian invasion of Ukraine has underscored why the US still maintains a large standing military. The US does not exist in a vacuum, and if it were to shrink back to defending only its borders, it would likely find itself where it was in World War I: slow to respond until only after a war had started. Germany has recently vowed to increase its military funding , but if Germany were to be attacked by Russia, it would have to heavily rely on NATO for defense, since military expansion takes time. You can't just raise a standing army on a moment's notice. | {
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72,191 | Could NATO Accept a new member who is at war? There are many reasons why NATO would not want to accept Ukraine as a new member state right now. The most prominent reason being the perception that this would increase the chance of a nuclear conflict. Now this may of course be true, but we may also be wrong here. If, let's say, NATO were to consider accepting Ukraine, would it be possible at all? Are there limitations in the NATO charter that prohibit Ukraine from entering simply because they are presently in a state of war? Are there other major reasons why this is not an option? | Yes. NATO membership is by unanimous political agreement of the existing members. And only these members get to interpret the NATO rules. So, assuming political agreement, there will be nobody that will raise a legal objection. Of course, when you change the question from "could they?" to "will they?", the rules become slightly more relevant. If we cannot assume political agreement, a country that disagrees with Ukraine's membership will likely prefer to formulate their objections in legalistic terms. Considering that NATO prefers to look united, such a political objection in legalistic terms will be probably accepted at face value by the other members. "My colleague from country X has brought up a good point. While the citizens of country Y would welcome Ukraine into NATO, we have to respect international treaty agreements. " | {
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72,192 | Rumors are that in Italy parts of the public opinion are accepting the view that the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 was justified by a previous NATO expansion. What are the (given) arguments (with references) for and against this view? | First, let's concede that many people will "justify" whatever they have chosen to justify. Giving support to Ukraine and oppossing Rusia involves some risks and cost. I have met some of those "theorists"(*) and to me it seems a mix of plain old anti-Americanism (including some who still consider Rusia to be somewhat of a Socialist country) with some people who do not want the effects/risks of the sanctions but want to oppose them with "a clear conscience" (it is not that they are ignoring an unlawful aggression, it is that Ukraine had it coming because of US/Western machinations). Points to consider: Ukraine, as an independent country, is free to pursue its own international politics. Period. Even if Ukraine was about to join NATO in February, that would not allow Russia to invade it. The only point in international law that would allow an aggression would be to defend from a clear and imminent threat of aggression from Ukraine, which clearly is not the case. In any case, Ukraine wanting to join NATO would have been more than justified by previous aggressions by Russia (mainly the annexation of Crimea, but also support for breaking regions). There was no indication that NATO membership was imminent. Some countries had held off any possible talks in order to, among other issues, avoid antagonizing Russia. The possibility that Ukraine would have been able to join NATO while in direct conflict with Russia over Crimea was always very remote. NATO is a defensive alliance and, as discussed everywhere else, even in that aspect it does not imply many actual obligations (the wording about what a member is required to do in case of aggression against another member is not very explicit). To claim that Ukraine joining NATO would be a first step towards a future aggression is dubious, at best. Since the end of WWII, one of the rules of international politics was disavowing "wars of conquest" by which a country would forcibly take over territory from other countries. While there have been some (Cyprus, Palestine), those have been mostly rejected by the international community. Yet Russia wants to use the war to legalize its control over Crimea, Donetsk and Lugansk, despite having recognized the current borders in 1991(**). To be fair, NATO has not been completely consistent on this point, and someone could think that the current stance about Kosovo points do a double standard. In my opinion the claim that Russia's security was at risk is not credible, as it still held a sizeable nuclear arsenal, including nuclear weapons on submarines that would give them a considerable retaliatory potential even in the case that they actually feared a first strike by Western countries. *: There are some, but in my opinion they are more "very vocal" than actually represent the whole of the population. **: To add into this point, that treaty saw Ukraine renouncing the nuclear weapons it had inherited from the Soviet Union. Allowing this treaty to be violated means that more countries may feel the need to have its own nuclear arsenal in order to ensure their safety; in fact, even in Spain some far right MPs have asked to start producing nuclear weapons. | {
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72,242 | It is frequently reported the Russian planes incur upon western airspace, and this presents challenges and demands on western air forces. Yesterday we had a report of Russian bombers “armed with nuclear warheads” reportedly entered Swedish airspace before being intercepted by fighter jets, and last month we had similar reports approaching UK airspace. Wikipedia says "In November 2014, the European Leadership Network reviewed 40 incidents involving Russia in a report titled Dangerous Brinkmanship, finding that they "add up to a highly disturbing picture of violations of national airspace, emergency scrambles, narrowly avoided midair collisions, close encounters at sea, simulated attack runs, and other dangerous actions happening on a regular basis over a very wide geographical area." From a non-military viewpoint, it would seem that Russia would be much more vulnerable to this sort of tactic, having a very large border over which the west could conduct such operations, from Hungary over the Black sea area, from the Baltic states in the Northwest, through Scandinavia, Greenland and Alaska in the North and the Pacific in the East. I would presume that if Russia was intercepting western airplanes frequently over this wide area it would inevitably take away air capacity from Ukraine, thus supporting the effort to resist Russian occupation. Why does the West not run such operations? | Two explanations immediately come to mind: Reporting bias The impression of more frequent Russian incursions is based on the reports that one reads in the media and/or the statements by the NATO officials. It could well be that NATO planes do commit incursions into the Russian airspace and/or that Russian incursions have not become any more frequent than before - but the intensity with which they are reported by the media and/or commented upon has changed, creating a false impression that Russia is doing something unusual or more aggressive. Possible Russian response to incursions Now, if we assume that the reports do reflect the reality, there is no guarantee that Russia would react to such an incursion in the same way as NATO forces do - by intercepting the plane and escorting it away from the airspace. It could well shoot it down - as it happened on several occasions in the past - see, e.g., Korean Air Lines Flight 007 or 1960 U-2 incident . Giving western (at least European) reluctance to escalate things further, it is a very unwelcome perspective. A more recent example is the shooting of Russian Sukhoi Su-24 by Turkey in 2015 . The incident happened while both countries were participating in military conflict in Syria, supporting different sides. The possibility of a war between Russia and Turkey was brought up, although the issue was eventually settled peacefully to mutual agreement: On 25 November, the foreign ministers of Russia and Turkey spoke for an hour by telephone, and both governments stated that day that they would not initiate a war as a result of the incident. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov told journalists that his country would "seriously reevaluate" its relationship with Turkey. The Russian Defence Ministry broke off military contacts with the Turkish Armed Forces and Russian defence officials said that future airstrikes in Syria would be escorted by fighters. According to the Russian Minister of Defence Sergey Shoygu, Russia will deploy S-400 surface-to-air missile systems to Khmeimim airbase in Syria, where the Russian Aerospace Forces group is stationed. | {
