source_id
int64 1
4.64M
| question
stringlengths 0
28.4k
| response
stringlengths 0
28.8k
| metadata
dict |
|---|---|---|---|
73,141 | In CNN's April 15, 2022 He was once Putin's Prime Minister. Now he supports Ukraine after 05:30 former Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov says (my transcription, no closed captions available): I'll bring you back twenty years ago when I was prime minister and (Putin) was in (his) first term as president. At that time we had excellent relations with the United States (unclear) in general. At that time me -- as the head of the cabinet -- I announced (that) I was dreaming to get Russia as a full-fledged member of NATO. Mr. Putin at that time, in not such a direct way also said that he didn't exclude such a position. And we established together with NATO a special council - a Russia-NATO Council, and relations were very good. Right now it's a completely different situation (and) a completely different Putin. Wikipedia's Russia-NATO relations: NATO-Russia Council doesn't specifically mention any discussion of Russia joining NATO. So I'd like to ask: Question: Did Russia once want to join NATO? Does former Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov refer to a serious interest in the past? Note: I'm asking about Russia's past intention 1 , not Kasyanov's. Here's a second reference to this possibility. In CNN's May 16 2022 Tony Blair explains what he thinks changed Putin (my transcription): The trajectory has been away from the reforming, western-oriented leader who could have allowed Russia to become part of the west - people used to even talk in the old days (I'm talking times when I was there) people were even talking about 'could Russia become a member of the European Union? Was there a way that Russia could be accommodated literally within the structures of NATO?' And it's very important that people remember this because this myth that Putin perpetrates that we were somehow trying to push him and humiliate Russia... Russia's problem is not the result of our humiliation of Russia, it's the result of bad government in Russia. Of course "people were even talking about" is not evidence of Russia's serious interest, but it at least supports the question's premise that it is valid to ask the question if it did. 1 Answers should reference statements by and evidence of actions associated with Russia itself, not Kasyanov "dream". See this answer in meta. | Others, albeit Westerners remember such talk from Russia, and more specifically from Putin some 20+ years ago too: Vladimir Putin wanted Russia to join Nato but did not want his country to have to go through the usual application process and stand in line “with a lot of countries that don’t matter”, according to a former secretary general of the transatlantic alliance. George Robertson, a former Labour defence secretary who led Nato between 1999 and 2003, said Putin made it clear at their first meeting that he wanted Russia to be part of western Europe. “They wanted to be part of that secure, stable prosperous west that Russia was out of at the time,” he said. The Labour peer recalled an early meeting with Putin, who became Russian president in 2000. “Putin said: ‘When are you going to invite us to join Nato?’ And [Robertson] said: ‘Well, we don’t invite people to join Nato, they apply to join Nato.’ And he said: ‘Well, we’re not standing in line with a lot of countries that don’t matter.’” The account chimes with what Putin told the late David Frost in a BBC interview shortly before he was first inaugurated as Russian president more than 21 years ago. Putin told Frost he would not rule out joining Nato “if and when Russia’s views are taken into account as those of an equal partner”. He told Frost it was hard for him to visualise Nato as an enemy. “Russia is part of the European culture. And I cannot imagine my own country in isolation from Europe and what we often call the civilised world.” (" Ex-Nato head says Putin wanted to join alliance early on in his rule ", 4 November 2021, Jennifer Rankin, The Guardian ) About two decades later, Putin recounted discussing the matter with Bill Clinton. RFERL relates in a 2017 article: Russian President Vladimir Putin has claimed that he once raised the possibility of Russia joining NATO with then-President Bill Clinton, and that Clinton said he had "no objection." Putin delivered this account in a series of interviews with U.S. film director Oliver Stone set to air later this month on the U.S. television network Showtime. Speaking with Stone in what appears to be Putin's presidential plane, the Russian leader recalls one of his final meetings with Clinton, who left office in January 2001. "During the meeting I said, 'We would consider an option that Russia might join NATO,'" Putin says. "Clinton answered, 'I have no objection.' But the entire U.S. delegation got very nervous." In a March 2000 interview with the British television journalist David Frost, Putin was asked whether "it is possible Russia could join NATO." Putin, who at the time was serving as acting president and weeks later was elected to his first term, responded, "I don’t see why not." (" Putin Says He Discussed Russia's Possible NATO Membership With Bill Clinton ", 3 June 2017, RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, with reporting by AFP) It might get into the realm of opinion-based how serious this was (from all participants in those discussions). For what's worth it, a google search even finds a 2000 report on NATO's site titled: "Should Russia join NATO?" | {
"source": [
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/73141",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/users/16047/"
]
} |
73,152 | The Russian State has been clear about its motivations in the recent Ukrainian conflict. Notably, its objection to NATO expansion. However, much Western media, Western discussion, and even Western politicians disregard Russia's stated motivations as "Russian propaganda". This phenomenon is not unique to Russia, I've noticed that European countries will e.g. have marches condemning Israel when Israel is attacked, selectively adhering to specific events yet ignoring other events. Similarly we've seen this happen with e.g. the United States' attacks on Afghanistan and Iraq, NATO's attack on Libya, and many other conflicts from recent memory to before I was born. I would say that presenting both sides of a conflict is the exception, not the norm. Rather, many conflicts are narrated as "bad guys" vs "good guys" by the media, and more importantly treated as such by governments whether they interfere or not. I can understand that some issues may look different from different points of view. Back to the Russian-Ukrainian example, surely the West would see NATO as not "expanding", but rather as "welcoming new members". But why is the Russian point of view disregarded so easily by Western politicians? Is not the first step of conflict resolution to understand the other side's concerns? I see these concerns outright dismissed by Western politicians (and media): Ukraine joining NATO Nazis in Ukrainian politics and military . Potential Ukrainian war crimes . To be clear, I am not excusing Russian actions in the current conflict. This question concerns the general phenomenon of politicians' disregard of "the enemy"'s point of view, using the specific example of disregard in Western government discourse of the Russian point of view (especially voiced Russian concerns before and after the invasion). This prevents practical application of regard for such concerns, which e.g. could have possibly prevented the Ukrainian invasion by addressing Russian concerns at the NATO-Russia meeting in January . | President Putin is jumping between different explanations/justifications for the invasion, and Western analysts believe that the true goal -- which is one of the stated goals -- is to undo the dissolution of the Soviet Union and to reintegrate Ukraine into Russia as the Soviet successor ( Reuters ). There is also analysis that the current Russian government (not the Russian people ) is fundamentally threatened by a Russian-speaking, Slavic nation which embraces Western-style democracy and tells their in-laws across the border how their elections are going. But the West cannot defuse this threat without denying the universal scope of the values it proclaims to embrace. ( RAND ) So NATO could not have 'resolved Russian concerns' in 2022 or 2021 or earlier without a repeat of the Molotov-Ribbentrop-Pact or perhaps a replay of Yalta . Russia believes that it needs a sphere of buffer states to be secure, the West doesn't want to abandon states into that buffer. If it wasn't about NATO, it would have been about EU membership or association; if it wasn't about Ukraine, it would have been about Georgia, or Moldova, or the Baltics. | {
"source": [
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/73152",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/users/5736/"
]
} |
73,168 | I was reading a recent question on why a Vice President might choose to use a negative casting vote on a tied vote in the Senate rather than just letting the motion fail by withholding their vote, when I wondered how common this latter scenario actually is. I know it's happened in the past because I found a few relevant excerpts from Riddick's Senate Procedure : On occasions he (the Vice President) has refused to vote
in the case of a tie; 25 25 Apr. 17, 1917, 65-1, Record , p. 767; see also tie votes on the following dates; Feb. 7, 1919, Jan. 22, 1920, Feb. 9, 1921, July 18,1921, Apr. 7, 1922, May 8, 1928. and In one instance in 1949, the Vice President announced
the tie vote and stated that inasmuch as the Chair would
vote in the negative, his vote is not necessary to defeat the
motion. 38 38 Oct. 18. 1949, 81-1, Journal , p. 809, Record . p. 14842 These examples are all from over 70 years ago though - has the current Vice President, Kamala Harris, ever chosen not to exercise her casting vote? By this, I mean that she was: Physically presiding over the Senate when a tied vote occurred; Had the opportunity to place a casting vote (i.e. not on votes which require more than a simple majority), and; Chose not to vote in the negative, but to let the motion fail. If this scenario has never happened during Kamala Harris' term of office, when was the last time this happened? | The last time this happened was in the early morning of February 5th, 2021 - Kamala Harris was presiding over the Senate and had, in fact, just used her casting vote to pass Chuck Schumer's amendment 888 to S.Con.Res.5 . On the very next vote, on Mitch McConnell's amendment 889 to the same bill, the Senate divided 50-50 once again. Instead of casting her vote in the negative, Harris reported the vote as follows ( C-SPAN, 19:22:10 ): Are there any Senators in the Chamber wishing to vote or to change his or her vote? If not, the Yeas are 50, the Nays are 50, and the amendment is not agreed to. Compare also the reporting of the two votes on the Senate's website - the vote on Schumer's amendment is reported as: Vote Counts: YEAs: 50 NAYs: 50 Vice President of the United States Voted: Yea while on McConnell's amendment , there is no reference to how the Vice President voted. This is the only occasion to date on which Harris has chosen not to use her casting vote while in the chair - based on comparing the Senate's list of casting votes she has used to the list of tied votes in the Senate as reported in the dataset here . For all other tied votes which she presided over, she has cast her vote in favour of the motion. | {
"source": [
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/73168",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/users/42934/"
]
} |
73,214 | I was puzzled by this move by Turkey to block swift approval of Sweden and Finland to NATO Finland and Sweden formally applied to join NATO on Wednesday in another step toward the Western military alliance’s expansion. The full accession process could take a year, and the countries will need to overcome objections from Turkey, which blocked swift approval of their applications. Why is Turkey objecting to their NATO entry? | According to Turkey's President Erdoğan , they will not immediately approve the enlargement unless Turkey's own security concerns are considered. In general, Erdoğan believes that they have not received their fair share of support from NATO in protecting Turkey's borders or handling refugees. More specifically he believes that various NATO and non-NATO nations are directly or indirectly supporting the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and the People's Defense Units (YPG), which Turkey considers terrorist organizations. A summary of a recent address by Erdoğan to a parliamentary meeting with his party can be found here , and some relevant quotes from Erdoğan: "The fact that the humanity has come to the brink of a great confrontation yet again after the Second World War as made visible by the war on Ukrainian territory has brought security balances to the forefront. NATO is in pursuit of strengthening its eastern borders. Accordingly, various steps are being taken with a view to enlargement" Pointing to Türkiye’s sensitivity regarding the protection of its borders against terrorist organizations’ attacks, President Erdoğan said: “Because of this, we have had a lot of sufferings and casualties for years and have paid heavy prices. We still pay. Unfortunately, almost none of our allies has respected this sensitivity of ours in the manner or to the extent we have expected, let along [sic] give us support. We have not forgotten the days when air defense systems were dismantled and taken away from our country at a time when the PKK and DAESH were charging towards our borders.” "Today as well, we are one of the top countries that actively support the Alliance’s activities. Yet, this doesn’t mean that we will say ‘yes’ to every proposal brought before us. NATO's enlargement is meaningful to us only to the extent that our sensitivities are respected. Asking us for support for NATO membership while providing every kind of support to the PKK/YPG terrorist organization amounts to incoherence to say the least." President Erdoğan continued his remarks as follows: “The things that have been done in France, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland and Sweden... Are we supposed to not see these? The things that have lately been done in Sweden, and we have wanted 30 terrorists. They said, ‘We don’t give.’ You don’t give us terrorists but then ask us for NATO membership. NATO is a security establishment. It is a security organization and therefore we cannot say ‘yes’ to depriving this security organization of security." | {
"source": [
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/73214",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/users/12027/"
]
} |
73,283 | Multiple European newspapers stated that the Ukrainian government was doing everything in its power to allow the Ukrainian civilians to flee the country safely. I was under the impression that Ukrainian civilians who are currently taking part in the military conflict against Russia willingly chose to do so. However recent reports from the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights indicate that a lot of Ukrainian civilians are forced to join the military, under prison or death threats. The civilians are apparently forced to enroll based on their gender; mostly males between 18 and 60 and even trans women. The Ukrainian military would deny these civilians the right to cross the border and flee the country. They would check civilians' cars at checkpoints to find civilians physically able to use weapons and forcefully enroll them in the armed conflict. So are Ukrainian civilians really free to flee the country? Or are some of them forced (under prison or death threats) to participate in a military conflict? Edit Whether conscription is scandalous or not is opinion-based and beyond the scope of this question. What I'm trying to know is whether all Ukrainian civilians (whatever their gender, age, or ethnicity) are free to flee the armed conflict in Ukraine, or whether some or all of them are forced in any way to remain in the country to take part in the armed conflict. | To quote Wikipedia on conscription in the Ukrainian army : In October 2013 President Yanukovich ended conscription in Ukraine, at the time 60% of Ukraine's forces were composed of professional soldiers.[82] However, due to the 2014 Russian military intervention in Ukraine conscription, as well as a partial mobilization, was reinstated in 2014.[83] Ukraine has modified the age group of males eligible for conscription for 2015 from 18–25 to the 20–27 age group.[84] After serving out the term of service Ukraine's conscripts become part of the inactive reserve and are eligible to be recalled for mobilization until they reach age 55, age 60 for officers. Due to the war in Donbas Ukraine has instated a partial mobilization to fill needed positions in its armed forces, recalling conscripts who have served before, because of the war many conscripts have also been forced to serve longer than their original 18-month term of service.[85] It was planned that in 2015 Ukraine would undergo three waves of partial mobilization, this would have allowed new troops to replace those serving longer than their original term of service.[86] And further: All medical workers in Ukraine, regardless of gender, are eligible to be called up for service in case of a national emergency. In other words, all able-bodied men, as well as the medical personnel (regardless of gender) are legally obliged to take part in the fighting ( mobilization in the quotes before) - I suppose that there is a motivated order by the president to this end. Naturally (and understandably), there are many men who flee, in order to protect their lives, and the authorities are trying to force them to return and join the army. The situation is not unusual in the times of military conflict, and whether one calls them deserters , draft dodgers or civilians fleeing fighting is a matter of personal perspective. | {
"source": [
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/73283",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/users/43280/"
]
} |
73,301 | I know the US Constitution covers the right to bear arms, but can the government theoretically ban the buying, selling and manufacture of arms? | Keep in mind that prior to District of Columbia v. Heller , 554 US 570 (2008), the Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution was basically a dead letter with no enforceable effect, in substantial part due to its ruling in United States v. Miller , 307 U.S. 174 (1939). The Supreme Court held in United States v. Cruikshank (1876) that the Second Amendment did not apply to state governments, affirming an earlier decision in Barron v. Baltimore (1833) that the Bill of Rights did not apply to state and local governments. This remained good law, and the Second Amendment as interpreted by Heller (which was limited to federal law), was not "incorporated" to apply to state and local governments until McDonald v. City of Chicago , 561 U.S. 742 (2010) was decided. The development of this area of law is ongoing and evolving. Heller and McDonald struck down laws that basically prohibited all private possession of handguns by ordinary people for use of self-defense in their homes. Still, as Heller acknowledges, the Second Amendment itself, with its reference to a "well-regulated militia" on its face recognizes the validity of reasonable regulation of firearms. Heller and subsequent cases make clear that a complete ban on buying, selling or manufacturing firearms is not constitutional, but significant restrictions are allowed. In particular, Heller expressly stated that: nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on ... laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms. In general, business regulation of the sale and manufacture of firearms as long as its does not effectively foreclose or unduly burden an individual's right to self-defense with firearms is permitted . As a result there has been very little litigation, post- Heller , of these kinds of regulations compared to regulations of individual possession and ownership of firearms. Heller adopted the theory that the individual right to buy arms is tie-barred to the natural right of self-defense. So, selling military grade weapons to members of the general public (e.g. anti-tank missiles or surface to air missiles) has long been extremely regulated, and those restrictions appear to be constitutional. The courts have so far not adopted the political theory behind the Second Amendment which is that widespread firearm ownership discourages authoritarian regimes. Thus : [T]he Supreme Court noted that one important limitation on the Second
Amendment right is “the historical tradition of prohibiting the
carrying of ‘dangerous and unusual weapons.’” The Court acknowledged that “weapons that are most useful in military
service—M-16 rifles and the like—may be banned” without violating the
Second Amendment. The Court also recognized that its prior decision in Miller explained
that the weapons protected by the Second Amendment are those “in
common use at the time”; Miller held that for this reason,
short-barreled shotguns (which were not in common use) are
unprotected. The selling and manufacture of firearms and explosives in the U.S. is regulated and taxed by the federal government and administered by the Alcohol and Tobacco Trade Bureau (TTB) within the U.S. Dept. of Treasury, in a regime of regulation that has been held to be constitutional. One must obtain a license to sell or manufacture firearms, which costs a significant amount to keep in force and can be revoked for failure to comply with regulatory requirements like conducting background checks and maintaining records. This has been upheld as constitutional. See United States v. Focia , 869 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2017) (federal law prohibiting unlicensed dealing of firearms “merely ‘impos[es] conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms’” so “qualifies as the kind of ‘presumptively lawful regulatory measure[]’ described in Heller”); United States v. Hosford , 843 F.3d 161, 166 (4th Cir. 2016) (federal law prohibiting unlicensed firearms dealing is a facially constitutional “longstanding condition or qualification on the commercial sale of arms”). States laws that have been upheld as valid likewise require background checks in sales involving private buyers and sellers of firearms. So have laws requiring sales by out of state dealers to be handled by someone with an in state dealer's license. Mance v. Sessions , No. 15-10311, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 20270 (5th Cir. July 20, 2018). One excessively high sub-national tax on buying a firearm has been invalidated, although the outcomes vary in a face specific case by case manner. A tax on buying firearms in Chicago was upheld in Guns Save Life v. Ali , while a $1000 tax in the Marianas Islands was struck down in Murphy v. Guerrero . See also Kwong v. Bloomberg , 723 F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 2013) (upholding $340 fee to purchase a handgun); Bauer v. Becerra , 858 F.3d 1216 (9th Cir. 2017) (upholding law requiring all firearm purchasers to pay a $19 background check fee, when a portion of the fee goes to maintaining a database to track prohibited persons who have purchased firearms); Cruz-Kerkado v. Puerto Rico , No. 16-cv-2748, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59290 (D. P.R. Apr. 5, 2018) (upholding a $250 licensing fee for concealed handgun permits); People v. Stevens , 2018 IL App (4th) 150871 (Ill. App. Ct. May 16, 2018) (upholding a $300 licensing fee for concealed handgun permits issued to out-of-state residents); Commonwealth v. Cassidy , 81 N.E.3d 822 (Mass. App. Ct. 2017) (summary decision) (rejecting argument that firearm license fee is an “excise tax on [the] fundamental right” of “private gun ownership”), aff’d, 479 Mass. 527 (2018). Murphy and its sister case, Radich v. Guerrero , represented a near complete prohibition, and to some extent can be viewed as a case testing the question of whether Heller applies in a U.S. territory which has a different constitutional status than either the District of Columbia or a U.S. state (e.g. people born in the Marianas Islands are U.S. nationals, but not U.S. citizens). In 2016, in Radich v. Guerrero , a federal district court struck down
a regulatory system in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana
Islands (CNMI), a US territory, which prohibited most private
individuals from possessing and importing handguns and handgun
ammunition. The court found this general prohibition on handgun
possession to violate the Second Amendment, noting that “the
Commonwealth’s ban on handguns cannot be squared with the Second
Amendment right described in Heller and McDonald .” Later that
year, the same federal district court struck down other aspects of
CNMI’s gun laws, including a $1,000 handgun excise tax, a blanket
prohibition on the public carry of firearms, a ban on certain assault
weapons features, and a ban on long guns with caliber greater than
.223. ( Source ) Federal law that has been held to be constitutional likewise prohibits various classes of people including minors (although some restrictions on persons aged 18-20 have been struck down in a split of authority between different federal and state appellate courts considering the issue), drug users, people who have been involuntarily committed for mental health issues, see, e.g., Mai v. United States , 952 F.3d 1106, 1109 (9th Cir. 2020), undocumented aliens (see below), and people with prior convictions for felonies, see, e.g., United States v. Massey , 849 F.3d 262 (5th Cir. 2017) or for domestic violence offenses from buying firearms.
For example, the 11th Circuit, the most conservative of the U.S. Court of Appeal, upheld the prohibition on undocumented immigrants buying or possessing firearms, in a decision issued this week . Regarding regulation of sales to people age 18-20 see Jones v. Becerra , 498 F.Supp.3d 1317, 1326-28 (S.D. Cal. 2020) (concluding that age-based restrictions on firearms sales are consistent with longstanding historical prohibitions, and thus presumptively lawful regulations that do not implicate the Second Amendment); NRA of Am., Inc. v. Swearingen , No. 4:18cv137, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117837 at *3 (N.D. Fl. June 24, 2021) (finding that “the Second Amendment does not protect the sale of firearms to 18-to-20-year-olds”); Mitchell v. Atkins , 483 F.Supp.3d 985, 993 (W.D. Wa. Aug. 31, 2020) (joining the “several courts that have concluded that firearms age restrictions, particularly those for people under 21, fall outside the Second Amendment’s ambit”); Lara v. Evanchick , No. 2:20-cv-1582, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73813 at *4 (W.D. Penn. Apr. 16, 2021) (“An examination of federal caselaw following Heller shows a broad consensus that restrictions on ownership, possession and use for people younger than 21 fall within the types of ‘longstanding’ and ‘presumptively lawful’ regulations envisioned by Heller [which thus] fall outside the scope of the Second Amendment.”); Nat’l Rifle Ass’n v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives ,700 F.3d 185 (5th Cir. 2012); see also L.S. v. State , 120 So. 3d 55 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013). Indeed, in 2021 about 14% of all federal criminal sentences were for firearms offenses, mostly possession of a firearm by a felon, for which federal law imposes a long mandatory minimum sentence. The Supreme Court has weighed in on a Second Amendment case only two
times since 2010. The first was in Caetano v. Massachusetts , 136 S.
Ct. 1027 (2016) (per curiam), involving a Massachusetts law that
prohibited private possession of stun guns. In a short, unsigned
opinion, the Court did not break any new legal ground or rule that
stun guns are protected by the Second Amendment. Instead, the Caetano
Court simply vacated and remanded a state court’s decision that upheld
the constitutionality of the state’s stun gun ban using a test that
the Supreme Court had previously rejected, and directed the state
court to re-decide the case according to Heller. Second, in 2019, the Supreme Court heard New York State Rifle & Pistol
Association v. City of New York (“NYSRPA”). However, the NYSRPA Court
ended up not issuing a substantive Second Amendment ruling in the
case, which had been brought by a state affiliate of the NRA. Instead,
by a 6–3 vote, the justices found that that the NYSRPA case was moot
based on New York City’s decision to repeal the challenged handgun
transport restrictions. N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. City of
N.Y. , 140 S. Ct. 1525, 1526 (2020) (per curiam). However, four
justices joined separate opinions indicating that they would support
taking up another Second Amendment case in the near future. Justice
Kavanaugh, who agreed that the case was moot, wrote a separate
concurrence to express “concern” that lower courts are wrongly
upholding gun regulations in a manner inconsistent with the Supreme
Court’s prior Second Amendment decisions. Justice Alito also wrote a
dissent, joined by Gorsuch and in part by Thomas, disagreeing that the
NYSRPA case was moot and expressing the same concern over lower
courts. . . . In April 2021, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in New York State
Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, No. 20-843 (“Bruen”), a challenge
to New York State’s concealed carry licensing requirements brought by
the same NRA-affiliated plaintiffs that had earlier initiated NYSRPA.