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72,267 | Together, answers to How often a post WWII US president said publicly that the leader of another country must go? (e.g. "For God’s sake, this man cannot remain in power") have listed perhaps a half-dozen times when postwar US presidents have made public statements themselves or via senior white house spokespeople that the leader of another country has got to go. They also suggest that this is a fairly recent phenomenon, mostly starting with George W. Bush about Iraq's Saddam Hussein and instances for Barack Obama , Donald Trump and now (perhaps in-)famously Joe Biden . But it seems to me that in the case of Biden's closing sentence of his March 27, 2022 speech in Poland about Vladimir Putin For God’s sake, this man cannot remain in power. there is widespread reference to this off-script sentence as a "gaffe" and that statements by the white house, other cabinet members (e.g. Antony Blinken ) and Biden himself meant to "clarify" his statement as "walking it back". Just a few examples: Al Jazeera: US has no strategy of ‘regime change’ in Russia, Blinken says Reuters: White House says it is not advocating for regime change in Russia The Atlantic Biden’s Comments About Putin Were an Unforced Error Question: Why is Biden's "For God’s sake, this man cannot remain in power" widely considered a gaffe to be walked back, previous US presidents have made superficially similar statements? There is one answer to the linked question that while it does not address the question asked does strive to answer this question. The reasons I've asked this new question include the following: Avoid "mission creep". The previous question was asked only to find out if this kind of a statement on its surface was isolated or if other presidents have made similar (if superficially so) statements. Allow all users an opportunity to answer this question ...that future readers will more easily find in searches as they now match the question. | It's often said that "a gaffe is when a politician tells the truth", and that's very much what's happening here. For the most part, the pushback isn't because people think Putin should stay in power, or because of a sincere belief in political decorum (most probably agree with him), but because they think Biden's off-the-cuff remark was diplomatically unwise. The primary goals for the US and the West in Ukraine are to help Ukraine preserve their independence (preferably while retaining their economic and military self-sufficiency so they're not a drain on Europe) while avoiding WWIII. Doing that is going to almost certainly require a negotiated settlement where Putin will have to make concessions. Thus, it's important to avoid aggravating or insulting Putin unnecessarily. This is particularly true if, as seems to be the case, the US doesn't plan on regime change. Coming from the President, a statement like this, even if it's just an off-the-cuff remark with no deeper thought behind it, sounds like a change in policy, and it's an important part of the Press Office to push back, lest it become one (assuming it wasn't intended to be). To put it another way, it's a problem because the US does not expect or intend regime change in Russia. It was "OK" (at least from the perspective of the US Federal Government) for Bush to talk about the removal of Saddam Hussein or for Obama to talk about the removal of Muammar Gaddafi because that was part of the plan and government policy. Biden made a personal remark that is not in line with government policy, and so the government has to push back since it would be very damaging if people come to believe that it was government policy. | {
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72,371 | China stressed economic development and GDP growth in the 1970s when Deng Xiao Ping proposed the economic reform in 1978. China never stopped after that. Regarding the USSR, Gorbachev tried to bring about economic reform, and it backfired and caused the dissolution of the USSR. During the 2000s, Putin came to power and saved the country from an imminent bankruptcy with the help of the then-finance minister Alexei Kudrin, Russia never seemed to go beyond its effort of gas production. They seemed to be complacent about their vast gas reserve and have been behaving like a gigantic gas station ever since. For instance, Russia has the technology of semiconductors, but never tried to market them on a large scale. Russian civil aircraft never made a cut into the global aero market. Russia has some of the biggest shipyards but is not a famous shipbuilder like Denmark. Russia doesn't have any successful car brands. Russia is not known for producing electronic home appliances. Russia is not known for selling railway locomotives or rolling stock. Recently, Pakistan was in talks with Russia about producing the Sputnik vaccine in Pakistan. I am not sure if that talk made it to production. Why did the Russian Federation never stress GDP growth as China did? | From 2001 to 2012 Russia had quite good GDP growth: Most of it came from the domestic market - you sell the same amount of oil but learn to make and sell more stuff inside the country, creating new jobs. Usually it is done by letting foreign businesses open their localized production, you don't really have to export the goods. You can see there is very little GDP growth past 2014. I would theorize that Russian government actually expected a serious conflict with the West in the future, so the efforts were directed in reinforcing existing economy rather than trying to grow GDP (which would crash anyway in the case of conflict) - such as by introducing own credit card payment infrastructure, paying off debts, investing in infrastructure instead of wages growth. With regards of high-tech exports: It really takes time to build and it's very easy to disrupt. Airbus, Intel or TSMC have decades of time advantage compared to any Russian high-tech manufacturer, can access large markets at favorable terms, can borrow money cheaper, etc, etc. Moreover, any serious sanctions would mean disruption in the supply chain and grinding those exports to halt. Whereas Russia exports not only oil, gas and coal (three different products), but also a lot of metals, wheat, fertilizers, wood, etc. These have several advantages. If Germany or the USA does not want your copper or fertilizer, you can just sell it to India or China for basically the same money - there's an open commodities market. Whereas with airplanes or chips it's not so easy - you often need to cater to a specific customer. The competition is not as fierce since you can always sell a spare ton of copper or a bushel of wheat, whereas you can't sell a chip if it becomes outdated or a market failure. Such production is harder to disrupt since it depends on some capital investments and technologies, but does not need a constant stream of parts to continue. Also, in some areas the existing players will not let Russia through to the market they control, such as passenger airplanes where Airbus and Boeing have a duopoly. You can't really control raw materials market by not letting new players in. The same applies to mentioned Sputnik vaccine whose recognition and adoption was directly hindered by existing players, turning a development success into a regional, niche product. Finally, Russia had a huge international trade surplus so it's not obvious why it would become even more export-oriented. | {
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72,389 | Suppose, a country 'X''s civil airline wants to fly to another country 'Z'. There are three routes. However, the shortest route is 1000km which is through country 'Y'. Can the country 'Y' block its airspace for civil airlines of 'X' without giving any reason? If NO, can 'X' go to an international court for this? If YES, what would the penalty for the country 'Y' be? | It depends - if country 'Y' is one of the 134 parties to the International Air Services Transit Agreement , then the first article of that agreement grants scheduled air flights the privilege to fly across its territory without landing, and to land for non-traffic purposes. Otherwise the answer is a little more complicated - with regard to scheduled international flights for purposes such as commercial transit of passengers, according to article 6 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation , to which the 193 members of the UN are parties: No scheduled international air service may be operated over or into the territory of a contracting State, except with the special permission or other authorization of that State, and in accordance with the terms of such permission or authorization. If the flight was not of this type, however, article 5 of the convention grants aircraft the right of overflight and to make non-traffic stops without needing to require prior permission - subject to the terms of the convention: Each contracting State agrees that all aircraft of the other contracting States, being aircraft not engaged in scheduled international air services shall have the right, subject to the observance of the terms of this Convention, to make flights into or in transit non-stop across its territory and to make stops for non-traffic purposes without the necessity of obtaining prior permission, and subject to the right of the State flown over to require landing. Each contracting State nevertheless reserves the right, for reasons of safety of flight, to require aircraft desiring to proceed over regions which are inaccessible or without adequate air navigation facilities to follow prescribed routes, or to obtain special permission for such flights. There are a few exemptions - for example Article 7 states that parties have the right to refuse permission to the aircraft of other states to load "passengers, mail and cargo carried for remuneration or hire" if their destination is within the party's territory. Article 9 of the convention grants contracting states the right to restrict or prohibit flights in the case of emergency so long as the prohibition is applied uniformly "without distinction of nationality". This the provision which was used during, for example, the 9/11 attacks. So the answer to your question in general terms is yes with regard to scheduled flights, such as commercial airlines, but no in general - if such an infraction took place, the affected state party could bring a dispute to the ICAO Council, which could decide to suspend the infracting state's voting rights in the Council or the ICAO Assembly. | {