Oral arguments were held on November 3rd, 2021, with questioning from
the justices suggesting that a majority of the Court is likely to
strike down New York’s requirement of “proper cause” to carry a loaded
firearm in public. ( Source ) Some of the gun control laws which have been upheld by lower courts post-Heller include : Requiring “good cause” for the issuance of a permit to carry a
concealed firearm. Prohibiting the possession of machine guns, assault weapons, and large
capacity ammunition magazines. Requiring that firearms be stored in a locked container or other
secure manner when not in the possession of the owner. Forbidding gun possession by dangerous persons including those
convicted of felonies and domestic violence crimes, and those who have
been involuntarily committed to mental institutions. Requiring the registration of all firearms. Forbidding persons under 21 years old from possessing firearms or
carrying guns in public. Regulating firing ranges, including zoning, construction, and
operation requirements. Requiring that handguns sold within a state meet certain safety
requirements. Imposing fees on the commercial sale of handguns to fund firearm
safety regulations. Requiring a waiting period before completing a firearm sale. Where else have Second Amendment claims been successful? [T]he Seventh Circuit and two district courts struck down laws
interpreted to completely ban the carry of guns in public, while the
DC Circuit invalidated Washington DC’s “good cause” concealed carry
permit law, departing from all other federal circuit courts to have
considered such a law. In addition, while upholding the central
components of Washington’s gun registration system, the DC Circuit
struck down other provisions in the law, including a ban on
registering multiple guns each month and a requirement that residents
pass a test on the District’s gun laws. The Illinois Supreme Court
struck down a law that prohibited carrying guns within 1,000 feet of a
public park, finding the law “effectively prohibit[ed] the possession
of a firearm for self-defense within a vast majority of the acreage in
the city of Chicago.” In 2011, the Seventh Circuit enjoined
enforcement of a Chicago ordinance banning firing ranges in city
limits where range training was a condition of lawful handgun
ownership, and the same panel later struck down a zoning law
restricting where firing ranges could operate and an age restriction
barring entry into ranges by supervised minors. Finally, as previously
mentioned, courts have approved a handful of as-applied challenges to
federal prohibitions on firearm possession, including in the Third and
Sixth Circuits. Federal trial courts have ruled in favor of Second Amendment claims in
various cases, several of which are currently being appealed. A district court in the Seventh Circuit struck down a Chicago law completely banning the sale or transfer of firearms except through inheritance, but explicitly reiterated that cities and states have broad authority to regulate the sale of firearms, including limits on the locations where dealers may operate. A district court in the Ninth
Circuit, citing the now-vacated Peruta panel opinion, struck down
regulations prohibiting the possession of firearms on U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers property. A district court in the Ninth Circuit also
issued an injunction blocking implementation of a California law
prohibiting the possession of large-capacity magazines; the court found that California’s prohibitions on the sale, transfer, and possession of large-capacity magazines violate the Second Amendment and that the possession restrictions also violate the Takings Clause. The district court’s order is an extreme outlier that contradicts decisions reached by six federal appellate courts. Recognizing that
the district court’s “decision [to enjoin California’s law] cuts a
less-traveled path,” the district judge stayed his own injunction
order in part, allowing California to continue to enforce the ban on
the manufacture, sale, and transfer of large-capacity magazines
pending the state’s appeal to the Ninth Circuit. Note that the
district court had earlier issued a preliminary injunction that was
narrowly affirmed by the Ninth Circuit in an unpublished decision that
did not reach the merits of the constitutional challenge, but found
only that the district court’s preliminary assessment was not an abuse
of discretion. Other outliers include: a California federal district court decision
currently under appeal finding the state’s assault weapon prohibitions
unconstitutional, North Carolina district court decision finding that
a state law prohibiting the carrying of firearms during states of
emergency violated the plaintiffs’ Second Amendment rights, an Ohio
state-court decision sustaining a constitutional challenge to a
domestic violence restraining order that prohibited the respondent
from possessing firearms, a Massachusetts federal district court
decision finding that a U.S. citizenship requirement for possessing
and carrying firearms violated the plaintiffs’ Second Amendment
rights, and decisions in Massachusetts, Illinois, Michigan, and New
York striking down state laws prohibiting the possession of Tasers and
stun guns, concluding that the Second Amendment protects those
devices. ( Source ) (citations to case law citations in the source omitted). Only one case where a law has been struck down on Second Amendment grounds, other than Murphy mentioned above in the Marianas Islands, and one 7th Circuit trial court ruling (which involved a total ban), have invalidated regulations of the manufacture and sale and taxation of firearms, and the trial court decision in the 9th Circuit is unlikely to be upheld as it contradicts many other appellate court decisions. Essentially, the case law has been applied at the margins to limit more extreme prohibitions and regulations in an "intermediate scrutiny" analysis, while still allowing substantial regulation. | {
"source": [
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/73301",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/users/32790/"
]
} |
73,403 | There is a plethora of news about Turkey opposing Sweden and Finland from joining NATO, suggesting that this will be quite a long process. Being part of NATO offers an important advantage (besides others) due to collective defense ( article 5 ), but I am interested mostly in the de facto advantages here based on the following rationale: NATO successfully rolled out arms in Ukraine , a non-NATO member, which had an important role in pushing back the invading Russian army Both Sweden and Finland 's armies ensure interoperable capabilities with NATO, so I guess NATO helping them would be even easier than in Ukraine's case That means that NATO (+ others interested to help) can effectively help a country resist a Russian invasion regardless of NATO membership. Is there anything on the practical side that brings NATO membership for Sweden and Finland on the short-medium term (1-2 years)? | There is a difference between providing arms and going to war . You are correct that under the current status quo, if Russia seriously threatened Sweden or Finland, NATO nations would unquestionably provide them with military aid. But the full extent of that aid and the form it takes would be a matter of debate. But NATO membership means that an attack on one is an attack on all . Finland joining NATO would mean that a Russian attack on Finland would be considered an attack on the United States, an attack on the UK, an attack on France. That is to say, a Russian invasion would be a de facto declaration of war on the entirety of NATO. Right now NATO is in something of a proxy war with Russia. If Ukraine had been in NATO, there would be no "proxy" about it, it'd just mean the full might of the UK, France, Germany, and US coming down on Russia. At absolute worst, it'd mean nuclear exchange, end of the world, that whole business. If that sounds like something Russia would never, ever do, you're probably correct. And Finland and Sweden are hoping the same. tl;dr- NATO membership is the difference between generous military support in the face of invasion, and a near-guarantee the invasion will never happen in the first place | {
"source": [
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/73403",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/users/11278/"
]
} |
73,431 | U.S President Biden has been in the news, such as this article in Forth Worth Star-Telegram , appealing for tougher gun laws. The article says that He repeated calls to restore a ban on the sale of assault-style
weapons and high-capacity magazines — and said if Congress won't
embrace all of his proposals, it must at least find compromises like
keeping firearms from those with mental health issues or raising the
age to buy assault-style weapons from 18 to 21. Yet in other news we hear that he has signed an executive order legislating something or other (the executive orders signed by President Biden can be found here in the Federal Register ). This article at the National Constitution Center says that An executive order is a directive from the President that has much of
the same power as a federal law. Question: So instead of begging for support for his wishes on gun control, why can he not simply legislate that through executive order? | For one, executive orders only govern the actions of the the Executive Branch. The president cannot commandeer state governments, nor can he order private citizens to do, or not do, anything. Second, Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution requires the President to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” Even the Executive Branch is fairly tightly constrained in what it can do by laws passed by Congress and signed by the president or one of his predecessors. So the president cannot simply order that such-and-such a firearm not be sold, or that someone who does so should be penalized. This country does not work that way. For example, the president could, if he chose, pause gun control to an extent, by ordering the Justice Department and its Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives to “deprioritize” enforcement of existing gun-control laws. That would work except that: any state or local gun control would still be in effect. if any US Attorney “went rogue“ and decided to enforce a deprioritized law, the defendant would not be able to argue in court that the law was not supposed to be enforced — and the Attorney General might fire or reassign the USAA in question but there would be no other penalty. the president’s successor could issue a countervailing executive order. The president could even order the Justice Department to spend more effort on gun control and to seek more severe punishments, but that does not change the law, and more important, it does not affect the behavior of state-level law enforcement, which outnumbers their Federal counterparts by 20 to one. | {
"source": [
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/73431",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/users/15806/"
]
} |
73,442 | One of the most important reasons for Ukrainians being able to defend themselves against the Russian military is the weapons sent by various NATO / EU countries. However, it seems that there is quite a reluctance on sending more powerful weapons compared to what would be possible and the Russians are making progress in Eastern Ukraine . For example, the US is sending advanced longer-range rocket systems to Ukraine , but this happens quite late. This delay in sending powerful weapons that would have helped the Ukrainian army push back the Russians faster has arguably led to more Ukrainian cities being almost completely destroyed. I know that various countries might have various reasons, so I would exclude from this question the countries that still significantly depend on Russian oil and/or gas (e.g. Germany, Hungary). What reasons have the other countries given for not sending more powerful weapons or what risks are attached with sending these weapons? | It is in the interest of most Western countries to preserve/restore the territorial integrity of Ukraine. This is part of their interest to preserve the established international order, which benefits them. It is not in the interest of most Western countries to have the war escalate to other countries, especially not other EU or NATO countries. Russia has threatened to escalate the war if things don't go as Russia wants. It is probably not in Russia's interest to start another war while they are not winning the current one, but the West might be reluctant to bet too much that Russia sees the Russian interest the same way. Net result, Ukraine is getting considerably more aid and weapons than other countries in similar positions, but less aid and weapons than Ukraine might wish. | {
"source": [
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/73442",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/users/11278/"
]
} |
73,451 | Some examples of politicians who spent a long time behind bars before coming to power include Vladimir Lenin, Vaclav Havel, Nelson Mandela, Aung San Suu Kyi. It therefore seems like a risky move for an authoritarian regime to keep their opponents alive in prison, rather than silencing them forever as soon as they come to prominence. So why does e.g. Russia bother keeping Navalny alive in prison? They did try to assassinate him covertly previously but now that he’s in prison, why don’t they finish the job? What’s the incentive for keeping people like him alive? | For different reasons, some of which are implicitly absent from your question: First you are looking at "survivor bias", where the given outcome - loss of power to imprisonee - happened, rather than the regime successfully keeping an opponent bottled up. I.e. how many regime opponents died or became irrelevant in prison, making this policy a success? Second, it is not clear in those examples how many of them, if any, resulted in a loss of power from the prison . I.e. Mandela did not cause the fall of South Africa's apartheid, he only took over afterwards. Ditto Aung San Suu Kyi. Yes, they symbolized opposition abroad, but see point #4. a moderate, high-profile, opponent may be a useful insurance policy if you did lose power: at least you have a known opponent to negotiate with rather than a bloodthirsty mob baying for your blood. Mandela and Aung San Suu Kyi certainly assisted a more peaceful transition. Conversely - and I don't know the answer, just asking the question - did Ceaucescu's regime have any prominent opponents left in prison? Third, domestically, the aversion of political deciders towards creating martyrs is well-known. How often a martyr causes loss of power for the ruling party is another question, but certainly "we don't want to make X a martyr" is a commonly attributed motivation. In line with user16791137 answer , a regime like Maduro's Venezuela, that is somewhat short of being a full totalitarian state like Stalin's USSR might err towards caution and prison. Fourth, a straight out execution puts a regime in a more difficult spot internationally. Executing Mandela would have probably made sanctions against South Africa more likely, earlier on. Executing Navalny would probably have gone some way convincing laggards like Germany not to build Nord Stream 2 , even without the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Fifth, things can happen in Putin's Russia outside of prison, which is much more convenient and deniable: you could get shot while walking around Moscow you could fall off a balcony Polonium could magically end up in your tea military grade latest-generation nerve agents might accidentally end up on your underwear. ... Sixth, who is important and dangerous may not be all that clear without the benefit of hindsight. Quoting a comment below: Re Lenin: While he was in Russian jail, he probably was not that big of a risk as it could have been expected by the looking at the final results.. . Or, on another answer: Solzhenitsyn was sent to a labor camp (note: Solzhenitsyn wasn't sent to camps for being a dissident, but merely for voicing minor? criticism about Soviet military planning in personal letters back home in 1943 ). Mind you, from reading The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich , you could apply the Hitler method as he did when he purged Rohm and the SA, along with a whole bunch of other people, as early as 1934: kill them all. Then again, killing them all should have been a huge red flag to the other European countries about Hitler, which brings you back to point #4 (international disapproval). Last, a regime might be less horrible than commonly depicted in Western press and may actually have qualms about executing a political opponent. | {
"source": [
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/73451",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/users/7434/"
]
} |
73,468 | There will be a vote of no confidence in the prime minister of the UK today, but it is limited to Conservative MPs only and requires a majority of them to pass the motion. None of the media coverage I saw explained why the vote is limited to Conservative MPs. If the vote is open to the opposition as well, there will be a very good chance for the PM to lose. So what is the justification for this limitation? Why can't the opposition vote? | Because it's not a vote of confidence in the Prime Minister, it's a vote of confidence in the Leader of the Conservative Party, who also happens to be the Prime Minister. See the announcement from the Chairman of the 1922 Committee, Sir Graham Brady: The threshold of 15 per cent of the parliamentary party seeking a vote of confidence in the leader of the Conservative Party has been exceeded. In accordance with the rules, a ballot will be held between 1800 and 2000 TODAY MONDAY 6th JUNE — details to be confirmed. The votes will be counted immediately afterwards. An announcement will be made at a time to be advised. Arrangements for the announcement will be released later today. The vote is being held under the rules of this committee - made up of all Conservative party MPs. The full process of the confidence vote and any subsequent leadership election is explained in this House of Commons Briefing Paper here . If Boris Johnson is unsuccessful in a confidence vote, he will remain as Prime Minister until a new Conservative party leader is chosen, who will then be invited by the monarch to form a government and take over as Prime Minister. | {
"source": [
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/73468",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/users/43401/"
]
} |
73,498 | From what I understand, printing money gives the government more money while, in time, decreasing the value of the rest of the money in circulation (or reducing how much the value of the currency would otherwise have grown). In principle, it takes economic value from the country and gives it to the government, which from seems like basically the same thing as increasing taxes. So, is printing money any different from taxing people? | I can see one difference between taxing the people and printing currency. Taxing the people only takes money away from the people in that country, as the people outside the country don't have to pay taxes (except in special cases such as the US and possibly a few other countries, as mentioned in the comments). However, printing currency would take money away from everybody who has that form of currency, including those outside the country. | {
"source": [
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/73498",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/users/43416/"
]
} |
73,567 | As I understand, arrest records (records showing that someone was arrested by police) are public in the United States, at least in many states (see e.g. Are Arrest Records Public? ). However, it seems to me knowing about an arrest objectively provides little useful information (at least much less than e.g. knowing about convictions), because many people are arrested without being guilty, and many people are guilty without being arrested. At the same time, people are being discriminated against based on arrest records, to the point that there is regulation forbidding not hiring someone based on "an arrest, in itself" ( Enforcement Guidance on the Consideration of Arrest and Conviction Records in Employment Decisions under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act ). In that view, why are arrest records made public? Would the right to privacy and non-discrimination not obviously override the interest of the public to know about arrests? Is there any discussion or any politician on record about why arrest records should be/remain public? Note: Arrest records not being public is actually the standard in many other countries - for example in Germany, arrests are not even part of the criminal record ( Bundeszentralregister ), only convictions (and other official judgments) are. | The US political system was designed by people who are profoundly sceptical of government power. Their Constitution is designed more to protect the citizens from the state than to protect the citizens from each other or to simplify the functioning of the state. The origin of "that government is best which governs least" seems to be disputed, but it fits right into American political theory. Having arrest records and court proceedings public would make it possible for citizens to keep an eye on their law enforcement personnel. Concerned citizens can read about the cases, watch trends, and make an informed choice at the ballot box. Of course one could also argue that there is a Jim Crow aspect to it, where powerful groups try to suppress others by the use of the justice system. The German constitution you mention is simply one and a half centuries younger. It is longer, more complicated, and it was written with a different then-recent past in mind. To a larger degree than the American system, the German constitution expects the federal state to actively safeguard the human rights of the citizens, not just to refrain from hurting them. | {
"source": [
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/73567",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/users/16582/"
]
} |
73,649 | The Ukrainian military is basically starving for more advanced equipments. From what is public information, it is clear that the West hasn't been supplying to the levels that would satisfy the Ukrainian's side needs (e.g. Anna Malyar recently remarked that Ukraine had only received 10% of what it needs). So why doesn't Ukraine just buy these weapons? Now obviously, not all the weapons that Ukraine has received from the West are for free. But I imagine that the country as a whole has the resources to at least buy part of what it needs? Perhaps the problem is not resources but rather that they cannot find adequate sellers for this kind of advanced/heavy weaponry since most (if not all) sellers should be countries, and even the sellers that are not countries are probably depended on their government's approvals for such transactions? Or perhaps there is also a bit of propaganda going on here and their needs are actually for the most part quelled (though this appears to be very unlikely)? | Buying arms isn't like buying a TV set, or even buying a car. Normally, it takes several years from order to delivery. In the normal case, arms are manufactured for the specific export customer, with cash in advance and a long lead time. There may be some used/refurbished/surplus arms for sale, but those may not be exactly what Ukraine needs. There are situations where Ukraine could "jump the waiting list," but those usually involve government action to use national security clauses in the contracts. The first IRIS-T SAMs will arrive in October, for instance, and that means other customers (presumably Egypt) will wait longer. Arms manufacturers don't like breaking contracts. Normally, arms exports require permits. Getting those is relatively routine for friendly countries not at war, but exports to belligerents face greater scrutiny because they might involve the seller in a conflict. If a nation is willing to sell to Ukraine, they can just as well donate -- money isn't the main sticking point. There is even an EU fund to reimburse EU members who give arms to Ukraine, called the European Peace Facility for some reason. So if Ukraine needs weapons now , most of them come from government stocks. There Ukraine is in competition with war stocks reserved for NATO contingencies. Every howitzer or MLRS that goes to Ukraine now will not be available to defend the Baltics or Poland if that should become an issue. Of course defending Ukraine might prevent further Russian attacks -- or provoke them, we don't know. Regarding the propaganda angle, Ukraine argues that it is fighting Russia to defend the rest of Europe and the West in general, and hence deserves unstinting support. The West is providing billions in arms, more billions in humanitarian aid, and shelter to millions of refugees. The West is not doing all it could do. The West made clear, successively, the Ukraine is not a NATO member, that there would be no NATO ground troops, and that there would be no NATO air forces and air defense troops (the "no fly zone" proposal). The OP asked if the needs are getting mostly fulfilled. I don't think so. This might explain the Ukrainian communications strategy. They may be asking for weapons they will not get to make sure that they get other weapons as a "consolation prize." Or they are using public diplomacy to pressure governments. Or they are simply under so much stress that they are getting undiplomatic. Or all of the above. | {
"source": [
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/73649",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/users/38787/"
]
} |
73,707 | As stated by Jake Sullivan , a main goal of the US in the current Ukraine war is to "weaken and isolate Russia". Considering that the US has been a major and frequently sole ally of Israel on pretty much any major issue, I wonder why hasn't it pressured Israel to take a more active approach on Moscow? I understand that from Israel's perspective, caution is important since Russia can, for example, make its life harder in the region (i.e. Syria). Or perhaps the influence of such sanctions would be too insignificant for the US to bother, and potentially even outweigh the possible advantages of Israel not having sanctions towards Russia? | There are a number of ways to look at it. First of all, many countries have not imposed sanctions on Russia, Israel is by no means unusual. The West can't, nor should, coerce willy-nilly on those countries who don't put up sanctions of their own. (Times of Isreael) Israel hasn't joined anti-Russia sanctions, but its firms need to tread carefully | The Times of Israel Israel has managed until now to walk a tightrope between Russia and Ukraine. There are Jewish communities in both nations and Russia maintains a heavy military presence in Syria, on Israel’s northern border, where the IDF needs to be able to continue its aerial sorties against Iran-backed targets. This ostensibly neutral position has enabled Israel to assume the role of mediator between the two warring parties. ... Jerusalem is not currently planning to impose sanctions on Moscow or Russian oligarchs, senior Israeli officials told The Times of Israel. but the same article then goes on to say: A number of Israeli tech firms have already suspended or pulled their commercial operations in Russia over the ongoing war with Ukraine, including Fiverr, a company that connects businesses with freelancers offering digital services; web creator Wix; payments firm Payoneer; and gaming giant Playtika. So, a number of Israeli companies have cut ties with Russia and there is no indication either that Israeli firms are engaged in assisting Russia in bypassing Western sanctions. Even China treads carefully there. So Israel, while not putting in place its own sanctions is abiding by Western sanctions. Israeli firms that want to trade with private or government entities in Russia and Belarus must check if the entities involved in the deal — whether a trading partner, a financial associate or even a means of transport — are on the sanctions list, the Israeli Ministry of Economy and Industry said in a March 9 letter it sent to Israeli companies. And the trade that is taking place is not that significant either (Haaretz) : Israel wasn’t one of the countries that imposed sanctions on Russia, either diplomatic or economic. But it does have a significant number of citizens whose livelihoods depend on their connection to Russia. ... This week, the Bank of Israel issued a report predicting that the war in Ukraine and the international sanctions won’t significantly affect Israeli exports. “First, Israel’s direct trade with Russia and Ukraine amounts to only about 1 percent of Israel’s total trade ,” it said. Last, and certainly controversial to some, just because the US is a close ally of Israel doesn't necessarily mean that Israel always reciprocates the favor. Or at least not when it's not in its national self-interest to do so. Since we are on a bit of a Mearsheimer binge here lately, that is one of the points made in The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy - Wikipedia . No, not so much the book's claims about lobbying as the observation that the US doesn't necessarily always benefit all that much from the relationship. For one thing, while Israel is a strong regional ally, its involvement until recently , tended to be more of a problem than a help, unless it the issue specifically concerned Israel in the first place . Not necessarily because it didn't want to, but because its involvement would have been a cause for Arab rejection. During Gulf War 1 for example, Israel, far from being able to assist against Iraq, was more of a drain on coalition resources. The reason being that the Arab parts of the coalition would have pulled out if Israel had intervened alongside that the US. Knowing that, Saddam SCUDed Israel, hoping to trigger some Israeli response. The coalition had to divert quite a lot effort towards SCUD hunting in a vast desert area that was outside their own zone of operations. To take another example, how many US bases are there in Israel? One, a very minor one, and it only opened in 2017 . In 2022, after Israeli-Arab diplomatic normalizations with a number of states, it is quite possible that Israel would be more able to support US foreign policy goals in the region, should it choose to. The US has excellent relations with Israel and there is a very valid and strong case for guaranteeing Israeli security in the last resort. But this relationship does not necessarily mean that Israel will subordinate its national interests to those of the US. p.s. what would really be helpful, rather than imposing sanctions, would be if Israel sold some of its weapons to Ukraine. But, again, one can see why the upside to Israel is limited and the downside greater. p.p.s. "weaken and isolate Russia" should not be a goal the West pursues. Merely allowing Ukraine to restore control over its territory. p.p.p.s. some areas where the US certainly benefits from the alliance are CIA-Mossad collaboration, defense technology exchange (Israeli weapons tech is topnotch) and science/engineering. Israel is by no means a negligible partner. | {
"source": [
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/73707",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/users/38787/"
]
} |
73,774 | Democracies are based on political equality. All individuals have equal weight in electing representatives. Parallel to the process of bringing individuals into the political arena of equal footing, we find growing economic inequalities. A small number of ultra-rich enjoy a highly disproportionate share of wealth and incomes. Not only that, their share in the total income of the country has been increasing. Those at the bottom of society have very little to depend upon. Their incomes have been declining. Sometimes, they find it difficult to meet their basic needs of life, such as food, clothing, housing, education and health. Democracy is the rule of the majority. The poor are in majority. So, democracy must be the rule of the poor. How can this not be the case? | Voters voting by habit, not by analysis. Many people vote the same way their parents voted. Other vote exactly the opposite way. Neither involves analysis of their objective economic interest. A middle class believing to be rich, a lower middle class believing to be middle class. In many countries, voters tend to vote in the interest of the class they aspire to be, not in the interest of the class they actually are. Part of that is self-deception about inequality and the own position. That is visible in tax policy, for instance, where the middle class votes against taxes on the upper class. An upper class better able to work the political system than the poor. In some countries, attempts to simplify the access to the political system (e.g. through direct democracy or participatory budgeting ) have backfired when it comes to the poor. These mechanisms remain complicated enough that it takes some familiarity with the political system to get anything done. Knowing how to organize a grassroots movement, how to write minutes of a meeting, how to collect signatures for a ballot initiative . So instead of better welfare in poor parts of town, there are better playgrounds in rich parts of town. | {
"source": [
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/73774",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/users/43543/"
]
} |
73,838 | Since the polls clearly show that the majority of the American people disagree with the Supreme Courts decision to overturn Roe vs. Wade, why does the US government not introduce an amendment to the constitution to allow abortion? | Because it likely wouldn't get passed. In order for a Constitutional amendment to be passed, it currently needs 38 state legislatures to support it. For practical purposes, it also needs supermajorities in both houses of Congress. There are 22 states that are going to ban (or already have banned) abortion. That only leaves 28 states that could possibly be willing to vote for such an amendment, which is not enough to pass it, and some of those are likely to join the list of those banning it over the next few months. Given that neither party has a 2/3 supermajority in either house, there isn't even the political power available to get such an amendment proposed. And since no one has a supermajority in the Senate, neither side can even get an ordinary law on this topic passed, let alone an amendment. | {
"source": [
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/73838",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/users/19968/"
]
} |
73,881 | In a recent answer , user kandi made this statement: the war probably could have been ended by now if the West wasn't passionatly supporting the bloodshed by provided just as much arms as to keep parity. This is a clear indication that the West's goal is to weaken Russia and not help Ukraine (sending more arms than now and defeating Russian army might cause a democratic revolt in Russia, which might strengthen Russian economy in the long run and thus bad for the West). In other words, the user suggests "the West" (presumably, this means the political players relevant in Western countries that support Ukraine) intentionally tries to make the fighting last as long as possible - not because a certain military goal must be reached that can only be achieved after x weeks of fighting, but specifically to draw out the fighting just so the fighting doesn't stop. Is there any sign/statement/etc. that supports this hypothesis? I am asking because in my impression, there are several other reasons for why certain Western countries deliver the amount of weapons they do, not more, not less, all while hoping for the war to end rather sooner than later. | Additionally to the answer by o.m. one should add that sending military equipment isn't very helpful alone and there is training and maintenance on this equipment needed. The training for artillery would typically take five weeks (for professional soldiers I take it). Another issue: additional equipment or ammunition may need to be produced first and that also takes additional time. And the equipment must be delivered in a way that the Russian military cannot easily intercept and destroy the delivery. That probably also takes time. That's why the weapons support today might be the result of Western assessments and decisions weeks ago. So why not help even more and send also personnel for example? That would risk increasing the scope of the war and ultimately the use of nuclear weapons by Russia if they feel like they are in a corner. That's why everyone treads carefully there and tries to maintain some sort of balance. In the end this resulted in a war of attrition. Ukraine gets all the help that the West feels safe with giving, given the considerations above. That's not enough to win decisively against Russia but just enough to strongly delay Russian advances. Ukrainians pay with their lives and could e.g. decide that it's not worth it and the help they get is not sufficient and aim at a peace with lots of territorial concessions from their side. But they don't seem to be willing to do that currently. Leaves the question what the plan of the West is? Nobody knows exactly and maybe at a NATO meeting in one week they still have some more ideas how to tip the favor in Ukrainian direction but apart from that the only ways this war and the killing end are: Ukraine surrenders Russia recognizes its errors and stops Both sides get tired of fighting and negotiate according to perceived strengths Ukrainians pay for their country with their lives. It will always be a big question if the West could have done more and supported Ukraine more before and during this war and if this would have resulted in much less casualties in the end. But you also have to give them some slack, war is difficult to predict, a nuclear weapons possessing country is involved. Assuming no further plan and just saying that more killing is the plan itself is too cynical for me. I basically expect Western military support to ramp up over the coming weeks with more and more modern weapon systems coming in (Himars for example) but also declining abilities of Ukrainian forces to fight at the same time. Western support short of taking part in the war might be too little too late to change the front lines substantially from where they are now. Effectively resulting in a stalemate with slowly dying activity. Update in February 2023: The war is still going on with no immediate end in sight. It's basically a stalemate. The West very slowly ramped up military support, recently even agreeing on sending battle tanks of the newest generation. They will however take some time to arrive in Ukraine. Would the decision to send them have been made earlier, they would also have arrived much earlier. Among others fighter jets are still out of the question (even though for example the US would have hundreds of F-16 to spare). It seems that the West is not interested in a quick end of the war nor does Russia and the amount of support from the West seems to be just enough to keep Russians from advancing further into Ukraine (for the moment) but not enough to drive them back. It has resulted in trench warfare a bit like in World War I. My guess is that this is calculated. The West could but dares not to support Ukraine so that Russia can be defeated, and also doesn't want Russia to win either. The only possible end is then Russia and/or Ukraine giving up. I guess this is because Russia owns nuclear arms and facing defeat the risk that Russia would use them is not controllable. Only a nation with nuclear arms can risk invading a neighbor like this, it seems. On the other hand, nuclear arms don't mean you win, just that you don't lose and the war can go on. | {
"source": [
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/73881",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/users/7554/"
]
} |
73,917 | https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k8PXkkNJ2_o Bloomberg reports that the default is largely symbolic and Russia is simply defaulting since Western financial institutions won't accept Russia payments. Is there anything the West is gaining from this? Because you would think they would make exemptions since not receiving debt payment from Russia is also hurting them in the process. Why aren't Western countries allowing Russia to pay its debt to them? | By not allowing Russia to pay its debt, the West adds further financial costs to Putin's regime as a punishment for its invasion of Ukraine. This is consistent with economic sanctions against Russia and military and financial support of Ukraine. Specifically, the default serves to: Make Russia’s access to foreign financing limited for decades. Make Russia face higher borrowing costs for decades. Downgrade Russia's credit rating, if the credit agencies rate it in the future. Open the possibility of litigation against Russia by the creditors. Crash other Russian bonds. Cause other serious negative consequences for Russia: lower investment, lower growth, lower living standards, capital and human flight (brain drain), and a vicious circle of decline for the Russian economy. REFERENCES: A formal default would be largely symbolic given Russia cannot borrow internationally at the moment and doesn't need to thanks to plentiful oil and gas export revenues. But the stigma would probably raise its borrowing costs in future.
[...]
Credit ratings agencies usually formally downgrade a country's credit rating to reflect default, but this does not apply in case of Russia as most agencies no longer rate the country. Russia pushed into historic default by sanctions. By Karin Strohecker, Andrea Shalal and Emily Chan. June 27, 2022: https://www.reuters.com/markets/europe/russia-slides-towards-default-payment-deadline-expires-2022-06-26/ Adam Solowsky, partner in the financial industry group at international law firm Reed Smith, told CNBC on Monday [...] “The existence of a Russian default may need to be resolved in litigation, but given the current state of the sanctions, a judgment in favor of investors may still not result in a payment any time soon,” [...] Timothy Ash, senior emerging market sovereign strategist at Bluebay Asset Management, said while the default might not have much immediate market impact, Russian sovereign longer maturity eurobonds that were trading at 130 cents before the invasion have already crashed to between 20 and 30 cents, and are now trading at default levels.
[...]
“But this default is important as it will impact on Russia’s ratings, market access and financing costs for years to come. And important herein, given the U.S. Treasury forced Russia into default, Russia will only be able to come out of default when the U.S. Treasury gives bond holders the green light to negotiate terms with Russia’s foreign creditors.” Ash suggested this process could take years or decades, even in the event of a cease-fire that falls short of a full peace agreement, meaning Russia’s access to foreign financing will remain limited and it will face higher borrowing costs for a long time to come. He argued that Russia’s alternative sources of foreign financing beyond the West, such as Chinese banks, would also be reluctant to look beyond the default headlines. “If they are prepared to run the secondary sanctions risks — which so far they have not — and still lend to Russia, they will add a huge risk premium to lending rates for the prospect of somehow being dragged into future debt restructuring talks,” Ash said. “It just makes lending to Russia that much more difficult, so people will avoid it. And that means lower investment, lower growth, lower living standards, capital and human flight (brain drain), and a vicious circle of decline for the Russian economy.” Russia slides into historic debt default as payment period expires. By Elliot Smith. Jun 27, 2022: https://www.cnbc.com/2022/06/27/russia-on-the-brink-of-historic-debt-default-as-payment-period-expires.html | {
"source": [
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/73917",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/users/38301/"
]
} |
73,943 | CNBC's June 28, 2022 U.S.’s Russia sanctions architect Singh departs as Ukraine war drags on refers to the position as a sherpa in two places as quoted below. The Sherpa people : ...are one of the Tibetan ethnic groups native to the most mountainous regions of Nepal, Tingri County in the Tibet Autonomous Region and the Himalayas. The term sherpa or sherwa derives from the Sherpa language words ཤར shar ("east") and པ pa ("people"), which refer to their geographical origin of eastern Tibet. and most westerners associate the term with the heroes who risk their lives to coordinate and facilitate climbs of Mt. Everest and carry a lot of the supplies that keeps the visiting climbers alive. Lhakpa Sherpa holds the record for female sherpas at 10 times (most recently just last month) and "retired" Apa Sherpa holds the record for male sherpas at 21. Back to the article: U.S. President Joe Biden will have a new “sherpa” on his trip to Germany next week — a former BlackRock strategist named Mike Pyle, who replaces Washington’s former point person on sanctions, Daleep Singh. Singh, who played a crucial role at the White House in coordinating Western sanctions against Russia over its invasion of Ukraine in February, this week took a job as chief global economist and head of macroeconomic research at PGIM Fixed Income, a Wall Street asset manager with $890 billion in assets. Pyle, who joined the Biden administration as Vice President Kamala Harris’ chief economic adviser, took the job on an acting basis and will play the crucial coordinating “sherpa” role in Singh’s absence when Biden joins the Group of Seven rich nations summit in Germany. He is one of three top administration officials who previously worked at the investment giant BlackRock, along with Deputy Treasury Secretary Wally Adeyemo and National Economic Council director Brian Deese. Surely it's staff and not investment bankers who coordinate and facilitate the US president's international trips and cary his food, oxygen and clothes, so I'm confused by the terminology and reference. Question: Why is the US Deputy National Security Advisor for International Economics called a "sherpa"? | The reference is to a sherpa in the sense of the word, not referring to a people or ethnicity, but to a guild of skilled Tibetan mountain guides who provide insight and carry key resources for mountain climbers who retain their services. The metaphorical use in this case is to a key aide serving as a skilled guide for the President added by resources of high levels of subject-matter knowledge and knowledge of the key players involved, in the treacherous environment of a diplomatic meeting which is the metaphorical mountain ("the summit") being climbed. The metaphorical sense of the word is recognized, e.g., at Dictionary.com 1 : a member of a people of Tibetan stock living in the Nepalese
Himalayas, who often serve as porters on mountain-climbing
expeditions. 2 (sometimes lowercase) an expert chosen by a chief executive to
assist in preparations for a summit meeting. | {
"source": [
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/73943",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/users/16047/"
]
} |
73,993 | The history of Stalin's rule is notorious for the oppression of large sections of the Soviet peasantry, who were executed in their hundreds of thousands, as the expropriation of grain supplies to the large cities was enforced. This included the fertile lands of "The Ukraine". Boris Pasternak's Dr Zhivago (1958) is a novel whose events mostly take place during the Civil War and the period immediately following the 1917 Revolution. Pasternak writes about Siberia and trains loaded with produce heading for Moscow and St. Petersburg. Anything worth having in the Volga and Urals regions was unavailable, simply because it had been shipped westward. A perennial Russian issue has been the shortage of arable land in relation to the size of the population. Under centuries of Romanov rule, widespread famine had led to increasingly severe measures being taken against inefficient peasant farming, both before and after the abolition of serfdom in 1861. In chapter one of his Russia: The Tsarist and Soviet Legacy (1996) Edward Acton says: At the end of the Soviet period, only just over one-tenth of the territory under Moscow's rule was actively cultivated, while two thirds were unfit for farming of any kind, and over half was virtually uninhabitable. Even on the best land , agriculture is handicapped by adverse climatic conditions. The richest soil, that of the so-called 'black earth' region which stretches from the south-west into Siberia, suffers from recurrent drought during the growing season and yields are further devastated by thunderstorms and hailstorms in the harvest season. Dystopian forecasts have long predicted wars for resources - oil, water, food etc. And Russian military policy seems overwhelmingly to control the Black Sea ports. Now Ukrainian grain is disappearing into Russia. One is tempted to wonder how much of Putin's motive in this war has been brought about by long-term forecasts of food shortages, exacerbated by the loss of the Baltic states. Are there ways in which the current policies can be seen as a continuation of Russia's inherent problem, as a largely landlocked country (making large scale importation difficult), to produce enough food for its population? | Securing the food supply of the population is not a problem for Russia. The Russian agricultural industry does pretty well. While it did decline a lot shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union, its net output is steadily improving and has now bounced back. Until the recent sanctions, Russia was a very important net exporter of several agricultural products. Further, Russia is expected to be one of the few countries whose agricultural industry will actually benefit from global warming. While large parts of Africa, the Americas and the Middle East become less and less arable, the north of Russia is actually expected to become much more suitable for farming in the near future. | {
"source": [
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/73993",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/users/6837/"
]
} |
74,041 | The People's Republic of China, according to many reports, is considering invading Taiwan. There is a law on the books that says if Taiwan does not bend diplomatically they will try to make it part of China by force. Why is the United States coming out in support of Taiwan given its own laws would stop a state, say Texas (the state that has the most talk of independence and was once even its own country), from declaring independence? The fact that the United States is supporting a country which could be argued to have seceded while the US explicitly does not allow its own states to become its own countries seems hypocritical. And also though I focus on the USA here, this question is not specifically about the USA. It is also about all countries with anti secession laws that are supporting Taiwan but focused on the United States. I'm not privy on the details. But I do know China and Taiwan are in a tough relationship. This question is not designed to criticize any country's positions. It's just for curiosity. To be clear I personally support Taiwan's right to choose on its relationship with mainland China. But, I'm pointing out something that others may see. | I'm from Taiwan, so I'll answer with some local perspective. There is a law on the books that says if Taiwan does not bend
diplomatically they will try to make it part of China by force. The first thing we need to recognize here is that just because China passes a law that says Taiwan is part of its territory does not automatically make it a reality. Just as if Russia passes a law that says Ukraine is part of its territory does not make it reality either. The truth is that national border and sovereignty have to be drawn by treaties and so far no such treaty exists to formally establish the border or relationship between China and Taiwan. We're essentially living in a legal limbo. What I can tell you is that Taiwan is currently a de facto independent, sovereign, and democratic country with 23 million people living on the island. It is a country with its own autonomy and agency, and that agency should not be taken out of the conversation. Taiwan is not a pawn, but a player that should have a voice at the table. Why is the United States coming out in support of Taiwan given its own
laws would stop a state... The fact that the United States is supporting a country which could be argued to have seceded while the US explicitly does not allow its own states to become its own countries seems hypocritical. Following on the previous section, national border and sovereignty have to be drawn by treaties. This is where the comparison between Texas and Taiwan falls apart. The Texas constitution ( Article 1 ) explicitly says it is part of the Union and - while independent under the federalism framework - subject to the US Constitution. The relationship here is clearly established. Whereas Taiwan's constitution does not mention any such relationship at all, in fact, when you read the text of Chinese and Taiwanese constitution, it would seem as though they live in different realities (because they kind of are). Another thing I need to correct is that Untied States does not formally "support" Taiwan. It simply remains " strategically ambiguous " towards the island, meaning that it will do something if China attacks Taiwan but they don't say what exactly it is that they will do. This is done on purpose to avoid diplomatic miscalculation. So even though there are a lot of posturing going on, we should keep in mind that the US does not have legal obligation to defend Taiwan the same way they are obligated to defend, say, Japan or NATO countries. In conclusion, given its legally ambiguous nature. The US does not formally support Taiwan, but even if it does it would not be illegal. On the other hand, Texas law has subjected itself to the US Constitution so there is legal basis to restrict Texas' means of sucession. TLDR: Taiwan is not Texas. US does not formally support Taiwan. | {
"source": [
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/74041",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/users/29035/"
]
} |
74,104 | On July 7, 2022, Boris Johnson announced his intention to resign as leader of the Conservative Party, and to leave the office of Prime Minister after the conclusion of a leadership election. Could Johnson have stood to be re-elected to the Conservative party leadership in this election? | No, he could not have run for re-election; Rule 2 of Schedule 2 - Rules for the Election of the Leader of the Conservative Party Constitution (as amended January 2021) states that: A Leader resigning from the Leadership of the Party is not eligible for re-nomination in the consequent Leadership election. Johnson could not, therefore, have been nominated by the 1922 Committee of backbench Conservative MPs as a candidate in this contest. He could, however, run in any subsequent leadership election. | {
"source": [
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/74104",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/users/42934/"
]
} |
74,116 | If the Supreme Court decided that same-sex marriage was a right on the federal level, what would happen if a specific state decided not to follow their ruling? What power does the federal government have over states? | I don't know if this is the worst case confrontation, but I suppose it ranks pretty high; following Brown v. Board of Education there were numerous attempts to resist, some solved with troops and some after legal battles forced the states' own courts to intervene: In September 1957, Arkansas governor Orval Faubus called out the Arkansas Army National Guard to block the entry of nine black students, later known as the "Little Rock Nine", after the desegregation of Little Rock Central High School. President Dwight D. Eisenhower responded by asserting federal control over the Arkansas National Guard and deploying troops from the U.S. Army's 101st Airborne Division stationed at Fort Campbell to ensure the black students could safely register for and attend classes. [...] In June 1963, Alabama governor George Wallace personally blocked the door to the University of Alabama's Foster Auditorium to prevent the enrollment of two black students in what became known as the "Stand in the Schoolhouse Door" incident. Wallace sought to uphold his "segregation now, segregation tomorrow, segregation forever" promise he had given in his 1963 inaugural address. Wallace moved aside only when confronted by General Henry V. Graham of the Alabama National Guard, whom President John F. Kennedy had ordered to intervene. [...] Virginia had one of the companion cases in Brown , involving the Prince Edward County schools. Significant opposition to the Brown verdict included U.S. Senator Harry F. Byrd, who led the Byrd Organization and promised a strategy of Massive Resistance. [...] in 1956, a special session of the Virginia legislature adopted a legislative package which allowed the governor to simply close all schools under desegregation orders from federal courts. In early 1958, newly elected Governor J. Lindsay Almond closed public schools in Charlottesville, Norfolk, and Warren County rather than comply with desegregation orders, leaving 10,000 children without schools despite efforts of various parent groups. However, he reconsidered when on the Lee-Jackson state holiday, the Virginia Supreme Court ruled the closures violated the state constitution, and a panel of federal judges ruled they violated the U.S. Constitution. And yeah, one holdout county (Prince Edward) kept all their public schools closed until 1964, basically 10 years after Brown . (Private) "segregation academies" were ruled unconstitutional in 1976, but in the meantime (1954-1976) they provided a legal way to circumvent Brown . Basically, if one were to generalize from the above, given a determined federal executive, it seems the only way to ultimately avoid federal troops enforcing a ruling is to make it non-applicable by making the locus of the dispute vanish/nil. (Both Eisenhower and Kennedy invoked the Insurrection Act of 1807 for their use of troops in the events described above.) The resistance was far less massive following Obergefell , but it involved a number of counties following the latter strategy, i.e. not issuing any marriage licenses, essentially being "closed for business" in that regard. The current wording of the Insurrection Act provision (which has been amended a few times since initial adoption), according to Wikipedia: Whenever the President considers that unlawful obstructions, combinations, or assemblages, or rebellion against the authority of the United States, make it impracticable to enforce the laws of the United States in any State by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, he may call into Federal service such of the militia of any State, and use such of the armed forces, as he considers necessary to enforce those laws or to suppress the rebellion. It provides a statutory exception to the otherwise broad prohibition against using the US armed forces "as a posse comitatus, or otherwise, for the purpose of executing the laws". | {
"source": [
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/74116",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/users/42684/"
]
} |
74,121 | A recent Washington Post article (July 8, 2022) on the assassination of former prime minister Shinzo Abe says Last year, eight of the 10 shootings in Japan were related to the yakuza, according to the National Police Agency, resulting in one death and four injuries. I'm aware the definition of "mass shooting" can change depending on the source (e.g. USA discussion ). I'm looking for an authoritative source (Japanese government agency, academic research project, etc) that has some statistics on mass shootings for a number of years. English is preferred, but a source that google translate will work with is also acceptable. | In 2019 Japan had 3 gun deaths. The USA had 39707. Let me repeat that. Three gun deaths. That's total deaths, not homicides. Less than 0.03% of the figure for the USA after adjusting for population. Now 2019 was a remarkably low year for gun deaths in Japan (though not the lowest), and if you go back twenty or thirty years you will find years where there were 50 or 60 deaths - still only 0.3% of the US rate after adjusting for population, and the vast majority of those are suicides. Since the most accepted definition of a mass shooting is when four or more people are killed by a gun, this means it is pretty certain that Japan has zero mass shootings in a typical year. Those that happen are very rare. Wikipedia supports this, listing three mass shootings over the last hundred years - one of those wouldn't count in a US list because only two people were killed, and another reaches the total of 4 deaths only by including the shooter's suicide. The last time an incontrovertible mass shooting happened in Japan was 1938 - before the current strict gun laws. Japan has some of the strictest gun laws in the world (ironically imposed on them by the USA after WWII). | {
"source": [
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/74121",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/users/10172/"
]
} |
74,135 | Russian chess supergrandmaster Sergey Karjakin (Pro-Putin, but Ukrainian-born) says in tweets here and here to international master Kostya Kavutskiy: Have you also collected money for the residents of Donbass, whom the Ukrainian army has been bombing for the last 8 years? You can come there and go, for example, to the Alley of Angels, which was built in honor of the children of Donbass who died from the shelling of Ukrainian criminals. Still funny? What is the meaning exactly of Ukraine was bombing Donbass for 8 years? In particular, I checked Wikipedia Russo-Ukrainian War , and it looks like just 1 year: 2014–2015 war in Donbas . | The war in Donbas has lasted for the past 8 years: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_the_war_in_Donbas In particular, the current battle over Sloviansk and Kramatorsk is largely a reversal of a similar 2014 battle, when Ukraine recaptured it from the Donbas republics: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siege_of_Sloviansk The war went mostly in Ukraine's favor. By 2017, Ukrainian forces reached to only a few miles away from Donetsk , one of the capitals, making it vulnerable. However, throughout the war, it appears that capturing large cities has proven very difficult for either side. The Ukrainian-populated cities have stayed with Kyiv. The cities that were part of the initial uprising have stayed with the rebels. The cities that were on the edge have changed hands, sometimes several times. For instance, Sloviansk initially had popular protests, but the police only surrendered when DNR forces arrived, rather than switch sides outright. Another difference that probably explains the war's low publicity in 2015-2021 is that the fighting was between Ukraine and its internal separatist movement, while Russia restricted its involvement to covert support and equipment for the latter. It just isn't as exciting a story. | {
"source": [
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/74135",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/users/5882/"
]
} |
74,149 | What might be dissuading Russia to sell advanced nuclear and military technologies to North Korea after the economic sanctions against Russia? Since Russia feared NATO sanctions from weapon sales and technology transfer to North Korea, and those fears no longer hold any sway since every possible sanctions were imposed against Russia, what might be holding Russia back from doing so? I am thinking China might be the reason, but why China might not want North Korea to be more powerful since North Korea being stronger would benefit them and not the NATO alliance? Could you explain the complex geopolitics and political calculus being at play here? | That might be done to spite the West, but with significant drawbacks for Russia itself. Russia has a land border with the DPRK. Russia would likely be unable to have full operational control about DPRK nukes. Russia gets significant political status from being a nuclear power. This gets diluted if there are more nuclear powers. (The DPRK has tested nuclear devices, but questions linger about their operational capability). The DPRK is unable to pay truly significant amounts of money. Russia needs Chinese goodwill, and China is interested in a stable buffer state between them and the ROK. And also on a non-nuclear Japan. Arming the DPRK would help neither goal. | {
"source": [
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/74149",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/users/38301/"
]
} |
74,211 | What/who are the prominent pacifist movements/organizations/thinkers in the 21st century, and what is their position on the conflict in Ukraine? Much of the public and political discussion about the conflict in Ukraine is grounded in the concept of just war . Indeed, the initial anti-war sentiment was aimed only against the Russian "special operation"; however, waging war by Ukraine and the support thereof by the West are considered largely justified, and those who volunteered to fight and kill for Ukraine have been largely treated as heroes, and the pacifist attitudes have even been denounced . One could agree that idealistic pacifism and/or non-resistance to violence is a no-go for Ukraine. However, pragmatic pacifism seems quire relevant: it is unlikely that Ukraine will be able to liberate all of its territory, which means that Ukraine and its allies will eventually need to seek an accommodation with Russia, lest countless Ukrainians and Russians continue to die in meaningless fighting. (Even if Ukraine were to regain the control over all of its territory, Ukraine and NATO will still need to coexist with Russia.) Politically, the question of accommodation with Russia imposes itself not only from a moral point of view, but also due to the economic hardships that the war brought to the world, particularly to Europe - in this sense pacifism could be a moral justification for negotiations with Russia. To return to the question: I would like to learn more about modern pacifism, its views on the conflict in Ukraine, and whether any prominent western politicians have expressed opinions in favor of making concessions to Russia in order to end the war. | Politicians, especially those who are sufficiently prominent to be involved in actual governance, are very seldom pacifists. Accordingly, I am unaware of any statements made by pacifist politicians on the Russo-Ukranian War. However, a large number of (self-described) pacifist organisations have provided some level of commentary, and examples are found below. Secular Organizations War Resisters' International Describes itself as, a global network of grassroots antimilitarist and pacifist groups, working together for a world without war and is one of the oldest and largest international pacifist networks, having been founded in 1921. It is based in London, UK. On February 24th 2022 they released the following statement, As War Resisters' International, we are extremely concerned about the war in Ukraine. War is a crime against humanity! We call on Russia to immediately cease all attacks and withdraw its troops from the borders with Ukraine. We call on the people of Luhansk/Lugansk and Donetsk/Donetsk to make it clear to the Russian government that they want to determine their own destiny, not at the price of war. We call on the Ukrainian government to renounce military resistance and to proclaim civil resistance instead. We call on the Ukrainian people to refuse all obedience to a possible new government installed by Russia. This is called social defence. If everyone refuses to obey Russia's orders, if Russia occupies Ukraine, it will ultimately not be able to achieve its goals. We also call on the Russian people and Russian soldiers to refuse all obedience to their government's acts of war, to resist non-violently and to bring about the removal of the Putin regime. This is also part of social defence. We call on Russia, the UN, the OSCE, NATO and all governments to start negotiations immediately. We call on NATO members to show moderation in their response to Russian aggression and not to make the Russian people pay for the crimes of their leadership. We stand in solidarity with the people of Ukraine in these difficult times and we support those resisting war in Ukraine, Russia and elsewhere. So essentially they condemn the Russian invasion and advocate the use of Civilian-based defence . More recently, WRI has published articles by Yurii Sheliazhenko, who is described as the executive secretary of a group called Ukrainian Pacifists. You can find the full article here . It is largely what one would expect from a pacifist group, but does include the following, somewhat interesting line, We don’t call for any particular action now to ensure that peace plans will not be targeted by hatred and attacks of militarists Peace Pledge Union Is a British NGO, founded in 1934, which, in its own words, "has been campaigning for a warless World". Here is a summary of their position on the Russo-Ukrainian War, The Peace Pledge Union stands in solidarity with peace campaigners in Ukraine, Russia and throughout the world who are resisting the war in Ukraine. Condemning the invasion of Ukraine and renouncing all war, we stand against both Russian militarism and NATO militarism. The War Resisters League Is an American organisation, founded in 1923 which claims to adhere to the following creed, The War Resisters League affirms that all war is a crime against humanity. We are determined not to support any kind of war, international or civil, and to strive nonviolently for the removal of all causes of war, including racism, sexism and all forms of exploitation. They released this statement in June 2022, which concludes as follows, As an antimilitarist organization that has resisted war for a century, we affirm that our hope does not rely in the actions of nations which will always be self-interested. Our hope lies in the courageous experiments with nonviolence among people who resist violence and oppression. Our hope resides in recognizing that no person is our enemy, but war itself is the common enemy of all humanity. To stop this war, we call for an end to the escalation, authentic peace talks, and a demilitarization of the region. There is no hope in military victory. German Peace Society (DFG-VK) Was founded in 1892 in Berlin, and released the following statement in February 2022, Stop the war! Остановите войну! After the deployment of Russian troops to the separatist regions of Luhansk and Donetsk and their recognition by Russia as independent states on Tuesday, this was followed Thursday morning by Russia's invasion of other parts of Ukraine in violation of international law on the orders of Russian President Vladimir Putin. Our solidarity is with the people of Ukraine and all who will suffer the consequences of this war. We demand an immediate stop to the attacks on Ukraine, the withdrawal of Russian troops and a return to the negotiating table. We call on all soldiers to lay down their arms and refuse to go to war. We demand from the European Union to open its borders for refugees and to maintain the visa-free regime for Ukrainians. The German government must accept and support deserters and conscientious objectors from Ukraine and Russia. We strictly reject arms deliveries to crisis and war zones, including Ukraine. These are counterproductive and make urgently needed peace negotiations impossible. There is no separation between defensive and offensive weapons. Any weapon can always be used to support own attacks or counterattacks. More weapons do not lead to peace, they rather pour oil on the fire of this conflict. We firmly reject demands from Germany for a military build- up or participation in the conflict. We call on all countries to reject Russia's breach of international law. The approval of the Russian invasion by individual states outrages us. We advocate the outlawing and prohibition of wars of aggression worldwide and legal consequences for those responsible. We call for prudence in this difficult situation in order to prevent a further escalation of the war. Russia's president is threatening consequences for interference the likes of which have never been seen in history. Putin's threats, particularly with regard to the worldwide nuclear arsenals, fill us with concern. This situation highlights the need for the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. The vision of a pan-European peace order is becoming a distant prospect as a result of the invasion of Russian troops. Only a cessation of hostilities and the development of sustainable solutions can restore prospects for peaceful coexistence. We welcome all non-violent protests in Russia, Ukraine and other parts of the world that demand the cessation of hostilities and work for peaceful solutions. We call on people to continue to take to the streets in the coming days and especially invite them to the large rally we are co-organizing on Sunday at 1 p.m. at the Victory Column in Berlin. Assorted South Korean NGOs You can find the full list of NGOs and their statement on the war (released February 2022) at the above link. This is the concluding paragraph, We strongly stand in solidarity with all people living in Ukraine’s territory and support the people of Russia who are against the war. South Korean civil society calls for peace and stands in solidarity with people around the world who are against this war. Stop the War Coalition Is a British group established in 2001 which has been active in opposing the War in Afghanistan, the Iraq War, and NATO more generally. They give this description of their own activities, Stop the War opposes the British establishment’s disastrous addiction to war and its squandering of public resources on militarism. We have initiated many campaigns around these issues. We are committed to supporting Palestinian rights, opposing racism and Islamophobia, and to the defence of civil liberties. In February 2022, they released the following statement in relation the Russo-Ukrainian War, Stop the War condemns the movement of Russian forces into eastern Ukraine and urges that they immediately withdraw, alongside the resumption of diplomatic negotiations to resolve the crisis. This dispute could and should be resolved peacefully, and that remains the only basis for a lasting settlement, rather than the imposition of military solutions. That it has not been resolved is not, however, the responsibility of the Russian or Ukrainian governments alone. The conflict is the product of thirty years of failed policies, including the expansion of NATO and US hegemony at the expense of other countries as well as major wars of aggression by the USA, Britain and other NATO powers which have undermined international law and the United Nations. The British government has played a provocative role in the present crisis, talking up war, decrying diplomacy as appeasement and escalating arms supplies and military deployments to Eastern Europe. If there is to be a return to diplomacy, as there should be, the British government should pledge to oppose any further eastward expansion of NATO and should encourage a return to the Minsk-2 agreement, already signed by both sides, by all parties as a basis for ending the crisis in relations between Ukraine and Russia. Beyond that, there now needs to be a unified effort to develop pan-European security arrangements which meet the needs of all states, something that should have been done when the Warsaw Pact was wound up at the end of the Cold War. The alternative is endless great power conflict with all the attendant waste of resources and danger of bloodshed and destruction. We send our solidarity to all those campaigning for an end to the war, often under very difficult conditions, in Russia and Ukraine. Stop the War can best support them by demanding a change in Britain’s own policy, which can be seen to have failed. Religious Groups Soka Gakkai Is a Japanese New Religious Group, founded in 1930, which is generally identified as Buddhist. They claim to have 12 million members and to be an organisation promoting "peace, culture and education", although their pacifist credentials have been disputed. Their president, Minoru Harada, released the following statement in February 2022, The flames of war continue to spread in Ukraine. It is deeply regrettable that civilian casualties are on the rise. Many people's lives, livelihood and dignity have been threatened by the conflict. This is truly tragic. It is heartbreaking to see the dire situation every day. We strongly call for an immediate cessation of hostilities. I hope that utmost efforts will be made by all countries concerned to prevent the situation from worsening. As a Buddhist, together with Sokai Gakkai members around the World, I am offering fervent prayers for the quickest possible end to the conflict and a return to peace and safety for all. Anglican Pacifist Fellowship Was established in 1937 and is based in the UK. In February 2022, they stated, The Anglican Pacifist Fellowship does not believe that war is ever a way to solve disputes between or within countries. Jesus taught us that we should love our enemies and do good to those that hate us. To use violence against others does not meet with His teaching. It is therefore with great sadness that we hear of the invasion of Ukraine and of the division and fighting over recent years in the Donbas Region. We think of all the people who will suffer as a result of this conflict, in Ukraine, Russia or surrounding countries. We hope that even now a peaceful solution will quickly be found and pray for those from many countries who are still working for that outcome. We need to pray also that other countries will not be drawn into this conflict. We stand with our fellow Christians in both countries caught up in this conflict, Orthodox, Catholic and all other denominations and with other peace-loving people. We pray that God will help them to witness to the message of the Gospel and that this will bring peace and hope to those affected by these dark times. And we hope that Christians the world over will do what they can to reject violence towards their fellow human beings and fellow Christians. That God will give wisdom to all political leaders, particularly those in Ukraine and Russia, the wisdom to see that war and the horrors that it brings is not the way to settle disputes. It is possible that their position has changed somewhat since then. Their May 2022 newsletter is fronted by a letter from a trustee of the organisation which concludes with, Consequently, NATO nations must literally dig
in to repel a hostile Russia. Although pacifists
would not accept this, perhaps to continue
to support Ukraine militarily is the sanest
answer, bearing in mind the great peril the
world is now in; some would say, its moment of
maximum danger. In this we can but regret the
failure of nuclear disarmament campaigns and
continue to support the peace activists working
in this area. Obviously, the above statements only represent a concise summary of the positions taken by these organisations, and there are many other organisations that I haven't discussed. A detailed discussion of the views of every pacifist in the World is well beyond the scope of this site. | {
"source": [
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/74211",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/users/38304/"
]
} |
74,216 | I was reading Wikipedia's Democracy Index and it shows the United States as a "Flawed Democracy". Reading in more detail, the article points out that the US has low scores in "Functioning of Government" (6.43) and also in "Political Culture" (6.25), but I don't understand those terms. Why is the US listed as a "flawed democracy" in the Democracy Index ? How should I interpret that? I guess my real concern is if there is a problem, then I would like to understand it first, and then somehow vote to improve it. | The Economist Intelligence Unit (a subsidiary of the Economist group best known for its publication ) publishes its Democracy Index every year. It seems that the latest, 2021, requires registration, but last years is freely available . It answers your question fairly comprehensively, starting on page 42. In summary: The US also remains in the “flawed democracy” category, having fallen out of the “full democracy” division in 2016 Principally blamed on "further erosion of public trust in the country’s institutions — a development that preceded the election of Donald Trump as president that year" Other reasons given are: extremely low levels of trust in institutions and political parties deep dysfunction in the functioning of government increasing threats to freedom of expression a degree of societal polarisation that makes consensus on any issue almost impossible to achieve differences of opinion in the US have hardened into political sectarianism and institutional gridlock public trust in the democratic process was dealt a further blow in 2020 by the refusal of the outgoing president to accept the election result The consequence of the long-running culture wars in the US and the heightened political polarisation of recent years is that social cohesion has collapsed and consensus has evaporated on fundamental issues, such as election outcomes, public health practices and even the date of the
country’s founding The cleavage in US politics has long been amplified by the mainstream media, including the main network TV channels which make no pretence of impartiality, but in 2020 social media companies intervened in a way that is likely to reinforce the divisions in American society Personal freedoms also declined in 2020 | {
"source": [
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/74216",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/users/43667/"
]
} |
74,219 | Many opponents of the newly overturned Roe vs. Wade law claim the law was "bad law", as stated on this, National Review, openly conservative website. https://www.nationalreview.com/corner/yes-overturn-roe/ . I understand now that this was not a law in the traditional sense. Is there a counter argument to the "bad law" theory? | When someone says something was "bad law" they don't literally mean that it was "poorly written." Law isn't a stylistic contest. They are not talking about grammatical mistakes, clumsy rhetorical flourishes, and ineloquent expression. What they mean, instead, is that the disagree with the legal arguments that were used to support that decision. And, while one can indeed disagree with a discretionary choice made by the U.S. Supreme Court in interpreting the U.S. Constitution, the decision was not, contrary to those who argue that it was "bad law", a decision that was particularly egregious or exceptional in departing from precedent or established modes of reasoning in constitutional interpretation. The newly decided Dobbs case, overturning Roe v. Wade in a stark departure from precedent that completely and non-incrementally overturned a well settled precedent when the court could have addressed the case before it in a far less sweeping way that would modify rather than outright overturn without pre-amble or build up, half a century of settled case law, is far more questionable from a jurisprudential perspective. Roe v. Wade was based upon the argument that the U.S. Constitution recognizes a right to privacy with respect to personal medical and sex related decisions because protecting a right to privacy is a substantive right which is necessary for the due process rights afforded to people under the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution to be adequately protected, in much the same way that this part of the 14th Amendment protects the rights to free speech and other provisions of the Bill of Rights vis-a-vis state and local governments pursuant to a closely related doctrine known as "incorporation". The Roe v. Wade court concluded that this right to privacy existed because the motivating force behind many other provisions of the Bill of Rights and the U.S. Constitution that protect individual rights such as the 1st Amendment freedom of religion and freedom of speech, the 3rd Amendment right to not have soldiers quartered in your home, the 4th Amendment right to be free of search and seizure without due process, the 5th Amendment right to decline to confess to crimes even if you are guilty, and so on, all can be seen as different ways of protecting a more general right to privacy and personal autonomy. The same reasoning about a general substantive right to privacy and personal autonomy has been used by the court to conclude that there is a right to marry the consenting adult of your choice, the right to raise your children as you see fit within reason, and the right for adults to have access to contraception. Likewise, similar reasoning, drawing upon different provisions of the U.S. Constitution at a more general level, has been used to conclude the that the U.S. Constitution protects the right to travel and prohibits states from enacting laws that unduly interfere with interstate commerce (which is called the "dormant commerce clause"). People who think that Roe v. Wade was wrongly decided disagree with that reasoning. They think that concluding that there is a general right to privacy and sexual autonomy that can be inferred from the more specific express protections of privacy in the Bill of Rights, was too big a logical leap and isn't analogous to a smaller leap from the rights inferred from specific protections in the U.S. Constitution like the right to travel and the invalidity of laws that prohibit you from marrying someone of another race. They also argue that Roe v. Wade is different because historical practice criminalizing abortion at some point is inconsistent with the notion that the U.S. Constitution has implicitly protected the right to have an abortion all along even if it wasn't described as a constitutional right in so many words prior to Roe v. Wade . They see abortion not as primarily about personal autonomy and privacy, but instead as about the legitimate interest of the state in protecting human life and upholding morality. Therefore, they believe that Roe v. Wade was wrongly decided. There isn't an objectively right or wrong answer to the question of whether this was rightly or wrongly decided. Judges are not umpires. Every decision about the scope of the rights protected by the U.S. Constitution necessarily involves some big picture discretionary decisions. Roe v. Wade was a very logical extension of Griswold v. Connecticut which protected the right to obtain contraception based upon the same basic reasoning, and was also a very logical extension of previous decisions such as Loving v. Virginia upholding the right to interracial marriage, and previous decisions upholding parental autonomy in how one raises one's children. Roe v. Wade is not a decision that was compelled by the language of the U.S. Constitution standing alone, and it could have been decided differently. But, it was also a decision consistent with logical progression from the reasoning of past precedents of the court and a legitimate conclusion that was within the scope of the U.S. Supreme Court's authority to interpret the U.S. Constitution which calls for more flexibility than the interpretation of an easily amended U.S. statute. The conservatives who oppose Roe v. Wade more generally have a different vision of how the U.S. Constitution should be interpreted that is less protective of the rights to privacy and autonomy, and view state intervention into the private, personal sexual activity and medical decisions of people as legitimate and appropriate. The liberals who joined the majority in Roe v. Wade and others who subsequently came to support this and other substantive due process cases, in contrast, have a vision of how the U.S. Constitution should be interpreted that sees this document, and especially the Bill of Rights, as part and parcel of a vision of the nation in which there is broad personal autonomy and freedom for individuals that disfavors and prohibits government interference in personal decision-making. So, when someone says that Roe v. Wade was "bad law" what they are really saying is that the courts decision to protect this and other rights, that were not historically protected by law and are not expressly enumerated in a specific way, was a poor choice of a vision for what the U.S. Constitution's Bill of Rights should protect, given the discretion that the courts have to interpret in multiple ways. They are emphatic about Roe v. Wade in particular being a bad decision in their view, because they see this decision as authorizing a medical provision which they view as tantamount to murder even in the face of considerations like personal preferences concerning child bearing or one's personal economic prospects which they view as much less weighty (i.e. so called "abortion on demand"). They see abortion as something that is so obviously immoral and wrong that the notion that it can be justified by protections for personal autonomy seem patently absurd to them. In contrast, supporters of Roe v. Wade see the personal autonomy considerations involved in carrying a pregnancy to term as much more weighty, do not equate abortion to murder, and feel that nearly a half century of Roe v. Wade being an established "super-precedent" which the justices who voted to overturn it had largely affirmed that they agreed with overcame any historical pre- Roe v. Wade historical practice (a history which they, in any case, feel has been mischaracterized by abortion opponents). | {