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72,442 | Recently I was reading things on the European debt crisis . It seems to me that when there is a financial crisis, strong economies in EU, like Germany and France, are supposed to help the countries in trouble, like Greece, out of the crisis, with debt or whatever. But this seems to be an economic burden for them being part of EU. I wonder what the benefits for strong economies like Germany and France are, for being members of the European Union. Please note that my question focuses on the positive side for them to stay in EU, namely I am not really asking what political troubles Germany and France will get into for leaving EU. | The main one is exporting without barriers to these other EU countries, in terms of [no] tariffs and [no] non-tariff barriers (thanks to unified product standards), and also lack of competitive currency devaluation from these countries (due to the euro). And of course, you get cheap vacations and even retirement abroad, so it's not like piling up euros is pointless. | {
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72,446 | I'm trying to figure out if this is a case of really bad color rendering, or is there a version of the flag of Pakistan that uses black instead of (dark) green. Image from Reuters. The Wikipedia article on the flag of Pakistan doesn't mention any black version. Nor is there anything like that listed in the list of related flags . So what explains the black color? | No, it’s just an odd colour balance in that particular image - see another angle from the same event from Alamy : | {
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72,540 | Currently the following things are true: Western countries have frozen most of Russia's foreign currency reserves Russia is either in default or would be soon However #1 is seen as fair and justified by the West, while #2 seems to be at least somewhat condemned . But isn't it only fair for a country to stop paying their debts if their foreign accounts are frozen? This is somewhat nonsensical as the primary reason why the debtors aren't getting their money back is because the debtors own nation has frozen Russia's assets, thus preventing payments from happening. In other words, it would be strange for the West to blame Russia for not paying back after freezing the money they were supposed to use for payments. | "most of Russia's foreign currency reserves" is not accurate. Only about half were frozen; TASS and Reuters agree on this figure. That still leaves hundreds of billion of dollars with which they could pay. But they don't want to pay (just) with/from those. Never mind that your question is a false dichotomy. It's perfectly acceptable to the US government for both things to happen. (Even more so because Russia has frozen assets that could be used to pay creditors, after wrecking Russia's credit rating and netting some legal fees that may even exceed the debt in question, if some past examples--cough, Argentina--are considered). The more recently stated US position is exactly that Russia must [try to] pay without being able to access all of their funds abroad [or default, although that was left unsaid]. The move was meant to force Moscow to make the difficult decision of whether it would use dollars that it has access to for payments on its debt or for other purposes, including supporting its war effort, the [U.S. Treasury] spokesperson said. It's also worth noting that the missed payment was less than Russia's typical one day income from gas & oil (and at recent prices just from gas)... which still gets paid even by the Western customers to various unfrozen & unsanctioned Russian banks (Gazprombank etc.) But I'd grant that there are probably some legal difficulties even in Russia forcing Gazprombank to pay the sovereign bonds. So "acceptable" for whom? Obviously Russia thinks it's not acceptable, hence their recent payment in rubles (to an account in Russia that's not really accessible to the creditors, due to a combination of Western sanctions and even more so to the Russian capital controls imposed in response). So yeah, Russia might argue it's like a "guy in a coma", to use Roger Vadim's analogy, while the US might be saying that it's more like Boris Becker, i.e. refusing to pay while it still has plenty of assets (and foreign income in the case of Russia). As some may be unaware of the Argentine case details, here's a partial summary, from an IMF book chapter : The Argentine debt crisis after 2001 is the best-known example for how large the legal costs of default can become. Dozens of hedge funds filed suit against Argentina in New York, litigated for full repayment, and repeatedly attempted to seize Argentine assets abroad. Fifteen years later, those holdout creditors achieved a major victory in court, which ultimately forced the Argentine government into a settlement of more than $10 billion – a multiple of the debt’s original face value (Cruces and Levy Yeyati 2016; Hébert and Schreger 2017). And interestingly enough, Argentina had troubles with later payments while that litigation was going on not due to sanctions, but because of court decisions: some contracts do not consider a payment to be made until each
creditor has received the funds. For instance, Argentina’s 2005 and 2010 exchange bonds specified that “the Republic’s obligation to make payments hereunder ... shall not have been satisfied until such payments are received by the Holders of this Security” (Republic of Argentina 2005). The distinction between the debtor’s payment and the ultimate creditor’s receipt became salient when a U.S. federal court blocked Bank of New York Mellon as trustee for Argentina’s exchange bonds from distributing the government’s interest payment to the bondholders. [fn:] Argentina had paid Bank of New York Mellon in violation of the court’s injunction designed to compel ratable payment to holdout creditors whenever the exchange bondholders were paid. | {
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72,564 | This is the election system in France and Ukraine. In the first round anyone can run. If no candidate wins an absolute majority, then the top two candidates go to a second round where they face off against each other. What are the relative disadvantages of this electoral system? Related: What are the disadvantages of first-past-the-post electoral systems? which deals with the relative disadvantages of the other major electoral system. | In no particular order: Cost. Elections cost in time and money. Having a run-off election means that you have to pay twice. Not Condorcet. A candidate who would win in a head to head against every other candidate can be eliminated in round 1. Indeed this system also fails the "independence of irrelevant alternatives" criteria. Voting for the least bad. In the second round, there may be one candidate supported by 40% of the electorate, and a second candidate supported by 20%, but if the 40% of voters who don't support either feel that the second candidate is marginally less awful than the first candidate, then the second candidate can be elected. Being elected for being "marginally less awful" seems a weak mandate! The candidate with the most supporters doesn't always win. Tactical effects. In the first round, voters may choose to vote dishonestly or tactically to get a candidate that they perceive as having a greater chance of making the top two. Then the results of the first round can have a significant tactical effect on the second. For example a candidate may have a significant lead in round 1, so their voters don't bother to turn out in round 2. Voter fatigue. "I've already voted once... Why do I need to do it again?" This can lead to low turnout in the second round, and a reduced mandate. And, as with all democratic systems, the winner is based on popularity, and not on competence. | {