"source": [
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/74219",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/users/43819/"
]
} |
74,234 | For the first time in twenty-five years, China, India, and Pakistan
took a similar position on a global issue, choosing to abstain from
voting on Ukraine, like so many others, including Indonesia,
Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka. Even solid American allies like the UAE and
Saudi Arabia have been found “sitting on the fence” on Ukraine. Given
this context, instead of rushing headlong into confronting and
containing China, wisdom gleaned from past experience and contemporary
geopolitical realities demand a review and reset in the U.S. approach
to China. https://nationalinterest.org/feature/us-china-policy-heading-towards-disaster-203510 Is Saudi Arabia sitting on the fence on Ukraine, because it's fearing military retaliation from Russia, or do they have something to gain from Russia invading Ukraine? How is Saudi Arabia benefiting from not making a choice in this situation if Saudi Arabia might make it European and American allies mad? What are the geopolitical and political considerations being made by the leadership in Saudi Arabia? | Here is a frame challenge to the question: it isn't, necessarily. The linked article moves smoothly from talking about countries that actually abstained from "voting on Ukraine," by which I take the author to mean at minimum the UN resolution condemning the Russian invasion of Ukraine , to talking about Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates being "on the fence," giving the impression that this has something to do with that resolution. However, both countries, including Saudi Arabia , actually voted in favor of that resolution , rather than abstaining. It is perhaps worth noting that the author also seems to mistakenly claim that Indonesia abstained from that resolution: in reality, it also voted in favor. As such, Saudi Arabia does not seem to be adopting an equivocal position (unlike, say, India or China, both of which did abstain). In fairness, it is worth noting that Saudi Arabia did abstain from another UN resolution, one that sought to remove Russia from the UN Human Rights Council. One might consider that to qualify as "being on the fence" about the Russian invasion of Ukraine, but in light of Saudi Arabia's vote to condemn the Russian invasion of Ukraine, this might be seen as more concern about the potential consequences for their own spotty human rights record in recent years. And, well, considering that Russia circulated a letter telling other countries that abstaining from the resolution would be treated similarly to voting in favor, this interpretation does seem more likely. So, in short, Saudi Arabia is not really on the fence. In two separate votes, it took a position that it knew would alienate Russia. It would seem that the Saudi government may agree with the reasoning in the question, that it would have more to lose from alienating the United States, Europe, and other countries opposed to Russia's invasion of Ukraine. | {
"source": [
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/74234",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/users/38301/"
]
} |
74,244 | Russia has been saying that there is no war in Ukraine, just a "Special military operation". Their laws prohibit them from sending conscripts to military operations outside Russia. The war did not go the way they thought it would, and now they have a massive shortage of military personnel. They obviously need to deploy their conscripts, but they refuse to call it a war. Why do they not just declare war and send their conscripts to the war zone? | The government of the Russian Federation does not declare war and announce general mobilization for the following reasons: Mobilization would increase domestic resistance. Even as is, there have been a number of "voenkomats" (military recruitment centers) set on fire (!) all over Russia. Mobilization would harm the economy and the living standards would fall, leading to popular unrest. Russian administrative system, unlike the Soviet system before it, may not be able to handle such a massive task. Newly recruited soldiers would be less likely to be well-trained and motivated. REFERENCES: But despite failing to achieve any of Russia’s strategic objectives in its all-out invasion of Ukraine in over four months, Putin has been reluctant to carry out mobilization. Some experts suggest Putin may fear that mobilization would trigger domestic resistance, with large numbers of potential recruits evading the draft. He may also be wary of the devastating effect that it would have on Russia’s economy: thousands would be removed from the civilian sector and living standards would fall drastically. Another potential fear is that Russia’s administrative system may not be able to handle such a tremendous task. Moreover, mobilization in Russia would likely entail a transition to an even more totalitarian system, and it may not prove so easy to transform Russia into North Korea. Putin lacks troops in Ukraine but fears mobilization in Russia. By Oleg Sukhov. Kyiv Independent, July 5, 2022: https://kyivindependent.com/hot-topic/putin-lacks-troops-in-ukraine-but-fears-mobilization-in-russia Russia is likely rapidly exhausting the manpower it can readily use to generate additional effective combat power even as its forces lose combat effectiveness in Ukraine amid high losses. Russian efforts to mobilize more manpower can bring more people into Russian combat units, but those people are unlikely to be well-enough trained or motivated to generate large amounts of new combat power. Mobilization efforts are likely to start producing diminishing returns as Russia moves through the categories of fully-trained and recently-released reservists into categories of people further removed from their initial military experiences and/or those who will undergo hasty training before deployment to the front lines. Individual replacements for battlefield losses are unlikely to have the same training as their predecessors, and new units or those reinforced by these augmentees will not have undergone unit-level training prior to employment. More units and reservist replacements will likely appear in Ukraine, therefore, but the net effect on Russia’s actual combat capability will likely be small and diminishing. A declaration of martial law and general mobilization would not overcome the structural challenges of Russia’s hybrid cadre-and-reserves and contract-soldier system. Creating cohesive fighting units cannot be accomplished overnight. Replacing individual combat casualties in Ukraine with recalled reservists who have gone years without military training is unlikely to dramatically increase Russian combat power. Explainer on Russian Conscription, Reserve, and Mobilization. By Kateryna Stepanenko, Frederick W. Kagan, Brian Babcock-Lumish. Critical Threats, March 5, 2022: https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/explainer-on-russian-conscription-reserve-and-mobilization The 2022 Russian mystery fires are a series of unusual fires and explosions that have occurred since the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine,[1][2] which have not been formally explained.[3] There have also been several notable arson attacks on military recruitment offices in Russia since the beginning of the war,[4] and there has been speculation that some of the fires or explosions have been the result of sabotage efforts by Ukraine.[5] 2022 Russian mystery fires. Wikipedia: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2022_Russian_mystery_fires A spate of recent fires in Russian cities has led some to speculate that the blazes may be linked to the war in Ukraine. Some of the fires have damaged military objectives while others have hit buildings unrelated to Russia's war infrastructure. In Photos: Russia On Fire With Mystery Blazes. By RFE/RL, June 06, 2022: https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-fires-mystery-ukraine-conflict/31884503.html | {
"source": [
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/74244",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/users/41599/"
]
} |
74,345 | In light of the ongoing UK Conservative leadership race, a lot has been said about the legacy of Margaret Thatcher. In particular, one of the candidates Liz Truss often invokes the image of Thatcher to appeal to party members. This suggests that Thatcherism remains an influencial school of thinking within the UK Conservatives, potentially enough to propel the next Prime Minister into office. I'm really struck by how UK Conservatives keep looping back to that particular period throughout the premiership of Cameron, May, and Johnson. It seems to suggest that whatever came after Thatcher was somehow failing to tap into the zeitgeist of UK Conservatives, so much so that they are still talking about her after Brexit. It's not clear to me what exactly is driving the appeal and nostalgia of Thatcherism within UK Conservatives. Can someone explain it in a way that is understandable to people who may not be particularly enthusiastic about Thatcher's policies? | Success! Margaret Thatcher was exceptionally successful, winning 3 General Elections with large majorities, and perhaps more importantly, never losing a general election. Partisans love a winner. Conviction politics. Margaret Thatcher was not a "let's try to keep everyone happy" politician. She broke the post-war consensus, established the political identity of the modern Conservative party. Partisans love strong opinions. Generational timing. The current crop of leadership contenders, and many party members, would have been in their teens or at university while Thatcher was PM. At that time when they were forming political opinions, she was the leader. | {
"source": [
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/74345",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/users/28067/"
]
} |
74,348 | Analogous to the corresponding question about Ukraine : All the official news coverage I've seen have indicated most of Russia is determined in continued fighting in Ukraine, saying things like that they will extend territorial claims and are not finished with the war . Still, the picture might be misleading because Russia can and does suppress opposition quite heavily, not only since the introduction of the law forbidding any criticism of the official position on the war (well you could not legally call it that in Russia). This might hint at that there is a faction within Russia that's in favor of collaborating with Ukraine, and by implication in favor of an immediate ceasefire. Is there any indication that there is a political faction in Russia (in Parliament or otherwise organized) favoring an immediate ceasefire and publicly advocating it? If not, what about the Russian population at large? As I understand it Russia has criminalized collaboration with Ukraine (which by their definition includes expression of resistance against the war or even calling it as such), hence if such a faction exists I imagine it'll either be underground or among Russian exiles. I'm referring to Russians who think Russia should implement an immediate ceasefire and say so, but don't identify as Ukrainian (e.g. by taking up Ukrainian citizenship) and will choose to remain Russian afterwards. | Alexei Navalny is clearly against continuing the war ( source ): It is now everyone’s duty to make at least some, even the smallest
contribution to stop this war and remove Putin from power. Protest wherever and however you can. Agitate however you can and whomever you can. Inaction is the worst possible thing. And now its consequence is death. He is the leader of the Russia of the Future party that is not officially registered. Alexei Gorinov has been sentenced for seven years in jail for criticising Russia’s military actions in Ukraine. Wikipedia claims he belongs to Солидарность but I cannot find the official position of this faction towards the war in Ukraine. The faction is against some other wars. Legal, active factions advocating the cease fire immediately I think are unlikely as they would be banned. Statements against the war are not allowed . Anyone seen to be spreading what the government deems "fakes" about "military action in Ukraine" can earn up to 15 years in jail. | {
"source": [
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/74348",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/users/8199/"
]
} |
74,420 | I'm American. And I recently wrote my representative and senators to express my opinion about bills on which they might vote soon. I got no response at all from two of these letters, and from the third I received a letter summarizing the politician's own views (on the same issues) with no reference to my views. I guess that at some level my purpose in writing is to influence the politicians' perceptions of their constituencies. I would hope that some clerk (or aid or whatever) at least skimmed the letter and made a hashmark on a table, trying to keep track of whether there's a general consensus or wide variety of opinion, or passion or indifference, or something along these lines. Now I wonder if they simply have an automated system for identifying the subject matter of correspondence and sending their own positions in response. Do we have any way of knowing whether letters to our representatives and senators are read by actual people and whether these letters ever have any influence on the positions that these politicians take? | Letters About Political Issues The vast majority of letters (about pending issues) written to politicians are read by staff members of the politician (who often code similar responses and reply with a form response, sometimes approved by the politician or a more senior staff member). Exceptional letters are frequently brought to the member's attention, while boilerplate letters are usually seen by a member only once even if hundreds are received although the number of letter of each type received are typically tallied. Do we have any way of knowing . . . whether these letters ever have
any influence on the positions that these politicians take? Politicians use the letters received in a few respects. They gauge how "hot" an issue is to somebody. They are notable when they don't match the politician's expectations about preferences in the district. And, rare, one off personal letters about lower profile issues can provided insights to politicians that may be useful in gaining information about obscure issue of which the politician might otherwise not have been aware. If an issue is hot, a good politician makes statements about it and votes on it with more attention and care in most cases rather than being flip and making off the cuff arguments that are ill considered. But, letters rarely cause a politician to change a position on an issue about which the politician has already made a strong ideological commitment unless they are wildly unexpected in volume or in pro/con mix on an issue. Constituent Service Letters about personal problems in dealings with the government from a constituent of the politician are quickly referred to different staffers who specialize in sorting out bureaucratic tangles that constituents get into, a process called "constituent service." All of these letters are read, and the politician's constituent service staff (at the state level, some legislatures consolidate most constituent service for the entire legislature, for an entire house of the legislature, or for a political party) addresses issues where the staffer agrees that there is a legitimate grievance. Sometimes an inquiry will be made with a call from staff or a formal letter signed by the politician, other times the politician will call or there will be a formal letter from multiple politicians who are all experiencing the same problem. Agencies, in turn, have staff members who are dedicated to responding to these inquiries, which in federal agency vernacular (as my wife who worked briefly in a federal agency related) is called "a Congressional." If the agency is unresponsive, the issue is sometimes escalated by putting a freeze on some legislative action, like a budget request or a Presidential appointment to the agency, until the issue is addressed, or the issue may be escalated to a superior of the agency causing the problem. (Most of this answer is based upon personal experience from working in and around legislators in Congress and in state legislatures.) | {
"source": [
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/74420",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/users/20944/"
]
} |
74,469 | Are pro-choice groups (i.e. those supporting legal abortion or extending the abortion rights) typically supportive of surrogate motherhood and/or prostitution? I am interested in groups and politicians who have taken clear stance on these issues (or clearly avoid taking stance on some of them, while supporting the other). I suppose that, from the point of view og woman's rights to her body, the issues are equal. However, as many pro-abortion groups are left-wing, they might object the economic aspect of surrogate motherhood or prostitution. Yet, from the liberal point of view, this is no different from selling one's body when doing hard physical work or risking one's life in police/military/firefighting. My guess is that the opposition to surrogacy and prostitution among anti-abortion groups is more consistent, since it is grounded in traditional and/or religious values, which are typically critical of all of them (perhaps less critical of surrogacy, which is a recent development.) | Political advocacy groups are usually single-issue in order to not dilute their message and not exclude potential supporters for their primary cause who might object to another cause the group supports. So when an organization is primarily formed around one specific issue, then they usually avoid taking an official stance on an unrelated issue. There are a lot of pro-choice advocacy groups in the United States, so mentioning them all would be an exercise in futility. So I am going to just look at a couple representative examples. I am focusing specifically on the US, because there is hardly another country in the world where abortion is such a dividing hot-button issue. Center for Reproductive Rights In their article on assisted reproduction , they state: The Center’s work on assisted reproduction—including IVF, surrogacy, and embryo and gamete regulations—seeks to destigmatize infertility and ensure equitable access to infertility care. So yes, they support surrogacy motherhood. Looking for articles on their website containing the word " prostitution " doesn't give a lot of results, and the articles usually only mention the topic in a single sentence, usually in the context of forced prostitution. Which even pro-prostitution advocacy groups usually condemn. So no clear position here. National Abortion Federation This group appears to be clearly single-issue on the topic of advocating for the right to abortions, providing information on abortion and providing access to them. I could not find anything on any other political subject on their website . Planned Parenthood Although PP is most known for providing abortions, it's an organization which does a whole lot more than just that. It deals with almost all aspects of reproductive health care. Yet, their abortion services are what makes them the bogeyman of the pro-life movement. So their positions on abortions are in the spotlight of the pro-choice movement, whether they want it or not. They describe gestational surrogacy as: an option for women who do not want to or cannot carry a pregnancy. Surrogacy can entail use of the surrogate’s uterus and eggs or only her uterus. As with their usual medial style, they inform and offer, but not advocate for or against specific options. Regarding sex work: The glossary on their website acknowledge that it exists, but there are not many mentions of it on their website. All I could find is this secondary source (which appears to be critical of PP) which claims: The clinic’s unofficial position on prostitution was identical to its stance concerning abortion. A woman had the right to choose what she did with her body. Period. End of story. We were trained to think that prostitution or stripping was as valid a choice for a woman as being a nurse or a lawyer. I could also find this tweet from Planned Parenthood Toronto (so not the US branch) which says: What is our position on #SexWork? Sex work is real work and we support sex workers’ rights. We believe that sex workers deserve sexual and reproductive health services that are inclusive, non-judgemental, and relevant to their needs. Feminist Majority Foundation The FMF is a catch-all Feminist organization which is also a major player in the pro-choice movement . All I could find regarding surrogacy on their website is an article about the ban of surrogate motherhood in Italy which while not clearly advocating for surrogate motherhood, appears to be more favorable than unfavorable of it. Their position on sex work appears to be ambiguous. Their website has only 3 articles tagged as "sex work" . One of them is about a debate between Amnesty International and the Coalition Against Trafficking in Women titled "Amnesty Votes on Policy to Decriminalize Sex Work, Sparks Feminist Debate" . The article doesn't take a clear position, but judging by the amount of verbatim quotes in the article, they appears slightly more favorable of the position of the CATW to ban sex work than that of AI to legalize it. NARAL - Pro Choice America I could find some statements where Pro Choice America condemned opposition to surrogacy motherhood as a sign of being "anti-choice" and therefore worth condemning. I could find some dossiers on their website where they summarize the positions of various district court attorney on the abortion debate: Sarah Pitlyk : Pitlyk has represented a number of anti-choice activist organizations in cases involving the validity of surrogacy agreements. In her briefs, Pitlyk stated that “[s]urrogacy raises an array of troubling issues.” Barry Ashe : Ashe served on the board of Christian Health Ministries Foundation (CHM) [...] According to its membership guidelines, CHM refuses to cover birth control, fertility treatment, surrogate procedures, sterilization, reversal procedures, and abortion There is also a pamphlet " The insidious power of the anti-choice movement " which states: These anti-choice activists have been working hard to set the stage for even more aggressive attacks on our reproductive freedom. [...] But as we’ve always said, reducing these players and this infrastructure to "anti-choice" is a misnomer as their ideology and their agenda exceeds well beyond ending legal abortion in our country. Even in areas of reproduction, they actively fight access to contraception, in vitro fertilization, and surrogacy. So it appears that they consider opposition to surrogate motherhood an anti-choice position and therefore irreconcilable with their core issue. I could not find anything which hints on their position on sex work. tl;dr: It appears that most organizations which are pro-choice also consider surrogacy motherhood a reproductive right worth protecting. But their positions on sex work are usually ambiguous. And with those organizations within the movement who do have a position, those positions are not consistent between organizations. | {
"source": [
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/74469",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/users/38304/"
]
} |
74,515 | The obvious motivation for the question is the latest news: U.S. kills al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahri in drone strike Targeted assassinations are a reality of political and military life, and perhaps an unavoidable necessity when it comes to national security. Yet, in my understanding it does not square with the western values, notably as: extrajudicial punishment (no due process) violation of other country sovereignty in some cases violence against its own citizens There are multiple examples of such violence not being condoned by the Western world: Outcry about such actions carried out on the western soil, e.g., those attributed to Russia Policy of ambiguity in respect to such actions, e.g., as practiced by Israel (i.e., refusing to acknowledge them, while not denying sometimes irrefutable evidence) Traditional secrecy surrounding such actions in popular culture, e.g. the secret nature of agents like James Bond Scandals when such actions are uncovered, e.g. the sinking of "Rainbow warrior" by the French secret services. In this sense, the US president openly claiming personal responsibility for a killing looks somewhat unsavory. What is the rationale for this US policy? Is it due to different understanding of "western values" in the US and elsewhere? Is there criticism of such policies from within the US? | Quoting Biden : “The United States continues to demonstrate its resolve and capacity to defend Americans from those who seek to do it harm,” Biden said, making it “clear again [that] no matter how long it takes, no matter how you hide … the United States will find you and seek you out.” Deterrence only works if the people you are deterring know you are trying to deter them. | {
"source": [
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/74515",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/users/38304/"
]
} |
74,519 | The United States killed Al-Qaeda's chief in an airstrike on his house in Kabul, Afghanistan. Though the agreement between the US and the Taliban is not public, one thing that is clear is that the US was supposed to completely withdraw its military presence and stop its operations in Afghanistan as part of the deal. Doesn't that mean the US wasn't allowed to do any such operation? Isn't this a violation of the deal signed between the two powers? | (This answer is analyzing the import of the agreement referred to in the question, not international law, which is another aspect) Pretty much. About the only hard commitment the Taliban got nailed to in the (public) 2020 Doha Accords was not to allow Afghanistan to be used as a terrorist base. The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan which is not recognized by the United States as a state and
is known as the Taliban will prevent any group or individual in Afghanistan from threatening
the security of the United States and its allies, and will prevent them from recruiting, training,
and fundraising and will not host them in accordance with the commitments in this agreement. (there's more verbiage about terrorist support in the agreement, this is only the most directly relevant) This is exactly what the US claims : A Taliban spokesman described the US operation as a clear violation of international principles - but did not mention Zawahiri. US officials maintained that the operation had had a legal basis. Under a peace deal struck in 2020, the Taliban agreed not to allow al-Qaeda or any other extremist group to operate in areas under their control. However, the Taliban and al-Qaeda are long-time allies and US officials said the Taliban were aware of Zawahiri's presence in Kabul, and he lived freely and in the open in the Afghan capital. In background briefings, US intelligence officers accused Taliban affiliates of going to the safe house after the strike to try to cover up evidence of Zawahiri's presence there. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken said that by hosting and sheltering Zawahiri in Kabul, the Taliban had "grossly violated" the peace agreement. al-Zawahiri being Al-Qaeda's leader hosting him seems to qualify very well for a material violation of Doha. Was he indeed "hosted"? Or did he live incognito and unknown to the Taliban in Kabul ? It is a neighbourhood which became notorious over the past two decades for its garish multi-storey villas, mocked by Kabul residents as the stronghold of corrupt warlords and officials, a gaudy symbol of the spoils of an ugly war. Kabulis called it Choorpur, the town of thieves. The Taliban took over some of the empty villas, close to some high-walled Western embassies, which also slammed shut when the Taliban took charge. p.s. and in the final analysis, Doha aside, esp. with Zawahiri, the US, like Gerritt says , would have done it anyway if it felt it could get away with it. Though it usually doesn't drone friendly countries but rather cajoles them into arresting the target (Pakistan is not really a "friend" in the traditional sense). | {
"source": [
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/74519",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/users/21386/"
]
} |
74,527 | There seem to be various stories of Russia cutting off various neighbouring and other Euro states from its oil over failing to pay for the oil in Roubles (this is independent of the Ukranian war and so on, I'd like to focus on the economic issue here rather than the paramilitary issue, if at all possible). The way this is painted in the media is that it is abnormal for Russia to require this, and it is an unreasonable endeavour for these countries to acquire Roubles to pay for the oil; consequently, Russia should accept other countries' currencies for its oil, and it should not be the other countries' responsibilities to acquire Roubles. It is my understanding, from a rudimentary macroeconomic perspective, that it is more normal/common than otherwise, in international trade, for the importer to pay for goods in the exporter's currency. The reason being that the exporting company needs to pay their wages/labour/materials/R&D/shareholders/etc in local currency, not in the import country's currency. For example, if Google does business in the UK, Google needs to pay its SF employees in USD; paying them in British pounds doesn't help them, and Google's employees would be right to be mad if they were paid in Pounds. This, from my understanding, is the norm. Now, given that the export country (Russia) uses Roubles as the currency, it should be normal and not newsworthy that the exporting company requires payments in Roubles. Why is this newsworthy? Is the only reason why this is onerous for the importing country the fact that the Russian economy has been locked down and Roubles aren't commonly available on the common forex markets, or is there something else here that I'm not aware of? | Because the contracts stipulated payments in other currencies (euros, dollars), not roubles. i.e. all your other arguments are superseded by the fact that these were not the contractual commitments Russia signed up to. Here's one recent example of Germany's position: Germany Rejects Putin Demand for Ruble Payments for Russian Gas - Bloomberg “Contracts are contracts,” Lindner (German Finance Minister) said Wednesday in an interview with Bloomberg Television in Washington. “Contracts are based on dollars and euros and so private-sector companies should pay in dollars or euros.” And... Explainer: Russia wants countries to pay for gas in roubles. Will buyers comply? | Reuters Currently, nearly all Russian gas purchase contracts are denominated in euros or U.S. dollars, according to consultancy Rystad Energy. Payments in roubles would benefit the Russian economy and shore up its currency. . | {
"source": [
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/74527",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/users/22118/"
]
} |
74,584 | We are currently witnessing a new conflict between Russia and the West, which some people have compared to a new Cold War. Additionally, the relations between China and the West are not as good as they were, and Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taiwan has not improved them. In this situation, an alliance between Russia and China seems likely. Some politicians, such as Henry Kissinger and Marine Le Pen, have expressed such concerns, but they do not have any political power. In this context, I am wondering if any current Western politicians (presidents or members of government) have also expressed such concerns? | Sure, Macron did . At least before 2022. Macron welcomed Putin again, in 2019, at the Fort of Brégançon, the Presidential summer retreat on the Mediterranean, where he acknowledged “this great power that is Russia” and offered to build, together, “a new security architecture for our Europe.” He doubled down a week later at a gathering of French Ambassadors. “Pushing Russia away from Europe is a profound strategic error, because we will push Russia either into an isolation that increases tensions or into alliances with other great powers such as China,” Macron said. I'm not sure if he's repeated it the same terms since though. As for less powerful politicians, you can include EU's High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy Borrell, quoted as saying (in 2021) that the EU has no “interest in pushing Russia and China closer together.” Borrell, in fact, wrote quite a bit about it on that occasion. Likewise former German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas warned, in a speech to the Bundestag, that the EU should avoid being heavy-handed with Moscow. “You would be driving Russia and China into each other’s arms, and thereby also be creating the largest economic and military alliance in the world,” he stated. I'm not sure which politicians (with power) in the US have articulated this, but the "average Joe" also sees the Russia-China ties as a "very serious problem for the US", according to 62% of those asked in a Pew poll this year. (I suppose one can include Trump here as a person of influence at least joking about starting a war between Russia and China--by a false flag operation.) As for the Biden administration, "expressed concern" is probably an understatement when they e.g. Biden told Xi there would be 'consequences' if China were to help Russia in the war in Ukraine. On the other hand, before the invasion Biden sought to downplay the growing Russia-China ties as "nothing new" . | {
"source": [
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/74584",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/users/41763/"
]
} |
74,593 | Russia has stated (prior to the formal invasion of Ukraine) that NATO poses an "existential threat" to itself. Interestingly, a paper from 6 years prior evaluates whether Russia is an existential threat to NATO. The European Union also has a collective defense clause (that has never been tested) that functions similarly to the NATO defense clause. Both organizations' clauses do mention that the alliance is a defensive obligation. Obviously, there is large overlap between the organizations. Notably, the EU is missing the US and the UK. In a recent statement, Russia officially states that the US is an existential threat so the lack of the US in the EU is likely a deal breaker. This brings the question then is the EU even a political body that can influence Russia (nevermind deter it from an invasion)? Ignoring the fact that Russia has significant influence in the EU, even to the point of members like Germany, France, and Austria stating that US sanctions on Russian energy are illegal in 2017, can the EU actually pose a threat politically? Sanctions do not seem to be deterring Russia from further invasion and Russia specifically calls out NATO expansion as red lines but seems to ignore similar talks about expanding the EU. It does help to keep in context that the de facto purpose of NATO on creation was to counter the USSR (whose successor state is now Russia), whereas the EU is an economic union with defense tacked on later. There seems to be some confusion on what the question is asking so I'll clarify what a "political threat" means. Entity A poses a political threat to Entity B if A can influence B to the point of acting in the interests of A instead of B. Regardless of official statements, many countries are de facto in this situation. North Korea is an example of B where China is A, in a protectorate/vassal relationship. Turkey and the KSA are in such a relationship, but in a different type of relationship (regional hegemony). NATO and Russia are in such a relationship, where NATO can essentially strong-arm Russia. | There is one way in which the EU is a threat to Russia, but it isn't the "Make Russia act in the interests of the EU" kind of threat. The EU is more economically successful than Russia, and it does that with governments that are less corrupt, less centralised and less generally repressive of their people. Some fraction of the Russian population are aware of this, and wonder why they have the government that they do, and if they could have a better one. That's a definite threat to Putin's popular support. | {
"source": [
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/74593",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/users/42121/"
]
} |
74,636 | Reading the Western press, the People's Republic of China (from hereon China) regularly threatens military brimstone and hellfire if the Republic of China (Taiwan) dares to declare independence. However, an acquaintance recently pointed out that if you read the actual wording of the threats, they are always couched in terms of fending off an attack on Taiwan, and if you see anything claiming otherwise, it's probably misquoting or editorializing. In other words, they're not directed against Taiwan itself, but against unspecified "invaders", "anyone who splits Taiwan from China", etc. A few recent examples, emphasis mine: “We have the determination and ability to mount a painful direct
attack against any invaders who would wreck unification of the
motherland, and would show no mercy.” - NYT "If anyone dares to split Taiwan from China, the Chinese army will definitely not hesitate to start a war no matter the cost” - Al Jazeera This old article from 2000 describes China's position as follows, but provides no direct link: Previously, China suggested that force would be used only in the event
of a foreign invasion of the island, or a declaration of independence
by Taiwan. But now the threat has been extended to apply if Taipei
indefinitely maintains its refusal to hold talks on unifying the two
governments, under Beijing's leadership. So: has China ever unambiguously stated that it will invade if Taiwan declares independence? Bonus points for citations to sources either in Chinese, or from a Chinese government publication in English. | And inevitably, immediately after posting my question, I stumbled onto the full English text of China's Anti-Secession Law of 2015 (反分裂国家法). Article 8 reads: In the event that the "Taiwan independence" secessionist forces should
act under any name or by any means to cause the fact of Taiwan's
secession from China, or that major incidents entailing Taiwan's
secession from China should occur, orthat possibilities for a peaceful
reunification should be completely exhausted, the state shall employ
non-peaceful means and other necessary measures to protect China's
sovereignty and territorial integrity. Original Chinese : “台独”分裂势力以任何名义、任何方式造成台湾从中国分裂出去的事实，或者发生将会导致台湾从中国分裂出去的重大事变，或者和平统一的可能性完全丧失， 国家得采取非和平方式 及其他必要措施，捍卫国家主权和领土完整。 In other words, yes , if "Taiwan independence secessionist forces ... cause Taiwan's secession from China", China will "employ non-peaceful means" (read: military force) against Taiwan. | {
"source": [
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/74636",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/users/19093/"
]
} |
74,699 | China has published a White Paper on the situation with Taiwan. Here is the translation: The spokesperson of the Taiwan Office of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of China was authorized to deliver a speech on the
publication of the white paper "The Taiwan Issue and the Cause of
Chinese Reunification in the New Era" Xinhua News Agency, Beijing, August 10th, on August 10th, a
spokesperson for the Taiwan Office of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of China was authorized to deliver a speech on the
publication of the white paper "The Taiwan Issue and the Cause of
China's Reunification in the New Era". The full text is as follows： The Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council and the Information
Office of the State Council today issued a white paper on "The Taiwan
Issue and the Cause of China's Reunification in the New Era". In August 1993 and February 2000, the Chinese government published
white papers on "The Taiwan Issue and the Reunification of China" and
"The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue", respectively,
comprehensively and systematically expounding the basic principles and
related policies for solving the Taiwan issue. For more than 20 years,
especially since the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of
China, the theory of national unification and the policy towards
Taiwan have continued to develop abundantly. General Secretary Xi
Jinping put forward a series of important concepts and major policy
propositions on the work of Taiwan, forming the overall strategy of
the Communist Party of China to solve the Taiwan issue in the new era,
and providing a fundamental framework and action plan for the work of
Taiwan. However, for a period of time, the authorities of the
Democratic Progressive Party of Taiwan have stepped up their “Taiwan
independence” separatist activities, and some external forces have
tried their best to engage in “Taiwan-based China” in an attempt to
prevent China from achieving complete reunification and the Chinese
nation from moving towards a great rejuvenation. The Communist Party of China unites and leads the people of all ethnic
groups throughout the country in their long-term struggle to build a
well-off society in an all-round way as scheduled, achieve the first
hundred years of struggle goal, and start a new journey to build a
modern socialist country in an all-round way and march towards the
second hundred years of struggle goal. Realizing the great
rejuvenation of the Chinese nation has entered an irreversible
historical process, and we are more qualified, confident, and capable
of completing the great cause of the reunification of the motherland.
The majority of cadres and the masses eagerly look forward to the
early completion of the great cause of reunification. The Chinese
people at home and abroad and the international community pay great
attention to the issue of China's reunification. Embarking on a new
journey and facing the new situation, it is necessary to issue a new
white paper on national reunification to further reiterate the fact
and status quo that Taiwan is a part of China, demonstrate the firm
will and strong determination of the Communist Party of China and the
Chinese people to pursue the reunification of the motherland, and
explain the positions and policies of the Communist Party of China and
the Chinese Government to promote the reunification of the motherland
in the new era. The white paper “The Taiwan Issue and the Cause of Chinese
Reunification in the New Era” insists on taking Xi Jinping's socialist
thought with Chinese characteristics in the new era as the guide,
based on the overall situation of the great rejuvenation strategy of
the Chinese nation and the unprecedented changes in the world in a
hundred years, and deeply implements the overall strategy of the
Communist Party of China to solve the Taiwan issue in the new era, and
demonstrates with a large number of historical and legal facts that
Taiwan is a part of China. It is unquestionable and cannot be changed,
comprehensively summarizes the Communist Party of China's unwavering
efforts to promote the complete reunification of the motherland.
History, major achievements and valuable experience, deeply criticized
the actions and fallacies of the Democratic Progressive Party
authorities stepping up their “independence” provocations and the
United States stepping up its efforts to play the “Taiwan card”, and
systematically expounded the actions and fallacies of the Communist
Party of China and the Chinese government in the new era The major
political policies and policy propositions for promoting the
reunification of the motherland on the new journey clearly clarify the
bright prospects for achieving peaceful reunification in accordance
with the “one country, two systems”, and fully demonstrate our
confidence in achieving the complete reunification of the motherland,
our firm determination to oppose the division of "Taiwan independence"
and foreign interference, and our unchanging original intention to
seek the well-being of compatriots on both sides of the Strait. In the current complicated international situation and the Taiwan
Strait situation, the publication of this white paper is conducive to
exposing and criticizing the “Taiwan independence” separatist forces
and external forces for colluding and provoking, attempting to harm
China's sovereignty and territorial integrity, obstructing and
sabotaging the process of Chinese reunification, and exposing their
political nature and sinister intentions. The determination of the
Chinese people to safeguard national sovereignty and territorial
integrity is unshakable, and the will is as solid as a rock; it is
conducive to demonstrating that the Communist Party of China and the
Chinese Government are willing to continue to strive for peaceful
reunification with the greatest sincerity and do their best. The
position and attitude, to maximize the efforts of compatriots on both
sides of the Strait, especially Taiwan compatriots and the
international community. Understanding and support; it is conducive to
boosting the spirit of the whole party and the people of all ethnic
groups determined to pursue national unity, enhancing the confidence
and courage of the anti-“independence” forces on the island and
overseas to promote unity, and condensing the majestic power to
support and promote the reunification of the motherland. Achieving the peaceful reunification of the two sides of the Strait is
not only a blessing for the Chinese nation and the Chinese people, but
also for the international community and the people of the world. I
hope that the majority of Taiwanese compatriots will firmly stand on
the right side of history, be dignified Chinese, seriously think about
Taiwan's status and role in national rejuvenation, understand justice
and act in accordance with righteousness, resolutely oppose the
division of “Taiwan independence” and interference from external
forces, and actively participate in the just cause of promoting the
peaceful reunification of the motherland. I hope that Hong Kong
compatriots, Macao compatriots and overseas Chinese will, as always,
make new contributions to promoting the peaceful development of
cross-Strait relations and achieving the peaceful reunification of the
motherland. It is hoped that the international community and all
countries that have established diplomatic relations with China will
abide by the one-China principle, properly handle Taiwan-related
issues, understand and support the Chinese people's opposition to the
division of “Taiwan independence” and strive to complete the just
cause of national reunification. Is there any benefit to doing this? I am wondering, because everyone knows that China considers Taiwan to be part of China. So what's the point of publishing a white paper and reiterating something most diplomats and senior officials already know? Is there any advantage that China can get out of this, or is this just some protocols people are being told to follow that led to this? | Short Answer While it is subtle, this Chinese "white paper" is a bigger deal than it seems from a casual reading out of context and without much further analysis. This Chinese "white paper" is basically an order from the very top in the person of China's supreme leaders Xi Jinping through his chief subordinate in charge of Taiwan policy, directed at powerful militant factions in the Chinese government, and all of Xi Jinping's other myriad subordinates in China's sprawling government, telling them to stand down in an escalating crisis. This is intended to end the crisis, and restore normal relations with the rest of the world, without causing China or the hawks in his government to lose face unnecessarily. But it is probably also a mild admonishment to his chief subordinate in charge of Taiwan policy for letting the situation get out of hand without Xi Jinping's pro-active involvement. Long Answer What Does The Term "White Paper" Traditionally Mean? In the traditional sense a " white paper " is a concrete proposal or statement of position that has not yet been reduced to a formal final form together with justifications for the proposed policy, that has been considered at some depth. In this original sense: White papers are a "tool of participatory democracy ... not [an]
unalterable policy commitment. White papers have tried to perform the
dual role of presenting firm government policies while at the same
time inviting opinions upon them. The term appears to originate with the Churchill White Paper of 1922 in the U.K. where the practice of issuing white papers originated. A traditional white paper is circulated for purposes of discussion and comment before it is finally adopted so that policy makers may benefit from the input provided in hammering out a final version of a new policy or even, in rare cases, for abandoning a proposal if the white paper leads to great outcry in opposition or a fatal flaw in the proposal is discovered in the course of public comment upon it. It is a practice that reflects, in part, the concern that, in a Westminster style parliamentary system policy makers can be particularly prone to being isolated from input from the general public if this input is not actively solicited, because little decision making actually takes place on the floor of parliament or among rank and file members of the governing political coalition. A white paper is a bit like a proposed regulation, but with more analysis and justification, and with a less formal and exacting form of the proposal which is typically written in more approached and less legalistic terminology than the final policy. What Is This Chinese Document? The Chinese document entitled a "white paper" has some of these characteristics, but not all of them. Like a traditional white paper, it contains justifications and explanations for the policy decisions made from the perspective of the ruling group in the government expressing its attitude towards the issue, rather than merely announcing a new policy without context. Also, like a traditional white paper it is not in formal statutory or legalistic language and is instead meant to be read like a report or an essay. But, unlike a traditional white paper, the Chinese document is not intended as a proposal that is open for discussion and comment. Instead, it is an articulation of general policy principles that are authoritative and fixed, from which a specific future legalistically worded laws, and formal diplomatically worded policy decisions will be crafted to apply these general principles more specifically to specific means of implementing these general principles. Given the pervasive role of the Chinese Communist Party on all issues of political policy in China, effectively then, this white paper serves more as a broad general authorizing statute at the political party level, from which other actions will operate more like regulations carrying out this top down command. Another way of thinking about it, which is perhaps more familiar, is as a plank of the Communist Party of China Platform on this issue to guide its members in setting future policy on this issue. So, despite its formal appellation as a "white paper" that isn't really precise what it is in this context. Still, what true "white papers", authorizing statutes, and political party planks, have in common is that they don't directly make any decisions when they are issued. Instead, they reveal where the current regime is heading in its policy making, which even without notice and comment, can reduce surprise, uncertainty, and miscommunication. What Is The Purpose Of Documents Like This Chinese White Paper? The purpose of this Chinese White Paper is to both coordinate the actions of policy-makers and other people who have to make decisions that could bear on Taiwan policy within China, and to reduce uncertainty about what China's position is vis-a-vis outsiders, in the hope that they will act in a manner sensitive to powerful China's views. What Change In Policy Is Being Articulated? Is there any benefit to doing this? I am wondering, because everyone
knows that China considers Taiwan to be part of China. So what's the
point of publishing a white paper and reiterating something most
diplomats and senior officials already know? Is there any advantage
that China can get out of this, or is this just some protocols people
are being told to follow that led to this? What Does It Say? On one hand, the white paper reiterates the basically counterfactual position that Taiwan is part of China's territory, that this position is non-negotiable, and that Taiwan's independence efforts and foreign support for them as unacceptable. On the other hand, it balances this position with repeated statements about the Party's hopes for a peaceful unification (i.e. please just surrender and acknowledge mainland China as supreme and we might even let you have a somewhat different system for a while as we did in Hong Kong and Macao). There is a complete absence of threats to use military action in an effort by mainland China to subject Taiwan to its rule , even though it states that counter-threats from Taiwan to go its own way with international support make it really mad and is unacceptable with unarticulated consequences. Any "or else" component of the one China policy has apparently been temporarily been taken off the table for consideration. What Does This Mean? As I see it, this white paper is basically an attempt to defuse the current military brinksmanship in the Taiwan straight, with Xi Jinping basically directing all of his myriad powerful subordinates in the Chinese government and non-governmental political organs like the media to stand down for the time being. He is doing so while standing fast to China's long standing one China policy which he does not purport to make available for negotiations about consenting to Taiwanese independence even if China isn't going to do anything about it just at this moment. In other words, he is basically encouraging a return to the status quo before a recent spat of escalations culminating in military warning shots from China, an increased U.S. military presence in and around Taiwan, trade sanctions, and in culmination of the latest near crisis, a rare brief visit by the Speaker of the U.S. House, Nancy Pelosi, to Taiwan itself. He is trying to do so without causing China, or the people backing efforts to take control of Taiwan within the Chinese power structure, to lose face. In part, he helps China and the hawks in the government save face by not actually directly mentioning a lack of specific threats, including a lack of specific threats to use of military force, and instead merely omitting these options. On the other hand, this source , comparing the current white paper to two previous ones, interprets the omission differently, noting that previous white papers expressly took certain kinds of military action off the table, while this paper omits that express limitation on what China will consider doing. In this reading, I have it backwards, and the new white paper is actually slightly escalating the situation by making an implied threat, even though it doesn't actually follow through by making that threat. I don't claim be an eminent expert in interpreting Chinese official statements, so I may have misread the subtle and implied message that are being made by omissions here due to a lack of sufficient context regarding the fine details of previous statements. One can see the policy being articulated by the white paper only by reading between the lines, in the classic, profoundly indirect style of Chinese political statements in the Communist era. This classic indirect and jargon filled style also allows the white paper to be widely disseminated and made known to the world (since no government the size of China can keep a tight hold on its secrets anyway with a message that needs to reach thousand or millions of people), in a manner that operates as a dog whistle. It is clear to the intended primary internal audience of senior and mid-level Chinese officials in the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese government. But it remains fairly obscure to ordinary Chinese people and foreigners who are less skilled at parsing the mushy, jargon filled, indirect, and vacuous official Communist party statement writing style. Because Xi Jinping has so much actual power, to the point of basically being able to order the deaths of billionaires and top government officials who get out of line, something approaching the power of Chinese Emperor's of old, and because everybody knows it, he can afford to be subtle. Everyone in China's power structure pays close attention to the slightest nuances of his every statement in an attempt to "read the room" of a metaphorical career making or breaking, life or death social gathering. Context Supporting This Reading Of The Chinese White Paper This approach is of a piece with China's lukewarm reaction to Russia's invasion of Ukraine. In that case, China did not affirmatively condemn Russia's actions in public, and did not vote against Russia in the U.N., but China also did not affirmatively take action supporting Russia's military action. China hasn't stopped all trade with Russia, but it has definitely backed away from providing a strong back door path for Russian exports out of fear of consequences for its trade relations with its other, more important international partners, including the United States with whom China has a love hate relationship. In both case, Xi Jinping has forged what he is trying to portray as a steady and seasoned path of caution, avoiding conflict to the greatest extent possible, in order to avoid the risk that China could provoke a more serious conflict, diplomatic, economic, or military, with its larger Western oriented trade partners. This is desirable for China because these Western oriented trade partners (including Taiwan itself) are essential to China's ongoing prosperity. A Plausible Additional Conjecture It may also be the case that the person delivering the white paper was the very person who had been seeking to aggrandize himself and gain power by escalating the situation. Forcing him to draft and deliver this white paper, presumably after having it reviewed by Xi Jinping in advance first, may be a form of admonishment to the regimes top Taiwan policy official, and a show of submission to Xi Jinping's authority. Effectively this may be a mild punishment for this senior official for allowing the situation to get out of hand, without a clear path forward and backing from the very top. This observation is purely speculation on my part, but would make sense in the overall context of the situation. Surely, this subordinate in charge of China's Taiwan policy must have been playing a central role in the crisis level escalation of tensions in the region in recent weeks. This conjecture is further suggested by the language early on in the paper stating that "General Secretary Xi Jinping put forward a series of important concepts and major policy propositions on the work of Taiwan" and by the title of the person delivering the paper. | {
"source": [
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/74699",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/users/38301/"
]
} |
74,741 | Ukrainian President Vladimir Zelensky said earlier in an interview
with the Washington Post that Western countries should ban entry to
all Russians . Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas, in turn, called on
EU countries to ban the issuance of tourist visas to Russian
nationals. According to her, visiting Europe is a privilege and not a
human right. The Finnish Foreign Ministry stated that the country
could introduce restrictions if a large number of Russians sought to
travel to other European countries using visas issued by Finland. https://tass.com/world/1492645 I found that perplexing, because banning all Russian visas would help Russia as it would force Russia into staying in Russia and help out Russia economically and militarily. So what does Ukraine have to gain from this if such a move would be adopted by Western countries? I am trying to think of all the pros and cons for Ukraine, and I can't think of any pros. | Currently the sanctions have much more effect on isolated poor regions and less effect on the more affluent ones. The more affluent regions exercise a strategy of sanction avoidance known as parallel imports . This allows them to be less inconvenienced by the sanctions while paying a slight premium for imported luxury goods. The theory is that a tourist visa ban would affect the more affluent communities , which have more clout and influence on the government. Because studying abroad is seen as a form of extreme privilege in the Russian Federation, a student visa ban is similarly seen a sanction on luxury goods . Cutting off access to this (thought to be) luxury good among the most privileged Russian elites would also be in line with the intent of the sanctions. If true, it would be an effective additional sanction measure. | {
"source": [
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/74741",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/users/38301/"
]
} |
74,759 | Recently, Russia has markedly reduced gas sold to European nations in their gas pipelines. This seems very strange to me. In my opinion, the only two logical amounts of gas to sell would be "as much as possible" (if they want to sell gas) or "none at all" (if they don't want to sell gas). One possible explanation could be that since western technology is no longer sold to Russia, that they have difficulties in gas production or transportation in pipelines. That's the excuse they have been using, that they can't sell full amount due to not getting a turbine repaired in the west. However, most western news sources point out that this is not the true reason but rather an excuse. I have a theory: since most western companies have made the decision to sell no products at all to Russia, that Russia doesn't need as much foreign currency anymore. They still have some small opportunities to buy products from the west, but the opportunities are much smaller than before the war. Hence, Russia needs only part of the foreign currency they used to need, and to get that foreign currency, they sell only part of the gas they can. Is this theory plausible? Could it be the real reason why Russia is still selling minor amounts of gas to Europe? | I am no expert on this by any means, but my thought as to why: If Russia completely cuts off the gas now, they lose leverage. That is, once the gas is completely cut off, they can no longer threaten to completely cut it off. At that point, Europe could take more drastic measures without fear of further reprisal on the gas front. If there is still some gas flowing, Europe is more afraid to take actions that would cause the Russians to completely cut off the gas. At the same time, Russia doesn't want to have the line fully flowing as that allows Europe to fill up their reserves completely for the winter. By having some gas flowing but not all of it, Russia retains leverage while still backing Europe into a corner for the coming winter. | {
"source": [
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/74759",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/users/16774/"
]
} |
74,783 | What does the average American citizen think of the raid on Trump?
While CNN, MSNBC, etc report how good it is, and Fox reports how bad it is, what does the average person think? I am asking as I read right-wing news and lean right, but I want to see what people who are more in the middle think.
Do people find it weird that the Biden DOJ is raiding Biden's most likely opponent in 2024, or that the leader of the Republican party is being raided 90 days before midterms? | In situations in which a variable exhibits drastically different behavior in different groups, asking about the average may not be meaningful. After all, if we were to take averages, we would find that the average human being has about one testicle and one ovary, speaks mainly Mandarin and English with a bit of other languages thrown in, and lives in the middle of the ocean somewhere, where they probably work as a retail salesperson—somehow. In the case of the raid on Trump's residence, this poll from Morning Consult and Politico suggests that opinion overall is divided: 41% of respondents said that the raid was an abuse of power that should be investigated, 40% said that it was not an abuse of power, while 6% said that it was an abuse of power that should not be investigated. Overall, around 47% expressed some degree of approval, while 37% expressed some degree of disapproval. As suggested by the statement at the beginning, 81% of Democrats thought the raid was due to evidence that Trump had comitted a crime, whereas 69% of Republicans believed that it was an attempt to damage his political career. For another, albeit probably less reliable perspective, this article references a poll suggesting that Democrats mainly approve, Republicans mainly do not, and Independents lean toward disapproval. However, the source of the poll is given as the Trafalgar Group and the Convention of States Action, the latter of which is a right-wing group financed by the Koch brothers whose leader described the raid as a "gestapo-style injustice," so take that as you will. Presumably the first group, a relatively reputable pollster , performed the data collection and analysis for the latter. | {
"source": [
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/74783",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/users/42023/"
]
} |
74,905 | Shortly before the invasion of Ukraine happened, Russia sent its security demands to the USA. The USA rejected these proposals, and many people say they were unrealistic. However after reading the document , I can't see why exactly. Most of the articles work both ways and include mutual security and tolerance, and I think the only questionable part was Article 4 : The United States of America shall undertake to prevent further
eastward expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and deny
accession to the Alliance to the States of the former Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics. The United States of America shall not establish military bases in the
territory of the States of the former Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics that are not members of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization, use their infrastructure for any military activities or
develop bilateral military cooperation with them. However, it's nowhere near what I thought it could be. Russia didn't ask to exclude any of the current NATO members or stop accepting any new countries. Russia essentially asked to ban not-yet-joined ex-USSR countries, which I find quite reasonable for maintaining the so-called buffer zone . I understand that in its current form it poses security risks for those states as well, but the US could complement the treaty with another article which guarantees security of these countries from the Russian side . If the US had signed such a document, Russia would have to violate another international agreement to invade, let alone that Russia would lose another excuse for invading. Wasn't it a fair price to avoid the armed conflict? | Russia essentially asked to ban not-yet-joined ex-USSR countries, which I find quite reasonable for maintaining the so-called buffer zone. That's not reasonable. Those are sovereign countries with their own will. State sovereignty is a centuries old concept, with Wikipedia introducing it as: Westphalian sovereignty, or state sovereignty, is a principle in international law that each state has exclusive sovereignty over its territory. The principle underlies the modern international system of sovereign states and is enshrined in the United Nations Charter, which states that "nothing ... shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state." According to the idea, every state, no matter how large or small, has an equal right to sovereignty. Russia is not against Westphalian sovereignty, but applies it selectively, as was argued by Deyermond, Ruth Margaret. / The Uses of Sovereignty in Twenty First Century Russian Foreign Policy . In: EUROPE ASIA STUDIES. 2016 ; Vol. 68, No. 6. pp. 957-984. The following quote from their paper summarizes the main idea: The idea of state sovereignty has been central to Russian foreign policy since the collapse of the USSR. As
thinking about, and practice in relation to, the sovereignty norm changed in Western states and key international
institutions, the Russian focus on sovereignty intensified. The Russian governmental approach has not been
uniform, however, with two opposing models of sovereignty evident in Russian foreign policy discourse and
practice: one is the traditional, or ‘Westphalian’, model of sovereignty which has been applied to Russia itself
and to states outside the post-Soviet space; inside it, what may be termed a ‘post-Soviet’ approach has
developed, in which the sovereignty of the states is treated as inviolable in the relation to ‘external’ actors but
permeable in relation to Russia, on grounds that reproduce the normative justifications of the post-Westphalian
approach opposed by Russia elsewhere. Why didn't US just complement Russia's security demands to avoid invasion to Ukraine? You also phrase your question in an interesting way in that you link not agreeing with the proposed treaty on the one hand to Russia's invading Ukraine on the other hand. The way I read that, you seem to imply that the US has some hand in Russia's invasion of Ukraine because they could have avoided it by getting onboard with this treaty. That makes it a weird situation though. In that reading, the proposed treaty is not just a proposal but it's a threat: 'agree to our demands or we will invade'. And in this reading, it's still a matter of sovereignty. The West believes in the sovereignty of nations. NATO is their alliance and Russia has no say or veto over who gets to join or not. Axios posted an article on this in December 2021 . I'll highlight two excerpts highlighting NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg's response at a press conference: When asked Wednesday whether NATO was expanding toward Russia's "sphere of influence," Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg gave an impassioned response, pounding his podium and insisting that it's "not acceptable" for the Kremlin to control the actions of its sovereign neighbors. "It's only Ukraine and 30 NATO allies that decide when Ukraine is ready to join NATO. Russia has no veto, Russia has no say, and Russia has no right to establish a sphere of influence to try to control their neighbors," Stoltenberg said at his press conference. | {
"source": [
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/74905",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/users/44165/"
]
} |
75,014 | The Universal Declaration of Human Rights says : Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to
return to his country. Would it therefore be legal to implement a Russian visa ban, as the European Union is currently considering doing ? | OK, let's look at the horse's mouth . Article 13 Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state. Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country. And a simplified explanation of it: Article 13 You have the right to freedom of
movement within your country.
Everyone has the right to leave a
country and to return home. So... First part. Yes, unlike some countries with internal passport systems , Russia does allow its citizens to travel and settle internally. Second part. Also met. Unlike East Germany and North Korea. Russia allows people to emigrate. No barbed wire and minefields. Plenty of Russians have left. A previous answer of yours even says so : there are no exit visas, so you can leave the country as long as you have no debts, and you don't work at secret military service I believe that, so far, they are being allowed back in, by Russia . Not doing so would be an exile situation, which is not happening. So, Russia , is not violating article 13, we'll agree. Obligations of other countries to provide travel visas for pleasure and business? Don't see them. Article 14 Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution. This right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely arising from non-political crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations. Accepting Russian who are leaving for good is happening. Not sure if Russia, yet, can be broadly accused of persecuting its own people and thus qualify for broad spectrum "justified claims of risk". If Russia's government wants to argue that its behavior, towards Russians, put it in the category of unsafe countries, maybe it could do so. But, needless to remind you, article 14 is not concerned about travel visas, as listed in the question. It is acceptance as refugees . To quote your linked article: To protect national security and the integrity of EU sanctions, the bloc must impose a travel ban on tourism on Russian citizens until Moscow ends its invasion of Ukraine, Estonia’s Prime Minister Kaja Kallas told EURACTIV. | {
"source": [
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/75014",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/users/44102/"
]
} |
75,028 | “For this reason,” Hook continues, “we should consider human rights as
an important issue in regard to U.S. relations with China, Russia,
North Korea, and Iran. And this is not only because of moral concern
for practices inside those countries. It is also because pressing
those regimes on human rights is one way to impose costs, apply
counter-pressure, and regain the initiative from them strategically.” This a memo that was given to Tillerson to bring him up to speed on politics. https://www.politico.com/story/2017/12/19/tillerson-state-human-rights-304118 It seems like Tillerson, who didn't have much experience in politics, had to be brought up to speed by the people within the U.S. government, because Trump chose him despite his lack of experience. Is there any procedure or rule that prevents the President to put in place a person without experience that was implemented before or after the nomination of Rex Tillerson? | There is, but it's just the requirement for Senate confirmation (like many other presidential appointments). If a President and a majority of the Senate agree that a person can be Secretary of State then they can be Secretary of State. If the Senate thinks that a nominee doesn't have enough experience, then the nominee won't be Secretary of State. If the Senate thinks that a nominee does have enough experience (or doesn't think that experience matters, or is outweighed by other factors), then the nominee will be Secretary of State. If voters care about any specific standards for people appointed to be Secretary of State, they need to vote for Presidents and Senators who will enforce those standards during the nomination and confirmation process. This is supposed to be the primary "defence" against unsuitable people being appointed to positions of power. | {
"source": [
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/75028",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/users/38301/"
]
} |
75,045 | One can read constantly in the media, that the West and especially the US announce sanctions against some countries. North Korea, Cuba, Iran and Venezuela are some examples. In some cases like Cuba and Iran, these sanctions are in force for decades, even for half a century, but the regimes in these two countries haven't been overthrown. The ordinary people in these countries, however, are suffering because of the sanctions. Has there ever been any successful example, where sanctions lead to desired results like regime changes? If yes where was that? If no, why are sanctions still imposed so much? | Opinions are divided on this. It's because no dictator has quit because his own car was out of gas or out of spare parts. So one can easily claim that sanction don't work (like that). The discussion on indirect effects easily gets complicated by confounders, but at least some academic research finds an effect, mind you, more so in the case of democracies or at least "mixed regimes" (e.g like Milosevic in Serbia) than for the most autocratic regimes. This study (by Marinov) I know of was published in 2005, so it misses a lot of the more recent instability in the Arab world etc. (Somewhat ironically, it finds Libya to be one of the most stable countries [barely behind China], although that data point claim [Libya] surely look silly with two additional decades of observations added. So there's that kind of caveat emptor with this kind of research.) Anyhow, the main points of the paper are roughly: The benchmark for measuring success is typically
whether economic sanctions can change the behavior of a
foreign government at an acceptable cost. The most comprehensive study of the effectiveness of economic sanctions assesses that the measure works about 35% of the
time (Hufbauer, Shott, and Elliott 1990). Critics respond that the success rate has been overstated (Pape 1997). [...] Many explanations can be offered for why the
controversy endures. One issue lies with the measurement
of “success.” What is success and how is it measured is often contested even by the very participants in an episode.
Another issue is whether success should be attributed to
sanctions. Economic pressure typically takes place alongside other important events and developments, such as a
weak economy or a foreign military intervention. Assigning the relative merits of economic coercion in each case
can cause reasonable people to disagree (Elliott 1998). [...] I take an approach analogous to that in the literature on the
relationship between government instability and a country’s level of wealth [...].The main dependent variable is leadership change. I ask
whether the presence of sanctions against a state’s leadership in a given year makes it more likely for the leader to be replaced.
I include in the test all countries with population over
500,000 (N = 160), and the period 1947 to 1999.
I break down the data
into country-year observations: a country gives rise to
one observation for each calendar year. This makes for a
total of 6,782 observations in the full data-set. [...] The estimation procedure I use is logistic regression
with fixed effects. [...] The reason interaction terms between Democracy,
Mixed Regime, and the natural log of years in office ln(t)
are included is to allow for the effect of political institutions to vary over time. As suggested by Chiozza and
Goemans (2004b) and others, we can expect to find varying effects of institutions over time. Because the effect of
autocracy is folded in the (nonlinear) baseline hazard, no
separate dummy is included. Economic sanctions are significant as expected. A leader who is subject
to economic sanctions in a given year is, on average, more
likely to lose office in the following year. The result holds
while adjusting for country-specific government instability and for a range of other factors, including the use of force. All other variables, except for the use of force perhaps,
are signed as expected. Lower economic growth hurts the
political survival of leaders in office. The effect is strong
and statistically significant. This finding is consistent with
what we know about government instability in good and
bad economic times. Perhaps surprisingly, the use of force strengthens a
leader’s hold on office. The use of force likely generates
two types of effects. One, it may weaken a leader. Second,
it may generate a “rally around the flag” effect. The finding
here indicates that what predominates, or what these two
effects average out to, is that a leader is less likely to lose
power. Averaged out over all 136 countries, the risk of losing
office, when sanctions are not in place, is 0.146. When
pressure is present, the hazard rises to 0.183. This means
that sanctions cause a 28% average increase in the risk of
losing power. This is, clearly, more than trivial trouble for
incumbents. The theoretical argument stated that one way pressure destabilizes is by lowering economic growth. If this is
the case, growth and sanctions are not independent. This
suggests that part of the effect of sanctions is currently being picked by economic growth. Dropping growth should
strengthen the effect of sanctions. Column 2 on Table 2
shows that this is the case. When economic growth is
dropped from the model, the coefficient of sanctions increases from 0.28 to 0.31. The significance level also improves, in line with expectations. (I'm not going to explain all the variables in the table here. Read the paper for that. The spline coefficients at the end allow for the effect of the duration of the government to [nonlinearly] vary both ways, because there are theoretical disputes whether a leader/regime gets stronger or not after coming in office.) So, although those imposing sanction won't so readily admit it,
making ordinary people suffer via sanctions... is part of the solution they provide in pressuring at least leadership change if not regime change. There's also the catch that absent the threat of (any) sanctions we might see more "bad behavior" from some governments, but this hard to ascertain because of unobservables. The
problem is, target governments are more likely to have
private information on their prospects for surviving in
office under pressure. Such information will not be measurable. The selection effect will remain undetected. And
it will bias estimates of the impact of sanctions downward.
The more prevalent this problem is, the more biased statistical estimates will be. A newer paper Escribà-Folch & Wright (2010) that I haven't read beyond its abstract has tried to further distinguish between types of
authoritarian regimes. It finds Using data on sanction episodes
and authoritarian regimes from 1960 to 1997 and selection-corrected
survival models, we test whether sanctions destabilize authoritarian rulers
in different types of regimes. We find that personalist dictators are more
vulnerable to foreign pressure than other types of dictators. We also
analyze the modes of authoritarian leader exit and find that sanctions
increase the likelihood of a regular and an irregular change of ruler, such
as a coup, in personalist regimes. In single-party and military regimes,
however, sanctions have little effect on leadership stability. I haven't delved into the paper (it's open access though, so you can DIY that), but given the time range, it's possible a lot
of that is explained by the single-party regimes being mostly in a block during the
cold war. What these studies generally don't seem to model well is whether the
sanctioned country also/still has allies that "prop it up" in some way, including
threatening [military] counter-intervention in case of regime change (which was definitely
the case during the cold war). Somewhat aside: a 3rd paper Wood (2008) finds that sanctions also tend to increase internal
repression in the target at least in the short run (and this is correlated with the
severity and extent of the sanctions too, as proxied by their effect on GDP, so e.g.
UN sanctions increase repression more than just US ones do.) So one could say that merely
alleviating internal human rights abuses in the short term is not really helped by (broad) economic
sanctions. The results of Marinov (recall they are for pre-2000 data) have been somewhat reproduced by Soest & Wahman (2014) using a newer dataset covering 1990-2010, and which additionally is more discerning of the type of sanction imposed and its stated goal(s). So, e.g. sanctions that nominally request compliance with some WMD demand aren't put in the same bin as those that demand multi-party elections, for instance. Likewise they look at more outcomes than mere leader change, e.g. a change in democratic index value ("a combined Freedom House and Polity IV score"). This is a fairly long paper (more than twice the number pages compared to Marinov's) so I'm not going to be able to capture its findings here except in part, but towards the end they have models fairly similar to Marinov's. I'm quoting this mostly for the concrete examples they illustrate their findings with (after the table). Model 8 shows no general
relationship between sanctions and a higher probability of ruler exit. However,
looking at only democratic sanctions in Model 9, we see a significant positive
relationship. Our findings reaffirm Marinov’s conclusion that sanctions generally
increase the probability of leadership exit. Looking at the models for regime
change, we once again see no significant effect of sanctions generally (Model
10), but we find a significant effect for imposed democratic sanctions (Model 11). A brief glimpse at some sanction cases reveals that different mechanisms may
account for increased democracy levels in targeted authoritarian regimes, with the
two major ones being (1) elite splits (and, in turn, regime changes and leadership
exit) and (2) democratic concessions without regime and/or leader change. In
Guatemala (1993), for instance, the military ousted President Serrano – who had
unconstitutionally dissolved parliament and the judiciary – after the US and its
allies imposed sanctions. An interim president took over, and the country’s democratic institutions were restored. In Nicaragua (1996) and Thailand (1993), sanctions similarly contributed to regime change. However, democratic sanctions
rarely create liberal democracies instantly; rather, they lead to multiparty autocracies. In addition, democratic sanctions have different effects on autocratic rulers
and regimes. In Peru, sanctions contributed to democratization without ruler
change. When President Fujimori suspended the legislature and introduced rule
by decree in 1992, the US withheld military assistance and economic aid and
blocked Peru’s efforts to obtain loans from international financial institutions. In response, Fujimori agreed to hold elections and to reinstate formally democratic institutions. Although his presidential dominance persisted until 2000,
Peru’s political system was liberalized to some extent for the remainder of his
time in office. In this particular case we could, hence, observe both institutional
change and democratization, without change in leadership. Interestingly, Table 6 also shows that FDI decreases the chances of both ruler exit (Models 8 and 9) and regime change (Models 10 and 11). However, this might be due to international investors’ aversion to investing in politically
unstable countries in the first place. Regarding sanctions, it is interesting to see
that comprehensive sanctions decrease the likelihood of regime change in
Models 9 and 11. We also see that (1) larger countries are more stable in terms
of both leadership exit and institutions and (2), as expected, that richer countries
experience fewer regime changes (Models 10 and 11). Reaffirming the idea of the
resource curse, we also see more regime stability in regimes with larger oil production (Models 8 – 11).