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72,572 | I just saw this video of Russian tanks on a video on Twitter . I can see four different flags flown by the soldiers but I can't make out what they are apart from the last one which just looks like the flag of Russia. I tried to screenshot them as best as I could but what are they and what does the text on them say? | The first flag shown is the double-headed eagle from the Coat of Arms of the Russian Empire imposed on the Empire's black/yellow/white tricolour . The flag also includes the motto "Мы - русские / С нами Бог", - roughly "We are Russian / God is with us". Image from RusAtribut The second flag is another unofficial one, it appears to be an alteration of the old flag of the Russian Naval Infantry , which was changed in 2020. The flag's emblem has been replaced with a skull wearing the Naval Infantry beret imposed on two crossed anchors, with the motto "Где мы - там победа" - "Where we are, there is victory". The text on the top is "Морская пехота", Russian for Naval Infantry. Image from RusAtribut The third, fourth and fifth flags are all the same - the ensign of the Russian Navy , and you've already identified the final flag as the flag of the Russian Federation. | {
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72,596 | This article mentions the frequent discussions between Emmanuel Macron and Vladimir Putin: French President Emmanuel Macron continues to keep his hotline open
with Russian President Vladimir Putin, speaking to him more than a
dozen times since the crisis escalated in December 2021, with the
latest call Thursday from a European Union summit at Versailles,
France. I understand that such discussions are required for trying to find a diplomatic solution, but what's the point of trying so many times? | Quoting Emmanuel Macron: If he doesn't talk to anyone anymore, then we don't know how far he can go. It's my obsession with him, I tell him every time. When you enter the cycle of violence, the hardest thing is to stop. The danger is the tipping point into the irreversible (Translated by Google from french source: Guerre en Ukraine : Emmanuel Macron estime que « Vladimir Poutine a décidé qu’il ne s’arrêterait pas » ) | {
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72,613 | I'm struggling to understand the notion of "war crimes". It refers to acts within the context of a war that are considered especially heinous and outside the normal parameters of armed conflict (the Geneva Conventions). But why is initiating the war itself considered acceptable in the first place? E.g. in the current situation, why do we only condemn Putin of committing war crimes when we find evidence of attacks on civilians, but not the initial act of invading Ukraine? Obviously, if a country is attacked they need to be able to defend themselves, and we would only accuse them of war crimes if they went beyond this. But shouldn't an initial, unprovoked attack be prohibited entirely? | An actual judicial definition of these crimes can be found in the Rome Statute that established the International Criminal Court. The statute distinguishes 4 crimes: The crime of genocide; Crimes against humanity; War crimes; The crime of aggression. War crimes refer to criminal conduct of war that breaks established rules of armed conflict. Punished are the soldiers performing such illegal acts, as well as any superiors who failed to properly control their troops . That's different for the crime of aggression : For the purpose of this Statute, “crime of aggression” means the planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of a State, of an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations. That is, the crime of aggression is a leadership crime. Punished are those who control the state, not the soldiers who fight the illegal war. Put differently, soldiers are required to conduct themselves according to the rules of war, while politicians are required to conduct themselves according to the rules of international relations. And that's one reason why the distinction between war crimes and the crime of aggression matters: Both are illegal, but the perpetrators are different. | {
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72,638 | From Wikipedia - Regime change is the forcible or coerced replacement of one government regime with another. Regime change may replace all or part of the state's most critical leadership system, administrative apparatus, or bureaucracy. Did China ever try to change regimes in any country successfully or unsuccessfully? | Just the most obvious ones: China openly fought on North Korea's side. NK tried to conquer all of Korea, so arguably do a "regime change" in the South. (I don't know if they supported the initial NK attack though, with logistics. There is a [now declassified] 1949 Soviet cable that China was willing to send troops even then, with somewhat amusing/frank talk like "we can through a few Chinese soldiers over to you; they are all black-[haired], no one will make them out, added Mao Zedong". Another telegram of 1950 from Stalin to Mao ostensibly left the date of the attack ["reunification"] to be decided by the Chinese and North Koreans together.) China supported Pol Pot who carried out a revolution in Cambodia. China supported the Viet Minh against the French (so "regime change" in the North of Vietnam), but fearing a repeat of Korea, tried to dissuade the Vietnamese from the Soviet inspired tactics like the Tet offensive in the South. China had a good cooperation in Laos with the North Vietnamese, both supporting the Pathet Lao armed struggle until 1968 or so, when the Sino-Soviet split made Laos more of a Vietnamese thing. According to Lovell 's book Maoism , China sponsored at least with training in insurgency some 20,000 people in no less than 19 African revolutionary movements, at a cost of some $170 to $220 million over 20 years (this data is based on a Chinese source ), the most notable in terms of success these movements being ZANU in Zimbabwe. | {
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72,641 | Whataboutism or Whataboutary is the technique or practice of responding to an accusation or difficult question by making a counter-accusation or raising a different issue. Examples: The USA to Russia: " You invaded Ukraine and killed tens of thousands of people. " Russia to the USA: " What about Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan,...? " Now, my question is, why is "Whataboutism" often criticized? Those who criticize whataboutism, What better type of reply do they suggest? | It's a logical fallacy. It notably doesn't argue that the act was justified, at most it only argues that you and I are both in the same boat - so if you are wrong, I am wrong too. Concretely: The USA to Russia: "You invaded Ukraine and killed tens of thousands of people." Russia to the USA: "What about Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan,...?" Say Russia is right that the Vietnam War, the Iraq War, and the Afghanistan War are unjust (implied by the original claim "You invaded Ukraine and killed tens of thousands of people"). Then Russia's argument only shows that the US is just as unjust as Russia is. The USA could reasonably say "OK, so I'm a hypocrite and I invaded Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, and killed tens of thousands of people. And you still invaded Ukraine and killed tens of thousands of people." The original claim - that it was unjust to invade Ukraine and kill tens of thousands of people - is not refuted. The kind of response that is needed is an argument that shows why it was just to invade Ukraine. | {
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72,732 | In Britain (excl Northern Ireland) a country close in many respects to the US - in terms of religious history, society, status of women, medical ethics etc abortion is rarely a political issue. The Act of 1967 made it virtually available on demand up to 28 weeks. This was reduced in 1990 by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act to 24 weeks, and allowed on the following very wide and encompassing grounds, certified by two doctors: Ground A – risk to the life of the pregnant woman; Ground B – to
prevent grave permanent injury to the physical or mental health of the
pregnant woman; Ground C – risk of injury to the physical or mental
health of the pregnant woman (up to 24 weeks in the pregnancy); Ground
D – risk of injury to the physical or mental health of any existing
children of the family of the pregnant woman (up to 24 weeks in the
pregnancy); Ground E – substantial risk that if the child were born it
would suffer from such physical or mental abnormalities as to be
seriously handicapped; Ground F – to save the life of the pregnant
woman; or Ground G – to prevent grave permanent injury to the physical