There are several instances where regime change has been preceded by sanctions, although we would not argue that the relationship between sanctions and
institutional change was causal in all these instances. [...] Changes in regime type rarely lead to full democracy, and countries sometimes transition from what could generally be perceived as
a more democratic regime type to a less democratic one. However, most of the
instances where change in regime type is preceded by democratic sanctions
show signs of at least limited liberalization (such as the implementation of multiparty elections). Another (sizeable) part of their paper--meaning the models <8 are linear ones, in the style
of Peksen and Drury (2010) (also Peksen 2009 ), but unlike those papers (which use pre-2000 data) Soest & Wahman find that if one accounts for the declared goal of the sanction, those specifically aimed at obtaining some democratic improvement have been successful at least in the sense of achieving statistical significance ... although that mere threats of sanctions have been much less so; in particular mere threats of sanctions to obtain democratic concessions are significantly less successful than those aimed at obtaining other kinds of concessions. Our analysis using the TIES [it's a sanctions database] data demonstrates that democratic and human rights sanction threats are rarely effective. Only 10% of sanctions related to democracy or human rights accomplished complete or partial concession by the target country at the threat stage. The corresponding number for sanctions with other goals is more than double (22%). Moreover, sanction senders are generally serious about their democratic sanctions. Where targets did not comply, 85% of all democratic sanction threats were carried out, compared to 79% for the rest. | {
"source": [
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/75045",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/users/39753/"
]
} |
75,134 | China and India are not participating in the sanctions imposed by the Western world on Russia for the invasion of Ukraine. This has effectively made the sanctions much less effective, compared to what they could have been. Of course these countries have massive profits from being the only ones trading with Russia, as they can procure cheap energy, and also have a monopoly on selling products such as cars, phones, computers, etc to Russia. So the real-politic answer to why they are not participating to the sanctions seems fairly obvious. But what is the political justification for this? Are they admitting that it is just about the money, or is there a politically correct reason for helping Russia to invade into Ukraine? | First, please understand that China and India are sovereign nations, not in the EU, not in NATO. They do not need to take a position. Just because you say they do does not make it so. * Having said that, China's position is the clearest stated, so I'll quote them from April: China During a daily press conference, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian said, "As the culprit and the leading instigator of the Ukraine crisis, the US has led NATO in pursuing five rounds of eastward expansions in the next two decades or so since 1999." "NATO's membership has increased from 16 to 30 countries and the organization moved over 1000 kilometers eastward to somewhere near Russia's borders, pushing the latter to the wall," Zhao added. Keep in mind that China is challenging the West globally. Why the heck should they back sanctions? Their hope is probably to get better access to Russian weapons technology and raw materials from an enfeebled Russia afterwards, not burning bridges. Public sentiment seems highly pro-Russia there as well . But China is also careful not to break Western sanctions and land itself in trouble. They're just not going out of their way to add any pressure themselves. China also likes to say that Western powers (the US foremost) are too bossy for the rest of world, so pushing back against a Western set of sanctions makes sense. (Not that China is above using sanctions of its own when it suits them .) India? (From memory listening to a podcast ): Sentimental: they had friendly relations with USSR/Russia for a long time and not always good vibes with West. Practical: they buy a lot of Russian weapons, which they need to counterbalance China. On the other hand, China is an even bigger Russian arms buyer, raising problems of conflicts of interest. And... who fancies Russian weapons much these days, after 6 months of crashing live demos? Cheap oil. Probably very useful in a time of higher commodity and food prices. Also, the US needs India to counterbalance China regionally and is trying to draw it into an alliance with Australia. That means the opportunity to "punish" India for not "following orders" is rather low. This is true in general for other "laggards" - the West needs to persuade them to isolate Russia, not try to bully them into doing so, which would likely backfire. * In fact the West could take the opportunity to examine why the backing by Latin American and African nations has been lukewarm at most: we're not half as popular as we think we are . Some of that may be unfair, some of it may be for good reasons, all of it merits examining. But perhaps a good enough explanation is that it is an European/NATO theater war, not all that much of their business, except as it disrupts their economies. Last, and I certainly don't mean it as my apology for Russia's behavior, from the PoV of many non-West-aligned countries and their citizens , the differences between Russia 2022 in Ukraine, USA 2003 in Iraq or NATO 2011 in Libya can be seen as rather subtle. Which brings me back to the West's need for more humility and empathy if it wants UN-level support in the future. | {
"source": [
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/75134",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/users/19236/"
]
} |
75,162 | https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/poland-officially-demand-ww2-reparations-germany-says-ruling-party-boss-2022-09-01/ What are the pros and cons of demanding 1.3 trillion in reparation from Germany? The Polish government made a 1.3 trillion demand for the damages caused by WW2. Does the Polish government have anything to gain from making such an outlandish claim? I don't see any benefit, I only see consequences, as the people of Poland won't take their own government seriously for making such an outlandish demand. Poland estimates its World War Two losses caused by Germany at 6.2
trillion zlotys ($1.32 trillion), the leader of the country's ruling
nationalists said on Thursday, and he said Warsaw would officially
demand reparations. | Pro: For domestic purposes, they are seen as standing up for Polish interests. (See this Politico article and this CNN article on the domestic angle). It puts Germany on the defensive regarding the rule-of-law proceedings. They might get something, after all. Con: It distracts from the Ukraine invasion response. Poland renounced all claims in 1953. A reputation for not keeping treaties is a bad thing. Germany believes that it settled all outstanding WWII claims with the same 1991 treaty which confirmed Polish possession of formerly German territory (the " westward shift " of Poland). Opening that is not in the Polish interest. | {
"source": [
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/75162",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/users/38301/"
]
} |
75,224 | Switzerland has imposed sanctions on Russia due to the conflict in Ukraine "Swiss set to match EU sanctions if China invades Taiwan — agency chief" These cases look like Switzerland de facto abandoning¹ their policy of neutrality. Why did they do so? Have similar cases happened in recent history? ¹ Switzerland actually claims that they didn't abandon their neutrality in a strict sense of the term because it "does not favour any warring party militarily", which might seem to be a valid argument, yet, if they wanted to remain 100% neutral, they wouldn't have recognized one side of the conflict as wrong and imposed sanctions. | If they wanted to remain 100% neutral. They don't. They make it quite clear in your linked press release that they do not consider this to be a symmetric conflict in which both sides are equally culpable. The Swiss position is that "Russia's military aggression against Ukraine over the last several weeks constitutes a gross violation of the fundamental norms of international law, including the prohibition of the use of force." and Switzerland intends to use such influence that it has to aid Ukraine and hinder Russian aggression. However, they do this within a framework of military neutrality. They have not allowed Swiss arms to be sold to Ukraine or Russia. Although they do not claim to be economically neutral, when setting sanctions, they have been mindful of the desire to maintain the Swiss credibility as a militarily neutral state. It is worth noting that Switzerland has previously applied sanctions to Serbia/Yugoslavia, and has either adopted, adopted in part, or taken steps to ensure that Switzerland was not used to circumvent sanctions against North Korea and Iran. | {
"source": [
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/75224",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/users/5933/"
]
} |
75,236 | Why does Poland give away so much monetary aid to Ukraine even though it took two thirds of the Ukrainian refugees? Do they have a budget surplus? Is the Polish popular opinion pressing the government? Is there any other reason? | Poland is on the front lines by bordering Belarus which made itself available as a staging area for a Russian invasion of Ukraine. This is an existential threat to Poland. Ukrainian refugees in Poland (about 2 million refugees in a country with a pre-war population of about 38 million people according to the question, although this is a moving target), if anything, provide the Poles with a daily reminder of that the threat of Russian military action that once would have been unthinkable in light of treaties in place, etc. is very real. But ultimately, there is very little direct connection between receiving refugees from Ukraine and providing economic support to Ukraine. One doesn't impact the ability to do the other, or vice versa. Accepting a refugee isn't necessary particularly draining on the government budget - not free, but not necessarily particularly expensive either and possibly a net gain for Poland economically in the medium to long run. The question's implied premise that refugees are such a drain on Poland's government funds that this seriously squeezes its ability to afford to provide financial aid to Ukraine is flawed. In the short run, Poland is spending 1% of its GDP ($5.3 billion USD equivalent) on aid to Ukrainian refugees , which is significantly smaller than its defense budget (2.2% of GDP in 2022, 3% in 2023 and with a longer term target of 5%-6% of GDP in light of the heightened threat from Russia which is a sudden unexpected crisis.) As the question notes, Poland's foreign aid to Ukraine is 0.49% of Poland's GDP and if the war in Ukraine isn't too long, that expenditure may not last too long. In 2022, Poland had an annual budget deficit of 1.9% of GDP , but deficit spending is normal in a national emergency or crisis. Essentially, its refugee spending and foreign aid and ramped up defense spending are being financed with government debt. Poland's annual deficits as a percentage of GDP each year for the last 25 years (according to Bloomberg) is shown below: But, Poland's government finance situation is actually pretty fiscally sound by historic, post-Cold War standards, at the moment. Every Russian tank and artillery battery destroyed, and every Russian general killed, by a Ukrainian soldier with resources that Polish funds make possible is one that a Polish soldier doesn't have to shed blood to destroy or kill if Russia attacks it. This is because Russia doesn't have a sufficient industrial base to replace its military losses promptly and countries like China that are willing to buy its oil aren't willing to sell Russia more advanced weapons. And, the more Russia's military capacity in Eastern Europe is depleted in the Ukraine War, the less likely it is that Russia will even attempt to take military action against Poland at all (avoiding the lost lives and damage to property that comes with having a war fought on your own territory). While Russia hasn't thrown all of its military capacity in Eastern Europe into the Ukraine War, it has devoted a very large share of that military capacity to the Ukraine War, so losses in Ukraine undermine its ability to attack Poland. It is a smart national defense investment to use your money to allow someone else to fight your most likely military opponent on their territory with their soldiers before you must fight that opponent on your territory with your soldiers. It doesn't even really matter what the aid is ear-marked for, since money is fungible, and non-military foreign aid frees up Ukraine's funds for military spending, and lots of countries are willing to sell advanced arms to Ukraine at the moment. | {
"source": [
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/75236",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/users/32479/"
]
} |
75,248 | It's a safe assumption that Russia won't pay a dime. However, comparing 5+ years of German vs 's 50-ish years of Russian occupation, couldn't Poland make a point about the colonial damaged caused by being in the Soviet sphere and not a Western-style liberal democratic political country (or whatever they wanted to be)? Due to historic reasons, Poland could have a stronger dislike towards Germany, but both being in the EU and in peaceful terms since decades, could lead to a more agreeable interaction. And it's certainly not the case Poland has a very positive view of Russia, although both are Slavic, we can clearly observe their anti-Russia stance (for example, by helping Ukraine). | You answer the question in your first sentence. Poland makes requests of Germany because it thinks there is some potential advantage in it. The Polish government thinks that Germany might be convinced/ pressured into making some sort of concession. It might be an agreement to support some EU policy that benefits Poland, it might be additional investment in Polish industry, it might be something else. It's unlikely that $1.3 trillion is on the table but there are plenty of ways an agreement might be concluded. Poland doesn't bother making requests of Russia because it knows there is no potential advantage in it. The Russian government is hardly concerned with the impact on its standing among other governments so it isn't bothered if Poland or other former satellite states want to complain about their time behind the Iron Curtain. If anything, making a demand for massive reparations might lead Russian nationalists to look for excuses to "liberate" parts of Poland that belonged to historical Russian states (a la Ukraine). | {
"source": [
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/75248",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/users/2760/"
]
} |
75,272 | Couy Griffin has been removed from his position and is barred from ever holding a state or federal elected position again. Does this mean that Trump can be barred from holding any elected position? Yes, this would probably be an uphill battle and I do understand that a state elected official is not quite the same as the position of president. However, they are both elected positions. | Yes he can . Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution states: No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any state, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any state legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any state, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability. Trump meets the first requirement. He had "previously taken an oath, ... as an officer of the United States ... to support the Constitution" So if a court found that he had "engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the [Constitution of the United States]" he would be disqualified from being "a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and Vice-President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State" Your question can therefore be considered equal to "Can Trump be sent to prison for murder?" The answer is yes, he can, if a court decides he has committed a murder. Likewise "Can Trump be disqualified?" Yes he can, if a court decides he meets the conditions for disqualification. And that makes this a rather boring answer. | {
"source": [
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/75272",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/users/19968/"
]
} |
75,313 | Queen Elizabeth was one of the most popular people in many countries, while also being significantly less controversial than any politicians or celebrities of the same scale. What actions did Queen Elizabeth take that made her so popular? As monarch she had almost zero decision power and never spoke on politically sensitive matters, so "good policy making" cannot be the answer. An ideal answer would include references to surveys asking British citizens why they liked (or disliked) Queen Elizabeth. | She actively engaged in what is universally considered as good ( charity ). She avoided controversial things. You say “as monarch she had almost zero decision power and never spoke on politically sensitive matters”, and that's an answer. If you are into politics, someone certainly won't like you, because politics is a game of conflicts. If you side with one side, another one won't like you. | {
"source": [
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/75313",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/users/7434/"
]
} |
75,326 | https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a25zzKQ59A0 There have been reports that Russia have been buying artillery from North Korea. Now, I was wondering what are the other means for Russia to buy ammunition and artillery from other sources? Are there independent arms traders, or other countries that could be potential sources for artillery and ammunition, or is it just North Korea and Iran, both of which are heavily sanctioned. | The Soviet Union was a major arms supplier: it provided weapons to the Warsaw Pact countries and many Soviet-aligned and neutral third-world countries (look at, for example, the operators of the T-72 tank or the D-20 howitzer ). Most of Russia's military equipment is either this Soviet equipment, or is derived from it. This presents a serious problem: most of the other countries that use this equipment are either incapable of building it, or are not inclined to sell it to Russia. Russia is purchasing things from Iran and North Korea not because they are similarly outcast, but because they are two of the very few countries that produce their own Soviet-compatible military equipment. Other countries that use Soviet or Soviet-derived hardware and have a non-trivial manufacturing base are China and India, and although neither of them is fully cooperative with Western sanctions on Russia, neither is willing to defy those sanctions to the point of supplying Russia with military hardware (and in the case of China, the Sino-Soviet split means that much of its hardware is only distantly related to Russia's hardware). | {
"source": [
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/75326",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/users/38301/"
]
} |
75,351 | https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20220909-ukraine-reconstruction-to-cost-349-bn-report Rebuilding Ukraine following the devastation caused by the Russian
invasion will cost an estimated $349 billion, according to a report
issued Friday. But the figure, which totals 1.5 times the size of the Ukrainian
economy, is considered a minimum and is expected to grow in the coming
months as the war continues, according to the joint assessment by the
government of Ukraine, the European Commission, and the World Bank. It has been reported that it would cost 349 billion to reconstruct Ukraine as it was before. I heard that the U.S. possess around 300 billion in frozen Russian asset, and I was wondering if the U.S. had the legal means to use that fund "illegally" and use it to finance the reconstruction of Ukraine? Is there a legal precedent for doing something similar? | Legal from what perspective? International law consists of the assumption that states are sovereign , and negotiated or customary rules between them. Just which customary rules are established enough to be jus cogens , binding on all states, is not finally clear. The ability of one state to deposit money in another state and get it back is not guaranteed . On the other hand, historically theft on this scale might have been a casus belli . But simply taking that money would be a grave breach of trust into the financial services of a country, unless most or all other nations agree that it is a very special case. Russia is arguing internationally that Western sanction policies are a threat to the rest of the world. The Western filter bubble tends to dismiss it as propaganda, but it has some succes in the rest of the world. If the US takes Russian money, would China, Saudi Arabia, India, Brazil trust American banks? And if they don't trust them, can they find an alternative? Follow-up: as you can see from the comments which have since been removed, some readers seem to think that I share the Russian position. I do not. But I do believe that (too) much of the rest of the world shares it, and that the West needs to be careful not to play into Russian narratives. Global support for sanctions is not automatic, it takes effort to maintain it. | {
"source": [
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/75351",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/users/38301/"
]
} |
75,355 | In the aftermath of Queen Elizabeth II's death, some news outlets had started speculating what kind of monarch her successor - King Charles III - would be. Much has been said about King Charles' more outspoken positions on certain policy areas, such as the environment and immigration. Likewise, his heir apparent - Prince William - is also outspoken on social issues like mental health. This leads to questions as to whether he - as the monarch - is permitted to express opinions on these policy areas, provided that he does not interfere with the daily functioning of the Government or Parliament. For example, he may publicly begrudge the Government doing little on mitigating climate crisis, but he nevertheless must ratify bills which enable such policy. Bear in mind that this is not without precedent. For example, Germany's head of state (i.e. German President) is a ceremonial office, but is still culturally permitted to express political positions to guide public discourse. Evidently, Germany has not burned to the ground just because their head of state has opinions. | A question of written rules, unwritten rules, and bending or breaking them. The UK political system developed from a monarchy to a democracy without the clean break of a final overthrow of the monarchy. That means formally, it is His Majesty's government, and the king can say what they king wants to say. Breaking the unwritten rules in an unpopular way would bolster republican sentiments, but since they are unwritten there is no clear boundary, just traditions which were also formed by the habits of the previous queen. Comparing the king with the German president misses the point, the president is an elected political position with clearly described powers and the right to enter the national political debate. | {
"source": [
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/75355",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/users/28067/"
]
} |
75,386 | The Abbey seats only 2000 people. Charles & Diana's wedding in 1981 was held at St Paul's which seats almost twice the number - for that reason. At the Queen's Coronation in 1953, the Abbey seating was extended by adding tiers to accommodate 8,000 people. Presumably it is not possible to do that while meeting modern health & safety standards. It also delayed the Coronation, which was held 16 months after the Queen's accession. Given that the leaders of all European nations, all crowned heads of Europe, President Biden, the government leaders of all Commonwealth countries, apart from other international leaders, Members of Parliament, as well as family, palace staff etc. will want to attend, I am amazed they are not using St Paul's. Does anyone have any thoughts as to why that might be? | There isn’t any reason in law - it’s up to the highest-ranking peer in the realm, the Duke of Norfolk, to organise the Queen’s funeral as part of his duties as Earl Marshal. Presumably, then, it’s being held in Westminster Abbey in accordance with the wishes of the Queen. The Dean of Westminster also noted the following , which seems to explain the choice further: The church in which she was married and in which her coronation took place, the Abbey was witness to promises that defined the life of our faithful and devoted Queen. In deep gratitude and in deep sorrow we will give thanks to God for the service she gave to God, nation and Commonwealth. We pray now, and in the days ahead, for our new King and for his family. God save the King. It was also reported in 2008 that the Queen had wanted Prince Philip to agree to a funeral at the Abbey, but that he had refused and opted for a more private affair at Windsor. In addition to being the location in which she married Philip in 1947, and was crowned in 1953, it also held the funeral of her mother in 2002, as well as a thanksgiving service for the life of her husband after his funeral at Windsor in 2021. | {
"source": [
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/75386",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/users/6837/"
]
} |
75,430 | Can anyone tell me why India is still giving asylum to the Dalai Lama? I mean, haven't the circumstances changed already after 70 years of the annexation of Tibet by the PRC? Isn't the Dalai Lama a political burden for India? For instance, if India gets rid of him, shouldn't it improve the relations of India with PRC? What does India gain nowadays by continuing to give asylum to the Dalai Lama? | India gains moral authority which enhances its " soft power ". It also promotes goodwill with Buddhists of all kinds (not just Tibetan Buddhists) and other people who view the Dalai Lama as a public figure positively (probably as many people worldwide as the Pope). India has strained relations with the PRC, at times escalating into military skirmishes on their shared border in any case, so India doesn't have a lot to lose in its relations with the only country in the world that would see this decision negatively. | {
"source": [
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/75430",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/users/32479/"
]
} |
75,493 | All sterling coins in circulation and most sterling banknotes have a picture of the late Queen Elizabeth II. Will they be replaced by ones with pictures of King Charles III? | Yes, but not quickly New designs of coins and notes from now on will have Charles' picture, but existing designs of coins will continue to circulate until they are withdrawn as worn out. Notes will be replaced faster than coins. The UK issues new note designs fairly often and withdraws the old ones, as an anti-counterfeiting measure: the very slowly-changing designs of US money are surprising to the British. The oldest note design circulating in 2022 was first issued in 2007; all the older designs have been withdrawn, although any ones that people still have can be exchanged for current issues at face value. Elizabeth II notes will probably all be replaced within a couple of decades. If we were still using paper notes, the process would be faster, but polymer notes were introduced because they last longer. Coins last longer: the oldest ones in circulation are from 1971. That's important, because the coinage was redesigned when the UK switched that year from 20 shillings (240 old pennies) to the pound, to the decimal standard of 100 new pence to the pound. The first designs of Charles III notes have now been unveiled . They're much the same as Elizabeth II ones, apart from the portraits. The BBC reports: The Bank of England said that, following guidance from the Royal household, the new notes would only be printed to replace worn notes or to meet increased demand, in order to minimise the environmental and financial impact of the change. Charles III fifty pence pieces are already circulating. There's a picture of one at the link. Money from past monarchs is normal All of the money in circulation as of the death of Elizabeth II had her portrait, because she reigned for 70 years and because of the decimalisation redesign. When I was a child learning to recognise and count money at the end of the 1960s, George VI coins were absolutely routine, and George V ones weren't rare, although they were often very worn. At the time, George VI had only been dead for about 17 years, and George V for 34. But that was 53 years ago (as of 2022). There wasn't much Edward VIII coinage issued, and I've never seen any. The combination of the long reign just completed and decimalisation has created a historically unusual situation. Given Charles' age, it is perfectly possible that there will still be some Elizabeth II money in circulation when William succeeds him. | {
"source": [
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/75493",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/users/11788/"
]
} |
75,497 | What are the pros and cons of having so many state-owned companies? https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_government-owned_companies State-owned enterprises accounted for over 60% of China's market
capitalization in 2019[4] and generated 40% of China's GDP of US$15.97
trillion (101.36 trillion yuan) in 2020 , with domestic and foreign
private businesses and investment accounting for the remaining
60%.[5][6] As of the end of 2019, China's SOEs represented 4.5% of the
global economy[7] and the total assets of all China's SOEs, including
those operating in the financial sector, reached US$78.08 trillion.[8]
Ninety-one (91) of these SOEs belong to the 2020 Fortune Global 500
companies.[9] China has a lot of state-owned companies, but if owning so many state-owned companies only had benefits for the nation having them, then how come other countries don't emulate China? That's why I am wondering what the pros and cons are for any nation for having a lot of state-owned companies. I can't think of any con, and I think of two pros, unlimited budget and financing from the government and higher income from other sources than taxation. | Not sure this is entirely balanced, but here are some pros and cons. Many of my cases come from France, where I used to live and which has long had a Colbert -inspired love affair with state ownership. This answer is strictly concerned with companies operation in for profit sectors as the OP asked for economic factors such as income and financing. Companies that are run for social purposes or operating in sectors where the market is not necessarily ideal, like health care or education aren't covered. Other answers do that. It also doesn't really concern itself where cases where the state provided initial assistance or subsidies but without ownership and over a short period ( arguably , SpaceX). Innovation (or the lack thereof) When I lived in France, we had a SOE, Honeywell Bull , who manufactured mainframes. They were the suckiest mainframes, far suckier than the not-great IBM mainframes. But being a state company they were a big fish. An underperforming private company usually ends up bankrupt. An SOE can remain a zombie . Sources of revenue (hah!) Again taking Bull, far from being an extra source of revenue, they gobbled up taxpayer bailouts every so often. Tellingly, while the EU never did put in rules limiting how much governments could finance themselves from their SOE, they did put in fairly strict limits on much they could subsidize their SOEs. Rules that the more SOE-happy countries were always trying to get around. Or the famous Credit Lyonnais case of the 90s in France . Crédit Lyonnais is a historic French bank. In the early 1990s it was the largest French bank, majority state-owned at that point. Crédit Lyonnais was the subject of poor management during that period which almost led to its bankruptcy in 1993. It was acquired by former rival Crédit Agricole in 2003. (look at r13's comment, and do the math) Keep-the-jobs pressure. Face it, no one likes to see mass layoffs, even if it is only to trim an underperforming division and hire in another. When a private company does it, depending on the country, they may get some governmental pushback, but it is a decision taken by an independent actor. When a state-owned company does it, there can be a political cost to its owner, the government. Which might decide not to layoff. When monopolists, can be expensive and bad for customers Before some measure of competition got injected, France Telecom was often criticized for delivering iffy phone services at high prices. At one point, their "certified" cassette answering machines were 4x US prices. British Columbia, where I now live, has a Crown company that has a monopoly that provides car insurance for consumers. Guess what, it also has much higher prices than other provinces. Does it make lots of money for the government? It does not, it is that inefficient. (see also Fizz's answer for an excellent point, no need for me to repeat it) Special rules for special companies. I'll take an example which isn't really an SOE, SNC-Lavalin in Canada. They got caught bribing abroad. Then they almost got a sweetheart deal because they were well-connected with the Canadian government. Big scandal on Trudeau's goverment. Those risks go up, way up, when the state owns the company, but they are tend to be more pervasive the more the state is involved in economic production. (I'll to find a directly state-owned case of malfeasance forgiven, but it will be obvious to most that the state is unlikely to treat itself unkindly in most cases). Governments are unlikely to "rock the boat". Let's take Tesla. When it first sold the Roadster it took a very bizarre spin on EVs: making them sexy. Before Tesla, this just wasn't how EV cars were designed and marketed. EVs were meant to be parsimonious cars for ascetic, high-minded, environmentally-conscious folk: EVs also didn't really exist. Once a government has stakes in many car manufacturers it will naturally try to limit their competition. This isn't necessarily a monopoly per se, but it will limit the funding and ease of bringing new business models to fruition when the government both regulates and benefits from economic activity in a given economic sector. Speaking on a related subject, one could consider the taxpayer-funded bits of NASA's contractors on the SLS to be almost SOEs. 20B$ later that turkey hasn't flown and will cost $2B/launch. Probably a comparable sum of cashflow and investment later SpaceX almost has Starship costing maybe as low as 10M+ per launch (yes, yes, that is Musk-speak so that needs a grain of salt, but it's still likely to be ballpark-ish). SpaceX has taken over a huge chunk of the launch market already with the Falcons. Sucking up financing. unlimited budget and financing from the government Well, yes. This means that better alternatives and innovative solutions may be starved of capital. Is that a "pro"??? Honorable mention: Fannie Mae & Freddie Mac (quasi-SOEs) and the 2008 financial crash They're not strictly for-profit, having more of a social dimension, but hey, couldn't resist. Some actual pros: Under some conditions a new market may be difficult to enter or finance and a government can start a new industry from scratch. EDF, in France, did very well for decades building nuclear reactors and it's hard to see private sector companies lasting it out in that domain (Westinghouse is dead, for example). As one commenter pointed out, high speed rail is something that the French SNCF has innovated and delivered (so did Japan Rail). Then again, USA's Amtrak shows that state ownership and rail is not an automatic win. Some sectors are more naturally suited to nationally or regionally coordinated/unitary infrastructures / monopoly providers - roads, rail, utilities, airports... etc. The state may operate those better than private sector companies that are unsuitably regulated. Strangely enough France has a very good network of high speed highways, built and run by private operators. It also has some world-class private companies specialized in municipal water delivery, something where public ownership isn't always good. There is a whole concept of involving private actors in these types of projects, PPP , that doesn't always deliver when private companies are brought in. In the US, there has been a push by some municipalities to put together their own municipal broadband services, citing bad service by the private sector. Of course, any protests by the much-beloved US telecoms companies, which has included getting state laws forbidding such initiatives passed, are purely in the interest of users. Or an endeavor may take a long time to come to fruition, yield massive, but diffuse economic benefits and needs government nurturing. Companies/government departments during agricultural research into better crops are something to consider, ex: Embrapa in Brazil . In a developing country with weaker financial and technological depth, a government can seize an opportunity and quickstart an industry the country has a special advantage in. In a situation with national resources sometimes it is better to have a national company than leave it to the foreign multinationals. Saudi Arabia is probably better off with Aramco than by letting Shell and Exxon take over (as a comment states, maybe Statoil in Norway is a even better showcase, but that might give the impression that you need a super well-run host country to pull that off). On the flip side, you have Venezuela's "management" of PDVSA (take the 25 year graph). A state may also choose to subsidize its SOEs exports to undercut at a loss local providers in its export markets, something known as dumping. This is something that comes up every so often with regards to China , whether that is actually the case or is just a convenient complaint by those local providers. This might be especially true in the case of "strategic industries" where a private sector actor would not have a benefit in behaving thus. China has been playing that game with rare earth metals . Success is not impossible... (assuming there is not too much corruption) But in many cases the more likely outcome will be that an SOE will underperform, economically. So even a state that is successfully deploying SOEs for specific purposes will likely need a larger stable of private enterprises to provide the tax base necessary. Most of China's newfound dynamism, the companies we hear about, aren't from an SOE background . Alibaba TikTok 2022 Paper abstract re China SOE : The nominal performance of SOEs is not high enough. Indeed, from 2001 to 2009, the average return on equity of SOEs was 8.16%, while that of non-state owned industrial enterprises was 12.9%. In 2009，the return on equity of SOEs was 8.18%, while it was 15.59% for non-stated owned industrial enterprises. Moreover, the recorded performance of SOEs is not a reflection of their real performance, but the result of numerous preferential policies and an unfair business environment. p.s. if you feel that I have misrepresented poor SOEs and undersold their benefits that's a cue to write your own answer. I have tried to show cases where for-profit SOEs can be useful - that list got progressively longer and detailed - but consider that to be very much the exception. | {
"source": [
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/75497",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/users/38301/"
]
} |
75,510 | There are many constitutional monarchies in Europe. However, I never see the enthusiasm people show for them as they show for the British royal family and their affairs. Why is that? | The reason for the great enthusiasm (or to be a bit more fair, interest) shown worldwide in the British monarchy compared with other monarchies is simple - worldwide reach and influence. A huge number of countries have at least some connection with the British monarchy in the past - India, Canada, Australia, much of Africa and the Caribbean, and significant parts of the Far East. Even for countries that have long dispensed with any formal or political link with the UK, there will be people who have grown up knowing about the British monarchy, if only from their history lessons. Commonwealth countries will at least have known the Queen as "Head of the Commonwealth" and many will have been visited by her. Even in the US there is a connection built on a common language, constant references to the British monarchy in history (even if set up as "the enemy") and significant shared culture (not to mention through recent marriages). Far fewer countries have a historical connections to Belgium, the Netherlands or Thailand. The UK is also a larger (or at least richer) and more influential country than many other monarchies. More people are interested in the UK Monarchy than the Swedish Monarchy for the same reason that more people worldwide are more interested in the President of the US than the President of Turkey. | {
"source": [
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/75510",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/users/32479/"
]
} |
75,538 | Why do pro-choice activists oppose mandatory ultrasounds? They don't prevent women from having abortions; if a woman initially requests an abortion but then declines after seeing an ultrasound, doesn't that mean her initial request was not informed? | The ultrasound procedure in the first trimester is likely not what you envision with the gel and the paddles on the belly. During the first trimester, an ultrasound wand is inserted into the vagina to get an image. Especially if the woman is pregnant as a result of rape, but even otherwise, this can be a traumatic experience in itself, especially if the woman doesn’t want to receive the ultrasound in the first place. It’s also worth noting that ultrasounds are not zero-cost activities. Requiring an ultrasound adds cost and additional time to the procedure. The other flaw in your question is that you assume the ultrasound will change the woman’s mind about the pregnancy. I don’t have any statistics, but I’m guessing it’s not a significant factor in deciding whether to continue the pregnancy.¹ I would guess that emotional pressure from an anti-abortion counselor would be more likely to have an impact than merely seeing the ultrasound. This, of course, feeds into your question about the consent being informed: if someone can be talked into changing their mind, does that mean that their consent is uninformed? What if they change their mind again? | {
"source": [
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/75538",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/users/43613/"
]
} |
75,633 | In the current war with Ukraine it seems like the West can send any forms of weapons (short of nuclear warheads) to Ukraine without causing the conflict to escalate beyond Ukraine’s borders. This includes long range weaponry capable of hitting military targets within Russia’s territory. However it seems like sending actual troops is out of the question as this would cause a significant escalation of the conflict. Why is this the case? What’s the difference between sending a HIMARS launcher and sending a battalion of troops? | International law is mostly based on precedent. There is the precedent that selling arms is not, by itself, an act of war. This was e.g. supported by cash and carry during the early phases of World War II, when the US was not yet a belligerent. There were other, earlier precedents that neutrals may not sell arms in the Alabama Claims , so it is not completely clear cut, but recent precedent seems to indicate that selling arms to a belligerent is not an act of aggression. (It will be seen as unfriendly.) There is a precedent that sending troops which do fight under the flag of the sending country is an act of war. It is a bit less clear how to treat large numbers of volunteers . Regardless of law, there is something of an understanding that one does not push a nuclear power beyond their reasonable red lines. Those red lines are not necessarily based in international law , they are based in power politics. When the Soviet Union deployed nukes to Cuba, that almost triggered WWIII. Not because basing nuclear missiles in Cuba is fundamentally different from basing nuclear missiles in Turkey or the UK, but because it represented a change in the political balance that was unacceptable to the US. The obvious problem with this realpolitik view is that it may allow nuclear powers to "get away with" unjustified actions, simply because nobody is willing to start a world war over them (compare the stability-instability paradox ). Where exactly these red lines are is a political bargain, with the mutual understanding driven in part by the diplomatic declarations of both sides. Russia is trying to establish that any strike on Russia (including annexed territories) and any delivery of weapons capable of deep strikes is crossing a red line. Those are two different issues, by the way. The West is not accepting the full claim of the Russian red line, but it has been reluctant to deliver such things as Western-made tanks and IFVs, long-range missiles, or combat aircraft. It has been delivering Soviet-made tanks and Western-made rocket and tube artillery. The West wants Putin to be defeated, but it does not want him to panic. Those two goals may be mutually incompatible, so what the West does may be characterized as not letting Putin win , which is slightly different from him being defeated. | {
"source": [
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/75633",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/users/7434/"
]
} |
75,713 | The ill-fated 2012 languages law in Ukraine (proposed by the Party of Regions, but eventually found unconstitutional by Ukraine's supreme court) allowed the use of minority languages in courts, schools and other government institutions in areas of Ukraine where the national minorities exceed 10% of the population. Was this modelled after some laws in countries of Europe (incl. Russia)? I.e. are there countries in Europe with a law with a similar provision based on a percentage, and is it this low (10%) or close to that, say <20%? | In North Macedonia, Amendment V to the Constitution - passed in 2001 after the signing of the Ohrid Agreement between the government and the Albanian minority - enshrines the status of 'official language' for any language spoken by more than 20% of the population. In addition, this applies in each local government unit; if more than 20% of the local population speaks a certain language, it has the status of 'official language' locally. Official languages may be used to communicate with government bodies, and personal documents must be issued to citizens speaking an official language in that language - as well as Macedonian. | {
"source": [
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/75713",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/users/18373/"
]
} |
75,768 | In the United Kingdom, there exists a couple main signifiers for the monarch. The first is the title, chosen from a slate of first names. The second is the cypher, written like "E II R" surmounted by a crown for the late Queen Elizabeth II. This signifies "Elizabeth II Regina". I was wondering how the title and cypher change for a King who has the same name as his heir apparent first born daughter. Consider the following scenario: King Wallace I reigns over the United Kingdom and other dominions. King Wallace's oldest daughter is also named Wallace. King Wallace dies, thus his daughter Wallace immediately ascends the throne and decides to take the name Wallace as well. If #3 happens...how is the monarch's title and cypher affected?
Is it "Queen Wallace II" and "W II R" respectively? Or is it "Queen Wallace I" with a cypher of "W I R"? | There has never been a case in which a queen has shared a name with a preceding king nor a king has shared a name with a preceding queen. There have been no Queen William, Queen Richard, Queen Henry, nor has there been a King Mary, King Anne or King Elizabeth. In English all these names are strongly gendered. Boys just don't get named Mary and Girls aren't named William (Occasionally girls get named George, but more often girls that are called George are actually "Georgina" but prefer to use George as a nickname) There is no fixed list of names that Kings or Queens can use, the great majority use their birth-name (except those named Albert). And when choosing the name of an heir, the royals tend to be conservative and pick names that are clearly gendered. The situation doesn't arise. If this tradition were to change, and a queen were to ascend to the throne with the same name as a previous king, the style she chose could easily be set by proclaimation. That is Queen Wallace could simply declare if she was II. This was done for Queen Elizabeth when it was noted that she was the first Queen named Elizabeth of Scotland. She simply proclaimed that she was Queen Elizabeth II across the whole of the UK and not just England. | {
"source": [
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/75768",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/users/19306/"
]
} |
75,815 | Germany has recently announced that while they’ll keep two of their nuclear power plants operational during the winter, they’re still planning to shut them down in the spring. But why aren’t they doing a complete U-turn and keeping the nuclear power plants permanently active in addition to building new ones? It seems like a viable option to deal with Russian energy supplies going away. | Because the majority of the electorate is opposed to nuclear power. In particular, Green and Social Democrat voters are against it. Thus, the current coalition (of Social Democrats, Greens and Liberal Democrats) cannot change its position on nuclear power. The current crisis didn't change the main concerns against nuclear power and, since building new plants would be very costly and time-consuming, that isn't considered to be a solution to the short-term issue. There is also political consensus that there are better long-term solutions than nuclear power. Image from above link translated by Yandex translate . Red text my interpretation. [RM] | {
"source": [
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/75815",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/users/7434/"
]
} |
75,984 | It may simply be my media bubble but it seems that the discussion on providing main battle tanks to the Ukraine focuses strongly, almost entirely, on the German Leopard 2. Why is that? Now I understand that the Leo 2 is likely the best tank out of all the options, being well-regarded, produced for export, etc. However, it seems odd to me that there is seemingly no discussion around e.g. the British Challenger 2 (or mothballed predecessors). Seeing how the UK is otherwise not shy in providing equipment, this seems an odd omission. | One has to consider that it isn't enough to give Ukraine tanks that are good, but are also able to be supported with logistics. Leopard 2 is in use by several other countries near Ukraine, including Poland and Hungary. The Leopard 2 would therefore be one of the easier western tanks to support in Ukraine. Neighboring countries could ship parts to Ukraine, and Ukraine could ship Leopards to Poland and other countries for repair (They are doing this with their T-72s by sending the Czech Republic and Poland). Challenger 2 is in use by absolutely nobody other than the UK and Oman. If a Challenger 2 breaks down nobody in continental Europe will be able to do anything about it. | {
"source": [
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/75984",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/users/44542/"
]
} |
76,028 | I often find that news agencies will quote political figures in "short form", sometimes quoting a sentence and paraphrasing the rest, and often quoting even less than a sentence. My recent experience prompting this question is this blurb from the Economist : Joe Biden, America’s president, warned of “Armageddon”, if Russia were to use tactical nuclear bombs in an attempt to turn around its fortunes in Ukraine. Which quotes Joe Biden using only a single word ! For the rest, we are left to hope that the Economist's correspondent got the context just right. Is Joe threatening Armageddon, or is he worried about Armageddon? It's hard to tell. Doing a web search for 'joe biden armageddon' reveals that basically all the news agencies have quoted him in single-word form. Surely the words of Joe Biden, the president of the USA, should be more a matter of public record than the words of Joe Schmo, local Nebraska freelance news correspondent? And yet, I simply cannot seem to find anything approaching Biden's full statements surrounding this one word. A sentence, at least, would be nice. Better, a paragraph. Frankly, I feel as though I should have access to the whole speech . But where is it? How can I find primary sources from the often extrememly short quotes of political figures offered by news organizations? | The reason that lots of news agencies often use the same quotes is that they're either syndicating their stories from AP or Reuters or similar, or are writing their articles using the same pool report. With this in mind, it's often easier to track down quotes like this if we check out official sources first, rather than just using a search engine, which will tend to just bring up other news articles. These sources will of course differ based on the individual in question, but for your example of the US President, a good place to start is the White House's own archive of the President's speeches, which may be found here . In this specific case, a full transcript doesn't seem to have been provided, but we can go to a lower level and check out the White House Pool Reports, which are posted publicly here . In this specific case, the pool report that news agencies seem to be using is ' Travel Pool #15 (correct #) Remarks/Putin quote ': He said hes spent a lot of time trying to hold NATO together. Theres a
lot of changes going on. Spoke of the CHIPS Act and his visit to IBM
this morning. Went back to Putin: We have not faced the prospect of Armageddon since Kennedy and the
Cuban missile crisis. Weve got a guy I know fairly well, he said of
Putin. Hes not joking when he talks about potential use of tactical
nuclear weapons or biological or chemical weapons because his military
is you might say significantly underperforming. I don't think there's
any such thing as the ability to easily (use) a tactical nuclear
weapon and not end up with Armageddon. I didnt realize how much
serious damage the previous administration did to our foreign policy.
Pool listened to the remarks from a staircase next to the room where
the event was taking place and could not see much. Looked like there
were large art pieces on every wall around the room. We were ushered
out at 7:53 as Sen. Peters took the mic. As you can see, these remarks are obviously taken in haste, and don't provide a completely accurate transcript of the speech - it's possible one doesn't exist. Other alternatives might be to track down a video of the event on the C-SPAN archive, if the event was filmed. For UK government speeches, one might try the Gov.uk News & Communications site, or track down a politician's speech in Parliament using Hansard . Many parliamentary bodies record a full transcript of proceedings and make these available online. To give another example, speeches from the French President are published on the Élysée website . I'm afraid there isn't a one-stop shop for tracking down transcripts in general, but hopefully that gives you some ideas of where to begin your search in future. | {
"source": [
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/76028",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/users/20887/"
]
} |
76,045 | Source As can be seen in the picture, almost all countries in North and South America (excluding island countries) unconditionally offer citizenship to anyone born in their territory. At the same time, almost all countries elsewhere don't do so. So, what makes North and South America special? | The countries in the Americas were founded by colonial settlers declaring independence from their corresponding colonial power, predominately at the end of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th century. To distinguish an American from a British person in 1777, ancestry is not that helpful. Place of birth, much more so. In the former Spanish colonies, this is compounded by a social system that gave preference to recent immigrants over locally-born descendants of Spaniards. Other settler-colonies, South Africa, New Zealand and Australia, still have mixed-forms. What sets them apart from most nations in the Americas is timing and method of gaining independence. | {
"source": [
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/76045",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/users/5933/"
]
} |
76,074 | Traditionally, and currently, what stops human vote counters from altering ballots to make them 'Spoilt / Invalid votes' ? Referring to - Spoilt vote / Invalid vote So if a theoretically dishonest human vote counter could mark / alter ballots that vote for politicians they are opposed to, to have them be disregarded as Spoilt votes / Invalid votes One would think the obvious answer would be the presence of overseers, however, would there not be cases of rooms with lots of human vote counters and not enough overseers. A USEFULL MEASURE would be to place all the 'Spoilt votes' into separate containers to have them examined, initially with magnifying glasses, these days, with all the new tech, there would be all sorts of methods, but of course applying them to more than one counting table would not make it viable, you would think. NOTE - A commenter below this question wrote - "Multiple persons each checking each other" - Two things - (1} - What if it is the first human counter that reads the ballots that alters them, then the ballot/ballots is changed forever without detection (2) - If the form is changed by a later human counter, then the form is changed forever and many may assume an error occurred, this could occur if the specific ballot form is not tracked / photographed | I think that this risk is greatly diminished by relying on multiple persons doing the counting simultaneously, the so called two man rule . Because you expressed disbelief in that in a comment, let me explain how that works in an example: I was part of an election committee for the last election of the German Parliament (Bundestag). Me and six others (we didn't know each other before) were counting the ballot. We were all in one room with an average distance of say 1-2m around a big table, all seeing and observing what the other one is doing. Nobody used a pen during counting except for the one person writing down the results and this person used a pen only on the minutes. First we opened the ballot box on the big table and sorted by (there is a two votes voting system) three categories (first and second vote equal, first and second vote unequal, potentially invalid). Then we sorted the single categories by party/person to be elected and counted them. For counting at least two persons counted the same stack repeatedly and compared results. The sum of the counted number of votes was compared to the total number of voters who had appeared this day. If the sums weren't equal we recounted everything. All the invalid votes were seen and decided upon by all members of the election board. We counted about 600 ballots in 1.5 hours (with almost final country-wide results in the same evening). Any citizen could have shown up and observed the counting process. At the end we signed the official report and to the best of my knowledge this report contains the numbers as I and others have counted them. What you describe as a possible way to forge results of an election would require secrecy, but I'm reasonably sure that this secrecy wasn't given at any time of the process. It's a lot of work, a huge number of people have to volunteer to have this amount of cross-checking power available, but I actually trust it more than any other system, especially computerized counting solutions. The low number of ballots that were counted by that many people means that even if somebody would be able to influence the counting results somehow, the possible strength would still be quite limited. | {
"source": [
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/76074",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/users/44137/"
]
} |
76,098 | Does the Democratic Party officially want to repeal the Second Amendment, or do they believe their gun control goals can be achieved within its proper interpretation? Please do not post your opinion or speculation on whether or not they want to repeal the Second Amendment, only official statements that they do or don't. This would be a good answer (if it was true, of course): Democrat candidate Jane Doe said, "We need to repeal the Second Amendment and implement common-sense gun restrictions to keep our communities safe. This is not, regardless of whether I agree or disagree: They obviously do; look at all the clearly unconstitutional gun laws they've passed. | I am not aware of any Democratic Party manifesto advocating for the repeal of second amendment (let along other constitutional provisions). It is safe to assume most Democrats believe stricter gun-safety legislations do not necessarily contradict second amendment (depending on the content of the legislation). I'm not sure what you mean by "proper interpretation" as the US Constitution is a living document (in the sense that all provisions can be amended in theory, unlike the German constitution). There is no "canonical" interpretation except for what is accepted by the legislature (i.e. Congress) and judiciary at any given time. This of course implies that interpretations of the US Constitution can change over time depending on the humans occupying federal institutions. It's a constant societal dialogue. PS: I should add that this does not preclude proposals among Democratic Party to add more provisions in the constitution, which is quite common in areas big and small. | {
"source": [
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/76098",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/users/43613/"
]
} |
76,166 | The Juice Media 's August 22, 2022 satirical video " Honest Government Ad | UK " (please be aware there's racy language; it's Australian satire) includes a presumably real clip of current UK Prime Minister Liz Truss saying the following: We're producing more varieties of cheese than the French! After which she paused and smiled for effect, presumably to let the point sink in. But without context we can't know what the point was. The only clue is the writing on the podium which says: Securing a Better Future So I'd like to ask, based on context from her speech once it can be identified and perhaps a transcript found: Question: What was (future UK Prime Minister / then Secretary of State for Environment, Food, & Rural Affairs) Liz Truss's point when saying "We're producing more varieties of cheese than the French!" in a speech before becoming PM? | While the British jingoism angle covered in other answers is definitely an important one, I think it’s worth considering the context in which the speech was delivered to get the full picture. The speech was delivered by Truss at the Conservative Party conference in 2014 - when she was serving as Secretary of State for Environment, Food, & Rural Affairs in David Cameron’s coalition government. This needs to be seen, then, in the context of appealing to the Conservative Party membership in the hope of their continued support, as well as a pitch to the country as a whole - given a General Election was right around the corner. In the same speech, she attacks both Labour and the EU - note that this speech took place two years before the Brexit referendum; The amount of British food we consumed and produced went down and the last Labour government tied our farmers up in red tape. They wasted £600 million on fines to the EU and left us with the worst bovine TB problem in Europe. The fact is Labour don’t care about the countryside. They think we can’t grow enough of our own food. They think it’s fine to outsource it. Well, they are wrong. She goes on to promote British agriculture and food production; I want our children to grow up knowing the taste of a British apple, of Cornish sardines, of Herefordshire pears, of Norfolk turkey, of Melton Mowbray pork pies and, of course, of black pudding. Under a Conservative government, Britain will lead the world in food, farming and the environment. In a fortnight, I’m going to Paris to the world’s largest food trade fair and I will be bigging up British products. So yes, the thrust of the sound bite linked is a jokey jibe at France based on their good reputation for producing cheese; but linked to promoting British agriculture - part of her job description as DEFRA Secretary. The speech also needs to be seen in the wider context of being a speech to the Tory Party faithful (hence the jingoism), rather than a serious policy speech, as well as taking place less than a year before a General Election. | {
"source": [
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/76166",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/users/16047/"
]
} |
76,186 | There're lots of people who believe climate change is happening and think governments should take action to curb emissions. Given that, it seems natural to welcome high fossil fuel prices - in fact, the higher the better. That's because high prices should dampen demand, which leads to less carbon emissions. However, I see news articles such as this and this where countries are taking steps to cap/lower fossil fuel prices. This applies even when the government/political party say they consider climate change a major problem. Why? The obvious explanation (and the one given by the US in one of the links above) is that they want to lower energy prices to lower Russian state revenue, which in turn makes Russia less able to prosecute the war in Ukraine. However, this explanation seems dubious because the US has tried to lower fossil fuel prices since before February 2022 ( example ). Another possible explanation is that high fossil fuel prices does not lead to less carbon emissions, but I can't see why that wouldn't be the case. Demand for energy might be inelastic to some extent, but only to some extent (c.f. how world energy usage dropped during Covid). The only other explanation I can think of is very cynical: the electorate support curbing emissions as long as someone else is paying for it. If they have to pay for it (by higher energy bills) then they don't support it anymore. By extension, governments (at least those that are democratically elected) must try to lower fossil fuel prices even if it leads to more carbon emissions. I'm looking for an explanation why climate-conscious governments (and climate change activists for that matter) aren't welcoming high energy prices with open arms. | Countries don't want to stop climate change, because their electorates are over-leveraged. You say: the electorate support curbing emissions as long as someone else is paying for it. but even this is too generous. Actually, only a minority support stopping climate change. Allow me to introduce "NPC theory": The majority of the electorate consists of people who don't really care to think about such things as climate change, and just want to be able to follow their established routines. Anything which threatens the routine is a threat. Why? Because a developed-country lifestyle is a house of cards, which is expensive and difficult to maintain. Anyone who's found a way to keep one would like to keep it. A misstep can result in the entire thing crashing down. Maintaining the status quo is much easier than finding an alternative route to keeping a similar lifestyle. Consider a suburbanite who commutes by car to the city center for work. What happens if the gasoline price spikes 10x? Then on Saturday they can't buy gasoline according to the routine (unless they do it by credit card). On Monday they can't go to work. On Tuesday they don't have a job. Next week they can't pay rent. Next month the police show up to kick them out of their landlord's house. Next month after that, they are found dead under a bridge. Or, they can push it back by a month or two by buying gasoline on their credit card. In the long run they should either live in the city center near their work, or commute by good public transit. Either of those would also be an acceptable lifestyle routine. But because there aren't enough apartments in the city center, and the best available public transit route includes a 45-minute stopover each way, and you already agreed to mortgage payments that you calculated based on being able to drive each day, you can't get from here to there without going through the intermediate state of dying under a bridge. This is similar to the financial concept of leverage. The more leveraged a person's financial position is, the more they have to gain from favourable price changes, but the smaller of an unfavourable price change would make them bankrupt. Westerners' lifestyles, just like organizations in the western financial system, tend to be very leveraged and therefore completely intolerant of disruption. A few weeks ago, the UK's entire pension fund system nearly went bankrupt due to the snowball effect of an interest rate increase of only a few percent. The mechanism by which high prices result in change is by trying to kill everyone (and bankrupt every business) that hasn't already made the change. Since the majority of people have not made the change, and don't want to (change is haaaaard!) they are strongly opposed to high prices. People with more under-leveraged, flexible lifestyles - such as single young professionals - tend to be much more supportive of anything which changes the system, as they can accommodate the change, but this group is a relative minority. | {
"source": [
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/76186",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/users/22967/"
]
} |
76,188 | The question is just this: Can a private citizen of a given country host a military base of another country on his private property? This might be especially important if this property is close to the borders/oceans? (e.g. A US citizen with large private property on Canada border hosts a Canadian Military Base) | No A private citizen does not have the right to issue visas, or other travel documents to citizen soldiers of a foreign country. Private citizens are bound by laws. They can't have military weaponry "on the farm" Private citizens are not permitted to negotiate with foreign powers as if they were the government. So the whole idea is a total non-starter. | {
"source": [
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/76188",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/users/44276/"
]
} |
76,211 | I'm having a bit of trouble wrapping my head around this one. Why was it that when a tax break (or, removal of a tax increase) was announced, the market and pound reacted negatively? Wouldn't the market prefer lower cost of doing business? | The problem with the mini-budget was that it included large tax cuts, but with no corresponding cuts in spending, or increases in other forms of revenue. This implied that government borrowing would have to substantially increase. None of that appeared to have been planned nor discussed with anyone else, including the Office for Budget Responsibility . The "markets" here aren't the individuals or companies who stood to gain the most. It's the financial markets who buy and sell currencies, shares and commodities. Sudden unplanned borrowing by a government results in rising interest rates, which further increases the cost of that borrowing. The markets consider such an economy to be a high risk. | {
"source": [
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/76211",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/users/29086/"
]
} |
76,236 | The latest UK Prime Minister is currently in quite a bad spot. The universally panned mini-budget has inflicted so much chaos the BoE has had to step in, and the Chancellor has been sacked a little over a month into the job. The i is reporting that as many as 100 Tory MPs have submitted no confidence votes to the 1922 committee well above the 15% threshold, such that only the party rules regarding a grace period are preventing her from being replaced by her own MPs through an internal confidence vote. Numerous Labour MPs are on record saying a general election is now required, hardly surprising given their current polling. Is something preventing Labour seeking a vote of no confidence in the Government? | You should distinguish between a vote in Parliament, and a vote in the Conservative party. These are very different, with different rules and different outcomes. There is nothing preventing a confidence vote in the government held in Parliament. The loss of this vote would likely lead to a General Election. However that would not be a no-confidence in Liz Truss. It would be a vote on the Conservative government. It is unlikely that Conservative party MPs would vote against the Government, and in favour of an election. The Labour Party may put down a confidence vote, but it would be merely a symbolic act, with practically no chance of passing A no-confidence vote in Truss would be a Conservative party internal vote. The current rules of the Conservative party do not allow for confidence votes in the leader in the first year after taking office. If the Party rules were changed, and the no-confidence voted passed, then Liz Truss would be required to step down as PM when a new Leader of the Conservative party was chosen, but there would be no requirement for a General Election. | {
"source": [
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/76236",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/users/18367/"
]
} |
76,263 | The past few PMs of the UK have resigned. Most recently Liz Truss, after 45 days. I assume that the reason was that she felt that she was failing at her job, and the pressure to succeed was causing her too much stress. If I make an analogy to the private market, let's say that for some reason I was appointed to be the CEO of Microsoft. I would be a bad CEO, after all, I have none of the theoretical or practical knowledge for that. I could either resign, or wait for the end of my term (after, say, 4 years). If I wait it out, Microsoft would definitely take a hit. However, it is a big company with many knowledgeable VPs, so if I just don't show up to work, Microsoft would probably survive. However, during my tenure, I would earn a CEO's salary, get to use the CEO's car+driver and make use of all of the personal assistants. Not a bad life. I don't know what benefits the UK's PM gets, but I assume quite a lot. So why not just be a (bad) PM until you are voted out, meanwhile taking full advantage of all of the perks? | While one would generally hope that Prime Ministers who clearly have no continued mandate would resign out of a sense of honour, at least in the last three cases they have resigned from their post when events were in motion to remove them anyway. If a Prime Minister were to decide to 'wait it out' and just fulfil the bare minimum requirements of that office, as you suggest, they would swiftly find themselves evicted through a confidence vote either in the House of Commons, or their own party. It's not like a job in a private corporation where an employee signs a contract to serve in the role for a certain amount of time; they can be forced out without recourse. Despite Theresa May and Boris Johnson having won confidence motions in both the House of Commons and the Conservative parliamentary party - the latter of which supposedly meant they were safe from another confidence motion for 12 months - they each resigned once it became clear that the Executive of the 1922 Committee of backbench MPs intended to change that body's rules to allow a second confidence vote which it was widely expected they would lose. In Liz Truss's case, it was expected that the 1922 Committee would again change the rules - this time to allow a parliamentary party confidence vote within 12 months of taking office; she didn't even survive an initial vote. As Glorfindel points out in his answer, it's generally viewed as much better to leave rather than be forced out. Furthermore, the ongoing perks of being a Prime Minister you refer to aren't even that fantastic considering the level of stress office-holders undergo - you get the use of No. 10 Downing Street, the use of the Chequers country house in Buckinghamshire, ministerial cars and so forth - plus a pay increase from £84k to £159k. This pay rise is obviously substantial, but tends to pale into insignificance compared to the fees which can be demanded on the after-dinner-speech circuit post-resignation; for example, just last week, Boris Johnson received a fee of $350,000 for a 30-minute speech to the Council of Insurance Agents and Brokers conference. The Daily Mail reported in June 2022 that Theresa May had received £2.1 million in speech fees since leaving office. The other financial perks are secured as soon as one walks into No. 10; former Prime Ministers may apply for £115k worth of Public Duty Costs Allowance per year, to be paid as expenses for continued public duties. There used to be a special pension for former Prime Ministers, but this has not been the case since the commencement of the Public Service Pensions Act 2013. Prime Ministers leaving office are also eligible for a lump-sum grant of a quarter of the annual salary (the additional Prime Minister bit, not the full £159k) under section 4 of the Ministerial and other Pensions and Salaries Act 1991 . | {
"source": [
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/76263",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/users/42313/"
]
} |
76,280 | I have read on the news that the US military and the President have vowed to protect Taiwan if China invades the de facto independent, sovereign nation. China arguably has a stronger claim to Taiwan than Russia does to Ukraine. Unlike Ukraine, Taiwan still calls itself China: its official name is the Republic of China. There is no ethnic Taiwanese population in the way that there is an ethnic Ukrainian population or a Taiwanese language (they speak Mandarin in China). Taiwan is more ethnically Chinese (97% Han Chinese/Taiwanese) than mainland China (92% Han Chinese). Why is the US military and government vowing to protect Taiwan when they won't protect Ukraine? Is there an alliance Taiwan is part of that provides insurance from other countries in the event of an external invasion like NATO that Ukraine is not part of anything similar that would give it American protection? I am not arguing that it is okay for China to invade Taiwan for these reasons. I think such an invasion would be devastating for world peace and the world order of respecting sovereign boundaries which is under attack by Russian imperialism in Ukraine and has the potential of being further attacked by Chinese imperialism. | The main reasons for the difference are likely: Taiwan's economic importance is more obvious. It does a great deal of high-tech manufacturing, and includes the world's leading computer chip manufacturing company, TSMC . Ukraine's grain exports are also important, but less so to the US than to other parts of the world. The US has a long-standing commitment to Taiwan , made when the US was vastly more powerful than the PRC. Nowadays, the military power of the two states is closer to equal, but the US does not want to back down. It's quite practical for the US to intervene in a PRC-Taiwan conflict, because Taiwan is an island, and the US has a powerful navy. In contrast, basing US troops in Ukraine would be seen as menacing Russia in new ways. Having ships near Taiwan is somewhat less threatening, and ships are far easier to move than armoured divisions. If it came to a naval battle in the Taiwan Strait, that doesn't immediately lead to a US invasion of mainland China or a Chinese invasion of the USA, so the risk of nuclear escalation is low. If the US based troops in Ukraine and they defeated the Russian forces there, nothing would prevent the US invading Russia, so the nuclear risk is high. | {
"source": [
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/76280",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/users/29035/"
]
} |
76,289 | According to this article , EU restrictions related to various appliances will go into effect on 2023.03.01. If nothing changes, most high-end TV cannot be sold in the EU: If nothing changes between now and then, there won’t be a single 8K TV
that can be sold in the EU. The rule also will affect a couple of 4K
OLED TVs, 65-inch QD-OLED TVs, and at least one high-performance 4K
QLED TV. The article provides more details and critiques how the EU computes the figures for such restrictions. I am wondering about the rationale of such a policy which might create various problems (e.g. producers cannot sell some products, make quality compromises to meet the restrictions, and higher production costs) and not consider alternatives like higher taxation. Examples: higher tax for products with power consumption above some thresholds higher prices of electricity based on various consumption thresholds Theoretically, higher taxation instead of restriction means no unhappy customers due to not being able to buy some stuff and higher income for the states. So, it is not clear for me why restriction instead of taxation. TimesOfIndia provides more details about the expected maximum power and the actual power required by some 8K TVs: (..) the EU wants 75-inch 8K TVs to consume 141 watts...Samsung
75-inch 8K TVs reportedly consume at least 303 watts... similar LG
models consume 219 watts ... TVs from TCL consume 356 watts. Note: While Why do governments encourage saving resources instead of simply
raising the price on them? is similar, there are two main differences: I am asking about the EU, not individual governments I am mentioning taxation on energy-inefficient products as opposed to resource taxation | Because the EU's intention is that TVs actually consume less energy, not that people simply pay more for waste, or that states collect more taxes. If the rich can afford to pay more, it can easily be invested in technological development that improves efficiency. Also I suspect one low-tech solution the rich could have to large and dim screens, would be to simply fit and use blackout curtains when viewing them, rather than expecting the screens to function in daylight. This is the reason why cinemas are dimly lit environments when the film is playing, because projector technology has always limited how bright the viewing screen can be. If the inefficiency of larger and finer screens cannot be overcome by technological means, then the intention is probably also to limit screen sizes and resolutions to a sensible maximum, implied by the power consumption limits. The assumption that consumers will be less happy due to these restrictions is I'm afraid an unproven suggestion. I enjoyed television and film just as much at PAL resolutions on a 14 inch screen. | {
"source": [
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/76289",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/users/11278/"
]
} |
76,305 | I've seen clips and articles stating that recent Russian attacks on Ukrainian power plants amount to "War Crimes". This seems right to me but I couldn't find any resource explicitly prohibiting it. Are these valid/invalid military targets in both practice and theory? | There’s nothing that I’m aware of in international law prohibiting the targeting of power plants in general - except for the blanket protection given to civilian objects defined in Article 52 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Convention. This defines a military objective as objects “which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage”. Russia’s position is presumably that power plants can be defined as legitimate military objectives under this article. However, Amnesty International’s Director for Eastern Europe and Central Asia has accused the country of a war crime by carrying out the attacks “with the sole purpose of terrorizing civilians”. This would be contrary to the general protections of Article 51 of the same protocol, which prohibits “acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population”. Power plants are not explicitly mentioned in Article 54 - which states: It is prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, such as foodstuffs, agricultural areas for the production of foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation works, for the specific purpose of denying them for their sustenance value to the civilian population or to the adverse Party, whatever the motive, whether in order to starve out civilians, to cause them to
move away, or for any other motive. It could be argued that energy infrastructure might fall under this definition, however. The accusations of war crimes that I’ve seen most recently regarding Russia’s latest attacks on power infrastructure relate to the reported mining of the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant. President Zelenskyy mentioned this in his speech on October 20th : According to our information, the aggregates and dam of the Kakhovka HPP were mined by Russian terrorists. Now everyone in the world must act powerfully and quickly to prevent a new Russian terrorist attack. Destroying the dam would mean a large-scale disaster. Attacks on dams and other infrastructure which contains ‘dangerous forces’ such as nuclear power stations are prohibited by Article 56 of the same protocol: Works or installations containing dangerous forces, namely dams, dykes and nuclear electrical generating stations, shall not be made the object of attack, even where these objects are military objectives, if such attack may cause the release of dangerous forces and consequent severe losses among the civilian population. Other military objectives located at or in the vicinity of these works or installations shall not be made the object of attack if such attack may cause the release of dangerous forces from the works or installations and consequent severe losses among the civilian population. There are, however, exceptions and caveats to these protections - in all of the articles quoted above. For example, Article 56 allows military attacks on a dam “if it is used for other than its normal function and in regular, significant and direct support of military operations and if such attack is the only feasible way to terminate such support”. There doesn’t seem to be any blanket protection in international law for energy installations, even for nuclear power plants. | {
"source": [
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/76305",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/users/44707/"
]
} |
76,307 | The BBC's October 22(?), 2022 Hu Jintao: The mysterious exit of China's former leader from party congress begins: There are a lot of questions and no answers so far from the Chinese government. Chinese state news agency Xinhua reported that Mr Hu was escorted from the chamber after feeling unwell. But Mr Hu, 79, appeared reluctant to move. If that is the case, why? What did he say to the man who replaced him, Xi Jinping, which prompted a nod from China's current leader? And what did he say to his protégé, Li Keqiang, as he tapped him on the shoulder before being ushered off stage? This AP News photo from The West's October 23, 2022 Questions as China's former leader removed seems to me that it would speak volumes to anyone in China watching this on TV if it was broadcast as such. Description of image for visually impaired: Hu - a party elder, former party general secretary, president, chairman of the Central Military Commission and member of the CCP Politburo Standing Committee and seated next to Xi was suddenly and unceremoniously escorted physically and reluctantly out of his seat and the room during this historic event. To me he looks surprised and frustrated towards Xi, who looks directly back at him with his typical composed expression. I'm not asking about statements later, especially not those made internationally. I'm only asking about the optics presented to the greater Chinese citizenry. To that end I'll ask: Question: How much of Hu Jintao's being escorted out of the Great Hall of the People in Beijing during the Communist Party Congress was seen by Chinese at home? Was it live? Did they see it close up as seen internationally? The removal of former Chinese president Hu Jintao (centre) has sparked a flurry of questions. (AP PHOTO) Credit: AP | This video cannot be viewed in China (it is already blocked on most social media). I didn't watch the live stream, so I'm not sure if this part was streamed, but since the conference live stream was intentionally set up with a minute or so delay, I'm guessing it wasn't. The video was first shot by an AFP reporter, and it happened just as foreign journalists were allowed to enter the venue to film. Not many people in China have seen this video. In fact, not many people in China even discussed the meeting (because it is dangerous in China). Edit 1st: Let's talk about some funny details. There are two main views on the Internet about Hu's departure: Hu left because of health problems. Hu was driven out by Xi Jinping. I prefer the second reason. For the first view, I do not agree. Because the party is very strict about the medical examination of such senior officials, if he is not fit to attend, then he will not show up in the first place. And even if there is a real health problem, the leader will still insist on such occasions. For example, at the last Chinese military parade, Jiang Zemin had a sudden health problem that prevented him from standing up, but he did not leave the stage. That's why I don't think the first point is true. From the second view, the possible explanation is that Xi cheated Hu and was discovered by Hu. Hu tried to take the document before leaving the scene but was prevented from doing so. Li Zhanshu, who was on the sidelines, tried to get up to stop Hu from being taken away but was held down by Wang Huning, who was on the sidelines. A piece of strong evidence is the list of documents photographed by journalists: The following picture is a reporter photographed the bodyguard leaving the scene when the hands of the list of documents, although the picture is very blurred, we can still see this list of the second person's name is three words, in fact, the second person on the published list is Li Qiang, two words. This means that the list in Hu's hand and the actual list are not the same. The whole video It is worth noting that Li Zhanshu has always been a hardcore Xi faction and was promoted by Xi, but this time he was also kicked out of the core of power by Xi. It is also interesting to see what happened in between. It has been pointed out that my answer lacks evidence, and it is well known that much of the information in China is inaccessible, I will do my best to provide evidence, but please remember that you have the right to disbelieve my opinion. At the same time, it was pointed out that I have a biased view of China, to which I responded: you have no reason to think you know more about China than a Chinese person, and if you think China is good, it is only because you cannot see the many inhuman sufferings in the land of China. | {
"source": [
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/76307",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/users/16047/"
]
} |
76,339 | Recently, Rishi Sunak , a person of Indian origin, became British PM. Indians have begun
making online posts about how the return of the Koh-i-Noor diamond will be possible now. Does the British PM actually have the power to return the Koh-i-Noor diamond to India? | Not unilaterally, no. The Koh-i-Noor diamond is part of the Crown Jewels, owned by the sovereign in the right of the Crown. The Prime Minister has no executive power to seize Crown property, and would have to pass primary legislation through both Houses of Parliament, as well as obtain Royal Assent to do so. Furthermore, as the legislation would affect the interests of the Crown, King's Consent would need to be sought before such a bill could pass through Parliament. | {
"source": [
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/76339",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/users/43816/"
]
} |
76,375 | According to this Financial Times movie , the UK has been significantly economically impacted by Brexit. According to them, this became clearer after COVID had been largely contained, but its economic consequences are still combined with those created by the Russian invasion of Ukraine: The UK's recent disastrous "mini" Budget can trace its origins back to
Britain's decision to leave the European Union. The economic costs of
Brexit were masked by the Covid-19 pandemic and the crisis in Ukraine.