or mental health of the pregnant woman in an emergency.[12] (Wikipedia) It has never been a party-political matter, rarely gets into the headlines - except when Northern Ireland is the subject of discussion - and most people, other than a few activists, seem to accept the law as it stands as reasonable. The political position in the United States could not be more different. There it can decide elections, even the presidency - and it is the key issue determining appointments to the supreme court. It plays a huge part in dividing the population, and individual states, into two rival camps. A gulf also separates the US from the UK on the matter of gun control - but there the reason is more obvious, given America's history as a frontier society. But quite why the US is so divided on a matter which can intimately affect any family, where it hardly ever enters a panel discussion, let alone an argument in a pub in Britain, is puzzling. An article in this week's edition of The Economist entitled What happens after Roe? suggests the following: In other countries abortion tends to be embedded in broader health-care systems. In the United States it is practised almost exclusively in stand-alone clinics, largely so that providers can avoid the costly billing systems found in hospitals. Yet this has made the job of anti-abortion campaigners easier, allowing them to find the right women to shout at and enabling them to portray abortion as being separate and different. Somehow, it seems to me that this cannot provide the whole answer - there has to be a more basic reason. | The following is necessarily a massive oversimplification. Religiousness America is, by and large, the most religious of the high-GDP countries that aren't Middle Eastern (and heavily Muslim) oil exporting nations . Compared to most Western European nations especially, the US has a significantly higher number of people who consider themselves highly religious, and a notably smaller proportion of those who identify as non-religious. In the UK, some 55% of people say they are not religious , with about 34% identifying as Christian. By contrast, in the US some 63% of people identify as Christian , most of them Protestants, and only 28% identify as non-religious. That's about a 30% swing. Imagine how much different the UK would be if a quarter of its population swapped over to being heavily religious from non-religious. As such, religious moralism, especially Protestant Christian moralism, plays a major role in all aspects of American society and politics at large. And Protestant (and Evangelical) Christianity largely sees abortion as one of the gravest sins imaginable (or at least, it seems the gravest one they're willing to get riled up about at the moment). There's simply no comparable religious undercurrent in the UK. While there are surely religious people there who take issue with abortion, they do not pose nearly as large of a sector of the voting (and politically vocal) populace. Ease of change Add to this the contrast in "reversibility" on the legality of abortion. In the UK, all Parliament has to do is pass a new law, requiring simply a majority of MPs, and boom, you can completely alter if something is allowed or not. You can even override court decisions this way, as Parliament is ultimately the supreme authority. Contrast in America, where a right to abortion has thus far been held as constitutionally protected by our Supreme Court. And the only thing that can override the Supreme Court on this is itself or a constitutional amendment. An amendment normally requires congressional two-thirds majorities in both chambers (only one of which is proportionate to population, but gerrymandered) and three quarters of states (which is definitely not proportionate to national population). This is obscenely difficult, and in theory a rather small fraction of our population can prevent any amendment, even if everyone else is vigorously in favor. Thus the much simpler solution: alter the Supreme Court to your view point. Which is still hard due to lifetime appointments, but easier than an amendment you don't have massive majorities for these days. And if you succeed, that difficulty now protects your success. The only way to go about that is through national politics, as Justices are appointed and confirmed through the federal political branches. All told this created a massive political pressure. Abortion, once a state issue with little national character, was catapulted into a primary issue of national importance because a significant fraction of the population abhorred the constitutional protection of abortion, and so had to mobilize in the single plausible direction of correction: a massive alteration of national politics aimed to alter the Supreme Court's jurisprudence. This sort of urgent need to exploit national politics doesn't seem to arise in UK's system because simple majorities in the Commons are all you ever need, and the appointment of judges to their Supreme Court or other courts are significantly less political—at least at present to my understanding, as Prime Ministers are largely required to appoint Justices from candidates selected by an independent commission —, and have a mandatory retirement age. The strategy of obstructing and playing the waiting game to win over a single government institution to achieve long term changes in the law is much less likely to succeed in the UK than in the US, especially when there are ostensibly much easier avenues to achieve your goals anyway, and they can be much more easily reversed. | {
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72,777 | In CNN's Attorney grills Marjorie Taylor Greene about her false stolen election remarks at about 03:35 reporter Amara Walker says: Now the judge is expected to make a decision early next month on whether or not Marjorie Taylor Green should be disqualified from running for re-election, he will make his recommendation to the Georgia Secretary of State who will then make a final determination. Now Kate keep in mind that this insurrection disqualification clause in the 14th amendment is from the Civil War era, so that means that this provision has never been tested in modern history. And that will make it likely an uphill battle for the challengers. Question: From where does the Georgia Secretary of State derive power to enforce the 14th amendment of the US constitution in the context of potentially denying Marjorie Taylor Green's right to run for reelection? Certainly state authority is what one would expect applies to an individual's running in an election to represent that state, but is there a law in Georgia that says in effect 14th amendment challenges to a citizen's right to run for congress shall be heard by a judge who then makes a recommendation to the Secretary of State of Georgia who can simply decide to prevent someone from running by themselves? This seems a bit tricky - is this current challenge following a codified procedure or is it somewhat ad hoc ? Note that answers to Who enforces the insurrection rules in the 14th Amendment, section 3? don't really seem to apply or fit in this case; and there's no mention of a Secretary of State of an individual state. | The relevant statute in Georgia is GA Code § 21-2-5 (2020) - it’s a bit long to reproduce here, but the general gist of the law is to first establish that all candidates for election must meet the constitutional requirements for holding the office for which they stand (section a). It then sets out in section b, the process by which a candidate may have these qualifications challenged by the Secretary of State, either on their own initiative or on the application of an elector. The matter is referred to an administrative law judge, but the final decision remains in the hands of the Secretary of State (section c). Section e covers the right of the candidate or an elector to appeal this decision by filing a petition in the Superior Court of Fulton County. This court may then alter the decision of the SoS: The court may reverse or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions of the Secretary of State are: In violation of the Constitution or laws of this state; In excess of the statutory authority of the Secretary of State; Made upon unlawful procedures; Affected by other error of law; Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by an abuse of discretion or a clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion. | {
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72,814 | As a background to this question, I know next-to-nothing about French politics other than briefly reading a few news articles about current events. In response to the re-election of Emmanuel Macron in the 2022 election, some violent protests and riots have broken out in France. Macron's opponent, Marine Le Pen, has been referred to as "far-right" by multiple news sources. Without knowing much about Macron's policies; it seems clear that he is the more left-wing candidate of the two. But it seems like these protests and riots are being carried out by far-left groups. This seems very confusing to me; even if far-left groups don't generally support Macron (similar to how far-left groups in the U.S.A. don't tend to support Biden because he is too moderate), shouldn't they be happy about this election outcome, as opposed to a victory by Le Pen? Why are left-wing groups protesting an election in which the right-wing candidate lost? https://www.news.com.au/world/europe/deadly-violence-breaks-out-in-paris-as-police-charge-protesters-furious-at-macrons-reelection/news-story/35ee330a949207ed472f356cb78c3931 | First, a bit of background is necessary: Macron was the Minister of Economy and Industry under Valls' government, when Hollande was president (this was a centre-left government). Previously, Macron was an investment banker (a profession which doesn't get much love on the left). He successfully ran for president in 2017 as a centrist, practically destroying the traditional centre-left (PS) and centre-right (LR [UMP before 2015]) parties with his victory. At the time he managed to convince a huge majority of people (including political figures from the left and the right) that he represented a new, modern kind of politics beyond the old-fashioned system.
It's worth noting that, already in 2017, the second round of the presidential election opposed him to Le Pen, and he clearly benefited from left voters. So there was a kind of expectation on the left that he would be especially moderate in his economic policy. But during his presidency his economic policy was (unsurprisingly) consistent with his ideas, i.e. very liberal (in the sense of liberal capitalism). For example he started by removing l' Impôt de solidarité sur la Fortune , a wealth tax on the richest people. He also made various remarks which were perceived as offending to jobless/poor people. He became generally considered on the left as an elitist, condescending person, and of course not fundamentally different from traditional politicians. During his presidency, the Yellow Vests protests were also symbolically important. From Wikipedia : [..] Including many people motivated by economic difficulties due to low salaries and high energy prices, the yellow vests movement has called for redistributive economic policies like a wealth tax, increased pensions, a higher minimum wage, and reduced salaries for politicians. The government replied mostly with police brutality against the protesters. For all theses reasons, left leaning people who used to have hopes about Macron are now angry against him, and many of those who voted for him in 2017 consider that he betrayed them. Most people on the left (especially the far left) are fed up with these presidential run-offs where they feel excluded: they are given a choice between two right-wing candidates, one far-right and one moderate. So these extreme reactions are not about Macron winning against Le Pen, they actually reflect the anger of these voters from the results of first round: between Macron and Le Pen, they feel that they don't have any acceptable choice. | {
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72,873 | Fox News' April 28, 2022 Germany drops opposition to Russia oil embargo: report includes the following: The reversal from Germany – which had been one of the main opponents of the EU severing its oil and gas trade with Russia – comes after Berlin struck a deal with Poland to import oil by way of one of its Baltic Sea ports, The Wall Street Journal reports . On Wednesday, Germany’s representatives to the EU lifted its objection to a Russian oil embargo pending the country has enough time to find alternative supplies, according to two German government officials who spoke to the newspaper. and ends with In the deal it reached with Poland, Germany will be able to receive oil from exporters docking at the Baltic Sea port of Gdansk, which is connected to a Russian pipeline that funnels crude into a refinery operated by Russian oil company Rosneft in Schwedt, Germany, The Wall Street Journal reports. The Schwedt refinery provides thousands of jobs for its region – and in the event Rosneft refuses to process non-Russian imports, Germany could place the refinery under state management, the newspaper also reported. It's that last sentence in bold that caught my attention and interest. The federal government taking over control of a business or even a part of it is a notable event in a democracy where capitalism and free markets are critical to its economy. So I'd like to ask: Question: Does Germany have much experience putting industries or facilities "under state management" if they don't cooperate? Is there provision for this in the constitution? Is there precedent? Potentially related: Reuters March 22, 2022 Germany puts Rosneft's purchase of Schwedt refinery stake (under review FRANKFURT, March 21 (Reuters) - Germany has put Russian oil group Rosneft's (ROSN.MM) planned purchase of a 37.5% stake in the PCK Schwedt refinery under review, a spokesperson for the economy ministry said on Monday. "Concerning the takeover of additional shares in the PCK (Schwedt) refinery by Rosneft, an investment review process has been launched," the spokesperson said in response to an enquiry. The deal, agreed in November, would raise Rosneft's stake in the east German refinery to 91.67%, with Italy's Eni (ENI.MI) holding 8.33%. | Germany already put Gazprom Germania under state management on April 4. You can see the official order here , this was ordered by Robert Habeck, the minister for the economy and climate. The order refers to the "§ 6 des Außenwirtschaftsgesetzes" for justification. The trigger for this was that the Gazprom Germania ownership was transferred to a different entity which then tried to liquidate Gazprom Germania. All of this would have required notification and approval from the German government because this concerns critical infrastructure. The German government was not notified and not asked for approval, additionally there were concerns that Gazprom Germania would become insolvent due to the current situation, endangering the gas supply. This law lists several cases where measures like this would be justified. The major ones are ensuring essential security interests of Germany, preventing disruption of peace, preventing disruption of foreign affairs or ensuring public order and security. The supply of gas is critical for both German industry and for heating private homes. So this case seems pretty obviously covered by the law, and I'm not aware that there was any kind of serious objection to this act. There is also article 15 of the Grundgesetz ( German constitution ): Land, natural resources and means of production may, for
the purpose of nationalisation, be transferred to public
ownership or other forms of public enterprise by a law that
determines the nature and extent of compensation. With
respect to such compensation the third and fourth sentences
of paragraph (3) of Article 14 shall apply, mutatis mutandis. So the state could also take ownership of these companies under some conditions. This would raise the question about compensation, but I'm not sure how this would work in this particular case. | {
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72,923 | Almost all major democracies have freedom of belief, faith and worship under the overall religious freedom. Some religions include controversial practices such as caste hierarchy, circumcision, polygamy or strict dress codes for women. Is religious freedom such a big thing just because majority of voters are religious? Or are there any other arguments for religious freedom which often legitimises controversial practices? | Because of history When modern Western democracies were first being formed, being religious was the norm, so religion had legitimacy by default. There continue to be many religious people today (especially in the U.S.), so that legitimacy has continued to exist to some extent. In addition, when the notion of religious freedom was being developed, it was a step away from a long history of state-mandated religions and religious leaders wielding great political power. I would argue that religious freedom continues to be important today to prevent a single religion from gaining political dominance. Because it's practical In a world with so much diversity of beliefs and customs, guaranteeing religious freedom is an effective way to help everyone live together peacefully. If I'm worried that the Christians or the Muslims or whoever are going to force me to abandon my faith or adopt their faith, then I will see them as a threat, and coexisting with them will be difficult. But if my government guarantees me my religious freedom, then it's a lot easier to get along with my religiously diverse neighbors. Because religion is important to people Unlike fairly tales, religion is something that people believe in deeply and care about passionately. You may feel that only things with hard scientific evidence should be taken seriously, but there are billions of people who disagree with that. For religious people (like myself), our religious beliefs are a sacred and essential part of who we are. In the eyes of religious people, a society that doesn't protect religious freedom isn't a free society. | {