But six years after the UK voted to leave, the effect has become
clear. In this film, senior FT writers and British businesspeople
examine how Brexit hit the UK economy, the political conspiracy of
silence, and why there has not yet been a convincing case for a
'Brexit dividend'. However, the film seems to cherry-pick a few persons to speak about Brexit economical consequences and I am not sure if this is representative of the entire population. This IPSOS survey from March 2021 indicates that most Britons say Brexit has made no difference to their daily life (~60%), with only about ~30% mentioning that they had been negatively affected. However, this survey is rather old, since it does not take into account the post-COVID economical recovery. Is there a more recent similar survey that shows how Britons feel about the economical consequences of Brexit? | In fact, Ipsos ran surveys with identical questions to the March 2021 one you've linked to in both June 2021 and June 2022. The full report may be found here , but I've taken an excerpt of the graph showing the most relevant figures below. Ipsos provided the following commentary on the changes in its news post : New polling by Ipsos UK in partnership with the EU:UK Forum shows that
the proportion of Britons who think the UK’s exit from the EU has made
their daily life worse has risen from three in ten in June 2021 to 45%
now. Seven in ten of those who voted Remain feel this is the case, up
from half last year – and the proportion of Leave voters who say the
same has doubled over the same period, from 10 to 22 per cent. At the same time, the proportion of those who say that Brexit has made
their daily lives better has also risen, although they remain a
smaller group: seventeen per cent say this is true, up from one in ten
in June 2021. Among Remain voters, one in ten now say Brexit has made
daily life better (up from 5% in 2021) – while a quarter of Leave
voters say the same, an increase from 17% a year ago. The proportion who say it has made no difference has shrunk from half
in 2021 to a third now. | {
"source": [
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/76375",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/users/11278/"
]
} |
76,383 | Do Ireland and the United Kingdom have a trade alliance similar to NAFTA or USMCA? | No. Prior to Brexit the UK and Ireland were in the EU single market. Post Brexit the UK is a third country while Ireland remains in the EU. The UK has to negotiate a bilateral trade deal with the EU as a whole and not Ireland individually. The UK, EU trade deal is an ongoing point of contention specifically around the details for UK, or more specifically Northern Ireland, and Ireland. | {
"source": [
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/76383",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/users/44024/"
]
} |
76,493 | Undoubtedly, the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge have both played a major role in educating Britain's elites in politics, business, entertainment etc. However, when it comes to Prime Ministers, in the last 80 years the UK has had 13 Oxford-educated PMs (Sunak, Truss, Johnson, May, Cameron, Blair, Thatcher, Wilson, Heath, Douglas-Home, MacMillan, Eden and Attlee) while none were educated at Cambridge. Statistically, this seems beyond a coincidence. Is it really much harder for those educated at Cambridge to rise the top in British politics? | This is a cultural effect. In the 20th century, Cambridge positioned itself as the university of science and technology. Oxford positioned itself as the university of humanities and politics. A school student with ambitions to become Prime Minister would know these traditions and would be more likely to apply to Oxford than Cambridge. The political clubs at Oxford (and particularly the Conservative club) do everything they can to continue this tradition. They are actively seeking potential prime ministerial material, and giving anyone who sees themself having a career in politics the connections to achieve high office. So, although the 13-0 split is surprising, it may not be that surprising, when you consider the different cultures of the two universities. As noted, Stanley Baldwin was from Cambridge, as was Rab Butler (deputy PM in the 1960s), Ken Clarke (Chancellor of the Exchequer 1993) (and Clarke's bête noire, Michael Howard), Charles Clarke (Home Secretary in 2005), Andy Burnham (Cabinet minister 2010), and Nick Clegg (Lib Dem leader and Deputy PM). All of these were potential Prime Ministers (perhaps not Clegg), as were Dominic Raab, Liz Kendall, Harriet Harman, Michael Portillo, David Owen, and Diane Abbot. And so it is partly a matter of chance that none made it to the top job. | {
"source": [
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/76493",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/users/15015/"
]
} |
76,525 | I saw that Bob Moran made this political cartoon that he posted on Twitter : When I first saw this cartoon, I assumed it was poking fun at the " False Balance " AKA "bothsidesism" argument that is usually deployed in conservative circles. Also I see that it was copyrighted by The Democracy Fund (bottom left) which is a left leaning charitable organization. However, from what I understand, Bob Moran is pretty right leaning/libertarian. So whats going on here? Am I misunderstanding the cartoon? Or am I incorrect about Bobs political leanings? | The cartoon seems to be a response to a recent article in The Atlantic , "Let's Declare a Pandemic Amnesty" . The article pleads to not judge too harshly the people who advocated or imposed stringent measures against COVID, especially the measures taken in the early days of the pandemic, which sometimes proved to be ineffective or over the top. Bob Moran seems to be very much on the side of the various groups that opposed (and still oppose) those measures. These groups have likened some of the measures to a witch hunt, especially the measures targeting individuals on basis of what measures (such as masking, vaccinating) those individuals took, for instance mandating masks at various places such as schools and stores. His cartoon should be understood in light of this. The women being burned at the stake represent the people who opposed the measures, while the witch hunters represent the government that imposed the measures, the entities (businesses, schools) that enforced them, and the people who adhered to them and called out others for not adhering. His point being that amnesty means nothing to the (in his view) victims. | {
"source": [
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/76525",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/users/8525/"
]
} |
76,530 | I do not really understand the reasoning behind. Should not it be at least something like Arrival of the Normandy Train, Gare Saint-Lazare by Monet ? (steam locomotive depicted there at least has large carbon footprint). Why sunflowers? Growing more sunflowers does not harm the climate. What is wrong with promoting how nice they can be? | It has nothing to do with the painting. The painting is simply high profile enough to make the media engage with the protesters rather than ignore them. Here is one of the protesters explaining their actions. Which I found by googling 'why soup on sunflowers' the link provided was the 2nd result. “We’re not asking the question, should everyone be throwing soup at paintings?” said Plummer. “What we’re doing is getting the conversation going so we can ask the questions that matter.” | {
"source": [
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/76530",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/users/2670/"
]
} |
76,534 | Examples: City has a homelessness problem. They increase services for the homeless, but because all the surrounding cities also have homelessness problems, homeless people from those cities move in until services are at or above capacity again. Although net good was done in the world (more homeless people fed / treated), from the perspective of a local voter who wants to see less tents in their parks, the program was a failure. City has a housing crisis. They implement a simple solution of building more housing. But because the entire country has a housing crisis, people from outside the city move in, and the housing will first go to those who can pay more, ie tech workers. As a result, the cost of housing does not notably improve for service workers, and there is even more demand for services. Edit: Another example - climate action. It's in everyone's best interest to reduce emissions, as climate change causes worldwide economic damage. However, if one country takes significantly more costly climate action that its neighbors, businesses will likely move production into countries with more permissive emissions laws, and our example country will take that economic hit and still suffer the consequences of those emissions, as greenhouse gases do not respect borders. I feel like this dynamic pops up a lot in many of the problems we face today, but I don't have a good way to express it or talk about it. I've heard the term induced demand for housing specifically, but I'm reaching for something more general. | While these examples may seem like the same phenomenon, they're meaningfully distinct. That said, there's a whole slew of terms that cover a variety of cases including these and others. In order of the examples: 1 & 2 are forms of the Rebound Effect , where efforts to improve a system have reduced benefits because use of that system now increases. Case #1 is also a matter of Perverse Incentives , wherein the needed solution has a powerful negative feedback against whoever implements it. As mentioned in another answer, Case #2 is classic Induced Demand , a special case of Rebound Effect which is due to an increase in supply lowering the marginal cost of the product and thereby attracting more consumers. Case #3 (Climate) is broad enough that numerous terms could apply, depending on the specific mechanisms you wanted to examine. Some good candidates: If you're the country who wants to implement strict climate policy and thus face emigration of businesses to less restrictive countries, we're back at Perverse Incentives. If you're the country seeing this and hoping to boost your economy by eliminating your climate policy, committing the world to more severe climate change, you're participating in the Race To The Bottom Generally it's a matter of non-rival , non-excludable , public goods which are chronically afflicted by the free-rider problem where if one person solves the issue, all benefit even if they don't contribute to the solution (more perverse incentives). In NR/NE Public Goods this is frequently described under the umbrella term Tragedy of the Commons . From @CanadianFriendly: Another thing all the examples have in common is a "parochial" mindset. Parochialism is the political tendency to look to collaboration within rather than collaboration without to solve problems. It can describe this tendency at a city, province/state, or national scale . It's a thinking of, "We'll look after our own, and they can look after theirs." | {
"source": [
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/76534",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/users/44840/"
]
} |
76,606 | Government employees' salaries are paid for by taxes levied by the government on the labour income of employees among other. Why do governments not simply pay their own employees tax-free salaries? I appreciate that taxing government employees has redistributive implications between different levels of governments. In practice it often means that local governments need to pay their employees higher gross salaries, which are then taxed by higher levels of government. But I doubt that this form of redistribution is the reason why government employees' income would be taxed in the first place. | Easier for everybody For the government Taxes are complex. It is not only how much the employee gets from the government. It is also: other income sources other income sources from family members (which might or might not be government employees) deductions To do that, you would need to create a new tax system (that needs to handle more complicated issues like mixed incomes) when you already have a "working" one. Easier for the employees Comparing offers from government and not government jobs is easier. They do not need to rely on specialized, more complicated, tax assessors/programs. Easier for the public A complex system makes it easy for loopholes to appear. Even if they are not widely exploited, loopholes that favour public employees are likely to create resentment among the public. And, why would you do otherwise? If the execution is perfect (everybody ends paying up the same that with the current system), there is no benefit at all. | {
"source": [
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/76606",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/users/35139/"
]
} |
76,697 | The United Nations General Assembly voted on 2022-11-14 to hold Russia responsible for war reparations . Tally 94 For 14 Against 73 Abstain The "For" and "Abstain" votes are understandable (e.g. the abstainers didn't want to explicitly antagonize Russia or NATO). The "Against" countries were: The Bahamas Belarus Central African Republic China Cuba Democratic People's Republic of Korea Eritrea Ethiopia Islamic Republic of Iran Mali Nicaragua Russian Federation Syrian Arab Republic Zimbabwe There are no surprises here either, except for the first country in the list. Why did The Bahamas vote in favour of Russia? Has the political situation there changed so much since I visited 10 years ago, when it had a very British/American feel (so likely to think along similar lines) and an open and prosperous atmosphere (so unlikely to want to significantly change what they have)? Note that this is not a duplicate of Why did ten countries side with Russia in the UN General Assembly vote on Crimea? ; it's asking specifically about The Bahamas. | It appears that the delegation intended to vote 'Abstain', but that the vote was incorrectly recorded as 'Against'. You can see the country's vote change on the board just as the chair reports that voting has been completed in the video recording of the proceedings here , at 3:18:10. The vote is now officially recorded by the UN as 'Against'. Two days later, Minister of Foreign Affairs Fred Mitchell addressed Parliament, addressing the vote - according to the Nassau Guardian : Unfortunately, due to an error, the vote of The Bahamas was recorded as 'no' when it should have been 'abstain'. We have a photograph of the board reflecting abstain, but when the vote closed, the vote recorded as no. It should have been abstain. We have taken the steps to seek to reflect properly what the record is, but we've been advised that in the system of the United Nations, it is not possible to change what is the recorded vote and the procedure is that you enter a statement which corrects the record which we have done. Furthermore, the representative from the Bahamas spoke during the debate on the resolution on behalf of CARICOM with an explanation of vote in which he presented the community's misgivings with the resolution and signalled the group's intention to abstain on the vote. In the speech, which starts at about 2:59:30 in the recording of the proceedings , he first condemned the unilateral military incursion into Ukraine and put forward CARICOM's subscription to the principle that for every wrong there is a remedy. He went on, however, to set out the group's issues with the resolution: Mr President, at the same time, while CARICOM supports in principle Ukraine's legitimate claim for reparations for wrongs committed against it by Russia, we believe that such a process must be pursued through an appropriate mechanism. What is being proposed in this resolution contemplates that the General Assembly should endorse a process over which it will have no control, no oversight, indeed no role to play whatsoever. The resolution as drafted asks member states, having thus given their approval, to then trust that the process will be conducted fairly and objectively with integrity, transparency, and in accordance with the relevant principles of international law. Mr President, CARICOM notes in OP 3 of the text "the need for the establishment in cooperation with Ukraine of an international mechanism for reparation for damage, loss or injury, and arising from the internationally wrongful acts of the Russian Federation in or against Ukraine". We also note the recommendation OP 4 for "the creation by member states in cooperation with Ukraine of an international register of damage to serve as a record of evidence and claims, information on damage, loss or injury, to all natural and legal persons concerned". In CARICOM's analysis of this call to action by the General Assembly, we offer the following observations on certain aspects of the draft. The resolution does not provide any guiding principles on how the future mechanism would operate, or how the register of damage is to be created or managed. In addition, member states are being asked to act on these initiatives in the context of an ongoing war with no real ability to predict any future developments or outcomes. Noting that while there are ongoing judicial processes addressing the situation in Ukraine, there is as yet no established jurisdictional basis for the proposed mechanism, nor the register of damage. Neither are pursuant to Security Council resolution, nor an order of the International Court of Justice. Furthermore, it is not within the power of the General Assembly under the UN Charter to create these initiatives. For these reasons, member states of CARICOM will abstain in their vote on this resolution. Nevertheless, CARICOM recognises that the Russian Federation must bear the legal consequences of all its wrongful acts, for any violations of international law, and/or for any violations of international humanitarian law in or against Ukraine. Indeed Mr President, CARICOM reiterates its strong support for the principle that member states have a legitimate right to claim reparations and compensation for injury, loss and damage caused by the wrongful actions of other member states. This principle is to be applied in the present case, as well as other similar cases worldwide. CARICOM makes this broader point regarding a range of issues before the international community, including climate action, and indeed reparations in connection with the transatlantic slave trade and native genocide. Mr President, mass atrocity crimes and gross violations of international law demand scrutiny and justice, without exception for whenever in time they occurred, wherever in the world they occurred, and by whomever they were perpetrated. There will always exist a moral and/or legal obligation to correct injustice, including the legacy of past injustice. In closing, CARICOM reaffirms its strong opposition to any and all actions which instigate the disruption of a peaceful multilateral order. We, therefore, reiterate the call for an end to hostilities, the immediate complete and unconditional withdrawal of Russian military forces from the territory of Ukraine, and the return to dialogue and diplomacy in good faith, to peacefully and constructively resolve differences. | {
"source": [
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/76697",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/users/27691/"
]
} |
76,758 | (Not sure if this should rather be on the Economics SE) Inspired by the following paragraph from this article . Singapore — one of only 11 countries in the world with the coveted AAA sovereign rating — is also in a league of its own. For starters, it does not have any net government debt. This is because there are laws that prevent its government from spending more than what it earns annually unless there are extraordinary circumstances, such as the Covid-19 pandemic. The prudence in financial management has allowed the accumulation of sizeable reserves, on top of what is reported by its central bank, which uses currency strength to hedge against inflation. The little debt service charges (less than 0.5% of revenue in 2020) Singapore incurs are more than made up for by its investment returns, which make up around one-fifth of its government’s annual income, giving the city state flexibility to remain a low-tax regime. Singapore is able to lower taxes because their investments are sufficient to provide 20% of the government's revenue. But if one can get 20% of revenue from investments, then it also might be possible to get 100% of the government budget from investments. At that point, one would not need taxes anymore. Is hitting 100% of revenue from investments actually possible? If yes, has any country ever managed or is attempting to hit that benchmark? If it is not possible, why not? | Consider Kuwait. It has "investments" in oil (ie it owns the land where the oil is found, and charges for the right to drill), and from these it makes enough money to not have any personal or corporate tax on Kuwaiti nationals or businesses owned by Kuwaitis. Is the money that the oil companies pay a "tax" or is it payment for a resource? So in principle, this is possible. It doesn't solve anything though. If the government is acting as a shareholder, and earning dividends from its holdings, that is money which could otherwise be passed onto others, either in the form of dividends to private shareholders, or in wages to workers. The net effect is still money moving from people to the government, but in a way that is less easy for the government to control (and so is likely to become more regressive). Unless there is a special situation (such as a massive and valuable natural resource like the Kuwaiti oilfields) this is not likely to be an effective way for a government to raise finances. | {
"source": [
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/76758",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/users/22967/"
]
} |
76,769 | Many countries have special laws regarding inheritance taxes. Why would this be treated separately when it could just be taxed equally to all other income? Suppose Eve normally earns €50,000 per year. Due to an inheritance, one year, Eve earns €150,000. Why do we need an inheritance tax — one could just tax an income of €150,000? We might want to tax income one has worked for less than income one has not worked for, but this could be organised by declaring both income from labour and total income separately. However, it seems rather that in some countries, inheritance income one hasn't worked for is taxed less than income from labour. I don't see how that makes sense. Eve is not a charity. There is a related question, What ethical (if any) or economical arguments are offered in defense of the inheritance tax? , but that one is sort of the other way around, because the asker seems to imply that inheritances should be taxed less than income from labour. If there is no inheritance tax ( Wikipedia lists various countries that have abolished them) it should be just taxed like all other income, I suppose. | Historically, inheritance was a family affair The family being a single economical unit, spanning generations. Parents and children working together for the common survival, as a farm or small business. The concept that society has inherited (pun intended) is: Inheritance is not income, it is just redistribution of common wealth within the same family. Each heir has already worked to create this wealth, the family income has already been taxed. The concepts of family, income, state, tax etc. have evolved, the importance of private income, individual wealth and inheritance has changed, as well as the relations between parents and children. What is just (or should be) regarding inheritance and taxation seems to be the core of this question. My answer can only be: whatever society decides. I gave some explanation how the current state has evolved. How it will evolve further is how society as a whole may answer the question. | {
"source": [
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/76769",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/users/130/"
]
} |
76,801 | As was well covered in the media, the Russian war of aggression came into a new phase in October with strikes on the civilian energy infrastructure in Ukraine. I can understand why they're doing this and (I think that I understand) why they didn't do it before. Obviously, good air defense capabilities can minimize the hits, and Ukraine has consistently asked for such capabilities since the beginning of the war. Now, I read about the Iris-T from Germany, NASAMS from the US, and some other systems from France and Spain flowing into Ukraine. Why didn't this happen before, i.e. why were these systems not supplied earlier in the war or even in advance? This seems to be a political decision, thus asking here. | The question is both interesting and somewhat incorrect in its assumptions. Why didn't? Oh, but they did. Ukraine got a very sizable proportion of NATO's stock of MANPADS (Stingers) for example. There just isn't that much sitting around waiting to be given away and it will take years to replenish. The need wasn't really there and those systems aren't so suitable Russia's air force, after an initial foray in the beginning, learned to stay away. It's been more or less absent since. More on that later. Ukraine did have stocks of systems like S300s for longer range defense. But maybe not all that much to shoot at. So air defense systems weren't a priority. Shooting down missiles is hard . I don't know exactly what combination of stuff they use to intercept, but it's never a given. Especially when you are trying to defend populations as whole. Israel has an unusual degree of protection with Iron Dome, but a) they've had decades to prep and b) their opponents use fairly low tech gear. Normally, you take out the enemy's launch sites but a) Russia is a nuclear state and b) shoots from home territory (or Belarus airspace) often as not. Some of Russia's stock of higher end gear (dwindling down) is non-interceptable, like the hypersonics. Those Gepards have a short range. They will not cover everything. You need to watch the $$$$ Russia's purchased Shaheds are supposedly $20K weapons. Even keeping in mind the relative economic weights of NATO vs Russia, shooting them down with $1.2M missiles is problematic. (That's not to say they shouldn't be used to protect power stations. Only that can't be the long term solution. Unless NATO has more of those missiles than Russia has Shaheds. And unless Ukraine's army can manage without those missiles at the front. Neither of those conditions hold true) Guns are better, costing less per shot down drone. But they need to be deployed near the power plants they are protecting. It will take a while to figure this out. Russia has found something more useful than the generic population shelling and bombing they had been engaging in. Additionally they have engineers who know the weak points of Ukrainian energy infrastructure (much of it co-designed during Soviet times) This will require a long term approach, without just one fix. harden power station defenses, improve interception rates transition Ukraine to replacement electrical gear (some of their heavy electrical generation stuff is Soviet vintage - no one has it around much) and Western stuff is incompatible . Transformers are used to step the power down from the high voltage that comes from power stations to a voltage that households can use. Much of Ukraine’s grid uses the old Soviet five-step system to do this. Western European systems use different voltages. Transformers are built to handle specific voltages, so those built for western European systems cannot replace older Ukrainian ones. continue giving them weapons to beat Russia on the ground. tighten sanctions so that the Shahed's Western-sourced electronics aren't available. trust that the Ukrainian people will react much like Londoners did during the Blitz - i.e. it wasn't a winning long term move by Nazi Germany to try to terrorize people. On the other hand - taking out electricity, in winter, is a more effective means to hurt civilians , so best not to trust overmuch in WW2 wisdom. win the war: that's the only long term solution to protecting civilians over that large a country from a high(ish) tech adversary. Don't lose sight of the end goal It is to take out Russia's armed forces from Ukraine. One concern by military experts is that Russia is not so much trying to beat Ukrainian civilians into submitting as it is to exhaust Ukrainian air defense systems. Then they could bring their tactical air force back on the battlefield and win on the ground. This is a pretty good, if dense, summary from Rusi.org : p.s. Fear of provoking Russia was likely not high on the considerations. These are defensive systems. There is some talk about supplying aircraft to help with the drones - that would be a sticking point, to an extent. | {
"source": [
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/76801",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/users/44975/"
]
} |
76,892 | I have picture showing where the UK is now compared to other countries. (Outside of European Free Trade Association, European Economic Area, Schengen Area, European Union, Eurozone, EU Customs Union). Is this an accurate representation for where the UK is? I am not interested in countries other than the UK for this one (although, would be good to point them out if any). I am just interested in if the UK is still part of any of the areas. | I saw a similar image a while ago (December 2021) on Facebook , originally published by Statista and compiled my own diagram. My main complaints with that one, which also apply here are: It doesn’t show the before, and the UK was never a member of some of these groups / agreements It misses off some other European (and wider) groups. I wouldn’t expect a diagram to show every agreement in existence (e.g. UN, NATO, UKAUS, Commonwealth, etc), but the CTA feels like a fairly obvious missing one given its European scope and Schengen similarity. The ETFA made it to the list! The various absent Scandinavian treaties are pretty important to those countries. The United Kingdom is 4 countries, with varying relationships to the EU. The United Kingdom is itself a pretty important organisation, and is not just one bloc (in this case). Switzerland, Türkiye, San Marino and Andorra have more nuanced relationships than implied. Plus The Holy See is absent (as is Gibraltar in the OP image) The original diagram I drew had a number of mistakes, so here is a corrected version: Some countries have a * symbol. This means they have similar or equivalent status to that shown, but through other treaties rather than direct members / signatories. Gibraltar is not a member of Schengen yet, there’s still negotiations going on . Switzerland's status is somewhat close to EEA but through bilateral treaties, rather than a direct member . Northern Ireland is not a member of the EU custom but, under the current ‘ Northern Ireland Protocol ’, it’s partially required to abide by a subset of rules of the EU single market and custom union. This was clarified in the linked article, just not in their image. Turkey is not a member of the EU Customs Union , but there is a bilateral agreement Thanks to Rodrigo for these clarifications Despite the original diagrams having them, I have excluded Monaco, Andorra, San Marino and The Holy See because their relationships with the EU are complicated, often facilitated by their "host" country. Generally they have freedom of movement and goods, use the Euro and are not members of the EU. Gibraltar remains because it's status was changed by Brexit. Feel free to share this image with attribution. | {
"source": [
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/76892",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/users/25018/"
]
} |
76,922 | Today it was in the news (for example at the Washington Post ) that the U.S. Senate has passed a bill to protect interracial marriages. Among other things, this bill would require that people are considered married in any state as long as their marriage was valid in the state where it was performed. This seems a bit odd because, as far as I know, there is no jurisdiction in USA that attempts to operate under 1950's laws regarding race relations. Why would interracial marriages need legal protection in the United States? | Because, in the recent Supreme Court opinion in the Dobbs case, the legal reasoning that Justice Alito used to overturn Roe v. Wade can reasonably be concluded to logically imply that Loving v. Virginia , which held that bans on interracial marriage were unconstitutional, should also be overturned. This is because Dobbs severely constrains and disfavors the substantive due process doctrine and the right to privacy upon which both the Roe and Loving decisions relied, even though it claims to limit its holding only to abortion. But, a concurring opinion by Justice Clarence Thomas in Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization argued the Court "should reconsider" the Obergefell decision which protects same sex marriage and is closely analogous in legal reasoning to Loving v. Virginia . Justice Thomas basically concludes that the substantive due process doctrine which Justice Alito argues can be overcome by a legitimately governmental interest in the case of abortion is more fundamentally unsound in all cases. Incidentally, Justice Thomas has also been the primary advocate on the court for not resorting to the due process clause of the 14th Amendment in the other part of the substantive due process doctrine that Justice Alito leaves unscathed, which is the use of this doctrine to justify the application of most provisions of the Bill of Rights to state and local governments (also called the "incorporation" doctrine). Justice Thomas believes that the incorporation doctrine should instead flow from the privileges and immunities clause of the 14th Amendment rather than from its due process clause, which would have the most significant practical effect of denying the protection of the Bill of Rights vis-a-vis state and local governments to people who are not citizens of the United States. Also, politically linking protections for same sex marriage (which has majority public support) with protections for interracial marriage (which has overwhelming public support now, although it is unpopular at the time that it was decided) made the bill harder to oppose politically. | {
"source": [
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/76922",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/users/15806/"
]
} |
76,971 | I am happy to be corrected that this is not the case, but from fairly frequent news items it seems to me that sentiment towards Russia in historic East Germany isn't all that negative. Or at least is more positive than West Germany's. For example, Meduza.io, Nov 6th , about the Ukraine War: In response to the question “Do you believe that NATO provoked Russia for so long that it had to go to war?” 19 percent of respondents answered in the affirmative. Twenty-one percent said they partially agreed with the idea. That means nearly 40 percent of Germans believe that the cause of the war is unclear and that NATO shares responsibility for it, or even forced Russia into war. In the former GDR in eastern Germany, the share of respondents who answered in the affirmative is 59 percent — making it essentially a mainstream belief. Or, again, Euronews Feb 2022 In East Germany, once part of the former Soviet bloc, more people (43%) blame the US for intensifying the conflict, compared to the 32% who point the finger at Russia, while in the West, the majority (52%) blames Russia, and only 17% the US, a Forsa survey found last Thursday (3 February). This is in contrast to many - not all - ex Warsaw Pact countries where anti-Russian sentiment is the norm, sometimes veering into Russophobia. Poland and the Baltics come to mind. Many countries who felt the USSR's boot have no love lost for Russia. And typically, some of the harshest sentiments towards Communism comes from people who lived underneath it. Nor are some East German memories very positive, such as the data protection laws specifically passed remembering the Stasi. I understand that Germany's overall relationship with Russia, pre-2022, is partially motivated by the very well-founded historical guilt re. WW2. But that effect should affect all of Germany, not be enhanced in ex-East Germany. And this question, BTW, is not limited to just sentiment about this war - although an answer stating that the war itself is causing a step change in relative East German/West German - Russia sentiment would be a good answer as well. | The aftermath of the fall of the Soviet Union played out very differently in Eastern Germany compared to the other non-Russian Warsaw pact countries. After its annexation by the FRG, the formerly state-owned companies were dissolved or sold to West German investors for almost nothing. Most leading civil servants were fired (due to their association with the SED dictatorship), and replaced by officials coming from Western Germany. As such, I would expect that the Russian narrative that Russia is "just trying to stand up to an aggressive expansionism of the West" would find a much better reception in Eastern Germany. In comparison, eg Poles will be acutely aware that Poland joined NATO out of fear of Russia, not out of fear of the US. A secondary aspect is the narrative of Putin as the leader of the neo-fascist forces fighting liberal decadence (eg "Russia had to invade Ukraine to prevent gay parades!"). This is definitely not a complete success, but (with the notable exception of Poland), overall far-right parties seem to be rather fond of Putin. In Germany, the leading far-right party is the AfD. On the federal level, the AfD is mostly a fringe party, but it had significant success in some of the Eastern German states (scoring eg 27.5% in the last elections in Saxony). | {
"source": [
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/76971",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com",
"https://politics.stackexchange.com/users/21531/"
]
} |
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.