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72,964 | Hungary is opposing a EU proposal to cut Russian oil imports by the end of this year. Their government said that doing so would "ruin the Hungarian economy". I see that they import some 60% of their oil from Russia, but it's not too clear to me what, besides the present $35/barrel discount that Russian oil seem to presently enjoy is stopping Hungary from importing from elsewhere. Basically, is this just a price issue? | All the refineries in Hungary (and in Slovakia) are calibrated to the Ural type of oil coming from Russia. This type is different from the Brent type of oil coming from North Sea, etc. Adjusting the refineries to Brent oil, or building a new refinery, would take at least a few years and about 700-1000 million dollars according to experts . | {
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73,044 | Water transfer requires government approval. And the government does not approve it. For example, in 2022, 337,564 AF 1 was requested and 0 AF was granted . Given that politicians talk about reducing water waste, wouldn't it make sense to approve transfers? If a water owner wants to sell his water, doesn't that mean that he found someone else that can generate more economic value from his water than the water owner can on his own property? Isn't it wasteful to force the water owner to use the water on his own property? Given the huge economic costs (billions in lost tax revenues as residents leave the state) caused by high retail prices ($8K/AF including "penalties") for urban beautification projects, why is a farmer who generates $1K/AF of value not allowed to help address the economic issue by selling his water? And how could the farmer possibly be happy about not being able to sell his water for greater profit? Is the political climate that there are just too many people or too much economic activity in California? If not, why wouldn't water transfers be approved? Clearly the transportation infrastructure can handle deliveries, since it was done in previous years (and now usage is cut back due to extreme conservation measures). Or are conservationists opposing water transfers? But then how does transferring water from a rice farmer to a city affect the amount of water delivered to nature preserves? Neither the rice farm nor the city is a nature preserve. Transferring water from one entity that's not a nature preserve to another entity that's not a nature preserve doesn't affect how much water gets to the nature preserve. 1 - AF is an acronym for acre-foot , a unit of volume commonly used in the US for water resources. It equals approximately 1233 m 3 (cubic metres). | First point: farmers who sell their water aren't farmers anymore. Both cash crops and livestock are water-intensive, and while farmers could shift to more water-friendly activities (away from nuts, fruits, and beef), that would have a tremendous economic impact on both them and the state. Second point: the central valley (where much of California's agriculture lies) and the southern metropolises are dry. Their water comes from underground aquifers, is drawn from the San Francisco Bay delta south through the aqueduct system, is brought west from the Colorado river, or is collected in government-constructed artificial reservoirs. As such, water allotments are given to agriculture and cities, not owned by agricultural and cities. If any given allotment is not used by the allotee, it is kept in the system to be used elsewhere. While I'm sure there's wastage, water is far too valuable a commodity in California for flagrant waste. California water politics is an ugly, angry, convoluted business, but environmentalists are not the major players. Environmentalists do get upset about potential damage to the wetlands of the delta, but the real fight is between agriculturalists (who want more water to follow high-value pursuits like almonds and cattle) and cities (which need water for economic growth and the health and welfare of their citizens). | {
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73,063 | [ Remark three months later, Aug 24, 2022: The question seems as pressing as ever. The conflict has indeed turned into a text book war of attrition, with neither side being able to make a decisive move. Instead, both sides try to exhaust each others' resources and to undermine the opponent's military and civil morale, all the while taking unusually heavy military and civil losses . A Ukrainian adviser estimated 150 Ukrainian military fatalities per day , leading to a conservative estimate of 10,000 fatalities since this question was posted. ] For weeks now the war has appeared to drag on with protracted fighting and a slow-moving front. Russia's attempt of taking Kyiv and replacing the government has failed, and given the Ukrainian resolve and Western support it seems unlikely that they will be able to do so in the future. Consequently they are concentrating their military efforts in the East and in the South where they try to extend the occupied area. Conversely, it seems unlikely that Ukraine will be able to restore the borders of 2021 or reconquer Crimea. The goals of the involved parties are, in a rough outline: Ukraine's immediate goal is to prevent Russian advances in the East and South. That goal appears realistic but is not a given. The long-term goal to re-establish control over its entire territory appears unrealistic. The best military outcome appearing realistic right now is to to re-conquer some places and prevent Russia from advancing elsewhere. The worst outcome is a protracted war with even more territorial losses. The Russian goal to establish permanent control over Ukrainian territories in the East and South seems in principle realistic, although the precise territory is still to be defined, by whatever means. The result may be a larger or a smaller territory than the currently occupied area. The Western goal is to prevent the aggressor from succeeding. A secondary goal is to weaken Russia's military. While the latter is realistic, the former is rather not: Even with massive deliveries of heavy weapons it is unlikely that Ukraine's borders of 2021 will be restored with military means in the near future. This seems to naturally lead to cease-fire negotiations that would determine a "line of actual control" close to an eventual realistic military outcome but save thousands of lives, let alone property and resources. Of course, the "eventual realistic military outcome" is pretty fuzzy. A cease-fire would define a line of actual control that is neither side's realistic maximum; this potential loss is offset — for both sides — by eliminating the risk of an even worse outcome. Are there signs that Ukraine and the West would be willing to, however grudgingly, factually (but not politically or legally) accept a Russian occupation and enter cease-fire talks? The benefits of, say, accepting the current line of control would be to eliminate the risk of further Russian incursions. The downside is the loss of the occupied areas and that an illegal invasion is accepted as successful. If Ukraine is not willing to negotiate now: What are their exit strategies, given that re-conquering the occupied areas seems unrealistic? Note: This war was full of surprises. I'd be happy about answers challenging my assumption that re-establishing territorial control is unlikely. Addendum: Right at this hour [which was in May 2022 -Peter] a NYT opinion piece has been published lamenting the ill-defined Western war goals and the lack of diplomatic efforts to end the war which makes arguments close to mine. | This seems to naturally lead to case-fire negotiations that would determine a "line of actual control" close to an eventual realistic military outcome but save thousands of lives, let alone property and resources. Not really, not at this time, not yet . Wars don't get started because both countries know the endpoint, they get started because each country thinks it can get what it wants and it takes a loss to convince the loser to concede. War on Rocks podcast, shortly after the shift of offensive from Kiev area to Donbas put it nicely: at this point, both parties believe they can manipulate the situation to their advantage and it will take military (or economic) losses to convince them otherwise . Russia's desire to control zones of Donbas beyond where they were on February 23rd goes beyond what Ukraine has said it is willing to negotiate about . Putin thinks, or at least thought 3 weeks ago, that Russia can take over the Donbas by running a more disciplined military operation in the East. The Russian people have little say. Zelensky believes Ukraine can kick them out, or at least hold the line, and has popular support. These are not reconcilable positions, at this point . One, or both, will have to make concessions they are not yet willing to make and those concessions won't happen until the current fighting goes one way or the other. Even then, it is not hard to imagine Russia settling in for a static conflict akin to what they did in Donbas since 2014 - trenches with artillery exchanges. And then that just becomes the new decision point: how much does it cost in lives and economically on either side. Asking one or the other to "give things up" is rather glib and not all that realistic. For Ukraine, losing territory is about the worst outcome a nation can get in warfare. Add to it that, for Ukrainians currently in Russian-occupied territories the behavior of Russian troops and authorities seems too abusive to dismiss as a simple exchange of territory. Bucha has made a negotiated settlement much harder for Zelenksy. For Russia, the situation is no easier: Putin could easily pull out, except that he's staked his entire political house of cards on reinvigorating Russian power and prestige. Both countries are still in the process of discovering what they, and the other, can or can not, do. For example, Ukraine claimed - either for propaganda or out of genuine belief - that the May 9th parade would see Putin either declare war or mobilization. That did not happen. As per ISW : Russian President Vladimir Putin used his May 9 speech to praise ongoing Russian efforts in Ukraine and reinforce existing Kremlin framing rather than announcing a change. He did not announce an escalation or declare victory in the Russian war in Ukraine. Putin likely calculated that he could not ask the Russian population for a greater commitment to the war effort and implicitly reassured the Russian people that he would not ask for a greater societal commitment in his speech. Putin may be recognizing the growing risks he faces at home and in Ukraine and may be adjusting his objectives, and his desired end state in Ukraine, accordingly. The Kremlin has already scaled down its objectives in Ukraine (from its initial objective of capturing Kyiv and full regime change) and will likely do so again—or be forced to do so by Ukrainian battlefield successes. Regardless of any change—or lack thereof—in the Kremlin's objectives, Putin’s speech indicates that the Kremlin has likely decided to maintain its current level of resourcing in the war. To go back to the question: For weeks now the war has appeared to drag on with protracted fighting and a slow-moving front. Yes, that's also part of the "learning process" for both sides. So, while there are plenty of possible exit strategies for the war, it is unlikely that they will be pursued until considerably more pain is suffered by both sides and one side is convinced they can't achieve their goals. p.s. It would be remiss not to mention ISW's latest (May 13th) take on Putin's exit strategy, RUSSIAN ANNEXATION OF OCCUPIED UKRAINE IS PUTIN’S UNACCEPTABLE “OFF-RAMP” It's a doozy: annex already-conquered Ukrainian territories into Russia declare that Ukrainian attacks to recover those areas are violating Russian home territory and liable for nuclear retaliation. Four months ago, despite a long dislike of Putin, I would have rolled my eyes at this blatantly unjustified trolling of Russia. Now I am hoping that ISW is wrong but by no means putting it beneath them. The interesting spin here is ISW's claim that Russia recognizing it can't win militarily would be precisely what would cause it to do this, to lock in their territorial robbery. | {
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73,093 | From his Wikipedia page, Joe Manchin appears to be a Republican pretending to be a Democrat to get elected in a state that is solidly Republican, but has returned him since 2010. He gets huge majorities in his primaries and thin majorities in the actual election and then in the current session has basically appeared to block all significant Democrat policy, but doesn't seem to be drawing significant removal attempts from either side. Why is Joe Manchin a Democrat when he sides so consistently on significant votes with the Republican party? Why do Democrat primary voters in his state vote for him so strongly, or even consider themselves Democrats if they consider him to align with their positions? Why does the central Democrat party continue to support him? I assume all of this has an underlaying unifying cause, but I have no idea what this might be. | Well, I guess I'd better start by saying, it's not clear that Joe Manchin DOES consistently vote against his own party . BUT I suppose if you pre-suppose the conclusion, you can get plenty of explanations for why Joe Manchin consistently votes against other Democratic Party members. You could say it's safer for a Democrat to cross party lines on legislation. Comparing Manchin and Sinema to Sasse and Romney , I'm not sure that's clearly the case. You could say it's because he's a greedy, reactionary coal baron who cares more about his own wealth than democracy or social welfare. But that doesn't match up. If you look at how often senators voted "Democratic" (i.e. voted along with the democratic president) look at their net worth and adjust for how long they've been in office , then there's some shaky data to suggest that you're either AS likely or slightly MORE likely to be a multi-millionaire if you vote strictly along party lines. You could say that it's because West Virginians voted for Trump in 2020. And it's true that if you look at a scatter plot of voting records , Manchin is definitely an outlier. So is he an outlier on his voting record too? Well, West Virginia is one of five states with both a Democratic and a Republican senator. Of the five, 2 voted with Biden 98% of the time (along with 17 non-split state senators). 1 (Manchin) voted with Biden 95% of the time (along with 12 non-split state senators), and 2 voted with Biden 93% of the time (along with Bernie Sanders). So is that our smoking gun? I don't know. Seems pretty shaky to me. So...maybe we should circle back to the beginning. Maybe Joe Manchin DOESN'T consistently vote against his party. Maybe if he IS affected by Republican intolerance or greed or the demands of constituents, the effect is so small that you can only see it if you believe it's there from the outset. | {
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73,129 | The Constitution allows for the Vice President to vote on an issue if the vote is equally divided. There have been a number of occasions when the Vice President has cast a negative vote, see here . Why would the Vice President ever cast a vote in the negative? A vote cast in the negative is redundant since an equally divided vote fails to secure majority. | Mostly (if anything), just to set a record. As a way of making the failing of the motion more "official", or to show the White House's opposition to it.
Technically, the result is always the same as if no vote was cast by the VP. | {
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